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THE FOUNDATIONS OF NORMAL AND 
 ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
WORKS BY BORIS SIDIS 
 
 The Psychology of Suggestion. 
 
 Multiple Personality. 
 
 Psychopathological Researches. 
 
 The Psychology of Laughter. 
 
 Philistine and Genius. 
 
 An Experimental Study of Sleep. 
 
 The Foundations of Normal and 
 Abnormal Psychology. 
 
 Symptomatology, Psychognosis, 
 
 and Diagnosis of Psychopathic Maladies. 
 
 The Causation and Treatment 
 of Psychopathic Diseases. 
 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
 
 NORMAL AND ABNORMAL 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 BY 
 
 BORIS SIDIS, A. M., Ph.D., M. D. 
 
 BOSTON : RICHARD G. BADGER 
 
 TORONTO : THE COPP CLARK CO., Limited 
 
Copyright, 1914, by Boris Sidis 
 
 All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 
 APR 16 1914 
 
 The Gorham Press, Boston, U. S. A 
 
 i C!,A369724 
 
To the Memory of My Master and Friend 
 
 WILLIAM JAMES 
 
 Who, being the foremost pioneer in the vast domain of 
 
 the human mind, has generously encouraged others 
 
 in their efforts at clearing fresh trails, leading 
 
 to an ever more comprehensive view of 
 
 the rich varieties of mental life. 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2011 with funding from 
 The Library of Congress 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/foundationsofnorOOsidi 
 
PREFACE 
 
 In this volume I made an attempt to formulate the 
 fundamental assumptions and main principles that un- 
 derlie normal and abnormal psychology. Every science, 
 mathematical, physical or biological, has its postulates 
 as the foundation of its structure. Psychology as a 
 science has also its own assumptions which have to be 
 clearly formulated. The object of the first part of this 
 volume is the unravelling of the principal concepts and 
 hypotheses which form the basis of the study of men- 
 tal phenomena. 
 
 All through the domain of the sciences there is a vast 
 movement for the search of fundamental concepts and 
 for the close investigation of such concepts. Even 
 such an exact science as mathematics has felt this spirit 
 of examination of its fundamental assumptions, axioms, 
 and postulates. Men like Lobatchevsky, Bolyai, Rie- 
 man and others have given the start and a number of 
 mathematicians have recently followed in their foot- 
 steps, with the result of getting a wider horizon and of 
 opening unknown regions. The same we find in the 
 case of physical sciences, such as physics, mechanics and 
 chemistry. Mach, Poincare, Ostwald, Pearson and 
 others have contributed to this spirit of investigation in 
 the domain of physical sciences. This spirit of inquiry 
 has become of late specially intensified by the revolu- 
 tionary discoveries of radio-active bodies. 
 
 We are acquainted with the great movement which 
 has swept all over biological, sociological, and eco- 
 nomical sciences due to the influence of the theory of 
 
 (0 
 
ii Preface 
 
 evolution. The spirit of free inquiry into fundamental 
 concepts has seized on all sciences. Throughout the 
 whole domain of human thought there is felt this re- 
 juvenating and invigorating breath of the new revolu- 
 tionary spirit. Philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, history, 
 law, economics all have been awakened out of their 
 long sleep of centuries. Every science has been shaken 
 by this mighty movement to its very foundation. Even 
 such a dry study as logic has left the vital breeze of 
 the inquiring spirit of modern times. 
 
 I make an attempt in this volume to examine in an 
 elementary way the foundations of normal and abnor- 
 mal psychology. This is all the more necessary as phy- 
 siologists, biologists, biological chemists, and recently 
 students of comparative psychology, a science which lies 
 on the borderland of psychology and biology, have a 
 tendency to make incursions into psychology proper, 
 and favor mechanical or purely physiological concepts 
 to the detriment and even total exclusion of mental pro- 
 cesses. 
 
 This tendency towards elimination of psychic life 
 by mechanical processes or by "The Unconscious" 
 is also observed in the writings of some workers in the 
 domain of psychopathology. They think it is in the in- 
 terest of strict science to express wherever possible men- 
 tal states in terms of physical changes. Finally a stage 
 is reached in which all consciousness is completely dis- 
 pensed with in favor of physiological processes or "The 
 Unconscious". Psychology is thus made a branch of 
 physiology and biology. 
 
 Again, philosophers and metaphysicians are apt to 
 make intrusions into the domain of psychology, because 
 the latter is regarded by them from time immemorial 
 
Preface iii 
 
 as legitimate prey, inasmuch as their own domain lies 
 on the outskirts of mental life. In the interest of meta- 
 physical systems philosophers attempt to subject psy- 
 chology to their own speculative purposes. 
 
 The popular mind has a tendency of regarding psy- 
 chology as something mystical and of identifying psy- 
 chology with all kinds of faith cures, mind cures, spirit- 
 ism, telepathy, telaesthesia, and table rapping. It is 
 unfortunate that even medical men of note, on account 
 of lack of acquaintance with psychological subjects and 
 inquiries, are apt to look askance at psychology and 
 identify it with religious beliefs, mental cures as well 
 as with the more shady side of spiritistic manifestations. 
 
 Still more complicated is the plight in which the psy- 
 chologist finds himself in regard to the recent claims 
 put forth by some psychologists in having achieved re- 
 sults of importance to law, industry, and to the reforma- 
 tion of social ills. The demand for practical results in 
 psychology is due to the industrial spirit of our times, a 
 spirit which requires immediate results that can be 
 cashed or expressed in dollars and cents. The earnest 
 psychologist should repudiate such industrial business 
 psychology, for the simple reason that such a psycholo- 
 gy is imaginary; in other words, such a psychology does 
 not exist. An experienced salesman, an intelligent busi- 
 ness man knows infinitely more about business and how 
 to obtain the best results out of certain combinations 
 than all the psychologists with their laboratory experi- 
 ments, their artificial statistics, and puerile trivial ex- 
 perimental arrangements, giving results no less trivial 
 and meaningless. 
 
 The claims made by psychologists as to industrial ef- 
 ficiency which psychology can give is ludicrous in the 
 
iv Preface 
 
 extreme. We may as well expect the astronomer to 
 claim that astronomy can give points how to conduct 
 successfully a political campaign. As a matter of fact 
 the psychologist has nothing to say on the subject of 
 advertisements, industry, and business, but common- 
 place trivialities expressed with all the pomposity of 
 scholastic authority. Industrial efficiency does not be- 
 long to the domain of psychology. We may as well ex- 
 pect the comparative psychologist to offer practical 
 points on the efficiency of cows to give milk or on the 
 efficiency of hens to lay eggs. The success of ad- 
 vertisement is a matter of experienced business men and 
 not of academic psychologists who have to offer nothing 
 but the merest platitudes. 
 
 We must once for all enter a protest against those 
 psychologists who claim that they have some great psy- 
 chological truths to reveal to business men, manufactur- 
 er and workingmen. I trust that both the businessman 
 and the workingman will have enough common sense 
 to take such psychological truths for what they are 
 actually worth. The ordinary psychologist under- 
 stands little of business life, knows almost nothing of 
 the life of the laborer, and is woefully ignorant of the 
 economical questions of the times. Psychological busi- 
 ness claims are illusory. The sooner the practical busi- 
 ness man learns this fact the better for him, and also for 
 the earnest psychological investigator. 
 
 Psychology is just emerging from its metaphysical 
 and theological stages as Auguste Comte would put it. 
 Psychology is just entering the circle of her sister 
 sciences. At present it is in a state similar to the phy- 
 sics of the sixteenth century. The psychologist should 
 declare frankly and openly that he can no more assist 
 
Preface v 
 
 the businessman and the manufacturer than the mathe- 
 matician with his non-Euclidean geometry or the logi- 
 cian with his algebra of logic can help the solution of 
 the great problems of capital and labor. 
 
 We can obtain some help from abnormal psychology 
 in its application to the medical treatment of nervous 
 and mental maladies. This is quite natural as abnor- 
 mal psychology is essentially based on clinical and ex- 
 perimental of mental diseases. The claim, however, 
 that psychology can give directions for vocations of life 
 or for business and industry is entirely unfounded. 
 
 The same holds true of the practical pseudo-psychol- 
 ogy that has invaded the school, the court, the prison 
 and the immigration bureau. The intelligence tests 
 are silly, pedantic, absurd, and grossly misleading. 
 
 I have not discussed in this volume the practical 
 aspect of recent quasi-business psychology for the reason 
 that such claims are nothing but a snare and delusion. 
 Of course I do not expect that this warning of mine as 
 to the misleading character of applied psychology will 
 be taken graciously. There is at present an epidemic of 
 practical or applied psychology. People however will 
 wake up from their psychological dreams and will real- 
 ize that applied psychology is nothing but a nightmare. 
 I am fully aware of the fact that my present protest will 
 draw on me the ire and severe attacks of many a psy- 
 chologist, but I sincerely hope that some of the more 
 earnest psychologists will sustain me in my present con- 
 tention. 
 
 So much for the practical limitations of psychology. 
 In discussing the theoretical aspects of psychology and 
 attempting to point out its limitations I have had to 
 touch on problems ultra-psychological, but this was un- 
 
vi Preface 
 
 avoidable. It had to be done in order to clear the path 
 and see the lay of the land. I have no doubt that there 
 will be found a great number of shortcomings in the 
 foundations as well as vagueness in the delineation of 
 the main postulates and psychological principles. I 
 shall be fully satisfied, if this volume will stimulate 
 others to better work in the same direction. 
 
 The second part of this work deals with my theory 
 of "moment-consciousness." This theory was advanced 
 by me some sixteen years ago in my "Psychology of Sug- 
 gestion." It was further touched upon in my "Multi- 
 ple Personality," but I had not stated the theory as dis- 
 tinctly as I did in this volume. I may add that when 
 James read the theory in "The Psychology of Sugges- 
 tion" he told me he found it valuable, and urged me to 
 develop it more in detail. 
 
 The theory of moment-consciousness presents a gen- 
 eral view of the nature and development of conscious- 
 ness, from reflex consciousness to compound reflex and 
 instinctive consciousness reaching the highest form 
 of consciousness, that of self-consciousness. Con- 
 sciousness and the adaptation of the psychic in- 
 dividuality or of the organism to the external en- 
 vironment is looked at not only from a psychological, 
 but also from a biological standpoint. Consciousness 
 in the course of its development is presented in a series 
 of stages and types, each lower stage leading to the next 
 higher and more complicated stage and type. This does 
 not mean that the higher type is included in the lower 
 We must assume spontaneous mental variations, or 
 psychic mutations, so that while the stages and types are 
 arranged in a progressive series of their development 
 and complication, they at the same time differ qualita- 
 
Preface vii 
 
 tively in type of mental life. 
 
 I may add that most of the ideas developed in this 
 volume have been formulated by me some fourteen 
 years ago, and then retouched from time to time. A 
 few of the chapters with some modifications have been 
 published by me in various psychological and medical 
 journals. 
 
 Boris Sidis. 
 
 Sidis Psychotherapeutic Institute, 
 Portsmouth, 
 New Hampshire, 
 January, ig 14. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PART I 
 
 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 I. 
 
 II. 
 
 III. 
 
 IV. 
 
 V. 
 
 VI. 
 
 VII. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 IX. 
 X. 
 
 XI. 
 
 XII. 
 
 XIII. 
 
 XIV. 
 
 XV. 
 
 XVI. 
 
 XVII. 
 
 XVIII. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Psychology as a Science . . II 
 
 Physical and Psychic Facts 18 
 
 The Definition of the Psychic Process. 26 
 
 Psychic States as Objects 31 
 
 The Scope of Psychology 36 
 
 The Sources of Psychology 40 
 
 Psychology and Psychopathology .... 45 
 The Spiritualistic and Materialistic 
 
 Hypotheses 51 
 
 The Transmission Hypothesis 59 
 
 The Metaphysical Hypotheses of Par- 
 allelism 64 
 
 The Unitary Experience of Voluntar- 
 ism 67 
 
 The Inductive Basis of the Positive 
 
 Psychological Hypothesis 73 
 
 The Deductive Basis of the Positive 
 
 Psychological Hypothesis ....... 82 
 
 Life and the Psychic Process 87 
 
 The Chance Aspect of Life and Mind. 93 
 
 Activity of Mental Life 10 1 
 
 The Postulates of Psychology 106 
 
 Mental Synthesis 113 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 XIX. Theories of Perception 119 
 
 XX. The Structure and Function of the 
 
 Percept 126 
 
 XXI. Primary and Secondary Sensory Ele- 
 ments 137 
 
 XXII. Secondary Sensory Elements and Hal- 
 lucinatory Perception 146 
 
 XXIII. The Attributes of Sensory Elements . . 160 
 
 XXIV. Sensation and External Reality 164 
 
 XXV. The Subconscious and Unconscious 
 
 Cerebration 175 
 
 XXVI. The Subconscious and Automatism. . 186 
 XXVII. The Subconscious and the Passive Con- 
 sciousness 194 
 
 XXVIII. Subconscious and Unconscious Ideas.. 198 
 XXIX. The Subconscious, Conscious and Un- 
 conscious 207 
 
 XXX. The Threshold and Mental Systems.. 213 
 
 XXXI. The Principle of Reserve Energy. ... 219 
 
 PART II 
 
 THE THEORY OF THE MOMENT CON- 
 SCIOUSNESS 
 
 I. The Moment Consciousness 229 
 
 II. Types of Moments and Moment- 
 Threshold 239 
 
 III. Modifications of Moments in the Or- 
 
 ganized Aggregate 249 
 
 IV. Mental Organization 254 
 
 V. The Gr« w th and Function of the Mo- 
 ment ...-„. 260 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 VI. The Relation of the Moment to the 
 
 Environment 265 
 
 VII. The Assimilation of the Moment in 
 
 Normal States 272 
 
 VIII. Abnormal Moments 283 
 
 IX. Mental Continuity and the Psychic 
 
 Gap 287 
 
 X. The Moment-Threshold 297 
 
 XI. The Process of Moment-Disaggrega- 
 
 tion 308 
 
 XII. Reproduction and the Reflex Moment 317 
 
 XIII. Desultory Consciousness 322 
 
 XIV. The Synthetic Moment and its Repro- 
 
 duction 326 
 
 XV. The Accumulative Character of the 
 
 Synthetic Moment 332 
 
 XVI. The Simple and Compound Synthetic 
 
 Moment 337 
 
 XVII. The Desultory Type in Pathological 
 
 States 346 
 
 XVIII. Presentations and Representations... 351 
 XIX. Representations and the Laws of their 
 
 Combinations 359 
 
 XX. Representation and Recognition .... 365 
 XXI. The Recognitive Moment and its Re- 
 production 376 
 
 XXII. The Synthetic Recognitive Moment. . 384 
 XXIII. The Synthetic Moment of Self-Con- * 
 
 sciousness 388 
 
 Appendix I. Consciousness 391 
 
 Appendix II. Physiological Traces . 398 
 
 Index 407 
 
PART I 
 
 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS 
 
 AND PRINCIPLES 
 
The Foundations of Normal and 
 Abnormal Psychology 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY AS A SCIENCE 
 
 WE assume that the reader regards psychol- 
 ogy as a science. It is however one thing 
 to label a subject as a science and another 
 thing to understand clearly in what sense 
 the term science is used in the case of psychology. A 
 clear understanding of the nature of science is here of 
 special importance on account of the peculiar position 
 psychology occupies in the hierarchy of human knowl- 
 edge. It is therefore desirable to define the meaning 
 of science before we proceed to discuss the subject mat- 
 ter of psychology. 
 
 Science is the description of phenomena and the 
 formulation of their relations. Science describes facts 
 and formulates their relations in laws. The task of 
 science is first to formulate facts belonging to the same 
 type, and then to generalize them, that is to express 
 their general relationship by one comprehensive for- 
 mula, in spite of the many individual variations in the 
 phenomena. Thus in geometry, possibly the most an- 
 cient of all sciences, many isolated and important facts 
 were already known to the semi-civilized nations of 
 antiquity, but it required the rationalizing spirit of the 
 
 II 
 
12 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 Greek mind to classify and generalize the facts into 
 theorems, the laws of space. Many important proper- 
 ties of the right-angled triangle, for instance, were al- 
 ready known to the ancient Chaldeans and Egyptians. 
 They knew that if in a right-angled triangle the two 
 sides are respectively three and four, the hypothenuse 
 must be five and so on; that is, they knew only con- 
 crete facts, but what they lacked was just the scientific 
 side. It required a Pythagoras to discover that in all 
 right-angled triangles the sum of the squares of the 
 two sides is equal to the square of the third. No mat- 
 ter what the size of the triangle be, no matter how dif- 
 ferent in length its sides are, once the triangle be of the 
 same type, namely right-angular, the same general re- 
 lationship must obtain. 
 
 To take an illustration from physics. Falling 
 bodies form one type of movement. Now the bod- 
 ies themselves may be different in kind, in nature, 
 may be of various material, may differ widely in 
 structure, weight, and shape, and still, since they 
 all belong to the same type of motion, they are, in 
 spite of their manifold diversity, expressed in one gen- 
 eral formula, in one law, namely, that the spaces tra- 
 versed are proportional to the square of times. 
 
 In other less exact sciences the facts are exhaustively 
 described and a general statement is formulated as to 
 their relationship. In physiology, for instance, we find 
 mainly descriptions of facts classified into types, the 
 relationships of which are expressed in general for- 
 mulae, or laws. Thus in the cerebro-spinal nervous sys- 
 tem, each part and its functions are described as fully as 
 possible, and then all the facts are brought under one 
 comprehensive formula such as the reflex arc. In em- 
 
Psychology as a Science 13 
 
 bryology the different changes of the embryo are 
 minutely described, classified into types, into a certain 
 number of definite stages, and then all the changes, in 
 the infinite wealth of their variety, are expressed in the 
 general proposition that the embryo in the short period 
 of its development traverses in an abbreviated form all 
 the stages that the species has passed through in the 
 many ages of its existence; all the changes are general- 
 ized in the formula that the ontogenetic series is an epi- 
 tome of phylogenetic evolution. We may, therefore, say 
 that science is a description of types of facts, the rela- 
 tionships of which are expressed in general comprehen- 
 sive formulae, or laws. It is in this sense that we un- 
 derstand psychology to be a science; it classifies phe- 
 nomena into types and searches for the general expres- 
 sion of their relations, or for what is termed psycho- 
 logical laws. 
 
 We must come to something more precise and defi- 
 nite. We said that psychology deals with classification 
 and generalizations of phenomena; but what are these 
 phenomena? In the different branches of science, we 
 find that each one has a determinate order of phenom- 
 ena to deal with, a definite subject matter. Thus ge-- 
 ometry deals with spatial facts, mechanics with motion, 
 physics with changes of molecular aggregations, chem- 
 istry with atomic combinations and their mutations, 
 physiology with processes going to make the equilib- 
 rium of organic life, sociology with phenomena of so- 
 cial life, and so it is in the case of all other sciences. 
 Now what is the subject matter of psychology? What 
 are the facts, the phenomena with which psychology 
 deals? — Psychology deals with facts of consciousness. 
 
 On the very threshold of our discussion, we may be 
 
14 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 stopped by the pertinent question: "You say that 
 psychology deals with facts of consciousness, but what 
 is consciousness?" — Consciousness is subjective facts, 
 such as the elements of sensation, feelings, pains, 
 thoughts, acts of willing and the like. Positive science 
 must have given facts, data to work upon; these data 
 it analyzes, describes, classifies into types and seeks to 
 find the formulae of their relationships. Psychology 
 can accomplish no more than any other science. The 
 data of psychology are facts of consciousness, these facts 
 are analyzed into their simplest elements, and the laws 
 of their relations are searched for. But psychology does 
 not, and legitimately cannot possibly go beyond con- 
 sciousness. Consciousness is the ultimate datum which 
 psychology must assume as given and which is from 
 a psychological standpoint unanalyzable. Conscious- 
 ness must be postulated, if we wish to enter the temple 
 of psychology. 
 
 In this relation psychology is as positive as the rest 
 of her sister sciences. Geometry, a science to which 
 no one will deny exactness, deals as we know with the 
 laws of space-relations. Should we ask the geometrician 
 the same question just put to the psychologist: You 
 say that your science, geometry, deals with facts of 
 space and their relations, but what is space ? The geo- 
 metrician will smile at us. He will tell us that by space 
 he means such forms as lines, angles, triangles, quadri- 
 laterals, circles, cubes, cylinders, pyramids, etc. Should 
 we persist and ask further, "Yes, that is true, but all 
 these are so many forms of space, what is the space it- 
 self with which you deal?" The geometrician will no 
 doubt answer : "My dear sir, geometry deals with facts 
 of space, space itself is taken as an ultimate datum. The 
 
Psychology as a Science 15 
 
 work of geometry is not to ask what space is in itself, 
 but what the relations are of spatial forms, space itself 
 being postulated." 
 
 Mechanics deals with the laws of energy and motion, 
 physics with molecular changes of matter, but neither 
 physics nor mechanics would have gone far, had they 
 stopped to answer the questions as to what motion, 
 energy, matter are in themselves. These are simply post- 
 ulated, taken for granted, they are the ultimate data of 
 these sciences. In this respect psychology does not 
 differ from other sciences, it takes its subject matter as 
 given and does not inquire as to what the nature of the 
 material is in itself. The reader must remember that 
 the question as to what things are in themselves is not 
 at all a question of positive sciences, but of metaphysics. 
 I do not mean in any way to detract from the dignity 
 of metaphysics, what I wish is simply to point out the 
 limits of positive science. The problem as to what things 
 are in themselves does not fall within the province of 
 science, but within the domain of metaphysical re- 
 search. 
 
 The question as to the nature of consciousness, what 
 it is in itself, may be a very important one, but it lies 
 outside the ken of psychology, just as the laws of aes- 
 thetics do not concern the chemist, although the latter 
 may be a great lover of beauty. In the contemplation 
 and enjoyment of a beautiful picture he will not intro- 
 duce a chemical formula, and in his chemical experi- 
 ments he will not introduce aesthetic considerations. The 
 same holds true in the case of psychology. The psy- 
 chologist may be a metaphysician, but in his psycholog- 
 ical work he must keep clear of metaphysics. Conscious- 
 ness therefore is a presupposition, a postulate of psy- 
 
1 6 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 chology. 
 
 There is one more important assumption which psy- 
 chology must start with in order to be a positive sci- 
 / ence at all, namely, uniformity. Under similar condi- 
 tions like results follow. Suppose a geometrician should 
 prove to you that the sum of the three angles of a tri- 
 angle is equal to two right angles, suppose that some 
 sceptic should come in and say, "Yes, that is all right in 
 relation to the triangles in this particular space, in 
 another portion of space, on some other star, or planet 
 the theorem will not hold good." The only answer the 
 geometrician could give is that we must assume that 
 space is uniform, so that wherever we form our tri- 
 angles we obtain the same results. The same is true 
 in mechanics. The laws of motion and inertia hold 
 good of the pebble on the roadside, of the dust grains 
 dancing in the sunbeam, and of distant stars in the milky 
 way. Uniformity of relations among phenomena must 
 be postulated, if science is to be at all. If under the 
 same conditions different results follow, science would 
 have been an impossibility. Uniformity of nature is 
 one of the most fundamental postulates of science. Psy- 
 chology assumes uniformity; it assumes that there exist 
 constant uniform types of mental activity with definite 
 relations that can be formulated into psychological laws. 
 Thus psychology at the very outset postulates conscious- 
 ness and uniformity of mental phenomena. 
 
 We can now see in what relation psychology which 
 deals with phenomena of consciousness differs from 
 philosophy whose subject matter is also consciousness. 
 Philosophy has no postulates, psychology, like all other 
 sciences, must have its postulates which it cannot tran- 
 scend. Philosophy deals with the ultimate in conscious- 
 
Psychology as a Science 17 
 
 ness, it investigates the very postulates of conscious ac- 
 tivity. Psychology on the contrary accepts the facts of 
 consciousness as ultimate data. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 PHYSICAL AND PSYCHIC FACTS 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY we said deals with facts of con« 
 sciousness, but this is too broad a statement, 
 for there are other sciences that also deal with 
 facts of consciousness, such as ethics, aesthet- 
 ics, logic. In what respect does psychology differ from 
 these sciences? It differs in this that ethics, aesthetics 
 * and logic are normative regulative sciences; psychology 
 is a positive natural science. Ethics deals with ideals 
 
 • of moral life, aesthetics with ideals of beauty, and logic 
 with ideal ways of correct reasoning. All these sciences 
 
 • deal with ideals, with norms to which the matter of fact 
 consciousness ought to conform, if it is to act rightly. 
 They put a value on the phenomena. Psychology, how- 
 ever, like all other natural sciences has no other ideal 
 than fact, it admits of no "ought." From a strictly 
 psychological standpoint, the ugly and the beautiful, the 
 good and the evil, the true and the false are of equal 
 value. Psychologically they are all facts of conscious- 
 ness and must be studied as such; just as the serpent 
 and the dove are of equal interest and value to the nat- 
 uralist. The ravings of a maniac are of the same psycho- 
 logical interest and value as the subtle reasoning of a 
 Newton. Psychology is a positive natural science, it does 
 not deal with the subjective evaluation of facts of con- 
 sciousness, but with their objective natural existence. 
 
 Having shown in what psychology agrees with other 
 positive natural sciences, we must now point out in what 
 
 18 
 
Physical and Psychic Facts 19 
 
 it differs from them. Psychology deals with phenomena 
 of consciousness as facts of objective natural existence. 
 Are these facts of the same order with those of the 
 physical world, the subject matter of the natural phys- 
 ical sciences? We must answer in the negative. The 
 objects of the natural sciences of the physical world are 
 of a material and spatial nature. A physical body has 
 weight, occupies a certain portion of space, so has the 
 molecule, the atom. Can we say the same of psy- 
 chological facts? By no means. They are different 
 in kind, and this I wish especially to impress on the 
 mind of the reader. To realize this truth, I think it 
 a good preliminary psychological exercise for the reader 
 to try to find how many grams, or grains his idea 
 of beauty weighs, how many millimeters long, wide and 
 high his feelings of love are; let him indulge in the 
 fancy of conceiving an engineer building a bridge with 
 mathematical formulae as links, and his feelings of vir- 
 tue and patriotism as supports. On the other hand let 
 him think of a logician trying to fill up the defects of 
 his train of reasoning with solid bricks, and using as 
 connecting links bars of pig iron. In short, psychol- 
 ogy differs from physical sciences in this, that its facts, 
 the facts of consciousness are not of a material nature. 
 "Do not physical sciences" it may be asked "deal with 
 such phenomena as sound and light?" Certainly they 
 do, but these sciences regard these phenomena from 
 a standpoint radically different from that of psychology. 
 Sound in physics is not the sensation sound, but the 
 external, material vibration of air, which may or may 
 not give rise to a sensation of hearing. The same holds 
 true in the case of light. What physics investigates is 
 not light as sensation, but vibrations of ether which 
 
20 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 may or may not give rise to a sensation of sight. It is, 
 however, just such facts as sensations, facts not spatial 
 in their nature which constitute the subject matter of 
 psychology. 
 
 "May not facts of consciousness be some kind of mat- 
 ter, some form of material substance the constitution of 
 which we do not as yet know ?" Such was the question 
 put by a medical man, when he heard me expounding 
 the difference in kind between physical and psychical 
 facts. "That might be" I answered, "but then that 
 substance, if it ever be discovered, will not have the 
 properties of matter; it will be a "matter" totally 
 different in kind from that studied by the physicist. For 
 the "matter" of physical sciences is essentially one of 
 extension; a matter however that occupies no space is 
 an existence altogether different in kind from that of 
 extended things, and is certainly no "matter" for the 
 physicist. 
 
 The persistent antagonist may raise here a further 
 objection. "Are not the phenomena of consciousness" 
 he may ask "facts of activity? And is not activity, 
 kinetic energy? And if this be the case must not the 
 facts of consciousness be ranged along with physical 
 phenomena, be reduced to the manifestations and trans- 
 formations of kinetic energy and thus really and ulti- 
 mately fall within the domain of the mechanical sci- 
 ences?" 
 
 Change certainly is manifested in the mutations of 
 states of consciousness, but this change is not the phys- 
 ical change of translocation. Change in the states of con- 
 sciousness may no doubt, be regarded as activity, and 
 if you please as energy, but this activity is not the en- 
 ergy of mechanics. Activity in mechanical or physical 
 
Physical and Psychic Facts 21 
 
 sciences means molar, molecular, or atomic movement 
 of matter through space, while psychic activity is not a 
 translation of matter through space, a thought is not a 
 material mass having extension, weight and locomotion. 
 This truth, simple as it may appear, cannot be too 
 often repeated and too strongly emphasized, since one 
 frequently meets with this fallacy of "thought-materiali- 
 zation" in the world of psychiatry. Words are often mis- 
 leading and the metaphorical expression "mental en- 
 ergy" is taken in its literal meaning of mechanical en- 
 ergy. While I am writing these lines I find in one of 
 the number of the Russian "Archives of Psychiatry and 
 Neurology" edited by Prof. Kowalevsky, an article, 
 in which an attempt is made to express mental activity 
 in terms of mechanical energy. The writer might as 
 well attempt to change inches into pounds. He who 
 undertakes the examination and study of mental phe- 
 nomena must bear in mind the simple and important, 
 but frequently forgotten truth, that facts of conscious- 
 ness are not of a physical, mechanical character. 
 
 Against our view may be urged the fact that in 
 proportion as a science tends to become exact, it takes 
 on more a quantitative aspect, its phenomena are re- 
 duced to molecular or atomic changes. If now psy- 
 chology is a science at all, it will reach its exactness, 
 when it can be expressed in terms of matter and motion, 
 so that the phenomena presented by consciousness, al- 
 though at present impenetrable to our imperfect instru- 
 ments and methods of investigation, must ultimately 
 be reduced, in some way or other, to mechanical terms. 
 Psychology has not yet had its Galileo. 
 
 This objection may be easily disposed of by the simple 
 answer that the exactness of science is not at all in pro- 
 
22 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 portion to its degree of reduction to terms of matter 
 and motion. No one will deny that mathematics is an 
 exact science, but is it exact because it is reduced to me- 
 chanical terms? While mechanics must be logical, logic 
 is not mechanical. 
 
 Within certain limits this generalization of the re- 
 lation of scientific exactness to mechanical formulae 
 may be fully granted, if it be restricted to the concrete 
 physical sciences, but it cannot possibly hold good in 
 case of psychology, as the latter does not fall within 
 the circle of the physical sciences. 
 
 The weakness of this last objection from scientific 
 exactness becomes clearly disclosed, if we get a little 
 deeper into the matter. The reason why there is such 
 a persistent tendency to reduce science to mechanical 
 terms is based on the tacit understanding that atoms 
 and motion are the only ultimate realities. We see at 
 a glance that this consideration is at bottom purely 
 metaphysical; it is a consideration which science has 
 not to take into account. Nothing is so dogmatically 
 metaphysical as just the common sense that has an ab- 
 horrence of metaphysics. That atoms and their motions 
 are the only ultimate realities is certainly metaphysics 
 and bad metaphysics too, as it is unguarded by reflective 
 critical thought. Since this unreflective metaphysics of 
 atomism is widely spread in the medical world, and is 
 considered scientific, one cannot help discussing it, point- 
 ing out its deficiencies, showing up the obstacles it puts 
 in the way of positive science. Metaphysics is a branch 
 of philosophy which deals with the nature of reality. 
 As philosophy it accepts no unanalyzed concepts; un- 
 like science it has no postulates taken blindly on faith. 
 The proposition now before us, namely that atoms and 
 
Physical and Psychic Facts 23 
 
 their motion are ultimate realities, is bad metaphysics, 
 because it is a blind unanalyzed postulate. How do we 
 know that atoms and their motions are ultimate reali- 
 ties? Why not ask what is reality? Once we are on 
 metaphysical ground, why not take it in real earnest? 
 Why stop on atoms and motions? Atoms themselves 
 are not ultimate simple units, they have shape, size, 
 weight. Now shape, size, weight, what are they after 
 all? They are so many resultants of masses of tactual, 
 visual and muscular sensations, which are as little ulti- 
 mate as are the sensations of color or of pain. It is 
 out of sensations, percepts and ideas that the concept 
 "atom" is framed. Subtract from the atom its sensa- 
 tional, perceptual and ideational elements, abstract from 
 it its shape, size, weight and the ultimate reality of the 
 atoms will become a bare nothing. The atom there- 
 fore is ultimately resolved into terms of consciousness. 
 The same holds true in case of motion. Motion is a 
 mental product of what is known as muscular and retin- 
 al sensations. What is most ultimately known is only 
 consciousness and its facts. The atom and its motions 
 are after all nothing else but constructs of consciousness. 
 From the standpoint of epistemology, or what the Ger- 
 mans call "Erkenntnisstheorie," we have only a 
 double series of mental phenomena, one standing for 
 the internal and the other for the external world, and 
 not atoms, but mental life may be regarded as the ulti- 
 mate reality. 
 
 From a strictly scientific standpoint, however, we 
 have no right to resolve matter into mind or still less 
 mind into matter, because the two are presented to con- 
 sciousness as different in kind, even though they both 
 may belong to a general consciousness. Between the 
 
24 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 two series of facts, the physical and the psychical, there 
 exists a fundamental difference. The door yonder is 
 covered with white paint, the inkstand before me is 
 made of glass, is round, is heavy, is black, but my idea 
 of the door is not covered with white paint, my idea 
 of the inkstand is neither made of glass, nor round, nor 
 heavy, nor black. In short, the facts of consciousness 
 are not spatial. 
 
 A fallacy prevalent among the medical profession and 
 now also extant among the populace is the placing of 
 psychic life in the brain. The neurologist, the patholo- 
 gist ridicule the old Greek belief that the place of the 
 mind is in the heart. Modern science has discoverd that 
 the heart is nothing but a hollow muscle, a blood pump 
 at best, the place of mental processes is in the brain. 
 This medical belief now circulating in the popular and 
 semi-scientific literature of to-day differs but little 
 from the ancient Greek belief, it is just as fallaci- 
 ous and superstitious. It is true that psychic life is 
 a concomitant variable function of nervous processes 
 and brain activity, but neurosis is not the cause of 
 psychosis. The brain does not secrete thought as the 
 liver secrets bile. The mind is not in the brain, nor 
 in fact is the mind anywhere in the universe of space; 
 for psychosis is not at all a physical spatial process. 
 
 As fallacious and superstitious is the recent tendency 
 of medical investigation to localize psychic processes, to 
 place different psychic processes in different seats or 
 localities of the brain, thus implying that each psychic 
 process respectively is placed inside some cerebral cen- 
 tre or nerve cells. Psychic life is no doubt the conco- 
 mitant of nervous brain activity, and certain psychic 
 processes may depend on definite local brain processes, 
 
Physical and Psychic Facts 25 
 
 but the given psychic process is not situated in a definite 
 brain centre, nor for that matter is it situated anywhere 
 in space. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE DEFINITION OF THE FSYCHIC PROCESS 
 
 THE definition thus far given of psychic life 
 is rather of a negative character. We de- 
 fined the psychic phenomenon in opposition 
 to the physical phenomenon. Physical phe- 
 nomena are in space, psychic phenomena are not spatial. 
 Now a negative definition may to many prove rather 
 unsatisfactory. It is, therefore, desirable to define 
 psychic phenomena in more positive terms. 
 
 It is now the tendency to define the physical process 
 in social terms and the psychic process in terms of indi- 
 vidual cognition. A physical phenomenon is defined as 
 one common to many minds, while a psychic phenomenon 
 is an object of an individual consciousness. I think 
 that such a view of the external physical object, as that 
 which is common to many minds in contrast to the 
 psychic or that belonging to an individual mind only 
 is incorrect from a purely psychological standpoint. 
 Psychologically considered the characteristic trait of a 
 physical object is not that it is common, but that it is 
 external. The tree yonder is to me a physical object, 
 not because it is common to many minds, but because I 
 perceive it as external, the sensory elements of the per- 
 ception carry with them external objectivity. 
 
 The social perception of an object may be one of the 
 criteria of external reality, but certainly not the only one, 
 and surely not the chief one. In perceiving an object I 
 do not consider it as a physical object, because I know 
 
 26 
 
The Definition of the Psychic Process 27 
 
 that it is common to my fellow-beings, but because the 
 very psychic process of perception gives the immediate 
 knowledge of externality. An object is considered as 
 physical, not because of its social aspect, but because of 
 its perceived external aspect. Had my perception of the 
 house yonder been a hallucination, I would have still 
 seen it as external and therefore regarded as a physical 
 object; and should this hallucination furthermore be 
 confirmed by the testimony of all my other senses, 
 should I be able to touch it, press against it and feel re- 
 sistance, knock myself on it and feel concussion and pain, 
 and have a series of tactual and muscular sensations by 
 walking into it and around it, and should I further have 
 this hallucination of all the senses every time I come 
 to this identical spot, the object would be to me an 
 external physical object, and no amount of social con- 
 tradiction could and would make it different. Regarded 
 from a psychical standpoint an object is considered as 
 physical, not because it is common to other minds, but 
 because it is projected as extensive and external to mind. 
 Not community, but extension, externality is the psy- 
 chological criterion of the physical object. 
 
 It is true that community of object is one of the cri- 
 teria of external reality, but it is certainly not true that 
 the community of the object gives rise to the perception 
 of externality. It may, on the contrary, be claimed, and 
 possibly with far better reason, that it is the object's 
 externality that gives rise to its community. 
 
 The child in its growth learns to discriminate be- 
 tween things and persons. Persons move, act, make 
 adaptations, while things are moved, acted upon, adapt- 
 ed to; persons initiate movements, things do not; per- 
 sons are prime movers and it is to them that one has to 
 
28 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 look up in the satisfaction of needs and in the acquisi- 
 tion and use of things. As against persons things are 
 contrasted as impersonal. Gradually the child learns 
 to include himself within the class of persons, — his 
 hopes, wishes and desires come in contact, as well as in 
 conflict with those of other persons, and he learns more 
 and more of inner life and activity with which he finally 
 identifies all personality. Personality is more and more 
 stripped of the thing aspect until the inner mental life, 
 especially in its will aspect, remains as its sole charac- 
 teristic. Persons are wilier s, and it is these wills which 
 are of the utmost importance for the child to learn as 
 the fulfillment of his will depends on them. He then 
 learns to class himself within the category of willers; 
 he himself is a wilier. Impersonal things, falling out- 
 side and being contrasted with the class of willers, are 
 conceived as independent of persons. 
 
 Moreover, while from the very nature of the case 
 each wilier bears to things a direct relation, his relation 
 to other willers is only to be established through things. 
 Wills come in contact not through the mere fact of will- 
 ing, but through their relations to things. Coming in 
 direct relation with things, things alone give direct ex- 
 perience, experience in its first intention. In other words, 
 only things give rise to sensation or rather perception; 
 hence sensory life with its time and space experience giv- 
 ing rise to externality is the criterion of the universe of 
 things, conceived as independent of will. Only thing is 
 external, will is not. Wills, however, can come in rela- 
 tion through things, and only through the same things; 
 the universe of things must be a common one to all the 
 wills, if these wills are to come into relation at all. In 
 other words, the physical universe, genetically regarded, 
 
The Definition of the Psychic Process 29 
 
 is external not because it is common, but it is common, 
 because it is external. 
 
 The definition of the physical object as that which is 
 common to many minds and of the psychic object as that 
 which is present to one mind only is not acceptable, 
 since it postulates the result of complicated epis- 
 temological reflection and psychological research, still 
 very doubtful in themselves, at the very outset of the 
 science of psychology. It may be that the world is noth- 
 ing but consciousness and that the physical universe is 
 nothing but the social object of many minds; still all this 
 belongs to the domain of epistemology and metaphysics. 
 The psychologist deals with phenomena and not with 
 the "really existent." Standing on the ground of psy- 
 chology the psychologist has no right to reduce the 
 physical world to psychic terms; in fact, such a pro- 
 cedure would undermine his science, as all distinction 
 between psychic and physical facts would become oblit- 
 erated. For if by an "object" common to many minds 
 we mean an object external to those minds, then we gain 
 nothing at all by introducing the "many," it is just this 
 "external" that has to be defined; if by the "common 
 object" we mean an object psychic in its character, but 
 only of a social nature, then we reduce the physical uni- 
 verse to consciousness and thus identify physical and 
 psychic processes. Such identification is an obliteration 
 of the opposition between the psychic and physical facts, 
 an opposition with which the psychologist must set out, 
 if he is to place psychology in the hierarchy of natural 
 sciences. The psychologist must postulate the existence 
 of an external physical world, just as the geometrician 
 postulates space or the mechanician matter and mo- 
 tion. 
 
30 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 It is the task of the epistemologist and metaphy- 
 sician to inquire into the nature of that physical world 
 whether it really exists independent of consciousness. 
 Without, therefore, going into metaphysical considera- 
 tions, I think it is best to define the physical phenomenon 
 as the object or process conceived as being independent 
 of consciousness, while the psychic object or process is 
 one that is conceived as being directly dependent on 
 consciousness. It seems to me that this definition has 
 the merits of being positive as the one given by the 
 representatives of the idealistic school; it has not the 
 defects of bringing in irrelevant metaphysical and epis- 
 temological considerations; and it has furthermore the 
 advantage of being fully in accord with the data and 
 postulates of psychology. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 PSYCHIC STATES AS OBJECTS 
 
 THE attacks may now be renewed from quite 
 a different direction. We asserted that psy- 
 chology deals with facts of objective, natural 
 existence, the subject matter of science in gen- 
 eral. How does it rhyme, it may be asked, with the con- 
 clusion just arrived at, namely, that the facts of psychol- 
 ogy are different from those with which other natural 
 sciences deal ? To this may be answered that facts may 
 agree in being objective, and still differ widely as to 
 kind, — a square and a man, a pound and a mile, are all 
 objective, and still their difference is certainly a funda- 
 mental one. 
 
 An objection may be raised that may to some appear 
 as a very grave one. Is psychology a science at all? 
 Does it actually deal with objective natural existence? 
 Physics, chemistry and other concrete sciences treat of 
 objects, of facts, in the external world. Any one can 
 go and verify those phenomena and their relations. This, 
 however, is not the case with facts of consciousness, they 
 are essentially subjective. Psychology, therefore, prop- 
 erly speaking, is not a science in the same sense as other 
 sciences are. This objection may be easily obviated by 
 the very simple consideration that the facts of any indi- 
 vidual consciousness are as much objective to other peo- 
 ple, as the chair, the table, the molecule, the atom. My 
 individual consciousness is considered by others as ex- 
 ternal, as objective, as existing outside of their con- 
 
 31 
 
32 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 sciousness, and, in fact, were it not so, there would have 
 been no individuality. 
 
 After this lengthy discussion we at last arrive at the 
 conclusion, that although the facts which psychology 
 treats of are not of a material, physical nature, they are 
 none the less objective in character. Objective however, 
 as the facts are, they are not independent of conscious- 
 ness in the same way as the objects of the external world 
 are regarded, they are essentially facts of consciousness. 
 
 "What is the relation," it may be asked, "of psychol- 
 ogy to the physical and biological sciences?" The 
 physical and biological sciences constitute a system of 
 knowledge of the material world. Psychology investi- 
 gates the genesis of this knowledge. Mechanics, for 
 example, treats of motion and space. Psychology in- 
 vestigates not what motion and space are in themselves, 
 but what the elementary acts of consciousness are out 
 of which the space and time perceptions are developed. 
 
 The different objects which other sciences treat of 
 may be regarded psychologically, and studied from the 
 standpoint of their rise and development in conscious- 
 ness. For objects to be known at all must first be per- 
 ceived or conceived by consciousness. Psychology im- 
 plies knowledge of the physical world as the content 
 of consciousness. In order to know how perception and 
 conception of objects originate, those objects must first 
 of all be given. A thing that is not yet in existence can- 
 not possibly be analyzed. It is only when knowledge 
 of objects is already formed that one can begin to think 
 about knowledge itself, how it originated and how it 
 came to be in the shape possessed by the knowing mind. 
 Physical sciences are in that relation independent of 
 psychology, the former can be carried on to a high 
 
Psychic States as Objects 33 
 
 degree of perfection without any knowledge of psychol- 
 ogy, while psychology without knowledge of the physic- 
 al world would simply lack subject matter. 
 
 Apart, however, from the fact that psychology 
 has as its subject matter the objects of physical sciences 
 as perceived by and developed in consciousness, it also 
 studies the forms, the character, the way of working of 
 consciousness, it formulates the laws of how conscious- 
 ness works, and analyzes into simplest elements and 
 their combinations, the rich material that goes to make 
 up the mental life of individual existence, or what is 
 known as mind. 
 
 The postulated objective reality acts upon the given 
 individual consciousness and gives rise to mental states 
 which along with the objective representation of that 
 reality has also its own coloring, its own subjective side. 
 The represented object floats so to say in a stream of 
 consciousness. The subject matter which the psycholo- 
 gist investigates is not the objective reality itself, but 
 objective states of consciousness. 
 
 We may represent the relation of the psychologist to 
 his object of study by the following series : 
 
 1 2 3 
 
 The objective The represented The subjective 
 
 reality. object. stream. 
 
 4 5 
 
 The objective The psychologist, 
 state of con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 We must be on our guard and not confuse objective 
 
34 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 thought, the thought of the object, and the object of 
 thought. The three differ fundamentally, and the 
 standpoints from which the matter is regarded must be 
 constantly kept in view. The thought contemplates and 
 holds the object by the function of knowledge it pos- 
 sesses, but the knowledge constituting the thought and 
 the object of that thought are totally different in their 
 nature. The object in the external world may undergo 
 change, but the thought that got hold of the object may 
 still persist, or on the other hand, the thought may 
 change and the object still remain the same; or again 
 the thoughts and the object may both change. As I am 
 writing these lines a red book lying on my table strongly 
 attracts my attention, and for the time being consti- 
 tutes the object of my thought. I can close my eyes and 
 continue to represent to myself the red book, its color, 
 its size, its content, in short all about the red book, the 
 red book constituting so to say the "focal-object" of my 
 thought constantly renewing itself by the fresh material 
 which it draws from the surrounding marginal stream. 
 Meanwhile the book may be changed, the cover may be 
 torn, the pages may be mutilated, the book may be burnt 
 or substituted by another body or by a totally different 
 object, say an ink-stand; or on the other hand, the 
 book may remain lying on my desk undisturbed, but my 
 thought may change. I may begin to think of some- 
 thing else, say of the coming election or the Spanish war; 
 or both the book and thoughts may change, the book 
 may be taken away and I at the same time may think 
 of something else, say of the watch and its mechanism. 
 The cognizant thought that possesses the object and 
 the object of that thought are from a purely scientific 
 psychological standpoint, independent variables. 
 
Psychic States as Objects 35 
 
 Thought itself with its object may in its turn become 
 an object of thought, and here once more the same rela- 
 tions obtain. The contemplations or psychological an- 
 alysis of a thought must be discriminated from the 
 thought as the material or object of that analysis. From 
 the confusion of these different aspects many a fallacy 
 results. Thus the schematic incessant change in the flow 
 of objective time is confused with the state of conscious- 
 ness having time as its object, and the attributes of one 
 are fallaciously ascribed as undergoing continuous 
 change. Another fallacy often committed by the so- 
 called "new psychology" is the substitution of the 
 attributes of the object for those of the functioning 
 thought. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE SCOPE OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY, we said, deals with states of 
 consciousness, but these states are not indepen- 
 dent, floating in the air so to say. They are in 
 connection with some material existence, and 
 not with physical reality as a whole, but with some 
 definite individual body. We must keep in mind that 
 psychology is first of all a natural science, and the only 
 thing it has to take into consideration is experience. 
 Now as a matter of fact we never find a thought, an 
 idea, a sensation setting up on its own hook and having 
 complete independence of all physical reality. Were 
 even such a thing possible, we could not know of it, 
 because the only way we come to know of other thoughts 
 is through their physical activities perceived by our sense 
 organs. We know of the existence of other individual 
 hate, love, anger, friendship, kindness by the physical 
 expressions of those feelings, by the acts that accom- 
 pany them. We know of the thoughts, of the emotions, 
 of our companions, by the muscular expressions of the 
 face, by the changes in the brilliancy of the eye, by the 
 general bodily state, such as quietness or restlessness, by 
 their gestures, by many other physical expressions, but 
 principally by means of those physical manifestations 
 known as speech. Were all those concomitant physical 
 processes absent, there would have been no means what- 
 ever of knowing of the very existence of external states 
 of consciousness. As an empirical science psychology 
 
 36 
 
The Scope of Psychology 37 
 
 studies only such states of consciousness as are connected 
 with physical reality, or truer to say with some indi- 
 vidualized physical being. In short, psychology treats 
 of states of consciousness as dependent on or connected 
 with the corporeal individual. 
 
 The meaning of the concept "corporeal individual" 
 must not be left in a vague state. From a purely me- 
 chanical standpoint we may say, that a corporeal indi- 
 vidual is a closely interrelated system of material parts 
 forming a more or less stable equilibrium. This equilib- 
 rium is constantly being interfered with, by the forces of 
 the external environment, but as long as that equilibrium 
 maintains itself in resisting the disaggregating influences 
 of external forces, it may practically be considered as a 
 corporeal individual. In other words, a corporeal indi- 
 vidual is a system of material parts organically inter- 
 connected, and functioning as one determinate whole. 
 Any living being will answer our definition. From the 
 lowest stage to the highest; from the monocellular 
 amoeba to the highest, most complicated multicellular 
 organism, we meet with the same fundamental traits, 
 characteristic of what we term the "corporeal individ- 
 ual." Now it is the mental states of the corporeal in- 
 dividual that psychology investigates and studies. 
 
 In our last discussion we have come to the conclusion 
 that consciousness depends on the corporeal individual 
 and can only be known from physical, bodily manifes- 
 tations. Each living being manifests some activity in its 
 reactions to the stimuli of the external environment. 
 Now what are the reactions characteristic of conscious- 
 ness? Where are the distinctive marks that stamp a 
 physical manifestation with the impress of psychic 
 states? The only sure way to tell is by purposive ac- 
 
38 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 tivity. We know that our neighbor is conscious, because 
 of his active purposive life. When a fly is on his nose, 
 he raises his hand and brushes it away; he knows how 
 to walk and preserve equilibrium ; avoids obstacles ; lives 
 in a house for protection from the changes of weather 
 and from harmful intruders; seeks shelter from rain; 
 dresses himself warmly on a frosty winter day; a thou- 
 sand other movements ail of them expressive of pur- 
 posive activity tell us of our neighbor's consciousness, 
 intelligence. The stone on the road changes its place 
 according to the influences of incident forces ; the grain 
 of dust is blown hither and thither by the wind; they 
 do not show a more or less definite purposive activity 
 under changing circumstances. The disturbance of their 
 equilibrium does not stimulate them to induce changes 
 in the external environment, changes that would tend to 
 restore that lost equilibrium. They, therefore, have no 
 purpose. For a purpose is the tendency to realize 
 some external action which is useful or indispensable to 
 the life-existence of the particular individual being. The 
 tendency to the maintenance of a definite activity in op- 
 position to the onset of disturbing forces of the environ- 
 ment in order to restore the lost equilibrium, may be 
 considered as the universal formula for purposive life 
 in general. 
 
 This formula holds true of all animal life. The 
 man in running after the car has purpose, so has 
 the cat in chasing the mouse, so has the deer in flee- 
 ing from the hunter. The very amoeba, that lump of 
 protoplasm, in extending its pseudopodia to draw in the 
 bit of nutriment, possesses the germ of purposive activ- 
 ity, and some primitive psychic state must therefore be 
 ascribed to it. Life is essentially purposive in its na- 
 
The Scope of Psychology 39 
 
 ture. Wherever, therefore, we meet with life, there 
 some form of psychic state, however primitive and ele- 
 mentary, must be present. Psychic states stand in the 
 most intimate relationship to life activity. The two in 
 fact cannot be separated. Psychosis is concomitant with 
 biosis. Psychologists as well as physiologists all agree 
 thus far, that there is no psychosis without neurosis; 
 some go further and affirm that there is no neurosis 
 without psychosis; I think, we are closer to the truth, 
 if we advance still further and assume, that there is no 
 biosis without psychosis. Psychic states must be pre- 
 dicated not only of highly organized animals, possessed 
 of a nervous system, but also of the most elementary 
 monocellular organisms. 
 
 The evolutionist especially must accept our last con- 
 clusion, for he will agree that consciousness did not 
 come into existence per saltum, he will acknowledge that 
 the germs of conscious life characteristic of the highest 
 organized being must already be present in the lowest 
 types of life, out of which developed the higher, the 
 more complex organisms. 
 
 We are now in a position to define the scope of psy- 
 chology. 
 
 Psychology is the science of psychic states both as to 
 content and form, regarded from an objective stand- 
 point, and brought in relation to the living corporeal in- 
 dividual. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE SOURCES OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 FACTS of consciousness, we pointed out, are the 
 subject matter of psychology. The question 
 arises as to the sources of the facts. The botan- 
 ist, when he wishes to carry out a series of ex- 
 periments, goes into the herbarium or into the field to 
 gather the material for his study. The entomologist 
 collects his specimens on the street, field, and forest. The 
 same holds true in the case of all other sciences. The 
 external world is infinitely rich, it is an inexhaustible 
 mine from which physical science draws its facts. Now 
 what are the sources of the psychologist? The psychol- 
 ogist cannot possibly go out into the forest, catch his 
 specimens, dry them, and pin them for his observation 
 and study. 
 
 This question as to the sources of psychology 
 comes to us with greater force, when we realize, 
 that psychological facts are not of the same order with 
 those of the rest of natural physical sciences. It is, of 
 course, evident that we must draw our material from 
 consciousness, but where shall we turn to find the facts? 
 Where are the particular localities from which we can 
 work out and bring to light mental facts? Such is the 
 difficult question that arises before the mind of the 
 scientist, who has been trained in the school of concrete 
 natural science. He finds himself helpless. The neurol- 
 ogist to whom a psychological training is truly invalu- 
 able, finds himself ill at ease when in his investigations 
 
 40 
 
The Sources of Psychology 41 
 
 he strikes a problem which has to be studied mainly 
 from a psychological point of view. A piece of tissue, 
 a lump of protoplasm, a nerve cell with its dendrons and 
 axons can be stained, mounted, observed, and exper- 
 imented upon, but who can get hold of a fact of con- 
 sciousness, of an elementary psychic state, of a sensa- 
 tion, of a feeling, of an idea, stain them, put them un- 
 der the microscope for scientific investigation? The 
 facts of consciousness are so peculiar, so different in 
 kind from those which form the subject matter of other 
 sciences that they who are trained exclusively in con- 
 crete natural sciences are at a loss where to look for 
 "real" psychological facts. 
 
 Some even go so far as to doubt whether facts of 
 consciousness are "real" facts at all. Frequently I 
 have heard from people with a good medical educa- 
 tion, people who were far from being unintelligent, that 
 they doubted the reality of psychic facts : "they are not 
 anything ! nothing substantial !" Comical as this last 
 assertion may appear, one can understand its reason; 
 one can understand the consternation and bewilderment 
 of him who for the first time puts his foot on the thresh- 
 old of psychology. What they meant to express was the 
 strange experience of having been confronted with facts 
 of a nature totally different from the ones with which 
 they usually dealt. The facts with which they are conver- 
 sant are of a tangible nature, but the facts of conscious- 
 ness are not tangible, they cannot be seen, nor tasted, 
 nor smelled, nor weighed by pounds and ounces, nor 
 measured by rulers and compasses. In short, psycho- 
 logical facts cannot be reached by any of the sense or- 
 gans; that is why they are such a puzzle, that is why 
 some arrive at the conclusion that facts of conscious- 
 
42 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 ness can hardly be considered as facts, that they are not 
 anything substantial. Still on further reflection any of 
 these sceptics will admit that the phenomena of con- 
 sciousness exist, and as such they must be facts. 
 
 In fact, if one wants to be a thorough sceptic, he may 
 doubt the reality of the external material world. All 
 that might be nothing but a dream, nothing but an illu- 
 sion, a hallucination. We have no sure criterion of the 
 truth of the external material reality, but one thing re- 
 mains perfectly clear in all this destructive scepticism 
 and that is the reality of the doubting thought, the ex- 
 istence of the sceptic consciousness. That is why Des- 
 cartes, the father of modern philosophy, beginning with 
 profound scepticism as to the reality of things finally 
 found his criterion of the truth of real existence in his 
 very doubting thought, and he expressed it in his fa- 
 mous "Cogito ergo sum." Thought, therefore, is even 
 more real than the objects of the material world, 
 we know of the latter only through thought, through 
 consciousness. In short, consciousness is a stern reality, 
 and the phenomena of consciousness are real facts. 
 
 We may refer here to the behavior hypothesis recently 
 advanced by Watson. The psychological knowledge of 
 animals can only be obtained from the observation of 
 their action, of their behavior, or of their adaptations to 
 their environment. The same holds true in the case of 
 human psychology. Man does not differ from other 
 animals and should be studied in the same way. This, 
 if I understand Watson aright, is essentially his posi- 
 tion. Watson goes to the extent of denying the very 
 existence of "centrally initiated processes," he reduces 
 all psychology to peripherally induced processes, sen- 
 sory and motor. He contests the presence or the very 
 existence of images and denies the presence of any af- 
 
The Sources of Psychology 43 
 
 fective elements. Perhaps it may be best to quote Wat- 
 son's own words: 
 
 "Having thus summarily dismissed the image and the 
 affective elements, I crave permission to restate the es- 
 sential contention of the behaviorist. It is this : the 
 world of the physicist, the biologist, and the psycholo- 
 gist is the same, a world consisting of objects — their 
 interests center around different objects, to be sure, but 
 the method of observation of these objects is not essen- 
 tially different in the three branches of science. Given 
 increased accuracy and scope of technique, and the be- 
 haviorist will be able to give a complete account of a 
 subject's behavior both as regards immediate response 
 to stimulation, which is effected through the larger mus- 
 cles; delayed response, which is effected through the 
 same muscles (so-called action after deliberation) — 
 these two forms comprising what I have called explicit 
 behavior; and the more elusive types, such as the move- 
 ments of the larynx, which go on in cases where action 
 upon stimulation is delayed (so-called thought pro- 
 cesses). This latter form of behavior, which manifests 
 itself chiefly in movements of the larynx, but which may 
 go on in (to the eye) imperceptible form, in the fingers, 
 hands, and body as a whole, I should call implicit be- 
 havior. For years to come, possibly always, we shall 
 have to content ourselves with experimental observation 
 and control of explicit behavior. I have a very decided 
 conviction, though, that not many years will pass before 
 implicit behavior will likewise yield to experimental 
 treatment. 
 
 "Possibly the most immediate result of the acceptance 
 of the behaviorist's view will be the elimination of self- 
 observation and of the introspective reports resulting 
 
44 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 from such a method." 
 
 The view taken by Watson is physico-biological. 
 While one can sympathise with his views in making 
 psychology more of a biological study, still one can- 
 not help realizing the fact that he takes an extreme view 
 when he wishes to reduce all mental processes to be- 
 havior. His view of affection as being essentially sense 
 processes seems to be sound. He should not, however, 
 involve his view of affection with the more narrow sec- 
 tarian view of sex analysis forced gratuitously on clin- 
 ical facts. Affection and emotion are no doubt peri- 
 pherally induced and are probably due to the action 
 of the central nervous system and glandular secre- 
 tions of internal organs. In this respect one may 
 fully agree with the behavior hypothesis. There is no 
 need of invoking sex to that effect as Watson himself 
 states it: "It is not essential to my contention that the 
 above vague suggestion should be true. It is essential 
 to our position to have affection reducible to sense pro- 
 cesses. It is even more probable that the mechanism is 
 glandular; that very slight increase in the secretion 
 products gives us the one group; checking or decreas- 
 ing the secretion, probably the other." 
 
 What, however, one cannot accept is the extreme 
 view of the denial of introspection. Introspection 
 will ever remain the fundamental method in normal and 
 abnormal psychology. The very problem of sensations, 
 ideas, images, thoughts, affects, emotions, has no mean- 
 ing without introspection. We must know the psychic 
 states or mental processes from our own experiences. 
 Pain, pleasure, feelings, anger, fear, love, acquire their 
 meaning only from the introspective attitude of the 
 observer. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 
 
 THE popular scientific literature of to-day of- 
 ten asserts dogmatically the belief that the 
 investigation of the normal precedes that of 
 the abnormal. This belief is erroneous and is 
 only given credence to by people who had not thought 
 much on the subject, and especially by those who belong 
 to the so-called "new psychology" school. As a matter 
 of fact the abnormal in scientific research precedes that 
 of the normal. The investigation of the abnormal is 
 one of the most potent instruments for new discoveries. 
 The method of experimentation, the most powerful tool 
 of modern science, is in fact the creation of artificial con- 
 ditions, in other words, the effecting of abnormal states. 
 Where the compound is highly complex, where the con- 
 stituent factors and their relations are imperfectly or all 
 but unknown and are not therefore under control, the 
 spontaneous occurrence of some anomaly ought to be 
 greeted enthusiastically, as it discloses the role played by 
 the modified or excluded factor. This is specially true 
 in the case of mental life, where the phenomena under 
 investigation are the most complex in the whole domain 
 of science, where a direct modification of the functioning 
 mental activity is as a rule impossible without the pro- 
 duction of some anomaly. 
 
 In the case of psychic life experimentation may be 
 conducted on two different lines of research. The one 
 is the modification of the objective content by means of 
 
 45 
 
46 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 changing the objective stimulus; the other method, and 
 by far the most efficient and fruitful, is the modification 
 of the very function on which the psychic content de- 
 pends. 
 
 Memory, for instance, may be studied by giving the 
 subject a series of auditory or visual impressions at giv- 
 en intervals, and then seeing how many of the series the 
 subject can remember after a given interval. We can 
 thus determine the role played by such factors as time, 
 number of impressions, number of repetitions, etc. The 
 function of memory remains the same, and only the 
 stimuli of the psychic content are modified. We may, 
 however, study memory from a totally different stand- 
 point, and that is by the disturbance of its function. Dis- 
 turbance of function may be studied in artificial states 
 produced by drugs, or induced by hypnosis; or by in- 
 vestigating cases in which the function is accidentally 
 disturbed, such, for instance, as are to be found in dif- 
 ferent forms of amnesia and aphasia. 
 
 The second method is by far the more important 
 of the two, and is extremely valuable. For it is only by 
 disturbances in the function of thought that we can 
 learn something about the factors and nature of mental 
 life. We cannot possibly learn about the nature of a 
 process, unless we disturb it artificially, or unless we try 
 to study cases in which we can find the process in differ- 
 ent stages or degrees of perturbation; here one factor is 
 missing, there another is exaggerated, and sc on. From 
 such cases it is easy to analyze the constituent factors and 
 their interrelations. In mechanics, for instance, the law 
 of inertia would have never been discovered, if not for 
 the imagining of such a case as the absence of all fric- 
 tion, or its approximate removal. The ancients who 
 
Psychology and Psychopathology 47 
 
 looked to the ordinary phenomena of common life, that 
 is to the normal, considered that bodies are bound 
 to stop. The ancient physicists, relying on their obser- 
 vations of the normal, believed that bodies in falling tra- 
 verse space in proportion to their weight; it required 
 a Galileo to detect the fallacy and show that bod- 
 ies, no matter what their size and weight be, fall- 
 ing from a high place or in a vacuum, fall to the ground 
 at the same time. The same holds true in the case of 
 chemistry; no observer of water in its "normal" state 
 would have detected the presence of hydrogen and oxy- 
 gen. Only under highly artificial or abnormal condi- 
 tions was it possible to discover the constituents that go 
 to make up the compound water. 
 
 If we turn to the sciences dealing with more com- 
 plex phenomena, we find illustrated the same truth. We 
 know how highly instructive Darwin found it to follow 
 closely for a period of many years experiments of breeds 
 in artificial selection, and to what capital account he 
 turned his highly valuable observations of all forms of 
 curiosities and monstrosities. We all know how valua- 
 ble the observation and study of all forms of anomalies 
 or variations from the normal type or species proved to 
 the final establishment of the theory of evolution. The 
 pre-Darwinian zoologist ignored variation regarding 
 it simply as an exception to the normal, as a mere ab- 
 normality, as a pathological manifestation which is of 
 little value to the scientist, who is only occupied with 
 the discovery of general laws, laws of the normal. As a 
 matter of fact, it was just these neglected variations, 
 deviations from the normal that turned out to be at the 
 very foundation of biology, revealing the nature and 
 mechanism of the evolution of species. 
 
48 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 The same truth we find illustrate^ in the investiga- 
 tions of the functions of the different parts of the organ- 
 ism. Experiments on animals such as vivisection, in- 
 jecting of toxin matter, etc., experiments that actually 
 mean the putting of animals in pathological states, as 
 well as the investigation of pathological cases in man, 
 have given physiology its most valuable treasures. 
 Knowledge of the normal arises out of knowledge of 
 the abnormal. In fact we may even say that the nor- 
 mal itself originates in the abnormal. It is in varia- 
 tions, in anomalies, that the normal species takes its 
 origin. 
 
 Strictly speaking the normal is not at all a scientific 
 concept, it is purely provisional in its nature, and holds 
 only good from a restricted point of view in transitional 
 stages of science. The normal is that which is common; 
 the normal is the usual ; and it is not the usual, but the 
 unusual that gives birth to new life in science. The un- 
 usual attracts our attention and reveals to us the function 
 and role played by the particular affected product in the 
 total compound. 
 
 Taking all this into consideration, I think that they 
 are wrong who insist that the abnormal can be known 
 only from the normal. We can realize now how super- 
 ficial are those who tell us "we learn but little from the 
 abnormal, for first of all comes the normal." We real- 
 ize now how detrimental to scientific investigation such 
 a contention is. As a matter of fact the progress of 
 science is not from the normal to the abnormal, but the 
 very reverse, from the abnormal to the normal; the 
 normal is but an arbitrary temporary concept, modified, 
 and determined by the abnormal or unusual. 
 
 The supreme importance of pathological research 
 
Psychology and Psychopathology 49 
 
 holds especially true in the case of psychology, whert 
 the phenomena and the conditions on which these de- 
 pend are so highly complex and so intricate, appearing 
 at the same time so simple and taken as a matter of 
 course in ordinary life. 
 
 As we have pointed out in the investigation of mental 
 life we may either change the psychic or objective 
 content, or effect changes in the mental function it- 
 self. In the study of vision, for instance, we may effect 
 changes in the conditions of external objects, leaving 
 the eye itself undisturbed. We may keep the object at 
 different distances and study its appearances, put the ob- 
 ject in water and have it refracted at different angles; 
 we may look at it through different prisms, colored 
 glasses or contrast its color when appearing in combina- 
 tion with other colors, whether it be successive or simul- 
 taneously. Instead, however, of effecting changes in the 
 objects taken in by the eye, we may study the mechanism 
 of vision by investigating the disturbances of the 
 function of sight itself under the influence of drugs in- 
 jected into the eye, or in different ocular diseases. The 
 latter method is by far the more valuable for revealing 
 the real mechanism of the visual apparatus. 
 
 Similarly in the study of memory we may follow the 
 method of the German school, such for instance as that 
 of Ebbinghaus and others, and investigate the laws of 
 memory by analyzing the changes effected in its contents ; 
 or we may study the mechanism of memory by studying 
 its disturbances in different forms of amnesia and mental 
 diseases. Since psychology primarily deals with the laws 
 of psycho-physiological functions, it will be admitted 
 that the more important and valuable method is the one 
 that has for its subject matter the changes going on di- 
 
50 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 rectly in the material under investigation. The investi- 
 gations, however, of changes or disturbances of mental 
 function itself are really a study of the abnormal, re- 
 searches into the domain of mental pathology. In psy- 
 chology, as in many other sciences, especially those of 
 the biological order to which psychology naturally be- 
 longs, the pathological method is by far the most im- 
 portant. 
 
 We can realize now the reason why it would be well 
 for psychology to follow closely not the methods of 
 physical sciences, but those of the biological sciences. 
 The material with which physics deals lacks the 
 pathological element, it can be introduced only fig- 
 uratively, not so is it in the order of phenomena with 
 which biology deals. In biology variations, abnormali- 
 ties, pathological elements stand out in the foreground, 
 and no step can be made without taking them into con- 
 sideration. The psychologist in order to succeed and ob- 
 tain more efficient and valuable results must keep in 
 mind clearly the fact that the psychic process is a form 
 of life in general, its phenomena are naturally related 
 to the province of biology, and that of the highest part 
 of it. The methods of psychological investigation must 
 follow the line not of the physical, but of the biological 
 sciences. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE SPIRITUALISTIC AND MATERIALISTIC HYPOTHESES 
 
 IF we scrutinize more closely the science of psy- 
 chology, we find that it is essentially dynamical in 
 character. Consciousness is the subject matter 
 of psychology; but consciousness is dynamic, it is 
 first of all an activity, a process. Now all sciences that 
 deal with processes cannot possibly help forming some 
 working hypothesis that should unify the facts dealt 
 with, and should above all be a guide for further re- 
 search. Mechanics has its hypothesis of masses, forces, 
 energy, inertia, conservation of matter and energy; 
 thermotics its molecular energy; electricity its ether vi- 
 brations and currents; chemistry the affinity of atoms; 
 dynamic physiology has its reflex processes; what is 
 the fundamental hypothesis of psychology? 
 We find the following hypotheses : 
 
 (I) The Spiritualistic, or soul hypothesis, 
 
 (II) The Materialistic hypothesis, 
 
 (III) The Faculty hypothesis, 
 
 (IV) The Transmission hypothesis, 
 
 (V) The Psycho-physiological hypothesis. 
 
 (a) The Metaphysical, 
 
 (b) The Positive. 
 
 We give here a brief review beginning with the spirit- 
 ualistic hypothesis. At the very outset I must caution 
 the reader against the grave error of confounding spirit- 
 ualism with spiritism. The latter is a religious doctrine 
 of life after death, and of the influences of natural or 
 
 5i 
 
52 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 resurrected spirits ; the former is a philosophical theory, 
 hoary with age, that attempts to explain the phenomena 
 of consciousness. Such men as Lotze and Ladd are ardent 
 advocates of spiritualism. According to this hypothesis 
 there exists a spiritual substance, a soul, that acts in all 
 the processes of consciousness. The soul is the immuta- 
 ble principle that unifies all the phenomena of conscious- 
 ness ; in other words, all mental processes are but man- 
 ifestations of the soul's activity. 
 
 The medical man trained in the school of concrete 
 physical sciences may smile, if not sneer, at the mention- 
 ing of the "soul." Such a hypothesis is in his opinion 
 nothing but an anachronism. He may consider it as 
 a theory long exploded by science and now only linger- 
 ing among the lower ignorant classes, a theory which an 
 intelligent scientist should be ashamed to introduce into 
 his work even for the sake of discussion, and elucida- 
 tion of his subject, — the "soul" is nothing but supersti- 
 tion. To call a theory superstition does not refute it. 
 The significant fact that Prof. Ladd in his volume on 
 physiological psychology defends it valiantly, that 
 Sigwart in his "Logic" takes up arms for it, and 
 also that such a great thinker as Lotze, himself a 
 medical man, takes it under his protection and finds it 
 perfectly rational, and in fact the only tenable hypo- 
 thesis, seems to show that there must be something in 
 the "soul," and if superstition it be, it is one that has to 
 be reckoned with, and not dismissed with contempt. We 
 must, therefore, examine the reasons and facts that urge 
 some thinkers and scientists to accept the soul as a 
 working hypothesis for the phenomena of consciousness. 
 There are two weighty considerations that are strongly 
 in favor of spiritualism. 
 
The Spiritualistic and Materialistic Hypotheses 53 
 
 We have already pointed out in a previous discus- 
 sion that mental phenomena are different in kind from 
 those of the material world. A feeling, an idea, an 
 image, a thought have neither length, nor breadth, nor 
 heighth, nor weight; no psychic phenomenon can be ex- 
 pressed in terms of material magnitude. Hence, con- 
 clude the spiritualists, consciousness is different in kind 
 from matter, it is a different substance, a soul. 
 
 Another great point upon which spiritualism rests 
 is mental synthesis. We find that in consciousness, sen- 
 sations, ideas, thoughts, feelings, are not juxtaposed 
 as are the particles of some material body, but are in 
 unity, in synthesis. The chair seen yonder consists of 
 numerous impressions, sensations and ideas, but all these 
 do not appear in consciousness in their bare separate- 
 ness, but are synthetized in one percept, a chair. The 
 various experiences that reach the mind, in spite of all 
 their multitudinousness are still brought into relations 
 and are unified, synthetized into the unity of conscious- 
 ness, they are all referred to the same personality. Now 
 reason the spiritualists, many different phenomena will 
 remain in all their manifoldness and will not give rise to 
 a unity, unless there is a medium through which they 
 are unified. If a resultant is to be formed there must 
 be something on which the forces that are to form the 
 resultant, impinge. If then we do not assume the hypo- 
 thesis of a spiritual substance, mental synthesis is incom- 
 prehensible, if not impossible. 
 
 We must now point out the weakness of the soul hy- 
 pothesis. The argument of spiritualism, that because 
 mental facts differ in kind from material facts, a spirit- 
 ual substance must be assumed to exist is certainly fal- 
 lacious. Phenomena may differ fundamentally and still 
 
54 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 we have no right whatever to conclude that they require 
 two different substances. Time is different from space, 
 but are they two different substances? Consciousness 
 may differ widely from matter and still require no one 
 simple substance for its existence and activity. 
 
 The only solid argument that remains for the soul 
 hypothesis is that of mental synthesis. The very con- 
 sideration, however, on which the spiritualist lays so 
 much stress serves as his best refutation. That phe- 
 nomena of consciousness differ radically from material 
 ones is a fundamental proposition with the psychologist 
 in general, and with the spiritualist in particular, but 
 this is far from supporting spiritualism. On the con- 
 trary, it overthrows his last stronghold. For if mental 
 facts differ in kind from physical material facts, it is 
 poor reasoning to raise difficulties pertaining to one re- 
 gion, and carry them over into a totally different one. 
 It would be senseless to raise aesthetic difficulties in 
 chemistry or mechanics, but it is no better to reason 
 that because a medium is required for physical objects, 
 movements, forces to combine their effects in one 
 resultant, therefore, a medium, a substance, a soul, is 
 also required for a synthesis of a totally different order 
 of phenomena, those of consciousness. The two orders 
 differ in kind, and what is found necessary in one, is not 
 for that reason also proven to be indispensable to the 
 other. It must first be proven that the conditions of 
 unification are the same in both before the argument 
 from mental synthesis may be accepted as valid. States 
 of consciousness may become synthetized, without any 
 medium, without any tertium quid, without any soul. 
 
 The spiritualist by his "soul" hypothesis really 
 undermines his own position. For if it be grant- 
 
The Spiritualistic and Materialistic Hypotheses 55 
 
 ed that the conditions of unification are the same in 
 mental as in physical activity; that a medium is required 
 in both in order to get a unity, a resultant, then the 
 whole "soul" structure tumbles to the ground. 
 Material and mental phenomena cannot possibly 
 belong to two radically different substances, if the con- 
 ditions of their activity are exactly of the same nature. 
 It would have been perfectly logical had the difference 
 between consciousness and the physical world been as- 
 serted and emphasized, and had the medium, the soul, 
 been totally left out. 
 
