.5X 
 
E 477 
 .52 
 .S54 
 Copy 1 
 
 THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN. 
 
 BY CAPTAIN JOHN^ K. SHELLENBERQER. 
 
 e4TH OHIO INFANTRY. 
 
 PAJPER READ BEFORE MINNESOTA OOMMANDERY OF" 
 THE tiOYAHj LEGION U. S. DECEMBER 9th, 1902. 
 
.6'Z 
 
THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN. 
 
 BY CAPTAIN JOHN K. SHELLENBERGER, 
 
 64th OHIO INFANTRY, 
 
 (Read December 9th, 1902.) 
 
 Anything concerning the battle of Franklin coming my 
 way has always been devoured with a greedy interest, and 
 because of this interest, I have given fully ten times more 
 research to this battle than to any other in which I was en- 
 gaged. On account of the open character of the battle field, 
 the limited area which was fought over, and my presence 
 in the midst of that area, the leading features of the battle 
 came under my personal observation, but wherever that 
 observation was wanting for giving a clear account I have 
 supplied the deficiency with information gathered from 
 other reliable sources. 
 
 I was commanding Company B, Sixty-fourth Ohio regi- 
 ment, Conrad's brigade. Wagner's division, Fourth corps. 
 Wagner's division was the rear guard on the retreat to 
 Franklin, and about mid-forenoon of November 30th, 1864, 
 arrived on top of the Winsted Hills, two miles south of 
 Franklin. Halting there long enough to snatch a hasty 
 breakfast the division then hurried into battle line to delay 
 the columns of the enemy, in close pursuit, by compelling 
 them to deploy. The position was held as long as possible 
 without bringing on a battle and then Wagner began to 
 retire slowly towards Franklin. The town lies nestled In a 
 little valley in a bend of Harpeth River. A stand was made 
 to get the artillery and the long wagon train over the river 
 and while our commanding general, Schofield, was giving his 
 
personal attention to the facilities for crossing, the main 
 body of the army, under the supervision of General Cox, was 
 engaged in establishing our defensive line, which stretched 
 across the river bend, in the arc of a circle, inclosing the 
 town. As fast as the troops arrived and were placed in 
 position they hurried to cover themselves with breastworks, 
 and by the time the enemy was ready to attack. Cox's line 
 was well intrenched. The train got over the river in time for 
 the troops to have crossed before the enemy appeared, but the 
 opportunity thus offered for securing a much stronger de- 
 fensive position, with the river in front instead of in rear, 
 was not improved. 
 
 By one o'clock Wagner had fallen back so close to Cox's 
 line that he began a movement to withdraw his division be- 
 hind that line. Conrad's brigade had been called in from 
 the left flank and was marching in column of fours along the 
 Columbia pike, with the head of column approaching the 
 breastworks, when Wagner received an order from Schofield 
 to take up a position in front of Cox's line. In obedience to 
 this order Conrad counter-marched his brigade a short dis- 
 tance and then deployed it in a single line of battle, having 
 a general direction nearly parallel with Cox's line. Five of 
 the six regiments composing the brigade were posted on the 
 east side and one on the west side of the pike 470 yards in 
 advance of Cox's line, as measured along the pike. Lane's^ 
 brigade, following Conrad's, was posted on Conrad's right. 
 Lane's line trending backward on the right in general con- 
 formation with Cox's line. When General Hood assaulted, 
 Conrad's five regiments east of the pike proved to be in the 
 direct pathway of his assault and they were overwhelmed 
 before the line west of the pike, which was greatly refused 
 as to that pathway, became fully engaged. When Opdycke's 
 brigade, the last to withdraw, came up to the position oc- 
 cupied by Conrad and Lane, Wagner rode forward and or- 
 dered Opdycke into line with them. Colonel Opdycke stren- 
 
 I. 
 
 A)''H<)r. 
 
uously objected to this order. He declared that troops out 
 in front of the breastworks were in a good position to aid 
 the enemy and nobody else. He also pleaded that his bri- 
 gade was worn out, having been marching for several hours 
 during the morning, while covering the rear of our retreating 
 column, in line of battle in sight of the enemy, climbing over 
 fences and passing through woods, thickets and muddy corn- 
 fields, and was entitled to a relief. While they were discuss- 
 ing the matter they rode along the pike together, the bri- 
 gade marching in column behind them, until they entered the 
 gap in the breastworks left for the pike and finding the 
 ground in that vicinity fully occupied by other troops they 
 kept along till they came to the first clear space which 
 was about 200 yards inside the breastworks. There Wag- 
 ner turned away with the final remark, "Well, Opdycke, 
 fight when and where you damn please; we all know you'll 
 fight." Colonel Opdycke then had his brigade stack arms 
 on the clear space, and his persistence in thus marching his 
 brigade inside the breastworks about two hours later proved 
 to be the salvation of our army. 
 
 When Conrad's brigade took up its advanced position 
 we all supposed it would be only temporary, but soon an 
 orderly came along the line with instructions for the com- 
 pany commanders and he told me that the ordeu were to 
 hold the position to the last man, and to have my sergeants 
 fix bayonets and to instruct my company that any man, not 
 wounded, who should attempt to leave the line without or- 
 ders, would be shot or bayonetted by the sergeants. 
 
 Four of Conrad's regiments, including the Sixty-fourth 
 Ohio, had each received a large assignment of drafted men 
 so recently that none of these men had been with their regi- 
 ments more than a mouth and many had joined within a 
 week. The old soldiers all believed that our harsh orders 
 were given for effect upon these drafted men for we never 
 before had received any such orders on going into battle. 
 
