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 The Blockade of 
 Soviet Russia 
 
 I. Official Documents 
 
 11. Statements 
 
 III. Editorial Comments 
 
 IV. Articles 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 The Committee for the 
 
 Regeneration o/" Russia 
 
 1920 
 

 I 
 
Foreword 
 
 The object of this booklet is to gather under one cover 
 some of the official documents concerning the recent 
 action of the Supreme Council in Paris in partially lift- 
 ing the blockade of Soviet Russia, as well as different 
 opinions upon this action, both for and against it. 
 
 The position of the Committee for the Regeneration 
 of Russia is made perfectly clear in its official state- 
 ment, published in this booklet. 
 
 The opinions gathered here bring out, we believe, the 
 following points : 
 
 1. That the co-operative unions, through which the 
 Supreme Council expects to conduct trade, are under 
 the control of the Soviet Government. This is asserted 
 by the anti-Bolshevik elements, and admitted by both 
 the representatives of the Bolsheviki and those of the 
 Co-operatives. 
 
 2. That trade dealings with the Co-operatives would 
 be equivalent to trading with the Soviet Government 
 and, therefore, strengthening its strangle-hold on the 
 people of Russia. 
 
 3. That in any event trade with Russia is" impossible 
 on anything like an adequate scale, because of lack of 
 credits, of raw materials for export, and because of the 
 general disorganization of the country. 
 
 4. That the alleviation of Russia's fearful condition 
 will not be possible until Russia has a truly representa- 
 tive government, capable of organizing the political and 
 economic life of the country. 
 
 The Committee for the Regeneration of Russia. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 1. Text of the Announcement of the Supreme Council 
 
 Page 
 
 7 
 
 II. 
 
 Note of the Supreme Council 
 
 III. Statements of 
 
 1. Committee for the Regeneration of Russia 
 
 2. The Russian Embassy .... 
 
 3. V. N. Bashkiroff 
 
 4. Russian Economic League .... 
 
 5. The American-Russian Chamber of Commerce 
 
 6. I. G. Znamensky ..... 
 
 7. J. OkuHtch 
 
 8. A. Berkenheim ...... 
 
 9. M. Litvinoff 
 
 10. Russian Soviet Government Bureau 
 
 11. Santeri Nuorteva ...... 
 
 12. C. Krovopouskov . . . 
 
 13. C. Morosof¥ 
 
 14. Dr. I. J. Sherman 
 
 15. Alexander Zelenko ..... 
 
 16. Herbert Hoover . . . 
 
 17. Dr. E. E. Pratt 
 
 18. American Defense Society 
 
 IV. Editorial Comments 
 
 1. New York Times ...... 
 
 2. Philadelphia Public Ledger 
 
 3. New York Tribune ..... 
 
 4. New York World 
 
 5. N. Y. Evening Post 
 
 6. Boston Evening Transcript .... 
 
 V. Articles 
 
 L Trading with Russia, by Jerome Landheld 
 2. Lifting the Blockade, by Leo Pasvolsky 
 
 10 
 11 
 
 12 
 14 
 15 
 17 
 18 
 20 
 21 
 21 
 22 
 23 
 23 
 24 
 25 
 26 
 27 
 28 
 
 29 
 30 
 31 
 32 
 33 
 34 
 
 35 
 
 37 
 
♦ 
 
Text of the Announcement by the 
 
 Supreme Council in Paris Concerning 
 
 the Lifting of the Blockade. 
 
 Issued by the State Department, on January 16, 1920. 
 
 With a view of remedying the unhappy situation of 
 the population in the interior of Russia, which is now 
 deprived of all manufactured products from outside of 
 Russia, the Supreme Council, after taking note of the 
 report of a committee appointed to consider the re- 
 opening of certain trade relations with the Russian peo- 
 ple, has decided that it would permit the exchange of 
 goods on the basis of reciprocity between the Russian 
 people and allied and neutral countries. 
 
 For this purpose it decided to give facilities to the 
 Russian Co-operative organizations which are in direct 
 touch throughout Russia, so that they may arrange for 
 the import into Russia of clothing, medicines, agricul- 
 tural machinery and the other necessaries of which the 
 Russian people are in sore need, in exchange for grain, 
 flax, etc., of which there is a surplus supply. 
 
 These arrangements imply no change in the policies of 
 the allied governments toward the Soviet government. 
 
Supreme Council's Note to the Repre- 
 sentatives of the Russian Central 
 Co-Operative Union. 
 
 First. — The allied governments notify the Co-opera- 
 tive Union that they are disposed to authorize an ex- 
 change of products upon a basis of reciprocity between 
 the Russian people and the allied and neutral countries, 
 and they invite this Union to export from Russia the 
 surplus of its cereals, its foodstuffs and its raw materials 
 with a view to exchanging them for clothing and other 
 merchandise, of which Russia is in need. 
 
 It should be well understood that the value of the mer- 
 chandise, the importation of which into Russia will be 
 authorized, will be based on the value of the merchan- 
 dise exported from Russia within a reasonable period. 
 
 Second. — The Russian delegation at Paris will com- 
 municate immediately by wireless with the controlling 
 committee at Moscow and will ask if the Co-operatives 
 are ready to assume responsibility for handling these 
 importations and these exportations, and if exchanges 
 of this sort are practically possible. The respresenta- 
 tives of the Co-operatives at Moscow will determine im- 
 mediately these questions. 
 
 Third. — The Central Committee at Moscow will 
 guarantee that the exportation of cereals,^ flax, etc., shall 
 be authorized and that the necessary transporations fa- 
 cilities shall be furnished. 
 
 Fourth. — As soon as certainty is reached in this mat- 
 ter the Central Committee at Moscow will inform Berk- 
 enheim (Alexander Berkenheim, Vice-President of the 
 All-Russian Union of Consumers' Societies) at Paris. 
 
 Fifth.- — The Co-operative Unions in foreign countries 
 will then take measure to furnish Russian cereals and 
 flax on condition that the Co-operatives shall be ad- 
 vanced 25 per cent of the value of the exports, either by 
 direct contact or by British, French or Italian financiers. 
 
Sixth. — The balance of necessary credits will be fur- 
 nished in London or Paris by Russian resources or Brit- 
 ish, French or Italian Co-operatives, private banks or 
 traders. 
 
 Seventh. — Goods purchased by the above crdits will 
 be loaded immediately in Black Sea or Baltic ports, 
 risks of loss or conflagration being assumed by the Rus- 
 sian Co-operatives. 
 
 Eighth. — The Central Committee at Moscow will en- 
 deavor to supply at least four complete trains for the 
 transportation of goods to and from the Black Sea ports. 
 Should Moscow not succeed, the Co-operatives in for- 
 eign countries will employ part of the credits for the 
 purchase of freight cars and locomotives in the allied 
 countries. In any case, they will send motor trucks in 
 order to help railroad transportation. 
 
 Ninth. — As soon as the exportation of cereals, flax 
 and other raw material from Russia has commenced 
 effectively, the contracts referred to above will be con- 
 siderably increased in order, for instance, to reach a 
 million tons of cereals, which would be the quantity 
 available for export, in a little longer time. 
 
Committee for the Regeneration 
 of Russia. 
 
 {Statement.) 
 
 The Committee for the Regeneration of Russia, having discussed 
 the question of the raising of the blockade of Soviet Russia and of 
 the possibility of importing into Russia manufactured goods through 
 the Co-operative Societies, has come to the following conclusions : 
 
 Fiist. — The economic catastrophe and the starvation of Soviet 
 Russia are the direct consequences of the two years of civil war, 
 which was proclaimed by the Bolsheviki as the basis of their whole 
 military and economic policy and tactics, and which is really the 
 basis of the dictatorship of the Communistic party in Russia and the 
 introduction of the Socialistic regime through violence. 
 
 Second. — This catastrophic condition can be helped only by a 
 direct participation of the whole people in the life of the state, for 
 which the people must have full right to dispose of the products of 
 its toil in a free manner and unhampered by any class system; the 
 civil war must cease ; the local municipal and Zemstvo organs of 
 self-government must be re-established as the foundation of the 
 future Russian state, system of government, and national economy. 
 
 Third. — Since there exists a complete breakdown of the railroad 
 s_vstem and of other methods of transportation, -as well as a cruel 
 governmental system of requisitions of rural agricultural products by 
 the Bolsheviki for use in the cities and at the military fronts, there 
 are no guarantees that the goods intended for the villages, and for 
 the starving civil population, will ever reach their destination, while 
 on the other hand the goods intended for export will ever reach 
 the seaports. 
 
 Fourth. — The Russian Co-operative Societies do not represent an 
 independent economic organization in Soviet Russia, but are a relatively 
 small institution under the full control of the Soviet Government. 
 
 Fifth. — The military struggle against the Bolsheviki still continues 
 on all the fronts, and the Bolsheviki themselves are not full masters 
 of the situation even on the territory of Central Russia, the best proof 
 of which fact lies in the peasant uprisings, which still continue. 
 
 10 
 
Sixth. — Taking all these factors into consideration, the Committee 
 considers that, in view of the existing internal conditions in Russia, 
 the desires expressed in the declaration of the Supreme Council con- 
 cerning the resumption of trade with Russia and the rendering of 
 assistance to the suffering population of Russia are impossible of 
 realization, and considers also that the act of the lifting of the blockade 
 of itself does not constitute a solution of the Russian problem; but, on 
 the contrary, complicates this problem by causing a prolongation of 
 the period of Bolshevik domination in Russia and a, further disorganiza- 
 tion of Russia's productive forces, and consequently renders still more 
 necessary assistance on the part of the allied powers to the democratic 
 elements of the Russian people, who still continue their struggle for 
 the regeneration of free Russia. 
 
