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s IP E E c h: 
 
 OF 
 
 AARON F. PERHY, ESQ., 
 
 DELIVERED BEFORE THE NATIONAL UNION ASSOCIATION, 
 
 AT MOZAJRT SALL, CIWCIJSIJS^ATI, SEPT, 20, 1864. 
 
 Mb. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, — The time has come to consider again whether 
 it is for the public interest to continue the preseut Administration of the Federal Govern- 
 ment in power for another period of four years or to change it. We shall have no diiBcultj in 
 agreeing that this question should be decided, not on its bearings upon the fortunes of 
 particular individuals, but upon its bearings on the fortunes of the Commonwealth. It 
 should be decided, in other words, from public and not from private considera,tions. 
 
 You know that Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated President of the United States, on the 4th 
 day of March, 1861. At that time so far as secession could break up and dissolve the Union, 
 it had already been broken up, and the Union was dissolved. In the month of February 
 preceding, there had been organized a Confederate Government, under a provisional Con- 
 stitution, and a Confederate Congress had been held in Alabama. 
 
 The President elect, Mr. Jeff. Davis, had delivered on the IGth day of February, a public 
 address in which he declared, that " the time for compromise has now passed, and th« 
 South is determined to maintain her position;" that " our separation from the old Union is 
 complete," — that no " Compromise, no re-construction is now to be entertained." In the 
 meantime the navigation of the Mississippi had been blocked by hostile cannon. After the 
 lapse of a few days the Confederate batteries were brought to bear upon Fort Sumter, and the 
 Fort, after a few hours resistance, was compelled to surrender. Our country's flag — pardon m« 
 for necessarily alluding to a fact, which American men do not like to recall in the presence 
 of American women — our country's flag was lowered. 
 
 Unless our Government had been already destroyed, unless we had already sunk into the 
 deepest abyss of anarchy, there must have remained somewhere a power to decide what course 
 of policy should be adopted concerning the war thus waged on the Government If it were 
 conceivable that more than one course of policy was open to us, the authority to choose a 
 policy was iu that portion of the Federal Congress remaining true to its duty, or it was in the 
 Legislatures of the respective States remaining true to the Union, or it was in the people at 
 large. There is no need of nice investigation in which of these it was lodged, because they 
 all agreed with uncommon unanimity in the decision. There was scarcely dissent enough 
 anywhere, to make itself heard. The Federal Congress, the State Legislatures and the peo- 
 ple agreed that the war waged upon us should be resisted by war, and agreed to maintain the 
 territorial integrity of the Union by force. (Cheers,) This course of policy having 
 been determined upon by every tribunal which could be imagined to have a right to speak 
 upon the subject, must be considered to have been determined for better or for worse. It i.s 
 as true with Government as with the individual, that when in a difficult situation, a 
 course of policy shall have been deliberately chosen, that course of policy must be adhered to. 
 
2 T.'-r< 
 
 For an individual to prove himself fickle, is to render it impossible for bis friends to 
 trust or assist him. For a Government to do so, is to expose itself to the derision and con- 
 tempt of mankind. 
 
 This course of policy, then, having been determined upon by the State Legislatures and 
 people at large, and by Congress, what was needed to carry out that determination? 
 
 In the first place, raon ey was needed. In the United States Treasury, formerly so pros- 
 perous, nothing was to be found but a deficit. 
 
 In the next place, a Navy was wanted. The friends of the Rebellion, who had charge of 
 the Guvcrnmcnt for the last four years, had contrived to annihihxte the Navy or to appropriate 
 it to thflr own purposes. For all practical purposes, one may say we had no Navy. 
 
 An Army was wanted. Our Army had been disbanded in part, and in i^art surrendered 
 to the traitors. 
 
 In the next place, we had need of care and skill in our foreign relations ; for there waf^ 
 manifest danger that through the instrumentality of a cotton famine, the diplomacy of France 
 and Great Britain would be engaged in favor of the rebellion. 
 
 Let us now inquire for a moment what has been done to meet these wants. In the first 
 place, and it may be stated in a few words, tkat able man who was placed at the head of the 
 treasury department contrived to fish up from the bottom of the deficit money enough to carry 
 on the vast operations of this war by sea and land. 
 
 In modern history, it has been thought, that the Administration of the younger Pitt of 
 England was, in point of financial skill and command of resources, the model administration- 
 ITc found resources for carrying on the wars, growing out of the French devolution for a 
 period of many years. But if we compare the amount which he was called upon to raise in 
 any one, or in any three years, with the amount raised by our Treasury, during this 
 Administration, the American administration will compare favorably with that of Pitt. Friends 
 and enemies have awarded to Pitt and to our Secretary of the Treasury the reputation of 
 genius. But allow me to say that the success was not, in cither case, attributable to genius, 
 but to a far higher quality than genius— I mean character. 
 
 In both countries money was abundant What was needed above all, was eliaracter which 
 would give assurance that the money when raised should be faithfully applied. Without 
 dwelling any longer upon this part of the subject, I think it may be safely concluded that the 
 adminirtration of the treasury department has been a success. I do not allude to particular 
 financial measures as meritorious or otherwise. In such great exigencies success must be 
 attributed to the fact of having raised the money. * 
 
 How is it with the Navy ? I think that for all practical purposes, I may say that the war 
 was commenced without a Navy. Some of our principal naval stations were also in the hands 
 of the Rebels. Norfolk, Charleston, Mobile, Pensacola, New Orleans and Memphis were all 
 in their hand.s. From ore then lying in its bed, and from timber then growing, a Navy has 
 •fMsen constructed which can now stand against any Navy in the world; and what is more im. 
 portant is, ihat navy has so borne itself as to leave no temptation for any Navy in the world 
 to attack it (Tremendous api.lause.) Dupont, Porter, Footc, have more than renewed the 
 early fame of Mcdonough, of Perrv, of Bainbridge, and of Decatur. While Farragut-(loud 
 cheers)— I say Farragut stands out from the rest in solid and almost solitary greatness. In 
 the annals of modern naval achievement, the name of Nelson has been hitherto a leading 
 name. He fought more battles than Farragut has yet fought His celebrated battles of the 
 Nile and of Trafalgar were fought with wooden ships. Immense political consequences 
 depended upon these victories, and for that reason they became more famous than any others. 
 But he himself regarded the attack on Copenhagen as his most daring exploit The attack 
 upon Copenhagen was the only one of Nelson's battles which, from its circumstances, can be 
 c-.>m pared with the exploits of Farragut If you read the account of Nebon's attack upon 
 
Copenhagen in connection with the attacks of Farragut on tlie defenses of New Orh;ans and 
 the defences of Mobile Bay, you will find that cither of these exploits of Farragut will compare 
 favorably with the most daring exploit of Nelson. They treasure the ashes of Nelson in a 
 costly sarcophagus in the basement of St. Paul's in London. The basement is dark, but tho 
 sarcophagus is lighted continually by wax candles. He lost his life in the battle of Trafalgar 
 over fifty-five years ago, but the candles are yet burning. I suppose they will not be pi.-rmitled 
 to die out until Great Britain shall cease to cherish her Navy. The career of Farragut id not 
 yet ended ; apparently there is yet more work for him to do. Distant, far distant be the hour 
 when the spot for his final rest shall be chosen. Let it not, unless he shall so choose, be 
 in any city. Let it be a sunny head-land overlooking the scene of some one of his exploit*!, 
 where the stars of heaven may shine unobstructed upon the stars of the Hag which he 
 defended. (Tremendous applause.) 
 
