^^^ ^^^/T ^d^ 3 HicljLaxdsoTL.TTiiJlialier C-AMPAIGNS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC A CKITICAL HISTORY OF OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA FROM THE COMMENCEMENT TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 1861-5 WILLIAM SWINTON NEW YORK CHAKLES B. KICHAKDSON 540 BROADWAY 18G6 ^^^0 .'d. ■^^7 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1S66, By CHARLES B. EICHAEDSON, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Xew York. JOHN G. SHEA, STEKEOTTPEll AND ELECTROTTPEB, N. V. PREFACE, It is not without diflSdence that I give to the world a volume in nding- within its single self the histoiy of events so vast and coiti- ' ;ated, so little understood and so greatly misunderstood, as those that filled up the momentous four j-ears during which the chief armies of the North and the South fought the war of secession to an issue upon the soil of Virginia. Yet, I should not have at- tempted the task, had I not been met both by an inward prompting in the desire to speak truly of actions and men whereof there has been hitherto little else than false witness, and by outward solici- tations, in the possession of such a mass of documentary material as it seldom falls to the writer of contemporaneous history to obtain. While the Army of the Potomac was yet in the field, there were many who, believing that I would in time make fitter record of the doings and sufferings of that army than was possible in the brief chronicles which it was my duty to prepare for the press, began even then to furnish me with oral and written information. And no sooner had the w^ar closed, and it was known that I had ad- 4 PREFACE. dressed myself to this work in earnest, than, from all sides, repoi-ts, dispatches, and memorials poured in upon me. It soon came about that, respecting every important action of the Army of the Potomac;, there were broug-ht to my hand, not only the manuscript official re- ports of its corps, division, and brigade commanders, but, for the illustration of its inner life and history, a prodigious mass of me- moirs, private note-books, dispatches, letter-books, etc. In addition, 1 have had the benefit of the memory and judgment of most of the chief ofHcers ; and, both from these and others, have had so many proofs of their kindly solicitude that nothing which could be of use to me should be wanting, that I have been led to believe they did not regard me as entirely unworthy to record the history of their army. For the elucidation of the deeds of the Army of Northern Vir- ginia, the mighty rival of the Army of the Potomac, my sources of information have been scarcely less ample. These embrace the complete " Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia," and many manuscript reports and documents kindly forwarded to me. I have also had the advantage of full conversations with most of the chief commanders of the Confederate army ; and I think the result cannot fail to appear in the explanation of many things hitherto wrongly interpreted, many things hitherto wholly incomprehensible. I have seldom needed to refer for the corroboration of statements to what I personally saw ; and indeed the individual knowledge of any one man respecting such actions as were waged in Virginia, is necessarily slight. But that which has been of such use that with- out it the history of the Army of the Potomac never could have been wi-itten, is the power, gained by personal experience in the field, of PIIBFACE, 5 tcRtinc^ the truth of written evidence by a rcferoiir;«» to the actual conditions under which warfare was made in Virginia. Nor is it of loss value to have known the private judgments upon events of that great body of instructed officers that adorned the Army of the Po- tomac. As these judgments took shape from the deeds themselves under the very circumstances of their performance, I hold them to be sounder than any that are hereafter likely to be rendered. Hence I have garnered these with care, endeavoring to make this a record of the ar???j/- verdicts on men and things. It will be safe to presume that whatever is of worth in this book has this origin. It is probable that the estimates here rendered of the successive commanders of the Army of the Potomac, may in some cases be found to run counter to, and in other cases to be a reversal of, popu- lar estimates. I must snj, in justice to myself, that if some com- manders are here exalted above the place they have hitherto held in the hierarchy of reputations, and others brought down to a lower place, I dared not to judge one commander b}-- one standard, and another by another. Whatever criticism I have made on men has resulted from the reference of their actions to the test of tho^ simple principles to which almost all great military questions may be reduced. Those, therefore, who would impugn these judgments must in justice first impugn the reasoning on which they are founded. I desire to call attention to the maps and plans, which, though on a small scale, are entirely reliable. They have been prepared with great care, by Colonel W. H. Paine, of the engineer staff of the Army of the Potomac. I particularly instance those illustra- tive of Grant's campaign from the Eapidan to Petersburg. The Q TREFACE. lines of works marked thereon arc derived from the government surveys, and the angles indicated are correct. They will prove highly interesting and instructive to military students. To a distinguished officer I owe a special acknowledgment for the invaluable gift of the unpublished consolidated monthly returns of the Confederate army from the commencement to the close of the war. The notes in support of the text are made very ample, especially touching all disputed points. As, with a few well-known excep- tions, the sources of information are entirely manuscript, it has not been thought necessary to state this fact in each individual case. W. S. New York, April, 1866, CONTENTS, I. Page THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC IN HISTORY 13 II. THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN 26 I. War in Embryo 26 n. McClellan in Western Virginia 34 III. THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON 60 I. Organization of tlie Army of the Potomac 60 II. Plans of Campaign 68 IV. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 99 I. Before Yorktown 99 II. From Yorktown to the Cbickahominy 113 HI. Confederate Strategy on the Chickahominy and in the Valley of the Shenandoah 121 rV. The Battle of Fair Oaks 128 V. The Seven Days' Retreat 140 CONTENTS. V. Page POPE'S OAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA 167 I. Removal of the Army from the Peninsula 1G7 II. Pope's Retrograde Movement 175 ni. Jackson's Flank March , 1'77 IV. The Second Battle of Manassas 183 V. Exit Pope 193 VI. THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN 194 I. Manoeuvres Previous to Antietam 194 II. The Battle of Antietam 208 III. Close of McClellan's Career 225 VII. THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK 230 I. Change of Base to Fredericksburg 230 II. The Battle of Fredericksburg 238 III. Abortive Movements on the Rappahannock 255 VIII. THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN 267 I. The Army under Hooker 267 II. The Passage of the Rappahannock 270 III. At Chancellorsville— Friday 276 IV. Jackson's Flank March — Saturday 283 V. Simday's Action at Chancellorsville 293 VI. The Storming of the Heights 296 VII. The Coup ds Grace 299 VIII. Observations on the Battle of Chancellorsville 303 CONTENTS. J IX. Pago THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGIT • • 308 I. Theory of the Confederate Invasion 308 II. Manojuvres to Disengage Hooker 312 III. Hooker's Retrograde Movement 316 IV. Across the Border 320 V. Concentration on Gettysburg 325 VI. Gettysburg— First Day 328 VII. Gettysburg— Second Day 342 VIII. Gettysburg— Third Day 356 IX. The Confederate Retreat 366 X. A CAMPAIGJT OF MANCEUVRES 373 I. The March to the Eapidan 373 II. The Flank March on Centreville 376 HI. Mine Run 390 IV. The Army in Winter-quarters 398 XI. GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN 402 I. Combinations of the Spring Campaign 402 II. The Battle of the Wilderness 413 III. The Lines of Spottsylvania 440 IV. Co-operative Movements on the James and in the Shenandoah Val- ley 4G0 V. From Spottsylvania to the Chickahominy 470 VI. The Battle of Cold Harbor 481 VII. Observations on the Overland Campaign 489 XII. THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 497 L The Change of Base 497 II. The Army before Petersburg 507 III. The Lines of Peterisburg 515 10 CONTENTS. Pace IV. The Mine Fiasco 518 V. Lee's Diversion 535 VI. Summer and Autumn Operations against Petersburg and Riclimond. 529 VII. Observations on the Siege of Petersburg 550 VIII. Sheridan's Operations iu the Valley 554 XIII. THE FINAL CAMPAIGN" 565 I. The Circle of the Hunt 565 II. Lee's Initiative 573 III. The Armies Unleashed 578 IV. Five Forks and Petersburg 596 V. The Eetreat and Pursuit 6C4 VI. Ultimo Suspiro 614 MAPS AND SKETCHES. Page Map of Biill Rtm (opposite) 40 Map of the Peninsula " 100 Sketch of the Siege of Yorktown 101 Sketch of the Siege of Williamsburg 113 Sketch of Fair Oaks 133 Sketch of Gaines' Mill 149 Sketch of Malvern Hill 100 Map of Pope's Campaign (opposite) 176 Sketch of Manoeuvres on Antietam 199 Map of Antietam (opposite) 208 Map of Fredericksburg " 238 Map of Chancellorsville " 276 Sketch of Manoeuvres on Gettysburg 325 Map of Gettysburg, first and third days (opposite) 328 Map of Gettysburg, second day " 3-13 Map of the Wilderness " 414 Map of Spottsylvania " 443 Map of North Anna " 473 Map of Cold Harbor " 484 Map of Country around Peteisburg and Richmond " 508 Map of Final Operations " 578 Map of Lee's Retreat and Grant's Pursuit " 608 POKTEAITS. LIErTENA^'T-GE^;EEAL U. S. GnAifT. Majok-Genekal G. B. McClellan. Major-General A. E. Burkside, MAJOR-GENERAi J. HoOKER. MaJOR-GeNERAL G. G. MeADE. CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IN HISTORY. So soon as the passionate rusliing to arms tliat succeeded tlie bombardment and fall of Fort Sumter bad indicated that a great war was upon the sundered sections of tbe American Union, it became manifest that "Virginia was marked out as the principal theatre of the impending conflict. The tidings of what had happened in the harbor of Charleston foimd that State assembled at Eichmond in high debate on the question of Secession ; and then whatever there was in its councils of what men called "Unionism" or conservatism was hushed, and in wild tumult Yirginia was voted out of the Union and into the Confederacy. This, Yirginia voted on the 16th of April, 1861 ; but from her eyes was hid what else she voted — to wit, a War destined to redden all her streams, to desolate her fertile j&elds, to cut off the flower of her young men, and to leave her at its close a wreck and waif of fortune. When Yirginia linked her destiny with the Confederacy, those who controlled the Secession Revolution signified their appreciation of the accession of that ancient and powerful Commonwealth by transferring to her chief city the capital of 14: CA]\IPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. the Confederate Government ; and whereas that Government had borne the prefix " provisional" at Montgomery, at Kich- mond it assumed to itself the style and title of " permanent." Thus marked out as a seat of war by virtue of being the administrative centre of the insurgent power, Virginia was furthermore marked out as the main seat of war by her geographical relations as a frontier State. For upon her secession the Potomac, her northern boundary, became, for all the region between the Atlantic and the Alleghanies, the dividing line betwixt those " points of mighty opposites," the North and the South, — names which, hitherto of no more than political import, now assumed the new and dread significance of belligerent Powers. Thus, by her will and by fate, Virginia became the Flanders of the war. And ah^eady, from the moment the events in Charles- ton harbor made war flagrant, armed men, in troops and bat- talions, hurried forward, from the North and from the South, to her borders. An equal fire animated both sections. Pres- ident Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand men ; Mr. Davis, for a hundred thousand, — armies of a proportion never before seen on the "Western continent. Yet such was the spontaneous alacrity with which on each side the summons was obeyed, that within the space of a few weeks, these limits were greatly overpassed, and an additional call for a half million men on the part of the North, and a levy en masse on the part of the South, met a like response. Then by that new agent of trans- port that has wrought a revolution in military operations no less than in the movement of commerce, the volunteers were quickly conveyed to Virginia from points so distant and divergent as to strike the imagination with wonder. It is estimated that for many weeks after the first call for troops, armed men arrived in Richmond, from all parts of the South, at the rate of from fifteen hundred to two thousand daily ; and the multitude poured forth from the populous North was not less, but greater. From the loyal States, the point of concentration was Washington, where for a time the gather- ing force hold a simply defensive attitude : then bursting the THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IN HISTORY. I5 harrier of the Potomac, it launelied itself upon tliat soil which the men of Virginia fondly named "sacred," and the history of the Army of the Potomac began. I design in this volume to record, as far as may now be done, what that Army did and suffered in ten campaigns and twoscore battles, in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania., This history, if adequately made, must be the history also of much the larger part of that gigantic war that, originating in the secession of eleven States fi-om the Federal Union, ended, after four years, in the estabhshment of that Union on a last- ing basis. For though this conflict assumed continental pro- portions and raged around a circumference of many thousand miles, it was observed that its head and front remained alway in that stretch of territory between the Potomac and the James, and between the Blue Ridge and the Chesapeake. Here, from the start, each belligerent, as by common consent, concentrated its richest resources ; here, throughout the struggle, each continued to sustain its greatest armies, under its ablest commanders : and never for a day did it lose its military primacy in the eyes of either party to the conflict. It is estimated that out of the half million men who met death, and the two million who suffered wound in the war — the losses \ of both sides, and the casualties of all the battles and sieges ' over the whole continental field of action, being included — - above one-half this appaUing aggregate belongs to the Army j of the Potomac and its adversary. These losses are the sum- ming up of a series of campaigns and battles as grand in their proportions as any on record, waged with a remorseless energy, wrought out with all the resources that modern art has devised to make war deadly, and fought upon a theatre peculiar in its character and the conditions of warfare. That cheatre is Virginia — a colossal canvas whereon moving masses and the forms of wrestling armies appear. The history of the War for the Union would set forth that majestic exhibition of jiower by which a free People, without mihtary traditions, created great armies, waged a national 16 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. war, and subdued an internal revolt of a magnitude without parallel. But my present province is more restricted, and embraces the story of one alone of these armies, though the main one. I shall have to trace how this force arose, and its first essays and failures ; how it grew into the shape and substance of an army ; and how it then entered upon campaigns, bloody, in- decisive, and protracted. I shall have to show how this army, losing again and again the component parts of its structure, — thinned by death, and wounds, and wasting disease, and tilled up again and again by the unquenched patriotism of the Peoj)le, — never lost its indi- vidual being, but remained the Army of the Potomac still ; and I shall have to follow those changing pha^s that the life of an army, not less than the life of an individual, undergoes. I shall have to celebrate the unswerving loyalty of this army, that, ofttimes when the bond of military cohesion failed, held it, unshaken of fortune, to a duty self-imposed. I shall have to follow it through a checkered experience, in a tale commingled of great misfortunes, great follies, and great glories ; but from first to last it will appear, that amid many buffets of fortune, through " winter and rough weather," the Army of the Potomac never gave up, but made a good fight, and finally reached the goaL Nor can there fail to arise the image of that other Army that was the -adversary of the Army of the Potomac — and which, who can ever forget that once looked upon it ? — that array of " tattered uniforms and bright muskets" — that body of incomparable infantry, the Army of Korthern Virginia — which for four years carried the Ptevolt on its bayonets, opposing a constant front to the mighty concentration of power brought against it ; which, receiving terrible blows, did not fail to give the hke ; and which, vital in all its parts, died only with its annihilation. Of this drama there will be no other hero than the Army of the Potomac itself ; for it would seem that in this war of the XriE AK.IY OF THE POTOMAC IN HISTORY. 17 People it was decreed tKere sliould arise no imperial pres- ence to become the central figure and cynosure of men's eyes Napoleon, in an outburst of haughty eloquence, exclaims / that in the great armies of history the Commander was every y thing. " It was not," says he, " the Koman army that con- ' quered Gaul, but C?esar ; it was not the Carthaginian army j that made Eome tremble at her gates, but Hannibal ; it was not the Macedonian army , that marched to the Indus, but ' Alexander ; it was not the Prussian army that defended Prus- sia for seven years against the three most powerful States of Europe, but Frederick." This proud apotheosis has no appli- cation for the Army of the Potomac. And one must think - — seeing it never had a great, and generally had mediocre commanders — it was that it might be said, that Avhatover it won it owed not to genius, bnt bought with its blood. I must now add, that it would be to fail to draw some of the most important lessons furnished by the history of the army whose deeds form the subject-matter of this volume, if I should fail to set forth the relations of that army with the central authority at Washington. The conduct of a war under a popular government introduces new conditions into the established military system and traditions, and greatly com- plicates the duties of the commander. Now the history of the American war affords a new and enlarged exhibition of the behavior of a democratical Executive, suddenly plunged into the governance of great military affairs. While a sense of justice wiU suggest the exercise of much lenience in the judg- ment of an Administration called to a difficult task, it is none the less incumbent on the historian to point out errors and follies that cost much. In the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac there is pre- sented a remarkable unity, both as regards the theatre of operations and the objective of operations. The theatre was Virginia ; the objective, Richmond. The first military aspira- tion of the North expressed itself in the vehement cry, " On to Eichmond :" and when, after many battles and campaigns, 2 18 CAJSIPAIvlNS els' THE ARMY OP THE POTO^LVC, — more than aii}' man then dreamed, — Richmond fell, tlie structiu'e of the Confederacy fell with it. But though the sphere of action is in the main bounded hj the geographical figure of the State of Virginia, it resulted from the fact of the war assuming twice on the part of the insurgent force an aggressive character, that its area must be extended so as to include a part of the territory of the contig- uous States of Maryland and Pennsylvania. This circum- stance does not destroy, however, the unity of the zone within which the Armies of the Potomac and of Northern Yii-gmia: operated. The battles of Antietam and Gettysburg — the two actions out of the limits of Virginia — were fought in the nar- row salient of a great triangle, having the southern boundary line of Virginia as its base, the Shenandoah and Cumberland valleys as its western side, and the Susquehanna River and Chesapeake Bay as its eastern side. Prom its apex, this tri- angle measures seven hundred and fifty miles on its mountain- side, and about three hundred miles on its western side, wath five hundred miles on its base line. Now if it be considered that within this comparatively restricted space, two great armies manoeuvred and fought during the protracted period of four years, and that for all that time, though surging backwards and forwards, each main- tained its essential vantage-ground, there will arise the in- ference, either that the operations were conducted with little vigor, or else that there must have been some peculiar condi- tions that shut out victory fi-om sooner declaring itself on the one side or the other. But the former supposition is excluded by the palpable evi- dence, notorious to all the world, of a long bead-roll of bloody battles, and the terrible aggregate of losses sustained, in tliis conflict of Americans with Americans. 5 It results therefore that we must seek in the alternative the explanation of a historic fact seemingly so unaccountable. I shall briefly set forth some of the leading elements that enter into this problem as it stands related to the theatre of opera- tions in Virginia ai^d the conditions of warfare upon that THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IN HISTOET. 19 tlieatre, A proper appreciation of these conditions will lielp to explain the many bloody but indecisive battles that char- acterized the Virginia campaigns, and must modify the con- clusions of those who, from a distance, vainly seek to apply the principles and precedents of European warfare to a region having hardly one mentionable element in common. From the Potomac, as base, to Richmond, on the left bank of the James, as objective, the distance is one hundred and ten miles ; and it is to be noted, first of all, that in this zone an army upon the defensive has its operations facilitated, while an army assuming the offensive has its operations rendered difficult, from the fact that the water-shed being towards the coast, all the rivers cross any line of manoeuvre against Rich- mond. These rivers are : the Occoquan, formed by the union of Bull Run and Cedar Run ; the Rappahannock, swelled by the converging tides of the Rapidan and Hedgman rivers ; the Mattapony, which results from the confluence of four streams, named the Mat, the Ta, the Po, and the Ny ; the Pamunkey, formed by the union of the North and South Anna ; and the Chickahominy, which has its embouchure in the James. The Confederates found ehgible lines of defence along these rivers, which they used to great advantage, from the time when, at the opening of the war, Beauregard formed his array along Bull Run, to when, almost four years there- after, Lee disputed with Grant the passage of the Chick- ahominy, and compelled the Union commander to seek a new base south of the James. The mountain system of Virginia is thrown off on the western flank of the tlieatre of operations, where the Blue Ridge forms, with that parallel ridge called successively the Clinch, Middle, and Shenandoah mountains, the picturesque and fertile Valley of the Shenandoah. This valley, from its direction north and south, and its peculiar topographical relations, is an eminently aggressive line for a hostile force moving northAvard to cross the Potomac into Maryland, either with the view of penetrating Pennsylvania or of manoeuvring 20 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC- t.>v,-ards Washington. It was "by this line that Lee issued upon Vne soil of the loyal States on the occasion of both the Con- federate invasions — to wit, the Maryland invasion of ISO 2, and the Pennsylvania invasion of 1863. This circumstance com- ]ielled, throughout the war, the constant presence of a con- siderable army to guard the cUhoucJie of this great valley and tlio passes of the Blue Eidge ; and the Shenandoah region Avas the scene of a series of operations having an intimate lelation with those of the main theatre, which in general terms may be defined as the territory between the Blue Eidge and the Chesapeake, and between the Potomac a,nd the James. This region has, as its characteristic feature, a dense forest of oak and pine, with occasional clearings — rarely extensive enough, however, to prevent the riflemen concealed in their margins from covering the whole opening with their fire. The roads are few, bad, and form so many defiles ; and it was, throughout the war, commonly necessary for the axeman to precede the artillerist, to hew for him a path. It is rare, in all this tract of country, to find a field in which cavalry can have any legitimate play ; and it frequently happened that, ov.ing to the density of the forest, not even artillery could be employed. It is easy to see that under these circumstances military operations must assume many pecuharities ; and, it is to be added, these were quite in favor of the defensive. The abun- dance of wood afforded such facility for the construction of breastworks and abatis, that, during all the late years of the Virginia campaigns, actions were invariably waged beliind and about hastily improvised ramparts of earth and logs, with which every hundred yards gained was instantly intrenched. Under cover of these rude yet strong "coigns of vantage," — Avith the infantry protected by a parapet, and equipped Avith the improved arms — Avith rifled artillery sAveejoing a front of tAvo or liiree thousand yards, and this front obstructed by "slashings," — the army on the defensive might await, Avith comparative becurity, the approach of hues of battle that were almost fore- THE AKMY OF TIIE POTOMAC IN HISTORY. 21 doomed to repulse. If, peradventure, driven from one liiu', tlie enemy could, with the greatest ease, take up another, an;! another. A campaign thus became a kind of rough siege ; and in this state of facts, even victory was generally fruitless, because pursuit was impossible. The task of the commander increased in difficulty in the same proportion. Shut out from sight, and often even from hearing, the general on the field of battle was constrained to work in a manner blindfold, and compelled to rely on the firmness of his troops till couriers should arrive to bring tidings of the fight. But the obstructions that beset American warfare are not confined to these distinguishing features of the terrain; for the difficulty of any extended operation became greatly en- hanced by the question of subsistence, on which the mobility of an army so largely depends. There are two maxims that forcibly set forth the bearing of the commissariat on wars of invasion : the first is the saying of Frederick the Great, that " an army, like a serpent, moves on its belly ;" the second is the declaration of Csesar, that " war must support v/ar." The former of these maxims asserts the absolute dependence of military operations on the means of feeding the operating army ; the latter, that this dependence should be simplified by drawing supphes from the comitry in which the troops act. But while it is no less true in America than elsewhere that " an army, like a serpent, moves on its belly," the actual con- dition did not permit of carrying out the admonition to " make war support war." In the densely populated countries of Europe, it is easy, from the resources of the country, to sub- sist an arm}' of a hundred thousand men ; and Napoleon, wliile operating in the basins of the Rhine and Danube, and in the rich granaries of Belgium, Italy, and Swabia, constantly supported by requisitions much greater numbers. But in proportion as the population becomes thin, the productive forces decrease, and local sources of supply for an army de- cline or disappear altogether. What is possible in Germany, therefore, is impracticable in Poland, Paissia, or America. In Virginia, no dependence whatever could be placed on procur- 22 CAilPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. ing local subsistence. The area of manoeuvi-e was, therefore, circumscribed by the amount of rations that could be carried on the persons of the soldiers and in wagons, which in Vir- ginia was not more than suflSicient for from ten to sixteen days ; while its transport necessitated immense trains of two, three, and four thousand wagons — an overgrown mass of {mpedimenta that made rapidity of movement almost impos- sible, and constantly bound in the commander to saucy doubts and fears. Indeed, what alone made operations over the im- mense tracts of country overrun by the Union armies prac- ticable were, first, that new element in warfare, the railroad ; and, secondly, the command of the seaboard by the North. Now taking into account this cardinal maxim of American warfare, that an army operating over a large tract of country must pivot either on a railroad or a river, it appears that from Washington as a base, a force advancing against Kichmond by the overland route, and ha^dng at the same time to cover Washington, is restricted to two hues of manosuvre : 1. The hne of the Orange and Alexandria Kailroad ; 2. The line of the Fredericksburg and Eichmond Eailroad. Each of these lines was repeatedly essayed during the Yirginia campaigns — the former by Pope and Meade ; the latter by Burnside and Hooker. Touching the merits of these lines, experience con- firmed what theory would have postulated : that the line of the Orange and Alexandria Eailroad, though an eminently de- fensive line as regards Washington, is hardly aggressive ; and beyond the Eapidan involves so many complex considerations that no commander was ever able, on this line, to push an advance south of that river. The Fredericksburg route is an aggressive line as regards Eichmond, though it is surrounded with many difiiculties. It is not, however, a good defensive line as regards Washington ; and experience has shown that an army operating by that hne, and having also to cover Washington, may readily be dislodged from it and forced to attempt to regain the Orange and Alexandria line by a simple menace against the latter. And this fact suggests the reflec- tion that railroads in war, though affording great facihties for THE ARAIY OF THE POTOMAC IN IHSTORY. 23 transport, and permitting the execution of operations that, without this resource, would be impracticable, have their own peculiar drawbacks, and require the detachment of a consider- able part of the active force for their jJrotcctiou against hos- tile raids. But it may be said that the possession by the North of the whole Virginia seaboard gave many other secondary bases and lines of operation, free fi-om the objections above men- tioned. This is undoubtedly true ; yet the statement must be taken with the limitations that belong to it. The most im- portant of these lines are the Peninsula between the York and James rivers, and the route by the south side of the James. The former was adopted by General McClellan in the spring of 1862, and the latter was eventually taken up by General Grant in the summer of 1864, after having, in a re- markable campaign, crossed every possible line of operation against Eichmond. But it is manifest that Piichmond could be operated against from the coast only by an army that was in condition to leave Washington out of the question. Tlie secession of Virginia made the Potomac the dividing hne between two warring powers; and the unfortunate location of the national capital on the banks of that river, and on an exposed frontier, profoundly affected the character of military operations in Virginia, and, during the first three years of the war, caused a subordination of all strategic combinations to the protection of Washington. Saving the time when McClellan moved to the Peninsula, and Grant swung across the James Eiver, the Army of the Potomac was never allowed to "uncover" Washington.-, Now, in the former case, the first menace b}^ Lee foreshadowing a northward movement caused the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula ; and, in the latter instance, a small raiding column, detached by way of the Shenandoah Valley into Maryland, compelled General Grant to part with two of his corps to protect the national capital, and, for the time, almost suspended active operations before Petersburg. It remains now to add that the gigantic war whose prin- 24 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARiHT OF THE POTOilAC. cipal field was Virginia was one that, fi'om its very nature, threw the burden of the offensive on the side of the North. For, as the National Government undertook to subdue the insurrection of the Southern States, it rested with it to strike, and with the South to parry. But it soon became apparent that the task w^as very different from that involved in the quelhng of an ordinary rebellion, and that the conflict had, from the unanimity of hostile sentiment at the South, the vast extent of territory in insurrection, and the mighty force iu arms, all the character of a war waged iDetv/eeu two powerful nations. Nov,', of all the forms that war may assume, that is the most formidable which is denominated a "National War," the nature of which is thus powerfully depicted by the great- est of military theorists : " The difficulties in the j^atli of an army in National wars are very great, and render the mission of the general conducting them very arduous. The invader has only an army ; his adversaries have an army and a people wholly, or almost wholly, in arms — a people making means of resistance out of every thing, each individual of whom conspires against the common enemy ; so that even the non-combatants have an interest in his ruin, and accel- erate it by every means in their power. He holds scarcely any ground but that upon which he encamps ; and, outside the limits of his camp, every thing is hostile, and multiplies a thousandfold the difiiculties he meets at every step. These obstacles become almost insurmountable, when the country is difficult. Each armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths and their connections ; he finds everywhere a relative or friend who aids him. Tlie commander also knows the coun- tr}', and, learning immediately the slightest movement on the part of the invader, can adopt the best measures to defeat his projects ; while the latter, without information of their movements, and not in a condition to send out detachments to gain it, having no resource but in his bayonets, and certain of safety only in the concentration of his columns, is like a blind man — his combinations are failures ; and when, after the most carefulh' concerted movements and the most rapid and THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IN niSTORi'. 25 fatigiiing marclies, he tliinks lie is about to accomplisli Ina aim and deal a terrible blow, lie finds no sign of tlic encniy but his camp-lires ; so that, while, like Don Quixote. h(>. \.-\ attacking windmills, his adversary is on his line of communi- cations, destroys the detachments left to guard it, surpriscj; his convoys and depots, and carries on a war so disastrous for the invader that he must inevitably yield after a time.'" It needs not to tell any one who has followed the history of the Yirginia campaigns, that every shng and arrow thus graphically shown to assail an army penetrating a hostile country in which the population as well as the army enters into the belligerency, did harass the Army of the Potomac. Yet it is not possible that any, save such as have had actual experience of command, can measure aright the obstructions of every nature that hedged military operations in a country, unknown and unmapped, filled with a population ready to) convey to the enemy information of every movement, and/ eager to cut a telegraph-wire or throw a railroad-train from) its track. The Confederates, waging war on that theory thatj is named the " defensive with offensive returns," attempted, in? two memorable campaigns, an operation of invasion ; but the' decisive failure that attended both, may stand as an exemplary of the difficulties that constantly beset the Union army. [ If, notwithstanding these difiiculties, the Army of the Po- tomac at length succeeded in destroying its oj^ponent, — thus disproving the dictum of General Jomini, who, in the passage I have just quoted, asserts that in such a task the invader " must inevitably yield after a time," — it would appear to be a reasonable inference that the means by which this end was brought about must be notable, and that the army that accomplished this result may be worthy of a larger fame than the world has yet accorded it. 2G CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 11. THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. WAR IX EMBRYO. By tlie express terms of tlie ordinance of secession, passed by the Virginia Convention on tlie IGtli of April, 1861, the decree that was to link the fortvmes of that State ^^ith the Con- federacy became valid only on being ratified by the popular vote, appointed to be given -on the fourth Thursdaj^ of May. The Administration at "Washington respecting this provision, awaited the action of the people before advancing its armed force to " repossess the places and property" of the Federal Government. But it was soon manifest that this stipulation was destined to be a nullity in face of the swift-advancing realities of war. Virginia immediately threw herself into an attitude of defence. Governor Letcher issued a proclamation calling out the militia of the State, and Colonel Eobert E. Lee was appointed major-general and commander of the " Virginia forces." More than this : the Convention having, on the 21:th of April, decreed that pending the popular vote on the question of secession, " military operations, offensive and defensive, in Virginia, should be under the chief control and direction of the President of the Confederate States," Confederate troops, from South Carolina and the States of the Gulf, were rapidly throv/n forward into Virginia. Meantime, the United States arsenal at Harper's Ferry had been evacuated and partially destroyed by the commander of the post ; and the United States navy-yard at Norfolk had been abandoned by the TEE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 27 Federal officer in command, and several men-of-war, witli a vast accumulation of war materiel, consigned to the flames. Save from the fortress that guards the entrance of James River, the Federal flag floated nowhere within the boundaries of the " Old Dominion." The Confederates, with much energy, pushed forward prep- arations for the defence of Virginia ; and the middle of the month of May reveals the growing outlines of a definite mili- tary policy. This policy, however, so far as it touched the distribution of force, seems to have been shaped rather by the Austrian principle of covering every thing, than by any well- considered combination of positions. The Peninsula between the James and the York rivers was held by a Confederate force of about two thousand men, under Colonel J. B. Ma- gruder, who took position near Hampton, where he confronted the Federal force at Fortress Monroe, which had lately been placed under command of Major-General B. F. Butler. The defence of the highland region of Western Yirginia had been assumed by General Lee, commander-in-chief of the State forces, who had dispatched to that section Colonel Por- terfield, with instructions to raise a local volunteer force — not a promising undertaking among the hardy, Union-loving mountaineers — and hold the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the direct line of communication with the States west of the Alleghauies. Between these outlying members was placed the mam body of the Confederate force, in two camps — the one located at Manassas Junction, twenty-seven miles southwest from Alex- andria, and the point of intersection of the great Southern railroad route between Washington and Richmond and the Manassas Gap Raikoad, leading to the Valley of the Shenan- doah ; the other posted at the outlet of this valley, at Harper's Ferry. The force assembled and assembling at the former of these camps was at first under the orders of Gen- eral Bonham, of South CaroHna ; but before the close of May, the obvious importance of the position, as confronting any direct advance from Washington, caused the Confederate 2S C.UiPAIGXS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTO.^LVC. authorities to assign to its command the man enjoying the first military rejoutation in the South. This man was Gener:il Beauregard, and the region of country under liis control vriis named the "Department of the Potomac." The body of troops collected at Harper's Ferry, and Vthicli, at the close of the month of May, consisted of nine regiments and two battalions of infantry, four companies of artillery, and about three hundred troopers,* had been formed under the hand of a man, then of no name, but destined to become one of the foremost figures of the war — Colonel Thoma;i Jonathan Jackson, better known in the world's bead-roll of fame as " Stonewall Jackson." A lieutenant of artillery in the United States service during the Mexican war, he had at its close retired to a professorship in the Virginia Military Institute, beyond whose walls he was quite unknown, and within which he was marked only for his personal eccentrici- ties, stern puritanism, and inflexible discipline. Upon the secession of Virginia, Professor Jackson resigned his chair, and being appointed by Governor Letcher to a colonelcy in the Virginia line, he was immediately sent forward to com- mand the Confederate troops at Harper's Ferry. About the time, however, that Bonham was replaced by Beauregard, the command of the force at Harper's Ferry, which bore the style of the "Army of the Shenandoah," was committed to the hands of General J. E. Johnston ; and Colonel Jackson, assigned a subordinate command under that able soldier, de- voted himself to moulding into form and stamping with the qualities of his own genius that famous " Stonewall brigade," vrhose battle-flag led the van in that series of audacious enterprises that afterwards rendered the Valley of the Shen- andoah historic ground. General Johnston's other sub- ordinates were men of scarcely inferior ability to Jackson. Colonel A. P. Hill, subsequently one of Lee's ablest lieu- tenants, was at the head of another of his brigades ; Pendle- ton was chief of artillery ; and his few squadrons of Virginia * Report of General J. E. Johnston. THE TIIEEE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 29 horsemen were tinder command of Colonel J. E. B. Stuart, wliom even then Johnston styled " the indefatigable," and Avlio "svas also destined to a greater fame. Tims far, the line of the Potomac had not been crossed. The soil of Virginia, Arhicii her inhabitants loved proudly to style " sacred," had felt the tread of no invading force, Poj^ular notions hardly went beyond simply defending the cajoital ; and not only many men who were supposed to be skilled in the calendar of state, but even the shepherds of the people, still flattered themselves with the hope that there would be no war — that all that was needed to quell the " rebellion" was an imposing display of force."" Meanwhile, volunteers, burdening all the railways that, from the North and East and West, converge on Washington, continued to accumulate on the Potomac. The insurrection that for a time had threatened to involve Maryland, and had broken out in open attack upon the first Federal troops that passed through Baltimore, had been subdued by the firm policy of the Administration, and direct raih'oad communication be- tv/een the national capital and the North, for a time inter- rupted, had now been restored. By the middle of May, between forty and fifty regiments were encamped about Washington ; and, at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, a large force was accumulating under General Patterson, which by its position menaced Harper's Ferry. The presidential call had been for seventy-five thousand volunteers for a term of three months ; but through the persuasion of General Scott, who well knew that it was no three months' aftair the Govern- ment liad on its hands, a supplementary call for forty thou- sand men, to serve for three years or the Avar was made. An increase of the force of the Begular army was also ordered. These troops were raised with the greatest alacrity, and each * " It Avas a favorite notion "vvitli a large class of Northern politicians (and the people too) that nothing but an imposing display of force was necessary to crush the rebellion." General Barnard: The C. S. A. and the Battle of Bull Run, p. 43. 30 ca:mpaigns op the army of the potomac. State soon so greatly outran its assigned quota, that energetic measures liad to be taken to stop recruiting, until Congress, having assembled in extra session on the 4th of July, au- tliorized a levy of Five Hundred Thousand Men. Meantime, the frontier had not been passed ; and the pickets lounging at the bridges that span the Potomac from "Washington to the Virginia shore, and the gray-uniformed videttes on the southern bank, observed each other without any hostile mean- ing in their opposing eyes. But when the day came that the popular vote on the ques- tion of secession was taken, the w^ar, which had thus far " drifted," took definite shape. Though there were yet no tid- ings what the vote had been, there was, nevertheless, no room for illusion as to its scope and purport ; and that night, the night of the 23d of May, the van of the " grand army" passed the Potomac. After midnight, fifteen thousand troops were transferred by the Long Bridge, by the Aqueduct, and by steam- ers to Alexandria, situate on the right bank of the Potomac, and four or five miles below Washington. The city of Alex- andria, and the Heights of Arlington, opposite Washington, with the intermediate connecting points, were seized without opposition. A few troopers, that held the town as an outpost of the force at Manassas, were captured ; the remainder gal- loped off to bear the weighty tidings. The bloodless initia- tion of operations was beclouded by but one event, the mur- der of the young Colonel Ellsworth, of the Fire Zouaves, vrho was shot by a citizen within a hotel of the town of Alexandria, while bearing away a Confederate flag, which he had hauled down from the cupola of the building. Powerful earthworks, as tetes-de-pont to the Long Bridge and Aquediict, Avere imme- diately constructed by the engineers ; and forts were laid out to cover the approaches to Alexandria and Ai'lington. These formed the initiation of the system of " Defences of AYashing- ton."* The active force south of the Potomac was placed under the command of Brigadier-General Irvin McDowell, * Barnard : Eeport of Engineer Operations, p. 0. THE THREE MONTHS' CAilPAIGN. 31 and held a position threatening advance against the Confed- erates at Manassas, by the line of the Orange and Alexandria Kailroad. Leaving it for the present in that attitude, I must now detail a series of initial operations in other parts of the theatre of war in Virginia. The first of these operations is the affair, or, as it was at the time named, the battle, of Big Bethel,— an affair which, in- significant in itseK, had a considerable moral effect in elating the Southern troops, and a correspondingly depressing effect upon the people of the North. This expedition, which is as remarkable for the crudity of its conception as for the blun- ders that marked its execution, was devised by General But- ler for the purpose of capturing the Confederate posts at Little and Big Bethel, a few miles up the Peninsula from Fortress Monroe. The execution of the project was intrusted to one General Pierce, who, as it appears, had never been mustered into the United States service, and had no right to any command. The advance v/as made in two columns — the regiment of Duryea's Zouaves, followed by the Third New York Volunteers, under Colonel Townsend, on the right, by way of Hampton ; and Bendix's New York regiment and a Vermont battalion on the left, by way of Newport News. The movement was begun during the night of the 9tli of June, and it was designed to surprise the enemy before daylight next morning. The marches of the two columns were based on the showing of an old and incorrect map ; and as from this the troops that had to move from Newport News were three miles nearer the point aimed at than the other column, it was arranged that they should start an hour after the others. The true state of the case, however, was, that they were four miles fui'ther; and just before daybreak the rear regiment of the left column, under Colonel Bendix, and the rear regiment of the right column, under Colonel Townsend (which had fol- lowed Duryea's regiment at an interval of two hours), met at a junction of roads near Little Bethel ; and the former, mis- taking the latter for an enemy, opened a fusilade, by which Townsend's regiment suffered a loss of twenty-nine in killed 32 C-V^.IPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. n.nd v.'ouuJecl before the contretem.ps was discovered.'* The e^ieniT at Little Bethel, getting the alarm, took flight, and the expedition then advanced on Big Bethel. This position, as it appears, was occupied as an outpost of Magruder's main l)ody at Yorktowu, and was held by a force of eleven hundred North Carolina and Virginia troops, under Colonel D. H. Hill, then in command of the First North Carolina regiment.f The position v/as rather advantageous for defence, being covered by a svv^ampy creek, and further strengthened by some guns placed under cover. It was liable, however, to be easily- turned by the right. General Pierce displayed a great in- competence in his dispositions ; but it happened that- there vt'as one man there v/ho saw the course of action suited to the case. Lieutenant-Colonel "Warren suggested that a regiment should be sent round on each side to take the posi- tion in liank, and when these became engaged, those in front, lying in shelter in a wood, should attack. This operation, if carried out, would probably have been successful. But the regiment that was to make the movement on the enemy's right, instead of being directed by a detour through the woods, was advanced right across an open field, in front of the position, whereby it became exposed to an artillery fire. It happened, too, that the left company became separated from the rest of the regiment by a thicket ; and Colonel Townsend not being aware of this, and seeing the glistening of bayonets in the woods, concluded the enemy was outflank- ing him, and so fell back to his first position. The regiment that had gone round on the other flank found itself in a diffi- cult situation, where being exposed to pretty severe fire, it Avas found hard to bring the men up ; and Major Wiuthrop, aid to General Butler, a young man of superior culture and promise, * Lieutenant-Colonel, afterwards Major-General, Warren, at that time attached to Duryea's Zouaves, states in his evidence before the War Committee that " the two regiments, when they arrived on the ground, finding things not at all as they had been instructed, were justified in firing on each other." Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. ill , p. 084. t Hill • Report of Big Bethel. THE TIIKEE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 33 was killed wliilo rallying the troops to the assault. Lieuten- ant Greble, of the regular artillery, who had handled his guns very skilfully and caused the enemy to withdraw a battery posted to command the road leading to Bethel, was also killed ; and the aggregate loss was found to be about a hun- dred men. General Pierce then ordered a retreat, and the regiments marched off as on parade. Colonel Warren, who alone protested against the retreat, voluntarily remained on the ground, and together with Dr. Winslow, of his regiment, brought off the wounded. While he yet remained on the ground, the Confederates abandoned the position; and the reason for this step assigned by Colonel Hill is, that he feared re-enforcements would be sent up from Fortress Monroe.* The affair of Big Bethel really proved nothing, except that an attempt, involving failure in its very conception, had failed. Yet it was magnified as a great victory by the South ; was put forth as a test of what was called " relative manhood ;" and produced throughout the North a deep feeling of mortifi- cation and humiliation. + This feeling was kept alive by a trivial fiasco which occurred shortly after in General McDowell's department. General Schenck had been ordered to make a reconnoissance up the Loudon and Alexandria Kailroad to Leesburg ; and setting out with a few hundred troops, upon a train of cars, he jDro- ceeded upon that novel kind of reconnoissance. The excur- sion was made uninterruptedly until the train iieared Vienna, thirteen miles from Alexandria, when, turning a curve, it was suddenly opened upon by two guns planted near the track, the fire killing and wounding some twenty men. The troops immediately sprang from the cars and took to the woods ; and the engineer having detached the locomotive, made all speed to Alexandria, leaving the excursionists to get back as best * HUl : Report of Big Bethel. f Colonel Hill, in a bombastic report published at the time, spoke of ropulp- Jig "desperate assaults," and pursuing " till the retreat became a rout,' etc., etc. ; while he himself was retiring witliout any rcasson whatever.* This fus- tian found ready credence at the South. 3J: ca:mpaigns of the army of the potomac. might be, and the cars to be burnt by the enemy. The hos- tile force consisted of a small scouting party under Colonel Gregg, and did not pursue in the least. The adverse gims were, hke those of Big Bethel, immediately set down as a " masked battery," — a phantom of the imagination that played a reaUy considerable part during the early stages of the war.* But the discouragement caused by these lapses was destined soon to disappear under the influence of a series of very dif- ferent operations in Western Yirginia, from w^hose mountains was flashed the first gleam of positive victory upon the Union arms. 11. McCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. It has been seen, in an earlier part of this narrative, that the defence of Western Yirginia, on the side of the Confed- erates, had been undertaken by General Lee, who had dis- patched Colonel Porterfield to that region, for the purpose of raising there a local force. -The object of this, it is probable, was not so much to undertake offensive operations across the Ohio Biver^ as to coerce the loyal inhabitants into the seces- sion movement.f * This " masked battery" theory was given by General Schenck in explana- tion of the afiair at Vienna, touching which he says, in his dispatch of the time to General Scott : " We were fired upon by raking masked iattenes of, I think, three guns, with shell, round-shot, and grape," etc. It would be difficult to say how much, and for how long a time, this absurd fiction of " masked batteries' aflfected operations ; but it is certain that it had no inconsiderable influence. A curious illustration of this is given by General McDowell, in his evidence touch- ing the battle of Bull Run. " The march," says he, " was slow, — one reason being, that since the affiiirs at Vienna and Big Bethel, a fear of * masked bat- teries' caused hesitation in regard to adxance upon points concerning ichich there was a want of information." Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. ii., p. 4. So true to human nature is the maxim, " Oynne ignotum pro magnifico !' \ The correctness of this view of the aim of the Confederates in West Vir ginia is fully confirmed by captured dispatches from General Lee to Colonel Porterfield. THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 35 Now about the middle of May, tlie States of Ohio, In- diana, and Illinois had been formed into a department named the Department of the Ohio, and its control had by General Scott been intrusted to General George B. McClellan, for- merly of the Corps of Engineers in the regular army, who hav- ing a short time previously been made major-general of the Ohio contingent under the three months' call, was now raised to the same rank in the regular army. His command being bounded on one side by the Ohio River, McClellan's attention was naturally attracted to the events passing on the other side of the frontier, within the Hmits of West Virginia. Find- ing the position of the Confederates both oppressive to the loyal inhabitants and menacing in a mihtary point of view, General McClellan, about the end of May, without instructions from Washington, threw over a force to the Virginia side of the Ohio ; ' and hearing of a secession camp at PhillipjDi, he ordered it to be broken up. The movement to this end was under way, when Porterfield, becoming aware of it, abandoned his position. McClellan having determined to occupy the whole region, had his Ohio regiments, as they were in succes- sion equipped, transferred to the Virginia side. But the Con- federates were indisposed to give up this mountain fastness ; and accordingly, to meet the Union occupation, strong re- enforcements, to the amount of six thousand men, were directed upon Western Virginia, and the command given to General Garnett, an old officer of the regular army. Garnett took up advantageous positions at Laurel Hill, a westward-facing sentinel of the Alleghany range, where he held command of the great road from Wheeling to Staunton, — the main high- way of communications for the region west of the Alleghanies with that to the east of that mountain-wall, — and began a system of very active and very annoying partisan operations. In the course of a month General McClellan had on foot a considerable army, and he then determined to take the field against Garnett's force. The theatre of operations was that portion of Western Virginia contained between the Ohio and Cheat rivers in one direction, and the Baltimore and Ohio 36 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Railroad and Great Kanawlia and Gaulej rivers in the otlier. The affluents of the Monongahela and the two Kanawhas divide this region into a number of narrow valleys, separated by rough and difficult hills, which rise into true mountains as they approach the heads of the Little Kanawha and the west fork of the Monongahela, The country here becomes alpine in its character. The roads practicable for wagons are few, narrow, and difficult. As cultivation is generally confined to the valleys, and the mountain-sides are obstructed by rocks and a dense growth of timber and underbrush, it is difficult even for skirmishers to move across the country, and it is not possible for troops and trains to march elsewhere than on the narrow roads. Positions suitable for handhng artillery are rare, and cavalry is useful in that district only to con- vey intelligence. The resources of the country are incon- siderable.'^ These characteristics of ground, which are the common characteristics of mountain regions, give to mountain warfare certain principles particular to it, and different from those that obtain in military operations in the plain. Thus moun- tain warfare readily admits of combined marches, which can seldom be employed in the plain. Such marches offer, in highland regions, no real danger, since the enemy is unable to throw himself between the columns : it is therefore suffi- cient that each column be strong enough to defend the valley in which it operates. t But the facility of the tactical defence of highlands renders it necessary for the assailant to seek to dislodge the enemy by manoeuvres rather than du'ect attack : in other words, he should manoeuvre offensively while he fights defensively ; or, as Napoleon sums up the theory in one pregnant sentence, " the genius of mountain warfare consists in occupying camp on the flanks or on the rear of the enem}', * McClellan : Campaigns in Western Virginia, p. 25. + Vial : Coiirs d'Art et d'Histoire Militaires, vol. ii., p. 83. On this feature of mountain warfare, see also McDougall : Modern Warfare and Modern Artillerj, p. 350. THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 37 SO as to leave him only tlie alternative of evacuating liis posi- tion without fighting, or of issuing to attack.""'^ I make this exposition of the theory of mountain warfare, because, as will presently appear, the operations of General McClellan in Western Virginia afford a very happy applica- tion of all the cardinal principles here laid down. The main turnpike from Staunton to Wheeling, which is the great high- way across the mountains, was held by Garnett in an in- trenched position, at Laurel Hill. This road, which here rmis nearly southward, was his direct and natural line of retreat, and if cut off from that, his only chance of escape was by difficult roads over the mountains, eastward. Five miles below Garnett's main position at Laurel Hill, a road from the west passes through this spur at a defile known as Eich Mountain, and strikes the main road. To guard this approach against any menace directed upon his line of re- treat, Garnett had placed here his second in command. Colonel Pegram, with a force of about one thousand men. McClellan, whose line of march was from the west, fi'om the direction of the Ohio Kiver, determined to dislodge Garnett and Pegram by striking their main line of retreat below the position held by the latter. Then, to make the operation de- cisive, he resolved to direct another column fi-om the north to seize the only other avenue of escape, and thus, if possible, capture or destroy the whole adverse force.f With the main column of two brigades, under Brigadier Generals Scheich and Kosecrans, the afterwards illustrious commander of the Army of the Cumberland and victor of Stone Paver, General McClellan moved fi-om the west, by way of Clarksburg to Buchanon (July 2), twenty miles west of the hostile position. From here, several divergent expedi- "- As authority on this same point, see also Dufour, Strategy and Tactics, p. yCl ; Jomini : Art of War, p. 1G8 ; Vial : Cours d'Art, etc., vol. ii., p. 83. t In a letter to Lieutenant-General Scott, communicating his proposed plan of operations, McClellan adroitly put it that he should seek to "repeat the manwum'e at Cerro Gordo." 38 CAISIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. tionary columns were sent out to mislead tlie enemy. Another column, composed of the brigade of General Morris, held position at Phillippi, about the same distance north of the enemy's stronghold, as General McClellan, at Buchanon, with his other two brigades, was west of it. The 7th of July, Morris was directed to advance southward to a position within a mile and a half of Garnett's camp at Laurel Hill, and by strong demonstrations give the enemy the impression that the main attack was to be made by him. The 8th, Mc- Clellan, with the brigades of Eosecrans and Scheich, moved eastward from Buchanon, and on the following afternoon came within two miles of Pegram's position at Rich Moun- tain. Having reconnoitred it, he resolved, instead of making a direct attack, to hold one of his brigades in front, while he sent Eosecrans by a detour by the right and southward, to lay hold of the enemy's main line of retreat, the turnpike, and then take Pegram's position in the rear. Setting out early in the morning, Eosecrans moved j)artly by mountain bridle- paths, and partly through rough and trackless woods and thickets of laurel. It rained incessantly. By noon he had gained Pegram's rear ; but the latter, having captured a dra- goon carrying dispatches from the Union commander, became aware of the plan, and effecting a partial change of front, posted a force of six hundred men and three guns to hold the crest of the mountain in his rear, while with the remainder he confronted the force McClellan held in his front. After a sharp fusilade, Eosecrans carried the crest, driving the defenders in upon Pegram's intrenchments ; but against this force he did not push his advance, and as McClellan, awaiting the sounds of his musketry before joining in with a front attack, heard none, the day passed by. During the night, Pegram evacuated his position, and attempted to join Garnett's main body, five miles north. After a day's wandering through the woods, being surrounded, he was compelled to surrender with six hundred men, the few remaining hundreds escaping. Meantime, Garnett, alarmed at the forces gathering around him on all sides, also abandoned his position at Laurel HjIL THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 39 But, attempting with aboiit four thousand men to make good liis escape southward, he found McClellan ah-eady gTasping his Hne of retreat, and he then fled eastward over the moun- tains. Being \'igorouslj pursued, he was twice brought to a stand and severely handled ; but forces that the Union com- mander had directed to move from the north and east to intercept the flying enemy, did not act with sufficient prompt- ness,* so that the operation was not as decisive as it other- wise must have been. The last stand made by Garnett was at Carrick's Ford, at the passage of the Cheat River, where he was attacked by the advance of General Morris's brigade^ on the 13th, driven in disorder, losing all his guns and bag- gage, and General Garnett himself, while gallantly striving to rally his rear-guard, was killed. This ended the brief and brilliant campaign in the mountains, and General McClellan was able to telegraph to Washington as its result the capture of a thousand prisoners, with all the enemy's stores, baggage, and artillery, and the complete disruption of the hostile force. " Secession," he added, " is killed in this country." The result of this miniature campaign was most inspiriting to the people of the North, and had an efi^ect far beyond its intrinsic importance, just as had in another way the fiascos of Big Bethel and Vienna. It is the moral influence of small successes and small defeats, that in the first stages of a war makes their importance and forms the real measure of their value. All great commanders have understood this well. The campaign in West Virginia was conducted agreeably to mili- tary principles, — a characteristic that did not belong to other operations thus far ; and its execution, as well as the fact that it was undertaken by General McClellan of his own motion, and without countenance from Washington, stamped him as a man of superior abihty. * McClellan : Campaign in Western Virginia, p. 34. f This attack Avas made by the Fourteenth Ohio, the Seventh and Ninth Indiana, and a section of Barnett's battery. 40 CAilPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC. III. THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. When in a national crisis the tliouglits of men, and even the policy of the Government are in that condition which is expressed by the term drifting, wonderful is the effect of a phrase that crystallizes the floatinpj and half-formed senti- ments of the people into a definite theory. Such a phrase, about the time reached by this narrative, arose in the North. Thus far, no well-defined military poKcy guided the conduct of the war. The series of small outlying operations already sketched were, Avith the exception of those in West Virginia. crude in conception, undertaken at haphazard, and aimed at no definite result. But when Congress assembled in extra session, on the 4th of July, the eft'ervescent enthusiasm of the country found expression in a phrase that, as it perfectly em- bodied the popular sentiment, was presently echoed through- out the whole North. This phrase was, " On to Richmond." Now, in such popular cries there is always a certain element of the ideal ; and hence we may suppose that this one did not so much imply a literal movement " on to Richmond," as it expressed with emphasis and in definite shajje the conviction of the popular mind that immediate action should be taken against the rebelHous force that had ensconced itself in the Manassas stronghold, only a feAv miles in front of the Federal capital. No doubt there were many that actually believed the Union force might not only drive the enemy from Manassas, but really follow " on to Richmond." It need hardly be said, however, that an overland march to Richmond by the force then assembled at Washington would have been an impossi- bility, even had there been no enemy to oppose the adven- ture. The people, conscious of great earnestness and en- thusiasm, were unconscious either of the natm-e of the task they had set themselves to do, or the nature of the means THE THREE MONTHS' CAAIPAIGN. 41 Deeded to carry it through. They knew that the rebels were at Manassas. They saw around Washington an imposing martial array, which they fondly named the " Grand Army of the United States;" and they could not understand what, after almost three months of preparation, could possibly hinder the advance of that army against the confrontuig enemy, and even on to the capital seat of the rebellion.* The veteran soldier who, burdened with years and the infirmities of nature, remained, at the head of the United States army, and to whom, by consequence, it fell to direct the military councils at Washington, was ill-fitted to grapple with the tremendous problem forced upon him. General Scott knew well war and war's needs. He knew that the imposing array of patriotic citizens who, dressed and armed to represent soldiers, lay around Washington, was but the simulacrum of an army ; that to this mass were wholly Avant- ing the organization, discipline, experience, whatever, in fact, goes to the fashioning of that most complex of living organ- isms. But it was little that he should know this, when those in power, who knew it not, nor would not know it, were determined to act as if it were not. Indeed he had himself to assume that it was not, and proceed in the work of forming a plan of campaign for immediate action. Now, a plan of cam- paign General Scott could well devise ; for he was a man that knew generalship and grand war ; had himself plucked laurels on the field of battle before the present generation of men was born ; and long years ago, in Europe, had discussed the highest principles of the military art with the great marshals of Napoleon. But all this only served to separate him and his views and plans the more hopelessly from those with whom he had to deal. He was oj^posed to what he called " a * " The country could not understand, ignorant as it was of war and war's requirements, liow it could possibly be true that, after three months of prepa- ration and of parade, an army of thirty thousand men should be still utterly unfit to move thirty miles against a series of earthworks held by no more than an equal number of men." Hurlbut : McClellan and the Conduct of the War, page 103. 42 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AR^HY OF THE POTOMAC. little war by piecemeal." He was averse to fighting at all in Virginia, wliich lie did not regard as a theatre for decisive action, and thought that the Union army should strike its first blow in the basin of the Mississipjn. But what were such views to the ardent congressmen and cabinet councillors to whom Beauregard's blazon at Manassas was the picador's flag to the infuriate bull? They prevailed. General Scott has confessed it : his moral firmness gave way under the pressure of an Administration that was in turn goaded almost to frenzy by a press and peoj^le demanding action at all hazards. There was, therefore, to be an advance of the army in front of Washmgton ; and early in July the duty of planning and executing a movement agamst Beauregard at Manassas de- evolved upon General McDowell, who, since the transfer of the Union force into Virginia, had been put in command of the column of active operation south of the Potomac, and of the Department of Northeastern Virginia. This column numbered about thirty thousand men. The officer to whom it thus fell to lead the main army to its first field was a man of no mean capacity as a soldier. Of the staff of the old regular army, McDowell was distin- guished for his fine professional acquirements ; and having studied the theory of war and seen European armies, he was, of the small body of trained soldiers, perhaps the man best qualified for the command. That he had never commanded any considerable body of men on the actual field was a draw- back shared by every other ofl&cer in the service. General McDowell knew perfectly well the kind of mate- rial with which he had to work, and its greenness and unfitness to take the field ; and he did his best to improve it. This he might readily have done, had he had to grapple merely with this work ; but his main struggle was elsewhere : and he has left a pictui-e, half pathetic and half ludicrous, of his unavailing plea for a little common sense with those whose ardor was only equalled by their ignorance. " I wanted," says he, " very much a little time — all of us wanted it. We did not have a bit of it." To his plea of the THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 43 "greenness" of his troops, the answer, more specious than well taken, was constantly retui-ned — " You are green, it is true ; but tlmj are green also : you are all green alike. "'^ So far from having time to mould his army, many of his regiments were brought across the Potomac at the last moment, without his even seeing them, and without being even brigaded. He had, therefore, no opportunity to test his machinery — to move it round and see whether it would work smoothly or not ; and such was the feehng, that when, on one occasion, McDowell had a body of eight regiments reviewed together, he was censured for "trying to, make a show."t Even the special circumstance that should have caused de- lay, — to wit, the fact that a large part of the best, that is, the ■best-armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in fi-ont of Washington consisted of three months' vohmteers whose term of service was about to expire, — was an incentive to precipitate action. These troops had fulfilled the duty for which they were called out, which was to assure the safety of the national capital ; their presence had given time to organize a force for the war ; Congress had authorized a call for five hundred thousand three years' volunteers, and these were thronging to the Potomac. It is certainly easy to see that the dictate of prudence was this : not to attempt to employ the three months' men in active operations, but to organize and mobilize, from the three-year troops, an ade- quate army for the field. Other counsels prevailed, and the army with which McDowell took the field was an army without organization, or a staff, or a commissariat, or an organized artillery.:j: The wonder, indeed, is not that he ••• Report on the Conduct of the War, voL i., p. 38. f Ibid. X "Being tete-d-tUe with McDowell, I saw him do things of detail which, in any even half-way organized army, belong to the specialty of a chief of the staff. .... McDowell received his corps in the most chaotic state. Almost with his own hands he organized, or rather put together, the artillery. Brigades are scarcely formed ; the commanders of brigades do not know their commands, and the soldiers do not know their generals." Gurowski : Diary. 1861-2, p. Gl. Mr. Russell (My Diary North and South, pp. 424-5) makes some striking statements to the same purpose. 44 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. should not liave done more, but tliat lie did so mucli ; and tlie spirit of forbearance and alacrity with which he entered upon and carried through his trying task, entitles him to great credit. In entering upon the special problem assigned him, it was not possible for General McDowell to avoid taking into account not only his immediate enemy at Manassas, but whatever other hostile forces, distributed over the theatre of war in Virginia, might influence the fortunes of his projected expedition. The occupation of Manassas had been recom- • mended to the Confederates, from tlie very fact that it was the centre of the railroad system of Northern Virginia — at the junction of the great southern railroad route connecting Washington with Kichmond, and the Manassas Gap Eailroad leading to the Valley of the Shenandoah. The former highway connected Beauregard with the forces on the Penin- sula and at Richmond (distant by railroad about seventy -five miles) ; the latter, with the army under Johnston, in the Shenandoah Valley (distant by railroad about seventy miles). The Confederates, in fact, held a line interior to the forces of Butler, McDowell, and Patterson — respectively at Fortress Monroe, in front of Washington, and on the Upper Potomac. This distribution of the Union armies was a fault to which General McDov/ell was quite alive ; but he had assurances from the lieutenant-general that the enemy on the Peninsula should be occupied by General Butler, and that Johnston's forces in the Shenandoah Valley should be held there by General Patterson. On expressing his fears in regard to Johnston, a few days before the opening of the campaign. General McDowell was assured by General Scott that, "if Johnston joined Beauregard, he should have Pat- terson on his heels. "^ With this understanding, McDowell projected a plan of operations against Manassas, which was substantially to * For more on the same subject, see McDo-vvcll's testimony: Report on the Conduct of the War. THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 45 advance by Fairfax Courthouse, there make a sudden move- ment to the left, and, crossing the Occoquau just below the junction of that stream with Bull Eun (thus turning Beaure- gard's right), strike at the enemy's railroad communications. This project was submitted to the cabinet and agreed to, and the 9th of July was fixed as the day when the army should move. Owing, however, to the deficiency of transportation and supplies, the advance was not begun till a week later. "With the view of giving effect to that part of the miHtary programme which provided that Johnston's force in. the Shen- andoah Valley should be neutralized, General Patterson was, on the 2d of July, again ordered across the Potomac fi-om Maryland. He made the passage of the river at Williams- port, and took position at Martinsburg. Johnston then held post near Winchester with a force of about eight thousand men." The specific duty assigned to Patterson was, in view of the impending battle in front of Washington, to defeat Johnston or prevent his making a junction with Beauregard at Manassas. For this purpose, the force of twelve thousand men with wdiich General Patterson had crossed the Poto- mac was augmented to an effective of about eighteen thou- sand.'!- Now, from the relative position of the contendmg forces, it is evident that the only method of accomphshing the latter purpose, to wit, preventing Johnston from re-enfor- cing Beauregard, was to adopt the former course — namely, to attack Johnston. If Patterson, therefore, was not in condi- tion to do this, his force should immediately have been with- drawn to the front of Washington and united with McDowell's. General Scott expected Patterson to attack Jolinston,^,: but he gave no imperative order to do so ; and Patterson, who though more than doubly outnumbering his opponent, fancied Johnston had " at least forty thousand men," and that the * This estimate I derive from: General Johnston himself. f Patterson : Campaigns in the Valley of the Shenandoah, p. 63. X" I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy ; if not, to hear that you had felt him strongly, or at least had occupied him by threats and demonstrations." Dispatch from General Scott, July ISth. 46 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. wily enemy " had a trap set somewhere'' for liim, ■■ feared either to demonstrate or attack. His conduct was certainly feeble ; and his marches and countermarches, made far from the enemy, were ridiculous. At Martinsburg his position was a false one, where, instead of threatening the enemy, the enemy threatened him. At length, when informed that the army in front of Washington was actually under way, he (July 15th) advanced his force from Martinsburg to Bunker's Hill, from which point he, on the 17th, fell off upon Charlestown, near Harper's Ferry, and Johnston was left free to move to form a junction with Beauregard! This was precisely what John- ston now found occasion to do. As will presently appear, McDowell's reconnoitring parties appeared in front of Bull E-un on the 18th of July. On the same day a message reached Johnston from Beauregard : " If you wish to help me, now is the time." Johnston promptly availed liimseK of the oppor- tunity to escape unmolested. Making a rapid flank march by way of Ashby's Gap, he took cars on the Manassas Gap Railroad at Piedmont, and joined Beauregard with his ad- vance brigades on Saturday, the 20th. What part they played' in the coming battle will presently appear. General McDowell moved his army from the banks of the Potomac on the afternoon of July 16th. The movable column consisted of four divisions — the First Division, under General Tyler; the Second, under General Hunter; the Third, under General Heintzelman ; the Fifth, under Colonel Miles. The Fourth Division, under General Eunyon, was left in the works on the south bank of the Potomac. These divisions made an * Patterson : Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah, p. 57. GeneralJohnston, in conversation with the writer touching this point, made a ludicrous comment on Patterson's statement of his numbers. On, my mention- ing to him that Patterson, in a Narrative recently published, had put down the Confederate strength at forty thousand. General Johnston laughingly ex- claimed : " Why, if he had really thought that I had forty thousand, or half that number, sooner than have crossed the Potomac he would have thro^vn himself headlong into it." REFERENCES (■nion Troops. Con /i'derntr Troop}* \ First ZLu«rP(iSiiivns Ihi- t'riiiiiiiiiiiii!' Ill Uie .U: Ij S/ipi:iia.ui <■ Fl-llll/y'liill ,(l Ihnvtiirl f.H'Clcv ■ f. I'ortei- ft MUef. Ill' I lie /ttli)ini f( ■loiies /.y. I'l'll^MO'uirt^lUv. TIIE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 47 aggregate of about thirty-five thousand men. They moved in four cohimns : one by the turnpike ; one by the Literal country roads on the right; one on the left of the railroad; and another between the turnpike and railroad, following what is kno^^^l as the " Braddock" road.* It was known that Fairfax Coiu'thouse was held as an outpost by a brigade of South Carolina troops, and the three right columns were directed to co-operate on that point Avith the view of capturing this force ; but on entering the place, at three o'clock on the afternoon of the 17th, it Avas found abandoned. General McDowell had hoped to have his columns concentrated at Centreville that night, but the troops being unused to march, did not arrive till the following day. As it was, however, the march was really made with a good deal of rapidity. From Centreville, General McDowell proceeded to push out reconnoissances, with a view to the projected manoeuvre by his left ; but ex- amination soon proved the impracticability of the ground for this purpose. Moreover, the character of General McDowell's move was revealed to Beaiu'egard by an affair which the silly ambition of a division commander brought on that afternoon at Blackburn's Ford, on Bull Eun. General Tyler had been ordered with his division to occupy Centreville, and thence " observe the roads to Bull Eim," but was cautioned " not to bring on any engagement."! In obedience to this he pushed a brigade forward to Blackburn's Ford, which proved to be about the centre of Beauregard's true defensive line along Bull Eun. Eeaching the heights on the northern side of the stream, he opened an artillery fire with two twenty-pounder rifie-guns, which had the efi'ect of first developing and after- wards silencing the enemy's battery near the ford. Thus far he had not exceeded his instructions ; but he got it into his head that the enemy would run whenever seriously menaced ; and he declared that " the gi-eat man of the war would be the * So called from its having been made by that general on his memorable march to Fort Duquesne, in 1754, which terminated in his disastrous defeat and death. f McDowell's order : Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 46. ^48 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMT OF THE POTOMAC. man that got to Manassas, and lie meant to go tlirongli that niglit."-^" His notion of the method of executing this project was to file his brigade down to the stream, draw it up parallel to the other shore, and oj)en an unmeaning fusilade.t While engaged in this foolery, a force crossed the stream fi'om the other side, and strildng his left flank (the Twelfth New York), disrupted it completely. This admonished General Tyler to defer his intended visit to Manassas that night, and he v/ith- drew. The loss was inconsiderable, biit the effect on the morale of the raw troops was bad. In consequence of the abandonment of the plan of opera- tion on the Confederate right, the next two days (July 19th and 20tli) were spent by the engineers in reconnoitring and determining how and where the attack should be made. It was found that there was a good ford over Bull Eun at Sud- ley Spring, two miles above the point where the direct road fi-om Centreville to Warrenton crosses Bull Pain by the Stone Bridge. It was also found that this ford was unguarded by the enemy, and that above that point the stream was almost everywhere easily passable. On these data was based the plan of attack, which was as follows : The Eifth Division (Miles) to remain in reserve at Centreville, and to make with one of its brigades, added to Eichardson's brigade of Tyler's division, a false attack at Blackburn's Ford ; the First Divi- sion (Tyler) to move by the turnpike up to the Stone Bridge at daybreak, threaten that point, and, at the proper time, to carry it or cross if imcovered from above. Meantime, the principal column, consisting of the two divisions of Hunter and Heintzelman, of about twelve thousand men, was to diverge from the turnpike to the right a mile beyond Centre- ville, and, by a detour, reach Sudley Ford ; thence, descending the right bank of Bull Run, it would take the defences of the Stone Bridge in reverse. The united force would then give * My authority for this statement is Colonel Alexander, of the Corps of Engineers, then engineer on Tyler's staiF. t Barnard : The Battle of Bull Kun, p. 49. THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 49 battle, strike at the enemy's railroad commimications, or act ()tLierwise as circumstances might dictate," It was an excel- lent plan of battle. The execution of this plan was set on foot three hours after midnight of the 20th, when the troops, breaking camp at Centreville, launched on their novel adventure, and, in a dewy moonlight night, took up the march destined to bring them into presence of the enemy. The divisions had been ordered to march at haK-past two A. m., with the view of getting on the ground early in the morning of the 21st. Tyler's division had the advance on the main road from Centreville ; and, as the two divisions under Hunter and Heintzelman, to which was intrusted the turning movement, had to follow on this road up to the point where they were to diverge to the right, it was especially urgent that no obstruction should bar their march. Nevertheless, there was delay in getting Tyler's division out of camp and on to the road, and delay in its ad- vance, which, of coui-se, retarded the turning column. Then the road over which Hunter and Heintzelman had to pass was found to be longer than was expected ; so that, instead of getting into position by six in the mornmg, it was, as will subsequently appear, nine before this column debouched on the thither side of Bull Emi, at Sudlcy's Spring. Tyler, meanwhile, had pushed on, and, by six, drew up his division in front of Stone Bridge, where he opened an artillery fire on the enemy on the opposite side of Bull Kun. While the columns of McDowell were thus under way, events of equal moment were passing within the Confederate camp. General Johnston in person had joined Beauregard during the night of the 20th (his troops, however, not having yet arrived), and, being the ranking officer, he assumed com- mand of all the Confederate forces. Nevertheless, as Beau- regard knew his ground, the plans he had formed were adopted, and Johnston directed their execution under him. This plan contemplated an offensive movement before * McDowell : Order of Battle. 4 50 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. McDowell should be able to strike ; but, as a body of five tliousand troops of Johnston's force, that were expected to arrive during the night from the Shenandoah Valley, did not reach the gi'ound till some hours later, other dispositions had to be made.* Beauregard, in positioning his forces, had committed the error of treating the line of Bull Pain as a real defensive lino that could be passed only at the fords ; and hence he had stationed his brigades at these several fords — the brigades of Ewell and Holmes, at Union Mills Ford, forming his right ; the brigades of Jones and Early, at McLean's Ford ; the brigades of Longstreet and Jackson, at Blackburn's Ford ; and Bouham's brigade, at Mitchell's Ford. Other commands were in reserve and between these forces, while Colonel Evans, ■with a demi-brigade, held Stone Bridge, which formed the Confederate left. Meantime, he had neglected to note that on his left, from Sudley Springs up. Bull Run could bo passed anywhere. When, therefore, at six o'clock of the morning of the 21st, Beauregard learned from Colonel Evans that a Federal force (which was the head of Tyler's column) had drawn up opposite Stone Bridge, he assumed the attack would be made there — that is, against his left. He was ignorant that the real menace was a turning movement to take his whole line in the rear. Beauregard's military in- spirations were, however, always essentially aggressive ; and, on learning the appearance of the hostile force at Stone Bridge (being still unaware of the flanking operation in exe- cution above), he resolved to assume the offensive to reheve his left. He judged the most effective method of accomplish- ing this, to be a counter move by his right and centre on the Union flank and rear at Centreville ; and with this view orders were dispatched to General Ewell, whose brigade formed the right of the Confederate hne at Union Mills Ford, to begin the movement, which was to be followed up by the brigades of Jones, at McLean's Ford ; Longstreet, at Black- * Beauregard : Report of the Battle of Manassas. THE THEEE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 51 bum's Ford ; and Bonham, at Blitcliell's Ford.* I must add here a fact which is an evidence that the staff-organization of the Confederate Army was, at this time, Httle better than that of the Union Army — these orders did not reach their destina- tion for four hours after the time they were sent ; and this, as will presently appear, gave a very peculiar turn to the whole earlier part of the battle. Meanwhile, the force of Tyler had deployed in front of Stone Bridge, and a scattering skirmish fire was opened be- tween his troops and those of Evans on the opposite side of Bull Kun. This served as an excellent mask for the column executing the turning move, as it occupied the atten- tion of the force behind Stone Bridge for a couple of hours— that is, till about half-past eight. But, about that time, Evans becoming satisfied of the counterfeit character of the demonstrations on his front, and persuaded of an attempt to turn his left flank,t changed front, and marched towards Sudley Springs, leaving a skirmish line to observe for the while the Federal force opposite the Stone Bridge. Thus it was that the opposing forces were moving to meet each other ; and when, towards ten o'clock, the head of Hunter's column, having passed to the yonder side of Bull Kun, by way of Sud- ley Ford, and advanced for a mile through a thick wood, de- bouched into the open country beyond, the gray-jackets could be descried already drawn up in line of battle. Colonel Evans, with his demi-brigade, had taken up a position west of the Warrenton road, almost at right angles to Bull Kun, and considerably in advance of the ridge on which the main Confederate line was afterwards drawn. Had now, at the first encounter, a moderate degree of skiE or energy marked the conduct of the Union commander present on the field, there is little doubt that success was at this moment in the hands of General McDowell, who deserved * " By sucli a movement," adds Beauregard, " I confidently expected to achieve a complete victory for my country by 12 o'clock M." Report of the Battle of Manassas. f Beauregard : Report of the Battle of Manassas. 52 CAJNIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMACL success for the excellence of Lis generalship. A powerful body was, by a flank movement, planted on the thither side of Bull Run, and Beauregard's defensive line was taken in reverse. It is true this part of the plan should have reached this stage of development by six o'clock in the morning, and it was now ten ; but this was not enough to jeopardize the success of the scheme, for Beauregard was ignorant of what had taken place. It is also true that Colonel Evans, divining the move, had effected his change of front to meet the Federal advance ; but his entire force consisted of but nine weak companies, and Hunter had twelve thousand men. But there was present neither the skill nor the energy to take advantage of these circumstances ; and the manner in which the troops were brought iip affords a striking illustra- tion of the then greenness of even the foremost officers of the army. In place of making proper dispositions in a line of battle, General Hunter caused a feeble fusilade to be opened from the head of the column ; and Colonel Burnside's Ehode Island regiments, throAvn in alone, were speedily cut up. This wasted an hour. To aid Burnside's hard-pressed com- mand, the brigade of Colonel A. Porter was ordered up and deployed on his right, and Sykes' battalion of Regulars re- lieved him on the left. A serious advance of this line soon began to press the handful of Confederates back ; but Evans was speedily re-enforced by portions of the brigades of Col- onels Bee and Barton, who were at hand near the Stone Bridge, and, by these united forces, a fresh stand was made on a position still west of Young's Branch. But the increas- ing pressure of the Union line, strengthened now by the ad- dition of portions of Heintzelman's division coming in on the left, compelled the Confederates to yield ground, and they were presently forced back sufficiently to allow Tyler's force near Stone Bridge to commence crossing to the south side and join in the combat. Commanding one of Tyler's brigades was one Colonel ^Y. T. Sherman, afterwards of some repute in the world as the man v.-ho led the armies that marched from Chattanooga to THE TIIllEE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 53 Atlanta, and from Atlanta to the sea. This officer, who dis- played even in the war's infanc}^ something of that same mil- itary talent that, developed by experience, made him among the foremost of Union commanders, had discovered, while re- connoitring in the morning, an nnknown ford, half a mile above the Stone Bridge.* Being ordered to cross Bull Run to the assistance of the forces on the other side, he was en- abled to do so by this ford long before the Stone Bridge was uncovered for the passage. Keyes' brigade of the same divi- sion followed, and both succeeded in making a junction with the force engaged. This done, the whole advanced, and drove the enemy back across Young's Branch and over the Warren- ton road and up the slopes on the other side. The Confeder- ates went back in much disorder, and were only rallied on an elevated ridge or table-land beyond Young's Branch. f While these events, in the prelude of the battle, were going on, Beauregard and Johnston, from their headquartes, near the centre of the line, marked the outburst of battle on their left flank, and listened eagerly and anxiously for similar sounds from the direction of Centreville, resulting from the prescribed counter-attack in that quarter by the Confederate right. " To my profound disappointment," adds the Con- federate commander, " I learned, just about the time that the force on the left had been driven back by the advance of the Federals, that my order to General Ewell had miscarried." Judging it too late for the effective execution of the contem- plated move, Beauregard found himself, as he states, " forced to depend on new combinations to meet the enemy on the field upon which he had chosen to give us battle."| Leavinf^ Ewell, Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham at their positions along * " Early in the day, when reconnoitring the ground, I had seen a horse- man descend from a bluff to the bank, cross the stream, and show himself in the open field. Inferring we could cross," etc. Sherman : Report of Bull Run. f The disorder that pervaded the Southern force at this time is freely acknowledged by General Johnston, whose official report is marked by a candor not observable in that of Beauregard. J Report of the Battle of Manassas. 54 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AR5IY OF THE POTOMAC. the lower fords to make demonstrations against the Federal forces ©iiposite and prevent their going to re-enforce Mc- Dowell's right, the reserves, consisting of Holmes' two regi- ments and a battery, Early's brigade, and two of Bonham's regiments and a battery, were immediately ordered up to support the Confederate left flank, now so seriously imperilled. Jackson, who with his brigade of five regiments had been in reserve not far from the Stone Bridge, went up just at the time that Evans, and Bee, and Barton, who had been holding the advance position, had given way, and were at- tempting to rally and reform their troops on the plateau,* At this juncture, Beauregard and Johnston reached the field, and it required their best personal efforts to hold the men to their work. This accomplished, Beauregard took command on the field, while Johnston went to the rear to hurry up re- enforcements from his army arriving from the Yalley. The Confederates had now been forced back a mile and a half, and the Union force had cleared its front com- pletely across the Warrenton road; the Stone Bridge was uncovered, and McDowell drew up his line on the crest gained, with Heintzelman's division (brigades of Wilcox and How- ard) on the right, supported by part of Porter's brigade and the cavalry under Palmer, and Pranklin's brigade of Heintzel- man's division ; Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division in the centre ; and Keyes' brigade of Tyler's division on the left. Beauregard reformed his forces on the plateau beyond. His line of battle consisted of about six thousand five hundred men, thirteen pieces of artillery, and two companies of Stuart's cavalry. The definitive possession of this plateau now became the * He came not a moment too soon. Bee approaching Jackson, and pointing to the mingled remnants of his own command, and the shattered brigades of Barton and Evans huddled up in the woods, exclaimed, " General, they are heating us hack." " Sir, we'll give them the bayonet," replied Jackson ; and Bee, rushing back to his troops, rallied them with the words : " There is Jack- son, standing like a stone wall; let us determine to die here, and we will conquer." THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 55 prize eagerly contested by tlie opposing force. Tliis lieiglit is on three sides inclosed by small water-courses, wliicli empty into Bull Kun within a few yards of each other, and half a mile to the south of Stone Bridge. Rising to an elevation of quite one hundred feet above the level of Bull Bun at the bridge, it falls off on these sides to the level of the inclosing streams in gentle slopes, but which are furrowed by ravines of irregular direction and length, and shaded with clumps and patches of young pines and oaks. The general direction of the crest of the plateau is oblique to the course of Bull Run. Around its eastern and southern brow an almost unbroken fi-inge of second- growth pines gave excellent shelter to the Southern sharp-shooters. To the west, adjoining the fields, directly across the crest, on both sides of the Sudley road, ex- tends a broad belt of oaks, in which, during the battle, regi- ments of both armies met and contended for the mastery. Having obtained possession of the ridge, the main effort of the Union forces was made to work round and envelop the left flank of the Confederate line. This was a manoeuvre which promised well, but, unfortunately, the army was hardl}'' in a condition to execute it ; for, worn out in the hot day's work, it had already lost its cohesion, and eiTors were committed of wliicli the Confederates speedily took advan- tage. The batteries of Grifiin and Ricketts, which had played a brilliant part during the conflict, had been ordered by General McDowell to the top of the ridge on the right, so as to take advantage of the success gained. These batteries were supported by the Fire Zouaves and Marines, while the Fourteenth New York regiment was directed into a skirt of wood on the right, to protect that flank. The quick eye of Jackson, who held position in front, saw the exposed position and feeble support of Grifiin's battery, and he threw forward the Thirty-third Virginia to take it. Nor till they emerged from the skirt of woods, not a thousand yards distant, was the danger known ; and when Griffin was about to open on them, the chief of artillery, Major Barry, restrained him from so doing, conceiving they were the Fourteenth Nev." York, .56 CAMPAIGNS OF TILE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. that had been thrown mto the woods on the right in support. Jackson's men made a dash on the battery, and the sup- ports giving way, took possession of the guns, many of the cannoniers being shot down and the horses killed. Fresh forces were, however, brought up, the Confederates were driven back, and the guns retaken. Beauregard then advanced the right of his line in an attempt to recover the plateau and the guns. This effort was partially suc- cessful, but it was met by a fresh rally of the Union forces ; and thus the tide of battle repeatedly surged backwards and forwards, with varying success to each combatant. Finally, towards three in the afternoon, a fresh accession of force liaving arrived from the incoming troops of Johnston, Beau- regard made a determined effort to recover the disputed plateau. The attack was vigorously made, and swept back the Union forces from the whole open ground — the batteries of Griffin and Ricketts being again and finally captured. Still, the Union hne, though shaken and giving ground, did not yield the field. A fresh effort was even made to extend the right so as to envelop the Confederate left. While this movement was in execution, the brigade of Early, the rear of the army of the Shenandoah, reached the field from Manassas Junction, and coming in on the Union right flank (exposed and badly placed),"" deter- mined the action. Many of the regiments, especially on that wing, were ah-eady badly used up, and had lost their organ- ization. The fire from the fresh arrivals doubled up this flank and drove it back in a confusion which, presently, involved the whole line, extending even to the left, which had hitherto shown more consistency, and was even advancing. The whole force was thrown back in disorder, across and over the ridge, and over Young's Branch, and, in extreme confusion, made in all available directions towards Bull Bun. Every effort was made to rally the troops, even beyond the * " The enemy's new formation exposed Ids right flank more even than tlie previous one. ' Johnston : Report of the Battle of Manassas. THE TUUEE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 57 reach of fire, but in vain. The battalion of Rcgiilars, alone justifying the traditions of military discipline, made a brief stand on the margin of the ridge, to allow the volunteers to reach the Warrenton road. But the troops were rapidly reaching that condition when it escapes the power of man to hold them : there was running through them that mysterious terror which the Greeks ascribed to the presence of Pan. " The retreat," says McDowell, " soon became a rout, and this presently degenerated into a panic." The troops fled across Bull Pam ; and once on the road, the different bodies coming together, and without officers, became intermingled, and all organization was lost ; while army trains and artillery blocking the road, produced a hideous debdde. At the same time. Colonel Miles, who commanded the division of reserves, and to whom was intrusted the duty of holding the Centreville ridge from Centreville up to Blackburn's Ford, withdrew his troops from these positions, uncovering the passage of the stream to the Confederates, and exposing the whole retreating mass to capture or destruction, — a fate which was averted by the arrival of General McDowell, who ordered back Miles' troops to their position, and by the inactivity of the Confederates. Nothing like systematic pursuit was made, although a small party of cavalry followed the retreat as far as Cub Kun. By sundown, most of the army was safe behind the Centreville ridge. There was, however, no question of halting there ; for the condition of the army and the absence of supplies left no alternative but to fall back; and during the night the army made its way to the Potomac. The retreat was marked by great disorder, all semblance of military organization being lost. Many did not even stop on reaching the camps south of the Potomac, but fled by the bridges and ferries to Wash- ington. This, however, was at length stopped by Colonel Sherman, who posted strong guards at the points of passage. The Confederate loss in this action was 1852, of whom 209 were killed and 1438 wounded. The Union loss must have been above 2000 ; for the prisoners, well and wounded, left in Beauregard's hands, numbered 1460. 58 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. It is hardly necessary to seek any explanation of tlie events of Bull Run, other than what arises from the consideration of the simple fact that the battle was fought at all. McDowell's plan of battle was well-considered, and even bold ; but the faults of execution were innumerable. Owing to the absence of any thing like a staff, the attack was made in a most frag- mentary way, without order or ensemble. Since the close of the war, the Avriter of these pages has had with General Johnston a very full conversation on this action ; and on the question of the general management of the battle of Manas- sas, he spoke as follows : " The key-point was a flat, bare crest. It was here that the Federals made their attacks. But they were made by a brigade at a time. The position was really hardly tenable, and had an attack been made in force, with double line of battle— such as any major-general in the United States service would now make — we could not have held it half an hour, for they would have enveloped us on both flanks." So far as regards the mere physical fact of fighting, which was at the time the all-important question, there was noth- ing of which the Union soldiers had to be ashamed — they stood up to it with the blood of their race. The fault lay in the inherently vicious organization of the force — in the great number of miserable subordinate officers, which in turn was the natural result of the method of raising regiments. Yet, with aU the faults, the action was for a time almost a success, which shows that the Confederates were really in not much better condition. Their chief point of advantage was in the better class of officers created by their system. Nevertheless, the victory long hung in the balance, and might readily have declared itself on either side.* At the close of the action, the * General Jordan, chief of staff to Beaiiregard, informs me that while con- ducting " President" Davis up to the battle-ground from Manassas Junction during the progress of the action, and just a short time before the giving way of the Union lines, such were the streams of stragglers and skulkers pouring to the Southern rear, that Mr. Davis fancied Beauregard had been completely- beaten. Observing the fact that each even slightly wounded man was ea- THE THEEE MONTHS' CAMP^ilGK 59 Soutlierneis were hardly less demoralized tlian their oppo- nents, so that the idea of pursuit was not to be entertained. On this point, again, the testimony of General Johnston is of the highest value. "In our condition," said he, "pursuit could not be thought of ; for we were almost as much dis- organized by our victory as the Federals by their defeat. Next day, many, supposing the war was over, actually went home. A party of our soldiers, hearing that a friend lay wounded twenty miles off, would start out to go and see him ; or that another acquaintance was dead, and they would go and bury him. Our men had in a larger degree the instinct of personal liberty than those of the North ; and it was found very difficult to subordinate their personal will to the needs of military discipline." * Both sides, in fact, had much to learn ; and it is the fact that the battle of Bull Kun was the first great lesson which the two armies received, that makes the events which trans- pired on the plains of Manassas that July Sunday, forever memorable in the history of the War. corted by two or three comrades, Mr. Davis exclaimed to Jordan, " Battles are not won where several unhurt men are seen carrying off eacli wounded soldier !" * General Johnston in his official report says : " The war department has already been informed of all the causes that prevented pursuit, some ofichkh only are proper to be communicated." I suppose, what is stated above, which I had from General Johnston's own lips, supplies the rest. 60 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. III. THE ARMY BEFOPiE WASHINriTON. JUI.Y, 1861— March, 1863. I. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. AVhen the army that so lately had gone forth with siicli high hopes returned from Manassas shattered and discom- fited to the banks of the Potomac, wise men saw there was that had suffered worse defeat than the army— it was the system under which Bull Eun had been fought and lost. The lesson was a severe one ; but if it was needed to demonstrate the legitimate result of the crude experimentalism under which the war had been conducted, — when campaigns were planned by ignorant poHticians, and battles, precipitated by the pressure of sanguine journalists, were fought by raw three months' levies, — the price paid was perhaps not too high. The Bull Eun experiment taught the country it was a real war it had undertaken, and that success could only be hoped for by a strict conformity to military principles. The spirit in which the country rose to meet the emergency showed that it had benefited by the experience ; and if before Bull Eun the public mind had been in a mood to require just such a stern lesson for reproof and correction and instruction, it soon appeared that there was in it a temper to rise above the worst lapses and failures. For then Avas seen that which again and again throughout the war has been seen — a spectacle .-y^'^^, ^^ /jULa- THE AiniY BEFORE WASHINGTON. (JJ niarvelloiis and majestic, when the nation, stirred to its depths, uprose to meet the crisis that was upon it. Something of the •kind had been seen at the uprising that followed the assault on Fort Sumter. But that was a manifestation less deep and earnest than the swift, stern, almost savage vigor with which the men of the North, wounded in the instinct of self-love as well as in the sentiment of patriotism, arose to assert their manhood, impugned bj the humiliations of Bull Run. The crisis was one fitted to test the mettle of the nation ; for had it then shown the least supineness or hesitation, its doom had been sealed. Li a fortnight the terms of service of the sev- enty-five thousand volunteers w-ould have expired ; and the Southern army, flushed with victory and doubled in, material strength, would have found the capital of the United States an easy prey. The nation sprang spontaneously to arms. TVlth incredible rapidity new battalions w^ere formed and forwarded to Wash- ington ; and by the time the term of service of the provisional troops had expired, their number had been more than re- placed by fresh levies enlisted for three years or the war. What the country could give — men, material, money — that it gave lavishly, far outrunning the calls of the Government ; but what it could not give was precisely what was most urgently needed to vitalize these smews of war, — to wdt, ade- quate leadership, and that soul of armies, the mind of a gi'eat commander. For this the nation, keenly alive to its need, could only breathe passionate aspirations. General McDowell vacated the command of the army with- out forfeiting the respect of his countrymen ; for, while he had lost a battle, there was an instinctive consciousness that he had been the victim of circumstances rather than of any miscarriage of his own. And now there could be no doubt regarding his successor ; for the general and consenting voice of the North pointed to the young general who had just con- cluded his campaign in the momitains of West Virginia as the desired leader of the army. General McClellan, accord- ingly, was summoned to Washington the day after Bull Pam, C2 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AIUIY OP THE POTOMAC. and placed iu command of the disorganized forces that had returned from that untoward campaign, and of the rapidh* arriving regiments which the " populous North" was pouring- down from all directions to Washington. Out of these elements, an army was, first of all, to be fashioned. General McClellan brought to his high trust proofs of talent which, though not sufficient to show him a proper captaui of a great army, were yet enough to inspire the best hopes of him. He had served with distinction in Mexico, had studied war in Europe, was in the flower of his youth, and, above all, had just finished a campaign that, by its success amidst elsewhere general failure, seemed to furnish at once the prestige and prophecy of victory. The young chieftain threw himseK with the utmost ardor and energy into the work of moulding into form an army ade- quate for the nation's needs. It was a colossal task ; for it was necessary not merely to build up an army, but to make the model on which the army should be built. The military traditions of the United States, confined to the single cam- paign in Mexico, afforded no groundwork for the organization of such a military establishment as was now demanded for the portentous task before the country. The regular army kept on foot previous to the war was limited by law to under twenty thousand men. But its whole internal organism had been disrupted by secession, and it did not even form a cadre on which it was possible to build. The force around Washington, of which General McClellan assumed command on the 27th of July, numbered about fifty thousand infantry, less than a thousand cavalry, six hundred and fifty artillerymen, with nine imperfect field-batteries of thirty pieces. It still retained the jDrovisional brigade-organi- zation given it by McDowell; but the utter collapse that followed Bull Kxm had made it rather a mob than an army. Desertion had become alarmingly numerous, and the streets of Washington were croAvded with straggling officers and men absent from their stations without authority, and indicating by their behavior an utter want of discipline and organiza- THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. (53 tion/^ To correct this absence a stringent system of military police was at once adopted, and this measure was followed by an immediate improvement in the 7norale of the troops. The root of the evil, however, lay deeper — lay in the really \dcious system governing the primary organization of regiments and the appointment of their officers.f Though General McClel- lan was unable to strike at this, he endeavored, as far as might be, to remedy its results ; and Congress having passed a bill authorizing the President to dispense with the services of inefficient officers, the Army of the Potomac was soon weeded of several hundred worthless wearers of shoulder- straps. J The problem of the best organization to be given a newly formed army, is one that to this day has received no final solution; and whatever principle be adopted, the origi- nal organization will be apt to require modification very soon after entering upon a campaign. The division, com- posed of two or more brigades, is, however, a permanent unit : and General McClellan, * McClellan : Report, p. 9. f Prince de Joinville : The Army of the Potomac, p. 17 ; Lecomte : Guerre des Etats-Unis, p. 55. In just views regarding this, as regarding most other matters relating to the war, the people were much in advance of the Government ; and one of the most curious instances of this is a formal memorial at this time addressed to the President by " property holders of New York," regarding the system of officering regiments. This paper, marked by the soundest good sense, was published in the New York journals of August 1, 1861. " They complain," says the memorial, " that a suitable supervision has not been extended by Gov- ernment to the officering of the volunteer forces ; that the principle of allowing companies to choose their own officers, or officers their own colonels, is fatal to military discipline : that political, local, and personal interests have had far too much sway in the selection of officers ; that undue laxity prevails in the control of volunteer officers by their military superiors ; and that an ill-grounded apprehension of local or political censure has prevented the proper authorities from removing incompetent commanders, and from placing in responsible military positions those most capable of filling them, without regard to any thing but their qualifications," etc., etc. I After the institution of the qualifying examination, three hundred and ten officers were dismissed, or their resignations accepted, within eight months. 04 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. organized into brigades of four regiments each, and tlie bri- gades had been somewhat disciplined and instructed, formed divisions of three brigades each.* But, in armies of above sixty thousand men, it has been common, since the time of Napoleon, to create from the assemblage of two or more divi- sions the higher unit of the corps d'armee. As a theoretical principle of organization, General McClellan was in favor of the formation of corps ; but he wished to defer its practical application until his division commanders should, by actual experience in the field, acquire the requisite training to fit them for commands so important, and until he should have learned who of his divisional officers merited this high trust.t There was much to justify this course, for there are few men able to command a body of thirty thousand men •,% and it is worthy of note that it was not till the Army of Northern Vir- ginia had seen eighteen months of service that those at the head of military affairs in Eichmond organized corps.§ This hesitation, however, proved unfortunate for McClellan him- self ; for, several months afterwards, and just as he was about moving to the Peninsida, the President divided the Army of the Potomac into four corps, and assigned to their command men whom General McClellan would not have chosen; whereas, had he created corps at first, he might have made his own selection.il It next became necessary to create adequate artillery and engineer establishments, to organize the cavalry arm, and to * McClellan: Report, p. 11. f Ibid., p. 53. \ " An army corps rarely contains more than thirty thousand men, and often lower, even among nations who have the greatest number of troops. Such a command is a great burden, and few men are capable of managing it credita- bly." Dufour: Strategy and Tactics, p. 81. § The corps organization was created in the Confederate service immediately after the battle of Antietam. I General Hooker cannot be regarded as a partisan of General McClellan , yet I have often heard him say that it would have been impossible for General McClellan to have succeeded with such corps commanders as he had on the Peninsula. THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 65 provide for the administrative service of the quartermaster, ordnance, commissaiy, and medical departments. The task of forming an artillery establishment was facili- tated by the fact that the country possessed in the regular service a body of accomplished and energetic artillery officers.* As basis of organization it was decided to form field-batteries of six guns (never less than four guns, and the guns of each battery to be of uniform calibre) ;t and these were assigned to divisions, not to brigades, in the proportion of four batteries to each division ; one of which was to be a bat- tery of Eegulars, and the captain of the Eegular battery was in each case appointed commandant of the artillery of the divi- sion. In addition, it was determined to create an artillery reserve of a hundred guns and a siege-train of fifty pieces. This work was pushed forward with so much energy, that whereas, when General McClellan took command of the army, the entire artillery establishment consisted of nine imperfectly equipped batteries of thirty guns, before it took the field this service had reached the colossal proportions of ninety-two batteries of five hundred and twenty guns, served by twelve thousand five hundred men, and in full readiness for active field-duty.:}: With equal energy the formation of the engineer establish- ment was entered upon ; and this included not only the train- ing of engineer companies and the Corps of Topographical Engineers, but the organization of engineer and bridge-trains and equipage adequate for an army of first-class proportions. At the same time, the entire system of the defences of Wash- ington, both for the northern and southern side of the Po- * The duty of organizing this arm was confided to Major (afterwards Brig- adier-General) Barry, chief of artillery. f " It was decided that the proportion of rifled guns should be one-third, and of smooth-bores two-thirds — that the rifled guns should be restricted to the system of the United States ordnance department and of Parrott, and ths smooth-bores to be exclusively the light twelve-poimder or Napoleon gun."— Barry : Report of Artillery Operations, p. 106. t Report of the Engineer and Artillery Operations of the Army of the Potomac, pp. 106-109. 5 66 CAJIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. tomac, was planned and carried into execution,* "Washing- ton, in fact, assumed the aspect of a fortified capital, with a system of defences so formidable that the enemy at no time throughout the war attempted seriously to assail that city.f Such is but a faint setting forth of the manifold activities evoked and directed towards the creation of the Army of the Potomac by its new commander. It was a season of faithful, fruitful work, amid which that army grew into shape and sub- stance. And with such surprising energy was the work of organization pushed forward, that whereas General McClellan in July came into command of a collection of raw, dispirited, and disorganized regiments, without commissariat or quarter- master departments, and unfitted either to march or fight, ho had around him at the end of three months a hundi'ed thou- sand men, trained and disciplined, organized and equijDped, animated by the highest spirit, and deserving the fond name of The Geand Army of the Potomac. And certainly, if there are portions of McClellan's subsequent mihtary career that are open to animadversion, he yet challenges from all im- partial mmds the credit due this mighty performance.:]; Looking at the work he then initiated, in the only light in which we can rightly appreciate it —as it stands related to * These works were planned and executed by Major (afterwards Major- General) Barnard, chief-engineer of the Army of the Potomac. f The theory of the system of defences of Washington is that npon which the works of Torres Vedras Avere based— the occupation of commanding points within cannon-range of each other by field-forts, the fire of which shall sweep all the approaches, a connection being formed by infantry parapets easily im- provised. The line, as it encircles the capital on both sides of the Potomac, has a development of thirty-three miles. As to the value of this system of defences for the safeguard of Washington, that is a vast, complex, and difficult question, not to be entered on here. It has been very severely criticised by Colonel Lecomte in his work, "Campagne de Virginie et de Maryland en 1863 ;" and to these animadversions a warm rejoinder has been made by Gen- eral Barnard in " The Peninsular Campaign and its Antecedents." I History >\^11 not refuse to aflarm of this work the judgment pronounced by General McClellan himself: " The creation of such an army in so short a time from nothing, will hereafter be regarded as one of the highest glories of the administration and the nation." THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. g7 what went before, and what came after it — it is manifest that what gives it significance is that it represents science dis- placing sciohsm, the untutored enthusiasm of a nation unused to war, taught by a bitter experience to yield itself to the cunning hand of discipline — that power which Carnot calls " the glory of the soldier and the strength of armies."* If the Army of the Potomac afterwards performed deeds worthy to live in history, it is in no small degree due to the fact that the groundwork of victory was laid deep and broad in that early period of stern tutelage, when it learnt the apprenticeship of war. If other generals, the successors of McCleUan, were able to achieve more decisive results than he, it was, again, in no small degree, because they had the perfect instrument he had fashioned to work withal, f * " It is military discipline that is the glory of the soldier and the strength of armies, for it is the foremost act of its devotion, and the most assured pledge of victory {le plus grand acte de son desouement et le gage le plus assure de la victoire). It is by it that all veills unite in one, and all partial forces conspire to- wards one end." Carnot : De la Defense des Places Fortes, p. 505. f " Had there been no McClellan," I have often heard General Meade say, " there could have been no Grant ; for the army made no essential improvement under any of his successors." It was common throughout the war to ascribe a high degree of discipline to the Confederate army — even higher than that of the Army of the Potomac. But the revelations of the actual condition of that army since the close of the war do not j ustify this assertion. On the contrary, they show that the discipline of the Army of Northern Virginia was never equal to that of the Army of the Potomac, though in fire and elan it was su- I)erior. " I could always rely on my army," said General Lee, at the time he surrendered its remnant at Appomattox Courthouse — " I could always rely on my army for fighting ; but its discipline was poor." At the time of the Mary- land invasion, Lee lost above twenty-five thousand men from his effective strength by straggling, and he exclaimed with tears, " My army is ruined by straggling !" Nothing coidd better illustrate the high state of discipline of the Army of the Potomac, than its conduct in such retreats as that on the Pen- insula and in the Pope campaign, and in such incessant fighting as the Kapidan campaign of 1864. CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. n. PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS. Thkee months of varied and fruitful activity tlius passed, and the close of autumn found around Washington an army both formidable in numbers and respectable in efficiency. There then arose the problem of putting it in motion ; and this problem involved two questions — lohen to strike, and where? The latter was a question that concerned the general-in-chief ; but the former was one that profoundly touched the people, who, as the sustainers of the war, *' thronged m and made their voice heard, and became par- takers of the counsels of state."* During that period in which the army was a-fashioning, the public remained silent. And there was in this silence some- thing almost pathetic ; for, knowing that an undue urgency for action, expressed through the pviblic prints, had precipi- tated the disastrous campaign that ended in Bull Run, men sought to make amends by a sedulous refraining from the like again. General McClellan was left free to work his will ; and, being strong in the trust of the country, he was "master of the situation :" no monarch could be more so. Yet it was manifest that this confidence was in pledge of early and energetic action on the part of the commander ; for the country had too much at stake, and the passions and interests of men were too closely bound up with a speedy suppression of the insurrection, to brook a Fabian pohcy. General McClellan had, in a public speech at the time he assumed command of the Army of the Potomac, promised that the war should be " short, sharp, and decisive." This * This is the striking expression employed by Mr. Kinglake in describing the influence of English public sentiment in enforcing the War of the Crimea. THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. ^;9 was the very key-note on which all the motions of public sentiment turned. It was, therefore, in the highest degree important for him to seize the first opportunity to justify, by some palpable proof, that confidence which the country had spontaneously extended to him. There was too little mod- eration, too httle stability in the pubKc judgment, to make it possible that this condition of things should long continiie. The faith that had been freely bestowed would presently dis- appear, nor ever be overtook unless deeds should go with it A commander who, under a popular government, is in- trusted with the conduct of a war, has to shape his acts not alone according to abstract military dictates, but must take into account considerations of a poHtical and moral order as well. For the wishes, impulses, prejudices, ignorances even of his countrymen, enter as really into the problem with which he has to deal as the character of his enemy or the hnes of mihtary operation. A captain who is also king, may act in quite different wise from a captain responsible to a Cabinet or Congress. What a Caesar or a Napoleon might do, could not be imitated by a Wellington or a Eugene ; and the history of the latter illustrious commander, and his equally illustrious colleague— Marlborough— shows, strikingly, how that even the victor of Blenheim and Eamilies had to conform the inspira- tions of his mihtary genius to the dull wits of a Dutch States-General. McClellap, who had as yet done nothing to prove himself either a Wellington or a Eugene, should have made the lightest possible draft on the indulgence of the people. There is httle or no doubt that, thus far, General McClellan had formed no other theory regarding the employ- ment of the Army of the Potomac, than that which was common throughout the country; which, compendiously stated, was to make a direct attack on the enemy in front of Washington, and to make this attack as soon as possible.