Class 
 Book 
 
 COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT 
 
_ America's Duty 
 
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America's Duty 
 
 A» Shown by 
 
 Our Military History 
 Its Facts and Fallacies 
 
 By 
 
 Leonard Wood 
 
 Major General U. S. Army 
 
 The Reilly 8C Lee Co. 
 Chicago 
 

 Copyright, 1921 
 
 By 
 
 The Reilly & Lee Co. 
 
 Made In U. S. A. 
 
 America's Duty 
 
 MAR 29 1921 
 ©CI.A611374 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 I The Cost of Unpreparedness 9 
 
 II The Struggle for Peace . . 30 
 
 III Past National Policy 53 
 
 IV Lessons of the Revolution 84 
 
 V Seventy Years of Ineffi- 
 ciency 117 
 
 VI The Price of Unprepared- 
 ness IN THE Sixties 143 
 
 VII The Value of Prepared- 
 ness 160 
 
 Wpiat We Should Do. . . .183 
 
 Constructive Work of the 
 Army 203 
 
 X Lessons of the World War.216 
 
 Appendix 240 
 
 The Australian System 
 OF Defense 240 
 
 The Swiss System of De- 
 fense 248 
 
FOREWORD 
 
 Panic patriotism appears from time 
 to time when the clouds of possible 
 trouble loom more heavily than usual. 
 There is much discussion, some feverish 
 activity, but little accomplishment. 
 
 Adequate national preparedness on 
 sound lines will be secured only when 
 there is a general appreciation of its 
 vital importance for defense and of the 
 further fact that it can not be impro- 
 vised or done in a hurry. It includes 
 both moral and material organization. 
 
 Military preparedness, which includes 
 preparation on land and sea, should go 
 hand and hand with a nation's policy. 
 Our policy is not one of aggression, but 
 one which looks only to a secure defense. 
 Consequently, the arrangements for our 
 military establishment should be limited 
 to the needs of a secure and certain 
 
Foreword 
 
 national defense against any force which 
 may be brought against us. 
 
 A brief review of our past military 
 policy, its shortcomings and cost, may 
 aid ill establishing an appreciation of 
 our needs. 
 
 Fort Sheridan, Illinois. 
 November Seventeenth. 
 Nineteen Twenty. 
 
 The World War has come and gone, 
 so far as our participation is concerned. 
 We were unprepared in every depart- 
 ment. We paid the price in blood and 
 treasure. 
 
 There is nothing in existing condi- 
 tions which in any way justifies failure 
 to provide a sound system of national 
 defense. America must ever be ready 
 to throw the weight of her influence for 
 justice and the maintenance of righteous 
 peace. This influence will be most 
 effective in preventing war if we are 
 
Foreword 
 
 reasonably ready to make our protest 
 promptly effective. 
 
 A resolute spirit, fair dealing, respect 
 for the rights of others, earnest desire 
 and effort for the peace of righteous- 
 ness must go hand in hand with the 
 mofal and physical organization of our 
 resources both in men and material, if 
 our voice is to have the weight for peace 
 which it should have. 
 
 We have disregarded the lessons of 
 our other wars. Let us give heed to 
 those of the World War. 
 
 Leonard Wood. 
 
America's Duty 
 
 chapter i 
 The Cost of Unpreparedness 
 
 "Our culture must, therefore, not 
 omit the arming of the man." 
 
 — Emerson. 
 
 Wars and rumors of wars world-wide 
 in extent have aroused to an unusual 
 degree the interest of the American 
 people in their own military problems, 
 especially the question of national de- 
 fense, including, as it must, the organi- 
 zation of national resources. 
 
 There is a failure on the part of our 
 people to appreciate the defects of our 
 military organization in the past, and 
 
 9 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 a tendency growing out of this state of 
 misinformation as to what has been really 
 done, to continue to place too much de- 
 pendence upon a military policy found 
 gravely defective, even to the extent of 
 endangering success and in most instances 
 making it unecessarily costly. 
 
 There is still a general lack of appre- 
 ciation of the fact that military opera- 
 tions, in order to be effective, must be 
 conducted by highly trained, well organ- 
 ized and equipped forces, and that such 
 training, organization and equipment re- 
 quire much time and must be accom- 
 panied by an organization of industrial 
 resources, all in complete readiness in 
 advance of the day of trouble. 
 
 There is a general tendency to consider 
 that our geographical position renders 
 us secure from invasion and that our 
 numbers, resources and wealth would be 
 
 10 
 
COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 
 
 a secure defense if we should be attacked. 
 These very dangerous misconceptions are 
 largely due to a failure on the part of 
 our educational institutions, public and 
 private, to teach properly our military 
 history, and especially to their failure 
 to pl-esent that side of it which relates 
 to the methods employed in the conduct 
 of our military establishment in the past. 
 With few exceptions, the teaching of 
 the military history of our country has 
 not been such as to give the people a 
 correct idea of our military achievments 
 or of the conditions under which military 
 operations have been conducted. As a 
 rule, students leave school, and even 
 college, not only with superficial know- 
 ledge, but often with entirely incorrect 
 ideas concerning our achievments in war. 
 They know little or nothing of the sys- 
 tem under which we have raised and 
 
 11 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 maintained our armies, still less of the 
 unecessary cost in life and treasure which 
 has characterized the conduct of our 
 wars, or the reasons therefor. Only too 
 often the real facts of our failures are 
 overlooked and the account of our suc- 
 cesses exaggerated. The schools teach 
 the dates of battles and the names of 
 commanding generals, but nothing of the 
 organization which determined the effi- 
 ciency of military operations in our var- 
 ious wars. 
 
 The natural result has been an un- 
 warranted degree of confidence, a con- 
 fidence which has grown into a belief 
 that we always have been easily success- 
 ful in war; that, in the language of the 
 Fourth of July orator, we can defeat a 
 world in arms. The effect of this lack 
 of sound information is not limited by 
 any means to those in private life, but 
 
 12 
 
COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 
 
 too often characterizes the remarks of 
 those in places of trust and responsibility 
 who should know better. The result of 
 this general failure to teach correctly 
 our military history, and of the resulting 
 misinformation concerning it, is seen in 
 the general lack of interest in our mili- 
 tary situation, ignorance of the most ele- 
 mentary facts concerning our military 
 establishment, its organization, strength, 
 equipment and needs. 
 
 There is a lack of information also as 
 to the nation's resources in men and 
 material, both mechanical and chemical. 
 Americans are unaware that this country 
 is depending upon sea control for many 
 of these, and are uninformed as to the 
 time required to make arms and ammu- 
 nition. Intelligent public interest in ade- 
 quate preparedness has been so long 
 dormant, and ignorance of the need of 
 
 13 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 it is so general, that our people do not 
 appreciate how many links in our indus- 
 trial and chemical chain are wanting, 
 how many breaks are tied together with 
 string, how helpless the nation would 
 be in certain lines of endeavor without 
 these missing necessities. 
 
 They are cheerfully confident that an 
 untrained American is as effective in 
 war as a highly trained and equally well 
 educated foreigner of equal physical 
 strength and intelligence. There is a 
 lack of appreciation of the fact that will- 
 ingness does not mean fitness or ability. 
 This condition of mind is imdoubtedly 
 ascribable to the fact that we have been 
 actively engaged in matters in no way 
 relating to our military establislmient, 
 an immense work has been accomplished 
 in developing our resources. We are 
 entitled to credit for what we have done, 
 
 14 
 
COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 
 
 and we can justly take much pride in 
 it. We now need pitiless publicity as 
 to the defects in our military system, 
 organization and resources, which have 
 characterized them and endangered our 
 safety in all our past wars. 
 
 Tlie general lack of information and 
 interest in military matters is the result 
 of various causes; but first and foremost 
 is the want of sound teaching of our 
 national history, especially its military 
 side, and an unwarranted sense of se- 
 curity because of our assumed inaccesi- 
 bility. It is also due in a measure to 
 our rapid expansion, accompanied by 
 the development of our vast resources. 
 We have unconsciously come to look 
 upon the size, wealth and population of 
 our country as sufficient protection, for- 
 getting that without the organization 
 of our resources and the training of our 
 
 15 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 men these will be of little value against 
 lesser forces well organized and prepared, 
 and ignoring also the further fact that 
 valuable territory, great wealth, and 
 commercial aggressiveness, accompanied 
 by weak arrangements for defense, are 
 always an incentive to attack. 
 
 For many years after the Civil War 
 we had a large, well-trained, though 
 unorganized, reserve of officers and men 
 who had seen service. This fact gave 
 us for many years a sense of security 
 which was well justified. Gradually 
 this reserve of well-trained men has 
 passed away. 
 
 The Spanish War gave little training, 
 as did the Philippine insurrection. Cam- 
 paigns of this kind are of limited value 
 as a preparation for war with an organ- 
 ized prepared power. Our reserves to- 
 day are reserves in name only and con- 
 
 16 
 
COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 
 
 sist of those trained but unlisted and 
 unloeated men who have served in our 
 army and have gone back into the mass 
 of the people, forgotten and unheeded, 
 valuable material lost. Their number 
 is only a fraction in comparison with 
 the well-trained alien reservists living in 
 this country but owing military obliga- 
 tion to their home countries. The bal- 
 ance of our reserve consists of the wholly 
 untrained and unprepared men of our 
 population, of little military value until 
 trained. 
 
 The general failure to impress upon 
 our people the defects, weakness and 
 unreliability of our militia and volunteer 
 systems in the past, has resulted in an 
 unwarranted degree of dependency upon 
 them as reliable instruments of defense, 
 a dependence which is not warranted by 
 a careful study of the real facts of our 
 
 17 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 military history; a dependence, which, 
 if continued, will cost us dearly in case 
 of war with an organized military power 
 of the first class. 
 
 The spirit of the officers and men who 
 served under these systems, and are now 
 serving under one of them, is good, but 
 neither of the systems will stand the 
 test of war with an organized and train- 
 ed force. They will crumple up at the 
 first heavy impact of such a force. The 
 reason will not be the physical or moral 
 deficiency of the men, but the fact that 
 they will be untrained. If all great na- 
 tions were trusting to military props of 
 the type of these, the condition as to 
 possible defense would not be so serious, 
 but even in this case the waste of life 
 in camp and field from ignorance of the 
 proper care of men and lack of train- 
 ing for leading them in action, should 
 
 18 
 
COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 
 
 condemn these systems on the ground 
 of plain humanity/ 
 
 The danger of depending on these 
 systems or upon either one of them 
 should be made clear to our people in 
 order that their support may be had in 
 establishing a sound policy, one which 
 will give the largest measure of insur- 
 ance against war, one which will, if war 
 be forced upon us, enable us to conduct 
 it with the minimum loss of life. We 
 have no right to employ the services of 
 loyal and willing men under a system 
 which insures the maximum loss of life 
 and the minimum of success, a system 
 which has been condemned by military 
 experts the world over, including our 
 
 ^Every American should read Emory Upton's 
 Military Policy of the United States, and follow 
 it up with Huidekoper's work, which brings the 
 statement of our military policy, or lack of it, up 
 to date. 
 
 19 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 own. A continuance of these systems, 
 or either one of them, invites attack 
 and greatly increases the probabihty of 
 defeat. The real facts of our military 
 history make these conclusions so abso- 
 lutely clear that he who runs may read. 
 
 '' In time of peace prepare for war! " 
 This was the advice of George Wash- 
 ington. It was drawn from the expe- 
 rience of all time. The advice was 
 sound and conservative when given. It 
 is of even more importance to-day, for 
 the reason that organization, prepara- 
 tion, rapidity of transportation, have 
 all tremendously increased the rapidity 
 of the onset of modern war. 
 
 There is nothing particularly new in 
 the condition of the world to-day, so 
 far as our own situation is concerned, 
 as the following extracts from the mes- 
 sages of the early presidents indicate. 
 
 20 
 
COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 
 
 As one reads them he cannot fail to be 
 impressed with the fact that with the 
 change of a word here and there they 
 are as applicable to conditions to-day 
 as when written. 
 
 On December 3, 1799, President John 
 Adams, in his third annual address, spoke 
 as follows: 
 
 " At a period like the present, when 
 momentous changes are occuring and 
 every hour is preparing new and great 
 events in the political world, when a 
 spirit of war is prevalent in almost 
 every nation with whose affairs the inter- 
 ests of the United States have any con- 
 nection, unsafe and precarious would be 
 our situation were we to neglect the 
 means of maintaining our just rights. 
 The result of the mission to France is 
 uncei-tain; but however it may terminate 
 a steady perseverance in a system of 
 
 21 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 national defense commensurate with our 
 resources and the situation of our coun- 
 try is an obvious dictate of wisdom; for, 
 remotely as we are placed from the 
 belligerent nations, and desirous as we 
 are, by doing justice to all, to avoid 
 offense to anj% nothing short of the 
 power of repelling aggressions will se- 
 cure to our country a rational prospect 
 of escaping the calamities of war or 
 national degradation." 
 
 A few years later, December 3, 1805, 
 in his fifth annual message. President 
 Thomas Jefferson said: 
 
 " In reviewing these injuries from 
 some of the belligerent powers, the mod- 
 eration, the firmness and the wisdom 
 of the Legislature will all be called into 
 action. We ought still to hope that 
 time and a more correct estimate of 
 interest, as ^vell as of character, will 
 
 22 
 
COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 
 
 produce the justice we are bound to 
 expect. But should any nation deceive 
 itself by false calculations, and disap- 
 point that expectation, we must join in 
 the unprofitable contest of trying which 
 party can do the other the most harm. 
 Some of these injuries may perhaps 
 admit a peaceable remedy. Where that 
 is competent it is always the most 
 desirable. But some of them are of a 
 nature to be met wdth force only, and 
 all of them may lead to it. I can not, 
 therefore, but recommend such prepar- 
 ations as circumstances call for." 
 
 Two years later, on October 27, 1807, 
 in his seventh annual message, Jeffer- 
 son made the following statements: 
 
 " Circumstances, fellow citizens, w^hich 
 seriously threatened the peace of our 
 country have made it a duty to convene 
 you at an earlier period than usual. 
 
 23 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 The love of peace so much cherished 
 in the bosoms of our citizens, which has 
 so long guided the proceedings of their 
 public councils and induced forbearance 
 under so many wrongs, may not insure 
 our continuance in the quiet pursuits 
 of industry. The many injuries and 
 depredations committed on our commerce 
 and navigation upon the high seas for 
 years past, the successive innovations on 
 those principles and usage of nations 
 as the rule of their rights and peace, 
 and all the circumstances w^hich induced 
 the extraordinary mission to London 
 are already known to you. 
 
 " Under the acts of March 11 and 
 April 23, respecting arms, the difficulty 
 of procuring them from abroad during 
 the present situation and dispositions of 
 Europe, induced us to direct our whole 
 efforts to the means of internal supply. 
 
 24 
 
COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 
 
 The public factories have therefore 
 been enlarged, additional machineries 
 erected, and, in proportion as artificers 
 can be found or formed, their effect, 
 already more than doubled, may be 
 increased so as to keep pace with the 
 yearly increase of the militia. The an- 
 nual sums appropriated by the latter 
 act have been directed to the encour- 
 agement of private factories of arms, 
 and contracts have been entered into 
 w^ith individual undertakers to nearly 
 the amount of the first year's appro- 
 priation." 
 
 On February 18, 1815, President 
 James Madison, in a special message, 
 said: 
 
 " Experience has taught us that neither 
 the pacific dispositions of the American 
 people nor the pacific character of their 
 political institutions can altogether ex- 
 
 25 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 empt them from that strife which appears 
 beyond the ordinary lot of nations to be 
 incident to the actual period of the 
 world, and the same faithful monitor 
 demonstrates that a certain degree of 
 preparation for war is not only indis- 
 pensable to avert disasters in the onset, 
 but affords also the best security for the 
 continuance of peace." 
 
 And on December 5, 1815, in his 
 seventh annual message, Madison wrote 
 as follows: 
 
 '* Notwithstanding the security for 
 future repose which the United States 
 ought to find in their love of peace and 
 their constant respect for the rights of 
 other nations, the character of the times 
 particularly inculcates the lesson that, 
 whether to prevent or repel danger, we 
 ought not to be unprepared for it. This 
 consideration will sufficiently recommend 
 
 26 
 
COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 
 
 to Congress a liberal provision for the 
 immediate extension and gradual com- 
 pletion of the works of defense, both 
 fixed and floating, on our maritime fron- 
 tier, and an edequate provision for guard- 
 ing our inland frontier against dangers 
 to -which certain portions of it may con- 
 tinue to be exposed." 
 
 The foregoing are quoted at some 
 length for the purpose of pointing out 
 that there is nothing new in the advice 
 which is being given us for prepara- 
 tion. The general conditions under which 
 nations live always render adequate prep- 
 aration necessary, and our country is 
 no exception to the rule. We stand to- 
 day after a period of a hundred years 
 as we shall probably stand a hundred 
 years hence, in a position that renders 
 adequate measures of defense absolutely 
 necessary, if we consider our institutions 
 
 27 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 and our rights worth defending, and 
 are to defend them successfully against 
 powerful adversaries. 
 
 Our presidents throughout the entire 
 period of our national life have con- 
 stantly warned our people with refer- 
 ence to preparedness, not only as a 
 measure necessary for the successful 
 conduct of war, but more often as a 
 means of preventing war. It is time that 
 we finally take heed. 
 
 International relations are in a little 
 less precarious condition in these days, 
 speaking of the world at large, because 
 the telegraph, the wireless, and rapid 
 transmission of dispatches to all por- 
 tions of the world, make full and prompt 
 explanation of misunderstandings pos- 
 sible. On the other hand, rapid trans- 
 port and complete organization make 
 preparation even more necessary, as less 
 
 28 
 
COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 
 
 time is given to prepare after war is 
 decided upon. 
 
 Earnest efforts have been made for 
 arbitration and the maintenance of world 
 peace, but, as present conditions indicate, 
 success is still remote, and every nation, 
 while striving for peace, must make 
 adequate preparation to defend its life. 
 
 29 
 
chapter ii 
 The Struggle for Peace 
 
 "But in demonstrating by our con- 
 duct that we do not fear war in the 
 necessary protection of our rights and 
 honor, we should give no room to infer 
 that we abandon the desire of peace. 
 An efficient preparation for war can 
 alone secure peace." — John Adams, 
 Second Annual Message. 
 
 There is nothing new in the move- 
 ment for peace. It is centuries old. 
 Men have dreamed of it since they had 
 things of value to hold. Women have 
 prayed for it through the ages. Good 
 people have looked forward to the day 
 of peace and tranquility since the begin- 
 ning of written history, and doubtless 
 long before. Just as they have desired 
 
 30 
 
THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 
 
 to avoid great misfortunes, plagues, 
 earthquakes, fire, or famine, so they have 
 struggled to escape war, except in those 
 instances where war was the lesser of 
 two evils. Yet war is with us today, 
 was with us yesterday, and so through 
 all the years since history records man's 
 action or tradition tells of his deeds. 
 
 Today, initiated as a rule with more 
 formality, conducted with greater regard 
 for the lives of the noncombatants, and 
 characterized by a larger measure of 
 observance of the dictates of humanity 
 in the treatment of prisoners and the 
 helpless, war is still with us. Peace 
 leagues struggle to prevent it; great 
 alliances attempt to abate it through 
 preponderant forces — through war itself, 
 if need be. 
 
 Arbitration serves to lessen it a little 
 through disposing of many minor ques- 
 
 31 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 tions which, if allowed to grow, might 
 bring about disputes resulting in war. 
 ^^ one of the means of possible avoid- 
 ance of a resort to force, we welcome 
 arbitraton with open arms and strive 
 to give it the largest measure of success, 
 although realizing that in many cases 
 it will not avail to prevent that final 
 resort to force which can only be avoided 
 when all great powers think alike. That 
 time will come only when absolutely 
 unselfish justice marks international re- 
 lations; when trade is equitably shared 
 among competing peoples; when ^the 
 rich help freely the poor ; when com- 
 petition, greed, selfishness, race interests 
 and prejudices and religious intolerance 
 pass away; when men and nations have 
 no fixed convictions which differ from 
 those of others; when they neither dream 
 dreams nor see visions. Until then, 
 
 32 
 
THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 
 
 strive as we may, the cry will be '' Peace! 
 JPeace!" and yet there will be no per- 
 manent peace. Nevertheless, we must 
 strive unceasingly to reduce war to the 
 minimum, and to build up arbitration, 
 but in so doing we must not lose sight 
 of fhe fact that our efforts will not 
 alwiys be successful. 
 
 An infinite wisdom has established the 
 conditions under which we live and put 
 in being the great law which runs 
 through the universe; the law of the 
 survival of the most fit. We may 
 struggle against it, but it rules in its 
 general application. The most fit in 
 a military way, which includes good 
 bodies based on good food, careful sani- 
 tation, well thought-out training, clear 
 intelligence resting on good schools and 
 early training, good armament, equip- 
 ment and organization, all springing 
 
 33 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 from intelligence and education applied 
 to self -protect ion and expansion of inter-^ 
 ests and trade, will win in war just as 
 they wun in commerce. 
 
 They may not be the most fit in 
 abstract morality as relates to business 
 relations between individuals or nations, 
 or with regard to generosity or sense 
 of justice. The characteristics of sel- 
 fishness, self-interest and the spirit of 
 acquisitiveness are often accompanied by 
 a development of the means to get what 
 is coveted and to hold it securelv. 
 Human nature in the mass is still human 
 nature; under a little more restraint, 
 perhaps, but still the old complex prop- 
 osition of the ages, characterized and 
 controlled only too often by expediency 
 and self-interest. I 
 
 Nations are but collections of individ- 
 uals; we need courts for the individual 
 
 34 
 
THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 
 
 man, and courts are of no avail without 
 the police. In the vast group of indi- 
 viduals constituting a community, city 
 or nation, the resort to force by small 
 groups representing perhaps a thous- 
 andth, or less, of the population, is a 
 nuisance and is not permitted by the 
 great aggregation of the individuals 
 among whom they live, as it interferes 
 with the interest and activities, often 
 safety, of too many other people. The 
 individuals in the community of nations 
 are few in number, and it is much less 
 easy to bring preponderant force to 
 the control or restraint of the more 
 powerful. 
 
 Yet as men struggle within the com- 
 munitj^ and too often resort to force 
 unless restrained, so do nations stnjggle 
 and resort to force in the world com- 
 munity, only here counter force in the 
 
 35 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 form of international police has never 
 been resorted to. Can it be effectively 
 done while there still exist strong groups 
 characterized by century-old prejudices 
 of race and interest This is one of the 
 great questions of the hour. While con- 
 sidering it we should not neglect pre- 
 paration for defense or fail to recognize 
 conditions as they are. 
 
 The maintenance of peace and the 
 prevention of war have been attempted 
 through alliances to compel or regulate 
 the action of other groups or other 
 combinations of nations, by efforts so 
 to group nations as to maintain the 
 balance of power between people whose 
 territorial expansion and increase of 
 population and interests might other- 
 wise jeopardize peace. These efforts 
 have usually resulted in war sooner or 
 later, although in many instances serv- 
 
 36 
 
THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 
 
 ing to maintain peace for long periods. 
 The policy of no combination satisfies 
 the greed, ambition or policy of all its 
 members, and eventually the dominating 
 interest of one or more members of 
 such a combination, or the injection of 
 new interests or conditions, serves after 
 a time to bring about the loosening of 
 the bonds of the alliance and the form- 
 ation of new combinations, too often 
 with a resort to force as the final argu- 
 ment. 
 