 3 
 
We then began to fortify. On the retreat that morning 
 we had passed an abandoned wagon loaded with intrenching 
 tools, and by order each company had taken two spades 
 from the wagon, the men relieving each other in carrying 
 them. These spades were the only tools we had to work 
 with. The ground we occupied had been frequently camped 
 on by other troops who had destroyed all the fences and 
 other materials ordinarily found so handy in building hasty 
 breastworks, so that on this occasion our only resource was 
 the earth thrown with the few spades we had. Under the 
 stimulus afforded by the sight of the enemy in our front 
 preparing for attack the men eagerly relieved each other in 
 handling the spades. As soon as a man working showed the 
 least sign of fatigue a comrade would grab the spade out 
 of his hands and ply it with desperate energy, but in spite of 
 our utmost exertions when the attack came we had only suc- 
 ceeded in throwing up a slight embankment which was high 
 enough to give good protection against musket balls to the 
 men squatting down in the ditch from which the earth had 
 been thrown, but on the outside, where there was no ditch, it 
 was so low that a battle line could march over it without 
 halting. We were out in a large old cottonfield not under 
 cultivation that year. The ground ascended with an easy 
 grade from our position back to Cox's line, and all the in- 
 tervening space, as well as a wide expanse to our left, was 
 as bare as a floor of any obstruction. In our front was a 
 wide valley extending to the Winsted Hills. This valley was 
 dotted with a few farm buildings, and there were also some 
 small areas of woodland, but much the greater portion of it 
 consisted of cleared fields. As our line was first established 
 the 65th Ohio was on the left of the brigade, but it was 
 afterwards withdrawn, leaving the 64th Ohio on the left 
 and three companies, H, K and B, were partially refused to 
 cover the left flank. My position was at the refused angle. 
 
 About the time that we began to fortify my attention 
 
was called to a group of mouuted officers in a field on the 
 side of the Winsted Hills, to the east of the Columbia Pike, 
 and about a mile and a half in our front. This group un- 
 doubtedly consisted of General Hood and his staff. An 
 officer who was present with Hood has stated that from 
 their position they had a good view of Cox's line and that 
 after giving this line a hasty survey through his field glass 
 General Hood slapped the glass shut Vvith an emphatic ges- 
 ture and decisively exclaimed, ''We will attack." Staff offi- 
 cers then began to gallop forth from the group v/ith orders 
 for the troops to form for assault. At the angle where I 
 was our view of the valley directly in our front and to our 
 right was shut off by a piece of woodland a short distance 
 in advance of our position, so that we did not see anything 
 of the movements of Cheatham's corps, which formed astride 
 the Columbia pike. But looking up the valley to our left 
 front was a wide expanse of cleared fields and in these fields 
 we plainly saw the movements of a large part of Stewart's 
 corps. They first came into view from behind a body of 
 timber over towards the river, deploying from column on the 
 right by file into line on double quick. As fast as the troops 
 could be marched up from the rear Stewart extended his 
 lines over towards the pike. We could see all their move- 
 ments so plainly while they were adjusting their lines that 
 there was not a particle of doubt in the mind of any man 
 in my vicinity as to what was coming, and the opinion was 
 Just as universal that a big blunder was being committed in 
 compelling us to fight with our fiank fully exposed in the 
 midst of a wide field, while in plain sight in our rear was a 
 good line of breastworks with its flank protected by the 
 river. The indignation of the men grew almost into a mu- 
 tiny and the swearing of those gifted in profanity exceeded 
 all their previous efforts in that line. Even the green drafted 
 men could see the folly of our position, for one of them said 
 to me, "What can our generals be thinking about in keeping 
 
 6 
 
us out here. We can do no good here. We are only in the 
 way. Why don't they take us back to the breastworks?" 
 
 The regiment contained a number of men who had not 
 re-enlisted when the regiment had veteranized and whose 
 time had already expired. They were to be mustered out 
 as soon as we got back to Nashville and with home so nearly 
 in sight after more than three years of hard service these 
 men were especially rebellious. First Sergeant Libey of Com- 
 pany H, was a non-veteran, and was also a fine specimen, 
 mentally and physically, of the best type of our volunteer 
 soldiers. When the enemy was approaching he twice got 
 up from the line and started for the breastworks, vehemently 
 declaring that he would not submit to having his life thrown 
 av/ay, after his time was out, by such a stupid blunder. The 
 little squad of non-veterans belonging to the company both 
 times got up and started to go with him and both times 
 they all returned to the line on the profane order of their 
 captain, "God damn you, come back here." A" few minutes 
 later the sergeant was killed while we were retreating to the 
 breastworks. 
 
 It took two hours, from two till four o'clock, for the 
 corps of Cheatham and Stewart to come up and get into 
 position and then they advanced to the assault in heavy 
 lines of battle. We kept the spades flying until they had 
 approached within range of our skirmish line, which fired a 
 few shots and then began to retreat rapidly. Then the 
 spades were dropped and the men taking their muskets 
 squatted down behind the low streak of earth they had 
 thrown out to receive the coming onset. A little later Com- 
 pany E, from the skirmish line, came scurrying back, the 
 men, with a very serious look on their faces, settling down 
 with the line like a covey of flushed birds dropping into 
 cover. 
 
 All that has been related concerning Conrad's brigade 
 took place in full view of that part of Cox's line extending 
 
 6 
 
from the river on our left to the Columbia pike, and if there 
 had been any previous doubt in the minds of any of these 
 on-looking thousands as to Hood's intention, his determina- 
 tion to assault was as plainly advertised as it possibly could 
 be during the intense minutes that it took his army to march 
 in battle line from the place of its formation to our advanced 
 position. General Cox has claimed that Wagner's division 
 was ordered to report to him and that he was in immediate 
 command of all the troops engaged in the battle. By his own 
 statement he was on a knoll in rear of Stiles' brigade, on the 
 left of his line, where he had the best view of the whole field. 
 From this knoll he had been watching the preparations for 
 attack, and all the time directly under his eyes was Con- 
 rad's brigade busily engaged in fortifying to resist that 
 attack. If Wagner was disobeying his orders by remaining 
 in front too long, as was given out a few days later when 
 he was made a scapegoat for the blunder of his position. 
 Cox was watching him do it and took no measures to pre- 
 vent it. If it was Cox's expectation that Wagner would 
 withdraw the two brigades at the last moment he must have 
 known better when he saw Conrad's brigade squat down be 
 hind their half-built breastwork preparatory to giving battle. 
 There was even then time, if prompt action had been taken, 
 for a staff officer to gallop to the front, before the firing be- 
 gan, with a peremptory order for Conrad and Lane to get out 
 of the way, but Cox, fresh from a personal conference with 
 Schofield, to whom he had reported the situation and whose 
 orders he then received with reference to holding the posi- 
 tion, looked quietly on and thereby approved of Wagner's 
 action. 
 
