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 OPINION 
 
 J 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL STANBEM, 
 
 I'XDKU THE 
 
 RECONSTRUCTION LAWS. 
 
 THE POWERS OF THE MILITARY COMMANDERS, AND FURNISHING A 
 GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE DUTIES OF THE BOARD IN THE 
 MATTER OF REGISTRATION, AND IN THE MATTER OF 
 SUPERINTENDING THE ELECTIONS, AND AS TO 
 THE QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICA- 
 TIONS OF PERSONS APPLYING FOR 
 REGISTRATION. 
 
 WASHINGTON: 
 
 GOVE H N M E N T 1' II I \ T ING () F PIC K 
 18G7. 
 
 
 3 
 
 s< 
 
OPINION 
 
 OF 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL STANBERY, 
 
 UNDER THE 
 
 RECONSTRUCTION LAWS, 
 
 DEFINING 
 
 THE POWERS OF THE MILITARY COMMANDERS, AND FURNISHING A 
 GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE DUTIES OF THE BOARD IN THE MAT- 
 TER OF REGISTRATION, AND IN THE MATTER OF SUPER- 
 INTENDING THE ELECTIONS, AND AS TO THE QUALI- 
 FICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS OF PER- 
 SONS APPLYING FOR REGISTRATION. 
 
 WASHINGTON: 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
 18G7. 
 

 J A 
 
 N 5 15 
 
 a or a 
 
 1909 
 

 Attorney General's Office, 
 
 June 12, 18GT. 
 
 The President. 
 
 Sir: On the 24th ultimo, i had the honor to transmit for your con- 
 sideration my opinion upon some of the questions arising under the 
 reconstruction acts therein referred to. I now proceed to give my 
 opinion on the remaining questions, upon which the military com- 
 manders require instructions. 
 
 First, as to the powers and duties of these commanders. 
 
 The original act recites in its preamble that ' ; no legal State gov- 
 ernments or adequate protection for life or property exist" in those 
 ten States, and that "it is necessary that peace and good order should 
 be enforced" in those States "until loyal and republican State gov- 
 ernments can be legally established." 
 
 The first and second sections divide these States into five military 
 districts, subject to the military authority of the United States as 
 thereinafter prescribed, and make it the duty of the President to as- 
 sign from the officers of the army, a general officer to the command 
 of each district, and to furnish him with a military force to perform 
 his duties and enforce his authority within his district. 
 
 The third section declares "That it shall be the duty of each offi- 
 cer assigned as aforesaid to protect all persons in their rights of per- 
 son and property, to suppress insurrection, disorder, and violence, 
 and to punish, or cause to be punished, all disturbers of the public 
 peace and criminals, and to this end, he may allow local civil tribu- 
 nals to take jurisdiction of and try offenders, or, when in his judgment 
 it may be necessary for the trial of offenders, he shall have power to 
 organize military commissions or tribunals for that purpose; and all 
 interference under color of State authority with the exercise of mili- 
 tary authority under this act shall be null and void." 
 
 The fourth section provides "That all persons put under military 
 arrest by virtue of this act shall be tried without unnecessary delay, 
 and no cruel or unusual punishment shall be inflicted; and no sentence 
 of any military commission or tribunal hereby anthorized, affecting 
 the life or liberty of any person, shall be executed until it is ap- 
 proved by the officer in command of the district, and the laws and 
 regulations for the government of the army shall not be affected by 
 this act, except in so far as they conflict with its provisions: Provi- 
 ded, That no sentence of death under the provisions of this act shall 
 be carried into effect without the approval of the President." 
 
 The fifth section declares the qualification of voters in all elections, 
 as well to frame the new Constitution for each State as in the elec- 
 tions to be held under the provisional government until the new State 
 Constitution is ratified by Congress, and also fixes the qualifications 
 of the delegates to frame the new Constitution. 
 
The sixth section provides "That until the people of said rebel 
 States shall be by law admitted to representation in the Congress of 
 the United States, any civil governments which may exist therein 
 shall be deemed provisional only, and in all respects subject to the 
 paramount authority of the United States at any time to abolish, mod- 
 ify, control or supersede the same; and in all elections to any office 
 under such provisional governments, all persons shall be entitled to 
 vote, and none others, who are entitled to vote under the provisions 
 of the fifth section of this act; and no person shall be eligible to any 
 office under any such provisional governments who would be disqual- 
 fied from holding office under the provisions of the third article of 
 said constitutional amendment." 
 
 The duties devolved upon the commanding general by the supple- 
 mentary act relate altogether to the registration of voters and the 
 elections to be held under the provisions of that act. And as to these 
 duties they are plainly enough expressed in the act, and it is not un- 
 derstood that any question not heretofore considered in the opinion 
 referred to, has arisen or is likely to arise in respect to them. My 
 attention, therefore, is directed to the powers and duties of the mil- 
 itary commanders under the original act. 
 
 We see clearly enough that this act contemplates two distinct gov- 
 ernments in each of these ten States, the one military, the other civil. 
 The civil government is recognized as existing at the date of the act. 
 The military government is created by the act. Both are provisional, 
 and both are to continue until the new State constitution is framed 
 and the State is admitted to representation in Congress. When that 
 event takes place, both these provisional governments are to cease. 
 In contemplation of this act, this military authority and this civil au- 
 thority are to be carried on together. The people in these States 
 are made subject to both, and must obey both, in their respective 
 jurisdictions. 
 
