| BD] I-A4 f^m *e\ \*M . * ' iP^^^^h^^Ku *si iry *& • Kitf ^n >^ & *\ ^» > THE i&LIPIOJ^BIiil 1 ©IF ■JHSKDliftSIBffl OR ELEMENTS METAPHYSICAL SCIENCE, BY A LADY. "Prove all things" "The things which are seen, were not made of things which do "appear." HARRISBURG, Pa. PRINTED BY HUGH HAMILTON. 4 \ 2j $j PREFACE. The author of the following little work has no apo- logy to offer for having presumed to present it to an enlightened public, except the natural desire which burns in every bosom to communicate thoughts or dis- coveries which seem to itself new and important. It has been written amidst numerous difficulties and con- tinual interruptions — which it is hoped will excuse many inaccuracies, and nothing but an unconquerable propensity to such speculations, and a conviction that some of its suggestions might promote the interests of science, and accelerate the "march of intellect," could have sustained the author under the toil with which those "subtle and mysterious things" have been laid hold on and presented in a tangible form to the reader. The author was led to the undertaking in the fol- lowing way. Addicted to metaphysical studies, espe- cially that of the mind, the existing systems appeared unsatisfactory, or not sufficiently supported by evidence Endeavoring to investigate the foundation of those sys- tems, it was discovered that they were not founded in fact, that the principles to which they ultimately ap- pealed, were not established in a logical investigation of the phenomena of nature ; but rested on a vagrant kind of light, or of inspiration, denominated intuition. On farther inquiry it was observed, that intuition, not unfrequently, embraced error for truth, that what to one mind seemed intuitively true, to another seemed intui- tively false— that, in a word, the perception of truth is in IV PREFACE. every case a deduction of reason, and that what seemed to he perceived intuitively, or without reasoning, rested in fact on some other principle adopted unconsciously without investigation. It plainly appeared that the pursuit of science, on the principles considered as esta- blished in intuition, more frequently led to absurdity, and to scepticism, than to a knowledge of the truth. In keeping close to the same method, the investiga- tion of facts, it was discovered that the criterion of truth is a simple phenomenon, or form, in which truth invariably presents itself to the mind, and which is ac- tually, though tacitly recognized in mathematics, in phi- losophy, and in all the arts and sciences as characteris- tic of truth, and necessarily connected with it, or as con- stituting demonstrative evidence. It was farther discovered, or observed, that to detach the philosophy of mind from general metaphysics, is not the way to cultivate the former with success ; but that the metaphysics of mind is intimately connected with the metaphysics of matter and of truth ; and that to establish sound principles in the philosophy of mind, it is necessary to ascend to the very first and simplest prin- ciples of metaphysics, to discover the generic character- istic of substances, or that which all substances partake in common. — The first principles of metaphysics were discovered to be facts which are familiar to every mind, are continually acted on in common life— but are virtu- ally denied in philosophy. What success has crowned the labour will be judged of by those who attend us in the adventurous excursion, through a region here- tofore deemed a trackless and barren waste. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. Introductory. General Observations on the Nature and Objects ot Metaphysical Science, -7 CHAPTER IT. Ot the General Character of Substances, 11 CHAPTER III. Of Material Substance, 23 CHAPTER IV. Of Spiritual Substance, ---- 71 CHAPTER V. Ot the Nature of Truth, - - - 102 CHAPTER VI. Ot the Essence of God, 145 THE ALPHABET OF THOUGHT, OR ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICAL SCIENCE, CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY— GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE AND OBJECTS OF METAPHYSICAL SCI- ENCE. Metaphysics is the science which investigates effi- cient causes, and the necessary relations of things. Every one who perceives the existence of substances — every one who knows or believes the reality of an invis- ible world, is a metaphysician, or has performed that metaphysical analysis, through which process alone the existence of those invisible objects is discovered. Meta- physics then, is as old as the creation; every contempla- tive mind speculates on these things. But it is a field which, however long trodden, has not yet been cultivated to the best advantage ; the ground has never been broken up; the seeds of science lie buried beneath rubbish ac- cumulating for ages. The first principles of metaphysics have not been unfolded ; and it is yet a dispute as to what are the proper and genuine objects of the science, and whetfier or not any scientific principles are attain- able respecting invisible objects. 8 THE ALPHABET An elementary treatise on metaphysics must analyse this chaos, and reduce it to order. The iirst business of the metaphysician is to investigate the facts, the percep- tion of substances, and the belief in the existence of effi- cient causes; as the first principles of the science should be, the definitions of the several species of these invisible objects of knowledge. We will not stop here to inquire how the human mind originally acquires the idea, or knowledge of an efficient cause; we shall discover this in an investigation of par- ticulars. — It is a fact that mankind, generally, recognise several efficient causes ; and it is a fact that we believe certain axioms, or recognise certain necessary relations of the phenomena of nature to these efficient causes. All the objects of human knowledge — all things which have a real existence, may be classed under two heads, these are, Efficient Causes and Operations ; or, what are the same, Substances and Phenomena. The substan- ces which form our world and its inhabitants, are neither more nor less than the efficient causes of the phenomena; and, in fact, they are tacitly recognised as such by all mankind- Mankind perceive and acknowledge three specific ef- ficient causes, or substances ; which are perfectly simple, or uncompounded ; and which are essentially different from each other, having no one quality, or no one opera- tion in common. These three simple efficient causes are denominated Power, Spirit, and Truth. The following treatise consists of a disquisition intended to demonstrate that these three objects of knowledge are, all of them, in the same predicament — that they are efficient causes; and that they form the elementary principles of all the Substances known to the human mind. But to give some illustration of this subject, in^, general way, it may OF THOUGHT, 9 be observed, that there are known in nature three, and only three, simple phenomena, or operations, correspond- ing, severally, to the three elementary efficient causes just mentioned. These three simple phenomena are Motion, Perception, and Harmony. These three simple pheno- mena, or operations, require each, and to each is actual- ly assigned by the common sense of mankind, a specific efficient cause ; — and these three simple phenomena con* stitute all the varied and complex phenomena of nature. This fact will be established hereafter, as far as a princi- ple implying a negative is capable of being proved ; but to shew at once that the assumption of it here is not so extravagant as may at first view appear, let it be remark- ed that the words, or artificial signs called verbs, are they which express operations, and that all the verbs in human language are comprised in three, to move, to per- ceive, and to harmonize — and their various compounds. Verbs are the artificial signs of operations ; while opera- tions are the natural signs of efficient causes. The natural sign is that which is properly and strict- ly signified by the term idea or image ; it is that by which an invisible object makes itself known to the mind. Thus motion or impulse is the natural sign, or idea of Power; perception is the idea of Spirit, and har- mony, of Truth. The table below presents these efficient causes and their operations, or these substances and their phenome- na, in one view, connected as they are in nature,, and in fact. TABLE. Efficient causes. Phenomena. Power . . . Motion. Spirit .... Perception. Truth . v . . Harmonv, 10 THE ALPHABET If any one alledge that there are other simple elemeu- tar j phenomena beside the three above mentioned, he has only to point them out, and his exception to our theory will be supported by fact. It would be futile to stop here to answer the objections that will promptly arise out of a spurious metaphysics, against our hypo- thesis. Each of the simple invisible objects above men- tioned, will be the subject of a logical analysis, in which it will be demonstrated that they agree, severally, with the idea, or characteristic of an efficient cause; and with the signification of the word substance. In discussing each subject separately, the objections which appear most plausible will be investigated. The definitions of Power, Spirit, Truth, Motion, Per- ception, and Harmony, — or the general terms which de- signate these objects, together with the first truths, or axioms relating to them, constitute the Alphabet of Thought 9 or the elementary principles of all our know- ledge. Before we proceed to investigate the several species, it is proper and necessary to define the general terms ef- ficient cause and phenomenon. In the definitions we of course give the same signification to the terms which is most commonlv annexed to them, but in the axioms and corollaries we shall*take the liberty to enlarge on those commonly received, so as to exhibit a more ex- tended view of the truths implied in, or arising immedi- ately and necessarily out of the definitions, or out of the predicament of the things defined. Definition. An efficient cause is that which is able, in itself, to produce an effect, or an operation. Corollary. A specific efficient cause is that which is able, in itself, to produce a specific operation. Corollary. An efficient cause 4s an ultimate cause; OF THOUGHT. 11 for that cause which depends on another cause for its ex- istence, is dependent also for its operation ; it is not able, in itself, to produce an operation. Axiom. Like causes produce like effects. Corollary. The same simple efficient cause, produce* uniformly the same simple operation, and no other. Definition. A phenomenon is an operation addressed to the senses, or to the mind. Axiom. Every operation requires an operator, or a cause which is able to produce it, that is, an efficient cause. Cor. Every phenomenon is the operation of an effi- cient cause. Ax. A specific operation requires a specific efficient cause. Ax. An efficient cause must be present with its ope- ration ; — in other words, every phenomenon is the imme- diate effect of, and takes place within its efficient cause. CHAPTER II. OF THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF SUBSTANCES. It has been long the practice with writers on General Metaphysics, to set out in their discussions and inquiries about the general character of substance, with tacitly assuming the principle, that substances are no the effi- cient causes of the phenomena; that consequently, the phenomena have no necessary connexion with the sub- 12 THE ALPHABET stances; aud that of course they, the phenomena, fur- nish no logical evidence of the existence, or nature of the substances. But while metaphysicians tell us what substances are not, they omit to tell us what they are. In so doing they have acted like an unskilful general, who leaves an unsubdued fortress in his rear; from whence the garrison frequently sallies, and renders nu- gatory the rest of his progress. In fact, the farther me- taphysicians proceed on the above mentioned principle, the more they find themselves embarrassed; they have adopted without investigation a principle, which, were it correct, should be the key to all their future discoveries ; they have taken their very first step in the dark, con- trary to all the rules of philosophizing; they have relin- quished that which should be the first object of the me- taphysician, to ascertain, what is the general character of those invisible, or metaphysical objects, called sub- stances ; or what it is which the mind actually perceives, and which we denominate substance. A substance is that which subsists of itself, and is the subject of modes, that is, of qualities. Or more correct- ly, a substance is an efficient cause, or the agent in the production of some operation, or phenomenon. There is nothing which subsists of itself, or is self-existent, ex- cepting efficient causes. In fact, the things called sub- stances, are nothing else than the efficient causes of the phenomena which attend them; and they are really, though tacitly recognized as such by all mankind. The proof of these propositions is the main design of the fol- lowing treatise. It has been common to define substance thus, "A sub- stance is that which subsists of itself, independently of 4i all created beings, and is the subject of modes.'* But, with deference, it is no definition at all to tell us what a OF THOUGHT. 13 thing does not depend on, or whence it is not derived; we should he told whence it is derived, if derived at all. If the existence of the elements of substances depend on a creator, — if substances are made of nothing, the fact should be established on clear and rational evidence, be- fore it is made the ground work of philosophy. If it cannot be established, then we are free to inquire whe- ther the elementary substances subsist of themselves ab- solutely, or necessarily, and in their own nature. But let us not be misunderstood; substances subsist of themselves in their elementary state, — Power, Spirit and Truth subsist of themselves, — and these, it will be seen, are the constituent elements of all substance. But the existing combinations of substances, all the combina- tions which ever have existed, or ever will exist, depend on a Creator, There are in fact no other simple substan- ces than such as enter into the constitution of God him- self; that is, there is no other species, or kind of simple elementary substance, than those which constitute Deity. It is plainly revealed, that Power, Spirit and Truth be- long essentially to God, the only question is, are these things substances, essences ? and are they the elements of all substance ; or are they only attributes, qualities ? But this is a question of pure metaphysics, it is not de~ cided by revelation. To create, is to combine several substances in one. Before the creation substances were in an uncombined, or chaotic state ; "the earth was without form, and void;"'" it was void of any sensible form, or quality ; yet it "was, 9 * or existed. But there is no such thing in the created earth, as a substance existing in a perfectly simple state. It is a fact known in chemistry, that a simple substance passing from one compound into another, carries with it a portion of the substance with which it was previously 14 THE ALPHABET combined; and it is known that there are substances which never exhibit themselves singly to the senses, such are nitrogens, oxygene and hydrogene. It is, therefore, not in a chemical, but in a metaphysical ana- lysis, that the simple substances disclose themselves. Chemistry possesses no criterion of the simplicity of its subject; that criterion must be a metaphysical principle; as substances are metaphysical objects of perception, even while they are subjects of chemical analysis. It is a curious fact in the annals of philosophy, that its votaries disclaim a knowledge of what constitutes sub- stance, and assert that its generical characteristic is un- iliscoverable ; at the same time that without hesitation they call things by the name of substance, and enumerate a variety of kinds; and would deem it absurd to deny the substantiality of certain things with which tbry are familiar. On what principle are the metals or the earths called substances? It may be said these are known to be substances by their gravity and solidity. But gravity and solidity characterize the species, not the genus; Ihey characterize matter, but do not belong to any other species of substance. Mind, or spirit is neither solid nor ponderous, yet it is a substance. Why is spirit called a substance? Why is caloric called a substance? it is not known to gravitate. There must be some gene- ral idea annexed to the things so called ; there must be some known character which includes this class of ob- jects, and excludes all others. It would be palpably- absurd to call motion, or perception, or any operation whatever by the name of substance What then, is the signification which is in fact annexed to the term sub- stance ? This question will be answered as we proceed. There is another remarkable fact to be gathered from the annals of philosophy. It is this, that philosophers OF THOUGHT. 15 and metaphysicians, one and all, desiguate the matter, and the mind of this lower world, hy the same genericai term which they apply to the Being of the Supreme God- The common terms substance and essence are applied, alike to both. Now if matter is made of nothing, and is mot the efficient cause of its phenomena ; and if mind is in the same predicament, how can they possibly have that substantiality which characterises the great first cause ? How can they have the same genericai character- istic? If the penetrating minds of philosophers do prac- tically feel, or perceive this infinite difference, this entire discrepancy between the Being of God, and the beings he has made, is it conceivable that they would unani- mously agree in classing both under the same denomina- tion ? Or does not this fact plainly shew, that they could not separate the one from the other, in a philosophical arrangement of categories 5 or that, according to the gen- eral sense of mankind, the attribute of substantiality, or self- existence, is common to the Being of God, and by the substances which constitute the world ? We cannot prove, in a direct manner, the general prin- ciple that substances are the efficient causes of their phe- nomena, otherwise than by an investigation of particulars. This attempt will be prosecuted in the following chap- ters. But previous to this investigation it will be neces- sary to inquire into the foundation and authority of two principles which have long received the general belief, and which are opposed to the general principle just men tioned. These two principles are, first, The World is made of Nothing ; and, secondly, that The Essence, or Substance oj Deity is simple, or uncompounded: or, thai G d is a simple efficient cause. The connexion of these principles with the subject in hand, will be obvious to the reader. It is evident thers 16 THE ALPHABET can be no other efficient causes than those which enter into the constitution of God ; that is, there can he no other species, or kind, of efficient cause, than those which con- stitute the Supreme Efficient Cause ; for an efficient cause cannot arise out of, or he created from, nothing. Hence, if God is a simple, or uncompounded efficient cause, there is then but one efficient cause, in the philosophical sense of the term, in the universe. And if substances are efficient causes, and nothing else, there is then but one simple substance. On the other hand, if the world is made of nothing, and substances are not the efficient causes of the phenomena, then indeed there may, for aught we know, be a variety of substances, or, for aught we know, there may be but one; there would be no ground for any rational conclusion respecting this matter; we could not reasonably infer different substances from different phenomena ; and the phenomena of mind, as we are wont to call thought and perception, may, for aught we know, belong to matter; since on this hypo- thesis, the connexion of substance and phenomenon, or of substance and quality, would be merely arbitrary. If substances are made of nothing — if they are not the effi- cient causes of the phenomena, there is then no logical evidence, that is, no evidence at all, to determine in any case what tlie substances are, and the dispute about the materiality, or the immateriality of the mind, is idle. The Supreme Being contains within himself the source or substance of all possible good. No one will be so hardy as to deny this, unless he can point out some, other source of good. Hence the beings and things which He has created, are either composed of the same substances, or essences which constitute His own Being, or He has created, from noMiing, beings and things which arc not good. But this is wholly inadmissible; it would be im OF THOUGHT. U puting to God the origin of evil. If God made things of nothing, he would make them incapable of evil ; but the self- existent, self-sustained elements of substance, retain their primitive powers and tendencies in all their varied combinations. If evil originates in good, it is not because it is inherent in any good thing ; every simple substance is good in itself; every elementary efficient cause is good ; Power is good, and Spirit is good, and Truth is good; but every finite combination of these things, every finite mind, not possessing all truth, is liable to err, to reject truth. Hence the origin of evil, — hence decompo- sition, or corruption, — which begins in mind, in the rea- soning mind. Evil is a negative thing, it has no direct efficient cause. We will not stop to shew, in this place, by abstract reasoning, the absurdity of supposing that a simple effi- cient cause is capable of producing a variety of imme- diate effects, or that a simple principle of operation may produce, or exhibit, a variety of operations. Nor shall we adduce here any direct evidence in proof of the posi- tion, that Power, Spirit and Truth have all the same generic character, that they are all efficient causes. All that is intended in this place, is to investigate the testi- mony from scripture which is supposed to support the principles, that God is a simple Essence, and that the world is made of nothing. The principle that God is a simple Essence, is found- ed, or is supposed to have a foundation, in a single pas- sage of sacred writ, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God "is one Lord." — What is the plain and obvious meaning of this passage? Laying aside all pre-conceived opinion, and listening to the dictates of common sense,— if she may presume to have a voice in the matter, — do the words one Lord, sispiifv ore simple Essence? Common 8 18 THE ALPHABET sense says, No. — King David was one king; yet every chemist knows, and every metaphysician knows, that king David was composed of several simple essences. What, then, was the import of the words, which all Israel was called on to hear? Was it a metaphysical theory respecting the Essence of Deity, or respecting the constitution of His Being? The word essence does not occur throughout the whole of the sacred volume ; and though its synonyma, substance, does occur in many places, it is not used in a metaphysical sense. The meaning whicli the passage presents to a plain understanding, is this, He who is the God of Jacoh, He who sits between the Cherubim, who brought Israel out of the land of Egypt, is one Lord, — one King;— one Ruler of the universe;— He rules in heaven above, and He rules all the nations of the earth. It was evidently intended to contradict the heathenish belief, that the se- veral different efficient causes, which manifest their ex- istence by their phenomena, were each a distinct deity, The heathens worshipped Power under the names of Jupiter, Hercules, £gc. Spirit under that of Juno, and perhaps some others. Perhaps, Minerva, represented Truth. These separate objects are discovered by the unassisted faculties of the human mind; they exhibit themselves continually to common sense, or reason, through the medium of their phenomena. But it is from revelation alone we acquire the information, that Power, Spirit and Truth are united in one supreme Lord, who is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. It cannot be believed that any one who will turn his attention to this subject, will maintain, that the passage under consideration furnishes any ground for the meta- physical theory that is built upon it. It is hard, indeed, to imagine how any one could be led to conceive, that OF THOUGHT. 19 there is any connexion between the passage "Hear, O Israel/* &c. and the principle, God is a simple Es- sence. The text declares, "'The Lord our God is one Lord;" and upon this authority it is asserted, that God is one simple Essence. Surely the one is an expression quite different from the other; one Lord, and one sim- ple Essence, are not terms of the same import. King David was one king of all Israel and Judah ; yet king David's person was a compound of several essences, or substances. The body and spirit are different essencer, yet they form together but one man. And surely it is a perversion of the scriptural text to make it a prop to a mere metaphysical theory; for it is not in fact a princi- ple in theology ; — the unity of God, and the simplicity of His Essence, are two distinct principles; the one, of theology, the other purports to be a fundamental princi- ple of metaphysics. If the divine historian had given us the words one simple essence, instead of one Lord; if the passage had stood thus, The Lord our God is one simple essence, or one simple uncompounded Being, or one simple efficient cause; if the prophet, descending from his high vocation to give a lesson in metaphysics, had said this, or any words of the same import; then we must have submitted to take on the credit of such high authority, a principle which we could not reconcile to the dictates of reason. But the passage, if taken in its plain and obvious meaning, offers no such difficulty ; there is nothing in it to tempt reason to revolt ; nothing but what is perfectly reconcilable to the principles of ge- nuine philosophy. — And surely it is rendering no service to the cause of religion, to set her at war with reason and philosophy. There is no mode of rational interpretation, by which the passage of scripture under consideration can be made 20 THE ALPHABET to prove, that God is a simple Essence. But there is ahundance of evidence to be drawn both from scripture, and from reason, that the supreme Being is compounded, or consists of three distinct essences, or of three simple efficient causes, which are essentially different from each other. The solution of this problem will turn, almost entirely, on the signification annexed to the word es- sence; which will be the subject of inquiry hereafter. We next proceed to analyse the scriptural foundation of the principle, that Matter is made of nothing. In- deed, this principle has been extended to Mind, or Spirit, also, and it is confidently affirmed that All things are made of nothing. — It is plain that if the mind, or spirit; is made of nothing, it cannot be an efficient cause, or able of itself to produce an effect ; if it cannot sustain its own existence, it cannot sustain the effects of its ex- istence; it cannot be the real efficient cause of its own phenomena, or the real agent in thought, feeling, or voli- tion. We would not then be accountable beings, nor proper subjects of rewards and punishments ; a conse- quence which every sober mind must deprecate. — We shall be told that the Creator made of nothing the human spirit, and then gave it the power to perceive. But the power to perceive is the very substance or essence of spirit; spirit itself is the power to perceive, — or it is the efficient cause of perception. But more of this again. At present the discussion will be limited to an examina- tion of the passages of sacred writ which are supposed to uphold the principle, that the world is made of noth- ing. It is written, "God made all things by the word of "His Power." And again, it is written, "By faith we "understand that the worlds were framed by the word "of God; so that the things which are seen were not OF THOUGHT. 