 Neiu York, January 27, 1920. 
 
 The Russian Embassy 
 
 {Washington) 
 
 At the Russian Embassy here the plan meets with unhesitating con- 
 demnation as one certain to disappoint the purposes of its sponsors, 
 which are understood to contemplate the strengthening of the better 
 elements in Russia to a point where they can throw off the control 
 of the Lenine-Trotsky regime. Embassy officials assert that the Soviet 
 Government, certainly well informed of the conditions in Russia and 
 the extent of its own power, never v\'Ould knowingly acquiesce in the 
 execution of any project that M^ould sap its authority and bring about 
 its overthrow. But in full control of all of the co-operative societies 
 which it is proposed to use as a means of placing the imported supplies 
 in the hands of the Russian people, the Soviets, it is said, surely will 
 make certain the distribution of the supplies to its own supporters alone. 
 
 Further, it is stated at the Embassy that the moral encouragement 
 that would be given to the Soviet Government by this patent evidence 
 of recognition by its former enemies would completely discourage the 
 efforts of the remaining loyal Russians to restore and rehabilitate 
 domestic government in Russia. It would be regarded by these 
 Russians, it was added, as a measure dictated not by strength, but 
 by despair. 
 
 Asserting that it could be executed only by co-operation between 
 the Entente powers and the Soviet Government, Russian Embassy 
 officials say it would amount to a full recognition of that government, 
 which so far has been avoided by the Entente. Acceptance by the 
 Entente of gold in payment for goods sent into Russia, it was said, 
 would carry with it political recognition. For it is pointed out that 
 to receive gold from any but an authorized government would be 
 
 11 
 
unlawful and would make the parties subject later on to reclama- 
 tions by the real all-Russian government, which regards this gold as 
 a national fund and possession. 
 
 Finally, it is held that the danger from a military point of view 
 of invasion of the west by the Soviet armies, probably able to muster 
 a million rifles, if assisted in the way suggested with supplies, which 
 are certain to be given first to the soldiery, would be increased rather 
 than diminished, and a people's army would be created that would 
 menace the safety of all of the neighboring states. — Journal of 
 Com7nercej January 20, 1920. 
 
 V. N. Bashkiroff 
 
 Chai?-man of the American Co?nmittee of Siberian Agricultural 
 Co-operative Unions 
 
 {Statement) 
 
 First. — The whole problem of the blockade on Soviet Russia is 
 nothing more than an optical illusion. The population of the Bol- 
 shevist territories suffered, and is suffering, not so much from the Allied 
 blockade as from the Soviet internal blockade, imposed on the people 
 in the shape of a monstrous system of political and economic oppres- 
 sion, which is the Soviet substitute for their complete inability to 
 build the economic life of the country on a rational basis. 
 
 Second. — The likelihood of improving economic and living condi- 
 tions in Soviet Russia by means of cemmerce and trade through the 
 Co-operative Societies there is practically nil. The Co-operative 
 Societies in Soviet Russia scarcely exist now as independent bodies, 
 and at present represent onl)^ a part of the Soviet supply and dis- 
 tribution system. 
 
 The Co-operatives, like everything else in Russia, are operating 
 under the control and in conformity with the rules laid down by the 
 provincial and regional Soviets. To conduct, therefore, trade and 
 
 commerce through the Co-operative Societies would be possible only 
 under the condition that the economic and administrative mechanism 
 of the Russian Co-operatives is re-established and given full inde- 
 pendence, and a full contact is established between the Co-operatives 
 and the population. It is clear that those conditions are unacceptable 
 to the Bolsheviks, because their policy of supply and distribution is 
 based on class and oligarchical principles, while the Co-operative 
 Societies are non-political and non-class organizations. 
 
 Third. — The chief producer and consumer of Russia is the peasant. 
 The peasants, as a body, are non-Bolshevik, and are stubbornly op- 
 posing all the Bolshevist plans and undertakings. The political con- 
 
 12 
 
nection between the Bolsheviks and the peasants came to an end 
 when the Russian armies were demobilized and the estates of the 
 former landlords were seized by the peasants. At the same time the 
 connection between the village and the city was also severed, owing 
 to the fact that the city ceased to produce anything of value for the ■ 
 village. The question, therefore, arises: How can an equivalent 
 commercial compensation be obtained by the Allies in exchange for 
 the goods they are to supply Russia? 
 
 A small part of what the Bolsheviks needed to provide for the city 
 population was squeezed out from the villa'ge by means of incessant 
 requisitions and confiscations, through sheer military terror and semi- 
 military activities of specially armed foraging detachments made up 
 of city workingmen. This is the only way in which the Bolsheviks 
 can deal with that problem in Russia. Do the Allies really wish to see 
 their goods — clothing, medical supplies and machinery — once more 
 reach the Russian village through military pressure? 
 
 Fourth. — Russian cities are unable to export any goods because they 
 have none to export. The Russian village has a great deal of grain 
 and agricultural raw products, but the Russian peasant will be 
 willing" to give a part of that only when the foreign goods needed 
 by him shall have actually reached the village — i.e., when every izb"ah 
 (peasant house) shall receive its share of goods. In order to accom- 
 plish this it is necessary first that the peasants be able to dispose 
 freely of their goods without Bolshevik interference; and, second, that 
 the goods shall actually reach them. Transportation in Russia is 
 utterly disorganized. There is practically no rolling stock, no fuel, 
 and no river steamers. Paved roads are in an impossible state, and 
 the rate of mortality among horses is very high. By what means, 
 then, is it expected that, on the one hand, the foreign goods shall 
 reach the Russian peasant and, on the other hand, the Russian raw 
 material shall be sent abroad? 
 
 This is indeed the beginning a new civil war more terrible than 
 the present one. It matters not what efforts may be made by the 
 Co-operative, for the simple reason that they have neither means of 
 transportation, nor roads, nor administrative power. Therefore, trade 
 in Soviet Russia will assume the form of the Bolsheviks extorting raw 
 materials from the peasants at the point of the bajonet, and instead 
 of being a form of economic creative work, it will become but a new 
 method of oppression and extortion. 
 
 Fifth. — -Once the decision of the Supreme Council is put into 
 operation, we feel confident the near future will prove that sound 
 organizing capital has no place under Bolshevik rule. Under existing 
 conditions only speculative capital, gambling on enormous protits, will 
 venture to go to Russia. This, in its turn, will accelerate the further 
 impoverishment of the people and the reckless squandering of the 
 natural resources of Russia. 
 
 Ultimately the exasperated peasantry will fall upon the cities and 
 literally wipe out the last remnants of civilization in Russia. 
 
 13 
 
Russian Economic League 
 
 {State?tient) 
 
 The man}' inquiries concerning trade relations with Russia received 
 by the Russian Economic League • since the announcement of the 
 Supreme Council at Paris concerning the lifting of the blockade have 
 caused it to issue the following statement: 
 
 As the Russian Economic League is concerned onlj' with economic 
 affairs and the development of Russian-American business relations, 
 it is not within its province to discuss the political significance of the 
 announcement with reference to the blockade. 
 
 The blockade was a purel}' military' measure, the effectiveness of 
 which as carried out has alwaj's been in question, and the Russian 
 Economic League would welcome the lifting of the blockade at any 
 time under conditions and safeguards that would ameliorate the con- 
 dition of the Russian people, and not serve merely to strengthen the 
 minority which is oppressing them. 
 
 The League deems it proper to warn American business men against 
 exaggerated hopes of commerce with Russia as a result of the an- 
 nouncement of the Supreme Council, believing that no sound basis 
 can be laid for commercial relations without the restoration in Russia 
 of the institution of private property and the recognition of the rights 
 of the individual. 
 
 Practically there has been no blockade from the outside of Russia 
 so effective as the blockade exercised by the Soviet Government itself 
 within Russia, by the so-called nationalization of trade, by its absolute 
 control of food supplies, and by its incompetence to deal with the 
 problems of transportation and industrial production. 
 
 While the Russian Economic League will welcome every step that 
 can possibly lead to saving the population of the Russian cities from 
 starvation and to supplying the peasants of Russia with the goods 
 they so sorely need, it is unwise to expect that such ends will be 
 attained by the proposal just announced by the Supreme Council 
 at Paris. 
 
 New York, January 22, 1920. 
 
 14 
 
The American-Russian Chamber 
 of Commerce 
 
 {State'ment) 
 
 The American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, representing a large 
 number of influencial American business firms, through its Executive 
 Committee, at a special meeting held todaj'', issued the following 
 statement in regard to the recent action of the Supreme Council at 
 Paris relative to the partial lifting of the so-called blockade of Russia: 
 
 The recent announcement of the Supreme Council at Paris regard- 
 ing the removal of the so-called blockade of Russia has already led 
 to considerable misunderstanding. It is important that the public 
 should understand clearly how far a change of policy has been, 
 adopted and what may be expected from such a change. 
 
 In the first place, there has been no change of policy on the part 
 of the Entente Powers toward Soviet Russia which involves any 
 change of principle. The onh^ change is one of tactics. The an- 
 nouncement from Paris states in categorical terms that there will be 
 no change in relations of the Powers to the Soviet Government. There 
 will be no "recognition" of the Soviet Government, no direct dealings 
 with it. It is proposed only to allow an exchange of goods between 
 the Russian people and the outside world, and this primarily through 
 the agency of the Russian Co-operative Societies. 
 