 There is, then, an imperative necessity to define as clearly as pos- 
 sible the line which separates the two jurisdictions, and the exact 
 scope of the authority of each. 
 
 Now as to the civil authority, recognized by the act as the provi- 
 sional civil government, it covered every department of civil juris- 
 diction in each of these States. It had all the characteristics and 
 powers of a State government, legislative, judicial, and executive, 
 and was in the full and lawful exercise of all these powers, except 
 only that it was not entitled to representation as a State of the Union. 
 This existing government is not set aside; it is recognized more than 
 once by the act. It is not in any one of its departments, or as to any 
 one of its functions, repealed or modified by this act, save only in the 
 qualifications of voters, the qualifications of persons eligible to office, 
 the manner of holding elections, and the mode of framing the consti- 
 tution of the State. The act does not in any other reaped change 
 the provisional government, nor d"<-'s the act authorize the military 
 authority t<i change it. The power of further changing it is reserved, 
 not granted, and it is reserved to Congress, not delegated to the mil- 
 itary commander. 
 
Congress was not satisfied with the organic law, or constitution, 
 under which this civil government was established. That constitu- 
 tion was to be changed in only one particular to make it acceptable 
 to Congress, and that was in the matter of the elective franchise. 
 The pin-pose, the sole object of this act is to effect that change, and 
 to effect it by the agency of the people of the State, or such of them 
 as are made voters, by means of elections provided for in the act, and 
 in the meantime to preserve order and to punish offenders, if found 
 necessary, by military commissions. 
 
 We are. therefore, not at a loss to know what powers were pos- 
 sessed by the existing civil authority. The only question is upon the 
 powers conferred on the military authority. Whatever power is not 
 given to the military, remains with the civil government. 
 
 We see, first of all, that each of these States is "made subject to 
 the militarv authority of the United States"— not to the military 
 authority altogether, but with this express limitation, "as hereinafter 
 prescribed." 
 
 We must, then, examine what is thereinafter provided, to find the 
 extent and nature of the power granted. 
 
 This, then, is what is granted to the mililtary commanaer: the 
 power 'or duty "to protect all persons in their rights of person and 
 property, to suppress insurrection, disorder, and violence, and to 
 punish, or cause to be punished, all disturbers of the public peace and 
 criminals," and he may do this by the agency of the criminal courts 
 of the State, or, if necessary, he may have resort to military tribunals. 
 This comprises all the powers given to the military commander. 
 Here is a general clause making it the duty of the military com- 
 mander to give protection to all persons in their rights of person and 
 property. Considered by itself, and without reference to the context 
 and to other provisions of the act, it is liable, from its generality, to 
 be misunderstood. . 
 
 What sort of protection is here meant? What violations ot the 
 rights of persons, or of property, are here intended ? In what manner 
 is'this protection to be given ? These questions arise at once. 
 
 It appears that some of the military commanders have understood 
 this grant of power as all-comprehensive, conferring on them the 
 power to remove the executive and judicial officers of the State, and 
 to appoint other officers in their places, to suspend the legislative 
 power of the State, to take under their control, by officers appointed 
 by themselves, the collection and disbursement of the revenues of the 
 State, to prohibit the execution of the laws of the State by the agency 
 of its appointed officers and agents, to change the existing laws in 
 matters affecting purely civil and private rights, to suspend or enjoin 
 the execution of the judgments and decrees of the established State 
 courts, to interfere in the ordinary administration of justice in the 
 State 'courts, by prescribing new qualifications for jurors, and to 
 change, upon the ground of expediency, the existing relations of the 
 parties to contracts, giving protection to one party by violating the 
 rights of the other party. 
 
 I feel confident that these military officers, in all they have done, 
 
have supposed that they had full warrant for their action. Their 
 education and training have not been of the kind to fit them for the 
 delicate and difficult task of giving construction to such a statute as 
 that now under consideration. They require instruction, and nearly 
 all of them have asked for instruction, to solve their own doubts, and 
 to furnish to them a safe ground for the performance of their duties. 
 
 There can be no doubt as to the rule of construction according to 
 which we must interpret this grant of power. It is a grant of power 
 to military authority, over civil rights and citizens, in time of peace. 
 It is a new jurisdiction, never granted before, by which, in certain 
 particulars and for certain purposes, the established principle that the 
 military shall be subordinate to the civil authority, is reversed. The 
 rule of construction to be applied to such a grant of power is thus 
 stated in Dwarris on Statutes, page 652: " A statute creating a new 
 jurisdiction ought to be construed strictly." 
 
 Guided by this rule, and in the light of other rules of construction 
 familiar to every lawyer, especially of those which teach us that, in 
 giving construction to single clauses, we must look to the context and 
 to the whole law, that general clauses are to be controlled by parti- 
 cular clauses, and that such construction is to be put on a special 
 clause as to make it harmonize with the other parts of the statute, so 
 as to avoid repugnancy. I proceed to the construction of this part of 
 the act. 
 