 The greatest difficulty, however, which the spiritualist 
 encounters is the interaction of the two substances. If 
 matter and soul are different in nature how can they 
 interact, how can they come into any relation? Hours 
 in so far as they are different from pounds, or miles, 
 have nothing in common, and as such do not interact; an 
 hour cannot modify a pound, nor can pounds change 
 hours, and if this holds true of phenomena of the extern- 
 al world where the difference after all is not so very 
 great, it must with special force recoil on the spiritualist 
 where the soul and body are so totally different in all re- 
 spects. The only way out of the difficulty, if one is con- 
 sistent and is not afraid to take the consequences, is to 
 introduce the miraculous and say that the interaction is 
 due to the intervention of the deity. This view was in 
 fact taken by the followers of Descartes. The spiritualist, 
 however, with a philosophical and scientific training will 
 rather be inconsistent and support his view by all kinds 
 of props than to accept such a conclusion, because he 
 knows that it practically means defeat, it means that the 
 hypothesis is not working, and that the soul must take 
 shelter under the wing of the deity, the refuge of ig- 
 
$6 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 norance. 
 
 From a purely scientific standpoint we must reject this 
 soul-hypothesis. The first requirement of a scientific 
 hypothesis is that its hypothetical cause should be of 
 such a nature as to be verifiable by experiment and ob- 
 servation. Now in the case of the soul, this condition is 
 not fulfilled. The soul is something that lies outside 
 the range of experience, and could never be brought 
 within the limits of empiricism, the basis of science. The 
 spiritualist, in fact, has not even a positive notion of his 
 "soul," he either frames it in wholly negative terms, 
 that it is not changeable, that it is not material; or, if 
 pressed hard, he falls back on the phenomena of con- 
 sciousness, the very phenomena the soul is called for to 
 explain. 
 
 Furthermore, a scientific hypothesis is justified and 
 found useful, if shown that it makes the facts more 
 easily understood. This cannot be shown in the case of 
 the soul. As a hypothesis the soul is useless and scien- 
 tifically unjustifiable. The acceptance of the "spirit," 
 of the soul, does not make it a bit easier for us to com- 
 prehend the modus operandi of the states of conscious- 
 ness. The soul is an immutable, indefinite, indescriba- 
 ble, incomprehensible being, and the insuperable diffi- 
 culty of how it gives rise to conscious activity requires 
 another hypothesis. If mental phenomena present dif- 
 ficulties, spiritualism doubles them. The soul in fact, is 
 the "double," the ghost of consciousness. The soul is 
 an unverifiable superfluous entity, it is not a vera causa 
 in nature; it explains nothing, and without removing 
 difficulties is only introduced as an additional burden. 
 
 Before we dismiss the soul hypothesis, we may point 
 out that it must be rejected on quite different grounds, — 
 
The Spiritualistic and Materialistic Hypotheses 57 
 
 it is at bottom unscientific, it is metaphysical, it goes into 
 the ultimate nature of things, an investigation that does 
 not fall within the province of science. The soul-hypo- 
 thesis assumes the existence of an abiding unchangeable 
 entity behind the veil of mental phenomena, an entity 
 which in the flow and change of the phenomena remains 
 the same and is the really real, the ultimate nature of the 
 facts of consciousness. This belongs to the ontological 
 part of metaphysics, but should not be introduced into 
 science. The reader will realize now, why the 
 whole complicated "soul discussion" is taken up here. 
 It is to emphasize the fact that psychology has nothing 
 to do with substances, noumena, entities, and quiddities, 
 that psychology has nothing to do with the "inner na- 
 ture" of consciousness. Psychology, like all other sci- 
 ences, describes, classifies, and investigates by means of 
 observation and experimentation facts of consciousness 
 and their relations, and endeavors to express these rela- 
 tions in general formulae or laws ; all attempts to make 
 of psychology more than this can only result in bad met- 
 aphysics. 
 
 The materialistic hypothesis is even worse metaphys- 
 ics than is the spiritualistic one. It is a hypothesis which 
 in spite of its evident absurdity is none the less in favor 
 with some representatives of the medical profession. 
 Matter and force, as Biichner puts it, give rise to, or pro- 
 duce consciousness, or as Cabanis and Moleschott ex- 
 press it "the brain produces thought as the liver secretes 
 bile." vThis hypothesis is unscientific and metaphysical, 
 because it attempts to penetrate into the inner nature 
 of consciousness, and claims to have it resolved into 
 "matter." It is bad metaphysics, because it takes its 
 "matter" on trust, without any critical reflection. More- 
 
58 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 over it is more crude and worse metaphysics than is the 
 soul hypothesis, because it lacks even the recognition of 
 the most elementary, psychological proposition, namely 
 the knowledge of fundamental difference between mental 
 and material phenomena. 
 
 Turning now to the faculty-hypothesis, we find that 
 it is nothing else than spiritualism under a somewhat 
 different form. The faculty-hypothesis chops the mind 
 into many different parts, termed faculties, one is for 
 reading, another for speaking, another for remember- 
 ing, another still for willing, and so on. Sometimes 
 they are limited to a few, and sometimes they are mul- 
 tiplied to infinity. 
 
 The faculty-hypothesis is a cheap edition of spiritual- 
 ism, it is spiritualism many times over. Instead of one 
 soul it has many of them. Spiritualism has but one dif- 
 ficulty and that is the soul which, like an omnipotent 
 deity, presides in some mysterious way over mental and 
 organic activities. The faculty-hypothesis has an infinite 
 number of them, inasmuch as it multiplies the deity into 
 an endless number of gods and spirits that take charge 
 of different psychic and psychomotor departments. 
 
 One can see the reason of the faculty hypothesis. It 
 originated with people who as a rule are inclined to ac- 
 cept uncritically words for realities. Thus, will, mem- 
 ory, words that are only collective terms for many dif- 
 ferent states of mind, names furnished by the language 
 of unreflective common sense, are naively taken as indi- 
 cating some substantial entities, or little spirits existing 
 somewhere in the brain. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE TRANSMISSION HYPOTHESIS 
 
 HE transmission hypothesis advanced by 
 James is a modification of the soul hypothesis. 
 The transmission hypothesis postulates the 
 existence of a physical world and of an inde- 
 pendent universe of consciousness. Consciousness, how- 
 ever, cannot manifest itself in this sublunar world with- 
 out the occurrence of definite physical changes. That 
 level of physical changes which makes the manifestations 
 of consciousness possible is termed the physical thresh- 
 old. Now the ocean of consciousness pours forth its psy- 
 chic waves into the material world with the rise and fall 
 of the physical threshold. The threshold is to be pictured 
 as a sort of flood gate regulating the volume and inten- 
 sity of the transmitted current. The rising of the thresh- 
 old diminishes the psychic stream, while the lowering of 
 the threshold permits a greater volume of consciousness 
 to pour over into our physical world. 
 
 The transmission hypothesis has certain advantages 
 over the previous ones discussed by us. While this hy- 
 pothesis postulates the independence of consciousness, it 
 is also in accord with the scientific proposition now gen- 
 erally accepted, namely that mental life is somehow con- 
 nected with or is a function of brain activity, only speci- 
 fying that this function is one of transmission. It claims 
 to fall in line with the threshold concept of psycho- 
 physics as worked out by Fechner, and further harrowed 
 
 59 
 
60 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 by the "new psychology" movement; moreover, it is 
 comprehensive enough to embrace all the facts and 
 speculations brought out by recent investigations in the 
 domain of mental pathology. 
 
 The transmission hypothesis, however, has also 
 disadvantages which are of such a grave nature as to 
 make one hesitate to accept it. The transmission hypo- 
 thesis from its very nature is unverifiable. For, if, by 
 hypothesis, consciousness manifests itself in this sublunar 
 world (the only one we know) only under physical 
 conditions, how can we ever come to know and verify a 
 postulated world of pure consciousness ? Being outside 
 the domain of our psychophysical world, the universe of 
 disembodied consciousness cannot, by hypothesis, furnish 
 us the means for its verification. In this sublunar world 
 we can know of the existence of consciousness through 
 its physical expressions, through its being embodied. 
 How then, can we ever reach a universe of disembodied 
 consciousness ? But a hypothesis which from its very na- 
 ture is not verifiable cannot possibly be accepted. 
 
 The transmission hypothesis is all the more unaccepta- 
 ble as the terms in which it is expressed are contradic- 
 tory, and the analogy on which it is based is essentially 
 illegitimate. Consciousness is supposed to be different 
 in nature from the physical world and existing inde- 
 pendently, the psychophysical threshold alone regulating 
 the volume of the stream of consciousness to be poured 
 over into the material world. The threshold then which 
 is physical in character limits consciousness, but how can 
 the two be limited by each other when they are totally 
 different in nature ? In assuming two different universes, 
 we assert that the two cannot limit each other, but in 
 examining again the concept of threshold we make a 
 
The Transmission Hypothesis 6 1 
 
 contradictory assertion that the two can and do limit 
 each other. 
 
 The very analogy on which the concept of "transmis- 
 sion function" is based is illegitimate when applied to 
 consciousness in its relation to the physical world. The 
 concept of "transmission function" can only be applied 
 to a case where the transmitter and the thing transmitted 
 are of homogeneous terms, but not where the terms 
 are essentially heterogeneous. A stream of liquid can 
 be transmitted through a pipe, a beam of light through 
 stained glass, or a Runtgen ray through soft or more or 
 less rarified cellular tissue. Both the transmitter 
 and the material transmitted are physical in their 
 nature, but how can an idea or feeling such as our 
 idea of eternity, or of infinity, or aesthetic, or moral 
 sense be transmitted through a tube? How then can 
 we apply the concept of transmission-function to con- 
 sciousness and the physical world where the two are 
 totally different in nature? The analogy is figurative 
 and scientifically illegitimate. 
 
 The transmission hypothesis sins further by reason of 
 its transcending the legitimate grounds of psychology. 
 It assumes an independent world of consciousness which 
 cannot be brought within the range of experience. Now 
 even if it be granted that such a world does exist, it still 
 falls outside the subject-matter of psychology. For psy- 
 chology as we pointed out deals with facts of conscious- 
 ness, with experiences and their relations. If it be ob- 
 jected that every hypothesis is extra-experiential, it may 
 be pointed out that a hypothesis must be framed in 
 terms that can be drawn within the circle of experience, 
 it must use a vera causa, an agent that is observable in 
 nature. But, as we have already shown, the transmis- 
 
62 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 sion hypothesis lacks this essential requirement. Its 
 agent, disembodied consciousness, is not a vera causa, 
 nor can it ever be drawn into the circle of experience. A 
 good hypothesis must be framed with a view of becom- 
 ing a possible fact, but this hypothesis from its very na- 
 ture disclaims this possibility, since its agent is in a 
 region that lies outside our world of experience. 
 
 For this very last reason, namely, for speculating in 
 things extra-mundane, the hypothesis may also be 
 charged with committing transgressions in metaphysics. 
 Such a hypothesis is the more metaphysical as the phe- 
 nomena under consideration are dealt with as if they 
 were entities. 
 
 Furthermore, the hypothesis only seemingly holds to 
 the empirical law that consciousness is a function of the 
 brain. For if consciousness is in a separate world all 
 the psychic phenomena are in existence from all eternity, 
 ready made, the phenomena of consciousness have really 
 nothing to do with the brain, inasmuch as they exist from 
 all eternity, in a region outside and totally independent 
 of the brain. Thus the hypothesis by its very character, 
 even if the matter be regarded from a purely logical 
 standpoint undermines the proposition which it under- 
 took to explain, and as such can hardly be considered as 
 valid. 
 
 Finally, it may be urged, that the invocation of an 
 extra-mundane world helps matters little, as it does not 
 show the modus operandi of the interdependence of 
 mental and physical phenomena, inasmuch as the rising 
 or falling of a physical threshold does not in the least 
 explain or show how a stream of consciousness is made 
 possible to vary in volume and intensity. Without ex- 
 plaining the proposition that mental processes vary as 
 
The Transmission Hypothesis 63 
 
 physical processes, the transmission hypothesis only as- 
 sumes an additional world of disembodied consciousness 
 and thus gratuitously multiplies entities. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 THE METAPHYSICAL HYPOTHESES OF PARALLELISM 
 
 THESpinozistic doctrine of parallelism claims 
 that the mental and physical orders run par- 
 allel to each other, taking its stand on purely 
 metaphysical grounds, namely, on the ex- 
 istence of one substance with an infinite number of at- 
 tributes, all expressing the nature of this substance. Two 
 of these attributes, being mind and matter which in an 
 infinite number of parallel running modes or phenomena 
 express the nature of this one substance. A modification 
 of the unitary substance regarded under the attribute 
 of mind is a mental mode or phenomenon. The same re- 
 garded under the attribute of matter or extension is a 
 material mode or physical phenomenon. Mental and 
 physical phenomena are both manifestations of one uni- 
 tary substance. There is no need for me to point out 
 that this double aspect of one unitary substance belongs 
 to metaphysical dogmatism, of substantialism, and as 
 such cannot possibly be admitted into the province of 
 psychology as a natural science. 
 
 The voluntaristic school does not acknowledge a strict 
 parallelism in the sense of a double aspect of the same 
 unknowable or of two infinite attributes of the eternal 
 nature of the same substance, but it does teach a psycho- 
 physiological parallelism, grounding it on the double 
 aspect, subjective and objective, of one "unitary" ex- 
 perience. This differs but little from the substantialistic 
 dogmatism. Instead of one unitary substance the volun- 
 
 64 
 
The Metaphysical Hypotheses of Parallelism 65 
 
 tarist substitutes a no less metaphysical category of 
 "unitary experience." 
 
 Another metaphysical view of the new associationist 
 or sensationalist school grounds parallelism on epis- 
 temological and metaphysical grounds. Psycho-physio- 
 logical parallelism is partly a matter of pure definition, 
 partly a matter of philosophical considerations. This 
 school defines a psychic object as one belonging to a 
 single subject, one individual only, while a physical ob- 
 ject is one belonging to many subjects. Now, reasons 
 this school, if psychology is to be a science at all, it 
 must surely be of such a nature as to be communicated 
 to other subjects, that is, it must become common prop- 
 erty, and since by definition, only a physical object is an 
 object of many and is communicable, hence a psychic 
 object to become communicable must be expressed in 
 physical terms. 
 
 This excursion into the region of metaphysics and 
 epistemology of the otherwise matter of fact and com- 
 mon sense school is the result of good intention of being 
 thorough-going, hence, this metaphysical definition of 
 mental and physical phenomena of the "one" and the 
 "many." 
 
 Another argument adduced by the same school seems 
 to be somewhat more sound. Physical facts it is alleged 
 have a necessary causal connection, while psychic facts 
 are only connected by association, which is not one of 
 necessity. An idea a is sometimes followed by idea b 
 and sometimes by idea c and so on. There is no invari- 
 able connection in psychic life, such as is to be found 
 in physical facts. The soundness of this argument, how- 
 ever, is rather questionable. For it may be contended 
 that no fastening bonds are ever observed in physical 
 
66 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 phenomena, the only thing observed is a relation of se- 
 quence of antecedent and consequent, and in case of 
 causation an invariable sequence of a definite antecedent 
 and definite consequent. Now psychic facts also mani- 
 fest relations of sequence, we observe antecedents fol- 
 lowed by consequents. 
 
 The argument that an idea is sometimes followed by 
 one and sometimes by another idea showing the absence 
 of invariable sequence is, if looked at closer, of a rather 
 dubious character. An idea a or idea b is only ob- 
 jectively the same, by having the same object, 
 but the thought, mental stream, or moment consciousness 
 that possess that idea may not be the same, but it is 
 just this mental stream, the moment-consciousness 
 that determines the content of the succeeding idea. 
 The thought of a is different according to the dif- 
 ference of the mental stream or moment conscious- 
 ness. It is one of the psychologist's fallacies to 
 consider that if the object is the same then the thought 
 that possesses the object must also be the same. Now 
 ideas of the same a are totally different in different ment- 
 al streams, just as two different minds regarding the 
 same object have absolutely different psychic states. It is 
 therefore clear that an idea a may be sometimes fol- 
 lowed by b and sometimes by another idea. An idea 
 a followed by b is altogether different from idea a fol- 
 lowed by c. It is only the recurrence of the same mental 
 stream or moment consciousness that would give the 
 same sequence. This is clearly observed in hypnoidic 
 states where the same moment consciousness recurs, the 
 same sensations, ideas, feelings, and actions follow in 
 invariable succession. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE UNITARY EXPERIENCE OF VOLUNTARISM 
 
 N the course of our discussion, we had again and 
 again to refer to the data and postulates of psychol- 
 ogy. It would be well to give now a short review 
 of them so as to bring them clearly before the 
 mind of the reader. The fact that the postulates are 
 not kept clearly in view leads one to commit many a fal- 
 lacy. 
 
 Psychology assumes the validity of unanalyzed crite- 
 ria of reality taken as valid by common sense. The 
 verification of illusions, hallucinations, and. delusions is 
 finally based on the dictum of common sense. The 
 work of science may after all be nothing but an 
 illusion, an hallucination, or a delusion of consciousness. 
 What keeps up the scientist in his work is his firm belief 
 that mankind believe in it, and that when other people 
 are put under the same conditions they will verify his 
 experiences. 
 
 Science assumes the postulates on which all experience 
 of common sense is based. Science furnishes our knowl- 
 edge of the external world, but science is essentially not 
 self-conscious, and it cannot therefore on its own 
 grounds answer the question as to the validity of its 
 knowledge. Is there something independent in that ex- 
 ternally perceived object, the house, for instance, or is 
 the psychic account all there is to it? This is a problem 
 not to be answered on psychological grounds. Knowl- 
 edge, its possibility, its nature, and[ its general aspect 
 
 67 
 
68 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 must be taken for granted. Psychological knowledge, 
 general for all subjects must be assumed, as well as gen- 
 eral knowledge of the objective world. The psychologist, 
 like other scientists, must assume that his experiences 
 are so conditioned, that though they may be unique, 
 still if others were to be put under the same conditions 
 and confronted with the same external realities, they 
 would pass through similar experiences. In short, psy- 
 chology assumes the validity of its knowledge, its gen- 
 eral validity for all knowing subjects, also knowledge 
 of an externally existing object, analyzed from the sub- 
 jective standpoint into its psychological elements. Psy- 
 chology, therefore, has really far more assumptions at its 
 basis than any other natural science, for in addition to 
 the assumption of the existence of an external world it 
 must assume a knowing or sensitive subject, and also the 
 interrelation of the two. 
 
 It is true that the so-called "Voluntaristic school" 
 claims that psychology is the only science that has no 
 assumption at its basis. The representative of that 
 school claims that there is but one "unitary ex- 
 perience." From this "unitary experience natural sci- 
 ence abstracts the knowing subject and as such deals 
 with abstract mediate experiences requiring auxiliary 
 assumptions, not so is psychology which deals with ex- 
 perience as it is immediately presented to the experienc- 
 ing subject." According to the voluntarist natural sci- 
 ence deals with mediate experience, while psychology 
 deals with immediate experience requiring no assump- 
 tions. 
 
 This argument is questionable on the very face of it. 
 For the existence of that "unitary experience" is itself 
 an assumption; it implies that the experience and the 
 
The Unitary Experience of Voluntarism 69 
 
 object given by the experience are one. Such a unifica- 
 tion of experience and external object implied in "uni- 
 tary experience" is a metaphysical assumption which 
 idealistic philosophy may prove as being true, but which 
 the psychologist can not possibly accept as given directly 
 by experience itself. Furthermore, the concept "experi- 
 ence" cannot stand by itself, it implies assumptions; an 
 experience must be of something that lies outside that 
 experience. I have an experience of a house yonder, but 
 the house yonder is not an experience unless regarded 
 from a metaphysical or epistemological standpoint, but 
 then we overstep the boundaries of psychology which 
 deals with experiences of individual organisms and en- 
 ter the field of philosophy that deals with experience in 
 general. 
 
 In taking the most simple psychological element, 
 namely sensation, we have its correlative in the external 
 stimulus ; there can be no sensations without a stimulus, 
 but that stimulus is no longer a sensation nor is it any 
 other psychic process, such for instance as an idea. Psy- 
 chologically considered the identification of the stimulus 
 with psychic state or process is incorrect, because it 
 would mean that all sensory processes are initiated only 
 by sensations or ideas. 
 
 Again, if we come to ask in what sense we under- 
 stand the concept "immediate experience," we find furth- 
 er difficulties. For if the consciousness be of the anoetic 
 type, to borrow the term from Stout, there is neither 
 mediate, nor immediate experience; if the consciousness 
 is of the noetic type it is questionable as to what we 
 mean by "immediate." For it may be contended with 
 the modern realist that the knowledge of the object as 
 given in sensation is immediate, while the knowledge of 
 
70 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 sensation itself with which psychology deals is not 
 immediately given; it requires a long training before 
 this is separated and sifted from experience; the psy- 
 chological aspect of experience is really secondary, and 
 as such mediate. 
 
 If by "immediate" we mean to indicate the fact that 
 the psychic process must antedate the knowledge of the 
 external objective world, the proposition can be contested 
 once more; for along with the psychic process the ob- 
 ject also is given; especially is this true of the idealistic 
 metaphysical presupposition of the voluntaristic school 
 that identifies the objective world with the given 
 primary experience. The objective and subjective as- 
 pects of the "unitary experience" are both supposed 
 to be given together and, as such, are both immedi- 
 ate. Natural science abstracts the subjective aspect and 
 psychology abstracts the objective aspect the "mediate 
 experience." We should, however, question the term 
 "mediate experience." What may "mediate experience" 
 mean? If experience has any meaning, it means some- 
 thing gone or lived through directly, immediately; but 
 then all experience is immediate, otherwise it cannot be 
 experience. A mediate experience as contrasted with im- 
 mediate experience can only mean experience inferred, 
 experience not experienced, a concept contradictory in its 
 very nature and definition, and must be therefore reject- 
 ed as a meaningless term. The fact is, that "mediate ex- 
 perience" is an inappropriate and misleading term 
 for physical processes which as such are neither experi- 
 ence nor mediate. 
 
 The very statement of the voluntaristic psychologist 
 discloses the hidden assumption. There is a unitary ex- 
 perience which falls asunder into mediate experience of 
 
The Unitary Experience of Voluntarism 71 
 
 natural science and immediate experience, the subject 
 matter of the psychologist. If this be so, then the psy- 
 chologist does not deal with the totality of experience. 
 Since the mediate experience — part of the "unitary ex- 
 perience" falls outside its domain, it deals only with 
 experience in so far as it is regarded as immediate. 
 Evidently psychology requires presuppositions to supple- 
 ment the abstracted mediate aspect of the unitary ex- 
 perience. For the voluntaristic school will surely admit 
 that unitary experience is given neither in the mediate 
 aspect nor in the immediate aspect alone, and as science 
 deals either with the one, or with the other, presuppo- 
 sitions are ipso facto also indispensable in psychology. 
 
 Moreover, psychology even from the standpoint of 
 the voluntaristic school requires more presuppositions 
 than the natural sciences. For experience, even if it be 
 immediate, must still be of something other than itself. 
 The sensation white is of something white, the touch 
 sensation hard is of something hard, the pain sensation 
 prick is of something sharp, and so on. Now if this 
 something, if that other of which there is immediate 
 experience be the so-called "mediate experience" as this 
 is the supplementary part of the unitary experience, of 
 the total reality, then "immediate experience" is experi- 
 ence of "mediate experience." The science then that 
 deals with immediate experience must postulate mediate 
 experience as one of its fundamental presuppositions. 
 Thus we come once more to the conclusion, and this time 
 from quite a different standpoint, that psychology as sci- 
 ence in general has its presuppositions, and that it furth- 
 ermore presupposes all the presuppositions of the natural 
 sciences. 
 
 Psychology explains the subject and object in con- 
 
72 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 sciousness, and that only in relation to the question of 
 "how," — how we come to know this or that object, but 
 whether there is an object or subject independent of the 
 experiencing thought; what the nature of that object or 
 subject is, whether of mental experience stuff or of some 
 extra-mental material, is a question that does not belong 
 to the domain of psychology. The answer is differently 
 given by the idealist, materialist, realist, monist. In 
 short, the problem of "what" belongs not to psychology, 
 but to the province of metaphysics. The Voluntaristic 
 school in denying all presuppositions in psychology starts 
 with a purely metaphysical speculation of the idealistic 
 stamp, namely, in postulating that the external object of 
 psychic experience is identical with that same experience. 
 Psychology or any other science must reject unhesitat- 
 ingly such metaphysical speculations. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE INDUCTIVE BASIS OF THE POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
 HYPOTHESIS 
 
 IT now remains for us to examine the psycho-physio- 
 logical hypothesis. This last hypothesis fully ac- 
 cepts the difference between the two series of facts, 
 the material and the mental, but instead of going 
 to look for "the other side," instead of going into meta- 
 physics, it takes the two different series as its data, and 
 considers them as co-ordinate. It does not trouble itself 
 as to whether there is a soul behind the scenes, all it has 
 to consider is facts, phenomena that can be observed 
 and experimented upon. The co-ordination it assumes 
 is not an assumption based on abstract philosophical 
 speculations, on subtle hair-splitting, but is based on ex- 
 perience. 
 
 Numerous facts from pathology and experimental 
 physiology go to prove that mental states have 
 their physiological correlatives. It is enough to men- 
 tion the fact of the influence of toxic matters on the 
 brain and the effected mental disturbances. In alcoholic 
 intoxication, for instance, we first meet with an unloos- 
 ening of higher psychic inhibitions; in the initial stage 
 of intoxication there is an apparent heightening of 
 mental and motor activity, and then as the quantity of 
 the poison absorbed by the blood and conveyed to the 
 cerebro-spinal nervous system is increased, a progressive 
 paralysis of psychomotor life sets in. At first the high- 
 est psychic functions, the moral and intellectual processes 
 
 73 
 
74 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 are disturbed and finally paralyzed; and this paralysis 
 slowly descends to the lower and more stable functions, 
 such as speech and writing, then affecting the coordina- 
 tion of grosser movements, such as running, walking, 
 standing, sitting; and as the action of the poison in- 
 creases, the organic, respiratory functions become affect- 
 ed, finally ending in death. Different drugs and poisons 
 that act on the cerebro-spinal nervous system produce 
 different symptoms, but all of them, while influencing 
 the physiological nervous processes, at the same time have 
 their action manifested by a parallel modification of 
 psychic processes. Illusions, hallucinations, and delu- 
 sions, changes in reasoning and willing, changes in mem- 
 ory, amnesia and paramnesia, all these can be induced by 
 the influence of poisons. Thus we find that the two 
 series of phenomena, the psychic and the physiological 
 or physical are intimately related. 
 
 Pathology and psychiatry with their vast stores of 
 facts go to confirm the psycho-physiological hypothesis. 
 In general paralysis, for instance, we meet conditions 
 somewhat similar to those of alcoholic intoxication. At 
 first inhibitions are removed, the psychomotor pro- 
 cesses become deranged and slightly stimulated, sooner 
 or later to be followed by gradual paralysis. The pro- 
 cess of dissolution progresses from the highest, most 
 complex, least stable functions, memory, intelligence, 
 will and so on, to the lower, less complex and more sta- 
 ble functions, reading, writing, playing, etc., finally 
 reaching to the very lowest, to the simplest co-ordination 
 of movements, mastication, swallowing, etc. A post- 
 mortem examination of the brain uniformly reveals a 
 profound degeneration of the brain cells. In the vari- 
 ous forms of epilepsy and in most cases of chronic in- 
 
Inductive Basis of Psychological Hypothesis 75 
 
 sanity, ending in dementia, we find on examination as a 
 rule, some degeneration of the brain cells. 
 
 In cases of the many forms of aphasia, science tri- 
 umphed in discovering the brain lesion. In motor 
 aphasia the third frontal convolution, or that of 
 Broca is found to be degenerated, in sensory aphasia 
 the degeneration is in the first temporo-sphenoidal con- 
 volution, or that of Wernicke. In many other nervous 
 diseases where there is a profound change in the sensori- 
 motor functions, such as posterior spinal sclerosis or loco- 
 motor ataxia, acute ascending paralysis, acute poleomy- 
 elitis anterior, syringomyelia, etc., we also find degener- 
 ation in some one part of the cerebro-spinal nervous sys- 
 tem. Thus in tabes we find a degeneration of the pos- 
 terior root zones often associated with similar lesions in 
 the intramedullory continuation of the several cranial 
 nerves. In poliomyelitis anterior we find an inflamma- 
 tion of the anterior cornua (sometimes extending in the 
 antero-lateral columns) ; the multipolar cells with their 
 dendrons and neuraxons are destroyed. In syringo- 
 myelia we find the formation of one or more cavities 
 within the substance of the spinal cord, usually within 
 the horns of the gray matter the cavities being filled 
 with a fluid which is either liquid or gelatinous. We 
 find in these diseases definite organic changes concomi- 
 tant with definite sensori-motor modifications. 
 
 In the functional diseases belonging to the province of 
 psycho-pathology, diseases such as are known under the 
 vague term of hysteria in all its protean manifestations, 
 the different forms of anaesthesia and amnesia, abulia, 
 psychopathic chorea, astasia-abasia and numerous oth- 
 ers, where no organic lesion in the cerebro-spinal ner- 
 vous system can possibly be discovered, we have good 
 
76 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 reasons for suspecting some functional derangement in 
 the psysiological processes of the nervous system. My 
 own psycho physiological investigations in this line tend 
 strongly to confirm the theory that all functional dis- 
 eases are dis associations of functioning brain cell-sys- 
 tems, and that the gravity of the disease depends on the 
 extension of such functional dissociations. Thus we 
 find that neuro-pathology and the recent science of psy- 
 cho-pathology with all the wealth of facts and discover- 
 ies at their disposal give evidence of the truth of the 
 psycho-physiological hypothesis; in fact, this is their only 
 working hypothesis sine qua non the very existence of 
 these sciences. 
 
 The psycho-physiological hypothesis finds special sup- 
 port in the brilliant investigations of experimental physi- 
 ology. The experiments of Munk, Ferrier, Hitzig, 
 Brown-Sequard, Goltz, Schiff, and others clearly show 
 the correlation of brain functions with psychic activity. 
 They show, for instance, in animals that the physiolog- 
 ical processes in the occipital lobes are correlated with 
 vision, that those of the temporal lobe, especially of the' 
 superior temporo-sphenoidal convolution are correlated 
 with hearing, that sensations of smell are concomitant 
 with the function of the median descending part of the 
 temporal lobes, that taste is probably correlated with the 
 processes of the lower temporal regions, that tactual 
 sensibility is intimately connected with the physiological 
 processes of the motor zone; and the recent researches 
 of Bianchi and Flechsig tend to correlate the highest 
 psychic activity of man with the function of definite 
 areas in the cortex. 
 
 Should we care to look for more proofs as to the 
 validity of correlation of psychic with neural, or physical 
 
Inductive Basis of Psychological Hypothesis 77 
 
 processes, we can also find it in another branch of ex- 
 perimental physiology, namely, physiological psychol- 
 ogy. Thus Doctor Lombard by placing sensitive ther- 
 mometers and electric piles against the scalp noted a 
 rise in temperature during intellectual effort, such as 
 calculation, recitation, composition. The temperature 
 showed a marked rise exceeding 1 ° F. during an intense 
 emotion. When intellectual activity rose in intensity 
 there was also a parallel rise in temperature, thus the 
 temperature was found to be higher, when poetry was 
 recited silently than when the same was done aloud. 
 Similar results were arrived at by Schiff in his experi- 
 ments on dogs. He placed thermo-electric needles on 
 the scalps of dogs; the sensations of the animals were 
 then tested with different kinds of stimuli. It was found 
 that whenever the stimulus was given and the sensation 
 experienced, that a change was at once manifested in the 
 cerebral and motor processes which was indicated by the 
 deflection of the galvanometer. When the dog was lying 
 motionless and a rolled up piece of paper was given to 
 him, the galvanic deflection was small, when, however, a 
 piece of meat was brought near the dog, the deflection 
 became considerable. Galvanometric deflections con- 
 comitant with psychomotor activities have also been 
 shown in the case of human subjects. 
 
 The ponograph is well adapted to demonstrate 
 in a striking way to the doubting layman the in- 
 timate relation of physical and mental phenom- 
 ena. The subject is put on table, which is so 
 delicately balanced that at the slightest alteration in the 
 distribution of the weight of the subject, it tilts. Now 
 it is found that when the subject is spoken to, or when 
 making some intellectual effort, the table at once tilts, 
 
78 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 possibly because of the increased blood supply to the 
 brain and more especially on account of the motor reac- 
 tions. Pneumographic, plethysmographic, carotido- 
 graphic, cardiographic, automatographic, ponographic, 
 and ergographic tracings show physiological changes 
 concomitant with the slightest modification of psychic 
 processes. As simple an instrument as the sphygmo- 
 graph can demonstrate the same truth. A sphygmogram 
 taken under mental activity differs from the one taken 
 under mental repose. 
 
 All these facts, and many more could be adduced 
 to establish on a firm basis the psycho-physiological 
 hypothesis that psychic phenomena are accompanied 
 with physiological or physical processes. The whole of 
 recent psycho-physiological research work is based on 
 the hypothesis that there is no psychosis without neu- 
 rosis. The two are concomitant. Psychic and physical 
 phenomena go hand in hand, the two processes run 
 parallel to each other. Thus we find that psycho-physi- 
 ological parallelism is a strictly scientific hypothesis. 
 
 The psychic and physiological series of changes 
 are concomitant, parallel, but they do not stand to each 
 other in relation of antecedent and consequent, they are 
 not causally related. I take here the opportunity of 
 emphasizing the non-causal relation of mental and phys- 
 iological processes. It is usually taken for granted by 
 many medical men, and even by some scientists, neurol- 
 ogists, physiologists, biologists, who do not happen to 
 think out clearly the more theoretical aspects of their 
 investigations, that brain processes are the direct cause 
 of mental phenomena and that psychology therefore is 
 nothing but a chapter in physiology. Study the brain 
 and you will know all about psychic life. This view is 
 
Inductive Basis of Psychological Hypothesis 79 
 
 certainly fallacious. A psychic fact as we have pointed 
 out is radically different, different in kind from a phys- 
 ical, mechanical fact. One cannot, therefore, give rise 
 to the other. 
 
 The reason why it is thought that physical processes 
 give rise to mental, lies in the fallacious analogy taken 
 from the law of convertibility and equivalence of energy 
 in the activity of physical processes. Heat, it is reasoned, 
 can be converted into electricity, electricity into magnet- 
 ism, magnetism into motion, motion into sound or light, 
 and the same may be done in reverse order; the energy 
 of physiological processes therefore is converted into 
 mental, or psychic energy. The whole reasoning is 
 wrong. We must remember that what underlies all 
 these different physical phenomena is various forms of 
 molecular and molar motion, and when one order of 
 physical phenomena passes into another, it is after all 
 only the transformation of one form of motion into 
 another form. Quite different is it in the case of the 
 phenomena of consciousness. The activity of conscious- 
 ness is not a form of motion, and the two therefore, 
 cannot be converted into each other. Mental activity 
 is but figuratively termed energy, just as a well reasoned 
 argument may be characterized as clear and lucid, but 
 it does not mean that one can see a candle shining 
 through it. The energy of mental phenomena is as 
 much the energy of physical and physiological sciences 
 as the idea of a brick is a brick itself and made up of 
 clay. 
 
 Furthermore, were it possible that a physiological 
 process should be converted into a mental process, the 
 law of conservation of energy would have to be given 
 up, and along with it the whole edifice of modern science 
 
80 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 would tumble to the ground. For according to the law 
 of conservation of energy no physical energy can pos- 
 sibly be lost. One form of energy may pass into another, 
 but the physical energy which is some form of motion, 
 molar, molecular, atomic, ionic or electronic cannot be 
 lost, that is, there must always be so much motion, no 
 matter under what form it may appear. Now on the 
 one hand, were it possible that a physiological process, 
 which is nothing but a form of physical energy, could 
 pass into a psychic state, which is no motion at all, we 
 would really have a loss of energy. Were it on the 
 other hand possible that a mental or psychic process 
 should pass into a physiological process, we would have 
 had new energy generated, energy that is not a trans- 
 formation of some previous existing energy, or physical 
 activity. 
 
 If mental and physiological processes were to 
 stand to each other in relation of antecedent and conse- 
 quent, in relation of cause and effect, we would have had 
 with each beat of consciousness a new creation of physi- 
 cal energy and a loss of it with each cerebral process. This 
 would be sufficient to undermine the basis of science, and 
 practically we might have had good hopes that in the 
 near future our steam engines would be run by good 
 intentions and windmills by aesthetic feelings. 
 
 Psychic and physiological series are no doubt inti- 
 mately related, but their relation is not causal, they do 
 not stand to each other in relation of invariable suc- 
 cession characteristic of cause and effect, but in that 
 of co-existence. The two series of processes are 
 concomitant, they run parallel to each other, but 
 neither is the cause of the other. A change in 
 the one means also a simultaneous, concomitant mod- 
 
Inductive Basis of Psychological Hypothesis 8 1 
 
 ification in the other. In other words, every psychic 
 change must have its physiological concomitant, and 
 vice versa, every physiological process may have its 
 psychic accompaniment. This hypothesis of psycho- 
 physical parallelism is at the basis of all modern psycho- 
 physiological, neurological, and psycho-pathological in- 
 vestigations, inasmuch as it is taken for granted that for 
 every manifested sensori-motor or ideo-motor "symp- 
 tom" there must be present term for term some physio- 
 logical process. Psychology takes the same view and ac- 
 cepts the same hypothesis; it does not trouble itself 
 in the least with the philosophical problem as to whether 
 the two series of phenomena, the mental and the phys- 
 ical, have behind them separate substances, or whether 
 they are but two different aspects of the same 
 thing. This belongs to metaphysics. The psycho-phys- 
 iological theory like all other scientific hypotheses has 
 nothing to do with metaphysical substrata, but deals 
 only with facts and their relations. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 THE DEDUCTIVE BASIS OF THE POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
 HYPOTHESIS 
 
 THE concept of causality cannot be worked in 
 psychology in the same way as it can be done 
 in the physical science. The circle of physical 
 processes is complete in itself. A physical 
 process without ceasing to be physical can be traced 
 endlessly in the past or future, all the links of the endless 
 process must all be physical in their nature. For if we 
 permit in the endless chain of links of the physical pro- 
 cess any other but physical links to be interpolated, all 
 the physical sciences must fall to the ground, since at any 
 stage we may get hold of a process of which the antece- 
 dent link is not of a physical nature. In short, the postu- 
 late that forms the basis of physical science is that the 
 antecedent and consequent of a physical process taken 
 at any stage of the process are physical in their nature. 
 This is the principle of continuity. The whole edifice 
 of the physical sciences is based on this principle. 
 
 If we now turn to psychology, we find that it cannot 
 be based on a postulate of similar character. Psychol- 
 ogy cannot possibly work on the assumption that the 
 processes it deals with can be traced endlessly in either 
 direction, past, or future. Unlike the physical, the 
 psychic process is finite and final, — it has a beginning and 
 an end, it begins with a purpose, conscious, subconscious, 
 or unconscious, and ends with an adjustment. The 
 psychic process begins as a sensation, and its complete 
 
 82 
 
Deductive Basis of Psychological Hypothesis 83 
 
 cycle runs its course as an idea and then ends in a voli- 
 tion to act. The stimulus marking the beginning of the 
 psychic process and the act marking the end of the pro- 
 cess are physical links of a continuous physical process, 
 the links of which can be traced endlessly in physical 
 terms. 
 
 Taking the psychic process from the ontogenetic 
 standpoint, we find again the same thing. If the psychic 
 life of the individual is taken as a whole and traced back- 
 ward, in the past, we arrive at some point, when the 
 stream of consciousness begins, and on following it 
 forward, we finally arrive at a point where the stream 
 of consciousness ends. If we view the question phylo- 
 genetically, we come once more to the same conclusion. 
 In the history of biological evolution there was a time 
 when psychic life began, and there will come a time when 
 all psychic life will disappear from our globe. The 
 principle of continuity, the warp and woof of physical 
 science, cannot be worked in psychology, instead of it we 
 can only discover a principle of finiteness and finality. 
 
 In a physical process any link taken at random must 
 have a physical antecedent and consequent; not so is it 
 in a psychic process, not each link of the series has its 
 psychic antecedent and consequent, the first link has no 
 antecedent and the last one has no consequent. The 
 phenomena of sleep, of hypnosis, of amnesia, of uncon- 
 sciousness, of syncope show that the psychic process 
 may be cut short anywhere in its course, and may re- 
 sume its flow from any given link or stage. The links 
 that go to form the psychic process hang loosely, and 
 any link may really be without an antecedent or without 
 a consequent. 
 
 In many cases the seemingly lost antecedent 
 
84 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 can still be found in the subconscious, dissociated 
 from the active stream of consciousness constituting for 
 the time being the conscious personality or the self-con- 
 sciousness of the subject, such for instance is the case in 
 the many forms of functional psychopathic diseases and 
 also in hypnosis. In other cases, such for instance, as 
 unconsciousness of epilepsy, the stream of consciousness 
 is interrupted and resumed only after a certain period of 
 time, not even the subconscious can supply us the 
 missing link. In normal sleep we meet once more with 
 an interruption of the current of consciousness, and it is 
 only under certain conditions, such as dreaming, that the 
 subconscious can supply the missing states. Each psychic 
 process is like the life process of a given individual, it 
 has a definite beginning and a definite end; while a 
 physical process has neither beginning nor end, and can 
 be followed out endlessly in the direction of the line of 
 antecedents or consequents. In other words while a 
 physical process is infinite, a psychic process is finite. 
 
 Let P be a physical process and p represent a link in 
 that process, then p 1 , p 11 , p lu , etc., may be represented 
 as its consequents, while pi, p=, pa, pi, etc., may be rep- 
 resented as its antecedents. P therefore may be repre- 
 sented by the following infinite series : 
 
 P= +p*+ps+p 2 +p 1 +(p)+p 1 +p U +p 111 +p 1U1 + 
 
 The series is infinite in both directions, in direction of 
 pi antecedents, and in the direction of p 1 consequents. 
 
 Let S represent a psychic process, s a link in that pro- 
 cess, s 1 s 11 s ul s mi etc., its consequents and Si, s.-, ss, s*, 
 etc., its antecedents, then the psychic process can be rep- 
 resented by the following series : 
 
Deductive Basis of Psychological Hypothesis 85 
 S= +sd-S3+sd- Sl + (s) Xs 1 +s 11 +s lu +s im + 
 
 Now this series is finite, it begins at some link and ends 
 with some link, neither the beginning nor the end is de- 
 fined, — the series may begin at any link and end at any 
 link. Since the process may begin anywhere in the series, 
 there is really no necessary connection between the links 
 of the series. In the physical process on the contrary, 
 the series is infinite, and any link has a determinate 
 necessarily given preceding and succeeding link. In 
 other words, while the links of the physical process are 
 necessarily causally connected, the links of the psychic 
 process have no causal necessity. 
 
 Since the two processes, the physical and the psychic 
 are postulated to run parallel to each other, their co-or- 
 dination may be represented in the following series : 
 
 S. ., +Ss+S2+ Sl +(S)+S 1 +S 11 +. ., 
 
 +p*+p 3 +p 2 + pi + ( p ) +p 1 +p u +p 111 +p 1111 + 
 
 Each link of the psychic process has some link of the 
 physical process as its concomitant. 
 
 s has p, si, — pi, S2 — p 2 , s 1 — p 1 , s 11 — p 11 . 
 
 The psychic process not having its links causally con- 
 nected, the causal necessity can only be followed along its 
 concomitant physical or physiological series. Hence we 
 can see why the physiological series is indispensable to 
 the psychic series. 
 
 The finiteness of the psychic process makes it impos- 
 sible to apply to it the principle of necessity. For while 
 a physical process must necessarily have a physical an- 
 
86 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 tecedent and physical consequent, a psychic process and 
 each link of it does not necessarily have an antecedent 
 or consequent, it may begin and end at any link. 
 
 It is only by means of the physical or physiological 
 series that the principles of continuity and necessary 
 causal connection, the foundation of all objective science, 
 can be worked in psychology. Without the help of the 
 concomitant physiological series the investigator of the 
 psychic process is, scientifically considered, completely 
 helpless, since the psychic process has no objectively 
 necessary causal interconnection. 
 
 The "Voluntaristic" school in attempting to make of 
 psychology a science independent of all physiology is 
 fundamentally wrong. Without the physiological series 
 psychology has no cement to fasten its material with, it 
 has no foundation to build on. Psychology can main- 
 tain itself in the work of objective natural sciences only 
 on condition of its intimate interdependence with physi- 
 ology. No psychology without physiology. The psy- 
 cho-physiological hypothesis is both inductively and de- 
 ductively the sine qua non of the science of psychology. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 LIFE AND THE PSYCHIC PROCESS 
 
 WE have pointed out that the psychic process 
 is essentially finite and final, can we find any 
 other process that should be characterized 
 by the same mark of finiteness and finality? 
 We find an analogous process in life. The life process 
 is one that has the aspect of finiteness. Ontogenetically, 
 the life-process of an organism has its beginning in the 
 fertilization or stimulation to life-activity of the ovum, 
 and has its end in death. Phylogenetically, the life pro- 
 cess runs a determinate course. There was a time when 
 geological conditions did not permit the presence of life, 
 and there will come a time when life will be extinct. 
 Ontogenetically, the biological process is analogous to 
 the mental process. The biological process, unlike the 
 physical process, is not endless ; it has a definite beginning 
 and end. Taking any stage of the process as the start- 
 ing point, we find that neither the chain of antecedents, 
 nor that of consequents can be followed endlessly. Being 
 a finite process we find in it the same relation we discov- 
 ered in the psychic process, — the first term of the series 
 has no antecedent and the last one has no consequent. 
 Furthermore, the biological process, like the psycholog- 
 ical one, may be cut short at any stage, — the organism or 
 the protoplasm may die or be killed. It is only mechan- 
 ically regarded that the biological process can be worked 
 into the definite texture of physical series. 
 
 The finiteness of the life process is especially manifest- 
 
 87 
 
88 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 ed from the point of finality. In examining the char- 
 acter of living beings, in contradistinction to physical 
 things, we find a fundamental difference between the 
 two. The structure and function of living beings can 
 be regarded under the concept of purpose or that of 
 final causation, the purpose being the good, the ad- 
 vantage, the utility of the organism. Inanimate things 
 cannot be regarded under the concept of final causation, 
 but under that of efficient causation. The stone lying 
 yonder has no purpose, it has no special advantage for 
 its material particles from its particular position. The 
 inner relations of its parts and the relations of its surface- 
 angles and prominences are not of any ultimate good to 
 the stone, nor do we ask of what use is this particular vi- 
 bration to the molecules. We do ask, however, this 
 question of utility in regard to organisms. Of what use is 
 the grazing or drinking to the cow? Of what use is 
 this particular organ and its function to this or that 
 organism? The problem of utility is one that can only 
 be raised in the case of organic life, but not in the case 
 of inorganic things. We can see the reason why it 
 should be so. Life may be regarded as an adaptation 
 of inner and outer relations. Adaptation and fitness are 
 important criteria with biological processes. What is 
 the fitness, or utility of organs and their functions to the 
 particular organism, and how have they come to this 
 given state of fitness? These problems cannot be ig- 
 nored by biology as a science. The whole of the Dar- 
 winian theory aims to give the key to the way the differ- 
 ent forms of adaptations have come about. Adaptation 
 and utility, however, mean aims. A biological process 
 is not an endless series of antecedents and consequents, 
 but one that has an end. A life process is a final pro- 
 
Life and the Psychic Process 89 
 
 cess taking place in the organism in its internal and essen- 
 tial adjustments. 
 
 The finality of the life process is clearly brought out, 
 if looked at from a totally different point of view. The 
 most characteristic feature of a living organism, is its 
 being an organic whole, a unity, an individuality. All 
 the parts of the organism bear relation to and have their 
 significance with regard to the organism as a whole. The 
 fin of the fish, the wing of the bird, and the arm of the 
 man cease to be what they are, if separated from the 
 particular individual to which they respectively belong. 
 The structure and function of the part can be under- 
 stood only in relation to the needs of the organic whole. 
 The parts of the individual subserve the organic unity. 
 In the course of evolution, both ontogenetic and phylo- 
 genetic, parts may arise or drop out for the benefit and 
 advantage of the whole. Mechanically considered, an 
 organism is nothing but a heap of vibrating molecules 
 or atoms; biologically regarded, this heap constitutes a 
 whole, an individual, and each vibration is for the good 
 of this whole, if the individual is to maintain itself in 
 existence. 
 
 It may be objected that a machine, though purely me- 
 chanical, may be similarly defined. A machine consti- 
 tues a whole, a unity, and every part bears a definite re- 
 lation to the whole, and cannot in fact be understood 
 without the knowledge of the machine as a whole. Who, 
 without knowing a watch as a whole, could have guessed 
 the function of a particular wheel or spring, if shown 
 by itself? Each part within a mechanism has its dis- 
 tinctive character only in relation to the other parts 
 forming an interrelated system. Should this be granted, 
 in what sense, then, it may be asked, does an organism 
 
90 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 differ from a mechanism? Must not then a biological 
 process be, after all, reduced to mechanical terms; and 
 if this be so, is not rather the opposite statement the cor- 
 rect one, namely, that a biological process does not 
 really differ from a physical process? This, however, 
 is not so. The difference between the two is a funda- 
 mental one. The unity of the mechanism does not lie 
 in the machine per se, but in the needs and mind of the 
 mechanician, while the organic unity is postulated as be- 
 ing in the organism itself. The purpose of the machine 
 does not lie in the machine itself, but in needs outside 
 itself; no machine exists, for its own advantage and 
 good, from its very nature a machine is for something 
 else. 
 
 An organism, on the contrary, constitutes its own 
 purpose. No organism in nature, not as yet modified 
 by artificial selection, exists entirely for the good of 
 another. The structure and functions of the parts of 
 an organism are for the good and advantage of that 
 particular individual. Unlike a machine, the purpose 
 falls not outside, but inside the organism. An organ- 
 ism forms a closed circle, a microcosm, to which the 
 macrocosm is made subservient. Each organism is a 
 centre from which rays radiate to all the points of the 
 universe; in other words, an organism is an end for 
 which everything else is nothing but a means. Darwin 
 was so much impressed with this teleological aspect of 
 organic life that he frankly admitted that, if only one 
 example in a natural state could be produced, an exam- 
 ple of an organism showing structure and function use- 
 ful not to itself, but to another organism, his whole 
 theory of evolution would fall to the ground. A mech- 
 anism is a means, never an end; g,n organism is an end^ 
 
Life and the Psychic Process 91 
 
 never a means. 
 
 A biological process is finite, it has a definite begin- 
 ning and end ; it is also final, inasmuch as it is supposed 
 to be of some use to the organism in which the process 
 takes place. This does not mean, however, that the 
 biological process cannot be looked at from a purely me- 
 chanical standpoint. Every object, every external ob- 
 jective process can be looked at from the point of view 
 of pure mechanism, where the series of antecedents and 
 consequents is infinite, where only atoms and their move- 
 ments have supreme sway; but while some objects and 
 processes admit only of this standpoint, others admit 
 also of another point of view, namely the teleological 
 in which the leading principles are unity, synthesis, and 
 purpose. 
 
 Biological processes certainly admit of mechanical 
 treatment, they can be worked into the infinite series 
 of mechanical causes and effect, but, then, these 
 processes so regarded, are simply mechanical and cease 
 to be biological. Life is regarded under a teleo- 
 logical aspect. Science need not necessarily be 
 entirely mechanical, it may also deal with pur- 
 poses, not self-conscious, not even conscious, but 
 still with purposes, which on account of their not being 
 conscious are to be treated according to the principle of 
 efficient causation. Such is the method of Darwin, in 
 opposition to that of Lamarck. The purposive life 
 processes are treated by Darwin on the principle of 
 efficient causation. 
 
 They who want to reduce biology to mechanism 
 should reflect on the meaning of evolution. From a 
 mechanical standpoint, evolution, — the basis of biology, 
 is meaningless. Molecules, atoms and their vibrations 
 
92 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 can have neither lower nor higher stages, they are all 
 on the same plane, following the same laws from all 
 eternity. 
 
 If from our long digression on the nature of the bio- 
 logical process, we now return to the subject under dis- 
 cussion, namely, the psychological process, we can re- 
 alize clearly the point of view from which psychic life 
 should be regarded. The psychic process is primarily 
 a life process. 
 
 Since the life-process is regarded under a teleological 
 aspect, it follows that the psychic process should be 
 treated in the same way. The psychic process is the 
 highest stage in the evolution of life, and as such should 
 be studied not by the instruments of mechanics and 
 chemistry, but by the methods of biology. In addition 
 to the concept of efficient causation, psychology even 
 more than biology, should also work with the concepts 
 of unity, synthesis, and purpose. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 THE CHANCE ASPECT OF LIFE AND MIND 
 
 THE teleology of the biological process should, 
 however, be somewhat limited. We are apt 
 to overestimate the utility of organs and 
 functions in the world of living beings. There 
 may be organs which are of no use to the organism, and 
 there may be functions which are indifferent and even 
 positively harmful to life. It is questionable whether 
 the thymus gland, the tonsils, the appendix are of any 
 use to man, and it is quite certain that a number of 
 physiological processes take place in the organism which 
 are indifferent and even detrimental to the life existence 
 of the individual. 
 
 "In every organism" says Morgan, "there are parts 
 of the body whose processes cannot be of vital import- 
 ance to the individual. The rudimentary organs, so 
 called, furnish many examples of structures whose 
 presence may be of little or of no use to the individual; 
 in fact as in the case of the appendix of man the or- 
 gans may be a source of great danger to the individual. 
 Another example of the same thing is 
 found in the rudimentary eyes of animals living in the 
 dark, such as the mole and several cave animals, fishes, 
 amphibia, and insects. There are still other organs 
 which cannot be looked upon as rudimentary, yet whose 
 presence can scarcely be considered as essential to the 
 life of the individual. For instance, the electric organs 
 in some of the rays and fish can hardly protect the ani- 
 
 93 
 
94 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 mal from enemies, even when as highly developed as 
 in the torpedo; and we do not know of any other 
 essential service they can perform. Whether the same 
 may also be said of the phosphorescent organs of 
 many animals is perhaps open in some cases to doubt, 
 but there can be little question that the light produced 
 by most of the small marine organisms, such as noctilica, 
 jellyfish, ctenophores, copepods, pyrosoma, etc., can- 
 not be of use to these animals in protecting them from 
 attack. In the case of certain bacteria it seems quite 
 evident that the production of light can be of no use 
 as such to them. The production of light may be only 
 a sort of by-product of changes going on in the organ- 
 ism, and has no relation to outside conditions. In cer- 
 tain cases, as in the glowworm, it has been supposed 
 that the display may serve to bring the sexes together; 
 but since the phosphorescent organs are also present in 
 the larval stages of the glowworm, and since even the 
 egg itself is said to be phosphorescent, it is improbable, 
 in these stages at least, that the presence of the light is 
 of service to the organism. 
 
 While it is difficult to show that the wonderful pat- 
 terns and magnificent coloration of many of the larger 
 animals are not of service to the animal, however scep- 
 tical we may be on the subject, yet in the case of many 
 microscopic forms that are equally brilliantly colored 
 there can be little doubt that the coloration can be of no 
 special service to them. We also see in other cases that 
 the presence of color need not be connected with any 
 use that it bears as such to the animal. For instance, the 
 beautiful colors on the inside of the shells of many 
 marine snails and of bivalve mollusks, can be of no use 
 to the animal that makes the shell, because as long as 
 
The Chance Aspect of Life and Mind 95 
 
 the animal is alive this color cannot be seen from the 
 outside. . . . The splendid coloring of the leaves 
 in autumn is certainly of no service to the organism. 
 
 As an example of a change in the organism that is of 
 no use to it may be cited the case of the turning white of 
 the hair in old age in man and in several other mam- 
 mals. The absorption of bone at the angle of the chin 
 in man is another case of a change of no immediate use 
 to the individual. We also find in many other changes 
 that accompany old age, processes going on that are of 
 no use to the organism, and which may in the end be 
 the cause of its death." 
 
 We cannot help agreeing with Morgan that the tele- 
 ology of the biological process is not always evident. 
 A number of processes in the world of life are 
 indifferent, useless, and even detrimental to the life 
 existence of the organism. All the biological pro- 
 cesses that lead to the decline of the organism are cer- 
 tainly not useful to the individual; neither are all 
 the processes of a pathological character to which 
 organisms are often subjected in their relations with 
 and adaptation to the external environment. There 
 is certainly no more flimsy, more superficial, and more 
 specious reasoning than the one that ascribes a meaning, 
 utility, and purpose to every organ, function, and physio- 
 logical process found in the organism. The teleological 
 speculations are often a matter of ingenious casuistry. 
 
 The evolutionist who works with the teleological con- 
 cept of utility must assume spontaneous variation as an 
 important factor in the development of life. In other 
 words, out of a great number of many variations, harm- 
 ful, indifferent, and useful, the ones that are useful in 
 their adaptation to the external environment survive 
 
g6 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 or are selected by the process of natural selection. This 
 clearly requires the presence of a great number 
 of variations which show no adaptations and therefore 
 are not useful. The utility and adaptation manifested 
 by the biological processes are due to the presence of 
 an immense number of variations of biological processes 
 which are useless, indifferent, and even harmful. 
 
 The struggle for existence with its survival of the fit- 
 test and the principle of spontaneous variations clearly 
 indicate the presence of biological processes which are 
 essentially purposeless. The theory of evolution, at least 
 from a Darwinian standpoint, the most scientific of 
 evolutionary hypotheses, is based on the empirical as- 
 sumption that the unadapted variations far exceed in 
 number the adapted or useful variations. Useful pur- 
 posive biological processes are rare, few, and accidental, 
 while the indifferent, the useless and the purposeless 
 biological processes are by far the most common. The 
 purposive processes are the accidental and the excep- 
 tional, while the purposeless processes are the rule. It is 
 out of the purposeless that the purposive processes de- 
 velop. The fully developed biological process, the fully 
 developed organism is purposeful, because of its selec- 
 tion of the purposeful out of the great mass of purpose- 
 less biological processes and unadapted organisms. 
 
 In the psychological process a similar state prevails. 
 The general outcome may have purpose, but this is ac- 
 complished at the expense of a great number of pro- 
 cesses which are accidental, meaningless, and purpose- 
 less. The sensations, feelings, emotions, and ideas 
 that arise in our consciousness are spontaneous or 
 accidental variations. They are the raw material for 
 the guiding selective consciousness. Many of the psy- 
 
The Chance Aspect of Life and Mind 97 
 
 chic states as they arise in consciousness are rejected by 
 the selective action of attention and are left to die a 
 natural death as are the rejected variations by the pro- 
 cess of natural selection. Man would have been a rav- 
 ing maniac, if he were to give expression to the various 
 ideas that spring up spontaneously in his mind. The 
 great number of ideas that throng in the antechamber 
 of consciousness are in themselves purposeless. As 
 Galton well puts it "Although the brain is able to do 
 very fair work fluently in an automatic way, and though 
 it will of its own accord, strike out sudden and happy 
 ideas, it is questionable if it is capable of working thor- 
 oughly and profoundly without past or present effort. 
 The character of this effort seems to me chiefly to lie 
 in bringing the contents of the antechamber more near- 
 ly within the ken of consciousness, which then takes com- 
 prehensive note of all its contents, and compels the log- 
 ical faculty to test them seriatim before selecting the 
 fittest for a summons to the presence chamber." In 
 another place he justly remarks: "The thronging of 
 the antechamber is, I am convinced, beyond my control ; 
 if not, if the ideas do not come, I cannot create them 
 nor compel them to come." It is certainly true we 
 cannot call on our ideas to come at our bidding. They 
 come and go unasked. 
 
 Mental activity in its rational aspects whether it be 
 logical, moral, or aesthetic, is essentially selective in 
 character. The logical process can draw only definite 
 conclusions from given premises, the moral man or the 
 ethical thinker can only regard definite relations and 
 behavior as right or wrong, and the man who creates 
 and enjoys the beautiful can only regard certain definite 
 combinations as beautiful. Even in ordinary life where 
 
98 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 the process of selection is not so rigid as in the arts, 
 sciences, and philosophy, still the process of attention to 
 maintain rationality is a severe judge in the rejection of 
 the unfit ideas. In a train of ideas few ideas that offer 
 themselves are accepted as fit and utilized by the guid- 
 ing thought. The stream of consciousness as it rushes 
 along picks up objects that are intended for and help 
 to reach the destination set out. Every idea, every 
 thought as it presents itself to the guiding process is 
 selected with respect to the purpose of the given stream 
 of thought. 
 
 The thoughts that present themselves at any one 
 moment are meaningless and purposeless, they are 
 simply the accidental chance material which the giv- 
 en momentary, purposive thought selects as fit in order 
 to succeed best in the achievement of its purpose. The 
 ideas themselves as they present themselves are mean- 
 ingless, purposeless, chance creations of the brain, like 
 the phenomena of accidental variation. When the se- 
 lective process of attention is rigid, more of the chance 
 comers are rejected as not adapted for the purpose, 
 more of the ideas rising to the antechamber of conscious- 
 ness from the subconscious regions are found to be 
 purposeless. A Kepler rejects a number of generaliza- 
 tions before he finds the formulae of his laws that an- 
 swer his purpose in the co-ordination of his facts. 
 
 At the same time different minds, like different ani- 
 mals, differ in the spontaneous or accidental variations 
 to which they can give rise. The dull mind has but few 
 such variations, while the man of genius, like the en- 
 dowed animal, has a mass of accidental variations from 
 which to select in the adaptation to the purpose of the 
 thought. The man of genius whether as artist or thinker 
 
The Chance Aspect of Life and Mind 99 
 
 requires a mass of accidental variations to select from 
 and a rigidly selective process of attention. A great 
 wealth of chance variation of thoughts to select from 
 is the special endowment of the man of genius. 
 
 When the process of attention relaxes in the rigidity 
 of its selective activity, more chance images and acci- 
 dental variations of thoughts are presented to and ac- 
 cepted by consciousness; the selective thought does not 
 hold on to its purpose, the stream of thought becomes 
 constituted of relatively purposeless chance images and 
 accidental ideas. Such states occur in day-reveries or un- 
 der the influence of alcohol and various toxins as well as 
 in the hypnoidal, hypnagogic, and hypnopagogic 
 states. When the process of attention becomes com- 
 pletely relaxed as in sleep, fever, or in the acute forms 
 of mental maladies, the chance images and accidental va- 
 riations of ideas come and go without aim and purpose. 
 Purposeless thought is as much the rule of mental life 
 as purposeless accidental variations are the rule of or- 
 ganic life. Like the fully developed biological process, 
 the fully developed mental state presents purpose in its 
 selective activity. Purpose, however, arises out of chaos, 
 out of chance variations. Our dreams, our unintentional 
 errors in speech, writing and action are due to the many 
 chance thoughts which either intrude themselves on 
 consciousness in spite of the selective rigid process of 
 attention, or are due to the momentary relaxation of the 
 selective process. Chance-thoughts, meaningless images 
 and ideas, like accidental variations, form one of the 
 most important factors in the evolution of purposive 
 mental activity. 
 
 The so-called "psycho-analytic science" is erroneous, 
 not only because of its fallacious "psychic causation," but 
 
ioo Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 also because it is based on the fallacy of regarding each 
 and every mental state as purposive in character. This 
 pseudo-psychology misses the fundamental fact that 
 many psychic occurrences are like many biological oc- 
 currences, mere chance variations. These chance varia- 
 tions form the matrix out of which the purposive psychic 
 process arises. Not purpose, but chance is at the heart 
 of mental life. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 ACTIVITY OF MENTAL LIFE 
 
 THE popular mind regards cause as a strain- 
 ing agency which acts in agony of labor on 
 resisting material, finally fashioning it and 
 giving rise to the effect; such a relation is 
 considered as constituting the very essence of activity. 
 This anthropomorphic or animistic view of cause and 
 effect must be rejected by the scientist. The cause does 
 not beget the effect in labor, in strain. To conceive 
 causes as straining agencies is due to the fact that the 
 popular mind has a tendency to mythological creations, 
 to regard natural phenomena as products fashioned by 
 living agencies. The common-sense man in fashioning 
 his material works with his muscles and experiences 
 muscular sensation of strain, of push and pull, hence in 
 regarding the changes in the course of natural pro- 
 cesses, he projects into them his subjective muscular ex- 
 periences. Science, however, has succeeded in freeing 
 itself from all animism, and does not invoke the will and 
 labor of deities and spirits as the causes of physical phe- 
 nomena, nor does it regard causes themselves as little 
 deities and sprites with will and strain in the produc- 
 tion of effects. 
 
 Objectively regarded, what nature presents is only 
 sequences of events, or phenomena, and the only 
 relationship observed between cause and effect is 
 simply one of invariable sequence. If of two phe- 
 nomena one antecedent and the other consequent, the 
 
 IOI 
 
102 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 consequent is invariably observed to depend in its vari- 
 ation on the antecedent, such an antecedent is declared 
 to be the cause of the consequent. To give an illustra- 
 tion. If a stone falls from a certain height on a heap 
 of many layers of thin glass, the stone in falling breaks 
 the glass. We declare the stone to be the cause of 
 the breaking of the glass, why? Because we observe 
 the fall of the stone, and on reproducing the same con- 
 ditions, the same results follow; fall of stone, then 
 breaking of glass. Furthermore, increasing the weight 
 of the stone, more layers of glass are broken, on decreas- 
 ing the weight of the stone less layers are broken, vari- 
 ations in the consequent depend on the variations of the 
 antecedent. We may similarly change the distance from 
 which the stone falls, and the effect will vary once more. 
 On changing the material of the stone the amount 
 of breakage will vary once more. Furthermore, on 
 changing the consistency of the glass layer the effect 
 will again vary. In short, where the phenomena 
 are observed to stand to each other in functional rela- 
 tion of invariable sequence, the antecedent is declared 
 to be the cause of the consequent, such, as in our exam- 
 ple, the fall of the stone is regarded as the cause of the 
 breaking of the glass. What is observed is simply 
 an invariable sequence, so much stone momentum, 
 so much glass breakage. No strain or enforcement 
 are ever observed between causes and effects. No 
 strain is observed in the falling stone to produce 
 the effect, nor is it ever detected that the glass re- 
 sists and is forced into the broken state by the power 
 of the stone. 
 
 Strain, resistance, enforcement, power, are all states 
 drawn from experiences of our psychic life. As Mach 
 
Activity of Mental Life 103 
 
 puts it: "There is but one sort of constancy which 
 embraces all forms of constancy, constancy of con- 
 nection (or of relation). The majority of the prop- 
 ositions of natural science express such constancies 
 of connection: 'The tadpole is metamorphosed into 
 a frog; chlorate of sodium makes its appearance in 
 the form of cubes. Rays of light are retilinear. 
 Bodies fall with an acceleration of 9.81.' When these 
 constancies are expressed in concepts we call them laws. 
 Force (in the mechanical significance) is likewise merely 
 a constancy of connections. When I say that a body 
 A exerts a force on a body B, I mean that B, on 
 coming into contraposition with A, is immediately af- 
 fected by a certain acceleration with respect to A. 
 The singular illusion that the substance A is the ab- 
 solutely constant vehicle of a force which takes ef- 
 fect immediately on B's being contraposed to A is 
 easily shaken. . . . The phrases, 'No matter 
 without force, no force without matter,' which are 
 all but abortive attempts to remove a self incurred 
 contradiction, become superfluous on our recognizing 
 only constancies of connection." 
 
 Similarly Karl Pearson regards the scientific law "as 
 a brief description in mental short hand of as wide a 
 range as possible of the sequences of our sense-impres- 
 sions" or experiences. "If the stone from my hand 
 break a window, the cause of the broken window might 
 very likely be spoken of as the moving stone. But al- 
 though this usage is an approach to the scientific usage 
 of the word cause, it yet involves in the popular esti- 
 mation an idea of enforcement which is not in the lat- 
 ter. That the stone moving with a certain speed must 
 bring about the destruction of the window is, I think, 
 
104 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 the idea involved in thus speaking of the moving stone 
 as the cause of the breakage. But were our perceptive 
 organs sufficiently powerful, science conceives that we 
 should see before the impact particles of window and 
 particles of stone moving in a certain manner, and after 
 the impact the same particles moving in a very different 
 manner. We might carefully describe these motions, 
 but we should be unable to say why one stage would fol- 
 low another, just as we can describe how a stone falls to 
 the earth, but not say why it does. Thus scientifically 
 the idea of necessity in the stages of the sequence — stone 
 in motion, broken window — or the idea of enforcement 
 would disappear; we should have a routine of experi- 
 ence. When we speak however of the stage of a se- 
 quence in ordinary life as causes, I do not think it is be- 
 cause we are approaching the scientific standpoint, but 
 I fear it arises from our associating, through long 
 usage the idea of force with the stone. . . . Force 
 as cause of motion is exactly on the same footing as a 
 tree god as cause of growth — both are but names to hide 
 our ignorance of the why in the routine of our percep- 
 tions. The necessity in a law of nature has not the 
 logical must of a geometrical theorem, nor the cate- 
 gorical must of a human law-giver; it is merely our ex- 
 perience of a routine whose stages have neither logical 
 nor volitional order. In what we have termed second- 
 ary causes (successive stages of the sequence) science 
 finds no element of enforcement, solely the routine of 
 experience." 
 
 Within certain limits the psychic process, like the 
 physical process, may be regarded as an activity, as a 
 series of phenomena, as a sequence of antecedents and 
 consequents, or as Pearson puts it, as a routine of experi- 
 
Activity of Mental Life 105 
 
 ence. This activity of course should not be regarded 
 as a metaphysical agency in the sense of a supersensuous 
 soul, but as a successive series of psychic events. From 
 a scientific standpoint the physical process is regarded 
 as a series of successive physical events. Similarly the 
 psychic process may be regarded as a series of succes- 
 sive states consisting of psychic elements, presentative 
 and representative. 
 
 Final, and finite as the psychic process is, it has a 
 series of antecedents and consequents. In so far as these 
 can be traced, one can keep within the bounds of the 
 psychic process only. Furthermore, in so far as the 
 series of psychic antecedents and consequents persists 
 we are fully justified in speaking of the whole series as 
 a process, a form of activity, in short as mental activity. 
 
 If by activity is understood the sequence of antece- 
 dents and consequents, the position taken by some psy- 
 chologists in declaring the mental stream as inactive is 
 unacceptable. There is activity in the psychic process, if 
 by activity is meant not the popular belief in actual bonds 
 between cause and effect, but mere sequence of antece- 
 dents and consequents. The only difference we can 
 find between them is the finality and finiteness as well as 
 lack of invariable or necessary sequence of antecedents 
 and consequents characteristic of the psychic process in 
 contradistinction to the infinite series and invariable, 
 necessary, or causal sequence, presented by the physical 
 process. 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 
 THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 WITH all other sciences psychology must 
 postulate the existence of an external ma- 
 terial world of space, time, and objects. 
 Psychology does not inquire into the nature 
 of these objects, as to what they are in themselves. This 
 as we pointed out is the business of metaphysics, not of 
 science. Psychology however does ask how we come to 
 know the outside world ; it inquires as to the process by 
 which external reality comes to be presented in con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 The fact that psychology postulates an external ma- 
 terial world and studies it in so far as it comes to be 
 reflected in consciousness, points to another postulate 
 which psychology must assume in addition, namely, the 
 existence of an inner world consciousness. This postu- 
 late is peculiar to psychology, no other of the descrip- 
 tive and objective sciences have to assume it. Although 
 it is quite clear that without mind there can possibly 
 be no study, no science, still this is but an indirect reflec- 
 tion which none of the concrete sciences have to take 
 into consideration. Of course, a chemist is required 
 for chemistry, a physicist for physics, a physiologist 
 for physiology, and so on, but the chemist, the physicist, 
 the physiologist do not introduce themselves into their 
 science. In all concrete sciences the mind is entirely 
 projected into its object, it is the external object 
 itself that has to be taken into consideration. In con- 
 
 106 
 
The Postulates of Psychology 107 
 
 crete science consciousness is drowned in the object, in 
 psychology, on the contrary, the object is drowned in 
 consciousness. The chemist, the physicist, who will turn 
 his attention to consciousness and introduce his psychic 
 states, his moods, dispositions, and intentions as elements 
 into his investigations will hardly be an exact scientist. 
 Not so with the psychologist, he must take the inner 
 world into account, he must deal with consciousness, 
 with moods, with feelings. It is true that he must treat 
 them as objects, but these objects, unlike those of other 
 positive sciences, are after all of the inner subjective 
 world of consciousness. For the very essence of psy- 
 chology is the taking account of phenomena of con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 In our last statement that psychology deals with the 
 objective external world as reflected in consciousness 
 another postulate is implied. Besides the external and 
 internal worlds, psychology also postulates the interre- 
 lation of the two. 
 
 This interrelation is not direct, it is not one of ante- 
 cedent, and consequent, but that of coexistence; for as 
 we have already pointed out, the two series of phe- 
 nomena, the mental and the physiological, must be as- 
 sumed as concomitant, as running parallel to each 
 other. If, however, by "the external world" we un- 
 derstand the universe of objects exclusive of the func- 
 tioning psycho-physiological processes then we may say 
 that it stands to the phenomena of consciousness in re- 
 lation both of sequence and coexistence. 
 
 The objective external world enters into relation with 
 consciousness only through the intermediacy of physio- 
 logical nervous processes. Only on this condition can 
 the external world enter into relation with conscious- 
 
108 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 ness, and under special conditions become its direct 
 object. I take a dose of opium, mescal, or cannabis 
 Indica, and have different hallucinations and illu- 
 sions, mental activity is stimulated. The mind teems 
 with sensations, images, ideas, feelings, emotions, 
 moods ; now the whole organism is pierced by sharp 
 pain, now it tingles with indescribable acute pleas- 
 ure; now a charming vision appears, a beautiful 
 scenery unrolls before the mind's eye, a feeling of per- 
 fect heavenly bliss diffuses itself all over our conscious 
 being; now a disgusting, ugly figure presents itself, a 
 horrible scene is witnessed that plunges the mind into an 
 abyss of misery. The current of consciousness is ac- 
 celerated and it drives its waves with more vigor than 
 ever. 
 
 Instead of being accelerated, the current may be 
 depressed and retarded even to such a degree as to 
 plunge the mind into a deep sleep. Such retardation we 
 find under the influence of bromides, or of anaesthetics, 
 such as ether, chloroform, of hypnotics, such as sulfonal, 
 chloral and others. We have here the action of a drug, 
 of an external object on the physiological nervous pro- 
 cesses with their psychic concomitants. In this case, 
 however, the drug itself does not become the direct ob- 
 ject of consciousness. Through the mere absorption of 
 opium, cannabis or belladonna, we can know nothing of 
 their constitution, we can know nothing of their color, 
 of their size, of their weight, specific gravity and so 
 on, we cannot possibly perceive them as objects. The 
 states of consciousness which cannabis, for instance, gives 
 rise to affords no knowledge of the external objective 
 nature of the drug itself. 
 
 A direct knowledge of an external object is acquired 
 
The Postulates of Psychology 109 
 
 through the special senses. Yonder is an object, an 
 inkstand. It stimulates the peripheral sense organ, the 
 eye, the retina, the physiological processes aroused in 
 the rods and cones are transmitted by the optic nerve 
 and by the optic tracts to the visual centres of the occi- 
 pital lobes, the functioning of which is accompanied 
 by sensations of sight. The wave of stimulation 
 spreads from the visual centres to other centres closely 
 associated with them. They too begin to function with 
 more or less intensity, accompanied by images, ideas, 
 thought, which constitute the perception of the ink- 
 stand yonder. The combined activity, or function of a 
 whole system of centres gives rise to the percept ink- 
 stand along with its psychic fringe, with the stream of 
 consciousness in which it is bathed. We see and know 
 the inkstand. 
 
