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A SUMMARY 
 
 THE CASE OF 
 
 General Fitx-Johi Porter, 
 
 Theodore a. Lord. 
 
 m 291883 ^1 
 
 SAN FKAXCISCO '. ' ' 
 
 H. S. CROCKER & CO., 
 1883. 
 

 Copyright, 1883, 
 By THEODORE A. LORD. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Page. 
 
 Historical Sketch of Pope's Campaign 5 
 
 The Charges and Comments Thereon 14 
 
 The Night -march from Warrenton Junction to 
 
 Bristoe Station 18 
 
 Events of the 29TH of August 31 
 
 The "Joint Order" 35 
 
 The Time of Longstreet's Arrival 52 
 
 The "4.30 P. M. Order" 59 
 
 The Animus • 64 
 
 Errors of the Court-martial 70 
 
 Lincoln's Approval 79 
 
 Porter's Conduct August 30TH So 
 
 maps- 
 General Map of the Scene of 
 
 Pope's Campaign Facing page 5 
 
 Operations of August 29TH Placing page 33 
 
This map is copieil, in a reduced form, from a map contained in that admirable 
 work, the "History of the Civil War in America," by the Comte de Paris. I am 
 indebted to Messrs. Porter & Coates, of Philadelphia, the publishers of that work, for 
 their kind permission to use the map. The permission was specially given exclusively 
 for this purpose. Owing to the process employed for reprinting, this map does not do 
 justice to the beautiful execution of the origiwal. 
 
A SUMMARY 
 
 OK THK CASK OV 
 
 [}mwAi FiT^-joHN immi 
 
 The recall of jNIcClellan's army from the IV^niiisula 
 enabled Lee to leave Richmond, and direct his whole 
 force against General Pope. The latter, with ab(Hit 
 42,000 men, was occupying- a very advanced position, 
 the main part ot his iorce being in the vicinity of Cedar 
 Mountain, while detachments guarded the fords of the 
 Rapidan. He was confronted by Jackson with about 
 22,500 men. That enterprising commander had re- 
 cently beaten Banks, in the battle of Cedar Mountain, 
 and was eager to obtain reinforcements so that he might 
 resume the offensive. ■ 
 
 Before the retrograde movement of the Army of the 
 Potomac actually began, Lee dispatched troops to the 
 support of Jackson, and prepared to surprise Pope in 
 his dangerous position. Pope learned of this inten- 
 tion, prudently retired behind the Rappahannock, and 
 held the line of that river fVoni Kelly's Ford to the 
 neighborhood of Freeman's Ford. On the 21st of 
 August, 1862, Lee, with a total force of about 55,000 
 men, now fully released by the actual withdrawal of the 
 Army of the Potomac, held the opposite side of the 
 Rappahannock. 
 
 Being unable to surprise Pope, Lee determined to 
 turn his right flank. On the 2 2d, Jackson, with his 
 
6 
 
 three divisions and Stuart's cavalry, marched up the 
 right bank of the river, and sent a small part of his force 
 across at Sulphur Springs. That evening, in the midst 
 of a furious rain-storm, Stuart pushed on to Catlett's 
 Station, fired into a train of cars, captured all of Pope's 
 staff papers, attempted, without success, to destroy the 
 railroad bridge, and finally effected a safe retreat. The 
 rapid rise of the river in consequence of the rain, 
 checked Jackson's further progress, and also prevented 
 the return of the force which had = already crossed. 
 Pope had, from the first, divined the purpose of Jack- 
 son's movement, and prepared to meet it; but, unfor- 
 tunately, he was so inconstant in his plans, that he 
 adopted a course of action which led only to a useless 
 result. His first intention was to let Jackson cross 
 with all his force, and then attack him while separated 
 from Longstreet. For this purpose the troops were 
 rapidly marched in the required direction. Next, he 
 decided to cross the river and attack Longstreet while 
 separated from Jackson. Then the troops were as 
 rapidly marched in the opposite direction. They had 
 hardly reached the positions last designated, when they 
 were all ordered back again in the first direction, with 
 the hope of intercepting the small force of the enemy 
 which was isolated by the flood. Thus for three days 
 the Federal soldiers were harassed and wearied by, 
 hurried and continuous marches and countermarches, 
 only to find that Jackson had quietly withdrawn the 
 brigade which had been endangered, and was preparing 
 to make a far more serious demonstration. 
 
 On the 25th his whole force crossed the river at 
 Hinson's Mill, and reached Orleans. Protected from 
 attack by the Bull Run Mountains, he ijursued his way 
 
with all possible speed towards Thoroughfare Gap. 
 Early in the morning of the 26th he passed through 
 the Gap without opposition. That evening he cut the 
 telegraph and tore up the railroad track at Bristoe 
 Station. Still untiring, he pushed on that night for 
 Manassas Junction. Before morning his advanced 
 guard captured the place, after a slight skirmish, and 
 plundered and burned the vast quantity of stores col- 
 lected there. He was now fully in the rear of the 
 Federal army. He had stopped all of Pope's supplies, 
 and had interrupted all communication with Washing- 
 ton. His movements had completely mystified Pope. 
 About noon of the 25th the latter was informed 
 that Jackson was moving northward in force, but he 
 could not divine the purpose or destination of the 
 march. He believed that the enemy were going to 
 the Shenandoah Valley, and took no precautions to 
 withdraw his army or protect his communications and 
 supplies. On the same day Lee moved Longstreet's 
 corps up the river, into the positions vacated by Jack- 
 son. By a vigorous cannonade and by threatening 
 movements of troops, continued through the 25th 
 and 26th, he diverted attention from Jackson's march, 
 and kept the Federal army in constant apprehension 
 and activity. Late in the afternoon of the 26th, 
 Lono^street crossed the. river and followed the route 
 taken by Jackson. It was evident that the two were 
 acting in concert, but Pope was helplessly, almost 
 despairingly, groping to find out what they intended 
 to do. He seems to have thought of every direction 
 but the one they took, and to have planned for him- 
 self every course but the right one. The result was 
 a series of erroneous, contradictory, and futile orders — 
 
tedious and useless to follow in detail — which imposed 
 upon the already exhausted and ill-fed troops, long and 
 rapid marches by day and night in wrong directions, 
 whence they were speedily recalled to go in other 
 wrong directions. These harassing and ill-planned 
 movements wore out the strength, spirits, and confi- 
 dence of officers and men, and left Pope as badly off 
 at the end of them as he was at the beginning. 
 
 By the 26th of A^-igust, Pope had been re-enforced 
 by 23,000 men of the Army of the Potomac 
 (including the corps of General Fitz-John Porter), 
 and he had previously received 8,000 men by the 
 arrival of Reno's corps. His army considerably out- 
 numbered Lee's, and he had the expectation of a large 
 increase of force as soon as he should place himself 
 where additional troops could reach him. The raid 
 upon the railroad and telegraph at Bristoe Station par- 
 tially disclosed the secret of Jackson's movement. 
 On the morning of the 27th Pope promptly and 
 properly ordered his army to concentrate upon 
 Gainesville. This step should have been taken sooner, 
 but as it was, he had full opportunity to reap its ad- 
 vantages. The position of Gainesville commands the 
 road leading through Thoroughfare Gap. That road 
 would probably be taken by Jackson in case he should 
 retreat, and certainly by Longstreet, in the endeavor 
 to reach Jackson. Holding Gainesville in force, and 
 strongly guarding the Gap, Pope would intervene 
 between the two wings of the rebel army. No com- 
 mander could have wished to be better situated. Hav- 
 ing intercepted Jackson's most available line of retreat, 
 Pope designed to pursue and defeat him, before he 
 could be joined by Longstreet. The commands of 
 
9 
 
 McDowell, Sio-el and Reynolds reached Gainesville 
 on the night of the 27th, and the rest of the 
 army was within supporting distance. Hooker had a 
 successful engagement that evening, at Bristoe Station, 
 with Jackson's rear guard, under Ewell, and the latter 
 had retired in the direction of Manassas. Pope was 
 exactly in the position in which he should have been, 
 and wished to be ; but in his zeal to pursue and, as he 
 expressed it, "bag" Jackson prematurely, he threw 
 away all the chances of bagging him at all. I'he 
 troops, after toilsome marching, had no sooner reached 
 the designated positions, in which they ought to have 
 remained, than they were ordered to withdraw, at 
 daylight of the 28th, and start for Manassas. Pope 
 even defeated the efforts which his subordinates 
 made to do something right in spite of him. Mc- 
 Dowell had given orders for the disposition of the 
 force under his command, (which included his own 
 and Sigel's corps, and the division of Reynolds, 
 altogether about 30,000 men), so that he could hold 
 Thoroughfare Gap and the road leading from Hope- 
 well Gap. When the order came from Pope to 
 abandon that vitally important position, and march to 
 Manassas, McDowell, though directed to take his 
 whole force, assumed the responsibility of detaching 
 Ricketts' division to guard Thoroughfare Gap, and 
 delay the advance of Longstreet. This was as ju- 
 dicious and meritorious an act as was done durino-that 
 campaign, but Pope blamed McDowell for havino- 
 done it. 
 
 The order to march to Manassas was based upon 
 the supposition that Jackson was there ; but before the 
 movement commenced he had abandoned that place. 
 
10 
 
 and had taken a strong position north of the Warren- 
 ton l^urnpike. His front was protected by the cuts 
 and embankment of an unfinished raih'oad, and he 
 held the woods and heights in rear of it. His left 
 rested upon Bull Run, near Sudley Springs, and his 
 right was near the turnpike, between Gainesville and 
 Groveton. More than 20,000 men defended a line 
 only a mile and three quarters long. A. P. Hill was 
 sent to Centerville, to draw Pope in that direction. 
 This he succeeded in doing, and soon rejoined Jackson 
 in the position described. The complete execution of 
 Pope's order, therefore, would leave the way open to 
 Thoroughfare Gap, so that Jackson could retreat, or 
 Long-street advance, at pleasure. But, as the Federal 
 army was soon to learn, Jackson did not wish to 
 retreat any farther than was necessary to secure a safe 
 position, in which he could await Longstreet's arrival. 
 Pope's dispositions favored the design most admirably 
 and unexpectedly. The movement to Manassas was 
 bad enough, but as if to enlarge the error. Pope, misled 
 by Jackson's ruse, ordered nearly the whole army to 
 Centerville. This was exactly opposite to the direction 
 which it should have taken. The chance of retrieving 
 so many false steps was well-nigh hopeless. 
 
 In the afternoon of the 28th, King's division 
 of McDowell's corps, while making the retrograde 
 march on the road to Centerville, unexpectedly 
 stumbled upon Jackson, between Gainesville and 
 Groveton. Then ensued the terrific combat of Gaines- 
 ville, which lasted from five o'clock until nine at night, 
 and ended as a drawn battle. That accidental en- 
 gagement, which showed, simply, Jackson's zest for 
 fighting and his ferocity in attack. Pope interpreted 
 
11 
 
 as a desperate attempt of the enemy to break through 
 the forces which were supposed to be barring his 
 retreat. That night, therefore, he issued orders for 
 the pursuit and capture of Jackson. But the plan was 
 based upon a serious error. Jackson had no thought 
 of retreating, but King, who was supposed to be hold- 
 ing him in check, and Ricketts, who was expected to 
 detain Longstreet, did retreat. They, not knowing 
 exactly what to do, though meaning well, actually did 
 the worst thing possible under the circumstances. 
 The one retired to Manassas, and the other to Bristoe. 
 The road from Jackson's position to Thoroughfare 
 Gap was thus left wholly unobstructed. As soon as 
 Pope learned of the retreat of King, he sought to 
 remedy the evil by ordering the reoccupation of 
 Gainesville, which he had so carelessly abandoned. 
 But he was then too late ; men could not march as 
 easily or rapidly as orders could be issued ; fatigue, 
 hunger, uncertainty, and mistake, could not fail to arise 
 in a series of movements so complicated and conflict- 
 ing. The control of events soon passed out of Pope's 
 hands. He was in the power of Fate. Having sown 
 the wind in mismanagement, he was about to reap the 
 whirlwind in defeat. 
 
 About three o'clock in the afternoon of the 28th, 
 Longstreet, accompanied by Lee in person, arrived 
 at Thoroughfare Gap. Though delayed by Ricketts 
 until dark, he gained full possession of the Gap that 
 evening, and a considerable part of his force spent the 
 night on the eastern side of it. 
 
 At sunrise the next morning (August 2Qth), his 
 troops passed through it, and, inspirited by the sound of 
 battle, marched in haste to join Jackson. They reached 
 
12 
 
 their desired positions by ten or eleven o'clock. Pope 
 seems not to have been aware of this, and made all his 
 dispositions, on that day, as if he was still dealing with 
 Jackson, alone and in retreat. How he coulci have 
 formed or followed such an erroneous idea it is diffi- 
 cult to see, for Jackson stubbornly held his position, 
 and gave no sign of a retreat. Pope knew, too, that 
 Longstreet was at the Gap the night before, and was 
 therefore not more than ten miles from Jackson's posi- 
 tion, with an unobstructed turnpike between. But, 
 whatever his theory, if he had not misused his previ- 
 ous opportunity, he woulci have been master of the 
 movements of both Jackson and Longstreet, for he 
 would have defended the Gap, so that Longstreet 
 could not pass through it, and would have held the 
 only road by which Jackson could reach it. 
 
 After Lee's army was actually united, the only wise 
 thing for Pope to do, as he himself realized, before 
 fighting a great battle, was to withdraw to Centerville 
 or some place in the rear, where he could take a favor- 
 able position, and rest, reorganize, re-supply and re- 
 enforce his wearied and famished army. 
 
 During the 29th, occurred that series of fierce 
 but detached, desultory and fruitless combats, known 
 as the battle of Groveton. The Federal troops 
 attacked heroicall}^, but they were in too small force, in 
 every instance, and were not adequately supported, so 
 that they suffered great loss, without gaining any real 
 success. That night and the next morning. Pope stub- 
 bornly refused to believe that any considerable part of 
 Longstreet's force had united with Jackson, although 
 he was most emphatically told by Porter and Reynolds 
 that the junction of the enemy was complete. Jack- 
 
13 
 
 son's army remained in one place for two days and a 
 half, and fought every force that came in sight ; yet 
 Pope, after two days of such rough handling as his 
 troops received, still hugged the delusion that the en- 
 emy were in full retreat. Although his head-quarters 
 were, most of the time, within five miles of Jackson's 
 lines he seems to have been totally blind as to the en- 
 emy's real position and movements. Napoleon, whose 
 knowledge of the art of war was equaled only by his 
 knowledge of men, seems to have understood this kind 
 .of mental obliquity; for he says: "The first qualifi- 
 cation of a general-in-chief is to possess a cool head, so 
 that things may appear to him in their true propor- 
 tions, and as they really are. * '" " * There are 
 some men who, from their physical and moral constitu- 
 tion, deck every thing in the colors of imagination. 
 With whatever knowledge, talents, courage, or other 
 good qualities these may be endowed, nature has not 
 fitted them for the command of armies, and the direc- 
 tion of the great operations of war." 
 
