' \ > 4 -7- .4 . <> <5t V- 0^' I ■ o - HANDBOOK FOR THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF EUROPE, ASIA, AND AFRICA 1870-1914 By FRANK MALOY ANDERSON PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE and AMOS SHARTLE HERSHEY PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY OF INDIANA With the Assistance of 50 Contributors Prepared for the National Board for Historical Servios WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1918 HANDBOOK FOR THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF EUROPE, ASIA, AND AFRICA 1870-1914 By FRANK MALOY ANDERSON n PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE and AMOS SHARTLE HERSHEY PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY OF INDIANA With the Assistance of 50 Contrihutors Prepared for the National Board for Historical Service WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1918 /f- 1"; 0. ** *• JAN 4 19J9 PREFACE Responding to a request for urgent public service, the National Board for Historical Service undertook in February, 1918, to pro- vide for the preparation of this survey of recent diplomatic history, with the understanding that the work should be so planned as to be ready for use within a very limited time. The immediate execution of this task was intrusted by the board to Profs. F. M. Anderson, of Dartmouth College, and A. S. Hershey, of Indiana University. They were fortunate in securing the cooperation of several other com- petent scholars, but within the limit of time originally agreed upon adequate treatment of the material was obviously impossible. Dur- ing the present summer the material has been revised by Prof. F. M. Anderson, though still under such limitations as to time and available material as to preclude exhaustive research in many cases. It is believed, nevertheless, that this manual will prove of substantial service to workers in this field. Hearty thanks are due to both authors, and especially to Prof. Anderson, for the generous public spirit with which they have given many hours of gratuitous service, as well as for the energy and intelligence which they have applied to their difficult task. National Board for Historical Service. September 20, 1918. (3) ACKNOWLEDGMENT. rhe preparation of this handbook has been made possible only by the splendid cooperation on the part of the contributors. The grate- ful acknowledgment of the editors is due to the following authors of articles: George B. Adams, C. D. Allin. J. F. Baldwin. Carl Becker, Crawford M. I >i^lx p, Louise Fargo Brown, J. 1*. Chamber- lain, Victor Coffin, F. W. Coker, Fiances G. Davenport, A. L. P. Dennis. Eloise Ellery, Ellen I). Ellis, Logan Essary, Sidney B. Fay, R. II. Fife, jr.. CarlE. Fish. Fred M. Fling, 1. P. Fox. I). P. Fraryj Evarts 15. Green, N. 1). Harris. P. F. Haworth, C. J. II. Haves, S. K. Hornbeck, F. F. Humphrey, Charles Kettleborough, Everett Kimball, Albert Kohlmeier. A..C. Kiev. W. E. Lingelbach, F. M. Linton. A. H. Lybyer, J. G. McDonald, W. P. Manning, W. W. McLaren. Frederick Moore, Nellie Xeilson, A. T. Olmstead, F. L. Paxson, P. C. Phillips, Bertha II. Putnam, Clarence Perkins, Comers Eead, Bemadotte E. Schmitt, (i. C. Sellery, Lucy E. Text or.' Ida C. Thallon. F. R. Turner, M. W. Tyler, F. A. Updyke, B. B. Wallace, J. A. Wooclburn, F. W. Williams. Profs. Evarts B Greene and J. T. Shotwell, of the National Boar*! for Historical Service, kept in constant (ouch with tin 1 work. Their counsel and cooperation greatly lightened the task of the editors. Port". J. F. Jameson and Prof. Dana C. Munro, of the board. Mr. G. L. Leer and Mr. II. F. Munro, also made helpful suggestions. Mrs. K. Schoepperle Lever and Mr. A. Heywood Knowlton, as secretaries tor the editors, were of the very greatest assistance. Frank Malot Anderson. Amos Shartle Hershey. (4) TABLE OF CONTENTS. Page. Introduction 9 Section I. —1870-1878. 1. The effort to prevent the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, July 3 to July 19, 1870 21 2. The protection of Belgian neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War 25 3. The protection of Luxemburg neutrality during (he Franco-Prussian War. 27 4. German seizure of neutral property during the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1 . 29 5. The sale of munitions of war to belligerents during the Franco-Prussian War 30 6. The recognition of the Government of National Defence, 1870-71 33 7. The Roman question, 1870-71 35 8. The Black Sea question, 1870-71 '' 39 9. The peace preliminaries of the Franco-Prussian War 42 10. The Treaty of Frankfort, IS7 1 45 11 . German arguments for the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, 1870-1 49 12. The evacuation of France by the German armies, 1871-1873 50 13. The formation of the League of the Three Emperors 54 14. The Franco-German War scare of 1S75 55 15. Chino-Japanese relations, 1872-1876 58 16. The Kuldja affair, 1876-1881 59 17. The Eastern question, 1875-1877 60, 18. The Serbo-Turkish War of 1876 68 19. The Austro-Russtan accord of L876 77 70 20. The Russo-Eoumanian alliance of 1877-78 72 21 . The Treaty of San Stefano, 1878 " :! 22. The Congress of Berlin, 1878 77 23. Austria-Hungary and the Balkan set dement of 1878 86 24. Serbia and the Balkan settlement of 1878 88 25. Bulgaria and the Balkan settlement of 1878 90 26. Roumania and the Balkan settlement of 1878 :i:; 27. Montenegro and the Balkan settlement of 1878 94 28. The English protectorate over ( lyprus, 1878-1914 98 29. The abrogation of I lie North Schleswig plebiscite agreement 99 Section II.— 1878-1890. 30. The Greco-Turkish frontier question, 1878-1881 I() l 31. The Danube question, 1 s 7 1 1904 103 32. The Suez Canal, 1881-1904 105 33. The formation of the Dual Alliance, IS79 108 34. The formation of the Triple Alliance, 1882 I I 1 35. The renewals of the Triple Alliance ,- 113 36. Roumaniaand the Triple Alliance, ix.s:>,-1914 I L5 37. Bismarck's reinsurance treaty 117 (5) r; Page. 38. The Bulgarian devolution of 1885 119 39. The Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885-86 1-4 40. The pacific blockade of Greece, 1SS i 1 27 41. The Schnaebele* incident. 1887 128 42. Franco-Italian animosity. I 16 129 43. The partition of Africa, 1878-1885 131 44. The establishment of the French protectorate over Tunis, 1881 L33 45. The Dual Control over Egyptian finances. 1 876 -1883 135 46. The British occupation of Egypt, 1882-1914 140 47. The Soudan question, 1881-1899 i 146 48. The acquisition of Madagascar by France. L882-1897 148 49. Anglo-German rivalry in Southwest Africa. L883-1886 151 \ 50. Anglo-German rivalry in East Africa, 1885 L890 153 51. The question of West Africa, L880 L898 156 52. The formation of the Congo Free State. L876-1885 161 53. The Berlin Conference, L884-85 L64 54. The delimitation of European colonies in Central Africa, 1885-1899 L67 55. The international status of the Transvaal or South African Republic. 1877- 1884 171 56. British relations to the Boer Republics, 1884-1899 172 57. The question of the Portuguese colonies 175 '"58. The Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia. 1878-1887 1 79 59. The British acquisition of Upper Burma, 1885-S6 183 60. Franco- Siamese relations, 1893-1904 * 184 61. European encroachments in the Far East, 1S75-18S7 186 62. The Franco-Chinese War, 1882-1885 187 63. The journeys of William II to the Near East 190 Section- III.— 1S90-1904. 64. The dismissal of Bismarck. 1890 1 93 65.. The Brussels antislavery conference of 1890 L95 66. The formation of the Dual Alliance, between France and Russia, 1887-1893. 197 67. The Zanzibar-Heligoland treaty of 1 890 201 65. The Dreyfus affair 204 69. Railway concessions in Turkey 205 70. The Greco-Turkish War. 1897 211 71. The Cretan question. 1868 L897 212 72. The Armenian question, 1878-1897 216 73. The Serbian Revolution of 1903 220 74. Franco-Italian rapprochement, 1 S96-1902 221 75. Relations between Italy and Abyssinia, 1893-1900 222 76. The Fashoda affair, 1898-1899 224 77. The attempted Franco-German accord of 1898 227 78. The Kruger telegram 229 79. The seizure of German ships during the Boer War 23 1 80. The Treaty of Vereeniging, May 31, 1902 232 81. France and Morocco, 1894-1904 234 82. The annexation of the Congo Free State by Belgium, 1889-1908 237 83. Chino-Japanese rivalry in Korea, 1876-1894 240 84. The Treaty of'Shimonoseki, 1895 241 85. The retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula by Japan, November 8, 1895. . 242 86. The open-door policy in China, 1895-1904 , 243 87. The leasing of Kiaou-Chau by Germany, March 6, 1898 249 i Page. 88. The Cassini convention, 1896 251 89. The leasing of Port Arthur by Russia, March 27, 1898 252 90. The leasing of Wei-IIai-Wei by Great Britain, 1898 253 91. The Boxer Uprising, negotiations and settlement 254 92. The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 262^ 93. Russo-Japanese rivalry in Korea, 1895-1904 265 94. The Russian advance into .Manchuria, 1895-1903 268* 95. The Russo-Chinese convention for the evacuation of Manchuria. April 8, 1902 271 96. Negotiations preceding the Russo-Japanese War, 1903-1904 272 97. The abrogation of the Japanese extraterritorial city treaties, 1872-1894... 275 98. The First Hague Conference, 1899 279 99. The Anglo-French arbitration agreement of 1903 280 Section IV.— 1904-1914. 100. The formation of the Entente Cordiale 282 101. Secret negotiations' between the Kaiser and the Czar in 1904-1905 288 ■ 102. The seizure of neutral ships by Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. . 293 103. The Dogger Bank incident, 1904 296 104. The Treaty of Portsmouth 298 105. The renewals of the A nglo- Japanese alliance, 1905 and 1911 301 106. The open-door policy in China, 1904-1914 303 107. Spheres of influence in ( 'hina, 1897-1904 306 108. Railway concessions in China 311 - 109. Chino-Japanese relations, 1905-1914 '. 315 110. Japan's relations with Korea, 1904-1910 317 111. China and the Six Power Loan Syndicate, 1908-1913 319 112. Question of South Manchuria, 1905-1914 321 113. The Thibet question, 1880-1914 327'] 114. The Mongolian question, 1881-1915 329 115. The Morocco crisis of 1905-1906 332 116. The resignation of Delcasse, 1905 334 117. Italy and Morocco 338 118. Spain and Morocco 339 119. The Red Sea convention of December 13, 1905 343 120. The Persian question, 1906-1914 345 121. The formation of the Triple Entente 358 122. The separation of Norway from Sweden 362 123. The Baltic and North Sea conventions, 1908 365 124. The Second Hague Conference, 1907 367 125. The Reval interview, 1908 371 126. The Turkish Revolution of 1908-1909 371 127. The annexation of Bosnia-Herzego\ ina 374 128. The Austrian occupation of Novi-Bazar, 1878-1909 378 129. The Bulgarian declaration of independence, 1908 380 130. The Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909 382 131 . The Macedonian question, 1878-1908 385 132. The Macedonian question, 1908-1912 391 133. The Cretan question, 1897-1908 394 134. The Cretan question, 1 908-1913 397 135. The Casablanca affair, 1908-1909 398 136. The Morocco convention of 1909 401 137. The Morocco crisis of 1911 402 -V H Page. 138. The Potsdam accord, 1910 407 139. The Bagdad Railway, L899 L914 409 140. The Ealdane Mission to Berlin. L912 4 12 141. The Tripoli question, 1902-1911 416 142. The Treaty Oi Lausanne, 1912 419 143. The formation of the Balkan alliance of 1912 421 11 1. The efforts of the Powers to prevent the outbreak of the First Balkan War.. 426 145. The Treaty of London. L913 429 146. The Albanian question in the Balkan crisis of 1913 432 147. The establishment of the Principality of Albania, L912 L913 Lis. The effort to prevent the outbreak of the Second Balkan "War, 1913 437 149. The Treaty of Bucharest, August L0, L913 439 150. The Greco-Serbian alliance, L913 44] 151. The Treaty of Constantinople, 1913 443 152. The projected Austrian intervention in Serbia in L913 443 L53. Naval and military conversations between England and France, L905 1912. -ill 154. Military conversations between England and Belgium, 1906-1912 446 155. The attempted An^lo-tiertnan naval agreement, L907 1914 447 150. The projected Anglo-German accord, 1914 449 157. The London naval conference of L909 451 158. The Roman question, 1871-1914 158 159. Franco-German relations, 1S7 1-1914 463 1(50. The growth of European armaments in relation to European diplomacy 1ST 1-1914 » 468 Appendix 1. Documents 475 Appendix II. Collections of treaties and diplomatic documents most frequently cited 482 I mlex 483 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, 1871-1914. INTRODUCTION. The diploma* ic history of Europe from 1870 to 1914 falls naturally into four rather sharply defined periods: (1) 1870-1878. From the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War to the Congress of Berlin. (2) 1878-1890. From the Congress of Berlin to the retirement of Bismarck. (3) 1890-1904. From the retirement of Bismarck to the opening of the Russo-Japanese War. (4) 1904-1914. From the opening of the Russo-Japanese War to the beginning of the World War. A section of this volume is devoted to each of these periods. Ar- ticles which overlap any of the periods are placed in the section devoted to the period with which they seem most naturally connected. SECTION I. 1870-1878. During the earlier part of this period nearly everything of much importance in the diplomatic history of Europe was connected with the Franco-Prussian War. In view of the importance of the trans- action at (he lime and of (he significance attaching to some of them in connection with the World War quite a number of articles bearing <>n the diplomatic hist< ry of the Franco-Prussian War are included. There are articles on the effort to prevent the outbreak of the war (1), the protection of the neutrality of Belgium and of Luxemburg (2 and 3), German seizure of neutral property during the war (I), and on the sale of munitions of war to belligerents (•">). The col- lapse of the Second Empire on September 4, 1870, raised a prob- lem, which is dealt with in the article on the recognition of the Government of National Defence (<">). An article (8) is devoted to the adjustment of the Black Sea question which arose out of the action of Russia in declaring in October, L870, that it would no longer he bound by the terms of the Treaty of Paris (1856) rela- tive to the Black Sea. There are also articles dealing with the diplomatic aspects of the taking of Rome by the Italian Governmenl ■in September. L870 (7). on the preliminaries of peace (9), and (9) 10 on the Treaty of Frankfort (10). An article on the German argu- ments for the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine states the reason put forward by Germany in attempted justification of the annexation of that region and points out the real reasons for that action (11). The series dealing with the Franco-Prussian War ends with an article describing the manner in which the evacuation of France by the German armies was brought about in the years 1871-1873 (12). After the Franco-Prussian War and until his retirement in 1S90, Bismarck dominated the international affairs of Europe to a degree seldom paralleled by any other individual. Since the final over- throw of Napoleon in 1815 the only person who exercised an influence at all comparable with that of Bismarck in the years indicated was Metternich in the period 1815-184:8. From 1871 on Bismarck's chief and almost exclusive aim in foreign policy was to preserve for Germany the gains she had made by the Franco- Prussian War. As the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine made the restoration of a really friendly feeling between France and Germany impossible, Bismarck was haunted with the fear lest France should find allies and thereby a coalition hostile to Germany would develop. Bis- marck, therefore, bent his efforts toward securing the complete isolation of France. His success was remarkably speedy and com- plete. It was secured and maintained throughout the period by the arrangement commonly called the League of the Three Emperors, on which an article has been included (13). The article on the Franco-German war scare of 1875 (14) has a close connec- tion with this topic, since it shows the kind of danger to which France was constantly exposed owing to the isolation forced upon her by Bismarck. In this period European diplomacy was concerned almost wholly with European affairs. The problems of Asia and Africa did not engage the attention of diplomatists in any very large measure until the following period. There are. however, in this section two articles dealing with the Far East. One relates to the Kuldja affair (16), the other describes Chino-Japanesc relations, 1872-1876 (15). During the latter years of the period the most important features of European diplomacy arose out of the Eastern Question, as the problem of the existing status and future disposition of the Ottoman Empire was then called. Turkish misrule, especially in the Balkan Peninsula in the years 1875-1877, was the occasion for a series of negotiations involving all the states which bad signed the Treaty of Paris (1856) and the Balkan principalities. These difficulties, which in their diplomatic aspects are treated in the article entitled the Eastern question, 1875-1877 (17). finally resulted in the Russo- Turkish War of 1877-1878. Nearly all of the remaining articles in- 11 eluded in this section relate to that war and the settlement which grew out of it. As the settlement was the cause of great dissatis- faction in many different quarters and created conditions which had a large influence in bringing about the World War, several articles dealing with various aspects of the matter have been in- cluded. There are articles on the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876 (18), on the understanding between Russia and AYistria-Hungary shortly before the Russo-Turkish War began (19), on the alliance between Russia and Roumania during the war (20), on the Treaty of San Sic fa no arranged by Kussia and Turkey at the close of the war (21). en the Congress of Berlin (22), which revised this treaty and arranged the final settlement. In view of the importance of the settlement, a series of five articles (23-27) deals separately with the case of each State, except Turkey, which had a direct territorial in- terest at stake in the settlement arranged for the Balkan Peninsula. A number of articles dealing with problems which arose out of stipulations included in the Treaty of Berlin will be found in the sec- tions to which they seem most appropriately attached. The series dealing with the Eastern question closes with an article on the Eng- lish protectorate over Cyprus, 1878-1914 (28), that island having been acquired from Turkey by Great Britain on the eve of the assembling of the Congress of Berlin. Soon after the adjournment of the Congress of Berlin Bismarck obtained from Austria-Hungary a small installment of recompense for the assistance he had there rendered to the Dual Monarchy. This took the form of a release for Germany from the obligation which Prussia had contracted in 1866 by article 5 of the Treaty of Prague whereby Prussia was bound to permit the people of North Schleswig, an overwhelmingly Danish district, to determine by free vote whether they should be returned to Denmark. The final article of the sec- tion (29) deals with this matter. SECTION II. — 1878-1890. At the Congress of Berlin Bismarck professed to play the role of " honest broker," i. e., to seek no personal or German interest, but to act as the impartial friend of all parties and to facilitate the ar- rangement of a satisfactory adjustment. Whether or not he actually did seek to play that role is a matter about which there is, perhaps, loom for a difference of opinion. Russia, at any rate, was aggrieved at the settlement reached, and held that Bismarck had sacrificed the interest of Russia to promote the advantage of Austria-Hungary. The arrangement known as the League of the Three Emperors there- fore no longer met the requirements of the situation from the stand- point of Bismarck. He could no longer count upon the friendship of Russia to such a degree as to assure the complete isolation of 12 France. Some other device must be substituted. Bismarck speedily found the necessary arrangement in the form of a close alliance with Austria-Hungary. This was the (Austro-German) Dual Alliance, to the formation of which an article is devoted (33). Three years after the formation of this alliance the arrangement, from the Bis- marckian point of view, was improved by the entrance of Italy into the combination. This is dealt with in the article on the formation of the Triple Alliance (34). It is followed by articles on the re- newals of the Triple Alliance (35) and oh Roumania and its relation to that alliance (36). Bismarck was able to assure the continued complete isolation of France by entering into his well-known rein- surance treaty with Russia. An article deals with that subject (37). The affairs of southeastern Europe occupied the attention of dip- lomatists much less in this period than in the preceding one. A series of three articles deals with more important problems of that character: the Bulgarian Revolution of 1885 (38); the Serbo-Bul- garian War of 1885-86 (39) ; and the pacific blockade of Greece. 1886 (40). The readiness of Bismarck, several times displayed between 1871 and 1890, to threaten France with war lends interest to the article on the Schnaebele incident (11). which was a good example of that form of Bismarckian method. Throughout the entire period, but especially during the later years. questions arising out of the colonial enterprises of Europe, espe- cially in Africa, occupied much attention. As late as 1878 only a small portion of Africa, consisting chiefly of the Mediterranean coast, the southern end of the continent, and scattered regions along the west coast, was under the control of European States. Within the next dozen years nearly all of the hitherto unclaimed portion of the continent passed under European control. Rivalry for pos- session and the adjustment of boundaries gave rise to a series of dip- lomatic problems. A large number of such questions were settled by agreements between the powers directly interested. There were also some important general settlements of difficult African prob- lems. Problems of this sort were so numerous and involved that de- tailed treatment here is out of question. But a number of articles have been included which deal with some of the most significant fea- tures of the general problem. Among these are the articles upon the partition of Africa. 1878-L s s"t ( 13) ; the establishment of the French protectorate over Tunis, 1881 (14) ; the Dual Control over Egyptian finances. L876-1883 (45); the British occupation of Egypt, 1882- 1914 (-If.) ; the Soudan question, 1881-1899 (IT) : the acquisition of Madagascar by France. fs;si>-ls9T (18) : Anglo-German rivalry in Southwest Africa. 1883-1886 (49); Anglo-German rivalry in East Africa. 1885-1890 (50); the question of West Africa, 1880-1898 13 (51) ; the formation of the Congo Free State, 1876-1885 (52) ; the Berlin Conference, 1884-1885 (53) ; the delimitation of European colonies in Central Africa, 1885-1899 (54) ; the international status of the Transvaal or South African Eepublic, 1877-1884 (55) ; British relations to the Boer Republics, 1884-1899 (56) ; and the question of the Portuguese colonies (57). In this period Asiatic problems had not become as numerous or as important as they were to prove in the following period. But (here were a number of such .problems. The section, therefore, closes with, a series of six articles dealing with Asiatic matters: The Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, 1878-1887 (58) ; the British acquisition of Upper Burma, 1885-86 (59) ; Franco-Siamese rela- tions, 1893-1904 (60) ; European encroachments in the Far East, issj-issl (61) ; the Franco-Chinese War, 1882-1885 (62) ; the jour- neys of William II to the Near East, the first of which took place shortly before the end of the period (63). SECTION III.— 1890-1904. In the period 1890-1904 the problems of diplomacy in large meas- ure arose out of or were greatly influenced by four new factors affecting the international situation: (1 ) The collapse or abandonment near the beginning of the period of Bismarck's system for securing the isolation of France through the Triple Alliance in combination with his reinsurance treaty with Russia. (2) The development of the (Franco-Russian) Dual Alliance. (3) The adoption by Germany about 1890 of the policy of Welt- politik. (4) The Chino-Japanese War, 1894-95, and the changed situa- tion in the Far East, due in large measure to the war. Nearly all of the articles in the section deal with problems which were caused or Avere much affected by one or more of these influences. A few, however, deal with other matters. The section opens with an article on the dismissal of Bismarck, considered in relation to the foreign policy of Germany (64). It is naturally followed by an article on the development of the (Franco- Russian) Dual Alliance (66). After articles on the Zanzibar- Heligoland treaty of 1890 (67) and on the Dreyfus affair (68). there follows a series of articles dealing with matters arising out of the affairs of southeastern Europe and the Near, East. The first of the series aims to set forth the -history of railway concessions in Turkey other than the Bagdad Railway (69). Others in the series .leal with Greco-Turkish War of 1897 (70), the closely connected Cretan question (1868-1898) (71), and the Armenian question from 1878 to 1897 (72). The series ends with an article which 14 describes the action of the leading States in regard to the Serbian Revolution of 1903 (73), and aims to point out the significance of that occurrence for the course of later events in southeastern Europe, In this period, as in the preceding ones, African problems fre- quently occupied the attention of diplomatists. A series of articles is, therefore, devoted to that general topic. The clash between Italy and Abyssinia, growing out of. the colonial enterprises of Italy in the Red Sea region, is dealt with in the first article of the series, entitled Relations between Italy and, Abyssinia, 1803-1900 (75). The narrative is carried down to the time when Italy desisted from all effort to assert any claim of control over Abyssinia and acknowl- edged its entire independence. The article on the Fashoda affair 1898-1899 (7G) explains the settlement of conflicting territorial claims in the upper Nile region and makes plain the importance of that settlement in clearing the way for the development of the Entente Cordiale. From 1882 until after the Fashoda affair French resentment against Great Britain was constantly increasing, largely on account of colonial rivalry. Shortly before this hostile feeling reached its climax in the dispute over Fashoda an attempt was made to utilize" the possible opportunity thereby presented to bring about closer and more amicable relations between France and Germany. The idea of this project and the reasons for its failure are explained in the article on the attempted Franco-German accord of 1898 (77). Events connected with the Boer War are handled in the articles on the Kruger telegram (78), the seizure of German ships during the war (79), and the Treaty of Vereeniging (80). The beginning of the Morocco question is considered in an article on France and Morocco, 1894-1904 (81). The Congo question, after the establishment of the Congo Free State, is treated in its diplo- matic aspect in the article on the annexation of the Congo Free State by Belgium, 1889-1908 (82). A group of 15 articles, the largest in the section, bears witness to the important role which after 1895 the Far East played in diplo- matic history. The first of these articles deals with Chino-Japanese rivalry in Korea, 1876-1894 (83), thereby throwing light on the outbreak of the Chino-Japanese War. The peace at the close of the war is treated in articles on the Treaty of Shimonoseki (84) and on the retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula by Japan (85). An article on the ''Open-door policy" in China, 1895-1904 (86), deals with a most significant phase of the general Chinese problem, while the encroachments of European states upon portions of Chi- nese territory, seeming to foreshadow dismemberment, are handled in articles on the leasing of Kiaou-Chau by Germany (87), the Cassini convention (88), the leasing of Port Arthur by Russia (89), the leasing of Wei-Hai-Wei by Great Britain (90). The 15 Boxer Uprising, due in large measure to these encroachments, is treated in its diplomatic bearing (91). Matters connected directly with events and circumstances which led to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War are treated in articles on the formation of the Anglo- Japanese alliance of 1902 (92), Russo-Japanese rivalry in Korea, 1895-1904 (93), the Russian advance into Manchuria, 1895- 1903 (91), the convention for the evacuation of Manchuria, 1902 (95), and the diplomatic negotiations preceding the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War (96). The series closes with an article on the abrogation of the Japanese extra-territoriality treaties of Japan (97). The section concludes with articles on the First Hague Conference (98) and on the Anglo-French arbitration treaty of 1903 (99), the latter of which did much to pave the way for the Entente Cordiale. SECTION IV. — 1904-1914. From the standpoint of diplomatic history during 1901—1914 the events of most far-reaching influence were: (1) The negotiation of the convention of April 8, 1904, between France and England. (2) The signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth. (3) The Turkish Revolution of July, 1908. It would not be difficult to point out for nearly every matter dealt with in the articles under this period that there is a close and easily discoverable connection with some one of the three events. The section, therefore, appropriately opens with articles on the formation of the Entente Cordiale (100), and on the secret negotia- tions between the Kaiser and the Czar in 1905 and 1906 in conse- quence of the new international situation (101). For the Russo-Japanese War there is an article on the Dogger Bank incident (103), another on the seizure of neutral ships by Russia during the war (102), while the negotiation and terms of peace at the close of the war are described in the article on the Treaty of Portsmouth (101). As that treaty contributed largely to the cre- ation of a new situation in the Far East, the series of articles which follows seeks to state the essential facts in regard to the most im- portant of the diplomatic transactions arising out of that situation. Since Japanese influence was paramount in the Far East, and that, in turn, depended in considerable measure upon the relations between Japan and England, there is an article on the renewals of the Anglo- Japanese alliance in 1905 and 1911 (105). Important phases of the general Chinese problem are dealt with in articles on the open-door policy in China, 1904-1914 (106) ; spheres of influence in China, 1897-1904 (107) ; railway concessions in China (108) ; and on Chino- Japanese relations, 1905-1914 (109). There are also articles dealing - 16 with Japan's relations with Korea. 11)04-1010 (110), and with China and the Six Power Loan Syndicate, 1908-1913 (111). The prob- lem of the outlying and loosely connected portions of the Chinese Empire is considered in its diplomatic aspects in the articles on the question of South Manchuria, 1905-1918 (112) ; the Thibet question, 1880- MM I ( 11-".) : the Mongolian question, 1881-1915 (114). The theatrical journey of the Kaiser to Tangier and his speech there. (March, 100.')) precipitated the first of the European en over Morocco. This action by Germany was obviously influenced by the supposedly weakened condition of France, due to the fact that her Russian ally was stil! engaged in war with Japan and was already threatened with revolution. It was also the German counter- stroke to the formation of the Entente Cordiale. There can he little doubt that Germany hoped and expected that the new arrange- ment between France and England would thereby he destroyed or so seriously weakened that it would no Longer have any real value for France. The episode as a whole, including the Algeciras Confer- ence which terminated it. is treated in the article entitled, The Morocco crisis of 1905-G (Id). Other important matters closely connected with this crisis are treated in the articles on the resignation of Delcasse. 1905 (116), Italy and Morocco (117), and Spain and Morocco (118). Another somewhat related topic is treated in the article on the Red Sea convention, December 13, 1906 (110). At intervals for many years the Long continuing internal weakness of Persia made that country occasionally the subject of diplomatic discussion. After the Persian Revolution of 1000 such questions came up frequently. Russia and England, with territorial posses- sions bordering- on Persia and with claims to important interests in the country, were the Slates most directly concerned. Put Germany, on account of the Bagdad Railway and its ambitions in the Near East, was also interested. An article on the Persian question. 1000-1014 (120), deals with the matter. .V separate article on the Potsdam accord, 1010. to be found further along- (138), has also a bearing on the subject. The continued solidity of the (Franco-Russian) Dual Alliance, the attempt of Germany to destroy the Entente Cordiale in the iirst Morocco crisis, the growing Anglo-German antagonism, and the desire of Russia for speedy recovery from the disaster of the Rus io Japanese War and the revolutionary movement which followed it, led in L907 to the drawing together of Russia, France, and England. This important development is treated in the article on the formation of the Triple Entente. 1007 (121). After nearly a century, marked by frequent dissension, the per- sonal union between Sweden and Norway was dissolved in 1905- 1007. The diplomatic side of this adjustment is treated in an article 17 on the separation of Norway from Sweden (122). A separate article deals with the closely related topic, the Baltic and North Sea conven- tions of 1908 (123). This is followed by an article on the Second Hague Conference, 1907 (124). At the Reval interview, June. 1908, to which an article is devoted (125), Edward VII and Nicholas II were reported to have come to an agreement upon the reforms they were prepared to demand of the Turkish Government in regard to Macedonia. A desire to antici- pate the presentation of these demands is believed to have precipitated the revolution in Turkey long in process of preparation by the Young Turks. This revolution, to which an article is given (126), was the starting point and in large measure the cause for a chain of important events leading directly to the World War. Those of the events which occurred in 1908-9 and a number of other mat- ters closely connected with them are handled in a series of articles, the first of which deals with the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (127). It is followed by an article on the Austro-Hungarian occu- pation of Novi-Bazar (128), and that by another on the Bulgarian declaration of independence (129), which came immediately after and as a direct consequence of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The action of Austria-Hungary in annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was deeply resented by Serbia, precipitated a crisis, which nearly led to a general European war. The matter is dealt with in the article entitled the Bosnian crisis, 1908-9 (130). At the moment of the occurrence of the Turkish Kevolution and for some weeks afterwards there seemed to be good reason for the belief that the Young Turk'; could and would attempt to carry out the attractive program of reforms included in their profession of principles. Whatever possibility there may have been for the reali- zation of that expectation was destroyed by the action of Austria- Hungary and Bulgaria. The developments of the next three years showed the Young Turks accentuating instead of removing the evils which afflicted the Christian subjects of the Sultan. This feature of the situation brought to the front important questions which in one form or another had frequently been the subject of diplomatic consideration. Macedonia and Crete were especially under discus- sion at that time. The Macedonian question from 1878 to 1912 is dealt with in two articles (131 and 132), the Cretan question from 1897 to 1912 also in two articles (133 and 131). The settlement of the Morocco question, arranged by the Algeciras Conference in 1906. served to prevent the tension over the subjects between France and Germany from again becoming acute until in 1911. But there were meanwhile difficulties springing out of the matter. One of them is dealt with in the article on the Casablanca 53706—18 2 18 affair (135). Other difficulties were adjusted for a time by the Morocco convention of 1909, to which an article is given (136). The most dangerous stage in the entire Morocco controversy, includ- ing the settlement finally reached in the convention of November 4. is treated in the article entitled. The Morocco crisis of 1911 (137). From about L901 to 1908 Tripoli, nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire, passed more and more under the control of Italy, though at least a semblance of Turkish authority was constantly maintained. The Turkish Revolution somewhat arrested this tendency, because the Young Turks set out to check it. Disputes over that situation finally resulted in 1911 in the outbreak of war between Italy and Turkey. The article on the Tripoli question, 1902-1911 (141) deals with this problem. In the article on the Treaty of Lausanne the negotiation and terms of the peace at the close of the war are de- scribed (142). • A series of articles is allotted to the diplomatic history of the Balkan Avars (1912-13). The first of the series, the formation of the Balkan Alliance, aims to set forth what is known of the genesis of that league (143). It is followed by an article dealing with the unsuccessful effort of diplomacy to avert the outbreak of war between the Balkan Alliance and Turkey (144). For the negotia- tions and terms of the important treaty which brought peace at the close of that war between the Balkan allies and Turkey there is an article entitled The Treaty of London, 1913 (145). As the problem of adjusting numerous conflicting claims in. regard to Albania was an important factor in the negotiation of that treaty and as the Albanian question played a very important part in the whole Balkan situation in 1912 ami 1913, two articles have been al- lotted to the matter. One deals with the Albanian question in the Balkan crisis of 1913 (146), the other with the establishment of the Principality of Albania. L912-43 (147). The diplomatic history of the Second Balkan .War is treated in three articles, one dealing with the effort of diplomacy to adjust the dispute between Bulgaria and Serbia and Greece which preceded the outbreak of the war (148).; (he second with the Treaty of Bucharest (lb'): and the third with the Greco-Serbian alliance of 1913 (150). While Bulgaria was engaged in the Second Balkan War Turkey took advantage of the opportunity thus afforded to re- conquer part of the territory recently lost to Bulgaria. The peace at the close of this Turco-Bulgar War is dealt with in the article on the Treaty of Constantinople, L913 (151). A group of six articles deals with matters which belong to the closing years of the period and have a close connection with the World War. One aims to set forth what is known about the projected Austro-Hungarian intervention in Serbia in 1913 (152), 19 another deals with the Anglo-French military and naval conversa- tions, 1905-1912 (153), and a third with the military conversations between England and Belgium, 1906-1912 (154). The other three deal with various phases of the effort of diplomacy to make less acute the antagonism between Germany and England. One of these relates particularly to the attempt to arrange some agreement between the two countries as to naval programs (155). Another deals with the projected agreement of 1914, which is reported to have reached the stage for the signatures when the World War broke out (156). The third treats of the London naval conference of 1909 (157). The section concludes with a group of three articles dealing with matters of importance for the entire period 1870 to 1914; the Roman question, 1871-1914 (158) ; Franco-German relations, 1871-1914 (159) ; the growth of European armaments in relation to European diplomacy, 1871-1914 (160). SECTION I.— 1870-1878. 1. THE EFFORT TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR, JULY 3 TO 19, 1870. 1. INTRODUCTION. The victory of Prussia in the War of 1866 led immediately to the creation of the North German Confederation and to the conclusion of military treaties between Prussia and the South German States not yet members of the Confederation. A new situation was thereby created in Europe. Its most marked feature was mutual suspicion and distrust in Germany and France. A belief that war would soon break out became widely prevalent in both countries. Tension be- tween France and Prussia rapidly increased. In France the chauvinist spirit was promoted by the ultra-Imperialists, who felt that unless the prestige of France was restored the Empire would be overthrown. In Germany the enmity toward Fiance was nursed by Bismarck, who thought that the South German States, if they came to fear French aggression, would join the North German Confederation. 2. THE II0HENZ0LLERN CANDIDACY FOR THE SPANISH THRONE. Meantime the Spanish throne, vacant by revolution (1868), had been offered to several princes, among them Prince Leopold of HohenzOllern. Leopold at first declined, but in 1870, after the return from Madrid of Bismarck's secret agent, Von Versen, the offer was renewed and accepted. The acceptance, announced by the Havas Agency July 3 and published in the Paris papers July 4, 5, created the greatest excitement and indignation in France (Fester, I, 122, 124, 129-133). The Emperor Napoleon and the ministry (Emile Ollivier, prime minister, and the Due de Gramont, minister of for- eign affairs) regarded the affair as a Prussian intrigue designed to humiliate France and to weaken her in a military way, in case of a war between France and Prussia ; and the Government at once took the ground that France could never permit a Hohenzollern to ascend the Spanish throne. The official declaration to the chambers, July 6, affirmed the belief that " the good sense of the German people " (21) 22 and the "friendship of the Spanish people" would effect the with- drawal of Prince Leopold, otherwise " We shall know how to fulfill our duty without hesitation and without feebleness." (Angeberg, I, 20; Fester, I, 134.) 3. WITHDRAWAL OF THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDACY. To a request for explanations, the Prussian Government replied that it was not officially aware of the affair, which was a purely Hohenzollern family matter (Lesourd to Gramont, July 4; King William to Queen Augusta, July 5; Angeberg, I, 16; Fester, I, 123, 125). The French Government made it known that if Leopold be- came King of Spain Fiance would regard it as a sufficient cause for -war, and the courts of Europe were requested to use their influence with Prussia and Spain. Marshall Prim, the actual head of the Spanish Government, declared himself willing to "facilitate"* Leo- pold's retreat, and July 10 he sent an agent to Berlin to urge the withdrawal of the acceptance (Mercier to Gramont, July 7, 9, 10; Angeberg, I. 32, 56, 7:'.; Fester, II, 12, 37, 62). The English Gov- ernment, most active of all the powers in endeavoring to prevent war. represented to France that Prince Leopold on the throne of Spain could not be a serious danger to a great country like France and regretted the aggressive language of the French Government (Letters of Granville and Lyons, July 5-8; Fester, I, 128, II, 4, 12, 15, 27; Angeberg, I, 18, 23, 24, 40, 41, 45, 48, 51); represented at Berlin that Leopold's candidacy was of no importance to Prussia, that Leo- pold would find the position a difficult one, and urged the Prussian Government to "discourage" the project (Granville to Loftus, July 6; Fester, I. Ill; Angeberg, 1, 24): and very strongly urged upon the Spanish Government not to give effect to'the candidacy (Gran- ville to Layard, July 7; Fester. II, 8; Angeberg, I. 36, :'>7). Tic Austrian Government held the same language a! Madrid (Beust to Metternich, July 11: Angeberg, I. 87; Fester. II, 80), and at Berlin, while deprecating the attitude of France, expressed the con- viction that "the wisdom of the King and his influence as head of the Hohenzollern house will be utilized to prevent so unfortunate ■a development." (Beust lo Munch, July 6; Fester, I. 141; Angeberg, I, 21.) The Russian Government, after some delay (Fleury to Gramont, July 7, 9; Buchanan to Granville, July 9; Fester. II, 9, 45, 54), made similar representations at Berlin (Fleury to Gramont, July 12; Fester, II, 95). The Italian Govern- ment strongly urged the Spanish Government to "come to some arrangement/' (Layard to Granville, July 11: Fester, II, 83). Meanwhile the French Government, through Benedetti at Ems, re- peatedly urged upon King William to refuse his consent to Leopold's becoming King of Spain. The king failed to comply with the request, 23 but said that if Leopold should withdraw he would approve the withdrawal. (Benedetti to Gramont, July 9; King William to Queen A-iigusta, July 10; Fester, II, 45, 47, 63; Angeberg, I, 55. 56.) July 12, Prince Anthony of Hohenzollern, moved bj' the evident 1 hough not expressed desire of King William (King William to Prince Anthony, July 10; King William to Queen Augusta, July 11; Fester, II, 64, 75), by the desire that a family matter should not be responsible for a European war (Prince Anthony to King William, July 11; Fester, II, 74), and perhaps by representations of the French Government conveyed through the Roumanian agent Strat (Ollivier, Hidden Causes of the Franco-Prussian War, 169-175), withdrew on behalf of his son, Prince Leopold, the acceptance of the Spanish Crown (Prince Anthony to Prim, July 12; Fester, II, 93; Angeberg, I. 106). 4. THE DEMAND FOR " FUTURE GUARANTEES." To the great surprise of every one concerned this did not satisfy the Emperor Napoleon or the Due de Gramont, although a majority of the ministry would have been content with it. In opposition to very strong remonstrances by the English ambassador (Lyons to Granville, July 12; Fester, II, 109) and without consulting the ministry collectively the Emperor authorized Gramont to demand of King William that he should give "the assurance that he would nol again authorize that candidacy." (Gramont to Benedetti, July 12; Fester, II, 109; Angeberg, I, 95.) 5. THE EMS DISPATCH. The King refused, and upon a repetition of the demand he refused again (Benedetti to Gramont, July 13; Fester, II, 116, 117; Ange- berg, I, 107-109), and on July 13 sent through Abeken to Bismarck the famous Ems dispatch, relating the new demands of Benedetti and leaving Bismarck to decide "whether the new demand of Bene- detti should not be communicated to our representatives abroad and to the press." (Fester, II. 123; Ollivier, Hidden Causes, t84.) While the withdrawal of Prince Leopold "lifted a stone from the heart" of King William, Bismarck so much desired the war that he thought of resigning. The King's telegram furnished him with an unexpected opportunity. He at once "edited" the telegram in such a way that it would have "the effect over yonder of a red flag on the Gallic bull," and in this form gave it to the newspapers (Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman, II, 96-102 ; Ollivier, Hidden Causes, 281 ff.). The next day, July 14, the telegram appeared in the Paris papers, and had exactly the effect Bismarck desired (Fester, II, 143; Ollivier, 308). 24 6. OUTBREAK OF WAR. Austria ami Russia felt that the demand for "future guarantees" placed France entirely in the wrong, ami that nothing further could l>e done (Bloomfield to Granville, July L3; Fleury to Gramont, July L5; Fester, II, 141, 153). England thought the demands wholly unjustified, bul still worked to effeel a settlement (Letters of Lyons and Granville, July 11 -19; Fester. 1L 117 149, 165, L78). duly L5 the French Government adopted measures equivalent to a declara- tion of Avar, and July 19 the Prussian Government was officially informed that a state of war existed (Ollivier, 335 365). BIBLIOGRAPH i . Falat. Edmund. Bibliographic generate de la guerre de L870 1S71 ; repertoire alphabetique el raisonne* des publications de toute nature concernant la guerre franco-allemande parties en France et a l'etranger. (Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1896.) Contains data as to all important publications on the subject. The mosl essential letters are referred to in the text. The follow- ing collections contain most of the published documents of an official character, together with other material : • Fester. Richard. Briefe, AJktenstiicke und Regesten zur Geschichte der Hohenzollernscheu Thronkandidatur in Spanien. 2 vols. (Teubner, Leipzig und Berlin, lid: 1 ..) Contains diplomatic corre- spondence, extracts from newspapers, and other material, arranged chronologically, and accompanied with bibliography to material dealing with events not included in the collection. The most con- venient collection for a study of the subject. Angeberg, Comte d*. Recueil des traites, conventions, actes, notes. capitulations et pieces diplomatiques concernant la guerre Franco- Allemande. 5 vols. (Amyot, Paris, L873.) Material for the period July 3-19 is contained in vol. I. pp. 12-206. Contains the principal diplomatic despatches, all in French. Much less useful than Fester. British Parliamentary Papers. Correspondence respecting the Denotations preliminary to the war between France and Prussia : lsTO [C 167.]. France. Enquete parlementaire sur les actes du gouvernemenl de la defense nationale: depositions el (emoins. 4 vols. (Paris, 1S7:>.) Das Staatsarchiv : Sammlung der offiziellen AJ$tenstucke zur Ge- schichte der Gegenwart. (Berlin, 1870.) German semiofficial pub- lication. Vol. XIX of this collection covers the period in question. co\ i iM pob \i;v accoi \ rs. Aheken. IF. Ein schlichtes Leben in bewegter Zeit (Berlin, 1898) : Benedetti, Comte. Ma mission en Prusse (Paris, 1871); Beust, F. F. Graf von, Aus drei Yiertel-Jahrhunderten. '2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1887) : 25 Bismarck, Prince. Bismarck the Man and the Statesman, being the Reflections and Reminiscences of Prince Bismarck, 2 vols. (Harpers, N. Y., 1899), translated under the supervision of A. J. Butler; Gramont, Due de, La France el la Prusse avant la guerre (Paris, 1872); King Charles of Roumania, Aus dem Leber) Konig Karls von Roumanien, I vols. (Stuttgart, L894-1900) ; Loftus, Augustus, Diplomatic Reminiscences L862 is?!), 2 vols. (London. L894). 011ivier,E. L'empire liberal. IT vols. (Paris, 1895-1914) . The essentia] matter on the beginnings of the war of 1870 contained in (his book has been extracted and translated under the title, The Franco-Prussian War and its Hidden Causes. (Little, Brown and Co., Boston, L912.) Russell, W. II. My Diary During the Last Greal War. (London, 1871.) SK('<)\I)AI:V WORKS. Of the innumerable histories dealing with the origin of the war of L870 Hie following are perhaps the most essential: Delbruck, II. Der [Jrsprung des Krieges von 1870. (Walther, Berlin, L893.) La Gorce, Pierre de. Histoire du second empire. T vols. ( Paris. 1894 1905.) Judicious, well-balanced treatment. Vol. VI for the beginnings of (lie war. Marcks, E. Otto von Bismarck, ein Lebensbild. (Stuttgart, 1915.) Sorel, A. Histoire diplomatique de la guerre franco-allemande. •1 vols. ( Paris. 1875.) Rose. J. II. The Development of European Nations. I. ch. 1. Fifth edition. (New York, Putnam, 1916.) Sybel, II. von. (Die Begrundung des deutschen Reichs durch AVilliclm I. 5th revised edition.. 7 vols. (Munich and Leipzig, L889 1894.) Strongly biased. I»m Ictsed upon Prussian archives. 2. THE PROTECTION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY DURING THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR. 1. DANGER TO BELGIAN NEUTRALITY. The outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War brought danger to Belgian neutrality. Appropriate action to meet the situation was promptly taken by the Belgian Government. On July 15, the day the decision for war was made at Paris, the French ambassador at Brussels was informed that Belgium was firmly determined to main- tain its ueutrality and would be gratified to obtain from France an assurance that its neutrality would be respected. France gave the desired assurance on the following day. A similar proceeding brought forth a like declaration from Berlin on July 22. 26 Despite these assurances on the part of the belligerents there was i good deal of fear in England that Belgian neutrality would not b* respected. The chief and immediate cause of alarm was the publication of a draft treaty between France and Prussia drawn up in August, 1866, and allowing, under certain conditions, the annexation of Belgium by France. Publication took place in the London Times, July 25, 1870. 2. ENGLISH TREATIES WITH FRANCE AND PRUSSIA. On July 30 Granville sent identical notes to both France and Ger- many proposing a tripartite treaty, providing that if either party violated Belgian neutrality. England would cooperate with the other for its defense, but England's operations would be confined to Bel- gium. At the same time Russia and Austria, the other two signers of the 1839 treaty, were informed of this step. Both agreed to maintain Belgian neutrality, but declined to enter into any new agreement. Russia making such entrance conditional to a much wider guarantee treaty. Bismarck at once accepted the English project. France raised certain verbal objections, but finally agreed to* accept. (Statement of Gladstone. Aug. 8, Hansard, vol. 203, p. 1699, and of Granville, ibid., vol. 203, p. 1754.) 3. DISCUSSIONS IN BRITISH PARLIAMENT. Meanwhile a debate took place in Parliament during the period July 30-August 10. Almost all participants, with the exception of certain pacifist- | Hansard, vol. 203, p. I738ff), defended the policy of maintaining Belgian neutrality, if necessary, by force of arms. But the treaty was criticised (1) as weakening the position of the 1839 treaty, and (2) as likely to involve England, net only in Belgium but in other phases of the war as well. (See especially speech of Lord Cairns, Hansard, vol. 203, p. 1740.) Granville defended the treaty against the first charge by reference to the double agree- ment to maintain the Ottoman Empire, signed in 1856, the first by all the powers, the second by England. Austria, and France alone; and against the second charge by reciting the text of the treaty limiting British action to certain specified fields. (See his speech, Hansard, vol. 203, p. 1754.) IlIUElOtiKAPIIV. Morlev. .John. Life of William Ewart Gladstone. (New York, Macmillan, L913.) Short account. Morlev was in favor of Glad- stone's views. 27 Baguenault de Puchesse, G. La neutralite beige pendant ha guerre de L870-71. Revue d'histoire diplomatique, vol. 16, pp. 92-102 ( 1902). Walpole, Spencer. History of Twenty-five Years. Vol. II, I vols. (London. Longmans, 1904.) Also brief. Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond. Life of Lord Granville, H. 39-42. (London, Longmans, 1005.) Hansard, T. C. Debates, vol. 203, passim British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 60, pp. 10-13, 841-842, 948. Parliamentary Papers. Franco-German War. No. 1 (1871). Das Staatsarchiv, vol. 19, documents listed on p. V, and vol. 20, p. III. 3. THE PROTECTION OF LUXEMBURG NEUTRALITY DURING THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR. 1. INTRODUCTION. An affair of some importance, particularly in the light of the events of 1014, is the German allegation made during the Franco- Prussian War that the French were violating the neutrality of Luxem- burg. England evinced an interest in this charge and the matter, although finally explained satisfactorily, brought up a point in regard to the position of neutral States in war time which shows Bismarck's policy in this respect and which furnishes an interesting comparison to the German violation of Belgian neutrality in 1014. 