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 "ount of Aranda, Spanish Minister in France, acting 
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Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2011 with funding from 
 The Library of Congress 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/islandofcubamessOOunit 
 
32d Congress, [HO. OF REPS.] Ex. Doc. 
 
 1st Session. No. 121. 
 
 
 ISLAND OF CUBA. 
 
 MESSAGE 
 
 FROM THE 
 
 PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
 IN 
 
 Reference to the Island of Cuba. 
 
 August 31, 1.852. — Laid upon the table, and ordered to be prin'ed. 
 
 To the House of Representatives : 
 
 In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives, request- 
 ing information relative to the policy of the government in regard to the 
 island of Cuba, I transmit a report from the Department of State, and 
 the documents by which it was accompanied. 
 
 Washington, July 13, 1S52. 
 
 MILLARD FILLMORE. 
 
 Department of State, 
 
 Washington, July 14, 1S52. 
 
 On the 4th of February last, a resolution of the House of Represent- 
 atives, in the following words, was referred to this department: 
 
 "■Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to 
 communicate to this house, if not incompatible with the public interests, 
 all instructions from the Department of State to the diplomatic agents 
 of the United States abroad, not heretofore communicated to Congress, 
 declaratory of, or relating to, the policy of the government of the United 
 States in relation the island of Cuba." 
 
 The papers mentioned in the subjoined list are accordingly respect- 
 fully submitted. 
 
 W. HUNTER, 
 
 Acting Secretary. 
 
 To the President of the United States. 
 
„ 46763 „ n 101 V n-23 
 
 !s H. Doc. 121. -• . . __ _ 
 
 Z?'s£ of papers accompanying the report of the Acting Secretary of State to 
 the President, of the l&th of July, 1852. 
 
 Mr. Forsyth to Mr. Adams, extracts, November 20, 1822. 
 
 The same to the same, extract, December 13, 1822. 
 
 Mr. Adams to Mr. Forsyth, extract, December 17, 1822. 
 
 Mr. Forsyth to Mr. Adams, extract, February 10, 1S23. 
 
 Mr. Adams to Mr. Nelson, extract, April 28, 1823. 
 
 Mr. Appleton to Mr. Adams, extract, August 6, 1823. 
 
 The same to the same, extract, July 10, 1823. 
 
 Mr. Nelson to Mr. Clay, extract, July 10, 1825. 
 
 Mr. Clay to Mr. Everett, extract, April 27, 1825. 
 
 The same to the same, extract, April 13, 1826. 
 
 Mr. Everett to Mr. Clay, with enclosure, August 17, 1827. 
 
 The same to the same, extract, December 12, 1827. 
 
 Mr. Van Buren to Mr. Van Ness, extract, October 2, 1829. 
 
 The same to the same, extract, October 13, 1830. 
 
 Mr. Van Ness to Mr. Forsyth, extract, August 10, 1836. 
 
 The same to the same, extract, December 10, 1836. 
 
 Mr. Stevenson to Mr. Forsyth, June 16, 1S37. 
 
 Mr. Eaton to Mr. Forsyth, extract, August 10, 1837. 
 
 Mr. Forsyth to Mr. Vail, extract, July 15, 1840. 
 
 Mr. Webster to Mr. Irving, extract, January 17, 1843. 
 
 The same to the same, extract, March 14, 1843. 
 
 Mr. Upshur to Mr. Irving, extract, January 9, 1844. 
 
 Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Saunders, extract, February 4, 1847. 
 
 The same to the same, extract, June 17, 1848. 
 
 Mr. Saunders to Mr. Buchanan, extract, July 29, 1848. 
 
 The same to the same, August 18, 1848. 
 
 The same to the same, November 17, 1848. 
 
 The same to the same, extract, December 14, 1848. 
 
 ^ 
 
 
H. Doc. 121. 3 
 
 John Forsyth to the Secretary of State. 
 [Extracts.] 
 [No. 51.] Madrid, November 20, 1S22. 
 
 Sir : * * * I understand that this government are under serious 
 apprehensions lest Cuba should declare itself independent, and place 
 itself under our protection ; that they are informed a society of Free 
 Masons in Philadelphia has connexion with a society of Free Masons 
 in Havana, with the object, it is supposed, to hasten the declaration 
 of independence. This, according to their usual mode of judging of 
 our conduct, is thought to be known and countenanced by our govern- 
 ment. The squadron sent to Havana by the British, the pressure 
 upon Spain at this moment, when she has so much reason to dread the 
 determination of the European Sovereigns, by Great Britain, all 
 combine to show the necessity of watchfulness on our part, as to the 
 designs of that power, and the probability of their accomplishment af- 
 forded by the present condition and attitude of this country. A com- 
 mercial treaty between Spain and England is desirable to England, 
 but it is not of sufficient importance to induce her to take up the 
 gauntlet for Spain against the combined Sovereigns. It is not of suf- 
 ficient importance to induce her to guaranty the loans of money Spain 
 must have for the support of the constitutional system. What, then, is 
 the object of the one party, and how far will necessity oblige the other 
 party to assist in the accomplishment of it ? England desires the weight 
 of Spain as a European ally ; 2dly, the benefit of the commerce of the 
 Peninsula ; 3dly, to become the mediator between Spain and the Span- 
 ish American governments ; 4thly, the possession of Cuba, to give her 
 the command of the Gulf of Mexico ; 5thly, the communication between 
 the Atlantic and Pacific oceans over the Isthmus of Darien ; 6thly, 
 Montevideo. 
 
 That Great Britain has any fixed determination as to the 4th, 5th, 
 and 6th objects, I will not pretend to affirm positively, but my 
 impressions are strong that she has. If she has, the means of 
 success are a guarantee of loans, taking a lien upon some or all of them 
 as an eventual indemnity, or a purchase of them. The guarantee of 
 Cuba against the designs of the United States would not be an unlikely 
 mode of proceeding. The island, however, will be most reluctantly 
 surrendered by Spain, and the population of the island itself is known 
 to be hostile to any transfer to Great Britain. 
 
 The commercial treaty 'opens the road to Great Britain to profit 
 by the necessities of Spain. If the Congress do nothing decisive, 
 I hope nothing of consequence will grow out of the determination 
 to treat with England. Whatever may happen, I am here without 
 power to do more than to give you notice of what may be done or in- 
 tended. Without instructions, I can make no offers to this government 
 in order to divert them from this course, nor [do] I perceive what offers 
 we could [make that] in her present situation could induce Spain not to 
 
4 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 pursue [it] ; and we are here, I am constrained to say, not considered 
 in the friendly light we ought to be considered by Spain. 
 
 On the subject of Cuba I have taken all due pains indirectly to 
 remove the apprehensions of the government. To several deputies 
 of the Cortes, and to persons who I presumed would repeat what I 
 said to the ministers, I have spoken of Cuba as a very desirable acqui- 
 sition to any power, but that our interest required, as there was no 
 prospect of its passing into our hands, that it should belong to Spain ; 
 that as English property, it would be infinitely injurious to us ; as Colom- 
 bian or Mexican, it would not but be hurtful. , Independent of its for- 
 midable position, its slave population would make us anxious to keep 
 the island out of the hands of governments which would be compelled, 
 by their institutions, to make changes in it, extremely dangerous to the 
 repose and prosperity of the southern States. ) In a conversation with 
 one of the members of the political commission of the Cortes, I ex- 
 pressed a conviction that Spain would procure, by an immediate recog- 
 nition of Colombia and Mexico, and the adoption of a liberal system 
 of commerce, a guarantee of the island from Colombia, Mexico, and 
 the United States ; the three powers being equally interested to keep 
 it in the hands of Spain, out of the hands of England, and of each 
 other. He asked permission to speak of it to the ministers, which I 
 gave him, provided he spoke of it to the ministers as a matter of opin- 
 ion on a subject which had never been even named to me by my gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 John Quincy Adams, 
 
 Secretary of State. 
 
 John Forsyth to the Secretary of State. 
 [Extract.] 
 
 [No. 53.] "Madrid, December IS, 1S22. 
 
 "Sir: * * * * I received a few days since 
 
 a note from Mr. San Miguel, * * informing 
 
 me that the Spanish squadron in the Gulf of Mexico was about to be 
 reinforced. I supposed it probable that a similar note had been written 
 to all the foreign ministers, but find that this was not the fact. My 
 answer * * . * was written after ascertaining this. 
 
 What the motive is for sending a naval reinforcement you may proba- 
 bly understand better than I do, having direct information from Ha- 
 vana. As far as we are informed here, a land force would be more 
 useful for destroying the piracies of Cuba, and of breaking up their 
 connexion with Havana. It is more probable the view is to protect 
 Cuba, and to assist the government part}' against the Mexican and 
 Colombian governments. 
 
 "Hon. John Quincy Adams, <$'c., Sfc, fyc." 
 
H. Doc. 121. 5 
 
 Mr. Adams to Mr. Forsyth. 
 
 [Extract.] 
 
 [Secret.] Department of State, 
 
 Washington, December 17, 1S22. 
 
 Sir: The present condition of the island of Cuba has excited 
 much attention, and has become of deep interest to this Union. From 
 the public despatch and other papers which you will receive with this, 
 you will perceive the great and continued injuries which our commerce 
 is suffering from pirates issuing from thence, the repented demands 
 made upon the authorities of the island for their suppression, and the 
 exertions, but partially effectual, of our own naval force against them. 
 There is another point of view, however, in which the condition of the 
 island is yet more an object of concern. From various sources intima- 
 tions have been received here that the British government have it in 
 contemplation to obtain possession of the island. It is even asserted 
 from sources to which some credit is due, that they have been for more 
 than two years in secret negotiation with Spain for the cession of the 
 island; and it is added that Spain, though disinclined to such an ar- 
 rangement, might resist it with more firmness, if, for a limited period 
 of time, she could obtain the joint guarantee of the United States and 
 France, securing the island to herself. 
 
 There is reason, also, to believe that the future political condition of 
 the island is a subject of much anxiety and of informal deliberations 
 among its own inhabitants ; that both France and Great Britain have 
 political agents there observing the course of events, and perhaps en- 
 deavoring to give them different directions. The President lias, there- 
 fore, determined to despatch to you a special messenger to deliver this 
 letter; upon receipt of which, he wishes you to take such measures as 
 may be adapted to obtain correct information, whether such a negotia- 
 tion as has been above suggested is on foot between Spain and Great 
 Britain; and if so, to communicate to the Spanish government, in a 
 manner adapted to the delicacy of the case, the sentiments of tins gov- 
 ernment in relation to this subject, which are favorable to the continu- 
 ance of Cuba in its connexion with Spain. 
 
 John Forsyth, 
 
 Minister Plenipotentiary U. S., Madrid. 
 
 John Forsyth to the Secretary of Slate. 
 [Extract.] 
 
 [No. 58.] Madrid, February 10, 1823. 
 
 Sir: * * * I reminded Mr. San Miguel that there were portions of 
 the Spanish dominions whose vicinity to our territory rendered us 
 deeply interested in their fate, naming particularly the island of Cuba; 
 that, in the event of war with France, hostilities with Colombia and 
 Mexico continuing, the situation of the island would be extremely crit- 
 
6 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 ical. I requested, therefore, to be informed whether the local force 
 in that island was sufficient to defend it against a sudden attack, and 
 whether this government contemplated to increase its force in that 
 quarter. He seemed, at first, to understand this as a sort of offer to 
 protect the island ; but, when he was made clearly to understand it, he 
 said the local force was sufficient for the present ; that the government 
 would occupy itself immediately with that subject; that they relied 
 tipon their own resources and wpon us for the security of the island. To 
 this plain remark I could only reply that, without instructions, I could 
 only speak of what I supposed to be the wishes of my government 
 and believed to be the interest of the United States ; that we desired 
 no other neighbor in Cuba but Spain ; that I felt confident the United 
 States would do every thing in their power, consistent with their obli- 
 gations, to prevent Cuba from being wrested from Spain ; that he was 
 no doubt aware that there could be no understanding between the two 
 governments on this point without a reference to Washington. He 
 said he was aware of that, and should, as soon as the question here, 
 which was varying every moment, was settled, give instructions to the 
 Spanish minister in the United States on this subject. 
 John Quincy Adams, 
 
 Secretary of State. 
 
 Mr. Adams to Mr. Nelson. 
 [Extract.] 
 
 Department of State, Washington, 
 
 Apil 28, 1823. 
 
 In the war between France and Spain, now commencing, other in- 
 terests, peculiarly ours, will, in all probability, be deeply involved. 
 Whatever may be the issue of this war, as between those two Eu- 
 ropean powers, it may be taken for granted that the dominion of Spain 
 upon the American continents, north and south, is irrecoverably gone. 
 But the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico still remain nominally, and 
 so far really, dependent upon her, that she yet possesses the power of 
 • transferring her own dominion over them, together with the possession 
 
 1 of them, to others. These islands, from their local position and natural 
 appendages to the North American continent, and one of them, Cuba, 
 almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations, has 
 become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and 
 political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, with refer- 
 ence to the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas; the character of 
 its population ; its situation midway between our southern coast and 
 the island of St. Domingo; its safe and capacious harbor of the Ha- 
 vana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same advan- 
 tage; the nature of its productions and of its wants, furnishing the sup- 
 plies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and 
 mutually beneficial, — give it an importance in the sum of our national 
 interests with which that of no other foreign territory can be compared s 
 
H. Doc. 121. 7 
 
 and little inferior to that which binds the different members of this 
 Union together. Such, indeed, are, between the interests of that 
 island and of this country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and 
 political relations, formed by nature, gathering, in the process of time, 
 and even now verging to maturity, that, in looking forward to the 
 probable course of events, for the short period of half a century, it is 
 scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba 
 to our federal republic will be indispensable to the continuance and in- 
 tegrity of the Union itself, [t is obvious, however, that for this event 
 we are not yet prepared. Numerous and formidable objections to the 
 extension of our territorial dominions beyond sea, present themselves to 
 the first contemplation of the subject; obstacles to the system of 
 policy by which alone that tesult can be compassed and maintained, 
 are to be foreseen and surmounted, both from at home and abroad ; 
 but there are laws of political, as well as of physical gravitation ; and 
 if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose 
 but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural 
 connexion with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate 
 only towards the North American Union, which, by the same law of 
 nature, cannot cast her off from its bosom. 
 
 In any other state of things than that which springs from this incipient 
 w r ar between France and Spain, these considerations would be prema- 
 ture. They are" now merely touched upon to illustrate the position that, 
 in the war opening upon Europe, the United States have deep and 
 important interests involved, peculiarly their own — the condition of 
 Cuba cannot but depend upon the issue of this war. As an integral 
 part of the Spanish territories, Cuba has been formally and solemnly 
 invested with the liberties of the Spanish constitution. To destroy 
 those liberties, and to restore in the stead of that constitution the do- 
 minion of the Bourbon race, is the avowed object of this new invasion 
 of the Peninsula. There is too much reason to apprehend that, in 
 Spain itself, this unhallowed purpose will be attended with immediate, 
 or at least with temporary, success. The constitution of Spain will be 
 demolished by the armies of the Holy Alliance, and the Spanish na- 
 tion will again bow the neck to the yoke of bigotry and despotic sway. 
 Whether the purposes of France or of her continental allies extend to 
 the subjugation of the remaining Ultra-Marine possessions of Spain or 
 not, has not yet been sufficiently disclosed. But to confine ourselves 
 to that which immediately concerns us — the condition of the island of 
 Cuba — we know that the republican spirit of freedom prevails among 
 its inhabitants. The liberties of the constitution are to them rights in 
 possession ; nor is it to be presumed that they will be willing to surren- 
 der them because they may be extinguished by foreign violence in the 
 parent country. As Spanish territory, the island will be liable to in- 
 vasion from France during the war ; and the only reasons for doubting 
 whether the attempt will be made, are the probable incompetency of 
 the French maritime force to effect the conquest, and the probability that 
 its accomplishment would be resisted by Great Britain. In the mean 
 time, and at all events, the condition of the island, in regard to that of 
 its inhabitants, is a condition of great imminent and complicated dan- 
 ger ; and without resorting to speculation upon what such a state of 
 
 1/ 
 
8 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 things must produce upon a people so situated, we know that its ap- 
 proach has already had a powerful effect upon them, and that the 
 question, what they are to do upon contingencies daily pressing upon 
 them and ripening into reality, has for the last twelve months con- 
 stantly excited their attention and stimulated them to action. Were 
 the population of the island of one blood and color, there could be no 
 doubt or hesitation with regard to the course which they would pursue, 
 as dictated by their interests and their rights : the invasion of Spain by 
 France would be the signal for their declaration of independence. That 
 even in their present state it will be imposed upon them as a necessity, 
 is not unlikely ; but among all their reflecting men it is admitted as a 
 maxim fundamental to all deliberation upon their future condition, that 
 they are not competent to a system of permanent self-dependence ; 
 they must rely for the support of protection upon some force from with- 
 out ; and in the event of the overthrow of the Spanish constitution, that 
 support can no longer be expected from Spain — their only alternative of 
 dependence must be upon Great Britain or upon the United States. 
 Hitherto the wishes of this government have been that the connexion 
 between Cuba and Spain should continue as it has existed for several 
 years ; these wishes are known to the principal inhabitants of the island, 
 and instructions, copies of which are now furnished you, were some 
 months since transmitted to Mr. Forsyth, authorizing him in a suitable 
 manner to communicate them to the Spanish government. These wishes 
 still continue, so far as they can be indulged with a rational foresight of 
 events beyond our control, but for which it is our duty to be prepared. 
 If a government is to be imposed by foreign violence upon the Spanish 
 nation, and the liberties which they have asserted by their constitution 
 are to be crushed, it is neither to be expected nor desired that the peo- 
 ple of Cuba, far from the reach of the oppressors of Spain, should sub- 
 mit to be governed by them. Should the cause of Spain herself issue 
 more propitiously than from its present prospects can be anticipated, it 
 is obvious that the trial through which she must pass at home, and the 
 final loss of all her dominions on the American continents, will leave 
 her unable to extend to the island of Cuba that protection necessary for 
 its internal security and its outward defence. 
 
 Great Britain has formally withdrawn from the councils of the Eu- 
 ropean alliance in regard to Spain ; she disapproves the war which 
 they have sanctioned, and which is undertaken by France, and she 
 avows her determination to defend Portugal against the application of 
 the principles upon which the invasion of Spain raises its only pretence 
 of right. To the war as it commences, she has declared her intention of 
 remaining neutral ; but the spirit of the British nation is so strongly and 
 with so much unanimity pronounced against France, their interests are 
 so deeply involved in the issue, their national resentments and jeal- 
 ousies will be so forcibly stimulated by the progress of the war, what- 
 ever it may be, that, unless the conflict should be as short and the issue 
 as decisive as that of which Italy was recently the scene, it is scarcely- 
 possible that the neutrality of Great Britain should be long maintained. 
 The prospect is that she will be soon engaged on the side of Spain ; 
 but in making common cause with her, it is not to be supposed that she 
 will yield her assistance upon principles altogether disinterested and 
 
H. Doc. 121. 9 
 
 gratuitous. As the price of her alliance, the two remaining islands of 
 Spain in the West Indies present objects no longer of much possible 
 value or benefit to Spain, but of such importance to Great Britain that 
 it is impossible to suppose her indifferent to the acquisition of them. 
 