 Thus far we see little prospect of 
 change. We may hold down for a 
 time the explosive pressure or give it a 
 safe vent, but from time to time human 
 effort will fail and the explosion will 
 occur. In other words, the controlling 
 nations are too few in number and 
 their vital interests are so coincident or 
 interwoven with those of the controlled 
 
 37 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 nations that constant changes and rear- 
 rangements result in this grouping, and 
 these changes inevitably bring about an 
 appeal to force. It is difficult to see 
 how this condition can be changed so 
 long as national lines exist and racial 
 groups continue, or certain trade areas 
 remain under the control of these groups. 
 
 Justice and righteousness are not 
 enough to insure protection, nor is an 
 upright and blameless personal or nation- 
 al life a guarantee against the unscrupu- 
 lous. A Pilate was found to crucify 
 Christ; and a strong aggressive nation, 
 believing in its own worth and right to 
 expand, has always been prone to crush 
 and coerce a weaker one, regardless of 
 the abstract justice of the weaker nation's 
 cause. 
 
 Why all these things are, is a ques- 
 tion which this world cannot answer in 
 
 38 
 
THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 
 
 precise terms, and with such answer we 
 are not now concerned. But we are con- 
 cerned with the existence of the condition. 
 We can with justice say that pubhc 
 and national morahty is largely tlie reflec- 
 tion of the education of our youth. Given 
 sound moral training in the home, a 
 healthy body and a developed sense 
 of justice and fair play, and you have 
 the youth who will most probably make 
 the sound, just and normal man in pub- 
 lic life, the best citizen, and, collectively, 
 when assembled in legislative bodies or 
 engaged in executive or administrative 
 work, the man who will act on the most 
 just, reasonable and tolerant lines. But 
 even among men of this class there will 
 be strong differences of opinion and 
 it is little short of folly to assume the 
 contrary. We may diminsh the fre- 
 quency of strife and make more humane 
 
 39 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY v 
 
 the struggle, but for the present/nothing 
 more. 
 
 Blood, race, tradition, trade and a 
 host of other influences, capped by am- 
 bition to go on, to lead, to expand, 
 will always produce strife. We cannot 
 escape this conclusion if we take as our 
 guide the evidence of things done and 
 being done, rather than follow the dic- 
 tates of fancy or desire. The struggle 
 for peace is centuries old, and efforts 
 to end war and establish undisturbed 
 peace have filled the minds of men and 
 taxed the resources of nations. The 
 great combinations of power to prevent 
 war, were, after all, but combinations 
 of forces to restrain the exercise of 
 force, and have more often than not 
 ended in a great struggle for readjust- 
 ment of the balance of power. 
 
 The theories and policies of addled 
 
 40 
 
THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 
 
 minds and shallow intelligences, prod- 
 ucts of the applause of the lecture plat- 
 form, or of minds upset by the flattery 
 incident to sudden wealth, have had 
 their share of attention, and even of 
 sympathy. After all, they indicate only 
 a failure to understand that war gener- 
 ally has its roots running deep below 
 the surface that is swept by the gaze 
 of such observers. The authors of these 
 theories never have studied seriously the 
 causes of war. They assign as causes 
 the little incidents which serve to touch 
 off the mass of explosive which other 
 forces have been accumulating and piling 
 up for a generation or perhaps a century. 
 War, whether it be for evil or good, 
 is among men, and our clear duty is 
 to recognize this fact, instead of deny- 
 ing the evidence of our senses simply 
 because it is disagreeable and brutal, 
 
 41 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 something that we would get rid of. 
 Our duty is to protect ourselves as best 
 we can against war and build our pro- 
 tection on so secure a foundation and 
 maintain its efficiency so systematically 
 that our own institutions, ideals and 
 interests msLj be secure and that we 
 may be able to hand down to our chil- 
 dren all the benefits w^e have received 
 from our fathers. God has given us 
 ej'^es to see, ears to hear, and intelligence 
 and memory to glean and carry from 
 the lessons of the past something of 
 wisdom to guide us in meeting the issues 
 of the present. If we fail to make the 
 best use of those faculties which have 
 been given us, w^e must pay the penalty. 
 We must continue to strive for world 
 peace, for the betterment of human 
 conditions; we must do what we can to 
 promote arbitration, love of justice; but 
 
 42 
 
THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 
 
 we have no right to forget that none of 
 these will serve to protect us against 
 an unjust aggressor. Let us do all 
 these good things, but at the same time 
 take those measures of wise precaution 
 which the experience of time and of all 
 people teaches, that we may be pre- 
 pared to defend with force those things 
 which justice, honesty and fair dealing 
 are inadequate of themselves to defend? 
 As Cromwell said: "Trust in God — 
 but keep your powder dry." In other 
 words, do right, but do not trust to that 
 alone. The highwayman is not especially 
 concerned with the morals of the man 
 whose purse he covets, nor is the great 
 nation struggling for trade and expan- 
 sion disposed to give especial consider- 
 ation to the morals of the people standing 
 in her way. Every nation does, how- 
 ever, give serious and prompt heed to 
 
 43 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 the strength and abihty of another to 
 hold and protect what she has. 
 
 After going over the evidence of past 
 results and present conditions, we must 
 realize that arbitration to-day cannot as 
 a rule be depended upon for protection 
 or even as a means of delaying a resort 
 to force, except in such cases as are not 
 of vital importance to either of the dis- 
 putants. Questions of citizenship, cases 
 arising under the Monroe Doctrine — 
 in which we are particularly interested — 
 are among those which cannot well be 
 turned over to arbitration. Our interests 
 in them are vital. 
 
 Preparedness to resist injustice or 
 attack with force tends to amplify the 
 possibilities of successful arbitration, as 
 the cost and danger of the struggle and 
 the uncertainty of the outcome are evi- 
 dent. Preparedness lends weight to just 
 
 44 
 
THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 
 
 claims and makes the would-be aggres- 
 sor hesitate. It is the well-guarded house 
 in which the robber sees the danger and 
 realizes the cost. It does not mean 
 that the people of the house are less 
 just because they have had the good 
 sense to recognize conditions and take 
 the wise measure of proteci;ion. 
 
 All arbitration has a much better 
 chance of success when each party rea- 
 lizes that the other has the ability to 
 make strong opposition to unjust claims. 
 A countr}^ unable to defend her rights 
 on land and sea is not the country to 
 determine whether arbitration or force 
 is to be resorted to. It is the strong, 
 well-prepared nation which will deter- 
 mine whether a dispute is to be settled 
 by arms or arbitration, not the weak 
 and unprepared one. 
 
 Washington's words still hold good: 
 
 4.5 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 " To be prepared for war is one of the 
 most effectual means of preserving 
 peace." The assertion so often made 
 that preparedness increases the proba- 
 bihty of war, is unsound from every 
 standpoint, unless those who make the 
 assertion assume that we should not 
 engage in war in any case but rather 
 submit passively to whatever demands 
 are made upon us. The resort to aggres- 
 sive force will always be governed to 
 a certain extent by the question of cost 
 — cost in men and treasure. If no seri- 
 ous resistance is possible on the part of 
 one party to a dispute, the temptation 
 of the stronger and better prepared to 
 use force is great; if the reverse is the 
 case, consideration and a disposition to 
 arbitrate may be counted on. 
 
 Every dictate of common sense, the 
 teaching of history and the lessons of 
 
 46 
 
THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 
 
 the moment, suggest strongly and unmis- 
 takably the urgent necessity of the 
 organization of the might of the nation, 
 in order that we may be ready to meet 
 force with force, if other means fail. 
 Reliance on peace treaties is not a safe 
 policy. Experience shows they often 
 mean little in the face of a great crisis 
 threatening the life and interests of a 
 nation. 
 
 Preparedness does not mean mihtar- 
 ism or an aggressive military spirit; it 
 means simply the application to the mih- 
 tary questions of the day of something 
 of the experience and lessons of the past 
 as well as those of the present. A man 
 armed against thieves is not prone to 
 become a thief unless he is one at heart. 
 A nation can be strong without being 
 immoral or a bully. Militarism, as indi- 
 cated by the existence of a military class 
 
 47 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 demanding and receiving special con- 
 sideration and precedence and exercis- 
 ing an undue influence in the internal 
 affairs of the nation or upon its inter- 
 national relations, is to be avoided beyond 
 peradventure. But effective prepared- 
 ness can be had without a trace of this 
 condition, as illustrated by Switzerland 
 and France — taking only representative 
 forms of government as examples. 
 
 The entire trend of our sentiment, 
 past and present, disproves the possi- 
 bility of such a condition of affairs. No 
 class of the population is more opposed 
 to the establishment of a condition of 
 militarism than the army itself. The 
 army is absolutely democratic, repre- 
 senting, as it does, all classes of the 
 people. The great danger which con- 
 fronts our people is that which arises 
 from an ignorance of the organization 
 
 48 
 
THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 
 
 and capacity for the prompt use of 
 highly organized force on the part of 
 all the great nations except China and 
 ourselves. While talking peace and arbi- 
 tration we are, through wealth, commer- 
 cial aggressiveness and heedlessness as 
 to preparation to defend our rights and 
 properties, one of the great menaces to 
 peace. Lack of intelligent preparedness 
 cannot promote peace; it can and does 
 prejudice its continuance and will cer- 
 tainly serve to prolong and make more 
 deadly the effects of war. 
 
 It is an insult to us as a people to 
 assume that we cannot be strong and 
 prepared to fight for the right without 
 becoming likely to use our power for 
 ^vrong. This is the cant of weaklings 
 who have no strong convictions of right 
 for which they are willing to die, if 
 need be. Let us drop cant and h^^^poc- 
 
 49 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 risy and be sure that we can be both 
 strong enough to protect our own rights 
 and interests, and just and self- 
 restrained enough, even though strong, 
 to respect those of others. There is no 
 real basis for assuming that if we pre- 
 pare to resist aggression we are likely to 
 become aggressors. 
 
 We have no right to jeopardize all 
 we have and hold most dear by failing 
 to organize and prepare our strength 
 because of the fear that if strong, organ- 
 ized and ready, our nation may become 
 an international highwayman. Rubbish 
 and cant of the faint-hearted! Lacking 
 the spirit which places principles and 
 honor above fear and woimds! 
 
 Peace treaties — international law — 
 they should be observed, but they are 
 not always. Where are those who trusted 
 them and forgot that force is still 
 
 50 
 
THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 
 
 to be reckoned with? The great Peace 
 Palace stands empty in the land of a 
 prosperous, industrious people at pres- 
 ent under arms to protect their own 
 neutrality. None of the causes of the 
 greatest war of the ages has been or is 
 being heard within its walls. Interna- 
 tfonal law has been too often only the 
 will of the strongest and may be again. 
 It is at the best but a feeble staff to 
 lean on, when issues involving the life 
 of a nation, or nations, are involved. 
 
 As Washington said: " The best way 
 to make a good peace is to have a good 
 army," — using the word "army" in 
 the sense of military force, which includes 
 the navy; and he might have said that 
 the best way to preserve peace is to be 
 prepared against war. We should favor 
 preparedness not only on the grounds 
 of safety, but on the grounds of human- 
 
 51 
 
AMERICA S DUTY 
 
 ity, for it is a brutal waste of life to 
 send an undisciplined and untrained peo- 
 ple into war, and war will come, from 
 time to time, do what we may to try 
 to avoid it. Xo nation does more to 
 tempt others to war than one which, pos- 
 sessing much of the trade and more 
 than her proportion of the wealth of 
 the world, fails to make adequate prepa- 
 rations to Q'uard what she has. 
 
 52 
 
ckaptkr hi 
 Past Xat/oxaj. Poijcy 
 
 "A government is the murderer of 
 its citizens which sends them to the 
 , field uninformed and untaught, where 
 they are to meet men of the same age 
 and strength mechanized by education 
 and disciplined for battle." — General 
 Richard Henry Jjee. 
 
 We are a warlike, hut not a military 
 }>er>ple; that is to say, we are quick to 
 resent injury and ready to meet force 
 with force, but we are not organized 
 to employ force effectively. We are 
 commercially aggressive; we are exceed- 
 ingly rich. We never have submitted 
 and are still indisposed to submit our- 
 selves to discipline or preparation. We 
 spend human life like water anri pay 
 
 .53 
 
AMKHICA'S DUTY 
 
 with blood and treasure for the lack 
 of ordinary intelligent preparation. We 
 are not so niiieh unready to resort to 
 war for the right if need be as we are 
 unprepared to wage it. We hate mili- 
 tarism, object to large standing armies, 
 and properly, and we can continue so 
 to do and still make full preparation 
 on lines not at variance with our ideals 
 or the principles laid down by the 
 founders. 
 
 In our country peace societies are not 
 a new idea. The New York Peace 
 Society was founded in 1815, and as 
 long ago as 1827 there were many peace 
 societies in the United States. The effort 
 has passed through many stages; the 
 pacifists of to-day must not flatter them- 
 selves that they have discovered that 
 war is brutal. Cicero emphasized it in 
 his day. Seneca characterized war as 
 
 54 
 
IMST XATH)\AL VOIACY 
 
 ** plain insanity." If it wujrj be stopper! 
 by pointing out that it is brutal and 
 ^ives pain, it would have beerj stopped 
 jr>n^ ago. 
 
 We must realize that there are two 
 types of pr^aee. 'i'here is the peace of 
 Jtorrje urjder Augustus, whieh was a 
 real peace, and ito/ne and Korrjan citi- 
 zens were respected by their rjeighbors; 
 arid there is the other type, the peace oi' 
 Jfonorius, in whose time pacifists prated 
 as they do at present. Xonresistance 
 was the theory. Kmperor Jfonorius 
 raised poultry and the barbarians over- 
 ran the empire. In the first instance 
 there was peace with honor arjd dignity; 
 in the second iastance the empire was 
 overrun, a civilization almost destroyed 
 through failure to listen to the teach- 
 ings of Ijistory and make reasonable, 
 rational preparation. It was the sort 
 
 55 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 of peace which has existed in China. 
 It was the kind of peace which marks 
 the decadence of a nation. It goes hand 
 in hand with the policy advocated by 
 the peace-at-any-price people of to-day. 
 
 Our early presidents were most of 
 them truly great men, lovers of peace; 
 some of them had participated in war, 
 and all of them had lived through periods 
 of war. They were just and upright 
 in character. What was their advice 
 to our people'' Washington says, in his 
 first annual address: 
 
 " To be prepared for war is one of 
 tlie most effectual means of preserving 
 peace. A free people ought not onl}' 
 to be armed, but disciplined: to which 
 end a uniform and well digested plan 
 is requisite: and their safety and inter- 
 est require that they should promote 
 such manufactures as tend to render 
 
 56 
 
PAST NATIONAL POLICY 
 
 them independent of others for essential, 
 particularly military, supplies." 
 
 [fj his third arjnual message, s{>eaking 
 of the rrjilitia, which under the provi- 
 sions of the organic law included men 
 from eighteen to forty-five, W^ashington 
 said : 
 
 •* 'JTjc safetv of the United States, 
 under divine protection, ought to rest 
 on the basis of systematic and solid 
 arrangements, exposed as little as [k>s- 
 sihle to the hazards of fortuitous cir- 
 cumstances." 
 
 In his fifth annual message he made 
 this statement: 
 
 ** I cannot recomme/jd to your notice 
 measures for the fulfillment of our duties 
 to the rest of the world without again 
 pressing upon you the necessity of plac- 
 ing ourselves in a condition of complete 
 defense and of extracting from them 
 
 57 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 the fulfillment of their duties towards 
 us. The United States ought not to 
 indulge a persuasion that, contrary to 
 the order of human events, they will for- 
 ever keep at a distance those painful 
 appeals to arms with which the history 
 of every other nation abounds. There 
 is a rank due to the United States among 
 nations which will be withheld, if not 
 absolutely lost, by the reputation of 
 weakness. If we desire to avoid insult 
 we must be able to repel it; if we desire 
 to secure peace, one of the most power- 
 ful instruments of our rising prosperity, 
 it must be known that we are at all times 
 ready for war." 
 
 In Washington's eighth annual ad- 
 dress, speaking of the country's inability 
 to protect its commerce, he said: 
 
 " Will it not then be advisable to 
 begin without delay to provide and lay 
 
 58 
 
PAST NATIONAL POLICY 
 
 up materials for the building and equip- 
 ping of ships of war and to proceed in 
 the work by degrees in proportion as 
 our resources shall render it practicable 
 without inconvenience, so that a futiu'e 
 war in Europe may not find our com- 
 merce in the same unprotected state in 
 wHich it was found during the present? " 
 
 John Adams, in a special message, 
 stated: " With a view and as a measure 
 which even in time of universal peace 
 ought not to be neglected, I recommend 
 to your consideration a revision of the 
 laws for organizing, arming and dis- 
 ciplining the militia, to render that nat- 
 ural and safe defense of the country 
 efficacious." 
 
 In his second annual message, which 
 dealt with our relations with France, 
 President Adams declared: "But in 
 demonstrating by our conduct that we 
 
 59 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 do not fear war in the necessary pro- 
 tection of our rights and honor, we 
 should give no room to infer that we 
 abandon the desire of peace. An effi- 
 cient preparation for war can alone 
 secure peace. We ought, without loss 
 of time, to lay the foundations for that 
 increase of our navy to a size sufficient 
 to guard our coasts and protect our 
 trade." 
 
 Thomas Jefferson, in his fifth annual 
 message, advocated: " The organization 
 of 300,000 able-bodied men between the 
 ages of 18 and 26, for defense at any 
 time or at any place where they may 
 be wanted." 
 
 In a letter to James Monroe, from 
 Monticello, dated June 19, 1813, Jef- 
 ferson wrote: 
 
 " It proves more forcibly the neces- 
 sity of obliging every citizen to be a 
 
 60 
 
PAST NATIONAL POLICY 
 
 soldier. This was the ease with the 
 Greeks and Romans, and must be that 
 of every free state. Where there is no 
 oppression there will be no pauper hire- 
 lings. We must train and classify the 
 whole of our male citizens, and make 
 military instruction a regular part of 
 collegiate education. We can never be 
 safe till this is done." 
 
 This letter was written fourteen 
 months before the fiasco at Bladensburg 
 and the burning of Washington. Again 
 he says: 
 
 " If war be forced upon us in spite 
 of our long and vain appeals to the jus- 
 tice of nations, rapid and vigorous move- 
 ment at the outset will go far toward 
 securing us in its course and issue, and 
 toward throwing its burdens on those 
 who render necessary the resort from 
 reason to force. 
 
 61 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 " Considering the conditions of the 
 times in which we hve, our attention 
 should unremittingly be fixed on the 
 safety of our country. For a people 
 who are free and who mean to remain so, 
 a well-organized and armed militia is 
 their best security." 
 
 One might continue almost indefinitely 
 to quote from the messages and state 
 papers of our presidents, concerning this 
 great matter of defense, organization 
 and readiness. 
 
 General Henry Knox, when Secre- 
 tary of War, sent to President Wash- 
 ington, on January 18, 1790, a plan 
 which provided for the enrolling, classi- 
 fying and training of all able-bodied 
 men from eighteen to sixty years of age. 
 General Knox refers to the fact that 
 this plan had been previously presented 
 to Washington, had been modified some- 
 
 62 
 
PAST NATIONAL POLICY 
 
 what, and as now finally presented had 
 Washington's approval. Among other 
 things he states in his letter of trans- 
 mission : 
 
 " It had been my anxious desire to 
 devise a national system of defense ade- 
 quate to the probable exigencies of the 
 United States, whether arising from 
 internal or external causes; and at the 
 same time to erect a standard of repub- 
 lican magnanimity, independent of, and 
 superior to, the powerful influence of 
 wealth." 
 
 Both Washington and Knox had had 
 unfortunate experiences with the un- 
 trained militia during the Revolution, 
 and the plan they now proposed was not 
 one which contemplated the use of militia 
 as it was used during the Revolution, 
 but it was, in effect, the forerunner of 
 the idea voiced by Jefferson in 1813, 
 
 63 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 namely, the organizing, classifying and 
 training of the male population. Gen- 
 eral Knox precedes his plan by a long 
 introduction, much of which was appar- 
 ently written by Washington. Among 
 other statements therein made, worthy 
 of note are the following: 
 
 "But it is at the same time acknowl- 
 edged that, unless a republic prepares 
 itself by proper arrangements to meet 
 those exigencies to which all states are in 
 a degree liable, its peace and existence 
 are more precarious than the forms of 
 government in which the will of one 
 directs the conduct of the whole, for 
 the defense of the nation. 
 
 "It is the intention of the present 
 attempt to suggest the most efficient 
 system of defense which may be com- 
 patible with the interests of a free peo- 
 ple — a system which will not only pro- 
 
 64 
 
PAST NATIONAL POLICY 
 
 duce the expected effect, but which, in 
 its operations, shall also produce those 
 habits and manners which will impart 
 strength and durability to the whole 
 government. 
 
 " All discussions on the subject of a 
 powerful militia will result in one or 
 other of the following principles: 
 
 '' First : Either efficient institutions 
 must be established for the military edu- 
 cation of the youth, and that the knowl- 
 edge acquired therein shall be diffused 
 throughout the community by the means 
 of rotation; or, 
 
 " Secondly: That the militia must be 
 formed of substitutes, after the manner 
 of the militia of Great Britain. 
 
 " If the United States possesses the 
 vigor of mind to establish the first insti- 
 tution, it may be reasonably expected to 
 produce the most unequivocal advan- 
 
 65 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 tages. A glorious national spirit will be 
 introduced, with its extensive train of 
 political consequences. The youth will 
 imbibe a love of their country; reverence 
 and obedience to its laws; courage and 
 elevation of mind; openness and liberal- 
 ity of character, accompanied by a just 
 spirit of honor; in addition to which their 
 bodies will acquire robustness, greatly 
 conducive to their personal happiness, 
 as well as the defense of their country, 
 while habit, with its silent but efficacious 
 operations, will cement the system. 
 
 " Every intelligent mind would rejoice 
 in the establishment of an institution, 
 under whose auspices the youth and vigor 
 of the constitution would be renewed 
 with each successive generation, and 
 which would appear to secure the great 
 principles of freedom and happiness 
 against the injuries of time and events." 
 
 66 
 
PAST NATIONAL POLICY 
 
 General Knox then concludes his let- 
 ter with the following summary: 
 
 " First : That it is the indispensable 
 duty of every nation to establish all nec- 
 essary institutions for its own perfection 
 and defense. 
 
 " Secondly: That it is a capital secur- 
 ity to a free state for the great body of 
 the people to possess a competent knowl- 
 edge of the military art. 
 
 '* Thirdly: That this knowledge can- 
 not be attained, in the present state of 
 society, but by establishing adequate 
 institutions for the military education of 
 the youth; and that the knowledge 
 acquired therein should be diffused 
 throughout the community by the prin- 
 ciples of rotation. 
 
 "Fourthly: That every man of the 
 proper age and ability of body, is firmly 
 bound, by the special compact, to per- 
 
 67 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 form personally his proportion of mili- 
 tary duty for the defense of the state. 
 
 '' Fifthly: That all men of the legal 
 military age should be armed, enrolled 
 and held responsible for different degrees 
 of military service. 
 
 "And, sixthly: That, agreeably to 
 the Constitution, the United States are 
 to provide for arming, organizing and 
 disciplining the militia, and for govern- 
 ing such a part of it as may be employed 
 in the service of the United States, 
 reserving to the states, respectively, the 
 appointment of the officers and the 
 authority of training the militia accord- 
 ing to the discipline prescribed by Con- 
 gress." 
 
 This plan, briefly stated, consisted of 
 the grouping of physically and mentally 
 fit men, between the ages of eighteen 
 and sixty years of age, into three corps. 
 