 To consider, then, in the first place, the terms of the grant. It is 
 of a power to protect all persons in their rights of person and pro- 
 perty. It is not a power to create new rights, but only to protect 
 those which exist and are established by the laws under which these 
 people live. It is a power to preserve, not to abrogate; to sustain 
 the existing frame of social order and civil rule, and not a power to 
 introduce military rule in its place. In effect, it is a police power, 
 and the protection, here intended, is protection of persons and pro- 
 perty against violence, unlawful force, and criminal infraction. It is 
 given to meet the contingency recited in the preamble, of a want, of 
 "adequate protection for life and property;" and the necessity also 
 recited, "that peace and good order should be enforced." 
 
 This construction is made more apparent when we look at the im- 
 mediate context, and see in what mode, and by what agency, this 
 protection is to be secured. This duty, or power, of protection is to 
 be performed by the suppression of insurrection, disorder, and vio- 
 lence, and by the punishment, either by the agency of the State 
 courts, or by military commissioners, when necessary, of all disturbers 
 of tin; public peace and criminals; and it is declared that all interfer- 
 ence, under color of State authority, with the exercise of this military 
 authority, shall he null and void. 
 
 The next succeeding clause provides for a speedy trial of the of- 
 fender, forbids the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, and 
 requires that sentences of these military courts, which involve the 
 liberty or life of the accused, shall have the approval ol the com- 
 manding general, and. as to a sentence of death, the approval of the 
 President, before execution . 
 
All these special provisions have reference to the preservation of 
 order, and protection against violence and crime. They touch no 
 other department or function of the civil administration, save only its 
 criminal jurisdiction, and even as to that the clear meaning of this 
 act is, that it is not to be interfered with by the military authority, 
 unless when a necessity for such interference may happen to arise. 
 
 I see no authority, nor any shadow of authority, for interference 
 with any other courts or any other jurisdiction, than criminal courts 
 in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. The existing civil authority 
 in all its other departments, legislative, executive, and judicial, is 
 left untouched. There is no provision, even under the plea of neces- 
 sity, to establish, by military authority, courts or tribunals for the 
 trial of civil cases, or for the protection of such civil rights of person 
 or property as come within the cognizance of civil courts as contra- 
 distinguished from criminal courts. In point of fact there was no 
 foundation for such a grant of power, for the Civil Rights act, and 
 the Freedman's Bureau act, neither of which is superseded by this 
 act, made ample provision for the protection of all merely civil rights 
 where the laws or courts of these States might fail to give full, im- 
 partial protection. 
 
 I find no authority anywhere in this act for the removal by the uni- 
 tary commander, of the proper officers of a State, either executive or 
 judicial, or the appointment of persons to their places. Nothing short 
 of an express grant of power, would justify the removal or the ap- 
 pointment of such an officer. There is no such grant expressed or 
 even implied. On the contrary the act clearly enough forbids it. 
 The regular State officials, duly elected and qualified, are entitled to 
 hold their offices. They, too, have rights which the military com- 
 mander is bound to protect, not authorized to destroy. 
 
 We find in the concluding clause of the sixth section of the act that 
 these officials are recognized, and express provision is made to per- 
 petuate them. It is enacted that "in all elections to any office un- 
 der such provisional governments, all persons shall be entitled to 
 vote, and none others, who are entitled to vote under the provisions 
 of the fifth section of this act; and no person shall be eligible to any 
 office under such provisional governments, who would be disqualified 
 from holding office under the provisions of this act-" 
 
 This provision not only recognizes all the officers of the provisional 
 governments, but, in case of vacancies, very clearly points out how 
 they are to be filled; and that happens to be in the usual way, by the 
 peJple, and not by any other agency or any other power, either State 
 or federal, civil or military. 
 
 I find it impossible under the provisions of this act to comprehend 
 such an official as a governor of one of these States appointed to 
 office by one of these military commanders. Certainly he is not the 
 governor recognized by the laws of the State, elected by the people 
 of the State, and clothed as such with the chief executive power. 
 \or is he appointed as a military governor for a State which has no 
 lawful governor, under the pressure of an existing necessity, to exer- 
 cise powers at large. The intention, no doubt, was to appoint him 
 
8 
 
 to fill a vacancy occasioned by a military order, and to put him in the 
 place of the removed governor, to execute the functions of the office 
 as provided by law. The law takes no cognizance of such an official, 
 and he is clothed with no authority or color of authority. 
 
 What is true as to the governor is equally true as to all the other 
 legislative, executive, and judicial officers of the State. If the mili- 
 tary commander can oust one from his office, he can oust them all. 
 If he can fill one vacancy he can fill all vacancies, and thus usurp all 
 civil jurisdiction into his own hands, or the hands of those who hold 
 their appointments from him and subject to his power of removal, 
 and thus frustrate the very right secured to the people by this act. 
 Certainly this act is rigorous enough in the power which it gives. 
 With all its severity, the right of electing their own officers is still 
 left with the people, and it must be preserved. 
 
 I must not be understood as fixing limits to the power of the mili- 
 tary commander in case of an actual insurrection or riot. It may 
 happen that an insurrection in one of these States may be so general 
 and formidable as to require the temporary suspension of all civil 
 government, and the establishment of martial law in its place. And 
 the same thing may be true as to local disorder or riot in reference 
 to the civil government of the city or place where it breaks out. 
 Whatever power is necessary to meet such emergencies, the military 
 commander may properly exercise. I confine myself to the proper 
 authority of the military commander where peace and order prevail. 
 When peace and order do prevail, it is not allowable to displace the 
 civil officers and appoint others in their places under any idea that 
 the military commander can better perform his duties and carry out 
 the general purposes of the act by the agency of civil officers of his 
 own choice rather than by the lawful incumbents. The act gives 
 him no right to resort to such agency, but does give him the right to 
 have "a sufficient military force " to enable him "to perform his 
 duties and enforce his authority within the district to which he is as- 
 signed." 
 