2. THE GERMAN ALLEGATION. On December 3, 1870, Bismarck declared that the Prussian Gov- ernment could no longer consider itself bound to respect Luxem- burg's neutrality in the military operations of the German Army since there was no longer any doubt of a " flagrant violation of the neutrality of the Grand Duchy in the transit [of French soldiers] through it for the purpose of entering the active French forces, in the official further:) nee thereof by a functionary of the French Govern- ment, and in the toleration of such conduct by the Grand Ducal Gov- ernment." (Bismarck to Bernstorff, Circular Note, Dec 3, 1870, British Parliamentary Papers. Luxemburg. No. 1 (1871), pp. 1-2). Luxemburg thereupon produced a menacing letter in which the Prussian Government had threatened occupation of Luxemburg as early as November 27, 1870. The Grand Duchy further declared that the French Vice Consul had been called and had given a full explanation of his proceedings with reference to the complaint made by Prussia. 3. THE ENGLISH PARTICIPATION. England, upon being informed of the note of December 3, re- served judgment for awhile: then on December 15 asked the Prus- 28 sian Government whether it had any present intention of acting on its charges. (Granville to Russell, Dec i:>, 1870, Ibid, p. 4.) It further, though still refraining from passing judgment until the facts were authenticated, protested to the Prussian Government against its summary action in declaring the treaty of L867 violated before proof had been given to the other signet's of a direct viola- tion. (Granville to Loftus, Dee. 17, L870, Ibid, pp. 6-7.) The question was thus raised as to whether a power is bound, before de- claring the guaranteed neutrality of a State to have been violated, to notify and consult with the other guarantors. Bismarck declared that no State was so bound. lie replied on December 24 that "the question is as to the military defence against military injuries which may be done to one of the belligerent Powers from the violation of the neutrality by the other: that every Power engaged in warfare is entitled to such a defence lias hitherto been uncontested by interna- tional law, and that the defence, if it is to be effectual, must take place at the proper time, lies in the nature of war." lie goes fur- ther and. although he notes that Germany did for the time confine itself to a communication of the state of affairs, adds: " But if Lord Granville expresses the opinion that even in such a case the course to be taken was that the Royal Government should bring its com- plaint of the violation of the neutrality before the other signataries of the Treaty, with the request that the operation of such a state of things should be taken into consideration, then 1 can not admit the justice of the demand so made upon us." (Bismarck to Bernstorff, Dec. 24, 1870, Ibid, pp. 31-32.) Bismarck said, however, that England could rest assured that no denunciation of the treaty of 1807 was intended, that no designs were cherished against Luxemburg, and. that only such measures were being taken bv Prussia as were necessarv for her militarv security. England accepted this statement and, noting Luxemburg's explana- tion, expressed the hope that the misunderstanding was settled and withdrew from the discussion. (Granville to Loftus, Jan. 7, 1871. Ibid. pp. 34 35.) 4. THE 1. 1 XEMBT RG EXPLANATION. In the meantime Luxemburg had explained the offences to Bis- marck on December If as purely commercial and personal matters in which it had had as a Government no part. It further declared that if any violation of neutrality had been committed, Germany had been much more a guilty party than France. (Servais to Bismarck, Dec 1 I, L870, Ibid., pp. 10-25.) Three days later Luxemburg ap- pealed to England for protection of her neutrality should need arise, pointing out "'that the neutrality conferred on certain States in Europe would no longer have any real existence if the existence of a 29 state constituted as neutral in virtue of a treaty could depend on the will of a single one of the contracting powers." (Servais to Harris, Dec. 17, 1870, Ibid., pp. 9-10.) Bismarck replied to Luxemburg that Prussia was not wholly satis- fied with the explanations and, asking for an investigation of a spe- cific instance, suggested a commissioner from Prussia to discuss affairs with Luxemburg. The Grand Duchy in turn welcomed the proposition, and after a satisfactory explanation of the specific case had been made to him, Bismarck declared that further action would depend only on the state of affairs in the future and the matter was dropped. BIBLIOGRAPHY. British Parliamentary Papers, Luxemburg, No. 1 (1871), contain the important documents. 4. GERMAN SEIZURE OF NEUTRAL PROPERTY DURING THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR, 1870-1871. 1. THE DUCLAIR INCIDENT. In the latter part of the year 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War, an incident occurred (spoken of as the "Duclair incident") which throws some light upon German conceptions of the rights of neutral property in warfare, more especially where the so-called droit d'angerie (right of angary) might seem to be involved. The incident caused considerable irritation in England. In the course of their military operations the necessity arose for the Germans of barring the course of the River Seine at Duclair. Enemy vessels being unavailable for the purpose, the Germans seized six British vessels and sank them in the river, the crews of the ves- sels being treated, it is said, with great brutality. . In a communication to Lord Odo Russell, British agent at Ver- sailles, dated December 26, 1870, Bismarck argued that the question at issue lav wholly outside the rules of international law, inasmuch as the problem was one which had never been discussed by inter- national jurists. He suggested, however, that the captains of the vessels, by refusing to enter into a "legal" contract which stipulated terms of payment for the use of the vessels, had themselves been guilty of an infraction of neutrality. But in a later communication, dated January 8, 1871, and in an interview with Lord Odo Russell, Bismarck expressed sincere regrets that the German troops had been obliged to take such action. He admitted the right of the British owners of the sunken vessels to an indemnity, and agreed that they should be fully compensated for (heir losses. Me claimed, however, that the sinking of the ships was 30 justified by international law. Still Later, on January 25, Bismarck Rsserted that the action taken was a "right in time of war [which] lias become a peculiar institute of international law, the jus angariae, which so high an authority as Sir Robert Phillimore defines thus: That a belligerent power demands and makes use of foreign ships, even such as are not in inland waters, but in ports and roadsteads within its jurisdiction, and even compels the crews to transport troops, ammunition, or implements of warfare." (Staatsarchiv, vol. 21, p. 96.) 2. TIIK SEIZI RE OK SWISS RAILWAY PROPERTY IX ALSACE. During the same war the German authorities in Alsace also seized for military use between six and seven hundred railway carriages belonging to the Centra] Swiss Railway, together with a considerable quantity of Austrian rolling stock, and kept this material in their possession for some time. BIBLIOGRAPHY. For accounts of the " Duclair incident." see the Aiynial Register for L870 (London. L871), p. 110: Hall. W. E., Treatise mi Interna- tional Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press. L909, 6th ed., ed. by J. B. At lay), pp. 742 743. For the diplomatic correspondence, see I )'Angeberg, Count, Recueil des (rahes. conventions, etc.. concernant la guerre franco-allemande (Paris, Amyot, L873), Vol. IV, Nos. i>ll. 920, 957; Staatsarchiv, vol. 21, Nos. 1498 1509; Parliamentary Papers. Franco-German •War, Xos. :> and 6 (1871). 5. THE SALE OF MUNITIONS OF WAR TO BELLIGERENTS DURING THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR. 1. AMERICAN SALES TO FRANCE. During (he Franco-Prussian War France was compelled to buy vast amounts of munitions of war from neutral nations. The War Department of the United States had been authorized by Congress in lsi'.s to sell surplus ordnance stores and continued these sales throughout the period of the war (3 Wharton's Digest of Interna- tional Law, p. 512). Indirectly the French Government purchased the bulk of the $10,000,000 sales of the year L870-71. In October, L870, a New York linn, purchasers of one-half of the munitions, came under suspicion as being agents of the French Government, and all further sale- lo this company were at (nice forbidden, although the United States executed its previous contracts (Congressional Globe, 42d Cong.. 2d sess., 1018). Congressional committees ap- 31 pointed to investigate charges of breach of neutrality reported that the sales of munitions were not made under such circumstances as to violate the obligations of the Government as a neutral power, since it could not be proved that sales were made to known agents of the French Government (S. Kept. 183, II. Kept. 46, 42d Cong., 2d sess). The Senate committee erred against international law and the ac- cepted policy of the United States Government in stating that "if, instead of sending agents, Louis Napoleon or Frederick William had personally appeared at the War Department to purchase arms it would have been lawful for us to sell to either of them, in pursuance of a national policy adopted by us prior to the commencement of hostilities" (S. Kept. 183, 42d Cong., 2d sess.). This extreme view is not upheld by such eminent publicists as Hall (International Law, ]). r>!)~) and Oppenheim (International Law, II, p. 377). •2. ENGLISH SALES TO FRANCE. Munitions to a smaller amount were purchased by France from private individuals in England. These sales were the cause for a formal protest on the part of Prussia, to which the British Govern- ment replied that England was not by international law 7 under obli- gation to prevent her subjects from committing such acts (Oppen- heim, International Law, II, p. 347; Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. 205, p. 784). :;. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE SALE OF MUNITIONS. By proclamation as well as by actual practice England and the United States recognized the right of the citizens of the respective countries to trade with the belligerents in contraband of war, subject to seizure in transit (Moore's Digest of International Law, VII, p. 973). Neutrality, therefore, enjoins upon a nation abstinence from taking part in any operation of war, but does not force upon the neutral the necessity of making a prohibition on the commercial enterprise of its citizens (Westlake, International Law, Part II, p. 1G1). This view has been consistently entertained for the past century by the United States and by nearly every European country. From the beginning of its national existence the executive department of the United States has upheld the doctrine of the legality of the sale of contraband (Washington, Neutrality Proclamation in American State Papers, Foreign Kelations, I, p. 140; 3 Jefferson's Works, p. 558 ; Pierce on the Crimean War, Richardson's Messages and Papers, Y, p. 327; Moore's Digest of International Law, VII, pp. 955-973). The doctrine has, however, been most clearly enunciated by the judicial department in the decision of Justice Story in the case of the " Santissima Trinidad." " There is nothing in our laws, or in the 32 Law of nations, that forbids our citizens from sending munitions of wai- to foreign ports for sale. It is a commercial adventure which no nation is bound to prohibit and which only exposes the persons engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation" (7 Wheaton, p. 340). The English view as to the sale of munitions in time of war is in exact harmony with the American view, and in the parliamentary debates during the Franco-Prussian War the House of Commons refused to legislate to prevent the sale of munitions by municipal law. declaring that British law v\as in accordance with international law and with the municipal law of other nations (Hansard's De- bates, vol 205, p. 7s".). In the case of La Riviere v. Morgan, over the legality of sales made directly to agents of the French Govern- ment by English citizens, the British court decided that such opera- tions were entirely legal (Law Reporter, 7 Chancery, 550). The English judicial as well as the executive department concurred in the American view of the practice of a neutral State. I. GERMAN DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE. Although Germany protested at the time of the Franco-Prussian War, she lias in practice subscribed to the English and American positions, as is shown by her sale of munitions during the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War (Gregory in American Journal of In- ternational Law. Oct., L905, p. 5)30; Hershey, International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War). A few countries have refused to subscribe to the doctrine as laid down by international law. Switzerland and Belgium prevented the sale of munitions during the Franco-Prussian War; but because of political prudence rather than because of the obligations of neutrality (Oppenheim, International Law, II, p. 377). .-,. THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON THE SALE OF MUNITIONS. The Hague Conference of L907 laid down as a principle to be fol- lowed for war on land and sea that "a neutral power is not called upon to prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one or the other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war. or, in general, of any- thing which can be of use to an army or fleet" (Hague Convention, V. art. 7. 1907). From the evidence it may be concluded that the neutrality laws were not in the past and are not now designed to interfere with commerce even in contraband of war. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Richardson, Messages and Papers, V; American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I; Debates in Congress, Congressional Globe, 42d Cong., 2d sess.; Debates in Parliament, Hansard Parliamentary 33 Debates, cciii-cev; Senate Report 183, 42d Cong., 2d sess. ; House Report 46, 42d Cong., 2d sess.; Scott, J. B., Cases in International Law, Seton v. Low, p. 779 ; 7 Wheaton, 340, Santissima Trinidad ; 2 Wallace, 28, The Peterhoff; Law Reporter, 7 Chancery, 550, La Riviere v. Morgan. Moore. Digest of International Law. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1906.) VII, pp. 955-973. Standard for American Interpretation. Wharton, Digest of International Law. (Washington, Govern- ment Printing Office, 1887.) II, pp. 512-513. On French sales. Westlake, Internationa] Law. (Cambridge, University Press, 11)04-1907). Part II, pp. 161-177. Good for English views. Oppenheim, International Law. (New York, Longmans, 1912.) II, pp. 371-443. Hershey, A. S., The Essentials of International Public Law. (New York, Macmillan, 1912.) Ibid., International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War. (New York, Macmillan, 1906.) Ger- many's sale of ships. American Journal of International Law. (New York, Baker, l'.H I L917.) Historical summaries of doctrine of contraband. Annnls of American Academy of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia, The Academy, 1915). Hull, International Law. (Oxford, Clarendon, 1904), p. 557. Opposition to American sales in 1870. 6. THE RECOGNITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, 1870-1871. 1. INTRODUCTION. Sepl ember 3, 1870, word came to Paris that Napoleon ITT had been made prisoner at Sedan. At several meetings of the Corps Legislatif the overthrow of the Imperial Government and the substitution of some other form of authority was discussed. While the deputies debated, the people of Paris acted. On the morning of September 4 the ' Imperial Government was overthrown, and word was sent through France that a new authority, a Government of National Defence, had been created by acclamation of the people. (Archives Diplomatiques, first series, vol. 40, 472-508.) Sep! ember 6 Jules Favre sent abroad to the diplomatic agents of France a circular com- munication, bidding them explain the situation (Ibid., pp. 511-13) to the governments to which they were accredited. 2. RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED STATES. That very day the American Government instructed Minister Washburne al Paris not to hesitate to recognize the new government r,:;70G— 18 3 34 if it possessed effective power and was accepted by the people of France. Other communications followed, and that same day recog- nition was given together with the congratulations of the President and people of the United States upon the happy establishment of a republican government. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1870, p. G7.) 3. OTHER PROMPT RECOGNITIONS. Two days later the American example was followed by Spain, by Italy, and by Switzerland, and also by Portugal shortly after (Archives Diplomatiques, lirst series, vol. 40. pp. 524-528, 545). 1. THE DELAYED RECOGNITIONS. Thiers proposed that England give immediate recognition, but Lord Granville demurred, saying that the Republic had no legal sanction yet, since no constituent assembly had decided the future government of the country (Lord Newton. Lord Lyons, I, 316-17). A similar request was made at Vienna, for the French leaders desired the greater moral authority which recognition would give them, but Count Beust replied that the friendship of the Dual Monarchy was not dependent upon the form of the French Government, and that it would be contrary to international practice to give recognition be- fore the French people had pronounced their decision (Archives Diplomatiques, first series, vol. 40. p. 703). It was in vain that Count Chaudory instructed the French envoys to press the matter, declaring that more than nine-tenths of the people of Paris had voted in favor of the Government of National Defence (Ibid., vol. 41, 934-5, vol. 42, 1348). Earl Granville submitted the matter to a meeting of the cabi- net, which again refused, saying that there was wanting that kind of stability which could be given Only by a constituent assembly (Ibid.. IV, 1374-5). The truth is that contemporaries might well doubt whether the new government possessed either legal sanction or actual power (Annual Register. 1870. p. 182). In after days Hanotaux pro- nounced it to have been merely a grand local council (Contemporary France. I, 15). and on several occasions during the siege of Paris 'the Red Republicans attempted to overthrow it (Lord Lyons. 1. 375). February 4, 1871. when hope was gone of deliverance from the Ger- mans, the Government of National Defence called for elections of representatives of the people, and a little later formally yielded up its powers to them (Archives Diplomatiques, first series, vol. 42, 1406-71. 1487-0). England now decided, February 10. 1871. to give recognition at once (Lord Lyons. I, 307), and Austria-Hungary, de- siring to act with England, gave her recognition also (Archives Dip- lomatiques, first series, vol. 42. 1407, 1511). 35 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1. Archives Diplomatiques, Recueil Mensuel International de Diplomatic et d'Histoire, first series, vols. 40-42, contain most of the diplomatic correspondence relating to this subject. Moore, J. B. Digest of International Law, I, 127-128 (Washing- ton, Government Printing Office, 1906). 2. Lord Newton, Lord Lyons, A Record of British Diplomacy. 2 volumes (London. Arnold, 1913). Some excellent information on this subject from the British ambassador to France at this time. 3. The Annual Register: A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad, 1870. Some contemporary remark-. 4. Hanotaux, G., Contemporary France (translated by J. C. Tarver), 4 volumes (New York, Putnam, 1903-9), contains some brief comments upon the subject. 7. THE ROMAN QUESTION, 1870-1871. 1. INTKODUCTIOX. The French troops guarding papal sovereignty in Rome were with- drawn July 29 to August 19, 1870, as a consequence of the Franco- Prussian War. Thereupon the Italian people and the Italian Parlia- ment called upon the King to occupy the papal territories. Visconti- Venosta, minister of foreign affairs, despatched a memorandum to the powers August 29, announcing that the Government had decided on immediate occupation. One Aveek later the French Empire fell, whereupon the September Convention ceased to be an effective guar- antee for the safety of the Pope and of the Patrimonium Petri against the aspirations of the Kingdom of Italy for possession of the city of Rome. On August 29 the Italian Government, in a circular transmitted to the other Governments of Europe, intimated its intention of occu- pying Rome. Settlement of the relations to be established between the Italian Government and the Papacy on the lines subsequently followed in the Law of Guarantees was foreshadowed. No strong protest or indication of hostile action came from any of the powers & 2. TAKING OF ROME. Victor Emmanuel, in a letter dated September 8, called upon the Pope to accept the love and protection of the people of Italy in lieu of a sovereignty which could be maintained only through the support of foreigners. Pius IX replied, September 11, that such a letter was not worthy of an affectionate son. To the bearer of the ixwal appeal he intimated, September 10, that he might yield to force. 36 Gen. Cadorna, at the head of his army, entered papal territory September 11, and after having effected a breach in the walls of Rome, occupied the right bank of the Tiber September 20. Three urgent requests from the Pope induced him to occupy the Leonine City on the right bank September 21. A plebiscite October 2 an- nexed (hose papal territories to the Kingdom of Italy by a vote of 133,681 to 1,507. Though it is probable that many of the papalists refrained from going to the polls, the figures indicated that public sentiment in the papal state was strongly in favor of annexation. 3. LAW OK GUARANTEES. [taly effected its settlement of the papal question by the Law of Guarantees, May 13, 1S71. The vote of the chamber of deputies stood is.) to 10C>. The provisions of the law are as follows: Part I, Prerogatives of the Holy See. Article I. Pope's person declared sacred and inviolable. Article 2. Free discussion of religions questions allowed, but insults and outrages againsl ibe Pope to be punished as injury and insult to the King's person. Article .">. Pope granted royal honors and bis customary guard. Article 1. Annuity of 3,225,000 lire allotted for the maintenance of the Sacred College, the sacred palaces, tbe congregations, the Vatican Chancery, and tlie diplomatic service. Article 5. Exemption from taxation granted tbe sacred palaces, museums, and libraries and perpetual enjoyment of tbe Vatican and Lateral) buildings and gardens and of the villa at Caste] Gandolfo assured tbe Pope. Articles 6 and 7. Access of any Italian official or agent to tbe palaces or to any conclave or ecumenical council forbidden without special authorization from the Pope, council, or conclave. Article 8. Seizure or examination of ecclesiastical papers, documents, books, or registers of purely spiritual character forbidden. Article 1 9. Full freedom for the exercise of the spiritual ministry guaranteed the Pope and provision made Cor the publication of bis announcements on tbe doors of the Roman Church and basilicas. Article 10. Immunity extended to ecclesiastics employed by the Holy See and personal rights of Italian citizens bestowed on foreign ecclesiastics In Rome. Article 11. Diplomatists accredited to the Holy See and papal diplomatists while in Italy placed on same footing as diplomatists accredited to the Quirinal. Article 12. All papal telegrams and correspondence with bishops and with foreign governments to be transmitted free of cost In Italy and a papal tele- graph office served by papal officials in communication with the Kalian postal and telegraph system established. Article 13. All ecclesiastical seminaries, academies, colleges, and schools for the education of priests in the city of Pome exempted from all Interference on the part of the Government. Part II, Church a.nd State in Italy. Article it. Clergy allowed freedom of assembly. Article 15. Government relinquished its right of apostolic legation In Sicily and the appointment of its own nominees to the chief benefices d' the Kingdom; 37 bishops dispensed from swearing fealty to the King, though except in Rome and its suburbs, choice of bishops limited to ecclesiastics of Italian nationality. Article 16. Need for royal exequatur and placet abolished for all ecclesiastical publications, but the enjoyment of temporalities by bishops and priests made subordinate to the concession of a state exequatur and placet. Article 17. Independence of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction for spiritual and disciplinary matters maintained, but civil courts granted competence to pass judgment on the juridical effect of ecclesiastical sentences. Provision to be made by future law for the reorganization, conservation, and administration of all the church property in the Kingdom. Articles 268, 2G9, and 270 of the penal code were modified July 12 to make ecclesiastics liable to fine and imprisonment for spoken or written attacks on the laws of the State or for fomenting disorder. Victor Emmanuel made his official entry into the new capital July 12, and the first Italian Parliament at Rome opened Novem- ber 21. I. TEMPORARY FINANCIAL MEASURES. At first the secretary general of the Italian foreign office had been received almost daily by Cardinal AntonelH, papal secretary of state. The royal commissioner of finance, as a precautionary measure, had seized the pontifical treasury, but, upon being informed that it con- tained the fund of Peter's Pence, the council of state authorized the restoration of that amount. The Holy See was indemnified for moneys expended for the October service of the coupon of the pon- tifical debt as the Italian State had taken over that debt. Cardinal Antonelli apprised the Government September 29 that the was unable to issue drafts for the monthly payment of the pontifical budget for the maintenance of the Pope, the Sacred College, the apostolic palaces, and fl"' papal guards. The Government honored the drafts and thus contributed an installment of the annuity afterwards placed at the disposal of the Holy See by the Law of Guarantees. 5. PAPAL PROTESTS. Pius IX protested against both the principle and plan of the Law of Guarantees in a series of declarations of which the following were (lie more important: Protest of Cardinal Antonelli to the powers, September 20, 1870; papal letter to the cardinals, September 29, 1870; papal encyclical of November 1, 1870; dispatch of Cardinal A nl one! li to the papal nuncios, November 8, 1870; papal encyclical of May 15, 1871. (French texts of these protests are in Archives diploma! iques, first series, vol. 48, pp. 86-88, 111-113, 1G7-17G, 179-184, 228 234.) In the encyclical of May 15, 1871, the pope declared : "We will not admit and we will not accept, because it is absolutely impos- sible for us. the immunities or guaranties devised by the Piedmontese Government, whatsoever may be their tenor, nor any other of that 38 kind, with whatsoever sanction it may be clothed." " We never will accept any immunity or guaranty whatsoever, which, under pretext of protecting our sacred power and our liberty, would be offered in exchange for and to take the place of that temporal sovereignty with which Divine Providence has willed that the Apostolic Holy Sec should be provided and fortified and which is assured to us by legiti- mate and unattackable titles and a possession of more than 11 cen- turies." « Archives diplomatiques, first series, vol. 48, p. 231.) The essence of the papal position as to the Law of Guarantees is perhaps best expressed in a paragraph in the dispatch of Cardinal Antonelli to the papal nnncios. November 8, 1871: "An authority which lives and is exercised by virtue of a concession, and which, consequently, depends upon the gpod will or caprice of the one who concedes that authority, has not a life of its own and can not extend its influence beyond the limits which are imposed upon it and agreed to by its intrinsic and extrinsic conditions. Now. everybody knows that the head of the church has need of an unquestionable authority of his own, in order that the exercise of his spiritual authority may not be restricted by any cause nor interrupted at any thru?. It follows that, whatever the guaranty it may be proposed to give him, that authority will always be illusory if it remain subject to a sovereign or a lay power." ( Archives diplomatiques, first series, vol. 48, p. 183.) 6. TIIK POWERS AND THE ROMAN QUESTION. France recalled Senard, French minister at Florence, who had writ- ten congratulations to Victor Emmanuel on the capture of Rome. The next minister, the Comte de Choiseul, was instructed to absent himself from Italy at the moment of the King's official entry into the new capital. Thiers hastened to appoint a French ambassador to the Holy See. But the powers as a whole, although fully notified of Italy's actions, took no steps to get the papal status embodied in an international agreement, and their general acquiescence made the Law of Guarantees an accepted fact. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Annual Register, 1871. pp. 255-256; The Catholic Encyclopedia, article "Law of Guarantees"; Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., article "Italy": Bertolini, F.. Storia d'ltalia dal 1814-1878, 2 pts. (Milan, Vellardi, 1880-1881) ; Brah, M.. Geschichte des Kirchen- staats (Mainz. 1807-1000). 3 vols.: Cadorna, R.. La Liberazione di Roma nelPanno 1870 (Rome. 1880): Cappelletti, L., Storia di Vit- torio Emmanuele II e del suo regno (Rome, E. Voghera, 1893), 3 vols. ; Castellari, La Santa Sede (Milan. Societa editrice libraria, 1903); Dollinger, F. V.. "Pius IX" in Kleine Schriften (Reush, 39 Stuttgart, 1890), pp. 558 seq.; Geffcken, F. H.. Die Volkerrechtliche Stellung des Papsttums (Rome, 1887) ; Gillet, Pie IX, sa vie et les actes de son pontificat (Paris, 1877) ; Giobbio. Lezioni do diplomazia ecclesiastica (Rome, 1899) ; Godkin, G. S., Life of Victor Emmanuel II (London, 1879), 2 vols.; Halekamp, Papst Pius IX, in seinem Leben und Wirken (2d ed., Miinster, 1870) : King, B., History of Italian Unity (London, Nisbet, 1899), 2 vols.; MacCaffrey, James. History of the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century (St. Louis. 1910), 2 vols.; Massari. G., La vita ed il regno di Vittorio Emanuele II Primo re d'ltalia (Milan, Treves, 1901), 2 vols.; Niel- sen, Fr., The History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century. trans, under direction of A. F. Mason (New York. Dutton & Co., 1900); Orsi, P. L.. L'ltalia moderna (Milan, 1901); Pougeois, Ale- sander, Histoire de Pie IX et de sou pontificat (Paris. 1877-1888), 6 vols. ; Raffaelc, de Cesare, Last Days of Papal Rome, 1850-1870 ; Stepi- schnegg, Papst Pius IX und seine Zeit (Vienna, 1879), 2 vols.: Trollope, Life of Pius IX (London, 1877), 2 vols.; Westlake, John, International Law (Cambridge, University Press, 1910), vol. 1, pp. 37-39; Zini, Storia d'ltalia (Milan, 1875), 4 vols. For texts of documents, see Acta Pii IX (Rome n. d. ), pt. 1, vol. 5, pp. 286 seq., 306 seq., 352 seq.; Acta Sanctae Sedis (Rome, 1870- 1871). Archives Diplomatiques, first series, vol. 48, pp. 1-236. Par- liamentary Papers, 1870-1871. Rome, No. 1 (1871). See also Gaz- zetta Ufliciale. For text of the Law of Guarantees see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 65, pp. 638-642, 8. THE BLACK SEA QUESTION, 1870-187L 1. THE BLACK SKA AND THE TREATY OF PARIS (1856). The Treaty of Paris (1856) aimed. to establish a balance of power in the Near East by (1) protecting Turkey against Russian naval power in the Black Sea. and (2) safeguarding Russia against attack in that quarter by ;i third power. It neutralized the Black Sea, de- clared it open to merchantmen of all nations, forbade the establish- ment or maintenance of military-maritime arsenals on its coast, and interdicted it to men-of-war of the littoral and other States, admit- ting only a few Turkish and Russian vessels for coast service. An added convention bound the Porte, while at peace, to admit no for- eign ships of war into the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. 2. RUSSIAN CIRCULAR OF OCTOBER 31, 1870 (APPENDIX I, 2 ) . At a critical stage of the Franco-Prussian War, October 31, 1870, Russia issued a circular note to the signatory powers denouncing the stipulations of the general treaty and the separate convention 40 with Turkey of the same date relative to the limit of her naval forces in the Black Sea. Russia declared it could not admit de jure that treaties violated in several of their general and essential clauses should remain binding in other clauses directly affecting the inter- ests of Russia. The reunion of Moldavia and Wallachia, effected by a series of revolutions at variance with the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Paris, illustrated the " modifications to which most European transactions have been exposed, and in the face of which it would be difficult to maintain that the written law. founded upon the respect for treaties as the basis of public right and regu- lating the relations between States, retains the moral validity which it may have possessed at other times." " Repeatedly and under va- rious pretexts foreign men-of-war have been suffered to enter the straits and whole squadrons, whose presence was an infraction of the character of absolute neutrality attributed to those waters, admitted to the Black Sea.'" :j. reception of Russian circulat;. Serious statesmen were not surprised by Russia's action. Gran- ville wrote to Gladstone that, excepting England and Turkey, all the cosignatories of the Treaty of Paris had favored modification of the Black Sea neutralization, previous to Russia's declaration. While not dissenting from the substance of Russia's claim, Gladstone was outraged by its formal basis. His memorandum to Granville contributed the pith of the latter's reply to Gortchakoff's note. "The question therefore arises, not whether any desire expressed by Russia ought to be carefully examined in a friendly spirit by the co- signatory Powers, but whether they are to accept from her an announcement that, by her own act. without any consent from them, she has released herself from a solemn covenant." (Hertslet. Map of Europe by Treaty. Ill, 1899-1900.) 4. CALLING OF LONDON CONFERENCE OF 1871. Granville regarded war as a possible risk after the reply to Russia ; but the best English opinion was averse to war for the neutrality of the Black Sea. And with France unable to move, and Prussia back- ing Russia, England stood without allies. Yet, by a threat of war, Granville induced Bismarck to invite the states which had signed the Treaty of Paris (1856) to a conference at London to discuss the ques- tions raised by the Russian circular. (Morley, Gladstone. II, 353- 355; Marriott, England since Waterloo, 427.) Great Britain, Aus- tria-Hungary, Italy, Germany, Russia, and Turkey were represented. France, on account of the war. was represented only at the last session. 41 5. LONDON CONFERENCE OF 1871. The first protocol of the London Conference, January 17, 1871, recognized " that it is an essential principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treat}-, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the Contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement." (Hertslet, III, 1901.) This vindication of the sanctity of treaties was somewhat impaired by the fact that Russia, as a reward of submis- sion to international law, was given what she had affected to take. (Hall, op cit., 347-348; Lawrence, Principles of International Law, 6 ed., 328.) Articles II and III of the treaty, which was signed at the close of the conference, March 13, 1871 (See Appendix 1) , maintained the principle of the closing of the straits to foreign men-of-war, as long as the Porte is at peace, and the free navigation of the Black Sea by merchantmen of all nations ; Article I abolished the neutrali- zation of the Black Sea, the exclusion of warships of the littoral powers, and the prohibition of military-maritime arsenals on its coast. (Hertslet, III, 1919-1923.) The Danube Commission, cre- ated by the Treaty of Paris (1856), was continued until 1883 and pro- vision was made to protect and continue its work. (See article. The Danube Question, 1871-1904.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. Parliamentary Papers, 1871, vol. 36, pp. 1-178, and Archives Dip- lomatiques, first series, vol. 45, pp. 177-374, give the most important documents for the London Conference. The protocols of the Con- ference are in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 61, pp. 1193- 1227. Goriainow, S. Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, 144-312 (Paris, Plon, 1910). Important study, based on the Russian archives. Hall, W. E. A Treatise on International Law, pp. 344-348, 6th ed. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909.) Brief account of legal aspects of Black Sea question. Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond. Life of Lord Granville, II, 71-79 (London, Longmans, 1905). Phillipson, C, and Buxton, B. The question of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, ch. 6. (London, Stevens, 1917.) Morley, J. Life of W. E. Gladstone, 5 vols. (London, Macmillan, 1903.) Shows Gladstone's relations to the foreign office. Marriott, J. A. R. England since Waterloo. (New York, Put- nam, 1913.) Brief historical sketch. LaAvi-ence, T. J. The Principles of International Law, 6th ed. (New York, Heath. 1915.) 42 Hertslet. The Map of Europe by Treaty, 4 vols. (London, Sta- tionery Office, 1875-1891.) Holland, T. E. The European Concert in the Eastern Question. 271-276. (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1885.) Abel, Karl. Letters on International Relations before and during the War of 1ST0, 2 vols. (London, Tinsley, 1871.) Interpretation of current events by correspondent of the London Times at Berlin. Has appendix of documents relating to Black Sea, etc. 9. PEACE PRELIMINARIES OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR, 1870-1871. 1. THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE AM) THE THIRD REPUBLIC. .With the capitulation of Sedan (Sept. 2, 1870), the Second Empire collapsed. September 4 the Republic was proclaimed at Paris and the Government of National Defence organized, with Favre as minister of foreign affairs. Paris having been invested September 19, Gambetta became (Oct. 9) the head of a "delega- tion" from the Paris Government, first at Tours and later at Bor- deaux. The new Republic was recognized by the United States Sep- tember 6. and subsequently by the other powers. (See article. The Recognition of the Government of National Defence, 1870-1871.) Meantime Empress Eugenie in England claimed authority as "Regent." and the allegiance of the French Army in Metz to the Government of National Defence was uncertain. Bismarck, with the invading arm v. at first dealt with representatives of the various French factions, and showed a disposition to play one off against the. other, declaring on one occasion that the Paris government did not represent ''the will of France,"'' and suggesting either the calling of the old Napoleonic assembly, or a general election. (Busch, Bismarck in the Franco-German War. I, II passim, especially I. 219. 266; II. 302-303, 3 12 : Foreign Relations of the United States. 1870. 67-68; Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, II, 52-54.) Early in September the Government of National Defence was mak- ing overtures through the British foreign office to Bismarck, who in- sisted upon securities (the delivery of forts). September !). Thiers was sent by Favre on a mission to London. St. Petersburg. Vienna, and Florence in an effort to secure from the powers offers of inter- vention, mediation, or good offices, but without substantial result, except that Great Britain, Russia. Austria, Italy, Spain, and Turkey proposed an armistice, (favre. Gouvernement de la Defense Na- tionale, I, 126-283, 420-432; 11. 25-56; British Parliamentary Papers, Franco-German War. No. 1 (1871). pp. 60, 94, 99, 116, and passim; Busch, Bismarck, I. 144, 167-168; Rothan. Souvenirs Diplomatiques, 383-385.) 4:; 2. NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE SEPTEMBER, L870 JANUARY, 1871. Through Lord Lyons, British ambassador in Paris, a conference was arranged at Ferrieres (Sept. ID), but Bismarck refused Favre's request for an armistice, demanding that France should ac- cept the principle of territorial cessions and securities- (Favre, (ioiiverneinent. I. 420-432; Busch, Bismarck, 1G7-108.) Further abortive negotiations took place at Versailles and elsewhere (Oct. 1 to Nov. 7) on the subject of an' armistice and a general election. Action by the papacy was suggested (Jan. 6, L8, L871), and Favre made an attempt to attend the London Conference on the Black Sea question (Jan. 14. 15. See article, The Black Sea Ques- tion, 1870 1871), in the hope of securing a discussion of '"ail the questions which divide Europe," but was prevented by Bismarck. Finally, direct negotiations foe an armistice were held at Versailles between Bismarck and Favre (.Ian. 23-28), and on January 28 they agreed upon the capitulation of Paris and an armistice (exception made of the region idiout Belforl ) for 21 days to permit the election of a National Assembly. All of France, including Msace-Lorraine and the occupied district-, took- part in this election. ::. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY \ M> THE PEACE PRELIMINARIES. The elections held under the armistice resulted in a victory for the peace pari y, and the National Assembly, which mei ;it Bordeaux, February 12. chose Thiers as Chief of the Executive Power. Nego- tiations for peace were then held at Versailles (Feb. 21-26). The Prussian military party stood out for Belfort and a large part of French Lorraine including Nancy, as well as Met/, but Bis- marck doubted the wisdom of annexing so much French population, and was probably influenced by the opinion of the neutral States. France was accordingly allowed to keep Belfort and Nancy. Eng- land protested against the indemnity as excessive and may have helped to secure its reduction from six to five milliards. The pre- liminaries of peace were signed February 20. 1871, subject to ratifica- tions by the National Assembly. (Sic article, The Treaty of Frank- fort.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS OF INTERVIEWS, WITH DOCUMENTS. Busch, Moritz. Bismarck in the Franco-German AVar, 1870-1871. Authorized translation from the German. 2 vols, in one. (New Fork, Scribner, no date.) Important, owing to the personal char- acter of the negotiations. Based on and for the most part quoted from contemporary diary of Bismarck's confidential press agent. 44 Necessary to note carefully what Busch heard from Bismarck and what from others not in Bismarck's complete confidence. Ftivre, Jules. Gouvernement de la Defense Nationale, Paris, 1871, •I vols. Favre was chief negotiator with Bismarck. Many docu- ments and accounts of conversations dictated promptly after they occurred, though lacking the photographic exactitude of Busch. Let- ters of Thiers give conversations with Granville and Gladstone. ACCOUNTS, REMINISCENT ANT) HISTORIC, [NTEBSPEBSED WITH DOCUMENTS. Lord Newton. Lord L}'ons, a record of British diplomacy. (Lon- don, 1013.) 2 vols. Vol. I, 322-37."), gives account of the activity and observations of Lord Lyons, British ambassador at Paris, and intimate with the Favre government. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice. The Life of Granville George Leve- son-Gower, second earl of Granville, K. G., 1815-1891. (New York. 1905.) 2 vols. Granville was the British foreign minister. Vol. I, 30-80, covers this period; well informed, hut discreel. Morley. John. The Life of William Evarts Gladstone. (New York, 1911). 3 vols. Gives an intimate view of the man who con- trolled British policy. Vol. II, 338-3f>s. Simon. Jules. The Government of M. Thiers. From February 8, 1871, to May 21, 1873. From the French. (London, 1879). 2 vols. Lee, Sidney. Queen Victoria. (New York, 1903.) SPECIAL STUDIES. Rothan, G. Souvenirs Diplomatiques L'Allemagne et L'ltalie. 1870-1871. (Paris, 1881.) 2 vols. Vol. I. L'Allemagne, pp. 39-91. French minister at Florence. May. Gaston. Le Traite" de Francfort. (Paris. 1909.) Excellent study, with strong background of international law and diplomatic practice. Did not have access to archives. Hanotaux, Gabriel. Contemporary France. (Westminster. 1903- 1909, 4 vols.) Vol. I, translated by Tarver, valuable as work of dis- tinguished historian and foreign minister. Sorel, Albert. Histoire diplomatique de la guerre franco-alle- mande (Paris. 1875), 2 vols., pp. 435-439. An early work by a his- torian of high standing. provoke another conflict with France before her full recovery. (Ibid., pp. 35] 355, pp. 236 237.) Chauvinistic agitation spread throughout Germany, This delayed negotiations till Late spring. Bismarck often showed a disposition to doubt the honest intentions of the French, (Busch, Bismarck, Some Secret Pages of His History, II. pp. L03 L04.) He affected to believe thej would make war .is soon as they recovered their fortresses, though the French envoy pointed out that they would hardly be so foolish as to till the German treasury in advance if they were planning war. Bismarck demanded that the army of occupation remain as large as before, even after it held Utile Int the French eastern fortresses oi' Verdun, Toul, ami Belfort. Thiers feared that Bismarck planned to get the money and then find some excuse to hold Belfort. (Memoirs of M. Thiers, pp. 246 247.) ... THE CONVENTION OF JUNE 29, 18 At last. June 29, L872, a new treaty was made enabling France to pay the test o( the indemnity in installments up to Marcji 1. L875, <>r hasten the payment and secure quicker evacuation. (Ibicl., pp. 367 369.) Two departments were to be evacuated L5 days after payment of one half billion, t w o more after the second billion, and the rest, including the forts. 15 days after the last billion was paid. But, until the full evacuation, those departments were not to be garri- ned by more French troop; than were needed to keep order. No further fortifications were to be built there by either French or Ger- mans until evacuation was complete. 6. CONVENTION OF MARCH LS, 1873. After further negotiations Thiers succeeded (March L5, L873) in arranging for simultaneous evacuation of Belfort and the four re- maining departments, providing the fourth billion francs be fully paid on May 5, L873, and the fifth paid in the following four mom (Memoir- of M. Thiers, pp. 310 : >1S: Annual Register, L8T3, pp. I L25, lis 1 !u. The German occupying army appears already to have been reduced to 50,000 men A These payment- were promptly made, and accordingly Belforl and Nancy were evacuated Au- gust 1. Verdun was kept till September 16 following the final payment of the fifth billion Francs, with interest, on September 5, 187 Thus full payment was made and evacuation secured nearly two years before required by the earlier treaty. 7. INCIDENTS VNP QTJ LRKELS. During the German occupation there were some unpleasant inci- dents and quarrels between the civilian population and the Germans. 53 In November, 1871. French juries acquitted two men accused of kill- ing German soldiers. The German officers then had accused persons tried by military courts, which imposed the death penalty. (Zevortj Histoire de la troisieme rijpublique, I. pp. 153 154.) Bismarck was rather brusque in his diplomacy. June 16, 1871, he telegraphed that French soldiers had occupied some districts reserved for Germans, and thai they would be fired on that midnighl unless withdrawn. (Ibid., p. 286.) This worried Thiers greatly, because he feared Bi marck was seeking an excuse for an attack on France. Thiers or- dered the French officials to be very polite to the German officer . :iikI sent a special commissioner as a sori of diplomatic agent to rep- resent him ;it the headquarters of Gen. Manteuffel. (Hanotaux, Contemporary France, I. pp. 312 313.) This helped greatly in smoothing out these difficulties. In the six department!- to be evacu- ated In -f Tliicrs had new barracks built to house the German sol- diers. Their officers complained thai these buildings were unhealth- 1'ul. and sometimes billeted the soldiers on the people instead. (Me- moirs of M. Thiers. p. \'.)-2.) This caused much friction. But, ■< a whole, (he French people were (juict and the German soldiers be- haved themselves. (Annual Register, L873, |). 141).) There was little of the recrimination between them, so common during the war. BIBLIOGRAPHY. DOCUMENTS AM) OTHEB I'HIMAHV SOURCES. Villefort, A. Recueil des traites, conventions, etc., relatifs a la paix avec l'Allemagne. (Paris, Imprimerie Rationale, L879. •") vol- umes.) The standard collection. Contains all the conventions. Memoirs of M. Thiers, 1870-1873. Translated by F. M. Atkin- son. (New York. Pott, 1916.) Appendices Nos. 8-23 (pp. 341-369) give a number of important documents. Valuable. Documents emanant de M. Thiers. Occupation et Liberation. (Paris.) Marquis de Gabriac, Souvenirs diplomatiques de Russie et d'AUe- magne, L870 L872. (Paris, Plon, L896.) SECONDARY A< ' 0UNT8. Doniol, Henri. M. Thiers, le comte de Saint Vallier, le general de Manteuffel; liberation du territoire. (Paris, A. Colin, 1907.) The best single account of this subject. May, G. Le Traite de Francfort, chs. 11-12. (Paris. Berger- Levrault, 1909.) Valuable study from the legal standpoint. Valfrey. Histoire d^ traite de Francfort et de la liberation du territoire, 2 vols. (Paris. Amyol. 1874-1875.) 54 Hanotaux, Gabriel. Contemporary Franco. Translated by John Charles Tarver. (Westminster, Constable, 1903-1009.) 4 volumes. Very valuable. Zevort, E. Histoire de la troisieme republique. (Paris, Alcan, 1896-1901.) 4 volumes. 13. THE FORMATION OF THE LEAGUE OF THE THREE EMPERORS. 1. INTUOIH t TIOX. After the Franco-Prussian War of L870 7J, with its accompanying completion of German unification and the erection of the modern German Empire, Bismarck, the German chancellor, whose diplo- macy had been mainly responsible for the war and its political re- sults, saw clearly thai Germany would not gain by further territorial aggression, but rather by the maintenance of peace. With this thought in mind, and also with the idea of strengthening Germany's position so as to make France hesitant about attacking her for the purpose of recovering French losses in the war just ended, Bismarck undertook to maintain the previously existing close friendship with Russia and to effect a rapproachement with Austria. Tie had purposely treated Austria with great moderation after her de- fer,! by Prussia (the leading member State of the new empire) in L866, with a future reconciliation in view, and by the close of the Franco-Prussian War Francis Joseph, the Austrian Emperor, was so far reconciled to existing conditions as to be willing to consider an offer o\' alliance. The dynastic relations between Germany and Bus- sin were already very friendly, the Russian Czar, Alexander II, being a nephew of William I, the Prussian King, now invested with the additional title of German Emperor. 2. NEGOTIATION. Under these circumstances Bismarck found his task an easy one. lie persuaded his Emperor to take the first step by paying a visit to Emperor Francis Joseph at Ischl (August, 1871). A second meet- ing between the two Emperors took place at Salzburg the next month, ami the next year Francis Joseph visited the German Emperor at Berlin. As a result Austro-German relations grew sensibly more friendly. Russia now became concerned over this rapprochement in the making, and the Czar asked to be admitted as a third party. His request was readily granted, and from the time (December. 1^7'i) of the conference of these three rulers at Berlin dates what has been called, although improperly, the alliance of the three emperors. m 3. TERMS. The thing that was formed was. in reality, only an entente which did not result in any formal treaties. It was generally believed at the time that an understanding for cooperation was secured on the following points: First, to maintain, territorially, the status quo on the basis of the latest treaties. Second, to seek in common the solution of whatever difficulties might arise in the Orient; and Third, to repress revolution under its new form, socialism. 4. CONCLUSION. This arrangement was, in substance, a new Holy Alliance, from which its adherents hoped great things. However, friction speedily developed between Germany and Austria on the one hand and Russia on the other, and the entente after the Congress of Berlin fell apart. BIBLIOGRAPHY* Busch, Moritz. Our Chancellor. (New York, 1884.) Ward, A. W., et al. Cambridge Modern History. (N. Y., Mac- millan. 11)10.) Vol. 12, pp. L38-139. Rose. J. II. The Development of the European Nations. 2 vols. (New York, Putnam, 1905.) Debidour, A. Ilistoire Diplomatique, 1814-1878. 2 cols. (Paii<, Alean, 1891.) Fife, Robert Herndon. The German Empire between Two Wars. (New York, Macmillan, 1910.) Headlam, James Wycliffe. Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire. (New York, Putnam, 1899.) Lavissc et Rambaud. Histoire Generale. (Paris, Colin, 1901.) Vol. 12. Lowe, Charles. Prince Bismarck. (New York, Cassell, 1886.) 2 vols. 14. THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR SCARE OF 1875. 1. INTRODUCTION. In the spring of 1875 there occurred the first of several sudden alarms, such as from 1871 to 1914 periodically disturbed Europe, by indicating that war between France and Germany was about to be resumed. To this i\:)y the facts of the episode have not been entirely cleared up. but their general trend is fairly plain. 56 L\ ORIGIN OF THE SCARE. There was undoubtedly a party in Germany which looked upon the rapid recovery of France from her defeat with astonishment and anger. Especially the reform of the French Army, including the creation of a fourth battalion to each regiment, was pointed to as threatening a war of revenge. Would it not be wise, they said, even a Christian duty, to provoke a conflict before France should have recovered her full strength and found an ally? There is no ground for supposing that the German Emperor himself had any such de- sign. But opinion differs whether the ensuing plot was furthered by Prince Bismarck or by a military party acting apart from the chancellor and even in spite of him. Bismarck afterwards claimed that, the whole affair was an intrigue of his enemies, especially among the clericals at home anil abroad, for the purpose of discrediting him (Reflections and Reminiscences, 11. p. 188), and German writers are prone to accept his version. It is true he sometimes deprecated " wars of prevention," but again he would let fall ominous threats like the following: " We want to keep the peace: but if France goes on arm- ing st) that she is to be ready in five years and bent oh war at the end of that time, then we will declare war in three years." (Denk- wiirdigkeiten des Fiirsten Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, 11. p. 107.) .".. Tin: THREAT ov WAR. Early in April. 1875, the Kolnische Zeitung, the Berliner Post, and the Xorddeulsehc Zeitung. papers usually in close touch with the Government, sounded the, alarm by a series of inflammatory articles to the effect of "War in sight." "France preparing a war of revenge," " The Orleans princes thus to conquer the throne again," vte. To the French ambassador at Berlin rumor became a positive threat when Ilerr von Radowitz, one of Bismarck's trusted agents. intimated the plan of the German armies to invade France, to threaten the capital, to demand an indemnity of ten milliards, which should be paid in not less than -JO years, and to require a permanent reduction of French armaments (Blowitz, p. L02). 4. WHY THE PLOT FAILED. If this was the actual plot, it was foiled by two agencies, namely, the Czar of Russia, who was then about to visit Germany, and the London Times. On May 6 the Times published an article from its Paris correspondent (M. de Blowitz) revealing the whole matter to a startled public. Who inspired the article;? It may have been the French foreign minister, the Duke Decazes, as Blowitz says, or possibly the German ambassador, as Decazes gave out. At all events 57 the revelation served its purpose in making the project of a sudden war for the time impossible. The Czar, who under the circumstances could not pretend ignorance, intimated to the Kaiser his feeling against it. while his minister, Gortschakoff, scored a personal tri- umph over Bismarck by issuing a circular, "Now, peace is secured." Queen Victoria also is known to have written letters to the Czar and to the German Emperor in the interest of peace. (Lee. S., Queen Victoria, p. 431.) 