^' %/ y^^l ^^/ •»: V^ *• '^.^^^ ** # s'^'^ • ♦•I * ^.'«-^ .^^ ^*v V ^^ ^0^ ' %^^^ '^i^ J?^*. '^ ♦^ VV^ NARRATIVE OF Wfit ^SBav IN GERMANY AND FRANCE, IN 1813 AND 1814. BY LIEUT. GENERAL CHARLES WILLIAM VANE, MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY, G.C.B. G.C.H. COLONEL OF THE lOTH ROYAL HUSSARS. CAREY & LEA— CHESTNUT STREET. 1831. 1\C -£3 5 .1-6 /?3/ Gift Mias M. O. Oodman Msroh 1914 TO THE OFFICERS OF THE BRITISH ARMY. Redeeming the pledge I gave in my Narrative of the Peninsular War, to introduce to the public a Second Volume, relative to the Campaigns of 1813 and 1814, provided my first efforts should be sup- ported by the indulgence of my brother-officers; I now offer this additional tribute to those who have kindly considered my first book as not unworthy of their notice. Vane Londonderry, Lieut. Genl. Col. 10th Royal Hussars. ADVERTISEMENT. The following pages will be found to record, in an unbroken narrative, all those important military opera- tions which came under my immediate notice during the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. I felt that this could be done without compromising my own official respon- sibility, or breaking through the regard and considera- tion due to others. That which the soldier's eye has witnessed, surely the soldier's pen may fairly describe ; for, as I have already stated in my Advertisement to a former work, I was constantly in the habit of writing detailed statements of every occurrence. I did this, not merely in fulfilment of my public duty, but for the information of that individual to whose wise and digni- fied policy, not Great Britain only, but every nation of the civilized world, is, in my estimation, largely in- debted. I am free to own, and proud to record, that his aftec- tion was the solace — his good opinion the glory of my life ; and it is a source of honest pride to me at this moment that my communications, such as they were, and prepared always on the spur of the occasion, were considered by him worthy to be preserved. My letters to him form not merely the groundwork, but almost the entire substance, of the following pages. I have given them nearly verbatim, with the diflTerence only of adopt- ing a connected form, to avoid the inconvenience of those repetitions which must of necessity occur in de- tached and occasional communications. By doing this, A2 VI ADVERTISEMENT. ' I am aware that I forego, in some degree, the advan- tage of that internal evidence which the letters in their original form would have carried with them. This, however, is a sacrifice which I am content to make, as it regards myself personally. No one, I am certain, can impeach the accuracy of the facts, or the sincerity of the opinions recorded in this Narrative ; though it is possible some question may be started as to the share of literary distinction to be awarded to the writer. In reference to my former Narrative of the Peninsu- lar War, I stated very explicitly the obligation I was under to a gentleman for the arranging my letters, and thus aiding my first efforts in submitting them to the press. In the present case I have no such statement to make. This work, such as it is, is written and com- piled wholly by a soldier, not by an author; and, whatever the amount of its deficiencies may prove to be, I must take them upon myself. There will proba- bly be no occasion to wait long for an estimate of them, as that vigilance which exercises itself in weighing the claims of any individual to be considered a writer of military history is always in full activity. There is another point upon which I wish also to be explicit. Many may suppose that some of the opinions advanced, or documents produced, might arise out of papers belonging to my late lamented relation, which may have fallen into my possession since the period of his decease. But the fact is, on the contrary, that all these valuable records are still in the hands of his executors, from whom his family have never hitherto received them. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. Progress of the allied armies in the north of Germany at the commencement of 1813 — Active measures of the British government — The Hanoverian dominions — Alliance with Russia and Prussia— Various misrepresenta- tions — Heligoland — State of affairs at Hamburgh — Position of the allies — General Tettenborn— Regency at Hanover— Estimate of the French forces — Supplies from England — Brigadier-general Lyon appointed to command the Hanoverian and Hanseatic troops— Hanoverian levies — Bernadotte — Exertions of General Tettenborn — Capitulation of Thorn— Importance of Spandau — Force under Marshal Ney and General Sebastiani — Arrival of the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia at Dresden— Extensive co- operation of Great Britain Page 13 CHAP. II. Advance of the enemy— State of their troops— Exertions of the King of Prussia— Surrender of Spandau— Edict of the Prussian government— Ta- riff' of duties— Pleasures to check the advance of the French— Head-quar- ters of the allied Sovereigns— Position of the opposing armies at the end of April— Policy of Napoleon— The allies propose to pass the Elbe— Plan of operations— The French advance to Dresden— The allied forces cross the Elster— The Emperor Alexander— Plan of attack— Successes of the allies— Obstinate engagement— Retreat of the allies— Precautionary mea- sures-Results of the battle— Subsequent proceedings— Aifairs on the Lower Elbe 22 CHAP. in. Force under Buonaparte— Numerical strength of the allies— Composition of the French army— State of the Russians— Character of the Cossacks- Grenadiers of the guard— Unnecessary attirail— Animation of the Prus- sian army— The Poles- I^ine of conduct pursued by the allies— Review of operations— The allied army crosses the Elbe— Attempts of the enemy- Buonaparte enters Dresden— Concentration of the allied forces— Affair at Weissig— The King of Saxony declares in favor of the French— The con- tending armies in presence of each other— Force of the enemy— Gallant action of General Barclay De Tolly— Successes of the allies 32 CHAP. IV. Intentions of the enemy— General Miloradovitch withdraws from Bautzen —Observations on the position of the two grand armies— Reported move- ments of the enemy— Preparations of the allies— Battle near Bautzen- General Barclay de Tolly forced to retire— Gallant conduct of the Prussians under Blucher— Advantage obtained by the French— Retreat of the allies —Results of the battle— Heavy losses of the allies— Spirit of the army— The allies continue to retreat— Attempts of the enemy— Successful ma- nceuvre of General Blucher— Distinction conferred on Sir Robert Wilson —The French enter Breslau- Armistice— Anxiety respecting Austria- Review of the state of the allied army 40 CHAP. V. Conferences— Ability displayed by the Austrian njinister— Effective state of the Prussian armv— Proceeding on the part of the French— Fortress of Spandau— Public feeling at Berlin— The landsturm, or local militia- Swedish troops— Their general appearance— Head-quarters of the army— The Sovereigns— and society at head-quarters— Observations as to the Prince Royal of Sweden— The Hanseatic legion— The armistice prolonged —The Russian German Legion— their complete state of discipline, fee- News of the battle of Vittoria— Hanoverian levies— Movements of Swe- disli troops— The Prince Royal's arrival at Berlin 59 Vlll CONTENTS. CHAP. VI. British force under Major-general Gibbs — Hanoverian levies— Appointment of officers — The Prince Royal — Troops under his orders — Tlie Duke of Cumberland — Treaties of concert and subsidy vtith Russia and Prusaia — General Alexander Hope — Affability of the Prince Royal — His inter- view with the Duke of Cumberland — Removal of General Walmoden— The late Duke of Mecklenburg Strelitz— Adventures at Strelitz— Arrival of the Prince Royal at Berlin — Reports regarding the enemy — Letter from General Tauenstein — Intelligence from the grand head-quarters — Av- langements of the Prince Royal — Arrival of the Duke of Vicenaa — Dis- position of Napoleon's forces — Position of the allied army— Moreau — Austria declares war against France — Spirit of the Austrian troops — Slarch of the allies into Bohemia 09 CHAP. VII. Movements of the enemy — Removal of the allied head-quarters to Prague — Count Stadion— Intrepid character of the Emperor Alexander — Dispo- sition of Austria — Prince Schvvartzenberg — The Breslau central commis- sion — Observations on the rupture of negotiations — Reply of Austria — Conduct of Caulaincourt — Confidence of Buonaparte — Count 3Tetternich — his course of proceedings — Review of the Austrian army — Fine appear- ance and discipline of the troops — Retreat of the French — Collection of the enemy's forces at Zittau — The French general, Jomenil — Intelligence of the defeat of Soult — General Blucher attacked by Ney and Marmont — Count Wittgenstein's corps — Advance of the grand armies tonards Dres- den — The enemy retires — The allies attack Dresden — they abandon the assault — their loss on the occasion — Advantages of the French — Fate of Moreau 80 CHAP. VIII. Difficulties of the allies after their retreat from Dresden — Advantages of Napoleon — Causes of the late failure — Prince Schwart^enberg — Buona- parte's fortresses on the Elbe — Complexion of affairs — Operations of Gen- eral Blucher — Brilliant affair of General Sachen's corps — The Silesian army pursue the enemy — Successes of Blucher — Action near Toplitz — Bravery of the Russian guards — The Duke of Cumberland — Defeat of Vandamme at Kulm — The grand army encamps near Toplitz — Events in the north under the Prince Royal of Sweden — Repulse of General Bcr- trand— Victory obtained by the Crown Prince— Napoleon attacks the army of Silesia — Various military operations — Interests of the different powers 92 CHAP. IX. Attack on the allies at Dohna— Severe contest— Count Wittgenstein retires — The Duke of Cumberland assists in the action— Bnonap'artc arrives in force from Dresden— Preparations for a general engairemcnt-The French retire — Advance of the allies — Brilliant cmip de vtain—Mau(sn\rcB of Na- poleon — continues his retreat — Partial action — Losses of Marshal Ney — Demonstrations before Kulm — Attack on the allied posilion—R( pulse of the enemy — Napoleon's horse shot under liim— He retires towards Dresden — Distress of the French army — Positions of the allies— Successes of Generals Platoff and Thielman— Affair near AUcnbiirg— Movements of the allied army — Reports of Napoleon at Leipsic— Position of the Rus- sian and Prussian armies — System of Prince Schvvartzenlwrg — Tidings of Lord Wellington's victories in Spain — Napoleons letters to the Em- peror of Austria— Exalted position of England— Policy of Prince Met- ternich— The Emperor Alexander's letter to Sir C. Stewart— Pros; rcss of the Silosian army— Plans of the Prince Royal of Sweden— Napoleon's niancEuvres on the f^ister- Bold project and decided movements of the allies— Concentration of the enemy towards Leipsic 103 CHAP. X. Prosecution of offensive ojrerations- IMovcinents of the Silesian army — of the grand army — Loss of communications across the Elbe — Treaty with Bavaria— Intercepted dispatches— The enemy's demonstrations on the Mulda— Concentration near Leipsic— Movements of the Prince Royal of Sweden— Advance of the whole allied armv— Victory of Radefeld and CONTENTS. IX Lindenthal — Brilliant attacks of Blucher — Napoleon arrives in the field — attacks the whole line of the allies — forces part of their position by a cvup de main — unable to profit by it — The grand army resumes its posi- tion — Conversations with the Prince Royal— strictures on his movements —Letters to that Prince, and communications with General Blucher. 113 CHAP. XI. Successes of the Crown Prince of Sweden— of General Walmoden— Con- centration of the enemy round Leipsic — Remarks on this movement — ■ Proclamation to the allied army — Preparations for a general engagement -^Description of the battle of Leipsic — its glorious results — The enemy routed at all points — Capture of Leipsic — pursuit and dispersion of the French army — Movements of the allied forces towards the Rhine — Pub- lic rejoicings — Tidings of the victory in England — Propositions of peace from Napoleon — Singular interview with the Prince Royal — Presented by His Royal Highness with the Swedish military Order of the Sword. . 125 CHAPTER XII. Continued pursuit of the enemy — Line of march of the allies towards the Rhine — Unhappy fate of Prince Poniatowski — Attack of the retreating corps on Count Tolstoy — Extensive captures — Movements of Marshal Blucher and of the Prince Royal — Dresden evacuated by Gouvion St. Cyr — Motions of General Bennigsen — Collecting of the enemy near Erfurth — Progress and positions of the allied armies — Arrival of General Wrede — Active measures — The Silesian army overtakes and routs the enemy — Large capture of prisoners — Brilliant successes of Marshal Blucher — Dis- patches from Sir Hudson Lowe — Hot pursuit and narrow escape of Napo- leon — Disasters and sufferings of the enemy — Napoleon retreats on Frank- fort — Reports of General Wrede — of engagements at Hanau— Further progress of the Silesian army — Rapid marches, and heroic actions of the allies 135 CHAP. XIII. Movements of the French armj' — Bold and masterly conduct of General Wrede — Amount of Napoleon's force — Skilful retreat of his commandeis — Taking of Hanau — Head-quarters of Napoleon at Frankfort — Contin- ued retreat — Position of Marshal Davoust with the Danes — March of the army of the north towards Hanover — New plans of the Prince of Swe- den — Brilliant conduct of the partisan-corps — Marshal Blucher's pursuit of the enemy — Occupation of Bremen — Entrance of the allies into Hano- ver — Plans of the Prince Royal— The Duke of Cumberland — Dissatisfac- tion of General Walmoden — Conversations with the Prince Royal of Sweden — Causes of misunderstanding among the allies — Public declara- tion — Proposals to Napoleon — Movements of the allied armies — Capitula- tion treated of with Davoust by the Prince Royal — Capitulation of Dresden — not sanctioned at head-quarters — Interview with Prince Har- denberg — Alliance between Great Britain and Prussia — Grounds of union between the great powers 145 CHAP. XIV. Opening of the war across the Rhine — Measures adopted by Napoleon — Plan of the new campaign — criticised by the Prince of Sweden — Proposed movements of the allied army — Force in Germany — Motions of the Prince Royal — Discussion of negotiations — Alliance between the powers — Mag- nitude of the allied armies — Occupation of Holland — Embarkation of English forces — Successes of General Bulow — Concentration of the allied armies — Re-establishment of the Orange dynasty — Capture of the Ger- man fortresses— Surrender of Stettin, Dornberg, and Zutphen — The grand army under Prince Schwartzenberg — Marshal Bellegarde— Overtures to Napoleon — Proposed basis of peace — Position of Great Britain— English officers — Sir R. Wilson — Lord Burghersh — Active measures of the allies — General Blucher — Fall of Dantzic— Army of the Crown Prince — Success of the Danes— Report of the afl!air— Views of the Prince of Sweden — Af- fairs in Holland — on the Upper Rhine — Arrival of the Duke of Cambridge? — his public entry into Hanover — Rejoicings on that occasion 156 X CONTENTS. CHAP. XV. The war in the north— Poeition of Marshal Davoust— defeated by Genera! Wahnoden — Progress and state of the campaign — Motives and objects of the Prince Royal— The Duke of Cambridge at Hanover — The Duke of Brunswick — Communication from the King of Prussia to the Crown Prince — Sir C. Stewart proceeds from Hanover to Holstein — Armistice with the Danes — Letters from the King of Denmark and Prince Royal of Sweden — Observations on the Prince Royal — Gallantry of the Prussians — Capture of Bois le Due — Denmark joins tlie common cause — Articles of peace — Operations of the grand army— Passage of the Rhine — Surrender of Dantzic — Positions of the allies — Buonaparte at Metz — Progress of the allies — The enemy at Chalons — Power of Russia — Reflections — Success of Marshal Blucher — Relative positions of the armies — The Emperor of Rus- sia enters Vesoul — Capture of Nancy — Surrender of fortresses on the Rhine — March towards the capital 168 CHAP. XVI. British officers of distinction — their services in the common cause — Graad headquarters— Spirited conduct of the Prince of Wirtemburg — The ene- my retires on Chatillon — Junction of the allied forces — Toul carried by assault — Napoleon concentrates his forces — Relative positions of the ar- mies — Napoleon repairs to Chalons— his plan of the campaign — Move- ments of Marshal Blucher — Attacked by Napoleon — Severe action — Dis- positions of Prince Schwartzenberg — Movements of the enemy — Inter- cepted letter — Napoleon's views — The partisan corps — Estimate of the forces — Ineffectual efforts of Napoleon — his fearless exposure in battle — Retreat of the enemy— Intended march on the capital— Disposition of the French nation — Want of combination among the allies — Army of the Prince Royal of Sweden— Operations in Belgium— The English and Prus- sians attack Marshal Macdonald — are compelled to retire — Bergen-op- Zoom invested by the English — Advance and successes of General Win- zingerode— Assembly of plenipotentiaries at Chatillon— Presence of the allied sovereigns — influence the diplomatic body — Interviews and conver- sations with the Emperor Alexander — Policy of Russia — Prosecution of hostilities— Dis.solution of the congress of Chatillon — Character of Caul- aincourt, Due de Vicenza — Amicable disposition of the congress 190 CHAP. XVII. Resources and genius displayed by Napoleon— Magnanimity under adverse circumstances — his position at Troyes, Lesmont, Bar-sur-Aube — Prince Schwartzenberg determines to attack — Preparations of the allies — Opera tions of Marshal Blucher— Napoleon takes advantage of his imprudent ad- vance-falls upon the corps of Sacken and D'Yorck— gains a decided victory over them— Engagement with Marshal Blucher— Sanguinary contest— The Prussians outmanoeuvred and surrounded— retreat with considerable loss— Rapid movements and manoeuvres of Napoleon— Prepares to attack Prince Schwartzenberg— The allies collect their forces— Blucher attacked with loss at Mery — Grand head-quarters— Successful attack by Princo Schwartzenberg— Loss of the Prussians— Battle at Laou— Retreat of the enemy — Positions of Napoleon — General engagement and defeat of the French — Efforts of Napoleon — Masked movements and successes of the al- lies—Combined advance — Losses of the French — Barbarities of the Cos- sacks — Singular incident, and unhappy catastrophe 201 CHAP. xvin. Pursuit of the enemy— Junction of the allied armies— Successes of the Si- leaian armies — Position of the grand army — Partisan-corps — Rapid march of Napoleon to regain the capital— Progr(!ss of the allies— Concentration of forces — Actions with the enemy — Explosion of a magazine — Advance of the allies— they pass the Marne — Napoleon attacks Winzingerode, who is compelled to retreat— Movement on the rear of tlie allies— Bold decision of the Emperor Alexander — Allied march on Pari,'?— Sir R. Hill at Bour- deaux — Intercepted letter from the Empress Maria Louisa to Napoleon — Affair at Claye— Rapid movements of the allies towards the capital — arrive before it— Battle of Montmartre— Defeat of the French— Entrance of the allied sovereigns into Paris— Temper of the i)eople— Popularity of COKTENTS. XI the Emperor Alexander— Grand review in the Champs Eiyaees — Napoleon hastens towards Fontainebleau — The allies march to oppose him — The Emperor Alexander forms a cabinet — its preponderance — Absence of the Emperor of Austria — Talleyrand gained over — The provisional govern- ment — Due de Vicenza — D'Alberg, &,c.— Interviews with the Emperor Alexander 209 CHAP. XIX. Emissaries of Napoleon — Opinion of the Due de Vicenza — Deliberations of the senate — Desertion of Marshal Moncey — Lord Wellington at Toulouse — Great battle — Abdication of Buonaparte pronounced by the senate — Direction of affairs by the Emperor Alexander — Absence of the English minister — and of the Bourbons— Anecdotes of the Emperor of Russia's conduct — New government — Appointment of French ministers — Deser- tion of Marraont and his army — followed by Kellermann, Victor, Nan- souty — Efforts to form a regency for the king of Rome — Offer of Elba and a pension to Napoleon — Declaration of the Emperor Alexander in favor of the Bourbons — Napoleon accepts the terms proposed— Abandoned by his officers — His army directed towards Paris — Colonel Lowe sent with dispatches to England — Considerations of the policy adopted towards Napoleon — Bold tone assumed by Russia — Concessions of the other powers — Alarm of Austria — Influence of Great Britain — Policy of Prince Metter- nich— Opposition to the designs of Russia — Appeal to a Congress at Vienna 218 CHAP. XX. Strictures on the project of the Emperor Alexander — dangers to be appre- hended from it — its extreme unpopularity — opposed by the English gov- ernment — Influence and preponderance of the Russian policy — High char- acter of Great Britain — State of affairs at Paris — Publicity of events after its occupation — Lord Burghersh's memoir — Plans of ground and battles — The allied sovereigns prepare to visit England— her triumphant efforts — Recapitulation of military events — Last struggle oif Napoleon — His design to attack Paris — Prince Schwartzenberg assembles the allied army — Intrigues and treachery — Napoleon deserted by his officers and troops — Public festivities at Paris — Anecdotes of the day — The author repairs to Toulouse — The Duke of Wellington appointed ambassador at Paris— Napoleon presented by his marshals with the act of the senate — Signs the act of abdication — Departs for Elba — Peace concluded with France — Reception of the allied sovereigns in London — George the Fourth and the Emperor Alexander — Preparations for the European congress — Splendid military reviews — Opinion of the Duke of Wellington — Inter- views with the Emperor of Russia 229 CHAP. XXL Military opinions, and basis of operations for the campaign of 1815— Sleet- ing of the great congress at Vienna — Tidings of Napoleon's escape from Elba — Tumult and dismay in France — Military conference and arrange- ments for the new campaign — Interesting military memoirs— Opinions of Prince Schwartzenberg — Views of Austria — Estimate of relative forces— Considerations and military sentiments of the Prince Field-Mar- shal, Commander-in-Chief of the allied forces; of the chief of the Prus- sian t^tat-major. General Knesebeck; and the military ideas of the Duke of Wellington on the approaching campaign in Belgium, sent from Brus- sels to Vienna 240 Xll CONTENTS. APPENDIX. From Baron Haidenberg, Toplitz, 29th of September, 1813. Acknowledging how much the exertions of the Prussians were owing to England's aid 259 Observations on the Trade between Great Britain and Prussia at the period of the Russian treaty with Great Britain in 1813 ib. Heads of the Arrangement touching the Armistice and Negotiations. . 261 Conditions of equipment of the Hanseatic legion and other corps 263 Copy of a Letter from Lord Castlereagh to His Royal Highness the Prince Royal of Sweden, dated London, March 23d, 1813 264 Convention signed at Trachenberg, 12th of July, 1813, as a basis for the Operations of the Campaign 265 Declaration Autrichienne, Aoiit, 1813 266 Publication of Central Commission 269 Evaluation approximative des Armies des Puissances Bellig6rantes. .. ib. Etat des Forces des Allies, transmis comme minimum par M. le Chancelier Baron de Hardenberg a son Excellence M. le Comte de Metternich. . . 271 Note from the Chancellor Hardenberg to Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Stewart, dated Frankfort, 4th December, 1813 272 General Blucher's disposition for the attack on the 16th October ib. Letter from General De Gniesenau to Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Stew- art, which shows the great importance of his having effected the changes narrated in the Prince Royal's march, October 15th, 1813 273 Lord Castlereagh's Letter expressing the Prince Regent's entire approbation of Sir Charles Stewart's conduct, both political and military ib. The Prince Regent's permission for Sir Charles Stewart to accept and wear the Swedish Order of the Sword, conferred on him after the battle of Leip- sic, in a letter from the Prince Royal to His Majesty's Government. . 274 Memoir from General Walmoden, Dannewitz, November, 1813 ib. General Gniesenau to Sir Charles Stewart, in which he states his plan for an invasion of Holland, October 31st, 1813 277 General Gniesenau to Sir Charles Stewart, December 13th, 1813 278 Statement of the entire Force and Condition of the Austrian Army, in the year 1814 279 Copy of a Letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden to the King of Prussia, Stralsund, June 3d, 1813 280 Copy of a Letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden to the King of Prussia, Stralsund, June 4th, 1813 281 Copy of a Letter from the Prince Royal to His Majesty the Emperor of Rus- sia, dated Stralsund, June 10th, 1813 ib. Copy of a Letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden to the Emperor of Rus- sia, dated Stralsund, June 10th, 1813 282 Declaration of the Allied Plenipotentiaries 284 Capitulation of Paris 285 Letter to Sir Charles Stewart, sending the Order of the Garter to the Duke of Wellington 286 Conclusion of the Treaty of Paris, April 11th, 1815 ib. Return of the Army assembled at Dijon in 1814 Sjisa ADDENDA. Letter from Prince Metternich to the Author, dated May 17th, 1815 289 From the same to the same, dated May 18th, 1815 ib. Declaration drawn up by the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied powers, and promulgated on Napoleon's escape from Elba 290 Extract of a Letter from the Author, dated March 13th, 1815 291 Letter from the Author, dated March 16th 294 Ditto .... March 19th 295 Ditto .... March 27th 296 Ditto .... March 29th ib. Letter from Sir Henry Hardinge, Marcn 27th 297 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR IN GERMAJNJY AND FRANCE, IN 1813 AND 1814. CHAPTER I. Progress of the allied armies in the north of Germany at the commencement of 1313 — Active measures of the British government — The Hanoverian dominions — Alliance with Russia and Prussia — Various misrepresenta- tions— Heligoland— State of affairs at Hamburgh— Position of the allies — General Tettenborn — Regency at Hanover — Estimate of the French forces — Supplies from England — Brigadier-general Lyon appointed to command the Hanoverian and Hanseatic troops — Hanoverian levies — Bernadotte— Exertions of General Tettenborn — Capitulation of Thorn — Importance of Spandau — Force under Marshal Ney and General Sebastiani — Arrival of the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia at Dresden — Extensive co- operation of Great Britain. The successful progress of the allied armies against the Emperor of France, in the north of Germany, at the com- mencement of the year 1813, induced the British govern- ment to decide upon taking active measures in aid of the common cause in that quarter. It was therefore deemed ex- pedient, not only that the Prussian and Swedish efforts should be connected in one combined operation, but that His Majes- ty's Hanoverian dominions should be roused into action, and a fair opportunity afforded them of displaying that zealous attachment to the real interests of Great Britain, for which, on former occasions, they had been so eminently conspicuous. The most direct method of affording the desired assistance was obviously, in the first instance, to furnish military atti- rail in arms and stores ; and with these the Swedes, Prus- sians, and Hanoverians, were promptly supplied, in great abundance and variety. The next step was to place the sev- eral levies, for whose use these supplies were intended, under effective superintendence. For this service the writer of the following pages was selected ; and his instructions were to proceed forthwith to the north of Germany, charged, on the part of his Sovereign, with all the correspondence relating to the Prussian, Swedish, and Hanoverian armies, including an auxiliary corps of Russians attached to the forces, which, under the Prince Royal of Sweden, were about to commence a new series of operations from the southern shores of the Baltic. B 14 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR The Prince Regent, acting in the name and on behalf of His Majesty, had determined at this period, when the powers of Europe were at length rousing themselves, and about to shake off the intolerable load of French oppression, to seize the first opportunity of renewing his ancient alliance with Prussia ; and by accrediting a minister at the court of Ber- lin, to manifest his desire that the friendly relations between the two powers should be restored. Lord Cathcart at this time filled, with great zeal and ability, the high and important situation of His Majesty's ambassador at the court of St. Petersburgh. To him, therefore, and the writer of this memoir the charge was assigned, (in their ca- pacity of accredited ministers at the head-quarters of the armies of the Sovereigns of Russia and Prussia,) of making the British government acquainted with all the details of military arrangements and movements, including those of His Royal Highness the Prince Royal of Sweden, to whom Sir Charles Stewart had especial letters of authorization as to all matters of a military nature, although the political and diplomatic affairs connected with the court of Stockholm were conducted by Mr. Thornton, who, as the British minister at that court, attended the Prince Royal's head-quarters. It is not to the present purpose to enter into any statement of diplomatic transactions ; it is enough to say of those which preceded the treaty of alliance between Great Britain and the courts of Russia and Prussia, that they were brought to a conclusion in a manner highly satisfactory to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, whose anxious purpose was solely to sustain the common cause, and not to pursue objects of separate aggrandizement. It would, indeed, be unfair and improper so to characterize the efforts which were made to remedy the inconvenience resulting from the intersection of different states ; an inconvenience which had been long felt and complained of in the Electoral dominions. No time, un- doubtedly, could be more proper for procuring a redress of this grievance than that, in which England was making ef- forts of such magnitude and importance in behalf of the al- lies. There could, indeed, be but one opinion as to the im- portance of the object and the fitness of the occasion ; and the transaction is adverted to for the sake of bearing testi- mony against the gross and shameful misrepresentations by which it has been sought to impress an opinion, that the great object of the grand alliance had been lost sight of, for the sake of securing His Royal Higlmess the Prince Regent's personal gratification in a point which was supposed to in- terest his private feelings. I will not assert that these were the most flagrant misre- IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 15 presentations ever attempted ; for unhappily many such have gone abroad, and with but too much success, as will appear whenever the diplomatic history of Europe for the last twenty years shall be honestly written. My province, however, lies beyond the limits of diplomatic discussion. Duty, indeed, would forbid the necessary disclosures, even had I the incli- nation to unravel these state intricacies. But it better suits my taste and habits to confine myself to the single object of a military narrative. I sailed from Yarmouth on the 13th of April, 1813, in the Nymphe frigate. The winds being adverse, it was not until the 16th at noon that we made Heligoland. The return of the pilot-boat gave me an opportunity of communicating with the governor, Colonel Hamilton ; but the news he was able to furnish fell very short of the demand suggested by our anxiety to be made acquainted with the actual position of affairs on the main-land. The following day we ran up the Elbe. Off Cuxhaven I had an interview with Major Kinsinger, the commandant of a detachment which had been sent by Colonel Hamilton from Heligoland, to take possession of the batteries, after the town had been evacuated by the French. From Major Kinsinger I received the most encouraging reports of the success of the allies, and of the good disposition of the people in all quar- ters. The universal cry was for arms ; all ranks were animated with one spirit : for while the disasters which the French armies had experienced in quick succession emboldened the peasantry in planning and executing measures of annoyance, the wanton excesses committed by the retreating columns, especially in the neighborhood of Bremen, had roused a spirit of retaliation which could not be restrained. The actual state of affairs in Hamburgh at this moment was both critical and complicated. The town was occupied by a force of 2000 men, under the command of an officer in the Russian service, Baron Von Tettenborn, who having been detached from the division of Count Wittgenstein, immediately after the Rus- sian troops liad established themselves in Berlin, pressed for- ward with such ardor and boldness, as to compel General Morand to retire from Swedisli Pomerania. Hamburgh was thus left open ; Baron Tettenborn having entered it on the 18th of March, was welcomed by the inhabitants with every expression of delight, and proceeded forthwith to restore tlie ancient government. No event could have been more favorable for the further- ance of the operations then in progress. An opening wag thus afforded for direct communication between Great Britain 16 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR and the north of Germany, of which our ministers lost not a moment in availing themselves: so that I found a British consul already in the full exercise of his functions, and the shores of the Elbe beginning to resume an aspect of commer- cial bustle and importance. Still it cannot be denied that this success of the Russians was the result of a lucky con- currence of circumstances, rather than of any well-concerted combination. The advantages obtained by the forward move- ment of Tettenborn's corps were, however, numerous and important ; and though its consequences were eventually disastrous, and most unfortunately compromised some of the best citizens of Hamburgh, it may perhaps be doubted whether the arrangements for opening the campaign could, under any other circumstances, have been carried forward with so much spirit and success. The general position of the allied armies, at the moment of my arrival, was as follows. General Blucher's corps, about 30,000 men, were at Zwickau, in Saxony; General Winzingerode, with 15,000, was on the right of the above, between Merseburg and Altenburg, his parties extending to Weimar. General Wittgenstein and D'Yorck having formed a junction, had crossed the Elbe at Dessau, and were known to be moving in the direction of Halle, with a force of not less than 40,000, in contemplation of an immediate attack on Wittenberg, in which there was a garrison of from 4 to 5000 French. General Bulow, with a corps of about 10,000 men, was observing Magdeburg. Such may be regarded as the general operations in this quarter at this period of the campaign ; but detached from, and in a certain sense inde- pendent of these, were the new formations under General Uornburg, on the Aller and Weser, that had already distin- guished themselves in a very brilliant manner. Add also among the latter General Tettenborn, who had pushed for- ward towards Celle, in the neighborhood of Bremen, with a force of about 4000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, having four regiments of Cossacks and two of dragoons. This officer proved himself a sanguine and active character, always ready for a movement en avant; and being by birth a Ger- man, he brought into the cause his full share of that national sentiment with which every German bosom now seemed animated. A combined object was now given to these desultory opera- tions, as General Walmoden had arrived for the purpose of taking the command of all the new levies on the Lower Elbe; General Tettenborn, and the zealous and indefatigable General Chernichelf, were placed under his orders : an ar- rariement highly favorable to the active system of operations, irv' GERMANY AND FRANCE. 17 as I found that General Walmodeu had already concerted with General Tettenborn to press the enemy's left ; and calculating upon their force in cavalry, of which the Ft-ench had none in this direction, they were sanguine as to the result. The members of the regency of Hanover, assembled at this moment in Hamburgli, with Count Kilmansegge, a noble- man of much weight and importance in that country, at their head, were employed in re-establishing the civil authorities in the different towns as fast as the French left them. If to the details thus given, I add, that 7000 Swedes occupied Stralsund, Rostock, &c., and that the Prince Royal was daily expected with 10,000 more, I shall nearly complete the picture, which, with reference to the military objects of the allies, the north of Europe exhibited at the moment of my arrival. On the side of the French, aflairs wore a very different aspect. Beauharnois, the viceroy of Italy, had failed in an offensive movement from Magdeburg; and the failure seemed likely to lead to important results. General Vandamme had thrown himself into Bremen with 5 or 6000 men, and pro- ceeded to strengthen the fortifications ; but if the Viceroy retired from Magdeburg, it seemed improbable that a position could be held so far in advance, and that Davoust would })ersist in maintaining himself on the Aller, or attempt any line of operation beyond that of falling back, so as to insure his communications with the great mass of their force, which, to the amount of 70 or 80,000, was concentrated in the neighborhood of Frankfort and Wurtzburg under Marshal Ney. The force under Davoust and the Viceroy might be esti- mated at 40,000. Concentration was now obviously their policy ; for, finding themselves harassed in all directions by different bodies of Russian cavalry, their communications, if not wholly cut off, were rendered everywhere uncertain. Their garrisons also were completely shut up in the several fortresses where they had been lefl, and the 'morale even of their best troops became afl'ected. Thus while the boldest and ablest of the French commanders found full employment in concerting measures of defence, and securing their retreat, the word along the whole line of the combined armies was "forward !" and the most intelligent soldiers did not scruple to express a confident expectation that the French would be driven across the Rhine before the month of June. That England was in no respect wanting in exertion, will appear from the statement (Appendix, No. 1.) of arms, am- munition, and military stores, ordered for the Russian, Prus- B2 18 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR eian, - and Swedish governments, and actually supplied for their use within the incredibly short space of two months. Great care was exercised in regulating their distribution, both as to their kind and degree ; so that no want should occur which had not been provided against. So ably were the energies of the government at home, seconded by the officers appointed to the several departments of this service, directed, that it is not too much to affirm that all the objects proposed by this extensive aid were fully accomplished ; and urgent as the emergency appeared, and general as the excitement of the public mind against the French proved, so that the call for arms was little less than universal, that call was never- theless so well replied to, that no individual was left without a weapon who had the strength or the desire to wield one. Brigadier-general Lyon v;as now intrusted with the command of the Hanoverian and Hanseatic troops; and received orders to place himself at the disposal of the Prince Royal of Swe- den, for the purpose of aiding in training the new levies. The Brigadier took with him about 460 men of the King's German Legion, with a large proportion of officers. The business of the storekeeper's department was conducted with praiseworthy activity ; and the several agents stationed at Stralsund, Colbergen, and the other places to which the consignments were addressed, showed a laudable zeal and ability. With regard to myself, my attention was called, in the first instance, to the formation of the Hanoverian levies. It had been intended to have fixed one general point o^rassem- blement ; but it was foreseen that it would be attended with much inconvenience and expense, thus to bring nearly all the population of the country to one quarter. As the neighbor- hood was now comparatively clear of the enemy, it appeared much more expeditious and advantageous to raise the corps in different places, and to conduct the business of training and arming on the spot where the recruits \\'ere obtained. My suggestions to this effect were immediately acted upon. Another object, but of niuch more commanding interest, was the movement of the Swedish corps, that already occupied Stralsund in considerable force, to a forward position ; and this, it was conjectured, would be increased by the arrival of the Prince Royal to about 11,000 f^trong. Of the negotiations and discussions which liad led to this decisive step of His Royal Highness, I shall say nothing ; but the presence of such a body of troops, under a com- mander so celebrated as Bernadotte, could not fail to have a powerful influence on the events of the campaign and the state of the country, more especially as I am bound here to IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 19 remark, that throughout the Hanoverian dominions he had contrived to render himself popular, and enjoyed a high reputation. It next became my duty to ascertain, as speedily and ac- curately as possible, the military state of affairs at the Prince Royal's head-quarters, after his landing on the continent. I determined, therefore, to detach Lieutenant-colonel Cooke for this purpose : an officer of much zeal and talent, who, I had no doubt, would be able to recommend himself both to the Prince Royal and Mr. Thornton; or if Mr. Thornton should not have arrived from Stockholm, to make his own way through the difficulties with which such a mission was surrounded. Notwithstanding all my anxiety to get forward to Berlin, the first and main object of my attention, I was obliged to remain a day or two in Hamburgh. The time, however, was not unemployed ; for, at the pressing solicitations of General Tettenborn (acquiesced in by Count Kilmansegge on the part of the Hanoverian regency), I was induced to use my influence with General Lyon to augment the issue of arms to General Tettenborn from 3 to 5000 stand. It appeared that the Gen- eral could make use of these 5000 forthwith ; and that the Hanoverian levies, for whose use they had been originally destined, were at that moment by no means in such a state of forwardness as to require them. I was happy to find that this arrangement could be acceded to on the part of General Lyon, without prejudice to the service especially intrusted to him. I had thus an opportunity of obliging General Tettenborn, whose active exertions had afforded the greatest advantage to the common cause ; it being almost incredible how much he had done, and what a force he had brought under arms by a month's exertion. My journey to Berlin was performed Avith as much haste as possible; and prevented all observation on the state of the country, or the disposition of the people. I arrived there on the 22d of April, late at night ; and found a strong expecta- tion prevailing that the king of Prussia would join the Em- peror of Russia in a day or two at Dresden, having set out from Breslau for that purpose. I determined, in consequence, to continue my route immediately to head-quarters. An official communication had just been received, announcing the capitulation of Thorn to General Langcron on the 16th. The garrison, partly French and partly German, consisted of about 3000 men : the latter were allowed their parole, the former were made prisoners of war. It was farther said, that a very fine park of artillery had fallen into the hands of the allies. But an object of more immediate and pressing interest 20 XARRATIVE OF THE WAR was Spandau : its locality made it of immense consequence to Berlin, and its fall was anticipated with great anxiety. The g-arrison had made proposals to surrender, and were at this time waiting for General Wittgenstein's answer ; but if the terms were rejected, an immediate assault was to be made on the place by the troops surrounding it, aided by those which could be collected in Berlin. The subject for General Wittgenstein's consideration was not, however, entirely of a military nature. An opinion pre- vailed, founded on the statements of the French themselves, that an enormous quantity of plunder was lodged in the place, belonging to the Viceroy of Italy. If the garrison w-ere al- lowed to go out with their baggage, all this would be retain- ed and secured ; whereas the General was very desirous that his Russians should get the booty. Under these circum- stances, there was little room to expect that any terms pro- posed would be assented to ; and the assault was daily looked for with no small interest by the inhabitants of Berlin, who would gladly have been relieved, at any cost, from so danger- ous and troublesome a neighbor. These circumstances afforded a good opportunity of con- vincing the allies, practically, what were tlie real principles and feelings with which Great Britain had entered on the contest. Intimations were not wanting, that the only rapid and certain mode of -effecting an object of the greatest im- portance to the safety of Prussia, viz. the recovery of her fortresses, was by money; and it certainly was reported from different sources, that some of the commanders would not be proof against large offers. In reply, it was at once declared that such measures on the part of Great Britain would be wholly out of the question ; that if the allied armies could drive the French over the Rhine, the fortresses would not long hold out; and that we had now but one object to look to, which was to aimihilate Buonaparte by force of arms, and not by treachery or gold. My nearer approach to the scene of operations, served to convince me that tiieir actual aspect was somewhat different from that which the sanguine anticipations of my Hamburgh friends had ventured to predict. At Settin, the allies had met with a slight reverse ; and it was believed that the French armies were advancing, as an intercepted dispatch from the Viceroy to Marshal Ney disclosed a plan of attacking Gene- ral Blucher's corps, which was advanced to Altenburg, where it was unsupported. General D'Yorck had, in consequence, made preparations to meet Beanharnois; and General Blu- cher was ready to encounter Marshal Ney, who was known to be at Eisenach ; while General Sebastiani's corps, chiefly IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 21 cavalry, was at Coburg. The whole force under these two Generals was not less than 50,000 men ; and it was evident that their main army was debouching by the passes and de- files of the Thuringian forest. This forward movement could scarcely fail to lead to important results; and it became probable that within a few days the plains of Jena and Auer- stadt would become the scene of a tremendous conflict ; and if the allies were victorious, that the French must pass the Rhine. My arrival at Dresden was very happily timed. The two Sovereigns had entered the town on the preceding day : an event most propitious, inasmuch as it enabled me to carry into immediate effect the first and most important object of my instructions. His Majesty the King of Prussia having been with the Emperor the greatest part of the morning, as well as having attended a long service at church, it was not possible that he could grant me an audience on that day ; but Baron Hardenberg, the chancellor and first minister of state, gave me an appointment, and entered into a general communication in every respect satisfactory. It was at the moment of this Re-union at Dresden that the weight and importance of the grand military combination became developed. The career of Russian successes had enabled the army to march in the most rigorous winter from the banks of the Moskwa to the shores of the German Ocean. The barriers of the Oder had been passed, and the Rhine was now beginning to be considered as the probable limit of its victorious operations. Prussia was now incorporated in the consolidation of power against France. The King, whose courage and prudence had of late shone forth in a manner worthy of the descendant of the great Frederick, had been rescued by the affectionate loyalty of his people and army from the thraldom prepared for him ; and he now came for- ward from his comparative retirement at Breslau, to place himself at the head of the greatest national efforts which our and it may perhaps be said any, age had witnessed. Of the share which England was prepared to take in this great confederation, some faint idea has already been given ; and the immediate effect of her wise and liberal policy was found to be, that British commerce and British enterprise had now a channel again opened to them in the north of Europe. Our efforts were not alone limited to the supply of military stores, as before enumerated. The circumstances of the allies were such, as made it a case of absolute necessity that they should look to England for what has been truly called " the sinews of war ;" and it may not be amiss to state, what was then well known, that in addition to 500,000/., which was the 22 NAREATIVE OF THE WAR charge of the Russian fleet, two millions sterling were des- tined to sustain the military operations of the Prince Royal of Sweden in the north of Germany, and two millions more were given as a direct aid to Russia and Prussia. In return for efforts of such magnitude, it was agreed, on the other hand, by the allies, that Russia was to employ (exclusive of garrisons) 200,000 men, and Prussia not less than 100,000, in active operations against the enemy. CHAPTER II. Advance of the enemy — State of their troops— Exertions of tlie King of Prussia — Surrender of Spandau— Edict of the Prussian government — Ta- riff of duties — Measures to check the advance of the French — Head-quar- ters of the allied Sovereigns — Position of the opposing armies at the end of April — Policy of Napoleon — The allies propose to pass the Elbe — Plan of operations — The French advance to Dresden — The allied forces cross the Elster — The Emperor Alexander — Plan of attack — Successes of the allies — Obstinate engagement — Retreat of the allies — Precautionary mea- sures — Results of the battle— Subsequent proceedings — Affairs on the Lower Elbe. To resume the detail of occurrences on my arrival at Dresden, it must be remembered that the Foreign-office in England at this period attached intelligent officers to the dif- ferent head-quarters and corps of the allied armies ; amongst them, Sir Robert Wilson was throughout the war conspicu- ous for his ability and gallantry. At the period I am now alluding to, when he was with the advance at Chemnitz, an officer, dispatched by him, arrived at Dresden on the 27th ; and announced that the enemy was moving on our left, and that their advance had reached Jena. In consequence of their approach, the allied army was concentrating itself on the Saale, between Merseburg on the right, and Altenburg on the left. Buonaparte was supposed to have reached Erfurth ; and it was in expectation that he would forthwith risk a bat- tle in the plains, that the allies now effected this concentra- tion. Marshal Kutusoff was unfortunately taken ill at this moment; but there were many able officers to supply his place, so that the general interests of the army were likely to be fully maintained. General Count Wittgenstein had removed his quarters from Dessau, while General Milorado- vitch's corps was thrown forward to Plauen to strengthen the left. Every moment gave indication of a serious conflict, but there was no feeling of apprehension as to the result : for IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 23 though the amount of French force assembled on this side of the Rhine was not estimated at less than 160 or 170,000 men, numerically much superior to that of the allies, yet in their morale and composition they were so decidedly inferior, that a French general-officer had been heard to say, when looking at the new troops, " What shall we do with these sucking- pig-s !'" Their cavalry, too, was in every respect deficient. Still it was impossible not to perceive that the Emperor of the French did not play for so large a stake as the allies in risking a battle. If beaten, the Thuringian mountains were in his rear, and would enable him to escape without being annihilated by the superior cavalry opposed to him ; while the allies, if worsted, would find great difficulty in drawing off, having only one good bridge across the Elbe, at Dresden ; while the commanding point of Magdeburg was in the hands of the enemy. These considerations, however, did not check the forward movements of the allied troops ; and on the 25th, a corps of 15,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry defiled through Dresden in very fine order. On the 27th I was admitted to an audience with His Ma- jesty the King of Prussia, and had the honor of presenting my credentials. It was not possible to be received in a more gracious or satisfactory manner. In adverting to the position of military affairs, His Majesty dwelt much on the extraordi- nary efforts the Prussians had made : observing, however, that the effective force en campagne, at the moment, fell far short of the number to which his army would be ultimately brought by levies, now actually raised, though not yet entirely armed or fully disciplined. His Majesty concluded a very gracious conversation, by renewing the assurances of his de- voted regard and high consideration for His Royal Highness the Prince Regent. The morning of the 27tii brought us likewise the agreeable news of the surrender of Spandau. By the terms of the capitulation, the garrison was allowed to return to France, under an engagement not to serve against the allies for the space of six months. The artillery and every thing else contained in the fortress were to be given up. A point of considerable moment to the commercial interests of Great Britain came at this time under discussion. Amongst the immediate advantages to which we had a right to look as a requital for our great exertions, the destruction of Buona- parte's favorite continental system held the foremost place. An edict of the Prussian government, bearing date the 20th March, had formally declared the abolition of all those re- straints under which the commerce of the north of Europe had so long suffered ; but it was hardly to be expected that 24 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR the remedies applied could be such as to prove at once equal to removing' the evils. Representations v^^ere made to me that a tariff of duties had been issued at all the Prussian ports of the Baltic, so oppressive in its provisions as to destroy British trade altogether, and especially to put an end to any exportation of corn from the Prussian territories. The chan- cellor. Baron Hardenberg, paid immediate attention to my remonstrance on this subject ; and I had the satisfaction of receiving his assurance, that the regulations of the tariff should be suspended, provisionally, until an arrangement con- jointly with Russia could be agreed upon. (See Appendix, No. 2.) The indications of offensive operations on the part of the enemy were not confined to the main army in front of Dres- den. General Sebastiani, with about 8 or 10,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and a proportion of artillery, moved to the Elbe ; while Marshal Davoust advanced from Bremen, in the direction of Rotenbourg, on Harburg. These changes of posi- tion made it necessary for the detachment, dispersed through- out the Electorate of Hanover, to cross the Elbe : which was effected at Boitzenburg, Altenburg, and Harburg, without the smallest loss. Measures were taken to secure the navi- gation of the Elbe, and artillery and infantry were posted at all the points most capable of defence; so that a strong opinion was entertained at the Russian head-quarters that the enemy would find it difficult to press his advance, and impossible to maintain himself permanently at the mouth of the Elbe. The allied Sovereigns removed their head-quarters to Grimma on the 19th. Lord Cathcart on that day informed me it was his desire, as he was under the necessity of fol- lowing His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, that I should re- main at Dresden ; for the purpose of commencing with Baron Hardenberg, the Prussian chancellor of state, and the Rus- sian plenipotentiaries, the previous discussion of the impor- tant objects of the subsidiary convention with Great Britain. I was thus precluded from taking a personal share in the ac- tive operations of the following days. The details of these important occurrences reached me through the reports of those who directed or witnessed the movements. In giving them, however, I may observe, that my position afforded me some facilities for procuring as ex- tensive information as I should have enjoyed had I been my- self present, or stationed in any particular part of the field. A short recapitulation of the leading points in the positions of the opposing armies, at the close of the month of April, will make it more easy to give a clear account of the move- ments which followed ; and will impress more distinctly on IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 25 the minds of my readers the progress of the combined ope- rations. The general position of the allied army was be- tween the Elbe and the Saale : the grand head-quarters being at Altenburg. Count Wittgenstein, with the Russians, had his head-quarters at Zwickau. Kutusoff's corps was some miles in front of Dresden ; General Miloradovitch, forming his advance, at Chemnitz. Next, as regards the Prussians, General Blucher's attention was directed to the mountains which bound Saxony on the side of the Thuringian forest, with his head-quarters at Altenburg. General D'Yorck was farther to the right, towards Dessau ; and still farther north- ward. General Bulow was observing Magdeburg. On the other side, the French army occupied the line of the Saale, from Saalfeld to the Elbe. The Emperor was at Naumburg on the 29th, and directed the operations in person. He was known to have brought all his available means to bear on this point of advance. The corps under the Viceroy of Italy r which had retired from Berlin); Marshal Davoust, who had abandoned Hamburgh and the Lower Elbe ; General Bertrand with reinforcements from Italy : and detachments of cavalry which had been ordered from Spain, and newly-mounted : all combined to swell the total of the French force, and joined themselves to the main army, which the Emperor's astonish- ing activity had reorganized, and which had accompanied him on his return to the scene of fresh operations. The esti- mate of the total amount of the several corps, which placed the French force somewhere about 150,000 men, was cer- tainly not exaggerated ; though, to say the truth, it is very difficult to come at any precise grounds of calculation. Napoleon's policy, at the moment, was to strengthen the impression which his sudden combinations were so well fitted to produce ; and with this object he spared no effort to am- plify his apparent resources. Those writers who have since recorded his exploits have taken an opposite line : they have thought to aggrandize their hero, by representing his means of offence considerably below my impression of their amount. Making due allowances, however, for opposite representa- tions, I think we may take the number I have given as a fair medium ; and say that, including the reserves which were a few marches in the rear under Marshal Oudinot, the Empe- ror of France commenced his operations with a force of 150,000 men actually in the field. The reputed numerical strength of the allies would exceed this number ; but in that estimate were included the raw levies, but newly starting into military action ; and even from the troops which were in a comparative state of discipline, large deductions ought to be made for the corps left in observation of the several for- C 26 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR tresses. The best opinions coincide in estimating the total force advanced beyond the Elbe at about 85,000 men : of which 55,000 were Prussians, and 30,000 composed the Rus- sian grand army. A strong- opinion prevailed at head-quarters, that the move- ment now about to take place of passing the Elbe by the al- lies was both critical and false: critical, as a defeat would involve circumstances of great disadvantage ; false, as in the case of a victory the inclosed country of defiles and gorges bordering the Saale, through which the enemy must retire, would prevent our superior cavalry from reaping the fruits of success. The more prudent plan of operations, in the opinion of many, would have been that of a defensive camp (as pointed out in the King of Prussia's memoirs) established between Wittenberg and Torgau. To force the enemy to pass the river, if he would fight with you, and thus compel him to a battle in the plains stretching from Wittenberg to the sea, would have been the direct advantage of this plan of operations ; besides acting on a temporary defensive one of this nature, would have given the Russian reinforcements, which were known to be within fifteen days' march, time to arrive; and thus the means for future offensive movements would be much increased. Such wore some of the views maintained by those whose aversion to the plan of operations resolved upon was a mat- ter of notoriety. Amongst these were so many names of eminence, that it is impossible not to suppose that political rather than military considerations had been allowed to influ- ence the decision which had been taken. The position of Saxony directly, and Austria remotely, must have influenced the councils of the allied Sovereigns : there were elements in the combination which lay too deep for mere military rea- soning, founded on a superficial or partial view of affairs. No reasoning, however, could have anticipated that any considerations would have induced the allies, whose chief superiority was in cavalry, to have withdrawn from the plain where that cavalry would have been available, to contend in villages flanked by masked-batteries, and strengthened by intrenchments and every aid of art. Both sides, however, were resolved on assuming the offensive ; and, while the French Emperor made his advance on the road from Erfurth to Dresden by way of Leipsic, the allies were making a par- allel movement on the direct road from Dresden to Jena. The French army crossed the Saale on the last day of April, possessing itself of Weissenfels and Naumburg; and on the same day the Prussian army was collected at Borne. On the 1st of May it was at Kothen ; Count Wittgenstein, with the IN GERMANY AND FRANCE- 27 Russians, at Zwickau ; General Winzingerode observed and kept the enemy in check on the Flossgraben.* In the night of the 1st of May, the allied armies en masse crossed the Elster at Pegau. General Miloradovitch had undertaken to watch the enemy on the road from Chemnitz while this movement was effected on the right, as there was reason to apprehend he might push forward a strong corps in this direction, and thus get into the rear of the allied army. The remaining part of the Russian grand army had advanced from Dresden, by way of Rochlitz, to the Elster, and taken up a position to the rear of Wittgenstein ; and Blucher, with his Prussians, on the morning of the 2d of May, moved in the same direction to act as reserves. The allied Sovereigns, who had changed their head-quarters on the 29th from Dres- den to Grinima, were with the reserves. Their own con- spicuous courage and spirit of enterprise would, under any circumstances, have led them forward ; but at this moment the Emperor of Russia's presence in the field was a matter of no ordinary importance, as it served to allay certain feel- ings of annoyance which appeared amongst some of the older officers of the Russian army, in consequence of the nomina- tion of Count Wittgenstein as commander-in-chief upon the death of Kutusoff. It would be idle and improper in me to enter at large into the military feelings of a great power, who took at this period the most prominent and effective part in the war. In making the above allusion, I have only recorded it to show that so early as the period in question, it w^as necessary for the Emperor Alexander to use all that firmness, intrepidity, and tact, which pre-eminently distinguished the latter period of his brilliant career. The imperfect sketch above traced may be sufficient to give a correct idea of the relative position of the hostile ar- mies on the morning of the 2d of May. It will appear, that the leading divisions had passed each other in opposite an nearly parallel directions. Buonaparte, in his eagerness t make a dash on Leipsic, had extended his columns along the line of march ; so that while his advance was close upon Lutzen, his rear had scarcely cleared the deep valley of Griimsbach, on the road from Weissenfels to Leipsic. The united armies of the allies, which, as I have stated above, had crossed the Elster the preceding night at Pegau, were thus manoeuvring on his right flank ; and may be said * This operation was rendered memorable by the death of the Duke of Istria (Marshal Bessieres), who was killed on the Ist by a cannon-shot, in a smart conflict in advance of Weissenfels, near Posen. 28 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR to have had the choice of time, place, and manner of conduct- ing the attack. The plan of it was nearly as follows : the enemy, it was perceived, occupied in force the villages of Gross Gorschen, Klein Gorschen, Rahno, and Kaya, which lie near each other, somewhat in the form of an irregular square, in the plain between Lutzen and Pegau. The ad- vance of the allies was intended for the purpose of driving the enemy from these villages, and bringing the brunt of the attack on the right of the enemy's position, which appeared to be parallel to the main road from Weissenfels, If the endeavor to turn his right wing should prove successful, the cavalry, it was expected, would have an opportunity of act- ing with advantage ; and the result would have been deci- sive, inasmuch as the line of communication with the rear would have been cut through. The plain is traversed by the deep channel of a rivulet, called the Flossgraben, which was crossed by the whole combined army in small compact columns ; and it served as a support to the right after these columns had deployed. It was now noon, and some of the Prussian troops had been for thirty-six hours on the march ; a halt was therefore ordered behind the heights, about a mile and a half from Gross Gorschen. These heights afforded a view of the enemy's columns in full march towards Leipsic, by the way of Lutzen. The appearance of our battalions disconcerted this design ; and their foremost troops, hastily recalled, could be observed retracing their steps, and drawing towards the villages in their centre, against which the main attack was now to be directed. The first line of the assailants was formed by the Prussians under General Blucher ; the second by the corps of Russians, which had been under the imme- diate command of Wittgenstein ; the Russian guard and grenadiers were in reserve, together with the cavalry of both armies. After an iiours rest the attack upon the vil- lages was begun ; and after a desperate resistance, Rahno and Klein Gorschen (whicli lie about a cannon-shot to the right and left of Gross Gorschen) were carried by two brigades of Russian infantry under General Ziethen. For several hours this success was maintained ; and our columns pushed forward, driving the enemy before them be- yond Kaya, which was in flames, and left unoccupied by both parties. It was now about six o'clock, p. m., and the allies had gained, by liard fighting, more than a mile of ground. The village of Staarniedn], on the enemy's right wing, was evacuated ; but the want of sufiicient force prevented the allies from occupying it, although the second line had been brought into action. It was obvious Napoleon considered that IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 29 the fate of the battle would be decided by the possession of the five villages, and the obstinacy of the defence proved the importance he attached to them. By this protracted struggle the issue was in fact determined, as it afforded time to bring up General Bertrand's corps in support of the right of the French line ; while on the left, the Viceroy of Italy, who had brought back his troops almost from the very gates of Leipsic, was in sufficient force to baffle an effort made by Prince Eugene of Wirtemburg, with a corps of Prussian infantry, to turn the enemy's position by its left flank. This movement failed altogether : Prince Eugene, instead of out- flanking the enemy, was himself outflanked, and kept his place in the line only by an exertion of the greatest bravery. This was the state of things when the day closed : doubt- ful and hard-earned success in the centre was counterbalanced by the threatening aspect of both wings of the enemy's army, which was steadily advancing; \vhile no adequate force could be brought forward to resist them, formidable as they were both from numbers and from the comparative freshness of their troops: it thus became necessary to give up the point to which the attack of the morning had been directed. Before the resolution was taken to draw off the troops, a very gallant effort was made to snatch from the enemy the fruits of his success. As soon as the darkness of the night afforded a cover to the attempt, the whole force of cavalry, which had scarcely been engaged at all during the day, was ordered forward witli the hope of effecting a surprise, and driving the enemy from his ground at the moment he thought himself secure in its occupation. The attempt did not suc- ceed ; in the first instance, the advanced posts of the enemy's line were driven in without difriculty ; but the dense masses of infantry which were next to be encountered, and the con- fusion caused by a deep ravine in which several squadrons found themselves entangled, occasioned the failure of the plan. The assailants were soon dispersed in all directions; and the allies were not only unsuccessful in their immediate object, but lost the services of their cavalry at the critical moment when it became necessary to withdraw their columns, in the very front of a daring and successful enemy. The retreat was effected early in the morning of the 3d upon Borne and Altenburg. During these important events, from the 29th of April to the 2d of May, I had continued, most reluctantly on my part, at Dresden, in the preliminary diplomatic negotiations before detailed. I had made vain efforts to get away on the Ist; but it was not till the eveninorof the 2d that my wishes C2 30 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR were so far accomplished as to enable me to set out for the Prussian head-quarters, which it was said were at Borne. I had the mortification to find, on my arrival the morning of the 3d, that the battle had been fought. I was met on my road by all the equipages and attirail of the army proceeding to the rear. Much confusion was observable. The roads were choked up with the immense train of carriages and baggage of every description. Precautionary measures were imme- diately adopted to protect the allied army from being hurried across the Elbe. Of the ten thousand remarks and observations to which such a battle gave occasion, amongst those who had been personally engaged in it, I shall mention only that the best opinions were agreed in considering that the French had, in a certain degree, been unprepared for the attack ; and were indebted tor the result to the steadiness with which the villages in the centre were maintained, and time thus afforded for calling in the force from the extremities of the line. The allies certainly had an advantage throughout the day; but the appearance of the Viceroy on the right at the close of the evening, when there v/ere no more reinforcements to bring up, changed the face of things. Night came on before any advantage was reaped, and the allies remained on the field of battle. It was observed, too, and the fact was of im- portance, that tlie greater part of the enemy's corps actually engaged were German troops, Westphalian and Bavarian, Some of the more sanguine calculators indulged an expecta- tion, that these would lay down their arms; but all accounts agreed that they fought with most desperate bravery. The question of comparative force was next the subject of much debate. The most probable conclusion at which I could arrive was, that Buonaparte had brought up about 110,000 men ; the Viceroy 30,000, with 2500 cavalry and 1300 ar- tillery ; making about 140,000 men : this agrees nearly with the estimate given before. The French infantry was described as good, and the artillery well served ; but they had no flying artillery, and only little cavalr3^ With respect to the allied troops engaged, the corps of Wittgenstein, D'Yorck, Bluchor, and Winzingerode, would amount to near 60,000, including 20,000 cavalry : to these we must add, 9000 under Bulovv, 10,000 with IMiloradovitch, and General Massenbourg's division of about 25,000: making something more than 80,000 men disposable in the field. 1 had, however, reason to believe, that not more than 20,000 Russians and 50,000 Prussians, if so many, were engaged. The loss of the allies in killed and wounded did not fall short of 10,000 men, amongst whom were some names of note. IN GERxMANY AND FRANCE. 31 Prince Leopold of Hesse Honlbourg was unfortunately killed : the Prince of Mecklenburg Strelitz, and the deservedly cele- brated Prussian General Scharnhorst, (whose services in organizing the landwehr had been so conspicuous), were amongst the wounded. The Prince died the next day at Pegau. General Scharnhorst lingered till the 28th of June : his loss was universally regretted ; and his country has since done homage to his merits, by the erection of a public monu- ment. General Blucher himself received a slight w^ound. Both the allied Sovereigns displayed the greatest courage. Not a single piece of artillery was lost, and but few prisoners were taken. Several of the enemy's guns and tumbrils, with about 6 or 800 prisoners, were carried off as the trophies of this daj^ That the actual superiority during- the battle had been on the side of the allies, may be inferred from the fact that the villages from which their columns were withdrawn, on the morning of the 3J, were not occupied by the enemy till late in the day. I returned to Dresden on the 5th : our opera- tions for retreat were conducted without haste. The allies marched on the 4th from Borne and Altenburg to Rochlitz and Colditz ; on the 5th to Bobeln and Nossen ; on the 6th to Meissen and Willsdorf. The rear-guard, under Milora- dovitch, was engaged on the 5t]i at Teffersdorf; on the 6th at Ertzdorf: and General Blucher had a very smart affair at Colditz, in fliiling back upon Meissen. Count Wittgenstein's head-quarters were established in Dresden on the 5th ; and the train of the utlirail continued passing without intermission. Some idea may be formed of the number, when it is stated that on one road 13,000 wagons passed in succession. It became now very evident that the line of the Elbe was to be abandoned. But before we enter into an account of the events which followed this resolution, it v/ill be necessary to cast a glance at the state of affairs on the Lower Elbe, and to trace the immediate effect of the battle of the 2d upon the operations in that quarter. We left General Sebastiani in rnovenient from his position on the Aller, and Atarshal Davoust advancing from Bremen. The precautionary measures, wliich \vere there rendered necessary to keep the navigation of the river unmolested, proved unavailing. Marshal Davoust, with 10,000 infantry, including the division of Vandamme, possessed himself of Ijuneburg, Harburg, and Stade; and established his posts at intermediate points along the left bank of the Elbe. A corps also, in number about 2500, was pushed forward to Cuxhaven ; which they entered, though not without considerable loss from the fire of some English gun-boats which opened upon 32 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR their column in its advance. An attack on the island of Wilhelmsburg was, in the first instance, unsuccessful ; but it was renewed the next day with better fortune, and Hamburgh was in consequence exposed to the danger of bombardment. CHAPTER m. Force under Buonaparte — Numerical strength of the allies— Composition of the French army— State of the Uusdians— Character of the Cossacks — Grenailjcrs of the guard — Unnecessary a^irai/— Animation of the Prus- sian army — 'J'he Poles — Line of conduct pirsued by the allies— Review of operations— The allied army crostiRH the Elbi;— Attempts of the enemy — Buonaparte enters Dresden— Concentration of the allied forces — Affair at Weissig— The King of Saxony declares in favor of the French— The con- temJing armies in presence of each other — Force of the enemy — Gallant action of General Bniclay Da Tolly — Hiiccesses of the allies. The allies, ha vino- considered it expedient, after the battle of Lutzen, to repass tjie Elbe, it may not be irrelevant to discuss a little the plan of operations then thought best to be pursued. By the most authentic accounts, it appeared that Buona- parte's army comprised a ibrce of 110,000 men, including 10 to 15,000 Bavarian contingents; the Viceroy's corps, com- posed of four division^!, amounted to 41,000; Ney's corps, to 30,000 ; Davoust, Sebastiani, and Van(lan)me, to 24,000 ; the garrison of Magdeburg and Wittenberg, to 12,000: making in the whole a disposable ollensive force of nearly 200,000 men; allowing out of the gross miml)er, garrisons for the fortresses. In addition to tlie above may be enumerated, the Saxon army at Torgau of 13,000 men. With so powerful a force, although its composition iniglit be very inefficient, yet if aided by the advantages of his strong fortresses on the Elbe, Oder, and Vistulii, there was litHe doubt of ]>iiona,parte's at- tempting to relrieve by offensive un)V(Miieiits his late dis- asters. To calculate next tiie nmnerical force of the allies, and their means of carrying on the war, or making resistance between the Eli)e and the Odor, becomes important. From the best information 1 could obtain, Wittgenstein's force, com- posed of Russians and Prussians now concentrated, amounted to little more than 00,000 men. tliongh increased to 80,000 by tiio arrival of Barchiy do Tolly \silli his corps (l\irinef ; Bulow's corps, stated at 18,000, might have been raised by the militia, landwehr, and Count Woronzotf's division, to IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 33 40,000 : to which may also be added, the armaments on the Lower Elbe, about 15,000 ; but then their composition could not be reckoned upon, or accurately stated. Of any means of increasing this force by that which could be derived from the blockades of the garrisons, there appeared no prospect, as in general the garrisons of the enemy in the fortresses were nearly double the blockading force. The re- inforcements arriving from the interior of Russia were highly estimated : Labanow's at 40,000 ; Tolstoy's at more than that amount, besides other corps. Having considered the general numerical forces of tlie con- tending armies, it may be right to make a few remarks on their composition and state of efficiency. The French army was chiefly formed of young troops, but possessed experienced and excellent officers. They had little cavalry ; but, to all appearance, an imposing and well-served artillery. Their old soldiers were distributed into 20,000 guards with Buona- parte, 10,000 with the Viceroy, and the same number between Ney and Davoust. In addition to the celerity of movement which always distinguishes a French army, their possession of so many strong places, both on the Elbe and the Oder, gave them a peculiar facility and security of operations; while the allies were reduced to a state of fluctuating uncer- tainty and difficulty with respect to their communications, in whatever direction their movements might be carried on. It was impossible not to observe that the state of the Rus- sian army was, at this period, somewhat on the decline, from the incredible fatigues and liardships it had gone through during two campaigns. The battalions were so weak, that three or four scarcely formed a regiment, and seldom ex- ceeded 250 or 300 men. The cavalry was fine and com- manding. Tlie horses, subsisting in a country abounding with forage, were in good condition : yet, in a retreat of some ex- tent, no advantage was taken of this superiority over the enemy; nor did it seem politic so to do, as the plains were avoided, and the grand army (excepting indeed Bulow's corps, which was then in a situation likely to be obliged to seek its safety in retreat on the shores of the Baltic), buried in the mountains and defiles that separate Saxony from Bohemia. A considerable portion of the Russian cavalry was composed of the Cossacks. It would be unbecoming in me to speak disparagingly of a description of troops which, on many occasions, signalized themselves greatly, especially when well commanded : nor is it my opinion that they are an inefficient body, when applied in a particular manner, on certain occasions ; for instance, in fol- lowuig up, harassing, and living upon the flanks and rear of a 34 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR retiring army. From the observations I have made of these troops (which may be nearly assimilated to the Guerillas in Spain), I conceive that they are not formidable when a bold enemy advances; and being no longer buoyed up by their spoliations and hopes of plunder, they become careless and indifferent in their exertions. Having- little discipline, they spread much confusion and disorder along the line of march ; roaming in pelotons everywhere without control ; and lastly, being dispersed as bat-men and orderlies with every officer throughout the army. I should suppose it quite impossible to ascertain at any time, or with any accuracy, their effective amount. The regular heavy cavalry are undoubtedly very fine; the men gigantic ; horses good ; equipments superior, and in per- fect condition. The light cavalry are less striking in point of horses and general appearance ; but some of the hussars and lancers are good. The artillery seems particularly fine and well appointed : the horses to the brigades belonging to the guards are more round, compact, and perfect, than those in any other service. There is, however, a wide difference between the staple of the Russian army and the Emperor's guards. The latter are very select, both cavalry and infantry ; nothing, indeed, can be superior. The grenadiers of the guard are generally very tall men. The cuirassiers are equally large and stout: the discipline and well-dressed state of these men are very imposing. The whole appearance of a Russian army denotes hardihood and bravery, inured to any privations. They sub- sist well on black bread : few cattle are seen following the army. Their commissaries have little to do ; and the great burden of managing the commissariat, which is so irksome a task to a British commander on service, seems perfectly light and easy to a Russian chief Before I dismiss this hasty sketch of the Russian army, I cannot, as a military n)an, refrain from offering some remarks upon the enormous unnecessary altirail by which it is at- tended. The numerous baggages, wagons of all descrip- tions, &c. &c. exceed belief; and no general officer has less than eighteen or twenty orderlies, cavalry and infantry, which always follow him. In fact, I am persuaded the men out of the ranks, and the followers and military attendants in a Russian army, amount at least to one-fiflh of the total number. With regard to the officers, they are certainly brave men, and some of superior abilities; but the generality of them did not at this period possess those talents and resources found IN GERflJANY AND FRANCE. 35 amongst their opponents, so long initiated in the school of Buonaparte. The general tone prevalent throughout the military officers of the Russian army was of a desponding nature. They thought they had done enough, especially as Austria had not declared herself, and Saxony continued to oppose them. The tide of their success seemed to them arrested, and they eagerly looked to their own frontiers. The soldiers of the Prussian army had, at this crisis, a higher and more animated feeling: they were fighting for their existence ; and every mile, if in retreat, raised a mur- mur of discontent. Their state of discipline was good, and their superior officers most efficient ; their cavalry fine, and artillery excellent. Had the enemy overrun their states, the means of increas- ing their army would not only have been doubtful, but, on the contrary, there must have been a considerable diminution of effective force for their garrisons. Colberg, Konigsberg, Spandau, &c. &c. must each have been supplied with a strong force ; and no strong reinforcements could have been looked for to the Prussian armies. Again, the Poles required consideration ; and from the in- formation I received, there was every reason to fear the enemy would have had an additional force from them of 30 or 40,000 men ; and we should have had a hostile country to contend with, as Poland became independent. To return to the state of the campaign. — It must be con- sidered that the enemy had a superior numerical force imnie- diately mancEuvring upon the positions of the allies, sup- ported by two lines of fortresses, which could secure aU their operations : and under such circumstances, it would have been impolitic to have contended against them with inferior means, between the Elbe and the Oder, and thus risked the loss of the Russian army, by its being possibly cut off from its own frontier. For although it is to be remarked that, upon the noyau of this Russian army, they could raise one in their own country of 300,000 men ; yet, in the event of the loss of it and all the experienced officers, the military power of Russia might have been crushed for a generation. Was it possible then for the allies, without a fortress on either of the two rivers, and with inferior armies, to act on the of- fensive ] Were they .so to act, what would be their attempts, in which, from the nature of their position, they would not be foiled — in which they would not expose their line of com- munications ? And under such circumstances, what rational liopes of success could be entertained 7 It is a melanclioly truth, that the allies, with the same 36 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR fearless but incautious rapidity that urged Buonaparte to Moscow, hastened on to the banks of the Elbe and to the shores of the German Ocean ; calculating on the spirit of the countries they hoped ultimately to deliver, and on the chance of uniting Austria, Sweden, and Denmark, in one common cause: thus reckoning on the destruction of the French army to such an extent, that it would be impossible for Buonaparte to assemble another before the month of June at the earliest. Calculating with every sanguine view on these events, they rushed from the boundaries of Russia into the heart of Ger- many, leaving nearly all the powerful fortresses in their rear (two only of inferior notice having as yet capitulated) ; and now, too late, they found that Buonaparte, even in May, as- sailed them with nearly double the force they had collected. According to military calculations, indeed, should Austria not continue a decidedly hostile party, she would probably aim at compelling them to extinguish the flame in the con- federate states of Germany, which they had too prematurely and too rashly kindled. Even the policy of departing from Kalish was very doubt- ful ; but as to that of passing the Elbe, unsupported, with barely the means of fighting one battle (for want of ammunition was given out as the reason for retreating), there can be but one rational opinion of its extreme hazard. The enemy having passed the Elbe at Dresden, Meissen, Wittenberg, and Torgau, and having a direct line of only a few leagues to their main fortresses, Custrin, Stettin, and Glogau, could advance with security and rapidity. The al- lies, having collected on the Breslau road, had no alternative, if their flanks were turned, or if Berlin, and Glogau, and Custrin, were the enemy's line of march, but to attack them in flank, and risk every thing ; or make for Silesia, and as soon as possible station themselves behind the Oder. Had they fallen on the enemy immediately on their passage of the river, they might have occasioned them a momentary check. Had they collected their army in a central point at Torgau (instead of bringing every thing on the river Spree to a moun- tainous country, where the superiority of their cavalry was lost), and moved from right or left, as they might have been threatened, making their retreat, if necessary, on Frankfort, thus connecting their whole line of operation by having a central position, the advance would certainly have been more safe and advantageous. A ttic (hi pont could have been thrown up at Frankfort: from thence to the Vistula they might have retired under the protection of Marienbcrger, Plotyk, and Thorn, thus keeping the shortest and most direct line, )hey could certainly with less risk attempt any consider- IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 37 able affair with the enemy ; but by the movement executed, it was to be feared that the enemy bearing in force on the right would leave no alternative but a direct and rapid re- treat. The allied army passed the Elbe on the 8th of May. The head-quarters of the Emperor and King of Prussia were es- tablished at BischofFswerde ; and General Wittgenstein, vidth the main body of the army, was marching on the great roads leading towards Bautzen. The corps of General Blucher passed the Elbe at Meissen (General Kleist's corps having put itself in communication with him), while General Bu- low's corps still remained on the left bank of the Elbe at Dessau to watch the enemy's movements. It redounds infinitely to the credit of the allied army, that during the passage of so formidable a river, with the enemy advancing upon it towards his own fortresses, the operation was conducted with perfect order, and that not even a car- riage or attirail of any kind was left behind. Some works, indeed, had been thrown up on the left bank to cover the bridges; and these, when the enemy had passed, it was thought proper to abandon. It was not accurately ascertained upon what points of the river the enemy was directing his principal corps ; and as he possessed the support of the strong fortress of Wittenberg on his flank, and it seemed uncertain what line of policy the Saxons would now adopt at Torgau, it may be easily imagin- ed how difficult, if not impossible it would ha^e been, with the aid of these places in the enemy's favor, for the allies to have prevented his forcing the passage of the river under a heavy fire of well-appointed artillery. On the night of the 8th, the enemy made attempts to re- establish the arches of the main bridge at Dresden ; but the Russian artillery w^as so well directed, tliat he failed in his object; but succeeded on the 9th in passing near Raditz. The ground being very commanding on the left bank, and favoring their establishing batteries of heavy guns, they pass- ed in boats, and covered themselves advantageously. The passage was very bravely disputed by General Milor- adovitch's rear-guard ; and the Russian artillery, after dis- playing the greatest coolness and courage, was only with- drawn from the impossibility of contending against the su- perior position and fire of the enemy. From the best authenticated accounts, Buonaparte had en- tered Dresden in person ; while Eugene Beauharnois' corps and Marsha] Macdonald's were stated to be immediately op- posed to us. On the 10th, the allied army continued its march on Bautzen ; and as it was deemed advisable to concentrate D 38 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR the forces, General Blucher was ordered to Camenz, and General Kleist's corps to fall back upon him from Muhlberg, while General Bulow's retreat, if necessary, was directed on Roslitz. General Kleist's corps was attacked by an advanced g-uard of the corps of the enemy which liad crossed at Meissen, and moved by Konigsbruck ; and a sharp affair took place, in which the enemy made no impression. The spirit of the rear-guard of General . Miloradovitch's corps was also very conspicuous on this day at Weissig', where the enemy suffered considerably from the charges of the Russian cavalry. About this period, it was unfortunately ascertained that the Saxons remained favorable to the enemy. General Heilraan was deposed from his command, anil the fc^rtress of Torgau delivered up to Marshal Ney and General Regnier. The head-quarters of the allied army were moved on the 12th to Herrnhut, on the road to Gorlitz ; and the army took up a position near Hochkirch, a field already so celebrated in the Seven Years' War. General Miloradovitch's corps was again engaged, during the whole of this day, with the enemy, who sustained a very severe loss.* The whole army was in position on the night of the 13th, except General Bulow's corps, which still remained on the right ; and was in readiness to assist the landwehr and levies of the Prussian states, which amounted to above 40,000 men, and were daily increasing. General Miloradovitch was still in advance of Bautzen. General Barclay de Tolly's rein- forcements were expected to arrive in a day or two : several new corps of Prussians were come up, and the Russians re- ceived an accession of several thousand convalescents. The allied army remained in position on the 14th. The enemy made no apparent movement. General Sebastiani and Mar- shal Davoust v;ere reported to be moving on Magdeburg. General Miloradovitch having been pressed by the enemy in force, passed the river Spree on this day, and the enemy had taken up a position within cannon-shot of our advance. Up to the 17th, the respective armies had remained in presence of each other, without the occurrence of any event of importance. The allies had strengthened the position they * I cannot here refiaia from giving jiiiiblicity toa report made to nie by Sir Robert V\^jl3on on the lOtli, in the f iliowing terms, of a most njerilorious individual, and a much esteemed and dear relative of mine, the son of Sir Walter James, Bart., who was serving as a volunteer and attache to my mission with the armies: — " Mr. John Jrimos has merited and gained great eredit for hifl gallant zeal in yesterday's afl'air. All the generals, and par- ticularly Miloradovitch, express great admiration of him, and will slate his good Hervice to the Emperor." I afterwards learnt that General Milor- adovitch recommended Mr. John James to His Imperial Majesty for an Order of Went, which he obtained. IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 39 had taken up by many strong field-works and intrenchments; and seemed determined, in ardent hope and unabated confi- dence, to await the enemy's attack. The recent arrival of Genera.1 Barclay de Tolly's corps in the position, added con- siderably to their strength. The enemy had been reconnoitred on both flanks ; and it appeared that the great body of his army was assembled in this quarter, as no force had been stationed between the range of mountains which separate Saxony from Bohemia, and which bounded our left flank, though it was certainly possible for reinforcements to be passing on routes bearing on Custrin and Frankfort on the Oder ; but as yet there had been no such intelligence. It was difficult, from the nature of the country, to ascertain the force the enemy might have in motion. They occupied all the villages around. Patroles had apparently been made with a view to an attack, but it was delayed much longer than appeared to be necessary. On the night of the 17th and 18th, the enemy deboucheed in the direction of Luckau and Lubben on our right: the force was stated to consist of Regnier's corps. Intelligence having been also received that General Lauriston, with 9000 men, would march to reinforce this detachment. Generals Barclay de Tolly and D'Yorck, with a strong corps, were sent to intercept and fall upon General Lauriston. General Barclay de Tolly fell in with the enemy about six o'clock in the evening of the 18th, in the neighborhood of Konigswartha; and a sharp contest ensued, which was put an end to only by nightfall, and in which the allies were completely successful. They drove back the enemy at all points ; took upwards of 1500 prisoners, a general of division, and eleven pieces of cannon ; besides the enemy's loss in killed and wounded, which was considerable. General D'Yorck was engaged more on the right, and en- countered a strong force (supposed to be Marshal Ney's) sta- tioned for the support of General Lauriston's corps. He was in action from daybreak on the 19th till eleven o'clock at night, and with considerable success, though engaged against very superior numbers. A very brisk attack was also made on the same day by the enemy, who endeavored to possess themselves of the town of Bautzen. They manoeuvred on the left, but in reality aimed at General Miloradovitch's right, who sustained the attack most gallantly, with the assistance of General Kleist's corps, which was sent to his support. The conduct of the troops engaged was highly commendable; but two brilliant charges of Russian light cavalry were particu- larly conspicuous. 