 68 
 
PAST NATIONAL POLICY 
 
 The young men between eighteen and 
 twenty-one years of age formed the 
 Advance Corps, and the men between 
 twenty-one and forty-five formed the 
 Main Corps. There was a third, or 
 Reserve Corps, which consisted of men 
 from forty-five to sixty years of age. 
 The plan further provided that these 
 first and second groups should be organ- 
 ized into various military units; that 
 the young men of eighteen and nineteen 
 years of age should receive thirty days' 
 training in camp each year; the men of 
 twenty, ten days of training in camp 
 each year; the men from twenty-one to 
 forty-five, four days of training each 
 year. 
 
 This was a federal force and it was 
 to be equipped, armed and subsisted at 
 the expense of the United States; its 
 members were required to take an oath 
 
 69 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 of allegiance to the state and to the 
 United States. Herein was an element 
 of weakness. A force of this kind, or 
 any kind of national force, should be 
 purely a federal force. Its officers should 
 be apointed by the president on the fed- 
 eral authority and it should be available 
 for service within or without the United 
 States. The plan was a great advance 
 over an}i:hing hitherto proposed, inas- 
 much as it recognized the necessity for 
 general military training. The training 
 of these troops was to be prescribed by 
 the United States. 
 
 The early plan was a tremendous 
 improvement over the militia idea finally 
 adopted. It would have resulted in the 
 general military training of our people 
 and the dissemination of a knowledge of 
 our military policy. It represented an 
 appreciation of the necessity for mili- 
 
 70 
 
PAST NATIONAL POLICY 
 
 tary training. Had this system been 
 adopted, the War of 1812 would prob- 
 ably never have occurred. Or, if it had 
 occurred, we should have been quickly 
 successful in obtaining our objective. 
 Both Washington and Knox recognized 
 the economic efficiency which would be 
 gained by this training, and they also 
 realized that a tremendous improvement 
 in citizenship would result. They did 
 not expect the men from forty-five to 
 sixty to serve in the first hue, but they 
 saw that they would be a valuable asset 
 on the lines of communication, depots, 
 and other important fields of activity 
 where the highest degree of physical 
 excellence is not required. This pro- 
 posed act, if it had been passed and put 
 into effect, would have saved manv tens 
 of thousands of lives and many hundreds 
 of millions of money. 
 
 71 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 If the advice of our early presidents 
 was sound at the time it was given, 
 when the ocean was a real barrier instead 
 of, as at the present time, the readiest 
 means of approach, once sea control is 
 lost; when troops were moved over sea 
 by sailing ships of relatively small capac- 
 ity; when none of the great nations 
 contained large, highly organized and 
 equipped armies prepared for prompt 
 movement in any direction; when the 
 arms of war were simple and easy of 
 manufacture and easy to acquire famil- 
 iarity with; when we had little in the 
 way of commerce or wealth to tempt 
 aggression; how much more sound is it 
 now, when all great nations have highly 
 organized armies, large reserves of men 
 and material, adequate equipment of all 
 kinds ? 
 
 Since then steam has divided time 
 
 72 
 
PAST NATIONAL POLICY 
 
 and distance by ten; the arms of war 
 are most intricate and require a long 
 time to manufacture, and it takes a still 
 longer time to teach men to use them 
 effectively; our wealth has enormously 
 increased; our commerce spreads over the 
 earth and we hold great areas far beyond 
 our continental limits; our people are 
 unskilled in the use of arms, and our 
 population as a whole has little appre- 
 ciation of its military obligation. There 
 is no question but that the advice of 
 our early presidents is entitled to much 
 more attention to-day than when given. 
 This country has never engaged single- 
 handed in a war with a nation of the 
 first class prepared for war. We have 
 absolutely no conception of what modern 
 war means when conducted by a nation 
 organized and ready in men and mate- 
 rial. It is to be hoped that we may 
 
 73 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 never have this experience, certainly not 
 until we have learned something fmm 
 the experience of others, something from 
 the lessons of the past as well as those 
 of the present. 
 
 We have no markedly superior mili- 
 tary virtues; as a people, the blood of 
 all peoples runs in our veins. We live 
 under a form of government which tends 
 to develop individuality and self-confi- 
 dence, good qualities if coordinated and 
 harmonized by discipline. But there is 
 nothing which indicates peculiar or supe- 
 rior military excellence, and there is noth- 
 ing in our military history upon which 
 we can found such an assumption. We 
 have splendid material for soldiers, if 
 trained, but without training that mate- 
 rial is relatively of little value. 
 
 There seems to be a general impres- 
 sion that, having blundered through our 
 
 74 
 
PAST NATIONAL POLICY 
 
 past wars with a hideously unnecessary 
 expenditure of Hfe and treasure, some- 
 how or other we shall continue to blunder 
 on successfully, regardless of lack of 
 preparation on our part or of thorough 
 organization and preparation on the paii: 
 of our possible antagonist. Such an 
 opinion is entirely unwarranted. 
 Thorough preparation is absolutely indis- 
 pensable. 
 
 General Harry Lee — popularly known 
 as " Light-Horse Harry " — stated at 
 the end of the Revolution that the nation 
 was the murderer of its men which sent 
 them untrained and undisciplined to meet 
 equally good men, mechanized and dis- 
 ciplined by training. These words were 
 true when they were uttered and they 
 are true to-day, and they apply with 
 peculiar force to our own people. It is 
 not enough to be willing — we must be 
 
 75 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 prepared. One would not think of put- 
 ting into a lifeboat men who could neither 
 row nor swim; and yet we assume to 
 send them into battle undisciplined and 
 untrained, unfamiliar with the use of 
 arms, where they are to meet men trained 
 to the minute. It is murder — nothing 
 else. 
 
 If a lot of men physically of the 
 right type presented themselves for the 
 crews or for the teams of a university 
 and said they were willing to go into 
 athletics, but would not train, they would 
 receive scant courtesy at the hands of 
 their college mates. Experience in ath- 
 letics has taught that success is abso- 
 lutely dependent upon thorough prepa- 
 ration; and the would-be athlete who 
 assumed that he could meet, with any 
 hope of success, an equally good man, 
 physically fit and trained in all the 
 
 76 
 
PAST NATIONAL POLICY 
 
 details of the game, would be looked 
 upon as little better than a fool. 
 
 So it is with professional soldiers, who 
 have devoted their lives to their work: 
 they see the folly of the idle declarations 
 of the Fourth of July orator, or the 
 equally fatuous and misleading state- 
 ments of the men who say that we, by 
 virtue of peculiar qualities, are superior 
 to equally good men, trained and ready. 
 Such vain boasts are more than foolish 
 
 — they are dangerous. They strike at 
 the very life of the nation. If we heed 
 them longer we shall repent in sackcloth 
 and ashes. 
 
 While students of military policy and 
 our professional soldiers of the best type 
 
 — not the machine-cut-and-dried type, 
 but the soldiers with learning and imag- 
 ination — have always recognized that 
 campaigns are won in the preparations 
 
 77 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 for them, our people have never appre- 
 ciated this great truth, nor do they real- 
 ize that thorough organization of the 
 nation's resources in men, material and 
 money is necessary to a success which 
 shall be characterized by the minimimi 
 loss of blood and treasure. Battles are 
 won as well as lost in the national legis- 
 lature, in the offices of the administra- 
 tion, in departments, as well as in the 
 field. Failure to provide means for con- 
 ducting the war, neglect properly to 
 organize, undue interference by non- 
 technical persons in the direction of that 
 highly specialized and technical business, 
 war, the direction of operations to meet 
 political demands of the hour, all con- 
 tribute, with fateful force, to the out- 
 come of the armed struggle. 
 
 Under our procedure in the past, the 
 soldier too often has had little to say 
 
 78 
 
 "x; 
 
PAST NATIONAL POLICY 
 
 in the great question of preparation in 
 its varied forms, involving organization, 
 supply and equipment, and only too 
 often has found himself like a sailor put 
 on board a ship in a gale of wind — a 
 ship built not by professional shipbuild- 
 ers — a ship of whose equipment and 
 personnel he is largely ignorant. All 
 he can do is to make the best of a bad 
 situation, reorganize and re-equip in the 
 face of a storm. So it has been only 
 too often with our soldiers, called to lead 
 badly organized, uninstructed, half- 
 armed bodies of troops without previous 
 training. This describes, in a general 
 way, the situation which has existed at 
 the beginning of our wars in the past. 
 These conditions should not be possible 
 in future wars; but they will be unless 
 we study thoroughly the question in all 
 its aspects, and take wise measures of 
 
 79 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 precaution and make such preparation 
 as the experience of the past and the 
 best information of the present indicate. 
 
 When our people offer their bodies 
 and their lives to the nation for service 
 in war in the nation's defense, they have 
 a right to demand that these sacrifices 
 shall be made — if made they must be 
 — under conditions which minimize the 
 probability of disaster from lack of prep- 
 aration, instruction, arms, equipment or 
 organization, both on the fighting line 
 and behind it. 
 
 Preparation will tend to make the 
 struggle as brief as possible, and reduce 
 the cost in life and treasure to the low- 
 est possible limit. Our people have never 
 entered into war with any of these assur- 
 ances. They have gone into it blindly, 
 uninformed as to the necessity of the 
 hundred and one things which make for 
 
 80 
 
PAST NATIONAL POLICY 
 
 preparation and which are the sure 
 foundations of success. National defense 
 begins with the people, and must find 
 its main support among their represen- 
 tatives, for, as John Adams said, 
 " National defense is one of the cardinal 
 duties of a statesman; the soldier can 
 only endorse when asked; the statesman 
 must advocate, and the legislative body 
 enact." 
 
 Only too often do we find men who 
 should know better, speaking of our 
 great military resources, forgetting that 
 unless developed and organized they will 
 be of no more value in the quick onrush 
 of modern war, initiated by a prepared 
 nation, than would an undeveloped gold 
 mine in Alaska be in a crisis in Wall 
 Street. The fact that a nation has 
 resources does not help if those resources 
 are undeveloped and unavailable. If 
 
 81 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 modern war emphasizes any one thing 
 above another, it is that resources of all 
 kinds must be promptly available and 
 organized. Mere numbers, untrained, 
 unorganized and unequipped, mean lit- 
 tle; no wolf was ever frightened by 
 the size of a flock of sheep. 
 
 As one considers the conduct of our 
 various wars from the standpoint of 
 military efficiency and economy in life 
 and treasure, there is but one conclusion 
 possible, and that is that our lack of 
 system has been not only unduly expen- 
 sive from every standpoint but that it 
 has led to great prolongation of war, 
 unnecessary loss of life and treasure, and 
 consequent interference with the develop- 
 ment of the country. In some instances 
 that lack of organization has resulted in 
 failure to attain the object sought. 
 
 In the Revolutionary War, Washing- 
 
 82 
 
PAST NATIONAL POLICY 
 
 ton stands out conspicuouslj^ as the great 
 coordinating, dominant figure, and the 
 more one studies the conduct of that 
 war the more he is impressed by the debt 
 we owe to Washington. His sound 
 judgment, able military leadership, and, 
 above all, his patience and persistence, 
 coupled with infinite tact, made it pos- 
 sible for him to retain the confidence 
 of Congress and the people to an unusual 
 extent and to hold together the poorly 
 equipped and hastily assembled raw 
 levies which formed the bulk of the 
 K evolutionary armies. 
 
 83 
 
chapter iv 
 Lessons of the Revolution 
 
 "Against stupidity the very gods 
 themselves contend in vain." — Schil- 
 ler, 
 
 The causes leading to the Revolution 
 had produced such effect that, as early 
 as 1774, several of the Colonies began 
 preparations for war with England, and 
 a Provisional Congress was convened in 
 Massachusetts, with John Hancock as 
 president. This Congress appointed offi- 
 cers and adopted organization for the 
 militia and made certain arrangements 
 for the collections of supplies, equipment 
 and provisions. The royal governor of 
 the colony attempted to prevent the 
 
 84 
 
THE REVOLUTION 
 
 assembly of this Congress, but was unsuc- 
 cessful. 
 
 In the following year a second Con- 
 gress assembled and appointed a Com- 
 mittee of Safety, with authority to raise 
 and support a military force to resist the 
 Acts of Paarliament. Under this author- 
 ity a considerable force of militia was 
 raised, part of it called Minute Men, 
 or troops bound to hold themselves in 
 readiness for instant service. This was 
 the condition of aiFairs when the con- 
 flicts occurred at Lexington and Con- 
 cord. A few^ days later, April 22nd, 
 steps Avere taken formally to organize 
 for defense against Great Britain. The 
 Congress decided to raise an army of 
 30,000 men, and immediately to enroll 
 13,600 men within the limits of Massa- 
 chusetts, trusting that the balance might 
 be supplied by New Hampshire, Rhode 
 
 85 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 Island and Connecticut. Troops were 
 raised by giving to anyone who succeeded 
 in enrolling fifty-nine men, a captain's 
 commission, and a colonel's commission 
 to any man who could secure ten such 
 companies. In other words, qualifica- 
 tions for command rested solely on the 
 ability to enroll men. 
 
 It is not difficult to foresee the results 
 which must necessarily follow under a 
 system based upon such a policy. The 
 training of the officers and their qual- 
 ifications for command meant little. Of 
 course we must not forget that the situa- 
 tion was an extremely difficult one. The 
 troops had to be raised, there were rela- 
 tively few trained officers in the colony, 
 and many who had had previous military 
 experience remained constant in their 
 allegiance to Great Britain. Still there 
 is no doubt that a larger proportion of 
 
 86 
 
THE REVOLUTION 
 
 trained officers could have been secured 
 had the matter of organization been more 
 systematically undertaken. The men 
 were courageous, and when led by offi- 
 cers of experience and capacity, fighting 
 in a defensive position, and not required 
 to maneuver in the face of an enemy, 
 rendered brave and good service, as at 
 Bunker Hill. The Continental Army, 
 when Washington assumed command, 
 consisted of a mass of raw levies, gen- 
 erally speaking, under incompetent offi- 
 cers — levies composed of men who had 
 no idea of remaining throughout the war 
 and undergoing thorough training. 
 
 There were many things outside the 
 condition of the army itself which led 
 to great embarrassment. The action at 
 Lexington took place three weeks before 
 the assembling of the Second Conti- 
 nental Congress, and compelled that 
 
 8T 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 body to assume immediately the func- 
 tions of civil government, but as it had 
 no authority to levy taxes or provide a 
 revenue, it could only issue Bills of 
 Credit. The power to create and sup- 
 port armies was crippled by a financial 
 system which was based wholly upon the 
 faith of the people in ultunate success. 
 If the Congress had had the power to 
 levy taxes and raise a revenue, the war 
 would have been much shorter and its 
 conduct more vigorous. Moreover, the 
 Congress was vested with both executive 
 and legislative power and there was con- 
 sequently a lack of the balance and 
 adjustment which exists where these 
 functions are distinct and separate. The 
 country was dependent for its military 
 legislation upon the decisions of a group 
 of citizens wholly without instruction in 
 military matters, and influenced by gen- 
 
 88 
 
THE REVOLUTION 
 
 eral fear of a standing army. Washing- 
 ton's correspondence indicates very 
 clearly the embarrassments and the diffi- 
 culties of the situation. 
 
 The strength of the armj'- at the time 
 of Washington's assignment to command 
 was about 17,000 men, all of them under 
 sfiort enlistment. Much had to be accom- 
 plished. It was absolutely essential to 
 organize a force which would owe its 
 allegiance to the United Colonies, and 
 in June, with this end in view. Congress 
 authorized the raising of ten companies 
 of riflemen in Pennsylvania, Maryland 
 and Virginia, with a term of enlistment 
 of one year. This was the nucleus of 
 the army which finally achieved American 
 independence. During the year both 
 infantry and artillery were added. The 
 enlistments were stiU for a short period, 
 and did not extend beyond the end of 
 
 89 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 the fallowing vear. The terms of enlist- 
 merit of the troops thereby enrolled 
 mostly expired at or near the end of 
 177 o. As it was necessary promptly to 
 raise troops to replace them and to add 
 to those already enrolled, Congress 
 decided to raise twenty-six regiments: 
 sixteen in JMassachusetts, five in Con- 
 necticut, two in Rhode Island, and tliree 
 in New Hampshire. Washington was 
 authorized to appoint the officers. This 
 resulted in a condition to which Wash- 
 ington refers in various letters. 
 
 On November 11, 1775, he writes as 
 follows : 
 
 " The trouble I have in the arrange- 
 ment of the army is really inconceivable. 
 Many of the officers sent in their names 
 to serve in expectation of promotion; 
 others stood aloof to see what advantage 
 they could make for themselves, while a 
 
 90 
 
THE REVOLUTION 
 
 number, who have declined, have again 
 sent in their names to serve. So great 
 has the confusion arising from these 
 and many other perplexing circumstances 
 been that I found it absolutely impos- 
 sible to fix this very interesting busi- 
 ness exactly on the plan resolved on in 
 the conference, though I have kept up 
 to the spirit of it as near as the nature 
 and necessity of the case would permit. 
 " The difficulty with the soldiers is 
 as great, indeed, more so, if possible, 
 than with the officers. They will not 
 enlist until they know their colonel, lieu- 
 tenant-colonel, major, and captain, so 
 that it was necessary to fix the officers 
 the first thing, which is, at last, in some 
 manner done, and I have given out 
 enlisting orders." 
 
 And on November 28th he continues: 
 " The number enlisted since my last 
 
 91 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 is two thousand five hundred and forty 
 men. I am sorry to be necessitated to 
 mention to you the egregious want of 
 pubhe spirit which reigns here. Instead 
 of pressing to be engaged in the cause 
 of their country, which I vainly flat- 
 tered myself would be the case, I find 
 we are likely to be deserted in a most 
 critical time. Those that have enlisted 
 must have a furlough, which I have been 
 obliged to grant to fifty at a time, from 
 each regiment. The Connecticut troops, 
 upon whom I reckoned, are as backward, 
 indeed, if possible, more so than the 
 people of this colony. Our situation is 
 truly alarming, and of this General 
 Howe is well apprised, it being the com- 
 mon topic of conversation when the peo- 
 ple left Boston last Friday. No doubt 
 when he is reinforced he will avail him- 
 self of the information." 
 
 92 
 
THE REVOLUTION 
 
 And in a private letter a little later, 
 he describes conditions in the following 
 words : 
 
 " Such a dearth of public spirit and 
 such want of virtue, such stock- jobbing 
 and fertility in all the low arts to obtain 
 advantages of one kind or another in this 
 great change of military arrangement 
 I never saw before, and pray God's 
 mercy that I may never be witness to 
 again. What will be the end of these 
 maneuvers is beyond my scan. I trem- 
 ble at the prospect. We have been till 
 this time enlisting about three thousand 
 five hundred men. To engage these I 
 have been obliged to allow furloughs as 
 far as fifty men to a regiment, and the 
 officers, I am persuaded, indulge as many 
 more. The Connecticut troops will not 
 be prevailed upon to stay longer than 
 their term, saving those who have enlisted 
 
 93 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 for the next campaign, and are mostly 
 on furlough; and such a mercenary spirit 
 pervades the whole that I should not 
 be at all surprised at any disaster that 
 may happen. In short, after the last 
 of this month our lines will be so weak- 
 ened that the Minute Men and militia 
 must be called in for their defense, and 
 these being under no kind of govern- 
 ment themselves, will destroy the little 
 subordination I have been laboring to 
 establish, and run me into one evil while 
 I am endeavoring to avoid another; but 
 the lesser must be chosen." 
 
 These letters point out very plainly 
 the conditions w^hich existed. Another 
 important thing to remember is that 
 these occurrences took place during a 
 period when our forefathers were strug- 
 gling for independence, when, as we were 
 taught in school, a spirit of patriotism 
 
 94 
 
THE REVOLUTION 
 
 and self-sacrifice stirred the country. 
 The foregoing extracts from Washing- 
 ton's letters show the real situation. It 
 was extremely difficult to secure troops 
 for the armed forces. Men came only 
 for short periods of time, and insisted 
 upon the election of their officers. Dis- 
 cipline was poor, and such as there was, 
 was difficult of enforcement. In fact, 
 the situation was more or less one of 
 military chaos, and it was only Wash- 
 ington's remarkable personality that 
 made it possible to hold together these 
 discordant elements in the form of a 
 fighting force. 
 
 We soon went to the bounty, small 
 at first, but gradually increased. In 
 1778 freedom was offered by Rhode 
 Island to negroes if they would enlist. 
 The difficulty in increasing the Conti- 
 nental forces augmented instead of dimin- 
 
 95 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 ished from year to year. Washington 
 was twice empowered with dictatorial 
 |)owers. The colonial assemblies singly 
 and collectively made special efforts to 
 secure troops but there seems to have 
 been lacking a sense of individual respon- 
 sibility for soldier service and the result 
 was that our greatest force was in 1776, 
 when we had S9,()()() troops, 47,000 Con- 
 tinentals, 42.000 militia. The Continen- 
 tals were really short service troops. 
 From this year on the strength of the 
 American force steadily decreased until, 
 in 1781, the force was only a trifle over 
 29,400 men. At no time during the war 
 did AVashington have an effective force 
 of 20,000 men in line, notwithstanding 
 the fact that nearly 400,000 men were 
 enrolled during the war. 
 
 One of the principal causes of ditti- 
 culty during the war was that control 
 
 96 
 
THE REVOLUTION 
 
 of military matters rested with the Con- 
 tinental Congress, and that hody was 
 jealous of a standing army, knew little 
 of military matters, and was inclined 
 to make economies which resulted in vast 
 expenditures through extending the war 
 and rendering unavailing such expendi- 
 tures as had previously heen made. 
 Washington did everything a man could 
 do in his position, and he accomplished 
 miracles. We were fortunate in this 
 war in receiving at a critical time the 
 invaluahle assistance of France, and from 
 the further fact that the contention of 
 the Colonies was supported hy a strong 
 party in England. The difficulties which 
 Washington encountered can hest be 
 appreciated by soldiers who realize what 
 it means to make new armies practically 
 every year. Large forces of militia were 
 called in from time to time but they 
 
 97 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 were almost useless. Washington's opin- 
 ion of men raised in this manner with- 
 out training and without discipline, was 
 expressed as follows: 
 
 '* To place any dependence upon mili- 
 tia is assuredly resting upon a broken 
 staff. Men just dragged from the ten- 
 der scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed 
 to the din of arms, totally unacquainted 
 with every kind of military skill (which 
 is followed by want of confidence in 
 themselves when opposed by troops regu- 
 larly trained, disciplined, and appointed, 
 superior in knowledge and superior in 
 arms) are timid and ready to fly from 
 their own shadows. 
 
 *' Relaxed and unfit as our rules and 
 regulations of war are for the govern- 
 ment of an army, the militia (these prop- 
 erly so called, for of these we have two 
 sorts, the six-months men and those sent 
 
 98 
 
THE REVOLUTION 
 
 ill as a temporary aid) do not think 
 themselves subject to them, and there- 
 fore take hberties which the soldier is 
 punished for. This creates jealousy, 
 jealousy begets dissatisfaction, and this 
 by degrees ripens into mutiny, keeping 
 the whole army in a confused and dis- 
 ordered state, rendering the time of those 
 who wish to see regularity and good 
 order prevail more unhappy than words 
 can describe. Besides this, such repeated 
 changes take place that all arrangement 
 is set at naught and the constant fluctua- 
 tion of things deranges every plan as 
 fast as it is adopted. 
 