21 '•made of things which do appear/' This testimony is infallible as far as it goes ; what sacred writ affirms, it were folly and impiety to controvert, or to evade. It is granted then, that the worlds were framed by the word of God, or made by the word of His Power. But if this means that the worlds are made of nothing, it would at least require a prophet to tell us so, ere we should be entitled to give such interpretation to these passages. That God made the world by the word of His Power, and that God made the world of nothing, are proposi- tions of quite different import, if we take the words in their usual acceptation ; and it seems impossible, by any logical alchymy, to produce a transmutation of the one proposition into the other, or to make both represent the same ideas. There is not a word in either phrase that is found in the other, excepting the preposition of Shall we be accused of assuming too far, if we ven- ture to express the simple language of common sense, as to the signification of the above passages of scripture? It is not with theology that we would presume to enter the lists, but with a spurious metaphysics, which has surreptitiously connected itself with theology. That the world is made of nothing, purports to be &fact; but this fact is not attested in sacred writ, nor is it establish- ed on any rational ground. God made all things by the word — that is, by the expression, or operation of His Power. The words which in grammar are called verbs, literally words, represent operations. The words of a language are the artificial signs of things ; operations are the natural signs of efficient causes, or substances. Thus motion or impulse is the natural sign of power; or it is the word of power. It will be proved in another place that the Word, or the Son of God, is the operation of the three-fold Essence, or Efficient Cause, — that is, of 22 THE ALPHABET Power, Spirit and Truth combined in One ; or rather, that He, the Son, is the product, or register of this operation. God made the world by the Word, or the Operation of His power; — He regenerates the world by the Word, or expression, or manifestation of His truth, "For this cause came I into the world, that I might bear "witness to the truth." Impulse is the word, or the operation of power, but power operating on nothing, impels nothing, produces nothing. But power operating on, or within itself, pro- duces, or forms itself into a concrete, or solid substance. This will be shewn at length. St. Paul says, <*The things which are seen were not "made of things which do appear." That they were then made of things which do not appear to the senses, seems plainly to be implied. And if St. Paul really had known that things were made of nothing, there could not have been a more convenient opening for him to have made the declaration in plain terms. But he did not make it, and this alone is indirect evidence, that the things which are seen are made of things unseen. That the world is made of nothing, is a metaphysical dogma, unsupported either by reason, or revelation. It is thus that a false philosophy puts carnal weapons into the hands of theology, who persuades herself that she is wielding the sword of the word, while in reality she is fighting under the banners of a very different warfare. t)F THOUGHT 23 CHAPTER IH. OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCE. Matter is that which is solid and ponderous, or mat- ter is tli at which gravitates and repels. This is the usual way of defining matter. But "A definition strictly and "logically regular, points out the genus of the thing de- stined, and the specific difference by which that thing "is distinguished from every other species belonging to "that genus."* According to this, the above definition of matter is not logically regular; it points out the spe- cific difference, but not the genus. Gravitation and re- pulsion distinguish matter from every other species of substance, but do not form the character of the genus, or of substance generally. Matter, indeed, is called by a generical name; it is called a substance ; and it has this name in common with several other objects of knowledge, — or there are several species of substance actually re- cognized by mankind generally 5 and this would seem to imply, or rather it does most plainly imply, a tacit re- cognition of the generical characteristic of substance, — » or of that which constitutes any thing a substance. But we are admonished by the grave philosopher, that the generic characteristic is unknown, and that the knowledge of it is beyond the reach of the human intellect. We are told that facts are the only proper subjects of philosophi- cal investigation ;— and he who launches into the invisi- ble world, with a view to explore its depths, or who ftt- * Aristotle. 24 THE ALPHABET tempts to speculate on the metaphysical character of sub- stances, is viewed nearly in the same light with the alchymist in search of the philosophers stone. If it were really the fact, that the generic characteris- tic, or that which constitutes substance, were unknown, or un perceived by the human mind, then substance would be a word without any signification — at least without any metaphysical application. But if the generic character of substances were really unknown, on what principle, it might be asked, are the several species referred to the same genus? What is the ground of this classification? Why is matter, and why is mind called substance ? How does it come to pass, that mankind generally recognize certain things as substances? There must be some prin- ciple which has the common consent of mankind, at the bottom of this classification. The only rational solution of the problem is to be found in the fact, that the metaphysical, or generital characteristic of substance is perceived by mankind gen- erally, by the learned and by the unlearned. The busi- ness of philosophy is, not to deny this palpable fact, but to analyse it, to inquire what is indeed the object of the mind's eye in the perception of substance. A logical analysis of the fact, that the mind perceives certain things to be substances, will detect the metaphysical character of substance, because it will discover what it is that the mind actually perceives as constituting substance. It will unfold and demonstrate the principle, that substan- ces are the efficient causes of their respective phenomena- and it will shew that they are actually recognized as such. And it is a fact, that in all our theorizing respect- ing matter, and in all the common transactions of life, a specific efficient cause is tacitly recognized as constituting material substance. OF THOUGHT, &5 Matter is the efficient cause of gravitation and re- pulsion; in other words, material substance is mechani- cal power. It is proposed to establish this definition of matter in the disquisition which follows. It is common to apply the word power to efficiency in general, or to any species of efficiency. There is the power of truth, and the power to think, as well as the power to impel, or to move. But when the word is used absolutely, it signifies a certain species or kind of effici- ent cause, that is, mechanical power, or the power to impel. In opposition to our hypothesis we shall be told, that though matter gravitates and repels, it is not the real ef- ficient cause of these phenomena. We shall be told that matter is made of nothing, and that, consequently, it pos- sesses no real power, or efficiency, and is incapable, in itself, of producing any operation ; that though it is the apparent, it is not the real efficient cause of gravitation and repulsion. These consequences have been admitted on all hands, as flowing from the principle that matter is made of nothing; and that matter is not the efficient cause of the phenomena, is the ground on which it has been contended that matter has no existence. It is aL ledged by those who contend for the existence of matter^ dial gravitation is produced by a physical, or secondary cause, an impression, or impulse, produced ah extra. It is believed that this operation, ab extra, is necessary to the production of gravitation, because matter, as it is said, does not, in itself, possess the power to gravitate. It is believed, if we rightly understand this scheme, that the uniformity of the gravitation of matter, is maintained by the immediate superintendence and energy of the Su- preme First Cause, or Creator; and that all the pheno- 4 ft THE ALPHABET niena of matter are produced in the same way, or that God is the immediate agent in their production. This scheme implies that the Deity is the only effi- cient cause in the universe, and that every operation in nature is the effect of a divine volition, and the operation of divine power. To maintain consistency, this doctrine has been carried into the philosophy of mind also, and the Supreme Being is represented as the only effi- cient agent in every actiou, or operation, whether intel- lectual, moral, or physical. Some have supposed that events are produced simply by divine volition, without any exertion of power. But it is so absurd to suppose that a simple volition can produce the effects that are pro- per only to power, that it would be an insult to common sense to go about to refute it. That Divine Providence controuls and directs all events, is undeniable ; it is a fact that is established in revelation and in reason; but to suppose that He is the sole efficient cause, or agent, in all operations, moral and physical, while He at the same time controuls all events, is to suppose Him to controul His own operations. It would, in fact, imply the sup- position, that the Deity controuls, or that He only sus- pends His own operations, when He restrains the actions of the wicked. These are the legitimate consequences of the principle that the world is made of nothing 5 the Deity would be the real agent in all the operations of the human mind, as well as in the gravitation of matter. Some philosophers, perceiving the absurdity of this theory of gravitation, and perceiving also that it dero- gates from the dignity of the divine character,* have in- vented another scheme to account for the gravitation of *It is a heathen maxim, but a wise one, that. We should never make a god appear, but on an occasion worthy of a god. OF THOUGHT. 27 matter ; which shall be noticed after a short examination of the one already before us. <~Let us inquire then. Is it a real fact, that the gravita- tion of matter is produced, not by matter itself, but by divine power operating upon matter? Has it been ascer- tained by experiment and observation, that bodies gra- vitate, not by their own inherent tendency and power, but in consequence of an impulse produced upon them from without? By no means. It has never been observed in a single instance that gravitation is produced by an extraneous impulse. But it is said, this extraneous im- pulse, or some extraneous cause, is necessary to the pro- duction of the phenomenon, for that matter possesses no power in itself, nor any necessary tendency to gravitate. This is a begging of the question ; or, at best, it is a de- duction from the principle that matter is made of nothing ; a principle intirely without foundation. The other theory, above^ alluded to, invented to ac- count for the gravitation of matter consistently with the principle, that matter is made of nothing, is this, that matter, having no efficiency of its own, is endowed with the power to gravitate, or impressed with the tendency, at its creation. But this is a mere gratuitous assumption. And it might be asked, What was the thing that was impressed with the tendency to gravitate? It was not material substance until it had that tendency; for matter is that which gravitates ; What was it then before it was matter, or before it had gravity? It was nothing that was impressed with the tendency, or which received the pow- er to gravitate. It is nothing still if it do not gravitate really. And the difficulty returns. upon us, that matter gravitates, either necessarily or voluntarily. That gra- vitation is a voluntary operation, as it respects matter itself, cannot be admitted — will not be believed by any 28 THE ALPHABET one ; that it is the effect of divine volition, and the ope- ration of divine power, is equally inadinis sable; — this will appear more fully by and by ; — and, if gravitation is a necessary operation of matter, if it is the necessary consequence of its nature, how is that nature, or neces- sity, known to be superinduced, and uot involved in the existence of the substance? If matter gravitates necessarily, then it is, apparently, and there is no good ground to suppose that it is not really the efficient cause of gravitation. But if the former theory be the true one, that matter lias no real agency in producing the phenomenon ; then matter gra- vitates neither recessarily nor voluntarily; it is not real- ly matter which gravitates. But then, matter has no existence that we know; we had imagined that we per- ceived matter in its phenomena, or through the medium of its operations, but we certainly perceive nothing but that which gravitates, really, we perceive mechanical power, and nothing else. But matter manifests its existence so plainly through the medium of its solidity, or its phenomenon refill, sion, that it would be absurd to deny its existence, even though we give up gravitation as furnishing evi- dence of that existence. Is repulsion, then, the real operation of matter? Is material substance the real ef- ficient cause of repulsion? If so, then, that material substance exists, is a logical deduction from the exist- ence of the phenomenon. But if matter is the real agent in the one case, why not in the other? Repulsion is an energy, or operation, of the same species, or kind with gravitation, and requires the same species of ef- ficient cause ; and if matter is the real efficient cause of this phenomenon, why not of gravitation also? But those who tell us that matter is made of nothing, are bound to, OF THOUGHT. 29 contend that matter is not the real efficient cause of either phenomenon ; or that repulsion is not necessarily connected with the substance, any more than gravitation. They will tell us that the phenomena furnish no logi- cal evidence whatever, of the existence of matter, be- cause they have no necessary connexion with it. How then do you know that matter exists? Take away gra- vitation and repulsion, or take away the necessary con- nexion of these phenomena with matter, and the sub- stauce vanishes like the "baseless fabric of a vision, and "leaves not a wreck behind/' We perceive matter in these phenomena; gravitation and repulsion constitute the sensible form, or the idea of matter. We have no other idea of matter than this ; all other ideas, or sensi- ble forms may be abstracted from matter ; but gravitation and repulsion cannot. The only avenues to the mind, are the senses, and the reasoning faculty; in other ivords, every object of human knowledge is, either a phenomenon, that is, an operation which presents itself immediately to the senses or to the mind, or it is an object invisible to the senses, and perceived only by reason, or by way of inference from the phenomena. We infer the invisible efficient cause from the visible operation. But substances made of nothing are not perceived in either of these ways. This is granted on all hands. A substance does not present itself immediately to the senses, like an ope- ration; neither are substances made of nothing, perceiv- ed by reason ; the operations of nature furnish no logical evidence of a substance which does not really operate. Nor is it alledged that the human mind possesses any faculty of perception, other than reason, sense, and con- sciousness.. So ri?E ALPHABET But we are told, that though wc Lave no logical evi- dence of the existence of matter, and though it is not perceived immediately, as motion, perception and other operations are, yet that it is perceived; we know that it exists, for it is a fact that it is perceived. We perceive gravitation and repulsion by the senses, but beside this, we perceive the substance which gravitates ; or we per- ceive something which gravitates and repels; that is, we perceive that there must be an operator where there is an operation ; we perceive that there "must be some- thing which gravitates and repels. "* Very good. But this perception that there must he something which gravitates and repels, is a deduction of reason ; it is in- fering the agent from the operation. Then substances are not perceived immediately, as has been supposed, but their existence is inferred from the phenomena. It is a fact too, that we infer a specific operator, from a specific operation ; from gravitation and repulsion we infer the existence of that specific thing which we call material substance. — If the substance were perceived immediately, or without an exercise of reason, there could then be no ground for dispute about whether the substance which gravitates, be the same with that which perceives. If these substances were perceived imme- diately, as operations are, the question would be settled at once by immediate perception. We never dispute about whether blue and yellow are the same, or differ- ent colours; or whether motion, and perception are the same, or different phenomena. In the perception of a phenomenon, or operation, there can be no ground for dispute about what the object is ; it is just what it ap- pears to be. The case would be just the same with *Br. Reid. OF THOUGHT. SI respect to substances, if they were perceived immedi- ately; they would then appear to be just what they really are; their appearance would be occular demon- stration. It is an imperious dictate of reason, that wherever there is an operation, there is an operator, and that a specific operation requires a specific operator, or a spe- cific efficient cause,-— a cause which is able, and has a direct tendency to produce that specific operation. It is in fact a specific operator that is uniformly inferred from gravitation and repulsion, and that is denominated ma- terial substance ; for it is undeniable that mankind ge- nerally perceive this substance, and that they look no deeper, nor higher than the substance itself, for the ef- ficient basis of the phenomena. None but philosophers of a certain school ever speculate on the efficiency, or inefficiency of the substance; and they do not pretend to have ascertained the allcdged fact of its inefficiency, in a philosophical way ; they have not even investigated the metaphysical principle on which their doctrine is founded, the principle that the world is made of nothing. In opposition to these arguments it will be urged, thai ihG substance actually perceived is not the efficient cause of the phenomena, but that it is something else, a thing which is made of nothing, an inert thing, which cannot of itself produce the phenomena. — It is thus that it is attempted to reconcile the metaphysical dogma, that the world is made of nothing, with the known fact that sub stances are perceived by the human mind. It is assert ed that we perceive substances ivhich are made of noth- ing, and which are not the efficient causes of the pheno- mena; and, in conformity with this, it is asserted, that the perception of substance is not a deduction of reason. These allcdged facts are believed to be sufficient to prop. 32 THE ALPHABET or even to support the whole of the mysterious fabric that is reared upon them; among other things, that the metaphysical object called material substance is perceiv- ed, and yet its metaphysical character is not perceived $ that it is perceived neither by sense, nor by reason, nor by any known faculty of the mind, j^t it is perceived. Facts are stubborn things ; and it is a certain fact that we perceive material substance; we are conscious that we perceive it And if we are equally certain that wc perceive substances which are made of nothing, if we were conscious of this, or if we were conscious that the perception of substance is not a deduction of reason, then indeed there would be ground to contend for the nothingness of matter. But is it a real fact that we per- ceive substances that are made of nothing, and which are not the efficient causes of the phenomena ? Are we conscious of perceiving, in material substance, a thing which is made of nothing, and which has no necessary connexion with the phenomena? Are we conscious of jJerceiving that the phenomena are connected arbitrarily with the substance; and that, if it had pleased the Crea- tor, we might have perceived a material substance which did not gravitate and repel ; or that we might have had the phenomena just the same, but unconnected with any substance, or being, except the Deity ? Certainly we are not conscious of perceiving all this ; on the contrary* common sense revolts from the doctrine thus carried out to its genuine results. When the phenomena of matter are addressed to the senses, we perceive that there must be a substance, we perceive that the operation is neces- sarily connected with a specilic operator, or with some- thing which has a tendency to produce that specific ope- ration ; and we never dream of the hand of Deity being immediately concerned. OF THOUGHT, 33 It is granted on ail hands, that we perceive in matter something which gravitates and repels, But if that which produces these phenomena, is not, really, material sub- stance, but the hand of Deity, then it is the hand of De- ity that is perceived — or it is the power of Deity that is perceived ; and if we do not choose to call the power of Grod by the name of material substance, then there is no material substance. There is nothing in the universe that does, or that can gravitate and repel, excepting that which is able to gravitate and repel, that is, the efficient cause of gravitation and repulsion. Nothing but power can gravitate and repel; in fact, whatever does gravitate and repel, or produce any modification of impulse, is de- nominated power. The word poicer signifies, that which moves, or impels. These phenomena are, on ail hands, referred to power as their ultimate cause; but one party, or sect, contends, that there is an intermediate something, called matter; something which comes between the cause and the effect — between the operation and the real ope- rator. But this is a bare assumption ; for this interme- diate thing is not, in fact, perceived nor known to exist. The thing perceived through the medium of the pheno- mena, is the efficient cause of the phenomena; it is that which gravitates and repels really; we are not conscious of perceiving any thing beside. It is a maxim of the Newtonian philosophy, to "Admit no more causes than "are true [real] and are sufficient to account for the phe- nomena." If matter is not the real cause of the phe- nomena, its existence is not necessary to account for the phenomena. Before we quit this subject, it is perhaps necessary to , inquire a little further into this theory of the perception of matter. After the adoption of the principle that mat- ter is made of nothing, it was perceived to he a-necessa- 9 34 THE ALPHABET ry consequence, that matter is not the real efficient cause of its phenomena ; and that, of course, the phenomena could have no necessary connexion with the substance. Hence it became necessary further to admit, that there existed no logical evidence of the existence of material substance; and some pursued this train of reasoning until it led to the conclusion that matter has no existence. Those who still contended for the existence^ matter, in spite of philosophy, admitted all these results, (the last excepted j — they acknowledged they could not establish the fact of the existence of matter, on rational grounds. In truth, if the fundamental principle of this theory were true — if matter were made of nothing, it would be im- possible to prove its existence— it would be impossible to know or perceive its existence. But the modern attempt to establish this theory on fact, is perhaps the most ingenious, and is certainly the most sophistical that has been recorded. Ever since the invention of the new organ of investigation by Sir Fran- cis Bacon, the induction of facts has been considered the only legitimate method of philosophizing. Considering, very justly, that the study of metaphysics should be pro- secuted in the same method with that of physical science. by induction of facts, it has occurred to our modern me- taphysicians that the perception of matter should be considered an ultimate fact, or a law of the mind, just as the gravitation of matter is an ultimate fact, or a law of matter. This appears to have been intended as an application of the Baconian method in the science of Logic, to determine the predicament of a particular fact, or to induct that fact into a class; that is, to class the perception of matter with ultimate facts. But, unfor- tunately for the attempt, it seems to have been forgotten, that according to the Baconian method, investigation, or OF THOUGHT. 