5. CONCLUSION. Naturally, no one ever avowed participation in a plot which failed so discreditably. Whether it was instigated by Bismarck or his rivals, the intention seems to have, been, if not actually to provoke a war. at least to terrorize France and so broach the subject of her disarmament. Perhaps there was mingled a wish to feel the diplo- matic pulse of Europe. In the latter case it proved only that the isolation of France was not as complete as had been supposed. From this moment there were at frequent intervals signs of a trend of Germany away from friendship with Russia and of the approach of Russia toward alliance with France. BIBLIOGRAPHY. There are no oilicial documents. The narrative rests upon articles of the press, memoirs, and letters of persons concerned. Not all the letters cited have been published in full. The chief sources are : Bismarck, Prince von. The Man and the Statesman, trans, by But- ler ( New York, Harper, 1899), 2 vols., vol. 2, pp. 188-195; Busch, M., Bismarck, Some secret pages of his history (London, Macmillan, L898), 3 vols., vol. 2, p. 391; Blowitz, H. G. d,e, Memoirs (Xew York, Doubleday, 1903), pp. 91-115; Sir Robert Morier, Memoirs and Let- ters, 2 vols. (London. Arnold, 1911), II. ch. 30; Lee, Sidney, Queen Victoria, 430-432 (New York, Macmillan, 1903); Staatsarchiv, vol. is. pp. 47-70; Dreux, A., Dernieres annees de Tanibassade en Allemagne de M. de Goutaut-Biron, 1874-1877 (Paris, Plon, 1907). chs. 2 I. (Much the same material is in Broglie, An Ambassador of the Vanquished (London. Heinemann, 1896), pp. 165-239.) Further authorities are: Hanotaux, G., Contemporary France [translated], (Xew York, Put- nam. 1903-1909), 4 vols., vol. 3, pp. 210-260. The fullest narrative to be found. Debidour, A., Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe, 1814-1878 (Paris, A lean. 1891), 2 vols., vol. 2, pp. 470-474. Best general diplomatic survey. 58 Goolidge, A. C, The Origins of the Triple Alliance (New York, Scribner, 1917). pp. 53-64. Connects this incident with the events of the alliance. Seignobos, C. Europe since 1814, pp. 822-823 (New York. Holt. 1899). Excellent condensed statement of essential facts and of con- flicting interpretations. Ileadlam, J. W., Bismarck. Heroes of the Nations (New York, Put- nam), pp. 383-385. An English writer's view. Gebhardt, B. Handbuch dor Deutschen Geschichte, II, 709-71:'.. Second edition. (Berlin, L901.) Blennerhassett, R. The Threatened War of 1875. National Re- view, vol. 46, pp. 410— 1:51. 15. CHINO- JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1872-1876. \. JAPAN'S A.CQI Isri'ION OF THE LOOCHOO ISLANDS, 1872—1879. Japan began to pursue a vigorous foreign policy within a few vears after the restoration of the authority of the Mikado in 1SG8. As early as 1872 she took up against China the case of some shipwrecked Loochooans who had been murdered off the southern coast of Formosa by Formosan savages. She claimed that the Loochooans. who had been paying tribute to both China and Japan, were Japanese subjects. China denied all responsibility in the matter. In 1872 Japan secured from the King of the Loochoo Islands a surrender of the treaties which Ids Government had made with the United States. France, and Holland. In 1871 the Japanese sent a military expedition to Formosa to exact penalties and obtain indemnity. The controversy almost led to war between Japan and China. Japan even going so far as to send an ultimatum to China, but at the last moment the British minister at Peking offered his mediation, with the result that China agreed to pay an indemnity and the Chinese Government tacitly recog- nized that the Loochooans were Japanese subjects. In 1879 the islands were finally and definitely incorporated as part of the Japa- nese administration. 2. THE KOREAN WAR SCARE OF 1875. In September, 1S7~>. ;i Japanese gunboat was fired upon by a fort in Korea, with the unhappy continence that it- garrison was prac- tically annihilated. There was considerable excitement in Japan, and. as in 1872. a demand on the part of Japanese chauvinists for war, but wiser counsels prevailed, and an expedition was sent which succeeded in negotiating a treaty of "peace and amity." This treaty, signed on February 26, 1876, recognized the "complete independence" of Korea; but, though putting an end to Korea's 59 isolation, it marked the beginning of her gradual, but probably not then intended, subjugation to Japan (See article, Chino- Japanese Rivalry in Korea, 1876-1894). Strange to say, China was induced not only to assent to the Japa- nese proposals, but even to advise Korea to agree to. them. She cited her own example as a warning. Great and powerful though China was, her Government, she said, had found it impossible to close their country against foreigners, and had found protection by entering into friendly relations with them. BIBLIOGRAPHY. For a good account of Japan's acquisition of the Loochoo Islands, see Hornbeck, S. K., Contemporary Politics in the Far East (Apple- ton, New York. 1016), pp. 105-107. For an account of the Korean War scare of 1875, see Longford, J. H., The Story of Korea (New York, Scribner, 101 1 ) . pp. i>00-306. 16. THE KULDJA AFFAIR, 1876-1881. 1. THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KULDJA, 187G. As far back as 1871, owing to certain disturbances in Central Asia. where Yakub Beg seemed to be establishing an empire and the Tun- gam were causing no end of trouble, the Russians had intervened for the purpose of preserving peace on their borders. With China's con- sent Russian troops had occupied the Province of Kuldja or Hi, and wore still in possession when the Chinese undertook the reconquest of the rebellious provinces in 1876, and the State of Kashgaria, over which Yakub Beg ruled, was finally recovered. 2. THE LIVADIA CONVENTION OF 1S70. The successful conclusion of this campaign brought the Kuldja question to the foreground. During the negotiations which had led up to the Muscovite occupation of the province, the Russians had freely admitted that the Chinese were entitled to possession as soon as they had occupied it effectively. The Chinese, accordingly, sent Chenghow as special envoy to 'St. Petersburg, where he arrived early in 1870. A liter protracted negotiations a convention was drawn up at Livadia by which Russia surrendered the Kuldja Valley but retained that of the Tekes, which left in her hands the control of the passes through the Tienshan range into Kashgar. It was also agreed that China should pay an indemnity of 5.000,000 rubles toward the expenses of the Russian occupation. This Livadia convention was so unpopular in China that it was unanimously, condemned and the unfortunate envoy, Chenghow, 60 deprived of all his honors and condemned to decapitation. His life was. however, spared through tlie intercession of Queen Victoria. 3. THE tim'aty OF st. PETERSBURG, 1881. The negotiations having thus been rudely broken off, the Chinese sent another envoy in the person of the Marquis Tseng, who hud been appointed as minister at the Court of St. James. Marquis Tseng succeeded so well that he recovered almost the whole Province of Hi. including Kuldja and the passes; In exchange for this resto- ration he agreed to pay an indemnity of 9,000,000 rubles. To the treaty of St. Petersburg (See Appendix 1. 1!>). which was signed on February 12, 1881, there were added certain commercial regulations which conferred many advantages upon Russian merchants engaged in overland trade with China. BIBLIOGRAPIIT. The fullest account of these matters is given by Cordier, 11.. His- toire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales, 1860- 1900 (Alcan, Paris. 1902), Vol. II. chs. 9-12, pp. L62-2I&. A good brief account may be found in Douglas, R. K., Europe and the Far Kasi (University Press Cambridge, 1904), eh. L2, pp. 223-226. For the text of the treaty of St. Petersburg, see Cordier, op. cit, pp. 223 240, and Hertslet, China Treaties (London. 1908), No. 85, pp. !^:'> \'(. For an abstract of the abortive convention of 1879, see Cordier, op. cit., pp. 188-190. 17. THE EASTERN QUESTION, 1S7.V1S77. 1. THE HERZEGOVINA INSURRECTION. In the summer of 1875 there was an insurrection in Herzegovina. Sufficient grounds for an outbreak existed in the friction between Christian and Mussulman, ami in the inefficiency of Turkish rule. The uprising was characterized by barbarities, ami threatened to spread to the surrounding regions. The Disraeli ministry took the position that the Turkish Government should put down the revolt without the intervention of the powers. Only with reluctance, at the request o( Austria. Russia, and Germany, did it authorize the British consul to cooperate with the consuls of the other powers that hail guaranteed the Treaty of Paris ^i' L856, to localize the conflict by preventing the participation o( Serbia and Montenegro, anil to win the Forte to a policy of redress of grievances. The effort had no result, for the insurgents were unwilling, without a European guar- antee, to trust the reform measures published by the Forte. 61 2. THE ANDRASSY NOTE, DECEMBER 30, 1875. In December the three empires concerted a plan for pacification by persuading the Porte, to grant five reforms: Complete religious liberty; the abolition of tax farming; the application of direct taxes to local needs; the erection of a commission, half Moslem and half Christian, to superintend the reforms; and amelioration of the con- dition of the peasants. (See Appendix, I, 5.) The project was drawn up by Count Andrassy, the Austrian minister, and all the powers << incurred unreservedly, except (Treat Britain, who gave her consent rather reluctantly, promising general support, but reserving judg- ment on the details, some of which she considered of doubtful prac- ticability. She pointed out that some of the reforms had already been promised by the Porte. In February the Porte announced that it found four of the suggestions acceptable, but that the local application of direct taxes would not fit into its system. The re- forms were proclaimed, but the insurgents, still distrustful, did not lav down their arms. On the contrary the movement spread. 3. THE BERLIN MEMORANDUM. Again the three empires consulted and issued a memorandum from Berlin (May 13, 1876) with the request that France, Italy, and Great Britain concur. It was proposed that a two months' armistice be de- manded, during which action could be taken to pacify the insurgents, to localize the trouble, and to allow negotiations between the Porte and representatives of the revolted populations on the bases sug- gested by the latter, These were: Assistance in the repatriation of refugees, distribution of relief by a commission, concentration of Turkish troops, arms to be left with Christians as well as Mussul- men, and supervision of reform by the consuls of the power.-,. The paper closed with an intimation that the powers were prepared to take further action were these measures not successful. (See Ap- pendix I, <'>. ) I. GREAT BRITAIN AM) THE BERLIN MEMORANDUM. France and Italy gave immediate consent. The British Govern- ment expressed regret (May 1 ( .») that it was unable to cooperate. Seme of the proposed measures it characterized as unlikely to serve the desired end. others as subversive of the authority of the Sultan. The letters to British representatives which accompanied the reply showed that in this instance the Porte had not requested England's concurrence, as it had done on the two former occasions. (See Appendix T, 7.) They also showed annoyance that Great 62 Britain had not been consulted in the framing of the memorandum. On the other hand, the ministry did not suggest any alternative plan, although one of its members had one ready. (See Lang, Sir Stafford Northcote, vol. 2, p. 101.) To one portion of the Berlin memorandum the ministry agreed. It had suggested the sending of vessels, with instructions, to give protection in case of need to the Christian subjects of Turkey and to foreigners. Lord Derby announced that British vessels were being sent with orders to protect foreigners should necessity arise. The point was made that nothing should be done by the fleets to inter- fere with the Sultan's authority, and this, together with the number of British vessels sent and the position they occupied, caused Great Britain's action to be regarded by the other powers a> menace rather than cooperation. 5. THE BULGARIAN MASSACRES. The Berlin memorandum was not presented to the Porte, because the Turkish Revolution in May. 18T6, seemed to promise a better order of things. This promise was proven illusory. Tiowever. by events in Bulgaria. Bashi Basouks and Circassians were sent to quell an uprising there, and they set about it in a barbarous fashion. The English ambassador protested againsj the use of these irregular troops, but to his home government reported the rumors of atrocities as greatly exaggerated. Disraeli was content to accept this view of the case, and took no steps until the stirring up of English public opinion by the newspapers and a fervid campaign by Gladstone forced him into action. (See Morley, Gladstone, vol. 2, p. 549, if.: Gallenga, vol. 2, p. 149, ff.) But the other powers were not content with the situation. Rus- sia was indubitably the leader in the effort to bring pressure on Tur- key. While Austria had been the prime mover in the Andrassy note, Russia was chiefly responsible for the Berlin memorandum, which was much firmer in tone. In June she turned to England for advice as to the next step. The regime Russia favored for the affected region was the creation of tributary States, with rectified boun- daries and local autonomy. This England approved, but ascertained that Austria-Hungary objected to such an arrangement and also, apparently with Italy, objected to the proposal, approved by Russia and Great Britain, that Montenegro be given a port. On Russia's request for information whether non-intervention would be Great Britain's attitude should Serbia enter the war. the answer was affirmative, but that she refused to bind herself in case of the pur- suance of a different policy by other powers. On June 30 Serbia entered the war and Montenegro followed on July 2. 63 6. RE1CIISTADT CONFERENCE AND TREATY OF PESTH. Russia came to an agreement with Austria at a meeting of the two sovereigns at Keichstadt in July. The result made known at the time was a decision for non-intervention. The arrangements made con- fidentially at Reichstadt were crystallized early the following year in a treaty signed at Pesth. This secret treaty has never been pub- lished in its entirety, but some of its provisions were that Austria should be neutral in cms.* of a war between Russia and Turkey and that in case of the complete success of the Russian arms Austria was to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. No large State, Slav or other, was to be erected in the Balkans, and Constantinople was to be a free city. (See article on the Austro-Russian accord of 1876-7 and Goriainow, 334, ff. Cf. Bismarck, Reflections and Reminis- censes, vol. 2, ch. 28, p. 235, American edition.) The treaty was dated January 15, 1877, but was not signed until March 18. Between the conference and the treaty Russia made an unsuccessful attempt to learn what would be the attitude of Germany in case Russia should take independent action. (See Goriainow, 319, ff., Bismarck, ch. 28.) 7. BRITISH ATTEMPTS AT PACIFICATION. On August 20. 1876, Lord Derby telegraphed to Elliott, the British ambassador al Constantinople, thai British sympathy with the Porte had been entirely destroyed by the accounts of the Bulgarian atroci- ties, and that public opinion would not allow British interference, even in the event of a Russo-Turkish war. He must therefore use every effort to persuade the Porte to make peace. A fortnight earlier Great Britain had intimated to Serbia, which Avas being badly beaten, that an application to the powers for mediation would be favorably received in England, and the application had been promptly made. (Treat Britain thereupon with the assent of the powers proposed a several weeks* armistice. This the Porte refused to grant, but instead ordered an informal suspension of hostilities, tat ing the terms on which it was willing to make peace with Serbia. Great Britain declared these terms inadmissible, and suggested others, to which it had secured the assent of the other powers, includ- ing, after much difficulty. Austria-Hungary. These terms provided the status quo for Serbia and Montenegro; local or administrative autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, guaranteed by the mediating powers; and guarantees against maladministration in Bulgaria. In snhiiiitting them the British ambassador explained that the state of public opinion in Great Britain made it impossible for the Govern- ment to render the Porte "the support which they might otherwise have hoped for," and that the terms represented modifications Great Britain had obtained from the other powers. 64 8. RUSSIAN RLEASURES. While Turkey was raising objections to the terms, Russia proposed that if the Porte refused (hem. Bosnia be occupied by Austrian troops and Bulgaria by Russian troops, while a joint naval demonstration be made by the powers in the Bosphorus. Great Britain objected to the first part of the scheme, and still more to the Latter part, in which she would play the dominant role. Hostilities having recommenced, Russia consented to another demand being made by Great Britain Tor an armistice, to be followed by a conference. The Russian suggestion was for an armistice of six weeks, and Great Britain asked for one of not less than a month. The Porte offered to grant one of six months. Russia, feeling that such a long armistice would lie injurious to Serbia and Montenegro, protested, and sent an ulti- matum to the Porte, threatening to break off diplomatic relations if within 48 hours a six weeks' armistice was not granted. The Porte immediately complied. 9. ENGLISH VERSUS RT SSIAN VIEWS OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. The conference proposed by Great Britain was to meet at Con- stantinople, and her suggestions as bases for discussion were the in- dependence and territorial integrity of Turkey, and the abjuring by the powers of sellish designs against her. The bases for pacification were to be those already proposed— the status quo for Serbia and Montenegro, and local autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. (See Appendix 1. i». ) These bases were approved by the powers, although Russia made the specific objection that the word "territorial" be omitted, as occupation might be necessary for pacification, and the general objection that the independence and integrity of Turkey must be subordinated to considerations of humanity and peace. (Parlia- mentary Papers (Turkey), L877, No. 1. p. 705 (Cd. L028).) In these Russian objections lay the key of the Russian and British positions. Beaconsfield's preoccupation with British interests in In- dia ami Egypt explains his policy of maintaining the Turk as Keeper of the Gates. His ministry made clear that they were suspicious of Russian ambitions in that direction, and attention had been called, among other things, to the large number of Russian soldiers in the Serbian forces. The zeal of the Russian people for the cause of the Balkan Slavs was undeniable, and the Czar endeavored to dispel British suspicions on November 2 by stating definitely that he had no ambitions either in the direction of India or Constantinople (Hertslet, IV,2509). In view of the arrangements for that city which Alexander II made with Francis Joseph a few months later we can believe in the sincerity of the Czar, but a powerful party in his dominions had other views. Disraeli certainly was not convinced, as 65 was shown by his sabre-rattling Guildhall speech of November 9, which gave the text for the famous Jingo refrain of the music hulls. Two days later the Czar spoke of the Russians shedding their blood among the Serbs for the Slav cause and announced that if concerted efforts failed to ameliorate the Balkan situation, Russia would act alone (Hertslet, IV. 2518). A few days later he showed that he was anticipating this eventuality by announcing the beginning of the mobilization of the Russian troops. 10. THE CONSTANTINOPLE CONFERENCE. A well-informed British diplomat wrote (Appendix I, 10) during the conference at Constantinople that Lord Salisbury had come there convinced that no power was disposed to shield Turkey and that a new policy was therefore necessary for England; that Bis- marck was working for a war that would weaken Russia and break up Turkey; and that, therefore, it was desirable to draw near Russia. (Life of Sir William White, 116-118.) His instructions (See Ap- pendix I, 11), too, indicated greater firmness with Turkey. Un- fortunately the well-known Turkish sympathies of his colleague, Elliot, and certain actions of the. British ministry, created the im- pression with the Porte that they were still to have British support. Derby sent word to the Porte as well as to Salisbury on the eve of the opening of the conference that the Government would not assent to or assist in coercive measures against Turkey, but that in the event of war it could expect no assistance from England. The former part of the message more than counteracted the effect of the latter and created an impression of great friendliness, an impression which the ministry took somewhat tardy steps to dispel. (Parlia- mentary Papers, Turkey, No. 2 (1877), Nos. 78, 87, 148, 150.) The conference was in session from December 23, 1876, to Janu- ary 26, 1877. But as Russia had objected to the representation of Turkey and Great Britain had insisted upon it, preliminary sessions without the Turks were held from December 11 to December 22, a proceeding very galling to the Porte. On the first day of the formal session the proceedings were interrupted by a salvo of artillery, which (he Grand Vizier announced had been fired to welcome the proclamation of a new constitution for Turkey. He intimated that the work of the conference would in consequence be superfluous, but the delegates declined to take his view and the deliberations con- tinued. The proposals finally submitted to the Porte were modified through the efforts of the British delegates to a point where it was hoped they would be acceptable. They included flic appointment of the governors of the revolted Provinces for five years, with the 53706—18- 5 66 assent of the powers, an international committee of surveillance, lorn I control of taxal ion, and admission of Christians into the militia. Salisbury solemnly warned the Porte o\' the danger of refusing the findings of the conference, bul after deliberation it decided thai they were unacceptable. The ambassadors thereupon, according to the conditions the^ had made, withdrew from Constantinople, leaving the embassies with the charge's d'affaires. I I. THE I ONDON PROTOCOL. Within two weeks AJbdul Hamid, who had been reigning since the previous August, dismissed the author of the now constitution from office, and with him went the slight prospect there may have been of a more libera] regime. But peace was made with Serbia and negotiations begun with Montenegro, and the powers again adopted a policy <^ watchful waiting. Russia, however, sent a spe- cial mission to discuss measures by which her demobilization and that of Turkey might be carried out, and the result of this mission was a protocol, signed by the powers on March 81. (See Appendix 1, \-2.) It recognized the progress already made by Turkey, but threatened joinl action if the Porte did not immediately take full measures of pacification, putting reforms into execution and placing its forces on a peace footing. Russia annexed a declaration that Turkey, it* it. accepted the protocol, should send a special envoy to St. Petersburg to treat of disarmament and gave warning that recur- rence o( atrocities would cause her to stop demobilization. England declared that should reciprocal disarmament and peace between Russia and Turkey not result, the protocol would he null and void. Italy declared that she would he hound by her signature only as long as agreement between the powers was maintained. These indi- cations o\' divided counsels scarcely added to the force of the docu ment, which the Porte proceeded to decline. 12. riii' in ssian DECLARATION ov w Mi. The Porte's refusal was issued April !>. and Russia thereupon decided to act alone. On April 1!> she announced that her armies were ahout to cross the Turkish frontier, on the 23d broke oil diplo- matic relations, and on the 24th declared war. Turkey protested, pointing out that according to article 8 of the Treaty iA' Paris (1856) Russia should have resorted to the mediation i^( the powers before making war. On receivingthe Russian declaration oi' April P.) Great Britain also made a formal protest against the act as a breach of the Treaty of Paris (1856). Further action she confined to a declara tion id' neutrality and a formulation of English interests in the East. 67 13. APPRAISEMENT. Ii has been customary (<> lay the blame for the outbreak of the Turkish Win- largely upon the policy of Disraeli in subordinating the English policy in Turkish matters to the interests of Great Britain in [ndia and Egypl and refusing to put pressure upon the Turk, who never yields except under pressure. There is also a school of historians who see in Bi tnarck the power that pullet I the wires and broughl about the war. Their case is not well documented, however, and the evidence so Ear available indicates that he rather played a waiting game. Re reni si in lies based on Russian and Austrian archives tend to prove that Andrassy, far from being a mere tool of Bismarck, hud :i strong Austrian policy of territorial aggression, :in. (Paris, L886.) The best account. Written by a diplomat. Weill documented. Favorable to Russia. Cyon, Elie de. Historiede I'entente Franco- Russe. (Paris, L89&)i Strongly anti-German. Statements nol backed up with proof. Goriainow, Serge. Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles. (Paris, Ploir r p. Mo.) The author was the director of the Russian archives and base his work upon sources not generally known. 68 Lang, Andrew. Sir Stratford Northcote, first earl of Iddesleigh. (Edinburgh, 1890.) Vol. 2. Based on first-hand material, quoted at length. Morley, John. Life of Gladstone. (New York. Macmillan, 1911.) Valuable for contemporary English opinion. Rose, J. Holland. Development of the European Nations. 5th ed. (New York, Putnam, 1910.) Good brief account. Walpole, Spencer. History of twenty-five years. (London, 1908.) Vol. 4. Best account in English. Based on thorough use of Parlia- mentary Papers. In opinion agrees with Avril. White, Sir William. Life and correspondence, by H. Sutherland Edwards. (London. 1902.) Contains valuable letters. Bismarck, Otto, Prince von. Bismarck, the man and the statesman, being the reflections and reminiscences. (New York, Harper, 1899.) Gallenga. A. Two years of the eastern question. (London, 1877.) Vol. ii. Recollections of a newspaper correspondent. Loftus, Lord Augustus. Diplomatic reminiscences. (London, Cassell, 1894.) Vol. II. Lord Loftus was ambassador to Russia. Interesting personal touches. 18. THE SERBO-TURKISH WAR OF 1876. 1. ORIGIN OF THE WAR. Serbia's declaration of war upon Turkey, June 30, 1876, was made largely in consequence of her sympathy with the revolting provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. She had waited nearly a year in the hope that the great powers would induce Turkey to make reforms there. (Proclamation of the Prince of Serbia of war against Turkey. Hertslet, IV, No. 463.) The powers could not agree among them- selves and were inclined to defer collective action until Abdul Hamid, who had just become Sultan, should have made clear his temper and policy. 2. THE ARMISTICE. Late in August the Prince of Serbia asked the powers to mediate. (Dispatch from the Earl of Derby to Lord Loftus, Oct. 30, 1870. Hertslet, IV, No. 467, p. 2488.) September 14, Turkey submitted to "the judgment and equitable appreciation of the mediating powers" the following peace proposal: Serbia to abolish her militia, to permit her fortresses to be reoccupied by Turkish troops, to send home emigrants from limitrophe provinces, to pay an indemnity, to allow the Ottoman Government to construct a railway from Belgrade to Nish. (Turkish Memorandum, Sept. 14. 1876. Hertslet, IV, No. 466.) September 21 the powers suggested as a basis for" peace: (1) The stains quo, speaking roughly, for Serbia and Montenegro; 69 (2) local autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina; (3) guarantees against maladministration in Bulgaria; (4) a formal armistice. The powers did not present a united front with respect to the armistice. (Dispatch from the Earl of Derby to Lord Loftus, Oct. 30. 1876. Hertslet, IV, No. 467.) Russia therefore took the matter into her own hands and sent an ultimatum to Turkey demanding an armistice of six weeks or two months. (Russian Ultimatum, Oct. 31,. 1876. Hertslet, IV, No. 468.) Turkey complied. 3. THE CONFERENCE OF CONSTANTINOPLE. England suspected Russia of working for her own ends in Tur- key. (Dispatch from Lord Loftus. Nov. 2, 1876. Hertslet, IV, No. 470; dispatch from the Russian Government, Nov. 3, 1876. Ibid., No. 471; Russian dispatch, Nov. 19, 1876. Ibid., No. 474.) She therefore proposed a conference, the basis for the deliberations to be (1) the independence and the territorial integrity of the Otto- man Empire; (2) a declaration that the powers do not intend to seek any territorial advantages, any exclusive influence, or commer- cial concessions; (3) the bases of pacification proposed to the Porte September 21. (Circulars addressed by the Earl of Derby to Her Majesty's representatives at Paris, Berlin, etc. Hertslet, IV, No. 472. See also article, The Eastern Question, 1875-1877, sec. 10.) Russia contended that "the independence and integrity of Turkey must be subordinated to the guaranties demanded by humanity, the sentiments of Christian Europe, and the general peace." (Russian dispatch accepting proposals for a conference, Nov. 19. 1876. Herts- let. IV. No. 474, p. 2524.) The conference finally came to an agreement in a series of protocols. (Hertslet, IV, No. 475.) These were materially modified to meet the wishes of the Turkish plenipotentiaries (Protocols of Conferences,. Dec. 23, 1876-Jan. 20, 1877. Hertslet, IV, No. 477), only to be rejected by them in the end. The chief reason given for the rejec- tion of the protocols was that they failed to observe " the limits laid down by the English program and to conform to the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris as regards the nonintervention of the. powers in the internal affairs of the Empire/' (Dispatch from Safvet Pasha to Musurus Pasha. Jan. 25, 1877. Hertslet, IV. No. 478, p. 2545.) 4. TREATY OF PEACE. February 28, 1877, Turkey of her own accord made peace with Serbia on the basis of the status quo, amnesty for the Ottoman and Serbian subjects "compromised in the late events," and evacuation within 12 days by Turkish and Serbian troops from territory "out- side the ancient frontier demarkation." (Protocol for the Restora- tion of Peace, Feb. 28, 1877. Hertslet, IV, No. 480.) 70 5. CONCLUSION, The Serbo-Turkish War of 187G-TT is only one factor in the whole Balkan crisis of 1875-1S77, and its' diplomatic problems can be fully understood only in connection with that crisis. (See article. The Eastern Question, 1875-1877.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. til 1 KIM. CORRESPONDENCE AND OTHEB DOCUMENTS; Hertslet, E. Map of Europe by Treaty. (London. L875-1891. 1 vols.) The most important documents dealing with the Serbo-Turkish War arc the following: Xos. 463, 466-472, 474-475, 47s. t80, 482. SE< ONDARY AUTHOBITIES. Temperley, II. W. V. History of Serbia. (London. Bell, 1917.) Pp. 264-266. Ratchich, V. Le Royaume de Serbie : etude d'histoire diplomatique. (Paris, 1901.) Debidbur, A. Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe, L814-1878. 2 \() ] s. (Paris, Alcan, 1891.) A general account of the diplomacy of the period. Murray, William Smith. The Making of the Balkan States. Columbia University Studies. Vol. XXXIX, Xo. 1. (New York. Longmans, Green & Co., 1910.) Scholarly: full citation of authori- 1 ies in footnotes. Miller, William. The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913. (Cambridge, University Tress, 1913.) A careful account. MAGAZINE ARTICLES. Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Feb.. 1877 (vol. 121, pp. 245- 262). Valbert, G. Quelques reflexions sur la Conference de Constanti-. nople. Revue des deux Mondes, Feb.. L877, Vol. XIX. 3 e Periode, pp. 688 699. 19. AUSTRO-RUSSIAN ACCORD OF 1876-1877. 1. INTRODI CTION. The revolts in the Turkish Balkans in b s 7r> and Turkish barbarities in attempting to suppress them claimed the special interest of Aus- tria and Russia. These powers joined with Germany in a "con- fidential exchange of ideas"' and formulated a program of reforms to be demanded of Turkey. Acceptance by the Sultan could be secured only if it was apparent that the program had the united 71 support of the powers. But unanimity could not be obtained. Each power suspected the motives of the other powers. The British Gov- ernment was especially distrustful of Russia. (See article, The Eastern Question, 1875-1877.) Under these circumstances Russia, which Avas more intent on action against Turkey than any other power, sought an understanding with Austria-Hungary. 2. ACCORD OF REICHSTADT, JULY, 1S7G. The Emperors of Russia and Austria with their prime ministers met at Reichstadt in July, 1876. to formulate an agreement regard- ing the Balkans. The text of this arrangement has never been offi- cially published, but Sosnosky describes the agreement as covering two possible situations. If the Turks defeated the Serbs and Mon- tenegrans, with whom war was in progress (See article, The Serbo- Turkish War of 1876), the status quo was to be preserved. If, on the contrary, the Turks were defeated, the basis of settlement should be as follows : Serbia and Montenegro were each to receive additions of territory, but Austria was to acquire the greater part of Bosnia, and Russia to extend her control over southern Bessarabia and the Black Sea. Greece was to obtain Thessaly. Crete, Bulgaria, Rumelia, and Albania were to be autonomous states. Constantinople and the adjacent country was to be constituted as a "free state" (Sosnosky. Die Balkanpolitik Osterreich-Ungarns seit 1866, vol. I, p. 152) . This agreement apparently presupposed the defeat of Turkey by the Balkan principalities, and when their military operations collapsed it became unworkable, except possibly to leave Austria a free hand in Bosnia. (See article. The Serbo-Turkish War of 1876.) 3. THE CONVENTIONS OF PESTH, 1S77. Two secret conventions, signed at Pesth in January and April. 1877. superseded the Reichstadt accord. These conventions, also, have not been published. Founder and Goriainow give the terms, probably with substantial accuracy. If war broke out between Rus- sia and Turkey the Dual Monarchy was to assume an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward Russia and was to support her diplo- matically. The most significant stipulations, as regards the per- manent Balkan settlement, were that Austria-Hungary was left at liberty to take possession of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Russia was to get back Bessarabia, lost in 1856, and was to consent that no " larger Slavic State " should be erected from the territory of Turkey. 4. CONCLUSION. The Austro-Russian accord of 1876-77 explains in large measure the neutrality of Austria-Hungary during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, the attitude of the Dual Monarchy toward the Treaty 72 of San Stefano. and the reason why at the Congress of Berlin Bos- nia and Herzegovina were assigned to Austria-Hungary to occupy and administer. (Sec articles. The Congress of Berlin, and Austria- Hungary and the Balkan Settlement of 1878.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. Scarcely any of the documents bearing on this subject have been published in the official or semiofficial collections of diplomatic papers. Close summaries of the most important documents may be found in the books of Goriainow, Fournier, and Sosnosky. GoriainoWj S. Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles ch. 14 passim. (Paris, Fiov, 11)10.) Important study, based on the Eussian archives. Fournier. A. Wie Wir zu Bosnien Kamen, 21-23, 41— tl (Vienna. Reisser, 1909). Valuable for information from the Austrian archives. Sosnosky. Theodor von. Die Balkanpolitik Osterreich-Ungarns seit 1866. 2 vols. (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1913), vol. 1. pp. 152-160. Kniphasizes the Reichenbach accord. Louis-Jaray, G. L' Annexion de la Bosnie Herzegovina in Questions diplomatiques et coloniale of Feb. 1. L909, vol. 27. pp. 158-159. Diplomaticus. The Secret Treaty of Bucharest. Fortnightly Re- view, 1908, vol. 90, pp. 828-837. Coolidge, A. C. The Origins of the Triple Alliance, 91-97. 111- 1 L5. (Xew York, Scribner. 1917.) Good concise account. 20. THE RUSSO-ROUMANIAN ALLIANCE OF 1877-1878. 1. [NTRODTTCTION. At the time of the outbreak "of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877- 1878 Moldavia and Wallachia formed a separate State, but it was still tributary to Turkey. Though calling itself Roumania, it was known to Europe under the name of "The United Principalities." For some j^ears (since about 1870) Roumania or The Principalities had been forced to revolve in the orbit of Russia (See article, Rou- mania and the Balkan Settlement). 2. THE RUSSO-ROFMWi \X CONVENTION OF 1S77. At the conference of the powers which met at Constantinople in 1876-1877. as also through attempted negotiation, Roumania tried in vain to secure a guaranty of hen- neutrality. Failing to secure the desired guarantee, Roumania determined to take its stand on the side of Russia. 73 Consequently, there was concluded on April 16, 1877, a Russo- Eoumanian convention in which Prince Charles of Roumania assured to the Russian Army free passage through Roumanian territory. Russia, on her part, agreed to maintain and respect the political lights of the Roumanian State, as also to maintain and defend her actual integrity. The situation created by the Russian use of Roumanian territory led inevitably to war between Roumania and Turkey and implied a Russo-Roumanian alliance. BIBLIOGRAPHY. For a good account of the Russo-Roumanian accord of 1877. see D'Avril, A., Negociations relatives a traite de Berlin (Paris. 1886), pp. 208-235. For the text of the convention, see pp. 219-220. See also Whitman, S., Reminiscences of the King of Roumania (New York, Harper. 1899), p. 242. 21. TREATY OF SAN STEFANO, MARCH 3, 1878. 1. INEFFECTUAL NEGOTIATIONS. JUNE-DECEMBER, 1S77. On June 8, 1877, Russia informed England of her war aims (Pari. Papers. Turkey, 1878, XV, No. 1), and on July 20 the Czar, though not willing to suspend operations, was ready to treat for peace if the Sultan would make " suitable propositions " directly to Russia (Ibid., IX, Xos. 1 and 3). The Turks were not ready to treat (Ibid., II. No. 7), though England and Austria were afraid Russia might make peace independently with Turkey (Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, p. 351). By September Turkey sent terms to Berlin for communication to Russia (Hardy, A Memoir. II. p. 32) ; in Novem- ber, after the fall of Kars, Russia drew her terms for Berlin and Vienna to be used as direct basis with Turkey (Goriainow, p. 355) in connection with. the fall of Plevna, December 10. 2. TURKEY ASKS FOR PEACE DECEMBER, 1ST 7. December 12, following a hint from England, Turkey appealed to powers through England (P. P., Turkey. 187S. II. No. 1). Joint mediation failed, Germany refusing to act (Nos. 3, 5, 6), and Derby for Flngland claimed ignorance of Russia's terms. England asked for Turkish terms (No. 4) ; December 26 the Sultan asked for Eng- lish mediation (Nos. 8, 9). Derby communicated this to the powers, asking France to help at St. Petersburg (Archives diplomatiques, second scries, vol. 6. p. 1) ; Gortchakoff replied that Russia was ready for peace if the Porte would communicate directly with Russian field 74 headquarters, where they would learn tonus of armistice (P. P., Turkey, L878, 11. No. 10). Derby though! that Russia was trying to make peace "over the head of Europe" (Goriainow, p. 359) ami declared an armistice was for generals, but terms of peace were for governments, ami other powers were interested (P. P.. 11. Xo. 16). Meantime, December 29, the Czar sent terms of peace to Grand Duke Nicholas in the tield (Goriainow, p. 359). Turkey tried unsuccess- fully once more through England (Nos. 19, 20, 21). ()u January 8 (he Turks finally communicated with the Russian commander, only to find that the Czar's instructions, scut by messenger, would not arrive for a week or ten days. The Grand Duke warned the Turks that acceptance of bases of peace must precede armistice (Xos. 24, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 38), though hostilities stopped in Bulgaria January 11 (Xo. 41). 3. RUSSO-TUlIKlsn NEGOTIATIONS, JANUARY, 1S7S. In spite of Russian warning the Turkish delegates who reached Russian headquarters at Kyzanlik January 19-20 were not ready to accept Russian terms (Pears: Forty Years in Constantinople, p. 27: P. P., Turkey. L878, 11. Xo. 10: 111. Xos. 11. 14. 25). The Czar had refused to stop the Russian advance (Ibid., 111. Xo. 9), and Philipp- opolis was taken January 10. Adrianople January 20. The Sultan considered possibility of abdication and flight to England (Hardy. 11. p. 47). In a panic the Turks gave way (P. P.. III. Nos. 12, 13. 15-19; Goriainow, p. 361), though Derby had telegraphed that any treaty affecting the treaties of 1856 and L871 must be an European treaty and would be invalid without assent of other signatories (P. P.. Turkev. 1878, 111. No. 6). Schouvaloff, Russian ambassador at London. January 25. gave terms to Derby, who had received only garbled versions from Layard.at Constantinople (Ibid.. Xos. 33 -38). Russia also promised that the question of the straits would not be se;t led independently (Ibid.. No. 43. V. Xos. 10, 11. 14-16; Goriai- now. p. 362), although Ignatiev already had instructions to include that matter in a general sense in the Turkish agreement and to up- hold the principle of the closing of the straits. This was on January 27, when Layard at Constantinople had been begging for an English fleel (P. P., Turkey, 1878, VI, Xo. 1: Goriainow, p. 363). Such a situation led the English Government to recall the licet from the mouth of Dardanelles. Meantime Russian headquarters were moved to Adrianople. and further delay in negotiations ensued while the Russian armies advanced "on all sides" toward Constantinople (P. P.. Turkey, IV: V. Xos. 1. 5, 0. 13: VI. Xo. 3). The Grand Duke had received permission to use the greatest liberty of action if Eng- lish should disembark troops at any point (Goriainow, p. 364). 75 4. A It. All stick OF ADRIANOPLE, JANUARY 31, 1878. Under these circumstances the Turks gave up bargaining, signed preliminary bases of peace (Hertslet: Map of Europe by Treaty, IV, No. 514), and an armistice (Xo. 515) which led to further Russian advance (P. P., Turkey, 1878, VII, Nos. 2, 4, 6). England protested vainly (Ibid., XII, No. 7), when she learned that the Turks had sur- rendered even the main line of defense for Constantinople and that I he Russians were going to San Stefano (Ibid., XI, No. 2; XII. No. •"» : ( Joriainow, pi>. :'>C>6-368). Safvet Pasha, Turkish foreign sec- rotary, openly denounced England as betrayer of Turkey (Thomp- son : Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield, II, p. 376, quoting Daily News. Feb. 7). For a time there was possibility of a Russo- Turkish alliance following the peace. Under these circumstances (lie English fleet passed the Dardanelles in spite of Turkish pro- tests. (P. P., Turkey. 1878, XIV.) The Czar ordered an advance . TREATY OK SAN STEFANO, MARCH 3, 187S. In the negotiations Ignatiev, with Czar's approval, tried to estab- lish as many points as possible but was restrained by Gortchakoff, who was anxious not lo break with England. (GoriainoAV. p. 368.) The Turks, encouraged by Austria and British ambassador, openly -aid there was no use in arguing, as this treaty would be revised at a congress. (Goriainow, p. 365.) The treaty (See Appendix I, 14) based on agreement at Adrianople provided for: (1) Independence and increase of territory for Montenegro and Serbia. (2) Independence of Roumania, with cession by Turkey of Dob- rudja, including the valuable port of Constanza, by Avay of indemnity for surrender by Roumania of Bessarabia to Russia. (3) Bulgaria an autonomous tributary principality, with Chris- tian government and national militia and a large increase of territory in Thrace and in Macedonia. Russian military occupation limited to two years. ( I) War indemnity to Russia of 1,410,000,000 roubles. (5) In lieu of 1,100,000,000 roubles of the indemnity Russia Avas to obtain Ardahan, Kars, Batoum. Bayazet, and the territory as far as the Saganlough, in Asia, and Dobrudja, in Europe, the last of which was to be exchanged with Roumania for Bessarabia. 76 (6) Bosphorus and Dardanelles 10 remain open to neutral mer- chant shipping in time of Avar. (7) Reforms in government of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Crete. Epirns, Thessaly, and other parts of Turkey in Europe and of Armenia. (8) Amnesty and protection of rights of individuals. (9) Renewal of treaties of commerce. (10) Evacuation and exchange of prisoners. (11) Ratifications to be exchanged within 15 clays. BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1. DOCUMENTS AND SOURCE MATERIAL. Parliamentary papers. All the British published correspondence relating to Turkey for June, 1877, to April, 1878, is bound in volume 81 of House of Commons Papers. 1878, viz: Accounts and Papers, vol. 30. State Papers (continued) Turkey, 1878. (Contains Cd. Xos. 1905, 1906, 1923, 11)21, 19ii:». L926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930. 1931. 1932, 1919, 1951. 1952, 1954, L958, 1977. 1989, 1990, -2089, 2135.) Cited as P. P., Turkey, 1878, II, etc. Dispatches given* by number. Hertslet, E. The Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. IV, 1875-91. (H. M. Stationary Office, London, 1891.) Contains the treaties, etc. A map showing changes in San Stefano made by Berlin treaty is at p. 2798. Anon. Les Russes devant Constantinople. Revue de Paris 1th year. Vol. IV (July 15, 1897), pp. 101-418. Documents from Rus- sian Field Headquarters, etc.. 1878. Goriainow, S. Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles. (Plon., Paris, 1910.) Summary of unpublished Russian documents by the former director of the Imperial Archives. Thompson, G. E. ■ Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield. 1875 1880. (2 vols. Macmillan, London. 1886.) Useful collection of extracts from parliamentary debates, newspaper correspondence, magazine articles, etc. The treaties are to be found in all of the big collections and ate often reprinted from the text in Hertslet, 11. SECONDARE ACCOUNTS. Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe. (4 vols. Alcan., Paris, 1891-1917.) Standard manual. Driault, E. La question d'orient depuis ses origines jusqu'a nos jours. (Alcan., Paris, 1898.) Convenient general view. Avril, A. Negotiations relatives au traite de Berlin. (Paris, Leroux, 1886.) Skillful review. 77 Argyll, Duke of. The Eastern Question from the Treaty of Paris. 1856, to the Treaty of Berlin, 1878. and to the Second Afghan War. (2 vols. Strahan, London, n. d.) English liberal point of view by a contemporary. Gathorne-Hardy, A. E. (editor). Gathorne-Hardy, First Earl of Cranbrook. A memoir with extracts from his diary and corre- spondence. (2 vols.. London, 1910.) Contains inside opinions of British cabinet by the Secretary of War. Edwards, H. S. Sir William White, (Murray. London. 1902.) English diplomatic service. Contains letters from Layard. Midhat Pasha. Past, Present, and Future of Turkey. Contempo- rary Review, III (1878). pp. 981-99:1 Excellent general statement by liberal Turk. 22. THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878. 1. INTRODUCTION. The Congress of Berlin assembled on June 13, 1878, and ended its labors by signing the Treaty of Berlin on July 13. one month later. The fashioning of this important document, which has been called the constitution of the Balkan Peninsula during the following 30 years, might seem to have been marveously speedy. As a matter of fact, nearly all of its more significant features had been agreed upon beforehand, so that the congress had little to do beyond gathering existing understandings into a unified, elaborated, and harmonious whole. The more important of the preliminary agreements which prepared the way for the Treaty of Berlin will be mentioned. 2. NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE EASTERN QUESTION, 1876-187 7. On July 8, 1876, Emperor Francis Joseph and Czar Alexander II met at Reichstadt. and the former promised to remain neutral in a war between Russia and Turkey, provided he should be allowed to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bareilles (Les Turcs, 160- L61 ) quotes Caratheodory Pasha, who says that the Roumanian delegate, Cogalcineano, had handled the original memoranda of this meeting, in which Gortchakoff and Andrass}^ had set down the cession of southern Bessarabia to Russia and the extension of Austria into Bosnia and Herzegovina. (See article on the Austro- Russian accord of 1877.) On November 2, 1876, Lord Loftus, British ambassador to Russia, reported to his Government that the Czar had spoken to him of the provisional occupation of Bosnia by Austria and of Bulgaria by Russia, with a naval demonstration by the British at Constantinople, and of the erection of Serbia and Roumania into independent kingdoms. (Hertslet. pp. 2509-2510.) 78 At the preliminary meetings of the Conference of Constantinople, December 11-22, 1876, arrangements were proposed for peace and reform in the Turkish Empire, including new autonomous organiza- tions for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria. Serbia and Montenegro were to be enlarged. (Ibid., 2526-2530, Parliamentary Papers, Tur- key, No. 2, 1877.) These plans were elaborated and proposed at the regular meetings of the conference and rejected by the Turkish representatives January 20, 1877 (Hertslet, pp. 2541-2544. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 68, 1104 ff.), as tending to destroy Turkish sovereignty in those areas. (Hertslet, 2547.) 3. THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1S7 7-1ST8. On June 8, 1877, after war had been begun between Russia and Turkey, Count Schuvaloff communicated to the Earl of Derby some views on Russian and British interests in the East, in which he sug- gested that Bulgaria, from the Danube to the Balkans, become " an autonomous vassal province under the guaranty of Europe " and that Montenegro and Serbia receive increases of territory. Russia should have compensation in southern Bessarabia and around Ba- toum, Roumania in a portion of the Dobrudja, and Austria in Bosnia and "partly in the Herzegovina." (Ibid., 2634-2639.) The war continued, and after the fall of Plevna in December, 1877, the way to Constantinople was open. The British Government, supported by public opinion, began to fear the results of the Rus- sian success and prepared to take diplomatic and military action. Austria likewise became suspicious, and prepared to post troops in Transylvania, near the Russian line of communication. On Janu- ary 3, 1878. the Porte appealed to the powers for mediation. The refusal of Germany to take part in such a mediation made the British public apprehensive that Russia, supported by Germany, would try to force her own terms on Turkey. (Rose, I, Development of Modern Europe, I, 265.) On January 15 the British ambassador at Petrograd handed to Prince Gortchakoff an opinion of the British Government that any treaty between Russia and Turkey affecting the treaties of 1856 and 1871 must be a European treaty in order to be valid. (Hertslet, 2657.) 4. THE TREATY OF ADRIA^OPLE. Russia and Turkey signed at Adrianople on January 31, 1878, a document (See Appendix I, 13) which combined with an armistice the " preliminary bases for peace," and provided for an autonomous Bulgaria, with a national Christian government and militia ; the in- dependence of Montenegro, Roumania, and Serbia, with increases of territory; autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reforms in other 79 Christian provinces of Turkey in Europe; an indemnity to Russia; and an understanding to secure the rights and interests of Russia in the straits. (Ibid., 2658-60). On February 5, 1878, the Austrian ( Government proposed a conference at Vienna of the powers signatory to the treaties of 1856 and 1871. (Hertslet, 2668.) Baden was sub- stituted later as the place of meeting, and on March 7 it was proposed that not a conference but a congress be held, and that the place be Berlin (Ibid., 2697). Bismarck announced, in a speech to the Reichstag on February 19, that he proposed to act as an " honest broker, " with no partiality in favor of any country. 5. THE TKEATY OF SAN STEFAN O, 18TS. Russian and Turkey agreed on a " preliminary treaty of peace " at San Stefano on March 3, 1878 (See Appendix I, 14), which set forth, with annexed maps, new boundaries for Montenegro and Serbia. (See article, The Treaty of San Stefano, 1878.) Bulgaria was laid out extensively, including all areas which were believed to contain a majority of Bulgarians. The plan proposed at the con- ference of Constantinople for the organization of Bosnia and Herze- govina was to be put into effect. Improvements and reforms were to be provided in Armenia. An indemnity of 1,410,000,000 rubles was to be paid by Turkey to Russia, but in lieu of 1,100,000,000 rubles of this sum the Dobrudja and the districts of Ardahan, Kars, Batum, and Bayazid were to be ceded. Ratifications were to be exchanged within 15 days (Hertslet, 2672-2696; Parliamentary Papers, Tur- key. Xo. 22 (1878) . Holland, Eastern question, 335-348, etc.) . This treaty proposed an arrangement very favorable to Russian and Bul- garian interests. It was, however, as regards its disposition of the Balkan peninsula, much more nearly conformable to the principle of nationality than was the Treaty of Berlin. While it has often been considered an attempt to " tie the hands of the Congress " (Rose, I, Development, 1, 272) , it became very serviceable to that body in exact conformity with its denomination as a " preliminary peace." G. NEGOTIATIONS FOR CALLING CONGRESS OF BERLIN. There was a sharp exchange of views between the British and Russian Governments as to the extent to which this treaty should come before the congress for discussion, which was settled by Prince Gortchakoff conceding "full liberty of appreciation and action'' to all the powers to be represented. (See account in Salisbury's circular note, referred to below, and Gortchakoff's dispatch, Herts- let, IV, 2707.) Gen. Ignatieff was sent to visit the European courts, and is supposed to have offered Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria. 80 The Hapsburg power, however, was not pleased with the blocking o( the road to Salonika by the interposition of the great Bulgaria, and asked special rights in Serbia and Montenegro, with control of Bosnia and Albania (Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique, II. 515). Apparently i( was this attitude of Austria that caused Russia to yield full discussion of the treaty (Skrine, Expansion o( Russia, 259). Count Andrassy a few days later made a secrel agreement with England, obtaining thereby English support at the coming congress for the Austrian claims to Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Fournier, Wie- wir zu Bosnien kamen, p. 63.) Lord Salisbury issued a circular note on April L, L878, proposing modifications of the Treaty o\' San Stefano. in the direction of remov- ing exclusive Russian advantages, protecting British interests, and securing, without impairing Turkish sovereignty, improvement in the position of the subject peoples of 'Turkey (Hertslet, 2698 -7(H)). Prince Gortchakoff answered this on April :>, asking for specific proposals, ami adding comments in an annex. Russia's armies in 'Turkey were losing effectives rapidly. She was not prepared for a general war. nor was any ally in sight in ease one shouhd break out. She was therefore ready to make considerable concessions. Count Shuvaloff, Russian ambassador at London, served as intermediary in carrying personally to Petrograd (starting May 7) a statement o( the British objections to the 'Treaty o( San Stefano. On his return he was able to reach, by May 30, a secret agreement with Lord Salis- bury, which was later embodied in the entire Treaty of Berlin (Rose, I, 278 "JS-J. The text of this agreement was published in the Lon- don Globe on June lb L878. Paul, H., History of Modern Eng- land, vol. 4. 