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 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 
 
 [Iowa has special interest in the battle of Shiloh for several reasons. It 
 bad more men in the battle, in proportion to population, than any other State. 
 The Iowa regiments engaged (all infantry) were: Second, Third, Sixth, 
 Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and 
 Sixteenth — eleven in all. Besides these, there were three companies from 
 Iowa (F, I, K) in the Twenty-fifth Missouri, which was the regiment that 
 furnished the reconnoiteriug party sent out on Sunday morning, April 6th. 
 
 The Sixth Iowa Regiment claims the distinction of being the first regiment 
 to disembark at Pittsburg Landing, and the Eighth claims the distinction of 
 being the last regiment to retire from the line in the Hornets' Nest. Five 
 Iowa regiments were in the Hornets' Nest and three of the number (Eighth, 
 Twelfth, and Fourteenth) were captured. All of the other Iowa regiments 
 were in the thick of the fight on Sunday, and each maintained the honor of 
 the State. 
 
 Before the close of the war there were many promotions of both officerg 
 and men from among those engaged at Shiloh, and several attained civil dis- 
 tinction during and after the war. Major Wm. M. Stone (Third Regiment) 
 and Lieutenant Buren R. Sherman (Thirteenth Regiment) served the State as 
 Governors. Sherman served as Auditor of State three terms before becoming 
 Governor. Major W. W. Belknap (Fifteenth Regiment) became Secretary 
 of War, and Lieutenant David B. Henderson (Twelfth Regiment), after long 
 service in the lower house of Congress, became Speaker. Many others en- 
 gaged in the battle from Iowa served the State in the General Assembly, in 
 Congress, and in other official stations of responsibility.- — Editor.] 
 
 No apology is offered for the appearance of another 
 paper on the Battle of Shiloh, for the reason that the last 
 word to be said on the subject has not been said, and indeed 
 will not have been said until the last serious misrepresenta- 
 tion, made through ignorance, prejudice, malice, or for any- 
 other reason, has been corrected. It is not in the thought of 
 the writer that he will be able to contribute additional facts 
 to the literature of the subject; but it is hoped that the facts 
 may be so grouped and illustrated as to leave a clearer pic- 
 ture of the battle in the mind of the reader. 
 
 As far as the writer knows the movements of the battle 
 on Sunday, April 6, 1862, have not heretofore been illus- 
 
4 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 trated except by means of one general map, showing pro- 
 gressive movements of the battle lines throughout the day. 
 Such a map can be little better than a puzzle-picture to the 
 general reader. 
 
 The original map from which the tracings were made to 
 illustrate the Battle of Shiloh was prepared under direction 
 of the Shiloh National Military Park Commission, to ac- 
 company its account of the battle, entitled The Battle of 
 Shiloh and the Organizations Engaged, compiled from of- 
 ficial records by Major D. W. Reed, Historian and Secre- 
 tary of the Commission. To insure accuracy in the original 
 map, the field was carefully platted by the Commission's 
 engineer, Mr. Atwell Thompson, and the camps and battle 
 lines were located by Major D. W. Reed, after an exhaust- 
 ive study of official documents, aided by the recollections of 
 scores of officers and men engaged in the battle on the 
 respective sides. The reader must remember, however, that 
 the lines were never for a moment stationary, so that it 
 would be a physical impossibility to represent them cor- 
 rectly at short intervals of time. The analysis here given 
 of the general map jDublished by the Commission, it is be- 
 lieved, will aid materially in understanding the battle. 
 
 Though not offering an apology for this paper, the writer 
 is disposed to justify its appearance somewhat by referring 
 briefly by way of introduction, to a few illustrative errors 
 and misrepresentations sought to be corrected, pointing out 
 some of the so-called histories and memoirs where they are 
 to be found. Of course it is not to be presumed that these 
 errors and misrepresentations were intentional : they are 
 due mainly to two causes — to the "smart" newspaper cor- 
 respondent, whose main object was sensation; and to the 
 unreliable historian whose main weakness was indolence in 
 searching for facts. Prejudice may in a few cases have 
 contributed to the pollution of the historic stream. 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 5 
 
 Special acknowledgements are due from the writer to 
 Major D. "W. Reed, Secretary and Historian of the Shiloh 
 National Military Park Commission, for valuable sugges- 
 tions in the preparation of this paper. The writer is also 
 under obligations to Lieutenant Wm. J. Halm of Omaha, 
 Nebraska, a member of the Twenty-fifth Missouri, who was 
 of the Major Powell reconnoitering party, sent out by Colo- 
 nel Peabody on Sunday morning, April 6th; and also to 
 T. W. Holman of Rutledge, Missouri, who was a member of 
 the Twenty-first Missouri Infantry and was with the regi- 
 ment when it went out to reenforce the reconnoitering party 
 and the pickets. 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 One of the worst as it was one of the first of the 
 sensational stories of the Battle of Shiloh put in historic 
 form was the account by Horace Greeley in his American 
 Conflict. The camp at Pittsburg Landing before the bat- 
 tle is likened to a Methodist campmeeting, and the Union 
 army on Sunday morning is represented as a "bewildered, 
 half -dressed, .... helpless, coatless, musketless mob", upon 
 which the enemy sprang "with the bayonet". This account 
 has Prentiss's division "routed before it had time to form 
 a line of battle;" and Sherman's division is "out of the 
 fight by 8 o'clock".' 
 
 J. S. C. Abbott in his story of the Battle of Shiloh as 
 given in his two-volume History of the Civil War, gathered 
 his material from the same sensational sources and he used 
 it in the same sensational way as did Mr. Greeley. 
 
 A more pretentious work, which appeared much later, was 
 Scribners' History of the United States in five volumes. 
 This work appeared after original sources of information 
 had become easily accessible; and yet in its account of the 
 
 > Greeley's The American Conflict, Vol. II, pp. 58-61. 
 
6 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 
 
 Battle of Shiloh it is the sinner of sinners for untruthful- 
 ness. It is no exaggeration to say of the Scribners' account 
 of the battle what General Beauregard is credited with hav- 
 ing said of General Halleck's report to the Secretary of 
 War at Washington as to the condition of the Confederate 
 army after the evacuation of Corinth — "it contains more 
 lies than lines". 
 
 Another of the sensational type, though of pretentious 
 title, is Headley's History of the Rebellion. Headley repre- 
 sents the Union officers as still in bed, when the "inunda- 
 tion" came, and says that "the troops seizing their muskets 
 as they could, fled like a herd of sheep". Unfortunately 
 for the reputation of Mr. Headley as a historian, the facts 
 are all against him — he allowed himself to be misled by the 
 fiction-writers. 
 
 John Codman Ropes, who enjoys something of a repu- 
 tation as a critical writer, in his recent Story of the Civil 
 War, published by the Massachusetts Historical Society, 
 shows plainly that he followed very closely the account as 
 given by General Buell, in his Shiloh Reviewed; and he 
 shows, also, a prejudiced judgment against Grant and in 
 favor of Buell — whom he evidently admired. Mr. Eopes 
 makes it appear that none of the divisions near the Landing 
 were in line until after Sherman and Prentiss had fallen 
 back from their first lines, about ten a. m. He leaves it to 
 be inferred also that Buell had an entire division on the 
 west side of the river and in the fight on Sunday night ; and 
 he figures that not more than five thousand of Grant's five 
 divisions, which were engaged in the battle on Sunday, were 
 in line at the close of the day. 
 
 John Fiske is another writer on Civil War subjects, and 
 in his Mississippi Valley in the Civil War he describes the 
 Battle of Shiloh, but not without some rather serious errors. 
 For instance he attributes the "wait-for-Buell" policy to 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 7 
 
 Grant — it was due to his superior, General Halleck. He 
 says that General McClernand was the ranking officer at 
 I'ittsburg Landing in General Grant's absence, which is not 
 correct — General Sherman was the ranking officer. He 
 makes no mention of the reconnoitering party that went out 
 from Prentiss's division before daylight on Sunday morn- 
 ing, but says that "when the Confederates attacked in full 
 force on Sunday morning, the Federals were in camp and 
 not in line of battle." On the same page, however, he gives 
 himself a flat contradiction by telling how Prentiss had 
 formed line and advanced a quarter of a mile, where he 
 received "the mighty rush of the Confederates" — and the 
 time he fixes at about half past five o'clock, which is an 
 error of fully two hours. 
 
 On one page he gives the strength of the Confederate 
 army as 36,000, exclusive of cavalry, and on another page 
 his "reckoning" is 30,000 on the same basis. He criticises 
 General Johnston for giving so much attention to the 
 divisions of Prentiss and Sherman, at the opening of the 
 battle, when he should have massed heavily against Stuart, 
 the extreme left of the Union line, forgetting, if he ever 
 knew, that Prentiss and Sherman must be forced back be- 
 fore Stuart could be attacked. The plan suggested by Fiske 
 would have exposed the Confederate flank to the two divi- 
 sions of Prentiss and Sherman, which would have been a 
 blunder. The corps organization of the Confederate army 
 appears, by inference, to have been well maintained ; where- 
 as they began to commingle at the beginning of the battle, 
 and the corps were practically broken up by ten o'clock. 
 
 Mr. Fiske is again in error in leaving the inference that 
 an entire brigade of Nelson's division was in at the close of 
 the fight on Sunday night. And still another error is the 
 statement that three Confederate brigades participated in 
 the last attack near the Landing. He gives the number of 
 
8 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 
 
 guns in Grant's last line far below the facts, and then specu- 
 lates upon what might have been if General Beauregard 
 could have "put 6000 to 8000 fresh reserves into the fight 
 against his weary antagonist", apparently never thinking 
 of the converse of the speculation. Mr. Fiske appears to 
 be particularly unfortunate in the handling of statistics. 
 He makes it appear that Lew. Wallace brought 7000 men 
 to Grant's right, and Nelson about the same number to his 
 left, on Sunday night — an error of 4000 or more. If Mr. 
 Fiske had trusted less to Shiloh Reviewed and more to of- 
 ficial records, he would have made fewer mistakes. 
 
 Henry Villard, who was a newspaper correspondent with 
 Buell's army, has written what he calls "Memoirs", and 
 "in order to impart greater accuracy and perhaps some 
 novelty", to his "sketch" of the Battle of Shiloh, he goes 
 to Confederate reports for his information. His "sketch" 
 abounds in errors, even to the misquoting of one of Gen- 
 eral Grant's dispatches, thus changing a negative to an 
 affirmative statement. 
 
 As recently as 1895 a Brevet Brigadier General, U. S. V., 
 Henry M. Cist, in his Army of the Cumberland, quotes ap- 
 provingly from Comte de Paris 's History of the Civil War 
 as follows: "At the sight of the enemy's batteries advanc- 
 ing in good order, the soldiers that have been grouped 
 together in haste, to give an air of support to Webster's 
 batteries, became frightened, and scattered. It is about to 
 be carried, when a new body of troops deploying in the rear 
 of the guns .... received the Confederates with a fire that 
 drives them back in disorder." - Mr. Cist quotes also from 
 Whitelaw Reid's Ohio in the War as follows : "He [Buell] 
 came into the action when, without him, all was lost. He 
 redeemed the fortunes of the field, and justly won the title 
 
 2 Cist's The Army of the Cumberland, pp. 74, 75. 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 9 
 
 of the "Hero of Pittsburg Landing ".^ Of the second quota- 
 tion it needs only to be said that its author was the news- 
 paper correspondent who wrote the first sensational and 
 untruthful account of the Battle of Shiloh. The other 
 quotation may well pass for an Arabian Nights tale. 
 
 General Lew. Wallace, commanding the second division 
 of Grant's army, having his camp at Crump's Landing six 
 miles down the river from Pittsburg Landing, has left for 
 us his Autobiography, which in many respects is an inter- 
 esting work. But if it is to bo judged by its account of the 
 Battle of Shiloh, in which Wallace participated on the sec- 
 ond day, the author's reputation as a writer of fiction will 
 not suffer. General AVallace accepts the first stories as to 
 the "complete surprise" of the camp and offers argument 
 to prove the contention. Then he proceeds to upset his own 
 argument by showing that Prentiss and Sherman had their 
 divisions in line of battle before six o'clock, or before the 
 Confederate lines began to move to the attack. He brings 
 the advance of Buell's army on the field some three hours 
 before it was actually there; has General W. H. L. AVallace 
 mortally wounded about the same length of time before the 
 incident occurred; has General Johnston killed in front of 
 the Hornets' Nest. He credits the men in the Hornets' 
 Nest with holding the position "for two or three hours", 
 whereas it was "held" from about 9:30 a. m. to about 5:30 
 p. m. "against the choicest chivalry of the South, led by 
 General Johnston himself", to quote General Wallace. In 
 fact, General Johnston led no assault upon the Hornets' 
 Nest, or upon any other position in the Union line. These 
 are a few of many fictions in Wallace's Autobiography, 
 where, of all places, the truth should be found. 
 
 Had it been true that the position at the Hornets' Nest 
 
 • Cist's The Army of the Cumberland, p. 77. 
 
10 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 was held "for two or three hours" only, Grant's center 
 would have been broken while Nelson's division was still 
 ten miles away, and about the hour when Wallace's divi- 
 sion started on its fifteen mile march. In that event, the 
 story of the Battle of Shiloh would have been a different 
 story. Grant's army would, probably, have been defeated, 
 and Buell's army then strung out over thirty miles of coun- 
 try road, might easily have suffered the same fate. For- 
 tunately, General Wallace was writing fiction. 
 
 At the risk of tediousness one more writer on the Battle 
 of Shiloh will be mentioned. General Buell, who partici- 
 pated in the battle of the second day, in a carefully pre- 
 pared paper, entitled Shiloh Revieiced* takes the position 
 of an advocate before a court and jury, stating what he 
 expects to prove, then marshalling his facts — or fictions, 
 as the case may be — to make good his contention. He 
 opens his ease with the following proposition: "At the 
 moment near the close of the day when the remnant of the 
 retrograding army was driven to refuge in the midst 
 of its magazines, with the triumphant enemy at half-gun- 
 shot distance, the advance division of a reenforcing army 
 arrived .... and took position under fire at the point of 
 attack; the attacking force was checked, and the battle 
 ceased for the day." The reader, not familiar with the 
 facts, must necessarily draw two inferences from this state- 
 ment: (1) that an entire di\4sion of Buell's army was "at 
 the point of attack"; (2) that the presence of such a body 
 of fresh troops decided the fate of the day. Both infer- 
 ences are erroneous, as the facts will show. 
 
 On one point of some importance, General Buell flatly 
 contradicts himself. In speaking of the attack near the 
 Landing, Sunday night, he says, in Shiloh Reviewed, that 
 
 * The Century Magazine, Vol. XXXI, p. 749. 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH H 
 
 the "fire of the gunboats was harmless". In his official • 
 report written just after the battle, he says that the "gun- 
 boats contributed very much to the result" — the repulse 
 of the enemy. 
 
 Perhaps a perfectly fair and unprejudiced account of the 
 Battle of Shiloh ought not to have been expected from the 
 pen of General Buell. He had, or fancied that he had, 
 grievances against both General Grant and General Hal- 
 leck — and he was human. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH NOT AN ISOLATED INCIDENT 
 
 The Battle of Shiloh was not an isolated incident : it was 
 one of a series of incidents, more or less closely related, in 
 which the Army of the Tennessee figured prominently and 
 effectively, but with divided responsibilities. It is, there- 
 fore, proper to take into account conditions precedent to 
 the battle before passing judgment upon the men and the 
 commanders who happened to be present at the moment, 
 and upon whom fell the immediate responsibilities, and 
 who suffered for the shortcomings of others. The Army of 
 the Tennessee was at Pittsburg Landing under the orders 
 of an officer superior in rank to the officer in immediate 
 conuuand; and it was there for a definite purpose. If it 
 did not accomplish the definite purpose, it may be answered, 
 in extemuitiou at least, that it was not pex'mitted to try — 
 its hands were tied and it was ordered to "wait". It 
 waited imtil compelled to fight for its own safety. It saved 
 itself from defeat and, very probably, saved from destruc- 
 tion another army of equal strength. 
 