 Pope grew more sanguine as his errors developed, 
 and at noon of the 30th he ordered a vigorous pur- 
 suit of the theoretically retreating enemy. For this 
 purpose he weakened the left of his line to strengthen 
 the right. Lee saw the movement and let it go on, for 
 he desired nothing better. When it had gone far 
 enough to satisfy him, he advanced his right wino-, in 
 the hope of reaching the turnpike in rear of Pope, and 
 cutting off his retreat. The stubborn defense of the 
 Henry- House Hill, by Sykes, of Porter's corps was 
 probably the only thing that prevented the execution 
 of the plan, and thereby saved the Federal army from 
 total rout. Pope was badly beaten, and his army 
 
14 
 
 retreated to Centerville. Lee continued his movement 
 upon the Federal line of retreat, and in the afternoon 
 of September ist was fought the battle of Chantilly. 
 With that engagement the chapter of disasters in this 
 tragedy of errors ended, McClellan was placed in 
 command, and within fifteen days, gave the Army of 
 the Potomac — so sorely tried, but always faithful and 
 always brave — two victories, the first which had 
 cheered it for many weeks, and the last which it was 
 destined to experience for hopeless months. That 
 army could not anticipate Gettysburg, the first success 
 after South Mountain and the Antietam ; but it could 
 remember Malvern Hill, the last victory before those 
 battles, and remember too, that the glory of Malvern 
 Hill belonged — first, to McClellan, and next, to Fitz- 
 John Porter. 
 
 The Charges. 
 
 Having seen how Pope got into "his scrape," let 
 us now consider how he endeavored to get his reputa- 
 tion out of it. He must needs find some scapegoat to 
 bear his military sins ; indeed, it would seem as it it 
 was almost beyond the capability of one man to make 
 so many mistakes in so short a time. It was a matter 
 of astonishment to the rebels themselves. Accord- 
 ingly, he selected General Porter as most available for 
 the sacrifice. The latter had done distinguished ser- 
 vice and was conspicuous as a warm triend of Mc- 
 Clellan. He was also a representative of that cul- 
 tured and conservative regular-army element which, 
 like Napoleon, clung to those antiquated notions, so 
 obnoxious to Pope and Stanton, "of taking strong 
 positions and holding them, — of lines of retreat and of 
 
15 
 
 bases of supplies." The contempt of this element for 
 Pope was quite marked. Even Lee and Jackson 
 seem to have shared it, for upon any other hypothesis 
 their movements were reckless, almost to insanity. 
 Pope modestly ascribed his defeat, not to its true 
 cause, his own redundant incapacity, but to the mis- 
 conduct of Porter. In consequence of Pope's repre- 
 sentations (or misrepresentations), a court-martial was 
 convened at Washington, on the 27th of November, 
 1862, to try Porter upon charges which involved the 
 penalty of death. The court consisted of Generals 
 Hunter, Hitchcock, Prentiss, King, Ricketts, Casey, 
 N. B. Buford, Slough, and Garfield, with Holt as 
 Judge- Advocate-General. 
 
 The charges were : 
 
 I. Disobedience of orders, under the 9th Article 
 of War. 
 
 n. Misbehavicn^ before the enemy, under the 
 5 2d Article of War. 
 
 Under the first charge there were three specifica- 
 tions of which the court found Porter guilty. These 
 were substantially : 
 
 First. Disobedience to the order of August 27th, 
 requiring him to march from Warrenton Junction at 
 one o'clock in the morning of the 28th, and be at 
 Bristoe Station by daylight. 
 
 Second. Disobedience, on August 29th, while in 
 front of the enemy, to the Joint Order to McDowell 
 and Porter, directing them to march towards Gaines- 
 ville and establish communication with the other corps. 
 
 Third. Disobedience, on August 29th, while in 
 front of the enemy, to what is known as the "4.30 
 
16 
 
 p. M. Order," requiring Porter to attack the enemy's 
 flank and rear. 
 
 Under the second charge, the specifications upon 
 which Porter was convicted were, in substance : 
 
 First. Shameful disobedience to the "4.30 p. m. 
 Order," on August 29th, while within sight of the field, 
 and in full hearing of its artillery ; and retreat from 
 advancing forces of the enemy, without attempting to 
 engage them, or to aid the troops who were fighting 
 greatly superior numbers, and who would have secured 
 a decisive victory, and would have captured the ene- 
 my's army, but for Porter's neglect to attack, and his 
 shameful disobedience. 
 
 Second, Failure of Porter, all day on the same day, 
 to bring his lorces on the field, w'hen within sound of 
 the guns, and in presence of the enemy, and knowing 
 that a severe action of great consequence was being 
 fought, and that the aid of his corps was greatly 
 needed ; and his shameful falling back and retreat 
 from the advance of unknown forces of the enemy, 
 without attempting to give them battle. 
 
 Third. Shameful failure of Porter, on the same 
 day, while a severe action was being fought, to go to 
 the aid of General Pope's troops, believing that they 
 were being defeated, and were retiring from the field ; 
 and his shameful retreat away and falling back, under 
 those circumstances, leaving the army to the disasters 
 of a presumed defeat ; and failure, by any attempt to 
 attack the enemy, to aid in averting a disaster which 
 would have endangered the safety of the Capital. 
 
 Those are the accusations, and they would be suffi- 
 ciently serious, if they had any foundation in truth. 
 
17 
 
 General Gordon says, that "the proceedings Insti'i^ated 
 by Pope, were the most indefensible and the most 
 indecent, ever submitted by our Government to the 
 judgment of a court," "'' 
 
 On the 20th of June, 1878, a Board of Officers, 
 consisting of Generals Schofield, Terry and Getty, was 
 convened by President Hayes, to "examine, in con- 
 nection with the record of the trial by court-martial of 
 Major-General Porter, such new evidence relating to 
 the merits of said case as is now on file in the War 
 Department, together with such other evidence as 
 may be presented to said Board, and to report with 
 the reasons for their conclusion, what action, if any, in 
 their opinion, justice rec^uires should be taken "'' " '"" 
 by the President." This Board, after a patient and 
 thorough examination of all attainable evidence, and 
 after most elaborate arguments on both sides, by coun- 
 sel of exceptional learning and acuteness, rendered a 
 decision showing the errors which led to the convic- 
 tion of Porter, and completely vindicating him from all 
 the charges. They say : " Porter's faithful, subordi- 
 nate, and intelligent conduct, that afternoon (August 
 29th), saved the Union Army from the defeat which 
 would otherwise have resulted, that day, from the 
 enemy's more speedy concentration. ""' * * "'~ " 
 Porter had understood and appreciated the military 
 situation, and so far as he had acted upon his own 
 judgment, his action had been wise and judicious." . 
 
 Let us examine the case with all the lieht which 
 is now thrown upon it, and see whether the opinion of 
 the Court-martial, or that of the Board of Officers, is 
 most in accordance with the law and the evidence. 
 
 " The Army of Virginia from Cedar Mountain to Alexandria. " George 
 H. Gordon, p. 328. 
 
18 
 
 The newly-discovered evidence presented to the 
 Board, was not used or desired for the purpose of 
 making- a new defense ; that is, one in any way differ- 
 ent from that maintained before the Court-martial. 
 
 Porter's vindication was not an afterthought. It 
 did not arise from subsequently discovered and acci- 
 dental excuses for action which was reprehensible at 
 the time. He based his conduct at the time upon 
 what he then knew, and he justified it by that, and 
 that only. He proved beyond a reasonable doubt, all 
 the facts which he alleged, and which were ample for 
 his justification. But the court was not convinced, 
 and condemned him. The new evidence simply con- 
 firms the previous defense, and conclusively establishes 
 as absolute truth, what the Court-martial chose to con- 
 sider baseless pretense. 
 
 There is one accusation which requires no argu- 
 ment, and may as w^ell be disposed' of summarily. That 
 is all the matter relating to a retreat, whether shame- 
 ful or otherwise. There was no retreat by Porter, as 
 charged, and no semblance of any ; nor was there any 
 evidence of a retreat. In fact, the evidence was posi- 
 tive to the contrary. The verdict upon this point was 
 made, as the saying is, "out of whole cloth." It was 
 simply false. Some exercise of imagination is neces- 
 sary to account for it, and more of charity to excuse it. 
 
 Takine the accusations in their order, the first 
 relates to 
 
 The Night-march from -Warrenton Junction to 
 Bristoe Station. 
 
 On the night of the 27th of August, Porter was 
 at Warrenton Junction with orders to march to Green- 
 wich as soon as Banks should relieve him at the 
 
19 
 
 Junction. His corps numbered about 10,000 men. 
 One of his divisions had marched that day from 
 twelve to fourteen miles ; the other, nineteen or 
 twenty miles. The troops had been marching with 
 but little intermission for thirteen days previously, 
 sometimes by niq^ht as well as by day, and always 
 rapidly. They were very much worn with fatigue, 
 and had suffered greatly from the heat, dust, and lack 
 of food and water. For several days they had lived 
 upon a scanty supply of coffee, hard bread, and sugar, 
 or upon what they could pick up in the neighboring 
 cornfields and orchards. Morell's division, which had 
 marched the farthest that day, did not reach camp 
 until after sunset, and from the delay in getting sup- 
 per, the men were not in bed at ten o'clock. About 
 that hour Porter received the followinof order : 
 
 Head-quarters, Army of V^irginia, 
 
 Bristozu Station, August 27, 1862. 
 
 6. JO p. 7)1. 
 
 General: — The Major-General commanding, 
 directs that you start at one o'clock to-night, and come 
 forward with your whole corps, or such part of it as is 
 with yon, so as to be here by daylight to-morrow 
 morning. Hooker has had a very severe action with 
 the enemy, with a loss of about three hundred killed 
 and wounded. The enemy has been driven back, but 
 is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him 
 from Manassas, and clear the country between that 
 place and Gainesville, where McDowell is. If Morell 
 has not joined you, send word to him to push forward 
 immediately; also send word to Banks to hurry forward 
 with all speed to take your place at Warrenton Junc- 
 tion. It is necessary, on all accounts, that you should 
 be here by daylight. I send an officer with this dis- 
 patch, who will conduct you to this place. Be sure to 
 
20 
 
 send word to Banks, who is on the road from Fayette- 
 ville, probably in the direction of Bealton. Say to 
 Banks, also, that he had best run back the railroad 
 trains to this side of Cedar Run. If he is not with 
 you, write him to that effect. 
 
 By command of Major-General Pope, 
 
 Peorge D. Ruggles, 
 Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
 Major-General F. J. Porter, 
 
 Warrenton Junction. 
 
 P. S. If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction, 
 leave a regiment of infantry and two pieces of artillery 
 as a guard till he comes up, with instructions to follow 
 you immediately. If Banks is not at the Junction, 
 instruct Colonel Clary to run the trains back to this 
 side of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and section of 
 artillery with it. 
 
 By command of Major-General Pope, 
 
 George D. Ruggles, 
 Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
 
 The distance to Bristoe Station was ten miles. 
 The only road leading there from Warrenton Junction 
 was crooked and narrow, in some places not more than 
 ten feet wide. It ran, for a considerable part of the 
 way, either through or along the edge of dense woods. 
 It was full of little stumps, and seemed to be a newly 
 cut military road. It was crossed by a dozen or more 
 small streams, whose beds were like quicksand and 
 whose banks were either swampy and fringed with 
 thick bushes, or so high and abrupt as to be difficult of 
 ascent. It was encumbered at this time by the wagons 
 of the whole army, some 2,000 to 3,000 in number, 
 which had been pouring into it from two directions 
 during the entire day. In its windings, it several times 
 crossed the railroad track, upon which, by General 
 
21 
 
 Pope's order, trains were running during the greater 
 part of the night. Such was the road over which the 
 troops were obhged to march. There were no open 
 fields which they could take. The adjacent country 
 was in some places swampy, and the open spaces which 
 would have been otherwise passable, were occupied by 
 the wagons, parked in confusion. 
 
 At ten o'clock, the time when the order was 
 received, the night was extremely dark. Even a 
 witness for the prosecution. says that it was as black a 
 time for a while as he ever saw ; he could not see six 
 feet except by the flashes of lightning. General 
 Roberts, who made the charges, and Colonel Marston, 
 a witness for the prosecution, both say it w-as quite 
 dark ; the latter was out on a picket line and lost 
 his way. 
 
 General Patrick says : "It was one of the darkest 
 of nights." Lieutenant-Colonel Brinton, with two 
 officers, was two hours in going three miles on horse- 
 back along the road described. He says that they 
 ran into a tree upon one side, or a wagon on the other, 
 without seeing it until they were upon it. In the open 
 plain they could not see a wagon fifteen feet off. He 
 lost his way, as did many officers that night, going 
 singly or with escorts and guides. Colonel Ruggles 
 was lost in going a few hundred feet from the bivouac. 
 The whole night was cloudy and threatening. About 
 ten o'clock, and again before morning, there was a 
 drizzling rain. 
 
 Altogether, thirteen witnesses, two of them for the 
 prosecution, swore before the Court-martial that the 
 night was quite dark ; many said very, or unusually, 
 or extremely dark. Their testimony is supplemented 
 
22 
 
 and strengthened by the statements, before the recent 
 Board of Officers, of fourteen others to the same effect. 
 The experiences hereafter related will show whether 
 those opinions were well founded or not. 
 
 Upon the receipt of the order, General Porter 
 stated its purport to his principal officers, Generals 
 Sykes, Morell and Butterfield, and handed it to them 
 to read. They earnestly remonstrated against start- 
 ing at the time named. Porter replied in substance, 
 " There is the order ; it* must be obeyed." The 
 officers uroed the faticjue of the men, the darkness of 
 the night, the obstructions in the road, the loss by 
 straggling, and the cielay and confusion which would 
 inevitably ensue, as reasons for postponing the march 
 until daylight. They further argued that they could 
 make more effective progress, and the troops would 
 be of more service, by starting at daylight than at one 
 o'clock. The officer who brought the order had been 
 three hours and tw^enty minutes on the way. He said 
 that it was very dark, and he had experienced much 
 difficulty with the wagons. Porter had been informed 
 by his own officers, earlier in the evening, of the bad 
 condition and obstruction of the road. "After consid- 
 erable discussion, and with a good deal of reluctance," 
 he partially yielded to the protests of his officers, but 
 ordered them to move promptly at three o'clock. 
 
 There were other considerations which were 
 obvious to Porter, in connection with Pope's order. 
 
 First. Literal compliance with it was impossible 
 in the time mentioned. To start at one o'clock and 
 reach Bristoe at daylight, allow-ed only three hours for 
 a march of ten miles. Three miles an hour is very 
 rapid marching for troops on a good road and with 
 
zo 
 
 daylight. Yet Porter was expected to march at that 
 rate or faster, over such a road as he had, and in the 
 darkest part of an unusually dark night, in other 
 words, he was required to take 10,000 foot-soldiers 
 broken down with fatigue, a given distance, in less time 
 than that necessarily taken by a single horseman with 
 an urgent order. 
 
 Second. Although the order was sufficiently ur- 
 gent, as were most of Pope's orders during all the 
 time of these events, yet it gave the reasons for hast-e, 
 and those reasons hardly bore out the urgency of its 
 terms. They showed that the purpose of the order 
 was not to meet any present danger of attack, but to 
 pursue a retreating enemy and drive him from the sur- 
 rounding country. The march to Bristoe was only 
 the first step in a movement which required further 
 marching for an indefinite distance, and perhaps ficrht- 
 ing. As the literal execution of the order would have 
 been very difficult under any circumstances, and was 
 wholly impossible, as we have seen, under those exist- 
 ing, it was a matter of discretion with Porter so to use 
 his men that they would be most effective for carryincr 
 out the general purpose of his commander. The 
 question occurred to Porter- whether it would best 
 subserve that purpose to call his weary men up at 
 half-past eleven o'clock, — for it was necessary to sound 
 the reveille at least an hour and a half before starting,^ — 
 and keep them on their feet, uselessly waiting or hope- 
 lessly laboring until daylight for the removal of obsta- 
 cles which, by daylight, could be easily dispersed, and 
 then bring them in unfit for further service until after 
 a long rest ; or to rest for a few hours, and thereby 
 enable them to accomplish the march with comparative 
 
24 
 
 ease, arrive as soon as they could otherwise, and be 
 fit for anything that might be afterwards required of 
 them. To needlessly deprive the troops of rest that 
 they might reach Bristoe no earlier, and then be 
 obliged to halt half of the day from weariness, would 
 have been about as senseless a thing as Porter could 
 do ; for, to the uselessness of the force would have 
 been added the straggling and general demoralization 
 which fatigue produces. 
 