40 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR CHAPTER IV. Intentions nf the enemy — General Miloradovitch withdraws from Bautzen — Observations on the position of tlie two grand armies — Reported move- ments of the enemy — Preparations of the allies — Battle near Bautzen — General Barclay de Tolly forced to retire — Gallant conduct of the Prussians under Blucher — Advantage obtained by the French — Retreat of the allies — Results of the battle — Heavy losses of the allies — Spirit of the army — The allies continue to retreat — Attempts of the enemy — Successful ma- noeuvre of General Blucher — Distinction conferred on Sir Robert Wilson — The French enter Breslau— Armistice — Anxiety respecting Austria — Review of the state of the allied arniy. After the military movements on the 20th, and the attack on Bautzen by the enemy, his intention appeared to be to force the river Spree, and pass to some heights on the right of the allies : thus threatening General Miloradovitch's rear, and gaining advantageous ground from which his artillery could sweep the main position of the allies, and cover by its fire the dispositions tor the general attack. The conflict which ensued was bravely supported. A Russian battalion and some Prussian lancers, under cover of a battery, boldly advanced alone, and contested the heights in spite of the enemy's powerful efforts, until they were supported by Gene- ral Kleist's corps. In the mean time, on the extreme right, the enemy's corps followed Generals Barclay de Tolly and D'Yorck in their retrograde movement from their expedition against General Lauriston. General D'Yorck's corps entered the position in the evening of the 19th, but the night was spent before the Vfhole of General Barclay de Tolly's division was on the ground. General Miloradovitch repulsed the repeated efforts made by the enemy to force him on the left; and his columns, which had attempted to pass into the mountains, were kept in check. Finding, however, that General Kleist had fallen back into the main position. General Miloradovitch withdrew entirely from the river Spree and the town of Bautzen, and occupied the ground marked out for him in the general line. Previous to entering into a description of the battle about to ensue, it may not be irrelevant to make a few short observa- tions. Two great armies had now been tiirec days in presence of each other. The allies determined to meet the attack in the position they had chosen ; having weighed the conse- quences likely to result from a retreat, even to a more favor- able one at Gorlitz, against the advantages they now possess- ed : and they decided wisely, for every retrograde movement, in the present posture of affairs, prejudiced public opinion ; IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 41 and the soldiers had already begun to lose something of their morale^ as the Russian troops were not fitted at this particu- lar crisis to support a retreat in the immediate presence of an enemy, although vigorous, orderly, and careful to avoid need- less exposure. The ground that had been selected for the battle was open, and adapted for cavalry in the centre. On the left flank, the mountains were not unlike those which flank- ed the left of the English army at the battle of Talavera ; and some strong batteries added to the security of this part of the position. It then extended through some villages, which are strongly intrenched, and the plain, to some com- manding hills on the right, rising abruptly, and aflbrding strong points of support. But the country beyond these was open, and intersected by roads in all directions ; and there appeared no impediment to the enemy's moving round the flank of the allies, if their columns of infantry could cope witii the masses of cavalry on the plain. At this period, reports of the enemy's movements were A'cry contradictory. Some affirmed that Buonaparte was in person at the camp opposite Bautzen ; that Beauharnois' corps, Marmont's, and the troopsof the Rhenish confederation, were with him ; and that he meditated an immediate attack : others conjectured that not more than 30,000 men were immediately in our front. There appeared some difficulty in the interior arrangements of the Russian army, between the Emperor and his Cfeneral-in-chief The Prussians were in much the same relation to their allies, as the Portuguese in the Peninsula were to the British ; and the King, depressed both from pub- lic and private misfortune, lived much secluded with his aides-de-camp and staff! At this period Count Stadion ar- rived ; and the ministers, it was understood, were busily em- ployed in framing terms of mediation and pacification ; so that it was generally believed that Austria would now come forward and join the alliance. Such were the actual circum- stances of the armies on the eve of the battle of Bautzen. At day-break, the position in advance of Wurzen and Hochkirch was attacked by the enemy, under the command cf Buonaparte in person, who, in fact, had assembled all his fjrces for this effort, and had not detached largely, as was supposed, to other quarters. The ground selected by the allies to resist the enemy's ap- proach on the great roads to Silesia and the Oder, was bound- ed, as I have before stated, on the left by the range of moun- tains which separate Lusatia from Bohemia, over which Mar- shal Daun marched to the battle and victory of Hochkirch. Some strong commanding heights, on which batteries had been constructed near the village of Teukowitz (separated from D2 42 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR the chain of mountains by streams and marshy ground), formed the defence to the left of the position ; and beyond and in front of it, many batteries, defended by infantry and caval- ry, were stationed, on a ridge that projected into the low ground near the river Spree. It then extended to the right, through villages which were strongly intrenched, across the great roads leading from Bautzen to Hochkirch and Gorlitz ; thence in front of the village of Burschwitz, to three or four very commanding hills which rise abruptly in a conical shape : these, with the high ridge of Kreckwitz, were strengthened by batteries, and were considered to form the right point of the line. The ground in the centre was favorable for cavalry, except in some marshy and uneven parts, where their operations were impeded. Fleches were constructed, and intrenchments thrown up at advantageous distances on the plain : in front of which ran a deep rivulet, which extended round the right of the position. On the extreme right the country was flat and woody, and intersected by the roads above-mentioned, bearing towards the Bober and the Oder. General Barclay de Tolly's force was stationed here as a mancGuvring corps, especially to guard against the enemy's attempts on the right and rear of the allies ; and it was not immediately in position. The extent of the whole line was from three to four English miles. The different corps occupying it were as follows: Generals Kleist's and D'Yorck's corps in echelon, and m re- serve on the right ; General Blucher's, Count Wittgenstein's (commanded by General Riefski), and General Milorado- vitch's, formed on the left; and the guards and grenadiers, with all the Russian cavalry, were stationed in reserve in the centre. The enemy evinced early in the action a determination to press the flanks of the allies : a very strong corps had been stationed in the mountains on our left, which favored their plan of warfare ; but General Miloradovitch having anticipa- ted this mancEuvre, had detached Prince Gorshicoff'and Count Osterman with ten battalions of light troops, and a large corps of Cossacks, v/ith their artillery under Colonel Davidofl^ to occupy these hills. After a sharp skirmish in this quarter, and a distant cannonading on the- right, v/hich conmienced the action, the enemy began to develop his forces, and move his different columns of attack to their respective stations. The contest, in the mountains gradually became warmer, and was supported on their side by a very powerful line of artillery. The Prince of Wirtemburg's and General St. Priest's divisions of General Miloradovitch's corps were here IN GERMANY AND PRANCE. 43 sharply engaged, and a successfiil charge of cavalry was made against some guns of the enemy. Buonaparte was now visible, on a commanding spot, direct- ing the battle. He deployed, in front of the town of Bautzen, bodies of his guards, cavalry, and lancers ; displayed heavy columns of infantry on the esplanade before it ; and brought up, in addition, a number of brigades of artillery, with which he occupied some advantageous heights between the position of the allies and Bautzen. These demonstrations denoted an effort in this direction, and a disposition was accordingly made with General Blu- cher's corps and the allied cavalry to meet it; but an increas- ing and a more severe cannonade on the right, made it no longer doubtful where the chief attempt was directed. Columns of attacii, under cover of a lieavy fire, were now in motion from the enemy's left, while others were filing to gain our right. General Barclay de Tolly was assailed by a very superior force, under Marshal Ney and General Lauris- ton, who, it was stated, directed the enemy's forces in this quarter ; and, notwithstanding the most gallant efforts, was forced to abandon the villages of Klux and Cannewitz : having been outflanked by the enemy, while they warmly engaged him in front, and occupied the heights surrounding the vil- lages of Rackel and Barutt. He determined, in consequence of the enemy's efforts, to retreat to the heights and batteries on the right of Wurzen, where the imperial head-quarters had been established, which answered the purpose of covering the main roads through Wurzen and Hochkirch to the rear. When it was perceived that General Barclay de Tolly was pressed by very superior numbers, General Blucher (after- wards supported by Generals Kleist and D'Yorck) was order- ed to move to his right, and attack the enemy in flank, whom they thus succeeded in checking ; and a most sanguinary contest now ensued. Too much cannot be said in praise of General Blucher's corps on this occasion ; and the Prussians in this eventful day, as at the battle of Lutzen, again evinced that ardor and prow^ess which never will fail them when headed by a king they love, and fighting for their country, their liberty, and independence. A charge of 4000 of their cavalry on columns of the enemy's infantry, which had carried the village of Kreckwitz, suc- ceeded completely; and the Prussians having again possessed themselves of it, displayed the greatest order and steadiness under a most galling fire. These gallant efforts, however, were arrested by the enemy's bringing up fresh troops ; and although partial successes were obtained, the general issue was uncertain. 44 NARRATIVE OP THE WAR The enemy having" gained an advantage by General Bar- clay de Tolly's movements, lost no time in making every ex- ertion to turn it to account, by renev^^ing the attack also on our left flank, and assaulting the batteries that covered the conical heights, as well as those of Kreckwitz on the right. Having made themselves masters of the latter, and also of one of our batteries, which from its situation commanded the low ground on the right and centre of it, they thus, as it were, gained the key of the position. In every other part of the line, however, the allies firmly sustained the conflict ; but it had now become apparent, that the enemy had not only superior forces to attack at all points, but had also the means of prolonging their flank movements on the right : thus obstructing our communications, and menacing our rear. Although it would have been possible, by a general assault of the grenadiers and guards in reserve, to have recovered the heights of Kreckwitz, still the pressure round the flank on General Barclay de Tolly's corps would again have necessitated the abandonment of them ; as, when these troops moved to their point of attack, the centre, where the enemy still exhibited a powerful force, would have been endangered. It was only from such considerations that the allies were induced to change their position at five o'clock in the even- ing, having from day-break admirably contested every part of tiie field of battle. The superiority of numbers was on the side of the enemy ; but the firmness, ardor, and heroism dis- played by the allies, must have excited admiration and respect even in their enemies. The dauntless personal courage of the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, who never quitted the field of battle, made the greatest impression on all around them ; and had not reasons of prudence, united with the most important con- siderations, prompted them to relinquish their ground, the most ardent and anxious desire was evinced by them by renewed attacks to sustain the position. It is very difficult, especially for an observer unacquainted with nmch of the detail, to do justice by description to this battle, and the extraordinary efforts made on tlie occasion. The determination having, however, been taken to place the army in a new position, the troops moved oiT about seven o'clock in the evening for the ground surrounding Weissen- berg. The enemy immediately opened a tremendous fire from the heights of Kreckwitz and the village of Cannewitz on the retiring columns; but every gun was withdrawn from the batteries, and the troops moved off' as at a field-day. The corps of Generals Barclay, D'Yorck, Blucher, and Kleist, IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 45 marched off from their right to Weissenberg ; those of Gene- rals Wittgenstein and Miloradovitch from their left by Hoch- kirch. The retreat was made in echelon, covered by the cavalry, and was conducted with the most perfect order. General Kleist's corps formed the rear-guard of the corps moving on Weissenberg; and a battery of forty pieces of cannon, placed by Count Wittgenstein on the heights of Wurzen, impeded the enemy's advance. General Milora- dovitch covered the retreat of the troops on the line of Hoch- kirch. The allied army were in their new position at night. From the most authentic accounts, the force of the allies did not exceed 65,000 men : that of the enemy in the field was esti- mated at least 100,000. The loss on both sides was very considerable. The battle throughout was well contested : the troops performed their duty in the most intrepid manner ; but there w^as unfortunately some deficiency in management, which motives of delicacy and diffidence prevent me from dwelling upon. Count Wittgenstein, on all occasions, displayed great per- sonal courage ; but certainly he did not possess the general confidence of the Russian army, because perhaps he was not a Russian. They have most confidence in their own native good fortune and ability. While Kutusoff' was living, (said the military critics,) there was a great and scientific mind to guide the whole; but the talents of the new chief were not yet made manifest, and no implicit reliance was placed in the great directing power. There were the usual difficulties amongst the Russians as to their numbers; and it was impossible to procure a correct estimate. Barclay de Tolly's corps was calculated and de- clared at 18,000 men, but it barely amounted to 13,000; and having lost near 4000 in the action of the 20th, he had not more than 9000 men under arms on the 21st, when two corps, if not three, of the French army poured down upo him. If other misstatements are averaged in the same ratio, it may be calculated that the allies had not more than 65,000 men in the battle. The enemy must have had from 110 to 120,000 men. They showed much more cavalry than was expected; upwards .of 5000 were seen in front of Bautzen. Their artillery was most numerous; and their movements were made throughout with regularity and steadiness, not having the appearance of new troops. I early conceived our right would be the enemy's real point of attack ; and when the Emperor in the field was pleased to ask my opinion, as to renewing the combat and regaining our ground, I ventured to say to His Imperial Majesty, that I 46 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR feared the position was gone the moment Barclay de Tolly moved; and unless he could carry his whole force there, which was now too late, recovering the heights immediately in our front could be of little avail. The retreat had hitherto been conducted with great suc- cess ; but the losses on the 20th and 21st (which could not have been less than from 15 to 18,000 men) were so heavy, that we were enabled only to bring our rear-guard into ac- tion. Barclay de Tolly's corps suffered most severely, and Blucher's was very much cut up. Miloradovitcb, Kleist, and D'Yorck, all sustained, on the former day, considerable loss; but notwithstanding these circumstances, it is just to state that the spirit of the army was unbroken ; its conduct and firmness continued unaltered and unabated ; and more was done for the common cause by fighting the battle, than if the allies had retired from the presence of the enemy without awaiting his onset. By its line of conduct the army was still pre-eminent for intrepidity and exertions, and respected by the enemy and the world : by a different course, the hopes excited would have been abandoned without an effort, and the Emperor of Russia might justly have fallen in public esteem. Many imagined, previous to the engagement, that Buonaparte would not venture upon a direct attack upon the position taken up by the allies ; but his great mass of force accounts for his having done so. It was now reported that Barclay de Tolly had been offer- ed the command (Wittgenstein not being in favor), but that he declined it. Miloradovitcb likewise desired to be relieved from the rear-gup„rd ; and Count Pahlen, an excellent officer, was appointed to it. The army continued to retreat on the 22d, in two columns, on the great road to Buntzlaii and Lowenberg. The enemy made an attempt to intercept the corps of General Milorado- vitcb, in which he completely failed. At Reichenbach the rear-guard took up a position, wliich was defended in the most obstinate manner against the enemy >5 advance, led by Buonaparte in person. The enemy showed a strong force of cavalry, and made several charges on that of the allies : one even into the town of Reichenbach, which was successfully repulsed, with the loss of some hundred killed, wounded, and prisoners; among whom were several officers. By bringing up a number of guns and a large force, and by outflanking our roar-guard, he obliged us to leave Reichenbach; but the rear-guard fell back to Gorlitz in the best order. The conduct of the troops, after their long service and unequal combat of the 21st, was beyond all praise. Throughout the late movements there was no loss, on the part of the allied army, of guns, tumbrils, or baggage of any importance. IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 47 General Bulow, whose corps had been joined by General Borstell's in the neig-hborhood of Belitz and Trebbin, (finding" that the enemy had withdrawn the corps of Marshal Victor in that quarter, for the purpose of his general operations against the allied army,) resumed the offensive, and pushed patroles to Baruth and towards Wittenberg. The enemy did not advance rapidly; and the army retired in perfect order on the 24th. The corps of Generals Barclay de Tolly, Blu- cher, D'Yorck, and Kleist, moved on Lignitz; those of Count Wittgenstein and General Miloradovitch in the direction of Jauer : but the latter had his advanced-posts on the river Bober, the enemy occupying Lowenberg, The allies moved in the direction of Schweidnitz: thus having communication by Czenstochau with the Vistula, and being enabled from its intermediate position to take every favorable advantage. ■ Considerable reinforcements were arriving daily. Up to the 31st, the retreat was continued on Breslau and Schweid- nitz. The imperial head-quarters moved from Jauer to Streigau on the 27th, and on the 28th to Schweidnitz. A new dislocation of the army having now been made. General Count Wittgenstein resigned the command of the combined forces (which he held after Marshal KutusofTs death until definitive arrangements were made) to General Barclay de Tolly ; and was himself appointed to the command of the Russians; General Blucher to the Prussians; and General Miloradovitch, being indisposed, had given up his command for the present to General Count Pahlen. It was at this time that the corps under the orders of General Blucher exnibited (against the division of General Maison debouche- ing from Hainan,) what may be justly considered one of the most distinguished cavalry attacks against solid squares of infantry that has been recorded during this war. The Prus- sian cavalry were dexterously concealed behind ground highly favorable to the accomplishment of their object. The eager- ness to attack was so great, that the signal was given before the enemy were sufficiently advanced, and the result was consequently not so decisive as it would otherwise have been; but notwithstanding the premature onset, twelve pieces of cannon and 1300 prisoners fell into the hands of the allies. Rome other partial exertions were crowned with considerable success on the 27th. It is due liere to a distinguished officer, Sir Robert Wilson, who was attached to the allied armies by His Majesty's Gov- ernment, to mention a marked distinction that was conferred upon him by Hia Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, in the camp in front of Jauer. It is so grateful a task to witness the merits of a brother soldier justly rewarded, and there 48 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR was SO much in the manner in which this honor was con- ferred, that I shall stand excused for detailing such a signal testimonial of approbation, even at the expense of prolixity. The Emperor ordered a grand review of the troops in camp near Jauer. His Imperial Majesty went along the line, and was received with enthusiasm by the soldiers. Observing a favorable moment, when he was surrounded by his general and staff officers, and in front of the troops. His Imperial Majesty called Sir Robert Wilson to him, and addressed him in the following gracious speech : — " Sir Robert Wilson, I have duly appreciated the services, gallantry, and zeal, which have distinguished you throughout the war : in testimony of which I have determined to confer on you the third class of the Order of St. George ;" and then, as if desirous of doing it in the most gratifying manner, the Emperor directed Gen- eral Augerausky to take his cross from his neck, and he delivered it to Sir Robert Wilson. The gracious mode, the well-chosen moment, and the pride experienced by a British officer in seeing one of his companions in arms thus decorated in front of the imperial army, justify me in recording this event in my narrative. On the 27th, eight squadrons of Russian cavalry, half Cos- sacks, attacked near Gottesberg twelve squadrons of the ene- my's cuirassiers de Napoleon; and made 400 men and several officers prisoners : a partisan-corps also captured a large ammu- nition-park, and several prisoners. General Blucher's corps (Varmee retired on the 28th to Pruasnitz, on the Streigau river, while the main army took up a position near Schweid- nitz. The enemy, since the affair of Hainau, had not pressed General Blucher, nor had they attempted any thing in front of this part of the army ; it was therefore conjectured they were moving in force on our right, to put themselves in com- munication with Glogau : their advance, it was said, had reached Neumarkt. A report was prevalent, that Grand- marshal Duroc had been killed in the affair at Reichenbach, Buonaparte's head-quarters were, on the 31st, at Lignitz: the head-quarters of the Emperor of Russia and of the King of Prussia at Groditz. There was much reason to apprehend, from reports re- ceived, that a reinforcement of several hundred men, with a battery of artillery, on march from the Oder to join the main army, had fallen into the hands of the enemy, who were now on their march on Breslau. Woronzoffs cavalry fell in with a body of the French in the neighborhood of Dessau, and put them to the rout: they suffered considerably in killed and wounded ; among the former was a general officer ; and 500 IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 49 prisoners were taken by the allies, with a colonel and twenty- two other officers. General Bulow's active operations in the rear of the enemy deserved the highest commendation : he had pushed his par- tisan-corps in all directions, and had kept the enemy in con- tinual alarm on their flank and rear. General Zastroff, who commanded the Prussian landwehr in this neighborhood, made the greatest exertions ; and a very considerable force of this description was collected to act in combination with the al- lied troops now in position. The enemy having entered Breslau the evening of the 1st, the allied army could not remain in their position, and ac- cordingly marched at night in the direction of Neisse. It subsequently continued in its new position in the neighbor- hood of Schweidnitz until the 4th of June, when the armis- tice agreed on by the contending forces was made known. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia fixed their head-quarters at a country-house near Reichenbach ; General Count Wittgenstein's and General Blucher's corps d'armee remained at Schweidnitz, and its neighborhood. General Barclay de Tolly had his head-quarters at Reichenbach. It appeared the enemy had detached a corps, immediately preceding the armistice, against Generals Borstell and Bu- lovv ; and a sharp affair occurred with the former, who fell back some short distance, having been greatly overpowered by numbers. Operations in the rear of the enemy, on the other hand, still continued to alarm him, and to be attended with success. Within the last few days, many prisoners had been brought in by various partisan-corps. A brilliant achievement of General Czernichoff's at Halberstadt, hereafter detailed, was also reported. It is difficult to give an adequate idea of the anxiety that prevailed at this eventful crisis with respect to the decision of Austria. The allied armies had thrown themselves upon her frontier : they had abandoned their main line of commu- nication by Kalisch ; had placed themselves absolutely in a cul de sac ; and had Austria not declared for them, it would be easy to calculate what the consequences might have been : on the other hand, if she declared in their favor, Buonaparte's position was equally critical. It was improbable he would have ventured so much as he did, if he had not been in his own mind quite sanguine as to the result. Austria, as a mediating power, was now in a commanding position. Two attempts to treat separately with Russia, it is said, had been made and rejected ; Buonaparte was doubtless engaged else where. E " 50 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR The Austrian declaration, on the point of coming forth, was deferred from one day to another. It was first fixed for the 24th of May, then for the 1st of June, and was now post- poned till the 10th. A review of the state of the army, at this moment, may not be altogether superfluous. The Rus- sian force at the battle of Bautzen, including every thing, did not exceed 43,000 men. The . Prussians amounted to about 25,000. Since the battle, the Russians, by Wittgenstein's return in camp on the 27tli, only amounted to 35,000 eflfec- tive men ; it may be asked what had become of all the forces that were held to exist ; and it is difficult to pronounce on the causes of the rapid reduction, independent of garrisons and besieging corps in the rear. Reinforcements were no doubt arriving, but many might be intercepted : and the enemy had taken 800 men, ten pieces of artillery, and a large number of tumbrils, that were moving towards Lignitz, igno- rant of present events. The great line of communication being abandoned, much exertion was necessary to turn off the reinforcements in time into the new direction. With regard to reinforcements expected, there were 15,000 guards at Kalisch, and General Sachen's corps of 10,000 men : eight battalions arrived on the 28th from Laba- noff^s corps. General Tolstoy's corps was as follows : eighty- four battalions ; twenty-five squadrons ; seventeen regiments (Basquirs) ; six companies of artillery : total number, 70,000 men ; of these 50,000 were effective. A fever prevailed among the troops, occasioned by fatigue and exhaustion ; and tlieir effective strength became more doubtful. The head- quarters of Labanoff's corps, which was stated at 40,000, were at Biadacz. It was said that its divisions would arrive in succession ; but we prepared ourselves not to expect any large and sudden reinforcement. These were the principal great bodies of troops that were reckoned upon : of course there were other detachments, which would do little more than supply casualties. Prussia having withdrawn the block- ading force from Glogau, was now rated at between 22 and 23,000 men; and siie required time before she could bring forward more troops. Good as were the materials, and great as was the spirit observable in this army, it was very much outnumbered by the enemy. Tlie want of order just now was also visible in it : as far as the means of subsistence went, there was an improvident waste among the Russians : a French army husband what they procure, though their wants are more exorbitant. A deficiency of ammunition ex- isted ; and the army could ill afford the loss of the supplies that were coming up. On retiring from Bautzen, there were two great lines of IX GEEMANl' AXD FRANCE. 51 retreat open — to have proceeded to Breslau and Kalisch ; or to adopt the resolution of throwing- ourselves on Bohemia, keeping up our communications by Kosel and Czenstochau. The Emperor, with great magnanimity, decided on the lat- ter, wishmg to give the best chance of reuniting ourselves nearer to Austria. Every thing on the Kalisch line was abandoned ; and our new communication was now establish- ing by Oppeln, &c. The object, at present, was to gain time ; to delay the enemy, by making a demonstration of lighting, but still not to give him battle. A camp was take up in front of Schweidnitz; but if the enemy showed a dis- position to attack it, the intention was to have moved to the intrenched camp at Neisse, which had been some time pre- paring, and to have assembled all the landwehr and irregular force at Glatz, and there, if pressed, to have made a stand. In the mean time, the enemy appeared moving- all their threes on our right. The reinforcements that actually arrived after the battle of Bautzen were as follows : — six battalions of guards, 3000 ; three squadrons of cavalry, 900 ; garrison of Petersburgh, 3000 ; reserves of two divisions from Finland, twelve battalions, 6000 ; General Sachen, 7500: amounting in all to about 15 or 20,000. It may be difficult, perhaps, in a military narrative, and more especially when the writer professes not to enter into any details of the diplomatic transactions in which he liad the honor to bear a part, to advert with propriety to the great political questions that were now in agitation. Nevertheless, as the armistice — the decision of Austria in favor of the alli- ance — and the combinations that resulted therefrom, bore im- mediately upon the military operations of the moment, they cannot be passed over entirely without allusion to them and to their efiects. Of the policy of the allies in agreeing to the armistice, at this juncture, different opinions were enter- tained. Buonaparte, it was stated, could make greater efforts, du- ring the period of the truce, than the allies; and the general conduct of Austria led to a supposition that she was more anxious to dictate a peace than to incur all the dangers that might result from a ]>rotracted war in the centre of her own empire. On the other hand, the object of Great Britain was to preserve the allies from again entering into those separate treaties with revolutionized France, which had ahvays proved fallacious in tliemselves, and injurious to the common cause of Europe. The armistice was undoubtedly, at this moment, advanta- geous for the position of Prussia ; while the councils of that monarchy had been for a long time wisely and naturally di- 52 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR rected towards Austria : and it is worthy of remark, that there was considerable lenity shown, in the acts of Napoleon, towards Prussia, which may be accounted for by his anxiety to conciliate Austria. As a proof of French amity to Prussia, no contributions had been levied in Breslau ; every thing' was paid for in money in Silesia, and the people in the Prussian states were at this period universally well treated by the en- emy. But there was not a shade of doubt as to the firmness of the King, and the perfect good faith and adherence of his Prussian Majesty to the system of the alliance. Various were the statements as to the terms of peace that Austria might attempt to negotiate with Napoleon. The allies vi'ere sup- posed to desire, first, aggrandizement for Austria and Prussia ; secondly, the separation of the duchy of Warsaw from Sax- ony and France ; thirdly, the cessation of the Rhenish con- federacy; fourthl}% the re-establishment of the old dynasty in Spain ; and fifthly, the independence of Holland : while Austria, it was believed, would be satisfied with the three last stipulations. The measures of aggrandizement Napoleon might possibly sanction; but the separation of the duchy of Warsaw, it was certain, he would never consent to. The disputants, on the actual posture of affairs, arranged themselves under two classes : those who doubted the part Austria would take, were pacificators ; those who believed she would come for- ward as a belligerent, looked with eagerness and confidence to the renewal of hostilities. The plenipotentiaries who had gone to the French head- quarters to effect some military arrangement of detail, were earnestly pressed to enter into further and general negotia- tions; but they resolutely refused to treat on any other subjects, stating that every proposition must first be referred to Austria. In an article in the Moniteur of the 25th of May, it was stated that Buonaparte intended to assemble a congress at Prague, and that Austria had assented to this arrangement. The hetero- geneous mixture in the article was amusing ; but it showed that Buonaparte was aiming at a continental peace. Austria had placed herself in a position in which she would have had he.au jeu at a general negotiation ; and however much Count Metternich was criticised, it must be allowed that, from the date of Buonaparte's having said in 1809 — "The House of Lorraine has ceased to exist," he had done more in a short time to elevate his country, than perhaps any other individual had ever accomplished : strengthening her on the side of Ga- licia; making the Pruth the boundary with Russia; with- drawing the Austrian contingent from France ; disarming IV GERMANY AND FRANCE. 53 the Poles ; and ultimately superintending mainly the terms of negotiation for all the continental powers. The present policy of Count Metternich appeared to be to play his game with the allies against France. The council of Vienna believed their plans would be rejected by Buona- parte ; and that then being in full preparation, and having gained all the time they wanted, they could declare for the general cause. If, however, the terms settled by Austria were accepted by France, they would then be proposed to the allies; and if refused by them (from their adherence to the understanding with Great Britain and their first propo- sals), the war would continue, although it would, from di- minished means, assume a more defensive shape. On the other hand, it w^as urged that Austria's project, amended by France, would be received, and form the basis of the future plans of the allies. Austria having brought Buonaparte, by a menacing attitude, to consent to her individual objects, and to establish her mediation ; Russia and Prussia w-ould strug- gle to the last for all they could obtain : while England would be brought forward, and be included in the negotiations, not only from recent treaties, but as being the only power that could make any restitution at the general arrangement of the affairs of Europe. The allies likewise saw that a continental peace, without a maritime one, would never continue : and the alliance with England thus become more cordial. Every little circumstance that now occurred near the theatre of war was brought to bear, in one sense or othei-, upon the probability of Austrian co-operation, or the reverse: such, for instance, as the following. — Prince Schwartzenberg, on his arrival at Prague, called for a return of the number of 1 S-pounders mounted : as this is an enormous large field-piece, few of them had carriages ready prepared. These were to be got, and to be put in order, and extra horses procured for them. Difiiculties were made : upon which he declared, that as the French had 24-pounders in order of battle in position, the Austrians must at least have 18-pounders. Fifty pieces were consequently put forthwith in a state of preparation, and 800 horses got for them. This fact, as soon as it became known, immediately created sanguine hopes. Another cir- cumstance, of like cliaracter, w^as also spoken of; two bat- talions of every Austrian regiment had, in the first instance, marched to assemble in Bohemia ; but on General Count Bub- na's last return from Dresden, the third battalions of each regiment immediately received orders to follow. This looked like being in earnest. In a contrary belief as to Austria, however, it was now de- clared that Prince Poniatowski's corps had arrived at Oglau, E2 54 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR on the 2d of June, from Zwickau ; that he was continuing liis march to Waldkirchen ; that the Austrians did not im- pede his progress, and that he was even now directing his route so as to get into the French military line of operations. Some account of these Poles may not here be uninteresting. Prince Poniatowski stopped at Teschen, and dispatched Gene- ral Moyenski to Vienna, to gain intelligence of what liad ta- ken place on the Elbe. The Polish corps marched in five columns: their fire-arms, during the march, were conveyed in wagons which accompanied each regiment, in order that at each halting-place the troops might have them in readiness. The non-commissioned officers retained their arms, the cav- alry their swords and lances. Each column was composed of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The whole amounted to 15,000 fine, robust, well-clothed men. The Austrians re- ceived them with military honors, and great demonstrations of friendship. These troops would have proved a formidable addition to Buonaparte's force : indeed, had not Poland been wrested from French influence, a secure state of things could not have been enjoyed. Prussia was desirous that their King should have been declared Duke of Warsaw, and wished at once to have secured Poland. The Emperor dreaded Austria in this measure; and having also his own views, he remained passive. The state of the allied army was now nearly as follows: guards (reserve), 0000; grenadiers, 6000; and cavalry, 5400, under the Grand-Duke's command; Barclay's corps, 7500; Wittgenstein's, 12,000; Miloradovitch, 8000': Sachen, 7500; Prussians 21,000 ; Prussian reinforcement at Breslau, 5000 : total, 78,400. The Prussian landvvehr at Glatz were averaged at 20,000, and daily increased. The above amount included convalescents and reinforcements, and was made at the highest calculation. The army, with the cavalry and guards, had now taken up a position in echelon, with their front towards the Breslau and Brieg routes. The main body remained at Groditz, waiting the issue of events which were then pending. The loss of the French army since the opening of the campaign was estimated at 60,000 men ; but they had rein- forcements arriving: and Buonaparte was now anxious to have it believed, that it only depended on him to make separate negotiations either with Austria or lUissia. In the mean time, under the arrangements commanded by His Britannic Majesty, his diplomatic servants had finally concluded the subsidiary treaties between Great Britain, Russia, and Prus- tS GERMANY ASH FRAN'CE 55 sia; and thus insured to the alliance a commanding and effective force constantly in the field. Having now brought down our military details at head- quarters to the important epoch of the signature of the armistice, I proceed to give a rapid coujj-d/ceil of the opera- tions more immediately in the north of Germany. The consequences of the battle of Lutzen, as affecting the affairs on the Lower Elbe, were very disastrous. General Lyon, in his communications, had expressed a confident hope that the defensive positions on the line of the river might be maintained ; but when Marshal Davoust pressed forward with not less than 10,000 men, this expectation was disap- pointed. Tettenborn, Domberg, and Czernicheff, all fell back on Hamburgh, where they were for some days united. The further movement of a French force under Sebastiani, in- duced Walmoden to take up a position at Danitz, and to leave Hamburgh to its own resources, and the uncertain aid of some of the new levies. On the 8th, Davoust, who was in force opposite Hamburgh, attacked and carried the island of Wil- helmsburg, and threatened HamburgJi itself with an imme- diate assault. The fate of the city was for a short time suspended by the remonstrance and hostile demonstrations of a Danish force stationed at Altona, supported by some gun-boats. It was not, however, consistent with the policy of the Danish court to persist in this spirited resolution : their troops were with- drawn on the arrival of a detachment of Swedes, who under- took the defence of the place : but the diminution which this independent movement would have caused in the Swedish forces, made its propriety more than questionable ; and the detachment was shortly recalled, having had only one oppor- tunity of showing its military qualities, by taking part in the defence of the town against an attack made upon it on the 2'2d. On the 30th. General Tettenborn evacuated the city; and it was occupied by the French and Danes: the last of whom had now formally declared war against the allies, and taken part in the hostile operations. General Lyon liad fortunately succeeded in withdrawing the stores and treasures intrusted to his superintendence, and had retired provisionally to Wismar. The importance of the Swedish co-operation, at this moment, was too generally acknowledged to leave room for any feelincfs but those of regret for the fate of Hamburgh. A great military error would have been committed, if the rassemhlement at Stralsund and in its neighborhood had been interrupted by any efforts to send detachments to the Lower Elbe ; and it would moreover have exposed this part of the 58 NARRATIVE OP THE WAR combined operations to certain failure, inasmuch as the Crown Prince of Sweden must, by partial actions in detail, have been disqualified from pursuing the great objects which an undivided force, under the guidance of his military repu- tation, might accomplish. The same spirit, however, which Jiad displayed itself in the offensive operations of the earlier movements, was fully maintained now that the war had assumed on our part a character almost wholly defensive. It was a system of de- fence ever watchful for opportunity ; and though carried on in the face of a vigilant and powerful enemy, such opportu- nity was not wanting. Reports were made of several bril- liant enterprises, which I proceed to notice in the order of their occurrence. General Czernicheff left the Lower Elbe, and placed his corps in cantonments between Magdeburg and the junction of the Elbe and Havel. He learnt there that the Westpha- lian General Ochs would arrive at Halberstadt with a convoy of artillery : he therefore determined to surprise him ; and crossing the river, marched with his cavalry thirteen German miles. He had with him the hussars of Isum and Riga, with several pulks of Cossacks, and two guns. He arrived before Halberstadt at five o'clock on the morning of the 30th of May, but found the enemy prepared to receive him : 1600 infantry and eighty gens-d'armes were placed behind am- munition-wagons, supported by fourteen pieces of cannon. Notwithstanding this disparity of force, the Russians, after a desperate resistance, carried the strong position of the en- emy: of whom 400 were killed, as many wounded, and 800 taken prisoners. General Ochs was among the latter; wound- ed, but not severely. The Cossacks of Czernicheff" on this occasion distinguished themselves, by displaying as much steadiness and firmness as regular cavalry : an advantage arising from the superior manner in which they were led on by that very gallant officer. Their loss was considerable : the French fought desperately, and would not accept of quarter. All the guns were taken ; and the ammunition-wagons of the convoy were either blown up during the action, or afterwards de- stroyed. In respect to General Bulow's affair at I.uckau on the 4th inst., it was stated that Marshal Oudinot's corps was equal in numbers to the whole of the Prussians, and that only three brigades of General Bulow's came into action. The French attacked General Bulow, who had posted himself in and behind the town ; but they made no impression, and retreated at night, setting fire to the suburb wiiich they had occupied IN" GERxMANY AND FRA7VCE. 57 during tlie engagement. Their loss was computed at about 3000 men ; 500 of whom were prisoners : two guns and one howitzer were taken. The enemy retreated towards Tormee- walde, and were pursued by the cavalry. After the action, General Bulow was joined by Generals Borstell, Borgen, and Harpe ; and the armistice alone prevent- ed this combined force from making a most powerful diversion in the rear of the enemy's army. General Czernicheff, who had recrossed the Elbe after the affair at Halberstadt, having learnt that General Arrighi was at Leipsic with about 5000 men and considerable magazines, and that there were also a number of wounded French in the town, communicated with General VVoronzoff, who com- manded the Russian corps before Magdeburg ; and they agreed to make a joint attack on the enemy : they were joined by the Prussian partisan-corps of Lutzow. General Czernicheff took up a position at Bernburg, and succeeded in drawing the attention of the enemy from the real point of attack. In the mean time, the corps of Woronzofi' and Lutzow were directed by rapid marches to the neighborhood of Leip- sic : when they had reached Dolitsch, General Czernicheff joined them, by a forced march of nine German miles in one day. The French had scarcely time to take a position before the town at the village of Zaucha: they had some cavalry, which opposed but a weak resistance, and were routed in a moment ; their infantry then formed, but being attacked by the Russian cavalry, and that part of General Woronzoff 's infantry which had come up, their columns were broken, and they retreated precipitately towards the town. As their cavalry was completely beaten and dispirited, there is no doubt the issue of the contest would have been as at Lune- berg and Halberstadt, one half of the combined troops not having been brought into action before their opponents were actually discomfited ; but unfortunately, just as they were coming up. General Arrighi sent forward two officers with a copy of the armistice. General Czernicheff at first refused to believe it, and referred them to General Woronzoffj as the senior officer; but upon examination of the document, the latter being convinced of its authenticity, the victorious troops were obliged to abandon their well-earned success. General Czernicheff had taken 400 prisoners, and General Woron- zoff 150. The loss of the French in killed and wounded was considerable. Captain Colon, a Prussian partisan, who remained in Saxony in rear of the French army when the allies retreated, em- ployed himself in annoying the enemy in the remote parts 58 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR of Saxony towards Franconia. Having heard of the expected arrival of a train of fourteen pieces of cannon, six howitzers, and a number of ammunition-wagons, which were to advance by the road of Hoff, he formed an ambuscade, and attacked the convoy. The French, completely surprised, either fled or were made prisoners. The artillery was rendered useies.s, and the ammunition blown up : the guns were buried in the woods by the peasants. Captain Colon was afterwards joined by Major Lutzow with 600 cavalry and many volunteers. They established themselves in the mountains of the Vogt- land ; and their successful enterprises were only arrested by the conclusion of the armistice. Conformably to the terms of the armistice (lor which see Appendix), the line of demarcation was settled as follows : — The French line commenced at Travemunde on the Baltic, and followed the course of the Trave as far as Lubeck, in- cluding a circuit of one German mile round the town, thence extended to the frontier of Holstein, and passed by Bergedorf and Alten-Gamm to the Elbe. The Russian line commenced at Dessau, and was extended by Hollenbach to that river. The portion of territory included between these two lines was declared to be neutral, and was to remain in its actual military position until the termination of the armistice. The line of demarcation then followed the course of the Elbe to a little above Magdeburg; thence it passed along the frontier of Prussia and Saxony to the Oder, the course of which river it followed to the confluence of the Katsbach. Here a neutral space was again establislied: the French line passing by Dittersbach to the Bohemian frontier; our line attaining the same point by following the Oder to Althof, and thence passing by Land shut and Pfaflendorf The actual position of the troops of the grand army on the 15th was as follows : — The left wing occupied the villages on the left bank of the Neisse to the frontiers of Bohemia : the Emperor of Russia and the reserves at Peterswalde and the neighboring villages : the King of Prussia at Neudorlf, and his guards at Groditz, Emsdoff", a.nd tlie adjacent villages: General Wittgenstein's corps at Waldenburg : Generals Blu- cher, D'Yorck, and Kleist's corps extended from Strehlin to Breslau : Generals Lachen and Schaulau at Ohlau : the cavalry were on the right bank of the Oder; General Bar-^ clay de Tolly and the head-quarters at Reichenbach. IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 59 CHAPTER V. Conferences — Ability displayed by the Austrian minister — Effective state of tlie Prussian army— Proceeding on the part of the French— Fortress of Spandau — Public feeling at Berlin — The landsturm, or local militia — Swedish troops— Their general appearance— Head-quarters of the army — The Sovereigns— and society at head-quarters — Observations as to the Prince Royalof Svv'eden— The Ilanseatic legion— The armistice prolonged — The Russian German Legion— their complete state of discipline, &:c. — News of the battle of Vittoria— Hanoverian levies— Movements of Swe- dish troops— The Prince Royal's arrival at Berlin. No sooner had the conditions of the armistice been defini- tively adjusted, than the attention of the allied monarchs at head-quarters was turned to the negotiations about to be entered upon through the mediation of Austria. Of the pre- vailing impression of public opinion, some idea will have been formed from the sketch in the foregoing- chapter : conjecture was still very busy, and had a wide field for action. It was known that much discussion was taking place as to the manner in M'^hich the conferences should be carried on : Russia and Prussia having positively declined to send plenipotentiaries to communicate directly vv^ith the French authorities. It was at length determined that negotiators should proceed to an appointed rendezvous, where, without being invested with full powers, they might enter into conferences with Count Metternich and the French authorities. The distinction was certainly a very nice one ; but all things considered, it had its importance. Skilful and adroit as the French Emperor had ever shown himself in the arrangement and conduct of diplomatic discussion, he was on this occasion met with at least equal dexterity. The matter was conducted by the Austrian minister with so much address, that while the French Emperor was prevented from carrying his points in the cabinet, he was equally shut out from all opportunity of exercising a favorite political raanceuvre ; namely, that of turning his discomfiture in negotiation into a means of making an impression on the public mind in France. These were the views with which the conferences were about to open : the rendezvous was fixed at Gitschin in Bohemia. In the mean time, Prince Schwartzenberg's head-quarters were fixed at Braudeiss ; and the Austrian force was drawn together in cantonments, extending from the line of the Mol- dau to the Reisengeberge mountains. My own position, at this period, bore no direct relation to the negotiations in pro- gress. The treaties of concert and subsidy with Prussia had been completed, and signed ; and I was now at liberty to give 60 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR attention to the other objects of my mission. These were such as to render it desirable that 1 should set out, with as little delay as possible, for the north of Germany ; and in con- sequence I left Reichenbach on the night of the 22d, and reached Berlin on the 25th of June. I found on my route the best spirit prevailing- in the coun- try, and indications in every place that the Prussian army was rapidly becoming- more effective. A circumstance had happened with respect to one of the free corps which had raised the greatest indignation. This corps had been acting in the enemy's rear, when, on the news of the armistice, they desired to have a free passage from the neighborhood of Hoff to the right bank of the Elbe. The French general received them, and promised them safe-conduct. He however, in their march, fell upon them with superior numbers: two-thirds only of the corps effected their escape, and this with great difficulty. The excuse pleaded was, that he had received instructions to exclude from the benefit of the armistice all those who carried on war, like marauders, in the rear of their opponents, and to treat the free corps especially with great severity. This proceeding would have afforded sufficient ground for breaking the armistice, if the ruling powers had been so in- clined. The people of Leipsic were so exasperated, that their town was declared in a state of siege. A burgher guard was formed, and placed under the orders of a French colonel ; and it was expected they would immediately be marched to join the French army : a measure which wore the twofold character of punishment for past resistance, and a pledge taken to prevent the recurrence of new acts of hos-^ tility. This, however, was not deemed sufficient; as the Leipsic Gazette of the 24th contained a long article threat- ening that all who had been in communication with the al- lies, assisted them in any way, or who had spoken ill of the French, should be delivered over to a military commission. Having been detained at Berlin by an accident, I endea- vored to turn the interval to account by making an accurate inspection of the fortress of Spandau. It is situated at the confluence of the Spree and Havel, two German miles from Berlin. The suburbs on the Berlin side can be inundated, so as to render the approach impracticable. The country around is flat, and cannot be commanded ; nor would it be possible to attack the place on both sides simultaneously. The citadel is strong, and well placed : it consists of four large bastions with short curtains. There are in the different bastions em- brasures for forty pieces of cannon. When it was taken from the French, the attack was made IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 61 from the right bank of the Spree, and was directed chiefly against the west, or Queen's bastion. This bastion during the siege was destroyed by an explosion of the French pow- der-magazine : an accident which, it will readily be admitted, was very fortunate for the besiegers, whatever the causes may have been to which it might be ascribed. I found the Prussian commandant, Colonel Blankhaus, a very distinguished officer, busily engaged in forwarding the repairs of the for- tress. There were, however, only about 600 men within the walls, though the garrison ought not to be less than 3000 : indeed, the casements in the citadel alone would hold 3000 men. There were, as I was assured, 2000 pieces of ordnance in the place ; and my impressions on the whole were very favorable, with reference both to the diligence and skill ex- hibited in restoring this important fortress. The state of public feeling in Berlin was most satisfactory. A strong intrenched camp had been formed at Charlotten- burg; and works were thrown up round the town to secure it from surprise or military insult. I delayed my departure from Berlin until the 3d of July, to inspect (as I was told) near 20,000 landsturm, or local mi- litia, when these were collected : however, they diminished to about 4000 ; among which were two brigades of guns, manned and appointed by the citizens of Berlin. These ap- peared to be the most efficient part of the military spectacle. The men, considering their little practice, worked the guns well : the horses belonging to them were remarkably good ; and this artillery proved efficient. The landsturm were formed into six battalions : the generality of the men were fine, but there was a great proportion of boys amongst them. About 150 of each battalion were armed with rifles or mus- kets, the rest with pikes : they had been sufficiently drilled to march tolerably, and they were moved vvithout confusion, which was as much as could be expected from them in so short a time after their formation. General Bulow, who showed me these people, informed m they were only a fourth of the force in the neighborhood of Berlin, but that it was not convenient to have them assem- bled at once. I believe from 20 to 25,000 of these citizens, the immediate population of the town, were counted upon with certainty to add to the landwehr and other troops that were employed in its immediate defence in case of need. I proceeded from Berlin, on my way to Stralsund ; and ar- rived on the 5th inst. at Greifswald, the head-quarters of the Prince Royal of Sweden, and found him on the point of set- ting out for Traclienberg, on a rendezvous to meet the allied Sovereigns. The following dav, General Adlercreutz was so F 62 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR good as to propose to me to review the Swedish division of troops in camp near the town, consisting of 10,000 men. The appearance of the troops, collectively, was good ; individu- ally, they had not the air, gait, or dress of disciplined soldiers: neither the old troops or new levies were steady under arms: their clothes were ill made ; and their appearance, after see- ing the Russians and Prussians, was not prepossessing. How- ever, I must do them the justice to admit, that their perform- ance in the field exceeded my anticipations. Their guards and artillery were composed of the choice of their men; and throughout, the composition of the Swedish soldiery was respectable. The regiments exercised and moved on the French system of tactics : they were generally loose in their formations, and had not then acquired that celerity which counterbalances the other fault. I saw four brigades of artillery — two were mounted, and two were called artillerie assise — carrying the cannoniers : this was formerly the practice in the Austrian service, but was abolished there, and should be everywhere, as it is disadvantageous when guns are to move rapidly on bad ground : these were of iron, and seemed to be particularly inefficient; the carriages, and every thing relating to equip- ment, were very far behind those of the present day, and those in other armies. I inquired for the artillery received from England ; and was much surprised to find that they had parked it in the Isle of Rugen, and preferred bringing forward what was evidently so much inferior. I saw four regiments of cavalry : two of hussars, one of heavy cavalry, and one of chasseurs a cheval. The Swedish horse is not a good animal, having a very short neck, and an immense thick cart hind-quarter: he may en- dure fatigue, but in point of appearance and movement he is a sorry exhibition. There were, however, some few tolerable foreign horses in their cavalry; but in their exercise they were infinitely below par : nor, indeed, is it to be wondered at, as I understand few regiments of cavalry in Sweden are ever kept together. Proprietors of certain estates were obliged to keep a man and horse for the government, equipped to serve in the cavalry, and to find them in every thing. ' They had little opportunity of exercise, or being assembled ; so that this arm, which required the most constant practice and vigilant attention to bring it to perfection, was very much in arrear in Sweden. It was not surprising, therefore, after contemplating Rus- sian, Prussian, and English cavalry, that the Swedish regi- ments should have appeared to such disadvantage. However, I do not mean to assert that they were not fit to take the field ; IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 63 and if they could have been brought to act in conjunction with a better description offeree, they would, I am sure, have been efficient. The squadrons were weak, about thirty-two file each : the regiments were of five or six squadrons when completed. I believe the Crown Prince brought with him about 4500 cavalry, and 27 or 28,000 infantry ; which certainly fulfilled this part of his engagements. The infantry were serviceable, without being parade troops. The division mancEUvred by changing its front to the right, where they supposed an ene- my ; formed two lines; sent forward their artillery, supported by cavalry and infantry; retired in echequier, second line supporting ; charged with their cavalry as a finale ; and, on the whole, performed the movements without confusion, al- though without precision ; which, considering their little ex- perience, is saying much. I doubted whether the generality of the regiments were well officered ; but I was not well in- formed on this head. It appeared to me, from seeing these troops, that they were capable, in good hands, of great im- provement ; and a campaign or two with troops more aguerris, would bring them to a military state. In the repetition of movements, the recapitulation offerees, and the ordinary details of a military narrative, much same- ness must ensue ; and there will be a great dearth in this narrative of the light anecdote and personal exploit which interest the unprofessional reader : but it must be considered that a British officer, in witnessing the operations of foreign armies, cannot possess that intimate knowledge of their in- terior, as he would have when acting with the troops of his own nation. There is always, moreover, a considerable difficulty for a stranger in obtaining information of what is going forward on an immensely extended line of operation, and on those in- teresting incidents which the scene of a great assembled army produce. A description of the course of life at the grand head-quar ters of the army, which I had just left, may not be here en- tirely out of place, and serve to vary the monotonous military detail. The quarters of the ambassadors and foreign general officers attached to the Sovereigns were always allotted by the stafl' in those towns or villages where the head-quarters were es- tablished. Marked attention, as to accommodation and con- venience, was always shown to His Britannic Majesty's ser- vants : indeed, the general respect and deference with which they were treated, strongly indicated how much value was 64 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR attached to the powerful co-operation of the British govern- ment. About ten o'clock every morning, the Sovereigns had a parade of the guards and troops in the cantonment. On these occasions, every effort was made to demonstrate the perfect union of the alliance. The Sovereigns wore the uni- forms of the regiments they had been appointed to in each other's army : they headed those corps, of which they were the colonels, in the routine and forms of parade; and the stalls of the armies mingled together, as if they belonged to one directing head, and had but one impulse. After the attendance at parade, a levee was usually held for business at the Sovereigns' quarters ; and ministers, am- bassadors, and officers, transacted such affairs as they were charged with. The dinner-hour was two; and the Sovereigns invariably invited one or more of the ambassadors, ministers, or military commissioners, to dine with them. Excellent sup- plies always existed ; and nothing could be more agreeable than these repasts. In the head-quarters of the Sovereigns, more especially at the period of the armistice, many of the Princes of Germany, and their courtiers and nobles of the first distinction belong- ing to the different potentates, were assembled ; resorting, as they now did, to the seat of deliberation and war, for every thing that was valuable or important to them. Many were joined by their consorts ; and the beauty and attractions of the Princess Pauline of Wirtemburg, Madame D'Alopeeus, the Princesses of Courlande, and others, deserve to be elo- quently described, and with other anecdotes might prove more interesting to many than my military narrative. But my duty is not to deviate from, but to adhere to the dry detail of the campaign. However, it will be seen from the above, that female society of the most perfect description was within our reach ; and its allurements and dissipations often divided the mind of soldier and politician from their more severe duties. Exercise after dinner, des courses, or parties of pleasure in the neighborhood, and reunions in the evening, filled up the period of each day when the army was stationary ; and each ambassador or minister, of any calibre, kept his own table, and always received a certain number of guests. As my immediate avocations divided my attention between the grand head-quarters and the Prince Royal of Sweden, I shall now revert to his army ; and at a future moment give fiirther accounts and anecdotes of the mode of life during the interesting period of the years 1813 and 1814. I dined on the day of my arrival at Greifswald with the IN GERMANY AND FEANCE 65 Prince Royal of Sweden, and had two long- conferences with His Royal Highness. His engaging manners, spirited con- versation, facility of expression, and the talent which dis- played itself in all that he said, convinced me on my first interview that he was no ordinary man. It was, however, my duty not to permit myself to be dazzled by his brilliancy, but to ascertain if possible, through the glitter that sur- rounded him, what were his real views, and how far the warmth of his expressions and splendor of his designs would be borne out by the reality of his services to the general cause. The cautious line he had adopted and maintained during the last campaign, had been of the most important conse- quence to the allies. Nothing had yet occurred in his de- meanor which could be made a matter of reproach ; but, it must be owned, there was nothing to justify confidence : it remained to be discovered whether the future would wear a more promising aspect. The unequivocal proof of his sin- cerity would have been, to have boldly and unreservedly committed his new subjects against his old friends : it was not possible to believe him fully in earnest, until we should see him fairly in action at the head of his Swedes, with French troops for their opponents. He was on the eve of setting out to Trachenberg, at the moment of my arrival. The time, therefore, was too short to allow of systematic discussion ; and our conversations, on both sides, assumed a very miscellaneous character. Of these conversations, and of all the points embraced in them, my position debars me from giving a complete account ; but the impression left upon my mind will be conveyed exactly by a phrase of which I availed myself when recording what had passed — " He clothed himself in a pelisse of war, but his un- der garments were made of Swedish objects and peace ;" and further to confirm me in my belief that these sentiments were not erroneous, a celebrated and distinguished general officer, who was at this period one of my colleagues at the Swedish head-quarters, emphatically assured me, "The zeal of the Prince will always show itself the most when he shall think It the least necessary." In the progress, however, of my de- tail, I shall bring forward circumstances and facts that will enable the impartial reader to form his own judgment. In this part of the narrative, it is only necessary to state that there was, in truth, no natural link to connect him with the allies : policy had brought him forward ; but both policy and affection restrained him from committing himself absolutely against that nation, the love of which was early ingrafted in his breast. I must, however, beg to be understood in any F2 66 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR observations I make, as not having adopted them from any official source : they will be confined solely to the sentiments I formed myself on the bare military subjects that came for- ward, and were then in agitation. My opinions may be in- correct; the data for my judgment deficient; the difficulties of the Prince Royal's position known better to himself than to others ; but such as my sentiments are I give them, with honesty, and, I hope, with becoming deference, while writing a military narrative. It happened very fortunately, that the news of the debates on the Swedish treaty in the two houses of parliament, and of the very considerable majority in its favor, had preceded ray arrival. At Stralsund this had a most satisfactory influ- ence; and it was natural to ascribe much of the Prince Roy- al's cordiality to this cause. Of the individuals by whom His Royal Highness was surrounded, the most prominent was a Colonel Camps, his foster-brother, a Frenchman : the Swedish generals were undoubtedly honest, upright, and sensible men ; but there existed a secret ascendency over some of the staif- officers, which it was difficult to develop. I must, however, do, thus early, full justice to Baron Wetterstedt, the secretary of state, General Adlercreutz (since dead). General Count Lowenhehn, and some others : never were more valuable officers than these, nor men more devoted to the common cause of their country and P^urope. If reports were to be credited, at times there was a less direct and less respectable means of influence than these in operation. There was cer- tainly nothing in the character or habits of some leading persons at the Prince's head-quarters, which made it impos- sible to believe the reports in circulation. A celebrated actress had lately taken her departure from Stralsund, and it was said had been conveyed to General Vandamme's outpost with an escort. As to the nature and extent of lier commu- nications, rumor was not idle. But 1 advert to the fact only, for the sake of reminding my reader that the manoeuvres re- sorted to by Napoleon were not always of a strictly military character. For ten days or a fortnight after the Prince Royal's depar- ture for Trachenberg, my attention was taken up in arrang- ing matters of importance connected with the state of affairs at the anticipated renewal of hostilities. General Arentschildt, of the Russian German liCgion, had arrived; and with him I settled the supply of arms and necessaries for his division. Major-general Dornberg had connnunications to make rela- tive to the formation and organization of the Hanseatic legion. These troops had been newly taken into British pay, and the IX GERMANY AND FRANCE. 67 General had much to accomplish before tliey could be made effective. On the 15th, intelligence reached us from the Prince Royal that the armistice was prolonged to the 10th of August. Speculation was busy as to the ulterior movements of the Swedish troops, should the suspension of arms be protracted until winter. The island of Rugen becoming then insecure as a point of retreat, my anxiety was to keep the attention of these Swedish officers, who spoke to me on the subject, alivG to the real aim of the campaign, that they might give up the notion of partial retreat and all separate objects, and look to war on a grand scale. The Swedish troops, it was quite cer- tain, could winter well in Germany and Colberg ; and other points would offer means of re-embarkation, if necessary : but to talk of Stralsund and Rugen as places d''armes for retreat, was viewing things within narrow limits, and under a false light. My intention of effecting a tour of military inspection, had been postponed in consequence of the Prince Royal's absence ; but on the 17th, Major-general Arentschildt, commanding the Russian German Legion, having arranged with me to see his corps, I had great satisfaction in being able to make a detailed report upon it. The legion, as far as its numbers went, was not only per- fectly fit for service in the field, but it was a matter of con- siderable surprise to find that, notwithstanding the short time they had been raised, and the very arduous marches they had made, they should have arrived at a state of field discipline creditable to any description of troops. I could not but attach the entire credit of this to the general ofiicer, and the officers commanding corps: and the two officers commanding the cavalry regiments, Colonel Count Goltz and Major Count Dossman, appeared to me to be remarkably intelligent, clever officers. The commanding officers of the infantry battalions, as well as the corps of officers generall)'', were, to all appearance, admirably selected, and exactly what might have been de- sired. And here I should not omit observing, that so excellent an esprit du corjjs reigned amongst them, that one or two young officers who had not conducted themselves in a satis- factory manner, according to their brother officers' opinions, had been forced by them to leave their regiment. My in- spection of the Hanoverian levies was yet to be completed ; but I had already seen enough to satisfy me that we should soon have a considerable and efficient British force in this quarter, not less than 20.000 men. In what manner this force could be employed, and in what degree it would con- 68 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR duce prominently to the general issue of the campaigfn, re- mained to be decided. My own anticipations as a British officer were sanguine. Early on the morning of the 16th we were gratified by the arrival of a British messenger, bearing the glorious news of the battle of Vittoria. The Prince Royal returned the same evening from Trachenberg ; and it was easy to perceive that Lord Wellington's great achievements had produced as great a change in the political atmosphere of Dresden and the north, as it could have effected in southern Europe. On the Prince Royal's arrival, I had the honor of an interview : he declared very frankly his satisfaction at the favorable news, and held out brilliant hopes for the future. The maps were spread out ; and we had the advantage of hearing much said by His Royal Highness that was very eloquent and scien- tific on the subject of the great combinations which were to be entered upon. Nothing was left to wish for, but that the troops should be put in motion; his dislocations being com- pleted, and his masses assembled. This desirable event seemed likely now to take place. On the 20'th the Prince Royal began to put his troops in motion ; taking up a line, with the right at the Lake Schwe- rin, the left at Demmin and Pau. The Swedish division of Lieutenant-general Laendels', under Major-general Tetten- born, and a Prussian division of about 5000 men, were the forces destined for the corps of observation against the Danes and Hamburgh ; to which was to be added the Hanseatic Legion, as not being quite in a-fit state to go forward. This corps of observation remained in the neighborhood of Wis- mar. The Prince Royal proceeded himself to Berlin, along the line of demarcation, to see the troops; but dispatches from General Barclay de Tolly, relative to the assembling of Gene- ral Winzingerode's corps and the troops that were to be placed under his orders, obliged His Royal Highness to move rapidly ; and I had the honor to accompany him, after seeing the Hanoverian levies in our way. 1 IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. CHAPTER VI. British force under Major-general Gibbs— Hanoverian levies— Appointment of officers— The Prince Royal— Troops under his orders— The Duke of Cumberland— Treaties of concert and subsidy with Russia and Prussia —General Alexander Hope— Affability of the Prince Royal— His inter- view with the Duke of Cumberland— Removal of General Walmoden— The late Duke of Mecklenburg Strelitz— Adventures at SlreliTz— Arrival of the Prince Royal at Berlin— Reports regarding the enemy— Letter from General Tauenstein — Intelligence from "the grand head-quarters — Ar- rangements of the Prince Royal — Arrival of the Duke of Vicenza— Dia- position of Napoleon's forces— Position of the allied army— 3Ioreau~ Austria declares war against France— Spirit of the Austrian troops- March of the allies into Bohemia. Mr. Thornton now received the details of the British force arriving under Major-general Gibbs. Colonel Cooke was or- dered by me to afford them every assistance on their lauding, and to communicate between them and the Swedish authori- ties. The most important points at this moment for the delibe- ration of the British government were as follow : 1st. If the armistice should by any unforeseen occurrence be prolonged, what in such case was expected of the Prince Royal? 2d. If the Prince Royal should determine on remaining in Germany during the winter (to which he did not in any event positively object), whether Great Britain would be disposed to give an increased subsidy next year 1 This arrangement was strongly urged by the Prince Royal. 3d. In the event of France accepting any basis proposed by Austria, and acquiesced in by Russia and Prussia, whether it should be positively admitted that the corps of the Russian German l^eglon was to be considered as a corps at the dispo- sal of Great Britain, and to follow the Swedish army, or such orders as it mioht receive from Great Britain? In a detail of troops which was sent as Russian troops af- forded by the Emperor to the Prince Royal, the Legion was included : this gave dissatisfaction to the Crown Prince. The Hanoverian levies were also detailed by Russia in this paper ; and it was left to His Royal Highness to appoint chiefs to these corps. All this was incorrect ; for the whole of these troops, paid by Great Britain, should have been con- sidered as a British force, furnished solely by the Prince Re- gent to Sweden. The Prince Royal, to do him justice, was entirely of this opinion ; and would neither appoint officers, nor make any arrangement not dictated by the British government. It was, 70 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR however, now of importance that all these points should be finally determined. With regard to the appointment of officers to the levies, it was mainly in the hands of Lieutenant-general Count Wal- moden : but some check to the very great patronage this af- forded seemed necessary ; and the regency of Hanover, as well as the officer superintending the levies (Brigadier-gene- ral Lyon), obtained, at my instigation, proper control on this head. Baron Bremer, a very intelligent and zealous Hano- verian, was directed to reside at the head-quarters of these levies, to assist in their arrangements in the field. Orders were at this time received for the incorporation of the Hanseatic Legion into the Hanoverian levies : the Le- gion would not agree to this arrangement; and declared it must be preserved, if at all, as a corps subject to be conceded to Hamburgh when required. The same proceeding occurred with respect to the Dessau battalion; and it was only afterwards that propositions and treaties were framed, by which their services were defined and secured. Some abuses prevailed under the management of those whom Great Britain so largely and liberally supplied. At Stralsund, the English ordnance storekeeper was not only paying for store-houses, but actually for the disembarkation of every article of arms, whether for the Swedish or other services. It seemed so extraordinary, that the Prince Royal and the Swedes could not take upon themselves the landing of what was for their own use, that I immediately insisted on a complete and satisfactory arrangement with the Prince Royal on this subject. Other points might be mentioned ; but at last every thing was landed free of expense : receipts were given for the use of any horses or wagons — whatever was for the Swedish army, they were to defray ; and what went for the services of the other troops in British pay, the two governments were to settle hereafter, as might be agreed on. Colonel Cooke was placed by my orders in charge of all the service and details before mentioned, and always went through them with indefatigable assiduity and attention. Lieutenant-general Count VValmoden and Brigadier-general Lyon communicated with me on every military exigency that arose ; and measures were adopted to put the troops in an effective state to take the field. Major Macdonald, who was placed by Lord Bathurst under General Lyon, was stationed at Stralsund to assist Colonel Cooke until further orders. The Prince Royal showed some uneasiness as to the in- IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 71 tended regulations of command, on the arrival of Major- general Gibbs' corps, in the garrison of Stralsund. His Royal Highness was assured by me that General Gibbs would not interfere with the command of the place, so long as the Swe- dish general, Englebrecken, remained ; and all that must be understood was, that General Gibbs was not to be interfered with in the command of his own people. The Prince Royal added, that Lieutenant-general Laendels would command the corps of observation ; and that in the event of his falling back, or other accidents, General Gibbs would report to him. To this I did not conceive there would be any objection. Having completed the inspection of the Hanoverian levies, considering the disadvantages under which they had labored since their formation, they were in a better state than I had expected : but there was still much room for improvement. I must not forget to record here the strong interest, zeal and ability that were displayed by His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, who was residing now at Strelitz, at his father-in-law's court, in aid of the military preparations in the north : he had been waiting for ray arrival there, in order to accompany me both to Stralsund and on my way back to the grand head-quarters. I represented to His Royal High- ness the uncertainty of the period of my stay at Stralsund : the knowledge I entertained of the Prince Royal's immediate departure for the interview of Trachenberg ; and, finally, my belief that it would occasion him considerable inconvenience in travelling with me. He was therefore pleased to forego accompanying me to Stralsund, and waited for me at Stre- litz, in order to proceed with me back to the grand army ; where I shall hereafter have occasion to speak of his Royal Highness. To return again to the military impressions of the Prince Royal. When I repeatedly persevered, previous to his depar- ture, in speaking of the troops to be put under his orders, including General Winzingerode's corps, His Royal Highness seemed rather to think disparagingly of these forces, and gave me the idea that he felt events would counteract these arrangements. He said, if he had an army of 80,000 men, as stated in his letter to the Emperor of Russia, he must be independent of the grand army: to advance when he thought right ; to retire when it was prudent ; and that he would not commit his fate or operations to the direction of other men with other objects. In reply, I respectfully advanced that I concluded the Emperor and the King of Prussia would enter into a complete arrangement, and combine plans of operations with him, for which their meeting at Trachenberg had been concerted, than which nothing could be more advantageous 72 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR to the common cause ; and, if I were so fortunate as to see him on his return, I trusted to see all such arrangements completed to his satisfaction. The Prince asked me about our treaties of concert and subsidy with Russia and Prussia. I communicated with him frankly the substance of them ; and when he asked my opin- ion, if the armistice would be prolonged, I said I did not see how it could be so under our treaties, without the consent of England. He thought as I did on this subject. He denied that Sweden had accepted the late mediation of Austria; and while he was impressing on my mind the renewal of the war with vigor, I plainly perceived that he had no confidence in the issue of events proving fortunate for the allied cause ; and if I could read into his secret thoughts, there was little desire that this should be the case. I should not forget to mention, that the news had arrived of the division in the House of Commons on the Swedish treaty the day I conversed with the Prince Royal, as above detailed; and, notwithstanding the warmth with which I expressed my feelings, often differing entirely with His Royal Highness, he dismissed me at parting, as he received me on arriving, with two French embraces. I feel a delicacy in adding much more here on the subject of the Prince Royal, which I should have done, if there had not been present about that period a most able English officer, viz. General Alexander Hope, whose mission did much to elucidate the British government on the state of affairs in this scene of action on v/hich I was momentarily introduced. I had several conversations with the Crown Prince on his return from Trachenberg; and to judge of his intentions by his sentiments, and the manner in which he expressed him- self satisfied with all that had passed, they were most favor- able. The impression of Lord Wellington's success had been etrongand universal; and produced ultimately, in my opinion, the recommencement of hostilities. His Royal Highness produced as usual his map, and talked most eloquently and scientifically of the great combined operations we should be engaged in. This was all as it ought to be ; but I wanted to see his army in motion ; and in press- ing this object, he passed mc by, saying, it would not be prudent to collect his masses too early, as the enemy would be aware of their points of concentration : but he assured me that 10,000 men had marched. Whenever the Prince Royal conversed, it was always with the greatest affability and cordiality. It is impossible to re- sist tiio fascination of his eloquent expressions, or be indif- ferent to his insinuating lone and manner ; and when armed, IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 73 as he always is, with a bottle of Eau-de-Cologne in one hand, and a white handkerchief in the other, inundating lavishly every thing around him with the perfume. It requires some hardihood to be quite collected, and insensible to beautiful phraseology, so as to discover the drift or solidity of the extraordinary man into whose presence you are at all times admitted, and accosted as "Mow aw?"." To do his Royal Highness however justice, he was invari- ably kind and civil, particularly to me ; and when I mentioned the probability of my being at his head-quarters during any interesting operations, he assured me I should always be le bien-venu ; but at the same time distinctly told me, he never would agree in any convention or treaty to have British offi- cers, especially general officers, placed near his person. Russia and Prussia might do so, but he had a different way of thinking on these points ; thus evidently showing that he would be extremely jealous of the idea of any counsel or control. All this I took in as respectful a manner as possible. I now determined to proceed from Strelitz to the imperial head-quarters : but before I take leave of affairs here, I shall state the cause of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumber- land's change of purpose, as to accompanying me thither. In the course of conversation with the Prince Royal, I inti- mated the Duke's desire to see the active operations that might take place ; but that His Royal Highness's high rank and his general situation imposed difficulties in the way of arrangement. The Prince Royal listened with great inter- est to all I advanced ; and then added, that although he should be most desirous of forwarding any views agreeable to any branch of our royal family, still that the nominations to the command of any troops in his army in British pay must entirely originate with the British government. Owing to this communication, the Duke of Cumberland decided on repairing to the grand allied army; but to my surprise at Strelitz, after His Royal Highness had had a pri- vate audience with the Prince Royal, the former informed me that the latter had pressed on him the command of all the Hanoverian troops; saying, it was essential that one of the family should head them : that this offer opened to him a prospect of active employment ; and that he was to meet the Prince Royal again at Potsdam on the 10th, when he was to hear more in detail what the Prince Royal's views were: that at present he had confined his answer to the Prince Royal, to an expression of his desire to do whatever was most consistent with the good of the common cause, and whatever the Prince Regent's government might decide upon. Now the conduct of the Prince Royal was certainly disingenuous. U 74 NARRATH'E OF THE WAR It arose either from a desire to remove General Walmoden, or from a wish to conciliate one of our princes, by an offer which the Prince Royal felt himself could not be arranged. With regard to his desire of seeing- General Walmoden removed, it was evident that he was not pleased with that distinguished general officer: however, I was inclined to con- sider that this feeling on the part of the Prince Royal was just the reason that ought to induce me to wish the General to remain in his command ; for I believed him to be an excel- lent, vigilant officer, and above all, devoted to the Prince Regent and to the British objects. I must remark, that the result of what passed between the t^vo Princes was, that the Duke of Cumberland decided on remaining at Strelitz. A singular and ludicrous anecdote occurred to me at that court, which I cannot fjrbear relating, as a testimonial of the hospitality and kindness of the late Duke of Mecklenburg Strelitz : a prince who v.as beloved and respected not only by his subjects, but by all w^ho knew him ; and who marked by a particular kindness all English visitors and residents in his states. I had ordered myself, on arriving very late at night in the town, to be driven to the inn ; but being sound asleep in my carriage with my aides-de-camp on entering the gates, my chasseurs and orderly from the box showed my passports. I was not aware that orders had been sent from the palace to the guard-house to send my cortege to the reigning Duke's brother's house in the town. On alighting, I found myself shown into magnificent apart- ments, lighted up, with numerous servants, and with a grand convert laid for supper. Congratulating myself with my companions on our capital inn. we proceeded to call about us, ordered and made free, precisely as if in the first Paris hotel. The v.-ines were excellent; more and more were ordered up; a provision directed to be laid aride to carry forward on the ne.xt day's march: in short, we all v;ent to bed in the sweetest delirium. But the consternation that followed the next morn- ing was appalling : when av/akening, I Avas informed that the Duke's brother was in the anteroom, waiting to know, " if his Excellency was satisfied with his reception." The ridicule attached to me for this anecdote, did not leave me during the few very happy days I spent at the delightful palace of the Duke of Mecklenburnr at Strelitz, and in the most enchanting society that then embellished it. During the stay of the Prince Royal at ^lecklenburg, we had no little difficulty as to the etiquette of this small court with the two Princes. The Prince Royal, as heir to tho throne of Sweden, considered that he should take the pas. The Duke of Cumberland most properly and rationally could IN GEEMANY AND FRANCE. 