25 analysis, should precede induction. If the authors of this new theory of perception, had analysed the fact — the perception of matter — they would not have classed it with ultimate facts. But they seem to have considered a simple statement of the fact, and of its character, to be all that is called for by the method that they profess to follow. Professor Stewart, of Edinburgh who is the oracle in metaphysics, will speak for the whole sect on the theory of the perception of matter. On this subject the Profes- sor has the following observations. -^"Singular as it may "appear, Dr. Reid was the first person who had courage "to lay completely aside all the common hypothetical tf language concerning perception, and to exhibit the dif- "ficulty in all its magnitude, by a plain statement of the "fact. To what then, it may be asked, does this state- ment amount? — Merely to this, that the mind is so "formed, that certain impressions, produced on our or- "gans of sense by external objects, are followed by cor- respondent sensations ; and that these sensations (which "have no more resemblance to the qualities of matter "than the words of a language have to the things they "denote) are followed by a perception of the existence "and qualities of the bodies by which the impressions "are made." The author goes on to observe, that, "for "aught we know, the connection between the perception "and the sensation, as well as that between the sensation "and the impression, may be arbitrary; and that at any "rate, the consideration of these sensations, which are "attributes of mind, can throw no light on the manner in "which we acquire our knowledge of the existence and "nature of bodies. And though, by the constitution of "our nature, certain sensations are rendered the constant "antecedents of our perceptions, yet it is just as difficult 36 TtJK ALPHABET "to explain how our perceptions are obtained by their "means, as it would be upon the supposition, that we "were all at once inspired with them, without any con- comitant sensations whatever/** The Professor else- where tells us, that the perception of material substance, or "thg belief in the existence of the material world/' is a 'fundamental law of human belief "\ Professor Stewart and Dr. Reid are intitled to much credit for having had the candour to "exhibit the diffi- culty in all its magnitude/' instead of pursuing the beaten track, and -jMfr inquiring how our sensations and ideas are connected with a substance which is made of nothing; or in what manner the mind acquires a know- ledge of such substance. But it is strange that such minds should still have been so shackled by the false principle, that matter is made of nothing and has no necessary connexion with the phenomena; it is strange that the very nature and magnitude of the difficulty did not lead them to analyse the subject, and to shake off their chains by a detection of the fallacy. Men of tran- scendent talents, professing to reject, as spurious, every thing which did not come supported by established fact, yet voluntarily, and without an investigation of its evi dence, binding themselves down to a principle, which, like the stone of Sisyphus, is continually dragging them down again from the summit which seemed to beckon their ascent. The professor proposes to himself to "lay aside all the common hypothetical language concerning percep- tion, and to exhibit a plain statement of the fact." This fact is expanded into a pretty long paragraph; though ^Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, pages 86, 87, first vol Amer. ed. fVol. 2, p. 55, Ne^rYork ed. OF THOUGHT. 37 all that is really fact, may be expressed in a short sen- tence. "Certain impressions produced on our organs "of sense, are followed by correspondent sensations ; "and these sensations are followed by a perception of "the existence and qualities of the bodies by which the "impressions are made." These few words, and they are sufficiently prolix — express the, whole of the fact ; the remainder of the paragraph is hypothetical. And we are compelled to observe, that ihvfact is stated in- correctly ; there is a radical error contained in it, which it is necessary to have corrected, belftre it be received as a principle in philosophy; "the sensation is" not uni- formly or necessarily "followed by a perception of the "existence and qualities of the bodies by which the im- "pressions are made." The mind is not "so formed," that the impression on the external organ is necessarily followed by a perception of the bodies which make the impression. The author's "statement of fact," as he terms it, assumes the very point in dispute, that the per- ception of substance is not a deduction of reason ; but that "by the constitution of our nature," the impression on the external organ is followed by a perception of the bodies by which the impressions are made.-— If it be a truth, that the impression and sensation are uniformly followed by a perception of the existence and qualities of the bodies which make the impression, if in persons in capable of reasoning, that perception uniformly follows the impression and sensation, then that perception is not a deduction of reason, it is net an inference from the im- pression. But let us analyse the "'fact," and see whe* ther it is as the author has conceived and has stated it. It is a pretty plain fact, that "impressions produced on "the external organs of sense, are followed by corre- f spoadent sensations " — And yet this fact is not so plain He 38 THE ALPHABET and simple, as it may appear at first view, or as the author seems to have conceived it to be. He states, not merely, that the impression is followed by a sensation — but that "the impression is followed by a correspondent "sensation." He says, moreover, that "'these sensations "have no more resemblance to the qualities of matter, "than the words of a language have to the things they "denote." The correspondence then, of the sensation to the impression, is a mere arbitrary correspondence, like that of the words of a lansjuasre to the things thev denote. But if this^ue so, the author should have re- vealed the manner in which we acquire a knowledge of the impression, or of the qualities of body ; for if the sensation has no necessary connexion with the impres- sion, if the sensation is not the effect, of which the im- pression is the exciting cause; then it will be just as dif- ficult to explain how we come by a knowledge of the im- pression, as how we acquire a knowledge of the body which makes the impression. If the sensation is only the arbitrary sign of the impression on the external or- gan, as words are, of the things they denote, how do we learn the signification of the sign? how do we know that there is an impression ? the sensation is the only sign, or the only notice we have of the impression ; and if it is an arbitrary sign, and has no necessary con- nexion with the impression, how do we learn the exist- ence of the impression? Arbitrary signs have no natural or necessary relation to the things they denote; the words of a language convey no intelligence, until we have learned their signification, by comparing them with the things signified. But how shall we compare the sensa- tion within the mind, (which is perceived by conscious- ness,) with the impression without, which is not perceiv- ed by consciousness, and of which we know nothing. OF THOUGHT. 39 until we learn its existence through the medium of the sensation. We know nothing of the impression, unless the sensation is the evidence of its existence. But what is the fact ? is the connexion of the sensa- tion with the impression, an "arbitrary'* connexion? Bodies, or material substances produce certain impres- sions on the external organs of sense. These impres- sions are the same that are called the phenomena, or the sensible qualities of bodies, though the Professor does not seem to have identified in his own mind, the "quali- fies of matter," and the "impressions produced on the "external organs of sense." Matter has no qualities but those which are addressed to the senses. For example, solidity, or repulsion is a quality of matter ; and repul- sion produced on the organ of sense, is the "impression "produced on the organ of sense." The "qualities of "matter" then, are ihe same with the "impressions pro- "duced on the organs of sense by external objects." But what is the sensation which follows the impression ? It is simply the perception of the impression; or rather, it is the perception of the change, or configuration, pro- duced within the organ by the impression. When a hard body is held in the hand, the repulsion of that body produces a compression within the organ of feeling; the organ, or nerve, is conscious, or sensible of this com- pression ; or it perceives the compression ; this is the sense, or sensation of hardness, or of solidity; it is the perception of the impression, or quality of matter. It is thus that the sensation corresponds to the impression ; it is the perceptiou of the impression; this is not an ar- bitrary correspondence ; it is the correspondence of cause aud effect, for the impression is the exciting cause of the sensation. to THE ALPHABET It certainly does appear to the common sense of man kind, that there is a natural and necessary connexion be tween the impression on the organ of sense and the sen sation which follows; and that the sensation is the cos nizance, or the perception, of the impression. The way in which we obtain a knowledge of a substance and its qualities, is to apply it to the senses. But the Professor says, "the consideration of these sensations, which are "attributes of mind, can throw no light on the manner in "which we acquire our knowledge of the existence and "nature of bodies." And it is true that sensation, ah stracted from its object, and considered only as it relates to the mind, will afford no light on this subject; but there is no such thing, in fact, as abstract sensation ; eve»y sensation has an object, or exciting cause, as well as a subject, or an efficient cause. The mind is the efficient cause and subject of the sensation ; but the impression on the organ is the exciting cause and object of the sensa- tion; — and our sensations differ from one another, only according to the differences of the exciting causes. Thus it is in considering our sensations in relation to their ex citing causes, that we derive the light which explains the perception of substances ; for when we have discovered the impression through the medium of the sensation, we are then naturally led by reason to perceive, that there must be something which makes the impression — that there must be a substance, or an efficient cause of the impression. Our sensations correspond to the secondary qualities of matter, in the same way that they do to the primary, to solidity and gravity. This will be the sub- ject of some further consideration by and by. But to return. It is a fact, that 6 'impressions produced on our organ* '•'of sense, are followed by corresponding sensations : ami OF THOUGHT. 41 'Hnese sensations are followed/ 7 sometimes, "by a per- ••ception of the existence and qualities of the bodies by "which the impressions are made." But, we submit the question, Is it the fact, that the impressions are uniform- ly followed by a perception of the existence and qualities of the bodies by which the impressions are made? Do infants perceive substances as soon as the impressions are produced on their organs of sense ? Do infants per- ceive at all the existence and qualities of the bodies by which the impressions are made ? There is reason ttf believe that infants have no conceptions of any thing be- yond their own ideas and sensations ; they certainly have no conceptions whatever of the impressions produced on their organs, until they have acquired that knowledge by frequent experiment and observation. If impressions produced on the organs of sense, were uniformly followed, by a perception of the substances' which make the impression, then the perception of mat- ter would appear to be altogether unaccountable ; for it is evident that the impression has no tendency to pro- duce the perception of matter, unless it be addressed, as evidence, to a reasoning mind ; and it is equally evident, hat the mind has no innate tendency to perceive matter. if the mind were originally "so formed," as to perceive substance whenever an impression is produced on the organ of sense, then it should perceive matter as soon as it exists, for impressions from external objects are con- tinually presenting themselves. As soon as matter ex- ists, it gravitates ; — and as soon as mind exists, it per- ceives. As soon as there is life, impressions produced on the external organs of sense will be felt, or perceived. As soon as a sensative organ exists, it feels, or perceives the changes, or vibrations produced within itself by the impressions of external objects. Tt is true, then, that G 42 THE ALPHABET impressions produced on the organs of sense, are follow- ed by perception, or feeling; but not always by a per- ception of the substance or fTody, which makes the im- pression. Perception then, simple perception is a law of mind; whenever mind is excited, or acted on, it perceives; that mind perceives, is an ultimate fact which cannot be accounted for; that is, we cannot give a reason for it, we cannot tell why mind perceives, any more than we can tell why matter gravitates. We can only say, it is the nature of the one to gravitate, and of the other, to perceive. But we cannot with equal pro- priety say, that it is the nature of mind to perceive mate- rial substance, or any particular object. The mind has an innate tendency to perceive, but it has no innate ideas, or particular perceptions. Perception is its own; but ideas, or impressions, come to it from without. The gravitation of matter is an ultimate fact ; it is a fact which cannot be accounted for, that is, we cannot give a reason for it; it is a universal law of nature, that matter gravitates. And it has been conceived, that by representing the perception of matter as an ultimate fact, or a law of the mind, that the whole difficulty re- specting the perception of matter, would be obviated : that if it is a laiv of the mind to perceive substances which are made of nothing, no farther account of the matter could reasonably be demanded. But the percep- tion of matter is not an ultimate fact, as we have seen — - it is not a universal law of mind, the perception oj mat- ter, is by no means a parallel to the gravitation of mat- ter. The two facts are quite dissimilar, in a logical as well as in a philosophical point of view. That matter gravitates, and that mind perceives, are facts precisely analogous, in a logical sense, they are both ultimate facts ; the one is a universal law of matter, the other, of OF THOUGHT, 43 mind. But that mind perceives material substance, is quite a different species of fact. Perception relates to mind, in the same way that gravitation relates to matter ; these are necessary relations ; but the perception of mat- ter has no necessary relation either to mind, or to mat- ter; yet it relates to both; to matter, as its exciting cause and object; and to mind as the efficient cause of perception. That mind perceives, is a general fact, and it is a' fundamental principle of metaphysical science; but that mind perceives matter, is a particular instance of that general fact. The efficient cause of perception is every where the same, nothing but mind, or spirit, perceives ; hence the relation of perception, to mind, is a necessary relation ; but perception is excited by an in- finite variety of objects, or exciting causes, which arc foreign to the mind, but incidentally come in contact with it; hence the relation of perception to its object is an incidental relation. Before we have done with this subject, we shall essay to trace the process in which the mind discovers the ex- istence of material substance. In the mean time we will endeavor farther to illustrate the position, that Power is tlie substance of matter, and the efficient cause of gravis tatiou and repulsion. It may be alledged, that though it we^re admitted that Power is the substance of matter, still this would not re- m move the difficulty respecting the gravitation of matter; it would not account for the phenomenon, without a recur* rence to mind as the ultimate cause. It will be asked, Why does matter gravitate ? Supposing the substance of matter to be Power, why should power uniformly act toward a center ? Why should the most distant bodies approach, or be deflected toward each other? Power possesses no faculty of choice; matter an4 power, are 44 THE ALPHABET alike incapable of choosing in what direction to act, or to what end. How then can it be accounted for, that mat- ter uniformly gravitates, or acts toward a center of gra- vity, unless this direction is given it by mind, unless this phenomenon is produced by the power and influence of the supreme first cause, the divine mind ? This appears to be the grand difficulty. Yet it is not thought necessary, to inquire, Why does matter repel ? or why is it solid ? It seems to be universally admitted, that repulsion is inherent in the substance. Yet repul- sion is an operation of power, as well as gravitation ; it is an energy of the same kind, and requires the same ef- ficient cause ; and if matter is not the efficient cause of repulsion, this phenomenon is as hard to be accounted for, as gravitation. It is conceived, that as matter gra- vitates uniformly, that uniformity must be the effect of volition somewhere, and be produced by mind. Some philosophers have attributed that volition to matter itself, and the material world was believed to have a soul. But the more enlighted moderns perceive that matter does not act voluntarily; yet they have fallen into the opposite error, in supposing that matter is in its nature a clog to our volitions, and to pur intellectual enjoy- ments. All, however, who deny that matter has a soul, and acts voluntarily, attribute the phenomena to the di- vine will and power. But gravitation is not the effect of volition any where. Gravitation is not a voluntary, but necessary operation of matter ; contraction is not a voluntary, but a necessa- ry operation of power. Contraction is the modus ope-, randi of power; it is the primary operation, or that by which every modification of motion, or impulse, is ori- ginated. Sir Isaac Newton tells us, that "Every parti- ble of matter is continually deflected toward every other OF THOUGHT. 45 -particle of matter." Matter uniformly gravitates, or power uniformly contracts, simply because this operation is not voluntary, but necessary ; because power has no choice, nor a capacity to originate motion in any other way. Mind can no more than matter, choose before hand, whether it shall, or shall not, perceive — nor what it shall perceive. The appropriate operation of an ef- ficient cause, cannot be varied even by that cause ; much less is it to be controuled, or produced by any foreign, or extraneous cause. Mind or spirit, is in the same pre- dicament with matter, in this respect ; it is its nature to produce a specific operation; it perceives necessarily, and has no choice or direction in the matter. For this reason, the simple spiritual substance * cannot choose at any time, whether its operation shall be perception, or nome other phenomenon; its operation is perception necessarily; it has no power to originate motion. The supreme mind cannot choose— let it be spoken with re- verence—whether He shall, or shall not know, or per- ceive; He perceives necessarily; Spirit is a constituent element of His Being, or Essence; and Spirit is the ef- ficient cause of perception. The J)eity can no more cease to perceive, ttyan he can cease to exist. Gravitation or contraction, or the approach of the parts toward each other, is the mode, or manner in which power operates; it is tlje mean through which power produces all its more remote effects,, or by which it ori- ginates every degree and modification of motion or im- pulse. This fact we have exhibited before our eyes continually; and though it may never have been stated in terms, it is continually acted on in mechanical opera- tions. If an arm is bent, or drawn toward the body, ii is by means of contracting the muscles of the fore-side * That which is called mind, is a compound of power and spirit, 46 THE ALPHABET of the arm ; if it is stretched out, it is by contracting the antagonist muscles. If a great force is to be exerted, it is to be by concentrating the force, or contracting the muscles, perhaps of the whole body. In all machinery, the principle of motion is the same, and is recogn ized in the construction; the force produced is by means of a contraction, somewhere ; it is either by gravitation, as the falling of water, or the preponderance of a weight ; or it is produced by animal power, the operation of which al- ways originates in contraction. Contraction then, is the mode, or manner in which power operates ; it follows, that this operation is not the effect of volition, not even of divine volition ; it is the ne- cessary operation of power. But contraction, or gravi- tation, is the mode or manner in which matter operates ; it is the universal law of matter, as well as of power. It follows, that material substance and power, are one and the same. But it is the general belief, that Mind, or Spirit, is the ultimate cause of gravitation, and of every modification of force, or impulse. Notwithstanding this, it will be readily granted, that power is necessary to the produc- tion of impulse ; that when mind impels, or originates motion, it is by means of power ; and that, without power, mind is incapable of producing impulse. Power then is necessary to the production of impulse ; and it appears too, that it is able to produce impulse, and the only thing that is able to produce this phenomenon, for mind without power, is not able to impel. But that which is necessary to a specific operation, and is able to produce that operation, is the efficient cause of that operation. Still it will be contended, that power is an attribute of Mind ? and not an independent efficient cause, that Mind OF THOUGHT. 47 or Spirit is the ultimate efficient cause of all things. The principle, that Poiver is an attribute, shall be inquired into again ; at present we will consider whether or not the mind, or spiritual substance, is the efficient cause of gravitation and repulsion. If mind, or the spiritual substance, be the efficient cause of gravitation and repul- sion, it must produce these phenomena either immediate- ly, or mediately. If mind is the immediate cause of gravitation and repulsion, then it is mind which gravi- tates and repels, or mind is solid and ponderous. But this is absurd ; it is confounding things which are essen- tially different; for gravity and solidity, or gravitation and repulsion, are the characteristics of matter, and dis- tinguish matter from mind. But if mind produce gravi- tation and repulsion mediately, or by a previous opera- tion produced upon matter from without, that previous operation must be some modification of motion or im- pulse; it must be an operation of the same kind with that to be produced by it; for neither perception nor vo- lition have any tendency to produce, either primarily, or secondarily, the appropriate operation of power; to sup- pose that they could do so, would be utterly to confound all our ideas of cause and effect. But that previous im- pulse must be, either the immediate operation of mind — which involves the same absurdity we just exploded — or it must be the effect of another previous impulse — and that of another, and so on ad infinitum. But this is equally absurd with the former alternative. So it ap- pears, that on whatever principle Spirit is supposed to be the efficient cause of impulse, it implies an absur- dity. Since jfie spiritual substance is not the efficient cause of gravitation, it follows, that Power is the sole cause of this phenomenon ; there is no other cause concerned 48 THE ALPHABET in its production. If power is the efficient cause of gravitation, then material substance is the efficient cause of gravitation; or material substance is the power to contract, or to gravitate. The efficiency of material substance is tacitly admitted in all our reasonings re specting bodies, and in the uses we apply them to. Do not the walls of our houses repel the storm ? Does not the floor sustain our weight ? Perhaps it will be said, that matter is an instrument employed by presiding Deity for this and other purposes, and that it is nothing more. Be it so. But must not a thing possess somr power, or efficiency, to fit it for being an instrument ? Must not that which is employed to repel, possess the power to repel? If it do not, it can have no instrumen- tality in producing the effect. And if matter has no real instrumentality, no real efficiency, it is absurd to sup pose it employed as an instrument. And in this case, why should it be supposed to exist ? The phenomena would be just the same without it. The repulsion of the storm, the reflection of light; the suspension of our bodies some thousand of miles above the center of gra- vity, (if bodies we certainly have;) these phenomena are the real operations of power, and if material sub- stance is not that power, if it do not really produce and sustain these phenomena, what office does it perform? What part does it sustain? There is nothing really substantial excepting efficient clauses. That matter is the real efficient cause of its phenomena-— that is, of gravitation and repulsion; its es- sential phenomena is implied in Hie language, both of the learned and the unlearned. We may confidently appeal to the common sense of mankind, are the pheno- mena, gravitation and repulsion, exhibited to the senses by matter, or are they exhibited by mind? Bj matte OF THOUGHT, 49 certainly, it will be replied, and not by mind. Is mat- ter necessary to their exhibition, or are they sometimes exhibited by something else, independently of matter? Undoubtedly matter is necessary to their exhibition; there is nothing but matter that gravitates and repels ; and whatever gravitates and repels, is matter. Can matter exist without exhibiting these phenomena, or without solidity and gravity? No, it cannot; it gravi- tates continually and necessarily ; that which does not gravitate, is not matter. Then matter is necessary to the production of these phenomena, and it is adequate to their production, for it cannot exist without producing them; in other words, matter is the efficient cause of gravitation and repulsion. But there are still objections to this doctrine, which it is necessary to investigate. It is confidently asserted, that Power is an attribute of mind; and it is consider- ed a self-evident truth, that Power cannot he without a subject. These assertions have an imposing aspect; the first is in the form of a definition; and the last, of an axiom, or an intuitwe truth. That Power cannot be without a subject, is one of those principles, which, before the time of Mr. Locke, were called, innate ideas; and which at the present time are believed to be per- ceived intuitively, or which Professor Stewart terms "fundamental laws of belief." But truths are not per- ceived in this way, as will be shewn hereafter. To be convinced that the above axiom, Power cannot be .with- out a subject, is not perceived intuitively, but is a deduc- tion of reason, we need only observe its relation to the definition, viz. Power is an attribute of mind. The process in which the mind arrives at the axiom, is as follows. If power is an attribute, it follows of necessi- ty, that power cannot be without a subject. Here. Uk 7 50 THE ALPHABET major proposition, that is, an attribute cannot be without a subject, is taken for granted without being expressly stated, as is frequently the case in metaphysical reason- ing. The above reasoning is plausible, indeed the in- duction is quite correct; but it proceeds on a false prin- ciple, consequently the conclusion is false, although it is fairly deduced from the premises. The process would be stated more methodically thus, Jin attribute cannot be without a subject; but Power is an attribute, therefore. Power cannot be without a subject. The conclusion so plainly and necessarily follows from the premises, that we are apt, in reconsidering or applying the principle which forms the conclusion, to overlook both the major and the minor proposition, and the whole process by which w T e arrive at that principle, and to imagine that We perceive it intuitively, or without any exercise of rea- son. Yet it must be obvious to any one who considers the subject, that the truth of the principle, Power can- not be without a subject, depends entirely on the cor- rectness of the premises which have been stated, and more particularly on the minor proposition, that Powel- ls an attribute. It is assumed, that Power is an attri- bute ; but this is a false definition of power; consequent ly, the conclusion, that Power cannot be without a sub- ject, is false. If the term attribute have the same signification with the word quality, then it canno-t be a true definition of power to say, it is an attribute. When a thing is to be defined, or when we are about to point out the genus to which any thing belongs, it is necessary, not only thai the character of that thing be clearly ascertained; but also, that the characteristic of the genus to which that thing is to be referred, be well understood; otherwise the definition may be false, and may lead to false con- OF THOUGHT. 