 The Navy Department has been a success. The Army has sprung up as it were from tlie 
 ground, and by its conduct has refuted the cavils of the enemies of popular government. It 
 submits to discipline: it endures hardship: it fights. It conquers strongholds. It over- 
 comes obstacles and moves on. The army compares to-day favorably with any army in the 
 world. We have no account in ancient or modern times of armies more etncicnt than ours 
 are now. Three years ago these soldiers and their officers were, for the most part, in their 
 work shops, at the plow, or carrying on business in the avocations of civil life. They have 
 been converted into solid regiments and brigades, which fight battles, seven days in succes- 
 sion and still move on. (Loud cheers for the army.) The War Department has been success- 
 fully administered. 
 
 The only remaining feature of the Administration necessary to be considered here to. 
 nio-ht is the mangement of our foreign relations. It was natural for us to expect to receive 
 the sympathy of Western Europe in this great struggle. Regarding it as we do, and as it 
 truly is a great struggle for the principles of Christian civilization, we had a right to look for 
 sympathy and moral support. We did not need material aid, nor did we ask for it. But we 
 had not now to learn for the first time that a popular Democratic government has no friends 
 among the princes and hereditary rulers of Europe. (Applause.) Schemes have been mul- 
 tiplied to involve France and England in war with us. Both of these governments have ex- 
 hibited in various ways unfriendliness and have seemed willing to find pretexts for interfering 
 in this struggle between us and the Rebellion. It is enough to say here, that all these pre. 
 texts for interference have been met, and we stand to-day free of all dangers of foreign inter- 
 ference. While we would naturally expect that our Diplomacy should assume a flexible form 
 and should adapt itself to the exigencies of the occasion, we have not failed to enter our 
 earnest protest against the unauthorized and unjustifiable proceedings of France in forcing 
 Mexico to accept a monarchical government. 
 
 You have been told that Mr. Seward, our Secretary of State, had abandoned the Monroe 
 Doctrine. This is a mistake. Mr. Seward has repeated the Monroe Doctrine and firmly 
 asserted it, and you will find in the proceedings of the convention, which nominated Mr. Lin- 
 coln for re-election, the re-affirmance of the Monroe Doctrine in Mr. Monroe's own words. 
 
 I may say, then, that the duties of these Departments have been ably and successfully 
 performed. Their objects have been generally and grandly accomplished. There has been 
 no failure in these Departments. 
 
 Now I put to you the question, whether if it were a matter of private business, you would 
 in such an emergency, displace a man who had well conducted important transactions and 
 transfer them to a man who had no acquaintance with them? I put to you the question 
 whether the government would not necessarily lose advantages by .substituting other men v.-ho 
 
have not had acquaintance with the difficulties, the dangers, and the duties of these Depart- 
 ments ! Ihe answer is too obvious to admit of anv arj^nment. 
 
 If we wish to change the Administration ' of "the Government, it must be done 
 from one of two motives^ We may choose to make a radical change in the policy of the 
 Government. \ou might choose to say that your previous decision on the course of policy of 
 the Government was wrong, and that you would back out from it. In case you wish to say 
 that, then you ought to change the men of the Administration; because you oucrht not {o 
 require those whom you have put forward to assert this policy to undertake a different policy 
 But, If you do not want any change of policy what other reason may there be to chan^ 
 the present Adm.n.strat.on ?-Xow, if you were assured that you could put in a new Admi^n- 
 istrat.on which would administer the Government in the same general line of policy equally 
 well and with equal ability, still the argument would be against it. You must be assured that 
 you could put in the Adui.nistratlon an amount of ability to equal it, and at the same time to 
 surpass it so far, as to balance the disadvantages which you will necessarily incur in making 
 the change. What is proposed to ns ? Is it claimed by any intelligent man that Gen Mc 
 Clellan presents to us those superior Administrative abilities which invite us to chancre the 
 Government and place it in his hands for that reason ? I do not know that they are making 
 any such pretensions for him. Such pretensions would be simply ludicrous. The most thai 
 ..s claimed for General McClellan, so far as I know is:-That he is a man of intellicrence in 
 military affairs, and, that if he had not been interfered with, and if mlst^es had not been 
 made by 1 resident Lincoln, or by other military men, he. Gen. McClellan, mirrhthave been 
 more successful. That he ha. been successful nobody claims, and there is then no .around 
 to claim that Gen. McClellan has shown high Administrative abilities. The claim That he 
 possesses such abilities is a claim not yet tested. It is said that if he had a fair chance to 
 prove himself an able man he might do so. What man in the history of the world has ever 
 had such a chance for public service as Gen. McClellan has had ? Napoleon had not-Wel 
 hngton had not-Washington had not If McClellan had not a chance, pray what kind of a 
 chance can he ever have? (Cheers.) I hold in my hand a history of the Peninsula cam- 
 paign which was written by Prince do Joinville. The Prince and his two Nephews ac- 
 companied Gen. McClellan and his army during the campaign. After their return to France 
 the Prince wrote a history of that Campaign, which is frequently alluded to as a favorable and 
 eulogistic account of Gen. McClellan's military management. I shall, by and by read you 
 some passages from this book. The only particular in which it is favorable to McClellan is 
 Its criticisms upon the Government The writer obviously did not look upon him as 'an 
 energetic commander. I have said, that possibly, mistakes were committed by the Administra- 
 tion, or, by the military men who advised the President It was a new business both to the 
 President and his advisers. In the nature of the case mistakes could not have been preven- 
 ted. I am not now going into a detailed discussion for the purpose of arguin^ the case Let 
 U3 suppose that McClellan might have done better had he not been interfered with by the 
 Government I have before me a pamphlet written by a distinguished lawyer of New York 
 reviewing the Report of a Congres.sional Committee on the management of the Campaign' 
 It .8 written in the interests of McClellan, and is both able and zealous. Let us see where he 
 places the responsibility? 
 
 * ********** ^ 
 
 '■ I am not willing to believe, for I have not sufficient evidence of the fact, that the Presi- 
 dent h>m,self has not at all times been willing and desirous of bringing the war to a close by 
 suVduing the enemy; but I have what I deem sufficient evidence that prominent members of 
 h.8 own party, near to his person, had no desire that Gen. MoClollan should tnke Richmond, 
 but, on the contrary, labored to prevent such conquest, and that these persons so operated by 
 
their influence on the President as to make him an instrument in carrying out their designs. 
 This I charge." 
 
 You will observe that the writer acquits the President of any wrong purpose, but claims 
 that he was wrongly advised by persons near liim who had influence over him. But blame is 
 imputed to the President that he did not place more confidence in McClellan, and that he 
 called about him other military men for consultation. 
 
 My friends, is it possible for a man to feel more confidence in another than he docs feel? 
 Is confidence a thing that can be forced, a thing of choice ? Did not the President place in 
 the hands of McClellan at first, almost unlimited power and unlimited confidence? For 
 months there was no limit to the confidence in Gen. McClellan, but at length a feeling of 
 hesitation and uncertainty took possession of the minds of the people, and perhaps 
 of the President. It was found that the army was lying there month after month doing 
 nothing — proposing nothing. I beg your pardon, something was done — The literary branch 
 of the business of war was attended to. We had bulletins how to do it, and bulletins how not 
 to do it; proclamations followed by reviews, and reviews followed by proclamations; but no 
 tendency to fight the enemy was discovered. 
 