75 not brook his blood should give way at his uncle's court to Bernadotte, much less did he incline to cede the fair Princess who presided there. The old Duke of Mecklenburg, under these circumstances, entreated me to settle upon some plan tor them to get from the saloon into the dining-room. After some reflection, I proposed that the two ladies of rank present, the Princess of Solms and the Landgravine of Darmstadt, should go out together, and that the royal Princes should fol- low hand in hand. This was adopted after considerable dif- ficulty ; but the Duke of Cumberland soon assumed his just rights, and took the first place by the Princess : which the Prince Royal not only perceived, but certainly resented it, by showing extreme ill-humor during the dinner. From Strelitz the Prince Royal of Sweden repaired to Berlin, where he arrived on the night of the 24th of July, and immediately besran to occupy himself with the general arrangements of the army placed under his orders. General Bulow's head-quarters were at Berlin, and Count Woronzow and some of the principal Russian general officers were also in that place. A report at this time arrived from the ad- vanced-posts on the Elbe, which caused a considerable sensa- tion : it stated that the enemy had collected considerable masses at Magdeburg and Wittenberg, and strengthened their advances on the Elbe ; and on inquiry being made into the cause, the French general, Le Marois, commanding at Magdeburg, and others," appeared to feign ignorance of the armistice being prolonged, and seemed by their demonstra- tions as if Buonaparte was preparing to strike some unex- pected blow. The fact of the enemy's concentration of 60 or 80,000 men being reported, orders were issued for General Bulow to as- semble the greater part of his troops at Mittenv/alde and Belitz to cover Berlin: the Swedish armies were to be fur- ther advanced, and the necessary measures taken to prevent any breach of treaty, if it should be attempted, on the part of the French. The numerical forces in the neighborhood consisted of Bu- low's corps, said to be about 30,000 men, including land wehr; General Count Woronzow's corps, 9400 cavalry and 5000 infantry; and General Winzingerode with 12,000, chiefly infantrv: to these may be added, the corps on the Lower Elbe. The Prince Royal now received a letter from General Tauenstein before Stettin, pressing very strongly for the positive orders to assault that place, having no doubt of its immediate capture ; observing also on the advantages of liber- ating his corps from its blockade. The Prince assured me 7'6 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR that he should not delay sending" him complete powers to act when the moment arrived ; but it did not seem quite so clear when, in His Royal Highness's opinion, that would be. The accounts from Dresden now mentioned Buonaparte's extreme rage at the news from Spain. Every one was afraid to refer to the subject with him : at one instant he declared eternal war against England, and then more calmly he would revert to a pacific arrangement. The advice of his most confidential people, it is said, was for peace ; and risings in the interior of France urged it. The etat-major of the Prince Royal of Sweden^s army was at this period arranged ; and it was settled that General Baron Adlercreutz should be chief of the staff; Baron Ta- verst to be employed for the business of the chanceUerie ; and Count Lowenhehn for more active duties with the Prince Royal. Officers from the different corps, selected by their chiefs, were to assist in the general arrangements under the above chiefs. On the 27th, intelligence arrived from the grand head- quarters at Peterswalde, informing the Prince Royal that Austria was much satisfied with the consent given for the prolongation of the armistice. It then stated that Napoleon desired that the commissioners sent to his head-quarters should proceed with the arrangements that had been agreed upon ; but Napoleon accompanied this communication, by re- quiring that French officers should be sent to the fortresses charged to superintend the supplies of provisions, and that a return should be furnished for 50,000 men and 6000 horses : numbers very considerably superior to the garrisons, and to what had hitherto been provided under the stipulations of the armistice. The Emperor of Russia thought himself peremptorily called upon to resist this demand ; and the language held in reply by the French was, that Buonaparte would not ratify the pro- longation of the armistice, but would recommence hostilities immediately, if his demands were rejected. The Duke of Vicenza had not proceeded to Prague as was expected ; and since Count Narbonne's arrival at that city, up to the 22d, not the least step had been taken to enter upon the business of the negotiations. It was then calculated, that allowing for the time of His Imperial Majesty's answer to reach Dresden, and the rejoinder to be received, added to the six days neces- sary for the Denunciation of the truce, the 2d of August would be the earliest period when hostilities could recom- mence. Austria was extremely mortified at this new instance of unreasonable conduct on the part of France ; and Count Met- INT GEEJMANY AND FRANCE. 77 ternich declared most positively, that any neglect of their mediation, or an attempt to infringe what had been agreed on, would be followed by an immediate declaration of war on their part It was not very probable that Buonaparte would prematurely and injudiciously force Austria to decide against him ; and indeed it was more likely that the French Ruler was merely trying how far he could, by manoeuvres and artful man- agement, accomplish his objects. The Emperor of Russia, however, remained firm ; and the Prince Royal was pressed to forward his arrangements, so that the allies might not be taken unprepared. The plan of the campaign had been set- tled at the meeting at Trachenberg ; and the Emperor was already taking measures for the immediate movement of his troops. Meanwhile, Buonaparte proceeded himself to Luc- kau, and was there on the 22d, where a very large force had been assembled, with tjie view, as was supposed, of striking an immediate blow against the Prince Royal ; in which event the Emperor of Russia was immediately to move forward. The arrangements of the Prince Poyal, made in conse- quence of this communication from head-quarters, were to assemble General Bulow at Mittenwalde ; the head of Gene- ral Winzingerode's corps was to arrive also in the neighbor- hood of that place on the 1st of August ; General Woronzow was to assemble on the right; and General Czernicheif was to move forward tovv-ards Spandau and its vicinity. The Swedes were to advance, so that their head-quarters were to be established in the centre : the Russians and Prussians forming the flanks of this army ; and orders had been sent to llie officer commanding at the advanced-posts, to call upon the enemy to declare positively in what manner they regard- c d the armistice. The second Swedish divisions, from Ros- tock and Greifswald, were now marching forward ; but the Wismar division had not yet been put in motion. The Swedes were wonderfully healthy. In the Rostock division of 9400 men, there were only thirty-one sick. The second division amounted to about 21,000 men. General Walmo- den's corps was also now advancing. It was feared there would be difficulties here about provisions ; but this evident- ly arose only from want of arrangement. Allusions having been made to the plans of campaign and arrangements made at Trachenberg between the allied Sove- reigns and the Prince Royal of Sweden, the outline of the convention signed, as far as I became acquainted with it, will be found in the Appendix. During the period of the suspension of hostilities, the bel- ligerents on both sides occupied themselves in bringing for- ward all their resources to re-open the campaign with effect; G2 78 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR but it became generally evident, that Napoleon only consent- ed to the prolongation of the armistice with a view of detach- ing Austria, by mancBuvres and negotiation, from the com- mon cause of Europe. The Duke of Vicenza (Caulaincourt) arrived on the 28th of July at Prague, but not invested with such full powers as could give any hopes of a favorable issue to the affairs pend- ing ; and the 10th of August, the day of declaring the armistice at an end, now approached, without the parties having ad- vanced a step in the principal objects of their negotiations. The general apperru of Napoleon's forces and dispositions at this crisis was as follows : — The first corps, under General Vandamme, was assembling at Dresden from Magdeburg ; Marshal Augereau, collected in Saxony ; Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr, at Freyberg : all these united composed a force of not less than 350,000 men in Silesia and Saxony. Murat ar- rived on the 14th of July at Dresden, to take the command of the cavalry, in the place of Marshal Bessieres. The disposition of the grand allied army may next be briefly sketched as follows : — General Blucher commanded in chief his army of 70,000 men ; composed of General D' Yorck's corps, and two Russian corps under Lieutenant-general Count Langeron. General Gniesenau was chief of the staff of this army: an officer whose distinguished military reputa- tion and high fame in Europe are established on too firm a basis to require any eulogy from me. The remainder of the grand army was composed of, 1st. the corps of General Count Wittgenstein, under whom were Prince Gortchakoff, Prince Eugene of Wirtemburg, and Count Pahlen ; 2d. the Prussian corps; 3d. the Russian reserves, and the Russian and Prussian guards, under tiie Grand-Duke Constantine and General IMiloradovitch, then forming 80,000, which now pro- ceeded to join the Austrian army in Bohemia : making with them a total of about 200,000 men, under the command in chief of Prince Schv/artzenberg. General Radezkj'' was named chief of the staff to this army: the head-quarters of which were now stationed at Prague ; and on the 18th of August the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia arrived there. In addition to the illustrious warriors who graced this vast theatre of action, particular mention must be made of the celebrated French general, Moreau, who now arrived from New- York, and adoj)ted the title of aide-de-camp to the Em- peror Alexander, to oppose his former companions in arms, under the despot who now ruled them. War was declared by Austria aoainst France on the morn- ing of the 11th of August, in conformity with the intentions IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 79 announced in M. de Metternich's dispatch to Count Stadion; and the French ministers received their passports, accom- panied by a note, in which it was declared that, no answer having- been returned to the Emperor's ultimatum, the con- gress was at an end ; and that his Imperial Majesty joined his forces to those of the allies to extort peace. It appeared that the Austrian minister's ultimatum was made known to M. de Caulaincourt on the 8th ; and that he was permitted to take a copy of it. In a long conversation which ensued between them, Gene- ral Caulaincourt told M. de Metternich that if he were Buonaparte, he would accept, without hesitation, the Austrian proposals (the nature of which I need not enter into) ; but that he was without full powers, and did not think that they would be accepted by the Emperor. A courier was dispatch- ed with them to Dresden, the moment when the conference ended. Although hostilities were not to commence until six days after the 10th, as originally stipulated, nevertheless, from the latter period, Austria became a co-bell ig.erent; and even if Napoleon had now changed his mind, his propositions must have been addressed to the allied powers, the mediation being at an end. It is difficult to describe the enthusiasm generally created by the Austrian declaration of war. The spirit of the army also was at the highest pitch. When the three allied Sove- reigns met at Prague, it excited a proud sensation in the breast of such British subjects as witnessed the event: for the persevering and energetic conduct of their own country, under the wise administration of the Prince Regent's gov- ernment, and, above all, the glorious exploits of British arms in Spain, had ultimately, and I may say exclusively, brought into action a complete and efficient alliance against the am- bition of France, and the tyranny of its chief; affording ra- tional hopes of a glorious termination of the contest. The recently dubious conduct of Austria having thus terminated, she nobly and magnanimously brought to bear her great and commanding advantages in point of numerical forces; and England, with her wonted generosity, was the first to acknow- ledge her sincerity, and restore to her her confidence. The allied army now continued its march into Bohemia. The treaties of subsidy and concert between England and the allies having been signed and settled at Reichenbach, I will not further allude to them, nor to any separate or secret conventions made between any of the powers : suffice it to say, that the alliance was preserved with that solid union, good faith, and complete understanding, which promised, and finally produced, a successful result. 80 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR CHAPTER VII. Movements of the enemy— Removal of the allied head-quarters to Prague —Count Stadion— Intrepid character of the Emperor Alexander— Dispo- sition of Austria— Prince Schwartzenberg— The Breslau central commie- sion— Observations on the rupture of negotiations— Reply of Austria- Conduct of Caulaincourt— Confidence of Buonaparte— Count Metternich— his course of proceedings— Review of the Austrian army— Fine appear- ance and discipline of the troops— Retreat of the P'rench— ColJ«^cUon of the enemy's forces at Zittau— The French general, Jomenil— Intelligence of the defeat of Soult— Ceneral Blucher attacked by Ney and Marmont— Count Wittgenstein's corps— Advance of the grand armies towards Dres- den—The enemy retires— The allies attack Dresden— they abandon the assault— their loss on the occasion— Advantages of the French— Fate of Moreau. On the 15th of August I proceeded to Landeck, where His Prussian Majesty's head-quarters then were, for the rati- fication of the treaties before alluded to, when intelligence was received that the French had crossed the line of demar- cation on the roads to Landshut, Jauer, and Neumarkt. Gene- ral Blucher took up a position at Schweidnitz; and General Sachen had orders to occupy Breslau. It was stated to have been said by the French general, Girard, at Lowenberg, that a very large army was to move on Berlin. Davoust was ad- vancing with the corps assembled round Magdeburg. The troops at Leipsic, Dessau, and throughout Lusatia, were now also in motion. Private accounts gave the detail of the French army as divided into thirteen corps: the 4th, which was in canton- ments near Sprottau, marched thence on the 12th of August towards Greseberg. It was supposed that this corps would pass the Oder, and proceed along the right bank of that river towards Kastrin. The corps of Ney, Lauriston, and Bertrand, were in the neighborhood of Lignitz, The 5th corps had been encamped hitherto near Goldberg, but had marched on Lignitz. The 6th corps left Bunzlau on the r2th for the same destination. The 11th corps marched on the same day from Lowenberg towards Lignitz; which place had been strongly fortified. Another corps encamped at Grciffenberg, was not yet put in motion. The French park of artillery at Bunzlau was sent to Lignitz. Scbastiani had arrived at Hay- nau. The 2d corps consisted chiefly of nineteen regiments of cavalry, which were however weak, not having more than 3 or 400 in each regiment. It was believed that the French troops assembled upon the Katzbach were not intended to act offensively against Silesia, but were to enter Bohemia through the Riesen-GebOrge, in IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 81 concert with another French corps cfarmee^ to penetrate from Zittau : thus breaking in on the line of march of the Russians and Prussians at Prague, and turning the positions of the Austrians on the banks of the Elbe. It was intimated that the Emperor of Russia was disposed to place the whole of the army of Barclay de Tolly under Prince Schwartzenberg; and General Moreau was to be re- quested by both Emperors to assist the Austrian field-marshal. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland now arrived from Strelitz, having learnt that His Prussian Majesty was at Landeck, on his way to Prague, whither His Royal High- ness determined to proceed. When I found the head-quarters were moving to Prague, I immediately applied to Count Stadion for passports for His Royal Highness. The Count declined giving passports until he had communicated with his Emperor on his arrival at Prague, but promised to send his answer to Landeck. The King of Prussia left Landeck for Prague on the 16th ; and as I received no answer from Count Stadion, I arranged with His Royal Highness that he should remain at Landeck, whilst I went forward and prepared for his reception at Prague. I found, on my arrival there, that no point had been so much canvassed as that of the chief command. The Emperor Alexander nobly aspired to the title of military captain: his personal intrepidity, perseverance, and firmness, entitled him to great consideration in this respect ; and my impression is, had Austria consented to place the whole of the allied forces under his orders, there would have been a unity of design, productive of beneficial results. The King of Prussia was not disinclined to this opinion. I do not mean to advance that the Emperor did not reserve some advice and assistance in command, but with General Moreau and the council the chief direction might have been well placed in His Imperial Majesty's hands : and considering the temper of the Russians, if they became dissatisfied, it did not appear the least advi- sable arrangement. Austria naturally wished, from the prominent part she had taken, to be the arbiter of a universal peace, and have the glory of her own work ; and she was therefore desirous of an Austrian for the military command. A certain degree of jealousy of Russia on political points operated against her yielding to the Emperor's wishes ; and, above all, the arrival of Moreau created discontent amongst the Austrians, and was perhaps the principal reason why the command in chief was not offered to the Emperor Alexander. At this period, Prince Schwartzenberg sent the orders of the day secretly to Barclay de Tolly ; but they were promulgated to the Rus- 82 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR sians as if emanating from their own general. Generals Moreau and (afterwards) Jomenil, both at the head-quarters of the Emperor Alexander, pressed strongly for His Imperial Majesty's assuming the chief command. This was natural ; as their own influence would be thereby more conspicuous in the eyes of Europe, in conducting the operations with an Em- peror of Russia as commander-in-chief than an Austrian Prince, whose character was established as an excellent and experienced officer. Next to the command in chief there was renewed con- tention regarding the Breslau central commission, and the occupation of the territories wrested from the enemy. This last point had become (owing perhaps to Baron Stein's pres- ence and want of employment) a topic of much deliberation. Austria did not like to agree to such an arrangement as was formed at Breslau : it remained then to be seen w-hether a new one might not be concocted more agreeable to all parties. There was incessant debate relative to the immediate of- fensive or defensive operations, among the great military chiefs in the respective armies. x\ustria thinking her troops young, preferred waiting Buonaparte's attacks; but Russia and Prussia overruled this caution ; and the campaign was pressed on the general plan, as laid down at Trachenberg : a reference to which, with what I have described, will con- vey, I trust, a general idea of the operations. It may not be wholly uninteresting to revert here to the general observations made at Prague upon the rupture of recent neo'otiations. Count Narbonne left Prague on the 14th; Caulaincourt remained till the 16th, and instead of answering direct the Austrian ultimatum, made some new propositions. It was however intimated to Caulaincourt that he could not with propriety remain in Prague, where the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia were hourly expected ; consequently he withdrew to a country-house in the neigh- borhood, where he stayed until his overtures were rejected. He w^as very urgent to obtain an audience of the Emperor of Russia ; but that was positively interdicted. The purport of those propositions was rumored to be; 1st. Napoleon was willing to cede the duchy of Warsaw, provided the King of Saxony received elsewhere an indemnification of 500,000 souls for this cession ; 2d. Prussia receiving Poland, was thereout to provide for that indemnification. Buonaparte also agreed to yield Dantzic and its territory, after a certain period, with the express condition that the works were to be completely destroyed. He consented, likewise, to restore the Illyrian provinces, with the exception of Istria ; and some m GERiMAPfY AND FRANCE. 83 added Fiume and Trieste. These were the outlines of the last offer. Austria was reported to reply, in answer, that her powers had ceased as a mediator ; but she consented to submit the proposals to the allies, by whom they were formally rejected, as wholly inadmissible. Caulaincourt then departed, but his conduct was very moderate ; and if it had depended on him, the terms of Austria would probably have been accepted. Narbonne, in all his communications to his Emperor, before Caulaincourt's arrival, expressed his firm conviction that Austria would never act hostilely, but only threatened to ac- complish her own objects. Caulaincourt suddenly arrived at Prague, and positively ascertained Count Metternich's deter- mination to declare war after the 10th, and saw that Nar- bonne had been deceived. His consternation was then great; and courier upon courier was dispatched to Buonaparte. Buonaparte was much urged by the Empress and Senate at Mayence to make peace on any terms. His answer is reported to have been, " All or nothing :" meaning to preserve all his conquests, or try the chance of war. His language always indicated confidence in his own genius and physical strength. He had, according to the most accurate accounts, above 300,000 men on the right bank of the Rhine. The Austrian force was now computed at 160,000 men in Bohe- mia, 30,000 in the valley of the Danube, and 50,000 on the banks of the Saave. The command v/as at length confided to Prince Schwartz- enberg. The two Emperors were to remain at or near the head-quarters of their respective armies, and the King of Prussia with those of the Emperor Alexander. Little was hitherto positively known of Buonaparte's intentions. He went from Dresden to Bautzen, and thence proceeded towards Gorlitz, Many augured that he would commence his opera- tions against the Prince Royal of Sweden ; whilst others said such a measure would be too hazardous, and conjectured that he would retire behind the Elbe, and enter Bohemia by the roads of Peterswalde and Sebastiansberg. Prince Paul Esterhazy was now named by the Austrian government for the embassy to England ; and intelligence arrived from home that the Earl of Aberdeen was appointed His Britannic Majesty's ambassador to the Emperor of Aus- tria, and was on his way to the head-quarters of .the army. Previous to noticing the arrival of a British ambassador, I cannot help doing justice to the noble sentiments which were unofficially expressed to me by Count Metternich, at an in- terview I had with him at Prague, at this interesting epoch. He began by detailing the course he had pursued since he 84 NARRATIVE OP THE WAR had taken the reins of government. He found the finances of the Austrian monarchy in a state of insolvency, and the despondency of its subjects at the lovi^est ebb. He arranged the marriage of the Archduchess, to give his country the first ascending step from the abyss of misfortune into which it had fallen ; never intending, when existence and power were again secured, that the marriage should direct or influence the politics of the cabinet of Vienna. He persevered in his course, he added ; and deaf to the opinions and entreaties of all, he would not stir, notwithstanding the most urgent so- licitations. When the Russians were on the Memel, he told them to come to the Oder and to the Elbe ; and when Aus- tria was ready, she should act. He was universally suspected ; but he had only a single object in view — to raise his country, and through her reascendency give peace to the world. He said he knew that the British cabinet had always doubted him : he did not wonder at it ; but that he hoped he should at length stand justified in their opinion, and that of posterity. He wished for nothing so much as to establish the most cor- dial relations between the two courts, which he hoped would be effected without delay. And here I am bound to add, that from this period to the death of that statesman who then pre- sided over our foreign affairs, there never was any serious divergence of sentiment on any great European question. The last letter from Bassano to Metternich was received pre- vious to the above conversation. This dispatch began and ended in an offensive tone, stating that Austria avoit prostitue the character of a mediator, for that to Bassano's knowledge she had been long united with the allies. Nevertheless, the extreme and urgent desire of the Emperor for peace, prompt- ed him to make another offer; that some neutral point should be fixed for negotiators to assemble even during the progress of hostilities. The deliberate answer returned by Metternich was, that the allies would never refuse to listen to negotiations for peace, provided England and Sweden consented, and as- sisted at the negotiations, of which the propositions of the 16th of May were to form the basis. The Austrian army was reviewed by the three Sovereigns near Schlan, six miles from Prague, on the 19th of August. It was a most sublime military spectacle ; ninety-one battal- ions of infantry and fifty squadrons of cavalry defiled before their Majesties. The battalions were about 800 strong ; and the infantry amounted to something more than 70,000 men. The cavalry present did not exceed 7000 : the remainder of it and light troops formed the advanced-guard, consisting of three divisions, about 30,000 men; these were in advance,, and not inspected. IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 85 The composition of this army was magnificent, although I perceived a great many recruits : still the system that reigned throughout, and the military air that marked the soldier, es- pecially the Hungarian, must ever fix it in my recollection as the finest army of the continent. The Russians may pos- sess a more powerful soldiery, of greater physical strength and hardihood, but they cannot equal the Austrians in disci- pline or military malntien. The general officers of the latter are of a superior class; and the army has a fine ton in all its departments. To see one Austrian and one Hungarian regi- ment, is to see the army : for a complete equality and uni- formity reign throughout ; and they have no constant changes of uniform and equipment : their movement was beautifully correct, and the troops seemed formed in the most perfect order. Twenty-four squadrons of cuirassiers and sixteen of hussars deserved to be particularly noticed. Among the for- mer were the cuirassiers of the Emperor, who were presented with new standards ; and the three Sovereigns nailed in uni- son their standards to the pole in front of the army, as a token of their firm alliance. This was a most exhilarating moment. The hussars are peculiar to this army in their style and ap- pearance : in vain do others imitate them ; and it is but strict justice to admit, that they are incomparable, I may say match- less. The artillery seemed less well appointed ; and the ammu- nition-wagons and horses for their guns and train were of an inferior description to those of the Russians (whose artillery horses are perfect) ; but the officers and men are scientific and expert, and the artillery is not to be judged of by its ap- pearance. From the military reports now current, it appeared that the grand allied and French armies were making two conver- sions, as it were — the allied armies wheeling from Bohemia into Saxon]?', by the passes of Peterswalde and Komotau ; and the French forces withdrawing from Silesia were turning to- wards Bohemia, and collecting on the right bank of the Elbe. These demonstrations denoted the approach of a serious con- flict; and it v/as argued that if it should occur, the allies would probably engage with their front towards the Elbe ; and the enemy having it in their rear, would offer a tremen- dous resistance ; and that if Napoleon acted upon military principles, he would retire to the left bank of the Elbe, and rather give battle on that side. The French forces having commenced their retreat on the 15th from Grimberg and Freystadt in Silesia, abandoning the line of demarcation, the allies immediately moved forwards. General Blucher's corps, as has been before observed, from H 86 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR its position at Schweidnitz, occupied successively the points evacuated by the enemy. General Sacken's corps entered Breslau ; and on the 18th the greater part of Silesia, and par- ticularly the towns of Parchwitz, Lignitz, and Goldberg, were abandoned. General Blucher had his advanced-posts at Low- enberg. From these movements, it was expected that the interest- ing intelligence would soon arrive of the French having wholly retired into Saxony ; but while the retreat v/as con- tinued here, an effort was preparing in another quarter. By the reports up to the 17th from Berlin, all seemed quiet in that direction, the Prince Royal having his head-quarters at Potsdam : thus it was apparent that the grand armies, on the frontiers of Bohemia and Saxony, would first come in con- tact. The enemy's great assemblage of troops was at Zittau, Grossenhayn, and Chemnitz. From the former place they moved a corps on the 17th against the Austrian General, Neu- perg, who was at Friedland with about 25,000 men. General Regnier and Poniatowski's corps made this movement. The Austrian General, as the enemy's approach was sudden and unexpected, retired. The great operations of the allied ar- mies were now in activity on the principal roads to Leipsic, by the passes of Peterswalde and Komotau. The Russian and Prussian armies were proceeding by the former, namely, the corps under Count Wittgenstein and General Milorado- vitch, with the reserve of the guards and cavalry ; General Kleist being on the right, and the Austrian army occupying the left. The advances approached near St. Sebastiansberg and Lobositz, thus pressing on the enemy's flank; and as he had delayed his retreat so long, according to all reasonable calculation he must have severely suffered from it. Buonaparte reviewed his guards at Leipsic on the 10th (called 30,000 men) ; and his having withdrawn them from Dresden, indicated that he meditated his great concentration near the former place. The Emperor of Russia moved his head-quarters on the 21st to Walditz ; the Emperor of Aus- tria to Lahn ; and the King of Prussia followed on the 22d. Mention has been made of the French general, Jomenil : he had come over from the enemy, and was an officer cele- brated for his military writings. He was appointed (I believe) a Lieutenant-general in His Imperial Majesty's service; and his experience and knowledge were no doubt of the highest importance in the approaching crisis. In a conversation I had with this officer, he stated Napoleon's force to be very strong; and, above all, that the exertions he made in France to re-equip and re-organize a great mass of artOlery were liV GERMANY AND FRANCE. 87 quite astonishing. He added, that his contemptuous conduct had deprived him of every sincere friend he ever had ; and that he lived in tlie army only from the fear entertained of him, and the ability he possessed, which his most inveterate enemy was compelled to admit. This opinion of his talents, from such a source, was at any rate interesting. It was no ordinary satisfaction, at this juncture, that intel- ligence reached the allied army from Paris, dated the 12th, stating that Lord Wellington had completely defeated Soult, near Roncesvalles, on the 28th of July. The French General had retired first on St. Jean de Luz, and afterwards to St. Jean Pied de Port, near Bayonne ; and Lord Wellington was following him, up to the 31st, when the accounts came away. All Soult's baggage, artillery, and 15,000 prisoners, were Kaid to be takenT St. Sebastian's, and it was believed also Pam- peluna, had both fallen. On the Mediterranean side, Suchet was retiring from Barcelona towards Perpignan ; and was so annoyed by the British fleet, added to his general position, that the greatest appreliensions were entertained at Paris for the safety of his army. It was added, from the best authority, tliat Soult had written, that unless Buonaparte could send him 50,000 fresh troops that had never been in Spain, it would be quite impossible to maintain any footing in the Peninsula. Intelligence arrived also from Toulon and other quarters of French disasters; and the greatest panic pre- vailed in the south of France, and families were flying in all directions. Such were the gratifying details circulated through the allied army; and the glory of the above achieve- ments could be equalled only by their opportune occurrence. To return to the military operations before us. While the main Russian army under General Barclay de Tolly, in- cluding the corps of Wittgenstein and JVIiloradovitch, and the Prussian corps of General Kleist, together with the whole of the Austrian army, were to act offensively from Bohemia, un- der the chief command of Prince Schwartzenberg, — General Bluclier's corps d\irmee, composed of a division of Prussians under B'Yorck, Generals Sachen's and Langeron's Russian divisions were to move from Silesia on Lusatia, and threaten the enemy in front. General Blucher was directed to avoid any general action, especially against superior numbers. In conformity with those instructions, General Blucher ad- vanced, on the 20th, in three columns, from Lignitz, Goldberg, and Jauer, on Bunzlau and Lowenberg; General Sachen's corps moved to tlie riglit on Bunzlau; D'Yorck's in the centre, and Langeron's on tlie left. The enem}'^ abandoned Bunzlau, destroying tlieir works and magazines. General Blucher's force advanced to the Bober, where they were attacked, on gg NARRATIVE OF THE WAR the 21st, by the enemy under Marshal Ney, and by the 6th corps under Marmont. These moved in great force on Bunz- lau, Lovvenberg, and Lahn; and a very serious affair took place. It was reported that Buonaparte also was in person in the field, and that he opposed 100,000 men to the force of Blucher. The allied troops contested the g'round with great bravery; but as General Blucher had received orders to avoid a general engagement, he withdrew in the bent order to Haynau, Siegendort, Horschberg, and behind the Katzbach. The Iobs of General Blucher in this affair was reported to be 3000 men : he took, however, several prisoners. The enemy suffered considerably; but General Blucher deemed it expedient to fall back with his army on Jauer. Having now detailed the first movements of the army of Silesia, I return to the grand armies on the side of Bohemia, which, on the 20th and 21st, commenced passing the fron- tiers. Count Wittgenstein's and General Kleist's columns proceeded by the pass of Peters walde, and the Austrians by Komotau. On the 22d, Count Wittgenstein's corps fell in with the enemy, and had a very serious affair with them near Timscht. The enemy encountered the allies on the frontiers ; but, although they endeavored to defend every inch of ground, they were beaten back from all their positions towards Dres- den. The different columns of the allied armies debouched from the mountains, and passed at such concerted points as would probably have operated fatally on the enemy, if the arrangements, as planned, had been completely carried into effect? But the eagerness of the troops to push on and en- gage, brought, on the morning of the 22d, the right corps into action before the other columns were up. The French were commanded by Gouvion St. Cyr, and their force consisted of upwards of 15,000 men : they were supported by their troops from Koningstein, and by the camp of Ijllienstein, which amounted to at least 6000 men, under General Bonnet. After a very sharp action, Count Wittgen- stein drove the enemy before liim, and took 3 or 400 prison- ers. The French had also a vast number killed and wounded: the loss of the allies was not severe. After this action, the enemy retired into Koningstein and his intrenched camp, and also into tJie various works he had thrown up round Dresden. The allies pressed forwards on every side; and the grand army now manccuvred to encircle Dresden. On the 20th, the hussar regiment of Grodno, belonging to Wittgenstein's corps, had a very brisk engagement close to IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. S9 Dresden, in which they took four guns and 6onie howitzers. The advanced-guards of the Russians, Prussians, and Austri- ans, encamped that night on the heights above Dresden. On the morning of! the 26th, the French abandoned the ground which they had occupied, in advance of Dresden, called the Grossen-Garten, and withdrew into the suburbs and their difl'erent redoubts. As no official reports were made out, every hour being fraught with events, details may in many points be imperfect; but certainly the history of war nowhere offers any period like the one before us, in which two such immense armies stood committed to such bold opera- tions. If Buonaparte maintained his positions in advance, it was evidently with an intention of forcing a passage into Bohemia, and adopting that plan of campaign against the al- lies which they so successfully foiled and imitated. The pos- session of Koningstein afforded him a facility of passing the Elbe at that place, moving into the mountains of Bohemia, and acting against the pivot of the force with which he was contending : on the other hand, such an attempt was sure to be hazardous, and if it failed destructive. Napoleon felt at this period the absolute necessity of his presence on the Elbe, in front of the grand army. He arrived, therefore, on the 23d, with Marshal Ney, leaving Marshal Macdonald in command of the army opposed to Blucher in Silesia, consisting of the 3d, 5th, and 11th corps; and on the 24th, Marmont's corps, the 6th, and General Latour Mau- bourg's cavalry, also received orders to return to Dresden. Tvv^o Westphalian regiments of hussars, commanded by Colonel Hammerstein, now came over from the enem}'-, and were eager to be incorporated with the allies, and take their revenge for the misery the French had inflicted upon their country. The enemy having on the morning of the 27th abandoned the ground surrounding Dresden, called the Grossen-Garten, and having withdrawn into their works and into the suburbs of the town, it was deemed expedient, as its possession had become of considerable importance, to make an attack with a large force upon the place. During the morning of the 26th, in the attack of the gardens. Count Wittgenstein's and General Kleist's light corps, on the right of the town, expe- rienced some loss; and indeed the enemy had so much im- proved by art the defences around it, that the capture by assault was evidently an enterprise of considerable difficulty. The most important of the fortifications of the city, were three strong redoubts on the left bank of the Elbe ; one before the Freyberg, and the others before the Plauen and Dippol- diswald gates. The troops moved to the attack at three H2 1 90 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR o'clock in the afternoon : Count Wittgenstein's corps, in three columns, on the right of the Grossen-Garten ; while General Kleist's moved one column through these gardens, and two on the left. The left column was headed by Prince Augustus of Prussia. Three divisions of Austrians, at the same time, on the left of the town, under the immediate direction of Count Coloredo and Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein, joined the Prussians ; these formed the centre attack, the Russians being on their left. A tremendous cannonade commenced this grand opera- tion : the batteries being planted in a circular form round the town. The effect was magnificent. The fine buildings of Dresden were soon enveloped in smoke and flame ; and the troops moved forward in the most perfect order to the assault. They approached on all sides close to the town ; and the Austrians took an advanced redoubt, with eight guns, in the most undaunted and gallant style. The work was of the strongest description, situated about sixty yards from the main wall ; and nothing could surpass the gallantry with which it was stormed. The enemy fled from it only to shelter themselves behind new defences, manning the thick walls of the town, in which it was impossible, without a long and continued fire of heavy artillerj'', to make a breach. The French, v;ith the aid of the means of resistance which a strong tovv^n afibrds, now held in check the troops which had so gallantly carried and entered the outworks. The night was fast approaching ; and the enemy now attempted to make a sortie with all his guards, amounting at least to 30,000 men, in order to separate the allied troops, and take each wing in flank and rear. This was immediately perceived ; and as it appeared evident that it was not practicable to carry the place that night, orders were sent to draw off the troops, which returned to their several encampments. Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein adopt- ed an admirable disposition on the side where the enemy made their sortie, and by which all disorder v;as avoided. This enterprise, in proportion to its importance, was one of great difticulty. No troops could have signalized themselves more than those of the allies engaged in this day's combat; and if it had been physically possible to have carried the place under the circumstances, they would have accomplished it. Unfortu- nately, there were no breaches practicable for the troops to enter; and the artillery, although brought up at the close of the evening to within one hundred paces of the wall, was unable to batter it, or make any material impression. From the best calculation, the loss of the allies was under 5000 IN' GERM AN^l'" ANI) FRANCE. 91 men ; and m this attack the Austrians chiefly suffered. The sortie of the enemy was a prelude to a more genera] engage- ment, which took place the following morning, on the 27th. Buonaparte having a strong force in Dresden, at least 130,000 men, determined on attacking the allies, who occupied a very extended position on the surrounding heights. The enemy had great advantages in their disposition for attack. Dresden, bristled with guns, was in their rear ; while their communi- cations were not intersected. If they made an impression, they could follow it up; and in case of failure, could with- draw in security. The allied troops, if victorious, could not pursue under the guns of the fortress. One of the worst days ever seen added materially to the embarrassment of the allies, who had arrived at their positions by rapid marches, through bad roads and defiles; and their supplies of every kind it was difficult, if not impossible, to bring up. Availing himself of the advantages above stated, Napoleon displayed an immense number of field-pieces on* the morning of the 27th ; and heavy cannonading on both sides formed the chief feature of the battle. Charges in various parts were made, as well with Russian and Prussian, as Austrian cavalry, and they distinguished themselves highly; but the main bodies of the infantry in both armies did not come into contact. The weather was hazy ; the rain incessant. The action was sustained at all points under tlie heaviest disad- vantages ; and towards the middle of the day a catastrophe occurred, which awakened more than ordinary sensibility and regret throughout the allied army. General Moreau, while in earnest conversation with the Emperor of Russia on the progress of operations, had both his legs carried otf by a cannon-shot (the ball piercing the body of his horse). Thus the good cause and the profession of arms sustained a heavy loss. It was impossible not deeply to lament the hard fate of an amiable man and gallant sol- dier, whose talents, patriotism, and courage were doubted and decried, and his life cut short by his own countrymen. The enemy continued his efforts on the position of the allies till the evening, when finding he could make no impression, the action ceased. The battle cost the allies 6 or 7000 men : the enemy must have suffered more. In one charge of Russian cavalry against infantry and a battery, a great number of prisoners were taken, though the guns were not brought off. 92 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR CHAPTER VIII. Difficulties of the allies after their retreat from Dresden — Advantages of Napoleon — Causes of the late failure — Prince Schwartzenberg — Buona- parte's fortresses on the Elbe — Complexion of affairs — Operations of Gen- eral Blucher — Brilliant affair of General Sachen's corps — The Silesian army pursue the enemy — Successes of Blucher — Action near Toplitz — Bravery of the Russian guards — The Duke of Cumberland— Defeat of Vandamme at Kulm — The grand army encamps near Toplitz — Events in the north under the Prince Royal of Sweden — Repulse of General Ber- trand — Victory obtained by the Crown Prince — Napoleon attacks the army of Silesia — Various military operations — Interests of the different powers. The general difficulties which the ailied army had to en- counter, owing to their failure on Dresden (by no means anticipated), now became apparent ; not only from the large force opposed to them, but from tlie opinion that Napoleon would pass a considerable body of troops across the Elbe at Koningstein and Pirna, to possess himself of the passes iu the rear of the Abur : these and other considerations operated in forming the resolution to withdraw the allied armies behind the Eger. Orders for this purpose were issued on the evening of the 28th ; and the army commenced its retrograde move- ment in different columns. The enemy did not follow vigor- ously ; but the roads through the passes were extremely bad, and the difficulty of getting the artillery and baggage through them was extreme. It was impossible not to regret that so fine and numerous an army, perfectly entire in all its parts, should have been reduced to the necessity of making any retreat ; as miscal- culations might be made on the event, and the enemy might suppose he had gained essential advantage. But it was cer- tain the allied army was as eager as ever to meet the enemy ; the same determined spirit existed : though a partial change, of operations might be deemed necessary, the general result of the campaign was in no degree doubted. The enemy's force was not diminished on the side of Lusatia, from his efforts on the Elbe up to the 23d, as he again attacked Gene- ral Blucher on that day in great force, who retired upon Jauer ; of which I shall speak elsewhere. During these events, the Austrian corps of General Neuberg had also advanced in the direction of Zittau for some days past. In the bold game both armies were now playing, Buonaparte had this great advantage — there was one mind directing one force ; whereas the allies, with national jealousies ever aris- ing, had to encounter great impediments. In these first operations, Wittgenstein was much censured tor having IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 93 engaged his columns too soon, and advanced too rapidly, be- fore the other corps deboucheing from the mountains had got more into the rear of the enemy, advancing on the frontiers. The attack on the town of Dresden was boldly attenipted : yet I could not but feel surprised that the Austrians, so well versed in war, should have moved their columns of attack up to the glacis of a town in which no breach had been previously made, and without scaling-ladders, or means of accomplishing any lodgment when the troops should ai'rive at the fosse. The bravery of the troops was unquestionable : but the previous plan was ill-digested ; and the necessary prepara- tions for insuring success were, I conclude, confided to some unskilful subordinates. The assault was certainly commenced at too late an hour in the evening, as it became twilight the moment the troops arrived at the ramparts ; whilst the enemy had perfect light to observe the directions in which the dif- ferent columns approached. Now the desideratum in similar attacks is to arrive concealed at the points where the troops are to mount, and to wait for light to begin the work. When the Austrians carried the advanced works, they were tediously exposed to a galling fire from the enemy, owing to the want of their pioneers to destroy the palisades, through which they could not penetrate. However, nothing ever surpassed their gallantry. When the sortie was made as it was growing dark, there was some disorder ; and I was fortunate enough, with Prince John of Lichtenstein and my aide-de-camp, to gal- lop through a French column ; and we were in rear of their batteries before we were aware of our danger. In this ex- tremity, our only chance was to dash through, trusting to our being undiscovered in the vieUe, which, in the obscurity of the evening, occurred. The brunt of this attack chiefly fell upon the Austrian army. The most that can be said of this battle is, that the raiu was intense and the mist general ; the positions were remote, and the intervals between the corps of the army so extensive, that at one position little or nothir,^ could be distinguished of what was going on at another. Buonaparte, on its immediate flank, below the extensive heights that surrounded Dresden, with his army collected, moved it with facility, and preserved it compact. His cavalry, under INIurat and Latour Maubourg, was always available, and of the highest service. The allies, extended, and occupying the larger circle, distant from their supplies, having bad roads in their rear, and sadly oppressed by the weather, labored under every disadvantage. The failure of the attack on the city was the first misfor- tune. Why it was not bombarded by all the mortars in the 94 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR army, and why such insufficient measures were taken to as- certain the real state and improved strength of it before any attempt was made, remains for others to explain. If one asked the reason why Dresden was attacked under such cir- cumstances, the answer received was, that being before the town, it was necessary to do something. Much of the great evil resulted from the difficult and perplexing state in which the command still seemed to lay. Schwartzenberg nominally issued orders, and v;as undoubtedly chief; but the Emperor, all along eager for the glory of generalship, acted as a man who still aimed at and desired to obtain his favorite object. His own partisans and officers depreciated Schwartzenberg's military abilities. The latter was called upon for explana- tions of all orders he gave, when he should have been think- ing of future directions. Possibly only half his own plans, with half those of the Emperor's, who was aided by Moreau until his wound disabled him, were adopted ; while Jomenil, who was also in council, filled up the measure of embarrass- ments. No one would own the project that had just failed ; and each diverted the storm of blame from himself. The error was in grasping at the object too precipitately, and passing the defiles before means were collected to insure the subsist- ence of the army ; and before it was perfectly determined what the army was to accomplish when it came before Dres- den, already intrenched and made a respectable fortress. Buonaparte could never have annoyed our movements, by acting on our riglit flank, if we had not been too far and too heedlessly committed. The strong fortress of Theresienstadt, the works on the frontiers, and the Austrian corps of General Neuberg, who had been left to guard the defiles, gave ample security for the riglit ; and the most feasible movement, as I conceive, was for all the corps deboucheing from the left to have made a detour, so as to have appeared before Dresden previous to our right flank having forced the enemy from his forward positions near the passes. By thus proceeding, our right would have been always secure and respected ; our pivot, as it were, unmolested ; and the force that arrived be- fore Dresden would have compassed all v.e had in view, until we could see further into the intentions of the enemy. The allies should never have lost sight of the five very strong and important fortresses (no doubt fully supplied witli every article of war) which Buonaparte liad on the Elbe- Hamburgh, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau, and Dresden — which gave him the facility of being a chcval on that river in every point. Like a snake, he could twist and turn him- self, making front every way ; having his fortresses, his de- liV GERMANY AND FRANCE. 95 pots, and his means at his back. The nunabers he possessed enabled him to meet the allies in any quarter ; and, above all, he had advantages that existed in the unity of action of his sing-le word and undivided command. Both the movements beyond the passes and the attack on Dresden were undertaken against the advice of General Mo- reau. His conduct and demeanor, since his arrival at the army, had been generally spoken of in the highest terras ; and he was the greatest loss the army could then have sus- tained. His heroism was truly great: after the fatal shot, he spoke to the Emperor with the most perfect self-possession, never uttered a groan, and smoked a cigar the moment after the shot had struck him. Prince Schwartzenberg, with whom I had much conversa- tion after the retreat, mentioned that Barclay de Tolly, to whom he sent orders on the day of the general action to ad- vance and attack, declared that it was impossible, as the enemy were too superior. It was undeniable that the retreat was attended with some disaster and confusion: the corps were mixed, retiring through the different defiles; ammunition, stores, and supplies, were everywhere deficient, A great quantity of baggage was taken : the stragglers and wounded were left behind ; and we lost at least 2000 men, up to the 28th, by the retreat. But Schwartzenberg excused himself by the observation, that there was no commanding with Em- perors and Kings on the spot ; and he certainly had a difficult card to play. From the general complexion of affairs, it appeared that if Buonaparte persevered in making propositions, there was great probability they would be listened to. The conferences, political as well as military, became frequent. The Emperor of Russia, from the disappointment of not having the com- mand, was less eager to share in the contest; and Prince Schwartzenberg informed me, he deemed it judicious, at that moment, to avoid general actions, unless he were forced into them, and to act wholly on the defensive. I must now revert to General Blucher's army of Silesia, in position on the 24th at Jauer, and to that part of the French army wliich was before him upon the Katzbach. On the 25th, Marshal Blucher advanced, and took up the position of Hen- nersdorf; and on the 26th he made a general attack on the enemy. His three corps, of Sachen, D'Yorck, and Langeron, were to pass the Katzbach, between Goldberg and Lignitz. The enemy deployed between the villages of Weinberg and Eichholz. After an obstinate combat. General Sachen's corps took possession of Eichholz, which turned the enemy's po- sition ; and among the Russians, the Generals WassiltsLhakofF, 96 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR Navorossky, and Lieven, greatly distinguished themselves. The rain fell in torrents during the action, which was both bloody and decisive ; and the French were in full retreat, when a reserve arrived from Lignitz, with sixteen pieces of artillery, and attacked the right flank of Blucher's army, in the hope of saving Lauriston's corps from entire annihilation. Generals Lieven and Navorossky, however, again repulsed the enemy, and took the train of artillery ; maintaining their success until night closed on this brilliant action. On tlie 28th, the Silesian army, passing the Katzbach, con- tinued its pursuit of the enemy, who was forced to retire by the only passage overr the Bober at Bunzlau. The division of the French General, Pacthod, which had been detached to- wards Jauer to operate on Blucher's rear, was now cut off; and a corps under Prince ScherbatofF, and cavalry under General Korff, forced the surrender of his division, after a gallant re- sistance. This division consisted of ma.ny officers, 400 men, and two standards. On the 1st of September, Blucher's head-quarters were es- tablished at Lowenberg ; and he announced to his army that since the 26th he had taken 100 pieces of cannon, 250 tum- brils, three generals, many colonels, and near 20,000 prison- ers. We must now return to Bohemia. Napoleon, greatly elated by the retreat of the allies, considered them as sub- stantially broken, and took immediate measures for a vigor- ous pursuit of their different columns. The cavalry, with the 1st corps under General Yandamme, and the 6th and 14th, were immediately put in motion. Murat and Victor advanced to Freyberg ; Marmont to Dippoldiswald ; St, Cyr and Van- damme towards Nollendorff. Mortier took post at Pirna with part of the guards. On the 29th, Murat was at Leuchten- berg with the 2d corps ; the 6th at Falkenhein ; and the 14th at Reinhartsgrimma. General Vandamme followed the corps of the Russian Gene- ral, Osterman-Tolstoy, from Nollendorff towards Toplitz : the latter disputed every inch of ground with the enemy. A very hrilliant action now tool? place on the road from Toplitz to- wards Peterswalde, about two German miles from the former place. The Russian column under Count Osterman, retiring by the pass of Peterswalde, found the enemy, who had eventu- ally crossed the Elbe at Pirna and Koningstein, in possession of the pass in the mountains ; and Osterman's corps were to force their way through with the bayonet. They there re- mained in action with the enemy till late in the evening ; and having been reinforced by the reserve of the Russian guards, cavalry, and infantry, the former under the orders of the Grand-Duke Constantine, who were sent rapidly to their sup- IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 97 port, this body of troops, consisting of about 8000, held in check during the day two corps and one division of the French army, under Generals Vandamme and Bertrand, amounting to at least 30,000 men. As to the dauntless con- duct of His Imperial Majesty's guards, were I to describe here the admiration I felt at witnessing their reckless bravery, I should fail for language to express it. Tlie light cavalry of the guards, consisting of the Polonese and dragoon regiments, charged columns of infantry, regard- less of every disadvantage or rule of modern warfare. Gene- ral Diebitsch, an officer of great merit, and now commander- in-chief of the Russian army in the East, particularly distin- guished himself: Prince Demeter Gallitzin in like manner, and he was wounded in the attack. Count Osterman, towards the close of the day, had his arm carried off by a cannon-shot. The General commanding the cuirassiers of St. George was also wounded. The importance of the firmness and audacity displayed by these troops is highly augmented, when it is considered that had they not held their ground, the columns of the army and the artillery retiring by Altenburg, which were delayed by the bad roads, would have been aux abols. His Prussian Majesty was in Toplitz when the enemy push- ed on by Peterswalde ; and he made the most able disposi- tions to reinforce Count Osterman. By his coolness and per- sonal exertions, he preserved order and regularity ; which even the momentary idea of the enemy aux reins is apt to destroy. The admirable conduct of this Sovereign, on every occasion, was the theme of invariable praise in the armies. The corps of Count Osterman lost 3200 men in this day's action, hors de combat. The French loss may be averaged at double. General Vandamme's corps suffered very severely. The cavalry of the Russian guard took two standards, and 3 or 400 prisoners. The enemy followed the rear-guard during the day, on the Dippoldiswald road ; and they met with con- siderable check from the rear-guard, commanded by the Aus- trian general. Count Hardegg. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland arrived at Toplitz on the 28th, at the moment the enemy were making their impression in that quarter. His Royal Highness ran considerable risk of being taken ; but repaired immediately to the field of battle, and assisted in the operations through this and the following days, with all that ardor, true personal courage, and ability, that are proverbially the attributes of the royal family of England. The brilliant action of the 29th, in which the Russian guards covered themselves with glory, was followed up by a I 98 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR very general and decisive victory over that part of the enemy's force which had advanced from Koningstein and Pirna, on the great chaussee leading from Peterswalde to Toplitz. It became of the utmost importance to make this attack ; not only to give time for those columns of the army to fall back, which were still retiring upon the Altenburg and Dippoldiswald roads, but at the same time to extricate the corps of General Kleist, which had not disengaged itself from the mountains. The enemy had the advantage, in pushing rapidly forward upon our right flank, of a good line of road ; whereas the columns of the allied army, although retiring by shorter lines, were impeded as well by the unfavorable state of the weather as by almost impassable roads. A great pro- portion of the artillery-train and baggage of the allied army had not got clear of the mountains, when the enemy had arrived at NollendorfT and Kulm, about three German miles distant from Toplitz, the scene where the action took place. The attack being determined upon, the following arrange- ment of the troops destined for that purpose was immediately made. Prince Schwartzenberg charged General Barclay de Tolly with the chief direction of the attack, and placed the divisions of Colored©, Bianchi, and Philippe de Hesse Hom- burg, with the Russian corps, at his disposition. Six thousand of the grenadiers of the latter, 2000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, imder the immediate orders of General Miloradovitch, together with 12,000 of the Austrians under Count Coloredo and General Bianchi, commenced the attack, the remainder of the troops collected far this enterprise being formed in columns of reserve upon the adjacent plain. The village of Kulm is situated at the bottom of a range of moun- tains, which forms an almost impregnable barrier between Saxony and Bohemia : from this point branch off two distinct ranges, east and west, between which the ground is generally flat, affording however, in some places, good defensible posi- tions. Upon this ground, immediately fronting the village of Kulm, the enemy collected a strong force of infantry, with a considerable train of artillery. A galling fire was maintained incessantly from this point upon the Russians, under General Miloradovitch. Such was the strength of the adjacent heights of Kulm, and so ably had the enemy disposed of their force for their defence, that it was judged more expedient to make the prin- cipal attack by the right : in consequence of which, the Aus- trian infantry were directed to move along the high ground upon the right, while the Russian guards and infantry were to commence their attack upon tlie left, as soon as the Aus- trians were sufficiently advanced. While these movements IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 99 were executing, the corps of General Kleist, which had not been disengaged from the mountains, appeared in the enemy's rear, descending the road by which the latter expected to re- tire in case of need. On all sides the attack was commenced in the most vigor- ous and decisive manner. The enemy's left was turned by the skill and bravery of the Austrians, under Count Coloredo ; the cavalry charging repeatedly : while upon the other flank, General Miloradovitch, with the hussar imperial guards and grenadiers, forced every position, which the enemy in vain attempted to defend. Upon this point, above forty pieces of artillery and sixty tumbrils, much baggage, and the whole equipage of General Vandamme, fell into the hands of the Russians. Completely beaten in front at all points, and in- tercepted in their rear by General Kleist, nothing was left for the enemy, but a desperate and precipitate dispersion. Five hundred French horse immediately dashed through the Prussian landwehr, and actually took possession, for a few minutes, of the whole of General Kleist's artillery : it was, however, immediately recovered, by the rapid advance of the Russian and Austrian cavalry. The rout now became general ; the enemy throwing down their arms in every direction, and ceasing all resistance, abandoned their guns and standards to seek for shelter in the forests. The fruits of this victory were considerable: no less than the general commanding, Vandamme, six other general officers, among whom were Generals Giott, Hein- berg, and Prince Reass, sixty pieces of artillery, and about 6000 prisoners, with six standards. The whole of General Vandamme's staff, and many officers of rank, were also num- bered among the prisoners. The enemy continued their re- treat, closely pursued by the Cossacks and allied cavalry. Having received a severe wound in the thigh, by the ex- plosion of a shell, shortly after the commencement of the ac- tion, I was under the necessity of quitting the field of battle late in the evening ; and my details must necessarily be more imperfect. It may be fairly stated, however, that the ene- my's force in this battle was annihilated, except a small body of cavalry that escaped under General Dumonceau, with other officers. This signal action amply compensated for the failure before Dresden; and with Blucher's brilliant victory of the Katzbach, renewed all the former enthusiastic hopes of the allied armies. After the battle, the grand army en- camped in the neighborhood of Toplitz, where the head-quar- ters of the three Sovereigns were established. The Prince Regent of England now sent the Order of the Garter to the Emperor of Russia, as a mark of his high es- 100 NAR&ATIVE OF THE WAR teem and personal consideration. It was conveyed to His Imperial Majesty by Sir T. Tyrwhitt, who suffered not a little difficulty and embarrassment in his heavy equipages, traversing the bad roads, and mixing in the columns of march in the mountains ; and at this time the Emperor of Austria also conferred the Order of Maria Theresa on the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia. Leaving their Imperial Majesties in the delightful environs and luxurious residence of this far-famed and delicious wa- tering-place, where there is a magnificent palace of the Aus- trian prince, Clari, we must turn our eyes for a short time to the events in the north, under the Prince Royal of Sweden. Here, however, I can give only a cursory detail, as the care of my wound at Toplitz, with other circumstances, deprived me of that information, which otherwise I was likely to have obtained. The Prmce Royal, on the 17th of August, assembled his army between Berlin and Spandau, with his head-quarters at Charlottenburg. Marshal Oudinot now received orders to attack him with the 4th, 7th, and 12th corps, and a mass of cavalry, under the Duke of Padua. On the 21st, the Prince Royal moved his head-quarters to Potsdam. On the same day, the French attacked the line destined to cover Berlin ; and on the 22d, the Crown Prince took up the following po- sitions : — The Swedish army was stationed at Potsdam ; the Rus- sians were at Juterbock; the Prussian corps at Wittstock ; and General Winzingerode and his Cossacks at Belitz. On the 23d, General Bertrand attacked the Prussians, under Bu- low, Borstell, and Tauenstein, at Gross-beeven ; but was re- pulsed, with the loss of twenty-six guns, sixty tumbrils, and 2000 prisoners. Partial actions continued to take place in this quarter during many of the following days; and the Prince Royal transferred his head-quarters to Saarmund, and then to Buchholz, on the 30tli. On the 4th of September he was at Rabenstein, where His Royal Highness projected passing the Elbe at Rosslau to move on Leipsic. In the mean time. Napoleon was unwilling to abandon his enterprise of taking Berlin ; he reinforced his troops in this quarter, and on tiie 4th intrusted to Marshal Ney the chief command. That general moved on the 6tli on Neundorff, Juterbock, and Roterbeck. General Bulow met the advancing columns with the brigades of Borstell, Thiimen, Kraft, and Hesse Homburg, and the corps of General Tauenstein. These, for some time, arrested the whole of Ney's force, amounting to 80,000 men, till the Prince Royal, with seventy battalions of Russians and Swedes, 10,000 cavalry, and 150 IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 101 pieces of cannon, advanced, and obtained a complete and signal victory. After the battle of Roterbeck and Juterbock, the enemy retired : tlieir loss amounted to 14 or 15,000 men, eighty pieces of cannon, and 10,000 prisoners. The Russians, on the part of the allies, suffered most, having 8000 men killed and wounded. In the mean time, General Blucher, with the Silesian army, passed the Neisse; and was following up hia victory, when Napoleon, now liberated by the retreat of the grand army through Bohemia, turned all his remaining force from Dresden against Blucher, who took up a position behind the Lobauer-Wasser. Napoleon attacked the army of Silesia on the 5th before Reichenbach, and obliged Blucher to retire across the Neisse and the Q,ueis ; but he was unable to follow the Prussians, as the victory of Kulm, and the advantages gained by the grand army, made him aware they would soon resume the offensive : he returned, therefore, to Dresden on the 6th. The delay that now occurred in the operations afforded the main army some repose, and placed them in a more efficient state : supplies of all kinds, particularly shoes, arrived. Count Wittgenstein proceeded to Peterswalde ; and Prince Eugene of Wirtemburg's division advanced to Dippoldiswald. The enemy took up strong positions in rear of the above places on the different roads. General Gouvion St. Cyr commanded their advance ; and the ground on the Peterswalde side was formidable, in case it were to be attacked. The intelligence from Dresden, that Napoleon had gone v/ith all his guards towards Bautzen with a view of acting on Blucher, hastened the movement of a large corps on Zit- tau to gain communication with the Silesian army. It had boen finally determined that 50,000 Austrians should make this movement; Prince Schwartzenberg taking the command of them ; and they were to arrive at Zittau on the 13th. The divisions of Meerveldt, and all the reserve under the Prince of Hesse Homburg, composed this force. Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein's light division proceeded, in the direction of Altenburg, to observe Freyberg ; and General Kleinau's division marched upon Chemnitz, to sup- port the light corps of General Thielman : which last was to continue its demonstrations towards Leipsic. The movement to the right bank of the Elbe with so large a support to General Bluciier, both from the intelligence received and the general complexion of affairs, was certainly the most prudent and judicious operation. By advices received, General Bennigsen's army of reserve had its advance already at Lignitz, where that general him- 12 102 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR self now was in person r it was stated at 80,000 men. The losses since the opening of the campaign to the grand army were not less than 35,000 men. The attempt to pass the range of mountains in front of the grand army having al- ready been attended with so little solid advantage, it was not likely to be again restored to ; nor indeed would it have been wise or judicious, when we consider that the season of the year was too far advanced to reckon with certainty upon favorable weather. The late success against Vandamme appeared to insure some offensive operations, which otherwise would have been avoided ; although no positive decision was yet arrived at as to what these offensive operations should be. I am apt to be- lieve it was the intention immediately to reinforce the Aus- trian general, Neuberg's, corps, which hitherto consisted only of 6 or 8000 men ; this had been stationed between the main army and that in Silesia and Lusatia. The allies seemed dis- posed, while they acted offensively, to do it at the least pos- sible hazard : they reinforced their troops upon the right bank of the Elbe, while they made demonstrations of meditating another formidable movement against Dresden and Leipsic. With this object, a corps had already been detached of 4000 horse on the Chemnitz road to Leipsic ; and it was to be fol- lowed by a larger flying corps, as soon as the troops had taken a few days' repose. The French troops in Lusatia had been filing towards the Elbe, appearing to retire to the left bank of that river; but hitherto their intentions were by no means known. However great and formidable the alliance against France now appeared — however cordial and zealous were the allied powers for the common cause, still it was impossible the great leaders of the different armies should not have their military opinions in some degree governed by the immediate interests of the powers they represented. It was Russia's interest to act in Saxony, inasmuch as she might be looking to that feeble duchy as a future prize. It was Austria's to rouse the Tyrolese, to recover their own freedom and Italy. The movements chalked out for Bavaria upon the Danube were more congenial to her objects, and made her feel more secure. It was the interest of Prussia to remove the war from Silesia, and regain her strong-liolds. All these objects would be accomplished by the overthrow of the enemy : but it always has been, and will continue to be, the essential de- fect of great coalitions, both military and, I believe, political, that the several powers concerned will not divest themselves of the bias of their own immediate interests, or consent to forego the chances of attaining and securing their own objects during the progress of the operations they carry forward. IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 103 CHAPTER IX. Attack on the allies at Dohna — Severe contest — Count Wittgenstein retires — The Duke of Cumberland assists in the action — Buonaparte arrives in force from Dresden — Preparations for a general engagement — The French retire — Advance of the allies — Brilliant coup de main — Manoeuvres of Na- poleon—Continues his retreat — Partial action — Losses of Marshal Ney — Demonstrations before Kuhn — Attack on the allied position — Repulse of the enemy — Napoleon's horse shot under him — He retires towards Dresiien — Distress of the French army — Positions of the allies— Successes of Generals PlatofF and Thielman — Alfair near Altenburg — Movements of the allied army — Reports of Napoleon at Leipsic — Position of the Rus- sian and Prussian armies — System of Prince Sclnvartzenberg — Tidings of Lord Wellington's victories in Spain — Napoleon's letters to the Em- peror of Austria — Exalted position of England — Policy of Prince Met- ternich — The Emperor Alexander's letter to Sir C. Stewart — Progress of the Silesian army — Plans of the Prince Royal of Sweden— Napoleon'* manoeuvres on the Elster — Bold project and decided movements of the allies — Concentration of the enemj' towards Leipsic. On the 8th of Aug-ust, the corps of Count Wittgenstein, and part of General Kleist's, under the orders of General Zeithen, which had advanced throug-h the mountains beyond Peterswalde and on the road towards Dresden, were attacked by a very superior force of the enemy, and a sharp afiair took place. Count Wittgenstein had his head-quarters at Pirna when the enemy began their advance. The chief contest during the day was for the village of Dohna, which was de- fended with much steadiness and bravery by the allies ; but the enemy bringing up increasing numbers towards the even- ing, Count Wittgenstein determined to fall back, and evacu- ate Dohna. General Zeithen's c^jrps, therefore, was ordered to occupy Pirna in the evening, and Count Wittgenstein's corps fell back towards Peterswalde. The loss of the allies in this day's action may be estimated at about 1000 killed and wounded : that of the enemy was much more consider- able. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland was in the field, and assisted throughout tlie engagement. General Kleinau, with a corps, had been detached towards Frcyberg and Chemnitz, on the left ; while the Austrians had moved to Aussig and Leutmeritz, on the Elbe. On the 9th the enemy continued their advance ; and the allies retired, fighting every inch of ground in the mountains. Buonaparte arrived from Dresden; and a very large force was advancing, either with a determination to make a general attack, or for tlie purpose of a great demonstration to cover a retrograde movement, and the removal of a large magazine of powder from Kon- ingstein to Dresden. On the advance of the enemy, orders were immediately sent for the Austrians to countermarch ; and the allies imme- 104. NARRATIVE OF THE WAR diately began to collect all their forces in the now victorioua fields of Kulm and Toplitz. On the 10th, the enemy pressed, apparently with greater force, from the mountains, on Kulm and towards Toplitz. They had advanced not only with the columns that followed Count Wittgenstein's rear, but also with another very considerable corps by Kraupen. At this time the Austrian columns had not come into close commu- nication from Aussig and Leutmeritz ; and it was known the Russian and Prussian force in front of Toplitz was greatly outnumbered by the en-emy. It was however determined to give him battle in the event of his advancing, and the dispo- sition was accordingly made. The enemy continued, upon the 11th, to make such demonstrations as indicated a general attack; and on the 12th they advanced, and took possession of the village of Nollendorff, approaching close to Kulm. Above half the Austrian corps had now rejoined the army, and come into position : they had been marching in very bad weather and worse roads, without intermi.-sion, from the 10th instant; but arrived in excellent order. Buonaparte could at length perceive the allied army of upwards of 1G0,(100 men in position, with SOU pieces of cannon, ready to give him battle. It seems, however, that he began his retreat about mid-day from Nollendorff: the allies began immediately to clear their front, and to send out strong reconnoitring parties; and General Kleinau's corps was again detached to the left, and reinforced by two divisions under Prince Lichtenstein. Up to mid-day on the 13th the enemy still continued his re- treat, breaking up and destroying the roads in every direction towards Dresden. This rather delayed the pursuit of the allies, and made even any lateral movement more difficult. Accounts were now received of General Blucher's having entered Bautzen on the 10th ; and on the 0th, the Russian colonel. Prince Modatoff, of the Alexandroski guards, had exe- cuted a brillant coup de main between Bautzen and Dresden. He blew up 200 ammunition-wagons, took a part of tlie ba.g- gage of Napoleon, and made 1200 prisoners. On the 13th, General Count Bubna, who now commanded the Austrian corps, lately under General Neuberg, which had been much reinforced, entered Neustadt and Neukirchen ; and came into close communication with General Bluclier, who had his head- quarters at Hermshutt, with his advanced-posts beyond Baut- zen : the enemy having retired to BischofFswerde. On the 14th, in the morning, the advanced-posts of the grand army advanced again to the frontiers by the Peterswaldc road. The rear-guard of the enemy, consisting of two battalions of infantry and a regiment of cavalry, and some guns, were forced from Nollendorff by Count Pahlen, commanding Count m IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 105 Wittgenstein's advance : the artillery of the allies, and more force, was in readiness to follow, as soon as the roads could be made practicable. The Prussians, under General Kleist and Prince Augustus, moved to Ettersdorf. Buonaparte assisted personally at the grand reconnoissance made on the 10th. He had his head-quarters at Liebstadt on the 11th; and moved forward on the left of the allies to Barenstein, near Altenburg, on the 12th. The plan of the enemy appeared to have been to attack the allies, if he could do so with an evident advantage ; if not, to impede their ad- vance, and by menaces gain time, either to extricate himself from the dangerous predicament in which he stood, or to mancEuvre the allies out of their position. On the 15th, in the morning, the enemy continued to retire ; and Prince Schwartzenberg ordered a general reconnoissance to be made on all sides. Count Wittgenstein and Count Pahlen's corps fell in with the enemy near Peterswalde. Four squadrons of Russian cavalry very gallantly charged a French column, and cut down several hundred men. To give some idea of these attacks, from a French return which was found of the loss of the 7th regiment of infantry, when the Russian cavalry in Count Osterman's action charged, they had 825 wounded, and 730 killed : the residue of fugitives remaining were 600. The enemy's corps in advance, opposed to Count Pahlen, consisted of 12,000 men, under General Bonnet, They made a good stand near Gotleibe: six Russian light guns did great execution, and forced this column to Jeave their ground. The main position of the enemy was not at- tacked. An Austrian corps of 17,000 men, under Count Coloredo, equally reconnoitred the enemy on the side of Berenstein and Breitenau. The head-quarters of the enemy were now moved to Dip- poldiswald. General Thielman's partisan-corps met with considerable success. He took possession of the town of Weissenfels, which was occupied by infantry and artillery; and made a general, forty officers, and near 1300 men prisoners ; these partisans were very useful. The Austrian Colonel, Mensdorff, took a French courier between Leipsic and Dres- den, charged with dispatclies and letters from the French army for Paris, at least 5000 in number: these letters gave the most doleful details of the French army, and of their defeats. Of the whole corps engaged under Marshal Ney, only 16,000 men had escaped : 10,000 had arrived at Dresden under Marshal Oudinot; the rest, according to these let- ters, were left at Wittenberg and Torgau. Reinforcements, amounting to 15,000 men, had reached Erfurth; but they were troops of an inferior description. It was also stated in 106 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR these letters, that the new guards, and particularly the artil- lery, suffered dreadfully in the battle near Dresden : Generals Vachot and Leibu were killed, and Generals Dentail, Zios, Boisildieu, Maison, Ween, and Aubert, severely wounded. On the 15th, in the evening, the enemy brought up more troops against Count Pahlen : and as it was not the intention of the allies to engage in a general affair in the mountains and defiles of Saxony, the advanced-corps moved back to NoUen- dorff. The French had two corps (Carmee supporting their advanced-corps of 12,000 men. General Blucher's last ac- counts were from Bautzen, with his advanced-posts within a German mile of Dresden; and he was, at this period, in communication with the Prince Royal's army. Active preparations were made at the allied head-quarters for movements in advance by our left. General Kleinau's corps was at Marienburg. A considerable body of the enemy were at Freyberg, and a corps of their cavalry between that and Rossen. It was reported, on the 16th, that Buonaparte had retreated back to Dresden, clearing it of all non-combat- ants, and that he was concentrating to cover the recent movements, to which the late successes of the allies had re- duced him. Accounts from Klagenfurt, dated the 6th, stated that the Viceroy of Italy had been engaged on the Drave, in a general battle with General Hiller, near Rossuk, and had forced him from his position : later accounts, however, brought the satisfactory intelligence, that the latter had gained ad- vantages over the Viceroy. The enemy, on the 16th, still occupied the mountains and heights in front of Nollendorff in considerable force : they made in the evening* an attempt to turn the right of the allied position before Kulm, while they also assailed the cen- tre and left. Buonaparte appears to have assisted in person at this affair : 15,000 men were detached to turn the right ; 8000 advanced in front and on the left : about 30,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry in reserve formed the attack on the part of the enemy. On the 17th, the corps moving on our right being conceal- ed by an intense fog, and advancing through dense woods, had succeeded in gaining our flank before its movement was perceived ; while the enemy, in very superior force, drove the Russians and Prussians from tlie village of Nollendorff; but they were kept in check on the left. General Colloredo now, with a corps of Austrians, fell on the enemy's advanced column, which had gained our right; and with an intrepidity, steadiness, and order, that gained universal admiration, com- pletely defeated his flank, took between 2 and 3000 prisoners, among whom were the general of division, Kreitzer, and IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 107 many officers, with ten guns. Our loss was about 1000 killed and wounded. At the time the enemy made their attack on the centre, the Prussians were about to be relieved by the Russians, which occasioned some momentary disorder. A very fine young man, a son of General Blucher, who was distinguishing himself very gallantly in re-establishing order, was killed. The enemy, repulsed at all points, retired at night into their former position on the mountains, occupying, however, NollendorfF. The allies took up their old ground, extending across the plain in a semicircular position. It was determined, from these frequent demonstrations and partial attacks of the enemy, and from the numbers he had assembled, that any movements on the left by the allies, as before resolved upon, should be deferred ; it not being prudent to detach largely while the enemy was collected in force. The continued affairs and skirmishes during the last fortnight cost many men on both sides ; but there was no doubt of the enemy having suffered in at least a double proportion. It was stated that Buonaparte had his horse shot under him, while reconnoitring on the hill on that day. The Austrian troops that formed the advance of General Kleinau's corps, under the immediate command of General Scheiither, had entered Freyberg, where they surprised and made prisoners 400 of the enemy, with their general. It was a singular and pleas- ing circumstance, that two of the remaining squadrons of the Westphalian hussars, which did not come over from the enemy with their two regiments (being on detachment), form- ed a part of the prisoners taken. An Austrian corps also advanced towards Chemnitz. On the 19th, the enemy remained in position at Peters- walde. Buonaparte slept at Pirna. On the 20th, they retired still further towards Dresden, and withdrew also from Nollen dorff The Prussian corps under General Zeithen immediately followed them. An order was intercepted from Marshal Berthier to General Lobau, commanding the advanced troop.s of the enemy, directing him to make all his dispositions for retreat on Dresden. All accounts agreed in stating the extreme distress of the French army in the mountains ; they were losing numbers of their horses daily, and their troops were in the greatest want of provisions. It seemed probable that Buonaparte would remain a cheval on the Elbe as long as possible. General Bennigsen's army was expected to arrive in five or six days by the pass of Zittau, when more extended move- ments were contemplated. According to the general report and information, Buonaparte arrived at Bischoffswerde on the 108 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR 23d, and he meditated some attempt on General Blucher; but finding that officer not only prepared for him, but actually making preparations to act ofiensively, Buonaparte retired again on Dresden. The old guards were still stationed there with various depots of regiments. The enemy were working at the place. The redoubts at Pirna gate were demolished ; but new ones were erected at those of Falken, Freyberg, and some others. Provisions were very scarce in the city ; one loaf was divided amongst eight men. To add to these distresses, two magazines were burnt down, containing hay and oats ; one to the value of 30,000, and the other 40,000 rix-dollars. It was believed the enemy was retiring grad- ually to the left bank of the river : 4000 men and sixteen guns had lately returned from Bischoffswerde to the heights of Potshafel. Marshal Lefebvre, according to the French account, had 30,000 men at Leipsic. In Magdeburg there were 9000 men, and the artillery was very complete. Mar- shal Augereau set out for Branberg on the 23d, 11,500 strong. Great exertions were now making in the dillerent fortresses on the Rhine. Ehrenbreitstein was to be repaired, and ren- dered as strong as possible. All the troops that had measured back their steps across the Elbe were in a miserable condi- tion. Count Bubna attacked the enemy's troops near Hol- pen : the Austrians suffered some loss. The enemy's move- ments, on the whole, seemed very wavering ; and it was difRcult, with certainty, to determine their immediate inten- tion, though of their ultimate attempt to retreat no doubt was entertained. The whole of General Bennigsen's corps was not expected in their positions until the 3d or 4th of October; but the fol- lowing movements were determined on. Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein was to march with 5000 Austrians to Gera, to donner la 7nain to all the partisans, Platoff, Thielraan, &c. who communicated quite round the enemy's positions with the Prince Royal's light corps from the army of the north. General Kleinau's corps, upwards of 25,000, were to move to Chemnitz ; General Count Wittgenstein's and Kleist's corps, above 30,000, to Marienburg; the Austrian corps of Giulay to Zwickau ; the 1st and 2d corps of the Austrian army to Komotau ; and General Barclay de Tolly, with the Russian head-quarters, to Briix. General Bennigsen was to have his head-quarters at Toplitz. This flank movement was to be prolonged in the direction of Erfurth ; and an attempt was to be made to destroy the enemy's corps and magazines, &:c. in that place. In the mean time, it was presumed thQ,t the favorable ap- IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 109 pearances from the side of Bavaria, would shortly put in mo- tion a combined force, in the direction of Wurtzburg, which would complete the enemy's embarrassments in every quar- ter of Germany. A report was received on the 30th, that a joint attack was made by Platoff and Thielman on the enemy at Altenburg-, near Leipsic, in which 2000 prisoners were made. One regiment of hussars escaped, but it was supposed it would still be taken. The affair near Altenburg proved of more importance than was at first supposed ; and the Hettman, Platoff, with his usual ability and gallantry, performed a brilliant exploit against a considerable corps of the enemy's cavalry. This corps was under the orders of General Lefebvre-Desnouettes, and consisted of the French light cavalry, the Polish uhlans of the guard, and a brigade of light dragoons under the or- ders of General Pivot. The force consisted of 8000 cavalry and 700 infantry, one squadron of Mamelukes, and a small party of Tartars of the guard, under a Colonel Mucol. The whole were attacked by PlatofiJ and completely put to the rout. A general was reported by the prisoners to have been killed : 1500 prisoners, five guns, and forty officers, including three officers of the staff, were the fruits of this enterprise. The army broke up fi*om Toplitz on the 1st of October, and was in movement to the left. On the 30th of September, the corps of General CounJ; Wittgenstein was at Komotau, and that of General Kleist near Briix. The Austrians marched upon Chemnitz. A report from the enemy stated that Napo- leon, attended by the King of Saxony and family, had de- parted upon the 28th instant for Leipsic, whither his head- quarters were about to be removed ; and a French corps, under Marshal Augereau, had marched upon Coburg. The Russian and Prussian army now exceeded 80,000 men ; and it was to assemble on the Chemnitz and Frej'berg line. To this may be added the corps of Kleinau of 10,000 men, to- gether with all the Austrians, General Bennigsen's corps was reviewed this day, and was found in a very efficient state ; and a reinforcement of 7000 men for the Prussian corps of General Kleist was upon the road from Prague. Afler the late actions, Prince Schwartzenberg, with the grand army, confined his offensive system to constant skir- mishing of light troops and affairs of out-posts, under General Thielman, Colonel Mensdorff, and others. The various suc- cesses, however, of the General-in-chief in the main opera- tions, afforded to the armies of Silesia and the north the ad- vantage of coming into close communication. Being anxious now to carry into execution the measures K 110 NARTIATIVE OF THE WAR with which I was charged, I set out again for the head-quar- ters of the Prince Royal of Sweden. Previous, however, to my leaving the grand army, I ought to record that owing to their late splendid successes, and also to the victories of Lord Wellington in Spain, astute means of opening negotiations, in the specious form of a general congress, had been adopted by Napoleon. This was done by letters addressed from him- self through the Duke of Bassano on that subject direct to the Emperor of Austria. It was a glorious and exalting era for Great Britain ; at the present moment she saw herself rewarded for her unex- ampled perseverance and generosity, by the whole continent of Europe relying upon the wisdom of her councils and the exploits of her arms, which were about to decide the desti- nies of Europe. Nobly were her labors repaid ; gloriously were her efforts crowned, by the bright and cheering pros- pect that now beamed upon the civilized v^'orld. It is in vain, however, to conceal that, owing to a concurrence of circurh- stances, the great powers of the continent appeared to think, if they could obtain a peace upon fair terms, it would be pre- ferable to protracting the present sanguinary contest. The length of its duration, the little jealousies of individual com- manders in the allied armies, the peculiar objects of each power (demonstrated in various quarters), with the considera- tion of the family alliance between the Emperor of Austria and Buonaparte, which certainly influenced in some small degree the Austrian minister, au fond the commander-in- chief, as well as the prime minister. All conspired to ac- complish a peace by the shortest and safest way possible, rather than to continue the struggle. It was difficult to point out how the congress proposed was to proceed, if assented to by all parties; but Count Metternich always had his eyes open, and saw at once the cessions Buonaparte might make, and how the general interests of Europe might be poised: he was not so young in politics as, in contemplating a particular measure, not to divine the result. The world will not, I trust, accuse me of vanity, but give me credit for an honest pride, if, before I take leave of the very interesting details of the battles of Dresden and Kulm, I venture to annex an indulgent, though unmerited autograph letter I received from that brave and virtuous monarch, the Emperor of Russia, at that period. " Toplitz, September 27, 1813. " General Stewart, "1 have witnessed, as well as the whole army, the inde- fatigable zeal which you have exhibited during this campaign, IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. Ill where, always present on the field of honor, in the most ex- posed situations, you have been remarkable for your self-pos- session as well as for your bravery. "It is my duty to do honor to such brilliant qualities, and 1 believe I give a proof of the justice which I render theni in sending you the insignia of the order of St. George of the fourth class. " These you know are granted alone to military virtue. They will recall to your mind the memorable day of Kulm, where your blood flowed ; and all the heroes who fought there will, with pleasure, see you bear a decoration which attests that you have partaken of their glory and of their dangers. " Receive, with these particular marks of my esteem, the assurance of my sentiments. (Signed) "Alexander." I received at the same time a letter from the Prussian Chancellor of State, conferring on me, by the King's com- mand, all the Prussian orders, including the very highest, that of the Black Eagle.