 In the suppression of insurrection and riot, the military commander 
 is wholly independent of the civil authority. So, too, in the trial 
 and punishment of criminals and offenders, he may supersede the 
 civil jurisdiction. His power is to be exercised in these special emer- 
 gencies, and the means are put into his hands by which it is to be 
 exercised, that is to say, "a sufficient military force to enable such 
 officer to perform his duties and enforce his authority/' and mili- 
 tary tribunals of his own appointment to try and punish offenders. 
 These are strictly military powers, to be executed by military author- 
 ity, not by the civil authority or by civil officers appointed by him 
 to perform ordinary civil duties. 
 
 If these emergencies do not happen, if civil order is preserved, and 
 criminals are duly prosecuted by the regular criminal courts, t ho mil- 
 itary power though presenl must remain passive. Its proper func- 
 tion is to preserve the peace, to acl promptly when the peace is bro- 
 ken, and restore order. When that is done and the civil authority 
 may again Bafelj resume its functions, the military power becomes 
 again passive, but on guard and watchful. 
 
This, in my judgment, is the whole scope of the military power 
 conferred by' this act, and in arriving at this construction of the act, 
 I have not found it necessary to resort to the strict construction which 
 
 is allowable. 
 
 What has been said indicates my opinion as to any supposed power 
 of the military commander to change or modify the laws in force. 
 The military commander is made a conservator of the peace, not a 
 legislator. His duties are military duties, executive duties, not leg- 
 islative duties. He has no authority to enact or declare a new code 
 of laws for the people within his district under any idea that he can 
 make a better code than the people have made for themselves. The 
 public policy is not committed to his discretion. The Congress, 
 which passed this act undertook in certain grave particulars to change 
 these laws, and these changes being made, the Congress saw no fur- 
 ther necessity of change, but were content to leave all the other laws 
 in full force, but subject to this emphatic declaration, that as to these 
 laws and such future changes as might be expedient, the question of 
 expediency and the power to alter, amend or abolish, was reserved 
 for "the paramount authority of the United States at any time to 
 abolish, modifv, control, or supersede the same." Where, then, 
 does a military commander find his authority " to abolish, modify, 
 control, or supersede" any one of these laws? 
 
 The enumeration of the extraordinary powers exercised by the mil- 
 itary commanders in some of the districts would extend this opinion 
 to an unreasonable length. A few instances must suffice. 
 
 In one of these districts the governor of a State has been deposed 
 under a threat of military force, and another person, called a gover- 
 nor, has been appointed by the military commander to fill his place. 
 Thus presenting the strange spectacle of an official entrusted with 
 the chief power to execute the laws of the State whose authority is 
 not recognized by the laws he is called upon to execute. 
 
 In the same district the judge of one of the criminal courts of the 
 State has been summarily dealt with. The act of Congress does give 
 authority to the militarv commander, in cases of necessity, to transfer 
 the jurisdiction of a criminal court to a military tribunal. That being 
 the specific authority over the criminal courts given by the act, no 
 other authority over them can be lawfully exercised by the military 
 commander. But in this instance the judge has, by military order 
 been ejected from his office, and a private citizen has been appointed 
 judge in his place, by military authority, and is now in the exercise 
 of criminal jurisdiction "overall crimes, misdemeanors, and offences, 
 committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This mili- 
 tary appointee is certainly not authorized to try any one for any 
 offence as a member of a military tribunal, and he has just as little 
 authority to try and punish any offender as a judge ot a criminal court 
 
 of the State. • . . . 
 
 It happens that this private citizen, thus placed on the bench, is 
 to sit as the sole judge in a criminal court whose jurisdiction extends 
 to cases involving the life of the accused. If he has any judicial 
 power in anv case, he has the same power to take cognizance ot cap- 
 
10 
 
 ital cases, and to sentence the accused to death, and order his exe- 
 cution . A strange spectacle ! where the judge and the criminal may 
 very well "change places;" for if the criminal has unlawfully taken 
 life, so too does the judge. This is the inevitable result, for the onlv 
 tribunal the only judges, if they can be called judges, which a mili- 
 tary commander can constitute and appoint under'this act, to inflict 
 the death penalty, is a military court composed of a board, and called 
 in the act a "military commission." 
 
 I see no relief for the condemned against the sentence of this agent 
 of the military commander. It is not the sort of court whose sentence 
 of death must be first approved by the commander and finally by the 
 President; for that is allowed only where the sentence is pronounced 
 by a "military commission." Nor is it a sentence pronounced by the 
 rightful court of the State, but by a court, and by adjudge, not clothed 
 with authority under the laws of the State, but constituted by the 
 military authority. As the representative of this military authority, 
 this act forbids interference "under color of State authority" with 
 the exercise of his functions. 
 