 The object of the proposed program is partly to relieve the distress 
 among the non-combatant population of Russia, and partly, by per- 
 mitting a distribution of supplies to the non-Bolshevik elements, to 
 weaken the Bolshevik .domination over the masses. Regarding the 
 practicability of this program there is difference of opinion. Mr. 
 Hoover has said that" he believes it will help in some measure to 
 strengthen the elements opposed to Bolshevism by exposing its failure. 
 In any case, we shall now be able to test the arguments of those 
 who have maintained that the blockade has proved not only a harsh 
 policy, but a stupid one. Such people have said that by maintaining 
 the blockade the Powers have merely given to the Bolshevik oppres- 
 sors the opportunity to throw all blame for their failure and the 
 consequent sufferings of the Russian people on the Allied governments. 
 
 While it is to be hoped that this may be the effect of lifting the 
 blockade, unfortunately the chances for it seem to be very slight. It 
 is to be feared that the Bolshevik Government will point to thi& 
 action as a concession extorted by the triumph of their arms, and will 
 be stimulated to make more stringent military aggressioiis both east 
 and west. Furthermore, the Bolshevik rulers are shrewd judges of 
 their own interests. We may be sure that if they welcome this 
 
 15 
 
program it is because they are convinced that they can turn it to their 
 own advantage. If they think there is any likelihood of their op- 
 ponents becoming strengthened thereby they will not permit the Co- 
 operative Societies to participate in this program. 
 
 In any case, absurdly exaggerated notions prevail in some quarters 
 regarding the possibility of trade with Russia at the present time. 
 
 In the first place, the exporter may as well put out of his mind 
 the much-advertised Bolshevik proposal to pay in gold. 
 
 In the second place, it is obviously impossible for any Russian 
 organization, situated in Russia, to receive extensive credits at the 
 present time. Consequently, the only means of payment consists in 
 such raw materials as are accumulated at Russian points, and which 
 may be exported in exchange for manufactured goods imported. 
 
 It is clear then that the announcement makes no change of real 
 importance either politically or economically. The Russian problem 
 still confronts us as before. We should not believe for a moment that 
 the solution has been found. There is and can be but one solution. 
 That solution lies in the establishment of a legitimate form of 
 government, stable and responsible, and, as far as Russian conditions 
 '^ermit, representative of the interests and will of all the Russian 
 people. With this accomplished will follow the restoration of Russia 
 as a productive unit in the family of nations. She can never be 
 supported from the outside. Her restoration as a producer is essen- 
 tial to the prosperity of the world, including America. It can only 
 be accomplished by the overthrow of the forces of destruction which 
 now have her in their grip. The American people will soon wake up 
 to the fact that no economic stability in the world is possible until the 
 forces of law, order and property are restored in Russia, and that the 
 present is no time to abate by one jot or tittle all efforts to bring 
 about this consummation. 
 
 There is today a life and death struggle between civilization and 
 Bolshevism, and in this struggle there can be no €ompromise. 
 
 It is essential that we state clearly that there shall be no recognition 
 of or collaboration with the destructive tyranny that rules in Moscow; 
 that we stand for a unified, independent and democratic Russia, and 
 that we stand ready to co-operate with and extend aid to all the 
 constructive elements of the Russian population in their struggle to 
 free themselves from the grip of their oppressors and to reconstruct 
 their national life and prosperity. 
 
 Further, we believe that America should take the leading part in 
 such a definite and constructive program. 
 
 New York, January 20, 1920. 
 
 16 
 
I. G. Znamensky 
 
 The aim of lifting the blockade is to give assistance to the suffering 
 population of Russia and it is precisely this aim, in my opinion, that 
 cannot be attained. The lifting of the blockade under present condi- 
 tions will not help the population of Russia but will be only of assistance 
 to the Bolshevik Government. 
 
 No well-established commercial relations with Soviet Russia could be 
 possible. First, it will be difficult to find reliable firms which would be 
 able to trade in Russia. There are no private banks now and all the old 
 firms there are ruined or have simply disappeared. Thus there is no 
 commercial apparatus at present in Soviet Russia. 
 
 The commercial relations w^ith the Co-operative societies is also im- 
 possible as the Co-operative societies have no independence whatever. 
 The Bolsheviki control them. 
 
 No credit transactions are possible. The Russian paper rouble has 
 no value whatever; there thus remains barter for the Russian raw ma- 
 terials. 
 
 But raw materials however are very scarce in Russia. Under the 
 Bolshevik regime production has dropped to the minimum, and most 
 materials produced by Russia were used by the nation itself. The 
 only raw products that might be found are in the hands of the peasants. 
 The Co-operatives as such have nothing. Thus they will have, as any 
 other organization, to collect the raw materials from the peasants. 
 Nothing had been collected for the last two years. The peasants will 
 give up their raw materials only in exchange of merchandise, but the 
 latter cannot under the present conditions " reach the peasants on ac- 
 count of the utter breakdown of transportation. What is left of the 
 railroad transportation is entirely taken up by the needs of the Bol- 
 shevik Red Army and could not be used for commercial interests. 
 
 Every attempt to gather the raw materials from the peasants by 
 force will certainly fail. The Bolsheviki have tried it several times and 
 invariably failed. There might possibly be some limited commercial 
 transactons based on gold which is in the possession of the Bolshevik 
 Government and partly belongs to Russia, partly to Roumania. We 
 doubt, however, if any of this gold will be given up by the Bolshevik 
 to the foreign commercial firms. 
 
 To establish commercial relations with the Bolsheviki would mean 
 helping the further destruction and disorganization of Russia. It 
 would mean helping the enemy of the civilized world. The future 
 commercial relations with Russia can be established only after the fall 
 of the Bolshevik Government, when there will be a Government hav- 
 ing the confidence of the people at large and able to work for the future 
 regeneration of Russia. 
 
 17 
 
J. Okulitch 
 
 Representative Plenipotentiary of the Siberian Creameries Associations. 
 
 With reference to the decision of the Supreme Council, there are two 
 questions which I should like to take up : First, concerning the position 
 taken by the Co-operative societies in Soviet Russia and, second, the 
 question of possible importation of goods into Russia at this time. 
 
 In March, 1918, at Omsk, I had a talk with the Bolshevik Commis- 
 saire of Food Supplies, Schlichter, concerning the relations then ex- 
 isting between the Bolshevik Government and the Co-operative Societies. 
 Schlitchter told me quite definitely that the Bolshevik Government 
 proposed to do away with all the co-operative organizations as repre- 
 senting the wealthy part of the rural population, and that the Govern- 
 ment wanted to organize special communal food supplies. The Bol- 
 shevik then began in 1918 the realization of this plan but could not ac- 
 complish it, having been driven out of Siberia by the Siberian anti-Bol- 
 shevik forces. I know that the Moscow Co-operative Bank has en- 
 tirely lost its independence and that it was merged into the Bolshevik 
 State Bank. I also know that the Bolsheviki have introduced their 
 representatives into all the other co-operative organizations for their 
 control, thus we cannot consider that the co-operative organizations 
 are separate from the Bolsheviki organization. Thus when Mr. Berk- 
 enheim, the representative of the Moscow Central Union, one of the 
 largest consumers co-operative societies, negotiated with the representa- 
 tives of the English Government, he certainly had to base his plans on 
 the friendly approbation of Lenine and Trotsky. 
 
 The fact that the Government of Lenine has ref^ised to admit Eng- 
 lish steamers with goods belonging to the Co-operative societies into 
 Soviet Russia is another proof that the representatives of Co-opera- 
 tive societies in Russia have no freedom of action. 
 
 Turning now to the other side of the matter, Messrs. Berkenheim 
 and Company are quite sure that they can establish commercial rela- 
 tions and that they will export to western Europe many agricultural 
 products and will thus help to lower the prices on these products in 
 European countries. 
 
 But there is nothing to export, except, possibly, grain. However, we 
 know that in 1917 Russia had great difficulty in feeding her army and 
 her cities, especially in the north. We know that all the efforts of the 
 Department of Agriculture and the Zemstvo organizations did not lead 
 to any successful results. We also know that the Russian Govern- 
 
 18 
 
merit could not fulfil its promise of sending wheat to France on account 
 of these difficulties. Finally, we know that at present not only the 
 northern cities but even some of the rural districts of Central Russia 
 are suffering from starvation and we know that all forms of transporta- 
 tion, and especially the railroads, have utterly broken down. 
 
 Commercial relations or barter with Western Europe are not pos- 
 sible at present, and how is it possible to speak of export of food sup- 
 plies out of Russia when part of her population is dying from starvation ? 
 For the organization of regular commercial transactions we must have 
 entirely different political, social and economic surroundings. As long 
 as there exists in the country a financial prostration, a lack of regular 
 system of currency in financial or economic plan, no credit whatever and 
 absolute absence of law and order, we cannot build up any sound com- 
 mercial relations. The latter will be impossible as long as the Bolshe- 
 viki disorder and disorganization continues in the country. 
 
 St. Louis, January 30, 1920 
 
 19 
 
A. Berkenheim 
 
 President, Foreign Board of the Russian Co-operative Union. 
 
 In February, 1919, we laid before the British Foreign Office, and 
 also before the secretary of Premier Lloyd George, our plan for the 
 exchange of Russian raw material for manufactured goods from allied 
 countries. C. Krovopouskoff and myself were summoned last week 
 before the Supreme Council, where the plan was adopted. 
 
 We require farming and agricultural implements, cloth, shoes, 
 locomotives, motors, automobiles and medical supplies. Ship tonnage 
 must be furnished by the Allies, as Russia's shipping has completely 
 disappeared. Ships may enter Black, Baltic and White sea ports 
 loaded with goods needed by Russia and may return with our 
 exports. 
 