 Thi7'd. The order directed Porter to come for- 
 ward with his " wJiole corps'' or such part of it as was 
 with him. Under this, he would not have been jus- 
 tified in attempting to hasten his march, by taking his 
 infantry and leaving his artillery. The exception in 
 the postscript of the order, in reference to leaving a 
 section of artillery in a certain contingency, implied as 
 strongly as could be, that he was expected to bring 
 the rest of his artillery with him. 
 
 But, it may be said, if Porter knew the difficulties, 
 and could not effect the desired object by starting at 
 one o'clock, that was the strongest reason for starting 
 earlier, rather than later. So it was, if men were 
 mere machines, driven by a force which required no 
 rest, and which can be turned on and off at pleasure. 
 If anything was to be gained in the darkness, and the 
 men could endure the fatigue, Porter's duty certainly 
 was to urge them forward, from the time he received 
 the order r but of the advantage of moving, and of the 
 condition of the men, he was the sole responsible 
 judge. The question with him was, how could he 
 soonest reach Bristoe, with his troops in condition for 
 further service ? He yielded his own desire to move 
 at the time mentioned in the order, to the better 
 
25 
 
 judgment of subordinates whose zeal and capacity 
 were never questioned ; and in so doing he acted 
 wisely. He gave his tired troops a few hours of 
 needed rest, and accomplished all that could have 
 been effected in many hours of darkness. His only 
 fault was in not deferrino- the time of startinof until 
 daylight. 
 
 He did not leave Pope in ignorance of the situa- 
 tion, but wrote him statintv the difficulties, and askino- 
 for cavalry (as Porter had none), to clear the road. 
 Pope admits receiving that dispatch before daylight ; 
 and he also admits that he received one or more 
 requests to have his end of the road cleared ; but, as 
 in the case of several other writincjs which were of 
 value to Porter, the dispatches were demanded of 
 Pope, but were never produced. Porter also requested 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Brinton who arrived about twelve 
 o'clock, to bring up some of the First Maine Cavalry 
 from Catlett's Station. He sent out two officers to 
 explore the way, and they were obliged to dismount 
 and feel for the road. Lieutenant-Colonel Locke, 
 Porter's Chief-of-Staff, was severely injured by falling 
 over a stump in the middle of the camp. 
 
 At three o'clock, when the march commenced, the 
 obstacles encountered fully equaled the expectations. 
 It was with great difficulty that officers formed their 
 commands, or men found their places in the ranks. An 
 aid-de-camp who was sent to find the way, and guide 
 the column, though assisted by several soldiers, re- 
 turned and said he could not distinguish the road. 
 The leading brigade was obliged to light candles in 
 going through the woods. Artillery and wagons were 
 mired, not five hundred yards from the camp ; the 
 wheels sank up to the hubs in the marshy soil. 
 
2G 
 
 Lieutenant (now Major) Randol, a most capable 
 officer and remarkably intelligent witness, says that 
 with all the ingenuity he could use in cutting his way, 
 and extemporizing a crossing, it took hiiii tzvo hours to 
 get his battery across one stream. By the time the com- 
 mands were fairly extricated from the camp, they came 
 upon the wagon-train. Wagons and artillery were 
 stalled on both sides of the streams, and in the middle 
 of them. Wagons blocked the road, and were four or 
 five deep on the sides of the road. General Warren 
 says they were " pell-mell, — 'parked', like a lot of ice 
 that jams in on the shore." That describes the condi- 
 tion vividly. Many miles of such confusion had to be 
 cleared up, when it was so dark that one could not 
 distinguish a wagon five yards off. The teamsters 
 were insubordinate, and were acting without system, 
 and under no authority. They had not seen a wagon- 
 master for a week, and were going independently, they 
 said. When driven off the road, they would turn into 
 it again, and thereby break up the commands and cause 
 great disorder and delay. General Sykes was obliged 
 to station officers with drawn swords, to keep them 
 back. Another officer threatened to shoot them. 
 Sykes says that he never had so much trouble with 
 wagons in his life. He was obliged to halt his brigades 
 for an hour, on account of wagons intervening, Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Locke says that the work at Savage's 
 Station and White-Oak Swamp was holiday work to 
 that. Many of the troops were under arms at two 
 o'clock, and remained in the road until daylight or 
 after, waiting to take their places in the column. This 
 experience amply justifies the judgment of Porter and 
 his principal officers, as to the uselessness of starting 
 any earlier than they did. Porter wisely refrained 
 
9 7 
 
 from harassing his men, by trying to do what he knew 
 to be impossible. It was proved, and was admitted by 
 a witness for the prosecution, that General Porter per- 
 sonally, and his entire staff, used great exertions to 
 clear the way and expedite the march. But little 
 progress could be made until daylight; after that the 
 difficulties were more easily overcome, and the com- 
 mand made good speed to its destination. General 
 Porter rode on ahead and reported to Pope about 
 eight o'clock in the morning, and his corps was fully 
 up by ten o'clock, or a little after. 
 
 A march of ten miles in seven hours, under such 
 difficulties, indicates not only very creditable, but ex- 
 traordinary celerity. The experience of other per- 
 sons and other commands, on the same night, will 
 afford us a good standard of comparison. Two officers 
 of General Pope's staff, mounted of course, with a 
 guide, left Warrenton Junction for Rristoe at mid- 
 night, lost their way, and did not reach their destina- 
 tion until seven o'clock in the morning. General Mc- 
 Keever, with a small escort, required four hours to ride 
 over the same road in the afternoon of the twenty- 
 seventh. General Patrick, of King's division, was 
 from dusk until midnight, about five hours, in march- 
 ing seven or eight miles, on a turnpike road. At ten 
 o'clock, the time when Porter received his order, 
 Patrick's orderlies and apart of his staff dismounted to 
 feel for the road. He himself was lost. Men were 
 placed across the road, lest the commands should pass 
 the points were they were expected to bivouac. It 
 was so dark, that the openings on the side of the road 
 could not be seen. 
 
 Ricketts, with his division, started at two o'clock 
 in the morning, marched on a fine turnpike road 
 
obstructed by only 200 wagons, and in nine hours had 
 not go'ne twice the length of the division front from 
 where he started. The part of this command to which 
 Captain Duryea belonged left Warrenton by daylight, 
 and was engaged until midnight in marching three or 
 four miles. The troops were obliged to halt every ten 
 or fifteen minutes. The commands of Kearney and 
 Reno reached Bristoe about the same time that Porter 
 did, although they had marched only four miles, and 
 had been ordered, as Pope expressed it to Kearney, 
 in language of oriental fervor, " at the very eai'liest 
 blush of dawn'' to push forward with all speed, so as 
 to '' bag the zvhoie croivd^ Yet Porter's alleged delay, 
 which in reality was no delay at all, was a willful vio- 
 lation of orders, because to one of Pope's staff officers 
 he looked as if he was a traitor ! And the Court-mar- 
 tial listened to such contemptible nonsense, and con- 
 demned a orallant and faithful soldier. 
 
 Porter gave his troops two hours of needed rest, 
 and reached his destination as soon as he could have 
 reached it if he had started earlier. The most effective 
 part of his march must have been made after daylight, 
 in either case ; but in the one his troops were in con- 
 dition for further service, and in the other they would 
 have been useless. As it was, he arrived at Bristoe 
 in time for every purpose for which Pope required 
 him. The two hours delay in starting made no 
 difference to Pope whatever. Porter was at hand for 
 disposal as Pope saw fit. Pope had " much conversa- 
 tion" with him that morning, and made no complaint 
 of the delay — " said nothing about obeying or diso- 
 beying." He afterwards expressed himself as satisfied 
 with Porter's whole conduct, excepting one trivial 
 matter, which even the Court-martial ignored. 
 
29 
 
 Pope made no plans or disposition of his forces, 
 different from what he would have made if the delay 
 had not occurred. He said that the necessity had 
 passed. The movement he was making, was the with- 
 drawal from Gainesville, the most fatal error of that 
 lone series of errors, and he was soon obliged to coun- 
 termand it. If anybody was to be cashiered for the 
 false movements of that day, it should have been Pope, 
 not Porter. 
 
 Despite the urgency of the summons, Pope had no 
 use for Porter after he got him. The latter remained 
 at Bristoe the entire day and night of the twenty- 
 eighth. Twice during the day, he sent to Pope for 
 orders, and twice received the answer, "Tell him to stay 
 where he is, when wanted he will be sent for." It was 
 not until about six o'clock in the morning of the twen- 
 ty-ninth, that he received orders to move. 
 
 In judging of Porter's conduct throughout these 
 events, we must bear in mind the rule which results 
 from the ever-varying nature of circumstances in mili- 
 tary affairs. It is stated by Napoleon, and is so well 
 settled as to have becon^ie a maxim. He says : "An 
 order requires passive obedience only when it is given 
 by a superior who is present on the spot, at the 
 moment when he gives it. As the superior is then 
 familiar with the state of affairs, he can listen to objec- 
 tions, and make the necessary explanations to the 
 officer who is to execute the order." 
 
 It follows therefore, that, in the absence of the 
 superior, an officer is always justified in using a rea- 
 sonable discretion. As far as circumstances will admit, 
 he is expected to comply with the spirit of the order, 
 but he is not a slave to its letter. 
 
30 
 
 Porter used his discretion in this instance, right- 
 fully and reasonably. His "disobedience" consists 
 solely in his not doing an impossible act for a useless 
 purpose. 
 
 On this head, we may justly conclude : 
 
 First. That it was absolutely impossible for 
 Porter to obey the order literally. 
 
 Second. It being so, he had a right to use his dis- 
 cretion as to the manner in which he could best fulfill 
 the intention of his commander. 
 
 Third. He used that discretion reasonably and 
 efficiently. 
 
 Fourth. His action, whether right or wrong, 
 proved to be of no earthly importance. 
 
 There was nothing in Porter's conduct in this 
 instance, to base charges upon, and nothing deserving 
 the name of evidence, upon which to found a convic- 
 tion. But a Court which could find the fact of a re- 
 treat when there was no retreat, and no evidence of 
 any, could as easily find the fact of disobedience, when 
 there was no disobedience and no evidence of any. 
 It is but fair to assume that this charge relating to the 
 twenty-eighth of August, was entirely an afterthought, 
 — a makeweight — and would never have been heard 
 of, but for the occurrences of the succeeding day, and 
 Pope's inglorious failure. 
 
 As the charges of disobedience of orders and 
 "shameful behavior" on that day grow out of the 
 same events, and are closely interwoven, we will treat 
 of them together. By knowing exactly what Porter 
 was able to do, and what he did, we can judge whether 
 he disobeyed or committed any "shameful" act. 
 
31 
 
 Events of the 29TH of August. 
 
 Pope swore before the Court-martial that he feared 
 the arrival of Longstreet at any moment, and expected 
 it certainly during the afternoon of the 29th, (and 
 there was every reason why he should have expected 
 it earlier) ; yet in the orders which he issued to 
 Porter about ten o'clock in the morning of that day, 
 he says : " The indications are that the whole force of 
 the enemy is moving in this direction, at a pace that 
 will bring them here (Centerville) by to-morrow night 
 or next day." 
 
 Again, Pope stated in his Report to the Committee 
 on the Conduct of the War, (and he has sworn to sub- 
 stantially the same thing), that about sunset of the 29th 
 the main body of Longstreet's force began to reach the 
 field ; that he is " positive," up to five o'clock in the 
 afternoon, Porter had in his front no considerable force 
 of the enemy; that he "believed then," as he is "very 
 sure" afterwards, that Porter might have turned Jack- 
 son's flank and attacked his rear, up to eight o'clock 
 in the evening, before Jackson could, dy any possibility, 
 have been sufficiently reenforced ; that during the 
 whole night of the 29th, and until noon of the 30th, 
 the advance of the main army under Lee was arrivino- 
 on the field, with fresh forces even then coming from 
 the Gap. In other words. Pope claims that Lee was 
 twenty-four hours h^hmd t'lm^, m going a little over 
 nine miles ; and that there was not a rebel on the field, 
 excepting Jackson, until night, and very few then ; yet 
 we find him writing to Halleck, early the next morning, 
 August 30th: "We fought a terrific battle here yester- 
 day with the conibijted forces of the enemy, which lasted 
 with continuous fury from daylight until after dark." 
 
32 
 
 How these and many conflicting statements of 
 Pope's are to be reconciled, can be known only when 
 the Recording Angel exhibits and explains the com- 
 plicated entries which must have resulted from this 
 campaign. Pope himself declined the opportunity for 
 explanation when he was invited to testify before the 
 Board of Officers. All of those statements cannot 
 truly indicate what Pope believed. The question 
 arises, did he intend to deceive his subordinate at the 
 time, and thereby entrap him into a false movement 
 which would cover his own delinquencies in case of 
 failure, or did he afterwards intend to deceive the 
 public and the Court, and thereby secure the condem- 
 nation of that subordinate, when on trial for his life, 
 after Pope's failure was complete ? It is difficult to 
 decide which is the more charitable view to take 
 of such contradictions. I am disposed to conclude 
 that Pope really did believe what he said in his order, 
 and did not believe what he said afterwards, though 
 when he knew Longstreet had possession of the Gap 
 the night before, it is hard to see how he could sup- 
 pose that the latter would be from thirty to forty-eight 
 hours in marching fifteen miles, to Centerville. On 
 the other hand, it is almost equally hard to understand 
 how he could expect Longstreet to be from the 
 night of the 28th till the afternoon of the 29th 
 in marching nine miles to Jackson's position. It 
 is a puzzle in either view. Pope's ideas of the rebel 
 movements throughout, were so erratic, that it is doubt- 
 ful if he had at any time a clear discernment of what 
 he really did think. His was a case of "mournful 
 obstinacy in seeing things not as they were, but as he 
 thought it to his interest they should be." '"' His erro- 
 
 *Quatre Bras, Ligny and Waterloo. Dorsey Gardner. 
 
Operations of August 29th. 
 
 This map is compiled from maps contained in two works of the highest excellence and 
 interest, viz.: "The Army under Pope," by Mr. John C. Ropes, published by Charles Scribner's 
 Sons, New York, and "The Army of Virginia from Cedar Mountain to Alexandria," by 
 General George H. Gordon, published by Houghton, Osgood and Company, Poston. 
 
 My thanks are due to Mr. Ropes, General Gordon and Charles Scribner's Sons, for their 
 kindness in permitting the use of their maps. Their permission was specially given to me solely 
 for this purpose. 
 
33 
 
 neous belief certainly furnished a very bad omen for 
 the operations of that day. 
 