 It is of no consequence who first suggested the line of the 
 Tennessee and Cumberland rivers as the weak point in the 
 Confederate line between Columbus on the West and Bowl- 
 ing Green on the East. It would have been a reflection on 
 military genius, if the suggestion liad not come to several 
 
12 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 
 
 persons at about the same time — so patent was the evi- 
 dence. It is of some importance, however, to remember 
 who made the first move to save the "weak point". Just 
 seven months before the Battle of Shiloh (September 6, 
 1861), the first direct step was taken leading to that event. 
 
 On September 4, 1861, General Grant took command of 
 the Cairo district with headquarters at Cairo, General Fre- 
 mont being then department commander with headquarters 
 at St. Louis. On the day after taking command of the 
 district. General Grant learned of an expedition from 
 Columbus to occupy Paducah at the mouth of the Ten- 
 nessee. A force was at once prepared to anticipate the 
 Confederate movement; a dispatch was then sent to head- 
 quarters that the force would move at a certain hour unless 
 orders were received to the contrary. No order came back, 
 and Paducah was occupied without firing a shot on the 
 next morning much to the surprise of the inhabitants who 
 were hourly expecting the Confederates then on the march. 
 General Grant returned to Cairo on the same day, finding 
 there the order permitting him to do what was already 
 done. The same movement that saved the Tennessee saved 
 also the Cumberland. 
 
 Except for this prompt action on the part of General 
 Grant the mouths of these two rivers would surely have 
 been strongly fortified; but, instead, the Confederate line 
 was forced back a hundred miles, in its center, to Fort 
 Henry on the Tennessee and Fort Donelson on the Cum- 
 berland (Map T). 
 
 Columbus, a few miles below Cairo, strongly fortified and 
 garrisoned by the Confederates, was so situated that it 
 might, unless threatened from Cairo and Paducah, throw 
 troops either west into Missouri or east by rail to Bowling 
 Green or to points within easy marching distance of Fort 
 Henry and Fort Donelson as there might be need. As a 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 13 
 
 result of these conditions, there was activity in Grant's 
 district, during the fall and winter months of 1861. The 
 battle of Belmont (Nov. 7, 1861) was one of the "diver- 
 sions" to keep the garrison at Columbus at home. In the 
 following January, General Halleck having become depart- 
 ment commander, expeditions were sent out from Cairo 
 and Paducah to the rear of Columbus and up the west bank 
 of the Tennessee — General C. F. Smith commanding the 
 latter expedition. General Smith, having scouted as far 
 toward Fort Henry as he thought advisable, went on board 
 the gunboat Lexington "to have a look" at the Fort. The 
 gimboat went within "about 2i/2 miles .... drawing a 
 single shot from the enemy .... in response to four sev- 
 eral shots fired at them." In his report (Jan. 22, 1862) 
 to General Grant, General Smith said: "I think two iron- 
 clad gunboats would make short work of Fort Henry."' 
 
 On the same day that General Smith reported on Fort 
 Henry, General Grant was given "permission to visit head- 
 quarters" in response to a request made some time before 
 — but he soon learned that advice and suggestions in re- 
 gard to affairs in his district were not wanted, and he went 
 back to his command. He ventured, however (Jan. 28th) 
 to send the following to his superior: "With permission, 
 I will take Fort Henry . . . and establish and hold a large 
 camp there."" Permission was granted on the 30th, and 
 Grant was "off up the Tennessee" (February 2nd). 
 
 Except for this appeal for "permission" to take Fort 
 Henry, backed by the advice of Flag-Officer Foote, com- 
 manding the gunboat flotilla, the expedition would have 
 been delayed at least two weeks, giving that much more 
 time for the Confederates to strengthen themselves. On 
 
 5 War of the EcbeUion: Official Sccords, Series I, Vol. VII, p. 5 
 « War of the Eebellion: Official Eecords, Series I, Vol. VII, p. 
 
 561. 
 121. 
 
14 THE BATTLE OP SHILOII 
 
 the day after the surrender of Fort Henry (February 6) 
 Halleck telegraphed to Buell that he "had no idea of com- 
 mencing the movement before the 15th or the 20th in- 
 stant".'^ And he was evidently very uneasy about the suc- 
 cess of the movement, as appears from a dispatch sent to 
 the General-in-Chief (McClellan), at Washington at the 
 very moment when Foote's guns were pounding at the little 
 mud fort. The dispatch was as follows: "If you can 
 give me .... 10,000 more men, I will take Fort Henry, cut 
 the enemy's line, and paralyze Columbus. Give me 25,000 
 and I will threaten Nashville .... so as to force the enemy 
 to abandon Bowling Green without a battle. ' ' * Before that 
 dispatch was received in Washington the thing was accom- 
 plished by a gunljoat bombardment of an hour and fifteen 
 minutes at Fort Henry. 
 
 Notwithstanding the fact that the expedition against 
 Fort Henry was undertaken before Halleck was ready for 
 it and the fact that he had misgivings as to its success, he 
 yet seems to have been jealous lest Buell might share in 
 the honors in case of success. When Buell learned of the 
 movement, which was undertaken without consultation with 
 him, he telegraphed Halleck to know if "co-operation" on 
 his part was "essential to ... . success," to which Halleck 
 replied: "Co-operation at present not essential." ^ Buell 
 was piqued at Halleck 's reply, and telegraphed to the Gen- 
 eral-in-Chief: "I protest against such prompt proceed- 
 ings, as though I had nothing to do but command 'Com- 
 mence firing' when he starts off."^" 
 
 This episode is mentioned only for the purpose of show- 
 ing that there were i:»ersonal comjilications between these 
 
 7 War of the Eebellion: Official EecorcU, Series I, Vol. VII, p. 593. 
 
 8 War of the KebelUon: Official Becords, Series I, Vol. VII, p. 587. 
 
 9 IFar of the Bebrllion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII, pp. 574, 576. 
 '0 War of the Eebellion: Official Beeords, Series I, Vol. VII, p. 933. 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 15 
 
 three commanders that, possibly, had some bearing ou the 
 Battle of Shiloli. The affairs of the succeeding three 
 weeks, after Fort Henry, did but complicate the compli- 
 cations, and upon General Grant fell the unfavorable 
 results. 
 
 No person was more surprised than was General Hal- 
 lock at the success of the expedition to Fort Henry, but he 
 continued to appeal to the General-in-Chief for "more 
 troops" while Grant was preparing to advance upon Fort 
 Donelson and after the investment of that place: (February 
 8th) without more troops, "I cannot advance on Nash- 
 ville"; (February 10th) "Do send me more troops. It is 
 the crisis of the war in the West" ; (February 14th) "Can't 
 you spare some troops from the Potomac?" " 
 
 Two days after the last appeal. Fort Donelson surren- 
 dered, and Clarksville and Nashville waited only to be 
 "occupied". They were occupied, respectively, on the 21st 
 and 25th, without opposition. Nashville was occupied by 
 Nelson's division of Buell's army which was sent to re- 
 enforce Grant at Donelson; but, arriving too late, it was 
 sent directly forward to Nashville by order of Grant, the 
 latter following in person for the purpose of conferring 
 with Buell — and this last move came near being the un- 
 doing of General Grant who mortally offended his supe- 
 rior by pushing the campaign too rapidly, arousing at the 
 same time the jealousy of Buell by occupying Nashville 
 just ahead of his [Buell's] army approaching from the 
 North. General Grant was in "ahead of the hounds", at 
 Nashville — that was his only offense. 
 
 FROM FORT DONELSON TO SHILOH 
 
 On the day that Nashville was occupied by the Union 
 troops (February 25) the Confederates began the evacu- 
 
 11 War of the SebelUon: Official Becords, Series I, Vol. VII, pp. 594, 599, 612. 
 
16 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 ation of Columbus, the last defense on the original line, 
 and began at once to establish a new line along the Mobile 
 and Ohio Eailroad from Columbus southward to Corinth 
 and from Memphis eastward through Corinth to Chatta- 
 nooga on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, with Gen- 
 eral Beauregard in command, Corinth being the strategical 
 point at the crossing of the two roads (Map I). 
 
 After the evacuation of Nashville the Confederates un- 
 der General Johnston moved southward as rapidly as pos- 
 sible, striking the Memphis and Charleston road at Decatur, 
 thence moving west to Corinth, the advance reaching that 
 place March 18th. General Johnston reached Corinth on 
 the 24th, assuming command of the combined Confederate 
 forces on the 29th. 
 
 The commanders of the two Union armies, Halleck and 
 Buell, after Nashville, did not fully agree as to the best 
 plan of following up the advantages already gained. Buell 
 thought, with the General-in-Chief (McClellan), that Chat- 
 tanooga was of "next importance" after Nashville'- and 
 he prepared to follow Johnston south. Halleck thought 
 that the line of the Tennessee River offered the opportunity 
 to strike the enemy's center at or near Corinth ^^ and he 
 urged Buell to join him in that movement, but without avail. 
 A few days later, however. General Halleck secured what 
 he had long desired, the consolidation of the two Depart- 
 ments with himself in command. Halleck urged his claims 
 on two grounds: (1) that all of the armies of the West 
 should be under one command, and (2) that the command 
 should fall to him in recognition of the successful campaign 
 against Fort Henry and Fort Donelson in his Department.^* 
 The consolidation took place on March 11th, after which 
 
 12 War of the BcheJlion: Official Hecnrds, Scries I, Vol. VII, p. 660. 
 
 " War of the Bchellion: Official Eecords, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 38. 
 
 14 War of the Reiellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII, p. 628. 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 17 
 
 date General Buell was subject to orders from St. Louis, 
 as General Grant had been from the first. General Buell 's 
 advance southward from Nashville had reached Columbia 
 on Duck River before the consolidation (March 10), but 
 his headquarters were still at Nashville. 
 
 On the first of March it appears that General Halleck 
 notified General Grant that his column would move "up 
 the Tennessee", and that the main object would be "to de- 
 stroy the railroad bridge over Bear Creek, near Eastport 
 .... and also the connections at Corinth, Jackson, and 
 numl)oldt." He was instructed to "Avoid any general en- 
 gagement with strong forces . . . better .... retreat than 
 risk a general battle ".'° Two days later. General Halleck 
 sent to the General-in-Chief the complaint against General 
 Grant, which resulted in the latter's practical suspension 
 from active command, Halleck suggesting at the same time 
 that General C. F. Smith command the expedition up the 
 Tennessee. In response to Halleck 's complaint, he was 
 authorized to put General Grant under arrest, "if the good 
 of the service requires it", to which Halleck replied: "I 
 do not deem it advisable to arrest him at present".'" On 
 the fourth of March, Halleck dispatched to Grant: "You 
 will place Maj. Gen. C. F. Smith in command of expedition 
 and remain yourself at Fort Henry." To this. Grant re- 
 ]>lio(l, on the next day: "Troops will be sent, imder com- 
 mand of Major-General Smith, as directed. I had prepared 
 a different plan, intending General Smith to command the 
 forces which will go to Paris and Humboldt, while I would 
 command the expedition upon Eastport, Corinth, and Jack- 
 son in person." He then assures General Halleck that 
 instructions will be carried out "to the very best" of his 
 ability.'^ 
 
 IS War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII, p. 674. 
 
 i« Jiar of the Rebclliori: Official Records, Scriog I, Vol. VII, pp. 680, 682. 
 
 1' yVar of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 3-5. 
 
18 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 Under this order of his superior, General Grant re- 
 mained at Fort Henry, acting in the capacity of a forward- 
 ing-ofiScer, until the 17th of the month — the most impor- 
 tant two weeks between the date of the order to proceed 
 up the Tennessee and the 6th of April following, when the 
 camp was attacked at Pittsburg Landing. The expedition 
 was planned without consultation with General Grant, com- 
 mander of the district, and it was directed, except in minor 
 details, from headquarters in St. Louis both before and 
 after March 17th — the date of General Grant's restora- 
 tion to active command of the army in the field. 
 
 The expedition left Fort Henry on March 9th under 
 command of General Smith, with full authority from the 
 Department commander to select the place of landing.^* 
 General Smith established headquarters at Savannah, on 
 the east bank of the river, but sent one division (General 
 Lew. Wallace) five miles farther up to Crump's Landing 
 on the west bank of the river, where his division went into 
 camp on the 12th. On the 13th Wallace sent an expedition 
 west about fifteen miles to the Mobile and Ohio Railway 
 near Bethel station, where about a half-mile of trestle work 
 was destroyed.!" rpj^g damage to the road was slight, how- 
 ever, as repairs were soon made. (Map I.) 
 
 On the 14th General Smith reported that he had "not 
 been able to get anything like the desired information as 
 to the strength of the enemy, but it seems to be quoted at 
 50,000 to 60,000 from Jackson through Corinth and farther 
 east." It was this information that induced General Smith 
 "not to attempt to cut the commimication at that place, 
 [Corinth] as that would inevitably lead to a collision in 
 numbers" that he was "ordered to avoid".-" Immediately 
 
 IS War of the SeheJUon: Official Secords, Series I, Vol. X. Part II, pp. 21-26. 
 i» War of the Seiellion: Official Becords, Series I, Vol. X. Part I, pp. 9, 10. 
 50 War of the MehelUon: Official Kecords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 8. 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 19 
 
 after this report was made, General Sherman was ordered 
 with his division to a point some distance above Pittsburg 
 Landing, with instructions to cut the Memphis and Charles- 
 ton road, if possible, at some point east of Corinth. The 
 attempt failed on acount of high water and Sherman 
 dropped back to Pittsburg Landing, where he met Hurl- 
 but 's division sent up by General Smith as support in case 
 of need. The two divisions left the boats at Pittsburg 
 Landing and went into camp. General Sherman sent out a 
 strong recouuoitering force toward Corinth, and on the 
 17th he reported to General Smith: "I am satisfied we 
 cannot reach the Memphis and Charleston Road without a 
 considerable engagement, which is prohibited by General 
 Ilalleck's instructions, so that I will be governed by your 
 orders of yesterday to occupy Pittsburg strongly."-' 
 
 General Lew. Wallace, whose division was at Crump's 
 Landing at this time, says in his Autobiography that if Gen- 
 eral Smith had received the order from Halleck that he 
 expected, to move directly on Corinth, "there had been no 
 battle of Shiloh." And again he says that by the 
 time General Grant was restored to command, the oppor- 
 tunity of advancing on Corinth was "going, if not already 
 gone"." 
 
 General Grant was restored to active command on March 
 17th, and going at once to General Smith's headquarters 
 at Savannah lie reported on the 18th the distribution of 
 troops as he found it — three divisions on the west side 
 of the Tennessee, Sherman and Hurlbut at Pittsbui-g Land- 
 ing, and Lew. Wallace at Crump's Landing; at Savannah, 
 on the east side of the river was McClernand's division; 
 and on transports on the river, waiting for orders, were 
 several regiments which were ordered to Pittsburg Land- 
 s' If'ar of the SebelHon: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 25. 
 2= Wallace 'a Autobiography, Vol. I, pp. 446, 47A. 
 