- * Though General JMcClellan used to keep his own counsel, yet General ]\IcDowell tells me lie was wont, in their rides over the country south of the Potomac, to point out towards the flank of Manassas and say, " We shall strike tliem tJierc.'" 70 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. All his plans at this period contemplated a general advance from Washington as early as the month of November ; and, looking back to the middle of October, it appears from General McClellan's oAvn statement that he had at that time upwards of one hundred and fifty thousand men under his command, out of which, after deducting the forces to be employed in garrisoning Washington, Baltimore, and Annap- olis, and those assigned for guarding the line of the Potomac, he was able to place in the field a column for active operations of above seventy-five thousand men.* But about the time he had designed putting the army in motion, General McClellan found himself, by his appoint- ment as general-in-chief, charged not only with the direc- tion of the Army of the Potomac but of all the other armies in the field. He then began to change his views regarding the line and method of operating against the enemy in Vir- ginia ; and this led him to the adoption of a policy that caused a delay of all active operations, lasting throughout the whole winter and continuing till March, 1862, when the movement to the Peninsula was begun.f This inactivity, by * McClellan : Report, p. 7. f It -would appear that it was during the month of November that General McClellan first began to change his purpose of operating against the enemy in front of Washington, and determined to assail Richmond from the coast. The earliest recorded intimation of this change of purpose appears in a reply by General McClellan to a memorandum drawn up by President Lincoln, suggest- ing a movement on Manassas. This paper, with many others relating to his own personal correspondence with General McClellan, was given the writer by the late President during the summer of 1864. It is marked in Mr. Lin- coln's hand as having been made " about the 1st of December, 1861." " If it were determined to make a forward movement of the Army of the Potomac, without awaiting further increase of numbers, or better drill and dis- cipline, how long would it require to actually get in motion '? " [Answer in pencil by McClellan : ' If bridge trains ready, by December 15 — probably 25th.'] " After leaving all that would be necessary, how many troops could join the movement from southwest of the river ? " [Answer in pencil, ' 71,000.'] " How many from northwest of it 1 THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 71 \Yliatever military considerations it may liave been justiflotl to General McClellan's own mind, was certainly very unfor- tunate ; and, as it had afterwards an important bearini^ on that commander's relations to the Administration, and has since given rise to much antagonism of opinion, it will be proper to consider briefly both the reasons which are thought to justify and those which are thought to condemn it. The points of defence of the inactivity of the Army of the Potomac during the winter of 1861-2 may all be included in this summary : the yet imperfect organization, equipment, " [Answer in pencil, ' 33,000.'] '•■ Suppose, then, that of those southwest of the river [supplied in pencil, ' 50,000'] move forward and menace the enemy at Centreville ? " The remainder of the movable force on that side move rapidly to the crossing of the Occoquan by the road from Alexandria towards Richmond ; there to be joined by the whole movable force from northeast of the river, hav- ing landed from the Potomac just below the mouth of the Occoquan, move by land up the south side of that stream, to the crossing point named ; then the whole move together, by the road thence to Brentville, and beyond, to the rail- road just south of its crossing of Broad Run, a strong detachment of cavalry having gone rapidly ahead to destroy the railroad-bridges south and north of the point. " If the crossing of the Occoquan by those from above be resisted, those landing from the Potomac belovv to take the resisting force of the enemy in rear ; or, if landing from the Potomac be resisted, those crossing the Occoquan from above to take that resisting force in rear. Both points will probably not be successfully resisted at the same time. The force in front of Centreville, if pressed too hardly, should fight back into the intrenchments behind them. Armed vessels and transports should remain at the Potomac landing to cover a possible retreat." The following reply is in General McClellan's handwriting, dated Wash- ington, December 10, and marked "confidential :" " I inclose the paper you left with me — filled as you requested. In arri\-ing at the numbers given, I have left the minimum numbers in garrison and observation. " Information recently [received] leads me to believe that the enemy would meet us in front with equal forces nearly — and I have noio my mind actiwilhj turned towards another plan of campaign that I do not think at all anticipated by the enemy, nor by many of our own iKople. "George B. McClellan." The " other plan of campaign," hero foreshadowed, is of course no other than the coast movement. 72 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. and discipline of the army ; the inadequacy of its force ; the difficulty of winter campaigning in Virginia ; and the neces- sity of a simultaneous movement throughout the entire theatre of war. Some of these points are well taken, while others will not stand a critical examination. It is true that the army, though comj^osed of material of uncommon excellence, was necessarily green and had the imperfections incident to improvised armaments ; and, no doubt, it was in much better condition to move in April, 1862, than it could have been in November or December, 1861. But, assuredly, General McClellan over-estimates the then condition of his opponent's army, when, in his report, he speaks of its superior discipline, drill, and equipment. There is now overwhelming evidence to show that, previously at least to the organization of the permanent Confederate Army in April, 1862, nothing could exceed the laxity of dis- cipline, demoralization of temjjer, and inferiority in arms, equipment, and means of transport that marked the Southern force. It is true, also, that General McClellan w^as never able to obtain quite the colossal force he had called for — a movable column of one hundred and fifty thousand men, to- gether with garrisons for Washington, Baltimore, etc., and corps of observation for the Kne of the Potomac, making the enormous aggregate of two hundred and forty thousand men. But it should be considered that this demand was based on the theory set forth by General McClellan himself, that the enemy had, in October, "a force on the Potomac not less than one hundred and fifty thousand strong, well drilled and equipped;" whereas it is certain that General Johnston's entire force barely exceeded one-third that number.'^ * Several months ago General Johnston stated verbally to me that his recol- lection of the maximum of his strength during this period was 54,000. Since then, however, I have obtained in manuscript the consolidated monthly re- ports of the Confederate armies. Johnston's strength, October 31, 18G1, was 44,131 present for duty (present and absent 06,243) ; December 31st it was 63,112 present for duty (presL-nt and absent 98,088) ; February 28, 1862, it was 47,017 (present and absent 84,225). THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 73 It is also tiTie that military operations in a Virginia winter and on a Virginia soil are attended witli great ditHculties ; and no military student will, after the experience of the war, say that it would have been practicable for General McClellan at that season to undertake a grand operation, such as a cam- paign against Kichmond. But it was quite possible to have made a special operation of the nature of a movement against Johnston at Manassas. Had Johnston stood, a battle with good prospect of success might have been dehvered. But had he, as there was great likelihood he would do, and as it is now certain he would have done, fallen back from Manassas to the line of the Eapidan, his compidsory retirement would have been esteemed a positive victory to the Union arms.* And, even had it been accounted impracticable to undertake a movement against Manassas, there were still many incidental * General McClellan himself, in discussing the relative merits of a direct ad- vance against the enemy at Manassas and a change of base to some point on the lower Chesapeake, makes certain admissions that, considering the circum- stances of the case, might well have decided him to take the former course, lie admits that an attack on the Confederate right flank by the line of the Occoquan would, if successful, "prevent the junction of the enemy's right with his centre," affording the opportunity of destroying the former ; would " remove the obstructions to the navigation of the Potomac ;" would " reduce the length of wagon transportation," and would "strike directly at his main railway com- munication." Now assuming the successful execution of this plan, what would have been the result ? General McClellan himself shall answer : " Assuming the success of this operation and the defeat of the enemy as cer- tain, the question at once arises as to the importance of the results gained. I think these results would be confined to the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by the enemy, and the moral e9ect of the victory ; important results, it is true, but not decisive of the war, nor securing the destruction of the enemy's main army, for he could fall back upon other positions, and fight us again and again, should the condition of his troops permit." A tactical victory in the field, the compulsory retreat of the enemy from his cherislied position, the relief of the blockade of the Potomac, and the " moral effect of the victory," with the losses, disasters, and demoralization therefrom resulting - all of which General McClellan admits were within his grasp by the movement indicated — were surely well worth the effort. True, the operation Avould not have been " decisive of the war,'— for such was the grand but some- what vagiie and, as has since appeared, misjudged ambition that possessed him. 74 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. operations* tliat were perfectly feasible, and whicli, while valuable in themselves, would have had the effect to satisfy the country and consolidate the confidence of the people and the Administration in General McClellan, And it is precisely in this regard that General McClellan showed himself deficient in certain qualities of mind indis- pensable for one who has to deal with the larger questions of war. If, as a soldier, he was right in wishing to postpone grand military operations till spring, when the times and seasons and circumstances should all favor ; when his army, strengthened in numbers and tempered by discipline, would be fit for the field ; when the full preparation of the other armies would enable him to enter on large combinations, he certainly showed a lack of that kind of political savoir faire and knowledge of human nature necessary to a great com- mander, in remaining perfectly inactive. It was for him to consider whether the increase in numbers and improvement in discipline likely to accrue to his army in the mean time would at all compensate for that loss of confidence, that popular impa- tience, that political obstruction, which were certain to arise, and which actually did arise. For so soon as the period of reorganization had passed, the public and the Administration became naturally anxious to see the imposing army of a hun- dred and fifty thousand men that had grown up on the banks of the Potomac turned to some accomit. And this anxiety presently grew into an impatience, which at length broke out in loud clamor that at once embarrassed the Government and marred the harmonious relations between it and the com- mander of the army. It happened, too, that during this period there occurred a series of untoward events that made a deep impression on the people of the North, and tended both to grieve patriotic men and stir up a bitter opposition to the commander held responsible for them. The most important of these were the * Among these General Barnard mentions the capture of Norfolk. The Peninsular Campaign, p. 12. THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 75 blockade of the Potomac and the disaster at Ball's Bluff, of which events I must give a brief account. Shortly after the battle of Bull Eun, the Confederates ad- vanced their outposts from Centreville and Fairfax Court- house forward as far as Munson's Hill, and almost to the banks of the Potomac, — a move that was of no military value, but which gave them the prestige of flaunting their flag within view of the capitol of the nation. They then proceeded to erect batteries at different points on the Virginia side of the Potomac, with the view of obstructing the navigation of the river. So successfully was this work performed, that early in October the flag-officer of the Potomac flotilla officially re- ported the water highway by which a large part of the sup- plies for the army around Washington was brought forward from the North to be effectually closed.* This event, the actual blockade of the capital, produced throughout the country a deep feehng of mortification and humiliation, and caUed forth bitter comjDlaints against the Government. A proposition was made to destroy these batteries by an assault- ing force sent from the Maryland side of the river ; but the enterprise was abandoned in consequence of an adverse report from General Barnard, chief-engineer.f Meanwhile, the com- mander was unwilling to undertake the destruction of the batteries by the only method that promised success — to wit, a movement by the right bank of the Potomac, — for the reason that it would brmg on a general engagement. The afiair of Ball's Bluff was of a kind to affect still more powerfully the popular imagination ; for, while in itself a lamentable disaster, it seemed to reveal a strange looseness and want of responsibihty in the conduct of military affairs. It appears that on the 19th of October, General McCall was ordered to make, with his division, a movement on Draines- ville, for the purpose of covering reconnoissances in all direc- tions to be made the following day. These reconnoissances * Report on tlie Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 8. f McCleUan : Report, p. 50. 76 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AKMY OF THE POTOMAC were successfully accomplished on the 20th ; and General Mc- Clellan, anticipating that this demonstration would hare the effect of inducing the enemy to abandon Leesburg, directed General Stone, whose division of observation was guarding the left bank of the Potomac above Washington, with head- quarters at Poolesville, to " keep a good lookout upon Lees- burg," and suggested " a slight demonstration" as hkely to have the effect of moving the enemy at that point. Accord- ingly, on the afternoon of the 20th, Gorman's brigade was sent to Edward's Ferry to make a display of force, and the Fifteenth Massachusetts regiment, under Colonel Devens, was sent to Harrison's Island, from which place a small scouting party was about dark sent across by Ball's Bluff, to the Yir- ginia side, and ordered to push out towards Leesburg and report the position of the enemy. The reconnoitring party having returned, bringing report of a small encampment of the enemy within a mile of Leesburg, Colonel Devens was ordered by General Stone to cross five companies of his regi- ment to the Virginia shore, and advancing under cover of the night to the eiiemy's camp, to destroy it at daybreak, and, after making observation of the country, to return. The report touching the enemy's encaijipment proved to be a mistake ; but Colonel Devens found a wood in which he concealed his men, and proceeded to examine the space betAveen that and Leesburg. About eight o'clock, however, finding his position discovered, he retired to the Bluff, but presently returned to- M-ards Leesburg, and occupied the ground till towards one o'clock ; when on being attacked by a regiment of the enemy, he again fell back to a field in front of the bluff, where the main action afterwards took place, and where was posted a small supporting force under Colonel Lee. Meantime, in tlie morning, General Stone had assigned to Colonel Baker the command of the right wing at Ball's Bluff, giving him a discretionary order either to retire the small force on the Vir- ginia side, or to re-enforce it from his own brigade. Colonel Baker determined on the latter course, and succeeded in ferry ing over about a thousand men of his comman(i. These THE ARMY BEFORE WASIIIXGTOX. 77 lie nnited to the commands of Colonel Devcns, wlio had mean- while retired to the bluff, and of Colonel Lee ; and with this force of about one thousand eight hundred men formed Hne of battle in the field at the top of the bluff, where, about half- past two in the afternoon, he began to receive the attack of the enemy. The Southern force was composed of four regi- ments, under command of Colonel Evans, who with his brigade had been holding post at Leesburg. Finding that the small Union force, which had been easily driven back fi'om its ad- vance towards Leesburg, was constantly being re-enforced by the fresh trooj)S which Baker was bringing across the river, Evans ordered a general attack. The action continued for two hours ; the Confederates assaulting impetuously, and the Union force stoutly resisting, though losing ground. In the midst of the contest the commanding officer. Colonel Baker, was killed ; and shortly afterwards the line, receiving a severe tire on the left flank, retreated in disorder down the bluff towards the river. Here, towards dusk, an appalling scene ensued. The troops swarmed down the steep bluff', pursued by the yelling Southerners, who shot and bayoneted them as they ran. The means of transportation had been very in- adequate ; the one flat-boat was soon swamped, the lifeboat drifted down the stream, and the couple of skiffs which made up the total were soon lost. Many were shot while in the water ; many were drowned ; many surrendered ; others suc- ceeded in swimming to the island. Not half of those who went over returned. This lamentable affair discouraged the people of the North as much as it elated the Southerners.* Its entire history affords a sti-iking exemplification of the looseness of military conduct and relations at that time. In venturing on the undertaking. General Stone proceeded on the supposition that General McCaU, who, as General McClellan informed him, * In tlie hot and suspicious temper of the hour, the gravest charges were brought against the commanding oificer, who some time afterwards was placed in arrest and confined to Fort Lafayette. From these charges a calmer survey of the events completely exonerates General Stone. 78 CAMPAIGNS OF TIIE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. had occupied Drainesville on the 20th, and was to " send out reconnoissances in all directions," still remained there ; yet McCall was withdrawn the following morning, when Stone sent the force across the river, without the latter's being in- formed of the fact. Again, though General McClellan did not order the expedition across the river, yet on being informed of the crossing during the day, he congratulated General Stone, thereby inferentially approving it.* Stone's plan of opera- tions lacked definite purpose : it was neither a feint nor a serious attack. He seems to have left Colonel Baker in mis- understandmg as to the co-operation of the force at Edward's Ferry ; and the conduct of Colonel Baker, — a high-spirited and patriotic man, who had quitted his seat in the United States Senate to take the field, — was without military skill or discretion. These events could not fail to have a deeply depressing effect on the public mind. It is vain to argue that the coun- try should have subordinated its wishes to abstract military necessities. Nor is it strange, as month after month passed by in inaction, with the capital of the nation under blockade, the foreign relations of the United States menacing war, Secession gaining prestige day by day, while an army of por- tentous strength lay as under a spell, that the deepest soHci- tude should have overcome the hearts of men ; that the timid should have begun to despair, and the proudest to hang their heads with shame. These things came back upon the Admin- istration in a pressure daily growing more and more oppres- sive ; and when, towards the close of that gloomy year, the commander of the Army of the Potomac being then sick, President Lincohi called in several of the general ofiicers to counsel with him, he declared, in his sad, homely way, that " if something could not soon be done, the bottom would he out of the tvliole affair, t This exposition of the condition of the public mind is due * Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. ii., p. 489. ■j- McDowell : Manuscript Minutes of Council of War. THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 79 liere ; because, if we shall not be able to hold the Administra- tion blameless in its dealings with General McClellan, a just verdict will at the same time not omit to estimate how severe a demand that officer — unwisely, as we must think — made on the country and the Government. I now pass to the exposition of the cause that produced this long and unfortunate inaction, and which will be found in the alread}^ noted change of the plan of operations. There is little doubt that, at the period to which this recital has extended — namely, the close of the year 1861 — General Mc- Clellan had fully resolved upon acting against the enemy by a flank movement by water instead of assailing him by direct attack ; and as the adoption of the former course had a most important bearing on the relations between the Executive and the general-in-chief, I shall enter with some detail into the origin and development of that plan of campaign that removed the Army of the Potomac from the front of Washington to the Peninsula. The first formal discussion of a movement to the Lower Chesapeake seems to have taken place at a series of war-coun- cils held at Washington early in January, 1862. It appears that at this time President Lincoln, troubled in spirit at the condition of public affairs, and further distressed at the sick- ness of General McClellan, summoned the attendance of two division commanders, to counsel with himself and the mem- bers of the cabinet as to the propriety of commencing active operations with the Army of the Potomac. These officers were Generals McDowell and Franklin. The former officer committed to writing the substance of what passed at these interviews, and the following is a transcript of his manuscript minutes : " January 10, 1862. — At dinner at Arlington, Va. Received a note from the Assistant-Secretary of War, saying the President wished to yee me that evening, at eight o'clock, if I could safely leave my post. Soon after I re- ceived a note from Quartermaster-General Meigs, marked 'private and con- fidential,' saying the President wished to see me. 80 CA^IPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. "Repaired to the Prcsi'lcnt's house at eight o'clock p. m. Found the President alone. Wus taken into the small room in the northeast corner. Soon after we -were joined by Bngadier-General Franklin, the Secretary of State, Governor Seward, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Assistant- Secretary of War. The President was greatly disturbed at the state of affairs. Spoke of the exhausted condition of the treasury ; of the loss of public credit ; of the Jacobinism of Congress ;* of the delicate condition of our foreign relations; of the bad news he had received from the West, par- ticularly as contained in a letter from General Halleck on the state of affairs in Missouri ; of the want of co-operation between Generals Halleck and Buell; but more than all, the sickness of General McClellan. " The President said he was in great distress, and as he had been to Generiil McClellan's house, and the general did not ask to see him ; and as he must talk to somebody, he had sent for General Franklin and myself to obtain our opinion as to the possibility of soon commencing active operations with the Army of the Potomac. " To use his own expression, ' If something was not soon done, the bottom would be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellan did not want to use the army, he would like to borrow it, provided he could see how it could be made to do something.' " 1 he Secretary of State stated the substance of some information he con- sidered reliable as to the strength of the forces on the other side, which he had obtained from an Englishman from Fort Monroe, Richmond, Manassas, and Centreville, which was to the effect, that the enemy had twenty thou- sand men under linger, at Norfolk ; tliirty thousand at Centreville ; and in all in our front, an effective force, capable of being brought up at short no- tice, of about one hundred and three thousand men — men not suffering, but well shod, clothed, and fed. In answer to the question from the President, what could soon be done with the army, I replied that the question as to the 7c7ien must be preceded by the one as to the how and the where. That substantially I would organize the army into four army corps, placing the five divisions on the Washington side on the right bank. Place three of these corps to the front — the right at Vienna or its viTjinity, the left beyond Fairfax Station, the centre beyond Fairfax Courthouse, and connect the lat- * General McDowell's manuscript was submitted by the present writer to President Lincoln, during the summer of 18G4, and he indorsed its entire con- tents as a true report of these war-councils, with the exception of the above phrase, " the Jacobinism of Congress." His autograph indorsement on the manuscript states that he had no recollection of using such an expression. It may be supposed that the phrase expresses the impression produced on Mc- Dowell's mind by Mr. Lincoln's words, though his precise language may have been different. THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 81 tcr place with the Orange and Alexandria Railroad by a railroad now par- liallj' thrown up. This would enable us to supply tliese corps without tlio use of horses, except to distribute what was brought up by rail, and to act upon the enemy without reference to the bad state of country roads. '' 1 he railroads all lead to the enemy's position ; by acting upon them m force, besieging his strongholds if necessary, or getting between them if pos- sible, or making tlie attempt to do so and pressing his left, 1 thought wo should in the first place cause him to bring up all his forces and mass them on the flank most pressed, the left; and possibly, I thought probably, we should again get them out of their works and bring on a general engngc- ment on favorable terms to us ; at all events keeping him fully occupied and harrowed. The Fourth Corps, in connection with a force of heavy guns afloat, would operate on his right flank beyond the Occoquan, get behind the batteries on the Potomac ; take Aquia, which being supported by the Third Corps over the Occoquan it could safely attempt, and then move on the railroad from Manassas to the Rappahannock, having a large cavalry force to destroy bridges. I thought by the use of one hundred and thirty thousand men thus employed, and the great facilities which the railroads gave us, and the compact position we should occupy, we must succeed by i-epeated blows in crushing out the force in our front, even if it were equal in numbers and strength. The road by the Fairfax Courthouse to Centre- ville would give us the means to bring up siege-mortars and siege materials; and even if we could not accomplish the object immediately, by making the campaign one of positions instead of one of manoeuvres, to do so eventually and without risk. That this saving of wagon transportation should bo effected at once by connecting the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad with the Alexandria roads, by running a road over the Long Bridge. That when all this could be commenced, I could better tell when I knew something more definite as to the general condition of the army. "General Franklin being asked, said he was in ignorance of many things necessary to an opinion on the subject, knowing only as to his own di\-i>ion, which was ready for the field. As to the plan of operations, on being asked by the President if he had ever thought what he would do with this army if he had it, he replied that he had, and that it was his judgment that it should be taken, what could be spared from the duty of protecting the capital, to Yorh Fiver to operate on Eiehmond. The question then came up as to the means at band of transporting a large part of the army by water. The j\.s- sistant Secretary of War said the means had been fully taxed to provide transportation for twelve thousand men. After some further conversfiti.Mi, and in reference to our ignorance of the actual condition of the army, t!io President wished we should come together the next night at eight o'clock, and that General Franklin and I should meet in the mean time, obtain such further information as we might need, and to do so from the stalT of tho 82 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. headquarters of the Army of the Potomac. Immediate orders were to ho given to make the railroad over Long Bridge. "January 11. — Held a meeting with General Franldin, in themorning, at the Treasury Building, and discussed the question of the operations which, in our judgment, were best under existing circumstances — as season, present position of the forces, present condition of the country — to be undertaken before going into the matter as to when those operations could be set on foot. I urged that we should now tind fortifications in York Kiver wliich would require a movement in that direction to be preceded by a naval force of heavy guns to clear them out, as well as the works at West Point. That Richmond was now fortified; that we could not hope to carry it by a simple march after a successful engagement; that we should be obliged to take a siege-train with us. That all this would take time, which would be im- proved by the enemy to mass his forces in our front, and we should find that we had not escaped any of the difficulties we have now before this po- sition ; but simply lost time and money to find those difficulties when wo should not have so strong a base to operate from, nor so many facihties, nor so large a force as we have here, nor, in proportion, so small a one to over- come. That the war now had got to be one of positions, till we should penetrate the line of the enemy. That to overcome him in front, or cut his communication with the South, would, by its moral as well as physical efl:ect, prostrate the enemy, and enable us to undertake any future operations with ease, and certainty of success ; but that in order of time, as of importance, the first thing to be done was to overcome this army in our front, which is beleaguering our capital, blockading the river, and covering us day by day with the reproach of impotence, and lowering us in the eyes of foreign nations, and our people both North and South ; and that nothing but what is necessary for this purpose should go elsewhere. "General Franklin suggested whether Governor Chase, in view of what we were charged to do, might not be at liberty to tell us where General Burnside"s expedition had gone? I went and asked him. He tohl me that, under the circumstances, he felt he ought to do so ; and said it was destined for Newborn, N. C, by the way of Hatteras Inlet and Pamlico Sound, to operate on Raleigh or Beaufort, or either of them. That General McCleUan had, by direction of the President, acquainted him with his plans, which was to go with a large force of this Army of the Potomac to Urbanna or Tappa- hannock, on the Rappahannock, and then with his bridge-train move directly to Richmond. On further consultation with General Franklin, it was agreed that our inquiries were to be directed to both cases of going from our pres- ent position, and of removing the large part of the force to anotlier base further South. A question was raised by General Franklin, whether in de- ference to General McClellan we should not inform him of the duty we were ordered to perform. I said the order I received was marked private and THE AEIMT BEFORE WASHINGTON. 83 confidential ; and as they came from the President, our commander-in-chicl', I conceived, as a common superior to Geaeral McOlellan and both of us, it was for the President to say this, and not us. That I would consult the Secretary of the Treasury, who was at hand, and could toll us what was tlie rule in the cabinet in such matters. The secretary was of oi)inion that the matter lay entirely with the President. We went to Colonel Kingsbury, chief of ordnance of the Army of the Potomac, Brigadier-General Van Viiet, chief quartermaster, and Major Shiras, commissary of subsistence, and obtained all the information desired. Met at the President's in the evening at eight o'clock. Present, the same as on the first day, with the addition of the Postmaster-General, Judge Blair, who came in after the meeting had begun the discussion. I read a paper containing both General Franklin's and my own views, General Franklin agreeing with me— in view of time, etc., required to take this army to another base- that operations could best now be undertaken from the present base, substantially as proposed. The Postmaster-General opposed the plan, and was for having the army, or as mucb of it as could be spared, go to York Eiver or Fortress Monroe, either to operate against Richmond, or to Suffolk and cut off" Norfolk ; that being in his judgment the point (Fortress Mon- roe or York) from which to make a decisive blow. Tliat the plan of going to the front from this position was IJull Eun over again. That it was stra- tegically defective, as was the elfort last July. As then, we would have the operations upon exterior lines. That it involved too much risk. That there was not so much difficulty as had been supposed in removing the army down the Chesapeake. That only from the Lower Chesapeake could any tiling de- cisive result against the army at Manassas. That to drive them from their present position, by operating from our present base, would only force them to another behind the one they now occupy, and we should have all om- work to do over again. Mr. Seward thought if we only had a victory over them it would answer, whether obtained at Manassas or further south. Governor Chase replied in general terms to Judge Blair, to the eflfect that the moral power of a victory over the enemy, in his present position, would be as gi-eat as one elsewhere, all else equal ; and the danger lay in the probability that we should find, after losing time and millions, that we should have as many difficulties to overcome below as we now have above. The President wished to have General Meigs in consultation on the subject of providing water transportation, and desired General Franklin and myself to see him in the morning, and meet again at three o'clock p. M. the next day. "January 12.— Met General Franklin at General Meigs'. Conversed with him on the subject of our mission at his own house. I expressed my views to General Meigs, who agreed with me in the main as to concentrating our efforts against the enemy in front by moving against him from our 84: CA:*IPAIGNS of the army of the POTOMAC. present position. As to the time in which he could assemble water transpor- tation for thirty thousand men, he thought in about from four to six weeks. Met at the President's. General Meigs mentioned the time in which ho could assemble the transports as a month to six weeks. The general subject of operations from the present base was again discussed, General Meigs agreeing that it was best to do so, and to concentrate our forces for the purpose. The President and Mr. Seward said that General McClellan L-ad been out to see the President, and was looking quite well, and that now, as he was able to assume the charge of the army, the President would drop any further proceedings with us. The general drift of the conversa- tion was as to the propriety of moving the army further south, and as to the destination of Burnside's expedition. The Postmaster-General said that if it was the intention to fight it out here (Manassas), then we ought to concentrate. It was suggested and urged somewhat on the President to countermand, or have General McClellan countermand General Burnside's expedition, and bring up at Aquia. The President was, however, exceed- ingly averse from interfering, saying he disliked exceedingly to stop a thing long since planned, just as it was ready to strike. Nothing was done but to appoint another meeting the next daj', at eleven o'clock, when we were to meet General McClellan and again discuss the question of the movement to be made, etc., etc. "Monday, Jantjaey 13. — Went to the President's with the Secretary of Treasury. Present, the President, Governor Chase, Governor Seward, Postmaster-General, General McClellan, General Meigs, General Franklin, and myself, and, I think, the Assistant Secretary of War. The President, pointing to a map, asked me to go over the plan I had before spoken to him of. He at the same time made a brief explanation of how he came to bring General Franklin and General McDowell before him. I mentioned in as brief terms as possible what General Franklin and I had done under the President's order, what our investigations had been directed upon, and what were our conclusions as to going to the front from our present base, in the way I have heretofore stated, referring also to a transfer of a pai-t of the army to another base further south. That we had been in- formed that the latter movement could not be commenced under a month to six weeks, and that a movement to the front could be undertaken in all of three weeks. General Franklin dissented only as to the time I mentioned for beginning operations in the front, not thinking we could get the roads in order by that time. I added, commence operations in all of three weeks ; to which he assented. I concluded my remarks by saying something apologetic in explanation of the position in which we were. To which General McClellan replied somewhat coldly, if not curtly — ' You are entitled to have any opinion you please !' No discussion was entered into by him whatever, the above being the only remark be made. General THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 85 Frimklin said that, in giving his opinion as to going to York Paver, ho did it knowing that it was in the direction of General McCkHan'a plan. I said that I had acted entirely in the dark. General Meigs spoke of his agency in having us called in hy the President. The President then asked what and when any thing could be done, again going over somewhat the same ground he had done with General Franklin and myself. General McClellan i^aid the case was so clear a blind man could see it, and then spoke of the difficulty of ascertaining what force he could count upon ; that he did not know whether he could let General Butler go to Ship Island, or whether he could re-enforce Burnside. Much conversation ensued, of rather a general character, as to the discrepancy between the number of men paid for and the number efl^ctive. The Secretary of the Treasury then put a direct question to General McClellan to the eifect as to what he intended doing witli his army, and when he intended doing it? After a long silence, Gen- eral ^fcClellan answered that the movement in Kentucky was to jirecede any o le from this place, and that that movement might now be forced ; that he had directed General Buell if he could not hire wagons for his transporta- tion, that he must take them. After another pause he said he must say he was very unwilling to develop his plans, always believing that in military matters the fewer persons who were knowing to them the better; that he would tell them if he was ordered to do so. The President then asked hira if he counted upon any particular time; he did not ask what that time was, but had he in his own mind any particular time fixed when a movement could be commenced. He replied he had. Then, rejoined the President, I will adjourn this meeting." It need liardlj be said that the plan of campaign that General McClellan had in his mmd, and which he was un- willing to disclose in presence of his subordinates and an un- militarj council, was the project of attacking Eichmond by the lower Chesapeake. A few days afterwards he fully de- veloped this plan in a letter to the President, and the result was that the President disapproved it and by an order issued on the 31st of January, substituted one of his own.* This order was as follows : Special War Order, No. 1. Executive Mansion, Washington, January 31, 1S62. Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an expedi- * Mcaellan : Report, p. 42 86 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. tion for the immediate object of seizing and occupyinjf a point upon the railroad south westward of wiiat is known as Manassas Junction, all detail:^ to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, aud the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next. Abuaham Lincoln. Tlie operation here indicated is that of a flanking move- ment on the enemy's position at Manassas. Now, it is due to add that in thus disapproving the plan of operations of Gen- eral McClellan and substituting one of his own, there is con- clusive evidence to show that the President was moved less by any consideration of the relative strategic merits of the two plans of campaign, than by the question of time in regard to the commencement of active operations. With him this was the controlling circumstance ; for the anxiety on the part of the Administration for an immediate movement of the Army of the Potomac had become what General McClellan calls " excessive ;"* and four days before the order of the 31st January, dictating a movement of the Army of the Poto- mac against Manassas, the President had decreed that " a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces should be made on the 22d day of rebruary."t It is obvious, therefore, that the * " About the middle of January, 1862, upon recovering from a severe illness, I found that excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the Army of the Potomac had taken possession of the minds of the Administration." McClellan 's Report, p. 42. f This order, styled " President's General War Order, No. 1," was issued on the 27th of January, without consultation with General McCleUan (Report, p. 42). It is as follows : Executive Mansion, Washington, January 27, 1S62. Ordered, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general move- ment of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces. That especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Anny of Western Virginia, the army near Mumfordsville, Kentucky, the anny and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day. That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective comaiandera, THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 37 President, having categorically ordered a general movement of all the armies to be made on the 22d of February, was forced to the next step of prescribing for the operations of the Arm}' of the Potomac a plan of campaign which could bo undertaken at the time fixed. It was impossible that McClel- lan's jiroject could be initiated at the appointed period ; for not onl}' was it necessary to put in execution the difficult task of moving the army and all its material to the designated point on the Lower Chesapeake, but it was necessary first of all to provide the vast amount of water transportation need- ful for so colossal an enterprise. Hence the order for a direct movement on Manassas. Upon the receipt of this order, General McClellan lost no time in seeing the President and requesting to know whether this order was to be regarded as final, and whether he could be permitted to submit m writing his objection to the plan of the Executive and his reasons for preferring his own. Permission was accorded, and on the 3d of February the general-in-chief submitted, in a paper to the Secretary of War, an elaborate discussion of the two plans of campaign.* Whether from the force of reasoning of the paper, or from other and extrinsic considerations,! the result was that the President rescinded his order for the movement on Manassas ; and on the 27th of Febniary the War Department instnicted its agents to procure at once the obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders whea duly given. That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally bo held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order. Abraham Lincoln. * Report, pp. 43-48. f Mr. Raymond, editor of the New York Times, who had the best means of knowing the secrets of the Presidential mind, remarks : " The President was by no means convinced by General McClellan 's reasoning : but in consequence of his steady resistance and unwillingness to enter upon the execution of any other plan, he assented," etc. History of the Administration of President IJn- coin, p. 225. 88 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. necessary steamers and sailing-craft to transport tlie Army of the Potomac to its new field of operations. Even after this step had been taken, however, the Presi- dent, convinced against his will, retained his aversion to the proposed movement. He repeatedly expressed his dissatis- faction at the project of removing the army from Washing- ton, and preferred that an operation should be made for opening the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad by a movement across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and another for the destruction of the enemy's batteries on the Potomac. Gen- eral McClellan seems to have been able to overcome these objections by a recital of the same considerations he had pre- viously presented ; but, on the 8th of March, the President returned with renewed vigor to his old position, and urged him to submit his project of camjjaign to a council of his division commanders. The meeting was accordingly held the same day. The commanding general laid before his ofiicers the inquiry, whether it were advisable to shift the base of operations. The plan of a change of base to the lower Chesa- peake was approved by eight out of the twelve generals present. Impressed by the emphasis of the approval which General McClellan's plan received in the adliesion thereto of two to one of the chief ofiicers of the army, the President, never- theless, saw fit to bind the execution of the plan, which he could now do no less than approve, by several embarrassing restrictions, contained in two important war-orders issued on the 8th of March. The first of these orders directed the organization of the Army of the Potomac into four corps, and nominated four generals to their command. These ofiicers were not of General McClellan's selection, while their ap- pointment excluded certain other ofiicers upon whom he had fixed for corps commanders.* The second of these orders * The officers nominated to tlie command of the corps into which tlio Army of the Potomac was divided were, Generals Keyes, Sumner, Heintzel- man, and McDowell. The latter was well fitted for the command by his ability, but the relations between him and the commander were not cordial. THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 89 ^5rcscribed the conditions upon whicli a change of base would be allowed, and is in the following terms : General War Order, No. 3. Executive Mansion, Washington, March 8, ISG'Z. Ordered, That no changfe of the base of operations of the Army of the rotomac ^hall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the general-in-chief and the commanders of army corps, shall leave said citj entirely secure. That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved en route for a new base of operations, until the navigation of the Potomac from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay shall be freed from the enemy's batteries and other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission. That any movement as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the general-in-chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March ; and the general-in-chief shall be responsible that it so moves as early as that day. Ordered, That the army and navy co-operate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Ciiesapeake Bay. Abraham Lincoln. L. Thomas, Adjutant-General. It is easy to see what must have been the result of this fatal indecision, vacillation, and want of harmony between the Administration and the chief of the army ; but it happened that this clash of opmion was suddenly interrupted by an event that made a complete change in the mihtary situation. This event was no less than the sudden evacuation of Manas- Generai Sumner was the ideal of a soldier; but he had few of the qualities that make a general. The others do not call for any analysis. I have, in a pre^^ous part of this volume (p. 64), set forth the views of General McClellan toucbinj? the organization of corps ; and, as there remarked, his failure to make appointments to these commands at the time he was all-powerful resulted in his having forced upon liim as lieutenants men he did not wish in that capacity. It wou)IAC. Clellfin did in impressing his on tlie cabinet at Washington. Nevertheless, in accordance with his counsels, the abandon- ment of Norfolk was ordered ; and General Huger, after de- stroying the dockyards and removing the stores, evacuated that place on the 10th of May, and withdrew its garrison to unite with the army in front of Kichmond. On the next da^' it was occupied by a Union force, led by General Wool, from Fortress Monroe. One important consequence of the evacua- tion of Norfolk was the destruction of the Merrimac, which vessel proving to have too great a draft of water to proceed up the James to Eichmond, was on the following clay bloAvn up by order of her commander, Commodore Tatnall. This at once opened the river to the advance of the Union gunboats; tttid immediately afterwards a fleet, composed of the Monitor, Galena, Aroostook, Port Koyal, and Naugatuck, iinder Com- modore Eodgers, ascended the James, with the view of open- ing the water highway to Eichmond. Within twelve miles of the city, however, the vessels were arrested by the guns of Fort Darling, on Drury's Bluff, and after a four hours' en- gagement, in which the Galena received severe damage, and the one-huiidred-pouhder Parrott on the Naugatuck was burst, the fleet Avas compelled to withdraw. It was not these events, however, that determined Mc- ClcUan's line of advance on Eichmond by the York rather than by the James ; for the former course had already been dictated to him by antecedent circumstances. Before the destruction of the Merrimac had opened the opportunity of swinging across to the James, the army was already well en route by the York and Pamunkey, under injunctions to push forward on that hue for the purpose of uniting with a column under McDowell, which was about to move from Fredericksburg towards Eichmond. As this circumstance exercised a controlling influence on the campaign, and power- fully affected its character and results, I shall enter into its exposition at some length in the succeeding chapter. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. lOJ. III. CONFEDERxVTE STRATEGY ON THE CHICKAHOMINY AND IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. Tlie brilliant liistorian of the war in the Spanish Peninsula lays down the maxim that "military operations are so dependent upon accidental circumstances, that, to justly cen- sure, it should always be shown that an unsuccessful general has violated the received maxims and established principles of vv^ar." ■^'' Now as General McClellan's offensive movement towards Richmond really ended with the establishment of his army on the Chickahominy, and as the narrative of events to follow will show the enemy in an offensive attitude, and the army whose proper role was the aggi'essive reduced to the defensive, and finally compelled to retreat, it will be in place to follow attentively the course and causes of action with the view to discover whether the untoward events that befell the Union arms be traceable to any departure from those "estab- hshed principles of war," the violation of which furnishes a just ground of censure. Upon McClellan's arrival on the Chickahominy, there were two objects which he had to keep in view : to secure a firm footing on the Bichmond side of that stream with the viev/ of carrying out the primal purpose of the campaign, and at the same time to so dispose his forces as to insure the junc- tion of McDowell's column ivowi Fredericksburg with the force before Richmond. The former purpose was accom- plished by throwing the left wing of the Army of the Potomac across the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge, which the Con- federates had left uncovered. Casey's division of Keyes' corps crossed on the 20th of May, and occupied the opposite . * Napier : History of tlie Peninsular War, vol. i., p. 8. 122 CA^IPAIGNS OF .THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. heights. Heintzehnau's corps was then thrown forward in support, and Bottom's Bridge was immediately rebuilt. To secure the second object, McClellan extended his right wing well northward, and on the 24th carried the village of Mechanicsville, forcing the enemy across the Chickahominy at the Mechanicsville Bridge which the Confederates after crossing destroyed. He then awaited the march of McDowell to join him, in order to initiate operations against Richmond. I must now turn aside to show in what manner the object of this movement was baulked by the skill of the Confederates and the folly of those who controlled the operations of the Union armies. At the time the Army of the Potomac was toiling pain- fully up the Peninsula towards Eichmond, the remaining forces in Northern Virginia presented the extraordinary spectacle of three distinct armies, planted on three separate lines of operations, under three independent commanders. The highland region of West Yirginia had been formed into the " Mountain Department" under command of General Fremont ; the Valley of the Shenandoah constituted the " Department of the Shenandoah" under General Banks ; and the region covered by the direct lines of apjDroach to Washington had been erected into the " Department of the Bappahannock," and assigned to General McDowell at the time his corps was detached from the Army of the Potomac. About the period reached by the narrative of events on the Peninsula, these armies were distributed as follows : General Fremont with a force of fifteen thousand men at Franklin, General Banks with a force of about sixteen thousand men at Strasburg, and General McDowell with a force of thirty thousand men at Fredericksburg on the Bappahannock. It need hardly be said that this arrange- ment, the like of which has not been seen since Napoleon scandalized the Austrians by destroying in succession half a dozen of their armies distributed after precisely this fashion— nor indeed was ever seen before, save in periods of the echpse of all mihtary judgment — was in violation of the true THE PENINSULAE CAMPAIGN. 123 principles of war. One hardly wishes to inquire by whose crude and fatuitous inspiration these things were done ; but such was the spectacle presented by the Union forces in Virginia : the main army already held in check on the Chicka- hominy, and these detached columns inviting destruction in detail. Not to have taken advantage of such an opportunity would have shown General Johnston to be a tyro in his trade. It came about, after the commencement of active opera- tions on the Penmsula had drawn towards Richmond the main foi*ce of the Confederates and reheved the front of Washing- ton from the pressure of their presence, that the Administra- tion, growing more easy touching the safety of the capital, determined, in response to General McClellan's oft-repeated appeals for re-enforcements, to send forward McDowell's corps, — not, indeed, as he desired, to re-enforce him by water, but to advance overland to attack Eichmoncl in co-operation with the Ai-my of the Potomac. To this end, the division of Shields was detached from the command of General Banks in the Shenandoah Valley, and given to General McDowell ; and this addition brought the latter's force up to forty-one thou- sand men and one hundred guns. General McClellan had received official notification of this intended movement ; and on the march fi-om Williamsburg to the Chickahominy, as has been shown, he threw his right wing well forward, so as to insure the junction of McDowell's force, when it should move forward from Fredericksburg.* After numerous delays, the time of advance of this column was at length fixed for the 26th of May, a date closely coincident with the arrival of the Army of the Potomac on the Chickahominy. The head of McDowell's column had already been pushed eight miles * It should not be forgotten that this was the controlling consideration in the choice by General McClellan of the line of advance by the Pamunkey, instead of swinging his army across to the James immediately after the battle of Williamsburg aud the destruction of the Merrimac immediately thereon, — a course the adoption of which would, in all probability, have altered the entire character of the campaign. 124 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AIJMY OF THE POTOMAC. south of Fredericksburg ; aud McClellan, to clear all opposi- tion from liis path, sent forvvard Porter's corps to Hanover Junction, where he had a sharp encounter with a force of the enemy under General Branch, whom he repulsed with a loss of two hundred killed and seven hundred prisoners, and estab- lished the right of the Army of the Potomac within fifteen miles, or one march, of McDowell's van. McDowell v/as eager to advance, and McClellan was equally anxious for his arrival, when there happened an event v.hicli frustrated this plan and all the hopes that had been based thereon. This event was the irruption of Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley. The keen-eyed soldier at the head of the main Confederate army, discerning the intended jimction between McDowell and McClellan, quickly seized his oppor- tunity, and intrusted the execution of a bold coup to that vig- orous lieutenant who had already made the Valley ring ^^'itll his exploits. Jackson, on retiring from his last raid in the Shenandoah Valley, which had ended in his repulse by Shields at Win- chester (March 27), had retreated up the Valley by way of Harrisonburg, and turning to the Blue Ridge, took up a f)osition between the south fork of the Shenandoah and Swift Eun Gap. Plere he was retained by Johnston, after the main body of the Confederate army had been drawn in towards Bichmoiid. Jackson was joined by Eweil's division from Gordonsville on the 30th April, and at the same time he received the further accession of the two brigades of General Edward Johnson, who had held an independent command in Southwest Virginia. This raised his force to about fifteen thousand men. Banks' force, reduced by the detachment of Shields' division, sent to General McDowell, to about five thousand men, was posted at Harrisonburg. Fremont was at Franklin, across the mountains ; but one of his brigades, under Mih'oy, had burst beyond the limits of the Mountain Department, and seemed to be moving to make a junction Avith Banks, with the design, as Jackson thought, of advancing on Staunton. Jackson determined to attack these forces in THE PP]NINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 125 detail. Accoidinglj-, he posted Ewell so as to hold Banks in check, whilst he himself moved to Staunton. From here he threw forward fiye brigades, under General Edward Johnson (May 7), to attack Milroy. The latter retreated to his moun- tain fastness, and took position at a point named McDowell, where, re-enforced by the brigade of Schenek, he engaged Johnson, but was forced to retire on Fremont's main body at Franklin. Having thus thrown off Milroy eccentrically from communication Avitli Banks, Jackson returned (May 14) to destroy the force under that officer. But during Jackson's pursuit of Milroy, Banks, discovering his danger, had retii-ed to Strasburg, followed by Ewell. Jackson therefore followed also, and at New Market he formed a junction with Ewell. Instead of marching direct on Strasburg, however, Jackson diverged on a line to the eastward by way of Luray Yalley, and moved on Front Eoyal, with the view of cutting off Banks' retreat from Strasburg, interposing between him and re- enforcements, and compelling his surrender. The 23d he entered Front Pioyal, capturing the garrison of seven hundred men there under Colonel Kenly ; and thence he moved to Middletown by a road to the right of the main Yalley road, hoping there to cut off' Banks. But the latter v/as too quick for him : so that when he reached Middletown, he struck only the rear of the retreating Union column. Banks, with his small force, offered such resistance as he could to the advance of Jackson, and took jjosition on the heights of "Winchester (May 24), where he gave fight, till, being as- sailed on both flanks, he retired hastily to the north bank of the Potomac (May 25), making a march of fifty-three miles in forty-eight hours. Jackson continued the pursuit as far as Hailtown, within two miles of Harper's Ferry, where he remained till the 30th, when, finding heavy forces converging on his rear, he began a retrograde movement up the Yalley. The tidings of Jackson's apparition at Winchester on the 24th, and his subsequent advance to Harper's Ferry, fell like a thunderbolt on the war-council at Washington. The order for McDowell's advance from Fredericksljur.cr, .to unite with 126 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. McClellan, was instantly countermanded ; and he was directed to put twenty thousand men in motion at once for the Shen- andoah Valley, by the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad.'- McDoM'ell obeyed, but, to use his own language, "with a heavy heart," for he knew, what any man capable of survey- ing the situation with a soldier's eye must have known, that the movement ordered was not only most futile in itself, but certain to paralyze the operations of the main army and frus- trate that campaign against Eichmond on the issue of which hung the fortune of the war. In vain he pointed out that it was impossible for him either to succor Banks or co-operate with Fremont ; that his Une of advance from Fredericksburg to Front Eoyal was much longer than the enemy's line of re- treat ; that it would take him a week or ten days to reach the Valley, and that by this time the occasion for his services would have passed by. In vain General McCleUan urged the real motive of the raid — to prevent re-enforcements from reaching him. Deaf to all sounds of reason, the war-council at Washington, like the Dutch States-General, of whom Prince Eugene said, that " always interfering, they were al- ways dying with fear," t heard only the reverberations of the guns of the redoubtable Jackson. To head off Jackson, if possible to catch Jackson, seemed now the one important thing ; and the result of the cogitations of the Washington strategists was the preparation of what the President called a " trap" for Jackson — a " trap" for the wily fox who was mas- ter of every gap and gorge in the Valley ! Now this pretty scheme involved the converging movements of Fremont from * Dispatch from President Lincoln : Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 274. f This expression of Prince Eugene is used by him in a passage of his Memoires, descriptive of an event curiously analogous to that to which the above text has relation : " Marlborough," says he, " sent me word that Ber- wick having re-enforced the duke of Burgundy, the army, which was now a hundred and twenty thousand strong, had marched to the assistance of Lisle. The deputies from the States-General, always interfering, and alicays dying xdthfear, demanded of me a re-enforcement for him," etc. — Memoirs of Prince Eugene, p. 106. THE PENINSULAK CAMPAIGN. 127 tlie west, and McDowell from tlie east, upon Strasbiirg. The two columns moved rapidly ; they had almost effected a junc- tion on the 31st; but that very day Jackson, falling back from Harper's Ferry, slipped between the two, and made good his retreat up the Valley, leaving his opponents to follow in a long and fruitless Chevy Chase, all the time a day be- hind. The pursuers did their best : they pushed on, Fremont fol- lowing in the path of Jackson up the Valley of the Shenan- doah ; while McDowell sent forward Shields' division by the lateral Luray Valley, with a view to head him off when he should attempt to break through the gaps of the Blue Eidge. Jackson reached Harrisonburg on the 5th of June ; Fremont the next day. There Jackson diverged eastward to cross the Shenandoah at Port BepubUc, the only point where there was a bridge. Shields was moving up the east side of the river, was close at hand, and might prevent his crossing, or might form a junction with Fremont. Both results were to be pre- vented. Jackson threw forward his own division to Port Ee- pubUc (June 7) to cover the bridge ; and left EweU's division five miles back on the road on which Fremont was following — • the road fi-om Harrisonburg to Port Eepublic. Next day Fre- mont attacked EweU's five brigades, with the view of turning his right and getting through to the bridge at Port Eepublic to make a junction with Shields. At the same time Shields attacked the bridge on the east side, to make a junction with Fremont. The residt was that EweU repulsed Fremont, while Jackson held Shields in check. Early next morning, drawing in Ewell and concentrating his forces, Jackson threw himself across the river, burned the bridge to prevent Fremont from following ; fell upon Shields' advance, consisting of two bri- gades under General Tyler, and repulsed him, capturing his artillery. The former of these affairs figures in history as the battle of Cross Keys, and the latter as the battle of Port Ee- public. In this exciting month's campaign, Jackson made greab captures of stores and prisoners ; but this was not its chief 128 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE rOTOJ.IAC. result. "Without gaining a single tactical victory lie liad jc\ acliieved a great strategic victory, for by skilfully manoeuvring fifteen thousand men he succeeded in neutralizing a force of sixty thousand. It is perhaps not too much to say that he saved Richmond ; for when McClellan, in expectation that Mc- Dowell might still be allowed to come and join him, threw forward his right wing, under Porter, to Hanover Courthouse, on the 26tli of June, the echoes of his cannon bore to those in Kichniond who knew the situation of the two Union armies the knell of the capital of the Confederacy.* McDowell never went forward — was never allowed, eager though he was, to go forward. Well-intentioned though we must believe the mo- tives to have been of those who counselled the course that led to the consequences thus delineated, the historian must not fail to point out the foll}^ of an act that must remain an im- pressive illustration of what must be exjDected when men vio- late the established principles of war. lY. THE BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. It is easy to see the perilous position in which the events just recited placed the Army of the Potomac. Had McClellan been free immediately after the battle of Williamsburg, when the destruction of the Merrimac opened up the James River as a highway of sxipplies, to transfer his army to that line, it is easy to see that he would have avoided those dangers of the other line whereof the enemy finally took such energetic advantage. I have already set forth the circumstances that dictated his advance by the lino of the York and the Pamunke}^ — to wit, the expected march of McDowell's column from Fredericksburg for the purpose of joining the Army of the Potomac — and I have detailed the events whereby that column was prevented from making its antici- * Prince de Joinville : The Army of tlie Potomac, p. 112, note. THE PENINSULAR CA.MPAIGN. 129 patcd marcli. Now, it was almost simultaneous with tlie establishment of the base at AVhite House that McDowell's column was turned aside from its contemplated co-operation with the Army of the Potomac, and diverted to the Shenan- doah Valley. Knowing this fact, General McClellan knew that the hope of further re-enforcements was vain, and it was incumbent on him to act vigorously with his proper force. He knew that the presence of Jackson's corps in the Shenan- doah Valley neutralized a force of fifteen thousand men that was certain to be brought against him if he should delay. Besides, he was making an offensive movement in which vigorous action was above all requisite ; for when once the offensive has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. Yet, having reached the Chickahominy, he assumed an almost passive attitude, with his army, too, cut in twain by that tickle and difficult stream. Now, though a position a cheval on a river is not one which a general willingly assumes, it is frequently a necessity, and in that case he S2:>ans the stream with numerous bridges.* It was necessary for General McClellan to pass the Chicka- hominy because it crossed his line of manoeuvre against Kichmond ; and it was also necessary for him to leave a force on the eastern side to cover his communications with his base at the Wliite House ; but this is not a situation in which one would assume a passive attitude with few and very imperfect connections between the divided wings. The passage of the Chickahominy was made by Casey's division at Bot- tom's Bridge on the 20th of May, and by the 25tli the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman were established on the right bank. Meantime, the corps of Sumner, Porter, and Frank- Un remained on the left bank. By the 28th, Sumner had constructed two bridgesf for the j^assage of his eorj^s ; but * " If a stream divide a position at riglit angles, it should be spanned with as many bridges as would enable troops and guns to pass from one side to tbe other, as if no sucb feature existed." General McDougall : Modern Warfare and Modern Artillery, p. 107. f Known as " Sumner's Upper Bridge" and " Sumner's Lower Bridge." 130 CMIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. up to the time when tlie Confederate commander assumed the initiative on the 31st, no provision was made for the crossing of the right wing, and the re-enforcement of that wing by the left involved a detour of twenty-three miles, — a distance quite too great for the possibihty of re-enforcement in the fierce emergency of battle. Materials for three bridges* to be used in the passage of the right wing wer6 indeed prepared, and by the 28th of Mayt these bridges were all ready to be laid. But, meantime, they were not laid, and the two wings were suffered to remain separated by the Chickahominy, and without adequate means of communica- tion. The Chickahominy rises in the highlands northwest of Richmond, and- enveloping it on the north and east, emp- ties into the James many miles below that city, and after describing around it almost the quadrant of a circle. In itself this river does not form any considerable barrier to the advance of an army ; but with its accessories it constitutes one of the most formidable mihtary obstacles imaginable. The stream flows through a belt of hea^dly timbered swamp. The tops of the trees rise just about to the level of the crests of the highlands bordering the bottom, thus perfectly screening from view the bottom-lands and slopes of the highlands on the enemy's side. Through this belt of swamp the stream flows sometimes in a single channel, more frequently divided mto several, and when but a foot or two above its summer level, overspreads the whole swamp. The bottom-lands between the swamp and the highlands, in width from three-quarters of a mile to a mile and a quarter, are little elevated at their margin above the swamp, so that a rise of the stream by a * These bridges -were the " New Bridge" and two other bridges, the one half a mile above and the other half a mile below. f " So far as engineering preparations were concerned, the army could have been thrown over as early as the 28th of May, Sumner uniting his corps with those of Heintzelman and Keyes, and taking the enemy's position at New Bridge in flank and rear. Thus attacked, the enemy could have made no formidable resistance to the passage of our right wing." Barnard : Report of Engineer Operations, p. 21. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 131 few feet, overflows large areas of tliese bottoms, and even when not overflowed thej are spongy and impracticable for cavalry and artillery.* In this state of facts, McClellan's disposition of his army must be considered a grave fault, and inaction in such a situ- ation was in the highest degree dangerous. " A general," says the Archduke Charles, " must suppose that his opponent will do against him whatever he ought to do." Now, for Johnston to omit to strike one or the other of these exposed wings, was to neglect that principle which forms the whole secret of war — to be superior to your enemy at the point of colhsion : it was, in fact, to overpass a unique opportunity of delivering a decisive blow. The Confederate commander was not the man to let slip such an opportunity ; and, so soon as reconnoissances had fully developed the position of that portion of the Union army which lay on the Bichmond side of the Chickahomy, he determined to act. It was a situation in which, by bringing two-thirds of his own force to bear against one-third of the Union force, he might hope not merely to defeat but to de- stroy the exposed wing. By the 30th of May he had formed his resolution, and he immediately made preparations for carrying it into effect on the following day.f During the * Barnard : Report of Engineer Operations, pp. 18, 19. f It is commonly supposed that it was the freshet in the Chickahominy, caused by the storm of the night of the 30th, that prompted General Johnston to attack ; but he had fully resolved to strike before the storm came on, on the mere chances of the situation of the Union army. The storm did not come on till the night of the 30th, and the following extract from the ofBcial report of Major-General D. H. Hill will show that General Johnston had made disposi- tions for the attack as early as noon of that day : " These reconnoissances (of Hill's brigade commanders) satisfied me that the enemy was not in force on the Charles City road, but was on the Williamsburg road, and that he had fortified himself about the Seven Pines. The fact was further established, that the whole of Keyes' corps had crossed the Chickahominy. These facts I com- municated to General Johnston about noon on Friday, 30th of May. I received a prompt answer from him, that, being satisfied by my report of the presence of the enemy in force in my immediate front, he had resolved to attack them." Oflacial Reports of Battles. Richmond, 1864. 132 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. night of the 30th, there came a storm of miwouted violence ; and this circumstance, while it would embarrass the execu- tion of Johnston's proposed plan, at the same time gave that general the hope of making the operation still more complete from the situation in which it would place his op- ponent. The reconnoissauces of the Confederates had disclosed the fact that Casey's division of Keyes' corps held an advanced SKETCH OP THE FIELD OF FAIR OAKS. position on the Williamsburg road, three-quarters of a mile beyond the point known as Seven Pines and about six miles from Eichmond. Couch's division of the same corps was stationed at Seven Pines, on both sides of the "Williamsburg road and along the Nine-mile road, his right resting at Pair Oaks Station, on the Eichmond and York Eiver Eailroad. Of the two divisions of Heintzelman's coq^s, that of Kear- ney was on the Williamsburg road and the railroad, three- quarters of a mile in advance of Savage Station; and that THE PENINSULAR CAJIPAIGN. 133 of Hooker was guarding the approaclies of the White Oak Swamp. In this state of facts, Johnston made the following disposi- tions for attack : Hill (D. H.), who had been covermg the Williamsburg and Charles City road, was directed to move his division, supported- by the division of Longstreet, out on the Williamsburg road, but not to move till Huger's di^-ision, which was to move out on the Charles City road, should re- lieve him. Huger's duty was to strike the left flank of the Union force which Hill and Longstreet should engage in front. G. W. Smith, with his division, was to advance on the right flank of the Union force, to the junction of the New Biidge road with the Nine-mile road, there to be in readiness either to fall on Keyes' right or to cover Longstreet's left.'^ The divisions were to move • at daybreak ; but the horrible condition of the roads, resulting from the storm, greatly re- tarded the movement of the troops. Hill, Longstreet, and Smith, indeed, were in position by eight o'clock ; but not so Huger. For hour after hour, Longstreet and Hill awaited in vain the signal-gun that was to announce Huger's arrival in his proper position. At length, at ten o'clock, Hillf went forward on the WiUiamsburg road,! and presently struck Casey's divi- sion. The advance position beyond Seven Pines, held by that oflficer, was defended by a redoubt, rifle-pit, and abatis ; but, at this time, these works were only in process of construction, and the troops were, indeed, engaged at this work when the attack was made.§ The pickets were quickly driven in, and * Jolmston : Report of Seven Pines : Confederate Reports of Battles, Rich- mond, 1864. f Hill was acting under Longstreet's orders during the day. I -Hill's Report : Official Reports of Battles. Richmond, 1864. g The attack was not, however, a surprise, for the movement of the enemy's troops had been observed for several hours before. It appears, more- over, that about half-past ten an aid-de-camp of General Johnston was cap- tured by the pickets of General Naglee. His presence so near the lines, and his "very evident emotion" when a few shots were fired in front of Casey's headquarters (Keyes' Report), caused increased vigUance, and the troops were ordered to be under arms at eleven o'clock. 134 CA^IPAIGXS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. the more so that a regiment* sent forward to support the picket-line gave way without making much if any resistance. The first blow fell upon Nagiee'sf brigade, which held a posi- tion in advance of the redoubt, where it made a good fight and held the enemy in check for a considerable time, and then retired and fought with the rest of the division in the redoubt and rifle-pits — the force being strengthened by Peck's brigade sent forward by General Couch. The Confederates ad- vanced in close columns, and suffered severely from the fire of the batteries in front of and in the redoubt. Presently, how- ever, one of their brigades, which had been sent round on the left of Casey, gained the rear of the redoubt.^ When, there- fore, a severe flank fire was opened by the force that had made this detour, the division crumbled away, the guns in the redoubt and a portion of those of the battery in front were captured,§ * The One Hundred and Third Pennsylvania. See McClellan's Report, p. 108. But for a statement that this regiment did better than liad been re- ported, see testimony of General Casey, in Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 445. + In addition to Naglee's brigade, the position of which is given above, the other two brigades of Casey's division were posted as follows : General Wes- sel's brigade in the rifle-pits, and General Palmer's in rear of Wesssl's. Of the artillery, one battery was in advance with Naglee ; one in rear of the rifle-pits to the right of the redoubt ; a third in rear of the redoubt ; and a fourth, un- harnessed, in the redoubt. X General Johnston's account of the manner in which Casey's position was carried is as follows : " Hill's brave troops, admirably commanded and gal- lantly led, forced their way through the abatis, which formed the enemy's external defences, and stormed their intrenchments by a determined and irre sistible rush. Such was the manner in which the enemy's first line was car- ried." (Johnston : Ofiicial Report.) But tliis does not give an accurate repre- sentation of the case. Hill, who was in command of the attacking columns, says: "General Rains had now gained the rear of the Yankee redoubt, and opened fire on the infantry posted in the woods. I now noticed commotion in the camps and redoubts, and indications of evacuating the position. Rgdes took skilful advantage of this commotion, and moved up his brigade in beauti- ful order, and took possession of the redoubts and rifle-pits." Oflacial Reports of Battles. Richmond, 1864. § Among those who fell in the redoubt were, Colonel G. D. Bailey, Major Van Valkenberg, and Adjutant Ramsay, all of the First New York Artillery. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 135 and such of the troops as held together were brought to a stand at General Couch's position at Seven Pines."'^' Early in the action, General Keyes, whose troops were those upon whom the attack had thus far fallen, finding he was being hard pushed, had sent to General Heintzelman, who commanded the whole left wing of the army, and whose two divisions were close at hand, to send him aid. But the mes- sage was both delayed in reaching that officer,!' and when he sent forward re-enforcements, they were, through some misun- derstanding, very tardy in reaching the front ; so that it was past four o'clock when Kearney, with his foremost brigade,;|: arrived at the position where Couch's troops and the wreck of Casey's division were struggling to hold their own.§ Berry's brigade was immediately thrown into the woods on the left, where his rifles commanded the left of the camp and works occupied by Casey in the morning, and now held by the enemy. Meantime, though the divisions of Longstreet and Hill had thus for three hours been vigorousl}^ pushing forward on the Williamsburg road, the column of G. W. Smith, to which was intrusted the important flanking operation already indicated in Johnston's original plan, had not yet moved. The Confed- erate commander had placed himself with this column ; but failing to hear the musketry of Longstreet and Hill,|i he waited till four o'clock, when, learning how these generals had been engaged, he immediately threw forward Smith's com- mand. Thus it happened that when Casey had been driven back to Couch's line at the Seven Pines, and the latter with two regiments of his division had advanced to relieve the j^ressure on Casey's flank by an attack of the hostile left, he was met * " On my arrival at the second line, I succeeded in rallying a portion of my division." — Casey's Report. t He received it at two P. M. — Heintzelman 's Report. :]: Berry's brigade. ^ Hooker's division did not reach the ground till the action was decidea. II " Owing to some peculiar condition of the atmosphere, the sound of thtj musketry did not reach us." — Johnston : Report of Seven Pines. ]36 CAilPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. bj large masses of the enemy bursting out on his right l)y the rear of the Nine-mile road, and another heavy column moving towards Fair Oaks Station. This was Smith's column, which had at length got fairly to work. Couch, who had been re- enforced by two additional regiments, made fight, but was overpowered and thrown off eccentrically to the right, — the enemy penetrating between the force with which Couch Vt'as executing this manoeuvre and the main body of his division.* And now, between five and six o'clock, it seemed that the wdiole left wing of the army across the Chickahominy was doomed ; for not only was Couch bisected, but the brigades of Berry and Jameson, of Kearney's division, which had gone up on the left, were thrown back by the enemy on White Oak Swamp, only regaining the main body under cover of night ; and the centre was struggling with indifferent success to hold its own, after being driven from two positions. But just at this crisis, when the fate of the day was trembling in the balance, the action was determined by the sudden apparition of a column from the north bank of the Chickahominy. Upon first learning the state of affairs on the left wing, McClcllan sent orders to General Sumner, who held the centre of the general line of the army, on the north side of the Chickahominy, and about six miles from the scene of action, to hold his corps in readiness to move. But as soon as the sounds of battle from the west side of the Chickahominy reachedt him, Sumner, divining the situation, had, with that soldierly instinct that characterized him, put his corps under arms, and marched it out of camp ; so that when, at two o'clock, he was ordered to cross his command wdthout delay, and proceed to the support of Heintzelman, no time w as lost. * " In twenty minutes, the enemy had passed over the road leading to my centre, cutting me off from the rest of the division." — Couch : Report of Fair Oaks. f " General Sumner, as soon as he heard the firing, and without waiting for orders, had put his troops under arms and marched them out of camp, thus saving an hour or so, which was of great sersace to us." - Heintzelman's testi- mony in Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 351. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 137 For the passage of the Chiekahominy there were, at that time, only Bottom's Bridge, the railroad-bridge, and two bridges built by Sumner himself intermediate between the two above mentioned. But to reach the battle-field that day by Bottom's Bridge or the raikoad-bridge was out of the question; his sole rehance, therefore, was on his own two bridges. Now, however, a new and dire difficulty presented itself : the lower bridge had been carried away by the fi-eshet ; the upper one was half adrift. When the head of Sumner's column, composed of Sedgwick's division, reached it, the rough logs forining the corduroy approaches over the swamp were mostly afloat, and were only kept from drifting off by the stumps of trees to which they were fastened. The por- tion over the body of the stream was suspended from the trunks of trees by ropes, on the doubtful staunchness of which depended the possibihty of making the passage. "The possibihty of crossing," says Colonel Alexander of the engineers, " was doubted by all present, including General Sumner himself. As the solid column of infantry entered upon the bridge, it swayed to and fro to the angry flood below or the hving freight above, settling down and grasping the sohd stumps by which it was made secure, as the line advanced. Once filled with men, "however, it was safe till the corps had crossed ; it then soon became impassable."* Sumner, debouching from the bridge with Sedgwick's divi- sion (Eichardson's division did not arrive till about sunset), pushed impetuously forward through the deep mud, guided only by the firing. To move the artillery was found impossi- ble.t At about six o'clock the head of Sedgwick's column"]: deployed into line in the rear of Fair Oaks, in a position where Couch, when separated fi'om the main body, had taken his stand to oppose the enemy's advance. They were no more than in time ; for at that moment Smith's troops, * " The Peninsular Campaign :" Atlantic Monthly, March, 18G4. f Lieutenant Kirby, Company I, First United States Artillery, by fairly carrying his guns to firmer ground, succeeded in getting up his battery, t Formed l)y Gorman's brigade. 138 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. having been gotten well in hand under the personal direction of General Johnston, moved forward, opening a heavy fusilade upon the Kne. They made several determined charges, but were each time repulsed with great loss by the steady fire of the infantry and the excellent practice of the batteries.* After sustaining the enemy's fire for a considerable time, General Sumner ordered five regimentsf to make a charge with the . bayonet into the woods occupied by the enemy. This operation was handsomely executed, and resulted in driving back the Confederates in confusion. Thus, when all was lost, Sumner's soldierly promjititude saved the day, as Moreau, flying to the assistance of Napoleon when hard pressed by the Austrians in Italy, chained victory to the stand- ards of the French. " O Moreau !" exclaimed that illustrious war-minister Carnot, on hearing of this ; " oh, my dear Fabius, how great you Avere in that circumstance ! how superior to the wretched rivalries of generals, which so often cause the best-laid enterprises to miscarry !"| The brave old Sumner now sleeps in a soldier's grave ; but that one act of heroic duty must embalm his memory in the hearts of his country- men. In this bloody encounter the Confederates lost nearly seven thousand men, and the Union army upwards of five thousand. But a severer loss befell the Confederates than is expressed even in this heavy aggregate ; for the able chief of the Army of Northern Virginia was struck down with a severe hurt. The command, for the time being, devolved on General G. W. Smith ; but the failure to make good the purpose of the attack, the heavy losses already suffered, and the disabling of * McClellan : Report, p. 110. General Jolinston simply says: "The strength of the enemy's position enabled him to hold it till dark." f The Thirty-fourth New York, Colonel Sinter ; Eighty-second New Yor^, Li(nitenant-Colonel Hudson ; Fifteenth Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel Kim ball ; Twentieth Massachusetts, Colonel Lee ; Seventh Michigan, Major Richard- son — the three former of General Gorman's brigade, the latter two of General Dana's brigade. I Alison : Ilistory of Europe, vol. iii., p. 327. THE PENINSULAR CAIMPAIGN. 139 General Jolinstoii, determined General Smitli to retire his forces. Preparations for withdrawal were actively pushed forward during tlie night ; but througli some accidental cir- cumstances, a portion of Sumner's line having become en- gaged on the morning of the 1st of June, there ensued a rencounter of some severity, which lasted for two or three hours. It ended, however, after some brisk salhes, in the withdrawal of the entire Confederate force to the lines around Richmond. The Union troops were immediately pushed forward, and occupied the positions held previous to the action.'^ * Tlirougli one of those odd freaks that sometimes overtake the record of military events, the history of the operation of the 1st of June has been made to assume a magnitude altogether beyond its real proportions. There are on record official reports and official testimony that wonld make one believe that the action on the morning following Fair Oaks assumed the volume of a battle — and a battle, too, if one were to credit the oft-recurring "bayonet charges," and attacks in solid column, of little less than first-class magnitude. There is little doubt, hosvever, that these details are largely, if not altogether apochryphal. There was, indeed, a rencounter on the morning of the 1st, but it was the result not of a plan and purpose of aggressive action on the part of the Confederates, but an incident in the withdrawal of the enemy from the Union front. Gen- eral Johnston has frequently expressed to the writer his amazement at the swelling bulk assumed by the " skirmish" of the 1st. Though not present, having been removed to Eichmond after his hurt. General Johilston yet knew by constant reports from the field what was going on, and asserts that nothing more severe than an afiair of the rear-guard took place. In his official report, General Johnston simply says: "Major-General Smith was prevented from re- suming his attack on the enemy's position next morning by the discovery of strong intrenchments not seen on the previous evening. On the morning of June 1st the enemy attacked the brigade of General Pickett, which was sup ported by that of General Pryor. The attack was vigorously repelled by these two brigades, the brunt of the fight falling on General Pickett. This was the last demonstration made by the enemy. In the evening our troops quietly returned to their own camps." 140 CAilPAICiNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. V. THE SEVEN DAYS' RETREAT. The attitude of the army during the month succeeding the action of Fair Oaks was not imposing. It was seemingly a body that had lost its momentum ; and the troops, sweltering- through all that hot month amid the unwholesome swamps of the Chickahominy, sank in energy. McClellan's position was a trying one : he realized the full necessity of action ; but he also realized better than any of his contemporaries the enor- mous difiiculty of the task laid upon him. Feeling^ deeply the need of new accessions to his strength, in order to permit him to carry out his plans, and seeing almost as large a force as he had to confront the enemy withal scattered in unmili- tary positions throughout Virginia, he was naturally urgent that they should be forwarded from where they were useless to where they might be so advantageously employed. Yet the situation was not one that permitted inaction ; for the position of the army astride a fickle river, and the ex- perience already had of the danger to which that division of its strength exposed it, should have been a sufiicient admoni- tion of the necessity of a change. The fundamental vice was the direction of McClellan's line of communications almost on the prolongation of his front of operations. Pivoting on the York Eiver Eailroad, and drawing his supplies from White House, it became absolutely necessary for him to hold a large part of his effective strength on the left bank of the Chicka- hominy for the protection of that line, — a situation that at once prevented his using his whole force, and exposed him to attack in detail. This false position might have been recti- fied in two waj^s : 1, By a change of base to the James, which would have given a line of manoeuvre against Richmond, en- tirely free from the objections inherent in that b}"- the York, THE PENINSULAR CAilPAIQN. 141 find wlicreon lie would have liad clioice either of movin.q against Eichmond by the north bank of the James, or, by a transfer to the south side, of operating agamst its communica- tions, which was altogether the bolder and more decisive method ; 2. By the transfer of the whole force to the right bank of the Chickahominy, abandoning the line of the York, and then making a prompt advance against Eichmond, with the advantage that, if unsuccessful in the battle against the adverse force, the line of the James might be taken up. The latter was the preferable choice, as it avoided the ill moral ef- fect that might be expected to attend a change of base without a battle.. But either would have been better than inaction, which, in the actual situation, was more hazardous than the boldest devisement, and was an eminent example of that kind of false prudence that is often the greatest rashness. General McClellan knew that the adoption of the one course or the other was necessary ; but unfortunately the case was one presenting an alternative, and it was the nature of that commander's mind to so balance between conflict- ing views, to so let " I dare not wait upon I would," that he was apt to hesitate even in conjunctures wherein the worst course was preferable to doing nothing. To whatever sub- tile cause, deej) seated in the structure of his mind — to whatever excess of lymph in his blood this may have been due — it certainly marred his eminent capacity as a soldier. There is something painful and at the same time almost ludicrous in the evidence, found in his official dis^^atches, of this ever-about-to-do non-performance. On the day succeed- ing the action of Fair Oaks, the 2d of June, he wrote : " I only wait for the river to fall to cross with the rest of the force and make a general attack. Should I find them holding firm in a very strong position, I may wait for what troops I can bring up from Fort Monroe." On the 7th of June : "I shall be in jDerfect readiness to move forward and take Eichmond the moment that McCall reaches here, and the ground will admit the passage of artillery." McCall's division (of McDowell's force) arrived on the 12th and 13th, which increased his 142 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. effectire to one hundred and fifteen thousand men.-" On the IGth he wrote : " I hope two days more will make the ground practicable. I shall advance as soon as the bridges are com- pleted and the ground fit for artillery to move." On the 18th : " A general engagement may take place any hour." On the 25th : " The action will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time," — and so on and on in the like tenor, until the time when the enemy cut short the endless debate by seizing the initiative. Now it cannot be said that these stops and cau- tels were not real difficulties in the way of an advance ; that the successive conditions precedent of action were not well taken, and based on sound military reasoning. What Gen- eral McClellan should have seen, however, is that his j^roper course of action was determined not by these circumstances at all, but was dictated by the necessity of extricating himself from a situation intrinsically false. This became only too soon manifest. When the hurt that General Johnston had received at Fair Oaks was seen to be one that must long keep him out of the field. General Robert E. Lee was nominated to succeed him in the command of the Army of Northern Virginia. Of this sol- dier, destined to so large a fame, men had at this time to judge by promise rather than by proof. General Lee's actual experi- ence in the field had been confined to a trivial campaign in the mountains of Western Virginia, in which he had been in a remarkable manner foiled by General Eosecrans ; and this, with his reflective habits and cautious temper, promised a commander of the Fabian mould. Yet there is nothing in which one may more readily judge wrongly than in the at- tempt to prognosticate from the plane of every-day experience * The rolls of the Army of the Potomac showed on the 26th of June the following figures : Total aggregate of present and absent, one hundred and fifty-six thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight ; aggregate absent, twenty- nine thousand five hundred and eleven ; aggregate on special duty, sick, etc., twelve thousand two hundred and twenty-five ; aggregate present for duty, one hundred and fifteen thousand one hundred and two. Official Records : Adjutant- General's Office. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 143 the beha^dor of a man placed in command of an army. Lee, Avhose characteristic trait was caution, marked the commence- ment of his career by a stroke briUiant in its boldness. It has been seen that in General Johnston's theory of ac- tion for the defence of Eichmond, he judged that the course best suited to the circumstances was to draw in around the Confederate capital, concentrate there all the available re- sources of the South, and then fall with crushing weight upon the Union army, divided by the Chickahominy. Accidental circumstances had made the blow which he delivered ineffect- ual. General Lee determined to continue the same line of action ; and this he was enabled to initiate under more favor- able auspices. Johnston's views touching the necessity of a powerful gathering of force at Eichmond fell comparatively unheeded ; but his successor had better fortune, and having decided to assume the offensive, he was able to draw in the Confederate detachments scattered along the coast and throughout Virginia, and by this means raise his effective to near one hundred thousand men. Lee's policy of concentration included the withdrawal of Jackson's force fi'om the Valley of the Shenandoah, — and a withdrawal so secret, that its first announcement should be the blow struck. Before commencing operations, however, he sent Stuart, with a body of fifteen himdred Virginia troopers, to make the circuit of the Union army, by a swoop around its rear. This having been success- fully accomphshed about the middle of June, Lee was ready, with the knowledge thus gained, to strike. To mask Jackson's intended withdrawal from the Valley, General Lee detached a division from the force around Eich- mond (the division of Whiting) and sent it to join Jackson. This was done ostentatiously, and in such a way that it should become known to General McClellan ; Lee judging that the intelligence of this movement would give his antagonist the impression of a revival of operations in the Shenandoah re- gion. If there was, as seemed likely, a renewed intention of sending forward McDowell's army to join McClellan, a fresh appeal to the fears of the administration for the safety of 144 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Wasliiugton was the shrewdly chosen means of again divert- ing that force. When this had had its intended effect, Jackson, with his whole command, now raised to about twenty-five thousand men, was ordered to march rapidly and secretly in the direc- tion of Richmond. He set out fi-om the vicinity of Port Re- public (where he had remained since the termination of the Valley campaign) on the 17th of June, and moving by way of Gordonsville and the line of the Virginia Central Railroad, pushed his advance so vigorously that on the 25th he struck Ashland, on the Fredericksburg Raikoad, twelve miles from Richmond. With such skill did Jackson manage his march, that not General McClellan, nor yet Banks, nor Fremont, nor McDowell, knew aught of it ;- and when, on the 25tli, Jack- son had reached Ashland, and was within striking distance of the right wing of the Army of the Potomac, McClellan, ab- sorbed in his proposed operations on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy, was that very day advancing his pickets on the Williamsburg road, preparatory to a general forward movement in that direction. Jackson had now reached a point where the other Confederate columns could begin the parts assigned to them. Lee's plan contemplated that so soon as Jackson, by Ins manoeuvres on the north bank of the Chickahominy, should have uncovered the passage of the stream at Meadow and Mechanicsville bridges, the divisions on the south bank should cross and join Jackson's column, when the whole army should sweep Aown the north side of the Chickahominy, towards the York River, laying hold of McClellan's communications with White House.t The only interference with this plan was caused by a day's delay in Jackson's movement whereby it occurred that * A deserter from Jackson's force came into the Union lines on the 24th, find stated that Jackson was moving from Gordonsville, along the line of the Virginia Central Eailroad, to strike the right of the Army of the Potomac ; but his story waa not credited. f Lee : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 6. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. I45 when, on the afternoon of the 26th, General A. P. Hill, after crossmg the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge and driving away the small force"'^ in observation at Mechanicsville (thus onabhng the divisions of Longstreet and D. H. Hill to cross at Mechanicsville Bridge and join him), attempted to proceed in the movement down the north bank of the Chickahominy, the columns were brought to a halt by a part of the corps of Fitz-John Porter, which held an intrenched position on the left bank of Beaver Dam Creek, a small tributary of the Chick- ahominy. The position was a strong one, the left bank of the creek being high and almost perpendicular, and the approach being over oj^en fields, swept by artiller}^ fire and obstructed by abatis. This position Avas held by the brigades of Key- nolds and Seymour; but when the Confederates showed a determination to force the passage. General Porter called up the remainder of his corps, consisting of Meade's brigade and the division of Morell. The Mechanicsville road, on which the Confederate divisions, under General Longstreet, moved to make the passage of Beaver Dam Creek, turns when near the creek and runs nearlj' parallel to it, thus causing an ad- vancing force to present a flank. The Federal troops were concealed by earthworks commanding this road ; and, reserv- ing their fire until the head of the Confederate column was nearly across the ravine, they opened a terribly destructive volley in the face and on the flank of the advancing force : the survivors fled, and no additional attempt was made to force the passage that night ; but brisk firing was continued till nine o'clock. t The enemy lost between three and four thou- sand men, while the Union loss was quite inconsiderable. | * The force here consisted of a regiment and a battery. f Porter : Report of ^Mechanicsville. This statement is fully borne out by TiCe : " After sustaining a destructive fire of musketry and artillery, at short range, the troops," says he, " were withdrawn." Reports of the Army of North- ern Virginia, vol. i., p. 9. I I derive this statement of the heavy Confederate loss from General Loug- etreet himself It does not appear in the official reports, and is much larger than had hitherto been supposed 10 liQ CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. The attempt was renewed at da^vn of the following morning, with equally ill success; but while the Confederates were thus engaged, Jackson passed Beaver Dam Creek above and turned the position. By the night of the 26th of June, the intelligence which McClellan received from his outposts left no doubt of Jack- son's approach, and, divining now the true nature of Lee's move, he resolved to withdraw his right wing under Gen- eral Porter from its position at Beaver Dam, where it was too far from the main body and too much " in the air." The answer to the question, what should be done with the right wing, would determine the entire situation. The disclosure of Lee's bold initiative made action indis- pensable. Three courses were open to McClellan : 1. To effect a concentration of the whole army on the north side of the Chickahominy, and there deliver general battle ; 2. To effect a concentration on the south bank, and march directly for Eichmond ; 3. To transfer the right wing to the south bank, and make a change of base to the James Eiver. The first plan w^as not conformable to military principles ; for Lee already laid hold of McClellan's communications with White House, and the Confederate force on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy imperilled his line of retreat to the James River. To have given general battle on the north bank would, therefore, have been to risk his army without an assui-ed hne of retreat.* The second project, that of making a counter-move on Richmond, would have been correct and at the same time very bold and brilliant. Such an operation has several illustrious precedents, of which one of the best known and most striking is Turenne's counter to Monte- * This is something which even Napoleon was unwilling to do. Discuss- ing the lines of conduct open to him after crossing the Alps into Italy, he says : " Of these three courses, the first— to march upon Turin — was contrary to the true principles of war, as the French icould run the risk of fighting without having a certain retreat, Fort Bard not being then taken." Gour- gaud and Montholon : Memoirs of Napoleon, vol. i., p. 276. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 147 cuciili in 1675. Montecuculi, commanding the Imperial armj^, after a series of beautiful manoeuvres, began to cross the Khine at Strasburg for the purpose of faUing upon the French force ; but Turenne, nothing disconcerted, threw a bridge over the river three miles below Strasburg, and, transferring his whole army to German ground, compelled Montecuculi to make a hasty return. There is httle doubt that a direct march of the whole army on Eichmond on the morning of the 27th, would have had the effect to recall Lee to the defence of his own communications and the Confederate capital, which was defended by only twenty-five thousand men.* McClellan held the direct crossings of the Chicka- hominy on the south bank, while the Confederate bridges were destroyed, and Lee would have been compelled to make a detour of at least a day to rejoin the force in front of Eichmond. Why, therefore, did not General McClellan exe- cute this operation ? He answers this question by a reference fco the limited quantity of supplies on hand ; but this can- not be accepted as vaHd, for the army had at this time rations for many days, and large stores had eventually to be burnt previous to the retreat. The real reason is, that the ojDeration overleaped by its boldness the methodical genius of the Union commander. It resulted, therefore, that he adopted the alternative of a change of base to the James Eiver. In deciding upon this plan, which was judicious if not brilliant, and which was executed in a manner to reflect high credit on the army and its commander, the only sacrifice made by General McClellan — and indeed it was no inconsiderable one — was that he did on compulsion what he might have done before from * General Magruder, who had command of the Confederate forces on the right bank of the Chickahominy, says : " I considered the situation of our army as extremely critical and perilous. The larger part of it was on the opposite side of the Chickahominy, the bridges had been all destroyed, but one was rebuilt, and there were but twenty-five thousand men between his— McClellan's — army of one hundred thousand men and Richmond." Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 191. 148 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. choice — what, indeed, he appears to have intended to do, but what, halting as that general so often did in the perilous half-way-house between the offensive and the defensive, never ivas done ; thus turning awry the current of an enter- prise of great pith and moment and losing the name of action. In determining to withdraw Porter's corps to the south bank of the Chickahominy and effect with his imited army a change of base to the James Eiver, General McClellan took a preUminary step which, though seemingly dictated by the ne- cessities of his difficult situation, enabled the Confederates to inflict a heavy blow on that corps, and beclouded the com- mencement of the retrograde movement by a severe disaster to the Union arms. It appeared that an immediate withdrawal of the right wing over the Chickahominy after Jackson had turned its position on Beaver Dam Creek would expose the rear of the army, placed as between two fires,* and enable Jackson by moving direct on the lower bridges of the Chicka- hominy, and even on Malvern Hill, to interrupt the movement to the James River. He resolved, therefore, to engage Jack- son with Porter's corps, re-enforced by whatever troops might be available from the south bank of the Chickahominy, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains and heavy guns and to gain time for arrangements looking to the change of base to the James. It was indeed an unhappy plight in which the commander found himself placed,— condemned either to hazard the safety of his whole army, or doom a portion of it to almost assured destruction. For it Avas not, as he con- ceived, with Jackson alone that Porter would have to deal, but with more than two-thirds of the entire Confederate army, with Jackson, and Longstreet, and the two Hills : it was in fact twenty-seven thousand against sixty thousand, — an over- ^^'eight of opposition that lent to the task assigned to Porter almost the character of a forlorn hope. In execution of this design, the greater part of the heavy guns and wagons were removed from Beaver Dam to the * McCleUan : Report, p. 135. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 149 soutli bank of the Cliickaliomuiy during the night of the 26th ; and shortly before dayHght the delicate oj^eration of with- drawing the troops to the position where it was determined to make the new stand, was commenced and skilfully and suc- cessfully executed; for, though the Confederates followed closely, skirmishing, yet Porter was able to take up his new position before they appeared in force in his front. The rear was handsomely covered by Seymour's brigade and the horse batteries of Kobertson and Tidball. SKETCH OP THE FIELD OP GAINES' MILL. The position on the north bank of the Chickahominy taken up for resistance, was well chosen, on a range of heights be- tween Cold Harbor and the Chickahominy. The line of battle formed the arc of a circle, covering the approaches to the bridges which connected the right wing with the troops on the south side of the river. The left (Morell's division) rested on a wooded bluff, which rose abruptly from a deep ravine lead- ing down to the Chickahominy ; the right (Sykes' division of Regulars) posted in woods and clearings, extended to the rear 150 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. of Cold Harbor. The ground, generally oj^en in front, was bounded on the side of the Confederate approach hj a wood Avith dense and tangled undergrowth and traversed by a sluggish stream. McCall's division was formed in a second line.* This field was destined to a historic character ; for two years afterwards, General Grant, in his campaign fi-om the Rapidan to Eichmond, dehvered a bloody battle on the same ground. Yet between the circumstances of the two battles, there was one point of difference ; and it is a point of difference that epitomizes the whole progress of the war from 1862 to 1864. By the time Lee found himself on the defensive along the Chickahominy, a long experience had taught the enor- mous advantage of those rude breastworks of logs and earth, which the troops of both armies had acquired such a marvel- lous facihty in constructing. But in the earlier action the art of preparing defensive positions was yet in its infancy, and the ground on which Porter disposed his force — a position that in two hours' vigorous use of the axe and spade might have been rendered impregnable — remained guarded by httle more than the naked valor of the troops. The dispositions had hardly been made, when at two o'clock General A. P. Hill, who had the advance of Lee's column, swung round by New Cold Harbor, and advanced his division to the attack. Jackson, who was to form the left of the Confederate line, had not yet come up, and Longstreet was held back un- til Jackson's arrival on the left should compel an extension of the Federal line. Hill, accordingly, attacked alone ; but he gained no advantage, for after piercing the Ime at one point, he was repulsed and forced to yield ground, his troops being driven back in great disorder and with heavy loss.f To re- * Reynolds' brigade was posted on the extreme right to cover the approaches from Cold Harbor and Dispatch Station to Sumner's Bridge. I Even a stronger statement than that above made would be justified bj the Confederate official reports. Thus General Whiting says : " Men were leaving the field in every direction and in great disorder ; two regiments, one from South Carolina and one from Louisiana, were actually marching back from the fire. Men were skulking from the front in a shameful manner." Re- THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 151 lieve Hill, tlie Confederate commander now ordered Long- street, who held the right of the Confederate hne, to make a feint on the left of the Union position ; but Longstreet soon discovered that, owing to the strength of this point, the feint to be effective would have to be converted into a real attack.* While dispositions for this were in progress, Jackson's corps together with D. H. Hill's division arrived ; and when disposi- tions had been completed, a general advance from right to left was made at six o'clock. Previous to this, General Porter, i&nding liimseK hard pressed, had called for re-enforce- ments, and in response, General McClellan, at half-past three, sent him Slocum's division of Franklin's corps, which increased his force to thirty-five thousand men. It was evident, how- ever, that, beyond this. Porter could expect little or no aid, for the troops on the south bank of the Chickahominy had at the same time their attention fully engaged by the demonstrations of Magruder, who by energetic handhng of his troops, making a great show and movement and clatter, held the corps com- manders on the south side, to whom McClellan appealed for aid in behalf of Porter, so fully occupied that they declared they could with safety spare none.:}: And thus it happened that, while on the north side of the Chickahominy thirty thou- sand Union troops were being assailed by seventy thousand Confederates, twenty-five thousand Confederates on the south side held in check sixty thousand Union trooyjs ! When, therefore, Lee, with all his divisions in hand, made a general advance, it was with an overwhelming weight and ports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 154 General Lee explains this by the statement that " most of these men had never been under fire till the day before." (Ibid., p. 8.) This furnishes an additional proof that Lee had been re-enforced by troops from the coast. * " I found I must drive the enemy by direct assault, or abandon the idea of making the diversion. From the urgent nature of the message frojn the commanding general, I determined to change the feint into an attack." Report of Longstreet : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol i., p. 124. f Sumner proflFered two brigades, if General McClellan was willing he should intrust the defence of his position to his front line alone. 152 CAMPAIGNS OF TUE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. pressure. Tlie right" held its gi-ound with much stuLboru- ness, repulsing every attack. The left, too, fought stoutly, but was at length broken by a determined charge, led l)y Hood's Texan troops. This, however, would not have sufficed to entail any great disaster; and Porter was. withdrawing his infantry under cover of the fire of fifty guns, when the artil- lery on the height on the left was thrown into great confusion by a mass of cavalry rushing back from the front ; and the batteries, being without support, retired in haste, overrunning tlie infantry, and throwing the whole mass into most admired disorder. The explanation of this is as follows. The cavalry had been directed to keep below the hill, and under no cir- cumstances to appear on the crest, but to operate in the bot- tom land against the enemy's flank : nevertheless its com- mander, General Phihp St. George Cook, doubtless misin- formed, ordered it to charge between the infantry and artillery upon the enemy on the left, who had not yet emerged from the woods.t This charge, executed in the face of a withering- fire, resulted, of course, in the cavalry's being thrown back in confusion ; and the bewildered horses, regardless of the efforts of the riders, wheeled about, and dashing through the bat- teries, convinced the gunners that they were charged by the enemy. Jackson, following up, carried the height on the left by an impetuous rush of Longstreet's and Whiting's divisions, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery ; and the Union division under Morell, which held that wing, was driven back to the woods on the banks of the Chickahominy.| The right con- * The right wing was held by Sykes' division of Regulars and Griffin's bri- gade, and was subsequently re-enforced by Bartlett's brigade of Slocum'a division. f Porter : Report of Gaines' Mill. j^ Stonewall Jackson, in his official report of the battle of Gaines' Mill, gives the following spirited description of the decisive charge by Hood's and Law's brigades of Whiting's division, Avhicli resulted in carrying the fortified crest on the Union left : " Dashing on with unfaltering step in face of those murderous discharges of canister and musketry, General Hood and Colonel Law, at the head of their respective brigades, rushed to the charge with a yeU. M(jving down a precipitous ravine, leaping ditch and stream, clambering up a difficult THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 153 tinned to maintain its gTouncl against the attacks of Ewcll's and D. H. Hill's divisions ; but the key-point being carried, retreat was compulsory. This was attended with much con- fusion, and the stragglers were thronging to the bridge, when French's and Meagher's brigades, sent across from the south side of the river by General Sumner, appeared, and under cover of their firm line the shattered troops were finally rallied and reformed. Yet, if alone on that small re-enforcement had depended the safety of that terribly shattered wing, hope would have been slender indeed ; but the growing darkness, the disorder which Hues of battle necessarily suffer in charging over thickly wooded ground, and the severe punishment the Confederates had received, prevented Lee fi'om pushing his victory to the dreadful extremity to which that routed force, with a river at its back, was exposed. Thus, when friendly night — so often awaited with such passionate longing by wrecked armies and distraught commanders — shut down on the dark and bloody thickets of the Chickahominy, the worn and weary troops were silently drawn over to the south bank, and at six of the morning the rear-guard of Kegulars crossed and destroyed the bridge behind them. The losses numbered many thousands on each side, but no precise aggregate is known.* With the transfer of the right wing to the south side of the Chickahominy, the Army of the Potomac turned its back on the Confederate capital and all the high hopes the advance liad inspired. It was no longer a question of taking Eich- ascent, and exposed to an incessant and deadly fire from the intrencliments, these brave and determined men pressed forward, driving the enemy from hia well-selected and fortified position. In this charge — in which upwards of a thousand men fell, killed and wounded, and in which fourteen pieces of artil- lery and nearly a regiment were captured — the Fourth Texas, under the lead of General Hood, was the first to pierce the stronghold and seize the gims." — Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 133. * No estimates whatever are given either by General McClellan or General Porter. Jackson states his loss at three thousand two hundred and eighty - four ; and in the same proportion for the other corps, it would put the Confed- erate casucdtics at above ten thousand. 154 CA^IPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. mond, but of making good the retreat to the James, with a victorious enemy in the rear. McClellan had still, however, a certain advantage of his opponent : he had a determinate course of action resolved on during the night of the 27th, and already in process of execution ; while Lee remaine'd still in doubt as to his adversary's design. He saw that McClellan might still throw his united force to the north side of the Chickahominy and give battle to preserve his communications by the White House ; and he saw that, holding the lower bridges of the Chickahominy, he might retreat down the Peninsula over the same route by which Johnston retreated up tlie Peninsula. In either case, it was necessary to hold his entire force in hand on the north side of the river. Yet Mc- Clellan had adopted neither of these courses, but one different from either, and which his adversary had not divined. And thus it happened that when, on the day after the battle of the Chickahominy — Sunday, the 28th of June — Lee threw forward Ewell's division and Stuart's cavalry corps to seize the York River Railroad, he discovered he had been anticipated ; for the line of supplies by the York River Railroad had been already abandoned two da^'s before, the water-transi30i-tation had been ordered round to the James River, the vast supplies had been run across to the south side of the Chickahominy, and the enemy on his arrival found nothing save the burning piles in which the remnant of stores it had been impossible to carry off were being consumed. In fact, the army was rapidly in motion for the James River ; and so skiLfuUy Avas the retreat masked by the troops holding the Hne of works on the Rich- mond side of the Chickahominy, that Magruder and Huger, who had been charged with the duty of watching closely the movements of the Union force, were quite unaware of what was going on. " Late in the afternoon (of the 28th) the enemy's works." says General Lee, " were reported to be fuUy manned. The strength of these fortifications prevented Gen- erals Huger and Magruder from discovering what was passing in their front." It was night, in fact, before the movement was disclosed ; and next morning (29th), before Longstreet THE PENINSULAR CAJIPAIGN. 155 and Hill and Jackson could be sent across to the south side of the Chickahominy, and, with Huger and Magruder, put in pursuit, McClellan had gained twenty-four hours— hours of infinite price in the execution of his deUcate and difficult enterprise. The hue of retreat to the James passes across White Oak Swamp, and the difficulty of the passage for the retreatmg army with its enormous trains was, at least, partially compen- sated by the barrier it opposed to reconnoissances and flank attacks by the pursuing foe. Keyes' corps, which had been holding a position on the margin of TVHbite Oak Swamp, naturally took the advance, and, traversing this region, had by noon of the 28th seized strong positions on the opposite side to cover the passage of the troops and impediments. Then followed the long train of five thousand wagons, with a herd of twenty-five hundred beef-cattle, all of which had to traverse the morass by the one narrow defile. It was success- fully accomphshed, however, and, during the same night, Porter's corps headed towards the James. Meanwhile, to allow the trains to get well on their way, Sumner's corps and Heintzelman's corps and Smith's division of Frankhn's corps were ordered to remain on the Eichmond, side of the White Oak Swamp during the whole of the 29th and until dark, in a position covering the roads from Eichmond, and covering also Savage Station on the railroad. Upon learning definitely the withdrawal of the army, Lee, on the morning of the 29th, put his columns in motion in pur- suit. Magruder and Huger were ordered to follow up on the Williamsburg and Charles City roads, wdiile Longstreet and A. P. Hill were to cross the Chickahominy at New Bridge, and move by flank routes near the James, so as to intercept the retreat ; and Jackson, making the passage at Grape-vine Bridge, was to sweep down the south bank of the Chicka- hominy. Now, when Sumner, on the morning of the 29th, learnt that the enemy was recrossing the Chickahominy and advancing in the direction of Savage Station, he moved his corps fi'om 15G CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. the position it had held at Allen's farm to that place, uniting there with Smith's division of Franklin's corps. Heintzelman, who was positioned on the left of Sumner, had been ordered to hold the Williamsburg road ; but, when Sumner shifted his force on to Savage Station, Heintzelman fell back entirely and crossed White Oak Swamp. Thus, when Magruder pushed forward on the Williamsburg road, he found, in con- sequence of Heintzelman's withdrawal, no force to oppose ; and Sumner, who was not aware of Heintzelman's retirement, was surprised to find the enemy debouching on his front at Savage Station. Such were the circumstances that, on the afternoon of the 29th, brought on the action known as the battle of Savage Station, — an action that forms the second of the series of blows dealt by Lee on the retreating army in its arduous passage to the James. Magruder attacked in front with characteristic impetuosity, about four in the afternoon, momentarily expecting that Jackson, whose route led to the flank and rear of Savage Station, would arrive to decide the action. But Jackson was delayed nearly all day by the rebuilding of the bridge over the Chickahominy, and did not get up, and Sumner held his own with the stubbornness that marked that old brave ; so that Magruder, assailing his position in successive charges till dark, met only bloody repulses. Thus, stout Sumner stood at bay, while, thanks to the barrier he opposed, the mighty caravan of artillery and wagons and ambulances moved swiftl}^, silently through the melancholy woods and wilds, all day and all night, without challenge or encounter, on its winding way to the James. During the night, the rear- guard also withdrew across White Oak Swamp. ^'' By the morning of the 30th, the army, with all its belong- ings, had crossed White Oak Swamp, and debouched into the region looking out towards the James ; the artillery-parks * By orders from General McClellan, Sumner was under the sad necessitj' of leaving beliind at Savage Station the general hospital, containing twenty-five hundred sick and wounded men. TOE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 157 had gained Malvern Hill, and tlie van of the army had already reached the river, the sight of which was greeted with something of the joy with which the Ten Thousand, re- turning from the expedition immortalized by Xenophon, hailed the Sea, The Confederate pursuit was made in two columns. Jack- son, with five divisions, pressed on the heels of the retreat- ing army by way of White Oak Swamp ; while Longstreet, with a like force, making a detour by the roads skirtmg the James Eiver, hurried forward with the view to cut off the column from its march. But, so long as the two Confederate columns were thus placed, it is obvious that they were hope- lessly separated, and the retreating army had less to fear from their partial blows. Just as soon, however, as Jackson should emerge from White Oak Swamp, he would come in immediate communication with the force under Longstreet, and the Avliole of Lee's army would then be united. To pre- vent this junction, so as to make time for the ongoing of the menaced and jealously guarded trains, became now the prime object. And this necessity it was that gave rise to the next serious encounter, kno-uii as the battle of Glcndale or New- market cross-roads. By noon of the 30th, Jackson reached the White Oak Swamp ; but he found the bridge destroyed, and on attempt- ing to pass by the ordinary place of crossing, the head of his column was met by a severe artillery fire from batteries on the other side. He then essayed to force the passage ; but each attempt was met with such determined opposition* that, obstructed and estopped, he was compelled to give over. Meantime, the column of Longstreet, whose line of march flanked the swamp and gave free motion, were pushing rap- idly forward on the Long Bridge or New Market road, which runs at right angles to the Quaker road, on which the army and its trains were hurrying towards the James. At the very * Tlie crossing was teld by General Franklin, Avitli the divisions of Smith and Richardson and Naglee's brigade. Captain Ayres directed the artillery. 158 CAjMPAIGNS of the army of the POTOMAC. time Jackson was arrested at White Oak Sv*'amp, Long- street had arrived within a mile of the point of intersection of these two roads. Should he be able to seize it, the army would be cut in twain. But Longstreet found this important point already covered, and if gained it would be at the price of a battle. The force at the point of contact was McCall's division of Pennsylvania Eeserves, formed at right angles across the New Market road, in front of, and parallel to, the Quaker road.