 Diirine the nieht of the 28th, believino- that 
 King had intercepted Jackson's retreat, Pope or- 
 dered the whole army to begin the pursuit at day- 
 light the next morning. But this pursuit seems to 
 have been by a sort of inverse movement, for he 
 ordered the commands of Hooker and Porter to 
 march to Centerville, the farthest point in the rear yet 
 reached, expecting them to fall in behind Kearney, 
 who was to advance at an earlier hour directly down 
 the turnpike. Porter was at Bristoe station where we 
 left him, and had he been ordered to march towards 
 Groveton by the Sudley Springs road, he would have 
 saved about ten miles of distance and a corresponding 
 length of time. When he received the order, about 
 six o'clock in the mornino^. it was evident to him from 
 the location of the battle of the previous night, and 
 from the cannonade already in progress that morning, 
 that the enemy were near Groveton and far from Cen- 
 terville. Though he realized the error, he obeyed 
 promptly, and had gone two miles and a half beyond 
 Manassas, when he received the usual countermand, 
 by an order, first oral and afterwards in writing, as 
 follows : 
 
 Head-quarters Army of Virginia, 
 
 Centerville, August 29, 1862. 
 Push forward with your corps and King's division, 
 which you will take with you, upon Gainesville. I am 
 following the enemy down the Warrenton turnpike. 
 Be expeditious or we will lose much. 
 
 John Pope, 
 Major-General commanding. 
 Major-General Porter. 
 
34 
 
 The reason for this order was that Pope had 
 learned early in the morning of King's retreat to 
 Manassas. He knew that the way was open for 
 Jackson's escape, and he greatly feared that the latter 
 would not stay to undergo the bagging process. 
 Accordingly, he ordered Sigel to attack the enemy 
 as soon as it was light enough to see, and if possible 
 bring him to a stand. By sending Porter with a 
 strong force in the direction of Gainesville, he hoped 
 to repair the error of abandoning that place the day 
 before. Soon after this order was issued, Pope heard 
 that Ricketts had been driven from the Gap by Long- 
 street the night before, and had retired he knew not 
 where. There was nothing, therefore, to prevent the 
 junction of the rebel forces, unless Porter could reach 
 Gainesville before that event could occur. Herein 
 Pope committed that old error, of which history fur- 
 nishes so many lamentable examples, and military 
 science such positive prohibitions, of directing con- 
 verging columns upon a point which the enemy can 
 reach first. Even before Porter received his order, 
 Longstreet's troops were marching through Gaines- 
 ville, and the junction with Jackson was virtually com- 
 plete. About nine o'clock or half-past nine. Porter 
 repassed Manassas, and pursued his march towards 
 Gainesville on the road leading past Bethlehem Church. 
 At Manassas he was joined by McDowell, and from 
 him learned the situation of the night before, and the 
 imminence of Longstreet's arrival. McDowell was 
 aggrieved that King's division had been taken from 
 him and given to Porter, and Porter was dissatisfied 
 because the orders which he received were so conflict- 
 ing, and were delivered, sometimes orally, by persons 
 
35 
 
 whom he did not know and of whose authority he 
 was not certain. The remonstrances of both officers 
 reached Pope about the same time. To satisfy both 
 he sent to them what is known as 
 
 " The Joint Order." 
 It was as follows : 
 
 Head-quarters Army of Virginia, 
 
 Centerville, August 29, 1862. 
 Generals McDowell and Porter : 
 
 You will please move forward with your joint com- 
 mands towards Gainesville. I sent General Porter 
 written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. 
 Heintzelman, Sigel and Reno are moving on the War- 
 renton Turnpike, and must now be not far from Gaines- 
 ville. I desire that as soon as communication is 
 established between this force and your own, the whole 
 command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back 
 behind Bull Run at Centerville, to-night. I presume 
 it will be so on account of our supplies. I have sent 
 no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to 
 interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's 
 troops, except what I sent by his aide-de-camp last 
 night ; which were to hold his position on the Warren- 
 ton Turnpike until the troops from here should fall 
 upon the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even 
 know Ricketts' position, as I had not been able to find 
 out where General McDowell was until a late hour this 
 morning. General McDowell will take immediate 
 steps to communicate with General Ricketts, and in- 
 struct him to rejoin the other divisions of the corps as 
 soon as practicable. 
 
 If any considerable advantages are to be gained by 
 departing from this order, it will not be strictly carried 
 out. One thing must be had in view, that the troops 
 must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull 
 Run to-night or by morning. The indications are that 
 
36 
 
 the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direc- 
 tion at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow 
 night or next day. My own head-quarters will be for 
 the present with Heintzelman's corps, or at this place. 
 
 John Pope, 
 Major-General commanding. 
 
 Porter had continued his march frOm Manassas for 
 five miles along the road to Gainesville, until, about 
 half-past eleven in the morning, he reached a small 
 stream called Dawkins Branch. There two scouts 
 were captured, who said that they were Longstreet's 
 men, and that Longstreet's corps was in Porter's front. 
 
 On the hills a little distance in advance, the ene- 
 my's skirmishers were seen, while beyond, in the road 
 in front, and on the turnpike, clouds of dust which rose 
 above the trees, indicated the presence of a large force. 
 Porter following his orders to push forward with King's 
 division upon Gainesville, prepared for action. He 
 threw out a regiment of skirmishers, deployed his lead- 
 ing division in line of battle, and sent Butterfield's 
 brigade across the stream, to occupy a commanding 
 hill. The skirmishers were exchancrinc: a few shots 
 with the enemy, when about noon an officer arrived 
 with the Joint Order. Shortly afterwards McDowell, 
 who had accompanied the column from Manassas, rode 
 to the front and showed to Porter his copy of the order. 
 Before the receipt of that order, there is little doubt 
 that McDowell had no authority over Porter, and he 
 exercised none; after its receipt, it is certain that he, 
 as the ranking officer, was entitled to command the 
 whole force, while he remained with it. The condi- 
 tions were precisely those contemplated by the (old) 
 62d Article of War. . This was understood and 
 accepted by both. McDowell saw the preparations 
 
37 
 
 for attack, and heard the shots of the skirmishers. 
 Almost the first thing said by him was, " Porter, this 
 is no place to fight a battle ; you are too far out already. 
 Put your troops back into the woods," or words to that 
 effect. In consequence of these suggestions, which 
 were in reality orders. Porter suspended his prepara- 
 tions for attack. McDowell showed him a dispatch 
 just received from General Buford, stating that seven- 
 teen regiments, one battery and 500 cavalry had passed 
 through Gainesville at a quarter before nine o'clock 
 that morning. Ihis they knew of course was a part 
 of Long-street's corps which had driven Ricketts from 
 the Gap the night before, and they also knew that the 
 rest of his command would be closely following. The 
 appearances in their tront, the capture of the scouts 
 and the dispatch of Buford indicated, unmistakably, 
 that Longstreet's force was before them, and that the 
 rebel army was united. 
 
 They discussed the Joint Order, especially the 
 requirement imperatively repeated, that they should 
 be in a position from which they could reach Bull 
 Run that night or the next morning. It was doubt- 
 less that requirement which McDowell had in mind, 
 when he said, "You are too far out already;" that 
 is, too far from the rest of the army, and the point 
 of concentration behind Bull Run. They were then, 
 at noon, eight miles from Bull Run, and the troops 
 were in a condition borderingf on starvation. 
 
 An advance was evidently impossible without 
 fighting a battle, and a battle, especially against Long- 
 street's corps, was forbidden by the tenor of the 
 Joint Order ; for besides the necessity of supplies, it 
 was the expected arrival of his force, that was given 
 
38 
 
 as a reason for the imperative injunction to retire. 
 McDowell and Porter rode over to the right to see if 
 • they could not, by a flank march across the country, 
 establish the communication directed by the order. 
 This was found to be impracticable, and it was finally 
 agreed that the best way to carry out the purpose of 
 the order, under the discretion allowed by it, was for 
 McDowell to take King's division of 8,000 men, march 
 up the Sudley Springs road, directing Ricketts to 
 follow, and thereby form a connection with the other 
 corps. Almost immediately McDowell started. 
 
 It is certain that McDowell gave up the idea of 
 Porter's further advance, or of his figfhtinof in that 
 place, as soon as he decided to take King and Ricketts 
 away ; for he remarked to General Patrick, soon after- 
 wards, "Porter has gone as far as he can go;" and 
 McDowell certainly would not have withdrawn 15,000 
 men, to go he knew not where, at the very moment 
 when he expected an attack to be made by the remain- 
 ing 10,000. 
 
 It is manifest, and McDowell testifies, that up to 
 the time when he left, which was shortly after twelve 
 o'clock, everything was done by the joint force that 
 should have been done. If not, then the fault was 
 McDowell's and not Porter's. After the receipt of the 
 Joint Order, Porter was a subordinate, and could do 
 nothing without McDowell's consent. It was for Mc- 
 Dowell to say whether there should be a halt, or an 
 attack, or, as he finally decided, a separation of their 
 forces. If he had wished to attack, he had immedi- 
 ately in hand 17,000 or 18,000 men, and by ordering 
 up Ricketts, could have controlled a force of 25,000. 
 They were tired and hungry to be sure, but still 
 
39 
 
 effective. If an attack was to be made at all, it 
 should have been made with all the force available, 
 and McDowell was too experienced a soldier to think 
 otherwise. He is in no wise to blame for not making 
 an attack. Under the injunctions of the Joint Order 
 and the evident necessities of the army, as he said, it 
 was no place to fight a battle. An isolated engage- 
 ment, even with 25,000 men, without communication 
 and without supports, against a presumably superior 
 and actually equal force of the enemy, on their own 
 ground and with full facility of concentration, would 
 have been a hazardous and reckless undertaking. 
 Such a rash venture was not warranted, either by 
 sound military principles or by the terms of the Joint 
 Order. The order was to effect communication, then 
 halt, and afterwards retire. 
 
 Even the discretion allowed was limited by the 
 one consideration which was to be steadily kept in 
 view, viz. : the necessity of retiring behind Bull Run, 
 because the enemy who then actually confronted 
 them, was slowly coming ! The order implied that, 
 if they were to fight at all, especially against Lee's 
 united army, the battle should be behind Bull Run. 
 The rules of the military art dictated the same thing. 
 Pope has testified that he did not desire to pursue 
 Jackson, even if alone, farther than Gainesville, on 
 account of the necessity of retiring for supplies. It 
 must be admitted that an order to march until commu- 
 nication is established, then to halt, and afterwards 7'e- 
 treat, is not of such an inspiriting character that, like 
 Colonel Hamilton's speech at Yorktown, it would lead 
 a man to " sto7'-m Hell" in response to it! 
 
40 
 
 McDowell wisely refrained from battle then and 
 there, and properly decided to use the discretion al- 
 lowed by the letter of the order, to carry out its spirit. 
 He took the divisions of Ricketts and Kino-, and went 
 to seek the communication which could not otherwise 
 be had. 
 
 Porter was convicted of disobeying the Joint Order. 
 But in what did that disobedience consist ? His actions 
 are well known, and the order speaks for itself. There 
 can not be pointed out one particular in which he diso- 
 beyed it. He was directed to march towards Gaines- 
 ville, and he did so, as far as he could go. He could 
 not go far enough to effect the communication with the 
 other corps, because the enemy stopped him ; and for 
 a similar reason the other corps could not reach the 
 place where they were expected to be. This Porter 
 knew, by the cannonade that he could hear east of 
 Groveton, by Buford's dispatch, and by the dust on the 
 turnpike. Therefore, if by any means he had gone all 
 the way to Gainesville, he would not have accomplished 
 what the order intended ; for the other corps were four 
 miles and more from Gainesville, and never got any 
 nearer. He did not fight it is true, but a direction to 
 fight can not be wrung from the terms of the Joint Or- 
 der; nor can any meaning be derived from it, even from 
 the discretionary part, which does not discountenance 
 a battle in front of Bull Run. So it appeared to 
 McDowell, when he had control of a force of 25,000 
 men. When he declined to fight with that force, and 
 took it away, as he had a right to do, if he saw fit. it 
 was certainly not Porter's duty to fight alone, nor would 
 he have been justified in doing so. If the Joint Order 
 
41 
 
 did not command McDowell to fight, it did not com- 
 mand Porter to fight. As he disobeyed it in no other 
 respect, it may be asked, upon what ground then did 
 the Court-martial condemn him ? We are obliofed to 
 rely upon conjecture for the answer, just as the Court 
 'relied upon it for the facts ; and the only rational 
 theory that we can frame to account for so strange a 
 conclusion, is, that it was the result of the same kind 
 of judicial jugglery that could exhibit the fact of a re- 
 treat when there was no retreat. 
 
 It seems there was something said by McDowell 
 which was erroneously construed into an order to fight. 
 It made no difference that the remark with its atten- 
 dant circumstances was not susceptible of such a 
 construction ; that it was not understood by Porter, 
 and would not have been binding upon him if it had 
 been understood; that it would have been ill-judged if 
 it meant what it was supposed to mean ; or that it 
 came from McDowell when Porter was charged with 
 disobedience of Pope. All this was ignored. There 
 was a supposed order to fight, and Porter did not 
 fight ; so, because it was erroneously supposed that he 
 disobeyed McDowell's order, he was convicted of dis- 
 obeying Pope's order. That is certainly the most 
 charitable theory by which to account for the verdict. 
 If that was not the reason for it, then, like the finding 
 in respect to the retreat, there was no reason for it. 
 
 There is considerable dispute as to what directions 
 McDowell gave Porter when he decided to go away. 
 McDowell admits that they were vague, and does not 
 fully recollect what conversation he had with Porter. 
 He thinks he said to Porter : "You put your force in 
 here, and I will take mine up the Sudley Springs road, 
 
42 
 
 on the left of the troops engaged at that point with the 
 enemy," or something to that effect. This, Porter has 
 always denied ; and it is in evidence that, as McDowell 
 rode away, Porter called to him : "What shall I do ?" 
 To this McDowell made no response, except by a 
 wave of the hand, and Porter saw him no more that 
 day. Whatever McDowell said was evidently noi 
 understood by Porter ; and it would not be material 
 now, if it had not apparently formed the ground of the 
 very false conclusion by the Court-martial. 
 
 No arcrument is needed to show the inexcusable 
 nature of a verdict based upon such a total variance 
 between the allegation and the proof McDowell's 
 remark, however it may be interpreted, was not an 
 order which was binding upon Porter, after McDowell 
 left him ; more especially, if it w-as opposed to the 
 spirit of the order of their common superior. General 
 Pope. Even if Porter heard the remark, he could not 
 properly derive from it, the meaning ascribed to it by 
 the Court. He could not suppose that McDowell 
 meant for him to attack, then and there, with 10,000 
 men or less, when McDowell was withdrawing 15,000 
 troops to go he knew not how far away. McDowell 
 W'as too dood a soldier to order an attack in that man- 
 ner, and Porter was too good a soldier to suppose that 
 he would be expected to attack unknown numbers in 
 that manner. If McDowell made that remark, "you 
 put your force in here;" Porter could only understand, 
 under the circumstances, what McDowell doubtless 
 intended to be understood, that the expression referred 
 to place and not to time or manner. It meant, not, 
 put your force in now, but zvhen you put your force in, 
 do so here. It meant, not, fight a battle alone, with a 
 
43 
 
 diminished force and without communication, but, you 
 remain here for future operations, while I go to estab- 
 lish the communication directed by the order. This 
 view is borne out by McDowell's testimony, where he 
 says : '" I did not venture to do anything more than 
 indicate the place where I thought he was to apply 
 that force ;" and that a skirmish line, if it was accord- 
 ing to Porter's discretion, would have fulfilled the 
 order. It is evident the order meant nothing more 
 than for Porter to stay where he was. In this view, 
 and in this only, the remark in question is consistent 
 with the other expressions which McDowell is shown 
 to have used about the same time, that this was too 
 far out, and " no place to fight a battle," (as they were 
 then situated), and again, " Say to him (General Porter) 
 that I am going to the right, and will take General 
 King with me. I think he had better remain where 
 he is, but if it is necessary for him to fall back, he 
 can do so upon my left." Can it be supposed that 
 McDowell would order an immediate attack with 
 10,000 men, when he thought it was too far out, and 
 no place to fight in, with 25,000 men ? 
 