 The motives of Great Britain for desiring the possession of Cuba are 
 so obvious, especially since the independence of Mexico and the an- 
 nexation of the Florida's to our Union ; the internal condition of the island 
 since the recent Spanish revolution, and the possibility of its continued 
 dependence upon Spain, have been so precarious, the want of protection 
 there, the power of affording it possessed by Great Britain, and the 
 necessities of Spain to secure, by some equivalent, the support of Great 
 Britain for herself, have formed a remarkable concurrence of predis- 
 positions to the transfer of Cuba, and during the last two years rumors 
 have been multiplied that it was already consummated. We have been 
 confidentially told, by indirect communication from the French govern- 
 ment, that more than two years since Great Britain was negotiating 
 with Spain for the cession of Cuba, and so eager in the pursuit as to 
 have offered Gibraltar, and more, for it in exchange. There is reason 
 to believe that, in this respect, the French government was misinformed ; 
 but neither is entire reliance to be placed on the declaration lately made 
 by the present British Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the French govern- 
 ment, and which, with precautions indicating distrust, has been also 
 confidentially communicated to us, viz: that Great Britain would hold 
 it disgraceful to avail herself of the distressed situation of Spain to ob- 
 tain possession of any portion of her American colonies. The object of 
 this declaration, and of the communication of it here, undoubtedly was 
 to ind uce the belief that Great Britain entertained no purpose of obtain- 
 ing the possession of Cuba; but these assurances were given with 
 reference to a state of peace then still existing, and which it was the 
 intention and hope of Great Britain to preserve. The condition of all 
 the parties to them has since changed; and however indisposed the 
 British government might be ungenerously to avail themselves of the 
 distress of Spain to extort from her any remnant of her former pos- 
 sessions, they did not forbear to take advantage of it by order of 
 reprisals given to two successive squadrons despatched to the West 
 Indies, and stationed in the immediate proximity to the island of Cuba. 
 
 By measures thus vigorous and peremptory, they obtained from Spain 
 an immediate revocation of the blockade which her generals had pro- 
 claimed on the coast of Terra Firma., and pledges of reparation for all 
 the captures of British vessels made under cover of that military fiction. 
 They obtained, also, an acknowledgment of many long-standing claims 
 of British subjects upon the Spanish government, and promises of pay- 
 ment of them as a part of the national debt. The whole amount 
 of them, however, as well as that of the reparation and indemnity 
 promised for the capture of British property under the blockades of 
 General Morales and by the Porto Rico privateers, yet exists, in the 
 form of claims, and the whole mass of them now is acknowledged claim, 
 for the satisfaction of which pledges have been given to be redeemed 
 hereafter, and for which the island of Cuba maybe the only indemnity 
 in the power of Spain to grant, as it will undoubtedly be to Great 
 Britain the most satisfactory indemnity which she could receive. 
 
10 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 The war between France and Spain changes so totally the cir- 
 cumstances under which the declaration above mentioned of Mr. Can- 
 ning was made, that it may, at its very outset, produce events, under 
 which the possession of Cuba may be obtained by Great Britain, without 
 even raising a reproach of intended deception against the British govern- 
 ment for making it. An alliance between Great Britain and Spain may 
 be one of the first fruits of this war. A guaranty of the island to Spain 
 m&y be among the stipulations of that alliance; and, in the event either 
 of a threatened attack upon the island by France, or of attempts on the 
 part of the islanders to assume their independence, a resort, to the tem- 
 porary occupation of the Havana by British forces may be among the 
 probable expedients through which it may be obtained, by concert, be- 
 tween Great Britain and Spain herself. It is not necessary to point out 
 the numerous contingencies by which the transition from a temporary 
 and fiduciary occupation to a permanent and proprietary possession 
 may be effected. 
 
 The transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event unpropitious 
 to the interests of this Union. This opinion is so generally entertained, 
 that even the groundless rumors that it was about to be accomplished, 
 which have spread abroad, and are still teeming, may be traced to the 
 deep and almost universal feeling of aversion to it, and to the alarm 
 which the mere probability of its occurrence has stimulated. The 
 question both of our right and of our power to prevent it, if necessary 
 by force, already obtrudes itself upon our councils, and the administra- 
 tion is called upon, in the performance of its duties to the nation, at 
 least to use all the means within its competency to guard against and 
 forefend it. 
 
 It will be among the primary objects requiring your most earnest 
 and unremitting attention, to ascertain and report 1o us every move- 
 ment of negotiation between Spain and Great Britain upon this subject. 
 We cannot, indeed, prescribe any special instructions in relation to it. 
 We scarcely know where you will find the government of Spain upon 
 your arrival in the country, nor can we foresee, with certainty, by whom 
 it will be administered. Your credentials are addressed to Ferdinand, 
 the King of Spain, under the constitution. You may find him under 
 the guardianship of a Cortes, in the custody of an army of faith, or 
 under the protection of the invaders of his country. So long as the 
 constitutional government may continue to be administered in his name, 
 your official intercourse will be with his ministers, and to them you will 
 repeat, what Mr. Forsyth has been instructed to say, that the wishes of 
 your government are that Cuba and Porto Rico may continue in con- 
 nexion with independent and constitutional Spain. You will add that 
 no countenance has been given by us to any projected plan of separation 
 from Spain, which may have been formed in the island. This assurance 
 becomes proper, as by a late despatch received from Mr. Forsyth, he 
 intimates that the Spanish government have been informed thata revo- 
 lution in Cuba was secretly preparing, fomented by communications 
 between a society of Free Masons there and another of the same fra- 
 ternity in Philadelphia. Of this we have no other knowledge; and the 
 societies of Free Masons in this country are so little in the practice of 
 using agency of a political nature on any occasion, that we think it most 
 
H. Doc. 121. 11 
 
 probable the information of the Spanish government, in that respect, is 
 unfounded. It is true that the Free Masons at the Havana have taken 
 part of late in the politics of Cuba, and, so far as it is known to us, it 
 has been an earnest and active part in favor of the countinuance of their 
 connexion with Spain. While disclaiming all disposition on our part 
 either to obtain possession of Cuba or of Porto Rico ourselves, you will 
 declare that the American government had no knowledge of the lawless 
 expedition undertaken against the latter of those islands last summer. 
 
 Mr. J. J. A'p'pleton to Mr. Adams. 
 
 [Extract.] 
 
 Cadiz, August 6, 1823. 
 If no buyers for the new loan offer without security, the interest may be 
 secured upon the revenue of the island of Cuba, which exceeds the ordi- 
 nary expenditures of the island by about $1,500,000 ; more than sufficient 
 for the principal which remains to be disposed of. A member of the 
 Cortes, high in the confidence of the government, and who has been con- 
 stantly employed in the commission of "ways and means," came to 
 see me yesterday with the formal object of inquiring whether a loan 
 could be negotiated in the United States, mortgaged upon the proceeds of 
 the customs of the Havana. He said that he was afraid that England, 
 pursuing her policy to thwart all the financial operations of Spain, and 
 to curtail thus her means of resistance, would prevent a negotiation of 
 the "inscriptions;" and that Spain would thus become a victim of 
 the reliance placed upon England. He was,. therefore, anxious that 
 Spain should look beyond England, and had thought that the United 
 States, knowing best how to value the island of Cuba, would be mosj; 
 likely to engage in a speculation resting upon its revenues. He there- 
 fore desired me to tell him frankly whether the government of the 
 United States would favor such a loan, if attempted. I answered 
 that I could not tell what would be the success of an offer of this kind 
 to the United States ; that there were some shapes in which it would 
 meet with great and perhaps insurmountable objections ; that there 
 were others where the difficulties would be less; that it appeared to 
 me, however, to be a subject of so much importance to Spain at this 
 moment, that I should be astonished if she did not take the necessary 
 steps to ascertain distinctly what she could expect in reference to it. 
 He asked me then what steps could be taken. I answered that I saw 
 no other way but by sending to the United States a person possessing 
 the entire confidence of this government, calculated to gain that of 
 mine, and furnished with ample powers. He observed that he had 
 thought of the same expedient, and that he thought the government 
 was disposed to send a minister to the United States. Let one of your 
 vessels of war, added he, come into this port, and I will insure his 
 appointment; for he would then have the means of getting to his des- 
 tination. I replied that I would let Mr. Nelson know what he had told 
 me, that he might, if he found it practicable, send, under any pretext, 
 
12 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 one of our vessels here ; but that I feared it would be difficult to ar- 
 range the opportunity he desired, and should be sorry if the govern- 
 ment waited for it, as in affairs of the importance of those in question 
 despatch was everything. The gentleman with whom I had this con- 
 versation, though not friendly to England, has always felt the import- 
 ance of securing her good will, if not her assistance, and has, in con- 
 sequence, been one of the organs through which the Cortes have, if I 
 may so say, conversed with the English minister and unaccredited but 
 confidential agents of Mr. Canning at this court. 
 
 His coming to me, under such circumstances, has impressed me with 
 the idea that there was but little hope of engaging England to enter in 
 the speculation which he proposes to the United States. That she has 
 been sounded on this or some analogous point, I have but little doubt; 
 that she has been found cold and distant, in consequence of her en- 
 gagements to other powers, and her little confidence in the stability of 
 the government from which the overtures proceeded, is also not im- 
 probable. What, however, you may rely upon as certain is, that up to 
 this day there has been nothing done involving the fate of the island of 
 Cuba. 
 
 Mr. J. J. Appleton to Mr. Adams. 
 [Extract.] 
 
 Cadiz, July 10, 1S23. 
 
 Sir: The contents of the letter of which I herewith enclose a dupli- 
 cate, are substantially confirmed by all that has come to my knowledge 
 since it was written. I shall say nothing of the official declaration of 
 England; they are documents which must long since have reached 
 you. I have it, however, in my power to say, upon the best authority, 
 that the sentiments she now professes in relation to acquisition of ter- 
 ritory at the expense of Spain have not always been entertained by her. 
 Mr. Quadra, now deputy of the Cortes, had, when minister of Ultra- 
 Marine in the year 1820, distant overtures made to him for a cession of 
 the eastern side of Cuba to England. These overtures were treated 
 with great coldness, and it is supposed have not been repeated. This 
 fact has been communicated to me in confidence by Mr. Gener, a dep- 
 uty from the Havana, who, being a European by birth, has had more 
 access to the secrets of the cabinet than his companions, and has lately 
 received a distinguished proof of the respect in which he is held in being 
 called to preside over the Cortes during an epoch of particular difficulty. 
 This gentleman has, moreover, assured me that these overtures were 
 the only ones that had ever come to his knowledge, though, before leav- 
 ing Madrid, he had made it a subject of particular inquiry. The depu- 
 ties of Cuba have, within a few days, written a letter to the provincial 
 deputations, in which, after acquainting them with the events which 
 have lately occurred here, express a hope that, if some of the worthy 
 patriots who have sacrificed everything to support the liberties and in- 
 dependence of the Peninsula should be obliged to cross the Atlantic, 
 
H. Doc. 121. 13 
 
 they will find an asylum in the island of Cuba. This letter is, as 
 I am informed by one of the signers, intended to prepare the people of 
 Cuba for the worst that can happen here. They suppose, and no doubt 
 correctly, that the invasion of the mother country will elicit much spec- 
 ulation as to the future fate of the island among its inhabitants, and 
 that the impulse which they have received in favor of independence 
 will not now be easily repressed; they see calamities, therefore, brood- 
 ing over their island. These deputies, who, in common with their col- 
 leagues, voted for the removal of the royal family to this place, are now 
 declared traitors by the regency at Madrid, and will, if the cause of 
 the constitution fails, be exposed to cruel persecutors. Under these cir- 
 cumstances, it is not astonishing that they should wish to insure them- 
 selves an asylum among their friends, and save their particular prov- 
 inces from the despotism with which those of Europe are threatened. 
 Great, however, as is their horror of despotism, it does not exceed their 
 dread of becoming independent too soon. In their anxiety, they cast 
 their eyes towards the United States, and inquire whether an arrange- 
 ment could not be made for the protection of the island against the evils 
 with which it is threatened in case things go badly here. Is there no 
 remedy, say they, but holding again our necks to the yoke? Is there 
 no alternative between despotism and the ruin that awaits us if, unsup- 
 ported, we attempt to resist? I have not dared to suggest any, though 
 I should suppose that the United States, or the United States and Eng- 
 land jointly, might find one in a guarantee of the island to Spain, while 
 in the enjoyment of the provincial government lately decreed for it by 
 the Cortes. The present is the moment when such an arrangement 
 might be made with Spain ; all her influential men look to the chance 
 of being driven from their country, and would probably rejoice in hav- 
 ing it in their power to reconcile its best interests with their own safety. 
 Should Mr. Nelson come provided with adequate instructions, he will 
 arrive in the best possible moment to fix the fate of the island in the 
 way that will best suit the interests of the United States. 
 
 John Quiistcy Adams, 
 
 Secretary of State. 
 
 Hugh Nelson to the Secretary of State. 
 [Extract.] 
 
 [No. 59.] Madrid, July 10, 1S2-5. 
 
 Sir : I have the honor to enclose a copy of my last note to the Sec- 
 retary of State of his Catholic Majesty, in which, on his request, I state 
 what I have been instructed to say to this government in reference to 
 the aversion of the American government to see the island of Cuba pass 
 into the hands of any other European power, and our disclaimer of all 
 views on our part in reference to the same subject. This note was 
 written on the request of the Secretary, and on his stating that it would 
 extract from them an answer in writing on the application which I had 
 made for the privilege of sending consuls to these islands. It has pro- 
 
14 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 duced no such effect; and although I have called repeatedly in person 
 and urged the subject, and have delayed my departure from Madrid 
 some weeks on their request, I have only obtained a promise that it 
 would soon be given. As I presumed, from its delay, that it would 
 not probably be very favorable, I have concluded to leave it to my suc- 
 cessor. 
 
 Hon. Henry Clay, 
 
 Secretary of State. 
 
 Don Francisco de Zea Bcrmudez to Mr. Nelson* 
 [Translation.] 
 
 Palace, July 12, 1S25. 
 
 Sir: I had the honor of laying before the King, my august master, 
 the note which you were pleased to address to me on the 22d ultimo. 
 His Majesty has, with the greatest satisfaction, seen confirmed in it the 
 friendly dispositions of your government, and, firmly persuaded of their 
 continuance, will always take pleasure in responding to them with that 
 faithfulness and noble frankness which are characteristic of him. 
 
 His Majesty has at no time thought of ceding to any power the islands 
 of Cuba and Porto Rico, and, so far from such a purpose, is firmly de- 
 termined to keep them under the dominion and authority of his legiti- 
 mate sovereignty. 
 
 This formal declaration will be satisfactory to the wishes of your 
 government, as you have been pleased to state to me with respect to 
 the intentions of Spain ; and the equally explicit declaration which you 
 make me, that the United States will not suffer, far less take part or 
 afford this assistance to, any plan which, by means of expeditions or 
 armaments, or of any other mode, is intended to foment internal discord 
 in said islands, to disturb their tranquillity, or attempt their separation 
 from the Spanish empire, has been in the highest degree grateful to the 
 King, my master. Wherefore, his Majesty doubts not that your gov- 
 ernment, duly appreciating the just observations which I had the honor 
 of making to you verbally, will particularly apply, with respect to the 
 said possessions, all the amplitude necessary to the assurances and guar- 
 antees which you mention to me, and that in a faithful observance of 
 the strictest neutrality it will be pleased to take the most prompt and 
 efficacious measures to prevent the rebellious subjects of his Majesty in 
 America from availing themselves of tortuous and secret means, in 
 having, in the ports and on the coasts of the United States, armaments 
 intended to harass the commerce of Spain in the American seas, to 
 attack said islands, to introduce into them a revolution, or promote their 
 separation from the mother country. His Majesty is still farther per- 
 suaded that your government will immediately direct the proper means 
 for uprooting these evils, as it cannot be ignorant that there have been, 
 and now are, many cases in which, by eluding the laws of the country, 
 there have been built, armed, and equipped, on account of, by the in- 
 stigation and with the flags of, the self-styled governments of Mexico, 
 
H. Doc. 121. 15 
 
 Colombia, and Buenos Ay res, in the ports of the United States, ships 
 of war and privateers of individuals; that, frequently converted into 
 pirates, they are employed in insulting and harassing not only the said 
 islands and their commerce, but also the commerce and navigation of 
 other nations. 
 
 When, therefore, by these and other securities, which the American 
 government may judge fit and proper for their dignity and interests to 
 give to Spain, the minds of the inhabitants of Cuba and Porto Rico are 
 tranquilized respecting the injuries which they have suffered and the 
 evils which they dread, then his Majesty will hasten to take into con- 
 sideration the proposition which you have been pleased to make me, 
 about the admission into them of consuls of the United States ; you may 
 be assured, sir, of the fidelity with which his Majest} 7- will invariably 
 respond to the testimonies of friendship which he receives from the 
 United States, cheerfully concurring on his part to consolidate the har- 
 mony and good understanding between the two nations. 
 
 ] avail myself of this occasion to express to you, sir, the value and 
 esteem which the King, my master, has fof you personally, for the 
 frankness and good faith with which you have endeavored, during your 
 residence at this court, to conciliate the interests of both powers ; and, 
 wishing you the most prosperous return to your country, I pray you, sir, 
 to receive the assurances of my sincere good will and very distinguish- 
 ed consideration. 
 
 God preserve } r ou many years. 
 
 Your most obedient, humble servant, 
 
 FRANCISCO DE ZEA BERMUDEZ. 
 
 Hugh Nelson to H. C. M. First Secretary of State. 
 
 [With No. 59.] 
 
 Madrid, June 22, 1825. 
 
 The undersigned, minister plenipotentiary of the United States, has 
 the honor to submit to his excellency a proposition in behalf of the gov- 
 ernment of the United States, for the admission of consuls into his Cath- 
 olic Majesty's islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. The undersigned having 
 presented to his excellency this proposal in conversation, now, by the 
 request of his excellency, offers it in writing. His excellency having 
 suggested, in the conference on this subject, the propriety, on the part 
 of Spain, under existing circumstances, of asking some assurances, or 
 pledges, to guard against the hazard of injury which might result from 
 this measure, was informed by the undersigned that he was not author- 
 ized to give any assurances or pledges, but that when he was honored 
 with the mission to Madrid, there then being in circulation rumors that 
 some European power was negotiating with Spain for the transfer of 
 these islands, he was authorized to declare to Spain the repugnance 
 with which the United States would see these islands transferred to any 
 other power; that they prefer to see the connexion between Spain and 
 these islands continued, to their severance from Spain and junction to 
 
16 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 any such power who might be desirous of acquiring these rich posses- 
 sions ; that whilst instructed not to conceal from Spain the repugnance 
 of the United States to such transfer of these islands, he was authorized, 
 unequivocally, to disclaim all views of aggrandizement, on their own 
 part, in reference to these objects, and to declare the exemption of his 
 government from all connivance at, or countenance of, internal dissen- 
 sion, or at expeditions, or equipments, having in view either the disturb- 
 ance of the internal repose of these islands, or the dismemberment of 
 the Spanish empire. The undersigned was also instructed to say that 
 the government of the United States expected, from the friendship and 
 good understanding subsisting between the two governments, that Spain 
 would not conceal from them a measure of this sort, should they at any 
 time contemplate the transfer of these islands, so contiguous to the ter- 
 ritory of the United States. These instructions were only deemed ne- 
 cessary from the existence of the rumors alluded to, and from some 
 insinuations which had been made by the representative of his Catholic 
 Majesty in the United States, injurious to the good faith and honor of 
 the United States, which it was presumed might have been laid before 
 his Majesty's government, and might render these explanations proper. 
 The undersigned has the honor to ask an answer to his proposals, and 
 to tender to his excellency his distinguished consideration, and to sub- 
 scribe himself his excellency's obedient, humble servant, &c, 
 
 HUGH NELSON. 
 