 " Those, sir, Congress may be assured, 
 are but a small part of the inconven- 
 iences which might be enumerated and 
 attributed to militia, but there is one 
 that merits particular attention, and that 
 is the expense. Certain I am that it 
 
 99 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 would be cheaper to keep 50,000 or 
 100,000 in constant pay than to depend 
 upon half the number and supply the 
 other half occasionally by militia. The 
 time the latter are in pay before and 
 after they are in camp, assembling and 
 marching, the waste of ammunition, the 
 consumption of stores, which in spite of 
 every resolution or requisition of Con- 
 gress, they must be furnished with or 
 sent home, added to other incidental 
 expenses consequent upon their coming 
 and conduct in camp, surpass all idea 
 and destroy every kind of regularity and 
 economy which you could establish among 
 fixed and settled troops, and will, in 
 my opinion prove, if the scheme is 
 adhered to, the ruin of our cause." 
 
 During the war various reorganiza- 
 tions took place; the conditions were 
 somewhat improved through the gradual 
 
 100 
 
THE REVOLUTION 
 
 acquirement of a small nucleus of trained 
 officers; but the old vicious conditions 
 concerning the method of raising men, 
 short terms of enlistments, rather than 
 enlistments for the war, bounties, deser- 
 tions, continued. Bounties grew from 
 small sums to sums Avhich, in those days, 
 were small fortunes and the foundation 
 was laid for a procedure which was most 
 vicious and tended to corrupt the patriot- 
 ism of the nation: namely, the bounty 
 system, or the buying of men to dis- 
 charge their military obligations to the 
 nation. 
 
 Washington's opinion of our military 
 policy is found in a letter to the presi- 
 dent of Congress, August 20, 1780: 
 
 " Had we formed a permanent army 
 in the beginning, which, by the con- 
 tinuance of the same men in service, had 
 been capable of discipline, we never 
 
 101 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 should have had to retreat with a hand- 
 ful of men across the Delaware in 1770, 
 trembling for the fate of America, which 
 nothing but the infatuation of the enemy 
 could have saved; we should not have 
 remained all the succeeding winter at 
 their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a 
 sufficient body of men to mount the 
 ordinary guards, liable at every moment 
 to be dissipated, if they had only thought 
 proper to march against us; we should 
 not have been under the necessity of 
 fighting Brandy wine, with an unequal 
 nimiber of raw troops, and afterwards 
 of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a 
 victorious army; we should not have been 
 at Valley Forge with less than half 
 the force of the enemy, destitute of 
 everything, in a situation neither to resist 
 nor to retire; we should not have seen 
 New York left with a handful of men, 
 
 102 
 
THE REVOLUTION 
 
 yet an overmatch for the main army of 
 these States, while the principal part of 
 their force was detached for the reduc- 
 tion of two of them; we should not have 
 found ourselves this spring so weak as 
 to be insulted by 5,000 men, unable to 
 protect our baggage and magazines, 
 tlfeir security depending on a good coun- 
 tenance and a want of enterprise in 
 the enemy; we should not have been the 
 greatest part of the war inferior to the 
 enemy, indebted for our safety to their 
 inactivity, enduring frequently the morti- 
 fication of seeing inviting opportunities 
 to ruin them pass unimproved for want 
 of a force which the country was com- 
 pletely able to afford, and of seeing 
 the country ravaged, our towns burnt, 
 the inhabitants plundered, abused, mur- 
 dered, with impunity from the same 
 cause. 
 
 103 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 *' Nor have the ill effects been con- 
 liiied to the mihtarv hue. A great part 
 of the einbarrassineiits in the civil depart- 
 ments flow from the same source. The 
 deranijement of our finances is essentially 
 to be ascribed to it. The expenses of 
 the war and the paper emissions have 
 been greatly multiplied by it. We have 
 had a great part of the time two sets 
 of men to feed and pay — the discharged 
 men going liome and tlie levies coming 
 in. This ^\as more remarkably the case 
 in 1775 and 1776. The difficulty and 
 cost of engaging men have increased at 
 every successive attempt, till among the 
 present lines we find there are some who 
 have received $1,50 in specie for five 
 months' service, while our ofHcers are 
 reduced to the disagreeable necessity 
 of performing the duties of drill ser- 
 geants t(^ them, with this mortifying 
 
 104 
 
THE REVOLUTION 
 
 reflection annexed to the business, that 
 by the time they have taught these men 
 the rudiments of a soldier's duty their 
 services will have expired and the work 
 i-ecommenced with a new set. The con- 
 sumption of provisions, arms, accouter- 
 ments, and stores of every kind has 
 been doubled in spite of every precau- 
 tion I could use, not only from the cause 
 just mentioned, but from the careless- 
 ness and licentiousness incident to militia 
 and irregular troops. Our discipline also 
 has been much hurt, if not ruined, by 
 such constant changes. The frequent 
 calls upon the mihtia have interrupted 
 the cultivation of the land, and of course 
 have lessened the quantity of its produce, 
 occasioned a scarcity, and enhanced the 
 prices. In an army so unstable as ours 
 order and economy have been imprac- 
 ticable. No person who has been a close 
 
 105 
 
AMERICA S DUTY 
 
 observer of the progress of our aifairs 
 can doubt that our currency has depre- 
 ciated without comparison more rapidly 
 from the system of short enlistments 
 than it would have done otherwise. 
 
 " There is every reason to believe that 
 the war has been protracted on this 
 account. Our opposition being less, the 
 successes of the enemy have been greater. 
 The fluctuation of the army kept alive 
 their hopes, and at every period of the 
 dissolution of a considerable part of it 
 they have flattered themselves with some 
 decisive advantages. Had we kept a 
 permanent army on foot the enemy could 
 have had nothing to hope for, and would 
 in all probability have listened to terms 
 long since." 
 
 There is no reason to believe that the 
 Washington opinions, as expressed, 
 underwent anv essential change. War 
 
 106 
 
THE REVOLUTIOX 
 
 drew its weary length along, with con- 
 stantly changing personnel and small 
 and ineffective commands. The year 
 of 1781 was marked by a mutiny of 
 troops of the Pennsylvania line. Our 
 regular officers had become skilled and 
 able and were making the best possible 
 use of the inferior troops furnished them. 
 Following the junction of the French 
 and American troops came the operations 
 against Yorktown and the capture of 
 Cornwallis. This was the last battle of 
 the Revohjtion. The United States had 
 employed during the war 395,858 troops. 
 Their forces were strongest in 1776. 
 The British forces at the outbreak of 
 the war numbered 20,121, while at the 
 end they amounted to 42,075. The mili- 
 tary events which had a strong bearing 
 upon the expulsion of the British were, 
 first, the capture of Burgoyne, and, sec- 
 
 107 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 ondly, that of Cornwallis, an event which 
 was made possible only by the strong 
 cooperation of the French forces on sea 
 and land. The prosecution of the war 
 by the British had not been at any time 
 especially vigorous. 
 
 The lack of centralized power was 
 felt throughout the Revolution, and we 
 have the curious picture of an alliance 
 of states engaged in war viewing with 
 suspicion a standing army, and yet on 
 two occasions forced to give to the com- 
 mander of these forces dictatorial power. 
 Embarrassing complications occurred 
 from the tendency to the exercise of 
 power by the states. The}^ assumed at 
 critical moments a quasi-independent atti- 
 tude, as illustrated by the action of Gov- 
 ernor Thomas Jefferson in detaining the 
 Virginia militia for home defense when 
 it was urgently required by General 
 
 108 
 
THE REVOLUTION 
 
 Greene; and by the action of the people 
 of Boston in fitting out (without con- 
 sulting the commander-in-chief) an inde- 
 pendent military expedition for opera- 
 tion against the British in Maine. 
 
 In April, 1812, the governor of Mas- 
 sachusetts denied the right of Congress 
 or the president to determine when con- 
 ditions justified the calling out of the 
 militia, and claimed that this right is 
 vested in the commanders-in-chief of mili- 
 tia of the various states — in other words, 
 in the governors. At the same time 
 Connecticut made substantially the same 
 claim. 
 
 A little later in the same year, Ver- 
 mont declared that the military strength 
 and resources of the state must be 
 reserved for its own defense and protec- 
 tion exclusively, and in the following year 
 the same state refused to permit the mili- 
 
 109 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 tia to go to General Macomb's support. 
 In fact, the whole structure was loosely 
 jointed and could not have resisted a 
 strong and well-organized attack. 
 
 Taking it as a whole, however, and 
 considering the lack of centralized power, 
 ignorance of the legislative and execu- 
 tive body in all matters military, the 
 depreciation of currency, and that con- 
 sciousness which must have existed among 
 the troops of a lack of strong govern- 
 ment, there was less trouble than might 
 have been expected. JNIutiny — although 
 causes for it in the way of shortage of 
 pay and clothing often existed — seldom 
 ocurred. The record of the Continen- 
 tal troops, one might say " the regular 
 troops," was remarkably good. We had 
 the material for both officers and men, 
 but we lacked a strong government, 
 organization and system. In other 
 
 110 
 
THE REVOLUTION 
 
 words, there was a weak military policy 
 and no appreciation of the nriilitary needs 
 of the country, if the war was to have 
 beer J conducted vigorously and with the 
 rnininiurn loss of life and expenditure 
 of treasure. 
 
 During the revolutionary war the 
 stales formed a very loose confederacy, 
 lacking most of the elements of strength 
 which come from national resources prop- 
 erly mobilized and directed by a central 
 authority. The Continental Congress 
 exercised only a limited measure of con- 
 trol and toward the end of the war it 
 was, to a large extent, advisory. Con- 
 gress lacked the power to utilize and 
 make available the country's military 
 resources. The result was that at no 
 time during the revolution was the full 
 strength of the new-born nation brought 
 to bear, and not only was there lack of 
 
 111 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 a strong coordinating authority, but the 
 whole military system was fatally defec- 
 tive. It represented the folly of depend- 
 ing upon troops enlisted for short 
 periods, untrained, poorly organized, 
 with a constantly changing enlisted per- 
 sonnel. The unnecessary sacrifice of life 
 and expenditure of treasure incident to 
 this system and adherence to it, has fol- 
 lowed through all our wars, as the table 
 on the following page indicates. 
 
 As a result of this pernicious system 
 of frequent and short enlistments, fol- 
 lowed naturally a pension system involv- 
 ing tremendous expense, only a small 
 portion of which would have been nec- 
 essary had we had a sound military 
 policy. 
 
 The policy of short enlistments, of 
 enrolling men hastily, not only cost us 
 unnecessarily in life and treasure, but 
 
 112 
 
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AINIERICA'S DUTY 
 
 at times exercised a dangerous influence 
 upon military operations. Arnold was 
 forced to deliver an assault upon Quebec 
 because of the approaching expiration 
 of the enlistments of a large portion of 
 his troops. Montgomery was killed, 
 Arnold wounded, and a large part of 
 the force killed, wounded, or taken 
 prisoners. 
 
 AVashington repeatedly refers to the 
 loss of troops and constant change of 
 personnel incident to this system of short 
 enlistments. 
 
 Brietlv, these are the lessons of the 
 Mar: That a confederation of states, 
 without a strong central government 
 under the direction of citizens without 
 experience in military matters and under 
 conditions which permit each state to 
 raise, arm and equip troops, is an exceed- 
 ingly weak form of government for the 
 
 114 
 
THE REVOLUTION 
 
 prosecution of war ; that the war resources 
 of a nation can only be employed to 
 the greatest advantage when used as a 
 national force under national control and 
 direction; that undisciplined and raw lev- 
 ies cannot meet disciplined troops with 
 any hope of success; that voluntary 
 enlistments based on patriotism and the 
 bounty cannot be relied upon to supply 
 men for the army during a prolonged 
 war, but that men should be enlisted for 
 the period of the war; and, finally, that 
 we should turn to the policy of general 
 military training with a fixed period of 
 obligation for all able-bodied men. 
 
 It is only by such a system that we 
 shall be able quickly, smoothly and 
 effectually to mobihze our forces for 
 war. Great changes have occurred in 
 the organization, equipment and pre- 
 paredness of our possible antagonists, 
 
 115 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 and whatever system we have must be 
 one which permits prompt mobilization 
 of trained men. It must be one which 
 enables us to know with certainty and 
 exactness what our resources in men are, 
 just when they will be available, and 
 what their qualifications are. This is 
 not possible under either a volunteer sys- 
 tem or under a system of draft, initiated 
 after war has commenced. 
 
 116 
 
chapter v 
 Seventy Years of Inefficiency 
 
 "It is better to be ready for war 
 and not have it than to have vrar and 
 • not be ready for it." — L. W. 
 
 The close of the Revolutionary War 
 found the young nation confronted with 
 many grave questions, among them the 
 question of a proper military establish- 
 ment. This was an object of special 
 solicitation on the part of Washington, 
 and he recommended in strong language 
 the thorough training of the militia, their 
 proper arming and equipment. By mili- 
 tia he meant the militia which includes 
 all men from eighteen to forty-five years 
 of age. The Continental Army was 
 disbanded, excepting one battery of artil- 
 
 117 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 lery known as the Alexander Hamilton 
 Battery, a battery which still exists in 
 our service. Although the finances of 
 the nation were exhausted, an attempt 
 was made to establish a small regular 
 establishment, a mixed regiment of 
 infantry and artillery, ridiculously inade- 
 quate, of course. Later that regiment 
 was expanded a little into a Legionary 
 Corps consisting of some 2,040 non- 
 commissioned officers and privates. 
 
 Feeble, half-hearted measures in the 
 direction of an organization of a small 
 military force followed during the next 
 few years. In 1789 the War Depart- 
 ment was organized. In 1790 there was 
 another reorganization of the army. This 
 organization fixed the standard at 1,216 
 noncommissioned officers and privates — 
 not a formidable force. Various Indian 
 campaigns indicated the necessity of a 
 
 118 
 
YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 
 
 stronger military establishment, and in 
 1791 there was a further reorganization 
 which resulted in the addition of another 
 regiment. Two general officers were 
 authorized. 
 
 St. Clair's defeat emphasized the neces- 
 sity of a still further increase in mili- 
 tary establishment, as well as the inad- 
 visability of depending upon untrained 
 militia. This reorganization resulted in 
 the filling up of the then existing mili- 
 tary establishment to full strength and 
 the addition of three regiments of infan- 
 try and certain minor additions in field 
 and staff officers. About this time the 
 legionary idea, which originated with 
 Baron von Steuben, was applied to the 
 organization of the regular army, and 
 was proposed for the militia. The 
 Legion was really a small, complete army 
 in itself, a complete fighting unit, com- 
 
 119 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 posed of the different arms. General 
 Knox, then secretary of war, strongly 
 approved the idea for the army, and 
 recommended its extension to include all 
 phj^sically and mentally fit men from 
 eighteen to sixty years of age, with the 
 idea of building up a trained citizen 
 soldiery. 
 
 The legionary organization for the reg- 
 ular establishment was adopted, although 
 unfortunately the general plan proposed 
 by General Knox, to divide and class- 
 ify the entire male population between 
 eighteen and sixty, was not adopted. In 
 1795-7 there was further reorganization, 
 made necessary by increasing calls for 
 troops in connection with Indian dis- 
 turbances and the Whiskey Rebellion in 
 Pennsylvania in August, 1794. In 1798 
 the president was authorized to organize 
 a provisional army in case of the exist- 
 
 120 
 
YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 
 
 ence of war or an invasion of our ter- 
 ritory, or imminent danger. This Pro- 
 vincial Army was to consist of 10,000 
 noncommissioned officers and men, to be 
 enlisted for a period of three years. The 
 force was to be officered by the presi- 
 dent. Washington was appointed com- 
 mander-in-chief, with the rank of lieu- 
 tenant-general. This army was never 
 called into being. Farther reorganiza- 
 tion in 1802 resulted in a further reduc- 
 tion in the strength of the army. In the 
 same year a real step forward was taken 
 through the establishment of the Mili- 
 tary Academy at West Point. Alex- 
 ander Hamilton was the moving force 
 behind the establishment of this splen- 
 did institution. Washington strongly 
 approved, and three days before his death 
 he wrote as follows to Hamilton: 
 " The establishment of an institution 
 
 121 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 of this kind on a respectable and exten- 
 sive basis has ever been considered by 
 Hie an object of primary importance to 
 this countrv, and while I was in the chair 
 of government I omitted no proper 
 opportunity of recommending it in my 
 public speeches and otherwise to the 
 attention of the Legislature." 
 
 McHenry, the Secretary of War, 
 urged the establishment of the Acad- 
 emy in the following words: 
 
 " It cannot be forgotten that in our 
 Revolutionary War it was not till after 
 several years' practice in arms, and the 
 extension of the periods for which our 
 soldiers were at first enlisted, that we 
 found them at all qualified to meet on 
 the field of battle those to whom they 
 were opposed. The occasional brilliant 
 and justly celebrated acts of some of our 
 militia during that eventful period detract 
 
 122 
 
yp:ars of inefficiency 
 
 nothing from this dear-bought truth. 
 
 " The great man who conducted the 
 war of our Revolution was continually 
 compelled to conform his conduct to the 
 circumstances growing out of the experi- 
 mental lessons just mentioned. What 
 w^ the secret of his conduct? Must it 
 be told? It may, and without exciting a 
 blush or an uneasy sensation in any of 
 his surviving companies in arms. He 
 had an army of men, but he had few 
 officers or soldiers in that army." 
 
 The Academy provided for a force 
 of only twenty officers and cadets, and 
 its purpose was to provide a corps of 
 engineers. Since the day of its founda- 
 tion it has been the strong prop of our 
 military establishment. 
 
 There were further sporadic changes 
 in the composition of the army, and in 
 1808 it was increased by some five regi- 
 
 123 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 merits of infantry, a regiment of rifle- 
 men, a regiment of light artillery, and 
 one regiment of light dragoons, enlisted 
 for a period of five years. This was the 
 result, principally, of the increasing prob- 
 ability of war with Great Britain. In 
 March, 1812, an attempt was made to 
 organize a Quartermaster's Department, 
 Commissary Department, Ordnance De- 
 partment, and during this year an 
 increase was authorized in the number of 
 cadets at the Military Academy. Under 
 this act, the maximum number of cadets 
 was fixed at 250. 
 
 On June 18, 1812, war was declared 
 against Great Britain. Our regular army 
 had been greatly increased immediately 
 preceding the outbreak of the war, and 
 now consisted of some 36,700 men on 
 paper. This number was rapidly 
 increased, from time to time, by calling 
 
 124 
 
YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 
 
 in volunteers for militia. We had appar- 
 ently learned very little from the lessons 
 of the Revolution. The war, taken as 
 a whole, was a series of disasters and 
 reverses on land, many of them highly 
 discreditable in character. Our record 
 on sea was much better, and we gained 
 manv notable successes. The men of 
 the fleet and on the individual ships of 
 war were better trained and better dis- 
 ciplined than those of the land forces. 
 The gallant action at Lundy's Lane, 
 where there was a strong nucleus of 
 regulars, and minor successes on the 
 Thames, formed the bulk of our credit- 
 able actions on land during the period of 
 the war. It should be remembered, in 
 commenting upon the relative efficiency 
 of the army and navy, that Congress has 
 never delegated to the states the power 
 to raise and maintain a navy. In 1813 
 
 125 
 
AINIKIUCA'S DUTY 
 
 there wiis a further increase in the 
 stren^lh o{' the re^i^iihir army hy twenty 
 reu'inients, enlisted for a year, and some 
 increases in Ihe statV. There was still 
 a general failure to a[)preeiate the neces- 
 sity oi' [)rovi(lint>- an aile(\iiate, well- 
 organized military estahlishment. We 
 put some .)27,(H)(> men into the war. 
 The l^ritish regular force in this country 
 at no time exceeded 1(5, 800. 
 
 Generally sj)eaking, our campaigns 
 against Canada were hopelessly inefYec- 
 tive. In 181 1 Commodore INrcDonough's 
 hrilliant victory on Lake Champlain ter- 
 minated an advance which, had it not 
 heen for the naval successes, might have 
 reached New \\)rk and cut off New 
 Kuffland frcnn the rest of the country. 
 During this war, as in the Hevolution, 
 the power of a state government to inter- 
 fere with military operations was illus- 
 
 12G 
 
YKAllS OF INKFFICJKXCY 
 
 tratecJ hy the action of liie governor of 
 Vermont in refusing to send militia when 
 (General Maeomh ealled for aid. This 
 war was signalized hy the abandonment 
 of our eapital to a foree about sixty per 
 eent that of the defeiiders. It is true 
 that most of the defenders were without 
 training or disci[)iine. Only af>out 1,500 
 of the Hritish foree of 3,500 were 
 engaged. Our troops abandoned the 
 eapital with a loss of eight killed and 
 eleven wounded. 
 
 The battle of }scw Orleans was one 
 of the most remarkable victories recorded 
 in our military history. It was fought 
 two weeks after peace had been signed 
 at Ghent. (Jur success was not without 
 the element of good fortune. I'he Brit- 
 ish attack was a frontal attack without 
 cover, in the face of men highly trained 
 in the use of the rifle. While our troops 
 
 127 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 are entitled to a high degree of credit, 
 the reports do not bring out the fact, 
 however, that our success was largely 
 influenced by the delay of Colonel Thorn- 
 ton's highly successful attack on the 
 Americans on the west bank. Had his 
 assault been delivered a little earlier, 
 the American line on the other side of 
 the river would have been untenable 
 and the result far different. While the 
 battle had no influence in determining 
 peace, it served as somewhat of a conso- 
 lation for a long series of disasters on 
 land. 
 
 The navy's record in the war was excel- 
 lent. It did all that a small force could 
 have done. It aided in the victory of 
 the Thames, saved the army from 
 destruction at Plattsburg, and at Nor- 
 folk, Bladensburg, Baltimore and New 
 Orleans rendered splendid service; but 
 
 128 
 
YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 
 
 at the end of the war Great Britain 
 controlled the sea. 
 
 The entire War of 1812 was but 
 another illustration of the unwisdom of 
 our general policy. No well-thought- 
 out organization in time of peace — no 
 sound policy in the way of preparation 
 — failure to do in time of peace those 
 things which cannot be done in time of 
 war. Taking the war as a whole, it was 
 disastrous and highly discreditable to 
 us on land. The blunders were those 
 of the Revolution in even a more aggra- 
 vated form and with less excuse, because 
 under the Constitution the government 
 did have the authority to bring into 
 play the entire financial and military 
 resources of the nation. As Upton 
 states: "Five thousand men (British) 
 for the period of two years brought 
 war and devastation into our territory 
 
 129 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 and successfully withstood the misapplied 
 power of seven millions of people." 
 
 Shortly after the conclusion of the 
 war, the army was again reduced and 
 we returned with more or less prompt- 
 ness to the old haphazard policy. In 
 1821 another plan of reorganization was 
 presented. This plan contemplated the 
 reduction of the army to 6,C00 enlisted 
 men and its maintenance as a group of 
 skeletonized organizations. It is inter- 
 esting to note, in this connection, that 
 Mr. Calhoun, in presenting his plan, 
 made the following statements: 
 
 " To give such an organization, the 
 leading principles in its formation ought 
 to be, that at the commencement of hos- 
 tilities there should be nothing either to 
 new model or to create. The only dif- 
 ference, consequently, between the peace 
 and the war formation of the army ought 
 
 130 
 
YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 
 
 to be in the increased magnitude of the 
 latter, and the only change in passing 
 from the former to the latter should 
 consist in giving to it the augmentation 
 which will then be necessary. 
 
 "It is thus, and thus only, the dan- 
 gerous transition from peace to war may 
 be made without confusion or disorder, 
 and the weakness and danger which 
 otherwise would be inevitable, be avoided. 
 Two consequences result from this prin- 
 ciple : First, the organization of the staff 
 in a peace establishment ought to be 
 such that every branch of it should be 
 completely formed, with such extension 
 as the number of troops and posts occu- 
 pied may render necessary; and, sec- 
 ondly, that the organization of the line 
 ought as far as practicable, to be such 
 that in passing from the peace to the 
 war formation, the force may be suffi- 
 
 131 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 ciently augmented without adding new 
 regiments or battalions, thus raising the 
 army, on the basis of the peace establish- 
 ment, instead of creating a new army to 
 be added to the old, as at the commence- 
 ment of the late war." 
 