 Imports will come to Russia consigned to us. They will be dis- 
 tributed to our stores throughout the country, and we will purchase 
 grain and cereals from peasants, paying them in rubles at a fixed 
 rate. We will also give them scrip entitling them to purchase from 
 our stores imported goods for the identical amount of rubles we paid 
 them when they were selling their own stocks. All dealings must 
 be done through our Co-operative Societies. 
 
 Our stores are not under the control of the Bolsheviki. When 
 the Moscow government nationalized all stores and closed them, our 
 stores continued business undisturbed. This was not through any 
 undue friendship with the de facto government, but because of the 
 high esteem in which the Co-operative Societies^ are held by the 
 population throughout Russia. We feel sure our headquarters in 
 Moscow can reach a satisfactory agreement with the Soviet authorities 
 for impartial distribution. — Associated Press Dispatch, dated Paris, 
 January 19, 1920. 
 
 20 
 
M. Litvinoff 
 
 Soviet Representative at Copenhagen. 
 
 M. Litvinoff, the Soviet representative, said that he had not yet 
 been approached concerning the Supreme Council's decision to raise 
 the blockade, but that he was ready to negotiate if approached. 
 
 Should his government agree to the suggested exchange, he added, 
 it must be through new representatives of the Co-operative Societies, 
 and not through a few of the former representatives in London and 
 Paris, who, he declared, were counter-revolutionaries. 
 
 Litvinoff had no knowledge of the Soviet Government's intentions, 
 but believed that it would be favorable to the proposition. — N. Y. 
 Times, January 20, 1920. 
 
 Maxim Litvinoff, the Russian Bolshevist representative, conferring 
 here with James O'Grady, British delegate, regarding an exchange of 
 prisoners and interned civilians, is much gratified by the announcement 
 from the Supreme Council in Paris that trade relations will be opened 
 between the Allies and the people of Soviet Russia. He considers the 
 action of the Council tantamount to raising the blockade, and says it 
 will have an enormous effect on the economic situation in Russia. 
 
 Russia has great stocks of goods for export, especially flax, hemp, 
 timber, bristles, hides, furs and platinum, he says, and particularly 
 needs machinery, agricultural implements and railway materials. He 
 declares there is plenty of food in Siberia and other sections, but there 
 is a lack of transportation facilities. He urges that it will be neces- 
 sary to allow Russia to send representatives abroad if trade with the 
 outside world is to be a reality, and declares Soviet Russia will freely 
 admit commercial and other representatives on a reciprocal basis. — 
 A^. y. Times dispatch, dated Copenhagen, January 18, 1920. 
 
 Commercial Department of the Rus- 
 sian Soviet Government Bureau 
 
 {Statement) 
 
 The recent decision of the Supreme Council at Paris regarding 
 Russia has created more or less fantastic speculations as to the pos- 
 sibility of the re-establishment of trade relations with Russia by dealing 
 with Russian "Co-operative Societies" only, but in other respects "not 
 changing the policy of the Allies toward Soviet Russia." It therefore 
 seems necessary to call the attention of American manufacturers and 
 exporters to certain obvious facts. 
 
 21 
 
The resumption of trade relations with Russia entails problems 
 such as the re-establishment of Russia's foreign credit, the matter of 
 transportation, of harbor facilities, of representatives abroad to take 
 care of the clearance of ships and of other matters of consular nature, 
 the issuance of passports for commercial travelers back and forth, the 
 mutual protection of foreign visitors in Russia and Russian visitors 
 abroad, etc. These questions cannot be solved without formal contact 
 with the authorities in Russia. 
 
 There exists in Russia no such Co-operative societies as contemplated 
 in the press. Under the present conditions in Russia the formerly 
 independent Co-operative societies have changed their nature and their 
 functions. They are today distributing agencies of the Russian 
 economic system, and they work in complete harmony with the Soviet 
 Government. So-called "representatives of Russian Co-operative So- 
 cieties" in London, Paris and New York do not represent the 
 Russian Co-operatives, and have no authority whatsoever to speak in 
 their name or to enter into any obligations on behalf of any number 
 of people in Russia. They do not represent anybody except them- 
 selves. They have no supplies in Soviet Russia, and have no right 
 to negotiate obligations in anybody's name except their own. 
 
 The foreign trade of Russia is nationalized and the Russian Gov- 
 ernment is in full control of all supplies in Russia, of the means of 
 transportation, and of such other resources which can be made a 
 solid basis for Russia's foreign credit. 
 
 New York, January 23, 1920. 
 
 Santeri Nuorteva 
 
 Representing L. C. A. C. Martens, Bolshevist Agent in the 
 United States. 
 
 The raising of the blockade is only the first step. The doors are 
 being opened. 
 
 It is significant that the despatch about the lifting of the blockade 
 includes also neutral countries. That means the following: 
 
 For the last six or seven months England sent enormous quantities 
 of goods to the Scandinavian countries. She is, of course, interested 
 to have those goods shipped into Russia before other countries. They 
 put it all over the American capitalists. 
 
 Another important point is that trade with Russia will be con- 
 ducted through Co-operatives. This does not embarrass us. Co- 
 
 22 * 
 
operatives in Russia are working under the supervision of the Soviet 
 Government. Co-operatives are a part of the distributive machinery 
 of Soviet Russia. Somebody's prestige had to be kept up, as you may 
 put it. But we are indifferent to formalities. The main thing for 
 us is that the population of Russia will be able to renew economic 
 exchange with other countries, and the population of Russia is sup- 
 porting the Soviet regime. 
 
 The partial lifting of the blockade is only the .first step. We are 
 confident in the near future the blockade will be lifted altogether. 
 
 Constantin Krovopouskov 
 
 Mernber of Foreign Board, Russian Co-operative Union. 
 
 This question was put to Constantin Krovopouskov, one of the 
 co-operative representatives in Paris, by a representative of the New 
 York Times : 
 
 "Is it true, or is it not true, that the Co-operatives are under con- 
 trol of the Soviet Government?" 
 
 His reply was: "It is true. In each of our Co-operatives there 
 is a Government Commissaire." 
 
 Then the following question was asked: 
 
 "Is it not a fact that the whole situation hinges on whether or not 
 the Soviet Government is disposed to authorize importation and 
 exportation by the Co-operatives, and whether it will facilitate this 
 
 commerce r 
 
 ?" 
 
 "That is a fact," he answered. — N. Y. Times, January 25, 1920. 
 
 C. Morosoff 
 
 General Manager, London Division of "Zakupsbyt." 
 
 We have no gold, but we have what is better than gold — raw 
 materials. 
 
 It is impossible to say what plan will be worked out in Paris, but 
 since we have the things the rest of the world wants, and we need 
 virtually everything the other world markets have to offer, it is certain 
 that a workable system by which the dealings can be accomplished 
 will be evolved. We are hopeful of finding a means of obviating the 
 seeming necessity of resorting to the elementary scheme of bartering, 
 which is so primitive and unwieldy and which inevitably would result 
 in great losses to all concerned in its operation. 
 
 The bulk of the accumulation of grain, flax and other commodities 
 is in central and southern Russia, which is a favorable circumstance, 
 since Black Sea shipping is not attended by the many difficulties which 
 would have to be overcome should trading be resumed through the 
 Baltic ports alone. 
 
 23 
 
Dr. I. J. Sherman 
 
 Director, New York Branch, Moscow Norodny Bank. 
 
 After several years of effort it seems that the Allies have recognized 
 that the Co-operatives are a strictly non-partisan and non-political 
 and strictly an economic organization. They have concluded evi- 
 dently that we are a people's organization; that no question of 
 profiteering or speculation can arise in connection with our business, 
 for the profits are distributed among the members. They seem to 
 have recognized the fact that the Co-operative institutions are the 
 only organizations in Russia which have survived the general ele- 
 mentary devastation, and that they possess the machinery for collecting 
 the raw materials and for distributing supplies. 
 
 The Co-operatives consist of 65,000 local societies, and are of three 
 kinds, consumers' societies, producers' associations, and credit unions. 
 A conservative estimate of the membership would be 20,000,000 
 householders, affecting the lives of 65,000,000 persons. 
 
 During the time when the Co-operatives were unable to do busi- 
 ness they considered it their most important duty to collect raw 
 materials, and at the present time they have considerable stocks of raw 
 materials. In addition there are considerable funds at our disposal, 
 and as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made we intend to 
 resume shipments to various parts of the world. 
 
 We have been buying goods for those parts of Russia, such as 
 Siberia, South Russia and Archangel, that have been accessible. We 
 have sent much in the way of manufactured articles to those points. 
 We have nothing in common with any Russian Government or com- 
 mercial agents in the United States. 
 
 While there are immense stores of raw materials ready for export 
 from Russia, yet the Russians, as well as the people of other European 
 countries, cannot pay for their machinery and manufactured goods 
 fully in raw materials. For this reason a system of credits and 
 banking arrangements must be made to facilitate trade. 
 
 The central organizations likely to play a leading part in trade 
 from now on, because of the announcements, are the Moscow Norodny 
 Bank, the All-Russian Central Union of Consumers' Societies, the 
 All-Russian Purchasing Union of Agricultural Co-operators, and the 
 Central Flax Growers' Association. 
 