 It was a pleasant, hazy, Indian summer day, and so 
 warm that I was carrying my overcoat on my arm. When 
 the line squatted down I folded the coat into a compact 
 bundle and placing it on the edge of the bank in rear of my 
 company and sitting on it, with my feet in the shallow ditch. 
 
by craning my neck, could look over our low parapet. The 
 battle was opened by a rebel cannon, which, unnoticed by us, 
 had taken position on a wooded knoll off our left front over 
 towards the river. The first shot from this cannon flew a 
 little high directly over the angle where I was sitting. The 
 second shot dropped short, and I was thinking with a good 
 deal of discomfort that the third shot would get the exact 
 range and would probably lift some of us out of that angle, 
 but before it came our line had opened fire on the approach- 
 ing rebel line and I became so much interested in that fire 
 that I never knew whether there was any third shot from the 
 cannon. 
 
 Our fire checked them in front for they halted and be- 
 gan to return it, but for a minute only, for, urged on by 
 their officers they again came forward. Their advance was 
 so rapid that my company had fired only five or six rounds to 
 the man when the break came. The salient of our line was 
 near the pike and there the opposing lines met in a hand-to- 
 hand encounter in which clubbed muskets were used, but 
 our line quickly gave way. I had been glancing uneasily 
 along our line, watching for a break as a pretext for getting 
 out of there, and was looking towards the pike when the 
 break first started. It ran along the line so rapidly that it 
 reminded me of a train of powder burning. I instantly 
 sprang to my feet and looked to the front. They were coming 
 on the run, emitting the shrill rebel charging yell, and so 
 close that my first impulse was to throw myself flat on the 
 ground and let them charge over us. But the rear was open 
 and a sense of duty, as well as a thought of the horrors I 
 had heard of rebel prisons, constrained me to take what 1 
 believed to be the very dangerous risk of trymg to escape. 
 I shouted to my company, ''Fall back! Fall back!'' and gave 
 an example of how to do it by turning and running for the 
 breastworks. As the men were rising to go the rebels fired, 
 but so hastily and with such poor aim that their fire did not 
 
 8 
 
prove nearly so destructive as I had feared. Probably the 
 most of their guns were empty, although I did not think so 
 just then. The range was so close that it seemed bullets 
 had never before hissed with such a diabolical venom, and 
 every one that passed close by made a noise like it was big 
 enough to tear your body in two if it should hit you. I had 
 forgotten my overcoat, but had run only a rod or two when 
 I thought of it and stopped and looked back with the in- 
 tention of returning to get it, but the rebels then appeared 
 to be as close to the coat as I was and very reluctantly, for 
 it was a new one, I let them have it. After running a few 
 rods farther I again looked back. They were then standing 
 on the low embankment we had left, loading and firing at 
 will, but just as I looked some of their officers waved their 
 swords and sprang forward. The fire then slackened as they 
 started in hot pursuit to get to the breastworks with us. 
 
 Our men were all running with their guns in their 
 hands which was good evidence that there was no panic 
 among them. While knapsacks or blanket rolls were fre- 
 quently thrown away I did not see a single man drop his 
 gun unless hit. The cry of some of our wounded who went 
 down in that wild race, knowing .they would have to lie 
 there exposed to all the fire of our own line, had a pathetic 
 note of despair in it, I had never heard before. A rebel ac- 
 count has stated that the next morning they found some ot 
 their dead with their thumbs chewed to a pulp. They had 
 fallen with disabling wounds and the agony of their helpless 
 exposure to the murderous fire from our breastworks, which 
 swept the bare ground where they were lying, had been so 
 great that they had stuck their thumbs in their mouths and 
 bit on them to keep from bleating like calves. Many of the 
 bodies thus exposed were hit so frequently that they were 
 literally riddled with bullet holes. 
 
 Our men were nearly all drifting towards the pike as if 
 with the intention of entering the breastworks through the 
 
 9 
 
gap at the pike. But I reasoned that the hottest fire would 
 be directed where the biggest crowd was, and I veered off 
 the other way in an effort to get away from the crowd. 
 While running rapidly with body bent over and head down, 
 after the involuntary manner of men retreating under fire, I 
 came into collision with a man running in a similar attitude, 
 but headed towards the gap. The shock was so great that 
 it knocked him down and pretty well knocked the wind out 
 of me. Just as we met a rebel shell exploded close over our 
 heads and as his body was rolling over on the ground I 
 ca.ught a glimpse of his face while upturned and in its hor- 
 rified look read his belief that it was the shell that had hit 
 him. The idea was so comical that I had to laugh, but my 
 laugh was of very brief duration when I found myself so 
 nnch disabled that I was rapidly falling behind. With 
 panting lungs and trembling legs I toiled along, straining 
 every nerve to reach the breastwork, but when it was yet 
 onlv a few steps away, even with life itself for the staked, 
 ' could go no farther, and thought my time had come. My 
 brave mother, the daughter of a soldier of 1812 and the grand 
 daughter of a Revolutionary soldier, when I had successfully 
 appealed to her pride in her military ancestry, and she had 
 consented to my enlistment had said, "Well, if you must go, 
 don't get shot in the back." I thought of her and of that 
 saying and faced about to take it in front. While I was 
 slowly turning my eyes swept the plain in the direction of 
 the pike. There were comparatively few of our men in my 
 immediate vicintiy, but over towards the pike the ground was 
 thickly covered with them, extending from the breastworks 
 nearly a hundred yards along the pike, and in some places 
 so densely massed as to interfere with each other's move- 
 ments. The fleetest footed had already crossed the breast- 
 work and all those outside were so thoroughly winded that 
 none of them could go any faster than a slow, labored trot. 
 The rear was brought up by a ragged fringe of tired strag- 
 
 10 
 
glers who were walking doggedly along, apparently with as 
 much unconcern as if no rebels were in sight. The rebel 
 ranks were almost as badly demoralized by pursuit as ours 
 by retreat. Their foremost men had alread} overtaken oui 
 rearmost stragglers and were grabbing hold of them to de- 
 tain them. 
 