 Fortunate, indeed, would we have been 
 had this policy been adopted, provided 
 we had a reserve of trained men to bring 
 the organization to war strength. But 
 it was not. At that time the possibility 
 of sudden invasion was remote. Most 
 of our people were familiar with the use 
 of the rifle. There was no possibility 
 of such concentration against us as dur- 
 ing recent years. The proposed organi- 
 zation related wholly to the regular army, 
 and did not provide for the organization 
 of that great bulk of our force which 
 must ahvays come from the people them- 
 selves, who, within certain age limita- 
 
 132 
 
YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 
 
 tions, must be trained, organized and 
 equipped in time of peace if they are 
 to be effective in war. Following the 
 War of 1812 came a series of Indian 
 wars, some of them of considerable mag- 
 nitude. The Seminole War, the Black 
 H^wk War, the Florida War, were 
 conducted with various modifications of 
 the military establishment, but, gener- 
 ally speaking, the old pohcy was fol- 
 lowed. Raw troops were raised to meet 
 each emergency, with resulting tremen- 
 dous expenditures of money, great loss 
 of life and a high degree of inefficiency. 
 On the heels of the Florida War came 
 the Creek campaign. Relatively large 
 numbers of troops were engaged in these 
 campaigns. In the Creek campaign, for 
 instance, nearly 12,000 troops were 
 employed. In the three wars — the Flor- 
 ida War, the Creek, and the Cherokee 
 
 133 
 
AIMKlUCiVS DUTY 
 
 War — we called into service the mili- 
 tia to the niiiiiher of 48,152. To these 
 should be added 12,589 regulars, making 
 ouv total force (>(),(>91 engaged in these 
 little campaigns. In 18;}7 there was 
 a slight increase in the regular army, 
 and some increase in the staff corps, but 
 there was no legislation looking to the 
 training, disci [)lining and equipping 
 under I'ederal direction oC the oreat body 
 oi' our men known as the militia. 
 
 In 1842, innnediately after the cessa- 
 tion of hostilities incident to the Florida 
 campaign, the army was reduced from 
 12,500 to 8,500. The lessons taught bv 
 these Indian wars were the lessons of 
 the Revolution and the War of 1812, 
 namely, that organization and prepara- 
 tion for war must be made in time of 
 peace, and that undisciplined and un- 
 trained troops, poorly organized, are the 
 
 184 
 
YEARS OF INEFFJCIENCY 
 
 most expensive weapons a nation ean 
 employ in war. 'J'liere was needless sae- 
 rifiee of life, undue prolongation of the 
 war, tremendous and unnecessary ex- 
 pense. Or, as Upton sums it up, the 
 lessons taught hy this war are: 
 
 "*'First: That its expense was tripled, 
 if not quadru|)led, hy that feature of the 
 law of 1821 which gave the president, in 
 times of emergency, no discretion to 
 increase the erdisted men of the army. 
 
 " Second: That, as in every previous 
 war, after successfully employing for 
 short periods of service, militia and vol- 
 unteers, and exhausting their enthusiasm, 
 Congress found it more humane and 
 economical to continue hostilities with 
 regular troops, enlisted for the period 
 of five years. 
 
 "Third: That for want of a well- 
 defined peace organization, a nation of 
 17,000,000 of people contended for seven 
 
 185 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 years with 1,200 warriors, and finally 
 closed the struggle without accomphsh- 
 ing the forcible emigration of the 
 Indians, which was the original and sole 
 cause of the war. 
 
 " Without dwelling on the needless 
 sacrifice of life, these hard lessons would 
 have been cheaply learned, could Con- 
 gress, at the end of the conflict, have 
 appreciated the value of expansive 
 organization. By withholding from the 
 president authority to add a few enlisted 
 men to the armv, it committed the same 
 great error as in 1821. We shall see that 
 this error more than doubled the cost and 
 length of another war, which despite the 
 mistakes of military legislation, was soon 
 to add to the luster of our arms." 
 
 The Mexican War furnished the next 
 opportunity to illustrate what the United 
 States had learned from the conduct of 
 
 136 
 
YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 
 
 previous wars. A close study of this 
 campaign discloses the fact that so far as 
 the methods and system are concerned, 
 little or nothing had been learned; and 
 although the government had ample 
 warning of the probabilities of war, little 
 or Tio preparation had been made for it. 
 We were opposed by an enemy inferior 
 both in organization and resources; we 
 had a small but good nucleus of regular 
 troops. The war was sufficiently remote 
 from centres of influence to give our 
 officers a better opportunity than usual 
 to train and discipline the new levies 
 which were sent them. Moreover, we 
 were singularly fortunate in having as 
 commanders and subordinates an unusu- 
 ally able group of officers, many of whom 
 became the great commanders of the 
 Civil War. The foregoing and other 
 circumstances resulted in the conduct of 
 
 137 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 the war being effective, one might almost 
 say, brilliant. 
 
 Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, Mon- 
 terey, Buena Vista, on one line of opera- 
 tions, and Vera Cruz, Cerro Gordo, 
 Contreras, Churubusco and El Molino 
 del Rey, on the other, tell the story of 
 the war. It was, taken as a whole, our 
 most successful and best conducted war; 
 but in remembering this success, we must 
 not forget that the system employed was 
 as defective as in previous wars, and that 
 the success that we had was not due to 
 the system, but was attained in spite 
 of it. 
 
 The regular army had been reduced to 
 an insignificant force in numbers — a 
 mere nucleus — and large numbers of 
 volunteers had to be called, resulting in 
 huge increase in annual expenditures 
 during the war. There was one hopeful 
 
 138 
 
YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 
 
 change, however, and that was the reduc- 
 tion in the proportion of militia used. 
 This was not due to the experience of 
 the past, but principally because the mil- 
 itia was not available for service outside 
 the United States. In the War of 1812 
 the" force of volunteers serving for twelve 
 or more months was only twelve per cent 
 of the total number of troops employed. 
 In the Mexican War it was approxi- 
 mately eighty-eight per cent. In the 
 War of 1812 a large force of militia and 
 untrained volunteers was practically baf- 
 fled by a force of 5,000 of the enemy's 
 regulars. In the Mexican War a force 
 of well-disciplined volunteers with a 
 nucleus of regulars overthrew an army 
 several times their number. In other 
 words, in the Mexican War we had a 
 good nucleus of regular troops and we 
 had time to develop our volunteers into 
 
 139 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 trained and reasonably well-disciplined 
 soldiers, and we used small numbers of 
 militia. What we did was not due so 
 much to any idea of abandoning the old 
 system with its free use of militia, as it 
 was to the fact that we had to conduct a 
 war where the militia could not be used 
 because of the constitutional limitation 
 upon its employment outside the United 
 States. 
 
 In this war the system of short enlist- 
 ments jeopardized the success of military 
 operations. Many of Scott's troops were 
 enlisted under conditions which gave 
 them the option of continuing in service 
 or taking their discharge at the end of the 
 year. On reaching Pueblo, he discovered 
 that seven of his eleven regiments had 
 decided to terminate their services at the 
 conclusion of the year. Consequently he 
 was stripped of a large portion of his 
 
 140 
 
YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 
 
 effective troops; had the Mexican forces 
 been capable of further activities disaster 
 would certainly have resulted. 
 
 We employed in the Mexican War 
 approximately 104,000 troops of all 
 arms, of whom only 12,000 were militia 
 — twelve per cent of militia against 
 approximately eighty-eight per cent in 
 the War of 1812. 
 
 At the close of the Mexican War the 
 army was reduced from 30,890 to 10,320. 
 There were some minor modifications in 
 the organization of our regiments, but, 
 generally speaking, little change was 
 effected by the Mexican War. Discre- 
 tion was given to the president to in- 
 crease the strength of organizations in 
 case of emergency, and incident to the 
 troubles in Utah and along the Texas 
 border, the president was authorized to 
 accept into service of the United States 
 
 141 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 a regiment of Texas volunteers and to 
 raise two regiments of mounted infantry 
 if required. There was no very impor- 
 tant change in pohey with reference to 
 making arrangements for possible war. 
 In other words, little had been learned 
 from the preceding wars, or if learned, 
 had not been put into practical applica- 
 tion. 
 
 142 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 The Price or Unpreparedness in 
 THE Sixties 
 
 "To lead an uninstructed people 
 into war, is to throw them away." — 
 Confucius, ^79 B. C. 
 
 According to Upton, at the end of 
 1860, with a population of 31,000,000, 
 we had in our regular army 16,367. 
 
 That army was scattered along the 
 western frontier and over the vast areas 
 west of the Mississippi, along the Atlan- 
 tic seacoast and the northern border, and, 
 roughly, provided two soldiers per mile 
 for guarding the frontier; for the area 
 west of the Mississippi, one soldier for 
 every 120 square miles; and for the 
 northwestern, or the remaining portions 
 
 143 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 of the Union, one soldier for every 1,300 
 square miles. There was almost no well- 
 organized, equipped and trained militia. 
 This was the general condition when 
 South Carolina passed the ordinance of 
 secession. That nothing had been learned 
 from previous wars and that no plan of 
 operations had been thought out or ade- 
 quate stores prepared for sudden emer- 
 gency, was indicated by the confusion 
 and difficulties which followed the 
 attempt to organize an army. The enlisted 
 personnel of the regular army was scat- 
 tered over the entire area of the country. 
 Practically all of the enlisted men re- 
 mained staunch in their adherence to the 
 cause of the national government, but 
 confusion and disorganization resulted in 
 those commands which were outside the 
 Union lines and filtered back piecemeal. 
 The great majority of the officers 
 
 144 
 
IN THE SIXTIES 
 
 retained their commissions in the national 
 service, but many of great ability ten- 
 dered their resignations and reported for 
 duty with the forces of their states. The 
 conduct of the governors throughout the 
 country largely followed party lines. In 
 the south there was a general refusal to 
 furnish militia for the purpose of the 
 national government. Along the border 
 states there was a general opposition to 
 furnishing any of these troops for 
 national service. In Delaware a new situ- 
 ation arose, as illustrated by the procla- 
 mation of the government of that state 
 in response to the call for one regiment 
 of militia: 
 
 " Therefore I, William Burton, gov- 
 ernor of the said State of Delaware, 
 reconmiend the formation of volunteer 
 companies for the protection of the lives 
 and property of the people of this state 
 
 145 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 against violence of any sort to which they 
 may be exposed. For these purposes 
 such companies, when formed, will be 
 under the control of the state authorities, 
 though not subject to be ordered by the 
 executive into the United States service, 
 the law not vesting in him such author- 
 ity. They will, however, have the option 
 of offering their services to the general 
 government for the defense of its capital 
 and the support of the Constitution and 
 laws of the country." 
 
 As a general rule, the governors of the 
 states which refused militia, acted on 
 their own initiative, and did not refer the 
 matter to the state legislature. Six states 
 to which an appeal was made for the 
 service of militia and refused by the gov- 
 ernors, afterwards furnished 252,000 
 men to the Union cause. This illustrates 
 how completely, under the militia sys- 
 
 146 
 
IN THE SIXTIES 
 
 tern, a governor can paralyze the military 
 resources of his own state, the people of 
 which in large part may be desirous of 
 meeting the national demand. 
 
 The story of the militia as a whole 
 illustrates the utter folly of depending 
 upon any system which leaves the control 
 of any portion of the military establish- 
 ment upon which the nation must depend 
 in war, in the hands of the governor of 
 a state, or of anyone else other than the 
 federal authority. The entire military 
 force upon which the nation is to depend 
 in war must be under the control of the 
 federal government absolutely and com- 
 pletely, and be trained, disciplined and 
 organized by it, if war is to be waged 
 efficiently. In the turmoil and confusion 
 of the moment, President Lincoln was 
 compelled, as a matter of national safety, 
 to assume dictatorial power. It was 
 
 147 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 indeed fortunate for the nation that we 
 had at that time a man as president who 
 was wilhng to assume this responsibihty. 
 In order to meet the emergency in 
 part, at least, President Lincoln, by proc- 
 lamation, increased the strength of the 
 regular army approximately 23,000 men, 
 and the navy 18,000 men. This action 
 was subsequently confirmed by Congress. 
 In addition to the natural inevitable 
 results of an entire lack of military policy 
 was the condition of rebellion, which had 
 disrupted to a certain extent the small 
 standing army and rendered unavailable 
 the military resources of the nation in the 
 way of supplies. JNIany of the northern 
 arsenals had been largely stripped of 
 supplies. There was a condition of veri- 
 table military chaos. Fortunately for 
 the safety of the country and the out- 
 come of the war, the South was unpre- 
 
 148 
 
IN THE SIXTIES 
 
 pared and had available no well organ- 
 ized force to take advantage promptly of 
 the helplessness of the national govern- 
 ment. 
 
 An attempt was made by the federal 
 authorities to organize a force of regu- 
 lars and volunteers on sound lines. The 
 regiments were to be of three battalions, 
 two at the front and one as a depot bat- 
 talion. It was also proposed to treat 
 volunteers as a purely federal force, the 
 officers to be commissioned by the presi- 
 dent. The commission, composed of reg- 
 ular officers whose report embodied these 
 suggestions, acted on sound lines, but 
 their views and recommendations were 
 rejected, and the volunteers were, to a 
 certain extent, state troops; to the gov- 
 ernors was left the appointing of offi- 
 cers. This, coupled with the employment 
 of untrained, poorly organized and offi- 
 
 149 
 
AMERICA S DUTY 
 
 cered militia, was another of the serious 
 blunders in the early stages of the war. 
 If the proposition of the board of 
 regular officers had been approved, we 
 should have entered the war on a com- 
 paratively sound basis and undoubtedly 
 terminated it in much less time than was 
 eventually necessary, and with much less 
 loss of life and expenditure of money; 
 but under the policy adopted, governors 
 of states soon showed a distinct tendency 
 to create new regiments instead of filling 
 up their old ones. The new regiments 
 gave an opportunity to appoint new offi- 
 cers — in other words, local politics was 
 exerting a strong influence in the build- 
 ing up of the militarj^ establishment. 
 Had the appointment of officers rested 
 with the president and the policy been 
 adopted of keeping the old regiments 
 full, we should have very soon had a 
 
 150 
 
IN THE SIXTIES 
 
 highly effective and eiScient force. The 
 handful of regular officers and men was 
 the nucleus around which the whole vol- 
 unteer military establishment rallied. 
 
 No attempt will be made to follow in 
 detail the conduct of the war. All that 
 itns desired to point out is that the militia 
 feature of the system was a failure and 
 that the volunteer system, as such, failed 
 both in the Northern and Southern army. 
 The spirit of the volunteers was splendid, 
 but the system was unsound and could 
 not be depended upon. It failed as it 
 had always failed and will always fail. 
 The Confederacy was forced to resort to 
 the draft in April, 1862; the national 
 government published its first draft order 
 in August, 1862, and resorted to the gen- 
 eral draft the following year. Deser- 
 tion was rampant. Such great numbers 
 deserted that efficiency was greatly 
 
 151 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 impaired. Great numbers of officers were 
 dismissed, and still greater numbers were 
 got rid of as unfit for the service. 
 
 The bounty — that evil child of the 
 Revolution — soon came into being and 
 was in this, as in other wars, one of the 
 strongest influences in debauching the 
 patriotism of our people and lowering 
 the standards of the individual apprecia- 
 tion of the obligation for the national 
 service. With it went a still greater evil, 
 namely, the purchase of substitutes. It 
 is difficult to conceive anything more at 
 variance ^Wth the principles of represen- 
 tative government and individual obliga- 
 tion for national service in war, than the 
 practice of buying substitutes, a practice 
 which made it possible for the rich to 
 avoid ser\'ice and escape the dangers and 
 hardships of a campaign by paying other 
 men to render their service for them. 
 
 152 
 
IN THE SIXTIES 
 
 The effect of both the bounty and the 
 purchase of substitutes was seen directly 
 in the lowering of the general sentiment 
 of individual obligation for service, and 
 in the vastly increased number of deser- 
 tions. 
 
 In fact, those two procedures, the 
 bounty and the purchase of substitutes, 
 have done more than anything else to 
 degrade and debauch that sense of indi- 
 vidual obligation in time of war which 
 should animate a people. They have 
 struck at the very foundation on which 
 the republic rests: an appreciation and 
 acceptance of the principle that with 
 manhood suffrage goes manhood obHga- 
 tion for service. 
 
 At the end of two years the armies on 
 both sides began to reach a state of real 
 efficiency, but it had been gained at a 
 great and unnecessary cost in life and 
 
 153 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 treasure. Each side was laboring under 
 somewhat the same difficulties, although 
 the South, as far as the conduct of the 
 war was concerned, was far better organ- 
 ized, in that it waged war more as a 
 nation than the North, which greatly 
 weakened itself in the conduct of the war 
 through surrendering to the governors of 
 the states too much of the federal power 
 in matters pertaining to the raising and 
 officering of troops. The Confederacy 
 really conducted the war as a nation; the 
 Union as a confederacy. By so doing, 
 the Confederacy added at least fifty per 
 cent to its efficiency. New regiments 
 were not created to the extent that they 
 were in the North. The government was 
 sufficiently centralized to conduct the war 
 with a much greater degree of efficiency 
 than was the Union government. Volun- 
 teering, as could have been expected, and 
 
 154 
 
IN THE SIXTIES 
 
 doubtless was expected by all who had 
 any knowledge of our military history, 
 diminished after the first excitement was 
 over, and the draft was in general appli- 
 cation, both in the North and the South. 
 
 At the end of the Civil War we were 
 for the first and only time in our history 
 prepared for war with a first-class 
 power. We had an admirable navy and 
 army, experienced, well organized, well 
 equipped. Our condition of prepared- 
 ness was recognized by foreign govern- 
 ments, as indicated by the prompt 
 evacuation of Mexico by Napoleon upon 
 the request of this government. 
 
 Once the Mexican difficulty was set- 
 tled, the strength of the regular army 
 was gradually reduced. The strength 
 fluctuated from year to year. In 1898 
 it amounted to 28,747. At the close of 
 the Civil War, until the outbreak of the 
 
 155 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 war with Spain, the army was principally 
 engaged in Indian operations in the 
 West, work which was largely of a police 
 character. Men were kept in the service 
 as long as practical; knowledge of the 
 language, of the country and the habits 
 of the Indian, made the re-enlisted man 
 valuable. It was really a military police 
 force and not an army in the proper 
 sense of the word. The organizations 
 were skeletonized and kept at reduced 
 strength. 
 
 This period was, from the standpoint 
 of military progress, a period of dry rot, 
 interrupted occasionally by sporadic 
 activities incident to Indian outbreaks. 
 The organizations were full of old sol- 
 diers. The work of the army was valu- 
 able in the highest sense as an aid in the 
 development of the Great West, and this 
 portion of its work is one of the most 
 
 156 
 
IN THE SIXTIES 
 
 interesting from the standpoint of local 
 history; but it was not a period marked 
 by military progress or development. 
 Promotion was slow; officers reached 
 command grade when they were too old 
 to exercise it. The militia was, generally 
 speaking, inefficient and of little or no 
 military value. Our regular army equip- 
 ment was years behind that of the great 
 military powers of Europe; we showed 
 all the effects of our peaceful slumber, 
 so far as military development went. 
 Interest in military matters was reduced 
 to a minimum; people were principally 
 concerned in the development of the nat- 
 ural resources of the country, opening up 
 lines of communication, building rail- 
 roads, turning natural wealth into money. 
 For a long time after the war we had 
 available for service from a million and a 
 half to two million men who had served 
 
 157 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 through the Civil war, and many thou- 
 sands of able officers; in other words, we 
 had an unorganaized though trained re- 
 serve. 
 
 In the thirty-three years which had 
 elapsed between the Civil War and the 
 war with Spain, which now began to 
 loom up, nearly all this personnel had 
 ceased to be valuable through age, phys- 
 ical disability and many other less impor- 
 tant causes, such as change in arms and 
 equipment. When the war with Spain 
 began, it was at once apparent that noth- 
 ing of importance whatever had been 
 taken to heart from the lessons of the 
 Civil War, and that we were wholly un- 
 prepared from every standpoint. We 
 were without reserves of men, officers or 
 material. We were using an obsolete 
 rifle, antiquated artillery, black powder. 
 In fact, we were a military *' Rip Van 
 
 158 
 
IN THE SIXTIES 
 
 Winkle." Fortunately, our navy was 
 stronger than the navy of our enemy, 
 and our coasts were free from molesta- 
 tion. 
 
 Our condition at that time was one of 
 disorganization and unpreparedness. On 
 every side was lack of well-thought-out 
 preparation. A clumsy, bureaucratic 
 system of administration crumbled under 
 the first pressure which was put upon it; 
 the sanitary administration of our camps 
 showed in many instances lack of elemen- 
 tary knowledge and reasonable prudence, 
 and an entire want of discipline. There 
 were some marked exception, but gen- 
 erally speaking, sanitary incompetency, 
 together with administrative failure, 
 served to give us a death list from dis- 
 eases many times greater than that from 
 bullets. 
 
 159 
 
chapter vii 
 The Value of Preparedness 
 
 "The safety of the United States, 
 under divine protection, ought to rest 
 on the basis of systematic and solid 
 arrangements exposed as little as pos- 
 sible to the hazards of fortuitous cir- 
 cumstances." — George Washington, 
 Third Annual Address. 
 
 The safety of our country and its insti- 
 tutions, the opportunity to enjoy hfe, 
 liberty and the pursuit of happiness 
 under the American flag, will be jeop- 
 ardized unless there is well-thought-out, 
 well-organized preparedness — a prepar- 
 edness based upon the principle that with 
 equality in the opportunities and privi- 
 leges of citizenship goes hand in hand 
 equality of obligation for service to the 
 nation in peace or war. 
 
 160 
 
VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 Citizenship means a great deal or it 
 means nothing. To the savage without 
 a country it is a meaningless word. 
 
 To the Roman it meant everything. 
 Our nation must be prepared if our gov- 
 ernment is to give us that type of citizen- 
 ship which carries with it the privilege 
 and the honors which the word implies 
 when applied to the citizens of a great 
 country, a citizenship of the type implied 
 in the words of the centurion to those 
 who were about to scourge Saint Paul 
 without trial, " Take heed what thou 
 doest for this man is a Roman." 
 
 While just and tolerant we must be 
 prepared and strong enough on land and 
 sea so that those contemplating injury to 
 one of our citizens may hear the warning 
 voice *' Take heed what thou doest for 
 this man is an American." 
 
 The people whom preparedness most 
 
 161 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 concerns, both from their number and in 
 the unfortunate result of the absence of 
 preparedness, are the wives and the fami- 
 hes of the men who in war constitute the 
 rank and file of our armies. The great 
 mass of our population, they feel more 
 severely than any other class the results 
 of a disastrous war — the loss of men, the 
 loss of protectors and supporters. We 
 desire for them a better destiny. 
 
 Avoidance of war will be rendered far 
 more probable and peace far more secure 
 by such well-ordered measures in the way 
 of preparedness as will protect us against 
 unjust aggression, and by such sound 
 training and education of our children as 
 will fill them with a sense of justice and 
 fair dealing. 
 
 Whether or not the time will come 
 when war will be controlled by a league 
 of nations, and a discussion of difficulties 
 
 162 
 
VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 insisted upon before a resort to force, is 
 a question which time alone can answer. 
 We hope it may be so. In the meantime, 
 work for this as we may and as we 
 should, we must not forget the situation 
 which confronts us, the conditions which 
 surround us. 
 