 If the President felt obliged to call about him other men and compare views, I think we 
 should not hold him accountable for it. (Applause.) The prevailing impression was that he 
 did not call those advisers one moment too soon. Possibly some mistakes were made by the 
 President and his advisers. While speaking of possibilities let me allude to one' other possibi- 
 lity. Is it not possible that this man McClellan was a bubble — a phantasm? (Cheers.) 
 Was not his reputation kindled and did it not blaze highest at a time when the country was 
 in an agony of hunger for a great General? And as starving men imagine to themselves 
 feasts and luxuries, is it not possible the people imagined for McClellan the qualities they so 
 much needed to find ? I do not know on what facts the writer grounds his charge that other 
 men near the President labored to prevent McClellan from taking Richmond. I have read 
 his pamphlet with care, and it would require something more than steam power to draw such 
 an inference from any facts he has stated. If there were such persons they were no l^etter 
 than the men of the Chicago Convention. 
 
 There has been a negation of thought rather than a thought, an absence of idea 
 rather than an idea, which has been frequently put forward as a thought or idea. It 
 is a shadowy resemblance, a nebulous suggestion of an idea, not easy to define, because 
 the moment it approaches definiteness of expression it escapes, and is found to be an 
 illusion. While it is admitted that the territorial integrity of the Union can be restored 
 only by successful war and by forcibly overcoming the rebellion, it seems to be imagined 
 that we must obtain the consent of the rebellion to be overcome. That it must be 
 crushed ; but, in order to crush it, we should contrive to persuade it to let itself be crushed. 
 From certain quarters, we have heard at every step of the war, how extremely dangerous and 
 appalling it might be to get the rebellion exasperated, so that its consent to be beaten could 
 not be expected. A leading theme of complaint against the present Administration has 
 been, that it has proved itself so ungracious to this rebellion, its consent to be overpowered 
 cannot reasonably be looked for. I infer from Gen. McClellan's letter of acceptance that he 
 has not recovered from the impression manifested in his early orders and proclamations, that 
 it is an unsafe thing to " exasperate" the South. (Boisterous applause.) You may remem- 
 ber the character of Barnardine in Measure for Measure. He was a malefactor, in prison, 
 under sentence of death. The time for his execution had been several times fixed, but he 
 had managed to obtain a reprieve. The clown of the play took up the conceit that the exe- 
 cution depended upon Barnardine's consent. The time for his execution having again arrived, 
 the clown was sent to wake up the criminal. He thumped vigorously at the door of the cell, 
 and was' answered—" A pox o' your throats 1 Who makes that noise there ? What are you ?" 
 
Clowx. — ■Votii friend, Sir, the lianyman ; yojt mvsi be so good, sir, to rise and be put 
 to death." (Great laughter.) 
 
 It seems to be thouj^ht, by some people, expedient that our Generals should keep up ft 
 similar dialogue with this rebellion. They would have war, uncoiiuuunly vigorous war, they 
 say, but without reliance on physical force. They would Incur all the expense in money and 
 in life, incident to genuine war, but would act on the theory of gaining victories chiefly by 
 consent of the opposing forces. They concede that negotiation was exhausted before war 
 commenced, so tliut an api)eal to bayonets and cannon was unavoidable. But they think a 
 mistake has been-made in not putting a sweet-cake on the point of every bayonet, and in not 
 loading vour cannon with poultices. If j'ou want to go back to that kind of a war, I know no 
 reason why you should not trust Gen. McClellan. (Cheers and laughter.) Otherwise you 
 may conclude that it is as well to go ou with Grant, Sherman and Farragut. 
 
 Let me call your attention to the fact which you very well know, that the chief com- 
 plaluts — the chief opposition to the present Administration come from a party which is 
 organized with two wings. One of these wings, and the one which I suppose has the greatest 
 vitality, believes and advocates the belief that from the beginning it has been utterly 
 impossible to break down the Rebellion by war, and therefore it is quite useless to attempt it. 
 That is the doctrine of the peace branch of the Democratic party. The other branch of that 
 party tells us that it is possible, and thai it ought to have been long ago crushed if we had 
 had a good Administration. I think we may safely leave them to combat with each other. 
 No claim Is presented which can justify a change of Administration on the ground of greater 
 efficiency in carrying out the policy which was decided upon with so much unity and empha- 
 sis. If we make a change we must find a reason for it in some proposed change of policy. 
 
 What then is that party organization which urges a change, what is its poKcy ? It is 
 common, and, I suppose it is necessary that those persons who agree upon substantial points of 
 policy, should unite together and organize themselves so as to be able to carry out their principles, 
 and in such an organization It Is always necessary that minor points should be subordinated to 
 the great leading points of policy upon which they all agree. But here is a party one half of 
 which is for peace and the other half for war. The party Itself is split by a chasm which is as 
 broad as an impassible gulf We have a candidate for President who tells us that he Is for war 
 and a candidate for Vice-President who is for peace, and If it should happen that they should 
 both be elected and continue in the same theories, they would be compelled in the Administra- 
 tion to oppose each other as much as they oppose us. What public services can a party promise 
 which presents itself to us In such aspects ? What assurance can they feel or give to others 
 tliat they can do anything except to disorganize the public service? A party, the two wings 
 of which are Irrevocably pledged to defeat each other! Suppose that a Congress were elec- 
 ted equally divided, what service could they expect to perform ? Is it not apparent that this 
 combination Is not for public purposes, but for private objects ? Is it not perfectly conclu- 
 sive, that it Is not to serve the country, but to serve persons? What is it better than a politi- 
 cal debauch? What is it better than an act of miscegenation publicly and indecently 
 performed ? 
 
 But, Is that the worst of It? Are we at liberty to leave it thus and simply call it 
 a debauch ? Can such a party of men assemble as was assembled at Chicago without 
 having some purpo.se of influencing public affairs? Can such an assemblage get 
 together without having some influence upon the interests of the country? Let us then 
 a.sk ourselves which side was that assemblage intended to strengthen and encourage? 
 Was the effect of it to support and encourage the Government of the United States or was the 
 effect of it to support and encourage the Confederate Government ? . It must have been 
 intended to exert an influence one way or the other. It is imi)ossIble for such a crowd of 
 persons to a.ssemble without some influence. We will not inquire too much into the motives. 
 We cannot enter into the hearts of men. But it is both lawful and charitable to ascribe to 
 
men pur230ses which their conduct seems intended to accompli:5h. It" that Convention would, 
 naturally, contribute to the reputation and strength of the Government of the United States, 
 we must suppose that such was its motive. If it would naturally, encourage and prolong the 
 rebellion we must suppose that such was its motive. 
 
 We can have no other or fairer test. 
 
 I propose, if you will consent, that we will make an Imaginary journey. 
 
 You know that August Belmont is the Chairman of the National Executive Democratic 
 Committee. We will imagine, if you please, that Mi-. Belmont wishes to ascertain where that 
 Convention could be satisfactorily held, and he will therefore proceed to Richmond to see if 
 there can be any objection to Its being held in Richmond. The last preceding Democratic 
 Couventlcn was held in Charleston. The party there split apart on questions Infinitidy little 
 compared with the question about which the two wings of that ])arty differ to-day. They con- 
 clude this time they will hold the convention a little further North, and accordingly we will 
 imagine that Mr. Belmont goes to Richmond. It is well to have a distinct idea how we shall 
 appear In this imaginary journey, and how we are to travel. I propose to invite you to 
 accompany Mr. Belmont in a journey over the scenes of the Peninsular Campaign. I will read 
 J, passage sent me by a friend and taken from a correspondent of the New York Post, 
 fvriting from Newport : — 
 
 "The equipage that throws all others in the shade, and causes them to 'pale their 
 ineffectual fii-ea,' is that of the aforementioned Chairman of the Democratic National Com- 
 mittee. It consists of a low barouche drawn by four elegant and fiery ' thorough-breds,' with 
 postilions mounted on the left or 'near' horse of eaeh pair. Two footmen in extreme livery 
 are suspended from a high seat on the back of the carriage, technically called the ' ramble.' 
 The barouche is lined with rich satin damask, and the outside trimmings are of heavy gilt. 
 The postilions are dressed in buckskin breeches and high top boots, with black silk velvet 
 jackets and caps highly ornamented with gold lace. The men are peculiarly well formed, 
 having been selected and' trained In Europe, with especial reference to their ' build,' and the 
 extra size of their 'calves.' Their livery is imported at a cost of about one thousand dollars 
 a suit, and the cost of the whole affair may be conjectured when I state that the horses are 
 valued at twenty-five thousand dollars, the carriage at five thousand dollars, and the harness 
 and other trappings at three thousand dollars. When the royal cortege makes its appearance 
 on the avenue, with the democratic prince in full costume, all other vehicles Instinctively 
 give way, as though the occupant was indeed a 'crowned head.'" 
 