20 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 ing. It is important to remember this distribution of the 
 army as General Grant found it, under the sanction if not 
 the direct order of the Department commander. That Gen- 
 eral Halleck still believed it possible to cut the Memphis 
 and Charleston Eailroad, according to his original plan, is 
 shown by a dispatch to General Grant (March 18th) based 
 on a rumor to the effect that the enemy had moved from 
 Corinth to attack the line of the Tennessee below Savannah, 
 that is, to attack Grant's communications. "If so," says 
 General Halleck, "General Smith should immediately de- 
 stroy railroad connection at Corinth." -^ To this General 
 Grant replied on the 19th: "Immediate preparations will 
 be made to execute your .... order. I will go in person".^* 
 Again, on the next day in a lengthy dispatch to Halleck 's 
 Adjutant General, Grant repeated his intention to go "in 
 person" with the expedition "should no orders received 
 hereafter prevent it" — adding that he would "take no 
 risk .... under the instructions" which he already had; 
 that if a battle seemed to be inevitable, he could "make a 
 movement upon some other point of the railroad .... and 
 thus save the demoralizing effect of a retreat ".^^ 
 
 General Halleck evidently thought there was special sig- 
 nificance in Grant's intention to "go in person" with the 
 expedition toward Corinth — he knew something would be 
 doing — so, on the 20th Halleck dispatched: "keep your 
 forces together until you connect with General Buell .... 
 Don't let the enemy draw you into an engagement now." ~° 
 
 Before this last dispatch was received, orders were issued 
 by General Grant to all division commanders to hold them- 
 selves ready to march at a moment's notice, with three days' 
 
 23 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 46. 
 "i War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 49. 
 =s War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 51. 
 20 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 50-51. 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 21 
 
 rations in haversacks and seven days' rations in wagons. 
 On receiving the "wait" order, Grant dispatched again 
 (March 21) : "Corinth cannot be taken without meeting a 
 large force, say 30,000. A general engagement would be 
 inevitable; therefore I will wait a few days for further 
 instructions."-^ Evidently General Grant was restive and 
 anxious, believing that precious time was going to waste, 
 as appears from what he wrote to General Smith: "the 
 sooner we attack the easier will be the task".^* 
 
 As far as the records show, no orders later than March 
 20th were received by General Grant; and so the army 
 within striking distance of the enemy was in a state of sus- 
 pended animation for nearly three weeks. The army was 
 expected to cut the Memphis and Charleston road, but it 
 was not permitted to fight for the purpose; it must do it 
 without disturbing the enemy. 
 
 It is important to remember in this connection that the 
 territory west of the Tennessee River, from near its mouth 
 southward to Pittsburg Landing and west to the Missis- 
 sippi, was the enemy's coimtry both in sentiment and by 
 strong military occupation, and so the expedition under 
 Oeneral Smith up the Tennessee was moving fully two 
 hundred miles from its base of supplies, wholly dependent 
 upon the river. This territory was well supplied with rail- 
 roads under control of the enemy, by means of which, if so 
 disposed, he might throw a strong force on short notice 
 against General Smith's communications. General Grant 
 evidently had this danger in mind when replying to General 
 Ilalleck's order sending the expedition up the river, as al- 
 ready quoted. But in this as in other things. General 
 Grant's advice was not sought and his suggestions were 
 not heeded. The conditions at Pittsburg Landing were 
 
 2' War of the Sebellion: Official Becords, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 55. 
 28 n'ar of the Sebellion: Official Becords, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 62. 
 
22 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 not of Ms making — they were accepted as they were founds 
 even after three requests to be relieved of command in the 
 Department, because of the strained relations between his- 
 superior and himself.-* 
 
 GENERAL BUBLl's MOVEMENTS 
 
 In pursuance of his plan after Nashville, to follow the 
 enemy south, on March 10th, General Buell reported his 
 advance at Columbia, Tennessee, at the crossing of Duck 
 River.^** The consolidation of the two Departments oc- 
 curred on the 11th, and on the 13th, General Halleck, as if 
 in some degree appreciating General Buell 's embarrass- 
 ment, wrote him as follows: "The new arrangement of 
 departments will not' interfere with your command. You 
 will continue in command of the same army and district of 
 country as heretofore, so far as I am concerned." ^^ Defi- 
 nite orders to General Buell soon followed the consolida- 
 tion ; March 16th : ' ' Move your forces by land to the Ten- 
 nessee .... Grant's army is concentrating at Savannah." 
 Again on March 20th: "important that you communicate 
 with General Smith as soon as possible." And again on 
 March 29th: "You will concentrate all your available 
 troops at Savannah, or Pittsburg, 12 miles above." '- 
 
 As already stated, General Buell had one division at 
 Columbia — about forty miles on the road to Savannah — 
 when the order came to join Grant. The remainder of the 
 army moved promptly, but was detained at the crossing of 
 Duck River in building a bridge until the 30th, though one 
 division (Nelson's) waded the river on the 29th. 
 
 =» The several requests to be relieverl of command in Halleck's department 
 bear date of March 7, 9, and 11.— War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Se- 
 ries I, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 15, 21, 30. 
 
 30 jrar of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 25. 
 
 31 War of the Rebellion : Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 33. 
 
 32 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol X, Part II, pp. 42, 51, 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 23 
 
 Naturally General Grant, in front of a rapidly concen- 
 trating army under General Johnston and General Beaure- 
 gard, was anxious to know of General Buell's movements, 
 and so, two days after assuming active command, two cou- 
 riers were started from Savannah for Buell's camp which 
 was reached on the 23d with this dispatch from Grant: "I 
 am massing troops at Pittsburg, Tennessee. There is every 
 reason to suppose that the rebels have a large force at 
 Corinth, Miss., and many at other points on the road 
 toward Decatur. "^^ Thus General Buell had positive 
 knowledge both from General Halleck and General Grant 
 that the latter was "massing troops" at Pittsburg Landing 
 — and this information was in possession of General Buell 
 a full week before his army was able to cross Duck River 
 (about 90 miles away) and two weeks before the battle. 
 This point is dwelt upon for the reason that certain writers 
 have erroneously claimed that General Buell had not been 
 informed of General Grant's position on the west bank of 
 the Tennessee and hence did not press his march. 
 
 After wading Duck River as stated, General Nelson's 
 division went into camp for the night, and took up the 
 march next morning (the 30th) reaching Savannah about 
 noon, April 5th, having marched an average of twelve miles 
 a day. ^^ General Buell arrived in Savannah "about sun- 
 down", on the same day, but he did not make his presence 
 known, nor was his presence known to General Grant, when 
 the latter, with his staff, took boat next morning for the 
 battle field after an "early breakfast" left unfinished. 
 It need not be matter of surprise that General Buell 
 
 as War of the Rcbdlion: Official Hccords. Series T, Vol. X, Part II, p. 47. 
 
 s« The following is the itinerary of General Nelson's march from Columbia, 
 as given by Colonel Ammen, commanding the advance brigade: March 30, 4 
 miles; March 31, 10 miles; April 1, 14 miles; April 2, 16 miles; April 3, 15 
 miles: .'\pril 4, lO'A miles; April 5, Qi'o miles. — .'Vmmen 's Diary in War of the 
 BebeUion: Official Secords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 330. 
 
24 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 should be reluctant to join his army of about equal strength 
 and independent in command with the army on the Ten- 
 nessee. It was Buell's wish to strike the Tennessee higher 
 up and conduct a campaign of his own. With this in mind 
 he suggested to General Halleck that he [Buell] be per- 
 mitted to halt and go into camp about thirty miles east of 
 Savannah, at Waynesboro. To this suggestion General 
 Halleck replied on the 5th: "You are right about concen- 
 trating at Waynesborough. Future movements must de- 
 pend upon those of the enemy." ^^ General Buell issued 
 orders to "concentrate", but fortunately his advance had 
 passed the point designated before the orders were deliv- 
 ered, and the march continued. Had it been otherwise the 
 reenforcing army would have been forty miles away, in- 
 stead of its advance division being within ten miles, when 
 the battle began. 
 
 It may be asked: "Why did not General Buell make his 
 presence in Savannah known to General Grant promptly 
 on arrival! Perhaps a perfectly just answer cannot be 
 given in view of the fact that the former was not required 
 to "report" to the latter as a subordinate to a superior — 
 the one was to join the other and wait for orders from a 
 higher source than either. There was but one contingency 
 under which any part of General Buell's army could come 
 under General Grant's orders — an attack upon the latter. 
 General Halleck 's instructions to General Grant were 
 (April 5th) : "You will act in concert, but he [Buell] will 
 exercise his separate command, unless the enemy should 
 attack you. In that case you are authorized to take the 
 general command." ^^ The contingency arose on the morn- 
 ing of the 6th. 
 
 35 War of the EebelUon : Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 94, 95. 
 30 ll'ar of the Eehellion: Offidal Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 94. 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 25 
 
 BEFORE THE BATTLE 
 
 From the date of General Halleck's "wait" order to the 
 date of the battle — that is from March 20th to April 6th — 
 there were fifteen full days, during which time this positive 
 order was in force : ' ' My instructions not to advance must 
 be obeyed." Nothing, therefore, remained but to watch 
 the enemy and dodge him in case he offered battle in any 
 considerable force. There was scarcely a day in that wait- 
 ing time in which there was not reconnoitering, resulting in 
 several light encounters. Colonel Buckland, commanding 
 the fourtli brigade of General Sherman's division, has given 
 a good account of the condition of things at the front dur- 
 ing the three or four days before the battle in a paper read 
 before the Society of the Army of the Tennessee in 1881 
 and jjublished in the Proceedings of the Society .^'^ 
 
 On Thursday, April 3d, three days before the battle and 
 the day on which the Confederates marched from Corinth 
 and surrounding camps, Colonel Buckland under orders of 
 the division commander reconnoitered four or five miles 
 toward Corinth, finding the enemy in such force as to deter 
 him from attack, in view of the order to "fall back" rather 
 than risk bringing on a general engagement. The brigade 
 marched back without an encounter. On the next day the 
 picket line was attacked in front of Buckland's brigade, 
 and a picket post was captured, consisting of a Lieutenant 
 and seven men. Colonel Buckland went out with a regi- 
 ment to investigate and had two of his companies sur- 
 rounded by Confederate cavalry, which was in turn sur- 
 prised and routed by the reenforcements sent to the relief 
 of the two companies. Just as the enemy appeared to be 
 forming for a counter attack on Buckland, the Fifth Ohio 
 cavalry of Sherman's division came up, attacked and routed 
 
 " Proceedings of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, Vol. XIV-XVI, 
 p. 71. 
 
26 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 the enemy, capturing several prisoners. This affair devel- 
 oped the presence of the enemy in considerable force — 
 infantry, cavalry, and artillery. When Colonel Bnckland 
 reached the picket line, on his return to camp, he found 
 General Sherman with several regiments awaiting him and 
 wanting to know, with a show of displeasure, what he had 
 been doing out in front. After hearing Colonel Buckland's 
 account of the matter, he was ordered back to camp with 
 his men. General Sherman accompanying the order with 
 the remark that he might have brought on a general engage- 
 ment, which is to be understood as a mild reprimand. 
 
 So i3articular was General Sherman to avoid censure 
 that he required Colonel Buckland to make a written report 
 of the incident which report was sent to General Grant. 
 
 Colonel Buckland further says that he was along the 
 picket line several times on Saturday, the day before the 
 battle, and saw the enemy at several points, and that the 
 pickets reported activity near the lines. Other officers 
 made similar observations. "It was the belief of all", says 
 Colonel Buckland, "that the enemy intended to attack us, 
 either during the night or early in the morning".^^ This 
 feeling was so strong that regimental officers were instruct- 
 ed to have their commands in readiness for attack — the 
 picket line was strengthened and a line of sentries was 
 established from the picket line back to camp. 
 
 Similar evidence as to the activity of the enemy on Sat- 
 urday the 5th is furnished by Captain I. P. Eumsey, a staff 
 officer of General W. H. L. Wallace, who was riding outside 
 the lines on that day. On returning to camp Captain Rum- 
 sey reported to Colonel Dickey, 4th Illinois cavalry, that he 
 had seen a considerable body of Confederate cavalry. The 
 two officers going to General Sherman's headquarters, re- 
 
 38 Proceedings of the Society of the Army of the Tainessee, Vol. XIV-XVI, 
 p. 77. 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 27 
 
 ported the facts, to which General Sherman replied: "I 
 know they are out there, but our hands are tied; we can't 
 do a thing." Colonel Dickey then asked permission to take 
 his regiment out to investigate, receiving for reply: 
 "Dickey, if you were to go out there with your regiment 
 you would bring on a battle in less than an hour, and we 
 have positive orders not to be drawn into a battle until 
 Buell comes." ** 
 
 Colonel McPherson, Halleck's chief engineer, who was 
 camping with the second division (W. H. L. Wallace) fully 
 corroborates the above statements, by saying: "It was 
 well known the enemy was approaching our lines".*" 
 
 Apprehension of an early attack upon the camp pre- 
 vailed among the subordinate officers of General Prentiss's 
 division, as well as among those of General Sherman's 
 division, and similar orders were given to companies and 
 regiments to be prepared for a night or an early morning 
 attack. And it seems now to be well settled that the recon- 
 noitering party sent out from Prentiss's division before 
 daylight on Sunday morning was sent out by Colonel Pea- 
 body of the 25th Missouri, commanding the first brigade 
 of the division, and without the knowledge of General 
 Prentiss. 
 
 In the history of the 25th Missouri, edited and compiled 
 by Dr. W. A. Neal, Assistant Surgeon of the regiment, and 
 published in 1889, appears a detailed account of the action 
 of Colonel Peabody on the eve of the battle, as related by 
 Lieutenant James M. Newhard, at the time Orderly Ser- 
 geant of Company E, 25th Missouri, one of the companies 
 in the reconnoitering party. It is related that Colonel Pea- 
 body urged upon General Prentiss on Saturday the 5th 
 
 »» Quoted by Major D. W. Reed in a paper published in the Proceedings of 
 the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, Vol. XXXVI, p. 216. 
 
 *o War of the ScbcUion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 181. 
 
28 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 that an attack was very probable and that preparation 
 ought to be made accordingly. As nothing was done except 
 to strengthen pickets and guards Colonel Peabody, under 
 the influence of a premonition that an attack would be made 
 early in the morning and that he would not survive the bat- 
 tle, decided to take upon himself the responsibility of send- 
 ing out a party to reconnoiter. So Major Powell, an officer 
 of the Eegular Army and Field Officer of the Day was 
 ordered to take three companies of the 25th Missouri, start 
 at about 3 o'clock in the morning, and march until he found 
 the enemy. The companies constituting the party were B, 
 H, and E, of the 25th Missouri. How and where the enemy 
 was found' will be related farther on. 
 
 Some persons will have doubts, probably, in regard to 
 the story of Colonel Peabody 's premonitions of attack, and 
 death in battle, but there can be no doubt about the attack, 
 or about the death of Colonel Peabody, within a few min- 
 utes after the main battle began. Major Powell was also 
 killed early in the battle, and so the two principal actors 
 in the first scene of the drama passed quickly ofi the stage, 
 but not until after the chief of the two was severely repri- 
 manded, at the head of his brigade in line and waiting for 
 orders. The following letter, to a nephew of Colonel Pea- 
 body, here given by permission, tells the story. 
 
 333 Highlaud Av. 
 SoMERViLLE, Mass. Feby. 27th 1902 
 Mr. F. E. Peabody, 
 
 Box 7 Boston. 
 Dear Sir: 
 
 Referring to our conversation concerning the Battle of Pitts- 
 burg Landing, Tennesi3ee, April 6 & 7, 1862, I have to state that: 
 Everett Peabody, Colonel of the 25th Mo. Vol. Inft., was in com- 
 mand of the first Brigade 6th Division and I was senior Captain 
 of the regiment. 
 