 When McDowell declined to make an attack in 
 that position with 25,000 men, and took away 15,000 
 of them into the wilderness. Porter supposed, as it was 
 reasonable to suppose, that he did so for the purpose 
 of bringing the whole army into communication, in ac- 
 cordance with the intent of the Joint Order, and with 
 sound military judgment. Porter did not and could not 
 suppose, that he was expected to attack, or would be 
 justified in attacking, before that communication was 
 established, and McDowell was in a position to co- 
 operate with him. As war is not a conjectural science. 
 
44 
 
 he was rieht in waitino- until he knezu whether that co- 
 operation was assured or not. In fact, he heard no 
 more from McDowell until night, and during all the 
 afternoon he was left to his own resources and the 
 guidance of his own judgment. 
 
 McDowell's suggestions, whether they were, to 
 fight, or not to fight, did not add to, or diminish 
 Porter's responsibility, after McDowell left him. Nor 
 did they afford him any guidance, except to influence 
 him to remain where he was, and await further knowl- 
 edee of McDowell's movements. 
 
 It was Porter's duty to act for himself according to 
 the best light that he could obtain from the orders be- 
 fore him, and from sound military principles. 
 
 We have seen that when Porter commanded King's 
 division, in addition to his own, and was acting upon 
 his own responsibility, under orders to march to Gaines- 
 ville, he prepared to fight his way there. He desisted 
 from attack, only when he was superseded by Mc- 
 Dowell, under orders which discountenanced a battle; 
 and was actually directed by him, not to fight. If a 
 battle was to be fought by virtue of the discretion 
 allowed, it was McDowell's duty to fight it, and not 
 Porter's, after McDowell left him. When McDowell, 
 for good reason, declined to fight then and there, Por- 
 ter, with a greatly diminished force, was certainly ab- 
 solved from fighting. 
 
 W^e conclude, therefore, that Porter did not violate 
 any order, Pope's or McDowell's, in not fighting. But 
 when his orders failed to provide for the emergency 
 and he was left to his own discretion, did he err in the 
 exercise of it? I think not, in any particular, but if 
 opinions differ upon that point, I would suggest one 
 
45 
 
 consideration which will go far to extenuate the error. 
 It is, that distrust of the commander is a very impor- 
 tant factor, in estimating the elements which go to 
 make up the judgment of a subordinate. How can 
 the subordinate intelligently exercise his discretion to 
 carry out the plan of his commander, when he has 
 good reason to think that the commander, himself, 
 has no intelligent plan? 
 
 The mistakes in fact, not to mention the numer- 
 ous errors in principle, which were manifest to Porter 
 during the 28th and 29th of August, were so numerous 
 and so glaring, that they would have destroyed all con- 
 fidence in Pope's judgment, even if Pope's ridiculous 
 proclamation upon taking command, and the contra- 
 dictory orders and futile marches for a week past, had 
 not already shaken the faith of the whole army. 
 First, was the urgent night summons to Bristoe, which 
 proved useless, and which was a part of a false move- 
 ment ; next, the order to march to Centerville, when 
 Porter knew there was no enemy near there, and the 
 route would take him far from his proper direction ; 
 then, the information that, by Pope's orders, Gaines- 
 ville had been abandoned, and the way was open for 
 the junction of the rebel forces ; then, the counter- 
 mand of the first order of the morning, which order 
 was far advanced towards fulfillment, and the direction 
 to Porter to retrace his steps for a considerable dis- 
 tance, and march towards Gainesville ; then, the errors 
 of fact and of judgment which were contained in the 
 Joint Order. These were : 
 
 First. The statment that the corps of Heintzel- 
 man, Sigel and Reno were near Gainesville, about ten 
 o'clock when the order was written, whereas Porter 
 knew that those corps were not near Gainesville at 
 
46 
 
 twelve o'clock, and, by reason of Longstreet's arrival, 
 were not likely to be there at all. 
 
 Second. The statement, in effect, that Longstreet's 
 force would require from thirty to forty-eight hours to 
 march fifteen miles, which Porter would have known 
 was absurd, even if Longstre.et had not then been ac- 
 tually before him. This was such an astounding error 
 on the part of Pope, that it is unaccountable even to 
 this day. 
 
 The knowledge that four such mistakes were 
 made in one morning (and more were to come in the 
 afternoon), following two of the day before, was enough 
 to puzzle any officer as to his present duty and the 
 plans of his commander. It was impossible for him, 
 with the best intentions, to know what would subserve 
 the purposes of a commander, whose plans were formed 
 wath so little reference to existing facts. 
 
 The reasons which induced McDowell to forego an 
 attack with 25,000 men were all the more cogent, indeed 
 were irresistible to Porter, when by McDowell's with- 
 drawal, his force was reduced to 10,000 men or less. In 
 his difficult position he could consider four courses ot 
 action : 
 
 First. To attack the enemy in his front. 
 
 Second. To make a flank march to the right in 
 order to reach the other corps. 
 
 Third. To retreat. 
 
 Foui'th. To remain on the defensive where he was. 
 
 We have seen the reasons which he had for not 
 attacking. The woods concealed the enemy's force to 
 a great extent, but Porter's previous knowledge of the 
 presence of a large part, if not the whole, ot Long- 
 street's corps, was confirmed during the afternoon, by 
 frequent reports from officers on the skirmish line. 
 
47 
 
 They saw large bodies of troops, and could hear their 
 movements and the commands of officers. Lieutenant 
 Stevenson estimated that he saw 12,000 to 15,000 men 
 in the enemy's lines, and we know now that he was 
 right. Colonel Marshall said that the enemy's force 
 was double that of Porter's. He saw heavy columns 
 moving into position. For Porter to have attacked 
 without McDowell's co-operation, forces of the enemy 
 presumably and actually superior in numbers to his 
 own, and advantageously posted, ought to have re- 
 sulted, and undoubtedly would have resulted, in over- 
 whelming defeat. He might, perhaps, have made an 
 attack to see what would come of it, but that would have 
 been anticipating the dreadful errors of Fredericksburg, 
 Spottsylvania Court-house and Cold Harbor. If he 
 began the attack, he could not predict where it was 
 likely to end, or whether or not he would be in a posi- 
 tion to retire behind Bull Run that night, as his orders 
 and the famished condition of his men alike dictated. 
 To fight without communication, and so place himself 
 that he could not retire behind Bull Run, when he had 
 been ordered to halt with communication, so that he 
 could retire behind Bull Run, to fight there if anywhere, 
 would have been as flagrant and criminal a violation of 
 orders, as anything that has been alleged against him. 
 That his judgment as to the inexpediency of an 
 attack was correct, is confirmed by the concurrent 
 ooinions of the most distino-uished rebel officers. 
 General Lee says, in a letter to Porter, in 1867 : "The 
 result of an attack before 12 m., with 25,000 men, 
 cannot be certainly pronounced ; but it ought to have 
 been repulsed if made after his (Longstreet's) troops 
 were formed. The probable result of an attack on 
 
48 
 
 Long-street, after 12 m., with less than 12,000, would 
 have been a repulse." And again, in 1870: "If a 
 repulse, especially at an early hour, or before 5 p. m., 
 the effect woyld have been an attack upon General 
 Pope's left and rear by Longstreet and Stuart, which, 
 if successful, would have resulted in the relief of Jack- 
 son, and have probably rendered unnecessary the 
 battle of the next day" (August 30th). 
 
 General Longstreet, in a letter to Porter, in 1866, 
 says: "We all were particularly anxious to bring on 
 the battle after 12 m.. General Lee more so than 
 the rest. If you had attacked anytime after 12 m., 
 it seems to me that we surely would have destroyed 
 your army ; — that is, if you had attacked with less than 
 25,000 men." 
 
 We have had considerable experience in attacking 
 Lee in his chosen positions, and it has invariably illus- 
 trated the maxims of Napoleon, "Not to do anything 
 which your enemy wishes," '" '■ "" and, " Avoid 
 a field of battle which he has reconnoitered and 
 studied." 
 
 General Hood writes to Porter in 1874 "* '" '" '" 
 An attack made by you, with about 11,000, it seems 
 to me, would have been attended by a repulse, and 
 perhaps great disaster, had time permitted it to have 
 been followed up." 
 
 General Wilcox, in 1870, writes : " I should think 
 it almost certain, had you attacked at 1 1 a. m., with 
 your command such as I supposed it to have been, 
 you would have been repulsed. Had you attacked 
 any time after 2 p. m., I have no doubt you would 
 have been easily and thoroughly repulsed, and had it 
 have been at or near two o'clock, you would have 
 
49 
 
 been used up, and those on your right might have, 
 and probably would have, been overwhelmed, too." 
 
 General B. H. Robertson writes, in 1870, " "''" * 
 ''" '"' I should say an attack with 25,000 men would 
 have failed. After 1 2 o'clock and throughout the day, 
 I believe an attack with 10,000 men would have been 
 utterly disastrous to the Federal forces." 
 
 At one time, late in the day. Porter actually began 
 making preparations for an attack in aid of Sigel, and 
 " that," the Board of Officers say, " was the nearest to 
 making a mistake that Porter came that afternoon." 
 
 We need no further authority for the conclusion that 
 his decision not to attack the forces in his front was a 
 wise one. What he had reason to believe, and did 
 believe, at the time, we now prove to have been the 
 truth. 
 
 Porter could not make a flank march across the 
 country to go to Pope's assistance or effect communi- 
 cation with the other corps, because the distance was 
 two miles, there were no roads, the ground was broken 
 and rocky, very heavily timbered, abounding in hills 
 and hollows and wooded ravines, intersected by many 
 streams, and wholly impracticable for artillery. The 
 only open country was along the front of the rebel 
 lines, exposed to the full fire of their batteries, and 
 attack by their troops. The moment Porter left his 
 position to make the flank march, his column would be 
 helplessly exposed to attack in fiank and rear, which 
 the rebel General Robertson says, would have been 
 " perfectly ruinous." General Longstreet testifies that 
 such a movement would have given his forces just the 
 opportunity they were waiting for, " and we should 
 have pushed it with all the vigor that was in us." 
 
50 
 
 Napoleon says: "Nothing is more rash, or more 
 opposed to the principles of war, than a flank march 
 in presence of an army in position, especially when 
 that army occupies heights, at the foot of which you 
 must defile." 
 
 Porter could not retire and take the Sudley Springs 
 road which McDowell had taken, because that was 
 filled with McDowell's troops, King's and Ricketts' 
 divisions, 15,000 men, marching up all the afternoon. 
 Besides, Porter's remaining in position was undoubt- 
 edly what made that road safe for McDowell's march. 
 
 Porter could not retreat entirely, in the face of a 
 vio-ilant and numerous foe, for that would have been 
 to invite destruction for himself and McDowell, as well 
 as for the rest of Pope's army. Besides, he cannot be 
 blamed for not retreating, for it was one of the charges 
 aoainst him, that he did retreat, and it was a capital 
 offense, and the Court-martial found him guilty of it, 
 although there w^as not a word of truth in it. It is 
 difficult to see what they would have found if it had 
 been really true ; but he saved them from that embar- 
 rassment, by not retreating at all. 
 
 He finally decided to remain where he was until 
 he could receive further intelligence or instructions. 
 He prepared for a plucky and obstinate defense, in the 
 strong position which he held. There he remained 
 until the next morning, when he was ordered away by 
 Pope. During the afternoon, he sent two written 
 messages to Pope (neither of which would Pope pro- 
 duce), stating his situation ; and at least four such 
 messages to McDowell or Pope, whichever could be 
 first found ; but McDowell, not being where it was 
 expected he would be, could not readily be found, and 
 was finally reached when he was with Pope. 
 
hi 
 
 Porter could not have known that a severe action 
 of great consequence was being fought, and that his 
 aid was greatly needed, or believed that General 
 Pope's troops were being defeated; because there was 
 no such action, and nothing^ to p-ive rise to such a 
 belief. There was no time in the afternoon, after 
 Porter reached his position, when more than 5,000 
 troops were engaged at once. With the exception 
 of an attack by a brigade or two, there was nothing 
 but cannonading, which the army had heard all the 
 way from the Rappahannock, to indicate that any 
 enemy was in their vicinity. At the very time 
 when, according to Pope's opinion. Porter ought to 
 have attacked, Pope himself rode upon the field and 
 stopped the fighting. It was not until nearly night, 
 too late to effect anything, that any musketry firing 
 was heard in Porter's position. 
 
 Porter could not see the field of battle at the right, 
 on account of the intervening woods and hills, nor 
 could he hear anything but the artillery firing, which, 
 as General Morell said, did not sound like a battle. 
 Therefore Porter did not believe that Pope's army 
 was being defeated, nor that the aid of his corps was 
 was greatly needed. 
 
 There was no such thing as a general engagement, 
 or a '' battle raging at the right," that day, despite 
 Pope's assertion that he fought a "terrific battle with 
 the combined forces of the enemy, which lasted with 
 contimwiis fury ixoxw daylight until after dark." Pope's 
 attacks were so weak and ill-supported that they could 
 not possibly have been successful. General Schurz 
 says in his report : " The troops were frittered away 
 in isolated efforts." 
 
52 
 
 Porter could do little after McDowell left him, but 
 what he did, was a service which Pope would never 
 acknowledge, but for which he ought to have been 
 profoundly grateful. Porter detained in his front the 
 greater part ot Longstreet's corps, to hold him in 
 check ; and prevented the concentration upon Pope's 
 left, which caused the defeat of the next day. We 
 have General Lee's authority for saying that, but for 
 Porter's presence, the terrible disaster which happened 
 on the 30th of August, would have occurred on the 
 29th. If so, it would have been fatal to Pope's army, 
 for night was all that saved the Federals on the 30th ; 
 and the attack if made the day before, would have 
 begun much earlier, and Pope would have been a 
 day's march farther from his reenforcements. 
 
 Chantilly would have been unnecessary, and Antie- 
 tam perhaps impossible. 
 
 But nothing could save Pope. The operations of 
 his mind, and the disposition of his forces, were alike 
 so faulty, that his defeat was merely a question of time. 
 
 His ideas and, unfortunately, many of his state- 
 ments were too little in harmony with the environ- 
 ment. 
 
 The Time of Longstreet's Arrival. 
 
 The time of Longstreet's arrival upon the field, 
 on the 29th of August, is now so conclusively settled 
 that it seems curious it should ever have been a 
 matter of dispute. Yet all the enemies of Porter 
 have strenuously denied that Longstreet's corps, or 
 any large force of the enemy was before him that day; 
 and Pope has defended that false position with all 
 the heaviest artillery of misrepresentation. 
 
53 
 
 Porter claimed before the Court-martial, and proved 
 the fact beyond a reasonable doubt to any body of men 
 who were not seeking an excuse for condemning him, 
 that the large part of the rebel army, known as Long- 
 street's corps, was confronting him. This question is 
 the one upon which any estimate of Porter's conduct 
 must chiefly depend. Porter had good reason at the 
 time to believe that Longstreet was before him ; he 
 did believe so, in common with all his officers who had 
 opportunity for observation; McDowell believed so; 
 every one who knew anything about it believed so, 
 except Pope, and he professes not to believe it to this 
 day. If Longstreet actually mas present, then are 
 both the judgment and conduct of Porter justified ; 
 for in that case, all of Pope's plans and orders were so 
 at variance with existing facts, that literal obedience 
 was impossible, and discretion could rest only upon 
 general military knowledge. 
 
 The question is settled, 
 
 First. By the probabilities of the case. 
 