 With such an outfit I think we may hope for a pleasant ride. Let us enhance the inter- 
 est of the journey, by taking along an authentic history of the campaign, which is tolerably 
 impartial, and which so far as it leans at all leans to a friendly interest in the fortunes of Gen. 
 McClellan. We will select the history written by the Prince de Joinville, who, with his two 
 nephews, were with Gen. McClellan during the campaign. He disposes of the long delay 
 while the army lay before Washington, by general remarks concerning the difficulties which 
 Americans find in taking the initiative. They wait, he thinks, one for another. Arriving 
 before Yorktowu, let us see what he says of the siege, (Page 27): "On these 
 ramparts had been sealed with the blood of our soldiers, an alliance, which had never 
 lelled itself, and to which the United States had owed their prosperity and their grandeur 
 i part from the emotion with which meeting thus afar, souvenirs of national glory, apart fi-om 
 tie interest with which I sought traces of military scenes of which I had known some of the 
 aCors, I asked myself if, by a strange caprice of fate, these same ramparts should not see un- 
 done the work of 1781, and if, from the slowness of the new siege of Yorktown was not to 
 cone, the ruin of the great republic, and the destruction of the Franco-American alliance.' 
 
8 
 
 At Williamsburg, we road his account of the battle, which it is obvious, he looks upou 
 as scarcely mauaged at all. lie is forcibly impressed with the need on our part of a better 
 organization of the stafi" of the army, and doubts if an American army can be made truly 
 manageable and eflective for want of what he calls " Hierarchy." From Williamsburg to the 
 Chickahominy, he says, their maximum days march was two leagues, about six miles per day 
 and presented the appearance of an armed emigration. 
 
 After speaking of the rains — of the swollen condition of the Chickahominy — and the 
 delays in filing the bridges thrown across — he says: '^ And dai/s, very precious days, Jled, 
 l/iHs ! Perhaps, let us say it frankly, they were not in so great a hurry to act as they might 
 have heeiL" 
 
 lie tells how McClellan threw one wing of his army across the Chickahominy, retaining 
 the other on the other side, so that the army was separated by that difficult stream ; how a 
 storm of rain full, and the rebel commander expecting a deluge, which would prevent the two 
 wings from assisting each other, attacked, defeated, and nearly destroyed, that part of the 
 army between the Chickahominy and Richmond; how Sumner got across and saved it He 
 inquires whether the whole army should not have been sent across, and considers the advan- 
 tages as well as difficulties of such a movement, concluding thus: 
 
 " But the stake was so great, the occasion presented was so unexpected and so favorable 
 for playing a decisive part, that nothing, in my opinion, should have prevented attempting at 
 any price, this operation. Here again, they carry the penalty of that American slowness, 
 which belongs much more to the character of the army than to that of its chief. It 
 was not until seven o'clock in the evening, that they resolved to establish without de- 
 lay, all the bridges, and to cause the whole army to pass at day-break to the right bank of 
 the Chickahominy. It was too late. Four hours had been lost, and the occasion, that instant 
 so fleeting, in war more than anywhere else, had flown." 
 
 He then describes the second days battle, near Fair Oaks, and says, [page 44] : — 
 
 " When at noon the firing ceased, the confederates, weary of the long struggle which, 
 they had sustained, and being no longer commanded, were in a state of inextricable confusion, 
 let it be imagined what might have happened if, at this moment, the thirty-five thousand fresh 
 troops left on the other bank of the Chickahominy had appeared on the flank of this disor- 
 derly mass, after having happily crossed the bridges." 
 
 And again, [pages 49 and 50] — : 
 
 "The Federals had had the defensive battle which they desired, had repulsed the enemy, 
 taken a General, and made a goodly number of prisoners, but, stopped by natural obstacles 
 u-hich were not insurmountable, they had drawn no advantage from their success. In real- 
 ity they had failed on both sides, for want of organization, for want of hierarchy, for want of 
 the bond which results from it, between the soul of the chief and that great body which they 
 call an army, a powerful bo nd which permits a General to demand of his soldiers, and to 
 obtain from them blindly those extraordinary efforts which gain battles. Nevertheless, 
 although the losses of the enemy were more considerable than those of the Federals, the mis- 
 carriage was above all baleful for the latter; they had lost an unique occasion to strike a 
 decisice blow. The.se occasions do not return, and besides, in the circumstances in which 
 they found themselves, the season was against them." 
 
 Observe that whatever mistakes had been committed by the President, they did not affect 
 thi.s ^^ unique occasion," when our army was stopjjed by '^obstacles not insu7-mountable," ant 
 lost a favorable chance to play a decisive part, in which they were not in so great a hurry S 
 ihcy ought to have been, and when days, very precious days were allowed to slip away unin- 
 proved. Observe also that the peculiar " bond " which was claimed to exist between McClelau 
 
aud his army was not then visible. The follurc is imputed to want of " hierarcliy," and to 
 "American slowness." Have you heard ofany "American slowness" or any want of "hierarchy" 
 in the armies of Sherman, or Grant? (Prolonj^ed applause.) 
 
 Mr. Belmont, having arrived in Richmond, we will suppose, is admitted to an interview 
 with Jefferson Davis. You will understand that the interview, like the journey is imajjinary. 
 The object is to ascertain if Davis will allow the Convention to be held in Richmond. 
 
 [Note by the Reporter.— The following parts of the speech, thrown into the shape of a 
 dialogue, for the convenience of reporting, were pronounced by the speaker as a colloijuy, 
 in which he signified by gestures, and other means, not easily reported, the person repre- 
 sented ; the audience following the changes with intense interest, only broken by frequent 
 . cheers and applause.] 
 
 Davis. — Did T not meet you in Charleston, at the lai3t Convention, Mr. Belmont? 
 
 Belmont. — I had the pleasure of meeting you there and have met you elsewhere. I 
 thank you for the honor of this interview, and wish to inquire if you will permit us to hold 
 our next Convention in Richmond ? 
 
 Davis. — It is important to know the kind of Convention you propose. Our old Demo- 
 cratic Conventions used to be pretty well arranged beforehand. Perhaps you can give me 
 an inside view of your intended proceedings. 
 
 Belmont. — I can. No Convention was ever more perfectly arranged beforehand. The 
 , platform has been shown to your Agents in Canada, and their suggestions were entertained 
 in framing it It is not long. Every word of it has been chosen with care, criticised, weighed, 
 measured and left in its place, because it is the word wanted. There is not a careless syllable 
 in it. With your permission, I will read it to you. 
 
 Davis. — Before doing so, I wish to make a few general inquiries. Please inform me 
 whether it contains anything hostile to me or to the Confederacy? 
 
 Belmont. — Nothing of that kind. 
 