* Sumner was at some distance to the left, and somewhat retired ; Hooker was on Sumner's left, and some- what advanced ; Kearney was to the right of McCall. The brunt of the attack, however, fell upon McCall's division. In the Confederate line the division of Longstreet held the right, and that of A. P. Hill the left. Longstreet opened the attack at about three o'clock, by a threatening movement on McCall's left, which was met by a change of front on that flank, in which position a severe fight was maintained for two hours, the Confederates making ineffectual attempts to force the po- sition. At the same time the batteries on the centre and right became the aim of determined assaults, which were repeatedly repulsed ; till finally Randall's battery was captured by a fierce charge made by two regimentsf advancing in wedge shape, without order, but with trailed arms. Rushing up to the muzzles of the guns, they pistoled or bayoneted the cannoniers. The greater part of the supporting regiment fled ; but those who remained made a savage hand to hand and bayonet fight over the guns,! which were finally yielded * McCall's disposition was as follows : Meade's brigade on the right, Sey- mour's on the left, and Simmons' (Reynolds') in reserve. Randall's (Regular) battery in front of the line on the right, Cooper's and Kern's opposite the cen- tre, and Dietrich's and Kennerheim's (twenty-pounder Parrotts) on the left. f These regiments were the Fifty-fifth and Sixtieth Virginia. J "The Sixtieth Virginia crossed bayonets with the enemy, who obstinately contested the possession of these guns." Report of General A. P. Hill : Rejwrts of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 177. General McCall is more magniloquent in his account : " Bayonets were crossed and locked in the struggle ; bayonet wounds were freely given and received. I saw skulls crushed by the heavy blow of the butt of the musket ; and in THE pexenSular campaign. 159 to the enemy. Meantime, a renewed attempt on the left shat- tered and doubled up that flank, held by Seymour's bri^^ade ; and the enemy following up, drove the routed troops between Sumner and Hooker, till, penetrating too far, he was caught himself on the flank by Hooker's fire, and, driven across Sum- ner's front, was thrown against McCall's centre, which, with the right, had remained comparatively firm. An advance by Kearney and Hooker now regained a portion of the lost ground, and repulsed aU further attacks. Darkness coming on, ended the action. While these events were passing at Glendale, Jackson, de- tained by the vigorous opposition he met on the other side of White Oak Swamp, could only hear the tell-tale guns: he was impotent to help.* Thus it was that McClellan, holding paralyzed, as it were, the powerful corps of Jackson with his right hand, with his left was free to deal blows at the force menacing his flanks. The action at Glendale insured the in- tegrity of the army, imperilled till that hour. During the night the troops that had checked Jackson and repulsed Longstreet silently withdrew, and when Lee was next able to strike it was at a united army, strongly posted on the heights of Malvern, with assured communication with its new base on the James. On the following morning (July 1st) Lee had his whole force concentrated at the battle-field of New Market cross- roads : but he could not fail even then to reahze that, though the pursuit might be continued, it was under circumstances that made the hope of any decided success now very distant. short, the desperate thrusts and parries of a life and death encounter, proving indeed that Greek had met Greek when the Alabama hoys fell upon the sons of Pennsylvania." McCall's Report: Pennsylvania Reserves in the Peninsula, pamphlet, p. 5. * " A heavy cannonading in front annoivnced the engagement of General Longstreet at Frazier's farm, and made me eager to press forward , but the marshy character of the soil, the destruction of the bridge over the marsh and creek, and the strong position of the enemy for defending the passage, pre- vented my advancing till the following morning." Jackson's Report : Reports of the Axmy of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 134. IGO CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Still it remained to try the issue of a general battle between the two united armies. The Confederate columns were ac- cordingly put in motion on the morning of the 1st of July, Jackson's corps leading. A march of a few miles brought the I)ursuers again in contact with the army, which was found occupying a commanding ridge, extending obliquely across SKETCH OP MALVERN HILL. the line of march, in advance of Malvern Hill. In front of this strong position the ground was open, varying in width from a quarter to half a mile, sloping gradually from the crest, and giving a free field of fire. The approaches were over a broken and thickly wooded country, traversed nearly throughout its whole extent by a swamp passable at but few places, and difficult at those.* On this admirable position General McClellan had concentrated his army, prepared to receive final battle. Lee's Ilt'port : Picports of the Army of Nortlicru Virginia, vol. i., p. 13. THE PENIKSUL.\R Cx\MPAIGN. 161 The left and centre were posted on Malvern Hill, an ele- vated plateau about a mile and a lialf by three-fourths of a mile in area ; the right was " refused," curving backward through a wooded region towards a point below Haxall's Landing, on James liiver. Judging from the obvious lines of attack that the main effort would be made against his left. General Mc- Clellan posted on Malvern Hill heavy masses of infantry and artillery. Porter's corps held the left, and the artillery of his two divisions, with the artillery reserve, gave a concentrated fire of sixty guns. Couch's division was placed on the right of Porter ; next came Kearney and Hooker ; next, Sedgwick and Piichardson ; next. Smith and Slocum ; then the remainder of Keyes' corps, extending by a backward curve nearly to the river. While the left was massed, the right was more de- ployed, its front covered by slashings. The gunboats in the James Eiver protected the left flank.* Lee formed his line with Jackson's divisionsf on the left, and those under Magruder and Huger on the right. A. P. Hill and Longstreet were held in reserve to the left, and took no part in the engagement. 'j: Owing to ignorance of the * McClellan's Report, p. 138. f Divisions of Jackson, Ewell, Wliiting, and D. II. Ilill. :j: General McClellan, mistaking the movements of these two divisions, fell into an erroneous apprehension regarding the part they played in the battle. In his Report (p. 139) he says : "About two o'clock a column of the enemy was observed moving towards our right. Arrangements were at once made to meet the anticipated attack in that quarter ; but though the column was long, occupying two hours in passing, it disappeared, and was not again heard of. The preaumptim is that it retired by the rear, and participated in the attad: ofterwiirds made on our left." This was the column of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, getting into its position in reserve on the Confederate left ; but, as above stated, it took no part in the action. During the battle, the observed move mcnt of this column gave McClellan great concern for his right, as he ccn- ceived it was making a detour with the view to fall upon that Hank ; and this caused him to remain on his right. " My apprehensions," he says, " v.'tre for the extreme right. I felt no concern for the left and centre." — Rej oi-t on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 437. Such troublesome errors are i.ie necessary result of the nature of such a theatre of wht as that on wliica the two armies were operating, 162 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AR.MY OF THE POTOMAC. country on the part of the Confederates, and tlie difficulty of tlie ground, tlie line was not formed until late in the after- noon, though a brisk artillery duel was kept up, and about three o'clock a single brigade (Anderson's, of D. H. Hill's division) attacked Couch's front and was repulsed.* As McClellan expected, Lee's purpose was to force the plateau of Malvern on the left. With this view he had massed Jack- son's force and the troops under Huger and Magruder well on his right, being resolved to carry the heights by storm. Previously to the attack, the Confederate commander issued an order stating that positions were selected from which his artillery could silence that of his opponent, and as soon as that was done, Armistead's brigade of Huger's division would advance with a shout and carry the battery immediately in his front. This shout was to be the signal for a general ad- vance, and all the troops were then to rush forward with fixed bayonets. Now towards six o'clock, General D. H. Hill, commanding one of Jackson's divisions, heard what he took to be the signal. " While conversing with my brigade com- manders," says he, " shouting was heard on our right, followed by the roar of musketry. We all agreed this was the signal determined upon, and I ordered my division to advance. This, as near as I could judge, was about an hour and a half before sundown. "t But whether the others did not hear what Hill heard, or whether what they heard was not taken for the signal, no advance by them was made ; so that when Hill went forward, it was alone. Neither Whiting on the left, nor Magruder or Huger on the right, moved forward an inch. Hill's 23oint of attack was directly against the crest of Malvern, bristling with cannon. " Tier after tier of batteries," says he, " were grimly visible on the plateau, rising in the form of an amphitheatre." In such cases, where cannoneers stand to * This repulse was determined by the excellent practice of Kingsbury's battery, together with the steady fire of the Tenth Massachusetts and a charge of the Thirty -sixth New York — the latter regiment capturing the colors of the Fourteenth North Carolina in a hand-to-hand conflict. f Keports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. 1., p. 186. THE PENINSULAK CAMPAIGN. 163 tHeir guns, and faithful hands grasp tlie rifle, it is easy to predict the result. Every assault met a bloody repulse. The promised artillery aid was not rendered : the few batteries used were beaten in detail.* Afterwards, Magruder and Huger attacked, but it was without order or ensemble, a bri- gade, or even a regiment, being thrown forward at a time. Each, in succession, met a Hke reception from the steady lines of infantry and the concentrated fire from the artillery re- serve, under its able commander, Colonel Hunt. The attacks fell mainly on Porter on the left, and on Couch ; and the suc- cess of the day was in a large degree due to the skill and coolness of the latter, who, as holding the hottest part of the Union line, was gradually re-enforced by the brigades of Caldwell, Sickles, Meagher, and several of Porter's, till he came to command the whole left centre, displaying in his conduct of the battle a high order of generalship. Night closed on the combatants still fighting, the oppos- ing forces being distinguishable only by the lurid lines of fire. Thus till near nine o'clock, when the fire, slackening gradually, died out altogether, and only an occasional shot from the batteries broke the silence that pervaded the bloody field. The repulse of the Confederates was most complete, and en- tailed a loss of five thousand men, while the Union loss was not above one-third that number. Lee never before nor since that action delivered a battle so ill-judged in conception, or so faulty in its details of execution. It was as bad as the worst blunders ever committed on the Union side ; but he profited by the experiment, and never repeated it. * " Instead of ordering up one or two hundred pieces of artillery to play an the Yankees, a single battery was ordered up and knocked to pieces in a few minutes ; one or two others shared the same fate of being beaten in detail. The firing from our batteries was of the most farcical character." — Report of General D. H. Hill : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i.. p. 186. General Lee says : " The obstacles presented by the woods and swamps made it impracticable to bring up a sufficient amount of artillery to oppose successfully the extraordinary force of that arm employed by the enemy."— Ibid., p. 12 See also report of General Pendleton, Chief of Artillery, Ibid., p. 227. 164 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Victorious tliougli the Army of the Potomac was on the field of Malvern, the position was not one that could be held ; for the army was under the imperious necessity of reaching its supplies. During the night, accordingly, the troops were withdrawn to Harrison's Bar, on the James. Colonel Ayerill, with a regiment of cavalry, a brigade of regular infantry, and a battery, covered the rear. Lee threw forward Stuart (who with his troopers had been absent during the whole pursuit on an expedition to White House and the lower fords of the Chickahominy, and only rejoined the army after the battle of Malvern), and followed up with columns of infantry ; but finding that McClellan had taken up a strong position, he retired on the 8th of July, and took his army back to Eich- mond. Thus ended the memorable peninsular campaign, which, in the bi-ief interval of three months, had seen the Army of the Potomac force its way through siege and battle to within sight of the spires of Kichmond, only to reel back in the deadly clinch of a seven days' combat to the James River. Viewed with reference to its aim — the capture of Rich- mond — the campaign was a failure, as were so many subse- quent campaigns having the same object in view. The judgments of men, accordingly, have turned rather on the result than on the causes that produced it. The theory of the campaign, primarily offensive, fi'om necessity changed into the defensive. The theory of the Confederates, primarily defensive, was skilfully converted into the offensive. Thus the prestige remained with the Confederates ; and the faults of Lee's offensive receive as little attention as the merits of McClellan's defensive. For, in an unsuccessful campaign, the slightest faidt is accounted mortal. Men regard only the ill that has happened, and not the worse that might have hap- pened had it not been prevented. In a fortunate issue, how- ever, the eyes of the public, dazzled by the ghtter of a briUiant achievement, are bhnd both to the faults of what has been gained and to the failure to gain much besides. Lee THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. Ig5 himself, conscious of tlie skilful manner in Vvliicli his antago- nist parried his blows, attempts to explain the failure to achieve a more decisive result by the enumeration of obstruc- tions which, as they beset McClellan himself, can hardly be considered a valid explanation. " Under ordinary cir- cumstances," says he, "the Federal army should have been destroyed. Its escape was due to the causes abeady stated. Prominent among these is the want of correct and timel}^ information. This fact, attributable chiefly to the character of the country, enabled General McClellan skilfully to conceal his retreat, and to add much to the obstructions with which nature had beset our pursuing columns." "' The losses of the campaign were, on the Union side, 15,249 ; on the Confederate side, above 19,000. The blows dealt by each were not less severe than the blows received by each. In a military sense, Eichmond's danger was really greater when, after its retreat, the Ai-my of the Potomac based itseK on the James, than when it stood astride the Chickahominy. Yet, so potent is the sway that general re- sults have over the imaginations of men, that, while the raising of the siege was the occasion to Jefferson Davis for a pro- clamation of thanksgiving, and thrilled the whole South with joy, the North was stunned with grief and despair at the thought that the army that was the brave pillar of its hopes was thus struck down. It is true these moral results count for much in war, and the historian must not fail duly to note and weigh them. Yet if, anticipating the spirit of a historical judgment, wo essay to estimate the events of the war by their intrinsic value, w^e shall not fail to see something meritorious, as well as something blameworthy, in this unsuccessful campaign. For the commander to have extricated his army from a diffi- cidt situation, in which circumstances quite as much as his own fault had placed it, and, in presence of a powerful, skilful, and determined adversary, transfer it safely to a jiosition * Lee : Reiwrts of tlie Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 14. 166 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC wlience it could act with effect, was of itself a notable acliieve- ment. For the army to have fought through such a campaign was creditable, and its close found inexperienced troops trans- formed into veteran soldiers. And, if alone from the appeal which great sufferings and great sacrifices always make to a generous people, the story of that eventful march and arduous retreat, when, weary and hungry and foot-sore, the army marched by night and fought by day through a whole week of toil, and never gave up, but made a good fight and reached the goal, cannot fail to live in grateful remembrance. POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 167 V. POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. August, 1863. I. REMOVAL OF THE ARMY FROM THE PENINSULA. It will have appeared from tlie exposition of tlie motives that prompted the change of base, that, in transferring the Army of the Potomac to the James Eiver, the fundamental idea of its commander was to secure a line of operations whereby, with a refreshed and re-enforced army, a new cam- paign, under more promising auspices, might be undertaken. The position of the army, at once threatening the communi- cations of Eichmond and enabhng it to spring on the rear of the Confederate force should it attempt an aggressive move- ment northward, seemed the most advantageous possible, whether for offensive operations or for insuring the safety of the national capital. General McClellan brought back to Harrison's Landing between eighty-five thousand and ninety thousand men ; and his view was, that all the resources at the command of the Government should be at once for- warded to him. Having the James Kiver now open as a line of suppKes, he had formed the bold design of transferring the Army of the Potomac to the south bank of that river, and operating against the communications of Richmond by way of Petersburg.* * That this was General McClellan's purpose is vouched for by no less an authority than General Ilalleck, who, in a memorandum of a visit to the head- quarters of the Army of the Potomac, at Harrison's Landing, on the 25th of 168 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Tliere appears to liave been at first an intention on the j)art of tlie Administration to adopt this judicious course ; but a train of events, partly the work of man and partly the effect of circumstances, presently arose, that not only fi-ustrated this design, but wrenched the army wholly from the Peninsula, and transferred the theatre of o^^erations to the front of Washington and then to the soil of the loyal States. What these events were I shall now set forth. Just before the commencement of Lee's offensive operations, the military councils at Washington, taught a lesson by the events of Jackson's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, had gathered together the disjointed fag-ends of armies in Northern Virginia under McDowell and Banks and Fremont, and had consolidated them into the "Ai-my of Virginia," which was intrusted to the command of Major-General John Pope.* That officer brought with him fi'om the West, where he had held command under General Halleck, the reputation for a species of aggressive energy that was supposed to characterize the Western style of warfare, in contradistinction to the me- thodical campaigning of the East,t and he signalized his advent July, 1862, says; " I stated to Mm [McClellan] that the object of my visit was to ascertain from him liis views and wishes in regard to future operations. He said that he proposed to cross the James River at that point [Harrison's Land- ing. General Grant, two years afterwards, crossed a few miles bciow], attack Petersburg, and cut off the enemy's communications by that route South, mak- ing no further demonstration, for the present, against Richmond. I stated to Mm very franJdy my views in regard to the danger and impracticability of the plan," etc. (Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1., p. 454.) It would ap- pear that General Grant had less respect for General Halleck's views of " the danger and impracticability of the plan," seeing that two years afterwards he adopted that precise plan, and took Richmond and destroyed Lee by it ! Nor can it be said that circumstances, so far as regards the defence of Washington, differed in the one case from those in the other — excepting that they were such as to warrant the adoption of the plan by General McClellan much more than by General Grant — for in 1862 there were ten men left behind for the defence of Washington to one in 1864. * The appointment of General Pope to the command of the " Army of Vir- ginia" bears date the 2Gth of June, the day before the battle of Gaines' Mill. f This supposed distinction between the Western and Eastern mode of mak- ing war is thus expressed in Pope's address to his army : " I have come to you POPE'S CAJIPAIGN IN NORTHEKN VIRGINIA. UQ to command by the promulgation of a pseudo-Napoleonic pro- clamation, in wliicli he expressed his contempt for " certain phrases he found much in vogue, such as bases of suppHes, and lines of retreat," — phrases which he enjoined his army to discard as unworthy of soldiers destined to follow the leader- ship of one who had never seen any thing but the " backs of his enemies." Underneath all its bombastic nonsense, Pope's proclamation contained one grain of sense, which Avas the rebuke it gave the ignorant use of mihtary terms common at the North ; and though there was an execrable want of taste in the pointed satire directed at McClellan's methodical tac- tics, there is no doubt that the declaration of a more vigorous war-policy quite met the views of the mass of the people. In assigning Pope to the command of the "Army of Virginia," although his first duty was to cover Washington, yet his ultimate object and avowed purpose was to take Rich- mond by an overland advance ; and he had charmed the ears of the members of the Committee on the Conduct of the War by his facile expositions of the manner in which he meant to " he off on the flanks of the rebels," and even — had he only such an army as McClellan's — march straight to New Orleans I'^' Before General Pope could set out in the execution of this de- sign, however, there occurred the series of events culminating in the retreat of the Army of the Potomac. No sooner had this taken place, than the powerfxil faction opposed to McCleUan and his plan of campaign, united in bringing to bear on the President a weighty "pressure" for the removal of the Army of the Potomac from the Pen- from the West, where we have always seen the backs of the enemies — from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary, and to beat him when found; whose policy has been attack and not defence. I presume I have been called here to pursue the same system." " " Question. Suppose that you had the army that was here on the 1st day of March last, do you suppose you would find any obstacle to prevent your inarching from here to New Orleans ? " Pope. I should suppose not." Report on the Conduct of the \Yar, vol. 1.. p. 282. 170 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. iusiila. Among tlie strongest in urging this measure was General Pope, wlio, as soon as the intelligence of McClellan's retreat to the James Eiver was received, began to play upon the fears of the Administration touching the safety of Wash- ington. To the President he expressed the opinion that Mc- Clellan's supphes would certainly be cut off;* pointed out that co-operation between the Army of Yirginia and the Army of the Potomac, in their then situations, was next to impossible ; and strongly urged the recall of McClellan's force to the front of Washington. t It happened, too, that at this crisis those who were urging these views received a powerful re-enforcement in the per- son of General Halleck, who had about this time been re- called from his Western field of operations and placed in supreme command of all the armies in the field by his ap- pointment to the office of genera 1-in-chief, — an ofiice which, to the incalculable obstruction of the conduct of the war and the intolerable annoyance of every general commanding the Ai'my of the Potomac, he continued to hold until pushed from his stool by the elevation, two years afterwards, of General Grant to the lieutenant-generalship. General Halleck added his strident voice in favor of the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula, although, owing to a sincere anxiety now cherished by Mr. Lincoln that Gen- eral McClellan should be allowed his " own way," he was not at first able to make the order imperative. The President, in response to General McClellan's appeals for re-enforcements to enable him to renew operations against Eichmond, had promised him an addition to his strength of twenty thousand men, to be drawn from Burnside's command in North Caro- lina and Hunter's command in South Carohna. With this re-enforcement, McClellan expressed his readiness to renew operations, and he had proceeded to make a reconnoissance in force with the divisions of Hooker and Sedgwick, who ad- * Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 279. f Ibid., p. 279. POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. I7I vanced and reoccupied Malvern, when he was met by a tele- gram from the new general-in-chief, dated August 3d, ordering him to withdraw the entire army from the Peninsula to Aquia Creek, there to make a junction with Pope. After an urgent appeal from this order, General McClellan proceeded to carry out his instructions. The judgment of the act that removed the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula must turn on the one fact, whether or not it was really designed to re-enforce that army. If it was not designed to re-enforce it to an effective that would enable it to immediately recommence active operations, then undoubtedly the wisest course was to withdraw it fi'om the Peninsula ; for a concentration of the divided forces was so prime a necessity, that if a junction of the two armies was not to be allowed on the James, a junction in front of Washington was preferable to their continued isolation, — a situation in which neither could operate with much effect.* If, however, there had been on the part of the Administra- tion any intention of giving effect to the views of General McClellan, by furnishing such accessions to his strength as would permit his moving upon Kichmond, the army should assuredly have remained on the line of the James. Now, it is a curious circumstance, that at this time there was another person full as anxious as General Halleck to have the Army of the Potomac leave the Peninsula. That person was General Lee. And if there be any force in that military maxim, which admonishes " never to do what the * There is another consideration that prompted certain oflBcers of the army to urge the removal of the army from the Peninsula, if it Vas not to be re-en- forced ; and that is the unhealthy situation in which the army would find itself lying in inaction amid the swamps of the James during the hot months of August and September. This was the reason why several of the officers of the Army of the Potomac— among them Generals Franklin and Newton — ex- pressed to President Lincoln, during a visit he made to McClellan's camp in July, 1863, an opinion in favor of withdrawing the army from the Penin- aula. I make this statement on the authority of the officers named. If re- enforcements were to be expected, they were altogether in favor of remaining. 172 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. eiiemy wants 3'ou to do," tliis notable coincidence should raise grave suspicions touching the wisdom of a measure in which the opposing chiefs Avere in such entire harmony. To dislodge the army from its threatenijig position on the James, Lee determined to menace its communications ; and with tliis view he moved a force to the south bank of the James, seized a position immediately opposite Harrison's Landing, placed forty-three guns in position, and on the 31st of July opened fire on the shipping." This did httle damage, however, and on the following morning General McClellan threw a force across the river, seized the position — Coggin's Point — fortified it, and was never troubled more. But little did the Confederate commander dream, when he was thus laboring to cause McClellan to withdraw, that the general-in- chief of the United States army was co-operatmg to the same end. Moreover, it happened that, while General Halleck vras willing to remove the army from the Peninsula before Lee made any effort with the same view, a certain measure taken by the Confederate commander with an entirel}' different aim, greatly expedited the withdrawal. For the just appre- ciation of this it will be necessary to glance a moment at General Pope's contemporaneous operations in Northern Yh- ginia. Upon assuming cotumand of the Army of Virginia, General Pope, whose military conduct was considerably sounder than his mihtary principles, had concentrated his scattered com- mands into one body in front of Washington, and thrown it forward along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Rail- road, in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottesville. His force numbered near fifty thousand men. As the seizure of the points named would taj) the Confederate communica- * General Lee's own evidence leaves no doubt regarding the object of this operation : " In order to keep McClellan stationary, or, if -posdhle, to cause him to tdthdraw, General D. H. Hill, commanding south of James River, was directed to threaten his communications by seizing favorable positions below Westover, from which to attack the transports in the river." Lee's Report : Reports of the Operations of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 15. POPE'S CAJIPATGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. I73 tions with Southwestern Yirgiiiia, Lee, to meet Pope's ad- vance, sent forward General Jackson, with his own and Ewell's divisions, towards Gordonsville. Jackson reached that pkxce on the 19th of July ; but from what he learned of Pope's strength he feared to risk offensive operations and called for re-enforcements.- Lee then increased his force by General A. P. Hill's division, which joined Jackson on the 2d of August. At that time Pope's army was along the turnpike from Culi^ej^per to Sj)erryville, near the Blue Piidge — his left at Culpepper ; while with the cavalry brigades of Buford and Bayard he observed the line of the Piapidan. The 7th and 8th of August, Jackson crossed the Eapidan, and moved towards Culpepper. Pope met this by throwing forward Banks' corps to a position eight miles south of Cul- pepper, near Cedar Mountain, where a severe action ensued on the 9th between Banks' corps and the three divisions under Jackson. Banks, with much spirit, assumed the offensive, although doubly outnumbered, and attacked Jackson's right, under General Ewell. He then fell with much impetuosity upon his left, turned that flank, and poured a destructive fire into his rear, which caused the Confederate centre and nearly the whole line to give way in confusion. The assailants were, however, considerably broken in moving through the woods ; and Jackson, receiving an accession of fresh troops, was able to check Banks, and finally force him back. The latter re- tired a short distance, but again took up position : so that when Jackson, under the imjjression of having gained a vic- tory, attempted to follow up with the view of making Culpep- per, he found himself checked. He remained in front of Banks until the night of the 11th, and then being apprehen- sive of being again attacked, he retreated to Gordonsville. The Confederate loss was aljout thirteen hundred ; the Union loss about eighteen hundred.f * Jackson's Report : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 3. t It is proper to add here that the above too brief statement of Banks' at- tack of Jackson is based on the official report of Jackson himself, and is there- fore not likely to be over-colored. " Whilst the Federal attack upon Early was 174 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. The encounter between Jackson and Banks raised in tlie mind of General Halleck tlie liveliest apprehensions touching the safety of Washington, and he sent General McClellan urgent orders to hasten the removal of his army. The sick, to the number of ten thousand, had already been shipped ; then, followed Burnside's corps (eleven thousand strong), which had been brought from North Carolina for the purpose of re-enforcing the Army of the Potomac, but was not allowed to debark, and was sent forward to Aquia Creek and thence to Fredericksburg. McClellan then put his whole army in motion, marched back from Harrison's Landing to Fortress Monroe, and thence, by successive shipments, forwarded it to Aquia Creek and Alexandria. Not till this movement had been fully disclosed did General Lee form the resolve of striking northward. The column de- tached under Jackson to operate against Pope was no larger than that he had had in his previous campaign, and was infe- rior in numbers to Pope's force ; and the menacing position held by General McClellan while at Harrison's Landing had retarded Lee from sending any additional troops to Jackson.'^ But now that he was being relieved from the pressure of Mc- Clellan's presence, there was nothing to prevent his moving in progress," says Jackson, " the main body of the Federal infantry moved down from the woods, through the corn and wheat fields, and fell with great vigor upon our extreme left ; and by the force of superior numbers, bearing down all opposition, turned it and poured a destructive fire into its rear. Campbell's brigade fell back in disorder. The enemy pushing forward, and the left flank of A. G. Taliaferro's brigade being by these movements exposed to a flank fire, feU back, as did also the left of Early's line. General W. B. Taliaferro's division (Jackson's old division) becoming exposed, they were with- drawn." — Jackson's Report of Cedar Moimtain : Reports of the A^-rny of North ern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 5. These are the words in which a general is apt to describe a serious defeat, and they justify a higher estimate of General Banks' conduct than his countrymen have yet accorded him. * On this point General Lee says : "Jackson, on reaching Gordonsville, ascer- tained that the force under General Pope was superior to his own, but the un- certainty that then surrounded the designs of General McClellan, rendered it inexpedient to re-enforce him from the army at Richmond." — Lee: Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 15. POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 175 forward his entire army to destroy Pope, and lie instantly took measnrcs accordingly.^" Tims it was that at the very moment McClellan was turning an unwilling back on Eicli- mond and leaving the course open to his mighty rival, Lee was putting his columns in motion towards the Potomac. I shall accordingly leave for a while the army undergoing the laborious process of transfer by water, and trace that fierce outburst of battle that swept from the Blue Eidge to the fore- ground of Washington. II. POPE'S RETROGRADE MOVEMENT. After the action of Cedar Mountain, Jackson retired to Gordonsville, fearing an attack fi'om Pope's superior force.f The 15th of August he was joined at that i^lace by the van of Lee's army, composed of Longstreet's division, two brigades under Hood, and Stuart's cavalry. Pope advanced his line, resting his left (Eeno's corps of Burnside's army) on the Eapidan near Eaccoon Ford ; his centre (McDowell's corps) on Cedar Mountain, and his right (Sigel's corps) on Eobertson's Eiver, a branch of the Eapidan. Banks w^as posted at Culpepper. On the arrival of Longstreet, Jackson advanced from Gor- donsville to the Eapidan, waited till the 20th of August for Longstreet to come up, when they crossed at Eaccoon and Somerville fords. * Nothing could be clearer than the evidence of General Lee on this point : " The corps of General Burnside," says he, " had reached Fredericksburg, and a part of General McClellan's army was believed to have left Westover [Harri- son's Landing] to unite with Pope. It therefore seemed that active operations on the James were no longer contemplated, and that the most effectual way to relieve Pdclimond from any danger of attach from that quarter would be to re- enforce General Jackson, and advance upon General Pope." — Lee : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 18. Veracious prophecy, showing that insight which is one of the highest marks of generalship ! \ Jackson's Report : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 7. 176 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Learning the approach of this force, Pope on the 18th and 19th drew liis army back behind the Rappahannock, his left at Kelly's Ford, and his right three miles above Eappa- hannock Station. This was a judicious measure on the part of General Poj)e ; but it was not carrying out his own prin- ciples. In expounding before the war committee, a month before this time, what he proposed doing, he held the follow- ing language : " By lying off on their flanks, if they should have only forty thousand or fifty thousand men, I could whip them. If they should have seventy thousand or eighty thousand men, I would attack their flanks, and force them, in order to get rid of me, to follow me out into the moun- tains, which would be what you would want, I should suppose. They would not march on Washington, with me lying with such a force as that on their flanks."* Now, though the force which Lee had at this time did not exceed the smallest of these hypothetical numbers, and the force with which Pope proposed this operation had been increased by the addition of Eeno's command, he did not attempt to carry it out, finding Lee, perhaps, less impressed than he should have been with the apparition of Pope " lying off on his flanks." Pope having withdrawn behind the Rappahannock, Lee ad- vanced his army to that stream, but finding that the Union commander covered the fords in force, he left Longstreet opposite these, to mask a turning movement by Jackson on Pope's right, by way of "Warrenton.t Jackson accordingly ascended the Rappahannock by the south bank, and crossed the head of his column (Early's brigade) at Sulphur or Warrenton Springs on the 22d August. But that day a severe storm rendered the river impassable, and Early was compelled to recross the Rappahannock, which he did the following night on an improvised bridge. While these manoeuvres were under way, Stuart with fifteen hundred horsemen, made an expedition to cut the railroad communica- * Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 278. }• Lee's Report : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, voL i., p. 19. :%' FAIRFAX C.H ^t a . '-' : ^'^ < C ; '; i^"-. <>"\rr,i4f \ /■.yiqrnfdf/ /or //istor-r o/'Ar>mi- a/" Ptittjiiuit- ^ Sra//' f>/' Miic.v i;,^ wik.rkt» ir s) i'^jRREM^H l«iian: 1^1.. ^xfloin** trrnaraoH'it „„r*^K4' f WASHlNGTOt ^iiSpej-ri^iJJe />' <%>(■ 'i/-$fe''/'^*^'T'"^' V/^,,,.^^ cijLPEPPER~C.I (b/vfiLVTav^ tSusretisbur^ _ . ^-i V "^ Hc/ere/uva- . • - = ■ /fotili'.t ol' Mriri-/i ifMmgy bin ^~ (lu/hlenitf Tt^>o/>.s- — — — " /liiufe.v of Mrirr/i , (hiiinii/ii Uiun/,Y NCE C.H. POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. I77 tions in rear of Pope's army. Stuart succeeded in reaclilnpf Catlett's Station in the dead of an exceedingly dark night, fired the camp and captured three hundred prisoners, with Pope's official j^apers and his baggage. He failed, however, to burn the railroad-bridge, and does not seem to have been aware that Pope's entire army train was parked there.* III. JACKSON^S FLANK MARCH. The movement of Jackson up the south bank of the Kappa- hannock to turn Pope's right was met by a corresponding- movement of Pope up the Rappahannock on the north bank, so that on the 24th, Sigel and Banks and Reno occupied Sul- phur Springs, and Jackson's main body lay on the opposite side of the stream ; but on the 25th, Jackson, striking out still further to his left by Amissville, crossed the upper Rappahannock — here called the Hedgeman River — at Hen- son's Mill, turned Pope's right, and moving by Orleans, bivouacked at Salem, after a forced march of thirty-five miles. Next day (26th) Jackson continued the advance. Diverging eastward at Salem, he crossed the Bull Run Mountain through Thoroughfare Gaj), and passing Gainesville, he, at sunset, reached Bristoe Station on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. This he proceeded to destroy, while he at the same time dispatched Stuart with his cavalry and a force of infantry to Manassas Junction, seven miles nearer Washing- ton. Here Stuart took several hundred prisoners, eight guns, and immense supplies of commissary and quarter- master's stores. Jackson's instructions from his chief had * This enterprise to the rear of his army must have given Pope an occa- sion to realize the truth of his own maxim, that " disaster and shame lurk in tlie rear." 12 178 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. been to " throw his command betAveen Washington Citj and the army of General Pope and to break up his raikoad com- munications with the Federal capital." * That energetic heutenant had carried them out to the letter. It is now time to look to Pope's movements. While Jackson's column was executing this flank move- ment to the rear of Pope, Lee retained Longstreet's command in his front to divert his attention, and learning that Pope was about to receive re-enforcements from McClellan, he ordered forward the remainder of his army from Eichmond.f Nevertheless, the stealthy march of Jackson did not pass un- beknown to the Union commander, who received very precise information respecting his movement northward, though he was unable to divine its aim.:|: Bewildered b}^ his antagonist's manoeuvres, Pope made a series of ridiculous tentatives ; but finally, on the 26th, he determined to fall back from the Kap- pahannock nearer to Washington. During the day he learned that Jackson was already on his rear at Manassas, and had cut his railway communications wdth Washmgton ! It must be admitted the situation was a difficult one, but it was one that afibrded a vigorous commander a rare opening for a decisive blow. Lee had in fact committed an act of un- wonted rashness, and voluntarily placed himself in such a position that when Jackson had reached Bristoe Station and Manassas, Longstreet, with the van of the main column, mov- ing by the same route taken by that officer, was stiU distant two marches. Pope was therefore left free to place himself between the two, and beat them in detail. Such a piece of * Jackson's Report: Reports of the Army of NortUern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 92. f Tliis force consisted of D. H. Hill's and McLaws' divisions, two brigades under General Walker, and Hampton's cavalry brigade. :}: The information was derived from Colonel J. S. Clark, of the staff of Gen- eral Banks. That oflBicer remained all day in a perilous position within sight of Jackson's moving column, and counted its force, which he found to be thirty- six regiments of infantry, with the proper proportion of batteries and a con- siderable cavalry force. POPES CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. I79 temerity is only justifiable when a general has a gi-eat and well-grounded contempt for his adversary. Pope was at this time in a condition to undertake a bold stroke ; for he had already been re-enforced by a considerable body of the Army of the Potomac arriving from the Peninsula. Reynolds' division of Pennsylvania Reserves had joined him at Rappahannock Station on the 23d ; the corps of Porter and Heintzelman at "Warrenton Junction, on the 26th and 27th, and the remainder of the Army of the Potomac (corps of Sumner and Frankhn) was en route from Alexandria. The measures taken by Pope to meet the new turn of affairs showed an appreciation of the line of action suited to the cir- cumstances ; but he was incapable of carrying it out, for he had completely lost his head. The obvious move was to throw forward his left so as to seize the road by which Long- street would advance to join Jackson. With this \dew, he, on the morning of the 27th, directed General McDowell, with his own and Sigel's corps and the division of Reynolds, upon Gainesville, — a movement that would plant that powerful force of forty thousand men on the road by which Lee's main column, moving through Thoroughfare Gap, must advance to join Jackson. This force was to be supported by Reno's corps and Kearney's division of Heintzelman's corps, which were directed on Greenwich, while he moved with Hooker's division along the Orange and Alexandria Raih-oad towards Manassas Junction. Porter's corps (when relieved at Warren- ton Junction by Banks, who was to remain at that point, covering the trains and repairing the railroad) was also directed upon Gaines\iUe. These dispositions were not only correct — they were brilliant. The lame and impotent sequel is now to be seen. The main or interposing column under McDowell was to reach its assigned position at Gainesville and Greenwich that night, the 27th. This was successfully accomplished. At the same time. Pope, with Hooker's command, moved along the raih'oad to make up with Jackson at Bristoe Station. Near that place Hooker, late in the afternoon, came up with a Con- 180 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. federate force under Ewell, whom Jackson liad that morning left there, while he, with his other divisions, pushed forward to Manassas Junction. A brisk engagement ensued, but Ewell, finding himself unable to maintain his ground, withdrew across Broad Kun, under orders fi-om Jackson, and joined the latter at Manassas Junction. Thinking that the engagement might be renewed in the morning at Bristoe Station, Pope instructed General Porter to move up fi'om Warrenton Junction at one A. M., and be at Bristoe by dawn of the 28th. Porter was not able to start till three o'clock, owing to the darkness of the night and the obstruction of the road, and did not reach Bristoe till between eight and nine o'clock. As it happened, however, there was no immediate occasion for him, as Ewell had, during the night, moved forward to rejoin Jackson at Manassas Junction. And now, as it appeared on the morning of the 28th, there was no escape for Jackson ; and Pope boldly proclaimed it.* Jackson was at Manassas Junction ; a powerful force was coming up in his rear. McDowell, at Gainesville, with forty thousand men, interposed between him and Lee, the remain- der of whose force was still west of the Bull Kun Mountains, distant a full day's march. But fortune and the errors of his adversary favored Jackson ; and at the very time he seemed to be nearing the crisis of his fate, events were occurring that were destined to extricate him from his seemingly perilous position. When, on the night of the 27th, Pope learnt that Jackson was in the vicinity of Manassas, he directed McDowell, with all his force, to take up the march early on the morning of the 28th, and move eastward from Gainesville and Greenwich upon Manassas Junction, following the Hne of the Manassas Gap Eailroad ; while he ordered Hooker and Kearney and Porter to advance northward from Bristoe Station upon the same place. From Gainesville to Manassas Junction the dis- * "If you will marcli promptly and rapidly at the earliest dawn upon Manassas Junction, we shall bag the whole crowd." — ^Pope's order of 27th to General McDowell : Eeport, p. 41. POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRQINIA. 181 tance is fifteen miles ; from Biistoe Station, it is eight miles ; and from Manassas Junction west to Thoroughfare Gap, where Lee must debouch through the Bull Hun Mountains to unite with Jackson, is twenty miles. This move was a great error. Pope's left (McDowell's col- umn) was his strategic flank, and should have been thrown forward, in place of retired ; for in withdrawing from the line of the Warrenton turnpike to Manassas Junction, he permitted Jackson, by a move from Manassas Junction to the north of the turnpike, to do precisely what he should at all hazards have been prevented from doing — namely, to put himself in the way of a junction with the main body of Lee's army. Could Jackson, indeed, have been induced to remain at Manassas Junction for the convenience of Pope, that gen- eral's strategy would have worked to a charm ; but Jackson was fully alive to the peril of his position, and while Pope thought he was in the act of " bagging" Jackson, Jackson was givmg Pope the slip. The details are in this wise : During the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th Jackson moved his force from Manassas, by the Sudley Springs road, across to the Warrenton turnpike ; crossing which, he gained the high timber-land north and west of Groveton, in the vicinity of the battle-field of the 21st July, 1861. When, therefore. Pope, with the divisions of Hooker and Kearney and Reno, reached Manassas Junction, about noon of the 2'^th, he found that Jackson had already gone ! Pope then tried to correct his error by calling back McDowell's column from its march towards Manassas Junction and directing it on Centreville, to which point Jie also ordered forward Hooker, Kearney, and Pieno, and afterwards Porter. But much time had been lost; the columns on the march towards Manassas had been forced to take other roads than those indicated for them ; and it was late in the afternoon when McDowell, with one divi- sion of his whole command (King's), regained the Warrenton turnpike and headed towards Centreville. Now Jackson, as al- ready seen, had taken position on the north side of the turnpike, near Groveton ; so that on the ai-)i3roacli of Kmg's column, it 182 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARjNIY OF THE POTOMAC. imwittingly presented a flank to Jackson, who assailed it furi- ously. Jackson attacked with two divisions (the Stonewall division, then under General Tahaferro, and Ewell's division), while the fight was sustained on the Union side by King's division alone. The behavior of his troops was exceedingly creditable, and the}^ maintained their ground with what Jack- son styles " obstinate determination." The loss on both sides was severe, and on the part of the Confederates included Gen- erals Ewell and Taliaferro, both of whom were severely wounded — the former losing a leg. Unfortunately, during the night, King withdrew his command to Manassas, leaving the War- renton turnpike available for Jackson to retire or Longstreet to advance. That same night, too, General Eicketts (whom McDowell had detached with his division to dispute the pass- age of Thoroughfare Gap with Longstreet) also withdrew to Manassas. Thus affairs went from bad to worse. IV. THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. By the morning of the 29th, General Pope had learnt the real position of the adversary who had hitherto so adroitly eluded him ; but his troops had become so scattered by his contradictory orders, that it could hardly be said he had an army at all. Sigel and Eeynolds had, however, turned up near Groveton ; and Pope directed them to develop the posi- tion of the enemy,* while he sought to get his remaining forces in hand. Eeno's corps, and Heintzelman with his two divisions under Hooker and Kearney, were ordered to coun- termarch from Centreville ; while Porter, with his corps and King's division of McDowell's command, was directed to * General Pope, in his otRcial report (p. 20), states that the attack by Sige] •was for the purpose of " bringing Jackson to a stand, if it were possible to do so," thus intimating that Jackson wasmo\"ing off. There does not seem to have been any occasion for this solicitude. POPES CiVMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. I33 advance on Gaiuesville, a position it liad been more easy to abandon tlie day before than to regain now. Jackson continued to hold his vantage-ground upon the highhinds northwest of Groveton ; and as he now commanded the Warrenton road, by which Lee was moving to join him, and had intelHgence that his chief was close at hand, he had ceased to fear the result of an encounter with Pope. Jackson disposed his troops along the cut of an unfinished railroad,* with his right resting on the Warrenton turnpike, and his left near Sudley Mill. The mass of his troops were sheltered in dense woods behind the railroad cut and embankment, which formed a ready-made parapet. General Sigel, as ordered, attacked in the morning, pushing forward his line under a warm fire, under which he suffered severely ; and, towards noon, he was joined by Eeno's com- mand and the divisions of Hooker and Kearney. Meanwhile, Porter, in the morning, moved forward from Manassas Junc- tion to turn Jackson's right by an advance on Gainesville. Had the position of the Confederates been as Pope im- agined, the latter move should have been decisive, and must have seriously jeopardized Jackson's safety. But, while Porter's column was yet in motion, and before it could reach Jackson's flank, the van of Lee's main body began to reach the field from Thoroughfare Gap. Bi fact, by ten in the morning, Longstreet had come up, and, taking position on Jackson's right, drew an extension of the Confederate line across the Warrenton turnpike and the Manassas Gap Kail- road, thus covering all the lines of approach by which the column of Porter might advance towards Gainesville. Upon * " My troops on this day were distributed along and in the vicinity of the cut of an unfinished railroad (intended as a part of the track to connect the Manassas road directly with Alexandria), stretching from the Warrenton turnpike in the direction of Sudley Mill. It was mainly along the unfinished excavation of this unfinished road that my line of battle was formed on the 29th : Jackson "s division, under Brigadier-General Starke, on the right ; Ewell's division, under Briga- dier-General Lawton, in the centre ; and Hill's division on the left "—Jackson's Report : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 95. 184 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AHMT OF THE POTOMAC. finding himself thus estopped, Porter was proceedmg to form his hne when he was overtaken hy General McDowell, under whose orders the former then came. The precise tenor of the instructions which, at this moment, McDowell gave Porter is a point in dispute, — McDowell asserting that he ordered Porter to move against the enemy, and Porter claiming that McDowell directed him to remain where he was. However this may be, McDowell took King's division, which belonged to his own corps, from under Porter, and, uniting it with Piick- ett's division (also of McDowell's corj)s), headed his column northward to the battle-field near Groveton, where he arrived late in the afternoon. Porter held his command for the rest of the day in the position taken up,^ — Morell's division being de- ployed and in. contact with the enemy ; the other divisions massed. Thus it was that, by contradictory orders and the useless marches and counter-marches they involved, Pope's oppor- tunity was thrown away, and instead of fighting Jackson's corps alone, it was the entire army of Lee with which he had to deal, — this, too, with his forces very much out of j^osition, and he himself ignorant both of his own situation and that of the enemy. When, towards noon. Pope, coming from Cen- treville, reached the field near Groveton, he found the situa- tion as follows : Heintzelman's two divisions, under Hooker and Kearney, on the right, in front and west of the Sudley Springs road ; Reno and Sigel holding the centre, — Sigel's line being extended a short distance south of the Warrenton turnpike ; Reynolds with his division on the left. But the commander was ignorant of the whereabouts of both Porter and McDowell, and he knew not that Longstreet had joined Jackson ! The troops had been considerably cut up by the brisk skirmishing that had been going on all morning. An artillery contest had also been waged all forenoon between the opposing lines ; but it was at long range and of no eifect. The jjosition of the troops in front of Jackson's intrenched line was one that promised very little success for a direct attack, and especially for a partial attack. Nevertheless, at POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 185 three o'clock, Popo ordered Hooker to assaidt. The attenipt was so unpromising that that officer remonstrated against it ; but the order being imperative, he made a very determined attack with his division. The action was especially brilliant on the part of Grover's brigade, which, advancing with the bayonet, succeeded in penetrating between the two extreme left brigades of Jackson's line,"" and got possession of the rail- road embankment which, by a savage hand-to-hand fight, it held for some time, till driven back by the arrival of re- enforcements to the Confederate left.f Too late for united action, Kearney was sent to Hooker's assistance, and he also suffered repulse. Meanwhile, Pope had learnt the position of Porter's com-- mand, and, at half-jiast four in the afternoon, sent orders to that officer to assail the enemy's right flank and rear,^ — Pope 'erroneously believing the right flank of Jackson, near Grove- ton, to be the right of the Confederate line. Towards six, when he thought Porter should be coming into action, he directed Heintzelman and Reno to assault the enemy's left. The attack was made with vigor, especially by Kearney, who struck Jackson's left under Hill, at a moment when the Con- federates had almost exhausted their ammunition.:]: Doubling up Hill's flank on his centre, Kearney seized the railroad em- bankment and that part of the field of battle. " This," as Kearney says, " presaged a victory for us all. Still," he goes on to observe, " our force was too light. The enemy brought up rapidly heavy reserves, so that our further progress was impeded." § In fact, Kearney was compelled to fall back * These were the brigades of Gregg and Thomas. — Jackson : Report, p. 95. f Rt'ports of the Array of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 253. j^ " The enemy prepared for a last and determined attempt. Their serried masses, overwhelming superiority of numbers [absurd exaggeration common to both sides], and bold bearing [it was Kearney], made the chance of victory to tremble in the balance ; my own division, exhausted by seven hours unre- mitted fighting, had hardly one round per man remaining, and was weakened in all things save its unconquerable spirit." — Report of General A. P. Ilill : Re^wrts of the Army of Northern Vii-ginia, vol. ii , p. 125. § Kearney's Report: Report of General Pope, p. 79. 186 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC. altogether from the raiboacl, and the "presage of victory" was turned to naught.* Turning now to the left, where Porter was to have assailed the Confederate left, it appears that the order which Pope sent at haK-past four, did not reach Porter till about dusk. He then made dispositions for attack, but it Avas too late. It is, however, more than doubtful that even had the order been received in time, any thing but repulse would have resulted from its execution. Porter was reduced to the necessity of making a direct attack in front ; for there was no opportunity of making a turning movement, seeing that, contrary to Pope's opinion, he had then, and had had- since noon, Longstreet's entire corps before him.t So as firing now died away in the * The Confederate re-enforcements, of which Kearney speaks, consisted of the brigades of Early and Lawton. (See Report of General A. P. Hill : Re- ports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 125.) General Early says, in his report : " My brigade and the Eighth Louisiana advanced upon the enemy through a field, and drove him from the woods and out of the railroad-cut, crossing the latter and following in pursuit several hundred yards beyond."— Ibid., p. 184. f As the view above taken of the action of that part of the " Second Bull Run," fought on the 29th of August, differs in some important particulars from previous accounts, and especially from the ofiicial report of General Pope, I shall here substantiate by Confederate official records the truth of such points of difference as are of moment. The question foremost in interest has relation to the time at which Longstreet's corps joined Jackson. General Pope re- peatedly states that this did not take place till " about sunset" (see Pope's Of- ficial Report, p. 21) ; and it is on this ground that he and the court-martial that tried General Porter based their condemnation of that officer for not turning Jackson's right. Says Pope : " I believe— in fact, I am positive— that at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 29th, General Porter had in his front no consid- erable body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very sure now, that it was easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of Jackson, and to have fallen upon his rear ; that if he had done so, we should have gained a de- cisive victory over the army under Jackson before he could have been joined hy any of tJie forces of Longstreet. " (Pope's Report, p. 22.) Now this assertion is traversed by the positive evidence of the official reports of several of the gen- erals under Longstreet's command, who show conclusively that Longstreet joined Jackson as early as noon. Says Longstreet himself: "Early on the 2dth the columns were united, and the advance, to join General Jackson, was resumed. The noise of battle was heard before we reached Gainesville. The POPES CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 187 darkling Avoods on the right, a pause was put for the day to the chaos and confusion of this mismanaged battle, in which many thousand men had fallen on the Union side. It would have been judicious for General Pope, in the then condition of his army, to have that night withdrawn across Bull Kun and taken position at Centreville, or even within the fortifications of "Washington. By doing so he w^ould have united with the corps of Franklin and Sumner, then between march was quickened to the extent of our capacity. The excitement of battle seemed to give new life and strength to our jaded men, and the head of my column soon reached a pemtion in reeir of the enemy's left flemk." (Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 8.) See also Hood. (Ibid., p. 209.) But General D. R. Jones, who commanded the rear division of Longstreet's corps is still more explicit. " Early on the morning of the 29th, I took up the march in the direction of the old battle-ground of Manasses, whence heavy firing was heard. Arriving on the ground about noon, my command was sta- tioned on the extreme right of our line," etc. (Ibid., p. 217.) This would appear to settle the time of arrival of Longstreet ; and I shall now show that before Porter came up from Manassas, Longstreet had taken up such a position as to bar his advance towards Gainesville. On this head Longstreet's own testi- mony will sufHce, and it is as complete as could be desired. After giving his dispositions for his connection with Jackson's right, he states that " Hood's di- vision was deployed on the right and left of the Warrenton turnpike, at right angles with it. General D. R. Jones' division was placed upon the Manassas Gap Bedlroad, to the right, and in echelon with regard to the three last bri- gades." (Ibid., pp. 81, 82.) Now it is quite obvious that this disposition covered Porter's whole front, and that it barred his approach to Gainesville. Any at- tack by Porter would therefore necessarily be made in front. When he re- ceived Pope's order to attack the enemy's right and turn his rear, Morell's di- vision was already deployed in front of Longstreet, and it was near dark when the order came to hand. Probably there is no military man who will now say that the operation indicated by Pope was at that time possible. General Por- ter many months subsequent to these events, and after having in the mean- while had command of the forces for the defence of the capital, and been at the head of his corps at the battle of Antietam, was arraigned before a court- martial at Washington, and dismissed the service of the United States, for al- leged disobedience to the above orders of Pope. I do not constitute myself the champion of General Porter, nor of any other officer ; but having become pos- sessed of the Confederate official reports, and having been struck with the new light thrown on these events by the unconscious testimony given above by the Confederate generals, I should have violated my instinct of historic veracity to have suppressed these facts. 188 CAJIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Washington and Centreville, whereas at Manassas Lee was sure to receive fresh accessions of force, while Pope could hope for none. The army was much cut up ; thousands had straggled from their commands ; the troops had had little to eat for two days previous, and the artillery and cavalry horses had been in harness and saddled continually for ten days. Vv^ith untimely obstinacy, Pope determined to remain and again try the issue of battle. To utilize Porter's corps, he drew it over from the isolated position it had held the pre- vious day to the Warrenton road, on which he pivoted, dis- posing his line in the form of a Y reversed — Piejaiolds' com- mand forming the left leg, and Porter, Sigel, and Pteno the right, with Heintzelman's two divisions holding the extreme right. Lee retained the same relative position he had held the day before — Longstreet on the right, and Jackson on the left ; but he drew back his left considerably, abandoning dur- ing the night some of the ground he had held on that flank. Now, by one of those curious conjunctures which sometimes occur in battle, it so was that the opposing commanders had that day formed each the same resolution : Pope had deter- mined to attack Lee's left flank, and Lee had determined to attack Pope's left flank. And thus it came about that when Heintzelman pushed forward to feel the enemy's left, the re- fusal of that flank by Lee, and his withdrawal of troops to his right for the purpose of making his contemplated attack on Pope's left, gave the impression that the Confederates were retreating up the Warrenton turnpike towards Gainesville. This impression was further strengthened by the report of a wounded Confederate soldier who fell into the hands of the Union pickets, and reported that he had heard his comrades say that "Jackson was retiring to unite with Longstreet." Now this statement was quite correct in the sense in which Lee's manoeuvres have already been presented— that is, as a tactical change of Jackson's position on the left to re-enforce Longstreet on the right. But Pope, who had not that day been to the front, accepted the story as indicating a real f.ill- ing back, and telegraphed to Washington that the enemy was POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 189 "retreating to the mountains,"— a dispatcli wliicli, flashed throughout the hind, gave the people a few hours, at least, of unmixed pleasure. To take advantage of the supposed " retreat" of Lee, Pope ordered McDowell with three corps— Porter's in the ad- vance—to follow up rapidly on the Warrenton turnpike, and "press the enemy vigorously during the whole day." But no sooner were the troops put in motion to make this pur- suit of a supposed flying foe, than the Confederates, hither- to concealed in the forest in front of Porter, uncovered themselves, and opened a heavy fire from their numerous artillery ;"=^ and while King's division was being formed on Porter's right in order to press an attack, clouds of dust on the extreme left showed that the enemy was moving to turn the Union Hue in that direction ; and that, instead of retiring, he was in the full tide of an offensive move- ment. To meet this manoeuvre, General McDowell detached Eeynolds' command from the left of Porter's force north of the Warrenton turnpike, and directed it on a position south of that road to check this menace. The "Warrenton turnpike, which intersects the Manassas battle-field, runs westAvard up the valley of the little ri^Tilet of Young's Branch. From the stream the ground rises on both sides, in some places quite into hills. The Sudley Springs road, on crossing the stream at right angles, passes directly over one of these hills, just south of the Warrenton turnpike ; and this hill has on it a de- tached road with fields stretching back away from it some hundreds of yards to the forest. This is the hill whereon what is known as the " Henry House" stood. To the west of it is another hill — the Bald Hill, so called— which is in fact a rise lying between the roads, and making about the same angle * " As soon as Butterfield's brigade advanced up the hill, there was great commotion among the rebel forces, and the whole side of the hill and edges of the woods swarmed with men before unseen. The effect was not unlike flush- ing a covey of quail. The enemy fell back to the line of the railroad, and took .shelter in the cut and behind the embankment."— Warren : Report of the BocfJiid Battle of Manassas. 190 CAilPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. with each, and running back to the forest. Between the two hills is a brook, a tributary of Young's Branch. Upon the latter hill General McDowell directed Bejnolds' division and a portion of Bickett's command, so as to check the flank ma- nosuvre that menaced to seize the Warrenton turnpike, which was the line of retreat of the whole army. The occupation of this position was judicious on the part of General McDowell ; but the detachment of Reynolds from Porter's left for that purpose had an unfortunate result ;* for it exposed the key-point of Porter's line. Colonel G. K. War- ren, who then commanded one of Porter's brigades, seeing the imminence of the danger, at once, and without waiting for orders, moved forward with his small but brave brigade of about a thousand men,t and occupied the important position abandoned by Reynolds ; Porter then, as well to sustain War- ren, as to fulfil his orders of pursuit, his column of attack being formed, made a vigorous assault on the Confederate position ; but beyond driving back the advanced line so as to develop the Confederate array as formed behind the railroad embankment, he was able to accomplish nothing. Line after line was swept away by the enemy's artillery and infantry fire, and so destructive was its effect that Porter's troops finally were compelled to withdraw. Porter's attack had been di- rected against Jackson ; but Longstreet, on Jackson's right, found a commanding point of ground, whence he could rake the assaulting columns with an enfilading fire of artillerj^ " From an eminence near by," says that ofiicer, " one portion of the enemy's masses, attacking General Jackson, were imme- diately within my view, and in easy range of batteries in that position. It gave me an advantage I had not expected to have, and I made haste to use it. Two batteries were ordered for the purpose, and one placed in position immediately and opened, just as this fire began, I received a message from * Sigel's corps should have been taken in place of Reynolds' division, or anybody else rather than Reynolds. • f Warren's command consisted of the Fifth and Tenth New York Volun- POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 191 the commanding general, informing me of General Jackson's condition and liis wants. As it was evident that the attack against General Jackson could not be continued ten minutes under the fire of these batteries, I made no movement with my troops. Before the second battery could be placed in po- sition the enemy began to retire, and in less than ten minutes the ranks were broken, and that portion of his army put to flight."* Warren occupying the important point he had seized, held on stoutly and against a fearful loss till all the rest of Porter's troops had been retired, and only withdrew when the enemy had advanced so close as to fire in the very faces of his men. Such was the situation of afiairs at five o'clock in the after- noon : Porter's troops, fearfully cut up in repeated assaults of a position which it was hopeless to attempt to carry, were retiring from the field. Jackson immediately took up the pursuit, and was joined by a general advance of the whole Confederate line — Longstreet extending his right so as, if possible, to cut off the retreat of the Union forces. By an impetuous rush, the latter carried the " Bald Hill," held by Keynolds and Kicketts ; and it then became doubtful whether even the " Henry House Hill" could be maintained so as to cover the retreat of the army over Bull Kun, for Longstreet had thro\\'n around his right so as to menace that position. This, however, was happily provided for by the firmness of some battalions of Kegulars, which held the ground until re- lieved by the brigades of Meade and Seymour and other troops, that maintained the position and permitted the with- drawal of the army. Under cover of the darkness the wea- ried troops retired across Bull Eun, by the stone bridge, and took position on the heights of Centreville. Owing to the ob- scurity of the night, and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull Run, Lee attempted no pursuit.f * Longstreet: Reports of tlie Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 83. \ " Tlie obscurity of tlie niglit, and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull Run, rendered it necessary to suspend operations until morning." Lee's Re- port : Reports of the Ajmy of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 25. 192 CA^IPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, EXIT POPE. At Centreville, Pope united with tlie corps of Franklin and Sumner, and he remained there during the whole of the 31st. But Lee had not yet given up the pursuit. Leaving Longstreet on the battle-field, he sent Jackson by a detour on Pope's right, to strike the Little Eiver turnpike, and by that route to Fairfax Courthouse, to intercept, if' possible. Pope's retreat to Washington. Jackson's march was much retarded by a heavy storm that commenced the day before and still continued. Pope, meantime, fell back to positions covering Fairfax Courthouse and Germantown ; and on the evening of the 1st of September, Jackson struck his right posted at Ox Hill, near Germantown. He immediately engaged the Union force with Hill's and Ewell's divisions in the midst of a cold and drenching rain. The attack fell upon Eeno, Hooker, a part of McDowell, and Kearney. A firm front was main- tained till Stevens' division of Reno's corps, owing to the ex- haustion of its ammunition, and the death of its general, was forced back in disorder. To repair this break, Kearney, with the promptitude that marked him, sent forward Birney's brigade of his own division ; and presently, all aglow with zeal, brought up a battery which he placed in position. But there still remained a gap on Birney's right, caused by the retirement of Stevens' division. This Birney pointed out to Kearney, and that gallant soldier, dashing forward to recon- noitre the ground, unwittingly rode iuto the enemy's lines and was killed. In his death, the army lost the hving ideal of a soldier — a prenx cJiecalicr, in whom there were mixed the quahties of chivalry and gallantry as strong as ever beat beneath the mailed coat of an olden knight. Like Desaix, whom Napoleon characterized as " the man most worthy to POPES 'CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. I93 l!C his lieutenant," Kearney clied opposing a heroic breast to disaster. On the following day, September 2d, the army was, by order of General Halleck, drawn back within the hnes of Washington, and Lee, abandoning direct pursuit, began to turn his eyes towards the north of the Potomac. Within the fortifications of Washington the army now rested from the labors, fatigues, and privations of this trying campaign, in which, from the Rapidan to the front of the capital, it had fought and retreated, and retreated and fought. It had passed through an experience calculated to dislocate the structure of most armies ; and if it reached the lines of Washington in any military order whatsoever, it was because the individual patriotism of the rank and file supplied a bond of cohesion when the bond of military discipline failed. Of the losses in killed and wounded during this campaign, no official record is found ; but the Confederate commander claims the capture of nine thousand prisoners, thirty pieces of artillery, and upwards of twenty thousand stands of arms in the engagement on the plains of Manassas alone. Untold thousands had straggled from their commands duriu^ the re- treat. As for Pope, it is hardly possible to feel for him less than pity, in spite of the bombastic pretensions with which he set out. The record already given does not justify the assertion that he was not obeyed by his subordinates ; but it cannot be denied that the estimate of his character held by the ofiicers under his command was not of a kind to eHcit that hearty and zealous co-operation needed for the eifective conduct of gi-eat military operations. He had the misfortune to be of all men the most dishdieved. General Pope took the first opportunity on his return to Washington to vacate the com- mand ; the Army of Yirginia passed out of existence, and its corps, united with the Army of the Potomac, fell back into the arms of McClellan. 13 194 CAAfPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. VI. THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. September— October, 1862. I. MANCEUVRES PREVIOUS TO ANTIETAM. When Lee put his columns in motion from Eichmond, it was with no intent of entering upon a campaign of invasion across the great river that formed the dividing line between the warring powers. But who can foretell the results that may spring from the simj)lest act in that complex interplay of cause and effect we name war ? A secondary oj)eration, hav- ing in view merely to hold Pope in check, had effected not only its primal aim, but the infinitely more important result of dis- lodging the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula. Thus relieved of all care touching Richmond, Lee was free to assume a real offensive for the purpose not merely of check- ing but of crushing Pope. The success of the campaign had been remarkable. From the front of Eichmond the thea- tre of operations had been transferred to the front of "Wash- ington ; the Union armies had been reduced to a humihating defensive, and the rich harvests of the Shenandoah Valley and Northern Virginia were the prize of the victors. To crown and consolidate these conquests, Lee now determined to cross the fi'ontier into Maryland. The prospective advantages of such a transfer of the theatre of war to the north of the Potomac seemed strongly to invite it ; for, in addition to the telling blows Lee might THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 195 hope to inflict in the demoralized condition of the Union arm}^ and the prestige that the enterprise woukl lend the Confederate cause abroad, it was judged that the presence of the hostile force would detain McClellan on the frontier long enough to render an invasion of Virginia during the ap- proaching winter diiElicult, if not impracticable." Yet, if the enterprise had promised only such military gain, it is doubtfid whether the Eichmond government would have undertaken a project involving the renunciation of the proved advantages of their proper defensive ; but it seemed, in ad- dition, to hold out certain ulterior inducements, which were none the less alluring for being somewhat vague. The theory of the invasion assumed that the presence of the Confederate army in Maryland would induce an immediate rising among the citizens of that State for what General Lee calls " the re- covery of their liberties." If it did not prompt an armed insurrection, it was, at least, expected that the people of Maryland would assume such an attitude as would seriously embarrass tile Government and necessitate the retention of a great part of its military force for the purpose of prevent- ing anticipated risings. By this means it was believed that it would be difficult for the Union authorities to apply a concen- trated effort to the expulsion of the invading force.f Without the prospect of some such incidental and ulterior advantages as these, the enterprise would hardly have been undertaken; for, not only was it perilous in itself, but the Confederate army was not properly equipped for invasion : it lacked much of the material of war and was feeble in trans- portation, while the troops were so wretchedly clothed and * Lee : Report of the Maryland Campaign, in Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 27. f General Lee's statement on this head is somewhat vague ; but it can hardly mean any thing else than what is indicated above : " The condition of Maryland encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however in- ferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington Oodernmcnt to retain all its available force to provide against contingencies which its course towarde the people of that State gave it reason to apprehend." — Ibid. 196 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. shod that little else could be claimed for them than what Tillj boasted of his followers — that they were an army of " ragged soldiers and bright muskets." * Plausible though this anticipation of a secessionist uprising in Maryland seemed, it rested on a false basis and was not more emphatically belied by experience than it was con- demned by sound reasoning before the fact. Nevertheless, misled by this illusion, Lee turned the heads of his columns away from the direction of Washington, which he never seems to have dreamed of assailmg directly, and put them in motion towards Leesburg. Between the 4th and 7th of September the whole Confederate army crossed the Potomac by the fords near that place, and encamped in the vicinity of Frederick, where the standard of revolt was formally raised, and the people of Maryland invited by proclamation of General Lee to join the Confederate force. But it soon became manifest that the expectation of practical assistance from the Mary- landers was destined to grievous disappointment ; and the ragged and- shoeless soldiers who entered the State chanting the song in which Maryland was made passionately to invoke Southern aid against Northern despotism found, instead of the rapturous reception they had anticipated, cold indifference or ill-concealed hostility. Of the citizens of Maryland a large number (and notably the j^opulation of the western counties) were really loyal, a considerable number indifferent, and a smaller number bitterly secessionist. But to permit the seces- sionists to move at all, it was necessary that Lee should first of all demonstrate his ability to remain in the State by over- throwing the powerful Union force that was moving to meet him ; while the lukewarm, whom the romance of the invasion might have allured, were repelled by the wretchedness, the rags, and the shocking filth of the " army of liberation." * " Thousands of the troops," says Lee, " were destitute of shoes." — Re- ports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. 1., p. 27. "Never," says General Jones, who commanded. Jackson's old " Stonewall" division, " had the army been so dirty, ragged, and ill provided for, as on this march." — Ibid., vol. ii., p, 221. THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 197 In the dark hour when the shattered battahons that sur- vived Pope's campaign returned to Washington, General Mc- CleUan, at the request of the President, resumed command of the Army of the Potomac, with the addition thereto of Burn- side's command and the corps composing the late Army of Virginia. Whatever may have been the estimate of McClel- lan's military capacity at this time held by the President, or General Halleck, or Mr. Secretary Stanton, or the Committee on the Conduct of the War, there appears to have been no one to gainsay tlie propriety of the appointment or dispute the magic of his name with the soldiers he had led. McClel- hin's reappearance at the head of affairs had the most bene- ficial effect on the army, whose morale immediately underwent ■ an astonishing change. The heterogeneous mass made up of the aggregation of the remnants of the two armies, and the garrison of Washington, was reorganized into a compact body— a work that had mostly to be done while the army was on the march ;* and as soon as it became known that Lee had crossed the Potomac, McClellan moved towards Frederick to meet him. The advance was made by five parallel roads, and the columns \\exe so disposed as to cover both Washington and Baltimore ; for the left flank rested on the Potomac, and the right on the Baltimore and Ohio Eaih-oad. The right wing consisted of the First and Ninth corps, under General Burnside ; the centre, of the Second and Twelfth corps, under General Sumner ; and the left wing, of the Sixth Corps, under General Franklin. f * " Like the rest of the army, the artillery may be said to have been organ- ized on the inarch and in tlie intervals of conflict." — Ilimt : Report of Artillery Operations of the Maryland Campaign. f The First Corps (McDowell's old command) had b3en placed under Gen- eral Hooker. The Ninth Corps, of Burnside's old force, was under Gcnieral Reno. Sumner continued to command his own (Second) corps, and also con- trolled the Twelfth (Banks' old command), which was placed under General Mansfield, a veteran soldier, but who had not thus far been in the field. The Sixth Corps, under General Franklin, embraced the divisions of Smith (W. F.), Slocum, and Couch. Porter's did not leave Washington until the 13th of September, and rejoined the army at Antietam. General H. J. Hunt, who had 198 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. The imcertaintj at first oyerhanging Lee's intentions caused tlie advance from Washington to be made with much circum- spection ; and it might, perhajjs, be fairly chargeable with tardiness, were there not on record repeated dispatches of the time from the general-in-chief, charging McClellan with too great a precipitancy of movement for the safety of the capi- tal. The van of the army entered Frederick on the 12th- of September, after a brisk skirmish at the outskirts of the town with the Confederate troopers left behind as a rear- guard. It was found that the main body of Lee's army had passed out of Frederick two days before, heading westward towards Harper's Ferry, It is now necessary, for a just appreciation of the events of the Maryland campaign, that I should give an outline of the plan of operations which the Confederate . commander had marked out for himself. This plan was simple, but higldy meritorious. Lee did not propose to make any direct move- ment against Washington or Baltimore with the Union army between him and these points, but aimed so to manoeuvre as to cause McClellan to imcover them. With this view, he de- signed, first of all, to move into Western Maryland and estab- lish his communications with Kichmond through the Shenan- doah Valley. Then, by a northward movement, menacing Pennsylvania by the Cumberland Valley, he hoped to draw the Union army so far towards the Susquehanna as to afford him either an opportunity of seizing Baltimore or Washington, or of dealing a damaging blow at the army far from its base of supplies. His first movement from Frederick was, there- fore, towards the western side of that mountain range which, named the Blue Eidge south of the Potomac, and the South Mountain range north of the Potomac, forms the eastern wall of the Shenandoah and Cumberland valleys — the former been in command of the reserve artillery on the Peninsula, relieved General Barry as chief of artillery, and remained in that position till the close of the wi'T. General Pleasonton commanded the cavalry division. The army with wliich McClellan set out on the Maryland campaign, made an aggregate of ••iglity-seven thousand one hundred and sixty-four men, of all arms. THE MARYL.VND CAMPAIGN. 109 liis line of communications with Richmond and tho hilLcr his line of manceu\Te tpwards Pennsylvania. SKETCH OF MANCEUVRES ON ANTIETAM. Now, at the time Lee crossed the Potomac, the Federal post at Harper's Ferry, commanding the debouche of the Shenandoah Valley, was held by a garrison of about nine thousand men, under Colonel D. H. Miles, while a force of twenty-five hundred men, under General White, did outpost duty at Martinsburg and Winchester. These troops received orders direct from General Halleck. Lee had assumed that his advance on Frederick would cause the immediate evacuation of Harper's Ferry* by the * " It liad been supposed that tho advance upon Frederick would lead to the evacuation of jMartinsburg and Harper's Ferry, thus opening the line of com- munication through the Valley."— Lee's Report : Reports of the Army of North ern Virginia, vol. i., p. 28. 200 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Union force, because that position, important as against a menace by way of the Shenandoah Valley, became utterly useless now that the Confederates were actually in Maryland ; and the garrison, while subserving no purpose, was in immi- nent danger of capture. In this anticipation, Lee had pro- ceeded solely on a correct military appreciation of what ought to have been done ; and indeed General McClellan, who had no control over this force, urged the evacuation of the post the moment lie learned Lee was across the Potomac. But it was the whim of General Halleck to regard Harper's Ferry as a point per se and in any event of the first import- ance to be held ; and he would hsten to no proposition lookmg to its abandonment. It is a remarkable illustration of the mighty part played in war by what is called accident that this gross act of folly which, as might have been expected, resulted in the capture of the entire garrison of Harper's Ferry, was, nevertheless, as will presently appear, a main cause of the ultimate failure of the Confederate invasion. Finding that, contrary to his expectation. Harper's Ferry was not evacuated, it became necessary for Lee to dislodge that force before concentrating his army west of the moun- tains, and to this duty Jackson, with his own three divisions, the two divisions of McLaws, and the division of Walker, was assigned. Jackson was to proceed by way of Sharpsburg, crossing the Potomac above Harper's Ferry, and, investing it by the rear ; McLaws was to move by way of Middletown on the direct route to the ferry, and seize the hiUs on the Mary- land side known as Maryland Heights ; Walker was to cross the Potomac below Harper's Ferry and take possession of the Loudon Heights. The advance was begun on the 10th : the several commanders were all to be at their assigned j^ositions by the night of the 12th, cause the surrender by the followmg morning, and immediately rejoin the remainder of the army, with which Lee was to move to Boonsboro' or Hagerstown. Up to the time of Lee's leaving Frederick, McClellan's advance had been so tardy as to justify the Confederate com- mander in the belief that the reduction of Harper's Ferry THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 201 woiild be caccomplislied and liis colvimns again concentrated before lie would be called upon to meet the Union army. But tliis expectation was disappointed, and all Lee's plans for ulterior operations in Maryland were thwarted by a piece of good fortune that befell General McClellan at this time. There accidentally fell into the hands of the Union com- mander on the day of his arrival at Frederick a copy of Lee's official order for the above movements of his troops, whereby his whole plan was betrayed to his antagonist. Instructed of the project of his rival, McClellan immediately ordered a rapid movement towards Harper's Ferry ; and Lee, unaware of what had happened, suddenly found the Union army press- ing forward with an unwonted rapidity that threatened to disconcert all his plans. On the afternoon of the 13th, be- fore Lee had received any word from Jackson, Stuart, who with his troopers was covering the Confederate rear, reported McClellan approaching the passes of South Mountain, and it became evident that if he were allowed to force these, he would be in position to strike Lee's divided columns, relieve the garrison at Harper's Ferry, and put a disastrous termi- nation to the Confederate campaign. Lee had not intended to oppose any resistance to the passage of the South Moun- tain, and had already moved to Boonsboro' and Hagerstown to await Jackson's operations. But when the news of McClel- lan's approach reached him, he instantly ordered Hill's divi- sion back from Boonsboro' to guard the South Mountain passes, and instructed Longstreet to countermarch from Ha- gerstown to Hill's support. McClellan, by his knowledge of Lee's movements, was so perfectly master of the situation, and the stake was so great as to authorize, indeed to demand, the very boldest action on his part. He knew the imperilled condition of the garrison at Harper's Ferry, which had by this time been j^laced under his control, and though its investment was the result of that ab- surd policy that, against his protest and in violation of sound military principle, had retained it in an untenable position, still he was bound to do his utmost to relieve it. McClellan 202 CMIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. acted with energy but not with the impetuosity called for. If he had thrown forward his army with the vigor used by Jackson in his advance on Harper's Ferry, the passes of Soutli Mountain would have been carried before the evening of the 13th, at which time they were very feebly guarded, and then debouching into Pleasant Valley, the Union commander might next morning have fallen upon the rear of McLaws at Maryland Heights, and relieved Harper's Ferry, which did not surrender till the morning of the 15th. But he did not arrive at South Mountain until the morning of the 14th; and by that time the Confederates, forewarned of his ap- proach, had recalled a considerable force to dispute the pas- sage. The line of advance of the Union- right and centre con- ducted across South Mountain by Turner's Gap, that of the left by Crampton's Gap, six miles to the southward. Frank- lin's corps was moving towards the latter ; and Burnside's command (the corps of Beno and Hooker) had the advance by the former. The Confederate defence of Crampton's Pass was left to McLaws, who was engaged in the investment of Harper's Ferry from the side of Maryland Heights ; but Turner's Pass, as commanding the debouche of the main high- way from Frederick westward, was committed to the com- bined commands of Hill and Longstreet. This pass is a deep gorge in the mountains, the crests of which on each side rise to the height of one thousand feet. The gap itself is unassailable ; but there is a jjracticable road over the crest to the right of the pass, and another to the left. The key-point of the whole position is a rocky and precipitous peak w^hich dominates the ridge to the right of the pass. With a considerable force this position is very defensible ; but when the advance of the Union force reached the mountain, on the morning of the 14th, it was guarded only by D. H. Hill's division of five thousand men. Reno's corps arrived near the pass early in the forenoon ; but that officer directed all his efforts to the assault of the crest on the left — the key-point being over- looked. After a sharp fight Beno succeeded in dislodg- TFIE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 203 ing the Confederate brigade opposed to him, and estal)- hshed his troops on the first ridge, but was unable to pusli beyond.* The commanding importance of the ground to the right of tlie pass soon developed itself, however, and on the arrival of Hooker's corps in the middle of the afternoon, he was directed to assault that position. By this time Hill had been re-enforced by two divisions of Long- street. The ridge to the north of the turnpike is divided into a double crest by a ravine, and Hooker put in Meade's divi- sion on the right, and Hatch's on the left ; Kickett's division being held in reserve. The ground is very difficult for the movement of troops, the hill-side being steep and rocky ; but the advance was made with much spirit — the light-footed skirmishers leaping and springing up the slopes and ledges with the nimbleness of the coney. It was found that, owing to the precipitous figure of the mountain sides, the hostile artillery did little hurt ; but the Confederate riflemen, fighting behind rocks and trees and stone walls, opposed a persistent re- sistance. They were, however, forced back, step by step ; and by dark, Hooker's troops had carried the crest on the right of the gap. Now, as simultaneous with this. Gibbon with his brigade had worked his way by the main road well up towards the top of the pass, and as Keno's corps had gained a firm foothold on the crest to the left of the pass, it seemed that the position was carried ; and though it was by this time too dark to push througli to the western side of the mountain, yet the whole army was up, and with the position secured would in the morning force an issue by its own press- ure. Yet these successes were not gained without a heavy sacrifice. Fifteen hundred men were killed and wounded in this severe struggle, and among those who fell was General Reno, commander of the Ninth Corps, an able and respected * The Confederate brigade opposed to Reno was under General Garland, who -was killed early in the action. " Garland's brigade," says General Hill, " was much demoralized by his fall, and the rough handling it had received ; and had the Yankees pressed vigorously forward, the road might have been gained." — Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 113. 204 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. officer. The Confederate loss was above three thousand men, 'whereof fifteen hundred Avcre prisoners. Tlie action at South Mountain deservedly figures as a bril- liant affair ; and the only adverse comment that may be made thereon will turn on the tardiness m commencing the attack ; for, with a more vigorous conduct on the part of General Burnside, he might have forced the pass during the forenoon, while yet defended only by Hill's small force ; and notwith- standing the previous delay, this would still have put Mc- Clellan in position to succor Harper's Ferry. During the contest at Turner's Gap, Franklin was strug- gling to force the passage of the ridge at Crampton's Pass, de- fended by a part of the force of McLaws, who was then en- gaged in the investment of Harper's Ferry.^ The position here was similar to that at Turner's Gap, and the operations were of a lili:e kind. Forming his troops with Slocum's di- vision on the right of the road and Smith's on the left, Franklin advanced his line, driving the Confederates from their position at the base of the mountain, where they were protected by a stone wall, and forced them back up the slope of the mountain to near its summit, where, after an action of three hours, the crest was carried.^ Four hundred prisoners, seven hundred stand of arms, one piece of artillery, and three colors were captured in this spirited action. Franklin's total loss was five hundred and thirty-two, and the corps rested on its arms, with its advance thrown forward into Pleasant Valley: During the night, the Confederates at Turner's Gap * Crampton's Pass debouches into Pleasant Valley directly in the rear of and but five miles from Maryland Heights, opposite Hari)er's Ferry. McLaws on learning the approach of the Union force, and seeing the danger of this attack in his rear, sent back General Cobb, with three brigades, instructing him to hold Crampton's Pass until the work at Harper's Ferry should be completed, " aven if he lost his last man in doing it." McLaws' Report: Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 1G5. f Slocum's line, on the right, formed of Bartlett's and Torbett's brigades, sup- ported by Newton, carried the crest. Smith's line, formed of Brooks' and Irwin's brigades, was disposed for the protection of Slocum's flank, and charged up the mountain simnltaujously. The brunt of the action full upon Bartlett's command. THE ^lARYLAND CAMPATOX. 205 ■v\dtliclre"vv, and tlie Union right and centre in the morning passed through to the west side of the mountain. If not too late, McClehan was now in a position to succor the garrison at Harper's Ferry, whose situation was one of almost tragic interest.'-^' But by a hapless conjuncture, on the verj^ morning that the army broke through the South Mountain, and was in position to relieve the beleaguered force, it was surrendered by Colonel Miles ! I shall briefly detail the circumstances under which this took place. Leaving Frederick on the 10th, Jackson made a very rapid march by way of MiddletoAvn, Boonsboro', and Williamsport, and on the following day crossed the Potomac into Vir- ginia, at a ford near the latter place. Disposing his forces so that there should be no escape for the garrison from that side, he moved down towards Harper's Ferry. On his ap- proach. General White with the garrison of Martinsburg evacuated that place, and retired to Harper's Ferry, the rear of which, at Bolivar Heights, Jackson reached on the loth, and immediately proceeded to put himself in communication with AValker and McLaws, who were respectively to co-op- erate in the investment from Loudon and Maryland heights. "Walker was already in position on Loudon Heights, and McLaws was working his way up Maryland Heights. The latter iiosition is the key-point to Harper's Ferry, as a brief descri2:)tion will show. The Elk Ridge, running north and south across parts of Maryland and Virginia, is rifted in twain by the Potomac, and the cleavage leaves on each side a bold and lofty abut- ment of rock. Maryland Heights is the name given the steep on the north bank, and Loudon Heights the steej^ on the south bank. Between Loudon Heights and Harper's Ferry the Shenandoah breaks into the Potomac, and to the rear of * To convey to Colonel Miles the information that the army was coming to his relief, he sent repeated couriers to run the gauntlet of the investing Iin(>s, and all along the march he fired signal guns to announce the progress of his approach. 206 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC; the feny is a less bold litlge, named Bolivar Heights, which falls off in graceful undulations southward into the Valley of the Shenandoah. The picturesque httle village of Har- per's Ferry lies nestling in the basin formed by these three heights, which tower into an almost Alpine sublimity. A line drawn from any one mountain-top to either of the others must be two miles in stretch ; yet rifle-cannon crowning these heights can easily throw their projectiles from each to other — a sort of Titanic game of bowls which Mars and cloud-com- pelling Jove might carry on m sportive mood. But the Maryland Height is the Saul of the triad of giant mountains, and far o'ertops its fellows. Of course, it completely com- mands Harper's Ferry, into which a plunging fire even of musketry can be had from it. While therefore Harper's Ferry is itself the merest mihtary trap, lying as it does at the bottom of this rocky funnel, yet the Maryland Height is a strong position, and if its rearward slope were held by a determined even though small force, it Would be very hard and hazardous to assail. Colonel Miles, in the distribution of his command, had posted on Maryland Heights a force under Colonel Ford, re- taining the bulk of his troops in Harper's Ferry. This was a faulty disposition. He should have evacuated the latter place, and transferred his whole force to Maryland Heights, which he could readily have held till McClellan came up. Under his instructions from General Halleck, he was bound, however, to hold Harper's Ferry to the last extremity, and, interpreting this order literally as applying to the town itself, he refused to take this step when urged to it by his sub- ordinates. But what was worse. Ford, after opposing a very feeble and unskilful resistance to McLaws' attack on the 13th, retired to Harper's Ferry, spiking his guns and top- pling them down the declivity. Thus Maryland Heights was abandoned altogether. McLaws succeeded in dragging some pieces up the rugged steep, and Jackson and Walker being already in position, the investment of Harper's Ferry was by the morning of the 14th complete. The Bolivar and THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 207 Loudon lieiglits were crowned with artillery during the day, and at dawn of the 15th the three co-operating forces opened lire upon the garrison. They were already doomed men ; and in two hours, Miles raised the white flag in token of sur- render. The Confederates, not perceiving the signal, con- tinued the fire for some time after this, and one of the shot killed Miles on the spot he had surrendered to his own dis- grace. Jackson received the capitulation of twelve thousand men, and came into possession of seventy-three pieces of artiEery, thirteen thousand small-arms, and a large quantity of mili- tary stores. But leaving the details to be arranged by his heutenant, General Hill (A. P.), the swift-footed Jackson turned his back on the prize he had secured, and headed towards Maryland to unite with Lee, who was eagerly awaiting his arrival at Sharpsburg. The successful lodgment McClellan had gained on the crest of South Mountain by the night of the 14th admonished Lee that he might no longer hope to hold Turner's Pass. He therefore withdrew Longstreet and D. H. Hill across Pleasant Yalley and over Elli Eidge into the valley beyond — the valley of the Antietam. In the morning McClellan passed through his right and centre and took position at Boonsboro'. Mean- time, Franklin, having the night previously swept away the adverse force, passed through Crampton's Pass and debouched into Pleasant Valley in the rear of McLaws. This seemed a favorable opportunity to destroy that force, which was isolated from all the rest of Lee's army ; but, appreciating his danger, the Confederate officer, in the morning, withdrew all his force from Maryland Heights, with the exception of a single regi- ment, and formed his troops in battle order across Pleasant Yalley to resist any sudden attack, and before Franklin could make his dispositions to strike, the garrison at Harper's Ferry had surrendered. This left free exit for McLaws, who skil- fully retired down the Yalley towards the Potomac, which he repassed at Harper's Ferry, and by a detour by way of Sliep- herdsto^-n joined Lee at Sharpsburg. 208 C/mPAIGNS OF THE AR:MY of the POTOMAC. Upon tlie retirement of the Confederates on the morning of the 15th, McCleUan pushed forward his whole army in pur- suit ; but after a few miles' march, the heads of the columns were brought to a sudden halt at Antietam Creek, a rivulet that, running obliquely to the course of the Potomac, emj)ties into it six miles above Harper's Ferry. On the heights crowning the west bank of this stream, Lee, with what force he had in hand, took his stand to oppose McClellan's pursiiit, and form a point of concentration for his scattered columns. THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. Whatever ulterior purposes Lee may have had touching the prosecution of the Maryland invasion, affairs had so worked together that it had become now absolutely necessary for him to stand and give battle. Whether he designed aban- doning the aggressive and repassing the Potonjuc, or pur- posed manceuvring by the line of Western Maryland towards Penns3dvania, he was obliged first of all to take up a position on which he might unite his divided forces, closely pressed by the advancing Union columns, and receive the attack of his antagonist. The circumstances were such that a battle would necessarily decide the issue of the invasion. It was late in the afternoon of the 15th when the Army of the Potomac drew up on the left bank of Antietam Creek, on the opposite side of which the Confederate infantry was seen ostentatiously displayed. The day passed in observa- tion of the position, and next morning that moiety of the Confederate force that had been engaged in the investment of Harper's Ferry rejoined Lee. The Confederate com- mander formed his troops on a line stretched cross the angle formed by the Potomac and Antietam ; and as the Poto- mac here makes a sharp curve, Lee was able to rest both ^^ ATT L 1 @rif jfuffi A Nl T 1 1 T A Ml FoTigKt Sept. 16 & 17th 1862 . Eiufinied /or Canyjtuqns oftJuiArmt/ ort/ie Potomac ' , Scale of Mile^ . ^ Ifnijon^ Troops Confedercvte^ Troops THE MAHYLAXD CAMPAIGN. 209 flanks on that stream, while his front was covered by the Autietam. The Confederate hne was drawn in front of the town of Sharpsburg — Longstreet's command being placed on the right of the road from Sharpsburg to Boonsboro', and D. H. Hill's command on the left. From Sharpsburg a turn- ])ikc runs northward across the Potomac to Hagerstown, from which direction the position might be turned ; and to guard against this, Hood's two brigades were placed on the left. Jackson's command was placed in reserve near the left. The IGth saw the whole Confederate force concentrated at Sharps- burg, with the exception of the divisions of McLaws and A. P. Hill, which had not yet returned from Harper's Feny. So greatly had the Confederate army become reduced by its pre- vious losses and by straggling, that Lee was unable to count above forty thousand bayonets. In this vicinity, the Antietam is crossed by four stone bridges ; but three of these were covered by the hostile fi'ont, and so guarded as to forbid the hope of forcing a direct passage. McClellan therefore determined to throw his right across the creek by an upper and unguarded bridge, beyond the Confederate left flank, and when this manoeuvre should have shaken the enemy, the centre and left were to carry the bridges in their front. Porter's corjDS was posted on the left of the turnpike, opposite Bridge No. 2 ; Burnside's Ninth Corps on the Eohrersville and Sharpsburg turnpike, directly in front of Bridge No. 3. The turning movement was in- trusted to Hooker's corps, to be followed by Sumner's two corps. The examination of the ground, and the posting of troops, and of artillery to silence the fire of the enemy's guns on the opposite side of the Antietam, occupied the hours of the 16th till the afternoon, — a lively artillery duel being, meanwhile, waged between the opposinar batteries." Then, * The Union batteries were those of Taft, Langner, Von Kleizor, and Weaver, placed on the ridge on the cast side of the Antietam, between tho turnpike bridge and the house occupied as general headquarters (Pry's). The practice of these batteries was excellent, and their superiority over the 14 210 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AI7MY OF THE POTOMAC. towards tlie niiclcllo of the afternoon, Hooker's corps was put in motion, and crossed the stream at the upper bridge and ford, out of range of the hostile fire. Advancing through the woods. Hooker soon struck the left flank of the Confederate line, held by Hood's two brigades. Lee had anticipated a menace 021 that flank, and had made his dispositions accordingly, — Hood's brigades forming a crotchet on the Con- federate left.* It was towards dusk when the troops of Hooker and Hood met ; and after a smart skirmish between the Confederates and the division of Pennsylvania Keserves under General Meade, the opposing forces rested on their arms for the night, both occupying a skirt of woods which forms the eastern and northern inclosure of a considerable clearing on both sides of the Hagerstown road. This movement across the Antietam on the 16th was of no advantage : it was made too late in the day to accomplish any thing, and it served to disclose to Lee his antagonist's purpose. The Confederate commander made no change in his dispositions, save to order Jackson, who lay in reserve in the rear of the left, to substitute a couple of his brigades in the room of Hood's Avorn-out command. General McClellan strengthened the turning column by directing Sumner to throw over, during the night, the Twelfth Corps under General Mansfield to tlie support of Hooker ; and he ordered Sumner to hold his own corps (the Second) in readiness to cross early in the morning. At the first dawn of the 17th the combat was opened by Hooker, who assailed the Confederate left, now held by Confederate artillery was soon apparent. Of this there is a very frank con- fession in the Report of General D. H. Hill : " An artillery duel between the Washington (New Orleans) Artillery and the Yankee batteries across the Antietam on the IGth was the most melancholy farce in tlie war. They could not cope with the Yankee guns." — Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 119. * " In anticipation of a movement to turn the line of Antietam, Hood's two hrigades had been transferred from the right to the left, and posted between D. H. Hill and the Hagerstown road." — Lee : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 32. THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 211 Jackson's force. The ground on wliicli tlie battle opened was the same field on which the action continued to be waged during the day ; and it has already been indicated in that opening extending to the east and west of the Hagerstown road bounded on each side by woods. In the fringe of forest on the eastern side of the road, Hooker had the previous evening effected a lodgment, though morning found the Con- federate riflemen still clinging to its margin, while the main force of Jackson lay in the low timbered ground on the west side of the road," where the Confederate troops were pretty well protected by outcropping ledges of rock. But though it had this tactical advantage for the defence, the position was really untenable ; for it was completely commanded and seen in reverse by high ground a little to the right of where Hooker formed his line of battle. This height was the key- point of all that part of the field, and had it been occupied by Union batteries, as it should have been, the low timbered ground around the Dunker church where Jackson's line lay could not have been held fifteen minutes. It is a noteworthy fact, that neither General Hooker, nor General Sumner who followed him in command on this part of the field, at all appreciated the supreme importance of this point.f The former, beginning the combat, opened a direct attack wijtii the view of carrying the Hagerstown road and the woods on the west side of it ; and this continued to be the aim of all the subsequent attacks, which were made very much in detail, and thus lost the effective character they might have had with more comprehensive dispositions. Hooker formed his corps of eighteen thousand men, with Doubleday's division on the right, Meade's in the centre, and Kicketts' on the left. Jackson opposed him with two divi- sions, Swell's division being advanced to command the open ground, while the Stonewall division lay in reserve in the * This road will be noted, in the accompanying sketch, as that on the mai- gin of which stands what is known as the " Dunker churcli." f It is equally remarkable that its importance was overlooked by the Con- federates tmtil several hours after the action opened. 212 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. woodland on tlie west side of the Hagerstown road. His en- tire force present numbered four thousand men — a great dis- proportion of numbers.* After an hour's bloody "bush- whacking," Hooker's troops succeeded in clearing the hither woods of the three Confederate brigades, which retired in disorder across the open fields, with a loss of half their re- duced numbers.t The Union batteries on the opposite bank of the Antietam had secured an enfilade fire on Jackson's ad- vanced and reserve line, and, together with the batteries in front, inflicted severe loss on the enemy. Hooker then ad- vanced his centre under Meade to seize the Hagerstown road and the woods beyond. In attempting to execute this move- ment, the troops came under a very severe fire from Jackson's reserve division, which, joined by the two brigades of Hood * Incredible tlioiigli this return of the strength of Jackson's two divisions may appear, it is vouched for by official evidence. So reduced had his num- bers become by the heavy losses of the campaign, and by the great straggling that attended the march through Maryland, that Jackson's old (Stonewall) division numbered but one thousand six hundred men. General J. R. Jones, who commanded this division at Antietam, says of it : " The division was re duced to the numbers of a small brigade, and, at the beginning of the fight, numbered not over one thousand six hundred men." — Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., pp. 223, 22o. Of the number of the three brigades of Ewell's division holding the advanced line, General Early, who, at a subse quent part of the day, came into command of it, reports as follows : Lawton's brigade, one thousand one hundred and fifty ; Hayes' brigade, five hundred and fifty ; Walker's brigade, seven hundred. This would make a total for the two divisions of four thousand men — the number above given. f "The terrible nature of the conflict in which these brigades had. been en- gaged, and the steadiness with which they maintained their position, is shown by the losses they sustained. They did not retire from the field until General Lawton (commanding division) had been wounded and borne from the field ; Colonel Douglas, commanding Lawton's brigade, had been killed ; and the brigade had sustained a loss of five hundred and fifty-four killed and wounded out of one thousand one hundred and fifty, losing five regimental commanders out of six. Hayes' brigade had sustained a loss of three hundred and twenty- three out of five hundred and fifty, including every regimental commander and all of his staff; and Colonel Walker and one of his staff had been disabled, and the brigade he was commanding had sustained a loss of two hundred and twenty-eight out of less than seven hundred present, including three out of four regimental commanders." — Ibid., pp. 190, 191. THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 213 that had moved up in support, issued from the woods, and threw back Meade's hne, which was mucli broken. At the same time, Eicketts' division on the left became hotly en- gaged with three brigades of Hill's division, which were at this time closed up on the right of Jackson in support ; and Hooker's right division, under Doubleday, was held in check by the fire of several batteries of Stuart's horse-artillery posted on commanding ground on his right and front. Hooker had suffered severely by the enemy's fire ; but, worse still, had lost nearly half his effective force by strag- gling.* In this state of facts, his offensive power was com- pletely gone ; and, at seven o'clock, Mansfield's corps, which had crossed the Autietam during the night and lay in reserve a mile to the rear, was ordered up to support and relieve Hooker's troops. Of this corps, the first division, under Gen- eral Williams, took position on the right, and the second, under General Greene, on the left. During the deployment, that veteran soldier. General Mansfield, fell mortally wounded. The command of the corps fell to General Williams, and the division of the latter to General Crawford, who, with his own and Gordon's brigade, made an advance across the open field, and succeeded in seizing a point of woods on the west side of the Hagerstown road. At the same time, Greene's division on the left was able to clear its front, and crossed into the left of the Dunker church. Yet the tenure of these positions was attended with heavy loss ; the troops, reduced to the attempt to hold their own, began to waver and break, and General Hooker was being carried from the field severely wounded, when, opportunely, towards nine o'clock, General Sumner with his own corps reached the field. t * McClellan : Report ; Meade : Report. f Of the extraordinary statement respecting this part of the battle made bj General Hooker, in his evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of "the War, it must be said, at least, that it is not justified by facts : "At that time [nine o'clock]," says he, "my troops were in the finest spirit: they had whipped Jackson, and compelled the enemy to &j, throwing away their Lirnis, their bamiers, and saving themselves as best they could." (Report, vol. i., p. 214 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. The battle had now declared itself with great obstinacy be- tween the Union right and Confederate left without having burst forth on any other j^art of the line. The action was fought very much in detail by both sides — each, as from time to time re-enforcements reached it, being able to claim a partial success. Hooker, after driving one of Jackson's divi- sions, was in turn forced back by the other ; and Mansfield's corps, having caused this to retreat, found itself overmastered by the fresh battalions of Hood." The combat, though very murderous to each side, had been quite indecisive. It was in tliis situation of affairs that Sumner's force reached the ground ; and it seemed at first that this preponderance of weight thrown into the Union scale would give it the victory. The troops of Jackson and Hood had been so severely pun- ished as to leave little available fight in them ; so that, when Sumner threw Sedgwick's divisions on his right across the open field into the woods opposite — the woods in which Crawford had been fighting — he easily drove the shattered Confederate troops before him, and held definitive possession of the woods around the Dunker church. At the same time, Sumner advanced French's division on what had hitherto been the left, and Richardson's division still further to the left to oppose the Confederate centre under Hill. Richardson 681.) Now not only is this contradicted by the facts above recited, and which are derived from the reports of both sides ; but General Sumner, wlio at the time spoken of by General Hooker reached the field, says : " On going upon the field I found that General Hooker's corps had been dispersed and routed. I passed him some distance in the rear, where he had been carried wounded, but I saw nothing of his corps at all as I Avas advancing with my command on the field. I sent one of my sta9"-ofEcers to find where they were, and General Hicketts, the only officer we could find, stated that he could not raise three hundred men of the corps." Sumner : Evidence on Antietam, vol. i., p. 308. " General Sumner afterwards held the following language in regard to these partial attacks : " I have always believed that, instead of sending these troops into that action in driblets, had General McClellan authorized me to march these forty thousand on the left flank of the enemy, we could not havo failed to throw them right back in front of the other divisions of our army on the left." — Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. oG8. « THE MARYLAND CAMPAIQN. 215 had got handsomclj to work, and Frencli had cleared his front, when disaster again fell on the fatal right. At the luoment that Sedgwick appeared to grasp victory in his hands, and the troops of Jaxjkson and Hood were retiring in disorder,'-^' two Confederate divisions, under McLaws and Walker, taken from the Confederate right, reached the field on the left, and immediately turned the fortunes of the day.t A considerable interval had been left between Sumner's right division under Sedgwick and his centre division under Erench. Through this the enemy penetrated, enveloping Sedgwick's left flank, and, pressing heavily at the same time on his front, forced him out of the woods on the west side of the Hagers- town road, and back across the open field and into the woods on the east side of the road — the original position held in the morning.:!: The Confederates, content with dislodging the Union troops, made no attempt to follow up their advantage, but retired to their original position also. We must now look a little to Sumner's other divisions — to French and Eichardson on his centre and left. When the pressure on Sedgwick became the hardest, Sumner sent orders to French to attack, as a diversion m favor of the former. French obeyed, with the brigades of Kimball and * Jackson admits tliat his troops liad " fallen back some distance to the rear" (Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 104) ; but the re- ports of the commanders that came upon the ground to take the place of liis troops give this " falling back" the character of a disorderly rout. f The fact that it was the oncoming of these divisions that decided the action on Sumner "s right is plainly marked by the time of their arrival, which is put down in all the Confederate reports at ten o'clock. Sumner's corps had arrived at nine. \ Of this attack, McLaws says : " The troops were immediately engaged, driving the enemy before them in magnificent style, at all points, sweeping the woods with perfect ease. They were driven not only through the woods, but over a field in front of the woods, and over two high fences beyond, and into another body of woods over half a mile distant from the commencement of the fight."— Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 170. See also reports of his brigade commanders — Semnes, Ibid., p. 349 ; Barksdale, p. 351 ; Kershfiw, p. o5o. 216 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POfOMAC. Weber, and succeeded in forcing back the enemy to a sunken road which runs ahnost at right angles with the Hagerstowu road. This position w^as held by the division of D. H. Hill, three of whose brigades had been advanced to assist Jackson in his morning attacks ; and it was these that were assailed by French and driven back in disorder to the sunken road,^ Uniting here with the other brigades of Hill, they received the attacks both of French and of Richardson's division to his left. The latter division was composed of the brigades of Meagher, Caldwell, and Brooke. Meagher first attacked, and fought his way to the possession of a crest overlooking the sunken road in which Hill's hue was posted. After sustaining a severe musketry fire, by which it lost severely, this brigade, its ammunition being expended, was relieved by the brigade of Caldwell — the former breaking by companies to the rear, and the latter by companies to the front. Caldwell immedi- ately became engaged in a very determined combat, and was supported by part of Brooke's brigade, the rest of the latter being posted on the right to thwart an effort on the part of the enemy to flank in that direction. The action here was of a very animated nature ; for Hill, being re-enforced by the division of Anderson,! assumed a vigorous offensive, and en- deavored to seize a piece of high ground on the Union left, * These brigades were respectively those of Colquitt, Ripley, and McRae ; and General Hill mentions the following curious circumstance as the cause of the repulse that befell them : " The men advanced with alacrity, secured a good position, and were fighting bravely, when Captain Thompson, Fifth North Carolina, cried out, 'They are flanking us!' This cry spread like an electric shock along the ranks, bringing up vivid recollections of the flank fire at South Mountain. In a moment they broke and fell to the rear. EflTorts were made to rally them in the bed of an old road, nearly at right angles to the Hagers- town pike, and which had been their position previous to the advance." — Re ports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 115. f " In the mean time, General R. H. Anderson reported to me with some three or four thousand men as re- enforcements to my command. I directed hiin to form immediately behind my men." — Hill : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. IIG. THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 217 with the view of turning that flank. This maufttuvre was, however, frustrated by the skill and promptitude of Colonel Cross of the Fifth New Hampshire (Caldwell's brigade), who, detecting the danger, moved his regiment towards the men- aced point. Between his command and the Confederate force there then ensued a spirited contest— each endeavoring to reach the high ground, and both dehvering their fire as they marched in parallel hues by the flank.* The race was won by Cross. The eflbrt to flank on the right was handsomely checked by Brooke, French, and Barlow— the latter of whom, changing front with his two regiments obhquely to the right, poured in a rapid fire, compelling the surrender of three hundred prisoners with two standards. A vigorous direct attack was then made, and the troops succeeded in carrying the sunken road and the position, in advance, around what is known as Piper's House, which, being a defensible building, formed, with its surroundings, the citadel of the enemy's strength at this part of the line. The enemy was so much Llisorganized in this repulse that only a few hundred men were rallied on a crest near the Hagorstown road. This slight array formed the wdiole Confederate centre ; and there is httle doubt that a more energetic following up of the success gained would have carried this position and fatally divided Lee's wings.t The few Confederates showed a very bold front, however, and, deceived by this, Richardson contented * Report of Richardson's division. (This report is made by General Han- cock, who -vvas assigned to the command on tlie field- of Antietam — General Richardson having been mortally wounded during the forenoon.) f This inference is strongly justified by the evidence of the Confederate re- ])orts. General Hill says: "There were no troops near to hold the centre except a few himdred rallied from various brigades. The Yankees crossed the old road, which we had occupied in the morning, and occupied an orchard and cornfield in advance of it. Affiiirs looked wry critical. They had now got within a few hundred yards of the hill wliich commanded Sharpsburg and our rear. I was satisfied, however, that the Yankees were so demoralized that a single regiment of fresh men could drive the whole of them in our front across the Antietam. I got up about two hundred men, who said that they were will- \ivj: to advance to the atUick if I would lead them. We met, however, with a 218 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. liimself witli taking up a position to hold wliat was akeady won. Three out of the six corps of the Army of the Potomac, and they the strongest, had thus been drawn into the seeth- ing vortex of action on the right ; and each in succession, while exacting heavy damage of the enemy, had been so pun- ished as to lose all offensive energy ; so that noon found them simply holding their own. Porter with his small reserve corps, numbering some fifteen thousand men, held the centre, while Burnside remained inactive on the left, not having yet passed the Antietam.