'"••^'T.-ii.f.i'l.i,. '•-.. E«-»->Ji .■r-V.r.i.-^^..-. -. ■*»;:..,w^.;..jpi,:;; B'*'i^'jfy"*~-i»'*-.':-j:u'-'..i:..i:i»,'.r: r-**. .: : „.; ,vsCj.,U4:-' ■ .:.;'•■;. i;«Si.(.!l,-./; i?,«f^>,:M<;i-«>';^;'-V..v.''::.f,:;i,3»;^jra.-r'.^ .tiVi . ?«^tir„" lUtM:. Ube Univ^ersitp of Cbicaao FOUNDED BY JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER THE SOCIAL MIND AND EDUCATION A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTIES OF THE GRAD- UATE SCHOOLS OF ARTS, LITERATURE, AND SCIENCE, IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY BY GEORGE EDGAR VINCENT /^C CHICAGO Ube xanivetsiti? ot Cbica^o press London: LUZAC & CO., \6 Great Russell St., W. C. INTRODUCTION. The task which this essay undertakes is one of organi- zation, rather than of investigation, the putting together in relations of interdependence, or mutual reinforcement, of ideas which have been worked out in connection with sev- eral more or less isolated pursuits. In terms of a proposition to be presented in Chapter I., the attempt belongs to that synthetic movement which is one of the factors in the progress of both the social and the individual mind. An effort is made to bring con- ceptions from social philosophy to bear upon the problem of education, with the hope that there may result both clar- ification of ideas and greater definiteness of purpose. The thought of social philosophy which sees in the development of society the growth of a vast psychic or- ganism, to which individuals are intrinsically related, in which alone they find self-realization, is of the highest significance for the teacher, to whom it suggests both aim and method. ^ While this undertaking is, in general, synthetic, its scope is so vast that emphasis will be laid chiefly, if not exclusively, upon the cognitive function of society and of the individual. Such one-sidedness of treatment is adopted deliberately, and not from any failure to recognize the organic unity of the mind. A complete view of the subject would include all the intimately interdependent aspects of both social and individual consciousness. Again, the view is confined to social life, as the sphere of man's activity, and as affording the immediate material of his Introduction. science and philosophy. The widest treatment would comprehend a cosmic philosophy ; but for obvious reasons it is necessary to limit an inquiry already covering an immense field. This primary synthesis must itself be further combined in the broader conception of the uni- verse. The argument of this essay, in its main outlines, is as follows : In the process of social evolution men's ideas, judg- ments, and desires have been combined into products which, transmitted from generation to generation, react upon individuals, and are in turn modified by them. These ' ' capitalizations of experience ' ' and their unceasing reactions form what may be described as the social mind. ^ The social tradition, in the course of its development, has been enriched by the successive separation or analysis of the world of phenomena and the generalization and re- combination of them in explanations or theories. Gradu- ally out of empiricism and "common sense" have been evolved more and more methodic examination and purpose- ful explanation, i. social mind may be stated in terms of the famihar intellectual tasks of men. Common or empirical knowledge forms a part of the social tradition and enters social consciousness, but is not a product of social self-consciousness. ' ' We break the solid plenitude of fact," says James, "into separate essences, conceive generally what only exists particularly, and by our classifications, leave nothing in its natural neighbor- hood, but separate the contiguous and join what the poles divorce."^ Such classification and rationalizing, purposeful efforts to reduce the world of phenomena to 1 Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative, Vol. II., p. 29. 2 Psychology, Vol. II., p. 634. The Social Mind and Its Development, 25 order and system produce sciences. Common knowledge is "untested and unanalyzed consciousness," while science is knowledge ' ' in its completest and purest form. ' ' ' The self-conscious element of the social memory, therefore, contains the sciences. From this point of view the prog- ress of the sciences is the extension of the area of self- consciousness in the social tradition. Common knowledge, originally chaotic and haphazard, is gradually ordered, organized, and brought under the reign of law.^ The methodical organization and enrichment of the social tradition have been achieved by division of labor which has become increasingly minute. "Nous sommes loin du temps," says Durkheim, "ou la philosophie etait la science unique ; elle est fragment^e en un multitude de disciplines sp^ciales dont chacune a son objet, sa methode, son esprit."^ He quotes also a passage from De Can- doUe,* who calls attention to the fact that in the epoch of Leibnitz and Newton the savant had two or three designa- tions, such as mathematician, astronomer, and physician. By the end of the eighteenth century several titles were still necessary to indicate the achievements, in more than one of the sciences and departments of letters, of men like Wolfi, Haller, and Charles Bonnet. In the nineteenth century this difficulty of description no longer remains, or at least is very rare. Candolle predicts that the dual profession of investigator and teacher will soon be 1 Flint : " Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum," Princeton Review, November, 1878. 2 "La succession des etats de conscience primitivement, desordonnee et fortuite, s'organise peu i. peu par I'activite de I'esprit. Elle ne devient intelli- gible pour lui que parce qu'il y met un ordre ; et par I'idee d'ordre on arrive ainsi a 1' idee de /ot." Quoted from a review of Andre Lalande's Lectures sur la philosophie des sciences, by Charles Andler in La revue philosophique. Tome XIX., p. 329. 3 De la division du travail social, p. 2. 4 Histoire des sciences et des savants, 2me Edition, p. 263. 26 The Social Mind and Education. definitely differentiated. Comte commented emphatically upon the increasing specialization of his day, and sounded a note of warning which is still reechoing in popular phrases. ' In terms of the social mind such specialization has been shown to be a dividing up of the social self-consciousness and the formation of groups to each of which a certain class of phenomena is intrusted. Each science, therefore, "est le fruit d'une collaboration seculaire entre des genera- tions de savants. ' ' ^ The advance of each science displays the processes of analysis and synthesis, the examination of details, and the recombination into a whole, a movement of which Froebel wrote : "I find in pure thought the type and law of all development. ' ' ^ The same movement which within the social mind sub- divides the collective tradition into sciences and arts, characterizes also the development of these special ele- ments. "Division, analysis," declares Flint, "is a neces- sary and inevitable condition of progress both in life and science. Every stage of progress must be consequent on a stage of division, spontaneous or reflective, industrial or scientific."* But division and analysis are only half the process. Combination, synthesis, render a complementary service. Just as each science is organized into coherence, so all the elements of the social tradition are constantly tending toward integration in philosophy. The history of philosophy has been described by Falck- enberg as "the philosophy of humanity, that great in- 1 Loc. cit., Tome I., p. 23. 2 Tarde : La logique sociale, p. 214. 