52 53. It was reprinted by The Times, June 15, L878. The French text is in Staatsarchiv, vol. 34, No. 6749). The principal features were that the Bulgarian regions south of the Balkans were not to be withdrawn wholly from Turkish control; that the Sultan would have the right to canton troops on the frontiers o( southern Bulgaria; thai England would present the cause o( the Creeks of Thessaly and Epirus to the powers; that while feeling "profound regret" at the cession of southern Bessarabia to Russia, she would not dispute it: and that Bayazid, controlling the main route from Asia Minor into Persia, should be given back to 'Turkey. Russia thus made considerable concessions, but in recom- pense Lord Salisbury abandoned the right to diseuss at the congress questions not mentioned in the secret agreement, and thus almost all independence o( decision was removed from the congress. 7. THE CYPRUS row BNTTON. On the very day when this arrangement was made Lord Salisbury telegraphed to Mr. Layard at Constantinople to negotiate about 81 guaranteeing the Sultan's Asiatic posse sionj and receiving the ad- ministration of Cyprus (Parliamentary papers, Turkey, NTos. 36 and 1:3, L878. Hertslet, EV, 2717 2720). A secrel agreement to this effect was drawn up June 1 (See Appendix 1, 16), with such prompti- tude as to suggest previous preparation. (Ibid., 2722 2723). Debi- dour (Histoire Diplomatique, II. 520) -suggests that England would liave been glad to take Egypt instead of Cyprus, but that France would riot have consented. She had stipulated Unit Egypt be not taken in hand by the congress. The principal features of the Treaty of Berlin and of the Cyprus Convention, which, while it stands sepa- rate, counts as si pari of the same great settlement, were thus fully determined before the meeting of the eont San Stefano were materially reduced, so that, in Austria's interest, the two small States might be carefully Insulated from each other. To secure this object more thoroughly, it was pro \ ided that Austrian garrisons be stationed in the Sanjak of Novi- bazar, which was to Lie between Serbia and Montenegro. To recom- pense Serbia in part the territories of Pirot and Vrania were as signed to her. By this action animosity between Serbia and Bulgaria was made almost inevitable, since Bulgaria regarded the region as Bulgarian territory. The Greek representatives were heard, but re- ceived no award of territory. The Roumanians, forced to surrendei southern Bessarabia in order to soothe Russian pride for its loss in L856, as well as to bring Russia to the Danube River, were assigned the infertile Dobrudja, enlarged a little at the south at the expense of Bulgaria. The Armenians, left with a Turkish promise of reform, were not even to have the direct supervision of a single power, hut a futile reliance upon the joint consideration of the powers, (See article, The Armenian Question, h s 7S L897.) The revelation on June I of the Cyprus convention (See article, The English Protectorate over Cyprus, L878 PHI") gave Beaconsfield a dramatic prominence that rejoiced his soul, ami he showed no signs of qualms of con- science because of the inconsistency of the episode with the principles for which England and he himself were standing of the integrity of Turkey and the inviolability of the Sultan's sovereignty. England (.lid indeed assume not only the defense of the Sultan's Asiatic posses sions, hut the protection of the Armenians, both of which engage- ments she quietly abandoned within a few years without returning Cyprus to the Porte, The only power that showed any attachment to the principle now regarded as of paramount importance, the self-determination of people-, was Russia, hut even she did not hold to it against what -he conceived to be her interests. The powers are all paying to-day. quite directly, in the catastrophe of the World War, for their selfish departures from justice at the Congress of Berlin. Even at the time none of them was satisfied with their work. "Not one of the interested parties hut returned from the congress with some discontent, some disquiet, some new perm of hatred or of strife" (Debidour, op. eit.. 11. 580), '.i. TREAT! OF BERLIN (SEE APPENDIX 1. IT). The Treaty of Berlin, as signed duly L3, 1S7S. contained 01 articles, of which the principal contents were as follows: Articles 1 to L2 established Bulgaria as an autonomous and tributary- principality under the Sultan of Turkey, defined its boundaries, provided for the election of a prince and the preparation of an organic law. a pro- visional Russian regime of not exceeding nine months, commercial and financial regulations, and so on. Articles L3 to 22 provided for 83 the Province of Eastern Roumelia, with administrative autonomy, delimitation of boundaries, ;i governor general, European commis- sions to arrange its organization and administer its finances pro- \i ionally, etc. Article 23 affirmed the organic law of Crete and pro- vided for applying similar laws el.-cu here in I he Turkish Empire. The frontiers of Greece were to !><• rectified (art. 24). Bosnia and Herze govina were to be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary, and the Latter State was to have the right to keep garrisons and maintain military and commercial roads in the San jab of Nbvibazar (art. 25). Articles 26 to 33 declared Montenegro independent, en- larged its boundaries, and arranged its relations with Turkey. Ar- ticles ; 'l to 42 provided similarly for Serbia, and articles 13 to 51 for Roumania. The control of the Danube by a European com- mission wascontinued in articles 52 and 57. (See article, The Danube Question, 1871 L904.) Article 58 ceded to Russia the districts of Batum, K;irs, and Ardahan in Asia, and the three subsequent arti- cles deall also with Asia, the last ( ( ;i) providing for reforms in the provinces inhabited by Armenians. Article 62 denned religious liberty for the Ottoman Empire, and the last two articles continued the treaties of Paris (1856) and London (1871) in points not super- eded ami arranged for ratification. 10. APPRAISEMENT OF THE CONOR] The Congress of Berlin, which assembled on June L3, L878, will be forever famous for the great personalities which composed it and for the unsatisfactory settlement of the great questions brought before it. Undoubtedly it. left conditions in the Near East much better than they had been in L875, but scarcely an advantageous change can be credited to the deliberations of the congress itself. Both the im- provements in the situation, such as the independence of Montenegro, Serbia, and Roumania, and the autonomy of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, and the shortcomings, such as the incomplete liberation of the Christian subjects of the Porte and the violation of the principle of nationality in the acquisitions of Russia, Austria, and England had been prepared beforehand. The predetermined compromise set- tlement which "in the Name of Almighty God" was sanctioned by the signatures of the brilliantly clothed plenipotentiaries \. filled with the seeds of oppression, bloodshed, and war. not excepting those of the World War. BIBLIOGRAPHY. DOCUMENTS. Hertslet, Sir Edward. The .Map of Europe by Treaty. (I vols, (vol. I. 1875 L891), London, printed for Her Majesty's stationery office by Harrison and Sons. 1891.) Official collection of important 84 •documents, with indexes, tables of contents, maps, etc. Treaty of Berlin, with abstract of protocols (minutes), list- of subjects, table of contents, and notes, pp. 2729-99. Holland. T. E. (editor). The European concerl in the Eastern question: A collection of treaties and other public acts. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, L885.) Introduction and notes by editor. Brunswick, Benoit. Le traite" de Berlin, annote el comments. (Paris, L878.) .Marten-. G. Fr. de. Xouveau reeueil general de traites et autre- actes relatifs aux rapport do droit international. II serie. Tome III. Leipzig. IV Clercq. Reeueil des trades de la France. Vol. XII. Under auspices of minister o( foreign affairs. Pari-. L881. Contains proto- cols and Treaty of Berlin. Alhin. Pierre. Pes grands traites politiques, reeueil des princi- palis testes diplomatiques depuis 1815 jusqu'a no- jours. (Paris. AJcan, L911.) Testa, Baron I. de. Reeueil de traites de la Porte ottomane. 10 vols. (Paris. 1st',! L901.) Noradounghian, G. Reeueil d'actes internal ionaux de I'empire ottoman. (Paris. L897 1913.) tish and Foreign State Papers. Vol. 69, L877-1878. Compiled by librarian and keeper of the papers. Foreign Office. London. Wm. Ridgway. 1884. Contains protocols or minutes ^f the Congress in full. pp. 862-1078, and the treaty without maps or notes, pp. 7b>-7r.s (all in the otlieial French version). Archives diplomatiques. 2d series, vols. 5, 6. Paris, 1882 -".. Vol. 6, pp. 1-320, contains correspondence of French representatives re- garding the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin. The Treaty o( Ber- lin is given, p. 28 1 if. Parliamentary Papers. (Blue books o\' the British Government.) There are more than LOO of these dealing with Turkey between 1876 and L881. Documents diplomatiques. Affaires d'orient. Congres de Berlin. Paris. L878. Livres jaunes of the French Government. Document] diplomatici. Libri verdi oi' the Italian Government. l s 77.and L'878, Atl'ari d'oriente. BOOKS. Rose, -I. H. The development of the European nations, IS7i>-1 ( .>U. (Fifth edition. -J vols, in 1. Now York, t!. P. Putnam'- Sons. L916.) A thoughtful and impartial history, with special attention to inter- national relations. Written in 1905, extended by three additional chapter- to November. L914. Vol. I. pp. 264 298 deal with the Balkan settlement of 1S78. 85 Miller, \Y. The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913. (Cambridge, Uni- versity Press, 1913.) A valuable and accurate compendium of the rise of the Balkan States. Internal affairs of Turkey relatively neg- lected. Some bias shown in favor of the Greeks. Pp. 382-398 dis- cuss the Treaty of Berlin. La Jonquiere, A., Vicomte de. Histoire de I'empire ottoman. (2 vols. 3rd ed., Paris, Hachette, 1914.) Especially full account in the second volume of the period since 1870. Bareilles, Bertrand. Les Turcs, ce que ful leur empire, leurs comedies politiques. (Paris, Perrin, 1917.) Chapter 6 gives direct information about the Treaty of Berlin from the report of the Turkish delegate, ( 'atheodory Pasha. Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe, 1814-1878. 2 vols. (Paris, Alcan, 1916.) D'Avril, A. Negociations relatives au traite de Berlin et aux ar- rangements qui ont suivi. (Paris, Leroux, 1887.) Choublier, M. La question d'Orienl depuis le traite de Berlin. (Paris, 1897.) Duggan, Stephen Pierce Hayden. The Eastern Question — a study in diplomacy. (New York. Columbia 'University Press. 1902.) Sosnosky, Theodor von. Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns seii 1866. (Berlin, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1913.) 2 vols. Bamberg, V. Geschichte der orientaliscen Angelegenheit im Ziet- raume des Pariser und Berliner Friedens. (Berlin, G. Grote, L892).. Beer, Adolf. Die orientalische Politik Oesterreichs seit 177 L (Prag, 1883.) Guarini, G. B. La Germania e la questione d'oriente lino al con- gresso di Berlino. (Rome, Loescher, 1898.) 2 vols. Bonghi, R. II congresso di Berlino e la crisi d'oriente. (2nd ed. Milan, Treves, 1885.) MAGAZINE ARTICLES. The Nation (New York), in vols. 26 and 27, contains many articles by E. L. Godkin and others on the affairs in Turkey and the con- gress and Treaty of Berlin. See vol. 26 : 37, 53, 194, 237, .'598: vol. 27: 6, 50, 65, 108, 159, 234. Campbell. The resettlement of the Turkish dominion-. Fort- nightly Review, April, 1878. N. S., vol. 23, pp. 543-00. Dicey, E. England's policy at the Berlin Congress. Nineteenth. Century, vol. 3, p. 779. Vambery, A. Russia and England: Batoum and Cyprus. Fort- nightly Review. Vol. 46, p. 372. Blennerhasset, R. Austria and the Berlin treaty. Fortnightly Review, November, 1908. Vol. 90, pp. 751-64. 86 Hahn, S. Diplomatie im Orient soit Beendigung des russisch- turkischen Krieges. Unsere Zeit, (Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, L880.) Vol. 2, pp. Id. 240. Cumming, A. N. Secret History of the Treaty of Berlin. Nine- teenth Century, July, L905, Vol. 58, pp. 83 90. M. K. Waddington at the ministry bf foreign affairs and the Ber- lin congress. Scribner's, February, L914. Vol, .V>. pp. 203 220. MAPS ILLUSTRATING TBEAT1 OF BERLIN. Series in Hertslet, Map of Europe In Treaty, v. 4. Maps to illus- trate Treaty of San Stefano alone are to be found after pp. 2674 (Montenegro); 2676 (Serbia); 2680 (Bulgaria); 2788 (Eusso- Turkish frontier in Asia). Page 2766, map of Bulgaria showing the boundaries as proposed by the Treaty oi' San Stefano and as fixed by the Treaty of Berlin. Stanford's Geographical Establishment: e. 26| m. to 1 inch; names iA' places taken from Austrian stall' map. Page 2774, Eastern Roumelia (Stanford's, etc.). Page 2782, Montenegro (ditto). Page 2786, Serbia (ditto). Page 2790, Bessarabia. Dobrudja, Danube Delta, Isle of Serpents. etc. (ditto). Page •_'T! ) t. Russo-Turkish frontier in Asia (ditto, except scale, which is c. 334; m. to 1 inch). Page 2798, Turkey in Europe, to illustrate Treaty of Berlin (ditto, except scale. 90 m. to 1 inch). Page 2798 (immediately following previous map), map showing territory restored to Turkey by Congress of Berlin (ditto). Page 2798, map illustrating Treaty o( San Stefano and Treaty of Berlin. Rose. Development of European Nations. 1. 284. (Stanford's. Lon- don. 133 m. to 1 inch.) Map illustrating treaty oi' Berlin in Europe and Asia, in Miller. Ottoman Empire. 398. (Cambridge, University Press, L913), c. 140 m to 1 inch. 23. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT OF 1878. 1. CIRCUMSTANCES FAVORING AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. Austria-Hungary entered the Congress o\' Berlin (Sec article, that title) in 1878 under circumstances exceptionally auspicious for the realization of the aims which Count Andrassy, minister of foreign affairs, formulated for the Dual Monarchy. Shortly before the 87 Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 began Austria-Hungary had come to an understanding with Russia (See article on the Austro-Russian accord of 1876-77) which undoubtedly contained stipulations very favorable to the designs of the Dual Monarchy upon Bosnia- Herzegovina. The strong opposition which Austria-Hungary imme- diately manifested to the Treaty of San Stefano could count with certainty upon the firm support of Great Britain, which as well as the Dual Monarchy was bitterly hostile to the proposed Great Bulgaria. The attitude of the small Balkan States was not to count for much in the congress unless in conjunction with that of a great power. Austria-Hungary could, therefore, make use of the hostility of Ser- bia. Greece, and Roumania to the idea of Great Bulgaria to break down that scheme and could then disregard the wishes of those States whenever that course should prove convenient. Finally Austria- Hungary could count upon the firm support of Bismarck, who. though claiming to play the role of the "honest broker," was intent upon using the occasion to make more solid the close understanding between Germany and Austria-Hungary, even if that should produce some difficulty as regards the third member of the League of the Three Emperors (See article, that title). 2. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE TREATY OF BERTJOJ Under the circumstances it was not surprising that Austria-Hun- gary secured its wishes on practically all points where its interests were involved. By article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin (See Appendix I, 17) Austria-Hungary obtained the right to occupy and admin- ister Bosnia and Herzegovina, though the inhabitants were by large majority Serbs and refusal to annex them to Serbia left that State outraged in national sentiment and shut off from all access to the sea (See article on Serbia and the Balkan settlement of 1878). That Austria-Hungary was to occupy and administer Bosnia-Herzego- vina instead of annexing them outright was not due to any reluctance on the part of the Congress of Berlin to permit annexation nor to any consideration for Serbia. The chief reason for the arrangement was to be found in the internal situation of the Dual Monarchy. In Hungary the Magyars and in Austria the Germans were not willing at that time to increase the strength of the Slavic forces in the Dual Monarchy. Occupation and administration was therefore more ac- ceptable than annexation. Novi-Bazar, lying between Serbia and Montenegro, and inhabited by Serbs, though much coveted by those States, each of which asked for its division between them, was chiefly through Austro-Hun- garian influence, restored to Turkey. But article 25. also secured to Austria-Hungary the right to keep garrisons and have military and 88 commercial roads there. (See article, The Austrian Occupation of Novi-Bazar, L878- L909.) .Vt Austria's insistence Montenegro was restricted in extent as compared with the Treaty of San Stefano and subjected to various conditions formulated in the interest of Austria- Hungary. (See article, Montenegro and the Balkan Settlement of L878.) In short, the settlement of L878 represented a successful first step in the Drang nach Osten. BIBLIOGRAPHY. See bibliography of the Congress of Berlin and of other articles dealing with differenl phases of the Balkan settlement of 1878. 24. SERBIA AND THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT OF 1878. 1. INTRODUCTION. Though Serbia had been unsuccessful in its war against Turkey in L876 and had engaged in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 on the side of Russia onlv at a comparatively late date in the stcuggle, the Serbs were not without some hope, as the end of the latter war drew near, that their little state might emerge from the approaching set- tlement o( Balkan affairs with its long Standing national hopes real- ized. These hopes aimed chiefly at two things: (1) Independence, (2) extension of tin 1 Serbian boundaries to include all of the territory inhabited by Serbs and still under Turkish authority. The territory in question fell into two divisions: ( 1) Old Serbia, a somewhat vaguely defined region lying to the east, south, and southwest of Serbia, (2) Bosnia-Herzegovina. •J. SERBIA AMI THE TREATY OK s,\\ STEFANO. The Treaty of San Stefano was the first disappointment for Serbia. It stipulated for the independence of Serbia, also for an increase of territory. But the amount of territory which it proposed to bestow on Serbia was inconsiderable, only a small fraction of Old Serbia. It was evident that Russia intended to bestow its favor chiefly on Bulgaria. :;. SERBIA and THE CONGRESS or man, ix. The calling of the Con«rress of Berlin revived the hopes of Serbia. lint it became evident at a very early Stage that the Serbs had very little basis for expectation o( a favorable outcome from its delibera- tions. The Serb representatives were refused admission to the con- gress. Later on they were not even permitted to appear before the 89 congress to present an argument in behalf of the Serb claims. From the French delegates the Serb representatives Learned that Bismarck attached the greatest importance to securing the satisfaction of Austria-Hungary and that Serbia would succeed only in so far as she was in accord with Austria. Under the circumstances, since it was well known that Austria- Hungary was intent upon the acquisition of Bosnia-Herzegovina for herself and there was some knowledge of her understanding in regard to that subject with Russia (See article on the Austro-IJussian Accord of L876-1877), Serbia did not venture in the formal papers which she communicated to the congress to lay claim to Bosnia- Herzegovina, knowing well that by so doing she ran the risk of getting very little of Old Serbia. I. Till. TREATY OF BERLIN AM) SERBIA. The Treaty of Berlin provided, so far as Serbia was concerned, a solution which was altogether such an one as Austria-Hungary wanted for Serbia. As a distinguished French historian has re- marked (Emile Denis. La grande Serbe, p. 108). it was in line with the Hapsburg policy as pursued toward Serbia ever since: To tolerate the existence of Serbia as long as she would be a docile vassal and would serve to extend little by little her ( Aust ro- ll ungarian) influence toward the south; to crush her without pity from the moment when it should attempt to fulfill freely her desti- nies as an independent power. Serbia got a recognition of its inde- pendence and a slightly larger but somewhat different extent of territory than had been contemplated in the Treaty of San Stefano. 5. SERBIAN DISAPPOINTMENT. The passionate disappointment of Serbia at this outcome can be judged by two contemporaneous Serb utterances. One is that of a Serb publicist in 1S7."> when the rising in Bosnia had raised Serb hope- that at length the time was approaching when the Serbs of that region might be united with those of Serbia. " Bosnia-IIerze- govina is for us not only that which Trentino and Triest are i'ov Italy and the Alpine Provinces of Austria are for Germany. It has for Serbia the importance which the environs of Moscow ha\e for Russia and the most vital parts of Germany and France for the ( rermans and the French." The other is that of a Serb poet, writing after the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin. "The Treaty of Berlin has a little enlarged the chains of Serbia, but thereby rendering them more terribly solid. The light of day breaks only to reveal the mutilation of Serbia, only that its wounds may be clearly dis- cerned and that it may be struck where it is still intact. The night 90 has dispersed only in order that the Serbs may no longer dream of their unity, that unity for which they have undergone so many sacri- fices." 6. APPRAISEMENT. The Balkan settlement of 1878 in the ease of Serbia exhibits in striking fashion two things: (1) The failure of all the powers to take into account the rights of nationality as represented by the Christian States of the Balkan peninsula, to which failure must be attributed in large measure the unhappy state of affairs which pre- vailed in southeastern Europe from 1878 to 1914, which condition became one of the most potent factors in bringing about the World War; (2) the failure of Russia in 1878 to appreciate its responsibility toward the Slavic peoples of southeastern Europe other than the Bulgars, thereby Leaving them defenceless in the presence of an ill- informed and indifferent Europe to the tender mercies of Austria- Hungary, already well embarked upon its Drang nach Osten policy. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Denis, E. La grande Serine, 10-2-113. (Paris, Delagrave, 1915.) Admirable short account by a leading authority. Ay rib A. Le Traite de* Berlin. (Paris, Leroux, 1886.) Stand- aril authority. GeorgeVitch, V. La Serbie au Congres de Berlin. In Revue d'his- toire diplomatique. (1892.) Vol. 5, pp. 483-552. Detailed and thoroughly documented study. Peritch, J. Le traite de Berlin et la question de la nationality par rapport a la principante de Serine. Revue generale de droit inter- national public, vol. 7. pp. 181-214. Temperley, H. W. V. History of Serbia. (London, Bell. 1917.) Ch. 13. Concise, authoritative. George \ itch. V. Die Serbische Frage. (Stuttgart, Deutsche Ver- lages Anstalt, 1909.) 25. BULGARIA AND THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT OF 1878. 1. INTRODUCTION. At the beginning of 1S76 all of Bulgaria was an integral part of Turkey. In the first part of that year the Christians of Bulgaria rose in revolt against the Turkish officers. The officers used irregu- lar troops called bashi-bazouks to repress the revolt and committed such atrocities that the peoples of Europe were stirred. Serbia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey. Disraeli, the premier of Eng- land, feared Russia too much to help the cause of Bulgar freedom, while Gladstone and the English people sympathized too much with 91 the Bulgars to permit the English Government to help Turkey. On April 24, L877, the Czar of Russia declared war on Turkey, disclaim- ing any desire for Constantinople. After the Russian entrance into Adrianople on January 20, 1878. the Sultan sought peace. On March 3, 1878, Russia and Turkey agreed to the Treaty of San Stefano. 2. TREATY OF SAN STEFANO. By this treaty Bulgaria was constituted an autonomous and tribu- tary principality under the suzerainty of the Sultan, with a Christian governor freely elected by the population, confirmed by the Sultan with the assent of the powers. This Bulgaria represented the " ( Jreater Bulgaria " of the Middle Ages. By the boundaries defined in the treaties it would extend, roughly, from the Danube on the north to the iEgean on the south and westward to Albania. All of this region was to be one principality. « 3. CONGRESS OK BERLIN. When the treaty became known the English Government feared that such a Bulgaria would be the avenue through which Russia could reach the Aegean and threaten the I^nglish trade route to India. Austria feared that because of the development of the Pan- Slavic feeling in Serbia and Montenegro, Russia would not live up to the Convention of Pesth (See article.The Austro-Russian Accord of L876-1877), in which Russia had agreed that Austria might occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. Greece protested against the inclusion of Macedonia and the Aegean littoral in Bulgaria, and Serbia against the inclusion of territory on her eastern and southern frontier. Rou- mania was grieved at the loss of southern Bessarabia, and Turkey saw an opportunity of regaining part of her territories. Austria proposed a conference at Vienna, but the powers preferred to accept the invitation of Bismarck to come to Berlin. England, Russia, Austria. Germany, France, Italy, and Turkey signed the Treaty of Berlin on July 13, 1878. 4 . TREATY OF BERL] N . By the Treaty of Berlin (See Appendix I, 17) " Greater Bulgaria " was divided into three parts. The part north of the Balkans, minus a few square miles in Dobrudja assigned to Roumania, was erected into an autonomous tributary principality under the suzerainty of Turkey, precisely as arranged for by the Treaty of San Stefano. The region south of the Balkans was to be called Eastern Roumelia and was to remain subject to the direct political and military author- ity of the Sultan under conditions of administrative autonomy. A 92 European commission, acting with the Sultan, was to fix the admin- istrative and judicial system. The governor-general was to be a Christian, nominated by the Sultan for a term of five years with the assent of the powers. Macedonia, the third portion, was to remain a part of Turkey, as before the war. A Russian army of 50,000 men was to occupy Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia for nine months after the ratification of the treaties. 5. RESULTS OF THE SETTLEMENT FOR BULGARIA. For Bulgaria the chief results of the settlement were: (1) The Treaty of San Stefano added the sandjak of Toultcha, in the Do- brudja, to Roumania. This was occupied b} 7 a mixture of Bulgars, Roumanians, and Turks. Berlin added a part of Dobrudja to the south of Toultcha occupied almost exclusively by Bulgars. This raised an ''irredenta " question for Bulgaria against Roumania; (2) because the efforts of Russia in behalf of Bulgaria, the latter looked to Russia for direction, 1878-1886; (3) because San Stefano erected a "Greater Bulgaria," it aroused in the Bulgars the hope of restor- ing the Bulgaria of the Middle Ages. At that time there was a na- tionalist feeling in Bulgaria and Roumelia, but none in Macedonia. The desire in Serbia and Greece to acquire parts of Macedonia was not at that time so developed as later on. It seems quite prob- able that, if liberally treated in other matters, they might have finally acquiesced in Bulgarian possession of that region if San Stefano had been allowed to stand. When the Congress of Berlin handed Macedonia back to Turkey it encouraged Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria with the hope that ultimately they might annex parts of that region, thus leading to the antagonisms which finally brought on the Second Balkan War, 1913. (See articles on the Macedonian question, 1878-1908, 1908-12.) ■ BIBLIOGRAPHY. Holland, Thomas Erskine. The European Concert in the Eastern Question. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1885.) Contains text of the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin in English. Chaunier, A. La Bulgarie. Etude d'histoire diplomatique et de droit international, pp. 20-35. (Paris, Rousseau, 1909.) Cambridge Modern History. (Cambridge, University Press, Eng- land, 1911.) Vol. 12. General account and bibliography. Report of the International Commission on the Balkan Wars. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington, 1911. Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe (1814-1878). (Paris, Alcan, 1891.) Vol. 2, ch. 13 passim. See also bibliography of article. The Congress of Berlin. 93 26. ROUMANIA AND THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT OF 1878. 1. INTRODUCTION. During the period 1870-1877 the statesmen of France lost interest in Roumania, those of England continued to neglect her, and those of Austria-Hungary for the most part continued to oppose her. Roumania was forced to revolve in the orbit of Russia. When war between Russia and Turkey became imminent, the Roumanian cabi- net voted to- remain neutral and Prince Carol tried to get the Great Powers to guarantee this neutrality. Failing in this, Carol agreed to a convention April 16, 1877, granting free passage to Russian troops through Roumania, Russia promising to respect political rights and to maintain and defend actual integrity of Roumania. (See article. The Russo-Roumanian Alliance of 1877-78.) Tur- key interpreted her suzerainty over Roumania literally and began bombardment of Roumanian towns on the Danube, whereupon Rou- mania declared her independence of Turkey May 23, 1877. When the Russian troops were halted before Plevna in Turkey, the Czar urgently plead for Carol to lead the Roumanian Army to the rescue. Carol went, and turned the tide. 2. TREATY OF SAN STEFANO. The Roumanians were not admitted into the negotiations of the Treaty of San Stefano between Turks and Russians. By this treaty Turkey recognized the complete independence of Roumania and ceded to Russia the Dobrudja with the right reserved to Russia to cede Dobrudja, a little favored region occupied for the most part by non-Roumanians, to Roumania in exchange for southern Bessarabia. The Roumanians protested to the powers against the ingratitude oP Ivu-sia and were among those who desired a conference. 3. CONGRESS OF BERLIN. At the Congress of Berlin the Roumanians were not admitted as members, but on the insistence of Lord Salisbury their delegates were permitted to state their case. (Protocol No. 9. Hertslet. IV, 2744.) The congress in general confirmed the arrangement of San Stefano so far as Roumania was concerned, with the exception that the Berlin congress drew the southern boundary line of Dobrudja from a point east of Silistria on the Danube to a point south of Mangalia on the Black Sea. instead of the line from Cheravavoda to a point north of Mangalia. as provided in San Stefano. 4. APPRAISEMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT. The added region was occupied almost entirely by Bulgars. The settlement turned the Roumanians asainst Russia because: (1) Of 94 resentment ;it the ingratitude of Russia, whose army had been saved at Plevna by the Roumanians; (-2) of the fear that Russia would insist on crossing Boumania in developing her hold upon the Balkans; (3) Russia's reaching the north bank of the mouth of the Danube would threaten Roumania's economic outlet to the Black Sea and through the Dardanelles; (4) Russia's an- nexation of 350.000 Roumanians in southern Bessarabia who had been subject to Roumania since 185G aroused discontent among the Bessarabians and the "irredentist" party in Roumania. The settlement left friction between Bulgaria and Roumania because: (1) In adding Dobrudja to Roumania it raised an irredenta question with Bulgaria; (2) in failing, through the opposition of Russia, to include the fortifications around Silistria in Roumania it exposed Roumania to attack from the south. The negotiations at Berlin had disclosed the fact that little help would come from England or France. For this and the above reasons Roumania chose to revolve (1879-1913) in the orbit of Austria, a Government for which Roumanians had no love because she held three and one-half million unredeemed Rou- manians, but a Government too powerful and near to be the object of unfriendly treatment until Roumania had grown stronger (See article. Roumania and the Triple Alliance. 1883-1911). BIBLIOGRAPHY. Avril. Traite de Berlin (Paris, Leroux. 1886), 208-235, 384-401. Holland, Thomas Erskine. The European Concert in the Eastern Question, etc. (Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1885.) Seton- Watson, R. W. Roumania and the Great War. (Constable. London, 1915.) General Account of Roumania's relations to Euro- pean powers. Map following page 99 shows distribution of Rou- manian peoples. Mitrany, I). Roumania. Her History and Politics. (Oxford. Uni- versity Press, 1915.) Ha/en, Charles Downer. Europe since 1815. ( Xew York, Holt. 1910.) General account. 27. MONTENEGRO AND THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT OF 1878. 1. MONTENEGRO AS EFFECTED BY THE TREATY OF SAX STEFANO. In her war with Turkey, declared July 2, 1876, Montenegro's armies occupied in general the following districts: (a) To the north and east the region of the Piva in the Herzegovina and part of Bihor in Novi Bazar; (b) the Zubci district and the coast of Spizza to the Boy ana River (including Dulcigno, Antivari, and Spizza) ; 95 (c) Xiksic; ( Gussinie-Plava region of Al- bania. Here Turkey used the Albanian League as her instrument, inciting rebellion. The Corti Compromise was adopted April 18, 1880 (Hertslet, Nos. 563, 564). To compensate Montenegro for the fertile Gussinie-Plava region, she was to be given the sterile region of the Kuci Kraina, which, however, was Slavic and dominated Podgoritza. Turkey agreed to accept this, but delayed, offering excuse after excuse, notwithstanding :m identic note of the powers on June 11. 97 At last an alternative suggestion was made on Lord Granville'ij initiative, that the port of Dulcigno go to Montenegro in exchange for ( Irussinie-Plava. (See Documents Diplomatiques, loc. cit., pp. 196 c( seq.). Austria required that it be subject to article 29 of Treaty of Berlin. The Porte requested also Dinosi. (Ibid., pp. 350 et seq.) This was granted: but a naval demonstration at Antivari (September "28, 1880) was necessary, and also a threat by Great Britain to occupy Smyrna, October 1, 1880 (Ibid.. No. 2, pp. 95, 113 et seq.), before Dulcigno was yielded by the Porte. November 25, 1880. (Ibid., No. 2, p. 120 et seq. Hertslet, No. 579.) Dulcigno's boundaries were estab- lished by the second session of the commission. (Ibid., No. 580 and map.) Spizza's were received from Austria at the third. (Ibid., No. 581 and map.) There were some later slight readjustments of the Al- banian line with Turkey. (Ibid.. Nos. 603, 604, 605.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. DOCUMENTS. Parliamentary Papers: Turkey, under years 1878-1880 for texts and protocols. British and Foreign State Papers : For the same years, especially vol. 69. Documents Diplomatiques, 1880, Affaires du Montenegro. Hertslet. Map of Europe by Treaty. Nos. 514, 518, 528, 530, 552, •580, 581. Holland. European Concert in the Eastern Question, pp. 227 et seq., App. II. pp. 335 et seq., 356 et seq., texts of treaties. SECONDARY AUTHORITIES. Cambridge Modern History, vol. 12. chap. XIV- by W. Miller, especially p. 386 et seq. Driault. La Question d'Orient. 3d ed. (Paris, Alcan, 1905.) Marriott, J. A. E. The Eastern Question. Chap. XII. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1917.) Pose. J. H. The Development of European Nations, especially chaps. 7. 8, 9. (New York, Putnam, 1916.) Lavisse et Eambaud. Histoire Generale. Vol. XII, chap. XIII, and p. 505. Debidour, A. Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe, 1814-1878. 2 vols. (Paris, Alcan. 1891.) Baron d'Avril. Negotiations Relatives an Traite de Berlin. (Paris, Leroux, 1887.) 53706—18 7 98 MAPS. Maps used in determining boundaries are conveniently reproduced in Hertslet, pp. 2782, 2956, 3018, 3097, 3130, 3140. Seh racier. Atlas Historique, Carte 51. 28. THE ENGLISH PROTECTORATE OVER CYPRUS, 1878-1914. 1. ACQUISITION As A PROTECTORATE BY ENGLAND, IXTs. The question of Cyprus grew out of the events of the war of 1S77-7S between .Russia and Turkey. The main aim of British diplomacy was the defense of Asia Minor against Russia, and it was evidently considered thai the island of Cyprus would be a good ba>e from which the British cooperation in this defense could be directed. It was also valuable as a defense of the Sue/ Canal. To this end a convention was negotiated with Turkey. June f, 1878 (See Appen- dix 1, 16), by which, if Russia retained Kars. Batoum, and Ardahan, or made further attacks on Asia Minor, England would cooperate with Turkey in their defence, and Cyprus should be given over to English occupation ami administration (analogous to Bosnia and Herzegovina). Reforms were promised by Turkey for Asia Minor. England was to pay a fixed tribute yearly for the island. ■2. BRITISH OCCUPATION, L878— 1914. With the turning of Russian interests to the eastward, the defense of Asia Minor through this means became unnecessary, and Cyprus has never been converted into a strong military base. With the acquisition of Egypt by England it lost, at least relatively, its im- portance for the defense of the Suez Canal, The majority of the inhabitants are Greeks, and Cyprus has become more and more to Greece " unredeemed " territory. England has. however, retained it, feeling, up to 1914, that if British control was withdrawn, honor demanded that it be given back to Turkey. 3. ANNEXATION, NOVEMBER 5, 11)14. In 1914, with the entrance of Turkey into the war. the convention? lapsed and England annexed Cyprus. (See Decree, Nov. 5, 1914 Near East, Vol. 8, p. 16.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 69, p. 71 1. The. Near Ea>t. Vol. 8, p. 16 ( November 6, L914). Marriott, ,1. A. R. The Eastern Question. (Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1D17.) The best general account of the problem. 99 Orr, C. W. J. Cyprus under British Rule. (London, Scott, 1918.) Hanotaux, G. Contemporary France. 4 vols. (New York, Put- nam, 1903.) Translated by J. C. Tarver (vol. 4 for this period). The best account of the Near East, 1877-1878. Walpole, S. History of Twenty-five Years. Vol. 4. (New York, 1908.) The account of this period from the English standpoint, (tear, but lacks the authority and access to sources enjoyed by Hanotaux. 29. THE ABROGATION OF THE NORTH SCHLESWIG PLEBISCITE AGREEMENT. 1. THE TREATY OF PRAGUE. By article 5 of the Treaty of Prague, August 23, 1866 (See Appen- dix I, 1), Prussia agreed "that the inhabitants of the northern dis- tricts of Schleswig shall be ceded to Denmark if they express a wish to be united thereto by vote freely given." The treaty, however, did not contain any stipulation as to the period of time within which the vote was to be taken, nor did it specify the extent of territory cov- ered by the words " the northern districts of Schleswig." The article in question was put into the treaty at the request of Napoleon III, who had been asked by the Danes of northern Schleswig, against (heir will separated from Denmark in 1864, to take an interest in their behalf. 2. EFFORTS TO OBTAIN EXECUTION. Afterwards Prussia showed no haste to carry out the terms of article 5. The request of a delegation from North Schleswig for an audience with King William to thank him for the inclusion of the article in the treaty was refused. In the Prussian Parliament the article was criticized. Bismarck in reply, while defending the article, declared that the principle of nationality could not be con- formed to in all cases and pointed out that the vague character of the article gave a certain latitude in the execution of it. When a little later the French Government called attention to the matter with a view to bringing about the execution of the article, Prussia denied vigorously the right of France to concern itself in the ques- tion. In 1867 there were negotiations between the Danish and the Prussian Government on the subject. Prussia professed a readiness to carry out the stipulation but demanded guarantees in behalf of Germans living in the region. The demands put forward have been characterized by Emil Elberling (Question du Schleswig) as follows: " The concession of such guarantees would have inevitably involved a continual interference of Germany in Danish affairs and would 100 have rendered Denmark dependent upon Germany." Under those conditions the negotiations came*to nothing. Later negotiations had the same result. After the Franco-Prussian War many German newspapers, probably taking their cue from the Government, argued that (In' article having been inserted in the treaty at the instigation of Napoleon III, was no longer to be regarded as obligatory, unless Austria should demand it. 3. ABROGATION. In 1878. when Austria-Hungary had recently incurred considerable obligation to Bismarck for the manner in which he had favored her program at the Congress of Berlin, and while the pourparlers leading to the Dual Alliance of 1ST!) were in progress, Germany induced Austria-Hungary to consent to a treaty abrogating article 5 of the Treaty of Prague. Some excuse for the disregard of the claims of Denmark in the matter was made out of the fact that a Danish princess had recently married the Duke of Cumberland, the pre- tender to the Hanoverian throne who had refused to renounce his claim to that throne, though Hanover had been, annexed to Prussia in L866. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Franz de Jessen (editor). Manuel historique de la question du Sleswig. (Copenhagen. 1906.) Consists of articles by various au- thors. Contains an admirable map showing the linguistic situation in North Schleswig. Pro-Danish, but fair and accurate. The text of the abrogation treaty of August '28, 1S78, is in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 09, pp. 778-774. SECTION II.— 1878-1890. 30. THE GRECO-TURKISH FRONTIER QUESTION, 1878-1881. 1. GREECE AND THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN. In February, 1878, the Greek Government sent troops across the Turkish frontier, on the pretext that Thessaly was in a state of in- surrection. A few days later they were withdrawn. (Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, IV, 2780.) Shortly after, when the affairs of the Near East were being settled at the Congress of Berlin. M. Waddington, the French representative, proposed that the Greek frontier should be rectified by being extended so as to include Thes- saly and Epirus. Supported by the Italian plenipotentiary, he gained the assent of all members of the congress, except the Turkish, and the 24th article of the Treaty of Berlin provided that in case Turkey and Greece were unable to agree about the rectification siig gested, the powers reserved it to themselves to offer mediation. (Ibid., pp. 2749, 2750, 2779, 2780.) M. Waddington's suggestion was made July 5, a week before the congress concluded its sessions, and is embodied in the 13th protocol. (Hertslet. IV. 2749-50.) Ar- ticle 24 of the treaty of Berlin provided : " In the event of the Sublime Porte and Greece being unable to agree upon the rectification of frontier suggested in the 13th Protocol of the Congress of Berlin. Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia reserve to themselves to offer their media- tion to the two parties to facilitate negotiations." NEGOTIATIONS, 1878-1880. Not long after the congress had broken up, the Government of Greece notified the powers that it had addressed the Sublime Porte, but that the answer returned after some delay was altogether evasive. It therefore asked for the exercise of the right of mediation reserved to them, since otherwise there seemed small prospect of putting the decision of the congress into effect. (British and Foreign State Papers, LXXII, 405-407.) Mediation was undertaken, but the Turk- ish Government employed very dilatory tactics, hoping, as usual, that (101) 102 the jealousies of the powers would prevent real intervention for Greece. Several Greco-Turkish commissions assembled, but wore unable to agree. S. CONVENTION OF MAT 24, L831. In Juno, 1880, after an interchange of notes, a joint communication was sent to the Porte, thai it was to the interest of the powers for the matter to be settled. (Hertslet,IV,2958 2961.) The result was that a convention was signed, May 24, 1881, giving to Greece much of Thessaly and part of Epirus, altogether somewhat less than 0.000 square miles. The treaty signed May "21. 1881, is entitled "Conven- tion between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary. France. Germany, Italy, Russia, and Turkey, for the settlement of the frontier between Greece and Turkey." (British and Foreign State Papers, LXXXII, 382-9; Hertslet, IV, 3042-3052.) The more important provisions were: the frontier hot ween Turkey and Greece was minutely described, a line running from above the headwaters of the Sale- morias and the Arta by an irregular course eastward to the sea : the inhabitants ^( the regions ra\vA to Greece were to have rights equal with those of the Hellenic citizens; life, property, customs, and religion wore to he scrupulously respected; proprietary rights granted by the Sultan were to he recognized by the Greek Govern- ment; the Sultan was to dispose oi! his crown properties in the dis- tricts ceded: inhabitants of neighboring regions might continue to enjoy old rights of pasturage in the cv^vA districts; freedom of religion and worship was guaranteed to Mussulmans; the Govern- ment of Greece was to assume a proportional part o( the Turkish public debt; inhabitants desiring to retain Ottoman nationality might have three years in which to leave; full amnesty was granted on both sides. (Ibid.) Some of these provisions are interesting with reference to characteristic Balkan problems. (See also Hertslet, IV. 2966-2973.) BIBLIOGRAPHr. Sir Edward Hertslet. The Map Of Europe by Treaty. 4 vol- umes. (London. L875-1891.) In this standard collection the Treaty of Berlin may he conveniently consulted. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 7-2. pp. 405-537, 736 7:'.7. contain the treaty of L881, and the numerous negotiations Leading to it. British Parliamentary Paplrs; Greece No. 1. L879, Nos. 1 -and 2; L880, Nos. 1. 2, 5, and 6, L881, contain the negotiations. P. D. Holt and A. W. Chilton. The History of Europe from L862 to PHI (New York. Macmillan, L917), contains an excellent brief account, page 248. 103 81. THE DANUBE QUESTION, 1871-1904. 1. TREATY OF PARIS. The Treaty of Paris in 1856 applied the principles of free naviga- tion as declared by the Congress of Vienna (1815) to the Danube. It created two commissions for the river. One was the Danube Riparian Commission composed of representatives of Wurtemberg, Bavaria, Austria, Turkey, Serbia, Roumania, and Bulgaria — the riparians — and was to be pennament. It was given the duty of (1) drafting navigation and river police regulations; (2) abolishing the obstacles of every nature to free navigation on the river; (3) carrying out uecessary improvement works: and ( t) maintaining the navigability of the mouths of the river and the neighboring seas after the dissolu- tion of the European commission. The other was the European commission, which was authorized to deepen the delta channels of the river and the bars in- front of its mouths, so that seagoing ships could ascend to river ports. It was "understood" that the commission would be dissolved in two years, but, in fact, its work was scarcely begun in that time. As the riparian commission proved a failure and a navigation authority at the mouths of the river was imperative in view of the inefficiency of the Turkish Government, the European Commission was continued and its powers increased by giving it control over the police and regulation of naviga- tion on that pari of the river under its jurisdiction, by various agree- ments from L858, which were incorporated in the Public Act of 1865, signed by the powers represented (British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 55, pp. 93-127). The works and personnel of the commission were neutralized by the Public Act (article 21). 2. TREATIES OF LONDON AND BERLIN. By the Treaty of London. March 13. 1871 (See Appendix I, 3. and article The Black Sea Question, 1870-1871) the European Commis- sion was continued until April 24. 1883, and the neutralization of the commission, its works and personnel expressly sanctioned. In the Treaty of Berlin, July 13. 1878 (See article, The Congress of Berlin), Roumania was given a seat in the commission, whose jurisdiction was extended up the river to Galatz, the first important Roumanian port, " in complete independence of the territorial authority" (Roumania ). To meet die new situation caused by Russia becoming a riparian, the independence of Roumania and its acquisition of the former Turkish delta of til-- Danube, and the autonomy of Bulgaria, " and to increase the guarantees" of freedom of navigation, all fortresses on the river were to be razed, no new ones erected, and warships prohibited below the Iron Gates. Regulations for the river from Galatz to the Iron 104 Gates, where a series of cataracts interfered with navigation — and the Austro-Hungarian boundary began — were to be drawn by the Euro- pean Commission, assisted by delegates of Serbia and Bulgaria as riparian States. 3. TREATY OF LONDON, 1883. By the Treaty of 'London. March 10, 1883 (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 74, pp. 20-22), the jurisdiction of the commission was extended to Braila in Roumania, practically the head of naviga- tion by seagoing ships, and it was continued for 21 years, to April 24, 1904, then for three-year periods unless one of the parties, a year before the expiration of a term, announced its intention of proposing modification in its constitution or powers. Control of the northern embranchment of the delta, on which Russia for part of the distance owned one bank, Roumania the other, was turned over to the riparian powers, and a mixed commission composed of Austria-Hungary, the riparian powers of Russia. Bulgaria, and Serbia was created to ad- minister the admirable regulation drawn up for the Braila-Iron Gates section. Because of the opposition of Bulgaria and Roumania, who were not represented at the conference which drafted'the treaty, the mixed commission never came into being and the regulation never took effect. 4. CONCLUSION. The European Commission has accomplished a universally com- mended work as an engineering organ in improving the channel and the bar and in building up the port of Soulina at the mouth of the river. It has also efficiently policed navigation in the jurisdiction, at first through Turkish officials under its control, but since 1882 through officials appointed by and responsible solely to itself. It has met all its expenses from tolls on shipping paid directly into the treasury. It is a striking example of an efficient international organ which in a limited sphere has operated to general satisfaction. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Parliamentary Papers, 1872. vol. 70. Report on Improvement of Danube; 1894, vol. 90, Further Report on the Improvements Made in the Navigation of the Danube, 1878-1893 ; 1907, vol. 87, Report on Operations of European Commission on the Danube. These reports are made by the retiring English commissioner and are short state- ments of the work of the commission, principally its engineering work. They are of great value. 1878, vol. 82 (Turkey). Treaties and other Documents Relating to Navigation of the Danube, 1856-1875. Baicoianu, C. 1. Le Danube. (Paris, Sirey, 1917.) Demorgny, G. La Question du Danube. (Paris, Sirey, 1911.) 105 Englehardt, Ed. La question des embouchures du Danube in Revue des Deux Mondes, July 1, 1870. Maioan, Jean-Constantin. La Question du Danube. (Paris, La- rose, 1905.) Les traveaux de la Commission Europeene des bouches du Danube, 1856-1911. (Vienna, Gerold, 1913.) Yoisin Bey. Les Travaux d'amelioration de l'embouchure du Dan- ube et du Bras de Soulina. (In Annales de Ponts et Chaussees, Sept. 1. 1893.) de Saint Clair, Andre. Le Danube: etude de droit international. (Paris, 1899.) For good, brief accounts, see Bonfils, H., Manuel de droit inter- national public (7th ed., Paris, 1914), pp. 351-355; Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law (Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1906), Vol. I, pp. 630-631; and Schuyler, E., American Diplomacy (Scribner's, New York, 1886), pp. 352-363; Krehbiel, E., The Euro- pean Commission of the Danube, in Political Science Quarterly (March, 1918), vol. 23, pp. 38-55. For documents and treaties, see British and Foreign State Papers ; Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty (London, 1891, in 1 vols.) ; Hert- slet. Commercial Treaties, vol. 26, pp. 862-904 ; and Sturdza, Recueil de documents relatif a la liberte de navigation du Danube (1904). 32. THE SUEZ CANAL, 1881-1904. 1. INTRODUCTION. In 1854 F. de Lesseps obtained from Said Pasha, viceroy of Egypt, a concession to organize a universal company for the financ- ing of the construction of a ship canal across the Isthmus of Suez. This concession was later ratified by the Sultan of Turkey, and the canal was formally begun in 1859. But owing to various difficulties, among them the diplomatic opposition of England, the work was delayed many years. A new firman was obtained in 1866 which contained the clause declaring the canal always open to all merchant vessels without dis- tinction of nationality. The canal was formally opened to traffic in 1869. In 1873 an international commission, called by the Sultan, met at Constantinople and declared the navigation of the canal open and common to warships and to vessels not used for the transport of troops. Events like the purchase by the British Government, in 1875, of the Khedive's shares, giving Great Britain a controlling interest in the canal, and the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 were the cause of general concern, and resulted in a demand for the so-called neutralization of the Suez Canal. 106 J. CONFERENCE OF PARIS, 1885. The bases for an arrangement of this kind were proposed in the celebrated circular note (See Appendix I, -2-2) of January 3, 1883, which Lord Granville addressed to Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Rome, and St. Petersburg. A conference, composed of delegates from nine Slates, met at Paris, on March 30, 1885, but it failed to come to an agreement. Long diplomatic negotiations followed which finally resulted in the Treaty of Constantinople. 3. THE TREATY OF CONSTANTINOPLE, L888 (SEE APPENDIX I. 37). This treaty was signed by Great Britain, Germany, Austria. France. Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Russia, and Turkey. It de- clares (Art. 1) that "the Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and emeu, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of com- merce or of war. without distinction of flag." The other main provisions of the treaty are as follows: The canal must never be blockaded, and no act of hostility may be committed either in the canal or in its ports of access, nor within the 3-mile limit. Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictuat or take in stores in the canal and its ports of access, except in so far as may be strictly necessary. ::: * * Their stay at Port Said and in the roadstead of Suez shall not exceed 2 1 hours, except in case of dis- tress. In such case they shall be bound to Leave as soon as possible. (Art. I.) " In time of war belligerents shall not embark within the canal and its ports of access either troops, munitions, or materials of war." (Art. .">.) At no time shall belligerents keep war- ships in the waters of the canal, but nonbelligerents may station war- ships in the ports of access of Port Said and Suez, the number of such war vessels not exceeding two for each nonbelligerent power. (Art. 7.) The execution of the treaty is placed in the hands of the agents in Egypt of the signatory powers and of the Egyptian and Ottoman Governments. (Art. 8.) Article 10 recognized the right i^ the Sultan and the Khedive to take such "measures" as they "might find necessary to take for se- curingby their own force- the defense of Egypt and the maintenance of public order." England had taken such measures when she crushed the revolt under Arabi Pasha. It should be noted that, according to the terms of the Treaty of Constantinople, the Suez Canal is not. strictly speaking, neutralized. for this would require that it be closed to all belligerent warships. It is. in a sense, internationalized, inasmuch as it is made free and open to the vessels of all nations. It should also be noted that at the Paris conference of 1885 the British delegates bad formulated a general reservation as to the ap- 107 plication of the principles proposed in so far as they "might fetter the liberty ol their Government during the occupation of Egypt by the forces of Her Britannic Majesty." In 1888 Lord Salisbury re- newed this reservation. In 1898 Lord Curzon declared in the British I [ouse of Lords that, owing to these reserves, " the convenl ion of ( !on- stantinople had not. been brought into practical operation." By article 6 of the Anglo-French declaration of April 9,1904 (Appendix 1,68), relating to British and French interests in Egypt and Morocco, the Brit ish Government declared that they adhered to the si ipulat ions of the 1 reaty of October 29, 1888, and that they agreed to their being put into force. But whether with or without express reservation, it must be conceded that Great Britain has the right to take such mea-ures as may he necessary for t he defense of the Suez ( 'anal. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The most extensive study of the administration, construction, and exploitation of the Suez Canal appears to be that by Voisin Bey, F. P.. Le Canal de Suez (Pari-. C. Dunod, 1902-1906), in 7 volumes. See also Charles-Roux, J.. L'isthmus et le Canal de Suez (Paris, Hachette, L901 ). in 2 volume.-, and Lesseps. F. de. Recollections of Forty Years ( New York. Appleton, 1888), in 2 volume-. For studies of the international status of the canal, see Camand, M. L.. Etude sur la regime juridique du Canal de Suez (Grenoble, 1899) : Dedreux. R., Der Suezkanal im internationalen Rechte (Tu- bingen, 1913); Rossignol, L. M., Le Canal de Suez (Paris. 1901); Holland, T. G., Studies in International Law (Clarendon Press, Ox- ford. L889), pp. 270-293; Asser, T. M! C, Le Canal de Suez in Revue de droit international public for 1888, Vol. XX. pp. 529 ff.; Travers Twiss, La neutralization du Canal de Suez, in Revue de droit international public. Vol. VII. pp. 682 ff. ; ibid., in Revue de droit international public. XIV. pp. ~>r2; ibid., in op. cit. XVIL pp. 615 ff. : Martens, F. de, "La question Egyptienne," in Revue de droit international, XIV. pp. 355 ff. : and Rolin-Jacquemyns, Delibera- tions de I'Institut de Droit Internationa] sur le Canal de Suez, in Revue de droit international. X. pp. 100 ff. For good brief accounts, see Bonfils, IP. Droit international public (Paris, L914, 7th ed.), pp. 336 339; Freycinet, C. de, La question d'Egypte (Paris, n. d.), pp. 99-204; White, A. S., The Expansion of Egypt, ch. 7 (London. Methuen, 1899) : Moore. J. B., Digest of Inter- national Law (Washington, Govt. Printing Office. 1906), Vol. Ill, po. 262 268; and Lawrence, T. G., The Suez Canal, in Essays on international Law (Cambridge. 1885), pp. 41-88. For the text of the Treaty of Constantinople, see Albin, P.. Les grands traites politiques (Paris. Alcan, 191-2). pp. 382-387. For an English text, see Parliamentary Papers. Commercial, Xo. 2 (1889). 108 For diplomatic correspondence relating to the subject, see British Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. ID (1885) ; ibid.. Commercial, No. 2 (1889) ; Ministere des affaires strangers, Documents diplo- matiques, Commission Internationale pour le libre usage du Canal de Suez (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1885); ibid., Negociations rela- tives au reglement international pour le libre usage du Canal de Suez (Paris. 1886-1887). For an extensive bibliography on the Suez Canal, see List of Books and of Articles iu Periodicals Relating to Interoceanic Canals and Railway Routes published by the Library of Congress (Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1900), pp. 95-13L 33. THE FORMATION OF THE DUAL ALLIANCE, 1879. 1. TREATY OF OCTOBER 7, 1879. The pact between Austria and Germany, known as the Dual Alliance, was signed at Vienna on October 7. 1879. It provided (See Appendix I, 18) that the two powers, if either should be attacked by Russia, should make war and conclude peace together. Should either power be attacked by an aggressor other than Russia, the other power agreed to observe an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward its ally. But if Russia should come to the support of the attacking power, the agreement to lend mutual assistance should become operative and war should be waged and peace concluded in common as if Russia were the aggressor. The treaty was to be kept secret. 2. WHY THE ALLIANCE WAS MADE. An alliance between Austria and Germany had long been in the mind of Bismarck. As far back as the Austro-Prussian War of L866 he demanded moderation in the treatment of Austria from the military party, urging that Prussian statesmen must keep in mind the possibility of such an alliance at some time in the future (Bis- marck's Reflections and Reminiscences, ch. 20). After 1870 the danger of French efforts to regain her lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine could not be dismissed. To offset this Bismarck had dex- teriously brought about the League of the Three Emperors, a league of the rulers of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia. (See article. The Formation of the League of the Three Emperors.) With Russia relations had been particularly cordial because of the friendship between Emperor William and the Czar. This friend- ship was severely tried by the outcome of the Congress of Berlin and Bismarck's so-called neutrality. Russia had stood faithfully by Prussia when her affairs were at a critical stage, and she now felt that her loyalty had been very badly rewarded. Bismarck com- 109 placently allowed the congress to give to Austria the administration of affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus starting her on a course of ambitious expansion in the Balkans and raising an insuperable barrier between Russia and Austria-Hungary by intensifying their rivalry in the Balkans. (See article, The Congress of Berlin.) In the face of this it was an open question whether, the League of the Three Emperors could be maintained, even though Bismarck had left the congress pledged to its continuance. Sooner or later he had to choose between his two allies. Pan-Slavists denounced Germany's conduct, and a bitter contro- versy raged between the newspapers of St. Petersburg and Berlin. Further irritation was caused in Russia by the apparent hostility of the German representatives on the international committee for the determination of the boundary of Bosnia. During the winter of 1878-79 the Russian press even talked of a Franco-Russian alliance, and the Government increased the army in Poland. The critical moment came when Alexander II. getting more and more resentful at the trend of Bismarck's policy, expressed himself in emphatic terms against the eiforts to sacrifice the good relations with Russia for those of Austria. 3. NEGOTIATIONS. Bismarck felt compelled to take decisive measures, and on August 27-28, 1879, held a conference with Count Andrassy, the Austrian prime minister, at which a closer alliance between the two countries was favorably discussed. But they had scarcely separated when Wil- Liam I and his nephew, the Czar, met at the Russian frontier town of Alexandrovo. The two monarchs became completely reconciled, and the Kaiser returned to Berlin absolutely opposed to the idea of an Austro-German alliance directed against Russia. In this crisis Bismarck threatened to resign. William I finally agreed to negotiations for a defensive alliance which must, however, not be specifically directed against Russia. When Bismarck reached Vienna on September 21 he found Count Andrassy unwilling to sign a general treaty of alliance. Russia, from the standpoint of Austria, was the only menace; against attack from this source alone should provision for common defense be made. As this view coincided entirely with that of the German chancellor, if not with his instruc- tions, the terms of the agreement were drawn up. and later in Sep- tember laid before the respective Governments for ratification. 4. OPPOSITION OF AMI-LI AM 1. Again Emperor William refused to accept Bismarck's view, de- claring that ratification of the treaty by him would be a breach of faith with the Czar. He protested that he would abdicate rather than 110 give his consent, and urged that Russia be admitted to the alliance and the League of the Three Emperors be renewed. Bismarck once more threatened to resign. But he had taken the precaution of enlist- ing the support oi' the Leading statesmen of the Empire. The King o( Bavaria and the crown prince were on his side. Von Moltke brought the influence of the military authorities to his support. Fi- nally the entire ministry threatened to resign it' the treaty were not ratified. The Emperor at last yielded and gave his consent, stipulat- ing that, although the terms of the treaty remain secret, he mighl in case ot need inform the (V.ar of its scope. 5. PUBLICITY. The news o( the alliance soon transpired. In Russia the Pan- Slavists' anger increased in bitterness and their denunciation con- tinned. Alexander J I. to whom the Kaiser sent the preamble oi' the treaty on November I. was loss resentful. Indeed, his letter, while not reassuring, was friendly in tone. The full text o[' the treaty was not made public until February 3, L888. The agreement then ap- peared simultaneously in the Berlin Official Gazette, in tjie AJbenpost of Vienna, and the Pester Lloyd, with the explanation that publicity w as given to it in order to put an end to doubts as to the purely defen she character of its provisions. BIBLIOGRAPHY. British and Foreign State Papers. 1SS-J. vol. 7;». pp. 270-272. Gives a good translation of the text of the Dual Alliance. The Ger- man is found in Schulthess, Europaische Geschichtskalendar, 1888, vol. 29, pp. 21-23; the French in Alhin, pp. 58 60. Coolidge, A. C. Origins of the Triple Alliance. (New York. Scribner, L917.) The best acc< unt in English. Treats both the Dual Alliance and the inception of the Triple Alliance. Alhin, Pierre. Les grands traites politiques des principaux textes diplomatiques deupis isle jusqu'a nos jours. (Paris. Alcan. L911.) Bismarck, 0. E. L., Prince von. The Man and the Statesman, Reflections, etc. (translated), 2 vols. (New York, Harper. L899.) Very good on the policy of Bismarck toward Austria and Russia in connection with the Dual Alliance, but necessarily to he used criti- cally, especially in this connection. Memoirs of Prince Chlodwig Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst (trans- lated), 2 vols. (X. Y., Macmillan. L906), which are frequently in disagreement with Bismaivk. Busch, M. Bismarck, Some Seeret Pages of His History. (New York. Macmillan. L898.) 3 vols. Hanotaux, G. Histoire de la France Contemporaine. (Paris, Com- bet, L908.) Vol. IV, p. 388. Ill Chiala, L. Pagine di Storia Contemporanea dal 1858 al 1897. (Turin. Koux, 1898.) 3 vols. Semiofficial and containing many texts. Kohl, H. Wegweiser durch Bismark's Gedanken und Erinnerun- gen (Stuttgart, J. C. Cotta, 1898), p. 170 et passim. 34. THE FORMATION OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE, 1882. 1. TERMS. The Triple Alliance was made in 1882 between Austria-Hungary. ( rermany, and Italy. It was really an extension of the Dual Alliance (See article, The Formation of the Dual Alliance), entered into in 1n7 ( .> by the first two powers. Only one of the treaties in operation dining the earlier years of the alliance have been published. It ap- pears, however, that there were three separate treaties and that the Austro-German treaty was that of 1879 made public in 1888 (See article, The Formation of the Dual Alliance, 1879). The effed of the three treaties was to create an arrangement of substantially the fol- lowing form: If France attacked Germany or Italy, the two powers were pledged to act together against her; if Russia attacked Germany or Austria, both were to make war on Russia; and if France and Russia attacked any of the three powers, all three woidd declare war. By L912, if not earlier, it appears that a single treaty had replaced the earlier separate treaty. By its terms, if one or more members of the Triple Alliance should be attacked by one or more of the Great Powers outside of the Alliance, without direct provocation being given, the other members were to go to the assistance of the member attacked. If a member of the Alliance, believing that its security were threatened .by a Great Power outside of the Alliance, should de- clare war on that Power, the other two members were to observe a benevolent neutrality toward their ally while each had the right to determine for itself whether to make common cause with its ally. (Text of the articles in the Austro-Hungarian Red Book, " Diplomatic ! documents concerning the relations of Austria-Hungary with Italy " (1915), pp. 189-190.) 2. WHY ITALY ENTERED. The circumstances that brought about this extension of the alliance arc fairl}* well known. Bismarck, though feigning indifference at first, welcomed the new ally that not only made Germany's position impregnable, but caused a more tractable mood in Austria and Rus- sia. But it was Italy which sought an alliance that seemed so out of accord with her history and her interests. The reasons are clear. She had been completely isolated for some years, particularly since the Congress of Berlin; she feared intervention by outside powers to restore the temporal power of the Pope ; she w 7 as bitterly disappointed 112 over her lost opportunity in Tunis, and indignant at French occupa- tion in 1881 of that territory. The Italians not only came away from the Congress of Berlin with empty hands, but, in the words of Crispi, they had been " humiliated at Berlin as the last people in Europe * * * slapped and de- spised." (Chiala, Pagine di Storia Contemporanea, II, p. 17.) Upon the outburst of popular anger against France and the fall of the Cairol] ministry. Crispi visited Berlin to sound Bismarck on the possibility of an alliance. The latter gave him to understand that Germany was on good terms with Austria-Hungary, and that any agreement would have to be made in accord with Vienna. Encour- aged, Italy opened negotiations with her old enemy. Germany soon took a hand, and on May 22, 1882, two identical agreements, save for the Balkan article (not included in the German-Italian treaty), were signed. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Annual Register, 18S8. English text of the published articles is found in the volume for 1915. German text in the Austrian Red Book. Coolidge, A. G. Origins of the Triple Alliance. (New York. Scribners, L917.) The best account in English. Treats both the Dual Alliance and the inception of the Triple Alliance. Bnsch, M. Bismarck, Some Secret Pages of His History. (New York. Macmillan, 1S98.) 3 vols. Tardieu, Andre. France and the Alliances. The Struggle for the Balance of Power. (New York, Macmillan. 1908.) Rather brief on the Dual and Triple Alliances. Leroy-Beaulieu, P. La France. Tltalie et la Triple Alliance, in Revue des deux Mondes. (Paris, 15 July, 1889; 15 Feb., 1891.) Pingaud, A. L'ltalie depuis 1870. (Paris. L915.) Gives a good .sketch of Italy's relation to the alliances. Albin, Pierre. Les grands traites politiques: recueil des prinei- paux textes diplomatiques depuis 1915 jusqu'a nos jours. 2d ed. (Paris. Alcan, 1912.) Fraknoi, Y. Zur Enstehungs Geschichte des Dreibundsvertrag, in Deutsche Revue for December. 1915. In the same periodical for January, 1916, by the same writer. Kritik des Driebundsrertrag. Bismarck. (). E. L., Prince von. Politische Reden. (Stuttgart. Cotta. L892-1905.) Singer, Arthur. Geschichte des Dreibunds. (Leipzig, Rabino- witz, 1904.) A good study from the German viewpoint. Chiala. L. Pagine di Storia contemporanea dal 1858 al 1897. (2d ed., Turin. Roux, L898.) 3 vols. Semiofficial and containing many texts. Stieglit/., A. N. LTtalie et la Triple Alliance. (Paris. 1906.) 113 35. RENEWALS OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. 1. INTRODUCTION. The Triple Alliance was renewed at least four times, the first time in March of 1887, the second time in June. 1891, the third time in June of 1902, and the fourth time early in December, 1912. It has often been asked why Italy should have been willing to continue for so long a period in an alliance from which she received but doubtful benefits at first, and which as time went on seemed to be clearly out of accord with her national policy. That the sentiment of opposition to the agreement grew as the years passed appears very clearly in the press and in the Chambers of Deputies at the time of the later re newals. In 1882 the alliance made secure the possession of Rome as the Italian capital in return (1) for Italy's virtual renunciation of her ambition to acquire what remained of unredeemed Italy in Austrian hands, and (2) for the adoption of a costly increase of her army and navy. As the years parsed the possession of Rome became assured without the support of the Triple Alliance agreement, while the mili- tary obligations Italy had undertaken as a member of the alliance •nntinued, and the sentiment of the Italians toward the completion of national unification grew in strength. This was accelerated by the fact that the interests of Italy and Austria-Hungary clashed in the Balkans. As a result of the absence of any real national or economic basis for the continuance of the treaty in the later years of its exist- ence, each renewal gave rise to vehement protests. 2. RENEWAL OF 1S87. The first renewal in 1887 occurred before the existence of the alliance was publicly acknowledged, and there w r as no expression of opinion one way or the other. A year later it became known. William II, speaking in his first address to the Reichstag, after re- ferring to the Dual Alliance, said : " Similar historical associations and similar national considerations at the present time bind us to Italy. * * * our existing agreements with Austria-Hungary and Italy. "' etc. (See Appendix I, 36.) 3. RENEWAL OF 1S91. The second renewal of the treaty was effected in 1891, a year before the time for its expiration, and apparently for six years with a pro- vision for its continuance automatically for six years more, if it was not formally denounced before. Much heralded royal visits fol- lowed. Italy's royal pair visited Berlin, wdiile Emperor William II and the Empress attended the silver wedding of Humbert and his 53706—18 8 114 consort in Kome in the following year. The good feeling continued till about 1898, after which difficulties between Italy and Austria, the revival of an intense Italian nationalism, and a better under- standing between Italy and France began to undermine it. 4. RENEWAL 'OF 1902. The alliance was only renewed in 1902 through the personal efforts of Von Billow and of Francis Joseph. In 1911 came the war upon Tripoli, in which Italy found her allies secretly hostile. Austria brusquely demanded that the operation of the Italian fleet against Epirus be discontinued, because she claimed it was a violation of article 7 of the treaty relative to the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans. Italy accepted the situation, but her resentment was very keen. Public opinion in Italy became more and more hostile to the alliance. 5. RENEWAL OF 1912. Nevertheless in 1912, a year before the time set for the serving of notice, the three powers, anxious over the difficulties in tjie Balkans, again renewed the treaty. From the Italian point of view this was significant because of the cordial relations with France and the mani- fest understanding with the rival group of powers in regard to Mo- rocco and Tripoli earlier. Many publicists in the countries of the Triple Entente favored this renewal, fearing lest a failure on the part of Italy to renew the alliance might become the occasion for some decisive act by Germany and Austria-Hungary which would seri- ously imperil the peace of Europe. An interpellation was addressed to the foreign minister by Signor Barzilai, who charged the Govern- ment with weakness in its dealings with Austria-Hungary and alleged that the Triple Alliance was both useless and burdensome to Italy. The Marchese di San Giulano replied that the Triple Alliance, kept alive and made fruitful by the close relations between its members, must remain the foundation of Italian foreign policy and the pivot on which it turned. The Chamber indorsed his decla- ration, and two days later it adjourned until February 6, 1913. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The available literature on this topic is not extensive. The differ- ent historical annuals like the Annual Eegister, Schulthess, Euro- paischer Geschichtskalendar, L'Annee Politique, Questions Dip- lomatique et Coloniales, etc., give shorter or longer accounts of the renewals in the volumes for 1887, 1891, 1902, 1912, and 1915. Some of these, like the Questions Diplomatique, etc., often give valu- able excerpts from Italian and German newspapers. 115 Pingnad, A. L'ltalk de|mis 1870. (Paris, 1915.) Gives a good -ketch of Italy's relation to the Alliances. Singer, Arthur. Geschichte des Dreibunds. (Leipzig, Rabino- witz, 1914.) A good study from the German viewpoint. Reventlow, Ernst zu (Count). Deutschlands auswartige Politik, 1888-1913. (Berlin, Mittler, 1914.) Biilow, Bernard von (Prince). Imperial Germany. (Transla- tion.) (London. London, Cassell, 1916.) Stieglitz. L'ltalie et la Triple Alliance, 1906. Barker, J. E. Italy's policy and her position in Europe. Fort- nightly, vol. 97 (1912), pp. 11-27. Benoist, C. L'ltalie dans la Triple Alliance. (Revue des Deux Mondes, June 1, 1894.) Cortesi. Italy and the Triplice. (North American Review, vol. 188 (1908), pp. 793-802. Blind, Karl. A plea for the Triple Alliance. (National Review, vol. 17, 1891, pp. 767-783.) Crispi, F. Dual and Triple Alliance. (Nineteenth Century, vol. 42 (1897), p. 673.) Fife, R. H., jr. Italy and the Triple Alliance. (North American Review, vol. 200 (1914), pp. 538-548.) Long, R, C. Germany's Mediterranean League. (Fortnightly, vol. 96 -(1911), pp. 874-890.) Outidanos. Triple Alliance and Italy's place in it. (Contempo- rary, vol. 56 (1889), pp. 469-488. Valbert, G. Un Publiciste Allemand et son Plaidoyer en faveur de la Triple Alliance. (Revue des Deux Mondes, June (1892), pp. 683- 694.) 36. ROUMANIA AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE, 1883-1914. l. roumaxia's relation to the triple alliance. Although Roumania was never actually a member of the Triple Alliance, through a treaty entered into in accordance with the pro- visions of the Roumanian constitution, there was a close connection maintained with the Triple Alliance from 1883 to 1914 by means of a personal adherence signed by King Charles. This agreement, whose existence had been long suspected in well-informed circles, became definitely known at the beginning of the World War. when King Charles informed the cabinet of the arrangement, and urged that Roumania join the Central Powers. The cabinet declined to recognize the legal validity of the arrangement and the King was forced to yield. 116 2. REASON FOB ROUMANIAN CONNECTION AVITH THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. The reasons Which moved Roumania to take up a position favor- able to the Triple Alliance were: (1) The memories of the treat- ment received by Roumania at the hands of Russia during the crisis of 1877-78, and fear of further aggressions on the part of Russia in her advance to Constantinople. (See article, Roumania and the Balkan Settlement of 1878.) (2) The feeling of racial and cul- tural difference separating them from the Slavs, and a resultant op- position to Slav ambitions in the Balkans. These interests, being parallel to those of Austria-Hungary, led them into close relations with that Slate and through her to Germany. German schools were established in which many of the Roumanian leaders were trained (Mitrany, The Balkans, p. 302), and Germany and Austria together controlled 65 per cent of Roumanian imports. (Lewin, German Road to the East. p. 275.) .".. ROUMANIAN ALIENATION PROM THE* TRIPLE ALLIANCE, 1908-1914. The Triple Alliance was never very popular in Rounmnia owing to the ill-treatment of the Roumanians of Transylvania by Hungary. At the same time, parallel with Italy, whose policy Roumania had tended of late to follow on account of racial and cultural relation- ship. Roumania took a more independent attitude toward the Triple Alliance and built up good relations with Russia. Tn the First Balkan War Roumania preserved neutrality, but at its conclusion a boundary dispute arose between Roumania and Bulgaria over the Dobrudja frontier, of which the former demanded a rectification and the latter refused. Despite the offers (Mitrany in The Balkan-. p. 303) and threats (Beyens, Germany before the War. 263, quoting the declaration of M. Take Jdnescu) of Austria, in behalf of her Bulgarian protege. Roumania entered the Second Balkan War on the side of Greece and Serbia. This completed the breach with Austria, although not with Germany, who appears to have given her approval to this policy. (Reventlow, Deutschlands auswaertige Politik, 380.) Tn 1914, despite the efforts of King Charles, Rou- mania followed Italy into a policy of neutrality. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Jorga, X. Quarterly Review. (1015.) Vol. 223, pp. 439-50. Probably the clearest statement of Roumanians policy. Seton-Watson, R. W. Roumania and the Great War. (London. Constable, 1015.) Pro-Roumanian, clear, but adds few new facts. Duggan, S. P. Balkan Diplomacy. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 32, pp. 224r-227, March. 1017. 117 Mitrany, D. et al. The Balkans. (Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1 ( .>16.| A very brief but clear account of Roumanian policy 1883-1914. Lewin, E. The German Road to the East. (London, Heinemann, 1916.) Strongly anti-German, somewhat careless as to statement, valuable bibliograplry. 37. BISMARCK'S REINSURANCE TREATY. 1. SITUATION LEADING TO THE TREATY. After the establishment of the German Empire in 1871 Bismarck rightly judged that his greatest task was the keeping of what had been gained. He always feared that his work might be lost through attack by some hostile coalition. Therefore he strove to surround Germany with friends and allies and at the same time to isolate France. First he drew together Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Ger- many in the League of the Three Emperors (See article, that title), but this wasweakened as Russia and Austria drew apart because of rivalry in the Balkans. He next entered into the dual alliance with Austria-Hungary in 1879. (See article, The Formation of the Dual Alliance, 1879.) But Bismarck was skeptical as to the permanence of any alliance, and, although he justly had much confidence in Aus- tria, resolved to provide against eventualities and at the same time make his position still stronger by drawing Germany and Russia together again. He was resolved, therefore, that the wire to St. Petersburg should not be cut. (Cambridge Modern History, XII, 158.) He would, as it were, take out a policy of reinsurance. (Mat- ter, Bismarck, III, 516.) The manner in which he carried out this reinsurance policy has been involved in much obscurity. Serge Goriainow, formerly archivist of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs, by the publication in the American Historical Review for January, 1918, of an article entitled, The End of the Alliance of the Emperors, has made possible a clear understanding of the matter. 2. THE SECRET TREATIES OF 1S81 AND 1884. Doubting the stability of the alliance effected between Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1879, and fearful of the possibility of an alliance between Russia and France, Bismarck contrived to bring about the signing of a treaty June 18, 1881, to which Russia. Ger- many, and Austria-Hungary were the parties. The first article of this treaty stipulated that if any of the three powers should find' itself at war with a fourth great power, the other two powers would preserve a benevolent neutrality and would strive for the localization of the conflict. This stipulation w T as to apply to the case of a war between one of the three powers and Turkey, only in a case a previous 118 agreement had been arranged between the three courts as to the results of such war. The treaty was for the period of three years. In 18S4 it was renewed with some modifications for another period of three years. 3. NEGOTIATION OF THE REINSURANCE TREATY, 1887. In 1887, when the question of renewing the treaty of 1884 came up, Russia was unwilling to renew it. ,The clash of interests between Russia and the Dual Monarchy in Balkan affairs, especially in the matter of the Bulgarian Revolution of 1886 (See article, that title), made Russia unwilling to continue the earlier arrangement. After considerable negotiation, however, between Bismarck and Shuvaloff, the Russian ambassador at Berlin, a new treaty between Germany and Russia was signed June 18, 1878. This was the reinsurance treaty. 4. TERMS OF THE REINSURANCE TREATY, 1S8 7. Article 1 stipulated that if either power should find itself at war with a third great power, the other would maintain a benevolent neutrality and devote its efforts to the localization of the conflict. This stipulation, however, was not to apply to " a war against Austria or France resulting from an attack made upon one of these two powers by one of the high contracting parties." This meant, of course, that Germany would help Austria-Hungary if Russia at : tacked the Dual Monarchy, while Russia need not remain neutral if Germany should attack France. By article 2 Germany recognized " the rights historically acquired by Russia in the Balkan Peninsula, and particularly the rightfulness of a preponderating and decisive influence on her part in Bulgaria and eastern Rumelia.*' Both courts pledged themselves to permit no modification of the territorial status quo in the Balkan Peninsula without a previous agreement between them. By the third article the parties agreed to uphold the existing rule in regard to the use of the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles for belligerent purposes. 5. TERMINATION. Negotiation for the renewal of the reinsurance treaty were in prog- ress at the time of Bismarck's dismissal in 1890. (See article, The Dismissal of Bismarck, 1890.) Bismarck was anxious for renewal. After the dismissal of Bismarck the Russian ambassador was sent for by the Kaiser and informed that German foreign policy would not be changed, and that Germany was entirely disposed to renew the treaty. A little later there was a change in German policy. The negotiation was transferred to the Russian capital and then allowed to drop. There has been much discussion about the reasons 119 why the German Government abandoned the reinsurance treaty policy. Opinion on the matter is still divided. Shuvaloff believed that the failure of Germany to renew the treaty could have two explanations: One, that the Kaiser counted on the accession of Great Britain to the Triple Alliance; the other, that Caprivi, Bismarck's successor, took more seriously than had Bismarck the German rela- tions with Austria-Hungary involved in the Triple Alliance arrange- ment. Whatever may have been the Kaiser's motives, the decision not to renew the reinsurance treaty was of importance. Russia, already showing considerable inclination toward an alliance with France (See article, Formation of the Dual Alliance between France and Russia, 1887-1893), was manifestly influenced in large measure to that course of action by the German decision as to the reinsurance treaty. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Goriainow, S. The End of the Alliances of the Emperors. Amer- ican Historical Review, January, 1908. Vol, 23, pp. 324-349. Based on the Russian archives. Earlier accounts must be corrected in the light of this article. Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman : Being the Reflections and Reminiscences of Otto, Prince von Bismarck, etc. 2 volumes. (New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 1899.) Translated by A. J. Butler. Fiirst Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsf iirst. Denkwiirdigkeiten. 2 volumes. (Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1907.) Reports Bismarck's con- versations on the subject. The Annual Register : A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad. 1884. (New series. London, 1885.) Contemporary account by one who had no special information. Matter, Paul. Bismarck et son Temps. 3 volumes. (Paris. Alcan, 1905-8.) Excellent account, giving the course of the negotia- tions and the terms of the convention, as they are generally under- stood. The textbooks and the standard histories have little about these matters, and have apparently copied that little from each other: though the brief account in Seymour, Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914 (New Haven, Yale Press, 1916), p. 37, is excellent and the references are good. 38. THE BULGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1885. 1. INTRODUCTION. In th'e agreement reached by Lord Salisbury and Count Shuvaloff, May 30, 1878, regarding a modification of the Treaty of San Stefano (See article, The Congress of Berlin, 1878), the outstanding 120 feature was the provision that the regions south of the Balkans which were inhabited mainly by Bulgarians should not be wholly withdrawn from Turkish control. (The Times (London), June 15, 1878; Staatsarchiv, vol. 34, No. 6749.) Russia and England alike, failing to realize the independence of the Bulgarian character, antici- pated that the new province would come easily under Russian control. Russia desired and England feared the weakening of the Turkish power. Inasmuch as Russia had become willing to make concessions to prevent a war for which she was not ready, she accepted the reduc- tion of the new Bulgaria. 2. BULGARIA AND THE TREATY OF BERLIN. As formulated in the first articles of the Treaty of Berlin, Russia's Bulgaria was cut into three parts — the principality of that name, lying between the Danube and the Balkans; the Province of Eastern Roumelia, south of this; and a remaining irregular portion, most of which was restored to the tender mercies of Turkey. England and Austria insisted upon this arrangement. Russia and the remaining members of the congress acquiesced. The feature most insisted upon was that the principality and the province should be entirely sepa- rate in government. Both were nominally still a part of Turkey, but Bulgaria was nearly independent, while Eastern Roumelia was subject to the quinquennial appointment of a governor (a Christian chosen by the Porte with the consent of the powers) and to the sta- tioning of Turkish garrisons along its northern frontier. 3. RUSSIA AND BULGARIA, 187S-18S5. The Bulgarian Revolution of 1885 consisted in the union of the province with the principality. The events of seven years had so changed the situation that now Russia was opposed to the union, while England desired and supported it. The Russian attempt at domination in both regions had met with increasing resistance from prince and people, and it had become evident that instead of being a foothold for Russia near Constantinople, Bulgaria was a barrier of increasing strength in the path of the Muscovite. Bulgaria remained under close Russian control until 1883, in which year, on September 18, Prince Alexander restored the constitution which he had suspended two years before, and henceforth followed as independent a policy as he found practicable. In September, 1884, the three emperors of Austria. Russia, and Germany met at Skiernewice, and made an agreement for three years, one of whose , provisions is said to have been that they would not oppose the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia " if it comes about by the force of circumstances." (Quoted by Rose, Development of Modern 121 Europe, II, 20-21, from Elie de Cyon, Historie de l'Entente Franco- Russe, 1895.) They also agreed not to allow Turkey to fortify the Balkan passes, and themselves not to occupy the Balkan princi- palities. This agreement may have bound the Czar's hands to some extent, but it also provided him with a solid backing, as long a s harmony prevailed between himself and his colleagues. 4. RUSSIAN AIMS IN BULGARIA ABOUT 1SS5. Russia appears to have desired to unite the two portions of Bul- garia, but she wished first to secure the removal of Prince Alex- ander, who had crossed her wishes, and perhaps to secure the ap- pointment of the Czar as Grand Duke of Bulgaria. If the union could be accomplished under Prince Alexander, he would be strength- ened. If accomplished after his rule had been supplanted by Russian control, the area of that control would be doubled. It is affirmed that in the summer of 1885 the Czar's agents endeavored to bring on war between Roumania and Bulgaria in order to weaken the " un- grateful" states and give an opportunity for Russian intervention. (R. Leonoff, Documents secrets de la politique russe en Orient, 81- 85, quoted by Rose, op. cit., I, 310 ff.) 5. UNION PROCLAIMED. The time was ripe, however, for other action. Eastern Roumelia had thriven in seven years of comparative freedom, and most of its people desired to clasp hands with their brothers beyond the Balkans. A sudden uprising at Philipoppolis on September 18, 1885, resulted in the gentle expulsion of Gavril Pasha, the second Christian gov- ernor appointed by the Porte, and a prompt invitation to Prince Alexander to accept the rulership of Eastern Roumelia. (In British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 76. pp. 1243-1315, is to be found a series of dispatches dealing with the Eastern situation in the latter part of 1885.) On September 21 Alexander announced his election and acceptance as Prince of- Eastern Roumelia, and asked the inter- vention of the British Government toward obtaining the Sultan's sanction, " to avoid the useless effusion of blood, since the people have decided to defend with their lives the fait accompli." G. PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONSTANTINOPLE CONFERENCE. The Porte appealed on September 23 to the powers to rectify the. infraction of the Treaty of Berlin. A conference was proposed to be held at Constantinople to decide on what advice to offer the Prince. The English ambassador was instructed to labor to induce the Sultan to abstain from military intervention and to appoint 122 Alexander as prince for life over Eastern Roumelia. The British representatives at Athens and Belgrade wore also instructed to work- in the interests of peace. The Czar had been greatly enraged at the news, and prepared (o order the withdrawal of the Russian officers from the Bulgarian Army, believing that he would thus leave it helpless. Germany, Austria, and Italy abstained from taking a positive attitude. Serbia and Greece promptly began to prepare for war. resenting the enlargement of Bulgaria, fearing the reestablish- ment of the Great Bulgaria of the Treaty of San Stefano, and demanding equivalent enlargements of their own territory. The conference of ambassadors drew up a declaration on October I and •'> deprecating the violation of the Treaty of Berlin and urging peaceful dispositions. After some modifications this declaration was sent to the Porte and the Government of Bulgaria on October 14. On the following day the Austrian ambassador proposed, as agreed with Enssia and Germany, that a formal conference be held at Constanti- nople, which should request Prince Alexander to withdraw his troops from Eastern Roumelia on penalty of the Sultan's use of force, and with the intimation that compliance would be followed by a union of the provinces. 7. CONSTANTINOPLE CONFERENCE. Lord Salisbury, on October 21, objected to the threat, of force, but appro veil the formal conference. He desired a preliminary basis for discussion to be agreed upon. The proposal made by the Porte In id dow n as a basis for the conference the maintenance of the Treaty of Berlin in conformity with the sovereign rights of the Sultan, the conference to consider the affairs of Eastern Roumelia alone. Lord Salisbury accept oil the invitation, and on November '_» sent a long dispatch elaborating the British point of view, and indicating clearly that a restoration of the status quo ante in Eastern Roumelia was not desirable. He took exception to the " balance of power" theory for the Balkan States. The Czar on November 3 gave indication of his intentions toward Prince Alexander by. dismissing him from the Russian Arm v. * s. THE SEBBO-BI it; \u WAR. 1885. Such was the situation when Serbia declared war on Bulgaria on November 11. The circumstances suggest strongly that this was with the approval of Russia and Austria, with Germany acquiesing. (These three powers were bound by the Skiernewicc compact o\' 1SSI. and they acted together regularly during the events under dis- cussion.) The Bulgarians, though without the help of Russian offi- cers, promptly showed themselves more than a match for the Ser- bians. (See article, The Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885 L886.) The ] ° -■> three Emperors agreed on a proposal for an armistice on November 24, to which England, France, and Italy adhered, and Count Kheven- hiiller enforced it on the Bulgarians, November 28, by the threat of Austrian military support of Serbia and Russian occupation of Bulgaria. (Rose, op. cit., p. 324, states that the Russian chancellor, on hearing of this threat, informed Vienna that the Czar would be very much displeased if the Austrian end of it were carried out.) Perhaps at this point the cooperation of the Emperors broke down. The pressure toward restoring the status quo ante in Eastern Roumelia slackened at about this time, and the English view of accepting the union rose toward acceptance. 0. TURKISH THREAT or WAR. At I lie same time, Turkey, encouraged by Austria and Russia, and attempting to proceed without the knowledge of England, gathered troops on the border of Eastern Roumelia, and sent two delegates to Philippopolis with a proclamation which purported to convey the decision of the conference, but which had not been approved or even seen by the British representative. This proclamation aimed at re- storing substantially the status quo ante in Eastern Roumelia. Grad- ually, however, the Turks came around to see that Bulgaria was not hostile to them and not inclined to be aggressive, and that it was rather to their interest to make her strong and friendly than divided and discontented. To this belief no doubt Lord Salisbury contrib- uted. (See his conversation with the Turkish ambassador on Decem- ber 23. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 76, p. 1311.) 10. SETTLEMENT. On February 1, 1886, a Turco-Bulgarian convention (See Appendix I., 31) was drawn up, which conformed closely to the Treaty of Ber- lin, in that Alexander was appointed governor of Eastern Roumelia for a period of five years. Certain border districts were transferred back to Turkey. Mutual military aid was provided between Turkey and Bulgaria. The three emperors objected to the military alliance of Turkey and Bulgaria, and the implacable attitude of Czar Alex- ander toward his namesake was shown by the former's refusal to permit the latter's name to appear in the convention. The Brit- ish Government accepted these changes, and the convention was signed on April .">. 1886. It provided for the essential aim of the revolution of Philippopolis, in that the two portions of Bulgaria were left united. BIBLIOGRAPHY. British and Foreign State Papers, vols. 76, 77. (1881-1886. Lon- don, Ridgway, 180-2.) Correspondence respecting Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria, 1243-1315. 124 Rose, J. H. The Development o( the European Nations, L870- L914. 5th ed. 2volsinl. (New York, Putnam, 1916^ Holland, T. E. Studies in International, Law. 251-269 (Oxford. Clarendon Press, L898). Clear, concise account of essentials. Miller, W. The Ottoman Empire, L801-1913, (Cambridge, Uni- versity Press, L913.) La Jonquiere, A. Vicomte de. Historic de l'empire Ottoman. •_' vols. 3rd ed. (Paris, Hachette, L914.) Minchin, J, (i. C. The Growth of freedom in the Balkan penin- sula. (London. Murray. L886.) Consul Genera] for Serbia in Lon- don. Had been correspondent on Balkan affairs for the Times and Morning Advertiser. Leonoff, R. Documents Secrets de la politique russe in orient. (Berlin, Wilhelmi, 1893.) For secret aims of Russia as regards Bui garia. Chaunier, Auguste. La Bulgarie. Etude d'historie diplomatique et d.e droit international. (Paris, Rousseau. L909.) Edwards, 11. Sutherland. Sir William White: Memoirs and cor- respondence. (London, Murray, L902.) « Coulbault, J. Che phase de la question bulgare. Revue de droit international public (1896), 111, 513-536. The Eastern Roumelian insurrection. Saturday Review, v. C>0. 399 WO. September 26, L885. Bryce, J. The troubles in southeastern Europe. (London. Octo- bers, L885.) Nation (New York), v. 41,357-358. October 29, L885. Langel, A. The Bulgarian revolution reviewed. (Paris. Decern ber 3, L885.) Nation (New York) . v. 41. 529-530. December 24, L885. Caillard, Vincent. The Bulgarian imbroglio. Fortnightly Re- view, v. 4 i. 840 851. L885. Schuyler, Eugene. United Bulgaria. The North American Re-. view, v. 111. 464 -474. L885. Laveleye, Emile de. The situation in the East. Contemporary Review, v. 50, 609 619. November. L886. 39. THE SERBO-BULGARIAN WAR OF 1885-1886. 1. PRELIMINARIES OV THE WAR. Kino- Milan of Serbia held that the union of Bulgaria- and Roumelia (See article on the Bulgarian Revolution of 18S5) meant a disturbance of the balance of power in the Balkans. Finding the proceedings of the conference of the powers at Constantinople too dilatory he proceeded to constitute himself the champion of the Treaty of Berlin. lie had reason to believe that his aspirations after territorial compensation would not be judged unjustifiable in AustrO- 125 Hungarian circles. (Phillips to Salisbury, Nov. 9, L885.; Parliamen- tary Papers, L886, vol. 75, No. 1. p. 249. See also Protetch, S., The secrel treaty between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, Fortnightly Re- view, January, L909, vol. 85, |>|». 838 849.) Serbian newspapers began in the u n( 1 1 ii in of 1885 to write of the balance of power and to air grievances againsl Bulgaria. 2. oi TBREAK OF THE WAR. The Serbian troops, which hud been mobilized, osten ibly against Turkey, since the revolt in Philippopolis, were massed on the Bul- rian frontier. The Bulgarian prince sent a friendly letter to King Milan, which the latter refused to receive, and thereupon Bulgarian troops were seni to the Serbian frontier. To n remonstrance from Bulgaria thai Serbian troops were in Bulgarian territory Milan re- turned a denial, and Prince Alexander issued a proclamation that as il< Serbian king had stated that the 300 Serbians on Bulgarian soil were net Serbian soldiers they were to be treated as brigands. The reply of the Serbian monarch was a reiteration of his denial, and the statement that Bulgarian troops had attacked Serbian forces on Serbian territory, and that renewal of such attacks would be consid- ered a casus bell i. The next day he issued a declaration of war, basing his act ion upon changes in the Balkans, innovations in Bulgarian cus- toms regulations designed to injure Serbian trade, ill treatment of Serbian subjects in Bulgaria, and attacks upon tic Serbian Army. Alexander appealed to the powers and to the Porte. The Porte laid the responsibility of the war on his head because '0' the Eastern Rou- melian affair. TREATT OF BUCHAREST, MARCH :;. L886. The Bulgarian troops met the situation with unexpected spirit, and after a short and sharp campaign drove the invading army back the frontier. Prince Alexander was invading Serbia when a special envoy from Austria-Hungary on November 28 demanded that he grant an armistice, threatening, if he refused, to send troops to Serbia' assistance. This was apparently not an independent ac- tion of Austria, as joint action for pacification had been agreed upon by Austria, Russia, and Germany some time before, and Eng- land had been using Iter good offices to the same end. (Parliamentary Papers, L886, v. 75, No. 1. pp. 284 (No. 496) 301. (No. 503), 307 (No. :»11 ). 308 (No. 515), 310 (No. 519).) The armistice was proclaimed, and on March 3, L886, largely through the good offices of Great Britain, the Treaty of Bucharest was signed, restoring the status quo ante helium. 126 ■i. APPRAISEMENT. There has been much speculation as to why King Milan wenl to war, but a sufficient explanation is that probably he saw in Bulgaria's case the possibilities of successful aggression and reckoned on the tradition of the old Serbian Empire to rally his people to a success- ful war. which would bring him much needed popularity. Bulgaria's armies were believed to be demoralized by the withdrawal of their Russian officers and the greater part of them won 1 on the Turkish frontier. Serbia as the champion of the Treaty of Berlin, which had robbed her o( the chance of annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, seems absurd enough; on the other hand, it is not remarkable that Serbia. having been denied by the Treat \ of Berlin the acquisition o( terri- tory which she felt Legitimately belonged to her. should have been unwilling t^ see thai treaty infringed to the advantage of a neigh- boring State and to her own relative detriment. By assuming that role, too, she might feel more sure of the sup- port i)( A.ustria-Hungray, to' whom, in addition Milan's exploit, gave the opportunity to show how far she felt bound to carry out the spirit of the convention of L881. The success of her army assured Bulgaria of the continued possession of Roumelia, while it disappointed the hope of a greater Serbia. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Parliamentary Papers, L886, vol. 75. Turkey, No. 1. Annual Register for L885 and L&86. Avril. A. Traite de Berlin. (Paris. E. Leroux. L886.) Rose,* J. Holland. Development of the European Nations. 5th ed. (New York, Putnam. 1916.) . Serins, Charles. La RoumeTie orientale et la Bulgarie actuelle. (Paris. A. Rousseau, L898.) Miller. William. The Ottoman Empire. (Cambridge. The Uni- versity Press. L913.) Becker, Georges. La guerre contemporaine dans les Balkans. (Paris, Berger-Levrault, L899.) Drandar, A. G. Les evenements politiques en Bulgarie. (Brus- sels, Falk, 1896.) lluhn. A. von. The struggle of the Bulgarians for National In- dependence. (London. Murray, L886.) By a newspaper correspond- ent, pro-Bulgar. Koch, A. Prince Alexander of Battenburg. (London, Whit taker. 1887.) 127 40. THE PACIFIC BLOCKADE OF GREECE, 1886. 1. CIRCUMSTANCES. At the Congress of Berlin the powers had recommended to the Porte to grant Greece a rectified frontier, and in 1881 Greece ob- tained about 9.000 square miles of territory in Thessaly and Epirus. Ji nt only a part of the territory claimed by the Greeks was actually secured (See article, The Greco-Turkish Frontier Question, 1878- 1881). On January 4, 188G, the Greek Government addressed a note to the powers, demanding as compensation for the union of Bulgaria with Eastern Roumelia (See article, The Serbo-Bulgar War of ISS.j-86)., that the boundary between Turkey and Greece be that originally fixed by the Berlin congress, and threatening naval and military action. 2. THE INTERVENTION BY THE POWERS. On January 24, the powers delivered a collective note at Athens, stating that "no naval attack by Greece against the Sublime Porte would be permitted." On the same day the Greek fleet left Salamis Bay; and all the great powers, with the sole exception of France, decided at the instigation of Lord Salisbury, to send warships to Suda Bay, in Crete, in order to prevent Greece from landing troops on the Turkish coast or attacking Turkish vessels. On February 2 the Greek premier insisted that any interference with the free dis- posal of her naval forces would be " incompatible with the inde- pendence " of Greece. The combined fleet of the powers met at Sulva Bay soon afterwards, but Greece continued her warlike preparations. The allied squadron then proceeded to the Piraeus, and on April 26 another collective note was delivered at Athens inviting the Greek cabinet " to place its land and sea forces on a peace footing as promptly as possible." Still another collective note was presented on May 6, and on May 8 the powers declared their intention to "establish a blockade of the coasts of Greece against all ships under the Greek flag * * *. All ships under the Greek flag attempting to run the blockade will render themselves liable to be detained." 3. THE BLOCKADE. On May 10, the pacific blockade of Greece was declared and its limits and scope carefully defined. It applied only to vessels under the Greek flag and such vessels were only to be detained. It would seem that the number of ships actually detained was about 70. The blockade resulted in some scarcity of provisions in certain places, but the British commander was given authority to relieve any cases of actual distress. 128 Meanwhile a now cabinet was formed in Athens for the purpose of carrying out the wishes <>( the powers; disarmament proceeded apace and the Greek Torres were ordered to withdraw from the frontier. The Porte also announced its intention to demobilize as soon as the Greeks should do so. After a good deal o( diplomatic correspondence between the powers, an agreement was reached and a joint note handed to the Greek Government on June 7. 'The blockade was raised, though h small squadron was left at Sulva Bay to see that the wishes o( the powers w ere carried out. BIBLIOGRAPHY. See especially the Annual Register for L886, pp. 870 374; and Hogan, A. E., Pacific Blockade (Oxford, Clarendon Pre—. L908), pp. L26 L30, L37 171. See also Soderquist, X.. Le blocus maritime (Stockholm, L908) ; Bares, ('.. Le blocus pacifique (Toulouse, Ber- thoumieu, L898), pp. 10 II: and Standacher, II.. Die Friedens-blok- ade (Leipzig, 1909). For diplomat ie correspondence, see British Parliamentary Papers, Greece No. I (1886). 41. THE SCHNAEBELJ3 INCIDENT, 1887. 1. THE MAIN PACTS. On April 21, L887, the Havas agency published a dispatch to the effect that M, Schnaebel<5, a French police inspector, had been arrested on the Franco-German frontier, near Pagny, as he was on his way to Ars-sur Moselle to have an interview with the German poliee inspector there at the hitter's request. A dispute followed as to whether the arrest had taken place on French or on German territory, the French claiming that under the circumstances M. Schnaebele" was entitled to immunity even on Ger- man territory, since he had been invited to a conference by Ger- man officials. The reason given by the German authorities for the arrest was that in an inquiry into charges of treasonable prac- tices against a number of Alsatians, evidence had been produced that M. Schnaebele* was concerned in transmitting to Paris information as to German fortresses furnished by Alsatians in the pay of the French Government, and that an order had been given to arrest him if ever he should be found on German soil. 2. SIGNIFICANCE. Within a week after his arrest, on April 28, M. Schnaebele* was released by order of the German Emperor, Tn a dispatch of the same date to the French ambassador at Berlin, Prince Bismarck L29 explained thai though the German Government considered, in view of the proofs of guilt, the arresf to be fully justified, it was deemed expedient to release M. Schnaebele on the ground that bu iness meet- ings of frontier officials " must always be regarded as protected by a mutually assured safe conduct." The excitement caused by the arrest of M. Schnaebele" was very great, particularly at Par-is. It occurred soon alter a parlia- mentary campaign on the pari of the German Government to secure the passage by the Reichstag of the Septennate army law, or seven years credit for military expenses; and it was accompanied by such threatening and provocative language as to cause serioug concern, not only in France, buf throughout Europe. In France. Gen. Boulanger and his party wanted to .