 From a psychological standpoint the mode of action 
 of the inkstand differs radically from that of the opium. 
 The latter may be characterized as psycho-physiological, 
 or even purely physiological, the former may be termed 
 psycho-physical or psychological, perceptual. The one 
 gives rise to perception, to knowledge of the external ob- 
 ject, while the other does not. Both, however, agree in 
 this that they can enter into relations with consciousness 
 only through the intermediacy of physiological nervous 
 processes. The two modes of action and their rela- 
 tion to consciousness may be represented by the follow- 
 ing diagrams: 
 
 I. Psycho-physical or perceptual relation. 
 
 II. Psycho-physiological relation. 
 
Iio Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 I 
 
 Fig. II 
 
 In fig. I, Ob. is the object stimulating S. the organ of 
 special sense, giving rise to physiological nervous 
 processes with their concomitant psychic states consti- 
 tuting the subjective object which is objectified in the 
 object yonder. In Fig. II, D. is the drug acting directly 
 on the nervous centre the stimulated activity of which 
 gives rise to the perception of an external object Ob. 
 Thus we find that external physical and physiological 
 processes are causally related, or stand to each other in 
 relation of invariable or necessary sequence while the 
 physiological and psychic processes stand in relation of 
 coexistence. What the nature of this inter-relation is 
 and how it is possible are problems for epistemology 
 and metaphysics. Psychology must assume this inter- 
 relation as its postulate. 
 
 If psychology is to be a science at all, it must postu- 
 late the uniformity of the phenomena with which it 
 
The Postulates of Psychology in 
 
 deals. This we have pointed out in our second chapter 
 when we discussed the subject matter of psychology. 
 We turn to it again in order to realize clearly its full 
 meaning in psychology. Psychology, as we know, in 
 addition to the external world of physical sci- 
 ences, also postulates consciousness. Its postulate of 
 uniformity is, therefore, far more complex than in other 
 positive sciences. With physical science psychology must 
 postulate uniformity of the external world, because it 
 presupposes the physical sciences, and because the ex- 
 ternal world forms the content and object of conscious- 
 ness. This, however, is not sufficient. Psychology must 
 also postulate the uniformity in the inner world of psy- 
 cho-physiological, or mental phenomena. Were there 
 no uniformity in the phenomena of consciousness, psy- 
 chology, as a science would have been an impossibility. 
 This, however, is not all. Psychology must also 
 postulate the uniformity of relationship between the 
 phenomena of the external and inner worlds. Definite 
 physical processes must be concomitant with certain well 
 defined psychic states. Were this otherwise, the two 
 series, the mental and the physical, would be out of 
 joint, the relations of coexistence would no longer 
 be obtained, and the two series would stand to 
 each other in no relation at all; thus noise, for 
 instance, would sometimes be smelled, sometimes 
 tasted, and sometimes seen. Psychology as a science 
 that deals with general laws, would certainly have 
 been impossible. We would neither have been able 
 to express to others our states of consciousness in 
 uniform definite movements, nor would it have been 
 possible for others to understand us, nor would it have 
 been possible to call forth in others certain desired states 
 
112 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 of consciousness; in short, not only psychology would 
 have been an impossibility, but also all human inter- 
 course. The myth of the tower of Babel would have 
 been fully realized. Psychology must postulate uni- 
 formity of interrelation of physical, physiological, and 
 psychic processes. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 MENTAL SYNTHESIS 
 
 ONE of the fundamental principles of psy- 
 chology is mental synthesis. Objects that 
 appear within the same consciousness are 
 synthetized in a unity, if they are taken cog- 
 nizance of. An object a may be presented to conscious- 
 ness, and another object b may be similarly perceived. 
 They remain two and separate as long as con- 
 sciousness does not take cognizance of their duality, 
 of their being two objects, but as soon as the 
 two appear in consciousness together and are perceived 
 as two, they are by this very fact synthetized into a 
 unity. This is a point which may not possibly be so 
 clear, and is also hard to realize for those who have 
 been used to work in concrete sciences. The reason is 
 that the mind is accustomed to dwell on the object 
 of thought, not on the function of thought itself, and is 
 therefore used to take the object for the thought. The 
 confusion between the thought that possesses the ob- 
 ject, and the object of thought is a fallacy that is as a 
 rule committed by the intelligence trained to busy itself 
 only with external objects. Our reader sees, of 
 course, through this fallacy, he knows that the thing 
 of the idea and the idea of the thing are not identical. 
 The paper on which I write is white and is five inches 
 wide and eight inches long, but my idea of the paper is 
 neither white nor has it so many inches in width and 
 length. 
 
 "3 
 
H4 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 The same fallacy, however, is not so very obvious 
 when it appears under a somewhat different guise. The 
 object of thought has parts, therefore it is concluded 
 that the thought of the object must also be made up of 
 corresponding parts. Because the chain in the external 
 world is made up of so many links, it is concluded that 
 the idea of the chain is made up of so many ideas of 
 links, and that the total sum of the ideas of the links 
 forms the idea of the chain. The idea of the chain, 
 however, is not a mere juxtaposition of so many ideas 
 of links. The ideas of the links would have remained 
 in the juxtaposed disconnected condition, had they not 
 been connected and synthetized in one new idea, the idea 
 of the chain. The word is made up of so many letters, 
 but the sum of the letters is not the idea of the word. 
 The phrase is made up of words, but the mere sum of 
 the words does not make sense, does not form the idea 
 of that sentence. 
 
 It is of the utmost importance to fully and clearly 
 realize this principle of mental synthesis. Many a mis- 
 understanding in psychology is cleared up, by keeping 
 this principle clearly before one's mind. We may say 
 that it is one of the principal keys that gives us an en- 
 trance into the science of psychology. A sum of sensa- 
 tions, of ideas, of images, of feelings, etc., at once 
 brought in consciousness as a sum is by this very fact 
 synthetized by thought into a unity. The chair yonder 
 is composed of many parts, it has four legs, a seat, a 
 back, and each part in its turn is again made up of many 
 parts. Each part, if represented in consciousness at all, 
 has its corresponding idea, but the idea of these com- 
 ponent parts, the idea of the chair is a whole, a unity, no 
 longer being a conglomeration of parts. Objectively 
 
Mental Synthesis 115 
 
 considered, that man yonder is made up of many parts, 
 of many organs, of many tissues, of millions of cells. 
 To my consciousness, however, he is one, my friend 
 John. 
 
 An idea is not made up of parts, as is the object of the 
 idea. Before me lies a grain of wheat, I have a percept 
 of it, I have an idea of that grain. The grain may be di- 
 vided into halves, or quarters, and I can form an idea 
 of a half, of a third, or of a quarter of a grain. Is it 
 possible to do the same thing with the idea ? Can we sub- 
 divide the idea of the grain in the same way as we did 
 the grain itself? Can we have a half, a third, a quar- 
 ter of an idea of the grain? One realizes the 
 impossibility and absurdity of subdividing an idea. We 
 can have an idea of a third of a pound, but it is absurd 
 to talk of a third of an idea of a pound. A third of 
 an idea is simply so much nonsense. But why is it ab- 
 surd to subdivide an idea? Why is it nonsense to 
 speak of having a half, a third, a quarter or any frac- 
 tion or part of an idea? Evidently because an idea is 
 essentially a synthesis, a unity, and has no parts. 
 
 This synthesis, or unity is more or less clear when 
 the percept, or idea is of such a nature as to be syn- 
 thetized into a numerical unity, and be projected into 
 the external world, such for instance, as the chair, the 
 table, the house, or my friend John. It is, however, 
 far less clear when thought includes many ideas, many 
 percepts and the nature of the synthetized unity is mul- 
 tiplicity. There are in my room four chairs. I per- 
 ceive them as being four. Have I not four percepts, 
 four ideas going to make up my idea of the sum of the 
 chairs ? Certainly not. What we have here is not four 
 ideas, but one idea of there being four chairs. A sum 
 
n6 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 of ideas is not the same thing as the idea of their sum, 
 just as in algebra the sum of squares is not the same 
 as the square of the sum. I think a sentence "I took 
 a stroll in the forest yesterday morning." The sentence 
 forms a multiplicity of words, but in spite of all that 
 multiplicity, the phrase appears in consciousness as one 
 whole, as a synthetized unity. Synthetic unity is the 
 essence, the backbone of thought. 
 
 This synthetic unity of consciousness can be made 
 still clearer by the following example. Let the reader 
 imagine a row of men, each thinking one single word of 
 the sentence : "We are standing here in a row." There 
 is here a completely isolated series of ideas, but the 
 words in the series will remain in their full isolation and 
 as such will make no meaning, no one sentence, as long 
 as they will be confined to different disconnected 
 thoughts, and not unified in the synthesis of one synthetic 
 thought or of what I term moment-consciousness. 
 
 To have the idea of a conglomeration, of a mul- 
 tiplicity of objects, images or ideas, a synthetizing 
 moment consciousness is required, a moment-con- 
 sciousness that should take cognizance of all these 
 objects, images or ideas and synthetize them into 
 a unity, the one idea of the many. The many words, 
 the many ideas must be synthetized in one moment-con- 
 sciousness before the idea of the sentence can emerge. 
 This synthesis, in fact, is that one idea. Ideas, images, 
 thoughts, feelings do not come together, fuse into one, 
 and make one idea. 
 
 A book is a complex object, it is a conglomeration of 
 pages, letters, words, lines, sentences, paragraphs, chap- 
 ters. We can have an idea of half a book, but it is 
 certainly absurd to have half an idea of a book. 
 
Mental Synthesis 117 
 
 It means nothing at all; the idea itself has not 
 been formed, and as such, as an idea, is totally 
 absent. A separate synthesis in consciousness is requisite 
 in order to have an aggregation, or association of ideas 
 cognized as one. Ideas do not meet, associate and form 
 a unity, mental synthesis is required. Such a synthesis 
 is always effected, whenever a moment-consciousness gets 
 cognizance of many objects; in other words, sensations, 
 ideas, feelings, images can only get unified in the syn- 
 thesis of a moment-consciousness. Mental synthesis of 
 psychic content in the unity of a moment-consciousness 
 is a fundamental principle of psychology. 
 
 It is the great and fundamental error of the asso- 
 ciationists to overlook this all important element of 
 synthesis in consciousness. They commit the fal- 
 lacy of regarding a mechanical combination, or jux- 
 taposition of ideas as making a "fusion," a synthesis, 
 a unity. There is an idea of A, and there is an idea of 
 B, therefore, it is tacitly assumed that there is the idea of 
 A and B. This as we have shown is a fallacy. The 
 associationists regard the idea of a sum as consisting of 
 as many parts, but only "fused," as the sum itself. This 
 is erroneous. The neglect of the element of mental 
 synthesis and the consequent identification of the idea 
 of the sum as a whole with the sum of ideas of the parts 
 going to make up the external sum falsified the other- 
 wise rich researches of the association school. The sig- 
 nificance of mental synthesis in the moment-consciousness 
 can hardly be overestimated. We shall return to the 
 theory of the moment-consciousness and its mental syn- 
 thesis further on. 
 
 The question as to the nature of that mental syn- 
 thesis does not fall within the province of psychology. 
 
1 1 8 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 Like all other problems that refer to the ultimate na- 
 ture of things and how they are possible, the problem of 
 the inner nature of mental synthesis does not belong to 
 science, but to epistemology and metaphysics. 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 
 THEORIES OF PERCEPTION 
 
 THE theory of perception is fundamental both 
 in normal and abnormal psychology. All 
 mental activities are intimately related with 
 the process of perception. Our wills, our 
 thoughts and our feelings relate to our experience of the 
 outer world of things. Biologically regarded, the per- 
 cept is of the most vital importance, inasmuch as it 
 forms the medium between the individual and the outer 
 environment. Psychologically, the percept reflects the 
 external world and mirrors the conditions of life to 
 which the given organism has to adjust itself. In fact, 
 the percept may be regarded as the coin possessing the 
 value of the external environment. In this respect we 
 cannot help agreeing with Baldwin's statement: 
 "The theory of perception is perhaps the most 
 important as well as the most difficult problem in psy- 
 chology. The interpretation of the higher processes of 
 mind rests upon it and it underlies the body of our gen- 
 eral philosophy. The great philosophies of the world 
 take their rise from initial differences in the method of 
 construing perception." 
 
 In abnormal psychology the theory of perception is 
 of the utmost importance, both from a theoretical and 
 practical standpoint. Illusions, hallucinations, dream 
 states, subconscious states, many states of dissociation 
 depend for their explanation on the analysis of the pro- 
 cess of perception, I have developed a theory of per- 
 
 119 
 
120 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 ception which may be characterized as the doctrine of 
 primary and secondary sensory elements. This doc- 
 trine is based on a close analysis of the normal process 
 of perception and is substantiated by observations and 
 experiments of abnormal mental life. 
 
 Before however we state our view of perception it 
 may be well to make a review of what the principal 
 psychological authorities teach on the subject. 
 
 James Mill in discussing perception tells us : "The 
 colors upon a body are different, according to its figure, 
 its shape, and its size. But the sensations of color and 
 the sensations of extension, of figure, of distance have 
 been so often united, felt in conjunction that the sensa- 
 tions of the color are never experienced without rais- 
 ing the ideas of the extension, the figure, the distance in 
 such intimate union with it, that they not only cannot 
 be separated, but are actually supposed to be seen (ital- 
 ics are mine). The sight, as it is called of figure, or 
 distance, appearing, as it does a simple sensation, is in 
 reality a complex state of consciousness, a sequence in 
 which the antecedent, a sensation of color, and the con- 
 sequent a number of ideas are so closely combined by 
 association that they appear not one idea, but one sen- 
 sation." 
 
 Sully defines perception as a mental act that 'supple- 
 ments a sense impression by an accompaniment or escort 
 of revived sensations, the whole aggregate of actual 
 and revived sensations being solidified or integrated into 
 the form of a percept.' The revived sensations are 
 equivalent to James Mill's associated ideas and images. 
 We shall point out later the confusion which generally 
 prevails among psychologists and psychiatrists, when 
 they talk indiscriminately of revived sensations and ideas 
 
Theories of Perception 121 
 
 regarding the two as identical. 
 
 Hoffding describes the process of perception "as the 
 fusing of a reproduction and an actual sensation. The 
 percept is thus conceived as compounded out of a rep- 
 resentation and a sensation." 
 
 Taine tells us that "Images associated with the sen- 
 sations of the different senses, especially with those of 
 sight and touch constitute acquired perceptions." 
 
 Wundt regards the percept as a psychical compound 
 of ideas or of revived sensations or images. In that 
 respect his analysis differs but little from that of other 
 psychologists who regard the ideas, images, and revived 
 sensations as identical elements going to form the asso- 
 ciated whole or psychic compound, the percept. 
 
 Kulpe speaks of 'centrally excited sensations' regard- 
 ing them as the ideas and the images of the psycholo- 
 gists and psychiatrists, and tells us that he avoids the 
 use of 'ideas.' As far as perception is concerned he 
 closely follows his master, Wundt, and talks of psychic 
 compounds, of sensations and centrally excited sensa- 
 tions which really are identical with the old ideas and 
 images. 
 
 Titchener follows closely Wundt and Kiilpe, and re- 
 gards the 'percept as a compound, or a complex of sen- 
 sations,' of peripheral and of centrally initiated sensa- 
 tions. In order to be explicit he hastens to tell us that 
 there is no fundamental difference between the percep- 
 tion and idea. "It is customary to speak of perception, 
 when the majority of the simple processes in the com- 
 plex are the result of stimulation of a sense organ, i. e., 
 are peripherally aroused, and of idea when the greater 
 number are the result of an excitation within the brain 
 cortex, i. e., are centrally aroused. If I have a table 
 
122 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 before me and my eyes open I am said to perceive the 
 table; if I close my eyes and think of what I saw, to 
 have an idea of a table. But we have seen that the sen- 
 sations aroused centrally do not differ as psychological 
 processes from those aroused peripherally." This state- 
 ment put in such an explicit form brings out clearly what 
 may be designated as the psychologist's fallacy. The 
 fallacy becomes specially apparent in the domain of ab- 
 normal psychology. 
 
 Baldwin with his characteristic breadth of compre- 
 hension puts the subject of perception on a wide basis: 
 "Perception is the apperceptive or synthetic activity of 
 mind whereby the data of sensation take on the forms 
 of representation in space and time; or it is the process 
 of the construction of our representation of the external 
 world." Baldwin does not commit himself to the or- 
 dinary fallacy current among psychologists. 
 
 Similarly James with his genius for psychological in- 
 sight tells us : "The consciousness of particular ma- 
 terial things present to sense is nowadays called percep- 
 tion." And again "Perception thus differs from sensa- 
 tion by the consciousness of farther facts associated 
 with the object of the sensation." He tells us further: 
 "We certainly ought not to say what usually is said by 
 psychologists and treat the perception as a sum of dis- 
 tinct psychic entities, the present sensation namely, plus 
 a lot of images from the past, all integrated together in 
 a way impossible to describe. The perception is one 
 state of mind." 
 
 We thus see that most of the psychologists regard the 
 percept somewhat in Spencerian terms as being made 
 up of presentations and representations, or as Spencer 
 puts it as being 'partly presentative and partly represent 
 
Theories of Perception 123 
 
 tative.' In other words, the percept is a compound of 
 sensations and images, a synthesis of peripherally in- 
 duced sensations and of images, or of ideas centrally 
 excited. One principle underlies the current theory of 
 perception, variously phrased by different psychologists, 
 and that is the identification of ideational and sensory 
 processes. 
 
 The identification of ideational and sensory processes 
 may be traced to Spinoza when he tells us in his Ethics, 
 Prop. XVII., note, "The modifications of the human 
 body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as 
 present to us, we will call the images of things" and then 
 in another place of Part II., Prop. XLIX., note, "In 
 order to illustrate the point let us suppose a boy imagin- 
 ing a horse and perceiving nothing else. Inasmuch as 
 this imagination involves the existence of the horse, and 
 the boy does not perceive anything which would ex- 
 clude the existence of the horse he will necessarily re- 
 gard the horse as present; he will not be able to doubt 
 its existence, although he be not certain thereof. We 
 have daily experiences of such a state of things in 
 dreams." The images, according to Spinoza, are equiv- 
 alent to sensations and percepts, unless counteracted by 
 the more intense peripheral sensations which thus be- 
 come the 'reductives' of the image, a doctrine afterwards 
 fully developed by Taine. I may add that Spinoza's 
 view of dreams is repeated almost verbatim by the great- 
 est psychological authorities, all uncritically giving their 
 assent to the current fallacy that the image is but a 
 weakened sensation and that the sensation is an intensi- 
 fied image. 
 
 This theory of images and perception is perpetuated 
 through Hobbes, Locke, Hartley, Hume, James Mill 
 
124 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 down to our times. 
 
 Hobbes in his terse English puts it: "Imagination 
 therefore is nothing but decaying sense and is found 
 in men and many other living beings, as well in sleeping 
 as waking." 
 
 Locke derives his 'ideas' from 'experience,' but his 
 'experience' is somewhat vague and broad, inasmuch as 
 it flows from two fountain heads, — sensation and re- 
 flection. "Let us then suppose the mind to be as we say 
 white paper void of all characters without any ideas, 
 how comes it to be furnished? . . . To this I an- 
 swer in one word from experience. . . . Our ob- 
 servation employed either about external sensible ob- 
 jects or about the internal operations of our minds, per- 
 ceived and reflected on by ourselves is that which sup- 
 plies our understanding with all the materials of think- 
 ing. These two are the fountains of knowledge from 
 whence all the ideas we have or can naturally have, do 
 spring." Perception is used by Locke in a broader sense 
 than what it is understood at present, as he uses per- 
 ception for sensory experience as well as for the intro- 
 spection of higher mental processes. He tells us, how- 
 ever, that in either case "the mind has a power to revive 
 perceptions which it has once had, with this additional 
 perception annexed to them that it has had them be- 
 fore." Locke evidently entertains the view that sensa- 
 tions can be revived as original sensory experience and 
 that the revived ideas do not differ, except for the addi- 
 tion of pastness, from the original ideas derived from 
 the great source of sensation. 
 
 When we pass to Hartley and Hume the identifica- 
 tion of sensation and idea is set forth with great ex- 
 plicitness. In fact, it is taken as the fundamental prin- 
 
Theories of Perception 125 
 
 ciple of their psychological systems. Thus Hartley 
 postulates in his eighth proposition that "Sensations by 
 being often repeated leave certain vestiges, types or 
 images of themselves which may be called simple ideas 
 of sensation," and correspondingly we have "sen- 
 sory vibrations, by being often repeated, beget in the me- 
 dullary substance of the brain a disposition to diminu- 
 tive vibrations which may be called vibratiuncles and 
 miniatures corresponding to themselves respectively." 
 The vibratiuncle is the physical substratum of what we 
 experience as an idea, and is a copy of the original 
 vibration. The vibratiuncle is a weakened vibration, 
 and the idea is a weakened sensation. 
 
 Hume does not burden himself with Hartley's vibra- 
 tions and vibratiuncles, but still at the basis of his sys- 
 tem we find the same fallacious psychological principle. 
 "All our ideas" he says "are copies of our lively percep- 
 tions or impressions." In other words, our sensations 
 are lively impressions, while the ideas are only weakened 
 perceptions, — the idea differs from the sensation only 
 in intensity. There is no qualitative difference between 
 sensation and idea. Ideas belong to sensory processes 
 and do not differ as such from sensations. This view 
 has since become the heritage of current psychological 
 theories. 
 
CHAPTER XX 
 
 THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE PERCEPT 
 
 AS in many other sciences, especially the ones 
 of the purely mental variety, a good deal in 
 psychology is traditional such for instance 
 are the tripartite and bipartite division of the 
 mind or the various classifications of the mental activi- 
 ties. Of course, classifications as well as theories have 
 their important function in science, but they should not 
 be permitted to become a bed of Procrustes to the 
 guests whom they shelter. 
 
 It may sometimes be well to disregard established 
 principles, classifications and time-honored traditions 
 and study the facts from a somewhat different stand- 
 point. We may then possibly see the facts in a new 
 light and realize aspects and connections which are hid- 
 den from the customary view of the phenomena. 
 
 Suppose we take a mental cross-section of a moment 
 of perceptual consciousness in the very act of formation 
 of a percept. The whole perceptual moment may be 
 said to be spread out before our mental gaze. We find 
 sensory elements of a relatively intense character. Cer- 
 tain sensory elements stand out first and foremost in 
 consciousness, they are the very first to arrest the mental 
 gaze and keep it steadily fixed on themselves. In the 
 same view, however, we can also discern other elements, 
 not so prominent, though equally sensory which, on ac- 
 count of their lack of prominence, appear to be of a 
 subordinate character. The whole tone of the percept 
 
 126 
 
The Structure and Function of the Percept 127 
 
 is given by the qualitative aspect of the prominent ele- 
 ments which seem to guide and form the organization 
 of the percept. 
 
 The general plan of the structure of the percept may 
 be compared to that of the cell. A close examination of 
 the cell reveals the presence of a central element, of a 
 nucleus surrounded by cytoplasm with its meshwork, the 
 cyto-reticulum. The nucleus forms the central and im- 
 portant structure having the functions of assimilation 
 and reproduction. The nucleus and cytoplasm, how- 
 ever, are intimately related; the modification of one 
 affects the other. Both nuclear and cytoplasmic struc- 
 tures form one organized whole, one living cell. Sim- 
 ilarly in the percept we find a group of sensory elements 
 which constitute the nucleus, and a mass of other sensory 
 elements, possibly the main mass, forming the tissue 
 of the percept. The nuclear elements are more intense 
 and appear to be predominant in the total mental state, 
 — both however are intimately connected and go to 
 form the living tissue of the percept. 
 
 The nuclear elements of the percept have the 
 lead and seem to possess the organizing, the fer- 
 menting power to assimilate the mass of subordin- 
 ate elements and have them transformed into one 
 unified organic whole. The slightest modification 
 in the structure and function of the nuclear ele- 
 ments brings about a change in the total cytoplasmic 
 mass of the percept, giving rise to a different structure, 
 to a different percept; and again, modifications of the 
 cytoplasmic mass, so to say, affect the formation of the 
 nuclear elements often resulting in a different percept. 
 It requires however quite a considerable change in the 
 subordinate elements to bring about a change in the per- 
 
128 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 cept; while the slightest modification of the nuclear 
 elements, whether in quality or intensity, often brings 
 about a fundamental transformation of the percept. 
 The nuclear elements may be regarded as the sen- 
 sitive, as the vital point of the perceptual system. We 
 cannot displace nor can we modify the nucleus of the 
 percept without profoundly modifying or even com- 
 pletely destroying the life existence of the percept. 
 
 We may point out here an important aspect of the 
 percept, an aspect which has been neglected by the 
 older psychologists, but which is now being more and 
 more emphasized by the younger psychologists who lay 
 more stress on the functional and biological side of 
 mental life. Like the life of all organized beings, the 
 life existence of the psychic state is for some reaction, 
 for some adjustments to the conditions of the external 
 environment. In the struggle for existence the animal 
 organism must on pain of death be adjusted to the ob- 
 jects of its external world. Now the central, nuclear, 
 sensory elements awakened by external excitations give 
 the cue for the reaction ; they form the sensitive organ- 
 ization for the release of motor energy in definite direc- 
 tions; they signify a definite object to which correspond 
 definite motor tendencies with final reactions of adjust- 
 ment. To the mouse the cat is not an object of contem- 
 plation or an object of observation, on account of its 
 sensory effects, — the cat is an object to run away from. 
 To the dog a cat is not an object of beauty, but some- 
 thing to be run after. The sensory stimulations coming 
 from the 'that,' which is mouse, is for the cat something 
 to be on the alert, to jump after and to attack. 
 
 The lower we descend in the scale of animal life, the 
 more prominent do the motor reactions become. Where 
 
The Structure and Function of the Percept 129 
 
 life is predominantly of the instinctive type, the motor 
 side of consciousness is more apparent. The fly at- 
 tracted by the scent to deposit its eggs in decomposed 
 meat; the wasp that strikes the caterpillar in definite 
 places paralyzing its nervous system, thus preparing 
 food for the coming larva ; the newborn infant starting 
 to suck, when put to the breast — are good examples of 
 motor reactions in response to sensory stimulations com- 
 ing from external objects. A definite sensory stimulus 
 is the trigger which releases a definite set of motor 
 reactions. The fly, the bee is hardly conscious of the 
 sensory characters of the honey; it is more likely that 
 the sensory stimulations of the honey release the ap- 
 propriate reaction of flying towards it. 
 
 The bright colors of flowers developed in the course 
 of natural selection for the fertilization of plants serve 
 the same purpose; they awaken definite responses use- 
 ful both to plant and insect, as it is hardly probable that 
 the insects are primarily attracted by the beautiful color- 
 ing of the flowers. The visual stimuli awakening defi- 
 nite sensory elements may be regarded as central and 
 nuclear which in turn serve as a highly sensitive trigger 
 to release definite systems of motor reactions. The effect 
 is somewhat similar to that of the moth attracted by the 
 flame, — the flame acts as a peripheral stimulus giving 
 rise to sensory elements which form the sensitive trigger 
 in the release of the reaction of circling around the 
 flame, in spite of the harmful results. The moth reacts 
 to bright objects in going towards them, but this partic- 
 ular bright object, the flame, has not been provided for 
 in the motor adjustments of the moth, hence the lack of 
 adaptation, the going to the danger, instead of flying 
 from it. 
 
130 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 So apparently insignificant is the sensory side and so 
 predominant is the motor side with its almost mechan- 
 ically fatal reactions, that some physiologists put the 
 whole mechanism of excitation and reaction in the lower 
 animals under the category of tropisms, which may be 
 positive or negative, according as the animal goes to or 
 from the particular stimulus. The sensory side is de- 
 nied, the whole affair is regarded as a delicate chemical 
 reaction, such as the chemotaxis of leucocytes in the phe- 
 nomena of phagocytosis observed in inflammations and 
 bacterial invasions, or what is still simpler as the phe- 
 nomena of heliotropism observed in the case of plants. 
 This purely mechanical or chemico-physiological view 
 may be crude and far fetched in the case of lower ani- 
 mals, but it brings out strongly the predominance of the 
 motor reaction in response to definite sensory excitations. 
 
 The motor attitude of the animal towards the excita- 
 tions of the external environment constitutes the pre- 
 dominant part of its objective world. The reactions 
 with their sensori-motor effects are part and parcel of 
 the total percept. Sensori-motor life gives reality to the 
 world of objects. The spatial, the resistant, the ma- 
 terial character of objects depends on our motor reac- 
 tions which give content and reality to the world of 
 things. Activity gives the sense of 'physical' reality, 
 the sense of material actuality, or of what is regarded 
 as 'the really real.' In other words, sensori-motor re- 
 actions with consequent kinesthetic sensations may be 
 regarded as constituting the very essence of the real, 
 external, material world, — the world of external, mate- 
 rial objects. 
 
 The percept as we have pointed out forms one or- 
 ganic whole, the constituent elements are firmly inte- 
 
The Structure and Function of the Percept 131 
 
 grated into one living organization. In other words, 
 just as the organism is not simply an integrated com- 
 pound of cells, tissues and organs, but all those lower 
 units go to form the higher living unit, the life of the 
 organism as a whole, so we may say that the sensory 
 elements are not the same as the percept, they are ana- 
 tomically found, on the autopsy of the percept, — the sen- 
 sory elements are the lower units that help to form the 
 higher unit, the living percept. From a scientific stand- 
 point, as the result of psychological dissection, the sen- 
 sory elements going to make up the psychic compound, 
 the percept, may be regarded as different from the total 
 synthesis with its characteristic living activity and its 
 peculiar form of perceptual consciousness. 
 
 The constituent elements of the percept are not of 
 the same definiteness and intensity. The central nuclear 
 elements stand out more distinct, more definite, and con- 
 sciousness lights them up with more power and inten- 
 sity. They are like the mountain peaks — when glade 
 and valley and mountain side are still immersed in dark- 
 ness, the rising sun greets the mountain tops and plays 
 and caresses them with its rays; when again the shades 
 of evening begin to flit and gather over vale, ravine, and 
 gulch, the rays of the setting sun long linger on the 
 peaks taking of them their last farewell. The central 
 nuclear elements are in the focus of consciousness, — 
 they are the first to be met by the glance of the mental 
 eye and are the very last to be left by it. Consciousness 
 plays with its searchlight on the nuclear sensory ele- 
 ments. The central nuclear elements are intense, dis- 
 tinct, and definite, while the subordinate elements are 
 of far less intensity, are often quite indistinct, are, so 
 to say, on the fringe of consciousness; in fact, may even 
 
132 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 be entirely subconscious. And still indefinite, indistinct, 
 and submerged as those subordinate elements are, they 
 form the main content of the percept, giving it the 
 fullness of reality. 
 
 The nuclear elements form the cue of the total re- 
 action, thus standing for the particular object, forming 
 the reality of the percept for the organism. No won- 
 der then that the cue, though it may be the smallest por- 
 tion of the percept, none the less forms for the organ- 
 ism the most vital, the most significant as well as the 
 most constant part of the percept. The attitude, the 
 total reaction of the organism depends on the slightest 
 difference in the cue, on the slightest change of the 
 nuclear elements, since the apparently slight modifica- 
 tion may often prove of great significance to the life 
 existence of the organism, — it may be a matter of life 
 and death. The nuclear elements constitute the signal, 
 the sensitive trigger for the release of definite reactions 
 towards the changes of external objects. Hence the 
 nuclear elements come to signify, in fact, to constitute 
 the essence of the percept. 
 
 A change of the subordinate elements of the percept 
 does not matter so much as the slightest modification in 
 the quality or even in the intensity of the signal. This, 
 of course, does not mean that the subordinate sensory 
 elements are not psychologically and biologically of the 
 utmost consequence to the organism, but they are not of 
 that immediate importance as the focal, nuclear ele- 
 ments appear to the consciousness of the organism. The 
 nuclear elements, as signal, focus the interest of the ani- 
 mal. We can well realize their vital importance, if we 
 consider that the nuclear elements are the flag which in- 
 dicates friend or enemy, war or peace, life or death. 
 
The Structure and Function of the Percept 133 
 
 If we regard the percept statically, we may describe 
 it figuratively as a psychic compound, the union of the 
 elements having somewhat the character of a chemical 
 combination. A new compound is formed possessing 
 qualities of its own, different from those of the con- 
 stituent elements. The sensory characteristics are pro- 
 foundly modified in the synthesis, so much so that they 
 cannot be directly discerned and can only be discovered 
 by patient study. The elements do not exist freely, 
 they are bound up in one indissoluble union of the per- 
 cept. It seems, as if different qualitative states arise in 
 the union, the qualities of the elements appearing, as if 
 transformed by the effected synthesis. 
 
 The percept forms a new compound in which the 
 component elements are disguised and transformed by 
 the qualitative aspect of the central elements. The 
 subordinate elements become adapted to the active 
 nucleus, and come out in the compound with sensory 
 characteristics foreign to their nature. In the process 
 of synthesis the subordinate elements become trans- 
 muted and assume the sensory characteristics of the 
 nucleus. To isolate the various elements out of the 
 synthetized percept, the central elements must be shift- 
 ed, — the subordinate elements must be made focal, giv- 
 ing rise to new percepts, but at the same time making it 
 possible to pass in review the various elements. In 
 other words, the elements become revealed in propor- 
 tion as we make of them signals, in proportion as they 
 become significant of the total percept with its sensori- 
 motor reactions. 
 
 The nuclear elements are the most pronounced, the 
 most prominent, as far as saturation of sensory quality 
 is concerned. They have so much of their peculiar 
 
134 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 sensory quality that they diffuse it into the other ele- 
 ments, — the subordinate elements appear under the 
 sensory form of the nucleus; they become assimilated 
 by the nucleus, and are saturated with its sensory color- 
 ing. This holds true not only in regard to saturation, 
 but also in regard to sensory brightness. The central 
 elements possess a sensory brightness far in excess of 
 other elements, and hence they shed their sensory light 
 on the more obscure, though no less important sensory 
 elements. What however they illumine is not so much 
 the peculiar sensory characteristics of those elements, 
 but their own coloring with which they have saturated 
 the total percept. 
 
 The force of the central elements lies specially in the 
 emotional or affective tone with which they are pervad- 
 ed. They arouse an attitude towards the external world 
 in general and to the special object in particular; Taine 
 would call it a tendency. The individual is stimulated 
 by those nuclear elements; his whole attention is going 
 out in direction to the object that has excited them. 
 The whole organism is invaded by the subtle influence of 
 the nucleus giving rise to definite sensori-motor reac- 
 tions, intensifying the affective state which permeates 
 the perceptual consciousness. 
 
 The affective state of the percept is not always 
 obvious in cases of fleeting percepts, but it becomes 
 manifest, when the central elements become temporarily 
 fixed, the stress and strain of consciousness tending in 
 one direction. The very changes occurring in the flicker- 
 ing intensity of the nuclear elements tend to sharpen the 
 situation, to enliven the interest, strain the attention, and 
 be all agog so to say. The cat getting a glimpse of a 
 mouse, or the dog catching sight of the cat may be taken 
 
The Structure and Function of the Percept 135 
 
 as good illustrations of the affective states present in 
 perceptual consciousness. The nuclear elements are the 
 ones that are specially charged with affective or emo- 
 tional states. 
 
 Biologically regarded, we can well see the importance 
 of the central nuclear elements, the necessity of their 
 standing out in consciousness as more prominent and 
 more intense than the rest of the sensory elements. Con- 
 stituting the signal, they come to be the most significant 
 part of the percept, for they announce what 'that' is, 
 they present the object, friend or foe, something to wel- 
 come or something to flee from. The central nuclear ele- 
 ments thus come to present objective reality, they safe- 
 guard the individual, they are the safety as well as the 
 danger signal. The more delicately differentiated those 
 safety-danger signals are, the more protected the indi- 
 vidual is in the struggle for existence. The more sen- 
 sitive the individual becomes to the least difference of 
 the nuclear elements, the better adjusted will he be to 
 the conditions of the external environment, and the bet- 
 ter will be his chances in the process of survival of the 
 fittest. 
 
 This brings us to the purposiveness of the percept. 
 One of the important characteristics of the biological 
 process is the final cause, the purpose formed by natural 
 selection out of chance variations, and leading to the 
 preservation of that process, to the preservation of the 
 individual. We should therefore expect that in the 
 psychic process which is the most highly developed bio- 
 logical process, purposiveness, formed out of psychic 
 chance variations, will be one of the most important 
 traits. In the course of phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
 evolution some sensory elements, the ones to which 
 
136 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 the organism is more sensitive, will be selected and 
 become the indicators of the total percept, they will 
 become the index, or better to say the pain-pleasure flag, 
 the safety-danger signal. The central elements will 
 thus be the most prominent, the most intense for that 
 particular state of perceptual consciousness. The na- 
 ture and character of the elements will vary with the 
 organization of the species and the individual. The 
 dog will become more sensitive to variations of his ol- 
 factory sensations, while man will show marked sensi- 
 tivity towards delicate differences of his visual sensory 
 elements. 
 
 The great sensitivity of the nuclear elements is sig- 
 nificant, in so far as they lead to better adaptation and to 
 more successful reactions. It is not of any consequence 
 for the cow to gaze at the stars, for the pig to observe 
 the phases of the moon, but it is a matter of importance 
 for them to perceive any signs of food, or the approach 
 of a beast of prey. The heavenly bodies are non-exis- 
 tent for the brutes, because of lack of all reactions of 
 adaptation, while food and predatory beasts are easily 
 detected, because of the vital reactions bound up in 
 the elements of the percept of which the nuclear ele- 
 ments form the signal. It is on account of the vital 
 reactions that the perceptual nucleus plays such a prom- 
 inent part and takes the lead of all the other elements. 
 As I have pointed out in a former work: "The 
 psychic state is for some reaction and that sensory ele- 
 ment which gives the cue for the formation of the psy- 
 chomotor elements, leading to some given reaction is, 
 for the time being, the center, the nucleus of the total 
 state." 
 
CHAPTER XXI 
 
 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SENSORY ELEMENTS 
 
 IF we inspect the percept more closely, we find that 
 there is some important difference in the character 
 of the various constituent sensory elements. The 
 central elements forming the nucleus of the per- 
 cept are given directly by the sense-organ stimulated 
 by its appropriate sensory stimuli, while the subordinate 
 sensory elements are given indirectly, — they cannot be 
 traced to appropriate sensory stimuli exciting those par- 
 ticular sense-organs on the activity of which those sub- 
 ordinate elements depend for their manifestation. In 
 perceiving the lump of ice I can see the color, the size, 
 the volume, the smoothness, the transparency, the dis- 
 tance, and even the weight and coldness. Now what 
 I can see directly is only the color, transparency, size, 
 as given immediately by the stimulated sense-organ, by 
 the visual sensations and image on the retina. Whence 
 then come the rest of the sensory elements so distinctly 
 experienced? They are not memory elements, — they 
 have the same sensory characters as the elements given 
 by the direct impression of the sense-organs. It is not 
 that on perceiving a certain transparent object we re- 
 member its volume, its distance, its smoothness, its re- 
 sistance, we perceive all that in sensory terms. They 
 are not images, ideas, or representations — they are sen- 
 sations. The central sensory elements may be termed 
 direct or primary, while the subordinate elements may 
 be termed indirect or secondary. The percept then may 
 
 137 
 
138 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 be regarded as consisting of two classes of elements of 
 sensations, the primary and secondary sensory ele- 
 ments.* 
 
 The secondary sensory elements are not images, nor 
 ideas, nor representations, different terms employed for 
 the same state by various writers, the secondary ele- 
 ments of the percept are essentially sensations. Now 
 sensations are qualitatively different from images, ideas 
 or representations. The image of a light does not 
 shine, the idea of a voice does not sound, and the rep- 
 resentation of a perfume does not smell. A sensation, 
 or presentation as it is sometimes termed, differs from 
 an image or representation qualitatively, fundamentally. 
 The sensation or presentation is given as immediate ex- 
 perience, while the image, the representation is essen- 
 tially mediate, it is a mental substitute for the immedi- 
 ate experience of the sensation. The idea or image 
 bears the same relation to the sensation as a photograph 
 bears to the original, or rather as a symbol to the thing 
 it represents. Ideas, images, representations substitute, 
 represent sensations, but they are not sensations. A 
 sensory process is fundamentally different. A sensation 
 is not an intense idea, nor is an idea a weak sensation. 
 Ideas differ far more qualitatively from sensations than 
 visual sensations, for instance, differ from olfactory sen- 
 sations. There is not a particle of evidence to sub- 
 stantiate the view that ideas or images are copies of sen- 
 sations in the sense of being weak sensations or 'centrally 
 excited sensations.' There is nothing of the sensory in the 
 
 *It may be well here to point out that the doctrine of primary 
 and secondary sensory elements advanced by me has nothing in 
 common with the primary and secondary qualities of the older 
 psychologists. 
 
Primary and Secondary Sensory Elements 139 
 
 idea. The weakest sensation cannot compare with the 
 most vivid representation. 
 
 The laboratory experiments on that subject 
 (Miinsterberg and Kiilpe) are inconclusive as they 
 either deal with incompletely perceived impressions, 
 or with minimal sensations. In either case the per- 
 cept is incomplete and uncertain. Kiilpe himself is 
 forced to admit that ideas or 'centrally excited sensa- 
 tions' as he terms them "cannot be regarded as simple 
 revivals of peripherally excited contents, if only for the 
 reason, that their remaining attributes are very rarely 
 indeed identical with those of perception." He then 
 goes on making a fatal admission: "The most striking 
 evidence of disparity is perhaps afforded by intensity. 
 It is only in special cases that centrally ex- 
 cited sensations can rise from their accustomed faint- 
 ness to the vividness of sense perception. We then speak 
 of them as hallucinations (?) ; and they enter into a 
 disastrous competition with the real material of per- 
 ception, completely transcending the boundary line 
 which so usefully divides it from the material of imag- 
 ination." Kiilpe admits that there is no intensity to the 
 image, that there is no variation in 'intensity' of images, 
 an 'attribute' characteristic of percepts. Psychologic- 
 ally regarded, this in itself shows the qualitative differ- 
 ence between image and percept. 
 
 In spite of the fact that Bergson is interested in psy- 
 chology from a purely metaphysical standpoint, he nev- 
 ertheless has some excellent remarks on memory and on 
 the qualitative difference between image and percept. 
 Although he is wrong in supposing that the image may 
 be prolonged and projected into perceptual conscious- 
 ness, he none the less emphasizes strongly the qualita- 
 
140 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 tive difference of the two. If I understand him aright 
 he is opposed to the view of identification of memory 
 images with sensations. A memory image is not a weak- 
 ened sensation. "The absurdity" says Bergson "be- 
 comes patent when the argument is inverted (although 
 this ought to be legitimate on the hypothesis adopted), 
 that is to say, when the intensity of the sensation is de- 
 creased instead of the intensity of the pure memory be- 
 ing increased. For, if the two states (memory-image 
 and sensation) differ merely in degree, there should be a 
 given moment at which the sensation changed into a 
 memory. If the memory of an acute pain, for instance, 
 is but a weak pain, inversely an intense pain which I feel 
 will end, as it grows less, by being an acute pain re- 
 membered. . . . Never will this weak state ap- 
 pear to me to be the memory of a strong state. Mem- 
 ory is something quite different." 
 
 Ideational and perceptual processes cannot be identi- 
 fied. The two are qualitatively different: the sensation 
 has intensity, the image lacks it. We may point out 
 the main differences of sensation and image. (a) A 
 sensation has intensity, an image totally lacks it. (b) 
 An image is a reproduction or rather a representation, 
 a symbol of a sensation, but no sensation represents 
 another; a sensation, unlike an image, is not mediate, 
 but immediate experience, (c) A sensation bears the 
 mark of externality, an image lacks it. Finally (d) a 
 sensation cannot be called up at will, while an image 
 is independent of peripheral stimulations of external ob- 
 jects and is usually under the control of the will. No 
 sensation differs so much from another as the image dif- 
 fers from its corresponding sensation. 
 
 Sensory elements and their synthesis, the percept, 
 
Primary and Secondary Sensory Elements 141 
 
 have motor tendencies, while the image or idea has not 
 any motor tendencies. The reason why every image 
 and idea has been made ideo-motor is because images or 
 representations have been regarded as sensory in char- 
 acter, as weakened sensations, as 'sensationalettes' so to 
 say. Bergson clearly sees the qualitative difference of 
 the two; he insists on the non-motor character of the 
 image in contradistinction to the strongly motor char- 
 acter of the sensation and the percept. Recently Thorn- 
 dike laid great stress on the psychological fallacy of 
 regarding images and ideas as motor in character. This 
 fallacy is essentially due to the current identification of 
 presentative and representative elements. 
 
 To refer as Kulpe does to a hallucination as an inten- 
 sified image is to reason in a circle and at the same time 
 to be in sad contradiction with facts. A hallucination 
 may be regarded as a fallacious percept, but it is not 
 on that account an image; a hallucination is a percept 
 and is essentially sensory in character. The fact of a per- 
 cept being fallacious does not in the least imply that it 
 is 'imaginary' and not sensory. 
 
 The ambiguity of the word 'imaginary' has not a 
 little contributed to the psychological fallacy helping 
 towards the confusion of image and sensation. 'Imagin- 
 ary' is used in the common sense meaning not corre- 
 sponding to any external reality, or in the psychological 
 sense of consisting of those internal events or processes 
 known as images or ideas. Now 'imaginary' used in 
 the sense of lack of an external object by no means im- 
 plies the psychological sense of consisting of images. A 
 hallucination is commonly said to be imaginary in the 
 sense of not having an objective reality, but we have to 
 prove yet that it consists of images. 
 
142 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 The theories of illusions, hallucinations as well as 
 of dream states and hypnotic hallucinations are viti- 
 ated by that fundamental psychological fallacy. As 
 a matter of fact hallucinations are not made up 
 of images, but of sensory elements; while on the 
 contrary hypnotic hallucinations are not made up of 
 sensory elements, but of images. Hallucinations are not 
 due to 'images' but to actual sensations. Psycho- 
 logically regarded, hallucinations do not differ in their 
 make-up from ordinary percepts. Ideas and images are 
 not possessed of magic virtues, and with all the fancy 
 work about them, they cannot display sensory quali- 
 ties. The image or idea is that bloodless, shadowy, 
 fluttering affair which can no more attain the life of a 
 sensation than a written letter can attain the power of 
 sound. Had it been otherwise the world would have 
 been a large asylum for images to play their pranks in. 
 
 We may quote Stout as one of the few psychologists 
 who seem not to accept the current psychological doc- 
 trine. In his 'Analytic Psychology' he tells us 'that 
 complex perception does not consist in a given impres- 
 sion reviving a cluster of faint images of previous im- 
 pressions.' And again "impressional revival does not 
 in the least countenance the theory that ideas are merely 
 faint revivals of impressions. On the contrary, it tends 
 strongly in the opposite direction. It shows that a 
 revived impression is itself an impression, and not an 
 idea." In his 'Manual of Psychology' he says 'that at 
 bottom the distinction between image and percept is 
 based on a difference of quality.' And again, "per- 
 cepts and images possess a relative independence. This 
 can be accounted for, if we suppose that the nervous 
 tracts excited in perceptual process are not wholly coin- 
 
Primary and Secondary Sensory Elements 143 
 
 cident with those excited in ideational process." 
 
 The elements of the percept are not ideational, not 
 imaginary, they are essentially sensory. The perceptual 
 elements are synthetized into one percept. To take our 
 stock example, the ice. The lump of ice is experienced 
 as one object with many qualities each of which fur- 
 nishes respectively its sensory quota towards the forma- 
 tion of the whole of the perceptual experience. We see, 
 we perceive the hard, heavy, smooth, resistant body of 
 ice, — all the elements have alike the intensity of sensa* 
 tion. The hardness, the smoothness, the bodily resist- 
 ance are perceived by the visual sense and are visual, 
 but as such they, of course, differ from the sensations ex- 
 perienced by their appropriate sense organs, as when 
 for instance the same sensations are given by touch or 
 by muscular and kinesthetic sensations. Those muscu- 
 lar and tacto-motor sensations appearing as visual are 
 not memory-images, but they are actual sensations, they 
 are secondary sensations; they are secondary sensory 
 elements which give the fullness of content to the per- 
 cept, having visual sensory elements as its nucleus. Un- 
 like memory-images, secondary perceptual elements 
 have the immediacy of sensory experience. Remem- 
 bered sensory qualities are not immediate experiences 
 given in the object of perception. 
 
 If we turn to pathology, we find that cases closely 
 confirm our view. In certain mental diseases the pa- 
 tient can perceive the various qualities, although he can- 
 not represent them to himself. In other cases the pa- 
 tient can clearly and vividly represent objects in all their 
 details, but he cannot perceive the objects, when direct- 
 ly confronted with them. Clinical cases, even if we 
 exclude all facts from introspective study, clearly point 
 
144 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 to the qualitative difference of image and sensation, 
 irrespective of the assumption of localization — they 
 may be due to the function of different brain struc- 
 tures, or to different processes of the same brain struc- 
 tures. In the light of recent research it is more likely 
 that the neuron structures underlying ideational pro- 
 cesses differ from those subserving sensory processes. 
 Whichever view however we entertain in regard to the 
 anatomical structures all the facts go to prove that 
 image and sensation are qualitatively different psychic 
 events. 
 
 The percept is not ideational, but sensory. There 
 are no memory-images in perceptual consciousness, al- 
 though the latter may be closely associated with idea- 
 tional processes. Such ideas, however, are on the fringe 
 of the perceptual consciousness and do not constitute the 
 essence of the percept. The percept consists of sensory 
 elements, primary and secondary. The primary ele- 
 ments are initiated directly by incoming peripheral stim- 
 ulations, while the secondary sensory elements are 
 brought about indirectly, through the mediacy of the 
 primary elements, the secondary elements themselves 
 being really derived from sense-organs others than the 
 ones directly stimulated by the peripheral excitation. 
 
 If the percept is visual, and V stands for the visual 
 physiological processes, A for the auditory, O for the 
 olfactory, M muscular, K kinesthetic, T for tactual 
 physiological processes; then let Vi, Mi, 0* t Ki, 
 Ti stand for the primary sensory elements; and let 
 V*, O2, Mi, Kz, T* stand for the secondary sensory ele- 
 ments, then the total percept may be represented by the 
 formula FiOiM&T*. Since all the other elements ap- 
 pear in the visual percept under the visual aspect, we 
 
Primary and Secondary Sensory Elements 145 
 may represent the percept by the formula : V^M^O^ 
 
 The secondary sensory elements, though forming 
 the main content of the percept, are apparently of 
 a visual nature, and still they really belong to qualita- 
 tively different realms of sensations. This clearly re- 
 veals their origin and nature : the secondary sensory 
 elements are not visual, but they become so by being 
 initiated through the visual sense. In other words, sec- 
 ondary sensory elements are not peripherally initiated. 
 Are they then centrally excited sensations? No. They 
 can only be induced by an external stimulus. But that 
 external stimulus must act indirectly, through another 
 sense-organ. 
 
CHAPTER XXII 
 
 SECONDARY SENSORY ELEMENTS AND HALLUCINATORY 
 PERCEPTION 
 
 IN stimulating a sense-organ we not only get sen- 
 sory elements characteristic of that particular sense, 
 but also sensory elements belonging to other sense- 
 organs which have not been stimulated. What 
 really takes place is this: the external excitation acting 
 on a particular sense-organ produces its appropriate sen- 
 sations, but the peripheral physiological process diffuses 
 or rather to say gets irradiated along other neurons of 
 other sense structures, awakening their appropriate sen- 
 sations. Such sensations, not being directly but indi- 
 rectly peripherally initiated should be regarded as sec- 
 ondary sensations. 
 
 The phenomena of secondary sensations are well 
 known in psychological literature. Some psychologists 
 following the general fallacy of confusing image and 
 sensation describe vivid images succeeding sensations 
 under the category of secondary sensations. Barring 
 such confusion we may say that the pure phenomena of 
 secondary sensations are essentially sensory in character. 
 When a sensation due to the stimulation of a periph- 
 eral sense-organ, instead of being followed by a train 
 of association of ideas is followed by another sensa- 
 tion belonging to the domain of another sense-organ, 
 the phenomenon is known as that of synesthesia or of 
 secondary sensations. 
 
 One image or representation relating to a sensation 
 
 146 
 
Secondary Sensory Elements and Perception 147 
 
 of one sense-organ may be associated and bring in its 
 train of associations any other image relating to any 
 other sensation of any other sense-organ. The series 
 of ideas or images is a reproduction of stimulated 
 sense-organs with their accompanying sensations, the 
 ideas running parallel to the original psycho-physiolog- 
 ical processes, somewhat on the Spinozistic principle 
 of 'Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et con- 
 nexio rerum.' And again in other cases, when not re- 
 producing a previous series of sensory experience, the 
 series of associated images may be more irregular and 
 apparently capricious — a process usually described as 
 the work of fancy, or imagination. A sensation or 
 image then may be followed by any series of images 
 without the intermediacy of external excitations and 
 peripheral physiological processes. A sensation, how- 
 ever, cannot be followed by a series of sensations with- 
 out the intermediacy of external stimulations. A sen- 
 sation can only be initiated by its own appropriate stim- 
 ulus and by its own specialized peripheral physiological 
 processes. The smell of a rose does not by simple as- 
 sociation give rise to a series of sensations of touring in 
 an automobile, nor does the eating of beefsteak give rise, 
 through association, to the hearing of a symphony. In 
 other words, there is an internal association of images or 
 ideas, but there is not an internal association of sensa- 
 tions. Images once born can be reproduced endlessly 
 and at will, sensations die almost immediately after they 
 are born and must be renewed every time under the 
 same conditions of external stimulations. Briefly stated, 
 there is memory for images, but not for sensations. Sen- 
 sations are independent, images are interconnected. 
 If we represent sensations by A, B, C, D and sym- 
 
148 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 bolize images by a, b, c, d, the A, B, C, D have no 
 relations to one another, but each one bears a definite 
 relation to each corresponding image, A to a, B to b, C 
 to c, D to d, and so with the rest of the series. Sensa- 
 tion A will arouse image a which in turn may arouse 
 the whole train of images, b, c, d, but A cannot give rise 
 to any of the sensations B, C, D. The image series 
 a, b, c } d can be reproduced at will, in fact after a series 
 of repetition the whole chain of links may rattle off 
 against will, but nothing of the kind occurs in the case 
 of sensations. Sensations do not form links in a chain 
 which becomes automatic after many reproductions. 
 Repetition of sensations does not form associated series; 
 sensations maintain their independence. 
 
 The difference between image and sensation in re- 
 spect to association is, psychologically regarded, appar- 
 ently flawless. Unfortunately as it is usually the case 
 with flawless generalizations and descriptions of phe- 
 nomena observed under normal conditions, there is an 
 ungracious 'abnormal' that refuses to fall into line. 
 There are cases apparently abnormal from the psycho- 
 logical standpoint, cases which refuse to be gathered 
 into the normal psychological fold; these cases seem to 
 run counter to all normal psychological introspection. 
 The sensations seem to run riot, — instead of being 
 linked with their respective images they really call up 
 associated sensations ; these are the so-called sound-phot- 
 isms or light-phonisms, and similar odd combinations. 
 It is true the sensations are rather awkwardly associ- 
 ated. One sensation always calls forth only a particu- 
 lar sensation and no other one, and besides the called 
 forth sensation does not belong qualitatively to the same 
 domain with the one that has initiated it. It is also 
 
Secondary Sensory Elements and Perception 149 
 
 true that the sensations show their lack of sociable char- 
 acter by not entering into any association with any other 
 sensation, and that, unlike images, no associative series 
 can possibly be formed. Still the fact remains that a 
 sensation can and does call forth another sensation. Evi- 
 dently sensations can enter into associative bonds. 
 
 Such psychic states appear uncanny and are regarded 
 as abnormal. The phenomena are regarded as freaks 
 belonging to the domain of pathology. Now curiously 
 enough our study reveals the fact that what has been re- 
 garded as the pathological and exceptional turns out to 
 be the ordinary and the normal. The stone which the 
 builders neglected has become the corner stone. The 
 exception has turned out to be the rule. Far from be- 
 ing the case that secondary sensations are rare and ab- 
 normal, they are quite common, since they constitute 
 the very flesh and blood of the percept. Secondary sen- 
 sations constitute the texture of the percept. The rea- 
 son why they appear so strange is just because they are 
 so common and so familiar. 
 
 The secondary sensation, when appearing alone out 
 of its perceptual complex, cannot be recognized as the 
 old familiar attendant belonging to the indissoluble 
 retinue of the humdrum percept. Dissociated from its 
 perceptual sphere the secondary sensation appears 
 ghostly, hallucinatory. As a matter of fact the second- 
 ary sensation, hallucinatory and spooky as its manifesta- 
 tions are, constitutes part and parcel of perceptual ex- 
 perience. In fact, the main content of the percept con- 
 sists of hallucinatory secondary sensations. Percepts and 
 hallucinations are of the same grain. A percept is a 
 hallucination with the primary nuclear sensory elements 
 present, a hallucination is a 'real' percept with the pri- 
 
150 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 mary sensory elements absent. 
 
 When secondary sensory elements become dissociated 
 from the perceptual synthesis with the primary sensory 
 elements, the elements, thus dissociated, not being re- 
 lated to any peripheral physiological process of their ap- 
 propriate sense-organ, are regarded as central phe- 
 nomena, as secondary sensations which are described 
 as unusual, abnormal events of mental life. What, 
 however, is abnormal is not the secondary sensation 
 per se, but the fact of its dissociation. A secondary sen- 
 sory element dissociated from its perceptual system be- 
 comes manifested as a secondary sensation. 
 
 Secondary sensations are free secondary sensory ele- 
 ments, dissociated from the perceptual aggregate into 
 the synthetic unity of which they enter as important 
 components forming the organic whole of the percept. 
 When appearing isolated, secondary sensations are the 
 simplest form of hallucinations which become more and 
 more complex as the secondary sensory elements, dis- 
 sociated from the primary elements, become manifested 
 in complex systems. Hallucinations are systems of sec- 
 ondary sensations or of secondary sensory elements. 
 
 Sensory elements are, as a rule, not free, they usually 
 appear as perceptual compounds, and this holds specially 
 true of secondary sensory elements. When, therefore, 
 dissociated from their perceptual compounds, they ap- 
 pear as ghosts of the 'real' percept, as hallucinations. To 
 quote from a previous work of mine: "The integra- 
 tion of the groups and especially of the secondary pre- 
 sentative groups is not of that unmodifiable organic 
 character. Around a nucleus formed by a group, or 
 combinations of groups of primary elements, groups of 
 secondary sensory elements become aggregated, and the 
 
Secondary Sensory Elements and Perception 151 
 
 total aggregate gives rise to a consolidated and unified 
 system of groups, resulting in a percept. In perceiving 
 the chair yonder only the visual sensations constitute 
 the true sensory groups that form the nucleus of the 
 percept. The other psychic groups that are crystallized 
 round the percept, such as weight, resistance, volume, 
 size, shape, distance are really visuo-tacto motor groups; 
 they are largely tacto-muscular groups tinged by the 
 sensory quality of the nucleus; they are tacto-motor 
 groups sensorially visualized, seen indirectly. Though 
 these secondary sensory groups are firmly integrated, 
 still their integration is not of such a character as not 
 to become disintegrated and rearranged into new sys- 
 tems of groups. Such a disintegration is no doubt 
 effected with difficulty, but it is by no means im- 
 possible. 
 
 Perceptual compounds, unlike sensory, admit of de- 
 composition into elementary primary and secondary 
 sensory groups. The component elementary sensory 
 groups can be experienced separately under differ- 
 ent conditions and circumstances. We can close our 
 eyes and walk up to the object of perception, say the 
 chair, and thus experience the free muscular sensations 
 of distance, or we may push our hand against the chair 
 and experience the sensation of resistance, or take the 
 chair in the hand and experience the muscular sensations 
 of weight and shape. The primary and secondary 
 groups going to make up the percept can be isolated by 
 withdrawing the organizing nuclear group of primary 
 sensations, thus bringing about a disintegration of the 
 particular aggregate. 
 
 "If we inspect more closely this process of isolation, 
 we find that the constituent secondary sensory groups 
 
152 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 are not really isolated, so as to stand out all by them- 
 selves. What actually happens in this seeming process 
 of isolation is simply the formation of a series of new 
 perceptual aggregates in which the particular sensory 
 groups that are isolated and specially brought out be- 
 come the nuclei, the foci. For in the perceptual aggre- 
 gate it is always the character of the nucleus that is 
 specially brought out, and it is the nuclear aggregate 
 that tinges with its sensory color all the other aggre- 
 gates. To revert to our previous example, to the per- 
 cept chair. In passing the finger over the chair, the 
 touch may form the nucleus of the moment, but around 
 this primary nuclear sensory group other secondary 
 sensory groups, such as thermal and muscular sensory 
 elements become organized to form the synthesis of the 
 perceptual moment. If we try to find out the shape of 
 the chair by a series of touches, we really form a series 
 of percepts, the sensory nuclei of which are not visual, 
 but tacto-muscular in their nature. A sensory group 
 then cannot in reality appear in a purely isolated form." 
 In other words, sensory elements appear in groups,* 
 and this holds specially true of secondary sensory ele- 
 ments or of secondary sensations. Secondary sensations, 
 though present in every percept, rarely appear in iso- 
 lation. The affinity of secondary sensory elements to 
 run into compounds becoming synthetized with primary 
 elements makes it difficult to observe them, except in the 
 peculiar phenomena of synaesthesia and in the abnormal 
 states of hallucination. 
 
 *James lays stress on this fact of grouping of sensory elements : 
 "All brain processes are such as give rise to what we may call 
 Figured Consciousness. If parts are irradiated at all, they are 
 frradiated in consistent systems and occasion thoughts of definite 
 objects, not mere hodge-podge of elements." 
 
Secondary Sensory Elements and Perception 153 
 
 If secondary sensations are simple hallucinations, 
 hallucinations are compound secondary sensations. As 
 we have pointed out a close examination of hallucina- 
 tions shows them to be systems of secondary sensations 
 dissociated from their primary nuclear elements. In 
 states of dissociation a peripheral stimulation with its 
 physiological process and concomitant primary sensory 
 elements may become dissociated from systems of sec- 
 ondary sensory elements which alone stand out in con- 
 sciousness as hallucinations. A close examination re- 
 veals the presence of some obscure pathological condi- 
 tions which by irritation and by irradiation awaken sec- 
 ondary sensory elements giving rise to full fledged hal- 
 lucinations. 
 
 In the cases of hallucinations investigated by me I 
 have found pathological processes which gave rise to 
 secondary sensations crystallized into hallucinations. 
 Thus one of my cases suffered from auditory halluci- 
 nations. The patient heard voices telling her all kinds 
 of disagreeable things. She complained that the voices 
 came not through the ear, but through a spot located 
 over the Fallopian tubes. An examination of the ear 
 showed nothing abnormal. Physical examination re- 
 vealed nothing abnormal in any of the other sense or- 
 gans. The Fallopian tubes, however, were very tender 
 and painful to pressure. The patient suffered from 
 an old chronic salpingitis. The hallucinations, which 
 were of a sexual character, became more severe at reg- 
 ular intervals coinciding with monthly periodicities. 
 
 One case of mine suffered from visual hallucinations. 
 He saw spirits, ghosts and visions of saints. When he 
 travelled in a car, he could see little men with benevo- 
 lent faces, and for some religious reason he regarded 
 
154 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 them as saints who came to his help. He could see 
 them splitting the rocks and disappearing there, or 
 sometimes the rocks split open and the saintly little men 
 came to the surface. Occasionally apparitions of the 
 dead visited him. The visions were never quiet, but 
 always in motion, they did not stay long and rapidly 
 disappeared, giving rise to new visions. An examina- 
 tion of his special sense-organs showed nothing abnor- 
 mal. The sense of touch, pressure and kinesthetic sen- 
 sibility manifested peculiar abnormalities. The skin of 
 the body was very sensitive and that of the scalp was 
 extremely tender to touch. The patient could not bear 
 any pressure of the scalp and was mostly bareheaded, 
 though he was very sensitive to draughts and to changes 
 of temperature. Occasionally he experienced a sense 
 of formication all over the body, especially in the scalp 
 and in the region of the neck, the muscles of which were 
 extremely sensitive to pressure. Now when the head 
 was inclined to one side or pressed hard or kept in a 
 tense state for a couple of minutes at a stretch, he could 
 see spirits floating in the air, he could see the little men 
 with their saintly faces coming out of the ground and 
 disappearing into it again. 
 
 One case of functional psychosis, with epileptiform 
 attacks presenting phenomena of dissociated states with 
 distinct tendencies toward the formation of multiple per- 
 sonality, suffered a good deal from auditory hallucina- 
 tions. It will take too much space to give an account of 
 the details of the different seizures and of the various 
 dissociated states manifested by the patient. For our 
 present purpose it is enough to refer to the hallucina- 
 tions. The patient complained that she could hear 
 voices talking to her, her mother and brothers commu- 
 
Secondary Sensory Elements and Perception 155 
 
 nicating with her from a distance. An examination of 
 the auditory apparatus proved it to be in excellent con- 
 dition. In this case the phenomena of unconscious 
 phonation were quite well developed, the patient was 
 observed to move her lips and whisper — the whisper 
 becoming sometimes quite loud so that many words 
 which the patient referred to the voices of the mother 
 and brothers were really uttered by the patient. An 
 examination of the eye revealed the presence of an 
 astigmatic condition and a limitation of the field of 
 vision. When the patient was made to count or to read 
 aloud or when absorbed in a conversation, the auditory 
 hallucinations ceased. The auditory hallucinations con- 
 siderably diminished, both in frequency and intensity, 
 when the astigmatism was corrected by eye glasses. 
 
 Similarly in another case the patient suffered from 
 auditory hallucinations. Here the patient was observed 
 talking to himself. This was so pronounced that now 
 and then he himself became conscious of the fact that 
 he was talking to himself. He describes this experience 
 of automatic talk which seems to be uncontrollable and 
 of which he is often unconscious by the term of 'auto- 
 vocalization.' In this case the patient now and then 
 can catch himself telling things to himself which he 
 takes for the voices of other people as he is then con- 
 scious of the hearing, but not of the utterance of the 
 words and phrases. This, however, is not always the 
 case; in fact in a good many cases where unconscious 
 phonation is present, as, for instance, in the case of the 
 patient with the epileptiform seizures described above, 
 the patient is entirely unconscious of the fact of 'whis- 
 pering.' When attention was drawn to the phenom- 
 enon, the whisper and the hallucination disappeared. 
 
156 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 Another patient of mine suffers from auditory hal- 
 lucinations. He hears people abusing him and calling 
 him names. The hallucinations occur when he is awake, 
 but they are frequent when he is on the point of falling 
 asleep, or when he wakes up. He thinks, in fact he hears 
 that people whisper about him. The voices are observed 
 to increase in frequency and intensity with the presence 
 of external noises, such as noises made in the hall, or 
 sounds made by cars passing by. The patient was ob- 
 served having subconscious or unconscious move- 
 ments of lips, tongue and even of the jaws. When he 
 hears the voices the subconscious movements increase so 
 that they may be perceived at a distance. Even the 
 nurse could not help perceiving the subconscious whis- 
 pering made by the patient. When the patient looks 
 through a printed or written page the subconscious whis- 
 pering increases. The same is observed when the patient 
 is very much interested in something or absorbed in 
 deep thought. During such times he complains that he 
 hears voices. With his mouth wide open and holding 
 his tongue stationary, the unconscious whispering 
 ceases and along with it the auditory hallucinations dis- 
 appear. 
 
 One of my cases, a lady of about sixty, suffered for 
 about fourteen years from auditory and visual hallu- 
 cinations. She complained that she was surrounded by 
 ghosts of departed family members who did not leave 
 her alone. The spirits talk to her, they give her advice 
 which is often against her interests. Her departed hus- 
 band and his brother are the chief leaders, the 'guides' 
 so to say. They talk to her on all important occasions 
 and try to guide her in life. The patient resents such 
 interferences. When the voices became insistent she 
 
Secondary Sensory Elements and Perception 157 
 
 also had visions of the spirits and could hear them talk 
 to her, a proceeding which she always attempted to dis- 
 courage, but she admitted that the voices and the spir- 
 its had the best of her, and she was forced to follow 
 their instructions. An examination of the patient 
 revealed the fact that the hearing on the left side was 
 rather defective, the tympanic membrane was thickened 
 and there was present a chronic pathological process due 
 to a former condition of middle ear disease. Any con- 
 tinuous and prolonged irritation of the diseased ear 
 started the voices, increased their intensity, and caused 
 the manifestations of the visions. 
 
 I may also refer to a patient under my care who suf- 
 fered from auditory hallucinations and thought herself 
 possessed by demons. From her ninth year she suffered 
 at various intervals from those voices which sometimes 
 told her unpleasant things. Along with the hallu- 
 cinations she also had attacks of automatic speech. Now 
 and then she simply heard voices and was not conscious 
 of any involuntary speech, but occasionally the involun- 
 tary utterance took such possession of her that she could 
 not control it. She felt as if some other being got pos- 
 session of her organs of speech. This frightened her 
 even more than the hallucinations. She kept away from 
 her friends fearing sudden attacks of involuntary speech. 
 It appeared to the patient, as if some other beings made 
 her talk against her will. She shunned society, because 
 the other beings forced her to tell aloud what she 
 thought of the people in whose company she was pres- 
 ent. When she was not conscious of the forced speech, 
 she often heard voices which she ascribed to the same 
 demons. There was nothing of the delusion of pa- 
 ranoia in it as she could not account for the involuntary 
 
158 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 speech and auditory hallucinations. The patient was 
 of Irish descent, uneducated, though very intelligent. 
 The explanation of 'demoniacal possession' was giv- 
 en and maintained by her family in Ireland. She was 
 glad to take my view of the phenomena which I tried 
 to make plain to her, as much as it was possible under 
 the circumstances. 
 
 A quotation from her written account may be of in- 
 terest: "When I was nine years old, one day, 
 I remember, I sat down on a stone and sud- 
 denly I heard a voice : 'If you live four or five years 
 more, you will wish you had never grown up.' I 
 thought it was strange, but soon forgot it and went to 
 play again. I had no trouble until I was fourteen, when 
 the voice changed and forced me to talk with my own 
 voice. The voices would make me speak of things that 
 in my own self I had no idea of doing and would not do 
 for anything. About eight years ago I had a terrible 
 fright after which I thought I talked with saints and 
 angels and saw unusual things, I really saw them." We 
 find here the presence of automatic speech, unconscious 
 phonation with subconscious states resulting in dissocia- 
 tions of secondary from primary sensory elements with 
 the consequent formation of various forms of hallu- 
 cinations. 
 
 Observations and experiments incontestably prove 
 that hallucinations are synthetized compounds of sec- 
 ondary sensory elements, dissociated completely or in- 
 completely from their primary elements. Normal and 
 abnormal perceptive processes do not differ psychologic- 
 ally as to their make-up, except in the relation of their 
 primary and secondary sensory elements. Hallucina- 
 tions are not central; they are essentially of peripheral 
 
Secondary Sensory Elements and Perception 159 
 
 origin; they are induced by peripheral excitations giv- 
 ing rise to peripheral physiological processes, awakening 
 primary sensory elements which are subconscious or fall 
 out entirely of the patient's consciousness, leaving the 
 groups of secondary sensory elements to stand out as 
 fully developed hallucinations. The hallucinatory sec- 
 ondary sensory elements may be tinged with the qualita- 
 tive aspect of the dissociated primary sensory elements; 
 thus pathological processes in the auditory sense organ 
 may give rise to voices; or morbid processes of the 
 visual apparatus may give rise to visions. Quite often, 
 however, the dissociation is so deep and extensive that 
 the synthetized system of secondary sensory ^elements 
 does not bear the least trace of the qualitative aspect 
 of the primary sensory elements; thus a morbid condi- 
 tion of the pharynx, for example, may give rise to an 
 auditory and even to a visual hallucination. Whatever 
 may be the qualitative character of the sensory com- 
 pounds one thing stands out clear and distinct, and that 
 is the fact that the percept, whether normal or ab- 
 normal, does not consist of images, but of sensations, 
 primary and secondary. 
 
CHAPTER XXIII 
 
 THE ATTRIBUTES OF SENSORY ELEMENTS 
 
 CONTRARY to the view maintained by many 
 psychologists we have laid special stress on 
 the fundamental qualitative difference between 
 image and sensation. We shall not venture 
 far from our facts, if we arrange images and sen- 
 sations in two qualitatively different psychic series. 
 Sensations can be ranged in a graduated series of 
 intensities, while images or representations can be 
 ranged in a graduated series of clearness and dis- 
 tinctness, or of vividness, as it is sometimes described by 
 some psychologists. I use the term vividness in the 
 sense of clearness and distinctness and not in the sense 
 of intensity as it is often used; even those psycholo- 
 gists who do not use intensity and vividness indiscrim- 
 inately ascribe both of them equally to sensation and 
 image. 
 
 Vividness and intensity are understood by me to 
 be two fundamentally qualitatively different aspects, 
 or attributes. Sensations have intensity, but no viv- 
 idness; images or representations have vividness, but 
 no intensity. Sensory elements may vary from min- 
 imum to maximum intensity. This variation in inten- 
 sity holds true both of primary and secondary sensory 
 elements. Similarly, images or representations may 
 pass through all degrees of vividness from minimum to 
 maximum. The image represents the sensation. In 
 
 1 60 
 
The Attributes of Sensory Elements 161 
 
 this respect we may somewhat modify the well-known 
 dictum of the sensationalists into : 'Nihil est in imagine 
 quod non antefuerit in sensu.' The sensory element is 
 represented by its respective representative element. 
 
 The representative elements may refer with differ- 
 ent degrees of vividness to the same sensory elements. 
 An image with one degree of vividness can be sub- 
 stituted for another with a different degree of vividness 
 and still refer to the same sensory elements. The de- 
 gree of vividness does not change the qualitative char- 
 acter of the representation. Not so is it with the 
 qualitative attribute of the sensation. The slightest 
 change in the intensity of the sensation changes its qual- 
 itative character. A sensation with one degree of inten- 
 sity cannot be substituted for another. A sound or a 
 color of a definite intensity cannot be substituted for a 
 sound or color of a different intensity. The 
 two are different sensations and no sensation can sub- 
 stitute another. Sensations falling in the same series of 
 intensity are really independent of one another, but each 
 sensation of the intensive series can be represented by a 
 whole series of representations of different vividness, 
 from minimum to maximum. Different series of rep- 
 resentative elements may also be regarded as indepen- 
 dent, since they refer to independent sensations. 
 
 If we symbolize a series of sensory elements by the 
 letters: A*, A*, A*, A*, A*, . . . A n ; and if we 
 symbolize the corresponding series of representative 
 elements by at, a*, as, a*, at, a n , then the 
 
 series of both sensory and representative elements may 
 be symbolized by the following formula : 
 
[62 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 Ai A* 
 
 A. 
 
 A, 
 
 A, . 
 