 But my attention was quickly so intently riveted on the 
 nearest rebel to myself that in watching him I became obli- 
 vious to all the other surroundings for I thought I was look- 
 ing at the man who would shoot me. He was coming di- 
 rectly towards me, on a dog trot, less than fifty yards away, 
 and was in the act of withdrawing the ramrod from the 
 barrel of his gun. When this action was completed, while 
 holding the gun and ramrod together in one hand, he stopped 
 to prime and then, much to my relief, aimed and fired at a 
 little squad of our men close on my right. He then startea 
 to trot forward again, at the same time reaching back with 
 one hand to draw a fresh cartridge. By this time I had 
 rested a little and looked back over my shoulder towards the 
 breastwork. I then noticed that there was a ditch on the 
 outside and the sight of this ditch brought renewed hope. 
 With the fervent prayer, into which was poured all the in- 
 tense longing for more life natural to my vigorous young 
 manhood, "O, God, give me strength to reach that ditch," I 
 turned and staggered forward. I fell headlong into the ditch 
 just as our line there opened fire. The roar of their guns was 
 sweeter than music and I chuckled with satisfaction as I 
 thought, "Now, rebs, your turn has come and you must take 
 your medicine." I lay as I fell panting for breath, until I 
 had caught a little fresh wind and then began to crawl 
 around to take a peep and see how the rebels were getting 
 along. When my body was lengthwise of the ditch I hap- 
 pened to raise my head and was astounded by the sight of 
 the rebels coming into the ditch between me and the pike, 
 the nearest of them only a few yards away. They were so 
 
 11 
 
tired that they seemed scarcely able to put one foot before 
 the other and many of them stopped at the ditch utterly 
 unable to go a single step farther until they had rested. It 
 was only the strongest among them who were still capable 
 of the exertion of climbing over the breastwork, and if the 
 men behind that work had stood fast not one of those tired 
 rebels would ever have crossed that parapet alive. Trans- 
 fixed with amazement I watched them until the thought 
 flashed into my mind that in an instant some of their com- 
 rades would come in on top of me and I would be pinned 
 down with a bayonet. The thought of a bayonet thrust was 
 so terrifying that it spurred me into a last effort, and with 
 the mental ejaculation, "I never will die in that way," I 
 sprang on top of the breastwork. Crouching there an instant 
 with both hands resting on the headlog, I gave one startled 
 look over my shoulder. The impression received was that if 
 I fell backward they would catch me on their bayonets. 
 Then followed a brief period of oblivion for which I cannot 
 account. With returning consciousness I found myself lying 
 in the ditch on the inside of the breastwork, trampled under 
 the feet of the men, and with no knowledge whatever of how 
 I got there. It is possible that I was taken for a rebel when 
 I sprang up so suddenly on top of the breastwork and that 
 I was knocked there by a blow from one of our own men. 
 I was lying across the body of a wounded man who had 
 been hit by a bullet which, entering at his cheek, had passed 
 out the back of his head. He was unconscious, but still 
 breathing and the breast of my coat was smeared with the 
 blood from his wound. The press was so great that I could 
 not get on my feet, but in a desperate effort to avoid being 
 trampled to death managed in some way to crawl out be- 
 tween the legs of the men to the bank of the ditch, where 1 
 lay utterly helpless with burning lungs still panting for 
 breath. My first thought was of the rebels I had seen cross- 
 ing the breastwork, and I looked toward the pike. I Mad 
 
 12 
 
crossed our line close to a cotton gin that stood just inside 
 our works and the building obstruced my view except di- 
 rectly along the ditch and for a short distance in rear of it. 
 Our men were all gone from the ditch to within a few feet 
 of where I was lying and a little beyond the other end of 
 the building stood two cannon pointing towards me with a 
 group of rebels at the breech of each one of them trying to 
 discharge it. They were two of our own guns that had been 
 captured before ever they had been fired by our gunners and 
 were still loaded with the double charges of canister intended 
 for the rebels. Fortunately the gunners had withdrawn the 
 primers from the vents and had taken them along when they 
 ran away and the rebels were having difficulty in firing the 
 guns. As I looked they were priming them with powder 
 from their musket cartridges, and no doubt intended to fire 
 a musket into this priming. Just then I was too feeble to 
 make any effort to roll my body over behind the cover of the 
 building, but shut my eyes and set my jaws to await the out- 
 come where I was lying. After waiting long enough and the 
 cannon not firing I opened my eyes to see what was the mat- 
 ter. The rebels were all gone and the ditch was filled with 
 our men as far as I could see. If the rebels had succeeded 
 in firing those two cannon they would have widened the 
 breach in our line so much farther to our left that it might 
 have proved fatal, for the two brigades holding our line, 
 from the vicinity of the cotton gin to the river, had each but 
 a single regiment of reserves. The men in the ditch at my 
 side when I first saw the cannon, were so busily engaged in 
 keeping out the rebels who then filled the ditch on the other 
 feide of the parapet, that I do not believe they ever saw the 
 two cannon posted to rake the ditch, and their conduct was 
 most gallant. 
 
 For a brief period the rebels held possession of the in- 
 side of our breastworks along the entire front of Strickland's 
 brigade on the west side, and of Reilly's brigade down to 
 
 18 
 
the cotton gin on the east side of the pike, and the ground 
 in their possession was the key to Cox's entire position. 
 This break in our line was identical in extent with the front 
 covered by the great body of Wagner's men in falling backfs^ 
 it was occasioned by the panic and confusion created by 
 Wagner's men in crossing the breastworks. Cox's men, along 
 this part of our line, seem to have lost their nerve at the sight 
 of the rebel army coming and on account of their own help- 
 less condition. They could not fire a single shot while Wag- 
 ner's men were between themselves and the rebels and the 
 first rebels crossed the breastworks side by side with the last 
 of Wagner's men. 
 