* Now, between twelve and one o'clock, Franklin with two divisions of his corps, under Slocum and W. F. Smith (Couch remaining behind to occupy Maryland Heights), reached the field of battle, from where the action at Crampton's Pass had left him. General McClellan had de- signed retaining Franklin on the east side of the Antietam, to operate on either flank or on the centre, as circumstances might require. But by the time he neared the field, the strong opposition developed by the attacks of Hooker and Sumner rendered it necessary for him to be immediately pushed over the creek to the assistance of the right.f The arrival of Franklin was opportune, for Lee had noAv accu- mulated so heavily on his left, and the repulse of Sumner's right under Sedgwick had been so easily effected, that the enemy began to show a disposition to resume the offensive — directing his efforts against that still loose-jointed portion of Sumner's harness, between his right and centre. General warm reception, and the little command was broken and dispersed. Colonel Iverson had gathered up about two hundred men, and I sent them to the right to attack the Yankees in flank. They drove them back a short distance, bat, in turn, were repulsed. These two attacks, however, had a most happy efivct. Tlie Yankees were completely deceived by their boldness, and induced to be- lieve that there was a large force in our centre." — Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 117. * The left of Sumner's command was sustained by Pleasonton's cavalry di- vision and the horse batteries, to whose support most of Sykes' divit5iou (Porter's corps) in the afternoon crossed the Antietam f McClellan : Report, pp. 385, 386. THE I\IARYLAND C.VJMPAIGN. 219 Smith, with quick perception of the needs of the case, of his own accord filled up this interval with a part of his division ; and his third brigade, under Colonel Irwin, charged forward with much impetuosity, and drove back the advance until abreast the Dunker church. Thougli IrAvin could not hold what he had wrested from the Confederates, his boldness, seconded by another charge made soon after by the Seventh Maine Regiment alone, served to quell the enemy's aggressive ardor. Franklin then formed the rest of his available force in a column of assault, with the intent to make another effort to gain the enemy's stronghold in the rocky woodland west of the Hagerstown turnpike — the woods Hooker had striven for, and Sumner had snatched and lost. But Sumner having command on the right, now intervened to postpone further operations on that flank, as he judged the repulse of the only remaining corps available for attack would peril the safety of the whole army."^' It is now necessary to look to the other end of the Ucion line, held by the Ninth Corps under Burnside. This force lay massed behind the heights on the east bank of the Antietam, and opposite the Confederate right, which it was designed he should assail after forcing the passage of the Antietam by the lower stone-bridge. The part assigned to General Burnside was of the highest importance, for a successful attack by him uj)on the Confederate right would, by carrying the Sharpsburg crest, force Lee from his line of retreat by way of Shepherdstown. General McClellan, ap- preciating the full effect of an attack by his left, directed Burnside early in the morning to hold his troops in readinessf to assault the bridge in his front. Then, at eight o'clock, on learning how much opposition had been developed by Hooker, he ordered Burnside to carry the bridge, gain possession of * Franklin : Report of Antietam. f "Early on the morning of the 17th, I ordered General Burnside to form his troops and hold them in readiness to assault the bridge in his front and to await further orders."— McClellan : Report, p. 389. 220 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OF lUE POTOMAC. tlic lieiglits, and advance along tlicir crest upon Sliarpsburg,* as a diversion in favor of the right. Bnrnside's tentatives were frivolous in their character ; and hour after hour went by, during which the need of his assistance became more and more imperative, and McClellan's commands more and more urgent. Five hours, in fact, passed, and the action on the right had been concluded in such manner as has been seen, before the work that should have been done in the morning was accomplished. Encouraged by the ease with which the left of the Union force was held in check, Lee was free to remove two-thirds of the right wing under Longstreet — namely, the divisions of McLaws and Walker — and this force he applied at the point of actual conflict on his left, where, as has already been seen, the arrival of these divisions served to check Sumner in his career of victory, and hurl back Sedg- wick. This step the Confederate commander never would have ventured on had there been any vigor displayed on the part of the confronting force ; yet this heavy detachment having been made from the hostile right, should have ren- dered the task assigned to General Burnside one of com- parative ease, for it left on that entire wing biit a single hos- tile division of twenty-five hundred men under General Jones, and the force actually present to dispute the passage of the bridge did not exceed four hundred. t Nevertheless, it was one o'clock, and after the action on the right had been deter- mined, before a passage was effected ; and this being done, two hours passed before the attack of the crest was made.:}: * McClellan : Report, p. 390. f These statements, surprising tliougli tliey may seem, are not made at random, but rest on a sure basis of official evidence. General Jones, wlio commanded tbe entire riglit, says : " When it is known that on that morning my whole command of six brigades, comprised only two thousand four hun- dred and thirty men, the enormous disparity of force with wluch I contended can be seen." — Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 219. The force covering the bridge-head consisted of two regiments under Genci'al Toombs, numbering four hundred and three men. — Ibid. X '■ Tlioiigh tlie bridge and upper ford were thus left open to the enemy, he moved with such extreme caution and slowness, that he lost nearly two hou:3 TIIK MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 221 This was successfully executed at tliree o'clock, the Sharps- burg ridge being carried and a Confederate battery that had been delivering an annoying lire, captured. It was one of the many unfortunate results of the long delay in this operation on the left that just as this success was gained, the division of A. P. Hill, which Jackson had left behind to receive the sur- render of Harper's Ferry, reached the field from that place by way of Shepherdstown,* and uniting his own re-enforcement of two thousand ment with the troops of Jones that had been broken through in the attack, he assumed the offensive, recaptured the battery, and drove back Burnside over all the ground gained, and to the shelter of the bluff bordering the Antietam. This closed the action on the left, and as that on the right had been suspended, the battle ceased for the day. It was found that the losses on the Union side made an ag- gregate in killed and wounded of twelve thousand five hun- dred men ; while the Confederate loss proves to have been above eight thousand.:}: in crossing and getting into action on our side of the river ; about wtich time General A. P. Hill'*s division arrived from Harper's Ferry."— Toombs' R«port : Ibid., p. 324. * This conjuncture is obtained by a comparison of the time of the attack and of the arrival of Hill. The assault was made about three o'clock, and Hill began to arrive about half-past two. " The head of my column arrived upon the battle-field of Sharpsburg, a distance of seventeen miles, at half-past two, and, repoi'ting in person to General Lee, he directed me to take position on our right."— Hill : Pteports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 128. f " The three brigades of my division actively engaged did not number over two thousand men, and these, with the help of my splendid batteries, drove back Burnside's corps of fifteen thousand men."— Hill : Ibid., p. 129. It appears, however, from Toombs' Report (Ibid., p. 335), that his brigade also aided in this counter-attack. X I give this only as an approximate estimate. General Lee gives his ag- gregate loss in killed and wounded in the Maryland campaign as ten thousand two hundred and ninety-one. As the killed and wounded in all the other ac- tions save Antietam were not above two thousand two hundred and ninety- one, it leaves about eight thousand for the casualties of that battle. Genera] McClellan states that about two thousand seven hundred of the Confederate dead were buried ; and taking this as a basis, aud counting the asual proper- 222 C-y^IPAIGNS OF the army of the POTOMAC. The morning of the 18th brought with it the grave question for McClellan whether to renew the attack or to defer it, even with the risk of Lee's retirement. After anxious de- liberation, he resolved to defer attack* during the 18th, with the determination, however, to renew it on the 19th, if re-enforcements, expected from Washington, should arrive. But during the night of the 18th, Lee withdrew across the Potomac, and by morning he stood again with his army on the soil of Virginia. This inactivity of McClellan after An- tietam, has been made the theme for so much animadversion, that it may be proper to set forth briefly the facts that should guide criticisiu in t]iis case. It should first of all be borne in mind that the action at Antietam, though a victory in its results, seeing that it so crippled Lee's force as to put an end to the invasion, was tactically a drawn battle — a battle in which McClellan had suffered as much as he had inflicted. In such cases, it re- quires in the commander a high order of moral courage to renew battle. An ordinary general, overwhelmed with his own losses, the sum and details of which forcibly strike his mind, and powerfully appeal to his sensibilities, is apt to lose sight of those equal, or perhaps greater, suffered by the enemy ; and hence indecision, timidity, and consequent in- action. "What McClellan knew was that the battle had cost the terrible sacrifice of over twelve thousand men ; that two of his corps were completely shattered, and that his oldest generals counselled a surcease of operations. He did not know, what is now a matter of historic certainty, that the Confederate army was by this time frightfully disorganized and almost at the end of its supplies both of food and am- munition. The general situation was, moreover, such as to inspire a circumspect policy on the part of McClellan ; for Virginia had been lost, and Maryland was invaded, and his tion of five wounded to one killed, the aggregate would be very much in excess of General Lee's statement. But it is needless to sound deeper in this sea of blood. * McClellan's Report, p. 211. THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 223 army was all that stood between Lee and Washington, Balti- more, and Philadelphia. The conduct of a commander should be judged from the facts actually known to him ; and these were the facts known to General McClellan. Nevertheless, I make bold to say (and in doing so I think I am seconded by the opinion of a majority of the ablest officers then in the army-), that Gen- eral McClellan should have renewed the attack on the morn- ing of the IStli. This opinion is grounded in two reasons — the one, general in its nature ; the other, specific and tactical. If it is possible to imagine a conjuncture of circumstances that would authorize a general to act a Voutrance and with- out too nice a calculation of risks, it is when confronting an enemy who, having moved far from his base, has crossed the frontier, and being foiled in his plan of invasion, is seeking to make good his retreat. This was the situation of Lee. He was removed an infinite distance from his base ; his plan of campaign had been baulked ; his army, reduced to half the effective of that of his opponent, was in a condition of great demoralization, and he had a difficult river at his back. McClellan stood on his base, with every thing at his hand, and his troops, doing battle on loyal soil, fought with a verve and moral force they never had in Virginia and could be called on for unwonted exertion. But in addition to these considerations there is a special reason that promised a more successful result of an attack on the 18th than that which had attended the action of the 17th. The battle-field was by this time better understood; and notably General McClellan had had his attention directed to that commanding ground on the right, before mentioned, which formed the key-point of the field ; but which, strange to say, had been overlooked the day before. It was proposed to seize this point with a part of Frankhn's corps ; and had - I may liere say that this opinion is shared by General Franklin, an officer distingiiished for the maturity of his military judgments. He, at the time urged a renewal of the attack on the morning of the 18th. 224 CAMPAIGNS OP THE AmiY OF THE POTOMAC. this been done, Jackson's position would have been wholly untenable. Besides, Burnside held the debouclie of the bridge on the extreme left, and threatened the Confederate right; and Porter's corps was fresh — having been in reserve the day previous. If these considerations may be regarded as over- ruling the reasons that prompted McClellan to postpone at- tack, then his conduct must be looked upon as an error. The Confederate campaign in Maryland lasted precisely two weeks. Its failure was signal. Designed as an invasion, it degenerated into a raid. Aiming to raise the standard of revolt in Maryland, and rally the citizens of that State around the secession cause, it resulted in the almost complete dis- ruption of that army itself. Instead of the flocks of recruits he had expected, Lee was doomed to the mortification of seeing his force disintegrating so rapidly as to threaten its utter dissolution, and he confessed with anguish that his army was " ruined by straggling." * Thoroughly disillusion- ized, therefore, respecting co-operation in Maryland, on which he had counted so confidently, it is not probable that Lee would have sought to push the invasion far, even had its military incidents turned out better for him ; but from the moment he set foot across the Potomac circumstances so shaped themselves as to thwart his designs. The retention of the garrison at Harper's Perry compelled him to turn aside * The Confederate reports are replete with evidence of the enonnous strag- gling that attended the Maryland campaign. Says Lee : " The arduous service in which our troops had been engaged, their great privations of rest and food, and the long marches without shoes over mountain roads, had greatly reduced our ranks before the action began. These causes had compelled thousands of Irave men to absent themselves, and many more had done so from unworthy mo- tives. This great battle was fought by less than forty thousand men on our side." — Report, p. 35. Says Hill : " Had all our stragglers been up, McClellan's army would have been completely crushed or annihilated. Thousands of thiev- ish poltroons had kept atcny from sheer cotcardice. The straggler is generally a thief, and always a coward, lost to all sense of shame : he can only be kept in the ranks by a strict and sanguinary discipline." — Rej'orts of Maryland Cam- paign, vol. ii., p. 119. THE MARYLAND C.VMPAIGN, 225 and reduce that place. This reqviired the presence of his whole army to cover the operation; and before it was com- pleted, McClellan had come up and forced him into a corner, so that he never was able to carry out his original design of taking up a position in "Western Maryland, whence to threaten Pennsylvania. Crij)pled at Antietam, he was fain to cross the Potomac, and seek in Virginia the opportunity to gather up the fragments of his shattered strength ; for he had no longer the army with which the campaign was begun. More than thirty thousand men of the seventy thousand with which he set out from Richmond, were already dead or liors de combat. The remainder were in a sorry plight. Both armies in fact felt the need of some repose ; and, glad to be freed from each other's presence,* they rested on their arms — the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley, in the \dcinity of Winchester, and the Army of the Potomac near the scene of its late exploits, amid the picturesque hills and vales of Southwestern Maryland. III. CLOSE OF McCLELLAN'S CAREER. The movement fi'om Washington into Maryland to meet Lee's invasion, was defensive in its purpose, though it as- sumed the character of a defensive-offensive campaign. Now that this had been accomplished and Lee driven across the frontier, it remained to organize on an adequate scale the means of a renewal of grand offensive operations du'ected at the Confederate army and toAvards Eichmond. The comple- tion of this work, including the furnishing of transportation, clothing, supplies, etc., required upwards of a month, and * On the retreat of Lee, a not very judicious pursuit into Virginia was madi^ by a part of Porter's corps, but the pursuing column was soon driven back across the Potomac with considerable loss. 15 226 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. during tliis period no military movement occurred, with tli<^ exception of a raid into Pennsylvania by Stuart. About the middle of October, that enterprising officer, with twelve or fifteen hundred troopers, crossed the Potomac above Williams- port, passed through Maryland, penetrated Pennsylvania, occupied Chambersburg, where he burnt considerable govern- ment stores, and after making the entire circuit of the Union army, recrossed the Potomac below the mouth of the Monoc- acy. He was all the way closely pursued by Pleasonton with eight hundred cavalry, but though that officer marched seventy-eight miles in twenty-four hours, he was unable to intercept or overtake his fast-riding rival. On the recrossing of the Potomac by Lee after Antietam, McClellan hastened to seize the dehouclie of the Shenandoah Valley, by the possession of Harper's Ferry. Two coi-ps were posted in its vicinity, and the Potomac and Shenandoah spanned by ponton-bridges. At first McClellan contemplated pushing his advance against Lee directly down the Shenan- doah Valley, as he found that, by the adoption of the line east of the Blue Ridge, his antagonist, finding the door open, would again cross to Maryland. But this danger being re- moved by the oncoming of the season of high-water in the Potomac, McClellan determined to operate by the east side of the Blue Ridge, and on the 26th his advance crossed the Potomac by a ponton-bridge at Berlin, five miles below Har- per's Ferry. By the 2d November the entire army had crossed at that point. Advancing due southward towards Warrenton, he masked the movement by guarding the passes of the Blue Ridge, and by threatening to issue through these, he compelled Lee to retain Jackson in the Valley. "With such success was this movement managed, that on reaching Warrenton on the 9th, while Lee had sent half of his army forward to Culpepper to oppose McClellan's advance in that direction, the other liaK was still west of the Blue Ridge, scattered up and down the Valley, and separated from the other moiety by at least two days' march. McClellan's next projected move was to strike across obhquely westward and THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 227 inteipose between the severed divisions of the Confederate force; but this step he was j^revented from taking by his sudden removal from the command of the Ai^my of the Potomac, while on the march to Warrenton. Late on the night of November 7th, amidst a heavy snow-storm. General Buckingham, arriving post-haste from Washington, reached the tent of General McClellan at Kectortown. He was the bearer of the following dispatch, which he handed to General McCleUan : General Orders, No. 182. Wak Depaetment, Adjutant- General's Office, Washington, November 3, 1S62. By direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take the command of that army. By order of the Secretary of War. E. D. TOWNSEKD, Assistant Adjutant-General. It chanced that General Burnside w^as at the moment with him in his tent. Opening the dispatch and reading it, with- out a change of countenance or of voice, McClellan passed over the paper to his successor, saying, as he did so : " Well, Burnside, you are to command the army."* Thus ended the career of McClellan as head of the Army of the Potomac — an army which he had first fashioned, and then led in its maiden but checkered experience, till it became a mighty host, formed to war, and baptized in fierce battles and renowned campaigns. From the exposition I have given of the relations which had grown up between him and those who controlled the war-councils at Washington, it will have appeared that, were these relations to continue, it would have been better to have even before this removed McClellan — better for himself, and better for the country. This, indeed, * Hurlbut : McClellan and the Conduct of the War. 228 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. was practically done, when, on the return from the Peninsula, his troops were sent forward to join Pope ; but the disastrous termination of that campaign prompted the recall of McClel- lan as the only man who could make the army efficient for the trying emergency. Having accomplished his work of expelling Lee from Maryland, he entered, after a brief repose, on a new campaign of invasion ; and it was in the midst of this, and on the eve of a decisive blow, that he was suddenly removed. The moment chosen was an inopportune and an ungracious one ; for never had McClellan acted with such vigor and rapidity — never had he shown so much confidence in himself or the army in him. And it is a notable fact that not only was the whole body of the army — rank and file as well as officers — enthusiastic in their afifection for his person, but that the very general appointed as his successor was the strongest opponent of his removal. The military character of McClellan will not be difficult to settle, however much it is yet obscured by mahcious detrac- tion on the one hand, or blind admiration on the other. He was assuredly not a great general ; for he had the pedan- try of war rather than the inspiration of war. His talent was eminently that of the cabinet ; and his proper place was in Washington, where he should have remained as general-in- chief. Here his ability to plan campaigns and form large strategic combinations; which was remarkable, would have had full scope ; and he would have been considerate and helpful to those in the field. But his power as a tactician was much in- ferior to his talent as a strategist, and he executed less boldly than he conceived : not appearing to know well those counters with which a commander must work — time, place, and circum- stance. Yet he was improving in this regard, and was like Turenne, of whom Napoleon said that he was the only exam- ple of a general who grew bolder as he grew older. To General McClellan personally it was a misfortune that he became so prominent a figure at the commencement of the contest ; for it was inevitable that the first leaders should be sacrificed to the nation's ignorance of war. Taking this into THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 229 account, cstimatinc; both wliat he accomphshed and what ho failed to accomplisli, in the actual circumstances of his per- formance, I have endeavored in the critique of his campaigns to strike a just balance between McClellan and history. Of him it may be said, that if he does not belong to that fore- most category of commanders made up of those who have always been successful, and including but a few illustrious names, neither does he rank with that numerous class who have ruined their armies without fighting. He ranges with that middle category of meritorious commanders, who, like Sertorius, "VVallenstein, and William of Orange, generally un- fortunate in war, yet were, in the words of Marmont, " never destroyed nor discouraged, but were always able to oppose a menacing front, and make the enemy pay dear for what he gained." 230 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC, yn. THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. November, 18G3-Jandary, 1863. CHANGE OF BASE TO FREDERICKSBURG. To the general on whose shoulders was placed at this crisis the weighty burden of the conduct of the Ai-my of the Potomac, the great responsibility came unsoiight and unde- sired. Cherishing a high respect for McClellan's military talent, and bound to him by the ties of an intimate affection, General Burnside naturally shrank from superseding a com- mander whom he unfeignedly regarded as his superior in abihty. The manly frankness with which Burnside laid bare at once his feelings towards his late chief and his own sense of inadequacy for so great a trust was creditable to him, and absolved him in advance from responsibilities half the weight of which at least was assumed by those who thrust tlie baton into his unwilling hands * To the pubhc his modest shrink- * General Burnside in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War makes a very frank statement of his opinion touching his own unfitness for the command of the army. " After getting over my surprise, the shock, etc., I told General Buckingham [the officer who brought the order from Washington assigning him to the command] that it was a matter that required very serious thought ; that I did not want the command ; that it had l>een offered to me twice before, and I did not feel that I could take it. * * I told them [his staff] what my views were with reference to my ability to exercise such a command, which views were those I had always unreservedly C B.RacliaTdsoii Ptililiaher. THE CAMPAIGN ON TIIE RAPPAHANNOCK. 231 ing and solicitude appeared the sign of a noble nature, wronging itself in its proper estimate, and it was judged that he was a man of such temper that the exercise of great trusts would presently bring him a sense of confidence and power. And, indeed, severely just though Burnside's judgment of his own capacity afterwards proved, there was at the moment no man who seemed so well fitted to succeed McClellan. Of the other corps commanders of the Army of the Potomac, no ono had yet proved his capacity in the exercise of independent command. But Burnside, as chief of the North Carolina ex- pedition, brought the prestige of a successful campaign, and it was known that he had energy, perseverance, and above all, a high degree of patriotic zeal. Frank, manly, and generous in character, he was beloved by his ovm corps, and respected by the army generally. To the troops he was recommended as the friend and admirer of McClellan ; and in this regard, as representing a legitimate succession rather than the usurpation of a successful rival, he seemed the man of all others best fitted to smooth over the perilous hiatus supervening on the lapse from power of a commander who was the idol of the army. Upon assuming command of the army. General Burnside made at Warrenton a halt of ten days, during which time he endeavored to get the reins into his hands, and he carried into execution a purpose he had formed of consolidating the six corps of the Army of the Potomac into three Grand Divi- sions of two corps each* — the Eight Grand Division being fspressed — that I was not competent to command sucli a large army as this. I had said the same over and over again to the President and Secretary of War ; and also, that if things could be satisfactorily arranged with General McClellan, I thought he could command the Army of the Potomac better than any other general in it."— Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i,, p. C-0. * The Right Grand Division was composed of the Second Corps under General Couch and the Ninth Corps under General Wilcox. The Centre Grand Division, of the Third Corps under General Stoneman and the Fifth Corps under General Buttcrfield. The Left Grand Division, of the First Corpg under General Reynolds and the Sixth Corps under Generid W. F. Smith. •232 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. placed under General Sumner, the Centre Grand Division under General Hooker, and the Left Grand Division under General Franklin. It need hardly be said that this protracted delay at the moment the army v^^as manoeuvring to fight a great battle, however necessary General Burnside may have deemed it," was likely seriously to jeopardize the opportunity presented by the scattered condition of Lee's forces when the army reached "Warrenton. At that time the Confederate right, under Longstreet, was near Culpepper, and the left, under Jackson, in the Shenandoah Valley — the two wings being separated by two marches ; and it had been General McClellan's intent, by a rapid advance on Gordonsville, to interpose between Lee's divided forces. But this was not a matter that touched Burnside's plan ; 'for he had already resolved to abandon offensive action on that line, and was determined to make a change of base to Fredericksburg on the Bappahaunock. It would be difficult to explain this determination on any sound military principle ; for while the destruction of the hos- tile army was, in the very nature of things, the prime aim and object of the campaign, General Burnside turned his back on that army, and set out upon a seemingly aimless adven- ture to the Rappahannock, whither, in fact, Lee had to run in search of him. If it be said that Richmond was General Burnside's objective point, and that, regarding this rather than the hostile force, he chose the Fredericksburg Une as one presenting fewer difficulties than that on which the army was moving (the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad), the reply is, that an advance against Richmond was, at this season, impracticable by any line ; but a single march would * In a like case, when the army was manceuvring to meet Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania, General Meade being nominated to succeed General Hooker, put the troops in motion without an hour's delay — the columns moving on as if no change had taken place. There were no circumstances that made the task easier in his case than in that of Burnside. THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 233 liave put liini in position to give decisive battle under circum- Titances eminently advantageous to him.* Military history is a repository of the brightest inspirations of genius and the wildest excesses of folly. It is therefore difficult for a general to commit a blunder so gross but that it can be matched by a precedent. Burnside's change of line of manoeuvre from one on which he had a positive objective — to wit, Lee's army — to Fredericksburg, where he had no ob- jective at all, is paralleled by Dumourier's conduct in Holland in 1793, respecting which Jomini remarks, that he " foolishly abandoned the pursuit of the allies in order to transfer the theatre from the centre to the extreme left of the general field."t But such instances are for the warning, rather than the imitation of commanders. The project of changing the line of operations to Freder- icksburg was not approved at Washington, but it was assented to ;:j: and on the 15th of November, General Burnside put his columns in motion from Warrenton. In the march towards Fredericksburg, it was determined that the army should * General Burnside, on coming into command of the army, drew up a plan of operations, which bears date, Warrenton, November 9, 18G2, and is ad- dressed to the general-in-chief. In this paper, urging the adoption of the Fredericksburg route, he states his intention of making " a movement upon Richmond from that point ;" but the statement is made vaguely, and he post^ pones giving " the details of the movement" till some time '• hereafter." In point of fact, General Burnside had not matured any definite plan of action, for the reason that he hoped to be able to postpone operations till the spring. He did not favor operating against Richmond by the overland route, but had his mind turned towards a repetition of McClellan's movement to the Peninsula ; and in determining to march to Fredericksburg he cherished the hope of being able to winter there upon an easy base of supplies, and in the spring embark- ing his army for the James River. How he could have counted on being allowed to carry out a plan so adverse to the wishes of the Administration, and involv- ing what the public temper could not be expected to brook, the inaction of the army for the winter, I do not undertake to say. I derive these revelations of General Burnside's motives and purposes from the corps-commander then most intimate in his confidence. f Art of War, p. 106. t Halleck : Report of Military Operations, 1862-3. 234 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. move by the north bank of the Eappahannock to Falmouth, where by a ponton-bridge, the boats for which were to bu forwarded from Washington, it would cross to Fredericksburo and seize the bluffs on the south bank. It had been also de- signed to march a force by the south side of the Eappahan- nock to anticipate the possession of the heights, but this was not done. Sumner's Grand Division led the van, and on the afternoon of the 17tli it reached Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg. The town was at this time occupied by a regiment of Virginia cavalry, four companies of Mississippi infantry, and one light battery. Wlien the head of Sumner's column reached the river these guns opened upon it from the heights above Fredericksburg, but they were in a few minutes silenced by a Union battery. The Rappahannock was at this time fordable at several points near Fredericksburg, and Sumner was exceedingly anxious to cross and take possession of the town and the heights in its rear, but was prevented from doing so by instructions from General Burnside.* The * Sumner : Report of Operations on tlie Rappahannock. In his evidence before the Congressional Committee, General Sumner says : " My orders were not to cross. But the temptation was strong to go over and take those guns the enemy had left. That same night I sent a note to General Burnside, asking if I should take Fredericksburg in the morning, should I be able to find a practicable ford, wliich, by the way, I knew when I wrote the note I could find. The general replied that he did not think it advisable to occupy Freder- icksburg until his communications were established" etc. — Report, p. 657. From the above it will be seen how erroneous is the statement of General Lee, who, in his official report, says : " The advance of General Sumner reacheJ Falmouth on the afternoon of the 17th, and attempted to cross the Rappahan nock, but was driven back by Colonel Ball, Avith the Fifteenth Virginia Cavaliy, four companies of Mississippi infantry, and Lewis's light battery."— Report ol Movements on tlie Rappahannock, p. 38. In point of fact, the only engage ment was a brief artillery duel between the Confederate battery above men- tioned and Petitt's battery of ten-pounder Parrotts. The writer stood beside tliis battery at the time, and can testify that Petitt in fifteen minutes, by hia excellent shots, caused the Confederate gunnel's to leave their guns ; and the pieces were only dragged off by the men crawling up and attaching prolongois to them. General Lee's statement is almost too absurd to require serioua reply. THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHiiNNOCK. 235 following days, 19tli and 20tli, Hooker's and Franklin's gi'and divisions reached the Eappahannock, near which the cntu^e Union army was now concentrated. At the time the army began its march from Warrenton, Longstreet's corps was at Culpepper Courthouse, and Jack- son's corps (with the exception of one division that had been transferred to the east side of the Blue Eidge) was still in the Shenandoah Valley. In this situation, nothing can be ima- gined easier than for Lee, by a simple manceuvre towards Warrenton, to have quickly recalled Burnside from his march towards Fredericksburg. The line of the Orange and Alex- andria Railroad is the real defensive line for Washington ; and experience has proved that a hostile force might always, by a mere menace directed against that hne, compel the Union army to seek its recovery. General Lee either felt himself to be not in condition to attempt any offensive enter- prise at this time, or he was prevented from doing so by instructions from Eichmond ; for he adopted the less briihant alternative of planting himself directly in the path of the Union army.* So soon as Burnside's intention of moving towards Fredericksburg was fully disclosed, Jackson's corps was directed on Orange Courthouse, and Longstreet was in- structed to march from Culpepper Courthouse on Fredericks- burg, which point his van reached two days after Sumner's arrival at Falmouth. A few days afterwards, Jackson's corps also was called up to the Eappahannock, which Lee assumed as his new defensive line.f Whatever may have been General Burnside's purpose in this transfer of the army, he could hardly have anticipated the result to which it conducted ; for having voluntarily moved away from the hostile force, that much more than any geographical point was the proper objective of his efforts, he * " It is not always by taking position in the direct path of an enemy that [lis advance is opposed ; but sometimes points may be occupied on the flank with much advantage, so as to threaten his line of operations, if he ventures to pass." — Dufour: Strategy and Tactics, p. 41. f Lee : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 38. 23G CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. cliose a new route to Kicliinond only to find his antagonist confronting liim thereon ! It was now even questionable whether he would be able to obtain possession of Fredericksburg. The passage of the Rappahannock was no longer the simple problem it had been when Sumner first drew up at Falmouth ; for the rapidly ar- riving forces of Lee,, gathering in strength on the menacing heights opposite, showed that the passage of the Rappahan- nock would cost a great battle. Nor was there at hand the means of making the crossing ; for by a blunder, the respon- sibihty of which seems to be divided equally between General Halleck and General Burnside himself, no ponton-train had reached the army; and when, a week afterwards, it arrived, Lee's whole army had arrived also. Lee positioned his corps along the south bank of the river, and began the rapid construction of defences along the crest of hills in rear of Fredericksburg, extending from the river about a mile and a half above the town to the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, three miles below the town.* Day by day, new earthwork epaulements for the protection of artillery made their appearance on the Fredericksburg ridge, till, at the end of a few weeks, its terraced heights, crowned with the formi- dable enginery of war, presented an inferno of fire into which no man nor army would willingly venture. Nevertheless, action was imperative ; and as soon as Burn- side had established his base at Aquia Creek, and connected it with his front of operations by the restoration of the rail- road, preparations were begun for a crossing of the Rappa- hannock. Now, from the situation of the opposing forces, this operation obviously resolved itself into the alternative of forcing a direct passage at Fredericksburg, or of making a turning movement on one or the other of the Confederate flanks. The formidable character of the Fredericksburg de- fences, plainly visible from the north bank, seemed to pre- clude the former plan. A turning operation on the Con- * Lee : Rejxjrt of Operations on the Rappahannock, p. od. THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 237 federate right, by a movement clown tlie Rappaliannock, was therefore discussed, and it was at first determined to make tlie passage at Skenker's Neck, twelve miles below Falmouth. But the preparations for this move were discovered by the enemy, who concentrated below to meet the threatened ad- vance, and the purpose was abandoned.'' There remained the operation against the Confederate left by a movement up the Rappahannock. This plan does not, however, appear to have been entertained at this time, not- withstanding that it was what seemed to be dictated by sound mihtary considerations. As a tactical operation, it was easier than to make the passage below Fredericksburg,t and it gave the direction of attack on Lee's left, which was his strategic flank ; for the manoeuvre, if successful, would throw the en- emy back towards the coast. But there were other consider- ations that determined Burnside's plan. It was discovered that the preparations that had been made to cross at Skenk- er's Neck had so engaged Lee's attention, that he continued to hold a considerable force near that point ; and Burnside judged that by making a direct crossing at Fredericksburg, he might surprise Lee tlnis divided. It will be conceded that if this purpose could have been successfully executed, the result would have been eminently advantageous ; but it is far from clear how its successful execution could have been reasonably exi^ected, Tlie passage of a river by a great * " On the 3d of December, my division was sent to Port Royal, a few miles below Skenker's Neck, to prevent the crossing of the Yankees at or near that point." — General D. H. Hill : Report of Operations on the Rappahannock. Up to the time of the battle of Fredericksburg, Longstreet's command held the heights at the town ; Hill remained at Port Royal, and the rest of Jackson's corps " was so disposed as to support Hill or Longstreet, as occasion might re- quire." — Lee: Report of Fredericksburg, p. 38. Hill on the 5th succeeded in driving oif several Union gunboats that attempted to ascend the Rappahannock towards Fredericksburg. f The Rappahannock below Fredericksburg increases rapidly in width, and at the first available point below Skinker's Neck Avould require one thousand feet of bridging, whereas above Banks' Ford from two to three hundred feet would suffice. — Warren : Report of Engineer Operations on the Rappahannock 238 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. army, observed by a watchful opponent, is not an operation of the nature of a coup de mam; and unless the enemy could neither see nor act, it was manifest he might concentrate his force as rapidly as the assailant could defile on the south- ern bank. Now this remote contingency of a surprise was the sole recommendation of the operation ; for, otherwise, the attack of the fortified position behind Fredericksburg was not of a kind to be voluntarily undertaken. It was certainly a slender chance on which to hazard the issue of a great battle : but Burnside boldly accepted the risk. The 10th of December found the preHminary preparations completed, and it was determined to force the passage of the Rappahannock the following day. II. THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. Viewed as a tactical operation, the passage of the Rappa- hannock at Fredericksburg presented no formidable diffi- culties ; and, indeed, the configuration of the ground is such that it is not in the power of an enemy occupying the south side to prevent it. On both banks of the stream, and parallel with its course, there runs a well-defined crest of hills ; but that on the northern side, named the Stafford Heights, ap- proaches close to the river's margin and commands the oppo- site side, where the heights stand at a distance of from three- quarters of a mile to a mile and a half from the bank. Union artillery could therefore control the intermediate plain, and it was beHeved that it could neutralize the efibrts of the enemy to oppose the construction of bridges. But the thought of what must come after the crossing was one to give pause to every reflecting mind. During the night of the 10th, under direction of Chief-of- Artillery Hunt, the Stafford Heights were crowned by a power- /v"*// 7//// '•'tliuiiiHiii ^y v'- '%-':% M.i|) of iIk- DEC 13 TH. 1862 j; irii/px f ', -I * -Refer ENces ^_= - = - - / '////.// 7} v>,v« Co,>/M.n,/<' Troor^ h.Meuih}, ihrthe.s/ ,ul,„nr, .' r/,.uve of lre,„/>ler.s hru, THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 239 fill artillery force, consisting of twenty-nine batteries of one hundred and forty-seven guns, destined to reply to the enemy's batteries, to control his movements on the plain, to command the town, and to protect and cover the crossing. At the same time, the troops were moved forward to positions immediately behind the ridge, and the ponton-trains were drawn down to the river's brink. It had been determined to span the stream by five ponton-bridges— three directly opposite the city, and two a couple of miles below. On the former, Sumner's and Hooker's Grand Divisions were to cross, while Franklin's Grand Division was to make the passage by the lower bridge. Before dawn of the morning of the 11th, the boats were un- shipped from the teams at the river's brink ; and, swiftly and silently, the engineer troops proceeded to their work, amid a dense fog that filled the valley and water-margins, and through which the moving bridge-builders appeared as spec- tral forms. But no sooner did the artificers attempt to begin the construction of the bridges than they were met by volleys of musketry at short range from the riflemen posted opposite, behind the stone houses and walls of the river-street of Fred- ericksburg ; and instantly the double report of a piece of ordnance boomed out on the dawn. This was the signal-gun that summoned the scattered Confederate corps to assemble for the long-expected attack.* Aware, from the configuration of the ground, that he could not hope to prevent the passage of the stream, Lee made his dispositions to resist the advance after crossing.! He, how- * " The artificers had but got fairly to work when the firing of two guns from one of the enemy's batteries announced that we were discovered. They were, doubtless, signal-guns." — W. Swinton : Correspondence of New York Times, December 13, 1802. General Longstreet says: "At three o'clock, our signal- guns gave notice of the enemy's approach. The troops, being at their difierent camp-grounds, were formed immediately, and marched to their positions along the line."— Confederate Reports of Fredericksburg, p. 428. f " The plain of Fredericksburg is so completely commanded by the Stafford Heights that no effectual opposition could be made to the construction of bridges or the passage of the river. Our position was therefore selected witli a view to resist the enemy's advance after crossing."— Lee : Report of the Battle of Fredericksburg, p. 39. 240 CAMPAIGNS OF TIIE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. ever, caused a couple of regiments of Mississippi riflemen to be posted behind the stone walls of the river-street of Fred- ericksburg, to resist, as long as might be, the constiiiction of the bridges. An unexpected success attended their efforts. At the point assigned for Franklin's crossing, two miles below the town, there was no such protection for the sharp-shooters, and they were therefore covered by rifle-trenches near the river's brink. But Franklin soon succeeded in dislodging this force, and by noon two bridges were available for the passage. The attempt to construct the bridges opposite the town, however, met a different fate ; for the keen- eyed marksmen opposed so vigorous an opposition to the laying of the pon- tons that the little band of engineers, murderously thinned, was presently compelled to slacken work, and then cease altogether."" Several hours passed in renewed but unavailing efforts, and it became clear that nothing could be done until the sharp-shooters were dislodged from their lurking-places. To accomplish this, Burnside, at ten o'clock, gave the com- mand to concentrate the fire of all the artillery on the city and batter it down. On this there opened from the massive con- centration of artillery a terrific bombardment that was kept up for above an hour. Each gun fired fifty rounds, and I know not how many hundred tons of iron were thrown into the town. Of the effect of this, however, nothing could be seen, for the city Avas still enveloped in mist ; but presently a dense pillar of smoke, defining itself on the background of fog, showed that the town had been fired by the shells ; and at noon the curtain rolled up, and it was seen that Fredericks- burg was in flames at several points. Appalling though the bombardment was as a spectacle, it was of very slight military * Two regiments of Hancock's division, sent to cover tlie working parties engaged in building the bridge directly opposite Fredericksburg, soon lost from their thin ranks one hundred and fifty men. — Hancock : Report of Fredericks- burg. These regiments were, the Fifty-Seventh New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman, and the Sixty-Sixth New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Bull, of Zook's brigade, Hancock's division. Couch's corps. THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 241 pcdvantage ;* the hostile force lay oiit of range behind the hills iu rear of the town, and the artillerists were unable to give sufficient depression to their guns to reach the river-front of the city, along which the marksmen were posted, and the con- flagration did not extend but died out. During the thick of the bombardment, a fresh attempt was made to complete the one half-finished bridge opposite the town ; but this too failed. The day was wearing away, and afiairs were at a dead-lock. In this state of facts, the chief of artillery, Brigadier-General Hunt, an officer of a remark- ably clear judgment, made a suggestion that proved the fit thing to be done. He proposed that a party should be sent across the river in the open ponton-boats, and that after dis- lodging or capturing the opposing force, the bridges should be rapidly completed. The Seventh Michigan Eegiment and the Nineteenth and Twentieth Massachusetts regiments of Howard's division volunteered for this perilous enterprise. i' Ten ponton-boats were lying on the brink of the river waiting to be added to the half-finished bridge. Rushing down the steep bank, the party found shelter behind these and behind the piles of planldng destined for the covering of the bridge ; and in this situation they acted for fifteen or twenty minutes as sharp-shooters, to hold in check the South- ern tirailleurs opposite, while the boats were pushed into the stream. This being accomplished, the men quickly sought the boats, pushed ofl:', and the oarsmen pulling lustily, they iu a few minutes, notwithstanding the severe fire by wdiich several were killed or wounded, came under cover of the opposite bluff. Other boats followed, and so soon as an adequate number of men were assembled on the Southern * It has, indeed, seldom been found that such bombardments of towns aro of any avail, and, as Carnot observes, they are generally adopted only when real means are lacking. "Les bombardemens sent en general beaucoup nioin.s a craindre qu'on ne le pense ordinairement. On les employe lorsqu'on manque de moyens reels." — Da la Defense des Places Fortes : Bibliotheciua Militaire, tome v., p. 523. f Couch's Report of Fredericksburg. 10 242 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. side, tliey rushed up the steep bank, when the Confederate marksmen, seeing the new turn of affairs, emerged fi'om cellar, rifle-pit, and stone wall, and scampered off up the streets of the town; but upwards of a hundred of them were captured. The buildings that had afforded shelter for the sharp-shooters were taken possession of, and the ponton- bridges were in a few minutes completed. Thus by a simple stroke of genius was accomplished what the powerful enginery of a hundred guns had failed to effect. The affair was gallantly executed, and the army, assembled on the northern bank, spectators of this piece of heroism, paid the brave fellows the rich tribute of soldiers' cheers. That evening Howard's division of Couch's corps crossed the river and occupied Fredericksburg, having a sharp skir- mish in the upper streets of the town ; and the next day, under cover of a fog, the other divisions of Couch's corps, and the Ninth Corps under General Wilcox (thus including the entire Kight Grand Division under Sumner), passed to the south side of the Rappahannock. At the same time, Franklin crossed several divisions of his command by the bridges he had con- structed below. The Centre Grand Division imder Hooker was still held on the north bank of the river. The whole of the 12th of December was consumed in passing over the columns and reconnoitring the Confederate position. The troops lay on their arms for the night under that December sky: then dawned the morning of Saturday, the 13th, and this was to be the day of the battle. Eight-and-forty hours had now passed since that signal gun, booming out on the dawn, sounded the note of concen- tration for the Confederate forces. Longstreet's corps was already at Fredericksburg ; Jackson held the stretch of river below — his right at a remove of eighteen miles. But he had had abundant time to call in his scattered divisions, and the morning of the 13th found the entire Confederate army in position,* Wliatever hope of a successful issue attached to * " Earlj on the morning of the 13tli, Ewell's division under General THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 243 General Biirnside's plan of attack rested on the hypothesis that the crossing of the Eappahannock at Fredericksburg could be made a surprise,* But this expectation had been grievously disappointed, and it would have been a judicious measure then to have made other dispositions ;t for the naked enterprise, stripped of this hope, was of a very desperate character. A brief description of the terixdn will serve to prove this. The battle-field of Fredericksburg presents the character of a broken plain stretching back from the southern margin of the Rappahannock from six hundred yards to two miles, at which distance it rises into a bold ridge that forms a shght angle with the river, and is itself dominated by an elevated plateau. This ridge is, from Falmouth down to where it touches Massaponax Creek about six miles long, and this was the vantage-ground of the Confederates which the had strengthened with earthworks and crowned with artilk In rear of the town the plain is traversed by a canal, at righv. angles with which run two roads leading up to the heights,^ which rise abruptly at the distance of a few hundred yards. Early, and the division of D. H. Hill, arrived after a severe night's march from their respective encampments in the vicinity of Buckner's Neck and Port Royal— the troops of Hill being from fifteen to eighteen miles distant from the point to which they were ordered." — Jackson : Report of Fredericksburg in Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 434. * " I decided to cross here because I felt satisfied that they did not expect ta to cross Jiere, but dovrn below." — Burnside's Evidence : Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 653. f A commander of any fertility of resource might readily have devised modifications of the plan adapted to the altered state of affairs. I shall men- tion one move that would have been promising. The passage of the river at Fredericksburg was made for a real attack. Burnside might have converted it into a feint ; he might have made threatening demonstrations of attack with Sumner's command, and meanwhile, he might have thrown Hooker's two corps up by Banks' or United States Ford, to execute a turning movemer.t on Lee's left. Hooker could have been strengthened almost indefinitely, and it is difficult to see why this operation should have failed of success. X The road to the right leads from Fredericksburg to Culpepper ; that to the left, named the " Telegraph Road," from Fredericksburg to Richmond. 2M CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. This position formed the left of the Confederate line, and here Lee disposed Longstreet's corps. It was these heights that the right of the Union army under Sumner was destined to assail. The left of the Union line composed of the Grand Division of Franklin was, as already stated, two miles below Fredericksburg. The plain here stretches to a width of two miles, and is scolloped by spurs of hills, less elevated than those in the rear of the town and clothed with dark pines and leafless oaks. This position, forming the right of the Confederate line, was held by Jackson's corps ; Stuart, with two brigades of cavalry and his horse artillery, formed the extreme right extending to Massaponax Creek.* The nature of the ground manifestly indicated that the main attack should be made by Franklin on the left ; for the field there affords ample space for deployment out of hostile range, whereas the plain in the rear of Fredericksburg, re- stricted in extent and cut up by ditches, fences, and a canal, caused every movement to be made under fire, presented no opportunity for manoeuvi-e, and compelled a direct attack on the terraced heights, whose frowning works looked down in grim irony on all attempt at assaidt. In the framing of his plan of battle, General Burnside con- formed to the obvious conditions of the problem before him, and caused it to be understood that General Franklin, who, in addition to his own two corps, had now with him one of Hooker's corps — that is, about one-half the whole army — should make the main attack from the left, and that upon his success should be conditioned the assault of the heights in rear of the town by Sumner. Such, at least, was the plan of action as understood by his lieutenants, who were to carry it into execution. When, however, on the morning of the 13th, the commanders of the two bodies on the left and right, Gen- erals Franklin and Sumner, received their instructions, it was found that having framed one plan of battle, General Burnside had determined to fight on another. I must add that the dis- * Lee's Report : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 40. THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 245 positions were sucli tliat it would be difficult to imagine anj worse suited to the circumstances, Franklin, in place of an effective attack, was directed to make a partial operation of the nature of a reconnoissance in force, sending " one division, at least, to seize, if possible, the heights near Hamilton's Crossing, and taking care to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open," while he was to hold the rest of his command " in position for a rapid move- ment down the old Richmond road."^'' General Sumner's instructions were of a like tenor : he was to " form a cohimn of a division for the purpose of pushing in the direction of the telegraph and plankroads, for the purpose of seizing the heights in rear of the town," and " hold another division in readiness to support in advance of this movement."t General Burnside's plan thus contemplated two isolated attacks by fractional forces, each of one or at most two divi- sions, one on the right and the other on the left. Such par- tial attacks seldom succeed, and directed against such a citadel of strength as the Confederate position at Fredericksburg, * For the full text of the order from Burnside to Franklin, see Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 701. On receipt of this order by Franklin, at half-past seven of the morning of the 13th, it was so diflTerent from what he had expected — so different from what General Burnside had given him reason to expect the night before — that he consulted with his two corps-commanders. General Reynolds and Smith, and they concluded from its terms that it meant there should be simply an armed reconnoissance with a single division, especially as the main point of the order, twice referred to, was that the command should be " kept in readiness for a rapid movement along the old Ekhmond road." — Franklin's testimony : Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 708. I have in my possession a copy of an elaborate statement on this point by General W. F. Smith, sworn to by him before a magistrate. In this he says . " General Franklin showed the order immediately to General Reynolds and myself, and the conclusion of all of us was that General Burnside had deter- mined not to adopt the plan of making the attack in force from the left. No one differed in what was intended by the order." f I derive this statejnent of General Sumner's instructions from Coucli's Report of the Battle of Fredericksburg, in which Burnside's orders to Sumner are given. 246 CAIVIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. such feeble sallies were simply ludicrous. Not a man in tlio ranks but felt the hopelessness of the undertaking.'^ The morning of the 13th found the sun strugghng with a thick haze that enveloped Fredericksburg and overhung the circumjacent valley, delaying operation for some hours.t But towards ten o'clock the lifting fog revealed the left of the army, under Franklin, spread out on the plain, and showed the gleaming bayonets of a column advancing to the attack. I shall first detail the operations on the left and then return to Sumner's force, which remained yet in the town. In obedience to his instructions, Franklin threw forward Meade's division, supported by Gibbon's division on the right, with Doubleday's in reserve for any emergency. Meade ad- vanced across the plain, but had not proceeded far before he was compelled to stop and silence a battery that Stuart had posted on the Port Royal road, and which had a flank fire on his left. This done, he pushed on, his line preceded by a cloud of skirmishes, and his batteries vigorously shelling the heights and woods in his front. This caused considerable loss to Hill, who held Jackson's advanced line ;:[. but the Confed- erates concealed in the woods made no reply from artillery or infantry, until Meade reached within point-blank range, when, suddenly opening, shell and canister were poured in fi-om the long silent Confederate batteries. Yet this did not stay him ; * That it may appear this is not a judgment penned apres coup, I add the following, written by the author of this volume on the field : " It was with pain and alarm I found this morning a general want of confidence and gloomy forebodings among officers whose sound j udgment I had learned to trust. The plan of attacking the rebel stronghold directly in front would, it was feared, prove a most hazardous enterprise. It was doubted that the co-operation of the right and left could be effective. ' The chess-board,' said Napoleon, in 1813, 'is dreadfully confused {embrouilli'). There is but I that see through it.' We all felt the application of the first part of this saying to our case. But did we feel equally confident that there was in our case an ' I' that saw through it f — W. Swinton : Correspondence of N. Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1863. f " The dense fog in the twilight concealed the enemy from view ; but his commands, ' Forward, guide centre, march !' were distinctly heard at different points near my right." — Longstreet : Report of Fredericksburg. X Hill's Report : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 464. THE CAMPAIGN OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 047 and the line advanced so boldly that the three Confcdcrato batteries posted in advance of the railroad had to be hastily withdrawn. The division of Hill which held Jackson's advanced line was thus disposed : the brigades of Archer, Lane, and Pender from right to left, with Gregg's in rear of the interval between Archer and Lane, and Thomas's in rear of that between Lane and Pender. Meade pushed forward his line impetuously, drove back Lane through the woods, and then, wedging in be- tween Lane and the brigade on his right (Archer's) swept back the right flank of the one and the left flank of the other, cap- turing above two hundred prisoners and several standards, crossed the railroad, pushed up the crest, and reached Gregg's position on a new military road which Lee had made for the purpose of establishing direct connection between his two wings, and behind which Jackscm's second line was posted.* And now was seen the farcical character of Burnside's order of attack, by which a single division of five thousand men w^as assigned the work of fifty thousand. For, in assaults of this kind, there comes a moment of supreme importance, when the attacking column, having carried the enemy's first line, must assure its victory by a decisive blow, or be driven back by tlie hostile reserves and lose the fruit of all its gain. In this moment of intoxication and peril, the attacking Hue, confused and disintegrated by its advance, must be instantl}'^ supported by a fresh body, to consolidate and crown the victory, or else the enemy rallies and repels the victors. Such was precisely the result that happened to Meade ; for no sooner had he penetrated to the military road behind which the Confederate second line lay, than he was met by a fire for which he was not at all prepared. " The advancing * The importance of tliis road has been greatly exaggerated by General Burnside : it was made merely for convenience of transportation, and \\as in no sense a key-point. Meade's attack was certainly made in a spirited manner, but its success has also been much over-estimated. The dispositions and fore; of the Confederates plainly show that nothing could have resulted even had Franklin's entire Grand Division been put in. 248 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. columns of tlie enemy," says General Hill,""" " had enconntered an obstacle in the military road which they Uttle expected — Gregg's brigade of South Carolinians stood in the way." It appears that the advancing Federals were mistaken for a body of Confederate troops, and Gregg would not allow his men to open on them. When their true character was revealed, the brigade poured a withering fire into the faces of Meade's men ; and, at that moment, Early's division — one of the two divisions of Jackson's second line — swept forward at the double-quick, and instantly turned the tide.f Exposed to fire on both flanks, Meade was forced to draw back, losing severely in the process ; and the disaster would have been much greater had not supports been at hand. General Frank- lin, giving a liberal interpretation to Burnside's prescription of " one division at least" for the column of attack, had put in not only Meade's division but Gibbon's division and Doubleday's division, making the whole of Eeynolds' corps. Doubleday, early in the attack, was turned off to the left to meet a menace by the enemy from that direction ; but Gibbon advanced on the right of Meade, and, though he did not push on as far as the latter, he helped stem the hostile return, and assisted in the withdrawal of Meade's shattered line.:}: In addition to these two divisions. General Franklin ordered forward Birney's divi- sion of Stoneman's corps ; and Birney arrived in such time that, when the troops of Meade and Gibbon were broken and flying in confusion, he presented a firm line that checked the Confederate pursuit.§ Meade's loss was very heavy — ujDwards * Reports of the Army of Northern "Virginia, vol. ii., p. 4Go. f I loarn from Colonel Marshall of the staff of General Lee, that General Gregg was killed on the military road while beating down the muskets of his men to prevent them firing into what he supposed was a body of Confederate troops. l Meade : Report of Fredericksburg. i^ " As I advanced with my command to the crest of the hill, I found Meade's entire command — two divisions — in utter confusion, and flying in all dii-ections without order from the field. At General Meade's request I tried to stop the rout with my command, and deployed two regiments to try to stop the fugitives ; but it was useless — they went right through us. The enemy - THE CAMPAIGN ON THE llAPPAHANNOCK. 240 of forty per cent, of his whole command ; and the aggregate loss in Eeynolds' corps was upwards of four thousand men. At the time the attack on the left was fully developed, Sumner, on the right, was instructed to assail the height back of Fredericksburg. He also was ordered to make the attack Avith a single division, supported by another. Of the two corps composmg Sumner's Grand Division, Couch's (Second) corps occupied the town, and Wilcox's (Ninth) held the inter- val between the left of Couch and the right of Frankhn's command. The attack, therefore, fell to the lot of Couch ; and, in accordance with instructions, he ordered forward French's division from the town at noon, to be followed and supported by Hancock's division.* French, debouching from the town, moved out on the plank and telegraph roads, and, crossing the canal, found a rise of ground, under cover of which he deployed his troops in column of attack with brigade front.f Hancock's division followed and joined the advance of French.^ Even while moving through the town, and marching by the flank, the troops were exposed to a very severe fire from the enemy' ,'- s pursued them closely witli great slaughter, as they fled from the field. The pursuit was so close that they came within fifty yards of my guns. I think it was Early's division," etc.— Testimony of General Birney : Report on the Con- duct of the War, vol. 1., p. 705. General ISIeade's own report, as well as the Confederate reports, agree substantially with this account. See Hill's Report : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 463 ; Early's Report : Ibid., p. 469. Birney's statement, regarding the pursuing column being that of Early, is curiously corroborated by the official report of the latter, in which he states that his division " was compelled to fall back from the pursuit by a large column on its right flank, which proved to be Birney's dlcidon," etc - Ibid., p. 470. * Couch : Report of Fredericksburg. f "General Kimball's brigade was in front, and by its subsequent conduct showed itself worthy to lead. It was followed in succession by the brigades of Colonel J. W. Andrews, First Delaware, and Colonel Palmer, One Hundred and Eighth New York."— Couch : Report of Fredericksburg. X Hancock's formation was the same as that of French : "brigade front with intervals of two hundred paces— the brigades in the order of Zook, Meagher, and Caldwell."— Hancock : RejOTrt of Fredericksburg. 250 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMT OF THE POTOMAC. batteries on the heights, against which it soon became im- possible for the numerous Union artillery on the north bank of the Ilai32)aliannock to direct its fire, seeing that the missiles presently began to play havoc with the columns advancmg over the plain.* Longstreet, who held the position in the rear of Fredericks- burg' forming the Confederate left, had taken up as his ad- vance line the stone wall and rifle-trenches along the telegraph road, at the foot of Marye's Heights ; and here he posted a brigade, afterwards re-enforced by another brigade, f But the whole plain was swept by a direct and converging fire from the numerous batteries on the semicircular crest above, and behind this lay the heavy Confederate reserves — un- needed, as it proved, for a few men were enough to do the bloody work. Under orders, nothing was left but to assail this position ; so French first was thrown forAvard from the rise of ground, where he had formed, towards the foot of the heights. No sooner had this division burst out on the plain, than from the batteries above came a frightful fire — cross showers of shot and shell opening great gaps in the ranks ; but " closing up," the ever-thinning hues pressed on, and had passed over a great part of the interval, when met by volleys of musketry at short range. They fell back, shattered and broken, with a loss of near half their number, amid shouts and yells from the enemy. Close behind French came up Hancock, and, being joined by such portions of French's command as still preserved their formation, his three bri- gades valiantly advanced under the same terrific fire, passed * " Our artillery being in position, opened fire as soon as the masses be- came dense enough to warrant it. This fire was very destructive and demoral- izing in its effects, and frequently made gaps in the enemy's ranks that could be seen at the distance of a mile." — Longstreet : Report of Fredericksburg. f This position was first held by the brigade of R. R. Cobb, re-enforced in the afternoon by Kershaw's brigade, both of McLaws' division ; and this small force, not exceeding seventeen hundred men, was all that was found necessary to repulse the numerous assaults made by the Union columns. — McLaws : Re- ports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 445. THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 251 the point Frencli liacl rcacliod, and like those that went before them, were forced back after little more than fifteen im- mortal minutes. Of the five thousand men Hancock led into action, more than two thousand fell in that charge ; and it was found that the bravest of these had thrown up their hands and lay dead within five-and-twenty paces of the stone wall.* To relieve Hancock's and French's hard-pressed bat- talions, Howard's division now came up, and Sturgis' and Getty's divisions of the Ninth Corps advanced on Couch's left, and made several attacks in support of the brave troops of the Second Corps, who ♦could not advance and would not retire ; but all these could do was to hold a line well ad- vanced on the plain under a continual murderous fire of ar- tillery. It is hardly to be supposed that General Burnside had con- templated the bloody sequence to which he was committing himself when first he ordered a division to assail the heights of Fredericksburg ; but having failed in the first assault, and then in the second and third, there grew up in his mind some- thing which those around him saw to be akin to desperation. Eiding down from his headquarters! to the bank of the Rap- pahannock, he walked restlessly up and down, and gazing over at the heights across the river, exclaimed vehemently, " That crest must be carried to-night,":]^ Already, however, every thing had been throw^n in, saving Hooker, and he was now ordered over the river. Crossing with three of his divisions. Hooker went forward, reconnoitred the ground, consulted with those who had pre- * HaDCOck took five thousand and six men into action, and his loss,num- bered two thousand and thirteen men, of whom one hundred and fifty-six were commissioned ofiBcers. The losses in some of the regiments were of a severity seldom seen in any battle, no matter how prolonged. " These were veteran ragiments," says Hancock, "led by able and tried commanders."— Report ol Fredericksburg. f At the "Phillips House," a mile or so back from the river. X These statements are made from the personal knowledge of the writer, in whose presence what is related occurred. 252 CAMPAIGNS OF TI]E ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. ceded him in action, saw that the case was hopeless, and went to beg Burnside to cease the attack. But Burnside in- sisted.* Couch had ah'eady thrown forward two batteries to within one hundred and fifty yards of the enemy's works, and endeavored to make a breach large enough for the entrance of a forlorn hope. After a vigorous cannonading, without any perceptible effect, Humphrey's division was formed in column of assault and ordered in. They were directed to make the assault with empty muskets, for there was no time there to load and fire.f When the word was given, the flien moved forward with great impetuosity, and advanced to nearly the same point Han- cock had previously reached, close up to the stone wall : they advanced, in fact, over a space the traversing of which by any column would result in the destruction of half its numbers, when the}^ were thrown swiftly back, leaving behind seven- teen hundred of the four thousand that had gone forward.;*: What else might have followed in the commander's then mood of mind, it is impossible to say ; but it was already hi~^ when Hooker's attack was begun, and night now dropped its curtain on a tragic scene, that miglit be fitly written only in the blood of the thousands of brave men who lay dead or moaning in agony worse than death on the plains of Freder- icksburg. So decisive was the actioii of the day that it is difficult to see how there could be any question touching the propriety of recrossing the Eappahannock. This course was earnestly urged by the chief commanders ; but General Burnside judged * " I liad the matter so much at heart that I put spurs to my horse, and rode over myself, and tried to dissuade General Burnside from making the attack. He insist(d on its being done."-- Hooker's testimony : Report on the Conduct of the AVar, vol. i., p. 6GS. f Hooker : Report of Fredericksburg. J There is an almost savage irony in the manner in which General Hooker states the result of this attack. " Finding," says he, " t/iat I hod lost as many men as my orders required me to lose, I ijuspended the attack."'— Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. GC8. THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 253 otlienvise, and determined to renew the assault on tlie morrow. The form this determination took was an evidence that he had lost that mental equipoise essential for a com- mander in the difficult situation in which he found himself. He resolved to form the Ninth Corps (Avhich he had himself formerly commanded) in a column of attack by regiments, and lead it in person to the assault of the heights. All the preparations had been completed, and the attack was about to be made when, moved by the urgent entreaties of Gen- eral Sumner, Burnside desisted fi'om his purpcJse. The troops, however, still lay on their arms during Sunday, the 14th, and Monday, the 15th, of December, and, during the night, in the midst of a violent storm, the army was with- drawn to the north side of the Rappahannock. General Lee, unaware of the extent of the disaster the Union army had suffered, hourly expecting a renewal of the attack, and deem- ing it inexpedient to expose his troops to the fire of the batteries on the north bank, refrained during all this time from assuming the offensive," and the withdrawal eluded his knowledge. ThQ loss on the Union side was twelve thousand three hun- dred and twenty-one, killed, wounded, and missing ;t and on the part of the Confederates, it was five thousand three hun- dred and nine, killed, wounded, and missing.:}: There is little need for comment on this battle, or for other reflection than must spontaneously arise from the simple recital of its incidents. Such slaughters stand condemned in the common voice of mankind, which justly holds a com- * Lee : Report of Fredericksburg in Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 43. f Hallecli : Report of Military Operations for 1863. General Halleck adds that a good many of the Union " missing" afterwards turned up. X This aggregate I make up from the returns of the two corps of Lee's army —the First (Longstreet's) losing three thousand four hundred and fifteen, and the Second (Jackson's) one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four. Confed- erate Reports of Fredericksburg. 254 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. mauder accountable for tlie useless sacrifice of liuman life. There are occasions when, as at Thermopylae, a general is doonied to the tragic fate of immolating himself and his army ; but such cases are rare and exceptional. It was not necessary for General Burnside, in a problem that admitted of indefinite solutions, to give to his army the character of a forlorn hope, in the assault of positions chosen, long-prepared, and impregnable, when he was free by manoeuvres to select his own field of battle. But even with the choice made of a direct attack of the fortified ridge, the plan of battle — if such fatuitous devise- ment as has seldom been seen can be called a lolan — was exceedingly faulty. The conditions of attack and defence, and the nature of the position already set forth, dictated that the principal operation should be made from the left, where Franklin held one-half the army in hand. It is true that General Burnside, at a period subsequent to the battle, asserted that this was his purpose, and endeavored to fasten the responsibility of the disaster on General Franklin's alleged failure to make an adequate attack. But judging by the orders in which General Burnside's original intent and will are revealed, rather than by the inspirations of after- thought, it is manifest that, if he designed to make the main attack from the left, he at least made no provisions for giving effect to this intention. It would appear from his own state- ment, that he made his theory of battle to hinge on a con- tingency which he used no adequate means to bring about, unless it be thought that two isolated attacks on the for- tified stronghold of the Confederates, made by a single division each, were adequate means to this end, and af- forded a reasonable hope of carrying the position. That they were wholly inadequate was proved by the terrible experiences of the day, both on the right and the left ; and the preliminary attacks having failed, as they must, I can only account for the tragic sequence, on the supposition I have already stated, that, distraught and demented with the failure, General Burnside continued in sheer despera- THE CAMPAIGN ON THE EAPPAHANNOCK. 255 tion to throw in division after division, to foredoomed de- struction. But wliile this may explain, it will not justify General Burnside's conduct. It would have been well for him had the failure of the first assaults, and the disclosures they made of the strength and position of the enemy, given him pause in their repetition. When General Warren at Mine Kun, after viewing the enemy's hne, which, like that at Fred- ericksburg, was manifestly impregnable, dechned to throw away the lives that had been placed in his charge, preferring with a noble sense of honor and duty to sacrifice himself rather than his command, that instinct of right which is never absent in a generous people, appreciated the motive and applauded the act. Had General Burnside followed the like prompting, he would have saved his name from association with a slaughter the most bloody and the most useless of the war. III. ABORTIVE MOVEMENTS ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. In tracing the development of military operations as they stand related to the army that was the agent of their execu- tion, it is important to mark not only the army's condition of material strength and well-being, but those moral transforma- tions with which, in so large a degree, its efficiency as a living organism is bound up. Nothing is more difficult than to indicate, in precise terms, that complex of qualities, passions, prejudices, and illusions, that at any given time make up what is expressively caUed the morale of an army. Like the imponderable forces of phj^sical philosophy, it is inappreciable by material weight and measure. Yet, if difficult of analysis, it does not fail to make itself felt as a palpable power ; and the foremost master 250 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARIVIY OF THE POTOMAC. of war attempted to convey liis sense of its potency by the expression that in military affairs, " the moral is to the physi- cal as three to one." That the morale of the Army of the Potomac becamo seriously impaired after the disaster at Fredericksburg was only too manifest. Indeed it would be impossible to imagine a graver or gloomier, a more sombre or unmusical body of men than the Army of the Potomac a month after the battle. And as the days went by, despondency, discontent, and all evil inspirations, with their natural consequent, desertion, seemed to increase rather than to diminish, until, for the first time, the Army of the Potomac could be said to be really demoralized.'' The cause of all this could not be concealed ; it was the lack of confidence in General Burnside — a sentiment that was universal throughout the army. Troops who have by experi- ence learned what war is, become severe critics. It is a mis- take to suppose that soldiers, and especially such soldiers as composed the American army, are lavish of their lives ; they are chary of their lives, and are never what newspaper jargon constantly represented them to be — " eager for the fray." " The soldier," says Marmont, " acquires the faculty of dis- criminating how and when he will be able, by offering his life as a sacrifice, to make the best possible use of it." But when the time comes that he discovers in his commander that which will make this rich offering vain, fi'om that moment begin to work those malign influences that disintegrate and destroy the morale of armies. General Burnside had brought his army to that unhappy pass that, with much regard for his person and character, it distrusted and feared his leadership ; while the general ofiicers had little belief in or respect for his * The form which this demoralization assumed was aptly expressed by General Sumner, in his ofBcial testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War touching the battle and the condition of the army as a general spirit of " croaking." " It is difficult," said he, " to describe the state of the army in other way than by saying there is a great deal too much croaking — there is not sufficient confidence." THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 257 military plans. It is easy to see liow fatal to the success of any military operations must have been this state of affairs ; and this received striking illustration in the two attempted movements which fill up the remainder of General Burnside's career as commander of the Army of the Potomac. The first of these movements was undertaken a fortnight after the bat- tle of Fredericksburg, towards the close of December. Gen- eral Burnside had determined to cross the Rappahannock seven miles below Frdericksburg, with a view to turn the Confederate position, and in connection with this operation he resolved to send a cavalry expedition to the rear of Lee's army for the piirpose of cutting the railroad communications of the Confederates. Now the raiding column had actually got under way, and the whole army was in readiness for an immediate move, when, on the 30th of December, General Burnside received a dispatch from President Lincoln instruct- ing him not to enter on active ojjerations without letting the President know of it. Surprised at this message, General Burnside recalled the cavalry expedition, and proceeded per- sonally to Washmgton to ascertain the cause of the presiden- tial prohibition. On seeing Mr. Lincoln, he was informed by him that certain general officers of the Army of the Potomac had come up to see him, and had represented that the army was on the eve of another movement ; that all the preliminary arrangements were made, and that they, and every prominent officer in the army, were satisfied, if the movement was entered upon, it woidd result in disaster. In consequence of this condition of facts, the President, without prohibiting a move, judged that any large enterprise, at that time, would be injudicious ; and General Burnside returned to his head- quarters amazed at the revelation of the state of feeling in the army that was notorious to every one in it save the com- mander himself. The position in which that officer now found himself was as false as it was humiliating ; and was one that neither his own sense of honor, nor the Government's sense of the public Welfare, should have permitted him to occupy. He had lost 17 ,3 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. ' : ) confidence of the army ; he was unable to obtain the sanction of the general-in-chief to any proposition for a more- • 1 nt, and at the same time the country looked to him for »i:'Lion. In this unhappy situation, General Burnside's con- .Inct was marked by a self-sacrificing and patriotic spirit ; I lit he was utterly helpless to extricate himself from the coil t ; it enveloped him. At length, as the be-all and the end-all (K his hopes, he resolved to again try the fortune of battle, in t'>ie expectation that if successful it would rehabilitate him in li.o confidence of the army. Unfortunately, success was already too necessary to him, aad he made too much contingent upon it ; for if success was iKodful as the means of recovering the confidence of the ai my, this very confidence was itself indispensable as a con- ..tion of success. The point at which General Burnside resolved this time to e.Ksay the passage of the Bappahannock was Banks' Ford (not tlion fordable), about six miles above Fredericksburg. As, L )vvever, the enemy had a force in observation at all the J acticable crossings of the Bappahannock, and as there was lii) possibility of making prej^arations for the passage at any one point with such secrecy that he should not become aware (>!; it, it was resolved to make feints of crossing at several I i:itinct points, both above and below Fredericksburg, and I . us mask the real intent. Accordingly, new roads were cut t rough the woods to aftbrd readier access to the fords, bat- t. .ies were planted, rifle-trenches were formed, and cavalry demonstrations made along the line ; and these manifesta- tions were made impartially at a variety of points. The weather and roads had been in excellent condition .->... ce the late battle, and on the 19th of January, 1863, the c.lumns were put in motion with such secrecy as could be ( bserved. The Grand Divisions of Franklin and Hooker jiscended the river by parallel roads, and at night encamped ii the woods at convenient distance fi'om the fords. Couch's f irps was moved below Fredericksburg to make demonstra- tions there, and the reserve corps under Sigel, which had THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 059 been united with the Army of the Potomac, was assign t J the duty of guarding the hne of the river and the comnui- nications of the army. Preparations for crossing were pusljcd on during the 20th, positions for artillery were selected, the guns were brouglit up, the pontons were within reach a short distance back from the river, and it was determined to make the passage on the following morning. But during the night a terrible storm came on, and then each man felt that the move was ended. It was a wild Walpurgis night, such as Goethe pamts in the Faust. Yet there was bravB work done during its hours, for the guns were haided painfully up the heights and placed in their positions, and the pontons were drawn down nearer to the river. But it was already seen to be a hopeless task ; for the clayey roads and fields, under the influence of the rain, had become bad beyond all former experience, and by dayhght, when t.> boats should all have been on the banks ready to slide dc into the water, but fifteen had been gotten up — not enougi. for one bridge, and five were wanted. Moreover, the night operations had not escaped the notice of the wary enemy, and by morning Lee had massed his army to meet the men- aced crossing. In this state of facts, when all the conditions on which it was expected to make a successful passage had been baulked, it would have been judicious in General Burnside to have promptly abandoned an operation that was now hopeless. But it was a characteristic of that general's mind (a char- acteristic that might be good or bad according to the direction it took), never to turn back when he had once put his hand to the plough ; and it had already more than once been seen that the more hopeless the enterprise the greater his pertinacity. The night's rain had made deplorable havoc with the roads ; * but herculean eftorts * The nature of the upper geologic deposits of this region affords unequalled elements for bad roads, for it is a soil out of which, when it rains, the bottom drops, and yet which is so tenacious that extrication from its clutch is nest to impossible. 260 CA5IPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. were made to bring pontons enough into position to build a bridge or two withal. Double and triple teams of horses and mules were harnessed to each boat ; but it was in vain. Long stout ropes were then attached to the teams and a hundred and fiflj men put to the task on each. The effort was but little more successful. Floundering through the mire for a few feet, the gang of LHiputians with theu' huge-ribbed Gulliver, were forced to give over, breathless. Night arrived, but the pontons could not be got up, and the enemy's pickets, discovering what was going on, jocularly shouted out their intention to " come over to-morrow and help build the bridges." Morning dawned upon another day of rain and storm. The ground had gone from bad to worse, and now showed such a spectacle as might be presented by the elemental wi'ecks of another Deluge. An indescribable chaos of pon- tons, vehicles, and artillery encumbered all the roads — supply- wagons upset by the road-side, guns stalled in the mud, ammunition-trains mired by the way, and hundreds of horses and mules buried in the liquid muck. The army, in fact, was embargoed : it was no longer a question of how to go forward — ^it was a question of how to get back. The three-days' rations brought on the persons of the men were exhausted, and the supp'ly-trains could not be moved up. To aid the return all the available force was put to work to corduroy the rotten roads. Next morning the army floundered and stag- gered back to the old camps, and so ended a movement that will always live in the recollection of the army as the " Mud March," and which remains a striking exemplification of the enormous difiiculties incident to winter campaigning in Virginia. The failure of this movement is sufficiently accounted for by those " slings and arrows of outrageous fortune" the efiect of which I have endeavored to portray ; and the commander was certainly justified in suspending it, and recaUing the army to its quarters, when the operation was seen to be hopeless. But General Burnside had fancied that he discovered another THE CAMPAIGN ON Tm<] RAPPAnANNOCK. OQl and deeper cause, tliat, aside from the interference of tlio weather, would have baulked his projected campaign. This cause was a lack of confidence in him which he believed to be entertained by the leading officers of the arm3\ Among these officers were Generals Franklin and Hooker, respectively com- manders of Grand Divisions ; and his first act on the return of the expedition was to prepare an order dismissing from the service of the United States Generals Hooker, Brooks, Cochrane, and Newton, and relie\-ing from their commands in the Army of the Potomac, Generals Franklin, W. F. Smith, Sturgis, Ferrero, and Colonel Taylor. Upon this order he resolved to make issue with the Government ; and he immedi- ately took this paper to Washington, demanding of the Presi- dent its approval or the acceptance of his resignation. It was not asserted by General Burnside that the officers named had been guilty of any dereliction of duty, but simply that they lacked confidence in him as commander. This charge was probably true ; but, as this issue involved the alternative of reHeving nearly the whole body of the officers of the army or of relieving General Burnside himself, the President was com- pelled to refuse to sanction the order. General Burnside's resignation was accepted; and General Hooker, the officer whose name stood in the order as head and front of all the offending, and who, by its terms, was dismissed the service of the United States, Avas by the President i)laced in command in his stead. General Burnside's career as head of the Army of the Potomac was as unfortunate as it was brief; and there is much in its circumstances and in his character to inspire a lenient judgment. His elevation to the command was un- sought by him ; for, with a good sense that was creditable to him, he knew and proclaimed his unfitness for the trust. It was right to try him, because it was impossible to tell whether his OAvn gauge of his fitness was correct, or whether he "^^^'onged himself by a self-distrust that he might soon surmount. When, however, the trial had proved the absolute justness of 262 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. his measure of liis own incapacit}^ (and there can be no doubt that this was fully proved by the events of the battle of Fred- ericksburg), they must be held accountable for the conse- quences who retained him in a j^osition which his own judg- ment, now fortified by the general verdict of the army, pronounced him unequal to fill. His retention after this, if there be any fidelity in the portrayal I have presented of the condition of the army, imperilled not only its efiiciency but its existence. Desertions were going on at the rate of about two hundred a day, and the ofiicial rolls at the time he was relieved showed an absence from the Army of the Poto- mac of above eighty thousand men — " absent from causes unknown.' * I must here add that, while the superior officers had httle respect for Burnside's military plans, they, nevertheless, did not allow their personal views to influence in the least their conduct. And it is the more important to state this con- viction with emphasis, because it was commonly believed throughout the country that General Burnside, especially in the last operation attempted, failed to receive from his sub- ordinates that hearty co-operation absolutely necessary to the success of any military enterprise.! It is not unlikely that General Burnside himself had the same suspicion ; for, though he did not put it forth, yet it is hardly to be supj^osed that he would have demanded the dismissal of the officers named in his expurgatorial index on the mere ground of their ab- stract military views— for it is vain for any commander to ex- pect to control these. General Burnside was, and would have been, obeyed in the execution of all his plans of operation ; * Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, voh i., p. 113. f It "Nvas one of the traits of the public temper during the war to be in con- stant suspicion of disaflfection and disloyalty on the part of officers. Yet, if tiiere be one characteristic of that period more remarkable than another, it is the absence of these things. And, in this regard, it strikingly contrasts with the common experience of nations at war ; for even Napoleon, wielding im- ]»rial power, found it next to impossible to subordinate the individual wills of hia lieutenants. THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAIIANXOCK. Cf for there was that loyal alacrity among the officers that won d liave prompted this in any circumstances of personal relati< ; . If, however, he was unable to command the homage of thc;j intellectual approval, that was his own misfortune.'''" * It may be observed, that many of the leading officers of the Army of t" r Potomac were not in favor of operating by the Fredericksburg line. The 1 lowing correspondence between Generals P^'ranklin and Smitli and Presidtii Lincoln has relation to this question. It is of great interest and has not befui.' been published. Headquarters Left Grand Division, Deoembor 21, 1862. To THE President : The imdersigned, holding important commands in the Army of the Pot" mac, impressed with a belief that a plan of operations of this army may 1 devised which will be crowned with success, and that the plan of campai;.'n which has already been commenced, cannot possibly be successful, present wi . diffidence the following views for consideration. Whether the plan proposed be adopted or not, they consider it their duty to present these views, thinkiii;^- that perhaps they may be suggestive to some other military mind in discui-.-.- ing plans for the future operations of our armies in the East. I. — We believe that the plan of campaign already commenced will not be successful for the following reasons, viz. : 1. The distance from this point to Richmond is sixty-one miles. It will be necessary to keep open our communications with Aquia Creek Landing from all points of this route. To effect this, the presence of laig bodies of troops on the road will be necessary at many points. The result c making these detachments would be, that the enemy will attack them, inte; rupt the communications, and the army will be obliged to return to drive hin. away. If the railroad be rebuilt as the army marches, it will be destroyed at important points by the enemy. If we do not depend upon the railroad, but upon wagon transportation, the trains will be so enormous that a groat deal of the strength of the army will be required to guard them, and the troops will be so separated by the train-, and the roads so blocked by them, that the advance and rear of the army could not be within supporting distance of each other. 2. It is in the power of the enemy at many points on this route to post himself strongly and defy us. The whole strength of our ai-my may not be suPJcient to drive him away ; and even were he driven away at great sacrific' of blood on our part, the result would not be decisive. The losses to him in hiy strong positions would be comparatively slight, while ours will be enormous. II.— In our opinion, any plan of campaign to be successful should posset- the following requisites, viz. : 2C4 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC. It was not possible to continue a condition of affairs tliat neutralized the best forces of the army, and the President wisely relieved General Burnside from a position deeply 1. All of the troops available ia the East should be massed. 2. They should approach as near to Richmond as possible -without an en- gagement. 8. The line of communication should be absolutely free from danger of interruption. A campaign on the James River enables us to fulfil all these conditions more absolutely than any other, for, 1. On the James River our troops from both Nortli and South can be con- centrated more rapidly than they can be at any other point. 2. They can be brought to points within twenty miles of Richmond with- out the risk of an engagement. 3. Tlie communication by the James River can be kept up by the assist- ance of the navy, without the slightest danger of interruption. Some of the details of this plan are tlie following : We premise that by concentrating our troops in the East, we will be able to raise two hundred and fifty thousand men. Let them be landed on both sides of the James River as near Richmond as possible, one hundred and fifty thousand on the north bank, and one hundred thousand or more on the south bank. All of them to carry three days' pro- visions on their persons and one hundred rounds of ammunition, without any other baggage than blankets, and shelter-tents, and a pair of socks, and a pair of drawers. Let it be understood that every third day a corps or grand division is provisioned from the river. If this arrangement be practicable (and we think it is), we get rid of all baggage, provision, and infantry ammu- nition wagons, and the only vehicles will be the artillery and its ammunition wagons and the ambulances. The mobility of the army caused by .carrying out these views will be more like that of an immense partisan 'corps than a modern army. The two armies marching up the banks may meet the enemy on or near the river. By means of pontons kept afloat, and towed so as to be reached at any point, one army can in a few hours cross to assist the other. It is hardly supposable that the enemy can have force enough to withstand the shock of two such bodies. If the enemy declines to fight on the river, the army on the south bank, or a portion of it, will take possession of the railroads running south from Rich- mond, while the remainder will proceed to the investment or attack upon Richmond, according to circumstances. Whether the investment of Richmond leads to the destruction or capture of the enemy's army or not, it certainly Will lead to the captm-e of the rebel THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 2G5 humiliating to any man of lionor. He lapsed from the great- ness thrust upon him without forfeiting the respect of the capital, and the war wll be on a better footing than it is now or tas any present prospect of being. The troops available for the movement are : the Army of the Potomac, the troops in Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina, with the exception of those necessary to hold the places now occupied, the regiments now in process of organization, and those who are on extra duty and furlough, deserters, and stragglers. The number of these last is enormous, and the most stringent measures must be taken to collect them — no excuse should be received for absence. Some of the troops in Western Virginia might also be detached. The transports should consist of ordinary steamers and large ferry-boats and barges. The ferry-boats may become of the greatest use in transporting troops across the James River. ^Vith the details of the movement we do not trouble you. Shoiild the general idea be adopted, these can be thoroughly digested and worked out by the generals and their staffs to whom the execution of the plan is committed. Very respectfully, your obedient servants, W. B. Franklin, Major-General. W. F. Smith, Major-General. E.XEcuTivE Mansion, Washington, December 22, 1S62. Major-General Franklin and Major-General Smith: Yours of the 21st, suggesting a plan of operations for the Army of the Potomac, is received. I have hastily read the plan and shall yet try to give it more deliberate consideration, with the aid of military men. Meanwhile, let me say it seems to me to present the old questions of preference between the line of the Peninsula and the line you are now upon. The difficulties you point out pertaining to the Fredericksburg line are obvious and palpable. But now, as heretofore, if you go to the James River, a large part of the army must remain on or near the Fredericksburg line to protect Washington. It is the old difficulty. When I saw General Franklin at Harrison's Landing on James River, last July, I cannot be mistaken in saying that he distmctly ad\ised the bringing of the army away from there. Yours, very truly, A. Lincoln. Headquarters Left Grand Division, December 26, 1S62. To THE President: I respectfully acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22d inst. In arguing the propriety of a campaign on the James River, we supposed Wash- ington to be garrisoned sufficiently, and the Potomac impassable except by bridges. The fortification of Harper's Ferry is another important requisite. 2GG CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. country for his zeal and patriotism ; but lie left behind him no illusions respecting his capacity for the command of an army. These matters were considered as of course, and did not enter into our discus- sion of the two plans of campaign. I presume that you are riglit in sujjposing that I advised the withdrawal of the army from James River in July last. I think that under the same circumstances I would give the same advice. The army was debilitated by what it had already gone through, was in an un- healthy position, its sick list was enormous, and there was a prospect that wo would have to remain in that position during the two worst months — August and September. The effect of this would have been to ruin the army in health. Circumstances are very difFerent now. The army is in good health, and the best months of the year are before us. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, W. B. Fkanklin, Major-Geueral. QiJ.:R.i.-hnTrl«n-n V-n'K THE CnANCELLORS\lLLE CAMPAIGN. 207 VIII. THE CHANCELLOPiSVILLE CAMPAIGN. April— May, 1863. I. THE ARMY UNDER HOOKER. In an army composed of citizens of a free country who have taken up arms from patriotic motives in a war they con- sider just there is a perennial spring of moral renovation. Such armies have constantly exhibited an astonishing endu- rance, and, possessing a bond of cohesion superior to disci- pHne, have shown their power to withstand shocks that would dislocate the structure of other military organizations. The Army of the Potomac was of this kind. Driven hither and thither by continual buffets of fortune ; losing its strength in unavailing efforts ; changing its leaders, and yet finding no deliverance ; misunderstood and unappreciated by the people whose battles it was fighting — it was not wonderful that it had sunk in energy. Yet, notwithstanding the untoward for- tunes the Army of the Potomac had suffered, it could hardly be said to be really demoraUzed, for its heart was still in the war ; it never failed to respond to any demand made upon it, and it was ever ready to renew its courage at the first ray of hope. Such a day-spring came with the appointment of General Hooker to the chief command, and under his influence the tone of the army underwent a change that would appear astonishing, had not its elastic vitality been so often proved. 2G8 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AliMY OF THE POTOMAC. Hooker's measures of reform were judicious : he cut away the root of many evils ; stopped desertion and its causes ; did away with the nuisance of the " Grand Division" organization ; infused vitahty through the staff and administrative service ; gave distinctive badges to the different corps ;* instituted a system of furloughs ; consohdated the cavahy imder able leaders, and soon enabled it not only to stand upon an equality v.ith, but to assert its superiority over, the Yirginia horsemen of Stuart.f These things proved General Hooker to be an able adminis- trative officer, but they did not prove him to be a competent commander for a great army ; and Avhatever anticipation might be formed touching this had to be drawn from his previous career as a corps-commander, in which he had won the repu- tation of being what is called a " dashing" officer, and earned the sobriquet of " Fighting Joe." He had gained a great popularity both in the army and throughout the country — a result to which his fine soldierly appearance and frank man- ners had much contributed ; nor was tliis diminished by a * The germ of the badge designation was the happy tliought of General Kearnej-, who, at Fair Oaks, ordered the soldiers of his division to sew a piece of red flannel to their caps, so that he could recognize them in the tumult of battle. Hooker developed the idea into a system of immense utility, and hence- forth the different corps and divisions could always be distinguished by the red, white, or blue trefoil, cross, lozenge, star, etc. f The cavalry of tlie army had hitherto had no organization whatever as a corjjs. It was organized by brigades or divisions and scattered among the grand division commanders. From the time of its consolidation it was able to act in its legitimate line, and underwent a great improvement. On the 10th of March, Hooker sent out an expedition of sis mounted regiments and a bat- tery, vmder General Averill, to engage the Confederate cavalry on Lee's left, hold- ing position near Kelly's Ford. Forcing the passage of the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, on the morning of the 17th, by a spirited dash, in which twenty- four of the enemy were captured, Averill pushed forward, driving the enemy before him for four miles south of the river, when he became engaged with the Confederate cavalry brigade of Fitz Hugh Lee. A very brilliant passage at arms here ensued, both sides repeatedly chargmg with the sabre. Nothing decisive resulted ; but the Union cavalry were much encouraged by the ex- ploit. Averill's loss was eighty-four ; that of the Confederates one hunired and seventy.— Fitz Lee : Report of Kelleysville. THE CIIANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 200 habit lie had of self-assej-tion, which, however, proved httU?, since it may be either the manifestation of impotent conceit, or the proud utterance of conscious power. Hooker had shown himself a pitiless critic of his predecessors in command : he was now to be tried in an ordeal whence no man had yet escaped unscathed. The new commander judiciously resolved to defer all grand mihtary operations during the wet season, and the first three months after he assumed command were well spent in re- habilitating the army. The ranks were filled up by the return of absentees ; the discipline and instruction of the troops were energetically continued, and the close of April found .the Army of the Potomac in a high degree of efficiency in all arms." It numbered one hundred and twenty thousand ment (infantry and artillery), with a body of twelve thousand well-equipped cavalry,! and a powerful artillery force of above four hundred guns.§ It was divided mto seven corps — the First Corps under General Keynolds ; the Second under General Couch ; the Third under General Sickles ; the Fifth imder General Meade ; the Sixth under General Sedg^'ick ; the Eleventh under General Howard ; and the Twelfth under General Slocum.H Lee's force was greatly inferior to that of his opponent ; for * It was not without truth that Hooker, at this time, in his grandiose style, named it " the finest army on the planet." \ This estimate is approximate ; the data are as follows : The effective of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth corps was put by General Hooker, just before Chancellorsville, at forty-four thousand six hundred and sixty-one. — Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 120. The effective of the Sixth Corps is given by General Sedgwick (ibid., p. 9")) as twenty-two thou- Eand ; and the effective of the First and Third corps, by the same authority, was thirty-five thousand. There remains the Second Corps, to which, if we give a minimum of eighteen thousand, there will result the aggregate of one hundred and nineteen thousand six hundred and sixty-one. I Pleasonton : Official Returns, May 27th. § Hunt : Report of Artillery Operations. fi Generals Franklin and Sumner both retired from the Army of the Poto- mac after the change of commander. The latter was assigned to a command in the West, but died soon afterwards at his home in New York, lamented by the army and the country as the bravest of soldiers and purest of men. 270 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC. relying on tlie strength of the hne of the Eappahannock, he had, in February, detached two divisions, under Longstrect, to operate south of the James liiver,""' and the remainder did not exceed an effective of fifty-five thousand men.i- Hooker, therefore, was in a situation to attempt a bold enterprise, and the close of April found him ready to cross the Eajipahan- nock and oive battle. II. THE PASSAGE OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK. The opposing armies had so long faced each other on the banks of the Eappahannock, that it may well be supposed there remained no point in the problem of the attack or de- fence of that line that had not been thoroughly considered. Since the battle of Fredericksburg and the subsequent at- tempts to pass the Eappahannock, Lee had extended his pur- view to the guarding of aU the practical crossings of that stream. At the time the operations resulting in the battle of Chancellorsville began, he occupied in force the heights south of the Eappahannock from Skenker's Creek to United States Ford (a distance of about tw^enty-five miles), having continu- ous lines of infantry parapets throughout, and his troops so disposed as to be readily concentrated on any given point. Interspersed along these lines of intrenchments Avere battery- epaulements, advantageously located, for sweeping the hill- slopes and bottom-lands over which an assailing force would have to march — the crests of the main hills being from three- quarters of a mile to a mile and a half from the river's mar- * " General Longstreet, with two divisions of his corps, was detached for service south of James River in February, and did not rejoin the army until after the battle of Chancellorsville." — Lee : Report of Chancellorsville, p. ;"j. f Tbe rolls of Lee's army showed, the 31st of March, 18G3, a force of G0,298. But at the battle of Chancellorsville, the reports of the subordinates make it fully ten thousand less. THE CIIANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 271 gin.* To gain the immediate banks opposite tlie centre of the enemy's line was, however, practicable in several places where the high ground on the north side approached the stream and enabled artillery to command it ; but the prospect of then gaining a footing on the heights was, from past expe- rience, hopeless. The Confederate right flank was so posi- tioned that Lee was secure against attack in that direction ; while above his left, at United States Ford, the junction of the Eapidan with the Eappahannock involved the passage of that stream also in any attempt to turn that flank. Indeed, the execution of a movement to turn the Confederate left by the Union army, at such a distance from its base, and with heavy ponton and artillery trains, and in face of means of in- formation such as Lee had at his command, seemed very un- likoly, and he gave himself very little concern about it. Pifticult as was the problem in all its aspects, and debarred as Hooker was from making a direct attack, the most prom- ising enterprise was nevertheless an operation against Lee's left. This, after much cogitation. Hooker resolved to execute, and he formed a very bold plan of operation. He determined to make his main movement against the enemy's left by a strong column, that by a wide detour up the Eappahannock to Kelly's Ford (twenty-seven miles above Fredericksburg) should pass round Lee's flank to Chancellorsville ; while he resolved to mask this turning operation by forcing the Eappa- hannock near Fredericksburg with a considerable body, and ostentatiously threatening direct attack. He expected that the successful execution of the turning operation would have the effect to cause Lee to abandon his defences along the Eappahannock, when battle might be given with great ad- vantage. In co-operation with this attack, he prepared a powerful cavalry column of ten thousand sabres, destined to operate simultaneously on Lee's railroad communication with Eichmond. * Warren : Report of Engineer Operations connected witli the Battle of Chancellorsville. 272 CA^IPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC. The turning column was composed of tliree corps — tlie Fifth (Meade), the Eleventh (Howard), and the Twelfth (Slocum), Marching on the morning of Monday, April 27, this force reached the vicinity of Kelly's Ford on the follow- ing day. During the night of the 28th, and next morning, the passage of the Rappahannock was made at Kelly's Ford on a canvas ponton-bridge, laid with but slight opposition from a small observing force; and the three corps, being divided into two columns, moving on parallel roads, took up the line of march towards Chancellorsville, to reach which it was necessary first to cross the Eapidan. The right column (Eleventh and Twelfth corps) struck the Eapidan at Ger- manna Ford,* the left column (Fifth Corps) at Ely's Ford. The stream proved to be barely fordable ; but celerity of movement being an object of the first importance, it was im- mediately resolved to cross the troops by wading — an arduous and somewhat dangerous feat ; for the stream is rapid, and even at the fords came up to the shoulder. The men, how- ever, plunged in — the greater part stripping and carrying their clothes and cartridge-boxes on their bayonets — and amid shouts and scenes of Homeric laughter and gayety waded through the water, which reached to their arm-pits. Such as were carried away by the current were caught by a cavahy picket stationed below. After dark (the crossing being con- tinued all night) huge bonfires were kindled, and by the aid of the lurid light thus cast over the wild scene, the troops filed over the river, and next morning all were across. The soldiers were in the highest spirits ; for, acute judges of mili- tary movements as the rank and file always are, they knew that the march they had made was one of those pregnant marches that are in themselves victories : so they gayly headed towards Chancellorsville, which was the assigned point of concentration and which they reached in the after- noon of the 30th. * At this ford, a party of Confederates were found engaged in rebuilaing the bridge ; but by a well-executed movement most of them were captured. THE ClIANCELLOllSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 273 'Wlnle the three corps, whose movements I have indicated, liad passed far up the Eappahannock to Kelly's Ford, the Second Corps under General Couch had moved no further than United States Ford, where it was directed to remain on the north bank of the Eappahannock till the turning column sweeping down the south bank should have uncovered United States Ford, when it was to cross and move also to Chancel- lorsville. This object was, of course, accomplished the mo- ment the Rapidan was crossed; and the same afternoon, Couch threAV a ponton-bridge over the Rappahannock, and marched on Chancellorsville, at which point the four corps bivouacked that night (Thursday, April 30). The same night, General Hooker removed his headquarters to Chancellors- ville.* He had secured a position which took in reverse Lee's entire fortified line, and he held in his hand a puissant force of fifty thousand men. The remarkable success attending this movement, of which Lee did not become aware till the Rappahannock had been crossed, was the result of a secrecy and a celerity of march new in the Army of the Potomac. To have marched a column of fifty thousand men, laden with sixty pounds of baggage, and encumbered with artillery and trains, thirty-seven miles in two days ; to have bridged and crossed two streams, guarded by a vigilant enemy, with the loss of half-a-dozen men, one wagon, and two mules, is an achievement which has few paral- lels, and which well deserves to rank with Prmce Eugene's famous passage of the Adige. In securing this result, important service was rendered by the skilful manner in which the flank march was masked by General Sedgwick, under whom had been placed for the exe- cution of this duty the First Corps (Reynolds) and the Third Corps (Sickles), in addition to his own Sixth Corps. As soon as the column destined to make the turning movement was well under way, Sedgwick was ordered to cross the river in the vicinity of Fredericksburg for the purpose of making a * This place consisted of a single large brick liouse. 18 274 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. direct demonstration. Accordingly, before dawn of tlie 29tli, while tlie flanking force was passing the Rappahannock thirty miles above, ponton-boats, borne noiselessly on men's shoul- ders, were launched three miles below the town, near the point at which Franklin had made his crossing on the occasion of the battle of Fredericksburg. In these a party passed to the south bank, capturing the small force in observation. Two bridges were then constructed, and two divisions thrown across. This menace immediately engaged the attention of the Confederates, who promj^tly began intrenching their en- tire front, as fearing a direct attack.* Demonstrations as though with that intent were made during the 29th and 30tli, and as, by the night of the 30th, the feint had subserved its purpose, and a lodgment had been gained at ChancellorsA'ille, * There was much in what was visible to the Confederates of Sedg-^vick's operation to inspire them with the belief that Hooker was preparing his main attack at that point ; and an accidental circumstance, the details of which are given be-low, tended greatly to confirm this impression. Being a spectator of Sedgwick's operations, I at the time interpreted certain movements as a ruse de guerre, designed to give the enemy an exaggerated notion of the strength of the force present at that point, whereas they were the necessary result of an entirely different operation ; and I elaborated this point with some fulness in a letter on the battle of Cliancellorsville in the New York Times. What was there stated has already passed into history ; and Colonel MacDougall, an Eng- lish military writer of repute, following that account (without credit given, however), thus writes : "The four remaining divisions of these two corps [Sedgwick's and Eey- nolds'] remained on the north bank, and an ingenious ruse was practised to deceive the enemy into the belief that the greater part of the Northern army was there massed with the intention of crossing. It is to be noted that, from the configuration of the ground, the enemy could not see the bridges, neither could they see the four divisions on the north bank, which Avere behind the fringe of hills aforesaid. These troops were then put in motion, and, mounting the ridge, which, sloping both ways, served as a screen, marched along the top in full view of the Confederates, and then dipped down out of sight towards the bridges. Instead of crossing these, however, they turned back through a gully roimd the rear of the ridge, round again on the top, and again disappeared from sight to play the same game — ^just the same evolution as is practised by the ' brave army' on the stage of a theatre, and with the same intent of deceiv- ing the spectators as to their numbers. The like stage effect was practised by the artillery and wagon-trains, until the Confederates had seen defile before THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 275 Sickles' corps was directed to join the force at tliat point— Sedgwick, with two corps, meanwliile remaining below to await developments on the right. The success that had crowned these operations, which, as they were executed out of sight of the enemy, may be called the strategy of the movement, inspired the army with the highest hopes and greatly elated the commander. On reach- ing Chancellorsville on Thursday night, he issued an order to the troops, in which he announced that "the enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruc- tion awaits him." This boast, so much in the style of Hooker, was amplified by the whole tenor of his conversation. " The rebel army," said he, " is now the legitimate property of the Army of the Potomac. They may as well pack up their haversacks and make for Richmond; and I shall be after them," etc., etc.* And, indeed, there was much in the aspect of affairs to justify jubilant expectations ; for, of the two lines them a force which they might well conclude to be the whole Northern army." — MacDougall : Modern Warfare and Modern Artillery, pp. 834, 335. The following note from INIajor-General McMahon explains the real purpose of the operation misinterpreted by me : New Yokk, January, 1S66. My dear Sm — The movement of troops under General Sedgwick, to wMch our conversation referred, was not for the purpose of deceiving the enemy into the belief that we were re-enforcing the left wing, although such probably was its effect. The movements consisted of the withdrawal of Reynolds' corps from the lower crossing, which was effected without attracting the attention of the enemy ; and the transfer of one division of the Sixth Corps from the upper to the lower bridges, to hold the position abandoned by the First Corps. The march of this division was so ordered that only its arrival at the lower bridges could be seen by the enemy. It Avas a necessary movement, made so by the departure of the First Corps for Chancellorsville, and not a stratagem. Of course, in this as in all similar movements, advantage was taken of the nature of the ground, to conceal our intention from the enemy as far as it was practicable. Very respectfully, etc., M. T. McMahon, Late Chief of Staff to Major-General Sedgwick. W. SwiNTON, Esq. * These observations were made in presence of the writer. 276 CAIklPAIGNS OF THE AEISIY OF THE POTOMAC. of retreat open to Lee, Hooker already laid hold of that by GordonsviUe, and threatened that by Richmond. The former he could not take up ; and, if he chose the latter, he would have Hooker with five corps on his flank, and Sedgwick •with two corps pressing his rear. The bright promise of these initial operations was beclouded by but one fact — the cavalry column which was to cross the Rappahannock on the right of the infantry, and cut Lee's communications at the game time that the infantry was operating on his army, had been so delayed by the rise of the river that it did not cross the Rappahannock till the morning of the 29th, and had thus far made very insufficient progress. But, instead of " ingloriously flying," Lee preferred to " come out of his defences" and give battle to Hooker ; and, unhappily for that general, the circumstances under which he chose to receive battle, in place of insuring Lee's " certain destruction," as he had vaunted, resulted in the disastrous termination of a campaign thus brilliantly opened. Now, as these cu-cumstances furnish the key to the right apprecia- tion of the whole action, I shall, in the succeeding chapter, set them forth with some fulness of detail. III. AT CHANCELLORSVILLE— FRIDAY. When, on Thursday night, Hooker had concentrated his four corps at Chancellorsville, the real character of the move- ment, which, up to that point, had been so admirably con- cealed from his antagonist, became fully disclosed. The Confederate leader saw that the demonstrations near Fred- ericksburg that had engaged his attention were but a mask, and that the turn of affairs called for the promptest action. Lee, with instant perception of the situation, now seized the masses of his force, and with the grasp of a Titan swung them into position as a giant might fling a mighty stone from Map of the ific/afO//p Operations. FROM APRIL29th.To MAYSth I863j^;jj*' h^ren-e// for Hist "ft ■ o/'Ai-ini ■ «/' Ritonirir " / Referfttffes . — - Con fe/if rate Salem OM /a m rOERICKSBURG ,A^. id€ %. THE CIIANCELLORSVILLE C.UIPAIGN. 277 a sling.* One division and one brigade — tlie division of Early and the brigade of Barksdale — were intrusted with the duty of holding the heights of Fredericksburg ; and, at mid- night of Thursday, Jackson and McLaws, and the rest of his divisions, recalled from Fredericksburg, and from far below Fredericksburg, were put in motion towards Chancellors ville to meet Hooker with a fi'ont of opposition, before he should be able, by advancing from Chancellorsville, to seize the direct Confederate communications with Richmond. If the Confederate commander was able to effect this pur- pose, it was because the Union commander allowed him so to do ; and this voluntary act on the part of the latter devolves upon him the responsibility for all the consequences flowing therefrom. Chancellorsville, where Hooker had dra^vn up his forces, lies ten miles west and south of Fredericksburg, with which it is connected by two excellent roads — the one macadamized, the other planked. It stands in the midst of a region extend- ing for several miles south of the Bapidan and westward as far as Mine Eun, localized, in common parlance, as " the Wilderness" — a region covered with dense woods and thickets of black-jack oak and scrub-pines, and than which it is im- possible to conceive a field more unfavorable for the move- ments of a grand army. But, advancing from Chancellorsville towards Fredericksburg, the country becomes more open and clear as you approach the latter place, and affords a fine field for the use of all arms. Now, there is evidence that General Hooker did not originally design to allow himself to be shut up in this tangled thicket ; and, on Friday morning. May 1st, he began to push forward his columns to gain the open country beyond the bounds of the Wilderness. The two roads running from Chancellorsville to * "The enemy in our front [Sedgwick], near Fredericksburg, continued in- active ; and it was now apparent tliat the main attack would be made upon our flank and rear. It was, therefore, determined to leave sufficient troops to hold our lines, and, with the main body of the army, to give battle to the ap- proaching column." — Lee : Rejwrt of Chancellorsville, p. 7. 278 ca:mpaigxs of the army of the fotomac. Fredericksburg (the plankroacl on the right and the turnpike on the left) unite near Tabernacle Church, about midway between the former two places ; and to the left of the turn- pike there runs a river road leading along the Rappahannock to Banks' Ford. On the latter road two divisions of Meade's corps were pushed out, while on the turnpike Sykes' division of the same corps was thi'own forward, and Slocum's corps was given the same direction on the plankroad. This was a movement to take up a line of battle about two and a half miles in front, prejDaratory to a simultaneous advance along the whole line, set down for two o'clock in the afternoon.