 . • A n 
 
 a* a* 
 
 as 
 
 a* 
 
 to 
 
 a n 
 
 i i 
 a' a± 
 
 as 1 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 ai a* 
 
 ai 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 at a* 
 
 3 
 
 a-i 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 4 4 
 
 ai a* 
 
 4 
 
 a» 
 
 
 
 # 
 
 s s 
 
 ai a* 
 
 6 
 
 a* 
 
 
 
 • 
 
 • • 
 
 • 
 
 
 
 
 /i D si n 
 
 ih Cl- 
 
 0? 
 
 a? a 
 
 n 
 s 
 
 < 
 
 The characteristic of the image, or of the represen- 
 tative element is just its extraordinary plasticity and 
 possibility of substitution. This function of substitu- 
 tion was described by Taine with all the power of his 
 lucid style. The great modifiability of representation 
 plays an important role in psychic life — adaptabil- 
 ity to various conditions of life increases, reactions cease 
 to be rigid and uniform, but change easily in response 
 to a changing environment. Variations of sense-organs 
 with their physiological processes are rather slow and 
 tardy, often requiring generations for an effective 
 change, while the representative element can be modified 
 and adapted within the life-existence of the individual 
 and often in a very short time. In brief, the function 
 of substitution possessed by the representative element 
 in the processes of mental selection is the substitute for 
 natural selection in the highest representatives of animal 
 life. 
 
 Now under ordinary conditions of life the graduated 
 series of representative vividness runs parallel to the 
 gradated series of sensory intensities. Usually a more 
 
The Attributes of Sensory Elements 163 
 
 intense sensation is represented with greater vividness. 
 The increase or decrease of intensity of the sensory 
 series has a corresponding change in the vividness of 
 the elements of the representative series. Intensity and 
 vividness vary directly. Such direct variation, however, 
 is not always the rule. There are cases, when the two 
 part company. In states of distraction, in subwaking 
 states, in states of dissociation, and generally in the con- 
 ditions of functional psychosis, intensity and vividness 
 do not vary directly. 
 
 Strong stimulations may give rise to sensations 
 of great intensity, but the vividness of the repre- 
 sentative elements may fall so low as almost to 
 reach the minimum. When the vividness is so low 
 as to reach the minimum, the representative elements 
 cannot be used as substitutes and, since reproduction 
 belongs to representative elements which symbolically 
 reproduce the sensations by the process of substitution, 
 reproduction or memory of the original experience is 
 absent and there is a break, a gap in mental continuity, 
 dissociation results. The depths and extent of disso- 
 ciation of mental systems may be regarded as variables 
 of vividness. Dissociation varies inversely as vividness. 
 When vividness is at its minimum, dissociation is at its 
 maximum. The phenomena of functional psychosis 
 having their origin in states of dissociation may thus be 
 regarded psychologically as functions of vividness, the 
 most characteristic attribute of representative elements. 
 Functional psychosis with all its protean manifestations, 
 the great variety of dissociated and subconscious states 
 may thus be reduced to variations of one fundamental 
 attribute — vividness. 
 
CHAPTER XXIV 
 
 SENSATION AND EXTERNAL REALITY 
 
 WE must not omit to point out another fun- 
 damental difference between sensory and 
 representative elements. Sensations have 
 the significance, or possess the attribute of 
 external reality, while images, ideas, or representations 
 entirely lack it. Put in Baldwin's terminology — sensa- 
 tions have the coefficient of external reality, the 
 sensory coefficient of reality. No matter wheth- 
 er the sensation was produced by an external stim- 
 ulus, or by a pathological process going on in the sense- 
 organ, or brought about indirectly through the action 
 of another sense-organ by means of indirect association- 
 paths; no matter whether the sensation is primary or 
 secondary, as long as it is a sensation at all, it possesses 
 the sensory coefficient of reality. A sensation whether 
 'true or false' possesses rightfully the coefficient of real- 
 ity as its necessary and inherent attribute. The percept, 
 true or hallucinatory, consisting of sensory elements, has 
 therefore the sensory coefficient of reality. 
 
 Psychologically regarded, the 'true' percept and the 
 hallucination have the same sensory constitution with 
 the same attributes. The difference between the true 
 and false percept may be regarded from a biological 
 standpoint as a matter of adjustment. The percepts 
 with successful adjustments are true, while those with 
 unsuccessful motor reactions are false and hallucina- 
 tory. Psychologically, the difference between the 'true' 
 
 164 
 
Sensation and External Reality 165 
 
 percept and hallucination is in the shifting of the pri- 
 mary and secondary sensory elements. Where the sec- 
 ondary sensory elements can be shifted and become pri- 
 mary, the percept is regarded as true; where the second- 
 ary sensory elements do not admit of being shifted and 
 becoming primary, the percept is regarded as halluci- 
 natory. 
 
 If we turn now to the representative elements, we 
 find that they lack the sensory coefficient of reality. 
 This lack of sensory coefficient is only the negative side 
 of the image. There is also a positive side to it. The 
 image is not felt as image, because it is not sen- 
 sation or lacks the sensory coefficient, but because it 
 possesses a qualitative character of its own. A sen- 
 sation is not felt as such, simply because it lacks the 
 character of another sensation. Thus sensation green 
 is not experienced as the particular color sensation, be- 
 cause it has not the quale of sound or of pressure, but 
 because the sensation green has a positive experience 
 of its own. The same holds good of the representa- 
 tion — it possesses its own characteristic quale. As an 
 experience sui generis we claim for the representation 
 a special psychic mark, an 'ideational or representative 1 
 coefficient. The image has its own qualitative character 
 just as the sensation possesses its own. In contrast to the 
 sensation which possesses the coefficient of external real- 
 ity, the image or representation has the coefficient of 
 internal reality. Both sensation and image have real- 
 ity, each one has its own kind of reality — the sensation 
 has external objective reality, the image has internal 
 subjective reality. It is on account of the ideational or 
 representative coefficient that every image is placed 
 unhesitatingly into its own world of reality, into its own 
 
1 66 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 series of images with which it easily associates and fuses. 
 
 Writers on psychology in trying to define further the 
 coefficient of reality refer it to the will. Some maintain 
 that the coefficient of reality is the 'independence of the 
 will,' while others claim that the coefficient of reality is 
 'subjection to the will.' Baldwin in his paper 'The 
 Perception of External Reality,' offers an extreme- 
 ly interesting solution which reconciles both views. 
 He points out that there is a difference between 
 the 'memory coefficient' of reality and 'sensational co- 
 efficient' of reality. The two coefficients are opposite 
 as far as control of will is concerned. The sensational 
 coefficient is independence of the will, while the memory 
 coefficient is control by the will. A sensation, in short, 
 is not under the control of the will, while an image is 
 subject to the will. 
 
 Baldwin makes a further distinction between a 
 simple image or 'memory image' and a 'memory 
 image of external reality.' The memory image can 
 be brought up voluntarily by its proper associates, but 
 it has no sensational coefficient as a result, while the 
 memory image of external reality can be followed by 
 sensational coefficients, that is, sensations can be brought 
 about in the train of such an image. To quote 
 Baldwin: "Certainly a present sensible reality is 
 not under the control of my will; it is independent, 
 and if my coefficient is to be discovered in the relation 
 of the presentation to my voluntary life, this must be its 
 expression and I go over to the class of writers who find 
 the psychological basis of external reality in sensations 
 of resistance. But when we come to inquire into the 
 'memory' coefficient — asking the question what charac- 
 ter is in a memory-image which testifies to its being a 
 
Sensation and External Reality 167 
 
 memory of reality, the tables seemed to be turned. 
 Without stopping to examine other views, I hold that 
 that image is a true memory which we are able to get 
 again as a sensation (Baldwin's italics) by volun- 
 tarily repeating the series of muscular sensations 
 which were associated with it in its first experience. The 
 memory coefficient therefore is subjection to the will in 
 the sense indicated. ... A true memory in short 
 is an image which I can get at will by a train of memory 
 associates, and which, when got, is further subject to 
 my will ; a memory of external reality, on the contrary, 
 is an image which I can get at will by a train of sensa- 
 tional associates and which, when got, is not subject to 
 my will." 
 
 Now if I understand Baldwin aright, a sensa- 
 tion does not fall under the control of the will, while 
 a simple 'memory image' and a 'memory image of ex- 
 ternal reality' are both under the control of the will, the 
 difference being that the former does not terminate in 
 a sensation, whereas the latter does. This I take to 
 mean that a sensation does not depend on the subject 
 (will), but on the external objects; in other words, a 
 sensation cannot be produced from center to periphery 
 (not internally initiated by the will), but is initiated by 
 an external excitation peripherally stimulating the sense- 
 organ and giving rise to sensation. An image, on the 
 other hand, does not depend for its initiation on the ex- 
 ternal object or excitation, but is essentially an internal 
 event which can be brought about from within by the 
 process of associative activity, so highly characteristic 
 of the image. Thus far my analysis seems to me to be 
 in full accord with Baldwin's view. Similarly, Baldwin's 
 views in regard to 'memory images' and 'memory im- 
 
1 68 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 ages of external reality,' the former not ending in sen- 
 sory experience, the latter terminating in experience with 
 sensory coefficient, seem to me to be closely related to 
 the views expressed by me in this work and in my other 
 works on the subject. 
 
 In spite of the agreement on so many points there are 
 other points which do not appear to me acceptable. We 
 may agree that kinesthetic and muscular sensations or 
 sensations of resistance are at the core of things, but 
 are they the be-all of external reality? Have not sen- 
 sations of pain, of hearing, of color, or of smell as much 
 reality as our sensations coming from muscle, joint, 
 synovial membrane and articular surfaces? The acute, 
 shooting, twinging pains of rheumatism, gout, tabes- 
 dorsalis, the burning pains of meningitis, the excruci- 
 ating throbs of megrim, the fine stabbing pains of tooth- 
 ache, the agony of angina, the sharp tormenting pains 
 of facial neuralgia, and many other pains coming from 
 different organs and tissues, are not they real and ex- 
 ternal? In fact, do they not bear on them more the 
 mark of grim, pitiless, external necessity than any of 
 the sensations coming from active muscle and joint? 
 What about light, color, sound, smell, are not they sen- 
 sations of external reality, even if sensations of resist- 
 ance do not enter into their make-up? 
 
 Muscular and kinesthetic sensations may be granted 
 to play an important role in our knowledge of things, 
 but psychologically regarded, all sensations bear on them 
 unmistakably the mark of external reality. It is not the 
 particular form or kind of sensation, but it is the sen- 
 sory quale as such, that gives the coefficient of reality. 
 As far as resistance is concerned Baldwin is 
 right, if it be applied to each and every sensation. For 
 
Sensation and External Reality 169 
 
 each and every sensation possesses this mark of stub- 
 bornness about it; it shows opposition, resistance, and 
 floods the mind. We may say that the stimulus forces 
 open the gates of the sense-organs and invades the mind 
 with an overwhelming power. Still, on the whole, 
 Baldwin is right in laying special stress on sensa- 
 tions of activity and resistance, since, biologically re- 
 garded, they are the ones that give the smack of life 
 and the kernel of things and help to bring about ad- 
 justments to the external environment. 
 
 Thus far the difference between Baldwin and 
 myself seems to be rather insignificant.* When, 
 however, we reach what Baldwin terms the 'mem- 
 ory image of external reality' the difference stands 
 out somewhat more strongly. He contrasts the two, 
 image and sensation, on the basis of dependence or in- 
 dependence of the will. The sensation is independent 
 of the will, while the memory image of external reality 
 is subject to the will which can bring about the sensation 
 originally experienced. Now it seems to me that we 
 are just as sure of the external reality of a sensation 
 referred to by the memory image, even if we cannot 
 bring about the original experience. We may perceive 
 sensations which cannot possibly be repeated, and still 
 they are regarded in memory as events that have taken 
 place in the world of external reality. We may have 
 the perception of a comet which may never again come 
 
 *The difference is far less than I have originally thought. In a 
 letter to me Professor Baldwin writes : "I am much interested in 
 your views. You will find my later and fuller treatment of resist- 
 ance and of the nature of memory images in my Thought and 
 Things, or Genetic Logic, where I attempt explicitly to trace the 
 genetic development of knowledge from sense objects to image 
 objects in detail, being I think nearer to your views than my earlier 
 article brought out," 
 
170 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 into our experience, and even if it should come, its com- 
 ing is not due to our voluntary control; it is not we 
 that can make the comet-experience come into our per- 
 ceptual or sensory world with its sensory coefficient of 
 external reality. We may be in the position of Plato's 
 cave-dwellers and have no control over reality, the 
 reflection of which is displayed before us, and still we 
 may agree with Plato that for the cave-dwellers the 
 memory images of external reality, the recurrence of 
 which is not under control, will still be discriminated 
 from a general memory image, from an image of fancy. 
 The sensation or percept may be unique, its reproduc- 
 tion may not be possible, and still its memory image will 
 be that of external reality. 
 
 On the other hand, we meet in psychopathologv with 
 a vast domain of phenomena, such as recurrent mental 
 states, insistent ideas which force themselves on the 
 patient's mind against his will. The recurrent mental 
 states or the insistent ideas are far more stubborn and 
 uncontrollable than anv resistant sensorv obiect. The 
 idea mav come like attacks which overcome the patient 
 more than anv sensory reality, or the idea mav be per- 
 sistent oriawing at the very vitals of his mental life. No 
 external obiect is so stubbornly, so painfullv resistant 
 as iust such an idea: and still the insistent idea is not 
 regarded as a sensorv realitv. The insistent idea 00s- 
 sesses the coefficient of external realitv, independence of 
 the will, painfullv so, and still it is not regarded bv the 
 patient as external reality: in spite of its being inde- 
 oendent of the will, it is still regarded as an idea. 
 
 Tt seems to me that we cannot express the sensational 
 and ideational coefficients in terms of will, of control or 
 non-control. Tt is not resistance to the will that makes ex- 
 
Sensation and External Reality 17 1 
 
 perience sensory, nor is it subjection to the will that 
 makes experience ideational or representative. Why 
 not state the fact as it is? External reality is the quale 
 of sensory experience, while internal reality is the quale 
 of the image or representation. A sensation is experi- 
 enced as sensation, no matter whether or no it depends 
 on the will, the independence is a secondary matter ; the 
 same holds true in the case of the image, it is experi- 
 enced as image, independent of the fact of its subjection 
 to the will. 
 
 There is another view which finds the fundamental 
 difference between percept and image in what is and 
 what is not common to all selves. Perceptual experi- 
 ence is common, while ideational experience is not com- 
 mon to all fellow-beings. I see the sun and other peo- 
 ple can share it with me, while my image of the sun 
 is experienced by myself. Thus Calkins tells us: 
 "I perceive lowering heavens, pouring rain, bare trees 
 and drenched sparrows, but I imagine wide horizons, 
 brilliant sky, blossoming apple-trees and nestling ori- 
 oles. The main difference is this : in the one case I as- 
 sume that my experience is shared by other people and 
 that everybody who looks out sees the same dreary land- 
 scape; but my imagination of the sunny orchard I re- 
 gard as my private and unshared experience." 
 
 The mark of being common is not the essential coef- 
 ficient of external reality given by the percept. The 
 percept is not experienced as external, because 
 it is common to other people. We do not see the tree 
 yonder, because other people can see it too; we would 
 see it there, even, if, like Robinson Crusoe, we had no 
 fellow-being to compare notes with. A hallucination 
 is as fully a percept and is perceived in the full garb of 
 
172 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 external reality, although it may have no currency with 
 my fellow-men. The percept possesses the coefficient 
 of external reality, no matter whether or no others can 
 share in it. 
 
 Moreover, psychologically regarded, the percept is 
 as much of a private experience as the image is, In fact, 
 every psychic state has the privacy ascribed to the 
 image, and as such is unshared by other selves. It is 
 simply the old psychological fallacy of confusing the 
 physical with the psychic object, or with the 
 psychic state cognizant of the physical object.* 
 The flower as physical object, as stimulus, is 
 shared by all who perceive it, but the per- 
 ception of the flower varies with each individual. My 
 perception of the flower cannot be experienced by any 
 one else; like the image, the percept is entirely individ- 
 ual, unshared by other selves. I perceive the flower as 
 having external reality, not because my perceptual expe- 
 rience is the same as that of other people, not because 
 it is shared with others — as a matter of fact, it is not the 
 same, and from its very nature cannot be the same as 
 the experience of others, as we cannot possibly share 
 our individual psychic experience with our fellow-men. 
 We perceive the flower as an external reality simply and 
 solely because it is sensory. The percept consisting of 
 sensations, primary and secondary, bears the impress of 
 external reality; it possesses what Baldwin so apt- 
 ly terms 'sensational coefficient' giving external 
 reality. External reality is given directly and imme- 
 diately by the sensation or by the sensory compound, by 
 
 *Royce and Miinsterberg define the physical object in terms of 
 'sociality,' but if I understand them correctly they do not regard the 
 definition as a psychological one. 
 
Sensation and External Reality 173 
 
 the percept. 
 
 To quote from a work of mine: "Sensation 
 carries along with it the reality of its stimulus. It 
 is not that the sense of reality is different from the sen- 
 sation, it is given in the sensation itself. Similarly the 
 percept and the sense of external reality are not two dif- 
 ferent things; they are given together in the same pro- 
 cess of perception and are identical. . . . The 
 sensory process is also the process of the sense of ex- 
 ternal reality. ... In seeing or perceiving the 
 chair yonder we do not perceive it as real, because of its 
 social or common character — the reality of its existence 
 is given directly in the sensory processes of the percept 
 itself. . . . 
 
 The sense of reality of the external object is 
 strengthened by association of the original sensory 
 systems with other sensory systems, and the intensity 
 rises in proportion to the number of systems of sen- 
 sory elements, brought into relation with the function- 
 ing sensory systems. . . . The more systems of 
 sensory elements are pressed into service, the stronger 
 is the sense of external reality and the more assured is 
 the reaction to the stimuli of the external environment. 
 
 In the evolutionary process of man's adaptation to his 
 environment he becomes extended in being and grows 
 more developed, because of his social relations. Man 
 presses into active service the systems of sensory ele- 
 ments of his fellow-beings. Adaptations and hence suc- 
 cessful reactions to the external environment are now 
 more assured and the sense of external reality is still 
 further emphasized and intensified. Throughout the 
 course of intensification of the sense of reality the prin- 
 ciple remains unchanged in nature. The sense of re- 
 
174 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 ality is given by and consists in nothing else but the sen- 
 sory elements." 
 
 From a philosophical and epistemological stand- 
 point the social aspect may perhaps be sufficient 
 to fix the externality of the object, but from a 
 psychological standpoint the trade-mark of 'shares and 
 common stock' has no currency. The percept consist- 
 ing, as we have shown, of sensory elements, primary 
 and secondary, possesses, on that account, the sensory 
 attribute of external reality. 
 
CHAPTER XXV 
 
 - I 
 
 THE SUBCONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS CEREBRATION 
 
 PLATO put on the portals of his academy the 
 inscription, "No one can enter here without a 
 knowledge of geometry." Similarly no one can 
 gain access to the facts of abnormal psychology 
 without a thorough understanding of the subconscious. 
 The subconscious may be briefly defined as mental pro- 
 cesses of which the individual is not directly conscious. 
 Such knowledge is all the more requisite as psychopathic 
 disturbances with which psychopathology proper deals 
 are essentially affections of subconscious life activity. 
 The general drift of my Psychology of Suggestion is the 
 description of the subconscious as a diffused conscious- 
 ness below the margin of personal consciousness. I 
 sometimes use the term "subconscious self." I designate 
 by "self" not personal consciousness, but mere con- 
 sciousness. In Multiple Personality, in which I develop 
 the theory of thresholds in regard to the phenomena of 
 normal and abnormal mental life, I define the sub- 
 conscious as consciousness below the threshold of at- 
 tentive personal consciousness. I find that my clinical 
 and psychological investigations more and more con- 
 firm me in the view of the subconscious advanced by 
 me in The Psychology of Suggestion. I am pleased to 
 find that Prof. James, in a recent article, accepts the 
 same view, and advances the same theory of threshold 
 in regard to the subconscious. "Nobody knows," he 
 writes, "how far we are 'marginally' conscious of these 
 
 175 
 
176 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 memories, concepts and conational states at ordinary 
 times, or how far beyond the 'margin' of our present 
 thought trans-marginal consciousness of them may 
 exist." 
 
 In my Psychology of Suggestion I pointed out the 
 difficulties of the purely physiological interpretation of 
 the subconscious. Since this view still lingers among 
 some psychologists, I cannot do better than reproduce 
 the passage : 
 
 "The facts of hypnotic memory alone strongly indi- 
 cate the intelligent nature of the subconscious. Can the 
 theory of unconscious cerebration explain, for instance, 
 the fact of suggested amnesia during hypnosis ? I hyp- 
 notize Mr. V. F. and make him pass through many 
 lively scenes and actions. I give him hypnotic and post- 
 hypnotic suggestions. The subject is wakened and hyp- 
 notized time and again. At last he is put into a hyp- 
 notic state, and it is suggested that on awakening he 
 shall not remember anything of what had happened 
 in the state of hypnosis. The subject, on emerging 
 from his trance, remembers nothing of what he has 
 passed through. I then put my hand on his forehead 
 and tell him in a commanding voice, 'You remember 
 now everything.' As if touched by the wand of a 
 magician, the suppressed memories become endowed 
 with life and movement, and invade the consciousness 
 of the subject. Everything is now clearly remembered, 
 and the subject is able to relate the tale of his ad- 
 ventures without the omission of the least incident. So 
 detailed is the account that one cannot help wondering 
 at the extraordinary memory displayed by the subject. 
 How is the theory of unconscious cerebration to ac- 
 count for this strange fact? Prof. Ziehen, in his Phys- 
 
Subconscious and Unconscious Cerebration 177 
 
 iological Psychology tells us that it is still a matter 
 of doubt whether, despite their complication, all the 
 acts of the hynotized individual are not motions ac- 
 complished without any concomitant psychical pro- 
 cesses," and that "even the recollection of the hypnotic 
 psychical processes do not necessarily argue in favor 
 of their existence during the hypnotic trance." This 
 extreme view is certainly wrong, for the subject during 
 hypnosis not only acts, moves, but he also speaks, an- 
 swers questions intelligently, reasons, discusses; and if 
 such an individual may be regarded as a mere machine, 
 on the same grounds we may consider any rational man 
 as a mere unconscious automaton. 
 
 The advocates of unconscious cerebration must ad- 
 mit at least this much, that hypnosis is a conscious state. 
 Now, on the theory of unconscious cerebration, it is 
 truly inconceivable how psychical states can be sup- 
 pressed, the accompanying physiological processes alone 
 being left, and all that done by a mere word of the ex- 
 perimenter. The restoration of memory is still more 
 incomprehensible than the suggested amnesia. A com- 
 mand by the experimenter, "Now you can remember," 
 brings into consciousness a flood of ideas and images. 
 It is not that the experimenter gives the subject a clue 
 which starts the train of particular images and ideas; 
 but the mere general, abstract suggestion, "You can re- 
 member," is sufficient to restore memories which to all 
 appearances have ..completely vanished from the mind 
 of the subject. Are the unconscious physiological ner- 
 vous modifications so intelligent as to understand sug- 
 gestions and follow them? Does unconscious cerebra- 
 tion understand the command of the experimenter, and 
 does it oblige him to become conscious? 
 
178 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 On closer examination, we find the term uncon- 
 scious cerebration to be of so loose a nature that 
 under its head are often recorded facts that clearly 
 indicate the working of an intelligence. Thus, Mr. 
 Charles M. Child brings the following fact as a 
 specimen of unconscious cerebration: "I had earnestly 
 been trying," a gentleman writes to Mr. Child, 
 "to make a trial balance, and at last left off 
 working, the summary of the Dr. and Cr. sides of 
 the account showing a difference of £2 10s., the Dr. 
 side being so much smaller. The error I had not found 
 on Saturday night when I left the counting-house. On 
 this same Saturday night I retired feeling nervous and 
 angry with myself. Some time in the night I dreamed 
 thus: I was seated at my desk in the counting-house 
 and in a good light; everything was orderly and nat- 
 ural, the ledger lying before me. I was looking over 
 the balance of the accounts and comparing them with 
 the sums in the trial-balance sheet. Soon I came to a 
 debit balance of £2 10s. I looked at it, called myself 
 sundry names, spoke to myself in a deprecating manner 
 of my own eyes, and at last put the £2 10s. to its proper 
 side of the trial-balance sheet and went home. I arose 
 at the usual Sunday time, dressed carefully, breakfasted, 
 went to call on some . . . friends to go to church. 
 Suddenly the dream flashed on my memory. I went for 
 the keys, opened the office, also the safe, got the ledger, 
 and turned to the folio my dream had indicated. There 
 was the account whose balance was the sum wanted 
 which I had omitted to put in the balance-sheet, where 
 it was put now, and my year's posting proved correct." 
 
 The adherents of unconscious cerebration tacitly in- 
 clude under this term not only unconscious physiological 
 
Subconscious and Unconscious Cerebration 179 
 
 processes, or nerve modifications, but also psychical 
 states. Keeping clearly in mind the real meaning of un- 
 conscious cerebration as referring to physiological pro- 
 cesses, or nerve modifications with no psychical accom- 
 paniment, the difficulties of unconscious cerebration to 
 account for the phenomena of hypnotic memory be- 
 come truly insurmountable. For if the physiological 
 processes subsumed under the category of unconscious 
 cerebration are completely lacking in all psychical ele- 
 ments whatever, how can a general abstract negative 
 phrase, "You cannot remember," suppress particular 
 psychical states, and how can a similar positive phrase, 
 "You can remember," bring the forgotten memories 
 back to consciousness? It is simply incomprehensible. 
 
 Furthermore, while the subject is in a hypnotic con- 
 dition, we can suggest to him that on awakening he 
 shall not remember anything, but when put to the au- 
 tomatic recorder he shall be able to write everything 
 that has taken place in the state of hypnosis. The 
 subject is then awakened: he remembers nothing at all 
 of what he has passed through while in the state of hyp- 
 notic trance. As soon, however, as he is put to the 
 automatic recorder the hand gives a full rational ac- 
 count of all the events. If now you ask the subject what 
 it is he has written, he stares at you in confusion; he 
 knows nothing at all of the writing. How shall we ac- 
 count for this fact on the theory of unconscious cere- 
 bration ? Can unconscious physiological processes write 
 rational discourses? It is simply miraculous, incom- 
 prehensible. 
 
 These, however, are not the only difficulties which 
 the theory of unconscious cerebration has to encounter. 
 Take the following experiment: I gave Mr. V. F. 
 
180 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 the suggestion that on awakening he should put my 
 coat on three times, take it off, and put it on again; 
 that he should do it when he heard a signal which 
 should be a knock ; amnesia was suggested and also the 
 possibility of writing the suggestion. The subject was 
 then roused from his trance. There was not the slight- 
 est recollection of what had been suggested, but when 
 he was put to the automatic recorder the hand at once 
 proceeded to write everything. In the middle of the 
 writing, "when a signal will be given . . .," I 
 stopped the subject and asked him what he was writing 
 about. "I do not know," he answered. "How is it," 
 I asked again, "you write and do not know what you 
 write?" "I do not know, I think it was something 
 about a coat." "What was it you were writing about a 
 coat?" "I do not know, maybe it was about the make 
 of a coat." Then when the signal came, he rose and 
 put on the coat three times. 
 
 To take another experiment of the same kind : 
 I give the subject the suggestion that he should 
 bow to the gas whenever the door should be opened; 
 again amnesia is suggested, with the possibility of 
 writing. The subject is stopped when he finished 
 his account. "What was it you wrote?" I asked. 
 The subject looked surprised. I repeated my ques- 
 tion. "I do not know, I think something about a 
 door." "What was it about a door?" "I do not 
 know." I have made many similar experiments, and 
 all of them with the same results. It is evident that the 
 writing is not an unconscious automatic process, for the 
 subject possesses a general knowledge of what he has 
 written, or even of what he is going to write. 
 
 Now, on the theory of unconscious cerebration this 
 
Subconscious and Unconscious Cerebration 181 
 
 general knowledge ought to be entirely lacking, since the 
 physiological processes of the suppressed memory have 
 no psychical accompaniment. It would not do to say 
 that the subject knows each word as he writes it, but be- 
 comes unconscious of it, forgets it as soon as it is written 
 down, because the subject is able to tell the central idea; 
 that is, he has a general knowledge of it; and, what is 
 more, he is able to tell us this general central idea even 
 before he finishes the writing, — in fact, he can do it 
 when stopped in the middle of the phrase. On the 
 theory of secondary consciousness, however, the ex- 
 periments could not possibly give other results. The 
 secondary consciousness understands the suggestion 
 given by the experimenter, accepts them, obeys the 
 commands, keeps the suppressed memories, and sends 
 up a general knowledge of them to the upper conscious- 
 ness, and if commanded, communicates the suppressed 
 particular suggestions in all their details. 
 
 The advocates of unconscious cerebration assume 
 too much : they assume that normal memory, or recol- 
 lection in the normal state, can be fully accounted for 
 by unconscious physiological processes, and the only 
 thing required is to apply this theory to the phenomena 
 of hypnotic memory. It would be well to examine this 
 theory and see how strong its claims are in the case of 
 normal memory. 
 
 Many a modern psycho-physiologist no doubt smiles 
 at the crude, ancient psycho-physiological theory of per- 
 ception. Images or copies of objects emanate from ob- 
 jects, get deposited in the mind, hence perception, cog- 
 nition, memory. The modern psycho-physiological 
 speculations, however, the speculations of Maudsley, 
 Carpenter, Ziehen, Ribot, etc., are no less crude. Thus, 
 
1 82 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 Ziehen, for instance, conceives that each sensation de- 
 posits a copy of itself, — an image, an idea, in some 
 one of the memory ganglion cells, and memory consists 
 in the reproduction of this copy, — the hen lays an egg 
 from which another hen may come out. Maudsley 
 expresses the same thing in slightly different terms ; in- 
 stead of "deposits of images in memory ganglion cells," 
 he uses "modifications of nerve elements." "It may be 
 supposed," says Maudsley, "that the first activity did 
 leave behind it, when it subsided, some after-effect, some 
 modification of the nerve element, whereby the nerve 
 circuit was disposed to fall again readily into the same 
 action, such disposition (unconscious) appearing in con- 
 sciousness as recognition or memory." Ribot and many 
 other psychologists, with slight variations in minor 
 points, follow the same beaten track. All of them agree 
 that it is the nerve modifications produced by the physi- 
 ological processes of sensations, emotions, etc., that con- 
 stitute the basis, nay, the very essence, of memory itself. 
 It does not require a close examination to find the de- 
 ficiencies of this theory. A mere modification left be- 
 hind as a trace cannot possibly explain memory, recol- 
 lection, the fact of referring a particular bit of experi- 
 ence to an experience felt before. The retention of a 
 trace or of a nervous modification, and the reproduc- 
 tion of that trace or modification, cannot in the least 
 account for the fact that a series of sensations, ideas, 
 images, emotions felt at different times, should become 
 combined, brought into a unity, felt like being similar, 
 like being repetitions, copies of an original experience. 
 77 is not retention or reproduction, but it is the recogni- 
 tion element that constitutes the essence of memory. 
 The rose of to-day reminds me of the rose of yesterday, 
 
Subconscious and Unconscious Cerebration 183 
 
 of the same rose seen the day before yesterday. Now 
 the image of the rose may be retained, may even be 
 reproduced, but if it is not recognized as having hap- 
 pened in my past, there can be no recollection. In short, 
 without personal recognition there is no memory. As 
 James strongly puts it, "the gutter is worn deeper 
 by each successive shower, but not for that reason 
 brought into contact with previous showers." Does the 
 theory of unconscious physiological processes, of mate- 
 rial brain traces, of nerve modifications, does the theory 
 take into account this element of personal recognition? 
 Can the theory of unconscious cerebration offer the 
 faintest suggestion as to how that element of recognition 
 is brought about ? What is that something added to the 
 unconscious physiological trace or nerve modification 
 that effects a conscious recognition? 
 
 Furthermore, first impressions can be localized in the 
 past, but so can also each subsequent revival. How 
 shall we explain on the theory of unconscious physio- 
 logical nerve registration that the original, the primi- 
 tive sense experience, as well as each subsequent re- 
 vival, can be referred to as distinct psychical facts. For 
 if the structural nerve elements are slightly modified 
 with each revival, how shall we account for this psy- 
 chical distinction of the original sense experience as well 
 as of the modified revivals? The remembered experi- 
 ence leaves its own individual trace, then a trace of its 
 being a copy of a former original impression, and also 
 a trace of its being a member in a series of similar 
 traces, each trace being a copy of another and a copy of 
 the original impression. How all that is done is a 
 mystery." 
 
 These objections advanced by me many years ago 
 
184 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 hold true of recent theories which fall back on the old 
 views of Mill and Carpenter, namely, unconscious cere- 
 bration. The modern upholders of unconscious cere- 
 bration think that they have discovered new facts 
 and arguments in favor of unconscious mental activ- 
 ity, and are thus justified in denying subconscious men- 
 tal life. The arguments, as we have pointed out, are 
 not new, nor are the facts advanced in support of these 
 arguments true. The same objections hold true in the 
 case of the theory of unconscious cerebration offered us 
 in the garb of nerve currents and nerve paths, well worn 
 nerve tracks, opening and closing of nerve currents and 
 tracks, and formation of all shapes and forms of neu- 
 rograms. Why be misled by figments and by sounds? 
 The subconscious stands for a number of facts, reac- 
 tions, and behavior which are accompanied by psychic 
 life, by mental activities, by consciousness. 
 
 The physiological unconscious registration theories of 
 nerve currents, nerve-paths, and neurograms are not 
 only figments, arbitrary fanciful weavings of the imag- 
 ination, they cannot even hypothetically explain the 
 simplest act of memory, and especially of recognitive 
 memory. 
 
 Since the theories of unconscious registration fail us 
 in the most elementary mental processes, how can we 
 possibly rely on cerebration-fancies in the case of such 
 complex phenomena as hypnotic conditions and various 
 mental states of trance and dissociation? The physio- 
 logical theories, such as unconscious cerebration and 
 its modifications, failing, we must use for all those 
 phenomena the psychological interpretation. The sub- 
 conscious must be taken as a necessary theory in psy- 
 chopathology, as atoms, molecules, electrons and ether 
 
Subconscious and Unconscious Cerebration 185 
 
 are in chemistry and physics. The subconscious is not 
 an "unconscious," it is not a physiological automatism. 
 The subconscious is a consciousness, a secondary con- 
 sciousness, a sort of secondary self, the self being un- 
 derstood by me as a diffused consciousness. 
 
CHAPTER XXVI 
 
 THE SUBCONSCIOUS AND AUTOMATISM 
 
 THE theory of unconscious cerebration dies 
 hard. Recently a few psychologists made an 
 attempt to revive it. The arguments ad- 
 vanced are rather philosophical than psycho- 
 logical. It may be well to test the validity of these ar- 
 guments. If we clear the ground of all superfluous 
 speculations, we find two main contentions. In the first 
 place, it is assumed that many hypnotic and hysterical 
 manifestations are solely the result of physiological ac- 
 tivities. It is claimed by some, such as Miinsterberg, 
 that physiological processes without any psychic accom- 
 paniments, may reach such a high state of complexity 
 as to account fully for all the observed manifestations in 
 the different forms of mental dissociations. In the sec- 
 ond place, it is claimed, from a purely philosophical 
 standpoint, that even in the case of dissociation when 
 consciousness may be granted to be present, there is no 
 dissociation in consciousness itself, since consciousness is 
 but a passive onlooker while the active changes go on in 
 the content of consciousness; in other words, in states 
 of dissociation it is not consciousness that is changed, 
 but only the content of consciousness. 
 
 Let us examine these contentions and see whether 
 they can stand the test of critical analysis. The view 
 of regarding mental activity from a purely physiological 
 standpoint is not new, it dates as far back as Descartes, 
 who regards all the animals, with the exception of man, 
 
 186 
 
The Subconscious and Automatism 187 
 
 as mechanical automata. The philosopher, Maimon, 
 in his "Autobiography" tells an anecdote on himself. 
 In his youth Maimon was an ardent adherent of Car- 
 tesian automatism. During one of his strolls with a 
 friend Maimon struck a goat. The animal bleated. 
 The friend rebuked Maimon for his cruelty. Maimon 
 laughed at the simplicity of his friend. — "The goat is 
 like a drum which sounds when it is beaten." 
 
 Huxley carried this view further, regarding con- 
 sciousness as an epiphenomenon. The physiological 
 mechanism is the engine, consciousness is but the whis- 
 tle accompanying it. 
 
 Of course, it goes without saying that psychologists 
 and physiologists at present assume that all states 
 of consciousness are accompanied by physiological 
 processes. Every thought, every feeling, even the most 
 complicated poetical inspiration, or the most abstruse 
 mathematical, logical, and metaphysical speculations, 
 have physiological processes as their accompaniments. 
 We are, however, hardly justified in carrying this postu- 
 late to the absurdity of the total denial of consciousness, 
 and regarding all adjustments and adaptations as so 
 many chemical and mechanical reactions — "tropisms," 
 as some modern biologists, such as Loeb and others, are 
 apt to put it in the case of many animals, a reversion to 
 the Cartesian hypothesis of mechanical automatism. Mo- 
 tor reactions can be regarded solely from the physiolog- 
 ical standpoint, but consciousness cannot be entirely 
 ruled out. What probability is there that a play of 
 atoms and electrons would produce the Iliad, Hamlet, 
 the Principia of Newton, the Celestial Mechanics of La- 
 place, or Darwin's Origin of Species? 
 
 Even if we descend to such motor reactions as are 
 
1 88 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 expressed in the compositions of a schoolboy, we still un- 
 hesitatingly assume a conscious activity. We cannot re- 
 fute the philosopher who would regard all such mani- 
 festations as so many physiological processes without 
 any conscious accompaniment. For though every one 
 is directly conscious of his own mental life, no one can 
 experience directly the mental life of another. We can- 
 not inspect directly the psychic processes that go on in 
 other living beings, or in our fellow men. Mind is in- 
 ferred from action, from behavior. Reactions, ad- 
 justments to environment, accompanied by conscious- 
 ness, by intelligence in us, are rightly judged to have the 
 same accompaniment in other beings, in our neighbours. 
 To deny consciousness to our neighbour, and to regard 
 him as a physiological automaton, is to put oneself in 
 the absurd position of denying the existence of states 
 which are observed in ourselves under similar condi- 
 tions. In fact, the burden of proof falls on those who 
 make such a denial. 
 
 Now, in the case of hypnosis or various states of dis- 
 sociation, we meet with intelligent adjustments often 
 expressed in gestures, writing, and speech. We can, by 
 means of various methods, enter into active relation- 
 ship with those dissociated activities, unknown to the in- 
 dividual himself. We can obtain intelligent replies to 
 our questions either by writing, or by speaking, or by 
 other arranged means of communication. What right 
 have we to deny consciousness in one case while we 
 affirm it in another case under similar circumstances? 
 When I receive a letter from my friend I regard the let- 
 ter as having been written by a being who possesses 
 consciousness, but when a similar letter is written by a 
 friend in a hypnotic or post-hypnotic state, we regard 
 
The Subconscious and Automatism 189 
 
 it as the result of physiological automatism, with no 
 conscious accompaniment. It is clear that the denial of 
 consciousness to the hypnotic individuality is purely ar- 
 bitrary. It is certainly arbitrary in the case of double 
 or multiple personality to regard one personality as con- 
 scious and the other personalities as purely automatic, 
 with no consciousness in them. It would have been 
 more consistent, if the psychologist were to take the 
 solipsistic point of view and deny consciousness to all 
 else except himself. 
 
 The arbitrary standpoint of the psychologist who de- 
 nies secondary and multiple consciousness can be still 
 further made clear in the case of coexistent, dissociated 
 mental activity. Thus one hand of the subject or of 
 the patient may write a letter, while the other hand may 
 be engaged in drawing or writing a composition, of 
 which the individual is not cognizant. Both hands 
 enter independently of each other into communication 
 with the external observer. The communications are 
 independent and equally intelligent. In each case we 
 get intelligent replies and reactions to our questions 
 and stimulations. Which of the two is supposed to be 
 conscious? To take a concrete experiment. Mr. M. 
 presents phenomena of dissociation. When in one of 
 those states of dissociation Mr. M. is made to write a 
 letter with one hand, while the other hand, being an- 
 aesthetic, is put under a screen and made to carry out a 
 calculation. One hand replies to questions, while the 
 other solves problems. Both hands give intelligent re- 
 plies. To which of them is consciousness to be ascribed? 
 If we deny it in one case, we should also deny it in the 
 other. But, then, why not be consistent, and deny it 
 in every case of intelligent adjustment? We realize 
 
190 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 how arbitrary and illogical is the position of those psy- 
 chologists who coquet with physiology under the de- 
 lusion that they are more scientific. They are led to 
 take arbitrary positions which lead into the pitfalls 
 of solipsism, with all its contradictions and absurdities. 
 
 Besides, physiological processes are, after all, but hy- 
 pothetical concepts; physiological currents are con- 
 ceived after the model of electrical currents, and are by 
 no means theoretically proven. While they should be 
 used for the sake of a better elucidation of the facts, it 
 is not good scientific sense to sacrifice to them the very 
 material of the science of psychology. Sensations, ideas, 
 feelings, emotions, are after all the direct data of the 
 psychologist, while physiological processes and currents 
 are purely hypothetical. When, therefore, these hy- 
 pothetical entities lead not to a better understanding 
 of the facts of mental life, but to their denial, the very 
 purpose of the hypothetical creations is completely de- 
 feated. 
 
 Physiological processes are framed to explain states 
 of consciousness with their motor reactions. When, 
 therefore, these hypothetical creations threaten to sweep 
 away the actual living facts, it is time to halt and ex- 
 amine closely the sterile character of the hypothesis. 
 The central fallacy lies in the tacit assumption that un- 
 known and possibly unknowable, highly problematical 
 brain currents, with their "opening and closing valves," 
 with "well worn or blocked paths," all of a purely conjec- 
 tural character, have, by their ingenious complexity, be- 
 come, likes marionettes, so marvellously endowed with 
 sense-like activities as to dispense completely with the 
 mental states which these conceptual entities were 
 called in to explain. 
 
The Subconscious and Automatism 19 1 
 
 Clinical cases and experimental facts go further to 
 invalidate the theory of the purely physical interpreta- 
 tion of the subconscious, or what may be described as 
 automatism-psychology. If anything is of the utmost 
 importance in mental life, it is surely memory. Mem- 
 ory forms a unity of our life, brings, so to speak, to a 
 focus our life-experiences, which would have otherwise 
 been disconnected, confused, and chaotic. I remem- 
 ber just now what I did an hour ago, a day ago, what 
 I lived through many years ago. I remember the ex- 
 periences of my childhood, boyhood, and youth. I re- 
 member my struggles and disappointments, my loves, 
 my friendships, my enmities, my feelings, sentiments, 
 emotions, ideas, and sensations. All these inter-con- 
 nected, interlocked links of memories form the solid 
 chain of my conscious personality. 
 
 In my memory of the past experiences there is 
 the present consciousness that all that I had gone 
 through at the time of the experience — any change, 
 any modification, that had taken place — occurred 
 in my mind, in my consciousness. Unless under 
 delusion or illusion of memory we cannot remem- 
 ber what did not occur in consciousness. We can- 
 not remember what we were not conscious of. The 
 past mental state which the present memory refers to is 
 a state of consciousness; otherwise memory is impossi- 
 ble and meaningless. Memory, recollection, reminis- 
 cence, can only refer to a previous state of consciousness. 
 Surely no one else can have a better and more direct 
 knowledge than I myself have of the ideas, emotions, 
 and moods that I remember, as experienced by me. 
 
 The memory factor is all the more important in 
 psychology, since we have to take account of the sub- 
 
192 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 ject's inner experiences. In each case of memory the 
 burden of proof falls on those who deny the validity of 
 that memory, as referring to a past state of conscious- 
 ness. Suppose I have a memory in a full state of con- 
 sciousness that I lighted a lamp an hour ago, the burden 
 of proof would fall on those who deny the existence of 
 such a state. It would be an arbitrary, if not a prepos- 
 terous position for an outside observer to claim that the 
 lighting of the lamp was carried out mechanically, by 
 a physiological automatism, and that the subsequent 
 memory was but an illusion. The onus of proof that 
 the original act had no conscious accompaniment is en- 
 tirely on those who take such a position in opposition 
 to the direct introspective account. Where such a proof 
 is not forthcoming, the position taken is arbitrary. Were 
 we to take such a position, the very science of 
 psychology would become an impossibility, since all 
 memory would have to be declared a snare and a delu- 
 sion. All psychological studies based on introspection 
 and memory would have to be abandoned, and we 
 should have to follow Comte, and declare psychology 
 an impossibility. A psychologist maintaining such a 
 point of view is, from the very nature of his attitude, 
 disqualified to give his opinion; he must fall back on 
 physiology, and rule out all psychology. 
 
 If, however, memory and introspection are not re- 
 jected, then the recollection of a conscious state should 
 not be arbitrarily dismissed, unless there are good rea- 
 sons for such a dismissal. Now, the hypnotic subject, 
 or the patient, in the case of functional psychosis, un- 
 dergoes an experience of which he is apparently uncon- 
 scious. In a subsequent state, in a hypnotic or trance 
 state, he actually recollects that the experience was a 
 
The Subconscious and Automatism 193 
 
 conscious one; we cannot possibly reject this recollec- 
 tion as an illusion of memory. The burden of proof 
 that the former state was not a conscious one falls on 
 him who denies the person's mental experience. Such a 
 proof is all the more requisite, since it can be demon- 
 strated that in subconscious states there is really pres- 
 ent a subconscious consciousness. 
 
CHAPTER XXVII 
 
 THE SUBCONSCIOUS AND THE PASSIVE CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 DRIVEN out of the psychological fortress, 
 some psychologists of the philosophical type 
 (Miinsterberg) still take refuge in the meta- 
 physical citadel. It is claimed that, psycho- 
 logically, mental life is analyzed into consciousness and 
 its content. Now, it is further assumed that all mental 
 modifications occur in mental contents, but not in con- 
 sciousness. Consciousness, itself, is supposed to be a 
 passive, immutable looker-on, a sort of psychic deity. 
 We thus have a mental content which is not conscious 
 and a consciousness, the blessed Buddha in his blissful 
 state of Nirvana. Consciousness is regarded in the light 
 of a substance which contains the mental content some- 
 what after the fashion of a material substance underly- 
 ing physical qualities. This view of an underlying, im- 
 mutable substance, with a changing qualitative content, 
 was long ago criticized by Hume, both in the case of 
 mind and body. The assumption of an entity under- 
 lying observed phenomena, whether physical or mental, 
 has since become so weakened that it is no longer re- 
 garded as a living hypothesis among thinking men of 
 science. 
 
 We can see at a glance that the substance-conscious- 
 ness with its changing qualitative content is but a piece 
 of metaphysical speculation, it is a revival of the old 
 soul-hypothesis, long ago buried by modern psycholo- 
 gists. The soul-consciousness hypothesis must be re- 
 
 194 
 
Subconscious and the Passive Consciousness 195 
 
 jected, for the simple reason that it complicates 
 matters, and explains nothing. In fact, the hypo- 
 thesis of an imperturbable soul-consciousness from the 
 very nature of its hypothetical being, itself requires an 
 explanation, while it does not in the least explain the 
 mental content, which is the material of the psycholo- 
 gist. Such a passive, changeless soul-consciousness is 
 a sort of box in which the content of soul-consciousness 
 resides and has its being. This soul-consciousness is but 
 a survival from a past metaphysical period. 
 
 In the case of double and multiple personalities it is 
 claimed that while the personalites are different, their 
 consciousness is not different, but one and the same. In 
 the different personalities found in the case of multiple 
 personality, there is among them but one consciousness, 
 somewhat like the Greek myth of the three old women 
 with one eye among them. By a parity of reasoning we 
 may say that the minds of different individuals, such as 
 John's and Peter's, are really identical. John and Pe- 
 ter are different personalities with different contents, 
 but with the same consciousness. In fact, we may gen- 
 eralize further and say that the whole human race and 
 the beasts of the field and the birds of the air share 
 in one and the same indivisible, passive, immutable con- 
 sciousness, a sort of world-soul. This may be a grand 
 metaphysical speculation, but it is neither psychological 
 nor scientific. 
 
 There is another objection to the subconscious, an 
 objection based on an artificial fast and hard line drawn 
 between the purpose of science on the one hand, and 
 that of will on the other. Science, it is claimed, deals 
 with artificial concepts, while personal will is concerned 
 with the real values of life, It is claimed that the con- 
 
196 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 cept of the subconscious is illegitimate, because it in- 
 volves a confusion of this metaphysical double book- 
 keeping. 
 
 The world of description and the world of appre- 
 ciation were brought out and contrasted by Professor 
 Royce in his early works, and afterwards elaborated by 
 a few psychologists of the Schopenhauerian tinge. The 
 division is not new, and dates back to the Middle Ages, 
 with its split of science and philosophy on the one hand, 
 and religion on the other. It is the doctrine of the two- 
 fold truth (Die Lehre von der zweifachen Wahrheit). 
 According to mediaeval thought, there are two realms, 
 the realm of knowledge and the realm of faith; the 
 realm of intellect and the realm of will. What is true 
 in the one may not be true in the other. From Maimo- 
 nides, Ibn Gabirol, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas 
 to Duns Scotus and Occam the same doctrine of the two- 
 fold truth and the two realms prevailed. The scholastic 
 could say anything he wished provided he was cautious 
 to claim that what was true secundum rationem was not 
 true secundum fidem. 
 
 This double view still survives in some philosophical 
 quarters. Instead of finding fault with the subcon- 
 scious for ignoring this time-honored double truth, it 
 should rather be regarded as a special merit. As a mat- 
 ter of fact, the subconscious, unless interpreted in meta- 
 physical terms of a cosmic self, has nothing to do with 
 the heirloom of metaphysical mediaeval thought. The 
 subconscious is based on experience and facts to which 
 philosophical and metaphysical distinctions should adapt 
 themselves. 
 
 We thus find that the objections to the subconscious 
 are based on insufficient grounds. We also find that the 
 
Subconscious and the Passive Consciousness 197 
 
 abandonment of the subconscious leads to a tangle of 
 difficulties and to the quagmire of mediaeval metaphys- 
 ics. , If the metaphysical interpretation of the sub- 
 conscious in the sense of a cosmic self lands one in the 
 misty regions of religious mysticism, the opposite view 
 of the total negation of the subconscious, apparently in 
 the interests of science, lands one in regions no less 
 shadowy, regions of naturalistic mysticism. 
 
 So fundamental, however, is the concept of the sub- 
 conscious that even its opponents have to admit it under 
 different names. They admit the fact of dissociation, 
 of dissociated mental systems, and of dissociated person- 
 alities. But they put forth the hypothetical claim that 
 it is one and the same consciousness present in all the 
 different forms of dissociation. Now, if we omit that 
 speculative metaphysical consciousness which, being in- 
 active and unchangeable, is of no use in scientific work, 
 we are really left with the mutations and permutations 
 of mental systems which, from their very nature, must 
 be conscious. The psychopathologist must postulate 
 the subconscious just as the geometrician postulates space 
 and position, or as the physicist postulates matter and 
 force. 
 
CHAPTER XXVIII 
 
 SUBCONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS IDEAS 
 
 THERE is a school which regards the sub- 
 conscious as formed of "suppressed mental 
 complexes." The views of this school are 
 not psychologically clear. It seems, however, 
 that the subconscious is viewed in the light of "un- 
 conscious ideas." "Unconscious Ideas" were discussed 
 by me in my Psychology of Suggestion, and I cannot 
 do better than to quote from that volume, "For the 
 mechanism of consciousness is hidden deep down in the 
 depths of the subconscious, and it is thither we have to 
 descend in order to get a clear understanding of the 
 phenomena that appear in the broad daylight of con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 The German school, with Wundt at its head, at first 
 started out on similar lines, but they could not make any 
 use of the subconscious, and their speculations ran wild 
 in the fancies of Hartmann. The reason of this failure 
 is due to the fact that the concept of the subconscious 
 as conceived by the German school was extremely vague, 
 and had rather the character of a mechanical than that 
 of a psychical process. An unconscious consciousness 
 — that was their concept of the subconscious. In such 
 a form as this the subconscious was certainly meaning- 
 less — mere nonsense — and had to be given up. The 
 German psychological investigations are now confined to 
 the content of consciousness in so far as the individual 
 is immediately conscious of it. But as this form of con- 
 
 198 
 
Subconscious and Unconscious Ideas 199 
 
 sciousness is extremely narrow and circumscribed, the 
 results arrived at, though remarkable for their thor- 
 oughness, are, after all, of a rather trivial nature. It is 
 what James aptly characterizes as "the elaboration of 
 the obvious." 
 
 This criticism applies well to Freud and his adher- 
 ents. Das Unbewusste is conceived as "Suppressed un- 
 conscious idea-complexes." Of course, the claims of 
 that school to originality and to the apparent unveiling 
 of the causation of psychoneufosis are entirely unjusti- 
 fied. A "suppressed complex" is but another term for 
 a dissociated system, commonly accepted in psychopath- 
 ology. The special theories developed by that school in 
 regard to desire, to sexuality, and to voluntary suppres- 
 sion of unpleasant or painful ideas are entirely gratuit- 
 ous and false in the light of modern psychology and clin- 
 ical experience. 
 
 This psycho-analytic school has unfortunately fallen 
 back on the Herbartian psychology with its metaphysical 
 Reals or ideas which by their mutual tension keep 
 suppressing one another, thus determining the dis- 
 play of the contents of consciousness. As Her- 
 bart tells us: "Concepts become forces when they resist 
 one another. This resistance occurs when two or more 
 opposed concepts encounter one another." This proposi- 
 tion or principle proclaimed by Herbart is at the basis 
 of Freud's mythical speculations. "A concept is in con- 
 sciousness in so far as it is not suppressed," Herbart tells 
 us, "but is in actual representation. When it rises out of 
 complete suppression, it enters into consciousness." Ac- 
 cording to Herbart and his modern followers, sup- 
 pressed ideas become forces and impulses. Concepts 
 which are not opposed or contrasted with one another, 
 
200 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 so far as they meet unhindered, form a "complex," a 
 favourite term used by the psycho-analytic school and 
 its followers. 
 
 It may possibly be of interest to remark that Herbart 
 is closely followed by the psycho-analytic school 
 in regard to the doctrine of desire. Desire with 
 Herbart is fundamental. "The faculty of desire 
 must include wishes, instincts, and every species of long- 
 ing." "The expression 'desire' must not be so limited 
 as to exclude those wishes which remain, though they 
 may be vain, or so-called pious wishes, and which, for 
 the very reason that they do remain, constantly incite 
 men to new efforts, because through them the thought of 
 a possibility is ever anew suggested, in spite of all rea- 
 sons which appear to prove the impossibility of attain- 
 ment. It is very important to give the concept of the 
 unattainability of the wished-for object strength enough 
 so that a peaceful renunciation may take place of the 
 desire. A man dreams of a desirable future for him- 
 self, even when he knows it will never come." These 
 Herbartian doctrines, long ago abandoned'by psychol- 
 ogy, are now being revived by the marvellous, "scien- 
 tific" psycho-analytic technique as a new discovery in the 
 science of normal and abnormal psychology. No better 
 criticism can be passed on this revival of Herbartian 
 psychology in the domain of psychopathology than the 
 one made by James : "I must confess that to my 
 mind there is something almost hideous in the glib Her- 
 bartian jargon about Vorstelliingmassen and their Hem- 
 mungen (suppressions) and sinken and erheben and 
 schiveben and V erschmelzungen and Complexionen 
 (complexes.)" 
 
 It is claimed by some of Freud's younger adherents 
 
Subconscious and Unconscious Ideas 201 
 
 that the mechanism of "unconscious ideas," though a 
 contradiction, is nevertheless justified, because of its 
 being a conceptual construct, as Karl Pearson puts it, 
 in order to aid the explanation of mental phenomena. 
 This is a new epistemological argument in defence of a 
 tottering system. It is truly amazing that science has 
 nowadays become so philosophical that when a theory 
 is unstable, it is unhesitatingly supported by epistemo- 
 logical considerations. 
 
 Perhaps it may be well to point out that self-contra- 
 dictory hypotheses are not quite acceptable in science. 
 A scientific hypothesis should at least have the merit of 
 being rational, logical, and not conceived in a wild 
 harum-scarum fashion. A good scientific hypothesis 
 must have restrictions and definite conditions. I think 
 it is Huxley who says that in the case of stolen goods 
 two hypotheses are at hand: one hypothesis is that an 
 angel is responsible for it, and the other that a thief has 
 carried off the goods. The angel-hypothesis is hardly 
 considered by science. In other words, the hypothetical 
 causative agency must be conceived in terms of ex- 
 perience. 
 
 The hypothetical agency must either be a fact di- 
 rectly observed in nature, or a fact which can be verified 
 later on. Thus the theory of gravitation is based on 
 the facts of falling bodies; the theory of natural selec- 
 tion is based on the facts of the struggle for existence 
 observed in the organic world. In short, a good scien- 
 tific hypothesis must take as its causative agency a vera 
 causa, a fact observable in experience, or a fact which 
 can be verified by further experience. Atoms, electrons, 
 ether, are not haphazard constructs; they are not re- 
 garded by the physicist as unreal fancies, unreal abstract 
 
202 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 notions to explain the real facts; but each of these hy- 
 pothetical agents is regarded as real, as a vera causa. 
 We cannot help agreeing with J. S. Mill on the subject 
 of hypothesis : "I conceive it to be necessary, when the 
 hypothesis relates to causation, that the supposed cause 
 should not only be a real phenomenon, something actu- 
 ally existing in nature, but should be already known to 
 exercise, or at least to be capable of exercising, an influ- 
 ence of some sort over the effect. In any other case it is 
 no sufficient evidence of the truth of the hypothesis that 
 we are able to deduce the real phenomenon from it." 
 Again, "What is true in [Newton's] maxim is that the 
 cause, though not known previously, should be capable 
 of being known thereafter; that its existence should be 
 capable of being detected, and its connection with the 
 effect ascribed to it should be susceptible of being proved 
 by independent evidence." 
 
 If we apply this very simple rule of logic to the theory 
 of "unconscious ideas," we at once realize the illegiti- 
 mate character of such a hypothesis. An idea is essen- 
 tially of a conscious nature. To speak, therefore, of 
 unconscious ideas, is to introduce into psychology the 
 self-contradictory impossible concept of unconscious 
 conscious ideas. This is equivalent to the assumption of 
 an unconscious consciousness. An unconscious idea is 
 neither a vera causa nor a fact ultimately to be verified. 
 The conception of an unconscious idea is like the con- 
 ception of a round square. 
 
 Moreover, it is not true, psychologically, that ideas 
 can be "suppressed" so that they become dissociated or 
 "unconscious." It is not true that we suppress painful 
 ideas into the "unconscious." We do not forget our 
 painful ideas. On the contrary, painful ideas stand out 
 
Subconscious and Unconscious Ideas 203 
 
 all the more prominent in our consciousness. Pain ham- 
 mers experience into the mind. In fact we may say with 
 more right that it is the pleasurable ideas that are for- 
 gotten, while the painful ideas are remembered. An 
 experience associated with pain is never forgotten. Like 
 a splinter in the flesh, it remains in consciousness. It is 
 due to other causes that a painful experience becomes 
 subconscious. 
 
 Teleologically, we can well see the importance of this 
 fact. It would have been suicidal to the individual and 
 ultimately to the species, if painful experiences were for- 
 gotten. The individual must learn to avoid harmful ob- 
 jects and hurtful stimuli. This can only be accom- 
 plished by actually remembering painful experiences. 
 That individual would survive who remembered best 
 his painful experiences. Were it otherwise, the indi- 
 vidual would be very much in the condition of the pro- 
 verbial silly bird that hides its head at the sight of the 
 hunter. The subjective painful experiences must be re- 
 membered; a painful experience fixes the attention. 
 
 On this fact of strengthening memory by pain was 
 based the once universally recognized method of train- 
 ing and education. What is fixed by pain is never forgot- 
 ten. What may bring about forgetfulness is either 
 a constitutionally bad memory, or a state of indif- 
 ference, or an intense, paralyzing emotion of fear, 
 especially in early childhood. The whole theory of 
 "suppression" of painful "complexes" is based on 
 false clinical and psychological assumptions. Neither 
 is there such a process as "suppression of complexes," 
 nor is there such a mental state as an "unconscious 
 idea." 
 
 Bergson, who as usual has his hand everywhere, takes 
 
204 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 up cudgels in defense of the unconscious. In his work 
 "Matter and Memory" he argues that common sense 
 assumes the presence of external objects, although it 
 may not be directly cognizant of them. Being an ideal- 
 ist and pan-psychist Bergson regards the nature of things 
 as made up of images. If, then, he reasons, common 
 sense believes in the existence of objects 'passed out of 
 sight and sense,' if it affirms unhesitatingly the actual 
 existence of not directly experienced objective images, 
 there should be no difficulty in assuming the existence of 
 subjective images, or of psychic states of which there is 
 no consciousness. The argument is essentially meta- 
 physical and will hardly have any weight with the psy- 
 chologist or psychopathologist. 
 
 Bergson's psychology is unfortunately so much satu- 
 rated with metaphysics that many a valuable sug- 
 gestion becomes lost in the haze and tangle of 
 his speculations. The psychologist has nothing to 
 do with the constitution of matter as it is 
 in itself. This belongs to metaphysical ontology. The 
 psychologist assumes matter as an external existence, 
 and separates it from his own subject matter, — psychic 
 states, mental processes, their elements and relations. A 
 psychic state made up of 'images' after the fashion of 
 'material images' with no consciousness to them ceases 
 to be psychic in the psychological sense. From a psy- 
 chological standpoint the term 'psychic' can only mean 
 some form of consciousness, however vague and mar- 
 ginal. Bergson's view would have probably been near- 
 er the truth, if he had assumed the existence of a subcon- 
 scious consciousness. 
 
 An "unconscious idea" in the sense that the idea has 
 no consciousness can have no meaning. If, however, by 
 
Subconscious and Unconscious Ideas 205 
 
 an "unconscious idea" is understood a consciousness of 
 which the individual or personal self is not conscious, 
 then we come around to a subconscious consciousness, as 
 developed by me in my various works. A quotation 
 from Hoffding may bring out my point in a clearer and 
 stronger light: 
 
 "The question before us is, whether the unconscious 
 can be other than a purely negative concept. In daily 
 speech (and more than is proper even in the scientific use 
 of the language) we use such expressions as unconscious 
 sensations, unconscious ideas, unconscious feeling. As, 
 however, sensations, ideas and feelings are conscious 
 elements, the expression is in reality absurd. If by an 
 unconscious idea is meant the idea which I have, then 
 the predicate "unconscious" signifies only that I do not 
 think of or pay heed to the fact that I have it. This use 
 of the word unconsciousness is connected with a twofold 
 use of the word consciousness. It is used to denote not 
 only the inner presentation of our sensations, ideas and 
 feelings, but also self-consciousness, the attention espe- 
 cially directed to our sensations, ideas, and feelings. 
 We have, of course, many sensations and ideas 
 without being conscious that we have them, 
 that is, without self-consciousness : many feelings 
 and impulses stir within us, without our clearly 
 apprehending their nature and direction. In this sense 
 we speak, for example, of unconscious love. A man 
 who has this feeling does not know what is astir in him ; 
 perhaps others see it, or he himself gradually discovers 
 it; but he has the feeling, his conscious life is determined 
 in a particular way." 
 
 In other words, what Hoffding practically claims here 
 is that there is no such mental state, no idea that is 
 
206 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 "unconscious," but that there are mental states, ideas, 
 feelings, which, though conscious, do not reach self- 
 consciousness. In other words, there are in us mental 
 processes which have consciousness, but no self-con- 
 sciousness. This is precisely what I mean by the sub- 
 conscious, — mental states which have consciousness, but 
 do not reach the personal consciousness. In short, the 
 only possible psychological assumption is a subconscious 
 consciousness. 
 
CHAPTER XXIX 
 
 THE SUBCONSCIOUS, CONSCIOUS, AND UNCONSCIOUS 
 
 THOSE who accept the division of the sub- 
 conscious into co-existing consciousness, or the 
 co-conscious and the unconscious really as- 
 sume the doctrine of the subconscious. They 
 claim that it would be better and more precise to indi- 
 cate whenever possible the conscious or unconscious, 
 that is, the strictly physiological character of the ob- 
 served manifestations. This, however, is more easily 
 said than done. We know next to nothing of the physi- 
 ological brain processes, which are mainly hypothetical, 
 and we do not know the limits of the subconscious con- 
 sciousness. In many cases it is not easy to determine 
 what the exact character of the subconscious manifesta- 
 tion is, how far it is conscious, dimly conscious, how far 
 it has gone toward the development of an independent 
 personality, and how far it shades in the direction of 
 the purely physiological. In the absence of any exact 
 determination, the term 'subconscious' indicates the char- 
 acter of the mental state without any definite commit- 
 tal to any of the possible hypotheses. 
 
 The term "unconscious" is all the more objectionable, 
 as Hoffding has already pointed out, it is essentially 
 an ambiguous, negative concept. The "unconscious" 
 may mean absence of self-consciousness, or lack of con- 
 sciousness, that is, purely physiological processes with 
 no conscious concomitant. He who uses the term "un- 
 conscious" must in each case indicate in what sense he 
 
 207 
 
208 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 uses the term. Is the manifestation entirely physiolog- 
 ical, or is it conscious in the sense of consciousness with 
 no self-consciousness? The two meanings are dia- 
 metrically opposed to each other. The unconscious in 
 the sense of the purely physiological assumes the theory 
 of unconscious cerebration; the other use of the uncon- 
 scious in the sense of mere consciousness with no self- 
 consciousness recognizes the view of the subconscious- 
 ness as advanced in my works. 
 
 It is claimed again that in many cases of psychopathic 
 maladies there is no need to have recourse to sub- 
 conscious systems. It is quite probable that the associa- 
 tion between the stimulus and the emotion called forth 
 is a direct one. The patient who is afraid of dogs has 
 the fear called forth by the sight of a dog. There is 
 no need to assume that there are here any intermediate 
 links in the chain of association. Even physiological 
 links may be totally absent here. It may be that by 
 investigation it can be shown that this association has 
 a history based on some former experience. There is no 
 reason to assume that the experience is functioning sub- 
 consciously, whether consciously or "unconsciously," that 
 is, physiologically. The dog and the fear have formed 
 an indissoluble association, so that, as soon as the dog 
 is perceived the fear is awakened. 
 
 This, however, is rather a debatable subject, since it 
 is impossible to tell in the case of purely physiological 
 links, whether such are present or not. Thus, Hoff- 
 ding says, "Not only may conscious results come from 
 unconscious (subconscious) working up, but there may 
 also be unconscious intermediate links in the midst of 
 conscious work. Supposing the idea a to be linked with 
 the idea b, and b again with c, then a will finally pro- 
 
The Subconscious, Conscious, and Unconscious 209 
 
 duce c directly without the intervention of b. The inter- 
 mediate links are often so numerous that they cannot 
 be recovered at all or with great difficulty. Many psy- 
 chological paradoxes and sudden suggestions have their 
 explanation in this unconscious determining of conscious 
 ideas." 
 
 Wundt seems to maintain the same view: "The 
 memory-process is especially predominant in those cases 
 where the element of the new impression that gave rise 
 to the assimilation is entirely suppressed by the other 
 components of the image, so that the associative rela- 
 tion between the memory-idea and the impression may 
 remain completely unnoticed. Such cases have been 
 spoken of as 'mediate memories' or 'mediate associa- 
 tions.' Still, just as with 'mediate recognitions,' we 
 are here, too, dealing with processes that are funda- 
 mentally the same as ordinary associations. Take, for 
 example, the case of a person who, sitting in his room 
 at evening, suddenly remembers, without any apparent 
 reason, a landscape that he passed through many years 
 before; examination shows that there happened to be 
 in the room a fragrant flower which he saw for the first 
 time in the landscape. The difference between this and 
 an ordinary memory-process in which the connection 
 of the new impression with an earlier experience is 
 clearly recognized, obviously consisted in the fact that 
 here the elements which recall the idea are pushed into 
 the obscure background of consciousness. The not 
 infrequent experience, commonly known as the 'spon- 
 taneous rise' of ideas, in which a memory-image sud- 
 denly appears in our mind without any assignable cause, 
 is in all probability reducible in every case to such latent 
 association." It appears, then, that both Hdffding and 
 
210 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 Wundt acknowledge the presence of intermediate links 
 in what appears to be a case of purely "immediate" as- 
 sociation. 
 
 In cases where the intermediate links are "un- 
 conscious," in the sense of a purely physiological pro- 
 cess, there is no criterion to prove the presence of such 
 intermediate physiological links, and one may as well, 
 from a purely psychological introspective standpoint, 
 deny their very existence. On the other hand, if with 
 Wundt, Hoffding and others we assume the presence 
 of intermediate psychic links, there is no way of dis- 
 proving them. It is quite probable that such inter- 
 mediate links are present in every single case. The 
 very fact that "unconscious" systems can be revived 
 as memories or hallucinatory hypnoidic states would in- 
 dicate their functioning when one of their components 
 becomes awakened to activity. 
 
 As an objection to the presence of intermediate psy- 
 chic links Pavlow's experiments are brought forward 
 to show that associations can be formed between re- 
 mote stimuli and glandular secretions, for instance. 
 Thus, a dog with a fistula in the parotid gland can be 
 made to react with secretions to light or sound stimuli. 
 
 This objection may be easily obviated by the consider- 
 ation that we do not know whether there are or are 
 not intermediate mental links between the artificial 
 stimuli and the discharge of the glandular secretion. 
 This consideration is all the more cogent as the remote 
 stimuli can only give results, if persistently associated 
 with food stimuli. If such association with food stimuli 
 is absent, and new stimuli are associated with remote 
 stimuli which give reactions through their associations 
 with food stimuli, the result is inhibition of secretion. 
 
The Subconscious, Conscious, and Unconscious 211 
 
 In other words, each new stimulus must be directly as- 
 sociated with the original food stimulus. 
 
 To quote from Savadsky's work carried out in Pav- 
 low's laboratory: "Wasiliev and Mishtovt were the 
 first to investigate conditions of inhibitions. At first 
 the authors had in mind to develop conditional reflexes, 
 not on the basis of the unconditional reflex (i. e. food) 
 but on the basis of another conditional reflex (such as 
 a sound or light stimulus giving secretion.) Their ex- 
 periments were as follows : From time to time they as- 
 sociated with the usual conditional stimulus another 
 stimulus which had no relation whatever to salivary 
 secretion, and this combination was not accompanied 
 by the presence of the unconditional stimulus (food). 
 By means of a great number of repetitions of such a 
 combination, it was supposed to associate with the 
 quality of the extraneous stimulus the quality of bring- 
 ing about salivary secretion. It turned out, however, 
 that such an arrangement of experimentation could by no 
 means transform the extraneous agent into a conditional 
 stimulus. In that way it became clear that the condi- 
 tional stimulus, contrary to the unconditional, is not 
 capable of communicating its property of bringing about 
 salivary secretion. The fact is that the associative ex- 
 ternal stimulus, when accompanied by the unconditional 
 stimulus alone, becomes after a few repetitions a power- 
 ful inhibiting agent." 
 
 This clearly shows that the conditional reflex in the 
 dog can bring about salivary secretions only when 
 associated with the unconditional reflex. What it means 
 is, that the dog on seeing a light or hearing the sound 
 expects food, and hence the psychic stimulation of his 
 salivary glands resulting in secretion. Pavlow's experi- 
 
212 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 ments and also the experiments carried out under his 
 directions by his pupils clearly prove that there is no 
 direct association between secretion and an external 
 stimulus, such as light or sound, but that the secretion 
 is brought about by an intermediate psychic link, namely 
 the expectation of food. Thus we find that the work 
 of Pavlow and his pupils, far from showing the possi- 
 bility of formation of direct associations, really goes to 
 substantiate the view of the presence of intermediate 
 mental links in cases of apparently immediate associa- 
 tions. 
 
 As a matter of fact there is no need for us to estab- 
 lish hypothetical, intermediate, unconscious or physio- 
 logical links. The "unconscious" brain-processes are 
 problematic entities and there is no way of getting at 
 them. What we need to discover in cases of mediate 
 association, and especially in cases of psychopathic dis- 
 eases, is whether the intermediate links, or the original 
 experience that brought about the trauma, or the state 
 of dissociation is present, consciously, or subconsciously, 
 or coconsciously. This is possible to test by hypnosis 
 or by means of the hypnoidal state. In many such cases 
 we actually find that the patient lives through the orig- 
 inal experience either consciously in a hypnoidal state, 
 or in a hypnoidic state, thus undergoing a mental experi- 
 ence which is immediately forgotten or dissociated; or 
 what is more commonly the case, the patient lives 
 through the original experience subconsciously. But, 
 whether conscious or subconscious, the mental state is 
 not "unconscious," but is essentially of a conscious char- 
 acter. In short, we deal here either with the personal 
 consciousness or with the subconscious consciousness. 
 Thus, all the facts of mental life, normal or abnormal, 
 substantiate the presence of a subconscious consciousness. 
 
CHAPTER XXX 
 
 THE THRESHOLD AND MENTAL SYSTEMS 
 
 IT may be well to point out some principles, im- 
 portant in many respects, but which at the present 
 moment are of interest from a psychopathological 
 standpoint. 
 Living tissue can only be set into activity by stimuli 
 of certain minimal intensity; should the stimulus fall 
 below that minimal intensity, the living protoplasm does 
 not react. This holds true of all cells, from the lowest 
 to the highest, — from the bacterium and infusorium to 
 the highly differentiated cell, such as muscle cell, or 
 neuron. The reaction of the living protoplasm to the 
 stimulus shows the irritability or sensitivity of the cell. 
 This sensitivity has its physiological threshold, so that 
 a stimulus falling below a certain intensity cannot call 
 forth any reaction in the cell. The rise or fall of the 
 threshold would mean an increase or decrease of the 
 minimal intensity of the stimulus requisite to bring about 
 a cellular reaction. By varying the conditions of sensi- 
 tivity, such as mechanical, thermal, electrical, chemical 
 and nutritional, the physiological threshold can be 
 raised or lowered. 
 
 The same holds true of a whole psycho-physiolog- 
 ical system, — there is a threshold of sensitivity be- 
 low which the minimal stimulus cannot fall, the 
 latter does not awaken any reaction in the system. 
 All the senses reveal the presence of such thresholds 
 which are also present in the case of all the higher psy- 
 
 213 
 
214 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 cho-physiological systems. If we term the stimulus 
 which can just bring about a reaction in the system the 
 stimulus threshold, we can say that a given system can 
 only be thrown into activity by a stimulus rising in in- 
 tensity above the stimulus threshold. Intensity of stim- 
 ulus, then, is an indispensable condition of the function- 
 ing of a psycho-physiological system. 
 
 In highly differentiated cells, however, it is not only 
 the quantity, or intensity of the stimulus that is to be 
 considered, but also the quality. The visual sense or- 
 gan is not affected by auditory stimuli nor can the audi- 
 tory sense organ be affected by visual stimulations. Sim- 
 ilarly, in the functioning of the higher psycho-physio- 
 logical systems the quality of the stimulus should not 
 be overlooked. Systems that remain inactive under 
 one set of stimuli, however intense, will respond to 
 another set of a different quality. 
 