8 Quoted by Miss Blow in Symbolic Education from a letter of Froebel to Krause. 4 Robert Flint : loc. cit. The Social Mi7id and Its Development. 27 dividual which . . . approaches by a necessary and certain growth of knowledge the one all-embracing truth which is rich and varied beyond our conception.'" As we have seen, humanity from the beginning has sought to unify its experiences, to explain all phenomena. This constant effort resulted at first in socially unconscious ex- planations which postulated the active agency of super- natural beings, and gradually with the increase of empirical or common-knowledge attributed all that happened to the power of a single God. This is the well-known theological stage of Comte's PJiilosophie Positive.^ It is impossible to mark off into definite stages the progress of collective thought. Only the tendency can be characterized. Fiske has described the movement implied in Comte's theory as progress from the more to the less anthropomorphic, ^ and Spencer has shown that in essential nature there is no difference between the theological, metaphysical, and positive stages, that all alike involve "the postulating of some external existence, and the postulating of this ultimate existence involves a state of consciousness (in positive philosophizing) indistinguishable from the other two."' The movement may also be described as progress from social unconsciousness to social self-consciousness, from 1 Loc. cit., p. 2. 2 " En d'autres termes, I'esprit humain, par sa nature, emploie successivement dans chacune de ses recherches trois methodes de philosopher, dont le car- actere est essentiellement different et meme radicalement oppose : d'abord la methode theologique, en suite la m^thode metaphysique, et enfin la methode positive." — Loc. cit., Tome I., p. 3. 8 " There are not three successive or superposed processes. There is one con- tinuous process which (if I may be allowed to invent a rather formidable word in imitation of Coleridge) is best described as a continuous process of deanthropo- morphization or the stripping off of the anthropomorphic attributes with which primeval philosophy clothed the unknown power which is manifested in phe- nomena." — Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy , Vol. I., pp. 175-176. * Essays : " Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte," Vol. II., p. 127. 28 The Social Mind and Education. spontaneous, unreflective explanations to ordered, system- atic, and purposeful investigation and conclusion. Be- tween these extremes there are many grades of partial self-consciousness that correspond in general to Comte's metaphysical stage which he himself conceived and de- scribed as a transition from the first to the third rather than as a clearly differentiated period.' The familiar "law of the three stages," therefore, maybe restated more exactly in terms of social self-consciousness. Each science passes gradually from unconscious empiri- cism to socially self-conscious or reflective organization and interpretation, just as philosophy in its attempt to interrelate and unify the sciences advances from more or less instinctive explanations to definitely planned and systematic efforts to construct a rational conception of the whole. Again, the order in which the sciences become the objects of the reflective social mind clearly depends upon more factors than Comte has indicated.^ The vary- ing simplicity and consequent progressive dependence of the phenomena themselves constitute only one of the causes which determine their relative rates of advance into social self-consciousness. Phenomena become the objects of reflective explanation not merely in the order of their 1 " La premiere est le point de depart nScessaire de I'intelligence humaine ; la troisifeme, son etat fixe et definitif ; la seconde est uniquement destinee a servir de transition." — Loc. cit., Tome I., p. 3. 2 Comte's principle of decreasing generality and cumulative dependence in the classification of the sciences was also made to serve as an explanation of the order in which the sciences have advanced through the " three stages." The well-known heirarchy is mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology (including transcendental biology — an abortive psychology), and social physics, or sociology. It should be said in justice to Comte that he himself recognized and admitted that the development and sequence was by no means rigidly linear. " On voit, en efifet, que, quelque parfaite qu'on p(it la supposer, cette classification ne saurait jamais etre rigoureusement conforme a I'enchainement historique des sciences. Quoi qu'on fasse, on ne peut 6viter entierement de presenter comma ant6rieure telle science qui aura cependant besoin, sous quelques rapports par- ticuliers plus ou moins important, d' emprunter des notions a une autre science classee dans un rang post^rieur. — Loc. cit., Tome I., p. 68. The Social Mind and Its Development. 29 simplicity, but in proportion as they are («) conspicuous or obtrusive, forcing themselves on the attention of men, ((5) frequent, demanding theories by their very iteration, (<:) concrete, seeking solution in definite tangible forms rather than in abstract relations, and (^) accessible or controllable within the natural or artificial range of human examination and analysis. ' Manifestly when all these influences are taken into the account the linear nature of Comte's law, based upon only one, must be greatly modified. The traditions of the social mind advance together in relations of mutual inter- dependence, the simplest aiding the more complex, while the latter often react in a most important way upon the former. In recognizing this organic growth of the social memory, it is unnecessary to go with Spencer to the extreme of wholly denying the existence of any order of progress based on the natural dependence of phenomena themselves. Even when Comte's rigid statement has been duly modified to include the other factors that have just been indicated, there remains the fact of -objective dependence which cannot be ignored. "So far from having succeeded in overthrowing that scheme [Comte's hierarchy of the sciences]," says Flint, "he [Spencer] has only succeeded in modifying it. There is a logical de- pendence of the sciences. And why ? Just because there is a natural dependence of phenomena. . . . There being such a hierarchy of phenomena, it is scarcely con- ceivable that there should be no corresponding hierarchy of sciences."^ A clear distinction should be made at this point between the historical order, in which certain bodies of knowledge 1 Fiske : loc. cit., Vol. I., pp. 208-211. 2 " The Classification of the Sciences," Presbyterian Review, July, 1886, p. 523- 30 The Social Mind and Education. have emerged into social self-consciousness, and the sys- tematic, reflective arrangement of these sciences in a scheme or classification designed to display their relations. Spencer^ in demonstrating the inadequacy of Comte's historical argument seems to ignore this discrimination. It is quite conceivable that the chronological sequence might have been in many details other than it was, but the exigencies of logic compel men in a self-conscious effort to systematize the social tradition to recognize "a rational dependence of phenomena" — a necessity to which Spencer himself has yielded in the sequence of the various parts of his Synthetic Philosophy.'^ But this distinction, which deserves passing notice here, will be emphasized from the pedagogical point of view in a subse- quent chapter. -^ It remains to show more definitely that philosophy corresponds to the synthetic movement of the social mind — a tendency toward integration which, no less than differentiation, is a condition of progress. The early philosopher had as his field a comparatively homogeneous social tradition ; he regarded all wisdom as his proper pursuit.