* I shall trace briefly the experience of each column. : The left column, composed of the divisions of Griffin and Humphreys, moved out on the river road for five miles, and came within sight of Banks' Ford, without encountering any opposition. The centre column, made up of the division of Sykes, sup- ported by the division of Hancock, advanced on the turnpike, and on gaining the first of a series of ridges that cross the roads between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, somewhat over a mile in advance of the former place, the mounted men in front were met and driven in by the enemy. This small force resisted handsomely, riding up and firing almost in the faces of the Eleventh Yirginia Infantry, which formed the enemy's advance. Thereupon, General Sykes moved forward in double-quick time, attacked the opposing force, and drove it back till, at noon, he had gained the position assigned him.t The column on the right, composed of Slocum's entire corps, pushed out on the planki-oad in the same general direc- tion with the two other columns, and gained a point as far advanced as the others without meeting any opposition of moment. * Hooker's Circular Order, May 1 : Report of the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 124. f Warren : Report of Operations connected with the Chancellorsville Cam- paign. THE CUANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN «270 The position secured by this movement of Friday forenoon was a ridge of some elevation, perfectly commanding Clian- cellorsville, out of the "Wilderness, and giving the dobonche into the open country in rear of Fredericksburg, Avliile the left column had practically uncovered Banks' Ford, thus shortening by twelve miles the communication between the main force on the Chancellorsville line, and the two corps near Fredericksburg under Sedgwick. That a position afford- ing such advantages — a position which Lee was then deploy- ing all his energies to secure— would be held at all hazards, and the possession insured by a general advance of the whole force, was what was naturally expected ; yet, strange to say, just at this moment the three columns received orders from the commanding general to withdraw back to Chancellors- ville. With mingled amazement and incredulity, this com- mand was received by the officers, who sent to beg Hooker to allow the army to push on and hold the front thus gained.'^-" It was urged in the warmest terms that the occupation of that fine position would uncover Banks' Ford, thus, as I have said, giving easy communication with Sedgwick ; that it secured the dominating heights which, if not held, would instantly be seized to his great disadvantage by his antagonist ; that it would take the army beyond the densely wooded region in which manoeuvring was impossible, and that it would enable it to command the open country on the posterior slope of the Fredericksburg heights soon to bo carried by Sedgwick. It was in vain that these considera- tions, whose supreme importance must be apparent from a * " The ground on wliicli I had posted Hancock in support of Sykes, was about one and a half miles from Chancellorsville, and commanded it. Upon receiving orders from General Hooker to come in, I sent Major Burt to him urging that, on account of the great advantages of that position, it should be held at all hazards. The reply was, to return at once. General Warren also went in person and urged the necessity of holding on." — Couch : Report of Chancellorsville. For confirmation of the same, see Warren : Report ; Hum- phreys : Evidence on Chancellorsville; Report of the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. Go. 280 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. moment's glance at the topography of the region, were urged by his ablest advisers. Hooker had assumed the defensive and was waiting for the enemy to attack him " on ground of his own selection." From that moment he flung away the initiative with all its mighty gains and far-reaching hopes. It is difficult to account for a line of action so faulty in a conjuncture of circumstances in which the fitting course was so manifestly marked out. Having studied the case at the time when a spectator of these events, I have returned to its examination in the light of the whole body of evidence since developed, and the riddle remains still unsolved. Till he met the enemy, Hooker showed a master-grasp of the elements of war, but the moment he confronted his antagonist, he seemed to suffer collapse of all his powers, and after this his conduct, with the exception of one or two momentary flashes of talent, was marked by an incomprehensible feebleness and faulti- ness ; for in each crisis, his action was not only bad — it was, with a fatal infehcity, the worst that could have been adopted. It is probable that Hooker never expected that Lee would turn to meet him on that line, but that, disconcerted by the suddenness and success of the primal stroke, he would beat a hasty retreat southward towards Richmond. When, on the contrary, he found his antagonist making a rapid change of front and hurrying forward to accept the gage of battle in the Wilderness, the general whose first stride had been that of a giant, shrunk to the proportions of a dwarf. The columns that had advanced so handsomely towards Fredericksburg returned to ChancellorsviUe ; and having shown that this was a position relatively inferior to that which had been gained, it remains to add that it was abso- lutely a bad position. It had been taken up by tired troops, towards the close of the previous day, without any prospect of fighting a pitched battle upon it ; it had several command- ing positions in its front for the enemy to occupy, aud the thicket was so dense as not only to rule out of use the cavalry and artillery arms, but to make the movements of infantry very difficult, indeed almost impossible except by traihng THE CIIANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 281 muskets. If it bo added that any line drawn tliereon would throw the right flank " in the air," while the woods would form a perfect screen for any hostile movements of the enemy, the military disadvantages of the locality will be fully appreciated. The withdrawal of the column that had moved out on the right, and that which had moved out on the left, was made without difficulty, though the Confederates followed up with some show of force ; but the retirement of Sykes, who had the centre, was an operation of more dehcacy, for he had met a considerable body of the enemy, and had gained his posi- tion by a smart fight which cost him seventy men ; and now the constantly arriving forces of the Confederates began to overlap both his flanks. Hancock's division, however, had moved up to Sykes' support, and, under cover of his line, Sykes was retired, and then Hancock also withdrew, and the enemy followed up, skirmishing, closing, and firing artillery from the crest, which Sykes had been ordered to abandon.* The force that had been met in this series of simultaneous reconnoissances was the van of Jackson's command, which, on the disclosure to Lee of the real character of Hooker's move, had been recalled from the direction of Fredericksburg, and after marching all Thursday night and Friday morning, had just arrived on the ground. On finding the Union force returning from its advance, Lee pushed forward the heads of his columns rapidly and deployed in front of Hooker's j^osi- tion at Chancellorsville. Hooker disposed his hue of battle, running east and west, along the Fredericksburg and Orange Courthouse plankroad, on which, at the point of intersection of that road with the road from Fredericksburg to United States Ford, stands the Chancellor House — that is, Chancellors"\dlle. Chancellorsville is placed in the middle of a clearing some three hundred yards in extent, and all around are the thickets of the Wilder- ness. The line of battle, as formed on Friday evening, was * nuncock : Report of Cliancellorsville. 282 CAIMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. about five miles in extent, stretcliing from a short distance east of Cliancellorsville (where the left wing was somewhat refused), westward, in front of the Orange plankroad for about three miles, when the right flank bent sharply back in a de- fensive crotchet. Meade's .corps (Fifth), with one division of Couch's (Second), formed the left ; Slocum's corps (Twelfth), and one division of Sickles' (Third), the centre ; and Howard's (Eleventh) the right. The other divisions were held in re- serve. As General Hooker had concluded to fight a defensive battle, trees were felled in front of the line to form abatis, and rifle-pits were thrown up ; and during the whole night the woods resounded with the strokes of a thousand Con- federate axe-men engaged at the same work. Next morning (Saturday, May 2d) Hooker stood on the defensive awaiting battle, and it seemed at first that his oppo- nent had been beguiled into playing into his hands by making a direct attack ; for the Confederates began early to make threatening demonstrations. First they felt Couch's line, but it proved to be well intrenched ; then they assailed Slocum's front, moving down on the plankroad, and throwing shells into the clearing at the Chancellor House, where Hooker's headquarters were established and the wagons were parked ;* afterwards they menaced the hue still further to the right, and these operations they kept up at intervals during the whole day. But Lee had quite another obje^ct in view : he knew too well the risks of a direct attack with a force so in- ferior in numbers as he could dispose of ; and while he en gaged Hooker's attention with these front demonstrations, he Avas putting into execution a bold move such as he may have learned, in his military studies, from Frederick the Great. I shall in the following section indicate the natui'e of this operation, and detail the manner of its execution. * "In the morning about six or seven, the enemy opened his artillery from our loft on the open field in front of the Chancellorsville House, and drove out all our wagons and every thing that was loose into position." — Warren's Report. THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAJiIPAIGN. 283 IV. JACKSON'S FLANK MARCH— SATURDAY. False as was the situation in wliicli the Union commander had placed his force in causing it to assume a defensive atti- tude at a moment when offensive action promised so much, Lee was, nevertheless, environed with peril. Strategically Hooker's position was a menacing one ; tactically, it was un- assailable by a front attack. In this dilemma Lee determined on a move which, considering the inferiority of his force, must be accounted astonishingly bold. He resolved by a flank march to assail Hooker's right and rear, with a view of doub- ling up that flank, taking his line in reverse, and seizing his communications %vith United States Ford. This suggestion was, it is said, made to Lee in councU during Friday night by Stonewall Jackson, who having, in his inde- pendent operations in the Valley, practised with gi-eat success the like manoeuvre, now burned to execute, on a gi-ander scale, one of these sudden and mortal blows. The plan, though full of risk, was immediately adopted by Lee, and, as a matter of course, its execution committed to his daring lieutenant, who was destined, in the climax of his power, to end his career in the world and the world's wars in this supreme exhibition of military genius. The force with which Jackson was to make this movement consisted of his own three divisions, numbering abovit twenty- two thousand men. Of the Confederate force on the Chan- cellorsville line there then remained only the two divisions of McLaws and Anderson. These Lee retained in hand to hold Hooker in check. No man knew better than Jackson the enormous importance of secrecy in the execution of such a design as that he took in hand on Saturday morning ; and he had often repeated to his staff a saying, that was to him a fundamental axiom of war — " Mystery, mystery is the secret of success." Nothing 284 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE F0T0:MAC. was omitted to secure this iiidispeu sable requisite in the task he had undertaken. Hooker's attention was to be engaged and the movement masked by energetic demonstrations of front attack to be made by Lee. Then, as the woods were thick and nearly impenetrable, Jackson hoped that, by taking a road some distance to the south of Chancellorsville, he would be able to pass unobserved ; yet he took care, in addition, to throw out Fitz-Lee's brigade of cavalry on the right of his column to screen his perilous flank march across the whole of Hooker's front. Diverging westward from the Fredericksburg plankroad, Jackson pursued his march by a forest-path a couple of miles south of, and parallel with, the Orange plank- road, on which the Union force was planted ; and, after pass- ing the point known as the "Furnace," struck somewhat south by west into the Brock road, and thence northward to seize the Orange plankroad and turn Hooker's right flank. This movement, skilfully masked as it was, was not made with such secrecy but that those who held the front of the Union line saw that sometliing was going on. And more espe- cially, in passing over a hill near the " Furnace," the column plainly disclosed itself to General Sickles, who held a posi- tion within sight of that point. Now, it happened that the road along which Jackson's column was filing there bends somewhat southward, so that, though the movement was dis- covered, it was misinterj^reted as a retreat towards Eichmond on the part of Lee ; or, if the idea suggested itself that it might be a movement to turn the right, it was still judged, on the whole, to be a retreat. With the view of determining this, but yet more under the conviction that Lee was withdraAving, Sickles was sent out with two divisions to reconnoitre and attack him.* At about three o'clock in the afternoon, he ad- * General Hooker, in his evidence on the batde of Chancellorsville, insinu- ates that he was all the time aware of the true character of Jackson's move, and that he made adequate preparations to meet a flank attack ; but he, at the time, gave a very different view to General Sedgwick, to whom he wrote, on Saturday afternoon, as follows : " We know the enemy is jlying, trying to sate Ills trains ; two of Sickles' divisioxis are among them." THE ClIANCELLOESVILLE CAMPAIGN. 285 Yanced tlirougli the Wilderness for a mile and a lialf, or two miles, reached the road on which Jackson had moved, struck the rear of his column, and began to take prisoners. Elated by his success, the result of which he commimicated to Hooker, General Sickles asked for re-enforcements ; and, at his request, Pleasonton's cavalry and two brigades of in- fantry were sent him. As one of these brigades was taken from the Twelfth Corps, and the other from the Eleventh Corps,* holding the right of the general line, it is hardly to be supposed that Hooker would have made the detachment had he thought that iiank was to be attacked. While this manoeuvre, under a false lead, was going on, Jackson was getting into position for his meditated blow. Ho had already readied the Orange plankroad, on which the Union line was drawn, and near the point at which it is crossed by the road from Germanna Ford ; but, ascending a hill in the vicinity, he saw that disposition of the Union force by which its right flank was thrown sharply back in a crochet, extending northward and at right angles with the general line, which ran east and west. He, therefore, perceived that he would have to move further to his left, and further to the north, and, in order to strike the rear of Hooker's defensive position, would have to reach the old turnpike wdiich runs parallel with and north of the plankroad.f Turning, there- fore, after a rapid reconnoitring glance, to one of his aids, he instantly said, '• Tell my column to cross that road":|: (mean- ing, thereby, the plankroad, so as to move up and strike the old turnpike). Reaching the turnpike about five o'clock, Jackson saw the Union line in reverse, and had only to advance in order to * Williamson's brigade, of Slocum's corps, and Barlow's brigade, of Howard's corps. — Pickles' Evidence : Report on the Conduct of tlie War, second series, vol. i., p. 5. f The " old turnpike" may, roughly speaking, be said to be parallel with the plankroad, though it really joins near Dondall's tavern, about two and a half miles west of Chancellorsville. i Cooke's Life of Stonewall Jackson, p. 251. 286 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. cro-^ii his perilous operation with complete success. The right of the Union line was, as before stated, held bj the Eleventh Corps, under General Howard;* and, while the major part of this corps formed hne of battle along the plank- road, and faced southward, the extreme right brigadef was " refused," and made to face westward, from which direction, towards six o'clock, Jackson burst out with resistless impetu- osity. The dispositions to meet such an attack were utterly inadequate. The right brigade, after two or three hasty rounds, was forced back; and the next brigade to the left (McLean's), surprised on its flank, broke and fled. The route of retreat of these troops, and that of some artillery caissons that were at the same time galloped off the ground, was down the road on which the entire balance of the corps was posted ; so that the confused mass overran the next division^ to the left, which was compelled to give way before the enemy even reached its position.§ Bushbeck, holding with his brigade the extreme left of the Eleventh Corps, made a good fight, and only retired after both his flanks were turned, and then in good order. II But the result was, that the whole corps was * Sigel's old corps ; Howard had very recently taken command. f Gilsa's brigade of Devens' division. f Schurz's division. § Schimmelfennig's brigade, of Sclmrz's division, made a rapid change of front to the west, and resisted the advance of the enemy for an hour or upwards. II The rout of the Eleventh Corps was bad enough without the exag- gerated coloring in which it has been painted. Much Avas said in the news- paper accounts of the time regarding the " cowardly Dutchmen," and the fact that this corps was supposed to be made up of German elements was empha- sized as lending additional opprobrium to the affair ; yet, " of the eleven thou- sand five hundred men composing the Eleventh Corps, but four thousand five hundred were Germans."— The Eleventh Corps and the Battle of Chancellors- ville. Pamphlet, New York, 18G3. The disposition of the corps to meet such an attack was excessively defective ; and, in so far as the rout was owing to this circumstance, the author of this disposition must assume the responsibility. General Warren, in his evidence before the Congressional committee, propounds a theory of his own touching the disaster, which he attributes to the fact that the ambulances, ammunition- wagons, pack-mule train, and even beef-cattle, had actually been allowed to come THE CIIANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 287 soou in litter rout. It was now seven o'clock, and growing dark ; but Jackson had seized the breastworks, had taken the whole line in reverse, pushed forward to within half a mile of headquarters, and now proceeded to make preparations for following up his success by a blow that should be decisive. The situation at this moment was extremely critical, for the Eleventh Corps having been brushed away, it was abso- lutely necessary to form a new line, and it was difficult to see whence the troops were to be drawn ; for just at that moment Lee was making a vigorous front attack on Hooker's left and centre, formed by Couch's and Slocum's corps. Hancock's front especially was assailed with great impetuosity ; but the attacking column was held in check in the most intrepid man- ner by Hancock's sku-mish line under Colonel Miles.* The open plain around Chancellorsville now presented such a spectacle as a simoom sweeping over the desert might make. Through the dusk of nightfall, a rushing whirlwind of men and artillery and wagons swept down the road, and up on the line of battle of tlie Eleventh Corps ; and that, when the fighting be- gan, all these, as a matter of course, ran away, greatly increasing the con- fusion. — Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 45. * Amid much that is dastardly at Chancellorsville, the conduct of this young but gallant and skilful officer shines forth with a brilliant lustre. Being intrusted with the charge of the skirmish line covering Hancock's front, he so disposed his thin line, well intrenched, that the Confederates, though making repeated charges in columns, on Saturday and Sunday, were never able to reach Hancock's line of battle. " On the 2d of May," says Hancock, " the enemy frequently opened with artillery from the heights towards Fredericksburg, and from those on my right, and with infantry assaulted my advanced line of rifle- pits, but was always handsomely repulsed by the troops on duty there, consist- ing of the Fifty-ssventh, Sixty-fourth, and Sixty-sixth New York Volunteers, and detachments from the Fifty-second New York, Second Delaware, and One Hundred and Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, under Colonel N. A. Miles. During the sharp contest of that day, the enemy were never able to reach my line of battle, so strongly and successfully did Colonel Miles contest the ground." — Report of Chancellorsville. Colonel Miles was on Sunday morning wounded severely, and it was supposed fatally ; but he afterwards recovered to share the glories of his corps to the close of the war, and he rose to the rank of brevet major-general. 288 CxVMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. past headquarters, and on towards the fords of the Eappa- hannock; and it was in vain that the staff opposed their persons and drawn sabres to the panic-stricken fugitives. But it chanced that at this moment, General Pleasonton, who had gone out with his cavahy to re-enforce Sickles, was re- turning, and on learning the giving way of the right wing, he moved forward rapidly, sent his horsemen on the charge into the woods, and, bringing into position his own battery of horse artillery, and such guns, twenty-two in all, as he could collect, he poured double charges of canister into the advan- cing line. Hooker, too, flaming out with the old fire of battle, called for his own old division, the darling child of his crea- tion, now under General Berry, and shouted to its com- mander : "Throw your men into the breach — receive the enemy on your bayonets — don't fire a shot — they can't see you!"* Berry's division, unaffected by the flying crowd streaming past it, hastened forward at the double-quick, in the most perfect order, with fixed bayonets, and took position on a crest at the western end of the clearing around Chan- cellorsville. Here General "Warren with Berry's men, and the artillery of the Twelfth Corps, under Captain Best, and Hay's brigade of the Second Corps, formed a line to check the enemy in front, while Pleasonton and Sickles assailed his right flank ; and fifty pieces of artillery, vomiting their mis- siles in wild curves of fire athwart the night-sky, poured swift destruction into the Confederate ranks. Thus the torrent was stemmed. But, more than all, an unseen hand had struck down the head and front of all this hostile menace. Jackson had received a mortal hurt. On seeing the success that attended the first blow, Jack- son, quick to perceive the immense consequences that might be drawn from this victory, proceeded to make dispositions to press on at once, extending his left so as to cut off Hooker from United States Ford. To relieve Kodes' division * Correspondence of William Swinton in tlie New York Times, May 5, 18G3. THE CHANCELLOESVILLE CAMPAIGN. 289 wliicli Lad made the attack, he sent forward A. P. Hill's division ; and being intensely anxious to learn the true posi- tion of his antagonist, he personally went forward through the dark woods, and with a portion of. his staff rode out beyond his own lines to reconnoitre the ground, instructing the troops not to fire, " unless cavalry approached from the direction of the enemy." * Finishing his examination of the ground, he turned back with his staff to re-enter his own lines ; but in the darkness, his troops, mistaking, as it is supposed, the party for a body of Federal cavalry on the charge, fired a volley which kiUed and wounded several of his staff, and pierced Jackson with three bullets. On being removed to the rear, his arm was amputated, and he seemed in the way of recovery, but pneumonia supervening, he expired at the end of a week. As the dying Napoleon is recorded to have murmured, "Tele (Varmee,'' so Jackson, his unconscious mind still busy with the mighty blow he was executing when wounded, breathed out his life in the order, "A. P. Hill, prepare for action !"t Thus died Stonewall Jackson, the ablest of Lee's heuten- ants. Jackson was essentially an executive ofiicer, and in this sphere he was incomparable. Devoid of high mental parts, and destitute of that power of planning and combina- tion, and of that calm, broad, mihtary intellect, which distin- guished General Lee, whom he regarded with a childlike reverence, and Avhose designs he loved to carry out, he had yet those elements of character that, above aU else, inspire troops. A fanatic in rehgion, fidly beheviug he was destined by Heaven to beat his enemy whenever lie encountered him, * Life of General Jackson, by an Ex-Cadet (Richmond, 1864), p. 183. The same circumstance is detailed in Cooke : Life of Jackson, p. 253. f Cooke : Life of Jackson, p. 270. Life of Jackson, by an Ex-Cadet, p. 100. During his illness, Jackson, speaking of the attack he had made, said with a glow of martial ardor: "If I had not been wounded, I would have cut the finemy off from the road to United States Ford ; we would have had them .en- tirely surrounded, and they would have been obliged to surrender or cut their way out — they bad no other alternative." 19 290 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. he infused something of his own fervent faith into his men, and at the time of his death had trained a corps, whose at- tacks in column were unique and irresistible ; and it was noticed that Lee ventured upon no strokes of audacity after Jackson had passed away. The operation of Jackson, resulting in the doubling up of Hooker's right, made important changes in the line indispen- sable : so during the night a new front was formed on that flank, with Sickles and Berry. The Eleventh Corps was for the time out of the fight ; but Reynolds' corps, which had up to this time been operating with Sedgwick on the left, below Fredericksburg, arrived that evening, and with its firm metal more than supplied the temporai-y loss. No idea was enter- tained of retreating ; and if Lee did not retire, it was evident that the morrow must bring with it a terrible struggle. But before detailing the events of Sunday, as the action becomes then more complicated, and flames out in a double battle, it will be necessary to indicate what had been passing with that portion of the army under Sedgwick, and to point out the relations between these two parts of one and the same drama. It was not until after Friday's developments near Chan- cellorsville, when the reconnoitring columns that went out towards Fredericksburg had met the enemy, and had been recalled, and Lee followed up and drew his lines around Chancellorsville, that Hooker became convinced that Lee was not minded to fall back. Seeing this, he, on Saturday morn- ing, withdrew Reynolds' corps also from the force under Sedgwick, and it reached Chancellorsville late that night. This left Sedgwick with only his own (Sixth) corps ; but it was a powerful corps, numbering some twenty-two thousand m(m.* Now, it is a question which will present itself to the military * In addition to this, Gibbon's division of Couch's corps held Falmoutli, and observed the river and the north side of Banks' Ford. THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 291 student, whether it would not have been better, the moment a lodgment was gained at Chancellorsville, on Thursday, to have at once brought the three corps under Sedgwick up to that point and united the army. Their presence below Fred- ericksburg, while the turning operation was in execution, was correct ; but after that purpose was accomplished, the three corps near Fredericksburg, and the four corps at Chancellors- ville, presented the character of a divided army, separated from each other by twenty miles, a river to be twice passed, and the enemy between the two parts. And especially when Friday's developments had proved that Lee would not re- treat but offer battle at Chancellorsville was such a junction desirable. Nor was this necessity lessened, but rather greatly heightened by the fact that Hooker's order to withdraw from the advanced position gained on Friday, by forfeiting pos- session of Banks' Ford (the tenure of which would have practically brought the two parts of his army together), de- finitively severed Sedgwick from the force at Chancellorsville, and made a junction possible only on one of two conditions : firstly, a detour by the north bank of the Rappahannock, making the passage at United States Ford — but this was one entire day's march ; secondly, by a direct march of Sedgwick from Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville, with Lee interposing between him and Hooker. Now when, on Saturday night, the disruption of the right wing had given a blow to all his hopes, and seriously im- perilled his army. Hooker resolved to adopt the latter course, and with a view to relieve the pressure that was upon him, sent, late at night, orders to Sedgwick to put himself in motion immediately, occupy Fredericksburg, seize its heights, gain the plankroad from that pUce to Chancellorsville, and move out to join the main body, destroying any force he might meet, and reaching his assigned position by daylight the next morning. This was precisely one of those movements which, according as they are wrought out, may be either the height of wisdom or the height of folly. Its successful accomplishment certainly promised very brilliant results. 292 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. It is easy to see how seriously Lee's safety would be com- promised, if, while engaged with Hooker in front, he should suddenly find a powerful force assailing his rear, and grasp- ing already his direct line of communications with Kichmond. But if, on the other hand, Lee should be able by any slack- ness on the part of his opponent, to engage him in front with a part of his force, while he should turn round swiftly to assail the isolated moving column, it is obvious that he would be able to repulse or destroy that column, and then, by a vigorous return, meet or attack his antagonist's main body. For the successful execution of this plan not only was Sedg- wick bound to the most energetic action, but Hooker also was engaged by every consideration of honor and duty to so act as to make the dangerous task he had assigned to Sedgwick possible. And now premising that Sedgwick, immediately on receipt of the order at eleven o'clock of Saturday night, put his force in motion from its position three miles below Fredericksburg and moved forward to effect a junction with the main body, I shall return to the recital of events at Chan- cellorsville at the time the action burst forth anew on Sunday morning. V. SUNDAY'S ACTION AT CHANCELLORSVILLE When, some hours before dawn of Sunday, Lee received word of the wounding of Jackson, the messenger who con- veyed to him the tidings, added that it had been Jackson's intent, had he been spared, " to have pressed the enemy on Sunday." " These people shall be pressed to-day !" ex- claimed Lee, with deep emotion.* Stuart had succeeded for the time being to Jackson's com- mand, and forming the corps in three lines, he advanced it at * Life of Jacfcson, by an Ex-Cadet, p. 185. THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 293 daylight to the attack, with the battle-cry, " Charge, and remember Jackson T* Swinging round his right so as to bring it perpendicular mth the plankroad, he seized the crest which had the day before been occupied by the left of the Eleventh Corps, got thirty pieces of artillery rapidly into position thereon, and opened a heavy fire on the plain around the Chancellor House." t The attitude of Hooker had not now even the pretence of an offensive character. The line he held, however, on Sunday morning, stdl covered the angle of roads at the Chancel- lorsville House. Sickles' corps, and Berry's division of Slocum's corps, and French's division of Couch's corps formed the right, and faced westward to meet Stuart's attack, while the rest of Slocum's corps and Hancock's di^dsion of Couch's corps formed the centre and left and covered the two roads from Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg to meet any assault from the remainder of Lee's army, while part of Han- cock was thrown back, facing eastward, so as to guard the communications with United States Ford. The corps-com- manders saw that it was only a question of saving what they could of the army's honor, for the army was without a head.t During the night the engineers had traced out a new line three-quarters of a mile to the rear of Chancellorsville, * Life of Jackson, by an Ex-Cadet, p. 187. f Stuart's Report of the Battle of Chancellorsville, p. 18. "In course of the morning, the corps on our right was pushed in, enabling the enemy to con- centrate his artillery fire on Chancellorsville with effect." — Couch's Report. This swinging round of Stuart's right was made under the following cir- cumstances. It will be remembered that Sickles, from the movement he had made on Saturday afternoon to attack the rear of Jackson's corps, reached a jtosition on the right flank of that corps ; but a little before daybreak, Sickles was ordered to retire from that position to his place in the new line. It was when the withdrawal had been nearly accomplished that Stuart advanced his right, and in so doing engaged Sickles' rear, consisting of the brigade of Gra- ham, who manoeuvred his command with address and made good his escape. — X When Slocum, after fighting long and hard, sent to inquire if other movements were being made that might relieve him, or if he might expect re- enforcements and ammunition, Hook(!r replied, that h« could not make soldier's or ammunition. This, too, when two corps lay idle ! 294 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOilAC. towards the river, and covering tlie roads to United States and Ely's fords. To this line Hooker had resolved to retire, and he seemed to be incapable of other resolve. Sickles and Berry and French made good fight at their position, receiving Stuart's impetuous attacks ; but the result was that, after a severe struggle, Sickles was forced from his front line. Carroll, with a few regiments of French's division, assailed Stuart's left flank, and threw it into much confusion, capturing several hundred prisoners,* but that flank being re- enforced, Stuart pressed back French in turn, and his right renewed the attack on Sickles, t While Stuart was thus bearing down on the right wing, Lee with his remaining divisions attacked the centre and left under Slocum and Hancock. He threw forward Ander- son's division on the plankroad connecting Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville to attack Slocum, and assailed Hancock with McLaws' division. The latter was repulsed in the most brilliant manner by the skirmish line of Hancock's divi- sion ; but Anderson pressed hard on Slocum, and throw- ing round his left, succeeded in making a connection with Stuart by a thin line. This done, Lee advanced his whole line, when Sickles and Slocum were forced back. The line melted away and the whole front appeared to pass out, and Hancock, with a portion of Slocum's corps under General Geary, alone held the extreme point of the Hne on the side of the Chancellorsville House towards the enemy.| Drawing back * " Prencli drove the enemy, taking about three hundred prisoners and recapturing a regiment of one of the corps in the hands of the rebels." — Ck)uch : Report of Chancellorsville. f " In the mean time the enemy was pressing our left with infantry, and all the re-enforcements I could obtain were sent there." — Stuart : Report of Chancellorsville, p. 18. :{: Hancock's testimony : Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 67. Geary, however, went out some time before Hancock, who remained till the last. It is proper to state that Sickles' ammunition had become exhausted, and no re-enforcements were sent him, notwithstanding tJiat Meade and Reynolds were both disengaged. Sickles, with the bayonet alone, repelled several successive assaults, and Mott's New Jersey brigade of THE CHANCELLORS VILLE CAMPAIGN. 295 to the Chancellor House, a struggle was made for a time at the angle of roads ; but the line soon began to waver. De- tecting this, the Confederates sprang forward, and at ten o'clock seized Chancellorsville.* A short time before the action thus culminated, General Hooker was thrown down by the concussion of a shot that struck one of the pillars of the Chancellor House, on the bal- cony of which he was standing. This prostrated him for a brief period, and he instructed General Couch to superintend the withdrawal of the troops to the new line in rear, which had been prepared and fortified during the previous night. This line had the form of a redan thrown forward in the angle between the Kapidan and the Bappahannock — the right flank resting on the former, and the left on the latter stream. The corps of Meade and Keynolds, which had held position on the right in reserve, and had, strange to say, not been called into action during the terrible struggle of the morning, w^ere formed on the new Hue, where they w^ere joined by the rest of the army falhng back from Chancellorsville, Lee, gathering up his forces, was about to renew the attack on this fresh jDosi- tion, when his upraised arm was suddenly arrested by tidings of great purport from Fredericksburg. f Sickles' corps alone captured seven or eight colors from the enemy's second line and took several hundred prisoners. * " Artillery was pushed forward to the crest, sharp-shooters were posted in a house in advance, and in a few minutes Chancellorsville was ours (ten o'clock, A. M.) " — Stuart : Report, p. 18. Lee states the same time. — Report, p. 10. Most of the Union reports make it eleven o'clock. f "Our preparations were just completed, when further operations were arrested by intelligence received from Fredericksburg." — Lee's Report, p. 10 296 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. VI. THE STOEMING OF THE HEIGHTS. It was towards midiiiglit of Saturday when Sedgwick re- ceived liis orders to move through Fredericksburg and pro- ceed towards Chancellorsville to unite with the main body. Tliis command found him holding his position on the south bank of the Eappahannock, three miles below Fredericksburg. He immediately put his corps in motion by the flank, and proceeded to the town, skirmishing sharply with the enemy all the way up — the Confederate force falling back slowly.* Some hours before dawn of Sunday, Sedgwick occupied Fred- ericksburg, but a small force thrown forAvard before dayHght to seize the enemy's works behind the town was immediately repulsed. Gibbon's division of Couch's corps, which had been holding Falmouth, then crossed to join him. For the defence of Fredericksburg, General Lee had left behind Early's division of four brigades and Barksdale's bri- gade of McLaws' division. t Barksdale occupied the heights immediately in rear of the town, includmg Marye's Hill and the stone wall at its base, famous in the story of Burnside's attack. Early's own division held the Confederate right below the town. Three companies of the "Washington Artil- lery occupied the crest, and so soon as Sedgwick's movement, was disclosed, on Sunday morning. Early sent Hays' brigade to re-enforce Barksdale. As it had required scarcely more than this force to repulse Burnside's successive columns of attack on the 13th of December, Barksdale had probably httle doubt of his ability to give a like reception to those now threatening assault. * Sedgwick ; Report of Fredericksburg Heights. f In addition to this force, the Confederate General Wilcox, who, with his brigade, had been holding position at Banks' Ford, moved up to join Barksdale, but arrived too late to take part in the action, though he played a part in the afterpiece. THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 297 Sedgwick's first efforts were of a tentative nature, Howe's division, occupying the left of liis line, made an effort against the Confederate right Avith a view to turn the heights. It had no serious character, however, and was not successful.* Gib- bon's division, on the right of Sedgwick, then essayed to move round the left of the Confederate position ; but this was foiled by the canal covering that entire flank. A partial attack in front was not more successful. Every action has these pe- riods of prelude, from which the proper course at length dis- closes itself. That which now presented itself as best suited to the circumstances, and promising the best results, was to form a powerful assaulting column and carry Marye's Heights by storm. The preliminary endeavors and the preparations for attack had consumed considerable time, and it was towards eleven o'clock when it began. Two columns were formed from New- ton's di\-ision— the right column of four regiments, and the left column of two regiments — and on the left of this a line of battle of four regiments was thrown out. The columns moved on the plankroad and to the right of it directly up the heights. The line of battle advanced on the left of the road on the double-quick against the rifle-pits, neither halting nor firing a shot until they had driven the enemy from ^their lower line of works along the stone w all at the base of Marye's Hill. In the mean time the storming parties had rushed forward to the crest and carried the works in rear of the rifle-pits, capturing the guns and many hundred prisoners.! The assault was executed v^ith great gallantry, under a very severe fire that cost Sedgwick a thousand men ; and the Confederates made a savage hand-to-hand fight on the crest and over the guns. * " The enemy made a demonstration against tlie extreme right, which was easily repulsed by General Early."— Lee : Report of Chancellorsville, p. 11. f " A large portion of the Eighteenth Mississippi Regiment and a part of the Twenty-first were taken prisoners, and a company of the Washington Artillery, with its guns, were captured." — Report of General Early, p. 34. The Sixth Maine, of the light brigade under Colonel Burnham, was the first to plant its colors on the works. 298 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ABMY OF THE POTOMAC. As, simultaneous with these events, Howe's divinioii on the left carried the crest below Fredericksburg, capturing a num- ber of prisoners and five guns, the whole ridgo wa?s now in Sedgwick's possession. Early's troops retreatcvl southward over the telegraph road, leaving the plankroad from Freder- icksburg to Chancellorsville open to an advance of Sedgwick. This the latter proceeded with all haste to set on foot. Such was the startling intelligence that, in the climax of his triumph, reached General Lee, who suddenly found him- self summoned to meet this new and unexpected menace. The course adopted by Lee in this emergency was precisely the course prescribed by the highest principles of war — the principles on which Caesar, and Gustavus, and Frederick fought battles ; but it was a course very bold — unusually bold for the cautious and methodical mind of the Confederate commander. Belying on the repulse Hooker had received to hold him inactive, Lee instantly countermarched from Hooker's front a force sufficient, in conjunction with the troops under Early, to check or destroy Sedgwick. Wilcox's brigade, which had been held at Banks' Ford, was already in position to meet him ; and in addition, Lee forwarded the brigade of Mahone of Anderson's division and the brigades of Kershaw, Wofford, and Semmes under General McLaws,* These, with the five brigades of Early, who was in position to place himself on Sedgwick's rear, he judged adequate to the work. While, therefore, this force was countermarching from Chancellorsville towards Fredericksburg, Sedgwick was advancing from Fredericksburg towards Chancellorsville ; and it happened that the heads of the columns came together just about midway — at Salem Heights, near the junction of the plankroad and the turnpike. It was now towards four o'clock in the afternoon. One of the Confederate brigades, under Wilcox, already held the crest at Salem Chapel, and McLaws was proceeduig to form his brigades on his right and left ; but Sedgwick threw forward Brooks' division, sup- * Lee : Report of Chancellorsville, p. 12. THE CIIANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 299 porting ii? with Newton's division on the right, and, advancing, gained the crest after a sharp conflict.-^ This was a momen- tary triumph, for he was soon pushed slowly back through the woods. The falling back was covered, and the advance of the enemy checked by the excellent firing of the batteries under Colonel Tompkins.t Sedgwick, in fact, was checked. His loss was severe, and with that suffered in carrying the heights of Fredericksburg, brought the total up to five thou- sand men.J Such was the situation in which night found this column. VII. THE COUP DE GRACE. Monday, May 4th, found both armies, and the opposing halves of each army, in a curious dead-lock. Hooker had assumed a strictly defensive attitude in his new line. Lee felt unable to attack with less than his whole force, which could not be concentrated until he was reHeved of the danger that menaced his rear in the person of Sedgwick.§ Sedgwick, on the other hand, while able to hold his own, was unable to advance in face of the opposition he encountered. This was now not lessened but rather increased, for General Early * Sedgwick's Report. f " The advance of the enemy was checked by the splendid firing of our batteries — Williston's, Eigby's, and Parsons'."— Sedgwick's Report. The Con- federate General McLaws testifies to the excellence of the artillery service : " The batteries of the enemy Avere admirably served, and played over the whole ground."— Report of the Battle of Chancellorsville, p. 30. I " My strength yesterday was twenty -two thousand men ; I do not know my losses, but they were large — probably five thousand men." — Dispatch from Sedgwick to Hooker, May 4th : Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 109. The precise loss was four thousand nine hundred and twenty-five killed, wounded, and missing. — Sedgwick's Report. § " In the mean time the enemy had so strengthened his position near Chancellorsville, that it was deemed inexpedient to assail it with less than our whole force, which could not be concentrated until we were relieved from the danger that menaced our rear." — Lee: Report, p. 13. 300 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARJIY OF THE POTOMAC. on Monday morning retook the heights of Fredericksburg, thus cutting off Sedgwiclv from communication with that place, and enveloping him on three sides. To cut this knot, Lee resolved to further re-enforce the troops opposed to Sedgwick and drive him across the Eappa- hannock, thus ehminating from the problem one important factor. Accordingly, on Monday morning Anderson was directed to proceed with his remaining three brigades to join McLaws.* Beaching Salem Heights about noon, he threw his force around on Sedgwick's left, with the view of cutting his command off fi'om the river. The Confederates, however, met considerable delay in getting into position, and the attack was not begun till six o'clock, when it was made with great impetuosity — Sedgwick resisting Avith the utmost stubborn- ness, but forced to yield ground, especially on the left. Hap- pily, darkness soon ensued to prevent the enemy's following up his advantage, and, under cover of night, Sedgwick safely withdrew his corps across the Kappahannock at Banks' Ford, where a ponton-bridge had been laid the day before. Thus it was that Lee on Tuesday morning (May 5th) saw himself relieved from this menace in his rear ; and having now but a single foe to cope with, he promptly recalled the divisions of McLaws and Anderson, united them with his main force at Chancellorsville, and resolved to give the remaining section of the Union army the coup de grace. Prep- arations were made dui'ing the afternoon and evening to as- sail Hooker's position at daylight the following morning (Wed- nesday, May 6th). When daybreak, however, came, and the Confederate skirmishers advanced, it was found that the army had, during the night, Avithdrawn across the Eapj^ahannock, Hooker had determined, on Monday night, to recross the river ; but Avhen the question was submitted to the judgment of his corjDS-commanders, it was found that a majority of those present were in favor of an advance rather than a with- drawal Hooker, however, had lost all stomach for fight. * Lee : Report of Chancellorsville, p. 12. THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 3Q1 Accordingly on Tuesday, the engineers were instructed to prepare a new line near the river to cover the crossing, and for this purpose they constructed a continuous cover and abatis, from the Rappahannock at Scott's Dam around to the moiith of Hunting Creek on the Rapidan, a distance of three miles. During the afternoon a heavy rain set in which lasted till late at night. The movement to recross was begun by the artillery at dark of Tuesday, and was suddenly interrupted by a rise in the Rappahannock so great as to submerge the banks at the end of the bridges, which the current threatened to sweep away — a consummation most devoutly wished by many of the leading officers of the army, who were bitterly opposed to recrossing the river. But fate willed otherwise, and in the midst of a night as gloomy as the mood of the army, the troops filed across to the north bank. The losses in the battle of Chancellorsville can be stated with accuracy. On the side of the Confederates, they made an aggregate of ten thousand two hundred and eighty-one.* On the Union side, they were seventeen thousand one hun- dred and ninety-sevenl- killed, wounded, and missing. The army left behind its killed, its wounded, fourteen pieces of artillery, and twenty thousand stand of arms. It remains now to glance a moment at the operations of the cavalry column under Stoneman. As this was a powerful corps, numbering some ten thousand sabres, and as its move- ment was intended to precede by a fortnight the commence- ment of operations by the army, very important results were expected from it. But the cavalry was delayed a long time by the swollen condition of the upper Rappahannock, so that it did not cross till the time the infantry made the passage, April 29. Hooker then divided the command into two * Lee : Report of Chancellorsville, p. 131. \ Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 143. Of this nunaber Lee claims five thousand prisoners, besides the wounded. He also claims the prize of seventeen standards, nineteen thousand and five himdred stand of arms, and mucli ammunition. — Lee : Report of Chancellorsville, p. 15. 302 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. columns, sending one, under General Averill, to move to Louisa Courthouse, threaten Gordonsville, and engage the Confederate mounted force, while the other, under General Buford, should break up the Eichmond and Fredericksburg Eailroad, destroying its bridges, etc. The only mounted force the Confederates could oppose to these columns was a small brigade of two regiments under General W. H. F. Lee.* That officer fell back before the Union cavalry, which advanced on Louisa Courthouse, and proceeded to destroy the Yu'ginia Central road. Stoneman divided Buford's force into six bodies, throwing them oiit in all directions ; but the important line of communications by the Fredericksburg and Eichmond Eailroad was not struck till the 3d of May, and the damage done it was very slight.f This is sufficiently shown by the fact that on the 5th the cars conveyed to Eichmond the Confederate wounded and the Union prisoners^ captured in the battle of Chancellors ville. The raid had, undoubtedly, the effect to alarm the coimtry through which the columns moved, and much property was destroyed; but its military result, as bearing on the main operation, was quite insignificant. * Report of General R. E. Lee on the Battle of Chancellorsville, p. 15 ; Re- port of General Stuart, p. 38 ; Report of General W. H. F. Lee, p. 49. f " The damage done to the railroad was small and soon repaired, and the James River Canal was saved from injury."— Report of General Lee, p. 15. if Hooker's testimony : Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 140. THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 303 VIII. OBSERVATIONS ON THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. The simple recital I have made of the operations attending the battle of ChanceUorsville wiU have served to reveal the extraordinary character of that action, which, opening with an exhibition of grand tactics marked by masterly skill, sank into conduct so feeble and faulty, as to be almost beneath criticism. 1. It is in war as in Hfe : a single false step often involves an endless train of swift-succeeding misfortune. This false step in the conduct of Hooker was that, having started out to fight an offensive battle, he reduced himself, at the very mo- ment when action was above all imperative, to a perilous defensive. The strategic operation of crossing the Kappa- liannock merits all the praise it has received. It was ac- complished with complete success, and resulted in placing at ChanceUorsville on the night of Thursday, April 30, four corps, in a position on the rear of the left of the Confederate de- fensive line, with Lee's forces scattered do\Mi the Eappahan- nock, a distance of five-and-twenty miles. All the enemy between Hooker and Fredericksburg was a mere handful of a division. Then did Hooker grasp the initiative. Then was the moment, if ever moment were, for vigorous impulse and fiery action, before his opponent should recover himself. By what prompting of chivalrous generosity, rare in war — and eclipsing forever the conduct of the commander of the Eng- lish Guards, who at Fontenoy insisted on the French deliver- ing the first fire — was it that in this situation he voluntarily resigned all the advantage of* the surprise, and allowed Lee forty-eight hours to concentrate against him ? 2. That delay at ChanceUorsville from Thursday afternoon till Saturday afternoon undid all that had been accomphshed. 304 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. It is true that the Wilderness is a region unfavorable for manoeuvring a large army ; but it was as bad for Lee as for Hooker, and the latter is estopped from availing himself of this excuse by his own order, in which he declared it to be " ground of his own selection." Besides, this objection wholly disappears in face of the fact that the reconnoissances of Friday, May 1st, showed he might have pushed out beyond the woods, thus rmcovering Banks' Ford, reducing the line of communications by twelve miles, and practically uniting both his wings. To the "special wonder" of all the commanders, he relinquished the fine jDOsition then gained, and stood on the defensive in the Wilderness, 3. But for a defensive battle the positioning of his army was faulty — the ground being commanded in front, and the right flank thrown out "in the air," whereas it might have been se- curely rested on the Bapidan. This afforded Lee his opportu- nity, and with consummate address, and a marvellous bold- ness, considering the disparity of his force, he on Saturday morning set on foot the execution of Jackson's flank march to attack the Union right. This is an operation usually condemned in war ; but the conditions justified it, seeing that Jackson was able to mask his movement, and success crowned it. 4. During the whole of Saturday, while Jackson was exe- cuting his flank march, the Confederate commander held Hooker's fifty thousand men with the division of Anderson and part of McLaws — eight brigades, or twelve thousand men. Not a motion of offence was made by Hooker all this time. 5. After the disaster to the Eleventh Corps on Saturday night. Hooker made every thing to hinge on Sedgwick's ad- vance to join him, which was to make the greater contingent on the lesser. His orders to Sedgwick, sent at ten o'clock of Saturday night, and received about midnight, were to move up from his position below Fredericksburg, take the heights, and move out by the plankroad towards Chancellorsville, distant fourteen miles. This move wouild, under the circumstances, THE CILVNCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 095 have been an impossibility, even had no enemy interposed. Sedgwick, after a gallant assault in which he suffered heavy loss, carried the Fredericksburg heights on Sunday forenoon ; and he then moved out to obey Hooker's instructions to fall upon Lee's rear at Chancellorsville, but was stopped by the enemy at Salem Heights. 6. But meanwhile, on Sunday morning Hooker had been driven back at Chancellorsville. Moreover, the operations ending in the giving gTOund of the army at Chancellorsville were over live hours before Sedgwick attacked Salem Heights. It is therefore evident, that unless the Sixth Corps could, single-handed, fight all the force brought against it, the sole object of taking the heights of Fredericksburg, or uncovering Banks' Ford, was to hold a position from which the army might debouch. Therefore the attack on Salem Heights was mere waste of men ; and if those heights had been taken, the Sixth Corps never could have extricated itself. Sedgwick should not have been called forward from Fredericksburg, be- cause to abandon the possession of the heights was to give up a positive gain for a remote possibihty. If, however, Sedgwick was to be expected to make a junction with the force at Chancellorsville, Hooker was committed by every considera- tion of honor and duty to so act as to make the junction possible. Yet he did not make the slightest effort as a diver- sion in Sedgwick's favor ; but allowed Lee to countermarch at pleasure from his front a force sufficient to first check and then overwhelm Sedgwick. General Hooker lays the blame of the disaster at Chancellorsville to Sedgwick's failure to join him on Sunday morning. "In my judgment," says he, " General Sedgwick did not obey the spirit of my order, and made no sufficient effort to obey it. His movement was delayed so long that the enemy discovered his intentions ; and when that was done, he was necessarily delayed in the further execution of the order." ^ This is a cruel charge to bring against a commander now beyond the reach of de- * Hooker's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. 20 306 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. traction ; whose brilliant exploit in carrying tlie Fredericks- burg heights and his subsecjuent fortitude in a trying situa- tion, shine out as the one reUering brightness amid the gloom of that hapless battle. 7. From the time when, at noon of Sunday, Hooker was driven from the line at ChanceUorsviUe, to his new line in the rear, he remained perfectly passive. Was ah. fight out of him ? Had the disaster to the Eleventh Corps, which nobody in the army regarded as of any moment (that corps hardly being accounted as belonging to the Ai-my of the Potomac), so paralyzed him that he could do nothing ? Yet the disrup- tion of the Eleventh Corps had been more than made up by the arrival of Eeynolds' corps (First) on Saturday night ; and in the decisive action of Sunday, he employed little more than half his force — neither Pveynolds nor Meade being allowed to go into action, though eager to do so. Hooker allowed a position to be lost when he had more men at hand that did not draw trigger than Lee had in his entire army ! 8. It was Monday evening before Sedgwick w^as attacked ; and the whole interval from noon of Sunday, when the action of ChanceUorsviUe ceased, till six o'clock on Monday evening — thirty hours — was available to re-enforce Sedgwick, which might readily have been done on a short line via United States and Banks' fords. Yet no attempt was made to do so. Lee made good use of this time in re-enforcing the wing opposed to Sedgwick, so that he was able at night to drive the Sixth Corps across the river after a severe action, in which Sedgwick's guns booming out like signals of distress were heard at ChanceUorsviUe. Indeed, such w^as Hooker's delusion (to use the mildest term) regarding the situation, that on Sunday afternoon, at the time Sedgwick was com- pletely enveloped, he sent word to that officer stating that he (Hooker) " had driven the enemy, and all it wanted w^as for him (Sedgwick) to come up and complete Lee's destruction !" 9. Even after Sedgwick had withdrawn across the Rappa- hannock at Banks' Ford on Monday, Hooker might have re- mained indefinitely on the third hue he had caused to be THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 307 prepared. It was of impregnable strength — both flanks rest- ing on the river ; and the army could here have repelled all assaults. The whole army wished this ; and a successful action, ending in Lee's repulse, would have saved the morale and pride of the troops. It has been said that the storm of May 5th, which caused a rise in the Rappahannock, and en- dangered the supplies of the army, was a motive for retreat. But the order to retire was given twelve hours before any rain and during a cloudless sky. 10. Not the Army of the Potomac was beaten at Chancel- lorsville, but its commander ; and General Hooker's conduct inflicted a very severe blow to his reputation. The officers despised his generalship, and the rank and file were puzzled at the result of a battle in which they had been foiled without being fought, and caused to retreat without the consciousness of having been beaten. 308 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. IX. THE GETTYSBUEG CAMPAIGN. JDNE— JtTLT, 1863. / I. THEORY OF THE CONFEDERATE INVASION. In the minds of that group of able and sagacious men that at Richmond controlled the course of the mighty experiment of war, there had early gi-own up a theory of military conduct that was undoubtedly the best adapted to the circumstances, and, indeed, is the only theory on which a defensive war can be maintained with any hope of success. It is now generally conceded that a Power that either vol- untarily or by compulsion allows itself to be reduced to a purely defensive attitude is certain to be compelled, sooner or later, to succumb. On the other hand, military history affords many memorable illustrations of the marvellous results that may be accomphshed by nations that, forced to the defensive by the superiority of the assailant, are yet able at the oppor- time moment to assume the offensive, and inflict blows as well as receive them. It was by acting on this principle that Frederick the Great, in that everlasting model of a defensive campaign, the Seven Years' War, was able to make head against the seemingly overwhelming combination brought against him ; and that Napoleon, in 1814, in that other bright exemplar of the defence of a country by boldly taking the offensive, was able to confront the invading Allies, and at length make them pay so dearly for the capture of his capital. ^^^^ c/: a THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 309 Sucli was the principle of action early adopted by the Con- federate leaders ; and the course of this narrative has already set forth the bold and successful manner in which it was more than once carried out. It was in accordance with this policy that General Johnston, after falhng back from Yorktown to the front of Eichmond, turned upon McClellan astride the Chickahominy, and dealt him a blow which but for accidental circumstances should have terminated the campaign — a result that, indeed, was accomphshed, when Lee, continuing the conception of Johnston, seized the initiative and hurled the Union army back to the James Kiver, And it was in following out the same line of action that he was able, by threatening the flanks and rear of Pope, to drive back that general to the fortifications of Washington, and transfer the theatre of war to the trans-Potomac region. It seemed that an opportunity for a new and bolder offen- sive than had yet been attempted now presented itseK. Twice the Army of the Potomac had crossed the Kappahan- nock, and on each occasion it had been driven back in disas- ter. Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville had raised the morale of Lee's army to the highest pitch. While the expe- rience of these battles had inspirited the Southern troops, it had given General Lee himself a sense of confidence and power he had not before felt. And now to this fact of the moral condition of the Confederate army, so favorable to bold enterprises, was added another incentive, in its condition of material strength. The diminution of Hooker's force by the extensive out-mustering of short-term troops* was well known ; * The regiments thus mustered out of service by the expiration of their term were among the fruits of that hap-hazard hand-to-mouth policy of enlistment that governed the military administration throughout the war. The two years troops had been enrolled for that period at a time when all were eager to be enlisted " for the war ;" and the nine-months' men were from the improvised levies which the Secretary of War, in his panic at Jackson's razzia in the She- nandoah Valley in July, 1862, had called out at that time. It is needless to remark that their term of service expired just about the time they became somewhat seasoned to war. 310 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. and to this relative increase of Lee's army was now added a positive increase by a large force of conscripts, and a more important re-enforcement by the two divisions of Longstreet's corps, which, having been operating south of James Eiver at the time of the battle of Chancellorsville, were immediately ■ thereafter recalled to take part in the meditated movement. If Hooker's force of infantry was at this time reduced, as he de- clares, to an effective of eighty thousand men,* there was now less disproportion between the two armies than generally ob- tained, for at the end of May, Lee's force had reached an ag- gregate of sixty-eight thousand infantry and a considerable body of cavalry. t The Confederate army had, moreover, been lately mobilized and increased in efficiency by its reorganiza- tion into three corps cCarmee, under Generals Longstreet, Hill, and Ewell — three able, energetic, and trusted lieutenants. In respect of transportation, equipment, and clothing, though not in respect of supplies, the Southern force in Yirginia was in better condition than at any previous time. And if its commissariat was deficient, the rich granaries of the North lay open — the inviting spoils of a successful blow.:}: * Letter from General Hooker to President Lincoln, May 13, 1863: "My marching force of infantry is cut down to about eighty tliousand men." The cavalry corps which, on Hooker's entrance into command, had been rendered stronger and more effective than ever before, was much reduced by the severe service to wliich it had been put. General Pleasonton, who succeeded General Stoneman in the command of the cavalry, gives its effective, at the end of May, at four thousand six hundred and seventy-seven horses — one-third its strength by the March report.— Report of General Pleasonton, May 27th. f This is the number present for duty the 31st of May* it was precisely 68,353 ; the aggregate present was 88,754. I learn from General Longstreet that when the three corps were concentrated at Chambersburg, the morning reports showed 67,000 bayonets, or above 70,000 of all arms. General Long- street added, that the Army of Northern Virginia was at this time in condition to undertake any thing. X There is no doubt that the condition of Lee's commissariat at this time had considerable to do with the invasion. General Longstreet told me a story to this point, the authenticity of which, however, he did not vouch for. Shortly before the movement, it seems. General Lee sent to Richmond a requisition for a certain amount of rations. The Commissary -General Northrup indorsed on it : "If General Lee wishes rations, let him seek them in Pennsylvania 1" THE GETTYSBURG C-iJMPAIGN. 311 Thus prompted, the Confederate leaders resolved upon a movement that should not only have the effect of causing the Ai-my of the Potomac to loose its hold upon the Eappahan- nock, but should initiate a campaign of invasion on the soil of the lojal States. . And it is proper to pomt out here that in coming to this determination, those who controlled the war- couucils at Eichmond would seem to have been influenced rather by the excited condition of the army and the South, than by a just appreciation of their proper defensive policy. This not only did not exclude, but it invited the seizing of favor- able opportunities to throw back the Army of the Potomac from its aggressive advances into Virginia, and, if possible, force it across the Potomac. But to convert these offensive returns into out-and-out invasion was to overleap their true policy and enter upon an enterprise uncertain, perilous, and costly. The experience of the Maryland campaign of the previous year might already have made this manifest ; and hence it would appear that the Eichmond leaders, in resolving to push the aggression into Pennsjdvania, took counsel not so much from prudence as from the clamors of the Hotspurs of the South, who, fretting at the defensive attitude held by Leo during the past twelve months, now burned to see the theatre of war transferred to Northern soil.* The close of May found the army ready to launch on this seductive but fatal adven- ture. * The vague flying rumors and the significant intimations of the Southern press had given Hooker reason to anticipate some hostile movement on the part of Lee, and on the 28th of May he commimicated this conviction to Wash- ington. "You may rest assured," said he, " that important movements are being made. ... I am in doubt as to the direction he [Lee] wiil take, but probably the one of last year, however desperate it may appear." — Dispatch from Hooker to Secretary Stanton. 312 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. II. MANCEUVRES TO DISENGAGE HOOKER. In execution of this project the first object with Lee was to disengage Hooker from the Rappahannock, and with this view secret movements were begun on the 3d of June, Mc- Laws' division, of Longstreet's corps, that day left Fredericks- burg for Culpepper Courthouse, and at the same time Hood's division, of Longstreet's corps, which, since its arrival from Richmond, had been encamped on the Rapidan, marched to the same place. On the 4th and 5tli Ewell's corps was given the same direction. Meanwhile, the corps of A. P. Hill was left to occupy the lines of Fredericksburg.* Made aware of some movement in the enemy's camp, but unable to determine its precise nature, Hooker, with the view of a closer reconnoissance, threw Sedgwick's corps, on the 6th, across the Rappahannock at Franklin's Crossing ; but as Hill remained in position to mask the march of the other corps, all that Sedgwick discovered was that the enemy was in force. Lee, therefore, did not interrupt the march of Longstreet and Ewell towards Culpepper, which place they reached on the 8th.t Hooker was still in ignorance of Lee's purpose, which was at length disclosed in the following manner. Stuart's cavalry had akeady been concentrated at Culpepper some time before the commencement of the main movement ; and the knowledge of this fact, which seemed to indicate some hostile intent, determined Hooker to send his whole cavalry corps to break up Stuart's camp.| Accordingly, on the 9th, * Lee : Report of the Gettysburg Campaign. f Ibid. :]: " As the accumulation of the heavy rebel force of cavalry about Culpepper may mean mischief, I am determined, if practicable, to break it up in its incipi- ency. I shall send all my cavalry against them, stiffened by about three thou- sand infantry." — Dispatch of General Hooker to General Ilalleck, June 6th. THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 3] 3 General Pleasonton, with two divisions of cavalry under Buford and Gregg, supported by two picked brigades of in- fantry under Kussell and Ames, crossed the Eappahannock at Kelly's and Beverley's fords, to move by converging roads on Culpepper. But Stuart, having already moved forward from Culpepper to Brandy Station, en route to form the ad- vance and cover the flank of the main movement, a rencounter took place soon after the Union cavalry passed the river. Crossing at Beverley's Ford, and advancing through the woodland, Buford immediately encountered a Confederate bri- gade under General Jones, which, after a considerable com- bat,* he drove back for a couple of miles, when he found himself checked by the arrival of the brigades of W. H. F. Lee and Wade Hampton to the support of Jones. Hereupon severe fighting followed ; but presently Stuart was compelled to draw off to face a menace by another force threatening his rear.t This threat came from the column under Gregg, which had crossed at Kelly's Ford, and advanced towards Brandy Station, its progress being disputed by a Confederate brigade under General Eobertson. Pushing on towards Brandy Station, a spirited passage at arms took place for the possession of the heights, which were at length carried by Gregg. Stuart having withdrawn the main portion of the three brigades from Buford's front, then approached quickly, and a determined combat ensued. Considerable loss occurred on both sides, and finally Gregg, finding that the other col- umn had not been able to move up to make a junction with him, fell back towards his right and rear and united with the division under Buford, whereupon General Pleasonton retired his command across the Eappahannock. This engagement between the entire mounted force of the opposing armies was an interesting one, because it was of the few encounters on a * In this action, Colonel B. F. Davis, of the Eighth New York Cavalry, was killed. Colonel Davis was a gallant oiiicer, and during the investment of Colo- nel Miles at Harper's Ferry cut his way through Jact son's lines, saving his force and capturing a portion of Longstreet's trains. f General Stuart : Report of the Battle of Fleetwood. 314 CA3IPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. large scale in which the cavahy fought in legitimate cavahy style ; for the troojiers commonly dismounted and used their carbines — a circumstance that ordinarily made these affairs quite insignificant and indecisive. The loss was between five and six hundred on each side.* This engagement had the important result of developing at once Lee's presence at Culpepper and his design of invasion, disclosures of both of which facts were found in captured cor- respondence. To meet this menace, Hooker advanced his right up the Eappahannock, throwing forward the Third Corps, on the 11th, to Rajopahannock Station and Beverley, while the cavalry observed the upper forks of the river. But while Hooker had his attention thus directed towards Cul- pepper and to guarding the line of the Eappahannock, with the view to prevent a crossing of that stream by the enemy, — who, it was supposed, would follow the same line of ma- noeuvre adopted in the advance during the preceding summer against Pope, — Lee had taken another leap in advance, and thrust forward his left into the Shenandoah Valley. Leaving Hill's corps still in the position at Fredericksburg, and Long- street's corps at CuljDepper, Ewell's corps was, on the 10th, put in motion westward and northward, avoiding the Eappa- hannock altogether till he reached the Blue Eidge, through which he passed at Chester Gap. Then striking Front Eoyal, he crossed the Shenandoah Eiver, and burst into the Yalley. Advancing rapidly towards Winchester, he arrived before that place on the evening of the 13th, after an advance from Cul- pepper of seventy miles in three days. Such was the startling intelligence that now reached Hooker, who still lay on the Eappahannock ; and action, prompt and vigorous, was seen to be instantly necessary. A glance at the map will reveal the extraordinary situation of the Confederate force at this time. On the 13th of June, with the Army of the Potomac yet lying on the Eappahannock, Lee's line of battle was stretched out over an interval of up- * General W. H. F. Lee was among the wounded. THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 315 wards of a liimdred miles : for liis riglit (Hill's corps) still held the lines of Fredericksburg ; his centre (Longstreet's corj^s) lay at Culpepper ; and his left (Ewell's corps) was at tlie mouth of the Shenandoah Yalley ! Now, it will doubtless not be difficult for any one capable of looking at the map of Northern Virginia with a military eye, to base on these data a plan of action which it may be supposed would be the plan of action suited to the circum- stances. But it would be altogether unjust to judge what General Hooker did, or what he failed to do, by the simple results of mihtary reasoning ; for in the relations which he held to the central military authority at Washrngton — an authority to which his own views were completely subordi- nated — he had neither the freedom of willing nor of acting. It would appear obvious that in the dangerous j)Ositioning of Lee's army (and this very boldness would seem to imply a great contempt for his opponent), the proper place for Hooker to strike was at that exposed rear of his long line' formed by Hill's corps ; for it is as sure an inference as any inference in war can be, that a fore-' of, say,* two or three corps, thrown across the Kappahannock at Banks' or United States ford, could interpose itself between Hill (at Fredericks- burg) and Longstreet (at Culpepper). And if the movement did not insure Hill's destruction (which it ought to do, in vigorous hands), his jeopardized situation would certainly recall Lee's other forces to his support. This interruption of the plan of invasion would be its ending. It is an interesting fact that precisely this method of action was suggested by General Hooker a short time before he became aware of Lee's actual movement,* and authority for its execution was asked in case the Confederate force should move northward.! To this most judicious suggestion two replies, or rather two forms of the same reply — for the opinion \vas Halleck's — were returned. The one was from the Prcs- * Dispatcli from Hooter to Halleck, June , t Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 153. 316 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. ident, disapproving tlie project, and couched in that quaint imagery which Mr. Lincohi was wont to employ in the expres- sion of his thoughts on the gravest subjects. " If Lee," said he, " should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, he would fight you in intrenchments,* and have you at disadvantage ; and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some w^ay be get- ting an advantage of you northward. In a word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, WxC an ox jumped Jial/ over a fence, and liable to he torn hy dogs front and rear, luifhoiit a fair chance to gore one way or to kick the other." f The other reply was from General HaUeck, and it expressed, in solemn mihtary jargon, the same opinion so pungently conveyed by the President ;| but suggested an operation against the "flank of the moving column" — a suggestion that is nothing better than a mask, for General Halleck must have known such an o]3eration to be perfectly impracticable, if Hooker was to have any observance of his express instruc- tions to cover Washington.§ III. HOOKER'S RETROGRADE MOVEMENT. Thus prevented from taking the only step that would have given him the initiative. Hooker was fain to faU back on the interior line towards Washington, taking positions defensive * Nothing easier than to turn the Fredericksburg defences by Banks' or United States ford. f Dispatch from President Lincoln to General Hooker, June 5. i; Dispatch from General Halleck to General Hooker : Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 154. § Any possible movement by Hooker, in execution of this suggestion, would have uncovered his r ght, and given General Lee precisely the opening for Buch a dash on Wash ngton which the report of that general shows he was warily watching. THE GETTYSBUlia CAMPAIGN. 317 as regards the capital, and wliicli would enable him to await the development of Lee's designs. Upon learning the move- ment of the enemy into the Shenandoah Yalley, Hooker, on the 13th, broke up his camps along the Eappahannock, and moved rapidly on the direct route towards Washington, fol- lowmg and covering the line of the Orange and Alexandria Kaih'oad. The first move was to Bealton, Warrenton, and Catlett's Station, on the 13th and 14th ; next to Fairfax Sta- tion and Manassas, on the 15th and 16th. Here he re- mained several days, while awaiting the disclosure of a series of movements which Lee was then making, and to the expo- sition of which I now return. Wlien on the 13th Hill, holding the hues of Fredericks- burg, saw the Union army disappear behind the Stafford hills, he knew that that for which he had remained behind was accomplished, and he then took up his line of march towards Culpepper, where Longstreet's corjDS stiR held posi- tion. Meantime, Ewell was making his Jackson-like swoop " into the Valley. General Jenkins with his cavalry-brigade had been ordered to advance towards Winchester, in co- operation with Ewell, and Imboden with his troopers had been thrown out in the direction of Eomney, to cover the movement on Winchester, and prevent its garrison from re- ceiving re-enforcements from the troops on the hue of the Baltimore and Ohio Eailroad. Both these ofiicers were in position when Ewell reached the Yalley. On crossing the Shenandoah Paver near Front Eoyal, Ewell detached Eodes' division to Berryville, to cut off communication between Winchester and the Potomac, while with the divisions of Early and Johnson he advanced directly upon that Federal post, driving Mihoy into his works around the town on the 13th. The following night, Milroy abandoned his position, but his force being intercepted, a good part of it was cap- tured in the confused meUe. As, at the same time, General Eodes took Berryville with seven hundred prisoners, and the garrison at Harper's Ferry withdrew to Maryland Heights, the Valley was now cleared of all Union force. 318 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. In this exploit Ewell captured over four thousand prisoners, twenty-nine pieces of artillery, and large stores. Milroy with a handful of men escaped across the Potomac. His defence of the post intrusted to his care was infamously feeble, and the worst of that long train of misconduct that made the Valley of the Shenandoah to be called the " Valley of Hu- mihation." Turning back to the other two corps of Lee's army, it ap- pears that on Hill's advance from Fredericksburg to Cul- pepper, Longstreet, who had been retained at the latter place, was pushed northward ; but instead of following the route of Ewell, he moved along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, taking position at Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. This served as a cover to Hill, who slipped through behind Longstreet into the Shenandoah Valley, and took position at Winchester, while, at the same time, it served as a lure to draw Hooker fi'om his base.* During the progress of tliesfe movements. Hooker, being de- termined not to be drawn into a manoeuvre that would expose his right, continued to hold position in the vicinity of Fairfax and Manassas, covering the approaches to Washington, while the cavah'y under Pleasonton was thrown out to feel towards the passes of the Blue Ridge. Here Longstreet's corps con- tinued still to hold post, while his whole front was secured by Stuart's troopers. At Aldie, the opposing cavalry had, on the 17th, a rencounter, which partly developed Lee's position to Hooker, who then felt forward cautiously, sending the Twelfth Corps to Leesburg, the Fifth to Aldie, and the Second to Thoroughfare Gap. Pleasonton, meanwhile, followed up Stuart, driving him on the 20th through Middleburg, and on the 21st through Upperville and beyond. But Hooker did not continue a movement which he felt to be compromising. •" General Lee in liis report explicitly declares this to have been his purpose. " With a view to draw him [Hooker] further from his base, etc., Longstreet ad vanced along the east side of the Blue Ridge, occupying Ashby's and Snicker's Gap .... It seemed to be the purpose of General Hooker to take a position which would enable liira to cover tlie approaches to Washington City." THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 319 Meantime, Lee seemed to be master of the situation. He held strong positions in the Shenandoah Valley where he was ready to welcome battle from his opponent, should he ad- vance, while he was free to cut loose a raiding column into Maryland and Pennsylvania. The longer Hooker remained on the south bank of the Potomac, the freer would be the scope of the foraging forces, and when he should cross to the north side, Lee, reheved from the danger to his communica- tions, would be able to pass to the north bank also, which was altogether in the line of his plan of invasion. In pursuance of this purpose, so soon as Hill and Long- street had relieved Ewell in the Valley, that general with the van of the invading columns passed, on the 22d, into Mary- land, while Imboden's cavalry was thrown out westward, and effectually destroyed the great lines of communication by the Baltimore and Ohio Kailroad, and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. Jenkins' troopers had already preceded Ewell's ad- vance by a week, and had penetrated Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg, throwing the whole north country into a wild blaze of excitement. After gathering in much cattle and horses, which he headed towards the Potomac, Jenkins turned back to join Ewell's force, which, after crossing the Potomac, on the 22d, at Williamsport and Shepherdstown, moved by two columns on Hagerstown, and thence, crossing the boundary into Pennsylvania, passed up the Cumberland Valley, reaching Chambersburg on the following day. The whole region of Western Pennsylvania up to the Susque- hannah was now open to Ewell, free to come and to go, without any other fear than that which might be inspired by the not very formidable aspect of the Pennsylvania militia.* * Forewarned of the designs of the invading army, the War Department had detached General Couch from the command of the Second Corps of the Army of the Potomac, and assigned him, on the 11th of June, to the Depart- ment of the Susquehanna, witli his headquarters at Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania. General Brooks was at the same time appointed to the com- mand of the Department of the Monongahela, with his headquarters at Pitts- burgh. But commanders without troops to command cannot be considered very 32 J CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. He had, tlierefore, free scope for an extensive commerce in horses and cattle, vast herds of which he sent southward, while for the subsistence of his troops he levied subsidies from the population of the country. Thousands of Pennsylvania farmers, j^anic-stricken, hastened with their cattle and house- hold goods to the north of the Susquehanna. From Cham- bersburg, Ewell moved nortliAvard, sending Rodes' division to Carlisle, while Early's division, moving to the east side of the South Mountain ridge, passed by way of Gettysburg to York, and thence to Wrightsville on the Susquehanna — the militia retiring and destroying the splendid bridge over the river at Columbia. lY. ACROSS THE BORDER. However galling the intelligence of the ravaging of Penn- sylvania may have been. General Hooker at least felt himself powerless to help, for it was impossible for him to pass to the north side of the Potomac until his opponent's puri3ose should be more fully disclosed. It was not, therefore, until he learned that the remaining corjDS of Lee were passing into Maryland that he also crossed the river. The corps of Long- street and Hill made the passage of the Potomac at Williams- port and Shcpherdstown on the 24:th and 25tli, and followed the path of Ewell into Pennsylvania. The entire army of the Potomac then crossed on the 25th and 26th at Edwards' Ferry, and made a movement of con- centration on Frederick — a position from which Hooker might formidable barriers to an invasion ; and tliough Governor Curtin issued procla mations and General Couch calls, the response was neither prompt nor enthu- siastic, and when at length a few thousand men liad been raised, and New York had sent forward some of her militia regiments, these oflQcers did not find it practicable to carry their views of defence beyond the line of the Susque- THE GETTYSBURG C-iMPAIGN. 321 either debouch through the South Mountain passes to plant himself upon Lee's line of retreat, or moving northward on the eastern side of the mountains, follow Lee's movement in the direction of the Susquehanna. The former course is of the two the bolder and more deci- sive move, and though there is no proof that is conclusive re- specting which of these courses General Hooker designed to adopt, there is yet evidence that he purposed making, at least, a strong demonstration on Lee's Ime of communications. With this view he threw out his left well westward to Middle- town, and ordered the Twelfth Corps, under General Slocum, to march to Harper's Ferry. Here Slocum was to be joined by the garrison of that post, eleven thousand strong, under General French, and the united force was to menace the Confederate rear by a movement towards Chambersburg. Unhappily, this project traversed the pet crotchet of General Halleck respecting Harper's Ferry, and thence began griefs for Hooker, and an imbroglio more and more involved till it resulted in his supersession from command at the critical mo- ment when the two armies were manoeuvring towards a col- lision the weightiest of the war. The circumstances under which this took place are as follows. At the time Lee's advance was set on foot, the distribution of the Union forces showed the same vicious amorcellement under independent commanders that had marked the worst period of 1862. General Heintzelman commanded the De- partment of Washington, with a force of about thirty-six thousand men ;* General Schenck controlled the Middle De- partment, east of Cumberland, including the garrisons at Harper's Ferry, Winchester, etc. ; while General Dix, with a considerable force, lay for some purpose inconceivable on the Peninsula. Now, about the time Hooker crossed the Potomac, the general-in-chief, awakening at length to the fatal folly of this untimely waste of valuable force, placed the troops of * General Heintzelman's tri-monthly rejwrt for June 10, showed thirty-six thousand six hundred and forty men. 31 322 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTO.AIAC. Generals Heintzelmau and Sclienck under Lis control. But it was soon proved that this control was rather in name than in reality ; for when he attempted to tit out from these de- partments a column of fifteen thousand men to move on Fred- erick, he found himself estopped by General Halleck's fears touching the safety of Washington — a circumstance for which General Hooker conceived he provided sufficiently by the presence of the Army of the Potomac covering the capital ; and when, after advancing on Frederick, he had planned the movement on the rear of Lee, and for that purpose had directed the temporary abandonment of Harper's Ferry, with the view of uniting its garrison of eleven thousand men under General French with the column of General Slocum destined to make the proposed movement, he asked General Halleck, on the 26th of June, " if there was any reason why Maryland Heights should not be abandoned after the removal of the public stores and property," he was met by the following reply from the general-in-chief : " Maryland Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying iJiem. I can- not approve their abandonment except in case of absohite ne- cessity."* It was in vain that General Hooker urged in rejoinder of this fatuitous objection that Harper's Ferry was, under the circumstances, a point of no importance ; that it defended no ford of the Potomac ; that its fortifications would remain after the troops were withdrawn ; nor was there the slightest probability that the enemy would take possession of them, and that, therefore, the ten thousand men that re- mained there useless, should be marched to a point where they could be of service.f * Telegram from General Halleck to General Hooker, June 27 : Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 292. f The text of General Hooker's dispatch is as follows : Sandy Hook, June 27, 1863. AIajor-General Halleck, Qeneral-in-cMef : I have received your telegram in regard to Harper's Ferry. I find ten thousand men here in condition to take the field. Here they are of no earthly THE GETTYSBURG CA3IPAIGN. 323 Against stupidity, sings Scliiller, gods and men fight in vain. Finding himself deprived of that freedom of action on which, in so hirgo a degree, the success of mihtarj opera- tions depends. General Hooker requested, on the 27th of June, to be relieved from the command of the Army of the Poto- mac ; and early the following morning, a messenger reached Frederick from Washington with an order appointing Major- General G. G. Meade, commanding the Fifth Ai'my Corps, in his stead. Provoking as was the behavior of General Halleck, the conduct of General Hooker cannot be accounted noble or high-minded. A truly lofty sense of duty would have dic- tated much long-suffering, in a conjuncture of circumstances amid which the success of the campaign might be seriously compromised by the sudden change of commanders. Yet it was fortunate for the Union cause at this crisis, that the choice of the Government for the commander of the Ai-my of the Potomac feU upon one who proved fitted for the high trust ; and fortunate, too, that that oft-displayed steadfast- ness of the army, unshaked of fortune and committed to the death to a duty self-imposed, rendered such transitions, else- where dangerous, here safe and easy. Meade put his hand to his work in a quiet, practical, business-Hke way ; and it was remarked that his undemonstrative temper, and the aspect he wore of a scholar rather than a soldier, were no drawback to the confidence of the troops, who had learned from the experience of his predecessor, that high-flown account. They cannot defend a ford of the river ; and as far as Harper's Ferry is concerned, there is notJiing in it. As for the fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy will even- take possession of it for them. This is my opinion. All the public propei"ty could have been secured to-night, and the troops marched to where they could have been of some service. Now, they are but a bait for the rebels should they re- turn. I beg that this may be presented to the Secretary of War, and his ex- cellency the President. Joseph Hookek, Major-Qeneral. 324 CA^rPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. promise is often associated with very disproportionate per- formance. Without being what is called a popular officer, General Meade was much respected by his comrades in arms. He was known in the army as one who had grown up with it, whose advancement was due to merit, and who had shown a special steadfastness in many trying hours. The command of the Army of the Potomac was put into his hand without any lets or hindrances, the President expressly waiving all the powers of the Executive and the Constitution, so as to enable General Meade to make, untrammelled, the best dis- positions for the emergency. Immediately the columns moved on as if no change had occurred. CONCENTRATION ON GETTYSBURG. At the time General Meade took command, the army was lying around and near Frederick — its left at MiddletoAvn ; and all he knew touching the enemy was, that Lee, after crossing the Potomac, had marched up the Cumberland Val- ley, and that Ewell's corps occupied York and Carlisle, and threatened the passage of the Susquehanna at Columbia and Harrisburg. In this state of facts, Meade adopted the only course then considered by him practicable, which was to move his army by the inner line fi-om Frederick towards Harrisburg, con- tinuing the movement until he should meet Lee, or make him loose his hold on the Susquehanna. He therefore put his army in motion on the morning of the 29th, taking a course due northward, and keeping east of the South Mountain range. The army moved in three columns, covering, as it advanced, the lines of approach to Baltimore and Washington. The First and Eleventh corps were dii-ected on Emmettsburg ; the Third and TweKth on Taney- THE OETTYSBUKQ CAMPAIGN. 32; town ; the Second on Frizzleburg; the Fifth to Union, and ilio Sixth to Windsor. Now, on the very day that Meade began to move north- ward, Lee, apprised of those previous manoeuvres that seemed to threaten an irruption into the Cumberland Valley (a step which would imperil his communications with the Po- tomac), discovered it would be necessary to do something to check tliis menace. At this time Longstreet and Hill were at SKETCH OF MANCEDVEES ON GETTYSBURG. Cliambersburg, Ewell was at York and Carlisle, and Lee was just on the point of moving his whole force northward to cross the Susquehanna and strike Harrisburg f when, learn- ing the already mentioned menace, he resolved to concentrate on the east side of the South Mountain range as a diversion "^ " Preparations were now made to advance upon Harrisburg ; but on the night of the 38th information was received from a scout that the Federal army, having crossed the Potomac, was advancing nortliward, and that the bead of the cohimn had readied South Mountain. As oiir communications 326 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOIMAO. in favor of his line of retreat, touching which he was justifi- ably nervous. Accordingly, instead of directing Longstreet and Hill to join Ewell on the intended invasion, he ordered them to march from Chambersburg, defiling through the South Mountain range, toAvards Gettysburg, distant twenty miles eastward ; and he instructed Ewell to countermarch from York and Carlisle on the same point. These move- ments were begun on the morning of Monday, the 29th of June. It was not until the night of the 30th, after the army had made two marches, that General Meade became satisfied that Lee, apprised of his movement, had loosed his hold on the Susquehanna and was concentrating his forces east of the South Mountain to meet him. But when and where the shock of battle, which was now seen to be imminent, would take place it was impossible to tell. Under these circumstances, he set about to select a position on which, by a rapid movement of concentration, he might be prepared to receive battle on advantageous terms. With this view, the general line of Pipe Creek, on the dividing ridge between the Mono- cacy and the waters running into the Chesapeake Bay, was selected as a favorable position, though its ultimate adoption was held contingent on developments that might arise. Accordingly, orders were issued on the night of the 30th for the movements of the different corps on the following day : the Sixth Corps, forming the right wing of the army, was ordered to Manchester in rear of Pipe Creek ; headquarters and the Second Corps to Taneytown ; the Twelfth and Fifth corps, forming the centre, were directed on Two Taverns and Han- over, somewhat in advance of Pij)e Creek ; while the left wing, formed of the First, Third, and Eleventh corj^s under General Reynolds, as it was closest to the line of march of the enemy, was thrown forward to Gettysburg, towards which, as it hap- pened, Lee. was then heading. with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his further progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountains." — Lee : Report of the Gettysburg Campaign. THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 327 Strategically, the position at Gettysburg was of supreme importance to Lee ; for it was the first point in his eastward march across the South Mountain that gave command of direct lines of retreat towards the Potomac : but it was not of the same moment to Meade, especially if a defensive rather than an offensive battle was to be fought ; and the topo- graphical features of Gettysburg, that make it so advanta- geous for the defence, were then wholly unknown to him. While, therefore, the left wing, under Reynolds, was thus thrown forward in advance of the rest of the army as far as Gettysburg, it was not with any predetermined purpose of taking up position there ; but rather to serve as a mask while the hue of Pipe Creek was assumed. But while, in war, commanders propose, fate or accident (so-called) often disposes ; and at the time these movements were in execution, events were occurring that were to lift the obscure and insignificant hamlet of Gettysburg into a historic immortality as the scene of the mightiest encounter of modern days. While the army was marching northward, Buford's division of cavalry w^as thrown out well on the left flank ; and mo>dng from near Middleburg on the 29th of June, it occupied Gettys- burg at noon of the following day— the day before Eeynolds - was directed on that point. Passing through Gettysburg, Buford pushed out in reconnoissances west and north, over the routes on which it was supposed Lee's army was moving. Now, Lee had that morning put his columns in motion towards Gettysburg — Hill and Longstreet moving due eastward from Chambersburg and Fayetteville, and Ewell southward fi'om Carlisle. Hill's corps had the advance on the great road from Chambersburg to Baltimore, which passes through Get- tysburg. The march was made with much dehberation : so that night found only two divisions through the South Moun- tain ; while the remaining division and Longstreet's corps remained west of the mountains. The advance divisions of Hill's command bivouacked, on the night of the 30th June, within six or seven miles of Gettysburg ; while Ewell, marc-b- 328 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. ing on a line perpendicular with tho route of Hill and Long- street, encamped at Heildersbiirg, distant nine miles. Of tlie Union force, Buford's cavalry division alone was at Gettys- burg that night ; and Eeynolds, with the First and Eleventh corps, bivouacked on the right bank of Marsh Creek, distant four miles, under orders to make Gettysburg the next morn- ing. The corps of Sickles (Third) and Slocum (Twelfth) were within call. The remaining corps were further off. It is easy to see, from the relative situations of the hostile armies, that unless one or the other should fall back, a battle was inevitable in the vicinity of Gettysburg. But these facts were unknown to both the opposing commanders ; and I shall in the next chapter relate how, contrary to the expectations of each, the action was precipitated. VI. GETTYSBURG— FIRST DAY. On the morning of "Wednesday, the 1st of July, the two Confederate columns continued their march towards Gettys- burg ; and Buford, holding position on the Chambersburg road, by which Hill and Longstreet were advancing, suddenly found himself engaged, a little past nine in the morning, with Hill's van, about a mile west of the town. As he knew that Reynolds was moving up to join him, he made dispositions to retard the enemy, holding back Hill's column by skilful de- ployments and the use of his horsc-artillerj^ Eeynolds, who (with his OAvn First Corps and the Eleventh Corps, under Gen- eral Howard) was then en route from his place of bivouac at Marsh Creek, hearing Buford's guns, pressed forward, with all haste. At ten o'clock he came upon the field with the leading division of the First Corps, under General Wadsworth. "While i - to = — f ''tuoti Linei Con/'etletnte ■ Scale ofJMilA THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 329 yet forming line, Wadswortli's troops were assaile J ; and they had to be thrown quickly into battle array under fire. Looking westward from Gettysburg the horizon of vision is bounded at a distance of ten miles by the mountain range known as the South Mountain, which running north and south forms the eastern wall of the Cumberland Valley. When the force which folded and raised up the strata that form the South Mountain was in action, it produced fissures in the strata of red shale which cover the surface of this region of country, j)ermitting the fused material from beneath to rise and fill them on cooling with trap-dykes or greenstone and syenitic greenstone. The rock, being for the most part very hard, remained as the axes and crests of hills and ridges when the softer shale in the intervening spaces was excavated by great water- currents into valleys and plains.* These ridges run in a direction nearly parallel with the South Moun- tain range, and give a rolling and diversified surface to the landscape. The town of Gettysburg nestles at the base of one of these ranges. At the distance of half a mile to the west of the town is another ridge, called, from the theological seminary that stands thereon, Seminary Eidge, and a mile further west run two other parallel swells of ground separated by Willoughby Kun. It was in the plain between these two latter ridges, the westernmost of which was occupied by the Confederates and the nearer by the Union trooj)s, that the action of July 1st opened ; for Buford's deployments had suc- ceeded in detaining the hostile column on the thither side of the run till Wadswortli's division came on the ground. As this force arrived, Keynolds hurried its two brigades into action, placing Cutler's brigade, with the battery of Hall — the only battery in the division — on the right and left of the Chambersburg road and across an old railroad grading (part of it in deep cut and part in embankment) near by and par- allel with the road ; while he directed General Doubleday * Professor Jacobs : " Later Rambles over the Field of Gettysburg ;" United States Service INIagazine. 18G4. 330 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. who bad reached the ground with the van of the infantry, to move the other brigade, usually called the '' Iron Brigade," under General Meredith, to the left of the road to occupy a piece of woods skirting "Willoughby Eun, across which and into the woods the Confederate right was at the same time pushing. Only the advanced division of Hill's corps, under Heth, had yet come up, so that the opening combat which might fitly be called the battle of Willoughby's Eun, was engaged between one division on each side. Heth, with his four brigades, attacked simultaneously the two brigades of Wadsworth's division under Generals Meredith and Cutler. The latter was assailed by Davis's Mississippi brigade, and with such success, that the three right regiments found them- selves flanked, whereupon they were withdrawn over the Seminary Eidge, leaving the battery unsupported. Mean- while, the skirmishers of Cutler's other two regiments (the Fourteenth Brooklyn, under Colonel Fowler, and the Ninety- fifth New York, under Colonel Biddle) were disputing with the Confederate brigade of Archer the passage of Willoughby Eun, and skirmishing in a skirt of woods along the brook with such as had crossed. At this moment, the " Iron Bri- gade" opportunely swept down from the left, struck the flank of the Confederate brigade, and captured several hundred that had already crossed, including the commander, Brigadier- General Archer.* The dispositions at this point were made by General Eeynolds in person ; and it was at the moment when, after urging on his men with animating words, he saw this successful charge under way, and turned to leave the woods, that he was struck with a rifle-shot that caused almost instant death — a grievous loss to the Army of the Potomac, one of whose most distinguished and best-beloved officers he was ; one whom, by the steady growth of the highest military qualities, the general voice of the whole army had marked out for the largest fame. * This movement was led by the Second Wisconsin, under Colonel Fair child, supported by the remainder of the Iron Brigade. THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 331 In tlius engagiug with the enemy, Reynolds has been charged with rashness in prematurely preci^^itating a battle. But wrongly ; for rashness was not a fault of that officer, as all who know his character are well aware ; and though he had no orders to bring on a general action (being, indeed, under instructions to fall back on the proj)osed hue of Pipe Creek), he was necessarily drawn into this engagement in aid of Buford's hard-pressed cavalry. His real motives, whatever they were, remain buried with him : but it is more than prob- able that, in hastening forward the head of his column to the plain beyond the town, his quick military eye had taken in at a glance the figure of that rocky bulwark around Gettys- burg as a vantage point where the army could most favorably receive battle, and in going out to oppose a front of resist- ance to the near-approaching enemy, and allow the army time to concentrate at Gettysburg, he knew he was doing what General Meade, who reposed the highest confidence in his judgment, would quite approve. While these events were passing on the left of Wads- worth's force, the retirement of Cutler's right left Hall's bat- tery unsupported ; and it was in imminent peril of capture, when the Fourteenth Brooklyn and the Ninety-fifth New York, joined by the Sixth Wisconsin, under Lieutenant- Colonel Dawes, made a change of front, and charged to the relief of the guns. This manoeuvre was so well managed that Davis's two Mississippi regiments, having sought shelter in the railroad cut, were there surrounded and compelled to sur- render with their battle-flags. Upon this, that part of Cut- ler's command that had previously fallen back, having m the mean time been reformed, returned and united with the three regiments engaged in this spirited affair, when the force was moved still further to the right to meet the extension of the enemy's lines in that direction. By the time these initial successes were gained, the combat, burstmg out anew, was increased in volume by the arrival of fresh forces on each side. On the Union side, the two re- maining divisions of the First Corps, under Generals Eow- 332 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AKMY OF THE POTOMAC. ley"" and Eobinson, readied the ground. The former division was immediately thrown in to sustain the now hard-pressed left, and was precipitated into close action. The men were in. the highest spirits, as was shown by their behavior, and by one incident among others. One of the brigades of this division, under command of Colonel Eoy Stone, had been as- signed to a position where it came under a heav}^ artillery fire ; and as the troops took their post. Colonel Stone re- marked, "We have come to stay." This went quickly through the brigade, the men adopting it as a watchword — " IFe have come to stay," And a very large part of them never left that ground, t Meantime, Robinson's division remained for awhile in re- serve on the Seminary Ridge ; but almost simultaneously with the arrival of these re-enforcements, the advance divi- sion of Ewell's corps, under General Rodes, came in from the direction of Carlisle, and, swinging round under cover and un- perceived, seized a position menacing the riglit of the Union line. This brought a heavy pressure to bear on that flank, held by Cutler's command, and to relieve it Robinson's divi- sion was moved forward from the Seminary. First, Baxter's brigade of this division took position on the right of Cutler, resting its right on the Mummasburg Road, and then, as the needs became more urgent, Baxter's command relieved Cut- ler, and the brigade of General Paul was brought up on Bax- ter's right. These troo23s opposed a vigorous resistance to Rodes' attack, and early in the action, by a skilful movement, captured three North Carolina regiments under General Iverson. With this series of successes the combat opened ; but it was destined soon to be beclouded by an untoward sequel. Thus far the action had been sustained on the Union side by the First Corps alone, and on the Confederate side by the advance * This officer commanded Doubleday's division, tlie latter officer being, for the time, in command of the corps. f Testimony of General Doubleday : Report on the Conduct of the '\^''ar, vol. i., i>. 307. THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 333 dmsions of the corps of Hill and Ewell. But new actors now appeared on the stage. Hill was re-enforced by another divi- sion under General Pender, and towards one o'clock the Eleventh Corps came up— General Howard having arrived some time before and by vhtue of his rank assumed com- mand of the field. General Howard left a division- in reserve on Cemetery Hill, and placed the divisions of Schurzt and Barlow to the right of the First Corps, on a prolongation of its general line, and covering the approaches to Gettysburg from the north and northwest. Almost simultaneously with the forming of the Eleventh Corps, a fresh division of Swell's corps, under General Early, arrived from the direction of Tork and took position on Barlow's front. It has been seen how, by fresh arrivals, the Union line was gi-adually extended, till now it made a wide curve of several miles around the west and north of the town. In this dispo- sition of his troops General Howard fell into an error that has been common throughout the war — the error of attempt- ing to cover too much ground, by which it coines about that these long lines are everywhere weak, and that in attempting to cover every thing one really covers nothing. It would have been a disposition much better suited to the nature of the ground had General Howard massed a heavy force of his newly arrived corps on the right of the First Corps, where the line ended in Kobinson's division— sweeping the plain to the north by its fire, in place of attempting to hold the whole stretch by a Hue thinly drawn out. This faulty placing of the force had a powerful influence on the result that followed ; and taken in connection with another circumstance, accounts quite as much as the alleged misbe- havior of some of the troops for the disastrous sequel. The circumstance to which I have made reference is this. When Bodes threw forward his division to connect Avith the left of Hill's troops, he secured a commanding position on an ele- * Stein wehr's division. f Tliis division was, for the time being, under General Scliimmelpfenig, Scljurz commanding the corps. 334 CA5IPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. vated ridge known as Oak Hill, situate between the Mnm- masbm-g and Carlisle roads. This position was the key-point of the entire field, and gave Rodes an advantageous point of attack on the centre of the line as now drawn ; or rather, as the corps did not connect, on the right flank of the First Corps and the left flank of the Eleventh Corps. The effect of this was soon seen. It required but a slight pressure for Early to throw back the right division, under Barlow, who found it impossible to hold his command to their work, and who was himself left on the field severely wounded. And when, towards three o'clock, a general advance was made by the Confederates, Eodes speedily broke through the Union centre, carrying away the right of the First Corps and the left of the Eleventh, and, entering the interval between them, disrupted the whole line. The troops fell back in much disorder into Gettysburg. At the same time the right of the First Corps, giving way, also retreated to the town, where they became entangled with the disordered mass. Early, launching forward, captured above five thousand prisoners.* The left of the First alone drew back in some order, mak- ing a stand on Seminary Ridge until the artillery and ambu- lances had been withdrawn, and then fell back behind the town. At the time the confused throng was pouring through Get- tysburg, General Hancock arrived on the ground. He had not brought wutli him his tried Second Corps, but had ridden forward from Taneytown under orders from General Meade, on learning the death of Reynolds, to assume command and use discretionary power either to retain the force at Gettysburg, or retire it to the proposed line on Pijoe Creek. General Hancock was instructed to examine the ground, and if he found the position under the circumstances a better one than that contemplated, he should so advise the commander, and the army would be ordered up. But on his arrival he found a more pressing duty forced upon him ; for it was clear that * Lee : Report of Gettysbxirg, MS. THE GETTYSBURG C.\^IPAIGN. 335 if the flight of the shattered masses of the First ami Eleventh corps was not stayed, a great disaster must follow. The sole nucleus of stabUity was presented by a single bri- gade of Steinwehr's division which General Howard, on arriv- ing, had left in reserve on Cemetery Hill, and the cavalry of Buford, which, deployed on the plain to the left of the town, and in front of the ridge, presented a bold and firm front. Everywhere else was confusion, and the enemy coming on. In such an emergency it is the personal qualities of the commander alone that tell. If, happily, there is in him that mysterious but potent magnetism that calms, subdues, and in- spires, there results one of those sudden moral transformations that are among the marvels of the phenomena of battle. This quahty Hancock possesses in a high degree, and his appearance soon restored order out of seemingly hopeless confusion — a confusion which Howard, an efiicient ofl&cer, but of a rather negative nature, had not been able to quell. Nor, fortmiately, could there be any question as to the right posi- tion to be taken up, for nature had already traced it out in a bold relief of rock. On the ridge of Gettysburg — the ridge Reynolds had mentally marked as he impetuously hurried forward to buffet the advancing enemy, and which, by the rich sacrifice of his hfe, he purchased for the possession of the army and for the possession of history forever— -Han- cock disposed the remnants of the two corps. The Gettysburg ridge is an irregular, interrupted hue of heights and hills running due south from the town of Gettys- bui'g. At the town the ridge bends back, eastward and southward, in a crotchet formed by Cemetery and Culps' hills. The former is so called from the bvu'j-ing-place of the town situate thereon. It commands the positions available for the enemy on the north and northwest. The latter forming the right Ivnob of the hne is in rough and rocky ground, much wooded and very unfavorable to the use of artillery. Along its eastern base runs Rock Creek, one of the tributaries of the Monocacy. From Cemetery Hill the line runs southward for about three miles, in a well-defined ridge, which may 336 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. properly be termed Cemetery Ridge, and which terminates, at that distance, in a high, rocky, and wooded peak named Eound Top, the less elevated portion near where the crest rises into Round Top being termed Little Roimd Top,^^' a rough and bald spur of the former. The broken character of the ground in front of the southern flank of the line renders it also unfavorable to the use of artillery. The general position is thus about four miles in extent ; but while Cemetery and Gulps' hills require the formation of a hne of battle to face northward, the direction of Cemetery Ridge (north and south) causes the line to front westward. The crest, mainly in cultivated fields, but with occasional fringes of woods, has, throughout, a good slope to the rear, afi'ording excellent cover for the reserves and trains. To the west, the ridge falls ojBf in a cultivated and undulating valley, which it commands, and at the distance of a mile or less is a parallel crest which has already been marked as Seminary Ridge, and which the Confederates occupied during the succeeding battle. In the valley between these two ridges the ground rises into an intermediate swell of land, along which runs the Emmettsburg road. Such was the ground destined to form the scene of the approaching shock of the two armies ; and on which Han- cock, assisted by Generals Howard, Warren, and Buford, now disposed his preliminary line of battle. Cemetery Hill was already partially held by Howard's troops. On the right of these, and occupying the important position of Culps' Hill, was placed TVadsworth's division of the First Corj)s, and his line completely commanded the approaches from the town of Gettysburg, now held by Ewell. The remaining two divisions of the First Corps under General Doubleday were posted on the left of the Eleventh, along Cemetery Ridge ; and Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps (Slocum) just then arriving, Avas ordered by Hancock to the high ground on the left. Towards six o'clock, the remaining division of that Corps came up, * This spur appears on the map of Colonel Batchelder, as Weed's Hill. THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 337 having been urgently summoned by General Howard during the afternoon. The command, thereupon, devolved on Gen- eral Slocum ; and Hancock, having ordered all the trains. lo the rear, so as not to interfere with any movement of troops that might be ordered, returned to headquarters at Taney- town, where General Meade still remained. General Hancock reported that the position at Gettysburg was a very strong one, and advantageous for a defensive battle, having for its only disadvantage that it might be turned: in fact, Hancock's representations were such that General Meade instantly gave orders for the forward move- ment and concentration of all the corps on Gettysburg, and he advanced his headquarters to that point, reaching it at one o'clock of the morning of the 2d. The Third Corps (Sickles) had early in the day been summoned up by General Howard. Its van reached Gettysburg at sunset of the 1st, and was joined by the remainder of the corps during the night and following morning. The Second Corps, having only to make the march of thirteen miles from Taneytown, arrived in the ^dcinity when General Hancock was on his way back, and was by him placed in position two miles in rear of the town to cover the flank and communications. The Fifth Corps (Sykes), when ordered forward, was at Union Mills, dis- tant twenty-three miles ; but by a night-march might reach the ground early in the morning. The Sixth Corps, forming the right wing of the army as it moved, was furthest off, being at Manchester, thirty-six miles from Gettysburg ; but the known character of General Sedgwick gave assurance that all the resources of skill and zeal would be employed to bring it up at the earliest possible moment. The important action of Wednesday, opening with success, followed by repulse, and ending in the occupation of the ridge of Gettysburg, was, as has been seen, fought by only the ad- vanced portion of the two armies : by the First and Eleventh corps on the Union side, and on the Confederate side by the divisions of Heth and Pender of Hill's corps, and the divisions of Early and Eodes of Ewell's corps. As it has been seen 338 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AIJMY OF THE POTOMAC. that the cokimns of Hill and Longstreet moved from Cham- bersburg and Fajetteville towards Gettysburg on the morn- ing of the 29th, and as the distance is not above twenty miles, it is evident that the march was conducted much more slowly than was usual with Lee, and this he attributes to his igno- rance of the movements of his antagonist — an ignorance due to the absence of Stuart's cavalry, the vigilant eyes of the Confederate commander.* From the exposition already given it will have appeared that by the encounter of Wednesday, the opposing armies were precipitated into general conflict sooner than the chief commanders on each side expected ; but when Lee, on the one hand, and Meade, on the other, reached the front late at night, they found themselves by the events of the day already committed to battle, and rapid concentration at Gettysburg became imperative. Having shown Meade's dispositions to this end, it remains to add that Lee also sent urgent orders to his remaining divisions to hasten their march. Meantime, Ewell was instructed to carry Cemetery Hill if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arri- val of the other divisions of the army. He decided to await the arrival of Johnston's division ; but as that officer did not arrive till a late hour, and in the mean time it was found that * The absence of Stuart happened in this manner : When Lee crossed the Potomac from the Shenandoah Valley, Stuart was left on the east side of the Blue Ridge, under instructions to harass Ho'oker as much as possible in cross- ing the Potomac, and then pass into Maryland, either east or ■west of the Blue Ridge, and take position on the right of the advancing column. This would have put him in his proper place to watch the Union cavalry thrown out on the left of the Army of the Potomac. Stuart, however, finding himself unable to impede the passage of the Potomac, advanced eastward as far as Fairfax Courthouse, and then crossed the Potomac at Seneca. But Hooker having crossed above, Stuart found the entire Union army interposed between him and Lee, so that he was compelled to make a wide detour on the exterior line : marching by way of Westminster, he advanced to Carlisle, but did not reach that point till the 1st of July, the day after Ewell had left for Gettysburg, tc which point he was then immediately summoned by Lee, who had during all these movements been deprived of the important services of his cavalry. THE GETTYSBURG CAIMPAIGN. 339 the Union force had fully occupied the heights, it was resolved not to attack until the arrival of Longstreet, two of whose divisions, those of Hood and McLaws, had encamped within three miles of Gettysburg. Hill's remaining division under Anderson reached the ground soon after the close of the en- gagement. Nevertheless, to neither of the opposing chiefs could the situation, as it presented itself on their arrival that night, be either encouraging or satisfactory. General Meade found affairs pressing to a culmination, and the rolls of the First and Eleventh corps showed as the result of an encounter which in its general relations was but a reconnoissance in force, the formidable loss of near ten thousand men ! He did not know but that Lee had his whole force, massed in front of him, while his own army was much scattered, and a part distant by a full day's march.* Yet the position seemed favorable, and above all it secured to him the advan- tage of the defensive, forcing upon his antagonist all the perils of attack.f Dropping at once, therefore, as now ob- solete, all previous contingent plans looking to other lines of defence, he had the moment he learnt the nature of the posi- tion given orders for the rapid concentration of the whole army at Gettysburg. To Lee, on the other hand, though the action of the 1st had been on the whole favorable, yet the situation in which he found himself was very different from what he desired. It must be borne in mind that Lee's sudden movement to the east side of the South Mountain range, just at the moment he was heading his columns to cross the Susquehanna and ad- * The two corps furthest off were the Fifth and Sixth, the former of which was distant twenty-three, and the latter upwards of thirty miles. f General Meade makes no secret of his strong desire, at the time, to secure the advantage of the defensive. " It was my desire," says he in his testimony before the War Committee (Report, p. 439), " to fight a defensive rather than an offensive battle, for the reason that I was satisfied my chances of success were greater in a defensive battle than in an offensive one ; and I knew the moment- ous consequences dependent upon the result of that.'* 340 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. vance on Harrisburg, was solely prompted by the menace to his communications with the Potomac resulting from the ma- noeuvi'es of his antagonist. It was, therefore, with the view of checking the latter that Lee threw his forces to the east side of the mountain : but in doing so, he was far fi'om expecting or desiring to take upon himself the risk of a general battle, at a point so distant from his base. He was wiUing to do so only in case he should, by manceuvring, secure the advan- tage of tlie defensive, or some special opening for a blow, should his opponent make a false move. Indeed, in enter- ing upon the campaign. General Lee expressly promised his corps-commanders that he would not assume a tactical offensive, but force his antagonist to attack him. Having, however, gotten a taste of blood in the considerable success of the first day, the Confederate commander seems to have lost that equipoise in which his faculties commonly moved, and ho determined to give battle.* In adopting this course he committed a grave error, as the event proved, and judging from a merely military point of view ; but this is not the first case in which it has been seen that other considerations than those of a purely mili- tary order enter into the complex problem of war. General Lee states as his main motive for giving battle, the diflfi- culty that would have been experienced in withdrawing through the mountains with his large trains — an excuse that can hardly be considered valid. A considerable part of the trains had not been advanced to the east of the mountains, and he could readily have withdrawn all under cover of his line of battle ; and then retired his army by the same routes — the Cashtown and Fairfield roads — over which he ultimately retreated. Besides, there was open another and stiU bolder move. Longstreet, holding the right of the Confederate line, * Tliis, and subsequent revelations of the purposes and sentiments of Lee, I derive from General Longstreet, who, in a "full and free conversation with the writer, after the close of the war, threw much light on the motives and conduct of Lee during this campaign. THE GETTYSBURG CASIPAIGN. 3-il had one flank secm-elj posted on the Emmettsburg road, so that he was really between the Army of the Potomac and AYashmgton ; and by marching towards Frederick could imdoubtedly have manoemTed Meade out of the Gettysburg position. This operation General Longstreet, who foreboded the worst from an attack on the army in position, and was anxious to hold General Lee to his promise, begged in vain to be allowed to execute." What really compelled Lee, contrary to his original mtent and promise, to give battle, was the animus and inspiration of the invasion ; for, to the end, such were the " exsufflicate and blown surmises" of the army, and such was the contempt of its opponent engendered by Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, that there was not in his ranks a barefoot soldier in tattered gray but believed Lee would lead him and the Confederate army into Baltimore and Washington, if not into Philadelphia and New York.t To have withdrawn, therefore, without a battle, though materially easy, was morally impossible ; for to have recrossed the Potomac without a blow, and abandoned the invasion on which such towering hopes had been built, would have been a shock beyond endurance to his army and the South. Such were the causes that, under providential ordainment, resulted in the mighty shock of arms that hurled the invading force fi-om the soil of the loyal States, and dealt the army of Lee a blow from which it never afterwards recov- ered. To the events of this action I now return. By mornmg of the 2d of July the entire Union army, saving the corps of Sedgwick, had reached Gettysburg; and the whole Southern force, with the exception of Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps, had come up. * The officer named is my authority for this statement. + Colonel Freemantle, of the British service, who was with the Confederate army during the battle of Gettysburg, thus testifies to tliis feeling : " The stafl- officers (on the night of the 1st) spoke of the battle as a certainty ; and the universal feeling in the army was one of profound contempt for an enemy whom they have beaten so constantly, and under so many disadvantages." — Three Months in the Confederate States, p. 356. 