 In another one of these districts a military order commands the 
 governor of the State to forbid the reassembling of the legislature, 
 and thus suspends the proper legislative power of the State". In the 
 same district an order has been issued "to relieve the treasurer of 
 the State from the duties, bonds, books, papers, &c, appertaining to 
 his office," and to put an " assistant quartermaster of United States 
 volunteers" in place of the removed treasurer; the duties of which 
 quartermaster-treasurer are thus summed up: He is to make to the 
 headquarters of the district " the same reports and returns required 
 from the treasurer, and a monthly statement of receipts and expendi- 
 tures; he will pay all warrants for salaries which may be, or become, 
 due, and legitimate expenditures for the support of the penitentiary' 
 State asylum, and the support of the provisional State government'; 
 but no scrip or warrants for outstanding debts of other kind than 
 those specified will be paid without special authority from these head- 
 quarters. He will deposit funds in the same manner as though they 
 were those of the United States." 
 
 In another of these districts a body of military edicts, issued in 
 general and special orders regularly numbered, and in occasional cir- 
 culars, have been promulgated, which already begin to assume the 
 dimensions of a code. These military orders modify the existing law 
 in the remedies for the collection of debts, the enforcement of judg. 
 Hunts and decrees for the payment of money, staying proceedings 
 instituted, prohibiting, in certain cases, the right to bring suit, en- 
 joining proceedings on execution for the term of twelve months, 
 giving new liens in certaiu eases, establishing homestead exemptions,' 
 declaring what shall be a legal tender, abolishing in certain cases the 
 remedy by foreign attachment, abolishing bail "as heretofore author- 
 ized in cases ex contractu, but not in "other cases, known as actions 
 exddicto," and changing, in several particulars, the existing laws as 
 to the punishmenl of crimes, and directing that the crimes' referred 
 to "shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor for a term not 
 
11 
 
 exceeding ten years nor. less than two years, in the discretion of the 
 court having jurisdiction thereof." One of these general orders, 
 being number ten of the series, contains no less than seventeen sec- 
 tions embodying the various changes and modifications which have 
 been recited . 
 
 The question at once arises in the mind of everv lawyer, what 
 power or discretion belongs to the court having jurisdiction of any 
 of these offences, to sentence a criminal to any other or different pun- 
 ishment than that provided by the law which vests him with juris- 
 diction. The concluding paragraph of this order, No. 10, is in these 
 words: " Any law or ordinance heretofore in force in North Carolina 
 or South Carolina, inconsistent with the provisions of this general or- 
 der, are hereby suspended and declared inoperative." Thus an- 
 nouncing, not only a power to suspend the laws, but to declare them 
 generally inoperative, and assuming full powers of legislation by the 
 military authority. 
 
 The ground upon which these extraordinary powers are based is 
 thus set forth in military order No. 1, issued in this district: '• The 
 civil government now existing in North Carolina and South Carolina, 
 is provisional only, and in all respects subject to the paramount au- 
 thority of the United States at any time to abolish, modify, control, 
 or supersede the same." Thus far the provisions of the act of Con- 
 gress are well recited. What follows is in these words: li Local laws 
 and municipal regulations not inconsistent with the Constitution and 
 laws of the United States, or the proclamations of the President, or 
 with such regulations as are or may be prescribed in the orders of 
 the commanding general, are hereby declared to be in force, and in 
 conformity therewith, civil officers are hereby authorized to continue 
 the exercise of their proper functions, and will be respected and 
 obeyed by the inhabitants." 
 
 This construction of his powers under the act of Congress places 
 the military commander on the same footing as the Congress of the 
 United States. It assumes that "the paramount authority of the 
 United States at any time to abolish, modify, control, or supersede," 
 is vested in him as fully as it is reserved to Congress. He deems 
 himself a representative of that paramount authority. He puts him- 
 self upon an equality with the law-making power of the Union, the 
 only paramount authority in our government, so far, at least, as the 
 enactment of laws is concerned. He places himself on higher 
 ground than the President, who is simply an executive officer. He 
 assumes, directly or indirectly, all the authority of the State, legis- 
 lative, executive, and judicial, and in effect declares " I am the State." 
 
 I regret that I find it necessary to speak so plainly of this assump- 
 tion of authority. I repeat what I have heretofore said, that I do 
 not doubt that all these orders have been issued under an honest be- 
 lief that they were necessary or expedient, and fully warranted by 
 the act of Congress. There may be evils and mischiefs in the laws 
 which these people have made for themselves through their own leg- 
 islative bodies, which require change: but none of these can be so 
 intolerable as the evils and mischiefs which must ensue from the sort 
 
12 
 
 of remedy applied. One can plainly see what will be the inevitable 
 coni usion and disorder which such disturbances of the whole civil 
 policy of the State must produce. If these military edicts are al- 
 lowed to remain even during the brief time in which this provisional 
 military government may be in power, the seeds will be sown for 
 such a future harvest of litigation as has never been inflicted upon 
 any other people. 
 
 There is, in my opinion, an executive duty to be performed here, 
 which cannot safely be avoided or delayed. For notwithstanding 
 the paramount authority assumed by these commanders, they are not, 
 even as to their proper executive duties, in any sense, clothed with 
 a paramount authority. They are, at last, subordinate executive 
 officers. They are responsible to the President for the proper exe- 
 cution of their duties, and upon him rests the final responsibility. 
 They are his selected agents. His duty is not all performed by se- 
 lecting such agents as he deems competent; but the duty remains 
 with him to see to it that they execute their duties faithfully and ac- 
 cording to law. 
 