 Davis. — Does it express or hint any disapprobation of what you call the rebellion, or im- 
 pute blame to us who got it up ? 
 
 Belmont. — Not a breath — not a syllable, Mr. President. (Laughter.) 
 
 Davis. — Does it in any way encourage the Federal Armies, or propose to strengthen or 
 assist them ? 
 
 -■^;. Belmont. — Far from it, I assure you. (Laughter.) 
 
 -^■'' Davis. — How is it in regard to Maximilian aud his new Monarchy in Mexico, any objec- 
 tion to his proceedings there ? 
 
 Belmont. — Not a whisper, Mr. President. 
 
 Davis. — So far, very well. But how will it be with your speakers in the Convention and 
 out of it ? 
 
 Belmont. — Mr. President, no Convention was ever more perfectly understood beforehand 
 in all its parts. The actors have had some — delicacy — about taking parts until they had seen 
 the play, and knew what other actors they were to play to. There has been a necessity for 
 uncommonly careful rehearsals. I not only know the speakers for inside and out, but I under- 
 stand perfectly the siyirit which will prevail in that assemblage. I have no hesitation in 
 assuring you that nothing, absolutely nothing, will be said which can be unpleasant to you or 
 your friends. I do not limit this to the speakers. You may send your detectives among the 
 crowd, and they will hear nothing unfriendly or disrespectful to you or the Confederacy. 
 
 Davis. — Let us proceed then to the Platform. 
 
 Belmont. — (Reads first Resolution.) 
 
 Resolved, That in the future, as in the past, we will adhere with unswerving fidelity to 
 the Union under the Constitution as the only solid foundation of our strength, security and 
 happiness as a people, and as a framework of government equally conducive to the welfare 
 and prosperity of all the States, both Northern and Southern. 
 
 Davis. — What you have said concerning the care with which the language is chosen 
 makes me notice that the resolution does not absolutely promise to adhere to the Constitution, 
 but only to adhere "z/t the future as in the past" If I am right in my facts I can appreciate 
 the propriety, not to say felicity of the qualification. At the time I refer to, I was absent from 
 
10 
 
 Washington, and much occupied with what Lincoln calls the rebehon^ ^^^'^l^ tuth 
 that the leaders who will figure in this Convention were m favor of allowing "^ ^^ f»'';,f«th 
 'amend the Constitution until it should be satisfactory to us • They ^ buned that t^e war 
 could be honorably avoided and a reasonaole arrangement made, on the idea that it would 
 ^ave been bothreasonable and honorable to allow us to amend the Constitution to suit us. 
 Am I right as to facts ? 
 
 Belmont —You are. The facts are on record and indisputable. 
 
 Dvvis— If your platform should carry, and we should negotiate an arrangement, you 
 eould^hen allolrtoLuend the Constitutlo'n to suit us, and still adhere to ,t "«. zn the past. 
 Indeed this phrase would seem to signify a purpose of that kind. Am I nglit .' _ 
 
 Belmont.— The language is before you. I am not authorized, Mr. President, to interpret it. 
 
 Davis.— Proceed, Mr. Belmont. _ 
 
 Bfi movt -( Roads second resolution.) '^Resolved, That this Convention does explicitely 
 declare as the ense of the American neiple, that after four years of fudure to res ore the 
 Un ioriv the evperiment of war, during which, under the pretense of military necessity, or 
 ;I DoweVhthTthan the ConstitutIon,°thc Constitution Itself has been d.sreprded in every 
 r>.u^^ d mibli 1 be y, and private right alike trodden down, and the "^,-tena prosperity of 
 he Countr e sen tiullv impaired, justice, humanity, liberty and the public welfare demand 
 at iZedate etf^ts be made tbr a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an u timate con- 
 V n loTi Sail the States, or other peaceable means, to the end tnat, at the earliest practicable 
 moment, peace may be restored on the basis ot the hederal Union ot the States. 
 
 Da^iI-A good deal of language there, Mr. Belmont. Let us have it more ^"de ail clause 
 by clause How do you count The " four years of failure?" Do you coun l^'^/^'; *« the last 
 Th^mocrSic Convention at Charleston, or how do you get it ? Lincoln will not have been in 
 ?ffi?efou years until March, 18G5 ; and It was sometime after he got in betore he cou d do 
 much We^had fixed him so that he could hardly stir for awhile. How do you count it ? 
 
 arms— Call it four years, Mr. President. 
 
 D.vis -The word " failure'' is happily chosen. Mr. Secretary Bei^amln and myself have 
 
 'e"deral navy and armies at New Orleans, 
 , Port Royal, Stone River, Millsprlng, Chat- 
 Bay,. .Atlanta, Gettysburg, KnoxviUe, Ihe 
 icr failures, our nart was just the reverse. 
 ly chosen. No accident could have been so 
 
 had difficulty to make our soldiers and people unaersia.ui ii uuu « ay <> . -^- Z"{{'f, :„ the 
 that the people of the North, and the world at large, understand it as we do Fj^i^^^^ « ^^^ 
 
 wE'r rrC^he ^^Iden^^^^^^ &a,'&c., being failures, our part was just the -verse. 
 
 You are r ght M . Belmont, the words are carefully chosen. No f^^.^^^^'^Vil"!^. ^nd Gr 
 louarerigat, ._i , ., shm-man retreated on Atlanta, and Lrr, 
 
 public m°n There is a wide margin for honest difference of opinion; but 1 "bsene ou do 
 
 ^nhi alike trodden dotvn." In other words you have no lawiul government J.nu) n.in i6 
 
 It is purely a (.ucstion of convenience, whether any man shall obey, or i^i^^^l ^;"; .' ^ °j"'' 
 menrTlire'can be no moral or legal obligation to submit to it; "'^''^^^^JIV^,,,;^;? t' 
 v^olat.-d only a few provisions of the old Constitution. Lincoln has disregarded e^ cr} part o U, 
 
11 
 
 border States which had not then openly joined us. I think that was wluit woiihl bo called 
 a Convention of all the States, and it" so, I have no objection to its being repeated. I like the 
 resolution on another account. It tends to make your government appear contem].tible abroad. 
 Do you think your Government would expose itself to the derision of mankind by allowiujf 
 such charges to be publicly made against it? Would not Lincoln put you all under arrest? 
 
 Belmont. — He cannot be counted on to do it or not to do it. He has some low cunning, 
 and has always hit us wrong. When we want him to make arrests he wont do it. Wlien we 
 do not want him to, he will. He is very odious. 
 
 Davis. — You shall not be arrested in Richmond, unless your other resolutions are more 
 objectionable. Whatever fear Lincoln may have of your Convention, I can see uo occasion 
 for me to fear it. Let us look further. The resolution says that ^'Justice," and several other 
 things, demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities. "Justice" 
 demands it. That, I think, is correct. The States had a legal right to secede, and your war to 
 prevent it is unjust. Is that the meaning ? 
 
 Belmoxt. — I have already said that you must look to the language itself I am not 
 authorized to construe it. 
 
 Davis. — Why! if justice demands immediate cessation of hostilities, it must be because 
 
 rihe Wiir is unjust. Being unjust, you will expect, in case we negotiate a peace, to assume the 
 
 Svar debt you have unjustly compelled us to incur. You will indemnify us for the unjust spol- 
 
 *'iations of this unjust war. You will help us erect monuments to those men who have fallen 
 
 in battle, endeavoring to resist this nnjustice. You will, honor us who fought this good fight. 
 
 Ts it not RQ ? 
 
 Belmoxt. — There is the language of the resolution. You need no further assurance, 
 Mr. President, that it was deliberate. 
 