 The consumers begin with the local societies in the small towns. 
 These organizations belong to a district union of a particular com- 
 modity. After the district unions come the provincial organizations, 
 and then the all-Russian organizations, each one of which includes all 
 
 24 
 
the smaller societies in that particular line. The flax growers have 
 their organization, as well as those dealing in hemp, butter, eggs and 
 other things. The financial center of the movement is the Moscow 
 Norodnv Bank, which acts as a clearing house. The Co-operatives 
 have established representation in New York, London, Shanghai, Kobe, 
 Helsingfors, Paris, Stockholm, Christiania, Genoa, Marseilles, Prague 
 and manv other cities. — Journal of Cominerce, January 19, 1920. 
 
 Alexander Zelenko 
 
 Secretary of the A?nerican Committee of the Russian Co-operative 
 
 Union. 
 
 In Archangel and Black Sea ports there is enough raw material . 
 on hand to pay all the credit needed by the Co-operatives. Last year 
 the Co-operatives operated over 500 industrial plants and had a total 
 of over 50,000 employes. The importance of the Co-operative so- 
 cieties as a means of restoring normal conditions in Russia and of 
 re-establishing trade conditions with the outside world can hardly be 
 overestimated. 
 
 The entire problem of economic interchange between Russia and 
 America may be reduced to three main channels — increase of agri- 
 cultural efficiency, importation into Russia of finished manufactured 
 products, and credit for commercial and industrial expansion. In all 
 three branches of this interchange America is the most welcomed 
 country, because the Russian people expect from America fair treat- 
 ment and open competition entirely free from hidden desires for ex- 
 ploitation of territorial or political rights. 
 
 Russia needs financial credit in order to foster this trade exchange, 
 needs industrial credit not only to restore her industries but to start 
 new branches of industry on the half-product basis, and needs many 
 technically trained men to introduce modern methods in all branches 
 of economic work. After-war conditions have made the need for 
 long-term credit more imperative than ever. 
 
 There has been no possibility of transporting and no willingness 
 on the part of the people to exchange goods for paper money. Large 
 stocks of butter and flax aggregating millions of pounds have accumu- 
 lated, and as the hunting of fur-bearing animals has practically been 
 at a standstill during the period because of lack of powder and shot, 
 there is a vast amount of furs to be collected. 
 
 The co-operatives unite 20,000,000 members and serve a popula- 
 tion of approximately 100,000,000. They hold themselves strictly 
 aloof from politics, and have carried on their activities with remark- 
 ably little interruption, all things considered, from the beginning of 
 the war. They still conduct their long chain of stores, and these are 
 the centres for distributing and collecting raw materials. — N. Y. 
 Times, January 19, 1920. 
 
 25 
 
Herbert Hoover 
 
 I have advocated ever since last Winter that the blockade on 
 Soviet Russia should be removed on everything except arms and 
 munitions, not because it would do the Bolshevist tyranny in Russia 
 any good, but because I believe the removal of the blockade will 
 take from under them one of their greatest props. For the last year 
 they have laid every failure of socialism onto the blockade. They 
 daily and hourly blamed the allied blockade for the shortage of food, 
 clothing, and agricultural implements, and the misery that has arisen 
 therefrom, and they have succeeded in impressing this upon an ig- 
 norant people. They have also used it as a stimulus to raise armies 
 under the contention that they are fighting to save themselves from 
 starvation. 
 
 These shortages and this suffering is not due to the blockade, but 
 is due to the total industrial demoralization and bankruptcy in pro- 
 duction, which will continue as long as socialism and the Bolshevist 
 rule lasts. If the blockade is opened, the Bolshevist Government must 
 secure the import of food and clothing at once, and thereby great 
 suffering will be mitigated. 
 
 The acute starvation is in the larger cities. These will be the 
 areas that must receive imported food. The peasants have food 
 enough at home. But, after a few months, when they have exhausted 
 the $50,000,000 or $75,000,000 in gold and securitiies which they have 
 remaining from the amounts they have stolen from the banks, then 
 they will need to export commodities in exchange for inward goods. 
 No one is going to give them credit. They have no commodities to 
 export without causing further suffering to their people. They can- 
 not export wheat when the population is hungry, nor cotton or flax 
 when they are in rags. Their imports will then automatically cease. 
 
 The greatest blow they can receive is to have such an exposure of 
 the complete ■ foolishness of their industrial sj^stem to their people. 
 Moreover, a lifting of the blockade will allow the real truth oi the 
 horror of Bolshevist rule to come out of Russia. 
 
 There is one thing that needs to be guarded against in the United 
 
 States. Our frontier and port oflficers must redouble their vigor 
 
 against the export to us of Bolshevist agents, propaganda, and money 
 for subsidizing criminals to create revolution. 
 
 The Bolsheviki also ought to be called upon to recognize the 
 frontier of Poland and Russia as settled by the Peace Conference, and 
 to cease fighting on that zone. — N. Y. Ti?nes, January 18, 1920. 
 
 26 
 
Dr. E. E. Pratt 
 
 Fo7-nur Chief of the U. S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic 
 Connnerce. 
 
 From my point of view there are three facts of outstanding import- 
 ance in connection with trade with Russia at the present moment: 
 
 First, the problem of Russia is so important that it is essential 
 for the United States to develop a constructive policv toward Russia, 
 wise in its decision and comprehensive in its scope, which will be of 
 benefit to American business interests and to the Russian people. 
 
 Second, if it is possible to develop unrestricted and independent busi- 
 ness transactions with individual firms in Russia and with the Russian 
 Co-operative Societies without any direct dealings with the Soviet 
 Government, such transactions would be of definite assistance ; and I 
 agree with Mr. Hoover that such business relations would tend to 
 restore normal conditions in Russia. Unless this degree of independ- 
 ence of the Soviet Government could be attained, I should think that 
 any such policj'' would then be futile. 
 
 Third, the establishment of any trade between the United States 
 and individual firms or with the Co-operative Societies in Russia 
 must be on a barter basis. This is true because any transactions 
 based on the payment in gold by the Soviet Government involves the 
 question of the legality of such payments. It is a question whether 
 or not sny American firm would be willing to accept direct trade 
 relationships with the Soviet Government or its representatives in 
 view of the fact that such American firms, by accepting gold as pay- 
 ment, would be in the 'position of receivers of stolen property. 
 
 I believe that the restoration of Russia as a free and' independent 
 State under a liberal and democratic government, is of vital impor- 
 tance both from the standpoint of the general international, situation 
 and also from the view point of the permanent extension of American 
 industrial and commercial interests.- — A", Y. Times, January 27, 1920. 
 1920. 
 
 27 
 
American Defense Society 
 
 If we are a nation of dollar chasers, willing to sacrifice honor and 
 the safety of the world for the sake of profitable trade with the Bol- 
 sheviki of Soviet Russia, then the so-called American Commercial 
 Association to Promote Russian Trade should be allowed without 
 protest to continue its sordid campaign. We urge you to patriotically 
 resist the pressure that is being made upon the American Government 
 by those business houses who recently met in Washington to induce 
 the Government to consent to an exchange of goods that would mean 
 physical, moral and vital aid to the enemies of civilization. America 
 wants none of the crime-tainted money of Lenine and Trotzky. 
 
 28 
 
New York Times 
 
 {Editorial January 18, 1920.) 
 
 The Russian blockade is lifted; Mr. Lloyd George, having failed to 
 kill the wolf, now offers him a juicy bone. For the first time in its 
 history the British Empire has adopted the policy of buying off a 
 dangerous enemj' — a policy which, to be sure, was successfully em- 
 ployed on occasion by famous empires of the past, but which is as 
 unlikely to bring permanent and satisfactory peace at this time as it is 
 inconsistent Avith the habit of British foreign policy. To be sure, the 
 surrender is veiled by the solemn assurance that we are reopening 
 trade, not with the Bolsheviki, but with the Russian co-operatives, 
 and that our policy toward the Soviet Government remains the same. 
 But nothing can be sent into Russia without coming into the posses- 
 sion of the Soviet Government if that Government wants it; what- 
 ever the position of the Russian co-operatives, the party which con- 
 trols the seaports, the railroads, the army, the factories, will be able 
 to take and use everything that is sent in. And to say that the ship- 
 ment of supplies of all sorts to a Government hitherto our enemy 
 involves no change of policy, is so ridiculous that the Supreme Council 
 can hardly have hoped that an5'body would believe it. 
 
 The lifting of the blockade must mean the early conclusion of for- 
 mal peace. Otherwise we should have the continuation of a state of 
 war in which one side supplies the othef side with anything it may 
 need. England could hardly remain in nominal alliance with Poland 
 and Rumania and furnish the Bolsheviki with material to be used 
 in the war against Poland and Rumania. It has been said that peace 
 would bring a speedy change in Russia ; that without a war to evoke 
 some support from national feeling the Bolsheviki would soon be 
 ousted by Russian moderates, or be compelled themselves to become 
 so moderate as to be unrecognizable. War, it has been argued, only 
 strengthens Bolshevism; peace must mean its downfall. It is some- 
 what surprising that this argument is presented most loudly by those 
 who do not want to see the downfall of Bolshevism, who are the 
 friends and apologists of Lenine's regime. Nevertheless, there is more 
 hope of a collapse or metamorphosis of Bolshevism in a full state of 
 peace than in a state of war where we send supplies to our enemies. 
 The announcement made on New Year's Eve by the Bolshevist wire- 
 less service that the collapse of Kolchak and Denikin meant Soviet 
 governments in Berlin, Paris, Rome, and Washington before another 
 year was somewhat too enthusiastic as a political prophecy, 57et quite 
 accurate as an index of Bolshevist policy. Peace is only another form 
 of war. Under the leadership of Mr. Lloyd George, the Allies are 
 going to try it. 
 