 The same holds true of that synthesis of mental sys- 
 tems which we term moment consciousness, and which 
 we shall treat in detail further on. To set the moment 
 into activity, the moment threshold must be passed, and 
 not only the intensity of the stimulations should be taken 
 into consideration, but also the qualitative aspect of the 
 stimuli. Ideas, emotion and feelings which apparently 
 remain dormant at the action of one set of excitations 
 will respond readily to the action of excitations of a 
 different nature. Habits, habitual movements, habitual 
 thought, depend entirely on the qualitative character of 
 the excitations, on the combinations of special objects, 
 circumstances and times. The quality of the stimulus 
 is one of the important factors in the activity of a psy- 
 chophysiological system, or of a moment consciousness. 
 
 Besides those two factors of intensity and quality, 
 
The Threshold and Mental Systems 215 
 
 another factor, that of inhibition, plays quite a role in 
 the variations of the threshold. We are acquainted with 
 inhibitions in physiology, such, for instance, as the inhi- 
 bitions exercised by the pneumogastric nerve on the 
 heart, or the arresting of the activity of glands or of 
 the peristalsis by the stimulation of afferent nerves. We 
 know also of central inhibitions, such as fear, distress, 
 pain, acting as so many inhibitions on the peripheral 
 organs and serving to arrest functioning activity. Sim- 
 ilarly in mental life, complex as it is, the highly organ- 
 ized psycho-physiological systems, with their concomi- 
 tant moments consciousness, still fall under the same gen- 
 eral physiological laws of inhibition. In the course of 
 associative activity systems become organized into com- 
 plex groups, into complicated systems or constellations 
 of systems which, to maintain their functioning equilib- 
 rium, keep one another in check or under inhibition. 
 
 Such a formation of checks and inhibitions is 
 just what takes place in the training and the edu- 
 cation of the individual and the race. Every psy- 
 cho-physiological system or moment entering into re- 
 lations with other systems and moments is bound in the 
 course of its associative activity to form inhibitions to 
 its function by the direct influence of external or in- 
 ternal excitations. In other words, there is a rise of 
 threshold due to inhibitory associations. 
 
 Inhibition and rise of threshold may also result in a 
 different way in the process of association. We may 
 possibly lay it down as a law, which plays no small role 
 in the interaction of systems and moments, that in a 
 series of aggregation of various systems or moments, 
 forming a more complex organized whole, due to as- 
 sociation and synthesis of the component systems, hav- 
 
2i6 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 ing various thresholds, the ones having the higher 
 thresholds will raise the thresholds of the moments hav- 
 ing a greater sensitivity. This, however, may be coun- 
 terbalanced by the lowering of the moment threshold 
 by associations with moments of great sensitivity, that 
 is, with low moment thresholds. 
 
 While on the one hand the inhibitions and the conse- 
 quent rise of threshold go along with the complexity of 
 systemic structure as well as with the increase of asso- 
 ciative activity, both in extension and intension, there 
 is at the same time an advantage gained for the sys- 
 tem, inasmuch as it really has now more chances to be- 
 come active, on account of the greater number of sys- 
 tems with which it has become associated. The thresh- 
 old of the associated system rises, but on the other hand, 
 the chances for activity increase, while the liberation or 
 discharge of energy with the consequent evil effects of 
 extreme fatigue, exhaustion and ill nutrition is checked 
 and guarded against by the inhibitions and the rise of 
 threshold. 
 
 What happens now when a psycho-physiological sys- 
 tem becomes dissociated? The inhibitions become re- 
 moved and the threshold falls. The system is no longer 
 checked by inhibitions or by other systems, and hence, 
 with a lowering of the threshold, becomes sensitive, re- 
 acting to any slight, passing stimulus, manifesting or 
 liberating all the energy it possesses until fatigue and 
 complete exhaustion set in. From this vantage ground 
 we can understand the fact of the extraordinary en- 
 ergy which the dissociated subconscious systems mani- 
 fest, so much so that the unusual energy appears almost 
 supernatural, and has on that account been ascribed by 
 the superstitious to diabolical possession. 
 
The Threshold and Mental Systems 217 
 
 To quote from a former work of mine : 
 
 "When a system present in the upper personal con- 
 sciousness is to be disintegrated, the suggestion given 
 should be kept out of the patient's personal memory. 
 One can observe this fact clearly in post-hypnotic sug- 
 gestions. If a post-hypnotic suggestion is fully remem- 
 bered, it usually miscarries, — the suggestion loses its 
 efficacy, and often comes up as a word-memory without 
 the stringency of realization. When, however, am- 
 nesia is enforced, the post-hypnotic suggestion is fully 
 realized. A dissociated system present in the sub- 
 conscious, when coming to the surface of the upper 
 strata of consciousness, becomes manifested with intense 
 sensori-motor energy. Dissociation gives rise to greater 
 dynamo genesis. This principle of dynamogenesis is 
 important; cases of so-called impulsive insanities and 
 'psychic epilepsy 1 are really due to this cause. 
 
 "A system entering into association with other sys- 
 tems is set into activity, not only directly by its own 
 appropriate stimuli, but also indirectly through the ac- 
 tivities of the various systems associated with it. These 
 associative interrelations bring about an equable and 
 normal functioning activity, controlled and regulated 
 by the whole mass of associated systems. The mass 
 of associated systems forms the 'reductives' of each in- 
 dividual system. In dissociated systems the controlling 
 influence of the 'reductive mass' is lost and the result is 
 an over-activity, unchecked by any counteracting ten- 
 dencies. 
 
 "This relation of dissociation and dynamogenesis is 
 closely related to periodicity of function, with its con- 
 comitant manifestation of psychomotor activity charac- 
 teristic of all passions and periodically appearing in- 
 
218 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 stincts. Dissociated systems present impulsiveness, be- 
 cause of lack of associated counteracting systems. The 
 only way to diminish the overpowering impulsiveness 
 with which the dissociated subconscious systems make 
 an onset in their rush into the personal consciousness is 
 to bring about an association with counterbalancing or 
 inhibitory, controlling, conscious systems, to work the 
 dissociate systems into the tissue of the personal, con- 
 trolling consciousness which has to be fortified and de- 
 veloped. 
 
 "Physiologically, it may be said that a neuron ag- 
 gregate, entering into association with other aggregates 
 and being called into activity from as many different di- 
 rections as there are aggregates in the associated cluster, 
 has its neuron energy kept within the limits of the phys- 
 iological level. A dissociated neuron aggregate, on 
 the contrary, is not affected by the activity of other 
 aggregates; it is rarely called upon to function and 
 stores up a great amount of neuron energy. When now 
 an appropriate stimulus liberates the accustomed en- 
 ergy, the activity is overwhelming, and is very much like 
 the eruption of an underground volcano, giving rise to 
 temporary attacks, to 'seizures' by subconscious states 
 of the whole field of the upper consciousness, — 'seiz- 
 ures' which, being really of the nature of post-hypnotic 
 automatisms, are generally mistaken for epilepsy, the 
 attacks being regarded as epileptic manifestations, as 
 'larval epilepsy,' as 'epileptic equivalents,' as 'psychic 
 epilepsy.' With the restoration of the equilibrium of 
 the neuron aggregate, with the synthesis of the associ- 
 ated systems, a synthesis which can be brought about by 
 different methods, the subconscious eruptions, the at- 
 tacks, or 'seizures' vanish, never to return." 
 
CHAPTER XXXI 
 
 THE PRINCIPLE OF RESERVE ENERGY 
 
 E have pointed out the significance of inhi- 
 bitions in keeping back the systemic neuron 
 energy from fully being discharged under 
 normal conditions of life, and we have also 
 shown that the removal of inhibitions results in the full 
 liberation of the accumulated neuron energy. This fact, 
 so striking in the domain of recurrent psychomotor 
 states, almost forces itself on the attention of the stu- 
 dent of abnormal psychology. From such a funda- 
 mental tact of abnormal mental phenomena, we may 
 draw some conclusions in regard to mental life in gen- 
 eral. For, after all, the laws of pathology do not dif- 
 fer from those of physiology in general, the patholog- 
 ical really being the physiological under special condi- 
 ^ons. The normal is either the usual, the habitual, 
 the customary, or is, at best, an ideal construction of the 
 variations of life more or less successfully adjusted to 
 the conditions of the external environment. 
 
 This adjustment, however, keeps on constantly shift- 
 ing ground, continually changing the relative position 
 of the normal and the abnormal. From this standpoint 
 pathology is of the utmost importance in the study 
 of organic life. The pathological being the normal 
 out of place, the abnormal being the normal un- 
 der special conditions, pathology that deals with 
 the abnormal gives us a deep insight into the gen- 
 eral laws of normal physiological activity. All the 
 
 219 
 
220 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 experiments in physiology consist practically in the 
 production of so many pathological conditions and 
 states. When the physiologist makes injections, sections 
 and stimulations by various agencies, what else does he 
 effect if not the production of the pathological, in order 
 to learn the physiological action of the various tissues 
 and organs? In psychopathological studies we fol- 
 low the interrelations of mental phenomena under 
 special conditions; it is the physiological method 
 of experimentation by production of pathological 
 variations ; the conclusion arrived at in psychopathology 
 should apply to mental life in general. What is this 
 conclusion ? It is the principle of potential subconscious 
 energy or, more briefly stated, the principle of reserve 
 energy * 
 
 The moment thresholds of our moment conscious- 
 ness, or, put in physiological terms, the thresholds of 
 our psycho-physiological systems, are usually raised, 
 mental activity working in the course of its development 
 and growth of associative processes under ever-increas- 
 ing inhibitions with ever-higher thresholds. It is enough 
 to compare the educated, the civilized, with the unedu- 
 cated or with the barbarian and the savage, to realize 
 the truth of our statement. On account of the threshold 
 and inhibitions, not the whole of the psycho-physiolog- 
 ical energy possessed by the system or moment is mani- 
 fested; in fact, but a very small portion is displayed in 
 response to stimuli coming from the habitual environ- 
 
 *When this principle was formulated by me in a series of articles 
 published in The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal for March 
 and April, 1907, James sent me his article, "The Energies of Men," 
 in which he developed a similar point of view, though on widely 
 different lines. Nothing gives me more pleasure than to find myself 
 in accord with the great American psychologist and philosopher. 
 
The Principle of Reserve Energy 221 
 
 ment. What becomes of the rest of unused energy? // 
 is stored, reserve energy. 
 
 Biologically regarded, we can well see the import- 
 ance of such stored or reserve energy. In the strug- 
 gle for existence, the organism whose energies are eco- 
 nomically used and well guarded against waste will 
 meet with better success in the process of survival of 
 the fittest, or will have better chances in the process of 
 natural selection. The high thresholds and inhibitions 
 will prevent hasty and harmful reactions as well as use- 
 less waste of energy, unnecessary fatigue, and states of 
 helpless exhaustion. Moreover, natural selection will 
 favor organisms with ever greater stores of reserve en- 
 ergy which could be put forth under critical conditions 
 of life. In fact, the higher the organization of the indi- 
 vidual, the more varied and complex the external envi- 
 ronment, the more valuable and even indispensable will 
 such a store of reserve energy prove to be. 
 
 The course of civilization and education, by con- 
 tinuously raising the thresholds and inhibitions, follows 
 the line of natural selection, and keeps on increasing the 
 disposable store of potential subconscious or reserve 
 energy, both in the individual and the race. It is in this 
 formation of an ever-greater and richer store of dis- 
 posable, but well-guarded, reserve energy, that lies the 
 superiority of the educated over the uneducated, and 
 the supremacy of the higher over the lower races. 
 
 Civilization and education are processes of economy 
 of psycho-neural force, savings of mental energy. But 
 what society is doing in a feeble way, natural selection 
 has done far more effectively. What education and 
 civilization are doing now on a small scale and for a 
 brief period of time the process of survival of the fit- 
 
222 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 test in the ever-raging struggle for existence has done 
 for ages on a large scale. We should, therefore, ex- 
 pect that the natural reserve energy would far exceed 
 that of the cultivated one. The brain and mind of the 
 ancient German differed in nothing from his modern 
 descendant, the German philosopher, and still what a 
 difference in the manifestation of mental energy! The 
 savage brain and mind do not differ from those of their 
 civilized descendants, and still what an ocean of mental 
 life separates the civilized man from his savage pro- 
 genitor 1 
 
 It is against the evidence of biological sciences to 
 suppose that the acquisitions of the cultivated brains 
 have actually been transmitted from generation to gen- 
 eration. It is not likely that acquired characteristics 
 brought about by social life will change so radically the 
 brain in the course of some forty or fifty generations 
 that separate the civilized man from his savage progeni- 
 tor; and the trend of biological evidence hardly favors 
 the transmission of such acquired characteristics. 
 
 "There sits the savage," once exclaimed a friend of 
 mine, an eminent neuro-pathoiogist, "with three quar- 
 ters of his brain unused." Yes, there sits the savage 
 with a brain far surpassing the needs of his environ- 
 ment, harboring powers of a Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, 
 of a Shakespeare, Goethe, Darwin, and Newton. The 
 ancient German and Briton hardly differed in their 
 mental powers from their contemporaries, the civilized 
 Egyptian and Babylonian. What, then did those 
 Aryan savages do with their richly endowed mental 
 energies? Nothing. The mental energy was lying 
 fallow, — it was reserve energy, — energy for future use, 
 for the use of future ages of coming civilization. 
 
The Principle of Reserve Energy 223 
 
 But what about the cultivated man? Does he suf- 
 fer from neurasthenia, from nervous impotence, be- 
 cause, as some would have it, on account of the strain 
 of civilized life he has exhausted his store of nervous 
 energy? One may well ponder over the significant fact 
 that it is the neurasthenic, the "psychasthenic" who is 
 doing the world's work. We must remember that civi- 
 lization is but of yesterday, and that the reserve energy 
 is hardly touched upon. 
 
 In the treatment of the phenomena of psycho-physio- 
 logical dissociation, in the protean symptoms of ner- 
 vous and mental exhaustion, we should not forget this 
 biological principle of reserve energy, and should make 
 attempts to use it. In many cases the inhibitions become 
 too heavy and the thresholds too high. We must loosen 
 the grip of some of the inhibitions and lower the thresh- 
 olds, thus utilizing a fresh supply of reserve energy. 
 
 The treatment of psychopathic diseases should be 
 based on this biological principle of dormant reserve 
 energy. In many cases the inhibitions become too heavy 
 and the threshold too high. We must loosen the grip 
 of the inhibitions and lower the thresholds, utilizing 
 a fresh supply of dormant reserve energy.* 
 
 A similar train of thought was developed by Dr. S. 
 J. Meltzer, in his excellent paper on "The Factors of 
 Safety in Animal Structure and Animal Economy." By 
 a striking series of instructive facts, Dr. Meltzer points 
 out that "all organs of the body are built on the plan 
 of superabundance of structure and energy." I cannot 
 resist the temptation of quoting Dr. Meltzer's conclu- 
 
 *The principle of reserve energy is of great importance in educa- 
 tion. I hope to work out this subject elsewhere. I have also shown 
 the importance of the principle of reserve energy in my work The 
 Psychology of Laughter. 
 
224 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 sions at some length, because they so clearly elucidate 
 our principle of reserve energy, which is all the more 
 valuable, as Dr. Meltzer has formulated it indepen- 
 dently on widely different grounds. "Of the supplies 
 of energy to the animal, we see that oxygen is luxuri- 
 ously supplied. The supply of carbohydrates and fats 
 is apparently large enough to keep up a steady luxurious 
 surplus. . . . The liberal ingestion of proteid 
 might be another instance of the principle of abundance 
 ruling the structure and energies of the animal body. 
 There is, however, a theory that in just this single in- 
 stance the minimum is meant by nature to be also the 
 optimum. But it is a theory for the support of which 
 there is not a single fact. On the contrary, some facts 
 seem to indicate that Nature meant differently. Such 
 facts are, for instance, the abundance of proteolytic en- 
 zymes in the digestive canal and the great capacity of 
 the canal for absorption of proteids. Then there is 
 the fact that proteid material is stored away for use in 
 emergencies just as carbohydrates and fats are stored 
 away. In starvation, nitrogenous products continue to 
 be eliminated in the urine, which, according to Folin, 
 are derived from exogenous sources, that is, from in- 
 gested proteid and not from broken-down organ tis- 
 sues. An interesting example of storing away of pro- 
 teid for future use is seen in the muscles of the salmon 
 before they leave the sea for the river to spawn. Ac- 
 cording to Mescher the muscles are then large and the 
 reproductive organs are small. In the river where the 
 animals have to starve, the reproductive organs become 
 large, while the muscles waste away. Here, in time of 
 affluence, the muscles store up nutritive material for the 
 purpose of maintaining the life of the animal during 
 
The Principle of Reserve Energy 225 
 
 starvation and of assisting in the function of reproduc- 
 tion. This instance seems to be quite a good illustration 
 of the role which the factor of safety plays also in the 
 function of the supply of the body with proteid food. 
 The storing away of proteid, like the storing away of 
 glycogen and fat, for the use in expected and unex- 
 pected exceptional conditions, is exactly like the super- 
 abundance of tissue in an organ of animal or like an 
 extra beam in the support of a building or a bridge — 
 a factor of safety. 
 
 "It seems to me that the factors of safety have an 
 important place in the process of natural selection. 
 Those species which are provided with an abundance of 
 useful structure and energy, and are prepared to meet 
 many emergencies, are best fitted to survive in the strug- 
 gle for existence." 
 
 Unusual combinations of circumstances, great radi- 
 cal changes of the environment, often unloosen the inhi- 
 bitions, and, overstepping, or lowering the thresholds, 
 release some of the reserve energy. Critical periods, 
 great dangers, wars, revolutions, often make man rise 
 to the occasion, so that apparently insignificant and 
 worthless individuals display an energy unforeseen and 
 unsuspected, and which makes of them heroes and 
 heroines. There is a rise in intensity and a qualitative 
 change in the stimuli, an unloosening of some of the 
 inhibitions with a consequent release of some of the 
 bound-up reserve energy. 
 
 In this respect wars and revolutions may be regarded 
 as important factors in the manifestation of human po- 
 tential energy. The Persian and Peloponnesian wars 
 unloosened some of the energies of Greece, giving rise 
 to great thinkers, scientists, and artists, having a lasting 
 
226 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 influence on the destiny of humanity. The constant 
 wars and national misfortunes of the jews released 
 their reserve energy making of them a race of proph- 
 ets, apostles and martyrs, deeply affecting the course 
 of human civilization. The wars of the Reforma- 
 tion open a new era of free development of 
 modern European civilization. The English, Ameri- 
 can, and French revolutions have released new supplies 
 of energies and have opened a new arena for the free 
 development of political, social, and industrial forces. 
 In our own times we meet with the example of the 
 Japanese, who, under the strain of great national dan- 
 ger, have released a reserve energy unsuspected in races 
 of the Mongolian stock. 
 
 Reserve energy becomes manifested under the influ- 
 ence of radical changes in the environment, just as we 
 have found that psycho-physiological systems react and 
 start into function under the influence of special condi- 
 tions and special appropriate qualitative stimuli. In 
 the study of functional nervous and mental diseases, in 
 the study of neurasthenia, or psychasthenia, hysteria, 
 and insistent or recurrent mental states, one becomes 
 more and more impressed with the fact that beyond the 
 psycho-physiological limits of energy, available for the 
 habitual adjustments to the ordinary external condi- 
 tions of life, there is a vast store of reserve energy 
 whose depths one cannot gauge. 
 
 A us dem Kelche dieses Geisterreiches 
 Schaumt ihm seine Unendlichkeit. 
 
PART II 
 THE THEORY OF 
 
 THE MOMENT CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 THE MOMENT CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 WE must try to realize the precise meaning 
 of the "moment consciousness," as a clear 
 comprehension of it is of the utmost im- 
 portance to psychology in general and to 
 psychopathology in particular. 
 
 In a former work I pointed out that "consciousness 
 is not uniform, that of the infant differs from that of 
 the adult; the consciousness of the brute differs from 
 that of the man, and still they all belong to the genus 
 consciousness." I also insisted on the fact that there 
 is a confusion in the use of the term "consciousness," a 
 confusion which almost amounts to what I may term 
 as "the psychologist's fallacy." The fully developed type 
 of consciousness characteristic of the adult human mind, 
 namely, self-consciousness, is substituted for the lower 
 forms, or for types of consciousness characteristic of the 
 lower animals. The psychologist, and, especially the 
 physiologist, when writing on psychological matters is 
 apt, to substitute, either on account of the introspective 
 method used or on account of lack of discrimination, the 
 type of consciousness of the observer, namely, self-con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 No biologist, not even Loeb, will accept unrestrictedly 
 the Cartesian view that consciousness, or the soul, or 
 mind is the privilege of man alone, while all other ani- 
 mals have no soul, no mind, no consciousness, they are 
 complex reflex mechanisms, highly developed automata 
 
 229 
 
230 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 with no psychic life to them. We must allow the fact 
 that other animals low r er than man in the rungs of devel- 
 opment possess some form of psychic life. The horse, 
 the dog, the cat, the cow, the ant, the bee, and other 
 animals have some form, however varied, of psycho- 
 physiological activity, some form of mental life, how- 
 ever different in type from that of man. Abnormal psy- 
 chology discloses to us dissolving views of human con- 
 sciousness, such as found in the various forms of insan- 
 ity and in the various manifestations of psychopathic 
 states, presenting conditions of all stages of dissocia- 
 tion and disaggregation of consciousness. Psychic life 
 is by no means uniform, there are many types of con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 We have pointed out above that synthetic unity is 
 the essence of consciousness. Consciousness is not an 
 association of independently existing ideas, images, feel- 
 ings, and sensations. Mental events must form a unity, 
 a synthesis in the total psychic life of some psycho-biolog- 
 ical organization. Disconnected words of a sentence 
 thought by a series of thinkers do not give rise to that 
 unified mental process which goes to form the psychic 
 experience of the meaning of the sentence. The words 
 must be cognized by the consciousness of one psycho- 
 biological organism. Ideas, images, feelings, emotions, 
 volitions do not meet on independent ground, associ- 
 ate, fuse and go to to form a unity, a new idea or feel- 
 ing. Experiences in different minds do not combine 
 and associate to form a new synthesis. Even the as- 
 sociationist tacitly implies that the various associations 
 of ideas and feelings take place in some one mind. 
 
 In order to get some form of cognizance or some 
 form of experience of sensations and ideas there must 
 
The Moment Consciousness 231 
 
 be some one organic consciousness that experiences or 
 lives through the psychic events. Thoughts, feelings, 
 ideas, images, and sensations are occurrences in some 
 one psychic individuality, a psycho-biological or psycho- 
 physiological organism, an organism which possesses 
 the living synthetic unity of consciousness. From a 
 purely psychological standpoint we may term this living 
 organic unity of consciousness — a subject. I use the 
 term "moment-consciousness," or simply "moment" to 
 indicate this synthetic unity of consciousness which con- 
 stitutes the characteristic of the subject having the syn- 
 thesis of mental experiences. This holds true of all 
 psychic life, from the very lowest representative of men- 
 tal life to the very highest, such as the self-consciousness 
 of man. 
 
 The subject, or the unity of the psycho-physio- 
 logical individuality cannot be represented by a series, 
 whether temporal or spatial, as a series ceases to be a 
 unity, or a synthesis. For a series of independent events 
 remains a series, while the synthesis or unity of the 
 series is a superadded event. A series of psychic events 
 must exist in and for some psychic unity or individuality 
 which stands for the organic unity of consciousness, or 
 for the synthesis of consciousness, no matter what the 
 type of consciousness is, low or high, animal or human. 
 This synthetic unity of consciounsess, no longer a series, 
 is indicated by the term "moment" or "moment con- 
 sciousness." There are various types of moment con- 
 sciousness, according as there are various forms or types 
 of synthesis. 
 
 Psychic contents or states of consciousness are always 
 found in connection with some individuality. That piece 
 of bread lying yonder may awaken hundreds of mental 
 
232 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 states under different conditions and in various organi- 
 zations. My friend sitting by my side sees it, so do I, 
 and so does the child, so does the bird in the cage, so 
 does the dog, and so possibly does the fly flitting around 
 the table. The states awakened are no doubt different, 
 but they are of a psychic character none the less. My 
 friend and I may be conscious of the personal element 
 along with it. We may think it in the form of owner- 
 ship: "It is who thinks, who has the thought of 
 the bread ;" but this is only one of the many forms un- 
 der which the perception or thought of the bread may 
 appear. One thing, however, is essential to all the 
 states, different as they may be in their con- 
 tent, and that is the fact that they belong to some one 
 individuality which under certain special conditions may 
 also be of the nature of a personality. The individuality 
 may be of a high or of a very low type, it may be that 
 of a man or it may be that of a fly, but it must be some 
 one conscious being that synthetizes the psychic state. It 
 is this one synthetizing consciousness that constitutes the 
 essence of what we term "moment consciousness." 
 
 The moment consciousness is the subject, the psycho- 
 biological individuality, requisite in all psychic activ- 
 ity. The psychic individuality cannot be regarded as a 
 series of independent physical events. For it may be 
 asked, for whom does that series exist and to whom is it 
 presented? A synthetizing moment consciousness, both 
 subject and content, is a fundamental assumption of 
 psychology, just as space is that of geometry, and mat- 
 ter and force that of physics and chemistry. This neces- 
 sity of assuming a synthetizing moment consciousness 
 becomes clearly manifested in the highest form of psy- 
 chic activity, such as self-consciousness. For if self- 
 
The Moment Consciousness 233 
 
 consciousness be reduced to a series, it may be per- 
 tinently asked with John Stuart Mill, "How can a series 
 be aware of itself as a series?" 
 
 A moment consciousness must not be considered 
 as something apart from its content; it does not exist 
 by itself: it exists wherever and whenever psychic states 
 are synthetized; it is the synthetized psychic material; 
 mere synthesis without material is meaningless. On the 
 whole, we may say that the moment consciousness is like 
 an organism, it forms a whole of many constituent parts. 
 
 In the moment consciousness we find psychic material 
 synthetized round one inmost central event which in its 
 turn may have a central point. It reminds one strongly 
 of the cell ; although it branches out in all directions, it 
 has always its inmost central point, its nucleus, nucleolus, 
 and nucleolinus. While I am sitting here writing, I 
 take in the many impressions coming to me : The sun- 
 shine pouring through the window, the table, the tick- 
 ing of the clock, the chair, the bookcase, and many 
 other things in the room ; all of them are formed and 
 synthetized into one, and as such they form a moment 
 consciousness. 
 
 They are not, however, indifferently grouped; 
 their unity is an organized whole with a cen- 
 ter, with a vital point, so to say. At the heart of the 
 synthetized whole there is a central point, the grouping 
 around which constitutes the individuality of the partic- 
 ular moment consciousness. In my own case, the cen- 
 tral interesting point is the paper on which I write the 
 sentence just formulated, and is the inmost point, the 
 principal idea under discussion which forms the nucleo- 
 linus, so to say, of the whole moment consciousness. The 
 most interesting or the most important experience forms 
 
234 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 the center of the moment. 
 
 The same object which seemingly gives the same ex- 
 perience assumes different meanings and is therefore 
 really quite a different experience, according to the 
 moment consciousness in which the perception or knowl- 
 edge of that object is synthetized. These presently ex- 
 perienced states, synthetized within the moment, form 
 the matter, or what we may term the content of the mo- 
 ment consciousness. The moment of consciousness will 
 change with the changes of the synthetized content. As 
 an official, I am now in my office doing my work, and 
 the different experiences form one whole, an association 
 of experiences, systematized and synthetized into an 
 organic unity. As a family man, I am at home enjoy- 
 ing the company of my wife, children, and friends, and 
 once more the experiences are organized into the unity 
 of a moment consciousness. Now I am climbing moun- 
 tains and stand on the slippery edge of a precipice, now 
 I enjoy a conversation with the child I love, now I 
 take part in the excitement of the political arena, now I 
 sit on the bench of the jury listening gravely to the cross- 
 examination of witnesses in a murder case; all these 
 are nuclei for the formation of different moments. All 
 of these depend on the different central experiences that 
 form the kernel for the moment consciousness. 
 
 The central experience, round which all other 
 experiences are grouped and synthetized, forms, so 
 to say, the very essence of the given moment con- 
 sciousness, and as long as this central experience remains 
 unchanged in its position the new experiences are 
 assimilated within the same moment consciousness. 
 The moment consciousness, therefore, does not vary 
 with the change of the content, if only the assimilating 
 
The Moment Consciousness 235 
 
 nucleus remains invariable. Should, however, the con- 
 tent vary so that the central experience is transposed and 
 some other one occupies its place, then the moment 
 consciousness itself is changed. In fact, we may have 
 the content of the moment consciousness entirely un- 
 changed; but if the central experience alone is displaced 
 from its position, then the moment consciousness itself 
 becomes changed in its nature. Thus, if as a traveller 
 I climb the mountains chiefly for the sake of pleasure, 
 and keep the scientific and aesthetic aspects in the back- 
 ground, the moment consciousness will be entirely dif- 
 ferent from the one where the scientific or aesthetic as- 
 pects are in the foreground, and all other considerations 
 in the background. The moment consciousness, we may 
 say, is entirely determined by the leading central ex- 
 perience. 
 
 The content of the moment consciousness, however, 
 is not confined to the presently experienced psychic states 
 only; it embraces the past, it includes memory, that 
 is, it synthetizes outlived moments. In my present ca- 
 pacity of physician and working in the office, I may also 
 include the experiences as traveller, as juror, as teacher, 
 as companion, and as lover, but still the tone of this par- 
 ticular moment consciousness is given by the duties 
 )f my present occupation. The most vivid, inter- 
 esting, and leading experiences form in this synthesis 
 the nucleus round which all other experiences are crys- 
 tallized and synthetized into one organic whole. We 
 have here a series of moments, all of them being coor- 
 dinated and contained in one synthesis of one moment 
 consciousness. 
 
 The members of this synthetized series are not 
 of equal value nor are they qualitatively the same. 
 
236 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 The leading experience that constitutes the as- 
 similating element of the given moment has reality, in- 
 terest, and value, while others are only so much mater- 
 ial support for the principal central experience. This cen- 
 tral experience differs also from the other experiences 
 synthetized in the moment consciousness by the fact that 
 it alone, that is, the nucleus only, has the most vivid 
 psychic states, sensational and perceptual elements, 
 while the others may totally lack them. Other subsidu- 
 ary synthetized moments are rather of an ideational 
 character; they are what is called "reproductions," ideal 
 representatives of formerly experienced, outlived mo- 
 ments. 
 
 The moment consciousness may contain moments that 
 happened to emerge by the dynamic process of associa- 
 tion, such as contiguity, similarity, or contrast. Each 
 moment consciousness may become content for the next. 
 Each successive moment consciousness may synthetize 
 the preceding ones, contain them in an abridged idea- 
 tional form, and may, moreover, recognize and claim 
 them as belonging to- itself, and as being one with them. 
 There may, in short, be various forms of mental unifi- 
 cation, but one thing stands out clear and that is the 
 nature of the moment consciousness. The essence of 
 the moment consciousness is mental synthesis. 
 
 If we take a cross section of the moment conscious- 
 ness, and try to fixate it with our mental eye, we find a 
 central psychic element round which other psychic ele- 
 ments are crystallized. This central psychic element is 
 prominent, vivid, forms, so to say, the vital point of 
 all the states and gives the tone to the rest, forming a 
 whole, one organized experience. The psychic matter 
 that surrounds the luminous central point does not stand 
 
The Moment Consciousness 237 
 
 in a free, more or less disconnected relation to the lat- 
 ter, it is intimately related to the centre, and cannot be 
 separated without destroying the moment as a whole 
 and even the life existence of each particular constituent. 
 The whole moment seems to form an organic network 
 in which the other elements take their place, according 
 to a plan. 
 
 The structure of the moment may in this respect 
 be compared to that of the cell. In the cell we 
 discriminate the nucleus round which the protoplasm 
 is grouped. The protoplasm is connected with the 
 nucleus by a network, a cytoreticulum. The destruction 
 of the nucleus affects the protoplasm and the destruc- 
 tion of the protoplasm affects the nucleus. The two 
 are intimately, organically interrelated by the common 
 network, the general plan of their organization. 
 
 A concrete example will perhaps best answer our pur- 
 pose. Suppose the moment is perceptual and consists 
 only of one percept. Now in the percept we find a cen- 
 tral sensory element surrounded by other elements. This 
 central element stands out prominently in the given 
 psychic state, while the other elements are subordinate. 
 Not that those elements are unimportant for the percept, 
 on the contrary they are of the highest consequence and 
 moment, they only lie outside the focus of the psychosis. 
 Along with the focus those elements form one organ- 
 ized whole. The intensity of the psychic state pro- 
 ceeds from the periphery to the centre. The elements 
 can as little be separated from the central element as 
 the area of the circle from its centre. By removing the 
 centre the circle will be destroyed and the centre will 
 cease to be what it is. All the elements of the percept 
 form one texture having the central sensory element as 
 
238 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 its nucleus. 
 
 Integrated as all those elements are they are not, how- 
 ever, of equal value and importance for the life exist- 
 ence of the whole. The central sensory element is of 
 the utmost consequence, it is the vital point of the whole 
 experience. While the change or destruction of one or 
 some of the subordinate elements may still leave the 
 total moment unchanged, or but slightly modified, a 
 change of the central sensory element or of the nucleus 
 will profoundly modify all the other elements and their 
 interrelation; and a destruction of the nucleus will des- 
 troy the total moment. Like their neuron counter- 
 parts, the moments may be regarded as being organized 
 into groups, systems, communities and constellations, 
 aggregates of greater and greater complexity. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 TYPES OF MOMENTS AND MOMENT-THRESHOLD 
 
 WE may discriminate the following types of 
 moment-consciousness : 
 I. The Desultory Moment, 
 (a) The Absolute, 
 (b) The Relative, or Reflex Moment. 
 
 II. The Synthetic Moment. 
 
 (a) The Simple Accumulative, 
 
 (b) The Compound Accumulative. 
 
 III. The Recognitive Moment. 
 
 (a) The Synthetic, or Generic Recognitive, 
 
 (b) The Specific, the Reflective, or the Synthet- 
 
 ic Moment of Self-consciousness. 
 The chief characteristic of the desultory moment is 
 the lack of interconnection of the links of the psychic 
 series. Each pulse of psychosis stands out as an isolated 
 fact without "before" and "after." A moment of such 
 a character has no reproduction, no recognition, no 
 memory, and certainly no personality. The lower stages 
 of this moment, the absolute desultory moment-con- 
 sciousness are mere moment-content devoid of all or- 
 ganization and substance. The higher forms of the des- 
 ultory moment, those of the reflex moment-conscious- 
 ness, have an elementary organization, but of such a 
 fixed character that the series of manifestations, or of 
 functioning remain completely isolated. Reproductions 
 appear here for the first time in an elementary form, 
 inasmuch as the recurrences of the moment leave the 
 
 239 
 
240 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 latter unmodified; it is reproduction only on ac- 
 count of the modifications produced in a higher 
 observing moment. 
 
 This moment has the germs of reproduction, but no 
 recognition and hence no memory, no self-con- 
 sciousness. The moment of the absolute desultory 
 type may possibly be found in unorganized proto- 
 plasm and in the lowest forms of the pro- 
 tozoa. The higher forms of moment of the desultory 
 type, the reflex moment, may be found in the lower 
 forms of lowly organized life and in the lower struc- 
 tures of the higher metazoa. 
 
 The moment-consciousness of the synthetic type has 
 its series of links interconnected. In each link the pre- 
 ceding ones are synthetized. The recurrence of this 
 type of moment, unlike the moment of relative desultory 
 consciousness, is embodied in the structure and func- 
 tion of the moment. It is in this type of moment that 
 reproduction is for the first time cleaj ly and fully man- 
 ifested. The moment is modified with each reproduc- 
 tion; it accumulates more content with each recurrence 
 and, as such, the synthetic moment may also be char- 
 acterized as accumulative. 
 
 This type of moment has reproduction, and the re- 
 production is not only for the external observer, but is 
 present and inherent through changes in the organiza- 
 tion, structure and function of the moment itself. Mem- 
 ory first appears in this type, but it is rather organic, not 
 recognitive in nature. 
 
 The more elementary form of this type of moment 
 shows accumulations only along single lines of develop- 
 ment. The lines remain disconnected. Sensory nuclei 
 surrounded by secondary sensory elements do not 
 
Types of Moments and Moment-Threshold 241 
 
 occur, and perceptual psychosis characteristic of the 
 higher forms is absent in this stage of the synthetic mo- 
 ment, which is therefore termed the simple accumu- 
 lative moment of synthetic consciousness. It is only in 
 the higher forms of synthetic consciousness, in the com- 
 pound synthetic moment that perceptual life may 
 be said to arise. 
 
 In the compound synthetic moment, series along di- 
 verse lines become severally compounded and sensory 
 nuclei with secondary sensory elements make their 
 appearance. But even here recognition is not pres- 
 ent and hence memory may from a subjective 
 standpoint be regarded as absent. The synthetic 
 moment even in its highest phase of development 
 lacks ideational life and is entirely devoid of self-con- 
 sciousness. The higher invertebrates and the lower 
 vertebrates probably do not rise in their psychological 
 development above the higher form of synthetic con- 
 sciousness, the compound synthetic moment. 
 
 In the recognitive moment the series of reproductions 
 are intimately connected as we find the case to be in the 
 synthetic moment. The moment becomes modified with 
 each occurring reproduction, containing in an abridged 
 form the history of previous modifications. The 
 mode of reproduction of the recognitive moment, how- 
 ever, differs widely from that of the synthetic mo- 
 ment. The content of the previous occurrence need not 
 be actually reproduced, but only represented and any 
 psychic element may fulfill this function of representa- 
 tion. It is through such representation that the repro- 
 duction of this type of moment is effected. Through 
 representation the moment reproduces form and content, 
 and cognizes over again immediately what it has just 
 
242 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 experienced, in short, it re-cognizes. 
 
 Recognition is the function of representation and is 
 the essential characteristic of this type of moment-con- 
 sciousness. Ideational psychosis germinates and devel- 
 ops with the growth of the recognitive moment. For 
 the very function of the idea is the cognition over again 
 of what has been cognized in perception, in short, rec- 
 ognition is the essence of the idea. 
 
 In generic recognition the time element is absent or 
 but vaguely present. In perceiving the table yonder 
 we also recognize it as table by classing the percept ta- 
 ble with representations derived from previously per- 
 ceived tables, but hardly does any time-element enter 
 into this form of recognition, the idea of having gen- 
 eric recognition does not refer to any percept experi- 
 enced at some definite point of time. The recognitive 
 moment uses the idea as a means to reproduce its form- 
 er experience without actually living them over again. 
 The representation in the lower form of moment is so 
 bound up with the percept that the function of recog- 
 nition is but implicit, and becomes explicit in the higher 
 forms, when the ideational or representative elements 
 become completely free and appear in mental trains, or 
 in series of associated ideas. 
 
 In its specific form, however, the recognitive moment 
 also includes the time element. The moment-content 
 or object generically recognized is classed or combined 
 with a definite representation generically referring to 
 perceptual experience; specifically recognized, the con- 
 tent or object is placed in a definite point of the objec- 
 tive schema of the flowing time series. The 
 particular rose thought of now is the particular rose 
 seen before, say yesterday. The idea of the rose 
 
Types of Moments and Moment-Threshold 243 
 
 substitutes and represents the percept and has the 
 function of the percept as reproduced, thus referring to 
 the same object. That is why the qualitatively different 
 representation is identified with the actual perception. 
 What is common to the two is their reference to the 
 same object, in all else they really differ widely. The 
 recognitive moment that lacks the time-element is termed 
 generic, while the moment that has time element in- 
 cluded in the process of its recognition is termed spe- 
 cific recognitive moment-consciousness. 
 
 In the lower and simpler stages of the recognitive 
 moment the generic form predominates, in the higher 
 and more complex stages the specific form of recogni- 
 tion arises and attains its full development. From a 
 biological standpoint one can understand the import- 
 ance and immense advantage in the struggle for ex- 
 istence of those organisms whose moment-consciousness 
 has varied in the direction of representation and has 
 begun to reproduce after the mode of the recognitive 
 type. To effect a modification and new adaptation to 
 changes in the environment the moments of the desul- 
 tory type have no other mode of modification but by the 
 slowly working factors of spontaneous variations and 
 natural selection, a process of adaptation and useful 
 modification prolonged throughout the course of gener- 
 ations. The adaptations of the different forms of the 
 synthetic type are greatly facilitated, and the course of 
 the process is so much foreshortened that it becomes re- 
 duced to the life-existence of the given individual or- 
 ganisms. The adaptations are brought about by the 
 slow process of chance success and error, and the whole 
 series of modifications must be fully and directly under- 
 gone by the organism. 
 
244 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 The recognitive moments have reduced the time- 
 elements of adaptations to changes of conditions 
 in the external environment almost to a minimum, 
 the series of reactions in the growth to most per- 
 fect adaptations is effected in representation, saving 
 itself the necessity of actually undergoing a series of 
 intervening modifications. Representative elements, be- 
 ing free, can enter into different modes of combinations, 
 and thus form adjustments and adaptations with an ease 
 of which the primary and secondary sensory elements of 
 the lower moments do not admit. This freedom of 
 movement in the formation of new representative com- 
 binations is an important factor in organic life, as it 
 gives the organism that possesses this variation an ad- 
 vantage in the struggle for existence. Adaptation can 
 be made for the future from the experiences of the past. 
 
 In those forms of the recognitive moment in which 
 the time-element plays a part in the determination of the 
 whole there is always present a specific time-localization 
 of the given psychic or moment content. Where the 
 form of recognition is specific the representation or idea 
 is regarded as actual and localized in some definite point 
 in the stream of past time, where the recognition is gen- 
 eric the representation or idea is referred to no definite 
 point in the stream of objective time, and when present 
 in the highest types of moments, is regarded as belong- 
 ing to what is termed imagination. Recognition de- 
 termines the place of the given experience in the series 
 of events. 
 
 In the lower stages of the recognitive moment no time 
 element is present, in the higher stages some vague ref- 
 erence to time may be present in the forms of specific 
 recognition, but definite localization appears only with 
 
Types of Moments and Moment-Threshold 245 
 
 the rise of the recognitive moment of self-consciousness. 
 With the appearance of the conceptual schema of objec- 
 tive time the specific form of recognition refers not only 
 to a definite point on the scale of objective time, but to a 
 definite mental synthesis localized on that objective time- 
 schema ; in other words, the self-concept is involved in 
 specific recognition, which therefore belongs to the high- 
 est form of the recognitive moment, namely, the mo- 
 ment of self-consciousness or of personality. 
 
 In specific recognition the present self projects 
 the bit of representative experience into the past 
 self which is felt to be identical with the former in the 
 series of selves to which the reproduction of the 
 moment gives rise. The highest recognitive mo- 
 ment, or moment of self-consciousness may be rep- 
 resented as a series of selves projected in the time 
 schema the preceding selves being synthetized by each 
 succeeding self. From this standpoint we may regard 
 such a moment as synthetic and term it the synthetic 
 moment of self-consciousness. 
 
 Should this series of reproductions constituting the 
 history of the moment become dissociated and isolated 
 through mental degradation and degeneration, then the 
 form of consciousness becomes analogous to the desul- 
 tory consciousness and may therefore be termed the 
 desultory moment of self -consciousness. 
 
 The functioning moments of a highly organized 
 psychic being, at any point of time, present a hierarchy 
 of moments differing not only in degree of con- 
 sciousness, but also in the type of structure and 
 function. Moments-consciousness from the lowest 
 to the highest, from the simplest to the most com- 
 plex, from the desultory type to the recognitive type 
 
246 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 of self-consciousness all are present in the adult stage of 
 the most highly organized psychic life. Now in the 
 series of moments going to form such a highly complex 
 being, those that are of the recognitive type can become 
 focal, while those that belong to the lower types can 
 never enter the focus. The lower types of moment- 
 consciousness, belonging to the groups and systems of 
 reflex and instinctive activity, cannot, from their very 
 nature, reach that level of consciousness and that degree 
 of psychosis as to become qualified to enter into the 
 focus of the moment of self-consciousness. 
 
 From this standpoint, then, the subconscious may be 
 divided into two regions, the one including all the mo- 
 ments belonging to that of the recognitive type, the oth- 
 er comprising all the moments belonging to the lower 
 types. Within the subconscious, then, there is a thres- 
 hold which the lower types of moments cannot pass. 
 This threshold may be termed the threshold of recogni- 
 tive consciousness. 
 
 The moments lying above the threshold of recogni- 
 tive consciousness may change in psychic intensity, may 
 pass through all degrees of sensory intensity and repre- 
 sentative vividness ranging from minimum to maximum ; 
 they may sink and rise gradually or suddenly, but they 
 do not and cannot fall, without becoming degenerated, 
 below the recognitive threshold. Those moments that lie 
 below the recognitive threshold cannot rise above it, they 
 are condemned to remain in the obscure regions of the 
 subconscious ; their fate is never to enter the strong light 
 of the upper world of consciousness. At the same time 
 their psychic intensity does not suffer any change, they 
 do not shift forwards and backwards in the field of con- 
 sciousness like the moments of the recognitive type ly- 
 
Types of Moments and Moment-Threshold 247 
 
 ing above the threshold, they remain unalterable, they 
 are fixed. 
 
 In a certain sense the moments lying below the thresh- 
 old of recognitive consciousness may be considered as 
 dissociated from the upper regions, inasmuch as they 
 lie outside the field of the upper consciousness. From 
 the standpoint of activity, however, they stand in inti- 
 mate relation to the upper level of consciousness. The 
 highly organized moment uses the lower ones as instru- 
 ments to carry out its purpose, and through them it also 
 enters into relation with the external environment. 
 Stimuli are received by the lower moments, and motor 
 responses are once more given by these moments. In 
 other words, the lower types of moments are in service 
 of the higher moments. 
 
 From a teleological standpoint one can understand 
 the importance of it for the life-existence of the individ- 
 ual. In order to save time and energy any activity that 
 can be carried out by the lower aggregates is directly 
 responded to by the less complex and more fixed mo- 
 ments. The lowermost moments are the easiest to 
 gain access to by the external stimuli, and in case the 
 adaptation is simple the response immediately follows 
 without any reference to higher aggregates. Should, 
 however, the stimulus be under conditions where more 
 complex adaptations are requisite then the next higher 
 aggregate is set into activity. The ascending degree 
 of complexity of aggregates set into activity grows in ac- 
 cordance with the need of complexity of adaptation, un- 
 til the most complex of all aggregates is reached, the 
 one representing the complete organization of sensori- 
 motor adaptations of the organism as a whole. 
 
 At the same time it must be pointed out that there 
 
248 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 is a series of moments almost independent of this organ- 
 ized hierarchy of moments, never falling under the 
 sway, or but indirectly and casually being affected by the 
 principal complex moment-consciousness; such are the 
 moments that go along with functions, directly subservi- 
 ent to the internal needs of the organism. This complex 
 aggregate of moments from its very nature is withdrawn 
 from the general control of the other aggregates, inas- 
 much as it need not adapt itself to the varying condi- 
 tions and different stimulations of the external environ- 
 ment. The set of stimuli this aggregate responds to 
 remains almost unchanged, hence their activity is of a 
 low order, belonging to the character of the reflex mo- 
 ments. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 MODIFICATIONS OF MOMENTS IN THE ORGANIZED 
 AGGREGATE 
 
 IN pointing out the parallel in the series of mo- 
 ments as they appear in ontogenesis and phylo- 
 genesis, we must make some restrictions. The 
 series of the subordinate-moments in the organiza- 
 tion of a highly evolved and complex moment may be 
 homologous to the phylogenetic series, but still the 
 two greatly differ in character. Each moment in the 
 series subordinate to the principal moment is greatly 
 modified in its activity and, as such, differs in nature 
 from the moment of the corresponding stage in the phy- 
 logenetic series. A complicated act after a series of rep- 
 etitions sinks into the subconscious, becomes degraded 
 in character and falls to the level of the so-called "sec- 
 ondary automatic" acts. This does not mean that in the 
 phylogenetic or even in the ontogenetic evolution the 
 moment occupying a parallel stage is of a secondary au- 
 tomatic character, as it appears in the moment of higher 
 organization. 
 
 When the sensori-motor series going to con- 
 stitute the secondary automatic act becomes well or- 
 ganized, the links in the series fall to a minimum of psy- 
 chic intensity, but the moment consciousness occupying a 
 corresponding position in the scale of evolution has a 
 higher psychic intensity than the one characteristic of 
 the secondary automatic stage! The psychosis of a dog, 
 horse, mouse, rabbit is hardly of the same order of 
 
 249 
 
250 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 intensity characteristic, for instance, of the act with 
 which one buttons his coat, opens his door, walks in the 
 street, or simply maintains his equilibrium. The con- 
 sciousness of the dog, rabbit or mouse may be and surely 
 is of a lower order than that of a man, but its intensity 
 is not necessarily of the same level with the automatic 
 activity of man. 
 
 The greater differentiation of elements in the highly 
 constituted being is also their greater simplification. The 
 lower a moment is in the scale of a highly organized 
 being, the more differentiated it is, and the more simpli- 
 fied is its function in the organic whole. Quite different 
 is it in the case of the lower type of moment in the phylo- 
 genetic series, there the differentiation has not proceeded 
 far, and although it may be low in type and structure, 
 the very lack of differentiation of function makes that 
 lowly moment more complex as to function. A low 
 moment of a high type of organization is lower than a 
 high moment in a lower type of organization. A mo- 
 ment occupying a low stage in a statically established 
 hierarchy is really lower than a corresponding stage in 
 either the phylogenetic or ontogenetic series. The high- 
 est moment-consciousness of a fish is homologous with 
 a very low moment in man, but the latter lacks the in- 
 tensity to which the former attains. 
 
 The moment by entering as a unit in an organized 
 hierarchy becomes degraded and loses much of its 
 psychic activity by becoming differentiated and con- 
 fined to one mode of reaction, though reaching its acme 
 of perfection in that direction. The number of func- 
 tions present, though in an imperfect, undeveloped, 
 sketchy way, in the representatives of the low type of 
 moment becomes narrowed down, even limited to one 
 
Moments in Organized Aggregate 251 
 
 function, highly developed and intensified in the lower 
 representatives of moments belonging to a hierarchy 
 organized on the plan of a higher type. 
 
 If a, b, c, d, e . . . etc., represent the functioning 
 modes of a low type of moment, then the total of func- 
 tioning modes of the moment may be represented by the 
 sum {a 1J rb 1J cc i -\-cl}+e l + . . . ), each function is in its 
 first degree, that is, it is present in a primitive undevel- 
 oped form. The low moment, however, forming a part 
 of a highly developed organic hierarchy, becomes highly 
 differentiated in the process of evolution of the whole 
 and is finally reduced to the exercise of one function 
 only, fully developed and intensified to its highest pitch. 
 The number of functions then present in a primitive 
 form in the moment of low type is in the course of evo- 
 lution gradually sundered into its units, each unit reach- 
 ing a high stage of perfection in the low moment be- 
 longing to a high type of moment hierarchy. 
 
 If a function in its primitive form is represented 
 by a quantity, then the same or analogous function 
 highly developed may be represented by the same 
 or similar quantity raised to (« th ) degree. Now 
 let a 1 stand for the primitive function, then a n will stand 
 for the fully developed function. The number of the 
 moment's functions is limited, but highly developed. 
 The moment's functioning activities may be represented 
 by the formula : a n +b u . The highest moment of 
 the low type has a richer and more variable content 
 than the lower moment belonging to the higher type. 
 This truth can be still further realized by having re- 
 course to the higher guiding moment-consciousness, the 
 lower moments are shown there to work with an almost 
 mechanical-like activity. Man, dog, or monkey with 
 
252 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 their spinal or medullary ganglia only fall lower than 
 a fully developed fish or a full grown lobster. 
 
 If we come to consider the moment of corresponding 
 stages in the ontogenetic and phylogenetic series, we 
 once more meet with resemblance, but at the same time 
 with one of fundamental difference. The moment of 
 high type that passes ontogenetically the stages of phylo- 
 genetic evolution does it in a general, and, so to say, 
 sketchy form, each stage of ontogenesis in reality funda- 
 mentally differing from that of the parallel stage in 
 phylogenesis. Just as the human embryo in the course 
 of its growth and passing the stages that re- 
 flect phylogenesis is not necessarily once a worm, then 
 a fish, then a bird, but only approaches these types in a 
 most general form, so also is it in the case of the moment 
 in the different stages of its growth; it approaches the 
 lower types of activity in a most general and sketchy 
 form. 
 
 The moment in phylogenesis is independent and is fully 
 developed, while the corresponding stage in ontogenesis 
 is but a stage in the growth of another and higher mo- 
 ment, and as such is certainly different in nature from 
 the phylogenetic moment. The embryo in the first 
 state, though provided with gills, is still not a fish and 
 could not live in water. The consciousness of the infant 
 in passing through stages running parallel to the lower 
 moments-consciousness does not temporarily become that 
 particular low moment-consciousness. It is simply a gen- 
 eral outline of the type of moment-consciousness that the 
 higher moment is passing or a stage in the course of its 
 ontogenetic development. 
 
 The infant in the growth of its psychic life 
 does not actually turn butterfly, fish, bird, monkey, 
 
Moments in Organized Aggregate 253 
 
 savage, he does not really pass those modes of psychic 
 states, but he passes through stages which in a general 
 outline remotely resemble the lower grades of animal 
 psychosis. All the stages are determined by the principal 
 type of moment-consciousness, and, in reality, are not a 
 series of low moments ending in a high type, but stages 
 of growth of one high type of moment-consciousness. 
 The stages through which the infant and child pass are 
 the evolution of man. The moments of the low form 
 
 develop on the type of a nJ rb n +c n + , while the 
 
 moments of the highest forms develop on the type of 
 (a+b+c+c+, . . . . ) n , a far more complex organization. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 MENTAL ORGANIZATION 
 
 MOMENTS of the same type form aggre- 
 gations in an ascending series of complex- 
 ity, groups, systems, communities, clusters, 
 constellations. Isolated moments are or- 
 ganized into groups, groups into systems, systems into 
 communities and communities into constellations. 
 Groups are the simplest, while constellations are the 
 highest and most complex of the aggregates. The firm- 
 ness, the stability of organization stands in direct rela- 
 tion to complexity, the more complex an aggregation the 
 less stable it is. 
 
 The order of complexity also represents the order 
 of development, so that the more complex is also 
 the latest to appear in the course of evolution. Evo- 
 lution and stability stand thus in inverse relation. What 
 appears early in the course of development is less firmly 
 organized than what appears later on. The whole ten- 
 dency of evolution is from stability to instability. The 
 order of growth and instability is in the ascending scale 
 — from groups, through systems, communities, to clus- 
 ters, and constellations. The simpler sensori-motor re- 
 actions are, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically, 
 the first to appear in the course of evolution and they are 
 also more stable than the more complex sensori-motor 
 reactions. We can possibly best realize the relation of 
 instability to complexity of structure, if we regard life, 
 including both physiological and psychic processes, as an 
 
 254 T 
 
Mental Organization 255 
 
 ascending organization of sensori-motor reactions to 
 the influences of the external environment. 
 
 The sensori-motor reactions represent a hierarchy of 
 organized aggregations beginning in the lowest re- 
 flexes and culminating in the highest activity. 
 
 An illustration of the lower reflexes may be taken, 
 such as the knee-jerk, the action of the bladder, persistal- 
 tic movements of the intestines, respiratory movements, 
 heart-beats, and other organic activities. Association 
 among these various reflexes may be taken as high- 
 er aggregates. The complex coordination of ori- 
 entation and space adjustment, such as the maintenance 
 of equilibrium, walking, running, jumping, flying, swim- 
 ming, etc., represent more complex activity. A still 
 higher aggregate is to be found in the association of 
 groups and systems of sensori-motor reactions within the 
 sphere of a sense-organ with the complex coordination 
 of motor adjustment of the whole body. The highest 
 aggregates are to be found in the association of all the 
 motor reactions organized within the different spheres 
 of sense-organs with the complex motor coordination of 
 body-adjustments. 
 
 Simple sensori-motor reflexes, complex reflexes, sen- 
 sori-motor coordinations, instinctive adaptations and in- 
 telligent adjustments, statically regarded, correspond to 
 the classification of psycho-motor aggregates into groups, 
 systems, communities, clusters, and constellations. In 
 other words, the study of the sensori-motor constitu- 
 tion of the higher organized beings in their adult stages, 
 reveals the presence and interrelation of moments. We 
 find that the history of the use and growth of 
 aggregates is in the order of their complexity. 
 In ontogenesis we find that the simple reflexes ap- 
 
256 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 pear first, then the association, the more complex 
 sensori-motor coordination, later on the so-called in- 
 stinctive adaptations begin to appear, while the intelli- 
 gent adaptations appear late in the course of develop- 
 ment. 
 
 The child at its birth is a purely reflex being; 
 the different reflexes are not even associated, it is the 
 medulla and the spinal cord that are principally active; 
 the pupils react to light, the legs and hands react to 
 more or less intense sensory stimuli, such as tickling, and 
 sensori-motor reflexes to taste-stimuli are present. All 
 of those reactions are isolated, incoordinated ; they are 
 so many simple groups of sensori-motor reflexes, even 
 the sucking activity of the infant is largely of the sen- 
 sori-motor reflex type; the child at its birth is a spinal 
 being, and its moment consciousness is desultory, con- 
 sisting of the desultory activities of isolated function- 
 ing sensori-motor groups. 
 
 Later on the reflex activity such as of the hands, 
 legs, eyes become associated through the develop- 
 ment of sight and kinaesthetic sensations; the eyes 
 can follow an object, the hands become adapted 
 to the seizing movements. Movements and body- 
 coordination then begin to appear, such as turn- 
 ing the body to right or left, then sitting up, then 
 creeping, standing, then walking, then talking, all 
 involving more and more coordination of muscles and 
 kinaesthetic sensations, aided by the association of sensa- 
 tions and sensori-motor reactions from different sense- 
 organs. It is late in its history of development that 
 the child begins to gain full control of its actions and 
 adjustment to the stimuli coming from the external en- 
 vironment. 
 
Mental Organization 257 
 
 The history of phylogenesis runs a parallel course. 
 The lower organisms are purely reflex in their sensori- 
 motor reactions, and as such, they belong to the type of 
 the desultory moment-consciousness, such for instance 
 as may be found in the lower form of the Mollusca 
 as the class Tunicata. In the higher forms of Mol- 
 lusca association of sensori-motor reflexes begins to 
 appear. These associations become more and more 
 complex with the rise and growth of differentiation of 
 sense-organs in the higher forms of Mollusca and the 
 lower Arthropodes, giving rise to groups, systems, com- 
 munities, reaching the cluster-stage, in the higher Arth- 
 ropodes and the lower Mammalia, finally culminating 
 in the complex functions characteristic of the constella- 
 tion-stage, such as found in the sensori-motor reactions 
 of man in his adaptation to physical and social surround- 
 ings. 
 
 Each highly organized moment represents a hier- 
 archy of many moments, but of lower types. The high- 
 est constellation has at its command lower types of psy- 
 chic aggregates, and had it not been for these lower 
 moments, the higher type would have lacked matter 
 and activity for carrying on its own work. 
 
 The lower forms of moments, however, are subordi- 
 nate to the higher type which constitutes the centre, the 
 nucleus of the total psychosis. The other constituent 
 moments, from the simplest to the most complex, are in 
 the service of the highest type of moments, though the 
 former lie outside the central focus of the principal con- 
 trolling moment-consciousness. These lower forms are by 
 no means to be ignored, since they form the main fac- 
 tors that determine indirectly the moment's activity; they 
 constitute the storehouse from which the central mo- 
 
258 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 ment draws its material. Without the lower moments 
 the principal, controlling moment could not have re- 
 ceived stimulations from the external environment, nor 
 would it have been enabled to make proper motor re- 
 sponses. In fact we may say that without the lower 
 forms of moments, the moment-nucleus would have lost 
 its vitality and even its meaning. 
 
 The perception of an object and the proper adjust- 
 ments to it depend not so much on what is directly pres- 
 ent in the focus of consciousness, but on the wealth 
 of accumulated material lying outside the moment focus. 
 In reading a book, for instance, the handling of it, the 
 motor adjustments in keeping it, the perception of the 
 letters, of the words, of the phrases lie outside the focus 
 of consciousness, and still it is this mass of perceptions 
 that forms the matter of the controlling moment. The 
 inventor in working on his particular invention has a 
 mass of accumulated material and experience indispen- 
 sable for the development of the invention, subconscious 
 material lying in the background of his consciousness. 
 Similarly the mathematician in solving his problem 
 which forms the focus of his consciousness possesses a 
 body of knowledge or a mass of material which, though 
 it lies on the margin of his consciousness, forms the main 
 stay of his particular investigation. 
 
 There is more in consciousness than is actually di- 
 rectly present in the focus of the moment. While I am 
 writing these last phrases my consciousness is occupied 
 with them alone, but they are supported by a body of 
 subconscious thought. All our perception is largely de- 
 termined by the results of our previous experience which 
 falls outside the central point of consciousness. Many 
 perceptual illusions find their explanation in habit. An 
 
Mental Organization 259 
 
 otherwise novel experience surrounds itself with famil- 
 iar experience which disguises the novelty and trans- 
 forms the percept by substituting what is otherwise fa- 
 miliar and habitual. 
 
 This mass of familiar experience is not present 
 in the focus of the moment-consciousness, it lies 
 outside the centre and is often submerged in re- 
 gard to the direct introspective scrutiny; it has, 
 however, a powerful influence on the activity of 
 the moment. The submerged moments, though lying 
 outside the direct group of the main focus, still exercise 
 a great influence on the course of the moment's growth 
 and development. The conscious controls the material 
 supplied by the subconscious, while the subconscious 
 by the quantity and quality of the mass of its material, 
 in its turn modifies and determines the course of con- 
 scious activity. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE GROWTH AND FUNCTION OF THE MOMENT 
 
 WE may turn now to the study of the mo- 
 ment's functions. This can be best investi- 
 gated in following up its history, in watch- 
 ing the growth and development of the 
 most elementary moment-consciousness. In its perceptual 
 stage the moment-consciousness may become modified in 
 its subordinate psychic elements only, indirectly reacting 
 on the nuclear sensory elements, giving a further determ- 
 ination of the total moment without changing its funda- 
 mental character. The moment may express then only 
 more distinctly the final aim to which it is striving. The 
 changes brought about in the moment are of such a 
 nature that the latter in its whole tendency becomes 
 adapted for reaction to the external environment, a re- 
 action for which it primarily maintains itself in being. 
 The moment as percept may have at first an inade- 
 quate content which brings about a reaction inadequate 
 for the purpose of the given psychic moment. The reac- 
 tion brings more content, both primary and secondary. 
 The new content enriches the moment and gives rise to a 
 modification resulting in a reaction which in its turn 
 further enriches the content, until a reaction results fully 
 adequate to the purpose of the moment. The moment 
 reaches for the time being its full maturity. To give a 
 concrete example. A small puff-fish is thrown into a 
 tank containing a hungry tautog. The tautog perceives 
 the puff-fish and comes up to seize it; the puff-fish be- 
 
 260 
 
The Growth and Function of the Moment 261 
 
 gins to swell. The sudden swelling of the little fish 
 frightens the tautog away. The tautog's reaction has 
 proved unsuccessful. Some modification is being pro- 
 duced in the tautog's state relating to the puff-fish yon- 
 der. Another reaction may then follow, a sudden 
 pounce and bite, the puff-fish swelling in the tautog's 
 mouth. The tautog's reaction is once more a fail- 
 ure, the puff fish is dropped, but considerably hurt. A 
 series of similar reactions with a series of similar mod- 
 ifications finally result in a totally different reaction. 
 The fish by a series of sudden pounces and bites succeeds 
 in debilitating the puff-fish, paralyzing its power of 
 swelling and finally devouring it. A series of such repe- 
 titions of experiences determine the general procedure of 
 the tautog to the puff-fish. The tendency to a series 
 of sensori-motor reactions may thus become organized. 
 
 The chick emerging from the egg sees an object, say 
 a caterpillar, and attacking the caterpillar misses it at 
 first. This procedure enriches the chick's psycho-motor 
 life and modifies its next reactions in relation to the cat- 
 erpillar, until the whole moment of pecking at edible 
 objects when presented to the eye consists of success- 
 ful reactions, as the result of their repetition, finally 
 ending in perfect organization. The infant in seeing 
 an object makes at first fruitless attempts at seizing it. 
 These futile attempts further determine his activity and 
 finally he reaches a state when the adaptation is complete. 
 The psycho-motor reaction becomes adequate to the 
 stimulus. 
 
 In all these cases there is no need that the growth and 
 improvement of adaptation should be brought by ex- 
 plicit processes of judgments and associations of free 
 ideas. The fish, the chick, the infant have no distinct 
 
262 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 consciousness of what sort of psychic process is going 
 on, nor do they deliberately after weighing the pros and 
 cons of their actions, finally decide on one which is 
 consciously to be rejected on trial and so on, at length 
 hitting on the right solution of the problem. Such 
 is not the state of their mind. To ascribe to them con- 
 scious thought, cunning, knowledge, is to ascribe modes 
 and forms of adult human consciousness to a lower stage 
 where all this is absent. Their psychic processes are far 
 simpler. The growth of the moment-consciousness in 
 the stage under consideration is altogether different in 
 nature from that of the adult stage. 
 
 In the moment-consciousness under consideration each 
 sensory response to a given stimulus along with its re- 
 sulting motor reaction brings about a modification of 
 the total moment. Each new modification brings the 
 moment nearer in its sensory and motor elements, 
 to a more perfect adaptation to the specific conditions 
 of the external environment; this modification is repro- 
 duced on the recurrence of the moment. 
 
 Let a be the moment and b, b x , b 2 , b 3 , the successive 
 modifications, then the modified moment at each stage 
 of its growth may be represented as follows: a, ab, abb X} 
 abb 1 b 2 ^ abbJ?.J? ? ,, etc. The reproduced successive mod- 
 ifications do not emerge singly. The reactions of the 
 moment do not occur in repetition of the order in which 
 they have primarily followed each other. In other 
 words, the reactions are not gone through in the order in 
 which they have taken place. The series is not literally 
 repeated. Each subsequent modification is super-imposed 
 on the previous ones and modifying them becomes 
 synthetized in a single complex reaction. The last suc- 
 cessful reaction is the only one that emerges in the oc- 
 
The Growth and Function of the Moment 263 
 
 currence of the particular stimulus under a given set 
 of conditions. 
 
 All the intermediate, unsuccessful reactions, al- 
 though they have gone to determine the last state 
 of the moment with its particular reactions and are 
 implicitly contained in it, gradually drop out, and only 
 the last forms of reaction occur. The last moment-con- 
 sciousness at each birth generated by a given stimulus un- 
 der appropriate conditions possesses in a vague outline 
 the history of its previous stages. Most of the stages 
 seem to drop out, only the ones that are indispensa- 
 ble remain. 
 
 The moment-consciousness in its growth and develop- 
 ment expands into a series of moments, each subsequent 
 moment being an expansion of the preceding one. In 
 this expanded series each succeeding moment is richer 
 in content than the one that has passed away, and is 
 more adapted to the original end for which the moment 
 as a whole subsists and maintains itself in the struggle 
 for life. The last moment is an epitome of the preceding 
 series, an epitome in which by adaptive selection many 
 links have dropped out, and in which the ones that sur- 
 vive appear not in their bare isolation, but in a synthesis 
 of organic unity. 
 
 In respect to synthesis the moment may be compared 
 to the percept in which the moment-elements are not in 
 a free state and cannot be separately reinstated. In the 
 moment as in the percept the elements are firmly bound 
 together, and in this bondage they are reproduced. In 
 the psychic moment itself the previous stages are not 
 discriminated, since the whole moment emerges as one 
 compound in which the elements are firmly held together 
 in a form of "mental-chemistry" by a process of cumu- 
 
264 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 lation, a process which, as we have pointed out, is es- 
 sentially different from the process of association of 
 ideas in which the ideal elements are free. 
 
 A moment-consciousness lacking free elements in its 
 constituents cannot know its own history; in other 
 words, it cannot recognize the identity or similarity of its 
 elements with the ones that have been present in a pre- 
 vious state. The recognitive element is entirely wanting 
 in such a type of moment-consciousness. A moment- 
 consciousness of such a nature may be termed reproduc- 
 tive. A reproductive moment-consciousness reproduces 
 its contents, hut lacks the element of recognition. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE RELATION OF THE MOMENT TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
 IF we inspect closely the reproductive moment- 
 consciousness, we can discover in it definite traits 
 specially characteristic of it. From the very char- 
 acter of its organization the moment-consciousness 
 is of such a nature as to be accessible to and at the same 
 time affected by definite stimuli of the external environ- 
 ment. The moment-consciousness itself is formed 
 through the influence of stimuli coming from its en- 
 vironment. The psychic states that go to make up the 
 nucleus-content of the moment-consciousness are pri- 
 marily sensory in character, due entirely to incoming 
 stimulations proceeding from some external source. This 
 is fundamentally true not only of the lowest and simplest, 
 but also of the highest psychic moment. The infinite 
 wealth of our experiences is of an incoming character 
 derived entirely from stimulations coming from the 
 periphery, or from the outside world. Even where the 
 moment is ideal in character it is still originally derived 
 from sensation. 
 
 The nature and primary function of the moment 
 is to be sensitive to stimuli. The origin of the mo- 
 ment takes its rise in sensory responsiveness, and its 
 growth is due to the formation of successive layers of 
 sensory elements. The sensory characteristic is still 
 further brought out in the fact of adaptation and pos- 
 sibility of further modification of the moment. Psychic 
 modification under the influence of external stimuli 
 clearly demonstrates the important characteristics of 
 
 265 
 
266 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 sensitivity. We may say that sensitivity, meaning by 
 it psychic processes aroused by stimuli, is a fundamental 
 character of the moment-consciousness, however ele- 
 mentary. 
 
 The moment-consciousness is not only sensory, but 
 also motor in character. The whole purpose of the mo- 
 ment's being is adaptation to external conditions. These 
 adaptations, however, are brought about not by the mere 
 sensitivity, but by motor reactions. If the moment shows 
 sensitivity towards the play of definite external stimuli, 
 it shows itself still more ready to give vent to its activity 
 in definite sets of motor reactions. In fact we may say 
 that primarily sensitivity is readiness for reaction. The 
 stimulus that irritates the naked protoplasm of the 
 amoeba results in movement of its pseudopodium. The 
 irritation of the nerve endings of the ascidian or of the 
 medusa results in the contractions of the muscular coat. 
 In the more highly organized animals the excitation of 
 the peripheral sense-organ results in contraction and re- 
 laxation of muscles or secretions of glands. 
 
 This is clearly manifested in the life-phenomena of 
 invertebrates and lower vertebrates. The fly, the 
 bee, the ant, the butterfly, the fish, the frog react 
 immediately as soon as they are acted upon by 
 influences of their external medium. In this respect 
 they almost resemble highly complicated mechanisms 
 that manifest definite sets of movements when acted 
 on different parts of structure. Especially is this mani- 
 fested in the lower centres. 
 
 The fly, the ant, the bee, the butterfly, without their 
 higher central ganglia are pure automata. Thus if the 
 fly is deprived of its frontal ganglia, or head, it remains 
 quiet as if dead, until it is stimulated, when a motor 
 reaction immediately follows. If such a "headless" fly 
 
Relation of the Moment to the Environment 267 
 
 is turned on its back, it rights itself, or flies some dis- 
 tance, alighting on its legs, and again remaining in the 
 same state until a new stimulus brings it out of its tor- 
 por. If the thorax is stimulated, the front legs pass 
 through the wiping movement. If the delicate hair on 
 the lower part of the abdomen are irritated, the hind 
 legs react. If the side hair are stimulated, the side legs 
 respond, and so on. In short, the stimulus is followed 
 by immediate reaction of the stimulated organ. 
 
 With the central ganglion present, the fly differs but 
 little as a reactive being, only the reactions are more 
 complicated, more co-ordinate, more adaptive; they do 
 not occur in a uniform and automatic fashion in the di- 
 rectly stimulated organ, but in some other organs dis- 
 tant from the stimulus directly applied and in a series of 
 co-ordinate movements, responding to the stimulus in a 
 form advantageous to its needs, or preservative of its 
 life. 
 
 In the frog we meet once more with the same state of 
 things. Without its brain the frog is an auto- 
 maton responding to external stimuli immediately with 
 some simple set of movements. With its brain present 
 the response differs only in the fact that it is more com- 
 plex and more adaptive. The same holds true in the 
 case of the higher vertebrates, in the bird, in the rabbit, 
 in the dog, in the monkey, and also in man. When de- 
 prived of the brain they are automata immediately re- 
 sponding to stimuli with simple movements of but little 
 adaptation. With their brain in full and healthy func- 
 tion they are, biologically regarded, highly organized 
 beings responding to external stimulations with com- 
 plex movements of more or less perfect adaptation. 
 
 Should we like further illustration and evidence we can 
 
268 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 find it not only in phylogenesis, but also in ontogenesis. 
 Young animals react to any passing stimulus; their life 
 is full of movement and activity. The movements are 
 not adaptive to the special conditions of the environ- 
 ment; in fact these reactions may often be of such a na- 
 ture as to hurt and even endanger the life of the young 
 animal. External stimuli simply liberate pent-up en- 
 ergy in centres which are but little co-ordinated. In 
 this respect of lack of co-ordination and adaptation 
 young animals resemble vertebrates or invetebrates de- 
 prived of their frontal ganglia. 
 
 The restlessness of children and of infants is notori- 
 ous ; in an infant under my observation, I have observed 
 kicking of legs as many as 25-35 P er minute, and this 
 was kept up for a quarter of an hour, sometimes for 
 half an hour at a time; each kick of the leg served as 
 a stimulus for another one, until fatigue was induced. 
 An external stimulus at once calls forth a reaction in 
 the child or the infant. The reaction is usually not 
 adaptive, purposeless, and frequently hurtful. 
 
 There are also purposeful reactions, reactions that 
 are of a purely instinctive character, useful for the life 
 and growth of the animal. These reactions, however, 
 are, physiologically regarded, of a more complex re- 
 flex character. Given a definite stimulus and a certain 
 set of conditions, a series of reactions immediately fol- 
 lows in a certain order and succession. Thus the aphis 
 secretes its limpid drops of sweet juice, when its abdo- 
 men is tickled by the antennae of the ant only. No other 
 delicate tickling stimulations can bring about the reac- 
 tion of secretion. The ant on seeing the aphis runs at 
 once up to it and begins to play with its antennae on the 
 abdomen of the aphis, and the latter on feeling the par- 
 
Relation of the Moment to the Environment 269 
 
 ticular stimulations reacts in lifting up its abdomen and 
 secreting the viscid juice. 
 
 The white butterfly lays her eggs as soon as it 
 comes in contact with stimuli coming from cabbage 
 leaves. As soon as the change of temperature 
 occurs, the migration instinct of birds is awak- 
 ened. Young pointers are sometimes known to point the 
 first time they are taken out. Young chicks disperse and 
 show fright as soon as they hear an intense sound. In 
 an infant of two days old I have observed protective 
 grasping movements; the infant when immersed in the 
 bath tub for the first time got hold and clasped firmly 
 with his little finger the hand of the person that 
 bathed him. Furthermore, the whole body assumed 
 strained and rounded positions, lifting itself out of the 
 water with which it came in contact; the infant was 
 clinging with all its little strength to the hand that 
 bathed him. 
 