 Mr. Clay to Mr. Everett. 
 [Extract.] 
 
 Department of State, 
 
 Washington, April 27, 1825. 
 Besides the preceding objects, to which your attention will be di- 
 rected, others of great interest will also claim it. Of these, that of the 
 highest importance is the present war between Spain and her former 
 colonies on this continent. The President wishes you to bring this 
 subject, in the most conciliatory manner possible, before the Spanish 
 government ; it would be as unnecessary as unprofitable to look to the 
 past, except for the purpose of guiding future conduct. True wisdom 
 dictates that Spain, without indulging in unavailing regrets on account 
 of what she has irretrievably lost, should employ the means of retriev- 
 ing what she may yet preserve from the wreck of her former posses- 
 sions. The war upon the continent is, in fact, at an end, and not a 
 solitary foot of land from the western limit of the United States to Cape 
 Horn owns her sway, not a bayonet in all that vast extent remains to 
 sustain her cause, and the Peninsula is utterly incompetent to replace 
 those armies which have been vanquished and annihilated by the vic- 
 torious forces of the new republics. What possible object, then, can 
 remain to Spain to protract a war which she can no longer maintain, 
 and to the conclusion of which, in form, there is only wanting the re- 
 cognition of the new governments by treaties of peace ? If there were 
 
H. Doc. 121. 17 
 
 left the most distant prospect of her reconquering her continental pro- 
 vinces which have achieved their independence, there might be a mo- 
 tive for her perseverance. But every expectation of such reconquest, 
 it is manifest, must be perfectly chimerical; if she can entertain no 
 rational hope to recover what has been forced from her grasp, is there 
 not great danger of her losing what she yet but feebly holds? It should 
 be borne in mind that the armies of the new States, flushed with vic- 
 tory, have no longer employment on the continent; and yet, whilst the 
 war continues, if it be only in name, they cannot be disbanded without 
 a disregard of all the maxims of just precaution. To what object, then, 
 will the new republics direct their powerful and victorious armies? 
 They have a common interest and a common enemy; and let it be sup- 
 posed that that enemy, weak and exhausted as he is, refuses to make 
 peace, will they not strike wherever they can reach? and from the 
 proximity and great value of Cuba and Porto Rico, is it not to be an- 
 ticipated that they will aim, and aim a successful blow, too, at those 
 Spanish islands? Whilst they would operate from without, means 
 would doubtless be at the same time employed to stimulate the popu- 
 lation within to a revolt; and that the disposition exists among the in- 
 habitants to a considerable extent to throw off the Spanish authority, 
 is well known. It is due to the United States to declare, that they have 
 constantly declined to give any countenance to that disposition. 
 
 It is not, then," for the new republics that the President wishes you 
 to urge upon Spain the expediency of concluding the war; their in- 
 terest is probably on the side of its continuance, if any nation can ever 
 have an interest in a state of war. But it is for Spain herself, for the 
 cause of humanity, for the general repose of the world, that you are 
 required, with all the delicacy which belongs to the subject, to use 
 every topic of persuasion to impress upon the councils of Spain the 
 propriety, by a formal pacification, of terminating the war; and as the 
 views and policy of the United States in regard to those islands may 
 possibly have some influence, you are authorized frankly and fully to 
 disclose them. The United States are satisfied with the present con- 
 dition of those islands in the hands of Spain, and with their ports open 
 to our commerce as they are now open; this government desires no 
 political change of that condition. The population itself of the islands is 
 incompetent at present, from its composition and its amount, to main- 
 tain self-government. The maritime force of the neighboring republics 
 of Mexico and Colombia is not now, nor is it likely shortly to be, ade- 
 quate to the protection of those islands if the conquest of them were 
 effected. The United States would entertain constant apprehensions 
 of their passing from their possession to that of some less friendly 
 sovereignty; and of all the Europe m powers, this country prefers that 
 Cuba and Porto Rico should remain dependent on Spain. If the war 
 should continue between Spain and the new republics, and those islands 
 should become the object and the theatre of it, their fortunes have such 
 a connexion w T ith the prosperity of the United States, that they could 
 not be indifferent spectators ; and the possible contingencies of such a 
 protracted war might bring upon the government of the United States 
 duties and obligations, the performance of which, however painful it 
 2 
 
18 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 should be, they might not be at liberty to decline. , A subsidiary con- 
 sideration in favor of peace deserving some weight, is that, as the war 
 has been the parent cause of the shocking piracies in the West Indies, 
 its termination would be probably followed by their cessation; and 
 thus the government of Spain, by one act, would fulfil the double obli- 
 gation under which it lies to foreign governments, of repressing enor- 
 mities, the perpetrators of which find refuge, if not succor, in Spanish 
 territory, and that to the Spanish nation itself of promoting its real in- 
 terests. 
 
 Mr. Clay to Mr. Everett. 
 [Extract.] 
 
 Department of State, 
 Washington, April 13, 1826. 
 
 On the twentieth day of last December I addressed a note to each 
 of the ministers from Colombia and Mexico, a copy of which is now 
 forwarded, for the purpose of prevailing upon their respective govern- 
 ments to suspend any expedition which both or either of them might 
 be fitting out against the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. The Presi- 
 dent considered the suspension might have a favorable effect upon the 
 cause of peace, and it was also recommended by other considerations. 
 We have not yet been officially informed of the result of the applica- 
 tion, but it was made under auspicious circumstances, and there is 
 reason to believe that it will be attended with the desired effect. You 
 will avail yourself of this measure to impress upon Spain the propriety 
 of putting an end to the war, and urge it as a new proof of the friendly 
 dispositions of this government. In respect to Cuba and Porto Rico, 
 .there can be little doubt, if the war were once ended, that they would be 
 safe in the possession of Spain ; they would at least be secure from 
 foreign attacks, and all ideas of independence which the inhabitants 
 may entertain would cease with the cessation of the state of war which 
 has .exqited them. Great Britain is fully aware that the United States 
 could not; ,consent to her occupation of those islands under any contin- 
 gencies whatever. France, as you will see by the annexed correspond- 
 ence \with Mr. Browm and with the French government, also well knows 
 that we could .pot see with indifference her acquisition of those islands; 
 and the forbearance .of the United States in regard to them may be fully re- 
 lied on from their 'known justice, from their patience and moderation here- 
 tofore exhibited, and fr«om their established pacific policy. If the acqui- 
 sition of Cuba were desirable to the United States, there is believed to be 
 no reasonable prospect of ,effecting at this conjucture that object; and, 
 Xf thexe were any, the frankness of their diplomacy, which has induced 
 ,the President freely and fully to disclose our views both to Great Britain 
 and France, forbids absolutely any movement whatever at this time 
 with such a purpose. This condition of the great maritime powers 
 (the .United States, Great Britain, and France) is almost equivalent to an 
 absolute guaranty of the islands to Spain ; but we can enter into no stip- 
 ulations by treaty to guaranty them, and the President therefore ap- 
 
H. Doc. 121. 19 
 
 proves your lmvirig explicitly communicated to Spain that we could 
 contract no engagement to guaranty them. You will continue to 
 decline any proposal to that effect, should any such hereafter be made. 
 
 Mr. A. H. Everett to the Secretary of State. 
 
 [confidential.] Madrid, August 17, 1827. 
 
 Sir : The enclosed copy of a confidential despatch addressed to the 
 Minister of State, by the Conde de la Alcudia, Spanish minister at 
 London, was handed me to-day by a private friend, and may be de- 
 pended on as authentic. As the communication was made to me in 
 the strictest confidence, and as the document is in itself unsuitable for 
 the press, I take the liberty of transmitting it to you — for the President's 
 information — in the form of a private letter, and request that it may not 
 be placed on the public files of the Department of State. 
 
 In this letter the Spanish minister informs his government of a plan 
 conceived by that of England, and already in a state of partial execu- 
 tion, for effecting a revolution in the Canary islands and in Cuba. The 
 sources from which the Count de la Alcudia derived his knowledge 
 upon the subject are, as you will perceive, of the most respectable 
 character, and such as leave no doubt of the facts. The object seems 
 to be, to establish the British influence in these islands — in the end, 
 probably, to obtain territorial possession of them ; and the cover of a 
 spontaneous declaration of independence by the inhabitants is to be 
 employed in order, as is expressly stated, to avoid awakening the 
 jealousy of the government of the United States. 
 
 I have thought it of high importance to give you the earliest inform- 
 ation of these proceedings ; and, wishing to send off the paper by the 
 French courier that leaves town to-night, I have no time at present to 
 add any further remarks. The President will perceive at once the 
 bearing of these projects upon the interest of the United States, and 
 will judge what measures it may be proper to adopt for the purpose of 
 defeating them, or counteracting their effects. If any should be resolved 
 on in which my concurrence may be wanted, you will, of course, favor 
 me with the necessary instructions. In the mean time I shall endeavor 
 to collect all the information on the subject that is accessible here, and 
 shall give you notice of any other circumstances that may come to my 
 knowledge. 
 
 It is rather singular that the Duke of Wellington should have made 
 known to the Spanish minister a plan formed and acted on while he was 
 himself a member of the cabinet. The fact was probably owing to the 
 strong feelings of disgust and bitterness with which he has been in- 
 spired by the late change in the administration. It is also rather singular 
 that Mr. Salmon himself should have made no communications to me upon 
 a project which is certainly not indifferent to the United States, and in 
 regard to which he might naturally expect that their co-operation would 
 be useful to Spain. Upon this point, and others connected with the sub- 
 
20 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 ject, I shall hereafter submit to your consideration some additional re- 
 marks. 
 
 I am, with great respect, sir, your very faithful and obedient servant, 
 
 A. H. EVERETT. 
 
 Translation of a private despatch addressed by the Spanish Minuter at Lo?i~ 
 don to the Minister of State, 
 
 [confidential.] London, Jnne 1, 1827. 
 
 Most Excellent Sir : I deem it my duty to give you notice, for the 
 information of the King, our lord, that this government despatched a 
 frigate some time ago to the Canary islands, with commissioners on 
 board, who were instructed to ascertain whether any preparations 
 were making there for an expedition to America, and also the state of 
 defence of those islands, and the dispositions of the inhabitants. The 
 result of these inquiries was that the said islands were in a wholly 
 defenceless situation, provided with few troops, and those disaffected 
 and ready for any innovation. 
 
 The frigate then proceeded to the Havana, where the commissioners 
 found many persons disposed to revolt ; but in consequence of the large 
 military force stationed there, and the strength of the fortifications, 
 they considered it impossible to take possession of the island without 
 the co-operation of the authorities and the army. In consequence of 
 the information thus obtained, measures have been taken in both these 
 islands to prepare the public opinion, by means of emissaries, in favor 
 of England, to the end that the inhabitants may be brought to declare 
 themselves independent, and to solicit the protection of the British. 
 The latter are prepared to assist them, and will in this way avoid any 
 collision with the United States. The whole operation has been under- 
 taken and is to be conducted in concert with the revolutionists resident 
 here (at London) and in the islands, who have designated a Spanish 
 general, now at this place, to take the command of the Havana when 
 the occasion shall require it. 
 
 The Duke of Wellington communicated to me the above information, 
 which is also confirmed by an intimation which he gave to Brigadier 
 General Don Francisco Armentecos, when this officer took leave of him 
 to go to the Havana. The Duke then advised him, if he should dis- 
 cover any symptoms of disaffection in the authorities, to give immediate 
 notice to the King, as it would be a grievous thing for his Majesty to 
 lose the Havana. 
 
 I have thought it my duty to make these circumstances known to 
 your excellency. God keep you many years. 
 
 EL CONDE DE LA ALCUDIA. 
 
 His Excellency the First Secretary of State. 
 
H. Doc. 121. 21 
 
 Mr. A. H. Everett to the Secretary of State. 
 [Extract] 
 
 [No. 3, confidential.] Madrid, December 12, 1827. 
 
 Sir: I have intended, ever since I received the information respect- 
 ing the British intrigue for revolutionizing the island of Cuba and the 
 Canaries, to communicate with this government upon the subject at the 
 earliest favorable opportunity. The unsettled state of the administra- 
 tion for some time after, and then the departure of the King and the 
 only effective minister for Catalonia, together with the urgent character 
 of thek occupations in that quarter, rendered it of course inexpedient 
 for the time to direct their attention to any other affairs, however in 
 themselves important. I should probably have adjourned the matter 
 until after the King's return, which is expected about the middle of 
 January, had not the government recently shown a disposition to terminate 
 at once the negotiation respecting indemnities. It struck me that a free 
 communication with- the minister, upon the subject alluded to, would 
 naturally produce a more friendly and confidential feeling towards the 
 United States, which might possibly have a favorable effect upon the 
 decision of this question. In the conversations which I have recently 
 had with Mr. Salmon, I have accordingly taken occasion to suggest, 
 without of course mentioning from what quarter the information had 
 been received, that the government of the United States had reason to 
 suppose that the British government had organized a plan for revolu- 
 tionizing the islands ; and I inquired of him whether this government 
 had any knowledge of the proceedings. Mr. Salmon seemed a little 
 surprised at the tenor of my remarks, but replied that this government 
 had in fact received information some months ago that the British gov- 
 ernment had sent out a frigate to the Canaries and to Cuba, for the 
 purpose of reconnoitring the state of the preparations for defence at 
 those islands, and of establishing relations with such discontented persons 
 as might be found there. He had heard nothing respecting the results 
 of this expedition, and believed that thus far everything was tranquil 
 and secure. The government, he said, placed great dependence on 
 the fidelity and efficiency of the troops at Cuba, which they believed 
 were quite competent to secure the island against any hostile enter- 
 prise, foreign or domestic. 
 
 I then mentioned to Mr. Salmon, that according to the information 
 which the government of the United States had received, the object of 
 the plan was to place the islands under the protection of Great Britain ; 
 but that the form of a declaration of independence was to be adopted, 
 in order to avoid awakening the jealous}'' of the United States; that 
 the United States would not, of course, be deceived by this artifice ; 
 that they could not view with indifference these movements of the 
 British government, considering it, as they did, as a settled principle 
 that the island must in no event pass into the possession of, or under 
 the protection of, any European power other than Spain; that it was 
 not their desire to derive any accession of territory, or other direct 
 advantage, from the part which they might be compelled to take in the 
 affairs of Cuba, by the result of this intrigue; but, on the contrary, to 
 
22 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 employ their influence, should it be necessary, in the manner most 
 agreeable to the wishes and the interest of his Majesty; and 1 intima- 
 ted to him that the moment seemed to be favorable for a more full and 
 free communication of intentions and opinions respecting the state of 
 this island, and of the American colonies in general, than had yet 
 taken place between the two powers. I suggested to him, at the same 
 time, that it would, in my opinion, contribute materially to the estab- 
 lishment of a good understanding between them, (so desirable, on every 
 account, at the present moment,) if his Majesty's government woulcl 
 consent to arrange immediately, to the satisfaction of the United States, 
 the several questions now under negotiation- Mr. Salmon appeared 
 to be a good deal interested in what I said upon the subject, and 
 requested me to give him a note of the principal particulars, that he 
 might be able to make them known with precision to the other minis- 
 ters. I have accordingly prepared a short confidential memorandum 
 upon the subject, which I shall hand him the nest time I see him, and 
 of which a copy is herewith transmitted. No results can be expected 
 from these communications in reference to the more general subject of 
 the colonies, or even of the island of Cuba, until after the return of the 
 King and Mr. Calomarde. If they have any immediate effect, it can 
 only be upon the decision of the minor matters in negotiation between 
 the two governments, and especially the indemnity question. On this 
 latter point I am not at all sanguine, but have considered it my duty 
 to try the chance. 
 
 Hon. Henry Clay, Secretary of State. 
 
 Confidential memorandum for the Secretary of State. 
 
 Madrid, December 10, 1827. 
 
 The government of the United States have been informed, and that 
 of his Catholic Majesty cannot of course be ignorant, of the move^- 
 ments commenced a few months ago by the British ministry, in con- 
 junction with the Spanish refugees in London, and now in a course of 
 execution, for the purpose of revolutionizing the island of Cuba and 
 the Canaries. The strong contrast between these proceedings and those 
 of the government of the United States in the same quarter, which have 
 been made known to his Majesty and met his approbation, will serve, 
 it is hoped, to enlighten the councils of Spain in regard to some import- 
 ant points in her foreign policy. 
 
 In the papers which have been transmitted to the government of the 
 United States in regard to this subject, it is expressly stated, on the 
 authority of some of the highest personages in Great Britain, that the 
 main object of the plan is to place the islands in question under the 
 protection of that power, but that the form of a declaration of independ- 
 ence will be adopted in order to avoid awakening the jealousy of the 
 United States. The United States will, of course, not be duped by 
 this artifice; and it is impossible for them to view with indifference 
 these movements of the British government, considering it, as they do, 
 as a settled principle that the island of Cuba must in no event, and 
 
H. Doc. 121. 23 
 
 under no pretext, pass into the possession of, or under the protection of, 
 any European power other than Spain. It is not their desire to derive 
 any accession of territory or other direct advantage from the part which 
 they may be compelled to take by the results of this intrigue, and they 
 are anxious, on the contrary, to employ their influence, as far as the occa- 
 sion may render it necessary, in the way most agreeable to the wishes 
 and interest of his Catholic Majesty. 
 
 It appears to the government of the United States that, at this crisis 
 in the colonial affairs of Spain, a more full and confidential communi- 
 cation of opinions and intentions between the two powers, in regard to 
 these islands and to the general subject of American politics, would be 
 of material advantage to both. 
 
 It also appears to that government that a satisfactory arrangement of 
 several important questions, which have been for some time past in a 
 course. of negotiation between them, would have, under the present 
 circumstances, a particularly favorable effect upon the slate of their 
 relations. A comparison of the treatment extended by Spain to the 
 United States and to some other foreign powers, in regard to a number 
 of interesting points, would seem to show that the policy pursued by 
 his Majesty's government is not precisely such as might naturally be 
 expected. 
 
 1. The French government have had, for three or four years past, a 
 consul at the Havana, and his Catholic Majesty is bound by treaty to 
 admit a consul for the United States in all the ports in his dominions 
 where such an agent is admitted for any foreign power. It is now more 
 than two years since the United States have been soliciting in vain the 
 fulfilment of this explicit and formal contract. In the mean time the 
 British Government have, under the name of commissioners for attend- 
 ing to the execution of the slave-trade convention, two acknowledged 
 political agents at the Havana. One of them (Mr. Kirby) was a partic- 
 ular friend of the late Mr. Canning, enjoys the confidence of his gov- 
 ernment, and is doubtless the manager of the present intrigue for revo- 
 lutionizing the island. The United States, whose wish and policy it is 
 to sustain the King's rights and the existing state of things, are not 
 allowed to have an acknowledged agent on the spot. 
 