 At early morn before breakfast the line of Battle was formed, 
 
THE BATTLE OP SIIILOII 29 
 
 with the right of I5i-igade resting oa the right of our regimental 
 color line. My company was on the right of Brigade. A few min- 
 utes after the line was formed, General Prentiss rode up near 
 Colonel Peabody, who was mounted and in front of my company, 
 about tlie center of the first platoon and said to him, "Colonel 
 Peabody, I hold you responsible for bringing on this fight." 
 Saluting, Colonel Peabody -said: "If I brought on the fight I am 
 able to lead the van." General Prentiss ordered him to take his 
 best regiment .... the next words I heard were: "25th Missouri, 
 forward. ' ' 
 
 Signed Yours respectfully, 
 
 F. C. Nichols, 
 Captain U. S. Army, Retired; 
 formerly Major & Capt. 25th Mo. 
 Vol. Inf. War of '61 & 5. 
 
 This letter by Capt. Nichols makes clear and positive 
 two important points: (1) that General Prentiss, like Gen- 
 eral Sherman, was impressed with the idea that, under 
 General Halleck's orders the enemy was to be avoided 
 rather than sought out, and he reprimanded his brigade 
 commander for doing, irregularly, the very thing that saved 
 the army from the "surprise" about which so many un- 
 truths have been told; (2) the letter makes it clear that 
 Prentiss's division was neither in bed nor at breakfast, 
 when the attack came — it was in line "before breakfast", 
 and the enemy was received with a hot fire, as will appear. 
 
 Prentiss's reprimand of Colonel Peabody was, doubtless, 
 prompted by the same sense of responsibility as was that 
 administered by General Sherman to Colonel Buckland, al- 
 ready mentioned. It had been ' ' ground into ' ' each division 
 commander, so to speak, that, "in no case" were they "to 
 be drawn into an engagement." 
 
 There was another incident in the activities immediately 
 procodiiig the battle, more important than anything yet 
 mentioned, which, however, was not revealed, until forty 
 
30 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 years later — an incident which, had it been known when 
 and by whom it should have been known, the Battle of 
 Shiloh would have had a different story to tell. We now 
 know, though the knowledge is comparatively recent but 
 entirely reliable, that General Lew. Wallace, commanding 
 the second division of the army at Crump's Landing, had 
 positive information of the movement of the Confederate 
 army to attack Grant on the very day that the movement 
 began — information brought directly to him by one trust- 
 ed scout and confirmed by a second. During two full days 
 and three nights ("for three days and nights," to quote 
 his langua,ge) he "simmers" this all-important information 
 in his mind, trying to determine how he could best reenforce 
 the comrades beyond Snake Creek in case of need. 
 
 General Wallace tells in his Autobiography how and when 
 the information came to him of the movement of the Con- 
 federate army from Corinth as follows : 
 
 "About as the sun set, Thursday, the 4th [3d], Bell the 
 scout came into my tent, evidently the worse for a hard 
 
 ride, and said, abruptly, 'I bring you news, sir The 
 
 whole rebel army is on the way up from Corinth They 
 
 set out this morning early. By this time they are all on 
 the road .... batteries and all.' This important informa- 
 tion was confirmed by another scout (Carpenter) : 'John- 
 ston's cut loose and is making for Pittsburg.' " ^^ 
 
 General Wallace says that he sent this information by 
 his orderly, on the same evening to Pittsburg Landing, 
 with instructions in case Grant was not found to leave the 
 dispatch with the postmaster, to be delivered next morning. 
 General Wallace's excuse for not sending a proper officer 
 with positive orders to find Grant, seems almost too puerile 
 to be credited — he did not want to appear "officious". 
 The dispatch never reached its proper destination, and the- 
 
 <i Wallace's Autobiography, Vol. I, pp. 454-456. 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 31 
 
 secret was in the keeping of General Wallace until he dis- 
 closed it in his Autobiography. For his own reputation, it 
 might better have died with him. A dispatch boat was at 
 all times at Wallace's headquarters, subject to his orders, 
 and there should have been no difficulty in the way of find- 
 ing General Grant within two hours, whether at the Land- 
 ing above or Savannah below. It is worth remembering in 
 this connection that the orderly sent with this dispatch 
 went by the river road and over Snake Creek bridge which 
 had been repaired on that very day under direction of 
 Colonel ^IcPherson, Halleck's chief engineer. General 
 Wallace pleaded ignorance of this road, two days later, in 
 excusing himself for marching his division over the wrong 
 road. 
 
 THE UNION ABMY AND THE FIEU) 
 
 To understand and properly appreciate the difficulties 
 under which the Battle of Shiloh was fought on the Union 
 side, the composition of the Army and the topography of 
 the field must both be considered. The Army of the Ten- 
 nessee as it was camped in the woods above Pittsburg 
 Landing on Sunday morning, April 6, 1862, was never in a 
 camp of organization and instruction, as an Army — it 
 grew by accretion, beginning at Fort Donelson in the mid- 
 dle of February preceding. Some of the regiments that 
 stormed the enemy's works at Donelson dropped into line 
 for the first time vinder fire, and only a few hours before 
 the assault was made. In like manner new and untrained 
 regiments and batteries came, one by one, to swell the 
 ranks at Shiloh, even after the roar of battle sounded 
 through the woods, taking their assigned places under fire. 
 The division (Prentiss's 6th) from which the reconnoitering 
 party went out before daylight on Sunday morning to ' ' sur- 
 prise" the enemy was the newest of the new, having but 
 
32 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 
 
 two organized brigades — though there was enougli "raw 
 material" assigned to the division for a third brigade, not 
 all on the ground, however, when the battle began. Atten- 
 tion is called to these facts for the reason that they should 
 be taken into account in passing judgment upon the Battle 
 of Sliiloh. 
 
 Besides the lack of organization and drill of the army 
 the character of the field upon which the battle was fought 
 should be considered. It has been said with much truth 
 that a clear understanding of the Battle of Shiloh cannot be 
 had without studying the movements on the ground. A 
 written description can convey only a very general idea of 
 the plateau upon which the battle was fought ; hence a map 
 showing the principal streams, roads, open fields, etc., is 
 added to aid the study of the positions and movements. 
 (Map II.) 
 
 The plateau, rising eighty to one hundred feet above the 
 Tennessee on the east, was surrounded by almost impassa- 
 ble barriers on all sides — except an opening to the south- 
 west, two and a half to three miles in width. The phiteau 
 sheds its waters west, north, and east — west and north- 
 west into Owl Creek; north into Snake Creek; and east 
 into the Tennessee. The creeks were effectually guarded 
 by swampy margins and heavy timber, or by a combination 
 of the three — timber, under-brush, and swamp. They ad- 
 mitted of no crossing except by bridges, of which there was 
 one on each of the streams leading to and from the battle 
 field. The Tennessee could be crossed only by boat, as the 
 army had never been supplied with pontoons. 
 
 This plateau, bordered as described, was cut into numer- 
 ous gullies and ravines by small spring-branches, running 
 to all points of the compass in finding their tortuous ways 
 to the larger streams. Most of these spring-branches ran 
 through marshy ground — impassable in the early spring 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 33 
 
 except where bridged. Some of the ravines were deep, miry, 
 and so densely choked with briers and brambles as to defy 
 invasion by anything much larger than a rabbit. The hill- 
 sides and the ridges were covered with timber and under- 
 brush, except where small farms were under cultivation. 
 There was not an elevation anywhere on the three miles 
 square from which a general view could be had. Wide 
 flanking movements were impossible to either army, and 
 cavalry was practically useless. The Landing itself was a 
 mud bank at the foot of a steep bluff, a single road winding 
 around the bluff and up the hillside to higher ground. At a 
 distance of about a half-mile from the Landing the road 
 forked and a little further on struck the Hamburg and 
 Savannah road, running nearly parallel with the river. 
 Still further on the Corinth road crossed the Hamburg and 
 Purdy road and struck the Bark Road, one branch three 
 miles out and the other branch four miles out. Besides 
 these main roads shown on the map, there were numerous 
 farm roads winding around on the ridges, and the needs of 
 the army made many new roads — all were deep in mud 
 made of the most tenacious clay, so that the unloading of 
 boats and the hauling to camp was a slow and laborious 
 process for both man and mule. 
 
 Had John Codman Ropes understood the topography and 
 other conditions of the field of Shiloh, he woiild hardly 
 have ventured to criticise General Johnston for making a 
 front attack upon the commands of Hurlbut, Prentiss, and 
 Wallace, and for failing to force his way along the Ham- 
 burg and Savannah road on the Union left at an earlier 
 hour. Oonoral Johnston had no choice but to make a front 
 attack and he did his best to force his way along the Ham- 
 burg and Savannah Road, toward the Landing at the ear- 
 liest possible hour. Why and how he failed to accomplish 
 his main object, before the close of the day, will appear 
 
34 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 later. The ground between the Hamburg and Savannah 
 Eoad and the river was much broken — so much so that 
 there were but two or three cultivated fields on that part 
 of the plateau. 
 
 THE CONFEDEEATE AEMY AND ITS OBJECTIVE 
 
 As already stated, after the surrender of Fort Donelson 
 and the evacuation of Nashville General Johnston's army 
 fell back as rapidly as possible southward to the line of the 
 Memphis and Charleston Railroad with a view to joining 
 General Beauregard, who commanded the territory west 
 of the Tennessee River with headquarters at Corinth. By 
 the last week in March there had been concentrated at Cor- 
 inth and in the vicinity an army of 40,000 effective men, and 
 General Johnston took command on the 29th of March with 
 General Beauregard second in command. The object to be 
 accomplished by this army was to attack and defeat Grant's 
 army before the arrival of Buell, then on the march from 
 Nashville with 37,000 men, following up this anticipated 
 success with the defeat of Buell, thus opening the way back 
 to Nashville so recently evacuated. The movement from 
 Corinth and surrounding camps to attack Grant began in 
 the early morning of April 3d, with a view to making the 
 attack early on the 5th. Bad weather and bad roads de- 
 layed the attack twenty-four hours — to Sunday morning, 
 April 6th. How the expected "surprise" of Grant's army 
 was anticipated will now be told. 
 
 THE BATTLE 
 
 It is not the purpose to describe in detail the movements 
 of the battle throughout the two days, but only to touch 
 upon salient features. One of the salient features, and not 
 the least important, is that of the action of the reconnoiter- 
 ing party heretofore referred to as having been sent out 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 35 
 
 before daylight on Sunday morning from Prentiss's divi- 
 sion. General Prentiss in bis official report makes no men- 
 tion of the Powell party, but he says that " at 3 o 'clock .... 
 Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Missouri, with five com- 
 panies of his infantry regiment, proceeded to the front, and 
 at break of day the advance pickets were driven in".*^ 
 
 C olonel Moore, in his official report, says that he was 
 ordered out by Colonel Peabody, commanding the First 
 Brigade, "at about 6 o'clock", to support the picket guard 
 which "had been attacked and driven in". It appears to 
 be certain, therefore, that both the reconnoitering party 
 imder Major Powell and the support under Colonel Moore 
 were ordered out by Colonel Peabody without consulting 
 the division commander ; hence the reprimand above quoted 
 — heard and remembered by many others besides Captain 
 Nichols. Colonel Moore's command was a reenforcing not 
 a reconnoitering party. 
 
 The line of march of the Powell party may be traced on 
 the map (No. II) along the road passing the camp of the 
 '25th Missouri, past the southeast corner of Rhea Field and 
 the north side of Seay Field, passing the picket line at the 
 forks of the road and striking the corner of Fraley Field 
 a few rods farther on. From this point the videttes of the 
 Confederate picket, under Major Hardeastle of Hardee's 
 corps were encountered. The videttes fired upon the ad- 
 vancing party and retired to the picket line at the south- 
 west corner of Fraley Field. The fight between the picket 
 post and Powell's party began at once, though it was still 
 quite dark — "too dark to see, in the timber and under- 
 brusli", so the firing at first was at random. As there never 
 was an official report made of the part taken by the Powell 
 reconnoitering party, as both the officer ordering it out and 
 
 42 War of the BebcUion: Official Eecords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 278. 
 
36 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 
 
 the officer commanding it were killed early in the main bat- 
 tle, we must rely upon the report of the officer commanding 
 the Confederate picket at Fraley Field for the incidents of 
 that encounter. Major Hardcastle says the firing began 
 "about dawn" (at 4:55 in fact), and he says: "We fought 
 the enemy an hour or more without giving an inch". "At 
 about 6:30" he saw the brigade formed behind him and 
 "fell back". The casualties in Major Hardcastle 's com- 
 mand were four killed and nineteen wounded.*^ The cas- 
 ualties in the Powell party were never certainly known. 
 
 This stubborn picket fight seems to have been something 
 of a "surprise" to at least one of the Confederate generals. 
 General Bragg, commanding the second line of attack, says 
 in his official report that "the enemy did not give us time 
 to discuss the question of attack, for soon after dawn he 
 commenced a rapid musketry fire on our pickets." ** Major 
 Hardcastle, commanding this picket line, says : ' ' The enemy 
 opened a heavy fire on us at a distance of about two hundred 
 yards ".''^ That the Confederate line was not ready to move 
 forward at once when the firing began appears from Major 
 Hardcastle 's official report. He says: "At about 6:30 a. 
 m. I saw the brigade formed in my rear and fell back."^*' 
 So there was a full hour and a half elapsed between the be- 
 ginning of the firing and the movement forward. The bat- 
 tle front, two and a half to three miles in extent with a 
 curtain of skirmishers, advanced to the attack. Major Pow- 
 ell's party and the Union pickets that joined him fell slowly 
 back, carrying their dead and wounded until they met 
 Colonel Moore with five companies of his regiment (21st 
 Missouri). Colonel Moore taking command, sent back for 
 
 13 War of the ScbeUion: Official Eecords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 603. 
 
 44 War of the EebcUion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 46-1. 
 
 45 War of the HcbcUion: Official Hecords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 60.3. 
 48 War of the Rebellion : Official Jtecords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 603. 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 37 
 
 the other five companies of his regiment, under Lieutenant 
 Colonel AVoodyard. The force now consisted of the 21st 
 Missouri, three companies of the 25th Missouri, four com- 
 panies of the 16th Wisconsin, and two companies of the 12th 
 Michigan — all infantry. This force formed in Seay Field 
 and advanced to a point near the northwest corner of the 
 field, where the Confederate skirmishers were encountered, 
 the 8th and 9th Arkansas. (Map III.) There was a sharp 
 fight at this point lasting about thirty minutes, in which 
 Colonel Moore was severely wounded. Lieutenant Mann 
 of the same regiment was wounded, and Captain Saxe (16th 
 Wisconsin) was killed — the first Union officer killed in 
 the battle of Shiloh. 
 
 As the Confederates advanced, the little Union force 
 moved slowly back across Shiloh Branch, forming again at 
 a point about two hundred yards from the southeast corner 
 of Rhea Field, where the remainder of Peabody's brigade 
 was in line. This position was held from a half hour to an 
 hour against two brigades (Shaver's and Wood's). While 
 fallinj!f back in line from this point Major King (21st Mis- 
 souri) was mortally wounded. Meantime, General Prentiss 
 had formed the remainder of his division (Miller's brigade) 
 and had advanced about eighty rods from the front of his 
 camp to the south side of Spain Field (Map III), where he 
 was joined by Peabody's brigade, Powell's party, and the 
 pickets. The division, now consisting of seven regiments 
 and two batteries, was here attacked by four brigades — 
 Wood, Shaver, Gladden, and Chalmers — comprising 
 twenty regiments and three batteries. Against this tre- 
 mendous odds tlie position was held for about thirty min- 
 utes, when the division fell back to the line of the camp 
 where another stand of about thirty minutes was made, the 
 division finally retiring at about nine o'clock — more than 
 
38 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 
 
 five hours after the reconnoitering party marched out. 
 Among the casualties on the Union side in front of Pren- 
 tiss's division were Colonel Peabody and Major Powell, 
 killed; and on the Confederate side General Gladden was 
 mortally wounded. 
 