 The character of instinctive reaction is perhaps more 
 closely manifested in the following interesting experi- 
 ment performed by me on a very young infant. The 
 infant was not more than three hours old, he was put to 
 the breast and the nipple put to the mouth. The stim- 
 ulus of the nipple in the mouth at once excited the physi- 
 ological arrangement for sucking movement, an arrange- 
 ment which the infant brings with him in a more or less 
 ready state, on his coming into the world. When the 
 infant had enough, the sucking movements ceased. The 
 nipple was then withdrawn, and then put again into his 
 mouth, the sudden fresh stimulus once more awakened 
 the mechanism to activity, and the sucking movements 
 began only to stop soon. This was repeated a few 
 times, every time as soon as the stimulus was supplied 
 
270 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 the sucking movement began. 
 
 The experiment was then slightly modified, the 
 baby after ceasing its sucking movements was left 
 keeping the nipple in its mouth, and instead of 
 taking away the nipple and putting it back, thus 
 enforcing the stimulus directly, some other stimuli 
 were employed. The infant's legs were tickled, the 
 skin of the body was rubbed, pricked in different places, 
 and every time as the stimulus was applied the sucking 
 movements were started. 
 
 A few hours later when the baby became sensitive to 
 sound, I tried the same experiments with sound stimuli, 
 and obtained the same results. Sensory stimulations fol- 
 lowed by motor reactions are the elements out of which 
 moment-consciousness from the lowest to the highest is 
 formed. If one aspect of the moment-consciousness is 
 sensory, the other aspect is motor. The two aspects are 
 inseparable, correlative. 
 
 The sensori-motor relation is observed not only in the 
 lowest forms of psychic life, but also in the highest. 
 In the highest form of mental life we still meet with the 
 same factor of motor reactions. Mental activity tends 
 to pass into action. Psychic processes, motor and 
 glandular reactions are interrelated. All along the course 
 of mental activity reaction is present as its invariable 
 concomitant. Some muscles are in a state of tension, 
 others in a condition of relaxation. According to the flow 
 and content of ideas, representation is now retarded, 
 now accelerated. The functioning activity of the glands, 
 of the vaso-motor system is influenced, the circulation 
 of blood is affected, more blood rushing to the brain. 
 
 This reaction aspect of mental life, and especially 
 of affective, emotional life, can easily be demonstrated 
 
Relation of the Moment to the Environment 27 1 
 
 by appropriate instruments. By aid of the sphygmo- 
 graph, the tromograph, the pneumograph, the plethys- 
 mograph, the automatograph, the galvanometer, and 
 other instruments registering physiological results, it can 
 clearly be shown that mental activity with its affective 
 tone results in some end effect, muscular or glandular 
 reaction. With a very delicate automatograph, or swing- 
 ing pendulum, it can even be shown that the movements 
 manifested often express the content of consciousness. 
 
 This is especially striking in case of different 
 forms of automatisms — in people who are of the mo- 
 tor type. When the subject's hand is put on the 
 automatograph, and the subject begins to think, the 
 pen of the automatograph begins to move and write. 
 When the person thinks of the left side of the 
 room the movements swing to the left; when the sub- 
 ject thinks of a series of definite movements, movements 
 of a similar order and character are followed out by the 
 pen of the automatograph. Subjects who are of a pro- 
 nounced motor type when their attention is distracted 
 write with the automatographic pen the ideas of which 
 they happen to think at that moment. The remarkable 
 experiments made by Pavlow and his pupils are here to 
 the point. The experiments clearly prove the close 
 interrelation of mental activity and glandular function. 
 
 The reaction character of mental life is still more dis- 
 tinctly manifested in the various forms of mental disso- 
 ciation, such as are to be found in the psychopathic and 
 neuropathic diseases and in the states of hypnosis, and in 
 fact in all the phenomena belonging to the order known 
 as the subconscious. Many of the most important meth- 
 ods in psychology and psychopathology are based on 
 this reaction aspect of the moment-consciousness. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE ASSIMILATION OF THE MOMENT IN NORMAL 
 STATES 
 
 THE fact that the moment-consciousness ex- 
 pands, grows, and develops in its organization 
 until it reaches a point of perfect adaptation 
 to external conditions clearly shows that the 
 moment is capable of working new psychic material 
 into its constitution. The. material which it gets is of 
 such a nature as to help to perpetuate the psychic 
 life of the moment. The moment cannot possibly go 
 on growing without having such material at hand. If 
 the moment comes in contact with any psychic element 
 or experience that can further its content, the experience 
 is at once seized on and synthetized in the moment. The 
 psychic element is not simply taken in and associated or 
 annexed to the rest of the content, it is actually trans- 
 formed in this process. 
 
 When the moment is stimulated to activity by an ex- 
 ternal object, the sensory stimulations of the present 
 time-moment are new. Just these particular stimulations 
 and sensory processes awakened have not occurred as 
 yet in the life history of the animal, and still the object 
 meets with its appropriate sensory response and motor 
 reaction. The moment that has more or less like con- 
 tent to the given new psychic experience aroused appro- 
 priates the new states, works them into its own psychic 
 content, and sends out its characteristic reaction in re- 
 sponse to the stimuli. The moment that gets hold of 
 
 272 
 
Assimilation of the Moment in Normal States 273 
 
 new psychic material is ordinarily the one which is in the 
 process of activity at the given time when the stim- 
 ulations occur. The new material is absorbed by the 
 moment as a whole, and is then assimilated by the func- 
 tioning nucleus. The primary sensory elements of the 
 nucleus become strengthened. 
 
 At the same time the new sensory material ab- 
 sorbed awakens some new secondary sensory ele- 
 ments which are assimilated by the secondary sen- 
 sory elements constituting the so-called protoplasm 
 of the moment. In this absorption of new mate- 
 rial the moment does not and cannot possibly remain ex- 
 actly the same, it is modified in a degree, although the 
 internal relations of its constituents may practically re- 
 main unaltered. Readjustments may occur and usually 
 do so, but they are made as nearly as possible to the old 
 plan, and are assimilated to the old content. 
 
 In the perceptual moment of the tautog that which 
 constitutes its content may be the perception, say of a 
 little fish yonder; soon, however, a new feature may arise 
 in the course of experience, namely, change in color for 
 instance in the case of the squid, or swelling in the case 
 of the puff-fish. If the fish usually reacts in making at- 
 tacks when receiving perceptive stimuli coming from 
 small fish, and if the new experience is somewhat unusual 
 in its ordinary life experience, and at the same time not 
 so striking as to call forth the reaction of fear, the fish 
 will still carry out its ordinary reaction of aggressive 
 movement, slightly modified by the new incoming ex- 
 perience. 
 
 The chick in seeing a cinnabar caterpillar has the new 
 experience of the different color from that of the cater- 
 pillar on which it usually feeds, but the reaction is still 
 
274 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 the same which caterpillars call out in chicks, namely, 
 seizing and pecking. The new experience of taste got 
 through the reaction may further modify the reaction 
 of the chicks when confronted with cinnabar caterpillar. 
 
 The young infant pushes indiscriminately everything 
 in its mouth, everything is for sucking, and only by ex- 
 perience it learns gradually to modify its reaction to- 
 wards objects. On seeing a lemon, a child that is only 
 acquainted with oranges will take it as an orange. The 
 child will perceive the new visual experiences given by 
 the lemon, as different from orange, but they will be 
 assimilated to his sensory orange experience. The spec- 
 ial visual experiences will give rise in the child's mind to 
 some qualification of the percept "orange," the object 
 being a kind of orange, a bad orange. The reaction in 
 relation to the lemon will then be of the kind relating to 
 orange in general. This reaction will be of course mod- 
 ified by repeated experiences resulting from a series of 
 reactions in relation to the lemon. 
 
 Savages confronted for the first time with the horse 
 or the ox, consider them a species of pig, an animal with 
 which they are well acquainted, and they expect from 
 the horse, or the ox similar manifestations. Their re- 
 actions towards those new species of animals will be of 
 the same kind, as if those animals were pigs. 
 
 The same relation is still better illustrated in cases of 
 young children with a definite moment-consciousness, 
 which for convenience sake may be characterized as the 
 family-moment. The child's moment-content of life- 
 relationship consists of his experience gotten from his 
 relation with his papa and mamma. Baby, papa, and 
 mamma and their various relations go to make up the 
 total moment of the child's family life experiences. 
 
Assimilation of the Moment in Normal States 275 
 
 When the child is confronted with young animals, the 
 latter are regarded in the light of "babies," they are 
 also babies, they have their papas and mammas who 
 give them cookies, tea, and oatmeal, undress them, 
 and put them to bed. 
 
 A young child of about three years and a half 
 asked me whether the baby-calf's mamma gave it 
 pie to eat. Another time the same child on see- 
 ing a young kitten inquired after its mamma and 
 papa, and when the baby kitty was going to have its 
 tea and put to bed. In one child of less than three 
 years old, young animals, plants, such as young trees 
 and flowers, and even little stars were so many "baby 
 Willies." Their lives were fully assimilated to his 
 own, they were eating oatmeal, drinking milk and 
 were having tea, sugar, and biscuits for their supper. 
 The same child was greatly surprised and partly even 
 horrified at finding that baby-Willie-flowers had no 
 papa and no mamma. The moment-consciousness is 
 awakened by definite specific traits in the object, by 
 familiar experience sense-data constituting the content 
 of the moment; the rest and differential traits of the 
 object are worked into the general plan and character 
 of the functioning moment. 
 
 The assimilative power of the m'oment is clearly re- 
 vealed in the very character of perception. That 
 pitted object yonder is perceived as an orange with all 
 its attributes of color, shape, size, weight, fragrance, 
 and taste. The synthesis of so many sensory elements 
 corresponding to such a complex of stimuli was grad- 
 ually effected in the course of ontogenetic development, 
 and no doubt determined by inherited disposition of 
 phylogenetic evolution. 
 
276 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 Suppose the orange turns out to be a new species 
 never met before by the individual; it feels differently 
 when touched, it has different weight, special taste, and 
 fragrance. When such sense data are experienced re- 
 peatedly, the percept orange is modified by assimila- 
 tion of the new sense data. On seeing another time 
 such a sort of an orange all the previously separately 
 experienced sense-data appear together in one synthe- 
 tized percept. The moment-consciousness which we, 
 for illustration sake, have assumed as consisting only 
 of experiences relating to oranges and with corres- 
 ponding psycho-physiological reactions, has enlarged 
 its content, has increased, and modified its adaptation 
 to external conditions. 
 
 The assimilative power of the moment-conscious- 
 ness is well brought out in the activity of the higher 
 form of consciousness. The desire to go to the post-of- 
 fice to get my mail forms the central point of my present 
 moment-consciousness. Round it as a focus are grouped 
 ideas, feelings, and sensations, all more or less tending 
 in the same direction. The actual walking to the post- 
 office gives a series of new motor sensations which are 
 subconsciously assimilated by the moment as a whole. 
 The tactual and motor sensations coming from each 
 step are assimilated by the moment, leading in their 
 turn to new series of reactions. Each new step is fol- 
 lowed by new sensations that give rise to new reac- 
 tions and so on, until the end of the moment is reached 
 and the purpose accomplished. 
 
 The whole sensori-motor series is guided by the 
 nuclear elements of the moment, although the succes- 
 sive stages of the series are assimilated subconsciously. 
 In reading a book the successive stages are guided by 
 
Assimilation of the Moment in Normal States 277 
 
 the central general idea. The perception of the letters, 
 words, and their isolated meaning is assimilated sub- 
 consciously, all of them being incorporated into the 
 guiding moment-consciousness which is growing and 
 developing, becoming enriched with more and more 
 content. In writing a letter or an article on a certain sub- 
 ject we find the same fact of assimilation by the moment- 
 consciousness of the sense-data coming in the succes- 
 sive steps of the whole experience. The handling of 
 the pen, the dipping it into ink, its guiding by the hand, 
 its gliding over the paper, the drawing of the letters, 
 the formation of letters into words, and of the words 
 into lines and sentences, all follow in successive stages 
 and are assimilated partly subconsciously and partly 
 consciously. All are guided by the principal moment 
 which grows richer in content with each successive step 
 made, with each succeeding link of the series. In fact 
 we may say that all those successive steps are stages in 
 the growth and development of the one moment-con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 The growth and development of the moment-con- 
 sciousness is through its assimilation of fresh psychic 
 material. In the man of science a favorite theory ex- 
 ercises such an assimilative power over facts other- 
 wise disconnected. The moment-consciousness having 
 the given theory as its nucleus absorbs more and more 
 material, and with the assimilation of new material the 
 content and strength of the internal organization grows 
 in a corresponding degree. The assimilation is guided 
 by the intense interest aroused by the nucleus of the to- 
 tal moment, and is in its turn aided by the active pro- 
 cess of assimilation, especially by the influence of sub- 
 merged, subconscious moments which have reached 
 
278 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 the minimum of consciousness, or lie on the margin of 
 the sphere of waking consciousness. 
 
 The influence of the subconscious is in proportion to 
 the duration and intensity of the activity of the mental 
 process. We are well acquainted with the fact that an 
 action requiring at first great stress of attention, finally, 
 with its repetition, drops out of the focus of conscious- 
 ness and becomes, as it is called, automatic or uncon- 
 scious. They who have observed a child striving to 
 stand by himself or beginning to walk realize how such 
 seemingly automatic acts as standing or walking are 
 at first accompanied with intense attention. The 
 child, when standing up all by himself, does it hesitat- 
 ingly; he shakes and trembles, as if occupying unsafe 
 ground, or doing a difficult act; he looks around for 
 support, stretches out his hands, asking the help of his 
 parents or nurse, and if he does not get aid in time, 
 begins to cry from fear and drops on all-fours. It is 
 a difficult feat for him. Withdraw his attention from 
 his performance, and in the first stages of his series of 
 trials he drops helplessly to the ground. 
 
 The same holds true in the case of walking. The child 
 in beginning to walk, does it with great hesitation and 
 fear. It can only be compared to the attempt of an 
 adult in learning to walk a rope, or a narrow board on 
 a high place. Each step requires intense attention. The 
 least distraction of attention and the baby falls down 
 in a heap. The least change in the touch, muscular 
 and kinaesthetic sensations arrests the successful at- 
 tempt at standing or walking. Thus in the case of my 
 baby of fourteen months after the first two days of more 
 or less successful trials at walking, a new pair of shoes 
 was put on. This arrested the walking. When the 
 
Assimilation of the Moment in Normal States 279 
 
 baby became accustomed to the new sensations which 
 fell in the background of his consciousness, he once 
 more started a series of trials, and with such success that 
 after two days' practice he walked almost a whole mile. 
 
 After a period of long practice the complex muscular 
 adjustments, required in the acts of standing and walk- 
 ing, gradually retreat to the background of conscious- 
 ness and become automatic. Not that consciousness in 
 those acts is lost: it has simply reached its necessary 
 minimum, leaving the focus of consciousness free for 
 other new and unaccustomed adjustments, which in 
 their turn retreat from the centre to the periphery and 
 fall into the subconscious. The usual movement of 
 mental processes is from the conscious to the subcon- 
 scious. 
 
 Experiences, however, may first be perceived by sub- 
 merged subconscious moments and then transmitted 
 to the focus of consciousness, the movement of the 
 process thus taking a direction opposite to the usual one, 
 from the subconscious to the conscious. Experiences, 
 for instance, lived through in hypnotic states, in trance 
 states or in dreams, may come to the surface as hyp- 
 noidal states and then become synthetized in the upper 
 waking consciousness, or they may be lighted up in 
 hypnosis, and then permanently synthetized in the cen- 
 tre of attentive consciousness. 
 
 Similarly experiences first lived through in the sub- 
 conscious states induced by alcoholic intoxication or by 
 anaesthetics may be brought by hypnoidal states or 
 by hypnosis into the focus of consciousness. Hypnoi- 
 dal states are uprushes of the subconscious, and by 
 means of them many a hidden and obscure region of 
 the subconscious may be discovered. Thus the Hanna 
 
280 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 case was largely marked by hypnoidal states. In many 
 of my cases hypnoidal states are the means by which 
 subconscious experiences become completely revealed. 
 In cases of amnesia the hypnoidal states give glimpses 
 into subconscious regions which even deep hypnosis 
 can not reveal. 
 
 The method of guesses is valuable in showing the 
 reverse process of mental activity, the passage of r 
 subconscious state into the focus of consciousness. 
 
 If the anaesthetic spot of a psychopathic case is stim- 
 ulated, the patient is unaware of such stimulation; 
 should he, however, be asked to guess, or to tell any- 
 thing that happens to come into his mind, he is often 
 found to give correct answers. The patient perceives 
 subconsciously. This perception, often in a slightly 
 modified form, is transmitted to the upper conscious- 
 ness, or to what for the present constitutes the patient's 
 principal moment consciousness, or personality. 
 
 If, for instance, the anaesthetic spot of the patient is 
 pricked a number of times, the patient remains quiet and 
 is seemingly insensible. Should we now ask the patient 
 to tell anything that comes into his mind, he will say, 
 "pricking" and will be unable to tell why he happened 
 to think of "pricking" at all. Should we now ask him 
 to give any number that may enter his mind, he will 
 give the correct number, once more not being able to 
 give the reason why this particular number happened 
 to enter his mind, considering it a mere "chance num- 
 ber." The subconscious sensations experienced are 
 transmitted as abstract ideas to the focus of conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 Often instead of the particular idea being trans- 
 mitted, only the general aspect of it reaches the focus. 
 
Assimilation of the Moment in Normal States 281 
 
 Thus the patient is not able to guess the particular na- 
 ture of the stimulus, but he may give the character of 
 the unfelt stimuli. This reveals the reverse movement 
 from the subconscious to the conscious. 
 
 This reverse movement of the psychic state, from 
 the originally subconscious to the upper consciousness, 
 is well manifested in psychopathic cases of visual 
 anaesthesia as well as hypnotically induced anaesthe- 
 sia. The patient's field of vision is limited. If objects 
 are inserted in any place of the zone extending from 
 the periphery of the narrowed field to the utmost 
 boundary of the normal field, the patient can guess 
 correctly the names of the inserted objects invisible to 
 him. General guesses are correct on the periphery 
 of that "subconscious" zone. Some of the phenomena 
 of paramnesia can be explained by this principle of 
 reverse movement, when subconscious experiences 
 transmitted to central consciousness appear under the 
 form of "familiar" memories. 
 
 A lighting up of the subconscious regions bringing 
 about a reverse movement from the subconscious to 
 the conscious can also be brought about by the use of 
 toxic drugs. Pent-up neuron energies become liber- 
 ated from lower and lower-most moment consciousness, 
 long forgotten experiences well up to the centre of con- 
 sciousness ; outlived moments are resurrected and come 
 to the focus of consciousness with all the vividness of 
 a present perceptual experience. Thus De Quincey, in 
 his "Confessions of an English Opium-Eater," tells us 
 that "the minutest incidents of childhood or forgotten 
 scenes of later years were often revived. I could not 
 be said to recollect them, for if I had been told of them 
 when waking, I should not have been able to acknowl- 
 
282 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 edge them as my past experience. But placed as they were 
 before me in dreams like intuitions and clothed in all 
 their evanescent circumstances and accompanying feel- 
 ings, I recognized them instantaneously." 
 
 Hypnoidic states reveal the wealth and extent of 
 psychic experience hidden in the subconscious regions. 
 Glimpses into the subconscious are also given in hyp- 
 noidal states which are induced by the process of hyp- 
 noidization. The patient is asked to close his eyes and 
 keep as quiet as possible without, however, making 
 any special effort to put himself into such a state. He 
 is then asked to tell anything that comes into his mind. 
 The patient may also be asked to attend to some stimuli, 
 such as reading or writing or the buzzing of an electri- 
 cal current, and he is then to tell the ideas, thoughts, 
 images, phrases, no matter how disconnected, that 
 happen to flitter through his mind. 
 
 This same condition of hypnoidization is sometimes 
 better accomplished through mental relaxation with con- 
 centration of attention in a definite direction. The pa- 
 tient is put into a quiet condition, and with his eyes 
 closed and the experimenter's hand on the patient's fore- 
 head, the latter is urged to mental effort and strain, and, 
 if necessary, given some hints. Experiences seemingly 
 inaccessible flash lightning-like on the upper regions of 
 self-consciousness. In all such cases the active mo- 
 ment-consciousness seizes on and assimilates any cog- 
 nate experience, conscious or subconscious. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 ABNORMAL MOMENTS 
 
 THE power of the moment's assimilation is 
 well brought in the activity of abnormal mo- 
 ments. Distressing thoughts, gloomy ideas, 
 painful sensations, and feelings of depres- 
 sion form a nucleus round which other mental states 
 become firmly organized. A delusion arises which 
 constitutes the moment-consciousness of the melanchol- 
 iac. This moment assimilates all other cognate experi- 
 ences. Everything that takes place is seized on by the 
 moment and assimilated. The patient who believes that 
 he has no intestines, or that he is made of glass and is 
 transparent and hence hides himself from people, as his 
 functions are open to the sight of outsiders, such a 
 patient will make all experiences confirm and strength- 
 en the delusion. The delusion constituting the predom- 
 inant moment-consciousness in the patient's life absorbs 
 and assimilates most, if not all of the material that 
 gains access to the patient's psychic life. The moment 
 like a cancerous growth expands, grows, and develops at 
 the expense of other moments, starves them by cutting 
 oft their mental food supply. What cannot be used by 
 the moment is rejected as waste material. 
 
 A similar state of affairs we meet with in paranoia, 
 as well as in many paranoidal states of a purely psycho- 
 pathic character. A moment-consciousness is formed of 
 high organizing and assimilating power. Any experience 
 relevant and irrelevant entering consciousness is greed- 
 
 283 
 
284 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 ily absorbed and assimilated. Any flitting thought, any 
 passing impression is worked in and organized into the 
 moment. All other moments fall a prey to this domi- 
 nant all-absorbing moment. 
 
 In some cases the assimilating capacity of the mo- 
 ment seems to be limitless. In fact, the more it assim- 
 ilates, the greater grows its craving and capacity for 
 getting more material. The most trivial facts, the 
 slightest sense-impressions all are pressed into the ser- 
 vice of the despotically ruling moment. The insignifi- 
 cant becomes significant and points to the central delu- 
 sion. 
 
 In other cases the limit of the process of assimilation 
 soon reaches its maximum point, more psychic material 
 is rejected by the moment. Such conditions are to be 
 found in various states of dissociation manifested in 
 different forms of psychopathic diseases. The mo- 
 ment's capacity for assimilating new material is of 
 limited range, soon reaches its utmost bounds and loses 
 for the time being all capacity for further assimilation. 
 Such states may be found in amnesia. The moment is 
 then said to be dissociated from the main current of 
 psychic life-activity. Specific stimuli under definite con- 
 ditions are requisite to resuscitate the moment and 
 arouse its power of assimilation. 
 
 It is certainly interesting and instructive to study the 
 fluctuations of the moment's power of assimilation in 
 abnormal mental states. In some forms of mental dis- 
 eases and general psychic derangements the moment 
 may be of ephemeral and unstable character; it may 
 dissolve soon after its birth. Such conditions are 
 to be found in various forms of maniacal states 
 and in the initial stages of many cases of general 
 
Abnormal Moments 285 
 
 paresis. 
 
 In psychomotor manifestations of a psychopathic 
 character moments-consciousness are often formed 
 and dissolved like soap-bubbles. The investigation of 
 them is of the utmost interest and value. In hypnosis 
 moments of such a nature may be experimentally in- 
 duced and studied. The whole process can thus be 
 followed through all the stages of evolution and disso- 
 lution. 
 
 A greater condition of stability is to be found in the 
 various automatisms preceding or following epileptic 
 seizures, or in the so-called "psychic equivalents of epi- 
 lepsy." The pure "psychic epilepsies" are essentially 
 hypnoidic states, moments of stable character. This 
 can be demonstrated both by observation and experi- 
 ment. 
 
 The principle of selection is fundamental in the life- 
 history of the moment. The whole tendency of the 
 moment is to select material conducive to the further- 
 ance of its activity and to reject all material that 
 thwarts its functions and growth. This process of se- 
 lection is from a biological standpoint essential for the 
 survival and development of the moment. 
 
 The development of the moment may become ar- 
 rested on some one stage of ontogenesis, and then the 
 moment, belonging to a higher type resembles in its psy- 
 chic activity that of a lower type; although it has 
 many vestiges of the higher type, it is greatly modi- 
 fied in nature and as such really differs from the 
 healthy normal representative of the corresponding 
 low type. Still we may affirm that the arrested high 
 type has virtually become a moment of low type. The 
 state of psychosis of the imbecile, or idiot, may be tak- 
 
286 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 en as a good illustration. The mental activity of the 
 idiot resembles the lower types of animal psychosis. 
 Although as we have already pointed out, the con- 
 sciousness of the idiot and that of the animal are by 
 no means identical, still both belong to a low type of 
 moment, and as such, they may be put on the same level. 
 In pathological cases where mental degeneration sets 
 in we also have a similar course. The moment of the 
 higher type becomes degraded and falls to the level of 
 lower and lowermost types, according to the advance of 
 the process of degeneration. Such states are to be 
 found in the degenerative psychosis characteristic of 
 secondary dementia. When the pathological process 
 is wide, intense, persistent, and lasting, then secondary 
 dementia results in most cases of mental degeneration. 
 Should, however, the process become arrested then the 
 moment simply falls to the level of a relatively lower 
 type. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 MENTAL CONTINUITY AND THE PSYCHIC GAP 
 
 THE activity of the moment-consciousness is 
 continuous, without break and interruption. 
 Should the activity become arrested and the 
 break be seemingly absolute, continuity is 
 still present with the resumption of activity. The 
 thread is taken up where it was dropped, the moment 
 appears as a whole without any break. There is no le- 
 sion in the moment consciousness, at least as far as 
 the moment itself is concerned. In going to sleep and 
 waking up again we may be indirectly conscious of the 
 interruption, but the activity of the moment is still 
 continuous, the moment begins its activity at the point 
 where it has left off. In fainting, in coma, in hypnosis, 
 or somnambulism the periods of unconsciousness are 
 immediately bridged over by the awakening activity of 
 the moment. 
 
 Objectively considered, we have the moment's ac- 
 tivity, then break, or absence of that activity, and 
 then the resumption; subjectively, however, the mo- 
 ment's activity is felt as one and continuous with- 
 out a break and gap. In consciousness the psychic con- 
 tent and activity preceding the break along with pres- 
 ent cognizance of the break are synthetized into a 
 unified continuity; the present consciousness of the 
 break is taken into the synthesis, the very gap thus 
 forming the bridge for unity. 
 
 The cognizance of the break may, however, be com- 
 
 287 
 
288 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 pletely absent, and the edges of the mental wound 
 may become closed, healed, and united with the 
 functioning activity of the moment, the moment, 
 without even the least consciousness of the in- 
 tervennig gap, resuming its line of work precisely 
 at the place where it had been arrested. From the mo- 
 ment's own standpoint, the gap is as if non-existent, 
 there is no break in the moment's psychic life-activity. 
 
 The break formed by the interruption of the mo- 
 ment's functioning activity, objectively regarded, may 
 present an actual gap in which, for all intents and pur- 
 poses, it may be supposed that no mental activity is 
 taking place. Such cases are found in the state of 
 deep sleep, undisturbed by dreams, or in the states of 
 unconsciousness produced by toxic and narcotic agen- 
 cies, in states of deep com'a, in the attacks of typical 
 epilepsy, petit or grand mal, in status epilepticus, in the 
 states of unconsciousness produced by intense mechani- 
 cal stimuli, such as a blow, or a fall, or a strong 
 electrical current. In all such cases we often find 
 a state that may, for all intents and purposes, be 
 characterized as unconsciousness. No other moment 
 comes to the surface, even temporarily, to fill the 
 mental gap caused by the interruption of the moment's 
 functional activity. The gap presents a mental blank. 
 
 To the important question: "How, then are we to 
 explain amnesia where consciousness is indicated?" 
 Ribot answers "By the extreme weakness of the con- 
 scious state." This explanation is inadequate. For 
 first of all, what is the meaning of a weak state of con- 
 sciousness? Is it a state felt as being weak? If so, the 
 explanation is obviously wrong. We may far better re- 
 tain in memory the whisper of a dear friend than 
 
Mental Continuity and the Psychic Gap 289 
 
 the striking of the tower clock or the explosion of a 
 gun. Does he mean by a weak state of consciousness 
 a confused indistinct state? Once more he is wrong. 
 A confused and indistinct state of mind is often clearly 
 remembered. I am dizzy, everything is confused and 
 indistinct, I am unable to tell in detail what I have 
 seen and heard, but I can clearly and distinctly remem- 
 ber the state of dizziness and confusion, and very often 
 far better than any other less confused mental state. 
 This, however, is not the case in the states of amnesia 
 under discussion. 
 
 In amnesia there is no memory at all of the experi- 
 enced mental states and what the subject or the 
 patient remembers is the last link of the state pre- 
 ceding the amnesia. The state preceding the am- 
 nesia and the one succeeding it are joined together, 
 the intermediary is left out, as if it had never been in 
 existence. Evidently the theory is that the state of 
 consciousness is so weak that it leaves no "trace," no 
 memory behind. But if this be the case, then the ex- 
 planation is a tautology. The problem is, why is there 
 no memory in certain states of consciousness? To this 
 the reply is that the states of consciousness leave no 
 memory behind. It is obvious that this explanation is 
 vague and when one tries to give to it a definite mean- 
 ing, it is either wrong or turns out to be a reasoning in 
 a circle. 
 
 Granted, however, that a weak state of conscious- 
 ness is something definite, that by it is meant to indi- 
 cate confusion, indistinctness of consciousness, and 
 granted furthermore, that such a state leaves no mem- 
 ory behind, how then shall we explain amnesia of men- 
 tal states when consciousness was intense, clear and 
 
290 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 distinct, as in the case of hypnosis or of artificial som- 
 nambulism ? In these states the senses are almost hyp- 
 eraesthetic, the sense of discrimination is extremely 
 acute and memory is in a state of exaltation. Why is 
 it then that amnesia can be enforced in the case of al- 
 most any experience immediately after the trance is 
 over, or even during the very state of hypnosis ? The 
 state of consciousness is intense and still there is am- 
 nesia. 
 
 How is it in cases of double consciousness or 
 of multiple personality? Surely the explanation of 
 "weakness" of the states of consciousness cannot be 
 advanced by any one who has a personal knowledge 
 of these phenomena. How is it in psychopathic cases 
 where the amnesia is brought about by an intense pain- 
 ful state of consciousness, such as fright, fear or great 
 grief? On the theory of weakness of consciousness all 
 these phenomena are mysterious, incomprehensible. 
 On our theory of moment-consciousness, however, the 
 phenomena presented could not possibly be otherwise, 
 in fact, we should expect them a priori, if our theory be 
 correct. 
 
 A psychic blank, however, is not the only possible 
 consequence of the moment's lapse of function. The 
 moment's activity is interrupted, but only, what is more 
 often the case, to give rise to activity of another mo- 
 ment. The break produced in the moment's life is 
 not a real gap ; for the gap is filled in with the function- 
 ing activity of another moment which is usually of a 
 lower, though sometimes it may even be of a higher 
 type. From the standpoint of the arrested moment, 
 however, there is a distinct gap, not that the moment 
 itself is cognizant of the gap, but it is so for the ex- 
 
Mental Continuity and the Psychic Gap 291 
 
 ternal observer that takes that moment for his stand- 
 point. The gap exists in the moment, though not for 
 the moment. 
 
 Such states may be found in hypnosis especially 
 in that stage of it known as somnambulism. When 
 the subject falls into a deep hypnotic state, it is 
 possible to make him pass through a series of compli- 
 cated actions, changes of personalities without the least 
 awareness on awakening. The whole series of his 
 waking consciousness it is as non-existent, in short, it is 
 a gap. 
 
 This gap however, is far from being a mere men- 
 tal blank. On the contrary there may have been 
 intense psychic activity, but only that of another mo- 
 ment which in the waking state has become submerged. 
 This submerged moment may be brought up in the 
 waking state by suggestions or by means of hypnoidiza- 
 tion and be synthetized in the upper consciousness. 
 Sometimes glimpses of the submerged moment may 
 come up in dreams, in reveries, in sudden flashes dur- 
 ing the waking state, or in spontaneous hypnoidal 
 states, the subject doubting whether they refer to some- 
 thing actual or are simply mere whims and fancies. 
 
 In the cases of the so-called "psychic epilepsy" which 
 are really amnesia of a psychopathic character, one 
 meets with psychic states in which the gap is not abso- 
 lute, but relative, being filled with the activity of an- 
 other moment. Thus, M. carried on conversations, 
 arguments, and discussions while in the abnormal sub- 
 conscious state and could not remember anything of it 
 when emerging from it and returning to the normal 
 condition. Similarly F. in his subconscious state trav- 
 elled a distance, sold horses and returned, but knew 
 nothing of what had taken place from the beginning to 
 
292 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 the end of his journey. 
 
 In the H. case the gaps formed in the second- 
 ary state by the manifestations of the primary state 
 were as if non existent for this secondary conscious- 
 ness. The same held good of the primary con- 
 sciousness : the two were working independently of 
 each other, each synthetizing its own experience, each 
 beginning at the place where it had left off. Neither 
 of them knew of and felt subjectively the gap. There 
 was a gap, only it was filled in by another moment 
 consciousness of which the present functioning moment 
 was not aware. 
 
 In cases of typical epilepsy subconscious states are 
 sometimes found, states that constitute gaps in the ac- 
 tivity of the normally working moment-consciousness. 
 Thus in some cases of idiopathic epilepsy under my 
 observation, the patients in the stuporous states suc- 
 ceeding the epileptic attack answer questions, but do 
 not recognize me, nor do they know the nurse who takes 
 care of them, although they can remember and recog- 
 nize other names mentioned to them. In their nor- 
 mal state, however, they neither know of their attacks 
 nor do they remember anything of the conversations 
 and experimentations during the stuporous post-epilep- 
 tic state. In other severe cases of epilepsy with fre- 
 quent attacks of grand mal and petit mal, the patients 
 during the periods of their stuporous post-epileptic 
 states answer questions often mistaking persons and 
 environment, referring to events and incidents of their 
 early childhood. On emerging from their abnormal 
 states, the patients are completely unaware of what 
 had taken place, the epileptic attack with stuporous 
 post-epileptic state forming a gap in the functional 
 
Mental Continuity and the Psychic Gap 293 
 
 activity of his principal or upper moment-conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 If we look at the moment from its subjective stand- 
 point there may be consciousness of the gap bridging 
 over the edges of the mental lesion, or such conscious- 
 ness may be altogether lacking, the psychic edges of 
 the mental lesion being closely unified in the synthetic 
 activity of the temporarily arrested, but now once more 
 functioning moment-consciousness. If we look at the 
 objective side of the gap, we find that there may be 
 total absence of all mental activity, no other moment 
 coming up to fill the place of the one that has ceased 
 functioning, or another moment may take the place of 
 the one arrested in function, seemingly fill up the men- 
 tal gap, and become submerged with the restitution of 
 the arrested moment's activity. Not that the gap is 
 really filled up objectively or subjectively; it is like the 
 close successive manifestations of different individuali- 
 ties. The close observer can easily detect the arrest, 
 the gap, the filling up of the gap with another moment's 
 activity, and finally the restitution of the original tem- 
 porarily arrested moment-consciousness. What is pre- 
 sented to cursory observation is apparent continuity 
 of mental activity. 
 
 Mental gaps may be classified as follows : 
 
 f Subjective (with consciousness of mental gap. 
 I Standpoint (without consciousness of mental gap. 
 Mental gap { 
 
 I Objective /Absence of moment. tv{\oher 
 I Standpoint \ Presence of moment ■< y ° ' 
 
 When the principal moment becomes arrested in its 
 activity and a new dominating moment takes it place 
 in the formed gap, the type of the new moment is us- 
 
294 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 ually of a lower grade. The conditions that bring 
 about an aggregation of moments are of such a nature as 
 to allow of the activity of a high type of moment. Not 
 appearing in the mental synthesis of the organization 
 of moments characteristic of consciousness in the nor- 
 mal state, the moment is poor in content and simple in 
 nature. Falling as it does outside the complex normal 
 aggregate of moments, the moment lacks the harmony 
 and balance in its psychomotor and psycho-physiological 
 reactions, since the counteracting balancing and hence 
 regulative psychomotor tendencies of other systems of 
 moments are wanting. 
 
 A moment that enters into a highly complex aggrega- 
 tion of moments, when stimulated to activity, sets also 
 other moments into functioning, moments that are closely 
 associated with it and often of different and even con- 
 trary psychomotor and psycho-physiological reactions. 
 Strengthening other systems against the lines of its own 
 activity the moment is thus controlled, inhibited, and 
 regulated in the very act of awakening to functioning ac- 
 tivity. For it must be clearly understood that there is no 
 special controlling agency somewhere in the mind send- 
 ing out orders, mandates, inhibitions, like a despotically 
 ruling autocrat, like a psycho-analytic censor, or like 
 an omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, invisible deity. 
 The regulative, inhibiting control to which a moment 
 is subject is in the mutual interrelation, balance, and 
 harmony of the systems and constellations of moments, 
 entering into an aggregate, and forming the organized 
 activity of a highly complex moment-consciousness. 
 
 When a moment becomes dissociated and isolated 
 from other systems of moments, it loses its balance and 
 being freed from control, manifests its psychomotor re- 
 
Mental Continuity and the Psychic Gap 295 
 
 actions in the full force of its original powers. The lack 
 of control and the moment's energy of manifestations 
 are just in proportion to the depth and extent of disso- 
 ciation or of disaggregation of moments. Dissociation 
 and over-action are co-related. 
 
 The intimate relation of dissociation and over-action 
 is clearly seen in cases of so-called "psychic epilepsy." 
 The dissociated subconscious states manifest themselves 
 with an over-powering activity, with an energy that can 
 neither be resisted nor controlled, they come like irre- 
 sistible, uncontrollable, imperative impulses, which are 
 closely related to them in nature. If, however, these 
 states are brought out from the hidden subconscious 
 depth from which they make invasions; if they are 
 brought to light before the court of the upper conscious- 
 ness one by one in hypnoidal states, and are forced to 
 become associated with and synthetized into the princi- 
 pal moment-consciousness, the impetuosity and energy of 
 their manifestations are gone. All my cases of dissocia- 
 tion give experimental confirmation of this law of dyna- 
 magenesis of dissociation. 
 
 The dissociated cluster, although inaccessible 
 through the ordinary channels of intercommunications, 
 on account of the disaggregation of the aggregate into 
 which it enters as a constituent part, may still be 
 reached through other channels, coming from other 
 moment-aggregates. For a moment, or a combination 
 of them forms a constituent part not only of one ag- 
 gregate, but of many other aggregates. Loss of com- 
 munication through a certain channel does not neces- 
 sarily exclude loss of all communications. If the lost 
 channel is habitual, the activity of the seemingly lost 
 moments may be awakened through unhabitual chan- 
 
296 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 nels. 
 
 If the moment cannot be set into activity by the 
 organization of constellations constituting the con- 
 scious personality, on account of disaggregating pro- 
 cesses, the moment may still be set into fuctioning ac- 
 tivity through aggregates falling outside the focus of 
 personality, but which work with that focus in close 
 co-operation, namely the subconscious. In other words, 
 in the process of disaggregation, conscious, or rather 
 self-conscious experiences fall into the region of sub- 
 conscious life; what is absent in personal thought may 
 be present in impersonal, subconscious states. All psy- 
 chopathic functional disturbances consist just in such 
 an interrelation of mental aggregates; in the process 
 of disaggregation of the self-conscious personality ag- 
 gregates of moments drop out and fall into the domain 
 of the subconscious. What disappears from attentive 
 consciousness may fall into subconsciousness. The dis- 
 aggregated moment, ceasing to enter into relations with 
 the upper personal consciousness of the highly com- 
 plex constellation, may still form a component of the 
 lower aggregates of the subconscious. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 THE MOMENT-THRESHOLD 
 
 TAKING an initial stimulus with its concom- 
 itant sensory effect as the starting point we 
 add by degrees small unperceived stimuli un- 
 til a point is reached when a barely percepti- 
 ble change of the external stimulation is effected in 
 consciousness. The sum of the differential stimuli up 
 to the point where the perceptible change is produced 
 is found out, and brought into relation with the quanti- 
 ty of the initial stimulus. Working with this method 
 of least observable differences Weber succeeded in ex- 
 pressing the relation of the differential stimulus io sen- 
 sation in the formula known as "Weber's law." With- 
 in certain limits, no matter what the absolute value of 
 the stimulus be, the differential stimulus, or what is 
 the same the barely sensible addition to the initial to- 
 tal stimulus, must bear the same proportion to the 
 total stimulus. By many experiments Weber found 
 that in the case of weight, for instance, the relation is 
 one-third. Thus if the first weight be nine pounds the 
 barely sensible addition will be one-third of nine, or 
 three pounds; in twelve pounds the increment is one- 
 third of twelve, or four pounds; in fifteen pounds the 
 barely sensible increment is again one-third of the total 
 stimulus that is one-third of fifteen, or five pounds, and 
 so on. 
 
 Further investigations have shown that, within cer- 
 
 297 
 
298 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 tain limits, there is for all the senses which admit of ex- 
 act measurement a constantly uniform quantitative re- 
 lation between the stimulus and the just noticeable stim- 
 ulus-difference. Experimentation by different investi- 
 gators have confirmed "Weber's law" for the different 
 senses by showing that, within a certain range of in- 
 tensities of stimuli, there is a more or less constant ra- 
 tio between the increase of the stimulus necessary to 
 produce a just noticeable difference of sensation and 
 the total stimulus intensity. Thus, it has been shown 
 that noise stimuli must increase by one-third; pressure 
 stimuli by one-fortieth; stimuli of muscular sensations, 
 such as lifting weights, by one-fortieth; achromatic 
 light stimuli by one-hundredth. Weber in his paper 
 De Tactu expressed his law as follows : "In observan- 
 do discrimine rerum inter se comparatarum non dif- 
 ferentiam rerum, sed rationem differentiae ad magni- 
 tudinem rerum inter se comparatarum percipimus." 
 
 Gustav Theodor Fechner, the founder of psycho- 
 physics and its methods, starting with Weber's law 
 worked out a general formula for the quantitative re- 
 lation between physical stimuli and sensations. As- 
 suming that the just noticeable differences of sensation 
 given by ascending or descending series of different 
 stimuli to be equal units, he finds by means of different 
 psycho-physical methods, first elaborated by him, the 
 threshold of sensations or that stimulus which is just 
 near the limit of giving rise to a sensory effect, but 
 which is still not sufficient to awaken a sensation; in 
 short, he finds the stimulus the correlating sensation of 
 which is zero. 
 
 The minimum perceptible or stimulus-threshold is 
 found by measurements of the different senses. Thus 
 
The Moment-Threshold 299 
 
 two parallel lines are for most people barely dis- 
 tinguishable when the distance between them sub- 
 tends an angle of less than 60 seconds. In the 
 sense of hearing the vibrations recurring between 30-35 
 per second are barely distinguishable. Below 16 vibra- 
 tions per second no sensation of sound can be produced. 
 
 Thresholds have been similarly determined for all 
 other sensations. Thus the sense of touch, when tested by 
 the aesthesiometer, an unsatisfactory instrument, gives 
 the average for the tip of the forefinger about 1.65 mm., 
 on the back of the hand about 16.0 mm., Sensibility to 
 pain as tested by the algeometer varies from 10 to 15 
 degrees. Sensitivity to smell varies with different sub- 
 stances; thus for smell of garlic sensitivity varies in 
 detecting 1 part in 44,000 parts of water to one part in 
 57,000 parts of water; for oil of lemon from 1 to 
 116,000 to 1 to 280,000. Taste can detect the bitter- 
 ness of quinine in a solution of 1 part quinine to about 
 400,000 to 459,000 of water; the sweetness of sugar 
 can be detected in a solution of 1 part sugar to 200 of 
 water; the taste of salt can be detected in a solution of 
 1 part salt to about 2,000 parts of water. 
 
 After discovering the zero point of sensation and 
 the minimum perceptible he finds the constant ratio for 
 the just noticeable difference. The minimum percepti- 
 ble forms the unit of sensation. Each increase of the 
 stimulus giving a just noticeable difference is counted 
 as an additional sensation-unit to the total sum of sen- 
 sations. 
 
 Let A be the threshold giving sensation zero, and let 
 r be the constant ratio of increase then we have the 
 following series of stimuli and their corresponding 
 sensations : 
 
300 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 Sensation o is 
 
 given 
 
 by 
 
 stimulus A 
 
 i 
 
 u 
 
 
 " " (i+r) 1 
 
 2 
 
 u 
 
 
 " " (i+r) 2 
 
 " 3 
 
 (( 
 
 
 " " (i+r) 8 
 
 " 3 
 
 a 
 
 
 " " (i+r) 8 
 
 n 
 
 (< 
 
 
 « i« ( I+r )n 
 
 Thus we find that while the stimulus increases in a 
 geometrical ratio, the sensation grows in an arithmeti- 
 cal ratio. The sensations stand therefore in the same 
 relation as the logarithms to their numbers. Hence 
 we may say that sensation increases as the logarithm 
 of the stimulus. If S be the sensation, R the stimulus 
 and C the magnitude of the constant ratio, then we 
 have the following formulas : 
 
 S=C log. R. 
 
 This formula is known as "Fechner's law." 
 
 Fechner's expression of Weber's law is rather ques- 
 tionable. Fechner assumes that the just noticeable dif- 
 ference of different stimuli are qualitatively and quanti- 
 tatively equal, — a dubious assumption. A third of an 
 ounce added to an ounce does not feel the same as a 
 third of eighteen pounds added to the same number of 
 pounds, or as nine pounds added to twenty-seven 
 pounds. These units even, if they have a quantitative 
 expression, do not stand in a simple quantitative rela- 
 tion and are rather incommensurable. 
 
 Furthermore, it may even be considered that Fech- 
 ner's assumption is fundamentally wrong and unpsycho- 
 logical. In opposition to the first elementary principle of 
 psychology Fechner tacitly postulates that sensations can 
 be measured and that one sensation or a complex sensa- 
 tion is a multiple of another. Now the peculiar trait of 
 the phenomena of mental life is essentially their qualita- 
 
The Moment-Threshold 301 
 
 tive character. Sensations are not quantities to be meas- 
 ured, but are essentially qualities. A strong sensa- 
 tion is not a weak sensation many times over, but its 
 very strength, its intensity is its own separate individ- 
 ual quality constituting the essence of that particular 
 sensation. An intense sensation of pure white is not a 
 multiple of a weak sensation of grey just as the thought 
 "nation" is not the thought "man" raised to the n^ 
 degree. 
 
 In psychological investigations one must be care- 
 ful not to confound the nature of the physical stim- 
 ulus with that of the sensation. A physical stimulus 
 can be measured quantitatively, but a sensation does 
 not consist of quantitative units, and hence, is not 
 measurable. The only relation that can be measured 
 and expressed quantitatively is that between stimulus 
 and physiological process, the physical concomitant of 
 psychic states. 
 
 Whether or no we accept Fechner's statement of 
 Weber's law we may safely assume that the threshold 
 rises with successive stimulations. This law holds true 
 of all life processes, from the life of an ameba to the 
 life activity of a highly organized moment-conscious- 
 ness. In the sphere of sensation we find such a rise of 
 threshold. We are all acquainted with the fact that an 
 additional candle or lamp, for instance, in a well light- 
 ed room does not produce the same sensory effect as 
 when brought into a more or less dark room. An elec- 
 tric light in the sun is scarcely perceptible. An addi- 
 tional ounce to a lifted pound does not feel as heavy as 
 when raised by itself. A sound added to another sound 
 or noise, sounds less loud than when appearing iso- 
 lated, or when the same sound is breaking upon silence. 
 
302 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 The same relation holds true in the case of other senses. 
 
 This same truth is still more clearly brought out in 
 the fact that, if we take a certain stimulus as a unit, giv- 
 ing rise to a definite sensation, then as we progressively 
 ascend and add more and more units of the same stim- 
 ulus, the intensity of stimulation is far from rising pro- 
 portionately. If we take, for instance, the weight of 
 an ounce as our unit of stimulation, then the successive 
 moments of unit stimulations, that is, of ounces, will 
 not give rise to as distinct and similar sensations as the 
 initial sensation. The second ounce will give a sensa- 
 tion fainter than the first one, and the third fainter 
 than the second, and so on until a point is reached 
 when the sensation of an additional ounce will not at 
 all be appreciated, will dwindle away and almost reach 
 the zero point. 
 
 In the same way, if the pressure of a gramme 
 is excited in the hand, successive increments of 
 grammes will not in equal degree increase the sensory 
 effect; the additional increments of grammes, though 
 they are equal units of stimulation, give rise to fainter 
 and fainter sensations, until finally all sensory appre- 
 ciation of the added unit fades away and disappears. 
 If the hand is immersed in water, say at the freezing 
 point, an addition of ten degrees will be perceptibly 
 appreciated, while successive increments of ten degrees 
 each will be felt less and less, and finally will not be 
 noticed and will be difficult to detect. In short, the 
 threshold rises with the process stimulation. 
 
 To bring about a sensory response of an already stim- 
 ulated sense-organ the intensity of the stimulus must be 
 relatively increased. This is what constitutes Weber's 
 law. The continuous progressive sensory response of a 
 
The Moment-Threshold 303 
 
 sense-organ requires a constant increase of stimulations 
 which, within certain limits, bears a constant ratio to 
 the total stimulus. This law is sometimes summed up 
 by psychologists in the statement that "the increase 
 of the stimulus necessary to produce an increase of the 
 sensation bears a constant ratio to the total stimulus." 
 Activity raises the threshold; it is the beginning of fa- 
 tigue. 
 
 The rise of threshold after stimulation holds true in 
 the whole domain of biological activity. If the gas- 
 trocnemius muscle of a frog, for instance, is stimu- 
 lated by an electric current, the muscle, with each suc- 
 cessive stimulation, responds less readily with a con- 
 traction, and this becomes more evident with the on- 
 set of fatigue. Pftefer, in a series of extremely inter- 
 esting experiments, has shown that spermatozoids of 
 ferns are attracted by malic acid, the progressive re- 
 sponse of attraction of the cell requiring a constant in- 
 crease of the degree of concentration of the acid, the 
 increment of stimulations, as in the case of sensation, 
 bearing, within certain limits, a constant ratio to the 
 total stimulus. The threshold rises with each succes- 
 sive stimulation. 
 
 The rise of thresholds increases with intensity and 
 duration of stimulation as we approach the state of 
 fatigue. Through the influence of exhaustion, fatigue, 
 or the influence of toxic, autotoxic, emotional, and 
 other stimulations, the thresholds of certain moments 
 have been raised so that ordinary or even maximal 
 stimuli can no longer call out any response. When 
 such a rise of thresholds is present the moments with 
 raised thresholds can no longer enter into association 
 with systems of moments with which they are usually 
 
304 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 associated, and the result is dissociation, giving rise to 
 the great multitude of phenomena of functional psy- 
 chosis with a subconscious background, the extent of 
 which depends on the number of raised thresholds, on 
 the extent of the dissociation effected. 
 
 When a moment or aggregate of moments begins to 
 function, it radiates stimulation to other moments or 
 aggregates of moments. All the aggregates which 
 these radiated stimulations reach do not equally be- 
 gin to function. It will depend largely on the state of 
 the aggregate and its threshold. If the radiated stim- 
 uli be minimal, the many aggregates that have a high 
 threshold will not be effected at all. Furthermore, 
 many aggregates whose arousal could otherwise be 
 easily effected by the given stimulus may temporarily 
 be in a condition in which their thresholds have become 
 raised and thus fall outside the sphere of activity of 
 the functioning aggregate. On the other hand, aggre- 
 gates that are usually inaccessible to those minimal 
 stimuli may under certain conditions be set into activity 
 by minimal stimuli, if there is a lowering of the thres- 
 hold of the total aggregate. Thus the aggregates set 
 into activity by the functioning aggregate are condi- 
 tioned by the rise and fall of their thresholds. 
 
 In case where the threshold of an aggregate is raised 
 the radiated minimal stimuli coming from a particular 
 functioning aggregate may become efficient and reach 
 the threshold, when another aggregate begins to func- 
 tion simultaneously. This holds true even in the case 
 when the minimal stimuli, coming from two different 
 aggregates are just below the threshold-stimulus. Thus, 
 under certain conditions, when visual stimuli are bare- 
 ly or not at all discernible, they can become intensified 
 
The Moment-Threshold 305 
 
 by re-enforcing them with auditory stimuli. This is 
 commonly found in the mode of recovery of some for- 
 gotten name, or of some lapsed experience. We try 
 to find the name and seek to come to it in one line of 
 thought, but of no avail ; new lines are attempted, and 
 finally the combined activity of the systems reaches the 
 lapsed aggregate whose threshold has become tem- 
 porarily raised. 
 
 We find the same law further exemplified in the case 
 of the infant under my observation. When with the 
 nipple in his mouth the infant ceased nursing, the suck- 
 ing movements could be induced again by stimulating 
 some other sense-organ. The tactile, pressure, tempera- 
 ture, and taste stimuli coming from the nipple in the 
 infant's mouth became insufficient to stimulate to ac- 
 tivity the functioning aggregate of sucking movements, 
 on account of its raised threshold ; only additional stim- 
 ulation could bring about a further functioning of the 
 lapsed aggregate. This, of course, could also be effect- 
 ed by making the tactual and pressure stimuli more in- 
 tense, such, for instance, as shaking the nipple while the 
 infant kept it in its mouth. This increase of intensity, 
 however, mainly indicates that the stimuli were no long- 
 er effective, and an additional stimulus was requisite, a 
 stimulus that might come either from the same aggre- 
 gate or from a totally different aggregate. 
 
 In the many cases of post-hypnotic amnesia, we find 
 the same truth further illustrated. In the deeper stages 
 of hypnosis, from which the subject awakens with no 
 remembrance of what had occurred during the state 
 the lapsed memories can be brought into the upper 
 consciousness by plying the subject with many ques- 
 tions. During the trance or during the intermediate 
 
306 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 stages, with subsequent trance and suggested amnesia, 
 the subject is made to perform a certain action, — to light 
 and extinguish the gas four times in succession, or to 
 open and close the door a certain number of times. The 
 subject is then awakened from his trance; he remem- 
 bers nothing of what has taken place. If he is asked 
 point-blank whether he remembers any incidents of his 
 hypnotic state, he answers with an emphatic negative. 
 If now the subject is asked whether he knows how much 
 two times two are or his attention is incidentally direct- 
 ed to the gas or to the door, he at once becomes reflec- 
 tive, the subconscious memories are on the way to surge 
 up, and a few further indirect questions, the number 
 depending on the depth of hypnosis, finally bring out the 
 lost memories. The threshold that has risen at the end 
 of the trance is stepped over by the combined effect of 
 the many stimulations coming from different directions, 
 and the subconsciously submerged moment or aggre- 
 gate of moments surges up to the focus or nucleus of the 
 upper consciousness. 
 
 Once a particular moment is stimulated in its appro- 
 priate way, it may go on developing, and usually does 
 so by stimulating and setting into activity aggregates of 
 moments associated with it, or may form new combina- 
 tions of aggregates. The solution of a problem may 
 present great difficulties, but once started on the ap- 
 propriate line, the whole series of combination goes on 
 unfolding, stimulating other moments and aggregates 
 and forming more and more complex combinations. 
 Thus, Archimedes, as the story runs, while in the bath, 
 made the discovery of the law of specific gravity. Ac- 
 cording to the popular account Newton was led to his 
 discovery of universal gravitation by the accidental fall 
 
The Moment-Threshold 307 
 
 of an apple. Hughes was started by the idea of sym- 
 metry in his discovery of the laws of crystallography. 
 Goethe was led to his conception of metamorphosis and 
 evolution by a skull on the plains of Italy. Darwin by 
 reading Malthus' economical treatise on population was 
 inspired to work out the great principles of the strug- 
 gle for existence and natural selection. Myers was led 
 by the greater redness of blood in the blood-vessels of 
 tropical patients to his grand conceptions of transforma- 
 tion, equivalence, and conservation of energy. All these 
 examples illustrate the fact that once a moment has 
 been started it goes on developing by stimulating other 
 cognate moments and aggregates to functioning activity. 
 
 The same condition is also found in psychopathic 
 borderland states, such as dreams. In dreams a peri- 
 pheral stimulus gives rise to sensations that start the 
 activities of moments, which in turn give rise to 
 phantastic combinations of different aggregates. This 
 phantastic combination of aggregates, giving rise to 
 the functioning of otherwise unusual, or what may be 
 termed abnormal constellations, is largely due to the 
 fact, of redistribution of thresholds in the dream state. 
 
 The dream state is characterized by a rise of 
 the thresholds of moments and their aggregates 
 that have been functioning during the waking states, the 
 thresholds of these aggregates having been raised 
 through activity. In the sleep state moments that have 
 their thresholds relatively or absolutely lowered through 
 inactivity, moments or aggregates that are unusual or 
 have not been in use during the waking state, become 
 aroused, and begin to function. Hence the arousal of 
 hypnotic dream states reproducing long lapsed mo- 
 ments of child-life, hence the phantasms of the world 
 of dreams. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE PROCESS OF MOMENT DISAGGREGATION 
 
 EACH stimulation leaves after it some mo- 
 ment-disaggregation, a condition that makes 
 further disaggregation more difficult. The 
 more intense the stimulation is, the more ex- 
 tensive and deeper is the disaggregation, and hence, 
 the more difficult further disaggregation becomes. If 
 the stimulation is continued or made highly intense, a 
 point is soon reached beyond which no stimulation can 
 pass without giving rise to disaggregation having as 
 its manifestation the different forms of pathological 
 mental dissociation. The pathological process under- 
 lying the phenomena of abnormal mental life is not 
 essentially different from the one taking place in nor- 
 mal states. If difference there be, it is not certainly 
 one of a quality, but of degree. 
 
 The more intense a stimulation is, the more ex- 
 tensive is the process of disaggregation, the higher 
 mounts the moment-threshold giving rise to the dif- 
 ferent phenomenon of psycho-physiological and psycho- 
 motor dissociation. As expressed in a former work: 
 "The process of disaggregation setting in under the 
 action of strong and hurtful stimuli is not some- 
 thing new and different in kind from the usual; 
 it is a continuation of the process of association 
 and dissociation normally going on within the function 
 and structure of higher constellations. The one pro- 
 cess gradually passes into the other with the intensity 
 
 308 
 
The Process of Moment Disaggregation 309 
 
 of duration of the stimulus." 
 
 The process of disaggregation is a descending one, 
 it proceeds from constellations to groups. Under the 
 influence of strong stimulation such as mechanical and 
 chemical agencies, and psychic affections, such as in- 
 tense emotions of fear, anger, grief, anxiety, or worry, 
 the degenerative process of disaggregation sets in, af- 
 fecting first the higher aggregates and then with the 
 continuity and intensity of the stimulations the process 
 descends deeper and deeper affecting less complex ag- 
 gregates, finally reaching the simplest aggregates of 
 moments. The higher types of moments degenerate 
 and fall to lower and lower stages of consciousness. 
 
 The law of disaggregation as that of degeneration 
 in general is from the complex to the simple. The low- 
 er moments, on account of the simplicity of their organ- 
 ization, are more stable, and are in a better condition to 
 resist the disaggregating action of hurtful stimulations. 
 Furthermore, the lower and simpler an aggregate of mo- 
 ments is, the older it is, either phylogenetically or onto- 
 genetically, and its stability is therefore more firmly as- 
 sured by selection and adaptation. In the course of the 
 life-existence of the individual and the species lower 
 types of moments have come more often into activity, 
 since the higher an aggregate is the later does it rise in 
 the history of evolution. Hence moments that are not 
 working smoothly and with little friction are continually 
 weeded out. 
 
 This same process is going on not only in the his- 
 tory of the species by the eliminating action of natural 
 selection, but also by the special adaptations brought 
 about in the life experience of the individual. In phylo- 
 genesis the best and most firmly organized instincts sur- 
 
310 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 vive, while in ontogenesis those habits are consciously or 
 unconsciously selected which are most firmly established 
 and are best adapted to the given end. At the same time 
 the older an instinct is, the more thoroughly organized 
 it becomes, the more is it enabled to withstand the on- 
 slaught of external hurtful stimuli. The same holds 
 true in the case of habits. A habit of long standing is 
 well organized, and it is often extremely difficult, if not 
 impossible, to control. 
 
 Food instincts, sex instincts, social instincts, and per- 
 sonal moral life from an ascending series both as to time 
 of appearance in the history of the species as well as com- 
 plexity of structure and function. Food instincts in 
 time and simplicity precede sex instincts, and sex in- 
 stincts in their turn precede social instincts which ante- 
 cede personal, moral life. Now we find that the instabil- 
 ity is in the same ascending line. Food instincts are more 
 stable than sex instincts, sex instincts are more stable 
 than social instincts which are more firmly organized 
 than a highly unified personal life, guided by a moral 
 ideal. The structure and functions of the system of 
 alimentation remain unchanged for ages ; the sex instincts 
 may become slightly modified for some period of time; 
 the functions relating to social life vary from generation 
 to generation, while the moral life guided by the moral 
 ideal is highly individualized and personal. 
 
 In the downward course of mental disease-processes 
 the degeneration is from the complex to the simple, 
 from the stable to the unstable, from the highly organ- 
 ized to the lowly organized. In the different forms of 
 mental diseases first the moral life, then the social in- 
 stincts become affected, the patient becomes selfish, in- 
 trospective, morally selfish, then loses all regard for 
 
The Process of Moment Disaggregation 311 
 
 others, becomes careless, wasteful and negligent of his 
 vocations, life-work, and duties; his whole thought be- 
 comes concentrated on himself. In certain forms of 
 mental alienation, such as melancholia and paranoia, 
 the patient becomes suspicious of others, of his near and 
 dear ones, becomes cruel and revengeful, sometimes 
 ending by attacking his own friends and near relatives, 
 and committing homicide. When the deterioration of 
 personal moral life and social instincts is well under way, 
 degeneration of other functions sets in, — the patient 
 gives himself over to excesses, to all kinds of debauches, 
 and indulges in the different forms of abnormal sexual 
 practices. Only very late in the course of the disease 
 are the food instincts in any way affected. 
 
 Even in the lighter forms of psychic degenerative 
 forms that lie on the borderland of mental alienation, 
 such, for instance, as are present in the various forms 
 of psychopathic maladies we still find that the same 
 relation holds good. Moral life is the first to be af- 
 fected. Social instincts, follow, while disturbances of 
 sex and food instincts set in very late in the course of the 
 pathological process of disaggregation and degenera- 
 tion. 
 
 In the mentally defective, such as in imbeciles, idiots, 
 and cretins we once more find that our law holds good. 
 The depth of the congenital mental degeneration is 
 from moral to social, then to sex, and last to food in- 
 stincts. In the imbecile, only the moral, social, and in- 
 tellectual activities are affected, the imbecility being ac- 
 cording to the depth of the degeneration, the other in- 
 stincts are more or less normal. In the idiot and cre- 
 tin the process of degeneration has gone still deeper 
 and sex and food instincts with their psycho-physiologi- 
 
312 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 cal functions and psychomotor adjustments become af- 
 fected, the idiocy being in proportion to the gravity of 
 the affection. 
 
 The phenomena manifested under the action of nar- 
 cosis go further to confirm the same point of view. 
 Moral, personal life is the first to succumb, other activi- 
 ties follow in the order of their complexity and duration 
 of function. In other words, the law of disaggregation 
 or that of degeneration is from the complex to the sim- 
 ple, from the highly organized to the lowly organized, 
 from the least stable to the most stable. This stability 
 is proportionate to the complexity of moment aggre- 
 gates, and the frequency and duration of their associa- 
 tive activity. 
 
 In habits, formed within the life time of the indi- 
 vidual, the same law holds true. Old habits become in- 
 veterate, habits formed in childhood and perpetuated 
 can hardly be eradicated, while those that are formed 
 later in life become more easily dissolved. Complex hab- 
 its formed in late life, relating to moral life and social 
 intercourse, become dissolved at the first onset of the 
 process of mental degeneration, while habits formed 
 early in life, such as handling spoons, fork, and plate 
 or dressing and buttoning the coat long resist the de- 
 generative process. Paretics and patients of second- 
 ary dementia in general, though far advanced on the 
 downward path of degeneration, are still for some 
 time able to attend to the simpler functions of life ac- 
 tivity, such as dressing and feeding. Once more we 
 are confronted with facts pointing to the same law 
 that the process of degeneration of which disaggrega- 
 tion constitutes a stage is from the highly to the lowly 
 organized, from the complex to the simple. 
 
The Process of Moment Disaggregation 313 
 
 If we observe more closely the history and stages of 
 disaggregation, we find that, although the process it- 
 self is going on within the centre or nucleus of the ag- 
 gregate, the course of the process is inverse, from the 
 periphery to the centre. This law is really a corrolary 
 of the first law of degeneration. For the nucleus of 
 the moment aggregate usually consists of moments that 
 have early become organized, and round which more 
 moments gather from all sides, the aggregate finally 
 attaining a high grade of organization. The further 
 away from the centre or from the nucleus, the newer 
 is the formation of the strata of moments, and the more 
 unstable is their structural and functional relationship 
 within the total aggregate. Hence, when the process 
 of degeneration sets in affecting the controlling nucleus, 
 the associative ties of moments within the aggregate 
 become lowered, and the newest strata, the most re- 
 mote from the nucleus are the first to be affected, the 
 process passing from newer to older strata. In other 
 words, the process of degeneration is from periphery 
 to centre. 
 
 In the building up of a moment-aggregate the early 
 deposits are less complex than the later deposits which 
 are not as yet well organized by use and adaptation. 
 The child under my observation learned early that the 
 shining point yonder in the "ky" (sky) is 'Venu(s) 
 the (s) tar," and when absent it is "hidden by a 
 c(l)oud." This knowledge is certainly extremely 
 meagre, but still it forms the nucleus round which grad- 
 ually more knowledge will become formed and organ- 
 ized. The child will learn the dimensions of the plan- 
 et, its distance from the earth, its orbit, its relation as 
 a member within the solar system, relations that may 
 
314 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 be extended endlessly, making the whole moment-ag- 
 gregate more and more highly complex and unstable. 
 
 If we turn to motor adaptations, we find a similar 
 course of development. It took the infant time before 
 out of the aimless series of spontaneous motor reactions 
 some definite adaptations emerged relative to external 
 visual stimuli, so that he learned to grasp the object 
 yonder. These grasping motor reactions are at first 
 crude and inexact. The distance of objects is often mis- 
 taken, and the child stretches his hand to fetch distant 
 objects, while small objects cannot be picked up; the 
 hand often goes in the wrong direction and objects are 
 often dropped, because the reactions are not exact and 
 steady. Still these grasping movements form the nu- 
 cleus for the formation of new and more complex strata 
 of motor reactions. He learns the delicate adaptations 
 of grasping small objects and the fine adjustments of 
 producing a series of highly complex and extremely del- 
 icate motor reactions, such for instance as one finds in 
 the handling of instruments, reading, writing in the 
 execution of musical pieces, in singing, and piano play- 
 ing. All these motor reactions as they become more 
 complex and delicate are further and further removed 
 from the organized nucleus. 
 
 What happens now in the descending process of dis- 
 solution? The reverse process takes place. The more 
 complex the psycho-motor structure is, and the further 
 it is removed from the original nucleus, the more easily 
 does it become disintegrated in the downward course 
 of the process of degeneration. In the different forms 
 of mental diseases, such as the various types of mania 
 melancholia, paranoia, general paresis, primary demen- 
 tia, dementia praecox, senile dementia, and in all those 
 
The Process of Moment Disaggregation 315 
 
 chronic forms that end in secondary dementia, adapta- 
 tions and acquisitions further removed from the orig- 
 inal nucleus, constituting the simple relations of things 
 acquired in early youth and childhood, gradually become 
 disintegrated. The more remote the stratum is from 
 the central nucleus the earlier does dissolution set in. 
 
 With the setting in of the process of dissolution the 
 scientist, the professor, the student loses by degrees the 
 lately acquired wealth of knowledge, the complex 
 and delicately balanced conceptual structure of 
 scientific relationship; the more remotely related to the 
 original nucleus of sense experience is the first to be- 
 come shaken and tumble down. When the degenera- 
 tive process has gone far enough, the original meagre 
 nucleus of sense-experience becomes disintegrated in its 
 turn. 
 
 With the onset of the process of degeneration 
 the banker, the business man, the speculator, grad- 
 ually begin to lose the understanding of those 
 speculative aspects of business adaptations and adjust- 
 ments that are remotely related to the original nucleus 
 of self-preservation. With the further advance of the 
 process of disintegration, more stable strata, more near- 
 ly related to the original nucleus become affected, until 
 finally the nucleus itself is reached and its constituents 
 are affected, the patient is unable to take care of himself. 
 
 In motor reactions we find that the same law holds 
 true. The finer, the more complex a given activity is, 
 the more remote it is from the primary nucleus of mo- 
 tor adaptations, the easier and sooner does it become 
 disintegrated in the course of the pathological process. 
 The musician, the virtuoso loses the power of infus- 
 ing harmony, life, and emotion into the play; the 
 
316 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 painter loses control over his brush, the singer over his 
 voice; the watchmaker, or the mechanician is unable to 
 regulate the fine movements of the spring, the wheels of 
 the delicate mechanism, and the mechanic is unable to 
 handle his instruments. Drawing deteriorates, writing is 
 impaired and defective. The liquid "r" a sound which 
 children acquire late becomes difficult, if not impossible 
 to pronounce. The speech test of general paralysis is 
 well known. The patient is unable to repeat such a sim- 
 ple formula as "round about the rugged rock the rag- 
 ged rascal ran," or "truly rural." 
 
 With the further advance of the process, such simple 
 actions as picking up a pin, or threading a needle are ex- 
 ecuted with great difficulty, and much hesitation. To 
 produce a straight line or to draw a circle becomes im- 
 possible. Involuntary tremor is predominant, a tremor, 
 the rhythmical regularity of which becomes fully mani- 
 fested in senile degeneration, and which is also observed, 
 though without its rhythmical regularity, on the very 
 eve of mental life, in infancy. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 REPRODUCTION AND THE REFLEX MOMENT 
 
 WE have described the moment-conscious- 
 ness as being stimulated to activity, as 
 emerging, as assimilating new material, 
 as growing and developing, as passing 
 through many stages in the history of its individual 
 evolution and dissolution. All this tacitly implies anoth- 
 er characteristic besides the ones found as belonging 
 to the nature of the moment. The moment-conscious- 
 ness has the function of reproduction. We have inci- 
 dentally discussed reproduction of the moment-con- 
 sciousness, but we have not studied this character more 
 closely from the standpoint of the moment's general 
 nature. 
 
 A close inspection of the moment-consciousness re- 
 veals the fact that every moment-consciousness can be 
 reproduced as long as it is not destroyed, as long as it 
 is not dissolved into its constituent elements. For as 
 long as the moment exists, each time when it is stimu- 
 lated to activity the manifestation of its content, both 
 sensory and motor, is ipso facto the moment's repro- 
 duction. What remains for us to investigate is the 
 various modes and forms of reproduction, and also 
 the conditions under which they occur. 
 
 The simplest case we may suppose is a moment- 
 consciousness set into activity by an appropriate stimu- 
 lus. This activity runs a certain course and comes to 
 an end; it ceases when the purpose of the moment is 
 
 317 
 
318 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 accomplished. A second stimulus will call forth a rep- 
 etition of the activity, a recurrence of the phenomena; 
 a third, a fourth, a fifth stimulus of the same kind will 
 each time call to life the moment-consciousness; the 
 moment will be produced again, will be reproduced. A 
 repetition of the specific appropriate stimulus will be 
 followed by a reproduction of the moment. 
 
 The reappearance of the moment presents a series 
 of moments situated at a distance of different time in- 
 tervals. The members of this series are disconnected, 
 inasmuch as each member does not contain the fact of 
 its previous appearance. The present functioning ac- 
 tivity is not felt in the moment by some modification 
 effected in the content, it is not cognized as a reappear- 
 ance. This is impossible from the very character of 
 this form of reproduction, since the emerging moment 
 is supposed to appear with an unchanged content, 
 while modifications, feeling, and cognition of previous 
 appearances require something added to the moment 
 which makes it different in content. The members in 
 such a series are disconnected and do not enter into re- 
 lation. Each moment presents a separate beat of con- 
 sciousness. The previous appearances of the moment 
 are not represented in its subsequent appearances; 
 each one stands by itself. No modification is pro- 
 duced in the organization of the moment by the 
 previous history of its life activity, no "trace" is left 
 by and of former experience. On each occasion the 
 same psychic content is reproduced. 
 
 Since the form of consciousness, now under considera- 
 tion, is of such a nature as to have no modification left by 
 each separate beat of the moment, no connections are 
 formed by the fact of functioning. Only that connec- 
 
Reproduction and the Reflex Moment 319 
 
 tion exists which is given in the organic constitution. 
 In other words, we may say that a being with such a 
 type of moment-consciousness does not profit by indi- 
 vidual experience ; it does not, and cannot get any ac- 
 quired characters during its individual life existence. It 
 lives only by what has been obtained by the process of 
 natural selection, during the life history of the species. 
 Primary sensory elements are certainly present, but 
 secondary sensory elements may be absent as it de- 
 pends entirely as to whether such connections requisite 
 for secondary sensory elements have been established 
 by variation and natural selection in the phylogenetic 
 history of the moment. We may possibly say that 
 while such connections are absent in a lower stage of 
 the moment, they are present in a higher stage. Both 
 stages, however, lack the formation of acquired char- 
 acters during their individual history. 
 
 Such states of the moment consciousness may be large- 
 ly hypothetical, but they are probably present in the very 
 lowest representatives in the scale of evolution. The 
 throwing out of pseudopodia in the amoeba are as per- 
 fect in the daughter amoeba as in the mother before 
 fusion has taken place. The young vorticella is 
 just as efficient as its parent in its sudden spring-like re- 
 actions of contracture and expansion, both of its body 
 and of its long attached thread-like fibre. What is pres- 
 ent is in all probability some primitive primary 
 psycho-biological element, a germ out of which the ele- 
 ments of the higher forms of psychic life have differ- 
 entiated. 
 
 The structure and functions of the higher forms 
 of life have become differentiated out of the homo- 
 geneous activity of lower forms. The sensory nerve 
 
320 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 cell, the recipient of the stimulation, like the 
 muscle cell, the reagent to stimuli, has evolved 
 from the primitive cell by greater and greater differ- 
 entiation, both of structure and function. In the crus- 
 taceans, invertebrates, and lower vertebrates where mo- 
 tor reactions to stimuli are more or less complex and 
 varied, the sensory aspect of the moment is probably cor- 
 respondingly complicated, — organic connections are 
 present giving rise to secondary sensory elements, con- 
 stituting the material of perceptual life. 
 
 The soft-bodied hermit crab as soon as he hatches out 
 from the egg looks for a shell to fit his body in, to pro- 
 tect it from danger, and does the fitting and measuring 
 of the shell with as delicate a nicety and circumspection 
 as his seemingly more experienced older relatives. As 
 a matter of fact, experience does not count here, — a 
 baby hermit-crab is as learned as its parent. Not even 
 organic modifications are acquired, the organization or 
 mechanism is ready, and the first appropriate stimulus 
 sets into activity reactions to external conditions in the 
 most perfect way of which this organization is capable. 
 The butterfly, the ant, the bee on emerging from their 
 chrysalis are as perfect in their reactions as any of the 
 adult individuals. Acquired characters count for noth- 
 ing, inherited organization is everything. 
 