^ Aristotle made a rational effort to specialize the social mind by the preliminary divisions of his classi- fication.* A classification of human knowledge is in its nature an act of social self-consciousness. ' ' In classing the sciences," says Bacon, "we comprehend not only things already invented and known but also those omitted 1 Essays : Vol. II., " The Classification of the Sciences." Cf. also Fiske : loc. cit., Vol. I., pp. 199-212. 2 L. F. Ward: " Sociology in Its Relation to the Social Sciences," ^wz^rzca« Journal of Sociology, "ivXy, 1895. 3 Flint : The History of the Philosophy of History (France), p. 32. 4 Aristotle divided philosophy or knowledge into (a) theoretical, including physics, mathematics, and metaphysics; {b) productive, the arts; and (c) practi- cal or moral, comprising ethics and politics, under the latter of vi'hich he also placed rhetoric and economics. — Vide p. 41. The Social Mind and Its Development. 31 and wanted."' Here was a definitely conceived purpose to review the achievements of mankind and to plan an intellectual campaign for systematic conquest. Classification is a necessary preliminary for philosophical synthesis, it is a definite display of the analyzed elements which are to be organized into a unified conception.^ Flint mentions eighty-two philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle to those of the present, who have worked out classifications of the sciences and arts as a part of their intellectual contributions. The list includes, with few ex- ceptions, the most illustrious names in the history of thought. ^ Thus far the term philosophy has been used as though it tiad a definite and universal meaning. Yet this is far from being the case. Perhaps no term in general use is so vaguely and variously conceived. We cannot consider in detail the many theories which have been advanced in the past, but must confine attention to certain modern views. Philosophy may be regarded as having a hierarchy of functions, each of which is an advance upon the preced- ing and rests upon it. In this view philosophy may be regarded as : I. Syyithetic, which Flint describes as "simply science that has attained to 4he knowledge of the unity, self- consistency, and harmony of the teachings of the separate sciences."* Hodgson in attempting to discriminate be- tween science and philosophy presents among other theories virtually the same view, which he characterizes as 1 Instauratio Magna (tr. by Dewey), p. lo. 2 "All classification is a striving after unity. To classify it is necessary to generalize." — L. F. Ward : Dynamic Sociology , Vol. I., p. 3. 3 Flint : " The Classification of the Sciences," Presbyterian Review, July, 1885, and July, 1886. 4 Flint : " Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum," Princeton Review , November, 1878, p. 698. 32 The Social Mind and Education. ' ' Comtean Positivism. ' ' ' From a French source comes a statement of a similar tenor : ' ' Cette conception [onto- logical] de la philosophic tend aujourd'hui a disparaitre et 6tre remplac^e par une autre beaucoup plus facile a d^fendre, suivant laquelle la philosophic n'a pas d'objet special, est un simple unification du savoir, un ensemble du generalizations plus comprehensive que celles des sciences speciales, mais portant sur les m^mes objets."^ Spencer in his examination of the nature of philosophy regards it as a fusion of all the contributions of the sciences into a whole, ^ and defines the; progressive integra- tion of knowledge in these terms :^" Knowledge of the lowest kind is un-unified knowledge ; science is partially- unified knowledge ; philosophy is completely -unified knowl- edge. '"* M. Berthelot claims recognition for "an ideal science of the whole" which hereafter shall do purposefully what the systems of the past did with a sort of ' ' uncon- scious dissimulation."* Royce asserts that the con- spicuous tendency of modern thought is toward unity, the reconciliation of contradictions, "the unification of the world which anarchical passion and analytic reflection have conspired to rend asunder. ' ' ® Not to multiply quo- tations which are cited less as authorities than to indicate the trend of thought in minds which look at the question from different points of view, it is clear that philosophy may be regarded in one of its functions at least as an organization and integration of the social tradition, a re- flective unification of the special sciences. 1 S. H. Hodgson : " Philosophy and Science," Mind, January, 1876. 2 B. Bourdon : Review of R. de la Grasserie's " De la classification, objective et subjective, des arts, de la littSrature et des sciences," Revue philosophique, Vol. XIX., p. 106. 3 First Principles, p. 132. 4 Ibid., p. 134. « M. Berthelot : Science and Philosophy , reviewed in Mind, July, 1886. 6 Josiah Royce : The Spirit of Modern Philosophy , p. 297. The Social Mind and Its Development. 33 But there are other functions of philosophy which de- pend upon this first. They may be hardly more than indicated here, since they do not come within the limited scope of this essay. Philosophy may further be regarded as 2. Critical, examining the conditions of all knowledge ; in the words of Bain, "tracking the facts of conscious- ness to their innermost deeps, planting all the special sciences upon common ground, giving every objective phenomenon its highest validity by showing its indissoluble relation to that fact of facts, self-consciousness."' Again philosophy may be conceived as 3. Metaphysical, viewing all knowledge in its relation to primary and efficient and ultimate and final causes. In this view philosophy becomes, according to Hodgson, "the discovery of absolute existence," while the sciences become scientific only ' ' when they are deduced from the laws of the absolute existence, from which they receive their whole scientific character. This is the Hegelian view."^ Once more, in so far as philosophy may deal with problems of conduct it may be thought of as" 4. Practical or moral, attempting to discover funda- mental principles for the guidance of humanity. However the scope of philosophy may be conceived, the dependence of its various functions upon the primary task of integrating the special sciences cannot be denied. Flint has stated the relation clearly : ' ' Philosophy as positive, i. e., a unification of the sciences, must precede philosophy as critical, metaphysical, and as practical. Critical philosophy, metaphysical philosophy, and prac- tical philosophy must further submit to be tested by posi- tive philosophy, by the collective results of the sciences. 1 Communication on an allusion by Hodgson to Lewes in Mind, April, 1876. i Mind, January, 1876. This is not Hodgson's personal view, but one of four theories which he enumerates as having prominent advocates. 1 34 The Social Mind and Education. What has to be criticised are the conditions of all the sciences. What has to be viewed in relation to primary and efficient, and ultimate final causes are the results of all the sciences.'" It is with the primary function of philosophy, the inte- gration of the special sciences, that this discussion is concerned. Yet the fact should not be overlooked that the highest philosophic synthesis may go far beyond merely a systematic effort to relate and render coherent the various fragments of the objective world which the sciences present. The deeper insight into the nature of life is the crowning achievement of the self-conscious social mind. This is dependent, however, upon the preliminary syn- thesis. As Mackenzie remarks : " If it is the business of philosophy to get behind the work of the sciences and see their true meaning and relations, it is clear that it must presuppose a certain development of the sciences and cannot easily outstrip them. We must have got the con- ceptions and be able to use them with some freedom, before we set ourselves to the task of investigating their significance."