 It is true that this act of Congress only refers to the President in 
 the matter of selecting and appointing these commanders, and in the 
 matter of their powers and duties under the law, the act speaks in 
 terms directly to them; but this does not relieve them from their re- 
 sponsibility to the President, nor does it relieve him from the consti- 
 tutional obligation imposed upon him to see that all "the laws be 
 faithfully executed." 
 
 It can scarcely be necessary to cite authority for so plain a proposi- 
 tion as this. Nevertheless, as we have a recent decision completely 
 in point, I may as well refer to it. 
 
 Upon the motion made by the State of Mississippi before the Su- 
 preme Court of the United States at its late term, for leave to file a 
 bill against the President of the United States, to enjoin him against 
 executing the very acts of Congress now under consideration, the 
 opinion of the court upon dismissing that motion, and it seems to 
 have been unanimous, was delivered by the Chief Justice. I make 
 the following quotation from the opinion: " Very different is the duty 
 of the President in the exercise of the power to see that the laws are 
 faithfully executed, and among those laws the acts named in the bill. 
 By the first of these acts he is required to assign generals to com- 
 mand in the several military districts, and to detail sufficient military 
 force to enable such officers to discharge their duties under the law. 
 By the supplementary act, other duties are imposed on the several 
 commanding generals, and their duties must necessarily be performed 
 under the supervision of the President as Commander-in-Chief. The 
 duty thus imposed on the President is in no justsense ministerial. It 
 is purely executive and political." 
 
 Certain questions have been propounded from one of these mili- 
 tary districts touching the ('(instruction of the power of the military 
 commander to constitute military tribunals lor the trial of offenders, 
 which I w ill next consider. 
 
 Whilst the ad does not in terms displace the regular criminal courts 
 of the Slate, it does give the power to the military commander, when . 
 
 
13 
 
 in his judgment a necessity arises, to take the administration of the 
 criminal law into his own hands, and to try and punish offenders by 
 means of military commissions. 
 
 In giving construction to this power, we must not forget the recent 
 and authoritative exposition given by the Supreme Court of the Uni- 
 ted States as to the power of Congress to provide for military tribu- 
 nals for the trial of citizens in time of peace, and to the emphatic dec- 
 laration as to which there was no dissent or difference of opinion 
 among the judges, that such a power is not warranted by the Con- 
 stitution. A single extract from the opinion of the minority as de- 
 livered by the Chief Justice will suffice. " We by no means assert 
 that Congress can establish and apply the laws of war where no war 
 has been declared or exists. Where peace exists the laws of peace 
 must prevail. What we do maintain is, that when the nation is in- 
 volved in war, and some portions of the country are invaded, and all 
 are exposed to invasion, it is within the power of Congress to deter- 
 mine in what States or districts such great and imminent public dan- 
 ger exists as justifies the authorization of military tribunals for the 
 trial of crimes and offences against the discipline or security of the 
 army or against the public safety." 
 
 Limiting myself here simply to the construction of this act of Con- 
 gress and to the question in what way it should be executed, I have 
 no hesitation in saying that nothing short of an absolute or control - 
 ing necessity would give any color of authority for arraigning a citi- 
 zen before a military commission. A person charged with crime in 
 any of these military districts has rights to be protected, rights the 
 most sacred and inviolable, and among these the right of trial by jury 
 according to laws of the land. When a citizen is arraigned before a 
 military commission on a criminal charge, he is no longer under the 
 protection of law, nor surrounded with those safe-guards which are 
 provided in the Constitution. 
 
 This act, passed in a time of peace, when all the courts, State and 
 federal, are in the undisturbed exercise of their jurisdiction, author- 
 izes, at the discretion of a military officer, the seizure, trial, and con- 
 demnation of the citizen. The accused may be sentenced to death, 
 and the sentence may be executed, without an indictment, without 
 counsel, without a jury, and without a judge. A sentence which for- 
 feits all the property of the accused, requires no approval. If it 
 affects the liberty of the accused, it requires the approval of the 
 commanding general; and if it affects his life, it requires the approval 
 of the general and of the President. Military and executive authority 
 rule throughout, in the trial, the sentence, and the execution. No 
 habeas corpus from any State court can be invoked ; for this law declares 
 that "all interference, under color of. State authority, with the exer- 
 cise of military authority under this act, shall be null and void." 
 
 I repeat it, that nothing short of an absolute necessity can give any 
 color of authority to a military commander to call into exercise auch 
 a power. It is a power, the exercise of which may involve him, and 
 every one concerned, in the gravest responsibilities. The occasion 
 for its exercise should be reported at once to the Executive for such 
 instructions as may be deemed necessary and proper. 
 
14 
 
 Questions have arisen whether, under this power, these military 
 commissioners can take cognizance of offences committed before the 
 passage of the act, and whether they can try and punish for acts not 
 made crimes or offences by federal or State law. 
 
 I am clearly of opinion that they have no jurisdiction as to either. 
 They can take cognizance of no offence that has not happened after 
 the law took effect. Inasmuch as the tribunal to punish, and the 
 measure or degree of punishment, are established by this act, we 
 must construe it to be prospective, and not retroactive. Otherwise it 
 would take the character of an ex post facto law. Therefore, in the 
 absence of any language which gives the act a retrospect, I do not 
 hesitate to say it cannot apply to past offences. 
 