 2. Depredations were committed several years ago by naval and 
 other officers of his Catholic Majesty, doubtless against his orders, at 
 the same time and place, and under precisely the same circumstances, 
 upon the rights and property of British subjects and of citizens of the 
 United States. The matter was immediately arranged with the British 
 government by an amicable convention; and for the purpose of settling 
 the business in detail the negotiation has been several times resumed, 
 and is at this moment actually going on at London. The proposition 
 for a similar arrangement, which was made about the same time, by 
 the United States, has not yet been formally answered ; and there is 
 reason to suppose, from some late informal communications of the Secre- 
 tary of State, that the answer, which is now in preparation, will amount 
 to a positive refusal to entertain the claim. 
 
 3. All foreign ships pay in the ports of the Peninsula a tonnage duty 
 of one real per ton, excepting those of the United States, which pay 
 twenty reals. A proposition, made by the minister of the United States 
 
24 H. Doc. 12 J. 
 
 in the name of his government nearly two years ago, to treat on this 
 subject, remains unanswered. A specific proposal, subsequently sub- 
 mitted, for an amicable arrangement of the question in a different way, 
 has been declined, and the minister has lately been privately informed 
 that the Board of Duties have it in contemplation to raise, instead of 
 diminishing, the tonnage duty on the vessels of the United States, 
 leaving it as it is as regards all others. The effect of this distinction is 
 to drive their vessels from the ports of Spain to Gibraltar, whence their 
 cargoes are smuggled into his Majesty's dominions. 
 
 4. The foreign trade with Cuba is burdened with enormous duties of 
 tonnage and impost not enforced in the Peninsula. As nine-tenths of 
 this trade are in the hands of the United States, the discrimination oper- 
 ates as if directed entirely against their commerce. Under a more 
 liberal system the island would flourish as much more than it does now, 
 as it does now more than it did under the old colonial monopoly. 
 
 It would be as difficult, perhaps, to reconcile these different modes of 
 proceeding in regard to different powers with any correct view of the 
 policy of Spain, as with the dictates of good faith and justice towards 
 the United States. A revision of this chapter in the foreign relations of 
 the kingdom could hardly fail to promote the amicable concert between 
 the two governments which is so very desirable at the present crisis. 
 
 Notes of a conversation of Mr. Everett with Mr. Zen, communicated with his 
 despatch No. 7, of 25th September^ 1525, to Mr. Clay, Secretary of 
 State. 
 
 [Extract.] 
 
 Our relations with the island of Cuba having been particularly alluded 
 to by the minister, (Zea Bermudez,) I thought it a proper occasion to 
 express to him my regret that the King had not acceded to the propo- 
 sition made by Mr. Nelson for the formal recognition of our commercial 
 agents at that island and at Porto Rico in the character of consuls. 
 He repeated to me, in answer, the same remarks in substance as are 
 contained in his last note addressed to Mr. Nelson. He said that,, al- 
 though Spain was willing, as far as possible, to overlook and keep out 
 of sight, in all her relations with us, the unpleasant circumstance of our 
 recognition of the independence of the colonies, yet that she did not 
 think it politic to admit into any of the American possessions an au- 
 thorized public agent of a power which openly avowed the policy of 
 encouraging the separation of these possessions from the mother coun- 
 try; that our ministers and consuls on the continent were constantly 
 holding a language favorable to the insurgents; that our consuls in the 
 islands would no doubt do the same; and that if they were formally 
 recognised, there would be no means of preventing them ; but that at 
 present the authorities would have the right, if the consuls conducted 
 themselves imprudently, to proceed against them in the usual forms of 
 law. He added, that the admission of French consuls was a favor 
 granted to a power which had rendered them essential services^ and 
 
H. Doc. 121. 25 
 
 that it could not be surprising to us if they were disposed to do some- 
 thing more for a nation thus situated, than for one that stood only on 
 the common footing of other friendly nations; that the refusal was not 
 a measure directed invidiously against us in particular, but that it was 
 extended in like manner to all other powers except France, and in par- 
 ticular to England. I told him that we had no intention to ask favors 
 of his Majesty's or any other government, and that we did not consider 
 the free admission of our consuls at all in that light, arid that we viewed 
 it as a thing equally advantageous to both parties, since any measure 
 tending to place our commerce with these islands on a better footing 
 was at least of equal, not to say much greater, importance to them than 
 to us, inasmuch as this commerce formed only a fifteenth or twentieth 
 part of our whole trade, while it amounted to nearly three-fourths of 
 theirs; that we stood, on this account, in a different situation from any 
 other power, not excepting England, whose trade with the islands was 
 much less considerable than ours. I added, that we nevertheless did 
 not consider the matter as being of any very great consequence, and 
 were not disposed to magnify it into more importance than it really 
 possessed. 
 
 He then said, as he had done in his note to Mr. Nelson, that the King 
 would perhaps be disposed to concede this point if the United States 
 would furnish any pledges or guarantees, by way of security, respect- 
 ing their future relations with the islands. I replied that I did not dis- 
 tinctly understand the nature of the pledges he appeared to contem- 
 plate; that the American government had given to the world the 
 example of a uniform observation of the rules of justice, good faith, 
 and humanity, in all their past policy, which were, perhaps, the best 
 assurances that could be had of the correctness of their future pro- 
 ceedings ; and that I should be glad to learn what sort of pledges the 
 King desired. He said that perhaps we might be willing to guaranty 
 to them, by treaty, the possession of the islands. I replied, that en- 
 gagements of this kind were inconsistent with the standing rules of our 
 foreign policy, which was no other, according to the just and forcible 
 expression of one of our Presidents, than "peace and friendship with 
 all nations — entangling alliances with none ; " that, independently of this 
 objection, the value of the object was inadequate to the price demanded 
 for it; that such a guarantee might place us, at any moment, under the 
 necessity of going to war, and that the people of the United States 
 would not be content to fight upon the question whether their repre- 
 sentative at the Havana should be called a commercial agent or a 
 consul. He then said that perhaps a law like the one he had sug- 
 gested before, requiring bonds to be given by all ship-owners that their 
 ships were not intended to act against friendly powers, would be 
 looked upon as a sufficient consideration. In answer to this, I repeated, 
 in part, the objections which I had started before to this proposition, and 
 told him that 1 should probably send him a written answer to the last 
 note which he had addressed to Mr. Nelson on this subject. 
 
26 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 Mr. Van Buren to Mr. Van Ness. 
 [Extract.] 
 
 Department of State, 
 
 Washington, October 2, 1829. 
 
 One of the considerations which the ministers of the United States 
 who preceded you at the court of his Catholic Majesty were advised 
 to press upon his government, as an inducement for him to terminate 
 the contest with his late colonies, is the preservation of his insular pos- 
 sessions in the West Indies, which still constitute a part of the Spanish 
 monarchy. Cuba and Porto Rico, occupying, as they do, a most import- 
 ant geographical position, have been viewed by the neighboring States 
 of Mexico and Colombia as military and naval arsenals, which would 
 at all times furnish Spain with the means of threatening their com- 
 merce, and even of endangering their political existence. Looking with 
 a jealous eye upon these last remnants of Spanish power in America, 
 these two States had once united their forces ; and their arm, raised to 
 strike a blow which, if successful, would forever have extinguished 
 Spanish influence in that quarter of the globe, was arrested chiefly by 
 the timely interposition of this government, which, in a friendly spirit 
 towards Spain, and for the interests of general commerce, thus assisted 
 in preserving to his Catholic Majesty these invaluable portions of his 
 colonial possessions. 
 
 The government of the United States has always looked with the 
 deepest interest upon the fate of those islands, but particularly of Cuba. 
 Its geographical position, which places it almost in sight of our south- 
 ern shores, and, as it were, gives it the command of the Gulf of Mex- 
 ico and the West India seas, its safe and capacious harbors, its rich 
 productions, the exchange of which, for our surplus agricultural pro- 
 ducts and manufactures, constitutes one of the most extensive and valu- 
 able branches of our foreign trade, render it of the utmost importance 
 to the United States that no change should take place in its condition 
 which might injuriously affect our political and commercial standing in 
 that quarter. Other considerations, connected with a certain class of 
 our population, make it the interest of the southern section of the Union 
 that no attempt should be made in that island to throw off the yoke of 
 Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the sudden 
 emancipation of a numerous slave population, the result of which could 
 not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United 
 States. On the other hand, the wisdom which induced the Spanish 
 government to relax in its colonial system, and to adopt with regard to 
 those islands a more liberal policy, which opened their ports to general 
 commerce, has been so far satisfactory in the view of the United Stales 
 as, in addition to other considerations, to induce this government to 
 desire that their possession should not be transferred from the Spanish 
 crown to any other power. In conformity with this desire, the minis- 
 ters of the United States at Madrid have, from time to lime, been in- 
 structed attentively to watch the course of events and the secret springs 
 of European diplomacy, which, from information received from various 
 quarters, this government had reason to suspect had been put in motion 
 
H. Doc. 121. 27 
 
 to effect the transfer of the possession of Cuba, to the powerful allies 
 of Spain. Tt had been intimated at one time that the armed interfer- 
 ence of France in the affairs of that country would extend over her 
 insular possessions, and that a military occupation of Cuba was to take 
 place for the alleged purpose of protecting it against foreign invasion 
 or internal revolutionary movements. A similar design was imputed 
 to the government of Great Britain, and it was stated that in both cases 
 a continuance of the occupation of the island was to constitute, in the 
 hands of either of those powers, a guarantee for the payment of heavy 
 indemnities claimed by France, on the one hand, to cover the expenses 
 of her armies of occupation, and by Great Britain, on the other, to com- 
 pensate her subjects for spoliations alleged to have been committed 
 upon their commerce. The arrangements entered into by Spain with 
 those two powers, by means of treaties of a recent date, and providing 
 for the- payment of those indemnities, although removing the pretext 
 upon which the Occupation of Cuba would have been justified, are not 
 believed entirely to obviate the possibility of its eventually being 
 effected. The government of the United States considers as a much 
 stronger pledge of its continuance under the dominion of Spain the 
 considerable military and naval armaments which have recently been 
 added to the ordinary means of defence in that island, and which are 
 supposed fully adequate for its protection against any attempt on the 
 part of foreign powers, and for the suppression of any insurrectionary 
 movement on that of its inhabitants. Notwithstanding these apparent 
 securities for the maintenance of the Spanish authoiity in the island of 
 Cuba, as it is not impossible that Spain, in her present embarrassed and 
 dependent situation, might be induced to yield her as.--.ent to a tempo- 
 rary occupation of it, as a pledge for the fulfilment of her engagements, 
 or to part with her right of property in it for other considerations, afford- 
 ing immediate relief in the hour of her distress, it is the wish of the 
 President that the same watchfulness which had engaged the attention 
 of your predecessors in relation to this subject should be continued 
 during your administration of the affairs of the legation of the United 
 States at Madrid, and that you should take special care to keep this 
 department informed of every occurrence whose tendency, direct or 
 indirect, might, in your judgment, bring about any change in the pres- 
 ent condition of the island of Cuba. 
 
 Your predecessors, who had been repeatedly instructed to that effect, 
 have availed themselves of every fit opportunity to make the wishes 
 and policy of the United States with regard to the Spanish islands fully 
 known to the government of his Catholic Majesty, whom you will find, 
 already possessed of every information which you will have it in your 
 power to communicate upon this head; but it is not improbable that the 
 same inquisitiveness which has hitherto been manifested on the part of 
 that government in relation to it, may again be evinced by the Spanish 
 ministers, who, affecting to construe the avowed anxiousness ol the 
 United States into a determination not to suffer the possession of Cuba 
 to pass into the hands of other powers, have inquired how far this gov- 
 ernment would go in sustaining that determination. Should similar 
 inquiries be made of you by the ministers of his Catholic Majesty, you 
 are authorized to say that the long-established and well-known policy 
 
23 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 of the United States, which forbids their entangling themselves in the 
 concerns of other nations, and which permits their physical force to be 
 used only for the defence of their political rights and the protection of 
 the persons and property of their citizens, equally forbids their public 
 agents to enter into positive engagements, the performance of which 
 would require the employment of means which the people have retained 
 in their own hands ; but that this government has every reason to be- 
 lieve that the same influence which once averted the blow ready to fall 
 upon the Spanish islands would again be found effectual on the recur- 
 rence of similar events ; and that the high preponderance in American 
 affairs of the United States as a great naval power, the influence which 
 they must at all times command as a great commercial nation, in all 
 questions involving the interests of the general commerce of this hem- 
 isphere, would render their consent an essential preliminary to the exe- 
 cution of any project calculated so vitally to affect the general concerns 
 of all the nations in any degree engaged in the commerce of America. 
 The knowledge you possess of the public sentiment of this country in 
 regard to Cuba will enable you to speak with confidence and effect of 
 the probable consequences that might be expected from the communi- 
 cation of that sentiment to Congress, in the event of any contemplated 
 change in the present political condition of that island. 
 
 Mr. Van Buren to Mr. Van Ness. 
 
 [Extract.] 
 
 Department of State, 
 
 Washington, October 13, 1830. 
 
 This government has also been given to understand that, if Spain 
 should persevere in the assertion of a hopeless claim to dominion over 
 her former colonies, they will feel it to be their duty, as well as their 
 interest, to attack her colonial possessions in our vicinity, Cuba and 
 Porto Rico. Your general instructions are full upon the subject of the 
 interest which the United States take in the fate of those islands, and 
 particularly of the former; they inform you that we are content that 
 Cuba should remain as it now is, but could not consent to its transfer to 
 any European power. Motives of reasonable state policy render it 
 more desirable to us that it should remain subject to Spain rather than 
 to either of the South American States. Those motives will readily 
 present themselves to your mind; they are principally founded upon an 
 apprehension that, if possessed by the latter, it would, in the present 
 state of things, be in greater danger of becoming subject to some Eu- 
 ropean power, than in its present condition. Although such are our 
 own wishes and true interests, the President does not see on what 
 ground he would be justified in interfering with any attempts which 
 the South American States might think it for their interest, in the prose- 
 cution of a defensive war, to make upon the islands in question. If, in- 
 deed, an attempt should be made to disturb them, by putting arms in 
 the hands of one portion of their population to destroy another, and 
 
H. Doc. 121. 29 
 
 which in its influence would endanger the peace of a portion of the 
 United States, the case might be different. Against such an attempt, 
 the United States (being informed that it was in contemplation) have 
 already protested and warmly remonstrated, in their communications 
 last summer with the government of Mexico ; but the information lately 
 communicated to us in this regard was accompanied by a solemn as- 
 surance that no such measures will, in any event, be resorted to; and 
 that the contest, if forced upon them, will be carried on, on their part, 
 with strict reference to the established rules of civilized warfare. 
 
 Mr. Van Ness to the Secretary of State. 
 [Extract.] 
 
 [No. 124.] Legation of the United States, 
 
 Madrid, August 10, 1836. 
 
 Sir : * * * A person who has good means of in- 
 
 formation, has this moment informed me that the agents from the islands 
 of Cuba and Porto Rico, now in Madrid, as well as other persons from 
 there, have secretly aided in promoting the late disorders and changes 
 here, for the purpose of facilitating the declaration and establishment 
 of the independence of those islands. It is said to be believed by 
 them that such a state of anarchy and confusion will exist here, that the 
 accomplishment of their purpose will be an easy task ; and I under- 
 stand it to be their object to have the attempt made very soon. I can- 
 not answer for the truth of this, but the importance of the subject, as 
 it regards the United States, has induced me not to lose a moment in 
 giving you the information. 
 
 Hon. John Forsyth, 
 
 Secretary of State. 
 
 Mr. Van Ness to the Secretary of State. 
 [Extract.] 
 
 Madrid, December 10, 1836. 
 
 Sir: About twenty days ago I observed a piece in one of the prin- 
 cipal newspapers of this city, relating to the island of Cuba, in which 
 was stated a falsehood with regard to the President of the United 
 States, which I thought called for a prompt and official denial and con- 
 tradiction; especially as. Mr. Calutrava, not having been in any politi- 
 cal office until August last, and probably never having seen the Presi- 
 dent's last message, might be induced, together with many others now 
 in office, to believe the statement alluded to. I therefore addressed to 
 the editor of the paper, in which the statement had appeared, the fol- 
 lowing letter, and which I afterwards procured republished in the 
 official Gazette of this city : 
 
30 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 "Legation of the United States of America; 
 
 Madrid, November 23, 1S36. 
 
 " To the Editors of the Revista Nacional: 
 
 " In your paper of the 19th instant, in an article under the head of 
 'Independence,' treating of the island of Cuba, I have observed, in ad- 
 dition to various unfounded insinuations, the following statement: 
 
 " ' There is yet another fact of the gravest importance which fortifies 
 the proofs of the designs to attempt independence. We refer to the 
 last discourse (message) pronounced by the President of the United 
 States to the Congress. In it is asserted, clearly enough, the absolute 
 impossibility that the island of Cuba can continue united to the Me- 
 tropolis, (mother country,) and the day of its emancipation is announced 
 to be near at hand. The publicity given to this document, so far from 
 being, in our opinion, prejudicial, we consider it useful, for reasons so 
 obvious, that it would be trifling with the good sense of our readers to 
 enumerate them ; and as the divulging of it is not a fable, it may with 
 reason be called an infamous calumny.' 
 
 ■"If this were one of the ordinary articles which frequently appear in 
 the public papers of Madrid, abounding with error and injustice as it 
 regards the United States, I should not have considered it necessary, 
 and perhaps not even proper, to take notice of it; but as it contains a 
 direct and positive assertion, that the President of the United States 
 has made a public and official declaration of a nature injurious to the 
 rights of her Catholic Majesty, and characterized that declaration as an 
 infamous calumny, I deem it my duty, as the representative of those 
 States at this court, to make a public and formal contradiction of the 
 charge contained in the above extract. The President did not in his 
 last annual message to Congress, nor in any other which I have seen, 
 speak of the probability of a separation of the island of Cuba from 
 the Spanish crown ; nor has he even, in any manner, alluded to the 
 question of such separation. Not only is it contrary to the truth that 
 the President has made any suggestion of the kind imputed to him, 
 but it may be asserted with the utmost confidence, that the United 
 States have a peculiar interest in the preservation of Cuba to Spain, 
 and that their desires in this respect are izi perfect accordance with 
 their interests. If any proof of this were wanting, other than the na- 
 ture and circumstances of the case themselves afford, it might be found 
 in the fact that the government of the United States, on at least one 
 occasion, has contributed to avoid a blow, which, but for its friendly 
 intervention, might have injuriously, if not fatally, affected the jurisdic- 
 tion of Spain over that island. But I have said enough, since my ob- 
 ject was merely to expose the want of foundation for the charge which 
 has called forth this communication. 
 
 "I have the honor to remain your obedient servant, 
 
 "C. P. VAN NESS." 
 