 29 
 
But this is not the only factor. Bolshevist industry is reviving 
 under the direction of George Krassin, before the war Russian repre- 
 sentative of the Siemens-Halske interests of Berlin. That is to say, 
 Germany has the inside track in the race for commercial domination 
 of Russia. Mr. Lloyd George or his supporters may have been in- 
 spired in part by the fantastic hope of outstripping the Germans, if 
 they can start now. The Germans have more than the inside track — 
 they have an enormous number of business men who know Russia 
 and are known in Russia, while the British have very few. On the 
 commercial side, it is to be feared that Mr. Lloyd George's mountain 
 will give birth to a somewhat ridiculous mouse. 
 
 Philadelphia Pubhc Ledger 
 
 - {Editorial January 20, 1920.) 
 
 The supreme Council in Paris has just launched a new trade policy 
 toward Russia. It was launched while the shock of an explosion, 
 revealing a wide difference of opinion in British Government circles as 
 to what the proper Russian policy is, was still reverberating through 
 the air. It is clear enough that the Churchill group wants to fight 
 the Bolshevists, believing that it is impossible to make peace with a 
 raving wild beast. The Lloyd George group wonts to fight them, 
 too, but believes that their grip on the helpless Russian people could 
 be broken if food, medicines, machinery and supplies generally were 
 distributed throughout Russia by an agency independent of the Mos- 
 cow Government. They expect to find such an agency in the Co- 
 operative Societies of Russia. 
 
 The truth is that nothing could be more absurd and yet full of 
 possible tragedy than the attitude of civilization toward Russian 
 Bolshevism. We vvill not make peace with the Bolshevist Govern- 
 ment, and yet we will not make war on it. As we refuse the Bol- 
 shevists peace, they must fight us whether they want to or not; but, as 
 we refuse to fight them, we present them with the easy victory of a 
 one-sided conflict, except for such feeble local resistance as we can 
 stir up among the Russian anti-Bolshevists, the menaced Poles, the 
 threatened Rumanians and the dubious Baltic States. 
 
 Yes, the Russian problem is vitally interesting to every civilized 
 nation. Belligerent Bolshevism in Russia means that carrying of the 
 war into every American city, means a constant example before the 
 discontented everywhere of the possibility of a purely proletarian 
 government, means a way out for Germany, means a grave menace 
 of bankruptcy for most of Europe if Germany does not pay, means a 
 constant threat of the most appalling possibility in history — the stir- 
 ring up and letting loose on a hopelessly outnumbered world of a 
 fanatic Asia, newly converted to the contagious gospel of Lenine. 
 
 30 
 
New York Tribune 
 
 {Editorial January 20, 1920.) 
 
 Mr. Hoover says, the removal of the blockade against "Red" Russia 
 has knocked one of their greatest props from under the Bolsheviki. 
 
 Thousands hope that events will show Mr. Hoover to be right; 
 but the same thousands fear he will be shown to be wrong. Those 
 who sympathize with the Bolsheviki have not noticeably shouted for 
 a continuance of the blockade. If they had believed in any genuine 
 way that the suspension would "knock the props" from under the 
 Bolsheviki would they have favored suspension? Would Lenine and 
 Trotzky have begged for a suspension if they thought it would send 
 them into exile and end their system? 
 
 Scarcely. Over against the opinion of Mr. Hoover, then, are to 
 be placed the opinions of Bolshevist leaders and sympathizers. Mr. 
 Hoover has high repute as an expert, but, of course, he makes no 
 claim to infallibility, and the weight of expert judgment seems against 
 his conclusion. One may imagine, when the news came, that Lenine 
 grinned in a way he would not have done if he thought a victory had 
 been gained over him. 
 
 No particular good is likely to come from indulging in rose dreams. 
 Some 300,000 Bolshevists, organized into a party which is responsive 
 to the orders of its executive committee, have possession of practically 
 all the machine guns and munition factories of Russia. Of course, the 
 unarmed cannot stand against them. In Czar days a similar minority 
 bossed Russia by the use df an army. If the World War had not 
 compelled the Czar to "water" his army by conscription he would 
 still be autocrat. Lenine saw clearly how to control Russia. He 
 dismissed the civilian army and organized one composed of profes- 
 sionals. He is now willing to have a breathing spell to consolidate 
 his power, but has no intention of giving Russia free institutions. He 
 will countenance no election whose result he cannot control, and the 
 imperialism he has set up will act as imperialisms always do. 
 
 Inasmuch as the withdrawal of military aid was followed by a lift- 
 ing of the blockade, it may be predicted that the lifting of the block- 
 ade will be followed by "recognition." When "recognition" comes 
 let us hope the world will be honest — that it will not receive the 
 ambassadors of a so-called Russian republic, but of Lenine I, Autocrat 
 of All the Russias — a despot with power to make trouble if not kept 
 in good humor. 
 
 31 
 
New York World 
 
 {Editorial] anuary 19, 1920.) 
 
 As the Allied Powers have had no well-sustained policy toward 
 Russia except that of non-intercourse, the statement b}' the Supreme 
 Council that the lifting of the blockade does not mean a change in 
 its attitude toward the Soviet Government must be accepted as one 
 of the insincerities behind which baffled statesmen at times take 
 refuge. 
 
 The fact is that Western Europe has been as irresolute in the 
 presence of the Red menace as, previous to acquiring unity of com- 
 mand, it was unsuccessful in the field, and for the same reason. Mili- 
 tarism has been shouting for a new war regardless of consequences, 
 whereas Socialism of various shades has demanded fraternity on any 
 terms. In all countries most people have recoiled as instinctively 
 from another savage conflict as from the proposed embrace of the 
 dictators of the proletariat. 
 
 Trade with Russia is to be limited to the great Co-operative so- 
 cieties. If that results in a quasi-recognition of the Red Government, 
 so be it. The blockade has amounted to that all along. With com- 
 mercial relations established even in part, the rule of outlawry must 
 soon be confronted by conditions at home with which it will be pow- 
 erless tO- deal. To tolerate it will be to encourage civilizing rela- 
 tions that must prevail over savagery. To interfere will be an open 
 confession of perfidy. 
 
 In spite of the statement by the Supreme Council to the' con- 
 trary, this is a new policy and it has been adopted because the old 
 policy was a demonstrated failure. Success may not attend the ven- 
 ture, but it will introduce a domestic problem into the councils of the 
 commune not likely soon to be disposed of by falsehoods and force. 
 
 32 
 
N. Y. Evening Post 
 
 {Editorial, January 17, 1920.) 
 
 Peace with Soviets. 
 
 That is the obvious meaning of yesterday's action in the Supreme 
 Council at Paris. The official statement which announces the decision 
 to resume trade with "the Russian people" is at pains to affirm that 
 the arrangement implies "no change in the policies of the Allied 
 Governments towards the Soviet Government." But it must be re- 
 called that the Allied Governments have never been technically at 
 war with the Soviets. Allied troops M'ent into Russia to repay the 
 debt they owed their Russian friends in the war with Germany and 
 as part' of that struggle. When active Allied participation in the 
 Russian civil war came to an end, their aid in money and materials 
 continued as the redemption of a pledge of honor to their Russian 
 friends. Now these friends have been swept out of existence by the 
 Red armies, and the Allies are confronted with the accomplished fact 
 of Soviet victory. This fact they can acknowledge, because they 
 have paid their debt of honor to the anti-Soviet parties. 
 
 We cannot tell now how far the co-operatives have, in some form 
 of silent truce, been merged into the Soviet scheme of government. 
 And so it is difficult at the present moment to say how far a recogni- 
 tion of the co-operatives goes towards a recognition of Lenine, in 
 fact if not in form. The initial gain in prestige is certainly on 
 Lenine's side. But the Soviet problem is one that must be dealt 
 with on the basis of hard facts and to the exclusion of considerations 
 of sentiment. Lenine niay be welcome to his prestige if the Allied 
 world can get into touch with the sane elements of the Russian people. 
 With Russia open, Lenine is open to a searching examination of the 
 actualities of Soviet rule. 
 
 Physical communication between the Allies and the Russian people 
 cannot help being intercourse in considerable measure with the Soviets. 
 But the true Allied policy must remain one of moral non-intercourse 
 with a system avowedly built upon minority domination and, by prin- 
 ciple, at war with Western democracy. Lenine's victories in the field 
 have been acknowledged. His rule in Russia cannot be acknowledged 
 until the Russian people has been given the full opportunity to speak 
 for itself. 
 
 33 
 
Boston Eve. Transcript 
 
 {Editorial January 19, 1920.) 
 
 The lifting of the Russian blockade can only be interpreted as the 
 prelude to the earh^ recognition b}^ the Allies of the Soviet Govern- 
 ment. It marks the reversal of the policy of isolating by a barrier of 
 non-intercourse the Bolshevist power from the rest of Europe; a policy 
 to which the Allied governments had been long committed, in the hope 
 that thereby they might escape from the peril of the Soviet bid for 
 world empire. The opening of Russia to trade must soon be followed 
 by an announcement of the cessation of the state of w^ar, and a recog- 
 nition of the Soviet Government. The Allies cannot for long en- 
 gage in trade with the people of a Government with which they 
 profess to be at war. The processes of trade are incompatible with 
 a condition of war. Nor can that fact be altered or disguised by 
 a declaration that the raising of the blockade involves no change in 
 the official attitude of the Allies toward the revolutionary Govern- 
 ment of Russia. 
 