51 elusions, even when we have a just conception of the thing to be defined. That Power has been erroneous- ly defined, was owing, not so much to the want of a correct knowledge of the nature of power, as to the vagueness of the generical term attribute. When it is said that Power is an attribute, a precise meaning should be annexed to the word attribute ; we should not only have inquired— What is Power? but we should have ascertained with precision — What is an attribute? The word attribute is generally used as synonymous with the word quality, but it is sometimes applied in a different sense. It frequently signifies that which belongs to, or is possessed by, some being or thing ; as when we say, Man possesses mind, or intelligence. This is attribut- ing mind to man, or it represents mind as an attribute of man. In this sense of the word, an attribute may be either a substance or a quality, for mind is a substance, and an attribute of man; and power may be an attribute and at the same time a substance, a thing which subsists of itself, or without a subject. But in the more strict and proper sense of the word, an attribute is some action, or operation, or some species of action, or operation, as that gravitation is an attribute of matter; thought, or perception is an attribute of mind. This agrees with the signification of the word quality ; gravitation, or gravi- ty, is a quality of matter ; but it does not agree with the character of Power. Power is not an action, nor an operation of any kind ; Power is the subject of an attri- bute ; contraction is the attribute, or the quality of power. Yet the principle, that Power is an attribute — in the latter sense of the word attribute, or that power is a quality, is the foundation of the axiom, Power can- not be without a subject. Definitions do neither good nor harm, except when they arc made principles of science 52 THE ALPHABET It may be proper, and it may tend to illustrate tlie foregoing paragraph, to inquire a little further into the general character of qualities. A correct definition, either expressed or understood, of the term quality, would seem to be a necessary preliminary to the deter- mination, respecting any particular object, whether or not it be a quality. Quality is a term which has ac- quired a considerable latitude; to discover what is its radical signification, we should proceed by an investiga- tion of particulars. Gravity and solidity will be allow- ed on all hands to be qualities, in the strictest sense of the word. W4|at is gravity? and what is solidity? Gravity has been defined, a tendency to gravitate ; or a power to gravitate. But this latter has been exploded; modern philosophers affirin, that matter possesses no power to gravitate. We have, in fact, no knowledge of a power to gravitate, different from the substance, or that which actually gravitates. Power is not an attribute. Material substance is itself the power to gravitate, or the power to contract ; the efficient cause of gravitation, is the only power to gravitate. There is no such thing as a quiescent tendency, or power, to gravitate ; the actual operation, and the efficient cause of the operation, which cannot cease to operate, are the only real objects of knowledge ; gravitation, and that which gravitates, are all that we know of, or belonging to, material substance. Whatever has a real existence belongs to the one or the other of these two genera ; it is either an efficient cause, or the operation of an efficient cause. Perhaps it is not strictly proper to say, that an operation exists; but ope- rations are certainly real, and they are vecessary too. — The idea which is really annexed to the term gravity, is that of gravitation, or of the actual force, or deflection of one body toward another, (gravity and solidity are OF THOUGHT. 55 the same with gravitation and repulsion; the one and the other are called sensible qualities; or qualities per- ceived by the senses ; but the organs of sense perceive only operations ; they do not perceive latent tendencies or powers. This is the true philosophical import of the word quality ; a quality is a phenomenon, or an opera- tion addressed to the senses, or to the mind. If this be the true import of the word quality, then power is not a quality, it is not a phenomenon. Power is not an attribute of mind. That mind exerts an ac- tive power, is an undeniable fact; but it does not follow, that Power is a quality of the mind, any more than it would follow from the operation of Spirit, that Spirit is a quality of the mind. To explain this matter more ful- ly, the subject will be resumed ; but we have not done with the qualities of matter. Of the secondary qualities of matter we shall speak again ; but there are several ac- cidents which are considered to be essential and distin- guishing qualities of matter, which have no title to be so denominated. Divisibility is certainly not a phenome- non, or an operation, it is therefore not a quality of mat- ter, nor of any thing else. Neither is extension a phe- nomenon, or an operation, or a quality of matter. It has been generally set down as an undeniable fact, that ex- tension and divisibility belong exclusively to matter, and that they distinguish matter from mind, or from spirit. But this is an assumption without proof; no one pre- tends to have discovered by experiment and observa- tion, or by any mode of investigation, that spirit or mind, is unextended ; but it is one of those principles, which get possession of the mind by means of that native love of mysteijy which attaches to our natures. Matter and Spirit are distinguished from each other, only by their phenomena ; Spirit is ^u extended being, as will be sgep 54 TIIK ALPHABET when the subject comes to be investigated. Extention is a word of nearly the same import with space. Space is length, breadth, and depth abstracted from body, or substance; extention is length, breadth, and depth attri- buted to body or substance. Extention, signifies the space which a substance occupies; space, is extention unoccupied. Vis inertiw has also been considered a characteristic of matter. But the terms contain a solecism. The power of inertness, is the power to be powerless. That which is obviously alluded to in this expression, is the power of gravitation, or the power to resist being mov- ed in any direction, but that in which matter uniformly tends, toward a center of gravity. Resistance is an operation of power; it is a phenomenon of the same kind with impulse, and requires the same species of efficient cause. This resistance is called inertness, because it is not a voluntary action, nor to be overcome by simple volition; it is only by organization, or by combining spirit with matter, that the latter becomes obedient to the will. Matter is morally and intellectually, but not phy- sically, inert. The power of inertness is the power of gravitation and repulsion; and this power is not a qua- lity, but a substance. This substance, or power to gravitate, is not perceiv- ed by the senses ; but it is perceived by reason ; it is discovered in a metaphysical analysis of the nature of the phenomena. This analysis is a spontaneous opera- tion of the mind, and takes place even in children, or as soon as the child begins to observe the result of its own experiments, or the effects produced within its organs of sense by contact with external objects. In pretty early childhood we discover, that certain events, or operations, are uniformly succeeded by certain other events. We OF THOUGHT. 55 find by experiment, that by a single stroke we can send an apple or a ball rolling across the carpet. In this way we acquire the conception of a cause, and of the relation of cause and effect. The child, indeed, will not com- prehend your meaning, when you talk to him of a cause; for he has not learnt the meaning of the term ; but he will tell you that he can make the apple roll, which plaiuly expresses his idea of a cause. But they are only physical, or secondary causes that he first becomes acquainted with. In making farther experiments and observations, he discovers another kind of cause. When he holds a lump of clay or a ball of metal in his hand, he perceives that it forcibly presses downward, or to- ward the earth; and as often as he repeats the experi- ment, he observes the same phenomenon. He observes also a powerful repulsion in the ball, which prevents his hand from closing. He knows that he was himself the cause of the rolling of the ball, or that the rolling was produced by the impulse which he had originated; but he discovers no external, or secondary cause of the lat- ter phenomena, of the gravitation and repulsion of the ball. But he has learned from his observations on se- condary causes, that every effect has a corresponding cause; the gravitation and repulsion of the ball, inusr, have a cause suited to their production, and that cause must be within the thing whence the phenomena pro ceed. That thing must of itself produce the phenomena, or it must be the efficient cause of the phenomena. And that efficient cause must have a substantial or permanent existence, for it never ceases to maintain the phenomena or sensible appearance. This is the metaphysical pro cess in which, while children, we discover the existence of material substance, or the efficient cause of gravitation and repulsion. Every mind discovers for itself the 50 THE ALPHABET relation of cause anil effect, and the existence of efficient causes; no words, or artificial signs can inspire the mind with a knowledge of this relation, or with the idea of an invisible efficient cause; we perceive eilident causes only through their natural signs, their opera- tions. But when the child becomes a youth, he learns from books, or from his preceptor, that his reason plays him false in this matter; that she is not a proper guide in philosophy; that there are certain principles, no matter whence derived, to which reason must succumb; that the world is made of nothing, and that matter is not Vm ef- ficient cause of the phenomena: and that the substance which he perceives has no necessary connexion with the phenomena. — This appears mere jargon to his unsophis- cated mind ; for he is unconscious of perceiving "any thing in, or belongiug to matter, excepting the pheno- mena, and the efficient cause of the phenomena. He cannot conceive how the substance can appear to be any thing beside what it really is, for he knows that it does not appear at all to the senses, it discloses itself only to reason, through the evidence of the phenomena. It is in vain that he asks for the rationale of the theory pre- sented to him, the ultimate appeal is, not to reason, bul to the principle— -The world is made of nothing; and he is exhorted to believe, on pain of being pronounced a dunce and iufidej. And after an inward struggle be- tween reason and prescription, he adopts the dogma, and enters a labyrinth where the farther he advances, the more he is entangled. We come now to consider the secondary qualities of matter: It is an obvious fact, that there is an infinite variety of phenomena attending matter, which yet are not essential to it, or necessarily connected with it ; and OF THOUGHT. 57 are therefore called secondary qualities. The pheno- mena which meet the senses, are not, all of them, the real operations of matter; that is, simple material sub- stance, or power, is not the efficient cause of all the phenomena with which it is connected. Home bodies exhibit phenomena, which all bodies do not, and which, therefore, do not necessarily belong to body. Matter is not the real efficient cause of all the phenomena which attend it; and from this it has been too hastily conclud- ed, that matter is not the real efficient cause of any of its phenomena ; or that gravitation and repulsion are not its real qualities, nor necessarily connected with it, any more than the secondary qualities. If there are certain phenomena exhibited by some bodies which are not ex- hibited by all, we may rationally conclude that these phenomena are not essential to body; or that simple ma- terial substance does not produce, by its own efficiency, those phenomena which it does not exhibit anifoi ly ; but we are not entitled to infer, that matter does not pro- duce any operation by its own power. There are phe- nomena attending bodies, which mechanical power does not, and which it cannot produce ; but the legitimate in- ference is, that there are other causes present; that there are other, or immaterial substances in combination with matter; substances which do not contract and repel, but which, by producing other modes of operation on the or- gans of sense, excite other sensations than those excited by contraction and repulsion. And if we shall actually find other substances — substances, the phenomena of which are essentially different from gravitation and re- pulsion; if we should find such substances in chemical combination with matter — if we should find spiritual substance concerned in producing some of the phenome- na which apparently belong to matter — we ought not to 8 58 THE ALPHABET recoil from the truth, although it may shock our preju- dices. Some one has well said, that "We should pur- sue truth whithersoever she lead, heedless of conse- quences." But we shall be told, that it is absurd to suppose mat- ter and spirit to be chemically combined. Most people are ready to pronounce absurd any doctrine or principle, which contradicts opinions which have long held posses- sion of the mind, whether these opinions are founded in reason and in fact, or are not. To be absurd, is to be incompatible with s«Ome known truth, or established gei- neral fact. If any established truth or fact, can be pointed out, with which the allegation that material and immaterial substances are chemically combined, is in- compatible, then that allegation is absurd and inadmis- sible ; but if no such truth, or fact can be adduced, you are not entitled to pronounce the allegation absurd. Perhaps this challenge will be met, if not by an esta- blished fact, at least by a theory which has long usurped the authority of truth. It will be asserted that the spirit or mind is an uuextended thing, occupying a point some- where in the brain ; that it is therefore incapable of com- ing in contact, and consequently incapable of combining chemically with matter, which is extended. But on what does this theory rest? It is not a known fact, esta- blished in experiment and observation, that spirit is un- extended; nor is it a fair deduction from any known fact. We will not suppose that any enlightened mind will pertinaciously adhere to this theory. There is a substance well known to chemists, which does not gravi- tate; it exhibits no phenomenon that belongs essentially and properly to matter; therefore it is not a material, but an immaterial substance. Yet it enters into chemi- cal combination with all substances; it is caloric, or OF THOUGHT. 59 heat; Its modus operandi is expansion, the reverse of contraction. — It will be demonstrated in the next chap- ter, that the substance of heat or fire, is neither more nor less than the elementary spiritual substance. There is another immaterial substance, the phenomena of which we shall find blended with those of matter. But it will be thought inconceivable, that the opera- tions of immaterial substances should affect the senses; that they should be seen, or felt, or tasted. But if the operations of immaterial substances are not the exciting causes of some of our sensations, then all the variety of ideas and sensations which we experience, are produced simply by the operations upon our organs, of contraction and repulsion. But this is much harder to conceive, than that the operations of immaterial substances should be seen with the eyes, or tasted with the palate, And we would ask, Why may it not be true, that immaterial substances affect the senses ? What is matter, that it should have more efficiency than spirit in affecting the organs of sense? Or are the organs of sense adapted only to contraction and repulsion ? There are several facts to be ascertained, before it can be asserted on good ground, that the senses are incapable of discerning the operations of immaterial substances ; or that these sub- stances have, and can have, no share in producing the phenomena of nature. There can be but one simple mate- rial substance, or one simple basis of contraction and re- pulsion; and it would be absurd in the extreme to sup- pose, that this one simple principle can be the basis of all the endless variety of phenomena which meet the senses; or that it can produce at the same time contrac- tion, expansion, bitter, sweet, red, blue and yellow. There are a variety of minute operations produced on the organs of sight and of taste, which have not been 60 THE ALPHABET ascertained to consist of contraction and repulsion ; we know that the senses take cognizance of other modes of operation exhibited on a broad scale, such as the ascen- sion of vapour, the expansion of bodies by heat, the harmony of sound; and when these operations are mi- nute, and are produced in contact with the organs of sense, may they not produce that variety of sensation which we experience ? It is unphilosophical, and con- trary to common sense, to suppose that all our different sensations have only one exciting cause ; which must be the case, if the senses perceive only the phenomena of matter. There is a two-fold classification of phenomena, which arises out of the nature of things, but which ren- ders this subject much more complex and entangled ap- parently, than it is really. The classification we allude to, is not a scientific, or artificial one ; it is to be collect- ed from the common language of mankind ; it is founded in common sense, and common observation, and in the obvious differences and analogies, of the phenomena of nature, and of the organs of sense. And first, the phenomena are classed according to the different organs affected. There are colors, or objects of sight; sounds, or objects of hearing; tastes and odours, or objects of taste and smell; and all the differ- ent degrees and modes of repulsion, as hardness, rough- ness, £fc. the objects of feeling. But each organ of sense perceives different phenomena, or different modes of operation. And it is a fact worthy of observation, that several of the organs of sense, perhaps all of them, excepting that of feeling, distinguish three simple modeg of operation, or experience three distinct kinds of sen- sation. Of the objects belonging to the organ of vision, we have the three primary colour^, red, Hue and ml- OF THOUGHT. 61 low0 corresponding, numerically, and essentially too, as will appear — to the simple elementary phenomena, motion, perception and harmony — and to the simple ef- ficient causes, Power, Spirit and Truth. The organ of hearing distinguishes three distinct operations; first, simple so und; secondly, harmony of sound, a phenome- non distinct from simple sound ; and thirdly, the pathos of sound, distinct from either of the former. Every sound that differs at all from simple sound, partakes of one, or both of the two latter modifications of sound.— The organ of taste also distinguishes three simple phe- nomena, the sweet, the pungent, and the astringent, or acid. But again, the common sense, and common language of mankind, recognize an analogy between the sensa- tions of the different organs, or rather between the phe- nomena addressed to the different organs; which pheno- mena are the objects and exciting causes of our sensa- tions. Thus Ave have sweet sounds, and sweet colours, as well as sweet tastes and sweet odours. Then we have lively and dull colours, lively and dull sounds, lively and dull, or insipid tastes, &c. This analogy, or similarity, which is so plainly recognized in the pheno mena, is obviously inferred from the analogy, or simL larity of the sensations excited in the different organs by the phenomena. It is obviously taken for granted, that the sensation excited in one organ by any mode of operation, is analogous to the sensation excited in any of the other organs, by the same mode of operation. The same simple mode of operation, that is harmony, is beauty to the eye, melody to the ear, and sweetness to * The remaining four of the colours sometime* numbered witlrth* elementary, are evidently compounds. 62 THE ALPHABET the taste and smell. A harmonious vibration produced in the organ of sight, or in that of taste, similar, or cor- responding to the vibrations produced in the organ of hearing by musical sounds, will of course produce in those organs sensations, analogous to that excited by- music; for a sensation is nothing else than a percejHion of the vibration or change, produced within the organ of sense, by the operation of the external object upon that organ. The eye has the advantage of perceiving harmony in a variety of different situations and relations, from which circumstantial differences the same phenomenon takes different names. There is harmony or proportion of form or figure, otherwise called beauty; harmony of movements, called grace; and one of the primary co- lours will of course consist of a harmonious vibration produced upon, and within the organ of vision. "So the glad impulse of congenial powers, "Or of sweet ^ound, or fair proportion'd form, "The grace of motion, or the bloom of light, "Thrills through imagination's tender frame, "From nerve to nerve." Which of the primary colours it is that consists of a harmonious vibration, whether it is the red, the blue, or the yellow, it would be hazardous, perhaps, to decide ; but there is reason to conjecture that it is the red. This conjecture is founded, partly on fact, and partly on the analogy of our sensations. It will probably be granted, that the sensation excited in the organ of sight by the co- lour of yellow, is not analogous to that excited in the or. gan of hearing by harmony of sound. Our appeal in this case, is to the consciousness, and the discriminating taste of the reader. But there is external evidence in support of the conjecture, that blue is not the colour of OF THOUGHT. 63 harmony. It is a known fact, that blue is the most re- frangible of the elementary colours; but refraction is a particular case of gravitation, it is the approach of the parts; and gravitation or contraction is a phenomenon distinct from harmony, aud excites a sensation peculiar to itself, which will he noticed just now. That the co- lours are all refrangible in some degree, is evidence that no one of them is quite pure, or unmixed, excepting the blue, or that they all contain a portion of the gravitating substance* Again, the same simple mode of operation, that is, contraction, is acidity, or astringency to the taste; sim- ple sound to the ear , and to the eye the colour blue. When the material substance in its pure elementary state, enters the organ of sight, as light in general enters and passes through any other chrystaline body, it pro- duces its own mode of operation, a contraction in the nerve. This contraction is, in the first place, the opera- tion of the substance which enters the organ; this opera- tion is the colour blue ; when it has entered the organ, it excites a like operation, a contraction in the organ it- self, or the nerve ; this is called the idea of the colour blue. The idea, is the colour itself, or it is contraction produced within the organ. Further, the feeling or per- ception of the idea, or the perception of the contraction within the organ, is that which is called the sensation of the colour blue. The organ does not perceive what is the mode of operation by which it is affected, but it perceives that a peculiar idea or change, is produced within it ; it perceives the differences of the colours, or of the ideas produced within it, but it does not perceive in what these differences consist. There is a third simple mode of operation which, with tWse before mentioned, complete the circle of the phe~ 64 THE ALPHABET nomena, or of the objects of our sensations. If contrac- tion constitutes the colour of blue and harmony, the red, the only remaining simple mode of operation, that is, ex- pansion, will form the colour yellow. It will be shewn in the next chapter, that expansion is the modus operan- di of spiritual substance ; or that it is the manner in which spirit operates upon, and influences matter. It is probably this mode of operation or expansion, that ex- cites the idea and sensation of warmth or pungency in the organ of taste, and the same which produces or con- stitutes, the pathos of sound. Pathetic, or penetrating sounds, issue from a relaxation of the muscles produc- ing sound, or producing the human voice, and operate by sympathy upon the hearer. This relaxation in the voice, arises from internal distress, or is imitated where there is no real distress, either by the human voice, or by a musical instrument. Thus expansion, the modus operandi of Spirit, is pathos to the ear, pungency to the taste, and to the eye the colour yellow; while harmony, the modus operandi of Truth, is music to the ear, sweetness to the taste, and beauty, or the colour red to the eye ; and contraction, the modus operandi of Power, is astringency to the taste, simple sound to the ear, and sublimity, or the colour blue to the eye. The phenomena of Power constitute the sublime ; those of Truth, the beautiful ; and those of Spirit, the pathetic. This is an outline of a theory which cannot be fully developed, except in a detailed investigation of the nature of the human mind. It is merely intended as an illus- tration of the position, thai there is a natural and ne- cessary relation between our sensations and perceptions, and the antecedent impressions produced on our organs of sense by external objects 5 and that the qualities of OF THOUGHT. 