 In the lower vertebrates such as fishes, acquired char- 
 acters, modifications formed during the life time 
 of the individual begin to appear, but this is only in its 
 germ; here too inherited organization is everything. 
 The mechanism is ready and perfect as soon as it comes 
 into life, and enters into relation with the condition of 
 the external environment. The moment-consciousness 
 concomitant with such a type of organization is perfect 
 
Reproduction and the Reflex Moment 321 
 
 from the start and has reached its maturity at birth. 
 The contents of the moment cannot be enriched, the in- 
 ternal relations cannot be improved, — no modifications 
 can be brought about in its sensory response and motor 
 reactions. External stimuli set the organization into 
 activity with an unvaried psychic content, with an unal- 
 terable psycho-physiological structure and motor mani- 
 festations. The content of such a moment is fixed and 
 unalterable. This low stage differs but little from reflex 
 activity; in fact, such a type of psychosis may be termed 
 reflex moment-consciousness. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 DESULTORY CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 THE characteristic feature of the reflex mo- 
 ment-consciousness is its activity on single 
 lines of sensori-motor reaction. This is well 
 seen in the more differentiated form of this 
 stage of psycho-physiological organization. In the as- 
 cidian, for instance, we meet with one sensory nerve 
 cell connected with the muscular reacting apparatus. 
 This is of the nature of reflex action found also in the 
 higher representatives of the life series. In the high- 
 er forms of the fixed moment some connections are 
 formed, several sensory ganglia are connected ; the ac- 
 tion may then become more varied. In the still higher 
 stages of the same form many systems of ganglia of 
 several organs become connected, thus giving rise to 
 a highly differentiated sensori-motor apparatus. 
 
 At this stage secondary sensory elements enter into 
 the content synthetized by the moment-consciousness. 
 What, however, characterizes all these forms as be- 
 longing to the same type of moment-consciousness, is 
 the fact of their being unmodifiable, fixed in their or- 
 ganization. The moment does not get modified by its 
 recurrent manifestations. The organization does not 
 get improved by repetition. Things are in statu quo 
 since the time of birth. The moment, not being modi- 
 fiable by its previous occurrence, when stimulated, 
 emerges each time with an unchangeable content. Each 
 time the moment recurs, it shows not the slightest trace 
 
 322 
 
Desultory Consciousness 323 
 
 of its former life activity. 
 
 The various reproductions of this type of moment- 
 consciousness presents a disconnected series. The mo- 
 ment at each time of its occurrence may, psychologi- 
 cally, be regarded as an entirely new moment, inas- 
 much as it bears no trace of its having been in activity 
 once before. To an objective observer confronted for 
 the first time with this type of moment, the latter ap- 
 pears, and rightly so, as if it were just come into the 
 world. The moment is regarded as reproduced, not 
 by a mark inherent in its constitution, due to the fact 
 of its recurrence, but by modifications in the observer. 
 In short, the moment in its recurrent manifestations 
 presents a disconnected series. 
 
 If we look at consciousness from the standpoint of 
 serial relationship, then the disconnected moments in 
 the series appear as separate, as isolated. This isola- 
 tion of the members in the series is the chief character- 
 istic of this type of moment-consciousness which may 
 then be termed desultory consciousness. 
 
 The moment consciousness of the desultory type 
 may also be represented in a more hypothetical form. 
 There may be a type of consciousness in which the mo- 
 ment does not recur at all. Each moment appears and 
 vanishes, never to come again, and is followed by an- 
 other moment of a totally different content. The mo- 
 ments have no relation to one another. The antece- 
 dent moment is totally, and we may say absolutely dis- 
 connected from the subsequent moment. The series of 
 moments appearing are unrelated and are also different 
 in content. The moments appear like a series of suc- 
 cessive bubbles, each bubble bursting, vanishing, giving 
 place to a new bubble, and so on. There is oq connec- 
 
324 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 tion between the successive moments, neither in rela- 
 tion nor in matter. Such a moment is a purely desul- 
 tory form of consciousness and may possibly be pres- 
 ent in the completely unorganized, non-nucleated proto- 
 plasm. 
 
 The lack of a definite stable organization may result 
 in an indefinite mass of sensory responses and motor re- 
 actions, hence with a changeable, indefinite psychic con- 
 tent. When life becomes more differentiated and or- 
 ganization appears, then the psychic content becomes or- 
 ganized in a recurrent desultory moment-consciousness , 
 with a more or less definite content. Amorphous life 
 has as its concomitant amorphous psychosis. 
 
 Reproduction probably begins with the more or less 
 definite formation of the moment and its nuclear ele- 
 ment. When the moment-consciousness appears to be 
 definitely organized then reproduction is present. In 
 other words, reproduction is a fundamental characteris- 
 tic of the formed moment-consciousness. The reproduc- 
 tion of the moment, the type of which we have just an- 
 alysed, is fixed in its activity, unmodifiable in its func- 
 tion from the very start of its entering into relations 
 with the external environment. This type of moment 
 is of such a nature as not to admit of further growth 
 after it has come into the world and has begun to func- 
 tion ; it admits of no improvement, of no modification. 
 
 It is interesting to find that such a type of moment- 
 consciousness is not altogether absent in the very highest 
 forms of psychic life. Under certain conditions we 
 meet in the higher mental types with a form of 
 moment-consciousness closely resembling the fixed 
 moments of the lower forms of psychic life. In 
 the degenerative states of idiocy, we find the moment 
 to be of the desultory type. The moment is fixed, admits 
 
Desultory Consciousness 325 
 
 of no further growth; the moment recurring at more 
 or less regular intervals. Such are the rhythmical move- 
 ments often observed in low types of idiots, movements 
 that are closely allied to those of the vorticella type. 
 
 In the pathological states known as hypnoidic, found 
 in many forms of amnesia, in somnambulistic states, in 
 the so-called "psychic equivalents" of epilepsy and in the 
 pure "psychic epilepsies," the moment possesses a definite 
 content, highly organized, of course, considering the 
 stage in which it occurs, but essentially fixed in its char- 
 acter, not capable, not admitting of any changes, of any 
 improvements. The hypnoidic state resembles more the 
 desultory reproductive movement of the second stage 
 with a highly varied and differentiated content, but oth- 
 erwise fixed in character. The hypnoidic state, when- 
 ever it appears, recurs with a content unchangeable, un- 
 modified by the previous repetitions; it acquires no 
 new, no modified characters in the course of its repro- 
 ductions. Previous reproductions leave no trace behind. 
 The hypnoidic state always appears fresh and new, as if 
 coming into the world for the first time, not bearing the 
 stamp of its life history. 
 
 An inspection of the hypnoidic state, when it oc- 
 curs, does not in the least reveal the fact of 
 its having had a past, of its having similarly ap- 
 peared once before. The hypnoidic state is the past 
 itself, and nothing more than the past. Like the mo- 
 ment-consciousness of the crustacean, or that of the in- 
 vertebrate, it reacts to the stimuli of the external en- 
 vironment with a given moment-content, with a definite 
 set of highly complicated sensori-motor reactions. From 
 this standpoint the hypnoidic state may be regarded as a 
 reversion to a primitive form of psychic life, it is 
 a reversion to the fixed moment of the desultory type. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 THE SYNTHETIC MOMENT AND ITS REPRODUCTION 
 
 IN our last analysis we have examined the trait of 
 reproduction in the lowest types of psychic life, 
 such as the different forms of desultory moment- 
 consciousness. We may now turn to the higher 
 types of moments and show that in them, too, the same 
 fundamental character is present, only of course, be- 
 coming more complicated and more differentiated with 
 the progress of psychic life. The moment which we 
 have thus far studied is one in which growth is impossi- 
 ble as the reproduction of the moment does not embody 
 the previous manifestations of the moment. In other 
 words, the type examined is of such a character as only 
 to synthetize content within the occurring moment, but 
 it lacks synthesis of moments themselves. The repro- 
 duction is of inherited content, it is phylogenetic in na- 
 ture. We turn now to higher types of moments in which 
 content and moments are synthetized alike. Such a type 
 of psychic activity may be termed synthetic conscious- 
 ness, and its moment the synthetic moment-conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 The reproduction of the synthetic moment-conscious- 
 ness is not isolated, it stands in relation to the antecedent 
 and subsequent moments. Each reproduction modifies 
 the next one to a certain degree, however, slight that 
 may be. The moment is essentially modifiable and capa- 
 ble of improvement up to a certain point of which its 
 internal organization permits. The reproduction of the 
 
 3 26 
 
The Synthetic Moment and Its Reproduction 327 
 
 synthetic type bears in its organization the stamp of its 
 previous life history. We may say that just as the mo- 
 ment of the desultory type is an epitome of phylogenetic 
 evolution, so is the moment of the synthetic type an epi- 
 tome of ontogenetic development. 
 
 In its lowest form the synthetic moment undergoes 
 modification by the fact of previous functioning ac- 
 tivity. The synthetic moment in its reproduction may 
 be represented in a series of moments, each repro- 
 duced moment is modified by the preceding moment 
 and in its turn modifies the succeeding moment. The 
 series is interrelated and interconnected. Each link in 
 the series includes the previous link, and is in its turn 
 included by the succeeding link. Each member in the 
 series possesses itself of the wealth and being of its 
 predecessor, and is itself inherited by its successor. The 
 whole series is really a history of the continued growth 
 and development of the one moment-consciousness 
 passing through various stages in the way of reaching 
 maturity, both in structure and function. 
 
 It is true that once the synthetic moment has reached 
 its maturity it may go on reproducing in the same way 
 as the desultory moment, but the element of modifica- 
 tion is still present, although it cannot be so clearly 
 seen by a superficial examination. To detect this 
 element of modifying influence of one reproduction on 
 the succeeding one, we must watch the moment closely 
 and, if possible, experiment on it. As long as the con- 
 tent of the moment remains relatively unchanged, no 
 change is observed in its reproductions after having 
 reached the acme of development. Should, however, 
 some change be introduced during the functioning of 
 the moment, at once this modification reappears on the 
 
328 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 reproduction of the moment. 
 
 A change may be introduced in the moment in a 
 somewhat different way, namely, by letting it rest for 
 a time longer than requisite for its restitution by arrest- 
 ing its activity. This introduces a change in the inter- 
 nal constitution of the moment, weakening the intensity 
 of its activity, or loosening the co-ordination of its in- 
 ternal relationship. The co-ordination and activity 
 of the psychic elements synthetized in the moment be- 
 come shaken; the stability of the moment is interfered 
 with; its equilibrium gained in growth and develop- 
 ment by the successive series of modifications is partial- 
 ly overthrown ; the moment becomes unstable, its struc- 
 ture and function regress and fall back a few steps 
 lower in the course of its adaptation to the conditions 
 of the external environment, adaptations acquired dur- 
 ing the life history of its individual development. The 
 mere arrest of the moment's function for a shorter or 
 longer period at once tells on the subsequent reproduc- 
 tion of the moment. The function of the moment suc- 
 ceeding the period of arrest is less perfect; the moment 
 is less adapted in its reactions to external stimuli. 
 These facts, it seems, clearly indicate that in reaching 
 maturity the moment has not lost its capacity for 
 adaptability and modification. 
 
 Furthermore, the fact of arrest with subsequent 
 modification and degradation of function shows that 
 the adaptation reached by the moment in its mature 
 state is really kept in stable equilibrium by its more 
 cr less continued reproduction. Each reproduction of 
 the moment is indispensable to the existence of the 
 next one, and manifests its influence by maintaining 
 the succeeding moment in the stage of maturity reached 
 
The Synthetic Moment and Its Reproduction 329 
 
 by the long series of modifications. 
 
 The moment of the synthetic type profits by experi- 
 ence, the moment of the desultory type does not. We 
 realize now the difference between the moment of the 
 desultory type and the moment of the synthetic type. 
 The desultory reproductive moment is highly stable in 
 its organization, formed by variations and the iron hand 
 of natural selection; it is crystalized in character, func- 
 tion does not effect its organization. The reproductive 
 moment of the synthetic type, however, while having on 
 the one hand as its basis a functioning apparatus, formed 
 in the course of phylogenesis, has on the other hand a 
 large capacity for modification, and is mainly built up by 
 function; it is profoundly modified by its own function- 
 ing activity. In other words, while the moment of the 
 desultory type is entirely organic in its nature, the mo- 
 ment of the synthetic type is mainly of a functional char- 
 acter. The contrast between the two types of moment 
 may be summarized in the one phrase: "function vs. 
 structure." The aphorism "function maketh structure" 
 holds good only of the synthetic moment. 
 
 In speaking of the fact that the synthetic moment 
 profits by its experience, while the desultory moment does 
 not, we must be guarded against the term 'experience.' 
 For it implies a psychic state belonging to a higher type 
 of moment-consciousness, and it is misleading, unless the 
 term be qualified, when used for a lower type of psychic 
 life. Experience would imply that the moment under 
 consideration has an idea of its state and remembering 
 it takes on another occasion advantage of its acquired 
 knowledge. Nothing of the kind occurs in the synthetic 
 type. The synthetic moment has no knowledge of what 
 is taking place in its psychic activity, it is not conscious 
 
330 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 of the states it is living through. The only knowledge 
 the synthetic moment possesses is the one characteristic 
 of sensory life in general, — it is somewhat like what 
 some writers term knowledge of acquaintance. The 
 content of the synthetic moment only approaches to this 
 form of knowledge, which is really different in nature, 
 inasmuch as "knowledge of acquaintance" is only a 
 lower stage of mental activity characteristic of a higher 
 type of moment than the one under investigation. 
 Knowledge of acquaintance implies a sensation also the 
 free image and free idea of that sensation. The synthetic 
 type on the contrary has only the sensation, the free 
 image and idea are totally wanting. 
 
 The psychic life of the infant is probably the near- 
 est that comes up to the nature of knowledge or ex- 
 perience characteristic of the synthetic moment. I say 
 that the infant's psychic life comes nearest to that of 
 the synthetic moment, but still the two are not exactly 
 the same. In the infant's consciousness, however 
 young, free images and ideas are potential and on the 
 way to germinate, while the synthetic moment lacks 
 this potentiality, inasmuch as the synthetic moment 
 reaches its full development without giving rise to free 
 psychic elements. The consciousness of the infant is a 
 low stage of a high type of moment-consciousness; 
 while the synthetic consciousness is a high stage of a 
 low type of moment-consciousness. The high stage of 
 a low type and the low stage of a high type may be 
 respectively illustrated by the algebraic formulae: 
 (a-\-b) n and (a+b J rc+d J re J \-f- i r . . . . )* where a, b, c, d 
 .... are the functions of the moment and n the de- 
 gree of development of the moment. 
 
 The consciousness of the young infant as closely re- 
 
The Synthetic Moment and Its Reproduction 33 1 
 
 sembles the synthetic moment as the fish stage of the 
 human embryo resembles the fish itself. Still the anal- 
 ogy is useful as it gives a closer insight into the consti- 
 tution and relations of the two types of moment-con- 
 sciousness. The infant in its psychic growth no doubt 
 passes through the inferior types of moment-conscious- 
 ness, but in a most general and sketchy form. The 
 ontogenesis of psychic life is probably as much an epi- 
 tome of its phylogenesis as the ontogenesis of biosis 
 is an epitome of its phylogenesis. Both give a most 
 generalized epitome modified by adaptations and by 
 the specific type of organization in which the ontogene- 
 tic evolution is taking place. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 THE ACCUMULATIVE CHARACTER OF THE SYNTHETIC 
 
 MOMENT 
 
 T 
 
 ""^HE experience of the synthetic moment 
 means not consciousness of the presented 
 content, but simply modification of psychic 
 function. The experience of the functioning 
 moment influences the content on its next reproduction. 
 If A is the original functioning synthetic moment and 
 bi, &2, bs, b* its modifications due to the functioning ac- 
 tivity, then the successive reproductions of the moment 
 may be represented by the following formula : A, Ai&i, 
 A2&2, A3&3, A«^, A0&5 until it reaches its maturity or state 
 of stable equilibrium, say A Q b n . The whole series may 
 be represented by the formula : A, Ai£i, AJ?*, A>b* — 
 A n b n . Each member of the series reproduces in an 
 epitomized form all the members that preceded it and 
 the last one, the mature moment in its state of equil- 
 ibrium, representing an epitome of the whole series. 
 The series in its successive stages represents the life 
 history of the growth and development of the synthetic 
 moment. 
 
 Concrete examples may help to make the matter 
 clearer. The fish in making repeated attacks on an- 
 other fish contained in the same tank and meeting re- 
 peatedly with failures will finally desist from its at- 
 tempts. The fish that has been snapped at many times 
 and has escaped will keep away from the dangerous 
 place. This does not mean that the fish remembers its 
 experiences, that it is conscious of its failures, of the 
 
 332 
 
Accumulative Character of Synthetic Moment 333 
 
 futility of its attacks, or that it knows that yon- 
 der is a dangerous place which is to be avoided. 
 The whole matter is far simpler. Each repeated fail- 
 ure modifies the moment-consciousness so that the con- 
 tent slightly changes, the unsuccessful motor reactions 
 diminish and finally disappear, while in their place 
 others are substituted. Thus the fish on perceiving its 
 prey may either avoid it and swim away, or it may 
 keep quiet simply following the prey with its eye. 
 
 The chick on emerging from the egg may peck at its 
 excrements a few times, but each time the disgust ex- 
 perienced modifies the moment. The reaction of the next 
 moment, when confronted with the same stimulus, be- 
 comes less vigorous and finally with the reproductions of 
 the moment, the adaptation becomes so perfect that the 
 mere sight of the disagreeable object suffices to repel the 
 chick and make it turn aside. Here once more it is not 
 that the chick remembers the disgust, and as soon as it is 
 confronted with its excrements, its straightway remem- 
 bers the disgust it has experienced. This is to ascribe a 
 high form of consciousness to a moment of a low type. 
 The process that has taken place is simpler. The disgust 
 experienced has so modified the sensory motor reactions 
 of the moment that finally different reactions result in 
 response to definite stimulations under definite condi- 
 tions. 
 
 The same holds true of the cat, and the dog. The 
 first weeks of their life kittens or puppies are unable to 
 walk well, they seem to pick their way continuously; 
 gradually they learn to walk and run; the dog soon be- 
 gins to race and the cat becomes graceful and nimble in 
 its movements. It will certainly be agreed that 
 young puppies or young kittens do not actually remem- 
 
334 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 ber the steps of their experiences. What happens is 
 that the activity of the organs, along with the growth 
 of the corresponding motor cells, so modifies the func- 
 tion that the walking becomes more and more perfect 
 until it reaches perfect adaptation. 
 
 The same thing occurs in the training of brutes. It 
 is not that the brute remembers the steps of the process, 
 and knows how improvement has taken place by a given 
 way of action. In the process of training modifications 
 are brought about by each successive reproduction of the 
 moments in response to the action of external stimuli. 
 Modifications due to successful chance action, being 
 more satisfactory to the brute, are stronger and modify 
 the moment in their own direction, while unsuccessful 
 reactions tend to drop out and thus adaptation, improve- 
 ment is brought about. The cat in scratching for the 
 door to open it scratches at first aimlessly and does not 
 open, — the actions are unsuccessful. Should the cat hap- 
 pen to scratch the handle and open the door, which 
 certainly is probable, considering the activity of the cat's 
 paw, the result is satisfactory. The repetitions of 
 such chance actions will gradually so modify the cat's 
 scratching that it will become more and more definite. 
 The successful actions alone will be repeated, the un- 
 successful will drop out. Finally the adaptation will 
 become so perfect that the sight of the closed door will 
 at once result in the reaction of scratching the handle 
 and opening the door. 
 
 The young bird is brought in the world in a rather 
 helpless condition as to movement of co-ordination, 
 especially flying movements. The apparatus for flying 
 is undeveloped, but it soon reaches its perfect adapta- 
 tion through activity, exercise, practice, that modify 
 
Accumulative Character of Synthetic Moment 335 
 
 both structure and function. The bird does not remem- 
 ber the steps of its acquisitions and profits by its failures 
 so as to make consciously better and more adaptive 
 movements. The process that takes place is far more 
 simple : Each act of functioning produces and repro- 
 duces modifications, both in structure and function, until 
 the apparatus and its activity reach perfect adaptation. 
 The total moment is modified on each reproduction until 
 a point is reached where further growth and develop- 
 ment ceases and maturity of function is established. 
 
 The same holds true in the case of the child. The 
 child on learning to sit is doing it in a very clumsy 
 fashion, tumbles over every time; it must be sup- 
 ported by pillows to keep it in the same position and also 
 to prevent it from being hurt. The structure works im- 
 perfectly. The exercise of the apparatus, along with 
 its further growth, brings about a more perfect adapta- 
 tion, and the child finally learns to maintain its equi- 
 librium when in the sitting posture. The standing up- 
 right passes through a similar history. When the co- 
 ordinating apparatus for walking begins to appear, it 
 works at first in a very awkward manner. The child 
 first walks by holding on to some objects, such as chairs, 
 or the wall, or the hand of his parent and nurse. When 
 he makes a step all by himself, he is almost frightened, 
 and when left alone often cries. 
 
 Practice and growth of the walking apparatus be- 
 comes more and more perfect. The child makes two 
 or three steps hesitatingly, stops, asks for help and sup- 
 port. Gradually his movements become more certain, 
 and more steps are taken until finally the child learns 
 to walk, still imperfectly, in the waddling fashion 
 characteristic of young age. The walking apparatus 
 
336 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 grows and keeps on functioning. The function reacts 
 on the further growth making the movements more 
 and more perfect. Each attempt makes the next one 
 easier. Adaptations develop not only by the mere 
 growth of the apparatus, but also by function. In fact 
 function largely determines the growth of the appar- 
 atus. 
 
 It must, however, be pointed out that the example 
 taken from baby life may be used only as an illustra- 
 tion of the way the synthetic moment grows by func- 
 tion or reproduction. The child's growth does not ex- 
 actly follow the same lines as those of the synthetic 
 moment, since the psychic life of man develops on a 
 higher level belonging to a higher type of moment. In 
 the efforts of the baby to walk some germs of deliber- 
 ation and reflection may be observed, but it is hardly 
 probable that these elements are present in the first 
 attempts of the cat to walk or of the bird to fly. The mo- 
 ment of the synthetic type grows by simple modifica- 
 tions of its function brought about by its repeated re- 
 productions. 
 
 The modifications, however, of the moment's func- 
 tion are not mere chance modifications. The function, 
 is modified on a definite line in the direction of more 
 perfect adaptation. 
 
 Reactions to stimuli coming from the external en- 
 vironment become more defined until a definite set of 
 reactions is established. This involves the selective ac- 
 tivity of the moment. Certain fit reactions are selected 
 and assimilated by the moment, while others, unfit are 
 rejected. This, however, is a trait which is character- 
 istic not only of the synthetic moment, but of the mo- 
 ment-consciousness in general. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 THE SIMPLE AND COMPOUND SYNTHETIC MOMENT 
 
 A FURTHER examination of the synthetic 
 moment reveals two stages, a lower and a 
 higher. The moment may consist of a nu- 
 cleus having only one kind of sensory ele- 
 ments and of a net-work of subsidiary relations belong- 
 ing to the domain of the same sensory elements. The 
 animal may trace its food or its prey by the sense of 
 smell alone. This act becomes more perfect with further 
 function. The modifications accumulate in the domain 
 of the same sense-element and the adaptations occur in a 
 relatively simple one-sided sensori-motor apparatus. 
 Modifications of such a character occur phylogenetically 
 in the sensory apparatus of the lower invertebrates, such 
 as Crustacea, arthropodes, and possibly also in the lower 
 forms of vertebrates. Such a phylogenetic accumula- 
 tion in these low types of moments is formed only by 
 variation and natural selection, while in the case of the 
 synthetic moment the accumulation is formed during 
 the life history of the particular individual. The one 
 is racial acquisition, the other is individual experience. 
 Both, however, may agree in the general character of 
 the modification effected. The modifications are in one 
 sensory organ, and the psychic moment-content consists 
 of similar sense-elements. Such a stage of psychic ac- 
 tivity may be termed simple accumulative synthetic mo- 
 ment-consciousness. 
 
 If A represents the first occurrence of the moment, the 
 
 337 
 
338 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 first functioning of the simple sensori-motor apparatus 
 as given by phylogenesis, and if a be the modification ef- 
 fected, then the accumulative process may be represented 
 by the powers of a; thus the first will be A, the next 
 is Aifl 1 , the following is A?a\ then A*a and so on. The 
 total process to the point of maturity may be represented 
 by the following formula : A, A^a 1 , A?a% Asa 3 , A*a\ .... 
 A n a n . A n a n represents the highest stage of perfection 
 reached by the simple accumulative synthetic mo- 
 ment. 
 
 The synthetic moment may also have a higher stage 
 where many different sensori-motor elements are syn- 
 thetized, the accumulative modifications occur along 
 different lines of sensory responses and motor reac- 
 tions. The moment reaches here the highest form of 
 consciousness as mere perceptual in character. The 
 fish perceives its prey not only by smell, but also by 
 sight along with muscular and touch sensations; all 
 of them go to form the percept of the prey yonder, as 
 far as perception of fish space is concerned. 
 
 The American flounder of the Atlantic coast may be 
 taken as an illustration. Although the flounder is per- 
 fectly quiet, almost lying motionless at the bottom of 
 the tank, only occasionally moving his small protrud- 
 ing eye, no sooner is some small fly thrown into the 
 tank, than the flounder at once darts in that direction, 
 and attacks its prey with a snap. I wanted to find out 
 how far visual perception is concerned in the tracing 
 of the prey, and how far sense of smell and touch are 
 important in this particular fish at least. The flounder 
 was deprived of its organs of sight, and after having 
 been given about twenty-four hours time to recover 
 from the effects of the operation, it was thrown into a 
 
The Simple and Compound Synthetic Moment 339 
 
 tank teeming with little fishes on which it feeds. 
 
 The flounder settled to the bottom, but in about a few 
 minutes raised itself in the attitude of attack, so highly 
 characteristic of this species, either smelling the little 
 ones or feeling the vibrations made in the water by the 
 swimming movements of the little fish; it made a dart 
 in the direction of a whole mass of them, but missed. 
 This has been repeated many times over, the flounder 
 failing every time and only snapping water or air bub- 
 bles. The little folk soon became emboldened and 
 avoiding his front they came from behind pecking at 
 his blind eye. The flounder could not reach these lit- 
 tle fellows. 
 
 Moreover, the bottom of the tank where the 
 blind flounder was lying was full of small sea-robins 
 which like to walk on the bottom with their high- 
 ly sensitive leg-feelers. The blind flounder did not at- 
 tack them, although with his eyes in good order, he 
 would have instantly attacked the sea-robins. It ap- 
 pears then that the flounder tracks its prey by the sense 
 of sight mainly, while the other senses are indefinite 
 guides. Still the other senses seem to take an active 
 part in tracing the prey, as the blind flounder was most 
 of the time in an attitude of attack. Evidently he was 
 smelling the prey or feeling its movements all the time 
 and was aware of its presence, though the senses with- 
 out sight could not give him the definite direction in 
 which the prey was to be found. In other words, the 
 other senses awaken only the sensations of presence of 
 the food, but do not give its direction and location. 
 
 It is highly probable, then, as far as we can infer from 
 this experiment as to the psychic state of the fish, that 
 the flounder does not get a definite percept, unless 
 
34° Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 many different sensory elements are combined in a 
 synthesis giving rise to a well defined motor reaction 
 of more or less perfect adaptation. The synthetic mo- 
 ment, then, in this particular species at least, seems to 
 be of a highly complex character, inasmuch as many 
 different sense-elements go to make up its content. 
 
 Similarly it is affirmed of the sea-robin that, if its deli- 
 cate leg-feelers are cut off, the fish is unable to feed. If 
 that be true, then the touch sensation is important here 
 and enters as a determining element in the moment 
 along with other elements coming from other sense- 
 organs. In the dog smell is mainly the determining 
 factor, but the functioning of other senses are requisite 
 to form secondary sensory elements; here too the mo- 
 ment is made up of many series of various sense-ele- 
 ments. In the bird, in the ape, in the man, sight is the 
 chief element in perception, but the percept arises not 
 from visual elements alone, but from a synthesis of 
 a multitude of elements coming from other sense-or- 
 gans the visual elements often taking the lead. 
 
 From a purely biological standpoint we can under- 
 stand the importance of the leading part played by the 
 visual elements in the psychic life of the higher verte- 
 brates and especially of that of man. It is of the 
 greatest advantage in the struggle for existence to de- 
 velop a sense organ that admits of the most delicate 
 objective discrimination. No other senses, not even 
 that of hearing, are so free from the general organic 
 sensation as the sense of sight. Hence the sensory 
 elements coming from the sense organs other than 
 sight are confused and lack the objective clearness 
 characteristic of the sense of sight. The visual sense 
 further is of the highest sensitivity to extremely low 
 
The Simple and Compound Synthetic Moment 341 
 
 and distant stimulations such as are produced by ether 
 waves. An animal therefore that will by natural se- 
 lection have its moment consciousness organized round 
 a nucleus of highest sensitivity such as that of visual 
 sense elements will have better chances to survive and 
 succeed in the struggle for existence. Still, even 
 in man the elements coming from other sense 
 organs may become predominating in the nucleus 
 and give rise to various mental types, such as audiles, 
 motiles, and so on. This holds specially true of the 
 higher representative elements. A moment-conscious- 
 ness that has a varied content of many different sen- 
 sory-elements synthetized in one compound, accompan- 
 ied on the motor side with a complex of motor reac- 
 tions may be termed compound synthetic moment-con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 The compound synthetic moment-consciousness is 
 characterized in its series of accumulations in the same 
 way as is the simple synthetic moment, the only differ- 
 ence being the complexity of the lines of accumula- 
 tions. The accumulated sensori-elements of the same 
 kind or of the same sense-organ form primary com- 
 pounds among themselves and secondary or double 
 and treble compounds with other compounded series of 
 sensory elements. If V represents the original pri- 
 mary visual sensory element, T tactual, A auditory, O 
 olfactory, and M muscular sensory elements, then the 
 series for the development of the highly adapted A 
 aspect of the moment may be represented by the form- 
 ula already given, in our analysis, namely: A, Aia 1 , 
 A 2 a 2 , Asa*, A4a 4 .... A n a n . The V aspect of the moment 
 similarly gives V, V^v 1 , V=v 2 , Vsv 8 , V*v\ . . . V n V n . 
 
 The T, O, and M series will give respectively the 
 
34 2 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 following formulae : 
 
 T, T\t, TV, Tst f , T<t 4 Txot 10 T n r\ 
 
 O, do, Oo 3 , Oao 3 , Cho 4 0-o 10 O n o n . 
 
 M, Mim, M^m 2 , IVW, Mm 4 M.om 10 . . . M n m n . 
 
 The process of composition begins not at the first 
 members of the series, but rather further on. Some 
 accumulations must be made first in each series sepa- 
 rately before combinations of the different series can 
 take place. For simplicity sake we may postulate that 
 the process of composition of all lines begins in each 
 alike, although this may not be the case; let us assume 
 that such a process begins in the tenth stage of the ser- 
 ies. Before that, say in the third stage compositions may 
 be found only on two or three lines, such as WT^ 8 or 
 still further V 5 vT 5 t 5 M 5 m 5 , or WTVCW Mem 9 . The V 
 precedes in the formula indicating its primary import- 
 ance in the case of the moment where the visual sensory 
 elements are mainly the guide for sensori-motor reac- 
 tions, the visual sensations constituting the leading and 
 central elements of the compound. In a moment of 
 the same type but with a differently related content O or 
 A may be the main elements of the compound, an ele- 
 ment round which other sense-elements become grouped. 
 The formula may then be OsoT^Msm 6 , or in the case 
 where A is predominant A^TsfMsm 5 , etc. The syn- 
 thetic moment will from its starting point, say VWTiot 10 
 Oioo 10 Aioa 10 Mium 10 proceed onward, reaching its height of 
 development and adaptation in the compound V n v n 
 T n t n O n o n A n a n M n m n . This last stage of the moment 
 has at its disposal the accumulations of all the 
 previous synthetic moments both simple and com- 
 
The Simple and Compound Synthetic Moment 343 
 
 pound. The compound synthetic moment is the heir 
 of all previous acquisitions and accumulations, and, as 
 such, may be characterized as the compound, accumula- 
 tive, synthetic moment. 
 
 Although the simple synthetic moment and the com- 
 pound moment differ in character and complexity of 
 content, they still agree in one general trait character- 
 istic of the synthetic moment, namely, fixed synthesis. 
 The series of sensory elements, both primary and sec- 
 ondary, that enter into the content of the moment are 
 firmly combined. The elements of such compounds 
 cannot get disengaged and do not therefore exist in a 
 free state, they form stable compounds. 
 
 The form of reproduction common to all the 
 moments thus far examined is that of reinstate- 
 ment. The sensori-motor elements of the moment 
 are reinstated in all their reality. The moment 
 in its successive stages of reproduction is brought 
 to life by impressions coming from external stimuli. 
 Primary and secondary sense-elements enter into the 
 moment's constitution whenever it reappears. In both 
 forms of the synthetic type, the moment with the recur- 
 rence of the reproductions, becomes enriched in sen- 
 sory elements, primary and secondary; but these ele- 
 ments must be present, and, from the very nature of 
 the types of moments under consideration, no other 
 elements can possibly be present. The series in which 
 the successive steps of the moment, desultory or syn- 
 thetic, manifests itself is composed entirely of sen- 
 sory elements, most or all of which vary but little from 
 one beat of the moment to the other. 
 
 The fact of the simple reinstatement is especially 
 clear in the case of the desultory moment. Each rein- 
 
344 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 stated moment induced by external stimuli is an exact 
 copy of its predecessor. In the synthetic moment the 
 content of two adjoining stages is a little varied, still 
 the sensory elements constituting the content of the 
 preceding moment is reinstated in the succeeding one. 
 It is true that even the desultory moment is not abso- 
 lutely smooth in its course of repetitions or reinstate- 
 ments. Interruptions of functions due to unfavorable 
 stimuli often occur within the series, interruptions, 
 which may be brought about by artificial conditions and 
 in which different psycho-motor responses are interpo- 
 lated, but these responses do not enter into the content 
 of the moment when the favorable conditions are re- 
 stored, — the responses do not become habitual. Thus 
 the rhythmical pulsations of the vorticella may be 
 temporarily arrested by the evaporation of the liquid 
 in which it is contained, but no number of evaporations 
 will change the series of rhythmical pulsations by hav- 
 ing stages of arrests interpolated into the series. Simi- 
 larly it is highly questionable whether a fly, beetle, or 
 cockroach could contract any habits. 
 
 Some eminent psychologists go to the length of af- 
 firming that even the lowest representative animal life, 
 the protozoa (possibly bacteria, bacilli), possess idea- 
 tional and volitional processes, that the lower stages of 
 mental life manifest association, reproduction, mem- 
 ory, cognition, and recognition. Other psychologists 
 are more moderate, they regard the acquisition of 
 knowledge as adaptation through habit, characteristic 
 of the lowest representative of animal life. Thus one 
 psychologist propounds the question, "How is it that 
 we or the brute learn to do anything?" Does the amoe- 
 ba learn at all? What belongs to our type of con- 
 
The Simple and Compound Synthetic Moment 345 
 
 sciousness is assumed as being true of all types — the 
 old psychological fallacy. "Learning," habits are bio- 
 logical variations characteristic of the higher types of 
 consciousness and are not present in the lower forms 
 of mental activity. 
 
 It is highly questionable whether the formation of 
 habits is possible even in the highest representatives of 
 the invertebrata, such as the bee and the ant. The 
 ant is probably largely guided by the sense of smell, 
 while the bee is prompted in its activity both by smell 
 and sight. The activities of these animals, though 
 highly complex, are still fixed in their character becom- 
 ing manifested with the recurrence of definite sensory 
 stimulations. The individual acquires nothing by ex- 
 perience and forms no habits; everything is formed by 
 the species. Spontaneous variation and natural selec- 
 tion are the only agencies of the relatively high or- 
 ganization and complex psycho-motor life-activity of 
 the higher types of the synthetic moment. 
 
 Habit is a character that does not belong to the 
 desultory moment, it comes only with the birth of the 
 synthetic moment. The fixed character of the desul- 
 tory moment admitting of no modifications precludes 
 the formation of any habits ; the moment's reproduction 
 therefore is reinstatement par excellence, — each repro- 
 duced moment being an exact copy of its original. The 
 individual presents only the history of the species. The 
 reproductions of the synthetic moment begin to show 
 the history of the modification which have appeared in 
 the course of the moment's life activity. Each recurrent 
 reproduction of the synthetic moment is an epitome of 
 its individual life-history, an epitome of its ontogenetic 
 psychogenesis. 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 
 THE DESULTORY TYPE IN PATHOLOGICAL STATES. 
 
 A FORM of reproduction analogous to the 
 ones present in the desultory moment is to 
 be found in various psychopathological 
 states. The nature of reproductions of the 
 hypnoidic states comes very near to the simple form of 
 reinstatement characteristic of the desultory moment. 
 The main feature of this pathological state is its re- 
 current sensory character isolated from the rest of the 
 individual's psychic life. Experiences emerging in 
 this state are actually lived over again. The hypnoidic 
 state is desultory, it forms no connected relations in its 
 various reproductions, it does not become modified by 
 its many occurrences, and the first stage is as rich 
 in psychic content as the last stage. The hyp- 
 noidic state is relatively fixed. Of course, between the 
 desultory moment and the hypnoidic state there is only 
 an analogy in the nature of functioning, otherwise the 
 states are actually different, inasmuch as they belong 
 to altogether different types of moments. 
 
 The nature of reinstatement characteristic of the re- 
 productions of the synthetic moment is clearly revealed 
 in the way modifications are effected and non-adaptive 
 reactions are eliminated. Sensory responses and mo- 
 tor reactions that have met with failure and evil con- 
 sequences are modified by degrees, in portions so to 
 say. The law that regulates the succession of the mod- 
 ifications effected is the order of the degree of harm 
 
 346 
 
The Desultory Type in Pathological States 347 
 
 consequent on the reactions to which the sensory re- 
 sponses lead. If then the most harmful reactions be- 
 long to the middle of the series of motor reactions 
 constituting the motor aspect of the moment, these 
 are modified by being gradually dropped out and oth- 
 ers substituted. The rest, the more or less indifferent 
 reactions of the series are gone through, although they 
 bear no longer any relation to the sensori-motor reac- 
 tions that have immediately preceded them. To an 
 external observer such reactions are ridiculous and un- 
 intelligible, since they cannot be understood with refer- 
 ence to their immediate antecedents; their nature can 
 only be made clear from the history of the moment. 
 
 Such traces in the organization of the synthetic mo- 
 ment are vestiges of previous useful functions, of a 
 series of adaptive reactions; they are like rudimentary 
 organs in the economy of the organism. Thus a chick 
 may peck repeatedly at his waste products or at a burn- 
 ing match and repeatedly wipe his bill; finally a marked 
 modification is brought about in its sensory responses 
 and reactions. When the chick is confronted with 
 those objects, it comes up to them, looks at them, does 
 not peck, but wipes its bill. To an external observer 
 to whom the history of the chick's experience is un- 
 known, the wiping of the bill would have been entirely 
 unintelligible. 
 
 Reinstatement can be similarly observed in cases 
 where conditions have changed, but the modification 
 has not yet been effected within the content of the mo- 
 ment. Thus the story of the actions of the hen that 
 brought her brood of chicks to the river and urged 
 them to swim would have appeared strange, possibly 
 mysterious, if not for our knowledge of the hen's 
 
348 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 former experience with a brood of ducklings. The 
 mode of reproduction of the synthetic moment is a 
 series of successive phases of more and more modified 
 reinstatements which can only become intelligible on 
 following up more or less closely the history of the 
 moment's development. 
 
 The forms of reinstatement characteristic of the 
 synthetic and desultory moments are to be found in 
 higher types of moments. When undergoing the pro- 
 cess of dissolution, secondary dementia, the terminus of 
 chronic insanity offers a wealth of facts at our disposal. 
 The mental states of secondary dementia are like the 
 ruins of great castles, like fossils of former growth of 
 vegetation and animal life. The active living moments 
 are disintegrated, decomposed and only some of the 
 constituents are left to function. These constituents, 
 remnants of former life-activity, are simply reinstated. 
 One who has not known the history of the case will 
 hardly comprehend the actions of the patient. Thus 
 one dement may keep on covering himself with a 
 blanket, or hiding himself into corners. He who is ig- 
 norant of the history of the case would regard the ac- 
 tion as capricious and meaningless, he would hardly 
 guess from the patient's actions that the latter when in a 
 state of chronic melancholia labored under the delu- 
 sion that he was made of glass, and that people could 
 see the actions of his guts. The synthetized and sys- 
 tematized delusion itself was swept away in the general 
 ruin and decomposition, only some remnants were left, 
 a few sensori-motor elements remained. These elements 
 are now being reinstated in the same fashion as the sim- 
 ple types of the synthetic and desultory moments. Simi- 
 larly it would be hard to guess from the frequent mum- 
 
The Desultory Type in Pathological States 349 
 
 bling of the words 'Alexander,' that the dement in his 
 early stages of mental alienation was under the delusion 
 that he was the deceased Russian czar come to life. The 
 word 'Alexander' is simply a chip of a former highly 
 systematized moment, the chip now reproducing itself 
 after the simple fashion of the desultory moment. 
 
 The phenomena of imperative concepts, insistent or 
 fixed ideas, uncontrollable impulses all grow and de- 
 velop along the general lines of the synthetic moment. 
 They are reinstatements of portions of dissociated mo- 
 ments buried in the subconscious and growing by the 
 process of modification with each recurrent reinstate- 
 ment. 
 
 Hypnoidal states described by me bear evidence to 
 the same truth of reinstatement of psychic elements. 
 In the hypnoidal states fractions of dissociated mo- 
 ments present in the subconscious come up like bubbles 
 to the surface of the patient's consciousness, burst, dis- 
 appear, and vanish never to come again. The frag- 
 ments are reinstated chips of highly organized mo- 
 ments, now in a state of disaggregation. The hypnoi- 
 dal chips sometimes manifest themselves in their re- 
 production after the mode of simple or elementary 
 desultory consciousness, mental states appear and dis- 
 appear, leaving no traces behind them. 
 
 In the phenomena of automatic writing, crystal gaz- 
 ing, shell-hearing and so on, reinstatement of moments 
 in different degrees and stages of organization takes 
 place. Finally in the phenomena of hypnosis we meet 
 with similar conditions, the states are induced artifi- 
 cially in the otherwise healthy and normally function- 
 ing individuality. Such are the phenomena of person- 
 ality metamorphosis and of post-hypnotic or hypnoner- 
 
350 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 gic states. In these states moments are artificially 
 formed in the dissociated subconscious moments which 
 rise to the surface of consciousness with all the energy 
 supplied to them by the subconscious. They reproduce 
 and perpetuate themselves after the mode of the syn- 
 thetic moment until their end is achieved, when they 
 gradually fade away, or, what is still more often the 
 case, vanish in the same sudden and abrupt way as they 
 come. 
 
 The artificially induced post-hypnotic or hypnoner- 
 gic states studied from the standpoint of the moment- 
 consciousness are found to be analogous to many psy- 
 chopathic conditions. The main character of these 
 states is their dissociation and reproduction, or rather 
 reinstatement on the basis of lower types of moment- 
 consciousness. 
 
 In psychopathic functional states not only does dis- 
 integration of content occur, but there is also present 
 functional degradation of the type of the moment. The 
 function of the moment reverts to lower types of psy- 
 chic activity, while the content consists of constituents 
 formed on higher lines of psychic life. Hence the 
 lack of adaptation, the conflict in psychopathic states 
 between function and content. It is like the formation 
 of a barbaric society out of the remnants of a ruined 
 civilization. 
 
 We may then affirm that the characteristic mode of 
 reproduction, both of the desultory and synthetic mo- 
 ment, is reinstatement. The difference between the 
 two moments being that while the moment of the des- 
 ultory type reproduces by reinstatement only, that of 
 the synthetic type reproduces by both reinstatement 
 and modification. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 PRESENTATIONS AND REPRESENTATIONS 
 
 IN the course of our analysis of the lower types 
 of moments it has been shown that the psychic 
 elements entering into their synthetized content 
 occur not in a free independent state, but in fixed 
 accumulations and stable compounds, having reinstate- 
 ment as the mode of their reproduction. There is, 
 however, a higher type of moment in which psychic 
 elements occur in a free independent state, having ac- 
 cordingly a mode of reproduction different from that 
 of the types we have just examined. Let us see now 
 what the nature of these free elements is, how they 
 come to arise and what is the peculiar mode of their 
 reproduction. 
 
 If we look at the tree yonder and then close our 
 eyes, we can represent to ourselves the tree in its gen- 
 eral outlines at least. We see its trunk, its branches, 
 and its green foliage. After our friend's departure 
 we continue to see him in our mind's eye. We live 
 over mentally, in our imagination, all our relations, 
 our mutual enjoyments. We seem to watch him act 
 and hear him talk. The representative elements can- 
 not possibly be identified with or derived from after- 
 images. For after images are really after-sensations 
 and consist of sensory elements. The elements in- 
 volved in the state of representative psychic life are 
 freed from all immediate coexistence with sensory ele- 
 ments, primary or secondary; in fact, they appear 
 
 351 
 
352 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 when the sensory elements disappear. 
 
 The two sets of psychic elements, the presentative 
 and representative, stand in inverse relation to each 
 other. When the one is at its maximum the other is 
 at its minimum. When sensory elements appear the 
 free elements become faint. This faintness is in pro- 
 portion to the intensity of the sensory element. It is 
 hard for us to look at a color and imagine it at the 
 same time ; and the more intense and brilliant the color 
 is, the harder it is for us to have the color, at the same 
 time, represented. Look at an object, say the lighted 
 lamp, take in well its sensory elements and you will 
 find that it is almost impossible to represent it to your- 
 self at the same time. Try hard to represent to your- 
 self the object and you will find that its sensory ele- 
 ments will begin to vacillate and become faint, or less 
 vivid. When absorbed in our ideas we often do not 
 notice even very intense stimuli. The two series of ele- 
 ments, the sensory or, presentative, and the free ones, 
 the representative, cannot run together without inter- 
 fering with each other, nay, without arresting each 
 other. 
 
 Representative elements bring with them a new 
 fundamental departure in the mental activity of the 
 moment, they may keep up its activity when flagging, 
 may intensify it, but may also deflect it, or distract it, 
 giving rise to another conflicting moment. Thus on the 
 one hand my continuous thought about a certain scien- 
 tific proposition constituting the substance of the pres- 
 ent active moment may begin to flag, but it is soon kept 
 up by new observations and experiments; on the other 
 hand, the occasional glance at the morning newspaper 
 may tend to deflect mental activity to quite a different 
 
Presentations and Representations 353 
 
 channel by awakening the activity of quite a different 
 moment-consciousness conflicting with the train of 
 thought on scientific matter. 
 
 Presentative elements have a permanency and sta- 
 bility which representative elements totally lack; they 
 can be kept up in their full strength by keeping up the 
 same intensity of stimulation, as by maintaining the ob- 
 ject before the particular sense organ that forms the 
 nucleus of the percept. Thus the pricking of the 
 needle is perceived as long as the stimulation is con- 
 tinued, and the chair yonder is seen as long as it is kept 
 before the eyes. Representative elements on the con- 
 trary, are extremely unstable and fluctuating, and are 
 aptly characterized as being very much like "the flare 
 and flicker of a gas flame blown by the wind." When 
 representative elements become permanent, stable, the 
 state of the moment acquires a pathological character 
 manifested in the phenomena of insistent thoughts and 
 fixed ideas. 
 
 Presentative psychic elements are always firmly 
 bound up with an external object and with stimu- 
 lations of peripheral sense-organs ; they can never free 
 themselves from the bondage to the external environ- 
 ment. Not so the representative elements, although 
 appearing at first in connection with sensory elements 
 and peripheral stimulations, they finally end by freeing 
 themselves from this bondage. The representative 
 elements involved in the representation zebra do not 
 originally arise without some presentative elements. 
 Once however, the given representation has definitely 
 arisen we may imagine the zebra without actually per- 
 ceiving it. In the midst of a conversation, or in the 
 midst of an engaging study, the image of a tiger, or of 
 
354 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 a palm seen in some distant country may rise clearly 
 and vividly before the mind's eye, and temporarily in- 
 terrupt the course and trend of our thought. 
 
 While I am writing these lines a fleeing copperhead, a 
 pulsating vorticella, a fish's tail, a cow's head and a puff- 
 ing steam engine have flashed across my mental field and 
 gone. They may be ultimately traced to some sensory 
 stimulus and positive after images, but these are far in 
 the background of consciousness and remain unnoticed. 
 Representative elements come and go in consciousness, 
 they appear independently of all other elements, they 
 are essentially free elements. We call this coming and 
 going of these independent elements the "free play of 
 the imagination." 
 
 Where sensory elements appear in synthetized com- 
 pounds, or in the precept, they cannot be separated, 
 they are firmly bound together. It is only in repre- 
 sentation that the corresponding representative ele- 
 ments free thmselves from the bonds of union which 
 the sensory elements cannot throw off. The orange 
 yonder is a synthetized compound of many sensory 
 elements, primary and secondary, but as long as they 
 remain sensory the elements are kept in union and can- 
 not be dissociated. Such a dissociation, however, is 
 fully possible with the representative elements enter- 
 ing into the representation of the orange. We can think 
 of its color, size, shape, weight, smell and taste sepa- 
 rately. 
 
 The freedom of the representative elements is clear- 
 ly brought out in the so-called free play of the imagi- 
 nation. Sensory elements are synthetized in the com- 
 pound in definite relations which cannot possibly be 
 severed unless the stimuli are rearranged, and in many 
 
Presentations and Representations 355 
 
 cases the sensory elements do not admit even of that 
 procedure. The sensory elements in the perception 
 of a particular object, say a house, have definite rela- 
 tions which cannot be modified without first changing 
 the color, structure, shape, size, of the house and rear- 
 ranging its relative parts. In imagination or repre- 
 sentation, however, all that is done in less than no 
 time, without in the least interfering with the external 
 stimuli. 
 
 Representative elements manifest even more free- 
 dom. In many cases a modification of certain relations 
 in the sensory elements cannot possibly be effected, be- 
 cause the relations of the external stimuli constituting 
 what may be termed the external object do not admit 
 of a rearrangement. Thus we cannot have the mouth 
 of the horse on his back, horns growing out of his 
 sides, the mane on his hind parts and the tail on his 
 brow. We can, however, easily accomplish such a re- 
 arrangement in our imagination. Furthermore, in rep- 
 resentation psychic elements appear in combinations of 
 which sensory elements do not admit. Pegasus, a 
 horse with wings; mermaid, a being half woman half 
 fish; centaurus, a being half man and half horse, and 
 other combinations of the most impossible character, as 
 far as sensory elements are concerned, may be formed 
 in representation. 
 
 At first representative elements are started by sensa- 
 tions and are thus far bound up with them, but they 
 gradually free themselves from it. Thus in a baby un- 
 der my close observation, the representative element 
 never came unless the object was present. If the ob- 
 ject was taken away, he soon forgot it. In the un- 
 educated mind even of a high type of moment-con- 
 
356 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 sciousness representations are still bound up with pre- 
 sentations. The gossip can keep on talking as long as 
 the thought is fixed on the concrete. Persons who lack 
 scientific, conceptual thought cannot grasp an abstract 
 general proposition without having it first expressed in 
 concrete terms, or fixed in sensory pictures. The sav- 
 age gets a headache when his thought is forced to 
 flow in a stream of representation. In the imbecile, 
 in the idiot we find the same thing manifested. They 
 can only think in concrete sensory terms. In mental 
 asthenia which approaches the state of the higher 
 stages of imbecility and also in secondary dementia, 
 states consequent on psychic degeneration, we find 
 the same truth illustrated. The patient's men- 
 tal activity falls many stages nearer to the level of pre- 
 sentative life. It is only in the higher forms of psychic 
 life that representative elements become free, inde- 
 pendent, and are freely and easily associated and dis- 
 sociated. 
 
 If looked at from the standpoint of control, we find 
 that sensory elements, on account of their fixed rela- 
 tions in the combinations and compounds in which they 
 enter, are uncontrollable. The compound with all its 
 sensory elements, primary and secondary, is given, and 
 cannot directly be controlled; it is highly stable, it re- 
 sists attempts at decomposition. The combinations, 
 however, formed of the free representative elements 
 are of unstable equilibrium, the elements can be easily 
 shifted, displaced, rearranged, easily dissociated, and 
 new combinations formed. The mode of function of 
 the representative element is free association. 
 
 Even when entering into the associative play the rep- 
 resentative elements do not blend and fuse so as not to 
 
Presentations and Representations 357 
 
 be discriminated. Representative elements certainly do 
 not float about without entering with others into some 
 form of association, but in the very association and com- 
 bination they still manage to preserve relatively their 
 freedom and independence. The sensory elements in 
 the compound are so blended and fused that they can- 
 not be discriminated in the compound without some ef- 
 fort and under special artificial conditions. Oculo-mo- 
 tor sensations, the estimation of the visual angle, of the 
 size of the image thrown on the retina are not so very 
 evident in the direct perception of the external object. 
 Tactual and muscular sensations are not so very clear 
 in our perception of space, nor are our rhythmical, res- 
 piratory and kinaesthetic sensations quite obvious in our 
 estimation of time. The free associations, however, into 
 which representative elements enter give full scope to 
 their components. The elements are combined without 
 at the same time losing their individuality; they remain 
 clearly defined in their nature and outlines in relation to 
 the other elements with which they form combinations. 
 Representations, however, presuppose presentative 
 life, they constitute the intermediate stages of which 
 presentations form the termini. Representations begin 
 and end with presentations. At the same time it should 
 be clearly held in mind that while representation refers 
 to presentation, it is by no means true that representa- 
 tions can be analyzed into sensory elements in the same 
 way as a living organism can be analyzed into elemen- 
 tary cells. The living organism is made up, is consti- 
 tuted by elementary cells; cells form the organism. Rep- 
 resentations, however, are not formed out of presenta- 
 tive elements, sensory elements, sensation elements. Sen- 
 sory processes do not enter into the make-up of a repre- 
 
3$S Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 sentation. Just as the sensation black is not black, so is 
 the idea or representation of black not a sensation 
 'black.' 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 
 REPRESENTATIONS AND THE LAWS OF THEIR COMBINA- 
 TIONS 
 
 REPRESENTATIVE elements form what 
 may be characterized as mental trains. The 
 elements of a mental train are connected by 
 relations of contiguity, resemblance, and con- 
 trast. Association by contiguity depends on the fre- 
 quency, recency with which the elements have been as- 
 sociated, while resemblance and contrast may be re- 
 garded as two or more mental trains of representative 
 elements associated by contiguity, crossing and inter- 
 secting in a few points, in other words having some ele- 
 ment in common. From this standpoint associations by 
 resemblance and contrast are often regarded as cases of 
 contiguity which is therefore considered as the mode of 
 association characteristic of representative elements. 
 From another standpoint, however, resemblance may 
 equally be considered as fundamental. It is nearer to 
 the truth to regard both contiguity and resemblance or 
 similarity as fundamental modes of association of repre- 
 sentative elements. 
 
 Association by contiguity may be expressed in the fol- 
 lowing general proposition : Ideas or images which have 
 frequently followed one another tend to recur in the 
 same order. If a, b, c, d, e be images or ideas that 
 have frequently followed each other in a definite order 
 of succession, then the tendency is that the ideas or im- 
 ages will occur in the same order, if the initial idea or 
 image is awakened. Thus if a, b, c, d, e, be that order, 
 
 359 
 
360 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 then if a is awaken the rest, b, c, d, e, tend to emerge 
 in the same order in which they have followed each oth- 
 er previously. 
 
 The formula for association by contiguity may be 
 expressed as follows : a+b+c+d+e-h .... 
 
 Representative elements, however, as we have pointed 
 out are derivative, they are functions of sensory com- 
 pounds, and vary concomitantly with the wealth and dif- 
 ferentiation of sensory life-experience. Blind people 
 have no visual images, nor can deaf persons form any 
 idea of a sound. Although representative elements are 
 essentially different in nature from sensory elements and 
 their compounds, still it remains true that sensory ex- 
 perience is the soil from which the rich variety of rep- 
 resentative life grows up. Sensory elements and their 
 compounds are prerequisites of representations of their 
 combination and organization. 
 
 The course of associative relations of representations 
 may be determined by the course of sensory series. If 
 a series of sensations and perceptions have frequently 
 followed each other pretty uniformly, then their cor- 
 responding representations will tend to recur in the 
 same uniform order. Let A, B, C, D, E. . . . be the 
 order of succession of the sensory series, then the order 
 of the series of representations will be: a, b, c, d, e. . . . 
 When sensation A with its corresponding representation 
 a are awakened, or if a alone occurs, then the rest of the 
 series of representations tend to emerge. The formula 
 for association of contiguity may be somewhat modified 
 and represented as follows : 
 
 a b c d e .... Representations 
 
 A B C D E .... Presentations 
 
Representations and Laws of Combinations 361 
 
 A+a-h(b J rc+d+e), or simply a+ (&+<;+ d+e) ... . 
 
 B+b+(c-\-d~\-e), or simply b+tc+d+e) .... 
 
 We have shown that ideas and images are associated 
 with motor and physical reactions, hence muscular 
 movements or rather kinaesthetic sensations and their 
 representations also enter the circle of the associative 
 series. The series of representations gives rise to move- 
 ments which in their turn give rise to kinaesthetic sensa- 
 tions, and these in turn may either give rise to another 
 series of representations, or may maintain the same ser- 
 ies. Hartley, the father of English associationism, who 
 reduced all association to contiguity, states his doctrine 
 of association in the following general proposition : 
 
 "If any sensation A, idea B or muscular motion C, be 
 associated for a sufficient number of times with any oth- 
 er sensation D, idea E, or muscular motion F, it will at 
 last excite d, the simple idea belonging to the sensation 
 D, the very idea E or the very muscular motion F." 
 
 Turning now to association by similarity we find that 
 the relations of the elements are somewhat more com 
 plex than in that of contiguity. Where mental life is com- 
 plex and where there are present many different trains 
 of ideas and images, there will be a tendency for them to 
 cross and intersect at many points. The course of a 
 given train of ideas and images instead of running in 
 its habitual line will tend to become deflected along oth- 
 er lines and give rise to that particular form of associa- 
 tion of representative elements known as association by 
 similarity and contrasts. 
 
 Let a, b, c, d, e, f, be one series and let p, b, g, r, m, 
 another series, q, r, k, I, n, a third series and s, I, x, y, z 
 a fourth series and so on. The course of association in- 
 stead of running along one line of habitual association 
 
362 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 determined by contiguity will tend to run on new lines. 
 The course may be represented as follows : 
 a, — b, — c, — d, — e, — f 
 
 i 
 p, — b, — g, — r, — m 
 
 q, — r, — k,- 
 
 s, — 1, — x, — y, — z 
 Let each series be represented by a row of squares 
 formed into a rectangle and let each crossing series be 
 representd by a similar rectangle intersecting the pre- 
 ceding one at right angles, then the course of associa- 
 tion by similarity may be diagrammatically represented 
 as follows: 
 
 The course of the mental train of ideas is changed and 
 deflected along lines which are otherwise unhabitual for 
 the particular mental train. In association by similarity 
 the mental train ever corruscates along new lines. 
 
Representations and Laws of Combinations 363 
 
 Association by similarity may be expressed in the gen- 
 eral proposition: like states often follow each other. 
 What that likeness consists in we have already seen, — 
 it is some common characters, some representative ele- 
 ments which two or more crossing trains of contiguous 
 representations possess in common. The crossing of 
 one train by another at a point where the representa- 
 tions have common features is purely accidental, as far 
 as the crossed train is concerned; it is the play of the 
 imagination. As an illustration of such a crossing of 
 trains we may take the example when one, from a ser- 
 ies of images and ideas about the recent Americo-Span- 
 ish war, is led to think of the Anglo-Spanish war in the 
 1 6th Century, the common representation being the de- 
 struction of the Spanish fleet ; and from the mental train 
 on the Anglo-Spanish war to the Franco-Prussian war 
 the common representation being invasion, and from 
 this to the Napoleonic war, then to the political affairs 
 of France, and thence, to the peace conference 
 of European powers. The course of the trains of ideas 
 is every time deflected along new channels. The deflec- 
 tion depends largely on the complexity and number of 
 the trains and their activity. 
 
 The relation of likeness is present not only in trains 
 of representations, but also in presentations or in what 
 is termed by us psychic compounds. Thus twins we 
 say look alike, so do eggs, so do animals of the same 
 species; a picture say of a landscape looks like the actual 
 landscape, and a portrait or statue resembles the orig- 
 inal. In all these examples the likeness is constituted by 
 the sensory elements common to the presented psychic 
 compound. Not that the sensory elements are ex- 
 actly the same; subjectively considered, they may be 
 
364 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 totally different in their psychic stuff, in the psychic re- 
 lations that cluster about them, as no two sensations, no 
 two psychic compounds, are really the same, as far as 
 the mental state is concerned, but they refer to the same 
 characters in the external object. It is this common ref- 
 erence to the same traits or characters in the external ob- 
 ject that constitutes the bond of association of likeness 
 in sensory element or psychic compound. On the same 
 grounds may be explained the likeness between the rep- 
 resentations and the psychic compound, the percept, 
 which it represents. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER XX 
 
 REPRESENTATION AND RECOGNITION 
 
 IF from the general consideration on the modes of 
 combinations or free association characteristic of 
 representations, we turn to analyse the nature of 
 the moment with representative elements as con- 
 tent, we find that it differs essentially from the synthetic 
 and desultory moments. A close inspection of the char- 
 acter of representations reveals the fact of its differ- 
 ence from presentation-elements. A representative 
 element is neither of the nature of the primary nor 
 of the secondary sensory elements, it differs from both 
 in the character of its psychic "stuff." The difference 
 consists in the fact that a representative element is not 
 cognitive, but recognitive. 
 
 As far as the cognitive aspect is concerned the 
 chief characteristic of the synthetic and desultory 
 moments, having sensory elements only as their 
 content, is the direct reference to the object, to the 
 relations of the external environment, while the 
 characteristic feature of the moment, having mainly rep- 
 resentative elements as its constituent, is the indirect ref- 
 erence to external relations. In other words, the sen- 
 sory elements of the synthetic and desultory moments 
 have immediate cognition, while the representative ele- 
 ments of the moment now under consideration has me- 
 diate cognition, or recognition. I see the book lying on 
 my table, I close my eyes and represent to myself the 
 whole thing over again. As I look out of the window 
 
 365 
 
366 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 I see a house, a horse and carriage standing near by; I 
 close my eyes and imagine the whole situation over 
 again. We say then, incorrectly though, that the repre- 
 sentation is a copy of the presentation. Evidently the 
 representation is regarded as not being the same as the 
 presentation just as a copy is really not the same as the 
 original. The psychic elements of representation have 
 the function of cognizing again, or what is more correct 
 to say the function of re-cognition which constitutes 
 the very essence of representation. In representation 
 events are lived over again without the actual recur- 
 rence of those experiences. In representation the mo- 
 ment becomes independent of the present, it becomes 
 free from its immediate environment. 
 
 In order that a representation be a true "copy" of 
 its original, it must be cognized as a "copy," that is, it 
 must be cognized as something already cognized, in oth- 
 er words, it must be recognized. This function of re- 
 cognition is the sine qua non of representation. The 
 image, representation, or idea of a table is not itself a 
 table, nor is it a synthetized sensory compound refer- 
 ring to the object, table, it is a psychic element referring 
 to the sensory compound on its objective aspect. The 
 representation of the table does not refer directly to the 
 table as it is the case in the sensory compound, but to the 
 table as perceived. The image or representation refers 
 not to the object immediately, but mediately, to the ob- 
 ject as object of the sensory compound. Hence the ob- 
 ject is cognized over in representation, in other words, 
 is recognized. 
 
 This recognition may be of a general or of a specific 
 character. The function of recognition in its general 
 aspect is manifested in the idea. The idea possesses 
 
Representation and Recognition 367 
 
 this function of general recognition. The idea "man" 
 recognizes its content in a general way, it refers to man 
 in general, but does not identify its content with any 
 particular individual. I may represent to myself an ob- 
 ject recognized as a table, not as any particular table, 
 and I may also represent this particular table on which 
 I am writing. The representation I have of my friend 
 John refers specifically to John not to any one else. As 
 in my imagination I scrutinize the features of my 
 friend's face, I all along recognize that it is my friend's 
 countenance. Recognition, general as well as particu- 
 lar, is involved in the very function of representation. 
 
 In immediate perception itself there is no recogni- 
 tion present. It is not true to fact to say that in the 
 perception of a horse we recognize the object by per- 
 ceiving it as horse and not as anything else. The fact 
 that I perceive the object as it is depends entirely on 
 the sensory compound which has cognition as the func- 
 tion of its psychic character. The sensory component, 
 the percept horse, is the cognition of the object "horse." 
 
 Some psychologists attempt to find the origin of rec- 
 ognition in the feeling of familiarity. Familiarity, how- 
 ever, is not a primary state out of which recognition de- 
 velops, but on the contrary recognition is the primary 
 state and familiarity is derivative only. Familiarity is 
 simply the feeling of vague, marginal, or subconscious 
 recognition. Of course, if by the term familiarity is 
 meant not that psychic state observed in the adult con- 
 sciousness, both abnormal and normal, but that primary 
 state of recognition out of which more definite recogni- 
 tion develops, then it may be admitted that familiarity 
 is the germ of recognition, but then it is only the giving 
 of a special term "familiarity" to an elementary form of 
 
368 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 recognition. The definite form of recognition devel- 
 ops out of the indefinite form of recognition, recogni- 
 tion must be a primary element. Recognition then 
 is an irreducible mode of psychic activity characteristic 
 of representative mental life. 
 
 Some psychologists regard familiarity as a pure 'feel- 
 ing of at homeness' or as Fouillee puts it in the decrease 
 of the inward shock of surprise. This is however to 
 put the cart before the horse. It is not the feeling 
 of familiarity that gives rise to recognition, but it is 
 vague, indistinct, marginal, or subconscious recognition 
 that gives rise to the feeling of familiarity. When a 
 person, a scene, an event, or situation is familiar, 
 the psychic state is one of having gone through the 
 same experience before. We cannot localize its date in 
 our scheme of time on which we project our past experi- 
 ences. We have experienced the same before, but we 
 ask ourselves, — where and when have we seen that per- 
 son, the scene or the situation before? Often we succeed 
 in forming a complete association with the past, we lo- 
 calize the given familiar experience, and then complete 
 recognition ensues. Familiarity is incomplete, vague, 
 indefinite recognition. 
 
 The peculiar experience of a present novel situation 
 as having experienced or lived through the same before 
 has been mystically referred to a previous existence, the 
 theory of Platonic reminiscence, The explanation, how- 
 ever, of this phenomenon is quite simple, inasmuch 
 that it can be shown that in such cases some 
 similar experience had been gone through before. The 
 subject cannot close the circuit, so to say, and effect a 
 connection with his previous life experiences, he cannot 
 associate fully the present experience with his form- 
 
Representation and Recognition 369 
 
 cr experience and localize it in his past. Other cases of 
 such familiarity are brought about by states of dissocia- 
 tion. The patient perceives, goes through experiences 
 in one state and vaguely remembers them in another. 
 Such states of familiarity or imperfect recognition can 
 be found in pre-epileptic states, in post-hypnotic condi- 
 tions, in hypnoidal twilight states, and other subcon- 
 scious dissociative states. 
 
 In regard to this phenomenon of general familiarity 
 almost amounting to recognition without attaining it 
 James makes the following pertinent remarks which 
 fully bears out the fact that recognition is primary and 
 is at the basis of what we term the sense of familiarity. 
 "There is a curious experience" says James "which 
 everyone seems to have had — the feeling that the pres- 
 ent moment in its completeness has been experienced be- 
 fore — we were saying just the thing, in just this place, 
 to just these people, etc. This 'sense of pre-existence' 
 has been treated as a great mystery and occasioned much 
 speculation I must confess that the quality of mys- 
 tery seems to me a little strained. I have over and over 
 again in my own case succeeded in resolving the phe- 
 nomenon into a case of memory, so indistinct that while 
 some past circumstances are presented again, the others 
 are not. The dissimilar portions of the past do not 
 arise completely enough for the date to be identified. 
 All we get is the present scene with a general suggestion 
 of pastness about it." I may say the same thing in my 
 own case. Whenever I find in myself the presence of 
 some obscure form of familiarity, I can invariably trace 
 it to some vague, indistinct memory of an experience 
 lived through some time before. The same holds true 
 in the case of patients, as well as of my experiments car- 
 
370 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 ried out on subjects in subconscious states, hypnotic, 
 post-hypnotic, hypnoidal, and others. 
 
 When an experience enters into a number of systems, 
 or as James would put it into a number of "settings," 
 then the special character of the "setting" becomes con- 
 fused or even obliterated. The experience present calls 
 forth so many different systems or "settings" that the 
 recognition element lapses and reverts to the psychic 
 state characteristic of the lower forms of moment con- 
 sciousness, passing through the more elementary forms 
 of recognition to cognition. When the recognitive mo- 
 ment reproduces itself so that it becomes habitual and 
 automatic, it falls in the scale of psychic life and reverts 
 to the type of a lower moment. 
 
 A psychic state which recurs under a great number 
 of conditions and circumstances loses all special and 
 local psychic color, so to say, and hence becomes de- 
 graded in the type of its mental activity. All 
 ordinary experiences which have been recognized 
 over and over again, all sorts and conditions of 
 mental life, under different and opposite tendencies, feel- 
 ings and emotions, under various settings and conflicting 
 systems cease to be surrounded by a nimbus of pastness 
 and become cognitive in character. When too often re- 
 peated the experience becomes so much worn by use, if 
 we may use such an expression, that it can no longer be 
 reproduced voluntarily in consciousness. Thus a strange 
 face seen a few times or only once can be clearly repre- 
 sented, but the faces of familiar people with whom we 
 are in constant intercourse can no longer be clearly re- 
 produced and represented. Such a reproduction can only 
 be brought about by a perceptual state, or by various 
 subconscious states, such as dreams, hypnosis, or hyp- 
 
Representation and Recognition 371 
 
 noidal state. In such cases there is present a feeling of 
 familiarity due to the series of recognitions and cogni- 
 tions. Familiarity here is lapsed recognition. 
 
 James brings it out clearly: "If a phenomenon is met 
 with, however, too often, and with too great a variety 
 of contexts, although its image is retained and repro- 
 duced with correspondingly great facility, it fails to 
 come up with any one particular setting and the projec- 
 tion of it backwards to a particular past date conse- 
 quently does not come about. We recognize but do not 
 remember it — its associates form too confused a cloud." 
 In other words, recognition does not reach its full de- 
 velopment. There is recognition of the phenomenon 
 as such, but not as having had the experience in the 
 past. The halo of pastness is gone. James quotes 
 Spencer "To ask a man whether he remembers that the 
 sun shines, that fire burns, that iron is hard, would be a 
 misuse of language. Even the almost fortuitous con- 
 nections among our experiences cease to be classed as 
 memories, when they have become thoroughly familiar. 
 Though on hearing the voice of some unseen person 
 slightly known to us, we say we recollect to whom the 
 voice belongs, we do not use the same expression re- 
 specting the voices of those with whom we live. The 
 meanings of words which in childhood have to be con- 
 sciously recalled seem in adult life to be immediately 
 present. 
 
 "James then goes on saying" : "These are the 
 cases where too many paths, leading to too diverse as- 
 sociates, block each other's way, and all that the mind 
 gets along with its object is a fringe of felt familiarity 
 or sense that there are associates. A similar result comes 
 about when a definite setting is only nascently aroused. 
 
372 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 We then feel that we have seen the object already, but 
 when or where we cannot say, though we may seem to 
 ourselves to be on the brink of saying it. That nascent 
 cerebral excitation can affect consciousness with a sort 
 of sense of the imminence of that which stronger excita- 
 tions would make us definitely feel, is obvious from 
 what happens when we seek to remember a name. It 
 tingles, it trembles on the verge, but does not come. 
 Just such a tingling and trembling of unrecovered asso- 
 ciates is the penumbra of recognition that may surround 
 any experience and make it seem familiar, though we 
 know not why." In other words, imperfect, diffused 
 recognition with no special system, or setting to come in 
 live contact with and be localized in a mental series of 
 an individual moment consciousness fails to give that 
 mental synthesis which is the essential characteristic of 
 the fully developed moment-consciousness. Recognition 
 of an experience lived through in the past is the basis of 
 what is known as the sense of familiarity. 
 
 Perhaps we may refer to the Bergsonian view of rec- 
 ognition, namely that recognition is interrelated with 
 and based on special motor adaptations. "Every per- 
 ception" says Bergson "has its organized motor accom- 
 paniment, the ordinary feeling of recognition has its 
 roots in the consciousness of this organization." While 
 it is true that recognition deals with the use of objects 
 and with special adaptations to the external environ- 
 ment, as far as such recognition is expressed in motor 
 adjustments, it can hardly be said that this view holds 
 true of recognition in general. In the process of rec- 
 ognition it is not the motor accompaniment, it is the 
 feeling of sameness of experience, the feeling of past- 
 ness with its localization in a series of "settings" or of 
 
Representation and Recognition 373 
 
 systems that go to form the main elements. 
 
 I must say that the motor accompaniments have been 
 too much overworked in our psychological theories. We 
 have carried over into our philosophy, such as pragma- 
 tism, and into our psychology of recent years too much 
 of the haste and whirl of the exchange and the shop. 
 Everything is motor and everything is practical. This is 
 a reflection of our present industrial age in the domain of 
 the mind. Perhaps it expresses well the tendency of the 
 modern philosophical and psychological trend of trans- 
 muting every thing into motion when psychologists de- 
 scribe themselves as being "motor men on the psycho- 
 logical car." 
 
 Recognition is not motion at least from a psycho- 
 logical standpoint, unless like Bergson we resort to 
 the metaphysical, pan-psychistic argument of reducing 
 motion to independent objective images as constituting 
 the nature of external reality. Barring such metaphysi- 
 cal speculations that, as we have pointed out, have no 
 place in psychology which must keep strictly to the dif- 
 ference between the external and internal, to the oppo- 
 sition of the objective reality of the material world and 
 of the subjective reality of the mental world, different 
 spheres of phenomena which should not be reduced one 
 to the other, we cannot help realizing the fact that there 
 is far more of the character of recognition in mental 
 states in which the motor element is insignificant or nil, 
 such as sensations, ideas, memories, thought reasoning 
 and so on than there is in the automatic reflex reactions 
 of behavior and motor adjustments. When we see col- 
 or green and recognize that we have seen it the day be- 
 fore we can hardly speak of a motor element present in 
 recognition. When I think of the Bergsonian theory of 
 
374 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 memory, or recognition and remember of my thinking 
 about it the night before and disagreeing with it, the 
 motor element can only enter by a great strain of imagi- 
 nation. If there are any motor elements they hardly 
 play any significant part in the process of memory and 
 recognition. We must deny emphatically the signifi- 
 cance and importance of the motor element in recogni- 
 tion. The essential element in recognition is not the 
 motor, but the psychic elements. 
 
 Bergson himself is driven to take this aspect of recog- 
 nition when he develops his theory of pure memory with 
 no action in contradistinction to the memory which in- 
 serts itself edgewise into the flux of sensori-motor adap- 
 tations. Bergson not without some contradiction 
 strongly contrasts the true pure memory with the 
 memory image sharply inserted into the plane of action. 
 If we grant Bergson that such pure unadulterated mem- 
 ories are present, memories free from all motor reac- 
 tions, then we must necessarily agree to the fact that 
 remembrance, recollection, and hence recognition can 
 exist without any motor accompaniments. In other 
 words, recognition cannot be resolved into action, into 
 motor accompaniments, into behavior and reactions. 
 Recognition is a psychic quale sui generis. 
 