 There is ample testimony in the official reports of Con- 
 federate officers to show that the resistance met by their 
 several commands in the slow advance from the picket line 
 had none of the features of a sham battle. There were 
 many casualties on both sides — how many was never cer- 
 tainly known. There was no bayoneting of Union men on 
 their beds in their tents or elsewhere. Indeed there was 
 never any foundation for such stories except in the imagina- 
 tion of sensational newspaper correspondents. And it is 
 further to be stated that at the time when the lines came in 
 collision at the front — about 8 o'clock — every regiment 
 in the camp, three miles in extent, was in line waiting or- 
 ders or was marching toward the sound of battle. 
 
 A word of explanation should here be made in regard 
 to General Sherman's (5th) division. This division was 
 the first to go into camp at Pittsburg Landing, and the 
 necessities of the situation required it to cover three im- 
 portant approaches from the back country to the Landing; 
 namely, the main Corinth road; a bridge on the Hamburg 
 and Purdy road over Owl Creek; and a ford over Lick 
 Creek near its mouth which accommodated travel from 
 Hamburg both to Purdy and Savannah. The crossing of 
 Owl Creek was about three miles west of the Landing, and 
 the crossing of Lick Creek was about the same distance to 
 the south of the Landing ; while the Corinth road ran south- 
 west nearly midway between the two crossings. General 
 Sherman camped three brigades (1st, 3d, and 4th) to occupy 
 the Corinth road at Shiloh meeting-house, thus covering 
 Owl Creek bridge. The other brigade (Stuart's) camping 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 39 
 
 to cover Lick Creek crossing, was separated from the divi- 
 sion by a little more tliau one mile, and it remained sepa- 
 rated throughout the first day's battle, acting independently 
 of the orders of the division commander. The space be- 
 tween the two parts of Sherman's division was later occu- 
 pied by General Prentiss's (6th) division formed of new 
 regiments as they arrived. When reference is hereafter 
 made to Sherman's division, in the action of Stmday, it is 
 to be understood that Stuart's brigade is not included for 
 the reasons explained. 
 
 Still another explanation is needed. Wlien General Sher- 
 man first went into camp special attention was paid to the 
 selection of camping sites convenient to good water. By 
 consulting the map it will be seen that three brigades of 
 this division were camped somewhat irregularly, the left 
 brigade being out of line with the other brigades and also 
 -out of line in itself. As a consequence when line of battle 
 was formed on Sunday morning it was not a prolonged 
 line, the left of Hildebrand's brigade being well forward 
 and in an open field where it was peculiarly exposed to the 
 force of the first onset to which it quickly yielded as will 
 1)6 seen. 
 
 At a little after seven o'clock, and after line of battle 
 had been formed, General Sherman and staff rode to the 
 left of his division in Rhea Field for a better view to the 
 front; and while there in front of the 53d Ohio regiment 
 (Col. Appier) the Confederate skii-mishers opened fire from 
 the brush across Sliiloh Branch, killing the general's or- 
 derly. At about eight o'clock, looking off to the "left 
 front", there were seen "the glistening bayonets of masses 
 of infantry", and then, for the first time. General Sherman 
 was convinced that "the enemy designed a determined 
 attack."" A few minutes later the Confederate advance 
 
 <' War of the Scbellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 294. 
 
40 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 struck Sherman's left under Colonel Hildebrand, and 
 Prentiss's right under Colonel Peabody. How Prentiss's 
 division met the attack has already been stated. How Sher- 
 man's division met it will now be shown. 
 
 The 53d Ohio, exposed as has been explained, and com- 
 manded, unfortunately, by an officer whose nerve deserted 
 him at the critical moment, after firing two volleys, became 
 demoralized and as an organization disappeared, though 
 two companies were rallied by their officers, joined other 
 organizations and staid on the firing line throughout the 
 day. Colonel Appier disappeared from the field and was 
 later cashiered for cowardice. 
 
 The attack on Sherman's left and center by Cleburne's 
 brigade of Hardee's corps was furious and sustained — to- 
 be repulsed, however, with heavy loss, by Buckland's brig- 
 ade and the two remaining regiments of Hildebrand 's 
 brigade. Cleburne, in his official report of this affair, says : 
 "Everywhere his musketry and artillery at short range 
 swept the open spaces .... with an iron storm that 
 threatened certain destruction to every living thing that 
 
 would dare to cross them Under the terrible fire much 
 
 confusion followed, and a quick and bloody repulse was 
 the consequence."*" 
 
 One of Cleburne's regiments (6th Miss.) lost three hun- 
 dred men, killed and wounded, out of 425, and his brigade- 
 soon went to pieces. A second assault was made by Ander- 
 son's brigade of Bragg 's corps to meet a similar repulse. A 
 third assault was made by two brigades of Polk's corps 
 (Russell's and Johnson's) joined with the reorganized brig- 
 ades of Cleburne and Anderson and assisted by Wood on 
 their right. This assault was successful, forcing Sherman 
 from his first line at about ten o'clock, and with him one 
 brigade of McClernand's division that had come to his sup- 
 
 48 War of the Eehellion: Oficial Records. Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 581. 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 41 
 
 port on tbe left. Sherman's right brigade (McDowell's) was 
 not involved in this engagement for the reason that the line 
 of attack crossed its front diagonally without bringing it 
 into action; but a little later Pond's brigade, from the ex- 
 treme left of Bragg 's corps, appeared in McDowell's front, 
 overlapping his right and covering Owl Creek bridge. Or- 
 ders were then given to fall back to the Purdy road, and Mc- 
 Dowell's camp was abandoned without a fight. By this 
 time Hildebrand's brigade had gone to pieces and Hilde- 
 brand himself being without a command, reported to Gen- 
 eral McClernand for staff duty. In fact this first assault 
 on Sherman's line fell mainly upon a single brigade (Buck- 
 land's), and it was on the hillside in his front where, accord- 
 ing to General Lew. Wallace, there was "a pavement of 
 dead men", after the fight was over. This must be con- 
 sidered one of the conspicuous features of Sunday's bat- 
 tle. Time was of the utmost importance, to enable the 
 proper formations in distant parts of the camp. The need- 
 ed time was secured by the stubborn fight made by Sher- 
 man's division on its first line; and it was probably this 
 that gained for General Sherman, in the minds of some, 
 credit for saving the day. 
 
 It was in the Confederate plan to push its right east to 
 the river, turn the Union left, seize the Landing, and force 
 the army back on Owl Creek where it was expected sur- 
 render would necessarily follow. The stubbornness of the 
 resistance to the Confederate left delayed the movement 
 toward the river somewhat, though two brigades (Chal- 
 mers's and Jackson's) were in fi'ont of the Union left near 
 the mouth of Lick Creek, very soon after the extreme right 
 fell back from the first line. To meet these two brigades 
 of nine regiments and two batteries. Colonel Stuart had a 
 single brigade of three regiments without artillery — and 
 one of these regiments (71st Ohio) was led off the field by 
 
42 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 its colonel soon after the fight began to take no further 
 part in the day's battle. Colonel Mason was later cash- 
 iered for his conduct at Shiloh. 
 
 The two remaining regiments of this brigade gave a. 
 good account of themselves (54th Illinois and 55th Ohio),, 
 making heroic resistance and suffering severely in casual- 
 ties. There are those who believe that the fighting on the ex- 
 treme left by this little band of about eight hundred men 
 without artillery and against three or four times their num- 
 ber with artillery was not less important than was the 
 fighting on the extreme right, though less conspicuous. This, 
 movement of the Confederate right was under the personal 
 direction of General Johnston, and upon its quick success 
 depended the success of the battle as planned. Before 
 eleven o'clock the battle was raging from right to left, a 
 distance of three to four miles. 
 
 As has been already stated, by the time that the battle 
 was fairly on at the front every regiment in the most dis- 
 tant parts of the camp was in line. McClernand promptly" 
 supported Sherman, and Hurlbut also sent one of his brig- 
 ades (Veach's) to that part of the field, leading his two- 
 remaining brigades to support Prentiss. Hurlbut, meeting 
 Prentiss's division falling back in disorder, allowed the men 
 to drift through his ranks, then formed line at the Peach 
 Orchard, facing Lamnan's brigade west and William's 
 brigade south, where he met first the attack of Chalmers's 
 and Jackson's brigades from the direction of Prentiss's 
 abandoned camp. A little later this position was attacked 
 by the brigades of Bowen, Statham, Stephens, and Glad- 
 den — the latter officer, however, having received a mortal 
 wound in front of Prentiss's first line, as already stated. 
 
 C. F. Smith's (2nd) division, now commanded by W. H. 
 L. Wallace, camped near the Landing and fully three miles 
 from the point where the battle began, was in line by eight 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOU 43 
 
 o'clock, and the first brigade of four regiments (Colonel 
 Tuttle) advanced to Duncan Field and took position in the 
 "sunken road" — long abandoned as useless, but which ere 
 nightfall was destined to become famous for desperate fight- 
 ing against odds. (Map III.) Of the second brigade (Gen- 
 eral McArthur's) one regiment was sent to the right; two 
 were sent to cover Snake Creek bridge, over which General 
 Lew. Wallace's division was expected at an early hour; 
 and two marched under General Mc Arthur himself, to the 
 support of Stuart, on the extreme left. The third brigade 
 (Sweeny's) moved south on the Corinth road to act as a 
 reserve, though it was not permitted to wait upon oppor- 
 tunity. Two regiments of this brigade (7th and 58th Illi- 
 nois) were sent at once to the right to prolong Tuttle 's 
 line to connect with McClernand, going into position at 
 about nine-thirty o'clock. A third regiment (50th Illinois) 
 was sent to McArthur on the left; and the remaining regi- 
 ment of the brigade (8th Iowa), between eleven and twelve 
 o'clock, took position at Tuttle 's left in the "sunken road" 
 connecting its left with Prentiss who, having rallied a part 
 of his division, put them in at the right of Hurlbut. Pren- 
 tiss was here joined under fire by the 23d Missouri, just 
 landed from the boats, giving him about one thousand men 
 in the "Hornets' Nest". Two other regiments (15th and 
 16th Iowa), assigned to Prentiss's division, landing too late 
 to join him at his camp, were sent to McClernand, joining 
 him at Jones's Field, one and a half miles west of the Land- 
 ing. 
 
 Before noon the contending armies were in continuous 
 and compact line from flank to flank. Welded in the fur- 
 nace heat of four hours' battle witliout a moment's respite, 
 it might be said with little exaggeration that the men stood 
 foot to foot, contending for the mastery. The Union lines 
 had steadily but slowly receded, shortening at the flanks. 
 
44 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 and the Confederates had as steadily advanced, extending 
 their flanks but recoiling again and again from attacks 
 made at the center, and with heavy loss. 
 
 The Confederate reserve under General Breckenridge, 
 about 8,500 men, were all in action before noon, the first 
 brigade (Trabue) going in on their extreme left at about 
 the time that Sherman fell back from his first line. The 
 other two brigades (Bowen and Statham) went into line 
 on the right south of the Peach Orchard, between eleven 
 and twelve o'clock in front of Hurlbut and near where Gen- 
 eral Johnston had his headquarters in the saddle. Though 
 General Johnston personally directed the battle on the 
 Confederate side, in this part of the field, he did not, as 
 some writers have told the story, personally encourage an 
 unwilling Tennessee regiment by riding along the line and 
 tapping the bayonets of the men with a tin cup which he 
 carried in his hand, then leading the line in a furious 
 charge. No part of such an incident occurred there or 
 elsewhere, on the authority of one of General Johnston's 
 chief Aids, Governor Harris of Tennessee — the only per- 
 son who was present at the death of General Johnston soon 
 after and near the spot where the incident is said to have 
 occurred. 
 
 Stuart, McArthur, and Hurlbut having successfully re- 
 jiulsed several attacks, General Johnston was evidently 
 convinced that the Union left was not to be easily turned ; 
 and so about noon under his personal direction, having put 
 into his lines two brigades of the reserve under General 
 Breckenridge, a forward movement was ordei*ed, six brig- 
 ades participating — Chalmers's, Jackson's, Bowen 's, Stat- 
 ham's, Stephens's, and Gladden's. Threatened on his left 
 by a cavalry flanking movement, Stuart was the first to 
 slowly give ground; McArthur, on Stuart's right, neces- 
 sarily followed, both changing front from south to south- 
 
THE BATTLE OF SIIILOII 
 
 45 
 
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 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
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 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
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 n.i,»*s 
 
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THE BATTLE OP SlilLOH 
 
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 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
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 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 53 
 
 east, falling back and fighting for every foot of ground. 
 This movement compelled Hurlbut to retire from his first 
 position to the north side of the Peach Orchard (Map IV). 
 At about two o'clock, Colonel Stuart having been wounded, 
 his two regiments having lost heavily, and having exhausted 
 their ammunition — even after robbing the cartridge-boxes 
 of their dead and wounded comrades — retired toward the 
 Landing. General McArthur followed not long after; and 
 General Hurlbut, having connected his right with General 
 Prentiss's left, swung back until their lines were nearly at 
 right angles. (Map V.) Hurlbut retired toward the Land- 
 ing at about four or four-thirty o'clock, leaving the line 
 from left to right in the following order: Prentiss's com- 
 mand, 8th Iowa of Sweeny's brigade, Tuttle's full brigade, 
 and the 58th Illinois of Sweeny's brigade. 
 
 While this fierce struggle was in progress on the Con- 
 federate right, at about two-thirty afternoon, General John- 
 ston received the wound from which he died a few minutes 
 later. General Bragg then took command of the right, and 
 General Ruggles succeeded Bragg in the center. 
 
 While the battle raged on the Union left, as described, it 
 was not less stubborn and bloody on the right; but Sher- 
 man and McClernand were forced back to the Hamburg 
 and Savannah road — a mile from the Landing — about 
 four-thirty o'clock, the Confederates gradually closing in 
 from both flanks around the center. (Map VI.) Meantime 
 General W. H. L. Wallace had sent orders for his command 
 to retire; but for some reason never explained four of his 
 six regiments did not receive the order and were captured, 
 as will be explained. As General Wallace and General Tut- 
 tle, followed by the 2nd and 7th Iowa Regiments, were fight- 
 ing their way through a severe crossfire at short range, 
 General Wallace was mortally wounded, and was left on the 
 
54 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 field to be recovered the next day, dying three or four days 
 later without recovering consciousness. 
 
 THE hornets' nest 
 
 This appellation owes its origin to the men who felt the 
 sting of the hornets. William Preston Johnston in his 
 history of his father (General A. S. Johnston) speaks of 
 the term as a "mild metaphor", and says that "no figure 
 of speech would be too strong to express the deadly peril 
 of an assault upon this natural fortress whose inaccessible 
 barriers blazed for six hours with sheets of flame, and whose 
 infernal gates poured forth a murderous storm of shot and 
 shell and musket-fire which no living thing could quell or 
 withstand"." 
 