 Davis. — Proceed. 
 
 Belmoxt. — (Reads the third resolution.) ^^Besolved, That the direct interference of the 
 military authority of the United States in the recent elections held in Kentucky, Maryland, 
 Missouri and Delaware, was a shameful violation of the Constitution, and a repetition of such 
 acts in the approaching election will be held as revolutionary, and resisted with all the means 
 and power under our control. 
 
 Davis. — Still better. Here you begin to talk of resistance, like men I I am not quite 
 posted as to the acts complained of in Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri and Delaware, but I 
 suspect it refers to the arrests, and other proceedings, by McClellan, and others, to prevent 
 what they call disloyal persons from being elected to office ? 
 
 Belmoxt. — I do not know precisely what is referred to, but I think that is it. 
 
 Davis. — There has been a manifest purpose to try to keep my friends out of office. 
 In the former resolutions, where you speak of the Constitution being disregarded in ^^ every 
 part^' you do not point at violence, though you make a case in which violence might be 
 expected. Here, when you contemplate the repeated outrages on my friends, I perceive 
 that blood is thicker than water after all, for you openly threaten resistance. Well ! I have 
 had some trials. I thank you kindly for so much consideration. Aside from this, the reso- 
 lution is the work of a man who knows how to secure practical advantages. The people are 
 encouraged to look to their Government as an enemy, to expect outrages, and to be prepared 
 for resistance. They look, of course, to their leaders to tell them when the act has happened 
 P^ which calls for insui'rection. This is the way we managed it in the South, and it worked 
 ] admirably. People easily believe what they have been led to expect. Besides we did as you 
 have done, charged the revolution upon the Government. They are more %-igilant now. 
 You may find it awkward, perhaps impracticable, to start much of an insurrection. But the 
 fact of such a thing being threatened by a large convention, will strike a blow at the credit 
 of your Government, and do it as much harm as forcible resistance. Proceed. 
 
 Belmomt. — (Reads fourth resolution.) ^'■Resolved, That the aim and object of the 
 Democratic party is to preserve the Federal Union, and the rights of the States unimpaired, 
 and they hereby declare, that they consider the administrative usurpation of extraordinary 
 and dangerous powers not granted by the Constitution ; the subversion of the civil by military 
 law in States not in insurrection; the arbitrary military arrest, imprisonment, trial and sen- 
 tence of American citizens in States, where civil law exists in full, force ; the suppression 
 of freedom of speech and of the press; the denial of the right of asylum; the open and 
 avowed disregard of State rights ; the employment of unusual test oaths, and the interference 
 with, and denial of the right°of the people to'bear arms, as calcula.ted to prevent a restoration 
 
12 
 
 of the Union, and a perpetuation of a Government deriving its jast powers from ihc consent 
 of the governed." 
 
 Davis. — The aim of the Democratic part}' to preserve the "rit/hts of the Staies," is the 
 same as my aim. I do not share your wishes to preserve the Federal Union, but do not 
 object to any thing of that sort while State rigiits are conceded. Because, with State rights 
 acknowledged, we can go out when we please. When the elections go to suit us, we will bo 
 satisfied to stay in. When they do not go to suit us, we will step out. We cannot be expec- 
 ted to submit to a majority, when it disregards our wishes. We are not slaves. I notice you 
 allude a second time, and with emphasis, to "the open and avowed disregard of State rights." 
 1 do not ilesire any stronger language. All we at the South want is, what is reasonable. This 
 resuhition complains again, and justly, of military arrests of my friends, of persons who defend 
 me, who assert the rights of the Confederacy, who bring me information, who discourage 
 enlistments among tne Lincoln hirelings and encourage desortion.s. It. justly stigmatizes 
 the permission of your Government to carry off a negro stealer from New York to the country 
 where his thell was committed, as "denial of tiie right of asylum." Perhaps, it is not quite 
 clear on the principles of public law, that a murderer, forger, pirate or other criminal who 
 escapes from justice in his own country, has an indefeasible "right of A.syluin ' in this country. 
 Bui the case referred to in the resolution was the case of an innocent man fleeing from 
 persecution. All he had done was to steal some niggers, who were free, and sell them into 
 slavery. Yet he was given up. Who could have imagined, ten years ago, that the United 
 States of America would ever come to that! Thank God ! It is not my fault We, at the 
 South, may be e.xterminated, but we will never submit. "The employmeHt of unusual test • 
 oaths" you have also stigmatized, as it deserves. Lincoln brutality compels my friends and 
 the friends of the Confederacy, inside his hnes, to take the oath of allegiance. It is uncon- 
 stitutional and binds nobody, and is so generally understood; but there are a fev/^ over suscepti- 
 ble persons who stumble at it. The "interference with and denial of the right of the people to 
 bear arms," refers, I suppose, to the outrage recently committed in Indiana, of spying out the 
 proceedings of a secret organization of our friends there, and breaking up their plans for 
 arming themselves against the Lincoln tyranny. Am I right ? 
 
 Belmoxt. — I had no idea that you noticed our politics so closely. 
 
 D.\vis. — A man in ray situation does not rest on a bed of roses. Few movements escape 
 me. The time may come when I can show my friends how well I know all they have done, 
 suffered or attempted. Let us see the next resolution. 
 
 Belmont. — (Heads the fifth resolution.) 
 
 Resolved, That the shameful disregard of the Administration in its duty, in respect to 
 our fellow-citizens, who now and long have been prisoners of war in a suffering condition, de- 
 serves tlie severest reprobation on the score alike of public and common humanity. 
 
 Davis. — Mr. Belmont, I have had some apprehension that our mode of treating prisoners 
 of war would expose us to — to the necessity of explanations. The close, filthy rooms, insuffi- 
 cient and unwholesome food, want of clothing, sickness, &c., might attract the observation of 
 our friends in other countries and temporarily injure us. It never occurred tome before, that 
 your Government was chargeable with this suffering. The author of that resolution is a man 
 of genius. The opinion of a mass Convention of northern people, putting all the blame on 
 vour government, and imputing none to mine, for those dreadful emaciations, is opportune. 
 What other witnesses can I need to defend myself abroad. lam more than ever satisfied 
 that not one word of your platform has been accidentally put in so far. Is there any more? 
 
 Beumo.s't. — One more resolution. (Reading the sixth and last resolution.) "Resolved, 
 That the sympathy of the Democratic party is heartily and earnestly extended to the soldiery 
 of our army who are and have been in the field, under the flag of our Country, and, in the 
 event of attaining the power, they will receive all the care, protection, regard and kindness 
 that the brave soldiers of the Republic so nobly earned." 
 
 Davis.— The soldiers will undoubtedly be objects of sympathy, should your platform 
 succeed. I observe again the same carelul choice of words. You do not propose to honor 
 or compensate the soldiery, but to extend sympathy. In this, I will cordially join you. 
 They may look for sympathy even in the South', but for honor and reward nowhere. Is there 
 not one mistake of language at last, at the clo.se? I suppose you mean that the soldiery will 
 receive care and protection, &c. : but nicely criticised it would seem to d(>elare that it is the 
 DcTJocratic party which "will receive all the care, protection, regard and kindness that the 
 liiiivi- soldiers of the Heimblic so nobly earned." This I think was not the intention, but it is 
 thi: grammatical (■onstruction of the sentence. If you succeed, Mr. Belmont, this last clause, ' 
 
13 
 
 so construed, may prove the greatest prophecy of the whole. You have my best wishes that 
 it may. I consent to your Convention. But before we drop the sul)ject, let me remark that 
 I notice in the resolutions considerable stress is laid on freedom of speech. What sense is 
 that to be understood in ? 
 