 When the Revista published my letter, it was done in a way not to 
 call much attention ; and the direction to that paper at the head was 
 left out, so as to afford the inference that it might have originally been 
 addressed to some other paper; and, consequently, that some other 
 
H. Doc. 121. 31 
 
 paper might have promulgated the falsehood. I therefore took the 
 communication to the director of the official paper, (Gazette,) and re- 
 quested him to publish it in its original state, which he promised me to 
 do. Two days afterwards, I received an intimation from a person em- 
 ployed in the Gazette office, that my coram unication had been carried 
 to Mr. Calutrava, and was for the present retained by him ; and, further, 
 that he, Calutrava, had expressed himself in terms of dissatisfaction 
 with the President. I immediately went to see Mr. Calutrava, carry- 
 ing with me the President's last message; and I began by telling him 
 of the statement I had seen in the Revista, and of my contradiction ; 
 but adding that my letter had been so badly published in the Revista, 
 that I had carried it to the Gazette office, where they had promised to 
 insert it, but for some reason or other had not yet done it ; and that as 
 the Gazette was the official paper of the government, I hoped that he 
 would direct the insertion of my letter. He answered that the Gazette 
 was a private establishment, but received a certain sum from the 
 government for the insertion of official documents and acts. Upon 
 which I told him that I had understood that communications sent to 
 the Gazette were generally first laid before the ministers, to which he 
 repiied that it was a mistake. I then offered to show him the Presi- 
 dent's message, which I held in my hand, and to point him to that part 
 relating to Spain, and to the island of Cuba; but he declined looking at 
 it, saying, that if he had entertained any doubt about the matter, my 
 word was sufficient to satisfy him. After some further explanations by 
 me about this subject, he sent for the first officer (chief clerk) of his 
 department; and on his appearance, he said to him : "Was there not 
 something said the other day about a letter from the minister of the 
 United States to the Gazette ?" To which the clerk replied : "Yes, there 
 was one." "Where is it?" asked the minister. "It is returned, with 
 directions for its publication," answered the other. " It appears, then," 
 said the minister to me, "that it has been sent here, and has already 
 been directed to be published." The result was somewhat inconsistent 
 with what he had before said to me ; but I was satisfied ; and he ex- 
 pressing himself equally so, I left him. There has been no attempt to 
 contradict, or lessen the force of my article, and it was well published 
 in the Gazette. 
 
 In regard to the situation of things in the island of Cuba, it already 
 appears that my late warnings to you have been well founded and sea- 
 sonable. It is well known here that General Lorenzo, who commands 
 at St. Jago de Cuba, has proclaimed and sustains the constitution of 
 1812, in defiance of the orders of the Captain General at the Hava- 
 na, Tacon ; and some assert that the negro question is mixing with the 
 political one. The government observes silence. I have not seen the 
 minister for some days, on account of his being closely occupied during 
 these days in the Cortes. I think it will be very difficult to keep 
 down the island of Cuba in the existins; state of the Government here, 
 and also from the manner in which they are draining and anticipating 
 the resources of the island. They commenced upon the plan of pay- 
 ing the dividends due upon the foreign debt, the 1st of November, by 
 issuing to the creditors bonds upon the treasury of Cuba, bearing five 
 per cent, interest, and payable in four annual instalments, when, at the 
 
32 H. Doe. 121. 
 
 same time, they had already drawn largely in advnnce upon the trea- 
 sury. It was found, however, that the plan would not go down ; and 
 alter a few of the Cuban bonds had been sent into the market, this gov- 
 ernment disavowed the arrangement made by its agent, and adopted 
 the plan of giving obligations directly upon the royal treasury here, and 
 also bearing 5 per cent, interest, but payable in six and twelve months. 
 Had the first arrangement been carried into effect, it would have ope- 
 rated like a mortgage of Cuba to foreigners, mostly English ; and as it 
 is, her revenues are well pledged always in advance, since it is the 
 most important resource remaining in the power of this government to 
 raise money upon. How long Cuba herself will bear this mode of an- 
 ticipating and pledging, not to say draining, may be considered quite 
 uncertain. But in another view, no person can doubt the bad results 
 with regard to that island, from the changes and revolutions which are 
 taking place in the mother country. In the first place, here is estab- 
 lished a constitution, and one of very democratic tendency for a mon- 
 archy, while in the neighborhood of the island are several independent 
 States, who, like herself, have been colonies of Spain, and whose inde- 
 pendence is at this moment about being formally confirmed by Spain; 
 and, in the second place, to Cuba is obstinately refused either the one 
 or the other of these privileges, so that she has to remain in a state of 
 colonial bondage, ancl bearing the burden of sustaining in the mother 
 country those principles of liberty the application of which to her is 
 denied. Under all the foregoing circumstances, then, it will be seen in 
 due time whether my predictions will prove correct. I had forgotten 
 in its place to add, that if Carlos should succeed here, the question 
 might be considered quite doubtful whether the island would consent 
 to pass to what might be called another government. I have con- 
 versed with Mr. Calutrava once or twice on this subject since he has 
 been minister, and found him incredulous as to any danger. He be- 
 lieves that the fear of the negroes is worth an army of 100,000 men, 
 and that it will prevent the whites from making any revolutionary at- 
 tempts. One thing is certain : this government can send no force from 
 Spain to oppose any attempt that may be made on the island. If 
 what is there be insufficient, there will be no remedy. 
 
 Hon. J. Forsyth, 
 
 Secretary of State. 
 
 Mr. Stevenson to Mr. Forsyth. 
 
 [No. 2S.] Legation of the United States, 
 
 London. June 16, IS 3 7. 
 
 Sir: 1 have the honor of communicating to you, confidentially, the 
 result of an interview I have lately had with Lord Palmerston, on a 
 subject of a very delicate and interesting character. 
 
 You have doubtless seen, both in the English and French newspa- 
 pers, the various speculations which have appeared on the subject of a 
 large Spanish loan, supposed to have been made by a banker in Paris, 
 
H. Doc. 121. 83 
 
 upon condition that France or England would give some guarantee 
 connected with the islands of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines. 
 Having received information, from sources that I could rely on, that 
 propositions from the government of Madrid had actually been made 
 for a loan of six millions of pounds sterling, and that agents had been 
 sent to Paris and London for the purpose of consummating the loan 
 and negotiating with the two governments on the subject of the guaran- 
 tee, I deemed it my duty to take an early opportunity of having an in- 
 formal conversation with Lord Palmerston, and accordingly, last week, 
 asked an interview for that purpose, the result of which I now com- 
 municate. 
 
 I stated to Lord Palmerston that the object of my visit was to con- 
 verse with him, unofficially and confidentially, upon the subject of this 
 Spanish loan, and that I hoped, if he felt any delicacy on the subject, 
 he would frankly say so. His lordship at once said that there was not 
 the slightest objection to the course I proposed, and that he would hear 
 with pleasure anything I might be disposed to communicate. 
 
 I opened the subject by stating that I presumed he had seen the 
 publications with which the French and English papers had been filled, 
 on the subject of this loan. That I had good reason for believing that 
 propositions had been made, both to France and Great Britain, for the 
 purpose of some guarantee connected with the island of Cuba and 
 Porto Rico. That, in the absence of instructions from my government, 
 and ignorant of what his Majesty's government had done, or might be 
 disposed to do, in relation to the matter, I felt it to be my duty to take 
 the earliest opportunity of placing his lordship in possession of what I 
 knew to be the views of my government, on the subject of these islands, 
 and of reminding him of the course it had heretofore felt itself justified 
 in taking in relation to the subject. I proceeded to give a brief expla- 
 nation of the geographical relation of these islands to the United 
 States, and the consequences that would be likely to follow their sepa- 
 ration from the dominion of Spain. That the possession of Cuba by 
 a great maritime power would be little else than the establishment of 
 a fortress at the mouth of the Mississippi, commanding both the Gulf 
 of Mexico and Florida, and, consequently, the whole trade of the 
 western States, besides deeply affecting the interests and tranquillity of 
 the southern portion of the Union. That, under such circumstances, 
 it was not to be expected (if the subject was even now for the first 
 time agitated) that the United States could remain indifferent to the 
 destiny of Cuba, or its separation from Spain. I remarked, however, 
 that the question was not a new one, and referred to the course of our 
 government, heretofore, on the subject. I reminded his lordship of the 
 declaration made by our minister to the French government, in the 
 year 1826, "that the United States could not see with indifference Porto 
 Rico and Cuba pass from Spain into the possession of any other power." 
 That France, at that time, so far from complaining of this course, as a 
 breach of neutral duty or interference with the concerns of other na- 
 tions, acquiesced in it. I referred, also, to the proceedings which took 
 place in Mexico, in 1825-6, between the agent of Great Britain and 
 the minister of the United States, in which he identified himself in the 
 3 
 
34 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 communications received and made on the appearance of a French 
 fleet in those seas. That these views of our government were made 
 known, at the time, to the Russian government, and, by it, to all the 
 courts of Europe. 
 
 Under such circumstances, I felt justified in saying frankly to hisv 
 lordship that it was impossible that the United Stales could acquiesce 
 in the transfer of Cuba from the dominion of Spain to any of the great mari- 
 time powers of Europe; that of the right of the United States to interfere 
 in relation to these islands I presumed there could be little doubt ; that 
 whilst the general rule of international law which forbids the interference 
 of one State in the affairs of another was freely admitted, there were 
 yet exceptions to the rule, in relation to the laws of defence and self-preserva- 
 tion, which all nations acknowledged, and that the present was precisely 
 such a case ; that in this view, and with a sincere desire to guard against 
 possible difficulties, I deemed it proper to say what I had, and hoped 
 his lordship would receive it in the spirit in which it was offered. 
 
 Lord Palmerston in reply said very little. He assured me that he 
 understood and appreciated the motives which had produced the inter- 
 view. He said that the government of Spain was no doubt desirous to 
 terminate their civil wars, and he seemed to think that it could only be 
 done by a large loan of money; that efforts had been made for that 
 purpose in the manner supposed, but on what terms the loan had been pro- 
 posed, or whether they had been successful or not, he did not say, nor did I 
 think it proper to inquire. His lordship admitted that propositions had 
 been made to Great Britain on the subject of the loan, (the nature of 
 which he did not state,) but he said that they had been declined by his 
 Majesty's government. He remarked, however, at the same time, that 
 the consent of Parliament was necessary to the fulfilment of any pledge 
 of the character supposed, and that, under the present state of things, 
 there would be very little probability of any such consent being given. 
 This remark was made in a way that left me at liberty to draw my own 
 conclusions as to what the government here might have been disposed 
 to do, if the consent of Parliament could have been obtained. It is 
 proper, also, that I should state, that having expressed in the course of 
 conversation my impression that the course and policy of France could 
 not, I thought, be mistaken, and that I had reason to believe that she 
 would not for a moment listen to the application which had been made : 
 to her on the subject, Lord Palmerston remarked that considerations of 
 that nature could not be permitted to influence the conduct of Great 
 Britain; that in deciding all such questions, his Majesty's government 
 could not listen to the opinions and views of any foreign government, 
 but must decide for itself. 
 
 This remark was made by his lordship in good temper, but its tend- 
 ency was too obvious to be mistaken. I replied to it, by stating that 
 my remark, to which his was an answer, was entirely incidental, and 
 merely intended to show that the opinions of France in relation to Cuba 
 had undergone no change since the year 1825-6, but were in accord 
 with those of the United States. To this Lord Palmerston said nothing. 
 
 As there seemed to be no desire on the part of his lordship to continue 
 the conversation, and having accomplished what I had intended, I for- 
 bore to press the subject, and the interview closed. 
 
H. Doc. 121. 35 
 
 It is proper, however, to state, that the language and manner of Lord 
 Palmerston were in the highest degree conciliatory, though evidently 
 more marked than usual. 
 
 You will see that I took care to guard against misconstruction or com- 
 mitment of our government, by expressly stating at the outset that I was 
 neither instructed or authorized to say anything on the subject, but was 
 acting solely on my own responsibility. 1 need not say that I shall feel 
 gratified if the course which I have taken shall meet the approbation of 
 the President. 
 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 A. STEVENSON. 
 
 John Forsyth, Esq., 
 
 Secretary of State, Washington. 
 
 John H. Eaton to the Secretary of State. 
 [Extract.] 
 
 United States Legation, Madrid, 
 
 August 10, 1837. 
 
 Sir: * * '* * Many rumors have spread concerning 
 a commercial treaty between England and Spain, a lien obtained upon 
 Cuba, &c, &c. " Nothing of this sort can now be done but with the as- 
 sent of the Cortes. The elections are in progress, and the two Chambers 
 of Spain, for the first time, will assemble in November. Should any 
 treaty be made, before these assembled bodies it will come up for con- 
 sideration and approval. 
 
 The English minister at this court, Mr. Villiers, is a frank, urbane, 
 and qualified man for his position. With his business I, of course, can 
 have nothing to do; but in conversation, merely, I have taken occasion 
 to express a hope that his government would not attempt to obtain the 
 possession of Cuba; and not for the reason that the United States desired 
 or wished it as an appendage of their territory, but because I felt satis- 
 fied that it would occasion war between the two countries. His reply 
 was, "England does not desire its possession." In a former letter, I 
 suggested the propriety of our government making some official com- 
 munication upon this important subject through our minister at London, 
 whereby the British government might be estopped to say, in the future, 
 that in acquiring Cuba she had not anticipated any objections from us. 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 JNO. H. EATON. 
 
 Jno. Forsyth, Esq., $fc, §'c. 
 
 Mr. Forsyth to Mr. Vail. 
 [Extract] 
 
 Department of State, 
 
 Washington, July 15, 1840. 
 
 The United States have long looked with no slight degree of solici- 
 tude to the political condition of the island of Cuba. Its proximity to our 
 
36 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 shores, the extent of its commerce with us, and the similarity of its do- 
 mestic institutions with those prevailing in portions of our own country, 
 combine to forbid that we should look with indifference upon any oc- 
 currences connected with the fate of that island. The Spanish govern- 
 ment has often been apprized of the wishes of the United States that 
 no other than Spanish domination should be exercised over it, and 
 scarcely need be told that our policy in that respect has under- 
 gone no change. For fear, however, that the subject should be lost 
 sight of in the frequent changes or modifications of the Spanish cabinet, 
 it is important that you do not allow any person who may be called to 
 a share in the councils of the Spanish government to be ignorant or for- 
 getful of our views : these continue what they have always been, and 
 such as you will find them fully stated in the correspondence and 
 archives of the legation. There are, however, considerations which, 
 in addition, will claim your attention; it is surmised, and by many be- 
 lieved, that Great Britain has designs upon the island. If such be the case, 
 pretexts will not be wanting for measures calculated to open the way to 
 the realization of such designs. Spanish liabilities are to a great extent 
 held by British subjects, and their government have, it is believed, claims 
 upon that of Spain. As a guarantee for both, the resources of Cuba afford 
 a tempting prize, towards which British views have several times been 
 directed. Let such a guarantee be once given, and its realization or en- 
 forcement might lead to a military occupation at some point of the 
 island. Again, Spain and England are by treaty bound to certain pro- 
 ceedings for the suppression of the African slave trade, and a mixed 
 commission sits at Havana to enforce sundry stipulations in the treaty. 
 The practical operation of the system is known to be nearly nugatory; 
 for, whether with or without the connivance or knowledge of the British 
 commissioners, the fact that the slave trade is carried on in Cuba to a 
 great extent, in violation of the Anglo-Spanish alliance to prevent it, is 
 notorious and undisguised. England may think herself to have, under 
 the treaty, a right to call upon Spain for a faithful and efficient per- 
 formance of the obligations contracted under it; and in case of an 
 avowal by Spain of her inability to comply, it might be apprehended 
 that England would enforce compliance by means which would event- 
 ually affect the territorial rights of her ally to the island of Cuba, or 
 undertake to perform her obligations under the treaty on receiving 
 guarantees or equivalents calculated to lead to an increase of her influ- 
 ence and power in that quarter. Whether attempted to be brought 
 about b} T one or the other of the means alluded to, or by any other process, 
 the United States can never permit it. The Spanish government is to 
 bear in mind this fixed resolution on our part, and be given to under- 
 stand that it is taken upon long and mature deliberation, and at all costs, 
 to govern the conduct of the United States. You will understand the 
 tact and delicacy which are to regulate the communications you may 
 have to make to the Spanish government on this subject: they are not to 
 be volunteered, nor made in writing, unless in case of necessity, but in 
 informal and confidential conversations with the members of the gov- 
 ernment you are to endeavor fully to acquaint them with our views. 
 Should you have reason to suspect any design on the part of Spain to 
 transfer voluntarily her title to the island, whether of ownership or 
 
H. Doc. 121. 37 
 
 possession, and whether permanent or temporary, to Great Britain or 
 any other power, you will distinctly state that the United States will 
 prevent it at all hazards, as they will any foreign military occupation 
 for any pretext whatsoever. And you are authorized to assure the 
 Spanish government, that in case of any attempt, from whatever quar- 
 ter, to wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may securely 
 depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States 
 to aid her in preserving or recovering it. It is believed that the 
 means of preventing such an attempt, or of disconcerting all designs 
 that may lead to it, lie within the reach of the Spanish government : 
 the readiest which occur to us is to deprive England of all real motive, 
 and even of the remotest pretence, for interference on her part in the 
 affairs of Cuba, by a scrupulous performance of all the obligations 
 Spain may have contracted towards her, either of a pecuniary charac- 
 ter, or as connected with the existing agreements between the two 
 nations in relation to the slave trade. No proper opportunity of which 
 you can avail yourself, without incurring the risk of being thought offi- 
 cious, should be allowed to escape you, to let the Spanish government 
 be fully informed of the views we entertain with regard to the island, 
 as set forth in these instructions, and in the others on file in the lega- 
 tion. And you will hold yourself in readiness, should the occasion arise 
 formally to protest, in the name of your government, against any act, 
 whether of Spain herself or of any other power, likely to lead to a trans- 
 fer, of "her territorial right to the island of Cuba, or to the military occu- 
 pation of it by the forces of any other nation. 
 
 Mr. Webster to Mr. Irving. 
 
 [Extract.] 
 
 Department of State, 
 
 Washington, January 17, 1843. 
 
 I have the honor to transmit a cop} r of a private and confidential let- 
 ter addressed by this department, on the 14th instant, to Mr. Robert B. 
 Campbell, consul of the United States at Havana. It was drawn forth 
 by information recently communicated to the department from a source 
 so reputable that it could not fail to awaken some concern. The archives 
 of your legation will show you that the subject of supposed designs upon 
 the island of Cuba by the British government is by no means new, and 
 you will also find that the apprehension of such a project has not been 
 unattended to by the Spanish government. It was, accordingly, in view 
 of what had already passed, and what had recently transpired, calculated 
 to excite anxiety on the part of this government, in regard to its relations 
 w r ith what is to us the most interesting portion of the Spanish empire, 
 that it was thought expedient to give your predecessor special directions 
 about it, which you will see in the instructions to him from this depart- 
 ment, dated on the loth July, 1840, and numbered 2. To these in- 
 structions you are now particularly referred, as well as to a confidential 
 despatch from Mr. Vail (numbered 10,) of the 15th January, 1841, de- 
 tailing what passed in a conference with M. De Ferrers, at that time 
 
38 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs at Madrid, from which you will learn the views 
 and the ground taken by this government, which it never can relinquish. 
 From the perusal of these documents, you will at once perceive the ne- 
 cessity or propriety of carefully reviewing those instructions, and acting 
 Upon them in the mode that you may conceive most judicious for the 
 purpose of again pointing the attention of the Spanish government to the 
 alleged precariousness of the tenure by which Spain is supposed to hold 
 her possessions in this quarter, and to obtain for your government the 
 best intelligence which is in any way connected with the subject. 
 