 No more graphic description of the fight at the Hornets' 
 Nest has been written than that of which the language 
 quoted is a part — written from the view-point of the at- 
 tacking forces, and, therefore, written with full knowledge 
 of the results that followed from the "murderous storm of 
 shot and shell and musket-fire." ^It is literally true that 
 Duncan Field and the woods and thickets bordering it 
 along the "sunken road" were thickly strewn with the dead 
 and wounded. The same author tells us that "Hind- 
 man's brilliant brigades .... were shivered into fragments 
 and paralyzed"; that "Stewart's regiments .... retired 
 mangled from the field"; that "Gibson's splendid brigade 
 .... recoiled and fell back" — four several times, indeed. 
 Colonel Gibson, in his official report says of his brigade: 
 "Four times the position was charged and four times the 
 assault proved unavailing." 
 
 The best informed writer, living or dead, on the details 
 and incidents of the Battle of Shiloh — Major D. W. Reed, 
 Secretary and Historian of the Shiloh National Military 
 
 *3 Johnston's Life of General A. S. Johnston, p. 620. 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 55 
 
 Park Commission and author of Campaigns and Battles 
 Twelfth Regiment Iowa Veteran Volunteer Infantry, who 
 was himself in the Nest during the entire day, says there 
 were "twelve separate and distinct charges" made upon the 
 line at the Hornets' Nest, with the result that three Confed- 
 erate brigades were" entirely disorganized", and that "thir- 
 teen regiments lost their regimental organizations .... and 
 were not brought into the fight again .... during the day."^" 
 General Euggles, who commanded the Confederate lines in 
 that part of the field after the death of General Johnston, 
 designates this as "one of the controlling conflicts of that 
 eventful day." '' The position was of such conspicuous im- 
 portance that a brief description of the ground will not be 
 out of place. 
 
 Moving out on the Corinth road from the Landing about 
 three-fourths of a mile one crosses the Hamburg and 
 Savannah road. A fourth of a mile further on the road 
 forks, the left hand branch (Eastern Corinth) bearing south 
 of southwest; and one-fourth of a mile still further on it 
 crosses an old abandoned road near the southeast corner of 
 Duncan Field, and near the center of the Hornets' Nest. 
 The right-hand road from the fork runs nearly west, cross- 
 ing the north end of Duncan Field, then bearing south 
 passes the ' ' Little Log Meeting-house ' '. At the point where 
 this road, going from the Landing, strikes the east line of 
 Duncan Field the abandoned road leads off to the south- 
 east about a half-mile, then bending east to the Hamburg 
 and Savannah road near Bloody Pond — another signifi- 
 cant local name. Along this abandoned road, beginning 
 near the north end of Duncan Field, the line of battle from 
 right to left, was as follows: 58th Illinois (Sweeny's brig- 
 
 »o Rpcd 's Campaigns and Battles of the Twelfth Begiment Iowa Veteran Vol- 
 unteer Infantry, p. 50. 
 
 »i War of the Bebellion: Official Becords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 475. 
 
56 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 
 
 ade) ; second, seventh, twelfth, and fourteentli Iowa regi- 
 ments (Tuttle's brigade) ; to the left of this brigade was 
 the eighth Iowa, of Sweeny's brigade; to the left still was 
 Prentiss's division, consisting of one entire regiment (23d 
 Missouri), and parts of several other regiments — the en- 
 tire line nmnbering not to exceed 2,500 men. The old road 
 ran along a slight elevation and was so water-washed in 
 places as to afford good shelter to men lying down to fire 
 on an advancing enemy — a sort of natural rifle-pit, though 
 rather shallow in places. About half of the distance, from 
 right to left, there was open field extending to the front 
 about 500 yards to the timber occupied by the Confederates. 
 The left half of the line was well screened by timber and, 
 for the most part, by a heavy growth of underbrush so that 
 the advancing lines not able to see the men lying in the old 
 road were received with a crushing fire at short range. In 
 every instance the repulse was complete and bloody. 
 
 General Ruggles, becoming convinced that the position 
 could not be taken by infantry, from the front, determined 
 to concentrate his artillery and bombard the strong-hold. 
 He tells us in his official report '- that he directed his staff 
 officers "to bring forward all the field guns they could col- 
 lect from the left toward the right". General Ruggles 
 evidently believed that this was a crisis in the battle, admit- 
 ting that "for a brief period the enemy apparently gained". 
 Nor was he alone in tlie belief, for one of his artillery of- 
 ficers (Captain Sandidge) said officially: "I have no doubt 
 that had they been seasonably reinforced when they checked 
 our advancing troops, they could certainly have broken our 
 lines". And he feared that result before the guns could 
 be planted and infantry supports brought up. General Rug- 
 gles succeeded in bringing up sixty-two guns from the left, 
 
 52 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 472. 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 57 
 
 which were planted on the west side of Duncan Field about 
 five liundred yards away; and the bombardment began at 
 about four-thirty afternoon. Of course there could be but 
 one result. The Union batteries were forced to retire, leav- 
 ing the way clear for the encircling Confederate lines to 
 close in. Besides the Ruggles aggregation of artillery of 
 sixty-two guns, there must have been several other batter- 
 ies playing upon the Hornets' Nest from the right, as none 
 of the guns from that part of the field were in the Ruggles 
 aggregation. Probably not less than seventy-five guna 
 were trained on that devoted spot, and fully three-fourths 
 of the Confederate army was coiling around it. And for 
 some time before the surrender took place, a few minutes 
 before six o'clock, rifle-fire poured in from three directions, 
 as the beleagured faced about and attempted to fight their 
 way out. The number to surrender was about 2,000 men. 
 The importance of tliis prolonged contest, from a little be- 
 fore ten forenoon to nearly six afternoon, upon the des- 
 tinies of the day can hardly be estimated. It secured to 
 General Grant's army the thing most needed — time to form 
 the new line; time for Lew. Wallace, for Buell, and for 
 Night to come. The Hornets' Nest was distinctly an altar 
 of sacrifice. (Map VI.) 
 
 HOW BUELL SAVED THE DAY 
 
 By the time the Confederate oflBcers had recovered from 
 their "surprise" at the smallness of the capture at the 
 Hornets' Nest, in view of the prolonged and effective resist- 
 ance encountered. General Grant had formed his new line 
 on the north side of Dill Branch, running from the mouth 
 of the Branch on a curve back to the road leading from the 
 Landing; thence west to the Hamburg and Savannah road; 
 thence north to the swamp bordering Snake Creek. At the 
 extreme left of the line, the two gunboats lay opposite the 
 
58 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 mouth of the Branch. On the bluffs near the mouth of the 
 Branch were two batteries, trained up-stream. Two other 
 batteries were a little farther from the river and back 
 nearer the road leading from the Landing; and two more 
 were still farther west, but advanced toward the edge of 
 the bluffs overlooking the Branch. Back on the road again 
 and a little west were two more batteries before coming to 
 the six big siege guns. 
 
 A glance at the map for Sunday night's position will 
 show that the line from the mouth of Dill Branch west to 
 the siege guns was a semi-circle with the gunboats at the 
 extreme left, and that there were about fifty guns in the 
 line east of the Hamburg and Savannah road, exclusive of 
 the gunboats. Behind this array of artillery was ample 
 infantry support, except on the extreme left where support 
 was not needed, because of the nature of the ground in 
 front. As General Nelson marched the head of his column 
 up from the Landing at about five-thirty o'clock, he noted 
 the absence of infantry along that part of the line, and in 
 his official report he describes what he saw as a "semicircle 
 of artillery, totally unsupported by infantry", which was 
 not quite true; and he added another statement which was 
 not at all true, namely; "the left of the artillery was com- 
 pletely turned by the enemy and the gunners fled from their 
 pieces." ^^ General Nelson evidently knew nothing of the 
 batteries near the mouth of Dill Branch, for he struck the 
 line at about the middle of the "semicircle" and the single 
 regiment that he brought into action (36th Indiana) was 
 sent to support the guns in front of the main line toward 
 Dill Branch. 
 
 Opposed to this array of Union artillery a single Confed- 
 erate battery took part in the last attack, and that was dis- 
 abled. 
 
 =3 Var of the Sebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 323. 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 59 
 
 Any fair-minded person, having knowledge of the char- 
 acter of the ground between the lines of the two armies as 
 the lines were on Sunday night — especially on the left of 
 the Union lines — must admit that Grant's was a strong 
 position and that his antagonist had serious obstacles to 
 overcome before he could strike with effect. 
 
 With as little delay as possible after the surrender at 
 the Hornets' Nest, General Bragg, still commanding the 
 Confederate right, ordered his division commanders to 
 "drive the enemy into the river", believing, doubtless, that 
 the "drive" would be a brief and easy task. Accordingly 
 the Confederate right uncoiled itself from around the Hor- 
 nets' Nest and, led by Chalmers's and Jackson's brigades of 
 Withers 's division, advanced along the road toward the 
 Landing; then, filing right, formed line on the south side 
 of Dill Branch and near the margin of the deep ravine. 
 This ravine, impassable at its mouth by reason of steep 
 bluffs and back-water, was difficult to pass fully a half-mile 
 from its mouth. Its steep sides were timbered and ob- 
 structed by underbrush, and at the bottom it was fairly 
 choked with undergrowth. 
 
 The last attack made upon the Union lines was upon the 
 extreme left in which only two small brigades and one bat- 
 tery participated. Chalmers's brigade had nominally five 
 regiments, but one of the regiments (52nd Tennessee) 
 "acted badly" in the early part of the day, and three hun- 
 dred of its four hundred men are not to be counted. Jack- 
 son's brigade detached one regiment to guard the Hornets' 
 Nest prisoners, so that it seems to be liberal, allowing for 
 the losses of the day, to say that there were not to exceed 
 1800 men engaged in the last assault. 
 
 The two brigades made their way down the southern 
 slope, through the tangled undergrowth at the bottom of 
 the ravine and, quoting from their official reports, "strug- 
 
60 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 gled" up the other slope, "which was very steep" encoun- 
 tering in "attempting to mount the last ridge" the "fire 
 from a whole line of batteries protected by infantry and 
 assisted by shells from the gunboats." General Chalmers 
 says his men "were too much exhausted to storm the bat- 
 teries".''* 
 
 General Jackson says his men were without ammunition, 
 having "only their bayonets to rely on", and that when 
 they "arrived near the crest of the opposite hill", they 
 "could not be urged farther without support", the men 
 "sheltering themselves against the precipitous sides of the 
 ravine" where "they remained under fire for some time." ^^ 
 (The Confederate skirmish line is shown on Map VI, at the 
 crest of the bluff, north of Dill Branch.) 
 
 This was the situation when eight companies of the 36th 
 Indiana (Colonel Grose), about four hundred men, of Am- 
 men's brigade. Nelson's division. Army of the Ohio, arrived 
 on the scene. Colonel Grose was ordered to go to the sup- 
 port of Stone's battery, which was in position some distance 
 in advance of Grant's main line and near the brow of the 
 hill up which the assailants were climbing with great diffi- 
 culty. There the 36th Indiana exchanged shots with the 
 skirmishers of Chalmers's brigade, during fifteen to thirty 
 minutes ^^ having one man killed and one man wounded. In 
 his history of the 36th Indiana, Colonel Grose says that 
 "after three or four rounds the enemy fell back. It was 
 then dark." And he says, further, that "no part of Buell's 
 army, except the Thirty-sixth Indiana, took any part what- 
 ever in the Sunday evening fight at Shiloh." And he might 
 have said with equal truth and without disparagement to 
 his regiment that the presence of the Thirty-sixth Indiana 
 
 51 War of the Bebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, pp. 550-551. 
 
 55 War of the EebelUon: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 555. 
 
 56 War of the RebeUion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 334. 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 61 
 
 had no effect in determining the issues of the day. Had the 
 four hundred men not been there the "enemy" would have 
 retired just the same, for he could never have crossed the 
 open space from the "last ridge" to the "line of batteries". 
 The ground to be traversed was but gently rolling with lit- 
 tle to obstruct the view — no sheltering ridge or friendly 
 copse to admit of unobserved approach. It must have been 
 a "rush" of two to four hundred yards, in the face of point- 
 blank firing, to reach the batteries, behind which, as already 
 stated, was ample infantry support. The battle of the day 
 really came to an end at the Hornets' Nest. All that fol- 
 lowed was mere skirmishing for the purpose of developing 
 the new conditions. 
 
 THE LOST OPPORTUNITY 
 
 The "Lost Opportunity" is a phrase of Confederate 
 origin and it refers to the last moments of Sunday's battle, 
 briefly described above. Both the idea and the phrase seem 
 to have been born of an afterthought, and a disposition to 
 shift blame to the shoulders of General Beauregard, should 
 blame be imputed, for failure to crush or capture Grant's 
 army. The claim has been put forward with considerable 
 persistency that the order of General Beauregard to with- 
 draw from the contest was responsible for the escape of 
 Grant's army. This absurd claim has been answered most 
 effectively by General Thomas Jordan, Adjutant-General 
 of the Confederate forces engaged at Shiloh. 
 
 In Southern Historical Society Papers,'''' General Jordan 
 takes up the subject and refers to the official reports of 
 several division, brigade, and regimental commanders for 
 the purpose of showing the demoralized and exhausted con- 
 dition of the Confederate army. In referring to the report 
 of General AVithers, two brigades of whose division made 
 
 07 Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, p. 297. 
 
62 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 the last feeble assault, he says: "If there be significance 
 in words, he makes it clear that such was the absolute late- 
 ness of the hour, that had the attempt been made to carry 
 the Federal batteries .... with such troops as were there 
 assembled, it would have resulted in an awful butchery and 
 dispersion of all employed in so insensate, so preposterous 
 an undertaking; and such must be the verdict of any mili- 
 tary man who may studiously read the reports of the sub- 
 ordinate ofiScers of Withers 's three brigades, and bear in 
 mind the formidable line of fifty-odd pieces of artillery 
 which Webster had improvised".^* 
 
 Surgeon J. C. Nott of General Bragg 's staff, who rode 
 by his chief's side nearly all day, is quoted as saying that 
 the "men .... were too much demoralized and indisposed 
 to advance in the face of the shells .... bursting over us 
 in every direction, and my impression was .... that our 
 troops had done all that they would do, and had better be- 
 withdrawn." ^® 
 
 Another officer of General Bragg 's staff. Colonel Urqu- 
 hart, writing in 1880 is quoted thus: "The plain truth 
 must be told, that our troops at the front were a thin line 
 of exhausted men, who were making no further headway. 
 .... Several years of subsequent service have impressed 
 me that General Beauregard's order for withdrawing the 
 troops was most timely".®" 
 
 The claim that there was a "Lost Opportunity" because 
 of the order to retire. General Jordan says, "becomes sim- 
 ply shameful, under the light of the closely contempora- 
 neous statements of every division commander, except one 
 (Withers) ; of all the brigade and regimental commanders 
 of each Confederate corps, including the reserve whose re- 
 
 ^» Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, pp. 300, 301. 
 sc Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, p. 307. 
 60 Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, p. 316. 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 63 
 
 ports have reached the light ; that is, of nearly all command- 
 ers present in the battle.""' 
 
 This ought to be sufScient evidence to settle forever both 
 propositions in the negative; namely, the claim that Buell 
 "saved the day", and that there was a "Lost Opportunity". 
 