* All these testimonies of the feel^ ings of the allied courts towards the British nation in my person, His Royal Highness the Prince Regent was gracious- ly pleased to permit me to accept and wear. The army of Silesia now moved forward from the Pleisse along its whole line, to circumscribe the enemy in their posi- tion round Dresden ; while the army of the Prince Royal, profiting by their late victory, crossed the Elbe, the French corps opposed to them retired towards Torgau. I joined the head-quarters of the Crown Prince of Sweden at Zorbig on the 9th. After the brilliant passage of the Elbe by General Blucher at Elster, in whicli both decision and judgment were pre-eminently displayed, and the consequent crossing of the same river by the Prince Royal's army at the points of Ross- lau and x\cken, His Royal Highness conceived that a move- ment of the whole allied force to the left bank of the Saale would either force the enemy to a general battle, or effectu- ally embarrass and impede his retreat, if he should determine upon a measure which the combined movements of the armies of Bohemia, Silesia, and the north of Germany, on his flanks and on his communications, seemed to render so indispensa- bly necessary. Buonaparte, it seems, had, according to reports, manoeuvred from Dresden with a large corps of cavalry on the right, and all his infantry on the lefl bank of the Elbe, as far down as Strehlau. A strong demonstration, from 25 to 30,000 men, * This letter will be found in the Appemlix, No. V. 112 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR was made from Torgau towards the point of the Elster on the 8th, where General Blucher passed, probably with a design of menacing him, and forcing him to repass the river. The bold determination of the allies was not, however, to be ar- rested ; and the whole army of General Blucher being now in close communication with that of the Prince Royal, the former marched from Duben on Jasnitz on the 9th, and passed the Mulda, while the Prince Royal concentrated his forces near Zorbig. The enemy, according to accounts, appeared to be collected about Eulenburg and Oschatz, between the Mulda and the Elbe. On the 10th, General Blucher moved from Jasnitz to Zorbig ; and the armies of Silesia and the north of Germany were here assembled. The determination being taken to pass the Saale, orders were issued in the night ; and General Blucher moved with the Silesian army : bridges being constructed for that pur- pose. General Bulow, with his corps (Varmee, was in like manner to pass at Wettin ; General Winzingerode, with the Russians, at Rothenberg; and the Prince Royal, with the Swedes, at Alsleben and Bernburg. The v\'hole allied force was then to place itself in order of battle on the left of the Saale, waiting the further development of the enemy's move- ments. General Woronzoff, who formed General Winzinge- rode's advanced-guard at Halle, was to refuse battle, and fall back on the forces passing at Wettin, if he should be attack- ed by superior numbers ; but otherwise, to retain Halle as long as possible. By these decided movements, the points of passage on the Elbe, by which the armies had passed, were to be abandoned, and destroyed, if necessary ; while other bridges were prepared below Magdeburg, in case of need. The corps of observation, under General Thtimen, before Wittenberg, of about 6000 men, in the event of the enemy forcing a passage there, (for the purpose of alloirgetng the right bank of the Elbe, and returning by Magdeburg, in the extremity in which he was placed, or in another improbable, but possible event of his pushing with all his forces to Berlin,) had orders to retire on General Tauenstein, who with 10,000 men was to remain at Dessau ; and, according to circum- stances, either to manoeuvre on the right bank against any possible effort of the enemy's, or by forced marches strengthen, if necessary, the armies assembled on the Saale. General Tauenstein was to be assisted by all the landsturm, and some smaller detached corps were also to join him. Information now arrived that General PlatofF, with his Cossacks, was at Pegau ; Generals Kleist and Wittgenstein, with the advance of the grand army of Bohemia, were ap- proaching Altenburg; and communications seemed to be es- IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 113 tablished in tlie rear of the French army by our light troops. Information of the movements of the enemy were vague ; but accounts were brought in, on the evenings of the 11th and r2Lh, that he was moving troops from the diiferent points of Lutzen and Wurzen towards Leipsic ; and it was added, that Buonaparte was expected to arrive there. His force be- tween Dresden and Leipsic, exclusive of garrisons, was es- timated, at the highest calculation, at 180,000 men ; that of the Silesian army at 65,000 ; that of the Prince Royal at 60,000 men, with 100 pieces of artillery ; and it was impos- sible to see finer troops, or more fully equipped in all essentials. General Platoff^ with his Cossacks, had arrived at Lutzen, having taken some hundreds of prisoners at Weissenfels ; and he' was in complete communication with the advance of General Woronzoft''s Cossacks from Halle. Platoif reported the assembling of the enemy round Leipsic. The army of Bohemia was between Altenburg and Chemnitz ; and Gene- ral Bennigsen, with the Austrian division of Coloredo which had been joined to him, was meditating a demonstration to- wards Dresden. Such were, at this period, the general out- lines of the positions of the respective forces; and it was im- possible, on looking at the map, not to be sanguine as to the result. Buonaparte seemed to have the advantage of con- centration : that he might carry his whole force against the grand army, or the Prusso-Swedish army, was evident; but in either case the arm}', unattacked, was close in his rear. The Cossacks and light troops were hovering on all his com- munications; they even passed through his army in different directions, and his position seemed similar to that in which he was placed on the Beresina. CHAPTER X. Prosecution of offensive operations — Movements of the Silesian army — of the grand army — Loss of commnnications across the Elbe — Treaty with Bavaria — Intercepted dispatclies— The enemy's demonstrations on the Mulda — Concentration near Leipsic — Movements of the Prince Royal of Sweden — Advance of the \\holc allied army — Victory of Radcfeld and Lindenthal — Brilliant attacks of Rluchor — Napoleon arrives in tiie fiold — attacks the whole line of the allies — forces part of their position by a coup de main — unable to profit by it — The grand arn)y resumes its posi- tion — Conversations with thi' Prince Royal— strictures on his movements — Letters to that Prince, and communications with General Blncher. The bold and offensive system now so gallantly commenced by General Bluchcr, gave a new tone to tlie operations of the allies. The glorious career of the Silesian army, daily engaged K2 114 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR in action Bince the opening of the campaign, and hourly cov- ering itself with laurels, merits the historian's loftiest eulogy: it stood pre-eminent in the advance next the foe, with its venerable and gallant leader eagerly availing himself of every opportunity to augment his heroic reputation, rescue his country, and avenge her sufferings. General Blucher was not enabled — the bridge being incomplete — to traverse the Saale at Wettin ; but proceeded to Halle, where he passed. General Bulow had not got over on the 11th of October; but the rest of the allied army crossed to the left bank of the Saale on that day. On the 12th, the Prince Royal's head-quarters were at Seyda, General Winzinge- rode's cavalry occupied Dessau and Kothen. On the 14th, the Prince Royal moved to Coswick ; on the 15th, to Zerbst. Various affairs of advanced -posts now took place : the details of which, however deserving of praise, would hardly fall within the extent and object of the present narrative. The army of Silesia and that of the Prince Royal continued a cheval on the Saale, up to the 11th instant. On the 12th, it appeared that the enemy had collected consider- ably on the right bank of the Mulda, between Duben and Eulenburg; while at the same time, it was believed, he remained in force against the grand army. But his chief strength seemed concentrated between the Mulda, Leipsic, and Torgau. The grand army, on the 12th, was posted as follows: — the main body was at Altenburg; General Wittgenstein's corps at Borne, where it appears he had a successful affair with the enemy ; General Kleinau at Freyberg ; Generals Giulay and Thielman at Zeitz ; Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein at Pe- gau ; General Bennigsen had advanced from Peterswalde and Dohna to Waldheim ; and General Bubna had a very brilliant affair before Dresden on the 10th; he also succeeded in carrying the lete da ponl at Pirna, destroyed the boats, and took some cannon and prisoners. The enemy had left about 12,000 men in garrison at Dresden. To this general information was added, that of the enemy having debouched from Wittenberg on the right bank of the Elbe, and suc- ceeded in forcing the corps of General Thiimen to retire on the 11th. It became now of the greatest importance to ascertain the amount of the enemy's force passing at Wittenberg. That Buonaparte should adopt the measure of crossing with his army at Wittenberg and Torgau, by which he abandoned all his communications, and allow the whole allied armies to bn united and placed between him and France, seemed so des- perate, and so little in accordance with military calculation, IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 115 that until the existence of the step was beyond a doubt, it was impossible to act upon its adoption. The Crown Prince, in the present state of affairs, recrossed the Saale on the 13th, and marched to Kothen, where he took up a position ; being- thus within march of General Blucher at Halle. Each army would reciprocally support the other, and combine their move- ments, while the grand army was expected every hour at Leipsic. Six divisions of the enemy, with the guards, had passed at Wittenberg, and were directing their march on Berlin. Our communications across the Elbe at Rosslau and Acken were attacked ; and the former were given up by General Tauenstein, who had passed at Wittenberg, joined General Thiimen, and then fallen back on Zerbst, and towards Potsdam. The momentary loss of the communications across the Elbe, except below Magdeburg, was a temporary inconvenience ; but the annihilation, if possible, of the French army being the grand object, the Crown Prince resolved to march to Halle, and join the corps of General Blucher and the grand army. When the allied forces should thus be united, the fate of Napoleon might be decided. The intelligence of the treaty being signed between the allies and Bavaria arrived on the 15th ; and at this period also news was received that the King of Wirtemburg had joined the common cause, and that his forces, which were assembling under the orders of General Baron Wrede, would immediately join the grand array. General Walmoden's corps in the north, and the other forces, were to act according to circumstances. The accounts received of the six divisions of the jeune garde of the enemy having debouched from Wittenberg, as also troops from Torgau on the right bank of the Elbe, like- wise of his having taken possession of Dessau, caused a mo- mentary anxiety ; but later intelligence stated that he was recalling his forces from the direction of Wittenberg to the Lower Mulda, and seemed to be assembling them in the neigh- borhood of Leipsic, Tamhu, and Eulenburg. This report was in part derived from a lieutenant-colonel of the French etat major, who had been taken prisoner ; on whom was found a letter addressed to Marshal Marmont, enjoining him to put himself in march for Leipsic, and place himself under the orders of Murat. The enemy's force employed in manoeuvring on the right bank of the Mulda, and which had crossed the Elbe, was commanded by Marshals Ney and Marmont ; and they had so studiously concealed their movements by marches and counter-marches, and the countrv was so inclosed and diffi- 116 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR cult near the conflux of those rivers, that the information was not precise. The enemy's assemblage in the neighborhood of Leipsic was now positive. On the 14th he retired from Zerbst, and withdrew from Acken, where he had shown himself. Having destroyed our tete dii pont at Rosslau, he abandoned it; and the Cossacks of General Winzingerode's corps of the Prince Royal's army drove him from Dessau, which was reoccupied. These different events confirmed the other intelligence ; and appearances denoted the movement from Wittenberg to have been undertaken with a view of alluring the northern army to repass the Elbe. Upon general and military principles, for the allies to have crossed that river without possessing the appui of Wittenberg, might be considered by many a doubtful, if not an injurious, undertaking ; but on the other hand must be balanced the advantages derived from tbc union of above 300,000 men surrounding the enemy on all points, the state of demoralization in his army, their distress for pro- visions, which, hemmed in as they were, necessarily increased daily; and, lastly, the advantage of being able to undertake vigorous and offensive operations in all quarters. The Prince Royal of Sweden detached on the 14th a di- vision of his army, under the orders of the Prince of Hesse Ilomburg, to re-establish his communications at Acken, and to insure the passage of the river and #"the town, which is strong, by fortifying it still further, if possible. The garrison of Magdeburg made attempts upon the post of Bernburg on the Saale — a point of infinite importance for the passage of that river, in case of necessity. They were here, however, again checked by a detachment of Cossacks of General Win- zingerode's corps ; and two battalions and some guns were placed to reinforce the garrison. The Prince Royal's army, on this day, extended its rig'lit in the direction of the moun- tain called !St. Peterberg — a point which forms a principal feature in this country, from its abrupt rise; its left towards Kothen and Elsdorf ; while his advanced-guard was pushed into the villages on the left bank of the Mulda. The Silesian army was in position near Halle, with its advanced-guards at Merseburg and Skenditz. By dispatches from the grand army, Count Wittgenstein made a general reconnoissance on the 13th, and marching to his left, occupied Pegau with tlie greatest part of his corps. On the 14th, establishing iiis communication on the left with the Austrian corps of Count Giulay and Prince Maurice of Ijic!)tenstoin posted at Weissenfels and Naumburg, he joined with Tliielman and Platoll' towards Lutzen ; and on the right with the corps of Count Kleinau, who marched to Borne, and IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 117 was to detach to Grimma and Colditz. The Russian grena- diers and cuirassiers were at Altenburg. The main body of the grand army, namely, the corps of Meerveldt, the Aus- trian army of reserve, the Russian and Prussian guards, took post at Zeitz ; the corps of Coloredo at Chemnitz and Penig, and detached towards Rochlitz. General Bennigsen had or- ders to make himself master of the roads leading on Nossen and Meissen, and to push on with all possible expedition. In this general position, the armies were to press on, closing in the enemy till they were enabled to make simultaneous at- tacks. Under these circumstances, if the enemy forced his passage against any one of the corps, the others united would be able to fall on the point attacked. This operation became the more easy, in proportion as the communications between the different armies became established ; and the circle which the allied troops occupied round the enemy narrowed. In the event of a retreat, the left bank of the Saale afforded a very strong line on the one side, and the position of Lutzen, Weis- senfels, and Altenburg, on tlie other. The Bavarian corps of Count Wrede, and the Austrian corps of Prince Reuss, were ordered to advance, by forced marches ; and every effort was made to take possession of Wurtzburg, and to fortify the line of the Maine, All the corps of the grand army had moved forward on the 15th ; General Blucher to Gross-Kiigel and Skenditz, with his advance pushed towards Leipsic ; while the Prince Royal had his right in front of the St. Peterberg, the left at Zorbig, with the Swedes near Wettin. The glorious army of Silesia now added another victory to its list ; and the brow of its valiant leader was again deco- rated with a fresh laurel. Forty pieces of cannon, 12,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, one eagle, and many caissons, were the fruits of the victory of Radefeld and Lindenthal. To give the clearest idea in my power of this battle, I must revert to the positions of the armies of Silesia and the north of Germany, on the 14th instant, when certain intelligence was received that the enemy was withdrawing from the right bank of the Elbe to collect on Leipsic. At this time the Prince Royal was at Kothen, and General Blucher at Halle: the former in possession, with his advanced- guards, of the left bank of the Mulda; and the latter, of Merseburg and Skenditz. General Blucher moved his head- quarters on the 10th to Gross-Kiigel, pushing his advance on the great road to Leipsic, and occupying the villages on each side of it. The enemy were in force in his front ; still hold- ing Debitz and Radefeld with some troops along the Mulda. The Crown Prince of Sweden issued orders to march to 118 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR Halle on the night of the 14th ; but when his troops were en route, he took up his head-quarters at Sylbitz, and placed the Swedish army with its right at Wettin, and the left near to St. Peterberg. General Bulow occupied the centre of his line, between Peterberg and Oppin ; and the corps of Win- zingerode was on the left at Zorbig. His Royal Highness seemed to have apprehended, either that the enemy were not clear of the Elbe, or that we might be attacked from the Mulda: the bridges, however, had been broken. His ad- vanced-guard was on it : and a direct march on Zorbig, and towards Debitz and Radefeld, would, without question, have brought the army of the north into action on the 16th, which would have rendered the victory much more decisive. General Blucher found the enemy's forces, consisting of the 4th, 6th, and 7th corps of the French army, and great part of the guard under Marshals Ney and Marmont and General Bertrand, occupying a line with their right at Freyroda, and their left at Lindenthal. The country around these villages is open, and very favorable for cavalr}^; but the enemy was strongly posted in front of a wood of some extent near Rade- feld, and behind it the ground is more intersected : generally speaking, however, it is adapted to all arms. The disposi- tion of attack of the Silesian army was as follows: — the corps of General Count Langeron was to attack and carry Freyroda, and then F^adefeld, having the corps of General Sachen in reserve: the corps iVa-nnee of General D'Yorck was directed to move on the great chaussce leading to Leip- sic, until it reached the village of Lutschen, when turning to its left it was to force the enemy at Lindenthal : the Rus- sian guards and the advanced-guard were to press on the main road to Leipsic : the corps of Genervil St. Priest, arriving from Merseburg, was to follow the corps of Count Lange- ron : the cavalry and the dift'erent reserves were formed in the open ground between the villages. It was nearly mid-day before the troops were at tlieir sta- tions ; and hopes were entertained, which proved fallacious, that the cavalry and flying artillery of the Prince Royal's army would be in line. The enemy soon afler the first onset gave up the advanced villages, and retired some distance ; but tenaciously held the woody ground on their right, and the villages of Gross and IClein, Wetteritz, as also the vil- lages of Mockau and Mockern, on their left. At Mockern a most bloody contest ensued ; it was taken and retaken by the corps of D'Yorck five times: the musketry fire was most gall- ing ; and this was the hottest part of the field. Many of the superior officers were cither killed or woundetL At length IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 119 the victorious Silesians carried all before them, and drove the enemy beyond the Partha. In the plain there were several brilliant charges of cav- alry. The Brandenburg regiment of hussars distinguished itself in a particular manner, and, supported by infantry, charged and carried a battery of eight pieces. The enemy made an obstinate resistance also on his right, in the villages of Great and Little Wetteritz, and in the surrounding wood ; and when he perceived we had forced his left, he brought an additional number of troops on Count Langeron, who was chiefly engaged with Marshal Ney's corps, from the neigh- borhood of Duben. The Russians, however, equally with their brave allies in arms, made the most gallant efforts, and they were fully successful ; night only putting an end to the action. The Russian cavalry acted in a very conspicuous manner. General Korff 's cavalry took a battery of thirteen guns ; and the Cossacks of General Emanuel, five. The enemy now drew off towards Siegeritz and Pfosen, and passed the river Partha, retreating from all points. General Sachen's corps, which supported General Langeron, very much distinguished itself in the presence of Napoleon, who, it seems, according to the information of the prisoners), arrived from the other wing of his army at five o'clock in the evening. The corps of D'Yorck, which displayed the utmost coolness and courage, had many of its most gallant leaders killed or wounded. Among the latter were, Colonels Heinmetz, Kubzler, Bouch, Hiller, Lowenthal, Laurentz, and Majors Schon and Bismark. The momentary loss of these officers was seriously felt, as they- nearly all commanded brigades from the reduced list of general officers in the Prussian army : and we had to lament that His Serene Highness the Prince of Mecklenburg Strelitz, who was distinguishing himself in a particular manner, hav- ing had two horses shot under him, and whose gallant corps took 500 prisoners and an eagle, received a severe, though happily not mortal, wound. Among the Russians, General Chinchin and several officers of distinction were killed or wounded ; and I average General Blucher's total loss at near 6 or 7000 men, hois de combat. Let me here own my anxiety to perpetuate the renown so deservedly acquired by this brave army, in endeavoring feebly, but I declare faithfully, to detail its proceedings. Liberated Europe will, I am confident, justly appreciate the enthusiasm and lieroism with which its operations were con- ceived and effected. It had measured its strength in twenty- one combats, several times with the best troops of France, including the guards. I attached that excellent and able 120 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR officer, Colonel, afterwards Brigadier-general, Hudson Lowe, to General Blucher in the field the early part of the day, be- ing myself with the Prince Royal ; and it is due to the talent and zeal of that officer to record, that I derived great assist- ance from the activity evinced in all his reports. To turn to the operations of the grand army up to the 16th, and the disposition for the attack to be made on the 17th. The corps of Generals Guilay, Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein, Thielman, and Platoff, were collected in the neighborhood of Mark Ranstedt, and were to move forward on Leipsic, keep- ing up the communication with General Blucher's army and the other corps to their right. General Nostitz's cavalry were to form also on their right; and in case of retreat, these corps were to retire towards Zeitz. The reserves of Russian and Prussian guards were to move on Rotha, where they were to pass the Pleisse, and form in columns on its right bank. The reserves of the Prince of Hesse Homhurg, Gene- rals Meerveldt and Wittgenstein, were also to take post at this station. General Barclay de Tolly commanded all the columns on the right bank of the Pleisse. Generals Wittgen- stein, Kleist, and Kleinau, advanced from their respective positions on Leipsic: the Russian guard formed their reserve; and General Coloredo moved from Borne as reserve to Gene- ral Kleinau. The retreat of these corps was to be on Chem- nitz. Generals Wittgenstein's, Kleist's, and Kleinau's, on Altenburg and Penig. The army of General Bennigsen was to push on from Colditz towards Grimma and Weingen. The corps of Count Bubna had been relieved before Leipsic by General Tolstoy's. A very heavy firing continued all the day of the 16th from the grand army. Late at night, a report reached General Blucher, that Buonaparte had attacked in person the whole line of the allies, and, forming his cavalry in the centre, succeeded in making an opening in the com- bined army before all its cavalry could come up. He was, however, not able to profit by this grand coup de main : he retired in the evening, and the allies occupied their position as before. On the 17th, the combined corps were ready to renew the attack. The Prince Royal, who had his head-quarters at Landsberg and his army behind it, marched at two o'clock in the morning, and arrived at Radefeld towards mid-day. Gene- rals Winzingerode's and Bulow's corps had moved forward in the night near the heights of Taucha, No cannonade being heard on the side of the grand army (though General Blu- cher's corps was under arms), and as it was also understood that General Bennigsen would not arrive until this day at Griraraa, and part of the Prince Royal's army being still in IN GERMANY AND PRANCE. 121 the rear, it was deemed expedient to wait till the following day to renew the general attack. The enemy showed himself in great force in a good position on the left of the Partha, on a ridge of some extent parallel to the river. There was some cannonading in the morning: the enemy made demonstra- tions ; and the hussars charged on advanced parties into the suburbs of Leipsic, and took some cannon and prisoners. The state of affairs was now so changed, that the most sangume expectations were justly entertained that the glo- rious cause in which Europe was engaged would immediately triumph. I shall now offer some personal observations relating to the Prince Royal's position at Kothen on the 14th, when Gene- ral Blucher was at Halle. No sooner was information re- ceived, and ascertained to be correct, that the enemy's corps beyond the Elbe w^ere returning towards Leipsic, than I con- ceived that a forced march of the army of the north to con- centrate at Zorbig (having its advance towards Dolitsch and Duben) was indispensably necessary, in support of the plan of taking a forward position. I expressed this opinion to the Prince Royal of Sweden ; and stated, that according to the reports of the dispositions of the allies from the grand army, and of General Blucher's operations, if his Royal Highness did not cover that general's left, it seemed to me he might be deprived of his share in the anticipated struggle. The Prince Royal replied, that I was urging him to make a march with his flank to the enemy as at the battle of Eylau, which could not fail of being disastrous. I answered His Royal Highness, that as all the bridges on the Mulda were destroyed, and as its passage was so difficult, that His Royal Highness had told me he could not pass it to attack : the enemy, I was certain, if they were present in force, could not attempt its passage to attack him, especially with General Blucher before them, and the grand army so close. Besides, I told him, he had 60,000 men, with a river to protect his flank during his march, on which he might, if necessary, throw an additional corps to his advanced-guard during this movement: and, above all, as we knew the enemy was filing towards Leipsic, there could be no possible risk. After more conver- sation, in which I blended the respect I had for his military renown with an honest disclosure of my sentiments, I ex- pressed my gratitude for his condescension in listening to me, where he had an undoubted right to consider himself as best qualified to judge. His Royal Highness at length determined to march to Halle : I urged, with deferential earnestness, that Halle was in rear of General Blucher, and if the General should engage, His Royal Highness would never be able to L 122 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR support him during the conflict His Royal Highness answer- ed, he would be in the second line, and able to support if necessary : and in his orders on the following' day, he directed his army to prepare to follow the enemy if they were beaten, and to do them all possible mischief in their retreat, evidently showing he did not intend to assist in the action. I left the Prince Royal, however, in the evening, with a promise, on his part, that he would change the direction of the march from Halle to the left on Zorbig, when the troops should be in route in the morning. Here, I must observe, my urgent propo- sition was to reach Zorbig on the i4th, which could easily have been achieved, as we remained two da)^s at Kothen; still it was something to approximate the army towards the former place. On the 14th, I left Kothen, and rode with the Prince on the morning of the 15th ; but my surprise and chagrin were equal when, instead of directing his troops to the left on Zorbig, as he had promised, or even to Halle, he marched the Swedes by Gropzig, in the rear of the Peter- berg, towards Wettin ; the Prussians to the Peterberg and Oppin ; while the Russian corps had their left at Zorbig. The army collected at Kothen on the 14th : their obvious march, to support General Blucher and to meet the enemy, was to the left and forward ; but His Royal Highness direct- ed them to the right, in rear of General Blucher, and back- ward, making at the same time an angle to the rear, which nearly doubled their distance. At Sylbitz, where the Prince Royal stopped to issue orders to the troops, I respectfully but urgently requested it might be weighed whether the other armies would not complain of this movement, especially Gen- eral Blucher, when it was intimated that any one who recom- mended a march to the left of Zorbig was un sot : after some time, however, I had the satisfaction of finding the Russian corps ordered to Zorbig. Baron Witterstedt, still minister of Sweden, and General Adlercreutz, also, were present, but took no part in this discussion. I must here observe, that the orders intentionally (for they could not be ignorantly) issued on this day by the Prince Royal were for the different corps to have brigades formed towards the Elbe, evidently to give the impression that the enemy were to be looked for in that quarter. On the 16th, in the morning, being personally much chagrined at the Prince Royal's resolutions, I repaired to General Blucher. All I had been able to accomplish by dint of persuasion, was to get the Russians to Zorbig; and General Blucher fairly and naturally sympathized with my painful sensations on this result. The Prince Roval however assured me, that in case Gen- IN GERx'klANY AND FRANCE. 1 23 eral Blucher should make an attack the following- day, I might give the General his word that he would be on the ground in the direction of Dolitsch and Eulenburg, with 8 or 10,000 cavalry and light artillery to support him, even if his infantry could not arrive. This pledge I stated totidem verbis to General Blucher when I joined him. I there wrote and dis- patched by my own aide-de-camp from the ground, while the dispositions for General Blucher's attack were making, the following' letter to His Royal Highness : — " October 16th, i past 9, A. M " My Lord, " After the report of General Blucher, the enemy quitted Dolitsch. It is of the greatest importance, according to his ideas, that the army of your Royal Highness should march to the left, behind Dolitsch: the marshes and defiles will place it entirely without risk ; and your Royal Highness will be in a state to take part in the combat, which will be more deci- sive with your army and your military talents. As the whole force of the enemy is in the environs of Leipsic, permit me to say to you that the moments are precious. The English nation has its eyes upon you : it is my duty to speak to you with frankness. England will never believe that you are in- different, provided the enemy are beaten, whether you there take part or not. I must entreat your Royal Highness, if you remain in the second line, to send Captain Bogue with his brigade of Rocket-men to act with General Blucher's cavalry. " I have the honor to be, &c. &c. (Signed) " Charles Stewart, " Lieut. General." General Blucher now urged me strongly to hasten to the Prince Royal in person, that the object of this letter might be insured. I proceeded immediately, and met an aide-de- camp of the Crown Prince's on the road, bearing a letter from General x'Vdlercreutz, acquainting me that, in conse- quence of my pressing solicitations, His Royal Highness had consented to move with his advance (tlie Russians) to the left of Landsberg on that day. Tlie Prussians were a march behind the Russians, and the Swedes one more behind the Prussians. In vain I sought the Prince Royal ; and despairing of an interview, I stated to General Adlercreutz, at Landsberg, how imperiously necessary it was lor the Russian cavalry and light artillery to advance immediately in the direction of Taucha ; and that the Prince's word had been pledged to it. 1 24 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR The General replied, if I could arrange that step with Gen- eral Winzingerode, he would answer for the concurrence of the Prince. I hurried to this General, who stated that his orders were positive from the Emperor of Russia not to act but by the express commands of the Crown Prince ; that he dared not move in person, but he would send 3000 horse forth- with, and 8000 on the following morning, if I could procure such order. I returned to General Blucher greatly disap- pointed; but was happy to learn, in the sequel, that 3000 horse were actually pushed forward that evening, on General Adlercreutz seeing the Prince, and they appeared on Gen- eral Blucher's left in the morning. After seeing General Blucher's action, and being uncertain where to find the Prince Royal, I rode late at night to Halle, where I found Baron Witterstedt; I prevailed upon him to send an express to His Royal Highness with the following letter: " Halle, October 16th, 9 o'clock, P. M. " My Lord, " I come from the field of battle, from General Blucher. I have the honor to send you the details of this affair. "I entreat your Royal Highness to set out the moment you receive this letter, and to march upon Taucha. " There is not a moment to be lost. Your Royal Highness has promised me to do so. This is to speak to you as a friend. I speak now as a soldier ; and if you do not commence your march, you will for ever repent of it. " I have the lienor, &c. (Signed) " Charles Stewart." The answer from Baron Witterstedt afforded me the satis- faction of knowing, that by repeated and strenuous efforts, the head of the northern army would have been in their place at twelve on the 17th, if an attack had been made. I think I have said enough to show that, if the Prince had exerted all ]iis faculties, and the mental and phvsical energy he possessed, the corps of Marmont, Ney, and Bertrand, would have been more completely overthrown, and the serious losses of D'Yorck's corps of Prussians spared, by the timely arrival of the Prince Royal's army. A moment's reference to the detail of the positions, will convince the world of this fact. If the northern army had marched to Zorbig on the 14th, or even on the 15th, with its advance towards Dolitsch, evacuated by the enemy on that day, the Prince Royal would have been enabled to have acted upon Ney's force, wliich, on General Langeron's attack, filed from the neigborhood of Duben and Dolitsch, and protected Marmont's right ; and if IN GERMANY ATVD FRANCE. 125 an impression had been made and followed up to the Partha, simultaneously with General Blucher's attacks, the whole force of the enemy must have been destroyed. Bold as these remarks are, I have no solid motive for dis- guising them : as a soldier devoted to his country and his profession, fearing neither the frowns nor courting the favors of any man, I publish my own observations and sentiments as they arose in my mind out of the circumstances which passed within my own knowledge. Of these facts others may judge ; and form their own, and perhaps different con- clusions, influenced as they may be by conflicting accounts, or the knowledge of latent motives, operating upon the chief actor in these very interesting proceedings. I have at least one consolation, that if these details give dissatisfaction in any quarter, the King and country I served were, at all events, satisfied with my humble exertions ; which will best be seen from the letter addressed to me by my own government, which will be found in the Appendix. I have merely to mention, before closing the present chap- ter, that in the battle of the 16th, a most brilliant charge was made by the Adjutant-general Orloff with the Cossacks of the guard, directed in person by the Emperor Alexander, when they took twenty-four pieces of cannon. There were also various exploits in every part of these bloody fields to which I much lament my pen is unable to do justice; for such was the hurry and confusion of the moment, and the rapidity with which event followed event, and victory battle, that it was totally impossible to collect all details. CHAPTER XL Successes of the Crown Prince of Sweden— of General Walraoden — Con- centration of the enemy round Leipsic — Remarks on this movement- Proclamation to the allied army — Preparations for a general engagement — Description of the battle of Leipsic — its glorious results — The enemy routed at all points— Capture of Leipsic — pursuit and dispersion of the French armj- — Movements of the allied forces towards the Rhine — Puli- lic rejoicings— Tidings of the victory in England— Propositions of peace from Napoleon — Singular interview with tlie Prince Royal — Presented by His Royal Highness with the Swedish military Order of the sword. Before describing the great operations connected with the battle of Leipsic, by which the fate of Napoleon, in my opin- ion, was entirely and irrevocably decided, I wish to direct the reader's attention to the corps in the north. Tlic Prince Royal left General Walmoden with iiis corps, and those of L2 1 26 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR General Tettenbom, Dornberg, &c. to keep Marshal Davoust in check ; and on the 18th of August, in a well-contested ac- tion at Vella, 2000 cavalry under Walmoden held in check 15,000 French, commanded by Davoust. That general, in consequence of the successes of the Prince Royal, evacuated Schvverin, where he had his head-quarters; the Danes, how- ever, now separated themselves from the French, and took post behind the Stecknitz river. A very brilliant action took place on the 15th near Domitz. General Walmoden left General Vegesack to observe Da- voust, and marched to join General Tetterborn, who found the enemy placed between the villages of Ollendorf and Euchdorf with 10,000 men and eight pieces of artillery. The disposition being made. General Walmoden succeeded on every side, destroyed the entire division of Pecheux, and took thirty officers and 1500 men. After the action, Walmo- den placed his head-quarters at Dennewitz, and Davoust re- treated behind the Stecknitz. Many brilliant skirmishes were reported in that direction ; amongst which a Prussian colonel, Marwitz, greatly distinguished himself The great crisis now approached, by Napoleon concentra- ting all his force in the environs of Leipsic. Why he decided upon this measure, and did not rather determine on taking his iirst position behind the Saale, or carrying his army in the direction of Magdeburg, was a point often and much debated on. The allied army being at length assembled, the Field-mar- shal Prince Schwartzenberg issued the following order : — " Brave Warriors ! The most important period of the holy struggle is arrived ; the decisive hour is about to strike ; pre- pare for combat. The band which unites the most powerful nations for one and the same end, will be riveted on the field of battle : Russians, Prussians, Austrians, you will fight for the same cause, for the liberty of Europe, for independence, for immortality. All for one, one for all, let this be your watch-word in this holy combat ; be faithful to it at the deci- sive moment, and the victory is yours. " Charles P. Schwartzenberg." Such was the order issued to the grand army by its com- mander. Europe now approached her deliverance ; and England might fairly and triumphantly look forward to reap that har- vest of glory her steady and unexampled efforts in the com- mon cause so justly entitled her to receive. I can only re- gret the absence of an abler pen in the individual commis- sioned to make known to the British government the events IN GERMAXT AXt) FEANXE. 127 of the 16th, 17th, and 18th of October, but such was the task imposed on the writer of this narrative ; and in endeavoring rapidly to describe the prominent features of these memora- ble days, pregnant with the fate of so many millions, with any thing like military connexion and precision, he conceived he best fulfilled his duty as a soldier. The battle of General Blucher on the 16th was followed by a complete and signal victory on the 18th, by the com- bined forces, over Buonaparte, at the head of his army, in the neighborhood of Leipsic, The collective loss of above 100 pieces of cannon, 60,000 men, an immense number of prisoners — the desertion of the Saxon army, and also of the Ba- varian and Wirtemburg troops still remaining in the French ranks, consisting in all of artillery, cavalry, and infantry— many generals killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, among whom were Regnier, Valberg, Brune, Bertrand, and Lauriston, were some of the first-fruits of the glorious day of the 18th of October. These were followed by the capture by assault of the town of Leipsic ; the magazines, the artillery, stores of the place, with the King of Saxony, all his court, the garrison, and the rear-guard of the French army ; the whole of the enemy's wounded, the number of whom exceeded 30,000, with the complete deroute of the French army, it being entirely sur- rounded, and endeavoring to escape in all directions: such were the prominent subjects of exultation. Buonaparte was fortunate enough to escape by rapid flight two hours before the entry into Leipsic of all the allied forces. The further re- sults may be obtained from a statement of the day's military manoeuvres and positions, which it will here be my endeavor to give as succinctly as possible : firstly, of the general and combined operations determined upon by the imperial and royal generals; and secondly, a description of what immedi- ately came under my own observation, namely, the move- ments of General Blucher and the Prince Royal. The positions of the allied armies, up to the 16th, have been already detailed. It being announced by Prince Schwart- zenberg that it was the intention of their majesties, the allied Sovereigns, to renew the attack upon the enemy on the 18th, and the order above detailed for the army having been issued, the armies of the north and Silesia were directed to co-ope- rate. Napoleon's army was situated on the 18th nearly as follows : — the Sth, 2d, and 5th corps, under Murat, at Can- newitz ; the right was commanded by Prince Poniatowski ; Victor formed the centre at Probstheide ; the lefi:, under Lau- riston, occupied Homburg; the guards occupied Thornberg, where Buonaparte was in person ; Ney was uith Napoleon ; Oudinot supported Poniatowski with the jeune garden and 128 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR Mortier was charged with the defence of Leipsic. The dis- positions and orders of the grand army were as follows : — the 1st column, under Barclay de Tolly, composed of Wittgen- stein's corps and the Russian and Prussian guards, were to advance to the heights of Wachan ; the 2d column, under the Hereditary Prince of Hesse Homburg, a most gallant and skilful officer (since married to our English Princess Eliza- beth, but unfortunately now no more), composed of the divisions of Bianchi, Maurice, Lichtenstein, and Weissen- wolf, with the reserve, marched on Dolitsch, with Coloredo's corps as a further reserve ; the 3d column, under Bennigsen, with the corps of Kleinau and Guthin, marched on Holzhau- sen. Whilst the grand a.rmy was to commence the attack from the different points of assembly, on the principal villages sit- uated upon the great roads leading to Leipsic, the armies of the north and Silesia were jointly to attack the line of the Saale, and the enemy's position along the Partha river. Gene- ral Blucher intrusted to the Prince Royal of Sweden 30,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery; and with this formidable reinforcement, the northern army was to attack from the heights of Taucha ; while General Blucher was to retain his position before Leipsic, and use his utmost efforts to gain pos- session of the place. In the event of the whole of the ene- my's forces being carried against either of the armies, they were reciprocally to support each other, and concert further movements. That part of the enemy's force which for some time had been opposed to the Prince Royal of Sweden and General Blucher, had taken up a very good position upon the left bank of the Partha, having its right at the strong point of Taucha, and its left towards Leipsic. To force the enemy's right, and obtain possession of the heights of Taucha, was the first opera- tion of the Prince Royal's army. 'I'he corps of Russians under General Winzingerode, and the Prussians under Gene- ral Bulow, were destined for this purpose ; and the Swedisli army was directed to force the passage of the river near Plosen and Mockau. The passage was effected without much opposition : General Winzingerode took about 3000 prisoners at Taucha, and some guns; and General Blucher put his army in motion, as soon as he found the grand army engaged very liotly in the neighborhood of the villages of Stetteritz and Probstheide. The infantry of the Prince Royal's army had not sufficient time to make their flank movement before tiie enemy's infantry had abandoned tiie line of the river, and retired over tiie plain, in line and column, towards Leipsic, occupying Pounsdorf, and Schonefel hi strength, so as to pro- IN GER.MANY AND FRANCE. 129 tect their retreat. A very heavy cannonading, and eorae brilliant performances of General Winzingerode's cavalry, marked cliiefly the events of the early part of the day; to- wards the close, when General Count Langeron had cross- ed the river and attacked the village of Schonefel, he met a determined resistance, and at first was unable to force liis way : he however possessed himself of the villages, but was driven back ; when the most positive orders were sent liini by General Blucher to reoccupy it at the point of th bayonet, which he accomplished before sunset. Some Prussian battalions of General Bulow^s corps were warmly engaged also at Pounsdorf, and the enemy were re- tiring from it, when the Prince Royal directed the rocket brigade, under Captain Bogue, to form on the left of a Rus- sian battery, and open upon the retiring columns. Congreve's formidable weapon had scarcely accomplished the object of paralyzing a solid square of infantry, which, after our fire, delivered themselves up, as if panic-struck, when that esti- mable man and gallant officer, Captain Bogue, of the British royal artillery, received a mortal wound in the head, which at once deprived society of a noble character, and this country of his valuable services. Lieutenant Strangeways, who suc- ceeded in the command of the brigade, received the Prince Royal's thanks, conveyed through me, for the important assistance they had rendered. I felt great satisfaction at witnessing, during this day, a species of improved warfare, the effects of which were truly astonishing; and produced an impression upon the enemy of something supernatural. During the action, twenty-two guns of Saxon artillery, with two Westphalian regiments of hussars, and two battalions of Saxons, joined us from the enemy ; the former were in- stantly led again into the field, our artillery and ammunition not being all brought forward. The close communication was fully established between the grand army and those of Blucher and the north. The Grand-duke Constantine, Generals Platoff, Miloradovitch, and other ofiicers of distinc- tion, joined the Prince Royal, to communicate the events carrying on in the several quarters of this great field of battle. The most desperate resistance was made by the enemy at Probstheide, Stetteritz, and Cannewitz. But the different columns bearing on those points, as above detailed, carried every thing before them ; General Bennigsen taking the vil- lages on the right bank, and General Giulay manteuvring 25,000 Austrians on the left bank of the Elster. General Thielman's and Prince Maurice Lichtenstein's corps moved upon the same river ; and the grand result of the day was, 130 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR that the enemy lost above 40,000 men in killed and wounded, sixty-five pieces of artillery, and seventeen battalions of German infantry, with all their staff and generals, who came over in a mass during the action. The armies remained, du- ring- the night, upon the ground which they had so bravely conquered. The Prince Royal had his bivouac at Pounsdorf ; General Blucher remained at Wellens; and the Emperors and Kmg at R-oda. About the close of the day, it being reported that the enemy were retiring by Weissenfels and Naumberg, General Blu- cher received an order from the King of Prussia to detach in that direction. The movement of the Prince Royal's army completely precluded the retreat on Wittenberg ; that upon Erfurth had long since been lost to them, and the line of the Saale appeared alone to remain. As both the flanks and rear would be operated upon during their march, it was difficult to say with w^hat portion of his army the enemy could get to the Rhine. On the 19th the town of Leipsic was attacked, and carried, alter a short resistance, by the armies of Blucher, the Prince Royal, Bennigsen, and the grand army. Marmont and Mac- donald commanded in the town : these, with Augereau and Victor, narrowly escaped Vvith a small escort. Their majes- ties, the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, and the Crown Prince of Sweden, each heading their respective troops, entered the town at different points, and met in the great square. The acclamations and rejoicings of the people are not to be described : handkerchiefs waving from the win- dows, hands clamorous in applause, and lastly, but most eloquently, tears rolling from the eyes, announced the de- lightful era of the liberation of the world from the tyranny of the despot to be at hand. The moment was too enthu- siastically felt to be described in adequate terms, and I confess myself unequal to it. The multiplicity of brilliant achieve- ments, the impossibility of doing full justice to the talent and prowess shown in the series of enterprises arising from the boldness of conception in our commander, Prince Field- marshal Schwartzenbcrg, and the other intrepid and ex- perienced captains, will be admitted by every one, and plead an excuse for a sketch which scarcely merits the name of a description. I sent the account of this battle to England by my aide-de- camp and cousin, Mr. James, who most gallantly was every- where in the hottest of the action, and had been distinguished for his ardor in the service since he had been witli this army. In order also to take every measure to accomplish the ti*ans- mission home of this vitally important intelligence as speedily IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 131 as possible, I was induced to avail myself of the services of Mr. Solly, a Prussian gentleman, largely connected in England ; who with indefatigable zeal, and at great personal risk and inconvenience, undertook to carry a copy of my communication direct to the English government through the midst of the French armies. He embarked in an open boat, and arrived in London with this glorious intelligence in an incredibly short space of time. One palliating circumstance connected with my imperfect detail of this combat is, that I wrote it nearly as I have given it above on a stone in^ the field of battle, when the fire had ceased, without correction or amendment. I ought here to record the gallantry displayed, and the efficient assistance I received from my aides-de-camp, Captain Charles, now Major, Wood, and Lieutenant-colonel Noel Harris ; the latter brave officer lost his arm, in the fol- lowing year, at Waterloo. An officer arrived on the 19th from General Tettenborn, bringing the intelligence of the surrender of Bremen to the corps under his orders ; and the keys of that town were pre- sented by the Prince Royal to the Emperor of Russia in the square of Leipsic. The losses sustained in the last four days' combats could not with precision be stated ; but they were averaged, on the part of the enemy, at 15,000 prisoners, without reckoning 23,000 sick and wounded found in the hospitals at Leipsic, 250 pieces of cannon, and 900 tumbrils. Prince Poniatowski, Generals Vial, Rochambeau, Dumoutier, Campans, and La- tour Maubourg, were killed; and Ne}^, Marmont, and Souham, wounded. Fifteen generals were made prisoners. The loss of the allies was equally serious. The Prussian corps of D'Yorck lost 5000 men : the Austrians enumerated no less than sixty officers of distinction killed in this sanguinary contest. I have now to record an ingenious device of the enemy to excite delay and discussion amongst tlie allies. Genera] Meerveldt, who had been taken on the 16th, was liberated on his parole by Buonaparte, charged with propositions of peace to the Emperor of Russia. Buonaparte saw General Meer- veldt in the village of Lutschen : he spoke very earnestly on the subject of a general pacification ; but first declared that he had 200,000 men in line, and a much more considerable cavalry than the allies had expected. He offered, on condi- tion of an armistice during the negotiation, to evacuate Dant- zic, Modelin, Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Dresden, Torgau, and even, in case of necessity, Wittenberg. He promised to re- tire behind the Saale; and he said, as to terms of peace, that England could receive Hanover; the neutrality of the flag 132 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR of Hamburgh and Lubeck might be insured, as well as the independence of Holland ; and Italy be united with an inde- pendent monarchy. He hesitated as to the restitution of Mantua to Austria ; and repeated, that Italy should be kept entire. Meerveldt observed, that tlie allies might object to Murat as the sovereign of Naples. The answer was, that it was not necessary to anticipate that arrangement ; and Na- poleon again and again declared he did not believe England would make peace ; and never without a condition to which he could never submit, viz. limitation of the number of French ships of war. General Meerveldt then inquired, whether he would resign Erfurth, as well as the other fortresses'] Napoleon hesitated : the General then said, the resignation of the protectorship of the Rhine was necessary. Buonaparte replied, it w^as impos- sible; but on being told that Bavaria had withdrawn from his protection, the courier from Munich having been taken, and that other treaties were negotiating, he exclaimed. Then the protectorship of the confederation ceases of itself. As to Spain, it was a question of dynasty, ^e n'y suis plus — there- fore, that question is decided. These were the principal topics of conversation, as given by General Meerveldt. His impres- sion also was, from Napoleon's manner and all he said, that he would fall back upon the Rhine : he looked jaded and ill at this period, and was very much depressed. This interview, it must be understood, took place before the last battles ; and there was certainly amongst the allies a disposition to accept of Buonaparte's terms, and open a negotiation. In further reference to my correspondence with the Prince Royal of Sweden, already detailed, it is right for me to state, that returning to the head-quarters of His Royal Highness on the morning of the 18th from General Blucher at Breiten- feld, when dispositions were making for the attack, the gene- ral officers being present, the aide-de-camp in waiting desired me to walk in. On entering, I was no less surprised than hurt, when the Prince approached with a look bordering upon suppressed anger, and withdrawing towards the window, he addressed me nearly as follows, but in a purposely low tone, that others might not overhear: — "How is this! General Stewart? what right have you to write to me I Do you not recollect that I am the Prince of Sweden, one of the greatest generals of the agel and if you were in my place, what would you think if some one should write to you as you have written to me 1 You have no authority here ; it is through my friendship that you are here ; and you have caused me much pain." I an- IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 133 swered in the most respectful tone: — It was possible my zeal had carried me too far ; but, according to my own conception of my duty, I could not repent one step I had taken. I had urged the march to Zorbig: His Royal Highness had reluc- tantly, and in part only, consented to that measure. I had entreated the movement forward to Landsberg ; and His Royal Highness had adopted that idea. After General Blucher's victory, my letter and entreaty induced His Royal Highness to break up at two o'clock in the morning from Landsberg, and bring the head of his columns at that critical moment into position. His Royal Highness could then see whether I had mistaken the views of the enemy. The whole circumstances were known to his staff, his ministers, and the principal officers of his army. I desired to be judged by Baron Wet- terstedt and General Adlercreutz whether the result had not been attained by my individual, but humble, importunity and exertions. I had never been intentionally deficient in respect to His Royal Highness's exalted position ; but it was a little hard, instead of receiving thanks for my services, to be visit- ed with displeasure : it is true, I was not formally accredited as British minister to the court of Sweden, but I was charged generally with the military interest of Great Britain in the north of Europe. England paid the Swedish army ; and my reports whether that army did what I considered its duty to the common cause, actively or passively, must operate seriously upon the alliance. I was incapable of the vanity of placing the value of my military opinions on a par with those of so great a general ; but it required very little discrimination to perceive that His Royal Highness had been literally pressed into the recent transactions — that his original orders wore evidently a departure from the system of combination, and foreign to the dispositions of the grand armies. But independently of these demonstrations of isolated objects, certain expressions of his own were most explicit, and this was not a moment for diplomatic concealment. I spoke my opinion openly and firmly, but respectfully. I never should shrink from my duty in the most painful situ- ation ; which, I fairly confessed, after listening to His Royal Highness, the one I was then placed in appeared to me to be. The expression of his countenance during my discourse varied considerably, and at length had become calm ; and he replied with bon-hommie : " Very well ! do you wish that we should be friends'! You know, my friend, the friendship I bear you; why not speak together of military dispositions ? Tell me your opinions ; but do not write any more, I beg of you." I assured His Royal Highness I felt honored by his M 134 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR friendship, when I considered he was acting as became the Crown Prince of Sweden : that if he was displeased with my correspondence, I should write in future to General Adler- creutz ; although his own invitation, on my first arrival, had led me rather to address my letters to the Generalissimo in person. My anxious efforts were to assist the Swedish nation ; but I could never see their chief depart from what I knew were the true interests of his situation, without remonstrating- boldly. The Prince upon this took my hand, assuring me of his friendship. We discussed the principal features of what had passed, and I felt myself restored to favor ; so much so, that he invited me. at dinner to meet the Emperor and King, I being the only minister present. However distressing this scene was to my feelings, I relate it to show the difficulties of the duties imposed upon me ; and I experience a sensible pleasure in stating, that those able, experienced, and highly-talented general officers, who were placed by the allied powers near the person of His Royal Highness, amongst whom General Pozzo di Borgo stood pre-eminently conspicuous for his high abilities and acute discernment, aided me in my most difficult task. If the time should ever arrive to allow of the correspondence of those general officers. Generals Baron Vincent, Krusemark, and Pozzo di Borgo, with their courts (much of which I have in my possession), to be made public, I shall have no hesita- tion in giving them to history, as more than corroborative of my candid statements. Posterity will then do justice to the extreme difficulties we had to surmount in the execution of our duties. General Pozzo di Borgo had made himself very unpalatable to the Prince Royal, through his ardent zeal for the common cause, heightened by his personal knowledge of the dangerous character of Buonaparte; and every effort was made at Leipsic by his Royal Highness, to remove him from the head-quarters of the Swedish army. I was the fortunate medium, however, of arresting that measure ; and the Em- peror of Russia ordered no change to take place ; and by making my own government privy to General Pozzo di Bor- go's able reports, I confirmed the confidence the English gov- ernment had in his capacity. After the battles above detailed, His Royal Highness presented me with the Swedish military Order of the Sword, which the Prince Regent graciously permitted me to accept. IN GEEMANY AND FRANCE. 135 CHAPTER XII. Continued pursuit of the enemy — Line of march of the allies towards the Rhine— Unhappy fate of Prince Poniatowski— Attack of the retreating corps on Count Tolstoy— Extensive captures— Movements of Marshal Blucher and of the Prince Royal— Dresden evacuated by Gouvion St. Cyr — Motions of General Bennigsen — Collecting of the enemy near Erfurth — Progress and positions of the allied armies — Arrival of General Wrede — Active measures — The Silesian army overtakes and routs the enemy — Large capture of prisoners — Brilliant successes of Marshal Blucher — Dis- patches from Sir Hudson Lovv'e- Hot pursuit and narrow escape of Napo- leon—Disasters and sufferings of the enemy — Napoleon retreats on Frank- fort—Reports of General Wrede— of engagements at Hanau— Further progress of the Silesian army — Rapid marches, and heroic actions of the allies. The pursuit of the enemy continued along- the whole line ; and prisoners, baggage, and all the attirail of a flying army were hourly sent in by the Cossacks and light troops. I felt most anxious about the fate of Buonaparte, conceiving that his ultimate destiny could not be doubtful or remote. He reached Lutzen on the 19th ; and I concluded he would either direct his march across the Saale, and make for Nordhausen and the Hartz, in order to place himself behind the Weser, calling Marshal Davoust's army from the north to his aid, or attempt to move on the chaussee towards Erfurth, after pass- ing the Saale at Weissenfels. It was almost impossible he should escape, except with the wreck of an army ; but it was easy to imagine that the remnant of his masses, directed on one line, might force their way through smaller corps. The following disposition of the allied armies was now concerted, with immediate preparations to carry it into effect. The grand army of Bohemia marched on the enemy's right in the direction of Frankfort on the Maine; taking the route of Pegau, Zeitz, and Eisenberg. The army of General Ben- nigsen, united to that of the army of the north, and under the orders of the Crown Prince, followed the enemy's centre in the direction of Lutzen and Naumburg. The triumphan army of Silesia, when near Leipsic, diverged still further to the right, and was to cotoyer the enemy's left by Merseburg ; and its cannon was soon heard reverberating in that direction. If the enemy passed the Saale at Weissenfels, the army of the Prince Royal was to move on Freyberg. The Saxon troops were joined to the Swedish army ; but 2000 Baden troops were considered prisoners of war. The captures con- tinued to be still greater than those hitherto detailed ; fifty more pieces of cannon were discovered, besides those buried by the enemy. Prince Poniatowski, who received two wounds in attempting to pass the Elster, urged by what the French 136 NABRATIVE OF THE WAR call un beau desespoir, was drowned in that river ; decked, it was said, with brilliants, and too heavily charged with coin for a retreat a la nage. Several battalions of Poles joined the allied army. The Emperor's head-quarters moved on the 31st towards Eisen- berg. The Prince Royal preferred a change in his line of march, and moved to Merseburg the same day. His Prussian Majesty nominated General Blucher to the rank of Field- marshal, as a fit recompense for his pre-eminent services ; and their Majesties, the Emperor of Russia and the Emperor of Austria, conferred on Prince Schwartzenberg the First Class of their respective military Orders of St. George and Maria Theresa, and the King of Prussia that of the Black Eagle. By intelligence received from Count Tolstoy's corps, which was left to watch the force under General Gouvion St. Cyr, in garrison at Dresden, the enemy, findmg the grand army had moved away, commenced an offensive operation on Count Tolstoy, which they followed up with some success, as he was much outnumbered. He lost 4 or 5000 men ; but took up a defensive position at Peters walde. The allied armies continued tlieir pursuit of the enemy; and no day passed, since the memorable battle of Leipsic, without cannon, prisoners, baggage, and carriages of all sorts, falling into their Imnds. Marshal Blucher's pursuit was the closest, from the position which he occupied on the 19th, as he followed the enemy on the Lutzen road. Marshal Blucher thus formed the centre army, the Prince Royal the right, and the grand army the left of the allied forces. I am unable, from my own personal observation, to afford the details of the advantages obtained at this epoch in pur- suit by the armies of Silesia, Bohemia, and the north ; and to recapitulate the information obtained from different sources would require volumes. The Crown Prince put his army in march on the 20th, and had liis head-quarters at Merse- burg on the 22d ; at Querfurt on the 23d ; and at Artern on the 24th. By advices received, General Gouvion St. Cyr, after his action with General Tolstoy, evacuated Dresden, taking with him the garrison, and directed himself on Torgau and Wit- tenberg. It was computed that he could collect between 30 and 40,000 men : which force, it was presumed, would march upon Magdeburg, and probably attempt to form a junc- tion with Marshal Davoust's corps. As this army's move- ment might occasion a momentary alarm. General Bennigsen, with a corps of 10,000 men, exclusive of cavalry, was di- rected to put himself in march immediately; and he was ordered to assume the command of all the allied corps on IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 137 the Elbe, under Generals Tolstoy, Tauenstein, &c., amount- ing to between 60 and 70,000 men. This army was first to find out General Gouvion St. Cyr, wherever he might be, and fall upon him en masse. They were then to undertake the sieges of Torgau and Wittenberg, should they still hold out. Lieutenant-general Count Walmoden's movements were to be guided by those of Marshal Davoust, and in combination with those of General Bennigsen. The other two divisions of General Bennigsen's army were added to the Russians under General Winzingerode. The Saxon troops were de- tached to join General Count Tolstoy. According to further advices, the enemy were collecting about Erfurth on the 27th of October. The following was nearly the position of the different armies : — the grand army was at Weimar ; Marshal Blucher at, or about, Eisenach ; General Langeron at Wisbach ; General D'Yorck at Som- merda; General Bulow atColleda; the Crown Prince at Ar- tern ; and General Winzingerode at Kindelbriick. By the above arrangement, if the enemy stood his ground, the wings could all fall back upon the grand army, and inflict the coup de grace upon that hydra of demoralization and destruction still lingering in Germany. Some thousand French, sur- rounded and succorless, now laid down their arms near Weissenfels. The enemy's columns continued their retreat with so much rapidity, that however difficult to keep Vepee aux reins, yet increased harasses and further discomfiture daily ensued. General Count Wrede had arrived with his army of 58,000 Bavarians and Austrians. On the 24th, he was to surround Wurtzburg, to summon the fortress, and bombard both that and the city in case of refusal to surrender. General Wrede next proposed to place himself a cheval on the Maine, and to occupy and break up the roads to Mayence, in order to im- pede the enemy's retreat, and attempt to take possession of the tete du pont of Cassel. The grand army moved on by its left, in two columns, from Weimar towards Erfurth. The first column, composed of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Austrian divisions, and the advanced-guard, pressed forward on Erfurth and Gotha : Generals Wittgen- stein's and Kleist's corps observed Erfurth ; and in the event of the enemy having left only a small garrison, they were to blockade the place with a corps, and move on in pursuit. The second column, composed wholly of Russian and Prussian guards and reserves, marched from Weimar by Berka and Kranichfeld, where the head-quarters were to be established on the 28th. The enemy evacuated Erfurth, leaving a gar- M2 138 NAURATTVE OF THE \VAR rison in it. In the centre, the army of Silesia never allowed itself a moment's repose, or ceased from those extraordinary efforts by which its whole progress had been characterized. The Russian advanced-guard, under General Wassilchikoff, made 2000 prisoners near Lutzen : after which, General D'Yorck came up on the 22d, reached the enemy near Frey- berg, took 1500 more prisoners, liberated 4000 Russians and Austrians, captured eighteen pieces of cannon, and compelled the enemy to destroy 500 ammunition-wagons. Marshal Blucher's march, through defiles and bad roads, was most difficult and appalling : added to which, the soldiers had to contend at this unfavorable season with almost total destitution of necessaries ; but he proceeded through Weiss- ensee and Langencalza, always on the enemy's flank, who kept the great chaussee to Erfurth and Gotha, On the 26th, the Field-marshal again came up with the enemy near Eisenach ; they appeared in a column of about 20,000 men, in tolerable order : the ground was unfavorable for the Marshal's cavalry, being between the Thuringian mountains and the Hortelberg and Kahlenberg ; and as the greater part of his infantry had been directed on Gross-Leip- nitz, more on the enemy's flank, it was late before the strug- gle commenced. General D'Yorck's corps, however, when it arrived from Gross-Leipnitz, attacked the enemy entering the town of Eisenach, and he was thrown into complete dis- order. General Langeron coming up made 2000 prisoners ; and the enemy abandoned here, as elsewhere, a whole train of caissons, most of which were blown up. Night closed this brilliant and decisive affair. On the 27th, the enemy retired from Eisenach, pursued by Marshal Blucher. It was believed General Bertrand's division was completely sepa- rated, and cut off from the grand route of Frankfort, and forced to take the mountain roads in the direction of Schwein- furth; General D'Yorck was sent after this corps. Buona- naparte left Eisenach at five o'clock on the morning of this action. Marshal Blucher moved on the high road to Frank- fi)rt; and it was conjectured that this would be Buonaparte's great line of retreat. Marshal Blucher's successes since the battles of Leipsic might be fairly averaged at 6000 prisoners, 4000 Russiana liberated, forty ])ieces of cannon, and 100 caissons taken, ex- clusive of those blown up. Of the corps of Marmont, which was composed of the best French troops, only 3000 now re- mained : in short, the disasters of the enemy were hourly, and of every description. Colonel Hudson Lowe being at this period attached by me to Marshal Bluclier, I can confide in the authenticity of the IN GERMANY AND FRANCE 139 information which I give, as received from that able and in- telligent officer. Marshal Blucher's army, since leaving Leipsic on the 27th of October, had outmarched the grand army even in its own line of march, and now formed in the van. The Colonel conceived that the 26th might have been a most fatal day for Buonaparte, had the Silesian army put itself in movement at an earlier hour, or had there been offi- cers of greater activity and combination at the head of the Russian cavalry. A prompt march upon Eisenach, which lies in the very centre of defiles, would have rendered all further retreat on that line impassable. It would have cost some lives, however : and tlia infantry had already snfiered so much, and were so exceedingly harass- ed, that it would have been unreasonable to expect much more could have been done by then). The extraordinary effort must have been made by the cavalry, with such artillery and infantry as could follow. Notwithstanding, sufficient was done, as it was, to establish a fair claim to public approbation. Even Napoleon, who by the rapidity of his march had placed himself at a very secure distance from the grand army, must not have been a little surprised and alarmed at finding his Silesian opponents close upon his flanks, and arriving at Eisenach at almost the same moment as himself The Colonel continues to write as follows: — " I had mentioned to General Gniesenau what you desired me to say. He is of opinion, as every other person must be, that the Prince Royal could not do less* than he has done to meet the extraordinary services you have rendered to the cause and to him. "General Gniesenau has had the cross of a commander of Maria Theresa conferred on him. I wish sincerely that our country had some method also of distinguishing the services of officers known to it, who deserve so well for their exer- tions in the public cause. There is nothing which appears to afford Marshal Blucher so much gratification, as the idea that liis name and exploits will be well considered in England : any testimony of approbation, either from the Sovereign or the country, would, I am sure, delight him. " I hope, sir, you will do me the justice to believe that 1 am incapable of abusing your indulgence, so far as even to express a desire of remaining with General Blucher's army, whilst there are duties of a more indispensable nature for nic to perform in any other quarter. If there can be any situa- tion more enviable than another, it is that of being attached * This alludns to the Prince Royal of Sweden havinji conferred the Swedish militajy Order of the Sword on General Sir Charles Stewart. 140 NARRATIVE OP THE WAR to such an army ; and the longer I remain with it, the more agreeable I feel I should find it: but the business I have in the other quarter I know must be terminated, and I shall be therefore ready prepared at your first call to proceed, and join you wherever you appoint me to receive your further directions. Perhaps one of the columns may come to a halt in two, three, or four days, v/hich may appear to you the most suitable time. "The interest of the present moment is so very great, Napoleon so near, and the Bavarian array marching across his supposed line of retreat, that not manydays can elapse before some crisis ensues. However, I beg to say I am en- tirely at your orders for an immediate move, wherever you judge my services most necessary. In the mean time, whether it may be my good fortune to be attached to JMarshal Blucher on any future occasion or not, I shall always feel a most lively sense of the high favor you have conferred on me, by placing me near him at the present important crisis, "I must now inform you, that General Blucher, at the sug- gestion of the king of Prussia, detached General D'Yorck's corps, and a body of cavalry under General Wassilchikoff, to harass the enemy in his retreat. General Wassilchikoff came up with the enemy near Lutzen, and made near 2000 prison- ers. General D'Yorck, who moved with his infantry by a wider route, did not con:ie up with the enemy till the 22d, near Freyberg, w^here he attacked a column that had marched by that road, took eighteen pieces of cannon, 1500 prisoners, liberated nearly 4000 i^ustrians and Russians, whom the enemy was conducting as prisoners into France, and com- pelled hira to burn upwards of 400 ammunition-wagons.'" Before daylight on the morning of the 27th October, the enemy had quitted the town of Eisenach, which was imme- diately after entered by Marshal Blucher's army ; an advanc- ed corps of which had Ijcon sent directjy in pursuit, and came up with the rear of tlie enemy at the entrance of the defiles in the mountains, within about a German mile from the town. The blowing up of the several ammunition-wagons, the de- struction or abandonment of baggage, and tlje capture of several stragglers, was the immediate consequence; but the enemy had penetrated fir into the defiles, wliere the ground was not favorable for the advance of tlie cavalry ; and it was only by following his march for the three subsequent days, that the precipitancy and disasters of his flight became ob- vious. For an extent of nearly fifly English miles, from Eisenach to Fulda, carcasses of dead and dying horses, without num- ber, dead bodies of men, who had been either killed or per- IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 141 iohed through hunger, sickness, or fatigue, lying on the roads or in the ditches ; parties of prisoners and stragglers, brought in by the Cossacks ; blown up or destroyed ammunition and baggage- wagons,- in such numbers as absolutely to obstruct the road, sufficiently attested the sufferings of the enemy ; whilst pillaged and burning towns and villages marked at the same time the ferocity with which he had conducted him- self The number of dead bodies on the road had been consider- ably augmented, from a resolution that had been taken to carry off all the sick and wounded; not resulting surely from any principle of humanity, but probably as matter of boast, in the relations that might be given to the world of the event, as several of these men were found abandoned on the road in the last gasp of hunger and disease : the dead and the dying were frequently mixed together, lying in groups of six or eight, by half-extinguished fires on the road-side. Several of these men must have been compelled to move on foot, as their bodies were found on the road with the sticks with which they had endeavored to support their march lying by their sides. The dead might have been counted by hundreds ; and in the space from Eisenach to Fulda could certainly not have amounted to much less than a thousand. The enemy continued to be closely pursued during the three days' march from Eisenach to Vach Hiinefeld and Fuldai and frequently cannonading ensued at the head of the ad- vanced-guard ; but the nature of the country not permitting the cavalry to act, the enemy escaped with only such losses as have been enumerated. On arriving at Fulda, it was ascertained that Buonaparte had fled in the direction of Frankfort ; but a subsequent re- lation assured us that General Count Wrede had taken Hanau, with his Bavarian troops, by assault, on the 28th : Napoleon would be therefore compelled to turn towards Coblentz, and Marshal Blucher had made his dispositions for following him in that direction. General Count St. Priest, of General Baron Sachen's division, had in the mean time entered Cassel. General Baron Sachen, who had not found it necessary to pursue him in that direction, halted this day at Lantubach ; General Count Langeron at Luder, and General D'Yorck at Neuchoff The whole were to move forward on the Lalm. It had been the original intention of Field-marshal Blucher to keep the high road to Frankfort, on which he was already the foremost in advance; but the columns of the grand combined army following close on the same route, the solicita- tions of the Prince Marshal commanding it, who represented the difficulties of subsistence, and the advance of General 142 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR Wrede on Hanau, induced him to turn off to the right, so as effectually to provide against the enemy's effecting his retreat by the way of Coblentz. The first day's march was to Ulrickstein, an old town with a castle, on the highest pinnacle of the Vorelberg mountains. The roads to it were full of every obstacle that hills, woods, ravines, morasses, and roads that had never been destined for wheel conveyances, could present ; and were, in fact, such as, according to any usual military calculation, would have been considered as impracticable for the movements of a large army : infantry, cavalry, artillery, and baggage, every thing, however, were pushed over them. The Russian twelve- pounders frequently stuck in the road ; but where six horses were not sufficient, twelve were tackled; and finally, every thing was made to yield to the perseverance and determined resolution which had distinguished all the operations of this army. The troops after their long march were cantoned in several of the small mountain villages ; and corps of 3000 men were allotted to some, whose usual population would not amount to as many hundreds. The inhabitants supplied their wants with cheerfulness in every thing : the soldiers were delight- ed ; and they had equal reason to be satisfied with each other. The soldiers from Caucasus and the Volga, forgot all the fa- tigues of their long marches in the hospitable reception the peasants had afforded them. On arriving at Ulrickstein, accounts were received by Field- marshal Blucher that General Wrede had fallen in with the enemy, during their retreat on the 29th, and taken 4000 pris- oners, many of them of the guards. On the 30th, he was himself attacked by Napoleon, but enabled to keep his posi- tion. On the 31st, another affair was reported to have taken place ; the result not known. At or near Gelnhausen, Gene- ral Platoff also fell in with the enemy ; and, as reported to the Field-marshal, had taken 30C0 prisoners. Tlie Field- marshal marched this day to Giessen. It was here reported that Napoleon was still in Frankfort, and had concentred his army between and round Hanau, Frankfort, and the Rhine ; that General Wrede, who had possessed himself of both Hanau and Frankfort, found it ne- cessary to dra.w in his force to resist the attacks of Napoleon, who, after his first affairs, returned from the Frankfort road to attack the General ; and that he was now in position about these towns, both of which he occupied. There were further reports of another battle, in which General Wrede had been successful ; but no accounts to be relied on had been received. General Blucher did not commence his march until afler IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 143 the assault of Leipsic. After six days' rapid marches, by cross-roads, through Freyberg, Colleda, Weissensee, and Langencalza, in a thick clayey country, where preceding rains had rendered the defiles almost impracticable, whilst the ene- my, followed by the grand combined army, was moving his columns along the great chaussee that leads from Leipsic to Erfurth and Gotha, General, now Field-marshal, Blucher found himself on the enemy's flank, in his line of retreat from Gotha to Eisenach. He appeared to be in a strong column of from 15 to 20,000 men, the main body marching in tolera- bly good order ; but a considerable number of stragglers, many without arms, on their flanks and in the rear. The Field-marshal made the following dispositions: the whole army had marched on that morning, the 26th of Octo- ber, from Langencalza. He ordered the corps of General Count Langeron to move on Frederichsworth, and that of Generals D'Yorck and Sachen on Gross- Leipnitz, to recon- noitre the heiglits and villages on their front, and to attack where circumstances admitted. The chaussee on which the enemy was proceeding runs in a valley ; bounded on one side by the great chain of the Thuringian mountains, and on the other by a range of minor heights, called the Hurthberg, Horselberg, and Kalilenberg. The river Horsel runs closely parallel to the chaussee : the ground was not, in consequence, favorable for the operation of cavalry, or for bringing artillery speedily up to the attack ; and the enemy had occupied all the ravines and lower eminences bordering on the road with his tirailleurs. The main body of the Field-marshal's infan- try had been directed upon Gross-Leipnitz, considerably in advance towards Eisenach. It was not, therefore, until late in the evening that the at- tack commenced. General D'Yorck's corps advanced from Gross-Leipnitz, and threw itself upon the enemy as he was entering the town of Eisenach. A heavy cannonading and musketry ensued on both sides: the enemy was thrown into confusion ; and General Count Langeron, who had pushed on at the same time with his corps in the rear, and gained the great chaussee, made 2000 prisoners, and compelled the ene- my to blow up several of his powder-wagons. General D'Yorck suffered a loss of nearly 300 killed and wounded : the enemy must have suffered in a greater proportion ; and in regard to prisoners, his entire loss was not ascertained, as several stragglers were every moment hurrying in. On the 27th of October the enemy quitted Eisenach, pur- sued by the Field-marshal's advanced-guard. It was ascertain- ed that General Bertrand's division of the French army had taken the direction of Schweinfurth. General D'Yorck had 1 144 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR received orders to march across that line. General Baron Sachen's corps was to move towards Cassel. Field-marshal Blucher, accompanied by the chief of his staff, General Gniesenau, followed him with the corps of Gen- eral Count Langeron on the high road to Frankfort, which the Marshal conjectured would be his line of retreat. Thus was the army of Silesia, after taking the most circuitous marches, again the first in its pursuit and attack of the ene- my. The number of prisoners taken by it, since the retreat from Leipsic, cannot be estimated at a less number than 6000 men ; whilst nearly 4000 had been gained for the cause, viz. the liberation of the prisoners that had been taken by the enemy. Information was now received that Lieutenant-general Count Wrede, at the head of an army of 58,000 Austrians and Bavarians, had advanced as far as Wurtzburg, and was pursuing his march on Frankfort, so that sanguine hopes were entertained of his arriving there before the enemy could reach that point. On the 20th the Prince Royal moved his army to Sondershausen, and on the 28th to Mulhausen ; having his advance, under Lieutenant-general Woronzofl^ on the great roads leading towards Cassel, to which point His Royal Highness's immediate attention now seemed directed. Lieutenant-general Czernichefl^ who joined General Win- zingerode's command, with his usual activity, was alive in all directions in the enemy's rear and on its flanks; and he never gave them breathing time. He had a brilliant affair at En- terode, near Eisenach ; attacking with 200 horse the division of Fournier, 800 strong : he made 200 prisoners, and killed many more. The general then resolved to march on Fulda, to head the enemy's columns in that direction. Buonaparte generally remained with his rear-guard, which was composed of his guards. Marshal Kellerman, it was believed, had not more than 4 or 5000 men at Frankfort. General Czernicheflf' marched without guns for greater ra- pidity, and generally advanced eight or ten German miles a day. General Tauenstein reported all quiet in the quarter of Wittenberg, and the right bank of the Elbe ; and it was now said that General Gouvion St. Cyr was directing him- self on Chemnitz. General Bennigsen's corps continued its march by Leipsic. The ci-devant King of Westphalia had fled from Cassel, forcing the inhabitants to buy all the valua- bles he had and could not carry off with him : he decamped with a good booty. While successes crowned the efforts of the allies on all sides, the firm and cheerful behavior of the troops, amidst all their fatigues and deprivations, was remarkable : yet it be IN GERMANY AND FKAIVCE. 145 came necessary before long to give the armies repose, in order to recruit their ranks, to re-equip the soldiers, and carefully to superintend the hospitals. Numbers of men had been left behind, worn down by suffering and exertions almost superhuman. But while this measure appeared so necessary, it was stUl a secondary consideration with the allied Sovereigns, so long as the enemy remained on the right bank of the Rhine. A successful coup de main by a partisan. Colonel Chra- powitski, who entered Gotha on the 22d, took the French minister. Baron St. Aignau, seventy-three officers, 900 men, prisoners, and blew up fifty ammunition-wagons, terminated this campaign. Many interesting letters were intercepted by the capture of the above-named diplomate, who was now about to play a prominent part on this great scene of action. CHAPTER XIII. Movements of the French army — Bold and masterly conduct of General Wrede — Amount of Napoleon's force — Skilful retreat of his commanders — Taking of Hanau — Head-quarters of Napoleon at Frankfort — Contin- ued retreat — Position of Marshal Davoust with the Danes — March of the army of the north towards Hanover — New plans of the Prince of Swe- den — Brilliant conduct of the partisan-corps— Marshal Blucher's pursuit of the enemy — Occupation of Bremen — Entrance of the allies into Hano- ver — Plans of the Prince Royal — The Duke of Cumberland — Dissatisfac- tion of General Walmoden — Conversations with the Prince Royal of Sweden — Causes of misunderstanding among the allies — Public declara- tion — Proposals to Napoleon — Movements of the allied armies — Capitula- tion treated of with Davoust by the Prince Royal — Capitulation of Dresden — not sanctioned at head-quarters — Interview with Prince Har- den berg— Alliance between Great Britain and Prussia— Grounds of union between the great powers. To return to the movements of the grand army : on the 23d of October, Napoleon seemed to be concentrating and reorganizing his army at Erfurth. On the 25th, the two Emperors, the King of Prussia, and Prince Schwartzenberg, established their head-quarters at Weimar ; while the Sile- sian army, anticipating the probability of a future combat at Erfurth, proceeded to Langencalza ; a movement which, threatening Napoleon's rear, compelled him to abandon his position at Erfurth. Marshal Blucher then marched on Eise- nach, as has been already recorded. The enemy continued their rapid retreat by Fulda and Frankfort, harassed by the cavalry and Cossacks, under Platoff, Sloweiski, and Czernicheff. In the mean time, General Wrede, with the Bavarian N 146 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR army, made rapid marches towards Mayence, in the hope of arriving at Frankfort before them, and of cutting- off the major part of the • etreating army. The grand allied army marched in two columns: one by Fulda, and the other by Aschaffenburg, on Frankfort. The Silesian army continued its route by Wetzlar. The Prince Royal of Sweden, up to this period, moved in the direction of Cassel : but changes took place here, which shall be presently detailed. General Count Wrede, with the Bavarian army, having very gallantly assaulted three different times the strong capital of Wurtz- burg, ultimately succeeded in forcmg its capitulation on the 26th of October, and pressed on his march as has been before mentioned. On the 27th he arrived at Aschaffenburg, and on the 28th entered Hanau. The Bavarian General now learn- ed that the main French army was before him : he was obliged, therefore, to evacuate the place until all his troops came up ; and he took up a position in the rear of it, and on the following days had various skirmishes with the enemy. At length he collected about 36,000 men ; and taking a posi- tion with his right to Reineck, and his left to Gelnhausen, he determined to attack the enemy, however superior in numbers. Napoleon, however, had upwards of 60,000 men and 120 pieces of cannon, and only wanted to disengage the line of march for his retreat. His generals, Nansouty, Sebastiani, and Davoust, ably and skilfully fulfilled the orders that were given ; and a great portion of the French army filed off during the night towards Frankfort. But on the following day, General Wrede made a most gallant and desperate attack on Hanau, which he took by assault, receiving a severe wound in the action, while leading on his troops with dauntless intrepidity. Napoleon, meantime, continued his march by Stockstadt, on the right of the great road near Hanau, leaving Marshal Mortier, with a rear-guard of 14,000 men, to cover his retreat. On the 31st, the light cavalry of the French passed the Maine, and entered Frankfort ; and at twelve on that day, Napoleon established his head-quarters there. The result of the battle of Hanau was stated to be 1.5,000 killed and wound- ed, 10,000 prisoners, and nine generals. On the 1st of November, Napoleon continued his retreat from all points. The Emperors of Russia and Austria, and the King of Prussia, accompanied by Prince Schwartzenberg, Generals Barclay de Tolly and Wittgenstein, surrounded also by their other generals and suite, made their magnificent and solemn entry into Frankfort on the 4th ; and the main French IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 147 army was now effectually driven from the right bank of the Rhine. I now return to the Prince Royal's army. The intended movement of the main body of the army of the north on Cassel was arrested ; and the Prince Royal was induced to direct his operations towards Hanover and the north, for the following- substantial reasons : — Marshal Davoust was still iij position on the right bank of the Elbe, and seemed very un- willing to separate from the Danes, so long as he could main- tain his positions. The corps of Lieutenant-general Count Walmoden was not of sufficient force to act offensively, with- out considerable aid. The extermination of the enemy in the north of Germany ; the possession of Bremen ; the mouths of the Weser and the Elbe; the speedy reduction of Ham- burgh ; the advantage of opening an immediate communica- tion with England during the winter ; the liberation of His Majesty's electoral dominions, and the organization of its civil and military power ; the facility that would be afforded to the future operations of the northern army, either in Holland or on the Rhine, when their rear should be entirely secure; and, lastly, the hope of cutting off Marshal Davoust com- pletely from Holland, were the united considerations which determined His Royal Highness to alter his proposed move- ment. The army of the north was consequently put in march, towards the end of October, for Bremen and Hanover ; from whence it was to be directed against the remaining forces of the enemy in the north of Germany. The Prince Royal transferred his head-quarters from Mulhausen to Dinglestadt on the 29th ; on the 30th to Heligenstadt, and on the 1st of November to Gottingen. The advanced-guard of Woronzoff, and the Russians under General Winzingerode, entered Cassel on the 30th. The Swedes and Prussians were in the neighborhood of Heligen- stadt on that day, when His Royal Highness determined on a change in his line of movements. Reports received from General Czernicheff, dated from Newens, on the 27th, de- tailed, that having joined General Sloweiski with another partisan-corps of the grand arm}'', he proceeded to Fulda, which town he occupied, making 500 prisoners ; he then destroyed the enemy's magazines, and proceeded to break down llie bridges, and render the roads as impracticable. as possible, having contrived to post himself between the ene- my's main body and their advance. The manner in which General Czernicheff harassed them was not to be described. While in his position at Fulda, he perceived the advance of their collected force, consisting of some squadrons of gen- 148 NA^lRATIVE OF THE WAR darmes, moving towards the town : he immediately advanced with his Cossacks, charged, and overthrew them, and then returned to follow the advanced-guard on the great road towards Frankfort, carrying destruction before him, and de- priving the enemy of all their means before their arrival. General Czernicheff, moreover, stated, that Buonaparte went from Eisenach to Vach ; and that he had the intention of going to the Weser, but the march of the Prince Royal and Marshal Blucher prevented him, and he supposed his line would be Frankfort. He added, his army was reduced to 60,000 strong, armed and collected ; many of the enemy, however, were retiring in different directions, even without arms : the retreat forcibly resembled that from Russia. All accounts agreed that the greatest consternation reigned in France, and that interior discontent was very generally mani- festing itself From the intrepid and dexterous exploits of the partisans, we now turn, with equal cause for exultation, to the move- ments of the armies. Marshal Blucher, with the Silesian army, reported from Philipstadt and Hunefeldt, on the 29th, that such was the disorder of the enemy's flight, he could not for a moment desist from the pursuit, however harassed his troops might be : His Excellency was daily making prison- ers. General Bennigsen reached Halle on the 29th. It seemed that the corps of General Gouvion St. Cyr, originally stated to have left Dresden for Torgau or Wittenberg, and latterly supposed to be moving to Chemnitz, had, nevertheless, re- mained at Dresden. A part of General Regnier's corps, probably separated from the French army by the operations of the allies and the battle of Leipsic, had been mistaken for that of General Gouvion St. Cyr. Tliis corps was now en- camped near Torgau, on the right bank of the Elbe ; and General Bennigsen was moving towards the Elbe, to act with all the different corps under his orders there in the most vig- orous manner. There was now a report of a corps of the enemy, about 12,000 men, under General Mollitor, moving from Holland ; but it had not advanced further than Bonstanger. General Cara St. Cyr reoccupied the town of Bremen with a part of his force, after General Tettenborn had evacuated it; it was, however, soon again free. The movements of the Prince Royal's columns in march were as follow : — the Russians pro- cieeded from Cassel by Padcrborn to Bremen and Oldenburg; the Prussians, under General Bulow, to Minden ; and the Swedes, to Hanover. On the 28th of November, I witnessed, with inexpressible pleasure, the entrance of the allied troops into the Electoral IN GERMANY AND FHANCE. 