 Whether recent reports are, or are not, unfounded or exaggerated, 
 it is nevertheless highly desirable that you should sound the government 
 of Spain, in order that the United States may know its sentiments and 
 purposes with the same certainty and distinctness, that those of the 
 United States have been so unreservedly and so repeatedly made known 
 to it. 
 
 A copy of my letter to the consul has just been placed by me in the 
 hands of the Chevalier D'Argaiz, minister of Spain, in Washington. 
 
 [Private and confidential] 
 
 Department of State, 
 
 Washington, January 14, 1S43. 
 
 Sir: A communication, from' a highly respectable source, has just 
 been received at this department, which purports to contain information 
 of so serious a nature, in regard to the present condition of the island of 
 Cuba, that the President has come to the conclusion that it is expedient 
 to lose no time in ascertaining, if practicable, how far the real facts of 
 the case may correspond with the representations. The name of the 
 individual from whom these accounts have come is, for good reasons,, 
 withheld. It is sufficient to say that they come from the island, and 
 have been transmitted from thence by a person of high standing, whose 
 statements, as we are told by those who know the source, are believed 
 to be entitled to as much consideration as those of any individual in 
 Cuba. Acting under this belief, and influenced by the consideration 
 that this government has frequently received intimations from various; 
 quarters in regard to Cuba, which give a color of probability to the 
 statements which have thus been recently received, the President has 
 instructed me to make this communication to you, to call your attention 
 to the matter, and to desire you to transmit all the information you pos- 
 sess, or can obtain, in regard to it. 
 
 The necessity of absolute secrecy in everything that relates to the 
 inquiries you are directed to make, and in the transmission of their re- 
 sult to your government, has obliged us to send to Havana a special 
 messenger, who will take charge of, and deliver to you in person, this 
 letter, and who will be directed to remain with you for some short time 
 to afford you opportunity to prepare a reply, and to impart all the intel- 
 ligence which may be within your reach. 
 
 It is proper, however, to apprize you that it is highly desirable that 
 there should be as little detention as possible, as the President is ex- 
 
H. Doc. 121. 39 
 
 •eeedingly anxious to be well informed upon the subject at the earliest 
 practicable moment. 
 
 The messenger is unacquainted with the contents of this letter, and 
 it is not necessary or desirable that the subject of this correspondence 
 ■should be in any way made known to him. The amount of the in- 
 formation which has been received is this : the writer represents him- 
 self as bound in honor not to reveal what he has made known to his 
 correspondent in the United States, to the local authorities of Cuba, for 
 reasons which can only be guessed at. 
 
 His statements, confirmed as they appear to be in some particulars 
 by various recent occurrences of a public character, with which you 
 cannot but be familiar, are considered as entitled at least to serious at- 
 tention, and to call for immediate examination and inquiry. 
 
 It is represented that the situation of Cuba is at this moment in the 
 highest degree dangeous and critical, and that Great Britain has re- 
 solved upon its ruin ; that Spain does not, or will not, see this intention, 
 and that the authorities of the island are utterly incompetent to meet the 
 crisis; that although, according to the treaty of 1817, the slave-trade 
 ought not to have been carried on by any subject of Spain, it has, 
 nevertheless, been continued in full vigor up to the year 1841, not- 
 withstanding the incessant remonstrances of the British government, 
 "which was better informed, it is said, from month to month, of every- 
 thing that took place in the island, than the Captain General himself. 
 It is alleged that the British ministry and abolition societies, finding 
 themselves foiled or eluded by the colonial and the home govern- 
 ments, have therefore resolved, not, perhaps, without secretly congratu- 
 lating themselves upon the obstinacy of Spain, upon accomplishing their 
 object in a different method by the total and immediate ruin of the I 
 island. Their agents are said to be now there in great numbers, offer- ! 
 ing independence to the Creoles, on condition that they will unite with J 
 the colored people in effecting a general emancipation of the slaves, and 
 in converting the government into a block military republic, under British 
 protection. The British abolitionists reckon on the naval force of their 
 government stationed at Jamaica and elsewhere, and are said to have 
 offered two large steamships-of-war, and to have proposed to the Vene- 
 zuelian general, Marino, who resides at Kingston, Jamaica, to take 
 the command of an invading army. This is to be seconded, as is sug- 
 gested, by an insurrection of the slaves and free men of color, supported 
 by the white Creoles. 
 
 If this scheme should succeed, the influence of Britain in this quarter, 
 it is remarked, will be unlimited. With 600,000 blacks in Cuba, and 
 800,000 in her West India islands, she. will, it is said, strike a death- 
 blow at the existence of slavery in the United States. Intrenched at 
 Havana and San Antonio, ports as impregnable as the rock of Gibraltar, 
 she will be able to close the two entrances to the Gulf of Mexico, and 
 even to prevent the free passage of the commerce of the United States 
 over the Bahama banks, and through the Florida channel. 
 
 The local authorities are believed not to be entirely ignorant of the* 
 perils which environ them, but are regarded as so torpid as not to be 
 competent to understand the extent and imminency of those perils, nor 
 the policy by which Great Britain is guided. 
 
40 H. Doc. 121 
 
 The wealthy planters are described as equally blind to the great 
 danger in which they stand of losing their property. They go on, it is 
 said, as usual, buying negroes, clamoring for the continuation of the 
 trade, and denouncing as seditious persons, and friends of Great Bri- 
 tain, the few who resist the importation of slaves, and encourage the 
 immigration of free whites. 
 
 The writer points to the census of the population of the island, 
 taken by authority, and just published, of which he encloses a copy; 
 and from the proportion between the different colors, he infers the pro- 
 bability that the white Creoles will be able to preserve their rights in 
 the future Ethiopico Cuban Republic; and as to the Spaniards, he pre- 
 sumes that they will leave the island at once. The writer very natu- 
 rally supposes that the United States must feel a deep solicitude upon 
 a subject which so nearly concerns their own interests and tranquillity. 
 He seems anxious that public opinion in this country should be formed 
 upon it and properly directed, and does not hesitate to express 
 the opinion that the mass of the white population of Ctiba, in easy circum- 
 stances, including the Spaniards, prefer, and will always prefer, the flag of 
 the United States to that of England. 
 
 In thus communicating to you the substance of the statements of this 
 writer, you will distinctly understand that your government neither 
 adopts nor rejects his speculations. It is with his statement of sup- 
 posed facts that it concerns itself; and it is expected that you will ex- 
 amine and report upon them, with scrupulous care, and with as much 
 promptness as strict secrecy and discretion will permit ; and the whole 
 of the statements is now imparted to you, not to limit, but to guide and 
 direct the inquiries you are called upon to make in so delicate a matter. 
 It is quite obvious that any attempt on the part of England to em- 
 ploy force in Cuba, for any purpose, would bring on a war, involving, 
 possibly, all Europe, as well as the United States; and as she can 
 hardly fail to see this, and probably does not desire it, there may be 
 reason to doubt the accuracy of the information we have received, to 
 the extent to which it proceeds. But many causes of excitement and 
 alarm exist, and the great magnitude of the subject makes it the duty 
 of the government of the United States to disregard no intimations of 
 such intended proceedings, which bear the least aspect of probability. 
 
 The Spanish government has long been in possession of the policy 
 and wishes of this government in regard to Cuba, which have never 
 changed, and has been repeatedly told that the United States never 
 would permit the occupation of that island by British agents or forces 
 upon any pretext whatsoever; and that in the event of any attempt to 
 wrest it from her, she might securely rely upon the whole naval and 
 military resources of this country, to aid her in preserving or recover- 
 ing it. 
 
 A copy of this letter will be immediately transmitted to the Ameri- 
 can minister at Madrid, that he may make such use of the information 
 it contains as circumstances may appear to require. 
 
 I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 DANIEL WEBSTER. 
 
 Robert B. Campbell, Esq., 
 
 U. S. Consul at Havana. 
 
H. Doc. 121. 41 
 
 Mr. Webster to Mr. Irving. 
 [Extract.] 
 
 Department op State, 
 
 Washington, March 14, 1843. 
 
 A reply to the confidential letter from this department, of 11th Jan- 
 uar3 r , to the consul at Havana, a copy of which was sent to you in my 
 despatch No. 11, has been received. From the reply, it would seem 
 that as far as the consul knew or could obtain intelligence upon the sub- 
 ject from the authorities of the island and from other sources, the inform- 
 ation which has been received here is, as was supposed, greatly ex- 
 aggerated. Enough, however, of danger and alarms still exists in that 
 quarter to render caution and vigilance, on the part of this government, 
 indispensabry necessary. 
 
 Mr. Upshur to Mr. Irving. 
 
 [Extract.] 
 
 Department of State, 
 
 Washington, January 9, 1S44. 
 
 The delicate nature of our relations with Spain in regard to the 
 island of Cuba, taken in connexion with the supposed designs of another 
 power upon that territory, renders it necessary that this government 
 should exercise a sleepless vigilance in watching over the rights of Spain 
 in that quarter, in a matter that so nearly concerns her own interests 
 and security. You will, therefore, lose no time in endeavoring to as- 
 certain the present views and feelings of the Spanish government upon 
 this important point, and communicate to your own all the information 
 yon can obtain in regard to it. It is necessary that Spain should be 
 duly impressed with the importance of such a crisis as late events have 
 led this government to apprehend as altogether probable and near at 
 hand, and it is still more necessary that this government should be pre- 
 pared to act with a perfect understanding of the whole subject with 
 reference to its own safety and interests. In the event that Spain 
 shall so far yield to the pressure upon her as to concede to Great Brit- 
 ain any control over Cuba, the fact will necessarily have an important in- 
 fluence over the policy of this government. It is difficult to give you any 
 positive instructions upon this subject, and you are therefore left to your 
 own discretion as to what you shall say, and to whom. It may be ad- 
 visable to confer confidentially with some of the friends of the Chevalier 
 D'Argaiz, who are represented to have influence, and to whom, there- 
 fore, it may be politic to impart the feelings and wishes of this govern- 
 ment on the occasion. My only object is to obtain full and accurate 
 information in regard to every movement which England may make 
 with reference to Cuba, whether designed to obtain a transfer of that 
 island to herself, or to obtain a control over the policy of Spain in re- 
 gard to it, or to affect the institution of African slavery now existing 
 
42 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 there. The modes in which you may acquire this information are sub- 
 mitted to your discretion. 
 
 I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 A. P. UPSHUR. 
 
 Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Saunders. 
 [Extract.] 
 
 Department of State, 
 
 Washington, February 4, 1847. 
 
 The enclosed paper, marked "extract," is a copy of one received 
 from Mr. Yulee, Senator from Florida, who states certain particulars in 
 regard to the writer of the letter from which the "extract" is made, 
 showing that he has enjoyed very peculiar opportunities for becoming 
 well informed upon the subject. Mr. Yulee says, in conclusion, that he 
 is " of opinion that the information he gives is deserving the attention of 
 this government." It would seem scarcely within the bounds of possi- 
 bility, that any consideration which could possibly be offered by Spain 
 could operate as an effectual inducement with Great Britain to relin- 
 quish Gibraltar. A knowledge of the views of Mr. Yulee's correspondent, 
 even although they should be erroneous in this particular, may, how- 
 ever, prove useful to you. 
 
 I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 JAMES BUCHANAN. 
 
 Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Saunders. 
 [Extract.] 
 
 [No. 21.] Department of State, 
 
 Washington, June 17, 1848. 
 
 Sir : By direction of the President, I now call your attention to the 
 present condition and future prospects of Cuba. The fate of this island 
 must ever be deeply interesting to the people of the United States. We 
 are content that it shall continue to be a colony of Spain. Whilst in 
 her possession we have nothing to apprehend. Besides, we are bound 
 to her by the ties of ancient friendship, and we sincerely desire to ren- 
 der these perpetual. 
 
 But we can never consent that this island shall become a colony of 
 any other European power. In the possession of Great Britain, or any 
 strong naval power, it might prove ruinous both to our domestic and 
 foreign commerce, and even endanger the union of the States. The 
 highest and first duty of every independent nation is to provide for its 
 own safety; and, acting upon this principle, we should be compelled to 
 resist the acquisition of Cuba by any powerful maritime State, with all 
 the means which Providence has placed at our command. 
 
H. Doc. 121. 43 
 
 Cuba is almost within sight of the coast of Florida, situated between 
 that State and the peninsula of Yucatan, and possessing the deep, ca- 
 pacious and impregnably fortified harbor of the Havana. If this island, 
 were under the dominion of Great Britain, she could command both the 
 inlets to the Gulf of Mexico. She would thus be enabled, in time of 
 war, effectively to blockade the mouth of the Mississippi, and to deprive 
 all the western States of this Union, as well as those within the gulf, 
 teeming as they are with an industrious and enterprising population, of 
 a foreign market for their immense productions. But this is not the 
 worst : she could also destroy the commerce by sea between our ports 
 on the gulf and our Atlantic ports, a commerce of nearly as great a 
 value as the whole of our foreign trade. Is there any reason to believe 
 that Great Britain desires to acquire the island of Cuba? We know 
 that it has been her uniform policy, throughout her past history, to seize 
 upon every valuable commercial point throughout the world, whenever 
 circumstances have placed this in her power. And what point so 
 valuable as the island of Cuba? 
 
 The United States are the chief commercial rival of Great Britain ; 
 our tonnage at the present moment is nearly equal to hers, and it will 
 be greater, within a brief period, if nothing should occur to arrest our 
 progress. Of what vast importance would it, then, be to her to obtain 
 the possession of an island from which she could at any time destroy 
 a very large portion both of our foreign and coasting trade ? Besides, 
 she well knows that if Cuba were in our possession, her West India 
 islands would be rendered comparatively valueless. From the extent 
 and fertility of this island, and from the energy and industry of our 
 people, we should soon be able to supply the markets of the world 
 with tropical productions, at a cheaper rate than these could be raised 
 in any of her possessions. 
 
 But let me present another view of the subject. If Cuba were an- 
 nexed to the United States, we should not only be relieved from the 
 apprehensions which we can never cease to feel for our own safety and 
 the security of our commerce, whilst it shall remain in its present con- 
 dition, but human foresight cannot anticipate the beneficial conse- 
 quences which would result to every portion of our Union. 
 
 This can never become a local question. With suitable fortifications \ 
 at the Tortugas, and in possession of the strongly fortified harbor of 
 Havana as a, naval station on the opposite coast of Cuba, we could 
 command the outlet of the Gulf of Mexico, between the peninsula of 
 Florida and that island. This would afford ample security both to 
 the foreign and coasting trade of the western and southern States, f 
 which seek a market for their surplus productions through the ports on \ 
 the gulf. 
 
 2. Under the government of the United States, Cuba would become 
 the richest and most fertile island, of the same extent, throughout the 
 world. According to McGregor's Commercial Regulations and his 
 Commercial Statistics, "in 1830, of the 408,523 caballerias of thirty- 
 two English acres of land, which. compose the. whole territory, 3S,276 
 were under sugar, coffee, tobacco, garden and fruit cultivation, and 
 9,734 in grazing grounds and in unfelled woods, belonging to sugar 
 
44 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 and coffee estates." It thus appears that in 1830 less than one-twelfth 
 of the whole island was under cultivation. The same author says: 
 "We have no accounts of the present extent of cultivation in Cuba ; 
 but by comparing the value of exportable produce of 1830 with that 
 of 1842, and by various estimates, we consider it probable that the 
 lands under sugar, coffee, tobacco and gardens, may fairly be esti- 
 mated at 54,000 caballeras, or 1,728,000 acres." According to this 
 estimate, between one-eighth and one-ninth, only, of the whole island, 
 was under cultivation in 1842. The author proceeds: "If we com- 
 pare this extent with the remaining vast area of the fertile soils ot 
 Cuba which are still uncultivated, and the produce which the whole 
 island at present yields, it can scarcely be an exaggeration to say that 
 Europe might draw as much coffee and sugar from Cuba alone as the 
 quantity already consumed." Mr. McGregor states the aggregate popu- 
 lation of Cuba in the year 1841 to have been only 1,007,624 ; but from 
 the data which have just been presented, it may fairly be inferred that 
 the island is capable of sustaining in comfort a population of ten mil- 
 lions of inhabitants. Were Cuba a portion of the United States, it 
 would be difficult to estimate the amount of breadstuff's, rice, cotton, 
 and other agricultural as well as manufacturing and mechanical pro- 
 ductions ; of lumber, of the produce of our fisheries, and of other ar- 
 ticles which would find a market in that island, in exchange for their 
 coffee, sugar, tobacco, and other productions. This would go on in- 
 creasing with the increase of its population and the development of its 
 resources, and all portions of the Union would be benefited by the 
 trade. 
 
 Desirable, however, as the possession of this island may be to the 
 United States, we would not acquire it except by the free will of Spain. 
 Any acquisition not sanctioned by justice and honor, would be too 
 dearly purchased. While such is the determination of the President, 
 it is supposed that the present relations between Cuba and Spain might 
 incline the Spanish government to cede the island to the United States, 
 upon the payment of a fair and full consideration. We have received in- 
 formation from various sources, both official and unofficial, that among the 
 Creoles of Cuba there has long existed a deep-rooted hostility to Spanish 
 dominion. The revolutions which are rapidly succeeding each other 
 throughout the world, have inspired the Cubans with an ardent and 
 irrepressible desire to achieve their independence. Indeed, we are in- 
 formed by the consul of the United States at the Havana, that "there 
 appears every probability that the island will soon be in a state of civil 
 war." He also states that "efforts are now being made to raise money 
 for that purpose in the United States, and there will be attempts to in- 
 duce a few of the volunteer regiments now in Mexico to obtain their 
 discharge and join in the revolution." 
 
 I need scarcely inform you that the government of the United States 
 has had no agency whatever in exciting the spirit of disaffection among 
 the Cubans. Very far from it. A short time after we received this 
 information from our consul, I addressed a despatch to him, of which I 
 transmit you a copy, dated on the 9th instant, from which you will per- 
 ceive that I have warned him to keep a watchful guard both upon his 
 words and actions, so as to avoid even the least suspicion that he had 
 
H. Doc. 121. 45 
 
 encouraged the Cubans to rise in insurrection against the Spanish gov- 
 ernment. I stated also that the relations between Spain and the Uni- 
 ted States had long been of the most friendly character, and both 
 honor and duty required that we should take no part in the struggle 
 which he seemed to think was impending. I informed him that it 
 would certainly become the duty of this government to use all proper 
 means to prevent any of our volunteer regiments now in Mexico from 
 violating the neutrality of the country by joining in the proposed civil 
 war of the Cubans against Spain. Since the date of my despatch to 
 him, this duty has been performed. The Secretary of War, by com- 
 mand of the President, on the day following, (June 10,) addressed an 
 order to our commanding general in Mexico, and also to the officer 
 having charge of the embarcation of our troops at Vera Cruz, (of which 
 I transmit you a copy,) directing each of them to use all proper meas- 
 ures to counteract any such plan if one should be on foot, and instruct- 
 ing them "to give orders that the transports on which the troops may 
 embark proceed directly to the United States, and in no event to touch 
 at any place in Cuba." The consul, in his despatch to me, also stated 
 that, if the revolution is attempted and succeeds, immediate applica- 
 tion, would be made to the United States for annexation ; but he did not 
 seem to think that it would be successful, and probably would not be 
 undertaken without the aid of American troops. To this portion of the 
 despatch I replied — knowing the ardent desire of the Cubans to be an- 
 nexed to our Union — that I thought it would not be " difficult to predict 
 that an unsuccessful rising would delay, it it should not defeat, the an- 
 nexation of the island to the United States," and I assured him that the 
 aid of our volunteer troops could not be obtained. 
 