 Second. By direct and overwhelming testimony. 
 
 The Probabilities. 
 
 We know, as Porter and Pope knew, that Lee, 
 with Longstreet's corps, reached Thoroughfare Gap 
 soon after noon of August 28th. A part of his force 
 had passed the Gap, and was driven back by the 
 advance of Ricketts. It may be supposed that Lee 
 was anxious to reach Jackson, knowing that the small 
 force of the latter was exposed to the whole Federal 
 army. He took measures at once, to dislodge 
 Ricketts, which he soon succeeded in doing. At least 
 
54 
 
 three of his divisions encamped that night on the east 
 side of the Gap. From the Gap to Gainesville is six 
 miles and a half; from Gainesville to the extremity of 
 Jackson's line, was about three miles, and from Gaines- 
 ville to Dawkins Branch, where Porter stopped, was 
 about three miles, with a good road all the way, 
 Lee's line was about a mile in front of Porter, so that, 
 from daylight, Lee would have about seven hours and 
 a half in which to march eight miles and a half, and 
 arrive at his position near Dawkins Branch, at the 
 same time as Porter. At daylight was heard the 
 engagement of Sigel's corps with Jackson, and it is 
 certain that officers and men of Lee's force would not 
 be slow in marching towards the sound of the cannon. 
 With no reason for delay, and every reason for speed, 
 it would be incredible if Lee did not reach his position 
 in much less time than what we have allowed him. 
 We know that he did arrive there in ample time, by 
 
 Direct and Overwhelming Testimony. 
 
 Longstreet says, in his report : " The march was 
 quickened to the extent of our capacity." He testifies 
 that they moved in the gray of the morning, about four 
 o'clock. After hearing the artillery, they increased 
 their speed to three miles an hour. General Wilcox 
 started at sunrise from Hopewell Gap, and moved 
 rapidly — "too rapidly." He reached the junction of 
 the roads, and found Longstreet's troops going by. 
 Major Williams, aide-de-camp to General Jones, testi- 
 fies that they made the march "as rapidly as it could 
 be made." General Buford saw what he estimated to 
 be over 14,000 men (more than half of Longstreet's 
 force then present), go through Gainesville, at a quar- 
 
55 
 
 ter before nine o'clock. So much for the rapidity of 
 the march. 
 
 As to the time of arrival — besides the indirect evi- 
 dence derived from the citations which we have given 
 before in reference to an attack — General Lee says : 
 " Longstreet's command arrived within supporting 
 distance of Jackson on 29th August, '62, between 9 
 and 10 A. M. General Longstreet's command was 
 formed by 12 m., August 29th, in two lines on Jack- 
 son's right." And again : " I was there then ; I saw 
 Porter approach. I went out and reconnoitered his 
 corps, and made proper dispositions to meet it." 
 
 General Longstreet says : " My command (25,000 
 in round numbers) was within supporting distance of 
 General Jackon at 9 a. m., August 29th, having passed 
 Thoroughfare Gap at early dawn. My command was 
 deployed in double line for attack between 10 a. m. 
 and 12 M. on the twenty-ninth, extending from 
 Jackson's right across turnpike and Manassas Gap R. 
 R. My command was ready to receive any attack 
 after 11 o'clock a. m." He testifies before the Board 
 of Officers : "I think they had been deployed by 
 eleven o'clock in the day." 
 
 In addition to that convincing testimony, we have 
 the statements, either in reports, letters, or testimony, 
 of the rebel Generals Robertson, D. R. Jones, Early, 
 Hood, Wilcox, Colonel Marshall, aide-de-camp of 
 General Lee, Major Williams, aide-de-camp of General 
 Jones, and Lieutenant W. M. Owen, Adjutant of the 
 Washington Artillery, all to the eff'ect that the arrival 
 and formation of Longstreet's corps occurred between 
 10 and 12 o'clock that morning. General Beverly 
 Robertson says : " My videttes had reported your 
 
56 
 
 (Porter's) approach, and Longstreet's forces to meet 
 yours were mainly posted before your arrival. Had 
 you continued your march, or attacked at any time, 
 you would have struck Longstreet's line of battle, over 
 25,000 strong." It is idle to say that the fallibility of 
 human memory discredits witnesses so intelligent, so 
 numerous, and so reputable, whose testimony is positive 
 and harmonious. The event which those officers 
 describe was one in which they personally took part ; 
 it was of great importance, and therefore likely to fix 
 the attention; the hour of noon is one which naturally 
 attracts notice ; the start trom the Gap at sunrise, within 
 hearing of the distant cannonade, gave them a definite 
 point from which to estimate time and distance ; and 
 further, the memory could be refreshed, if doubtful, by 
 reference to their own contemporaneous orders, reports, 
 and memoranda. Buford saw half of Longstreet's 
 force, before nine o'clock, zoithin three miles of the 
 position afterwards taken by Porter. Why should 
 not that half have arrived within one mile of that posi- 
 tion by half-past eleven, and why should not that part 
 have been followed by the rest ? We know with all 
 the certainty which can exist in human affairs that 
 Longstreet's force was present just as Porter believed 
 and alleged that it was. 
 
 It is absurd to attempt to combat such evidence, 
 by other evidence equally depending upon the fallibil- 
 ity of memory, and based upon Stuart's vainglorious 
 report, or any other work of fiction. Stuart's report 
 was written six months after the events it erroneously 
 describes. From that report, one would judge Stuart's 
 movements to have been very important ; whereas in 
 fact, his whole conduct on the fielci was that of a busy- 
 
57 
 
 body. He did little useful service ; but by ordering 
 troops away from places where they were needed, and 
 into places where they were not needed, he nearly 
 marred the plans of his superiors. He and Rosser 
 may have amused themselves by ordering their com- 
 mand to tie brush to their horses' tails, and drag it 
 along the road, in order to raise a dust — as a story, 
 " that is magnificent, but it is not war" — but whether 
 they did so or not, they did not deceive anybody, for 
 Lonestreet was there, and there was nothing for any- 
 body to be deceived about. Other enemies of Porter, 
 with less candor in the avowal and more harm in the 
 result, have been ever since " raising a dust" to con- 
 ceal the true time of Longstreet's arrival. 
 
 But as they are consciously weak in their theory of 
 time, they endeavor to bolster their hopeless cause by 
 another theory in respect to place. They plead a con- 
 fession and avoidance. They maintain, that even if 
 Lonostreet did arrive anywhere near the time when 
 die thinks he did, his troops were not placed where he 
 and Lee and other prominent officers think they were. 
 They try to prove by the testimony of citizens and 
 chaplains, that the rebel lines were west of Page Land 
 Lane, a mile or more back of their actual position. 
 That, when those lines were arranged by Lee in per- 
 son, with special reference to Porter's presence, 
 they were not placed where they could do Porter any 
 harm, or interfere at all with his movements. We 
 have neitlier time nor space in which to argue against 
 such " preposterous conclusions." Nor is it necessary. 
 Lee with Longstreet was in Porter's front, whether 
 near this or that citizen's house, is not material ; he 
 reached his position before Porter came up ; he had 
 
58 
 
 the choice of the country, and doubtless took the 
 Dosition he wanted to take ; he arranged his Hues in 
 person, with special reference to Porter. I have 
 sufficient faith in Lee's military judgment, to believe, 
 that the position chosen was the most commanding 
 and best for all purposes, which the vicinity afforded ; 
 that when Lee saw Porter approach, and disposed his 
 troops to meet him, those troops were placed where 
 they would be most effective. 
 
 Lee, Longstreet, and others identify on maps the 
 place where they were, and describe the formation of 
 their lines. Their opinions substantially agree with Por- 
 ter's. Colonel Marshall, Lee's chief-of-staff, found and 
 identified the position of the troops he visited, and the 
 tree which he climbed near Lee's head-quarters ; and 
 if Lee's statement of the position of his line is not 
 correct, and Marshall is worthy of belief, Lee's head- 
 quarters must have been far in advance of his first line. 
 
 General Lee personally arranged his lines ; and 
 when he says that he saw Porter approach, and made, 
 dispositions to meet him, I believe it ; and I should 
 believe that Lee knew what he saw, and knew where 
 his troops were placed, and that they were most 
 advantageously posted, if all the citizens in the county 
 and all the chaplains in the Confederacy should gain- 
 say it. Besides, we know where Porter was, and we 
 know from the testimony of his officers, that the woods 
 in front of them were full of hostile skirmishers ; and 
 large bodies oi troops, estimated at from 12,000 to 
 15,000, were seen on the hills beyond. Heroic men 
 crawled tow^ards the rebel lines, where discovery was 
 death, and heard the movement of troops, and the 
 commands of officers. 
 
59 
 
 We have seen that Porter had good reason to 
 beUeve that Longstreet was before him in strong force; 
 he did believe so, and it was the truth. The contin- 
 o-ency was not provided for by his orders. He was in 
 a difficult and dangerous situation, and had nothing to 
 guide him but his own judgment and military knowl- 
 edo-e. These he used, as we now know, loyally and 
 wisely. He remained on the defensive during the 
 afternoon, with little molestation. His conduct thus 
 far was neither "disobedient," nor "shameful." 
 
 But at night a new difficulty arose from the receipt 
 of what is known as 
 
 The "4.30 p. M. Order." 
 
 The order reads as follows : 
 
 Head-quarters in the Field, 
 
 August 29, 1862, (4.30 p. m). 
 
 Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's 
 rio-ht flank. I desire you to push forward into action 
 at once on the enemy's flank, and if possible, on his 
 rear, keeping your right in communication with Gen- 
 eral Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in 
 front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you 
 engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves, and use 
 your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the 
 time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to 
 your right and rear, so as to keep you in close com- 
 munication with the right wing. 
 
 John Pope, 
 Major-General commanding. 
 
 Major-General Porter. 
 
60 
 
 This order, even if it had been possible of execu- 
 tion at all, was not delivered to Porter until sundown, 
 too late to execute it. Five witnesses of unimpeachable 
 character, before the Court-martial, swore positively to 
 this fact. The Court chose to believe the conjectures 
 of Douglas Pope, in preference to the convincing tes- 
 timony of the opposing witnesses. I will not charac- 
 terize Captain Pope's testimony, or that of his orderly. 
 It bears its refutation upon its face, and subsequent 
 disclosures in the record, conclusively establish its 
 character. 
 
 The flank and rear which Pope intended should 
 be attacked, were of course Jackson's. But therein 
 he added another to the many errors of that day. 
 Porter's line of march did not bring him in upon the 
 enemy's flank, either right or left. It brought him 
 directly upon Longstreet's front, where 25,000 men 
 were ready to receive him. Jackson's flank was three 
 miles away from him, across an impracticable countr\', 
 and the only way to reach it would have been either 
 by a flank march along the whole length of Long- 
 street's line, or by the defeat of his overwhelming 
 forces. This at sunset, with 10,000 men against 25,000, 
 ^ would have been a sufficiently serious undertaking. 
 
 The next mistake on the part of Pope, was the direc- 
 tion to Porter to keep his right in communication with 
 Reynolds. The latter was at least two miles from Por- 
 ter, with the same impassable country between them. 
 Porter could not connect with Reynolds, and there was 
 no flank or rear of any enemy that could be attacked. 
 Longstreet outflanked Porter, and Jackson was too far 
 off and too well defended. 
 
61 
 
 On this point General Lee says : " Porter could 
 not take Jackson in flank while he was attacked in 
 front. He could do nothino- of that sort ''' ''' '" '" 
 We flanked him. He could not flank Jackson. I 
 suppose we should have cut Poriei'- to pieces if he had 
 attacked to get at Jacksonsjlanky 
 
 Porter was convicted for not attacking in front, 
 under an order to attack in flank. The order was not 
 received in time for any thing; but because the Court 
 erroneously supposed that it was received in time to 
 attack the enemy directly in front, it therefore con- 
 cluded that Porter was guilty for not attacking an 
 enemy three miles away in flank. By such contradic- 
 tions did the Court seek to appease popular passion, 
 and propitiate the Powers that be. 
 
 To have reached Jackson's flank as intended by the 
 order, and prepared tor action, would have required at 
 least two hours, even it no enemy had been opposing. 
 The whole order was a mistake, and Porter knew it 
 then, as well as we know it now. 
 
 However, late as it was, he sent to Morell the 
 order to attack, and himself rode to the front to direct 
 the movement. All the officers there, who had been 
 watching the enemy during the whole afternoon, Morell 
 included, remonstrated against the attack. Even that 
 gallant veteran, Colonel Marshall, who had risked his 
 life that day by crawling close up to the rebel pickets 
 who was wounded almost to death at Fredericksburg, 
 who never flinched trom an enemy whom he could 
 see; even he, said that it would be certain destruction 
 to attack, and he did not wish to go into that timber. 
 
 In view of all these circumstances, Porter very 
 
62 
 
 properly recalled the order. To have done otherwise 
 would have been little better than useless murder. He 
 would not have been justified in attacking even by 
 daylight, with the knowledge that he had, which he 
 knew his commander had not. The order was based 
 upon premises wholly false. Pope still labored under 
 the hallucination, which lasted far into the following 
 day, that he was fighting Jackson alone, and that Jack- 
 son was anxious to retreat. Hence all his dispositions 
 were erroneous. 
 
 The situation on the 29th of August may be repre- 
 sented approximately thus : 
 
 What Pope assumed it to be:""' 
 
 JACKSON, 22,000 men. 
 
 POPE, 33,000 men. 
 
 What it actually was 
 
 25.000^- 
 
 ^^ 
 
 i-ACK 
 
 SOv 
 
 ^2.000 , 
 
 ^ea. 
 
 It will be seen at a glance how erroneous Pope's 
 ideas were, how difficult was Porters position, and 
 how impossible of execution was the "4.30 Order." 
 
 * x\s General Grant has never seen fit to give me any credit 
 for these diagrams and several other parts of this article which 
 he used in the North American Reviezu for December, 1882, I am 
 obliged to make the acknowledgment for him, in order to protect 
 myself from the charge of plagiarizing what was actually my own 
 work. — T. A. Lord. 
 
6; 
 
 It has been held by Pope, and by the Judge-Advo- 
 cate of the Court-martial, that Porter should have 
 attacked whatever force was in his front: — Pope says: 
 "Whether there were 5,000 or 50,000 of the enemy;" 
 even if "the whole Southern Confederacy was in front 
 of him." And this to obey an order to attack in flank 
 and rear a supposed small detachment already outnum- 
 bered ! This proposition is hardly worthy of discus- 
 sion. But for fear some one may be misled by it, I 
 will give it a moment's consideration. Napoleon's 
 maxim already quoted in regard to passive obedience, 
 is the best guide in forming our judgment. 
 
 Where an officer receives an order from his com- 
 mander who is personally present and cognizant of the 
 situation, it is undoubtedly his duty to obey, however 
 danoferous or even reckless or mistaken the undertaking 
 may appear to him ; for he cannot know but it may be a 
 part of a general plan which requires his sacrifice for 
 some great and compensating advantage. The same is 
 true when the subordinate is at a distance, and the com- 
 mander gives the order, with a full knowledge of the cir- 
 cumstances, or repeats it after he has received informa- 
 tion of them. This last was the case with Hooker at 
 P'redericksburg, and Porter on the 30th of August. 
 Hooker was ordered by Burnsicie to make an attack 
 which was ill-judged and hopeless. He left his com- 
 mand, sousrht Burnside, and remonstrated aQ^ainst such 
 a desperate movement. The order was repeated, and 
 Hooker attacked. He says with grim humor in speak- 
 ing of the result : " Poinding that I had lost as many 
 men as my orders required me to lose, I suspended 
 the attack." 
 