 As we look back over the long and 
 needlessly costly wars of the past, we 
 realize how much was due to the lack of 
 preparedness. 
 
 The practical and vital questions that 
 now concern us are: Have we learned 
 anything from these hideously costly and 
 wasteful wars? Are we prepared to take 
 steps necessary to establish a rational 
 degree of preparedness, which will not 
 only serve as an insurance for peace but 
 will, if we are forced into war, make it 
 short and limit the expenditure of life to 
 the minimum. Or are we going on to 
 
 163 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 our next war without organization and 
 without preparation, depending upon the 
 unexpected, some happy chance, some 
 dreamed-of invention, which will make 
 good our lack of preparation, or tend to 
 insure our protection? Men work their 
 own miracles in matters of defense. 
 
 The onlv war we have to fear is war 
 with a highly organized and thoroughly 
 prepared power of the first class. Noth- 
 ing will protect us against defeat or 
 destruction in such a war, except the 
 most thorough organization and careful 
 preparation made in time of peace. We 
 must remember the world-old slogan, 
 than which truer words were never 
 uttered, " In time of peace prepare for 
 war." We might vary it by saying, '' In 
 time of peace make such preparation 
 against war as will make it improbable," 
 but however we state it, it means prep- 
 
 164 
 
VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 aration — careful, thorough and well 
 thought out. 
 
 In considering this great question, it 
 must constantly be borne in mind that we 
 have never yet in all our history engaged 
 single-handed in war with a first-class 
 power prepared for war. This experi- 
 ence is undoubtedly before us unless our 
 history is to be different from that of all 
 other peoples, an assumption which is 
 wholly unwarranted. We may see no 
 concrete danger at the present, but in 
 these times, although at peace, we are 
 like a ship in the cyclone area with mes- 
 sages constantly coming in over the wire- 
 less, bearing tales of storm and disaster 
 all about us. We are poor sailors and 
 unworthy of the trust and responsibility 
 placed upon us if we do not take heed of 
 the warnings. 
 
 Our wars have been hideously wasteful 
 
 165 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 of life because we have sent the youth 
 of our country into war untrained and 
 undisciplined — even worse, we have sent 
 them unprepared either to take care of 
 themselves or to render efficient service 
 as soldiers. We have required of them 
 the sacrifice but we have not given them 
 the opportunity to make it reasonably 
 effective. We have sent them untrained, 
 willing, but unprepared; we have sent 
 them under officers ignorant of their ele- 
 mentary duties. We have thrown away 
 their lives with reckless, brutal prodigal- 
 ity. Fortunately for our interests and 
 national life, our enemies have either 
 been inferior in strength and resources, 
 or, like ourselves, have been unprepared 
 and have had to learn the art of war 
 while engaged in war. 
 
 This would be impossible in case of 
 war with a strong, well-organized nation, 
 
 166 
 
VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 a nation whose effort is founded upon 
 well-thought-out preparation — a nation 
 which has not left all the burden of war 
 for the moment of war, but has prepared 
 in advance, her organization, including 
 reserves of men, her equipment and ade- 
 quate supplies to make good the con- 
 sumption and losses of war. 
 
 A policy which permits a people to 
 drift on willing but unprepared, in spite 
 of all the lessons of the past, ignorantly 
 proposing to place the burdens of war 
 wholly upon the period of war, is a policy 
 which spells destruction for this or any 
 other people foolish enough to adopt and 
 follow it. It is a policy which must meet 
 the strong condemnation of every patri- 
 otic man who has an interest either in the 
 lives of his people or the welfare of his 
 country. No soldier worthy of the name, 
 either from the standpoint of informa- 
 
 167 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 tion or that of patriotic impulse, could 
 for a moment advocate such a pohcy 
 unless bowing to political opportunism 
 rather than seeking the welfare and 
 safety of his country. The experience 
 and lessons of the past are especially 
 valuable if we will but heed them, for 
 the lessons taught by mistakes are oft- 
 times, to honest, open-minded men, as 
 valuable as success. 
 
 Our system has been most undemo- 
 cratic. We have induced our people by 
 bounty, by gifts of land and other means, 
 to discharge their plain military obliga- 
 tions. We have encouraged a system 
 which has enabled the rich to escape the 
 blood tax — the sei^ice in war — through 
 their ability to buy others to take their 
 places in the ranks. I refer to the 
 unspeakably contemptible, unpatriotic 
 and, for the future, I hope, impossible 
 
 168 
 
VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 practice of buying substitutes. Further 
 resort to these vicious practices should 
 not be permitted. They have no place 
 in a true democracy. 
 
 Every good American honors the real 
 volunteer spirit, but it is difficult to 
 understand how any man who is familiar 
 with our country's history can advocate 
 the continuance of the volunteer system, 
 with its uncertainties, unpreparedness 
 and lack of equality of service. We have 
 been warned repeatedly by the experi- 
 ence of others of the folly of depending 
 upon the volunteer system. The lack of 
 training, the uncertainty in the way of 
 returns, the cost, the confusion, have all 
 served to demonstrate the danger of the 
 procedure; the danger to us has been 
 greatly increased by the thoroughness of 
 modern organization and the rapidity 
 with which armies can be transported 
 
 169 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 over land or sea to deliver attacks in 
 force. 
 
 Washington's letters are full of advice 
 against trusting to uncertain returns and 
 insisting upon organaization and prep- 
 aration. The best and bravest have 
 always rushed to the colors first. They 
 are willing but unprepared, and prove 
 an almost vmavailing sacrifice. After 
 the excitement wears off, men no longer 
 come, as was seen during the Revolution 
 and during the Civil War. Then comes 
 the use of the bountv, a most vicious and 
 demoralizing practice, and then the draft, 
 and this always in the crisis of a struggle. 
 What system could be more dangerous in 
 these days of organized preparedness? 
 
 Service to the nation and for the 
 nation in war is a service which every 
 man, rich and poor, must give, if 
 required, subject only to the limitations 
 
 170 
 
VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 of age and health. When this vital prin- 
 ciple is generally recognized and the 
 rich and the poor stand shoulder to 
 shoulder in the nation's service, there will 
 be much less of class distinction and 
 much more solidarity and a better 
 national spirit. Individuals with more 
 intelligence than courage admit the gen- 
 eral proposition that manhood suffrage 
 goes hand in hand with manhood service, 
 and still state that the country is not yet 
 ready for it. If it is not ready it is 
 because they and others of their kind 
 lack the courage to state and urge their 
 convictions. If there was ever a time in 
 the history of this country when it is 
 apparent that this great principle should 
 be urged as the only just and equitable 
 one — the only one on which we can safely 
 rely — it is to-day, with the lessons of the 
 greatest of all wars before our eyes. 
 
 171 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 That struggle shows conclusively, as 
 have our past wars, that a volunteer sys- 
 tem cannot be depended upon and that 
 dependence upon such a system means 
 hastily-raised and untrained armies, offi- 
 cered by willing but uninstructed officers. 
 It means campaigns accompanied by 
 losses unnecessarily great and attended 
 by results far short of what could have 
 been obtained. 
 
 We must continue our efforts for 
 World Peace, encourage arbitration, do 
 all we can to extend its application, but 
 while doing this we must not forget the 
 fact — if we do we shall aid in accom- 
 plishing the destruction of our own 
 nation — that the era of World Peace has 
 not yet arrived, and that arbitration is 
 not yet of general application. We 
 must not only be just, tolerant and 
 upright in all our dealings with other 
 
 172 
 
VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 people, but we must also be ready to 
 meet the strength of evil with the force 
 of right. 
 
 Our people must be organized and pre- 
 pared in order that they may be able to 
 uphold the institutions they believe in, 
 defend the right, and if need be, aid the 
 oppressed. 
 
 It is unfortunate that we cannot 
 depend upon our own fair dealing and 
 sense of justice to protect us, but never- 
 theless it is a fact that we cannot. In 
 seeking the ideal we must not forget the 
 actual; we must not let our hopes for 
 the future regulate entirely our conduct 
 at the present. A people may dream of 
 peace and work for it, but they should 
 not lose sight of the fact that it is not 
 yet among us. We are struggling for 
 the elimination of dreaded diseases, but, 
 realizing that we have not thus far been 
 
 173 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 successful, we take every possible pre- 
 caution against them. So it is with war. 
 
 It is a pathetic sight to see a great 
 people, despite all the teachings of his- 
 tory, follow counsels which must lead not 
 only to unnecessary sacrifice of life, but 
 even perhaps to the loss of national free- 
 dom. It is the duty of all who have 
 gathered anything from the history of 
 the past, to bring before the people 
 frankly the lessons taught by the past 
 results of lack of organization and 
 preparation. 
 
 The professional pacifist, the advocate 
 of unpreparedness and nonresistance, is 
 the most dangerous of our citizens. He 
 is generally eminently respectable. He 
 is like the well-dressed and well-groomed 
 typhoid carrier, as he goes about, poison- 
 ing the very life of the people. He 
 advocates a policy which if adopted will 
 
 174 
 
VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 surely end in great and unnecessary loss 
 of life, if not in the final loss of our 
 national liberty. In him lie the possibil- 
 ities of future disaster. 
 
 Assuming that our cause is just, non- 
 resistance and unpreparedness mean the 
 establishment of a condition which pre- 
 vents our effectively defending the right. 
 It assures the subordination of good to 
 evil. It is the most brutal of all policies, 
 as well as the most cowardly and sinis- 
 ter; brutal in that it insures the unneces- 
 saray loss of thousands upon thousands 
 of our people in a struggle that is fruit- 
 less because it is unprepared and unor- 
 ganized. It is the more cowardly and 
 sinister in that it is an admission that 
 there is nothing worth fighting for — that 
 there are no great principles which are 
 worth the sacrifice of life. It is a policy 
 which marks the decadence of a people, 
 
 175 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 and if followed by the bulk of a nation 
 means that its end is at hand. 
 
 Preparedness is based upon organiza- 
 tion. National preparedness means far 
 more than the mere organization of the 
 army and navy. It means, first of all, 
 the moral organization of the people, an 
 organization which creates in the heart of 
 every citizen a sense of his obligation for 
 service to the nation in time of war or 
 other difficulty. This is the greatest part 
 of organization, and if once accomplished 
 all the rest follows easily and naturally. 
 The organization of the industrial 
 resources of the country would place the 
 government in possession of full knowl- 
 edge concerning the capacity of each 
 industrial plant — just what it can do, 
 how much, and when — and at the same 
 time would place in the possession of the 
 various industrial organizations an exact 
 
 176 
 
VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 knowledge of what was expected of them 
 and would see to it that they are properly 
 equipped to discharge their obligations 
 promptly when called upon. An organ- 
 ization which takes into consideration 
 transportation, communications and sup- 
 ply; the organization of the sanitary 
 service, and of the various special groups 
 of highly-trained men; an organization 
 of the financial system of the country so 
 that it may have the elasticity and expan- 
 sibility to meet the demands of war; the 
 organization of the economical resources 
 of the country ; the careful study of ways 
 and means to make good shortages; 
 organization of our chemical resources; 
 provision as far as possible of substitutes 
 for things which are not found within 
 our own limits, so that we may be sup- 
 plied in case of loss of sea power — all 
 these things come under organization and 
 
 177 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 require much time for their considera- 
 tion. This cannot be accomphshed in the 
 haste and confusion of war. 
 
 A wise nation, reahzing that its safety 
 depends upon preparation, and that 
 preparation depends upon organization, 
 gives careful heed to all these questions. 
 It is a vital part of national policy. 
 
 The fighting forces of the nation, the 
 land and sea forces, might be compared 
 to the edge of an extremely heavy knife. 
 The mass of steel behind the edge repre- 
 sents trained reserves of men, reserves of 
 munitions, organization, transportation, 
 communication, sanitaray units, special 
 service groups — in brief, all that great 
 mass of organization which measures the 
 might of the nation, which serves to renew 
 the cutting edge and to give it the rigidity 
 and weight necessary to force it home. It 
 is the type of organization which makes 
 
 178 
 
VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 it possible to apply promptly the might 
 of the nation, and to maintain it for the 
 maximum period of time; it is organiza- 
 tion which leaves nothing to chance. 
 It is a recognition of the fact that effi- 
 ciency can be secured only through 
 preparation, and that preparation rests 
 upon organization. 
 
 This sort of preparation makes for 
 national unity, consequently for national 
 strength. It involves having all the men 
 of a certain age doing something in com- 
 mon for the nation at the same time. It 
 makes for national solidarity; it tends to 
 do away with class distinctions. It tends 
 to build up a truer national spirit, to fuse 
 the various elements into a homogeneous 
 mass which, with us, would be one of real 
 Americanism. It tends to the establish- 
 ment of a condition which will obliterate 
 the sharp distinctions between the rich and 
 
 179 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 the poor, the distinctions of race and 
 creed, and to make us one homogeneous 
 mass fused by common patriotic impulses. 
 A people not only willing but organized 
 and trained for peace and, if need be, for 
 war. 
 
 If we have faith in our institutions and 
 confidence in ourselves, and believe our 
 purpose in the world is a worthy one, this 
 is a condition which we should strive to 
 attain. Its attainment will result in bet- 
 ter citizens, better men physically, men 
 better morally and more efficient from 
 the economic standpoint, men more tol- 
 erant and more observant of the rights 
 of others. They will be better physically 
 because of the training which will have 
 placed their bodies more fully under the 
 control of their will, will have built up 
 their muscles, corrected their physical 
 defects, taught them how to protect 
 
 180 
 
VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 themselves in camp and field and to ward 
 off disease and infection. They will be 
 better citizens morally because of the dis- 
 cipline they have had. They will be more 
 observant of the law and the constituted 
 authorities; more observant of the rights 
 of others; more efficient economically 
 because of their habits of discipline, regu- 
 larity and promptness. They will appre- 
 ciate that with the rights and opportuni- 
 ties of citizenship go its obligations. 
 They will be all-around better citizens, 
 and collectively we shall be a better 
 nation. 
 
 An approximate idea of the unneces- 
 sary cost of our military establishment 
 resulting from an unsound military pol- 
 icy, is indicated by the statement on the 
 following page, taken from Huidekoper's 
 statement to the Military Affairs Com- 
 mittee of the Senate. 
 
 181 
 
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chapter viii 
 What We Should Do 
 
 "Oh^ ye Athenians, yet is there time ! 
 And there is one manner in which you 
 can recover your greatness, or, dying, 
 fall worthy of your past — go yourself, 
 every man of you, and stand in the 
 ranks ; and either a victory beyond all 
 victories in its glory awaits you, or, 
 falling, you shall fall greatly and 
 worthy of your past." — Demosthenes 
 to the Athenians. 
 
 Our past military policy, so far as it 
 concerns the land forces, has been thor- 
 oughlj^ unsound and in violation of basic 
 military principles. We have succeeded 
 not because of it, but in spite of it. It 
 has been unnecessarily and brutally 
 costly in human life and recklessly 
 extravagant in the expenditure of treas- 
 
 183 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 ure. It has tended greatly to prolong 
 our wars and consequently has delayed 
 national development. 
 
 Because we have succeeded in spite of 
 an unsound sj^stem, those who do not 
 look beneath the surface fail to recognize 
 the numerous shortcomings of that sys- 
 tem, or appreciate how dangerous is our 
 further dependence upon it. 
 
 The time has come to put our house in 
 order through the establishment of a 
 sound and dependable system, and to 
 make such wise and prudent preparation 
 as will enable us to defend successfully 
 our country and our rights. 
 
 No such system can be established 
 which does not rest upon equality of serv- 
 ice for all who are physically fit and of 
 proper age. Manhood suffrage means 
 manhood obligation for service in peace 
 or war. This is the basic principle upon 
 
 184 
 
WHAT WE SHOULD DO 
 
 which truly representative government, 
 or free democracy, rests and must rest if 
 it is successfully to withstand the shock 
 of modern war. 
 
 The acceptance of this fundamental 
 principle will require to a certain extent 
 the moral organization of the people, the 
 building up of that sense of individual 
 obligation for service to the nation which 
 is the basis of true patriotism, the teach- 
 ing of our people to think in terms of the 
 nation rather than in those of a locality 
 or of personal interest. 
 
 This organization must also be accom- 
 panied b}^ the organization, classification 
 and training of our men and the detailed 
 and careful organization of the material 
 resources of the country with the view to 
 making them promptly available in case 
 of need and to remedying any defects. 
 
 In the organization of our land forces 
 
 185 
 
AMERICANS DUTY 
 
 we must no longer place reliance upon 
 plans based upon the development of 
 volunteers or the use of the militia. 
 The volunteer system is not dependable 
 because of the uncertainty as to returns, 
 and in anj'^ case because of lack of time 
 for training and organization. 
 
 Modern wars are often initiated with- 
 out a formal declaration of war or by a 
 declaration which is coincident with the 
 first act of w^'ir. 
 
 Dependence upon militia under state 
 control or partially under state control, 
 spells certain disaster, not because of the 
 quality of the men or officers, but because 
 of the system under which they work. 
 
 We nuist also have a first-class navy, 
 ^^'ell balanced and thoroughly equipped 
 with all necessary appliances afloat and 
 ashore. It is the first line of defense. 
 
 We need a highly efficient regular 
 
 186 
 
WHAT WE SHOULD DO 
 
 army, adequate to the peace needs of the 
 nation. By this is meant a regular force, 
 fully equipped, thoroughly trained and 
 properly organized, with adequate 
 reserves of men and material, and a 
 i'ovee sufficient to garrison our over-sea 
 possessions, including the Philippines and 
 the Hawaiian Islands. These latter are 
 the key to the Pacific and one of the main 
 defenses of our Pacific coast and the 
 Panama Canal, and whoever holds them 
 dominates the trade routes of the greater 
 portion of the Pacific and, to a large 
 extent, that ocean. The army must be 
 sufficient also to provide an adequate 
 garrison for the Panama Canal, which is 
 an implement of commerce and an instru- 
 ment of war so valuable that we must not 
 under any conditions allow it to lie out- 
 side our secure grasp. 
 
 The regular force must also be ade- 
 
 187 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 quate to provide suiRcient troops for 
 our coast defenses and such garrisons 
 as may be required in Porto Rico and 
 Alaska. The regular force must also 
 be sufficient to provide the necessary 
 mobile force in the United States; by 
 this is meant a force of cavalry, infan- 
 try, field artillery, engineers and aux- 
 iliary troops sufficient to provide an 
 expeditionary force such as we sent to 
 Cuba in 1898, and at the same time to 
 provide a force sufficient to meet pos- 
 sible conditions of internal disorder. 
 It must also furnish training units for 
 the National Guard, or whatever force 
 the federal government may eventually 
 establish in place of it, and provide suffi- 
 cient officers for duty under the detail 
 system in the various departments, 
 instructors at the various colleges and 
 schools w^here military instruction is or 
 
 188 
 
WHAT WE SHOULD DO 
 
 may be established, attaches abroad and 
 officers on special missions. 
 
 The main reliance in a war with a 
 first-class power will ultimately be the 
 great force of citizen soldiers forming 
 a purely federal force, thoroughly organ- 
 ized and equipped with reserves of men 
 and material. This force must be trained 
 under some system which will permit 
 the instruction to be given in part dur- 
 ing the school period or age, thereby 
 greatly reducing the time required for 
 the final intensive period of training, 
 which should be under regular officers 
 and in conjunction with regular troops. 
 In brief, the system must be one which 
 utilizes as far as possible the means and 
 opportunities now available, and inter- 
 feres as little as possible with the educa- 
 tional or industrial careers of those 
 affected. A system moulded on the gen- 
 
 189 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 eral lines of the Australian or Swiss^ 
 will accomplish this. Some modifications 
 will be required to meet our conditions. 
 Each year about one million men reach 
 the military age of 18; of tliis number 
 not more than fifty per cent are fit for 
 military service, this being about the 
 average in other countries. Far less 
 than fifty per cent come up to the stand- 
 ards required for the regular army, but 
 the minor defects rejecting them for 
 the regular army would not reject them 
 for general military service. Assuming 
 that some system on the general lines 
 of the Australian or Swiss must be 
 eventually adopted in this country, it 
 would seem that about 500,000 men 
 would be available each year for military 
 training. If the boys were prepared by 
 the state authorities, through training 
 
 ^See Appendix for complete description. 
 190 
 
WHAT WE SHOULD DO 
 
 in schools and colleges, and in state 
 training areas — when the boys were not 
 in school — to the extent that they are 
 in Switzerland or Australia, it would be 
 possible, when they come up for federal 
 training, to finish their military train- 
 ing — so far as preparing them for the 
 duties of enlisted men is concerned — 
 within a period of approximately three 
 months. We should be able to limit 
 the period of first line obligation to the 
 period from eighteen to twenty-five, 
 inclusive, or seven years, or we could 
 make the period of obligatory service 
 begin two years later and extend it to 
 twenty-seven. This procedure would 
 give in the first line approximately three 
 and one-half millions of men at the age 
 of best physical condition and of mini- 
 mum dependent and business respon- 
 sibility. From the men of certain years 
 
 191 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 (classes) of this period, organizations 
 of federal forces should be built up to 
 the extent of at least twenty-five divi- 
 sions. They would be organized and 
 equipped exactly like the regular armj^ 
 and would be held ready for immediate 
 service as our present militia would be 
 were it under federal control. 
 
 Men of these organizations would not 
 live in uniform but would go about their 
 regular occupations as do the members 
 of the militia to-day, but they would 
 be equipped, organized and ready for 
 immediate service. If emergency required 
 it, additional organizations could be 
 promptly raised from the men who were 
 within the obligatory period. 
 
 There should be no pay in peace time 
 except when the men were on duty and 
 then it should be merely nominal. The 
 duty should be recognized as a part of 
 
 192 
 
WHAT WE SHOULD DO 
 
 the man's citizenship obligation to the 
 nation. The organizations to be made 
 up of men within the period of obhga- 
 tory service, could be filled either by the 
 men who indicated their desire for such 
 training or by drawing them by lot. This 
 is a matter of detail. The regular army 
 as organized would be made up as to-day; 
 it would be a professional armj^ The 
 men who came into it would be men who 
 had received in youth this citizenship 
 training. They would come into the 
 regular army because they wanted to be 
 professional soldiers. The regular army 
 would be to a certain extent the train- 
 ing nucleus for the citizen soldier organ- 
 izations and would be the force garrison- 
 ing our over-sea possessions. It would 
 be much easier to maintain our regular 
 army in a highly efficient condition, as 
 general military training would have pro- 
 
 193 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 duced a respect for the uniform and an 
 appreciation of the importance of a 
 soldier's duty. 
 
 The reserve corps of officers would be 
 composed of men who had had longer 
 and more advanced training, and could 
 be recruited and maintained as indicated 
 below, through further training of men 
 from the military schools and colleges 
 and those from the officers' training corps 
 units of the nonmilitary universities and 
 colleges. There would also be those from 
 the military training camps and other 
 sources, such as men who have served in 
 the army and have the proper qualifica- 
 tions. This would give a military estab- 
 lishment in which every man would be 
 physically fit to play his part and would 
 have finished his obligation in what was 
 practically his early manhood, with little 
 probability of being called upon again 
 
 194 
 
WHAT WE SHOULD DO 
 
 unless the demands of war were so great 
 as to require more men than those of the 
 total first line, eighteen to twenty-five 
 years, inclusive. Then they would be 
 called by years as the occasion required, 
 anci would be available for service up to 
 their forty-fifth year. It would give 
 us a condition of real national prepared- 
 ness, a much higher type of citizenship, 
 a lower criminal rate and an enormously 
 improved economic efficiency. Pending 
 the establishment of such a system, every 
 effort should be made to transfer the 
 state militia to federal control. By this 
 is meant its complete removal from state 
 control and its establishment as a purely 
 federal force, having no more relation 
 to the states than the regular army has 
 at present. This force under federal 
 control will make a very valuable nucleus 
 for the building up of a federal force 
 
 195 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 of citizen soldiers. Officers and men 
 should be transferred with their present 
 grades and ratings. 
 