 At some point a break started and then it spread rapidly 
 until it reached the men who were too busily occupied in 
 firing on the rebels to become affected by the panic. Op- 
 dycke's brigade was directly in rear of where this break oc- 
 curred. At the sound of the firing in front, Opdycke had 
 deployed his brigade astride the pike, ready for instant ac- 
 tion, and as soon as he saw that a stampede was coming from 
 the breastworks, without waiting for any order, he instantly 
 led his brigade forward. Charging straight through the 
 reat, after a desperate hand to hand encounter in which 
 Opdycke himself, first firing all the shots in his revolver and 
 then breaking it over the head of a rebel, snatched up a 
 musket and fought with that for a club, his brigade restored 
 the break in our line. It is true that hundreds of brave men 
 from the four broken brigades of Conrad, Lane, Reilly and 
 Strickland, who were falling back, when they met Opdycke's 
 advancing line and understood that the position would not 
 be given up without a desperate struggle, faced about and 
 fought as gallantly as any of Opdycke's men in recovering 
 and afterwards in holding our line, but if Opdycke's brigade 
 had not been where it was, the day undoubtedly would have 
 closed with the utter rout and ruin of our four divisions of 
 infantry south of the river. When General Cox met 
 
 14 
 
Opdycke on the field immediately after the break was re- 
 stored he took him by the hand and fervently exclaimed, 
 ^'Opdycke, that charge saved the day." 
 
 The front line of Strickland's brigade extended along the 
 foot of the garden of Mr. Carter, the owner of the plantatioQ 
 on which the battle was fought. The reserve line was posted 
 behind the fence at the other end of the garden, close to the 
 Carter residence, where the ground was a little higher, and 
 65 yards in rear of the main line. This reserve line, with the 
 fence for a basis, had constructed a rude barricade as a pro- 
 tection against bullets which might come over the front line. 
 When Opdycke's demi-brigade, charging on the west side of 
 the pike, came to this barricade, it halted there, probably 
 mistaking it for our main line. The rebels in the garden fell 
 back behind the cover of Strickland's breastwork and during 
 the remainder of the battle, on this part of the field, the op- 
 posing lines maintained these relative positions. Every at- 
 tempt made by either side to cross the garden met with a 
 bloody repulse. The body of one dead rebel was lying be- 
 tween the barricade and the Carter house and this body no 
 doubt indicated the high water mark reached by Hood's as- 
 sault. It is only fair to the gallant rebels who penetrated 
 our line to state that Opdycke's charge was made too prompt- 
 ly to give them any time to recover their wind, and that 
 tlierefore in the hand to hand struggle, they were laboring 
 under the great disadvantage of the physical fatigue already 
 described. 
 
 Returning to my personal experiences, when I had rested 
 enough to be able to sit up I found at my feet a can of coffee 
 standing on the smouldering embers of a small camp fire, 
 and beside it a tin plate filled with hard tack and fried bacon. 
 Some soldier had just got ready to eat his supper when he 
 was hastily called into line by the opening of the battle in 
 front. I first took a delicious drink out of the cofifee can 
 and then helped myself to a liberal portion of the hard tack 
 
 16 
 
and bacon, and while sitting there eating and drinking in- 
 cidentally watched the progress of the fighting. By the 
 time I had finished I was so fully rested and refreshed that 
 thereafter I was able to shout encouragement to the men 
 fighting in my vicinity as loud as any other company com- 
 mander. Along that part of the line only the breastwork 
 separated the combatants. On our side we had five or six 
 ranks deep composed of the original line, the reserves and 
 Conrad's men, all mixed up together without any regard to 
 their separate organizations. The front rank did nothing 
 but fire. The empty guns were passed back to those in rear 
 who reloaded them. The rear rank was kneeling with gun» 
 at a ready. If a rebel raised his head above the breastwork, 
 down it would instantly go with one or more bullets through 
 it fired by these rear rank men. In this close fighting the ad- 
 vantage was all on our side for our front rank men, stand- 
 ing up close against the perpendicular face of the breastwork 
 on our side, could poke the m.uzzle of a gun over the headlog 
 and by elevating the breech could send a plunging shot 
 among the rebels who filled the outside ditch and expose for 
 an instant only the hand and a part of the arm that dis- 
 charged the gun. But on account of the convex face of the 
 work on their side the rebels could not reach us with their 
 fire without exposing themselves above the breastwork. They 
 kept up the vain struggle until long after dark, but finally 
 elevated their hats on the ends of their muskets above the 
 breastwork, as a signal to us, and called over that if we 
 would stop shooting they would surrender. When our firing 
 then ceased many of them came over and surrendered, but 
 many more took advantage of the darkness and of the con- 
 fusion created by their comrades in getting over the breast- 
 work to slip back to their own lines. Soon after the firing 
 had ceased the 64th Ohio reformed its broken ranks a few 
 steps in rear of the breastwork and just east of the cotton 
 gin. I did not learn all the facts that night, but when they 
 
 16 
 
came out later it transpired that every man in my company, 
 save one, who had escaped the casualties of the battle, fell 
 into line. A |1,000.00 substitute had fled to the tov^^n where 
 he hid in a cellar. He went to sleep there and awoke the 
 next morning inside the rebel lines. He was sent south to a 
 prison and when returning north after the close of the war 
 lost his life in the explosion of the Steamer Sultana. 
 
 I had lost my overcoat, but had never let go the grip 
 on my sword. Some of my men had dropped their knapsacks 
 or blanket rolls, but every one of them had his gun and 
 cartridge box. They were all in high spirits over their own 
 escape and over the part they had played in the final repulse 
 of the rebels, and were talking and laughing over their 
 various adventures in the greatest good humor. The con- 
 dition of my company was typical of the condition of all the 
 other companies in the regiment as I saw while passing 
 along the line inquiring into the fate of brother oflScers and 
 other friends. I also learned in a conversation the next day 
 with Major Coulter, who had been my old captain, and who 
 was acting that night as assistant adjutant general of the 
 brigade, that every other regiment of the brigade had re- 
 formed in rear of the breastwork in the same way as the 64th 
 Ohio, and that the brigade as an organization, had marched 
 from the vicinity of the cotton gin v/hen the order to retreat 
 was executed that night. I never heard from any source 
 any intimation contrary to the truth as I have stated it until 
 I read in 1882, with the most indignant surprise, in Cox's 
 book on this campaign, then recently published, his statement 
 that the brigades of Lane and Conrad rallied at the river but 
 were not again carried into action. When Cox made that 
 statement he was more concerned in patching up that fatal 
 gap in the battle line of his own command without any out- 
 side assistance, than he was in ascertaining the truth, and he 
 took that way to dispose of two entire brigades. In his first 
 official report, for he made two reports, Cox went to the 
 
 17 
 
other extreme for he then stated that on the approach of the 
 enemy the two brigades in front had retired in a leisurely 
 manner inside his line. "Leisurely," is so good in that con- 
 nection that it always brings a smile whenever I recall the 
 "leisurely" manner in which Conrad's brigade made its way 
 back to Cox's line. 
 