65 bodies, or the phenomena, which are the immediate ob- jects of our sensations, are logical evidences of the ex- istence, and of the various natures of the substances with which they are connected. The most formidable obstacle in the way of conceiv- ing and establishing the true definition of niatter, or of power, viz. Power is the substance and efficient cause of the phenomena of matter, is the prejudice that lin- gers in the mind respecting the nature of Mind. It is an undeniable fact, that Mind exerts an active power, that it originates motion, or gives the first impulse to muscular action. Hence it is inferred, that power is an attribute or quality of mind. Yet it is not from this simple fact — Mind originates motion, taken by itself, that the inference is deduced; for a much plainer and more natural conclusion would be, that Power is com- bined with spirit in constituting the substance of the mind. But it is tacitly assumed, that Mind is a sim- ple substance; and it is on this principle, taken in con- junction with the fact just mentioned^ that it is so bold- ly asserted, that Power is an attribute of mind. If mind were a simple substance, it would seem that either the power to impel, or the power to perceive, must be a quality, or that both might be qualities; for if they are both substances, and both belong to mind, then mind is a compound. But admitting mind to be a simple es- sence, and considering that the phenomena of spirit are they which distinguish mind from matter, it follows that the simple spirit is that essence, or constitutes the sub- stance of the mind ; and that power is an attribute or quality of spirit. That mind originates motion, is a known fact. Mo~ Hon then is an attribute of mind, or it is an operation of mind. But power certainly is not an operation. Power 9 66 THE ALPHABET is not the operation of a cause, but the efficient cause of an operation. Motion is the operation of power, not of spirit. Mind must possess power, that is, mechanical power, or the power to impel, otherwise it could not originate motion; the spirit or power to perceive, is not the power to impel. The energy of the mind is in proportion to its mechanical power, and not to its in- tellectual, as distinguished from its mechanical power ; it is in proportion to the tension of the nerve, not to the intensity of feeling, nor to the acuteness of perception. Strength of mind does not consist in sensativeness ; it consists even less in the clearness and quickness of perception, than in the power to repel thoughts that are painful, or troublesome, and to confine the attention to a subject which requires labor. The labor of the mind is a mechanical operation, as really as the labor of the body ; the first consists of a continued effort to pro- duce those trains of ideas, or successive configurations in the brain, which are the signs, or evidences of the things which the mind is investigating. The only lo- gical inference that can be deduced from the fact, that Mind exerts an active power, is, that Power is a consti- tuent element of the substance of the mind. We have the same kind of evidence for the existence of power, in the mind, that we have for the existence of spirit in the mind ; each exhibits its peculiar pheno- menon; Spirit perceives, and Power impels. From the phenomenon, we infer the existence of the sub- stance; and from the species, or kind of phenomenon, we infer the species, or kind of substance ; that is, from perception, we infer the existence of spirit; and from motion, power. Power and spirit, or matter and spirit, are in the same predicament as to their generic characters; they are both substances, or they are both OF THOUGHT. 67 invisible efficient causes, of visible, or perceived opera- tions. Mind contains a principle of action, or of impulse, as well as a principle of perception; but it is just as rational to suppose, that the principle of action, me- chanical power, is the agent, or efficient cause, of per- ception, as that the principle of perception, or the power to perceive, is the agent, or efficient cause, of impulsion. It is just as reasonable to suppose that the material substance, or that power, perceives, as that the spiritual substance impels. Whenever motion, or impulse, is exhibited to the senses, the thing which impels is, without hesitation, called body, or matter; but when the operation is hidden from the senses, and we are left to infer it from the more remote effects, that is, where the impulse perceived by the senses has been communicated, or produced by a previous impulse — for instance, where the action of the muscles is produced by an impulse originating in the mind, in this case, the primary cause, or thing which moves, is called power. When the senses perceive the primary, or immediate operation of power, as in gravitation and repulsion, we pronounce the operator to be matter; but when the senses perceive only the secondary effect, we pronounce the originating cause to be power. If we could see with our eyes, or feel with our hands the operation of mind in originating muscular motion, we should have no hesitation in determining that mind is in part mate- rial. But we can only infer the operation of the mind in this transaction from what follows, from the action of the muscles ; and this is in fact the only evidence we have, that there is an action, or impelling operation, in the mind as distinguished from the rest of the sys- tem; for we are not conscious of an exertion of power 68 THE ALPHABET any where except in the muscles. And if from the action of the muscles we infer that an impulse is given by the mind, it is in plain terms applying the laws of matter and motion, to explain the phenomena of the mind, and the muscular system. It is an axiom of the Newtonian philosophy, that the momentum communi- cated, is in direct proportion to the momentum of that by, or from, which it is communicated; or, that "The "velocity, multiplied into the quantity of matter, of the "body impelled; is in proportion to the velocity mul- tiplied into the quantity of matter of the body which "impels.' 5 It is common to contrast the mind, with solid body, the ethereal spirit, with the clod of the valley; and doubtless there is an essential difference between mat- ter and spirit ; and there is a contrast between the clod under our feet, and the air which surrounds us. Yet the air contains material substance, and so does the mind, which is not serial ; and matter is not necessarily a clod ; it exists in the atmosphere in a gaseous state ; for the lightest gas that gravitates, — and they all gravi- tate — is in part material, or contains the gravitating principle. That which the apostle Paul calls a spiritual body, is probably an serial substance, composed of power and spirit, or matter and spirit. It must be in part ma- terial, or it would not be body, and it differs from the natural body, probably by having a greater proportion of the spiritual principle, and in being far less dense. Material substance, in its primitive state, is not a clod. When the earth was without form, that is, "in "the beginning," when creation was about to commence; it is probable that the bodies which now exist in a sen- sible form, were, either in an serial state, like our atmos- phere, w*here several elementary substances enter into OF THOUGHT. 69 the formation of a gas, or perhaps it was without any chemical attraction, when it would form a more com- plete chaos; the elements mingling, or existing together in space, without at all affecting, or being affected, by each other. The lightest gas has some degree of gra- vity, and gravity is the distinguishing characteristic of matter; the lightest gas then is, in part, material, and in some part the same, essentially, with the heaviest bodies in the internal parts of the earth. Every elastic fluid, or every gas, contains necessarily a contracting, and an expanding principle ; the opposing tendencies of these two principles constitute elasticity. Were it not for the operation of the contracting principle, the sub- stance of the gas would be dissipated ; and but for the operation of the expanding principle, the contracting substance would form itself into a solid mass. There can be little doubt but that our atmosphere contains the elements of all the substances which compose our earth and its inhabitants ; and it is highly probable that the earth is continually growing, or acquiring new acces- sions from the atmosphere, and that it has been alto- gether formed in this way, or from the atmosphere — under the controul and direction of infinite Wisdom and Power. But the atmosphere is in no danger of being exhausted, for, in any rational hypothesis, it must be supposed interminable; the air must extend through in- finite space, for it would be absurd to suppose, that an elastic fluid should be terminated by a vacuum. Before the formation of the heavens and the earth, the substances which compose all things were probably distributed, by their own equal attractions and expan- sions, throughout infinite space; and it would of course, require all the power in the universe, or if this phrase is improper, of infinite power, to break the equilibrium; 70 THE ALPHABET and to compress a small part of the universal matter into a solid, or sensible form. — What the origin is, of that plastic energy, called chemical attraction ; whether it is the result of the combined tendencies of the several simple substances, or efficient causes, and is inherent in these causes, or is entirely dependent on the will of Him who presides over all these operations, it would require deep and undivided attention and research, to discover, and perhaps would not reward the toil by dis- closing itself to the enquirer. As knowledge and science are desirable, only as they are useful and applicable to the affairs of life, we will hazard an attempt to identify the efficient cause of gra- vitation, as it appears to the metaphysician, with the corresponding, or the same principle or substance, as it appears to the naturalist and the chemist. This attempt will, perhaps, be scouted, as was Galileo's theory of the earth ; but we firmly believe in the correctness of our theory ; yet if we should hereafter be convicted of error, it will not require a holy inquisition to make us recant. The simple substance which, in chemistry, is called Jiydrogene, is probably the same with the contracting principle, or material substance. This conjecture is founded, principally, on two known facts. First, Hy- drogene forms the solid parts of woody, or vegetable substances ; but solidity, or repulsion, belongs to mat- ter only, and material substance is the same one prin- ciple in all bodies ; therefore hydrogene is the basis of all solid, or material substances. Secondly. The forcible condensation, or contraction of hydrogene gas f whenever the equilibrium of the chemical attractions of its constituents is disturbed, as in the formation of wa- ter, is the other fact on which we ground the hypothesis, OF THOUGHT. n that hjdrogene is the contracting principle, or material substance. There are other facts known in chemistry which will tend to throw light on this subject; it rest* with chemists to refute, or confirm the hypothesis. CHAPTER IV. OF SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE. The existence of a spiritual substance is a principle Which is almost universally recognized. It has indeed been denied by a few speculative philosophers, some of whom have declared their conviction, that we have no knowledge of any thing beyond our own ideas. But this doctrine has always been predicated on the princi- ple, that All things are made of nothing. The exist- ence of matter has been denied on the same principle. Some have admitted the existence of matter, while they denied that of spirit; for, say they, if all things are made of nothing, it follows, that neither matter not spirit are the efficient causes of the phenomena ; that, consequently, the phenomena have no necessary con- nection with the substances ; and that it is then obvious, that for aught we know matter may both gravitate and perceive; all the phenomena in nature may belong to one and the same substance, and that substance may be matter. If all things are made of nothing, matter is not the real agent in gravitation, any more than in 72 THE ALPHABET thought and perception; and there is no principle on which it can be either affirmed or denied, that spirit i§ essentially different from matter. The annals of philosophy do not record any regular attempt to investigate the evidence of the existence of spiritual substance; or to analyse the procedure of the mind in the discovery of this substance. Hence we have no regular science, or no principles established in a regular way, respecting the existence and nature of spiritual beings. — No doubt it would be deemed absurd, if we should talk of investigating the nature of spirit, by experiment and observation; yet all the knowledge w T e possess of spiritual substance is derived from experi- ence. But as this method has not been adopted regu- larly, in the philosophy of spirit, it has not been pursu- ed with advautage. That spirit exists, is taken for granted, but it is contended, very unphilosophically, that we neither know, nor can discover what is the es- sence of the mind or of spirit. We hope to make it appear, that the essence of the mind is known in fact, not to philosophers only, but that it is recognized by the common sense of mankind. In the philosophy of mind it has been customary to assume, as a first principle and an undeniable fact, that the mind is a simple essence; or, that the simple spiri- tual substance constitutes the whole of the mind, and i» the efficient agent, not in perception only, but also in motion; that it originates the actions of the muscles, and performs all the complex operations of the mind. It is believed that the essence of the mind is some mys- terious unknown thing — something beside the power to perceive and the power to move or impel; it is believed that these poivers are, not the ultimate efficient causes of the phenomena, perception and impulse, but that they ^ of thought; n are qualities or attributes belonging to something else, which is called the essence of the miud, the knowledge of which, it is said, is beyond the reach of the hunan intellect. It is not pretended that there is auy log c al evidence of the existence of a substratum of these pvite ers; it is not alledged that a simple essence* to which they necessarily belong as qualities, is actually perceiv- ed; the power to impel, and the power to perceive are not operations, from which we would be bound in rea- son to infer the existence of an agent or cause. Yet it is on the ground that these powers^ the power to per- ceive and the power to move, are attributes, or qualities, that they are supposed to belong necessarily to a sub- stratum, or to something which is called the essence of mind. Now the essence of any thing, is that which makes that thing to be what it is. But what is it that makes the mind to be what it is, or to be mind ? It is the power to perceive, and the power to impel that makes mind to be mind. Therefore, the power to perceive, and the power to impel, constitute the essence of the mind. It is also received as an incontrovertable princi- ple, that Mind, or Spirit is unextended and indivisible. It is not intended to enter into an inquiry here, re- specting the nature of the human mind. Mind, or that being which both thinks and acts, — which both per- ceives and impels, is a compound substance, consisting of power and spirit, or matter and spirit. The simple spiritual substance perceives ; its operation is uniformly perception ; therefore it does not impel. Like causes produce like effects. Besides, it has already been prov- ed, that the power to impel is not a quality, but a sub- stance, and as power, as well as spirit, is essential to the constitution of mind, it follows that mind is a com pound substance. 10 M THE ALPHABET The nature of the spiritual substance is the subject of the present inquiry, and it is proposed to establish the position, that Spirit, in its elementary state, is a self-existent independent being, and the efficient cause of perception ; that previous to its entering into the constitution of the mind, it exists in an elementary state; and that it extends throughout all space, and pervades all bodies, animate and inanimate. The simple fact, that Spirit perceives, is a funda- mental principle in the philosophy of Spirit, or of Mind, as distinguished from matter ; it is a general fact pre- cisely analogous to that of the gravitation of matter. These simple ultimate facts present themselves to every mind capable of observation and reflection; and it is perhaps on account of its being so familiar to the mind, and on account of its simplicity, that the former princi- ple — spirit perceives — is almost overlooked in the phi- losophy of mind. To deny either of these simple ge- neral facts, would be to confound truth and falsehood, and to undermine every principle of philosophy. Yet it is, in effect, to deny these principles, to affirm, that Spirit impels, or originates motion, or is the efficient cause of gravitation. Like causes produce like effects. But this principle is inapplicable to a substance that is made of nothing; and that is not the real cause of any effect. If spirit is made of nothing, it does not really perceive; it is incapable of any operation in its own capacity ; and on any principle, it is just as rational to suppose that matter perceives, as that spirit impels, or originates motion. When natural reason lifts her voice, she finds a ready accordance in every unprejudiced mind. It will be readily granted, that spirit perceives, and that it is the only species, or kind of being, capable of perceiving: in a OF THOUGHT. ;3 word, that whatever perceives is spirit; and that what does not perceive, is not spirit. Whenever we observe a specific phenomenon, we infer the existence of a spe- cific efficient cause, or substance ; whenever we observe perception, or feeling, we infer the existence and pre- sence of spirit ; and this amounts to, or includes all that we know of spirit ; every genuine principle of the phi- losophy of spirit, is implied in this one, that spirit per- ceives. If spirit is that which perceives, and is the only thing which perceives, it is the efficient cause of percep- tion ; it is that, and that only which is able to perceive. But like causes produce like effects; therefore, spirit does not impel, or produce any phenomenon different from perception. The power to perceive, is the essence of Spirit. There is not the least ground to suppose the existence of any other essence of spirit, or of a being to which the power to perceive is an attribute. The foicer to per- ceive is not a quality, requiring a subject, or substratum; it is not an operation, from which reason is bound to in- fer the existence of an agent. Perception is an attri- bute of spirit; the power to perceive is spirit itself; or it is that which perceives ; there is no power to perceive, excepting the efficient cause of perception, or that which actually perceives. If Spirit is the efficient cause of perception, it must be a self- existent independent being, in its elementary, or primitive state, for that which depends on some other being for its existence, can have no efficiency of its own ; it cannot of itself produce any operation;* it is not an efficient cause. Yet every individual spirit, although in itself an efficient cause of perception, is indebted, for its individuality, and for its situation relatively to sur- rounding objects, to the Creator, who separates it from 70 THE ALPHABET the common element, and unites it to an organized body, through which it acquires all its knowledge, and all its enjoyments. In opposition to this it will he alledged, that the Su- preme Being has power to create, and actually does create, from nothing, all the spirits, or souls of men. But beside that this is bare assertion without the sha- dow of proof, it is absurd, for the reasons already men- tioned, to suppose the possibility of an efficient cause being created from nothing. This will be met with the argument, that infinite power can do all things ; that there is nothing too hard for infinite power. It is true, that in the proper sense of the terms, there is nothing too hard, or difficult for infinite power; yet it will not be denied that there are some things impossible even to infinite power. Infinite power cannot make two, equal to four, or a non-entity, equal to an efficient cause, There is indeed one sense of the words, in which it is true, that substances are made of nothing. When we look around in space, w r e say, that we see nothing, that the space is empty ; yet this may be occupied by air, or by light ; substances which enter into the composition of bodies, but which, in their elementary state were consi- dered to be nothing. The world and all that it contains was once in that state ; ^the earth was without form, "and void," yet it was ; substances existed, but without a sensible form ; their operations could not have been perceived by organs of sense such as ours. When it is asserted that infinite power creates sub- stances from nothing, it should in reason be shewn, either that it is within the compass of infinite power to do this thing, or that in fact it has been done. But neither of these can be shewn, on the contrary, the ab- surdity of the supposition is palpable. Can infinite OF THOUGHT, 77 fwiver think, or perceive? We speak of mechanical power, or the power to impel. No, certainly: power does not, cannot perceive; it is spirit only that per- ceives, or that can perceive. If infinite power cannot produce the phenomenon, is it not absurd to suppose that it can create, from nothing, the efficient cause of the phenomenon ? The sole operation of power, is motion, or impulse, which never can amount to, or create, its own efficient cause. It would be equally absurd to suppose tbat Spirit can create other spirits from nothing. Spirit, then, is a self- existent, independent being, and is the efficient cause of perception. The spiritual substance exists in an elementary state ? previous to its entering into the constitution of the hu- man mind. The proof of this proposition will be. drawn from known facts, and from the attestation of sacred w r rit. It is a well known fact, that the substance of the body is continually wasting, and continually renewed by the food we take. But who shall dare to conjecture? in the face of the prevailing theories respecting mind; or spirit, that this too is constantly expending itself, and constantly repaired by the element from which it first originated. Yet there is hardly room for conjecture, it is a fact, which is obvious to the attentive observer, that the principle of life is thus wasted, and supplied; though the element from which it is supplied, is dif- ferent from that which replenishes the bodily substance, and is received through a different organ. The vital air which we inhale by the lungs, is the food of the principle of life. Every exercise of animal power exhausts, or lessens the principle of life, or the sensorial power; and is followed by an increase of breathing, to obtain a fresh supply, and an accelerated 78 THE ALPHABET circulation of the blood, to distribute that supply tbroughout the system. There is no fact more clear- ly ascertained, than that life results from the air we breathe, and death from the exclusion of air. So long as we breathe, we live ; but the most perfectly orga- nized body, is dead until it breathes. "God made man "of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nos- trils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." But what is the principle of life ? That which is called life, consists of actions, or motions excited by stimulus ; and stimulus is something perceived, or felt. The principle of life then, is that substance which is capa- ble of being stimulated, or of feeling, or perceiving the action of stimulus. But that which perceives, or feels, is Spirit. Wherever there is perception, there is spirit; from the lowest or dullest feeling of sense, to the highest exercise of reason, the same species of phenomenon, requires the same species of efficient cause. And by whatever name we call that phenomenon, whether we term it feeling, sense, or perception, it is essentially the same; it is the distinguishing characteristic of spiritual substance ; and it is the prominent feature in all the complex phenomena of reason and of sense. It is then an obvious fact, that the air we breathe contains, and constantly supplies the aliment of that substance, which is the principle both of life, and of intelligence. That spirit exists in an elementary state, is attested by the word of the august Being, who, by His creative power united our bodies and spirits, and who is most intimately acquainted with the constitution of man. The sacred historian, by divine inspiration informs us, that "God made man of the dust of the ground, and "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." In consequence of the breath OF THOUGHT. 79 ©f life, or the air, being breathed into his nostrils, lie became a living soul. The dust of the ground, and the breath of life, are the elements from which is formed the living man, or the living soul. We are told by the learned, that the word which is translated wind, and breath, is the same throughout the sacred scriptures, with that which is rendered spirit ; the same word in the original, signifies spirit, ivind, breath. This would seem plainly to imply, that the wind, or the air, is spirit, or that it contains the ele- mentary spiritual substance. There is no part of sacred writ that forbids this implication ; but the metaphysical theories of the learned forbid it. However it is gene- rally true, that the most learned are also the most libe- ral, and most ready to encourage research; and with these encouraging reflections we proceed to lay before the reader the following considerations. In the first chapter of Genesis it is said, "The earth "was without form, and void, and darkness was upon "the face of the deep, and the Spirit of God moved upon "the face of the waters." It appears to be assumed by divines, that the Holy Spirit is spoken of in this passage. But surely — with deference to these respected authori- ties, — it is attributing to that divine person, an office by no means appropriate, and far beneath the dignity of his character. It is not warranted by other parts of sacred writ, for wherever the Holy Spirit is expressly mention- ed, he is employed in revealing, either the character of God, the history of fallen man, or the mysteries of re- demption. The Holy Spirit is the proper subject of the moral attributes of God; or is the agent in producing holiness, and in inspiring the mind of man with the knowledge and love of truth ; but is nowhere represent- ed as the agent in physical operations, such as moving 30 THE ALPHABET on the face of the waters. The wind, or Spirit of God spoken of in the passage under consideration, would ap- pear to a plain mind to be that elementary spirit, or breath, or vital air, which to this day moves upon the face of the waters, being the fluid element next in weight to water. It was that elementary substance, which doubtless then was, and which still is one of the consti- tuents of atmospheric air ; and which supplied the first progenitors of our race, and which still supplies their descendants with the principle of life, or the spiritual part of their constitutions. And it was called the Spirit of God, because it was that elementary substance which was yet retained absolutely in His hands, or which had not yet been appropriated to the formation of indi- vidual beings. v There are many passages of scripture in which the Spirit of the Lord is mentioned, where it is evidently not the Holy Spirit that is intended. Such are the fol lowing. "And the Spirit of the Lord came mightily "upon him," [Sampson] "and he rent him" [the lion] "as he would have rent a kid, and he had nothing in "his band."