149 dominions. Tlie enthusiastic loyalty and unbounded joy of the people are not to be described ; and although ten years had elapsed since that country had been governed by its legiti- mate sovereign, it was obvious that he still reigned in their hearts with the same deep-rooted affection. The reception of the Prince Royal must have been highly gratifying. The tew English present were greeted with joyous acclamations. It is a remarkable and pleasing anecdote, that during the existence of the new regime, and the studied obliteration of every memorial of the ancient dynasty, the bust of our re- vered Monarch, which I believe was a present of Her Ma- jesty's to the professors and students, retained its place in the university : no sacrilegious hand had ever presumed to remove it. Active measures were taken, under the authority of the regency, for the re-establishment of all the civil authorities; and His Royal Highness the Prince of Sweden, with the ut- most attention and care in providing for his troops by requi- sitions, made arrangements for payment ; and in every thing considered the country and its inhabitants the most favored soil. So soon as His Royal Highness the Prince of Sweden changed his plan of operations^ on the 30th, His Royal High- ness the Buke of Cumberland joined the corps of Lieuten- ant-general Walmoden ; but tlie Crown Prince expressed fears that if the Duke of Cumberland entered Hanover un- der existing circumstances, embarrassment would arise. General Walmoden now became discontented with his situation and position. This was the more to be lamented, considering the extraordinary favor that had been shown him by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent. The frequent representations he made to tlio Prince Royal of his critical and forlorn predicament, operated as an argument, which His Royal Highness did not fail to make use of, to lead his forces to that quarter, where the Prince Royafs inclinations had been so long leaning. As it appeared now of the greatest importance to open the communication, without loss of time, from the Weser with fleligoland, in order that packets might go from thence with our communications, I addressed a letter to the Governor of Heligoland by a confidential person for this object. On the 4th of November, the Prince Royal, in a confer- ence, was pleased to communicate to me that he had dis- patched the Count Lovvcnheilnj, one of the officers of his staff, to His Imperial Majesty, to propose the following disposition for consideration : — That the grand army of Bohemia should place its left on the Maine, stretching with its right to the N2 150 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR conflux of the Sieg with the Rhine : the army of Silesia, or the army of the centre, to have the appui of its left on the right bank of the Sieg, and to post its right towards Dussel- dorf : the army of the Prince Royal, after disposing of the enemy's forces in the north, was to undertake the siege of Wesel, directing itself from thence upon Holland ; of which country His Royal Highness proposed to undertake the libe- ration : the armies in the several positions on the right bank of the Rhine were, in the first instance, to reorganize them- selves as far as possible ; the recruiting of them was to be carried to the highest possible pitch ; and, at the earliest mo- ment, operations were to commence on the left bank of that river: the troops employed in the blockades of the different fortresses on the Elbe were, as soon as possible, to undertake the sieges of them, as well as of those on the Oder. The Crown Prince expected that Torgau and Stettin would fall in the course of fifteen days : these appeared the general outlines of His Royal Highness's ideas ; which I deem inter- esting, in a military point of view, to record. No official ac- count was yet promulgated, from whence a judgment could be formed of the manner in which Buonaparte, with the rem- nant of his army, had extricated himself after the sangui- nary and hard-fought actions with General Wrede, who mer- ited, unquestionably, the highest encomiums. The force of Buonaparte, as he retired on the great line of his communi- cations, was probably augmented by troops at Erfurth, and other places on its march. In his battles with General Wrede, he brought forward 60 or 70,000 men : a force much beyond what we estimated him to possess after his various losses. It was quite clear, however, he did not think himself secure with this number, as, during the last battle, he appeared to seek his safety with an e&cort of 10,000 cavalry; which General CzernichefT very gallantly attacked, and roughly handled. Marshal Blncher's army being directed out of tlie great line of road on Frankfort, on which they were following the enemy, were marched, as I liave before stated, on Wetzlar and Coblentz. I certainly considered, when General Wrede occupied Hanau and Frankfort, that Buonaparte would march on Coblentz; but it was to be regretted that our numerous cavalry ever lost sight of the enemy, so as to have made the question of his march for a moment doubtful. By Marshal Blucher being turned into another direction, it appeared that no part of the grand army did or could arrive in time to take part in the actions with General Wrede, which was much to be lamented, as the final escape of Buonaparte, and his pas- sage of the Rhine, became the object of much discussion; IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 151 and I am corry I have it not in my power to afford ample and complete information on so interesting- a matter. The Prussians, mider Bulow, were now at Minden ; and General Winzingerode was to arrive in a day or two at Bre- men : the Swedes were marching- towards Harburg ; the corps of General Bennigsen descended the Elbe, and arrived at Lutzen. This General, with Count Walmoden, had orders to operate on the right bank, against Marshal Davoust's posi- tion on the Stecknitz. The Prince Royal's plan at this moment seemed to be, to proceed to Strasburg- with part of his army, in order to be ready to co-operate in the attacks upon Marshal Davoust ; as also to possess himself of Hamburgh, and, if possible, secure an appui on the Elbe, before he pushed forward with the whole of his forces into Stralsund. Generals Winzingerode and Bulow, however, were not to be delayed in commencing their marches. General Bennigsen brought ample force with him; while General Bulow recruited his army, in His Prus- sian Majesty's ancient states, to the number it amounted to before the opening of the campaign. The generous and libe- ral aid of the Prince Regent, in arms and clothing, was of in- valuable importance to these brave Prussians at this moment: they were the means of re-equipping and arming the corps cVarmee forthwith, nearly on their original establishment. It must be as gratifying to the English nation as creditable to its government, to see how opportunely their aid was forth- coming. The gratitude of Marshal Blucher and General Bu- low, as expressed to me, was most satisfactory to the country I served. On the return of Count Lowenheilm from the imperial head-quarters with the plan from the Prince Royal of Sweden (the outline of which I have before stated), he brought a counter-project, or rather a plan of operations, which it seems had been there decided upon. The Prince Royal, on its re- ceipt, expressed himself much hurt at being so little con- sidered : he said that it was by his plan at Trachenberg the allies had obtained so much success — that lie was not in a position to be directed by any one — that if the plan fixed was that of the Emperor of Russia, or of any military man of great character, he would, bad as he thought it, be disposed to ac- quiesce ; but that he knew it was either the offspring of the ideas of those Faircuis, alluding, I apprehend, to the Russian etat major, who had yet to be as much instructed in war as he was; or else a plan which Austria was anxious to grasp at to cover her hereditary states in Italy, to liberate that country, and to forward her own objects rather than the com- mon cause, or it would not have been adopted. 152 NARRATIVE OF THE \\^AR His Royal Highness . then called my attention to the situa" tion in which he stood; the Swedes looked up to him for something. Of all the powers, he was the only individual who had not recovered some valuable possession : his rear must be made secure, and Hamburgh occupied. He further told me his determination was taken to write observations on the Emperor's plan, detailing fully his opinions ; it appeared to the Prince, that the projectors at the grand head-quarters had founded their present reasoning and project pretty much on the general ideas the Prince had laid down at Trachen- berg, without ever adverting, as His Royal Highness observ- ed, to the wide change and difference that existed as to the relative situation of our general political affairs and the ar- mies. To expose this difference-— to elucidate his own ideas — to make himself heard, if not heeded, the Prince determined to draw up a military paper of observations. In discussing these important subjects, I could not refrain from admitting, that in my opinion there was much weight in many of the opinions of His Royal Highness ; but I put it to His Royal Highness fairly, to consider whether a plan even with some objections, acted on in perfect concert, was not better than for each army to pursue its own objects without a perfect understanding. The Prince, in reply, assured me, that after he had made his representations to the Emperor, afler he had done himself justice, and after he had felt him- self somewhat more secured as to Davoust's operations, and the line the Danes would adopt, he would, however unfavor- ably he thought of the plan, do his utmost to act his part, and carry it into effect; that he was anxious, however, during the interval of concentration, to go in person to Minden and Bre- men, and from thence to Stralsund, with his Swedes, in addi- tion to General Woropzoff already there, and General Wal- moden on the right bank of tJie Elbe; that he hoped this movement would bring something to a conclusion with Da- voust. If, however, matters were protracted, lie could at all events make new dispositions. His Royal Highness expressed himself much discontented at the idea of ordering his Swedes to be so much divided, and complained generally of the little consideration shown him in this instance. He appeared to entertain great horror at the idea of the Cossacks entering France ; he was more than ever anxious to rouse that nation, which he loved, against their ruler, whom he abhorred: he wrote a proclamation, perfect in most respects, except where he dwelt on himself and his own exploits. However eager I was, when a military plan of operations had come from the head source, to support it, without any IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 153 reference whatever to my own ideas, still the Prince, in two or three conversations, seemed so fixed in the line he had adopted, and reiterated his reasons so strongly, that I per- ceived I could do no good by contending with him; and under all the bearings of the circumstances, I thought it prudent to desist until further advices should arrive from the grand head- quarters. I must here remark, that the Prince was very anxious for a public declaration, by way of appeal to France, of the terms on which we would make peace : much of his reasoning and argument was formed on the injury we should do to the com- mon cause, if such a proceeding did not take place. His Royal Highness, it seemed, had not been informed, until I now made it known to him, that M. de St. Aignan had been charged by Prince Metternich with communications to Napo- leon ; of the purport of which, more hereafter. When the Prince Royal became acquainted with this fact, he appeared delighted, but he thought the diplomatic mode not sufficiently public ; and, indeed, if it were an object to urge the Prince Royal, in his military capacity, to do what the allies required, it was surely impolitic to put him so little ail fait, in the first instance, upon so important a demarche : he had a right to expect his due share in these discussions. Finding himself thus excluded, he argued he was no longer considered ; and his feelings operated accordingly. In propor- tion as the difficulty of managing the Prince Royal increased, the disposition to attempt so delicate a task diminished, his aid having become less essential. The army of the north continued its march on Munster and Bremen ; and that part of it under the immediate orders of the Prince Royal of Sweden moved on Harburg, for the purpose of a combined movement with the forces on the right bank of the Elbe, directed against Marshal Davoust. The army did not make these movements with rapidity, as the troops needed re-equipment in the principal towns through which they passed ; and as measures for the recruiting and re-establishing the proper authorities in the different districts required time during the progress of the march. The Prince Royal of Sweden moved on the 16th to Min- den and Bremen, to inspect and give the necessary orders in those towns. His head-quarters were to move to Celle ; from thence he proceeded to Luneberg and Harburg. His Royal Highness joined his head-quarters again before they passed Luneberg ; and he adopted the necessary measures to render himself master of the Lower Elbe. Durmg this interval, His Royal Highness's operations towards the Rhine and Hol- land were not to be neglected. A report arrived that Marshal 154 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR Davoust had broken up from Ratzeburg and his positions on the Stecknitz, and retired ; but it was as yet uncertain whether he meant to throw himself into Hamburg-h, or to withdraw into Holstein and the fortresses of Lubeck and Rendsburg- : the latter was most probable, especially from his seizure of the bank of Hamburgh, and sending it to Altona. There were so many accounts of the misunderstandings between the French and the Danes, and this last subject of the bank had so much added to the dissatisfaction, that some favorable issue was anticipated. It appeared that Buonaparte was himself at Mentz. This seemed a central point, from which he could transport him- self to the point most threatened. By a report from Lieuten- ant-general VVoronzoff, at Luneberg, dated the 14th instant, at night, his advanced parties sent intelligence that Marsha] Davoust had arrived with from 9 to 12,000 men at Harburg, and it was thought with a view of directing his march on Bremen. This intelligence seemed too good to be true : in such an event. Marshal Davoust was infallibly lost, as our army would surround his force on all sides ; and Lieutenant- general Walmoden's corps, disposable, would follow him across the Elbe, and march on his rear. This report was possibly circulated to cover his real movement into Hamburgh, or the fortresses in Holstein. A report was now received at the head-quarters of the army of the north, that a capitulation was demanded and acceded to by General Thielman before Dresden ; by which the gar- rison was to return into France, and be exchanged, man for man. This was ratified by the Commander-in-chief Notwithstanding the formal protest I made to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Sv.-eden against the impolicy and dishonor of entering into capitulation with Marshal Da- voust, by which he should be permitted to return to France with his force ; and notwithstanding His Royal Highness as- sured me that if I entertained such serious objections to it, he would not attempt such a measure, the moment after my departure from Hanover to return to Frankfort, as I was in- formed by both Generals Vincent and Krusemark, instruc- tions were sent to Lieutenant-general Count Walmoden to do his utmost to bring about a capitulation by Marshal Da- voust of the nature alluded to. Having received the Prince Royal's assurance to the contrary only the preceding evening, I was surprised by this intelligence; and as His Royal High- ness had left Hanover for Bremen, I had no alternative but to write to him the annexed letter, containing my sentiments on the subject. IN GERMANY AND FKANCE. 165 "Hanover, 16th November, 1813. " My Lord, "Permit me to address you two lines, on the eve of my departure ; the subject is in my opinion of the greatest im- portance ; and I believe that your Royal Highness, with your usual kindness, will permit me to express the sentiments of Great Britain on a military subject, in which she ought to take the greatest interest. In all probability Denmark will be with us, and Marshal Davoust lost ; if he should return to France by any capitulation, I foresee a spot of the blackest kind on the military glory of the army of the north. This would be to carry the corps of Davoust to a fatal spot where it would be lost, and then to put it in array against the allies. My Prince, you have overwhelmed me with kindnesses; be persuaded, it is to your glory and to your personal interests that I address myself I will answer for the opinion of my country. It is with great pain that I hear, after the manner of your Royal Highness to me last evening, that General Walmoden has received new orders to this effect. " I beg you to pardon me, my Lord, if I go too far. I only do my duty in reiterating the opinions of my government, and hereafter I leave every thing with confidence to your wise and worthy decision. " I have the honor to be, of your Royal Highness, the most devoted of servants, (Signed) " Charles Stewart, " Lieut. General." I was fortified in my view of this act, by the intelligence that a capitulation of a similar kind at Dresden had not been ratified at the imperial head-quarters. In consequence of a communication I received while at Gottingen, the then head- quarters of the Crown Prince of Sweden, from His Majesty's ambassador at the court of Russia (Earl Cathcart), leaving me at liberty to open myself to the Prussian government on the subject of the important diplomatic instructions alluded to as being enforced just before the battle of Leipsic, I lost no time in proceeding to Frankfort. On my arrival, I had frequent discussions with His Excel- lency Prince Hardenberg respecting my object; and had great satisfaction in finding him enter entirely into the views of His Majesty's government. He repeatedly assured me, that he was convinced the policy of Prussia was to cultivate the strictest union with Great Britain, and fully sensible both of the wisdom and justice of the proposals I was charged to make ; being entirely of opinion that the instructions for- warded to me were preferable to any alterations that were 156 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR projected by the ministers of either of the imperial powers, I felt it a duty I owed to this government and myself to state to my court the determination of His Prussian Majesty. Union between the great powers was to be collected by in- ference and a sense of necessity, rather than to be found em- bodied in any ostensible and defined treaties : there were no grounds for departing from the great measure of consolidating the union of the allies by one general and complete under- standing. CHAPTER XIV. Opening of the war across the Rhine— Measures adopted by Napoleon- Plan of the new campaign— criticised by the Prince of Sweden— Proposed movements of the allied army— Force in Germany— Motions of the Prince Royal— Discussion of negotiations— Alliance between the powers— Mag- nitude of the allied armies— Occupation of Holland— Embarkation of English forces— Successes of General Bulow— Concentration of the allied armies— Re-establishment of the Orange dynasty — Capture of the Ger- man fortresses— Surrender of Stettin, Doriiherg, and Zutphen— The grand army under Prince Schwartzenberg — Marshal Bellegarde— Overtures to Napoleon — Proposed basis of peace — Position of Great Britain— English officers— Sir R. Wilson— Lord Buvghersh— Active nieasurf^s of the allies — General Blucher— Fall of Dantzic— Army of the Crown Prince — Success of the Danes— Report of the alfair — Views of the Prince of Sweden — Af- fairs in Holland — on the Upper Rhine— Arrival of the Duke of Cambridge — his public entry into Hanover — Rejoicings on that occasion. Napoleon, when forced across tlie Rhine, was obliged to employ the greater part of his disposable force in the garri- sons upon that river, the Moselle, and the Mouse. At the close of 1813 he returned to Paris, and ordered the levy of 120,000 men of the conscription of 1814: by a senntus-con- sultum it was also decreed, that 160,000 men of the con- scription of 1815 were to be called out; and by a further decree, he directed the assembling of 300,000 conscripts from the arrears of the years 1811 to 1814. These preparations produced the conviction that a long^er delay on the part of the allied Sovereigns in following up their advantages, could only be prejudicial to their ultimate object, — that of conquering France. Besides the above efforts on the part of Napoleon, he or- dered 30,000 citizens of Paris to form a national guard for its internal protection. These stupendous exertions induced the allied Sovereigns to issue a declaration of their principles, and the grounds on which they continued hostilities, dated the 1st of December, from Frankfort. This manifesto is annexed to the Appendix, No. VI. IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 157 The allies equally resorted to gig-antic efforts. A new confederation of the Rhenish states was formed, divided into eight principal corps d'armee; and the additional force which Germany was to bring into the field amounted on paper, ac- cording to the arrangements, to 280,000 men. Certain plans were concerted for the arrangement of the forces of the Ger- man states belonging to the Rhenish league ; and a financial system was also adopted, not necessary to detail. The general idea of reopening the campaign, which had been in some manner laid down by the supreme powers at the grand head-quarters, was, as usual, criticised by the Prince Royal of Sweden ; and he made representations thereon to the allied Sovereigns, On my arrival at Frankfort, no definitive resolution ap- peared to have been taken ; and although the array was in march, much change was contemplated before the plan de- veloped itself A deviation of no trifling nature already occurred ; it was said that the grand army, instead of going into Switzerland and Italy, which was at first proposed, would pass the Rhine near Basle and Huningen, and march direct on Befort, occupying the country in its neighborhood. At the same time a strong corps was to traverse Switzer- land, and to come into communication by Milan with Marshal Bellegarde's army, advancing from Vicenza; and when the Italian army should be more closely united with that acting from the Rhine, the operations could be combined, and they could mutually support each other. On the other hand, the proposed plans for Marshal Blucher seemed to be, that he should remain in the centre of the very extended line, oppo- site the fortresses, thirteen in number, which present them- selves when we pass the Rhine at Mayence. This was con- fiding to the army of Silesia to play the same game that they had hitherto pursued — that of retiring, if the enemy advanced upon them, while they could pass the Rhine and make demon- strations, should the enemy move all his force against the grand army. The army of the north was to have orders to enter Hol- land, as already projected, and pursue its operations indepen- dently. The same system appeared in this outline as in the plan hitherto acted upon. Switzerland was to become another Bohemia; Blucher acting in the centre, and the Prince Royal in the north. The difference in the execution, however, was the immense extent to be acted upon, and, to preserve the road of communication between the armies, the occupation of Switzerland seemed essential. It presented an appui for the flank, in undertaking any operation ; and it was argued, that by possessing the line of the Danube, behind the grand army, O 158 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR great resources in Bavaria, and the means for supplying am- munition, would be secured. These were the prevailing motives that determined the great feature of future operations ; and it was now promul- gated, that the head of the grand allied army was to arrive at Friburg about the 25th instant. About the 5th of Decem- ber, it was supposed a corps might arrive at Befort; but, in the mean time, no order for movement of the head-quarters was positively given ; and discussions still prevailed. I ought here to record, for the honor of his country, the eminent ser- vices rendered in the grand allied elat major, and in all their councils and grand military combinations, by that highly- gifted Prussian officer. General Knese. He was constantly attached to the King's person throughout the war ; but his genius, commanding talents, and experience, made him the most prominent adviser in every arrangement, and his ardor and skill in execution contributed towards every good result. I never can forget his personal kindness to me ; and this eulogy is a very inefficient mark of the respect and affection to which his virtues entitle him, and which I sincerely feel towards him. The Prussian general Gniesenau, always remarkable for his activity, was much chagrined at the existing delays. Measures being still protracted from day to day, he framed and submitted to the Emperor a new plan, materially varying from the outline detailed ; but his views appeared too vast, considering the then state of the allied forces. Amongst other points, he proposed to carry Marshal Blucher's army forward into Holland, instead of that of the Prince Ro)*al. No great progress was made in the organization of the German forces, while the allied army remained on the Rhine. The different interests, the various authorities, the confusion incident to new measures, and the means necessary, pre- cluded the carrying into effect the intended arrangements : still the collecting, consolidating, and arming the German states was of so much importance, that it became an object to make such a disposition of the great armies, as would not impede the formation of those which would be so powerful as auxiliaries. This was another disadvantage of the delays that occurred in determining the line of operation. R was now given out that Marshal Bellegarde's arrival at Frankfort was anxiously waited for, in order to consult his opinions, and combine the movements of tiie army of Raly with that of the Rhine. On this ground, fresh delay was excused. With respect to the army of the north of Germany, they came to the reso- lution at the grand head-quarters, that in the event of con IX GER3IANY AND FRANCE. 159 tinued operations against the Danes being necessary, and of the Prince Royal still manifesting a disposition to engage in this warfare in preference to that of Holland, they would leave under orders of that Prince 50,000 men, includino- his Swedes, and consider him as quite independent of the com- bined operations in France ; and place in the hands of an- other general the army destined to enter Holland. It was however to be presumed from the accounts received, that the Prince Royal intended to direct his own march from Bremen to Holland, his Prussian corps having already entered it at various points ; and General Baron Adlercreutz was to have the direction of the forces against the Danes. The affair of the capitulation of Dresden created great discussion, and awakened lively interest. Had the capitulation been ratified, Napoleon would have received 1700 officers, an im- portant acquisition, in addition to the whole of Gouvion St. Cyr's garrison, as a nucleus to the new armies he was organ- izing. It was formally annulled ; and General St. Cyr was offered permission to return and resume the command, which he refused. I am about to touch upon a subject which I find myself precluded by my diplomatic position from so discussing in all its bearings, as under other circumstances I should most anxiously have desired; I mean that celebrated interview which the Austrian minister had with M. de St. Aignan at Frankfort. It took place in the presence of a British ambas- sador; and ended in a sort of minute of conference, produc- tive of negotiations and correspondence, which became the cause of much complication and misunderstanding in the councils of the allies at this juncture. The archives of our Foreign Office contain, for the information of future states- men, the course pursued by the diplomatic servants of the different governments at this interesting crisis. I shall only state that, having had the misfortune to differ from my col- leagues in the principal features of that negotiation, I had the satisfaction, nevertheless, of receiving the approbation o* His Majesty's government for the whole of my conduct and proceedings. The alliance between tlie powers was placed on so clear a basis, that no proceeding should have been taken but in com- plete concert; and it never should have been imagined that when the allied armies were victorious on the Rhine, the Prince Regent's government should depart from those great principles of negotiation which were proclaimed when they were on the Oder, with the armies of France still unbroken before them. The points in negotiation, from which it was known the 160 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR British government would under no circumstances relax, were Spain, Portugal, Sicily, and the fulfilment of the existing engagements with Sweden. With regard to maritime rights, it was a question in which the mediation of any ally with Great Britain could not be accepted ; and it was still less a question which Great Britain would ever discuss at a general congress. How far these great points were compromised, or attempt- ed to be compromised, perhaps undesignedly, in M. de St. Aignan's most extraordinary negotiation, time and future his- torians will develop. It was well understood, however, that Great Britain deprecated the assembling of a congress until a basis should be positively agreed to : and this basis, as re- garded England, was distinctly established by diplomatic notes, in date of the 16th of May, as well as by subsequent instructions to her diplomatic servants. At the moment the communications for peace were opened with Buonaparte through M. de St. iVignan at Frankfort, it may be well to remark, that the allied forces, if vigorous and proper measures were adopted, would arrive at an army of the following magnitude, arrayed for the cause of Europe, and able to bid defiance to all the efforts that could be made against it : German army .... 291,120 Russian ditto, by treaty . 150,000 Austrian ditto, by ditto . 150,000 Prussian ditto, by ditto . 150,000 Swedish ditto, by ditto . 30,000 Total 771,120 besides what it was conjectured would be obtained from Hol- land, and from the armies of the Duke of Wellington ; and Holland now began to show a determined spirit to liberate herself from French dominion. A revolutionary spirit broke out at Amsterdam on the 15th of November, which was quickly communicated to the far greater part of North Holland, and followed by the termina- tion of the French power in that country. I received immediate intelligence from the Earl of Clan- carty, appointed His Britannic JMnjesty's ambassador to the provincial government of the Prince of Orano-e at the Hague, that a deputation was sent to His Serene Highness tlie Prince of Orange to invite liini to his sovereignty, and to solicit arms and succors from the British government. The depu- ties arrived in London on Sunday the 21st of November ; and having communicated with His Majesty's ministers, imme- diate orders were given for the dispatch of 25,000 stand of IN GEKMATnY and FllANCE. 161 arms, which had been previously embarked, in anticipation of this movement. A body of troops, composed of every de- scription of force, to the amount of between 5 or 6000 men, were ordered for embarkation, under the command of Lieu- tenant-general Sir Thomas Graham. A deputation also ar- rived from the Hague at the grand head-quarters: in conse- quence of which, his Majesty the King of Prussia immedi- ately dispatched the young Prince Frederick of Orange to the corps of General Bulovv, in order that one of the Orange family might be present at the re-establishment of their dy- nasty. The fortress of Stettin surrendered on the 5th of Decem- ber to the troops of His Prussian Majesty. The garrison became prisoners of war, and were to be conducted to the Prussian territories on the right bank of the Vistula: Za- mose, also, was taken by capitulation ; and it was confidently e.xpected that Dantzic would immediately fall. ^ General Bulow's successes in Holland were next an- nounced ; he had carried Dorsberg and Zutphen on the Issel by assault; both of these places were fortified, but had been stripped of their artillery, although they had strong garrisons. The enemy had inundated Deventer, and it presented more difficulty. Arnheim was carried in a very gallant manner. The utmost exertions were making to pursue the great ad- vantages so gloriously opening in Holland. The allies hav- ing lost the opportunity of following up tlie enemy in the moment of panic, after concentrating at Frankfort, extended their flanks, and were disposed at length to operate simulta- neously on the sides of Switzerland and Holland ; while Marshal Blucher passed the Rhine near Mayence, and by drawing the attention of the enemy, to afford the armies on the flanks more liberty to act. The army in Holland was to push to Utrecht, Rotterdam, and the Hague. Prince Schwartzenberg, with the grand army of nearly 180,000 men, was to pass the Rhine near Basle and Brisach, and assemble in the neighborhood of Be- fort and Besancon : detaching a strong corps through central Switzerland, by Neufchatel, to Geneva. The three places of Huningen, Befort, and Besancon, would, it was thought, not require a greater force to observe them than Mayence. The main army was to endeavor to penetrate towards Lyons and Dijon, to cut ofl^ the enemy's communication with Italy ; General Kleinau to march to reinforce the army of Italy, which was to be augmented to 100,000 men ; and Marshal Bellegarde, who had now arrived at Frankfort, was to pro- ceed to take the command of the whole. With respect to Switzerland, although deputies had arrived to concert and 02 162 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR proclaim its neutrality, and to arrange a route into Franco without infringing' its territory ; and although there was a doubt on the part of the Emperor of Russia as to the precise mode to be pursued, still it was evidently too important a military feature, both for the safety of Germany and Italy, not to secure it against any attempt from France. Every forbearance was to be shown to this small, but highly respect- able republic, while the body of the main army was to cross the Rhine at Basle. On the 9th of December, I was privately informed that an answer had been received from the Duke of Vicenza (Caul- aincourt), in consequence of the overtures through M. de St. Aignan, by which France accepted the basis of negotiation proposed ; and in order to explain the whole course of this proceeding, that ingenious and dexterous, as well as profound diplomatist, General Pozzo di Borgo, was sent as a check against any English accounts, or as a joint expounder of cir- cumstances, from the allied ministers at Frankfort to the cabinet of St. James's. As I found, by dispatches from the Earl of Clancart}^ that he was extremely desirous of every information from the grand head-quarters to regulate matters at the Hague, I de- termined to send off immediately my secretary of legation, Mr. Jackson, with full details to his lordship, in order to put him completely in possession of the carte du 'pays. This sub- sequently procured for me the double advantage of having aJl my proceedings on M. de St. Aignan's mission thoroughly explained to my government : for Lord Clancarty, acting in that spirit of confidence and friendship which uniformly char- acterized his relations with me, when he found General Pozzo di Borgo waiting for a passage from the Hague to England, charged with a special mission, ordered Mr. Jackson to be Hccommodated on board the same packet. In remarking on the state in which political afRiirs tlien stood, I could not but feel that the Prince Regent's ministers, WMth all their caution and all the detailed instructions they had sent, were placed, by an unfortunate train of circum- stances, in a most embarrassing predicament. They were obliged, by the invitation now transmitted to them, either to send a plenipotentiary to open a negotiation prcU/ninaire with a French authority (and in conjunction with the other three powers) on an undetined basis, — their resolutions hav- ing been previously clearly promulgated ; or by declining such an insidious proposition, to incur the imputation of resisting a measure seemingly tending to a general pacifica- tion. No negotiator could be sent from England w-ithout buoying IN GERMANY AST) FRAXCE 103 up that nation with the prospect of immediate peace. And was England, in her present commanding- attitude, to lend herself to a premature communication for a congress, if she did not discover a sincere intention on the part of France, evinced by decisive acts, or by declarations of such restricted views, as might tend to a probably favorable issue to the negotiation '! Would it not be more fatal to enter into discus- sions, and encourage hopes of peace, if all were to end as at Prague, than to adhere to that wise policy which had marked the proceedings of the Prince Regent's ministers in all their previous measures ] There was no temptation, in my humble opinion, and under all the suspicious circumstances by which this affair was accompanied, to send a plenipotentiary at a moment when we stood in such a proud position : on one side planting our standards in France ; upholding the nations of the continent on the other : almost unanimous in our parlia- ment: and one voice and one impulse directing the sound part of the British empire. I should before have stated, that the military councils and the political proceedings which passed at Frankfort were largely and fully detailed to the British government, by the appointment of more English officers to the different corps of the allied armies. In addition to Sir Robert Wilson, who had been from the campaign of Moscow acting with the Pvussian, and subsequently with the Austrian, armies in the tiekl, which gave him great insight into all that was planned, rejected or adopted by the allied Sovereigns, Lord Burghersh also arrived, accredited to the Austrian army as military commissioner; and was immediately placed near Prince Schwartzenberg's person. The high favor he soon obtained amongst the Austrians, the friendship of their commander, with his own tilents and energy, soon placed him in a posi- tion to render solid services to his government and the common cause. In short, so ample was the information from the central theatre of war, that, acting upon that discretionary power with which I was intrusted, I returned to the army of the north of German)^ The outline of the plans for actively commencing the cam- paign remained generally fixed, as I have before pointed out. The grand army, passing the Rhine at Basle and Huningen, was to respect, as far as possible, the neutrality of Switzer- land. General Blucher, with his Silesian army, was to cross the river at Mayence and Manheim, and push forward in like manner into France, with all the forces on his right ; while the Prince Royal was engaged on the side of Holland. Dantzic fell on the Stli of December, by capitulation, to the Duke of Wirtemhnrg; but as it was a similar arrange- 164 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR ment to that at Dresden, it was not ratified by the Emperor, and Dantzic was taken possession of by the allies upon their own terms. During my absence from the head-quarters of the Crown Prince of Sweden, various affairs and skirmishes between the forces in that quarter took place, but none of very material moment. The Prince Royal and General Walmoden hemmed in Marshal Davoust in Hamburgh. Colonel Cooke, who was stationed there, gave me regular and able reports of all that occurred. I am bound, as a candid writer, to afford some account of those troops, in which the British government felt a peculiar interest. I subjoin the Colonel's report of the 14th of December from Eidestadt, near Kiel; although it does not give a flattering prospect of the new levies, judging from their first efforts. " There has been a very serious affair in this neighborhood with a part of Walmoden's corps, under the immediate com- mand of General Arenscheldt, and the Danish troops, under the direction of the French General, L'Allemande. It was known that the Danish division, consisting of good men, in- tended marching upon Rendsburg; although they were aware that part of Count Walmoden's army was at hand to oppose them. The Prince Royal directed General Walmoden to meet them ; adding, that General Vegesack's corps should be at hand to support him. " In consequence of this order, the Russian German Legion, the Dessau battalion, Lauenbourg, and Brigade Halkett, marched with the greater portion of the cavalry. In the neighborhood of Kleswick the two armies came in contact. The Danes immediately withdrew into position, and were followed and attacked by the allied troops. No sooner, how- ever, were the allies brought under fire, than they were broken, in spite of an inclosed country, stone walls, haystacks, peasants' houses, and steep banks: some Danish cavalry, wl)o, it is true, fought most nobl}", got among them, and continued the pursuit: two British guns were taken. "At this time General Lyon, from whom I have this ac- count, not having readied this place from head-quarters until the ensuing day, received an order to advance with his di- vision to support the troops engaged. The narrow road by which he advanced impeded his progress; and the broken troops of all descriptions pressing upon his front, almost pre- cluded the possibility of the best disposed troops getting forward. " Meantime the Danish dragoons were employing them- selves in routing the remains of the infantry named to you, without receiving any check. The conduct of the allied IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 165 troops was far from creditable. At length the corps of Gene- ral Lyon disengaged itself, and remained firm, drove back the cavalry, and covered the retreating troops. Disposition was immediately made for covering the bridge of Ulneiah : fortunately, the Danes, content with the advantages they had gained, moved away upon their right, and gained Rends- burg. " I have avoided entering into any minute detail of the outline of this operation, or giving my opinion upon it; but you will not fail to observe two very strong features — bad information of the enemy's strength, and an army not well disciplined. "The enemy had possession of Schested before we knew it: some cavalry and light troops were sent against the place. The officer commanding requested succor: soon after, he reported the retreat of the Danes ; but upon the approach of the battalion sent to his support, the whole Danish army turned about, and drove them into the river directly in their rear upon a single bridge. Dornberg was at Eckersdorff; too distant to be of use in case of a battle. "We knew the enemy were at Kiel, and marching on Eendsburg. That fact established, what more simple than to collect the army between Schested and the Wittensee in po- sition 1 By this means Rendsburg was always covered, our original object completed, and the Danish army must have capitulated. "It is believed, however, that the plan of advance and at- tack was the Prince Royal's ; and although Walmoden did in some particulars object to the distribution, he was directed to adhere to the original order. Vegesack's division was in the rear at NordorfF. Had the enemy forced the bridge of Kluvesik, none of the troops engaged would even have got away. The enemy carried away about 400 prisoners and two British guns. General Lyon attributed the whole of the mis- conduct in the affair to some of the raw inexperienced levies. The Dessau battalion had only forty men leff., although few were killed ; the Russian German Legion appear to have acted ill ; and Colonel Halkett's report, in an official form, is of such a nature, as to attach a distinct cliarge of cowardice. Officers are what the levies stand in great need of, and a regular system of discij)line, without which they will again be subject to a recurrence of a similar nature. " It appears now there is some negotiation going on. The Prince of Hesse sent a flag of truce to Walmoden, express- ing surprise that operations in the field should still exist, when it was known that peace had been signed at Copenhagen. To this communication no reply was made by the Prince Royal. 166 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR His Royal higlmess is at Kiel ; and has issued an order for all leading men of property to attend him there, in order to assist in the formation of a government for Holstein. His interest appears to lead him in every point of view^ to render this country the scene of his operations: he will linger here; and although no operation be effected, he w^ill feed his Sviredes on the country and the villages by requisition," It was impossible, from this and various other similar re- ports, to blind myself as to the real motives influencing the restless spirit of the Crown Prince : all his movements were directed towards securing his own particular objects. The whole of his proceedings relative to a protectorship for the Hanse Towns, followed up by an attempt for the immediate annexation of Holstein to the crown of Sweden, denoted a conduct which required close observation. The system to be adopted by me towards the Prince Royal became a subject of very serious and anxious consideration. By some communications which arrived from the Prince of Orange, it appeared that the Prince Royal was now persuad- ing the Prussians so to reinforce General Bulow, that there might be no necessity for Russians or Swedes in Holland ; and as the command in the Prince of Orange's hands was a point now working to the exclusion of the Prince Royal, a desire was expressed by Russia that he should remain in Holstein. Difficulties arose about the chief command in the Low Countries. Captain Perponcher arrived from the Hague to procure for the military questions in that quarter a proper discussion and arrang-ement — the plans of campaign on the Upper Rhine ; the employment of Marshal Blucher in that direction, which engrossed the other force that might have been disposable for Holland ; and, lastly, the necessity and importance of keeping the alliance together on its first prin- ciples, were all points that were canvassed and debated : fcv my own part, it was my intention to urge the Prince Royal in the strongest manner to advance into Holland, and commit himself honestly in the great contest with France. I left Frankfort on the 14th of December, and arrived at Hanover on the 17th, on my way to the Prince Royal. I un- derstood at Hanover that His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge was immediately expected. I met the secretary of legation of Count Bombelles on the road, who put me in possession of the late events in Holstein, and in some degree acquainted me with v.'hat had occurred at Copenhagen. He also stated, that an armistice was on the point of being con- cluded between the Prince Royal of Sweden and the Prince of Hesse on the part of the Danes. Being certaui from these IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 167 accounts that no further military operations would immediate- ly occur in the Prince Royal's army, and being- equally per- suaded that he would wait in Holstein at least for the return of M. de Bombelles' secretary, and advices from the imperial head-quarters, I considered that I could not more usefully employ my time than, in the interval of the reorganization of the electoral dominions, awaiting the Duke of Cambridge's arrival at Hanover; and by a personal communication with His Royal Highness and Count Munster, deliver up, in the most satisfactory manner in my power, all those concerns relative to Hanover with which I had hitherto been charged. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge made his public entry into Hanover on the 20th of December, 1813. It was my good fortune to have witnessed, of late, many happy events ; but the scene of the 20th pre-eminently surpassed them all, in the touching and affecting demonstrations of joy exhibited by all classes at the return of this beloved descend- ant of their ancient race of sovereigns — a language that spoke from the heart, and which my pen cannot adequately convey : a loyalty and devotion displayed, which would have done lionor to Britons, and which British dominion, so nearly resembling patriarchal sway, so universally inspires. In the necessary absence of military ceremony, from the Electoral troops being in the field, the citizens formed themselves into bands to honor the entrance of His Royal Highness into their capital : their wives and daughters, dressed in white, strewed his path with flowers ; and the voices of their innocent chil- dren, tutored to chant in one peal our national hymn, gave the whole of this spectacle a character as peculiar as it was interesting and affecting. Illuminations and other demonstra- tions of joy at night closed this first day of relief from anxiety and alarm, the harbinger of the subsequent prosperity and ha'jpiness of the Hanoverians under their natural protectors. I (58 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR CHAPTER XV. The war in the north— Position of Marshal Davoust — defeated by General Wahnoden — Progress and state of the campaign — Motives and objects of the Prince Royal— The Duke of Cambridge at Hanover— The Duke of Brunswick — Communication from the King of Prussia to the Crown Prince —Sir C. Stewart proceeds from Hanover to Holstein— Armistice with the Danes— Letters from the King of Denmark and Prince Royal of Sweden — Observations on the Prince Royal— Gallantry of the Prussians— Capture of Bois le Due — Denmark joins the common cause — Articles of peace — Operations of the grand army— Passage of the Rhine — Surrender of Dantzic — Positions of the allies— Buonaparte at Metz— Progress of the allies — The enemy at Chalons — Power of Russia — Reflections — Success of Marshal Blucher— Relative positions of the armies — The Emperor of Rus- sia enters Vesoul — Capture of Nancy — Surrender of fortresses on the Rhine — Marcli towards the capital. I SHALL now shortly advert to the state of affairs in the north, and to the position of Marshal Davoust. He remained stationary in his intrenchments upon the Stecknitz ; where he was assailed repeatedly by Generals Walmoden, Tetten- born, Vegesack, and Dornberg, in several affairs between the 6th and 12th of October. On the 13th a corps of this army, under General Tettenborn, attacked Bremen ; which was taken, as well as Nienburg, after a short resistance. This last success reduced Marshal Davoust to his communications with Denmark alone. On the 18th, Davoust made a general reconnaissance ; attacked, but was defeated at all points. An expose of the general state of affairs at this period, and the opinions of that high-spirited and intelligent officer, General Walmoden, may be seen by a reference to the Appendix, No. VII. The glorious successes of the allies now insured the reconquest of Holland ; and, in justice to an able and gallant officer, I have added in the Appendix to this narrative a letter from General Gniesenau to myself, in which his talents and genius prompted him to suggest an expedient by which the invasion could be effected. (See Appendix, No. VIII.) The whole of the military operations in Holstein appeared to me of an unpleasant character ; and confidence in the Prince Royal's adherence was hourly diminishing. It seemed to me inauspicious, that he should now continue with all his force on the right bank of the Elbe, leaving Marshal Davoust by Harburg, an open road into Holland, Witliout imputing any bad intention, still, after the desire shown to let Marshal Davoust return to France, if he should have escaped into Holland and created confusion, although he might ultimately have been destroyed, I should not have acquitted the Prince Royal, now that a Swedish division was marching on Schles- wig and Gluckstadt for the immediate security of Drontheim. IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 169 The Prince Royal was most anxious to retain the whole of Holstein and the fortresses. His Royal Highness demanded that the Polish troops (cavalry), serving with the Danes, should be given up to him as prisoners of war. This would have been treachery as regarded the Danes, and should never have been required. I had now very satisfactory communications with His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge and Count Munster, on their arrival at Hanover : they notified to me, that 15,000 men was the contingent which Hanover and Brunswick would furnish to the common cause. I had much communication at this period with His Serene Highness the Duke of Brunswick, who arrived at Hanover. His mind was very unsettled : he expressed a wish to serve, yet declared he would serve neither under Walmoden nor the Prince of Sweden : he was likewise very uneasy about the arrangements for Brunswick. I endeavored to convince His Serene Highness how much it was his interest to sub- scribe completely to the Prince Regent's decision in all these points; to communicate with the government here as to his quota, the means of arming it, the assistance to be derived from Great Britain, and his own personal situation as to the command of his own contingent, under such a leader as the Prince Regent might select: and His Serene Highness ap- peared at length satisfied with the line of conduct I urged him to pursue. Since my departure from Frankfort the king of Prussia had written to the Crown Prince to say, that the corps of Putlitz and Marwitz (landwehr) were placed under his or- ders ; and that His Majesty hoped he would have arranged with the Danes, and defeated Davoust ; and that he would hasten to gather laurels in the Netherlands, as it was of the utmost importance not only to secure what was already gain- ed in Holland, but also to push the advantages obtained there. His Majesty proposed that General Borstell should join General Bulow, and be replaced by part of General Win- zingerode's corps ; and that the Saxon corps, and the remain- der of that of Winzingerode, should be ordered to advance to the Meuse, and support the left wing of General Bulow on his advance. From Hanover I proceeded to Kiel, in Holstein, and ar- rived there on the 29th of December. On my arrival I found, to my great regret, that a prolongation of the armistice with the Danes, to the 6th of January, had been concluded between the Prince Royal and the plenipotentiary sent from Copen- hagen. It was useless to complain, the thing was irretrieva- ble ; but from all the oteervations I could make, and the P 170 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR conversation I heard, it was evident Denmark was anxious to gain time by the prolongation of the armistice. The letters in the Appendix, (Nos. IX. X. XL) from the King of Den- mark and Prince Royal of Sweden, will show the main grounds upon which the negotiation was accomplished, which gained Denmark to the cause of the alliance. With regard to the military points, when I conversed with the Prince Royal on the absolute expediency of making every eifort immediately for Holland, I found him so determined on taking no further steps whatever until the expiration of the armistice on the 6th, that it was a vain attempt to use per- suasion ; indeed, he sealed my lips by an entreaty to that effect. I think it right to mention another circumstance, on which His Royal Highness and I had some discussion, and which occurred to me as very singular. The Prince Royal ordered from Stralsund a number of French officers of all ranks, to the amount of 150 prisoners of war, to be marched back to France on their parole. I met them on their march through Hanover. General Borstell very properly wrote, that he could not permit them to pass by Wesel without the most positive orders. I inquired from the Prince an explana- tion of this circumstance, and suggested the serious mis- chief such a number of officers returning would create. His Royal Highness said, where he sent back a thousand officers, he gained a million of friends; that he had a right to do as he pleased with his own prisoners of war ; and that he had settled this on an agreement with the Emperor Alexan- der: which last declaration, of course, silenced any further remonstrance. After the 6th, when the armistice with the Danes expired, a momentary return to hostilities occurred ; but Rendsburg and Schleswig being taken by the Swedes and Woronzoff's corps, peace was concluded on the 15th at Kiel, on the follow- ing basis: — 1st. Denmark joined the common cause, declared war against France, and furnished a corps of troops to the army of the north. 2d. Denmark yielded Norway to Sweden. 3d. Sweden yielded to Denmark Swedish Pomerania and the Isle of Rugen. 4th. The troops were to evacuate Holstein, except those who formed the blockade of Hamburgh ; in which fortress Marshal Davoust's corps still remain. The siege of this place was now confided to General Ben- nigsen ; and the Prince Royal intimated his intention of passing the Rhine, and engaging in the hostile operations 4 IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 171 in France. How far any subsequent service, however, was derived from these expressed intentions, will be seen in the sequel. To return to the Upper Rhine, and the operations of the grand army. The neutrality of Switzerland having been respected in consequence of different negotiations, and its future integrity secured at a general peace by the sovereigns of the alliance, Prince Schwartz«nberg moved his head-quarters on the 20th December to Lorrach ; and on that day, his army commenced crossing the Rhine in different columns at Basle, Lauffenberg, and Shaffhausen. It may be interesting to point out what was expected by the sovereigns of the alliance from Switzerland, and to give a sketch of its strength and situation. The military force of this independent state might be raised to 25 or 30,000 men : the militia were immediately to be established to guard the towns on the frontier: the town of Biel made an offer to form two companies of guides who knew all the avenues and mountains of the Swiss confines. Arberg is one of the most advantageous points in the cen- tre of the line of defence of Switzerland. Nature itself has formed it a fortress against France ; for the Aar surrounds it, and is only accessible by a bridge. It stands upon a hill of considerable magnitude, without being commanded by a higher point, as is the case with all the positions behind the Aar. By this circumstance the transports of cattle from the upper land of Bern could always be secured and facil- itated. Biel is an open place, surrounded by mountains ; but the lake of Biel is connected with that of Neufchatel, by which the transport by water is managed, and the town may be protected against a coup de main by light troops stationed in the passes of Biel : but Arberg remains the most advantageous point as a basis for a line of operation : this line forms an angle which extends itself from Arberg on both sides to the extreme fortified points of Switzerland, Geneva and Basil, and forms with her mountains and defiles, which are easily secured and defended, the surest basis, for all the operations against France. The establishment of troops to be raised was to protect this line ; and should Switzerland not join the offensive operations of the allies, this position protected her basis, her provisions, her transports, and her hospitals. At the frontier of Bran- truth, on the French boundary, the following inscription had been placed : " Malheur a celui qui franchira cette limite d main armee.^^ Threats and sentences of this tenor were 172 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR generally the arms of all French generals on the frontier, which intimidate none but the timid of the country. This war of words was made use of in lieu of real forces, of which they now stood greatly in need. All the reports agreed that Buonaparte assembled his chief force round Paris : the means to form this force were of the most oppressive kind : the gendarmerie were to deliver up the greatest part of their horses, as the cavalry was not yet mounted. Napoleon, how- ever, by this measure, got no more than 4,600 horses fit for service. These horses belonged to the gendarmes them- selves, and this corps thereby was unable to perform its services; and the desertion in the army, that is, of the sol- diers who returned to their homes, was so considerable, that the 10th regiment of line, which arrived from Lyons, con- sisted of but 500 men; and of a battalion of the national guards, which was to be expected in Eefort, only the com- mander with 113 men arrived. Nobody belonging to the conscription ordered now appeared at his regiment: no taxes were raised ; and the emptiness of the coffers may be con- ceived by the forced loan of 120 millions from the merchants; and the weakness of the regiments, by the defence of the towns being intrusted to citizens, as belonging to the national guard. Whether the proprietor of a house would see it burnt down with the same indifference as the soldier, vvho had no property in it, remained to be seen. The poverty of the military chest in every state and canton was so great, that the officers in all the districts of the frontiers were reduced to half-pay. The struggle in France was now calculated to bring all classes of society, whatsoever were their opinions, to moderate principles. The present municipality of Besan- 9on, Befort, and Bourg-en-Brisse, was composed of married priests, who planted the tree of liberty in those places : but this tree, which twenty years ago had no roots, frightened now even the adherents of Buonaparte ; and the adherents of the red cap and of the imperial crown formed everywhere two parties, who endeavored to aggrandize themselves by every means. TJiis difference of opinion arrested all mea- sures and things, in a country where formerly reigned only one will, which formed every thing according to its fancy. Many passages over the Upper Rhine, in Swit/.erland, were practicable, and might be undertaken wherever it was thought proper; and from this side of France, (except a small part of Franchc-Comte, of Lothringen, and particularly Colmar,) the greatest part of the inhabitants being supported by a foreign power, it was supposed would show themselves ac- tive for the good cause. The town of Basle lies without the line of defence of IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 173 Switzerland, which line begins at the mountain chain which rises behind Liechstall. The fortress of Huninguen is ex- tremely strong, and seemed capable of resisting any attack. The fortifications of Geneva could also be increased ; and an- other strong point on the declivity of the Jura, near the passes of Biel, perhaps Biel itself, would tend to make the line of Switzerland secure against France, and all transports to the allied army could with safety be forwarded through this country. Yverdun is the next strongest position in Switzerland There are three great lines leading to it; viz. Yverdun, Mou- don, and Lausanne. These lines of march may bring corps stationed there by one march to the frontiers of Switzerland to any threatened point. The right wing of this position is covered by the lake of Neuburg; the left by a morass, which is only dry in the hottest summer season ; and the front by the Orbe river, over which there are three wooden bridges constructed, that can be removed in a few hours. Next to the general defences of Switzerland, the state of a Swiss soldier may be worthy of remark: he receives every day fifteen kreutzers, one pound and a half of bread, and half a pound of meat. The proprietor of the house where he is billeted is obliged to fiirnish him with salt, vegetables, wood, and candles, which are paid for by the cantons, and cost a considerable sum, owing to the dearness of articles, especially in the small cantons. Of the troops themselves I must speak Avith approbation : they may be ranged in loyalty to the cause they fight in, and in appearance, with the best troops of Eu- rope ; and their chasseurs are very pre-eminent in enduring Hardships, and as excellent marksmen. The above detail may afford a general notion of the state of Switzerland at this crisis. The object of the allies was CO place the country in a situation to refuse nothing, and to aid in every respect the common cause ; and every step they could oblige or urge Switzerland to take against France, placed her more in this situation. To return to what relates to Marshal Blucher's passage of the Rhine, it will be as memorable in military annals for its rapidity and decision, as his passage of the Elbe ; and I re- gretted that absence in Holstein prevented my being a per- sonal witness of a military event remarkable for its brilliant execution. The Marshal passed with his army at three points : Lieu- tenant-general Count St. Priest, of Count Langeron's corps (Varmce, crossed opposite Coblentz on the nights of the 1st and 2d instant : he occupied that town, took seven pieces of cannon, and made 500 prisoners. Generals Count Langeron r 2 174 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR and D'Yorck passed at Kaab, where Marshal Blucher as- sisted in person, without much resistance on the part of the enemy. On the 3d instant, Count Langeron attacked and forced Bingen, which is considered very strong in point of situation ; and was defended by a general of brigade, with cannon and infantry. Count Langeron made some prisoners, and his loss was trifling. He had already his advanced-posts established as far as the Salzback, opposite Ingelheim. Marshal Blucher advanced, notwithstanding every difficulty of roads and season, to Kreugreach ; and General D'Yorck's advanced-posts were directed upon the Lauter. General Baron Sachen's corps forced the enemy's intrenchments near Manheim, after passing the Rhine, and was directed on AU- zey. The King of Prussia was present at Manheim at the passage of the Rhine, and inspired all around him, as hereto- fore, with admiration of those military attributes that are so conspicuously his own. Dantzic surrendered on the 2d of January : the first-capitu- lation was not ratified, hat the garrison finally surrendered prisoners of war. It would be tedious to give a detail of those marches and combinations which brought the allied armies again into motion in the beginning of 1814 : I shall confine myself, therefore, to the actual position of the com- bined forces early in the month of January, adding such ob- servations as occur on the recommencement of active hostili- ties. The head-quarters of Prince Schwartzenberg remained at Lorrach on the 20th of December. Count Bubna had moved to Dole. The other Austrian corps between Dole and Mont- belliard, in the valley of the Dauve. Detachments occupied Vesoul, Espinal, &c. ; in the former place 200 prisoners were taken. Parties were also in possession of the valley of Mar- tigny, the Semplon, and St. Bernard. The first division of the Austrian army moved on Aney ; the second was at Mont- arlot, near Besancon ; the third at Villersexelle ; the division Greenfeld at Mollars; the division Bianchi at Befort; two divisions of Austrian grenadiers, and two of cuirassiers were in march for Besancon ; the fourth division was at St. Amber ; the fifth, composed of the Bavarians, formed the blockade of Huningen and Breisach, and extended to Schletstadt. Count Wittgenstein was before Kehl, and occupied also Fort Louis, , pushing his parties, very fir advanced on the other side of the Rhine, in the direction of Nancy. The Russian grenadiers were in march to relieve Bianchi's division in the blockade of Befort, in order that the latter niight then be enabled to move forward. The Russian and Prussian guards and reserves were still at Altkirk and Lor- IK GERMANY AND FRA^XE. 175 rach, but were forthwith to marcli forward. Tlie main body of the Cossacks, under their daring- Hetman, Platoff, had ad- vanced, on the 7t'n of January, as far as Corrimont, Vesoul, and Langres ; and they might already be said to be threaten- ing Napoleon's " good city of Paris." The enemy, under Marshal Marraont, had already been overtaken by Marshal Blucher. This French force was estimated at between 16 and 17,000 men : it occupied Kaiserslautern, which is the Hollendorff pass, as it were, of the country. The environs are so intricate and mountainous, that every step Marmont took, posted as the Silesian army would soon be, rendered his situation precarious. General D'Yorck and General Sachen were on the 5th of January between Frankenstein and Neu- stadt ; and General St. Priest at Coblentz, From the advanced position of General D'Yorck on Mar- shal Marmont's flank, and the march of the corps moving up in all directions, we flattered ourselves that if he delayed much longer at Kaiserslautern, Marshal Blucher would be able to force him to an action. The auspicious aspect of af- fairs that every day brightened to the view of the allies, the marcli of events as rapid as they were glorious, the success tliat seemed to attend upon the most trifling movement, mili- tary or political, produced a strong sentiment of religious gratitude in the public mind. The progress of the campaign jiitherto seemed to promise even more brilliant consequences tlian its projectors could have anticipated. Buonaparte for some time collected at Metz : for, by the march of General Bulow towards Holland, he possibly thought the allies were carrying' their forces in that direction ; and s'vit his guards, by rapid conveyances, towards Breda, about the 18th instant. However, when Prince Schwartzenberg crossed the Upper Rhine, on the 20th, the enemy's troops were as rapidly countermarched, being thrown into uncer- tainty as to the plans of the combined armies. Buonaparte seemed to have separated the remnant of his force, and they were dispersed in corps : there was no mass collected any- where, and it must have been a large one indeed which could arrest in any manner the formidable legions of the conquerors. The importance of the possession of Huninguen, on the Upper Rhine, to Prince Schwartzenberg, was considerable ; but it did not seem that it could be easily taken. The cap- ture of Befort was also of great moment ; for, from such a base, the grand army might march immediately on Paris with perfect security against any possible contingency. The con- verging march of the different colunms all bearing to the central point, so that on an emergency a large force might be 176 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR collected, without unnecessarily risking any separate corps, with vigilant communications, and a due regard always to the main points of appui, formed the system on which the inva- sion of France was conducted : and if this principle had not been unfortunately departed from, many of the failures and disasters which intervened would never have occurred. After the battle of Leipsic, it was noway chimerical to predict that Europe approached her deliverance ; and I now waited with the calmness of perfect confidence for the arrival of that happy moment, for my country and the whole civilized world, when it would fall to my lot to announce to the British gov- ernment that the individual whose elevation had caused no many calamities had ceased to reign. I think I may without presumption or indibcretion attempt here a very general view of the important negotiations on the tapis. The questions were of so extensive a nature, the ar- guments to be adduced so various, and, above all, the inform- ation I individually possessed so limited, that I look with some apprehension to the task of introducing into my narra- tive even such prominent diplomatic features as may be essen- tial to the better understanding of the military combinations: still, where a point is to be gained, and a mass is to be digested, little hints may serve to throw some light u])on the subject. Supposing, in the first place, it was expedient to enter into negotiations with Buonaparte, on the basis pro- posed by the allies through M. de St. Aignau, which M. de Caulaincourt's arrival at the advanced-posts, and the last communications, brought to a decision in the affirmative, the following were some of the leading points to consider. That Prince Metternich wished to accomplish a pe;»ce could not be doubted, and that the arrangements for Germany were to be made as he planned, was pretty evident: that he had also his own game nearer at heart than any other was not surprising; but it was not to be permitted that, in order to play this as he fancied, the other powers of Europe were to be confined in their natural views and objects, Avhich the downfall of Napoleon and increased successes might in some degree alter. When Buonaparte subdued Austria, did he not dictate peace? did he not insist on heavy pecuniary contribu- tions to indemnify the people of France? At Tilsit, did he not, in like manner, drain Prussia of her last kreutzer to sup- ])ort his army, and alleviate tlie burdens of the French nation ? Would not a just principle of retaliation direct, that if the allies now made peace with France, and confined her to lier ancient limits, the amount of past robberies should be re- funded ] And yet, when we had the game in our own hands, we appeared, by a secret and extraordinary mission at Frank- IN GERMANY AND TRANCE- 177 fort, ^iid a demi-official declaration, referring to propositions which the world were unacquainted with, and which tjeemed now to be as binding in the minds of some as the best authen- ticated state document, to have lost the commanding position in which we stood. It was argued that the propositions sent in embraced the twofold objects of accomplishing a general peace, and a more humbled state of the political and military government of France. How much more humble she would have been at this period, and how much less enibarrasshig our predica- ment, had those propositions not been made, can be best ap- preciated by remarking the effects produced by M. de St. Aignau's mission, with all the explanations and defences and shifts which followed it. If we negotiated now, it was deter- mined, first, to make a peace with Buonaparte himself, in preference to holding out and attempting to obtain the legiti- mate government for France by his downfall. Secondly, we were content with obtaining the basis proposed, in the most extended sense and latitude, attached to it. Thirdly, this peace, such as we dictated, signed at Basle, seemed to be con- sidered by some more advisable, than, by undertaking a march to the capital of France incur the hazard of another revolu- tion, which might bring all the horrors of the former to be acted over again. It really seemed impossible, but yet it was given out, that the great powers coincided in this general idea ; and I must suppose, if so, that it arose from a difference of opinion amongst them as to what, if Buonaparte were set aside, would be the best and wisest government for France. Austria might pre- fer the King of Rome under a regency ; which the spirit of her present minister, in a great degree, could direct or con- trol: England, the Bourbons: the Emperor of Russia, possi- bly, as was said, his friend Bernadotte. In short, there seemed a dread of anarchy in France; and a disunion in the coalition, if a bold choice were made, which might produce a more convulsed state of Europe than that existing before the reign of Buonaparte. If Napoleon were forced from the throne of France, it was to be considered whether the sentiments of the allies could be brought to the same decision on the great question of a successor. Should this be the case, a totally difierent line might be taken from what was then under contemplation. This view I founded on the certainty that the re-establish- ment of the Bourbons would be more acceptable to England than any other arrangement. If, however, as some main- tained, England wished to see France reduced to as humble a position as possible, it might be policy to keep Buonaparte 178 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR on his throne, with his wings clipped to the utmost, in prefer- ence to restoring the hereditary princes, who might again resume a sway similar to the times of Louis XIV., and become formidable alike to England and to the continent. The difficulty of negotiation at this crisis appeared in fix- ing upon the fundamental principles to be adopted and the points to be obtained ; and it seemed indispensable that the government of England should send their minister of foreign affairs to the then theatre of action, as no one could ax;t with the same advantages. There were other considerations of a minor nature — which, however, were not to be overlooked — such as the trifling jealousies among powers and personages that might arise ; and which made me firmly of opinion, that the British cabinet could delegate this duty to none but the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He could see, in the progress of discussion, to what points it was possible that the political machine could be wound up : an object, under the then predicament of the allies, that seemed to be the genera) wish; although some had neither the boldness nor the will to avow it. Having taken a hasty view of the probable train of negotia- tion, founded on the principle of treating with Buonaparte under the projected basis, before I proceed to enter at large into what the allies would have to contend for, or rather dic- tate, as their decision, I shall just advert to what might, in my judgment, have been the best policy, in case of deciding to await the expression of public feeling in France, in order to secure the overthrow of the existing dynasty, and the re- establishment of the Bourbons. Every delay in negotiation with Caulaincourt, in such case, should have been made. It might fairly have been stated that, so long as the King of Spain and the Pope were in captivity, the allies would not send their propositions : meanwhile, the armies might have continued their march ; and six weeks, or two months, might have given rise to a general impulse throughout the nation expressive of their wish, without positively departing from the first proposals. It was thus to be considered whether a plan of procrastina- tion, under existing circumstances, might not make events lean to the great object of a lasting peace for the world, even more rapidly than they were actually advancing. Great Britain's decision expressed, might change Austria, and per- suade Russia and Prussia. But the policy of these courts, I must say, was so anxiously, so impatiently bent upon insuring the blessings of peace, so long withlield from them, that tliey thought and dreamed of notliing else. Austria desired it on even reasonable terms with France ; and the Emperor wished IN GER3IANY AND FRANCE. 179 it, for the sake of a daughter he very much loved. Russia so eagerly longed for it, that no man but the Emperor, v^^ho stood alone as a sheet-anchor of perseverance and devotion to the common cause, could have kept his generals, officers, and troops, so long tranquil. Prussia sought for it after her sufferings, and the King after his misfortunes, public and pri- vate, in preference to any war that would insure her aggran- dizement. The amiable domestic habits of that monarch led him rather to seek a mournful consolation, near the tomb of his departed queen, in Charlottenburg. In justice, however, to his revered, lamented, and incomparable minister, the Chancellor Hardenberg, I must declare that his firmness and conviction of the policy of a vigorous prosecution of the con- test, greatly tended to press forward the power of Prussia. Still the wish nearest the hearts of all became every day more and more evident ; there was a general cry for no delay in its accomplishment. The project of continuing the war for the Bourbons was liable, in case of a reverse, to cause dis- union among the powers, if they were not agreed in the prin- ciple of proceeding ; and it was argued, at this period, that a march to Paris, in order that the Emperors might enter at the head of their guards to sign the same peace w^ith Buonaparte as they could conclude at Basle, would be mere vain-glory and parade ; and a movement on Paris should only be undertaken for a specific and agreed object — the re-establishment of the Bourbons. No lasting peace with France could be made, in my mind, so long as Buonaparte was at the head of the gov- ernment. In the north of Germany still greater difficulties than those already described arose. Prussia had not only a right, after her treaties, to be placed in the state in which she was in 1805, but, independently of this, all the powers were of opin- ion that Prussia should be placed on such a respectable footing as, combined with Austria, to oppose a barrier to Russia on one side, and to France on the other. Austria, it was said, desired this : they would assign to Prussia ten millions of souls ; the latter had at that time not more than between four and a half and five millions. If they were to restore to Prussia all she had lost in Poland, it would give her two millions and a half of what was required ; but Russia was only willing to give that part which joins Russia with Silesia, and wanted to carry her own frontier to the Vistula: hence arose to Prussia a deficit of two millions and a half The question of Poland likewise came under discussion ; but as it is of immense importance, and cannot be treated at length, I shall not touch on it: I shall equally avoid allud- ing here more at large to the state of Switzerland, Russia 180 NARRATIVE 01' THE WAR desired to draw a line, from Johansberg by the Pilicia to the corner of Silesia ; and she would not consent to give up this plan for any consideration. Prussia might be permitted to possess, as she desired. Saxony ; and there seemed no objec- tion, except as to a part which the Emperor of Russia wished to reserve for the Duke of Weimar. By this plan Prussia would acquire one million and a half of subjects. After this there would be wanting an indemnity for Hildesheim. There belonged to Prussia all her Westphalian provinces, Anspach, Bayreuth, and Neufchatel ; yet, if she repossessed all these, she would not obtain near the extent of possession she had just pretentions to claim. If Prussia obtained Saxony, Anspach and Bayreuth would not be too far separated, and she might be glad to recover them ; but, even in this case, more indemnity must be found for Bavaria. Prussia, however, was not desirous of having these detached possessions, pro- vided she could be remunerated in a collected body; but the difficulty to find this was the evil. Nothing appeared to be more impolitic than the designs imputed now to Austria, of requiring, in case of a general arrangement, the possession of certain districts she formerly held in the Brisgau, on the confines of France. This policy was viewed as an attempt to remove a controlling power over the states which separate Austria from France ; such as Bavaria, Wirtemburg, and Baden, and to secure them in her interests. It was argued that the result would be totally ad- verse to the designs of Austria ; for the control would not be effectual for the purpose of influence and power over those states, and it would breed in them perpetual jealousy, and lead them to consider the power of France as necessary to balance any design which might be conceived against them by Austria, and to dispose them to alliances with the former power. This policy was placing within the reach of France possessions which would give a pretence, in any war with Austria, for France passing the Rhine into Germany. She would have always a distinction in her favor that she was not going to attack the German league, but Austria only; and if France quarrelled with Austria onl}^ exclusive of Germany, she v/ould have a right to use this argument. But if we con- sider another course, and suppose Austria, from a principle of confidence in the German powers, to give up the idea of con- trol, and to act upon principles of sincere confidence, Austria could never be attacked but by the desertion of the three in- intermediate powers named from the cause of Germany and their own. It is against every principle of calculation that Baden, Wirtemburg and Bavaria would ever sufler a French army to pass the PJiine> except from jealousy of Austria; IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 181 and so long as they are really united with her, they will form to her an impregnable barrier. Jealousy and suspicion of Austrian designs and pretensions can alone divide or unite them against her. The divisions amongst the members of the German body have been the sources of all the wars which have desolated Germany. It should be the great object of Austria, therefore, to keep them united, which could alone be accomplished by renouncing all old claims of every kind, and making herself the protector of Germany, by resolving never to take an in- terested part in the quarrels in which Germany might en- gage, even if Austria, in consequence of her powerful inter- ference and victories, had fair and just claims of aggrandize- ment. She would by this means secure herself against France, and be enabled to have her resources concentrated, in case of need, against Russia; whom, on every account, in looking over the vale of years, Austria has most to dread. Nothing can be more disadvantageous to a nation than to have paltry distant posts and interests, which invite the at- tack of enemies, and prevent the whole of a nation's resources from being applied to the point of real danger. If France and Russia showed themselves really friendly to the designs of Austria, now promulgated, in her desire to re- establish herself in the Brisgau, no clearer proof could be assigned that they were anxious for the downfall of that power. Another question of some moment that agitated the great negotiation for a general arrangement of Europe, was the fate of Saxony. So long as this power remained independent in the rear of Prussia, the latter could not become a sufficient barrier to the north against Russian invasion : and if once the Prussian armies should be defeated on the Oder, and Saxony awed into neutrality or confederacy with Russia, Berlin and Pomerania would immediately fall. But should Prussia be put in possession of Saxony, were she beat upon her first line of the Oder, she could form again with renewed force and strength on the Elbe, and be enabled to collect all her resources, and those of her allies, before Russia could master her fortresses, which would not be the case if Russia, by the means of the treachery or imbecility of Saxony, were to lay hold on the Elbe, It was upon this reasoning that, mixed up as I was with other political projectors, I formed under existing circum- stances, a strong opinion that the possession of Saxony by Prussia, at a general settlement of its affairs, was essential to the preservation of Europe, and that means ought to have been found to have induced the king of Saxony to resign liis a 182 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR dominions with a view to some such arrangement, even if he had done nothing to invalidate or forfeit his titles to them, and if they had not been at this time under French occupa- tion. Add to this argument that Prussia ought not to have been looked to as a barrier against Russia, or to be prepared to place herself, conjointly with Austria, in that position, unless means were supplied to Prussia by the powers of Europe for playing that game with security and with effect. Prussia, from her contiguity with Russia, and her com- parative weakness, was at this period lending herself to the views of that colossal empire. The great personal friendship that existed between the monarchs aided this course of ac- tion ; and Prussia acted in a degree of subordination to a bolder policy : she was forced to consider the mere view of her own safety. If she detached herself, unprepared, and without arrangements, from Russia, to place herself as the advanced-guard of Europe against her, what had she not to expect from Russian resentment 7 The first favorable moment would be seized by that aggressive colossus, when Europe might be distracted and Saxony tangible for Russian purposes, and Prussia might then be sacrificed, Europe having denied her those resources which were necessary for the part she ought and was destined to play in maintaining the balance of Europe. I therefore consider, on every principle of sound policy, Prussia ought neither to have been expected to en- gage in forming a barrier against Russia, nor should Europe allow her to attempt it, unless she should be supplied with adequate means, which she could never have without the ac- cession of Saxony. As the peace that the allied powers might make with France, at the present moment, was of more importance than any negotiations that had ever yet been entered upon, so it was necessary to consider how its stability could best be secured, as well as for diplomatic theorists to give their opinions on all parts of the arrangements, and on all the contingencies, sacri- fices, or aggrandizements that might occur. Consequently the grand head-quarters became a constant scene of political disquisition. The idea of forming minor states on the frontiers of the French empire, which could oppose such a resistance to the encroachments of France as would afibrd time for the more powerful nations in the rear to get their forces into the field and their preparations in forwardness, was a point which next required to be maturel)^ considered. The basis, perhaps, of a lasting and efficient peace de- pended, first, on gaining sufficient territory from France for the formation of states on the frontier ; and, secondly, on IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 183 Strengthening and consolidating, as much as possible, the powers in the rear interested in supporting them. Here it was certain that Austria and Prussia were the principal powers alluded to : to augment their forces, and to form intermediate powers between them and France, were the main objects. Every plan had to depend and be modified on the extent of those conquests which France might be willing to restore on a peace. To consider the terms upon which the allies ought to insist with the greatest firmness : — it was evident that if Alsace were not wrested from the enemy, all the fortresses on the Rhine, as low down as Lan- dau, should be destroyed : Strasburg might become, as here- tofore, a free city ; and then the ancient frontier of France, from Landau to Dunkirk, would be the most perfect military line. It was to be considered whether, in uniting territories under the pretence of a sufficient barrier for Holland, we did not leave to France a greater population and extent than under her kings: we might give her the frontier of the Rhine from Basle to Landau, and then take what we might consider an adequate security for Holland, or for the power that would be placed between France and the Rhine. Supposing it would not be possible to bring France to con- sent to the surrender of the four departments, La Lys, Jemappe, L'Escaut, and La Dyle, it might then be proposed to leave in her possession Avignon and the maritime Alps, or some other indemnity in lieu of two of those departments : at all events, the departments of L'Escaut and La Dyle ought to be surrendered ; and with thesfr we secured the important points of Antwerp, Namur, Luxemburg, and Mentz. Of Antwerp there could be no question ; of the other three places stated, there should have been none. Namur was essential for the command of the Mouse, Luxemburg for the Moselle, and Mentz for the Rhine. 1 believe Namur was of as much importance as either of them. The next best military line to draw w^ould have been from Namur to Dinant; from thence along the Som me towards Aslon ; and from thence to the Rhine : thus including Trevis, which might be fortified and made a very strong place. If any of these frontiers were obtained, especially the two former, a very considerable territory would be gained on the left bank of the Rhine, and the military barrier of Holland secured. If Prussia had a possession in this quarter, it should be a large one ; at least containing three or four millions of inhabitants, in which she could hold an army of 100,000 men. If Prussia were brought thus close to France and Austria, by the annexation of the Brisgau, which many believed she would always cling to, and part of Alsace, also close to the 184 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR Rhine, it remained to be considered whether this might not be the most secure plan for the tranquillity of Germany. An idea prevailed, that a temptation might be held out to Hanover to change the electorate for territories of nearly double the population, between the Rliine and the Mouse, connecting the possessions of the Prince Regent more with Holland, and thus making Hanover and Holland the outposts, while Prussia would receive the Hanoverian provinces. This notion, however, I always thought impracticable ; but it was stated, that instead of a population of 800,000 souls, which Hanover then had, she would be offered one of two millions, and a much more valuable position. It is not necessary to enter into all the details and calcu- lations of extent, position, and population, that were' now going on ; but the outlines I have stated will satisfy my read- ers that every possible plan was now under discussion, for peace, and the future settlement of Europe. With regard to the south, there were as many projects and speculations ; but it would be superfluous to detail them. - The columns of the allied armies C(mtinued their advance on all sides towards the capital of France. The head-quarters of Marshal Prince Schwartzenberg were, on the 12th instant, at Vesoul. At Langres, on the advance of General Giulay's corps, the inhabitants fired on the troops ; but this was the only instance where the allies had not been universally well received. Prince Schwartzenberg's head-quarters were to be at Langres on the 15th or 16th. General Bubna's corps had a new direction given it, from Dole towards Lyons, and it was on its march. General Bianchi operated against Befort ; and there was a report that it had surrendered. Besan<;on was invested by the corps of Prince Lichtenstein. The Bavarians, under General Wrede, had a very serious affair v.