 Soon after the regiment had reformed one of the drafted 
 men of my company was brought in from the ditch outside 
 mortally wounded. No doubt he had reached the ditch in 
 too exhausted a condition to climb over the breastwork and 
 had lain out among the rebels where he had been repeatedly 
 hit by our own fire. The pain of his wounds had made him 
 crazy, for he would not talk, but kept crawling about on all 
 fours moaning in agony. There were a few men missing 
 from the company of whom their comrades could give no 
 •account and moved by the fate of the drafted mar, I crossed 
 the breastwork to search outside if perchance I might find 
 one or more of the missing ones lying there wounded and 
 bring them aid. I went to a gun of the 6th Ohio battery, 
 posted a short distance east of the cotton gin, to get over, 
 and as I stepped up into the embrasure the sight that met 
 my eyes was most horrible even in the dim starlight. The 
 mangled bodies of the dead rebels were piled up as high as 
 the mouth of the embrasure, and the gunners said that re- 
 peatedly when the lanyard was pulled the embrasure was 
 filled with men, crowding forward to get in, who were liter- 
 ally blown from the mouth of the cannon. Only one rebel 
 got past the muzzle of that gun and one of the gunners 
 snatched up a pick leaning against the breastwork and killed 
 him with that. Captain Baldwin of this battery has stated 
 that as he stood by one of his guns, watching the effect of its 
 fire, he could hear the smashing of the bones when the mis- 
 siles tore their way through the dense ranks of the approach- 
 ing rebels. 
 
 While I was cautiously making my way around one 
 
 18 
 
side of that heap of mangled humanity a wounded man lying 
 at the bottom, mth head and shoulders protruding, begged 
 of me for the love of Christ to pull the dead bodies off him. 
 The ditch was piled promiscuously with the dead and badly 
 wounded and heads, arms and legs were sticking out in 
 almost every conceivable manner. The ground near the 
 ditch was so thickly covered with bodies that I had to pick 
 my steps carefully to avoid treading on some of them. The 
 air was filled with the moans of the wounded and the plead- 
 ings of some of those who saw me for water and for help 
 were heartrending. While walking along towards the pike 
 to get in the pathway in which my company had come back 
 T passed two rebel flags lying on the ground close together. 
 It did not occur to me that I would be entitled to any credit 
 for picking up the flags under such circumstances, but 1 
 thought that if I did not find what I was looking for I would 
 return that way and take the flags in with me. I had passed 
 on a few steps when I heard a man behind me exclaim, "Look 
 out, there!" and thinking he meant me I turned hastily and 
 saw him pitch the two flags over the breastwork. I presume 
 that the men inside the work who got possession of the flags 
 were afterwards sent to Washington with them and possibly 
 may have got medals for their capture. I felt so uneasy 
 while outside lest the rebels should make some movement 
 that would start out line to firing again that I kept close to 
 the breastwork, and as it was soon manifest that the chances 
 in the darkness of finding a friend where the bodies were so 
 many was too remote to justify the risk I was taking, I re- 
 turned within our line. 
 
 From what I saw while outside I have always believed 
 that General Hood never stated his losses fully. Those 
 losses were in some respects without precedent in either 
 army on any other battle field of the war. He had five gen- 
 erals killed, six wounded and one captured inside our breast- 
 works, and the slaughter of field and company officers, as 
 
 19 
 
well as of the rank and file, was correspondingly frightfuL 
 It was ofificlally reported of Quarles' brigade that the rank- 
 ing officer in the entire brigade at the close of the battle was 
 a captain. Of the nine divisions of infantry composing 
 Hood's army, seven divisions got up in time to take part in 
 the assault and at least six of these seven divisions were as 
 badly wrecked as was Pickett's division in its famous charge 
 at Gettysburg. 
 
 Our loss was officially stated as 2326 men and almost 
 the whole of it was due to the presence of the two brigades 
 in front of the main line. Casement's brigade, to the left of 
 Reilly's, sustained a very determined assault which was re- 
 pulsed with a loss of only nineteen men in Casement's bri- 
 gade. But the action of Casement's men was not hampered 
 by the presence of any of Wagner's men in their front and 
 they could open fire as soon as the rebels came within range. 
 If the brigades of Reilly and Strickland could have opened 
 fire under the same conditions they would have done just as 
 well as Casement's brigade. A critical investigation of our 
 losses will conclusively demonstrate that at Franklin the 
 violation of the military axiom never to post a small body or 
 troops in a way to hamper the action of the main body, was 
 directly responsible for the unnecessary loss of more than 
 2,000 of our soldiers. That was the frightful butchers' bill 
 our army had to pay because of an inexcusable blunder. 
 
 How was it possible for veteran generals of the Atlanta 
 campaign to make such a gross blunder? 
 
 In his official report Cox states that at two o'clock the 
 enemy came into full view and that he reported that fact and 
 the position of the two brigades in front of his breastworks 
 to Schofield, and received his orders with reference to hold- 
 ing the position, but he does not state what those orders 
 were. Cox made that report and received those orders in a 
 personal conference with Schofield when they must have ful- 
 ly discussed the situation, and Cox's peculiar statement in 
 
 20 
 
this connection seems to carry a covert threat, as if he had 
 said to Schofield, *'If you attempt to hold me responsible for 
 the blunder I will tell what those orders of yours were." 
 
 In a written account furnished me by Captain White- 
 sides, Wagner's Assistant Adjutant General, he states that 
 about half past two o'clock Wagner ordered him to see 
 Colonel Lane and find out what was going on in his front. 
 From his position on the pike at the gap in the breastworks 
 Wagner could see for himself Stewart's corps forming in 
 Conrad's front, as already described, but his viev/ of Lane's 
 front was obstructed by the large number of trees and by 
 the inequalities of the ground on the west side of the pike. 
 Colonel Lane told Whitesides that Hood was forming his 
 army in battle order and that without any doubt it was his 
 intention to attack in force; that the position occupied by 
 the two brigades was faulty, being without any support on 
 either flank, and unless they were withdrawn they would be 
 run over by the enemy or compelled to fall back to the 
 breastworks under fire. On reporting Lane's statement to 
 Wagner Whitesides was directed to find General Stanley, 
 the corps commander, and tell him what Lane had said. He 
 found Stanley with Schofield at the house of Dr. Cliffe in 
 the central part of the town, where they could see nothing 
 of what was going on in front, and reported to them as 
 stated above. He then returned to Wagner who received 
 no orders after this that he knew of. 
 