^ Purposely confining attention, therefore, to this single function of philosophy, as it is now con- ceived, we remark once more that the social tradition displays two distinct movements, a constant and increas- ingly definite analysis into parts, and a complementary recombination of these parts into general conceptions of the whole. ^ To revert to a figure already employed, the 1 Flint : " Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum," Princeton Review, November, 1878, p. 714. 2 An Introduction to Social Philosophy , p. 38. 3 There seems to be discoverable in scientific division of labor a tendency to specialization according to problems rather in artificially and arbitrarily ab- stracted subjects. Such terms as "physical-chemistry," " astro-physics," " chemi- cal physiology," " physiological psychology," etc., are full of significance. There are subordinate syntheses among groups of sciences. L. F. Ward has pointed out the relations of science and philosophy. The The Social Mind and Its Development. 35 stream of social consciousness not only flows in more and more definite channels through the minds of men devoted to the various parts of the tradition, but now and again the separate currents converge in the consciousness of one individual and issue forth a fuller and deeper unity ^ only once more to undergo division and separation. Such in general is the rhythm of the social mind, yet beneath the seeming chaos of ideas and feelings it is hard to trace the movement in definite outlines. Only a broad glance over a wide sweep of history can reveal the process. Contrast Aristotle's vague classification of the sciences with the definite divisions of Comte,^ Shields,^ or Wundt,* and compare the incoherent explanations of medieval philosophers with the precisely stated, though tentative, generalizations of Von Baer, Meyer, Darwin, or Spencer. Philosophy, like the sciences — from which it differs in scope and definiteness rather than essential nature^ — passes from unconsciousness to social self-consciousness. "Whether we will it or no," says Royce, "we all of us do philosophize. The difference between the temperament which loves technical philosophy and the temperament which can make nothing of so-called metaphysics is rather one of degree than of kind."® The difference of former is concerned with ideal relations of coexistence or independent existence, the latter with real relations of sequence and dependence in a system. Dynamic Sociology, Vol. I., pp. 3 and 4. 1 Tarde describes this process as philosophy which is Mwz-cowjczoMi-. ". . . la philosophie, c'est tout simplement I'etat uni-conscient de la science, succedant, progres immense a son etat morcele, emiette, multi-conscient. . . ." — Loc. cit., p. 204. 2 Loc. cit., Tome I., 2me Legon. 3 The Order of the Sciences. 4"Uber die Entstehung der Wissenschaften." — Philosophische Studien (Bd. v.). Cf. also R. de la Grasserie's De la classification, objeQtive et subjective , des arts, de la litterature et des sciences. 5 Each science has its philosophy which gives it unity. An inclusive philosophy of the sciences bears the same relation to the group of these special pursuits. 6 The Spirit of Modern Philosophy , p. 2. 36 The Social Mind and Education. degree registers itself in terms of self-consciousness. The social tradition, at first vaguely and unconsciously unified, becomes gradually the object of more and more purpose- ful, reflective attention' until the culminating triumph of collective self-consciousness is a philosophy which repre- sents a systematically planned effort to organize into unity the varied contents of the social memory.^ Philosophy, like the sciences, is a product of social maturity. The relation of the sciences and philosophy is one of interdependence. Philosophy, dealing with the materials which the sciences supply, must await their results and adjust itself to their discoveries. On the other hand, philosophy aids each special science by pointing out its relations to other pursuits,^ and as a coordinating agency helps to show how the various sciences may assist each other.* The development of each science does not display a definitely linear series of analysis and synthesis ; there is no conscious determination to avoid unifying hypotheses until all particulars have been isolated and examined. On the contrary, analysis and synthesis are concomitant.* A few data are combined into a guiding theory, which is then tested by continued experiment, or wider observation, 1 In connection with this subject Spencer's description of the stages through which human opinion passes is significant. The steps of the progress are : "the unanimity of the ignorant; the disagreement of the inquiring, and the unanimity of the wise." — Education, p. 101. In other words, the advance is from unconscious passivity to conscious observation and to self-conscious agreement. 2 It should be remembered that this process of unification cannot be completely based on positive scientific knowledge. Falckenberg insists that a new meta- physics is needed to supply the gaps in experience and observation and thus effect a unity. — History of Modern Philosophy (tr.), p. 625. 3 Flint : " Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum," Princeton Review, November, 1878, p. 699. 4 Ibid., p. 702. 5 Spencer : Essays, Vol. IT., " The Genesis of Science," p. 24. The Social Mind and Its Development. 37 modified to include newly discovered truths, or, if it fail to explain them, abandoned for a more adequate hypoth- esis. ' So it is with the progress of philosophy. The social tradition includes at the same time special sciences and unifying philosophies in action and reaction. Yet the dependence of philosophy upon the sciences is more obvious than the service of philosophy to the sciences. "It often happens in philosophy," says Fostor, "that a question is forgotten for a time while science prepares materials for asking it and answering it more definitely. ' ' ^ Spencer recognizes this relation of philosophy to science when he remarks that a single modern observation ' ' has to be digested by the organism of the sciences."^ The reason why the service which philosophy may render to the sciences has not been more clearly perceived is to be found in the fact that philosophy in the modern sense "* has only within comparatively recent times emerged into the social self-consciousness. Philosophy has often seemed so remotely related to science in the past that the term does not commend itself readily to scientific minds. ^ But 1 Comte : loc. cit., Tome I., p. 7. 2 H. M. Fostor : " Organic Evolution and Mental Elaboration," Mind, October, 1895. 3 Essays, Vol. II., p. 67. 4 Mr. John Fiske's statement of the cosmic philosophy may be regarded as fairly tj'pical : " The cosmic philosophy is founded upon the recognition of an Absolute Power manifested in and through the world of phenomena ; and it consists in a synthesis of scientific truths into a universal science dealing with the order of the phenomenal manifestations of the Absolute Power." — Outlines of Cosmic Philoso- phy, Vol. I., p. 263. 