-ith the enemy, commanded by Marshal Victor, near St. Drey. In the commencement of the action the former were repulsed, and the French cavalry, commanded by General Mulhaud, had some success ; but on the arrival of General De Roy's Bavarian brigade, the enemy were in their turn completely repulsed, and retired towards Luneville, with the loss of several officers and some hundred prisoners. The Cossacks continued very far in advance. We anxiously expected in- telligence of important events from Marshal Bluclier: it seemed, however, that Marshal Marmont retired with precipi- tation from Kaiserslautern, and passed the Saar. Marshal Blucher had his head-quarters on the 10th at Kessel ; and it was said he had proceeded as far as Saarbruch, and that he would be at Mentz on the 15th or 16tli. IN' GEraiATCY AXt) TRANCE. 195 By accounts from Pans, the enemy were collectmg some force near Chalons: if so, they probably meant to retire on it from Nancy; for by the approach of the allied armies on all sides, any force that delayed falling- back would have been surrounded. The Russian and Prussian guards and reserves, to the amount of 30,000, crossed the Rhine at Basle on the 14th, and defiled before the allied sovereigns. It is impossible by any description to give an exaggerated idea of the perfect state of these troops ; their appearance and equipment were admirable ; and when one considered what they had endured, and contemplated the Russians, some of whom had emerged from the steppes of Tartary bordering the Chinese empire, traversed their own regions, and marched, in a few short months, from Moscow across the Rhine, one was lost in won- der, and inspired with a political awe of that colossal power. The condition in which the Russian cavalry appeared, re- flected the highest reputation on this branch of their service ; and their artillery was admirable. I could not help, on seeing these Russian guards on that day, recurring to serious im- pressions with regard to this overgrown empire ; and I much apprehend the present tidings from the east of Europe bear out my predictions in 1814, when the Russians were passing the Rhine. If we consider the power of Russia, unassailable as she is, in flank or rear, hovering over Europe with an immense front, mistress of the Caspian, the Euxine, and the Baltic, with forty millions of hardy, docile, brave, enthusiastic, and submissive inhabitants, with immense armies, highly disci- plined, excellently appointed ; her innumerable hordes of desolating cavalry; her adoption of the French maxims in war, of raakino- the countries where her armies march, or are cantoned, feed and maintain them, what may we not fear from her? When we furtlier consider this power flushed with success, and disposed to consider treaties and engagements with her as waste paper, if they stood in the way of any project of aggrandizement; and if we further contemplate her determined will to surmount every barrier which engage- ments have interposed, in order to advance herself into the heart of Germany, to supplant on one side the ancient do- minion of Prussia; on the other, to turn the northern flank of Austria on the Vistula, as she has turned the southern on the Danube ; and demanding, as it Vv-ere, by the fortresses of Thorn and Cracow, the keys of Berlin and Vienna; — when we further reflect on the natural march of empires from north to south, from the regions of frost, and snow, and famine, to the climates of warmth, verdure, and fertility, and recollect Q2 186 NAF.EA'irvE or the war the revolutions which have taken place in Europe, Asia, and Africa, from the desolating invasions of the northern hordes, what may we not fear and expect ? When, in addition to these circumstances, we further re- flect upon the successive aggrandizements and incorporations Russia has made within the last one hundred and fifty years ; the numerous Tartar tribes she has embraced within her military system ; the provinces she has successively added to her empire from Persia, the Porte, Sweden, and Poland ; that her whole system of government is a military despotism, and nothing known in it or regarded but military subjection on the one hand, and military property, military rank, and military honors, on the other, what may not be the results ? If we consider all these circumstances in all their bearings and dependencies, is there a serious and reasonable man in Europe that must not admit that the whole system of Euro- pean politics ought, as ite leading principle and feature, to maintain, as an axiom, the necessity of setting bounds to this formidable and encroaching power? Weighed against this superior and imperative duty, — a duty urged by all the mo- tives of self-preservation, every minor and secondary consid- eration, resulting whether from ancient rights or claims, from family feelings and alliances, from views of future political combination and power, ought to be postponed and disregard- ed. There was no better physical or moral safCiTuard against the stupendous greatness with vv^hich the continent might, ere long, be menaced and overwhelmed by Russia, than in the personal character of the reigning Emperor Alexander ; a mixture of benevolence and rectitude, a high sense of re- ligion, and a generous view on all subjects. These afforded, in my mind, the only and best guarantee against the far too formidable legions that v/ere then defiling over the Rhine ; and that guarantee we have, alas I lost. The details from the advanced corps continued to be of the most encouraging description. Marshal Blucher had taken near 3000 prisoners, and twenty-five pieces of cannon, since his passage of the Rhine. By his last reports from St. Arol, of the 8th instant, detachments of his troops were occupying Treves; and in a few days Luxemburg was to be invested. Marffhal Marmont had been under the necessity of making the most rapid forced marches, to prevent the Silesian army from getting in his rear by the Yosges mountains. In his retreat he broke down all the bridges over the Saare ; but Marshal Bluchor pursued him closely. Reports of the con- fusion and disorder thronghout France were prewilent: the assembling of the conscripts was very slow; those that were brought together wanted arms and all kind of equipment. IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 187 There seemed nothing now more certain than that the allied armies could effect a march to Paris whenever they thought proper. Two-thirds of the French old soldiers that had re- crossed the Rhine were either dead or gone into the hospitals ; and all the general officers and men of experience declared tliat no effectual resistance could be made. Prince Schwartzenberg however was still at Vesoul on the 15th. The enemy were collecting at Langres, and the Prmce Marshal was preparing to attack them, if they should remain there : he had made his dispositions for this purpose, and his forces amounted to about 165,000 men. The line he occu- pied was, nevertheless, a very extended one, if the enemy had force to take advantage of it with collected means in any one point. The main Russian army, under General Barclay de Tolly, was to be ready to support Prince Schwartzenberg's offensive movement. General Wittgenstein's corps occupied the country between General Barclay de Tolly and Marshal Blucher ; and the Russian and Prussian reserves, accompa- nied by the Emperors of Russia and Austria, left Basle to march on Vesoul. The French garrison that had retired into Besancon amounted to 8000 men. Befort v/as still bombarded, and General Schoffer commanded the forces engaged there. General Bubna was at Bourg-en-Bresse, having left detach- ments at Geneva and Fort I'Ecluse, which had been taken, as well as the fortress of Stettin. The Semplon and St. Ber- nard were occupied : the Prince of Wirtemburg advanced from Epinal ; the enemy retiring, after their defeat by Gene- ral de Roy, towards Charmes, and the Prince of Hesse Hora- burg from Dole. General Scheuther surrounded the fort of Solins ; while General Platoff's Cossacks were heard of in every quarter. The entry of the Emperor of Russia into Vesoul, with the Russian and Prussian reserves; the abandonment of Langres, and the position around it, by the enemy; the advance of the Prince Royal of Wirtemburg in the direction of Chaumont; all carried Lhe grand army nearer the final accomplishment of its glorious labors. The movement of so powerful a force as the allies now possessed, in all directions, upon any central point, rendered the best position the enemy could take up wholly precarious. In my opinion they could not have effectu- ally covered their capital by any disposition whatever, the allies being determined to enter it: — and at length that tri- umphant moment was at hand. Marshal Blucher's reports of the 17th instant, from Nancy, were, that he had sent the keys of that town to the grand head-quarters. The Emperor of Russia met the officer bear- ing them as he was on his march to Vesoul : he immediately 188 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR sent two of the keys to the King of Prussia, with an appro- priate message, reserving tv/o for himself. This showed the mutual deference and consideration that existed between the allied sovereigns on every occasion. Marshal Blucher was in communication with General Wrede's corps, and thus with the grand army. The former energetic veteran wrote that he was determined to plant his banners on Napoleon's throne ; and he gave a life and vigor to all proceedings, that afforded an invaluable example to every professional man. Another brilliant achievement of the Prussian arms now occurred : the king became again master of Wittenberg, and by no other means but the desperate valor of his brave soldiers. The siege was begun on the 28th of December, and the place was in his possession on the 12th of January. No im- pediment of the season had arrested the spirited exertions of the besiegers. The enemy made a respectable resistance : a breach was effected on the 11th, and it was practicable on the 12th, when a proposal to surrender was made and refused. At midnight, the assault was determined on in four columns. The gallant Prussians overcame every obstacle, and in less than half an hour they were masters of the place. All the garrison that did not lay down their arms were put to the sword. The governor had intrenched the castle and the hotel de ville : the latter was carried by the troops ; and the governor, who v/as in it, surrendered at discretion, with the rest of the garrison. This capture alone would establish the fame of that distin- guished officer General Tauenstein ; but his former exploits in this war were too brilliant ever to be obliterated from the records of his country. The siege cost about 800 men, and the assault alone, about 107 officers in killed and wounded. The Prussians found ninety-six pieces of artillery here, and made 2000 prisoners. In Torgau they had already obtained possession of 31(> pieces. In these fortresses the Prussians also found considera- ble magazines of corn and powder. General Tauenstein was now to proceed to Magdeburg ; and it is not to be overlooked here, that every fortress which now fell by tlie admirable dispositions that had been made, augmented very materially the force advancing against the enemy : we had thus reinforcements, and three lines of re- serve as it were on the Oder, the Elbe, and the Rhine, from which we constantly derived aid. The head-quarters of the Emperors of Austria, Russia, and the King of Prussia, were on the 23d of January at Vesoul. In continuing my account of the various operations and n^jve- ments of the different armies, divisions, and corps, I ought to IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 189 State generally, that in proportion as the large masses of troops approached to one point, viz. the capital of the French empire, the respective corps necessarily passed and repassed each other in the same direction, but on a more confined theatre of war. On this account, to trace the exact progress of all lines of march, and keep each clear and distinct, would require much greater information than I had the means of obtaining, and occupy also much more time_ and space than it is the object of the present circumscribed narrative to afford. All I mean to attempt is limited to a general and connected view of the most important movements and actions, and I leave to more experienced and able writers of each nation the task "of a more complete and detailed history; ■ ' General Bubna still continued his march, possessing him- self of the whole of the. department of the Jura. ' .Having re- paired the fortifications of Geneva, he next took Dole, and , made himself master of the bridge over the Doubs.- General Zeuchmeister with his division occupied Aix and Chamberry on the 2d instant, without opposition. Had- General Bubna at this period been reinforced, he might in conjunction with Zeuchmeister have moved rapidly forward on Lyons; but the opportunity was lost, and Marshal Augereau no\y received orders to repair thither, and, if possible, organize a large force. General Bubna in consequence took up a position' behind the Arve, and ultimately fixed his head-quarters at- Geheya. v. ; With respect to the leading operations on, the l-Tth, Mdrr shal Mortier, who was immediately opposed .tb the main. ad-' vance from Vesoul on Langres and Chaumpnt, finding it ap- parent that his left flank might be turned by the Austrian General Giulay's division, abandoned his position at Langres, retiring on Chaumont, and the grand head-quarters were now taken up hi the former city. General Wrede's corps having left a division to blockade Huninguen, now advanced in the rear, keeping up communication with the troops that block- aded the fortresses of Befort and other places. General Count Frimont's corps marched on from Colmar t Rixheim : General Count Wittgenstein's division had follow- ed Marshal Victor's corps from the side of Strasburg, and had now also united in the main line of operations, while General Wrede had orders to advance still further from the Meurthe river towards the Meuse. By tliis junction,, and bringing up General Wrede's division between the grand army and the army of Silesia, the forces of the allies became united in one formidable line of attack. Prince Schwartzenbcrg now determined to carry his army immr-liately forward from the line of Chaumont to Chalons- sur-Marne, where it was reported that Buonaparte had assem- bled all his forces with a view of giving battle. 190 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR CHAPTER XVI. British officers of distinction— their services in the common, cause— Grand head-quarters— Spirited conduct of the Prince of Wirtemiburg — The ene- my retires on Chatillon — Junction of the allied forces — Toul carried by assault — Napoleon concentrates his forces — Relative positions of the ar- mies — Napoleon repairs to Chalons — his plan of the campaign — Move- ments of 3Iarshal Blucher — Attacked by Napoleon — Severe action— Dis- positions of Prince Schwartzenberg— Movements of the enemy— Inter- . cepted letter — Napoleon's views — The partisan corps — Estinjate of the forces — Inetfectualefforts of Napoleon— his fearless exposure in battle — . Rptreat of the enemy — Intended march on the capital — Disposition of the French nation — Want of combination among the allies— Army of the Prince Royal of Sweden — Operations in Belgium — ^The English a'ftd Prus- sians, attack Marshal Macdonald — are compelled to retire — Bergeh-op- Zoom invested by the English— Advance and successes of General Win- zingerode^-Assembly of plenipotentiaries at Chatillon — Presence of the allied sovereigns — influence the diplomatic body — Interview's and conver- sations witli the Emperor Alexander — Policy of Russia — ^Prosecution of hostilities — Dissolution of the congress of Chatillon — Character of Caul- aincourt, Due de Vicenza— Amicable disposition of the congress. I HAVE already adverted to the number of Britisli officers employed with the different corps of the allied armies ; from all of whom mmute accounts were given, at this period, of the dispositions, movements, and operations of the respective corps d^armee. But I must particularly refer my readers, in order thoroughly to understand every part of the great mili- tary manoeuvres now pending, to the able reports of Sir Robert Wilson, Colonel Lord Burghersh, (who has written an able and excellent memoir of this campaign,) Colonel (now Brigadier-general) Sir Hudson Lowe, Colonels Cooke, and others. These will fully and clearly exemplify the minutest military operations : my province is an attempt to exhibit to my readers a more general view of the great drama, of which France was now become the theatre. The grand head-quarters were established on tlie 29th at Chaumont, after a brilliant action of the Prince Royal of Wirtemburg, who drove Mortier from his position, and fol- lowed him on the route to Troyes and Joinville; ' while Giulay's corps, at the same period, repulsed the enemy from Bar-sur-Aube, and followed up his rear closely towards Chatillon. On the 16tli and 18th the army of Silesia had accomplished its junction with the grand army, between the Moselle and the Marne ; the enemy retiring behind the latter river. He still, however, occupied Toul, which Marshal Blucher ordered the corps of Sacken to carry by assault. This was gallantly performed by General Count Lieven. General D'Yorck's cor2)s d'armee, in the mean time, had proceeded from Metz to I IN GERMANY AND FR.INCE. 191 the Meiise, leaving corps to blockade Sarre-louis, Thionville, and Luxemburg-. The two grand armies of the allies being now in line on the Meuse, Napoleon had concentrated in their immediate front the corps of Mortier, Victor, and Marmont. He had been hiniself constantly at Paris since the passage of the Rhine by the allies, making efforts to rally the first ban, or third of the French population, and to collect reinforcements of all kinds for his armies ; and he now issued orders that every inch of ground was to be in future disputed by his generals in command. He himself repaired to the army at Chalons-sur-Marne, where he arrived on the 26th of January. Marshal Ney also had now joined Napoleon ; and several fresh bodies of troops and conscripts had come forward from Paris. His cavalry likewise was reinforced by part of the imperial guard ; and Generals Lefebvre-Desnouettes, Milhard, and Grouchy, were assembled at Chalons with a force of near 100,000 men. Napoleon's first plan was stated to be, to march to Nancy, and operate on the rear of the allies ; but finding the grand army superior to the force he had collected, and to what he had expected, he determined to fall on Marshal Blucher, and annihilate him, if possible, before he could be supported by Prince Schwartzenberg. On the 28th Napoleon marched his army on Vassy; and proceeded, by the way of Montierender and Somevoire, in two columns, to attack Marshal Blucher's corps, now posted in and about Brienne. Marshal Blucher had only the corps of Sacken and part of that of Langeron with him. General D' Yorck was still at Ligny, and the Prince Royal of Wirtem- burg's corps (which was the nearest in support of the Marshal) between Bienville and Trannes. The action was reported to have been very bloody, but entirely in favor of the allies. The town of Brienne, for some time, was in possession of the enemy ; but they were ultimately driven from it with great slaughter, and lost some guns. The Marshal resumed his position ; and it was most animating to see a very inferior force resist at one point the enemy who had collected in such strength before him. Marshal Blucher had moved from Joinville to Brienne, placing himself rather in advance : this had probably tempted Napoleon to engage ; but from what occurred, and the man- ner of the attack, it was doubtful if Buonaparte's plan were to bring on a general action in the country about Chalons : it rather appeared that he would not risk so desperate a game. Field-marshal Prince Schwartzenberg now made his dispo- 192 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR sitions, and collected all his troops, in case the enemy should still hold his ground. The Prince Royal of Wirtemburg was ordered up to the support of Marshal Blucher. The divisions of Giulay and Coloredo arrived at Bar-sur-Aube. General Wittgenstein's corps in Joinville was ordered to Vassy ; as also General Kleist, not far in his rear. General Winzmge- rode, from the northern army, was likewise in march to join the grand army : General D'Yorck moved on the 30th to St Dizier : General Wrede, with the Bavarians, to St. Urbain, ready to support the movements of General Wittgenstein : the Austrian grenadiers and reserves to Colombey : the Rus- sian and Prussian guards and cavalry were at and near Chau- mont. If the enemy should threaten any one corps before the allies had all their force brought up, that corps was to retire ; but as in two days all the corps were to be united, and ready to act, there could hardly be a doubt of another day such as Leipsic, if Buonaparte ventured to afford the opportunity. On my visiting Marshal Blucher on the 31st, at Trannes, I found him occupying a very advantageous position ; his left resting on that village and the Aube river, and his right at Maison, which was occupied by the Prince Royal of Wirtemburg. The enemy showed themselves with then* right at Dienville, their centre above Lacoutiere, and then* left extending tovv^ards Loulaine. In the middle of the day they appeared to be col- lecting on their centre ; and their first movements indicated an attempt on Trannes and Marshal Blucher's position. After- wards, however, it became evident, by an advance of a con- siderable body of cavalry and the filing of troops to their right, that they had another object, and that the demonstration made was to cover it. The country being unfavorable for ascertaining with preci- sion the enemy's movements, and the reports of the patrols and light corps not having come in, it was difficult to pro- nounce as to Napoleon's intentions. By an intercepted letter from Berthier, sent in by General ScherbatoflT, it became still more evident that it had been Buonaparte's first plan to fall upon the right or rear of the allies, and to get round the flank, and act upon our communications. Another useftil lesson, however, received by Buonaparte at Brienne, when the second determination was taken, added possibly to the report of Gene- ral D'Yorck's corps at St. Dizier, and General Wittgenstein's moving from Joinville, induced him entirely to abandon his project. He certainly would have found himself between three corps; and the whole allied armj'^ would have been united, ready to fall upon him. The road from Brienne towards Troyea was now broken up, IN GERMANY AND FUANCE. 193 and tlie bridge at Lesmont destroyed by General Scherbatoff's partisan corps. Count Pahlen with all his cavalry made a movement from Marshal Blucher's position on the 31st to the right, to join Count Witt^enstem. This probably operated to accelerate the enemy's withdrawing- from the left. The corps of the allied army on the 31st, at night, were posted as fol- lows : — General Sacken's, and a division of Count Langeron's under Generals Lauskoi, Otterfief, and ScherbatofF, with the Prince Royal of Wirtemburg, were in position near Trannes and Maison. The Marshal's force might now be averaged at above 35,000 men. General Wrede with the Bavarians, amounting to 28,000, arrived at Doulevant; General Giulay, with about 18,000, at Bar-sur-Aube. General Coloredo with 21,000 marched on the gi'eat road from thence towards Troyes. Count Wittgenstein's, at or near Vassy, was stated at 15,000. General D'Yorck at St. Dizier had 20,000 men. The re- serves of the Russian and Prussian grenadiers and guards con- sisted of about a5,000. Thus from 160 to 170,000 men might have been concentrated against the enemy, on the morning of the 1st of February. General Kleist's corps then arriving at St. Michael, and General Winzingerode's following it, were not included. The whole of the enemy's force engaged against Marshal Blucher on the 29th, belonged to the guard. The marshal averaged his loss at not more than 7 or 800 men. The enemy's was very heavy ; his immense superiority in numbers showed the powerful resistance he had met with. Buonaparte v/as seen to encourage his troops and expose his person fearlessly during the combat ; and Marshal Blucher's movement of his cavalry, which he led on himself, was spoken of in the highest terms. Napoleon, who, at this period, scarcely acted, in any instance, on common military calcula- tion, drew up his army on the 1st of February in two lines, on the great plain before La Rothiere, occupying the villages, and neglecting much stronger ground in his rear about Bri- enne, evidently showing that he meant to play a desperate jxame. He led on la jeune garde in person against Marshal Blucher's army, to wrest the village of La Rothiere from the pallant corps of Sacken ; but three repeated efforts were in- effectual. All agreed that the enemy fought with great in- trepidity. Buonaparte seemed to have set his political exist- ence on a die, as he exposed himself everywhere : his horse was shot under him, and he had the mortification of witness- ing the capture of a battery of guns in charge of la jeune garde. Had Marshal Blucher not previously immortalized himself, this day would have crowned him in the annals of Fame ; for R 194 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR whatever were the well-grounded apprehensions entertained by many for the result of the Prince of Wirtemburg's attack on the right, the Marshal dauntlessly eifected those combina- tions upon which the result of the day depended. The Russian artillery were spoken of in the highest terms : the ground was covered with snow, and so deep, that they were obliged to leave one-half of their guns in the rear. Yet by harnessing double teams to the other half, they contrived to bring those forward and get a sufficient number into action. The allies brought about 70 or 80,000 men into this bat- tle ; the other corps of the army were not yet in line : the enemy were supposed to have had about the same strength. The enemy's last attack on the village of La Rothiere was at two o'clock on the morning of the 2d, immediately after which they commenced their retreat. Passing the Aube river, they took up a very strong rear-guard position in the neighborhood of Lesmont. Dispositions were made to attack this position with the corps of the Prince Royal of Wu'temburg, Generals Wrede and Giulay ; and there was a sliarp fire on this spot. But the day was unfavorable, and the fall of snow so excessive, that the troops could make no progress. In tlie mean time the Field-marshal Prince Schwartzen- berg made his arrangements for the pursuit of the enemy, who had retired on Vitry, Troyes and Arcis. The two former places were supposed to have garrisons and cannon, and Vitry v/as walled and protected by a ditch of some extent. It was now resolved that the grand army should march by Troyes on Paris, and the army of Silesia by Lesmont upon Vitry, form- ing their junction with the corps of General Wittgenstein coming from Vassy, and the corps of D' Yorck from St. Dizier, which last place was taken by General D' Yorck, with some loss on the part of the enemy. This great combined force was thus to proceed on the shortest route to the capital ; and Marshal Blucher sweeping round by the right, and forming a jimction with the corps above stated, was to overpower every obstacle. It was calcu- lated he probably would come in contact witli the corps of Marshal Macdonald, which it was reported was marching to unite near Vitry. Prince Schwartzenberg's head-quarters were on the 3d of February at VendoBuvrep, and Marshal Blucher's at Breaux-le-Comte. In the battle of La Rothiere eighty pieces of cannon and 4000 prisoners were taken by the allies ; the latter of whom lost 6000 in killed and wounded. The Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia were present, and by their heroic con- duct infused life and vigor into all the operations. After this IN GLRMANY AI\D TRANCE. 195 battle Napoleon, on the 4th of February, retreated upon Troyes, where he established his head-quarters. With regard to the fortresses which were left to be block- aded by forces in their rear, while the allies made their rapid and glorious advance on the capital of France, it may be suf- ficient here to state a fact applicable to them all ; namely, that the different corps left before them were so nearly amounting in force to the garrisons of the places, that the latter conhned themselves to insignificant sorties, while the former were only desirous of keeping the fortresses invested In the march of the army forward, the French nation ap- peared to me generally to favor the allies; they seemed wearied with the wars they were engaged in, and still more weary of their military ruler. The peasantry, however, were not allowed by the existing authorities to be passive ; and finding measures had been taken to arm them, Prince tSchwartzenberg was induced to issue a general order to treat all the natives as enemies who were found with arms in their possession. Napoleon took great care, after the defeats at Brienne and La Rothiere, to publish his own accounts in Paris, with that dexterity for which he was so conspicuous ; and thus, by his own bulletins at this period, as well as during the whole of the succeeding battles, the citizens of Paris were kept in profound ignorance of the real state of events. There is no doubt that the military science and manoeuvres displayed between the months of January and March, 1814, are the most interesting and important that distinguish this or any otiier war. Napoleon, although defeated again and again, seemed to rise superior to his difficulties; and after the battle of Brienne he displayed more strikingly all those resources and talents against his adversaries for which he has generally been so conspicuous; while great and grievous faults were, subsequently to the above battle, committed by the allies. A too confident sentiment now prevailed ; and because Napoleon had been defeated in an open battle, it was supposed lie could no longer maintain an effective resistance; little calculation was placed on the considerable reinforcements that the French empire continued to pour forth on all sides, and each of the allied armies thought itself capable of meet- ing the enemy unaided by the other; whereas nothing but their union, and a joint operation of t:ie w^hole collected force, would ever have insured success. Both the grand army and the army of Silesia were eager to have the eclat of first entering Paris. To this absurd desire many of the misfortunes and losses of Marshal Blucher in his march for- 196 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR ward were to be attributed : it led bitn to advance far too rashly, and separate himself too widely fron) the support of Prince Schwartzenberc^ ; and when he experienced a check, it became more fatal, from the Silesian army having; no suc- cors. Prince Schwartzenberg's marches were more mea- sured ; but there was a want of concert, which nothing- but beintr over-sanguine as to the ultimate results could account for. With regard to the Prince Royal and his army of the north, he took no part in the grand manoeuvres towards Paris. The greatest part of Holland was, during the month of January, delivered and restored to her rightful sovereign, with the exception of some of the strong places. The rem- nant of the French force collected at Antwerp, and retired into Belgium, of which Generals Bulow and Winzingerode endeavored to make themselves masters. In order to effect this object, General Bulow took up a position near Utrecht, where he had his head-quarters; and early in the year lie addressed a proclamation to the Belgians, in wliich he de- clared that he was arriving amongst them to deliver them from the odious tyranny under which they had so long groaned. General Bulow next advanced and passed the Waal, driving back the French corps on Antwerp. They still occupied however Bergen-op-Zoom, with 4000 men, while Marshal Macdonald had his corps assembled between the Meuse and the Lower Rhine, and he threw garrisons and provisions intx) the different fortresses on the Wesel. Napoleon was known to take the deepest interest in the operations carrying on in this quarter; and when he heard that the fortress of Breda had been taken by the Russians of General Bulow's corps e/'orme>, ho sent directions to the French general commanding at Antwerp to hazard every thing in retaking it. The French general Roguet, in compliance with this order, attacked the garrison of the fortress, commanded by General Beakendorff, with 10,000 men. General Bulow and Sir T. Graham learning this event, immediately sent reinforcements ; but the gallant conduct of General Beakendorff had forced the French general to retire into Antwerp before the succors had arrived. Great ])raise was due to General Beakendorff for his conduct in this gallant defence of Breda. A second attempt was in like manner made, and proved equally abortive ; a column of Eng- lish troops having meanwhile arrived in the neighborhood, as well as General Bulow's reinforcements The troops of the expedition from England, under Sir T. Graham, now united with Bulow's corps, and Bcakendorff's IK GERMAXi' AND FRANCE. 197 cavalry, forming a division of at least 20,000 men, in the neighborhoood of Breda, t^ufEciently strong to compel the French troops to enter an intrenched camp between West Wesel and Antwerp, with a view to cover the latter place. Napoleon, aware of the discomfiture of his forces in Belgium, determined now to send General Maison with all the forcea he could spare to Lisle, in order to provision and prepare fur- ther defences in that city, and in the fortresses. The French troops still occupied the country between the Waal and the Me use. General Bulow, in pursuance of his instructions to make himself master of Belgium, attacked Marshal Macdonald in the middle of January, in his intrenched camp near Ant- werp. The attack was formed in three columns, commanded by Generals Borstell, Thiimen, and Oppen : the two former succeeded, but the latter failed in his attack; and notwith- Htanding this offensive operation was well supported in the following days by renewed efforts, aided by the English corps, Bulow was under the necessity, at the end of the month of January, of resuming his former positions near Breda ; and Sir Thomas Graham's English division returned to Bergen- op-Zoom, which place they invested. In the mean time the corps of General Winzingerode, which had been joined by all Czernicheff's cavalry, passed the Rhine at Dusseldorff, and in the middle of January occupied Aix-la-Chapelle and liege. In the latter place C'zernicheff had a brilliant cavalry affair, in which he was completely victorious. Marshal Macdonald moved his head- quarters, on Winzingerode's passing the Rhine, to Namur, and from thence he fell back to Mezieres, and ultimately to Dinant and Givet, followed by Czernicheff's cavalry. Win- zingerode's head-quarters were established in the end of January at Namur. Although the rapid march of Winzin- gerode's corps, aided by General Bulow's operations, was not attended with the full success that had been expected, yet the fall of Bois le Due by assault, and the capture of Brussels at the end of January, gave a complete triumph to military events in this quarter. I shall now briefly recall the reader to that part of my narrative which touched incidentally upon the great diplo- matic transactions in progress at this period, and those nego- tions which led to the conferences of Chatillon, The prin- cipal secretary of state for foreign affairs having received his Majesty's command to repair to the head-quarters of the al- lied sovereigns, arrived in the month of January, and imme- diately entered into the strictest communication with the state-ministers of the allied powers. And here I cannot, in R2 198 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR natural feeling, refrain from inserting a paragraph of Lord Burghersh's Memoirs, which states as follows : — " The de- cision now taken in England, v/as to depute one of the cabinet ministers to represent Great Britain in the congress, which appeared now likely to be held for the final arrangement of a secure and lasting peace. Lord Harrowby is un.'lerstofid to have been first thought of for this mission : Lord (Jastlc- reagh, however, undertook the charge, and in the beginning of January joined the head-quarters of the sovereigns. No measure was ever wiser, or productive of greater benefits. Lord Castlereagh, by the manliness of his conduct, by the talent which he displayed under the most difficult circum- stances, secured more solid advantages, not only to England, but to Europe, than perhaps will ever be generally known or acknowledged. In the various changes of fortune which at- tended the operations of the campaign of 1814, the steady course with which he pursued the general objects of the al- liance, being never led aside from them either by reverses or success, placed him in triumphant contrast with others, vvjio, elated or depressed by the events of each succeeding period, would have ruined their cause, as much by overstrained pre- tensions in one alternative, as by a conduct totally the reverae in the other. Lord Castlereagh is understood to have lef^ England with instructions to negotiate for peace upon con- ditions honorable to France, but differing from those proposed at Frankfort, which the change of circumstances had rendered totally inapplicable." The consequence resulting from M. de St. Aignan's early mission from Frankfort wa.s the aj>- pointment of the Due de Viccnza, Caulaincourt, as French plenipotentiary to treat for a general peace with the allied ])lenipotentiaries assembled at Chatillon for this great objec(. The ministers met in the middle of February; I^ord Ab»T- deen, Lord Cathcart, and Sir Charles Stewart having been named plenipotentiaries on the part of Great Britain ; Count Razunioffski on the part of Russia ; Count Stad ion for Aus- tria ; and Baron Von Humboldt for Prussia. These j)lenipo- tentiaries continued to assemble and hold repeated conftr- eni^es until the middle of March; and during the whole of this period the military operations were carried on. T was prevented by my diplomatic duties from witnessing, and con- sequently detailing any personal observations on the military movements during the same interval ; but the British gov- ernment were accurately informed of the course of the ope- rations by Colonel J^owe's and Lord Burghersh's very able communications. The time may possibly arrive when I shall think myself justified in giving the history of the diplomatic transactions liV GERMANY AND FRANXL. 199 of this little congresH at this period. 1 retain my own ininutea of every minister's remarks on all the subjects of discnssion, from which a summary might be drawn up not uninterestin."- to posterity. It may not here, however, be irrelevant to re^ mark, that it was easy to perceive from the tirst discussions as to the terms of peace for Europe, that the most serious difficulties presented themselves; and while the statesman- like views of the ministers were influenced by the peculiar feelings of their sovereigns on the spot, it was hardly possible to predict how any ultimate good could be accomplished. To prove more strongly the truth of what I have asserted, I shall now relate an unofficial conversation I had about this period with the Emperor Alexander. His Imperial Majesty's known condescension of character, and the marked kindness and good-nature he invariably showed me, penetrated me with sincere attachment and devotion to his person, and on various occasions he honored me by communicating his ob- servations and sentiments. At this period, one of the most difficult and interesting points for adjustment at a general peace, was the fate of the Polish nation, and this peace now began confidently to be looked for. In one of my interviews with the Emperor, His Imperial Majesty dwelt at great length on the immense sacrifices of Russia, and putting these foremost in the statement, he declared how doubly necessary it became him, on the eve of a settlement of Europe, to look to the permanent interests of his own empire. His Imperial Majesty stated, that his moral feelings, however, and every principle of justice and right, called upon him to use all iiis power to restore such a constitution to Poland as would se- cure the happiness of so fine and so great a people. The abandonment of seven millions of his subjects, were he to relinquisli his Polish provinces in any general arrangement, without a sufficient guarantee to his country for the great utility and advantage of the measure, would be more thon his imperial crown was worth. But the consolidating these provinces with the Duchy of Warsaw, under such a king, and such a constitutional administration as Russia would name, would be productive of the happiest efl^ects. His Im- perial Majesty continued to observe that his character was well known, and ought to give full confidence to Europe. I r»-'marked in reply, that Europe could not insure herself at all times an Alexander on the throne. To which His Im- perial Majesty rejoined, that the Grand-Duke Constantino partook entirely of his own sentiments, as well as his two brothers. He was happy also to believe that the proposition lie had started, and the mode in which he viewed it, were seen by Austria in the same light. That he had had a very 200 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR long conversation with Prince Metternich a day or two since, in which the whole of His Majesty's plan had been opened, and that the prince n'avoit rien contre, or words to this purpose. I was considerably struck at the time with so extraordinary a declaration from His Majesty ; and I ventured not only to express my sur|^rise, but to assure His Majesty that Prince Metternich had held a very different language to me, and that I never could suppose he would leave to England the task of being the only power which would oppose itself to His Imperial Majesty's views in case they should not meet witii general concurrence, when they were of so much more vital interest to Austria and Prussia. His Imperial Majesty next alluded, rather in a menacing manner, to his power of taking military occupation of Poland, and seemed to be certain of the facility with which he could obtain his end ; and I doubted much, from the firm and pos- itive manner in which he expressed himself, whether he would ever be diverted from the purpose he now declared. This expose of a great monarch's mind was deeply interest- ing at the moment it was communicated ; and later events showed, (notwithstanding the complex character of this question,) how sedulously the Emperor of Russia's eflbrts were thus early directed towards it. But confining myself at present to my military narrative, I shall only now insert in the Appendix the declaration of the allied plenipotentiaries, which after much fruitless delay and manceuvring on the part of the French plenipotentiary to gain time, ended by dissolving the congress, and by the return of the ministers to their respective head-quarters. Averse as I had ever been to the whole arrangements and negotia- tions with M. de St. Aignan, followed up as they were by tlie conferences at Chatillon, I sincerely rejoiced at their ter- mination ; and it was soon indeed perceptible that the Due de Vicenza neither talked the language, nor was kept an courant of the projects of Napoleon ; and that the only desire the lat- ter had was to protract an idle negotiation to cover his own deeper designs and objects. The allies were too long trifled with; and to have permitted it to be spun out longer would have been unpardonable. I must do Caulainconrt the justice to record, that if it had depended upon him, he was sincerely desirous of obtaining a peace for his emperor, whose predica- ment he evidently saw became daily more perilous. To the memory of these interesting days I must add, that the conviviality and harmony that reigned between the min- isters made the society and intercourse at Chatillon most agreeable. The diplomatists dined alternately with each IN GEHMANY AND FRANCE. 201 other; M. de Cuulaincourt liberally passing for all the minis- ters, through tlie French advanced posts, convoys of all good cheer, in epicurean wines, &c, that Paris could afford ; nor was female society wanting to complete the charm, and banish ennui from the Chatillon congress, which I am sure will be long recollected with sensations of pleasure by all the pleni- potentiaries there engaged. CHAPTER XVII. Resources and genius displayed by Napoleon— Magnanimity under adverse circumstances — his position at Troyes, Lesmonl, Bar-sur-Aube— Prince Schvvartzeiiberg determines to attacit— Preparations of the allies— Op?3ra- tions of Marshal Blucher— Napoleon takes advantage of his imprudent ad- vance-falls upon the corps of Sacken and D'Yorck— gains a decided victory over them— Engajienient with Marshal Blucher— Sanguinary coutv-st— The Prussians out-manceuvred and surrounded — retreat with considerable loss— Rapid movements and manceuvres of Napoleon— Prepares to attack Prince Schwartzenberg— The allies collect their forces— Blucher attacked with loss at Mery— Grand head-quarters— t?uccessful attack by Prince Schwartzeuberg— Loss of the Prussians— liattle at Laon— Retreat of the eneniv — Positions of Napoleon— General engagement and defeat of the French— Etforts of Napoleon— Masked niovemetils and successes of the al- lies— Combined advance— Losses of the French— Barbarities of the Cos- sacks — Singular incident, and unhappy catastrophe. Napoleon, after the battles of Brienne and La Rothiere, displayed, by his masterly movements with an inferior against two superior armies, and by braving his accumidated difficul- ties, that undoubted science in war which his bitterest ene- mies must accord to his genius. In proportion as his embar- rassments increased, he seemed to rise superior o.s an individ- ual. During his adverse fortune on the Elbe he appeared fluctuating and irresolute ; and his lengthened stay in unten- able and disadvantageous positions was the cause of his fatal overthrow at Leipsic, and of subsequent misfortunes. But now lie appeared once more to have burst forth with all his talent, and all his energies and mental resources. During the early days of February, Napoleon's army was in position at Troyes, occupying the main routes of Lesmont, Bar-sur-Aube, and Bar-sur-Seine. Prince Schwartzcnberg determined to attack Troyes, by turning it by the side of Bar- sur-Seine. The divisions of Bianchi and Lichtenstein were directed on this object, while Wittgenstein's corps moved on Vassy and Montmirail. After some hard fighting at Troyes, and on Napoleon's perceiving that the army of Silesia was advancing to the Marne, and might take him in rear, he re- 202 I'^ARRATIVE OF THE WAR tired from Troyes on the 8th of February to Nogciit, on the left bank of the Seine. The Prince Royal of Wirtemburg-'s corps now advanced and occupied Troyes; the whole of the grand army followed, and on the 9th had its advance at St. Libaud. Marshal Blucher next pressed forward be- tween the Seine and Marne ; and it was perceived that Na- poleon from Nogent was transporting a part of his army in the direction which indicated another determined attack on Blucher, with the hope of crushing him before he could be followed by the grand army, which the difficulties of passing the rivers rapidly made a hazardous undertaking. Blucher had his head-quarters at Vertus on the 8th, and D'Yorck was at Chateau-Thierry. General Kleisfs corps was in the rear, and not able to form in position so soon as was required for the formidable attack Napoleon meditated: orders were there- fore sent by the Marshal for Kleist and Sacken to retire on Montmirail. At this period it was generally lamented that the Silesian army had too much dispersed its corps; and probably to this cause Napoleon's latter success over them was to be attribu- ted. On the 18th Napoleon, leaving Oudinot and Victor op- posite the grand army on the Seine, marched with Marmont, Ney, Mortier, Groucliy, and all his cavalry, from Sezanne and Champaubert; leaving then a division before Blucher, he moved rapidly after Sacken and D'Yorck, and falling upon them with superior forces, Napoleon gained a partial but de- cided victory at Marchais, and the slaughter was immense. Marshal Blucher, not aware of the defeat of his and other corps, marched forward to attack Marmont at Champaubert; but Napoleon now arriving from Montmirail, a most bloody contest ensued; when towards the close of the day of the 14th Blucher saw his army entirely surrounded between Champaubert and Etoges: he nevertheless determined de se /aire jour, and made good his retreat upon the latter place, not without the loss, however, of above 8000 men, and ten or twelve piecf s of cannon. These defeats of the Silesian army operated as a temporary check to the advance of the allies at this moment, and tended to make them prolong and encourage the conferences at Cha- tillon. Prince Schwartzenberg was not well informed of Napoleon's movements, and did not believe that he was march- ing all his forces against Blucher. This may account for his inactivity during this interval ; but the too great dispersion of the Silesian army and Napoleon's masterly and rapid manoeuvring were the true causes of the success of the ene- my. He accomplished a march of thirty leagues in the space of seven days, between the 9th and 16th of February, fought IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 203 three battles, returned into position on the Seine, and re- joined Victor and Oudinot. On the 16th Napoleon had his head-quarters at Guignes; and having beaten Blucher separately, having reunited his divisions, and received the reinforcements from Maine, which had arrived by forced marches from Paris, he resolved to fall upon Prince SchM^artzenberg, and strike another and he hoped decisive blow against him. Wittgenstein's corps, however, on Napoleon's advance, had retired ; and Napoleon pursued him to Nanges. General Victor's corps moved to Montereau, and the head-quarters of the sovereigns fell back to Trainel. Prince Schwartzenberg then determined, the 19th of Feb- ruary, to collect his whole army at Troyes, and Blucher was ordered to concentrate at Mery and Epernay. On the 20th Napoleon moved his head-quarters to Nogent. It may be necessary to record here, that when both Schwartzenberg's and Blucher's armies were thus collected, the latter proposed to pass the Seine and give Napoleon bat- tle. But the Austrian field-marshal did not think the environs of Troyes favorable ; he moved therefore to Colomiers, still having his army collected. Blucher was attacked at Mery on the 22d, and fell back with some loss. On the 26th the allied sovereigns again, took up their head-quarters at Chau- rnont, and Prince Schwartzenberg determined to attack the enemy in his position of Bar-sur-Aube, with the corps of Wrede, Prince Royal of Wirtemburg, and Wittgenstein, which happily was attended with complete success ; so that on the 2d of March the grand head-quarters were transferred to Bar-sur-Aube. The Austrian field-marshal next deter- mined on attacking the enemy at Troyes with four corps of his army ; but Marshal Oudinot refused battle, and retired on Provins behind the Seine. The armies remained then sta- tionary for some days in cantonments ; and some overtures for an armistice being made, it was supposed they would be attended with success. On the 9th of March Blucher concentrated his army about Laon, and was again attacked by Napoleon ; but Blucher re- pulsed him vigorously, and General St. Priest's corps much distinguished itself The enemy under Marmont, however, entered Rheims, and took 2000 prisoners. Marshal Blucher, after this action, sustained his army on the Aisne ; and Kleist, Bulow, and Sacken were assembled at Soissons ready to march forwards, elated as they were by their success at the battle of Laon. That was indeed a critical moment. If a victory had not been won, Blucher would have been forced to retire on the Low Countries, and all our plans might have been rendered abortive. But this brilliant and memorable 204 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR battle encouraged Prince Schvvartzenberg to resume the of- fensive ; he instantly determined on attacking Oudinot and Victor, who had retired to Provins. The head-quarters of the monarchs were again transferred to Troyes on the 15th of March, and immediate dispositions were made for the at- tack. Napoleon had his forces collected also at Chateau-Thierry, Fere Champenoise and Arcis ; and on the 20th he moved in great force to the latter place. A general battle now com- menced : it was warmest at a village called Torcy ; and the result of this day's combat was that Napoleon maintained himself in his positions near Arcis and Torcy. The following morning Prince Schwartzenberg gave orders for a still more concentrated and general attack, which was performed at all points with the most triumphant success ; and the enemy suf- fered a complete and signal defeat. Napoleon now found that he could no longer maintain his positions, having failed in his attempt to debouch from Plan- cis and Arcis across the Aube : having, moreover, abandoned his idea of attacking Prince Schwartzenberg in his position at Mesnil la Comptesse (taken up after the battle of the 21st), he seems to have been guided in his next operations by the desire of preventing the union of the armies of Prince Schwartzenberg and Marshal Blucher. Should he not suc- ceed to the utmost in this object, it was evidently his best policy to force their communication as far to the rear, and to make it as circuitous, as possible. It was further manifest, also, by intercepted letters, that Buonaparte was of opinion that the movement he contemplated, on the right of Prince Schwartzenberg, (no other than the extraordinary project of passing by Vitry and St. Dizier, and marching upon Nancy on the rear, and on the communications of the allies,) might induce Schwartzenberg to fall back towards the Rhine, for fear of losing the base of his operations; and that then Na- poleon would be able to relieve his places, and be in a better situation to cover Paris. It generally occurs that manoeuvres are made with the ad- vance on the head of the opposing army ; but Buonaparte, un- der his present project, seems to have forced measures so far, by the passage of the Aube with all his troops near Vitry, as to have left himself completely open to that bold and masterly decision which was immediately adopted. 'Buonaparte put his corps in motion on the evening of the 21st for Vitry; and that night he remained at Sommosuis. On the following day the advanced corps arrived at Vitry, and summoned the place. It had been placed by the Russian commandant in a very tolerable state of defence, and had a garrison of between 3 IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 205 and 4000 Prussians. Marshal Ney endeavored, by every menace, to obtain a surrender; but the brave commandant resolutely refused, and held the town, which reduced the French commander to the necessity of crossing- the Marne river by bridges constructed near Frigincour. Napoleon crossed here also with his whole army on the 23d and 24th, and was immediately ascertained to have taken the direction of St. Dizier. Three objects might now be in his view by this movement round the right flank of the allies ; namely, to force them back; and if this failed, either to operate upon their commu- nications, and proceed to form a junction with Marshal Au- gereau ; or finally, by moving to his fortresses of Metz, &.c. prolong the war by resisting on a new line, while he placed the allies in the centre of France, having taken the best pre- cautions in his power for the defence of his capital. On the 22d, the allies having crossed to the right of the Aube, lost no time in forming a junction of the two armies to the westward, placing themselves thus between the French army and Paris, and proceeding with a united force of at least 200,000 men towards the capital of the French empire. In order the better to mask this movement, the march of the allied army was made from Pougy, Lesmont, and Arcis, on Vitry, and the Emperor of Russia, by two extraordinary marches of eighteen and twelve leagues, established his head- quarters with those of the Austrian field-marshal at Vitry on the 24th instant. A very brilliant capture of several pieces of cannon, 1500 prisoners, and a large number of caissons, was made on the 23d instant by General AugerofFski, of the cavalry of the Russian guard ; and on that day, and the pre- ceding, several advanced-guard affairs took place between General Wrede's corps, the Prince Royal of Wirtemburg's and the enemy. At the passage of the Aube by the enemy, owing as it was said to the late arrival of orders. General Wrede with the Bavarians missed an opportunity of attacking Marshal Ney with advantage as he defiled under the heights where the General was in position, the French army having at tlie same moment the Prince Royal of- Wirtemburg's corps close on their rear. When the Prince Marshal had decided on the advance to Paris, he made his dispositions accordingly, by forming a corps on the Bar-sur-Aube line, which he committed to the care of General Ducca, to protect the head-quarters of the Emperor of Austria ; and as it was replete with circumstances of delicacy at this moment, for the father of the Empress to be with the advance as the allies approached Paris, his Impe- rial Majesty, Prince Metternich. and the first ministers of all S 206 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR the allied courts, remained in the rear under the arrangement above alluded to, constant communication being kept up with them ; while they held themselves prepared to move forward as soon as the Emperor of Russia took possession of the French capital. General Ducca received orders to attend to the numerous convoys, supplies, &.c. and carry them if necessary towards the army of the south, and also to secure his rear, while he pursued the objects confided to his directions. The combined army marched in three columns to La Fere Champenoise on the 25th : all the cavalry of the army formed the advance, and were to push forward to Sezanne ; the sixth and fourth corps formed the advance of the centre column ; the fifth was on the right ; and the three corps and the re- serves, with the guards, on the left. Marshal Blucher was reported to have arrived with a great part of his army at Chalons. General Winzingerode and General Czernicheff, with all their cavalry, entered Vitry on the 23d, and were immediately detached to follow up Buonaparte's march on St. Dizier, and to threaten his rear. General Winzingerode's infantry had remained at Chalons with Marshal Blucher, together with General Woronzoff's and General Sacken's corps. General Bulow had marched to attack Soissons; and Generals D'Yorck and Kleist had moved in the line of Mont- mirail. By these simultaneous movements, had Buonaparte even not crossed the Aube, and passed between the two allied ar- mies, he probably would have found himself in a similar posi- tion to that at Leipsic, and the result to him would have been, I have no doubt, of the same disastrous nature. The army bivouacked on the 25th at La Fere Champenoise. It appeared now that the corps of Marshals Marmont and Mortier, who had been retiring before Marshal Blucher, were moving down towards Vitry to connect themselves with Buonaparte's operations; ignorant perhaps of his strateg-ic intentions, which may not have been fully formed until Na- poleon found himself too far committed to retract with suc- cess. The above corps of his army were much perplexed on finding themselves close to Prince Schwartzenberg when they expected to reinforce their own army. It is a singular, but an undoubted fact, that Marshal Mar- mont's advance was within a very short distance from Vitry on the night of the 24th, without tlie enemy's being aware that it was in the occupation of the allies. On the morning of the 25th the sixth corps of the Austri- ans, under General Reifski, fell in with the advance above mentioned, and drove them back to Connandrey and through IjE Fere Champenoise : in the former place a large number IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 207 of caissons, wagons, and baggage, were taken. In the mean time, on the left the Russian cavalry of the reserves, under the Grand-Duke Constantine, was equally successful, charging the enemy, and taking eighteen cannon and many prisoners. But the most brilliant movement of this day occurred after the allied troops in advance had passed through La Fere Champenoise. A detached column of the enemy, of about 5,000 men, under the command of General Ames, had been making its way, under the protection of Marmont's corps, from the neighborhood of Montmirail to join Buonaparte : this corps had in charge an immense convoy of bread and am- munition, and was considered of great importance with the force attached to it, which had just quitted Paris to reinforce Buonaparte. The cavalry of Marshal Blucher's army was the first to discover this body on their march from Chalons : my aide-de-camp. Captain (now Colonel) Harris, who was, during the whole campaign, most active and intrepid in all his duties, was fortunate enough, looking out with a party of Cossacks, to give the first intelligence to Marshal Blucher of their position. The cavalry of Generals Korf and Wasiltchi- kofi''s corps were immediately detached after them, and they were driven upon La Fer6 Champenoise as the cavalry of the grand army was advancing from that village. Some attacks of this cavalry were made on this French corps, which had formed itself into squares; and it is but justice to say, de- fended itself in the most gallant manner, notwithstanding it was composed of young troops and garde nationale. When completely surrounded by the cavalry of both armies, some officers were sent to demand their surrender ; but they boldly resisted the summons, marching on and firing ; and they re- fused to lay down their arms until a battery of Russian artil- lery liad opened, and repeated charges of cavalry had thrown them into confusion. This light battery was especially di- rected by the Emperor of Russia in person ; and he moment- arily gave the command and charge of the service to t?e Earl of Cathcart. Nothing could have been served with great- er precision and ability than the guns ; and after a sharp and continued fire and a most brilliant resistance. Generals Ames and Pacthod, generals of division, five brigadiers, 3,000 pris- oners, and twelve cannon, with the convoy, fell into the hands of the allies. I witnessed here a very interesting, but I fear unfortunately too usual an occurrence, that took place in the capture of the convoy and enemy's baggage, &c. at La Fere Champenoise. Being forward in the melee, I perceived that some of the Cossacks, most probably from Bashkir, had not only secured a French colonel's caleche and baggage, but one of them had 208 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR seized his wife, whose cries rent the air, and with the aid o\ two other gallant Tartars was placing her behind him. I wils )U)t detail the frequent histories of lawless troops, nor add to these pages instances of barbarity which I fear have been tou justly given of the conduct of the Russian predatory hordes in their march through France ; but I reflect with satisfac- tion that it was my good fortune to rescue, even for a moment, a lovely and most interesting Frenchwoman from the hands of these wild soldiers. Being, however, unable to listen to her afflicting details, and not knowing in what manner better to place her in security, I ordered my own orderly hussar, of the King's German Legion, to place her for the moment en croupe, and carry her to my billet at the head-quarters. I was unwilling, and indeed could not at that moment leave the tield; but consoled myself with the thought that when I re- turned at night to my quarters I should receive the grati- tude of a beautiful creature, and pictured to myself romance connected with this occurrence. But, alas! how little can we reckon on any future event, and how idly do we build des chateaux en Espagne ! I fear that my precautions were not so great as I flattered myself they were : the distance between the chatnp de ha- taille and Fere Champenoise was inconsiderable : the town was in sight ; and from the number of officers and troops moving about, I could not imagine my beautiful prisoner would be recaptured ; but, sad to relate, either the same Cossacks returned, or others more savage and determined, and perceiving my faithful orderly hussar and prize, fell upon him, and nearly annihilating him, reseized their victim ; and although the strictest investigation was made throughout his whole army, by the Emperor of Russia, to whom I immedi- ately repaired, and related the melancholy tale, (and who heard it v/ith all that compassion and interest it could not fail to inspire,) the beautiful and interesting Frenchwoman never reappeared again. I drop a veil over the horrible sequel which imagination might conjure up, and I took much blame for my neglect of a sufficient escort. My hussar crawled to me next morning, half dead from ill usage ; and his pathetic tale placed me in a state of mind scarcely less deplorable. i IN GERMANY AND FRANCE- 209 CHAPTER XVIII. Pursuit of the enemy — Junction of the alhed armies— Succeosc-s of the Bj- fesian armies— Position of the grand army— Partisan-corps— Rapid march of Napoleon to regain the capital— Progress of the allies— Concentration of forces — Actions with the enemy — Explosion of a magazine — Advance of the allies — they pass the Marne — Napoleon attacks Winzingerode, who is compelled to retreat— Movement on the rear of the allies— Bold decision of the Emperor Alexander— Allied march on Paris— Sir R. Hill at Bour- deaux— Intercepted letter from the Empress Maria Louisa to Napoleon- Affair at Claye— Rapid movements of the allies towards the capital- arrive before it— Battle of Montraartre— Defeat of the French— Entrance of the allied sovereigns into Paris— Temper of the people— Popularity of the Emperor Alexander— Grand review in the Champs Elys6es— Napoleon hastens towards Fontainebleau— The allies march to oppose him— The Emperor Alexander forms a cabinet— its preponderance— Absence of the Emperor of Austria— Talleyrand gained over— The provisional govern- ment—Due de Vicenza— D'Alberg, &c. — Interviews with the Emperer Alexander. After the last battle the rear-guards of Marmont's and Mortier's corps appeared to have drawn off in the direction of Sezanne, and it was now difficult to say whither they would be able to effect their escape, as every disposition was making to harass and surround them. The grand army marched to Mailleret : the head-quarters were now at Tref- faux ; and the advance pushed as far as La Ferte Gauchere. Marshal Blucher was at Etages, and was to advance towards Montmirail. Upon the retreat of Marmont and Mortier's corps before the several columns of the allied armies, whose junction had been effected between La Fere Champenoise and Chalons, above eighty pieces of cannon and a great number of caissons fell into our hands, independent of the convoy before alluded to. The guns were abandoned in all directions by the enemy in their rapid retreat, and were captured not only by the cavalry under the Grand-Duke Constantine and Count Pahlen, hut also by the corps of Riefski, and of the Prince Royal of Wirtemburg. Generals D'Yorck and Kleist, who moved from Montmirail on La Ferte Gauchere, where they arrived on the 26th, greatly augmented the enemy's discomfiture. General D'Yorck's corps was seriously engaged with the enemy at the latter place, and took 1500 prisoners. It may be fairly estimated that this part of Buonaparte's army had been so roughly handled as to have lost one-third of its efficient men, w'ith nearly all its artillery. Nothing but continued forced marches could have enabled any part of these corps to elude their victorious pursuers; and when I state that Marshal Blucher'a S2 210 NARRATIVE OP THE WAR army was at Niemes on tlie 24th, and was fighting at La Ferte Gauchere on the 26th, making a march of t\yenty-six leagues, it will be evident that no physical energies could exceed those that the present unexampled crisis brought into action. The o-rand army was in position at Mailleret on the 26th. The march was continued in three columns from Jm Fere Champenoise. The head-quarters of the sovereigns and Prince Schwartzenberg were at Treffaux; the cavalry of Count Pahlen were pushed beyond La Ferte Gauchere, joining the corps of Generals D'Yorck and Kleist. The cavalry of tlie reserves were bivouacked at La Vicquiere, on the right of the great road; the sixth and fourth were in the centre, the fiilh on the left, and the third remained in the rear to cover all the baggage, artillery, parks, and train, and to make the march of the whole complete. Generals Kaiseroff's and Leschavian's partisan-corps occupied and observed the coun- try about Arcis and Troyes, and between the Marne and tlie iSeine rivers. Intelligence was received from General Win- zingerode, who with General Czernicheff, and 10,000 cavalry, and forty pieces of artillery, continued following Buonaparte's rear, that the latter was marching by Brienne to Bar-sur- Aube and Troyes, hastening back to the capital witli the ut- most precipitation ; a plain demonstration (if any were want- ing) that superiority of manoeuvring, as well as of force, was in his adversaries' scale. Tiie Prince Marshal continued his march without inter- ruption: his head-quarters were established at Colomiers; the sixth corps arrived at Moison : Count Pahlen's cavalry and the Prince Royal of Wirtemburg, who were sent to turn the enemy's right, followed one part of the corps before us, which seemed now^ to have separated, to Crecy; while Generals D'Yorck and Kleist pushed the other by advancing from La Ferte Gauchere to Meaux, where they secured the passage of the Marne for Marshal Blucher's army. The 5th corps took up its ground near Chailley ; the third at Mercelon, and the cavalry of the guard, the guards, and reserves, at Colo- miers. Marshal Blucher's head-quarters were now at La Ferte Jouarre ; and his army passed the Marne, which it was ex- pected the grand army would do at Lagny ; thus concentrating nearly their whole force on the right bank of the river, and taking position on tlie heights above Paris. I was ignorant of the motives that might have directed the corps of tlie enemy in our front: whether a part had fallen back to form a noyau to les gardes nationalcs at Paris, with which they might attempt to defend the passage of the Marne; or IK GERM.UvTY AND F^A^XE. 211 whether they were moving by Provina to join Buonaparte, remained yet to be seen. \Vhatever the ultimate result of the operations in progress might be, however brilliant they might appear, the sovereigns who were present, and the Prince Marshal wlio led these armies, had the proud and consoling reflection, that by their intrepid manoeuvres, they pursued the true interests and glory of their countries, their people, and the great cause they had resolved to bring to an issue : that issue, after such a decision, rested with Providence. On tlie 28th the grand allied army, and that of Silesia, con- tinued their advance to Paris. The sixth corps, the Austrian grenadiers, the guards and reserves, and the cavalry of the Grand-Duke Constantine, took up their ground in the neigh- borhood of Conilly and Manteriel. The third corps was this day at Moison, and the fifth remained at Chailley, with the advanced-guard in the direction of La Ferte Gauchere, ob- serving the routes of Sezanne and Provins ; the head-quarters were established at Quincy. The passage of the Marne at Meaux was effected by the sixth corps with little resistance. Part of Marshal Mortier's corps, under the immediate com- mand of General Vincent, who retired through that place, broke down the bridge in their retreat, and delayed the allies in their pursuit. About 10,000 of the national guards, mixed ^vith some old soldiers, endea^'ored to make a feeble stand before the army of Silesia, between La Ferte Jouarre and Meaux; but General Korf gallantly placing himself at the head of some squadrons of cavalry, attacked and pierced a mass of infantry, drove them from their position, and took tlio French commander prisoner. The passage of the river WIS also disputed at Tressort, where the army of the Marshal })assed ; but notwithstanding the iire of the enemy, the bridge Vv'Ms soon re])aired, and the whole of this army passed the Marne on the iOth, The French, on their retreat from Meaux, cau-sod a magazine of powder, of an immense extent, to be blown up, without giving the slightest information to the in- habitants of the town, who expected instant destruction from the explosion. Not a window in the town but was shivered to atoms ; and great damage was done to every Jiouse, and to the magnificent cathedral. The corps of Generals D'Yorck and Kleist advanced on tiro I3d to Claye : the corps of General Langcron was on their right, General Sacken's in reserve, and that of General Wo- ronzoft' in tlie rear, at Meaux. Various bridges were con- structed on the Marne to enable the grand army to file over in diflbrent columns. As soon as the passage was effected, the allied armies, 212 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR which had abandoned their communications, immediately opened others more advantageous, considering tije exhausted state of the country which they had left. It must always be distressing to great armies to be without direct communications, and to depart from the base of their operations : but the line of Brussels, the Low Countries, and along the coast, would now afford so many facilities, that from the moment of the passage of the river, I conceived the armies might be deemed in security. It was not improbable that Buonaparte would attempt, by an operation on the rear of the allies, by Chateau-Thierry, or some other point, to act in the above direction : but it would have been hazardous in the face of the army of the Prince of Sweden, and of that in Holland. General Bulow's corps blockaded Soissons, and was in march towards the Marne. This movement af- forded additional security. General Winzingerode, who had followed Buonaparte's rear towards St. Dizier, was assailed on the evening of the 26th, and the morning of the 27th, by a very preponderating force of the enemy, especially of infantry. The details of the affair are not of great moment, but it appeared that the general was obliged to retreat in the direction of Bar-le-Duc. From the most recent reports, Buonaparte was himself at St. Dizier on the 27th, and it was said that his advanced guard was at Vitry : it thus appeared that he was marching after the allies, or directing himself on the Marne. - Paris was now to be summoned, and the appeal was to be made, not as conquerors, but as deliverers, implying a deter- mination to support the wish of the nation. The Emperor of Russia, without the ministers of England and Austria, who were left in the rear of the army, was of course supreme ; and it is but justice to say, that the determination and bold- ness of the enterprise of the march on Paris was mainly his own. When he decided on the advance, the Emperor of Austria and the allied ministers remained behind, as before stated, and there was no prospect of communication with them until the crisis was over. Paris was to be occupied as under a secret treaty, which it vvas said had been made. A report was prevalent that Buonaparte had left his own army, and by a rapid movement had reached Paris in person ; but this did not turn out to bo correct. The allies were very anxious for a disembarkation of troops, liowever small, in Normandy, from Jersey. All the prisoners in that quarter, near 20,000, would, it was supposed, join them. Reports of Sir R. Hill bouig at Bourdeaux, and the white IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 213 cockado having been hoisted, were now prevalent, but there was no official news of it. A very interesting intercepted letter from the Empress to Buonaparte was at this period shown to me, in which, after expressing great affection, she states the effect which his late victories had produced at Paris ; and ends by relating an anecdote of the king of Rome having a dream, in which he cried most bitterly, calling frequently on his papa; and when lie awoke and was questioned as to the cause, no entreaty or threat would induce him to give the smallest explanation, or reveal the nature of his dream. This made the child very melancholy, and the Empress partook of it, though she rode daily in the Bois de Boulogne. It is quite certain that no princess ever performed the various conflicting duties of her situation so admirably as the Empress Maria Louisa. What- ever sacrifices she made to what was considered her country's welfare at the period of her alliance with Napoleon, from tiiat period during the remainder of her reign she acquitted herself in the most trying circumstances as Empress of France, as a wife, and as a mother, in a manner that must hand her name down to posterity as a character of the first order. On the 28th, in the evening, a very sharp affair occurred at Claye, between General D'Yorck's corps and the enemy's rear. The ground the latter were posted on was very favor- able for defence, and in a very severe tiraillade the Prussians lost some hundreds of men ; but the enemy were driven bacli at all points. On the 29th, the army of Silesia, leaving a corps on the IMarne, was directed with its right to advance on the great road from Soissons to Paris. General Langeron was on the right near the village of Villapanto, Generals D'Yorck and Kleist were on the left, and Generals Sacken and Woronzoff in their rear. The sixth corps passed Triport, and reached Bondy and the heights of Pantin at night. The fourth corps crossed at Meaux, with the guards, the reserves, and the cavalry. The former were immediately directed to gain the high road from Lagny to the capital, and to take post on the heights of Chelles : the third corps was to support the fourth ; the fifth moved to Meaux, and remained on the left of the INIarne, having its cavalry at Crecy and Colomiers. On the advance of the sixth corps to Villeparisis, some re- sistance was made ; and as it was necessary to relieve Gene- rals D'Yorck and Kleist, to enable them to move to the right, a cessation of hostilities for four hours was agreed upon by mutual consent. This delay prevented the march forward being so rapid as it otherwise w'ould have been. The army 214 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR this night had their right in a position towards Montmartre, and their left near the wood of Vincennes. After a brilliant victory on the 30th, it pleased Providence to place the capital of the French empire in the hands of the allied sovereio-ns ; a just retribution for the miseries inflicted on Moscow, Vienna, Madrid, Berlin, and Lisbon, by the deso- later of Europe. It would be injustice not to declare, that if the continent had so long borne the scourge of usurpation under the iron sway of Buonaparte, it was also crowned with the blessing of possessing amongst its legitimate sovereigns one who, by a firm and glorious conduct, richly deserved the appellation of the liberator of mankind. This sovereign I have no hesi- tation at this moment in denominating the Emperor Alexan- der ; for it is impossible to estimate too highly his energies and noble conduct in the short campaign from the Rhine to Paris. The enemy's army, under the command of Joseph Buona- parte, aided by Marshals Marmont and Mortier, occupied with their right the heights of Fontenay, Romainville, and Belleville ; their left was on Montmartre, and they had seve- ral redoubts in the centre, and an immense artillery along the whole line. In order to attack this position the army of Silesia was di- rected on St. Denis, Montmartre, and the villages of La Vil- lette and Pantin, while the grand army attacked the enemy's right on the heights before mentioned. Marshal Blucher made his own dispositions for his attack : the sixth corpp, under General Riefski, moved from Bondy in three columns, supported by the guards and reserves, and leaving the great road of Meaux, they attacked the heights of Romainville and Belleville. (These as well as Montmartre are strong positions : the ground between is uneven and covered with villages and country-seats, and their possession commanded Paris and the country round.) Prince Eugene of Wirtemburg's division of the sixth corps commenced the attack, and with the great- est steadiness endured for a long period a very galling fire of artiller3^ The division was supported by the reserves of grena- diers; and after some loss the heights of Romainville were carried, the enemy retiring to those of Belleville. The fourth corps, under their gallant commander, the Prince Royal of Wirtemburg, were engaged in tlie attack more to the left, di- rected a.gainst the heiglits of Bourg and Charonne: the eighth corps was placed in echelon near Neuilly-sur-Marne in re- serve, as well as the cavalry. The attack of the grand army had commenced some short period before that of Silesia (delayed by some accident); but IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 215 it was not long- before Generals D'Yorck and Kleist de- bouched near St. Denis on Aubervilliers. Here and at Pantin a most obstinate resistance was made. His Royal Highness Prince William of Prussia with his brigade, together with some Prussian guards, much distinguished themselves. The enemy's cavalry attempted to charge, but were brilliantly repulsed by the Brandenburg and black hussar regiments. A strong redoubt and battery of the enemy's in" their cen- tre kept General D'Yorck's corps in check for some part of the day. The enemy's right flank having been gained by the heights of Belleville, their great loss in every part of the field, and their complete discomfiture on all sides, reduced them to the necessity of sending a flag of truce to demand a cessation of hostilities, they agreeing to give up all the ground with- out the barriers of Paris until further arrangements should be made. The heights of Montmartre were to be placed by the stated generosity of a beaten enemy in our possession (Romainville and Belleville having been carried) at the very moment Count Ijangeron's corps was about to storm them, and had already got possession of the crest of the hill. General VVoronzofF's division also carried the village of La Villette, charging with two battalions of chasseurs : they took twelve pieces of cannon, and were only stopped at the barrier of Paris, which they had forced, by the flag of truce. However, the Emperor of Russia, the king of Prussia, and Prince Schwartzenberg, with that humanity which must ex- cite the admiration of Europe, acceded to a proposition to prevent the city of Paris from being sacked and destroyed. Count Orloff, aide-de-camp to the Emperor, and Count Paar, aide-de-camp to Prince Schwartzenberg, were sent to arrange the cessation of hostilities; and Count Nesselrode, His Impe- rial Majesty's minister, went into Paris to hold a conference with the constituted authorities at five o'clock the same evening, as soon as the battle ceased. The results of this victory could not yet be known: numer- ous pieces of artillery, and a large number of prisoners, fell into our hands. Our loss was considerable ; but we had the consolatory hope that the brave men who fell had shared in accomplishing the downfall of despotism, and had assisted in rearing the standard of renovated Europe, about to return to its just equilibrium, and the dominion of its legitimate sovereigns. I feel it impossible to convey an accurate idea, or a just description of the scene that presented itself on the 31st in the capital of the French empire, when the Emperor of Rus- 216 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR sia, the King of Prussia, and Prince Schwartzenberg, made their entry at the head of the allied troops. The enthusiasm and exultation generally exhibited must have very far exceeded what the most sanguine and devoted friend of the ancient dynasty of France could have ventured to hope ; and those who were less personally interested, but equally ardent in that cause, could no longer hesitate in pro- nouncing that the restoration of their legitimate king, the downfall of Buonaparte, and the desire of peace, had become the first and dearest wish of the Parisians, who had by the events of the last two days been emancipated from a system of terror and anarchy which it is impossible to describe, and from a state of ignorance of what was passing around them, in which they had been hitherto kept by the arts of falseh«x)d and deceit, almost incredible to an enlightened people, and incomprehensible to the reflecting part of mankind. The cavalry under His Imperial Highness the Grand-Duke Constantine, and the guards of all the allied forces, were formed into columns early in the morning on the road from Bondy to Paris. The Emperor of Russia, with all his staff, his generals, and the suites present, proceeded to Pantin, where the King of Prussia joined him with a similar cortege. The sovereigns, surrounded by all the princes and generaLs in the army, together with the Prince Field Marshal and the Austrian etat-major, passed through the barrier of Paris, and entered the Fauxbourg St. Martin about eleven o'clock, the Cossacks of the guard forming the advance of the march. The crowd was already so great, and the acclamations were so general, that it was difficult to move forward ; but before the monarchs reached the Porte St. Martin to turn on the boulevards, it was next to impossible to proceed. All Paris seemed to be assembled and concentrated on one spot; one mind and one spring evidently directed their movements. They thronged in such masses around the Emperor and the King, that notwithstanding their condescending and gracious familiarity shown by extending their hands on all sides, it was in vain to attempt to satisfy the populace, who made the air resound with the cries of "Vive I'Empereur Alexandre! Vive le Roi de Prusse ! Vivent nos Liberateurs !" Nor were these cries alone heard ; for with louder acclamations, if pos- sible, they were mingled with those of " Vive le Roi ! Vive Ijouis XVIII. ! Vivent les Bourbons ! A has le tyran !" The white cockmle appeared very generally, and many of the national guards wljom I saw Vv'ore them. This clamorous applause of the multitude was seconded by a similar demonstration from the higher classes, who occupied the w^indows. and terracen of the houses along the line to the IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 217 Champs Elysees. In short, to form an idea of such a mani- festation of public feeling- as the city of Paris displayed, it must have been witnessed, for no description can convey any conception of it. The sovereigns halted in the Champs Elysees, where the troops passed before them in the most admirable order ; and the head-quarters were now established at Paris. I ought here, perhaps, to close this narrative : the objects of the war were established ; the standards of the allies were planted on the walls of Paris ; and Napoleon's political ex- istence, at the same moment, was terminated. In my further short resume I shall therefore merely add a few general ob- servations that may be interesting, by way of explanation. Buonaparte moved his army from Troyes by Sons towards Fontainebleau, where the debris of Marshals Marmont's and Mortier's corps joined hira. He arrived in person at Fro- menteau (three quarters of a post from Paris) on the 30th, and would have been there that evening had not the capitulation secured it to the allies. On learning what had occurred, he retired to Corbeil, collecting his army in the neighborhood of Fontainebleau ; and it could not amount to more than 50,000 men. That he might make a desperate attempt was still possible, provided the army stood by him ; but the senate and the nation now declared against him. The allied armies, with the exception of the guards and reserves, who remained at Paris, marched towards Fontainebleau, and were to be regulated by the movements of Buonaparte. The emperor of Russia and his minister, Count Nesselrode, together with M. d'Arnstedt, and General Pozzo di Borgo, now formed a cabinet, in whose hands the great arrangements of negotiation seemed chiefly to lie ; and I must do them jus- tice in finding fault with nothing but the preponderance which this state of things made visible. Prince Schwartzenberg, by nature easy and complying, had, to all outward appearance, given up the command of the array, except indeed nominally ; and as Prince Metternich did not arrive in the commence- ment, to supply in ability and talents what the other wanted in firmness and management, I am not sure whether things did not turn out altogether for the best. It seemed, indeed, almost like a merciful dispensation, that the Emperor of Aus- tria should have been separated from the head-quarters at such a moment, and thus prevented from witnessing the hu- miliation of a daughter, a son-in-law, and a grandson. The emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia dined on the 31st incognito with M. de Talleyrand. The latter was some time before he took his decision ; but he did it in the end in a most decided manner. The proclamation directing the T 218 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR formation of a provisional government was hardly sufficiently known at this juncture to judge of its effects. M. de Talley- rand was to be at the head of this government. M. Barthele- my, the Due d'Alberg, and some others, were to be members. M. de Caulaincourt was at Paris during the battle of the 30th. The following morning he came out certainly in a most unac- countable manner to the Emperor of Russia at Bondy, with the deputation from the municipality, who presented them- selves to make arrangements for the occupation of the town. I was sorry that the Emperor thought proper to receive M. de Caulaincourt. At the interview, I learnt that he declared he would sign the Chatillon project, or any other, immediately. No answer was given to this offer. He then stated that lie did not come in the character of minister of foreign affairs, but as one of the municipality of Paris. Prince Schwartzen- berg afterwards saw him. It seemed that M. de Talleyrand, who was personally a friend of M. de Caulaincourt's, had been endeavoring to keep him with the party of the new gov- ernment, and to make him remain at Paris, as he was con- sidered a man of considerable influence and interest, and amia- ble, and well-meaning, in regard to promoting a peace. CHAPTER XIX. Emisearies of Napoleon — Opinion of the Due de Vicenza — Deliberations of the senate — Desertion of Marshal Moncey — Lord Wellington at Toulouse — Great battle — Abdication of Buonaparte pronounced by the senate — Direction of affairs by the Emperor Alexander — Absence of the English minister — and of the Bourbons — Anecdotes of the Emperor of Russia's conduct — New government — Appointment of French ministers — Deser- tion of Marmont and his army — followed by Kellermann, Victor, Nan- aoiity— Efforts to form a regency for the king of Rome— Offer of Elba and a pension to Napoleon— Declaration of the Emperor Alexander in favor of the Bourbons — Napoleon accepts the terms proposed — Abandoned by his officers — His army directed towards Paris — Colonel Lowe sent with dispatches to England — Considerations of the policy adopted towards Napoleon — Bold tone assumed by Russia — Concessions of the other powers — Alarmof Austria— Influence of Great Britain— Policy of Prince Metter- nich — Opposition to the designs of Russia — Appeal to a Congress at Vienna. Paris was now quite tranquil ; and notwithstanding seve- ral of Buonaparte's eniL^.-xjries were in tlie city endeavoring to work on the people witli money and promises to rise on the allies, no instance of disorder occurred. So much did M. Caulaincourt nt length despair of the pos*- eibility of Buonaparte's return, tliat he sounded M. de Talley- rand and the Due d'Alberg as to tlis mlention of the allies IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 2l9 with regard to his Emperor's fiittire lot, as he considered him a lost man. The senate met to deliberate and to pronounce their decision ; but since the declaration of the Emperor Alex- ander in the name of the allies, they had but one course to adopt, which was to declare Buonaparte hors de la loi. The national guards, who had been commanded by Marshal INIoncey, were without a leader, he having fled. Comit Mont- morenci remained, and what part he would take was yet un- certain. The brother-in-law to the late General Moreau was mentioned as likely to be placed at the head of the national guards; but hitherto every arrangement was necessarily in- complete. A report now arrived by a letter from Toulouse, of a great battle having been fought on the 23d ult. between Lord Wel- lington and Marshal Soult, in which the latter had been com- pletely defeated, and driven into Toulouse, with only one piece of artillery left. The decision of the senate, who met on the 1st of April, de- clared, that as Napoleon Buonaparte had deserted the govern-- ment of France, they felt themselves called upon to choose another chief; and that they were unanimous in calling to the throne their legitimate sovereign, Louis XVIIL The management of every new measure undoubtedly lay with the Emperor of Russia and the confidential cabinet which he had formed. Count Nesselrode, at no time very indepen- dent, fell somewhat into the hands of M. de Talleyrand, aa well as General Pozzo di Borgo : the latter was now the per- son accredited by his Imperial Majesty to the provisional gov- ernment of France ; a man of consummate ability, but not yet of sufficient weight in Paris to afford any check to the mode of proceeding of the new French ministers. It was to be lamented that the English secretary of state for foreign affairs by accidental occurrences had been thrown out of the way of affording that invaluable benefit which his presence at this crisis could not have failed to produce. The provisional government were now endeavoring, and straining every nerve to consolidate their power ; in which they suc- ceeded so effectually, that on the arrival of Louis XVIII. or his representative, it seemed as if he would find himself only the shadow of a king, dependent on these people, and mixed up with their proceedings. Every office in the government was filling up ; the constitution was to be formed precisely as the provisional government pointed out ; and the senate and corps legislatif were to declare it, the new government to approve it, and it was to be presented to the King for liis ac- ceptance. Buonaparte had managed every thing by his im- mense military power and the satellites appertaining to it, 220 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR and M. de Talleyrand was no doubt endeavoring to become as absolute as a minister as the circumstances of the times enabled him. It was now of the first importance that Monsieur, or some one of the royal family, should arrive in the capital with the least possible delay ; as a surveillance over the measures of the new government, and some immediate control, became essentially necessary for the satisfaction of the great majority of the people of France, and the successful issue of the cause of the Bourbons. It became the more essential, because it was evident that the Emperor of Russia's policy was tliat of ingratiating himself with the nation, rather than making any public or manifest declaration of any wishes relative to Louis the XVIII. Of this there occurred a remarkable instance, which was subsequently much discussed. When the Em- peror of Russia received the deputation of the senate, his declaration relative to the release of the French prisoners was made to them alone, and at their instance, when it af- forded so favorable an opportunity to have done this popular act in the name of their legitimate monarch. This anecdote, coupled with others, gave rise to conjectures as to whether the Emperor had not some secret designs ; and his conduct since his arrival at Paris had been carried on with so much address, that it was incalculable what influence he had obtained over the Parisian character. The allies, and Great Britain in particular, had little more to hope for from the actual provisional government than the commencement of a new order of things; whereas, if the ancient govern- ment of the Bourbons had been at first re-established, they would have had every thing to expect, and there would have been less of that intrigue, ambition, and personal animosity, which so much governed the present proceedings of the capital. It was universally known that the persons whom M. de Talleyrand protected could now be employed in any situations they pointed out. In the provisional government, every man, except the Abbe de Montesquieu, was devoted to M. de Tal- leyrand. M. Caulajncourt would have been included by M. de Talleyrand in his arrangement, if he could have prevailed on him to desert Napoleon ; but after a good deal of negotia- tion, Caulaincourt remained firm. M. de Jaucourt was no doubt a sensible man, but M. de Talleyrand's interest made him a senator, and afterwards a chamberlain ; he was there- fore entirely under his control, as was also General Bour- nonville, who was a man of less consequence. M. de Bar- theleniy was equally devoted to M. de Talleyrand : and the m GERMAXY AXD FRAXCE. 