 The report of Cox and the statement of Whitesides in- 
 dicate that both Cox and Wagner believed that Hood in- 
 tended to attack but that neither of them would take the re- 
 sponsibility, with Schofield in easy communication, of with- 
 drawing the two brigades from the position to which they 
 had been assigned by his order without his sanction. They 
 reported to him the situation and then waited, and waited 
 in vain, for him to take action. 
 
 In a personal interview Dr. Cliffe told me that Schofield 
 
 21 
 
came to his house about nine o'clock for breal?fast and after- 
 wards kept his headquarters there until the battle began; 
 that after breakfast he retired to a bed room where he slept 
 until noon or shortly after; that a short time before the bat- 
 tle began Cox was there in conference with Schofleld and 
 staff oflScers kept coming and going until the fighting be- 
 gan; that Stanley was there with Schofield and they were 
 waiting for their dinner; that they told him there would be 
 no battle that day because Hood would not attack breast- 
 works but that after dinner they would ride on to Nashville 
 together and the army would follow after dark. 
 
 Stanley and Cliffe had been school boys together in 
 Wayne county, Ohio, and as Cliffe was a well known Union 
 man and it was supposed to be unsafe for him to remain in 
 Franklin he was invited to accompany Schofield and Stanley 
 on their ride to Nashville. General Schofield has claimed 
 that he scored a great success in his campaign against Hood 
 and that this success was largely due to his intimate knowl- 
 edge of Hood's character, gained while they were classmates 
 at West Point, which enabled him to forsee what Hood 
 would do and then make the proper dispositions to defeat 
 him. At Franklin he relied so confidently on his ability to 
 foretell what Hood's action would be that he not only wholly 
 neglected to give any personal attention to the preparations 
 for assault which Hood was making in plain sight of our 
 front but he would not give any heed to the reports brought 
 him by those who had seen these preparations. It was his 
 belief, based on his intimate knowledge of Hood's character, 
 that Hood was making an ostentatious feint to mask his real 
 intention of executing a flank movement, for in a telegram 
 to General Thomas, dated at three o'clock Schofield informed 
 Thomas that Hood was in his front with about two corps and 
 seemed prepared to cross the river above and below. 
 
 He has tried to escape all personal responsibility for 
 the blunder by the weak statement that he was across the 
 
 22 
 
river when the battle began. Even if that statement were 
 true, and it is directly contradicted by the disinterested state- 
 ment of Dr. Ciiflfe as well as by an abundance of other re- 
 liable evidence, both direct and circumstantial, there is no 
 possible escape for Schofield from the inexorable logic of the 
 situation. For two hours Hood was engaged in prepara- 
 tions for assault in plain sight of thousands of our soldiers. 
 What was Schofield doing those two hours? If he saw any- 
 thing of Hood's preparations he showed incompetence by his 
 failure to promptly withdraw the two brigades from the 
 blundering position to which he had assigned them. If he 
 saw nothing of Hood's preparations, it was only because of 
 a criminal neglect of his duty at a time when the perilous 
 position of his army, with a greatly superior rebel army in 
 its front and a river at its back, demanded his utmost Vig- 
 ilance. 
 
 It was said that General Stanley was sick but he spent 
 the day with Schofield and he also, having had West Point 
 experience of Hood's character, concurred fully in Schofield's 
 belief that Hood would not assault. So great was their de- 
 lusion in this respect that it would not be shaken by the re- 
 ports made by their subordinates, and nothing short of the 
 loud road of the opening battle was able to arouse them into 
 giving any personal attention to the situation. Then at last, 
 when it was too late to do anything to remedy a blunder 
 which already had gone so far that it must go on to its full 
 culmination, Schofield and Stanley left the house of Dr. 
 Cliffe. Stanley hurried to the front which he reached just 
 as Opdycke's brigade was starting forward. Spurring his 
 horse to the front of this brigade he personally led it in its 
 famous charge. A little later his horse was shot under him 
 and he got a bullet through the back of his neck as he was 
 rising to his feet. It was a flesh wound that bled freely, 
 but Stanley declined to leave the front until after the fight- 
 ing was all over. He then went to the rear to have his 
 
 23 
 
wound dressed and after his departure Cox was the senior 
 general on the battle field. 
 
 When Stanley started for the front Schofield started for 
 the rear, and the most charitable construction that can be 
 placed upon his action, is that he interpreted the sound of 
 the firing to mean that the expected flank movement had be- 
 gun and that his duty called him across the river to provide 
 against that flank movement. His disturbed mental condi- 
 tion at that time is disclosed by the fact that he abandoned 
 in the room of Cliffe's house where he had slept, his over- 
 coat, gloves and a package containing the official dispatches 
 he had received from General Thomas. These articles were 
 not reclaimed until our army returned to Franklin after the 
 victory at Nashville and in the meantime Mrs. Cliffe saved 
 the coat from being taken by some needy rebel by wearing 
 it herself and she also safely kept the gloves and dispatches. 
 