* — "And when he came to Lehi the Philis- tines shouted against him ; and the Spirit of the Lord "came mightily upon him ; and the cords that were on "his arm became as flax that was burnt with the fire, %nd his bands loosed from off his hands. "f No one can seriously believe, that the Spirit of the Lord, in these passages, means the Holy Spirit ; it appears plainly to be the principle of life, or the principle of ani- mal strength that is alluded to. The following passage has the same purport. "As the beast goeth down into "the valley, the Spirit of the Lord causeth him to rest."]; Mtttes J&t. IS, f xv. 14. i Isaiah Ixiii. 14. OF THOUGHT, 81 These passages shew pretty plainly, that the words Spirit of the Lord, in the holy scriptures, do not al- ways allude to the Holy Spirit. — In the following ex- tracts, the words spirit, and Spirit of God, evidently mean the elementary principle of animal life. "All the "while the breath is in me, and the Spirit of God is in "my nostrils, my tongue shall not utter deceit."* — "And "the Spirit of God came upon Saul when he heard "these tidings, and his anger was kindled greatly ."f "Cease ye from man, whose breath" [spirit] "is in his "nostrils, for wherein is he to be accounted of."f— It is impossible to inculcate in a plainer manner, the princi- ple, that the elementary principle, or spirit of life, is de- rived from the air we breathe. That the spiritual substance has extension, scarcely needs any farther proof than what the foregoing argu- ments afford ; yet as there is direct testimony from sa- cred writ, as well as the clearest evidence from fact to establish this point, it is proper to say a few words on the subject, especially as it will tend to confirm the posi- tion before insisted on, if it be thought to need any far- ther confirmation, — that spirit exists in an elementary state. And first, of the testimony from sacred writ. "The "eyes of the Lord are in every place, beholding the "evil and the good."|| This text, with many others, prove the omnipresence of the Spirit of God. But it is idle to go about to prove the omnipresence; ho one will deny it. And it is probable that no one will ven- ture to alledge, that omnipresence^ and extension, are two different modes of existence,— or, that the first does not imply the last. But if the Spirit of the Lord is ♦ Job xxvii. 3. f I Samuel si, $. * Isakh il 22, fl Proverbs xv. 3, 11 tt THE ALPHABET omnipresent, or is extended throughout all space, then extension is not inconsistent with the nature of spirit ; if the Spirit of ike Lord is not distinguished from mat- ter by being unextended, is it necessary that the spirits of men should be distinguished from matter by the want of extension ? If the Spirit of the Lord is extended through infinite space, does not this afford strong pre- sumptive evidence, that all spirits have their degree of extension. But we have more direct evidence from fact, in sup- port of the principle that spirits are extended beings. Whatever facts we possess in relation tc this subject, and as they respect the human spirit, or mind, are of course derived from the testimony of consciousness. And may we not confidently appeal to the conscious- ness of the reader; do we not feel, or perceive with our eyes, our ears, palate, at the ends of our fingers, and with almost every part of the body ? Are we not con- scious of all this ? Does not the experience of every moment confirm it ? Make a farther experiment when you will ; put your finger in the blaze of the candle, and you will instantly perceive that something is going forward in the finger. Whatever swift little messenger conveyed the notice of this to the central reflecting or- gan, the brain, it must first have perceived it itself, at the point where the action originated. There is a perception, or sensation in the finger ; and the sensa- tive substance must have extended to the finger. It is to no purpose to say, that the sensation is in the mind ; and that the mind is confined to the brain, or to a single point in the brain; it might as well be said that the mind is in the moon ; if it is not present in the part where we are conscious, we know not where it is: consciousness is then no guide: its testimony is false. OF THOUGHT. $S But, to return: we are conscious that there is a sensa- tion in the finger, and this consciousness is the only evidence we have, on the subject of the locality of the seusative substance. It is a fact that the finger feels, or is conscious of the violent change produced within it, by the action of the fire ; no sophistry can disprove this fact. The sensation is without doubt in the mind ; this cannot be denied ; wherever there is sensation, there is mind ; but must we, in spite of fact, conclude from this, that the sensation is in the brain, and confin- ed to a single point there; or should we not rather conclude that the mind extends to the finger, and to every point where sensation is felt. There is no fact that forbids this conclusion ; it is not inconsistent with any principle established in reason. If, where there is sensation there is necessarily mind — and if it is a fact that there is sensation in the finger, then the mind ex. tends to the finger; the mind has nearly the same ex- tension with the body. But in defiance of the testimony of consciousness, it will, perhaps, be insisted on, that sentient beings are unextended; we shall be told that the pain produced by the heat of the candle, is not really in the finger, but in the mind which occupies a point somewhere in the brain. But this is borrowing the question; when it is proved that the mind is unextended, then we shall be compelled to admit that our sensations are confined to a point; but the only evidence calculated to prove that the mind is unextended, would be the fact, that our sensa- tions are confined to a point. Now this fact can be ascertained only by experiment and by the testimony of consciousness ; but consciousness does not testify the fact ; on the contrary, consciousness testifies that sensa- tion takes place in the external organs, — hence it is that 84 THE ALPHABET they are called the organs of sense, or of sensation; — if we are to rely on the testimony of consciousness, a single sensation extends itself over a considerable sur- face, or throughout the whole extent of an organ. There is no evidence to be drawn from consciousness, that the pain which is apparently in the finger, is really in the head. We are not conscious that our sensations are alto- gether in the brain ; we are not conscious at all of sensa- tion in the brain, excepting when it is disordered. It is not to the brain that we refer our pains and our plea- sures ; they originate apparently in the bodily organs ; our joys and our sorrows we refer to our bosoms — love, hatred, anger, benevolence we attribute to the heart, by which is meant, not the muscular organ so called, but the spirit, residing in the bosom as well as in the head. The head is no doubt the principal seat of intelligence, it is there all the organs meet ; it is to this common re- ceptacle is brought all the notices of external objects ; it is there these notices, or impressions are analysed, and our inferences drawn as to the existence, nature, and positions of external objects, and our connexions with them. But it is in the bosom we experience the feelings, the sentiments, and the perturbations excited by those objects ; it is in the bosom, in conjunction with the brain, that we approve, or disapprove. We per- ceive right and wrong in the brain,- but we feel good and evil in the heart, that is, throughout the whole of the nervous system, including the brain. To sum up all in one word, wherever there is blood, and nerve, and vital air, there is sensation. There can be no doubt, but that the external organs of sense communicate with the brain, and with it form one grand organ of sensation, or perception, and that OF THOUGHT. 85 the spirit, or mind, having her principal seat in the brain, has there the advantage of receiving and compar- ing all the impressions, or ideas conveyed through the several external organs, and of drawing her conclusions from the whole. It is thus we learn to estimate dis- tance, by comparing the ideas of the organ of sightj with those of the organ of feeling. But if the spiritual substance exists in an elementary state ; and if in the human system it is continually ex- pended, and supplied again by the air we breathe, does not this destroy the identity of the mind ? — By no means. The identity of the mind does not consist in its having retained the identical parts, or particles of spirit, any more than the identity of the body consists in its having retained the same particles of matter. — The sameness of the spiritual substance cannot consti- tute the identity of the mind,— first, because the spirit does not constitute the whole mind. Mind is a com- bination of power and spirit, or matter and spirit. The only operation and characteristic of spirit, is perception ; there is nothing in one spirit, simply as spirit, to distin- guish it from another spirit; every spirit perceives. Simple spirit is incapable of acquiring a fixed and per- manent form, or a distinct, or individual character.-— Secondly. If we consider the mind as formed of two distinct substances, power and spirit, still there is nothing simply in this combination of substance to dis- tinguish one mind from another; power and spirit is the same in one mind, with power and spirit in another mind. One mind is distinguished from another, not by perception, but by the objects of its perceptions, or about which it has been conversant, or by the ideas and the knowledge it has acquired, and by its habits of think- ing and feeling. The identity of the mind consists in *6 THE ALPHABET the identity of its ideas, associations, and habits of thinking and feeling. But knowledge, and ideas, and habits of thinking and feeling, can be acquired only through the medium of organs, adapted at once to re- ceive impressions from external objects, and to feel, or perceive these impressions ; that is, organs composed of matter and spirit; matter, to be acted on and to react, or to receive impression from matter ; and spirit, to perceive, or feel the impression. Such in fact are our organs of sensation. It is the material part of the nerv- ous system, or mind, which receives the impressions from external objects, or which is the subject of the ideas, or configurations or modes of operation communi- cated by these impressions; but it is the spiritual part, which is in combination with the material, that per- ceives these impressions. Every repetition of an idea in the mind, that is, every repetition of a particular ac- tion, or operation, in the external organs of sense and the brain, increases the facility, and the tendency to re- peat this same idea, or operation, and in all probability increases the bulk and consistence, or solidity of the or- gan, or organs, both external and internal thus brought into action ; — just as the repetition of a particular action in the muscular organs, increases the size of the muscle, and the facility of repeating that action. We come now to consider more particularly, the phy- sical and chemical characters of spiritual substance ; or to inquire in what form it exists in the physical, or ex- ternal world, and in what way it exhibits itself to the senses. It is a known fact, that the spirit, or mind in- fluences, and is influenced by bodily substances; yet, perhaps, the attempt to investigate this fact, or to in- quire into the manner in which this reciprocal influence Is effected, will be pronounced vain and idle. But OF THOUGHT, 8/ surely it is the office of philosophy to explore, and not to shut up a field of inquiry. Therefore, we hope to receive the indulgence hestowed on adventure, instead of the censure due to temerity. — The problem, as to the manner in which matter and spirit reciprocally affect each other, is to be solved only in one way, — that is, by identifying Spirit with some one of the substances fami- liarly known in what is called the physical world, and by shewing what is the modus operandi of this sub- stance, or the manner in which it affects, and is af- fected by matter. The manner in which it is common to identify one substance with another in philosophical investigation, is in reasoning from analogy, the analogy of the pheno- mena. It is on this species of evidence that any two substances are pronounced to be of the same kind, or species; the soul, or spirit of a man, and the soul or spirit of a beast, are called by the same name, or per- ceived to be the same species of substance, on the evi- dence of analogy, the analogy, or sameness of their phenomena; the lightning of the heavens, and the elec- tric aura, are pronounced the same, on the same kind of evidence; and aerial substances are known to be mate- rial, on the evidence of analogy, or because they gravi- tate and repel. We propose to shew, on the evidence of analogy, that the substance which in metaphysics is denominated Spirit, is the same with that which in chemistry is called the matter of heat, or caloric. It is apt to be imagined, that there is no metaphysi- cal reasoning at all attending the discovery and percep- tion of material substance; we seem to perceive it by the senses; it obtrudes itself so continually on observa- tion, that without reflection and a laborious abstraction, we imagine that we perceive, the substance immediately j 88 THE ALPHABET while in reality it is ouly the phenomena that are peiv ceived immediately, or by the senses. At the same time, Spirit is conceived to he an invisible mysterious thing, and that even its operations are necessarily invi- sible and mysterious. It is admitted, indeed, that the phenomena of spirit are perceived by internal sense, or consciousness; but it is believed that they can in no wise affect the external organs of sense. But material substance, or the basis of gravitation and repulsion, is as completely invisible to the senses, as the spiritual substance; neither the one nor the other is perceived immediately, or in the way that we perceive operations. The perception or knowledge of matter, as well as the knowledge of spirit, is the result of a metaphysical in- vestigation of the phenomena. The modus operandi of spirit is perceived by the external organs of sense ; and we have ventured to term this, the physical characteristic of spirit. There is no good reason to aver, that the phenomena of spirit may not affect the organs of sense as well as the phenomena of matter ; or that they may not affect the external, as well as the internal sense, or consciousness. For what is internal sense ; or what is consciousness ? It is the perception, or feeling of the operations, or phenomena which take place within the mind. — And what is exter- nal sense, or sensation in the external organs? It is con- sciousness too ; or it is the perception, or feeling of the changes, or operations communicated to and produced within the external organs, by the impressions of exter- nal objects. It appears then, that sensation in the ex- ternal organs, and consciousness within the mind are precisely similar ; they differ only in their localities « consciousness in the mind, is the sensation, or percep- tion of what takes place within the mind; aud sensation OF THOUGHT. 89 in the external organs, is the consciousness or percep- ception of what takes place within the external organs. Sense and consciousness perceive phenomena, or opera- tions, hut do not take cognizance of substances. If the internal organ of consciousness, or sensation per- ceives the phenomena of spirit, why may not the exter- nal organ of sensation, or consciousness perceive the phenomena of spirit ? Is spirit less efficient than mat- ter? Is it matter only that has the power to awaken the sentient organ ? Or has the sentient principle in the ^he external organs the power to perceive the pheno- mena of matter; and not the power to perceive the phe- nomena of spirit? The organ of feeling perceives gravitation and re- pulsion; and reason infers an invisible cause, a some- thing which gravitates and repels ; and this something is called matter. The external organ of feeling per- ceives heat also ; that is, the phenomenon called heat ; and it is inferred, that there is a substance, or mat- ter of heat; we do not refer this phenomenon to the same cause, or substance which produces gravitation. Though the substance of heat is, improperly, termed matter of heat, it is notorious that it does not gravitate or repel. The substance of heat is immaterial. Heat is capable of being accumulated to an unknown extent, by means of its chemical attraction for material sub- stance; but this is quite different from gravitation, which is the necessary operation of matter, independ- ently of chemical affinities. Heat radiates, or expand^ but this is different from the repulsion of matter, for while heat radiates, it penetrates solid bodies, it does not repel them. By means of its chemical attraction^ heat imparts to bodies its own mode of operation, ex- pansion, and causes matter to exhibit phenomena essen- 12 i>0 THE ALPHABET tially different from contraction, or gravitation. It is in consequence of this tendency to expand, together with its chemical attraction for material substance, that heat produces solution and decomposition in unorganized bodies; and it is in consequence of the same tendencies, physical and chemical, that it gives to organized bodies k peculiarity of character called life. — It is a known fact, that the living principle is continually counteract- ing the contracting, or gravitating tendency of the ma- terial part of the animal system. Many of the animal functions are performed by means of expansion ; and it is this mode of operation that distinguishes the living from the dead body;— or the phenomena of life, from simple gravitation and repulsion. It is by expanding the chest that Ave breathe ; it is by alternate contractions and expansions of the heart and arteries, that the blood is circulated, &c. It has been shewn, that the mode of operation of the material substance, or of power, is con- traction; that in all animal actions, the primary opera- tion is contraction. But when a muscle has contracted^ the material part has not any power nor tendency again to expand ; consequently its actions would be at an end, if there were not another species of energy, or power, to expand the contracted muscle. The contractions of matter cannot be counteracted but by direct expansion. But what is it that is known to counteract and controul the contracting tendency of matter in the animal con- stitution ? It is the spirit, or the principle of life. Expansion then is the mode, or manner in which spirit operates upon, and controuls matter. — But expan- sion is the mode or manner in which heat, or fire ope- rates upon and controuls matter; therefore, heat and spirit, are the same substance. — It is probable that heat causes bodies to expand, not by force, which is the kind OF THOUGHT. 91 ef energy exhibited by power, or matter, but by its own tendency to expand, united with its chemical attraction for material substance. The force exhibited by ex- panding bodies, is the energy of power; but the direc- tion of that force, that is, from a center, is the operation of spirit, and the material substance is carried along with the spiritual by chemical attraction. There are certain metaphors in the language of cul- tivated nations, which plainly indicate a common senti- ment, or apprehension among mankind, that external fire, and the internal spirit, are analogous, or that they are essentially the same. When the mind exhibits much excitement it is said to be heated, or fired. Thft mind is fired with a thirst of glory; fired with a thirst of revenge, &c. Then there is the j^re of genius; the fire of anger; the^re of ambition; the fire of devotion. — - Prometheus stole fire from heaven, to animate his man of clay. — "When I mused, the fire burned," said the royal poet. The following, from the same pen, is an expression without any metaphor of the sameness of spirit and fire. "Who maketh spirits his angels, — a "flame of fire his ministers." — Passion is said to be a combustion, in which the body is consumed by internal fires. Animal life is a slow combustion, in which the body is exhaled by the operations of the spirit, and if not constantly replenished, would cease to furnish fuel for the vital flame. But metaphor, it may be said, is not a proper vehicle of philosophical truth. Yet metaphor is founded in analogy, and analogy certainly is one species of philo- phical evidence. Analogy consists in the sameness of the mode of operation, or of some circumstance attend- ing some two things. There is a loose analogy, where the circumstances which correspond in the two things 92 THE ALPHABET which are analogous, are remotely connected with those things, or are the remote effects, and not the immediate necessary operations of those things. The following metaphor presents an instance of this loose analogy. "If any man seem to he religious, and bridleth not his tongue," &c. This metaphor is founded in the analogy between a bridle and a moral precept, or truth. The point of analogy is the restraint imposed by the bridle, and by the precept; but the effect is remote from either cause; and the mode of operation of the one cause is different from that of the other. A bridle restrains by force, and by the pain it inflicts ; but a moral precept, or truth restrains by its beauty, and by the pleasing sen- sation it excites in the mind. — It would be improper to rest the proof of a principle in philosophy on this vague analogy. But there is a strict and philosophical ana- logy, which consists in the sameness of the immediate effects, or of the modes of operation of the analogous causes, and which indicates the sameness of the causes themselves. This strict analogy subsists between spi- ritual substance, and the substance of heat; the mode of operation of the one, and of the other, is the same; it is expansion ; and this is the point of analogy between them. Spirit, or the substance of heat, pervades all bodies animate, and inanimate. "Whither shall I go from thy "Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence." The Spirit of God is every where, it extends through- out all space, through that which is occupied by body, as well as that which is not. So it is w 7 ith the substance of heat. From its inherent tendency to expand, it dis- seminates itself universally ; it cannot be excluded from any part of space, nor totally abstracted from body. But the phenomena of spiritual substance, that is, OF THOUGHT. 93 perception and sensation, as they appear to our internal consciousness, and as they exhibit themselves through the external signs of feeling, and of enlargement of mind, are much more obvious, or discoverable in the animal and rational worlds, than in the vegetable and mineral. Hence the common opinions taken up with- out investigation, that the spiritual substance belongs exclusively to those higher parts of creation. But if spirit operate by expansion, if it expand in perceiving, and if it is by this mode of operation that it influences and controuls matter, then wherever we observe this phenomenon, expansion, we are bound in reason to in- fer the presence and agency of spirit. But when we seek the phenomena of spirit in other beings beside ourselves, we look not for expansion; for we are not conscious of this mode of operation in per- ceiving ; and if we were, we could not see the expan- sion of other minds, which are invisible; in all orga- nized bodies, the sensative part of the system is furnish- ed with a covering, at all points sufficient to conceal and protect the immediate subject of sensation, though not to exclude all impressions from without. But where we expect to discover the sensative substance, we look for its secondary effects in the actions of the beings or things wherein we expect it to reside ; we look for the external signs, of perception, or feeling, and of choice or volition, in the actions of other beings, and when we perceive a train of actions which manifestly tend to a desirable end, and which are too complex to be the effect of accident, we always infer, that they spring from de- sign, or volition, and that the spiritual substance is pre- sent. That is, where these external signs are exhibited by animal beings, we fail not to recognize the spiritual substance through them. And if we can trace the 94 THE ALPHABET «ame external signs in the vegetable and mineral king- dams, will it not be a fair induction to refer tbem to the same invisible causes, or to infer that they originate in sensation and volition, the operations of spiritual sub- stance. It is not necessary that spirit exhibit the high- est attribute of mind, in order to manifest its existence. Reasoning implies, not only perception, the simple ope- ration of spirit, it implies also the presence of ideas, or of a subject on which reason is exercised, and ideas re- quire bodily organs; reasoning also implies some know- ledge of truth, or of the necessary relations of things. Let us then endeavour to trace those external signs of sensation and volition, in the gradation from a man, to a mineral, and see whether there is a point at which these signs entirely disappear, and at which spirit ceases to exhibit her influence. In man these signs of percep- tion and volition shine forth with superior lustre, for they are blended with the signs of reason, and of high resolve. — Take away reason from man, or take away that internal organ of thought and perception, in which all the external organs meet, and which, being enlarged and extended as the mind acquires new ideas, has the power to reflect, or repeat the ideas at pleasure, and, by comparing and analysing, to discover the relations of things, — take away this organ, and there remains a mere animal, a sensitive system, but without the appa- ratus for reasoning. The simple spirit, or power to perceive, is the same in this as in the former, the same in the mete animal that it is in the rational being; but the organ of comparison, the store house of assorted ideas is gone. Still the organs of sense remain, and the principle of sensation and volition. — Take away then the external organs of seeing, hearing, tasting and smelling, and take away the muscles of locomotion, and OF THOUGHT. 