342 CAJIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Meade, following the natural line of defence, disposed Ins forces as follows : The Eleventh Corps (Howard) retained its position on Cemetery Hill, where it was supported by Kobin- son's and Doubleday's divisions of the First Corps (Newton) ; on its right was j^laced Wadsworth's division of the same corps, which together with the Twelfth (Slocum) held the right of the whole army, on Culps' Hill ; the Second (Han- cock) and Third (Sickles) corps occupied the crest of Ceme- tery Ridge — the former connecting with the left of the Eleventh, and the latter (which formed the left of the line) connecting with the left of the Second. The Fifth Corps (Sykes) was held in reserve on the right. Lee placed his troops along the Seminary Ridge, separated from the Cemetery Ridge by an interval of about a mile, and inclosing it with a wider curve. Longstreet, with the divisions of Hood and McLaws, held the right, facing Round Top and a good part of Cemetery Ridge, on which Sickles and Han- cock were placed. Hill's three divisions continued the line from the left of Longstreet round the Seminary Ridge, and fronted, therefore, the remainder of Cemetery Ridge. Ewell, with his three divisions, held from the Seminary through the town ; and sweeping round the base of Cemetery Hill, termi- nated the left of the hostile line in fi'ont of Culps' Hill, occu- pied by Slocum's corps, which formed the Union right. The Confederate line was about five miles in stretch, and was in great part Avell concealed by a fringe of woods. Both sides placed in position a powerful artillery force. VII. GETTYSBURG— THE SECOND DAY. When morning revealed to Lee the position of the Union army drawn up on that ridge of rocks, he must have keenly reahzed all the perils of the attack ; for upon a like position held by him at Fredericksburg he had seen the army under hei< i triK s ( ( nl^ Bni nc, (a/fhieJl iyr49SgCran'/h/r/. MAP OFTHE BATTLE or .slunviftf/ /^o.iiJw/i.s /teM JU LY 2° 1863 Prepared V Col.W.H. Payne. for C(ttfi/jiitf//is oftheArmi/ofUie CuTiif'drrate / THE GETTYSBURG CAJSIPAIGN. 343 Burnside clash itself to pieces, in liigli but im^wtent valor. But the excited condition of his army, in which he still shared, would not allow him to pause. He therefore pro- ceeded with his dispositions for attack ; yet it was four o'clock in the afternoon before these were completed. The Union troops, meanwhile, made good use of the time, and improvised for themselves cover behind breastworks and stone walls. Early in the morning, Ewell's deployment of his left around the base of Gulps' Hill attracted attention, and raised the belief that the enemy would attack that point. General Meade therefore proposed to assume the initiative there, allowing General Slocum to attack with his own and two additional corps ; but that officer having reported the ground very unfavorable, the purpose was given iip.* About two o'clock the Sixth Corps, under General Sedgwick, arrived, having made a march of thirty-five miles in twenty hours. On the arrival of Sedgwick, General Meade directed Sykes' corps (Fifth), that had been in reserve on the right, to move over and be in reserve on the left. The result of the Confederate reconnoissances was to fix upon the ground opposite Lougstreet — that is, the left and left centre, held by Sickles' corps — as the most practicable point of attack. That portion of the Union front was placed in a very anomalous position ; and this fact, which presently became the pivotal fact of the Confederate attack, was the result of a train of events that befell in this wise. In the original ordainment of the line of battle. Sickles' corps (Third) had been instructed to take position on the left of Hancock, on the same general line, which would draw it along the prolongation of Cemetery Kidge towards the Bound Top. Now, the ridge is, at this point, not very well defined ; * The attack was designed to be made by Slocum's own corps and the Fifth Corps, together with the Sixth, as soon as it should arrive. But at ton, orders were sent to attack without the Sixth Corps ; and it was then that General Slocum reported adversely to it. General Warren, chief-engineer, who at the time went to examine the position, also reported an attack from the right unad- visable. — Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 438. 344 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC. for the ground in front falls off into a considerable hollo ;\\ But at the distance of some four or five hundred yards in advance, it rises into that intermediate crest along which runs the Emmettsburg road. General Sickles, thinking it desirable to occupy this advanced position — which he conceived would, if held by the enemy, make his own ground untenable — assumed the responsibility of pushing his front forward to that point. The motive that prompted General Sickles to this course was laudable enough, yet the step itseK was faulty : for though to a superficial examination the aspect of this advanced position seems advantageous, it is not really so ; and pro- longed to the left, it is seen to be positively disadvantageous. It affords no resting-place for the left flank, which can be protected only by refusing that wing and throwing it back through low ground, towards Kound Top ; but this, in turn, presents the danger of exposing a salient in a position which, if carried, would give the enemy the key-point to the whole advanced line.* * The point wliere two lines meet in an angle must always be weak for de- fence. This truth is recognized as one of the leading principles of the science of fortification, where the lines which meet in an angle are represented by ramparts or parapets, because there must always be a certain space, more or less great in proportion to the greater or smaller acuteness of the angle, which is undefended by the direct fire of the lines. The same applies to lines formed by troops, whose fire and general resistance can only be effective when they act perpendicular, or nearly so, to the direction of the lines. There is another mathematical truth which applies to the case of troops, and which is thus stated by Colonel MacDougall : " Where two lines representing mechanical forces meet in a point, the single line or force which is capable of counteracting them, called their equivalent, is always less than the sum of the two lines ; and the direction of this equivalent is that of the diagonal produced of the parallelogram supposed to be formed on these two lines, by acting in a con- trary sense." (MacDougall : Modern Warfare and Modern Artillery, p. 145) There is yet another serious evil attaching to an angle presented by a line on a field of battle — the enemy may place guns so as to enfilade one or both of the faces. When, therefore, circumstances render such a formation unavoidable, the angle should be covered by ground inaccessible to the enemy by nature or rendered so by art. But neither was this position taken up by General Sickles unavoidable, nor was it strengthened by artificial defences. THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 345 General Sickles' disposition of his troops had precisely this character, and was as follows : his right division, under Gen- eral Humphreys, was thrown forward several hundred yards in advance of Hancock's left, and disposed along the Em- mettsburg road. On Humphreys' left, the prolongation of the same line was continued to the left by Graham's brigade of Birney's division, as "far as the "Peach Orchard," where, leaving the ridge, the remainder of Birney's division, made up of the brigades of De Trobriand and Ward, was refused, and stretched obliquely back through a low ground of woods, a wheat-field and woods, towards Round Top, in front of which, in a rocky ravine, the left flank rested. This brought the salient at the peach orchard, which was therefore the key-point of Sickles' rather weak Hne. On this obtruding member, Lee determmed to make his attack ; for, as he states, " it appeared that if the position held by it could be carried, its possession would give facilities for assailing and carrying the more elevated ground and crest beyond." This eccentricity in the placing of Sickles' corps did not become known to General Meade until about four o'clock, when he arrived personally on that part of the field ; and though he then saw the danger to which that corps exposed itself, it was thought to be too late to correct the error ; for just at that moment, Longstreet, under cover of a powerful artillery fire, opened his attack, and all that remained for General Meade was to support Sickles as far as could be done in the emergency. Longstreet first advanced his right divi- sion under Hood, so that the attack fell upon that part of Sickles' corps which stretched back from the peach orchard to the Round Tops — that is, upon the brigades of De Tro- briand and Ward; and while sharply assaihng this front. Hood at the same time thrust his right unperceived between the extreme left of Sickles and Round Top. The extraordi- nary danger to which this menace exposed not merely the force of Sickles, but the whole army, Avill be obvious when it is remembered that the possession of this point would have taken the entire hne in reverse. This result seemed at this 346 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. moment imminent, for Little KounJ Top was quite unoccnpiccl. Had Hood known its nakedness, and, massing his whole divi- sion on the force that had outflanked Sjckles' left, pushed boldly for its rocky summit, he would have grasped in his hand the key of the battle-ground, and Gettysburg might have been one of those fields that decide the issues of wars. Fortunately, at the time Hood made his attack. General Warren, chief-engineer, happened to reach Little Bound Top. The summit of this hill had been used as a signal station, and at the moment of his arrival, the signal-officers suddenly seeing that the enemy had penetrated between Bound Top and the left of Sickles' line and was approach- ing their position, were folding up their flags to leave ; but Warren, commandmg them to continue waving them, so as to make at least a show on the hill, hastened to seek some force wherewith to occupy this important point. It happened at this pregnant moment that the head of Sykes' column, which had been ordered over to the left, reached this vicinity, and the leading division of this corps, under General Barnes, was then passing out to re-enforce Sickles. General Warren assumed the responsibility of detaching from this force the brigade of Vincent, and this he hurried up to hold the position, while Hazlitt's battery was by enormous labor dragged and lifted by hand up the rocky brow of the hill and planted on its summit. As these events followed in quick succession, it resulted that while that part of Hood's force that had penetrated to the left of the line was approaching the front slope of the Little Bound Top, which in a few mo- ments would have been seized by it, other claimants were hurrying up its rear. Vincent's men, thrown forward at the pixs de course, and without time to load, reached the crest just as Hood's Texans, advancing in column and without skirmishers, were running to gain it. Little Bound Top— the prize so eagerly coveted by both combatants— is a bold and rocky spur of the lofty and peaked hill Bound Top. It is impossible to conceive a Bcene of greater wildness and desolation than is presented b.y •THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 847 its bare and mottled figure, up-piled with gi-anite ledges and masses of rock, and strewn with mighty boulders, that might be the debris of some antique combat of the Titans. Here there ensued one of those mortal struggles rare in war, when the hostile forces, clenching in close contest, illus- trate whatever- there is of savage and terrible in battle. Vin- cent's brigade, composed of the Sixteenth Michigan (Lieu- tenant-Colonel Welsh), the Forty-fourth New York (Colonel Kice), the Eighty-third Pennsylvania (Captain Woodward), and the Twentieth Maine (Colonel Chamberlain), coming quickly into position, engaged Hood's troops in a hand-to- hand conflict, in which bayonets were crossed and muskets clubbed ; and officers, seizing the rifles dropped from dead hands, joined in the fray. After half an hour of this des- perate work, the position was secured. Meantime, Weed's brigade of Ayres' division of the Fifth Corps* took post on Vincent's right on Little Kound Top. Hood's men, how- ever, clung fast to the rocky glen at the base of the liiU, and working their way up the ravine between the Round Tops, succeeded in turning the left flank. The ammunition of Vin- cent's troops was already exhausted. It therefore became necessary to use the steel, and the enemy was driven from this point by a charge with the bayonet by Colonel Chamber- lain's Maine Regiment. Yet this rocky bulwark was not secured without a heavy sacrifice. Colonel Vincent, who had so heroically met the first shock, laid down his Hfe in defence of the position ; O'Rourke and the much-beloved General Weed were killed ; Hazlitt, who commanded the bat- tery, also fell at his perilous post ;t and among the ledges of rocks lay many hundred dead soldiers in blue.:^ * The One Hundred and Fortieth New York, of this brigade, had gone up simultaneously with Hazlitt's battery, and participated in the engagement. f Hazlitt was bending over the prostrate form of his commander, General Weed, and receiving his last words and sighs, when a bullet tlirew him prone and inanimate on the body of his comrade in glory and in death. :j: Towards dark, after Chamberlain's charge, Fisher's brigade of the Penn- sylvania Reserves re-enforced Vincent's troops ; and later at night Chamberlain's regiment, supported by two of Fisher's regiments, occupied Round Top proper. 348 CMIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. It has been seen tliat, at the same time Hood thrust his right through the interval between Sickles' left flank and Eouiid Top, and entered upon the contest for the possession of that point, he also assailed the portion of the Third Corps, line held by Birney's division. In this' attack he was joined by Longstreet's other division under General McLaws, so that this eff"ort was directed against the entire left and centre of the Third Corps, fi-om its left flank near Kound Top, forward to the salient m the peach orchard on the Emmetts- burg road. But it happened that Longstreet's line as formed did not cover the entire front of Sickles' corps (for Hood's point of attack was quite to the Confederate right, and Long- street had only McLaws' division in addition), and it failed to cover it by about the front held by the right division under General Humphreys. AVhere Longstreet's hne terminated, however, the prolongation towards the Union right was con- tinued by Hill's corps, so that Humphreys had part of that corps in his front. But Hill's duty was, while Longstreet attacked, to make demonstrations and only assault in case of a good opportunity. Thus it came about, that, Avlien Long- street, after the development of Hood's attack, advanced McLaws' division on the left of Hood, the brunt of the as- sault fell upon Sickles' centre and left under Birney ; Hum- phreys' division being for the time unassailed. The onset of Hood and McLaws upon Birney's front was made with great vigor, compelling General Sickles immediately to call for re-enforcements ; and it was in response to this re- quest that General Barnes' division of the Fifth Corps had been thrown out in support at the time General Warren detached from this division the brigade of Vincent to hold Little Bound Top. Its other two brigades, under Colonels Tilton and Sweitzer, hastened to the support of Birney's hard-pressed troops on the advanced line ; and General Humphreys, who held the right of the Third Corps, but had not yet been attacked, sent one of his own brigades under Colonel Burling to still further help. The heaviest pressure of the hostile attack fell upon that THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 340 exposed portion of tlie lino where it made an angle at tlio peach orchard, and this point of Sickles' line was held by eight regiments belonging to Birney's and Hnmphrey's divi- sions. The assault was made by McLaws' left, supported by Anderson's division ; ard though it was disputed by the Union regiments with very great stubbornness, the position was at length carried, and the key-point remained in the enemy's hands. Now certain]}', if not before, was seen the faultiness of the advanced line ; for the enemy having burst through the cen- tre, was free to penetrate the interval and assail in detail the disrupted forces right and left. To meet this menace, that portion of the line which was to the right of the peach orchard — that is, Humphreys' division and Graham's bri- gade — swung back its exposed left, thus making a change of front to face southward instead of westward, and the batteries on the forward crest under Major McGilvray were retired firing. That portion of the hue which was to the left of the peach orchard — namely, the brigades of Tilton and Sweitzer, that had been sent out to re-enforce Birney — being now not only assailed in front but having its right flank exposed, fell back ; and this also involved Birney's front. It is rare that a field of battle displays, in a more striking manner than was here presented, the influence of key-points in determining tactical results. The possession of the peach orchard enabled the enemy to meet and repulse a succession of attacks, and the history of the action on the left presents an extraordinary series of efforts to maintain ground now become untenable— one re-enforcement after another being thrown forward only to be driven back in a whirling vortex of advancing and retiring lines. The original fi'ont of Birney had already gone out and dis- appeared, and Barnes' two brigades sent forward in support had been repulsed. Hereupon Caldwell's division was de- tached from Hancock's fi'ont and ordered in to check the hos- tile advance. The disputed ground had come to be an inter- mediate position of woods and wheat-field between Sickles' lost 350 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. front and tlie Eouncl Tops, in the rear now securely held. Caldwell advanced with his left skirting Little Eound Top, and pushing forward into the wheat-field engaged the enemy with the brigades of Cross and Kelly. This line was much cut up, and Colonel E. E. Cross, of the Fifth New Hamp- shire (commanding the First brigade), whose intrepid bear- ing had so often been exhibited on the field of battle, was killed. To relieve these troops. General Caldwell then ad- vanced his second line, made up of the brigades of Brooke and Zook. The latter was mortally wounded while carrying his troops into action. Brooke led his command forward with much gallantry, and after an exceedingly stubborn fight, drove the enemy from under cover of the woods, and from a position of great natural strength along the rocky bottom of a creek at its margin.* But this success, notwithstanding that Sweitzer's brigade was again advanced to assist the attack, was tempo- rary. Hood had already carried the whole of the position originally held by the left of the Third Corps ; and to hold him in check at that point. General Aj^res, with two brigades of the Regulars of the Fifth Corps, moved forward. Caldwell experienced the same fate as those that had gone before ; for the Confederates, penetrating the wide interval made by the disruption of Sickles' centre at the peach orchard, enveloped his right, and penetrated almost to his rear. This quickly forced Caldwell back, after the frightful sacrifice of one-half his division. Then the enemy, breaking out through the woods on the right, hurled Sweitzer back ; arid the division of EegTilars, under General Ayres, being struck on its right and rear, fought its way with great gallantry and heavy loss through the enemy to its original line of battle. I shall leave now the recital of the manner in which he was finally checked, and take up the thread of events on the right of the Third Corps, where Humphreys yet clung with one of his flanks to his advanced position. It has been seen that when Sickles' line was cut in twain by * Colonel Brooke was ■wounded in tliis action. THE GEYTESBURG CAMPAIGN. 351 the carrying of the peach orchard, Humphreys, joined by the brigade of Graham, swung back his left so as to make a change of front, and with his right still held on to the crest on the Emmettsburg road. For a considerable time, while the contest raged to his left, he was not assailed, and the enemy only made demonstrations of attack; but when finally the whole left and the troops that had moved to its support were thrown back, the hostile force poured through the interval and advanced to strike Humphreys, whose left was greatly exposed, and whose right was thrown much out of position. To support that flank. General Hancock sent forward two regiments from Gibbon's division (the Fifteenth Massachu- setts, under Colonel Ward, and the Eighty-second New York, under Colonel Huston), and to cover the gap on the left, he detached Willard's brigade fi'om Hays' division ;- but at this moment Hill, converting his demonstrations into a real attack, pressed upon Humphreys, who was forced to fall back. In the midst of this action General Sickles was severely wounded, losing a leg. General Hancock hereupon took direction of the Third Corps (now under General Birney) in addition to his own. The attack on Humphreys was so sudden and severe, that two additional regiments (the Nineteenth Massachusetts, under Colonel Devereux, and the Forty-second New York, under Colonel Mallon), which Hancock had sent out to his assistance, finding that Humphreys was retiring, could only get quickly into line of battle, dehver a few volleys at the advancing enemy, and then retire with a considerable loss. The enemy pushed them so closely that a number of the Con- federates, eagerly pressing forward, fell prisoners into the hands of those they were pursuing. Humphreys, in retmng his men, which he refrained from doing until not only pressed upon by the enemy, but until ordered back, felt the import- ance of yielding stubbornly and slowly ; for under the circum- stances, he judged that if a rapid backward movement were * Colonel Willard wae killed in this action. 352 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. made, it would be difficult to rally the men upon the new lino. Yet this imposed obstinacy (jost the terrible sacrilice of half his small division. What of its remains was collected on the original line Avas the debris of many regiments — hardly more than an ordinary battalion, though with many colors. - Tliree guns of one of its batteries had been left on the field, owing to its heavy losses in horses and cannoneers. And now the enemy began to surge against the base of the crest, and it be- came urgently necessary to form a bulwark of men to resist his oncoming. This was not an easy task, for the action, as it rolled on, had fully involved Sykes' corps on the left, and a large part of the Second Corps had been thrown in to aid the Third at different points, and was shockingly cut up. With all that could be done the front was still only ixdchedy and wherever the head of a column could be thrust through, the enemy was quick to do so. Thus Hancock, in riding along the hue, suddenly met a force of the enemy, which hav- ing, unobserved, approached very close to the line, under cover of a fringe of undergrowth, was about to pass through an unprotected interval. Opportunely, the First Minnesota Ke- giment came up at this moment, and, making an exceedingly spirited charge, drove it back in disorder, capturing its colors. The line being, however, still incomplete, Stannard's brigade was brought up, and General Meade led forward in person a part of the Twelfth Corps, consisting of two regiments of Lockwood's Maryland brigade, which were placed further to the left. This was enough, for the enemy's efforts were now little more than the frantic sallies of an exhausted wrestler. A terrible price had been exacted for the success he had won : General Barksdale, the impetuous leader of the boldest at- tack, was mortally hurt, and lay within the Union lines, and many other Confederate officers were killed and wounded. Wlien, therefore, Hancock ordered a counter-charge, the en- emy easily gave way. This was made by the portions of the different corps that had come up to the assistance ; and Hum- * Hancock : Report of Gettysburg. THE aETTYSBri:a CAMPAiciX. . 353 plireys' little Laud joined iu, and had tlie satisfaction to re- take and bring back its lost guns. A new line was tlion formed by Doubleday's and Kobinsou's divisions of the First Corps, and by troops from the Twelfth Corps, brought up by General WilHams * Thus, at dusk, ended the action on the left centre, and at the same time the complicated action on the left, whose ebb and flow I have already described, was brought to a close. It has been seen how line after line was swept back, and how the enemy, following on the heels of the troops of Ayres last engaged, debouched from the woods in front of Little Round Top. Thus far, the success of Longstreet had indeed been considerable ; but it had no decisive character, and until this crest and spur should be carried, he could claim no substantial victor}' ; for the position wrested from Sickles was one intrin- sically false, and though the successive attacks of Barnes and Caldwell and Ayres had been repulsed, yet the advantage was gained at a heavy cost to the Confederates. When, therefore, debouching from the woods, they suddenly saw across a nar- row swale the beetling sides of Little Eound Top crowned with troops and artillery, and the figure of a battle array de- fined on the bold crest to the right,t their line was visibly shaken. At this moment six regiments of the division of Pennsylvania Reserves, moving down the ridge, rapidly ad- vanced under the personal leadershijD of General Crawford. This sally was enough to determine the action ; for seeing attack to be hopeless, and in turn assailed themselves, the Confederates, after a sharp but brief contest for the reten- tion of a stone wall occupied by them, hastily recoiled to the woods beyond the wheat-field, the opposite margins of which were that night held by the combatants. * It had been intended tliat Geary's division (with the exception of 'Jreeno's brigade) should also re-enforce the left ; but this division missed its way. Gen- eral Williams was temporarily in command of the Twelfth Corps, Slocum hav- ing charge of the whole right wing. •j Bartlett's and ^\^leaton's brigades, of the Sistli Corps, had just taken position on this crest 354: CAMPMGNS OF TEE AR^IT OF THE POTOJIAC. Such was tlio main current of the action as it fell on the left and left centre of the arni}^, and it was fought by Long- street's corps . and a part of Anderson's division of Hill's corps. Now the plan of battle contemplated that, while Longstreet attacked, Ewell should make vigorous demonstra- tions against the forces on Cemetery and Gulp's hills, to pre- vent re-enforcements being drawn from that flank to increase the opposition to be encountered in the real assault against the Union left. For some reason, however, Ewell's demon- strations were much delayed, and it was sunset before he got LO work. Then, opening up with a fire of artillery from a knoll in front of Cemetery Hill, he followed it by a powerful infantry attack with the divisions of Early and Johnson— the former on Cemetery Hill, the latter on Culp's Hill. As Early's columns defiled from the town, they came under the fire of Stevens' battery at eight hundred yards; but, wheeling into line, they pushed up the hill, and as their fi'ont became un- masked, all the g-uns that could be brought to bear upon them (some twenty in number), were opened upon them, first with shrapnel, then with canister, and with excellent effect, for their left and centre were beaten back. But the right, working its ' way up under cover of the houses and undulating ground, pushed completely through Wiedrich's battery into Eicketts' battery. The cannoneers of both batteries stood well to their guns, and when no longer able to hold them, fought with handspikes, rammers, and even stones.* Howard's troops were considerably shaken by the assault ; but the firmness of the artillery and the opportune arrival of Carroll's brigade of the Second Corps, voluntarily sent by General Hancock on hearing the firing, reptdsed the attack and saved the day.t But Ewell's efforts did not end here ; for at the same time this attack was made, he threw his left division, under Gen- eral Johnson, up the ravine formed by Eock Creek, and * Hunt : Report of Artillery at Gettysburg. f " Ewell had directed Rodes' division to attack in concert with Early, cov- ering liis right. When the time came to attack, Rodes not having his troops in position, was unprepared to cooperate with Early."— Lee's Report, MS. THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 355 struck the extreme right of the Union position on Gulp's Hill. If Ewell's delay had thwarted the original intention of pre- Tenting re-enforcements being sent from the right to buffet Longstreet's attack, it at least gave him the opportunity to make his demonstration, when at length made, really effective ; for such heavy detachments had been taken from the Twelfth Corps to re-enforce the left during the operations of the after- noon, that there remained of this corps but a single brigade, under General Greene, drawn out in a thin Hue, with the divi- sion of Wadsworth on its left. The brunt of the attack fell upon Greene, who, re-enforced by parts of Wadsworth's troops, maintained his own position with great firmness, but Ewell's left penetrated without opposition the vacated breast- works on the furthest right, and this foothold within the Union lines he held during the night. Thus closed the second day's action, and the result was such that the Confederate commander, beheving he would be able ultimately to carry the position, resolved to renew attack on the morrow. It must be admitted that the events of the day seemed to justify this beUef, Longstreet had carried the whole front on which the Third Corps had been drawn ; Ewell's left was thrust within the breastworks on the right, in a position which, if held by him, would enable him to take Meade's entire line in reverse, and the Union loss in the two days' combat had already reached the frightful aggregate of upwards of twenty thousand men. But Lee's inference, though specious, was unwarranted. The position carried from Sickles at such costly price to the assailants was no part of the real line as drawn on the crest of hills south of Gettysburg. This, intact throughout, remained yet to be assailed ; and such was the confidence felt by the corps- commanders in their abihty to maintain this position, that notwithstanding the partial reverses of the day, and the heavy loss sustained, when they came together that night there was a unanimous determination to fight it out at Get- tysburg — a sentiment which was quite in accord with General Meade's own conviction. S56 CA3IPAIGNS OF TEE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. VIII. GETTYSBUEG— THE THIRD DAY. Lee's plan of attack of the previous day had been directed against both flanks of the Union position, but, as I have shown, though the whole of the advanced hne on the left had been carried, this only brought Longstreet abreast a more formida- ble front drawn on the original line. Ewell, however, still maintained his foothold within the breastworks on Gulp's Hill; and this lodgment inside of the works on the right shaped the determination of the first plan of attack for the thkd day. " General Ewell," says Lee, " had carried some of the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was such as to lead to the behef that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy."* With this view, Johnson's force, hugging closely Gulps' Hill, was considerably strengthened ; but before preparations could be made for an attack, Meade assumed the ofifensive and drove back the intrusive force. During the night a powerful artillery was accumulated against the point entered by the enemy, and at four o'clock opened a heavy fire. Mean- while, the troops of the Twelfth Gorps returned from the left, and the divisions of WilHams and Geary, aided by Shaler's brigade of the Sixth Gorps, entered upon a severe struggle to regain the lost portion of the line. After four hours' close contest, it was carried by a charge of Geary's division, the original line on Gulp's HiU was re-estabhshed and the right flank made secure. Being thus thwarted in his plan of attack on the right — a j)lan which, besides, would have been difficult of execution, owing to the wide separation of the Gonfederate wings — General Lee altered his determina- tion and resolved to assault the centre of the Union position. In this he seems to have aimed to imitate Wagram. * Lee : Report of Gettysburg. THE GETTYSBUEG CAMPAIGN. 357 Tliat some weighty design was in preparation by the enemy was throughout the morning evident ; for after the struggle had ceased on the right there was for some hours a deep silence. During all this time the Confederates were placing in position heavy masses of artillery. Lee, less sanguine than the day before, knew well that his only hope la}^ in his abihty, first of all, to sweep resistance from the slopes before the assaulting columns moved forward. By noon a hundred and forty-five guns were in position along the ridge occupied by Longstreet and Hill. At one o'clock the ominous silence was broken by a terrific outburst from this massive concen- tration of the enginery of war. Ample means for a reply in kind were at hand ; for General Hunt, the chief of artillery, had crowned the ridge along the left and left centre, on which it was manifest the attack was to fall, with eighty guns — a number not as great as that of the enemy, but it was all that could be made effective in the more restricted space occupied by the army.* Withholding the fire until the first hostile outburst had spent itself. General Hunt then ordered the batteries to open ; and thus from ridge to ridge was kept up for near two hours ft Titanic combat of artillery that caused the sohd fabric of the hills to labor and shake, and filled the air with fire and smoke and the mad clamor of tv»^o hundred guns. During this outburst the troops crouched behind such slight, cover as they could find ; but the musket was tightly grasped, for each man knew well what was to follow — knew that this storm was but the prelude to a less noisy, yet more deadly shock of infantrj^ When, therefore, after the duel had * In the cemetery were placed DQger's, Bancroft's, Eakin's, Wheeler's, Hill's, and Taft's batteries, under Major Osborne. On the left of the cemetery the batteries of the Second Corps, under Captain Hazard— namely, those of Woodruff, Arnold, Cushing, Brown, and Rorty. Nest on the left was Thomas's battery, and on his left Major McGilvray's command, consisting of Thompson's, Phillips', Hart's, Sterling's, Ranks', Dow's, and Ames' of the re- serve artillery, to which was added Cooper's battery of the First Corps. On the extreme left, Gibbs' and Eitteuhouse's (late Hazlitt's) batteries. As batter- ies expended their ammunition, they were replaced by batteries of the artillerv reserve, sent forward by its efficient chief. Colonel R. O. Tyler. 358 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC continued for near two hours, the chief of artillery, finding his ammunition running low,* and that it was unsafe to bring np loads of it from the rear (for many caissons and limbers had been exploded), directed that the firing should be gradu- ally stopped : the enemy also slackened fire, and immediately the Confederate columns of attack were seen forming on the edge of the woods that cover the Seminary Ridge. As Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps had reached the ground during the morning, and as Longstreet wished to use the divisions of Hood and McLaws in covering his right, it was appointed to lead the van.f Pickett formed his divi- sion in double line of battle, with Kemper's and Garnett's brigades in front and Armistead's brigade supporting ; while on the right of Pickett was one brigade of HilFs corps, un- der General Wilcox, formed in column by battalions ; and on his left, Heth's division (also of Hill's corps), under General Pettigrew. The attacking force numbered about fifteen thou- sand men, and it advanced over the intervening space of near a mile in such compact and imj^osing order, that, whether friend or foe, none who saw it could refrain from admiration of its magnificent array. The hostile line, as it advanced, covered a front of not more than two of the reduced and incomplete divisions of the Second Corps, numbering, it may be, some six thousand men. While crossing the plain, it received a severe fire of artillery, which, however, did not delay for a moment its determined advance; so that the column pressing on, came wathin musketry range — the troops evincing a striking disposition to withhold their fire until it could be deHvered with deadly effect. The first opposition it received was fi-om two regiments of Stannard's Vermont * Report of Artillery Operations. f The absence of Pickett's division the day before made General Long- street very loth to make the attack, but Leo, thinking the Union force was not all up, would not wait. Longstreet urged in reply that this advantage (or Siqiposed advantage, for the Union force was all up) was countervailed by the fact that he was not all up either : but the Confederate commander was not minded to delay. My authority is again General Longstreet. THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 359 brigade of the First Corps, wliicli liad been posted in a small grove to the left of the Second Corps in front of and at a con - siderable angle with the main line. These regiments opened upon the right flank of the enemy's advancing lines, which received also an oblique fire from eight batteries under Major McGilvray. This caused the Confederate troops on that flank to double in a little towards their left, but it did not stay their onward progress. As, during the passage of the enemy across the intervening plain, the rifled guns had fired away all their canister, they were withdrawn or left on the ground, inactive, to await the issue of the impending shock between the two masses of infantry — a shock momentarily expected, for the assailants approached steadily, while the Union force held itself braced to receive the impact. When at length the hostile lines had approached to between two and three hundred yards, the divisions of Hays and Gibbon of the Second Corps opened a destructive fire, and repeated it in rapid succession. This sally had the effect to instantly reveal the unequal metal of the assaulting mass, and proved what of it was iron and what clay. It happened that the division on the left of Pickett, under command of General Pettigrew, was, in con- siderable part, made up of North Carolina troops compara- tively green. To animate them, they had been told that they would meet only the Pennsylvania militia. But when, ap- proaching the slope, they received the feu cVenfer from Hays' line, there ran through their ranks a cry, the effect of which was Hke to that which thrilled a Greek army when it was said that the god Pan was among them — "The Army of the Potomac!" Thus suddenly disillusionized regarding their opponents, Pettigrew' s troops broke in disorder, leaving two thousand prisoners and fifteen colors in the hands of Hays' division. Now, as Wilcox's brigade had not advanced, Pickett's divi- sion remained alone a solid lance-head of Virginia troops, tempered in the fire of battle. Solitary this division, buffet- ing the fierce volleys that met it, rushed up the crest of Cemetery Eidge, and such was the momentum of its assaidt that it fairly thrust itself within Hancock's line. 360 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AKMY OF THE POTOMAC. It happened that the full strength of this attack fell iipon Webb's brigade of three regiments. This brigade had been disposed in two hnes : two of its regiments, the Sixty -ninth and Seventy-first Pennsylvania, posted behind a low stone wall and slight breastwork hastily constructed by them, while the remaining regiment (the Seventy-second Pennsylvania) lay behind the crest some sixty paces to the rear, and so placed as to fire over the heads of those in front. When the swift advancing and yelling array of Pickett's force had, notwith- standing the volleys it met, approached close up to the stone wall, many of those behind it seeing their fire- to be now vain, abandoned the position ; and the Confederates, detect- ing this wavering, rushed over the breastworks, General Armistead leading, and crowned the stone wall with their standards. The moment was certainly as critical as can well be conceived ; but hapjiily, the regiments that had been hold- ing tlie fi'ont line did not, on falling back, do so in panic : so that by the personal bravery of General Webb and his ofli- cers, they were immediately ralHed and reformed on the remainder of the brigade, which held the second line behind the crest, and Hancock, who had the day before turned the fortunes of the battle in a similar emergency, again displayed those quahties of cool appreciation and quick action that had proved him one of the foremost commanders on the actual field of battle, and instantly drew together troops to make a bulwark against any further advance of the now exultant enemy. As the hostile front of attack was quite narrow, it left Han- cock's left wing unassailed. From there he drew over the brigades of Hall and Harrow ;* and Colonel Devereux, com- manding the Nineteenth Massachusetts Regiment, anxious to be in the right place, apphed for permission to move his regiment to the front — a request gladly granted by Hancock, "' One Hundred and Fifty-first Pennsylvania and Twentieth New York State Militia, both under Gates of Doubleday's division, First Corps, partici- pated. THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 361 who also gave Mallon's Forty-second New York Kegiment the same direction; while Colonel Stannard moved two re- giments of his Vermont brigade to strike the enemy on the right flank. These movements were quickly executed, but not without confusion, owdng to many men leaving their ranks to fire at the enemy from the breastworks. When the new line was formed, it was found that the situation was very peculiar ; for the men of all brigades, while individually firm, had in some measure lost their regimental organization— a confusion that arose from the honorable ambition of indi- vidual commanders to promptly cover the point penetrated by the enem3^ The essential thing was secured, however — the breach was covered, and in such force that, in regular forma- tion, the line would have stood four ranks deep. It wall be remembered that the brigade of Stannard held an advanced po-'nt on Hancock's left. As the assaulting column passed his right to strike Webb, he moved to the right, changed front forward, and opened a very savage fire on the enemy's flank. At the same time, the colors of the difi'erent regiments were advanced in defiance of the long line of battle-flags presented by the Confederates, and the men pressing fii'mly after them engaged in a brief and determined combat and utterly overthrew the foe. Whatsoever valor could do to TSTest victory fi-om the jaws of hell, that it must be conceded the troops of Pickett had done ; but now, seeing themselves in a desperate strait, they flung themselves on the ground to escape the hot fire and threw up their hands in token of surrender, while the remnant sought safety in flight. Twenty-five hundred jorisoners and twelve battle-flags were taken at this point, which brought the aggregate of Han- cock's captures up to four thousand five hundred prisoners and twenty-seven standards. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was exceedingly severe. Of the three brigade commanders of Pickett's division, Garnett was killed, xirmi- stead feU fatally wounded within the Union lines, and Kemper was borne off severely hurt. In addition, it left behind four- teen of its field-oflicers, and only a single one of that rank 8G2 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. escaped unhurt, wliile of its rank and file tliree-fourtlis were dead or captives. Pettigrew's division, also, though it had faltered earlier, was much cut up and lost many officers, besides heavily in killed, wounded, and prisoners. But this illustrious victory was not purchased without severe price paid ; and this was sadly attested in the thousands of dead and wounded that lay on the plain. The loss in officers was again especially heavy ; and among the wounded were Generals Gibbon and Hancock ; but the latter did not leave the field till he learned the tidings of the discomfiture of the enemy. After the repulse of Pickett's assault, Wilcox's command, that had been on the right but failed to move forward, ad- vanced by itself to the attack, and came to within a few hun- dred yards of Hancock's line ; but in passing over the plain it met severe artillery fire, and Stannard detached a force'"'' which took it in flank and rear, capturing several hundred prisoners : the rest fled.f This ended the combat, though towards dusk General Crawford advanced across the wheat- field into the woods and took several hundred prisoners and a large number of arms. During the action, the cavalry had been operating on the flanks, Kilpatrick's division on the left, and Gregg's division on the right. Both divisions dis- X^layed much gallantry and suffered heavy loss.t Allien the shattered columns of attack returned to their * The Sixteenth Vermont, supix)rted by a detachment of the Fourteenth Vermont. f It had not been designed that Wilcox should attack, hut simply cover, the right flank of Pickett's assaulting colmnn. But he did not move forward -with suflBcient promptness to effect the former puriwse, and when Pickett had been repulsed, he made a foolish and isolated attack. Thus, in the first instance, he did not move forward enough, and in the second he moved too far. t The scope of this work does not permit the recital of the details of the nu- merous cavalry affairs; but I cannot forbear to mention the very spirited attack on Hood's right by the brigades of Farnesworth and Merritt, operating on the left flank of the army. Farnesworth, with the First Vermont and First Virginia Cavalry, cleared a fence in his front, sabred the enemy behind it, and then rushed on the second line and up to the muzzles of the guns, where most of them fell, and their gaUant leader at their head. THE GETTySBURG CAMPAIGN. 363 lines on Semiuary Eiclge, it was clear to Lee that the attempt to break through the Union position was hopeless. The troops went back much disrupted, and it was only by the en- ergetic, personal exertions of Longstreet and of Lee that they were rallied and re-formed. It is said that a counter-attack by the Union forces was much feared at this moment ; and it is possible that had General Meade been aware of the extent of the damage he had inflicted on his opponent, and the ex- treme disorder of the moment, as also that the Confederate ammunition had run very low, an immediate advance by the left might have converted the repulse into a rout. But it must be borne in mind that he did not then know these things, and all he did know favored a cautious policy. For his own loss was terrible, the different corps were much intermingled, and to have quitted his defences would have exposed him to a repulse similar to that the enemy had just received ; and as — with the exception of a few brigades of Sedgwick's corps — there were no reserves, attack must have been made by already exhausted troops.* With Lee there now remained only the alternative of re- * So far as I am aware, the only important witness on the Confederate side in favor of attack at this time, is Colonel Fremantle of the British service. Referring to the situation after Pickett's repulse, he says: "It is difficult to exaggerate the critical state of aifairs as they appeared about this time. If the enemy, or their general, had shown any enterprise, there is no saying what might have happened. General Lee and his officers were evidently fuUy im- pressed with a sense of the situation." But the sequel seems to belie this ; for he immediately remarks : " Yet there was much less noise, fuss, or confusion of orders than at an ordinary field-day ; the men as they were rallied in the woods, were brought up in detachments, and lay down quietly and coolly in the positions assigned them." — Three Months in the Confederate States, pp. 269-270. A very different view of the probable success of an assault at this time is given by Captain Ross, of the Austrian service, who also witnessed the battle from the Confederate side. " The enemy," says he, " made no attempt to follow up their advantage, and it is well for them they did not. I see that a General Butterfield, in evidence given before some Federal committee, blames General Meade for not attacking Lee's right after the repulse, imagining that enormous captures of guns and other great successes would have been the re- sult. It was, however, well for the Federals that General Meade did not do so, 364 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. treat ; and bitter as tliis alternative was — seeing tliat it in- volved the abandonment of the scheme of invasion and all the high hopes built thereon — it was imperative, for the posi- tion he had to assail was one against which he might dash his army to pieces, but against which he could now hope for no success. Yet he did not begin an immediate retreat, but waited the whole of the following day, during which he was withdrawing his trains and disposing his army for a retro- grade movement. And it is the most striking proof that could be given of the confidence Lee still had in his troops, that during that whole 4th of July he was in a mood to invito rather than dread an attack. Ketiring his left fi-om around the base of Culjj's Hill and from the town of Gettysburg, which was reoccujDied by Howard's troops during the fore- noon, a strong line of works was thrown up from the Semi- nary northwestward, and covering the Mummasburg and Chambersburg roads, wdiile another hue was formed on the right flank, perpendicular with their general front, and ex- tending back to Marsh Creek. Here, while employed in the work of sending off their wounded, burying their dead, etc., the Confederates stood at bay, hopeless of venturing another attack, yet quite willing to be attacked. But this was not in the line of General Meade's intent, for having gained a victory, and being certain of the necessity that was upon his antagonist of making a retreat, he was in no mood to jeopard an assured success by any rash adven- for lie woald have found McLaws and Hood's divisions there perfectly ready and willing to give him a much hotter reception than he would have liked." — Cities and Camps of the Confederate States, p. 65. On the Union side, many of tlie generals present have testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in favor of attack. See Report, second series, vol. i., jyassim. But since the above text was written, I have become convinced from testimony more weighty than any given above — to wit, the testimony of General Long street himself— that attack would have resulted disastrously. " I had," said that officer to the writer, " Hood and McLavvs, who had not been engaged ; I had a heavy .force of artillery ; I should have liked nothing better than to have been attacked, and have no doubt I should have given those who tried as bad a reception as Pickett received." THE GETTYSEUEG CA5IPAIGN. 3G5 turc. Accordingly, notliiug was done save to make some demonstrations of a rather feeble cliaracter, and the day was passed in attentions to the wounded and burying the dead, while holding the army in hand for pursuit. That night Lcc began to retire by the Chamborsburg and Fairfield roads, A\hich leading westward from Gettysburg, pass through the South Mountain range into the Cumberland Valley at a dis- tance of seven miles from each other. As a severe storm had come on during the afternoon and continued during the night, the roads were rendered very bad ; so that the retreat was made painfully and slowly, and the rear of the column did not leave its position near Gettysburg until after day- light of the 5th. General Meade, as soon as he was satisfied that the enemy had actually withdrawn, took measures to fol- low up the retreat. When it became possible to take account of the losses of this great battle, it was found that on the Union side they included two thousand eight hundred and thirty-four kiUed, thirteen thousand seven hundred and thirty-three wounded, and six thousand six hundred and forty-three missing, mak- ing an aggregate of twenty-three thousand one hundred and ninety.* On the side of the Confederates, they were sup- posed to be near thirty thousand, whereof nearly fourteen thousand were prisoners.t * Official Records of the War Department. \ This is simply an approximate estimate, as no report of the Confederate casualties was ever made public. " It is not," says General Lee, " in my power to give a correct statement of our casualties, which were severe." Lee : lieport of Gettysburg. The number of prisoners captured by the Army of the Potomac, as by official returns, was thirteen thousand six hundred and twenty one. (Meade : Report of Gettysburg). 1 believe that the above estimate of thirty thousand for Lee's total loss will not prove to be in excess of the truth. Lee's aggregate present for duty on the 31st May was 68,353 ; and on July 31st it was 41,185— the difference being 37,217. 36G C\\3IPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. IX. THE CONFEDERATE RETREAT. The retreat of Lee, wliicli became definitively known on the morning of Sunday, July 5, brought with it the important question of pursuit. Now, there were two lines by which the Confederates might be followed up : the one was a direct pursuit by the same routes over which they had retreated, pressing them down the Cumberland Valley ; the other, a flank march by the east side of the South Mountains, defiling by the Boonsboro' passes, with the view to head off the enemy or take him in flank. The former had the recommendation of being the shorter lino ■ — the distance to the Potomac (at Williamsport) being in this case about forty miles ; and by the latter line, nearly eighty. The only disadvantage attending it arose from the fact that the enemy might hold the debouches of the mountains with a rear-guard, while making good his escape with his main body and trains. General Meade appears to have been in some doubt as to the proper method of action ; but on the morning of the 5th, he sent a column in direct pursuit. He ordered Sedgwick's Sixth Corps (then the freshest in the army) to fol- low up the enemy on the Fairfield road, while he dispatched a cavalry force to press the retreating Confederates on the Chambersburg road. Sedgwick that evening overtook the rear of the Confederate column at a distance of ten miles, where the Fairfield road breaks through a pass in the South Mountain range. This position was found to be very de- fensible ; but there was no occasion to attack it, for another course had, meanwhile, been determined on, and Sedgwick was recalled. Instead of pursuing the enemy by the direct route over which he had retreated, General Meade judged it better to THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 367 make a flank march by Middletown and tlie lower passes of tlie Soutli Mountain. To this end, General French, who with seven thousand men had since the evacuation of Harper's Ferry been occupying Frederick, was directed to seize these passes in advance and repossess himself of Harper's Ferry. Both these duties were fulfilled by General French, who also sent out a cavalry force that penetrated as far as Williamsport, and destroyed there a Confederate ponton-bridge across the Potomac. Then the army was put in motion by the east side of the South Mountains. On July 6th a large part of the army moved from Gettysburg towards Emmettsburg, and the remainder the following day. July 7th, the headquarters were at Frederick. The 8th, they were at Middletown, and nearly all the army was concentrated in the neighborhood of that place and South Mountain. The 9th, headquarters were at South Movmtain House, and the advance of the army at Boonsboro' and Eohrersville. The 10th, headquarters were moved to Antietam Creek: the left of the line crossed the creek, and the right of the line moved up near Funkstown. Tlie 11th, the engineers put a new bridge over the Antietam Creek ; the left of the line advanced to Fairplay and Jones' cross-roads, while the right remained nearly stationary. The 13th, Meade had his forces in front of the position taken up by Lee to cover the passage of the Potomac. The above data will suffice to show that the pursuit was conducted with an excessive circumspection ; and Lee, hav- ing reached the river six days before, had had time to select and fortify a strong position. Indeed, the Confederate army might have effected an unmolested escape into Virginia, had it not been for the fact that the great rains had so swoUen the Potomac as to make it impassable by the ford at Wil- liamsport,* and that the ponton-bridge at FalHng Waters had been destroyed by General French. This perilous circum- * " The Potomac was found to be so much swollen by the rains that had fallen almost incessantly since our entrance into Maryland, as to be unfordable." - -Lee : Report of Campaign in Pennsylvania. 308 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AR^r5^ OF THE POTO.MAC. stance compelled Lee to take up a defensive position where he might stand at bay, while his communications were being re-estabhshed. As the event proved, it would probably have been a better course to have pushed the pursuit by the direct line, as ap- pears to have been at first intended when Sedgwick, on the 5th, w^as thrown forward on the Fairfield road. The obstruc- tions which Lee could have placed in the defiles of the South Mountains cannot be considered- as presenting any serious difficulty; for General Smith with a division of militia had moved forward from the Susquehanna, on the 3d, into the Cumberland Yalley, and on the 5th he seized and held a pass in the South Mountains, a few miles above that through which the Confederate force passed. By this the whole army might readily have defiled through the South Mountains to fall on Lee's flank and rear." If nothing had been accomplished by this means, the retreat of Lee would still have been fol- lowed so closely, that coming to the Potomac, and ha%dng an impassable river in his rear, his situation would have been one of the very gravest peril. It cannot be said that General Meade was not alive to the importance of striking Lee a blow before he should be able to make good his retreat. But he was tardy in realizing the severity of the damage he had inflicted on his opponent, and the distance the army was compelled to march by the line adopted (double that by the Cumberland Valley), together with the slowness of the march (in part necessitated by the bad condition of the roads owing to the severe storm), re- sulted in Lee's being able to take ujd a position on the Potomac ; and having reached this point three days before * " On Saturday (5tli), I held tlie most northern pass, through wliich, by ra'pid marching, Meade might have cut off the enemy's rear-guard in the other passes, if they had tried to hokl them. Moreover, on July the Gth {the day Meade moved), I held the broad turnpike pass to Chambersburg, througli ■which he might have marched his entire army in two days, if all the other passes had been held." — Private letter from Qaneral W. F. Smith. THE GETTYSBURQ CAMPAIGN. 369 tlic Union army got up, lie had time to put it in a strong con- dition of defence. This coign of vantage was on the ridge of Marsh Creek, and formed a powerful kind of teie-de-jiont, covering the pas- sage of the Potomac at Williamsport. If it was designed to attack this j^osition, it should have been done the moment tlie army arrived before it, on the 12th. But the day and the morrow passed in timid councils. On the 13th, at a formal consultation of the corps-commanders, the majority of the general-officers voted against an attack, as it was thought tlie position was too formidable by nature and art to afford any prospect of a successful assault. Nevertheless, on the night of the 13th, General Meade determined to next morning take the offensive. But when, on the morning of . the 14th, the troops moved forward, it was discovered that the Confederate army had passed the Potomac. The Confederate engineers had succeeded in improvising a ponton-bridge, and by the aid of this and the ford at Williamsport* (the Potomac hav- ing, meanwhile, fallen sufficiently to admit of passage), Lee withdrew the remnant of his force with great skill and com- plete success. It will probably always remain one of those questions about which men will differ — whether General Meade should have attacked or refi'ained from attacking Lee at Williams- port. The adverse opinion of the corps-commanders will probably not be allowed to count for much, seeing it has passed into a notorious maxim that " councils of war never fight." And it may fairly be said that as General Meade de- termined to attack on the 14:th, against the opinion of his * " Part of the ponton-bridge was recovered, and new boats built, so tliat,, by the 13th, a good bridge was thrown over the river at Falling Waters. Our preparations being completed, and the river, though still deep, being pronounced fordable, the army commenced to withdraw to the south side on the night of the 1 Pith. Ewell's corps forded the river at Williamsport, those of Longstroet and Hill crossed upon the bridge." — Lae : Report of the Invasion of Pennsyl vania. 24 370 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. lieutenants, it would have been well had he done so on the 12th, wdthout consulting their opinion. No new element was, in the interval, introduced into the problem, excepting that the strengthening of the position by the enemy rendered at- tack on the 14th much more difficult than it was on the 12th, and the delay would, therefore, appear to have resulted from hesitation and indecision in the mind of the commander, which under the circumstances must be accounted an error. The problem, whether Lee should have been attacked in the position he had taken up, is one of a tactical nature, re- quiring for its solution special and professional knowledge. It is, therefore, one of those questions regarding which public opinion is necessarily worthless. On the other hand, the emphasis with which the corps-commanders pronounced against assault, should carry with it great weight ; and my own investigations lead strongly to the conclusion that Meade was right, in the relative situations of the opposing forces, in not attacking. But the question whether or not General Meade should have attacked at Williamsport, is really not the joroper point at issue. It is one of a larger scope, and turns on the whole history of Lee's retreat and Meade's pursuit. The principles already laid down as those that should guide criticism on McCleUan's conduct after Antietam, apply with equal and even greater force to Meade's conduct after Gettysburg. That an army that had moved so far from its base, as that of Lee ; that had crossed the frontier ; that had been defeated in a great battle of three days du- ration, in which it suffered immense loss ; that then sought safety in flight only to find itseK barred at the frontier by the rise of the Potomac (as though Providence fought with the Union army), should have been either destroyed or hope- lessly crippled, appears indisputable. The Army of the Po- tomac, though it also had suffered severe loss, was in the highest state of morale, and was eager to give its ojDpouent the conp de grace. It was powerful in numbers, and had been strengthened by the addition of eleven thousand men under THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 371 General Frencli, by a militia division under General Smith, and by considerable re-enforcements forwarded from Wash- ington and Baltimore by the Government, wliose officers, raised for a moment above that paltry policy that commonly controlled their military views, were eager to j)ut into tlie bands of General Meade every thing needed to assure the devoutly desired consummation of the destruction of Lee, who could not bring into battle array above forty thousand men of all arms. It will be hard ever to persuade the mass of men that this was not within the compass of a vigorous stroke- Descending, now, to the question of details : as I have pro- nounced both in favor of the most vigorous aggressive action of General Meade, and against an attack in the position in which he found himself at Wilhamsport, I must reconcile this seeming discrepancy, by saying tliat Lee's position on the ridge of Marsh Creek might have been turned. By throwing his right forward to the Conecoclieaque, Meade would have removed his army from the difficult region of woods and hills in which it found itself, and in which all the advantages of position were greatly in favor of the Confederates ; and he would have placed it in a country where he would have had the commanding heights down to the river. He would then have overlapped the Confederate left, which was thrown out in the air. To guard against any menace of Lee towards Washington, the South Mountam passes might have been held by the cavalry. In this position Meade would have attacked with as many advantages in his favor, as there were in the other disadvantages against him. But even had the army attacked and been repulsed, General Meade would have been forgiven ; for in war it is often better to have fought and lost, than never to have fought at all. It will always remain a strik- ing instance of the controlling influence exercised in this war by defensive positions, that the two decisive points of this great campaign were mainly determined by the simple incident of * " The fruit seemed so ripe, so ready for plucking," said President Lincoln to General Meade, soon after, " that it was very hard to lose it." 372 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. securing the defensive. It was in large part the mere holding the position at Gettysburg— the strategic key to the region south of the Susquehanna— that gained for the Union army the battle and the campaign; but when Lee, after terrible losses, found himself compelled to abandon the invasion, and seek safety in retreat, it was by taking up a strong vantage ground on the ridge of Marsh Creek that he was able, in a most difficult situation, to show so imposing a front of oppo- sition as to secure for his army safe exit from Maryland into Virginia. Tlius was baulked and brought to naught the scheme of Confederate invasion, an invasion undertaken by an army powerful in numbers and in the prestige of victory, and aim- ing at the boldest quarry — the conquest of peace on the soil of the loyal States. That it was a mistake, is not difficult to recognize in the light of the result ; but, as I have already pointed out, it was an error in its inception, for it was an en- terprise that overstepped the limits of that fitting theory of military policy that generally governed the Confederate war- councils, and committed Lee to all the perils and losses of an invasion, without any adequate recompense, and even without any well-determined mihtary object. The expulsion of the invaders freed the North from a great dread ; and though there were those that were dissatisfied at the incomplete termination of the campaign, the countiy was not loth to recognize that there had been wrought out for it a great dehverance by the valor of the Army of the Potomac. For once, that sorely tried, long-suflfering army had the fi-eely- given boon of a nation's gratitude. Note.— I am indebted to Colonel J. B. Batchelder, author of the well-knov\Ti and beautifully accurate isometricol drawing of the battlefield of Gettysburg, for a careful revision of the tactical details of the action at Gettysburg, and for many explanations given on the ground. A CAMPAIGN OF MANCEUVRES. 373 X. A CAMPAIGN OF MANCEUVRES. July, 1863— March, 18C4. I. THE MARCH TO THE RAPIDAN. The safe retreat of Lee from Maryland into Virginia im- posed upon General Meade the necessity of an immediate pursuit. This he undertook with a promptitude that was very creditable, considering the trying campaign that had just closed. On recrossing the Potomac, Lee fell back into the Shenan- doah Valley, placing his force on the line of Opequan Creek — the same position he had held during the autumn after his retreat from Antietam. Meade's plan of advance into Virginia was confessedly modelled on that of McClellan in November, 1862 ; and it was probably the best that could have been adopted. As a prob- lem in that branch of the art of war which is named logistics, or the supplying of armies, it was not considered practicable to subsist a force of the magnitude of the Army of the Poto- mac by the means available in a direct advance up tlie She- nandoah Valley. It remained, therefore, to march by the route of the Loudon Valley ; and by hugging the Blue Eidge closely, Meade hoped, by vigorous action, to bring the Con- 374 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOJIAC. federate force to battle under advantageous conditions before it should break through the mountains.* The army crossed the Potomac on ponton-bridges at Har- per's Ferrj and Berhn on the 17tli and 18th July, and followed southward, skirtmg the Blue Ridge ; while Lee, conforming to this manoeuvre, fell back up the Shenandoah Yalley. The movement of Meade was made with much vigor — indeed with so much vigor that, on reaching Union, on the 20th of June, he was compelled to halt a day, lest by further advance he should dangerously uncover his right ; bvit even with this delay, the army, on reaching Manassas Gap on the 22d, was so well up with the enemy, that it gained that point while the long Confederate column was still passing on the other side of the mountains. This, therefore, seemed an excellent open- ing for a flank attack, and it was fully appreciated by Meade, who directed five corps on Manassas Gap — the Third Corps, now under command of General French, being in advance. The selection of the leader for an enterprise demanding the most energetic qualities of mind — seeing that it was necessary to force Lee to battle under circumstances in which he would naturally wish to avoid it — was very unfortunate ; and by his mismanagement General French succeeded in depriving the army of one of the few really advantageous opportunities it ever had to strike a decisive blow. A slight observing force had been left at the Gap, but this was expelled, and the corps passed throiigh on the evening of the 22d, prepared to advance on Front Royal in the morning. But, on moving forward to strike the enemy's line of retreat, the corps-commander acted with such feeblenesSjt as to allow the rear-guard to delay him * No demonstration was made in the Valley of the Shenandoah other than that of a body of cavalry under Gregg, wliich retired after an indecisiva engagement with the Confederate cavalry under General Fitz Hugh Lee at Shepherdstown. f General Warren, in his evidence before the War Committee, states that General French " made a very feeble attack, tcith one brigade only, and wasted the whole day." He adds, that General Meade " was more disappointed in *,hat result than in any thing that had happened." — Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., pp. 381, 382. A CAMPAIGN OF MANCEUTIIES. 375 the wliole day, so tliat it was eveniug before he penetrated to the Confederate line of battle at Front Koyal. Next niorninj^, when Meade hoped to give battle, Lee had made good his retreat." Upon this, as nothing was now to be hoped from the movement on hand, the march was conducted leisurely towards tlie Rappahannock, and Lee retired to the vicinity of Culpepper. In this position a considerable period of repose followed ; and this inaction was imposed not more by the necessity of resting and recruiting the army, than because both sides found it necessary to draw detachments from the armies in Virginia for other needs. From the army of Meade a considerable body was taken to send to South Carolina, and a large force withdrawn to dispatch to New York for the purpose of en- forcing the draft, the attempted execution of which, some time before, had given rise to extensive riots in that city. On the other hand, the severe pressure that Eosecrans was bring- ing to bear upon the central army of the Confederacy under General Bragg, in Tennessee, prompted the detachment fi-om Lee's army of the corps of Longstreet, for the purpose of throwing it into the scale as a make- weight against the Union force. This withdrawal took place early in September, and necessarily reduced the Confederates to a purely defensive attitude in Virginia. Soon afterwards. General Meade be- came aware of Longstreet's departure, and he then sent his cavalry across the Rappahannock, drove the enemy over the Eapidan, and subsequently followed with his whole force, occupying Culpepper and the regions between the Rappa- hannock and the Rapidan, the latter river now becoming the * " As the Federals continued to advance along the eastern slope of the moun- tains, apparently with the purpose of cutting us off from the railroad, Long- street was ordered on the 19th of July to proceed to Culpepper Courthouse by way of Front Royal. He succeeded in passing part of his command over the Shenandoah in time to prevent the occupation of Manassas and Chester Gaps by the enemy. As soon as a ponton-bridge covdd be laid down, the rest of his corps crossed and marched through Chester Gap to Culpepper, where they ar- rived on the 24th. He was followed by Hill's corps. Ewell reached Front Royal the 23d, and encamped near Madison Courthouse the 29th." — Lee : Report. 376 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. dividing line between the opposing armies. As the 23osition held by Lee on the south bank of the Rapidan was a very advantageous one, Meade's projects of advance turned to- w-ards a flanking movement ; but just at the time he had matured a plan of operations, he was informed from Wash- ington that it was found necessary to still further weaken the Army of the Potomac by the withdrawal of two corps to for- ward to Tennessee, in which section of the theatre of w^ar the military situation had been seriously comjDromised by Eose- crans' defeat at Chickamauga — a defeat to which the force sent from Virginia under Longstreet had in no small degi-ee contributed. The corps taken were the Eleventh and Twelfth, and they were put under the command of General Hooker. This, in turn, reduced Meade to a strict defensive ; for though he received some accessions to his numbers fi'om the draft, yet these added little to his real strength, the conscripts being raw and unreliable, and large numbers deserted at the first op- portunity. It was evident, therefore, that he could undertake no considerable operation until the return of the troops sent to New York. But when, towards the middle of October, these finally came back, and General Meade was about to initiate an offensive movement, he found himself suddenly thrown once more on the defensive by the bold initiative of Lee, in an operation the events of which I shall now relate. II. THE FLANK MARCH ON CENTREVILLE. Made aware of the heavy deduction of force from the Army of the Potomac, but exaggerating probably its extent, Lee early in October determined on an offensive movement that should have the effect of driving Meade back from the line of the Rapidan. "VYith this object he resolved to move around his opponent's right flank, and endeavor to interpose A CAMPAIGN OP MANCEUVRES. 377 between liim and Wasliiugtou." He counted that if lie should be able in this situation to seriously cripple Meade, it would exhaust the season of active operations and detain the Ai'my of the Potomac on the frontier for the winter, during which time it would be possible for Lee to still further re-en- force from his own command the heavily pressed Confederate Ai'my of the West. In execution of this plan, Lee crossed the Eapidan on Friday, October 9th, and taking "circuitous and concealed roads," t passed by way of Madison Courthouse quite to Meade's right. Stuart, with Hampton's cavalry division, moved on the right of the column, while Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry division, with a detachment of infantry, was left to hold the Hues south of the Eapidan and mask the turning movement. The first positive intimation which General Meade had of Lee's intention was an attack made upon his advance jDOsts on the right at James City, held by a portion of Kil- patrick's cavalry division and some infantry of the Third Corps. This force was driven in by Stuart on the 10th, and fell back on Culpepper; and it being then clear to Meade that his right was already turned, he that night sent back his trains, and at two o'clock on the morning of the lltli, began a retrogTade movement across the Eappahannock. The march was accomplished during that night, and the bridge at Eappahannock Station blown up. Lee with his main body reached Culpepper on the 11th to find that the whole army had moved behind the Eappahan- . nock some hours before. He then halted during the rest of the lltii at Culpepper, while Stuart pressed the rear of * I learn from General Longstreet that Lee at this time frequently spoke of an operation that should '' swap Queens ;" that is, he thought of inarching direct upon and capturing Washington, giving up the attempt to cover Rich- mond. But Mr. Davis would never consent to this war d rot/trance ; and, besides, the Army of Northern Virginia was at this time too much reduced from its late losses to authorize so audacious an enterprise. f Lee : Report of Fall Operations in Virginia. 378 CAIMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOINIAC. Meade's column, wliicli was covered by the cavalry under Pleasonton. Buford's division of troopers had crossed the Rapidan at Gei'manna Ford on the night of the 10th, after the Confeder- ates had begun their movement, but was met on the morning of the 11th by Fitz Hugh Lee's horsemen ; whereupon Buford, falling back over the Bapidan, united at Brandy Station with Pleasonton's main body of cavah-y, and then followed the army across the Eappahannock. On the following morning, Monday, October 12th, Lee ad- vanced from Culpe])per ; but iinding that Meade had been too quick for him, and that his first turning movement had failed, owing to the rapid retreat of his opponent, he determined, in- stead of following up Meade by the direct line of his retreat, to make a new flank movement by routes to the west, " with the design," as he says in his report, " of reaching the Orange and Alexandria railroad north of the Bappahannock, and in- terrupting the retreat of the enemy." This operation had very near been successful, owing to the uncertainty of General Meade as to his antagonist's real purpose, and the false movements resulting therefrom. Having put the Bappahannock between himself and Lee, Meade conceived that his retreat might have been premature, especially as he became aware on the morning of the 12th that Lee had halted at Culpepper, and it was uncertain whether he intended to do more. Accordingly, that afternoon the main body of the army, consisting of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth corps, with Buford's cavalry division, was countermarched to the south bank of the Bappahannock to proceed back towards Culpepper. General Meade designed to give battle if Lee was really there. But, as has been seen, the latter had that morn- ing left Culpepper to plant himself by a circuitous turning movement on Meade's line of retreat towards Washington. Thus was presented the curious contretemps, that while on the 12th the main body of the army was marching southward to meet Lee at Culpepper, Lee was moving rapidly northward on parallel roads to lay hold of Meade's communications ! A CAMPAIGN OF ]\LVN(EUVUES. 379 But of this mistake, which if prolonged much louger might have proved fatal to Meade, he had that afternoon convincing proof in an event which fell out in this wise. While the three corps named had been sent on the counter- march towards Culpepper, the Third Corps under General French had been left to guard the hue of the Kappahannock, and took position at Freeman's Ford, while the cavalry division of General Gregg watched the passage of the Uiiper Kappahannock at Sulphur or Warrenton Springs. Now Lee, continuing his northward march, on the afternoon of the 12th struck Sulphur Springs, and there crossed his columns to the north bank of the Kappahannock ; so that Gregg found him- self assailed by the van of the enemy advancing towards War- renton, and was driven off after having been somewhat se- verely handled. Of course, on receiving this intelUgence from Gregg, the real nature of Leo's movement was instantly dis- closed to Meade, who sent an immediate order recalHng the three corps from their untimely move on Culpepper. This order found these corps in bivouac on the road to Culpepper, and reached them towards midnight of Monday, when they at once began a rapid retrograde movement to the north of the Kappahannock. It is easy to see that from this misunderstanding not only was the general retrograde movement to meet the Confederate advance seriously compromised, but the Third Corps, remaining alone on the north bank of the Kappahannock, was thrown quite out of. position and exposed to destruction by an over- whelming force. But Lee, unaware of the true state of affairs, did not turn aside to molest that isolated force, but continued his northward movement, and by a night march of the three corps, the different corps of the Army of the Potomac were, on the morning of Tuesday the 13th, again concentrated on the north bank of the Kappahannock. As on the morning of the 13th the opposing forces were both on the north side of the Kappahannock, there ensued between the two armies a close race — Lee aiming, by a flank march, to strike in on Meade's line of retreat by the Orange 380 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTO^IAC. and Alexandria Railroad, and Meade determined to check- mate him by a rapid retrograde movement. The latter, during that day, fell back along the line of the railroad, and Lee, continuing his advance fi-om Sulphur Springs by parallel routes to the west, struck Warrenton in the afternoon. Here he halted during the rest of that day to supply the troops with provisions.* Lee's plan now was to advance from Warrenton in two col- umns — the left column (the corps of Hill) to move northward by the Warrenton turnpike to New Baltimore, and then strike due eastward to lay hold of the railroad at Bristoe Station ; the right column (the corps of Ewell) to advance by roads to the east of the route of Hill, passing by Auburn and Green- wich, and uniting with Hill at Bristoe Station. This project was put in execution on the morning of the 14th ; but whether Lee would be able to make good his in- tent of reaching Bristoe before his antagonist, would, of course, depend on the activity of the latter. Meade, with the uncertainty of what Lee was about, had the interior hue ; Lee, with a definite purpose and clear line of conduct, had the exterior and longer route to pursue. Anticipating the sequel so far as to say that Meade beat Lee in the race, passing Bristoe with nearly his whole force before Hill and Ewell were able to strike his line of retreat at that point, it remains to describe some interesting complications that arose out of the proximity in which the two armies were manoeuvring. In the retrograde movement of the Union army, on the 13th, it was appointed that the Second Corps under General Warren should, after halting at Fayetteville until the Third Corps under General French was withdrawn, cover the rear of the army ; and its route was directed to be by way of Au- burn to Catlett's Station, and thence northward along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. In this duty, Kil- patiuck's division of cavalry was to co-operate. Now, on the evening of the 13th, when Lee reached War- * Lee's Report. A CAMPAIGN OF MANCEUVRES. 381 renton, Warren reached Auburn, distant only five miles to tlio east, and there he bivouacked with his corps on the south side of Cedar Run. To cover his rear from attack from the direction of Warrenton, where Lee was that night (unknown to, but not unsuspected by Warren), Caldwell's division with three batteries'^ was placed on the heights of Cedar Eun. Before dawn v^i the 14th, while the head of Warren's column was under way crossing Cedar Run, Caldwell's troops lit camp fires on the hill-top to cook breakfast ; and in this duty they w^ere engaged when most unexpectedly a battery opened upon them from their rear and directly on the road prescribed for the movement of Warren's column towards Catlett's Sta- tion.t This attack, sufficiently bewildering to those upon whom it fell, will readily be imderstood in the light of the following rather amusing incident. Stuart with the Confederate cavalry had the day previous met the head of French's column, and, being forced back, :'-e- tired tow\ards Catlett's Station. But on Sj^kes' corps moving up the railroad, Stuart found himself corralled between the two main Union columns, and bivouacked within two miles of General Meade's headquarters and not more than four hun- dred yards from where Caldwell's division was encamped, sending messengers through the Union lines to notify his fi-iends of his situation. When Caldw^ell's men lit their fires, Stuart opened on them. Unseen himself in the valley, veiled by mist and the gray morning hght, he had yet a plain view of the Union force on the illuminated hill-tops, and for a few minutes, till the troops could be moved to' the opposite side of the hill under cover, the fire from the Confederate battery told with fatal effect. | Having thus paid his comphments, the rollicsome sabreur escaped by moving to the rear around the Union rear-guard. But no sooner had Caldwell moved to cover on the opposite * The batteries of Captains Kicketts, Arnold, and Ames, f "Warren's Report. X A remarkable example of tbis destructive efiFect was furnished by one of the shells which killed seven men. 382 CAifPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. side of tlie hill tliau his command was opened on from that side also, the fire coming from the direction of the Warrenton road. The source of this new attack will be readily under- stood from the already mentioned intentions of Lee ; for it has been seen that from Warrenton EwelFs column was to proceed by way of Auburn on Greenwich, and having moved very early in the morning, it was his advance that struck Warren's force.* The moment was now a critical one for Warren, for his advance division under General Hays, Avhich had crossed to the north side of Cedar Kun, found itseK opposed by a hostile force at the same time that Caldwell's division, on the south side, was fired upon, and the corps appeared to be surrounded and its retreat cut off.t But the actual condition of things was not as bad as appeared. Little more than the mere van of Ewell's column, and that mainly cavahy, had yet come up : the crossing of Cedar Eun was not interrupted ; Hays, who was on the north side, having thrown out a couple of regiments, repulsed the enemy, and cleared the route over which the corps was to advance ;:J: and finally, when the head of Ewell's main column came up, it was held in check by skilful deployments of cavalry and in- fantry and the practice of the batteries, till the rest of War- * Lee : Report of Summer Operations of 1863 ; Warren : Report of Opera- tions. •j- " Attacted thus on every side, witli my command separated by a con- siderable stream, encumbered with, a wagon-train, in the vicinity of the whole force of the enemy, and whom the sound of actual conflict had already assured of my position, to halt was to await annihilation, and to move as prescribed carried me along routes in a valley commanded by the heights on each side." Warren : Report of Operations. j^ These regiments were the One Hundred and Twenty-sixth New York, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bull, supported by the Twelfth New Jersey Volun- teers ; and General Hays, in his official report, gives the following accoimt of this spirited affair : " I moved forward the entire regiment of the One Hundred and Twenty -sixth New York, supported by the Twelfth New Jersey. In a short time our force came in contact with the rebels. It was short, but very decisive. The rebel cavalry, led by Colonel Thomas Ruffin, charged furiously upon the deployed One Hundred and Twenty-sixth, and were most gallantly repulsed with the loss of their leader, who was mortally wounded." A CAMPAIGN OF MANCEUVKES. 383 ren's force bad crossed Cedar Fain, when lie continued his prescribed march— Caldwell's division covcrincj the re- treat, and closely skirmishing with the enemy.-- Ewell did not follow up directly on the rear of Warren's column, for his prescribed course took him to the left to move by Greenwich and join Hill.t Meantime, the whole army was pressing on along the rail- road towards Centreville, the point of concentration, where General Meade had resolved to halt and give battle. Warren, as has been seen, brought up the rear. As Lee's purpose was to strike Bristoe Station before Meade should have passed that point, he pressed the advance of Hill and Ewell. WTien Hill, however, after moving east- ward from New Baltimore, in the afternoon approached Bristoe, the whole army, with the exception of Warren's corps, had got beyond that point, and as the head of his column came up, the Fifth Corps, under General Sykes, had just crossed Broad Run. On seeing this, Hill threw out a line of battle to attack the rear of that corps, when suddenly he found his attention called off by the apparition at that movement of AVarren, who, after engaging Ewell at Auburn in the manner indicated, had advanced rapidly along the raiboad, and reached Bristoe Station only to encounter Hill, Warren's position was again a critical one ; for, instead of finding Bristoe Station held by the Fifth Corps, as had been * The escape was so narrow, that, as reported by Colonel Brooke (who com- manded the rear brigade of Caldwell's division, and to whose skilful manoeuv- ring the successful withdrawal was in no small degree due), " tlie enemy suc- ceeded in throwing a column of infantry across the road, and cutting off the Fifty-seventh New York Volunteers. Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman, command- ing the regiment, proved himself equal to the emergency, and by promptly moving to the right by a slight detour, succeeded in rejoining the column ^^nth but slight loss. I held the enemy at bay on my left and front by fighting him sharply with my flankers and skirmishers, and finally drove him by my fire into the woods on my left." f According to General Lee's report, Ewell " drove back the rear-guard of the enemy, and rapidly pursued it." But the extent of the pursuit has been recorded above. 384 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. indicated to liim in General Meade's orders, he discovered that he was there alone, in the immediate vicinity of the whole army of Lee, and found himself suddenly assailed while marching by the flank. But Warren was equal to the occa- sion, and by a remarkable vigor of action not only extricated his command from a perilous situation, but inflicted a severe blow to the Confederates. This action, known as the battle of Bristoe, I shall briefly detail. As the head of the column of the Second Corps approached, Hill threw forward a line of battle towards the railroad ; but Warren knew the locality with the critical knowledge of an engineer, and forming Webb's division on the right along the embankment near Broad Bun, he ordered Hays' division to run for the railroad cut, invisible from the position of both opposing generals. This it quickly did, and the point was reached just in time to meet Hill's advancing line of battle, which, receiving a severe fire from the trooj)s covered by the cut and embankment, and raked by the fire of Bicketts' bat- tery, fell back with heavy loss. Warren immediately ad- vanced a thin line in pursuit, and secured four hundred and fifty prisoners, two standards, and five pieces of artillery. The attack fell mainly on the First and Third brigades of General Webb's division — the former commanded by Colonel Heath, and the latter by General Mallon, an accomphshed and patriotic officer who was killed in the action — and on the Third Brigade of General Hays' divis on, commanded by Gen- eral Owen. The division of General Caldwell, which had formed the rear-guard, came up for a mile or two on the run, and took position on the left of Hays ; but the action had already been decided. Warren's loss was comparatively slight. Efl'ectual as was the check which Warren had given Hill, the position of the former was not one in which he could re- main, while, at the same time, it was difficult to withdraw. And now his situation became more dangerous ; for just as towards sunset the combat closed, Ewell's corps, which had A CAMPAIGN OF MANffiUVKES. 385 pursued bj-roads between the columns of Warren and Hill, came up, and this brought the entire force of Lee in front of the Second Corps. Nevertheless, before Lee could make dis- positions for attack, night came on, and, under its friendly cover, Warren retired, and next morning joined the main body of the army massed at Centreville.- Meade was now strongly posted on the heights of Centre- ville, and if compelled to fall back from there, would do so into the fortifications of Washington. As no additional turn- ing movement could be of any avail, Lee pushed his advance no further. His intention had been to gain Meade's rear, and as this Avas now completely foiled, he was not minded to essay assault on the army in position. Resolving, however, not to have made an utterly useless campaign, he threw forward a thin line as far as Bull Bun, and thus masking his design, he proceeded to destroy the Orange and Alexandria Railroad fi-om that point southward to the Rappahannock. Having effectually accomphshed that object,t he, on the 18th, began a retrograde movement. Meade commenced pursuit on the following day,! but with- out overtaking Lee ; and in this movement there occurred no rencounter of a more serious character than the wonted inde- cisive cavalry combats. Stuart, with his two divisions of horse, covered the retrograde movement, and during the en- tire march was constantly engaged in skirmishes with the Union cavalry. One of these affairs was of some import- ance. While on the advance towards Warrenton, on the 19th, Kilpatrick's division skirmished warmly with Hamp- * General Lee states that Hill's attack was made by two irigndes, and ex- tenuates the result by stating that the assault was " against greatly superior numbers." But Hill's own Report shows that he had two divisions on the field. Warren met their attack with little over three thousand men. f Lee's Report. ij: This delay in following up was owing to the fact that since the army had crossed to the north side, that stream had become much swollen by hravy rains ; and previous to that, not anticipating that the ponton-bridges would bu needed, they had been sent with the other trains some eight or ten miles to the rear. 386 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AR^IY OF THE POTO^IAC. ton's division up to Bucldand Mills, at tlie crossing of Broad Run, on the south bank of which Hampton took post, under the personal direction of Stuart, who here planned a skilful manoeuvre to defeat his opponent. Kilpatrick having forced the crossing bj turning the flank of Hampton, Stuart fell back slowly towards Warrenton with the view of permitting Fitz Lee's cavalry division to come up from Auburn and attack the Union cavalry in flank and rear. This plan was carried out with some success. Fitz Lee arriving just below Bucldand surprised Kilpatrick's force on the flank, and Stuart, hearing Fitz Lee's guns, pressed vigorously in front with Hampton's division. A stubborn resistance was offered, but a charge au fond finally forced Kilpatrick's command to give way, and he retreated in some confusion.''^' Lee retired be- hind the Rappahannock. The Army of the Potomac being pushed forward as far as "Warrenton, General Meade was compelled to halt there to await the repairing of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. This work, undertaken with much energy, was accomplished early in November ; and on the 7th, the whole army continued the advance towards the Rappahannock in two columns. Gen- eral French had command of the left wing, composed of the First, Second, and Third corps, and General Sedgwick had command of the right wing, composed of the Fifth and Sixth corps. The left column was directed to cross the Rappahan- nock at Kelly's Ford, and the right column at Rappahannock Station. Lee held position south of the Rappahannock, in the vicinity of Culpepper, with outposts at Kelly's Ford on the south bank, and at Rappahannock Station on the north bank. The Third Corps under Birney had the advance on Kelly's Ford, and on reaching that point, Birney crossed over a divi- sion by wading, without waiting for the laying of the ponton- bridges, and advancing an attacking party, composed of Ber- * Stuart says, " great confusion." " I pursued them from three miles of Warronton to Buckland, the horses at full speed the whole distance, the enemy retreating in great confusion." — Stuart's Eeport. But the reports of Custer and Kilpatrick are naturally not so frank as to avow this. A CAMPAIGN OF MAN(EUVRES. 387 dan's Sharp-shooters, the Fortieth New York, tlic Fh-st and Twentieth Lidiana, the Third and Fifth Michigan, and the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania regiments, carried the rifle-pits and captured five hundred prisoners. The enemy was prevented from strengthening the force in the works by the fire of batteries on the heights on the north side, which swept the plain on the southern bank. Birney's loss was trivial. While the left column was thus passing at Kelly's Ford, the right wing was forcing a crossing against more formida- ble obstacles. The Confederates occupied a series of works on the north bank of the river at Rappahannock Station, which had been built some time before by the Union troops, and consisted of a fort, two redoubts, and several lines of rifle-trenches. These works were held by two thousand men belonging to Early's division of Ewell's corps. Commanding positions to the rear of the fort having been gained, heavy batteries were planted thereon, and a fierce cannonade opened between the opposing forces. Just before dark, a storming party was formed of Russell's and Upton's brigades of the Sixth Corps, and the works were carried by a very brilliant coup de main. Over fifteen hundred prisoners, four guns, and eight standards were here taken. Sedgwick's loss was about three hundred in killed and wounded. This brilKant opening of the campaign should have insured a decisive operation ; and it is probable that, if a rapid ad- vance had been made either towards Culpepper or to the south of it by Stevensburg, the Confederate army, which lay in winter-quarters in echelon from Kelly's Ford to the west of Culpepper, might have been cut in two. But the army having crossed on the night of the 7th and morning of the 8th, the whole of that day was wasted in useless and uncertain movements,* and Lee, not courting battle, availed himself of the opportunity that night to withdraw again across the * On this point, see Birney's testimony : Report on tlie Conduct of the War, Becond series, vol. i., p. 372 ; Warren's testimony : Ibid., p. 385. 388 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Eapidan. Meade tlien advanced and took up position l3e- tween the Eapj)aliannock and the Kapidan, which was nearly the same ground he held before his retreat. This campaign may be regarded from two points of view, and fi-om each is susceptible of a different critique. Consid- ered as a movement to meet Lee's advance, it was perfectly successful, and its conduct highly creditable. Lee's line of manoeuvre was, it is true, exterior to that of Meade, and as it was necessary for him to pursue circuitous routes in order to effect his turning movements, this imposed on the former con- siderably greater marching. Yet he had a clear object in view, whereas his antagonist was necessarily delayed by ignorance of his opponent's real design. The very success of Lee's j)lan depended on being pushed impetuously. Nevertheless, he de- layed at Madison Courthouse, which thwarted the success of his first flank movement ; and he delayed again at Warrenton, which baulked that of his second. But even in view of these halts, which General Lee partly explains on the ground that they were necessary in order to supply the troops, the opera- tions of the 14tli were not conducted with much vigor. Ewell allowed himself to be detained by the rear-guard, at Auburn, from early in the morning till noon ; and from Greenwich he took a blind track across the fields, which he found very diffi- cult, and which gave him much delay, thus preventing his junction with Hill at Bristoe until too late. Nor was Hill's march made with much more expedition ; for notwithstanding that his route to Bristoe was but four miles longer than that of Warren, and that the latter was delayed for several hours by his rencounter with Ewell at Auburn, he reached the de- cisive point as soon as Hill. Warren's conduct throughout these operations was excellent, and a model of the execution of the duties of a rear- guard. But if, on the other hand, we look upon General Meade's line of duty as caUing essentially for offensive action, his course in this retrograde movement is open to another order of criticism. A CA^rPAION OF MAN(EUYRES. 3S Z , ;; =; \ -% W- o r lis I r P ^ " ^^^^' ^ GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 415 encampment near Stevensburg, and advanced to Ely's Ford,^' preceded by Gregg's division of cavalry. AVlien the corps reached the Rapidan the cavalry Avas well across, and had the canvas ponton-bridge nearly laid. This work being soon completed, the infantry made the passage and pushed forward to Chancellorsville, which place it reached at nine in the morning of the 4tli, the cavalry being thrown out towards Fredericksburg and Todd's Tavern. At Chancellorsville, Hancock's troops rested for the remainder of the day, await- ing the passage of the heavier column on the right. The troops bivouacked for the night on Hooker's old battle- ground. Thus the morning of Thursday, the 5th of May, found a hundred thousand men across the Rapidan. The barrier that had so long divided the opposing armies was passed, and with the mingled emotions which grand and novel enterprises stir in men's breasts, the troops looked out, hopefully, yet conscious that a terrible struggle was before them, into a region yet untrodden by the hostile armies, but soon to be- come historic by a fierce grapple of armed hosts and bloody battles in many tangled woods. Lee had offered no opposition to the passage of the Eapidan. His right was turned. Was this to be considered a great success ? The answer will depend on the hue of action marked out for himself by General Lee. In the defence of rivers, military art presents several dis- tinct hues of conduct. 1. The general on the defensive may permit the crossing of a part of the assaihng force, and then, by destroying the means of passage, seek to overwhelm the isolated fraction.! 2. He may oppose directly the passage of the hostile army, or, by occupying advantageous positions, * General Grant, in his ofScial report (p. 6), inadvertently states that the Second Corps crossed at United States Ford ; but Ely's Ford was the p(>int of passage. f The conduct of the Archduke Charles at Essling, is a good example oi this. See Vial : Cours d'Art et d'Histoire Militaires, vol. ii., p. 92. 416 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. prevent it from dei^loying.- 3. He may allow the enemy to make the passage entirely unobstructed, but fall upon him after crossing. In this case he simply observes the line of the river, and holds his masses distributed at convenient points within supporting distance. This last method was that adopted by General Lee ; and, as the line to be defended was long, and it was uncertain whether Grant would essay a turning movement on his left to- wards Gordonsville, or on his right by the lower fords, he had along the river merely a force in observation, while his main masses were positioned in echelon from the Eapidan near Somerville Ford to Gordonsville — Longstreet's corps being posted near the latter place. Hill's in the vicinity of Orange Courthouse, and Ewell's thence up to and along the Rapidan, the right of the Confederate line resting near E-accoon Ford. It is obvious, therefore, that though the successful passage of the Rapidan by the army with its enormous train of four thousand wagons was a matter of congratulation, it was no proof that a severe struggle was not imminent.! * A striking illustration of this mode of action is presented in the conduct of Vendome in disputing the passage of the Adda by Prince Eugene in 1805. It is thus described by Dufour : " Eugene had gained a march upon Vendume and was attempting to throw a bridge across the Adda at a very favorable spot. Vendome came up as soon as he could, and arrived before the bridge was com- pleted. He tried to arrest the work of the pontoniors, but in vain. The ground was so well swept by the artillery of Eugene that he could not get near enough to injure the workmen. Still, the passage of the river must be pre- vented. Vendume put his army to work upon a trench and parapet, surround- ing the ground occupied by the imperialists after crossing. They were finished nearly as soon as the bridges. Eugene deemed the passage of the river im- practicable and ordered a retreat." — Dufour : Strategy and Tactics, p. 253. f Lieutenant-General Grant, touching this point, uses language which shows that he regarded the passage of the Rapidan as a very important achievement. " This," says he, " I regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of cross- ing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably-com- manded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country and protected." — Grant : Report of Operations of 18G4-5, p. 6. But the trouble in regard to the trains really began when the army reached the Wilderness, being there shut up in the restricted triangle between the Rapidan and Rappahannock. GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 417 The line of march of the Army of the Potomac, after crossing the Kapidan, led through that region known as tlie Wilderness, which extends a considerable distance southward from the river, and westward as far as Mine Run. It was along its gloomy margin that the bloody battle of Chancel- lorsville had been fought a twelvemonth before. Now General Grant did not expect to be brought to quarters in this diffi- cult country, and the direction given the columns when the march was resumed on the morning of Thursday, May 5th, was such as would have carried them - quite beyond the bounds of the Wilderness region.* He counted that the Confederate right being turned by the successful passage of the Rapidan, he would be able to mask his march through the Wilderness, and then by a rapid advance toAvards Gordons- ville, plant himself between the Confederate army and Rich- mond. To foil his adversary's design was Lee's first aim. The plan he formed to effect this is one of the boldest and most * The following extract from the order of march for May 5th will show the line of advance contemplated by General Grant, and the points the corps were that day to reach, had not the movement been interrupted by Lee : " IIeadquakters Akmy of the Potomac, Mny 4, 1864—6 p. m. " The following movements are ordered for the 5th May, 1864 : 1st. Major- General Sheridan, commanding cavalry corps, will move with Gregg's and Tor- bert's divisions against the enemy's cavalry in the direction of Hamilton's crossing. General Wilson, with the third cavalry division, will move at five A. M. to Craig's Meeting-house on the Catharpin road. He will keep out parties on the Orange Courthouse pike and plankroad, the Catharpin road, Pamunkey road (road to Orange Springs), and in the direction of Troyman's Store and Andrews' Store or Good Hope Church. 2d. Major-General Hancock, commanding Second Corps, will move at five A. M. to Shady Grove Church and extend his right towards the Fifth Corps at Parker's Store. 3d. Major-General Warren, commanding Fifth Corps, will move at five A. m. to Parker's Store on the Orange Courthouse plankroad, and extend his right towards the Sixtli Corps at Old Wilderness Tavern. 4th. Major-General Sedgwick, commanding Sixth Corps, will move to Old Wilderness Tavern on the Orange Courthou.se pike as soon as the road is clear. * * * " By command of Major-General MRiVDE." 27 418 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. skilful conceptions of that officer. Instead of falling back, on finding liis flank turned, lie took a strategic offensive, directed a rapid concentration of his forces to meet Grant, and aimed to shut Grant up in the Wilderness. From Orange Courthouse, which was the centre of Lee's position, two parallel roads (the Orange and Fredericksburg plankroad and turnpike) run eastward and strike Grant's hne of march at right angles. By directing his forces rapidly forward on these routes, Lee would fall upon the army on the march and compel battle in the Wilderness, where he hoped to lure his antagonist into tangled labyrinths of confusion and disaster. This region, well known to him, was to his antago- nist pure terra incognita. In its thick chaperal, through which no artillery could play. Grant's masses would lose their force of impact, while the Confederate marksmen, with an almost Indian skill in woodcraft, could lie unseen in their gray array amid those dun woods and deal death to the assailants. Being apprised, therefore, on the morning of the 4th, that the Army of the Potomac had begun the passage of the Kapidan, he promptly directed his forces forward to meet it by the routes I have indicated. The mean distance of the corps fi*om their camps to where they would strike the army was about twenty miles. Ewell's corps was thrown forward on the old turnpike, and Hill's on the plankroad. Thus, while the Army of the Potomac was, throughout the 4th, defiling to the south bank of the Eapidan, the Army of Northern Virginia, making a rapid change of front, hurried forward to meet its rival with a front of opposition before it should have time, by a march beyond the Wilderness, to lay hold of the Confederate communications with Eichmond.* That night the van of the * " The enemy crossed the Rapidan at Ely's and Germanna fords. Two corps of this army moved to oppose him— Ewell's by the old turnpike, and Hill's by the plankroad. They arrived this morning (May 5th), in close prox- imity to the enemy's line of march."— Lee : Dispatch of May 5, 18G4. Long- street's corps, which formed the extreme left of the Confederate line. # was further off than the others, being near Gordonsville ; but it also was or- dered up, GKANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 419 hostile armies bivouacked, unsuspecting, very close to each, other— Warren's corps at Wilderness Tavern, situate at the junction of the Germanna Ford plank with the Orange and Fredericksburg turnpike ; E well's corps on the latter road, within three miles of Warren's position. Early next morning — the morning of the 5th of May — the Union columns set out to resume the onward march — the left column, under Hancock, being directed from Chancellorsville on Shady Grove Church, and the right column, led by War- ren's corps, fi-om Wilderness Tavern to Parker's Store, on the Orange and Fredericksburg plankroad. Warren's command was next to the enemy, and as the opening of the battle of the Wilderness took shape from Warren's movements, it will be necessary to describe these in detail. The proximity of the Confederates, the position of whose advance has been indicated above, was not at all known.* But to guard against any approach by the Orange turnpike, Warren threw out the division of Griffin on that road to guard against any irruption of the enemy into the route upon which Sedgwick's corps, which followed the Fifth, was yet to move from Germanna Ford ; while he set the van of his column, composed of the division of Crawford, in motion by a wood road to gain Parker's Store. Now Ewell also continued his eastward march early that morning on the turnpike, so that presently the skhmishers of Griffin's division, which had been thrown forward on that road, were driven in. Moreover, no sooner had Crawford's force neared Parker's Store than the troopers in his front, which had abeady occupied that point early in the morning, were met running back ; and on sending forward a reconnoi- tring force, it was found that a column of the enemy was press- ■* This ignorance of the enemy's position was partly due to the fact that Wilson's division of cavalry, which had, on the afternoon of the 4th, moved out on the turnpike nearly to Robertson's Tavern, was withdrawn that evening, and proceeded on a scout to Parker's store on the plankroad. Therefore no feelers were out on the route by which Ewell was advancing. 420 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. iug forward on the plankroad also/- It will be sufficiently clear wliat this force was when it is remembered that Lee had dispatched Hill's corps on this road, and the enemy encoun- tered by Griffin was the van of Ewell's column, which, as already seen, had bivouacked the night before within three miles of Wilderness Tavern. These developments, of course, necessitated a cessation in the prescribed movement of Gen- eral Warren, who found himself called upon to meet an imme- diate and pressing emergency. Such was the situation of affiiirs when, on the morning of Thursday, May 5th, Generals Grant and Meade reached Old Wilderness Tavern. Neither of these commanders, however, beliered that aught but a small force was in front of Warren to mask the Conffederate retreat, as it was not deemed possi- ble that Lee, after his defensive line had been turned, could have acted with such boldness as to launch forward his army in an offensive sally. It was, therefore, at once resolved to bnish away or capture this force ; but as this determination was formed under a very erroneous apprehension of the actual situation, the means employed were inadequate to the task.f The main development of opposition having come from the force that showed itself against Griffin on the turnpike, an attack was ordered at that point — Wadsworth's division * " Led the advance of the Fifth Corps at five A. m., with orders to proceed to Parker's Store. Received the following instruction from General Warren : ' Throw out a skirmish line well to your left and rear facing the plankroad, so that the enemy cannot get on your flank or rear without your knowing it. General Getty is now moving up the plankroad towards your left. If you hear firing in that direction it will be his.' Took the wood road from the Lacy House, and pushed on till reaching the open space about one mile from Parker's Store. The cavalry had become engaged with the enemy, who pressed them so hard that they sent back for support. I deployed the Buck- tails at once to the front, and they advanced just in time to resist an attack of infantry that had just arrived. Took up position, and at twenty minutes past eight A. M. received an order from General Warren, stating that the movement had been suspended and that liriffin and Wadsworth would attack on the turnpike."— Crawford : Notes on the Battle of the Wilderness. f As direct testimony to this state of feeling on the part of the commanding general, I extract from my note-book the following memorandum made on the GR.'^TS OVERLAND CMIPAIGN. 421 (also of Warren's corps) being disposed in line on the left of Griffin, and the division of Eobinson in support. Crawford's moYement towards Parker's Store, which had already been arrested by the enemy, was now formally suspended. One of its brigades (that of McCandless) was sent to act on the left of Wadsworth's command, and the remainder of the division was afterwards withdrawn— the enemy folloAving up and firing into the rear of the column. "With this force an impetuous attack was at noon made on the enemy on the turnpike. The brunt of this assault fell to the lot of Griffin's division, of which Ayres' brigade was formed on the right, and Bartlett's the left of the Orange turnpike. These succeeded in carrying every thing in theii- front ; and with dispositions better suited to the circum- stances, Swell's corps (only the van of which had yet reached the gi-ound) should have been crushed.* But as the attack spot : " May 5tli ; rode with Grant, Meade, and the staff to Old Wilderness Tavern ; found Warren "s corj^s in position there, and Sedg^vick coming up. At eight o'clock, while on the way, a message came that the enemy were ad- vancing on us by the turnpike. Griffin's division out on that road. At nine A. M., General Meade said to Warren, Sedgwick, and others standing by ; ' They [the enemy] have left a didsion to fool us here, while they concentrate and prepare a position toicards the North Anna ; and what I want is to pre- tent those felloics from getting back to Mine Run.' " * From officers of Ewell's corps engaged in this action, I learn the follow- ing particulars. When the first onset was made by the Fifth Corps, Johnson's divi.*ion alone held the position. Jones' brigade, formed across the turnpike, wa^ swept back by the force of the assault, and his troops fell back much broken. It was, however, immediately replaced by Stewart's brigade, and almost simul- taneously with the first signs of weakness in Johnson's line, Rodes' division arrived, took position on its right, and, by a firm counter-attack, drove the Union troops back. It is very clear from the conf^ ssion of the disorder result- ing from the first attack of the Union force that, had adequate preparations been made, Ewell's corps might have been overwhelmed. I may remark that General Warren urged a just \ievv of the situation— setting forth that if, as was believed at headquarters, there was but a rear-guard in his front, the attack could but little affect the great campaign on which the army was enter- ing ; but if the Confederates were present in force, time should be allowed to foi-m a really weighty attack. But immediate action, with such means as were at hand, had been determined uix)n. 422 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP 'i'HK POTOMAC was ordered under the impressiou that only a rear-guard of the enemy was present, the dispositions made were very far from being adapted to the actual situation. Recovering from its momentary repulse, the van of Ewell's force re-formed on a wooded acclivity a short distance in the rear, and there being joined by the remainder of the corps, the Confederates were soon in position not only to withstand the shock of Warren's onset, but to assume the offensive. It had been designed that the right of Warren's line should be sustained by the left of the Sixth Corps, the division of Wright forming the connection ; but, owing to the thickness of the woods, that officer was unable to get up to Warren's support in time, and this left the right of the latter ex230sed. Against this naked flank the Confederates made a vigorous attack upon Ayres' brigade of Regulars, and this giving way, Bart- lett's brigade also was beaten back,- Two guns that had been advanced on the turnpike to take advantage of the first success, their horses being killed, were left between the lines, and fell into the hands of the enemy. t On the left of Griffin, Wadsworth's division advanced simultaneous with it to the attack ; but there was no connection between the two, and the troops of the latter in their passage through the dense thicket, having taken a somewhat false direction, unwittingly exposed their left flank to a destructive fire from the enemy, which threw them back in some confusion. | The brigade of * " Moved at noon with Ayres' Regulars on the right. Attacked the enemy on my front and drove him. Tlie Regulars gave way, which exposed our right flank, and rendered retreat necessary by tlie brigade. This could not be effected across the ground by which we advanced, and I brought out the com- mand by a detour through the woods to the left, in rear of the enemy." — Bart- lett : Notes on the Battle of the Wilderness. I Meade : Report of the Battle of the Wilderness. :]: The cause of Wadsworth's repulse affords a curious illustration of the difficulties that beset the movement of troops in such a region as the ^MIde^ ness. General Warren gave Wadsworth his direction by a point of the com- pass, there being no other guide in such a thicket. His course was to be due west from the Lacy House, which would have brought him to the left of Griflin and on a prolongation of his line. But Wadsworth started facing northwest GR/VNT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 423 Crawford's division (that of McCaiidless), wliicli was to the left of TVadsworth, occupied an isolated position, and being nearly surrounded, it was easily driven from the field, with the loss of almost two whole regiments. Thus all the ground gained was given up, but the Confederates did not follow, and Warren assumed a new line somewhat in rear, but still in front of Old Wilderness Tavern and across the Orange turnpike. Such were the initial operations of the battle of the Wilder- ness. The opening w^as not auspicious. It gave Warren's corps a very severe shock, entailing upon it a loss of above three thousand men. The result left no doubt respecting the presence of the enemy in force, and early in the day, when the serious opposition encountered by the Fifth Corps made this manifest, General Grant, suspending the previously or- dained marches of the corps, made dispositions to accept Lee's gage of battle. The Sixth Corps being directly in rear of the Fifth, was ready to take post on Warren's right. But Han- cock's column, which was moving considerably to the left, and had that morning marched southward fi'om Chancellorsville, w^as quite out of position for a battle in the Wilderness. In- structions were therefore sent recalling it to unite with the main body by a movement up the Brock road to its intersec- tion with the Orange plankroad. This order was received by Hancock at eleven o'clock, and the countermarch immediately begun. He was then distant about ten miles.* instead of going due west. Now Ewell's line was at right angles with tlie turnpike, so that by the time Wadsworth's line of battle passed the Higerson House [see map] it had come almost to face the turnpike directly, and the first fire of the enemy came square upon its flank. The thick woods prevented any change on the spot, and by running back, the men did about the best tiling they could. * " At five A. M. on the 5th May, the Second Corps moved towards its designat- ed position at Shady Grove Church, taking the road by the Furnace and Todd's Tavern. My advance was about two miles beyond Todd's Tavern, when, at nine A. M., I received a dispatch from the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac to halt at the tavern, as the enemy had been discovered in some force on the Wilderness pike. Two hours later I was directed to move my command up on the Brock road to its intersection with the Orange plankroad." Hancock ; Report of The Battle of the Wilderness. 424 Cii^IPAIQNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. It will be borne in mind that tlie Confederate corps of Hill was hurrying forward on the Orange plankroad, and tha£ the van of Warren's force which had gone out towards Parker's Store in the morning had seen this column filing rapidly down that road. Four miles east of Parker's Store the plankroad is intersected by the Brock road, which runs southward to Spottsylvania Courthouse, and on which Hancock was moving up to join the main body of the army. It is obvious, there- fore, that this junction of road was a strategic point of the first importance, and if Hill should be able to seize it, he would interpose effectually between the two Union columns. Discerning this danger, General Meade, early in the day, directed a division of the Sixth Corps, under General Getty, to hold stoutly this position until Hancock's junction could be effected. "While the latter was still far off, Getty had begun to feel the presence of the enemy, and hour by hour it grexr more heavy upon him. But he held his post immovably, and towards three o'clock in the afternoon, the welcome cheer of Hancock's approaching troops was heard. Then the position was secure, and the Second Corps, hurrying forward as rap- idly as. the narrow defiles of the forest would permit, was dis- posed in double line of battle along and in front of the Brock road, facing Hill's hue drawn up across the Orange plank- road.* To make the tenure of the position certain, in case the enemy should assault, as seemed likely, substantial lines of breastworks were immediately constructed by Hancock's troops ; but before these were entirel}^ completed he received orders to advance upon Hill and drive him back on the plank- road beyond Parker's Store. * Birney's division, wLich led the van of Hancock's corps, first joined Getty, and vfas posted on the right soon after the divisions of Gibbon, Mott, and Bar- low c^me up, and were placed on the left ; Barlow's division (with the exception of Frank's brigade, which was stationed at the junction of the B.ock road with the road to the Catharpen furnace) formed the left of the line, and was thrown forward on some high, cleared ground in front of the Brock road, where, as the only available place in the dense, environing forest, Hancock massed his ar tillery. GRANTS OVERL^VND CAMPAIGN. 425 Tlie situation of the opposing forces v/as now peculiar enough. Warren had engaged Ewell on the turnpike with such result as has already been seen, and Hancock now pre- pared to attack Hill on the plankroad ; but there was no con- nection whatever either between the two Federal or the two Confederate columns. Each combat, in fact, had the charac- ter of an action in a defile, and had very slight bearing the one on the other. A little past four o'clock, the attack on Hill was opened by Getty's command. His troops encountered the enemy iu a line of battle, not intrenched, about three hundred paces in :ront of the Brock road, and immediately became hotly en- o-ao-ed. But as it was soon manifest that the Confederates were present in heavy force, Hancock advanced his own corps. The fight at once grew very fierce, the opposing forces being exceedingly close and the musketry continuous and deadly alongjhe whole Hue. Hancock attacked with the utmost vigor in what Lee justly calls " repeated and desperate assaults ;"* but the Confederates, seeking what cover the ground afforded, * " The enemy subsequently concentrated against General Hill, wlio, with his own and Wilcox's divisions, successfully resisted the repeated and desperate as- saults." — Lee : Dispatch, May 5. From General Hancock's official report I extract the following dctaUs of this action : " At a quarter past four P. M. General Getty moved forward on the right and left of the Orange plankroad, having received direct orders from General Meade to commence the attack without waiting for me. Finding that General Getty had met the enemy in great force, I ordered General Biruey to advance his com- mand (his own and Motfs divisions) to support the movement of Getty at once. Although the formation I had directed to be made before carrying out my in- structions to advance was not yet completed. General Birney immediately moved forward on General Getty's right and left— one section of Ricketts' bat- tery, (Company F, First Pennsylvania Artillery, moving down the plankroad j ust in rear of the infantry. The fight became very fierce at once, th.e lines of bat- tle were exceedingly close, the musketry continuous and deadly along the entire line. Half-past four p. M., Carroll's brigade of Gibbon's division advanced to the support of Getty's right, on the right of the plank road ; and a few minutes later, Owen's brigade of Gibbon's division was also ordered into action in sup- port of General Getty on the right and left of the Orange plankroad. Daring this contest, the Irish Brigade, commanded by Colonel Smy the of the Second Del- 426 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. and hidden by tlie forest, met the advancing hnes with siieh well-deHvercd and murderous volleys that Hancock was every time checked. Mott's division gave way, and Brigadier-Gen- eral Alexander Ha^s, in going to repair the break in the line, was shot dead while gallantly leading his command in the thickest of the fight.