5 Prof. Josiah Royce has put these imaginary sentences into the mouths of the scientists: "See these idealists! They have long tried to call the world their dream and to construct it a priori. But they grow hungry in their wilderness, feeding the swine of strange masters and longing for the very husks of specula- tive guess-work and delusion. Now they come back like prodigals, hoping that experience, our master, will have facts and enough to spare for them. In truth had they remained at home their reflective cleverness might have been of much use to science. But they took the portion of intelligence that belonged to them. 38 The Social Mind and Education. the definite effort to bring the sciences and philosophy into organic relations is only another evidence of a syn- thetic movement in the social mind. With the progress of this movement, the aid which a positive philosophy can render in the advancement of the special sciences will be more and more clearly recognized. Philosophy in its socially self-conscious phase represents the effort of a mature collective mind to preserve its unity. The social tradition, accumulated, sifted, and organized with increasing definiteness and purpose, has been divided into many sciences. All the materials of this growth have been derived from the phenomena of nature and human consciousness combined in the unity of social life. It follows, therefore, that the sciences themselves must make up a great whole, and that the system which they form must itself be an object of knowledge.' In other words, there must be a "science of the sciences" and this general science is philosophy.^ and went away, and here they come now, in all the rags of their poor systems." — The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 270. Ward declares that: "The leading distinction between modern and ancient philosophy is that the former proceeds from facts while the latter proceeds from assumptions. Every science is at the same time a philosophj'." — " The Data of Sociology," American Journal of Sociology , May, 1896. 1 Flint : " Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum," Princeton Review, November, 1878, p. 697. 2 " Philosophy claims to be the science of the whole ; but if we get the knowledge of the parts from the different sciences, what is there left for philosophy to tell us? To this it is sufficient to answer generally that the synthesis of the parts is some- thing more than detailed knowledge of the parts in separation which is gained by the man of science. It is with the ultimate synthesis that philosophy concerns itself, it has to show that the subject matter which we are all dealing with in detail really is a whole, consisting of articulated members." — A. Seth ; Encyclo- pcedia Britannica, " Philosophy," Vol. XVIII., p. 792. CHAPTER II. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AS A SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM. In Chapter I. we described the formal process by which social knowledge advances from vague unconsciousness in common empiricism to definite, reflective, and purposeful organization in sciences which are themselves integrated in philosophy. The next step will include both an examina- tion of the content of this process, i. e., the general classes of sciences which have been gradually formed in the course of social development, and an attempt to show that they are naturally and rationally related and combined in a philosophy of society which by virtue of such service becomes truly a ' ' science of the sciences. ' ' Whewell in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences ' presents two charts which are designed to show the progressive generalizations of astronomy and optics re- spectively from the earliest recorded observations of the Greeks to the sweepingly inclusive theory of universal gravitation and the undulatory hypothesis. In another work, the same author employs this figure : ' ' The table of the progress of any science would thus resemble the map of a river, in which the waters from separate sources unite and make rivulets, which again meet with rivulets from other fountains, and thus go on forming by their junction trunks of a higher and higher order. "^ The same thought extended to the sciences in their relations to each other 1 p. Il8. 2 History of the Inductive Sciences, p. 14. 39 40 The Social Mind and Education. would make philosophy a great stream gathering up the tributaries and rivulets of the various special pursuits. A chart which should exhibit in a synoptic view the chronological development of the various sciences in verti- cal columns, and indicate by horizontal lines the chief attempts of philosophy to bind these parts into unity, would be of great value if it could avoid, on the one hand, bewildering complexity of details, and, on the other, misleading uniformity and apparent definiteness. It has been shown that all science has its origin in the common experiences of social life.' The various phenomena of the environment, physical and psychical, have demanded attention and explanation. Empirical attempts to modify and utilize the materials and forces of nature have preceded rational and systematic inquiry into their nature and laws which has in turn resulted in more successful practical applications. " The dictum that ' ' every science has. its art" may be more properly reversed and modified into "every art has its sciences," for science has sprung from art and every concrete art requires the syn- thesis of two or more abstract sciences.^ From doing things men have advanced to rationalizing, reflecting upon the things they do, and in this process the concrete things themselves have been separated into ideal parts which have become objects of more or less isolated study. These abstracted, subjective products have been gradually arranged into so-called sciences. The attempt to form these various groups on some rational plan has been one of the problems of philosophy. There have been many solutions. Aristotle's classification assumed as its criterion 1 Spencer : Essays, Vol. II., " The Genesis of Science," p. 71. 2 A. Lalande : Philosophie des sciences, pp. i, 2. 3 Flint : " Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum," Princeton Review, November, 1878. Social Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiaruni. 41 the ends which the various pursuits may serve. Knowl- edge may be {a) theoretical, if it serve the end of pure thought in physics, mathematics, and metaphysics ; {b') productive, if it be applied to the tangible things of life in the arts, or (<:) practical, if it deal with problems of individual and social conduct in ethics and politics. Logic was regarded by Aristotle as the fundamental discipline preceding and conditioning all the other forms of knowl- edge. ' The Stoics adopted a tripartite division into (a) logic to guide the reason, (<5) physics to explain the world, and {c) ethics to rule the moral life. The vague generality of this scheme made it wide enough to include almost everything, although it seems to have ignored metaphysics, mathematics, psychology, and theology."^ It would not be worth our while to follow in detail the fanciful arrangements of knowledge on the basis of such intangible ideas as "four kinds of light "^ which reveal truth, or four "mirrors" of nature — doctrine, science, history, and morals," or Dante's poetical identification of the ten divisions of the sky with the ten sciences, by which the moon was made the symbol of grammar, Venus of rhetoric, and so on through the list. The educational curriculum of the Middle Ages, the seven so-called liberal arts included in the triviuni and the guadrivium," is of significance as showing the generally accepted ideas as to what organized bodies of knowledge ought systematically to be transmitted from generation to generation. These studies represent socially purposeful efforts. The rest of the tradition was unconsciously transmitted in the form of common sense, technical skill, 1 Metaphysics (tr. by McMahon), p. 157. 