 Thus you will perceive with what scrupulous fidelity we have per- 
 formed the duties of neutrality and friendship towards Spain. It is our 
 anxious hope that a rising may not be attempted in Cuba ; but if this 
 should unfortunately occur, the government of the United States will 
 have performed their whole duty towards a friendly power. 
 
 Should the government of Spain feel disposed to part with the island 
 of Cuba, the question, what should we offer for it? would then arise. 
 In deciding this question, it will be important to ascertain, 1st. What 
 net revenue it yields at the present moment to the royal treasury, after 
 deducting all the expenditure incurred on its account ; and, 2d. What 
 net revenue would it yield to the government of the United States in 
 its present condition ? 
 
 The firstinquiry I have no means of answering with accuracy. McCul- 
 loch, in his Gazetteer, states "that the whole revenues of the island, at 
 an average of the five years ending with 1837, amounted to $8,945,581 
 per year ;" and it is stated in Hunt's Merchants' Magazine for October, 
 1845, that the revenue for the year 1844 amounted to $10,490,252 87£. 
 Since 1844 we have no information on the subject in the department, upon 
 which reliance can be placed. Mr. Calderou informs me that the 
 Spanish treasury at Madrid have never received from Cuba in any one 
 year a sum exceeding $2,000,000. In answer to an inquiry, how the 
 remainder of the revenue was expended, he stated that it was appropri- 
 ated to defray the expense of its colonial government, and to pay and 
 
46 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 support the troops and maintain the vessels of war necessary for its 
 defence and security. 
 
 It will occur to you that if Spain should cede Cuba to the United 
 States, she would at once relieve herself from a great part, if not the 
 whole of this civil, military and naval expenditure. In this view of 
 the subject, it would seem that the sum of $50,000,000 would be an 
 ample pecuniary indemnity to Spain for the loss of the island. 
 
 2d. What net revenue would it yield to the government of the Uni- 
 ted States at the present moment ? 
 
 In estimating the amount of this revenue, we must mainly rely upon 
 two sources — duties on imports, and the proceeds of the public lands. 
 
 Of the average revenue of $S, 945, 581 for the five years ending 
 with 1837, McCulloch states that "the maritime duties formed 61 
 per cent. ; the internal taxes 22f per cent. ; the ecclesiastical deductions 
 li per cent. ; the personal deductions 2| per cent. ; the miscellaneous 
 revenues 2£ per cent. ; and the casual revenues 10£ per cent. " Now 
 it is manifest that if Cuba were in the possession of the United States, 
 the people would be relieved from the greater part if not the whole e£ 
 these contributions, with the exception of the maritime duties. B 
 sides, a considerable proportion of these maritime duties are levied 
 upon exports which the constitution of the United States would forbid. 
 
 But the important inquiry on this branch of the subject is, what 
 amount of duties could we collect in the island? and this must depend 
 upon the amount of the imports. 
 
 This we can ascertain for many years up, till 1S44 inclusive, from 
 the tables published annually by the Intend en te of the island. The 
 following tabular statement, extracted from Hunt's Magazine, is doubt- 
 less correct: 
 
 Years. Imports. Experts. 
 
 1S40 . ...$24,700,189 31|......:. $25,941,783 3' 
 
 1841 25,081,408 50 .26,774,614 5 
 
 1842.. . . 24,637,527 25 . s .26,684,701 
 
 1843 23,422,096 43f 25,029,792 ( £ 
 
 1844 25,056,231 06£ 25,426,591 if 
 
 Admitting that these imports have increased to $26,000,000 sii & 
 1844, and estimating the average rate of our duties under the existiii 
 tariff at 25 per cent., which the Secretary of the Treasury informs m*. 
 is correct within a small fraction, the revenue from imports would 
 amount to $6,500,000 ; but, from this sum must be deducted that por- 
 tion of it which arises from productions of the United States imported 
 into Cuba. The total value of these during the year ending the 30th 
 June, 1846, according to the books of our custom-house, was $4,713- 
 966. Estimating for their increased value at the custom-houses in 
 Cuba, in consequence of freight and other charges, it would approxi- 
 mate the truth to state that one-fiflh of the imports into Cuba consists 
 of American productions. Then, in order to show what revenue we 
 would derive from imports into Cuba, we must deduct one-fifth from 
 $6,500,000, and the balance remaining, $5,200,000, would be the 
 amount. 
 
 It may be remarked, however, that our acquisition of the island 
 
H. Doc. 121. 47 
 
 would doubtless considerably increase the annual military and naval 
 expenditures of the United States. But these calculations all refer to 
 Cuba in its present condition. Were it a possession of the United 
 States, its population and industry, and consequently its exports, would 
 rapidly increase, and produce proportionally increased imports. In- 
 deed, it is highly probable that during the very first year the duties 
 would amount to a sum not less than $6,000,000. 
 
 In regard to the quantity of public lands still remaining in Cuba the 
 department does not possess accurate information. From all that we 
 have learned, it is believed that the crown of Spain has already granted 
 by far the greater portion of the whole territory of the island to indi- 
 viduals. We need not, therefore, calculate upon deriving much revenue 
 from this source. Upon the whole, the President would not hesitate to 
 
 stipulate for the payment of — , in convenient instalments, for a 
 
 cession of the island of Cuba, if it could not be procured for a less 
 sum. 
 
 The apprehensions which existed for many years after the origin of 
 this government, that the extension of our federal system would endanger 
 the Union, seem to have passed away. Experience has proved that 
 this system of confederated republics, under which the federal govern- 
 ment has charge of interests common to the whole, whilst local govern- 
 ments watch over the concerns of the respective States, is capable of 
 almost indefinite extension, with increasing strength. This, however, 
 is always subject to the qualification that the mass of the population 
 must be of our own race, or must have been educated in the school of 
 civil and religious liberty. With this qualification, the more we increase 
 the number of confederated States, the greater will be the strength and 
 security of the Union, because the more dependent for their mutual 
 interests will the several parts be upon the whole, and the whole upon 
 the several parts. It is true that of the 418,291 white inhabitants which 
 Cuba contained in 1841, a very large proportion is of the Spanish race: 
 still, many of our citizens have settled on the island, and some of them 
 are large holders of property. Under our government it would speedily 
 be Americanized, as Louisiana has been. Within the boundaries of such 
 a federal system alone can a trade exempt from duties and absolutely 
 free be enjoyed. With the possession of Cuba we should have through- 
 out the Union a free trade on a more extended scale than any which 
 the world has ever witnessed, arousing an energy and activity of com- 
 petition which would result in a most rapid improvement in all that 
 contributes to the welfare and happiness of the human race. What 
 State would forego the advantages of this vast free trade with all her 
 sisters, and place herself in lonely isolation? But the acquisition of 
 Cuba would greatly strengthen our bond of union. Its possession 
 would secure to all the States within the valley of the Mississippi and 
 Gulf of Mexico free access to the ocean; but this security could 
 only be preserved whilst the ship-building and navigating States of the 
 Atlantic shall furnish a navy sufficient to keep open the outlets from the 
 gulf to the ocean. Cuba, justly appreciating the advantages of annex- 
 ation, is now ready to rush into our arms. Once admitted, she would 
 be entirely dependent for her prosperity, and even existence, upon her 
 connexion with the Union, whilst the rapidly increasing trade between 
 
48 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 her and the other States would shed its blessings and its benefits over 
 the whole. Such a state of mutual dependence, resulting from the 
 very nature of things, the world has never witnessed. This is what 
 will insure the perpetuity of our Union. 
 
 With all these considerations in view, the President believes that the 
 crisis has arrived when an effort should be made to purchase the island 
 of Cuba from Spain, and he has determined to intrust you with the 
 performance of this most delicate and important duty. The attempt 
 should be made, in the first instance, in a confidential conversation with 
 the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs; a written offer might produce 
 an absolute refusal in writing, which would embarrass us hereafter in 
 the acquisition of the island. Besides, from the incessant changes in 
 the Spanish cabinet and policy, our desire to make the purchase might 
 thus be made known in an official form to foreign governments, and 
 arouse their jealousy and active opposition. Indeed, even if the present 
 cabinet should think favorably of the proposition, they might be greatly 
 embarrassed by having it placed on record ; for in that event it would 
 almost certainly, through some channel, reach the opposition and be- 
 come the subject of discussion in the Cortes. Such delicate negotia- 
 tions, at least in their incipient stages, ought always to be conducted in 
 confidential conversation, and with the utmost secrecy and despatch. 
 
 At your interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs you might 
 introduce the subject by referring to the present distracted condition of 
 Cuba, and the danger which exists that the population will make an 
 attempt to accomplish a revolution. This must be well known to the 
 Spanish government. In order to convince him of the good faith and 
 friendship towards Spain with which this government has acted, you 
 might read to him the first part of my despatch to General Campbell, 
 and the order issued by the Secretary of War to the commanding gen- 
 eral in Mexico and to the officer having charge of the embarcation of 
 our troops at Vera Cruz. You may then touch delicately upon the 
 danger that Spain may lose Cuba by a revolution in the island, or that 
 it may be wrested from her by Great Britain, should a rupture take 
 place between the two countries arising out of the dismissal of Sir 
 Henry Bulwer, and be retained to pay the Spanish debt due to the Brit- 
 ish bond-holders. You might assure him that, whilst this government is 
 entirely satisfied that Cuba shall remain under the dominion of Spain, 
 we should in any event resist its acquisition by any other nation. And 
 finally, you might inform him that, under all these circumstances, the 
 President had arrived at the conclusion that Spain might be willing to 
 transfer the island to the United States for a fair and full consideration. 
 You might cite as a precedent the cession of Louisiana to this country 
 by Napoleon, under somewhat similar circumstances, when he was at 
 the zenith of his power and glory. I have merely presented these 
 topics in their natural order, and you can fill up the outline from the 
 information communicated in this despatch, as well as from your own 
 knowledge of the subject. Should the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 lend a favorable ear to your proposition, then the question of the con- 
 sideration to be paid would arise, and you have been furnished with 
 information in this despatch which will enable you to discuss that ques- 
 tion. In justice to Mr. Calder^n I ought here to observe, that whilst 
 
H. Doc. 121. 49 
 
 giving me the information before stated, in regard to the net amount of 
 revenue from Cuba which reached Old Spain, he had not then, and has 
 not now, the most remote idea of our intention to make an attempt to 
 purchase the island. 
 
 The President would be willing to stipulate for the payment of one 
 hundred millions of dollars. This, however, is the maximum price ; 
 and if Spain should be willing to sell, you will use your best efforts to 
 purchase it at a rate as much below that sum as practicable. In case 
 you should be able to conclude a treaty, you may adopt as your model, 
 so far as the same may be applicable, the two conventions of April 30, 
 1803, between France and the United States, for the sale and purchase 
 of Louisiana. The seventh and eighth articles of the first of these 
 conventions ought, if possible, to be omitted ; still, if this should be 
 indispensable to the accomplishment of the object, articles similar to 
 them may be retained. 
 
 I transmit yoii a full power to conclude such a treaty. 
 
 You will be careful to make a full and faithful report to this depart- 
 ment of all the conversations and proceedings on this subject between 
 yourself and the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs. Should you 
 succeed in accomplishing the object, you will associate your name with 
 a most important and beneficial measure for the glory and prosperity 
 of your country. _ 
 
 Yours, very respectfully, 
 
 JAMES BUCHANAN. 
 
 Romulus M. Saunders, Esq. 
 
 P. S. — You will send your despatches on the subject of this despatch 
 by a special messenger to our consul at Liverpool, and draw upon the 
 department for the expense, unless you can transmit them by a trusty 
 person. They may be directed to the President. You may probably 
 have occasion, in relation to this subject, to use the cipher of the lega- 
 tion. 
 
 [No. 22.] Department of State, 
 
 Washington, July ?, IMS. 
 
 Sir: With reference to the instructions to you of the ITJth, ultimo, 
 (No. 21)1 will thank you to substitute the following paragraph for that 
 beginning with the words, "In regard to the public lands of Cuba:" 
 
 In regard to the quantity of public lands still remaining in, Cuba, the 
 department does not possess accurate information. From all that we 
 have learned, it is believed that the Crown of Spain, has already granted 
 by far the greater portion of the whole territory of the island to individuals. 
 We need not, therefore, calculate upon deriving much. revenue from this, 
 source. 
 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,. 
 
 XAJVIES BUCHANAN. 
 
 Romulus M. Saunders, Esq. 
 4 
 
50 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 Mr. Sounders to Mr. Buchanan. 
 [Extracts.] 
 
 [No. 37.] La Granja, July 29, 1843. 
 
 Sir: I had the honor to receive, by the hands of Mr. Sawyer, on the 
 24th instant, despatch No. 21, enclosing copies of a letter from the de- 
 partment to Mr. Campbell, and of a confidential order from the Secretary 
 of War to Major General Butler, all relating to matters in Cuba, together 
 with a special commission from the President, authorizing me to enter 
 into negotiations for the cession of that island to the United States. 
 
 In acknowledging the receipt of these papers, I beg to express to the 
 President my deep obligations for this distinguished mark of confidence 
 in confiding to me so important and delicate a commission, and at the 
 same time to express to you my thanks for the very full and valuable 
 information you have given me in 3'our despatch. I shall not fail to avail 
 myself freely of its suggestions, facts and arguments, in any negotiation 
 I may have on the subject. 
 
 As I am directed to make a full and faithful report to the department 
 of everything which may transpire in connexion with the subject, I have 
 thought it advisable to avail myself of your directions to engage a special 
 messenger to carry this communication as far as Liverpool, and to make 
 it as full as I can at this time, so that, in any future despatch I may 
 refer to it in a way you will understand, without, at the same time, 
 risking anything by a miscarriage. 
 
 There are difficulties which surround the subject, which meet us at 
 the threshold, and which it is proper I should explain, that you may be 
 the better prepared to judge as to the course I may find it necessary to 
 pursue in the business. In the first place, I am not a little embarrassed 
 
 as to the person to whom I should first open the subject. 
 
 **#**##*# 
 
 I have also heard from another source, that the Duke of Sotomayor 
 was unfriendly to the United States. I have not myself discovered any 
 feeling of the kind. On the contrary, he always speaks with pride of 
 his grandfather, Governor McKean, and with respect of our country. 
 General Narvaez, the president of the council, is a bold, fearless man, 
 the soul of the cabinet. ***** Yet 
 
 he is difficult of approach, and might not like the responsibility of 
 having the .subject in the first instance broached to him. Another 
 difficulty, and, as I fear, an insurmountable one, is the influence of the 
 Queen Mother. She has great control over her daughter, and is feared 
 by the ministry, and I suspect would most decidedly object to the ces- 
 sion. She has considerable investments in C uba, from which she derives 
 great profits. 
 
 These investments are loudly complained of- 03^ the people of Ha- 
 vana, as interfering with their private matters, and such as the Queen 
 Mother should not intermeddle with — such as gaslight companies, and 
 other associations, in a small way. She could only be silenced by a 
 prospect of gain, or indemnity for her loss ; but at this stage of the 
 business, it is not necessary she should know anything about it, unless 
 
H. Doc. 121. 51 
 
 the minister should see fit to consult her. I have already intimated to the 
 Secretary of" Foreign Affairs 1x13^ wish to have a private interview with 
 him, and received an answer, through his secretary, that he was con- 
 fined to his chamber by a severe, attack of the gout, but would see me 
 so soon as he was able to attend to business. Whether I shall ask an 
 audience of General Narvaez will depend on my meeting with a favor- 
 able opportunity for doing so. 
 
 At this stage of my report, I heard there was likely to be a change 
 in the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 I deemed it prudent to see General Narvaez, and ascertain the truth 
 of the rumor. He readily informed me the health, of the Duke of Soto- 
 mayor rendered it necessary for him to retire, and that Mr. Pidal would 
 take his place. I at once decided to ask a private interview of General 
 Narvaez, and to make to him my communication in regard to Cuba. 
 He, without hesitation, acceded to my request, if it should be my pleas- 
 ure to make any communication to him. 
 
 It was arranged I should call the next dav, when he would receive 
 me at an early hour. I accordingly called at the hour appointed, and 
 opened the conversation by stating the information which had been 
 given by Mr. Campbell relative to the threatened insurrection in the 
 Havana; your instructions to our consul as to the caution to be used 
 in his words and actions, to avoid even the suspicion of encouraging 
 the insurgents ; and the positive order of the Secretary of War to Major 
 General Butler to prevent any attempt on the part of the volunteers in 
 their return from Mexico from stopping at the Havana. He expressed 
 himself as thankful for the information; as entirely satisfied with the 
 conduct of our government; and requested me to express nuchas gra- 
 cias, many thanks, to the President for his course in the business. He 
 further said they had their difficulties to contend with, both in Cuba 
 and at home; but should always look with confidence to our great 
 country, from the friendly relations which had so long existed between 
 Spain and the United States. 
 
 He requested to be furnished with copies of your answer and of the 
 Secretary's order. I promised to give him a copy of the order to Gen- 
 eral Butler, and of so much of your letter as referred to the subject; 
 with the understanding that the information given by Mr. Campbell 
 was not to be used in any way to excite prejudices against him as our 
 consul. 
 
 I considered this a favorable moment to introduce the subject which 
 had been the peculiar object of my visit. I began by saying: "His 
 excellency would allow me to advert to another matter in regard to the 
 island of Cuba, which, though one of delicacy, was of great importance 
 to us, and I trusted he would receive my communication in the same 
 friendly spirit in which it was made." He replied it would afford him 
 much pleasure to hear anything I might have to say. I continued : 
 "His excellency was fully aware of the very deep interest which the 
 United States felt in everything connected with the present condition 
 and future prospects of Cuba; its position, its great importance to our 
 commerce, the condition of a portion of its population, were well calcu- 
 lated to increase the interest we felt in its fate." He expressed his full 
 assent to all of this. I said, "that whilst the President and our people 
 
52 H. Doc. 12L 
 
 were perfectly content that it should remain a colony of Spain, and did 
 not by any means desire to change that relation, several events had re- 
 cently taken place well calculated to excite our fears, and to create 
 some alarm on the subject. I should content myself by referring him 
 to a few of them. 
 