 In effect, the decision of the Allies to allow trade with Russia is a 
 surrender to Bolshevism. The Soviets are to be bought off with 
 promise of financial profits to their merchants and traders. Only the 
 course of time w\\\ prove how successful the capitulation to Sovietism 
 will prove in the promotion of European peace. In the minds of the 
 war chiefs of Britain and France, that surrender will free Europe 
 neither from the rumor nor the fact of war. 
 
 34 
 
Trading with Russia 
 
 By JEROME LANDFIELD. 
 
 {N. Y. Times, January 21, 1920.) 
 
 What is the prospect of carrying on the proposed trade with the Russian 
 people by dealing with the Co-operatives? In this matter, it must be noted first 
 of all that while the Co-operatives include millions of Russian peasants, their 
 management has been seriously interfered with by the Bolshevist Government 
 and at the present time the local units are unable to conduct any enterprise 
 outside of Russia, or even with the large cities, except in accordance with the 
 will of the provincial Commissars. Secondly, any proposed trading is de- 
 pendent entirely upon transportation, and the transportation facilities, so far 
 as they exist, are entirely in the hands of the Soviet Government. Thirdly, 
 it is inconceivable that the Soviet Government will permit operations to take 
 a form that would work against them politically. Fourthly, the peasants 
 in the country districts are not in need of food, but of manufactured articles, 
 while the Bolshevist Government itself is in possession of such stores of raw 
 materials as might be available for exchange. It is therefore the Bolshevist 
 Government that would utilize the goods imported, for the purpose of securing 
 food supplies for the cities from the country districts. 
 
 The question of payment immediately arises. The statement alludes to the 
 exchange for grain, flax, &c. The Bolsheviki themselves have frequently as- 
 serted that the}' were prepared to pay gold to the extent of $200,000,000. Let 
 us consider the latter proposal. Some $500,000,000 of the Russian gold reserve 
 is accounted ' for by the payments made to Germany under the Brest-Litovsk 
 treaty and by the amount seized by the Russians and Czechoslovaks at Kazan. 
 Of the balance in their possession, $125,000,000 is the Rumanian gold reserve, 
 which was removed to Moscow for safekeeping when Rumania was invaded 
 by the Germans. If the Bolshevist Government undertakes to expend this 
 Rumanian gold, the Allies can scarcely recognize such transactions as legiti- 
 mate. On the other hand, the remaining gold is State property and therefore, 
 if the Allies legalize the use of this gold, in this wa}' it becomes- a technical 
 recognition of the Soviet Government, and if they do not permit it, then those 
 who accept it become receivers of stolen property and run the risk of future 
 litigation. 
 
 As for the exchange of raw materials, the practical difficulties are very 
 great. Even under the governments of Kolchak and Denikin, in possession of 
 the richest raw-material-producing regions, it was not found possible to export 
 very much. That the Soviet Government, with its nationalization of trade, 
 and its general confusion and disorganization, will be able to do better is not 
 to be expected. It will not be well, therefore, for American business men to 
 pin large hopes on the prospects of business resulting from the plan announced 
 by the Supreme Council. 
 
 It is well that the blockade should be lifted. As long as there were national 
 Russian movements against the Bolshevist power, the blockade served its 
 purpose in preventing the Bolsheviki from getting supplies with which to 
 increase their military power. With the collapse of these national movements, 
 thanks to the lack of the aid promised by the Allies, the significance of the 
 blockade has disappeared. Whether it was ever an effective measure, and 
 whether its advantages outweighed its disadvantages, is questioned by loyal 
 
 35 
 
Russians themselves, and recently there was a strong movement among the 
 anti-Bolshevist Russians in favor of lifting it. Although, as Mr. Hoover 
 clearly points out, the blockade has not been responsible for starvation in 
 Russia, a condition brought about entirely by the incompetence, graft, and 
 crazy economic experiments of the Bolsheviki, great use of it has been made 
 by Bolshevist sympathizers as a propaganda argument. The lifting of the 
 blockade would show up quickly the failure of the Bolshevist system, and it 
 would, at the same time, open the horrors of the Bolshevist regime to the 
 eyes of the world at large. It is scarcely possible that the system of terror 
 by which that regime is maintained could long continue in the light of pub- 
 licity, and the moment the system of terror is abandoned the present Bol- 
 shevist rulers must fall. It is possible, therefore, that the lifting of the block- 
 ade would greatly hasten that internal revolution from which alone can come 
 a proper cleansing of the Russian state. 
 
 As regards the military danger to Europe and Asia presented by the Bol- 
 shevist army and the aggressive militaristic aims of its leaders, the announce- 
 ment of the Supreme Council changes nothing. The civilized world is at war 
 with Bolshevism. The two systems and ideas cannot exist side by side. If 
 they prevail, we succumb — there is no middle course. The Bolsheviki realize 
 clearly that the class warfare which they have inaugurated is doomed unless 
 they can bring about general revolution. If they make peace or compromise, 
 it is but to obtain a breathing space in which to carry on their propaganda 
 more effectively, and to resume the attack when the time is propitious. There 
 are some foolish ones among us who seem to think that the Bolsheviki have 
 seen the errors of their programme and have reformed, and that since they 
 are in possession of Russia we should recognize them. But this is impossible. 
 We cannot compound the felony. 
 
 The greatest' danger in this warfare is that, through a blundering policy of 
 setting on the little States that were formerly parts of the Russian Empire to 
 fight our battles for us, we shall transform the struggle against Bolshevism 
 into a war with Russia. This would be a catastrophe, since it would unite 
 all the patriotic national elements in Russia on the side of the Bolsheviki, in 
 spite of their present antipathy for them. Our correct policy is to announce 
 to all the world, first, that we will not recognize the tyrannical Bolshevist 
 minority or collaborate with it; secondly, that we stand firmly for the unity 
 and independence of Russia; and, thirdly, .that we stand ready, to co-operate 
 in every way with the sound and constructive elements in Russia for the 
 restoration and regeneration of their country. 
 
 36 
 
Lifting the Blockade 
 
 By LEO PASVOLSKY. 
 
 {Neiv York Times, January 25, 1920.) 
 
 The blockade of Soviet Russia was one of the features incident to the con- 
 duct of the civil war which has been raging in Russia for the last two years. 
 Its lifting never could be considered as anything but another incident in the 
 civil war. The blockade itself never was an important factor in the war, 
 since the isolation of the Soviet regime was a direct and inevitable outcome 
 of the betrayal by the Bolsheviki of the allied cause in making a premature 
 peace with the Central Powers. But the circumstances under which the lift- 
 ing of the blockade would and finally did come about are of vital importance. 
 
 The action of the Supreme Council in Paris several days ago was expected 
 to come at some time or other by all those who were watching closely Russian 
 developments. But the circumstances under which this action came surpassed 
 all the fears of even the most pessimistic. Accidentally or otherwise, the an- 
 nouncement of the resumption of trade with Soviet Russia was made almost 
 simultaneously with the decision of the Supreme Council to recognize the 
 independence of the two republics in the Caucasus, namely, Georgia and the 
 Tartar Republic, and at the same time the Baltic Provinces were already 
 practically placed on the footing of independent States. 
 
 This fact gives a tremendous political weapon into the hands of the Bol- 
 shevist leaders. They can now come to the people of Russia and say to them 
 that the Red military successes have made the Soviet regime such a formidable 
 adversary for the Imperialists of Western Europe that the latter are willing 
 to bow down to its power and agree to its insistent demand for the lifting of 
 the blockade. At the same time the Bolsheviki can make use of the allied 
 action in placing a stamp of approval upon several important cases of sepa- 
 ratism in Russia. They can offer the Russian people another proof of the 
 statement they have so often made in their propaganda that the Allies have 
 in mind nothing but the weakening and the dismemberment of Russia. And 
 this time, unfortunately, the claims which the Bolsheviki can make in this 
 direction can be substantiated by what appears to be a definite policy. 
 
 Had the lifting of the blockade been accompanied by a definite statement of 
 policy on the part of the Supreme Council, acting for the allied nations, in 
 which their friendship for the Russian people was presented clearly and in 
 definite terms, then, perhaps, the present action would have had the same 
 effect upon the people in Russia as the President's Fourteen Points and other 
 declarations had upon the people of Germany during the war. Most probably 
 the method of getting this information to the Russian people would have had 
 to be the same, since the Bolshevist press of today is even less open to the 
 publication of the truth about the outside world than was the German press 
 during the war. As it is, the statement that the policy toward the Soviet 
 Government remains unchanged merely means affirming the lack of policy 
 toward Russia that has been the curse of the international life of the world for 
 the last two years. And, when coupled with the other actions of the Allies 
 toward Russia, it makes for a direct loss of what little moral prestige the 
 Allies still have in Russia and means merely a blow for the anti-Bolshevist 
 elements under the Soviet regime rather than an act of assistance. 
 
 Z7 
 
As for the practical possibilities of the course adopted by the Supreme 
 Council, there seems to be no doubt that it is merely a poor edition of the 
 Nansen plan which was discussed so much last Spring. The Nansen project 
 was the first attempt to lift the blockade of Russia by organizing trade with 
 Soviet Russia, at that time, through the -agency of the neutral powers. It was 
 on a semi-charity basis and was undoubtedly doomed to failure even before 
 it could be applied in actual practice. At the time when the Nansen pian 
 was under discussion, I had a long conversation with Mr. Nansen touching 
 upon the different features of his plan. There were two difficulties in the 
 carrying out of his plan which I pointed out to him and to which he could 
 not find a satisfactory reply. 
 