-.end an ultimatum demanding the release of Schnaebele and an apology. A large section of the German press demanded thai Germany make no concession. Elie de ('von (La France et la Russie, La NTouvelle Revue, vol. <;:). p. 69, April 15. L80O) asserts that Bismarck brought about the incident; that Czar Alexander III. made apprehensive for the peace; of Kurope, wrote an autographic letter- to William I in regard to the matter, and that the Kaiser, going over the head of his chancellor, ordered the release of Schnaebele. There is still much mystery about the affair. The reasons for- the arrest and release of Schnaebele have never been satisfactorily explained. It seem not. unlikely that, liis- marck provoked this and one or two other- "incidents" about 1887 for the purpose of putting pressure on France to counteract the Boulanger agitation. BIBLIOGRAPHY. L'annee politique for 1887, pp. 69-87 (Paris, 1888); Despagnet, I-'.. La diplomatic de la troisieme r^publique et le droit des gens (Paris, L. Larose, 1004), pp. 134-138; The Annual Register for 1887 (London, 1888), p. 247; Reinach, J., La Revue de Paris, August 15. 1017; Staatsarchiv, vol. 18, Nos. 0500 and 0507. 42. FRANCO-ITALIAN ANIMOSITY, 1886-1896. 1. ENTBOnUOTION. The taking of Tunis by France in 1881 (See article. The Establish- ment of the French Protectorate over Tunis, 1881) created much ill feeling in Italy, where the public was looking forward to an Italian occupation at an early date. Five years later this tension had not diminished. Then a series of clashes between the French and Italian Governments over a number of matters led to a decade of such pro- nounced Italian animosity against France that it became a factor of considerable importance in the international situation. 53706— is 9 130 2. TARIFF WAR. In 1886 a new commercial treaty between France and Italy was negotiated, but was rejected by the French Chamber of Deputies. Its rejection caused deep irritation in Italy, which retaliated by de- nouncing the existing commercial treaty of 1881, thereby leaving the two countries without any commercial treaty between them. From this action quickly developed a tariff war between the two countries which deeply affected their trade relations. French exports to Italy fell from 308,000,000 francs in 1887 to 181,000,000 in 1888, to 133,- 000,000 in 1889, and still lower the next year. French imports from Italy fell within two years from 372,000,000 francs to 227,000,000 3. CATHOLIC MISSIONS — ABYSSINIA. The use of Italian influence to try to take away from France its long exercised right of protecting Roman Catholic missions in China caused irritation in France, while several instances of mob misusage of Italian workmen in France led to sharp demands for their protec- tion by the Italian Government. Italian colonial activities in the Red Sea region were producing friction with King Menelik of Abyssinia, who turned for support to France, as French interests in the region were also affected by the forward colonial policy of Italy. Some encouragement appears to have been given to Menelik by France. His success in holding his own against Italy was naturally attributed by Italians to French support. 4. CRISPI. Throughout these years Crispi, whether in office or not, was the most potent personality in Italy. His intense animosity toward France, a thing of earlier origin, was accentuated by his enthusiasm for the recently developed connection with Germany and the Dual Monarchy in the Triple Alliance. Crispi's influence, always active against France, was of great power in intensifying the ill feeling in Italy against France. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Debidour, A. Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe depuis le con- gres de Berlin jusqu'a nos jours. 2 vols. (Paris, Alcan, 1916.) Vol. I, pp. 129-133. Excellent short account. Despagnet, F. La diplomatic de la troisieme republique et le droit des gens (Paris, Larose. 1904), 637-641. Crispi, F. Memoirs. 3 vols. (London, Hodder, 1912-1914.) Tardieu, A. France and the Alliance (New York, Macmillan, 1908), 80-88. Tardieu, A., Questions diplomatiques de l'annee 1904, pp. 5-13 (Paris, Alcan, 1905). 131 43. THE PARTITION OF AFRICA, 1878-1885. 1. EUROPEAN HOLDINGS IN AFRICA IN 187 7. When Stanley emerged from the interior of Africa in 1877, the hold of European nations upon that continent was a slight one. Great Britain held the Cape, with West Griqualand and Natal, and on the west coast had settlements at Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Lagos. The extent of these settlements was about 241,461 square miles. France held Algeria and had settlements on the west coast in Senegal and on the Gold Coast, the whole amounting to about 426,523 square miles. Portugal held Senegambia and Portu- guese Guinea on the west, Angola in the southwest, and Mozambique in the southeast. The Spanish had a settlement at Corisco Bay. The total territory claimed by European powers was thus about 702,371 square miles. 2. EXPANSION OF EUROPEAN HOLDINGS. 1877-1885. After the explorations of Stanley and Livingstone the topography of Africa was known roughly, and some glimpse had been given of its possibilities. It was not strange that the movement toward ex- pansion that began about 1878 should have turned toward this great unoccupied field. The first indication of widespread interest in African colonization was given by the formation of the Royal African Association under the leadership of the Belgian King Leopold, which led to the establishment of the Congo Free State. (See article, The Formation of the Congo Free State, 1876-1885.) Great Britain gradually obtained control of Egypt and the territory to the southward, until by 1883 her influence was paramount there. (See articles, The Dual Control over Egyptian Finances, 1876-1883; The British Occupation of Egypt, 1882-1914; The Soudan Question, 1881-1899.) In 1885 she proclaimed a protectorate in Nigeria. Dur- ing the same period her colonies already established were, almost with- out exception, extending their boundaries. In 1881 Tunis accepted a French protectorate (See article, The Establishment of the French Protectorate over Tunis, 1881), and by 1885 the extension of the in- fluence of France in West Africa and the Congo region had immensely enhanced her holdings. Her claim to Obock, near the southern en- trance to the Red Sea, was an old one, but the region was not actually occupied until this period. Spain's claim in West Africa was finally recognized as entitling her to several thousand square miles. German colonization of Africa began with the establishment of a protectorate over Angra Pequena in 1883, but her zeal was so untiring that by 1885 she had acquired 371,000 square miles. 132 .'.. EUROPEAN HOLDINGS IN 1888. Thus in a period of loss than 10 years the colonial possessions of Great Britain in Africa had increased from 241,000 square miles to 868,000; those oH France from 186,000 bo 726,000, those o( Portu- gal from 34,000 to 195,000, and Germany had acquired 371,000. In addition there had boon established the Congo Free State, <^' over a million square miles, ami Spain, from an indeterminate claim, had acquired a colony oi 243,000 square miles. While in L878 Euro- peans were in control of about 702,371 square miles of African terri- tory, in L885 they controlled about 3,461,128 square miles. Table of European holdings in Africa, 1877 and t885 ORE \ C BRIT u\ 1877. Grlqualand, v. Cape Gambia Gold Coast Lagos Natal Sierra Leone Total. Urea. S«. miles. 17,800 801,000 ai 6,000 6,000 li.i 12 168 241, mi 1885 Basutoland Beohuanaland Cape Colony ii imbia Gold Coast Natal Sierra Leone Walflsoh Hay . I ist I'io! s Egj i't (Protectorate) Total \roa. Sq. milet. 10,290 186,000 241. otxt 69 16,000 r;; 21,180 40S 460 394,240 868,640 Senegal settlements. . . Gold ooasl and Gaboon Algeria Total Senegambia and I ! oinea Angola. Benguela, and Mossamedes. Mozambique and Sofala Total FR INCE 51,170,000 Sq. milts. 400 116,000 230. ooo 20,700 6,200 371, OCX) J??, km. 26 312,609 382,083 696,218 So. milrt. 3,600 15,000 so, 000 195,360 i 426,523 square miles. > 726,938 square miles. . , _ . .-, ... i s Portugal claimed a large hinterland thai other powers did not admit; tho latter Bguras are the i>mi*ti estinuto, tho former the Portuguese. Tho latter are used In estimating the total. L33 Table of European holdings In ifriea, 1871 and 1885 Continued. 1X77. An An 8a. r 1,000 Kl '. LEOPOLD if. Congo I i' ■ 8q. rnilm. I , 056, 200 'I .,t*l, 703,371 g'luuro miles for J877;in and to the recognition of the International Association as a sovereign State. On April 23, 1884, Col. M. Strauch, the president of the association, addressed to the French minister for foreign affairs a note (Archives Diplomatiques, second series, vol. 12, p. 326) 163 in which he declared that the association would not cede its posses- sions to any power " except in virtue of special conventions which may be concluded between France and the association fof fixing rhe limits and conditions of their respective action/' The note further declared that the association engaged to give France the right of preference if, through unforeseen circumstances, it were compelled to sell its possessions. 5. RECOGNITION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CONGO FREE STATE, 1884. The United States was the first great power to recognize the asso- ciation as a sovereign State, on April 22, 1884. The next power to recognize the flag of the International Association as that of a friendly power, doing so on November 8, 1884, was Germany. Her action was followed by that of Great Britain on December 16, of Italy on December 19, of Austria-Hungary on December 24, of Hol- land on December 27, of Spain on January 7, 1885 ; of France and Russia on February 5, of Sweden and Norway on February 10, of Portugal on February 14, and Denmark and Belgium on February 23. G. BOUNDARY TREATIES. Thus, early in 1885, King Leopold had secured the recognition of the association as an independent State, but its territorial limits were not as yet clearly defined. The boundaries were fixed in a series of treaties with France, Portugal, and Great Britain bearing dates ranging from 1885 to 1906. (For a list of these boundary treaties see Encyclopedia Britannica [12th ed., 1910], Vol. VI, p. 919.) 7. KING LEOPOLD BECOMES HEAD OF THE CONGO FREE STATE, 1S8 5. On April 28, 1885, the Belgian chamber authorized King Leopold " to be chief of the State founded in Africa by the International Association of the Congo," but declared the union between Belgium and the new State of the Congo " shall be exclusively personal." The Belgian King at once began the work of organizing and administer- ing the new State. On August 1, 1885, he addressed to the powers a circular note in which he declared the neutrality of "the Inde- pendent State of the Congo," which had been proclaimed by the Berlin conference (See article, The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885). BIBLIOGRAPHY. The literature on this subject is enormous. The most important documents may be found in American Journal of International Law, III, Supplement, 5-26: Perhaps the fullest and most authoritative 164 account of the formation of the Free State is that by Stanley. H. M., The Congo and Founding of its Free State (New York. Harper, 1885). in 2 vols. See also Chapaux, A., Le Congo, historique. diplo- matique, etc. (Brussels, 1894) ; Wauters, A. J., L'Etat independent du Congo (Brussels, 1899) ; Boulger, D. C, The Congo State (Lon- don, 1898). Among the numerous special studies or monographs dealing with various phases of the subject (particularly juridical) may be cited: Reeves, J. S., The. International Beginnings of the Congo Free State, in Johns Hopkins University Studies (Baltimore, The Johns Hop- kins Press, 1894), XI-XII: Blanchard, G., Formation et Constitu- tion politique de L'Etat independent du Congo (Paris, A. Pedone, 1899); Moynier, (J.. La fondation de l'Etat independant du Congo (Paris, 1887) : Xys, E., The Independent State the Congo ami Inter- national Law (Brussels, n. . pp. 1178 L257, vol. 70, pp. 1021-1054. For the protocols and proceedings of the conference, see Protocoles el Acte General de In Conference 'I'- Berlin, L884-1885. See also Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Documents Diplomatiques, Af- faires 'In Congo et 'I'- I'Afrique Occidentals (Paris, [mprimerie Ra- tionale, 1885) ; and Correspondence concerning the Berlin Congo Conference (Senate Ex. Doc. No. L96, t9th Cong., 1st sess.). 54. THE DELIMITATION OF EUROPEAN COLONIES IN CENTRAL AFRICA, 1885-1899. 1. INTJfOIM < TIO.V. The Occupation of Central Africa by European States was a gradual and haphazard affair. There was no prearranged scheme of partition or agreement among the powers to follow any generally prescribed lines in their expansion. Tn the main, the movement had its inception in certain small settlements of the different Kuropean States whose holdings and spheres of influence were incirea ed through the agency of explorers and trading companies until they came into touch with similar agencies extending the control of of her European powers in the same region. Competition for cer- tain valuable areas or advantageous positions then arose, which led to sharp diplomatic controversies and caused considerable popular excitement in the home countries. Fortunately, recourse to arms never took place, though \>\iic]- feeling was often aroused. As there was plenty of room in Africa for the acquisition of large colonies, a 168 reasonable and fair compromise was always possible. The peaceful adjustment of these and other African disputes constitutes one of the greatest achievements of European diplomacy during the period between 1871 and 1914. For purposes of analysis, it is necessary to classify carefully the various agreements between European States concerning their in- terests in central Africa. They may be readily grouped under four headings: The Congo Free State treaties, the Anglo-French treaties, the Anglo-German treaties, and the Franco-German treaties. 2. CONGO FREE STATE TREATIES. Between November 8, 1884, and February 23, 1885, a series of agreements was concluded between the International Association of the Congo and a number of European States, including Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and Portugal, by which the Congo Free State was created and its boundaries definitely fixed. (See article, The Formation of the Congo Free State.) It was to embrace about 900,000 square miles and to extend from the French Congo and the Ubangi and Mbomu Rivers on the north, to Portuguese West Africa and Northern Rhodesia on the south, and from the Congo River on the west to the borders of British Uganda, German East Africa, and Lake Tanganyika on the east. Portugal relinquished a small strip on the north bank of the Congo to the Free State, but was com- pensated by the control of the south bank as far as Noki and the Province of Cabinda. The exact boundary line's were all adjusted later by special agreements and by special commissions which sur- veyed the country accurately and set up boundary posts, such as the Congo-Portuguese commission headed George Grenfell, which delimited the Congo-Portuguese boundary line between May, 1892, and June, 1893. 3. ANGLO-FRENCH TREATIES. (a) By the treaty of June 28, 1882, the watershed between the Mellicouri and the Great Scarcies Rivers was fixed as the dividing line between French Guinea and Sierra Leone (British). (b) The treaties of August 10, 1889, and of June 26, 1891, deter- mined the boundaries between the British colonies of Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, and Lagos, and the adjoining French colonies on the west coast as follows: Gambia was to include all the land within 10 kilometers of both sides of the Gambia River, and to ex- tended into the interior as far as Yarbatenda. Sierra Leone was to end at latitude 10° N., and Gold Coast, Lagos, and Dahomey at the 9° ; but the two latter were to be separated by a line running north from the intersection of the meridian of Ajarra Creek with the coast. 169 (c) By the treaty of August 5, 1890, a general boundary was drawn roughly between the British and French spheres of influence in Central Africa by a line running from Say on the Niger River due east to Lake Chad (Sokoto to be included in the British sphere). (d) The treaty of June 14, 1898, provided for the delimitation of the Dahomey-Nigeria boundary line, the disputed Borgu-Boussa district being divided between England and France ; also, the north- ern boundary of the British Gold Coast Colony was moved up from latitude 9° N. to latitude 11° N. ; and all boundary questions relat- ing to the French and British possessions in West- Central Africa were settled. The negotiations leading to this treaty began with an agreement between England and France on January 15, 1896, which provided for the appointment of a commission of four to determine, by an examination of titles and claims, the most equitable delimita- tion of the French and British possessions on the lower Niger. The commission held two sessions: February 8 to May 22, 1896, and October 24, 1897, to February, 1898; and the results of its efforts were summed up in two notes presented by the representatives of England and France, respectively, on February 18 and 24, 1898, and embodied in the convention of June 14, 1898. (e) The treaty of March 21, 1899, stipulated for a settlement of the boundary between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the French sphere of influence on the upper Congo and Lake Chad regions. Bahr el Ghazal and the old Province of Dar Fur were retained for Egypt, while the Kingdom of the Wadai, with the two valuable oases of Tibesti and Borku, went to France. This treaty was the outcome of the expedition of Major Marchand from the upper Congo to the Nile and of the resulting Fashoda incident. By its provisions the French rounded out their Sahara possessions south of Tripoli, joined them securely with their Lake Chad lands, and these again with the French Congo colony. (See article on the Fashoda affair.) By this series of five treaties (or groups of treaties) a definite and permanent connection was established between all the French colo- nies in West, Central, and South Central Africa, and the boundary lines between the British and French protectorates (Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Nigeria, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Da- homey, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the French Congo) in western and central Africa were successfully delimitated. 4. ANGLO-GERMAN TREATIES. (a) Southwest Africa. — In 1884 Great Britain, in correspondence with Germany, recognized the German claims on the southwest coast. By the treaties of October 29, 1886, and July 1, 1890, the final boundary of German Southwest Africa was determined on the east 170 and south, giving access to the Zambesi River, A supplementary treaty between Germany and Portugal on December 30, 1886, estab- lished the northern boundary of German Southwest Africa from the Cunene River to the Zambesi. (b) East Africa. — A preliminary boundary line (from the mouth of the Umba River to Lake Victoria) was established between the British and German spheres of influence in East Africa by the treaty of October 29, 1886. The final delimitation of boundary between German and British East Africa, by lines drawn from the mouth of the Umba River to Lake Victoria (east shore), from the west shore of the same lake to the Congo Free State border (leaving Uganda andl'nyoro to England), and from Lake Nyanza to Lake Tan- ganyika (separating northern Rhodesia from German East Africa), was effected by the treaty of July 25, L893. The treaty of December 30, 1886, fixed the boundary between German and Portuguese East Africa. (c) West Africa. — The boundary between Nigeria and the Cam- eroons was carried near to Vola by notes exchanged in April and May, 1885, and July and August, 1886. It was adjusted by treaties of July 1, 1890, and April 14, 1893, and prolonged to Lake Chad (giving both England and Germany access to the lake and assigning most of the Adamaua district to Germany) by treaty of November 15, 1893. The Togoland-Gold Coast boundary was also adjusted by the treatv of July 1. 1890. 6. I'KANCO-GERMAN TREATIES. In the treaty of December 24, 1885, the southern boundary of the Cameroons was fixed as the River Campo and the definition carried inland to 15° E. By the treaty of March 15, 1894, the northern por- tion of the French Congo and German Cameroons had their borders determined. The French claims to the Baghirmi country were rec- ognized, thus giving France access to Lake Chad. By the treaty of Juty 23, the Togoland-Dahomey line was extended to the 11° N. latitude. From the above analysis it will be seen that the main lines delim- inating the possession of European States in Central Africa and those fixing the boundaries of these regions with adjacent colo- nial possessions of European powers in West, East, and Southwest Africa were all completed between 1885 and 1899 by negotiation and treaties. In nearly every instance these lines were surveyed and marked out carefully later by joint commissions working in Central Africa. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The treaties, notes, and other official documents indicated in this article, are nearly all in British and Foreign State Papers, Herts- 171 let's Commercial Treaties, Hertslet's Map of Africa by Treaty, the Archives Diplomatiques, the British blue and the French yellow books. For .secondary accounts see: Harris, X. D. Intervention and Colonization in Africa. (Boston, Houghton, 1914.) Dubois and Ten-ice. Un siecle d'expansion coloniale. (Paris, Challamel, 1902). Keltie, J. S. The Partition of Africa, 2d ed. (London, Stanford, 189:.. ) Banning, E. Le partage politique de l'Afrique d'apres les trans- actions internationales les plus recentes. 1885-1888. (Paris, 1888.) White, A. S. The Development of Africa, 2nd cd. (London, Philip, 1892.) 55. THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE TRANSVAAL OR SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC, 1877-1884. 1. THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL, 1877. In 1877 the Transvaal, whose independence had been recognized by Great Britain in 1852, was annexed by Lord Beaconsfield's Government on the ground that its independence was a men- ace to the peace of other British possessions in South Africa. A delegation of Boers (among them Paul Kruger) was sent to Eng- land to protest and demand the restoration of independence. This mission was unsuccessful. 2. THE PRETORIA CONVENTION, 1881 (SEE APPENDIX I, 20.) In December, 1880, the Boers rose in revolt and on February 27, 1881. defeated a small detachment of British troops on Majuba Hill. Mr. Gladstone, who had succeeded Lord Beaconsfield as head of the British Government, restored to the Boers their independence. But the Pretoria convention of 1881, which sanctioned this arrangement, contained an express reservation of the suzerainty of the British Crown. This arrangement was far from satisfactory. The word " suzer- ainty" had no precise meaning and was resented by the Boers as a limitation upon their independence. 3. THE LONDON CONVENTION, 1884 (SEE APPENDIX I, 26). In 1884 this unsatisfactory Pretoria Convention was replaced by a new treaty called the London Convention, which restored to the Transvaal the old name of South African Republic, omitted the pre- amble of the Pretoria Convention in which the unfortunate word " suzerainty ? ' occurred, and inserted a provision (very important 172 in view of what occurred later) to the effect that " white men were to have full liberty to reside in any part of the Republic, to trade in it, and to be liable to the same taxes only as those exacted from citizens of the Republic." BIBLIOGRAPHY. For the main facts, see Harris, N. D., Intervention and Coloniza- tion in Africa (Boston, Houghton. 1914), ch. 8; and Cona, F. R., South Africa from the Great Trek to the Union (London, Chapman, 1909), chs. 6 and 8. For the Pretoria and London conventions, see Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty (London, 1909), Vol. I, pp. 222- 234. 56. BRITISH RELATIONS TO THE BOER REPUBLIC, 1884-1899. 1. CONVENTION OF 18S4 (SEE APPENDIX I, 2g). The political relationship between Great Britain and the Trans- vaal after 1884 Avas based upon the convention of Pretoria 1881 and upon that of London 1884. Both are in the form of grants from a superior to an inferior. (See Appendix I, 20 and 26.) The earlier convention gave to the Boers of the Transvaal a large measure of local self government under British " suzeraintv." The latter con- vention, restoring to the Transvaal its old name of South African Republic, gave almost complete local autonomy to the Boers, Avhile narrowly restricting their freedom of action in foreign affairs. The word " suzerainty " did not appear in the convention of 1884. Because of this omission the Boers claimed that the former British right of supervision, implied in the word suzerainty, had now been abrogated. (Despagnet: La Guerre Sud Africaine, pp. 2-8.) The British at first, through their colonial minister Lord Derby, admit- ting that the word suzerainty had been eliminated, insisted that they had kept " the substance " (Parliamentary Papers, Cd. 9507, p. 34) of their control. Later British statesmen argued that not even the word suzerainty had been allowed to disappear, because, they said, the convention of 1884 was not a substitute for the entire con- vention of 1881, but merely for the articles of that convention. Hence they insisted that the preamble of the earlier convention with its recognition of British suzerainty was binding after 1884, as before. (Mahan, The Merits of the Transvaal Dispute, North American Review, vol. 170, pp. 314-315.) The fact appears to be that the convention of 1884 was loosely and hastily drawn, with no thought that its uncertainty of phraseology would later en- danger the peace of the world. (Sydney Brooks, England and 173 the Transvaal, North American Review, vol. 169, p. 66. West- lake : L'Angleterre et la Republique Sucl Af ricaine, in the Revue de Droit International et legislation comparee, vol. 28, pp. 275-276. See also his Angleterre et Les Republiques Boers in the same Review, vol. 32, p. 546.) 2. GRIEVANCES OF THE UITLANDERS AFTER 1886. The discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1886 led to a great influx of English miners and speculators. Difficulties quickly arose between the native Boers and the aggressive foreigners — the Uit- landers. The ambitious plans of Cecil Rhodes, who dreamed of a South Africa united under British rule, clashed sharply with the ambitions of the Boer leaders for the maintenance unimpaired and possibly even the extension of the powers and territory of the South African Republic. The immediate occasion of the clash between Boers and Uitlanders was the determination of the former to main- tain Boer supremacy in the Republic. The Uitlanders published broadcast accounts of their grievances. Naturalization and the ac- quisition of the right to vote were made very difficult for them. They were forced to bear a disproportionate share of the taxes and of the military service. (Bryce : Impressions of South Africa, 2d ed., p. XVIII.) 3. THE JAMESON RAID. Exasperated by these abuses and the apparent failure of their at- tempt to obtain redress through appeals to Great Britain, and in- spired, possibly, by the hope of displacing the Boer Government, Dr. Jameson, the British administrator of Rhodesia, with a few hundred troopers, invaded the Transvaal in 1895. This unfortunate aggression had the two-fold result (1) of deeply embittering the Boers against the Uitlanders, and (2) of making it increasingly difficult for the Government of Great Britain to demand redress for their grievances. This difficulty was greatly increased by the Kaiser's telegram to Kruger (See article, The Kruger Telegram, 1896). 4. THE MILNER MISSION, 1897. A special commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, sent from England in 1897. reported to his Government (Staatsarchiv, vol. 63, pp. 263-283) that the condition of British subjects in the Boer Republic was in- tolerable. He insisted that the Boers were planning to extend their hegemony over the whole of South Africa. The issue, as he put it, made an instant appeal to Englishmen. 174 5. NEGOTIATIONS, 1898-99. During 1898 and 1899 a series of conferences were held between the representatives of the British and the Boer Governments in a vain attempt to adjust the difficult controversies, particularly that over the franchise for the Uitlanders. (Parliamentary Papers, Cd. 9404, 9518, and 9521. The Boer franchise law of July 26, 1899, and the British and Boer proposed modifications of the law are contained in the supplement to the Annals of the American Academy, vol. 16, pp. 47-57.) Elaborate legal arguments by the parties over the terms of the two conventions of 1881 and of 1884 hid the basic and fundamental causes of friction. These were political, economic, and racial antagonisms between the two peoples. Unable to accept Great Britain's terms, the South African Republic, October 9, 1899, issued, its ultimatum. (Supplement to Annals of American Academy, vol. 16, pp. 57-61.) The British reply, which meant war, was issued October 10, 1899. (Ibid, p. 61.) The Orange Free State, since 1852, practically independent, threw in its lot with its sister Boer Republic, by the resolution of its Volksraad, September 27, 1899. War followed in October between the two Boer Republics and the British Empire. (See article, The Treaty of Vereeniging. ) BIBLIOGRAPHY. Mahan, A. T. The Merits of the Transvaal Dispute. North Ameri- can Review, vol. 190, pp. 312-326. (1-899.) An excellent analysis of the evidence. Parliamentary Papers, Cd. 9507, 3914, 9404, 9518, 9521. Contain both British and Boer documents. Staatsarchiv, vol. 63, pp. 263-347, contains the most important documents for 1899. Martens. Nouveau Recueil General de Traites * * * 2d serie, Tome X. (Gottingue, 1885-86.) Contains conventions of 1881 and 1884. British and Foreign State Papers, vols. 90-95, passim, contain most of the documents. Williams, Hugh. Selected Official Documents of the South Af- rican Republic and Great Britain. Supplement to vol. 16 (1900) Annals of American Academy, 72 pages. Despagnet, Frantz. La Guerre Sud Africaine au Point de Vue du Droit International. (Paris, A. Pedonne, 1902.) An elaborate pro- Boer discussion. Westlake, John. L'Angleterre et la Republique Sud Africaine, Revue de Droit International et legislation comparee, vol. 28 (1896), p. 268 et suiv. L'Angleterre et les Republiques Boers, Ibid, vol. 23, I'd series (1900), pp. 514-544. These two discussions are perhaps the best from the point of vieAv of international law. 175 Baty, T. International Law in South Africa. (London, Stevens & Haynes, 1900.) Contains a useful discussion of the question of suzerainty. Brooks, Sydney. England and the Transvaal, North American Review, vol. 169 (1899), pp. 62-76. An excellent brief analysis of the possibilities of compromise. Br3'ce, James. Impressions of South Africa. (New York, Cen- tury Co., 1897.) Hazen, C. D. Europe since 1815. (New York, Holt, 1910.) 57. THE QUESTION OF THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES. 1. INTRODUCTION. Portugal was the leader in modern colonial expansion. In the sixteenth century she claimed the whole of Africa, southern Asia, and eastern South America; and her claim was not seriously dis- puted by any strong rival. But her Asiatic colonies, except a few unimportant posts, were lost at the beginning of the seventeenth cen- tury and her South American possessions early in the nineteenth. She never actually controlled more than a few isolated spots on the African coasts; and when, late in the nineteenth century, the great European powers began their energetic efforts for African colonies, Portugal was in no position to resist their encroach- ments. However, she still retains in her feeble grasp enough territory to make her the fourth colonial power of Europe. Besides her Madeira and Cape Verde Islands off the north- western coast she has, not far from the latter, Portuguese Guinea on the mainland, the cocoa islands of San Thome and Principe in the Gulf of Guinea, the large territory of Angola, or Portuguese West Africa, and the smaller but more important Portuguese East Africa. Until after the scramble for the partition of Africa was well advanced, Portugal still hoped to retain sovereignty over a wide strip of territory stretching across the entire continent between the last two ; but British activity from the Cape, especially the imperial ambitions of Rhodes, crossed her path. 2. ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ADJUSTMENTS. In 1875 the possession of Delagoa Bay was submitted for arbitra- tion to the President of France, who awarded it to Portugal, assuring her complete control of that bay and its important port, Lourenco Marques, the natural and almost essential outlet for the northern part of British South Africa, and the only really profit- able spot in Portugal's South African possessions. Between 1887 and 1891 a long correspondence and several negotiations ensued be- 176 tween England and Portugal respecting efforts of the latter to retain sovereignty over territories not effectively occupied according to the rules agreed upon at the Berlin colonial conference of 1884-5 (See article, The Berlin Conference, 1884-1885) and her attempts to con- trol the trade by way of the Zambesi, neither of which the former would admit. In 1890 a convention was finally signed, but it was not ratified. A modus vivendi was thereupon arranged for a short time, and when it was about to expire, renewed until June 11, 1891, when a treaty was concluded, which, Gibbons says, " destroyed for- ever the hopes of Portugal to a transcontinental African colony." (Map of Africa, pp. 245-246.) It delimited in general terms British and Portuguese territory in southeast, southwest, and south cen- tral Africa. Portugal accepted the inevitable, and cordial rela- tions were restored. In 1892 the boundary of the British enclave south of Lake Nyassa was more carefully defined. A dispute hav- ing arisen over the execution of a provision in the treaty of 1891 respecting Manica, the matter was, after three years of discussion, submitted to the arbitration of M. Vigliani, former president of the Cour de Cassation of Florence, and decided in favor of Eng- land in 1897. In 1901 Lord Milner, for England, concluded a tem- porary agreement maintaining treaty arrangements entered into earlier between Portugal and the then independent Transvaal Re- public, assuring a certain minimum of traffic from the latter by way of the Portuguese railway from Lourenco Marques to the Transvaal frontier, giving to goods coming by that route the same advantages as if they had come by way of the Cape or Natal, and permitting in exchange for these favors the recruiting in Portu- guese territory of necessary native labor for the Transvaal mines and other industries. Cape Colony and Natal objected to the arrange- ment; but it was sustained in London, slightly modified three years later, and in 1909, just before the Union of South Africa was effected, a new treaty was concluded by the Transvaal • Colony continuing these privileges for 10 years, in spite of serious objections by other members of the incipient union. In 1907, 1911, and 1912 there oc- curred exchanges of notes recognizing demarcations of various bound- aries between British and Portuguese dominions. 3. ADJUSTMENTS WITH FRANCE AND GERMANY. While suffering from British encroachments where her ancient claims were not supported by effective occupation, Portugal has been supported by England against encroachments by a third power. In 1884 threatened efforts of France to extend her Congo claims over northern Angola were thus resisted and the Portuguese position on the southern bank of the lower Congo recognized and preserved. In 177 188G a Portuguese-German agreement established the boundary be- tween their Southwest African possessions, and another of the next year drew a line between their East African territories, a river con- stituting the dividing line throughout most of its extent in each case. German merchants, supported by their Government, maintained a persistent and successful policy of increasing their commerce with the Portuguese colonies, arousing suspicions that they intended to secure political influence, if possible. In 1891 limits were drawn be- tween Angola and the independent, or Belgian, Congo. 4. Portugal's attitude toward her colonies. Much of Portugal's African soil is rich and would be productive if it were efficiently governed and intelligently developed ; but ineffi- ciency and mismanagement have characterized her colonial policy. Apart from the cocoa islands and the port of Lourenco Marquez, her African colonies are none of them self-supporting; and the surplus from these profitable possessions falls far short of counterbalancing the deficits in the budgets of the rest. Abuses in connection with the contract labor system (virtual slavery) by which workers have been recruited in Angola for the unhealthful cocoa islands have caused numerous riots and revolts, roused world-wide criticism, and occa- sioned international intervention. There has been considerable re- cent opposition in Portugal to the persistent colonial deficits and talk of abandoning or profitably disposing of the colonies, but the recent scramble of other European powers for African territory has in- creased the determination of Portuguese officialdom to cling to their unprofitable over-seas dominions, hoping that they may yet be able to reform abuses and make them both creditable and profitable. 5. PROJECTED PARTITION OF THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES. In the last decade of the last century, when the relations of Eng- land and Germany were fairly cordial, there were persistent rumors that they were planning to divide the Portuguese possessions between themselves. Johnston (The Colonization of Africa, p. 115) says: In 1898, when the unsettled state of Africa and the rivalry between Britain, Germany, and France made it advisable to forecast an allotment of the Por- tuguese colonies, should they slip from the grasp of Portugal or be offered for sale, an agreement was entered into between Britain and Germany partitioning the Portuguese African possessions into spheres of influence. But it is under- stood that at a later date Great Britain, on renewing her old alliance with Portugal, guaranteed her the undisturbed possession'of her colonial dominions. Gibbons states (Map of Africa, p. 247) that according to this treaty, which was never published, Germany was to have acquired 53706—18 12 178 "Portugal's Asiatic possessions, the northern part of her Easl African ami the southern part of her West African territories, and Walfish Bay from England, and the Latter was to have had all the rest of Portuguese Africa. In L908, and again in L909, rumors were rife in England that Germany was negotiating to get footholds on Portuguese possessions, and violent criticism of German in- trigues were voiced by the British press. (Ibid., pp. 249 250.) "During the four years between (he birth of the [Portuguese] Re- public and the beginning of (he European war there were constant rumors of the intention of Portugal to sell her colonies to Germany. Discerning readers could see in the way these reports were com- mented upon a clear indication of how Great Britain ami Germany were drifting toward war" (Ibid., p. 278). Partially successful efforts were made to reach understandings concerning their naval, commercial, and colonial rivalries. "Shortly before the outbreak of the war it was the belief in Portugal that the two great rivals had come to a new understanding. * * * The Times declared that there was nothing in the new Anglo-German accord to diminish the value i^( tin 1 Anglo-Portuguese alliance, and no intention to despoil Portugal, either by purchase or by any other means, of any of her colonies." (Ibid., pp. 273-274.) In another place (p. 262) Gib- bons says: la the spring of L914, however, the [Portuguese] colonial minister told Par- liament that not less than $40,000,000 was required, and that something must be done Immediately to demonstrate to the world the ability of Portugal to administer and develop this colony. Gibbons adds in a footnote that the minister '* had undoubtedly re- ceived official intimation of the serious 'conversations' going on at that moment between Great Britain and Germany, lie accepted during the same month, without Britain opposing, oilers of a German syndicate and German banks to help in Ajlgola." Prime LichnOWsky in My London Mission, L912 l!»ll. states (p. •J si) that in the projected Ajiglo-German accord of L914 (See article, that title) "An arrangement had been reached between us [Germany] and England, delimiting the interests of the two parties" in the African colonies of Portugal. His description of the projected agree- ment is as follows (p. 283) : Thanks to the conciliatory of the British government, 1 succeeded in giving to the now treaty a form which entirely corresponded to our [Germany's] wishes and Interests, ah Angola, as far as the 20th degree of Longitude was assigned io us, so thai we reached the Congo territory from the south. Moreover, the valuable islands of San TiToine and Principe, which lie north of the equator and therefore really belong to the French sphere of Interest, were allotted to us — a fact which caused my French colleague to enter energetic hut unavailing pro- tests. Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique; the Licango formed the boundary. 179 BIBLIOGRAPHY. DOCUMENTS. Nearly all of the more important documents referred to are printed in British and Foreign Papers. The following are the most importanl : Correspondence will) Great Britain, 1875, concerning the arbitration before the President of France, vol.70, pp. 338 341; corre- spondence with Great Britain, 1887-1800. vol. TO. pp. 100-2 L152, vol. 81, 977-1033, vol. 82. pp. 207 :J17; modus vivendi with England, Au- gust 20, 1890, vol. 82. pp. 317-339; renewal of the same, May L3, 1 891, vol. 83, p. 25; correspondence with England, 1800 L891, vol. 83, pp. 833-894; treaty with England, June 11, 1891, vol. 83, pp. 27 1 1 : arbi- tration with England, January 30, 1807, vol. 80, pp. 702-751; agree- ment wild Kngland, December IS, 1001. vol. 05. pp. 931 934; addi- tional articles to same. June 15, 1904, vol. 98, p. 1085; treaty with the Transvaal, April 1. 1000. vol. 102, pp. 110-120; boundary agreement with England, June 3, 1007. vol. 100, pp. 553 -555; another of October 21-November 20, 1011, vol. 101. pp. 185-193; another of .July 22- August 9. 1912, vol. 105. pp. 270-280; correspondence with England concerning northern Angola. 1882 1881. vol. 75, pp. 1272-13:W. 170- 482; treaties with Congo Free State, May 25, 1891, vol. 8:',. pp. 913 - 918: correspondence with England concerning contract labor abuses, 1909-1912, vol. 100, pp. 349-434. Prince Lichnowsky's revelations. My London Mission. 1012 1914, edited by Munroe Smith and Henry F. Munro, are in " International Conciliation," No. 127. June. L918. NABBAl hi;. Gibbons, H. A., New Map of Africa, 1900-1010 (New York, Cen- tury Co., 1916), for an excellent discussion, giving also the ante- cedent events before 1900; occasional footnotes suggest ource for further study. Johnston, H. II., Sir, Colonization of Africa (2d ed., Cambridge, University Press, 1913), of which the appendix contains an extended bibliography. Keltie, J. S., Partition of Africa (2d ed., London, Stanford, L895), for earlier part only, but many useful maps. Cambridge Modern History (New York, Macmillan, 1910), vol. 12, of which the appendix contains a bibliography. 58. THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN CENTRAL ASIA, 1878-1887. 1. INTRODUCTION. Afghanistan and Turkestan are far away from the Balkan penin- sula and Egypt, nevertheless', because of the extent of the great em- 180 pires of England and Russia, the fortunes of the four regions have been closely connected during recent decades. For example, the Balkan crisis in 1878 led to the Afghan War of 1878-1881, and the action of England in Egypt in the early eighties accelerated the Russian advance in Turkestan during the same j^ears. 2. RUSSIAN ADVANCES, 185G-187S. After the Crimean War the Russian expansive energy, curbed for the time in southeastern Europe, found an outlet in advancing south- ward the line across Central Asia. England, after the Sepoy mutiny, I was willing that her rival should bring the power of Europe to bear upon the independent portions of Asia, especially since the Khanates of Khiva, Bokhara, Samarcand, etc., were fierce, barbarous, and disorderly. The circular which Prince Gortchakoff issued in [1864 (Rose, Development of European Nations. II, 59). explaining that Russia could not keep the peace with uncivilized and predatory tribes, and must press on until she came to regions controlled by a strong State, was accepted by England, especially since the doctrine was useful to herself. Tashkend fell in 1864, Bokhara ftfecame a vassal state in 1868, and Khiva in 1873. This brought the Russian advance to the neighborhood of Afghanistan, which had long been in special relations with England. 8. ENGLAND AND AFGHANISTAN, 1S56-1875. A Iter the unsuccessful Afghan War of 1842, the English were con- tent with non-intervention, the payment of occasional subsidies, and the recognition of de facto rulers. When the Ameer Dost Mohammed died in 1863, the British Government refused special favors to his favorite and most capable son, Sher Ali. until the latter had estab- lished himself by the defeat of his opponents. The Ameer came to conference with Lord Mayo in March, 1869, and requested a guaranty of dynastic succession and a regular subsidy, while declining to admit a British resident into his capital. (Rose, Development of European Nations, II, 66-67.) He was promised only non-interfer- ence and the support of his independence. In 1873, alarmed at the Russian advance, Sher Ali proposed an alliance with the British. They refused and the Ameer began to despise them and to think of throwing in his fortune with the then more active Russians. 4. THE BRITISH "FORWARD POLICY," 1S75-1S7S. Sir Bartle Frere, representing a group of advocates of "the for- ward policy " in India, proposed on January 1, 1875, that agents be established in Afghanistan and that Quetta be occupied. (Rose, De- velopment of European Nations, II, 77.) Disraeli was nothing loath 181 to abandon the policy of "masterly inactivity," and presently ap- pointed as viceroy of India Lord Lytton, a man inclined to action, and. like the premier himself, ready on occasion to subordinate scruple to his purposes. In 1877 he reported that Sher Ali was lost to the British, and that " it is rather the disintegration and weakening, than the consolidation and establishment of the Afghan power at which we must now begin to aim." (Quoted by Rose, Development of European Nations, II, 83.) In the following year he planned the creation of a State of West Afghanistan under a prince of British choosing, who should even claim Merv, which the Russians consid- ered to be within their own sphere. A few months later he gave up the idea of getting Merv, but advised the conquest and occupation of enough Afghan territory to secure the northwestern frontier of India. 5. RUSSIAN ADVANCE, 1878-1 SS7. On the day of the assembling of. the Congress of Berlin, June 13, 1878, when it was considered practically certain in England that no agreement would be reached, Gen. Stolietoff left Samarcand on a mission to the Ameer. He was admitted into Afghanistan, and plans were ready for three columns of troops to follow him. Russia, ac- cording to a plan of Gen. Skobeleff, would thus have anticipated England in the Afghan territory had it come to war between the two Empires. The signing of the Treaty of Berlin defeated this plan, but Stolietoff is believed to have made an agreement with the Ameer. On the 22d of September the guard of Sher Ali in the Khyber Pass refused to admit a British representative. An ultimatum was sent and no answer having been received, war was begun on November 20. Beaconsfield had said, November 9', that a scientific frontier was needed at the northwest of India, and this caused much criticism in England. Russia gave no active support to the Afghans. Kandahar was taken and Sher Ali fled. The British recognized his nephew, Yakub Khan, who accepted a British resident at Kabul. Major Ca- vagnari was appointed but was murdered with his guards in Septem- ber, 1879. The war was renewed. Abdurrahman, a claimant to the throne, who had been hiding in Russia, was given Russian aid and crossed the frontier. Being an intelligent and shrewd man, he pres- ently came to agreement with the British, who recognized him on July 20, 1880, and gave him £900,000. Lord Roberts made his famous march to Kandahar and rescued the British garrison there. The city was evacuated April 15, 1881, and the British withdrew from Af- ghanistan. The situation of eight years before was thus restored. Afghanistan, without a British resident, was a friendly State to England. The Russians had begun war on the Turkomans in the autumn of 1878. After preliminary failures. Gen. Skobeleff took the last strong- 182 hold of the Turkomans on January 23, L881. The Russians began a penetration of the Khanate of Merv, and in 1884 began a further advance, supposedly in large part to obtain recompense for die British occupation in Egypt. It is supposed that the three em- perors sanctioned this advance at their conference at Skiernewice in September, 1881. but the English were greatly incensed and thought of war. Merv was taken, but the British acquiesced, and a boundary commission was appointed to determine the frontier between Russia and Afghanistan. (Correspondence between Great Britain and Russia respecting Central Asia. Merv, the Northwest frontier of Afghanistan and L883 L885 in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 76, pp. 1102-1232.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. Martens, G. Fr. de. Nouveau recueil general do trahes et autres actes relatifs aux rapports de droit international. Series 11 and III. (Leipzig, 1910.) Parliamentary Papers. Afghanistan. 1878. Central Asia, L881. British Foreign and State Papers. For correspondence ♦between Great Britain and Russia on Afghanistan, vols. 65, »>7. 68, 69, 70, 75, 76, 77, etc. See general index. O'Donovan, E. The Merv Oasis. (New York, Putnam, 1883.) 2 vol's. Roberts, Lord Frederick. Forty-One years in India. (New York, Longmans, Green X: Co., 1898.) 2 vols. Hensman, The Afghan War of 1878 L880. Lansdell, H. Russian Central Asia. (London. A. Low, Marston, Searle and Kivington. 1885.) 3 vo ' s - Lessar, Paul. La Russie et I'Angleterre dans I'Asie Centrale. (Paris. 1880.) From the Russian point of view. Marvin, Charles Thomas. Our public offices: embodying an ac- count of the disclosure of the Anglo- Russian agreement and the unrevealed secret treaty of May 31, L878. (London, Sonnenschein, 3d edition, 188-2.) Chirol, V. The middle Eastern question or some political prob- lems of Indian defense. (London, John Murray, 1903.) PopoAvski, Josef. The rival powers in Central Asia, or the strug- gle between England and Russia in the East. Translated from the German of J. Popowski by Arthur Baring Brabant, and edited by Charles E. D. Black. (Westminster. Constable, 1803.) Curzon, Lord. Frontiers. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1008.) Cur/on, Lord. Russia in Central Asia. (Loudon. Longmans, Green & Co., 1880.) Contains exhaustive bibliography. Curzon, Lord. Persia and the Persian question. (London, Long- mans, Green & Co., 1892.) 183 Skrine, F. H. The expansion of Russia. (University Press, Cam- bridge, 3d ed., 1915.) Rose, John Holland. Development of the European Nations. (New York, Putnam, 1910.) Vol. II, 44-142, contains a good account of the Central Asian question. There is a map of Afghanistan. Krause, Alexis. Russia in Asia. (New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1899.) Chesney, G. Russia and India. Nineteenth Centmv. :j: 005-010. April, 1878. Rawlinson, H. Advance of Russia in Asia. Nineteenth Century, April 17, 1885. Contains map of northwestern frontier of Afghan- istan. MAPS. See also those noted in above bibliography. Northwestern frontier of India. In Popowski, The Rival Powers in Central Asia. (Westminster, Constable, 1893.) The advance of Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia in the XIX century. (Stanford's, London.) (100 miles to 1 inch.) In Skrine, Expansion of Russia. (Cambridge Universitv Press, 1915.) 59. THE BRITISH ACQUISITION OF UPPER BURMA, 1885-1886. 1. THE CHEFOO CONVENTION, 1870. The Chef oo convention of 1876 stipulated that the viceroy of India, at any time he saw fit, might send an expedition to Yunnan, one of the southern provinces of China. (Appendix I. 8.) In 1884 an expedition was planned, but the Chinese protested on account of the size of the force which was to be sent, and during the negotia- tions which followed a compromise was arranged by which Chinese susceptibilities w r ere saved and the British obtained an important concession in Burma. 2. THE O'CONEB CONVENTION, 1886. For some years British relations with Thcbaw. King of Burma, had been unsatisfactory. Consequently, Mandalay was occupied, Thebaw was taken prisoner, and Burma was formally annexed on January 1, 1886. But China claimed suzerainty over Burma. It was, therefore, agreed by the O'Coner convention, signed at Peking on July 24, 1886, that the mission contemplated in the Chefoo Con- vention should be abandoned in exchange for China's renunciation of claims of suzerainty over Burma. (See Appendix I, 33.) 184 BIBLIOGRAPHY. For a narrative of these events, see Annual Register for 1885 (London, 1886), pp. 317-321; and Ibid., for 1886, pp. 421-423: For the text of the treaty of Chefoo, see Hertslet, China Treaties (Lon- don, 1908), Vol. I, No. 12, pp. 73-80. For the text of O'Coner's treaty of 1886, see Hertslet, op. clt., No. 15, pp. 88-90. 60. FRANCO-SIAMESE RELATIONS, 1893-1904. 1. EARLY FRENCH AGGRESSIONS, 1SG6-1S92. In another article (See The Franco-Chinese War of 1882-1885), it has been shown how France established a protectorate over Annam and obtained possession of Tonquin. She had also established certain rights over Cambodia on the plea that this country was tributary to Annam. On the same principle she urged that the eastern Provinces of Siam should owe allegiance to her. The French were constantly coming into conflict with the Siamese authorities along Siam's eastern frontier; France particularly claimed the western bank of tjie river Mekong from the Chinese Province of Yunnan to its mouth. The Siamese Government protested in vain against these claims and pro- posed a neutral zone 30 miles in width until an international commis- sion should determine the legitimate frontier. 2. THE FRENCH ULTIMATUM OF 1893. In 1892-93 a French officer and his escort were murdered in Siamese territory and another officer was captured. An ultimatum was at once presented at Bangkok, which included the folloAving demands: (1) A recognition of the right of Annam and Cambodia [and through them of France] to the left bank of the Mekong and the islands; (2) evacuation of the posts held there by the Siamese within a month's time; (3) satisfaction for the various aggressions against French subjects in Siam and against French ships and sailors; (4) punishment of the culprits and pecuniary indemnities to the families of the victims; (5) indemnities of 2,000,000 francs for various dam- ages inflicted on French subjects; (6) an immediate deposit of 3,000,- 000 francs as a guaranty for these claims, or in default, an assignment by way of security of the revenues of Battambang and Angker. (Doc- uments diplomatiques. Affaires de Siam (1893), pp. 6-7.) 