* The heavy firing borne to the ears of Generals Grant and Meade at the Old "Wilderness Tavern, attested the severity of the work that was going on at this important junction of roads. It was judged that the pressure on Hancock might be relieved by sending a force from Warren's corps to strike through southward the forest and fall upon the flank and rear of Hill. Wadsworth's division and the brigade of Baxter were accordingly dispatched late in the afternoon to execute this movement. But great difficulty was experienced by these troops in making their way through the thicket, and it was dark by the time Wadsworth got his force in position to ap- ply it in the manner directed. His troops lay on their arms during the night where darkness found them, which was in contact with the skirmishers on Hill's left flank — a situation in which Wadsworth might attack with much advantage the following morning.t aware Volunteers, and Colonel Brooke, Fourth Brigade, both of Barlow's divi- sion, Second Corps, attacked the enemy vigorously on his right and drove his line for some distance. The Irish Brigade was heavily engaged, and although four-fifths of its numbers were recruits, it behaved with great steadiness and gallantry, losing largely in killed and wounded. The section of Ricketts' bat tery which moved down the plankroad when Birney and Getty attacked, suf- fered severely in men and horses. It was captured at one time during tlie fight, but was retaken by detachments from the Fourteenth Indiana and Eighth Ohio Volunteers of Carroll's brigade. It was then withdrawn, and re-- placed by a section of Dow's Sixth Maine battery." * Meade : Report of the Rapidan Campaign. f The column imder command of General Wadsworth moved about four o'clock. After entering the woods southeast of the Lacy House, line of battle was formed. After proceeding half a mile the skirmish line of the enemy was driven in and steadily pushed until it was too dark to see, when the troops halted in line of battle for the night. The line had gradually swung round so as to be facing more nearly south, between Widow Tap's [see map] and the Brock road — the left being perhaps half a mile from the Brock road. GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 427 Hancock continued his unavailing efforts to drive Hill till eight o'clock, when night shutting down on the darkling woods ended the struggle. The combatants lay on their arms, mutu- ally exhausted after the fierce wrestle ; and many corpses lay in the tangled brakes and bushes, evidences of the bloody work done that day. The action of the 5th of May was not so much a battle as the fierce grapple of two mighty wrestlers suddenly meeting. But it had determined that there should be a battle, and it had drawn the relative positions of the combatants. The moving Union columns, almost surprised in flagrante delicto, had succeeded in making a junction ; and if it had been Lee's purpose to interpose between them, he was foiled in this. The antagonist armies and their commanders were in the highest mettle, both were filled with aggressive ardor, and the proof of this was that each determined to attack on the morrow. Yet each felt that in the encounter there would be need of all his strength, and whatever corps of each had not yet come up were urgently ordered forward. On the Union side all had ah-eady arrived, saving the Ninth Corps under General Burn- side, who had been instructed to hold position on the Orange and Alexandria Eailroad for twenty-four hours after the army had crossed the Eapidan. This corps was at once summoned to the front, and early on the morning of the 6th, after a rapid and arduous march, it reached the field and took position in the interval between Warren's corps on the turnpike and Han- cock's on the plankroad. The Union Hne of battle, as formed by dawn of the 6th, was therefore in the order of Sedgwick on the right next Warren, and Burnside and Hancock on the left. It ran north and south, faced westward, and was in extent about five miles. On the side of the Confederates, Longstreet's corps, which at the opening of the campaign had to march up from Gor- donsville (distant forty miles), had not been up to participate in the action of the 5th ; but that night it bivouacked not far off, and its presence eaily in the impending battle was 428 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. assured. Leo maintained the same ground lie liad held tlio day before — Ewell on the left across the turnpike, and Hill on the right across the plankroad ; but Avhereas, on that day, owing to the suddenness with which they were precipitated into action, there had been no connection between them, they now extended to meet each other and form a continuous front. It was appointed that Longstreet on his arrival should come upon the right flank of Hill's corps. The field where the first rencounter of the armies had taken place, and where it was now decreed the battle should be fought, w^as that region known as " The Wilderness." I have alreadj^ touched on some of the characteristic features of this region in the recital of the action of the 5th ; but it is necessary that these should be fully realized in order to gain a just appreciation of this sing-ular and terrible combat. It is impossible to conceive a field worse adapted to the move- ments of a grand army. The whole face of the country is thickly wooded, with only an occasional opening, and inter- sected by a few narrow wood-roads. But the woods of the Wilderness have not the ordmary features of a forest. The region rests on a belt of mineral rocks, and, for above a hun- dred years, extensive mining has here been carried on.''-' To * Tlie mines of tliis region were first worked in the early part of the last century by Alexander Spottswood, then governor of Virginia. Colonel Byrd, in his " Progress of the Mines," published in 1732, gives many interesting de- tails of this region, from which it appears that Gernianna, now known only as a ford, was once a place of some celebrity. "This famous town [Oernianna] consists of Colonel Spottswood's enchanted castle on one side of the street, and a baker's dozen of ruinous tenements on the other, where so many German families had dwelt some years ago ; but are now removed ten miles higher, in the fork of the Rapi^ahannock, to land of their own. In the evening the noble colonel came home from his mines. I let him understand that besides the pleasure of paj'ing him a visit, I came to be instructed by so great a master in the mystery of making iron, wherein he had led the way, and was the Tubal Cain of Virginia. He corrected me a little there, by assuring me that he was not only the first in this country, but the first in North America, who had erected a regular furnace." Another writer, of a still earlier period, thus speaks: "Beyond Colonel Spottswood's furnace, above the Falls of Rappahan- nock River, within view of the vast mountains, he has founded a town ca,lled GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN 429 feed the mines the timber of the country for many miles around had been cut down, and in its phice there had arisen a dense undergrowth of low-limbed and scraggy pines, stiff and bristling chinkapins, scrub-oaks, and hazel. It is a region of gloom and the shadow of death. Mauceuvring here was necessarily out of the question, and only Indian tactics told. The troops could only receive direction by a point of the compass ; for not only were the lines of battle entirely hidden from the sight of the commander, but no officer could see ten files on each side of him. Artillery was wholly ruled out of use ; the massive concentration of three hundred guns stood silent, and only an occasional piece or section could be brought into play in the road-sides. Cavalry was still .more useless. But in that horrid thicket there lurked two hundred thousand men, and through it lurid fires played ; and, though no array of battle could be seen, there came out of its depths the crackle and roll of musketry like the noisy boiling of some hell-caldron that told the dread story of death. Such was the field of the battle of the Wilderness; and General Grant appointed that at five o'clock of the morning the fight should be renewed. Combinations or grand tactics there were none ; the order of battle was simple, and was to all the corps — Attack along the whole line. It is a striking proof of the aggressive determination ani- mating both commanders, that Lee, also, that morning had resolved upon assuming the offensive. His plan was to dehver an overwhelming blow on the left of the Union army — a point well chosen, since this was Grant's strategic flank, the carrying of which would force him back against the Eapidan. It was, however, impossible to strike this blow ef- fectively until Longstreet's corps, which had not yet ai-rived, Germanna, from some Germans sent over by Queen Anne. Beyond this is seated tlie colony of Germans of Palatines, with allowance of good quantity of rich land, who thrive very well and live happily, and entertain generously." Hugh Jones : " Present Condition of Virginia," 1724. The latter syllable of the name Spottswood, latinized forms with the former part the name of the county of Spottsylvania. 433 CUIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. should come up. To distract attention, therefore, Lee re- solved to make a threatening demonstration against the Union right. Thus it came about, that fifteen minutes before the time appointed by Grant for the general attack, a sudden outburst of musketry from the direction of Sedgwick an- nounced that Lee was beforehand with him in offensive pur- poses. The attack was made upon Seymour's brigade on the ex- , treme right, involved the whole of Eicketts' division, and then ' Wright's. But, as has been seen, it had no serious cliaracter, and was not pushed with much vigor ; so that Sedgwick not only yielded no ground, but was able to push his front for- ward a few hundred yards. At the same time, Warren and Hancock joined in the general attack. But as the left was the point at which, as by common consent, the fiercest dis- pute took place, I shall first of all set forth the sequence of events on that flank. Wlien, at five o'clock, Hancock opened his attack by an advance of his two right divisions under Birney, together with Getty's command,* and pushed forward on the right and left of the Orange plankroad, the onset was made with such vigor, and Lee was yet so weak on that flank, owing to the non-arrival of Longstreet,t that, for a time, it seemed as though a great victory would then be snatched. At the same time that Hancock opened a direct attack, Wads worth's divi- sion,| which had the evening before secured a position to assail Hill's flank, took up the action, and fought its way across that part of the Second Corps posted on the right of the plauk- * The brigades of Owen and Carroll of Gibbon's division supported. •j- It would appear, also, that even Hill's corps was not aU up ; for Anderson's division had been left behind to guard certain fords of the Rapidan, and did not arrive for some hours. X " During the night I sent instructions to General Wadsworth to form his line northeast and southwest, and go straight through. Precisely at the hour the fighting began. Wadsworth fought his way entirely across the Second Corps front to the south side of the plankroad, and wheeling round com- mpnced driving the enemy up the plankroad." — Warren : Notes on the Battle of the Wilderness. ty GR.\NTS OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 431 road. The combined attack orerpowered the Confederates, and after an hour's severe contest, the whole hostile front was carried, and Hill's divisions nnder Wilcox and Hoth were driven for a mile and a half through the woods under heavy loss and back on the trains and artillery and tJie Confederate headquarters.* But here, whether the significance of the suc- cess was not understood, or because further advance was rendered impossible, owing to the disintegi'ation of Hancock's line in advancing so far through the thickets, a halt was cried, and a readjustment of the line made. This pause, as will presently appear, forfeited all the gain ; for, at the height of Hill's confused retreat, Anderson's division, soon followed by the head of Longstreet's column, came on the ground. When, therefore, about nine o'clock, after an interval of two hours, taken up in the rehabilitation of the line, Hancock, who had been re-enforced by Stevenson's division of the Ninth Corps, in addition to Wadsworth's division, resumed the advance, he met a bitter opposition, and though furious fighting took place, he gained no more headway.t That it was Longstreet that thus met him. General Han- cock did not, at this time, know. Indeed, Longstreet's attack had been anticipated in a very different direction ; and the manner in which this expectation influenced Hancock's dispo- sitions is a striking illustration of the kind of agencies that effect the issue of battles. It was known daring the night that Longstreet's corps, which had not been in the previous day's action, was marching up from the direction of Orange Court- house, to reach the field by a route that would strike Han- cock's left flank and rear. That ofiicer was cautioned ofiicially * I use here no stronger language tlian that employed by General Long- street, in a description he gave the writer of the ^situation of affairs at the mo- ment of his arrival. f The advance was made by Birney's and Mott's divisions, and Webb's, Car- roll's, and Owen's brigades of Gibbon's division, all of the Second Corps, together with Stevenson's division of the Ninth and Wadsworth's of the Fifth. Hancock had been so strengthened that now he had with him nearly one-half the anny. 4^2 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. to beware of this.* It was with the view to provide against this menace that, in attacking in the morning, Hancock ad- vanced only his right divisions, and allowed his left, under Gibbon, to remain on the original line on the Brock road ; so that, in throwing forward his right, he pivoted on his left, and, "with that flank, clung to the road on which it was expected Longstreet would come up. Now, at the time Hancock began his attack, Longstreet was really making the movement indi- cated ; but the assault was executed with such energy, and so completely disrupted Hill, that Lee found it necessary to re- call Longstreet from his flank march, and bring him forward to meet the more pressing necessity in front. Hancock, how- ever, unaware of this, still looked nervously to his left ; and though, after the successful advance of his right, he directed General Gibbon to advance with Barlow's division, and press the enemy's right, the approach of Longstreet's corps on the flank gave such constant apprehension, that Gibbon advanced only one brigade (that of Colonel Frank), which, after an ob- stinate resistance, succeeded in forming connection with the left of the advanced line.f This apprehension was, through- out the forenoon, constantly revived and strengthened by various incidents that befell. Thus, about eight o'clock, an outburst of fight was heard considerably to the left, where Sheridan, with a division of horse, had engaged the enemy ; but, instead of his encountering Longstreet, as Hancock sup- posed, it turned out to be Stuart's cavalry he had met. Some time after this, there came in a report that infantry was moving up on the Brock road from the direction of Todd's Tavern, about two miles from Hancock's left ; and as * Hancock : Report* of the Battle of tlie \^^ilderness. f " I do not know why my order to attack with Barlow's division was not more fully carried out ; but it was probably owing to the apprehended ap- proach of Longstreet's corps on my left about that time. But had my left advanced, as directed by me in several orders, I believe the overthrow of the enemy would have been assured. At all events, an attack on the enemy's right by the troops of Barlow's division would have prevented the turning of the left of Mott's division, which occurred later in the day." — Hancock's Report. GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 433 he knew he had no infantry in that quarter, he again supposed it to be Longstreet, and took measures to meet him.* But the reported cohimn of infantry proved to be a body of sev- eral hundred Union convalescents, who had come to the front by way of Chancellorsville, and were now following the route of the Second Corps around by Todd's Tavern. Thus it was that the suspicion, continually reawakened, that Longstreet was moving to turn Hancock's left flank, resulted in para- lyzing a large number of his best troops — troops that would otherwise have gone into action at the time when the disrup- tion of Hill's force opened a rare opportunity for a decisive blow. The contest that signalized Longstreet's arrival on Han- cock's fi'out, and restored the integrity of the shattered Con- federate right, now died away ; and for some hours, up to nearly noon, there was a lull. During this time, Longstreet's troops continued to arrive ; and when, at length, his line had acquired breadth and weight by the incoming force, it was advanced, and Hancock's troops, which had first halted, now began to feel a heavy pressure. The attack first fell on the left of the advanced line, held by the brigade of Frank. This force Longstreet's troops fairly overran ; and, brushing it away, they struck the left of Mott's division, which was, in turn, swept back in confusion ; and though Hancock endeav- ored, by swinging back his left, and forming line along the plankroad, to secure the advanced position still held by his right, it was found impossible to do so, and he had to content himself with rallying and re-forming the troops oijl the original line, along the Brock road, from which they had advanced in the morning. Wadsworth, on the right of Hancock, opposed the most heroic efibrts to the onset of the enemy ; but after several ineffectual charges, his troops broke into the retreat ; and while striving to rally them, that patriotic and high- * Brooke's brigade, of Barlow's division, was sent out on tbe Brock road to the extreme left, wliere a strong breastwork was constructed across the road, and Leasure's brigade, of the Ninth Corps, and Eustis' brigade, of the Sixth Corps, were held ready to support. 434: CAJklPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE P0T0:MAC. souled gentleman and brave soldier received a biillet in his head, and died within the enemy's lines the following day. But in the very fury and tempest of the Confederate onset the advance was of a sudden stayed by a cause at the moment unknown. This afterwards proved to have been the fall of the head of this attack. Longstreet had made his disi)ositions for a decisive blow ; for while advancing one force in front, he sent another to move round Hancock's left and lay hold of the Brock road. At the time the Union troops were giving ground, and the Confederates were pushing on, that oflficer, with his staff, rode forward in front of his cokimn ; when suddenly confronting a portion of his own flanking force, the cavalcade was mistaken for a party of Union horsemen, and received a volley under which Longstreet fell, severely wounded.* General Lee then took formal charge of that part of the field ; but it Avas four hours — that is, about four o'clock of the afternoon — before he could get things in hand to carry out the intent of his lieutenant. Before detailing the sequel of events at the left, it will, however, be proper to glance rapidly at what had meanwhile taken place on the centre and right of the field. The opening of the combat on the right, under Sedgwick, has been already seen ; and the history of what subsequently passed here can only be told in the heavy losses sustained by the Sixth Corps, in unavailing attempts to carry intrenched positions. On Sedgwick's left was Warren's corps, placed to the right and left of the Orange turnpike*; but as Hancock's needs had compelled the detachment to his assistance of two divisions of the Fifth Corps, the remaining two divisions (Griffin's and Crawford's) held a simply defensive attitude. * General Longstreet stated to the writer that he saw they were his own men, but in vain shouted to them to cease firing. He also expressed, with great emphasis, his opinion of the decisive blow he would have inflicted had he not been wounded. " I thought," said he, " that we had another Bull Run on you, for I had made my dispositions to seize the Brock road." But on my pointing out that Hancock's left had not advanced, but remained on the original line covering that road, he admitted that that altered the complexion of afiairs. ■,» GRANT'S OVERLAND COMPAIQN. 435 Severe skirmislimg took place tlirougliont tlie day ; but the enemy in front was found to be well intrenched, and no im- pression was made on his position. In the action of the previous day, there had existed a con- siderable interval between Warren's corps on the turnpike and Hancock's corps on the plankroad. It was designed that Burnside's command should advance through this opening ; and the point on which his attack was directed gave high hopes of a successfril issue. Advancing through the woods in the morning, the enemy was encountered on a wooded crest near the plankroad. An attack on this position was not thought advisable, and the corps was moved further to the left. It was not till afternoon, and subsequent to Hancock's repulse, that it became engaged with the enem3^ No decisive result followed, and towards evening Burnside feU back and intrenched. * The long lull that had followed the successful attack of Longstreet upon Hancock gave the latter time to thoroughly re-establish his position, now strengthened by fresh troops sent to him by General Meade. His immediate front was cleared by a w^ell-executed movement made by a brigade under Colonel Leasure, across its whole extent from left to right,t and he was prepared to meet the enemy, who, how- * Leasure's brigade belonged to the Ninth Corps, and held position towards the left of Hancock's line, tinder the immediate command of General Gibbon. Under orders from Hancock, Colonel Leasure formed his command at right angles with Hancock's front : his right, at about one hundred paces from the breastworks, swept across the whole front of Mott's and Bimey's divisions, and crossed the Orange plankroad to the right of Hancock's line, encountering in his progress what he supposed to be a brigade of the enemy, which fell back in disorder without engaging him. f " The head of the column passed the Lacy House at daybreak. Nothing was encoimtered until reaching the field this side of Wilderness Run ; here the flankers on the right became engaged with the enemy's skirmishers. As soon as the head of the column emerged into the field, a rebel battery at Tuning's opened on them. Some fifty shots were fired, but no one was hurt. The column halted : a strong skirmish line advanced across the run, up the slope covered with thick pines ; and as soon as they showed themselves in the edge of Tuning's field, they received a musketry fire and fell back. Pep- 436 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE P0T0:JAC. ever, made no demonstration until four o'clock in tlie after- noon. At that hour, Lee, having gotten well in hand the troops of Longstreet and Hill, made an .impetuous assault upon Hancock's intrenched position, pressing up to within less than a hundred yards of his front line. Here the Confeder- ates halted, and continued a long and uninterrupted fire of musketry, which, however, had little eflect on the troops be- hind their substantial breastwork of logs, whence they deliv- ered a sharp fusilade ; and the repulse of the Confederate attack would have been easy, but for an accident here occurring. In front of the left of the line a fire had, during the afternoon, sprung up in the woods, and at the time of the attack this had communicated to the log breastworks on that part of the line. At this critical moment they became a mass of flame, which it was found impossible to subdue, and which extended for many hundred yards to the right and left. The intense heat and the smoke, which was driven by the wind directly in the faces of the men, prevented them, or portions of the yet unin- jured line, from firing over the parapet. The enemy, taking advantage of this, swept forward ; a considerable body of the troops in the first line gave way, and retreated in great disor- liaps one division of tlie Ninth Corps was deployed in line of battle on the left of tlie road in the hollow. A long consultation now ensued between Gen- erals Buruside and Park, and Colonel Comstock. No one liked the idea of taking the hill by assault. * * * The idea was entertained that General Crawford was to advance and join on the right of the Ninth Corps ; but I explained that if Crawford advanced at all, he would close on the right of (iriflfin, and advance up the pike away from the Ninth Corps. More than an hour was lost doing nothing, while the firing over by Wadsworth grew very heavy. They finally concluded to abandon this route, and move further to the left, aiming at a point half-way between Tuning's and Tap's. The corps be- came engaged there about noon, with no decisive result, and fell back towards evening and intrenched." — Notes of a Staff OflScer. Regarding the anticipated effect of Burnside's movements. General Hancock USPS the following language : " I am not aware what movements were made by General Burnside near Parker's Store, on the morning of the 6th ; but I experienced no relief from the attack I was informed he would make across my front — a movement long and anxiously waited for." GRANTS OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 437 der towards Chancellorsville, and the enemy, pressing into the breastworks, crowned it with their standards. Yet the victory- was short-lived ; it was only the more adventurous that had penetrated the breastworks (inside of which, indeed, a few were killed), and these were quickly driven out by a forward rush of Carroll's brigade. Lee then abandoned the attack, in which he had suifered a considerable loss. This closed the main action of the day ; but just before dark, Ewell moved a considerable force around the right flank of the wing held by Ricketts' division of the Sixth Corps, and, in conjunction with a demonstration in front, succeeded in forcing this division back in considerable confusion, making prisoners of Brigadier-Generals Seymour and Shaler, and a considerable number of men. The attack produced a good deal of alarm ; but the break was soon repaired, and darkness prevented the Confederates following up the success of this sally. When the da^Mi of the third day (Saturday, May 7tli) came to light up the dark hollows of the Wilderness, neither army showed any disposition to take the offensive. The terrible conflict of the past two days had left both combatants bleed- ing and exhausted, and the events of the 7th were confined to a severe but indecisive combat between the opposing cavalry at Todd's Tavern. The heavy losses Lee had suffered in the battle, in which he had acted on the aggressive quite as much as his antago- nist, admonished a more cautious conduct ; and though he was willing to be assailed, he dared not venture further attack. When, therefore, the skirmish line was throwTi forward on the morning of the 7th, the Confederates were found standing at bay behind their intrenchments.* * General Grant appears to have drawn an inference from Lee's remaining behind his intrenchments on the morning of the 7th, which facts do not justify. " From this," says he, " it was e\'ident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position." — Report of Operations, p. 6_ 438 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. But the like reasons made Grant equally little minded to renew the assault. Yet the situation was such, that it was necessary either to go forward or to go backward. Had General Grant chosen to adopt the latter course, he would not have been without precedents. But this step was not only unbefitting his position — it was altogether con- trary to his bent of mind. There is much in that com- mander's temper that recalls that old marshal whom his soldiers named " Marshal Forwarts ;" and as Blucher, in the great campaign in France, that ended in the capitulation of Napoleon, would hear of nothing but marching straight on Paris, so Grant, his eyes fixed immovably on Eichmond as the goal of all his efibrts, the prize he resolved to seize, through whatever seas of blood he might have to wade, pronounced the magisterial word, " Forward !" When darkness came, the columns began their march for Spottsylvauia. The battle of the Wilderness is scarcely to be judged as an ordinary battle. It will happen in the course as in the begin- ning of every war, that there occur actions in which ulterior purposes, and the combinations of a military programme play very little part ; but which are simply trials of strength. The battle of the Wilderness was such a mortal combat — a combat in which the adversaries aimed each, respectively, at a result that should be decisive : Lee to crush the campaign in its inception, by driving the Army of the Potomac across the Rapidan ; Grant to dedroy Lee. Out of this fierce determination came a close and deadly grapple of the two armies — a battle terrible and indescribable It is not entirely clear what the lieutenant-general means by " maintaining the contest in the open field." During the two days' battle, both armies pivoted on intrenchments covering their entire front. From these, one side or the other sallied fortli to attack liis adversary, who endeavored to receive the at- tack from behind his breastworks. Lee attacked Grant's force behind in- trenched lines, quite as much as Grant attacked Lee's force behind intrenched lines. The real conclusion at which hoth commanders had arrived was, that farther assault on these lines was hopeless. GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 439 in those gloomy woods. There is something horrible, yet fas- cinating, in the mystery shrouding this strangest of battles ever fought — a battle which no man could see, and whose progress could only be followed by the ear, as the sharp and crackling volleys of musketry, and the alternate Union cheer and Confederate yell told how the fight surged and swelled. The battle continued two days ; yet such was the mettle of each combatant that it decided nothing. It was in every respect a drawn battle ; and its only result appeared in the tens of thousands of dead and wounded in blue and gray that lay in the thick woods. The Union loss exceeded fifteen thousand, and the Confederate loss was about eight thousand. That this result was a grievous disappointment to General Grant will be readily understood, if account be taken of the expectation with which he set out upon the campaign. Gen- eral Grant at this time shared an opinion commonly enter- tained in that part of the country where his own successes had been won — the opinion that the Army of the Potomac had never been fought to the uttermost. This belief was, per- haps, natural under the circumstances ; for there was much that, to one at a distance, where the peculiar nature of the task given the Army of the Potomac to do was little under- stood, might inspire this behef. Nevertheless it was fallacious. Sharing this view. General Grant hoped at one blow to finish the troublesome, and seemingly invulnerable, adver- sary. And to achieve this end, he made little account of those arts that accomplish results by the direction and combi- * This estimate of loss is inferential respecting both, sides. The tabular statement of casualties in the Army of the Potomac, embodied in the report of General Meade, gives an aggregate of twenty-nine thousand four hundred and ten killed, wounded, and missing, for the whole period between the 5th and 12th of May. But as the losses in the actions subsequent to the Wilderness, and previous to the 12th of May (which was the date of the main battle at Spottsylvania Courthouse), were probably not much over ten thousand, the aggregate of casualties in the Wildi'rness might perhaps be safely carried up to nearer twenty thousand. In estimating Lee's losses at eight thousand, I proceed on the basis of the aggregate of Confederate casualties during the en- tire campaign. 440 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. nation of forces ; for at tbis period lie avowedly despised manoeuvring.-'-' His reliance was exclusively on the applica- tion of brute masses, in rapid and remorseless blows, or, as he has himself phrased it, in " hammermg continuously." ' It soon appeared, however, that the hammer would itself break on the anvil ; and, taught a lesson by this, he was thereafter more disposed to accept whatever aid the resources of strategy afibrd. Great results, indeed, are seldom won save by the employment of both agencies. A well-considered offensive is never incompatible with so manoeuvring as to secure advan- tageous conditions to strike ; and the commander who at- tempts to renounce these is seldom long in having a costly proof of his error. Disappointed though he was in the result of the battle, General Grant was, nevertheless, not dismayed nor cast down ; but, seizing the masses of his force, he launched them forward to new trials of fortune. HI. THE LINES OF SPOTTSYLVANIA. The determination of General Grant to move southward from the Wilderness was formed early on Saturday, the 7th. His purpose was, to plant himself between Lee's army and Richmond, by a movement upon Spottsylvania Courthouse, * I trust the reader will understand that I do not make this statement at random. It is founded on the testimony of the highest authority, and I may mention an incident that corroborates tliis statement. Shortly before the opening of the Rapidan campaign, General Meade, in conversation -with the lieutenantr-general, was telling him that he proposed to manoeuvre thus and so; whereupon General Grant stopped him at the word "manoeuvre," and said, "Oh! I never manmuxre." This characteristic utteranc'e, which the suavity of biographers might readily pass over in silence, cannot be omitted Jiere ; for it is the proof of a frame of mind that essentially influenced the com- plexion of the campaign. The battle of the Wilderness can hardly be un- derstood, save as the act of a commander who " never manoeuvred." It was re- marked that he was not so unwilling to avaU himself thereafter of this resource. GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 441 fifteen miles southeast of the battle-field of the Wilderness.* The march of the infantry was not to be begun until after nightfall ; but it was necessary to make earlier disposition of the immense trains ; and for this purpose, they were with- drawn from the battle-field in the middle of the afternoon, and sent to Chancellorsville, there to park for the night. This movement of the trains apprised the enemy of Grant's withdrawal, but not of his objective ; and it was by a mere accident that a Confederate corps marched towards Spottsyl- vania that night.* The direct route to Spottsylvania Courthouse is by the Brock road, via Todd's Tavern. On this road, the Fifth Corps, under General Warren, was to take the advance, and, by a rapid march, seize Spottsylvania Courthouse. Han- cock's corps was to follow on the same line, while the corps of Sedgwick and Burnside were to move on an exterior route, by way of Chancellorsville.f The route of march of Lee, in • * The accideat befell in tliis wise. Lee seeing tliat Grant was moving off somewhere, but not knowing whether towards Fredericlisburg or Spottsylva- nia, instructed Anderson, now commanding Longstrcct's corps, to draw out his corps from the breastworks and camp it in readiness to move to Si)ottsylvania in the morning. Anderson not being able to find a good place to bivouac (the woods being on fire), began the march that night, about ten o'clock. t The following order of march will assist those who desire to study the logistics of this movement : IIeadquaktkks Army of the Potomac, May 7, 3 p. m. The following movements are ordered for to-day and to-night : 1st. The trains of the Sixth Corps authorized to accompany the troops will be moved, at four o'clock P. M., to Chancellorsville, and park on the left of the road, and held ready to follow the Sixth Corps during the night march. 2d. The trains of the Fifth Corps authorized to accompany the troops will be moved, at five o'clock p. m., to Chancellorsville, following the trains of the Sixth Corps, and parking with them, and held ready to follow those trains in the movement to-night. 3d. The trains of the Second Corps authorized to accompany the troops will be moved, at six o'clock p. m., to Chancellorsville, and park on the right of the road, and held ready to move at the same hour with the other trains, by way of Furnace's, to Todd"s Tavern, keeping clear of the Brock road, which will bo used by the troops. 4th. Corps-commanders will send escorts with these trains. 5th. The Reserve Artillery will move at seven o'clock, by way of Chancel- 442 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. order to foil liis antagonist's design of planting himself be- tween tlie Confederate army and Riclimond, was by the road from Parker's Store to Sj)ottsylvania Courthouse, which runs parallel with the Brock road, and a few miles west thereof. The distance in each case is about equal.* The vital interest of this turning movement centred in the lorsvillc, Aldricli's, and Piney Brancli Churcli, to tlie intersection of tlie road from Piney Branch Church to Spottsylvania Courthouse, and the road from Alsop's to Block House, and park .to the rear of the last-named road, so as to give room for the Sixth Corps. 6th. At half-past eight P. M., Major-General Warren, commanding Fifth Corps, will move to Spottsylvania Courthouse, by way of Brock road and Todd's Tavern. 7th. At eight and a half o'clock P. m., Major-General Sedgwick, command- ing Sixth Corps, will move, by the pike and plankroad, tp Chancellorsville, when he will be joined by the authorized trains of his own corps and those of the Fifth Corps ; thence, by way of Aldrich's and Piney Branch Church, to Spottsylvania Courthouse, and the road from Alsop's to Block House. The trains of Fifth Corps will then join the corps at Spottsylvania Courthouse. 8th. Major-General Hancock, commanding Second Corps, will move to Todd's Tavern, by the Brock road, following Fifth Cori>s closely. 9th. Headquarters during the movement will be along the route of the Fifth and Second corps, and at the close of the movement, near the Sixth. 10th. The pickets of the Fifth and Sixth corps will be withdrawn at one o'clock A. M., and those of the Second at two a. m., and will follow the routes of their respective corps. 11th. The cavalry now under the command of Colonel Hammond will be left by General Sedgwick at the Old Wilderness Tavern, and upon being in- formed by General Hancock of the withdrawal of this corps and pickets, will follow that corps. 12th. Corps-commanders will see that the movements are made with punc- tuality and promptitude. IStli. Major-General Sheridan, commanding cavalry corps, will have a suf- ficient force, on the approaches from the right, to keep the corps-commanders ad- vised in time of the appearance of the enemy. 14th. It is understood that General Burnside's command will follow the Sixth Corps. By command of Majok-General Meade. * General Grant (Report, p. 7) states, that " the enemy having become ap prised of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach thero first." But if there be any diffenmce in the distance of the routes travelled hy the rival armies, that of Lee was rather the longer. PLANor THE BATTLE 10 LINES "*>^..j>fl>')' -*■'/.••;•■• ■K» Co U BT H U S E Z^i .^. \^ Chvn-iiitUf Voiu/lit Mm/ rV*- il^J hSm.jy^ <3 ^ JIuiJ. 4Ml .r ^'^ I, 'oik „ f %'ih,- \ f- ■'Ma ^' % GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 443 marcli of Warren to seize Spottsylvania Courthouse. But tliougli tliat officer threw the utmost ardor into the execution of this purpose, it was, by causes now to be mentioned, first retarded and finally foiled. The advance of Warren's corps was begun at nine P. ]k. of the 7th. Reaching Todd's Tavern, he was delayed for an hour and a half by the cavalry escort of General Meade block- ing the way. On advancing two miles beyond that point, at about three A. M. of the 8tli, he was again detamed by the cavalry division of General Merritt, which had the day before, and up to a late hour of the night, been engaged in fighting and dri\dng the cavalry of Stuart, who had been sent by Lee to hold the Brock road, and who still barred further ad- vance.* Merritt, after two or three hours of ineffectual effort, gave way to Warren, who advanced to clear his own path. It was by this time broad daylight. A couple of brigades of the advance division, under Robinson, were deployed in line of battle, while the remainder of the corps followed in column. Numerous barricades obstnicted the road, and considerable loss occurred in removing these, several pioneers being killed and wounded while chopping. Finally, at eight A. m. of the 8th, the column emerged from the woods into a clearing, two miles north of Spottsylvania Courthouse.f Beyond this are woods again, and then the ground rises into the Spottsyl- vania Ridge. Forming in line, Robinson's division advanced over the plain. Thus far, only Stuart's dismounted troopers had been encountered, and no other opposition was anticipated; but when half-way across the field, and on the point of rising the * " At nine P. M., the army began to move towards Spottsylvania Co-urt- liouse, the Fiftli Corps having the advance on the Brock road. We were de- layed about an hour and a half by the cavalry escort of General Meade, and on reaching a point two miles beyond Todd's Tavern, were retarded about three hours Ijy Merritt 's cavalry endeavoring to clear the way for \is. They gave it up abouf six a. m. (May 8th), and got out of our way." — Warren : Notes on the Rapidan Campaign. t This clearing will be noted on the accompanying map as that mark-ed ** Alsop's." 444 CAilPAIGNS OF THE ARM:!' OF THE POTOJIAC. crest, the troops were met by a savage musketry fire from in- fantry. Owing to their severe experiences in the Wilderness, and the night march, without rest, the men were in an ex- cited and ahnoat frightened condition, and the tendency to stampede was so great, that General Warren had been com- pelled to go in fr'ont of the leading brigade. When, there- fore, they received a fire in front from the Tedoubtable foe they had left in the Wilderness, the line wavered and fell back in some confusion. General Robinson was, at the same time, severely wounded, which left the troops without their commander at a critical moment, and they were with some difiiculty rallied and re-formed in the woods back of the open plain. Griffin's division, which advanced on the right of Rob- inson, soon afterwards received the same fire, with a like re- sult* During this episode, Crawford's division had come up. It succeeded in driving the Confederates out of the w oods on Griffin's left ;t and Wadsworth's division (under General Cut- * It will be observed on tbe map that the road forks at Alsop's. Kobinson took to the left, and Griffin to the right ; the latter, forming Bartlett's brigade in line of battle in a ravine below Alsop's, advanced, with Ayres' and Sweitzer's brigades on the road. Of Bartlett's brigade, the Eighty-third Pennsylvania and Forty-fourth New York formed the first line, and the First Michigan and Eighteenth Massachusetts the second. " The Eighty-third Pennsylvania fought hand to hand with the Confederates, and pulled prisoners out of the works, and brouglit them to the rear ; but the enemy, seeing no supports coming up, got a flank fire on my right, from the fact of Robinson's division not pushing up in line. The enemy attacking at the same time in front caused me to abandon my position, and fall back of the second line, Avhich was then formed, with Colonel Sweitzer's brigade on the left, and General Ayres' on the right." — Bart lett : Notes on the Eapidan Campaign. " It so happened that Ayres' men in the road had good cover, the road be- ing sunken about three feet below the level. They lield their ground, thus affording a rallying point for Bartlett's men ; an.i in a short time the line was re-established, through the personal exertions of Generals Griffin, Ayres, and Bartlett. They advanced a little way further, and held the line our corps oc- cupied while north of Six)ttsylvania." — Notes of a Staff-Officer. f Crawford double-quicked into the woods, and drove the enemy entirely back, the Confederates leaving their dead and wounded on the field. " The enemy encountered at this point was Barksdale's Mississippi brigade ; and prisoners takep said they liad travelled all niglit to hurry in there, and that the divisions of McLaws and Anderson were right behind."— Crawford : Notes on the liapidan Campaign. GRANT S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 445 ler) also arriving, drove tliem out of the woods on Ids right, A line for the whole corps was then taken up, very close to the enemy, and the troops fell to intrenching of their own accord. The force encountered before Spottsylvania Courthouse w\is the head of Longstreet's column, which, having left the Wil- derness battle-field almost simultaneously with Warren's setting out, had hurried forward towards the threatened point, and, being favored by the delays that had befallen Warren, reached it ill time to bar further progress. It is probable that a vig- orous attack by an adequate force, any time during that day, would have carried the position ; for the Confederate army was but in process of arrival, and the defences, being such as were improvised on the spot, were not formidable. But there were various causes that prevented this. The task was too much for the Fifth Corps alone ; and when, in the afternoon, Sedgwick came up with the Sixth Corps, and took command of the field, there was much delay in determining the disposi- tions for attack. Moreover, Hancock's corps, which followed Warren's route from the Wilderness, and was designed to be within supporting distance, was, owung to the occupation of the road by other troops, halted in the morning, midway of the march, at Todd's Tavern ; and, later, events so shaped themselves, that Hancock was detained all day at Todd's Tavern by General Meade, to meet an anticipated attempt of Lee to fall upon the rear of the Union column.* * At Todds Tavern, the Brock road is intersected by a road (the Catharpen road) that connects the routes on which the rival armies were moving ; and as hostile parties madt? their appearance close to the Union line of march, this caused General Meade to retain Hancock's division all day at Todd's Tavern, though one division (that of Gibbon) was in the afternoon sent forward towards Spottsylvania Courthouse. To observe the Catharpen road against any hostile approach, Miles' brigade of Hancock's coi-ps, with a brigade of Gregg's cavalry and a battery of artillery, moved out in the afternoon, and took up a position within a mile of Corbyn's Bridge. This Miles held, meeting only an artillery fire, till he was recalled, late in the afternoon. While retiring, he was assailed by Mahone's division of Hill's corps ; but Miles, with much skill, repulsed the attack. It would probably have sufBccd to retain only a small masking force, such as that of Miles. In this case Hancock would liave been able to jiush on to the critical front. His retention at Todd's Tavern was very unfortunate, and 446 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. To return to the front of operations. Sedgwick having joined Warren with a part of his corps, resolved, late in the after- noon, to assault the position with such force as was available. But much time was lost, and it was evening before any thing was done. A partial attack was then made by a New Jersey brigade,* but it resulted in nothing. An advance was, how- ever, made soon afterwards by Crawford's division, with better fortune. It happened that a body of troops belonging to Ewell's corps was marching in by the flank, and coming un- expectedly upon Crawford's force, it was driven back for a mile in confusion, losing a hundred prisoners and a flag. Had the attack been made in stronger force, as was first in- tended, the best results might have been expected. t The operations of the day left the Confederates in posses- sion of Spottsylvania Courthouse. Lee, in fact, had succeeded in planting his army across Grant's line of march ; and having drawn upon the Spottsylvania Kidge a bulwark of defence, he was able, for twelve days, to hold the Army of the Potomac in check, and exact another heavy dole of blood. The army was all brought into position on a line in fi'ont of Spottsylvania on the following day, Monday, the 9th, and the cavalry under Sheridan was dispatched on a grand raid to cut Lee's railroad communications, Sedgwick's corps took post on the left of "Warren, and Burnside's on the left of Sedg- wick, forming the left of the army. Hancock came up from Todd's Tavern, and, moving to the right, took position on high ground overlooking the valley of the River Po, which, circling southward of Spottsylvania Courthouse, heads north- ward to the west of that place. Hancock formed the right of must be accounted rather timid generalship ; for the army, having been cut loose from the Wilderness, should have been pushed to Spottsylvania with the utmost vigor. The situation was such as to present quite as much danger to the head of the column as to its rear ; and had Warren gained Spottsylvania Courthouse, his position, with nothing within supporting distance, would have been very critical. * This brigade belonged to Neill's division of the Sixth Corps. f Notes of a Staff-Officer. GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 447 tlie army. Aside from tlio movements to take up position, tlio day was passed in quiet. The Confederate sliarp-sliooters were, however, very active, and early in the day their deadly aim brought down an illustrious victim in the person of Gen- eral Sedgwick, the beloved chief of the Sixth Corps, who was shot while standing in the breastworks along his line, and almost instantly expired. The loss of this lion-hearted sol- dier caused the profoundest grief among his comrades, and throughout the army, which felt it could better have afforded to sacrifice the best division. General Wright succeeded to the command. During the afternoon a Confederate wagon-train was ob- served filing along the road leading into Spottsylvania oppo- site Hancock's position. That officer was directed to make a movement across the Po, partly with the hope of capturing some of the train. Accordingly, towards evening of the 9th, the Second Corps forced a crossing of the stream, the south bank of which was observed by but a small force. The pas- sage was effected with entire success, in face of many diffi- culties of ground ; but night came on before the movement could be brought to a head. Next morning, the lOtli, Han- cock pushed forward the development of his operation, and, at the same time, bridged the stream at the points at which his force had crossed.. The Confederate train had all been safely retired within Spottsylvania Courthouse ; so that the continuance of the enterprise was without any very well- defined object. The Po, at Hancock's point of j)assage, runs nearly eastward ; but near Spottsylvania Courthouse it turns sharply southward. It therefore once more crossed his lino of advance ;- and it was observed that the enemy was in force behind intrenchments on its eastern bank, covering the approaches to Spotts3dvania Courthouse. The Po is here crossed by a wooden bridge two miles west of the courthouse. But the passage was not practicable, as all * Hancock, after crossing the Po, struck what is called the Block House road, which crosses the Po on a covered bridge two miles west of Spottsylvania. 448 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE P0T0:MAC. access was commanded by the euemj. Hancock, however, succeeded in throwing Brooke's brigade across the stream some distance above, and was proceeding to develop the ene- my's strength, when suddenly the movement was suspended by General Meade. While Hancock's movement was in prog- ress that morning, it had been determined to make an attack on the enemy on Warren's front and on that of the Sixth Corps, and General Hancock was ordered to withdraw two divisions from the south side of the Po, to assist the proposed assault. In obedience to this order, the divisions of Gibbon and Birney were retired, the rear of the latter being assailed in the act. There then remained only the division of Barlow, and as the enemy at this moment showed a disposition to attack, Hancock was instructed to withdraw this also. The order was given just as Barlow's skirmishers were being driven in, at two p. m. The operation immediately became one of great delicacy ; for after, by skilful disposi- tions, two brigades of the division had been withdrawn from the front, the enemy, encouraged by what he deemed a forced retreat, made a very vigorous assault on the two remaining brigades, under Colonels Brooke and Brown. He, however, met so deadly and determined a fire from these fine brigades that he was repulsed with heavy loss. During the heat of the contest the woods in the rear of the troops, and between them and the river, took fire; and in the midst of these appalling perils, with a fierce foe in its front, and a burning forest in its rear, the force, after checking the advance of the enemy by several stubborn stands, was retired across the Po. This was not accompHshed without heavy loss, and many of the wound- ed perished in the flames.* The remarkable coohiess and steadiness of the men alone saved them from a great disaster. One gun, the first ever lost by the Second Corps, had to be abandoned in consequence of being sunk in a marsh. Miles' brigade crossed last, taking up the ponton-bridge and destroying the other. * Hancock : Report of Spottsylvania. GR.\J^T'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 449 This affair, though iUustrating the steady valor of tbo troops, was an unfortunate one in every respect. It was undertaken witliout any very well-defined mihtary object, and abandoned under circumstances unfavorable to the spirit of the troops, and highly encouraging to the enemy.* The point against which the attack (to assist in which the Second Corps had been retired across the Po) was designed to be made, was a hill held by the enemy in front of Warren's line.t This was, perhaps, the most formidable point along the enemy's whole front. Its densely wooded crest was crowned by earthworks, while the approach, which was swept by artil- lery and musketry fire, was rendered more difficult and haz- ardous by a heavy gi-owth of low cedars, mostly dead, tho long bayonet-Uke branches of which, interlaced and pointing in all directions, presented an almost impassable barrier to the advance of a Hne of battle.:]: The attack of this position had already been essayed during the day by troops both of the Second and Fifth corps, and with most unpromising results.§ When Hancock's divisions joined the Fifth, an assault was made by the troops of both corps at five o'clock; but it met a very bloody repulse. The men struggled bravely against an impossible task, * This action was regarded by the Confederates as so considerable a victory that General Heth (commanding a division of Hill's corps), who directed it, issued thereon a congratulatory order, which was indorsed by General Lee. Upon this point General Hancock remarks : " Had not Barlow's fine division, then in full strength, received imperative orders to withdraw, Heth's division would have had no cause for congratulation."— Report of the Second Epoch of the Rapidan Campaign. f This point, known as Laurel Hill, will be noted on the accompanying map J Hancock : Report of Operations. § Of the Second Corps, the brigades of Webb and Carroll of Gibbon's divi sion, had at eleven A. M. engaged in an attack of this position, in which they suffered severe loss. At three P. M. the divisions of Crawford and Cutler ol Warren's corps had also essayed a preliminary assault in order to gain room to form the lines of battle for enough forward for the main attack appointed for five o'clock, when Hancock's divisions should join in. But they also failed ia this object and were repulsed with heavy sacrifice. 450 CA]\IPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. and even entered the enemy's breastworks at one or two points ; but they soon wavered and fell back in confusion and great slaughter. Notwithstanding the disastrous upshot of this assault, the experience of which had taught the troops that the work assigned them was really hopeless,* a second charge was ordered an hour after the failure of the first. The repulse of this was even more complete than that of the former effort ; and the loss in the two attacks was between five and six thousand, while it is doubtful whether the enemy lost as many hundreds. Among the killed was Brigadier- General Eice of the Fifth Corps, distinguished for his in- trepid bearing on many fields. On the left of "Warren an assault by part of the Sixth Corps met with more success. Upton's brigade, in a vigor- ous charge, carried the enemy's first hne of intrenchments, capturing nine hundred prisoners and several guns. But as this operation was unsupported the advantage could not be maintained, and after nightfall Upton withdrew, leav- ing the captured guns behind.t In these operations before the lines of Spottsylvania, Gen- eral Grant had carried out with much fidelity, but very indif- ferent success, his own principle of hammering continuously. Better results, however, at length rewarded his persevering efi"orts under sounder combinations. Thus far the attacks had been mainly directed against Lee's left. It was now resolved to make a sudden sally against * This conclusion the men had really formed, and this was precisely one of those cases in which the troops, thus viewing the task given them to do, showed a nervous wavering and a behavior very unlike that which was common with them. " Ward's brigade," says General Hancock, " retired in disorder, until rallied by my own staif and that of General Birnoy." " Birney's men," writes a stafF-officer, " in fact became scared and ran back a quarter of a mile behind some old breastworks." It is only those who know little of the motives which ■ influence troops that would mistake such conduct for pusillanimity. f General Meade attributes the failure of this operation to the fact that Up- ton was not supported, as had been designed he should be, by Mott's division of the Second Corps on his left. — Report of the Rapidan Campaign. GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 451 his right centre, where it was thought a favorable point of attack presented itself. Hancock's corps was selected for this operation, which was to be supported by the rest of the army. The 11th was passed in preparation for this, and, after dark, the Second Corps was moved over from the right to near the point decided on for the assault. The night was dark and stormy, and Hancock's troops quietly and promptly took position within twelve hundred yards of the position they were to storm — a position of which little or nothing was known.* The direction of advance was determined by the compass. Hancock disposed his troops as follows : Barlow's division in two hues of masses — Brooke's and Miles' brigades in the first line, Brown's and Smythe's brigades in the second line, each regiment forming double column on the centre ; Birney formed in two de- ployed lines on Barlow's right; Mott's division supported Bimey, and Gibbon's division was held in reserve. At half-past four o'clock of Thursday morning, May the 12th, as soon as the faint dawn struggUng through a fog gave sufficient hght to see the direction of advance, Hancock moved forward. Barlow's division, formed on cleared ground extending up to the enemy's hues, advanced at quick time for several hundred yards — his heavy column without firing a shot marching over the Confederate pickets. When half-way towards the hostile line, the men broke forth into a ringing cheer, and spontaneously taking the double-quick, rolled hke a resistless wave into the enemy's works, tearing away with their hands what abatis there was in front of the * The point to which Hancoct's corps moved during the night of the 11th and where it formed for the assault, will be noted on the accompanying map as the " Brown house." From this point to the enemy's lines, some twelve or fif- teen hundred yards, the ground ascends sharply and was thickly wooded, with the exception of a clearing about four hundred yards in width, extending up to the Confederate works in front of the " Landrum house" [see map], curving to the right as it approaches the enemy's position. The direction of advance was ascertained only by a line, determined by compass, from Brown's house to a large white house known to be inside the enemy's lines [" McCooI's house''— Bee map]. Such was warfare iu Virginia 1 452 CA5IPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. intrencliments, and spite of a desperate but brief defence car- ried the line at all points. Birney's division on Barlow's right, moving through the woods, went over the v/orks almost simultaneously with Barlow's men. Inside the intrencliments there ensued a savage hand-to-hand combat with the bayonet and clubbed muskets ; but it was of short duration, and re- sulted in the capture of near four thousand prisoners, com- prising almost the whole of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps (including General Johnson), twenty pieces of artillery, and thirty colors. The remainder of the force fled to the rear in great confusion.'* It happened that the storming column struck the line of works at the point where it formed a salient ; so that, having burst open this angle, Hancock had driven in a wedge be- tween the right and centre of the enemy, and was in position to rift asunder the formidable structure in which the Confed- erate army lay ensconced. But though the tactical disposi- tions to carry the works were admirable, Httle provision had been made looking to that critical moment that comes after an assault, when the victory must either be assured by a deci- sive blow or risk a lapse of all the gain. Flushed with their success, the troops that had made the assault could not be restrained after the capture of the intrenchments, but pushed the flying enemy through the forest towards Spottsylvania Courthouse. Now at the distance of half a mile they came up against a fresh line of breastworks ; but it was without order or ensemble, and the momentum of the assault had been so broken that on arriving in front of the new line the troops halted. t Here the Confederates quickly rallied on their re- * Hancock : Report of the Second Epoch of the Campaign of 1864. f The precise nature of this second line is somewhat difficult to determine. It is certain that a second line had been laid out but not completed. John- sou's artillery had been taken back to this line the day before ; but, becoming apprehensive of attack, that officer before daylight ordered it to return. It had iust syot back, but only two pieces were unlimbered when Hancock's attack was made. But what really stopped Hancock's column was that no adequate prep- aration had been made to follow up the success, and because the fire and enthu- siasm of the troops were not sustained ; for when this feeling is kept up great iTjsUts can be plucked even without orderly tactical dispositions. GRANTS OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 453 serves, and assuming tlie offensive, threw back their pursuers on the captured Hne ; but Hancock's men, forming on the right and left of the angle of works, resisted the attempt to dislodge them from the position won. Yet its tenure de- manded all the force that could be brought up, for the Con- federates, re-enforced by heavy masses, began an impetuous assault to retake the lost line : so that it was opportune that at this moment the Sixth Corps reached the ground and re- lieved the Second Corps from the salient to the right.* Hancock then formed on the left of the angle. The weight of the pressure brought to bear by Lee for the recapture of the lost line led to the inference that the concen- tration against the Second and the Sixth corps must be at the expense of a reduction of force in front of the rest of the army — that is, against Burnside on the left, and against Warren on the right — and at eight o'clock these officers were ordered to make a general attack, both to take advantage of the sup- posed diminution of the force in their front, and to relieve Hancock and Wright, The assault was made as directed, but produced no impression, though it resulted in very heavy loss of hfe. Seeing, at length, that nothing could be hoped from this, two of Warren's divisions (those of Cutler and Griffin) were detached and sent to aid the Second and Sixth corps, where the angle of works continued to be the prize hotly con- tended for. Lee seemed to be determined to retake, at any cost, the line wrested from him, and throughout the day made not less than five heavy assaults, each of which was in succession repulsed by the troops of the different corps now concentrated at the point assailed. Of all the struggles of the war tliis was perhaps the fiercest and most deadly. Frequently, throughout the conflict, so close was the contest that the rival standards were planted on opposite sides of the breastworks. The enemy's most savage salHes were directed to retake the famous sahent which was * The Sixth Corps came up at six A. M. ; its arrival was timely, and the ser- vice it performed during the day was of the first importance. 454 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. now become an angle of death, and presented a spectacle ghastly and terrible. On the Confederate side of the works lay many corpses of those who had been bayoneted by Han- cock's men when they first leaped the intrenchments. To these were constantly added the bravest of those who, in the assaults to recapture the position, fell at the margin of the works, till the ground was literally covered with piles of dead, and the woods in front of the salient were one hideous Gol- gotha.* At midnight, after twenty hours of combat, Lee drew back his bleeding lines, and reformed them on his interior position. The loss on the Union side this day was above eight thousand,! and on the Confederate side it must also have been great. But Hancock's success had an excellent moral effect on the army, and was worth all it cost. Thus the hues of Spottsylvania remained still intact, and General Grant, who might easily have turned the position and manoeuvred his antagonist out of it, seemed bent on carrying it by direct attack. Accordingly, during the succeeding week, various movements of corps were made from flank to flank, in the endeavor to find a spot where the lines could be broken.! These attempts were skilfully met at every point, * I am aware that the language above used may resemble exaggeration ; but I speak of that which I personally saw. In the vicious pliraseology com- monly employed by those who undertake to describe military operations, and especially by those who never witnessed a battle-field, " piles of dead" figure much more frequently than they exist in the reality. The phrase is here no figure of speech, as can be attested by thousands who witnessed the ghastly scone. It may be stated that the musketry fire has had the eflect to kill the whole forest within its range, and there is at Washington the trunk of a tree eighteen inches in diameter, which was actually cut in two by the bullets. f The precise loss in this battle is unknown ; but from the 12th to the 31st May it was by official returns ten thousand three hundred and eighty -one. The casualties subsequent to the action of the 12th were, however, in all like- lihood not above ten thousand. 1^ No mere general statement can give any idea of the enormous amount of labor, suffering, and privation that befell the troops in these continual shift- GR.VNT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 455 — tlie Confederates extending their lino to correspond with the shiftings of the army ; so that wherever attack was es- sayed, the enemy bristled out in breastworks, and every partial assault made was repulsed. Day by day Grant con- ings of the corps from point to point of the long line. I shall in this note in- dicate some details of the action from day to day. May 13th.— The battle of the 12th having ended in Lee's retirement to an inner and shorter line, it was resolved to attempt to turn his right flank. With this view, the Fifth Corps, during the night of the 13th, was ordered to march from its position on the extreme right, take post on the extreme left, to the left of Burnside's corps, and assault in conjunction with that corps at four A. M. on the 14th. The march was begun at ten P. Jr. The wet weather had, however, badly broken up the roads ; and the night being one of Egyptian dark- ness, the move was made with immense difficulty. The route of march was past the Landrum House [see map] to the Ny River, which had to be waded. Across the Ny the route followed no road, but traversed the fields and a piece of woods where a track had been cut. Here, midway of tlie journey, a dense fog arose and covered the ground, so that not even the numerous fires that had been built to guide the column could be seen. The men, exhausted with wading through the mud knee deep and in the darkness, fell asleep all along the way. In addition to this, the locality where the troops were to take posi- tion was quite unknown ; and at broad daylight, when the head of the column got to the left of Burnside's corps near the Fredericksburg turnpike [see map], the only troops on hand with which to execute the meditated assault were twelve hundred fagged-out men of Griffin's division. It was seven o'clock be- fore General Cutler got thirteen hundred of his men together. May 14th.— Skirmishing commenced at six A. M. Oif to the southeast of the Beverly House was a high hill— the Jet House [see map], which completely commanded Warren's position. It appeared, however, to be occupied only by a few of the enemy's cavalry ; so a small force of Regulars under Lieutenant Colonel Otis was sent to take it. The troopers retired, and Otis commenced to intrench around the house ; and while doing so, Upton's brigade of the Sixth Corps— that corps having followed the route of the Fifth— relieved him. Be- fore Upton was fairly established, a large force of the enemy's infantry moved against him, coming from the Courthouse. They made him clear out pell-mell, and were near catching General Meade, who had come upon the ground. The remainder of the Sixth Corps now came up and massed around the Anderson House [see map]. In the afternoon this important position was retaken, or re- occupied (it being doubtful whether the enemy had not abandoned it), by Ayres' brigade. Fifth Corps, in conjunction with troops of NeiU's division^ Sixth Corps. JNtAY ISth and IGth.— The withdrawal of the Fifth and Sixth corps from the right of the Second to make this movement on the left, caused the Second 456 CAJIPAIGNS OP THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC. tinued to throw out towards the left, in the hope of overhip- ping and breaking in the Confederate right flank : so that from occupying, as the army did on its arrival, a line extend- ing four or five miles to the northwest of Spottsylvania Court- Corps to be the right of the whole line. But on the loth an additional refusal of that flank was made — Hancock being directed to transfer the divisions of Barlow and Gibbon to the Fredericksburg road. Meanwhile, Birney's division remained covering the right of Burnside's corps, and was the right of the army. For the other corps, the day passed in getting things in order, collecting stragglers, cutting roads, and constant skirmishing. At this time also a new base was opened at Aquia Creek, whither the sick and wounded were sent, and whence supplies and forage, much needed by the army, were drawn. May ITth. — Hancock received orders to move his command back to the ■works he had captured on the 12th, and attack the enemy at daylight on the 18th in the intrenchments he then held in front of that ix>sition. The Sixth Corps was directed to form on Hancock's right and assail the enemy's line at the same hour. The Ninth Corps was also to participate. The movement commenced at dark of the 17th. The withdrawal of these corps left Warren holding almost the entire front of the army. The night march was a very arduous one. May 18th. — Before daylight of the 18th the troops were in position for an assault. It had been the intention to catch the enemy napping ; but he had at least one eye open, and was covered by acres of impenetrable slashings. At four A. M. the divisions of Gibbon and Barlow moved forward to the as- sault in lines of brigades. The artillery was posted in the first lirie of works, firing during the action over the troops in front. Birney's division and Tyler's division of foot-artillerists, which had recently joined the army, were in reserve. The Confederates held a strong line of intrenchments about half a mile in front of, and parallel to, the works Hancock had stormed on the 13th Their position was concealed by the forest, and protected by the heaviest kind of abatis. As the troo2:)s moved forward, they encountered a severe fire oi musketry and artillery, which completely swept the approaches, making great havoc in their ranks. They pressed forward, however, until they arrived at the edge of the abatis, which, with the heavy fire, arrested their progress. Many gallant attempts were made to penetrate the enemy's line, but without success. The Corcoran Legion of Gibbon's division was particularly marked on this occasion, and its losses were very heavy. At ten A. M., finding attack to be hopeless, operations were suspended by General Meade. During the morning, the batteries were opened along the entire line, the enemy scarcely replying. The only apparent effect was to drive them under cover of their breastworks. Immense waste of ammunition — result nil. "May 19TII. — During the night of the 18th, Barlow's, Birney's, and Gib- GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 457 house it had at the end of ten days assumed a position ahnost due east of that place, the left resting at a distance of four miles at Massaponax Church. After twelve days of effort, the carrying of the position was seen to be hopeless ; and General Grant, abandoning the attempt, resolved by a turning operation to disengage Leo from a position seen to be unassailable. Preparations for this movement were begun on the afternoon of the 19th ; but the enemy observing these, retarded its execution by a bold demonstration against the Union right. It happened that this flank was held by a division of foot artillerists, under General Tjder, posted in an important position, covering the road from Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg, which was the army's main line of communication with its base at the latter point. Ewell crossed the Ny River above the right flank, and mo^dng down, seized the Fredericksburg road and laid hands on an ammunition train coming up. Tyler promptly met this attack and succeeded in driving the enemy from the road and into the woods beyond. The foot artillerists had not before been in battle, but it was found that once imder fire, they displayed an audacity surpassing even the old troops. In these murderous wood-fights, the veterans had learned to employ all the Indian devices that afford shelter to the person ; but these green battahons, unused to this kind cJf craft, pushed boldly on, firing furiously. Their loss was heavy, but the honor of the enemy's repulse belongs to them. Shortly afterwards, troops of the Second and Fifth corps bon's divisions of the Second Corps moved to the vicinity of Anderson's Mills on the Ny [see map]. Tyler's division remained at the Fredericksburg road near the Harris House [see map]. The assigned position was taken up by Hancock on the morning of the 19th, when he received orders to be ready to move at dark in the direction of Bowling Green. Preparations for this were under way, when, in the afternoon, Ewell attacked Tyler in the manner and with the results described in the text above. At the same time the Second Corps moved, the Ninth Corps also marched to the left and took post on the left of the Sixth Corps. In aid of Ewell's attack. Hill made a demonstra- tion on the Filth Corps, but without effect. May 20Tn. — The turning movement and southward march begin. 458 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. coming to their assistance, pursued the fugitives up tlirougli tlie valley of the Po, and made prisoners of several hundred Confederates that had scattered through the woods. This attack somewhat disconcerted the contemplated movement, and delayed it till the following night, May 20th, when the army, moving by the left, once more took up its march to- wards Kichmond. Before the hues of Spottsylvania the Army of the Potomac had for twelve days and nights engaged in a fierce wrestle, in which it had done all that valor may do to carry a position by nature and art imjDregnable. In this contest, unparalleled in its continuous fury, and swelling to the proj^ortions of a campaign, language is inade- quate to convey an impression of the labors, fatigues, and sufferings of the troops, who fought by day only to march by night, from point to point of the long line, and renew the tight on the morrow. Above forty thousand men had already fallen in the bloody encounters of the Wilderness and Spott- sylvania,* and the exhausted army began to lose its si3irit. It was with joy, therefore, that it at length turned its back upon the hues of Spottsylvania. ^Before proceeding to follow the Army of the Potomac in its southward march from Spottsylvania Courthouse, it will be proper to glance briefly at the operations of the cavalry under Sheridan during its raid on Lee's commrmications. This col- umn, consisting of portions of the three divisions of Merritt, Wilson, and Gregg,t cut loose from the Army of the Potomac * By the official returns, the casualties from the 5th to the l?th of May were twenty-nine thousand four hundred and ten ; and from the 12th to the 21st of May (at Avhich time the army moved from Spottsylvania), they were ten thousand three hundred and eighty-one — making an aggregate of thirty- nine thousand seven hundred and ninety-one. — Meade : Rejxirt of the Rapiositions to hold it permanently. The Confederates endeavored, in several determined assaults, to dislodge him ; but he - was able to repulse these attacks, and make the enemy pay dearly therefor. Turning Movement against Petersburg. — It was now ap- proaching the season when, practicable roacls and weather being no longer to be counted upon, active operations on a large scale must necessarily be suspended. Before settling down to winter-quarters, however. General Grant deter- mined to strike one vigorous blow for the capture of Peters- burg. The plan was to find the extreme right of the enemy's intrenched line, and by turning it, march upon and lay hold of the Southside Railroad, which was Lee's principal commu- nication. The expeditionary force consisted of the major part of the three corps of the army, leaving behind from each only a sufficient force to hold the lines in front of Petersburg. At this period the left flank of the Union line rested at a point about two miles west of the Weldon Railroad ; three miles west of this point one strikes the Boydton plankroad, which runs northeastward into Petersburg. This road, since the loss of the Weldon Railroad, had assumed such import- Grant : Report of Operations. THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 5-11 ance to Lee that he had prolonged the right of his intreiiclied line, covering that road for some distance below the point where it crosses Hatcher's Eud. These defences protected, also, the Southside Railroad, which at this point runs parallel with the Boydton plankroad, and two miles distant there- from. In the assignment of dntj to the respective coi^xs, the Ninth Corps, supported by that of Warren, was to attack vigorously the extreme right of the enemy's intrenched line, while Han- cock should cross to the west side of Hatcher's Eun, by a swing- ing movement, gain the Boydton plankroad and advance to seize the Southside Eailroad. The execution of this plan was begun early on the morning of the 27th. Proceeding westward two or three miles, the Ninth and Fifth corps, at nine a. m., struck the right of the Confederate intrenched line, which was found to rest on the east bank of Hatcher's Eun. The Ninth Corps, under General Parke, was on the right, and Warren's corps on the left. If Parke should carry the position, he was to follow up the enemy closely, turning towards the right. Warren was to support the attack in case of success ; but if the Ninth Corps should fail to break the enemy's line, he was to cross Hatcher's Eun and endeavor to turn the enemy's right, by recrossing at the first practicable point above the Boydton plankroad. It was very soon found impracticable to force the enemy's position by a direct attack, and Warren then set on foot the turning movement ; but before further following events here, it is necessary to detail thfe operations of the detached column of Hancock, whose part in the plan of action has been above indicated. Hancock marched by the Yaughan road, which inins west- ward a considerable distance south of the line on which Parke and Warren were acting. Having forced the crossing of Hatcher's Eun, disputed by a small body of the enemy on its west bank, he advanced northwestward, by the Avay of Dabney's Mill, and gained the Boydton plankroad. Thence he was to proceed to the crossing at White Oak bridge two miles above, and after a further march of foiu- miles strike the 542 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Soutliside Railroad in rear of the enemy's extreme right. Hancock's left was covered by Gregg's cavalry division. The crossing of Hatcher's Run at Burgess's Mill was found to be observed by merety a small force of the enemj', and wishing to mask his march, he was proceeding to drive it across the run, when, at one P. M., he received orders from General Meade to halt on the Boydton plankroad — an order prompted by the want of success attending General Parke's direct attack. It has been seen that, on the failure of the Ninth Corps to force the enemy's hne in its front, Warren set on foot a turn- ing movement. That officer was directed to send one of his divisions across Hatcher's Run, place its right flank on the run, and then move up its course. It was supposed this measure would serve the double purpose of supporting Hancock's right flank and turning the position in front of the rest of War- ren's corps and of the Ninth Corps. When, by a flank attack, the force in front of these corps should be forced to abandon its position, they were also to cross to the west side of Hatcher's Run. The division assigned by Warren to this duty was Crawford's, strengthened by one brigade of Ayres'. Crawford crossed Hatcher's Run at Armstrong's Mill, about noon, and proceeded up the stream in the manner indicated. It will now be understood that the order to Hancock to halt on the Boydton plankroad was prompted by the desire that Crawford should move up to his support, and open the way for the forces to the same ; for Hancock's position at Bur- gess's Mill, on the Boydton plankroad, isolated him by five or six miles and by Hatcher's Run from Warren and Parke, and raised fears as to his safety. Circumstances now to be de- tailed, however, prevented the junction of these forces, and finally ended prematurely an expedition from which the largest results had been hoped. Crawford's march up the west bank of Hatcher's Run proved to be one of great difficulty, the country being densely wooded and nearly impracticable. Great numbers of the men became lost — in fact, whole regiments losing all idea of where to find the rest of the division. After two or three THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 543 hours of toilsome effort, lie liad advanced so far up the Tarn as to be dii-ectly on the right flank of the intrenched lino opposed to the rest of the Fifth Corps and Ninth Corps. This line was, however, on the opposite side of the stream, and before crossing to assail the enemy, General Warren or- dered a surcease of operations, until he should consult with General Meade, for the country proved to be entirely different from the representations of the imperfect map. From the position where Crawford lay on the west side of Hatcher's Run, to that held by Hancock up this stream, at Burgess's Mill, the distance was not above a mile; but, owing to the difficult nature of the country, it was long before these re- spective forces found out the location of each other, and in the mean time affairs culminated by an attack of the Confed- erates on Hancock. Hancock, on being instructed to halt at Burgess's Mill, was also informed that Crawford's division was feeling its way up the west bank of the Eun, and he was desired to assist in making the connection by extending his right. Accord- ingly, General Egan (then commanding Gibbon's division of Hancock's corps), deployed two of his brigades to the right of the Boydton plankroad, and subsequently deployed two regi- ments as far as they would reach to the right. It was at one time reported that the connection with Crawford Avas made ; but this report was erroneous, and it was afterwards found that Crawford was full three-fourths of a mile from Hancock's right. While these occurrences were passing, Lee had resolved to assume the offensive, and fall upon the force west of Hatcher's Run, which, isolated from that on the east side, presented a favorable opportunity for a blow. The force detached to execute this stroke consisted of the greater part of Hill's corps. It appears that it was Lee's original design to cross Hatcher's Run above Burgess's Mill, and attack Hancock's left flank ; but as that officer had carried the bridge over the mill- dam before the Confederates were ready for their movement, and as Lee feared the Union force would cross and take the 5-11 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. lieiglits on tlie opposite side of the stream, the Confederate commander determined to move across Hatcher's Run at once, and assail Hancock's right. Hill accordingly crossed, and, as it happened, his point of passage brought him directly in the interval between Hancock and Crawford. But of this circumstance he was not at all aware, owing to the densely wooded character of the country. The Confederate infantry passed close to Crawford's skirmishers, and followed a patli through the woods until they were near Hancock's position, when they deployed, and, about four P. M., suddenly fell upon Mott's division of Hancock's corps. Most of the troops were disposed so as to meet an attack from quite a different direc- tion, so that the outbui st of the enemy was on their rear, and the presence of the Confederates was first announced by volleys of musketry. Peirce's brigade of Mott's division at this point gave way, one section of artillery was captured, and affairs appeared as critical as can well be conceived. Han- cock immediately ordered Egan to change front, and move to resist the adverse mass ; but that officer, with true soldierly in- stinct, had already done that of his own motion, and was moving rapidly to attack the force in his rear. It is probable that the Confederates did not precisely comprehend the situa- tion, for on emerging into the open space around the Boyd- ton plankroad, they pushed rapidly across that road, and, facing southward, commenced firing. Egan swept down upon the flanks of the enemy with Smythe's and Willett's brigades of his own division, and Mc- Allister's brigade of Mott's division, while De Trobriand's bri- gade and Kerwin's brigade of dismounted cavalry formed on the west side of the road, and advanced at the same time. The forward rush of Egan's men was irresistible, and the Confederates were driven from the field with the loss of two colors, and nearly a thousand prisoners. The two captured guns were retaken. The enemy made for the woods in con- fusion, and retired by the same route on which they had advanced. Several hundred of them strayed into Crawford's line, and were taken. An advance of the force under that THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 545 officer at this time, must have been decisive of the action, driving the enemy into Hatcher's Kun,* No such advance was ordered, however, as it was thought that Ayres' divi- sion could reach Hancock more readily than Crawford, there being no known road between these two. Darkness was so near at hand when Ayres moved that he halted for the night at Armstrong's Mill, and consequently did not reach Hancock.t * " The Confederate General Heth stated that he was greatly alarmed after he had crossed the run to attack vis, lest Crawford should advance upon his left flank, and said that had Crawford made such an advance, his (Heth's) com- mand must have been driven into the stream, and dispersed or captured." — Private letter from General Hancock. f As the above narrative recounts a series of rather complicated events, I add the following from the official report of General Warren : " I ordered Crawford to halt his line and get in good order, and press the enemy with his skirmishers, while I went to consult with General Meade, who, I supposed, was with General Hancock. When near the place of the latter, I was told by Major Riddle that General Meade had returned to Armstrong's Mill, and I proceeded to that point as rapidly as possible. Soon after reaching him we learned that the enemy had come in between Hancock and Crawford, and attacked the former with great violence. The commanding general immedi- ately directed me to send General Crawford to his support, but he assenting to my suggestion that General Ayres could more readily be got there, I directed General Ayres to move at once. Darkness was so near at hand that he was halted at Armstrong's Mill. The attack on General Hancock must have occurred while I was near General Crawford, and yet in the woods the sound of musketry did not reach us. There was besides no road known to us leading directly to General Hancock, and that same woods, for two or three miles, was certain to prevent his arriving for any contemplated emergency. What would have added still greater delay to commimicating with General Crawford supervened by the rebels getting in on the road by which we com- municated between him and myself The enemy became so bewildered in these woods that upwards of two hundred of them strayed into General Craw- ford's line and were captured. Some of these men, before being taken, cap- tured three of our ambulances a mUe in the rear of General Crawford. Sis of them captured Captain Cope, of my staff"; but finding themselves in our lines, gave up to him, and he brought them in. Major Bingham, of General Han- cock's staff", on his way to General Crawford, was captured by them, but made his escape ; and three officers of my staff", in attempting to avoid the road thus infested by the enemy, became lost in coming from General Crawford's to me, and had to stay out all night in the woods." — Warren: Report of Operations at Hatcher's Run. 546 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Almost simultaneously witli tliis attack, the Confederate cavalry (five brigades under Hampton) assailed Hancock's left and rear, held by Gregg's mounted division. This force was so heavily pressed, that Hancock was obliged to send General Gregg all of his force that he had used in meeting the attack in front. The action was kept up here till some time after dark. Gregg was able to maintain his ground, and the Confederates gained no success. Hancock's loss in this encounter was fifteen hundred men, which was less than that of the enemy. The action was highly creditable to his skill and the good conduct of the troops. Aside from the praise due to Hancock for the man- ner in which he had met this sudden attack on his iso- lated position, nothing can be said in favor of the expedition as a whole. It resulted in total failure, which was partly the result of misfortune, but mainly the result of faults in the original plan. The experience of this operation furnished a fair test of what may be expected from the like dispositions. After the repulse Hancock had given the force that assailed him, he was reluctant to leave the field that night ; but as his troops had nearly exhausted their ammunition, and as there was little ]3rospect that a fresh supply or re-enforcements could reach him in time for an attack in the morning, the withdrawal was begun at ten P. m.* This appears to have * " Between six and seven P. M. I received a dispatch from General Hum- plireys, stating that Ayres division of the Fiftli Corps liad been ordered to my support, but had halted at Armstrong's Mill, which was as far as it could be able to get. The dispatch also authorized me to withdraw that night if 1 thought proper ; but stated that if I could attack successfully in the morning, with the aid of Ayres' and Crawford's divisions, the major-general commanding desired me to do so. Though these re-enforcements were offered to me, the question of their getting to me in time, and of getting ammunition up in time to have my own command effective in the morning, was left for me to decide ; and I understood that, if the principal part of the fighting in the morning would he thrown upon these re-enforcements, it was not desired that they should bo ordered up. They would at least have been called upon to do the Agisting until my own command could have replenished their ammunition, which I was quite certain would not be in time to resist attack at an early hour in the morning. Reluctant as I was to leave the field, and by so doing lose some of THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 547 been a very fortunate decision, for during tlie night, the Con- federates massed at the position where the fighting ceased fifteen thousand infantry and Hampton's cavahy, with which they had intended to assail Hancock at daylight of the 28th.* Next morning the whole force returned to the lines before Petersburg. New Movement to the Left. — From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and Kichmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were mainly confined to the de- fence and extension of the lines, which were pushed westward as far as Hatcher's Run. The extension of the lines was pre- ceded b}^ a new movement to the left, which was very similar, in its general aspects to that above recounted. This opera- tion had the same object as the October movement, which was to turn the enemy's right and seize the Southside Rail- road. It was undertaken by the Fifth Corps, the Second Corps, now under General Humphrey s,t and Gregg's division of cavalry, and its execution was begun on the 5th of February. For several days preceding that date, a heavy bombardment was kept up from all the batteries before Petersburg, for the purpose of engaging the enemy's attention. The designated troops then moved out — Gregg's division taking the advance by the Jerusalem plankroad to Reams' Station, and masking the movements of the infantry. The plan of operations con- templated that the Second Corps should move directly on the right of the Confederate intrenched line at Hatcher's Run, while the Fifth marched around its right. the fruits of my victory, I felt compelled to order a withdrawal rather than risk a disaster by awaiting attack in the morning only partially prepared." — Hancock : Report of Operations on the Boydton Plankroad. * " The Confederate General Heth stated to me that they remained all night in the position they held when the fighting ceased on the evening of the 27th, and during the night massed fifteen thousand infantry, and Hampton's cavalry, with which they intended to have advanced upon us at daylight of the 28th." — Private Letter from General Hancock. f General Hancock had some time before been ordered North to raise the new First Corps, and he never returned to his old command. 548 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARxMY OF THE POTOMAC. From Keams' Station the cavalry moved westward, carried the crossing of Eowanty Creek after a brisk skii-misli, and marched rapidly on Dinwiddie Courthouse. The Fifth Corps also passed to the west side of the creek and moved on its ap- pointed route. Meantime Humphreys, with the Second and Third divisions of the Second Corps, marched down the Yaughan road to where it crosses Hatcher's Run. The Con- federate intrenchments on the opposite bank were not strongly manned ; the stream was, however, so obstructed that the cavalry were driven back in an attempt to cross it ; but De Trobriand's brigade easily carried the passage with a skirmish line. Before reaching Hatcher's Eun, Humphrey's second division under General Smythe was turned abruptly to the right on a path leading northeasterly towards Armstrong's Mill. Advancing about three-fourths of a mile, the enemy was found intrenched in strong force, and nothing was done save to form connection between the two divisions of the Second Corps. In the afternoon the Confederates made a furious assault on Smythe' s position, endeavoring to turn his right flank. This attempt was frustrated by the firmness of his troops, aided by McAllister's brigade of Mott's division, which held the extreme right. These maintained their ground with the utmost stubbornness and repulsed repeated attacks that were continued till dark. Next day the Fifth Corps, which had moved up the west bank of Hatcher's Run, was brought into connection with the Second Corps ; and Gregg's cavalry, which had, meanwhile, returned from Dinwiddie, took position to cover the left of the infantry. Warren then threw forward his left, under Crawford, towards the Boydton plankroad. That officer advanced as far as Dabney's, whence he drove a force of Con- federates under General Pegram. But the Confederates, having meanwhile found out where the exposed flank of this turning column lay, put in practice the usual and always suc- cessful tactics. A considerable force was sent by a detour by the Yaughan road to take Crawford's division in the rear, and cut off his retreat ; while at the same time they opened an THE SIEGE OP PETERSBURG. 540 attack in front. This flanking force first fell upon Gregg's cavalry, which was driven back to Hatcher's Run. Such a movement on the part of the enemy had been anticipated, and to strengthen Crawford, Ayres' division was ordered up to his support. But, while moving in column, that division was attacked and driven back, and then Crawford's division was repulsed in confusion and with heavy loss. Wheaton's division of the Sixth Corps, which had also been sent forward to re-enforce the left, only arrived in time to take part in the general discomfiture. The Hne of retreat was towards the position held by the Second Corps on Hatcher's Run. The Confederates, elated with their easy victory, followed up vigorously and dashed out into an open space in front of that corps. Here, however, they were met by a sharp fire from Humphrey's troops, who had intrenched themselves, and the enemy ceasing the attack, hastily retired. The Union loss in these operations was about* two thousand, of which the larger part fell on Crawford's division. The Confederate loss is stated to have been near a thousand, and included General John Pegram, who was killed. The action of the 6th put an end to the contemplated advance towards the Southside Railroad, and the only result gained was to prolong the left of the Union line westward to Hatcher's Run. Waeren's Operations on the Weldon Road. — After the action of February, winter operations were confined to expe- ditions for the purpose of crippling the Confederate lines of supply. Of these operations, the most important and exten- sive was that made by General Warren for the complete destruction of the Weldon' Raih'oad. This road, though the Union lines were long ago planted across it, was still of con- siderable service to the Confederates, who were able to use it up to within a few miles of the Union position, and from the point of stoppage supplies were hauled by wagon. Warren's expedition was to completely break up this line for a distance of twenty-five miles southward. The force consisted of the 550 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Fifth Corps, Mott's division of the Second Corps, and Gregg's mounted division. Setting out on the 7th of Decern'oer, with four days' rations, the troops moved southward, and that night reached Nottoway. The raikoad- bridge over this stream was destroyed by General Gregg. Next day the march was renewed to Jewett's Station, to which point the raih'oad-track was torn up from the Nottoway. The work of destruction was resumed early on the morning of the 9tli, by forming line of battle on the railroad, each division destroying all on its front, and then mo"sdng to the left alternately. A force of the enemy was encountered, but was driven by Gregg across the Meherrin River. At Hicksford, on the south side of this stream, the Confederates had three forts or batteries, armed with artillery, and connected by rifle-jDits, and manned by a considerable body ; so that it was impracticable to force a crossing at that point. As the attempt to turn the position would occasion, at least two days longer time than that for which the expedition was provisioned, General Warren re- solved to return. The railroad destruction was carried over a distance of eighteen or twenty miles, and was very com- plete. The return was made with the same success. The entire distance travelled was about a hundred miles in tlio six days. The loss was trivial. Subsequent occurrences during this jDeriod call for no special mention. The army settled itself in winter-quarters to await the season for the opening of the spring campaign. VII. OBSERVATIONS ON THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. Regarded as a whole, the operations I have brought to- gether under the designation of the Siege of Petersburg, form a fi-uitful study. From the extent of time they cover, the energy with which they were prosecuted, and the skilful man- THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 551 ncr in wliicli they were met by the defending army, they arc remarkable in the history of modern warfare. The cliaracteristic of these operations is the progressive development of the intrenched Union line to the left. Start- ing from the position directly east of Petersburg taken up by the Army of the Potomac on its first arrival in June, the lines of contravallation were gradually extended south and southwest of the town, till at last they stretched from the Appomattox to Hatcher's Kun, a distance of fifteen miles. This extension was less designed than accidental. It grew out of a series of manoeuvres by the left, of which manoeuvres the original purpose was in each case to turn the right of the Confederate system of defences, and lay hold of the South- side Railroad. Criticism should, therefore, first be directed to these operations regarded in the light of their original intent, rather than from the point of view of the incidental result arising therefrom. In their most general relations, these operations are to be looked upon as a swinging movement of the left pivot- ing on the right. The intrenched lines before Petersburg always strongly held, and on these as a point ifapjmi, it was attempted to throw the left against and around the Confed- erate right. But these manoeuvres had several characteristics that invariably robbed them of the success hoped from them : the pivotal force was generally stronger than the body to which was assigned the turning movement, and by reducing the garrison of his defences to the minimum, Lee was able to ac- cumulate on the menaced point a force sufficient to meet, and almost always to repulse, the body threatening his communi- cations. Moreover, these movements were invariably made in extended lines, which had the inevitable result to expose a flank. This system the enemy soon learnt so well, that his invariable plan was to attack the flank as soon as it was ex- posed. The region of country southwest of Petersburg in which these operations were conducted was highly favorable to the Confederates, being densely wooded, intersected with swamps, and possessing few roads ; and they had a great ad- 552 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. vantage in their minute knowledge of the topography of the country, which was nearly terra incognita to the Union com- mander. The success of the Confederate tactics was won- derful ; each movement, saving that to the Weldon Kailroad, which was conducted on a different principle, ending in a check, generally accompanied by one or more thousand pris- oners. The aggi-egate of captures made by the enemy in these successive swoops is astonishing. But notwithstanding the many costly proofs received of the fatality attending these unlimited extensions, the type of operation was adhered to with a constancy only accountable on the supposition that the Union commander was enamored of it. These turning movements, though in each foiled as regards their primal object, always resulted in a further prolongation of the intrenched line to the left. It remains to ask, was this extension of front a real gain ? The answer will depend on whether it was a front of offence or defence. If of the latter, it cannot be considered a gain, for in the part assigned the Army of the Potomac it was nothing if not offensive. But beyond the Weldon Kailroad the extension to the left carried Grant no nearer Lee's line of communications, the Southside Eaih-oad— in fact, rather away from it, for Lee, by thrusting his right southward along the Boydton plankroad, caused the Union intrenched line to run in the contrary direction to that of the Southside Eailroad. It may indeed be said that the prolongation of the Union line caused Lee to extend also, which was, pari passu, to weaken himself. But it is doubtful whether the advantage in this process was to the Union side. Lee always took the risk of holding his works with a force greatly inferior to that his antagonist was wiUing to employ : so that, proportionately. Grant could cut loose no heavier a turning column than with much shorter lines. In the object General Grant had in view, which was the capture of Petersburg, there would appear to be, theoretically, two modes in which this might have been accompHshed. The first is by a system of regular approaches from the points most favorable. These were the site of Port Sedgwick, and THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 553 the position lield by Burnside at the time of the mine affair. From these points two saps might have been ran, and in the course of a month, with well-led storming columns, there is every likelihood that the Confederate line might have been carried. The second method is more bold. It is to have aban- doned for a time the attempt to hold the long intrenched lines and the connections with the depot at City Point, and moved out the whole army against Lee's railroad communications. This would have compelled him to leave his defences and fight a battle in the open field, or to have evacuated Peters- burg and Richmond. The immediate recovery of his railroad communications would have been an absolute necessity to Lee, for so bad was the conduct of the Confederate commis- sariat and transport system that he was never able to accu- mulate even one day's supplies ahead — a fact well known to the Union commander. This line of action would have been a realization of that cardinal principle in American warfare which teaches that it should be the aim of the general on the offensive to so threaten the enemy's vital lines as to compel him to fight for their recovery. General Grant's great pre- ponderance in numbers would have made the contingency of his being beaten in such a fight a very remote one. It is true that this plan would not have been without hazard, and would have demanded proportionate skill and vigor in its execution ; but if successful, it would have been decisive. The proposed operation would have resembled the manoeu- vre by which General Sherman compelled the evacuation of Atlanta. That, also, was not without danger, though it is to be remembered that Sherman's opponent was infinitely infe- rior to the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. 554 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOJUAC. VIII. SHERIDAN'S OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY. Before proceeding to recount the history of the final cam- paign of the Army of the Potomac, it will be necessary to describe briefly the summer and autumn operations in the Shenandoah Valley, as they have an important bearing on the events that are to follow. In the relative situations of the contending armies in Vir- ginia, the operations in the Shenandoah Valley had always exercised a powerful influence on the main current of action. From the peculiar geographical relations of that Valley in a military point of view, it was always open to a detached force to make incursions across the frontier of the loyal States, whether for the purpose of plunder or of a diversion in favor of the main Confederate army, by a menace against Wash- ington. At the same time, the line of the Blue Eidge per- fectly covered its communications with Kichmond and Lee's army. From this circumstance, the Confederates had always been able, with astonishingly small bodies of cavalry and in- fantry, to retain a powerful Federal force for the protection of the frontier of Marjdand and Pennsylvania. In several critical situations the Shenandoah column had, by vigorous demonstrations, paralyzed the Army of the Potomac, by call- ing away therefrom so considerable a force as to compel a surcease of operations on the main Kne. Belying on the oft-j)roved effect of such threats, Lee, as soon as he found himself under beleagvierment at Petersburg, had detached the column of Early to menace the Federal capital. It has already been seen that the result did not correspond with his wishes ; for Grant, parting only with a sufiiciency of force to protect Washington, continued to hold Lee with an unrelaxing gi'ip. THE SIEGE OF PETEIJSBURG. 553 But altlioiigh the direct object of the Confederate menace had failed, it nevertheless met so considerable a measure of success that even after Early had retired to the Valley of the Shenandoah, he was there able to take up so threatening an attitude that it was found impossible to return the Sixth and Nineteenth corps to the Army of the Potomac. No sooner was this attempted, than Early was again across the border — his cavalry penetrating Pennsylvania as far as the town of Chambersburg, which they laid in ashes. Upon this, the Sixth Corps, which had been retired to Washington en route for the James, was returned to Harper's Perry, to unite with the Nineteenth Corps and the Federal forces of West Virginia in an effort to clear the Valley of the Shenan- doah. The distribution of the Union force in the region of Nortli- ern and West Virginia, and along the frontier of the loyal States, was at this time as little conformable to military prin- ciples as it had been in the worst period of 1862. Washington and Baltimore, and the country adjacent, formed the Depart- ment of Washington ; Eastern and Central Pennsylvania and Northern Maryland, the Department of the Susquehanna ; Northwestern Virginia and Western Pennsylvania, the Depart- ment of West Virginia ; and the region of the Shenandoah, and' eastward to the Bull Pam Mountains, the Middle Department. These several mihtary bailiwicks were under control of inde- pendent military commanders, whose petty jealousies and want of harmony of action enabled the Confederates, with a force ridiculously inferior, to pluck at any time cheap laurels. Happily the conduct of the war was now under one military head, so that General Grant could at will end this costly and disgraceful policy. The events of July showed the urgent need of unity of command in Northern Virginia, and the lieu- tenant-general, in August, consolidated these fovir depart- ments into one, named the Middle Mihtary Division,. under General Hunter. That officer, however, before entering on the proposed campaign, expressed a willingness to be re- lieved, and General P. H. Sheridan, who had been transferred 556 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. from the Armj of the Potomac to the command of the forces in the field under Hunter, was appointed in his stead. The selection was a fortunate one. An excellent strategist, of sound military views, and a wary, enterprising, and aggres- sive temper, General Sheridan was of all others the man best fitted for the peculiar command intrusted to him. To the column of active operation under his command, consist- ing of the Sixth and Nineteenth corps and the infantry and cavalry of West Virginia, under Generals Crook and Averill, were added two divisions of cavalry from the Army of the Potomac, under Torbert and Wilson. This gave him an efi'ective in the field of forty thousand men, whereof ten thousand consisted of excellent cavalry — an arm for the use of which the Shenandoah region aifords a fine field. General Sheridan was appointed to the command on the 7tli of August, and his operations during that month and the fore part of September were mainly confined to mana3uvres hav- ing for their object to prevent the Confederates from gaining the rich harvests of the Shenandoah Valley. But after once or twice driving Early southward to Strasburg, he each time returned on his path towards Harper's Ferry. General Grant had hesitated in allowing Sheridan to take a real initiative, as defeat would lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania before another army could be interjoosed to check him. Finding, however, while on a personal visit to General Sheridan, in the month of September, that that officer expressed great confidence of success, he authorized him to attack. At this time the Confederate force held the west bank of Opequan Creek, covering Winchester; and the Union force lay in front of Berryville, twenty miles south of Harper's Ferry. The situation of the opposing armies was pecuKar : each threatened the communications of the other, and either could bring on a battle at any time. It would appear that General Early had designed assuming the offensive ; for, leaving one division of infantry and Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry to cover Winchester, he had thrown the THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG, 557 bulk of liis army well forward by his left to Bunker Hill, twelve miles nortli of Winchester. From this point he, on the 18th, advanced a reconnoitring force as far as Martinsburg, twelve miles further to the north. Sheridan, whose position at Berry- ville was twelve miles east of Winchester, being well content with his antagonist's manoeuvi-e, advanced towards Winches- ter early on the morning of the 19th, expecting to catch his opponent in flagrante delicto. Wilson's cavalry division, having the advance on the Win- chester and Berryville turnpike, at dawn carried the Confed- erate intrenched skirmish line on the west bank of the Ope- quan. This stream runs northward at a distance of four miles east of Winchester. The way being thus opened, the infantry column, the Sixth Corps in the van, crossed at the ford and took position within two miles of Winchester. The direction of Sheridan's advance brought his attack full upon Early's isolated right, which, but for a vexatious delay, might readily have been overwhelmed, while the main Confederate force was still ten miles off at Bunker Hill. This delay, which con- sumed two hours, was caused by the non-arrival of the Nine- teenth Corps under General Emory, who had moved his column to the rear of the baggage-train of the Sixth Corps, instead of keeping his command closed up in the rear of the infantry of the Sixth. This enabled Early to hurry his force southward from Bunker Hill in time to meet the attack. Sheridan formed his hne of battle with the Sixth Corps on the left, covered on that flank by Wilson's cavalry division, the Nineteenth Corps in the centre, and the Kanawha in- fantry on the right. The latter flank was covered by Merritt's division of cavalry. Averill's division of cavalry, which had pressed down on the retreating Confederates from the direc- tion of Bunker Hill, succeeded in closing in on the Union right. This, therefore, brought two powerful divisions of horse on the right of the Federal line, which had a develop- ment of about four miles, enveloping Winchester from the north and east. Early's left rested on a series of detached and fortified hills to the northwest of the town. It is due to 558 CA:^rPAIGNS of the army of the potomac. state that there was a great disparity in the numbers engaged — Earlj^'s force consisting of eight tliousand five hundred mus- kets and three thousand sabres,* while Sheridan's strength was thrice that of the aggregate Confederate force. Sheridan's preponderance in horse enabled him to extend far beyond and overlap the Confederate left, and when, after several hours of indecisive fighting between the infantry, a general advance was, at four p. m., made by the whole line, the cavalry, by an impetuous charge, carried the fortified heights : the Confederates, pressed heavily in front b}^ the infantry, and on the right by Wilson's cavalry, broke in con- fusion, retiring from the field and through Winchester, with the Union forces in pursuit. Night, however, prevented Sher- idan from following up the victory, among the trophies of which were two thousand five hundred prisoners, five pieces of artillery, and nine battle-flags. Among the Confederate officers killed were Generals Rodes and Godwin. The Union loss was also severe, and included that intrepid soldier, Gen- eral D. A. Kussell (commanding a division of the Sixth Corps), who was killed. After his defeat at Winchester, Early did not pause in his southward retreat till he reached Fisher's HiU, near Stras- burg, thirty miles south of Winchester. This is a very defen- sible position, commanding the dehouche of the narrow Stras- burg valley between the north fork of the Shenandoah River and the North Mountain. On these obstacles Early rested * The authority for this statement of the Confederate force, is a letter written by General Early from Havana, and published in December, 18G5. In this letter that officer says : " At the battle of Winchester, or Opequan, as it is called by General Grant, my effective strength was about eight thousand five hundred muskets, three battalions of artillery, and less than three thousand cavalry." The Confederate cavalry of the Valley, consisting of two divisions under Fltz Hugh Lee and Lomax, was at this time in a miserable condition, materially and morally. "Our horses," says a letter from a Confederate officer of this force, " had been fed on nothing but hay for some time, and were quite weak ; and want of discipline had greatly demoralized the men." THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 559 his flank. In front of this position Sheridan arrived on tlio morning of the 22d, and formed his force for a direct attack, while he sent Torbert with two divisions of cavahy by the parallel Luray valley, to gain New Market, twenty miles in Early's rear. After much manceuvring, and several ineffectual efforts to force the position, an attack of cavalry was made from the right. Under cover of this mask a corps of infantry was moved to that flank, and by an impetuous assault carried the Confederate left resting on the North Mountain. A gen- eral attack in front then disrupted Early's whole line, and the Confederates retired in great disorder, leaving behind sixteen pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. The success at Fisher's Hill was greatly influenced by the fact that at the time the attack was made. Early was about retiring from the position, owing to his fears of an irruption on his line of communications by the Union cavalry column moving through Luray valley. This fear was, however, ground- less ; for this powerful body was held in check all day by a much inferior force of Confederate cavalry at Milford.* Early's retreat was not stayed until he reached the lower passes of the Blue Kidge, whither he retired with a loss of half his army. Sheridan, after pushing the pursuit as far as Staunton, and operating destructively against the Virginia Central Railroad, returned and took position behind Cedar Creek near Strasburg. Previously to abandoning the country * The defence at tliis point was made by a small division of Confederate cavalry under General Wickham, and an officer of that command thus writes concerning the affair of the 22d : " At Milford, with such fortifications as we could throw up, we fought all day Thursday (the 22d). At one time Torbert flanked us with three regiments. We did not allow this to stampede us like the army at Fisher's Hill ; but Col- onel Mumford, withdrawing several squadrons from the centre under a galling fire, went over to the right, and by resorting to a little strategy, repulsed the flanking column and restored our lines. At night Torbert retired, declaring that our position was impregnable. Some idea can be formed of the value of this victory when it is known that, had Ave run ofF, it would have let Torbert into Newmarket twelve hours before Early could have gotten back there with his army. This must have resulted in the annihilation of the latter beyond a possibility of a doubt."' 560 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. soutli of Strasburg, it was laid waste by the destruction of all barns, grain, forage, farming implements, and mills. The desolation of the Palatinate by Turenne was not more com- plete.* On the withdrawal of Sheridan, Early, after a brief respite, and being re-enforced by Kershaw's division of infantry and six hundred cavalry from Lee's army, again marched north- ward down the Valley, and once more ensconced liimseK at Fisher's Hill. Sheridan continued to hold position on the north bank of Cedar Creek. Nothing more important than cavalry combats, mostly favorable to the Federal arms, took place, until the 19th of October, when Early assumed a bold offensive that was near giving him a victory as complete as the defeat he had suffered. * General Sheridan's dispatch reciting the destruction of the Shenandoah . Valley is in the following words : " In moving back to this point, the whole coun- try, from the Blue Ridge to the North Mountain, has been made entirely unten- able for a rebel army. I have destroyed over two thousand barns filled with wheat and hay and farming implements ; over seventy mills filled with flour and wheat ; have driven in front of the army over four thousand head of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops not less than three thousand sheep. This destruction embraces the Luray valley and the Little Fort valley, as well as the main valley." This dread bulletin recites acts some of which are indefensible. The destruction of the crops, provision, and forage was allowable ; for this deprived the enemy of immediate subsistence, and operated to the end to in- duce him to surrender. But the burning of the mills and farming implements cannot be justified, for that was to inflict vengeance upon the country for many years to come. It may indeed be said that the desolation of the Shenan- doah Valley was a special measure designed to cover the frontier of the loyal States from invasion ; but this, though plausible, is not a sufiicient reason. I have cited above the destruction of the Palatinate, and the case is quite in point, both in respect to the act itself and the verdict history will pronounce thereon. "When," says a legal writer of the highest authority, " the French armies desolated with fire and sword the Palatinate in 1674, and again in 1689, there was a general outcry throughout Europe against such a mode of carrying on Avar ; and when the French minister Louvois alleged that the object in view was to cover the French frontier against the invasion of the enemy, the advantage which France derived from the act was universally held to be inadequate to the suffering inflicted, and the act itself to bo therefore unjustifiable." — Twiss : Law of Nations, vol. i., p. 125. See also Vattel, L. iii., c. 9, § 16G. THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 561 At tliis time tlie ITiii n force was positioned as follows : the infantry line ran along the east bank of Cedar Creek behind intrenchments drawn on rising and rolling ground — Crook's (Eighth) corps on the left ; Emory's (Nineteenth) in the cen- tre, and the Sixth Corps, for the time under Eicketts, on the right. The latter corps was posted somewhat in rear and in reserve. The cavalry divisions of Custer and Merritt guarded the right flank ; that of Averill (at this time under Powell) guarded the left, and picketed the wdiole line of the North Fork of the Shenandoah from Cedar Creek to Front Royal. The army was, at this time, temporarily under the command of General Wright — Sheridan being absent at Washington. The position held b}^ the Union force was too formidable to in\'ite open attack, and Early's only opportunity w^as to make a surprise. This that officer now determined on, and its exe- cution was begun during the night of the 18-19th October. Soon after midnight, Early, having made his dispositions at Fisher's Hill, moved forward in demonstrations against the Union right, whence the sounds of musketry announced a nglit on the picket-line. But this was merely a feint — the real attack was to fall on the left. One column was marched southeasterly from Strasburg, a short distance along the Ma- nassas Gap Railroad, so as to pass beyond the furthest de- velopment of the Union left flank, while another massed silently behind the picket-line for a direct attack. The flank- ing column then turned northerly on a path that crosses the North Fork of the Shenandoah, by a ford about a mile to the tiast of the junction of Cedar Creek with that stream. Before dawn it was across the ford, and being favored by a heavy fog, had attained, unperceived, the rear of the left flank of the Union force, formed by Crook's corps. This position gained, the Confederates closed in upon and captured the Union pickets, and rushed into the camp — the troops awaking only to find themselves prisoners. To rally the men in their bewilderment was impossible, and Crook's corps, being thor- oughly broken up, fled in disorder, leaving many guns in the hands of the enemy. 36 562 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. As soon as this flank attack was developed, Early, with his other column, emerged from behind the hills west of Cedar Creek, and crossing that stream, struck directly the troops on the right of Crook. This served to complete the disaster, and the whole Union left and centre became a confused mass, against which tlie Confederates directed the captured artillery (eighteen guns), while the flanking force swept forward to the main turnpike. Sach was the scene on which the light of day dawned. The only force not yet involved in the enemy's onset was the Sixth Corps, which by its position was somewhat in rear. With this General Ricketts quickly executed a change of front, throwing it forward at right angles to its former position, and firmly withstood the enemy's shock. Its chief service was, however, to cover the general retreat which Wright now ordered, as the only practicable means of reuniting his force. This was executed with such order as might be under the circumstances, and as the enemy pressed the left most vigor- ously, wedging in as though in the endeavor to cut off the Union force from its line of retreat to Winchester, the cavalry divisions of Merritt and Custer were transferred to that flank. At length, when Middletown, the first village north of Stras- burg and about five miles from that place, was reached, line of battle was formed and a stand made to dispute the further advance of the enemy. But it was obvious that there was still too little cohesion in the mass, and as the Confederates threatened to overlap the left flank, the Union line again fell back, and the enemy gained Middletown. Now, however, the pursuit began to lose its vigor, and, at the first good position between Middletown and Newtown, Wright was able to rally and reform the troops, form a compact line, and prepare either to resist further attack or himself resume the offensive. It was at this time, about half-past ten A. m., that General Sheridan arrived upon the field from Winchester, where he had slept the previous night. Hearing the distant sounds of battle rolling up from the south, Sheridan rode post to the front, where arriving, his electric manner had on the troops a very THE SIEGE OP PETERSBURG. 563 inspiriting effect.* General Wright had already brought order out of confusion and made dispositions for attack. These were left unchanged by Sheridan, except that Custer's cavalry division was transferred to its place on the right flank. A counter-charge was begun at three o'clock in the afternoon. Notwithstanding the success of the morning, or rather by rea- son of that success conjoined with bad discipline, the Confed- erates were at this time in a very unfit moral condition to resist attack, for a large part of Early's force, in the intoxication of success, had abandoned their colors and taken to plundering the abandoned Federal camps.f The refluent wave was as resistless as the Confederate surge had been ; the enemy was driven out of Middletown and beyond, and pressed upon back to Cedar Creek. The retreat soon became a rout, in which the Confederates abandoned much material. The Union infantry halted within their old camps ; but the cavalry, forcing the passage of Cedar Creek, hung on the flanks and rear of the enemy and followed beyond Strasburg till night put an end to the pursuit. Early succeeded in halting his force for the night at Fisher's Hill, and next morning continued his retreat southward. In the pursuit all the captured guns were * The dramatic incidents attending the arrival of Sheridan have perhaps caused General Wright to receive less credit than he really deserves. The disaster was over by the time Sheridan arrived ; a compact line of battle was formed, and Wright was on the point of opening the offensive. Wright certainly had not the style of doing things possessed by Sheridan, but no one who knows the steady qualities of that officer's mind can doubt that he would have himself retrieved whatever his troops had lost of honor. f General Early, in an address made to his army subsequent to this action, held the following language : " Had you remained steadfast to your duty and your colors, the victory would have been one of the most bri'iliant and decisive of the war. But many of you, including some commissioned officers, yielding to a disgraceful propensity for plunder, deserted your colors to appropriate to yourselves the abandoned property of the enemy; and subsequently, those who had previously remained at their posts, seeing their ranks thinned by the absence of the plunderers, when the enemy, late in the afternoon, with hia shattered columns, made but a feeble effort to retrieve the fortunes of the day yielded to a needless panic, and fled the field in confusion, thereby converting a splendid victory into a disaster." 564 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. retaken and twentj-tliree in addition. The captures included, besides, near fifteen hundred prisoners, which fully made up for those lost by the Union force in the morning. With this defeat of Early, all operations of moment in the Valley of the Shenandoah forever ended. The complete destruction of forage in this region rendered it impossible for the Confederates to sustain there any considerable body ol cavalry. The prestige won by Sheridan enabled General Grant to recall the Sixth Corps to the Army of the Potomac, and to take aAvay two of Sheridan's mounted divisions. Soon afterwards most of Early's infantry returned to rejoin the main Confederate force at Petersburg. In this stirring campaign of two months' duration, Sheri- dan's operations, characterized by great vigor, were crowned with complete success. It is indeed to be borne in mind that the credit awarded to warlike exploits is to be measured by the obstacles overcome, and that Sheridan certainly had a very great preponderance of force. Nevertheless, the clean- ness with which the work was done, the energy of the execu- tion, the completeness of the solution of a long-time vexatious problem, are all very admirable. Sheridan's operations were characterized not so much, as has been supposed, by any originality of method, as by a just appreciation of the proper manner of combining the two arms of infantry and cavalry. He constantly used his powerful body of horse, which under his disciplined hand attained a high degi-ee of perfection, as an impenetrable mask behind which he screened the execution of manoeuvres of infantry columns hurled with a weighty mo- mentum on one of the enemy's flanks. THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 555 XIII. THE FINAL CAMPAiaN Makch— April 9. 