 There is no legislative power given under this military bill to estab- 
 lish a new criminal code. The authority given is to try and punish 
 criminals and offenders, and this proceeds upon the idea that crimes 
 and offences have been committed ; but no person can be called a 
 criminal or an offender for doing an act which, when done, was not 
 prohibited by law. 
 
 But as to the measure of punishment, I regret to be obliged to say 
 that it is left altogether to the military authorities, with only this 
 limitation, that the punishment to be inflicted shall not be cruel or 
 unusual. The military commission may try the accused, fix the 
 measure of punishment, even to the penalty of death, and direct the 
 execution of the sentence. It is only when the sentence affects the 
 " life or liberty" of the person that it need be approved by the com- 
 manding general, and only in cases where it affects the life of the 
 accused that it needs also the approval of the President. 
 
 As to crimes or offences against the laws of the United States, the 
 military authority can take no cognizance of them, nor in any way in- 
 terfere with the regular administration of justice by the appropriate 
 federal courts. 
 
 In the opinion heretofore given upon other questions arising under 
 these laws, I gave at large for your consideration the grounds upon 
 which my conclusions were arrived at, intending thereafter to state 
 these conclusions in a concise and clear summary. I now proceed to 
 execute that purpose, which is made especially necessary from the 
 confusion and doubts which have arisen upon that opinion in the pub- 
 lic mind, caused in part by the errors of the telegraph and the press 
 in its publication, and in part by the inaptitude of the general reader 
 to follow carefully the successive and dependent steps of a protracted 
 l< •. al opinion. 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 WHO aim: ENTITLED TO REGISTRATION. 
 
 1. The oath prescribed in the supplemental act defines all the 
 qualifications required, and every person who can take that oath is 
 entitled to have his name entered upon the list of voters. 
 
15 
 
 2. The board of registration have no authority to administer any 
 other oath to the person applying for registration than this prescribed 
 oath; nor to administer any oath to any other person, touching the 
 qualifications of the applicant, or the falsity of the oath so taken by 
 him. The act to guard against falsity in the oath, provides that, if 
 false, the person taking it shall be tried and punished for perjury. 
 
 No provision is made for challenging the qualifications of the appli- 
 cant, or entering upon any trial or investigation of his qualifications, 
 either by witnesses or any other form of proof. 
 
 3. As to citizenship and residence. 
 
 The applicant for registration must be a citizen of the State and of 
 the United States, and must be a resident of a county included in the 
 election district. He may be registered if he has been such citizen 
 for a period less than twelve months at the time he applies for regis- 
 tration, but he cannot vote at any election unless his citizenship has 
 then extended to the full term of one year. As to such a person the 
 exact length of his citizenship should be noted opposite his name on 
 the list, so that it may appear on the day of election, upon reference 
 to the list, whether the lull term has then been accomplished. 
 
 4. An unnaturalized person cannot take this oath, but an alien who 
 has been naturalized can take it, and no other proof of naturalization 
 can be required from him. 
 
 5. No one who is not twenty-one years of age at the time of reg- 
 istration can take the oath, for he must swear that he has then at- 
 tained that age. 
 
 6. No one who has been disfranchised for participation in any re- 
 bellion against the United States, or for felony committed against the 
 laws of any State or of the United States, can safely take this oath. 
 
 The actual participation in a rebellion, or the actual commission of 
 a felony, does not amount to disfranchisement. The sort of disfran- 
 chisement here meant, is that which is declared by law passed by 
 competent authority, or which has been fixed upon the criminal by 
 the sentence of the court which tried him for the crime. 
 
 No law of the United States has declared the penalty of disfran- 
 chisement for participation in rebellion alone. Nor is it known that 
 any such law exists in either of these ten States, except perhaps Vir- 
 ginia, as to which State special instructions will be given. 
 
 7. As to disfranchisement arising from having held office followed by 
 participation in rebellion. 
 
 This is the most important part of the oath, and requires strict at- 
 tention to arrive at its meaning. I deem it proper to give the exact 
 words. The applicant must swear or affirm as follows: 
 
 "That I have never been a member of any State legislature, nor 
 held any executive or judicial office in any State, and afterwards en- 
 gaged in an insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or 
 given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof ; that I have never taken 
 an oath as a member of Congress of the United States, or as an offi- 
 cer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or 
 as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Consti- 
 tution of the United States, and afterwards engaged in insurrection 
 
16 
 
 or rebellion against the United States, or given aid or comfort to the 
 enemies thereof." 
 
 Two elements must concur in order to disqualify a person under 
 these clauses: First, the office and official oath to support the Con- 
 stitution of the United States: Second, engaging afterwards in rebel- 
 lion. Both must exist to work disqualification, and must happen in 
 the order of time mentioned. 
 
 A person who has held an office and taken the oath to support the 
 Federal Constitution and has not afterwards engaged in rebellion, is 
 not disqualified. So, too, a person who has engaged in rebellion, 
 but has not theretofore held an office and taken that oath, is not dis- 
 qualified. 
 