2 A. Lalande, pp. 42-44. 3 St. Bonaventura (1221-1274). Flint : loc cit., p. 417. 4 Vincent of Beauvais. Ibid., p. 417. 6 Compayre : History of Pedagogy (tr. by Payne), p. 75. 42 The Social Mind arid Education. legends, customs, and laws. The liberal arts were : grammar, dialectics or logic, and rhetoric, music, arith- metic, geometry, and astronomy, all, with the possible exception of the last, formal pursuits. The concrete studies were neglected, save perhaps in a few convents where the works of Aristotle were preserved and perused. * But this does not mean that there was no knowledge of nature, man, and society ; only that such knowledge ex- isted in an empirical, socially unconscious form. Re- flective and purposeful effort was expended upon the mental processes of men, upon the machinery of thought and expression. As a result of this situation there was great indistinct- ness of scientific ideas. Even the many clear notions of antiquity tended to lose their definiteness. ' ' When men merely repeat the terms of science," declares Whewell, "without attaching to them any clear conceptions ; when their apprehensions become vague and dim ; when they assent to scientific doctrines as a matter of tradition, rather than of conviction, on trust rather than on sight ; when science is considered as a collection of opinions, rather than a record of laws by which the universe is really governed — it must inevitably happen that men will lose their hold on the truths which the great discoverers who preceded them have brought to light. "^ In such circumstances little scientific progress was possi- ble — in fact, there was actual loss of ground — and attempts to classify knowledge into definite groups were doomed to failure. Roger Bacon was ' ' the first encyclopedic philosopher who emerged from the shadows of the Middle Ages."^ 1 Compayre : loc. cit., p. 76. 2 History of the Inductive Sciences, p. 2.-^8. 8 De Greef : Uevolution des croyances et des doctrines politiques, p. 37. Social Philosophy as a Scie7itia Scientiarum. 43 He urged the necessity of observation and enlarged men's conceptions by his advocacy of linguistic, optical, and experimental studies,' but the limited development of the sciences prevented him from offering a really useful classi- fication. Little progress was made until Francis Bacon so vigo- rously stimulated social consciousness by his famous ex- hibit of human learning/ The principle of classification is subjective, i. e., based upon the abstracted faculties of memory, imagination, and reason, out of which grow history, poesy, and philosophy respectively. This classi- fication is vulnerable at many points. It is based upon a false, artificial psychology ; it separates subjects which belong naturally together, as, for example, when it divides physiology into animal and human^; again it unites what ought to be separated in combining metaphysics with physics"; but the principles of historical judgment demand a contemporary standard. Considered from the point of view of his times. Bacon's classification is a remarkable contribution to the progress of thought. Moreover, it is valuable as an enumeration and discrimination of sciences, as an aid in their more definite formation. Bacon seemed consciously to recognize this service. "It is the office," he says, ' ' of all sciences to shorten the long turnings and windings of experience so as to remove the ancient com- plaint of the scantiness of life and the tediousness of art ; this is best performed by collecting and uniting the axioms of the sciences into more general ones, that shall suit the matter of all individuals. For the sciences are like pyra- mids, erected upon the single basis of history and ex- 1 Flint: " The Classification of the Sciences," The Pf'esbyterian Review, }vi\y, 1885, p. 417. i Instauratio Magna (tr. by Dewey), pp. 77 sq. 3 Ibid., p. 156. 4 Ibid., p. 144. 44 The Social Mind and Education. perience.'" In a broad, preliminary way Bacon may be said to have divided science or general philosophy into the sciences of (i) God, (2) Nature, (3) Man. and (4) Society. There remained, however, within this classifica- tion much confusion, overlapping, and artificial synthesis, which with the growth of more definite conceptions have been in large measure corrected. Descartes proposed no complete classification of the sciences, but made a broad division into (i) metaphysics^ under which he included the principles of knowledge, the attributes of God, and the immortality of the soul, (2) physics, by which he meant the principles of material things — earth, air, water, plants, animals, and man. By means of such knowledge, he declared, the other sciences become intelligible. Descartes employs the favorite figure of the tree of knowledge, the root of which is metaphysics, the trunk physics, and the branches all the other sciences which grow out of the latter. This seems to be a rather definite recognition of the natural dependence of the more complex upon the simpler sciences.^ Hobbes offered a classification on the basis of two kinds of knowledge : (i) of facts — history; (2) of consequences — science. This scheme was worked out with great inge- nuity but did not contribute to the more definite formation of the science groups.^ , There would be little profit in examining in detail the various classifications of the sciences proposed by Locke, ^ 1 Ibid., p. 139. 2 " Ainsi toute le philosophie est comme un arbre, dont les racines sont la metaphysique, le tronc est la physique, et les branches qui sortent de ce tronc sont les autres sciences qui se rSduisent a trois principales, a savoir la mSdecine, la mecanique et la morale ; j'entends la plus haute et la plus parfaite morale, qui, prfisupposant une entiSre connaissance des autres sciences, est le dernier degr^ de la sagesse." — Les PiHncipes, Ed. Liard, pp. 19-21. 3 Leviathan, Molesworth Ed. of Collected Works, Vol. III., pp. 71-73. 4 "All that can fall within the compass of human understanding, being either, Social Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiaruni. 45 Leibnitz/ and Wolff/ all of which were subjective and speculative, resulting in cross-classification rather than in coordination. They were constructed in virtual independ- ence of experimental knowledge and consequently ignored the existence of a natural objective relationship between different groups of knowledge. The far-reaching influence of Kant could not fail to afiect the problem of classification. It is treated in the Kriiik der Reinen Vernunft, in the chapter on the "Archi- tectonik der Reinen Vernunft." Kant's conception of science as an organism which grows from within, as a system of conceptions unified by a central regulative idea/ is of more value to our present discussion than is his classification itself. This betrays the same ignorance, or at least neglect of experience, which vitiates so many philosophic attempts at the coordination of knowledge.* Hegel constructed a comprehensive ideal scheme which was consciously designed to unify all experience, objective and subjective. The philosophy of nature aimed to give a complete account of the external world, and the phi- first, the nature of things, as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation ; or, secondly, that which man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent for the attainment of any end, especially happiness ; or, thirdly, the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated ; I think science may be divided properly into these three sorts." — Human Understanding , Ed. by Frazer, Vol. II., p. 460. 