 Belmoxt. — I have said that the platform must construe itself; but your question reminds 
 me of a letter received from an influential friend in Cincinnati, which I had nearly forgotten. 
 I will read an extract which may help you. (Heads;) " Should you have dltliculty in persua- 
 ding an august person to permit our Convention to be held in Richmond, please say to him 
 that a little before, but about the time of the commencement of the war, Mr. Yancey was here- 
 to speak in the interests of the rebellion. That we procured for him Pike's Opera House, 
 and cheered him with unstinted applause. After the speech, we gave him a complimentary 
 supper at the Burnet House. Not far from the time of the speech of the lamented Yancey, 
 Wendell Philips endeavored to make a speech in the same house. We mybbed Philips, hurled 
 our sentiments at him in the shape of rotten eggs, and broke up his meeting; he being a 
 sectional man. Tell Mr. Davis, that we maintain to this moment, through every persecution, 
 the same unshaken devotion to freedom of speech which inspired us then." (Tumultuous and 
 prolonged cheers.) 
 
 Bt:[.Mo>fT. — Then follows, Mr. President, in the letter, what is called a rhetorical burst, 
 but as you have given me so much time that is valuable to your country, I will omit that. 
 j Davis. — Let us have the rhetoric by all means. I know of nothing more important to 
 
 j the Confederacy at this time than your Convention. Let me hear it. 
 
 ' Belmoxt. — (Reads further from the letter.) "Tell Mr. Davis that a babe may be kept 
 
 i from its mother's bosom, but that we, who feasted Yancey and mobbed Phillips, cannot be 
 ! kept from the bosom of that Convention." ( Tremendous applause.) 
 
 Davis. — Mr. Belmont, be so good as to make my compliments to your Cincinnati friends. 
 
 . I see that they have the true Southern idea of freedom of speech ; and say to them that when 
 
 I they come to Richmond they must call and see me. I have no objection to grant your request 
 
 j to hold the Convention in Richmond. If convenient to your speakers, I will draw up my 
 
 brigades, and would like to have them addressed as generally as circumstances will permit. 
 
 [Here the Speaker, by a movement, signified that Mr. Belmont had taken his leave 
 and was retiring, when Mr. Davis, struck by a new thought, beckoned him back, and in a cor- 
 dial but deferential manner renewed the conversation.] 
 
 Davis. — Mr. Belmont, I have been so much interested, I may say charmed with the 
 
 ! liberality of your efforts in this matter, that if you would pardon me for taking a personal 
 
 ! liberty with you — I assure you that I claim no answer, and am well aware it is a liberty; but 
 
 ;i if you will allow me, Mr. Belmont, to inquire. — What is your motive for engaging in thesi 
 
 trcmsactions ? 
 
 Belmont. — (Placing one hand on each of his trowsers pockets, with solemnity.) Mr. 
 President, it is with me a matter of feeling ! It is sentiment ! (striking his pockets with 
 » emphasis.) (Loud and continued cheering.) Mr. President, I observe from your question 
 i that you are aware of the liberalizing tendency of practical finance. Gentlemen who spend 
 i the better portion of their lives in the upper financial circles learn to rise above the narrow- 
 ) ness of special adhesions, and of local attachment.s. To us one political party is like another; 
 I one country like another; one cause like another — in short one dollar is like another. _To us 
 St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, Paris. London, New York, are all the same. We have in onr 
 1 vocations, as in others, manipulators and artisans who are discouraged and hindered by 
 difficulties ; but with our men of genius, as with others, difficulties invite the largest play of 
 their faculties, and they find their pleasure in overcoming them. Allow me to say, Mr. Presi- 
 dent, that the gathering together of the scattered fragments of an old party, not yet entirelr 
 rid of the sturdy traditions of the days of Madison and of Jackson; the getting of them all 
 j down, grovelling and eating an humble pie like that, (holding out the Chicago Platform) — I 
 \ »ay, Mr. President, it required a higher style of financial management, than a mere dime 
 I subscription. (Great applause.) Besides, Mr. Davis, when this war compelled a public loan 
 ! often hundred, fifteen hundred, two thousand millions of dollars, it offered one of the finest 
 financial nuts to crack that has been seen for generations. This Administration threw 
 ' it all — all, I say every dollar, into the vulgar mud puddle of a popular subscription. T trust 
 •. I need not say, that I have some sense of the dignity of my vocation. How, then, could Ifeel 
 ;: anything but aversion or disgust at the financial management of such an Administration ? 
 I Jay Cook is said, I know, to have made something out of it; that is,_ something for a par- 
 ?: Tenu, a novice ; but it was nothing, absolutely nothing compared with what ought to have 
 
14 
 
 been made on such a loan, if liandled in any of the highest styles of the art. So much, Mr. 
 Presiduut, for the past. I look also to the future. You have done me the honor to mvite 
 this part of our conversation on conlidential terms, and will therefore excuse me for speaking 
 openlv. I mean no offence, and I speak only from a (luancial stand point. I am not a 
 miUtarv man. I pretend only to speak as a financier. Frankly then, Mr. Davis, it appears 
 to mo, that unless Lincoln's Administration can begot out of the way, your confederacy is on 
 its !a.s't legs. I beg your pardon— I can't help seeing it in that light. (Applause.) To finish up 
 and restore the territorial integrity of the Union, may cost five hundred, or a thousand millions 
 more. " But it will be money owed by the people of the country to themselves. As between in- 
 dividuals, one may pay and another receive, but as to the country at large, it will be taking 
 money from one pocke't and putting it in the other. I see in all this nothing but a simple, 
 vulgar, mechanical operation. So "far as the practice of my art is concerned, there might 
 very nearly as well have been no war at all. (Laughter and cheers?.) On the other hand, an 
 armistice,"if it comes in time, lights up the whole future with transcendant brightness. It 
 must come soon, I know, to be of any use. The platform which we have read together, pro- 
 poses it shall be immediate and unconditional. Gen. McClellan's letter of acceptance puts 
 the armistice on a little contingency. It is to be only " so soon as it is clear, or even pro- 
 bable," that you are "ready for peace on the basis of the Union." You will pardon the li- 
 berty,' Mr. President, which as a financier, I cannot help taking of putting some estimate on 
 your sagacity. You are not likely to let a great movement bo balked for want of an appear- 
 ance of"prohftbility. Nor will Gen. McClellan be likely, with his party demanding an uncon- 
 ditional armisticej to construe the indications of probability strongly against their wishes. 
 I asssume that, if he shall be elected, the armistice is just as inevitable as it he had mention- 
 ed no condition. Then what comes? Gen. McClellan says, that then "We should e.xhaust 
 all the resources of statesmanship." On his plan, the effort on the part of the North is to 
 be, not only frank and earnest, but "persistent." The platform looks to a convention of all 
 the States; and he probably includes that as among the resources of statesmanship which 
 are to be exhausted. Mr. President, my ehthusiasm kindles at the splendors which light this 
 course of pohcy. Yon will of course go into a convention only when its basis of represen- 
 tation, the subjects committed to it, and its plan of procedure shall have been satisiactorily 
 adjusted. There being no Constitutional or legal provision for such a convention, all its 
 details will be subject to popular discussion and arrangement. Six mouths time would be 
 short for getting it assembled, and when assembled it would have no legal character. 
 It micrht represent the country. It might represent a party. It might represent a mob. 
 Its deliberations commenced, you would propose, as fundamental principles, the Chicago 
 platform, viz : the legal right of a State to secede; the legal wrong ot the war; the iact, that 
 in making that war, the Federal Constitution had been disregarded in every part, that public 
 liberty and private right had l^een alike trampled under foot. These principles and facts hav- 
 ing been asserted in the platform and indorsed by a popular election, could no longer be 
 disputed. The logical result would be, that the war debt of the Federal Government, and all 
 its war measures, were illegal and unconstitutional— in short, the work of a mob. It would 
 also logically follow, that your war debt, and war measures, in defence of State rights, being 
 just and legal, ought to be assumed by the Federal Government : and you ought to be indem- 
 nified for spoliations and damages occasioned by the war. This would be the logical 
 necessity of the situation. But perhajis you would be conciliatory and concede more than 
 they could logically claim. You would place both war debts on the same footing, and the 
 claims for spoliation North and South to stand on the same footing. Well, here 
 would be topics for debate. Your convention would sit nobody knows how long. It it 
 should recommend anything, these recommendations would lack the force of law, and more 
 time and controversy would be consumed in trying to get the recommendations framed into 
 laws. It would all result in compromise or a failure to compromise. In case of a compromise, 
 there would be claims, regular and irregular, funded and unfunded, new issues and old 
 issues over-topping each other like the peaks of Himalaya ! It would be in a financial 
 point of view splendid beyond description, Rublime. Well 1 let us imagine a failure to com- 
 promise, after tim« had been taken to exhaust the resources of Statesmanship ; after persist- 
 ent efforts had worn out the shortest probable time for such efforts— say one to two years— 
 the .=oidiors of th« Federal Army would have scattered home on furloughs. Ne w enlistments 
 would have been neglected in the hope of peace. The ol<l enlistments would have expired. 
 In a word, the military power of the Federal (lovernment would have vanished. Disappoint- 
 ments, dis"U8ta, and divisions would prevent raising another army. England and trance 
 would rofu?se to wait for the end of such folly, and would recognize the independence oi the 
 Conf.'dcracy. You would be beyond all iiuestion, master of thu situation. Behold now the ini- 
 mitable and exhaustless resources of our young military genius, our young Napoleon. He 
 