95 we shall no longer have an animal, but we shall have a vegetable ; the system that remains may still vegetate* Does the perceiving substance, or principle of sensation and volition depend on the animal organization? and is it gone with the organs of sense — so called? No, there is an organic system of vegetable life, resembling that of animal life. The vegetable has its secretory organs, it has its circulatory, respiratory and nutritive systems, as well as the animal. Secretion implies selection, or choice, or volition; and this implies perception. The spirit, or perceiving substance still attends us; the vege- table exhibits the external signs of internal feeling and selection, or choice; circulation, respiration and nutri- tion, cannot be accoi nted for from the laws of matter; they cannot be resoived into contraction and repulsion- Now destroy the c ganic system of vegetable life, and the vegetable dies ; .here remains no organized part to supply the want created by the continual exhalation from all bodies th it vegetate. After death the exhala- tion, or decompos stion goes on, for a short time, just as it had done before; presently it becomes more rapid, and at last the eatth returns to the earth as it urns, and the spirit, or pri nciple of vegetable life, ascends to its native element in air; for it is notorious, that after the abstraction of r ason, of animal organization, and of vegetable organization, that which remains is not all matter; it does** not all gravitate and return to dust; a part ascends by its own elevating, or expanding power, — carrying ( with it a portion of the gravitating substance. The expanding principle must, therefore, be an immaterial efficiency, existing independently of any organization. This principle appears to be inca- pable, at least in he present state of the chemical affini- ties; of disengagir/g itself altogether from matter; a fact 90 THE ALPHABET which seeins to be signified in ancient mythology, by Vulcan having fastened an anvil to the feet of Juno, to prevent her escape from the earth, or from the at- mosphere. But to return, wherever the external signs of sensa- tion and volition are observed, there reason perceives spirit. It is not necessary that spirit should reason, to give evidence of its existence ; the faculty of reason- ing is not necessary to constitute a voluntary agent, for the lower animals act voluntarily, though they do not reason. It will be granted that spirit, or the perceiv- ing substance is the principle of knifrial life; that this principle may be traced from mm\ to the elephant, and from the elephant to the oyster. (There, are but a steps from the oyster to the vev.siiihe flan*,., and at each step the external signs of sensatioilj and t tend us. Yet though the externa] ?ip- bs :^ P : obvious, we shall not be aMew&i them here, as when will be denied tha the signs of sgn^fti firm, or deny, i&%tk fcaJste? thtfi Bid shall the objector uh,,t}.,;-. - ; -e j&&t''bite inrn Jnetions itffe voluntary? Mis fellmg l- e Se is :■>■;>•. pr-pof, fcrtit my own observations co&$$ofce im: ; 7 s-?,e h£z>|t ^afee food drink, avoid danger ami $rxk good, $*> ^lu^s this plant; it secretes* of selects fe'juices j)roper}for its sourish- ment ; and it shrinks from danger; ifhe inferiority of its powers to obi:ik fefaese end^ Is oofi prool^f the ab- sence of volitiou, op of ssrxsaiiokj tiiat inferiority con- sists, not in the want of feeling and desire, but in the want of more perfect bodily organs ;< if the phenomena are of the same kind,, though not t$ie same in degree X ! -D J T < iW [h. 3 ■^ce - - xM3 ft ;- tcti sally d . i d ai- OF THOUGHT. 9r with those of animal life, they require tlie same kind of efficient cause. Perhaps in the strict sense of the w< rd volition, the actions of the plant, or indeed of the lower animals, cannot be said to be voluntary. If volition be consi- dered as implying design and forethought, or an ex- pectancy of what is to be the effect of the action, or if it imply a conception of the manner of the action it- self, it would be absurd to attribute all this to the plant. Nor is it necessary to insist that the plant acts volunta- rily in this sense of the word; if it exhibit signs of sen- sation, this is sufficient for our purpose; sensation be- longs to the spirit only. But, it may be said, though the plant is apparently, it is not really sensitive. But how can this be determined, unless we admit the phenomena as evidence of the fact ? We cannot "reason but from "what we know." The plant exhibits the external signs of sensation ; on what established principle is the reality of the fact denied? And after all, how far is the oyster elevated in dignity above the sensitive plant, that we must allow the former to have a spirit, while we deny it to the latter? It will not be denied that the oys- ter is sensitive really; then why not the plant? — In truth there is the same kind of evidence to prove the sensitiveness of the plant, that there is to prove the sen- sitiveness of animals. There are certain actions, or operations in the animal economy which are called involuntary, and which are so with respect to the mind, or to the organs of sense and of reason; but if actions may be termed voluntary on account of their being prompted by sensation, then every action which is not resolvable into gravitation and repulsion, is voluntary. If the oyster acts voluntarily, sn do the organs of animal life. The circulatory, 13 98 THE ALPHABET respiratory, and nutritive systems have their nerves, and their sensations, or they are capable of being sti- mulated, as well as the external organs of sense through which we acquire the knowledge of external objects ; and their peculiar actions arise as really from the influence of the spiritual, or sensitive substance, as do the actions which result from hearing, smelling and tasting, or even from reason. Those organs of animal life do not, indeed, communicate their sensations in a very sensible manner to the mind ; nor do their actions originate thence; each system has its own distinct sen- sations and actions ; hence these actions are involuntary relatively to the mind; but they are not so absolutely. Simple perception, or sensation is absolutely involun- tary, and so are gravitation and repulsion ; but every action, or motion that is not resolvable into gravitation or repulsion, is the result of perception. It is obvious that the sensitive plant perceives, or feels the contact of other bodies; its actions exhibit the signs, or evidences of sensation; and why should the plant be deemed incapable of sensation when the oys- ter is deemed capable ? Though the organization of the animal may be more complex, and more perfect than that of the vegetable, the sensitive substance, or power to feel, is not an effect of organization. The more per- fect, or the more complex the organization, the more extended is the sphere of observation; but perception is not the more real. The meanest vegetable exhibits evidence of sensation; it has a circulatory, a nutritive, and it is said, a respiratory system ; it absorbs particles of air and of light. Its internal organs carry on cer- tain chemical processes, in which liquids are secreted for the nourishment of the plant. This is not the ope- ration of material substance; matter does not exhibit OF THOUGHT. 99 the phenomena of life; it is incapable of being stimulat- ed; wherever there is excitement there must be some- thing to be excited, or to perceive the stimulus. Spirit then is a constituent part of vegetables. But the gradation does not stop here; minerals also are formed by a gradual increase, or growth; they exhibit phenomena which do not belong properly or essentially to matter. We say a vegetable has life, because it is acted on — not mechanically, but according to the laws of life — by the soil, the air, and the light around it; and in its turn acts upon these things, producing chemi- cal changes and assimilating them to its own substance. Minerals also are acted on, not mechanically— and act upon light, heat, air, and other substances in contact with them, producing chemical changes. — In the pheno- mena of chemical combination and decomposition there is something essentially different from the phenomena of simple matter ; there is some principle, or substance that feels and selects, that deserts one combination of sub- stances and enters into another. This is not a mechani- cal operation; it has no connexiou with gravitation, or repulsion. — But a mineral does not crawl, like a worm, therefore it does not feel. Is this a philosophical con- clusion? The mineral has not the organization which enables the worm to crawl ; but it has motions which are not resolvable into simple gravitation and repulsion. Why should oxygene desert one combination and enter into another matter? has no likings or antipathies. The perceiving, selecting substance is probably the stirring agent in all the phenomena of the laboratory; perhaps these phenomena might all be resolved into the contrac- tions and expansions of the material and spiritual sub- stances. iOO THE ALPHABET Methmks I hear some one exclaim, What! the mind, the immortal spirit reside in fire, in air, in vegetables ? Does the carrot feel pain in being prepared for the boiler? Ts the oak sensible of injury when the feller is at work? — What agonies he must feel if this were true; what cruelty to pluck a rose, or even to pull a noxious weed. Can the beneficent author of nature have ordered things so? Can divine goodness have created a universe of sensitive beings, every one the sport of accident, and subject every moment to suffer- ing? A universe in agonies and convulsions ! — Softly, gentle reader. All this is not implied in our doctrine ; when we give free exercise to sentiment, the imagina- tion is apt to carry us far beyond the limit of philosophi- cal truth. Some of those alledged consequences do follow from our theory; but they are also undeniable facts; they are observed in nature, and therefore, in- stead of forming an objection to our theory, they tend to establish it. Independently of inanimate nature, there is a universe, or at least a world of sensitive beings, the sport of accident and the subjects of pain — no disparage- ment to divine goodness; — and there are actual convul- sions of nature, which are not surely the throes of inert matter. But though spiritual substance is a component part of the oak and of the carrot, though the vegetative process is produced by the action of stimulus, and though to be stimulated, implies feeling, or perception, yet it does not imply that the oak or the carrot is sensi- ble of pain. Pain is more than simple perception; pain is the perception of evil. Though the tree perceive, or feel certain things, it may not perceive this particular object, that is, evil; it will of course, not perceive all that a more perfectly organized being will perceive; and though it should perceive the stroke of the axe^— OF THOUGHT. 101 which however has not been affirmed,— yet it may not perceive any evil in that stroke, it may not experience any pain. A vegetable may be calculated to feel the stimulating qualities of the soil about its roots, without being capable of perceiving injury in its own destruc- tion. But were it admitted that these things feel pain under the knife or the axe, should this shock our reason more than that the lobster should exercise the perceptive faculty, or should it do more violence to our feelings than the death of an ox? Would it, even in that case, be more cruel to pluck a rose, than to draw a fish from the Mater? Spiritual substance is in its own nature immortal; but individual spirits, beings, parts separated from the common element, and joined to a portion of material substance, or power, are of course subject in themselves to decomposition, or dissolution. Their immortality is a gift. Spirits are immortal from no other cause, or necessity, than their being self-existent. No being can exist independently, in an absolute sense, unless it is self-existent; God himself cannot make a being inde- pendent of Himself. Spiritual substance is the principle of animal and of vegetable life, and it is concerned in the production of all those phenomena of inanimate nature which cannot be resolved into gravitation or repulsion. That the Supreme Deity is the immediate efficient agent in all the phenomena of vegetable growth, and decomposition, as well as in all the combinations and decompositions of mineral substances, is a doctrine that is both impious and absurd ; it attributes all the deformities, all the abortions, and all the decompositions and disgusting changes and appearances to the immediate agency of—,- we dare not finish the sentence. CHAPTER V. OF THE NATURE OF TRUTH. Pilate asked, What is truth? — and it is still made a question, what is the correct definition of truth. Some have professed to believe that there is really no such thing as truth. To this day it is believed and taught that there are no necessary truths in natural philosophy; but this belief arises out of the principle, that substances are made of nothing, and have no necessary relations; for to affirm a truth, is to affirm some relation of things. It is even now set down as undeniable, that truth is not a real, substantial thing, that it has no efficiency in it- self, and performs no part in nature. It is thence that it is believed to have no infallible criterion, and to be incapable of being logically defined. Yet though we should not be allowed to call truth by the general name of substance, it will readily be allow- ed to be self-existent, or necessary, and eternal ; we shall hardly be permitted to say that truth is an efficient cause, and the basis of a specific phenomenon ; yet we think it will be granted, that there is a certain state of things which cannot exist without the influence, or ope- ration of truth, that it is necessary to order, harmony, beauty — It is implied in our systems of religion, that truth is the conservator of the soul ; and in our ethics, that it is the bond of society, and the source of all that is fair, and lovely, and honorable, and of good report.—- Yet this theory, correct in itself, and founded in reason and fact, as well as in revelation, is accompanied with a OF THOUGHT. 103 vague belief, or theoretical assumption that the conser- vative and beautifying qualities of truth belong to it only by appointment, and depend on the arbitrary will of the Creator. In the modern schools of philosophy and me- taphysics, instead of its being believed and taught that Truth makes the Creator to be what He is, holy, and upright, and just, it is believed and inculcated that the Creator makes truth to be what it is, to be the light of all who possess it. The scholastic theory of truth is precisely similar to that of material substance, — that its phenomena are not produced by its own necessary tendency, or by its own efficiency, and that they are connected with the substance only incidentally, or by divine appointment; — or, that the Creator makes power to be what it is, instead of power being; an essential part of his Being. This coin- cidence in the theories respecting truth, and material substance, might have suggested the thought, and have led to the inquiry whether truth may not be a substance, whether it may not have the same generical characteris- tic with matter. But it seems to be considered an in- dubitable fact, that truth has no quality, or phenomenon, no sensible appearance, or form by which to distinguish it from other realities ; nor any characteristic in common with any other objects of knowledge, by which it may be referred to a class, or genus. Hence it is that truth is deemed incapable of being defined, for a logical defi- nition points out the genus, and the specific difference of the thing defined. If truth belongs to no genus, or if it possess no characteristic in common with some other things ; and if it exhibit no phenomenon by which it can be distinguished from other objects, and by which at the same time it manifests its own existence or reality, then of necessitv it is undefinable, But if this were its i04 THE ALPHABET character, or its no character — it would be un discover, able too, it would be impossible to know, or perceive it : for truth is not perceived immediately or in a direct man- ner, as phenomena, or operations are ; truth is an invi- sible thing. To arrive at a correct knowledge and right definition of truth, the best, and perhaps the only successful me- thod, is that recommended by Sir Francis Bacon, that is, the investigation of facts. We must analyse the manner in which truth is actually perceived ; and we must inquire what is, in fact, the object of the mind in the perception of truth-— or what is the precise thing to which we give the general appellation of truth. It should be inquired whether truth has a resemblance, in any one point, to any other object, and whether it is ne- cessarily or uniformly attended with a specific phenome- non. If it be suggested that truth cannot be a substance, — we would ask, Why ? Is it because truth does not gra- vitate and repel, that we must not refer it to this genus? Is it because it is not tangible ? Gravitation and repul- sion characterize the species, not the genus ; they are peculiar to matter, and distinguish it from spirit and from truth — Spirit does not gravitate, and yet it is a sub- stance; it is a substance, because it is the efficient cause of a phenomenon \ it is spiritual substance, because its phenomenon is perception. If truth exhibit any species of phenomenon, if any effect is proper to truth only, then truth is the efficient cause of that phenomenon, or effect, and is a substantial, or indestructible being. The definitions heretofore offered of truth have gene- rally given a partial view of that object. Writers paint that aspect of truth with which they happen to be most familiar : or they describe the peculiarities jof the class OF THOUGHT. 105 of truths which their particular pursuits have led them to investigate. But a regular definition should point out the characteristic which is common to all classes of truth, and which at the same time distinguishes truth from every other species of the same genus, that is, from every other substance, this is to point out the "spe- cific difference ;" and it should point out the genus, or the characteristic which it has in common with some other objects of knowledge — that is, with other sub- stances. "Truth," says Mr. Wollaston, "is the conformity of "those words or signs by which things are expressed, "to the things themselves." "Truth," says Dr. Tatham, "is of the nature and "essence of God ; like Him incomprehensible in the "whole, and ineffable in its sublimer parts. For these "and other reasons it cannot admit of an adequate defi- "nition.—*- God is Mind," continues the Doctor, "and "truth is consequently an attribute of mind." "I account that to be truth," says Dr. Beattie, "which "the constitution of our nature determines us to believe; "and that to be falsehood which the constitution of our "nature determines us to disbelieve." None of these definitions are logically regular; it is probable the authors did not intend them for such. We should indeed except that by Dr. Tatham, for though he professes to believe that truth "cannot admit of an "adequate definition," yet the latter part of the above extract: — "Truth is an attribute of mind," is a defini- tion in the very form prescribed by the father of dia- lectic. "Attribute" is the genus; "of mind," the spe- cific difference. But though this definition is logically regular, it is not philosophical ; it does not distinguish truth, from power, for this sect of philosophers define 11, 106 THE ALPHABET power in the same words, Power is an attribute o? mind. Now truth, and poiver are essentially different from each other, and they cannot both he properly de- fined by saying they are attributes of mind. But if the word attribute mean a phenomenon, or operation, then neither truth nor power are attributes, they are not phe- nomena. Truth has no necessary relation to mind; if it had, the brutes would possess it, there would be no irrational minds, none incapable of moral perception. But the knowledge of truth involves the exercise of rea- son; hence, mind may exist without truth, and truth certainly exists independently of mind. Truth is the efficient cause of harmony. Truth is a substance, a self- existent, indestructible being; and like other substances it is distinguished by, and perceived through a specific phenomenon. Dr. Wollaston took his idea of truth from oue class of truths, the truth of words, or historical truth; and his„ definition is formed on this particular view, or on the connexion between truth as it is in itself, and the words by which it is expressed. "Truth," says he, i% the conformity of words or signs to the things ex- "pressed. 5? This is truth as opposed to falsehood ; nothing but words, or artificial signs can be falsified. But truth exists independently of words, and is to be distinguished from other things, as well as from false- liood ; and we shall find, that the characteristic by which truth is distinguished from other species of the same genus, that is, from other substances, is also the only infallible criterion hv which to distinguish truth from falsehood and error. Harmony is the characteris- tic of truth, and constitutes demonstrative evidence. But this class of truths, the truth of "words," would be more accurately defined by saying, that it is the OF THOUGHT. 10f conformity of jjropositions to the relations of things as they really exist. Single words express "things," but single words do not express truths. The word power expresses a certain object of knowledge, but it expres- ses neither truth nor falsehood. It is only when words affirm, or deny some relation of things, that they are either true or false. Every proposition affirms some relation of things; and a proposition is true, when it expresses the real, and none but the real relations of things, the relations as to time, place, action, cause, ef- fect, &c. When we say power produces motion, we affirm a specific relation, the relation of cause and effect, between power and motion. The truth affirmed, or "expressed" in this proposition, is that relation of cause and effect, between power and motion; but the truth of the proposition, is its relation of conformity to that relation of cause and effect as it really is. The truth of the proposition, and the truth expressed by the proposition, are different truths; the last, viz. that power produces motion, is a necessary eternal truth; but the first, the conformity of the proposition to the eternal relation, is an incidental truth; as words are only the conventional and arbitrary signs of things, they can have no natural or necessary conformity to the things they express. Hence words, and even propositions may have a "conformity" to things, and yet be false ; if this were not so, there could be no such thing as falsehood. I may say, matter perceives. The words of this proposition have a conformity to the things they express, and to the relation also which they ex- press; they affirm the relation of cause and effect, or of agent and operation, between matter and perception. But though matter, and perception are both real objects, no such relation subsists between them, therefore the 108 THE ALPHABET proposition is false. Words have always a conformity, an artificial conformity, to the things they express 5 otherwise they would not be the signs of those things ; but they sometimes affirm relations which do not exist, or which do not belong to the things of which they are affirmed ; and it is then they are false. Dr. Beattie's remarks apply, almost exclusively, to general and necessary truths; for it is only this class of truths of which it may in some sense be said, that "the constitution of our nature determines us to believe" them ; that is, when the evidence of a truth is presented to a mind unbiassed, and capable of appreciating, or of perceiving the nature of evidence, that mind necessarily believes, or perceives the truth. But the mind in its best state, is not determined by its constitution alone, and independently of evidence, to the belief, or percep- tion of any specific truth ; if it were, it should have that perception, or a knowledge of that truth, from the ear- liest moment of its existence. As soon as mind exists, it perceives; "the constitution of its nature" absolutely determines it to perception, but not to the perception of truth, or of any particular object. The perception of a particular object depends on external circumstances, as well as on the constitution of the mind. Every truth is a relation of some two things; and when the mind has a knowledge of those things, and perceives some necessary relation arising from the nature of the things, then it perceives a necessary truth. But the Doctor's remarks are not universally true even of general or necessary truths. The "constitution of our nature" is not so infallible, as uniformly, or necessarily to exclude the belief of falsehood; hence, belief is not the criterion of truth, nor disbelief, of false- hood. The Doctor's definition of truth seems to imply, OF THOUGHT. [ 109 that the constitution of the mind is such, that it will necessarily believe truth, and reject falsehood. But if this were true, the circumstance would characterize, not the truth, but the mind ; it would characterize the mind, which perceives, not the object perceived, Perception is the operation of mind, and the perception of truth characterizes the rational mind ; but to be perceived does not characterize any thing, does not distinguish one thing from another. Besides, it is a notorious fact that we are often deceived, that we often mistake false- hood for self-evident necessary truth. This arises, not from the want of an infallible criterion of truth, but from the fallibility of the human mind. — Considering the dif- ficulty which arises in many cases, in ascertaining the truth, the single circumstance, that we believe a propo- sition, is not a sufficient test of its truth. The perception, or belief of truth, is characteristic of the mind, rather than of truth ; that is, it distinguishes the rational mind from the irrational. Although the perception of truth do not arise from the constitution of the mind necessarily, nor even from that of the rational mind, independently of evidence, yet the perception of truth constitutes rationality; when the two causes meet, when evidence, the existing cause, is presented to the rational mind, the efficient cause, the effect, the percep- tion of truth necessarily follows. And though there are other invisible objects beside truth, the knowledge of which are acquired through the medium of evidence, the perception of any object through the medium of evi- dence, involves the perception of truth, or of some ne- cessary relation. Every logical deduction, implies the perception of a necessary relation between the conclu? sion and the premises. HO THE ALPHABET It is a singular anomaly in philosophy, to represent the perception of truth as characterizing truth, and at the same time as arising necessarily from the "constitu- tion of our nature ;" or from the constitution of the mind. Dr. Eeattie is not singular in this. The per- ception of truth is a complex phenomenon, it does not arise, singly, either from the constitution of the mind, nor from the nature of truth; and therefore is not the distinguishing characteristic of either. Perception is thQ characteristic of Mind, or of Spirit, — harmony is that of Truth.