1 Nouveaux Essais, Ed. by Von Gerhardt, Vol. V., pp. 503-509. Leibnitz supports the ancient tripartite division into physics, ethics, and logic. 2 Wolff's classification is implied in the phrase, " cognitio humana, historica, philosophica et mathematica." Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica, etc., pp. 1-3. 3 " Das Ganze ist also gegliedert (articulatio) und nicht gehauft (coacervatio); es kann zwar innerlich (per intussusceptionem) wachsen, wie ein thierischer Korper, dessen wachstum kein Glied hinzusetzen, sondern ohne Veranderung- der Proportion ein jedes zu seinen Zwecken starker und tuchtiger macht."^' Sdmtnliche Werke, Ausg. Hartenstein, Bd. III., S. 548. 4 As an illustration of Kant's method the following passage may be cited: " Wenn ich von allem Inhalte der Erkenntniss, objectiv betrachtet, abstrahire, so ist alles Erkenntniss subjectiv, entweder historisch oder national. — Loc. cit., p. 550. 46 The Social Mind and Education. losophy of spirit sought to do the same for human con- sciousness, both in its subjective phenomena and its external manifestations in social institutions and their development. Without undertaking to discuss the ideal scheme as a whole, we emphasize the fact that this classifi- cation exhibits clearly sciences (i) of nature, (2) of man, and (3) of man and nature in interaction.' Hegel's apparent failure to realize that though nature were merely objectified idea, that idea could be truly comprehended only by scrutiny of nature herself, renders the minor details of his scheme of no scientific value. His contribu- tion is almost wholly a philosophic service. Dr. Neil Arnott's* classification of knowledge about nature is divided into two parts : (i) natural history — materials of the universe, and (2) science or philosophy, including (a) physics, (Ji) chemistry, (c) science of life, and (^) science of mind. Of this second group Arnott writes : ' ' They may be said to form a pyramid of sciences, of which physics is the base, while the others constitute succeeding layers in the order mentioned, the whole having certain mutual relations and dependencies well- figured by the parts of a pyramid. ' ' This idea approaches closely the principle of the classification suggested by Burdin, published by Saint Simon, but elaborated and incorporated into a general system of philosophy by Comte. * The general principles of Comte' s classification are : 1 It is not asserted that Hegel made the statement in this form but that his division substantially included these sciences. The classification of Hegel is thus given in the introduction to his Encyclopiidie der philosophischen Wissen- chaften: " I. Die Logik, die Wissenschaft der Idee an und fiir sich ; II. Die Naturphilosophie als die Wissenschaft der Idee in ihrem Anderssehn ; III. Die Philosophie des Geistes als der Idee, die aus ihrem Anderssehn in sich zuriick- ^€ax\.:'—Werke, Bd. VI., S. 26. 2 Elements of Physics, cited by Flint. I have been unable to find the volume. 3 Fouill§e : Le mouvement positiviste et la conception sociologique du ntond, p. 2. Social Philosophy as a Scientia Scieniiarum. 47 first, a division of sciences into abstract and concrete, i. e., into sciences that deal with the laws which govern the elementary facts of nature, laws on which all phe- nomena actually realized must depend, and, on the other hand, sciences that concern themselves only with the particular combinations of phenomena which are found in existence.' This discrimination has been attacked by Spencer, who uses the terms in a different sense, but the criticism does not seem of vital importance, indeed is chiefly a verbal quibble.^ The next step consists in an arrangement of these abstract sciences in a scale or "hierarchy," of decreasing simplicity or generality and increasing complexity or speciality, so that each science will depend naturally on that which precedes it. Mathe- matics is made the basis, as being the most general of all in its range, then follow astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology (including "transcendental biology"), and social physics, or sociology. The same hierarchical plan is applied with varying success to the subdivisions of the different sciences. Comte himself admitted that "il faut commercer par reconnaitre que, quelque naturelle que puisse ^tre une telle classification, elle renfermera toujours n6cessairement quelque chose, sinon d'arbitraire du moins d'artificiel, de maniere a presenter un imperfection veri- table."^ It is not a part of our plan to review the discus- sions to which this classification has given rise. Thus much remains after the critics have done their worst : the sciences are grouped into three general classes : ( i ) formal (mathematics); (2) inorganic nature (astronomy, physics, chemistry); (3) organic nature (physiology or biology and social physics or sociology); but, what is of chief 1 Loc. cit., Tome I., pp. 57 sq. 2 Fiske : Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. I., pp. 193-220. J. S. Mill : The Positive Phi- losophy of Auguste Comte, p. 41, note. 3 Loc. cit., Tome I., p. 10. 48 The Social Mind and Education. importance, they are seen to be in such dependence that as the mind seeks to explain the highest phenomena, it finds itself of necessity forced back along the series step by step. Yet in this unbroken sequence there is a deception. No physiology, even transcendental, can bridge the chasm between vital and social phenomena.' Comte felt such contempt for psychology, was indeed so ignorant of it that he prematurely completed his scheme and gave to it a spurious appearance of finality. If we turn to the classification of Comte' s chief critic, Spencer, we naturally expect to find a wholly different arrangement. But when all discussion of terms and prin- ciples is done and we are confronted with a synoptic view of Spencer's scheme, it transpires that in spite of division into ' ' abstract, " " abstract-concrete, ' ' and ' ' concrete ' ' sciences, the hierarchical order persists, although greatly improved by the placing of astronomy after physics and chemistry, and by the interpolation of psychology between biology and sociology.^ At almost the same time that Spencer denies the validity of the hierarchy he admits the general, progressive dependence and in his system of Syn- thetic Philosophy treats the concrete sciences in this order. ^ Bain, Shields, Stanley, Flint, and others who have more recently proposed classifications of the sciences, have either consciously recognized or, what is quite as signifi- cant, unconsciously adopted in general the hierarchical arrangement. If other proof were needed that this idea of dependence has emerged into social self-consciousness, it 1 Fouillee recognizes this gap and seeks to fill it by the synthesis of the idea of organism on the one side and that of the social contract on the other: "Nous croyons qu'il faut unir les deux idees d'organisme social et de contrat social dans une idee plus comprehensive, que nous appellerons 1' organisme contractuel. — Loc. cit., p. III. 2 Spencer : Essays, Vol. II., " The Classification of the Sciences," pp. 84-95. 8 Ward : " The Place of Sociology among the Sci&nc&s," America7i Journal of Sociology, July, 1895. Social Philosophy as a Sciejitia Scientiarum. 49 might be found in the organization of educational curricula, and in the arrangement of scientific compilations.