 On the 30th of August Pope believed the enemy 
 
64 
 
 were in retreat. Porter and the other officers at the 
 front knew better. They recaptured a Union soldier, 
 who confirmed the report of a retreat. Porter sent 
 him to Pope, remarking that he believed either that 
 the soldier was a fool, or that he was released on pur- 
 pose to create a wrong- impression. The message came 
 back : " General Pope believes that soldier, and directs 
 you to attack." And Porter did attack splendidly, and 
 was repulsed, and lost quite as many men as his orders 
 required him to lose. \\ herever it was possible for Pope 
 to make a mistake he made one. 
 
 When it was Porter's duty to obey, he did not 
 hesitate; but under the 4.30 Order there was no duty 
 which he could fulfill. The order required an impos- 
 sibility, and based the requirement upon two vital 
 errors. It showed on its face that Pope had no, accu- 
 rate knowledge of the situation — that he was hopelessly 
 mistaken. To declare that Porter should have use- 
 lessly sacrificed men under such circumstances, is simply 
 monstrous. 
 
 Porter withdrew his forces as ordered, early in the 
 morning of the 30th, and rejoined Pope near Groveton. 
 We shall presently see whether his action on that day 
 was disobedient or shameful. 
 
 The Animus. 
 
 An attempt was made to prejudice the mind of the 
 Court-martial, and subsequently that of the President, 
 by means which seem to the writer wholly unfair and 
 improper. When Porter left General Burnside's com- 
 mand to join Pope. Burnside requested him to send 
 information from time to time, of affairs at the front. 
 This Porter did in a series of dispatches designed 
 
65 
 
 merely for Burnside's personal perusal. The dis- 
 patches were mainly an account of military movements, 
 and in that respect were unobjectionable. But there 
 was an occasional sentence, written with the freedom 
 which one friend would use in writing to another, 
 which referred somewhat disrespectfully to Pope and 
 his strategy. Here are the worst of those allusions : 
 "The'' strategy is magnificent, and tactics in the 
 inverse proportion." 
 
 -It would seem from proper statements ol the 
 enemy, that he was wandering around loose ; but I 
 expect they know what they are doing, which is more 
 than any one here or any where knows." 
 
 "AH that talk about bagging Jackson, etc.. was 
 bosh That enormous gap, Manassas, was left open, 
 and the enemy jumped through ; and the story of Mc- 
 Dowell having cut off Longstreet, had no good foun- 
 1 tion * '" ■''■ "' ^ expect the next thing will be 
 Traid on our rear by Longstreet, who was cut off." 
 
 Those passages certainly do not indicate any great 
 depth of depravity. Burnside testified that he saw no 
 harm in the dispatches, and he sent them to the Presi- 
 dent Mr. Lincoln saw no harm in them, or it he did, 
 be made himself a party to their wickedness, for he 
 expressed himself as glad to get them, and personally, 
 thanked Porter for them on the battle-field of Antietam. 
 He said they gave him the only true account of events 
 that he could get at the time. 
 
 But when the prosecution could not make out a case 
 against Porter by the evidence of his aets, they sought 
 to eke out their scanty proof by alleged evidence of his 
 thomhts. Thev used these dispatches, as Judge- Advo- 
 cate Holt avowed, for the purpose of " determinmg 
 
66 
 
 points otheriuisc left doubtful by the evidenced In other 
 words, when it could not be shown from the evidence, 
 that Porter's acts were wrong, it was sought to prove 
 that they must be so, because his thoughts were wrong. 
 An erroneous idea of what he would be likely to do, was 
 used as evidence to prove what he did. To such a ridic- 
 ulous extent was this method carried, that Lieutenant- 
 Colonel T. C. H. Smith testified, that he had never 
 seen Porter before, but from his manner and tone, he 
 (Smith) knew Porter would fail Pope. Smith was the 
 great mind-reader for the prosecution. He further 
 says that, but for fear of the law, he would have mur- 
 dered Porter at that time, merely on account ot his 
 looks ! That is some of the testimony by which Porter 
 was convicted. 
 
 The attempt was made to prove that Porter's 
 animus towards Pope was evil, therefore his whole 
 conduct would be evil. Acts which would have been 
 considered innocent and unavoidable in the case ot 
 another, were distorted into high crimes in the case of 
 Porter, because forsooth, he did not speak reverentl)- ot 
 Pope's ridiculous proclamation and futile strategy. 
 Such a course of proceeding was wholly wrong both in 
 principle and in fact. In principle, because, when the 
 acts which a man did are the subject of inquiry, they 
 cannot be proved by showing what he might be thought 
 likelv to do. It would be as reasonable to convict a 
 man of murder, because he hated his enemy and there- 
 fore might be thought likely to wish him dead, when 
 the sole question was — and it was a point lett doubtful 
 by the evidence — whether that enemy had been killed 
 by anybody, or was dead at all. 
 
 The questions which the Court was investigating 
 
67 
 
 were, not what did Porter think, and what action would 
 such thoughts be likely to lead to ; but, first, what did 
 he do ? and second, was that action reasonable and 
 right under the circumstances ? His opinion of Pope, 
 or his feelings towards Pope, have nothing to do with 
 the case, until it is not left doubtful by the evidence 
 that he failed in his duty. No one pretends that he 
 served Pope from love of him — tew officers did. 
 The sole question is, did he dutifully serve him ? Did 
 he fulfill his orders as it was reasonable to understand 
 them, and as far as it was possible to execute them ? 
 If it is not evident that he did so, then I have not ade- 
 quately set forth the true conclusions from the record. 
 If he did so, then his motives or his thoughts are of 
 no consequence. 
 
 The method of proof was wrong in fact, because the 
 dispatches were represented to mean what they did 
 not mean. 
 
 They do not express any wish for Pope to fail, 
 much less any intention to betray him. They indicate 
 a /ear that he will fail ; and that fear was abundantly 
 warranted by the facts, and completely vindicated by 
 the result. The whole trouble with the dispatches 
 was, not that they were false, but that they were true. 
 No intention to fail Pope can be properly inferred 
 from them, even if they show contempt for him anci 
 his strategy. The case is very different from that of 
 a quarrel between private persons, where only per- 
 sonal feelings and personal interests are involved. In 
 this case orreat national interests were at stake, and 
 far more important considerations than personal spite, 
 would influence Porter's conduct. For Porter to iail 
 Pope meant more than to gratify a personal resent- 
 
68 
 
 ment. It meant to fail in conduct as a soldier; to 
 forfeit the reputation of a lifetime of duty and of bril- 
 liant success ; to give up the hope of future distinction 
 and advancement. It meant to inhumanly sacrifice 
 the lives of men, for whose welfare he was almt)st 
 unduly solicitous ; and finally, to imperil the safety 
 of the Capital, and the existence of the nation for 
 whose well-being he had received wounds in one war, 
 and risked death in two. All this was the evident 
 effect of failing Pope. Can it be supposed that Porter 
 would risk all this, because he playfully reflected upon 
 Pope's ridiculous strategy ? Can it be supposed that, 
 in consequence of a petty spite, lor the remote chance 
 of ruining Pope, he would endanger the Capital and 
 take the imminent chance of ruining his country ? 
 And this, too, with the certainty that his honor, if not 
 his life, would pay the penalt}' ? There are many 
 hio"her motives than love for Pope to induce an officer 
 to do his duty, even under Pope's command. There- 
 fore I say, that, until it is proved that Porter was out 
 and out a traitor to his country, and lost to all sense 
 not only of humanity but of self-interest, it cannot be 
 aro^ued that contempt for Pope would lead to a failure 
 of duty under Pope. For this reason the use of ex- 
 pressions derogatory to Pope was improper for the 
 purpose of proving acts hostile to the nation. It is 
 preposterous to argue anything as to Porter's acts, from 
 his dislike of Pope, until it is shown that all good mo 
 tives and all self-interest were absent ; or else that 
 love for Pope is the highest and most potent influence 
 that can "spring eternal in the human breast." 
 
 And further, we have no right to argue as to any 
 motive to explain Porter's acts, until we prove beyond 
 
(39 
 
 a reasonable doubt that his acts were so faulty as to 
 require such explanation. Not till then does the ques- 
 tion of animus arise, to determine whether those acts 
 were the result of willfulness or weakness. If what was 
 required of him was impossible or unreasonable, what 
 he thought of Pope does not affect the character of the 
 requirement, or the action which should have been 
 taken under the circumstances. Therefore, it was not 
 proper to supplement the proof of points left doubtful 
 by the evidence, by dispatches which could not in any 
 way prove the facts claimed to be proved by them, 
 even if they showed the animus claimed to be shown 
 by them. 
 
 But the so-called evidence of animus availed to 
 bridge all the gaps between the allegations and the proof. 
 It was an operation of Porter's mind that could make 
 possible a march in three hours, which was impossible in 
 six ; that could make the fact of a retreat, when there 
 was no retreat ; that could make a battle of great con- 
 sequence, when there was no such battle ; that could 
 make an order to fight out of an order to retire ; that 
 could cause an order to be delivered at five o'clock, 
 which was not delivered until seven ; that could make 
 Longstreet absent, when he was present ; that could 
 make possible an attack upon Jackson's flank, when 
 the only possibility was an attack upon Longstreet's 
 front; that could have insured the capture of Jack- 
 son's army, when Jackson ran no risk of capture. It 
 is claiming a good deal to say, even from the evidence 
 for the prosecution, that these points attained the re- 
 spectabilitv of being doubtful. Yet Porter's animus 
 supplied all deficiencies. Other officers might be 
 lonofer on the march, under fewer difficulties than 
 
70 
 
 those which Porter overcame. Tkci r covuXuct was ener- 
 getic and exemplary. But it was Porter's animus that 
 detained him, not the darkness nor the 2,000 wagons. 
 After all Porter's action, his "shameful disobedience" 
 and "cowardice," and even the dreadful animus of these 
 dispatches, were known to the Government, they still 
 haci so much faith in his capacity and integrity that 
 they put him in command ot 25,000 men, for the de- 
 fense of the Capital which he had so "willfully" and 
 "shamefully" endangered. 
 
 Pope himself, when he knew all about Porter's acts, 
 told him that he was satisfied with them, except in one 
 trivial and unimportant particular. But that was before 
 he was aware of the animus. When he saw the criti- 
 cisms upon his strategy, his ''eyes lucre opened^ Then 
 he saw how heinous had been the conduct which he 
 had before, with full knowledge, approved, He forth- 
 with commenced that series ot " indefensible and in- 
 decent" proceedings which culminated in the Court- 
 martial. 
 
 Errors of the Court-martial. 
 
 The Court-martial which convicted Porter, has 
 been very tenderly dealt with in the record of the 
 Board of Officers ; that is, if complete reversal of its 
 opinions, and the exhibition of numerous errors which 
 It committed, are consistent with tender treatment. 
 The Board very truly say : " These charges and speci- 
 fications certainly bear no discernible resemblance to 
 the facts of the case as now established." 
 
 But in a critical study of the evidence presented 
 to the Court, it is difficult to see how, with honesty 
 and intelligence, it could have made so many mistakes. 
 
71 
 
 It is to be regretted that the oath of secrecy prevents 
 the disclosure of the vote by which its conclusions 
 were reached. But for that, we miorht discriminate 
 between the majority and the minority, if there was 
 any such division. However, I should suppose that a 
 member of the minority would be willing to bear his 
 share of the odium, for the privilege of having cast his 
 vote in protest against so great a wrong. 
 
 The Court derives no authority from its person- 
 ality. It consisted of nine officers of high rank, it is 
 true ; but rank affords no sanction when acts are con- 
 trary to justice and common sense. " By their fruits 
 ye shall know them," not by their rank. Besides, we 
 have as much rioht to aro^ue that the decision was 
 reached by a bare majority, and was therefore virtu- 
 ally the opinion of one man, as an opponent would 
 have to claim the authority of nine men. 
 
 In reviewing the testimony, it is impossible to under- 
 stand the system upon which the Court estimated the 
 credibility of witnesses, or the value of evidence. It 
 seems as if every conjecture for the prosecution, by 
 whomsoever advanced, outweighed every fact for the 
 defense. The verdict was certainly not fairly derived 
 from the evidence, and in some instances, as that of a 
 retreat, was not derived from the evidence at all. It is 
 necessary to look for some influence outside of the case 
 to account for such strained conclusions. We need not 
 seek for a cause, beyond the wild passions of the time, 
 the popular belief that treason was rife and an ex- 
 ample must be made, the clamor of the multitude, the 
 same unthinking ferocity that, with the cry, " Crucify 
 him, crucify him ! " led even a Roman governor to 
 deliver to the sacrifice an innocent victim. 
 
72 
 
 But, besides this cause, there was, perhaps, a spe- 
 cific reason for the action of the Court-martial. That 
 was the great desire, if not the great need of the Ad- 
 ministration to secure a convictio'n. 
 
 General McClellan had been set aside by Stanton 
 and Halleck, wlio were personally and politically hos- 
 tile to him. General Pope was put in his place, and 
 held out as the champion who was to show the world 
 how wrong McClellan had been, and how wise was the 
 cabal which had overthrown him. Pope had begun his 
 campaign in the character of Bombastes F'urioso. He 
 had issued a proclamation which has ever since been a 
 source of shame to his friends and delight to his ene- 
 mies. The purposes of this proclamation were to fire the 
 popular heart, and reflect upon McClellan. Therefore, 
 when on the 2d of September, after Pope's dismal 
 failure, the cabal was obliged to call McClellan again 
 to the command, in order to save the Capital and the 
 nation, the Administration w^as placed in an awkward 
 and humiliating position. Something must be done to 
 restore the reputation of the Government which had 
 made such a grievous and ridiculous blunder as that 
 which the appointment of Pope proved to be. The next 
 elections might be fatal to the party in power, unless its 
 accents could shift from themselves the responsibility 
 for the late disasters. How could that be done bet- 
 ter than by showing that Pope's defeat was due not 
 to the incompetence of Pope himself, but to the negli- 
 gence and insubordination of his officers ? And how 
 could a more conspicuous example be made than by 
 selecting Fitz-John Porter as the victim .-^ His con- 
 viction would exonerate Pope, save the Administra- 
 tion, punish McClellan indirectly, and terrify McClel- 
 
73 
 
 lan's other friends. It was a large stake to play for, 
 and it was won. 
 
 The members of the Court were appointed by 
 General Halleck, one of the cabal, instead of by the 
 <>-ood President, who was often the dupe of the cabal. 
 If the Court did not do the bidding of its masters, 
 then there is no intelligible reason for its false findings. 
 Then the promotions of Judges and witnesses for the 
 prosecution, which followed almost immediately after 
 the conviction of Porter, are the most remarkable 
 coincidences in history. If those promotions were not 
 a return for value received from the verdict of the 
 Court, the time when they were given indicates ex- 
 ceedino-ly bad taste on the part of the authorities. 
 
 Let us summarize the serious errors of the Court. 
 
 In respect to the events of the 29th of August, it 
 decided against Porter, contrary not only to the pre- 
 ponderance of evidence, but contrary to all the com- 
 petent and credible evidence upon every point. The 
 conviction was principally based upon the testimony of 
 four witnesses who confessedly swore only upon con- 
 jecture, as against the incontrovertible testimony of 
 many witnesses who swore positively as to facts within 
 their own knowledge. 
 