 The condition of Grant's army at the close of Sunday's 
 battle as to strength has been greatly underrated by certain 
 writers, and its disorganization has been greatly exagger- 
 ated by writers who have had an object in so representing it. 
 It is true that both armies were badly battered as the result 
 of about fourteen hours' continuous fighting with scarcely a 
 moment's cessation. Careful study of the reports of Con- 
 federate officers shows that there was not a single point of 
 attack on any part of the field at any hour of the day where 
 there was not stubborn resistance with serious loss to the 
 attacking forces. These reports also show that there was 
 serious defection from their ranks, beginning early and 
 continuing during the day, and that when night came on 
 there was such disorganization that some of their command- 
 ers were entirely separated from their commands and re- 
 mained so separated to the close of the battle, Monday 
 night. These reports further show that instead of bivouack- 
 ing in line of battle as did Grant's army the entire Confed- 
 erate army, with the exception of a single brigade (Pond's 
 brigade on the extreme left) withdrew a distance of two to 
 four miles from the Landing. It is in evidence also from 
 the same sources of information that General Beauregard 
 was able to put in line on the morning of the second day 
 substantially half the number of men that were in line on 
 the morning of the first day. General Grant was able to 
 put in line about the same proportion, exclusive of the re- 
 enforcements that came up during the night. 
 
 There are no means of determining the comparative 
 
 •J Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, pp. 316-317. 
 
64 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 casualties in the two armies on the first day, but there is no 
 reason for doubting that they were substantially equal — 
 exclusive of the capture at the Hornets' Nest. It is known, 
 however, that the casualties among field officers, from the 
 grade of colonel upward, were greater in the Union than in 
 the Confederate army in Sunday's battle. 
 
 Much has been said about the "stragglers" from the 
 Union lines crowding the Landing and "cowering" under 
 the river bluffs — and with about the same degree of exag- 
 geration as certain writers have indulged in their descrip- 
 tions of the opening of the battle. There were ' ' stragglers ' ' 
 from both armies, and there is no reason to doubt that the 
 nmnbers were substantially equal. It is true, however, that 
 the straggling was more in evidence on the Union side, for 
 the very good reason that it was more concentrated — con- 
 fined to a limited area about the Landing — while on the 
 other side there was unlimited room for expansion and 
 scattering over miles of territory. This remark applies 
 with equal force to other features of the crowded condition 
 near the Landing, late in the day. Hundreds of teamsters 
 with their four-mule and six-mule teams were there because 
 it was the only place of safety for one of the essential parts 
 of the army's equipment; the sick from the regimental hos- 
 pitals and company tents were there — several hundred of 
 them — because there was no other place to go ; and hun- 
 dreds of wounded were there from the front, together with 
 a force of hospital attendants. Add these together and you 
 have several thousand without counting a single "strag- 
 gler". These things are never considered by critics who 
 have a cause to support. Every large army requires a 
 small army to care for it, who are, necessarily, noncom- 
 batants. 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 65 
 
 BtJELL COMES ON THE FIELD 
 
 By General Orders of March 31st, General Grant's head- 
 quarters were transferred from Savannah to Pittsburg 
 Landing; but a headquarters' office was continued at the 
 former place for convenience up to the day of the battle, 
 and General Grant passed between the two places every day, 
 or nearly every day, on the headquarters' boat, Tigress. 
 On Sunday morning, at Savannah, an "early breakfast" 
 had been ordered, as it was General Grant's purpose to 
 ride out with his staff to meet General Buell, whose arrival 
 the evening before was not known. While at breakfast, 
 firing was heard in the direction of Pittsburg Landing — 
 "the breakfast was left unfinished" and General Grant 
 and staff went directly to the boat and steamed rapidly up 
 the river, stopping at Crump's Landing to order General 
 Lew. Wallace to hold his division in readiness for marching 
 orders. 
 
 Before leaving Savannah General Grant sent to General 
 Nelson of Buell's army, the following order: "An attack 
 having been made on our forces, you will move your entire 
 command to the river opposite Pittsburg".''- A similar 
 order was sent to General Wood, commanding another 
 division of Buell's army, not yet arrived at Savannah, to 
 move "with the utmost dispatch to the river" at Savannah, 
 where boats would meet him. The following note was left 
 for General Buell whose presence in Savannah was not 
 known to General Grant: 
 
 Savannah, April 6, 1862 
 General D. C. Buell: 
 
 Heavy firing is heard up the river, indicating plainly that 
 an attack has beon mado on our most advanced positions. I have 
 been looking for tbis. but did not believe that the attack could be 
 made before Monday or Tuesday. This necessitates my joining the 
 
 02 IVar of the SeheUion: Official Becords, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 95. 
 
66 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 forces up the river instead of meeting you today, as I had contem- 
 plated. I have directed General Nelson to move to the river with 
 his division. He can march to opposite Pittsburg. 
 Respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 U. S. Grant 
 Major-General Commauding.*^ 
 
 This note clearly shows that General Grant, in common 
 with his division commanders, was expecting an early 
 attack. 
 
 As soon as General Grant, after arriving on the iSeld, 
 learned the true situation, he sent a staff officer with an- 
 other order to General Nelson : *'.... you will hurry up 
 your command as fast as possible. All looks well but it is 
 necessary for you to push forward as fast as possible"."* 
 liater still, probably about noon though it may have been 
 later, nothing having been heard either from Buell or Nel- 
 son, General Grant sent another hurry-up order addressed 
 to the "Commanding Officer Advance Forces ( Buell 's 
 Army)". This order was delivered to General Buell on 
 the boat as he was going to the Landing. He arrived at 
 the Landing, he tells us in Shiloh Reviewed, about 1 o'clock, 
 though Villard, who claims to have been on the same boat, 
 makes the time later, between 5 and 6 o'clock, about the 
 time that Nelson's advance crossed the river. And there 
 are certain features of Buell 's official report which, in the 
 absence of a definite statement on the point, make Villard 's 
 claim as to the hour at least plausible. 
 
 General Grant's first order to General Nelson must have 
 been received as early at 7 o 'clock — probably earlier, for 
 Nelson had the order when General Buell, after hearing 
 the firing, went to General Grant's hadquarters for infor- 
 mation, where he learned that the latter had "just started 
 for the Landing"."' 
 
 03 War of the Eebellion: Official Records, Vol. LII, Part I, p. 232. 
 
 6-1 War of the Bebellion: Official Becords, Vol X, Part II, pp. 95-96. 
 
 66 War of the Bebellion: Official Becords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 292. 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 67 
 
 General Nelson in bis ofiScial report does not state the 
 Lour of receiving the order to march, but says that be "left 
 Savannah, by order of General Grant, reiterated by General 
 Buell in person, at 1.30 p. m. '"'''■ The language is a little 
 ambiguous, but it doubtless means that the order was "re- 
 iterated" about noou or later and that the march began at 
 one-thirty, afternoon.*^" (Colonel Ammen says at one, 
 afternoon.) 
 
 Villard, heretofore quoted, says that Nelson received 
 Grant's order about noon, by which he probably means the 
 "reiterated" order. In any event it appears that General 
 Buell "held up" the order to Nelson fully five hours and 
 then "reiterated" it. Why did General Buell do that? 
 Why did General Nelson wait to have the order "reiterat- 
 ed"? Why did he not obey the original order regardless of 
 any dilatory order from General Buell, since the contin- 
 gency had arisen under which by General Halleck's instruc- 
 tions General Grant was "authorized to take the general 
 command" of both armies; namely, an attack upon his own 
 army? Had General Nelson marched under the original 
 order, his division would have been on the field at about 
 the time that it started on the ten-mile march. What might 
 have been the effect of throwing 4,500 fresh men in the 
 scale of battle, then hanging in doubtful poise, is, of course, 
 conjectural — and it must be left to conjecture, though 
 there is little room for doubt. 
 
 General Nelson's entire division was across the river soon 
 after dark. Advancing a little to the front on the extreme 
 left it bivouacked for the night. A little later General Lew. 
 Wallace came up on the extreme right, his division number- 
 ing about 5,000 men ; but having to counter-march the divi- 
 sion in order to bring the regiments in proper position his 
 
 «« ffar of ihe Sebcllion: Offlcial Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 323. 
 •I War of the Ecbellion: Official Secords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 323. 
 
68 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 formation was not completed imtil after midnight when it 
 went into bivouac. 
 
 During Sunday night Crittenden's division of Buell's 
 army (two brigades) came up by boat, and in the morning 
 two brigades of McCook's division arrived, to be joined 
 about noon by another brigade. Wood's division, which 
 was about thirty miles away when the battle began, arrived 
 on the field at about two afternoon Monday, when the battle 
 was about over. The total additions to the Union lines up 
 to noon on Monday was approximately 20,000 men. 
 
 During Sunday's battle General Grant passed from point 
 to point behind the firing line, meeting and consulting with 
 his division commanders and carefully observing the move- 
 ments of the contending forces, for, as has already been 
 stated, there was no point on the field from which general 
 observations could be made. On Monday he commanded his 
 own army, giving no orders to General Buell, the latter 
 exercising independent command. Why General Grant did 
 not assume "general command" of both armies we might 
 fairly conjecture (if conjecture were necessary) to be due 
 to the attitude of General Buell toward Grant's order to 
 Nelson on Sunday morning — treating it as invalid until 
 "reiterated" by himself. There is no room for conjecture 
 in the matter, however, for General Buell says in his Shiloh 
 Reviewed^^: "I did not look upon him [Grant] as my 
 commander". There is evidence also that Buell was dis- 
 posed to treat the subject of Sunday's battle as something 
 of a sham — that the resistance to the Confederate attacks 
 was not particularly strenuous. General Tuttle of Grant's 
 army, acted on Monday as reserve to General Buell, having 
 under his command the two Iowa Regiments that cut their 
 way out of the Hornets' Nest on Sunday, and one or two 
 other regiments of Grant's army. General Tuttle relates 
 
 68 The Century Maga:ine, Vol. XXXI, p. 771. 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 69 
 
 that "while passing over the field, April 7th", following up 
 the advancing lines, "General Buell taunted me with not 
 having done any fighting that amounted to anything [on 
 Sunday]." When they came to the "clearing" in front 
 of the Hornets' Nest and saw the ground strewn with dead, 
 Buell "was compelled to confess that there must have been 
 terrible fighting". Had General Buell passed over the 
 ground at the Peach Orchard and over the slope in front 
 of Sherman's first line, he would have found similar con- 
 ditions to those in the "clearing" in front of the Hornets' 
 Nest. His estimate of the vigor of the Confederate attacks 
 on Sunday was probably based upon the feeble attack made 
 by exhausted men which he himself saw near the Landing 
 on Simday night. 
 
 In Monday's battle General Buell 's army constituted the 
 left and General Grant's the right, with General Lew. Wal- 
 lace's fresh division occupying the extreme right of the 
 line — and it is worth mentioning here that at least two of 
 Grant's regiments were sent before the battle was over to 
 the extreme left, and one of them, under command of Gen- 
 eral Nelson, made a bayonet charge across an open field. 
 Another of Grant's regiments, under Crittenden and near 
 the center, charged and captured a battery. In neither 
 case was it necessary for General Grant to "reiterate" 
 the requisite orders. 
 
 As to the outcome of the contest on Monday there could 
 be no doubt, with the large accession to the ranks of the 
 Union army — a force nearly equal to the number of men 
 that the Confederates were able to put in line. General 
 Grant had instructed his division commanders on Sunday 
 night to be ready to attack early in the morning, and Gen- 
 eral Buell ordered his divisions "to move forward as soon 
 as it was light". Artillery fire began nearly at the same 
 time — about five-thirty — on the extreme flanks of the Un- 
 
70 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 ion army, though the lines were not in contact until about 
 eight o'clock. It would not be correct to characterize the 
 movements of the Union lines on Monday as General Beau- 
 regard characterized the movements of the Confederate 
 lines on Sunday — the figui-e of the ' ' Alpine avalanche ' ' 
 would not apply to the movements of either day. However, 
 the Union lines moved forward without serious repulses at 
 any point, though there were some reverses on the left. The 
 Confederates held their ground with stubbornness, oc- 
 cupying the line of the Purdy road until about noon. By two 
 o'clock the battle was practically over, and an hour later the 
 Confederates were in full retreat. Map No. VII will give a 
 good idea of the general movements, on Monday. There was 
 no general pursuit of the defeated army — just enough to be 
 sure that it was a retreat in fact. The lack of pusuit was 
 not, however, because Grant lacked "the energy to order a 
 pursuit", as John Codman Roi^es alleges, but because Hal- 
 leck's instructions did not permit pursuit;"* hands were 
 still "tied". 
 
 NUMBERS ENGAGED AND LOSSES 
 
 There are two methods of estimating the strength of an 
 army — one method excludes all noncombatants, the other 
 includes noncombatants as essential parts of the army. On 
 the inclusive method, the Historian and Secretary of the 
 Shiloh National Military Park Commission ''" gives the 
 strength of Grant's five divisions on Sunday at 39,830, and 
 that of Johnston's army at 43,968."^ In a note "^ in which 
 he excludes noncombatants, the estimate is 33,000 and 40,000 
 respectively. The figures last given correspond with the 
 
 09 War of the Rebellion: Offieial Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 97, 
 104. 
 
 TO Eeed 's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 98. 
 '1 Reed's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 110. 
 72 Reed's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 112. 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 71 
 
 estimates of the two commanders — Grant in his Memoirs, 
 and Johnston in his dispatch from Corinth, when about to 
 march. In artillery, Johnston had one hundred and twenty- 
 eight guns and Grant one hundred and twelve. Had Wal- 
 lace's division come upon the field early on Sunday the two 
 armies would have been very evenly matched, both in men 
 and guns. On the second day, including noncombatants and 
 "stragglers", the figures given are: Union, 54,592; Con- 
 federate, 34,000.'^^ The complete and accurate losses of the 
 respective armies for the respective days have never been, 
 and cannot be, stated. The losses of Grant's army by divi- 
 sions, two days (except 3d di\'ision one day) were as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 Killed Wounded Prisoners Total 
 
 1st division, McClernand 285 1,372 85 1,742 
 
 2nd " W. H. L. Wallace . . .270 1,173 1,306 2,749 
 
 3d " Lew. Wallace 41 251 4 296 
 
 4th " Hurlbut 317 1,441 111 1,869 
 
 5th " Sherman 325 1,277 299 1,901 
 
 6th " Prentiss 236 928 1,008 2,172 
 
 Unassigned 39 159 17 215 
 
 Total Army Tenn 1,513 6,601 2,830 10,944'* 
 
 Army of the Ohio, Monday — '' 
 
 2nd division 88 823 7 918 
 
 4th " 93 603 20 716 
 
 5th " 60 377 28 465 
 
 6th " 4 .. 4 
 
 Total 241 1,807 55 2,103 
 
 Grand total 1,754 8,408 2,885 13,047 
 
 Armyof Miss. (Confederate) ...1,728 8,012 959 10,699'« 
 
 13 Rood '8 The Battle of Shiloh, p. 110. 
 
 "Reed's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 98. 
 
 "Reed's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 102. 
 
 " Reed 's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 110. 
 
72 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 The killed in the two days' battle are almost exactly 
 equal ; the wounded are in excess by nearly four hundred, in 
 the Union army ; and there was in the Union army an excess 
 in prisoners, of 1,926. Eliminating the prisoners taken in 
 the Hornets' Nest, it appears that more prisoners were 
 taken in the open field by the Union army than by the Con- 
 federates. The loss in officers in Grant's army on Sunday 
 from the grade of colonel up was much heavier than in the 
 Confederate army — forty-five in the former to thirty in 
 the latter." 
 