1865. THE CIRCLE OF THE HUNT. The time lias now come when it is no longer possible to consider the Army of the Potomac apart from that colossal combination of force that, pressing from all' sides on the structure of the Confederacy, finally bore it to the ground. That this army cannot rightly be viewed independently of the co-operative forces throughout the general theatre of war, is made ajjparent by the single fact that during the winter months succeeding the close of the campaign of 186-i, so far from its being any longer a desirable object to capture Petersburg and Richmond, Grant's efforts were mainly directed to restraining the Confederates from voluntarily giving up to him those strongholds that, having been for four years the prize so eagerly coveted, were now the possession most of all to be shunned. How this was and must have been so, will become manifest from a brief glance at the relations which the gigantic vigor of Sherman had established between his own army and the opposing forces in Virginia. The communications on which Lee's army depended, not only for the maintenance of its interior lines with the remain- ing forces of the Confederacy in the Southwest, but for its supplies of food and ammunition, ran through the Carolinas 566 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOIMAC. and the seaboard States and radiated over the great joroduc- tive territory of the central zone. By the capture of Atlanta, gained in the midsummer of 1864, Sherman grasj)ed one of the main ganglia of the South- ern railroad system. This was a loss terrible indeed to the Confederates, and narrowing the sphere of their activit}'- and their means of intercommunication, yet not so deadly but that they might still, by the judicious use of such force as they had, oppose a menacing front and greatly prolong the war. But whatever ojDportunity was then afforded the Confeder- ates of thus acting, was thrown away, with that species of mad- ness with which the gods are said to inspire those whom they would destroy, when Hood, at this time in command of the Confederate army of the West, quitting his proper defensive, was directed to make his ill-judged and disastrous aggressive movement into Tennessee. What would have been a thorn in the side of an inferior man, was to Sherman an oppor- tunity, and with one of those inspirations such as are possible only to military minds of the first order, he determined to offer a counter to Hood's initiative by laying hold of and advancing along those interior lines voluntarily abandoned to him by his antagonist. Sherman's march assumes the aspect of a great swinging movement, the pivot of which was the army before Petersburg, But it was a swinging movement described on a radius of half a continent — one of those colossal enterprises whereof there are few exemplars in military his- tory, and which fill up the measure of the imagination with the shapes of all that is vast and grandiose in war. From Atlanta Sherman advanced, destroying the Southern railroads, foundries, mills, workshops, and warehouses, to Savannah on the sea. That city was reached the 21st of De- cember, after a march of above three hundred miles, in four- and-twenty days. It was now open to General Grant to unite Sherman's army with the army before Petersburg either by water or by an advance of Sherman through the seaboard States. The latter course was determined on as the more decisive in its character, and its execution begun on the 1st TllK. FINAL CAMPAIGN. 567 of February, 1865, wlien Slicrman crossed the Savannuli into South Carolina. When Hood's crushing defeat by Thomas before Nashville had made an end of the campaign that Mr. Davis had pro- jected as the means of throwing Slierman back out of Georgia in a " Moscow retreat," and when it was seen that Sherman, heading his columns northward towards Virginia, approached like an irresistible fate, sweeping a wide swathe of desolation through the centre of the South, the Eichmond authorities, awaking to a sense of their fatal folly and goaded by the clamors of an alarmed and frenzied people, sought a measure of amelioration for the shattered fortunes of the Confederacy by the reappointment of General Johnston to the command of the foi'ces opposing Slierman. But it was already too late. Johnston did all he could ; and all he did was judicious : but he could only stay for a time a result seen to be inevitable. "Withdrawing the garri- sons of the seaboard cities, and uniting thereto the corps lately under Beauregard and the remnants of Hood's army, which with much address he succeeded in bringing to a junc- tion with the troops confronting Slierman, he prepared to oppose such a resistance as was possible to the onward march of his formidable antagonist. Johnston had on paper a nu- merous army ; but, in effect, it was not, all told, above twenty thousand strong ; while the troops were in such condition of morale as may be imagined of men who had already been driven through two States into the forests of North Carolina. In this state of facts it was vain for Johnston to attempt an aggressive policy, unless indeed he should find an opportunity of striking a blow at a detached fragment. But his antagonist carried too much art into his dispositions of his columns of march to present such an opening, and the one stroke at Ben- tonville (a partial and unimportant success), was all the ofT-n- sive essayed by Johnston. The Confederate commander was, moreover, in a tryuig dilemma : in order to keep open the Danville line, by which a junction of the forces of Lee and Johnston might be made, it 568 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. was necessary for him to constantly refuse liis left and mantjen- vre by his right. But this was to uncover the path by which Sherman might advance to unite with Grant. As this result, however, could not long be prevented, Johnston chose the former course and fell back in the direction of Kaleigh, which was a judicious measure, since a junction of the two Con- federate armies was now the governing desideratum. Press- ing forward his advance, Sherman, the 23d of March, reached Goldsborough, North Carolina, where he united with the Federal columns that had moved out from Newbern and Wil- mington. His course to Petersburg was then clear — the dis- tance a hundred and fifty miles in a northerly direction. No immediate start, however, was made from Goldsborough, as well for the reason that his army had to be refitted as that General Grant feared if Sherman should then move any fur- ther on his way, Lee would abandon Petersburg and Eich- mond. This, as I have already intimated, was the thing now least desired, for the conditions were not such as to permit of an effective pursuit, and Grant, like Phocion, desired to have an army fitted for a long race — a race, the goal of which was the destruction of his adversary. While from the direction of the south Sherman thus drew from the mountains to the sea a wall of bayonets that im- prisoned the enemy between himself and the Army of the Potomac, Grant directed Sheridan to make a new raid, with a view to severing all the remaining communications of the Con- federates — a necessary step in that plan of encircling and en- closing Lee which the lieutenant-general had devised as the preliminary to his premeditated blow. Moving from Winchester the 27th of February, Sheridan galloped up the Valley of Virginia. With his superb column of ten thousand sabres, he httle recked of any enemy he was likely to encounter. Early, indeed, still hovered about the Valley that had been so fatal to him ; but what of force re- mained with him was but the shreds and patches of an army, numbering, perhaps, twenty-five hundred men. Foihng by his THE FINAL C.^.MPAIGN. 5G9 rapid advancG an attempt to destroy the bridge over the Mid- dle Fork of the Shenandoah at Mount Crawford, Sheridan en- tered Staunton the 2d of March and then moved to Waynes- boro, where Early had taken position to dispute the debouche of the Blue Eidge. Charging upon this scratch of an army without taking the trouble of making a rcconnoissance even, Sheridan broke it in pieces, capturing two-thirds of it, with most of its artillery trains and colors. Then, defihng by the passes of the Blue Ridge, he struck Charlottesville, where ho remained two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmond and Lynchburg, including the two large bridges over the north and south forks of the Rivanna River. He had now moved so far away that it was necessary for him to await the arrival of his trains. Sheridan's instructions prescribed that he should gain Lynchburg on the south bank of the James. From that point he was to effectually break up those main branches of Lee's communications, the Lynchburg Raih'oad and James River Canal, after which he was to strike southward through Vir- ginia to the Westward of Danville and join Sherman. But while awaiting at Charlottesville the arrival of his trains, the James River became so swollen by heavy rains as to be im- passable. Nowise disconcerted by this untoward fortune, but with an admirable fertility of resource, he determined to abandon the purpose of capturing Lynchburg, and in the mean time to operate against the canal, and then, if possible, efiect a crossing of the James between Lynchburg and Richmond. The former design was very completely car- ried out, but he was unable to pass the James, as the Con- federates destroyed all the bridges. Thus cabined and confined, there was for Sheridan but one alternative, either to go back whence he had come, or strike a base at White House and thence effect a junction with the army before Petersburg. With characteristic daring he adopted the latter course, and this resolve, though it baulked Grant's original intent, led to a result every way better. 579 CAJSIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. After compkting the destruction of the canal, he concen- trated his whole force at Columbia, and thence rounding the left of Lee's army, and putting the Pamunkey between him and the Confederate force, Sheridan proceeded towards the York, breaking up en route all the railroad tracks and bridges. The 19tli of March he reached AVhite House, whither an in- fantry force and supplies had been forwarded to him. After resting and refitting here, Sheridan, on the 24:th, moved across the Peninsula to James River, and passing to the south bank at Jones' Landing, he, two days afterwards, joined the army before Petersburg. The circle of the hunt was now complete. The leashed dogs of war lay ready for the spring, whenever the meditative soldier who sat silent in his wooden hut at City Point should sound the " laissez oiler." That the campaign about to be opened could have but one result — to wit, the destruction of the Confederate armies — was not now doubtful ; and discerning men at the South plainly read the omens of doom. It Avas not alone that an over- wdielming weight of ph3'sical power, represented by a million men in arms, threatened to overwhelm the insurgent armies, or that the great extent of territory overrun by the Union forces had torn asunder the fabric of the Confederacy ; but secret causes of disturbance in the moral order had corrupted the life-blood of the revolt. It is such metaphysical influ- ences that govern the issues of war — influences little under- stood by the superficial annalists Avho attempt to explain by material causes the secrets of an art so vast, subtle, and com- plex as to be almost beyond the reach of man's mind — influ- ences, whose sovereign power was marked by the greatest of commanders in the aphorism, that in war the moral is to the physical as threo to one. When in a revolution the time arrives that the people sep- arate themselves from the cause of their leaders, that cause speedily falls to the ground. This was the pass to which the Confederate States had come. It was not precisely that the THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 57 1 people of the South had ceased to desh-e the triumph of seces- sion ; but they had ceased any longer to be capable of those efforts failing which success is out of the question. It will bo for the philosophical historian, unraveUing the intricate web of cause and effect, to trace the reasons of this decHne in the moral energy of the South : it is enough here to mark the re- sult as it influenced the fortunes of the armies in the field. General Grant, during the winter of 18G4, expressed in a strong figure the behef that the fighting population of the Confederacy was exhausted. " They have," said he, " robbed the cradle and the grave." But this statement overshot the reality. The South did not so much lack men as the men lacked interest in the war. The conscription then became odious, and evasion universal, while those who washed to es- cape military service readily found those at home willing to open their ranks, let them slip through, and close up behind them. It finally came about that men enough to form three armies of the strength of Lee's lay 2'>i., directed that, ' should you determine by your reconnoissance that you can get possession of, and hold the White Oak road, you are to do so, notwithstanding the orders to suspend operations.' " Thus it appears that I did not move with a division, but with a reconnoi- trino- brigade, which reconnoissance it was necessary to make to ascertain where to use the whole corps if it were to be all used. The order to take possession of the road was contingent upon the result of the reconnoissance. It is also evident that only in a very modified sense could I be said to have as yet re- ported favorably to getting possession of the road. At most, I had but ox- pressed my willingness to try, venturing a little on my own responsibility to achieve a desired end, and ready to make every hazard, if ordered. " Simultaneous with this advance of General Ayres' picket-line, the enemy attacked us in heavy force."— Warren : Report of Operations. 590 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Hardly, however, was this reconnoissance begun by an ad- vance of the brigade of Winthrop, at haK-past ten A. M., than a heavy attack fell upon Warren. It wais Lee's initiative. Often before had he broken up these turning movements in their inception by falling heavily on the exposed flank of the Union force. Once more he es sayed the like blow, and, to give it all the weight possible, he threw into it the bulk of the troops he had collected and formed on his right. The attack upon "Warren was sudden, and burst out simul- taneously both from the north and west. It was indeed near attaining almost the wonted success, for Ayres' troops, finding themselves enveloped in the thick woods, easily gave way, falling back on Crawford, whose division, disorganized by the fugitives, broke in turn. Happily the disposition Warren had made of his force rendered this disruption far from irretriev- able. No disaster had occurred, for the troops ran rather be- cause they were bewildered by a sudden flank and rear attack in a dense and swampy forest, than because they were forcibly beaten back. When, however, they emerged into the clearer ground in the rear, where Grifiin's division held post, they were soon rallied. The good effect of the echelon arrangement was now seen. Griffin maintained his ground immovably. The Confederate onset was soon checked, and Warren, gather- ing together his forces, prepared to make a counter-attack. To assist this. General Humphreys promptly advanced Miles' division on the right of Warren. While the Fifth Corps at- tacked in front, Miles assailed the Confederate left flank. The operations of both forces were spirited and forcible, and re- sulted in repulsing the enemy at all points, and driving him back to his old line on the White Oak road. In the Fifth Corps, Chamberlain's brigade was especially distinguished, capturing nearly the whole of the Fifty-sixth Virginia regi- ment, with its colors. Miles also took one flag and many prisoners. Humphreys, with his remaining two divisions, at- tempted also to carry the enemy's works covering the Boyd- ton road crossing; of the White Oak road and those on the THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 591 west side of Hatcher's Run ; but these efforts met no suc- cess.^ To Lee paucity of numbers made economy of Kfe so im- perative a duty, that, though he was pushed by his temper and the necessities of his situation to attempt an aggressive pohcy, he knew well that he could only hope for such success as sud- den swoops might bring, and that he was in no condition to attempt a general offensive. Hence, when he found himself foiled in the attack against the left of the infantry, he drew back with but slight effort to resist the countercharge of Warren, and sought some other favorable opening for a blow. Such an opening was presented by the cavalry of Sheridan, who, by manoeuvres now to be described, had gained a position that was very menacing to Lee's right flank. From the position of Sheridan at Dinwiddle Courthouse the distance to the Five Forks was about eight miles due north ; and from Five Forks the distance to Lee's intrenched line con- fronting Warren and Humphreys was but four miles east. Hold- ing Five Forks, one holds the strategic key that opens uj) the whole region which Lee was now seeking to cover. Sheridan, appreciating the immense importance of this point, deter- mined, notwithstanding the obstruction to the movements of cavalry caused by the storm that had overtaken the army, and the consequent increase of operations, to secure its possession. Nowise disconcerted by the failure of the attempt of the previous day, he, on the morning of the 31st, directed * The details of Humphreys' operations on the 31st are as follows : Miles, hy his advance, succeeded in occupying the White Oak road ; but the enemy's in- trenchments here covered a strong position on the crest of a long slope, with wide slashings in front and abatis covering the ditch, with artillery at short intervals. De Trobiands brigade of Mott's division was put into position to strengthen Miles, and subsequently McAllister's brigade was extended to the left to perfect the connection. During the day General Mott made an attempt to carry the redoubts and intrenchments covering the Boydton road crossing, but without success. General Hays likewise attempted to carry the Crow House redoubt, but was prevented by the heavy slashing, which was impass- able for any large number of troops. 502 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Devin's division agaiii towards Five Forks. Finding that tliis body encovmtered a considerable opposition, he re-enforced it with Davies' brigade of Crook's division, while Crook, with his other two brigades, under Smith and Gregg, were ordered to the left, and encountered a hostile cavahy force at Chamber- lain's Creek, a little west of Dinwdddie. With his two brigades Crook held this body in check, and Devin and Davies moved upon and seized Five Forks, which at the moment was guarded by but a small force, the Confederate cavalry being mainly on the west side of Chamberlain's Creek, and the infantry engaged with Warren. But the tenure of Five Forks was not to be long. Having been foiled in the assault on Warren, Lee detached portions of the two divisions of infantry under Pickett and Bushrod Johnson, and moved them by the White Oak road westward to Five Forks. These falling upon the Union cavalry there, drove it out and back in confusion on Dinwiddle Courthouse. The Confederates then pushed rapidly forward on the west side of Chamberlain's Creek, but when they attempted to cross this, in order to strike Dinwiddle Courthouse, they were foiled by the stout resistance of Smith's brigade. They then effected a crossing higher up the creek, and falling upon Davies' brigade forced it back against the left flank of Devin's division, thus partially isolating Jlll this force fi'om Sheridan's main hne at Dinwiddle Courthouse. In order to unite it on this line, Sheri- dan directed it to make a detour by the Boydton plankroad. The execution of this manoeuvre appeared to the Confederates a forced retreat on the part of Devin, and, deceived by this, they made a left wheel, and were proceeding to follow him up. This tactical change caused the Confederates to present the flank and rear of their line of battle to Sheridan's force at Dinwiddle, whereupon, seizing the opportunity, he directed a charge to be made with the brigades of Gregg and Gibbs. This unlooked-for sally compelled the Confederates to face by the rear rank and give up the movement against Devin, who was thus enabled to rejoin the main body. Against this the Confederates now advanced with all the force of cavalry and THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 593 iufautry present. In numbers the assailants were not superior to the Union eavahy, but they had an advantage in the range of the fire-arms of their infantry. Thus placed, Sheridan displayed rery commendable pluck. Having dismounted his troopers, he disposed them behind a slight breastwork previously prepared, and here, from their carbines, they poured so biting a fire into the ranks of the assailants that they were repulsed in the attack, and darkness prevented its renewal. The conduct of the men was certainly excellent ; but it was a great relief when night intervened to abridge the attack of the Confederates, for the cavalry had been sorely handled in the action. The tidings of Sheridan's situation received at headquarters led to the belief that he could not maintain himself at Dinwid- dle unless re-enforced, and such was the alarm in regard to the safety of his force, that all dispositions became subordinated to the forwarding of troops to his succor. For this purpose War- ren was, at nine r. M. of the 31st, ordered to send a division to Dinwiddle Courthouse by w^ay of the Boydton plankroad ; and two hours later, the concern about Sheridan growing mean- while, he was directed to move with his two other divisions by a road to the west, with the idea that he would strike the rear of the Confederate force confronting Sheridan.'^ * Previously to this— to wit, about five P. M., and before it became known that Sheridan was being pressed by the enemy— ^^'a^ren had been directed to send a small force down the White Oak road to communicate with General Sheridan. Warren accordingly dispatched Bartlett's brigade, which moved across the country in a southwesterly direction, towards Sheridan's firing. Bartlett forced his way, after brisk skirmishing, to Gravelly Run, across which a hostile body was driven ; but as it was much after dark before he completed his dispositions, no further advance could be made that night. When, how- ever, an hour or two later, intelligence was received of what had belal'ien Sheridan, such was the alarm thereby inspired at headquarters, that it was even determined to go so far as to sacrifice the advanced position gained by the Fifth and Second corps. The following extract will show that General W^arren was himself the first to suggest that he should be allowed to move with his whole corps, and attack in rear the force confronting Sheridan : 594 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Warren promptly dispatclied Ayres' division, as the one that could get under way most expeditiously ; and proceeded to make arrangements to move with the other two divisions as soon as practicable. Had the roads been imohstructed, the march to Dinwiddie would not have occupied above four or five hours. When, however, the project was formed of send- ing Warren to succor Sheridan, there was one very important fact which was not known at headquarters, but which was of a nature to prevent any possibility of a force reaching Sheri- dan that night. This was the fact that the bridge over Grav- elly Run, by the Boydton plankroad, was destroyed. It was, by consequence, necessary for General Ayres to halt at the run until an infantry bridge was built. This consumed till near two A. M. of April 1st, when Ayres crossed his division and has- tened towards Dinwiddie. When the condition of the crossing of Gravelly Run became known to General Meade, that commander, believing that Sheridan " could not maintain himself at Dinwiddie without re-enforcements," suggested (in a dispatch received by General Warren at one A. m.) other methods by which the desired end " At 8.40 p. M. I received by telegraph the following, marked ' Confidential/ from General Webb, cliief of staff, written 8.30 P. M. : ' The probability is, that we will Iiave to contract our lines to-night. You will be required to hold, if possible, the Boydton plankroad and to Gravelly Run. Humphreys and Ord along the run. Be prepared to do this at short notice.' " I regretted exceedingly to see this step foresliadowed ; for I feared it would have the morale of giving a failure to our whole movement, as similar orders had done on previous occasions. It would, besides, relieve the enemy in front of Sheridan from tlie threatening attitude my position gave me. I therefore Bent the following by telegraph, at 8.40 P. M., to General Webb : ' The line along the plankroad is very strong. One division, with my artillery, I think, can hold it, if we are not threatened, south of Gravelly Run, east of the plank- road. General Humphreys and my batteries, I think, could hold this securely, and let me move down and attack the enemy at Dinwiddie Courthouse on one side, and Sheridan on the other. On account of Bartlett's position, they (the enemy) will have to make a considerable detour to re-enforce their troops at that point from the north. Unless General Sheridan has been too badly handled, I think we have a chance for an open field-fight that should be made use of.' " — Warren : Report of Operations of March 29, 80, and 31. THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 595 might be accomplislied. They did not, however, meet the real state of facts. He suggested that Warren should send troops both by the Boydton plankroad and by the Quaker road, further to the east, even if he should give up the medi- tated rear attack. But the distance to Dinwiddie by the Quaker road was above ten miles, and, at the advanced hour of the night at which the dispatch was received, it would have been impossible for the troops by that road to have reached DiuAviddie before eight a. m., by which time they could be of no use in holding that place. In this case the most direct route for the rear attack would be down the plankroad, by which Ayres' division was marching. Solicitous as General Warren was, therefore, of arriving for Sheridan's succor at the earliest possible moment, he justly judged that the desired end could be best attained by abiding the movements akeady be- gun, holding, meantime, the two divisions of Griffin and Craw- ford where they were, until he should hear that Ayres' division had reached Dinwiddie. In the midst of this general anxiety for Sheridan, that offi- cer himself had ceased to feel any solicitude touching his situ- ation ; for before midnight he knew that the enemy had with- drawn aU but a mask of force from his front. Lee, in fact, could not afibrd to retain so considerable a body at Dinwiddie, both because it was very much out of position for the defence of the Confederate line on the White Oak road, and because the force thus isolated was directly menaced by Warren. It was, therefore, retired by Lee as soon as he could communicate with it, which was about ten P. M. of the 31st, and it fell back and took position at Five Forks, leaving only a cavalry picket, which also withdrew as soon as assailed at dawn. It was, in fact, seen hastily decamping by Ayres, when, at dajlight of April 1st, he joined the cavalry. Sheridan followed up vig- orously, putting his whole force in motion northward towards Five Forks. Meantime, Warren withdrew his two other divi- sions, which, marching directly across the country, joined the cavalry midway between Dinwiddie Courthouse and Five Forks at seven a. m., April 1st. 596 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Full of doubts and fears as the night had been, morning dispelled these noxious vapors. The event proved a happy illustration of " All's well that ends well ;" for, thanks to the good judgment of Warren in keeping his corps together, it was now in position where it could best be applied conjointly with the cavalry in a renewed effort against tlie Confederate position at Five Forks. Towards that position Sheridan was resolved to move, and in the operations that followed, Warren, with the Fifth Corps, came under his orders. IV. FIVE FORKS AND PETERSBURG. The situation of the opposing forces on the morning of the 1st of April was somewhat peculiar. From the Appomattox to Hatcher's Eun the Confederate line was so meagerly gar- nished with troops that there was but one man to every five yards of front. Confronting this hne were the Union corps of Parke, Wright, Ord, and Humphreys. But the point of dis- pute was nowhere along these locked lines ; and as, by times, in olden battles, the whole array of two opposing armies would stand still while one knight from each side engaged in single combat, so it seemed to be now tacitly agreed that the gage of battle was for the possession of the Five Forks— an isolated position four miles to the west of the Federal left and Confederate right. Hither Sheridan was moving, and here, as for the defence of a point of vital value, Lee had accumu- lated all the force he could spare. In thus massing upon his right, Lee ran a great risk ; for the Petersburg defences were left so inadequately defended, that they were incapable of withstanding a serious attack. But necessity left no alternative. It is worthy of note that there was no imperative need of delivering battle at Five Forks, for Sheridan's manoeuvres by the left, together with the pressure of the Second and Fifth corps, had had so fully THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 597 tiie effect of drawing the Confederate strength to a head at that flank, that it was open to the Union force to break di- rectly through the Petersburg defences. Indeed, both Wright and Ord, ascertaining from their reconnoissances the compara- tive nakedness of the Confederate works, reported favorably to assault on the 1st. But it was otherwise determined. There is, however, no occasion to note, othervvise than as a contin- gency of the situation, that the battle of Five Forks need not necessarily have been fought in order to have gained the cap- ture of Petersburg. That, nevertheless, it was fortunate it was fought, will not be doubtful after the recital of the events of that brilliant action. Pressing forward his cavalry, Sheridan, by spirited charges, drove the Confederates from two temporary lines, until, at two p. M., April 1st, he had confined them within their works at the Five Forks. The admirable method in which Sheridan combined the operations of cavalry and infantry — using the former as an impenetrable mask behind which he manoeuvred with the latter — has already been seen in the history of the Valley campaign. This combination was now to receive a new and splendid illustration. In pressing back the enemy into his works Sheridan had em- ployed only his powerful body of horse, leaving the Fifth Corps behind, at the point where it had joined the cavalry in the morn- ing. Now, however, that the Confederates were confined within the defences on the White Oak road, where they were closely enveloped by his numerous squadrons, he directed General Warren to bring forward the Fifth Corps, for the employment of which he devised a beautiful tactical manoeuvre. He ordered General Merritt, while holding the enemy in front with the cav- alry, to demonstrate as though he aimed to turn the Confeder- ate right, and he directed Warren to form the infantry so that its full pressure would fall directly on the enemy's left flank. At the same time he sent McKenzic's division of cavalry, Avhich had joined him that day, to the White Oak road to cover the right flank from any hostile force moving westward fi'om the di- 598 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. rection of Petersburg. McKenzie executed liis orders with skill and vigor, attacking a body of the enemy and driving it to- wards Petersburg, after which he countermarched and rejoined Sheridan in time to participate in the action. Warren formed his corps before moving forward. He dis- posed Ayres' division on the left and Crawford's on the right, with Griffin's in reserve behind the right. Each of the two front divisions placed two brigades in front, each brigade in two lines of battle ; and the third brigade in two lines of bat- tle behind the centre of the two front lines. Griffin's division was posted in column of battalions in mass behind the right. In moving, the lines were instructed to keep closed to the left, and to preserve their direction in the woods by keeping the sun, which was shining brightly, in the same position over their left shoulders. The movement was to be forward to the White Oak road, at a point beyond the enemy's left flank, when the line was to swing round, pivoting on the left, and having formed itself perpendicular to the White Oak road, it was then to advance and fall upon the Confederate left flank. Warren's dispositions being promptly completed by four p. M., he immediately then advanced. A few minutes brought the line to the White Oak road, distant about a thousand yards, when it changed front so as to face westward instead of northward. The Fifth Corps was now directly on the left flank and rear of the Confederates, with a line of battle formed perpendicular to their position. The enemy had, however, refused his left in a crotchet about a hundred yards in length turned northward at right angles to his main line, and covered by a strong breastwork screened behind a dense undergrowth of pines. Thence northward to Hatcher's Kun, the Confederates pieced out the line by a slim picket. Ayres' division being the pivot on which Crawford's and Griffin's wheeled, efi"ected its change of front first, and encountered the enemy's skirmishers in front of the position at the crotchet. That division covered nearly the whole of this refused line, so that Crawford and Ayres outflanked it to the north. Or nearly so : Crawford's division, THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 590 indeed, in changing front, having occasion to pass over some open ground, received on its left from this lino a fire which caused the division to oblique to the right, so as to keep the protection of the woods and ridge while executing the ma- noeuvre. Now, owing to this circumstance— to wit, that Craw- ford's division on the right of Ayres, having to manoeuvre on a more extended radius and being also thrown more to the right to avoid the enemy's fire, was not able to change front so rapidly — it came about that Ayres' right was for a time " in air ;" and as it received the same fire that Crawford's left had encountered, the troops on that flank became very unsteady, and many broke to the rear. This difficulty, however, was soon remedied. Griffin's division was drawn in towards the left to close up this interval, and Ayres' division assailing the enemy's intrenched crotchet, carried it by an impetuous charge, in which above a thousand prisoners and several battle-flags were taken. Griffin then fell upon the rear of the enemy's left, capturing the breastworks and fifteen hundred prisoners. At the same time Crawford, who was moving further to the right, advanced steadily in rear of the enemy's fine, driving back the skirmishers all the way, and continually turning the left of any force opposing Ayres and Griffin, till he attained the Ford road, which runs directly northward from the centre of ihe Confederate rear, and thence across Hatcher's Run. The outlet for the enemy's escape northward being thus closed, Warren directed Crawford's line to swing round to face south- ward and advance upon the reverse side of the enemy's line. The Confederates were now completely entrapped. Held as in a vice by the cavalry which enveloped their whole front and light, stung them with a biting fire, and charged at the signal ot the musketry of the infantry, they now found a fine of bat- tle sweeping down on their rear. Thus placed, they did all that men may. Forming front both north and south, they met with a desperate valor this double onset. But it was vain. From the rear Warren swept down towards the White Oak road, Crawford taking four guns ; and simultaneously the cavalry from the front charged upon this road with resistless 000 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. impetuosity. The whole centre was now carried, as the left had been before, and the Confederates, pressed front, flank, and rear, mostly threw down their arms. Having gained the White Oak road, "Warren changed front again to the right and advanced westward, so continually to take in flank and rear whatever hostile force still continued to hold the right of the Confederate line. This had originally been about three miles in extent, but above two-thirds of it were now carried. Yet, vital in all its parts, what of the two divisions remained still continued the combat with unyielding mettle. Parrying the thrusts of the cavalry from the fi'ont, this poor scratch of a force threw back its left in a new and short crotchet so as to meet the advance of Warren, who continued to press in at right angles with the White Oak road. When the infantry, greatly elated with their success, but somewhat disorganized by marching and fighting so long in the woods, arrived before this new line, they halted and opened an untimely fusilade, though there had been orders not to halt. The officers, indeed, urged their men forward, but they continued to fire without advancing. Seeing this hesitation, Warren dashed forward, calling to those near him to follow. Inspired by his example, the color- bearers and officers all along the front sprang out, and, with- out more firing, the men charged at the fas de coarse, captur- ing all that remained of the enemy. The history of the war presents no equally splendid illustration of personal magnet- ism. Warren led the van of the rushing Imes ; his horse was fa- tally shot within a few feet of the breastworks, and he himself was in imminent peril, when a gallant officer. Colonel Richard- son of the Seventh Wisconsin, sprang between him and the enemy, receiving a severe wound, but shielding from hurt the person of his loved commander. A charge of the cavalry completed the rout, and the rem- nants of the divisions of Pickett and Johnson fled westward from Five Forks, pursued for many miles, and until long after dark, by the mounted divisions of Merritt and McKenzie. The trophies of the day included many colors and guns and above five thousand prisoners, of which number three thousand two THE FINAL CxVMPATGN. COl himdrecl and forty-four were taken by the Fifth Corps. Bril- liaut as the victory was, it was wou without great sacrifice of hfe, the losses of the cavahy being but a few luindred, and those of the infantry six hundred and thirty-four killed and wounded.* No sooner had the sound of musketry died away at the Five Forks, than from the multitudinous throats of all the guns that studded Grant's lines before Petersburg there oj^ned a prodigious clamor, and the darkness of night was illumined by the lurid light of hundreds of bursting shells and bombs. It was a paean to victory ; but still more a pre- lude of what was yet to come. The action at Five Forks had simplified, not solved the problem. Lee's right, wrenched violently from his centre — the troops captive or rushing wildly westward — would trouble no more. But the Confederate lines encircling Pe- tersburg from the Appomattox to Hatcher's Eun, were still intact. This was Lee's centre in the general relations of all the points he aimed to defend, while his left was the front that covered Richmond from the Union force threatening assault on the north side of the James. But as, strangely enough, Longstreet, who commanded on the Eichmond side, had not discovered how greatly the enemy in his front had been re- duced, still retained two divisions on that side of the James, the force immediately defending Petersburg was reduced to two incomplete divisions. Upon this General Grant, on learn- ing the success at Five Forks, ordered an attack to be made by the corps of Wright, Parke, and Ord, the foUowmg morn- * After the close of the action, General Sheridan, for some reason as yet un- explained, relieved General Warren from duty, and assigned General Griffin to the command of the Fifth Corps. In saying that this act is " as yet unexr plained," it will hardly be interpreted in the sense that I am unaware of the reasons stated by General Sheridan in his official report, but that these reasons are wholly inadequate to justify that officer's conduct. It is needless here to enter into the discussion of this painful question ; for General Warren has ex- hausted it in a brochure, lately published, under the title of " An Account of the Fifth Army Corps at the Battle of Five Forks." G02 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. ing. Being apprehensive, however, that Lee might during the night Avithdraw this force and fall ujDon Sheridan in his isolated position, he ordered Miles' division of Humphreys' corps to his support, and commanded all the guns in the Petersburg lines to be opened in a general bombardment. This, beginning at nightfall of the 1st, was kept up till four A. M. of the 2d April. At earliest dawn of Sunday, the 2d, the assault was opened, from the Appomattox to Hatcher's Eun, by the troops of Parke, Wright, and Ord. Parke on the right, with the Ninth Corps, carried the outer line of intrenchments ; but the posi- tion of that corps confronted that portion of the Confederate defences longest held and most strongly fortified, and after the outer line had been penetrated, the Confederates were found holding an inner cordon of works, from which Parke could not force them. Wright, with the Sixth Corps, next on the left of the Ninth, assaulting at four A. M., carried every thing before him. Hav- ing attained the Boydton plankroad, he swept to the left down the Confederate intrenchments, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was closely followed by two divisions of Ord's command, and continued on until he met the other division of Ord's that had succeeded in forcing the lines near Hatcher's Run, when the united forces swung to the right and proceeded by the Boydton plankroad towards Petersburg. When these successes were reported, Humphreys, holding the Union left to the west of Hatcher's Run, advanced with two divisions of the Second Corps (the divisions of Hays and Mott) and stormed and carried a redoubt in his front. Seeing this lost, the Confederates abandoned this position, and Hum- phreys moved up the Boydton plankroad and connected with the left of the Sixth Corps. The other of Humphreys' divi- sions, under Miles, pursued whatever debris of the enemy remained west of Hatcher's Run. This force retreated north- ward to Sutherland Station, on the Southside Railroad, where it was overtaken by Miles, who in a spirited charge dis- THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 603 lodged and defeated it, taking two guns and six hundred prisoners. On reaching the lines immediately around Petersburg, a part of Ord's command, under General Gibbon, began an as- sault with the view to break through to the city. The attack was directed against Forts Gregg and Alexander, two strong, inclosed works, the most salient and commanding south of Petersburg. The former of these redoubts was Manned by Harris's Mississippi Brigade, numbering two huudi-ed and fifty men ; and this handful of skilled marksmen conducted the defence with such intrepidity, that Gibbon's forces, surging repeatedly against it, were each time thrown back. At lengtli, at seven a. M., a renewed charge carried the work ; but not till its two hundred and fifty defenders had been reduced to thirty ; and it is calculated that each of these riflemen struck down at least two assailants, for Gibbon's loss was above five hundred men. The other fort found no such defenders, and readily fell. This being accomplished, the Union line of in- vestment was drawn close around the city. The result of these operations was, that the Confederates, having lost most of their outer system of defences, w^ere pressed back to a chain of works immediately around Peters- burg. But as they had here a short and strong line, with their left resting on the Appomattox on the east of Petersburg and their right on the same river on the west side, they still protected the city, and the Union force, weighty as it was, found it impossible to dislodge them. Lee, indeed, was even able to make, in the old style, an oflensive sally or two, for about ten A. M. a sHght re-enforcement came to him. Longstreet having at length discovered that the force that for many days had confronted him on the north side of the James was httle more than a mask, drew therefrom several of his brigades, and at the hour named reached Petersburg, accompanied by Benning's brigade of Field's division. This increase of his lorce, shght though it was, together with the protracted resist- ance offered by Fort Gregg, enabled Lee to establish what of force remained to him in such wise as would best avail for G04 CAMPxVIQNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. the defence of tlie city. General A. P. Hill tlien pushed for- ward the division of Heth on the Confederate left, in an effort to regain some commanding ground held by the Ninth Corps. The attack was made with such vigor and pressed so heavily on that corps, that it was with difficulty it could maintain its ground, and the garrison of the defences of City Point had to be ordered up to its support. This may be accounted the last blow struck by the Army of Northern Virginia while cov- ering Riclimond ; and it is noteworthy that in its execution fell General A. P. Hill, who in all the operations that from first to last filled up the four years' defence of the Confederate capital, had borne a most distinguished part. In thus maintaining a stubborn attitude of resistance at the threshold of Petersburg, Lee had now but one thought, which was to hold his ground ' until the oncoming of night should enable him to put into execution the ulterior design he had formed. This design was communicated to the Pichmond authorities in a message sent by Lee about eleven o'clock of the forenoon of that same Sunday. It was received by Mr. Davis while worshipping at the church of Saint Paul's ; and those who, as he passed out, marked his countenance (on which it seemed the burden of an additional score of years had in a moment fallen), knew that message could bear nothing but tidings of direful import. It announced Lee's purpose of that night abandoning Peters- burg and Richmond. V. THE RETREAT AND PURSUIT. It may well be supposed that the purpose of the hardy captain who designed to " make an end of it before going back," was not relaxed, but rather intensified by the events of the past two days ; and forecasting what must be the next THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. G05 move of his antagonist, Grant, on the night of the 2J, had ah-eady begun his dispositions to checkmate him. To Lee there was but one Kne of retreat that led anywhere but to destruction. This Avas up the Appomattox, parallel with the Southside Railroad, and Avestward to the Danville line. But the Fifth Union Corps was already at Sutherland's Station on the Southside Railroad, ten miles west of Petersburg, and Sheridan, with the cavaby, on the night of the 2d bivouacked at Ford's, ten miles still further to the west. This estoppel compelled Lee, at the outset, to make his retreat by the north bank of the Appomattox, and threw him upon the exterior line. To the Union force set free for pursuit, in case that should be the order, was added, on the night of the 2d, the Second Corps under Humphreys, to whom was at the same time sent a ponton-train. The Sixth and Ninth corps and Ord's com- mand, meantime, held their close-drawn lines of investment around Petersburg, while from the north side of the James Weitzel watched Richmond. But not all the wary eyes of peering pickets served to dis- cover what was that night passing in the Confederate camp. When the long twilight of that May-day Sunday had faded out in the west, and deep darkness had settled down over the sleeping Union host, a silent withdrawal was begun from the whole Confederate front. The Petersburg force, retiring noiselessly through the town, filed over to the north bank of the Appomattox. Thence marching northward to Chester- field Courthouse, midway between Petersburg and Richmond, it was joined by the division holding the front of Bermuda Hundred. At the same time whatever force remained on the Richmond side was drawn in, and moved southward to Ches- terfield Courthouse, when the whole Confederate army headed westward. The evacuation was conducted with wonderful address; and the march being pushed vigorously all night, the Army of Northern Virginia, now reduced to twentj^-fivo thousand men, had by dawn put sixteen miles between it and Petersburg. 606 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. It is said by those who were with the Confederate com- mander, that his spirits were unusually light and cheerful on the morning of the 3d. " I have got my army safe out of its breastworks," said he, " and, in order to follow me, my enemy must abandon his hues, and can derive no further benefit from his railroads or the James Kiver." What then might he now reasonably hope for ? He could certainly not dream of the triumph of his cause. That is not to be supposed. But he might hope so to conduct affairs as to obtain advantageous terms of peace for the Confederacy. And it is certain that he did expect to effect a successful retreat — to escape entirely from the toils of his antagonist — to unite with the army under Johnston, and then so to act as to elicit good overtures not only for the capitulation of his army, but for the settlement of a basis of peace, Avliich, the Confederate government being fugitive, he took it upon himself to negotiate should opportu- nity be afforded. How this hope was dashed to the ground, as well by unforeseen misfortunes that befell Lee as by the prodigious vigor with which Grant pushed the pursuit, will appear in the course of this narrative. It is now neces- sary to look to the dispositions and movements of the Union columns. When in the gray dawn of Monday, April 3d, the skirmish- ers advanced from the lines before Petersburg, the city was found to bo evacuated. At the same time the Union force on the lines confronting Richmond from the north side of the James was startled hj a clamorous uproar, and the sky was seen to be Ut up with a lurid glare. Surmising the meaning of this direful blazon. General Weitzel threw forward a cavalry party that, entering the city without let, planted its guidons on the Capitol. Thus Richmond fell ! Marvellous as had been the one year's defence of the Confederate capital, its fall was not less strange. Occupied, not captured, Richmond, to gain which such heca- tombs of lives had been sacrificed, was at length given up by the civil authorities to a body of forty troopers ! THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 607 The explanation of the portentous sounds and sights was soon learned. To the rear-guard, under Ewell, had been left the last duty of blowing up the iron-clad vessels in the James and the bridges across that river ; and it was the noise of the explosions that first announced to General Weitzel that Richmond was given up. But the Confederate officials, in addition to this work of destruction (which cannot be con- demned on the score that it was not warranted by the rules of war), adopted a measure shocking to every sense of humanity. It appears that the warehouses of Richmond contained great store of government tobacco, and the cruel and senseless order was given to fire these — as though it were possible with impunity to play with the devouring element! The flames, spreading to the neighboring build- ings, soon involved a wide and widening area ; and, though the Union force, on its entry, labored to put out the fire it could not be subdued until the heart of the city, including all the business section, was laid in ashes. It was amid such scenes that Richmond fell, with the smoke of the torment of the Confederacy ascending to heaven, while far away all that remained of the Confederate army hastened beyond the sunset. But little did Grant reck of Richmond ; and already, since morning revealed the flight of the Confederates, he had been pressing to the uttermost the march of his columns. Pur- sued and pursuers fared forth by parallel lines — Lee by the north side of the Appomattox, Grant by the south bank. Let us see whither led all this mad haste. The Danville Railroad, Lee's line of retreat, runs southwest from Richmond, and is intersected by the Southside or Lynch- burg Railroad, which runs westward from Petersburg, at Burkesville, which is fifty-eight miles from Richmond by the former road, and fifty-two miles from Petersburg by the latter road. Burkesville, therefore, was to Lee a strategic point of the first importance, for if he should be anticipated in its posses- sion, he would be forced oft' the direct Danville line, and G08 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. coulcT only recover it, if at all, by a great detour to the west. This, accordingly, was his first objective. The march of the Union forces was conducted by two lines : the troops of the Army of the James, under General Ord, by the line of the Southside or Lynchburg Eailroad, towards Burkesville, and Sheridan, with the cavalry and Fifth Corps, followed by the Second and Sixth corps of the Army of the Potomac, by routes near the Appomattox, to strike the Danville Kailroad north of Burkesville. Lee's march led by the north bank of the Appomattox for thirty miles west, when it was necessary to cross that stream at Goode's bridge in order to strike the Danville road at Amelia Courthouse, thirty-eight miles west of Eichmond and Petersburg, Pushing the advance vigorously during the 3d, Lee next day reached Amelia Courthouse. Here a dire and unlooked-for anguish befell him. When Lee determined to abandon Petersburg and Eich- mond, he dispatched orders that large supplies of commis- sary and quartermasters' stores should be sent forward from Danville to Amelia Courthouse, there to await the arrival of his columns. "When, however, on Sunday afternoon, the loaded train of cars reached Amelia Courthouse, the officer in charge was met by an order from the Eichmond authorities to bring on the train to Eichmond, it being the design to use the cars in the transportation of the personel and prop- erty of the Confederate government. Interpreting this order in the sense that the train and its contents should be taken to Eichmond, the officer, wdthout unloading the stores at Amelia Courthouse, carried on cars, freight and all ; and the rations on which Lee had depended for the subsistence of his army were consumed in the general conflagration of Eichmond ! Such were the agonizing tidings that met the Confederate commander on his arrival at Amelia Courthouse ; and one can well imagine how, from that moment, all his hopes were dashed to the ground. Lee had fairly counted, that as Grant had, for the purpose of rapid pursuit, broken up his force into THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 609 several bodies, an opportuuity would present itself to fall upon these fractions in detail, should his retreat become seri- ously endangered. But, to accomplish this, it was necessary that he should have his whole army, now not much above twenty tliousand men, well in hand. This, in the absence of rations, was no longer possible; for, in order to keep life in what force remained to him, it became incumbent on him to break up a moiety of it into foraging parties. At Amelia Courthouse, where Lee had arrived the morn- ing of the 4th, he was compelled to remain during the whole of that and the following day; and this forced delay gave Sheridan, who, with the cavalry and the Fifth Corps, was pushing the advance impetuously far in the van of the re- mainder of the army, time to strike in upon the Confederate line of retreat. This he did the afternoon of the 4th, at Jetersville, on the Danville Railroad, seven miles southwest of Amelia Courthouse. Thus headed off from the direct line of retreat, there was for Lee but one alternative — to fall upon Sheridan's isolated force in the attempt to overwhelm it and recover the Dan- ville route, or, by doubhng on his track, take up an eccen- tric and exterior line. But, in reality, the first course was, under the circumstances, out of the question. Sheridan, in- deed, has animadverted upon Lee's want of activity here. " It seems to me," says he, " that this was the only chance the Army of Northern Virginia had to save itself, which might have been done had General Lee promptly attacked and driven back the comparatively small force opposed to him, and pursued his march to Burkesville Junction." * But it is not clear what this distinguished ofiicer means by a " comparatively small force." Sheridan had with him at Jet- ersviUe above eighteen thousand excellent cavalry and in- fantry, well intrenched ; while he himself reported Lee's entire strength at Amelia Courthouse as twenty thousand ; and it has been seen that half of this force was broken up * Sheridan : Report of Operations. 610 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. into foraging parties. In fact, to attempt escape was all that now remained to Lee. Late in the afternoon of the 5th, General Meade, with the Second and Sixth corps of the Army of the Potomac, joined Sheridan at Jetersville, where, expecting attack, he had held his force intrenched since the previous day. Lee was still at Amelia Courthouse. Meanwhile, Sheridan had been operat- ing with his cavalry well to his left, to watch if Lee should make any attempt to escaj)e by that flank. On the morning of the 5th, Brigadier-General Davies, with a mounted force, advanced to Paine's Cross-roads, where he struck a train of a hundred and eighty wagons, escorted by a body of Confed- erate cavalry, which he defeated, destroying the wagons and capturing five pieces of artillery and a number of prisoners. Gregg's and Smith's brigades of the Second Cavalry Division were sent out to support Davies, and some heavy fighting en- sued — the Confederates having sent a considerable force of infantry to cut off the latter ; but the attempt was thwarted. The night of the 5th, Lee moved from Amelia. His only hope now was to make a race to Farmville (west thirty-five miles), there cross the Appomattox once more, and, by de- stroying the bridges after him, escape into the mountains beyond Lynchburg. When, therefore, on the morning of the 6th, the whole Army of the Potomac, which, the night pre- vious, had been concentrated at Jetersville, moved northward towards Amelia to give battle to the Confederates, it was found that Lee had slipped past. The direction of the corps was then changed : the Sixth Corps moved from the right to the left ; the Second Corps was ordered to move by Deatons- ville ; and the Fifth and Sixth corps to move in parallel direc- tions on the right and left. As Lee was retreating by the Deatonsville route, this disposition of the pursuing forces placed one column in his rear on the same road by which he was moving, a second column by a parallel route to the south, and a third column by a parallel route to the north. Mean- while, the Army of the James, which had been pushing its THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 611 march by the Hne of the Lynchburg Raiboad, had reached Burkesville ; and on the morning of the 6th General Ord was directed towards Farmville. In order, if possible, to reach and destroy the bridges near that place, Ord sent forward a hght column, consisting of two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Brigadier General Theodore Read. This force met the head of Lee's column near Farmville, and Read heroically attacked it in the effort to detain the Confed- erate column until the main force should be able to make up with it. That gallant officer sacrificed his Hfe in the execu- tion of this duty, and his command was overwhelmed ; but the attack served the intended purpose, and so delayed the movements of the enemy, that Ord had time to arrive with the Arm}'^ of the James. Upon this, the Confederate force immediately intrenched itself. Sheridan, who had now with him only the cavalry, formed the van of the column that was marching on the southern parallel route ; and he was deploying all the resoiu'ces of an energy that seemed to grow hotter and hotter with the chase, to head off the hunted prey. Near Deatonsville, that same 6th, he strucK in upon the Confederate wagon-train escorted by a formidable force of infantry and cavahy. To wrest this prize from its guardians Sheridan made admirable dispositions. He ordered Crook's division to attack the train, and if the covering force proved too strong, one of the divisions would, while Crook held fast to and pressed the enemy, pass him and attack a point further on ; and this di- vision was ordered to do the same, and so on alternately. This method of action would, he judged, enable him finally to strike some weak point. This result was obtained just south of Sailor's Creek, a small tributary of the Appomattox that, running northward, empties into that stream a few miles east of Farmville. Custer's divi- sion gained the road, and the divisions of Crook and Devin coming up to its support, four hundred wagons were destroyed, and sixteen pieces of artillery and many prisoners were cap- tured. EweU's corps, which was following behind the train. 612 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. was thus cut off from its line of retreat. To detain this force as long as possible, so that the infantry might have time to come up, was now Sheridan's desire, and with this view he or- dered a mounted charge, which was executed in a very spirited manner by one of his brigades under Colonel Stagg. When the head of column of the Sixth Corps came in sight the Confederates began retiring, whereupon Seymour's division was directed to carry the road. This being done, the Confederates fell back slowly, skirmishing and turning with such sharp and sudden sallies of resis^tance, that a halt had to be called to get up Wheaton's division of the Sixth Corps. This took position on the left of Seymour, whereupon a renewed advance was made, and the Confeder- ates were driven until the lines of the Sixth Corps reached Sailor's Creek. Then from the north bank could be descried the cavalry on the high ground above the creek and south of it, and the long lines of smoke from the burning wagons be- yond. But even while thus environed, these men showed they could still exact a price before yielding ; and when an advance was made by a part of the Sixth Corps, they delivered so deadly a fire that a portion of that veteran line bent and broke under it. But the numbers were too unequal, too over- whelming ; and when a simultaneous assault was made by the Sixth Corps in front and the cavalry in flank and rear, Ewell's troops, finding themselves surrounded, threw down their arms in token of surrender. The captures included nearly all that remained of the corps of that officer, with Lieutenant- General Ewell himseK and four other general officers. The decisive character of this result was largely due to the energetic movements of the Second Corps, which, moving to the right, had pressed the Confederates closely in a rear-guard fight all day till night, when it had attained a position near the mouth of Sailor's Creek. Here the Confederates were so crowded upon, that a large train was captured and many hundreds were taken prisoners. The trophies of the Second Corps included, in addition several pieces, of artillery and thirteen flags. THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. (513 Lee, meanwhile, with the rehcs of his army, continued the retreat during the night, and passed to the north bank of the Aj^pomattox by bridges near Farmville, Such are the mere bald facts that, thus far, marked the re- treat and pursuit. But it would need other colors in which trul}' to paint that terrible race for life ; and one would haye to seek its like in what befell upon the snowy wastes of Mus- covy in the winter of 1812. The Confederates began the retreat with but one ration, and when no supplies were met at Amelia Courthouse, they were reduced to such scant store as could be collected from the poor and almost exliausted region through which they passed. This resource, moreoTer, grew more and more pre- carious, for the area of the foragers .was so restricted by the clouds of enterprising Union cavahy, that they could collect less and less. Those men yveve fortunate who had in their pockets a few handfuls of corn which they might parch by the wayside ; but many had naught wherewithal to assuage the pangs of hunger save the buds and twigs of spring that, with its exuberant bourgeon, seemed to mock the sere and deso- late winter of their fortunes. The misery of the famished troops during the 4th, 5tli, 6th, and 7th of April, jjasses all experience of military anguish since the retreat from the banks of the Beresina. " Towards evening of the 5th," says an eye-witness, " and all day long upon the 6th, hundreds of men dropped from exhaustion, and thousands let fall their muskets from inability to carry them any further. The scenes of the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th were of a nature which can be apprehended in its vivid reality only by men who are thor- oughly familiar with the harrowing details of war." While the sufferings of the men were thus severe, those of the horses and mules were even keener ; for of forage there was none, and the grass had not yet sprouted. Of course, in this condition of the draught-animals the locomotion of the trains and artillery could be but slow. Moreover, the long lines of wagons, filling miles of the road, frequently cut in Gl ^ CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. upon the route of the infantry columns, delaying them for half a day at a time : so that, from this and other reasons, the march had to be mainly conducted by night, which added the want of rest to the sum of miseries accumulating fast and faster on the hapless host of fugitives. Dark divisions, sink- ing in the woods for a few hours' repose, would hear suddenly the boom of hostile guns and the clatter of the hoofs of the ubiquitous cavalry, and they had to up and hasten off as fast as their wearied limbs would carry them. Thus pressed upon on all sides, driven like sheep before prowling wolves, with blazing wagons in front and rear, amid hunger, fatigue, and sleeplessness, continuing day after day, they fared towards the setting sun — " Such resting found the soles of unblest feet !" ULTIMO SUSPIRO. When, on the night of the 6th, the Army of Northern Vir- ginia had put the Appomattox between it and its pursuers, a group of the chief officers met around the bivouac-fire to take counsel together touching their fortunes. General Lee alone was not of the number. The result of the interchange of views was to reduce the possibilities of the situation to three hues of conduct. 1. To disband, allowing the troops to make their way as best they might to some fixed rallying point. 2. To abandon the trains and cut their way through the opposing lines. 3. To surrender. But it was soon seen that, in reality, two of these courses were excluded. To disband would be to give up all; for there was little likelihood that the troops could ever be rallied, while their dispersion over the country would neces- sarily entail unnumbered ills upon the inhabitants. To cut their way through was more easy to talk about than to do ; THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. G15 and even if tliey succeeded in effecting this purpose, tlio army, without a train or artillery or materiel, would lose all organization, and must starve. It resulted that there seemed to be no alternative but surrender. This was the voice of the council ; and General Pendleton was appointed to communi- cate the conclusion to General Lee. But the Confederate commander did not think such extrem- ity was yet upon him ; or, rather, he did not think he could with honor surrender until he should be compelled to surren- der; and this had not yet been. Moreover, all deliberation was cut short by an ominous outburst of sound which told that the hunter was again upon the track of the hunted, ^lien the whole of the Confederate column had filed across the Appomattox, near Farmville, which was not till towards dawn of the 7th, the bridges were fired to prevent pursuit. But the Second Corps, under Humphreys, taking up an early pursuit, came up with the Confederates at High Bridge, six miles east of FarmviUe. The rear-guard was overtaken just as it had fired the wagon-road bridge, and as the second span of the railroad bridge was burning ; but Humphreys succeeded in saving the wagon-road bridge — a matter of great importance, as the Ap- pomattox was unfordable. A considerable force of the Con- federates was observed drawn up in a strong position on the heights on the opposite bank to dispute the passage, while the bridge was held by skirmishers. These were, however, quickly driven off, and the Second Corps crossed. Barlow's division leading. ArtiUery was put in position to cover an attack ; but this was unnecessary, for the Confederate force retu-ed. A redoubt, forming the bridge-head on the south bank, was blown up as the Union troops approached, eight guns being abandoned to the pursuers, as were also ten others on the north bank. High Bridge was saved with the loss of four spans. Humphreys then took up the pursuit, with the division of Miles and De Trobriand, on the Old Stage road leading to Appomattox Courthouse, while Barlow's division was directed on FarmviUe, distant three miles. Barlow found this place in 616 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. possession of a considerable force of the enemy, that was burning the bridges there, and covering a wagon-train moving towards Lynchburg ; but on Barlow's approach it abandoned the place, destroying one hundred and thirty wagons, and rejoined the main body of Lee's army. This Humphreys found intrenclied in a strong position four or five miles north of Farmville, covering the stage and plank roads to Lynchburg. It proved to be too formidable for a front attack — the ground being open and sloping up gi-adu- ally to a crest about a thousand yards distant, which was cov- ered with intrenchments ^nd batteries. An attempt was then made to take it in flank, but the Confederate flanks were found to extend both on the right and left beyond the line of Humphrey's divisions, and it became manifest that all that re- mained of the Army of Northern Virginia was present. Bar- low's division was then ordered up. Meanwhile Humphreys, having extended his right the length of one division, ordered Miles to make an attack with three regiments ; but these met a complete repulse, sufi'ering the loss of above six hundred in killed and wounded. It was too late to renew operations when Barlow arrived, and during the night Lee again re- treated. "While these events were in progress, Sheridan dispatched two of his mounted divisions to Prince Edward Courthouse, and a third, that of Crook, to Farmville. The bridges having been burnt at this point, the horsemen crossed with great dif- ficulty by wading ; though the Sixth Corps, which was moving on the same line, was so delayed that it was not able to make the passage until night. Crook struck a train on the north side of Appomattox ; but it was too well defended by infantry ; and after a sharp skirmish the cavalry was driven ofi", General Gregg, commanding one of the brigades, being captured. The night of the 7th General Lee received the following communication : April 7, 1865. General : — The result of the last week must convince you of the hopeless- ness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this TIIE FINAL CAMPAIGN. G17 struggle. I feel that it ia so, and regard it as my duty to sliill from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. General E. E. Lke. It was at FarinYille that General Grant wrote this message, and lie was prompted by the belief that "General Lee's chances of escape were now utterly hopeless," Lee indited his reply that same night, but before General Grant received it, the Confederate commander had again put a long night's march between his army and its pursuers. It was in these words : General : — I have received your note of this date. Though not entertain- ing the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid use- less eflFusion of blood, and, therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. Robert E. Lee, General. Lieutenaxt-Gkneral U. S. Grant. To this General Grant immediately rephed : April 8, 1865. General :— Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of the same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say that peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely : that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you might name for tli" same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Vir- ginia will be received. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. General R. E. Lke. Meanwhile, Lee's night march of the 7th having again left the Union forces considerably behind, it was necessary to renew pursuit on the morning of the 8th. The Second and Sixth corps of the Ai'my of the Potomao 618 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. moved by tlie north bank of the Appomattox, while Sheridan advanced by the south bank, and, followed by Ord's command and the Fifth Corps, struck out for Appomattox station on the Lynchburg Kaih-oad. Lee's line of retreat was now by the narrow neck of land betwirt the Appomattox and the James. If its outlet towards Lynchburg was closed, all was lost for Lee. Sheridan was hastening to close this outlet. Desperate as the situation was, Lee, determined to put the best face on matters, with a kind of grim humor, wrote, but flying as he wrote : April 8, 1865. General : — I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine of yes- terday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, / do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army ; but, as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia, but as far as your proposal may effect the Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A. m., to-morrow, on the old stage road to Richmond, between the picket lines of the two armies. R. E, Lee, General. Lieutknant-General Grant. This note Grant received about midnight, and next morning he replied in these terms : April 9, 1865. General, :— Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace : the meeting proposed for ten a. m. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, general, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, &c., U. S. Grant, Lieutenant>-General. General E. E. Lee. But, before Lee received this, the time for parley had THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. G19 passed. The evening of the 8tli, after a march of above thirty miles, Sheridan reached Appomattox station on the Lynchhurg Kaih'oad, five miles south of Appomattox Court- house. The rear-guard of Lee's army had just arrived, and four trains of cars, loaded Avitli supplies for the starving Confederates, were approaching. Sheridan, by throwing a force in rear of the trains, captured them, and then assailing the vanguard, drove it back to Appomattox Courthouse. Here he planted his force directly in front of Lee and on his line of retreat, and resolved to hold fast for the night, knowing that the Army of the James would join him in the morning, whilst the Army of the Potomac would strike the rear of the Confederates. But one escape now remained to Lee, which was to cut his way through Sheridan's lines, and this he attempted at dawn. The once proud array of the Army of Northern Yu-ginia now presented this sorry spectacle. A thin line of battle, made up of Gordon's troops in front ; another scant line composed of the wreck of Longstreet's corps in rear — in all about eight thousand men. Between the two were the debris of the wag- on-train and the gaunt figures of some thousands of unarmed stragglers, too weak to carry their muskets. Lee sent orders to Gordon to cut his way through at all hazards. This was immediately begun with wonderful impetuosity, and the cav- alry, that had dismounted to resist the attack, found itself forced back. At this juncture Sheridan personally arrived from Appomattox Station, w^iither he had been to hasten the march of the Army of the James, That officer immediately directed his troopers to fall back gradually, resisting the enemy, so as to give the infantry time to come up and form its lines. This was soon effected ; and the moment the Con- federates caught sight of the advancing bayonets, they ceased their pressure and began to give ground. Then Sheridan, sounding the order to mount, dashed with his cavalry and placed it on the enemy's left flank. He was just about to charge on the trains and confused mass, when one bearing a white flag emerged from the Confederate lines with a letter 020 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AKMY OF THE POTOMAC. from General Lee, requesting a suspension of liostilities look- ing to a surrender, and an interview with General Grant. This meeting was had at a dwelling in Appomattox Court- house, where the rival chieftains, sitting together at a deal table, reduced to form the act that put out of existence the Army of Northern Virginia. The agreement was embodied in the two following papers : Appomattox Courthouse, Va., April 9, 1865. General : — In accordance with tlie substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms — to ^vit : Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The offi- cers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against tlie United States until properly exchanged ; and each company or regimental commander to sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public property to be packed and stacked, and turned over to the officers ap- pointed by me to receive them. This Avill not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his liome, not to be disturbed by United States au- thority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where tliey may reside. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. General R. E. Lee. Headquarteks Army of Northern Virginia, April 0, 18G5. General :— I have received your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. I wiU proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. IL E. Lee, General. Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. These terms were, on the part of General Grant, liberal and magnanimous ; and that officer displayed throughout the transaction the delicacy of a great soul. In the course of the afternoon, the result of this momentous interview became known to both armies, and then all the in- THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 021 tense, yet strangely diverse emotions which the intelhgenco was calculated to evoke, broke out in manifestations that pass all words of description. On the Union side there was joy unmixed and unrestrained — the joy of men that had gone through great tribulation, the joy of an army that, often un- fortunate and ever unappreciated, saw at length unparalleled labors crowned by illustrious success. On the Confederate side there was a kind of joy, too — such sad joy as men feel when a long agony is over. Yet there could not fail to be deep anguish in their hearts ; and this burst forth when Gen- eral Lee rode through the ranks. " "Whole lines of battle," says an eye-witness,^ " rushed up to their beloved old chief, and, choking with emotion, struggled with each other to wring him once more by the hand. Men who had fought throughout the war, and knew what the agony and humiliation of that mo- ment must be to him, strove witli a refinement of unselfishness and tenderness which he alone could fully aj)jjreciate, to lighten his burden and mitigate his pain. With tears pouring down both cheeks. General Lee at length commanded voice enough to say : ' Men, we have fought through the war to- gether. I have done the best that I could for you.' Not an eye that looked on that scene was dry." As the armies were enepiies no longer, there was no need of martial array that night, nor fear of surprise, nor call to arms ; but hostile devisement gave place to mutual helpfulness, and the victors shared their rations with the famished van- quished. In that supreme moment these men knew and re- spected each other. If the one army drank the joy of victory, and the other the bitter draught of defeat, it was a joy moder- ated by the recollection of the cost at which it had been pur- chased, and a defeat mollified by the consciousness of many triumphs. If the victors could recall a Malvern Hill, an Antie- tam, a Gettysburg, a Five Forks, the vanquished could recall a Manassas, a Fredericksburg, a Chancellorsville, a Cold Har- bor. If at length the army of Northern Yirginia fell before the massive power of the North, yet what vitality had it shown ! How terrible had been the struggle ! How mau^? 622 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AR^fT OF THE POTOMAC. livindreds of thousands of brave men had fallen before that result could be achieved ! And this is the glory of the Army of the Potomac, that it brought to the ground the adversary which had ever been the head and front of the revolt, and that in crushing it, it quelled the rebellion. For so decisive upon the issue of the war was the surrender of that army, that the capitulation of all the other Confederate armies followed as a corollary therefrom, and the structure of the Confederacy, losing its key-stone, fell with a resounding crash. Three days after the surrender, the Confederates marched by divisions to a designated spot in the neighborhood of Appomattox Courthouse, and there the troops stacked their arms and deposited their accoutrements. Less than eight thousand presented themselves with muskets in their hands ; but the capitulation included, in addition, about eighteen thou- sand unarmed. Paroles were then distributed to the men, and the Army of Northern Virginia passed out of existence. The Union troops then retraced their steps to Richmond, whence they were soon afterwards transferred to Washington. Here uniting with their illustrious sister-army of the West, they passed in review before the President and his cabinet, and the representatives of foreign powers, and an immense concourse of citizens, who with great rejoicings welcomed home the men whose valor had won the peace that now reigned over all the land. When the pageant was ended, the troops were mustered out of service, and the men, doffing the Union blue, were quietly reabsorbed into the body of society. Thus the Army of the Potomac — that mighty creation of the patriotism of a free people, which for four years had waged a struggle unparalleled in its continuous intensity — ceased to be, closing its career in the wprld and the world's wars by the happy re-establishment of the Union for which it had fought. What it belonged to me to say of this army is now com- pleted. It is worthy of, and will doubtless find, a better his- torian. Yet, inadequate as is the performance, I am con- THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 623 scions of Laving wronglit with a lanclablo aim — to wit : to speak the trnth with candor, and to challenge for that army the recognition which is justly its due, but which has not yet been accorded it — the work it did and the circum- stances under which it was done being both little under- stood. INDEX Abatis, the use of, in battle, 20. Alexandria, Va., captured by Federal troops, 30. Autietam, map of mancEuvres on, 199 ; the battle of, 208 ; the positions of the two armies, 208 ; Lee's force at, 209 ; the movement across the Antietara on Lee's left flank, 209 ; the desperate struggle between McClellan's right and Lee's left, 213 ; Sumner's appearance before the Confederate left, 213 ; Burnside at the lower stone l)ridge, 219 ; the operations on McClellan's left un- der Burnside, 219 ; Franklin ar- rives and re-enforces McClellan's right, 219 ; McClellan's urgent or- der to Burnside — the latter's de- lay to advance on Lee's riglit, 220 ; Burnside driven back by Confed- erate re-enforcements, 221 ; the losses of both armies, 221 ; Lee's withdrawal to Virginia, 222 ; McClellan's intentions as to re- newed attack, 222. Archduke Charles, the, on duties of a general, 131. Army of Northern Virginia — see Con- federate army. Army of the Potomac in History, 13 ; its adversary, IG ; organization of the, 60 ; engineer establishment of the, (15 ; artillery organization of the, 6'} ; brigade organization of the, 65 ; strengtli and condition of, on McClellan assuming command, 62 ; strength available for ad- vance, 70 ; army corps, McClel- lan's intentions,' 64 ; first disposi- tion of the, 27 ; first crossed into Virginia, 30; Manassas campaign — see Manassas ; inactivity during winter of 1861-2, reasons ad- 40 vanced for, 71 ; comparative disci- pline in 1861 and 1S62, 72 ; organ- ization into four corps by the Pres- ident, 88 ; resumes its positions of previous to battle of Fair Oaks, 139 : strength, June 26, 1861, 142 ; Gaines' Mills battle, 149; right wing on the south bank of Chicka- hominy River, 153 ; retreat to the James commenced, 154 ; order of march across White Oak Swamp, 155 ; concentrated at Malvern Hill — the battle of, 160 ; witlidraws from Malvern Hill to Harrison's Bar, 164 : its bravery and endur- ance on the Penmsuia, 166 ; num- ber brought back to Harrison's Landing, 167; ordered to with- draw to Aquia Creek. 171 ; trans- ferred to Aquia Creek and Alex- andria, ria Fortress Monroe, 174 ; Army of Virginia absorbed into, 193 ; movement towards Frederick, 197 ; moves towards Harper's Fer- ry, 201 ; arrives at South Moun- tain, 202 ; at Aniietam. 208 ; posi- ti:)n after battle of Autietam, 225 ; reorganization of operations after Autietam, 225 ; crossed the Poto- mac into Virginia, 226 ; McClellan removed and Burnside a])pointed to command, 227 : its change of base to Fredericksburg, 230 ; reor- ganized by Burnside into three grand divisions, 231 ; moves trom Warrenton, 233 ; the battle of Fred- ericksburg, 238 ; " mud march," 258 ; Hooker placed in com man I, 261 ; spirit of the officers under Burnside, 262; Chancellorsvillo campaign, 267 ; cavalry, Hookfi's organization of the, 268 ; tlie badge eystem and its value, 268 : 626 INDEX. its strength before Chancellors- ville, 2(jy : passage of the Rai)pa- hannock before Chancellorsville, 270; strength after Chancellors- ville, 310 ; Meade appointed to com- mand, 823 ; Hooker resigns com- mand, 323 ; Gettysl)urg campaign, 32(5 ; campaign of manoeuvres, 373 ; Mine iJiui move, 398 ; in win- ter-quarters, 398 ; overland cam- paign, the, 402 ; reorganized into three corps — Hancock, Sedgwick, and Warren, 410 ; Slieridan ap- pointed to command cavalry, 412 ; before Petersburg, 507; ceases to exist, G22. Army of Virginia formed by McDow- ell's, Fremont's, and Banks's ar- mies, 1G8 ; absorbed into the Po- tomac army, 193. Auburn, Stuart bivouacks within Union lines at, 381 ; Caldwell attacked in rear at, 381. Austrian Aulic council and its Wash- ington prototype, 90. Banks's (Department of the Shenan- doah) position during McClellan's advance, 122 ; at Strasburg with 16,000 men, 122 ; fights at, and retreats from, Winchester to north bank of Potomac, 125 ; General, at battle of Cedar Mountain, 173. Badge system of the Potomac army, its origin and value, 268. Baker, Colonel, death at battle of Ball's Bluff, 77. Ball's Bluff, the battle of, 75. Barnard, General, on early ideas on quelling the rebellion, 29 ; on as- saulting Yorktown, 110; on the passage of the Chickahominy, 130. Bethel, Butler, General, plan for cap- ture of Big and Little, 31. Big Bethel, the affair of, 31. Birney, evidence on Meade's attack at Fredericksburg, 248. Blackburn's Ford, General Tyler's re- pulse at, 48. Blair, Postmaster-General, on advance viii York River, 83. Blenker's division detached from Mc- Clellan to join Fremont, 93. Bolivar Heights, the position of, 206. Bottom's Bridge, purpose of throwing Potomac army on Richmond side of the Chickahominy, 121. Boydton plankroad, action of, 542. Braddock Road, origin of the name, 47. Brandy Station, cavalry action at, 313. Bristoe Station, Hooker's defeat of Ew- ell at, 1 79 ; race of the two armies for, 380 ; battle of, 383. Buckland's Mills, Kilpatrick's cavalry action at, 386. Buford, General, at Gettysburg, 328. Bull Run, battle of — see Manassas. Bull Run the Second — see Manassas No. 2. Burgess's Mill — see Southside Railroad. Burnside, General A. E., at Antietam — see Antietam ; appointed to com- mand Potomac army, 227 ; his opinion of his unfitness for the chief command, 230 ; change of base to Fredericksburg considered, 232; his delay at Warrenton to reorganize, 232 ; move to Freder- icksburg, 233 ; intentions and plan of operations via Freder- icksburg, 233 ; opinion on direct crossing at Fredericksburg, 237 ; desperation at repeated failures, 251 ; instructions to wait orders from the President, 257 ; contem- plated attempt on Lee's rear, 257 ; lost the confidence of the army, 258-261 ; his career as commander of the Potomac army considered, 261 ; he resigns his command, 261 ; spirit of his'oiiicers, 262; (Ninth) corps joins Meade, 413 ; the Peters- burg mine, 518. Butler, General B. F., design of raid on Richmond, 398 ; campaign on the James — see James River. Calls for troops by President Lincoln, 14, 29, 30. Campaign of Manoeuvres, 373 ; of ma- noeuvres criticised, 388. Carnot on military discipline, 67 ; on the bombardment of towns, 241 ; on selection of troops for assault, 521. Carrick's Ford, General Garnett de- feated and killed — West Virginia campaign ended, 39. Cedar Creeis, the battle of, 561 ; Gen- eral Wright commanding in Sher- dan's absence, 561 ; retreat of the Union army beyond 'Middletown, 562 ; Sheridan arrives in front, 562 ; Early attacked in turn and routed, 563 ; Early pursued be- yond Strasburg, 563 ; Early re- treats southward, 563. INDEX. 627 Cedar Mountain, Jackson's report of, 17-4; battle of, 17;!. Cedar Kun, attack on VV^arren at, 383. Cemetery liidge, see Gettysburg, 33(3. Centreville, Pope i>auses at alter Ma- nassas No. 2, l'J2 ; the Hank march on, 370 ; Meade strongly posted at, 38.1. Chancellorsville, Hooker's plan of op- erations against Lee's left, 271 ; passage of Ely's Ford, 272 ; pas- of Uermanna Ford, 272 ; passage of United States Ford, 273 ; Hooker in reverse of Lee's position, 273 ; Franklin's movement on Lee's front to cover flank march, 274 ; Hooker jubilant of success, 275 ; topography of the field, 277 ; Hooker commences pushing to- wards open country near Fred- ericksburg, 277 ; observations on the battle, 303 ; Hooker's order to abandon position gained towards open Fredericksburg, 279 ; strat- egic faults of the position, 280 ; Hooker's incomprehensible col- lapse on Lee's advance towards him, '280 ; Hooker's line of battle, 281 ; Jackson's march on Hooker's flank and rear — his force, 283 ; Jackson's attack on Hooker's right rear, 28G ; rout of the Eleventh Corps — not half were Germans, 286 ; Jackson's pursuit of the de- feated right checked, 288 ; Jack- son's attempt to cut Hooker from United States Ford, 289; Sedg- wick's movement on Lee's rear, 292; Sedgwick met at Salem Heights by a column from Chan cellorsville, 298 ; Hooker's forma- tion on second day, 293 ; Chancel- lorsville seized by the Confed- erates, 29.5 ; Hooker prostrated by concusrsion of a shot, 295 ; Fred- ericksburg occupied by Sedgwick, 296 ; for Sedgwick's move on Fred- ericksburg, see Fredericksburg, 296 ; countermarch of part of Lee's army to re-enforce Early, 298 ; Sedgwick checked — his losses, 299 ; positions on the third day, 299 ; Sedgwick's report of losses at, 299 ; Sedgmck attacked and cross- es the Rappahannock, 300 ; Hooker crossed to north bank of the Rap- pahannock, 301 ; the losses on both sides, 301. Cheat River, see Carrick's Ford. Chickahominy and Shenandoah Val- ley's comparative strategy, 121. Chickahominy River, McClellan posted on north bank of, 119 ; McClellan's object in crossing Bottom's Briilge, 121 ; dates of iM cClellan's jjassage, 129; topography of, 130; McCJe-l- lan's ai-my separated by the, 130 ; two methods of extrication open to McClellan, 140 ; the, its relation to Richmond defences, 481. Chickahominy Swamps, the anuy among, after Fair Oaks, 140. Circle of the Hunt, 5(:5. Cold Harbor, tlie battle of, 481 ; suc- cess of Wright and Smith, 483 ; positions of the two armies, 484 ; the Union army repulsed at every point, 485 ; criticism on tactics of, 487 ; the losses at, 487. Commissariat of armies, the importance of, 21. Committee on Conduct of the War, pressure of, 89 ; on McCleUan's march from Williamsburg to the Chickahominy, 119. Confederacy, conscription act passed — Mr. Davis holding absolute control of Southern military resources, 111 ; Johnston and Lee's armies the main armed force of, 404 ; the failure of the conscription system, 571 ; weakened by Grant's refusal to exchange prisoners, 571 ; com- missariat, the collapse of the, 571 ; fighting population was not ex- hausted, but had lost interest, 571 ; Confederate army, first disposition of in Virginia, 27 ; want of discipline, 72 ; strength and positions of, 80 ; for further of — see Lee. Confederate generals, the earliest, 28. Corps d'armee — see army corps, 04. Cramjjton's Gap, Franklin's advance to, 202 ; the Confederate force at, 203 ; the battle of, 201. Cross Keys, the battle of, 127. Culpepper, Longstreet left to occupy during EweU's Shenandoah Valley advance, 314 ; Lee's army at — Meade countermarching on, 378. Culp's HiU — see Gettysburg. Dabney's Mill — see Petersburg. Dahlgren, Colonel, marches towards Richmond — his defeat and death, 400. Davis, Colonel B. F., death at Fleet- wood, 313. INDEX. Davis, Jefiferson, at Manassas, 58. Deep Bottom — see Petersburg. Despondency of the North at the close of 1801,' 78. Detaclied columns of tlie army inviting destruction in detail, 132. Dinwiddle Courthouse, Warren sends re-enforcements to Sheridan, 593. Dufour on army corps, 64 ; on passage of the Adda by Prince Eugene, 410. Early attacked before Fort Stevens, and driven, 527 ; advances towards Washington, 537 ; burned Balti- more and Ohio Railroad viaduct, 527 ; retired across tlie Potomac, 537; expedition at Frederick, Ma- ryland, via Hagerstown, 526 ; op- erations in the Shenandoah Valley, 554 ; at battle of Winchester, 556 ; at battle of Cedar Creek, 561 ; ad- dress to army after his defeat at Middletown, 503. Ellsworth, Colonel, shot at Alexandria, Virginia, 30. Emmettsburg, see Gettysburg. Ewell rejoined Jackson after defeat of Bristoe Station, 180 ; advances into Maryland and Pennsylvania, 319 ; at Chambersburg, Carlisle, Get- tysburg, and York, 320 ; at Mine Run, 391 ; his corps captured at Sailor's Creek, 610. Exterior line, the Federal, in Virginia, 44. Fairfax Courthouse abandoned by Con federates, 47. Fair Oaks, the battle of, 128 ; Confed erate report of — Johnston's reasons for attack, 131 ; battle— map of, 132 ; positions of Union troops near, 132 ; Casey's redoubt at Sev- en Pines captured, 133 ; positions of Casey's division, 134 ; Hill's at- tack on Seven Pines' position not a surprise, 133 ; Sumner ordered to cross the Chickahominy to sup- port Heintzelman, 136 ; Couchs force bisected by G. W. Smith, 136 ; Sumner reaches Couch in rear of, 137 ; Confederates finally driven back by Sumner, 138 ; the fighting next day skirmishing only, 139. Final campaign, 1865, 565 ; Five Forks' battle — see Five Forks and Retreat. Fisher's Hill, Early's retreat to after battle of Winchester, 558 ; the bat- tle of, 559. Five Forks, Sheridan's movement to wards, 591 ; captured by Devin and Davies, 591 ; Lee sends two divisions to, 592 ; Union cavalry driven to Dinwiddie Courthouse, 593 ; Lee's weakness discovered — Sheridan puts his whole force in motion, 594 ; Five Forks and Pe- tersburg, 595 ; situation of the op- posing forces, 595 ; Sheridan's feint on Lee's right, and attack on left on White Oak road, 596 ; the des])er- ate position of the Confederates, 598 ; remnant of Lee's troops at, fled westward, 599 ; the battle over — see now Petersburg, 600. Fleetwood, cavalry action at, 313. Fort Gilmer, Butler's unsuccessful as- sault, 540. Fort Magruder at Williamsburg, Vir- ginia, 112. Fort Steadman, Lee's object in attack- ing, 575 ; surprised and taken by coup de main, .'■)76 ; attacking col- vimns unsupported, 577 ; the as- sault fails, and withdrawal impos- sible, 577 ; two thousand Confed- erates surrender — the losses on both sides, 577 ; Meade captures picket-lines on Lee's right, 577. Franklin, Fremont at with fifteen thousand men, 122. Franklin, General, on operating on Richmond xia York River, 81 ; evi- dence on Burnside's orders at Fredericksburg, 245 ; reply to President Lincoln's answer to him and General Smith, 265. Franklin's and Smith's letter to the President proposing plan of cam- paign, 263. Frederick the Great, seven years' de- fensive campaign, 308. Fredericksburg and Richmond Rail- road, line of advance towards Rich- mond, 33 ; compared with others, 406. Fredericksburg, the battle of, Burnside rt^aches Falmouth, opposite, 234 ; topography of the battle-field, 2-13 ; town and heights, Burnside's omis- sion to occupy, 234 ; Burnside's de- lay, and Lee's arrival on south bank of the Rappahannock, 336 ; Lee's whole array arrived and in position, 242 ; Burnside's designed crossing at Skenker's Neck, on Lee's right, 237 ; the possibilitie.s of crossing, 338 ; Burnside's pas INDEX. 629 sage effected, 243 ; Lee's sharp- shooters in the town delay Burn- side's cropt^hig, 240 ; the town bombarded by Burnsidc, 240 ; the advance passage of three regi- ments, and flight of the Confeder- ate shar]vshooters, 241 ; Jackson's report on concentration at, 243 ; Franklin's ojierations on the left, 246 ; Meade's temporary success on the heights against Jackson, 247 ; military road at, small im- portance of Meade's success on, 247 ; Sumner's operations on the right, 249 : Longstreet's position on the Confederate left. 250 ; French's and Hancock's attack on Lee's left, and terriljle rejiulses, 250 ; Hooker thrown forward, 252 ; Burnside's desperate resolve to renew attack next day, 252 ; the scene closed by night, 252 : Burnside framed one plan, and fought on another, 244 ; the losses of each army, 253 ; the opposing forces at, 2!)ti ; Sedgwick's attack on Marye's Hill, 297 ; Con- federate ix)sition taken — Sedgwick advanc >s towards Chancellorsvillo, 298 ; Hill left in position at, ol4; during Chancellorsville campaign — see Cliancellors\ ille. Fr»-f;mantle, Colonel, on Lee's critical position after Gettysburg, odS. Frtiiiont, General, assigned to Moun- tain Department of West Virginia, 9o ; (Mountain Department of West Virginia I position during McClel- lan's advance, 122. Front Royal, Jackson's capture of gar- rison, 125. Gaines' Mill, map of battle of, 149 ; Magruder occupies McClellan's at- tention on south bank of Chicka- hominy, 151 ; Porter overwhelmed, and the retreat commenced, 152 ; French and Meagher cover Por- ter's retreat, 15:) ; Porter's corps crosses to McClellan at night, 153 ; estimate of casualties, 153. Garnett, General, Confederate com- mander in West Virginia, 35. G 'ttysburg campaign, th<% 308 : theory of the Confederate invasion, 308 ; Berry\ille captured by Rodes, 317 ; Blue Ridge, passes occupied by Longstreet, 318; concentration of the army upon, 324 ; Lee's army countermarches towards, 326 ; ap- proach of the two armies towards, 326 ; topograi)hy of the field, 329 ; the first day — Buford engaged with Hill's van, 328 ; error of covering too much ground, 333 ; Howai-d, General, faulty disi)ositions at Get- tysburg, 333 ; the Union centre pierced by Rodes — the troops fall back through Gettysburg, 334; Gettysburg Ridge, the positif)n at, 335 ; Hancock arrests flight of First and Eleventh corps, 335 ; Hancock's line of battle on Ceme- tery Hill and Ridge, 336 ; Meade and Lee order up their entire forces, 337; both armies concen- trated on Gettysburg, 338 ; the first day's results considered, 341 ; the second day, 342 ; positions at com- mencement of the SLCond day, 342 ; Sedgwick's (Sixth) corps arrives, 343 ; Sickles' position on Emmets- burg road, 344 ; Longstreet's at^ tack on Sickles, 345 ; tlie figlit for Little Round Top, 346 ; \Varren saves the position at Little Round Top, 346 ; Hood s attack on Bir- ney's front, 348 ; the struggle for the peach orchard, 349 ; close cl the action on the left, 354 ; Ewell's attack on the Union extreme right, 354 ; losses of the first two days, 355 ; the third day — Lee resolves to attack on Gulps Hill, 350; Meade's line on Gulp's Hill re- gained, 358 ; the artillery combat of the third day, 357 ; battery po- sitions on the third day, 357 ; the Confederate column of attack, 358 ; Pickett's assault on Cemetery Ridge, 359 ; the panic of Petti- grew's raw troops, 359 ; surrender of Pickett's troops, 361 ; \^'iIcox'3 attack on Hancock, and its failure, ends the battle, 362 ; Lee's shat- tered army returns to its lines on Seminary Ridge, 363 ; Lee remains a day at bay before retreating, 363 ; the retreat of Lee, 363 ; losses on both sides, 363. Glendale— see Newmarket Cross-roads. Goldsborougli, Admiral, and the navy at Yorktown, 104. Grant's overland campaign. 402 ; a]> pointed to connnaud all the ar- mies, 403 ; his tlieory of action, 404 ; establishes headquarters wth the Potomac army, 405 ; on con- centric operations, 410 ; orders for ,630 INDEX. advance beyond the Wilderness, 417; liis opinion of manoeuvring, 440 ; liis reason for witlidrawing from the North Anna, 477 ; obser- vations upon, 489 ; " I projiose to fight it out on tliis line," 490 ; his theory of " hammering" consid- ered, 494 ; on Smith's delay to at- tack Petersburg, 503 ; failure to notify Meade or Hancock of move- ment on Petersburg, 504 ; was responsible for non-capture of Pe- tersburg, 506 ; at Petersburg, op- portunities open to him, 516 ; north of the James — feints on Richmond possible, 516 ; order for final optirations, 578 ; character of his final operations, 579 ; opera- tions delayed by rainstorm, 586 ; correspondence with Lee on sur- render, 615 ; see also Army of the Potomac. Gregg, Confederate general, manner of his death at Fredericksburg, 248. Groveton — see MantLssas, second battle of. Halleck, General W. H., opinion on McClellan's proposed crossing of the James, 167 ; an intolerable ob- struction and annoyance, 170 ; urged the withdrawal from the Peninsula^ 170 ; whim to hold Har- per's Ferry, 200 ; his interference with Hooki^r's intended movements on Lee's rear, 321 ; vicious distri- bution of the Union army under independent commanders, 321 : re- fusal to abandon Maryland Heights, 33-2. Hancock, report on, at battle of Fred- ericksburg, 251 ; at Gettysburg, 334 ; report of battle of the Wil- derness. 423 ; details of Ixittle of the Wilderness, 425 ; report of fifth epoch, campaign of 1864, 505 ; at Reams' Station, 535 ; movement towards Southside Railroad, 541 ; report of operations on Boyd ton plankroad, 546 ; leaves to organize new First Corps, and never rejoins his old command, 547. H; nover Junction, Porter's defeat of Branch at, 124. Harper's Ferry, United States arsenal abandoned in 1861, 26 ; topography of, 206 ; the first Confederate camp at, 28 ; Lee's advance against, 200 ; Jackson's movement towards, 205 ; completely invested by Confeiler- ate occupation of the heiglita round, 206 ; surrendered by Gen- eral Miles, 205 ; the surrender of and death of Miles, 207 : occupied by McClellan, 220 ; see also South Mountain. Heintzelman, General, evidence on siege of Yorktown, 110. Heth, Confederate Gem^ral, on battle of Hatcher's Run, 545. Hill, A. P., on Kearney at Manassaa No. 2, 186 ; on the battle of An- tietam, 220 ; marched to rejoin Longstreet at C'ulpepper, 317; at Mine Run, 391 ; death of, 603. Hill, General I>. H., bombastic report of Big Bethel aflliiir, 33 ; at the battle of Malvern Hill, 163 ; on the battle of Malvern Hill, 163; on battle of Turner's Gap, 203. Hooker, General, on McClellan 's Penin- sular corps commanders, 64 ; at bat- tle of Williamsburg, 115; assault on Jackson at Manassas No. 2, 185 ; wounded at Antietam, 213 ; statement on battle of Antietam, 213 ; on battle of Fredericksburg, 252 ; placed in command of Poto- mac army, 261 ; his reorganization of the Potomac army, 2G7 ; his popularity on assuming command, 288 ; at Chancellorsville (see also Chancellorsville), 271 ; contradic- tory evidence on Jackson's pur- pose at Chancellorsville, 284 ; tho army without a head on Sunday morning, 293 ; his Chancellorsville campaign considered, 303 ; strength of his army after Chancellorsville, 310 ; dispatch anticipating Lee's intentions, 311; dispatch on Con- federate movements on Culpepper, 312 ; dispositions to guard tlie Rap- pahannock line, 314 ; plans on hee'si invasion and opinions at Wash- ington, 315 ; retrograde move- ment towards W^ashingtim, 316 ; the army concentrated at Fred- erick, 320 ; plan of menacing Lei;'s rear towards Chambersburg, 321 ; dispatch to Halleck, urging aban- donment of Harpers Ferry, 322 ; resigns command of the array, 323. Hunt, appointed chief of artillery, 197; plan of crossing Rappahannock, 241. Hunter, General, operations in the She- nandoah, 468 ; victory at Piedmont, INDEX. 631 and subsequent retreat, 409 ; suc- ceeded by General Sheridan, 555. Interior line, the Confederate, in Vir- ginia, 44. Jackson, General T. J. ("Stonewall"), history of, 28 ; origin of the title " Stonewall" at Manassas, 54 ; his maxim, " mystery is the secret of success," 283 ; ])osition between the Shenandoah and Swift Run Gap, 124 ; forces Banks from Winches- ter to Ilall town, and then mov^^s back up Shenand(3ah Valley, 125 ; caiJtures Front Royal gar- rison, and moves towards Banks at Middletown, 125 ; holds Banks with Ewell's force, drives Milroy upon Fremont, and turns back on Banks, 125 ; McDowell ordered by the administration to head off, 126 ; holds Shields in check— Ew- ell repulse^ Fremont, 127 ; slips between McDowell and Fremont, converging on Strasburg, and es- capes up the Valley, 127 ; reunites with Ewell, and repulses Shields' advance, 127; strategic victories saved Richmond, 128 ; at Ashland, on McClellan's right wing, 144 ; withdrawal from Port Republic to co-operate witli Lee, 144; passed Beaver Dam Creek, 14G ; descrip- tion of Hood's charge at Gaines' Mill, 152 ; detached towards Pope, 173; battle of ('edar Mountain, and retreat to Gordonsville, 173 ; crossed the Rapidan towards Pope, 175 ; i)Ositiou and f.,rce at Gor- donsville, 175 ; flank march on Pope's right, 177 ; at Manassas, his perilous position, 180 ; cut off from Lee by McDowell, 180 ; strat- egy of his escape from Manassas, 181 ; position at Manassas, 184 ; attack on Pope's right at Ox Hill, 192 ; movement towards Harper's Ferry, 205 ; force at Antietam, 212 ; march on Hooker's flank and rear at Chancellorsville, 283 ; his death, 289; corps at Chancellorsville, Stuart's report of, 293. " Jacobinism of Congress," note on Mr. Lincoln's phrase, 80. James River open by fall of Norfolk, 120; Fort Darling, Union fleet compelled to witlulraw, 120 ; con- sidered as a base line, 140 ; McClel- lan adopts change of base to, 147 advance, merits of a, 408 ; Butler's advance by, 409 ; Butler's cam- paign on, 400 ; liis force, 400 ; as- cent of the river, 401 ; landing at Bermuda Hundriid, 401 ; Butler, Grant's vague instructions on James River campaign, 402 ; diffi- culties of the cami:aign, 403 ; Rich- mond and Petersburg Railroad, attemjjts to capture, 401 ; Bermuda Hundred, Butler forms intrenched line, 464 ; Beauregard's operations at Bermuda Hundred, 405 ; Gill- more, General, at Bermuda Hun- dred, 4()5 ; battle of Drury's Bluff, 405 ; losses of both armies at Ber- muda Hundred, 408 ; Butler's force withdrawn within Bermuda Iluu- dred lines, 408 ; Bermuda Hun- dred, General Smith's force ordered from to Grant, 482 ; Grant's changa of base to south of. 498 ; Bermuda Hundred, Smith's movement on Petersburg, 500 ; Butler's occupa- tion of Bermuda Hundred, 510. Jericho Ford — see North Anna. Jenkins' raid into Maryland and Penn- sylvania, 319. Johnstin. General, estimate of forces, 72 ; army removed 1o the Uapi- dan, 90 ; takes command of York- town defences, 103 ; on unknown redoubts at Williamsburg, 115; withdrawal behind the Chicka- hominy, 119 ; account of Casey's defeat at Seven Pines (Fair Oaks), 134 ; wounded at Fair Oaks, 138 ; theory of defence of Richmond, 143 ; on Grant's direct attacks on Lee, 495 ; restored to command of forces opposing Sherman — hia strength, 507 ; on the Confederate commissariat and conscription, 572. Jomini on the difficulties of an invad- ing army, 24 ; on interference with genei'als in the field, 90 ; on con- centric operations, 410. Jones, General, on the battle of An- tietam, 212. Kearnev's assault at Manassas No. 2, 185. Kearney, General, the death of, 192 ; his' origination of the badge sys- tem, 268. Kelley's Ford, the Union cavalry at, 208 ; cavalry action at, 386. 632 INDEX. Kilpatrick's raid towards Richmond, 8'J9. Kiiiglake, Mr., on English iiublic sen- timent on tlie Crimean war, 68. Laurel Hill, Virginia, Garnett's position at, 85 ; IMcC'lellan's plan of attack, 87 ; abandoned by (iarnett, 38 ; see also Rich Mountain. Lee, General Robert E., appointed ma- jor-general, and commander of the Virginia forces, 26 ; defence of West Virginia, 84 ; on the poor dis- cipline of the army, 67 ; ai)pointed to Army of Northern Virginia, 142 ; withdraws Jackson from Shenandoah Valley, 143 ; plan of attack on the Chickahominy, 144 ; concentrated at Newmarket Cross- roads, 150 ; on the battle of Mal- vern Hill. 1G3 ; after Malvern Hill battle withdraws towards Rich- mond, 164 ; fault in the Peninsular campaign unnoticed, 165 ; wished McClellan out of the Peninsula, 171 ; Seven Days' battle — see Seven Days ; opened fire on shipping at Harrison "s Landing from Coggin's Point — is repulsed, 172; resolved to strike northward on McClellun's evacuation of the Peninsula, 174 ; on advance on General Pope, 175 : unwonted rashness in front of Pope — Longstreet and Jackson separated, 178 ; joins Jackson at Manassas, 184 ; abandoned pursuit of Pope, and turned to north of the Potomac, 193 ; determined to cross into Maryland, 194; purposes af- ter campaign against Pope, 194 ; crossed the Potomac towards Lees- burg, 196 ; plan of Maryland cam- paign, 198 ; advances towards Har- per's Ferry, 198 ; plan of Harper's Ferry movement fell into McClel- lan's hands, 201 ; withdrew to An- tietani Valley, 1207 ; at Antietam — see Antietam ; Maryland campaign at an end, 224 ; position in the Shenandoah Valley after Antietam, 225 ; army divided by McClellan's combinations, 226 ; his erroneous statement on Sumner at Freder- icksburg, 244 ; arrives at Freder- icksburg and fortifies the heights, 236 ; at Fredericksburg — see Fred- ericksburg; strength before Clian- cellorsville, 209 ; army-roll on March 31, 1868, 270 ; positions be- fore battle of Cliancellorsville, 270 : discovery of Hooker's purpose at Chansellorsville, 276; Fredericks- burg held, and main army pushed towards Chancellorsville, 277 ; army increased by conscripts and Longstreet's divisions, 810 ; at bat- tle of Chancellorsville — see Chan- cellorsville ; strength of his army after Chancellorsville, 810 ; com- missariat — reasons for invading Pennsylvania, 810 ; army reorgan- ized into three corps, 810 ; force at opening of Gettysburg campaign, 310 ; manoeuvres to disengage Hooker fr(jm the Rappahannock, 312 ; Culpepper occupied by great part of his army, 812 ; Shenan- doah Valley advance — Winchester reached by Ewell, 314; his right at Fredericksburg, centre at Cul- pepper, left at mouth of Shenan- doah Valley, 815 ; on his effort to draw Hooker from his base, 818 ; whole army crossed into Pennsyl- vania, 820 ; countermarch of his army towards Gettysburg, 826 ; bat- tle of Gettysburg — see Gettysburg ; error in figiiting at Gettysburg, and his reasons therefor, 340 ; his re- treat after Gettysburg, 866 ; crosses the Potomac safely at Williams- port, 869; retreats to' Shenan- doah Valley, 373 ; weakened by detaching Longstreet to Tennes- see, 375 ; position behind the Rapidan, 376 ; at Culpepper, 378 ; flanks Meade's right, who falls back behind the Rappahannock, 377 ; swap queens (VVashington for Richmond), 877 ; destroyed Orange and Alexandria Railroad, 385 ; withdraws towards the Rap- pahannock, 885 ; withdraws across the Rapidan, 888 ; line of defences at Mine Run, 8U1 ; his positions on the Rapidan, 891, 416 ; method of defence of the Rapidan, 416 ; strat- egy to compel battle in the Wil- derness, 418 ; retired behind the Tolopotomy, 479 ; retrograded to- wards the Pamunky, and faced Grant in advance of the Chicka- hominy, 479 ; morale of his army after Cold Harbor, 492 ; losses dur- ing Granfs overland campaign, 492 ; his army pas.sing to south of the James, near Df ury's Bluff, 503 ; real forci3 on opening spring cam- INDEX. 633 paign, 18G."), 57:3; movement towards junction witb Johnston on Uanville line, 574 ; never meant to surren- der imtil compelled, 574 ; attack on Fort Steadman — see Fort Stead- man ; attack on Warrt^n, on (Grant's left, at Boydton plankroad, 5!)0 ; announces his jnirpose to abandon Petersburg and Richmond, GOo ; hopes of escape, and junction with Johnston, 005 ; final retreat — see Retreat; corresiiondence with Grant on surrender, 015 ; final surrender of his army, 018. I^eesburg — see Ball's BlufiF. Letcher, Governor, of Virginia, calls for State militia, 26. Lincoln, President, calls for troops, 14, 29, 30 ; correspondence with Mc- Clellan on movement on Manassas, 70 ; despondent saying at the close of 1861, 78 ; consultation with Gen- erals McDowell and Franklin at close of 1861, on a Peninsular cam- paign, 79 ; would like to borrow McClellan's army (1801), 80 ; spe- cial order to advance to Manassas Junction, 85 ; general order to move on February 22d, 80 ; gen- eral war order rescinded, and Low- er Chesapeake route adopted, 87 ; order on defence of \Yashington, 89 ; and the administration — policy and errors of reviewed, 93 ; his order recalling McDowell's corps from McClellan's army, 104; Mc- Dowell's recall to Washington — politics and military affairs, 105 ; reply to Generals Franklin and Smith's proposed plan of campaign, 205 ; opinion on Hooker's plan of isolating Hill and Longstreet, 315. Little Round To^d — see Gettysburg. Longstreet on time of his re-enforcing Jackson at Manassas No. 2, 180 ; wounded at the Wilderness, 434. Loudon Heights, the position of, 205. McCall, position at battle of Newmarket Cross-roads, 158; on the fight for the guns at Newmarket Cross- roads, 158. McCleUan, General, in West Virginia, 34 ; intrusted with Department of the Ohio, 35 ; placed in command of the army, 62 ; credit to for forma- tion of the grand army, 66 ; the en- entire confidence of the country, 08 ; plan of direct attack cUi Manassas, 09 ; corrospond(>ncc with President Lincoln on an advance, 70 ; change of plan of advance — consequent delay, 70 ; on merits of advance by Manassas, 73 ; tween al- ternatives, 141 ; intentions after battle of Fair Oaks, 142 ; the cours- es open to, on Lee's approach, 140 ; Seven Days' retreat — see Seven Days ; adopts clumge of base to James River, 147; error on posi- tion of Hill and Longstreet at Mal- vern Hill, 161 ; retreat a notable achievement, 160 ; design to cross the James, 167 ; proposed crossing of the James afterwards realized by Grant, 108 ; pi-omised re-enforce- ments in the Peninsula, 170; <'r- dered to join Pope at Aquia Creek, 171 ; advance towards Lee at Fred- erick, 197 ; gains copy of Lee's ]-)lan of Harper's Ferry advance, 201 ; arrived at South Mountain, 202 ; at Antietam— see Antietam ; his inactivity after Antietam con- sidered, 222 ; advance on Warren- ton, 220 ; removi'd from command in favor of Burnside, 227; th:* close of his career, 225 ; his mili- tary character considered, 228. McDougall, General, on positions di- vided by rivers, 129 ; on angles in line of battle, 344. McDowell, Cieneral, appointed to lead G34 INDEX. tlie Potomac army, 43 ; time for jireijaration denied him, 4'3 ; with- drew from command, (31 ; sug- gested advance towards Richmond, 80 ; corps detached from jNIcClellan to join in defence of Washington, 93 ; (Department of the Rappahan- nock) position during McCJellan's advance, 122 ; at Fredericksburg with 30,000 men, 122 ; ordered by tlie administration to attacli Ricli- mond in co-operaiion with McClel- lan, 128 ; advance south of Fred- ericksburg, 124 ; advance cleared by Porter's corps of tlie Potomac army, 124 ; ordered to the Shen- andoah Valley, 12G ; ISIanassas campaign — see Manassas. McMahon, General, on Sedgwick's movement before ChanceUorsville, 275. Magruder, Colonel J. B., position near Hampton, 27 ; on Confederate po- sition ou Chickahomiuy right bank, 147. Malvern Hill reached by McClellan's artillery, 157 ; map of the battle- field, 160 ; battle of, 160 ; position of the armies, 161 ; Hill's advance alone by misconception, 162 ; the Confederates completely repulsed, 163 ; left flank protected by James River gunboats, 161. Manassas J unction, the first Confederate camp at, 27 ; captures of prisoners and supplies by Stuart, 177 ; ad- vance against Jackson at, 181. Manassas, the first battle of, 40 ; Mc- Dowell, General, on fear of masked batteries in Bull Run advance, 34 ; popular ignorance on nature of the war, 40 ; the battle of, in 1801, 40 ; McDowell's plan of operations against, 44 ; Johnston's evacuation of Winchester, and imion with Beauregard, 46 ; McDowell's army moved from the Potomac towards, 46 ; McDowell's plan of attack, 48 ; Beauregard's lines of defence, 50 ; commencement of the battle, 51 ; the action of Stone Bridge, 52 : peril of Confederate left flank, 53 ; retreat of the Union army, 56 ; losses on both sides, 57 ; causes of the Union defeat, 58 ; followed by popular uprising, 60 ; evacuated by Johnston, 89. Manassas No. 2, Jackson's retreat from, 181 ; the second battle of, 182 ; Pope's position at, 184 ; useless at- tacks on Confederate positions, 185 ; close of first day's battle, 186 ; po sitions of second day, 188 ; Pope and Lee's intended attack on each other's left flank on second day, 188; Pope's belief of Lee's falling back, 188 ; McDowell ordered on Warrenton turnpike, 189 ; Porter's assault on Warrenton turnpike, 190 ; Porter repulsed from War- renton turnpike, 19(1 Manassas Gap, General l^rench's feeble attack, 374 Marmont on discrimination of the sol- dier, 256. Marsh Creek — see Williamsport. Maryland campaign, the, 194 ; Lee's expected co-operation from citizens, 195 ; his disappointment, 196 ; McClellan's reorganization of his army, 197 ; Lee's plan of operations, 198 ; Frederick evacuated by Lee, 198 ; General Miles force at Har- per's Ferry, 199 ; Lee's report on straggling' 224 ; the close of, 224 ; Autietam — see Antiftam. Maryland Heights occupied by Miles's troops, 205 ; abandoned by Miles, 206. Martinsburg and Winchester, General White's force at, 199. Masked battery fiction, influence of th'3, 34. Meade, Genei-al, on McClellan's creation of the army, 67 ; on the battle of Fredericksburg, 248 ; appointed to command Potomac army, 323 ; characteristics of, and estimation by the array, 323 ; position of th(j army on his taking command, 324 ; his desire to fight a defensive bat- tle at Gettysburg, 341 ; circumspect pursuit of Lee, 367 ; decides on at- tacking Lee at \\'illianisport, 369 ; Lee's escape at Williamsport con- sidered, 369 : advance into Vir- ginia, 374 ; drives Lee across the Rappahannock and Rapidan, 375 ; position on the Rapidan line, 376 ; falls back behind the Rapi a- hannock, his left being turned, 377 ; advances towards the Rajijia- hannock in pursuit of Lee, 385 ; crossed the Rai)paluinnock — the Confederate position, 387 ; back be- tween the Rappahannock and Raj)- idan, 388 ; the ISiine Run movij, 390 ; plan of operations in Mia : INDEX. 635 Run move, 391 ; pedantic orders? of Halleck after Mine Run, 31)8 ; army in winter-qnarters, 398 ; his strength on commencement of overhand campaign, 413. Mechanicsville, McCleiJan's object in carrying, 123. Meigs, General, on direct advance to- wards Richmond, 84. Merrimac, the, to be neutralized, 91 ; the, destroyed by Confederate Com- modore Tatnall, 120. Middle Military Division, creation of the, General Sheridan command- ing, 555. Miles, General, at Harper's Ferry, 199. Miles, Colonel, brilliant service at Chan- cellorsville, 287. Mine Run move, the, 390; sketch of the battle of, 393 ; Meade's plan to interpose between Ewell and Hill, 391 ; Lee's position at, 391 ; cause of delays of Meade's advance, 392 ; delays of the Third Corps, 394 ; the difficulties in crossing the Rap- idan, 392 ; Lee gains time to con- centrate, 394 ; Meade's plan of attack, 396 ; Warren's intended attack on Lee's right, 395 ; War- ren's attack impossible, and failure of the plan, 39(5 ; Warren's forlorn hope fastening their names to their coats, 397 ; Warren finds attack on Lee's right hopeless, 397 ; Meade withdraws his army, 397. Morale of an army, what constitutes it, 255. Moreau. a movement of compared with Sumner's crossing of the Chicka- hominy, 138. Mountain warfare, characteristics of, 36. Mud campaign, Banks' Ford, the cross- ing prevented by a storm, 259. Mustering out, haphazard policy of Gov- ernment, 309. Napier, Sir William, on judgment upon unsuccessful generals, 121. Napoleon, jiotes on invasion of Eng- land, 99 ; on fighting without line of retreat, 146; on the chessboard of war, 246 ; on attacking positions in front, 493 ; on changes of base, 498. National wars, the difficulties in con- ducting, 24. Newmarket Cross-roads, battle of, its object, 157. Newmarket, battle of, and defeat of Sigel, 468. Norfolk, (ieneral Huger evacuated, by ordca's from Richmond, to which garrison withdrew, 120; occupied by General Wool, 120. Norfolk Navy Yard, abandoned in 1861, 26. North Anna, the two armies head for, 472 ; the Union army arrives on north bank, and discovers Lee on south bank, 473 ; Warren crossed at Jericho Ford, and repulse of the enemy, 473 ; Chesterfield Bridge captured by Hancock, 475; extia- ordinary jjosition of Confederate army at, 477 ; Grant's withdrawal and start for the Paniunky, 477. North, the, oflensive thrown upon, 24. Northern Virginia, position of the three armies of, 122; Pope's campaign (for further, see Pope), 167. Officers, inefficiency of, property hold- ers' memorial on, 63. On to Richmond, influence of the phrase, 40. Opening of the war — see three months' campaign. Opequan, battle of — see Winchester. Orange and Alexandria Railroad — line of advance towards Richmond, 22 ; General Pope's position on — his force, 172. Organization of armies — the division and the corps, 63. Overland route to Richmond, of the difficulties, 408 ; overland cam- paign commenced, 414 ; overland campaign, observations on, 489 ; Cold Harbor — see Cold Harbor ; Pamunky crossed by the army, and communication secured with Chesapeake Bay, 478 ; casualties during the overland campaign, 491. Patterson, General, feeble operations against Winchester, 46 ; estimat s by, of Johnston's strength, 46. Peach Orchard — see Gettysburg. Peninsular campaii^n— Peninsula, de- scription of the, 100 ; Peninsula, unhealthiness of in August and September, 171 ; discussions, before adoption, between the President, members of cabinet, and Generals McDowell and Franklin, 79 ; Lower Chesapeake advance approved by 636 INDEX. eiglit of twelve division command- ers, 88 ; decided upon undiT ccr tain conditions, Ul ; McDowell's corps and Blenker's division de- tached from by the President, 93 ; Peninsula, transportation of the army to the, !)9 ; the army before Yorktovvu (for siege of — see York- town). 90 ; pursuit of Johnston to Williamsburg (for further — see Wiliiamsburg) 112 ; White House reached. 118; Seven days' retreat — see Seven days ; the close of the, 104 ; reflections on its strat- egy, 1(54; joy of the South and grief of the North, 1()5 ; losses of, 105. Peninsula, the, as a secondary base, 23. iVter.s burg, the siege of, 497 ; import- ance as point d'appui for the army, 500 ; its strategic relations to Rich- mond, ;■ 07 ; two possible modes of capture, 552 ; observations on the siege, 550 ; mancEuvres by the left, 551 ; Grant's change of base to south of the James, 497 ; Cole's Ferry — the ponton delay, 499 ; tlie fortifications of on Smith's arrival, 501 ; Grant's army all on soutii side of the James, 500; Gill- more's and Kautz's abortive at- tempt to caiitur(\ 500 ; partial suc- cess (if Smitii's forces, 503; non- capture— circumstances of Han- cock's marcli, 504 ; Hancock or- dered to asfti&t Smith before, 504 ; Grant's expectation of easy cap- ture by Smith, and failure to notify Meade of intended attack, 504 ; Lee's army arrived in, 50G; Meade's indorsement on non-cap- ture of, 50G ; Smith's suspension of operations for the night, 50(i ; Grant compelled to sit down before it, 507 ; Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, Terry's failure to destroy, 509 ; Hancock's and Burnside's as- sault the enemy driven on whole line, 509 ; Hancock and Burnside's renewed assault, 510 ; Grant com- mences intrenching a systematic line, 511; Lee draws closer round Petersburg, and repulses every new assault, 511; Jerusalem plankroad — Hill strikes between Second and Sixth corps, 512; Stoney Creek, the battle of, 513 ; Reams' Station, Wilson's defeat and escape, v.-ith loss of trains and artilierv, 513 ; Nottoway Station, cavalry action at, 513; Southside Railroad de- stroyed to Nottoway Station by Wilson and Kautz, 513 ; Weldon Railroad destroyed at Reams' Sta- tion by Wilson and Kautz, 513 ; losses of preliminary operations, 514 ; the lines of both armies de- scribed, 515; Deep Bottom, Han- cock's expedition to, 519 ; Deep Bottom, Hancock's secret return to Petersburg lines, 520 ; Lee's diversion against Baltimore and Washington — see Early, 526 ; Deep Bottom, Hancock's second exiiedition, 529 ; summer and au- tumn operations against Peters- burg and Richmond, 529 ; Weldon Railroad, Warren's seizure of dur- ing Deep Bottom operations, 532 ; Weldon Railroad, Warren's cap- ture, and Confederate efforts to re- take, 533 ; Peeble's Farm, move- ment by the left, 539 ; turning movement on Soutliside Railroad (for further — see Southside Rail- road), 540 ; Fort Harrison carried by Butler, 540; Butler at battle of Chapin's Farm, 540 ; CUiapin's Farm, capture of Fort Harrison by Butler, 540 ; Southside Railroad, failure to force Confederate posi- tion at Hatcher's Run, 541 ; South- side Railroad— Lee, his extreme line below Hatcher's Run, 541 ; Soutliside Railroad and Boydton idankroad, imp.ortance of to Lee, 511 ; Southside Railroad, plan of attack on Lee's right, 541 ; opera- tions extendiu'j,- Grant's lines west- ward to Hatcher's Run, 547 ; War- ren's oi)eraii()ns on the Weldon road, 54i) ; cliaracter of lines, 576 ; Warren's and Humphreys' move by the rear and left, 581 ; initial operations of the 29ih of March, 582 ; Lee's right, front position of, 582; Sheridan manoeuvring to the left, 583 ; Din\viddio Courthous(i occupied by Sheridan, 584 ; the Union line from the Appomattox, to Dinwiddie Courthouse, 584 ; Lee's strength and length of in- trenched line, 585 ; Longstreet re- tained at north side of James River, 585 ; White Oak roatl and Hatcher's Run, the two armies at, 586 ; Humphreys' report of opera tions of ilarch 30, 1865, 5o7 ; Uniou INDEX. 037 left (Warren's), disposition of tlic, 588; Lee's cuntre luul left still in- tact, CiOO ; Lee's centre assaulted by Parke, Wriglit, and Ord, GOl ; Confederates pressed back tc; cliaiu of works close around, (JOJ ; tlic defence of Fort ening of correspondence between Grant and Lee, 618. Reynolds, General, the death of, 330, Rich Mountain, Pegram defeated by Rosecrans, 38. Richmond the objective point of the war, 17 ; the lines of advance to- wards in 1861, 22 ; what a direct 638 ENDEX. march on would have effected, 147 ; outer line of redoubts pierced by Kilpatrick, 400 ; merits of plans of advance discussed, 400 ; outer de- fences penetrated by Sheridan, 460 ; entered by Uidon troops, 605. Rivers of Virginia, system of the, 19. Rivei'S, theories of defence of, 415. Round Toj) — see Gettysburg. Russell, W. H., on McDowell's army, 43. Schenck, General, flight of his recon- noitering party near Vienna, Vir- ginia, ad ; on Vienna masked bat- teries, 34. Scott, Lieutenant-General, views and plans of the war— how they were overruled, 41 ; dispatch to General Patterson on operations against Johnston, 45. Sedgwick, General, at Mine Run, 395 ; his death at Spottsylvania, 447; see also Chancellorsville. Seminary Ridge— see Gettysburg, 336. Seven days' retreat, the, 140 ; Lee dis- covers McClellan's movement for the James River, 154; commenced, 154 ; Lee commences pursuit, 155 ; battle of Savage Station, 156 ; the army debouches from White Oak S5, 587 ; report on ef- fort to gain the White Oak road, 589 ; bravery at battle of Five F(irks, 599 ; relieved from com- mand by Sheridan, 599. Washington, the defensive lines of, 22 ; the strategic protection of, 23 ; de- fences, the system initiated, 30 ; system of defences formed, the theory of, 65 ; popular anger at Confederate blockade of the Poto- mac, 75 ; President Lincoln's order to retain sufficient force to secure, 89 ; W ashington and Potomac line, dispositions to defend, 91 ; General Wadsworth placed in command of defences, 92 ; number and positions of covering force, 92 ; fears for safety of — foment by General Pojie, 170 ; Early's opportunity of enter- ing, 527 ; action before Fort Ste- vens, 527. West Virginia, Confederate defence of by General Lee, 34; topography of McClellan's operations, 35 ; cam- paign closed by victory at Car- rick's Ford, 39 ; see also Virginia White House, General Franklin's dis embarkation and check by John- ston, 117 ; McClellan's base of sup- plies established at, 118; White House to the Chickahominy, Mc- Clellan's march, 119. 640 INDEX. Wilderness, the battle of the, 413 ; Lee's dispositions to attack, 418 ; Warren's battle with Ewell's forces, 431 ; Hill's attempt to seize the position at Brock road, 424 ; Hancock s attack on Hill at Orange planki-oad, 42o ; Wadsworth sent to attack Hill's flank and rear, 426 ; close of the preliminary bat- tle of Warren and Hill, 427 ; to- pography and character of the field, 428 ; Lee's demonstration on Union right, 430 ; Hancock drives Hill back, 431 ; Longstreet arrives and restores Hill's line, 431 ; Long- street's attack on Hancock inter- rupted by his fall, 433 ; Hancock again assaulted by troops of Long- street and Hill, 43(5; cavalry ac tion, 487 ; the character and re- sults of the battle considered, 438 ; the losses on each side, 439. Williamsburg, the battle of, 113 ; Han- cock's capture of unknown works on Confederate left and rear, 115; battle of. Hooker's losses, 118. WLUianisport, Lee's withdrawal into Virginia in front of Meade, 369. Willoughby's Run, battle of, 330. Winchester, Johnston's position and force, 45 ; battle of, between Banks and Jackson, 125 ; Jackson de- feated by General Shields, 92 ; Ewell arrives before, 314 ; aban- doned bv Milroy after infamously feeble defence, 318 ; entered, 318 ; occupied by Hill, 319 ; battle of, 556 ; Sheridan's and Early's dis- positions, 556 ; battle of — strength of the two armies, 558 ; Early re- treats to Fisher's Hill (see also Sheridan), 558. Winthrop, Major, killed at Bethel, 32. Wistar's raid to Bottom's Bridge, 398. Wright, (Jeneral, at battle of Cedar Creek, 501 ; credit due to at battle of Cedar Creek, 563. Yellow Tavern, Sheridan's victory at, 459. York River Railroad, supply line aban- doned by McClellan, 154. York and Pamunky rivers, McClellan en ronte by, 120. York River, Franklin's ascension of, in pursuit of Johnston, 117. Yorktown, McClellans advance arrived at, and Lee's Mills, 101 ; descrip- tion and map of Confederate peti- tions, 101 ; McClellan's plans— the navy and McDowell counted upon, but unavailable, 103 ; re-enforced and to be held by Confederates, 103 ; the siege of commenced, 106 ; Lee's Mill, unsuccessful attempt to break Confederate lines, 106 ; siege of. General Barry on — expected ef- fects of artillery fire, 107 ; evacu- ated by the Confederates, 107 ; criticism upon McClellan's opera- tions, 108 ; Magruder's small force, and McClellan's delay of assault, 109 ; arrival of part of INIcDowell's corps during siege, 109 ; McClel- lan, Heintzelman, and Barnard's opinion on immediate assault, 110 ; to the Chickahominy, 112. m PROPERTY OF Company K,2iKl Regiment, LE D