 The first difficulty was that of organizing the distribution in Central 
 Russia. Mr. Nansen sought a parallel in the work of the Hoover commission 
 in Belgium, and when I pointed out to him that there was a vital difference 
 between the responsible military organization which the Germans maintained 
 in Belgium under their occupation and the thoroughly inefficient and irre- 
 sponsible organization of the Soviet regime, Mr. Nansen replied that he real- 
 ized that, but that he was willing to take chances. The second difficulty was 
 that of transportation, and I pointed out to Mr. Nansen that in order to carry 
 out his plan in all its details he would probably have to put on its feet the 
 whole Russian system of railroad transportation; which he also admitted was 
 true. And when I finally pressed him for an answer to the question as to 
 whether he would not in this way merely solve the two most difficult prob- 
 lems that the Bolshevist regime is facing, viz., feed the cities and reconstruct 
 transportation, he replied that, even if this were so, he was primarily ii.. 
 terested in feeding the starving population of the Russian cities. 
 
 The carrying out of the plan adopted by the Supreme Council in Paris still 
 involves the same difficulties and encounters new ones. The question of or- 
 ganizing distribution in Russia remains the same. The talk of dealing 
 through the Co-operative organizations when those organizations had been 
 ground under heel by the Soviet regime is a case of camouflage at best. A 
 Government grain monopoly still exists in Russia, and no one can purchase 
 grain from the peasants except the Government. No one, therefore, under 
 the Soviet regime, can gather from the peasants the grain needed for export 
 out of Russia, no one can obtain that grain for transportation to the cities, 
 except the Government. And if the Government is to bring the grain to the 
 cities, its system of distribution would certainly not be different from the sys- 
 tem followed out now ; the followers of the Bolshevist regime will still be 
 fed, and everybody else will still starve, as now? The Supreme Council plan 
 contemplates no charity features. It places everything on a business footing. 
 And how can any business dealings be had on anything like a large scale, 
 which the carrying out of the plan makes necessary, unless it be done with the 
 Bolshevist Government itself? It appears, therefore, that the plan is really 
 what the Bolshevist representatives already term it, a camouflaged decision 
 to enter into direct communication with the Soviet Government. 
 
 There is another feature which renders the present plan a very much 
 worse edition of the Nansen plan. The statement, as issued by the Supreme 
 Council, makes the central point of the plan not so much the importation of 
 goods into Russia as the export of foodstuffs from Russia. The Nansen plan 
 at least spoke only of feeding Russia. 
 
 One gets a peculiar sense of similarity between the conditions under which 
 the Germans concluded the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the conditions under 
 which the Supreme Council has now lifted the blockade of Russia. In both 
 cases the avowed object of making peace with the Soviet regime in Russia 
 was an attempt to get foodstuffs and raw materials out of the country. There 
 are grave dangers in the possibilities of this similarit}'. 
 
 38 
 
The dangers of the blockade itself and its effect upon the conditions in 
 Russia were always misunderstood in this country, as well as elsewhere. The 
 rural population in Central Russia never starved, except when the Bolshevist 
 requisitions robbed the peasants &f all of their available grain. The cities 
 were starving, but the reason for that was that Central Russia never could 
 support itself from the point of view of food. It always had to bring food 
 from South Russia and Siberia. The real causes of starvation in the north 
 lay, in the first place, in the fact that the civil war had rendered those sources 
 of food supply inaccessible, and, in the second, because even when the for- 
 tunes of war did bring those districts temporarily into- the hands of the 
 Bolsheviki, the disorganized transportation facilities made it impossible to 
 transport grain into the starving portions of Russia. The Supreme Council 
 in Paris has no foodstuffs to send to the starving cities of Russia. At best it 
 can feed only the port cities. 
 
 But even that is not so important. Persons returning from Soviet Russia 
 bear witness to the fact that in Russia itself, in the starving cities, the ques- 
 tion of blockade never meant anything. It was merely a weapon, a political 
 weapon in the hands of the Bolsheviki in precisely the same way that it was 
 an instrument for pro-Bolshevist propaganda outside . of Russia itself, par- 
 ticularly in England and America. And since this was so the circumstances 
 under which the blockade has been lifted merely make it a still more powerful 
 instrument and a still more important tool for propaganda in the hands of the 
 Bolsheviki in Russia and their agents abroad. 
 
 The whole action of the Supreme Council in lifting the blockade and the 
 condition under which this action was performed constitute the crowning 
 blunder of the whole allied policy of blunders in their relations with Russia. 
 It is fortunate, indeed, that America had no direct part in this latest and 
 crowning blunder of the Allies. The decision to life the blockade was ap- 
 parently taken without consulting America. Let us hope that this fact will be 
 clearly understood in time by the people in Russia whose struggle for liberation 
 — blockade or no blockade — will not be over until the Bolshevist tyranny is 
 overthrown and a democratic republic is established, when the people of Rus- 
 sia will be able at last to look backward, calmly and dispassionately, and de- 
 termine for themselves who were their real friends in Russia's darkest hour. 
 
 39 
 
>,^ 
 
 An Answer to Mr. Berkenhemn 
 
 By Dr. Kasimir Kovalsky 
 
 Member of the American Committee of Siberian Agricultural 
 Co-operative Unious. 
 
 The lifting of the blockade, in accordance with the plans urged by 
 Mr. Alexander Berkenheim, makes the Co-operative organizations the 
 instrument of possible commerce. In connection with this, the follow- 
 ing considerations are important: 
 
 Mr. Berkenheim's plan of supplying Russia with foreign goods 
 through the Cooperative Societies is the purest kind of Utopia. 
 
 True, the Russian Co-operatives are a great power. But that power 
 could give the full measure of its useful work to the population only 
 in the case when, on the one hand, the Co-operatives were able to 
 replace the whole of the trade and supply apparatus of the Soviets, 
 and, on the other hand, to gain control of the Russian transportation 
 system. Of course, the Soviets will never allow that, as it would 
 mean the complete reversal of Trotzky's and Lenine's tactics. 
 
 Now, regarding the export of the Russian raw materials: It 
 would be a good thing first for the Russian Co-operatives to ask the 
 Russian peasant what are his views on the export question, and what 
 has he actually to export. Cattle? It would be a crime to export 
 cattle from Russia at present. All the provinces of northern and 
 northwestern Russia, the northern part of Siberia, as well as the 
 large prairie (steppe) provinces, have lost during the great war and 
 after, during the civil war, close to fifty-two per cent of their horses 
 and milk cattle. The epidemic diseases of the cattle in the Kirgiz, 
 Orenburg and Ural steppes, in the years 1918 and 1919, have also 
 destroyed many million head of cattle. 
 
 Will Mr. Berkenheim deprive the population of what is left of their 
 horses and cattle for the sake of export? 
 
 Further, regarding grain : There are, in fact, in Siberia, on t' 
 Ural and in South Russia, millions (but hardly billions) of p' 
 of grain (36 lbs. to the pood). Before thinking of supplying f*" 
 countries with that grain the Co-operatives should in honor thi- 
 of that enormous part of Russia which is at present slowly 
 on one-quarter and one-eighth of a pound of adulterated b 
 day per person. 
 
 Of course, it is possible to organize the export of Ry' 
 but only with the consent of the peasants themselves, ^/ 
 unhampered assistance of the local Zemstvos and city ijy 
 bodies of local self-government re-established in their ri' 
 
 The right of local self-government is the first articlf 
 of the Russian socialistic parties. Has Mr. ' Ber' 
 those principles? 
 
i,nS.'!^."Y °^ CONGRESS 
 
 t 
 
 028 031 252 6 
 
 Finally, about flax : It is a pleasure to see Mr. Berkenheim's 
 effort to supply the English factories with flax, yet Russia herself 
 is clothed in the last rags of her cotton and flax textiles. Who will 
 attend to Russia's need in flax? 
 
 Production in Russia has fallen to ' the minimum. It seems then 
 that instead of keeping what little we have of flax for future produc- 
 tion we are to send it abroad. And what if the peasant is not going 
 to give the flax? In that case it will be necessary to send for it — 
 the Red Army, with machine guns and horsewhips. The Russian 
 Co-operatives have never stooped to such practices, and never will. 
 
 Mr. Berkenheim's plan is Utopia. Mr. Berkenheim has not even 
 given himself the trouble to think that transportation at present in 
 Russia, torn by civil war and starvation and infested by numerous 
 bandit bands of various descriptions, can be effected only under the 
 threat and protection of the bayonets oi the Red Army. 
 
 Economics are too closely connected with politics, and until "poli- 
 tics" in Russia have assumed the form of lawfulness, order and civil 
 peace the plans of Berkenheims will result only in the further im- 
 poverishment of the population and the fanning of the flames of 
 civil war. 
 
 Again, if the Co-operatives are so powerful in Russia and Russia 
 itself is so immensely rich in everything, why is it that both Co- 
 operatives and non-Co-operativcs are starving in Soviet territories, 
 and the peasants, in order to get an extra pound of potatoes from 
 their own fields, have to go out at night and steal for themselves 
 some potatoes, with the rifle in their hands? 
 
 New York, January 21, 1920. 
 
 Litvinoff Appointed Head of 
 Russian Co-operatives 
 
 i^im Litvinoff has been named Chief Director of 
 
 ssian Co-operatives. Litvinoff, as official represent- 
 
 the Soviet Government, has been conducting ne- 
 
 '^ with James O' Grady, British representative in 
 
 ^n. It will be difficult, then, to trade with the 
 
 ts directed by Litvinoff without treating with 
 
 vernment, of which Litvinoff is the official 
 
 ^^or/^ Times, February 9, 1920. 
 
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 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
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