 THE LOST DIVISION 
 
 So much has been written and said about the failure of 
 General Wallace to get his division on the field and into 
 the fight on the first day of the battle that the subject de- 
 serves a separate paragraph and a map of the roads over 
 which his division marched. By reference to the map (No. 
 VIII) it will be seen that the division occupied three camps 
 — one brigade at Crump's Landing; one at Stonylonesome, 
 two to three miles west; and one at Adamsville, about five 
 miles out from the Landing toward Purdy. There is no 
 dispute about the fact that Grant on his way up the river 
 on Sunday morning stopped at Crump's Landing to notify 
 Wallace to be in readiness for marching orders, though 
 Wallace makes no mention of the fact in his official report, 
 leaving it to be inferred that he had no order from Grant in 
 the morning. He says that from the "continuous cannon- 
 ading" he "inferred a general battle"; that he was in "an- 
 ticipation of an order"; and that he ordered his first and 
 third brigades to "concentrate" on the second at Stony- 
 lonesome.'* In his Autobiography General Wallace says 
 that he was satisfied before six o'clock, from the firing "up 
 
 " Reed's The Battle of Shiloh. p. 23. 
 
 78 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 170. 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 73 
 
 the river", that the battle was on ; and he says that at about 
 seven o'clock, his concentration of brigades began. The 
 official records show that this order was not carried out, for 
 the third brigade did not move from Adamsville until about 
 two-thirty afternoon, when it fell in behind the first and 
 second brigades on the march toward Snake Creek bridge, 
 and did not join them at Stonylonesome. 
 
 About a year after the Battle of Shiloh, General Wallace 
 had occasion to refer to the movements of his division, on 
 that Sunday in explaining to the Department Commander 
 the reasons for the lateness of his arrival on the field ; and 
 in his explanation he incidentally referred to Grant's call 
 at Crump's Landing on Sunday morning, fixing the time at 
 "about nine o'clock "J* General Grant and members of 
 his staflf fixed the time at seven to seven-thirty o'clock. 
 
 No special importance is to be attached to this difference 
 in time, however, for it had no important bearing on subse- 
 quent events — it is mentioned only because it may justify 
 a doubt as to the recollection of General Wallace in fixing 
 the time at which he received final marching orders ; namely, 
 "11 :30 a. m." It was the belief of General Grant and mem- 
 bers of his staff that the order must have been received 
 from a half hour to an hour earlier; though General Wal- 
 lace's statement is now generally accepted. The form of 
 order sent to Wallace can never be definitely settled, as it 
 is nowhere a matter of record, and the original was lost in 
 the hands of General Wallace, or through the fault of his 
 Adjutant General. 
 
 During the year after the Battle of Shiloh, there was 
 much criticism of General Wallace, to which he, of course, 
 made defence. And so General Grant requested his As- 
 sistant Adjutant General, Colonel Rawlins, Colonel Mc- 
 Pherson, Halleck's chief engineer, and Captain Rowley of 
 
 70 »"<ir of the Bebellion: Official Secords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 175. 
 
74 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 his staff, each of whom had knowledge of General Wal- 
 lace's movements on Sunday, to write out in detail their 
 recollections, to be submitted to the Department Com- 
 mander. Each wrote quite fully about one year after the 
 battle, C'olonel Rawlins reproducing from memory the order 
 dictated by him as he claims, to C*aptain Baxter, which order 
 was carried by the latter to Wallace. Following is the 
 order from memory : 
 
 Major- General Wallace : 
 
 You will move forward your division from Crump's Land- 
 ing, leaving a sufficient force to protect the public property at that 
 place, to Pittsburg Landing, on the road nearest to and parallel 
 with the river, and form in line at right angles with the river, 
 immediately in rear of the camp of Maj. Gen. C. P. Smith's divi- 
 sion on our right, and there await further orders.*" 
 
 Captain Baxter started by boat to deliver the order 
 "not later than nine o'clock", according to Colonel Raw- 
 lins, and reported back to Grant before "12 o'clock m." 
 
 In his official report, dated April 12, 1862, General Wal- 
 lace says : "At 11.30 o'clock the anticipated order arrived, 
 directing me to come up and take position on the right of 
 the army and form my line of battle at a right angle with 
 the river. ' ' *^ Writing a year later to General Halleck, ex- 
 plaining the reasons for his late arrival on the field, he 
 said : "At exactly 11 :30 a. m., a quartermaster by the name 
 of Baxter brought me an order in writing unsigned by any- 
 body", the bearer of the order explaining that he received 
 it verbally and put it in writing while on the boat. 
 
 In his Aiitohiograpliy, General Wallace enlarges some- 
 what on the subject of this order, and says that it was writ- 
 ten on paper discolored with tobacco stains and bore the 
 imprint of boot-heels ; and he says that Baxter told him that 
 
 80 War of the EebeUion : Official Secords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 185. 
 
 81 War of the EebeUion: Official Eeeords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 170. 
 
. THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 75 
 
 the paper was picked up from the floor of the ladies' cabin, 
 on the steamboat. The original order having been lost, 
 Wallace gives the following from memory: 
 
 Yon will leave a sufficient force at Crump's Landing to guard 
 the public property there: with the rest of the division march and 
 form junction ^\^th the right of the army. Form line of battle at 
 right angles with the river, and be governed by circumstances.*- 
 
 The Rawlins form of order was reproduced from memory 
 within one year after the event; that of Wallace, many 
 years after — possibly forty years. Aside from the pre- 
 cise road mentioned and the precise position on the field 
 designated in the Rawlins order, the two are strikingly 
 similar — sufficiently so to suggest that the former, which 
 had long been in print, may have been consulted to refresh 
 the memory in preparing the latter. 
 
 Referring again to the events of Sunday as related by 
 (^olonel Rawlins, it appears that about an hour after Cap- 
 tain Baxter started by boat with orders to General Wal- 
 lace, Grant sent a cavalry officer, familiar with the road, 
 with a verbal message to Wallace "to hurry forward with 
 all possible dispatch." This officer reported back to Grant, 
 between twelve and one o'clock, that Wallace declined to 
 move without written orders. According to Rawlins, Cap- 
 tain Baxter reported back about 12 o'clock; that he deliv- 
 ered the orders to Wallace at about ten o'clock; that Wal- 
 lace read tlie memorandum handed him by Captain Baxter 
 and "api)eared delighted ".**•' 
 
 Immediately after the report of the cavalry officer that 
 Wallace declined to move without written orders (Baxter's 
 written order had not yet been delivered). Captain Rowley 
 of Grant's staff was ordered to take the cavalry officer and 
 
 »2WaII.iPo's Autohiography, Vol. I, p. 463. 
 
 83 War of the BebeUion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X. Part II, pp. 185- 
 180. 
 
76 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
 
 two orderlies and carry instructions to Wallace, with au- 
 thority to put the instructions in writing and sign them, 
 if necessary.** 
 
 Captain Rowley's account of this incident is more in de- 
 tail than that of Colonel Rawlins. Rowley corroborates 
 Rawlins as to the report of the cavalry officer and says that 
 Grant, after hearing the report, turned to him (Rowley) 
 and said: "Captain, you will proceed to Crump's Landing 
 and say to General Wallace that it is my orders that he 
 bring his division up at once, coming up by the River road, 
 crossing Snake Creek on the bridge". Captain Rowley says 
 he was authorized to put the orders in writing and properly 
 sign the same, should General Wallace require it. He was 
 instructed to take the cavalry officer and two orderlies with 
 him with the further instruction: "see that you do not 
 spare horse flesh." ^'^ Captain Rowley gives the time of 
 his starting on this mission at about twelve-thirty o'clock. 
 Colonel Rawlins fixes it at "not later than 1 o'clock p. m." 
 
 Captain Rowley's party rode directly to Wallace's head- 
 quarters at Crump's Landing, to find "no signs of a camp 
 except one baggage wagon that was just leaving." **' (The 
 brigade had marched west to Stonylonesome in the morn- 
 ing.) Getting directions from the driver of the wagon, the 
 party followed the road taken by Wallace and overtook the 
 rear of the division some five or six miles out. The divi- 
 sion was "at a rest, sitting on each side of the road". Rid- 
 ing forward to the head of the column, Wallace was found 
 "sitting upon his horse, surrounded by his staff". Although 
 it is not so stated, it is fair to assume that the division was 
 at rest while the cavalry was scouting to the front, as Wal- 
 
 84 War of the SebelHon: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 185- 
 186. 
 
 6s War of the Kebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 179. 
 88 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 179. 
 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 77 
 
 lace believed that he was approaching the crossing of Owl 
 Creek, near the right of the army as it was in the morning, 
 and where he might expect trouble. 
 
 Captain Eowley delivered his orders and stated that it 
 had been reported to Grant that he (Wallace) had de- 
 clined to march without written orders, which according to 
 Eowley, Wallace denounced as a "damned lie!" Wallace 
 claimed that he had taken the ^^only road he knew anything 
 about," *^ leading in the direction of the right of the army. 
 On learning the real situation, Wallace ordered his division 
 to counter-march for the purpose of reaching the river road 
 by a short-cut if possible. Captain Eowley remained with 
 the division, acting as guide. 
 
 When Captain Eowley left the field with orders to Wal- 
 lace, it was supposed that the head of the column would 
 be found only a short distance north of Snake Creek bridge, 
 and that Wallace would soon be in the precise position 
 where he was expected to be, and where his presence was 
 most needed. Two o'clock came, but no information from 
 Wallace. Grant then sent two of the principal members 
 of his staff, Colonel Eawlins, Assistant Adjutant General, 
 and Colonel McPherson, Chief Engineer, to find the lost 
 division. 
 
 These officers rode directly to Crump's Landing, not 
 knowing whether the division had left its camp. Following 
 directions given them there, they came upon the division 
 counter-marching on a cross-road to the river road, at about 
 three-thirty afternoon. Colonel Eawlins repeated to Wal- 
 lace the reported refusal to march without written orders, 
 and Wallace repeated the denial. In regard to the road 
 taken, Wallace said, according to Eawlins, that his guide 
 had misled him. 
 
 Soon after Eawlins and McPherson came up with the 
 
 «T War of the Bebellion: Official Secords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 180. 
 
78 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 
 
 head of the column it was halted, as Rawlins states it, "for 
 a considerable length of time, to enable it to close up and 
 rest". There was another delay when near Snake Creek 
 bridge "for full half an hour" while changing the position 
 of the artillery in the column.** 
 
 The three officers, Eawlins, McPherson, and Rowley,, 
 agree in stating that the march of the column was very 
 slow, and that no urging of the terms of Grant's order or 
 the seriousness of the situation seemed to have auy effect. 
 According to Rawlins, the speed was less than "a mile and 
 a half an hour" after he joined the column, though "the 
 roads were in fine condition; he was marching light; his 
 men were in buoyant spirits, .... and eager to get for- 
 ward." *" 
 
 "Whatever the form of the order from General Grant to 
 General Wallace, and however it may have been interpreted^ 
 Wallace's march began from Stonylonesome at twelve 
 o'clock, noon, with two brigades, over the Shunpike road 
 toward Owl Creek bridge, the third brigade falling in the 
 rear where the road intersects from Adamsville. Captain 
 Rowley came up to the head of the column ' ' at rest, ' ' north 
 of and overlooking Clear Creek valley, not Owl Creek as 
 Wallace supposed — he was still more than three miles from 
 Owl Creek, and the rear of the column was still at Adams- 
 ville. The counter-march began from the north side of 
 Clear Creek, at a point marked "Smith's" (Map VIII). 
 It was necessary for the head of the column to march back 
 about two and a half miles to find a cross-road, then about 
 the same distance on the cross-road, before the rear could 
 move; so it was well along in the afternoon when the last 
 files of the third brigade left Adamsville. Colonel Rawlins 
 and Colonel McPherson came up with Wallace on the cross- 
 
 88 War of the Bebellion: Official Secords, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 187. 
 so War of the HebelUon: Official jRccords, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 188. 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 79 
 
 road at about three-thirty afternoon, as heretofore stated. 
 
 From a glance at the map (VIII) showing the roads north 
 of Snake Creek and the relation of the roads to the battle 
 field, it appears that the shortest possible route from Wal- 
 lace's camps to the right of the army (as it was even on 
 Sunday morning) was by the river road and Snake Creek 
 bridge (Wallace bridge on map). Not only was the road 
 by Owl Creek bridge much longer, but the crossing was 
 more hazardous in case the enemy succeeded in securing 
 the crossing and planting a battery, for the approach from 
 the North was through a swampy valley, heavily timbered 
 and with dense undergrowth, along a narrow road where 
 deployment was impossible and where the column would be 
 exposed to direct artillery fire for a distance of nearly a 
 mile. 
 
 Had General Wallace been familiar with the roads cov- 
 ering the territory which it was his special province to 
 guard, no guide could have misled him, and he would not 
 have said that he was on "the only road he knew anything 
 about". His position at Crump's Landing was as much 
 exposed to attack as was the camp at Pittsburg Landing, 
 and he was as likely to need support as he was to be called 
 on for support. It was of the utmost importance for the 
 safety of his own command that he know the shortest and 
 best road between the two camps. 
 
 Forty years after the event General Wallace was forced 
 to confess that he had all that time been laboring imder a 
 mistake as to the position of the head of his column when 
 the order was given to counter-march. He had all this 
 time supposed that he was overlooking Owl Creek at the 
 right of Sherman's lines when Captain Rowley came up 
 and foimd his division "at rest", while his cavalry was 
 scouting to the front. Instead of overlooking Owl Creek, 
 he was overlooking the valley of Clear Creek three or four 
 
80 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 
 
 miles to the north. Of these facts General Wallace was 
 convinced, not long before his death, by a personal inspec- 
 tion of the territory and the roads over which his division 
 marched, in company with the Secretary and Historian of 
 the Shiloh National Military Park Commission, several of 
 his own officers, with citizens living in the locality, and with 
 a Confederate cavalry officer who was watching his move- 
 ments on that Sunday. 
 
 Strangely, General Wallace allowed this confessed error 
 to stand in his Autobiography, with only partial correction. 
 
 It seems not to be generally known, though it has been 
 matter of official record since 1863, that General Wallace 
 in view of General Grant's criticism of his (Wallace's) con- 
 duct at Shiloh, asked of the Secretary of War a court of 
 inquiry. The date of the request was July 18th, 1863; but 
 on September 16th following, the Secretary of War was 
 asked to "suspend action in the matter". General Wallace 
 stating that he might be able to "satisfy General Grant 
 upon the points involved".*"* It was on the advice of Gen- 
 eral Sherman that the request for a court of inquiry was 
 withdrawn, and the request was never renewed, though 
 General Grant had found no reason to modify his original 
 criticism, down to the time of writing the chapter on Shiloh, 
 for his Memoirs.*' After the writing of that chapter, how- 
 ever, a letter came into General Grant's hands, written by 
 General Lew. Wallace to General W. H. L. Wallace, dated 
 April 5, 1862 (correct date April 4th). In this letter Gen- 
 eral Grant finds reasons for "materially" modifying the 
 criticisms upon General Wallace, as they appear in the 
 chapter itself, appending a foot-note thereto by way of ex- 
 planation."- 
 
 «o War of the Kebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, pp. 188-190. 
 »i Personal Memoirs of V. S. Grant, Vol. I, pp. 337-338. 
 92 Personal Memoirs of V. S. Grant, Vol. I, p. 351. 
 
THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 81 
 
 The writer hereof is impressed with the idea that it was 
 the promptings of General Grant's generous nature, rather 
 than the contents of the letter that prompted the foot-note. 
 It is not entirely clear, in view of the admissions made by 
 General Wallace in his Autobiography, that the letter from 
 General Lew. Wallace to General W. H. L. Wallace does 
 not furnish additional ground for censure. At the moment 
 of writing the letter the author of it must have been "sim- 
 mering" in his mind the knowledge that the Confederate 
 army was then on the march to attack Grant ; and yet there 
 was no mention in the letter of that important fact. The 
 reader must draw his own conclusions. 
 
 J. W. Rich 
 The State Historical Society op Iowa 
 Iowa City 
 
LB D '12