221 Abbe Louis, another dependant of his, was appointed a min- ister of finance. Three senators, who were Dutchmen, three Italians, and one or two Germans, who were introduced when Holland, Italy, and part of Germany were provinces of France, still remained, taking- part in the deliberations. This gave offence ; and there was much observation on the subject of their being now permitted to remain. Two articles appeared in the Moniteur, and other papers, at this time, which afforded much discussion, and tended to create suspicions injurious to the allies: one was the account of the rupture of the negotiations at Chatillon of the 18th of March, by which it appeared that if Buonaparte had accepted the projet of the allies, we should have treated with him : the other was Lord Wellmgton's proclamation, dated Febru- ary 2d, relative to the Bourbons. It was asked, and justly, how such different measures were to be reconciled. The revolution certainly appeared to be carrying forward with a degree of tranquillity very unaccountable ; and the different appointments in the government, those of General Dessolles to be governor-general of Paris, and commandant of the national guard, and of General Dupont to be minister of war, were very highly approved : M. de Malhouet, minis- ter of the marine, was also a good appointment. In an accidental conversation I had with M. de Talleyrand at this period, he told me that steps were taking to communi- cate with all the armies and the fortresses. He believed strongly in a movement among tlie troops favorable to the new order of things. Marmont and Le Fevre were the mar- shals who it was thought would declare first. On the other Iiand, it was said Buonaparte had an immense number of emissaries in Paris. M. Girardin, Marshal Berthier's aide- de-camp, was in the city with large sums of money at his disposal: some hundreds of the old guard had been introduced into Paris to head an insurrection, and Buonaparte w^as deter- mined, at any risk, de sefaire jour dans Paris. These various histories amused the alarmists of the day ; but an excessive tranquillity, and even indifference, reigned around. Much of this, it appeared to me, would have ceased if there had been on the spot some individuals who were free from all the guilt and suspicion which twenty-five years of revolution had more or less fixed on all those who were now carrying on the government. Upon a communication which was now made to Marshal Marmont, he consented to pass over with his wliole corps d'ormee, amounting to between 9 and 10,000 men, and emol himself and his followers in the cause of their legitimate T2 222 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR sovereign. He stipulated two principal conditions : the one, that Buonaparte's person, if taken, should not be sacrificed : the other, that if in his march he should be attacked, the al- lied troops were to support him. This very favorable event, so decidedly denoting the downfall of the last hopes of Buo- naparte, proclaimed the peace of the world to be accom- plished. Marshals Victor, Nansouty, Kellermann, and several other officers of note in Paris, then declared themselves in favor of the good cause. The allied army remained in position at Chevilly. The army of Silesia experienced at this juncture, by the illness of its gallant and veteran leader, an irreparable loss ; but it was hoped that he would speedily be restored to such a state of health as would enable him to enjoy the laurels which encircled his brow. General Barclay de Tolly was placed at the head of the army of Silesia, with General Diebitsch as chief of his staff! General Gnisenau succeeded to General Knesebeck's situa- ation near the King of Prussia, the latter officer having been left sick at Chaumont. Marshals Ney and Macdonald, and M. de Caulaincourt next arrived in Paris, for the purpose of endeavoring to treat for some sort of terms regarding the future fate and existence of Buonaparte. Great efforts were made to place Buona- parte's son on the throne of France, with a council of re- gency ; but this was most peremptorily rejected. Negotiationy for a peace were carrying on with the army on the base of assuring to Buonaparte specific terms, and also providing for many others. The conferences which the French marshals now had, both collectively and separately, with the Emperor of Russia, led to the determination to offer Buonaparte the island of Elba, as a retreat, with an income of six millions of francs, three millions for himself and Maria Louisa, and three to be divided between his brothers and sisters. M. de Caulaincourt and Marshal Ney were very urgent and persevering in their endeavors to obtain a regency, Buo- naparte having abdicated with that view. The Emperor of Russia was, however, firm, and gained over Marshal Mac- donald (Marmont having been before secured). His Imperial Majesty declared that the allies had already announced they would not negotiate with Napoleon Buonaparte or any of hia family, and that they were determined by the voice of the nation to proclaim the restoration of I^ouis XVIII. Napoleon Buonaparte at length accepted the terms offered by the allies for his future existence and that of his family. The exit of this individual from the stasfe where he had so IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 223 long exhibited, was marked by a degradation which his career had in some measure deservedly entailed upon him. Provi- dence seemed to have taught the nations of the world a lesson winch future ages would do well to record ; and the events of the French revolution, connected with that of 1814, will hand down to posterity an awful and an instructive example. Marshal Ney announced that Buonaparte accepted the island of Elba, and the pensions granted by the bounty of the allies : that he was ready to proceed to such place as might be indi- cated ; and requested that his family might be sent to him without delay. The French army was to move to the environs of Paris. Every individual officer, even Berthier, left Buonaparte, wiiose present predicament could only deserve that pity which is extended by Christians to the most atrocious as well as to the most unfortunate of their fellow-creatures. I now deemed it right to send Colonel Lowe, who had been attached to me during the campaign, by Calais to England, furnishing him with copies of every official document of the provisional government, as well as an abstract of the act of the new constitution, which I received from the Prince de Benevento. So much had been done, so various were the important objects to consider, and so multiplied were the reasonings that might be brought forward on every proceeding, that I deem it most prudent on all these points to say little. I also dis- patched Colonel Cooke, at the request of M. de Talleyrand, with a French officer of equal rank, to the Marquess of Wel- lington and Marshal Soult. Very considerable apprehension arose, after the Emperor of Russia made the offer of the island of Elba to Napoleon Buonaparte, as to the mischief and ultimate danger that might accrue if he were put in possession of it. Its extreme prox- imity to the shores of Italy, the power and influence Buona- parte still had there, the popularity of Eugene Beauharnois, the possible tergiversation of Murat, and finally, the number of discontented French who might follow Buonaparte's for- tunes to that quarter, were adduced, together with many other reasons, to throw great doubt on the policy of this ar- rangement. If Napoleon could have possessed himself of Italy by any future manoeuvres, which certainly would rather live under his sole dominion than be parcelled out as it was likely to be ; if he could have carried French soldiers and followers into that country; if his large pension was paid him ; and if the other dangers I have above alluded to were to have been apprehended, it would no doubt have been wiser to have considered further before the act was irretrievable, 224 NARRATIVE OF THE V/AR whether a far lesa dangerous retreat might not have been found, and whether Buonaparte might not bring the powder to the iron mines, for which the island of Elba was so famed. It was of the greatest moment that all this should have been duly weighed. The offer of such an arrangement was made by the Emperor Alexander to M. de Caulaincourt. M. de Talleyrand and the French government I heard at the time much disapproved of it, as well as other powers; and the more so, the more it was brought under consideration ; still it WIS ultimately arranged. Having stated above how much the Emperor of Russia seemed to assume and direct the general march of affairs at this juncture, and having often expressed my great personal respect and attachment to that monarch, I have less difficulty in entering a little at large into my own views of the various causes and different grounds which directed his actions at this eventful epoch. The Emperor undoubtedly began to presume on his suc- cess and popularity, and the decided influence he had gained over the King of Prussia, and he adopted a tone of superi- ority in the alliance, evmcing a determination to make the arrangements connected with Russian policy no longer a matter of fair and amicable negotiation, but one of authority and dictation. In order to soften this tone of assumption, Austria and Prussia, with a view to their own objects, went so far in con- cession to Russia in confidential communication with the Em- peror (as I was given to understand) as to admit the advance of his frontier as far as Kalisch at the general congress ; not meaning, however, the one to cede Thorn, or the other to cede Cracow or Zamoski, and not conceiving that the king- dom of Poland was to be revived under the Russian dynasty. These great overtures of concession, however, did not sat- isfy the Emperor, who soon announced his intentions as to reviving the kingdom of Poland, and of retaining Thorn, Cracow, and Zamoski. He privately intimated that he had an army of- 480,000 men ready for action ; that he must have Thorn ; and that he would not give a single village to Aus- tria. This tone of authority, and this resolution to retain the frontier fortifications commanding the roads to Berlin and Vi- enna, gave natural and just alarm to the two courts ; at the same time the concessions they had prepared themselves to make seemed to reduce the grounds for a new war in Eu- rope, from the great question of a preponderance displayed by Russia unsafe to other states, to the narrow question whether Russia should or should not possess two or three districts and IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 225 two or three towns, more or less ; and it seemed that a new war originating' upon so narrow a question, would not be un- derstood by Europe, and would be easily misinterpreted in Great Britain. This view of the argument had also, as I believe, particu- lar weight in directing the King of Prussia's feelings. The manner of dictating on the Polish question by Russia, the danger to be apprehended from re-embodying the Poles un- der a dynasty nominally national, though really Russian, the advancing the Russian frontier, protected by flanking for- tresses and a great river, almost into the heart of Germany, discovered such dangerous designs, and afforded such efficient means for realizing them, that when the settlement of the Polish system and limits came into real discussion, I believe that the two powers began to recoil at the dangers which threatened them. These two powers were at the time dis- united in several of their other views. Russia to gain Prus- sia had promised Saxony to her, which Austria wished to re- store to her natural sovereign as a frontier to Bohemia ; and Austria had made private engagements to Bavaria respecting Mayence ; whilst Prussia was resolved that it should never be given to that power, but at least be a confederate city. Austria had been so alarmed by Russia, coupled with the subserviency of Prussia, and her views in Saxony, that at an early period she put forward the language of resistance ; but when she was fairly questioned on the subject, and obliged to compare her powers with the joint forces of Russia and Prus- sia, she soon abandoned her warlike tone. It was evident she could not hope for a successful issue by arms without in- viting and accepting the assistance of France ; and the dread of bringing again a French army across the Rhine to fight German battles, appeared pregnant with more fatal conse- quences than a submission to Russia. At the same time it was ascertained that regenerated France was willing to sup- port Austria on the Polish and Saxon question, in return fo^ a compromise on the Neapolitan. In this state of things, let me next consider what was the part, in my humble opinion, of the British minister. He must have felt the danger which threatened the adjustment of any equilibrium in Europe, if the Russian designs, aided by Prus- sia, were to be carried into effect contrary to the consent of Austria. It was evident, or at least feared, that the two powers who could dictate such arrangements must command in all others. He felt also equal danger, I should suppose, in case Austria, by similar management, should be induced to join in the plan, and lest it should lead to the complete sub- jection of Europe to a triple alliance. He felt equally the 226 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR inexpediency of a new war, upon grounds which could be stated to be of very limited import, and which might not be generally felt or understood ; and he was sensible of the dan- ger of brinofinof France forward in the scene. The last ob- jection also made him naturally averse to any public appeal, because such a measure would give open grounds to France for interference and action. His object therefore was natu- rally to effect the abandonment of her designs by Russia through a similar kind of management ; to dissuade the Em- peror of Russia from perseverance in his projects by statement and argument; and by showing the dangers which threatened the two courts, to endeavor to separate Prussia from Russia, and to induce the former to join Austria in closer alliance ; under which, aided by Great Britain, and the German powers, they would be enabled to form a complete barrier against Russia on one side, and France on the other. I have reason to think the efforts of British councils with Prussia had an early appearance of being attended with complete success. The Prussian minister seemed cordial and decided ; but wlicn this progress towards the alliance had shown advances to maturity, the influence of the Emperor of Russia over the mind of the King of Prussia induced him to overthrow the scheme. The statements made to the Emperor of Russia had the effect of obliging him to lower his pretensions, and accede, in appearance at least, to the principle of negotiation; but from the security the Emperor felt in the King of Prussia's personal adherence to him, the advantages to be hoped by negotiation soon vanished ; for the Emperor considered him- self as secure of carrying his plans by negotiation as by mere authority. If the Prussian minister, whose sincerity was believed, had been cordially supported by his monarch, there was every reason to conclude that such a plan as I have detailed, if aided by a British minister, would have succeeded. Had Austria and Prussia reconciled their points of difference to the great consideration of limiting Russian encroachment, forming a barrier agamst her, and maintaining the balance of power in Europe, there can be little doubt but the plan above stated must, as has been affirmed, have completely succeeded. Rus- sia could not have ventured singly to contend against Austria, Prussia., and Great Britain, Bavaria, Holland, Hanover, Hesse, &c., when united against her, aided by the general voice of Europe. The Emperor of Russia still persevered in his designs; but with the pretence of satisfying tlie jealousies of his allies, he made a merit of offering that Thorn and its Rayon, Cracow IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 227 and its Rayon, should be neutralized, Prussia getting the whole of Saxony ; while Austria, from dread of war, felt a disposition to lend herself to the Polish point, provided she might restore the King of Saxony to his capital, and to that part of his dominions bordering on Austria. It is obvious that this arrangement would not have sub- stantially varied the state of things. Russia would have car- ried her frontier triumphantly near to the banks of the Oder ; Prussia would have been proved to be a mere vassal ; and Austria an intimidated power. The equilibrium of Europe would have been still lost, for a time at least, under Russian preponderance : it therefore occurred that a new effort ought to be made, and that the least objectionable mode of making such an effort was by an armed mediation of Great Britain, France, and Holland, possibly joined by other powers, for settling the points in discussion between Russia, Austria, and Prussia. The advantages of this position were : 1st. It was a measure not of war, but preventive of war. 2d. If war should ensue, it made the ground of it intelligi- ble and popular to all Europe, by the open refusal of Russia to admit of fair arrangement. 8d. It brought forward France in the best manner in which she could be brought forward as a mediating, not an invading power, for the accomplishment of a just settlement. 4th. It gave such immense accession of strength to Austria as would probably have intimidated Prussia by destroying all her hopes of getting the whole of Saxony, and of extending her possessions to the Rhine, and beyond it, by force ; and it would also have induced her to abandon at once the cause of Russia, and join the cause of Europe. When, however, this suggestion was opened to M. de Met- ternich, which I understood was the case, he recoiled at the very idea of bringing France into action, even as a mediator under the control of Great Britain ; he felt still some hopes that a relaxation would be admitted on the Saxon point, so as to give an escape to Austria, without the entire loss of her respectability and dignity. He thought another tentative might be made, and of course the above proposal was dropped. It could only be successful if embraced with cordiality and spirit by Austria; and in a case, where Austrian interests and security were pressing and immediate, and those of Great Britain more problematical and distant, it was the duty of the British minister to show a readiness to act if required, but by no means to force a reluctant feeling, or obtrude an unac- ceptable line of policy. A new tentative was accordingly now thought of by Prince 228 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR Hardenberg upon a joint proposal of the two courts confined to the Polish question. Tliorn, with the line to the Wartha, was demanded for Prussia ; and Cracow and its districts to the Nidda and Zamoski, with its territory, for Austria. To this overture the Emperor of Russia signified that he was resolved not to recede from his pretensions as to the duchy of Warsaw : but that as Thorn and Cracow had been considered as aggressive points, he would consent that Thorn and its Rayon, Cracow and its Rayon, should be formed into inde- pendent cities, and be made like Hanseatic cities, with inde- pendent privileges ; but upon these conditions, as a sine qua non, that in consideration of the concession made as to Thorn and Cracow, the integrity of Saxony should be simul- taneously confirmed to Prussia, and Mayence be made a city of the confederation of Germany, to be garrisoned by confede- rate troops. In announcing this determmation to Prince Metternich, Prince Hardenberg, whilst he expressed his acquiescence in it, and whilst he considered it as preferable not only to any quarrel, but even to any coldness with Russia, suggested the possibility that Cracow and Thorn might be possibly ceded, the one to Prussia, the other to Austria, on condition of their not being fortified ; and he offered some small accessions to Austria in Silesia, in compensation for minor cessions to be made to Prussia in return ; and further suggested the pro- priety of demanding from the Emperor of Russia the nature of the government and constitution he intended to give to the kingdom of Poland, in order that the arrangements as to the parts of Poland still remaining to the two powers might be modified. From all the above considerations and data, it became a most delicate question to examine, whether, if the great powers could not be brought to agree, it would be most politic to bring matters to a decision, which might lead to arms, to a public declaration of the opinion of Europe in a congress, or to keep matters in suspense, and negotiation open for a favorable moment, and finally to manage by delays. The latter question depended much upon the principle of actual possession, or such possessions as might be privately contemplated and obtained. The great obstacle was, that Russia was not only in military possession of the duchy of Warsaw, but also of Holstein. If she could be induced to retire from the latter, there would be little difficulty as to the rest. Prussia could be arranged, and she had Saxony in possession ; and the longer her possession the better her title. Hanover was in British possession : Holland also en- joyed the same right. Hesse, too, was in possession ; Baden IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 229 and Wirtemburg- nearly so ; and arrangements might be made with Bavaria. Austria was similarly circumstanced. Sardinia might take Genoa; and France, Spain and Por- tugal. In this state of things, and under all the great embarrass- ments and difficulties that presented themselves, the assem- bling of a general congress at Vienna appeared the most desirable arrangement. CHAPTER XX. Strictures on the project of the Emperor Alexander— dangers to be appre- hended from it — its extreme unpopularity— opposed by the English gov- ernment—Influence and preponderance of the Russian policy — High char- acter of Great Britain— State of aflTairs at Paris— Publicity of events after its occupation— Lord Burghersh's memoir— Plans of ground and battles— The allied sovereigns prepare to visit England— her triumphant efforts- Recapitulation of military events— Last struggle of Napoleon— His design to attack Paris— Prince Schwartzenberg assembles the allied army— Intrigues and treachery — Napoleon deserted by his officers and troops— Public festivities at Paris— Anecdotes of the day — The author repairs to Toulouse — The Duke of Wellington appointed ambassador at Paris— Napoleon presented by his marshals with the act of the senate — Signs the act of abdication — Departs for Elba— Peace concluded with France— Reception of the allied sovereigns in London — George the Fourth and the Emperor Alexander — Preparations for the European congress — Splendid military reviews — Opinion of the Duke of Wellington — Inter- views with the Emperor of Russia. Before I dismiss the consideration of the policy of the Emperor of Russia, as to his fixed and determined projects upon Poland, I cannot avoid recording that many of the sin- cerest friends of His Imperial Majesty regarded with deep anxiety and sorrow the false system which he had unfortu- nately adopted. He now declared his determination of pos- sessing himself irrevocably, in defiance of his allies, and the universal voice of Europe, of almost the whole duchy of Warsaw ; while he meant to gratify, if possible, his friend the King of Prussia with the kingdom of Saxony. His de- sign was to erect all the Polish provinces attached to the Russian empire into a new kingdom, to be called the king- dom of Poland, and to be governed by the Russian Emperor under a free constitution. This measure was viewed in two lights : first, as a mere project of Russian aggrandizement, giving her an accession of four millions of subjects, and in fact the keys of Berlin and Vienna.; and secondly, as obtain- ing a complete command over Prussia, and a most dangerous influence in Germany, rendering also the former subservient to Russian views as a vassal power. U 230 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR The king of Prussia, by the above measures, would be driven to compensate the loss of his frontiers by a measure extremely unpopular throughout Germany; and under this view, the idea of a free constitution for Poland was consider- ed as a false pretext. It added weight to alleged projects of Russian ambition, by exposing the policy of the Emperor Alexander to the charge of duplicity, as regarded his Polish subjects, and of injustice to the king of Saxony. It was, moreover, taking uujust advantage of the King of Prussia, assuming a threatening attitude towards Austria, and an undue influence over Germany ; usurping, in short, a preponderance which might be fatal to Europe. This arrangement was viewed also on the principle that the Emperor of Russia's design, as to giving his new Polish kingdom a free constitu- tion, was sincere ; that he really intended, on the principles he proposed, to erect twelve millions of Poles into a distinct kingdom, and to separate all the Russian-Polish provinces from the Russian empire for that purpose; to govern that kingdom by a separate constitution exclusively Polish : viz. a Polish senate, Polish chambers of police and finance, and a Polish army ; all his Russian governors, employes and troops, to be removed within the ancient limits of Russia. In the event of this latter plan succeeding, the danger to p]urope was considered the same, if not greater at the mo- ment ; but it was compensated by the prospects it held out, that at no distant period Poland, having acquired at once free- dom and consistency, might, when Alexander was no more, become impatient of subserviency to a Russian monarch. In its consequent struggle it might be supported by the neigh- boring states in establishing its independence, by choosing a sovereign from among its own hereditary race of princes. This latter view of the subject caused, I believe, some alarm among His Imperial Majesty's Russian subjects, who were sensible of its more than possible danger, and who thought themselves bound in duty to resist in their monarch a project at once deemed dangerous and chimerical. It was, however, to promote this great event (as a measure of duty early im- posed on his conscience, and according to his own creed) that the Emperor was determined to act. For this he was ready to resign all the reputation, character and glory he had ac- quired ; to be no longer considered as the savior, the pacifica- tor of Europe, but to be looked on as a monarch who disre- garded treaties and engagements for an object of ambition and caprice; and to incur, finally, the odium of many of his own subjects, and defy the sentiments of Europe. Great Britain, from her unrelenting opposition to the plans of Buonaparte, had long been considered as the only remain- IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 231 ing bulwark of the European continent ; and the success of her resistance, added to her immense contribution to the gene- ral cause, had raised her to the highest elevation of character, commanding the admiration and applause of the nations of Europe. The magnanimous efforts of the Emperor of Russia, his unparalleled firmness and constancy, his multiplied victories, and his unrelenting perseverance, crowned with ultimate gen- erosity and moderation towards France, turned aside gradual- ly the current of admiration from Great Britain, and directed the gratitude of the world as due to the Russian Emperor. When the settlement of France, and the treaty of Paris, came under discussion, it may be affirn)ed, without exaggeration, that the Emperor of Russia stood upon the most elevated pin- nacle of human grandeur that was ever attained by a mon- arch. The glory of Great Britain was eclipsed before him : but from the moment of his opening his Polish project, his splendor began gradually to decrease, till it almost vanished, and the untarnished character of Great Britain rose again to its former superiorit}^ It was at this time generally known that the minister of Great Britain had submitted to the Emperor a most strongly reasoned argument against his Polish projects ; but the se- quel of the congress of Vienna demonstrated what Russian power originally planned, Russian means were enabled, in spite of all t]]e efforts of Great Britain, in a great measure to accomplish. The whole tenor of the correspondence above alluded to, should it ever come to light, is calculated, I will venture to say, to raise the character of the government of Great Britain as the real protectress of the true equilibrium of Europe, and to mark the Emperor of Russia's conduct as a mere attehipt by the removal of French tyranny in the south to substitute Russian predominance in the north, and to characterize this spirit as founded upon the most dangerous of public principles. It was evident, from the tenor of the diplomacy at this crisis, that, from the good principles inculcated on the one side, and the mistaken ones vindicated on the other, the confidence of the continent in the British character rose in a considera- ble degree, so as to induce every nation to view, with dimin- ished jealousy, her maritime preponderance, and to consider their own safety as combined in the policy of supporting it; whilst, on tiie other hand, Russia was held up to the jealousy and hatred of Europe ; and every nation was induced to be- lieve that it was necessary for their preservation to combine against Russian power. As Russia, moreover, from her con- duct, could no longer hope to effect a combination against the / 232 NARRATH^E OF THE WAR maritime power of Great Britain, she was sensible that her kingdom was so circumstanced, in regard to commerce, and that her interests were so intimately connected with the con- sumption of British produce, that she could not interdict her intercourse with England without serious internal danger to herself. To revert to the state of affairs in the capital of the French empire : there remains little more for me to detail, as the public prints of the day, and the intercourse which was now established with England, gave the full accounts of all trans- actions, military and political, from the moment when the al- lied armies entered Paris. Besides, ample particulars are af- forded in an able memoir, which I have before alluded to, of Lord Burghersh. It winds up with accuracy and brevity the most important events of this period ; and I would refer my readers especially to the plans of ground and battles which it presents, and which I have not been able to procure with so much precision. The sovereigns of Russia and Prussia, attended by all the military heroes of the day, now prepared to embark for the shores of Great Britain, to gratify and render homage to the powerful and enlightened sovereign of that nation ; who had never ceased, under every conflicting disadvantage, perseve- ringly to oppose alike the outrageous views of jacobinism and the designs of despotism. The magnanimous efforts of the English people were at length justly rewarded by the interesting scenes of victory and triumph which the arrival of the sovereigns and warriors of Europe occasioned in London. To recapitulate, in a few words, the close of the military events, as far as they came within my knowledge, is all that now remains for me to do to wind up this humble narrative. It was on the 31st that Napoleon returned to Fontainebleau, v/hen he was joined by Marshal Marmont, whom he ordered to take up a defensive line at Essonne and Corbeil, which position he inspected himself on the following days, with a view of making an offensive movement on Paris. For this purjx)se he gave the necessary orders, and formed his dispo- sitions on the 5th of April. Prince Schwartzenberg, in consequence of the intelligence of Buonaparte's movement, inarched from Paris, and assem- bled his forces at Lanjunais. The whole of Marshal Blucher's and Prince Schwartzenberg's army were then collected, except the guards and reserves, which occupied Paris ; and the marshals took up their head-quarters at Chevilly. The negotiations and dispatching of emploijes and couriers here commenced ; and there was no end to the diplomacy, m GERMANY AND FRANCE. 233 manoeuvring, and treachery that appeared to reign on all sides. But glorious as the moment was for the allies, and for Englishmen in particular, it was an awful lesson for ambition to see a mighty chief deserted, one by one, by all his great companions in arms, whom he had raised and called to their present glory ; and to witness those troops, whom he had so often led to victory and triumph, under the animating cries of Vive r Empereur, now turning from their colors, and de- manding only la paix et leur roi legitime ! In the city every demonstration of joy, luxury, and gaiety was exhibited. The theatres and public places, the balls, and the entertainments, kept the conquering armies in a fever ; and no soldier who witnessed the takhig possession of Paris could ever have pictured to himself such a scene, while it is impossible that it should ever be effaced from his memory. Amongst the various anecdotes of the day, I cannot help here inserting an extraordinary adventure and escape, which happened one night to myself I had been at the opera, and afterwards at a ball, and had returned late to the hotel de Montesquieu, in la rue de Monsieur, where I was fortunate enough to be quartered ; and here it may be observed, that on the entrance of the hostile armies into Paris the best hotels were taken possession of by the sovereigns and their suite, the ambassadors, general officers,. and ministers belonging to, or at the respective head-quarters. In these magnificent palaces, for some time, the new inmates lived at free quarters, until regularity and order became established in the capital. I can never forget the kindness with which I was treated at the hotel above mentioned, nor the hospitality and friendship 1 received from its possessors. Returning home at two o'clock in the morning, as I before stated, I partook of my usual sup- per, which was always prepared for me, and taking off my hussar jacket and trappings, I threw them on my bed. On my pelisse I w^ore my stars and foreign orders (some of which I had set in diamonds). My bed-room and suite of apartments were on the 7'ez de chaussee, and large French folding sashes opened into the garden, which communicated with the boule- vards that surround Paris. These, owing to the heat of the night, were all open. On the tables in my room were my red dispatch boxes, containing interesting and valuable papers and documents, and every thing of real worth I had in the world. Disembarrassing myself of my clotlies, and overcome by fatigue and sleep, I got into bed, and my slumbers, fortunately, were profound, for when I awoke in the morning I found thieves, (and no doubt assassins, if I had stirred from my heavy U2 234 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR sleep) had entered in the night, and had cleared the room of every article belonging to me ; my official boxes, uniforms, and clothes taken from my very bed ; my swords and pistols ; all my stars and orders ; and in short every thing I possessed. I actually found myself without the means of getting up ; for the commodes were also pillaged, and the whole clean carried off. This daring robbery made much noise at Paris at the moment, and every effort was tried by the police to lead to a discovery ; but all proved vain. I had reason to believe after- wards that a French valet de chambre I engaged on entering Paris was an accomplice, if not the chief actor in this robbery, from the following circumstance. It will be remembered that the Duke of Wellington closed his glorious career in the Peninsular war at the battle of Toulouse, after defeating Marshal Soult before that town on the 10th of April. After the arrangements were entirely completed, by the arrival of all the ministers in the city, and more especially by the presence of the English secretary of state for foreign affairs, one of the first acts of this ever-to-be lamented individual was to take the King's pleasure on ap- pointing that warrior His Majesty's representative at Paris, who had, with the aid and means afforded him, conquered peace in the Peninsula. It was my lot to receive my sove- reign's commands through the principal secretary of state to proceed to Toulouse to offer the Duke of Wellington iJie post of His Majesty's ambassador to His Most Christian Majesty. I likewise was the individual who, on a former occasion, delivered to my commander the insignia of the Order of the Garter; as the letter in the Appendix will show. I arrived at Toulouse on the evening the Duke of Wel- lington was engaged at the hotel de ville at a magnificent ball, given by the inhabitants to the British army. It will not be easy for me to forget that moment of my life. The embassy was accepted by the Duke of Wellington ; and I returned to Paris without rest, and (what opened my eyes to my robbery) without a valet de chambre. The rascal absconded at Tou- louse, probably in the full possession of all my interesting valuables, and I never heard more of him. But to return to more serious and important matters, anrl to wind up the concluding days of Napoleon's history at this period. It appears that after haranguing his army on the 5th of April, and promising them (as before mentioned) the pil- lage of Paris for forty-eight hours, amidst the cries of Vive r Empereiir, Marshal Ney and all the chief officers assembled round him ; when the former stepping forv/ard, at once an- IN GERMANS' AND FRANCE. 235 nounfted to him that he was no longer Emperor, and present- ed him the act of his dethronement by the senate. Buonaparte appeared thunderstruck, and with violent im- petuosity at first seemed to resist the order of the senate. But no longer finding fealty among his troops, nor devotion in his officers, he was soon convinced of the absurdity and folly of resistance. Referring himself therefore to the direction of Marshals Oudinot, Victor, and Caulaincourt, he sent them to Paris, to m.ake the best terms for himself and his family, and to obtain what other objects they could for his advantage. Marshal Marmont's corps d'armee had passed over to the allies on the 4th of April ; and, as the first French general, he placed himself at the disposition of Louis XVIII. On the lltli of April Napoleon signed the formal act of abdication, having failed in all attempts at gainmg various conditions which he had attempted to negotiate. (For the act of treaty, see Appendix.) Napoleon took his departure for the island of Elba, ac- companied by four commissioners from each of the great powers, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. On the 25th of April the plenipotentiaries of the allied forces and the Count d'Artois signed a formal armistice. The allied armies were to evacuate France ; and, on the 30th of May, a definitive peace was concluded, and signed with Louis XVIII. •Such was the close of this eventful campaign, restoring the legitimate dynasty of the Bourbons to the throne of France, and rendering Germany, and indeed Europe, once more independent. Little was it supposed at this moment, when the tyranny of Napoleon ceased, and every fair indulgence had been granted to France in the terms she had received from the allied powers, that the flame of war was shortly to be re- kindled, and that the hero whose exit was believed to l)e eternal was shortly to reappear upon the same theatre, under uiore extraordinary circumstances, and seconded by a more powerful impulse of public feeling throughout France, and amongst his legions, than by any possible reasoning could either be accounted for or explained. The details of the campaign of 1815, ending with the glorious battle of Waterloo, with all the various interesting circumstances and events at the first opening of the congress of Vienna, are points of too mucli magnitude to be treated of at the close of the narrative of 1813 and 1814, which I have endeavored to relate. At some future period, if the present work, and its predecessor on the Peninsular War, 236 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR should be approved, it may be my lot to offer to the public the whole account of the transactions of Vienna to which I was a witness, and in which I was engaged ; as also to give all the military details and correspondence of the different officers employed under me, with the Austrian and Prussian armies, when they again took the field on Napoleon's escape from the island of Elba. Declining for the present to enter into the great and im- portant events that occurred in 1815, it remains for me merely to state generally to my readers, which I shall presently do, what the military position and forces of the allied powers ap- peared to be for meeting another new and unexpected cam- paign. Hereafter I may give a farther development of the whole of the proceedings of the year. The allied sovereigns, except the Emperor of Austria, as it is well known, paid London a visit at the conclusion of the peace of Paris. Their brilliant reception, the enthusiasm which was demonstrated, especially in favor of the Silesian hero, the sumptuous and splendid entertainments that were exhibited by a British sovereign and his city of London, which in one single fete to Alexander expended 25,000/. sterling, are subjects so well Imown, and still so recently in the recol- lection of many, that it would be entirely superfluous to de- scribe them. I constantly accompanied my friend Marslial Blucher to all the feasts and diimers given to him ; and it wag my pride and pleasure to translate his animated speeches, which were always given in German, to the public company. Two other points, also, I wish to record, as deeply rooted in my memory. I was the only individual present, when I saw England's king clothe his august ally, the Emperor of Russia, with the robes of the garter. The graceful manner and indescribable amiability with which the one performed his task, and the difficult and awk- ward mode in which the other ultimately managed to get into and put on the magnificent paraphernalia, cannot easily be forgotten; indeed the scene surpassed description. Again ; it was on the steps at the fete at Guildhall that I knelt dowm and kissed my sovereign's hand on his appointing me his ambassador to the court of Vienna, and at the same moment nominating me one of his lords of the bed-chamber ; a ch'cumstancc entirely unlocked for and unexpected by me. These appointments carried to my mind the grateful reflec- tion that I had done, my duty. Afler the series of brilliant rejoicings in England, the sove- reigns returned to Paris, preparatory to repairing to Vienna, and making arrangements for the European congress that was to be assembled. IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 237 It would be wrong m me, however, to o^'erlook, without comment, the two great military reviews and manoeuvres that took place in France previous to the allied troops withdrawmg from their cantonments within that country ; namely, those of all the Russian forces at Vertu, and subsequently of the Aus- trians at Dijon. The concentration of two such immense masses of foreign force in two very small champs de parade, in the midst of the French empire, will, it is hoped, remain a useful memento of the vicissitudes of war to French vanity, and a glorious re cord of European valor. It was either on the 9th or 10th of September, 1814, that I left Paris, to witness the great review of the Russian army, for which preparations had been makhig for nearly a month before. The number of the forces collected was so considera- ble, that it was not easy to bring them into a space sufficiently small for the parade movements of review ; but it was at length effected; and they mustered, when we saw them, 28,000 cavalry, 132,000 infantry, and 540 pieces of caimon. This was made known from field returns, which were given to the sovereigns who were present. I was accompanied by my aides-de-camp, Sir Henry Brown, Colonel Harris, Captain Charles Wood ; and I ought here to particularize especially the services of Mr. Jolm Bidwell, of the foreign office, who was also with me. This gentleman had been attached to all my fortunes since the moment of my landing in the north of Germany. His constant and unremitting labor in carrying forward the various and voluminous correspondence with the foreign and war departments, I never can too highly appre- ciate ; and it is always the most grateful task for my mind to acknowledge the merit, and to state what I feel I owe to the exertions and zeal of others. Sir Henry Hardinge also was of my party, having made his expedition en courier to Vertu in a manner that showed his active and tried zeal in the great cause, of gallantry, and his devotion to the service. The day was exceedingly sultry, but tolerably clear; an the spot where the head-quarters first assembled to have a sort of bird's-eye view of the v/hole, was a small hill in the centre of a large plain, near the village of Vertu, a short dis- tance from Chalons. Several English ladies, togetlier with all the princesses, duchesses, and first persons of Paris, were as- sembled (having been invited), and made parties to proceed from the capital to witness this magnificent spectacle. Amongst our own countrywomen were Eadies Castlereagh, Comber- mere, Grantham, Mrs. Arbuthnot, Miss Fitzclarence, and others, whose names it would be tedious to enumerate, who graced this most brilliant and unparalleled sight. 238 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR In going through the field, several of the ladies rode in company with the gallant chiefs; and English beauty was signalized by the Emperor of Russia's presenting a beautiful black charger to one of our fair countrywomen, to carry her through the ceremonies of the day ; but I never riglitly un- derstood the feeling that recalled this war-horse back to the imperial stables on the following morning. A flag-staff" had been placed on the top of the hill, having an ensign ready to be hoisted on the arrival of the sovereigns at tlie spot. We were on horseback about seven o'clock; and at eight the King of Prussia, attended by the commanders-in-chief of the allied armies, the ambassadors of nearly all the powers of Europe, and many of their prime ministers, with several of the French marshals, and an immense staff" of aides-de-camp, &c. &c. began to ascend the height. On the arrival of the sovereigns at the spot fixed upon for them, the ensign was unfurled, and a salvo of guns announced their presence ; and the whole Russian army tlien assembled was seen drawn up in three lines, extending as far as the eye could reach. The sun glittered on their arms, and on the drawn sabres of the cavalry, to a distance that appeared almost imagmary. The eye had scarcely time to comprehend so vast a spectacle, when a single gun fired from the height where we stood was the signal for three hurrahs from the troops. Even at this distant day these hurrahs sound freshly in my ears : a second gun gave the time for a general salute. The cannon and musketry began at once, and the fire ran aiong the three extended lines, showing more distinctly than any thing else could have done the vast space they occupied, by the distant flaslies and retiring sound of the musketry. I for- get exactly how long a time was necessary for three rounds from these saluting tens of thousands. We rode down the hill, and the Russians broke from their lines into grand columns of regiments ; and no one but a sol- dier can conceive the beauty of this great simultaneous change. A spot was then fixed upon for these masses to march by tlie sovereigns ; and the Emperor of Russia putting himself at the head of the leading regiments, thus formed in colunm, marched past, and saluted the Emperor of Austria and King of Prussia ; then placing himself by tlieir side to see the rest of tlie army go by. The whole of tlie day was only sufficient to give time for a re-formation into line, and an opening of ranks, along whicii the cavalcade of monarchs and their im- mense suite rode. The Emperor of Russia appeared greatly occupied with the Duke of Wellington (who was at this period our ambas- sador at Paris), as if anxious for liis opinion of what was IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 239 passing before them ; and his whole attention was given to him when not taken up with his fair companions, who rode on both his flanks. Thus closed the first day, never to be forgotten by those who witnessed the grand military display it presented. Great dinners at different bivouacs were given on the ground ; and my party of ladies and friends will make me long remember the day. The Duke of Wellington and Sir Lowry Cole, and various military friends, met together in the evening fit my quarters, full of admiration of the move- ments they had seen ; and I well remember the Duke of Wellington saying to me, " Well, Charles, you and I never saw such a sight before, and never shall again : the precision of the movements of those troops was more like the arrange- ments of a theatre than those of such an army — I never saw any thing like it." Much, however, as the duke was struck with the extraor- dinary perfection of tlie Russian formations, he was by no means satisfied with their slowness ; and I remember a re- mark from him, " that his little army would move round them in any direction whilst they were effecting a single change ;" an opinion which all who heard it re-echoed. On the following morning this great army heard divine service in masses of 20,000 each ; and the following day the Emperor selected from them 10,000 men, to be added to his guards. Afterwards these forces broke up for the cantonments, from which they had been drawn for this review. The impression given by this great military parade was certainly very favorable to the efficiency of the Russian army. The artillery was in beautiful order, and more particularly the horse-artillery, every part of the equipment appearing perfect; and the wild-looking little horses, three abreast, gal- loped along with the well-polished nine-pounder, as though they were scarcely sensible of its weight. These horses are Tartars, and are of excellent blood, and always keep their condition beautifully, as I have before stated. The clothing and appointments appeared excellent ; and the horses of the hussars in perfect order. On onr return to Paris, it was said that the Emperor Alex- ander called the Duke of Wellington to fix some time for him to see the English army, and that the duke said they might be seen on the morrow if Alexander wished it. I be- lieve they were reviewed on the day following, without pre- paration of any kind, under Montmartre, where they were put through the movements of the battle of Salamanca. It is not for me, however, to describe this army nor their exhibition. 240 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR The Austrians had assembled all their troops at Dijon ; and here the sovereigns now repaired to review this army. The Emperor Francis had determined to visit his Italian states previous to his return to Vienna, and it was convenient to his route to take Dijon in his line to Vienna and Milan. A re- turn of the strength of the army, as it appeared, will be found in the Appendix. Their movements were confined to a simple feu de joie^ and deploying before their majesties. The ground was neither so favorable nor so picturesque as at Vertu ; neither were there any of those temptations at hand which always add zest to military spectacles. The inhabitants of the interior of France were now not well disposed to the Austrians. Few persons moved out of the town of Dijon : the day was not favorable, and the spectacle purely military. The Emperor of Austria gave a grand convert dinner after the review, and proceeded on the following day on his route to Italy. The other sovereigns repaired to their different destinations. CHAPTER XXI. Military opinions, and basis of operations for the campaign of 1815— Meet- ing of the great congress at Vienna — Tidings of Napoleon's escape from Elba — Tumult and dismay in France — Military conference and arrange- ments for the new campaign — Interesting military memoirs— Opinions of Prince Schwartzenberg — Views of Austria — iEstimate of relative forces— Considerations and military sentiments of the Prince Field-Mar- shal, Commander-in-Chief of the allied forces; of the chief of the Prus- sian etat-major, General Knesebeck; and the military ideas of the Duke of Wellington on the approaching campaign in Belgium, sent from Brus- sels to Vienna. Having now brought my military narrative to a conclusion as far as the year 1814, I shall not, as before stated, enter upon the last epoch of Buonaparte's career, nor into any of the critical details of the congress of Vienna. I am never- theless disposed to gratify my military readers by adding to this work those recorded military opinions which formed the basis of the operations and movements of the allied forces in the campaign of 1815, previous to the battle of Waterloo, These memoirs of some of the greatest military charac- ters of the age, must be invaluable for the study and perusal of every officer. It is on this account that I have annexed them to the present vvorlc ; and I shall do so without further comment, reserving to myself, when I enter into the history IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 24 1 of the year 1815, to show how far these sentiments were acted upon or departed from. It will be in the recollection of my readers, that the great congress at Vienna assembled early in the year 1815. At that period, the eight great European powers, — Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, France, Holland, Spain, and Portu- gal, — nominated their plenipotentiaries to assemble at Vienna for the purpose of a final settlement of the affairs of Europe. The congress had scarcely proceeded to business, and to the important objects of their assembling, when Napoleon Buonaparte's extraordinary escape from Elba, and his landing at Cannes, were announced ; and the rapid march of his suc- cesses, the tumult and dismay in France, and the retreat of the king from Paris, soon turned the political disquisitions at Vienna into military conferences. At the first of these military conferences that were then held, the following arrangements were laid down as the basis upon which the allied forces were to enter upon the new campaign.* Protocol of a Military Conference held at Vienna on the Slst of March, 1815. A une conference tenue en presence de Sa Majeste I'Era- pereur de Russie par Son Altesse le Prince Royal de Wurt- emberg, par son Altesse M. le Prince de Schwartzenberg, Marechal et President du Conseil de Guerre de S. M. I'Em- pereur d'Autriche, et de M. le Marechal Prince de Wrede, M. le Prince Wolkonksy, aide-de-camp de S. M. I'Empereur de Russie, Son Excellence Milord Cathcart, General-en-Chef de S. M. le Roi d'Angleterre, et M. le Baron de Knesebeck, Lieutenant-General au service de S. M. le Roi de Prusse, on est convenu sur les points suivans : II se formera trois grandes armees sur le Rhin, savoir : 1. Armee sur le Haut Rhin, sous les ordres du Prince Schwartzenberg. 2. Armee sur le Bas Rhin, sous les ordres du Marechal Blucher. 3. Armee dans les Pays Bas, sous les ordres du Marechal le Due de Wellington. * The Austrian force entering into the campaign of 1815 is nearly the same as detailed in the return in the Appendix, of the troops collected at Dijon. The PrusGian force is also annexed in the Appendix. V 242 NARRATIVE OF TflE WAR L'armee du Haut Rhin sera composee de— Autrichiens 150,000 Bavarois 65,000 Wurtembergeois 25,000 Badois 16,000 Hessois de Darmstadt Total 8,000 264,000 L'armee sur le Bas Rhin sera composee de 153,000 Prus- siens. L'armee des Pays Bas par les troupes Angloises, Hol- landoises, et Hanovriennes. Le reste des troupes du nord de I'Allemagne, savoir, — Hesse-Cassel, Mecklenbourg, Nassau, Waldeck, Schwarz- burg", Reuss, Lippe, Anhalt, Saxe Royale, Saxe Ducale, 01- denbourg, Brunswick, et des villes Hanseatiques, — restent encore a distribuer dans les armees du Marechal Wellington et du Marechal Blucher. On a ete d'abord generalementde I'avis qu'il etoit evidem- ment necessaire de renforcer autant que possible le Duo de Wellington. On a remarque alors sur les inconveniens graves qui re- sulteroient militairement de toute mesure tendant a desor- ganiser un corps de 14 ou 15,000 hommes de bonnes troupes, a une epoque oil il est de la plus grand urgence a reunir sur les frontieres menacees un nombre suffisant de troupes alliees. On est convenu en suite sur les premiers cantonnemens a prendre par l'armee du Haut Rhin, savoir : L'armee Bavaroise, sous les ordres du Marechal Wrede, prendra les cantonnemens outre Mayence, Frankfort, et Manheim, et poussera une 'division sur la rive gauche du Rhin, Le Marechal Wrede se charge de la construction de deux tetes-de-ponts, une a Manheim, et une autre a Germersheim. Lc corps du Prince Royal de Wurtemberg cantonnera entre Bruchsal, Manheim, et Heidelberg, poussera une divi- sion sur la rive gauche du Rhin. Le corps d'armee du General Colloredo prendra ses can- tonnemens entre Bruchsal, Offenbourg, et Pforzheim. Le corps d'armee du General Prince de Hohenzollern can- tonnera entre Offenbourg, Freybourg, et Rothweil. La reserve Autrichienne sera cantonnee entre Heilbrun, Halle, Ulm, et Eslingen. L'armee Russe sous les ordres du Marechal Barclay de Tolly sera cantonnee entre Wiirzbourg, Nurembourg, et Bamberg. Les chefs d'etats-majors des differens corps se concerteront IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 243 dans une autre conference sur les details de differens can- tonnemens et routes militaires pour leurs corps d'armee. La garnison de Mayence se formera par Autrichiens 4000 Prussiens . . 4000 Bavarois 3000 De Frankfort, Isenbourg et Reuss .... 3000 De Nassau 1500 De Hesse-Cassel 4500 Mayence sera consideree comme une place d'armes pour les armees du Haut et Bas Rhin, La forteresse aura un gouverneur Autrichien et un com- mandant Prussien. Les Cours Allemandes les plus rappro- chees des frontieres Fran9aises seront incessamment invitees a prendre des mesures de police generale, pour empecher, autant que possible, Tespionnage de I'ennemi. After these general heads of disposition and agreement were entered into on the 31st of March, 1815, the following^ interesting memoirs were handed in for the consideration of the grand military assembly : — Opinions of Prince Schivartzenberg. Vienne, ce 20 Avril, 1815. A Touverture de cette campagne, I'Autriche part de cer- tains principes generaux. Le but de cette guerre est le repos et la securite de I'Eu- rope, menacees par le caractere entreprenant et hardi d'un chef et d'un armee licencieuse. Les forces qu'on a destinees a cette entreprise peuvent etre au moins evaluees au double de celles qui leur sont op- posees par le chef des Fran9ais. Elles ne peuvent done se trouver en inferiorite, que dans le cas — Ou, en se divisant trop, elles offriroient a I'ennemi une re sistance trop faible sur de certains points, et I'occasion de re- unir avantageusement ses moj'-ens d'aggression. Ou bien, en se resserrant trop elles formeroient un colosse immobile, qui n'auroit pas les moyens de se devellopper, et entraineroit meme I'impossibilite de pourvoir aux subsistances des armees. Ou bien, si une partie des armees se portoit en avant avec trop de precipitation, et sans avoir suffisamment assure ses communications centre les mouvemens qui seroient a re- douter de la part des habitans du pays, s'ils etoient appuyes par les garnisons des forteresses qu'on seroit oblige de laisser en arriere. 244 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR Detruire Tarmee et son chef est done Is premier but de cette guerre — eviter les dangers surmentionnes en est le second. II seroit dangereux de se laisser aller a des illusions flat- teuses : — le terns qui pouvoit etre favorable a un projet d'Jn- vasion est deja passe, les armees des allies etant generalement trop eloignees des frontieres de la France. Les moyens de resistance des Francais sont nombreux, et nous ne pourrona esperer de les combattre avec avantage, qu'en autant que nous nous attacherons a opposer un grand esprit d'ordre mili- taire et I'accord le plus parfait dans nos mesures, au principe du desordre et de brigandage, que Napoleon ne manquera pas de mettre en usage contre nous. Ces considerations nous portent a etablir les principes sui- vans : 1. Chacune des armees doit s'attacher a la base d'operation qui lui est la plus naturelle. 2. Toutes les armees doivent avoir un objet d'operation commun entr'elles, afin qu'elles puissent diriger tous leurs efforts vers le raeme point. 3. La route qui conduit de la base a ce point d'operation, doit etre suffisamment assuree, soit par des retranchemens, soit par I'etablissement de corps de reserve; — en un mot, I'armee doit se trouver dans la plus parfaite securite, quant a ses derrieres. II n'est pas probable que I'ennemi puisse opposer 400,000 aux 800,000 hommeSj-que nous mettons en movement contre la France : il sera done force, ou de diviser ses forces en adoptant un systeme de lignes, etendues, ce qui ne pent nianquer de le conduire a sa perte ; ou bien, il reunira la majeure partie de ses forces pour nous attaquer avec superi- orite sur un point. "4. Les armeea qui avancent doivent done etre disposees de maniere qu'elles puissent contraindre I'ennemi a decouvrir entierement une partie de ses possessions, s'il etoit tente d'agir offensivement d'un cutre cote, 5. Le moyen le plus efficace pour atteindre ce but seroit de menacer differens points assez distans les uns des autres pour pouvoir, dans le cas qu'une de nos armees essuyat des revers, retablir les affaires en agissant avec vigueur d'un cote different, I'empecher de poursuivre ses avantages deja acquis, et I'obliger peut-dtre a gagner avec rapidite un point oppose de sa monarchic, Ce n'est qu'ainsi qu'une de nos armees battue gagneroit le tems necessaire pour prendre I'offensive, et que meme en ad- mettant un second revers, I'ennemi finiroit par succomber a la continuite de ses efforts. IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 245 La base d'operation naturelle a I'Autriche n'est peut-^tre que cells qui favoriseroit, en la ligne la plus directe, la com- munication de son armee d'ltalie avec celle de TAllemagne, ainsi que le secours reciproque qu'elle pourroit se porter. Son aile droite est appuyee par la place de Mayence ; sa gauche par les gorges du Piemont ; son centre par celle de la Suisse. La base d'operation de I'armee Prussienne s'etend sur sa gauche jusqu'a Mayence ; sa droite est couverte par Parmee Angloise: done les operations, concertees avec les mouve- mens de la premiere, ne peuvent etre basees que par la Hol- lande et les Pays Bas. Celles-ci paroissent les bases naturelles, qui s'oftrent aux puissances mentionnees ci-dessus; il n'y a que I'armee Russe qui en soit depourvue dans cette guerre, attendu qu'elle se trouve a une trop grande distance de son pays. La tache qu'elle a a remplir se presente d'elle-meme ; elle doit rem- plir le grand intervalle, que la nature meme des operations des armees alliees Autrichiennes, Angloises et Prussiennes formera infailliblement. Elle doit etre prete a porter des secours a celle d'entre les armees alliees qui en auroitbesoin, non pas comme une armee de reserve, mais placee sur la meme ligne ; enfin, de pouvoir se porter a droite ou a gauche selon le besoin. L'ofTensive des Autrichiens doit etre dirigee sur la gauche, et, en partant de son aile gauche, celle des Anglois et des Prussiens sur la droite ; et par consequent, partant de leur aile droite, il en resulte, qu'independarament des autorites militaires, il y a trois grandes masses a disposer, savoir : 1. Une armee combinee Autrichienne sur le Haut Rhin, forte de 165,000 ('orps de Bavarois 60,000 Wurtembergeois 25,000 Troupes de Bade 16,000 Do. Darmstadt . . . . . 8,000 Armee Autrichienne en Italic . . . . 70,000 Total . . . 344,000 2. Armee Prussienne et Angloise, consistant en Anglois, Hanovriens, Hollandois .... 60,000 Prussiens 160,000 Saxons et Hessois . • . . . . 30,000 Total . . . 250,000 3. Armee Russe, forte de . . . . 200,000 V2 246 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR Les bases de ces armees sont donnees ; leur objet d'opera- tion est Paris, et la masse de Tarmee Francjoise par-tout ou elle se presentera. En consequence de ces principes, I'armee Prussienne feroit un mouvement sur sa droite, et I'armee Autrichienne sur sa gauche, aussitot que I'armee Russe seroit arrivee; I'operation principale ne peut cependant commencer avec avantage, avant que 50,000 Russes n'aient rejoint I'ar- mee Prussienne aupres de Coblentz, et que le meme nombre ii'ait fait sa jonction avec I'armee Autrichienne aupres de Manheim. Le g-ros de I'armee Russe se porteroit en marches forcees sur Mayence et Coblentz ; et quand la tete de leurs colonnes y sera arrivee, on sera a portee de jug-er, si c'est sur la droite que le corps Anglo-Prussien, ou sur la gauche que le corps Autrichien aura le plus besoin de son appui. Tels sont les principes generaux sur lesquels il faut tomber d'accord avant d'ouvrir la campagne. Pour les details des operations, pour les moyens les plus propres a attendre le but general, il faut s'en remettre k V ex- perience et aux lumieres des quatre generaux en chef; et eux-memes ne pourront les determiner, que quand leurs forces seront reunies, qu'ils connoitront celles des ennemis, et les positions qu'ils auront occupees. Cependant ces principes generaux devroient etre dictes par leurs Souverains respectifs aux quatre generaux en chef, pour leur direction generale. II resulte toutefois de cet expose, qu'une operation offensive ne peut etre ouverte avant le 16 de Juin. Tout ce que I'en- nemi pourroit vouloir entreprendre jusqu'a cette epoque, devroit etre soumis aux memes principes que nous venona d'etablir par rapport a I'ofTensive, c'est-a-dire, qu'un corps de troupes, attaque avec superiorite, se retireroit sans se comprometre, jusqu'a ce que tons les autres eussent fait des demonstrations energiques pour le degager. Si peut-etre des raisons majeures engagent S. M. I'Empe- reur de Russie a desirer la reunion des forces Russes entiere- ment sur un point, ou sur la droite ou sur la gauche, sans acceder au detachement propose de 50,000 hommes, on croit que cela n'attaqueroit pas essentiellement les principes gene- raux etablis dans ce memoire, pourvu que le total de cette armee occupe au plus t6t la position qu'on avoit indiquee en premiere ligne h I'armee de 100,000 hommes. IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 247 Considerations upon the military operations that may take place at different periods^ by the Prussian General Kne- sebeck. Vienne, ce 18 Avril, 1815. Par les memoires ci-joints on a tache de montrer : 1. La necessite de donner derechef de Tensemblc aux operations des difFerentes armees ; 2. De bien distinguer les epoques, afin de ne pas se trom- per sur le calcul des forces de I'ennemi. Essayons maintenant quelques considerations sur ces opera- tions memes. L'epoque, ou un mouvement isole et rapide pour le soutien de Paris auroit pu produire un grand resultat, paroit ^tre passee. Cette operation n'etoit bonne qu'aussi long-tems que le Roi de France etoit a Paris, et que Paris se maintenoit. La celerite de Buonaparte, et la decheance complette de I'armee Fran^aise, I'a fait manquer. Une autre question se presente pour le moment, savoir : Si I'on doit rester passif jusqu'a ce que I'armee Autrichi- enne sera arrivee sur le Rhin ; ou si les operations doivent commencer avec les forces rassemblees deja ; savoir done avec 50,000 hommes qui se trouvent deja sur le Haut Rhin, 50,000 Prussiens sur la JNIeuse, 43,000 de I'armee Anglo- Belgique. Les raisons qui parlent pour une telle offensive a I'instant, sont: 1. De soutenir le parti Royaliste du Midi de la France ct de la Vendee, avant que Buonaparte parvienne a le sup- primer. 2. D'empecher que Buonaparte ne profile pas de I'intervalle pour consolider son gouvernement, et gagner I'opinion de la nation, comme celle de I'armee s'est deja prononcee pour lui. II n'y a pas de doute que ces deux raisons sont d'une tres grande consequence ; mais ceux qui s'y opposent ne sont pas moins fortes. 1. II faut se demander, si I'entree des armees alliees sur le sol Fran9ais n'eveillera pas la nation et la ralliera autour de Buonaparte, au lieu de I'eloigner de lui. 2. Le memoire B. montre que la force disponible de Buo- naparte egalera la notre jusqu'a la fin de Mai ; savoir, qu'il pourra paroitre en campagne encore avec 120,000 hommes, apres avoir laisse des garnisons dans les places fortes, et des corps pour combattre la Vendee, le Midi, et observer Paris. A cela il faut compter, que les forteresses, que les allies trouveront a I'instant qu'ils auront passe les frontieres de la 248 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR France, et qu*ils doivent necessairement bloquer ou assie- ger, affoibliront tellement leurs armees, que Buonaparte en se concentrant derriere ces forteresses leur sera prepon- derant en forces. Si on ajoute a cela que les allies, par la situation geographique de la France, manoeuvrent sur le circuit du cercle, et que Buonaparte a ses forces concentrees dans le centre ; la situation militaire sera si defavorable pour lee armees alliees, s'ils entrent en France sans forces suf- fisantes, qu'une telle operation, autant que les raisons alle- guees semblent I'exiger, a trop de chances defavorables, qu'elle pourroit etre conseille autrement, que dans le seul cas, que la Suisse, en joignant see forces a celles des allies, permettroit un iibre passage a I'armee du Haut Rhin, et que cette expedition, qui se dirigeroit alors sur Lyon, seroit en m^me tems soutenue directement par la marche des troupes du Roi de Sardaigne sur Grenoble et Chambery, et indirecte- ment par les manoeuvres des armees de Blucher et de Wel- lington, qui auroient la tache d'attirer les forces de I'ennemi de leurs cotes, et de les occuper sans pourtant s'engager au- trement a un combat general, qu'a des chances tres fav^orables pour eux. Telles sont les considerations qui se presentent pour les operations qui pourroient avoir lieu pour le moment; celles de I'avenir semblent devoir etre bien distinguees pour les deux epoques marquees dans le memoire B. savoir celle au commencement du mois de Mai, ou quatre semaines plus tard. La premiere epoque demandera beaucoup plus de circon- spection pour les mouvemens que la second, qnoique le plan en general paroit pouvoir rester le meme. Devoit-on se decider a ne rien entreprendre pour le mo- ment, mais d'attendre jusqu'a ce qu'on pourra entrer en France, en forces, de toutes parts, il paroit que voici doivent etre les lignes fondamentales d'une telle operation. Battre les armees de Buonaparte, delivrer la nation Fran- chaise du joug sous Icquel elle gernit, tel est le but de la guerre. Tomber sur Tarmee Buonapartienne avec tant de forces quo possible ; done, diriger les mouvemens des differentes armees alliees de raaniere que jamais une d'elles risque d'etre accablee separement; mais au contraire, quo plusieurs doivent toutefois se trouver ensemble, et, s'il est possible, re- unis au jour de bataille generale ; voila le moyen d'atteindre CO but. II resulte de cette consideration, que si pour desti- tuer Buonaparte, Paris doit etre derechef Tobjet que les ar- ' mees alliees se proposent, ils doivent se trouver sur la meme hauteur avant do commencer un mouvement combine sur cette capitale. i IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 249 II semble done que Varmee de Wellington doit prendre position entre Enghien, Halle, et Gemappe, tenant des postee d'observation a Charleroi et sur sa droite jusqu'a Ostende. Cette armee doit regarder Anvers comme le point duquel ses operations doivent partir et ou elle doit s'etre reserve et prepare un asile au cas d'une stricte defensive ; enfin Anvers doit etre en Hollande pour I'armee Angloise ce qu'etoit Lis- bonne pour elle en Portugal. Au cas qu'elle se voit attaquee par des forces superieures, elle se retire sur cette direction, et y prend position jusqu'a ce que les operations des autres armees viendront la dcgager. L'armee de Blucher prendra position sur la rive droite de la Meuse, entre Namur, Huy, et I'Ourte. Cette armee s'etant eloignee de Mayence, prendra pour le moment Juliers ou Wesel pour place d'armes. Les circonstances que les capitaines experimentes de ces deux armees jugeront le mieux sur les lieux, leur indiqueront ce qu'il y aura a faire, et on laisse a leur sagesse d'en pro- fiter. On croit cependant devoir les prevenir, que jusqu'au com- mencement du mois de Juin, l'armee du Haut Rhin ne pourra pas etre rasserablee, ni passer cette riviere en forces. Le fardeau de la guerre pesera done jusque-la seul sur les forces reunies sur la Meuse, et le soutien de l'armee du Haut Rhin devra se borner a des diversions ou vers le Midi de la France ou vers la Lorraine. Des raisons majeures, comme par exemple la vraisemblance d'une contre-revolution a Paris, ou la certitude que I'ennemi, ayant ete dans la necessite de faire de fortes detachemens pour le Midi, ne se trouveroit pas en force du cote des Pays Bas, peuvent donner la possibilite de battre un corps d'armee de I'ennemi, ou de surprendre une des places fortes. Mais ei cependant ces raisons ne determineroient pas les deux ar- mees a prendre a I'instant une vive offensive, il paroit que pour le moment leurs operations doivent se borner a une defensive active, et de se soutenir reciproquement jusqu'a ce que l'armee du Haut Rhin pourra lier ses operations aux leurs. Quand les forces de I'ennemi tomberoient sur I'une de ces armees, sans que I'autre seroit pressee, celle-ci manceuvreroit en attendant sur le flanc de I'ennemi. Par exemple, quand l'armee de Wellington seroit contrainte de se retirer sur An- vers, et l'armee de Blucher pas pressee en meme terns, celle- ci s'avanceroit sur le flanc de I'ennemi pour degager l'armee de Wellington, avec recours de ne pas trop s'eloigner de la Meuse et des points de Namur et de Liege. De mime, quand l'armee de Blucher devroit ^tre menacee, I'armee de Wei- 250 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR lington passeroit la Meuse pour soutenir Blucher. Si I'ennemi se porteroit avec toutes ses forces du cote de la Moselle, les deux armees marcheront a la gauche sur Luxembourg et t^cheront de le couper de ses ressources. En meme terns un inouvement semblable se fera du cote de Manheim sur Treves par Tarmee du Haut Rhin. Dans cette position les deux armees resteront jusqu'a ce que I'armee du Haut Rhin passera le Rhin. Quand le mo- ment de ce passage sera venu, les armees de Blucher et de Wellington tacheront de le faciliter par un mouvement of- fensif de leur cote. L'armee du Haut Rhin continuera, en attendant, de se ras- sembler sur les lieux indiques. Le moment de son passage etant venu, elle se rassemblera vite sur un point, jettera des ponts et passera cette riviere, d'apres les circonstances ou a B^le ou entre Huninguen et Brisach, attirant I'attention de I'ennemi du cote de Spire par un corps qu'elle tiendra de ce cote. Le point d'appui de Tarmee du Haut Rhin doit rester derechef sur la Suisse, sans pourtant y passer qu'avec con- sentement du gouvernement Suisse. Mais comme il est in- dispensable pour l'armee Autrichienne d'avoir une communi- cation directe par la Suisse avec Tltalie, ainsi qu'il est de la plus haute consequence et pour les operations militaires en general, et pour la surete de la Suisse elle-meme, d'avoir un libre passage par Bale et Geneve, on entamera une negocia- tion avec le gouvernement Suisse, pour obtenir une route militaire entre la Souabe et I'ltalie, et le passage par les deux points indiques. La ligne d'operation de cette armee sera Bale, Befort, Langres, Muhlhausen, Epinal. D'apres cette esquisse on verra que les armees alliees ne formeront jusqu'a I'arrivee de l'armee Russe que deux grandes masses; I'une groupee sur la Meuse, I'autre du cote de la Suisse. La situation des circonstances a amene cette position ; et sans vouloir exposer i'armee de Wellington ;i un echec, il ne faudra rien y changer. Aussi se pourra-t-il que I'ennemi par-la se voit force de former de son cote dn meme deux armees ; done, de partager ses forces. Mais s'il re le fait pas, la trop grande distance entre la Meuse et le Rhin lui donne I'avantage de manoeuvrer long-tems sous la protection de ses forteresses et du Rhin, du cote de Stras- bourg, pendant qu'il pourra tombcr avec preponderance sur l'armee de la Meuse ; et s'il devroit reussir a la battre, de I'achever entierement avant qu'elle pourra etre soutenue. Ces considerations n'echapperont pas sans doute aux illus- tres capitaines qui commandent les deux armees de ce cote la, et les determineront a ne rien hazarder. IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 251 Si I'ennemi vouloit profiter de la lacune qui jusqu'a I'arri- vee des Russes se trouve entre I'armee du Haut Rhin et de la Meuse, et se Jeter dans cet intervalle, il semble qu'il faut etre bien d'accord de se porter sur ses communications de toutes parts. Voila, a ce qu'il paroit, la disposition generale jusqu'a I'arrivee des reserves et de I'armee Russe. Si les circon- stances n'ont pas change jusque-la, alors un mouveraent ge- neral pour I'interieur de la France pourra se faire avec as- surance de tous cotes. En attendant on aura soin de preparer a toutes les armees un train d'artillerie de siege, d'accelerer les marches des troupes en arriere, de les former en corps avant qu'ils passe- ront le Rhin, et de bien preparer les moyens pour rester, pen- dant toute la guerre, toujours au grand complet. L'armee d'ltalie ne peut entrer pour le moment dans ce calcul des operations, et doit agir separement jusqu'a ce que peut-etre a I'avenir elle pourra Tier ses operations directement a ceux des autres armees. Vienne, 24 Avril, 1815. D'apres les memoires successives que le soussigne a eu I'honneur de soumettre aux yeux des illustres Souverains, reste encore a faire I'esquisse, de quelle maniere qu'il faudra manoeuvrer, quand le moment sera venu, de marcher vers Paris, La situation de la France presente deux operations pour atteindre ce but : L'une, les allies ont suivi dans la derniere campagne, en s'avancant avec leurs plus grandes forces par les routes de Langres et de Dijon ; L'autre peut se faire par la droite, en portant les plus grandes forces entre la Marne et I'Oise. Considerant que les armees de Blucher et de Wellington partant de Mons et Namur n'auront a faire que la raoitie de chemin que ceux du Rhin, il paroit qu'il faudra donner la preference a la seconde ope- ration.. Si Ton s'y devroit resoudre, voici a ce qu'il paroit doivent etre les dispositions. Les corps de Wrede et du Prince Royal de Wurtemberg doivent marcher sur la Sarre ; I'armee Russe s'y portera de meme aussitot que possible. L'armee Autrichienne restera sur le Haut Rhin. Le quar- tier-general des Souverains sera pris a Fribourg: on t^chera de repandre de toutes parts les bruits, qu'on suivra a-peu-pres le meme plan de campagne que I'annee passee ; que la grande armee s'avanceroit derechef sur la route de Basle et Langres; 252 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR qu'elle seroit secouree par Tarmee d'ltalie et les Suisses ; que les Anglois auroient insiste de faire le sieg-e de Dunkerque, ce qui contraindroit Blucher de rester sur la defensive, et de faire une guerre methodique ; qu'il en etoit furieux, etc. etc. S'il est possible, il faut vendre de telles nouvelles et un tel plan a un des emissaires de Buonaparte, et en general rien negliger pour attirer les forces de Buonaparte vers les frontieres de la Suisse ou de I'ltalie. Si Ton reussit par ces stratagemes a detourner les forces militaires de Buonaparte de Paris, et de les attirer sur le Haut Rhin, alors il faut vite reunir les armees du Haut Rhin avec celle de la Russe ce qui feroit — Armee du Haut Rhin : Colloredo 40,000 Hohenzollern 36,000 Reserve 50,000 Wrede 60,000 Prince Royal de Wurtemberg 50,000 236,000 L'armee Russe 120,000 En tout ...... 356,000 et marcher a lui, pour lui livrer bataille, ou I'occuper et forcer de rester sur le Haut Rhin, pendant que Blucher et Welling- ton se porteront brusquement sur Paris. Si on decompte de ces 350,000 hommes cinquante, pour observer les forteresses de I'Alsace, on garderoit toujours 300,000 pour marcher sur Buonaparte, et lui livrer bataille, et Wellington et Blucher executeroient le manoeuvre sur Paris avec 120,000. Si on ne devroit pas reussir a attirer la plus grande masse des forces de Buonaparte vers la Suisse, I'ltalie, ou le Haut Rhin ; I'alternative se presente — ou, que Buonaparte, se voyant menace de Wellington et Blucher, marche vers eux avec des fo'ces superieures; ou, qu'il attend dans un cercle resserre autour de Paris, (a-peu-pres a la hauteur de Peronne, Laon, Rheims, ChAlons, Troyes,) les manoeuvres des allies. Dans le premier cas Wellington et Blucher doivent avoir la liberte de disposer des corps de Wrede et du Prince Royal de Wurtemberg, et pour les attirer directement a eux, et pour les faire marcher dans le flanc de I'ennemi. Bans le second cas, que Buonaparte devroit rester dans le cercle marque, pour attendre jusqu'a ce que les manoEuvres des allies se soient entierement developpes, voil^ ce qu'il paroit qu'il faudroit faire : IN GERMANY AND FRANCE. 253 J5Ha"sl?r?di ( ^^^ ^°^P® ^^ Wrede de . . 60,000 c6t6 de Deux- } et du Prince Royal de Wurtemberg 50,000 ponts. J — { En tout, de . 110,000 oil passe le /^ Rhin a Man- I heim. se por- I L'armee Russe de 120,000 passe le Rhin k miia'lnr^'fU Oppenheim, se dirige derriere l'armee Bava- Sarre et de lA j roise par Kreutznach, Birkenfeld, Treves, d par des march- Luxembourg. es rapides sur ° Btenay. *^ L'armee Autrichienne de 125,000 passe le Rhin entre Stras- bourg et B^le. Chaque armee destine un corps de vingt jusqu'a trente mille hommes, qui restera en arriere d'elle, pour con- tenir le pays, observer les forteresses, et soigner I'approvi- sionnement des armees. Tout ce qu'il y a de landwehr dis- ponible, se joigne a eux. Cette disposition faite, les opera- tions commencent. L'idee generale est — 1. Qu'on presente a I'ennemi trois masses a-peu-pres egales, dont le centre est destine de se porter d'apres les circon- stances ou sur la droite, ou sur la gauche, et de renforcer de cette maniere, par un mouvement rapide, une des ailes, pour lui donner une telle preponderance de forces qu'il pourra livrer bataille a I'ennemi avec I'espoir de la victoire : 2. Si done ce mouvement doit avoir lieu sur la droite, les armees Russes, Prussiennes, Angloises et Bavaroises t^chent de se reunir sur la Meuse aussi vite que possible ; reunies, ils chercheront I'ennemi pour lui livreiYj^ataille, ou marcheront brusquement sur Paris, tdchant de le battre s'il s'y oppose, ou de se tourner sur lour gauche, si I'ennemi cherche de les prendre en flanc par Chdlons, ou en longeant la Meuse, ma- ncEuvre auquel il faudra s'attendre si Buonaparte est reste concentre dans le cercle de Troyes, ChMons, et Rheims : 3. Que le Prince Royal de Wurtemberg entretienne les communications entre ces armees et l'armee Autrichienne, et que celle-ci manceuvre dans le flanc de I'ennemi, cherchant a I'attirer de son c6te, de le detourner du cdte de Paris, ou de le suivre s'il se tourne vers les armees de Wellington et de Blucher. Pour cet efFet, l'armee Autrichienne s'avencera premiere- ment sur Langres, le Marechal Wrede sur Verdun, le Prince Royal de Wurtemberg sur Nancy, Toul, et Commercy; l'armee Russe en tournant Sarre-Louis, Thionville, Longwy, sur Stenay ; l'armee de Blucher sur Mezieres ; Wellington sur Chimay, Chaque armee adopte en principe, de surprendre, s'il est possible, sur son cherain, quelques places fortes, et de ne pas s'engager avec des forces superieu.res. W 254 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR Si Tennemi tache de percer au centre, le Prince Royal de Wurtemberg se replie, et trouvera dans le cas le plus mal- heureux toutefois dosasiles surs a Mayence ou Luxembourg", pendant que les autres armees se porteront sur le flanc de I'ennemi pour le battre ou le prevenir a Paris.* The sentiments of the Duke of Wellington, then at Brus- sels, were earnestly solicited ; and I have reason to believe that he gave them in the following terms ; though I cannot vouch positively for their accuracy in all points. The state- ment hereafter detailed was, I know, communicated to the military conference before mentioned. " I saw Clarke yesterday, and he told me that a person of the war-office, upon whom he could depend, had informed him that on the 30th of April the enemy's regular army amounted to 139,000 men, and the guards to 25,000. Gendar- merie and national guards raised, and expected to be raised, would make it 280,000 ; this was the utmost expected. " Bournonville, who ought to know, told me this day, that we ought to reckon that the enemy had an effective force of 200,000 men. He says the king had 155,000 when he quit- ted Paris, and that he had granted above 100,000 conges, which had been called in ; but that not above half could be reckoned upon as likely to join. I understood, likewise, that there were above 100,000 deserters wandering about France. " In reference to these different statements I beg to ob- serve, that Clarke speaks from positive information ; Bour- nonville from conjectusa. According to Clarke's account, the army gained in strength only 3000 men in the last fifteen days ; but then it must be observed that the guards have gained about 19,000; being the difference between 6000, which they were, and 25,000, which they are now. " In respect to periods of commencing operations, I had adopted the opinion that it was necessary to wait for more troops as far back as the 13th of April. After, however, we shall have waited a sufficient time to collect a force, and to satisfy military men that their force is what it ought to be, to enable them to accomplish the object in view, the period of attack becomes a political question, upon which there can be no difference of opinion. Every day's experience con- vinces me that we ought not to lose a moment which could be spared. * In addition to the views of the allied military authorities and generals, it may not be uninteresting to see the sentiments of the French ministers who had Joined the congress; and therefore the memorandum of that intel- ligent and able minister the Due D'Albcrg, which was in circulation at this period, is annexed in the Appendix. IN GERiMANY AND FRA^XE. 255 "I say nothing about our defensive operations, because J am inclined to believe that Blucher and I are so well united and so strong-, that the enemy cannot do us much mischief. I am at the advanced post of the whole ; the greatest part of the enemy's force is in my front ; and, if I am satisfied^ others need he under no apprehension. " In regard to offensive operations, my opinion is, that how- ever strong we shall be, in reference to the enemy, we should not extend ourselves further than is absolutely necessary, in order to facilitate the subsistence of the troops. I do not ap- prove of an extension from the channel to the Alps ; and I am convinced that it will be found, not fatal, but only that the troops at such a distance on the left of the line will be entirely out of the line of the operations. " We are now, or shall be shortly, placed on the French frontier in the form of an echelon ; of which the right, placed here, is the most advanced of the echelons, and the left, upon the LFpper Rhine, is the most retired. Paris is our object ; and the greatest force, and greatest military difficulties, are opposed to the movements of the right, which is the most ad- vanced part of our general line. Indeed, such force and diffi- culties are opposed to us in this part, that I should think that Blucher and I cannot move till the movements of others of the allied corps shall have relieved us from part of the ene- my's force opposed to us. Then it must be observed, that we cannot be relieved by movements through Luxembourg. In my opinion the movements of the allies should begin with the left, which should cross the Rhine between B^le and Strasbourg. " The centre, collected upon the Sarre, should cross on the day when the left should be expected to be at Langres. " If these movements should not relieve the right, they bhould be continued ; that is to say, the left should continue its movements on both banks of the Marne, while the centre should cross the Aisne ; and the distance between the two bodies, and between each and Paris, should be shortened daily. " But this last hypothesis is not probable : the enemy would certainly move from this front upon the earliest alarm of the movements on the Upper Rhine, and the moment that he did move, or that the operations be practicable, Blucher's corps and mine should move forward, and the former make the siege of Givet, and the latter of Maubeuge ; and the former likewise aid the movement of the centre across the Meuse. " If the enemy should fall upon the centre, it should either retire upon Luxembourg, or fight, according to the relative strength ; and, in either case, Blucher should act upon the enemy's communications upon the Aisne. 256 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR " But the most probable result of these first movements would be the concentration of the enemy's forces upon the Aisne ; and accordingly we hear of the fortification of Soisson and Laon, of an intrenched camp at Beauvais, &c. We must in this case, after the first operation, throw our whole left across the Marne, and strengthen it if necessary from the centre and left. It should march upon Paris between the Seine and the Marne, while the right and the centre should either attack the enemy's position upon the Marne, or en- deavor to turn its left ; or the whole should co-operate in one general attack upon the enemy's position. "I come now to consider the strength required for these operations. The greatest strength the enemy is supposed to have is 200,000 men effective, besides national guards for the garrisons ; of this number it can hardly be believed that he can bring 150,000 to bear upon any one point. " Upon this statement let our proceedings be founded. Let us have 150,000 men upon the left, and 150,000 upon the right, and all the rest, whatever they may be, in the centre ; or, after a sufficient centre is formed, in reserve for the right, left or centre, as may be most convenient for their march and • subsistence, and I will engage for the result, as they may be thrown where we please. Let us begin when we shall have 450,000 men. Before the Austrians upon the left will be at Langres, the Russians will have passed the Rhine, and the whole Prussian army will be in line. "These are my general ideas, which I don't think differ much from General Knesebeck's. Mind, when I think of the siege of Givet and Maubeuge, I don't mean by the whole of the two armies of the right, but to be carried only by detach- ments from them. The centre should besiege Sedan, which is not strong or garrisoned, and observe Longwy, Thionville, and Metz. The left will have to observe Huningen and the fortresses in Alsace. " In regard to the force in Piedmont, I confess that I wish that the whole of the Austrian army in Italy were entirely employed against Murat, with the exception of the garrisons. Murat must be destroyed early, as he will hang heavily upon us. "If any force should be employed from Piedmont, its ope- rations should be separate from those of the great confeder- acy. They cannot be connected without disconnecting those of what I have hitherto considered the left, from the remain- der of our great line ; however, they may be calculated to aid that left, particularly by being directed upon Chamberry, or by keeping that post in check ; — their basis is, however, different, and cannot easily be otherwise. L\ GERMANY AND FRANCE. 257 *'God knows whether the allies will allow their forces to be divided as I suppose, and particularly whether the Prus- sians will act in two corps, one under Blucher here, and an- other from Luxembourg, with the centre ; or whether the other allies will like to commence till the whole Russian army is in reserve : but I am convinced that what I have prO' posed, is so clearly the plan of operations, that I do n^ doubt it will be adopted with but little variation.'''' Statement of the Due de Feltre. L'etat des forces de I'armee Fran9aise, tel qu'il m'a ete communique par un employe de la guerre, etait le premier de ce mois porte a 200 mille hommes effectifs; raais les homines qui devoient completer les ladres des regimens, pour produire ce nombre, n'etoient pas encore repartis dans leur corps respectifs, et leur completement exige encore trois semaines. Le materiel de la guerre, le train d'artillerie, les chevaux, les fusils, manquoient en grande partie : aussi a peine evalue- t-on la cavalerie actuellement montee a 20,000 hommes. Ce- pendant, on voit presque tons les jours arriver une petite quantite de remontes, qu'on envoie des provinces. Quoiqu'il n'ait pas encore ose rendre un decret pour faire revivre la conscription, il a neanmoins envoye aux prefets des departemens I'ordre de faire rentrer dans Tarmee tous les hommes qui ont servi, et d'employer en outre le moyen de procurer le plus grand nombre d'hommes possible par une cspece d'enrolement volontaire, male qui en efFet devient co- ercitif Lignes occupees par I'armee Fran^aise. Toute I'armee est repartie en six divisions ou corps d'armee. La premiere s'etend sur la ligne de Lille, Douay, Arras, 6ic. et est commandee par le General Excelmans. La seconde va depuis Calais jusqu'a Dunkerque, sous les ordres du General Beil. La troisieme, commandee par le General D'Erlon, est tra- cee depuis Dunkerque jusqu'a Verdun. La quatrieme s'etend depuis Verdun jusqu'a Landau, sous les ordres du General Lobau. La cinquieme, commandee par le General Girard, va jusqu'a Strasbourg. La sixieme est confiee au Marechal Suchet, et s'etend jusqu'a Huningen : c'est a tort que les journaux ont donne ce commandement au Marechal Ney. Sur toute la route depuis Paris jusqu'a Peronne, je n'ai pas rencontre un seul soldat, un seul chariot de munitions, ou W2 258 NARRATIVE OF THE WAR, &c. tout autre objet qui indiquerait des preparatifs militaires. A Peronne, qui nage pour ainsi dire au milieu des eaux, il n'y a qu'un seul bataillon ; le huitieme regiment de dragons, qui y etait, est parti pour Lille le 5. Je n'ai apperou que deux pieces de canon dans la partie de la place ou je suis entre. On travailloit a des batteries a Cambray, et les palissades devant la porte de Bouchain n'avaient ete commencees que depuis quelques jours. La porte de sortie etoit deja condamne le sixieme. La garnison etait composee de deux regimens d'infanterie et d'un regiment d'artillerie. II parait que toutes ces places manquoient de canon de gros calibre ; car je n'ai vu en batterie que de pieces de campagne. Valenciennes, qui est dans un bon etat de defense, ne renferme que 4000 hommes de garnison, dont le premier regiment d'infanterie ou regiment du roi, et le septieme de hussards, font partie. The scientific report made by the Duke of Wellington, on the most judicious mode of conducting the military operations in 1815, is so clear and explicit, and the reasoning so conclu- sive, that I hope I shall stand excused with the high authority from whom it emanates, if I should have trenched in any manner on communications within my knowledge, for the benefit of the profession, the British army, and posterity. And as these sentiments are in the possession of the cabinets and councils of the different pov/ers, they are no doubt in the hands of many, and in the archives of the chancellerie of Europe. My present offering to my companions in arms now closes. If they kindly approve my labor, I maj'- in another year or two, if I should find leisure, once more appear before tliera. APPENDIX, No. L— p. 17. From Baron Hardenberg, Topliiz, 29th of September, 1813. Acknow- ledging how much the exertions of the Prussians were owing to Eng- land's aid. Le Chancelier d'Etat soussigne a I'honneur de mettre sous les yeux de son auguste Souverain les offices que Monsieur le Lieutenant- General Stewart, Envoye extraordinaire, Ministre Pl^nipotentiaire de Sa Majeste Britannique, a bien voulu lui communiquer en dale du 23 et 87 de ce mois : Sa Majesty y retrouve avec une vive satisfaction les marques precieuses de I'interet et de I'amitie active de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Regent. II sera beau de devoir le triomphe de la grande cause a I'union intirae des primieres puissances de I'Europe et aux efforts reunis de leurs peuples. Ceux de la Prusse surpassent de beaucoup nos moyens. II lui deviendroit impossible de soutenir cette lutte penible, si elle ne trouvoit, a cote des ressources que lui offre I'enthousiasme des habitans, celles que lui fournit I'Angleterxe, et qui deviennent toujours plus urgentes a mesure que les evenemens se devoloppent. Sa Majeste, en m'autorisantd'exprimer ses sentimens a Son Excel- lence Monsieur le General Stewart, m'a charge de lui temoigner en nieme terns combien elle est reconnoissante des fournitures en armes et munitions que S. A. R. le Prince Regent a fait mettre a la dis- position du Roi, sans en deduire le montant sur les subsides. Le Roi a ete extremement sensible a cette nouvelle marque de I'interet de S. A. Royale : il le merite par I'afTection sincere qu'il porte a ce Prince. Le soussigne a I'honneur d'offrir a Monsieur le General Stewart I'aseurance reiteree de sa plus haute consideration. Hardenberg. Toplkz, le 29 Septembre, 1813. No. IL— p. 24. Observations on the Trade between Great Britain and Prussia at the period of the Russian treaty with Great Britain in 1813. Immediately after the declaration of war against France, a procla- mation was issued prohibiting altogether the importation of the pro- duce of the soil xmd manufactures of that country ; and allowing, w-ilhout any restriction, the importation of British goods at the lowest duties which had existed previous to or after the war of 1806. 