 The Court committed great error in regard, 
 
 1. To the position of Porter. 
 
 2. To the numbers and position of the enemy. 
 
 3. To the significance of the Joint Order. 
 
 4. To the time of the receipt of the "4.30 Order." 
 
 5. To the attack upon Jackson's flank and rear. 
 
 6. To the battle raging at the right. 
 
 7. To the retreat. 
 
74 
 
 No witness for the prosecution pretended to have 
 any ground but guess-work, upon which to base his 
 idea of where Porter was, or where the enemy was. 
 Even McDowell, who was with Porter for a time, 
 placed him a mile in advance of his real position ; and 
 before the Board of Officers admitted his error. The 
 other witnesses knew nothing of where he was, but 
 supposed him to be about the place indicated by Mc- 
 Dowell. The maps before the Court were wholly 
 wrong. 
 
 2d. The Court ignored the presence of Long- 
 street, and even the significance of Butord's dispatch, 
 and Buford's positive testimony as to what he actually 
 saw. 
 
 3d. The Joint Order was interpreted as an order 
 to fight, when it was really an order to halt and retire. 
 This error doubtless arose from the supposed order by 
 McDowell to fight, which impression was also an error. 
 
 4th. The error regarding the time of delivery of 
 the "4.30 Order," arose from the worthless testimony 
 of Captain Pope and his orderly ; testimony which 
 would not have received credit in a Police Court, in a 
 case which involved the penalty of one dollar. Their 
 testimony was conjectural, and they were directly con- 
 tradicted by five unimpeachable witnesses. The ad- 
 missions afterwards made by Captain Pope, in moments 
 of confidence or weakness, that he lost his way, and 
 did not arrive till late, sufficiently show the value of 
 his testimony. 
 
 Before the Board of Officers, Major Randol corrob- 
 orated the testimony of the five witnesses before the 
 Court-martial, as to the arrival of Captain Pope about 
 
75 
 
 dark. Further, the intrinsic evidence of dispatches 
 produced before the Board shows that Captain Pope 
 did not arrive with the 4.30 Order within an hour at 
 least of the time when he swore he did. The mem- 
 bers of the Court-martial ought never to have believed 
 him at all. In that case they would have had fewer 
 errors to repent of now. 
 
 Because the Court erroneously believed that the 
 order was received in time to attack the enemy whom 
 Porter claimed to be in front, they wrongly assumed 
 that it was received in time for an attack upon Jack- 
 son's flank, three miles away. 
 
 5th. Ignoring the presence of Longstreet, and 
 putting Porter a mile ahead of his true position, with 
 no enemy in his front, produced the error in regard to 
 the possibility of an attack upon Jackson's flank and 
 rear ; and because Porter did not attack overwhelming 
 forces in front, the Court convicted him of not attack- 
 ing weak forces in flank. 
 
 6th. The battle raging at the right was a myth 
 and a sham. As we have seen, there was no such 
 battle, and no severe action of great consequence 
 requiring Porter's aid, at any time after Porter reached 
 his position. Pope, without Porter, outnumbered 
 Jackson, if Longstreet was not there, by fully 10,000 
 men, before McDowell's arrival on the field, and after- 
 wards by 25,000. This shows the absurdity of the pre- 
 tense, that Porter's aid was needed, because Pope was 
 fighting "greatly superior numbers." He was scarcely 
 fiohtine at all, and the numbers were far inferior, unless 
 Longstreet was present, as Porter claimed. 
 
 Another absurdity closely connected with this, is the 
 
76 
 
 statement that Jackson's capture would have resulted if 
 Porter had done his duty. We can readily estimate the 
 chances of Jackson's capture, under the bagging pro- 
 cess as practiced by Pope. Jackson had been within 
 five miles of Pope for nearly two days, and the latter 
 knew no more of actual truth about him, than if he had 
 been living in another planet. It was Pope's good 
 luck, or rather the stubborn fighting of his troops, that 
 alone prevented Jackson from capturing him. 
 
 7th. The Court found the fact of a shameful 
 retreat, when there was no retreat whatever, and no 
 evidence of any ; and when in fact the evidence was 
 positive that there was no retreat. 
 
 I think these errors are sufficient to invalidate the 
 judgment of any court, no matter how respectable its 
 members, or how high their rank. Most of the errors 
 could easily have been avoided, and ought to have been 
 avoided, when it is considered that in order to con- 
 vict, guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 There was no one of the accusations against Porter, in 
 respect to which his innocence was not proved beyond 
 a reasonable doubt. We cannot escape the conclusion 
 that the Court-martial was organized to convict, and its 
 proceedings were a mockery of justice. 
 
 Many of the rulings of the Court were grossly 
 erroneous and unfair. They were so consistently, so 
 monotonously against the accused, that they would 
 really be amusing, if their consequences had not been 
 so serious. 
 
 The composition of the Court was not favorable to 
 an impartial hearing. The law requires, that where a 
 commander of an army prefers charges against an offi- 
 
77 
 
 cer under his command, the Court shall be convened 
 by the President. Pope first made the charges against 
 Porter before a military commission. This being too 
 manifestly illegal, the commission was dissolved, and 
 this Court-martial was convened by General Halleck. 
 Then the technicality was resorted to, of having the 
 charo-es made bv an officer of Pope's staff, instead of 
 Pope himself. The law was not designed to permit 
 any such miserable subterfuge as that, especially in a 
 capital case. When it suited Pope's purposes to deny 
 having anything to do with the charges, he did so ; but 
 at other times he claimed the merit of them, and con- 
 fessed that he had asked the President for his reward. 
 Porter protested against the mode of convening the 
 Court, but it is true he did not protest against any of 
 the members: 
 
 I St. Because he felt so confident of the merits of 
 his defense, that he thought it could not fail before any 
 court. 
 
 2d. Because the order which convened the Court, 
 told him, that "no other officers than these named, can 
 be 'assembled without manifest injury to the service." 
 
 He had, therefore, no choice but to accept the Court 
 as it was, and he would have been most unwise to have 
 made complaint. 
 
 The Court should have consisted of thirteen mem- 
 bers instead of nine, and the rank of all should have 
 been as hiorh as that of the defendant; whereas onlv 
 two were of the proper rank. Despite General Hal- 
 leck's certification that " no other officers than these 
 named can be assembled without manifest injury to the 
 service," he actually made one substitution, and offered 
 
to make another. In fact, he could have found a full 
 complement of officers, in numbers at least, it not in 
 rank. Halleck's statement was merely another subter- 
 fuge, in order to get a court which would produce the 
 desired result. 
 
 But we can afford to waive all narrow and technical 
 considerations, and rest our unqualified condemnation 
 of the Court-martial, upon the broad ground of its arbi- 
 trary and prejudiced proceedings, its erroneous inven- 
 tions, and its inexcusably false conclusions. 
 
 Two members of the Court, Generals King and 
 Ricketts, were concerned in the very movements which 
 were in question, and both had made a retreat which 
 has been mildly characterized as "uncalled for and un- 
 military." * It would be supposed, considering the con- 
 sequences of their retreat, that their conduct would 
 have been inquired into before that ot Porter. It was 
 liable to inquiry at any time, unless some other victim 
 should satisfy Pope, the Administration, and the public. 
 I do not allege that those officers were influenced by 
 that consideration, and for all we know they may have 
 voted in Porter's favor; but, being human, although 
 both were estimable men, they were not proper judges 
 in Porter's case. One of them. King, descended from 
 the bench to contradict an important witness for the 
 defense, and then returned to his seat, presumably to 
 estimate the value of the testimony ; and that, too, 
 when the accused person was on trial tor his lite. 
 
 The sentence imposed by the Court-martial was 
 not commensurate with the offense. Porter was con- 
 demned "to be cashiered, and to be forever disquali- 
 fied from holding any office of trust or profit under 
 
 ''John C. Ropes. "The Army under Pope," page 8i. 
 
79 
 
 the Government of the United States." That was 
 an intiiction sufficiently severe, when apphed to an 
 innocent man ; but if Porter was guilty, as the Court 
 declared, he ought certainly to have been shot, or 
 hung. A milder sentence for such heinous crimes, 
 shows either that the decision was reached by a bare 
 majority of the Judges, not enough for a death sen- 
 tence, or else, that they were distrustful of their own 
 verdict. There was certainly no mercy to be expected 
 from them. While depriving Porter of reputation, rank 
 and pay, they spared his life, as I believe, not from 
 mercy, but from, perhaps, a consciousness that if he 
 were ever vindicated, as he has recently been, a judi- 
 cial robbery would be less awkward for all concerned 
 than a judicial murder, 
 
 Lincoln's Approval. 
 
 We come now to the saddest part of this whole sad 
 business, that which relates to President Lincoln's 
 action. Lincoln was too just to have approved that 
 sentence, if he had known the true character of the 
 evidence. Not having time to read the voluminous 
 reports of the trial, he requested Judge-Advocate-Gen- 
 eral Holt "to revise the proceedings of the Court-mar- 
 tial, ''■ * * * and to report fully upon any legal 
 questions that may have arisen in them, and upon the 
 bearing of the testimony in reference to the charges and 
 specifications exhibited against the accused, and upon 
 which he was tried." 
 
 Lincoln wanted a full and fair statement of the case. 
 Holt did not neglect his opportunity. He had declined 
 to argue the case before the Court-martial ; but, before 
 Mr. Lincoln, the defense could make no reply. He 
 
80 
 
 presented a review which pretended to be such as the 
 President had asked for, but which, in reah'ty, was an 
 argument by an advocate for the prosecution, and a 
 very unfair, mean and bitter argument at that. Mr. 
 Lincohi fell into the trap, anci, relying upon Holt's 
 statements, approved the sentence of the Court. The 
 great-hearted, just-minded, and confiding President was 
 no match for the subtle and malicious schemers by 
 whom he was surrounded. It is not too much to say 
 that Lincoln's approval of that sentence was obtained 
 by willfully false pretenses. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln probably continued to the day of his 
 death in the belief that Porter had disgracefully re- 
 treated. The testimony before the Board of Officers, 
 of the President's son, Mr. Robert T. Lincoln, gives us 
 good reason for believing that this one so-called fact of a 
 retreat, which was really the only fact that had not a 
 particle of evidence, good or baci, to sustain it, was a 
 potent cause, if not the chief cause, of the President's 
 approval. 
 
 The President afterwards expressed his willingness 
 to give the case a rehearing, and his ho[)e for Porter's 
 vindication. He met his tragic death before Porter's 
 appeal was fully prepared. The great and good Lin- 
 coln, had he lived and learned the truth, would have 
 been swift to undo the cruel injustice which he had 
 been deceived into doing, and to rebuke the wicked- 
 ness which led to it. 
 
 Porter's Conduct, August 30th. 
 
 No estimate of Porter's conduct is complete with- 
 out a consideration of his services on the 30th of 
 August, the day following his alleged shameful behav- 
 
81 
 
 ior. His motives all through these events were called 
 in question before the Court-martial, and he was 
 not allowed to introduce evidence of his conduct on 
 the 30th, to show the falsehood of the accusation. 
 There was an additional specification under the second 
 general charge, alleging Porter's misconduct and feeble- 
 ness in attack on that day. Now it happened that his 
 action was particularly gallant and efficient that day, 
 and he could prove it so. Such proof would go far to 
 refute the charge of indifference and insubordination, 
 that is, the evil animus, on which the Government 
 especially relied to make out its case. The Judge- 
 Advocate promptly dismissed the accusation, at the 
 opening of the Court ; and consequently the accused 
 was not permitted to introduce evidence of his good 
 conduct on that day, to offset the alleged proofs of evil 
 intent derived from previous days. If that result was 
 in contemplation of the Judge- Advocate when he dis- 
 missed the accusation, such action, even in so eminent 
 a politician as Colonel Holt, was but little above a 
 very low degree of pettifogging. 
 
 It is not credible that an officer whose whole life 
 had been brilliant and honorable, should be a poltroon 
 one day and a hero the next, simply because he did 
 not like General Pope. Such an emotion would not 
 produce conduct so eccentric. 
 
 Porter's noble service on the 30th of August, has 
 been appropriated by Pope to himself on the 29th. 
 The latter published Jackson's report of operations 
 on the 30th, which included Porter's attack, under the 
 representation that it applied to the attacks of the 
 29th, under Pope's direction. In other words, by a 
 transposition of dates, he used Porter's own gallantry 
 
82 
 
 and enercry, to which his antagonist bore witness, as a 
 means of proving Porter guilty of cowardice and inef- 
 ficiency. Pope's attention has often been called to the 
 error, but I have not heard that he has yet endeavored 
 to correct it. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 30th of August, Porter's 
 command led the hopeless and ill-judged attack upon 
 Jackson's lines. The assault was described by rebel 
 officers, as "determined and most obstinate." Jackson 
 said it was impetuous and well sustained ; it engaged 
 his entire line in a fierce and sanguinary struggle, and 
 so " severely pressed " him, that he sent to Lee for 
 re-enforcements. Porter's command lost over 2,100 
 men, out of 6,000 present. So much tor the disloy- 
 alty and lack of bravery of an officer who had won 
 most honorable mention in the Army of the Potomac, 
 for skill and gallantry ; who had borne the brunt of 
 the attack at Malvern Hill, and received for his ser- 
 vices the commissions of Brevet Brigadier-General in 
 the regular army, and Major-General ot volunteers ; 
 who was bre vetted as Captain and Major for services 
 in the Mexican War, and was wounded in the assault 
 on the City of Mexico. 
 
 The truth is. Pope was beaten by his own niisman- 
 agement. His ideas and the disposition of his forces, 
 were (with one transient exception), so thoroughly 
 erroneous, and he showed such a capacity lor refusing 
 to accept correct information from persons or events, 
 that disaster was inevitable. " What he should not 
 have done he did with frightful energy, and what he 
 should have done he culpably neglected to do." '" Lee 
 
 '' Gordon's "Army of Virij;inia,"' page 462. 
 
83 
 
 himself was surprised. He expected nothing- from 
 Jackson's movement, but a formidable raid to save 
 Gordonsville, and he " moved from victory to victory," 
 until he seriously menaced the Capital, and began an 
 invasion of the North/" 
 
 It was not through any fault of officers or soldiers 
 that Pope was beaten. Officers served him as well as 
 they could, whatever they thought of him; and — 
 
 " Tho' the soldier knew 
 Some one had blunder'd," 
 
 he did not fail or falter in bravery or fidelity. The 
 toilsome marches by day and night, the privations 
 endured, — for the army was in a condition little short 
 of actual starvation, — and above all, as Porter said, 
 the " killed and wounded and enfeebled troops attest 
 their devotion to duty." 
 
 One needs to consider only the methods of the com- 
 mander as applied to the existing conditions, his faculty 
 of painting everything (even his reports), with the col- 
 qrs of the imagination, to find ample explanation of his 
 failure. Porter, who deserved as well of the Republic 
 as did any officer in the army, has been for twenty 
 years the chief sufferer for Pope's misstatements and 
 mistakes. It now remains for the people, through their 
 representatives in Congress, to right the grievous wrong 
 inflicted upon one who, in two wars, served his country 
 faithfully and gallantly. 
 
 As the case stands to-da)-, Porter is fully vindi- 
 cated by the highest military authorities of this and 
 other nations ; by the most eminent statesmen and 
 
 * Gordon's "Army of Virginia," page 463. 
 
84 
 
 jurists in the land ; and by all intelligent and fair- 
 minded men who know the facts. He can afford to 
 remain, like Belisarius, in silence and in poverty, in- 
 trusting to History his bright achievements and unsul- 
 lied fame. 
 
 But the Government cannot safely leave its repute 
 to History, if, after having before it overwhelming 
 evidence of the terrible wrong inflicted upon a faitht'ul 
 servant, it delays for one unnecessary hour, the inad- 
 equate reparation which can yet be made. 
 
 THE END. 
 

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