^ Yet there is a deceptive completeness and continuity about this hierarchy which requires careful examination. Is it made up of perfectly connected parts or does it fall into certain divisions, internally integrated, but externally less intimately joined ? We have seen that in all the classifications, with the exception of Comte's, there has been a more or less definite grouping into sciences of form, of nature, of man, and, in several cases, of society. In other words, phenomena are broadly divided into : physical, vital, psychical, and social. It is one thing to assert that there is an order of progressive dependence among these phenomena ; quite another to declare that the transition from one to the other forms a chain of unbroken and clearly perceived causal continuity. Life and consciousness may be accounted for in terms of chemistry, but scientific demonstration of the relation is still lacking.^ It is now in order to revert to a statement made in Chapter I.^ and to elaborate and illustrate the idea some- what more fully. The self-conscious social tradition is made up at any time of various groups of knowledge, i. 123- Concentration of studies, 106. Consciousness, social, general defi- nition, 13, 16, 68 ; relation to social self-consciousness, 19, 20 ; growth of purpose, 23, 24 ; contrast with social unconsciousness, 27-29. Contract, 80. Coordination of studies, 106. Correlation of studies, 106. Crowds, 17. Culture Epoch theory, 72, 81, 93, 96, 98, 99. Curricula, 116, 118, 130-135, 137-146. Custom, 12, 81. Cuvier, 57. Dante, 41. Darwin, Charles, 35, 60, 73. De Candolle, 25. De Garmo, Charles, 72, 109. De Greef, G., 15, 16, 19, 22, 42, 53, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62, 64, 66, 79, 80, 115. Democracies, 20. Descartes, 44, 53. Dewey, J., 94, 100, 103, 106. Discipline, mental, 118, 119, 122, 123. Discovery, 16. Division of mental labor, 15, 17, 25, 26, 51. 77- Dollinger, 73. Dumas, 73. Durkheim, E., 14, 23, 25, 62, 74, 81. Edinburgh Summer School, 115, 141. Education, as a social function, 91, 116- 118; aim of, 92, 96, 97, 121 ; both social and individual, 92; recapitulation the- ory, 100; diff"erentiation of studies, 85, 103 ; need of unity in higher, 114 sg. ; higher, 120 sq. Ego, development of, 86. 154 Index. Eliot, Charles, 117. Embryology, social, 77. Environment, 74, 95, 99, 112. Espinas, 67. Ethics, social, 134, 144. Evolution, mental, 75; social, 24, 51, 58; universal, 50. Faculties, college, 139. Falckenberg, R., 13, 17, 26. Fechner, 61. Fiske, John, 27, 37, 47, 60. Flint, Robert, 25, 26, 29, 31, 33, 34, 38, 40, 43,48,51.53, 54,59- Folk-psychology, 67. Foster, H. M., 37. Fouillee, Alfred, 12, 46, 48, 62, 67, 91, 115. Froebel, 26. Galileo, 53. Geddes, P., 115. Giddings, F. H., 12, 19, 57, 62. Goethe, 60, 70. Government, 20, 21. Grasserie, R. de la, 35. Guyau, J. M., 93, 99. Haeckel, E., 73, 74, 75. Hailman, W. N., 102. Hall, G. S., 77. Haller, 25. Happiness, 89. Harris, W. T., 93, 114, 117, 124. Hartmann, 72, 76. Hegel, 33, 45, 46, 64, 70. Herbart, 56, 61, 70-72, 107. Herder, 70. Heredity, 82. Hill, T., 124. Hinsdale, B. A., 118. Hobbes, 44, 58. Hodgson, S. H., 32. Hofding, H., 76, 77, 86. Huxley, T. H., 73. Imitation, 15. Induction and deduction, 100. Interest, 104. Izoulet, J., 20. Jackman, W. S., in. James, W., ii, 13, 16, 24, 82, 86, 130. Johnson, G. H., 77. Jordan, D. S., 141. Kant, 45, 70. Knowledge, social, 21, 24, 39, 66. Laboratory method, 120. Ladd, G. T., 51, 121, 125. Lalande, A., 25, 40, 41, 49. Lamarck, 57, 60, 73. La Mettrie, 56. Language, 12, 98, no. Laplace, 56. Lazarus, 67. Le Bon, G., 17, 67. Le Conte, J., 74, 121. Legislatures, 21. Leibnitz, 25, 45, 56. Lewes, G. H., 13, 14, 16, 18. Liberal arts, 42. Lilienfeld, P., 61, 62, 78. Locke, 44, 58. Lotze, 61. Lowell, J. R., 121. Lukens, H. T., 105, 107. Machiavelli, 58. Mach, E., 93. Mackenzie, J. S., 34, 57, 63, 88-90, 92, 93. McMurray, C. A., 82. McMurray, F. A., 108, in. Memory, social, 15, 18, 21, 22, 25, 29. Meyer, 35. Mill, J. S., 47, 59. Mind, social, general definition, 11, 67 ; dynamic or static, 15 ; differentiated, 16, 18 ; organized, 17, 25 ; distinguished from individual, 18, 19, gi ; struggle for unity, 23, 30, 83 ; development of, 28, 29, 35, 73, 79, 90 ; purpose in, 23, 24, 34, 68, 69, 79, 91 ; philosophy a synthesis of, 38, 73 ; individuals as organs of, 52, 68. Montesquieu, 58. Morris, G. S., 129. Natural selection, 94. Newton, 25. Oncken, August, 59. Organic concept, 57, 60, 62. Parallelism in individual and race de- velopment, 67-71, 80, 90, 96. Index. 155 Parker, F. W., in. Paul, 68, 98, 108. Payne, W. H., 12. Pedagogy, 93. Perrier, E., 49. Personality, S7-90. Personality, social, 67, 68, 69, 89. Pestalozzi, 71, 99, 106. Philosophy, synthetic nature, 30-36,40; a science of the sciences, 38 ; classi- fying function, 40-49; theology, 52, 53- Physiocrates, 58. Physiography, 141. Plato, 31, 52. Pleasure, 89. Preyer, 76. Primitive thought, 22, 82, 83. Printing, 17. Psychogenesis, 75, 76. Psychology, 56, 61. Quadrivium, 41. Quesnay, 58. Race development, 69, 70, 71, 77, 78. Recapitulation theory, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74. 77, 78, 96. Rein, W., 71, 72, 107. Research, 120. Romanes, 75, 76, 86. Rousseau, 71, loi. Royce, Josiah, 32, 35, 37, 56. Schaffle, A. E. Fr., 12, 21,61,62,78, 79. Scholasticism, 53. Sciences, nature of, 25 ; growth of, 26, 54, 56 ; order of development, 28-29 ; organism of, 33-35, 37, 45, 134 ; differ from philosophy, 35 ; unification of, 39, 50 ; origin of, 40, 83 ; abstract and concrete, 47, 48. Self, idea of, 88-90. Self-consciousness, social, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 34. 36, 37. 55. 59. 68. Seth, A., 38. Shields, C. W.,35, 48. Short-cuts in evolution, 78, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100, loi, 105, 135. Small, A. W., 62. Smith, A., 59. Social philosophy, 39, 52-65, 134. Social problems, 142-143. Spencer, Herbert, 24, 27, 29, 30, 35, 37, 40, 47, 48, 60, 61, 73, 74, 75, 78, 98, 99, loi. Spinoza, 58. Stanley, 48. Steinthal, 67. St. Simon, 46. Studies, 85, 102 ; differentiation of, 104, 105; correlation of, 106-112; liberal, 121 ; isolation of, 123; classification of, 124 sq.; requirements of, 128; unity of, 130-134. Suggestion, 98, 99. Sully,J.,76, 83, 84, 85, 98, 103. Syllogism, social, loi. Synthesis, 26, 31, 36, 54. Synthetic instruction, 137-146. Taine, H., 145. Tarde, G., 12, 14, 19, 20, 26, 35,62, 81,101, 118. Theology, 52, 55. Thomas, F., 99. Thompson, A. B., 121. Threshold of consciousness, 86. Toynbee, A., 136. Tradition, 15, 18, 22, 25, 30, 36, 37, 49, 84, 91.94- Treviranus, 60, 73. Trivium, 41. Tufts, J. H., 68, 89, 92. Turgot, 59. Unconsciousness, social, 27, 28, 80. Unity of knowledge, 114 sq. Van Liew, C. C, 81. Vico, 57, 58. Vogt, 72, 73. Von Baer, 35, 57, 60, 73. Ward, J., 82, 89. Ward, L. F., 16, 19, 20, 31, 34, 38, 48, 62, 102, 119. Whewell, William, 39, 42, 50. Wolff, 25,45, 73- Wundt, 35, 61, 68, 126. Ziller, 70, 72, 81, 107. ERRATUM. On page 93, note 2, " Mack " should read " Mach." rOUNDrO BY JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER THE SOCIAL MIND AND EDUCATION A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTIES OF THE GRAD- UATE SCHOOLS OF ARTS, LITERATURE, AND SCIENCE, IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY BY GEOR(?E EDQAR VINCENT CHICAGO tbe mnivetsiti? ot (Tbtca^o press London : LUZAC & CO., 46 Great Russell St., W. C. LBJL'04 «^ #i LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 029 487 352 1 :«,'>,.';^","i:.T,' ■:':ft;.'4,'r-^.:::-,.,. ,".>■.;,■ •■:>^:; ■4' ■'-;,c;";,-v::,j>J ■„"j:^:-%v,:'r4-"i .' ;,-ji;:.:i:'j.-;,'?t.a "r.':i;;'"u-c'.>r!ii; :;.^-.<«oM ::^ '- vv"-^=»f.^' „ . ;,.. :.f.., .•.•^'..(■-lej w;. -ji™ "'*-" ;.:',».•,'■;: :i'. Si JiJCs.