 The states have full authority to main- 
 tain a military force of their own and 
 under their exclusive control, if they 
 desire to do so. Pennsylvania has estab- 
 lished a state constabulary and in doing 
 so has taken a long step in the right 
 direction. Pennsylvania has not had to 
 call upon her militia for strike or riot 
 duty for a good many years. 
 
 As has been recommended by the Gen- 
 eral Staff, there should be built up 
 with the least possible dela}^ a corps of 
 at least 50,000 reserve officers, on lines 
 and through means recommended by the 
 General Staff, and by means of a further 
 development of the United States Mili- 
 tary Training Camps for college students 
 and older men, which have been in opera- 
 
 196 
 
WHAT WE SHOULD DO 
 
 tion for a number of years. These plans 
 include the coordination of the instruc- 
 tion at the various military colleges and 
 schools and the establishment of well- 
 thought-out plans for the noimiilitary 
 colleges at which it may be decided to 
 establish officers' training corps units on 
 lines now under consideration. 
 
 This number of officers, fifty thousand, 
 may seem excessive to some, but when 
 it is remembered that there were one 
 hundred and twenty-seven thousand offi- 
 cers in the Northern army during the 
 Civil War, and over sixty thousand in 
 the Southern, fifty thousand will not 
 appear to be excessive. Fifty thousand 
 officers will be barely sufficient properly 
 to officer a million and a half citizen 
 soldiers. We had in service, North and 
 South, during the Civil War, over four 
 million men, and at the end of the war 
 
 197 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 we had approximately one and a quarter 
 million under arms. 
 
 Under legislative provision enacted 
 during the Civil War, commonly known 
 as the Morrill Act, Congress established 
 mechanical and agricultural colleges in 
 each state, among otlier things prescrib- 
 ing military instruction and providing 
 for this purpose officers of the regular 
 army. There are nearly thirty thousand 
 students at these institutions who receive 
 during their course military instruction 
 for periods of from one to two years. 
 In some cases the instruction is excellent; 
 in others it is very poor. 
 
 There are in addition a large number 
 of military colleges and schools; at these 
 there are some ten thousand students, 
 so that there are approximately forty 
 thousand young men receiving military 
 instruction, nearly all of them under offi- 
 
 198 
 
WHAT WK SHOULD DO 
 
 cers of the army. This means a grad- 
 iialin^ elass of about eigFit thousaii(J, of 
 whom not more tlian forty-five hundred 
 woul(J he fit to underp»-o mihtary training'. 
 
 These men sliould f)e assemf)led in 
 CJrtited States Mihtary l^'aining Cam[)s 
 for periods of five weeks eaeii for two 
 eonseeutive years, in order tfiat they 
 may receive tliat practical and tfiorough 
 instruction which in the majority of 
 instances is not possible during their col- 
 lege course. With tliese should be assem- 
 bled tlie men wfio [uivc taken the officers' 
 training course at tfie various nonmili- 
 tary universities. This course, as out- 
 lined })y the Cieneral Staff, will be thor- 
 ough and conducted, so far as the purely 
 military courses and duties are concerned, 
 under the immediate control of officers 
 of the army. 
 
 From all these sources we have prac- 
 199 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 tically an inexhaustible supply of mate- 
 rial from which excellent reserve officers 
 can be made. From the men assembled 
 in camp each year, fifteen hundred should 
 be selected and commissioned, subject 
 only to a physical examination, as they 
 are all men of college type, for one year 
 as second lieutenants in the line and in 
 the various staff corps and departments 
 of the regular army. They should receive 
 the pay and allowance of second lieu- 
 tenants, or such pay and allowance as 
 may be deemed to be appropriate. 
 
 The men who receive this training 
 would furnish very good material for 
 reserve officers of the grade of captain 
 and major, whereas as a rule the men 
 who have not had this training would 
 qualify only in the grade of lieutenant. 
 
 From this group of men could well 
 be selected, subject to the prescribed 
 
 200 
 
WHAT WE SHOULD DO 
 
 mental and physical examination, the 
 greater portion of the candidates from 
 civil life for appointment in the army. 
 We have the material and the machinery 
 for tm-ning out an excellent corps of 
 reserve officers. All that is needed is to 
 take hold of it and shape it. 
 
 The prompt building up of a reserve 
 corps of officers is one of the most vitally 
 important steps to be taken. It is abso- 
 lutely essential. It takes much time and 
 care to train officers. Not only should 
 students of the various colleges, univer- 
 sities and schools where military training 
 is given, be made use of to the fullest 
 extent, but the military training camps 
 which have been conducted so success- 
 fully during the past few years should 
 be greatly extended and made a part 
 of the general plan of providing officers 
 for the officers' reserve corps. It will 
 
 201 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 be necessary to place the instruction at 
 these camps on a different basis and to 
 combine certain theoretical work with the 
 practical work of the camp. This is a 
 matter of detail which can be readily 
 arranged. The results attained at these 
 camps fully justify their being given 
 the most serious attention and being 
 made a part of the general plan for the 
 training of officers. 
 
 202 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 Constructive Work or the Army 
 
 "All civic virtues, all the heroism 
 and self-sacrifice of patriotism, spring 
 ultimately from the habit men acquire 
 of regarding their nation as a great 
 organic whole, identifying themselves 
 with its fortunes in the past as in the 
 present, and looking forward anxiously 
 to its future destinies." — Lecke. 
 
 Our people as a whole do not under- 
 stand what a tremendous factor our lit- 
 tle army has been in the building up 
 of the nation and the development of 
 its resources from the earliest days. 
 They too often think of it only as an 
 instrument of destruction. As a mat- 
 ter of fact it has been one of the great 
 influences in opening up and building 
 
 203 
 
AMERICA S DUTY 
 
 up the country and maintaining public 
 order. Of recent years it has played 
 a very great role as an administrative 
 force, and in areas under its control great 
 advances have been made and lasting 
 benefits to humanity secured. 
 
 Before and after the Civil War tlie 
 army was the main instrument in the 
 maintenance of order, the safeguarding 
 of life and in the opening up and pro- 
 tection of lines of communication inci- 
 dent to the development of the West. 
 This period of the army's activity was 
 full of fascinating interest; it was 
 attended by much hard and dangerous 
 work. Even to this day the strongest 
 hold the army has upon the affections 
 of our western people is the result of 
 the work of this period. 
 
 At the outbreak of the Spanish War 
 the army entered upon a new field of 
 
 204 
 
WORK OF THE ARMY 
 
 activity. The war with Spain was not 
 a great war. Fighting was limited to 
 a few hotly-contested actions in Cuba 
 and to some of lesser importance in 
 Porto Rico. Immediately upon the ces- 
 sation of hostilities the army was con- 
 fronted with the necessity of taking over 
 the civil administration of the conquered 
 territory. This administration was con- 
 ducted under the broad authority of mili- 
 tary law, but the agency employed was 
 the law of the land. It was military for 
 the time being, in that its source of 
 authority was the power of the military 
 occupant. Some deviations in form of 
 procedure, due to emergency measures, 
 were required, but, generally speaking, 
 the municipal law governed in the town 
 and city, and the general law of the 
 land in the administration of justice and 
 the control of administrative procedure. 
 
 205 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 The basic policy was to avoid changes 
 in the substantive body of the law, and 
 to limit, as far as possible, modifications 
 to procedure, with a view to its better- 
 ment and simplification, and also to giv- 
 ing the accused a larger measure of 
 protection. The accomplishment of this 
 demanded careful attention. 
 
 The administrative work in Cuba not 
 only involved the everyday conduct of 
 public business, but an immense amount 
 of constructive work incident to the estab- 
 lishment of a school system, construction 
 of great public works, and of the gen- 
 eral laws governing charitable institu- 
 tions, as Avell as an enormous amount 
 of sanitary organization, an electoral law 
 and constructive and administrative work 
 to bring about the many changes neces- 
 sary to convert a war- wrecked, demor- 
 alized and exhausted colony, fever- 
 
 206 
 
WORK OF THE ARMY 
 
 *"(cken and overrun by disease, into a 
 
 li'-governing republic. 
 
 This great work of the army involved 
 not only the maintenance of public order 
 and the safeguarding of life and prop- 
 erty, but, what was more far-i'eaching, 
 the building up of a sourul system of 
 sanitation, a system which, when once 
 in operation, greatly leduced the death 
 rate. Malaria, in its various forms, had 
 been one of the great causes of death 
 in Cuba. Measures were taken which 
 very greatly reduced its ravages among 
 the native population and almost elimi- 
 nated it from the army. Smallpox had 
 been a devastating scourge. This was 
 done away with entirely by vaccination 
 and the establishment of proper regula- 
 tions. Yellow fever, one of the most 
 dreaded of all tropical diseases, was 
 brought under thorough control, the 
 
 207 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 iiiettiis of transiiiission discovered and 
 the method of control worked ont. This 
 discovery freed Cnba of the dread dis- 
 ease wliich has swept away countless 
 thousands oC its popuhition and deci- 
 mated the Sj)anish ^^arrisons and the 
 Spanish |)()[)ulation tor <>enerati()ns. It 
 is a (hscovery of vast importance for all 
 time to all hving in the American trop- 
 ical and semi-tropical countries. Its 
 accomplishment was the work of medical 
 othcers of the army under the direction 
 of Major Walter Reed. The general 
 sanitary work in the Island was under 
 the control of an army medical oliicer who 
 was directly under the military g-overnor. 
 Cuban physicians of great ability cooper- 
 ated loyally in the great work of the 
 sanitary rehabilitation and rendered 
 invaluable service. The discoveries made 
 in Cuba and the methods established for 
 
 208 
 
WORK OF THE ARMY 
 
 the control of yellow fever were adopted 
 by other countries and the benefits 
 secured are now common to all countries 
 formerly ravaged by this disease. The 
 saving of life and money in our own 
 country incident to doing away with yel- 
 low fever and the quarantine that par- 
 alyzed the movement of business in the 
 entire South, has been many, many times 
 the cost of the war. 
 
 In Porto Rico similar work was done 
 with reference to malaria and smallpox. 
 The same methods were applied as were 
 employed in Cuba to control yellow fever. 
 The great problem of tropical anemia 
 was taken up and solved. A very great 
 portion of the credit for this work is due 
 to the army, principally to Major Bailey 
 K. Ashford, army surgeon, who took 
 up the work in Porto Rico and found 
 that there was a real cause for what we 
 
 209 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 looked upon as tropical shiftlessness and 
 laziness. The cause was the hookworm. 
 Most energetic and successful measures 
 were taken to combat it. Recent opinion 
 is to the effect that the re-energization 
 of the working class in Porto Rico inci- 
 dent to doing away with tropical anemia 
 or hookworm disease, amounts to about 
 60 per cent increased efficiency. The 
 benefits of this discovery are being 
 applied to many tropical and semi-trop- 
 ical countries, including our own South. 
 It means the re-energization of a great 
 mass of the people. The life-saving 
 value is tremendous. Each year in Porto 
 Rico the reduction in the death rate 
 incident to the control of tropical anemia, 
 exceeds the total loss by death and 
 wounds in the Spanish- American War. 
 Important constructive and administra- 
 tive work was also accomplished, during 
 
 210 
 
WORK OF THE ARMY 
 
 the period of military control, much of 
 it directly under the military governors 
 who were first appointed. 
 
 Similar work, administrative, construc- 
 tive and sanitary, was accomplished in 
 the Philippines. There for a long time 
 the government was under exclusive mili- 
 tary control. Much valuable and far- 
 reaching sanitary work was done in those 
 islands by medical officers of the army. 
 This work has been taken up and con- 
 tinued by the medical forces of the civil 
 government and pushed to a degree of 
 success hard to appreciate by those who 
 have not seen what has been done. It 
 has been a great work, resulting in the 
 saving of thousands and thousands of 
 lives. 
 
 The construction of the Panama Canal 
 was largely army work. It was built 
 very largely on a sanitary foundation. 
 
 211 
 
AMEKICA'S DUTV 
 
 Splendid and effective as has been the 
 work of the army engineers, the IViglil- 
 ful death toll wonld have prevented tlie 
 aeeoniplishinent oT the undertaking* had 
 it not been for Keed's discovery con- 
 cerning yellow fever and the splendid 
 application of the system of prevention 
 by Surgeon-Ceneral W^illiam C. Gorgas, 
 who made it possible to condnct the 
 gigantic work of construction under con- 
 ditions — so far as health was concerned 
 — equal to those existing in almost any 
 portion of the continental United States. 
 These great sanitary works in lands 
 under our control or taken over bv us, 
 alone have saved many times the num- 
 ber of lives lost in the war. The benefits 
 of these discoveries will be for all time. 
 More recently other measures of the 
 greatest value in saving human life have 
 been taken bv the militarv authorities of 
 
 * • 
 
 212 
 
WORK OK THE AUMY 
 
 the pfovcrnment in t\\it use of the anti- 
 typhoid serum in the army; so efleetive 
 has the serum heen that although there 
 are more than 100,000 men seatterecJ all 
 over the world from Tientsin, Cfiina, to 
 Pitnama, ancJ from Porto Ilieo to Alaska, 
 in tlie army we did not have a single 
 death from typhoid in 1915. 
 
 The universal a[)f>lieation of this pre- 
 ventive measure in tlie army has dem- 
 onstrated thoroiighly that ty})fioi(J fever 
 ean he eompletely eontrolled; that it is 
 a preventaf)le (iisease. Its universal 
 apj)li(!ation to the military establishment 
 was first ma(Je in the United States. 
 KriglaruJ first hegan the use of it, hut 
 did not make it geneial. 
 
 The army has done tremendous serv- 
 ice for tlie country in the handling of 
 the gmvc and alarming eoncJitions aris- 
 ing from the great Mississippi flood of 
 
 213 
 
r 
 
 VMERICA S DUTY 
 
 recent years. So quietly was this work 
 done that few people appreciate it; thou- 
 sands and thousands of people have been 
 saved from watery graves or from starva- 
 tion. 
 
 Such has been some of the constructive 
 and life-saving work of the army. A 
 force designed to protect our lives and 
 liberties in time of war, in time of peace 
 it has always been one of the great fac- 
 tors in the development of our own 
 countrv and of lands imder our control. 
 
 As has been pointed out again and 
 again in the foregoing pages, the train- 
 ing which men get in the army, the 
 knowledge of sanitation, the respect for 
 law and authority, and the habits of 
 discipline, are of unestimable value in 
 building up a sane and sound people. 
 What the army has meant to our people, 
 how far-reaching its work has been, is 
 
 214 
 
WORK OF THE ARMY 
 
 understood by few. It may at times 
 fail, and in ^rcat emergency must fail 
 unless backed and supported by an organ- 
 ized and devoted people who ai)preciate 
 that no amount of willingness can take 
 th« place of* preparedness and training. 
 
 Behind the reguhu* army must always 
 stand the great reserve army consisting 
 of the able-bodied men of the nation, so 
 trained as to be prom])tly available for 
 military service if needed, but following 
 their normal occupations in time of peace. 
 
 Any policy which fails to recognize 
 the principle of equal obligation and 
 equal service is but a makeshift. The 
 volunteer system is unworthy of serious 
 consideration; not trustworthy because 
 it would certainly break down under the 
 sudden shock and strain of modern war; 
 dangerous because it serves to lull people 
 into a false sense of security. 
 
 215 
 
chapter x 
 Lessons of the World War 
 
 "To be prepared for war is one of 
 the most effectual means of preserving 
 peace/' — Washington. 
 
 Since the foregoing chapters were 
 written we have passed through the great 
 World War, into whch we drifted un- 
 organized, unequipped and unprepared. 
 God had given us eyes to see, ears to 
 hear and an intelligence to apply the les- 
 sons of the past. If we are to judge by 
 the condition of America in all that re- 
 lates to preparation our eyes had not 
 seen, our ears had not heard and cer- 
 tainly our intelligence had not applied 
 our own experience or that of others. 
 
 216 
 
LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 
 
 Our ultimate, unavoidable entry into 
 the War had been for a long time clearly 
 evident, unless we were to abandon all 
 pretense of defending the rights and in- 
 terests of our people, unless we were to 
 wliolly fail to meet our obligations to 
 humanity as a great Christian nation, 
 standing for righteousness and justice, 
 and our obligations to civilization for the 
 maintenance of good faith and fair deal- 
 ing between nations. 
 
 We paid in blood and treasure for our 
 failure to prepare. Indeed the world 
 paid for it as well as ourselves, for had 
 we been reasonably ready and organ- 
 ized, had we had reasonable equip- 
 ment and supplies — in a word, had we 
 been in condition to enter the war with 
 reasonable promptness and effectiveness 
 — there is little probabihty that the War 
 would have taken place. 
 
 217 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 The aggressive enemy nations felt con- 
 fident that they could carry out their pur- 
 pose before we could intervene effec- 
 tively. Only the heroic resistance of Bel- 
 gium, the marvelous courage and effect- 
 iveness of the French, and the prompt, 
 unhesitating and determined entry of 
 England prevented the accomplishment 
 of their purpose prior to our being able 
 to enter the War. 
 
 The opinion of the German military 
 experts was that we could not enter into 
 any European war effectivelj^ within two 
 and one-half years. Generally speaking 
 they were right, but fortunately our un- 
 conscious and unintentional preparation 
 for w^ar, through the building of great 
 plants for the manufacture of arms and 
 equipment for the fighting nations, 
 enabled us to shorten this period some- 
 what. The plants which we built for 
 
 218 
 
LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 
 
 them were, to a large extent, made avail- 
 able for us almost immediately upon our 
 entry into the War. This enabled us to 
 push forward preparations more rapidly 
 than would otherwise have been the case. 
 As it was, it was more than a year after 
 we came in before we had any consider- 
 able number of troops in action. These 
 were our first two divisions. Their air 
 service, their artillery, their automatics 
 and their machine guns were furnished 
 by the Allies — and this despite the fact 
 that we are the greatest manufacturing 
 nation on earth, and the War had been 
 going on nearly four years. 
 
 Up to the time of our entry into the 
 War, which was nearly three years after 
 the War began, there had been no organ- 
 ized, thought-out preparation for war 
 on the part of our government and no 
 comprehensive scheme to meet the rapidly 
 
 219 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 approaching contingency. The Regular 
 Army and the National Guard provided 
 a limited number of officers. There were 
 a limited number in the Reserve Corps. 
 
 Many of the Regular Army and most 
 of the latter classes were not well 
 grounded in the methods of modern war. 
 Of modern equipment we had little or 
 nothing. No adequate plans for pro- 
 viding officers had been made. We were 
 pathetically and fatally unprepared. 
 
 We paid the price in blood and treas- 
 ure for our failure to do what for years 
 had been clearly necessary. We were 
 strong enough in men and resources to 
 pay it, excessive though it was, for it can 
 be conservatively stated that our losses 
 in men were from a third to a half greater 
 than they would have been had we had 
 time to train our troops properl}^ and 
 that the cost of the war was billions 
 
 220 
 
LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 
 
 greater than it would have been had we 
 made even reasonable preparation. 
 
 A dollar spent in preparation before 
 the war would have saved many later on. 
 We were practically without any air ser- 
 vice ; there were no well thought-out plans 
 for developing one in any way adequate 
 to the demands of the war. Our artillery 
 was supplied by the over-taxed Allies, as 
 was much in the way of special arms, 
 such as automatics, machine-guns, trench 
 mortars, etc. Our training camps were 
 for months without the necessary arms 
 and equipment to train the assembled 
 men. Wooden guns and improvised 
 equipment were used to the limit. We 
 did our best, the Allied line holding while 
 we got ready. 
 
 The medical and engineering profes- 
 sions of the country had responded years 
 before the War to the call to aid in build- 
 
 221 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 ing up a Reserve and were better pre- 
 pared to meet the demands than other 
 branches of the Service. The Plattsburg 
 Training Camps and their winter courses 
 furnished a large number of partially 
 trained officers. Some were furnished by 
 the military training corps of the great 
 universities; but these men, valuable as 
 they were in starting our training, were 
 sadly inadequate in number. 
 
 The crisis of the War was on. We 
 had to enter promptly or it would be too 
 late. 
 
 We were like a volunteer fire depart- 
 ment, called in the midst of a great con- 
 flagration — a department short of 
 equipment and knowing little or nothing 
 of how to use that which it had, a depart- 
 ment which had to be organized, equipped 
 and trained during the conflagration. 
 
 No nation ever sent braver, more enter- 
 
 222 
 
LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 
 
 prising troops to war — troops more reck- 
 lessly indifferent to losses — but they 
 were not trained as they should have 
 been. Time did not permit it. They 
 were not properly equipped to meet the 
 denjands of the War. There had been 
 no appreciation of the fact that prepara- 
 tion must be made in advance — that one 
 cannot buy time. These brave troops 
 were not given a sporting chance, nor 
 will our troops ever be given a sporting 
 chance unless we look a bit ahead and 
 unless we shape our policy for the future 
 with some understanding and apprecia- 
 tion of the lessons of the past. We 
 demonstrated during the war the mur- 
 derous folly of those who talk of raising 
 a million men between sunrise and sun- 
 set, of men springing to arms who have 
 never seen arms or learned how to use 
 them, of assuming that words, numbers 
 
 223 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 and money can take the place of organ- 
 ization and equipment. 
 
 The question now is : Have we learned 
 the lessons thoroughly enough not to 
 have to go through the experience of this 
 War again. Will our people heed the 
 mute appeal of the unnecessary dead of 
 this War and of all our previous wars, 
 or must the murderous folly of waiting 
 until war is upon us to prepare against 
 it be a continuing military policy? 
 
 The bending, bleeding line of the Al- 
 lies held while we were doing the things 
 which plain, common sense indicated 
 should have been done years before. For- 
 tunately their line held, and we arrived 
 in time to throw the determining weight 
 of our strength into the struggle. 
 
 Good fortune was with us in the Rev- 
 olution, when half of England was on 
 our side; in the war of '12 and '14, when 
 
 224 
 
LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 
 
 England was engaged in the great strug- 
 gle with Napoleon; in the JNIexican War, 
 when we fought an ill-equipped and much 
 weaker people; in the Civil War, when 
 North and South, equally uninstructed, 
 learned the game together; in the Span- 
 ish War. when we met a nation even less 
 prepared than ourselves; and last, in the 
 Great War, when the Allies held the line 
 while we got ready, furnishing us thou- 
 sands of instructors who brought to us 
 the lessons of the war — men whose ser- 
 vices were invaluable in the preparation 
 of our troops. 
 
 The Allies furnished us our artillery, 
 all of our fast fighting air service and 
 most of our air service of other types. 
 They transported a large portion of our 
 troops overseas. Their flags flew over 
 the ships which swept the enemy fleets 
 from the seas before we entered the war 
 
 225 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 and later in combination with our gallant 
 navy waged successful war against the 
 submarines, furnishing the bulk of the 
 ships so engaged. 
 
 It is not difficult to understand what 
 would have happened had we been the 
 front line, without support and depend- 
 ent entirely upon our own resources. No 
 soldier who was engaged in the Great 
 War has any doubt in this question. The 
 answer is: 
 
 Overwhelming disaster, recovery from 
 which would have taken generations. 
 
 If there was any question before, this 
 War has demonstrated that oceans are 
 no longer effective barriers unless you 
 have absolute sea control, but on the con- 
 trary are convenient lines of approach 
 and of supply. No longer can we look 
 to the physical isolation of our country 
 as a sufficient protection. We must 
 
 226 
 
LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 
 
 depend upon ourselves for protection 
 a7id upon no 07ie else. 
 