3. TREATY OF BANGKOK, 1893 (SEE APPENDIX I, 42). The result of this ultimatum was a treaty signed at Bangkok, Octo- ber 3, 1893. The following were its main provisions: (1) The Siamese Government renounced all claims to the whole of the terri- 185 tories on the left bank of the Mekong and to the islands in the river. (2) The Siamese bound themselves not to place or navigate any armed vessels on the waters of the great Toule Sop Lake, the Mekong, or their tributaries situated in the territory indicated in the next article. (3) In the third article the Siamese agreed not to construct any fortified post or military establishment in the provinces of Bat- tambang and Sien Rap, or within a radius of 15 miles from the right bank of the Mekong. (4) Inasmuch as the development of naviga- tion on the Mekong renders necessary certain works on its right bank or the establishment of relay stations for boats for wood and coal depots, the Siamese Government bound itself to give, at the re- quest of the French Government, all the necessary facilities for this purpose. (Ibid., pp. 14-17.) 4. TREATY OF 1902. In 1902, taking advantage "of some differences relating to the correct interpretation of the treaty of 1893, France concluded another con- vention with Siam by which three additional provinces lying strictly within the basin of the Mekong River were ceded to her. (Ibid., 1903, pp. 70-73.) But France showed a disposition to advance within the basin of the Menam River. This was within what Great Britain regarded as her sphere of influence. 5. ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT OF 1904. The consequence of this apparent conflict of interests was that in the Anglo-French Convention of April 8, 1904, there was included with the assent of Siam, an agreement (See article, The Forma- tion of the Entente Cordiale) by which the influence of these two powers in this region was strictly defined. It was mutually agreed that "the influence of Great Britain shall be recognized by France in the territories situated to the west of the basin of the River Menam, and that the influence of France shall be recognized by Great Britain in the territories situated to the east of the same re- gion, all the Siamese possessions on the east and southeast of the zone above described and the adjacent islands coming thus henceforth under French influence, and, on the other hand, all Siamese pos- sessions on the west of this zone and the Gulf of Siam, including the Malay Peninsula and the adjacent islands, coming under British in- fluence." At the same time, the two contracting parties solemnly dis- claimed all idea of annexing Siamese territory. (See Appendix 1,68.) 6. CONVENTION OF 1907. In 1907 a further convention was concluded between France and Siam (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 100, pp. 1028-1034) 186 by which Siam returned to the French protectorate of Cambodia the Province of Battambang, recovering from France in rot urn cer- tain parts of the maritime Province of Krat which had boon ceded in 1904. This convention also modified the extra-territorial rights enjoyed by France in Siam. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The most important documents are in the French Yellow Books: Ministere des Atl'aires Etrangeres; Affaires du Haut-Mekong (1898) ; Affaires de Siam (1893); Affaires de Siam. 1893-1903 (Paris, Imprimerie Rationale, 1893-1902). The most serviceable narratives of Franco-Siamese relations arc those by Douglas, R. K.. Europe and the Far East (University Press, Cambridge, 1004), ch. L9, pp. 389 408; and Cordier, H., Histoire des relations de la Chine avee les puissances occidentales. 1860-1902 (Paris. Alcan, 1902), Vol. Ill, ch. 8, pp. 106-135. See also Lemire, Ch., La France et le Siam (Paris, 1003) ; and Lepesqueur, P.-Ch., La France et le Siam (Paris, Megard, 1897) ; and Campbell. J. G. D., Siam in the Twentieth Century (London, Arnold, L902), ch. 11. on "International questions." For texts and document-, more particularly the treaty of 1893, see Cordier, op. cit., pp. 131-132. 61. THE EUROPEAN ENCROACHMENTS IN THE FAR EAST, 1875-1887. 1. THE GENERAL SITUATION. In 1868, when the restoration of the authority of the Mikado had been effected and a progressive or "enlightened" government in- stalled, the new Japan found herself facing a number of European footholds or vantage points on the mainland of eastern Asia. Russia was in possession of the Pacific Coast (including the Island of Saghalien and Primorsk Province) as far south as Vladivostok. China had ceded Hong Kong to England in 1842, Macao to Portugal (1887). and had lost all control over the important port of Shanghai as a result of a series of concessions, exi ending over a number of years, to several European powers. ■2. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE DISPUTE RESPECTING SAKHALIEN AND THE KURILE ISLANDS, 187 B. In 1875 a Russo-Japanese dispute of some years' standing respect- ing the possession of the Island of Sakhalien was ended for the time being by Japan giving up to Russia the whole of Sakhalien in return for the recognition of Japan's complete sovereignty over the 187 whole group of the Kurile Islands. In 1905 Japan again secured possession of the southern half of Sakhalien Island (See article, The Treaty of Portsmouth). In 1876 Japan also incorporated the Bonin Islands. The encroachments of the French in Annam and the gains made by France at the expense of China during the period from 1882 to 1887 are dealt with elsewhere. (See articles on Franco-Siamese Re- lations, 1893-1904, and The Franco-Chinese War, 1882-1885.) 3. THE BRITISH OCCUPATION AND WITHDRAWAL FROM PORT HAMILTON, 1885-1887. In 1885 occurred an incident which must have given to Japan con- siderable food for thought. Taking advantage of the quarrel between Japan and China over Korea, which resulted in the treaty of Tient- sin (1884—85), Russia proposed a convention that would have placed Korea under the virtual control of the Czar. But the intrigue became known ; and, at the instigation of China, the King of Korea refused to sign the proposed convention. • Determined to prevent such a danger in the future, Great Britain decided to occupy the group of islands off the southern coast of Korea forming the harbor known as Port Hamilton. The Chinese Government consenting, the British flag was hoisted on these islands in April, 1885. Russia at once protested and, after a heated controversy, the British withdrew from Port Hamilton on February 27, 1887, after Russia had given a positive assurance that under no circumstances would she encroach on Korean territory. China also gave an under- standing that no foreign power should ever be permitted to take pos- session of the islands. BIBLIOGRAPHY. For a brief account of the settlement of the Russo-Japanese dis- pute in 1875, see Hornbeck, S. K., Contemporary Politics in the Far East (New York, Appleton, 1916), p. 197. For accounts of the British occupation and withdrawal from Port Hamilton, see Douglas, R. K., Europe and the Far East (University Press, Cambridge, 1904), pp. 248-491, and Cordier, H., Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales, 1860-1892 (Paris, Alcan, 1902), Vol. Ill, pp. 3-4. 62. THE FRANCO-CHINESE WAR, 1882-1885. 1. TREATIES OF 1862 AND 1874. The effort to establish French authority in the Indo-Chinese peninsula, after a series of unsuccessful attempts going back to the eighteenth century, was resumed by the government of Napoleon III. L88 A treaty, signed at SaigoD in L862, conveyed certain provinces in southern Annam to France. In 1ST I another treaty was concluded with the king of Annam at Saigon by which the King recognized French sovereignty over all territory actually occupied by them. France, in her turn, recognized the sovereignty and "entire inde- pendence" of the 1 v i n ii of Annam, though the latter engaged to eon- form his foreign policy to that of France. •2. PROTEST or CHIN \. China took exception lo this latter treaty, pointing out (hat An- nam was a dependency o( China. Whereupon the King o( Annam. in 1S77. sent an embassy to China with tribute. In L881 Marquis Tseng declared formally that his Government repudiated the treaty of 1874 — a right which France refused to acknowledge. There Seemed serious danger o( war between the two countries, but China was not prepared for war. China chose another method oi' embarrassing the intruder. She subsidized the leader o( the Black Flags, a roving band o( marauders, to make incursions across the southern border. In L882 this band succeeded in inflicting two serious reverses on the French. It was necessary to send troops from France in order to restore the prestige of French arms. 8. .\\N\M DECLARES WAR ON FRANCE, L882. In the meantime, the Bong of Annam declared war on France (1882), The capital, Hue. was soon occupied, and a protege of France placed on the throne. The following year (1883), Annam. in a new treaty, "recognized and accepted the protectorate of France." This is known as thie treaty of line. signed August 25,1883. •4. FUTILE NEGOTIATIONS. The Chinese were now thoroughly alarmed. Li llung-Chang was appointed commander in chief in South China. Instead <^\' proceed- ing io the proposed seat of hostilities, this astute Chinese statesman got no further than Shanghai, where he opened negotiations. But, desirous of shifting responsibility from his own shoulders to those of Marquis Tseng, he suddenly left Shanghai for Tientsin. Mean- while, the marquis had been at work trying to secure the interven- tion of one o( the western powers. The United States offered (o arbi- trate, but the offer was rejected by France. On August '20. lSSo. Prince Kung was informed officially that a French fleet would at once blockade the ports o\' Tonquin and An- nam. Prince Kung protested, declaring that China would never give up her suzerainty over Annam. 189 War was now within measurable distance, but several bridges had to I)'- crossed before that happened. Negotiations had meanwhile been transferred to Paris, bul they also continued at Peking. Mar- quis Tseng was, however, soon recalled from Paris, and Prince Kung was di missed at Peking. Et looked as though the Empress Oowager was determined on war. 5. TJIi: FOUBNIEB CONVENTION, 1884. A si range evenl now happened. On May 11, 1881. there was con- cluded ;ii Tientsin between Li-Hung-Chang and Capt. Fournier, commander of a French man-of-war, who was invested with full powers by a telegram from Paris, what is known as the Fournier convention. (See Appendix I, 27.) By this convention France bound herself to respect and protect against all aggression by any nation and under any circumstances the southern frontiers of China :ind Tonquin. China agreed thai she would a1 once withdraw her garrisons from Tonquin and would respect the treaties concluded between France and the King of Annam. The dates of evacuation were not fixed in the treaty, but simply marked down in a memo- randum. Li-Hung-Chang seems to have greatly exceeded his in- structions and character! tically misrepresented the nature of the 'concessions made by China to the Empress Dowager, who appeared satisfied with the terms of the treaty as reported to her. The natural consequences followed. -The Chinese commandant received no instructions to withdraw the garrison from Tonquin, and when the French advanced to take possession an inevitable con- fliet followed, in which the French were defeated. France protested against what she claimed was an infringement of the Fournier convention. The Chinese Government claimed that the French had broken the treaty by attacking Chinese troops. 0. THE FRENCH ULTIMATUM, JULY 12, 1884. France now sent an ultimatum. China appealed in vain to the treaty powers. Tn the short war that followed both sides gained some successes and suffered some reverses. 7. TREATY 01' Ill.K. J 8 84. On June 6, 1884, another treaty, signed at Hue. was concluded between France and Annam, by which the Annamese agreed to ac- cept a French protectorate. In return France bound herself to guarantee the integrity of their territory. 8. TREATY OF TIENTSIN, 1885. Through the good offices mainly of Sir Robert Hart, terms of peace were finally arranged at Tientsin on June 9, 1885, between 190 France and China. (See Appendix I. 80.) It was agreed; (I) That Prance and China mutually agree to maintain order in the provinces adjoining their respective borders. (2) 'That China do nothing to compromise the work of fortification undertaken by France ami agree to respect all the treaties, conventions, ami ar- rangements between France and Annam. (8) That within six months commissioners tix the frontier between China ami Tonking. There \\ ere also a cumber o\' articles relating to the trade permitted to Chinese and French merchants, the regulation o( passports, imposi- tion of customs duos, trade in arms and munitions, the expedition and importation o{ opium, the construction of railways, etc More purely commercial treaties were also negotiated in 188G and 1887. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The fullest account oi' these matters (including texts and docu- ments) is given by Cordier, H., Historic des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales, L86O-1900 (Paris, Alcan, L902), \ ol. 11. chs, L2-26, pp. 242 575. For a good brief account, see Douglas, R. K., Europe amH.he Far East (Cambridge, University Tress. L904), eh. L2, pp. 226 241, and eh. IS, pp. 86] 888. * 63. THE JOURNEYS OF WILLIAM II TO THE NEAR EAST. 1. FIRST JOURNEY, 18s:>. The first visit of William 11 to the Sultan took place in November, L889, and marked a very significant change in German policy toward the Near East. Bismarck had always claimed to he disinterested in that region, and although his statement that "the whole eastern question was not worth the hones of a Pomeranian grenadier" may understate his interest, yet he does not appear to have considered the Near East as a sphere o\' German expansion. But William II, backed by and under the influence of German industrialists, seems early \o have decided on the policy of pushing German interests in thai region. Bismarck, also, considered the friendship of Russia, to whom the Near Kast was a vital question, io he of sullieient impor- tance to Germany to avoid wounding Russian susceptibilities by German action at Constantinople. The new policy of friendship \'ov Turkey and German penetration in the Near East seems to have led io the clash between William 11 and Bismarck and was possibly one of the reasons for the fall of the chancellor in 1890. (See article, The Dismissal o( Bismarck, 1890.) 191 2. GERMANY AND PAN-ISIiASHSM. After 1800 German policy in regard to the Near East began to work- wilh the Pan- Islamic plane of Abdul-Hamid. Ever since the 80's the Sultan had been cherishing the idea of uniting all the Mos- lems of the world around the government of Constantinople. Emis- aries were dispatched as far as Afghani tan to win over the Moslems. A propaganda was carried on in Persia, while in Africa strenuous attempts were made to win the Senussi a. border tribe between Tripoli and the Soudan as well a the Moslems of Tuni:-, and other North African protectorates. If this movement could he controlled by Germany it would mean a powerful leverage against both Eng- land and France, whose Moslem subjects numbered many millions. .",. THE ARMENIAN MASSACiMOS. The connection between German policy in the. Near rCast and the Pan-Islamic movement began to appear at the time of the Armenian massacres Of 1805. These and similar ma lacres of later date were due to efforts on the part of Pan-Islamic forces to root out from the. Turkish Empire all the non-Moslem peoples and thus unify the State as a Moslem power. The, refusal of the German Government to act with the other- powers in the interest of the Armenians made effec- tive action hy the, powers collectively and individually impossible. (See article, The Armenian Question, 1878-07.) The German am- bassador at Constantinople even refused to assist in the distribution of charitable aid. The German Government, held the value of German-Turkish friendship above the- dictates of humanity. This policy resulted in the strengthening of German influence at Con- stantinople and facilitated the granting by the Turkish Government of a number of economic concessions to German interests. 4. SECOND JOURNEY, 1 HUH. In 1808 William II made his second visit to the Near East. His aim- at this time, appear to have been two: (1) To win for Germany control of the Pan-Islamic movement, and (2) to secure further economic concessions for Germany in Turkey. In pursuit of his fir I aim he made a, sensational -\> ech at the tomb of Sahidin in Damascus. "The 300,000,000 Mohammedans that are scattered throughout the world," he declared, "may rest assured that the Ger- man Emperor will eternally he their friend." (Quoted by Hu^ronje, The World War "Made in Germany." p. 71.) And lie also gave high praise to Saladin. The effeel of this speech is dubious. It may well have captured the heart of the leaders of Pan-Islam, hut as Prof. 192 Hugronje points out (pp. 71-72) the average Moslem had little in- terest in Pan-Islam and had little remembrance of Saladin. In his second aim William II appears to have been more success- ful. In 1899 came the first concessions for the Bagdad Railway (See article, that title) and in 1903 followed the firman for its construc- tion. From this time on the Bagdad Railway formed a cornerstone of German policy in the Near East. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Cheradame. Le Chemin de fer de Bagdad (Paris. Hon. L903). Berard, V. Le Sultan, l'Islam et les puissances (Paris. Colin, L907). Hugronje, The Holy War "Made in Germany" (New York, Put- nam, 1915). Lewin, E. The German Road to the East (London, Heinemann, 1916). See also bibliographies for articles on the Bagdad Railway and the Armenian Question. SECTION III.— 1890-1904. 64. THE DISMISSAL OF BISMARCK, 1890. 1. INTRODUCTION. The dismissal of Bismarck was only to a very small degree de- pendent on foreign policy, but was a question of authority — " whether the Bismarck dynasty or the Hohenzollern dynasty should rule." (Hohenlohe, II, pp. 424, 426.) Nevertheless the chancellor's cultiva- tion of Russia at the expense of Austria lay to some extent in the background. After secret treaties in 1881 and 1884, in 1887 Bis- marck had entered into his reinsurance treaty with Russia, which stipulated that if either found itself at war with a third great power the other would maintain toward it a benevolent neutrality. France was thereby isolated. (See article, Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty.) The treaty, or agreement, was for three years, and 1889-1890 found Bismarck eager for its renewal. 2. THE DISMISSAL AND GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY. From William IPs accession Bismarck seems to have urged the cul- tivation of Russia. In July, 1888, four weeks after his accession, the Emperor visited the Czar, afterwards paying his respects at Vienna and the South German capitals. To a reporter of the Novoe Vremja (May 10, 1890), Bismarck said that he had advised against the Emperor's visit to Constantinople in 1889, as likely to offend Russia. The Czar visited the Emperor October, 1889, and it is said that the Emperor intended to visit him at the hunting chateau Spala, in Lithuania, when Bismarck's objection (possibly fearing that too many meetings might cool Alexander's friendship), brought on a public display of temper against the chancellor October 13, 1889. (Egelhaaf, Bismarck, p. 384, for the rather uncertain proofs of this.) In the following March, just as the inner administrative conflict was coming to a head between them, the Emperor was greatly incensed because Bismarck had failed to mention to him a delayed communi- cation from the German Consul Raffauf at Kiev, regarding Russian military preparations. William felt that Austria should have been warned. Bismarck's action was probably due to anxiety lest this probably exaggerated report might prevent the renewal of the "reinsurance treaty." (All sources in Egelhaaf, Bismarck, p. 388, 53706—18 13 (193) L94 who claims personal information.) William told his generals after Bismarck's resignation thai the chancellor was too friendly io Russia at the expense oi Austria (second-hand to Hohenlohe, II, p. 125); he told Hohenlohe (pp. 126 27) that Bismarck had misrepresented him to Alexander. The Kiev report was one of the matters that brought the demand that Bismarck yield or resign. It echoes in the obscure paragraph in Bismarck's resignation letter oi March L8 (first published by M. Busch in Berlin Lokalanzeiger, July 31, L898; now convenient, with the Emperor's replies of March 20, in Egelhaaf, Bismarck, 488 ff.)« Bismarck's determination to retain Russia's friendship was undoubtedly combined with a fear oi' British influence on the Emperor, .;. R] -si i is. The results of Bismarck's retirement were: (1^ The loss oi Russia's friendship: ^i) the "reinsurance treaty " was not renewed (Cf. for debate in Reichstag concerning this, Penzler, VII, pp. L59, L68) : (b) Caprivi tried to conciliate the Poles (against Russian policy) by language concessions (1891), by 1 1 to confirmation of Stablewski, a national Polish loader, as archbishop oi Posen- Qnesen (1891), etc.; (e) although visits between the Emperor and ir continued to take place, the French and Russians drew aearer together, the rapprochement culminating in the visit oi the French fleet to Kronstadt July 28, L891, and the formation of the Franco- Russian alliance (189J L898), (2) An improvement in relations with England, shown by the toast of the Emperor at the banquet to the Prince of Wales, March 21, L890, with its reference to joint maintenance oi European peace (Hohenlohe II, p. 422), and the conclusion of the Zanzibar Helgo- land treaty, dune L8, L890. (See article, that title.) (8) The improvement of relations with Austria and Italy by the re- moval of the fear that Germany was too friendly to Russia and by the reciprocity treaties, concluded bj Caprivi in L891. 1. OONOia MO\. When Caprivi retired in L894 the Franeo-Russian alliance had stabilized matters, and the era id' Weltpolitik began independently of Bismarck policies. The Lasting result oi Bismarck's dismissal was the Franeo-Kussian alliance, something which the chancellor michl have delayed, hut could hardly have prevented. nuuaooK \riiY. Hohenlohe Schillingsfurst, Prince Chlodowig, Denkwurdigkeiten, English translation. -2 vols. (New York. Macmillan, I'MKk) Im- portant first-hand information. L05 Delbrlick, II. I>i<' Eiohenlohe Memorien. Preussische Jahrbiicher, vol. L26, pp. 375 886. October December, 1906. &gelhaaf, ( /. Bi marck, ein Leben trnd sein werk. (Stuttgart, Krabbe, L911.) \ careful but very partisan study by an admirer, - I on much persona] informal ion- . Geschichte der aeuesten Zeit. (4tb Auflage, Stuttgart, Krabbe, 1^12.) Good resume*. Busch, M. Bismarck, Some Secret Page of bis II i tory. (New STork, Macmillan, 1898.) Mostly chatter, and bard to "control." Crispi, I'. Memoirs, II. 12T i-io. London, Hodder. L012 Gives :j close new by an [talian diplomat al Berlin who reported to Crispi. Penzler, J. PiirstBi marck nach seiner Entla sung. Bde. 1 VII. (Leipzig, Fiedler, 1807 08.) Debidour. Histoire diplomatique de LTEurope depuie le Con grei de Berlin jusqu'a uos jours. I. L89 146. (Paris, AJcan, L016.) Good, concise aarral i re. Mevil, A. Bismarck et la Russie, Bevue hebdomaire, May 11, L907. I >.> (Prut ian) Staatsarcb iammlung der offiziellen Akten- stiicke (Aegidi and Klaubold), since July. 1861, If. Schulthess, Europaischer Geschichtskalender, since I860. Other ource in the text. Practically none of the State papers hare been published. 05. THE BRUSSELS ANTISLAVERY CONFERENCE OP 1890. ] . PI BPO The II signatory powei of the Berlin Conference of i ee article, thai title) had obligated themselves to "strive for the suppre sion of $la >ecially of the Negro slave trade." Bui these provi ioi re inefl d the same po iv< 1 1 partici- pated in another conference called together at BrusseL in L80O for the purpose of " putting an end to the crimes and devastation engen dered by the traffic in Afri efficiently protecting the aboriginal population of Africi for thai vast co tinent the benefits of peace and civilization." _-. J J.I; US OJ 1 l.' l. The genera] ad of the Br Conference (consisting of LOO arti- cle! I conceded a Limited right of visit and search of vt tonnage i Le than 500 toni within a great maritime zone extending from the western c of the Lndian Ocean (the Persian Gulf and the Bed Sea included), from Baluchistan to Cape Tangalane (Quilli- mane), to a coi rial Line which firsl follow:-, the meridian from 196 Tangalane till it intersects the twenty-sixth degree of south latitude, is then merged in this parallel, then passes around the Island of Madagascar by the east, keeping 20 miles off the east and north shore, till it intersects the meridian at Cape Ambre; from this point the limit of the zone is determined by an oblique line, which extends to the coast of Baluchistan, passing 20 miles off Cape Hodd (art. 21). For the purposes of investigation and trial, each signatory power agreed to appoint in the zone in question territorial or consular authorities, or special delegates, competent to deal with the cases covered by the convention. Such a magistrate, when an arrested vessel is turned over to him, must proceed to make a full in- vestigation according to the laws of his own country, in the presence of an officer belonging to the foreign cruiser. If it is proved that a flag has been fraudulently used, the arrested vessel is to remain at the disposal of the captor (art. 51). If the examination shows an act connected with the slave trade, proved by the presence on board of slaves destined for sale, or any other offense connected with the slave trade, for which provision is made by special convention, the vessel and cargo are to remain sequestrated in charge of the magis- trate. The captain and crew are then to be turned over for trial to the tribunal of the nation whose flag they used (arts. 54r-57), and the slaves are to be set at liberty as soon as judgment has been pro- nounced. Damages are to be allowed where a vessel has been illegally arrested (arts. 53, 58). An international maritime bureau, at which each of the signatory powers may be represented by a delegate, shall be established at Zanzibar in order to "centralize all documents and information of a nature to facilitate the repression of the slave trade in the maritime zone (arts. 74-80). r.. RESULT. It would seem that there has been an honest effort on the part of the great majority of the powers concerned to enforce the provisions of the Brussels conference, and that, as a consequence, the African slave trade is practically extinct or merely sporadic by sea, and on its way to extinction or at least greatly decreased on land. BIBLIOGRAPHY. For the text of the general act of the Brussels conference, see Sup- plement to American Journal of International Law, Vol. Ill, pp. 29-01. For the various protocols and discussions at the conference, see Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. Conference Internationale de Bruxelles. Protocols et Acte Final (Paris, Imprimerie Natiomle. 1801). 197 For diplomatic correspondence, see Ministere des Affaires Etran- geres. Conference International et Commission de Brnxelles. Cor- respondence Diplomatique (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1891). The main works on the slave trade and the Brussels conference are by Queneuil, H.. De la traite des noirs et l'esclavage. La conference de Brnxelles et ses resnltats (Paris. 1907) ; and Montardy. H. de, Le traite et le droit international (Paris, 1899). For discussions and analyses see especially: Lawrence, T. J. Principles of International Law (3d ed., Boston, Heath, 1900), pp. 216-218; and Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law (Washing- ton, Govt. Printing Office), Vol. II, pp. 948-950. 66. THE FORMATION OF THE DUAL ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND RUSSIA, 1887-1893. 1. FRENCH ISOLATION, 1871-18S7. The provocation of the Dual Alliance betAveen France and Russia came from Germany, though its formation was probably assisted by the differences which both France and Russia had with England. After the Franco-Prussian War, Germany, in the person of Bis- marck, dominated international politics in Europe and Bismarck's foreign policy was directed in the main toward keeping France isolated and weak. To that end he formed the so-called League of the Three Emperors in 1872 (See article, that title) with Russia and Austria -Hungary. Later, when Russia and Austria fell out over the Balkan question, he signed a defensive alliance with Austria (1879). enlarged in 1882, by the inclusion of Italy, into the famous Triple Alliance (See articles, The Formation of the Triple Alliance and The Renewals of the Triple Alliance). Russia was not a party to it, but by the secret treaties of 1881 and 1884 and the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 Russia pledged herself to remain benevolently neutral in case Germany were attacked. (See article, Bismarck's Reinsur- ance Treaty.) Thus Bismarck isolated France from three of the four possible strong allies in Europe. The fourth, England, had many outstanding quarrels with France over African and Asiatic questions. Bismarck trusted to them to keep England and France apart. 2. FRANCE AND RUSSIA, 1871-1887. Naturally France wished to escape from this isolation. The tra- dition of her diplomacy indicated an ally to the far side of Germany, namely, Russia. With Russia she had no quarrel and Russia shared her antipathy to England. French republicanism, of course, was distasteful to Russian autocracy and the Russian Czar was close- bound to the German Emperor both by treaty ties and by ties of kinship. Yet the Czar was plainly becoming dissatisfied with his 198 German ally, particularly as he found Bismarck more disposed to support Austria's policy in the Balkans than his own. He had more- over manifested his disinclination to acquiesce in German designs against France. lie had intervened when Germany threatened France in 1ST."). (See article. The Franco-Gentian War Scare of L875.) Two years later he seems to have refused to allow Germany a free hand against France in return for a free hand in the Balkans. Jn 1SST he moved troops toward the German frontier when Franco- German relation^ were critical. His whole attitude, in fact, invited French advances. 3. ADVANCES TOWARD ALLIANCE, 1887-1891. These advances took form in 1887 in a project to float a Russian loan in Paris which was realized in December of 18S8. Other loans quickly followed and served to establish close financial relations be- tween France and Russia. A further step forward was taken in 1889, when the Russian Government was allowed to purchase army rifles in Fiance. In the spring of 1890 a Russian grand duke visited Paris; in duly of 1891 a French fleet visited Kronsiadt and was roy- ally entertained. All these things paved the way for a protracted and delicate negotiation, the details of which were little known and much misunderstood until the publication in September, L918, of a French Yellow Book, which made public most of the correspondence and documents (Documents Diplomatiques L' Alliance Franco-Russe. In the remaining sections of this article the figures enclosed in brackets refer to the numbers of the documents in that collection."). 4. DRAFTING OF THE MILITARY CONVENTION. Conversations looking; toward and alliance began as early as August, L890 (1). Progress at first was slow, though in March, 1891. the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in a dispatch communicated to the French Government did speak of the "entente cordidle" be- tween France and Russia as "the best guarantee of peace" and as "necessary for the maintenance in Europe of a just balance of forces" (2). By July. 1892. the renewal of the Triple Alliance and the reported '" indirect accession of England" led the two govern- ments to consider whether "the new situation created by that event for France and Russia would not render desirable one step more in the way of entente" (3). In August an entente was reached (17 and annexe). A draft of a military convention was then drawn up, the form being adjusted only after much delicate negotiation. This was signed for more effective presentation to the Czar by the Russian Minister of War and bv General Boisdeifre for Fiance (71). It 199 was expressly understood that these signatures added nothing to the binding character of the entente already existing (71). 5. SIGNING OF THE MILITARY CONVENTION. The French Government, apparently owing some hesitation on the part of Freycinet, the Prime Minister, sought to secure a number of changes in the convention (75). This may have had something to do with the failure to get promptly the signature of the Czar or of his Minister of Foreign Affairs. For some reason which the pub- lished documents do not fully disclose, the Czar at this point delayed action and apparently became anxious to postpone the signing of a definite instrument of alliance. More than a year passed during which the French Government, despite much effort, failed in every attempt to secure the formal signing of the convention. Finally on December 27, 1893, the convention was duly signed. Even then the French Government had to be content with an instrument which bore neither the signature of the Czar or of his Minister of Foreign Af- fairs. The latter, however, transmitted to the French Govermnent a letter marked " Tres secrete" (91 and annexe). It declared that the text attested in August, 1892, " can be considered as having been defi- nitively adopted in its actual form." No treaty of alliance was ever actually signed. There was an alliance, but it rested on the entente reached in August, 1892, and the military convention finally accepted by Russia in December, 1893. 6. TERMS OF THE MHITARY CONVENTION. The military convention stipulated (71) : " If France it attacked by Germany or by Italy, supported by Ger- many, Russia will employ all its disposable forces to fight Germany. " If Russia is attacked by Germany or by Austria, supported by Germany, France will employ all its disposable forces to fight Ger- many." note. STATEMENTS MADE BY FRENCH MINISTERS IN THE FRENCH CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES THROWING LIGHT UPON THE TERMS OF THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE. 1. On June 10, 1895, M. Hanotaux, minister of foreign affairs, made the following reference to the alliance : Deux grandes puissances, portees l'une vers l'autre par l'attraction de leurs sentiments et de leurs int6rets respectifs, se sont donnS la main. Elles ont nou6 une entente qui les rapproche naturellement dans le travail incessant de la politique courante, et qui, toujours pacifique, leur garantit une securit6 reciproque. 200 2. On the same day, M. Ribot, the prime minister, made the following reference to the same subject: Oul, nous avons aiiie aux interets d'une grande nation les lntGrGts de la Franco; nons l'avons fait pour la sauvegarde de la paix et le malntien de l'equilibre de l'Europe. Et s'il n'y a rion de change" dans les aspirations, dans la direction sup&leure, dans le bat suprtale do notre politique, il y a pourtant quelque chose de change en Europe depuis 1S91. (Archives diploma tlques, second sorios. vol ~>4. pp. 357, 370.) 3. On the 14th of June, 1912, M. Poincare, the prime minister, made the following statement: Notre alliance avec la Russle, consaoree non seulement par des accords positifs, mais par l'epreuve du temps, trouve son application sur tous les points du globe au benefice des deux nations. Elle n'a de pointe dirigee contre aucune puissance, mala elle pennet aux deux gouvernements allies de combiner leur action diplomatique pour la sauvegarde de leurs interets respectifs et de collaborer an malntien d«> la paix. (Ibid., third sorios, vol. 122, pp. 240-247.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. The most important source of information is Documents Diplo- matiques. L'Alliance Franco-Russe (Paris, Xmprimerie NfiHionale, 1918). See above. Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe depuis le Con- gres de Berlin jusqu'a nos jours. (2 vols., Paris, Alcan, 1916.) This is perhaps the best general account of modern French diplomatic history. It contains good bibliographies of French books. Volume I. chapters 5. 6, and 7 cover the history of the Franco-Russian al- liance. Tardieu, A. La France et les alliances. (Paris. Alcan. 190-1-.) English translation published under the title, France and the Al- liances. (London. Macmillan, 1908.) Tardieu's connection with the French foreign oflice gave him unusual facilities for obtaining infor- mation but also imposed upon him a certain obligation to defend the French position. The English translation of his book is probably the best account of the Franco-Russian alliance in English. Daudet, E. Souvenirs et revelations, histoire diplomatique de Palliance franco-russe, 1873-1893. (3rd ed., Paris, Ollendorff, 1894.) Suggestive but not always absolutely trustworthy. Hansen. J. J. L'Alliance franco-russe. (Paris, 1897.) Hansen was employed to assist in the negotiations for the military conven- tion of 1892. He was a newspaper correspondent of Danish origin and was unusually well informed. Ibid., Ambassade a Paris du baron de Mohrenheim. (Paris, Flan- marion, 1907.) Baron de Mohrenheim was the Russian ambassador at Paris while the negotiations for the alliance were in progress. Cyon. filie de. Histoire de Pentente franco-russe, 1886-1894 ; doc- uments et souvenirs. (3rd ed., Paris, Charles, 1S95.) Cyon was a 201 French man-of -letters very much interested in Russia and very well informed about Russian affairs. His book is largely an account of his own efforts and those of Katkof, a Russian man-of-letters to pro- mote the Franco-Russian alliance. It should be used with caution. Freycinet, C. de S. de. Souvenirs, 1878-93. (Paris, Delagrave, 1913.) Throws a good deal of valuable light upon the negotiations of 1891 and 1892 by one of the French ministers most active in pro- moting the alliance. Gorloff, V. de. Origines et bases de 1'alliance franco-russe. (Paris, G russet, 1913.) Chiefly valuable for the history of Franco-Rus- sian relations before 1892. Coolidge, A. C. The Origins of the Triple Alliance. (New York, Scribner, 1917.) An excellent short account of Bismarck's diplo- macy from 1871 to 1882. Prints in an appendix, from official sources, the terms of the Austro-German alliance of 1879 and the terms, so far as they have been published, of the Triple Alliance. Seymour, C. The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1916.) Contains, in chapter 3, a useful short account of the alliance in English. Vote. — Contemporary accounts of the public aspects of the Franco- Russian rapprochement will be found in L'Annec politique for the years 1888 to L894. Much valuable information on the alliance will also be ^ound in the accounts of the debates on foreign affairs in (!)<• French Chamber of Deputies printed in Archives diplomatiqucs, a bi-monthly review of diplomacy and history published in Paris. 67. THE ZANZIBAR-HELIGOLAND TREATY OF 1890. 1. THE PERIOD OP' BRITISH INFLUENCE, 187 5-1884. Though a treaty made between Great Britain and France in 1862 recognized the "independence" of Zanzibar, British influence was supreme in Zanzibar during the period extending from 1875 to 1884. This was mainly due to the efforts of a single individual, John Kirk, British consul to Zanzibar for 20 years. His influence was so great that it was said he was more powerful than the Sultan. 2. GERMAN ACTIVITY IN EAST AFRICA, 1865-1885. As early as 1865 a German by the name of Kersten had advocated the annexation of East Africa by Germany. Years before that Ham- burg trade had found a footing at Zanzibar. Again, in 1875, Vice- Admiral Lurniss had urged that Zanzibar be taken under German protection. But it was not until 1884 that suspicion of German intentions was aroused at the British Foreign Office. On November 28 the British ambassador at Berlin obtained an assurance from Prince 1*02 Bismarck that "Germany was not endeavoring to obtain a protec- torate over Zanzibar.*' On January 14, 1885, Earl Granville sent a communication to Berlin, somewhat timidly drawing attention to the mission to Zanzibar of the German African explorer, Dr. Rohlifs, at the same time expressing a confident belief that Germany did not mean to annex Zanzibar. (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 77, pp. 1099-1100.) On February 25 Earl Granville was informed that Dr. Rohlffs, who had been appointed German consul-general at Zanzibar, was "commissioned to exert his influence" to secure free- dom of commerce in the Sultan's dominions. (Ibid., p. 1103.) The British Foreign Office professed itself satisfied with the vague as- surances from Berlin. At the same time Dr. Carl Peters was extremely active. (in 1884- 1885) in founding a Societ}- of German Colonization and the Ger- men East African Co. In 1884, disguised as mechanics, Dr. Peters and Dr. Juhlke made their way to Zanzibar, and were soon at Avork making "treaties" with native chiefs and acquiring enormous stretches of territory in East Africa which was claimed by the Sultan of Zanzibar. ♦ 3. ANGLO-GERMAN DIPLOMATIC AMENITIES. On May 25, 1885, Lord Granville assured Prince Bismarck that the British Government had no intention of offering any obstruc- tion to German projects, but welcomed Germany's cooperation in developing the resources of East Africa and in trying to suppress slavery. Consequently, the protests of the Sultan of Zanzibar were of no avail. When, in June. 1885, Lord Salisbury succeeded Earl Granville at the head of the British Foreign Office, he w T as quite as favorable as his predecessor to the adoption of a conciliatory policy in East Africa. 4. THE ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT OF 1886. On October 29 and November 1, 1886, the British and German Governments came to a definite agreement in respect to the terri- tory, which should be recognized as remaining under the sover- eignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar, to which agreement the Sultan gave his assent on December 1. According to this agreement, the domains of the Sultan were mainly restricted to a strip of main- land along the coast 10 miles in width and to the island of Zanzibar and Pemba, together with some smaller islands. The Sultan gave up all claims to Kilimanjaro, though the aspirations of the embryo British East African Co. were to some extent satisfied by the defini- tion of a boundary to the north of which Germany would not inter- 203 fere with their " sphere of influence." As a partial consolation for these losses of territory, Germany recognized the " independence " of the Sultan, as England and France had done in 1862. 5. THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1886-1890. In 1886 there was formed the British East African Association which obtained various rights and concessions, and displayed con- siderable activity in the course of which they experienced consider- able difficulty with Dr. Peters and his friends. German methods of dealing with the natives had also brought on an insurrection which was suppressed with some difficulty with the aid and cooperation of England. 0. THE ANGLO-GERMAX AGREEMENT OF 1890. There resulted from these various difficulties the famous Anglo- German agreement, signed on July 1, 1890. (See Appendix I, 38.) By this agreement the northern boundary of German East Africa was drawn from the mouth of the Umba to Victoria Nyanza in 1° S. latitude, keeping the snowy Kilimanjaro in the German sphere, but leaving Taveta to England. The line was then drawn straight across the lake and westward until it reached the boundary of the Congo Free State, only deflecting southward so far as to include Mount Mfumbiro within the British sphere (though its precise posi- tion remains doubtful). Witu, at the mouth of the Tana, was given to Fngland. On the south the German boundary line was drawn along the river Rovuma to Lake Nyassa. The islands of Zanzibar and Pemba were recognized as under British protection. The two powers engaged that " neither will interfere with any sphere of influence assigned to the other by Articles I to IV." (Art. VII.) They also agreed to " apply in all the portions of their respec- tive spheres, within the limits of the free zone, defined by the act of Berlin of 1885 (See article, The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885), the provisions relating to freedom of trade, the freedom of the naviga- tion of rivers, lakes, canals, and ports, etc., the prohibition of trade monopolies, transit dues, differential treatment as regards transport or coasting trade, etc." 7. CESSION OF HELIGOLAND TO GERMANY. Article XII provided for the cession of the Island of Heligoland to Germany — a transaction scoffed at by Bismarck (then in retire- ment), and commonly regarded as a barren rock of little value to either England or Germany. At that time there seemed to be little 204 realization either in England or Germany of the immense strategic importance of this " rock " in any future maritime conflict between these two great sea powers. (See article, The Zanzibar-Heligoland Treaty of 1890.) S. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BRITISH PROTECTORATE OVER ZANZIBAR. On November 4, 1890, the Sultanate proclaimed a British protec- torate over Zanzibar. By a Zanzibar order in council in 1906, the protectorate was limited to the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The most interesting account of these matters is that given by Keltic, J. S., The Partition of Africa (London, Stanford, 1893), chs. 15 and 18, passim. See also Harris, N. D., Intervention and Colonization in Africa (Boston, Houghton, 1914), ch. 5. For the texts of the Anglo-German agreements of 1886 and 1890, see Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty (London, 1891), Vol. Ill, Nos. 264 and 270, pp. 882 ff., and 899 ff., and Map of Europe by Treaty (London, 1891), Vol. IV, pp. 3286 ff. * For the correspondence of 1885-1886 between the British and Ger- man governments, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 77, pp. 1099-1139; for documents dealing- with the treaty of July 1, 1890, see Parliamentary Papers. Africa, Xos. 5 and 6 (1890). 68. THE DREYFUS AFFAIR. 1. INTRODUCTION. The Dreyfus affair, despite its close connection with the relations between France and Germany, entered immediately and directly into diplomatic history only in small measure. Its chief immediate sig- nificance was for the internal rather than the foreign a Hairs of France, though indirectly and at a somewhat later date the foreign policy of the country was affected by the defeat of the anti- Dreyfusards. The heterogeneous coalition which bitterly opposed the attempts to reexamine the verdict passed upon Dreyfus by the first court-martial finally came to include practically all the elements in the country hostile to the Third Republic. In the sequel, triumph over so powerful a coalition of enemies added much to the solidity of the Third Republic. Soon after the close of the agitation the strength thus gained helped enable it to enter upon a more vigorous and independent foreign policy. 2. NEGOTIATIONS. It occasioned negotiations between France and Germany only in regard to charges made in French newspapers against the German ambassador, who was accused of having relations with 205 Dreyfus. In view of these charges the Kaiser in a personal message, sent through the chancellor and the German ambassador, informed the President of France that if there was proof that the German embassy was implicated in the affair the French Government should not hesitate to declare it. 3. PUBLIC STATEMENT. In consequence of this dispatch a statement for the newspapers was drafted by the French Government and submitted before pub- lication to the German Government. This statement, published in all the newspapers on January 9, 1895, did not specifically mention the German embassy but announced in the form of a reference to an earlier communication to the press that charges against foreign embassies in newspaper articles on espionage were devoid of foun- dation. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Reinach, Joseph. Histoire de l'affaire Dreyfus. (Paris, Librairie Charpentier et Fasquelle, 1901-1911.) 7 vols. Detailed and reliable, pro-Dreyfus. Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique depuis le congres de Berlin jusqu'a nos jours. (Paris, Alcan, 1916.) 2 vols. Most recent author- itative French history of European diplomacy since 1878. 69. RAILWAY CONCESSIONS IN TURKEY. 1. INTRODUCTION. The construction of railways in Turkey has been influenced by political and strategic objects of the powers and by the desire to secure Turkish markets, at least as much, if not more, than the economic value of each particular road. As the Turkish government was unsuccessful in its attempts to build and operate railroads almost all the track in Turkey was built and at the outset of the World War mostly operated by foreigners; the one exception was the Hedjaz pilgrim railway. Capitalists and engineers who built and managed the roads used material from their own countries and the principal employees of the roads, usually of the nations whose citizens control them. " involuntarily act as agents for the introduction " of their national goods. The use of railroads in the international competi- tion for the Turkish market was particularly marked in the German railroad development after 1888, a development strongly backed by the diplomats of the Empire and by its great banks. Political con- siderations of another sort led Russia to block railroad building in Armenia, which bordered on her territory, except with her consent. 206 We nun Leave out of consideration the railroads of European Tur key, as that territory is now almost entirely in the bands of other nations. Tho Bagdad Line is also to be omitted (See article, The Bagdad Railway, L908 L904), though the Later history centers around it. FIRST PERIOD, PO I 888, Railroad history may be divided into four periods, t ho division being marked b\ the years L888, L908, L908, In the Bret, the English were dominant. As early as L888 there was m serious attempt t* 1 work out routes to t ho Euphrates and the Persian Gulf, Leaving the seacoast either at Tripoli or at Haifa. The main object was the short route to India, Aftor the middle of the nineteenth century numerous plans were put forward to join the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf at Koweit : in L856, b concession with a six per rout guarantee on capita] invested, by the Turkish government, was obtained; but the financial returns were too doubtful, in view o\' the competition with Sues, to interest the necessary capital. The concession for t ho Smyrna and Aidin Railwav w:is given in L856 and was to expire in L985, The first section was opened in L866. The Turkish govern ment guaranteed six per cent on the cost o\' construction, but its paj ments foil in arrears; in ISSS. in a now convention, the arrears were cancelled, the guarantee abandoned for the future, and the conci sion extended to L9S5, when the government might exercise an option to purchase, but must pay, in addition to the purchase price, a large sum, as the agreed government debt to the company. The company, whoso line has boon extended up the Cayster and Afaender valle] . has since paid dividends to its stockholders without government aid. I\> the outbreak o( the war it remained in the hands o\' the British. The concession for the Smyrna-Cassaba Railroad was granted to English capitalists in L868 to expire in L891. In L872 it was ex tended to Aiashehr. At that time it made a Loan to the government and agreed to build and operate a Line to Soman for the government account. Another small road from Mersina to Adana. forty-two miles, was built in L888 by a Franco-English syndicate. In L888 the English interests won 1 bought out by tho French. The road had m> government aid and was not at first successful. Tho Turkish Government decided in L87] to take a hand in rail road construction and operation on its own account. In that year it began to build from Mudania to Brusa, but though the Line was only about twenty-six miles Loag, it was scarcely completed in L880 and was not opened for traffic, until in L891 it was conceded to a French company. Operation began the next year, Tho company had no government aid, At the same time the Turkish Government began a Line from llaidar Pasha, opposite Constantinople, to Esmidt, 07 fid i miles, which, though of ea - coil truction, took three to complete and Turkish operation wai bo onsucceM ful that the line lea -'I to British subjects In 1880. i ' OJ D PBBIOD, ! v,::. The econd period opens with 1888, marked by the beginning of kilometer guarantee , L <•.. a tipulated net revenue for each kilo- meter of road operated, the entrance of the Germans, and the lo . of ilj<- English po ition to the French and German . The Hai< Pasha I mi'Ji, line wa taken away from the English conce iona on payment of compensation in L888 by exercise of the right of de- nunciation and sold to ■■> German syndicate beaded by the Deutsche Bank, the greai German financial institution for S<;n- Bast enter prises. The Anatolian Railroad Co., formed to operate the J i ri*-. got a concession to extend to Angora, three hundred and two mil th a libera] kilometric guarantee, that is, a guarantee that the gross returni should be so much per kilometer. The guarantee was ared on the tithe (agricultural tax) of the proi no tra ei ed i, the road, [n addition, the road wa to re< ntere t oi ded during con truction, and, a /)'•■• and important feature, a. I J mining rights for twenty kilometers on either side of the railway. In 1893, the line was farther extended by two branches, one to An- gora, the other to Konia. J he company in accepting this com agreed eventually to extend the line from Angora to Bagdad; but it) fact, because of Russian opposition to the route through Armeu the Konia branch be< ame the next link in the Bagdad y. 1 he <■ lini « re rapidly pushed to completion, the money being n>] sale of stock and bond ba ed on the Turkish kilometric guaranl also secured on the local tithes.* This company had strong German diplomatic support, in contrast to the attitude of the British Gov- ernment which, en the Smyrna Ca I protection hi i, the danger of being shut off from its natural sphere of pene- tration by the exten ion to Konia, replied that it was glad to the extension of German railroad activity. The hi lebl of the Turkish Governmeni to the saba company and in ill success induced the compi o ell the road to the French investor . the Nagelmacker interest who go( a new concession from the Government on satii fying the claims of the old company against the Government. Turkey annuity of 92,400 poi ear for ninei ear the life of the concession, secured by «li f - Government's share of the re of the railway and the agricultural tax on the province of Aidin. The Government ha the right to repur< n 1974 1 eaimii made the basi for an is ne of bonds, and to provide the bulk of JOS the capital for the new construction authorized, oihor Issues of bonds were to be based also on a kilometrie guarantee. The com- pany fell into German hands and a junction was made with the Ana- tolian railroad. The most important road of Syria, the Societe Ottomans du Chemins de Fer de Damas, llama, et Prolonguements, was based on a concession to a native and on a similar one to a Turkish subject for a tramway south from Damascus. The line was without guar anty, as was the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, based on a concession to a native in L888 and completed four years later. An English concern began a pretentious line from Haifa to Damascus and the Hauran I L891), but ran out of money after 21 miles of rail had been laid out of Haifa. A new railroad policy was struck out by Turkey in 1900, when the Hejaz line was decreed. This was to be a pilgrim route, the money was Largely fco eome in contributions from the faithful throughout the world, the work was to be done by soldiers, and German engineers were permitted only in the non-sacred portion of the track. The lapsed road from Haifa and the French road south from Damascus were taken over and contact between Haifa and Damascus assured. 4. THIRD PERIOD, 1008-1908. The third period is dominated by the Bagdad road. The Mersina- Adana road was secured by Germans in 1906 by purchase of stock, though Anglo-French directors were still retained. (See article, The Bagdad Railway.) On the other hand, the English were given permission in the same year to extend the Aidin road and the French received a concession for one from Heraclea on the Black Sea. where they operated coal mines. 