 Each set of particular representative elements carries 
 along, as James terms it, its special "setting" or 
 as I describe it "system." It is this special set- 
 ting that helps the process of recognition in having 
 the particular experience projected in the past, in having 
 it oriented among many other systems of associations 
 and having it localized in its particular past. Recogni- 
 tion then arises when the present experience calls forth 
 its special system, or setting in a series of mental events. 
 The present experience must close with the past experi- 
 
Representation and Recognition 375 
 
 ence and form a circuit. At the same time the experi- 
 ence must not be short-circuited, because in such a case 
 we have a state of dissociation. The present experience 
 must form a circuit with its system or setting and with 
 the personality as a whole. Recognition thus requires a 
 special setting in the complex web and woof of the 
 present total moment consciousness constituting the in- 
 dividuality of the subject. 
 
 In the higher forms of mental life where self-con- 
 sciousness is developed, the experience forms a live cir- 
 cuit, so to say, with the whole personality. The higher 
 states of recognition appear in the form of the "I" con- 
 sciousness. "It is I who experienced all that in my past. 
 It is I who remembers that this bit of experience has 
 taken place in 'my' experience some time ago." There 
 is the my present self thinking of the experience as lived 
 through by my past self. 
 
 In the lower forms of recognition where the 
 self is not present, as in the higher vertebrates and 
 possibly in infants, there exists the present cogni- 
 tion of the experience and the re-cognition of it 
 in the shape of a vague memory that it had been experi- 
 enced before. The present experience of an already ex- 
 perienced event floats in a cloud of pastness. It is this 
 psychic state of pastness in a present experience that 
 makes it felt to the subject who experiences it — as re- 
 current and recognitive. Of course, not every recurrent 
 experience, even of the higher types of moments is 
 recognitive, as there are psychopathic recurrent states 
 which, like the lower forms of moment-consciousness, 
 recur and reproduce themselves with no element of rec- 
 ognition present. We can, however, fully assert that 
 every recognitive experience is recurrent. Recognition 
 requires former or past experience. 
 
CHAPTER XXI 
 
 THE RECOGNITIVE MOMENT AND ITS REPRODUCTION 
 
 RECOGNITION is one of the essential attri- 
 butes of representative life. The faintest 
 and most obscure representation requires the 
 presence of recognition in the background. 
 We may say that without recognition representation be- 
 comes an impossibility. Recognition is the function of 
 representative elements. Just as cognition is the func- 
 tion of sensory, presentative elements so recognition, or 
 secondary cognition is the function of representative ele- 
 ments. Now that moment consciousness which has rep- 
 resentative elements among the constituents of its content 
 may be termed recognitive moment-consciousness. 
 
 The recognitive moment is of a higher type than the 
 synthetic moment. Like the synthetic moment, mater- 
 ial or psychic content of the recognitive moment is as- 
 similated in a synthetized form; like the synthetic mo- 
 ment, it goes on reproducing not on the desultory, but 
 on the accumulative type; and moreover, it approaches 
 more the compound, accumulative type. Unlike the syn- 
 thetic moment, the recognitive moment is possessed of 
 representative elements having recognition as their 
 function. Representative elements with their function 
 of recognition, present in the recognitive moment, but 
 absent in the other lower moments, make a fundamental 
 difference in the nature of reproduction. 
 
 The reproduction of the recognitive moment is to- 
 tally different in character from that of the desultory 
 
 376 
 
Recognitive Moment and Its Reproduction 377 
 
 and synthetic moments. In the desultory and synthetic 
 moments reproduction is effected by means of presenta- 
 tive elements, and actual recurrence of former experi- 
 ence is indispensable ; in the recognitive moment nothing 
 of the kind is required. The reproduction of the recog- 
 nitive moment is effected only in representation. The 
 moment with its sensory elements is not reproduced as 
 recurrence, but only symbolized, or truer to say substi- 
 tuted in meaning or in function by the representative 
 elements. The representative element, the image, the 
 idea is recognized as functioning as a substitute, as 
 standing for the presence of the actual experience of the 
 original moment with its nuclear primary and secondary 
 sensory elements. In the higher stages of the moment 
 this recognition may become detached, and the act of 
 recognition may become duplicated and emphasized in 
 another subsequent representation. In reality, however, 
 both in the lower and higher forms of the recognitive 
 moment, the fact of recognition belongs directly to the 
 representation itself; for as we have pointed out recog- 
 nition is an essential function of representation. 
 
 Just as sensory elements express, or present the 
 qualities of the external object, so do representa- 
 tive elements mirror the psychic objects as presented 
 to sense-experience. This relation may be expressed in 
 a proportional form : as presentation is to the external 
 object so is representation to the presented object. 
 In the higher forms of the recognitive moment the rep- 
 resentation can be once more represented and this latter 
 is represented in its turn, each subsequent reproduction 
 representing, substituting and mirroring the preceding 
 one. Thus I may see the child yonder playing with its 
 ball, I may represent to myself the whole scene, and 
 
378 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 may further represent to myself the fact of representa- 
 tion itself which in its turn may be once more represent- 
 ed, and so on. The content of the recognitive moment 
 in this mode of reproduction, becomes more and more 
 modified, more and more different as it proceeds along 
 this line, becomes further and further removed from the 
 original experienced moment with its sensory elements. 
 
 In the more prevalent forms of the recognitive mo- 
 ment the process of reproduction does not proceed in 
 this way; reproduction keeps nearer to the lower types, 
 to the content of the types of the synthetic moments, or, 
 in other words, it keeps nearer to sense-experience. The 
 representation has a direct reference to the object as 
 presented in sense-experience, and in its reproduction 
 this direct reference is more or less preserved through- 
 out. 
 
 The recognitive moment is every time reproduced in 
 representation, and although having different represen- 
 tative elements with each successive reproduction, it still 
 refers to the same object as presented. The modifica- 
 tions that occur in the moment take place only in the 
 representative elements. Adaptations, instead of tak- 
 ing place by means of changes in the sensory elements 
 due to successive modification effected by the direct in- 
 fluence of stimuli from external environment, are now 
 freed from the direct influence of external conditions, 
 and may be effected within the representative elements 
 of the moment itself, without having recourse to the 
 modifying influence of stimuli. 
 
 We have already shown that the characteristic trait 
 of representative elements is their freedom from the 
 bondage in accumulations or compounds in which sen- 
 sory elements are kept; representative elements can be 
 
Recognitive Moment and Its Reproduction 379 
 
 easily transposed, they can enter into new free associa- 
 tions without requiring special external stimuli to break 
 the stable compound. The free associations of repre- 
 sentative elements may be dissolved by other representa- 
 tions. The stick lying near by may be kicked away by 
 my foot, but may also be represented as a support; it 
 may be imaged as a means of defense and attack, and 
 finally the representation may be changed in another di- 
 rection, the stick may be used as an instrument for 
 bringing down apples from a tree. Adaptation is 
 effected within the process of representation before any 
 changes are introduced into actual, presentative life. 
 
 From a teleological standpoint one can realize the 
 great gain in the economy of life reactions by a mode 
 of reproduction independent of and free from the direct 
 influence of external stimuli with their consequent sen- 
 sory responses and motor reactions, resulting in further 
 and further modifications of the original moment. The 
 recognitive moment in its growth and development by a 
 series of internal representative modifications spares it- 
 self ill adapted sensory responses and motor reactions. 
 This is an immense gain to life, a great aid and power- 
 ful weapon in the struggle for existence. 
 
 Regarded from this standpoint of modification the 
 moment-consciousness may be said to pass through im- 
 portant stages in the course of its development. The 
 stage of non-mo disability of content, then the stage of 
 modifiability of the sensori-motor content, and finally 
 modifiability in representation. The special importance 
 of the recognitive moment for the being possessing it is 
 the greater freedom from the dominion of the external 
 environment. External conditions are not so literally, 
 so slavishly reflected in the moment. Changes may oc- 
 
380 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 cur in sensori-motor reactions and adaptations due to 
 representations alone, without any previous material 
 changes in the external conditions. The recognitive 
 moment carries its external world in itself, in its repre- 
 sentation, and by affecting changes there, may bring 
 about changes in the environment, thus controlling 
 external conditions, instead of being controlled by them. 
 Instead of being driven by external forces into blind 
 obedience, into unintelligent adaptations, the moment is 
 on the point, even in its lowest forms, to acquire some 
 intelligent character in seeing ahead, by living over its 
 former experiences in the states of representation, the 
 sensori-motor reactions being accordingly modified. 
 
 The reproduction of the recognitive moment is not 
 induced by external stimuli only, but mainly by the 
 course of other representations. Without actually being 
 confronted with the object the representation of it may 
 any time arise in the mind and call forth new adapta- 
 tions to the external environment. 
 
 The representation by which the recognitive moment 
 effects its reproduction is not at all a mode of reinstate- 
 ment, partial or complete, a mode characteristic of the 
 lower types of moments. What the moment reproduces 
 is altogether different in nature and content from what 
 has been experienced, or directly presented. What is 
 presented is sensory material, what is reproduced is im- 
 agery, ideal "stuff." Imagery, ideal stuff as it is, it still 
 mirrors, substitutes, represents the "material" certainty 
 of sensory experience. 
 
 From the very nature of the moment and mode of 
 its reproduction the original emotional tone of the 
 experience is not reproduced by the recognitive mo- 
 ment. The emotional tone like the rest of the 
 
Recognitive Moment and Its Reproduction 381 
 
 psychic content is represented in recognitive repro- 
 duction, but not actually reproduced. The great 
 gain of it from a biological standpoint is momentous, 
 since the moment's reaction can be better adapted to the 
 changing conditions of its environment. The repre- 
 sentative elements entering into the idea or image of 
 an object change from reproduction to reproduction 
 but they always mirror, refer to the same sensory ele- 
 ments and compounds ; they recognize their object. 
 
 The recognition of an object or an event, however 
 vague, means some experience that has been lived 
 through before. In other words, the representation, al- 
 though experienced, as a present psychic element, must 
 have a glow of pastness about it. Representation is a 
 present experience referring to a past life, to an event 
 that is passing or that has passed away. Representa- 
 tion with its function of recognition is a reference to the 
 past. 
 
 This reference to the past may range from the in- 
 definite to the highly definite localization of experience 
 referred to the time past. This depends on the devel- 
 opment of the moment, of its place in the scale of evo- 
 lution. The higher the moment the more definite, the 
 lower the less definite the localization is. The dog in 
 recognizing his master, Ulysses, hardly knew the length 
 of time the hero had been away in his battles and wan- 
 derings, although the dog possibly had a dim feeling of 
 pastness, revealing it by the great joy manifested at 
 seeing his master, as if his long delayed expectations 
 have been finally fulfilled. If dogs are capable of rec- 
 ognition at all, some vague feeling of pastness is pres- 
 ent in the recognitive moment, however low it may 
 stand in the scale of development. 
 
382 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 In the child we find that the time localization 
 is quite indefinite. In very young children the fu- 
 ture and the past such as yesterday and to-morrow 
 have no definite meaning. Thus in children of three 
 years that have come under my observation the appre- 
 hension of the past and future, such as yesterday and 
 to-morrow is still wanting. When the child is told that 
 something took place, he referred it to a "yesterday" in- 
 definitely localized in the past. The day before, a week 
 ago, a month ago, years past are equally projected into 
 the vague past. The same holds true of the child-sense 
 of the future. "When is to-morrow?" is a question I 
 have been often asked by intelligent children of three, 
 four and even five years old. The child recognizes his 
 old friend after a departure of several months, but he 
 localizes this event far off in time, say "yesterday." 
 
 The reference to the past becomes more and more 
 definitely localized in time, the higher the recognitive 
 moment rises in the scale of evolution. This process of 
 localization of the recognized event in the past depends 
 entirely on the time-sense becoming fully definite with 
 the more or less greater perfection of the conceptual 
 time scheme. Thus savages and the ignorant classes 
 of even civilized societies have an imperfect form 
 of time localization. The definiteness of localiza- 
 tion, however, is not of material consequence as far as 
 our point of view is concerned. For all we know 
 Ulysses' dog, the ape and the infant have no time-local- 
 ization at all, what is enough to state from our psycho- 
 logical standpoint is the fact that recognition involves 
 some form of pastness belonging to the implicated rep- 
 resentative element, a pastness which in a higher stage 
 becomes time-localization. 
 
Recognitive Moment and Its Reproduction 383 
 
 Under the influence of toxic matter, of narcotics, and 
 in some forms of mental diseases, this time-sense may 
 swell, thus giving rise to the projection of experience on 
 a larger scale of objective time. Such states are to be 
 found under the influence of opium or cannabis, also 
 in some mental diseases when the patient claims that he 
 is many centuries old. This function of recognition 
 with its aspect of pastness is certainly present in the 
 passing recognitive moment. The process becomes more 
 complicated and also more objectified in the higher 
 types of moment-consciousness. In short, the recogni- 
 tive moment-consciousness in addition to its reproduc- 
 tion involves some form of awareness of its being a re- 
 production by its reference to a past experience. Be- 
 ing freed from its bondage to the present circumstances, 
 living in the by-gone past the recognitive moment gets 
 a glimpse of the not yet born future into which the free 
 representative elements are projected. 
 
CHAPTER XXII 
 
 THE SYNTHETIC RECOGNITIVE MOMENT 
 
 THE recognitive moment in its reproductions 
 may be arranged in a series. The first link 
 in the series is the sensory elements or com- 
 pound. Let this be expressed by A where A 
 is the sensory experience, and let a be the representation 
 of the first reproduction, the next reproduction may be 
 represented by a* and the succeeding series by a», a*, a*, 
 
 a*, a«, Each one of the series refers directly to 
 
 state A with its external object. Each of them recog- 
 nizes in the reproduced representation the represented, 
 formerly perceived object of the primary state A. Each 
 link in the series makes easier the occurrence of the suc- 
 ceeding one. The series forms a progression in which 
 the link further removed from the beginning differs to a 
 certain degree from the ones that preceded it. This 
 progressive difference is due to the continuous progress- 
 sive modifications effected in each successive link by the 
 occurrence or reproduction of the preceding links. The 
 process is one and continuous, and with the progress of 
 the series of reproductions each following link becomes 
 modified, emerges with greater ease, while the recogni- 
 tion is effected without any difficulty. Each previous 
 recognition makes the next one easier. 
 
 In the character of its modification the lower form of 
 the recognitive moment does not differ from the mo- 
 ment of the synthetic type of consciousness. Like the 
 synthetic moment, the modifications are not effected con- 
 
 384 
 
The Synthetic Recognitive Moment 385 
 
 sciously in the moment. The modifications are cumula- 
 tive, without there being direct awareness of them. As 
 to awareness of the previous reproduction and recogni- 
 tion each moment may be considered as isolated and 
 separated. The history of the recurrences, of the re- 
 production and recognition is not given in the conscious- 
 ness of the recognitive moment. As in the synthetic 
 moment, an external observer is required who should 
 read off the history of the recognitive moment from the 
 final forms taken by psycho-physiological and sensori- 
 motor reactions. 
 
 Expressed in a formula it may be said that each rep- 
 resentation, each reproduction of the recognitive mo- 
 ment, refers to the object A of the sensory state A which 
 may be represented as A A . Symbolically represented 
 the relations of the successive reproduced representa- 
 tions to the object as presented in state A and to each 
 other in order of their succession may be expressed by 
 the following diagram: 
 
386 Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 In other words the representative states in the series 
 of reproduction all refer to the original experience A A 
 and each preceding state modifies the succeeding one, 
 but the succeeding state does not include consciously the 
 previous reproduction and recognition. The partial in- 
 tersecting of the circles indicates that the successive 
 states do not include their predecessors, but are only in- 
 fluenced and modified by them. The state, however, 
 gets enlarged the further situated it is in the progres- 
 sion of the series. Each state inherits only the modifi- 
 cations accumulated by the preceding ones, but it does 
 not inherit the cognition or recognition of the state 
 itself. 
 
 In this respect the series of states going to make up 
 the recognitive moment differs from that of synthetic 
 type. The synthetic moment reproduces by reinstate- 
 ment with modifications accumulated in the course of 
 the process of reproductions. The recognitive moment 
 on the contrary does not reproduce by reinstatement of 
 presentation, but by representation. The preceding 
 state need not be actually repeated, and if such a refer- 
 ence is present it is represented. 
 
 Representation is effected by different psychic ele- 
 ments. The same or like elements need not be repro- 
 duced in the moment of the recognitive type. In the 
 recognitive moment of the stage considered by us such 
 a reinstatement is altogether absent. The states follow- 
 ing each other are different. Moreover they are isolated, 
 disconnected in the series. The links in the series refer 
 to the same object as presented, but they do not refer to 
 each other in the order of their progression, state a 
 does not refer to the state a that preceded it, nor does 
 a refer to a 2 , nor a to a% and so on. The series of 
 
The Synthetic Recognitive Moment 387 
 
 states of the recognitive moment in the stage under con- 
 sideration do, however, effect modifications in the order 
 of their succession, a modifies a, a modifies a\ a modi- 
 fies a, and so on each preceding state modifying the 
 succeeding one. 
 
 The dog on seeing a person for the second 
 or third time may recognize the friend of his mas- 
 ter, but he does not remember that he has recog- 
 nized him already on previous occasions. Similarly 
 when the baby sees a strange person for the first time, it 
 may become scared and begin to cry. Subsequent repe- 
 tition of similar experiences may reduce or on the con- 
 trary may increase the fear element, but the baby learns 
 to know and recognize his man and the psycho-physio- 
 logical and psycho-motor reactions follow as soon as the 
 "man" is caught sight of. Reproduction and recogni- 
 tion become easier, but it is questionable whether the 
 baby, like the intelligent dog, in recognizing the person, 
 is aware of having recognized the person on previous 
 occasions. The dog and the child are aware of the per- 
 son and recognize him, but they are not aware of the 
 series of preceding recognitions. A form of moment- 
 consciousness with a series of isolated reproductions and 
 recognitions, but with accumulated modifications may 
 be termed the synthetic accumulative recognitive mo- 
 ment. 
 
CHAPTER XXIII 
 
 THE SYNTHETIC MOMENT OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 IN the higher stages of the recognitive moment 
 the states in the series are no longer isolated. Each 
 succeeding state embraces or truer to say includes 
 and represents the preceding one. The whole ser- 
 ies is essentially an interconnected one. The states in 
 the series not only refer to the original experience of the 
 object as presented, but also to each other in the order 
 of their succession. Let A be the original experience of 
 which A is presentative and a is representative, then the 
 state of the recognitive moment may be represented by 
 a A . State a refers to # A , and the succeeding state a re- 
 fers not only to a A , but also to a. The same holds true in 
 the case of the other states, — a refers to a A and a and 
 not only to a alone but also to a; a refers once more to 
 a A and also to a, a\ a, and so on ; each succeeding state 
 refers to the original experience and also to the preced- 
 ing states of recognition. In other words, each state rep- 
 resents not only the original sensory experience, but also 
 some though not all of the preceding series of represen- 
 tations. There is, in short, awareness in the act of rec- 
 ognition. The preceding state modifies the succeeding 
 one, and this latter is fully aware of the former. This 
 awareness is present during the very occurrence of each 
 state in the series. 
 
 The reproduced state in its recognition recog- 
 
 388 
 
The Synthetic Moment of Self-Consciousness 389 
 
 nizes the object as presented to sense-experience, recog- 
 nizes, or is aware at least, that it has had some such 
 recognitions on previous occasions, and at the same time 
 recognizes, or is aware of its present recognition. Such 
 a recognitive moment, the highest of all the moments- 
 consciousness, is characteristic of the fully developed 
 adult human consciousness or of self-consciousness and 
 may be termed the synthetic moment of self-conscious- 
 ness. The synethetic moment of self-consciousness 
 forms a series of selves — the present or the percipient 
 self, the past or the perceived self and the intermediate 
 selves connecting the two selves as termini, the whole 
 forming a series synthetized by the life of the synthetic 
 moment of self-consciousness. 
 
 If we retain our previous denotation of objects and 
 of the series of recognitive states and denote the recog- 
 nitive reproduction by attaching the denotation of the 
 presented object as index to the state then the state may 
 be denoted by a A , the succeeding states in the simple rec- 
 ognitive moment may be denoted by a A , «= A , as A , a A , 
 a A , a A . The states in the series of the synthetic mo- 
 ment of self-consciousness may then be represented by 
 the following formula : 
 
 
 a\ 
 
 
 a A , a*, 
 
 
 
 a\ 
 
 #j, #2, as, 
 
 and so on the last being extremely complicated. . . 
 Graphically the synthetic moment of self-conscious- 
 ness may be represented as follows ; 
 
39° Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
 
 All along our analysis of reproduction we have at the 
 same time by implication discussed the various types and 
 forms of what may be conveniently termed as germinal 
 memory in the states of consciousness of the lower ani- 
 mals. Memory, however, is not present in the lower 
 types of moment-consciousness. Memory really begins 
 with the recognitive moment and reaches its full perfec- 
 tion in the adult human consciousness, — in the synthetic 
 moment of self-consciousness. It is only in the moment 
 of self-consciousness that all the characteristics of mem- 
 ory are to be formed, namely, reproduction; not rein- 
 statement, but reproduction after the kind of the recog- 
 nitive moment, recognition, definite localization in the 
 past and finally awareness of its own activity, or rather 
 self-awareness. Memory germinates and grows in the 
 recognitive moment, and blossoms in the personality- 
 moment. 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 In opposition to the metaphysical view that there ex- 
 ists one consciousness and a separate content, James in 
 his article "Does Consciousness exist?" flatly denies the 
 existence of such a consciousness. He lays stress on the 
 fact that such a consciousness is of a purely hypothetical 
 and speculative character. Psychologically speaking all 
 there exists is thought, experience, while an abstract un- 
 differentiated consciousness may as well be omitted 
 from the scheme of things. All we deal with is mental 
 facts. James ridicules the position of those who regard 
 consciousness as being independent of content: "To 
 consciousness as such nothing can happen, for timeless 
 in itself, it is only a witness of happenings in time, in 
 which it plays no part" . . . "Consciousness as 
 such is entirely impersonal — 'self and its activities be- 
 long to the content" . . . James' view is that in- 
 stead of an impersonal consciousness we should substi- 
 tute thought as a function of knowing (James's italics). 
 "To deny plumply that 'consciousness' exists seems so 
 absurd on the face of it — for undeniably 'thoughts' do 
 exist — that I fear some readers will follow me no farth- 
 er. Let me then immediately explain that I mean only 
 to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist 
 most emphatically that it does stand for a function. . . . 
 That function is knowing" (James' italics). 
 
 We can thus far agree with James. When however 
 he begins to speculate on unitary stuff and pure simple 
 experience which is both objective and subjective we 
 must part company, for he leaves the domain of psy- 
 chology and enters the domain of metaphysics. "My 
 thesis is" he writes "that, if we start with the suppo- 
 sition that there is only one primal stuff or material in 
 the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and 
 
 391 
 
39 2 Appendix I 
 
 if we call that stuff 'pure experience' then knowing can 
 only be explained as a particular sort of relation towards 
 one another into which portions of pure experience may 
 enter." In this respect James approaches perilously 
 close to Wundtian Voluntarism which he does not favor. 
 It practically means double barrelled experience which 
 on the one hand is objective while on the other it is sub- 
 jective. As James puts it, the same experience is counted 
 twice over in one stream which is external and the other 
 which is internal. 
 
 All objections urged against Voluntarism may be 
 brought against this view which is really nothing but 
 the voluntarism of Wundt under a different garb. We 
 are not better off by the assumption of the same experi- 
 ence participating in two different streams. We do not 
 understand the streams any better by assuming differ- 
 ences which really amount to the differences of matter 
 and mind, or of matter and consciousness. 
 
 James on the one hand is too metaphysical and on the 
 other hand he wishes to eliminate the inactive, impassive 
 consciousness of the idealists and of the Neo-Kantians. 
 He is metaphysical in assuming a pure experience which 
 is both material and mental and which in its purity is 
 neither mental nor material. His true psychological 
 sense tells him that an inactive, passive consciousness is 
 a useless, futile assumption. James draws a sharp differ- 
 ence between internal and external experience. "We 
 find that there are some fires that will always burn sticks 
 and always warm our bodies, and that there — are some 
 waters that will always put out fires . . . Mental 
 fire is what won't burn real sticks ; mental water is what 
 won't necessarily (though of course it may) put out 
 even a mental fire. Mental knives may be sharp, but they 
 won't cut real wood . . ." In short, James him- 
 self strongly contrasts the two sets of experiences. That 
 is all that the psychologist requires. The rest of the 
 speculation, — the identification of the two streams in 
 one unitary, primitive stuff-experience does not belong 
 to psychology as a science. 
 
Appendix I 393 
 
 The whole view of James is metaphysical, and still 
 with his clear psychological insight he cannot keep 
 away from psychological facts. He shifts from meta- 
 physics to psychology: "The stream of thinking" he 
 says, "(which I recognize emphatically as a phenome- 
 non) is only a careless name for what, when scrutinized, 
 reveals itself as to consist chiefly of the stream of my 
 breathing. The 'I think' which Kant said must be able 
 to accompany all my objects, is the breath 'I breathe' 
 which actually does accompany them. There are other 
 internal facts besides breathing (intercephalic muscular 
 adjustments . . .) and these increase the assets of 
 'consciousness' so far as the latter is subject to imme- 
 diate perception; but breath which was ever the original 
 'spirit', breath moving outwards, between the glottis 
 and the nostrils, is, I am persuaded, the essence out of 
 which philosophers have construed the entity known to 
 them as consciousness. That entity is fictitious while 
 thoughts in the concrete are fully real. But thoughts in 
 the concrete are made of the same stuff as things are." 
 (James' italics). In this passage James as usual dis- 
 plays his great psychological introspection which is un- 
 fortunately complicated with metaphysical considera- 
 tions. 
 
 Of course, even from a purely psychological point of 
 view we can hardly agree that sensations of respiration 
 and intercephalic, muscular adjustments are alone suf- 
 ficient as elements of general consciousness, for as Ri- 
 bot and others have pointed out coenaesthetic sensa- 
 tions, sensations coming from muscles, viscera, nerves, 
 neurones, peripheral, central, and sympathetic nervous 
 system, all enter as elements in the synthesis of con- 
 sciousness. It may be claimed that the sensations point- 
 ed out by James may be predominant, but this is rather 
 questionable. However the case may be, the identifica- 
 tion of matter and mind, one being objective and the 
 other subjective thought is an adventure into the realms 
 of metaphysics. 
 
 James differentiates the fire that burns from the 
 
394 Appendix I 
 
 fire that does not burn, the water that is really wet 
 from the water which is not wet, the motion that obeys 
 the laws of mechanics from the motion that does not 
 obey Newton's laws. In order to constitute water the 
 chemist does not mix oxygen with his thought of hydro- 
 gen; in order again to constitute the idea of water the 
 psychologist does not require tubes, retorts, so many 
 volumes of gases of oxygen and hydrogen. The chem- 
 ist does not put his ideas into his chemical compounds 
 and the psychologist does not subject his mental states 
 to chemical tests. It is only in metaphysics that the 
 fundamental difference of mental states and physical ob- 
 jects can be explained away in one unitary experience. 
 
 I may add that James himself realized the truth of my 
 contention, for in a private discussion with me he ac- 
 knowledged that the view taken by him was purely 
 metaphysical, that for the psychologist consciousness is 
 as much of a reality as matter, atoms, molecule, ether, 
 election, in short, as some form of material substance is 
 requisite for the physicist. 
 
 Recently some neo-realists attempted to identify con- 
 sciousness with energy and especially with that form 
 of energy known as potential energy. Now we can- 
 not possibly identify mental states and processes with 
 physical forms of energy, whether kinetic or potential. 
 Arthur Gordon Webster in his "Dynamics" points out: 
 
 ML 2 
 "Kinetic energy is of the dimensions the same as 
 
 those of work. Potential Energy is defined as work. 
 The C.G.S. unit of energy is, therefore, the erg." 
 If mental states or consciousness be potential energy 
 of the physicist, the neo-realist should define it in 
 terms of physical work. How many ergs are there 
 in the ideas of virtue, goodness, and beauty? It 
 is clear that if we use the term energy in the 
 case of mental states or processes, we can do it only in 
 a figurative way. Energy in psychology cannot be used 
 in the same sense as the physicist uses the term in the 
 
Appendix I 395 
 
 case of kinetic or potential energy. One cannot take 
 the mass of the idea and multiply it on the square of its 
 length. Such a procedure is meaningless, it is therefore 
 idle to talk of consciousness as potential energy. Ener- 
 gy is used in mental life as a figure of speech, as an il- 
 lustration or substitute taken from physical life, but en- 
 ergy and consciousness can not be identified. When we 
 say that an argument is clear, we do not mean that there 
 are no particles of dust in it, or that we can use it as a 
 medium through which we can see objects distinctly; or 
 when we say of a stupid person that he is dense, we do 
 not mean that he has a high specific gravity. Conscious- 
 ness is not physical energy. 
 
 It is, however, quite possible that the potential ener- 
 gy-consciousness of the neo-realist is neither the poten- 
 tial energy of the physicist nor the consciousness of the 
 psychologist. In this case we once more deal with some 
 general metaphysical unifying substratum akin to the 
 "pure experience" of James or to the "unitary experi- 
 ence" of Wundtian Voluntarism; in other words, we 
 deal here again with metaphysics and not with science. 
 One cannot help agreeing with Calkins: "Of late years 
 vigorous attempts have been made to eject the term 
 consciousness from our vocabulary, but, in my opinion, 
 these efforts, though richly significant, are metaphysical, 
 not psychological, since all are mainly concerned to 
 overcome the dualistic opposition of psychical to physi- 
 cal. For whether accurate or inaccurate, the attempt 
 to balance the account of thought and thing, that is, to 
 distinguish psychical from physical, is concerned with 
 the problem of ultimate reality, not with the explana- 
 tion and description of observed facts, and is therefore 
 metaphysical, not scientific in character." 
 
 While on the one hand there is danger that psychol- 
 ogy, dealing with mind, experience, knowledge, is apt to 
 fall into epistemological and metaphysical pitfalls, on 
 the other hand there is grave danger on the side of phy- 
 siologists and biologists to identify psychic facts 
 with physiological and biological facts. Recently 
 
39*6 Appendix I 
 
 students of animal life have made violent efforts 
 of merging psychology into biology. There is no 
 doubt that motor reactions, adjustments, adapta- 
 tions, behavior must be taken into consideration 
 in the study of psychic facts, but motor manifesta- 
 tions are of psychological significance only in so far 
 as they lead to an interpretation of the inner subjective 
 facts, facts of consciousness. This knowledge can only 
 be given through an introspective interpretation of the 
 facts of behavior. 
 
 We can fully realize the non-psychological attitude 
 when we find writers like Watson who wish to elimi- 
 nate ideas or kindred mental states from psychology, or 
 who like McDougall define psychology as a science of 
 animal behavior. The peristaltic movements of the in- 
 testines, the action of the heart, the lungs and the liver 
 belong to animal activities and still they can hardly be 
 included under psychic activities. McDougall thinks 
 that "psychologists must cease to be content with the 
 sterile and narrow conception of their science as the 
 science of consciousness, and must boldy assert its claim 
 to be the positive science of the mind in all its aspects 
 and modes of functioning, or as I would prefer to say, 
 the positive science of conduct or of behaviour." But 
 even from McDougall's standpoint mere movements do 
 not constitute psychological material, they are psycho- 
 logical in so far as they are the indications of some in- 
 ner subjective experience, such as sensations, feelings, 
 emotions, strivings, conations. Now it is just these 
 phenomena that form the subject matter of psychology. 
 The psychologist regards behavior as the means for an 
 introspective comprehension of what that behavior may 
 indicate subjectively. 
 
 Psychology, even from McDougall's standpoint, is 
 after all the science of the mind, the science of con- 
 sciousness which we can study through an introspective 
 interpretation of motor reactions or behavior. Know- 
 ing introspectively what fear is from our own introspec- 
 tion and from the observation of the motor reactions the 
 
Appendix I 397 
 
 instinct of fear gives rise to we can interpret similar re- 
 actions or behavior in our neighbor or in our lower kin 
 in the scale of evolution. 
 
 It is interesting to observe that while on the one hand 
 McDougall and others put motor reactions, conduct 
 among psychic phenomena, on the other hand pure mo- 
 tor phenomena and physiological activities with but the 
 rudiments of psychic life are described "in terms of the 
 three aspects of mental life of all mental processes — 
 the cognitive, the effective and the conative,' 'terms which 
 are really characteristic of the higher forms of mental 
 life. According to McDougall even "the lower ani- 
 mals perceive, feel, and act." This reminds one of 
 Binet's micro-organisms possessing perception, feeling, 
 and volition. 
 
APPENDIX II 
 
 PHYSIOLOGICAL TRACES 
 
 My attention was called to a very valuable paper 
 "Further Studies in the Chemical Dynamics of the Cen- 
 tral Nervous System," by T. Brailsford Robertson, pub- 
 lished in the "Folio Neuro-Biologica" Band VII, 19 13. 
 Robertson advances an extremely interesting hypothesis 
 based on his bio-chemical researches. Basing himself 
 on the fact that "the performance of mental work ini- 
 tially facilitates its further performance and subse- 
 quently depresses or fatigues it," he builds up a far 
 reaching chemico-physiological hypothesis of the main 
 phenomena of normal and abnormal mental life. I 
 quote freely from his paper as it is of importance and 
 highly stimulating to those who wish to go into the more 
 technical scientific details of physiological research in 
 regard to the phenomena of normal and abnormal 
 mental function. 
 
 "We meet therefore in the exercise of a given intel- 
 lectual function with two apparently contradictory facts. 
 Performance facilitates the exercise of the function and 
 it likewise depresses the exercise of the function. We 
 note furthermore that the facilitation and depression 
 become evident at different periods of time, the former 
 in the earlier and the latter in the later stages of per- 
 formance. Now this phenomenon is not at all limited 
 to the functions of the central nervous system. It is 
 displayed in a very striking way by a variety of other 
 functions, for instance in the contraction of the muscles 
 in response to stimulation, whether direct or indirect. 
 The phase of facilitation is displayed initially in the well 
 known 'staircase phenomenon' and the phase of de- 
 pression by rigidity and inability to contract to stimuli 
 in response to stimuli which formerly evoked a maximal 
 response. Again, as I have shown in a series of com- 
 
 398 
 
Appendix II 399 
 
 munications, a similar phenomenon is displayed in 
 growth which initially undergoes acceleration and there- 
 after slows down. Indeed acceleration and slowing 
 may alternate a number of times in the same organism 
 producing what I have termed 'growth cycles.' This 
 type of phenomenon would appear very generally dis- 
 played in the performance of life-activities, and in- 
 deed I am inclined to think with Loeb that the self 
 conserving character of the life-process will ultimately 
 find its solution in the study of phenomena of this de- 
 scription." 
 
 This principle of "growth cycles" is significant, inas- 
 much as it falls in line with the fundamental principle 
 of reserve energy developed by James and myself from 
 different standpoints. 
 
 Robertson assumes the presence of physiological 
 traces. "If the central nervous system conditions these 
 phenomena at all, as we believe it does, then the passage 
 of a stimulus through the central nervous system must 
 lead through a changed condition which for the sake of 
 forming a concrete image we may term in the language 
 employed by Maudsley, the deposition of a trace or in 
 the terminology of Exner, the excavation of a channel 
 (Bahnung) . . . The dynamic conception of 
 trace formation regards it as being due to a chemical 
 alteration of cell-material along the path of the trace.' 
 We have seen that trace formation is at first facilitated 
 by the process which brings it about and later depressed. 
 . At first a stimulus passes over the 'trace' more 
 readily, because it has previously done so, but at a later 
 stage it passes over it less and less readily until finally the 
 resistance is so great as to almost inhibit its passage 
 altogether. Recalling this fact we find ourselves in a po- 
 sition to crystallize our problem and state it in the fol- 
 lowing terms: 'What is the nature of a chemical reac- 
 tion which at first takes place the more readily in con- 
 sequence of having previously taken place, but at a later 
 stage is inhibited by its own progress?' When this ques- 
 tion is addressed to a physical chemist he does not hesi- 
 
400 Appendix II 
 
 tate in replying: 'The reaction is either catenary (con- 
 sists of two reactions the second of which uses up the 
 product of the first) or it is autocatalytic, i. e. one of the 
 products of the reaction accelerates the reaction.' No 
 other chemical reactions are known to the experience of 
 the chemist which display at any stage positive accelera- 
 tion." 
 
 The various experimental works carried out by Rob- 
 ertson lead him to the rejection of catenary reactions 
 and to the assumption of autocatalysis. Basing himself 
 on this hypothesis of autocatalysis Robertson goes on to 
 explain from a purely chemicho-physiological standpoint 
 the phenomena of memory, of amnesia, of hypnosis and 
 of allied phenomena. 
 
 "Adopting the working hypothesis outlined above, 
 we perceive that the canalisation hypothesis of Exner 
 can now be expressed in a much more definite and con- 
 crete form. Each incoming stimulus carves out for it- 
 self in the central nervous system or deepens a pre-ex- 
 isting channel in the central nervous system, but the 
 channel is not a trough formed by the physical displace- 
 ment of particles, it is a chemical channel, a thread or 
 trace of the autocatalyst of central nervous activities, a 
 thread which need not necessarily be supposed to be 
 more than a few times the diameter of 'the sphere of 
 molecular influence' in width. This deposit necessarily 
 follows faithfully the path pursued by the original im- 
 pulse and permits succeeding impulses to pass over the 
 same path more readily by virtue of its presence. It is 
 possessed of course of a definite spatial location, but, 
 and this is a very important point, if by any chance it 
 should be obliterated or destroyed it is not irreplaceable 
 even if the continuity of the original path be forever in- 
 terrupted. For it is only one of a conceivably enormous 
 number of paths which might be traversed by a stimulus 
 in its passage from one extremity of the original path 
 to the other. Furthermore, the trace is capable of be- 
 ing traversed by other subsequent or performed traces 
 in as many different ways as the axons and ganglion cells 
 
Appendix II 401 
 
 of the central nervous system intercommunicate, that is, 
 so far as our knowledge extends, in a number of ways 
 which for all practical purposes may be regarded as in- 
 finite. 
 
 "It must always be remembered that the trace consists 
 of a deposit of an autocatalyst which we are obviously 
 compelled to assume is an autocatalyst for the 
 propagation of all impulses. It follows, therefore, that 
 if a faint trace runs into, that is to say, traverses or in- 
 tersects a well-marked trace, there will be a tendency for 
 the impulse forming or following the faint trace to be 
 deflected completely at or in a great part into the well 
 marked trace. Indeed if the intersecting trace be suf- 
 ficiently well marked and formed subsequently to the 
 faint trace, we can see how impulses now arriving by way 
 of the faint trace would become so largely deflected into 
 the new well marked trace as to leave the parts of the 
 faint trace remote from the point of intersection almost 
 untraversed by any impulses at all. Instances of the 
 mental correlates of these physico-chemical phenomena 
 abound in our daily psychic life." 
 
 In our next book on "Symptomatology" we shall re- 
 fer to Robertson's application of his theory to the vari- 
 ous phenomena of hypnosis, multiple personality, am- 
 nesia and various forms of dissociation. I wish here to 
 call attention to Robertson's valuable paper and point 
 out his relation to the hypothesis of unconscious cere- 
 bration on the one hand and to my psycho-biological 
 doctrines of the moment-consciousness on the other. 
 
 Robertson fully realizes the shortcomings and crude- 
 ness of the physiological theories advanced by many 
 physiologists to the effects of crowding out mental phe- 
 nomena or consciousness, the very phenomena which the 
 physiological theories were constructed to explain phy- 
 siologically or rather to follow out physiologically step 
 by step. As I have insisted in this volume a physiolog- 
 ical correlative must be postulated for all phenomena of 
 consciousness. This however is far from denying the 
 mental facts themselves and thus being left with a phy- 
 
402 Appendix II 
 
 siological hypothesis instead of the facts themselves 
 for which this hypothesis was constructed. When a 
 physiologist or biologist constructs a physiological hy- 
 pothesis as a correlative of consciousness he is so carried 
 away with it that he soon forgets the purpose of the 
 hypothesis and proceeds to deny the main facts. From a 
 purely scientific standpoint we must postulate that each 
 and every act of experience, of consciousness has a phy- 
 siological correlative, a point on which I have laid spec- 
 ial stress. The reasoning of a Newton, Aristotle, and 
 Plato as well as the moral thoughts and feelings of pro- 
 phets and saints have their physiological correlatives. 
 This however would not mean that all those experiences 
 of genius, intellectual and moral, are unconscious cere- 
 brations devoid of all conscious awareness. Under such 
 conditions it is best to stick to the facts and regard the 
 physiological hypothesis as a pretty speculation which 
 may do more harm than good, inasmuch as it distracts 
 the attention from the facts at issue. 
 
 What I claim is that a good deal, if not the most of 
 what is described as subconscious, is essentially of the 
 same inner, subjective experience of what we otherwise 
 describe as conscious awareness, inasmuch as introspec- 
 tive experience, both direct and indirect, given by imme- 
 diate experience and by memory, as well as by reactions 
 and behavior are the same as found in fully conscious 
 states. If we deny awareness to subconscious manifesta- 
 tions, such as hypnosis and allied states, we should also 
 call in question the awareness of all other similar states. 
 It goes without saying as I have pointed that hypnosis 
 and allied states being phenomena of consciousness must 
 have a physiological correlative, but it is still to be 
 proven that in such states there is only a physiological 
 process without any conscious accompaniment. We may 
 as well claim that the Iliad, Hamlet, the Principia, the 
 Parthenon, Venus de Milo and other creations of genius 
 are the result of physiological processes. In a certain 
 sense the claim is true, there is a physiological correla- 
 tive to the highest flight of genius, but it is man- 
 
Appendix II 403 
 
 ifestly absurd to omit the conscious elements that go to 
 constitute the very essense of what we regard as genius. 
 Conscious and subconscious phenomena have alike phy- 
 siological correlatives and both of them are character- 
 ized by consciousness, awareness, and feeling. The 
 subconscious is a consciousness, an other-consciousness , 
 a consciousness other than the usual personal conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 Robertson is fully aware not only of the crude at- 
 tempts of what he terms static physiological theories, 
 but also of the fallacy of denying consciousness and in- 
 stalling in its place physiological currents, traces, and 
 deposits. "It must be admitted" he says, "that the 
 sporadic attempts which have been made from time to 
 time by biologists to advance interpretations of the phy- 
 sical correlates of psychic phenomena have seldom been 
 either well judged or attended by any measure of suc- 
 cess." In another place he says; "The static conception 
 as that developed by Munk and Ziehen, regards the 
 'trace' as some structural modification, some physical al- 
 teration, an alteration in other words in the distribution 
 of cell-matter in space. I have elsewhere dwelt rather 
 at length upon the more manifest objections to this 
 point of view, at least in the crude form in which it has 
 hitherto been presented. It would require each idea, 
 mental image and conception to be very strictly local- 
 ized. Such a localization of ideas has, of course, never 
 been demonstrated." 
 
 The "trace" is conceived by Robertson in dynamic 
 terms. This dynamic "trace," the correlative of mem- 
 ory, conscious and subconscious, is more or less per- 
 manent, because "the persistence of memories proves 
 that the 'trace,' whatever it may be is rather per- 
 manent and only very slowly fades away." 
 
 Robertson fully realizes the importance of the sub- 
 conscious for the conscious activity. "The phenomena of 
 subconscious memory reveal clearly that memories may 
 persist from childhood to advanced maturity without 
 intermediate self-conscious recollection to reinforce the 
 
404 Appendix II 
 
 trace. Occasional subconscious recollection cannot of 
 course be ruled out, but it must be rare in many cases, 
 for otherwise, as Sidis has pointed out, our entire men- 
 tal life would be occupied in recollecting." 
 
 In speaking of the static physiological theories Rob- 
 ertson says : "Sidis proceeds to dispose of all these 
 theories collectively on the ground that a mere modi- 
 fication left behind as a trace cannot possibly explain, 
 memory, recollection, the fact of referring a particular 
 bit of experience to an experience felt before." Robert- 
 son fully sees the function of the physiological theories 
 as correlatives of conscious states, not as substitutes. He 
 realizes fully that the function of a good physiological 
 theory of the physiological correlatives of conscious 
 states is not the ruling out of the subjective phenomena 
 which after all form the real material of investigation. 
 He assumes the presence of consciousness as a datum to 
 which he wishes to find a physiological correlative. 
 "Such criticism" he goes on to say "is perfectly sound, if 
 these theories are seriously advanced as 'explanations' 
 (rather as substitutes as I would say considering the hy- 
 pothesis of the subconscious advanced recently by some 
 writers on the subject) of the subjective experience of 
 memory. A subjective experience of recollection can no 
 more be identified with a physical modification of a 
 nerve element than the subjective experience of a given 
 color can be identified with a particular wave length of 
 light. But I submit that regarding memory from an 
 objective standpoint as a pure objective fact (modifica- 
 tion of the present as a result of previous reactions to 
 stimuli) it demands objective interpretation with pre- 
 cisely the same force as any other objective fact." 
 
 That memory has physiological correlatives we must 
 regard as one of the fundamental assumptions of psy- 
 chology, both normal and abnormal. What I protest 
 against is the metaphysical "Unconscious" which claims 
 to take the place of subjective facts. The Unconscious 
 (with a capital U) as formulated by Carpenter, Ziehen 
 and by other modern writers, under the belief and pos- 
 
Appendix II 405 
 
 sibly with the good intention of being more scientific, in- 
 troduces Hartmanian metaphysics of the marvels of 
 the Unconscious into psychic life. We must re- 
 member once for all that "deposits of images 
 in memory ganglion cells," "unconscious disposi- 
 tions," "neurograms" and other kinds of figura- 
 tive representations, are in the last resort figura- 
 tive images which may help to picture the possibility 
 of physiological correlatives of psychic states, but they 
 cannot, from their very nature, replace the real facts, the 
 facts of consciousness. As soon as such claim is made 
 by the "Unconscious" it must be declared to be what it 
 really is, namely a speculative hypothesis of certain 
 mental phenomena which alone constitute the real facts. 
 
 Perhaps it is in place to add a few words as to the 
 hypothesis of autocatalysis in relation to what Robert- 
 son discusses as Sidis' hypothesis of neuron disaggre- 
 gation Robertson thinks that the theory of neuron dis- 
 aggregation stated from the standpoint of neuron 
 retraction should be abandoned. It seems to me 
 however, that the theory of neuron disaggre- 
 gation or of systemic neuron disaggregation does 
 not depend on the theory of neuron retraction. The 
 latter is provisional. Systems of functioning neurons 
 may be thrown out of association due to changes of 
 their thresholds. This rise and fall of threshold devel- 
 oped in my Multiple Personality puts the hypothesis of 
 neuron disaggregation on a more solid and more certain 
 physiological basis. 
 
 In fact the rise and fall of thresholds of neuron 
 systems may be very well stated in Robertson's 
 own hypothesis of autocatalysis. The theory of 
 the rise and fall of thresholds is based on a series of 
 known physiological and psychological facts. It is 
 quite possible that the rise and fall of thresholds which 
 gives rise to neuron disaggregations with its accompany- 
 ing phenomena of dissociation are ultimately due to 
 changes in the formation of systems of autocatalytic 
 products. Should the latter hypothesis be proven I 
 
406 Appendix II 
 
 think the theory of neuron disaggregation would rest on 
 a sure chemico-physiological basis. 
 
 The theory of neuron disaggregation may well 
 be stated in Robertson's theory of autocatalysis 
 correlative with psychic phenomena. In fact, Rob- 
 ertson himself calls attention to the fact that his theory 
 does not fundamentally clash with mine, the two may 
 in fact be in full accord. "Abandonment of the postu- 
 late of neuron disaggregation," (rather neuron retrac- 
 tion) Robertson concludes his paper, "does not in the 
 least involve, however, rejection of the really essential 
 features of Sidis' hypothesis of 'moment consciousness.' 
 My hypothesis does not traverse the hypothesis of Sidis, 
 it merely supplements it and renders necessary a read- 
 justment of the physiological equivalents of his termi- 
 nology. From Sidis' point of view the full waking con- 
 sciousness may be likened to a pyramid having for its 
 base a greater or smaller number of 'moments conscious- 
 ness.' From my point of view it may be likened to a 
 complicated textile fabric built up out of the psychical 
 correlates of a greater or smaller number of intercon- 
 nected traces. It is obvious that for the purpose of 
 purely psychological analysis the two hypotheses are al- 
 most completely interchangeable; but for Sidis' 'mo- 
 ments consciousness' we must read not 'neurones, 5 but 
 'traces,' 'channels,' or 'deposits of autocatalyst.' " 
 
 The criticism passed on Robertson's theory that it 
 fails to account for conservation of memory is unjusti- 
 fied. Robertson's theory is fully adequate to explain 
 conservation of memories. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Abnormal, 47, 48 
 
 moment, 283 
 
 psychology, 119, 122, 203, 
 230 
 
 type, 45, 47, 48 
 Absence of controlling agency, 
 
 294 
 Absolute moment, 23 
 
 desultory moment, 230, 
 240 
 Accidental processes, 96 
 
 variations, 96, 98 
 Accumulative moment, 248 
 
 moment, simple, 241 
 Acquired characters, 319, 320 
 Activity, 105 
 
 change of, 26 
 
 mental, 79, 97, 186 
 
 mental, of moment, 287, 
 288, 290, 293 
 Adaptation, 88 
 Aesthetic, 18 
 Affect, 44 
 Affection, 44 
 Affective state, 134 
 Agency, absence of controlling, 
 
 294 
 Aggregate, moment, 248, 254, 
 255, 257, 294, 311, 3H 
 
 threshold of, 304 
 Amnesia, 46, 284, 288, 289, 
 290, 291, 325 
 
 post-hypnotic, 305, 306 
 Amorphous life, 324 
 
 psychosis, 324 
 Animal life, 38 
 Antechamber of consciousness, 
 
 97, 98 
 
 Aphasia, 46 
 Arc, reflex, 12 
 Aspect, social, 27 
 
 teleological, 90, 91, 95 
 Assimilation by moment, 272, 
 273, 275, 277, 282, 283, 
 284 
 Assimilation, power of, 275, 
 
 _ 277, 284 
 Association, contiguity of, 359, 
 361 
 contrast, 359, 361 
 immediate, 210, 212 
 indissoluble, 208 
 mediate, 209 
 by resemblance, 359, 361 
 by similarity, 363 
 Assumption, 16, 69, 70, 203, 
 
 206 
 Attention, process of, 99 
 Attributes, sensory, 160, 163 
 Automatic, recognitive moment, 
 
 370 
 Automatism, 186, 192, 249, 271, 
 285 
 psychology, 190 
 
 Baldwin, 164, 166, 167, 168, 
 
 169, 172 
 Behavior, 119 
 
 hypothesis, 42 
 Behaviorist, views of, 43 
 Bergson, 119, 139, 140, 1 41, 
 
 203, 204,372, 373, 374 
 Biological activity, 301, 302, 
 
 303 
 process, 87, 90, 91, 92, 
 95, 96, 138 
 
 407 
 
408 
 
 Index 
 
 Biosis, 39 
 
 Brain currents, 190 
 
 currents, localization of, 
 24 
 Biichner, 57 
 
 Cabanis, 57 
 Causal necessity, 85 
 Causation, efficient, 88, 92 
 
 final, 88 
 
 principle of efficient, 91 
 
 purpose, 88 
 Cause, the, 101 
 Censor, 101 
 Central elements, 134, 135 
 
 experience, 235, 236 
 Cerebration, unconscious, 175, 
 176, 177, 178, 180, 183, 
 184 
 Chance, 100 
 
 thought, 99 
 Chemo taxis, 130 
 Co-conscious, the, 207 
 Coefficient, ideational, 165, 1 70 
 
 memory, 166 
 
 of reality, 166, 168 
 
 of representation, 165 
 
 sensory, 165, 170 
 Coexistent, 80, HO 
 Cognition, immediate, 365 
 
 mediate, 365 
 Complexes, mental suppressed, 
 
 198, I99> 200, 203 
 Compound, perceptual, 151 
 
 psychic, 133 
 
 synthetic moment, 241, 
 
 337, 34-1, 343 
 
 synthetic moment, accu- 
 mulative, 341, 343 
 Conditional reflexes, 21 1 
 
 stimulus, 211 
 
 Consciousness, 13, 15, 19, 20, 
 23, 24, 30, 31, 32, 37, 
 41, 42, 59, 60, 62, 71, 
 79, 82, 83, 98, 106, 107, 
 108, in, 112, 113, 133, 
 136, 184, 188, 189, 196, 
 206, 229, 230, 231, 290, 
 296 
 
 antechamber of, 97 
 
 content of, 186 
 
 desultory, 256, 257, 322 
 323 
 
 double, 290 
 
 figured, 152 
 
 focus of, 258, 259, 279, 
 280, 281 
 
 moment, 214, 229, 232, 
 233, 234, 235 
 
 passive, 194 
 
 selective, 96 
 Constellation of moments, 254, 
 
 255 
 Content, 49, 231 
 
 mental, 49, 194, 195, 231 
 of the precept, 132 
 psychic, 46 
 Content of conscience, 14, 15, 
 
 186 
 Contiguity of association, 359 
 Continuity, mental, 287, 293 
 principles of, 82, 83, 86, 
 96 
 Contrast, association of, 359, 
 
 361 
 Controlling agency, absence of, 
 
 294 
 
 Corporeal individual, 37 
 Criterion of perceptive truth, 
 
 165 
 Cross section of moment, 236 
 Cumulation, process of, 263 
 Currents, brain, 190 
 
Index 
 
 409 
 
 Darwin, 47, 90 
 
 Data of science, 15 
 
 Day reveries, 99 
 
 Degeneration, mental, 296 
 process of, 313, 315 
 
 Delusion, the, 283, 284 
 
 Descartes, 42, 186 
 
 Desire, 109 
 
 Desultory moment, 239, 243, 
 323, 327, 329, 343, 344, 
 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 
 365, 377 
 
 Desultory moment of conscious- 
 ness, 256, 257, 322, 323 
 
 Desultory moment of self-con- 
 sciousness, 245 
 
 Desultory moment, recurrent, 
 
 324 
 Desultory type, 346 
 Disaggregation, 308, 309 
 mental, 310, 313 
 of moments, 308 
 of moments, law of, 309, 
 
 3ii, 313 
 of moments, process of, 
 296 
 Diseases, functional, 75, 76 
 mental, 311, 314 
 psychopathic, 271, 284 
 Dissociated moment, 350 
 Dissociation, 76, 150, 153, 158, 
 159, 163, 186, 188, 189, 
 197, 216, 217, 223, 230, 
 271, 284, 295, 308, 369, 
 375 
 Dissolution, process of, 314 
 Disturbance, psychopathic, 296 
 Doctrine, Spinozistic, 64 
 Dominant moment, 284 
 Double consciousness, 290 
 Dreams, 99, 307 
 
 Dynamogenesis, 217 
 
 of dissociation, 295, 303, 
 304 
 
 Ebbinghaus, 49 
 
 Efficient causation, principle of, 
 
 9i 
 Elements of affective state, 134, 
 
 137 
 central, 134, 135 
 freedom of, 354, 355 
 nuclei, 127, 131, 132, 
 
 135, 136 
 of objective state primary, 
 
 137 
 sensory, primary, 137, 319 
 sensory, secondary, 137, 
 _ 138, 145, 319 
 Emotion, 44 
 Emotional states, 113 
 
 tones, 134 
 Energy, 20, 21, 79, 80, 128, 
 216, 218, 123, 225 
 kinetic, 20 
 nervous, 218 
 neuron, 218 
 principle of subconscious, 
 
 270, 277 
 reserve, 219, 220, 221, 
 222, 223, 224, 225, 226 
 Epilepsy, equivalent of, 218 
 idiopathic, 202 
 psychic, 217, 218, 291, 
 295 
 Epistemology, 27, 30,' no, 118 
 Equivalent of epilepsy, 21 8 
 Errors, 99 
 
 Essence of percept, 132 
 Ethics, 18 
 Evolution, 47, 91, 254, 275, 285 
 
4io 
 
 Index 
 
 Experience, immediate, 69, 70 
 
 mediate, 70 
 
 unitory, 57, 68, 69 
 External reality, 26, 130, 164, 
 166, 171, 172, 182, 183 
 Externality, 27 
 
 Faculty hypothesis, 358 
 Faith, realm of, 196 
 Fallacious percept, 141 
 Fallacy, 21, 24, 35, 190 
 
 psychological, 35, 113, 
 114, 117, 122, 125, 171, 
 
 345 
 psychologist's, 229 
 Familiarity, 367, 368, 369, 371, 
 
 372 
 Family moment, 274 
 Fatigue, 303 
 
 Fechner, 59, 298, 300, 301 
 Figured consciousness, 152 
 Finality, 83, 88, 89 
 principle of, 83 
 Focus of consciousness, 258, 259, 
 
 279, 280, 281 
 Food instincts, 310, 311 
 Forgetfulness, 203 
 Free association, 356, 357 
 aggregate, 304, 305 
 Function of moment, 260, 265, 
 
 290, 294, 327, 336 
 of percept, 128 
 
 of substitution, 162, 163 
 periodicity of, 217, 218 
 Functional diseases, 75, 76 
 
 psychosis, 154, 163, 192, 
 304 
 
 Galton, 97 
 
 Gap, mental, 293 
 
 classification of, 293 
 psychic, 287, 288, 290, 
 
 291, 292, 293 
 
 Generic recognition, 242, 243, 
 
 244 
 Genius, 99 
 Geometry, 11, 14 
 Growth of moment, 260, 262, 
 
 263 
 Guesses, method of, 280 
 
 Habit, 214, 312, 319, 345 
 Hallucinations, 27, 141, 142, 
 146, 149, 153, 154, 155, 
 156, 158, 164, 165, 171 
 Hartley, 125, 361 
 Herbert, 199, 200 
 High type moment, 250, 251, 
 
 252, 253 
 Hobbs, 126 
 
 Hoffding, 170, 205, 207 
 Hume, 125 
 Hypnogogic, 39 
 Hypnoidal state, 99, 212, 279, 
 280, 282, 291, 325, 349 
 Hypnoidic state, 346 
 Hypnoidization, 282 
 Hypnosis, 46, 84, 176, 177, 
 179, 188, 271, 279, 280, 
 285, 287, 290, 291, 305, 
 349 
 Hypnotic individuality, 189 
 
 faculty, 358 
 Hypothesis, 201, 202 
 faculty, 358 
 materialistic, 57 
 psychological, 73 
 psycho-physiological, 73 
 spiritualistic, 51, 52 
 transmission, 59, 61 
 
 Ideas, 44, 66, 97, 114, 115, 116, 
 117, 120, 124, 125, 135, 
 138, 141, 142, 147, 164, 
 190, 230, 242, 360, 361 
 
 painful, 203 
 
 pleasurable, 203 
 
Index 
 
 411 
 
 Images, 43, 122, 123, 125, 135, 
 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 
 147, 159, 160, 164, 165, 
 166, 169, 170, 171, 172, 
 204, 230, 361 
 
 memory, 166 
 
 object, 204 
 
 subjective, 204 
 
 substitution by, 162, 163 
 Immediate association, 2IO, 212 
 
 experience, 69 
 Imperative concepts, 349 
 
 impulses, 295 
 Impulses, imperative, 295 
 
 uncontrollable, 349 
 Increase of sensation, 300, 302 
 Indissoluble association, 208 
 Individual, 89, 90 
 
 corporeal, 37 
 Individuality, psychic, 231 
 Inhibition, 214, 215, 216, 219, 
 
 223, 225 
 Insistent ideas, 170 
 Instinctive reaction, 268, 269 
 Instincts, 309, 310 
 
 food, 310, 311 
 
 periodic, 217 
 
 sex, 310, 311 
 
 social, 310, 311 
 Intellect, realms of, 196 
 Intensity, 160, 161, 162, 163 
 
 of stimulation, 297 
 Intermediate links, 208, 209, 
 
 210 
 
 mental links, 212 
 Internal reality, 171 
 Introspection, 44, 192 
 Investigation, methods of, 49 
 Irradiation, 146, 152, 153, 304 
 
 James, William, 59, 122, 152, 
 200, 270, 374 
 
 Kinetic energy, 20 
 
 Kulpe, 120 
 
 Ladd, 52 
 
 Lamark, 91 
 
 Law of degeneration, 313, 315 
 
 of disaggregation, 309, 311, 
 312 
 
 of thresholds, 215 
 
 Weber's, 297, 298 
 Life, 87 
 
 amorphous, 324 
 
 animal, 38 
 
 mental, 100, 101 
 
 moral, 310, 311, 312 
 
 personal, 310, 311, 312 
 
 processes, 87 
 
 psychic, 24, 230, 231 
 Likeness, relation of, 363 
 Logic, 18, 22 
 
 Low types of moment, 250, 251, 
 252, 253, 257, 285, 286 
 
 Mach, 102 
 Maimon, 187 
 Mania, 314 
 Material nature, 19 
 Materialistic hypothesis, 57 
 Matter, 20, 24, 57, 204 
 Mechanics, 15, 20 
 Mechanism, definition of, 90 
 Mediate association, 209 
 
 experience, 70 
 Melancholia, 311, 314 
 Meltzer, 223 
 
 Memory, 46, 49, 139, 140, 182, 
 191, 192, 203, 289, 290, 
 374, 390 
 
 image, 166 
 Mental activity, 79, 97 
 
 complexes, suppressed, 198, 
 199, 200, 203 
 
 content, 194, 195 
 271, 287 
 
412 
 
 Index 
 
 Mental continuity,236, 249, 253 
 degeneration, 286 
 disaggregation, 310, 313 
 diseases, 311, 314 
 energy, 21 
 gap, 293 
 life, 100, 101 
 movement, 278 
 process, 16, 80, 87 
 purpose, 315 
 selection, 162 
 state, 37 
 
 synthesis, 53, 54, 294 
 synthesis, principles of, 114 
 system, 162, 213, 214 
 Metaphysics, 15, 22, 23, 29, 30, 
 
 57, 110, 118 
 Method of biology, 50 
 of content, 46 
 of function, 46 
 of guesses, 280 
 of psychology, 50 
 Mill, J. S., 120, 202 
 Mind, 24, 33 
 Modification of moment, 262, 
 
 3i8, 334, 337 
 Moleschott, 57 
 Moment absolute, 239 
 
 absolute desultory, 230, 
 
 240 
 aggregate, 254, 255, 257, 
 
 294, 304, 305, 307, 3ii, 
 
 314 
 assimilation by, 272, 273, 
 
 275, 276, 277, 282, 283, 
 
 284 
 assimilative power of, 275, 
 
 277, 284 
 compound synthetic, 241 
 consciousness, 66, 116, 
 
 214, 229, 232, 233, 234, 
 
 235, 236, 249, 260, 265, 
 
 271, 272, 275, 277 
 
 Moment, cross section of, 236 
 cumulative, 240, 387 
 desultory, 239, 243, 323, 
 
 327, 329, 344, 346, 347 
 
 desultory of self-conscious- 
 ness, 245 
 
 disaggregation, 295, 308, 
 
 dominant, 284 
 
 family, 274 
 
 forces, 259 
 
 function of, 260, 327, 328, 
 336 
 
 generic, recognitive, 243, 
 244 
 
 low forms of, 257, 258 
 
 percept, 260, 277 
 
 perceptual, 237, 260, 273 
 
 purpose of, 260 
 
 recognitive, 241, 243, 
 244, 376, 377, 378, 380, 
 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 
 386, 388, 389 
 
 recognitive of self -con- 
 sciousness, 345 
 
 recurrent, 324 
 
 reflex, 239, 240, 317, 321, 
 322 
 
 representative, 381, 386 
 
 reproductive, 264, 265, 
 317, 3i8 
 
 self-consciousness, 388, 389, 
 390 _ 
 
 sensitivity of, 266 
 
 simple, accumulative, 241 
 
 single, synthetic,_ 337, 338 
 
 specific, recognitive, 242, 
 243, 244, 245 
 
 stage, 260, 277 
 
 structure of, 237 
 
 synthetic, 240, 241, 326 
 327, 329, 330, 33i, 332, 
 336, 337, 33^, 341, 342, 
 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 
 
Index 
 
 413 
 
 Moment, synthetic, 348, 350, 
 376, 384, 386, 388 
 synthetic compound ac- 
 cumulative, 341, 343 
 synthetic of self-conscious- 
 ness, 245 
 threshold, 214, 216, 220, 
 
 297, 308 
 type of, 239, 253 
 Moments, abnormal, 283 
 constellation of, 254,255 
 inter-relation of, 294 
 organization of, 254 
 subconscious, 277, 279 
 submerged, 259 
 Multiple personality, 290 
 Multiplicity, 115, 116 
 Mysticism, 197 
 
 Narcosis, 312 
 
 Natural selection, 96, 201, 221, 
 225, 273, 307, 309, 319, 
 329, 337, 34i, 345 
 
 Nature of things, 204 
 
 Necessity, causal, 85 
 principal, 85 
 
 Nervous energy, 218, 219, 220 
 
 Neurasthenia, 223, 226 
 
 Neuron aggregate, 218 
 
 Neurosis, 24, 39, 78 
 
 Normal, the, 45, 47, 48 
 
 Normal psychology, 200 
 
 Nuclei elements, 127, 131, 135, 
 136 
 
 Object, community of, 27 
 Objective images, 204 
 
 time, 244 
 Ontogenesis, 249, 252, 256, 
 257, 268, 285, 310, 331 
 Ontogenetic series, 1 3 
 Organic unity, 90, 91, 263 
 Organism, definition of, 90 
 
 Overaction, 295 
 
 Pain, 202, 203 
 
 Painful ideas, 203 
 
 Parallelism, 64, 78 
 
 Paranoia, 283 
 
 Pathological states, 346 
 
 Pathology, 74, 103 
 
 Pavlow, 210, 211, 212, 271 
 
 Pearson, 103 
 
 Percept, 89, 126, 128, 130, 131, 
 
 133, 135, 137, 138, 144, 
 149, 150, 159, 165, 171, 
 172, 174, 276 
 Perception, content of, 13.1 
 
 essence of, 132 
 
 function of, 138 
 
 structure of, 127 
 
 theory of, 119 
 Perceptual compound, 151 
 
 moment, 237 
 
 synthesis, 150 
 Periodicity of function, 218 
 Personality, 28, 192, 375 
 Persons, 27, 28 
 Pffefer, 302, 303 
 Philosophy, 16, 22 
 Phylogenesis, 249, 252, 309, 
 329, 331, 338 
 
 object, 29, 30 
 Physical phenomena, 26 
 
 process, 84, 85 
 
 series, 78, 87 
 
 universe, 29 
 Physiology, 86 
 Plato, 170, 175 
 Pleasurable ideas, 203 
 Post-hypnotic amnesia, 305 
 
 suggestion, 217 
 Postulate, 16, 17, 22, 23, 30, 
 67, 82, 106, no, in, 
 112 
 
 of psychology, 67, 68, 106 
 
414 
 
 Index 
 
 Precept, social, 26 
 Presentations, 351, 356 
 Presentative elements, 352, 353 
 Primary elements of objective 
 
 state, 137 
 Principle of continuity, 83, 86 
 
 of efficient causation, 91 
 92 
 
 of finality, 83 
 
 of finiteness, 83 
 
 of necessity, 85, 86 
 
 of reserve energy, 219 
 Processes, accidental, 96 
 
 accumulative, 263 
 
 biological, 87, 91 
 
 mental, 16, 80, 87 
 
 psychic, 26, 84, 85, 87, 
 107 
 
 psychological, 96 
 Psychasthenia, 223, 226 
 Psychic compound, 133 
 
 content, 49, 231 
 
 epilepsy, 218, 292 
 
 gap, 287, 290, 291 
 
 modification, 265 
 
 object, 29, 30 
 
 phenomena, 26 
 
 postulate, 106 
 
 process, 24, 25, 26, 76, 
 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 105, 
 112, 135 
 
 series, 78 
 
 state, 31 
 Psychiatry, 74 
 
 Psycho-biological element, 319 
 Psychological fallacy, 35, 171, 
 172 
 
 hypothesis, 73 
 
 laws, 16 
 
 methods, 50 
 
 processes, 26 
 Psychology, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 
 19, 20, 21, 30, 3i> 32, 
 
 Psychology, 36, 37, 39, 40, 51, 
 
 57, 61, 69, 71, 72, 81, 
 
 86, 92, 106, 107, no, 
 
 in, 112, 117 
 
 abnormal, 119, 122, 203, 
 
 230 
 automatism, 190 
 sources of, 40 
 Psychopathic, diseases, 84, 212 
 disturbance, 296 
 maladies, 311 
 state, 350 
 Psychopathology, 75, 175, 220 
 Psycho-physical relation, 109 
 Psycho-physiological hypothesis, 
 
 73 
 relation, 109 
 Psychosis, 24, 39, 78, 324 
 
 functional, 163 
 Purpose, 38, 90, 91, 95, 99, 
 
 100, 135, 315 
 Purposive life, 38 
 
 Reaction, 37, 128, 130, 136, 
 188, 213, 260, 261, 262, 
 263, 266, 267, 268, 269, 
 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 
 275, 294, 3H, 315, 333, 
 336, 338, 341, 342, 346, 
 347 
 
 Reality, 23, 33 
 
 external, 130, 164, 166, 
 171, 172, 174, 182, 183 
 
 Recognition, 182, 183, 242, 244, 
 265, 363, 366, 367, 368, 
 369, 371, 372, 373, 374, 
 
 375, 376, 377, 382, 383, 
 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 
 3?9 
 
 Recognitive, element, 182 
 
 moment, 241, 324, 370, 
 
 376, 378, 380 
 moment, threshold, 246 
 
Indei 
 
 415 
 
 Recurrent moment, 324 
 Reductive, the, 217 
 Reflex arc, 12 
 
 moment, 239, 317, 321 
 Reflexes, 255, 256, 257 
 
 unconditional, 21 1 
 Reinstatement, 343, 344, 345, 
 346, 347, 349, 350, 351, 
 390 
 Relation, psycho-physical, 109 
 
 psycho-physiological, 109 
 
 type of, 11, 12, 13 
 Representation, 160, 165, 351, 
 
 353, 356, 359, 361, 363 
 law of, 359 
 
 Reproduction, 239, 240, 241, 
 318, 323, 324, 325, 326, 
 327, 328, 343, 346, 350, 
 351, 376, 377, 378, 380, 
 384, 385, 386, 387, 390 
 
 Reproductive moment, 264 
 
 Reserve energy, 219, 221, 225, 
 226 
 principles of, 219 
 
 Ribot, 182, 288 
 
 Rise of threshold, 213, 215, 221, 
 246, 299, 303 
 
 Routine of experience, 104 
 
 Savadsky, 211 
 Science, 11, 13, 16, 21 
 Secondary consciousness, 181 
 Selection, principle of, 285 
 Selective consciousness, 96 
 Self, 175 
 
 Self-consciousness, 175, 176, 
 205, 206, 208, 229, 231, 
 232, 375, 388, 389 
 Self -cosmic, 197 
 Self-preservation, 315 
 
 Sensation, 20, 138, 140, 147, 
 148, 149, 151, 160, 163, 
 164, 166, 169, 171, 173 
 
 centrally excited, 121 
 
 motor character of, 141 
 
 threshold of, 298, 299, 
 301, 302 
 
 unit of, 299, 301 
 Sense of reality, 173, 174 
 
 of perceptual truth, 165 
 Sensitivity, condition of, 213 
 Sensory coefficient, 165, 170 
 Sensory elements, primary, 137 
 
 elements, secondary, 137, 
 138, 145 
 Sequence, causal, 105 
 
 invariable, 101, no 
 
 necessary, 105, no 
 Series, physical, 78, 87 
 
 psychic, 78 
 Setting, 370, 371, 372, 374, 375 
 Signal of reality, 135 
 Similarity, 361, 362, 363 
 
 association of, 363 
 Simple synthetic moment, 337 
 Sleep, 83, 84, 99, 108 
 Sociality, 172 
 
 Somnambulism, 287, 290, 291 
 Soul, 52 
 
 hypothesis, 55, 56, 57 
 Soul-consciousness, 194, 195 
 Sources of psychology, 40 
 Specific, recognitive moment, 
 
 243 
 
 Spencer, 122 
 Spinoza, 122 
 Spinozistic doctrine, 64 
 Spontaneous variation, 95, 243 
 Stage, moment, 260, 277 
 States, pathological, 346 
 
 psychic, 31 
 
 psychopathic, 350 
 Stimulation, 308, 309 
 
416 
 
 Index 
 
 Stimulus threshold, 214, 298 
 Structure of moment, 237 
 Subconsciousness, 84, 175, 184, 
 
 185, 186, 191, 193, 194. 
 
 195, 196, 197, 198, 204, 
 
 205, 206, 207, 208, 212, 
 
 217, 276, 277, 278, 279, 
 
 280, 281, 282, 296, 349, 
 
 350 
 Subject, the, 231, 235 
 Suggestion, hypnotic, 176 
 
 post-hypnotic, 176 
 Sully, 120 
 
 Suppression, theory of, 203 
 Synaesthesia, 152 
 Synthesis, 92, 116, 117, 133, 
 
 152, 214, 218, 233, 235, 
 
 263, 275 
 mental, 17, 53, 113 
 Synthetic moment, 240, 326, 
 
 327, 329, 332, 350, 365, 
 
 387, 388 
 moment compound, 337, 
 
 341, 343 
 moment of self-conscious- 
 ness, 245 
 Synthetic type of consciousness, 
 
 381 
 Synthetic unity, 116, 230 
 System, mental, 163, 213, 214 
 
 Taine, 120 
 Teleology, 92, 93, 95 
 Theory of suppression, 203 
 Things, 27 
 Thoughts, 34, 35, 42 
 Threshold, 54, 213, 215, 221, 
 223 
 
 aggregate, 304 
 
 fatigue, 303 
 
 moment, 216, 297 
 
 of sensation, 298, 299, 
 301, 302 
 
 Threshold, rise of, 213, 215, 221, 
 
 246, 299, 303 
 
 stimulus, 214, 298, 304 
 
 theory of, 175 
 Time, objective, 244 
 Transmission hypothesis, 59, 61 
 Tropism, 130, 187 
 Type, abnormal, 45, 47, 48 
 
 moment, 253 
 
 relation, 11, 12, 13 
 
 synthetic, 381 
 
 Unconditional reflexes, 21 1 
 
 stimulus, 211 
 Unconscious, the, 185, 198, 199, 
 202, 205, 207, 212 
 
 phonation, 155, 156, 157, 
 158 
 Uniformity, no, III 
 Unit of sensation, 299, 301 
 Unitary experience, 57 
 Unity, synthetic, 116 
 
 Variation, 319, 337 
 accidental, 96, 98 
 spontaneous, 95, 96 
 
 Views of behaviorist, 43 
 
 Vividness, 160, 161, 162, 163 
 
 Vivisection, 48 
 
 Volition, 83, 230 
 
 Voluntarism, 67 
 
 Voluntaristic school, 64 
 
 Watson, 42, 43, 44 
 Weber, 298 
 
 Weber-Fechner law, 300 
 Willers, 28 
 World of appreciation, 196 
 
 description, 196 
 Wundt, 209 
 
 Ziehen, 176