 After crossing the river Schofield rode to the fort that 
 had been built the year before on the high bluff which formed 
 the north bank. From this elevated position he had a good 
 view of a large part of the battle field and the heavy guns in 
 the fort were engaged in firing on the nearest flank of the 
 enemy, but he was not only well beyond the range of every 
 rebel bullet that was fired, but he was also so far away hj 
 the road which a staff officer must ride down the bluff to a 
 bridge and thence through the streets of the town to com- 
 municate with the firing line.that he was wholly out of touch 
 with the troops that were fighting the battle. His presence 
 in the fort had no more to do with the repulse of Hood's as- 
 sault than if he had been the man in the moon looking down 
 upon the battle field. The only order that he sent from the 
 fort was the order to retreat after the army had won a great 
 victory, ¥/hen this order reached Cox he made a manly 
 protest against it. He explained the wrecked condition of 
 the rebel army to the staff officer who brought the order, and 
 giving his opinion that retreat was wholly unnecessary he 
 
 24 
 
urged the officer to return to Schofleld and persuade him to 
 countermand the order. He also sent his brother, Captain 
 Cox, of his own staff, to remonstrate with Schofield, and to 
 say that General Cox would be responsible with his head 
 for holding the position. When Captain Cox reached the 
 fort he found that Schofield already had started for Nash- 
 ville. The Captain hurried in pursuit and overtaking Scho- 
 field on the pike and delivering his message, was told that 
 the order to retreat would not be recalled and must be exe- 
 cuted. In Wagner's division we had been marching, or forti- 
 fjdng, or fighting for more than forty hours continuously, 
 and believed that we had reached the limit of human endur- 
 ance, but we stil had to plod the eighteen weary miles to 
 Nashville before getting any rest.. 
 
 In January, 1865, Schofield, with the corps that he was 
 then commanding, was transferred from Tennessee to North 
 Carolina. When he passed through Washington en route 
 he had the opportunity of giving to President Lincoln a per- 
 sonal account of his campaign in Tennessee. The President 
 must have known in a general way, that at Franklin the 
 rebel army had made a very desperate assault which had 
 been most disastrously repulsed, but he certainly was ignor- 
 ant of the details of the battle, and in the absence of any in- 
 formation to the contrary his natural inference would be 
 that Schofield, as our commanding general, was entitled to 
 great credit for that repulse. At that time the truth con- 
 cerning Schofield's connection with the battle, which leaked 
 out slowly, was known to a few men only and those who 
 would have exposed Schofield's pretensions, if they had had 
 any knowledge of what he was claiming, were all far away 
 in Tennessee. The character of the ex parte claim for dis- 
 tinguished services rendered by Schofield in the battle, 
 which he succeeded in impressing upon "Honest Old Abe," 
 may be fairly inferred from the very extraordinary promo- 
 tion over the heads of many able and deserving officers given 
 
 26 
 
to Schofield, from Captain to Brigadier General in the regu- 
 lar army, to date November 30, 1864, with a brevet as Major 
 General "for gallant and meritorious services in the battle 
 of Franklin, Tennessee." 
 
As much of tlie/TOil^Hig/ monograph on the Battle of 
 Franklin as the time limit imposed would allow was read by 
 my brother, Companion George H. Shellenberger, at a meet- 
 ing of the Minnesota Commandary of the Loyal Legion held 
 in Minneapolis Dee. 9th, 1902. The paper was written after 
 an exhaustive investigation which was begun many years 
 ago and as I had no friend to protect and no enemy to perse- 
 cute among the generals engaged in the battle the truth ha^^ 
 been told without fear or favor. 
 
 The battle opened with a disgraceful and costly blun- 
 der which should have been investigated by a court of in- 
 quiry but a few days later General Wagner, the junior in 
 rank_and the weakest in influence of the generals implicated, 
 was relieved of the command of his division with the state- 
 ment that the blunder was due to disobedience of orders by 
 him and with this action the matter was hushed up. 
 
 I have no personal grudge against General Schofield. 
 whose obstinate reliance on his ability to fortell what Gen- 
 eral Hood intended to do was the prime cause of the blun- 
 der. My feeling towards him is the same that any honor- 
 able soldier will experience when he becomes convinced th it 
 an unmerited promotion has been obtained by dishonorable 
 methods. If any reader doubts the accuracy of the account 
 of Schofield's relation to the battle herein given let him go 
 to Franklin and look the battlefield over. A very brief in- 
 vestigation, if sincere, will then satisfy him that the blunder 
 described could not possibly have happened if Schofleld had 
 been attending to his duty intelligently and that his personal 
 conduct that day was not only the reverse of meritorious 
 but was wholly wanting in any element of gallantry. 
 
 In 1890 the National Tribune published an article on 
 the Battle of Franklin, written by me and containing in 
 much greater detail the charges against Schofield which are 
 
 27 
 
made in this article. Among the many letters then received 
 I have one from General Stanley in v^hich he expresses his 
 amazement at the accuracy with which I had told the truth. 
 There is not a particle of doubt about Captain Whiteside's 
 having reported to Schofield the statement of Colonel Lane 
 which is quoted. If Schofield had given to that report the 
 attention which its importance demanded he would have 
 remedied the blunder he made when he ordered Wagner's 
 division to the position occupied by the two brigades before 
 any evil results had happened. 
 
 In his book, "Forty-six Years in the Army," while de- 
 voting many pages to self laudation and defense of his con- 
 duct of the Franklin campaign, Schofield has not one word 
 to say in explanation of his failure to give any per- 
 sonal attention to the very extraordinary situation which at 
 Franklin developed right under his nose, so to speak. His 
 audacity in claiming the credit for the victory when he was 
 in Washington soon after the battle was fought and there 
 learned that the Administration was ignorant of its details 
 was a brilliant stroke of genius of its kind but not such 
 genius as any lover of his country will wish to see encouraged 
 in the ambitious young officers in our army. Was it for the 
 meritorious services he rendered by sitting idly in Cliff's 
 house and utterly ignoring the reports coming to him of 
 Hood's preparations for assault during the two hours that it 
 took Hood's army to come up and get into position, and for 
 the gallantry he displayed in crossing the river as soon as 
 the fighting began, thereby abandoning to his subordinates 
 the conduct of the battle, that Schofield claimed the promo- 
 tion he got? If he had been accorded the reward which his 
 conduct that day so justly merited it would have come in 
 the verdict of a court martial such as he declares in his book 
 ought to have been given to Wagner, Lane and Conrad: 
 "According to the established rules of war these three com- 
 manders" — and Schofield and Cox — "ought to have been 
 
 28 
 
tried by court martial and, if found guilty, shot or cashiered 
 for sacrificing their own men and endangering the army." 
 If any of the blame belonged to General Stanley it was 
 washed out gallantly with the blood of his wound. 
 
 29 
 
\ZI\JO 
 
r',r?,?"'°^=°~°REss 
 
LiBRftRV OF CONGRESS 
 
 013 702 783 5 0», 
 
 penmalipe* 
 pH8^