— Truth exists independently of the mind, and of being perceived; therefore, the perception of truth does not characterize truth; and the human mind exists long before it is capable of perceiving the nature of truth and evidence, therefore the perception of truth does not arise necessarily from the constitution of the mind. Before the mind can perceive necessary truth, it must be capable of appreciating evidence. That belief does not characterize truth is demonstrat- ed by the fact, that there are other invisible objects of knowledge, which are essentially different from truth, but which produce in the mind as firm a conviction of their reality as truth can do. Hence truth is to be dis- tinguished, and it is in fact distinguished, not from false- hood only, which should be disbelieved, but also from other real objects of belief Power, or material sub- stance presents itself to the mind by an evidence, or a criterion as infallible as that of truth, and obtains as firm a belief in its reality ; y&t that belief does not charac- terize power, because there are other objects, different from power, which produce belief. The distinguishing characteristic of power, is motion, its own peculiar phe- nomenon ; motion is the immediate effect, or the opera- tion, of. power; belief is the remote effect, produced in OF THOUGHT. Ill the mind by the operation upon the external organs of sense. Belief therefore is an incidental, and not a ne- cessary effect of the existence of power.— And the dis- tinguishing characteristic of truth is its own peculiar phenomenon, that is, harmony ; the belief, or perception of truth is the remote effect, of which, harmony is the exciting, or secondary cause. Mind is the efficient cause of perception, but Truth is the efficient cause of harmony. Br. Tatham seems to have had in his mind's eye, truth as it is distinguished from other real beings, or substances. He says, "Truth is of the Essence of "God ;" that is to say, truth is of the Substance, or Be- ing of God. He seems to have had a vision of truth in her genuine form ; but he has had also some theoretical notions, which threw an obscurity over the etbject of his contemplation, and infused themselves into his definition. The truth seems to have forced itself upon his mind, in despite of a theory which he held in opposition to it : for he tells us that "Truth is of the Essence of God ;" but again he says, "'Truth is an attribute" He re- fers truth first to the genus substance, or essence; and again he refers it to the genus attribute, or quality. Now an essence, and an attribute are distinct things ; substance, and quality are different genera. Although truth belongs essentially to God, it is certainly incorrect language to say that truth is an attribute of God. Truth is the basis of certain attributes of God, of justice, holiness, beauty; these are attributes of God; but they are attributes of a God of truth; a God without truth would not be holy, or just, would have no beauty in His character, any more than a God without power would be sublime and awful, an object of admiration and of fear. lie THE ALPHABET Truth is the efficient cause of harmony — or of beauty, which is harmony, or proportion of form, or of parts. Harmony is a simple phenomenon different from either motion, or perception, and requires a distinct efficient cause. Truth is the only cause which is adequate to the production of harmony; neither power, nor spirit. unconnected with truth, produces this phenomenon. The operation of power is motion; that of spirit, 'percep- tion; harmony is an operation distinct from either, and requires a distinct efficient cause. In fact the human mind, wherever it is capable of reasoning, or of the exercise of common sense, assigns a distinct efficient cause to this phenomenon. Wherever harmony, or beauty is exhibited to the senses, or to the mind, it is referred to truth as its ultimate cause, or that which is necessarily at the foundation of the phenomenon. — Har- mony indeed never exhibits itself to the senses but in connexion with the phenomena of power ; the writing of a proposition, and the sound of the words which convey a truth, are operations of mechanical power; but no one confounds the truth of a proposition with the sound of the words, or with the written characters. Yet though common sense distinguishes practically the sound from the sense, when philosophy comes to investigate the distinctive character of truth, she is apt to confound that character with its adjuncts ; she invariably brings along with her some dogma which she throws over truth, and then judges of her character through this false medium. — In music, harmony is connected with sound, but the harmony is a phenomenon distinct from the sound; the efficient cause, or principle of the sound, is mechanical power; but the principle of the harmony, or the first principles of music, are certain immutable rules, or truths. No one ever thinks of ascribing music OF THOUGHT. 113 to power as its sole, or as its efficient cause ; when the foundation, or first principles of music is sought for, it is sought among the truths. We practically recognize the necessary relation of truth and harmony, both in common life, and in the sciences; the harmony of a truth which is sought, with a truth already known, is the evidence, or the test of the genuineness of the former. Truth is always consistent with truth, or in harmony with truth. Truth is the foundation of beauty, or of harmony of parts in form, or figure ; such as beauty of architecture, beauty of person, &c. Architecture is an art founded on certain principles, or truths, and never could be brought to any degree of perfection independently of those principles; neither is personal beauty produced by its divine author at random, or without truth and science. "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of "his way, before his works of old. When he prepared "the heavens I was there." — Truth is the foundation of moral beauty; it is the basis of honour, integrity, jus- tice, &c. Harmony constitutes demonstrative evidence, or it is the criterion of mathematical and metaphysical truths Every demonstration in geometry proceeds upon the harmony, or agreement of the proposition, with the de- finition, or diagram to which the proposition relates. Thus, if it is to be demonstrated that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; the mathe- matician proceeds to analyse the two angles and the three angles, and when it is found that from their na- ture they necessarily harmonize with what is affirmed in the proposition, then the proposition is demonstrated to be a universal truth. The axioms are established on the same species of evidence, their harmony with the 15 114 THE ALPHABET definitions. Two straight lines cannot intersect each other in more points than one. This truth is said to be perceived intuitively, or without reasoning and with- out evidence. But this is not the fact. This negative principle may be resolved into the positive fact, that when two straight lines intersect each other, the farther they are produced the farther they diverge. This ge- neral fact is immediately founded in the definition — A straight line is the shortest that can he drawn between two points. Every negative principle, if genuine, is founded in some positive principle, which is ultimately founded in the definition, or predicament of the thing to which the principle relates. And it is the harmony of the axiom with the definition, or predicament of the thing to which the axiom relates, that is the evidence of the truth of the latter, and establishes it beyond con- tradiction. It is the same in metaphysics. Definition. Matter is the efficient cause of gravitation. Hence the axiom — Gravitatidn is a universal lata of matter, or, matter gravitates uniformly, and nothing but matter gravitates. This axiom has no other foundation than in that defini- tion, or in the nature of material substance ; and it evi- dently implies, and is implied in that definition, that matter is the efficient cause of gravitation. If matter is the efficient cause of gravitation, and if like causes pro- duce like effects, then gravitation is a universal law of matter : but if matter is not the efficient cause of gravi- tation, and if it is not a universal truth, that like causes produce like effects, then the axiom that matter gravi- tates uniformly, or at all times and all places and cir- cumstances, is a groundless assumption. But the defi nition is in fact recognized in the axiom; and it is the perfect harmony of the axiom, with the definition. OF THOUGHT. 115 or with the known and tacitly recognized predicament of matter, that demonstrates the genuineness of the axiom. In auy syllogism, it is the harmony of the con- clusion, with the premises, that constitutes the evidence , or proves the truth of the conclusion. Every invisible object of knowledge manifests itself to the mind through the evidence of some phenomenon, or of an operation which is immediately perceived ; gravitation is the evi- dence of the existence of matter, or of power ; percep- tion is the evidence of the existence of spirit; and har- mony is the evidence of the reality of truth. But it may be asked, If harmony is the infallible cri- terion of truth, and is generally recognized as such, how do we ever come to be deceived? If harmony is neces- sarily connected with truth, and if it uniformly excite the belief, or perception of truth, what is it that excites the belief of that which is false? How is it that we sometimes imagine that we perceive a truth, when no truth, but a falsehood is presented to the mind?— This anomaly does not arise from the nature of truth, nor from the nature of demonstrative evidence; but from the imperfection of human knowledge ; it does not arise from the want of an infallible criterion of truth, but from the fallibility of the human mind. Without entering into any elaborate discussion of the causes and consequences of this imperfection, we will simply state a few facts. Although harmony uniformly attends truth, and uniformly produces the perception of truth in the reasoning mind, yet the mind, as well as the ear, is sometimes deceived by an imperfect harmony ; — or, though truth must harmonize with truth, so falsehood may harmonize with falsehood, while from the limited, ness of our knowledge, we may not be possessed of the fundamental truths with which those falsehoods do not 116 THE ALPHABET harmonize, and which would prove their fallacy. Hence, a superficial knowledge of a subject, sometimes leads to greater absurdities than perfect ignorance ; and hence the necessity for ascending to first principles when any difficulty is to be solved. Every real truth will be found in harmony, and false- hood will be discordant, with the true definition of the thing to which they relate, or of which they are affirm- ed. An instance of this has been given in the chapter on material substance. That "Power cannot be with- out a subject," is a principle very similar to the axiom, two straight lines cannot intersect each other in more points than one. That is, these principles are similar in a logical point of view, or considered as principles of reasoning; they differ in the subjects they relate to, the one relating to the nature of power, the other to the na- ture of a straight line. They are both axioms; and they are both negatives ; and each is resolvable into the definition of the thing to which it relates. They both appear intuitively certain^ or they appear certain from their harmony with the definitions to which they respec- tively relate. Harmony is intuitive evidence. That two straight lines cannot intersect each other in more points than one, is a genuine truth, because it is found- ed in, or harmonizes with the true definition of a straight line. But the metaphysical axiom is false, because it is founded in a false definition of power. The axiom, power cannot be without a subject, takes for granted that power is an attribute, a quality, or the operation of a cause. It supposes that power is con- nected with spirit in the relation of cause and effect ; it supposes power to have the same relation to spirit, that perception has to spirit, or the same that motion has to power. But all this is false and absurd; power is, OF THOUGHT. 117 not the operation of a cause, but the efficient cause of an operation. So that instead of real and perfect harmony, this axiom, power cannot be without a subject, has pro- duced confusion and "harsh discord" in metaphysical science. But when it is brought to the touchstone of genuine fact, it betrays its unsubstantiality, it vanishes like the shadows of the night at the approach of the morning. Thus mathematics and metaphysics proceed upon the principle that harmony is the characteristic of truth. Prophets and poets recognize the same princi- ple. Truth and harmony, or beauty, are associated in their writings, in a way that plainly indicates a convic- tion in the minds of the writers, that those two things are necessarily connected. The prophets and apostles claim the first notice. The song of Solomon contains a variety of rapturous expressions of the beauty of the church and its King, of both which truth is the foundation and distinguish- ing characteristic. Many of those expressions are highly figurative ; but some of them are plain, and the sense incontrovertible. — "Thou art beautiful, O my "love, as Tirza; comely as Jerusalem." — "Behold, "thou art fair, ray love ; behold, thou art fair." — "Thou art all /air, my love; there is no spot in thee." — "My beloved is white and ruddy, the chief among ten "thousand, — yea, he is altogether lovely." — King Da- vid who is a prophet and a poet says, "Thou art fairer "than the children of men, grace is poured into thy "lips." St. Paul associates truth, with beauty thus : "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are "honest, just, pure, whatsoever things are lovely," or fieauttful, and "of good report." 118 THE ALPHABET The works of poets furnish the most ample testimony in favor of the connexion between Truth and Harmony. "Goddess of the lyre, "Which rules the accents of the moving- spheres, "Wilt thou, eternal Harmony descend "And join this festive train ? for with thee comes "The guide, the guardian of their lovely sports, "Majestic Tnith ,"* "Thus was beauty sent from heaven, "The lovely ministress of Truth and good "In this dark world ; for Truth and good are one. "And beauty dwells in them, and they in her, "With like participation."* "Alas ! how faint, "How slow the dawn, of beauty and of truth "Breaks the reluctant shades of gothic night "Which yet involve the nations !"* "Blest be the day I 'scaped the wrangling crew, "Of Phyro's maze, — — * Cf And held high converse with the god-like few, "Who to th* enraptur'd heart, and ear, and eye, "Teach beauty, virtue, truth, and love, and melody ."f In these stanzas the connexion of truth with beauty, or with harmony, is affirmed in direct terms ; and there are innumerable instances in the works of the poets, in which this connection is implied. We will notice a few. "Is there a heart which music cannot melt ? "Alas ! how is that rugged heart forlorn ! "He needs not woo the Muse, he is her scorn, "The sophists rope of cobweb he shall twine ; "Mope ov'r the schoolman's peevish page, and mourn."? " Song is but the eloquence of Truth."H * Akenside. f Beattie's Minstrel, t Minstrel. fGampbelL OF THOUGHT. 119 "The only amaranthine flow'r on earth "Is virtue,* the only lasting treasure truth."f "Where now that gloom which hid "Fair Truth from vulgar ken.—- $ The epithets fair, lovely, beautiful, and sweet, are applied to truth, but never to power, nor to spirit. Power is sublime; spirit, or mind is interesting, or is the object of benevolence; but truth is fair,* beautiful, or lovely. Truth is a substance, a being, or thing which has a permanent existence, and is the basis of a specific phe- nomenon. In many minds the general term substance is associated with the idea of a particular species ; that is, with the idea of material substance. To these minds the general term conveys no general meaning; it con- veys only the ideas of gravitation and repulsion, or of solid ponderous being; — they can hardly conceive of substance that is not tangible. Yet we have the same kind of evidence for the existence and substantiality of truth, that we have for the existence and substantiality of matter, or of spirit ; truth, like these other things, is the subject of a quality, or the basis of a phenomenon. A specific phenomenon is acknowledged both by the senses and by the mind ; reason, or common sense as- signs to this phenomenon a specific efficient cause, or invisible basis; and that basis we denominate truth, But as in the perception of gravitation and of matter, we are apt to confound the perception of the phenome- non, with the perception of the substance ; so it is with respect to truth and harmony, we are apt to confound the perception of harmony, with the perception of truth. * Virtuey moral beauty, f Cowper. t More, 120 THE ALPHABET But truth is too shadowy a thing to be conceived of as a substance ; we cannot handle it with our hands, or shape it into form, figure. Very right; truth is a subborn thing; it will give an impression, but receive none. Is it then more shadowy than spirit, which re- ceives, but does not give impressions? Would not power* or matter appear as shadowy, if we were in the habit of withdrawing the senses from the observation of its phenomena ? But it is hard to conceive of truth as exercising an efficiency, as being an operative cause. It is true, we cannot conceive why truth operates, or why it produces harmony, but we do conceive the fact, we know that harmony is the offspring and evidence of truth. But this does not satisfy us, our metaphysical predilections demand something more ; we are not content with the knowledge of an efficient, unless we can also discover a final cause, a reason for every phenomenon. There is a rooted prejudice in the mind which supposes, that every operation, whether simple or complex, is, in some way or other, the effect of volition ; that mind, or spirit is the only ultimate efficient cause in existence, and power, and truth are secondary causes, or attributes, ( qualities. J But we cannot tell why truth harmonizes, any more than we can tell why matter gravitates. — We shall hereafter consider of the reason why, or the manner in which truth affects the external organs- of sense; it will be shewn, that truth affects the senses by means of its harmony, or its sweetness ; but this is a different tiling from giving a reason why, or accounting for the fact, that truth produces harmony. We can give the causes of gravitation and of harmony, but we can give no rea- son why the one cause produces gravitation, or why the OF THOUGHT. 121 other produces harmony. These are ultimate facts ; they caunot be accounted for, otherwise than by attri- buting the phenomena to their respective ultimate causes. Gravitation and harmony are not voluntary operations, considering each with respect to its proper efficient cause; power contracts, or matter gravitates — necessari- ly, not voluntarily; and truth harmonizes, not voluntari- ly, but necessarily. Harmony, or beauty is the idea, the image, or visible form of the invisible substance called truth. Though it may be thought difficult to comprehend, or extravagant to affirm a universal and necessary relation between truth, and harmony, there is nevertheless a vague belief of the fact universal among mankind. And it is not so much the fact, as it is the ground, or evidence of the necessity and universality of the fact, that we sometimes puzzle ourselves about. Some are of opinion, that demonstration belongs exclusively to. the mathema- tical sciences ; yet there is nothing more common than to talk of demonstration, and to effect it too, in moral and natural philosophy. But there is much greater diversity of opinion about what it is that constitutes demonstrative evidence, or what is the criterion of truth. Tn the philosophy of matter and spirit, we proceed by investigating facts ; and we judge of the nature or character of these invisi- ble objects, by their phenomena. Their phenomena constitute their character. And in the philosophy of truth, is it not proper to proceed in a similar manner? This, too, is confessedly an invisible object of know- ledge ; and the way to arrive at a philosophical defini- tion of this object, is to investigate the facts relating to it, the manner in which the mind acquires a knowledge of it, or to inquire what is the/orm, the dress, the visible 16 122 THE ALPHABET operation, or the phenomenon through, or in which this invisible object presents itself to the mind. All are agreed that there is such a thing as demon- strative evidence, or an appropriate medium, a species of evidence which renders the truth perfectly certain. The question is, what is, precisely, that species of evi- dence? Some seem to suppose, that in any act of rea- soning, the premises is the evidence of the truth of the conclusion, or that one truth is evidence of another. But how is the truth of the premises perceived ? It is an invisible object as well as the truth of the conclusion. To say that one truth is evidence of another truth, or that one truth causes another to be perceived, is just about as correct as to say, that one body causes another to move, when it is well known, that it is not the one body at rest, or simply, because it is body, that causes the other to move, but that it is the one body in motion that impels, or causes the other to move. So it is with truth; the one truth does not cause the other to be per- ceived, or to manifest itself to the mind, but it is the phenomenon, it is the harmony of the truth of the con- clusion, with the truth of the premises, that demonstrates the former. Evidence in its very nature is something perceived immediately; but truth is not perceived im- mediately; it is therefore not one truth that demon- strates another truth, or causes it to be perceived; any more than a body at rest, makes an impression upon another body, or causes it to move ; but it is the pheno- menon, the harmony of truth with truth, that demon- strates its reality. The simple fact, that harmony is connected with truth, is discovered in the first place by observation, or in the same way that we discover that gravitation is connected with matter; but the ground of the univer- OF THOUGHT. 123 sality of that connexion, or of that fact, is to be found only in the nature of the things themselves. In an analysis of the natures of truth, and harmony, we find that the one is an effect, of which the other is the ef- ficient cause, or is that, without which the effect cannot he produced; hence they are universally connected. The unsophisticated mind goes directly to this result ; common sense, in the pursuit of truth, takes for granted her necessary connexion with harmony, and whatever is found in this garb, is received as truth. But when the philosopher comes to define truth, he thinks it necessary to assign her some metaphysical character, or some in- visible dress ; and thus places her out of sight altogether, and beyond the reach of inquiry. It is hard to conceive of power as being the efficient cause of certain phenomena of matter, because these phenomena are sometimes associated with the pheno- mena of mind ; and because of the long cherished belief that power is an attribute of mind, and that all the phenomena of matter some way or other depend on mind. And for a similar reason it is hard to conceive of truth as being the efficient cause of harmony; it is because harmony is associated with the phenomena of both matter and spirit. Because harmony of sound is produced under the direction of mind, there is a vague belief that mind, or spirit is the ultimate cause of har- mony in general, and of truth also. But the mind that hath music in itself must have been previously possess- ed of truth ; it must have acquired, in an analysis of the phenomena, those mathematical principles of quan- tity and number, which constitute the first principles of music. Even a child who performs a regular tune, must in some measure comprehend these principles, and must in some sort have performed this analysis ; else 124 THE ALPHABET how should he make his quantities aad numbers con- form to the rules of harmony. Beauty of architecture consists in the harmony, or right proportion of parts, and this we are wont to ascribe to the mind of the architect, as the ultimate cause of the phenomenon, the beauty ; and it is just to do so ; but it is to a mind informed, or possessed of the first truths, or rules of the art. A mind uninformed of those first truths, has no capacity to create beauty; as soon should we expect impulse where there is no power, as beauty, or harmony where there is no truth. Truth is essential to all the arts, as much so to painting, and to poetry, as to music or to architecture. Truth is not an attribute of mind, nor is it essential to the existence of mind; yet truth is undoubtedly a constituent element of every reasoning mind ; for reason is employed only in the acquisition of truth, or in dis- covering the relations of things. The spiritual sub- stance is also a constituent element of the substance of the mind; it is a distinct thing from truth, and exists without it ; as truth may, and does exist independently of spirit. It will not be denied that truth is indepen- dent of mind. That two and two are equal to four, is a truth though it be not perceived. Truth is not an at- tribute, or operation of the mind ; it is not an operation at all. It is only by confounding the perception of truth, with truth itself, that we come to call the latter an attribute of mind. Perception is the attribute of mind ; truth is the subject of the attribute of harmony. If truth is not the efficient cause of harmony, there is no adequate cause of this phenomenon, that has been discovered; or, contrary to the habitual proceeding of reason, she has not assigned a specific ultimate cause, to this specific phenomenon. If truth were not that OF THOUGHT. 125 cause, or were not recognized as such, we should then have a phenomenon, or quality, without a substance, or basis, — an operation, without an adequate cause; we should have truth, a thing independent in its nature, and eternally existent, yet producing no effect in nature, sustaining no part in the universe of being. We should have a being, or thing invisible in itself, and exhibiting no visible operation, no evidence of its existence, and yet perceived by the mind ; perceived neither mediately, nor immediately, yet perceived. We should have a cause without an effect, and an effect without a cause; or rather, an effect and its cause disjoined — uncon- nected. Truth is but a name, if it be not an efficient cause. We have n