15 
 
 does not fail in his letter of acceptance to look forward to this state of affairs. He has thG 
 courage to declare that ^^ t/ie responsihilifi/ Jhr ullerior consequences" will fall on yon I 
 (Cheers.) Now, Mr. President, in a financial point of view, this result is as fjood as the other, 
 Your war debt will need scaling and funding. The States now under the Fedt-ral Government 
 may separate and fly apart. There will ho scaling and funding North and South, East and 
 West. The sky will be all luminous with new issues, old issues, and the like. Imagination 
 fails to grasp the whole susceptibilities of the situation. I repeat that my heart is in the work 
 —my heart, sir I [Striking his pockets again with both hands.] (Tremendous applause.)" 
 
 You will please remember, my friends, that this interview is imaginary. The Conven- 
 tion was not held in Richmond but in Chicago; I leave you to judge wlicther Mr. Davis could 
 have objected to having it in Richmond. All the newspapers from .the Confederacy indicate 
 that their hope, and pretty much their only hope, is in the success of the Ciiicago nominations. 
 They indicate as much feeling in that direction as I have imputed to Mr. Davis. In the 
 nature of the case they must be expected to. On the other side, we have the statements of 
 Grant, Burnside, Hooker, and great numbers of our ofTicers and soldiers, that all we need for 
 perfect success is a united North. Reason confirms this opinion. The Rebellion is holding 
 out in great hope that the Chicago politicians will succeed. 
 
 I put the question some time ago, which side of this war the Chicago movement was 
 intended to help and encourage. If I mistake not, you are now able to answer that question. 
 The leading rebels tell us, and no doubt, truly, that they are at work to ptablish the in- 
 dependence of the Confederation and make the dissolution of the Union permanent. To 
 this end, they make no concealment of their anxiety to prevent the continuance in power of 
 the present Administration. It is with them a primary object that Mr. Lincoln should be 
 defeated. The Chicago men tell us that their object is to preserve the Union, but they choose 
 the same means to preserve it which the rebels rely upon for its destruction. The motives 
 of the two are matters of inference ; but the means resorted to are matters of fact, and are 
 identical. The )-es«Z^ of the thing done, is in the future, but for the present, the Chicago 
 men and the rebellion are jointly striving to do the same thing. (Loud cheers.) 
 
 My friends, I have detained you a long time. I will only add, that there is no danger of 
 the success of the Chicago ticket. We have no need to borrow trouble concerning it. It is 
 helpless. (Cheers.) That truculent, noisy, multituduous host, threatening peace to the ene- 
 mies of their Government; threatening war on their Government itself, where is it now? The 
 people have already breathed upon it as the Angel of Death breathed upon the hosts of 
 Senacherib. By the use of appliances and means, known to political artificers, they may, 
 and they will, from time to time, produce some abnormal rolling of the eyes, some galvanic 
 jerks and twitches of the muscles, some looks of fierceness and grimace ; but for all the pur- 
 poses of patriotism; for all the purposes of political power; for all the purposes of public 
 duty; for all the purposes of popular favor at the polls, that host is already and irrevocably- 
 dead. For all such purposes it is without voice. 
 
 "The tents are all silent; the banners alone ; 
 The lances unlifted ; the trumpet unblown ! " 
 
 [The speaker retired amidst prolonged cheers and applause.] 
 
 
The Union it mtt^t be J^eaereod ." 
 The Countri/ above I'arti/. 
 
 THIIE 
 
 NATIONAL UNION ASSOCIATION 
 
 OF OHIO. 
 
 HEADQUARTERS CATHOLIC INSTITUTE, (First Floor,) 
 
 N. W. CORRER VINE & LONGWORTH STS., CINCINNATI. 
 
 WEEKLY MEETINGS IN MOZART HALL 
 
 Each Tuesday and Saturday Night until Nov. 12, 1864. 
 
 Dr. WILLIAM SHERWOOD, President. 
 
 S. S. DAVIS, Treasurer. 
 
 JOHN D. CALDWELL, General Secretary. 
 
 Hon. EDWARD WOODRUFF, Chairman Ex. Com. 
 
 sxjB-ooiiv^:M:ia?TEEs. 
 
 Henry Kessler, Chairman, 
 L. S. Rosenstiel, 
 S. C. Newton, 
 
 S. C. NcT/ton Chairman. 
 F. J. Mayer, 
 C. F. Wilstach, 
 Geo. H. Wolff, 
 
 I'INAXCJE. 
 
 D. T. Woodrow, 
 James Dalton, 
 Dr. 0. W. Nixon, 
 
 CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Charles Reakirt, 
 Peter Gibson, 
 Joseph Kirkup, 
 John W. Carter, 
 
 AZL, SPEAKERS, &c, 
 
 Edgar Conkling, Chairman. 0. H. Geffroy, 
 
 Geo. H. Wolir, Adolph "Woods, 
 
 Maj. R. M. Corwine, 
 
 J) OCV SI ENTS , PItlNTINO, &c. 
 
 Hon. Ed. Woodruff, 
 George Graham, 
 
 A. T. Butler, 
 1). M. Marsh, 
 
 Eli Johnson, 
 S. S. Daris. 
 
 Charles Brown, 
 Hugh McBiruey, 
 E. C. Middletou. 
 
 Jacob WolflF, 
 M. Swoony. 
 
 M. B. Hagans, 
 J. D. Caldv.cll 
 
 N. Patterson. 
 
 EXPEXDITURES AND ACCOUNTS. 
 
 Col. A. Wataon, Chairman. J. W. Wynne, 
 
 4»" Send orders for Union. Documents. 
 
 JOHN D. CALDWELL, Gen. Sec 
 
 '•^weo -i« 
 

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