 8. Officers of the United Stcdes. 
 
 As to these the language is without limitation. The person who has 
 at any time prior to the rebellion held any office, civil or military, un- 
 der the United States, and has taken an official oath to support the 
 Constitution of the United States, is subject to disqualification. 
 
 9. Military officers of any State, prior to the rebellion, are not sub- 
 ject to disqualification. 
 
 10. Municipal officers, that is to say, officers of incorporated cities, 
 towns, and villages, such as mayors, aldermen, town council, police, 
 and other city or town officers, are not subject to disqualification. 
 
 11. Persons who have, prior to the rebellion, been members of the 
 Congress of the United States, or members of a State legislature, are 
 subject to disqualification. But those who have been members of 
 conventions framing or amending the Constitution of a State, prior 
 to the rebellion, are not subject to disqualification. 
 
 12. All the executive or judicial officers of any State who took an 
 oath to support the Constitution of the United States, are subject to 
 disqualification, and in these I include county officers, as to whom I 
 made a reservation in the opinion heretofore given. After full con- 
 sideration I have arrived at the conclusion, that they are subject to 
 disqualification, if they were required to take as a part of their offi- 
 cial oath, the oath to support the Constitution of the United Stcdes. 
 
 13. Persons who exercised mere agencies or employments under 
 State authority, are not disqualified ; such as commissioners to lay- 
 out roads, commissioners of public works visitors of State institu- 
 tions, directors of State banks or other State institutions, examiners 
 of banks, notaries public, commissioners to take acknowledgments of 
 deeds and lawyers. 
 
 ENGAGING IN REBELLION. 
 
 Having specified what offices held by any one prior to the rebel- 
 linn, come within the inclining of the law, it is necessary next to set 
 forth what subsequent conduct fixes upon such person the offence of 
 engaging in rebellion. I repent, that two things must exisl as to any 
 person, to disqualify him from voting: first, the office held prior to 
 the rebellion, and afterwards, participation in the rebellion. 
 
 14. An acl to iix upon a person the offence of engaging in rebel- 
 lion under this law, must be an overt and voluntary act, done with 
 
17 
 
 the intent of aiding or furthering the common unlawful purpose. A 
 person forced into the rebel service by conscription, or under a par- 
 amount authority which he could not safely disobey, and who would 
 not have entered such service if left to the free exercise of his own 
 will, cannot be held to be disqualified from voting. 
 
 15. Mere acts of charity, where the intenl is to relieve the wants 
 of the object of such charity, and not done in aid of the cause in 
 which he may have been engaged, do not disqualify. But organ- 
 ized contributions of food and clothing for the general relief of per- 
 sons engaged in the rebellion, and not of a merely sanitary charac- 
 ter, but contributed to enable them to perform their unlawful object, 
 may be classed with acts which do disqualify. 
 
 Forced contributions to the rebel cause, in the form of taxes or 
 military assessments, which a person may be compelled to pay or 
 contribute, do not disqualify. But voluntary contributions to the 
 rebel cause, even such indirect contributions as arise from the vol- 
 untary loan' of money, to rebel authorities, or purchase of bonds or 
 securities created to afford the means of carrying on the rebellion, 
 will work disqualification. 
 
 16. All those who, in legislative or other official capacity, were en- 
 gaged in the furtherance of the common unlawful purpose, where the 
 duties of the office necessarily had relation to the support of the re- 
 bellion, such as members of the rebel conventions, congresses, and 
 legislatures, diplomatic agents of the rebel confederacy, and other 
 officials whose offices were created for the purpose of more effectually 
 carrying on hostilities, or whose duties appertained to the support of 
 the rebel cause, must be held to be disqualified. 
 
 But officers who, during the rebellion, discharged official duties not 
 incident to war, but only such duties as belong even to a state of 
 peace, and were necessary to the preservation of order and the ad- 
 ministration of law, are not to be considered as thereby engaging in 
 rebellion or as disqualified. Disloyal sentiments, opinions, or sympa- 
 thies would not disqualify, but where a person has by speech or by 
 writing, incited others to engage in rebellion, he must come under 
 the disqualification. t . 
 
 17. The duties of the board appointed to superintend the elections. 
 This board, having the custody of the list of registered voters in 
 
 the district for which it is constituted, must see that the name of the 
 person offering to vote is found upon the registration list, and if such 
 proves to be the fact, it is the duty of the board to receive his 
 vote. They cannot receive the vote of any person whoso name is not 
 upon the list, though he may be ready to take the registration oath. 
 and although he may satisfy them that he was unable to have his 
 name registered at the proper time, in consequence of absence, sick- 
 ness, or other cause. 
 
 The board cannot enter into any enquiry as to the qualifications of 
 any person whose name is not on the list, or as to the qualifications 
 of any person whose name is on the list. 
 
 18. The mode of voting is provided in the act to be by ballot. The 
 board will keep a record and poll-book of the election, showing the 
 
18 
 
 votes, list of voters, and the persons elected by a plurality of the votes 
 cast at the election, and make returns of these to the commanding 
 general of the district. 
 
 19. The board appointed for registration and for superintending the 
 elections, must take the oath prescribed by the act of Congress, ap- 
 proved July 2, 1862, entitled, "An act to prescribe an oath of office-" 
 1 have the honor to be, with great respect, 
 
 HENRY STANBERY, 
 
 Attorney General. 
 
 I 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 013 786 472 1 •