 " The recent revolution in France, and the order by its provisional 
 government for the immediate emancipation of the slaves in the French 
 islands, and the fatal consequences which had followed, had produced 
 great anxiety in the United States as to its effects on the Spanish islands. 
 He would doubtless recollect the speech of Lord George Bentick, at 
 the last session of Parliament, on the subject of the Spanish bond-hold- 
 ers, and of the reply of Lord Palmerston, asserting the right of the 
 British government to wage war against Spain for the recovery of these 
 debts whenever it might deem it expedient." His excellency very em- 
 phatically signified his recollection of these speeches. "These circum- 
 stances, in connexion with the recent suspension of all diplomatic inter- 
 course between the two governments, had added to the anxiety of the 
 United States as to the condition of Cuba. They had led the President 
 to believe the time had arrived when it was prudent for him to give to 
 the minister at this court authority to treat on the subject of Cuba, if it 
 should be the pleasure of Her Catholic Majesty to enter into such a ne- 
 gotiation. I had been honored by the President with a special com- 
 mission for this purpose ; a fact which I had been directed to commu- 
 nicate to the government of Her Majesty in confidence, and which, from 
 the respect I entertained towards his excellency, had induced me to 
 make it known to him." He said in reply, " That he received the in- 
 formation with much pleasure; that whilst he should consider it as 
 confidential, it might be best that the Minister of State should be made 
 acquainted with it; that he enjoyed his full confidence, and might be 
 implicitly confided in." I rejoined : "I did not doubt on that score; 
 but had thought, from the nature of the subject, as the Minister of State 
 was just about to enter upon the duties of his office, it was most proper 
 to make the communication to his excellency." 
 
 Here our conference ended. As you will see, I was somewhat 
 guarded in the latter part of my expressions, and that the minister was 
 not very explicit in his reply. He evidently was pleased with the 
 communication. He was not only courteous and respectful, but mani- 
 fested the greatest attention and interest during the whole of the con- 
 versation. I deemed it most prudent not to use the word "cession," 
 and am not exactly certain that he understood me as being authorized 
 to treat for the cession, or merely for the security of Cuba. At all 
 events, I did not think it politic, at this stage of the business, to be 
 more explicit, or to press the matter further. I have opened the sub- 
 ject, apprized him of my authority, and can hereafter advert to the 
 subject as circumstances may justify. I am well satisfied nothing will 
 induce the Spanish government to part with Cuba but the apprehension 
 of a successful revolution in the island, or the fear of its seizure by 
 England. The national pride and character of these people would not 
 induce them readily to give up on the first point. I have reason to 
 know the government are not without their fears on the latter point. A s 
 I learn, private letters from England give them to understand that Lord 
 
H. Doc. 121. 53 
 
 Palmerston is disposed to give them trouble, and that the bond-holders 
 are pressing that something decisive should be done in their behalf. 
 If the government shall entertain any serious fears in regard to the 
 matter, they would likely open the subject, and thus enable me to bring 
 forward a formal proposition to treat for a cession. I deem it, there- 
 fore, the better policy to suffer the thing to rest as it is for the present. 
 The court will remain here for some weeks, when I shall have the 
 opportunity of meeting the ministers in an informal way, without 
 attracting that attention which our official visits in Madrid would likely 
 excite. Besides, 1 can, at my discretion, as the matter now stands, 
 renew the subject with the new Secretary, which I shall most certainly 
 do should I discover the least grounds to suspect that they are laboring 
 under any misapprehension as to my conversation with General Nar- 
 vaez. 
 
 Mr. Pidal belongs to the French party — is strongly prejudiced against 
 the English, and will warmly second General Narvaez on that point. 
 He was Secretary of -War at the time of the Queen's marriage — is the 
 brother-in-law of Mon, who was the Minister of Finance at the time, 
 and the great co-laborer of Count Bresson in support of the Montpen- 
 sier marriage. Still he is strongly Spanish in his feelings and charac- 
 ter, and not likely to join in promoting an act calculated to shock the 
 national pride. " On the other hand, he is a bold, rough, independent 
 man, and would fearlessly carry out any measure he might undertake. 
 Of the Queen Mother I have already spoken, so that you have a pretty 
 accurate idea of the persons with whom I have to deal, and of the 
 probability of success. You will naturally inquire if the state of the 
 finances is to have no effect on the question. With an empty treasury 
 and the expenses daily increasing — with the credit of the government 
 so far reduced as to be driven to the necessity of resorting to a forced 
 loan to raise the small sum of five millions, one would suppose such a 
 state of things as this would be the first consideration with those 
 charged with the administration of the government. But, unfortu- 
 nately, such is the desperate state of the finances, and of the public 
 debt, that all seem to despair of correcting them. The foreign debt is 
 estimated at four hundred millions of dollars, of which the agent of 
 the English creditors claims two hundred and fifty millions. Of the 
 domestic debt, what is the amount, no one seems to know: 'tis said 
 even the government keeps no account of it; or if it does, will not let it 
 be known. It is stated at three hundred millions three per cent., 
 exchangeable for certain kinds of public property. Mr. Henderson is 
 still at Madrid, acting as agent of the bond-holders, and boasts of 
 occasionally receiving a note of promise from General Narvaez. The 
 fact is, I expect he is merely kept there for appearances. I do not 
 see how they can well meet the heavy demands on the treasury, even 
 if so disposed. Certainly they cannot, without that radical reform 
 which no ministry has the resolution to undertake. The average 
 receipts for the last four or five years have been sixty-five millions of 
 dollars, and the expenditures seventy millions. The army is computed 
 at one hundred and fifty thousand in the Peninsula, fifteen or twenty 
 thousand for Cuba, and fifteen thousand for the other colonies. As 
 
54 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 matters now stand, when the country is governed by the bayonet, there 
 is little prospect/of a reduction. 
 
 The government places a much higher estimate on the revenues of 
 Cuba than j^ou/seem to calculate. They place it at twelve millions of 
 dollars, and after deducting the expenses of the civil and military, claim 
 for the treasury six millions. Besides this, the orders or rents on the 
 treasury, pay to the navy, and employment to persons who would be 
 entitled to retiring pensions at home, together with the profits from the 
 flour monopoly, make, according to the estimate here, some fifteen or 
 twent}^ millions annually. I doubt, therefore, if we have anything to 
 calculate on from a financial view of the question. Hence my con- 
 clusion that nothing short of necessity, arising from their fears as to the 
 consequences, will force them to act. 
 
 Allow me now to present the view I ventured to hint at some short 
 time since. In Mr. Forsyth's instructions to Mr. Vail — 15th July, 
 1840, No. 2 — is to be found the following very strong language: "You 
 are authorized to assure the Spanish government, that in case of any 
 attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this portion of her 
 territory, (Cuba,) she may securely depend upon the military and 
 naval resources of the United States to aid her in preserving or recov- 
 ering it." This assurance was accordingly given by Mr. Vail, and 
 again repeated by Mr. Irving, under his instructions from Mr. Web- • 
 ster. With this guarantee for the safety of the island, the Spanish 
 government has rested in perfect security. At the time of Mr. Bul- 
 wer's dismissal, when the public apprehended a rupture with England, 
 it was a common remark at the Puerta del Sol — the great theatre for 
 political discussion — " that the United States would aid us in the pro- 
 tection of Cuba." Now, whilst I would not formally withdraw this 
 assurance, I suggest the propriety of changing our tone by saying, "In 
 a war between Spain and England the United States might feel 
 greatly embarrassed, from her friendly relations with England ; that 
 she is not only our ally, with whom we are at peace, but with whom, 
 at present, we have the most intimate commercial relations ; that what- 
 ever we may think of her colonial policy, in the extension of her com- 
 merce and for the advancement of her manufactures, the United States 
 would feel great reluctance in an open rupture with her at this time : 
 besides, she might claim from us the same neutrality in a war with 
 Spain as she had observed in our late contest with Mexico." This 
 language might do good ; and, as I think, could do us no harm. And 
 whatever might be our secret resolution — that under no circumstances 
 could we allow Cuba to come under the control of England — still it 
 might be as well for us to keep this resolution to ourselves. 
 
 In my interviews hereafter with the minister I shall venture to pre- 
 sent this view of the subject, as a reason why we should greatly pre- 
 fer the purchase of Cuba to any interference to prevent its falling into 
 the power of England. 
 
 I have thus given you a full account of what has taken place since 
 the reception of your despatch — of the difficulties which surround the 
 subject, of my prospects, and of the course I design to pursue in 
 regard to this interesting subject. I feel highly flattered in having con- 
 fided to me a trust in whose successful execution I should connect 
 
H. Doc. 121. 55 
 
 my nnme with one of the most important events in our diplomatic 
 history. 
 
 I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 R. M. SAUNDERS. 
 James Buchanan, Esq., 
 
 Secretary of State. 
 
 Mr. Saunders to Mr. Buchanan. 
 
 [No. 38.] Legation of the United States, 
 
 Madrid, August IS, 1-848. 
 
 Sir : I reached here this morning from La Granja, and was some- 
 what surprised to find the gentleman who had engaged to carry my 
 despatch to Liverpool had not yet left, but expects to do so to-night. 
 It is perhaps as well, as it enables me to add information on the sub- 
 ject of a more definite character. On the 15th instant I had an inter- 
 view with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which I was more explicit 
 in my communication, and he more candid in his reply. I repeated 
 the interest which the United States felt in the present and future con- 
 dition of Cuba, and the belief of the President that possibly the existing 
 state of things might render it desirable for her Majesty to enter into 
 negotiations on the subject. He said he had been informed by General 
 Narvaez of the nature of nw communication to him, and of my au- 
 thority ; that, if I wished to press the matter further at this time, he 
 should like to hear whether I proposed to treat for the cession of Cuba 
 to the United States, or for its security to Spain ; and, in the event of 
 a difficulty with England, whether Spain could rely for any aid from 
 the United States. I answered lhat it was from the fear of a difficulty 
 with England, and the threat on her part to seize on Cuba, which had, 
 in part, induced the President to give me the special authority he had 
 done at present ; that, as his excellency would see, an open rupture 
 between Spain and England — the allies of the United States — might 
 greatly embarrass her as to the part which she, as a neutral, might find 
 it necessary to take : that, whilst self-preservation and the interest of 
 her commerce might prevent her from remaining passive in the event 
 of any pressing danger, she would greatly prefer a direct purchase of 
 Cuba, to involving herself in a war with England on that account. He 
 said he fully understood our difficulty ; that, from the present state of 
 things, he did not anticipate anything of the kind ; that it was but can- 
 did in him to say, he could not hold out any prospect at present of a 
 cession ; that possibly time might bring it about. Cuba was reported 
 to them as being secure, but there was no telling how long it might 
 remain so. He was pleased to receive my communication ; should 
 treat it as entirely confidential ; and if anything should occur to pro- 
 duce a dim" rent state of things, he should not fail to inform me of it. 
 
 The above is, in substance, what transpired. I did not deem it 
 prudent to ur^e the matter further at this time, but shall not fail to 
 keep myself fully informed of everything which may occur, and should 
 I see the least prospect of success, shall, of course, avail myself of it. 
 
 You may possibly see in the English papers some reference to the 
 
56 H. Doc. 121. 
 
 relations with Spain, and the anxiety on the part of the latter to have 
 these matters accommodated. I doubt if this be so. At least, I am 
 certain General /Narvaez has manifested no anxiety on the subject. 
 Senor Mon has just come into the cabinet as Minister of Finance. He 
 is the brother-iii-law of the Minister of State; is the peculiar friend and 
 partisan of Christina; is reported an honest man, and, from his charac- 
 ter, is likely to improve the moneyed matters of the country. The cal- 
 culation is, that lie and Narvaez may not continue to act very long with 
 much harmony. 1 doubt if he is likely to contribute anything to my 
 success in regard to Cuba. I have received from the Minister of State 
 the note, a copy of which I enclose, inviting me, as you will see, to be 
 present at the accouchement of the Duchess of Montpensier. As I found 
 most of the diplomatic corps intended going, I deemed it proper for me 
 to accept, and shall go off within a few days. This may seem rather 
 a ridiculous matter to us, but, as you know, is considered a necessary 
 ceremony among the regal families of Europe. I have been given to 
 understand my prompt acceptance was quite gratifying, both to the 
 Queen and her mother. I trust, therefore, in the absence of any direct 
 instructions, the President will approve of my course. 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, 
 
 R. M. SAUNDERS. 
 
 James Buchanan, Esq., Sfc, &fc, fyc. 
 
 Mr. Saunders to Mr. Buchanan. 
 
 [No. 42.] Legation of the United States, 
 
 Madrid, November 17, 1848. 
 
 Sir : There appeared in the New York Herald of the 20th October, 
 a letter purporting to be from a Madrid correspondent, and to have been 
 written by an American. It reflects in no very polite terms on this 
 legation, and refers to negotiations which the writer assumes as pend- 
 ing for the cession of Cuba to the United States. These statements, 
 with the editorial of the Herald, have been copied into the English and 
 French papers, and, as you will see from the enclosed articles, have 
 been noticed by the press here. 1 deemed it proper to call on the Min- 
 ister of Foreign Affairs, and to assure him the matter had found its way 
 into the press without any authority from anything done or said on the 
 part of myself or the secretary of this legation. He said he had no 
 suspicion of anything of that kind, but supposed it a trick of the news- 
 paper editors, or of some one, for the purpose of mischief; that it was 
 somewhat annoying, as it was calculated to produce a bad effect in 
 their colonies. I assured him I had taken steps to have the matter set 
 right at home, and to find out, if I could, the author of the letter. He 
 expressed himself as satisfied, and the matter dropped. You will 
 see, from the articles enclosed, the spirit in which the question of the 
 cession is received, and the feeling of the public on the subject. It is 
 certain they regard Cuba as their most precious gem, and nothing short 
 of extreme necessity will ever induce them to part with it. There are 
 
H. Doc. 121. 57 
 
 some statements In the publication which I feel called upon to notice. 
 It is utterly untrue that I have ever found it necessary to consult any 
 one unconnected with the legation, in my intercourse with the govern- 
 ment. On the contrary, most of the secretaries of foreign affairs since 
 my being here have spoken English, and I have at no time been em- 
 barrassed on that account, as the Under-Secretary is a good English 
 scholar. So the statement does great injustice to Mr. Sawyer, as he is 
 a good French scholar, speaks it well, and is fully qualified to converse 
 in and to translate the Spanish. I regret to say, these references, with 
 other allusions in the letter, have excited my suspicions as to the author. 
 In this I may be mistaken. I deem it proper to inform you, as the let- 
 ter refers to negotiations which the writer says took place during the 
 mission of my predecessor, I felt at liberty to write to Mr. Irving, re- 
 questing him to say to Mr. Bennett the statements in the letter were 
 false, and to endeavor, if practicable, to find out its author. You can, 
 therefore, if you should see fit, communicate direct with Mr. Irving, or 
 await his answer to my letter. If my suspicions as to the author of the 
 letter shall prove to be well-founded, he certainly deserves to be ex- 
 posed ; if unfounded, then it will give me pleasure to have them re- 
 moved. 
 
 I have had no encouragement to renew the subject in regard to Cuba; 
 so far as I have been able to collect the opinion of the public, it is 
 against a cession, and I do not think the present ministry could or 
 would venture on such a step ; both Pidal and Mon are against it, and 
 Narvaez says nothing. 
 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, 
 
 R. M. SAUNDERS. 
 James Buchaxan, Esq., 
 
 Secretary of State, 
 
 Mr. Saunders to Mr. Buchanan. 
 
 [Extract] 
 
 [No. 43.] Legation of the United States, 
 
 Madrid, December 14, 184S. 
 Sir: 
 
 As I considered this a favorable opportunity to renew the subject, I 
 remarked to the minister he must excuse me for again calling his atten- 
 tion to the matter of the cession of Cuba; that an impression had been 
 produced in the United States, in consequence of some recent publica- 
 tions on the subject, that Spain might be induced to make the transfer, 
 if terms sufficiently liberal should be offered; and I desired to know 
 if he was willing to hear anything further on the question. He an- 
 swered, he had understood, from our former conversations on the sub- 
 ject, that I had not been instructed to make any direct proposition for 
 the cession, but was authorized to enter into negotiations whenever it 
 5 
 
58 H. Doc. 121, 
 
 might please her Majesty to signify her wish to do so. In the mean 
 time, the President was satisfied to suffer things to remain as they were, 
 so long as Cuba, should continue under the dominion of Spain. With 
 this understanding, my communication had been well received, and 
 was entirely satisfactory ; that, so understanding me, he had felt author- 
 ized to give a direct denial to the publications to which I had referred, 
 and had so instructed the different agents of the government; that he 
 wished the matter thus to stand, as it would enable him to give, in a 
 satisfactory way, any explanations which might be demanded by the 
 Cortes. I replied he had correctly understood me ; and I had so re- 
 ported to my government, and had since received the President's 
 approval of my course ; that I did not now design to make any propo- 
 sition, as I had received no new instructions; but my object was a 
 simple inquiry, to enable me to learn and to state whether any terms, 
 however liberal, would induce her Majesty to make the cession. He 
 answered, he fully appreciated my motives, as he had seen the state- 
 ment in the papers, and could answer most positively, " that it was 
 more than any minister dare, to entertain any such proposition; that he 
 believed such to be the feeling of the country, that sooner than see the 
 island transferred to any power, they would prefer seeing it sunk in the 
 ocean." I replied, I was happy to find he understood my motives, and 
 after his positive and candid avowal, I certainly should not again renew 
 the subject, unless I should be specially invited to do so. I was fully 
 aware of this being an unpleasant subject with the ministry; that they 
 had been much annoyed by the recent publications ; but as I had. heard 
 from private sources that an improper impression had been produced 
 in the United States, in consequence of the articles in the New York 
 Herald, and that I had been charged with inefficiency in failing to 
 press the matter with sufficient energy ; and as I was anxious to vin- 
 dicate myself against such an imputation, and to justify the confidence 
 reposed in me by the President, I felt authorized to renew the con- 
 versation, which ended in a way, as I think, to the satisfaction of the 
 minister. I had made it my business to inquire, in a private way, from 
 those I knew to be friendly to the annexation of Cuba to the United 
 States, what they thought to be the public feeling on the subject, and 
 they have uniformly given the same answer; and that was, that the 
 nation would not sanction the measure ; that the general belief was, 
 whatever sum might be paid for the cession, it would not go to the 
 relief of the nation, but would be seized upon by those who might hap- 
 pen to be in power. And these remarks were always made under the 
 strictest injunctions of secrecy, as the individuals were most anxious 
 to conceal the fact that they were friendly to annexation. 
 
 I flatter myself the President will not disapprove of what I have felt 
 myself called upon to do, as the matter is now placed beyond all mis- 
 apprehension, and will be fully understood in future. I might, indeed, 
 have manifested a more active and zealous importunity; but it would 
 have been that pressing importunity, alike wanting in dignity and un- 
 authorized by usage, and which certainly was not becoming a question 
 of this character. I was satisfied a direct proposition would have been 
 met with a flat rejection, and might have left a bad impression ; where- 
 as the communication was well received, and may, in the end, produce 
 
H. Doc. 121. 59 
 
 a good effect. For the present, I am well convinced such is the tem- 
 per and feeling of the nation in regard to the matter, that it would not 
 have been within the power of the most skilful diplomatist to have 
 commanded success ; and it is because of my conviction that nothing 
 is to be effected on either of these important subjects, that I am most 
 anxious to close my mission and to return to my own country. And, 
 as this is likely to be the last communication which I shall have the 
 honor to make you on this interesting subject, I avail myself of the 
 occasion to renew to the President my grateful acknowledgments for 
 the high confidence reposed in me, and to express my deep regret that 
 it has not been in my power to add to the other important matters 
 which have marked his administration as one of the most distinguished 
 in the annals of our country. 
 
 I remain, sir, with high respect and esteem, your obedient servant, 
 
 R. M. SAUNDERS. 
 
 James Buchanan, Esq., 
 
 Secretary of Stale. 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
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