260 APPENDIX, It is to be observed, that after the peace of Tilsit, and exclusively with a view to the trade carried on with England during the three first years that followed this event, — trade kept open to a large extent, in spite of the French interference ; almost every article of foreign growth and manufacture formerly prohibited was allowed to be imported upon paying a certain per-centage: so that the manufactures that may at this time be imported from England into Prussian ports, and by way of transit be conveyed to the adjacent countries through her prov- inces, are far more numerous than they were formerly, before the old regulations were repealed. Unfortunately, the right of regulating the duties, which in some in- stances did not appear applicable to present circumstances, was grant- ed to a gentleman at the head of the board of public revenue, who. from want of information and judgment, committed the grossest mis- takes, and excited the well-founded complaints of our trade. His only end was to create a revenue; and he was little aware that his regu- lations not only defeated the king's intentions to give the greatest ac- tivity to British trade in our ports, but likewise destroyed the revenue "which would have arisen from it. These measures raised a general cry, especially in East Prussia ; and the petitions of the estates of that province, and of the city of Konigsberg, procured redress, though not the punishment of the author of the mischief An exorbitant duty was thus imposed upon the exportation of wheat, Avhich we succeed- ed ia having repealed, and that which was in force in 1806 was re- stored. That year having been an abundant harvest in England, with very little importation from the Baltic, the duties upon exportation, too much fluctuating according to our old system, were very low. This is not alleged as a service rendered to England, although such reductions of foreign duties may have some influence upon the price of corn at London. It was chiefly intended for the relief of our own country, where the proprietors, for several years, had suffered from exceeding low prices. But such a system cannot fail to encourage the trade upon both sides, as we cannot possibly import without exporting. The mistake committed operated for some time, and trade was very dull. Fortunately the military government of East Prussia having the produce of the customs assigned for the armaments, took upon them- selves to reduce the duties upon colonial produce below the an- cient rate ; and this has completely succeeded in attracting British ships to our ports. In the course of the month of May, upwards of 120 English ships, charged with colonial produce, arrived at the port of Memel alone. The value of tlieir cargoes far exceeds the sum granted by Great Britain to Prussia as a subsidy : and if our govern- ment take care to favor the British trade with our ports, and the events of the war do not prove quite unfortunate, the exchange of England, notwithstanding the subsidies paid, must improve, as far as it depends upon the balance of trade in ihe Baltic. The sufferings of these last six years have produced everywhere the conviction that a full and free trade with Great Britain is indis- pensable to the prosperity, nay, to the preservation of every country bordering on the sea. All sensible men are of course more disposed APPENDIX. 261 than ever to adopt such commercial regulations as may be beneficial to British trade above that of any other country. Such regulations might be entered into with Prussia as a permanent national system, provided Great Britain would consent to repeal some of those laws which affect the Prussian trade in a manner certainly not contem- plated towards a friendly nation. Our complaints are chiefly di- rected against the duty upon the Baltic timber, imposed in 1810, and against those which exclude the Silesian linens from the American markets, without benefiting the Irish linen trade: all the other objects are of less consequence. We, on our side, provided we regain our national independence, may, without hurting our interests, grant such privileges to British trade as, in an exceedingly short time, would amply repay all the assistance granted to us in this contest; and, at the same time, promote an intimate communication between both nations, which, in an age tending to establish public opinion as a political power, will be the best security for a permanent alliance. It is to be understood that no man will sacrifice the interests of his own nation to that of any other ; but a Prussian statesman who in several instances would think it necessary to preserve protecting duties for the manufactures of his own country, may, at the same time, exclude the prohibiting system altogether, and secure to British mer- chandise, both colonial and raanufactural, such advantages above those of any other nation as, in his country, would make their admis- sion merely nominal in most provinces. No. III.— p. 58. Heads of the Arrangement touching the Armistice and Negotiations. The Duke of Bassano on the 29th of June declared Buonaparte's satisfaction that the delay in the negotiation was not to be attributed to Austria, and that he was in possession of full power for negoti- ating a convention towards entering into a negotiation for peace. Count Metternich stated, his object was to fix and ascertain Buona- parte's acceptance of the mediation of Austria. The Duke of Bassano sends a project of convention, and proposes a congress either at Prague or Vienna, to which England, the King of Spain, the Regency a Cadiz, and all the powers engaged in the war, dans les masses, migh send plenipotentiaries ; and that the negotiations might continue, tike those of Munster, Nimeguen, Ryswick, Utrecht, and Osnaburg, al- though any of the powers should think it advisable to put an end to the armistice. The articles in this project were very artfully drawn up, in order to establish a separation of interests on the part of Austria from the allies, and to declare that that power did not interfere " comme arbitre, mais comme mediatrice armee et parfaitement des- interessee." Count Metternich rejected this project, upon which the Duke desired to recall it ; but Count Metternich refused to return it, declaring his intention eventually to print it. Count Metternich in- forms the Duke of Bassano that the Emperor of Russia and King of 262 APPENDIX. Prussia have accepted the mediation of Austria, and are ready to submit to arbitration: he therefore desires to know if Buonaparte is ready to do the same. A military report is now sent from Prince Schwartzenberg to the Emperor Francis, dated Brandeis, 28th of June. Its object was to demonstrate the expediency of prolonging the period of negotiation to the 10th of August, for the following reasons: The Bohemian army would not be more than entirely complete on the 20th instant. The vast and unexpected preparations of France render an increased armament on the part of Austria necessary ; therefore every unappropriated regiment of the line, the landwehr, and the Hungarian insurrection, must be called out and put into ac- tivity. Supposing the difficulty of supplying them with necessaries and clothing to be got over, yet it was impossible to bring the most distant regiments from the south-east provinces to Znain and Presburg before the 14tli of August, and the other troops in proportion. Besides the troops raised in Bavaria, 66,000 men under the Vice- roy had passed the Tagliamento, and large reserves were assembled atWurtzburg and Fulda. As these measures directly menaced Vienna and Gratz, it was necessary to assemble force to cover them, (Klagen- furth was the place proposed,) and a lesser force nearer to Vienna. It was absolutely necessary that these measures should be carried iiito effect without making any detachments from the Boliemian army. Carriages could not be procured in time to supply Russia with the provisions which she had desired to receive from Bohemia for a par- ticular service ; and as the extension of the French line on the Elbe might render it expedient that part of the allied army should move into Bohemia, it was most desirable that there should be sufficient time to prepare means of supplying such force; and that in the mean time the wants of the allies may be supplied from Galicia. A convention was then signed the 30th of June by Count Melter- nich and the Duke of Bassano, the heads of which were as follows ; Art. 1. Austria offered her mediation. Art. 2. France accepted the mediation. Art. 3. Plenipotentiaries on the part of Austria and France, and also Russia and Prussia, were to assemble at Prague on or before the 5 th of May. Art. 4. The period limited for negotiation, viz. 20th of June, being too short, the Emperor and King will agree to extend the same to the 10th of August; and the Emperor of Austria reserves to himself to endeavor to obtain the accession of the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia to this prolongation. Art. 5. Ratifications were to be changed within four days. The Emperor Francis ratified the convention, agreeing to prolong the "terme obligatoire de negociation" to the lOlh of August. This ratification was so worded as not to render any communica- tion necessary on the part of Russia and Prussia. Count Metiernich'.s first and principal object was to urge the expediency of prolonging the period of negotiation to the lOtli of August, for reasons stated in Prince Schwartzenberg's report. 2d, He was desirous that Count APPENDIX. 263 Stadion should accompany the Emperor to Trachenberg, who was to be instructed to use his utmost to strengthen and decide the Prince Royal of Sweden in his intentions to co-operate with the allies. Count Metternich now declared that the Emperor Francis' determina- tion was to support the justice of the cause for which the Emperor Alexander had employed such great resources (beaux moyens). It was then strongly urged in favor of the prolongation of the term, that the French would not benefit by it, because their preparations would be complete by the 20th inst. The Emperor of Russia had not stated his determination respecting the prolongation of the term to the 10th of August, and it was sup- posed he would not do so until after the conferences at Trachenberg. No. IV.— p. 70. Conditions of equipment of the Hanseatic legion and other corps. The Hanseatic legion, consisting of cavalry, artillery, and infantry', agrees under the following conditions to enter into the service of His Britannic Majesty under the present state of affairs in the north of Germany : — 1st. The Hanseatic legion is to receive the same pay as the Hano- verian levies from Great Britain, and is to serve during the war on the continent of Europe. 2d. The Hanseatic legion agrees while in the pay of Great Britain to serve under the orders of the general or other officer who may be appointed by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent in the same manner as the Electoral troops. 3d. The legion is to retain its denomination and establishment, but is to be subject to such dislocation in its formation as may be neces- sary for the improvement and amelioration of its discipline, or the general interests of the service which the general officer commanding may deem necessary. 4th. Should the Hanseatic towns become again free, the legion shall continue under the immediate orders and service of His Britannic Majesty no longer than is necessary to form an arrangement with the Hanseatic government for its return ; but, until such arrangernent be formed, the corps will continue to serve on the footing prescribed in the foregoing conditions. 5th. In case of vacancies or promotions in the officers, the same shall be conducted according to the manner now practised in the Hanoverian levies, so long as the legion remains in British pay. 6ih. The British government will keep the legion equipped in like manner with the Hanoverian levies. 7th. The general officer commanding on the part of Great Britain is to have the right of appointing officers to superintend and improve the discipline of the corps. 8th. Officers and men who may become incapable of further ser- vice by wounds shall receive the same pension or allowances as are 264 APPENDIX. granted to His Majesty's Electoral troops, until the Hanseatic towns become liberated, and shall be enabled of themselves to provide for them. Goldberg, 21 st Jxdy, 1813. No. v.— p. 73. Copy of a Letter from Lord Castlereagh to His Royal Highness the Prince Royal of Sweden, dated London, March 23 M. I'Empereur Napol(5on et le soussigne lors de son sejour a Dresde, est decidee a ne faire commencer les hos- lilitcs qu'apres le terme de six jours revolus. II a I'honneur d'offrir a. cette occasion, etc. etc. (Signe) Metternich. Prague, Ze 11 Aoiil, 1813. A. S. E. M. le Comte de Narbonne, Ambassadeur de S. M. I'Empereur des Francois, Roi d'ltalie. APPENDIX. 269 No. VIIL— p. 82. Puhllcalion of Central Commission. Their Majesties the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia have been pleased to resolve upon the establishment of a council of administration of the combined powers for the North of Germany, in order to bring unity, coherence and harmony into the management of public affairs in tliat country. This council of administration has particular instructions to communicate with the different existing gov- ernments on every subject which has reference to policy, finances, arming of the people, and on all things which may contribute to the security, the support, and increase of the armies engaged in the con- flict for the restoration of the independence of Germany. All public officers, and the inhabitants of the North of Germany, are enjoined to comply with the dispositions of the said council of administration. Their Majesties have been pleased to nominate Charles Baron de Stein president of this council. At the head-quarters, Kalisch, the 26th March (6th April) 1813. In the name of their Majesties the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, (Signed) Prince Kutusoff Smolensko, General, Field-Marshal, and Commander-in-chief of the Combined Armies. Page 83. Evaluation approximative des Armies des Puissances BeUigirantes. I. — Armiee FRAN9OISE. 1. Grande Armee sur leBober, ct celle a Dresde . . . . 120,000 2. Corps de Davoust, Vandamme 17,000 3. Corps detaches a Leipzig, Wurtzburg, Frankfurt, &c, . 23,000 4. Anticipation sur la levee de 1814, en marche . . . 40,000 N. B. Les autres 40,000 enseront apparemment envoyes en Espagne. ij. V'ieilles troupes qui Ton retire d'Espagne 50,000 6. Gamisons Francoises dans les forteressee, non compris dans les troupes des contingens que se trouvent dans les memes forteresses : A. Dantzig 15,000] B. Stetlin 7.000 I y^ ann C. Glogau 3.000 M®'^^® D. Custrin 3,000j Total, Francois . . . 278,000 X2 270 APPENDIX. II. — Contingens Allemands. Transportes .... 278,000 1. Saxone 20,000 2. Bavarois, a I'arra^e 8,000 > ^^ ,., » eiiBaviere , • . . . 12,000^ ' 3. Wirteinburgeois G,000 4. Badois 5,000 5. Nassau 1,800 6. Frankfort 1,800 7. Wurtzburg 2,000 8. Valdeck, Reuss, Yaenbuchen, Hohenzollern, Meiningen, Lippe 24,000 Total .... 358,600 III. — Troupes Italiennes cl dtrangeres. 1. Troupes Italiennes a Milan, sur I'lsonzo, Verona, &c. &c. 45,000 2. Napolitains 6,000 3. Suisses 8,000 IV. Gardes Nationales Bavaroises en activite . . 20,000 V. Polonois 12,000 VI. Garnisons Polonoises a Modlin et Tauck, &c. 10,000 Grand Total . . . 459,600 (Non comprises les troupes en Espagne et dans I'interieur de France.) Armee des Allies. I. — Russes. 1. Russes en Allemagne, y compris les renforts qui ar- ) rivent sous 1q General Labanoff, et qui ne les ont > 130,000 pas joint encore ) 2. Troupes Russes qui doivent bloquer les forteresses de i „« /^,vfw Dantzig, Modlin, et Tauck \ iii},VU[J II. — Prussiens. Y comprise la landwehr enregimentee, mais pas le land- ) . q- „„ _ .Sturm, et la landwehr de reserve, au moins . . . \ ' 3. Suedois 12,000 4. Mecklenbourgeois et corps francs d'Hanovriens, a-peu-pres 8,000 Total . . . 360,000 II y a encore des Russes en Pologne ct Lilluianie 40,000 Milice sous le Comte Tolstoy 80,000 Total, . . . 120,000 APPENDIX. Transportes . A uirickiejts. 1. Arm6e autre en Boheme 2. L'Armee en Illyrie, sut les frontieres de I'ltalie Grand Total 211 360,OQO 115,000 45,000 520,000 Sans compter 50,000 de landwelir en Boheme, ni les armees de Ga- licie et de Hongrie. Page 84. Efat des Forces des Allies, transmis comme minimum par M. Ic Chan- celier Baron de Hardenberg a son Excellence M- le Comtede Metier - nick. Reclificalions que VEmpereur y a ajoutees. Russes en Silesie . . . 80,000 Russes en Silesie . 112,000 Troupes reglees Prussiennes 40,000 Do 40,000 Laiidwehr choisioet exercee 30,000 Do 30,000 En Silesie 150,000 Corps du Prince Royal de Suede. Suedois, selon le Prince i Roval . . 30,000 C 182,000 comptes suelement a IjuIovv Walnioden Woronzoff Tauenzein Legion Allemande . . Dans 1 5 jours elle sera de ... 8,000 Russes a ajouler (C'est le corps de Winzingerode deja donne au Prince Royal) Reserves Russes. Tolstoy 25,000 25,000 11,000 4,000 6,000 6,000 8,000 85,000 60,000 D'Orloff Labanoff Reserves PrussienneTs. Resfes de la landwehr 40,000 Tolatoy entre Gitomie / et la Vistule . . ^ 14,000 D'Orloff entre Bialis- i 40 000 tock et la Vistule \ ' 30,000 Labanoff^ se dirigeant f ^,. -.,,^ surlaWaitha ^ '"'""" 90,000 Re.«erves de la land- ? go.QOO wehr . . . . ^ 409,000 527,000 272 APPENDIX. Trausp. 409,000 Tranep. 527.000 Autrichiens. Troupes rcglees en Bo- t hfetne et ailleurs . \ Reserves Autrichiennes 100,000 100,000 160,000 150.000 659,000 777,000 Page 111. Note from the Chancellor Hardenberg to Lieutenant-Geiieral !Sir Charles Stewart, dated Frankfort, 4th December, 1813. Monsieur le General, J'ai Thonneur de renvoyer a Votre Excellence les pieces relatives aux principes etablis en Anglelerre sur les Ordres de Chevaleric ctrangers. Le Roi, mon auguste Souverain, sous les yeux duquel je me suia cmpresse de les mettre, m'ordonne de vous dire. Monsieur le Gene- ral, que c'est pour vous donner ime marque publique de son eslime distinguee, particulierement de sa satisfaction de la valeur et des talens que vous avez deployes a cote de Sa Majeste, dans les differens coni- buts auxquels vous avez assistc, et dans lesquels vous avez verso votrc sang pour la cause commune, qu'il vous a decore dc ses ordres de I'Aigle Noir et de I'Aigle Rouge. Vouillez agreer I'assurance reiteree de tout mon attachement et dc nia haute consideration. (Signc) Hardenberg. Au Quartier-general de Frankfort, le 4 Decembre, 1813. Page 118. General Blucher's disposition for the attack on the 1 6th October. On the 16th October, at six A. M., the reserve cavalry of nil three corps, with their horse artillery, is to march : viz. — The reserve cavalry of the corps of D'Yorck on the great road to Lcipsic. As soon as it shall reach the cavalry of the advanced guard, the latter are to lead and proceed to Leipsic. The reserve cavalry of the corps of Count Langeron to march upon Radefeld and Lindenthal. 'J'he cavalry of the advanced guard loads theui also. But before the march of the cavalry there must be accounts whether the enemy be near Dubin, and whether he occupy Do- litsch, &;c. The cavalry of the reserve and advanced guard, and the horse ar- tillery of the corps of Sachen, are to follow the cavalry of the corps of D'Yorck over Schevditz to Leipsic. Sir C. Stewart will be at the head of this cavalr}-. APPENDIX. 273 If the eneniy thould not be in position on this side the Parlha, the rcBerve cavalry of the corps of D'Yorck in to march between Mackem and Gohles. The reserve cavalry of Langcron's corps, on this side Wcttnitz, and the cavalry of the advanced guard, to find tlie enemy, and show me the situation of the enemy, either behind the Partha, or on the road to Dubin. Tiie whole of the infantry to have their provisions ready, so as to be able to march at ten o'clock. An orderly from each corps is to accompany me; and will carry my orders to the respective commanders. Page 122. Letter from General De Gniesenau to Lieutenant-General Sir Charlee Stewart, which shows the great importance of his having effected the changes narrated in the Prince Royal's march, October 15th, 1813. Le nom du lieu ou le Prince Royal de Suede a pris son quartier- g^neral aujourd'hui n'etant pas distinctement ecrite dans votre lettre que V0U8 m'avez fait I'honneur de m'adresser aujourd'hui, et ne pou- vant pas trouver un tel nom sur la carte, je prends la liberty de vous adresser cette lettre pour vous prier de la faire parvonir au Prince. EUe contient la disposition pour notre attaque, et la deinande au Prince en quelle maniere il compte co-op^rer domain. En persuadant au Prince de changer la direction de sa marche, vous avez rendu, M. le G^n^ral, un service eminent a la bonne cause, etc. Ge.neral i>e Gniesenau. A. S. E. le Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Stewart. Gross Rugel, Octobre 15. Page 125. Lord Castlereagh' s Letter expressing the Prince Regent's entire approha tion of Sir Charles Stewart's conduct, both political and military. Foreign Office, November 30, 1813. Sir, The laudable activity which has marked your official correspondence down to the present period, precludes my adverting to the variety of topics which have been treated of in your dispatches. I must, therefore, in conveying to you the Prince Regent's most gracious approbation of your conduct, as well in discharge of your political as your military duties, apply myself to the series of im- portant events which have taken place since you left Toplitz ; in all of which His Royal Highness has had occasion to applaud, not less 274 APPENDIX. your zeal for hiB service than the judgment and abiUty with which you have conducted yourself under the most trying circumstances. I am, with great truth and regard, Sir, Your most obedient humble servant. Castlereagh. Lie utenant-G ene ral The Honorable Sir Charles Stewart, K. B. Page 134. The Prince Regent's permission for Sir C. Stetvart to accept and wear the Swedish Order of the Sword, conferred on him after the battle of Leipsic, in a letter from the Prince Royal to His Majesty's govern- ment. Foreign Office, December 21st, 1813. Sir, I have received and laid before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent your dispatch, No. 127, of the 28th of October last, transmitting a letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden to you, in which His Royal Highness is pleased to express his intention of recommending to His Swedish Majesty, that the dignity of a Commander Grand Cross of the Swedish military Order of the Sword should be conferred upon you, in testimony of the high sense entertained of the zeal, talents, and valor displayed by you in the memorable battles near Leipsic, on the 18ih and 19th of October in this year. I have now the satisfaction to acquaint you, that His Royal High- ness the Prince Regent has been graciously pleased to permit you to accept and wear the order in question ; and I beg leave to convey to you my sincere congratulations upon the occasion. I am, with great truth and regard. Sir, Your most obedient humble servant, Castlereagh. To Lieutenant-General The Honorable Sir C. W. Stewart, &c. &c. &,c. Page 168. Memoir from General Walmoden, Dannewitz, November 1813. A I'ouverture de la campagne au mois d'Aout le Marechal Davoust pent avoir eu 25 a 26,000 Fran^ais, et a re^u par detachemens des renforts jusques vers la mi-Septembre ; ils ont en partie compense les pertes qu'il a eprouvees: elles se montent a-peu-pres a 2500 pris- onniers ; 1500 tues, blesses, et mis hors de combat: il peut avoir 5 a 6000 hommes dans les hopitaux, et avoir recu pres de 4000 hommes de renfort pendant le terns que sa communication a ete ouverle avec le Weser. II resulte de la qu'il peut encore disposer de 20,000 hommes de toute arme. Le corps auxiliaire Danois etoit de 15,000 APPENDIX. 275 hommes ; il peut etre reduit par les maladies et autres pertes ti 1 1 Ji 12 niille hommes. Trente mille combaltana au moins sont done en- core sur ce point dans una des plus fortes positions possibles; Lubeck a I'abri d'un coup de main; la ligne de la Stecknitz facile a defendre ; I'Elbe sur le flanc ; Hambourg, qui est devenu une place forto, Brendsbourg et Gluckstadt, sur les derrieres, des positions interrae- diaires derriere la Bille et la Trave ; plus loin le canal de I'Eyder. Je ne puis juger des intentions des Danois .- — ils ont proclame jusqu'k present une guerre defensive ; et, quoiqu'ils aient accompagne Davouat a Schwerin, elles peuvent etre restees equivoques: c'est a cela, je suppose, qu'est en partie due I'inactivite du Marechal : peut-etre aussi a I'incertitude, dans laquelle d'un moment k I'autre 11 pouvoit etre sur les renforts qui pouvoient m'arriver, et auxquels je lui ai donne lieu de croire autant que possible par des mouvemens ofFensifa sur differens points. Effectivement, il etoit difficile qu'il supposat qu'un point aussi important pour les operations fut garde si faible- ment qu'il I'a ete, surtout des le moment ou, abandonnant, apres la defaite de la division Pecheux, la rive gauche de I'Elbe, il m'obligea de detacher, pour ne pas perdre les fruits du combats, en ne pas en- travant autant que possible ses communications directes avec Magde- bourg et la grande armee. II pousse ensuite I'inactivite et la pusil- lanimite jusqu'a laisser emporter Bremen par mes detstchemens; et cette conduite a etabli une securite k son sujet qui paroit encore avoir prevalu, quand on a simplement fixe un corps d'observation de 25,000 hommes pour le contenir. Encore reste-t-il a savoir, si ce corps doit observer et la Stecknitz et la rive gauche de I'Elbe, oii un autre corps est destin^ sur ce dernier point tout-a-fait separe devant Harbourg et Zottenspeicker. Mais la situation doit changer : cette crise doit, ou entramer le Dannemark dans la coalition, ou I'attacher irrevocable- ment aux interets de la France ; et la situation militaire sur ce point va presenter deux points de vue. Davoust, abandonn^ a ses propres forces, doit se jetter dans Hambourg, ou il faudra bloquer pres de 20,000 hommes, ou il sera soutenu par les Danois, qui alors doivent se renforcer, et par une armee qu'ils peuvent augmenter k volonte, menacer les allies sur des points ou dejk un grand rassemblement des forces ennemies ne laisse pas que de donner, sinon des inq'uietudes, au moins de fixer I'altention. Mais suppose meme que les Danois restent a leur systeme Francais et defensif en meme terns, quelles peuvent etre les operations d'un corps isole de 25,000 hommes k eux oppose ? II ne pourra jamais s'etabhr au-dela Stecknitz ; car s'il par- venoit momentan^ment k la passer, il n'y auroit pas une position au- de\k de cette riviere, ou ce corps de 25,000 hommes, entoure des places fortes de I'ennemi, pourroit se soutenir pendant I'hiver. Le tout se bomeroit en consequence a couvrir avec d'autant plus de peine le Mecklenbourg et les fronticres de la Prusse, que I'ennemi, tant qu'il savoit les grandes armees proches, pourroit craindre I'ar- rivee des renforts; mais a present, s'il les voyoit engagees dans des operations lointaines sur le Rhin, pourroit calculer d'apres I'inactivite de ces troupes, qu'on n'auroit laisse que ce qui etoit indispensable pour une observation, et baser la-dessus un systeme offensif, qui, vu 276 APPENDIX. la situation dea forces sur I'Elbe, pourroit devenir dangereux, par la proximity de Magdebourg et Berlin, les communications necessaires aux armees sur la basse Elbe, la situation du pays de Hanovre, on 1 'organisation militaire exige de la surete, et enfin par toutes les con- siderations que pourroit entrainer une diversion puissante. II me parait, d'apres cela, qu'il faut, avant de decider sur ce point, etre assure du parti que prendra le Dannemark, et le gagner pour la cause, ou le forcer a se detacher de celle de Tennemi. Hambourg, aban- donne a soi-meme, ne sera pas pour cela pris de sitot, vu I'hiver qui s'approche, et qui, sans compter le manque encore existant des moyens, en empecheroit le siege. II faut done s'attendre a un blocus long et difficile ; le local protege par des eaux des inondations, par beaucoup de soins qu'on a mis a le fortifier par une nombreuse artillerie et garnison, et des approvisionnemens considerables, amenera des difficultes et longueurs ; il faudra un corps considerable pour le bloquer, et 25,000 hommes y contiendront a peine 20,000, si Ton veut les restreindre a la place et les empecher de consolider les moyens de resistance pendant le blocus. Je ne sais quelle sera la suite des de- monstrations du Prince Royal: jusqu'ici elles n'en out encore eu d'autre que de porter I'ennemi a retirer les troupes qu'il avoit en avant de la Stecknitz, a Ratzebourg, aux camps de Ziethen et Schmielau, derriere cette riviere, et a les placer en reserve. Les Danois et Fran9ai8 sont encore meles a Lubeck, quoique du reste les premiers ont la gauche, leur gros sur la Trave, les autres la droite, leur reserve avec le quar- tier-general du Marechal, a Tchwayenbeck. MoUn est une tete-de- pont retranchee : une reconnoissance faite sur ce point a prouv^ qu'ils veulent le soutenir ; elle a coute inutilement cinq officiers et une cen- taine d'homraes tues et blesses. Si la suite de ces grandes forces de- ployees n'etoit qu'une demonstration, et qu'apres coup on en revint a une faible observation, il faut supposer que I'ennemi n'en devien- droit pas moins entreprenant ; et vu la situation generale des affaires sur I'Elbe, un manque de precaution sur ce point-ci pourroit la rendre critique. Le corps d'observation sous mon commandement, qui se trouve en ce moment sur la rive droite, est fort de 12,000 hommes d'infanterie, (Suedois et tout y compris,) et de 3600 hommes de cavalerie, avec 60 pieces de canon, — total, 15 a 16,000 hommes; la division du G^n^ral Tettenbom, forte de 2500 a 3000 hommes d'infanterie et de 1600 hommes de cavalerie, en ayant et^ d^tachee. On pent encore com|> ter ici 3 k 4000 hommes de milice Mecklenbourgeoise (landwehr), dont I'organisation n'est point encore tout-i-fait achevee, mais qui pourra etre employee dans la quinzaine an plus tard. S. Walmoden. APPENDIX. 277 Page 168. General Ghiiesenau to Sir Charles Stewart, in which he states his plan for an inmsion of Holland, October 31s«, 1813. Fulda, ce 31 Octobre, 1813. J'ai eu I'honneur, mon cher General, de recevoir voire lettre datce du 29 a Mulhausen. Les proijiesses que vous avez bien voulu me faire au sujet d'armes, habillemens, etc. pour les nouvelles levees a faire, font temoignage du point de vue eleve d'ou vous jugez les af- faires politiques. C'est a present le moment de faire de grands efforts, s'il en fut jamais. Permettez, cher General, que je leve les doutes que vous avez au sujet de la conquete de la Hollande. Vous dites, mon General, que notre armee a trop souffert, et que notre nombre est reduit. Cela est vrai. De 39 mille hommes que le corps d'Yorck etoit compose a I'ouverture de la campagne actuelle, il ne lui reste plus qu'entre 10 a 11 mille hommes. Mais il nous ar- rive 3 mille hommes de renforts ; aux Russes de notre armee il en ar- rive 15 mille hommes. Je tacherai de poster les nouvelles levees dans nos anciennes provinces cedees a la paix de Tilsit, de 20 a 30 mille hommes. Les Hessois probablement se joindront a nous, c'est-a-dire a I'armee de Silesie, parceque I'Electeur preferera de confier ses troupes a M. le General Prussien. Tout cela composera une armee formidable, qui pourra bien entreprendre la conquete de la Hollande. Meme avec ce qui nous reste maintenant, nous tacherons de faire une tentative, ne fut-ce que pour obliger I'ennemi de disperser ses forces. En second lieu, si j'ai con9u le plan de conqueiir la Hollande, c'est d'apres une combinaison que je crois assez juste. Je vais vous la developper. La France a entre 130 et 140 places fortes dans les guerres qui ont eu lieu jusqu'ici. Buonaparte a laiss^ sans garnisons la plupart de ces places fortes ; ce qui lui a donne la faculte de former de nom- breuses armees. Si on le force de mettre garnison dans un grand nombre de ces places fortes, ou lui otera la possibilite de mettre en campagne une armee assez forte pour nous resister. La Hollande, la Flandre, le Brabant, sont herisses de places fortes. Si on passe le Rhin, et ai on prend la direction sur Maestricht, on tourne toutes les places fortes de la Hollande, et on les isole de la France. L'ennemi alors n'a que deux choses a faire ; ou, de jeter au plus vite tous les consents qu'il peut ramasser dans ces places, ou de les laisser sans gar- nison. Dans le premier cas, nous ne trouverons devant nous une ar- mee capable a nous resister, et nous pourrons percer dans I'anoienne France elle-meme, si cela nous con\ient. Dans le second cas nous pourrons, sans beaucoup de peine, nous emparer des places de la Hol- lande, et nous nous y formerons ime base solide d'operations. D'apres les renseignemens que nous avons re(;'us, les places de frontiere en France sont tres mal pourvues de tout ce qu'il leur faut pour se de- fendre, et peut-etre que nous les aurons a bon marche. Faitea. mon General, la critique de mes projets militaires, je vous Y 278 APPENDIX. en prie, et rectifiez mes idees, si vous ne Icb trouvez pas assez justes. J'aime a battre le fer tant qu'il est chaud, et de ne donner de relache a I'ennemi vaincu. Beaucoup de militaires conseilleroient d'eviter les places fortes, et d'atlaquer la France par les cotes qui en sont le moins garnis : mais comme I'ennemi a perdu I'annee derniere une armee de 400 mille hommes, et dans la campagne actuelle une autre armee de 300 mille homraes, il faut choisir une place qui le force d'employer toutes ses nouvelles levees dans ses forteresses ; et on y parvient en se mettant dans un point central, et ou Ton menace un grand nombre de ces places a la fois. Ayez la bont^, cher General, de me faire parvenir une autorisation, par ecrit de votre main, pour I'officier que je vais envoyer h. Stralaund pour qu'on lui remette les armes et effets militaires dont vous parlez dans votre lettre. 11 ne faut pas perdre un moment; et il est impor- tant d'arranger au plus vite I'affaire des nouvelles levees. Agreez, raon cher General, les assurances de mon inviolable attachement. Le General de Gniesenau. Page 160. General Gniesenau to Sir Charles Stevxtrt, December IZtk, 1813. Staie of the Prussian army in the month of December^ which shows the great want in vihich they were of every necessary, from their extreme exertions, which Great Britain supplied. Monsieur le General, J'ai eu I'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 11 de ce mois, et je m'empresse d'y repondre. Par les nombreux combats que I'armee Prussienne a soutenue de- puis la reprise des hostilites, la consommation des armes a etc ennrme : un grand nombre a ^te detruit ou laisse sur les champs de bataille ; et, malgre le soin qu'on eut a les ramasser, une pariie en a et^ vol^e. Les soldats qui n'^taient pas grievement blesses, prirent leurs armes avec eux; mais le d^sordre qui regno dans les nombreux hopitaux en fait perdre un grand nombre, et les reconvalescens retoument k leurs corps sans armes. De-Ik vient que dans le corps d'Vorck il se trouve un grand nombre de soldats sans armes. Sur I'effectif de I'armee Prussienne je ne saurois vous donner, mon General, des informations }x>sitives. Vers la fin de I'armistice j'en ^tais bien instruit, parceque les corps alors etaient au complet, et que je connoissais le nombre des corps ; mais maintenanl, que les corps sont divis^ en combattans, et que I'eflectif des renforts m'est inconnu, j'en suis moi-m^me tres im- parfaitement instruit. La seule personne qui soil en meme temps en droit et en etat de vous en donner des informations, c'est M. de Knese- beck, qui vous donnera loyalement tous les renseignemens R-dessus. Cette disette des armes m'inquiete beaucoup, et, si la guerre se pro- longe au-deR de six mois, nous mettra dans de grands embarras. APPENDIX. 279 Toutes les fabriques d'armes de I'Allemagne ne sauroient rtpondre a la consommation des armes de 600 mille combattans. Tachez, mon General, de fixer I'attention de votre gouvernement sur ce sujet ; car sans cela nous aurons les hommes, sans pouvojr les armer. Si notre passage du Bas Rhin avoit eu lieu, j'aurais tkche de nous emparer des manufactures d'armes qui sont a Liege, et dans les en- virons de Namur, etc. etc.; et j'aurois cru de porter un coup mortel au gouvernement Fran9ais, en lui otant ou paralysant ses manufac- tures d'armes. Si nous n'etablissons pas des magasins d'armes bien fournis, desquels nous puissions tirer ce qui nous faut, nous serons dans de perplexites etranges. Personne n'y pense. J'ai remarque en Angleterre que dans chaque comte il y a un ar- senal qui renferme les fusils que le gouvernement a preles aux corps de Volontaires, k la Milice Locale, etc. ces armes forment un total de 700 k 800 mille fusils. Tout cela etait destine k servir centre une invasion Fran^aise. Maintenant cette invasion n'aura plus lieu. Ne seroit-il pas convenable de rendre ces armes, au moins en partie, aux princes d'Allemagne qui en auroient besoin? Embden seroit une place tres propre pour d^barquer et emmagasiner ces armes. Veuiller agr^er, mon General, I'assurance des sentimens distingues avec les- quelfi j'ai I'honneur d'etre, Mon General, Votre tres humble et tr^ obeissant serviteur, R. DE Gniesenau. Hochst, le 12 Dicembre, 1813. Page 160. Statement of the entire Force and Condition of the Austrian Army, in the year 1814. ^ eS JS !C a " c G o 00 O ts S« F. 3 s 3 6 ^ 2 66 21 44 8 11 6i 12 56 41 38 57 12 27 21 73 38 rJ 44 15 3 o 10 36 52 15 10 4 19 316 4 ]52i 19 315 STATIONS. Italy Dalmatia Mentz Bohemia Moravia Galicia Lower Austria .... Upper Austria .... Hungary Siebenburgen .... Banat,Sclavonia,theBanat and Carlstadt frontiers Total Effective state. Men Horses 106,001 7,028 7,320 15,6e'8 1,723 93,759 5,616 78,786 4,586 74,876 13,562 58,206 7.136 17,338 363 30,972 9,552 27,754 2,351 43,189 4,380 553,889 .56,297 ! Fighting. Men Horses 75,232 6,029 6,815 11,994 1,70(1 64,738 5,220 53,061 4,375 30,090 12,998 37,602 6,607 10,684 341 23,302 9.293 20,726 2,061 35,215 4,269 375.459 52.893 280 APPENDIX. i Ordnance ready for the field. j ! A t Praffue Pieces 200 ]50 120 24 120 Galicia. • do. ItaJy do. Total .... 800 Page 170. Copy of a Letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden to the King of Prussia, Stralsund, June 3d, 1813. [ These letters are inserted in the Appendix, to shovj that the Prince Roy- aVs sentime?its, as expressed, to Prussia and Russia, gave fair reason to look for his most zealous and cordial exertions.] Sire, Monsieur le Comte de Lurey m'a reniis votre lettre, datee de Bres- lau, le 27 Mai. C'est toujours avec iiu nouveau plaisir que j'apprcnds quelques Bucces en faveur de la bonne cause ; et je suis doublemeut heureux lorsqu'ils sont obtenus par les troupes de Votre Majeste. Je ne suis sur le Continent, Sire, que pour agir en conformite dea traites ; c'est sur leur garantie que je m'y suis rendu avec trente niille hommes. Pour accelerer la paix de I'Europe, avec retablisseiiient d'uu equilibre politique, j'ai consenti, sans pretendre renoncer a aucun des droits de la Suede sur la Norvege, a agir offensivement sur Ics deux rives de I'Elbe, des I'instant que les troupes promises par V. M. et par la Russie se sont jointes a moi. V. M. doit sentir avec quelle anxiete j'attends et I'arrivee de ses troupes, et I'avis de la ratification du Traite signe a Stockholm par Monsieur de Tarrac. Si, conirue je Tespere, elle a eu lieu, j'accepte avec plaisir, et en attendant les troupes que V. M. me destine, le corps que le General BuIoav cuui- mande. Dans ce cas je supplie V. M. de vouloir ordonner a ce General de se rapprocher de Wittenberg, afin qu'il puisse se lier aux operations que les circonstances commanderont. La Dannemarc a toujours etc a la devotion de la France ; sa poli- tique est parvenue depuis six mois a jetter entre les Cours alliees le soup^on et la mefiance: le voile est lombe plus tard que je ne I'aurai cru ; mais enfin ce gouvernement s'est declare notre ennemi. J'attends le retour du General Comte de Sowenhielm, que j'ai cn- voye au quartier-general de Sa Maje-ste I'Empereur Alexandre, pour me mettre en mouvement. Je suis, Sire, de Votre Majeste Le tres devoue Sexviteur et bon Frere, Charles Jean. Stralsund, le 3 Juin, 1813. APPENDIX. 2^1 Copy of a Letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden to the King of Prussia, Stralsund, June itk^lSlS. Sire, Monsieur de Kaas ayant fait dire au G^n^ral Tettenborn et au Gene- ral Suedois Boye, que si le Roi consentoit a renvoyer toute discussion sur la Norvege jusqu'a la paix generale, le Roi de Dannemarc met- troit a ma disposition vingt-cinq mille hommes pour agir centre I'Em- pereur Napoleon ; la connoissance que j'ai de la politique de ce Gou- vernement ne me permet point d'ajouter foi a ces ouvertures : mais, pour n'avoir rien a me reprocher, je voulus bien permettre que M. le Baron de Wetterstedt se rendit a Copenhague avee le General Luch- telin, le Minislre Anglais Thornton, et le General Hosse. Leur voy- age a et^ tout-a-fait infructueux, la permission de descendre a terre ne leur a pas meme ete accordee, et les reponses du Roi de Dannemarc ont ete declinatoires. Tout ce qui vient de se passer ne ra'etonne pas, mais doit prouver a V. M. et a I'Empereur Alexandre qu'il n'y a pas de surety pour I'Allemagne, tant que le Roi de Dannemarc ne com- battra pas pour notre cause, ou qu'il ne sera pas totalement depossede de sa presqu'ile. Par cette occupation, nous sommes maitres de Hambourg, de Lubec, du Mecklenbourg, et du cours de I'Elbe ; et I'Empereur Napoleon a besoin d'une armee de cent mille hommes pour observer mes mouvemens. Je viens d'apprendre, Sire, que le corps du General Bulow s'etoit poete sur Osoren : si V. M. n'a pas change d'avis, et qu'elle le destine toujours a agir avec moi, je la prie de lui donner I'ordre de s'en rap- procher. Je prie V. M. d'agreer Texpression des sentimens inviolables avec lesqueis je suis. Sire, De V^otre Majeste Le tres devoue Serviteur et bon Frere, Charles Je^vn. Stralsund, 4 Juin, 1813, ^('Py 9f o Letter from the Prince Royal to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, dated Stralsund, June lOth, 1813. Extremement occupe, il m'a ete impossible d'ecrire de ma main cette longue lettre ; mais je ne puis. Sire, resister au plaisir de reiterer a V. M. I'assurance que je desire vivement que les circonstances ac- tuelles jettent les bases d'une union eternelle entre la Russie et la Suede. II faut venger I'Europe, et la sauver. Voila, Sire, notre voca- tion : elle sera emplie, j'en atteste les principes de V. M. et les quali- tes eminens qui ont fixe sur elle mes premiers regards, et les yeux du monde. Que de voeux, que de soupirs, sont dans ce moment presses vers le camp Imperial Russe ! V. M, I. n'appartient pas seulement k la Russie, mais a I'univers : ce fut le langage que j'ai eu I'honneur de lui tenir, il y a dix mois, et certes les affiiires sont loin d'etre dans I'etat ou elles .'^e trouvoient alors. L'Autriche et la Prusse etoient Y 2 282 APPENDIX. contre vous, Sire : aujourd'hui la Prusse fait cause commune avec V. M. ; I'Autriche est au moins neutre ; et I'Allemagne nous appelle ; elle s'arme, nous attend, el nous conjure de rester unis. Agreez, Sire, mes voeux et mes sentimens pour tout ce qui vous in- teresse. (Signe) Charles Jean. Copy of a Letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden to the Emperor of Russia, dated Stralsund, June lOth, 1813. Sire, Le Colonel Pozzo di Borgo m'a remis les deux lettres dont V. M. I. avail bien voulu le charger pour moi en date de Schweidnitz, le 30 Mai dernier, et je ne perds pas un instant a y repondre. En la lisant, Sire, j'ai eprouve le plus profond chagrin de ce que V. M. I. a pu douter de mon coeur et des sentimens qu'il lui a voues. Croyez, Sire, qu'au milieu meme des momens les plus difticiles de nos discussions ni mon amitie sincere pour V. M. I. ni la confiance illi- mitee que j'ai placee en ses promesses n'onl jamais souffert la moindre alteration. Connoissant les immenses ressources de voire Empire, Sire, je m'etois attache a I'esperance que V. M. trouveroit le moyen de me fournir le corps de troupes stipule dans nos Traites, parceque cette reunion de forces promettoit a la cause commune les resultats les plus heureux ,- mais la lettre que V. M. I. vient de m'ecrire, en portant ce caractere de loyaute et d'epanchemenl qu'elle sail .si bien exprimer, m'eclaire a la fois sur ce que j'ai a attendre d'elle, et sur la marche que mes devoirs et mon attachement pour V. M. ra'indiquent. Sire, les grands evenemens qui se precipitent ne vous permeltent plus de revenir sur le passe ; que le souvenir d'opinions contraires soil enseveli a jamais ! le present nous appartient ; et en fondant une nouvelle epoque de confiance mutuelle, il deviendra un nouveau gage d'un avenir heureux. La nouvelle de I'Armistice conclu le 5 de ce mois m'est parvenue hier, et j'attends a lout moment la copie de eel acte. Quelque onereux qu'il soit, rien n'est perdu, si ce pre- mier pas vers un accommodement avec I'ennemi commun n'est suivi d'un autre plus decisif encore, ou il pourroit cimenter, par la plume, les avantages qu'il se sera acquis par I'epee. La position militaire do I'Empereur Napoleon est Irop aventuree pour qu'il ne doive tout tenter en faveur de la paix ; et sa tactique est plus active dans les negocia- tions que sur le champ de bataille. La fermete de V. iVI. I. et celle de S. M. le Roi de Prusse peul dejoucr toutes ces tentatives, et I'Eu- rope peul encore etre sauvce, si nous parvenons. Sire, a nous voucr a sa defense. Deja V. M. I. a vu I'ancienne capitalc de son Empire consumee par les flammes au milieu des cohortes enneraies, qui etoi- ent venues des bords du Rhin pour la conquerir. En cedant alors aux insinuations pacifiques de lEmpereur Napoleon, V. M. n'aurait appercu des ruuies du Kremlin, que I'Europe dans les fers. Elle re- sista aux intrigues et aux menaces : la Russie fut delivree, et les es- perances rendues au Continent. Que le meme marche dans ce mo- ment soit couronne du meme succes I Plus la crise actuelle est impor- APPENDIX. 283 tante. et plus la coucorde ot la perseverance doit devemr I'apanage des Puissances AUiees. Que lout interet particulier s'ajourne devant les grands interets de la cause dont nous sommes les defenseurs, et mon ccEur et mes calculs m'assurent que nous en sortirons avec gloire. En employant les six semaines que nous laisse I'armislice a renforcer les arniees, a concerter nos mouvemens, et a agir encore plus puis- samment sur le moral de la Cour d'Autriche, a mesure qu'elle noas verra en etat de recommencer la guerre d'une maniere efFicace, je crois que nous retirerons de cette suspension d'armes une utilite re- elle, bien preferable aux chances d'une nouvelle bataille, qui auroil pu amener imrnediatement la paix. Si V. M. I. et le Roi de Prusse sont decides a remettre encore au sort des armes la grand* question de la liberte Europeenne, a moins que I'Empereur Napoleon ne se prete a des conditions qui aesurent une garantie durable a la pacification, je propose a V. M. I. que si I'armee combinee u'auroit pas recu des renforts assez considerables avant I'expiration de I'armistice, elle reste derriere I'Oder, jusqu'a ce qu'elle soit egale en noinbre a celle de I'ennemi. En attendant je pourrai prendre I'offensive, si V. M. I. et le Roi de Prusse mettent de suite a ma disposition les corps dont I'etat suit ; en ajoutant a cette force 30,000 Suedois, je me trouverai, a I'ouverture de la campagne, avec plus de 60,000 hommes, non compris un corps de 15,000 hom- nies que je laisserai pour masquer les Danois et les Francois h Ham- Iwurg et a Lubec. Ce dernier corps reuni au Landsturm du Mulem- bourg, que le Due m'a promis de faire lever, aura dans tons les cas sa rctraite assuree sur la presqu'ile du Darz, que je fais retrancher sur Kibrutz, qui va devenir un bon poste, et enfin sur Stralsund, qui devieii- dra aussi bientot, par les ouvrages que j'ai fait construire, une tete-de- pont excellente pour I'lle de Rugen. En me portant sur le flanc quar:ier, ou sur les derrieres de I'armee Francaise, elle sera forcee de se replier pour venir a moi, et I'armee Russe et Prussienne en Sil^sie et en Pologne sera degagee d'autant. Celle-ci, suivant alors les mou- vemens de TEmpereur Napoleon, pourra profiler d'un moment oppor- tun pour reprendre I'offensive, et le resultat de nos efforts doit devenir funeste a I'ennemi. C'est ainsi, Sire, que nous devons dissiper les nuages momentanee, qui ont obscurci la serenile de nos relations; c'est ainsi que le Conti- nent attend encore des forces de votre Empire ; et de la loyaute de vos principes, la tranquillite el I'independance qu'il reclame. Les peuples de I'Allemagne ne demandent qu'un guide; la Cour d'Au- triche ne }x»urra pas rester indifferenle a la vocation brillante que lui prcsentent a la fois sa propre suretc, sa gloire, ses forces reelles, et les vceux des peuples opprimes. Tous les el6mens pour reussir existent encore : separes, ils ne tourneront qu'au profit de nos ennemis ; unis. ih assureront le repos du monde. Oui, Sire, accepter une paix en ce moment dictee par I'Empereur Napoleon, c'est poser la pieri-e sepulcrale sur I'Europe ; el si ce mal- heur arrive, il n'y a que I'Angleterre et la Suede qui peuvent renter Hitactes. Quelles que soient les determinations de V. M. L, soit pour la guerre. 284 APPENDIX. soit pour une paix g^nerale, je la prie de croire que j'lrai en toute oc- casion au-devant de ees vobux avec une entiere confiance. Je crois qu'il est plus important que jamais que nuUe divergence d'opinion n'existe entre nous ; et pour y parvenir, rien ne me parol t plus propre qu'une entrevue personnelle. La politique est a cetle occasion d'ac- cord avec mon coeur; et je serai heureux si V. M. I. et S, iVI. le Roi de Prusse, en profitant du terns de rel^che que donne I'armistice peut venir a Berlin, ou a tel autre endroit dans ses environs que V. M. I. indiquera. Une heuro d'entretien, surtout dans des circonstances aussi pressantes que celles de ce moment, est plus decisive pour la marche des affaires qu'un mois de correspondance. C'est le Lieut.-Gen. de Skjoldebrand qui aura I'honneur de remet tre celte lettre a V. M. I. ayant I'avantage "d'etre dejk connu d'elle, et possedant toute ma confiance, je prie V. M. de lui accorder la si- enne. Que V. M. I., rassuree sur mes intentions et sur mes plans, comnie j'espere qu'elle le sera par cette lettre, n'y voie qu'un motif de plus de perseverer dans la noble lutte qu'elle a entreprise, et qu'elle ne doute jamais de I'amitie inalterable qui sera toujours independante de tous les evenemens humains, et de I'attachement sincere avec lequel je suis, etc. etc. (Sign^) Charles Jean. Stralsund, 10 Juin, 1813. Corps du Lt.-Gen. Bulow 25,000 Comte de Janengsen 6,000 Comte de Walmoden 6,000 Comte de Woronzoff 4,000 Bataillons s^pares, qui pourroient 6tre omis du cote de la i ^ ^^^ Baltique ou de la Finlande ^ ' Total 47,000 Page 200. Declaration of the Allied Plenipotentiaries. Chatillon, February 28th, 1814. Plusieurs jours s'etant ecoules depuis que le projet des Pr6limi- naires d'une Paix gen^rale a ete present^ par les Plenipolentiaires des Cours alliees a M. le Plenipotentiaire Fran^aia, et aucune reponse n'ayant ete donnee ni dans la forme d'une acceptation ni dans celle d'une modification du dit projet; LL. MM. JI. et RR. ont juge con- Tenable d'enjoindre aux plenipolentiaires Francais une declaration distincte et explicite de son gouvemement sur le projet en question. Les plenipoteiuiaires des Cours alliees? pensent qu'il y a d'autant moins de motifs de delai de la part du gouvemement Francais a I'egnrd d'une decision sur les pr^liminaires proposes, que le projet pr^sente par eux etait base en sub.stancc sur ime offre faite par le plenipoten- APPENDIX. 285 tiair6 de France dans sa lettre au Prince de Metternich, datee le 9 de ce niois, que le Prince a soumise aux Cours alliees. De plus, les plenipotentiaires des Cours alliees sont charges de declarer au nom do leurs Souverains, qu'adh^rant pleinement a la substance des de- mand es contenues dans ces conditions, qu'ils regardent comme au&si essentielles a la surete de I'Europe, que necessairee a Tarraugement d'une paix generale, ils ne pourraient interpreter tout retard ulterieur d'une rcpouse a leur propositions que comme un refus de la part du gouvernement Frangais. En consequence, les plenipotentiaires des Cours alliees, prets a tc concerter avec M. le plenipotentiaire Fran9ais a I'egard du tems in- dispensablement necessaire pour communiquer avec son gouverne- ment, ont ordre de declarer que si, a I'expiralion du terme recoimu suflisant, et dont on sera convenu conjointement avec M. le plenipo- tentiaire de France, il n'etait pas arrive de reponse qui fiat en sub- stance d'accord avec la base 6tablie dans le projet des allies, la n6go- ciation seroit regardee comme termin^e, et que les plenipotentiaire* des Corns alliees retourneroient au quartier-gen^ral. Page 216. Capitulation of Paris. Art. 1. Les corps des Marechaux Dues de Tr^viso (Morticr) etde Raguse (Marmont) evacueront la ville de Paris, le 31 Mars, a 7 heures du matin. Art. 2. lis emraeneront le materiel de leur armee. Art. 3. Les hostilites ne pourront recommencer que 2 heures apres I'cvacuation de Paris, c'est-a-dire, le 31 Mars, a 9 heures du matin. Art. 4. Tous les arsenaux, ateliers, edifices militaires, et magasins resteront dans I'etat ou ils se Irouvoient avant la presente capitulation. Art. 5. La garde nationale, ou garde urbaine, est entierement K^paree des troupes de ligne. Elle sera conserv6e, desarmee ou licen- ciee selon que les Souverains allies le jugeront necessaire. Art. 6. Le corps de la gendarmerie municipale partagera en tout le sort de la garde nationale. Art. 7. Les blesses et maraudeurs qui 7 heures apres seront en- core a Paris seront faits prisonniers de guerre. Art. 8. La ville de Paris est recommandee a la generosite dee Hauts Allies. Fait a Paris, le 31 Mars, 1814, a 2 heures du matin. (Signe) Le Colonel Orloff, Aide-de-camp de S. M. I'Empereur de Russie. Le Colonel Comte Paar, Aide-de-camp general de S. A. le Feld- Mar^chal Prince de Schwartzenberg. Le Colonel Fabvier, attache a I'^tat-major de Son Excellence le Marechal Due de Raguse- Le Colonel Denys, premier Aide-de-camp de S. E. le Marechal Due de Raguse. I 286 APPENDIX. Page 234. Letter to Sir Charles Stewart, sending the Order of the Garter to the Duke of Wellington. College of Arms, March 10th, 1813. Sir, I have the honor to inclose the Royal Warrant, under the sign- manual of the Prince Regent, and the signet of the Most Noble Or- der of the Garter, bearing date the 5th instant, authorizing you to de- liver unto his Excellency the Marquess of Wellington, knight of that most noble order, the Gold George, and Garter of blue velvet, with gold letters, buckle and pendant ; which ensigns are herewith trans- mitted to you for that purpose. I have, at the same time, to request your obliging care of the pack- et addressed to His Excellency, which I also inclose, and which contains the Royal Warrant, signifying his election into the Order. I beg leave to observe that there is not any prescribed ceremony for the delivery of the ensigns transmitted to the Marquess ; as I have communicated in my dispatch to His Excellency. You will have the goodness to transmit me a line acknowledging the receipt of this letter, and of the ensigns ; and I have the honor to be, Sir, Your most obedient, humble servant, Isaac Heard, Garter. Major-General The Hon. Sir Charles William Stewart, K. B., &c. &c. &c. Page 235. Conclusion of the Treaty of Paris, April llth, 1814. Art. 1. S. M. I'Empereur Napoleon renonce pour lui et ses suc- cesseurs et descendans, ainsi que pour chacun des raerabres de sa famille, b. tout droit de souverainete et de domination, tant sur I'em- pire Fran9ais et le royaume d'ltalie que sur tout autre pays. Art. 2. LL. MM. I'Empereur Napoleon et I'lmperatrice Marie Louise conservent ces litres et qualites pour en jouir leur vie duranf ; la mere, les freres, soeurs, neveux et nieces de I'Empereur, conserve- ront egalement, partout ou ils se trouveront, le titre de princes de sa famille. Art. 3. L'lle d'EIbe, adoptee par I'Empereur Napoleon pour le lieu de son sejour, formera, sa vie durant, une principaut6 separee, qui sera possedee par hii en toute souverainete et propriete. 11 sera donne en outre, en toute propriete, k I'Empereur Napoleon, un revenu annuel de deux millions de francs, en rentes sur le grand livre de France, dont un million reversible a I'lmperatrice. Art. 4. Toutes les puissances s'engagent a employer leurs bons offi- ces pour faire respecter par les barbaresques Ic pavilion et le territoire APPENDIX. 287 de I'lle d'Elbe, et pour que dans ses rapports avec les barbaresques elle soit assimilee a la France. Art. 6. Les Duches de Parme, Plaisance, ot Guastalla seront don- nas en toute propriete et souverainete k S. M. I'lmperatrice Marie Louise ; ils passeront a son fils et k sa descendance en ligne directe. Le Prince son fils prendra des ce moment le nom de Prince de Parrae, Plaisance, et Guastalla. Art. 6. II sera reserve dana les pays auxquels I'Empereur Napo- leon renonce, pour lui et safamille, des domaines, oudonn6 des rentes Bur le grand livre de France, produisant un revenu annuel net, et deduction faite de toute charge, de 2,500,000 francs. Ces domaines ou rentes appartiendront en toute propriete, et pour en disposer com- me bon leur semblera, aux Princes et Princesses de sa famille, et se- ront repartis entr'eux de maniere a ce que le revenu de chacun soit dans la proportion suivante, savoir : k Madame Mere, 300,000 francs ; au Roi Joseph et la Reine, 500,000 francs ; au Roi Louis, 200,000 francs ; a la Reine Hortense et a son enfant, 400,000 francs ; au Roi Jerome et la Reine, 500,000 francs ; a la Princesse Elisa, 300,000 francs; a la Princesse Pauline, 300,000 francs. Les Princes et Princes- ses de la famille de I'Empereur conserveront en outre tous les biens, meubles et immeubles, de quelque nature que ce soit, qu'ils poesedent a litre particulier, et notamment les rentes dont ils jouissent egalement comme particuliers sur le grand livre de France ou le Mont Napxj- leon de Milan. Art. 7. Le traitement annuel de I'lmperatrice Josephine sera r^duit a un million on domaines ou en inscriptions sur le grand livre de France. Elle continuera k jouir, en toute propri^t6, de ses biens meubles et immeubles particuliers, et pourra en jouir conform^raent aux loix Fran9aises. Art. 8. II sera donn6 au Prince Eugene Viceroi d'ltalio, un eta- blissement convenable hors de France. Art. 9. Les proprieies que S. M. I'Empereur Napoleon possede en France, soit comme domaine extraordinaire, soit comrae domaine prive, resteront a. la couronne. Sur les fonds places par I'Empereur Napo- leon, soit sur le grand livre, soit sur la banque de France, soit sur les actions des forets, soit de toute autre maniere, et dont S. M. fait I'aban- don a la couronne, il sera r&erv^ un capital qui n'exc^dera pas deux millions, pour etre employe en gratifications en faveur des personnes qui seront portees sur I'etat que signera I'Empereur Napol6on, et qui sera remis au gouvernement Francais. Art. 10. Tous les diamans de la couronne resteront It la France. Art. 11. L'Empereur Napol6on fera versemens au tr^sor et aux autres caisses publiques de toutes les sommes et efiets qui auraient et6 deplaces par ses ordres, a I'exception de la liste civile. Art. 12. Les dettes de la maison de S. M. I'Empereur Napoleon, telles qu'elles se trouvent lors de la signature du present traite, seront immediatement acquittees sur les arrerages dus par le tresor public k la liste civile, d'apres les ^tats qui seront sign6s par un comraisaaire nomme a cet eflet. 288 APPENDIX. Art. 13. Les obligations du Mont-Napoleon de Milan envers tous, ces creanciers, soit Francais solt etrangers, seront exactement remplies sans qu'il soit fait aucun changement a cet egard. Art. 14. On donnera tous les sauf-conduits necessaires pour le libre voyage de S. M. I'Empereur Napoleon, de I'lmperatrice, des Princes et Princesses, el de toutes personnes de leur suite qui voudront les accomjjagner ou s'etablir hors de France, ainsi que pour le passage de tous les equipages, chevaux et efFets qui leur appartinnent. Les Puis- sances alliees donneront en consequence des officiers et des hommes d'escorte. Art. 15. La garde Imperiale Francaise fournira un detachement de 12 a 1500 hommes de toutes armes, pour servir d'escorte jusqu' a St. Tropez, lieu de I'embarquement. Art. 16. II sera fourni une corvette armee, et les batimens neces- saires pour conduire au lieu de sa destination S. M. I'Empereur Napole- on ainsi que sa maison ; la corvette demeurera en toute propriete a S. M. Art. 17. S. M. I'Empereur emmenera avec lui, et conservera pour sa garde, 400 hommes de bonne volonte, tant officiers que sous-offi- ciers et soldats. Art. 18. Tous les Francais qui auront suivi S. M. I'Empereur Na- poleon ou sa famille, seront tenus, s'ils ne veulent pas perdre leur qualite de Fran9ais, de rentrer en France dans le terme de trois ans, a moins qu'ils ne soient compris dans les emplois que le gouverne- ment Fran9ais se reserve d'accorder apres I'expiration de ce terme. Art. 19. Les troupes Polonaises de toutes armes, qui sont au ser- vice de France, auront la liberie de relourner chez elles, en con- servant armes et bagages, comme un temoignage de leurs services honorables ; les officiers, sous-officiers et soldats, conserveront les decorations qui leur auront ete accordees, et les pensions affectees a ces decorations. Art. 20. Les Hautes Pui.ssances alliees garantissent I'execulion de IOU9 les articles du present traite. Elles s'engagent a obtenir qu'elles soient adoptees et garanties par la France. Art. 21. Le present traite sera ratifie. Page 240. RETURN OF THE ARMY ASSEMBLED AT DIJON, IN 1814. Isl Corps Cavalry. Intantry. Artillery. 1 Total. ! Remarks. 3,200 30,800 1,620 35.620 iM do. . . 3,(500 30,000 1.600 35,200 3d do. . . 3,200 30,000 l.COO I 34,800 4th do. . . 4, too 30,000 1,600 1 36.400 5lh do. . . 4.800 30,800 1,600 37.200 Gth do. . . 4,800 30,0f)0 1,600 I 36,400 Reserve Corps l.tOO 11,200 540 13,340 For Saxony 900 28,900 7,000 199,800 10,160 7,900 ! 236,860 Grand Total Vienna, April 14, 1814. ADDENDA. The following' private Letters, written at the time of Napo- leon's escape from Elba, by the author, at Vienna, may not be wholly uninteresting ; and they are therefore added to the work. [The Letter here inserted will show how entirely the Prince Metternich agreed in the Duke of Wellington's military views upon the important sub- ject of the new campaign, which absorbed public attention.] Vienne, Mai 17, 1815. Je vous remerciede I'interessante communication de Lord Welling- ton. II y a un mot sur le 5me page que je ne puis lire. Si vous etes plus heureux que moi, veuillez m'ficrire ce que c'est que I'endroit illegible. Les idees de Milord Wellington sont entierement les miennes ; et je crois pouvoir repondre que le Prince de Schwartzenberg les parta- gera egalement. II propose un grand mouvement concentrique ; et il veut que pour que ce mouvement ne soit pas risquant, on attende que I'ensemble des forces soit a la disposition des generaux. Voila egalement ce que nous voulons. II veut que les armees se placent a telle hauteur qu'elles puissent se preter la main en cas de revers. II ne propose, en un mot, rien d'eccentrique ; et je I'aime aussi peu en fait de questions militaires, qu'en toutes autres. (Signe) Metternich. The following Letter is annexed, to show likewise the entire accord- ance of opinion between Prince Schwartzenberg and the Duke of Wellington, as to the proposed plan of the campaign in 181.5. Vienne, Mai 18, 1815. Je vous prie de me permettre, mon cher Lord, de convenir avec vous demain d'une heure de conversation avant que vous n'ecriviez h. Mdord Wellington. Je vous mettrai avec grand plaisir au fait de ma maniere de juger les operations; et je vois, par une lettre que j'ai recue aujourd'hui du Prince de Schwartzenberg, que je ne me suis pas trorape sur notre conformite de juger la position des choses. Le Prince de Schwartzenberg me mande qu'il a recu des lettres fort in- teressanles du Due, et qu'il lui a repondu fort en detail: il ajoute que leur maniere de voir est la ineme, ainsi done ce qui doit se faire, a Z 290 ADDENDA. lieu, et on peut attendre a des succes veritables. J'ai re9U un rapport du General Steigentesh de Moral, en date du 11 Mai, infiniraent curieux, pour les nouvelles de I'interieur de la France. Comme il est le duplicata d'un rapport adresse par lui au Prince de Schwartzenberg, il est hors de doute que le Due de Wellington est informe de son con- lenu. Je viens de le faire passer a I'Empereur Alexandre, et deraain je vous le communiquerai. (Signe) Metternich. A Son Excellence Lord Stewart. The following Declaration, drawn up by the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers in Congress at Vienna, was ultimately decided on, and promulgated on Napoleon's escape from Elba, and is added as a most interesting document : Les Puissances qui ont signe le Traite de Paris, reunies en Congres a Vienne, informees de I'evasion de Napoleon Buonaparte, et de son entree a main armee en France, doivent a leur propre dignite et a I'interet de I'ordre social une declaration solennelle des sentimens que cet evenement leur a fait eprouver. En rompant ainsi la Convention qui I'avoit etabli a I'lle d'Elbe, Buonaparte detruit le seul litre legal auquel son existence se trouvoit attachee. En reparoissant en France avec des projets de troubles et de bouleversemens, il s'est prive lui-raerae de la protection des lois, et a manifeste a la face de TUnivers, qu'il ne sauroii y avoir ni paix ni treve avec lui. Les Puissances declarent en consequence, que Napoleon Buona- parte s'est place hors des relations civiles et sociales, et que, comrae ennemi et perturbateur du repos du monde, il s'est livre a la vindicte publique. Elles declarent en meme tems, que fermement resolues de mainte- nir intact le Traite de Paris du 30 Mai 1814, et les dispositions sanc- tionnees par ce Traite, et celles qu'elles ont arretees ou qu'elles ar- reteront encore pour le completer et le consolider, elles employeront tous leurs moyens, et reuniront leurs efforts, pour que la paix generale, objel des voeux de I'Europe, et but constant de leurs travaux, ne soil pas troublee de nouveau, et pour la garantir de tout attentat qui menaceroit de replonger les peuples dans les desordres et les malheura des revolutions. Et quoiqu'intimement persuades que la France entiere, se ralliant autour de son Sonverain legitime, fera incessamment rentrer dans le neant cette derniere lantative d'un delire criminel et impuissant, tous les Souverains de I'Europe, animes des memes sentimens et guides par les memes principes, declarent, que si, conlre tout calcul, il pouvoit resulter de cet evenement un danger reel quelconque, ils seroient prets a donner au Roi de France et a la nation Fran^ais ou k tout autre gouvernement attaque, des que la demande en seroit form^e, les tecours necessaires pour retablir la Iranquillile publique, et a faire ADDENDA. 291 cause commune contre tous ceux qui entreprendroient de la compro- mettre. La prisenie Declaration insdrie au Protocole du Congres rliini a Vienne dans sa Sdance du 13 Mars 1815, sera reivdue publique. Fait et certijie veritable par les Pldnipopeniiaires des huit Puissances signataires du Traiti de Paris. A Vienne, le 13 Mars 1815. Suivent les signatures dans I'ordre alphabetique des Cours : AUTRICHE. ^ Le Prince de Metteunich. ) Le Baron de Wessenberg. ESPAGNE. P. Gomez Labrador. Che Prince de Talleyrand. r-o ATVTr^c J Le Due de Dalberg. FRANCE. ^ Latour-Dupin. (^Le Cte. Alexis de Noailles. C Wellington. GRANDE J Clancarty. BRETAGNE.i Cathcart. [_ Stewart. !Le Cte. de Palmella. Saldanha. LOBO. PRTTSSF ^ ^® Prince de Hardenberg. ) Le Baron de Humboldt. i Le Cte. de Rasoumowsky. RUSSIE. < Le Cte. de Stackelberg. ( Le Cte. de Nesselrode. SUEDE. Loewenhielm. Extract of a Letter. Vienna, March 13th, 1815. If I had had my will, or any responsibility, I should certainly have dispatched a messenger to England as soon as the news of Napoleon's flight reached this capital, in order to have put you in possession of the sensations this event has occasioned here, with the speculations it has given rise to, and the probable effect it will have on our still pending operations in Congress. Before I send off this letter, however, it is probable that many of my hypotheses may be at an end, by the destination of this singular man being ascertained. Nevertheless, to give you the conversation now current here, cannot be entirely uninteresting. It happened that Lord Burghersh's aide-de-camp. Captain Aubin, arrived in Vienna on the day of one of the fetes at court. He was the first proclaimer of the startling news ; and Metternich was so alarmed, that he would willingly have kept it secret, at least for that night, in order not to throw a sudden gloom over the reprisentations du Theatre Royal at court. However, as the populace in the town, and the cabarets had got possession of the intelligence, all notion of keeping the matter 292 ADDENDA. concealed was soon at an end. A conference was sitting the same day, with reference, I believe, to the mode of dealing with the King of Saxony. At this meeting the event of the escape came under dis- cussion ; and I understand there was an idea of a meeting of the eight Powers, to come to some sort of a declaration or sentiment of general and united hostility on the event. Whether it was afterwards considered that this had better be de- ferred until it was known where the game was to be found, or whether it was deemed imprudent to sound the tocsin too soon, I know not ; but I understood the above notion was given up, and the Duke of Wellington, Metternich, and Talleyrand, set out to conduct their negotiation with the King of Saxony at Presburg yesterday, as if nothing had occurred. It is almost difficult to describe to you the various impressions produced on the circle at court by the intelligence of the day. Some, with a degree of seeming indifference and jest, expressed blame and surprise that the English could have let him escape from Elba, the custody of him at that island having been con- fided to them. Others blustered and rejoiced at it, as an auspicious accident, that must bring all disagreeable differences to a close. Others again dreaded the possible breaking out of a civil war in France, and of the renewed bloodshed and tumult, of which Napoleon's appear- ing in France would be the forerunner; and finally, others speculated on Buonaparte's having made common cause with Murat to rescue the kingdom of Italy. It is however too true, that the present apparent Quixolical expedi- tion from the island of Elba occasions a general and indescribable ex- pression of fear in every quarter, that their best efforts cannot con- ceal. I understand that all the great men laughed on reading Ix)rd Burghersh's dispatch ; but next to the smile, I believe apprehension and alarm existed to an inordinate degree. Lord Wellington did not see the Emperor before the ball and play took place at court. The Duke, I understand, was very much satisfied with the Emperor of Russia's expressions. It seemed a moment for a general rally, and renewed pledges of union against a common danger. If the phoonix should again rise out of its ashes in Europe, whatever were the diffi- culties among ourselves, the Emperor declared that we must unite more firmly than ever against any new efforts made by Napoleon ; and that w-e ought now to exert every nerve to carry into the speediest effect all the remaining stipulations relative to the Treaty of Paris. When the Emperor approached Talleyrand, and observed on the curious fact of the bird having escaped from his cage, which he be- lieved would not have occurred if France had made the payments as stipulated by treaty, Talleyrand is said to have asked him jocosely, if His Imperial Majesty would pay in March what was not due till May. I think Talleyrand has been particularly cheerful since the news. I know not Mr. La Bernarchere's sentiments, ihe right-hand man of the French Chancellerie ; and D'Albcrg has been ill. I believe they all fear the party against the government in Franco, if Napoleon should go to the south. In this party, however, there is a schism, unless Napo- leon can manage to reunite it. The Empress Maria Louisa has been ADDENDA. 293 deeply affected, and has declared that Napoleon must be frantic to compromise in such a manner the interests of his son, without a solid hope of success. Her servants, &c. on hearing the intelligence, gave loose to extravagant demonstrations of joy, leaping, and hurraing, and saying that Buonaparte would be emperor again, &c. As to the course Napoleon has pursued, or his plans, there are vari- ous conjectures afloat. Naples appears the most likely point where, if acting in unison with Murat, a great force might soonest be col- lected. But is it probable that Murat would connect himself with him now? It would be the living acting with the dead. And Murat has certainly a better chance with Austria favorably disposed, and with the other powers in a degree passive, than if he were to join in battle-array against them ; besides the uncertainty as to what Napo- leon might bring into action, and with a knowledge that he must, in all J nts, yield to his superior direction. Treachery so great as to be- lieve Murat would seduce his old chief, and deliver him up after he fell into his possession, to secure his own object, can hardly be im- agined ; and yet some think this more probable than that Murat would consent to make common cause in Italy with Napoleon. The Austrians are naturally alarmed at the idea of the scene of war being in Italy ; and yet many say that if Buonaparte should land there, it would be the best means of their becoming extricated from their engagements with Murat; to which the Emperor of Austria, in his own handwriting, stands already pledged. Next to the speculations as to Italy, Napoleon's return to France is the most prevalent conjecture ; and on this head all seem to agree that it would be a most fatal and dangerous attempt, in which much blood must probably flow, and a civil war in the country ensue With respect to the immediate effect which the event may produce on our proceedings at Congress, I think the first impression w-as, that it would tend to accelerate them, and bring every point to a conclu sion. However, I am not of this opinion. It is not to be expected that an indecisive and theoretical mind like m}?^ friend Metternich's, leaning on events, would come to a straight-forward arrangement. Upon Italy, for instance, when there is such an enemy as Napoleon again in the field, and as regards all other unsettled poinl«, I doubt if our approach towards a general pacification will be narrowed. Tho arrangement as lo Parma might become more questionable if Napo- leon, by treaty, was not actually confined to Elba, which evidently appears not to be the case. However, I do not see the necessity of a change ; for, after this excursion, it is not very likely that the powers of Europe will allow him to return to the quiet possession of Elba ; and if he should close his career el.sewhere, all danger will cease with him. The arrange- ments of Italy, especially the question of Naples, must at present stand still in the hands we have now here. The Auslrians are rein- forcing, and I believe collecting their army as one of observation. I understand by letters frem Paris, that the point of the Valteline, &c. is acceded to by France : there will be therefore no remaining Z2 294 ADDENDA. difficulty in winding up the Swiss Cantons when we have directions so to do. The Austrian and Bavarian differences are still so heterogeneous, that, without the hand of a master, I do not think they will speedily be brought to a settlement. Bavaria has been more yielding on the point of Saltzburg, and in proportion more tenacious as to that of Planau, which was thrown out for her : but the king of Prussia has made such strong objections to the latter, and the remonstrances of Baden and Wirtemburg are so loud, that unless there is proper fore- sight to plan the best arrangement for all parties, and decision enough to say it shall be so, when it has been so laid down, I doubt whether the adjustments will ever be arrived at. The arrangements for Ger- many do not get on ; and Count Munster complains of the Prince Royal of Wirtemburg, who has set himself up as the champion of the Mediatizes, and he is opposing violently all efforts for the German constitution. The reports which Schwartzenberg received last night brought the intelligence of Buonaparte's landing at Cannes, near Grasse. He first made an attempt to re-embark at Antibes, where he was prevented, and then went to Cannes. His Polish lancers made M. de Monaco prisoner, and he was much examined as to the esprit reigning in France. He was then suffered to depart; and, going to Nice, gave the information above detailed. These reports came to the Emperor of Russia from Schwartzenberg, while at a party at Prince Ester- hazy's ; and the Emperor, the King, and all the ladies, got the maps, and were planning over the table the various probable enterprises of the great wild beast, as they all now term him ; and tiiey seemed all to be affected with the same alarm as the e.?cape of a ferocious animal would inspire. The French mission here now appear much terrified. I hear they have only two couriers by whom they dare send dispatches. When Talleyrand was told of the possible collusion between the French ships of war and Napoleon before he left Elba, he is said to have actually trembled. I think, however, Mr. Nicholson Stewart's report to Lord Burghersh on this head is possibly the tale of those who are secret adherents to Napoleon. I have urged the Duke of Wellington verj'^much to send Hardinge to Genoa, to communicate on military points, between Lord WiHiam and him, and from thence to go on to the most advanced troops, and join any French corps, if aiding the royal cause, and to report direct to the Duke. I am sure this arrangement would be attended with advantage, and I hope to carry it into effect. I fear Colonel Campbell has got into difUculty by all I learn, and his conduct is much animad- verted upon : this I lament, as I accomplished his recommendation. A'ieima, March 16. Our news from Paris last night of the 9th has quieted a pretty general ferment that prevailed. The Duke of Wellington adopted my plan, and sent Colonel Hardinge off last night. He goes by th« ADDENDA. 295 way of Zurich, and from thence towards Grenoble, or any other di- rection that is most advisable. He will correspond with Paris, to for- ward to London, and with the Duke here. You will, I am sure, pre- vent his being superseded. If this thing should last, . . . and at all events if Hardinge is up before the curtain drops, he may be of use. I see no progress here in other points ; a great deal of talk, but no acting. The arrangement of armies, planning commands, &c. is without end. I would rather be able to state the progressive marche of congress, or of some probable term to our labors. But how does this stand ? Prince Metternich places 160 articles — all, as he says, arretles, in the hands of the redacteurs. They find, on examination of them, that the sole points that are completely finished are our treaty on the Slave Trade, and the line between Prussia and Saxony. The limits on the side of Poland, between Austria and Prussia and Russia, are still loose. All the arrangements of Germany are un- settled ,• even the conclusion of the affair of Genoa cannot yet be put in treaty; and Switzerland is again postponed. Italy likewise opens rather a new face : Prince Metternich argues, that although Napoleon may have broken his treaty for himself, it still holds good for all the other parties. It is circulated also, most absurdly, and I know not on what grounds, that the English ministry are very zealous in Murat's interest. March 19 th. Since writing the foregoing pages, two days since, the aspect of affairs has much changed, and general alarrh, almost leading to unac* countable despondency, has taken place. Our accounts from Paris of the 11th mention Napoleon's entiy into Lyons; the different troops that have joined him — Garyan and La Beroudiere's corps; also the defection of the garrison at Metz, the garrison of La Force having inarched for Paris, &c. All these reports you will probably have alrendy received more accurately. Consternation has been produced, and I think the Duke of Welling- ton, who saw things in a good light at first, has changed to the other extreme. All unite in urging his immediate departure for Belgium, to consolidate the mass of acting force in that quarter. Prince Tal- leyrand appears to feel his going as his only salvation. I am quite of opinion he should do so, when the military cabinets here are agreed upon a common system of action. Several and repeated conferences have taken place. Knesebeck, Schwartzenberg, &c. have assisted the Emperor and King, and the Duke has been of immense service. Orders are gone to all the armies. General Nugent sets out for Italy to-day, and active measures are taken. The Duke's absence from hence, when once the outline of military arrangement is fixed, will not be important. I am satisfied Lord Clancarty will carry on such business as it is possible to accomplish, while Buonaparte occupies every head, and issues forth from every mouth. All our illustrious allies are pressing hard for subsidy, and we are to have a new treaty 296 ADDENDA. of Chaumont. I understand the Emperor of Russia, with \m usual address, has circulated doubts as to our last declaration against Napo- leon, evidently to liberate himself from carrying on an eternal war against France. If she chooses to be governed by a military chief, or even republic, who would execute, on their part, the treaty of Paris ? I hope some clear understanding may be insisted upon on this most important point. It is surely not to be endured that there should be a doubl, from our declaration, whether we are called upon not lo make war in France until appealed to by the King, much less that we should agree, after such a paper, to let Napoleon reign in Europe, when we have pledged ourselves to have neither " paix ni treve avec lui ;" and yet last night I heard frequently the language, that if the Bourbons were put down — if the army, and ultimately the nation, received Napoleon, that our declaration was not ratified, and might be arrested, &c. In short, we begin now to be exposed to the same vapors we breathed so much in the winter of 1813 and the spring of 1814. The French embassy, by their fears, will give great encour- agement to the alarm. Prince Talleyrand has already announced, if things go bad, he will never go back to France, but will reside in Germany. It is very well to take this resolution when the time arrives, but to circulate these sort of declarations at the present moment is very prejudicial. Lord Wellington was deeply affected by poor Packenhara's death: there never was a greater loss to the British army. The Duke received papers from Talleyrand by his courier, with an intimation that we had failed at New-Orleans. Going out to dinner in a hiury. he put them into his red box, and the two days following he waa busy; on the third by accident he looked into the box, found the newspaper of the 8th, which announced the misfortune, and \\hich for two days he had had shut up, ignorant of the contents. I question much if this failure — the non-ratification — your riots on com — and Buonaparte's resurrection, will not give you work enough at home. But I have no question of any crisis being replete enough with events, &:c. to puzzle or annoy you. March 27, at night, 1816. I have only time for a few words. The news received this night is as bad as possible. The accounts are of the 20th. The King was on the point of leaving Paris ; — the Melun camp all broken up, and there is little doubt of the success of Buonaparte in all quarters. Vienna, March 29, at night, 1815. I was not in the way when the last messenger was dispatched, and therefore missed the opportunity of writing. To-day's intelligence has confirmed Napoleon's entry into PariK — his nomination of his ministry — the King's fliglit to Lisle — his safe journey as far as Peronne, and all the other details, which you will have heard before this reaches you. Prince Mettornich read his accounis at the conference to-night, up to the 21st. Nothing can be worse ; and there is a gloom here ADDENDA. 297 quite indescribable ; it is a most wonderful change in one short month. It may be divided into three acts ; — Buonaparte lands, his attempt is ridiculed, and it is supposed the measures of the police and the first troops that meet him, will put an end to him. — His entry into Lyons next announces that the whole French army are with him, and opposed to the nation. — The last act of his arrival at Paris shows that nearly all France is under his influence ; and we must not deceive ourselves in thinking we have an easy task before us. It is true the nation are unaccountable in their acts and feelings ; for Ney's renew- ing his oath of fidelity perplexes sadly a well-regulated honorable mind ; and one is lost in amazement at the repeated instances of infidelity in the military chiefs. You will hear of the attempt to carry off young Napoleon from the King's palace at Schonbrunn. Every thing was arranged : young Montesquieu is believed to have been charged with it; and carriages, &c. were to have been in readiness near the Imperial Gardens. This plot was discovered, and the soi-disant King of Rome is now separated from the Empress Maria Louisa, and lodged in the palace here. I am rather out of sorts at all I contemplate. The accounts from France of the 14th are certainly very critical. It appears clear the cause of the Bourbons will not be upheld but by foreign aid, and by the vigor and decision of England ; and your own sterling courage and animated feelings on this head, will do more than any other appui. The intelligence from Italy is likewise alarming. Switzerland seems to be behaving well, and the Pays de Vaud and Geneva are showing great determination. Your return to the head-quarters, if things go on in their warlike shape, will be absolutely necessary : the different parts of the con- federacy will be disunited without it, and all seem to look for it. We have as yet no accounts from Hardinge, but we expect them daily. Adieu. The remainder of the author's letters, and all other documents and anecdotes of the congress, and the campaign of 1815, will be proba- bly introduced in a future work. These letters have been added at this moment chiefly to show the eflfect created by Napoleon's escape from Elba. And having now placed the readers of these pages in full possession of what passed at Vienna, as to military points, at the above epoch, this short series of letters is concluded by adding the first report received from Sir Henry Hardinge, at Brussels, which will demon- strate what was passing there, and will put on record, in an extraor- dinary manner, what the first elements and materials were in March 27th, of an army which, imder the Duke of Wellington, on June 18th, achieved the battle of Waterloo, entirely defeated Napoleon, and gave a second time peace to Europe. Brussels, March 27th. I am arrived here, my dear general ; and I do not think it likely that Napoleon will make a push in this direction ; for although we are not well prepared, either in the number or quality of the troops, 298 ADDENDA. yet I should conceive he will attempt to negotiate, and notwithstand- ing the declaration of the congress, consider its sentiments as no longer applicable to him, having been reinstated without bloodshed, or a civil war, by the unanimous choice of the people ; in whose internal affairs foreign powers have declared they are not entitled to interfere, he being ready, on the part of the nation, as its chief, to guaranty the Treaty of Paris, and to abide by all public diplomatic acts of the interregnum. This I suppose to be the course he will take in preference ; and I therefore do not in the least enter into the alarms of those who expect him at the head of his imperial guards immediately in Brussels. The dread of such a visit has been so strong and universal, that the greater part of the Enghsh have hurried away to the Hague. The force, I have said, is small, not amounting to 10,000 British, and including Hanoverians of the legion and landwehr, about 28,000, of which 10,000 are regiments for garrisons ; and, in point of quality, the British are mostly composed of the 2d battalion, who, as young soldiers, at their outset in this country, got somewhat discouraged by the Bergen-op-zoom failure ; and the Hanoverians, in point of ad- vancement in discipline, about as far advanced as the Portuguese levies the first year of their service. In short, this army has not 10,000 formed soldiers. The Belgian regiments are composed of officers and men who have served under Buonaparte, and who are not in a loyal temper, and therefore almost worse than nothing. They are sent to the rear, and may be sprinkled in the garrisons, until by reinforcements and steady measures the army and people gain confi- dence, when I have no doubt they may be usefully brought forward. There are also 25,000 Dutch troops on their march, in a raw undis- ciplined state ; and if the Duke personally takes the command of this army, and undertakes any operation at present, I should almost fear he would compromise his reputation; for they cannot move, and far outnumber the made troops. No very material augmentation can, I understand, be expected from England, and that it will be the middle or end of next month (April) before any American troops can arrive. The Russians call themselves 80,000 men, and promise for any co-operation 40,000 good troops, at the disposition of Holland and England, in defence of their frontier. The enemy have marched some bodies of troops in this direction ; but I believe they are chiefly the garrisons which the King drew out to protect Paris, and which, after betraying him, are on their march to resume their former points. The Prince of Orange is very active and very popular : his plans are however uncertain. The Dutch have the greatest confidence in his military talents; and His Royal Highness is not said to be pleased with the idea of the Duke's being likely to supersede him in the com- mand. Sir Hudson Lowe and Barnes are very anxious for the Duke's arrival. Colbome appears somewhat sick of his situation, and dreads any crisis of aflairs under the present state of things. The army is not unlike Lord RanclifT's description of the French pack of hounds — ADDENDA. 299 pointers, poodles, turnspits — all mixed up together, and running in sad confusion. Sir Charles Stewart came here this afternoon in con- sequence of an express which Lowe sent off the day before yester- day, with the news (confirmed) that Buonaparte was at Arras ; and the King is expected from the Hague to-morrow. The King of France is at Ostend ; and it would seem that he trusts his sentiments of future plans to no one, having taken (and very naturally, from the numerous treasons he has experienced) a suspi- cious turn of mind. He has, it is said, brought away, in cash and valuables, about five millions sterling ! Every one, it is said, lost their head, excepting the Due d'Orleans, who had a good deal of popu- larity in the army ; but, from the jealousy of the King, every advice and assistance of his is said to have been discountenanced and neglected. He has, by universal consent, the best abilities ; and if there is such a thing in France as personal attachment or party to the Bourbons, he possesses it. But I won't enter into farther conversation on this subject, as I must reserve a page for my own operations since I left Basle. I made my way through the Pays de Vosges to Nancy, where the troops and people had declared for Buonaparte, and hurried from thence to Chalons, still hoping to outmarch Buonaparte, and to place myself with some royal army, and not quite crediting the rumors I heard from his partisans, of his near approach to Paris. At Chalons I was induced, from a wish to get information, and a necessity of eating, to stop at an inn, where I was very unwillingly obliged to dine with some French officers, who were in great glee at the return of Buonaparte. They had information by express of his being at Paris. I therefore thought it quite time that I should leave such com- pany, and considering the declaration of the congress a declaration of war of Europe against Napoleon, and that the flight of the Bour- bons gave me no chance of acting upon my instructions, I determined to make for the frontier before I should be detained. I should tell you, that at most places I was brought before the civil and military authorities, and underwent a good deal of inquisitional examination. I was compelled to drive two stages on the high road to Paris from Chalons, because, when my horses were put to, these troublesome rascally officers asked the road I was about to take. About midnight we got the postilions to drive by a cross-road to Rheims, and thence to Mezieres, where I was again detained ; thence to Levan ; and so across the Duchy of Luxembourg to this place. I found the people, where there were no military, indifierent enough as to the success of either party; but certainly in general preferring Napoleon, or per- haps the change of masters, by which those who are not very well off speculate that by chance they may be better. Buonaparte appeara to have acted, and to be now acting, upon the old revolutionary prin- ciples of 1793. On his advance from Lyons, he was always one or two marches in front of his troops, liis partisans raising the mob of the villages through which he was to pass ; and when the multitude were in the fermentation desired, he used to make his appearance, 300 ADDENDA. cajoling them in the most familiar terms ; and by such means ne may be said to have entered Paris, by the aid of the rabble whom he picked up on the roads he passed along. Large parties of troops were, however, always in his front, and which, it may be supposed, he contrived by means of emissaries dis- patched to the chief towns and cantonments of the troops, with regular orders of march, signed by Davoust or Bertrand, ordering the troops on certain days to be at fixed places, so that at various places he knew he would meet with support by the junction of such deserters as had obeyed these orders, which were very generally and very artfully distributed throughout the country. Ever your most affectionate and attached, H. Hardino£. THE END. STEREOTYPED BY J. HOWE. H 109 89 iS.'*'^ • '•t«.«« .4 Oft • flO lO' '»•! iPv t 11 '^0^ .'^<^^ ^0*^ ♦ JT*- *P •]L*^* ^ V ^» Deacidified using the Bookkeeper proces '•v ♦ J