 We hope to build up a condition of 
 international agreement through which 
 war will be greatly diminished. We 
 hope to prevent war, but the nations en- 
 tering into this agreement must be strong 
 and they must be prepared to support the 
 right with force, other means failing. We 
 must realize that good intentions are of 
 little avail unless supported by a reso- 
 lute and strong spirit, and the organized 
 strength of the people. 
 
 We are today the leading nation of the 
 world. We have tremendous responsi- 
 bility. We love justice and practice fair 
 dealing, but if we are to be of the great- 
 est value in the maintenance of world 
 peace we must be not only righteous but 
 strong. 
 
 We are well out of this War, although 
 
 227 
 
AMERICAS DUTY 
 
 il luis cost us liciivily in iiniiecessary sac- 
 rifice of life and treasure. Otiier wars 
 will come. We wish it were not so, but 
 we have no suilicient reason to believe 
 that our wishes will be fully realized. We 
 are and always have been desirous of 
 peace. We believe in jirbitration more 
 lirndy th;m ever, but we must remem- 
 ber {\u\[ if we ai-e lo be eireclive in the 
 buildin/^ up of arbitration we must not 
 only love justice and priictice fair deal- 
 in/4\ but we must be ort^nnized and strong 
 ready to promptly apply our strength. 
 If the |)redat()ry nation, oi* group of 
 nations, knows thnt we c;innot effectively 
 enter our protest in the shape of our 
 armed forces without years of |)repara- 
 tion our voice will hav^e rehitively small 
 weight in the world's councils. 
 
 We do not want the largest army in 
 the world. W(* want one big enougli for 
 
 228 
 
J.KSSONS OF TIIK WORLD WAR 
 
 the peace needs of the nation. We want 
 it to he tlie hest army in exislenee. So 
 it is with the navy. It shonld he, not 
 necessarily tlie hirgest, hnt the best navy 
 in the world. To have such forces 
 re(|ilires the l)est and most inspiring* lead- 
 ership, the hi<>hest de^L^ree of morale, and 
 forces thoroughly trained in field and 
 iket maneuvers. i\n ellieient navy 
 recpiires not only a thor()u<^hly ellieient 
 personnel, hut the veiy hest in ships and 
 e(pn*pment and all the accessories of a 
 fil^htin^' fleet. It must he maintained on 
 a basis of instant readiness. Such a navy 
 must be strong- enough to play its part 
 effectively in any war of a<^gression 
 which may he waged against us. Rack 
 of the land and sea forces must !)e the 
 organized strength of the nation. 
 
 The conduct of the War demonstrated 
 I hat we had no well thought-out plan for 
 
 229 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 making use not only of the manpower 
 of the nation, but the power of our 
 people as a whole — our resources, trans- 
 portation, strength in the line of manu- 
 facture and construction. All this had to 
 be co-ordinated after we entered the War. 
 
 The organization of the material 
 resources of the country, to the extent 
 of knowing where and how we are going 
 to secure supplies, is almost as important 
 as the training of the men. Indeed, 
 unless our material resources are organ- 
 ized and preparation is made to secure 
 an output adequate for the needs of war, 
 the training of the men will be unavail- 
 ing, for they will have nothing to fight 
 with. 
 
 The organization of a nation to resist 
 aggression, as has been already pointed 
 out, is a very broad and comprehensive 
 proceeding. It includes the moral organ- 
 
 230 
 
LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 
 
 ization of the people; the building up of 
 a sense of citizenship responsibility on 
 the part of all to serve where they can 
 best serve. It is not for the citizen of a 
 constitutional democracy such as ours to 
 say where he is to serve or how, but it 
 is for him to serve wherever he is sent, to 
 the very best of his physical and mental 
 ability. The implanting in the minds of 
 our people of this principle is a very im- 
 portant part of our organization for the 
 defense of the country. Organization 
 also includes the building up of the phy- 
 sical well-being of our people, taking the 
 necessary steps to see that they are sound 
 in mind and body, that all remediable 
 defects are corrected. This is important 
 not only for war, but it is even more 
 important to the economic efficiency of 
 our people in time of peace. 
 
 The organization of the nation must 
 231 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 include safeguarding it against the 
 entrance of anarchistic, destructive 
 forces; of the physically or mentally 
 unfit, and of racial types which cannot 
 intermarry with and be absorbed in our 
 population; of racial groups which can- 
 not be assimilated. It includes the thor- 
 ough information of our people as to 
 what our rights and obligations are, and 
 the building up of a sound, national con- 
 science, one which will make America 
 quickly responsive to the call of duty. It 
 embraces the building up of a strong, 
 intense national spirit — not a narrow, 
 selfish one but one which, while charit- 
 able and helpful, is nevertheless intensely 
 American, and the avoidance of loose- 
 fibred internationalism, which means 
 national death. It also includes the 
 Americanization of the newcomer and 
 such of the native-born as are, speaking 
 
 232 
 
LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 
 
 in terms of citizenship responsibility, 
 slackers. It means the preaching of 
 Americanism from the pulpit, in the 
 schoolroom, on the street; the building 
 up of a spirit of national solidarity, 
 which is founded upon the establishment 
 of human and just relations between cap- 
 ital and labor; the rigid repression of 
 autocracy, whether it be that of capital 
 or of labor; the maintenance of a sound 
 system of public education; the mainten- 
 ance of courts which are unafraid and 
 unaffected by politics, assuring the citi- 
 zens of equality before the law without 
 reference to race or creed; strict adher- 
 ence to our Constitution. These are 
 some of the things which America stands 
 for, and when we preach and talk Amer- 
 icanism it should be with a view to the 
 thorough establishment and firm mainte- 
 nance of these principles and policies. 
 
 233 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 The Aincricanism wc preach must not be 
 mere theatrical bombast; it must be prac- 
 tical and constructive and active. 
 
 We must remember that we cannot 
 buy time. No amount of wealth will 
 build anus and equipment over night. 
 Tlie weapons and equipment of war mnst 
 be built and ready and the training of 
 the men nnist be done in time of peace. 
 ^Vn equal opportunity must be given to 
 all men of suitable age and physical 
 condition to take such training as w^ill 
 fit them to be officers if they have the 
 ability. It would be most nnwise to 
 limit our supply of offieei's to those wlio 
 come from the institutions of higher edu- 
 cation. All our youth mnst be given an 
 ecpial opportunity to win, in competition, 
 commissions, if they have the ability and 
 qnalities of leadership). Inevitably, edu- 
 cate)?! will tell, and the bulk of our offi- 
 
 234 
 
LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 
 
 cers will be men who have had a reason- 
 ably good education. 
 
 If a full opportunity to compete is 
 not given to all our youth who are sound 
 in mind and body we shall create a feel- 
 in^ that the leaders, the officer class, are 
 going to come from the families of those 
 who have the money and the means to 
 extend to their children unusual facilities 
 in the way of education. 
 
 Of course, broadly speaking, no man 
 should become an officei- who has not the 
 essentials of an elementary education. 
 Tie must be able to read and write and 
 to express himself clearly, to understand 
 orders and be able to transmit them. 
 
 To be an officer one should also have 
 the qualities of leadership. No amount 
 of education will replace these. On 
 the other hand, marked qualities of lead- 
 ership often outweigh educational defects. 
 
 235 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 See General Forest in the Civil War. 
 
 No system will be found to be effec- 
 tive in the great crises which depends 
 upon the volunteer principle. Service 
 must rest absolutely upon equality of 
 obligation. We must all serve some- 
 where — wherever we can best serve. 
 
 We must adopt some system of train- 
 ing which will bear equally upon all who 
 are fit — a period of intensive training 
 not to exceed six months — and com- 
 bine with it a certain amount of citi- 
 zenship, instruction and industrial train- 
 ing. All who come to these camps must 
 be taught to speak English, and to read 
 and write, if they are unable to do so. 
 The short period of intensive training 
 does not apply to the officers nor to 
 many of the noncommissioned officers. 
 The men who become officers and non- 
 commissioned officers are those who have 
 
 236 
 
LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 
 
 shown special fitness — those who are 
 keenly interested in military training. 
 They will go on from year to year as 
 Reserve Officers, seeking promotion 
 through preparation and efficiency in ser- 
 vtce, very much as the better officers of 
 the National Guard have done in the 
 past. From them will come the great 
 bulk of the officers who will be the in- 
 structors in whatever system of training 
 we may adopt for the youth of the coun- 
 try. Those who do not care to continue 
 in the Reserve Corps will eventually pass 
 into the unorganized reserve ; those whose 
 interest is keen will go on and eventually 
 reach the higher grades in the Reserve 
 Corps. 
 
 The war of the future is going to 
 require even more of organization, both 
 moral and material, than the wars of the 
 past. The weapons of war are yearly 
 
 237 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 becoming more powerful and more intri- 
 cate and require more skill and trainng 
 to use them effectively. 
 
 We have entered effectively two new 
 fields of effort; the aerial field and the 
 submarine field. Both have tremendous 
 importance; in both great developments 
 are being and will be made. The appli- 
 ances in each require time to construct 
 and great skill n operation. In other 
 words, as the years go by the char- 
 acter of war becomes more and more 
 one which requires organization and pre- 
 paration in advance. Less and less may 
 be left to chance. 
 
 We must remember that all this prep- 
 aration is but an insurance against war 
 and an added force in our struggle for 
 world peace, founded on righteousness. 
 Thus far we have not engaged in a war 
 in which we have had to meet, single- 
 
 238 
 
LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 
 
 handed and unaided, a first-class power. 
 Some day we shall have to, in spite of 
 all our efforts for peace. 
 
 The probability of war being forced 
 upon us will be much less if the world 
 knows that we, the champions of peace 
 and fair deahng, are both able and ready 
 to meet the organized forces of wrong 
 with the disciplined strength of right. 
 
 The Great War has verified the fore- 
 casts made in the earlier chapters of this 
 book. Shall other wars do the same? 
 Shall we blunder on, paying unneces- 
 sarily in blood and treasure, lacking in 
 weight in the world's councils, ineffect- 
 ive in the maintenance of world peace? 
 
 We shall, unless the world knows that, 
 all efforts for righteous peace having 
 failed, we stand ready and prepared to 
 defend the right with our resources, with 
 our bodies, if necessary with our lives. 
 
 239 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 THE AUSTRALIAN SYSTEM OF 
 DEFENSE. 
 
 Prior to 1870 the main defense of Australia 
 was in the hands of the British troops quartered 
 in the leading cities; the primary purpose of these 
 troops was to serve as a convict guard. When- 
 ever war appeared to be imminent volunteer corps 
 were organized. 
 
 All British troops were withdrawn in 1870, 
 and small detachments of permanent forces were 
 formed as a nucleus around which it was pro- 
 posed to shape a citizen soldiery. In 1883-1884 
 a partially paid volunteer militia was organized. 
 There was established at this time a system of 
 military instruction in the schools for boys. This 
 cadet system had attained considerable develop- 
 ment, but had not reached the class of boys who 
 fail for any reason to attend these schools, and 
 was purely of a volunteer nature. In 1903 the 
 volunteer system was extended by providing for 
 the military training of the youth not attending 
 school, and who were authorized to form a part 
 
 240 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 of the land defense of the country. This sys- 
 tem for both the general forces and the cadet 
 forces proved unsatisfactory, so that in 1909 a 
 statute was passed making both the cadet system 
 and the adult system compulsory. This act of 1909 
 did not become eifective until June 30, 1911, on 
 which date the volunteer system ceased, and on the 
 following day the compulsory provisions of this 
 act became effective. They divided the military 
 and naval forces of the Commonwealth into "per- 
 manent" and "citizen" forces — the former bound 
 to service for a term, the latter not so bound. 
 Until 1911 they were divided into militia who 
 were paid and volunteers who were not ordinarily 
 paid for their services, with a reserve who had 
 done active service. 
 
 Until Julj'^ 1, 1911, when compulsory training 
 went into effect under the Act of 1909, enlistment 
 in time of peace was voluntary. All male inhabit- 
 ants between 18 and 60 were liable to service in 
 time of war within the territorial limits of Austra- 
 lia only, and, in addition, cadet corps, in which 
 were enrolled schoolboys under 12 years of age 
 and youths l^etween 14 and 19 not attending 
 school, were established. These corps were not 
 liable for active service. 
 
 The Act of 1909 was the direct outcome of the 
 feeling shared by all classes in the community 
 
 241 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 that the defense of Australia was insecure under a 
 voluntary system; section 125 of this Act provides: 
 All male inhabitants of Australia 
 (excepting those who are exempted by 
 this Act), who have resided therein 
 foT six months and are British subjects, 
 shall be liable to be trained as follows : 
 (a) From 12 to 14 years of age in the 
 junior cadets; (b) From 14 to 18 years 
 of age in the senior cadets; (c) From 
 18 to 26 years of age in the citizen 
 forces ; provided that, except in time of 
 imminent danger or war, the last year 
 of service in the citizen forces shall be 
 limited to one registration or one muster 
 parade. 
 The Acts of 1910-1913 merely extended or 
 curtailed certain minor provisions of the Act of 
 1909. To-day the system is substanially as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 On July 1st of his 12th year every Australian 
 boy who has been officially declared physically, 
 mentally and morally lit, starts his training as a 
 junior cadet. He is furnished with a hat, shirt, 
 breeches, puttees and shoes, and is given a mini- 
 mum of 90 hours' elementary military training for 
 each of two years. In his 14th year he becomes 
 a senior cadet — his fundamental military train- 
 
 242 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 ing for four years^ with an annual minimum of 
 four 4-hour drills^ twelve 2-hotir drills and twenty- 
 four 1-hour drills in marching, discipline, the hand- 
 ling of arms, physical drill, guard duty and minor 
 tactics. A cadet rifle and belt are added to his 
 "junior" uniform, and 10 per cent of the best 
 shots are given target practice with the service 
 rifle. In his nineteenth year the youth becomes a 
 member of the "citizen forces." He receives two 
 woolen shirts, two pairs of breeches, overcoat, hat, 
 sleeping cap, two pairs of leggings, two pairs of 
 shoes, a kit bag, rifle and baj^onet. In the "citi- 
 zen forces" the minimum annual instruction must 
 reach an equivalent of sixteen whole days' drill, 
 not less than eight of which must be in camps of 
 continuous training. 
 
 From the senior cadets the youth is assigned to 
 that arm of the "citizen forces" to which he seems 
 best fitted and in which he is most interested, and 
 is given infantry and cavalry drill, or staff corps 
 training until he is 25 years of age. In his 26th 
 year he is required to attend one muster parade 
 only, and is then discharged from "active" service. 
 He remains, however, subject to recall to the colors 
 in time of war untill he becomes 60 years of age. 
 If he is declared proficient at the end of each 
 year's training by a board of officers convened to 
 pass judgment, he has received twelve years of 
 
 243 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 systematic progressive military training. To win 
 his discharge he must hold twelve annual certifi- 
 cates of proficiency — a failure to pass the efficiency 
 board means a repetition of that year of training. 
 Promotions in the "citizens" forces are absolutely 
 by merit, the principle adopted being that "the 
 best soldiers must lead, whatever their civil avoca- 
 tion or birth." The population of Australia of 
 military age is about 500,000. Exemptions and 
 rejections average about 10 per cent for senior 
 cadets and 33 1-3 per cent for "citizen forces." 
 The number under training when the system is in 
 full sway will give 100,000 senior cadets and 
 120,000 "citizen" soldiers. The available trained 
 force of Australia will in the course of a few years 
 approximate 300,000 men. 
 
 Under the Defense Acts the following classes of 
 exemptions exist: Persons physically, mentally 
 or morally unfit, members and officers of parlia- 
 ment, judges, police, prison employees, ministers 
 of religion, lighthouse keepers, and physicians and 
 nurses of public hospitals. The governor gen- 
 eral may by proclamation vary or extend these 
 exemptions, or he may exempt specified areas. 
 Persons whose religion or belief prohibits them 
 from bearing arms may be exempted from service 
 in the combatant branches, but are liable for serv- 
 ice in the supply departments; aiKl in every case 
 
 244 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 the burden or proof rests upon the person claiming 
 exemption. The parent or guardian who fails to 
 register a son or ward of service age, or the em- 
 ployer who interferes in any way with the military 
 service of his employees, although he is not required 
 to pay an employee for time absent on military 
 dufy, is liable to a heavy fine, and the boy or man 
 who is absent from a formation may be fined or 
 imprisoned. 
 
 Should the Congress of the United States pass 
 the proposed act to partially pay our organized 
 militia, our system of defense will be practically 
 that which was long ago abandoned by Australia 
 as "insecure." The effect of the present system 
 is the constant maintenance of an adequate, trained 
 force, which is under the direct control of the 
 commonwealth in time of emergency. 
 
 The government maintains "area officers" who 
 look after registration and enrollment of the avail- 
 able recruits in their districts, and it supplies its 
 forces with a simple, inexpensive uniform, but no 
 pay. 
 
 The young men of Australia give a small amount 
 of their time to the service of their country, and 
 in return receive the best kind of mental and 
 physical training at the most receptive period of 
 their lives. The expense to the government is 
 small, the benefits derived by it and the individuals 
 
 245 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 it accepts for training are many and important. 
 
 The foregoing is a brief synopsis of the Austra- 
 lian system. It will be noted that to apply this 
 system in this country , where practically the entire 
 matter of education is in the hands of forty-eight 
 state governments instead of being in the hands 
 of the general government^ will require consider- 
 able modification for its practical application. As 
 a matter of fact practically the greater portion of 
 the inherent difficulties attending the securing of 
 efficiency in the militia will have to be overcome 
 in the establishment of an efficient system of mili- 
 tary training of any kind that is undertaken by 
 our government. It is not believed that these 
 difficulties will be insurmountable if the people of 
 the country can be made to realize the inherent 
 defects in our j^i'^sent system, and our actual 
 inability to organize even a protective defensive 
 force in this country. By this effective organi- 
 zation is understood, of course, an organization 
 that can be completed in time to be of use under 
 modern conditions. The following ideas are 
 deemed to be essential to efficiency in any system 
 of defense that may be adopted, viz: 
 
 1. Absolute and unqualified control by the central 
 
 or responsible power. 
 
 2. A nation-wide appreciation of the needs of 
 
 the country in the form of national defense. 
 
 246 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 3. The actual training and organization of a 
 
 sufficient number of regular troops to act 
 as an expeditionary force or as a retaining 
 force until the citizen soldiers, whether 
 cadets or militia, can be mobilized. 
 
 4. That this citizen force, composed as it must 
 • be of militia and students, shall be not only 
 
 trained, but organized into fixed defensive 
 units, at all times whether in peace or war, 
 under the control and subject to the direct 
 call of the President as Commander in Chief 
 of the Land and Naval Forces. 
 
 24T 
 
THE SWISS SYSTExM OF DEFENSE. 
 
 "Nothing is more powerful, happier, 
 or more praiseworthy^ than a State 
 which possesses a very great number 
 of trained soldiers. The independence 
 of the Swiss Confederation rests not 
 upon assurances or promises of em- 
 perors or kings, it rests on a founda- 
 tion of iron — that of our swords." 
 
 The Swiss have always recognized the necessity 
 of universal military service, and as early as 
 1291 it appears that all who did not serve — even 
 widows and nuns — were subject to a special tax. 
 From a military policy based upon hurried levies 
 when war appeared to be imminent, and which 
 were as broken reeds in action, the Swiss in 1874 
 passed laws which form the basis of the present 
 system. The laws of 1874 have from time to time 
 been modified in many minor respects. 
 
 Today every Swiss schoolboy, from the time he 
 enters school until he is graduated, is given a 
 systematic course of athletic training to fit him for 
 his later military service. This training, which is 
 
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APPENDIX 
 
 progressive and prescribed by the federal govern- 
 ment, although directly supervised by the canton 
 authorities, is followed in every public and private 
 school and institution for boys in Switzerland. The 
 minimum time devoted to this instruction is two 
 hours a week for the younger classes, and three 
 hours a week for the older. 
 
 Upon leaving school the young man may vol- 
 unteer for a course in preliminary training. He 
 receives from 50 to 80 hours a year in athletics, 
 marching, care and use of the service rifle and tar- 
 get practice to include 300 metres. This course 
 is purely voluntary, and is largely gone into by 
 those who hope to win a commission in the Swiss 
 forces. 
 
 In his 20th year, if examination finds him 
 morally, mentally and physically fit, inust be 
 enrolled as a member of the recruit class of the 
 local battalion of the "Elite," or First Line. He 
 is furnished \vith a simple service uniform and 
 receives pay at the rate of 16 cents per day. In 
 his recruit year the Swiss receives from 60 to 90 
 days of military training, depending upon the 
 branch of the army he enters, by instructor-officers 
 of the permanent establishment. Every year 
 after the recruit year, he, as a soldier of the First 
 Line, returns to the colors for at least 11 days of 
 "review" instruction. He retains his uniform, rifle 
 
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AMERICA'S DUTY 
 
 and equipment in his immediate possession, and 
 since all other impedimenta is kept at the head- 
 quarters of the local organization, the details of 
 mobilization are greatly simplified. 
 
 Upon reaching the age of 32 the First Line 
 soldier is transferred to the Landwehr, or Second 
 Line, and at 48 to the Landsturm or Third Line. 
 The Landwehr is a feeder for the Elite, and is 
 itself fed from the Landsturm. 
 
 Officers are made through merit, are given 
 special courses, and retained in "active" service 
 for longer periods. The law permits no soldier 
 to decline promotion with its added responsibilities 
 in either the commissioned or noncommissioned 
 grades. 
 
 The government encourages the formation of 
 rifle clubs and competitions among them in every 
 possible way, and officers of the Second and Third 
 Lines make it a practice to assemble often for 
 tactical discussions and war games. 
 
 Every soldier is insured against sickness, accident 
 or death by the government while under instruction 
 or while engaged in any military duty. 
 
 Certain classes are exempted from active serv- 
 ice in time of peace, as members of the Federal 
 Council, ministers of religion (except the nec- 
 essary chaplains), prison wardens, frontier guards, 
 police, personnel of public hospitals, and rail- 
 
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APPENDIX 
 
 road and steamship employees, but are liable for 
 service in time of war in their professional capa- 
 cities. The morally and physically unfit are not 
 permitted to serve, but are required to pay a special 
 income tax in lieu of service. 
 
 in one sense it may be said that Switzerland has 
 no standing army, as its permanent establishment 
 consists of a general staff and a small number of 
 territorial recruiting supply and instructor officers; 
 yet with a population of 4,000,000 in the year 
 1912 it had a fully organized and equipped, well 
 trained and disciplined force of 490,430 men in- 
 stantly available. The military expenses of the 
 Government for that year were $8,229,941, or 
 $16.77 per man. 
 
 While the obligatory military service of the boys 
 is extremely short in contrast with that of the 
 great European powers, it must be remembered 
 that the boy has been receiving military instruc- 
 tions for a number of years, that he has been 
 acquiring a good body and familiarity with the 
 rifle and a high moral sense of his obligation to his 
 country, so that when he comes to the colors he 
 has already absorbed a large proportion of the 
 training which the recruit has to receive after 
 joining the colors in other armies. 
 
 Physical training forms an essential part of this 
 preliminary work, and the training is uniform 
 
 251 
 
AMERICA'S DUTY ^j?-"^ 
 
 throughout the country, as it coiild be here, it all 
 being based upon the calisthenic methods prescribed 
 by the army regulations. Practically all of this 
 instruction is given by the male teacher of the 
 public schools. Rifle shooting is encouraged 
 throughout the country, as it should be here. 
 
 252 /^-^H-^j^