5. FOURTH PERIOD, 190S-1914. The entire railroad situation seemed passing into the hands of the Germans when, in 1908, the revolution broke out. At first many o( the Young Turks were strongly anti-German, few favored that country. The new T Government undertook an elaborate program of development, but the ministry of public works favored from the first the principle of balance of powers in railroads and an attempt was made to distribute favors impartially. Complaints were made in the Turkish Parliament against the high kilometrie guarantees given the Bagdad road, but German diplomacy was able to make friends with the Young Turks and the concession was not interfered with. Concerns of all sorts of character brought forward all sorts of plans. One, for example, an English scheme, 209 was that the road should go from Adrianople across the Bos- porus north of Constantinople, parallel but south of the Black Sea, and then to Persia and India. An American concern, the Ottoman-American Development Co. of New York, asked conces- sions which were variously given as Angora-Sivas-Harput-Van or Alcxandretta-Diarbekir-Van and Diarbekir-Suleimania on the Per- sian frontier. No kilometer guarantee was asked, but 4 per cent was to be given on the cost of construction and 1 per cent for amor- tization, based on the revenues (tithes) of the six Provinces through which it went. Also, the oil and mineral lands for 20 kilometers on each side of the track were to be given the company. The scheme was approved by the experts and accepted in principle by the minister of public wopkn. Special desire was felt by the Turkish Government that this should develop, as the United States was felt to be free from desire to secure political control, but for some reason the plan did not succeed. Sir Edward Pears says (Abdul Hamid, p. 158) that the failure of the plan was due to Ger- man opposition. In the period just before the war several important developments were put through or were in process of being organized. In South- west Arabia, the Yemen, the French secured a grant from Hodeideh to Sanaa, and began work. The English, represented by Willcocks, who had already begun the irrigation work in Babylonia, suggested roads from Port Said to Arish, Lydda, Nablus, Rayak, and from Haifa or Tripoli to Hit and Bagdad, but the French Damascus line secured the concession Tripoli-Horn s in 1910 and opened the branch the next year. The concession Rayak-Lydda was granted just before the war, but actual construction was completed by the Turks from the junction at Afuleh in the plain of Esdraelon with the Haifa line through Lydda to Beersheba after the war began. The Smyrna- Aidin road began extension to Egedir in 1908, and the next year opened the National Bank of Turkey to oppose the Deutsche Bank which had financed the Bagdad line and the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the French concern. Just before the war the French were given the concession Samsun-Sivas-Erzingan-Trebizond, in northeast Asiatic Turkey, for construction and exploitation, through the Regie Generale des Chemins de Fer Ottomans, against a loan of a half billion francs, as part of the consideration for France's consent to an increase of Turkish customs; the extension of the Soma line to the Dardanelles, and thence to the Anatolian road at Ismid; and from Maidos on the Gallipoli Peninsula to Mirathi on the Oriental Railways, the purpose of these last being purely strate- gic. In conclusion, we should mention the convention of Germany with Russia in 1911, giving her northeast Turkey as her sphere of 53700—18 14 210 influence Mid the railways built by the British in their advanoe on Syria and Palestine ami on Babylonia. ('.. OONCLT stON. The Turkish railways were a benefit to the population in spite of the burden of the tdlometric guarantees, which, especially for the Bagdad Railway, were very high, and an advantage to the Turkish Government in the resulting increase of revenue, particularly us a large part of the Turkish taxes were in the form of a percentage of the crop grown. Without railways to move surplus crops to market, and to move troops to quell disorder, no great economic progress >\:is possible. The kilometric guarantees had the effect of creating n sort of monopoly in the territory covered by the roads, since the govern- ment was interested in preventing competition which would lesson the income of a guaranteed road. This consideration, along with Ger- man diplomacy, is said to have had considerable influence on the attempts o( French and English capitalists to get a concession to par- allel the Bagdad road from Horns to Bagdad though without a guarantee. HlBI.lOC.i; .WHY. There is no good study and the material is unusually scattered. An introduction may be found in the Encyclopedia Hritannica, Tur- key, and in the Murray and Baedeker guide books. The books on the Bagdad road deal to a certain extent with these problems. Per- haps the best of these is that of E, Auble. Bagdad (Paris, M Editions et Libraire." 1917), whose map might well serve as map for this sketch. For the earlier building, cf. especially Chenut, Note stir Tctat actuel des Chemins de For de la Turquie d'Asie, in the Revue Generale des Chemins de Fer, 1892, 1. p. 216 tl*. ; the tiles contain much of interest. For the various projects, concessions, and financial statements, cf. the Railway Times of London, passim. American con- sular reports, especially since 1908, gi\e considerable detail as to railroad construction. Some facts as to the diplomatic conditions of railroad concessions are in the Archives Diplomatiques, but in general we may' say that the more technical publications neglect tho diplomatic side. These may be found, so far as they have general interest, in the periodicals which deal with political questions, or in the books on the eastern question as a whole. A good example of the latter is that of Rene Pinon, I/Europe et 1'Fmpire Ottoman (Paris, Perrin, 1013), with maps of railroad conditions. A good description of the railroads in Asiatic Turkey in L895 and their history to that date, with maps, is in Parliamentary Tapers, Turkey, No. 4 (1896), "Report on Railways in Asiatic Turkey," by Major E. F. Law. A good account, particularly of the lledja/. rail- 213 road, o tained in Sir' Edward Peai ' Abdul Hamid, pp. l ( ', : z L64 (London. Con table, 1917). See also ftfuratet, Chemin de fer rjr- Bagdad (Aurillac, [mprimerie Moderne, L914); The Hedjaz raili in Petermann's Mitteilungen, roL 54 (1908), Erganzung . Heft L61. 'The Near En a mo I aluable periodical for information on Turkish Railwa 70. THE GRECO-TURKISH WAR, 1897. ). 0BI0I9 01 THl •■ f. Thi war is only an incident in the long struggle of the Gr< against 'J arkey for Panhellenism, After the W-u of Lil mly a small pari of the Greek people deluded in the i boun- daries laid down for Greece by the power . In 1807 volt, broke out in Crete, but because Turkey controlled the sea if able to crush the insurrection. At the Congree of Berlin, 1878, upon rhe insistence of France, steps were taken which ultimately brought it about that those portions of Thessaly and Epiru to be in- habited exclusively by ( >y<- are added to Greece, article, The Greco-Turkish Frontier Question, L878 1 ■-: The pro ions of this arrangement had not, been fully carried out by Tui 1897. The three sources of friction at this time were Macedoi . I md Crete. In the latter a Mohammedan pa ha had roused the Christian popu to insurrection, in The M border warfare was chronic. The ma capita] of Crete, con ed the Greeks, and G ■ ■ Col. W. o landed in Crete in defiance of the earning by th< 'Coi of po 3ee article, 'I he Cretan ' The Greek Government I of aiding th< but in seems that it, used its influence for pa ion. By February 15, L897, < ret< in the hands of the Greek troo n mo e f'r liberation ntirely I. At the rebellion was taken in hand by the \><>- < ho hud assembled a fl< in the harbor of Canea. This allied fl< '.' I a block- ade of Crete so trial ipplies from Athens might reach ( ol. 2. MILITARY OPEBATIO Public opinion in Greece and Turkey won reached the war heat. ] roops were massed on the Thessalian and Macedonian front ... - . On the 9th of April armed Greek troop the frontier and on April IT Turkey announced a state of war. In sp the enthusi- asm exhibited by the Greek* they were unable to withstand the Turk . After a month of almo I continuous defeats th< ed the powers to intervene l\ should be .said that the Greek fleet took little part in the war. Premier Delyannfa of Greece was accused of .1 1 .> not pushing the war with vigor Mid was forced to resign. The Greeks were disappointed in the supply of second hand rifles from Prance and ammunition bought in Austria was refused at the last moment by the Government Russia at this time warned Turkey that Bulgaria would mobiliie if t ho Turks carried t lio war further and an armistice was concluded May L9, ;:. THE \ r\ (HP M LOB, The ambassadors of the pov ers at Constantinople took up the w ork of making i treaty This \v as promulgated by the powers at Con- stantinople, December J. Turkey was given military preference along a rectified boundary line in Thessalv and Epirus, Greece was to pay an indemnity of 64,000,000 and submit its finances to the con trol oi a commission. Otherwise the status quo auto bellum was forced on the belligerents, nuuaouu why. The most important documents are in the British Parliamentary Papers, Turkej No. n (1897) and No. - (1898), ami in 'Mai-tons. Noureau Recueil Genera] des Traites, second series, vol. 28, pp. 680 -788. Annual Register for L896, pp. 296 299; L897, pp. 807 818, [sambert, G. Le conflit greco-turc, Amulos des sciences politiques, vol. L8, pp. L49 L78 (Mar., L898), Greece and the Powers, Spectator, vol. 78, 224 (Fob. 18, L897) ; vol, 79, 860 (Sept is. 1897), Motive oi [ntervention in Crete, The Nation (Nev Fork), vol. 64, 200 (March is. L897). Case against Greece, Fortnightly, vol. 07. 77-j; National Review, vol. 29, 525. Forum, vol. 28, 518 (July, 1897). Dilke, Charles W., and Botassi, D, N. "The Uprising; o( (uveee," in North American Review, vol. 164,458 161 (April, 1897). Williams, Charles. The War in Thessaly, in Fortnightly Review, vol. 61 (N. SA. 959 (June, L897). Norman, Henry. The Wreck of Greece (Scrihner's, October, 1897), vol, 22, 899, Richardson, R, B., in the Independent, vol. 19, 180, 500, 688. 71. THE CRETAN QUESTION, L868-1897, l. INTRODUCTION, There were in the Cretan question four important factors, all cos stantly interacting: (1) The racial and religious situation in Crete. (2) Turkish misgovernment there, as elsewhere, 213 (3) Cretan aspiration for union jrith Gree< (4) 'I he attitude of the European po The population of Crete was preponderantly Greek and Christian, wit.lj a Moslem minoritj large oi G origin and speaking Greek. 2. J'f.C.J. J.l.iO 01 From L866 to L868 Crete cc ttant insurrection I e of ], 2. •; above, and demanded union jrith Greece. Mos( of the p< re m';Jjn'-'J to press the Porte to yield to Cretan <\<-ifr,n, Appendix I. 14), 'J nrkey promised crupulou . application of the Organic Law of 18< Although at the Congret of Berlin Cretan annexation, as mak for European peaa nted by M. Delyannis, the - lit article 23 of the 'J of Berlin, an undertaking by Turkey to apply the Organic La to < suitable modifier Appendix I, 17.; The Cretans in despair requested that the be made a protectorate of Great Britain (Marriott, p. 338), ill supporting Turkey, refused. The Englij ml, ho induced Turkey to modify the Organic I- o f J the changi embodied in the Pact of Elalepa, October 12, L878 (Documents Diplomatique Affaires d'Orient. Affaire de Crete. Juin, 1894 I- ' "/.;. and later in the Firman of November, 1878 (B I For eigi Pa] . vol. 71, p. 759, et seq.). These coj brought momentary quiet. 4. REVOI/1 Of ! 89. The Bulgarian Bevolutioi o.' ' : cle, that title), arousing the resentment of Greece, a of other Balkan State ( mob- •J14 tgainst [\irkey, Crete took the opport unity to proclaim union with G ri\o powers blockaded Greece to prevent attack on Turkey See article, Che Blockade of Greece, l88tM England took the Lead, seeking 10 maintain Balkan and European peace, Rus ■\\;is interested in peace and feared complications with England. Prance, naturally inclined toward Greece, did not take a decided stand. Greece yielded for the time being, but tins situation culmi nated in tl\e Cretan revolt oi 1888 i <<0 . when Greece, -till torn be tween her own desires, Cretan demands, and the powers, demanded from the powers warships or other help in maintaining order and ob g reform. Failing that, Greece declared for definite anion. The powers refused to disturb the peace and warned Greece against intervention at her own risk. In A.ugust, ISS9, Turkey declared t ho state of siege in Crete. England urged reform. The outcome was that on November 22, 18S9, a Firman (Hertslet, p. 3281 i prac t io:ril\ revoking the Halepa was issued, Greece, alarmed by tho powers, held back. European policy shifted somewhat during these years, England's increasing security in Egypt and Suei allowed greater insistence upon Cretan reforms, and loss hostility toward Greece (Driault, p, 268), although she still wished maintenance of peace, Austria, France, Germany, and Russia were loss sealous for reform. Germany, in creasingly influential at Constantinople, desired tho integrity o( Turkey for her own ends; Austria and Russia desired ii because of mutual suspicion (Andrews, 11. p. 840 84q.)\ while Russia, France, and Germany opposed England on colonial and commercial grounds. All. however, finally agreed on tho need for peace, and proceeded against Greece accordingly. In 1894 tho Cretan assembly demanded a Christian Vali, Tho powers uphold tho demand, and Caratheodory was sent, hut recalled in L895\ ,->. CRETE ano nil' GRECO TI RKISH W vi; OF is;>:. In is;>t> civil war again broke out in Crete, excited by tho National Society oi Greece (Marriott, p. 386). On pressure from tho powers tho Sultan promised reform. Again there was delay, and in Febru- ary, 1897, Cretan Christians proclaimed union with Greece, (irook public opinion forced tho Government to prepare for intervention. The power- were alarmed. English public opinion favored tho Cretans, hut the Government decided \'ov the st<■!>■ . and ConHtatttinopl't f Parliament ;h y Pap<-.n-;. Turkey, No. -1 (1807), p. L), announced thd Crete could not ander existing circumstance! be annexed to f - but that, bi of Turkeys delay in effecting reforms, Crete should enjoj autonomy under the suzerainty of the Sultan. Greea ummoned to with- draw her army and fleet; 'J urkey to concentrate i.roop-, in fortn-. ■/■.■■. in preparation for withdrawal* These terms shoti a c om prom between England and other powcj .. fcp \/> ward solution. Greece refused to withdraw her troops till a Cretan plebiscite be taken; \\\f, insurgents refused to lay down their arms; therefore the admirals declared that a blockade of Crete would begin March 21. Troub continuing, the admirals bombarded Malaxa and occupied the prin cipa] Cretan ports. On March 2, 1807, the powers, in i note to the Greek Government, formally declared Crete henceforth under European protection, with autonomy under fl<<- suzerainty of the Sultan guartmi<*-/.l. On-> oui<-. /'-'i at the dow. of it/, un iJ':o<-.:-.\ful war with 'lurk'-;,. Crete . thereby left in the hands of the powers already committed to the program of autonomy under Turkish suzerainty. (Ibid, pp. 2 '■>■) BJKMOOIfAI'IfY. OOCVMBfl AST MATKJUAI.. (British Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, Nos, 4 o. 8 (\K)1). Brit- ish and Foreign State Papers, yean J w ;o' 1908; Hertslet, Sii Ed ward C. B., Map of Europe by Treaty (London, Harrison, 1891), vol. 4: Holland, 'I. ft.. The European Concert in the ftaKtem Ques- tion (Oxford, Clarendon Pre . 1885). >.*. ;iy M>.7KKf>.r.. Cam bridge Modern History, Vol-.. XI and XII (New York. Mac* millan, 1906 L910); Marriott, J. A. P.. r I he Eastern Question, A Study in European Diplomacy (Oxford, Clarendon Iv-.v.. 1^17); Lavi e et Bambaud, Histoire Generate (Paris, Colin. 1899 & L901), vol.-. 11 & I2:: Debidour, A.. Histoire Diplomatique de I'Europe, 1814 1878 (Paris, Alcan, 1891), 2 vol-.; Andrews, C. ML, The Histori- cal Development of Modern Europe from the Co - of Vienna to the Present Time (New fork, Putnam, 1898); Rose, J. EL, The Development of the European Nations. 1870 10M CSV// York. Put nam. 1916, 5th ed,) 2 rol in one; Driault, Edouard, La question 216 d*Orient depuis see Origines jusqu'ii dos jours (Paris, Aican, L917, 7(h ed.) j Choublier, M., La question d'Orient depuis le Traits' de Berlin (Paris, L897); Eliot, Sir C. N. E, (Odysseus), Turkey Id Europe (London, Arnold, L908) ; Miller, Wm., The Ottoman Em pire, L901 L018 (1018); Edwards, 11. S., Sir \Y. White, Ajnbassador al Constantinople, 1886 L891 (1908); Berard, V. E., Lea Affaires de Crete (Paris, 2d ed., L800) ; Kerofilas, Dr. C, Eleutherioa Veni selos, English translation by B. Barstow. (London, Murray, L915.) 72. THE ARMENIAN QUESTION, 1878-1897. i. ntBATDDS OP SAN STEFANO IND BERLIN, L8T8. The Armenian question may be said i" have arisen a ft or the olose of the Russo Turkish War of L877 L878. By artiele L6 of the Treaty of San Stefano, Turkey had agreed to "carry into effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms made necessary by Local needs in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Kurds and Circassians." This provision was superseded by article 81 <>r the Treaty of Berlin, which stipulated in addition that the Sublime Porte should "give notice periodically of the measures taken t»> this end <<> the Powers, who will watch over their application." It should be noted par- ticularly that the obligation undertaken by Turkey :it Berlin was to the powers, whereas in the Treaty of San Stefano it had only been to Russia. Article 62 of the Treaty of Berlin declared: The Sublime Porte having expressed ti><> Intention t<> maintain iin> principle of religious liberty, and give It the widest scope, the contracting parties take ndte of tins spontaneous declaration, in no part of the Ottoman Bmpire shall difference of religion i>«< ttilogod against anj person as q ground Cor exclusion or Incapacity us regards < i>o Uis charge of civil and political rights, admission to the public employments, func- tions, and honors, or the exercise of iii« v various professions and industries. \u persons siiaii in> admitted withoul distinction of religion i<> give evidence before the tribunals, Tho tret'. unn and outward exercise of all forms of worship are assured to all, and no hindrance siinii be offered either to the hierarchical organisation of tiu> various communloni or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs. Though the Armenians are not specifically mentioned in this article, they were entitled to claim the benefit o\' its provisions. By tlu> Cyprus Convention o\' June 4, L878,the Suhau also promised Great Britain to introduce necessary reforms " for tlu> protection of the Christians and other subjects \ the treaties on the part of the Turkish Government. Jn April. 1879, Lord Salisbury laid it down that "the Sultan bound not only to promulgate new and better law but to actually introduce reforms." In November, L870, the English Government went the length of ordering an English squadron to the Archipelago for the purpose of a naval demonstration. This brought nothing, nut fair promj I On June IK 1880, an i, L880. In ;i circular of January 12. L881, Earl Granville instructed the British ambassadors at Paris, Berlin, etc*, to call the attention of \\\c Governments to which they were accredited to the state of af fairs in Armenia* He aid : 'i ! in which the Porte i:. dealing v/it.d iti offer of r< uld ap pear to farniab food for remonetrauoe, and Her Majesty*! Government would be glad if the Qorernmenti would Inttruct their amba at Constantinople to Join with bli colleagnei in •■> repr< on to the :-:\i\>\)u><- Porte on the subject Austria declined to act in concert with the other j- , and Bis- ;n:uok <;:<:\>r<- opinion that it better for the powers to con- centrate on one question at a time. M When the Greek questioj er, it will be the moment to begin the Armenian question/' be said. France hid herself behind the refusal of Germany. Only [taly and !: •... - a conditional assent. D indeed, evident that the policy of enforcement by the powers was a failure. PERIOD 01 i.i,J:oij.\ • r-hii l i.i-i. :.. L908, King Alexander and Queen Draga of Serbia woe murdered in the royal palace at Belgrade by a band of officers of the Serbian Army. The assassination was followed by shocking indignities to the bodies of the dead and by the murder of two brothers of the Queen and of two ministers. The precise origin of the plot is not yet known. A charge lias been freely made and widely accepted that it was hatched under Russian auspices, but IT. W. Steed (Hapsburg Monarchy. 240-241) asserts that the Austro- Hungarian Government was fully informed of meetings held in Vienna by the conspirators. t •J. CAUSES FOR THE Ml I5DER. The murder was due to the long-continued misgovernment of the country under Kings Milan and Alexander ( 1 SOS -1003), to the fact that under the system of government maintained by King Alexander no political opponent of the King, his wife, or her brothers could count his life safe, and to the fear, apparently well founded, that almost any moment might witness further and more irremediable disgrace for the nation than had been its lot during recent unhappy years. "Political revolution was justified on every ground," says Temperley (History of Serbia, 280). It was one of Serbia's many misfortunes that revolution was accompanied by murder. King Peter who was tailed to the throne by the conspirators, though under no suspicion of personal complicity in the murder of his predecessor. was forced to begin his reign under exceptionally trying circum- stances. 3. ACTION OF OTHER STATES. The murder of the royal pair was promptly followed by the with- drawal from Belgrade of the diplomatic representatives of all the European States, except Russia and Austria-Hungary. The min- isters of these 1 two States were present at King Peter's entrance into his capital on June 2 4. Later on even these were \n ithdrawn in order to signify the displeasure of the powers at King Peter's failure to dismiss from service and punish *he murderers of his predecessor. But during the year 1904 the States which had withdrawn their representatives at Belgrade, except Greal Britain, resumed diplomatic relations with Serbia. At the coronation of King Peter on Sep- tember 21, there were representatives present of all the powers ex- cept Great Britain. Resumption of diplomatic relations between Serbia and Great Britain did not take place until August 17, 100G. 221 4. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REVOLUTION. The revolution of June, 1903, marked a turning point for Serbia and the change to which it led in that country reacted upon the whole course of events in the international relations of Europe. Under Milan and Alexander, Serbia had become practically a dependency of the Dual Monarchy. King Peter and the men who surrounded him soon began to show that they aspired to play a more independent role. Russian influence in large measure replaced Austrian influence. With emancipation from domination by its powerful neighbor and improved government in internal affairs Serin an national pride began to revive and the hopes of Serbian patriots began to dwell upon the glories of Serbia in the days before the Turkish Conquest. In that situation Serbia was in no mood to acquiesce without vigorous protest in any encroachment upon its rights or in any action which threatened to injure seriously its future development. It was this aspect of the matter which made the annexation of Bosnia-Herzo- govina by Austria-Hungary, October. 1908, so portentous an event. (See articles on the Annexation of Bosnia-Herzogovina and the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. Annual Register for 1903-1906. Tcmperley, H. W. W. History of Serbia. (London, Bell, 1917.) Denis, E. La grande Serbie. 120-126. (Paris, Delagrave, 1915.) Mijatovich, C. A Royal Tragedy. (London, Nash, L906.) Sieed, H. W. Hapsburg Monarchy, 240-240. (London, Con- stable, 1914.) 74. THE FRANCO-ITALIAN RAPPROCHEMENT, 1896-1902. 1. INTRODUCTION. The long period of rather strained relations between France and Italy (See article. Franco-Italian Antagonism, 1886-1896) came to a close in 1896, following the retirement of Crispi, to whose influence it had been due in large measure. The next six years witnessed the gradual reestablishment of cordial relations between the two countries. 2. STEPS IX RAPPROCHEMENT. The defeat of Italy at Adowa involving an early adjustment of its relations with Abyssinia removed one cause of strife, for in Italy France had been held largely responsible for the determined resist- ance of Menelek to Italian expansion at the expense of Abyssinia. Rudini, soon after succeeding Crispi, removed another obstacle to ooo friendship by adjusting Italy's grievances in connection with the French occupation of Tunis (September 28, 1896). Good commercial relations were reestablished by means of a new treaty of commerce, negotiated in L897 and ratified early in L899. The convention of 1902, whereby Italy agreed to give France a tree hand in Morocco and France recognized the special position of Italy in Tripoli, com- pleted the process. (See article. Italy and the Morocco Question.) From that date Italy, though still a member of the Triple Alliance, stood in many respects closer to France than to its associates of the Triple Alliance. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique depuis le congres de Berlin jusqu'a QOS jours. 2 vols. (Paris. Alcan. 1916.) 1. pp. 241 248. 279-281. Tardieu, A. France and the Alliances. (New York, Macmillan, 1908.) pp. 86-95. Tardieu. Questions di^lomatiques de 1'annee 15)04, pp. 10-22. (Paris. Alcan. 1905.) All are good concise account- of the essential facts. 75. RELATIONS BETWEEN ITALY AND ABYSSINIA, 1893-1900. 1. INTRODUCTION. Shortly after the French occupation of Tunis (See article, The Establishment of the French Protectorate over Tunis. 1881) Italy, who had hoped to obtain Tunis herself, sought consolation by en- deavoring to acquire a colony in the Red Sea region. Eer enterprise in that quarter soon brought her to a clash with Abyssinia. A con- flict was averted for a time by the Treaty of Ucciali, May 2, L889. (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. si. pp. 733-735.) This treaty, according to Italian interpretation, gave Italy a position of virtual domination over the affairs of Abyssinia and was well calcu- lated to facilitate the expansion of the Italian colony. Besides the opposition from Abyssinia Italy encountered two rivals in the Red Sea region. England and France. An adjustment of their respective spheres of influence was made by Italy and Eng- land in 1891 (Ibid., vol. 83, pp. 19-21). France, however, protested against this arrangement. Shortly afterwards the clearly foreshadowed conflict with Abys- sinia broke out. Kink Menelek repudiated the treaty of Ucciali, as- serting that article 17 in the Italian text, which secured for Italy CD ' control over the foreign relations of Abyssinia, read in an entirely different fashion from the corresponding article of the Arabic text. 223 2. ADOWA. The revolt of Bath Agos, who governed Oku hi Kusai on behalf of Italy, confirmed the Italian suspicions that the Abyssinian troops collected on the River Mareb were for use against Eritrea, and after an unanswered appeal to disband those forces, Baratieri attacked. Successes at Coatit and Senafe (Jan. 13-15, 1895) encouraged Crispi to demand the recognition of the Italian protectorate; and Tigre was formally annexed. But when Menelek gathered his hosts the Italians were defeated at Amba Alaghi, Makalle, and most de- cisively at Adowa (March 1, 1896). Crispi resigned. With some opposition, from the south of Italy especially, the Marchese di Rudini accepted a peace (October 26, 1890) which definitely annulled the Treaty of TJcciali. (Martens, Traites, second series, vol. 25, pp. 59-01.) " Italy recognizes the independence, absolute and without re- serve, of the Ethiopian Empire as a sovereign and independent. State." A provisional frontier was fixed at the Mareb, Belessa, and Mouna. Italy was to dispose of none of her land except to Abyssinia. A separate agreement freed the Italian prisoners, and Italy later paid £400,000 for the expense of their support. The following year a treaty of commerce gave the Italians the right to trade and travel in Abyssinia and the benefit of the most favored nation clause. Ru- dini wished in 1897 to restrict the colony to the town of Massowah, but the boundaries finally agreed upon in 1900 followed the line Tomat-Todluc-Mareb-Belessa-Mouna. 3. SINCE ISO 7. Since 1897 the relations between Italy and Abyssinia have been peaceful. Abyssinia has jealously preserved its independence, mak- ing use from time to time of the friendly influence of France, which has been a consistent friend of the African State. The British in- fluence has been somewhat distrusted as that of a powerful and per- haps dangerous neighbor and one that had been the <■< nf friend of Italy. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The treaties are in British and Foreign State Papers and in Mar- tens, Xouveau Recueil General de Traites. Wyldc, Augustus B. Modern Abyssinia. (London, Methuen, 1901.) A good chapter on history and much on the campaigns. . Despagnct, F. Le conflit entre lTtalie et l'Abyssinie. Revue gene- rale de droit international public (1897), IV, 5-61. Wallace, William Kay. Greater Italy. (New York, Scribner, 1917.) Pro-Italian — " defeat not so disastrous as it seemed in Italy." 224 Berkeley, George F. H. The Abyssinian question and its history. In Nineteenth Century, 1903, vol. 53, pp. 79-97. Bent, J. Theodore. The Italians in Africa. In Fortnightly Re- view, 1896, vol. 66, pp. 363-372. Rouard de Card, E. La France et les autres Nations Latines en Afrique. (Paris, Pedone, 1903.) 76. THE FASHODA AFFAIR, 1898-1899. 1. INTRODUCTION. During 40 years (1857-1897) French explorers and travelers trav- ersed the vast distances of the Sahara and the Soudan, claiming the country for France, and it has been noticed that their operations again displayed the nice symmetry and vastness of design which dis- tinguished the work of the French explorers on the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi. From the Mediterranean and equatorial seas they gradually converged to Lake Chad; and if they could go farther to the east and north they would reach the Nile and have most of North Africa. (Cambridge Modern History, XII, pp. 812-813. > Mean- while the English, having taken over the administration of Egypt, had after a period of preparation reconquered the lost Egyptian Soudan. In 1898 the French moving across the continent encoun- tered the British advancing from north to south. The result was the affair of Fashoda. 2. THE "GREAT DESIGN.'' This affair was the outcome of an ambitious project conceived by a group of French statesmen and colonial officials who belonged to or shared the ideas of the Colonial Party. The design was to send an expedition from the French possessions in the neighborhood of Lake Chad eastward to the upper waters of the Nile, where it was to be joined by another expedition coming westward from Obock. The authors of the project believed that by these expeditions a claim to the regions traversed could be established and thereby France would obtain control of an African territory stretching from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. Success would defeat the ambitions of Englishmen, such as Cecil Rhoades, who looked forward to the extension of the various British possessions in Eastern Africa until it would be pos- sible to build the much-discussed Cape-to-Cairo railroad entirely on British territory. Control over the upper waters of the Nile would enable France to force the reopening of the Egyptian question by bringing the matter before a congress of the powers and might com- pel the British to evacuate Egypt. 225 ::. THE FRENCH EXPEDITION TO FA8HODA. In September Sir Herbert Kitchener, Hi'- British commander, ar rived at Khartoum. There he learned thai a mall party of Euro peana were ai Fashoda, on the Nile, 300 miles to the south. Pro ceeding thither, he Pound that Major Marchand had taken po e ion of the place for France. Despite peremptory protest, Marchand declined to withdraw, referring the matter to his governmenl ai Paris. (Ibid., p. 148.) I. I. '.'»i I, '.'I [Ol Delicate negotiations followed, [n the House of Common on March 28, 1895, Sir Edward <>v\ d on. (See Appendix [,50.) Hanotaux had Long been an opponenl of England, hut in June, L898, Theophile Delca se had taken his place. From the start, (Sept. 8, ]HUH) ho had expressed desire to arrive at an tinder tanding with England. (See Appendix I. 58.) For a time both sides tood fast. The French took- the ground that the ri e of the Dervish power (See article, The Soudan Question, L881 L899) had 7). It provided that "Her Britannic Majesty's Government engages not to acquire either terri tory or political influence to the west o( the line oi' frontier defined in the following paragraph, and the Government of the French Re public engages not to acquire either territory or political influence to the east of the same line." Paragraph two drew the line. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Archives Diplomatiques, Recueil Mensuel International de Dip- lomatic et d'Histoire, second series (ed. Louis Renault, Paris). The negotiations and also the settlement are contained in volumes 68, pp. 52 72; •'>!'. pp. 261-269; Parliamentary Papers. Egypt, No. •_' (1898) and No. :\ (1898), contain the documents published by the British Government during the course of the controversy. British and Foreign State Papers. The volume for L898 L899 con tains the conventions by which the matter was settled. This collec- tion is compiled by the librafian and keeper of the papers of the Foreign Office. (British) Parliamentary Debates. The volumes for L898 and L899 (4th series) contain questions and answers in the Houses relative to the progress of the dispute. 227 Rose, •). II. The Development of the European Nations, 1870 L91 I. 11,2^0 226. An admirably unbia ed horl account. White, A. S. The Expansion of Egypt, U8 123. (London, Methuen, L890.) Cambridge Modern History. (Macmillan, X. V.. 1910.) An ex- cellent account of the French explorations is contained in vol. XII. Holt, L. !>.. and ( ihilton, A. \V. The History of Europe from 1 362 if. L914. (New Fork, Macmillan, L917.) pp.336 339. Seymour, Charles. The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870 L914. (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1916.) pp.119 L22. Lemonon, E. [/Europe e\ la politique britannique (1882 L909), ] 17 1..I. (Paris, Alcan, L910.) Blrard, A. Vers Fashoda. Questions Diplomatique* el Colo- niales, XI. 293 301. March 1. L901. Berard, V. Lee accords anglo-frangais. Revue de Paris, nth year, vol. I. pp. 210 213. Hanotaux, G. Fachoda. (Paris, Flammarion, L909.) Caix, B. de. Fashoda. (Pan-. L899.) Debidour. L'Histoire Diplomatique de I'Europe, !-7- 1916. II. 245 249. (Paris, Alcan, L916.) Blanchard, G. L'Affaire de Fashoda. Revue generate de droit international public 1 1899), VI, 380 t30. 77. THE ATTEMPTED FRANCO-GERMAN ACCORD OF 1898. I. ORIGIN '-I i HE PROJEC1 . In the years just preceding flit- Fashoda crisis tin- rivalry between England :m<- tween France and Germany. During these years also Germa turned more and more away from England and associated herself with France and Russia. (Pinon, France . (Fullerton, p. 54, note.) .:. PERMS. None of the official documents bearing upon the transaction have been published. The terms o[' the proposed entente are known only by inference. A number of qualified observers have supposed that France was to receive some satisfaction in Europe, but while this would have furnished the best foundation for a Franco-German accord, it i- doubtful and improbable. (Albin, pp. 83 84.) Fuller- ton and Several French writers declare thai the intended arrangement hail to do with drawing France and Germany closer together on the general basis of opposition to England, who was to be forced to yield to her opponents some of the colonial spoils of the world : and that in particular the accord concerned a division o( the Portuguese colonies in Africa, assistance for France in the valley of the Upper Nile, and for Germany in getting what she wanted in Central Africa, so as to block the ambitions of England there. (Fullerton, p. 53; Albin. pp. 83-84; Pinon, pp. 97-98.) 4. WHY THE TROJECT FAILED. The projected accord was abandoned when Ilanotaux, its leading French advocate, resigned. There was probably never any real chance for the success of the project. Entrance into such an under standing on the part o\' France would have involved tacit, if net actual, acceptance of the Treaty of Frankfort as a permanent >eitle- ment. Though the French were anxious to maintain peace in Europe and recognized that the long continued animosity between France and Germany was perhaps the chief obstacle to the development among the European nations of a state of mind favorable to peace, France could not agree to leave the Alsatians under the dominion of Germany. In that fact is to be found the fundamental reason for the failure of the projected accord. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Fullerton, W. M. Problems of Power: A Study of International Politics from Sadowa to Kirk-Kilisse. (Xew York. Scribuer. 1913.) Fullerton was Paris correspondent of the London Tim< . and a disciple of de Blow it/. Albin, P. Le "Coup" d'Agadir. (Paris, AJcan, L912.) Pinon, R. France et Allemagne, 1870-1913. (Pari ? Perrin, L913.) Apparently not hostile to such an under banding between Germany and France. Seymour, C. The Diplomatic Background of the War, L870 L9J \. (Vale University Press, New Haven, 1916. Pages 58 and 59 contain c good reference on this subject. Diplomaticu . The Foreign Policy of Greater Britain. Fort- nightly Review, vol. 77. pp. 385 387. March, 1902. 78. THE KRUGER TELEGRAM, 1896. I. THE JAMESON i:.\N>. 1 895 l 00. On December 29, L895 < to January -z. L896). an evenl occurred which greatly embittered the Boers again I the British and Ditlandi 'J lii was the Jameson Rail— a sudden invasion of the Tran vaa] by a few hundred troopers under Dr. Jameson, flic administrator of Rhodesia, with the evident purp supporting the Uitlanders, and probably of overthrowing the Kruger government. The raiders were i ptured and handed over to England. Cecil Rhod is universally regarded as the man really re ponsible for the movement, and I name was generally held in abhorrence by the Boers. ■i. THE Ki;i GEB TELEGRAM, 1800. On January 3, 1896, the morrpw of the failure of the Jami Raid, tin' German Emperor sent the following telegram to Pr< dent Kruger: i <• to you my sincere congratulations that, without appealing to the help of friendly powers, you and your people hav< l<'9-1900 (London, 1900, ed. by L. S. Amery, in 4 vols.), Vol. I, ch. 7; and Cana, F. R., South Africa from the Great Trek to the Union (London, Chapman & Hall, 1909), chs. 12-13. 23 L On the Kruger telegram, see especially Schmitt, B. K.. England and Germany, 1740 L91 1 (Princeton, University Press, 1910). pp. 145-146; and the Annual Register for L896 (London, Longmans, L897), pp. 2 3,273-275. 79. THE SEIZURE OF GERMAN SHIPS DURING THE BOER WAR. 1. INTRODUCTION. Near the end of the first year of the Boer War relations between Germany and England, already affected by manifest German sym- pathy with the Boers and apparent dislike of* England, were for a while made worse by an episode which aroused great indignation in Germany and occasioned brusque and peremptory diplomatic com- munications. 2. SEIZURES. In the winter of IS!)!), when the German steamer Bwndesrath was at Aden, suspicion was aroused that she was carrying contraband of war and German officers and men to the Boers. About the same time also report came that the German steamship Herzog had left the Suez Canal with a considerable number of Germans and Dutch apparently intending to enter service in the Transvaal. In December a British warship brought into Durban the Bundesrath, which had been seized off Delagoa Bay. The Herzog was also detained soon after. Mean- while the General, of the German East African Line, was stopped at Alien. All of these vessels were held and searched. 3. GERMAN PROTESTS AND ([.aims. Protest about the Bundesrath had been made at once, and on December 30 Count von Biilow sent for the British ambassador in Berlin, and declaring that the Hamburg-American Co. gave assur- ance that there was no contraband aboard, desired that the vessel be speedily released. Next day the German ambassador in London asserted that such wrongful seizure of mail steamers interfered with common interest. The German Government in pressing its demand that the vessels be given up, protested that no contraband was being carried,*but declared that in any event Great Britain had no right to seize and detain these ships, since they were proceeding from one neutral port to another, and that with respect to goods carried to Portuguese territory it "was for the Portuguese authorities to pre- vent them being sent to the Transvaal : " There can not be contraband of war in trade between neutral ports." 232 It was contended that such had been the view taken by the British authorities in 1863 in the ease of the Springbok against the judgment of an American prize court. January 7, von Billow asked for a reply to his complaint, desired prompt release, payment Tor losses sustained, and cessation of such practices in the future. The Mar- quis of Salisbury thought that the German communications were of a tone very unusual in diplomatic correspondence. I. RELEASE OF THE GERMAN VESSELS. Meanwhile search had been made as speedily as could be, though with unavoidable delay. Notwithstanding discoveries which seemed to confirm the British suspicions there was not what was deemed proof sufficient to warrant sending the vessels before a prize court. Accordingly, while Lord Salisbury replied that Germany had mis- stated the British position with respect to the Springbok, yet that the Herzog had been released after search, and the General because she was stopped so far from her destination, but that the Bwndesrath would be held for further action by a prize court. The tone of Ger- man communications was softened now: it was explained iliat the German contention was not pressed because there was hope for an amicable agreement. No more mail steamers were seized on sus- picion alone, and presently the Bwndesrath was released. 5. SETTLEMENT. In subsequent negotiations the British Government agreed in prin- ciple to compensation for the detention of the vessels; it expressed regret, but did not accept the German contention that contraband must be interpreted merely as articles or persons "suited for war." Nor did it accept the German contention that there was no contra- band from one neutral port to another, a question which Germany reserved the right to raise at some future time. The matter was finally disposed of in September, 1900, when the joint commission appointed to settle the compensation agreed upon the sum of £70,503 to be paid to German owners by the British Government, There is some account of the details in The Annual Register, 1900. The negotiations are in British and Foreign State Papers, (1900- 1901), vol. 94, pp. !>7: , >-1007, and in Staatsarchiv, vol. 01, pp. 208-221. 80. TREATY OF VEREENIGING, 1902. 1. ANNEXATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLICS. Great Britain proclaimed the annexation of the Orange Free State on May 28, 1900, and of the Transvaal on September 11, fol- lowing. After these annexations the British refused to negotiate 233 with the Boers on any basis except the surrender of their inde- pendence. 2. OFFER OF MEDIATION BY THE NETHERLANDS. In January, 1902, the Government of Netherlands informally ten- dered its mediation, but Great Britain refused to negotiate except directly with the South African Republics. Lord Kitchener was instructed, however, to transmit copies of the correspondence re- garding the Dutch offer to the Boer leaders. These latter replied, almost immediately with a request for a conference on peace pro- posals to which the British agreed. 3. CONFERENCE OF PRETORIA APRIL 12, 1902. At a conference held at Pretoria of Lords Milner and Kitchener representing the British Government with the Boer leaders, the Boers wished to negotiate on the basis of independence. They offered full political rights to the Outlanders, equality of English with Dutch in the schools, a customs union with' Great Britain, arbitra- tion of future disputes, and mutual amnesty. The British, however,, refused to "entertain any proposals which were based upon the former independence of the republics." The Boers then decided to refer the British ultimatum to a congress elected for the purpose. 4. CONGRESS OF VEREENIGING. Thirty representatives from each of the Boer Republics met at Vereeniging to consider the terms of peace. The congress appointed commissioners who offered to surrender the conduct of foreign affairs to Great Britain, but asked internal autonomy under British super- vision. They also agreed to surrender a part of their territory. These terms were refused. The Boers then asked the British to name their terms. 5. TREATY OF VEREENIGING. Milner and Kitchener formulated a set of articles based on the sur- render of Boer independence. These provided for the surrender of all arms, but the Boers were to be returned to their homes without loss of liberty or property. The Dutch language was to be permitted in courts and the schools. Civil government was to be reestablished and representative institutions set up as soon as possible. The Boers were not to pay any special tax on account of the war. Commissions were to be appointed to restore normal conditions and the British Govern- ment was to provide a fund of £3,000,000 for the relief of destitution due to the war. Notes and receipts issued by commanders in the field were to be accepted as evidence of "war losses." If additional sums 234 were needed the British Government agreed to make loans, the firsl two years to be without interest. Citizens of Natal and Cape Colony who fought Tor the Boers were to be dealt with according to the laws of their colonies, hut immunity was practically promised. Largely through the influence of Gen. Smuts, these terms were accepted, and the treaty was signed at Pretoria on May 31, L902. (See Appendix I. 66.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. Worsfold, William Basil. Lord Milner's Work in South Africa. (London, Murray, 190G.) pp. 551-583. Justifies the British policy. Revue Generale de Droit International Public (July, L902), vol. !), pp. 652-670. Anti-British. Franklin, W. H. La paix dans I'Afrique du Sud, in Questions dip- lomatiques et coloniales (15 June, L902), vol. L3, pp. 7:U 738. Argues for a league of Europe against Great Britain. Reede, H. The Treaty of Vereeniging. In the Westminster Re- view 7 for August, 1902, vol. 158, pp. 117-123. Summary of provisions. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 95, pp. 146-162, contain the most important documents bearing on the negotiations; pp. 1(H)- L62 for text of the treaty. 81. FRANCE AND MOROCCO, 1894-1904. 1. INTRODUCTION. At the close of the last century Morocco was the last independent State of Africa Minor. A Mohammedan country, it was suhmerged in feudal anarchy, which was accentuated by the absence of geo- graphical unity and the lighting propensities of the various tribes. Down to 1894 the Sultan Mulai Hassan and after his death the grand vizier Ben Ilanied managed to protect such Europeans as settled in the country for purposes of commerce. But the weakness of the Government and the addiction of Sultan Abdul Assiz to costly refinements of European life brought on bankruptcy, and a tribal revolt in L903 made European intervention inevitable. With an area of 219,000 square miles and a population of only 5,000,000 Morocco could receive a large number of European settlers; the climate was salubrious; the agricultural possibilities were boundless; and the soil was rich in iron and other ores much in demand by industrial nations. 2. WHY FRANCE BECAME INTERESTED IN MOROCCO. The power with the most vital interest in Morocco was France. Ever since Algeria became a French colony (1830-1847), the Moroc- can frontier had been a source of trouble. After the occupation of 235 the lasl Saharan oases in the nineties. Morocco came to be regarded as the necessary keystone of the French African Empire, and the colonial party in France openly expressed its desire for annexation or a protectorate. In the event of a war with Germany, the Republic might supply the deficiency in its own army from the fighting tribes- men; the position of France throughout Africa mighl be seriously compromised by Mohammedan agents in the pay of Germany operat- ing from an independent Morocco. .:. THE RIVALS OF FRANCE JX MOROCCO. Nevertheless the assertion of French control was no easy task. Spain, with four presidios on the Mediterranean littoral and a small settlement on the Atlantic coast, was not to be ignored. Germany was already in the field as a commerce-gatherer, a treaty of 1800 having secured for her the most-favored-nation treatment; German travelers published numerous monographs about the country, and the expansionists wished to see Morocco, or a part of it. become a Ger- man colony. Italy was seeking revenge for the French occupation of Tunis, and in 1895, it appears, the British, German, and Italian ministers considered recommending an Italian protectorate. But the most serious opponent of French designs was Great Britain. She enjoyed the largest share of the trade, and she desired to preserve the independence and integrity of the country; her agents arid trad- ers practically controlled the Shereefian Government; her policy required that Tangier, opposite Gibraltar, should not pass into European occupation. ). AGREEMENTS WITH ITALY AND SPAIN, 1902-1904. France undertook no aggressive campaign until the outbreak of the Boer War. M. Delcasse, the foreign minister, reached an agree- ment with Italy, L900 1902 (See article, Italy and the Morocco Question) by which the latter withdrew her pretensions in return for French recognition of her claims in Tripoli. Negotiations were opened with Spain, and in 1002 a secret treaty, negotiated but not ratified, provided for the partition of Morocco; the project was presently dropped by Spain, for fear of offending Great Britain, but the principle was established that Spain was an interested party. (See article, Spain and Morocco, 1894-1012.) M. Delcasse is said also to have negotiated with Germany, but this remains obscure. 5. ANGLO-FRENCB CONVENTION OF 1904. After the Boer War the British Government inaugurated a policy of liquidating various disputes which might fetter its freedom of action ; a policy the more desirable, if indeed not necessary, in view 236 of a distinct unfriendliness recently displayed by Germany. The most important matter was the question of Egypt, where the French had systematically hindered the British- since their occupation in 1882. In L903 M. Delcasse made overtures to Lord Lansdowne, the British foreign secretary, for a joint settlement of the Egyptian and Moroccan questions, for which the way had been prepared by the refusal of Lord Lansdowne, in June, 1901, to proclaim a British protectorate over Morocco, as desired by the Sultan. The result was the agreement of April 8, 1904. (See Appendix I, 68, and article The Formation of the Entente Cordiale.) The pub- lished articles bound the two Governments not to "alter the political status" of cither Egypt or Morocco, but in secret articles, not pub- lished till 1911, they considered "the event of either Government rinding themselves constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco," and they promised mutual assistance in seeking reforms in either country. (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101, pp. 1058-1060.) In other words. France had secured the diplomatic support of Great Britain in her Moroccan policy. As regards Spain, her ^interests on the Mediterranean littoral were recognized by the public declara- tion, and France was bidden to come to terms with her. By a public declaration of October :'>, 1904, France and Spain declared that they were " firmly attached to the integrity of the Moorish Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan," but secretly they con- cluded a second treaty which was communicated to the British Government and which bound Spain never "to alienate or cede, in any form, even temporarily, the whole or any part of the territories awarded to her" — a precaution, perhaps, against a German pur- chase or lease. (See article. Spain and Morocco, 1894-1912.) 6. FKENCH PACIFIC PENETRATION. France was now in a position to develop a more active policy, a policy foreshadowing, and, indeed, the compelling cause of the agreements with Great Britain and Spain. Since 1898 she had been complaining of Moroccan raids on the Algerian frontier and of the murder of several of her citizens. In May, 1901, a squadron appeared before Tangier, and on July 20 a treaty was signed in Paris, to be followed by others on April 20 and May 7, 1902. These instruments provided for a more satisfactory policing of the Alge- rian frontier and paved the way for penetration pacifique. A serious native rebellion hindered the execution of these agreements and so increased the financial difficulties of the Shereefian Gov- ernment that in June, 1904, a loan of 62,500,000 francs had to be raised in Paris. The apple seemed ready to fall into the French 237 lap, and so sure of victory was M. Delcasse that he delayed till Feb- ruary. 1905, to present a program of reforms which would have con- verted Morocco into a virtual French protectorate. Unfortunately for France, the battle of Mukden temporarily de- stroyed the military power of Russia. France's ally: the Kaiser dramatically intervened, thereby precipitating the crisis of 1905-0. (See article. The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1900.) 7. APPRAISEMENT OP FRENCH POLICY. The policy pursued by France, though fully justified at most points in the light of subsequent events, exposed her to two criticisms: (1) That she had publicly committed herself to maintaining the integrity and independence of the Moorish Empire, but was. in effect, secretly preparing its partition and absorption. (2) That she had come to terms with Great Britain, Italy, and Spain, but had ignored Ger- many, even to the point of failing to communicate officially to Germany the convention of April 18, 1904. The French Govern- ment doubtless felt that Germany's interests in Morocco were only secondary and commercial. But the course which was followed failed to take sufficient account of the fact that the French Army and Navy were both in ill condition for war. and that Germany, with her powerful military machine, might take advantage of any special opportunity to attempt to force upon France the acceptance of such demands as Germany chose to bring forward. Russia's loss of military power soon offered that opportunity. Tt was out of this state of affairs that the crisis of 1905-1900 arose. (See article, The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1900.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. For bibliography see article. The Moroccan Crisis of 1911. 82. THE ANNEXATION OF THE CONGO FREE STATE BY BELGIUM, 1889-1908. 1. THE BEQUEST BY KING LEOPOLD OF THE CONGO FREE STATE TO BELGIUM, 1889. The international status of the Congo Free State was from the first an anomalous one. (See article, The Formation of the Congo Free State. 1S70-1885.) The first step toward annexation by Belgium may be said to have been taken on August 2. 1889. when King Leopold bequeathed to Belgium "all our sovereign rights over the Independ- ent State of the Congo, as they are recognized by the declarations, conventions, and treaties concluded since 1884 between the foreign powers on the one side, the International Association of the Congo 238 and the Independent State of the Congo on the other, as well as all the benefits, rights, and advantages attached to that sovereignty." In July, 1890, Belgium acquired, by the terms of a loan to the Congo Free State, the option of annexing the State on the expiration of ten years and six months. 2. PROJECTS OF ANNEXATION, 1895-1908. On January 9, 1895 the Belgian Government made a treaty with the King to take over the Free State with all its claims, possessions,, and obligations, as from the 1st of January of that year. A bill em- bodying these provisions was introduced into the Belgian Parlia- ment, but it was finally withdrawn after long delays and much oppo- sition. In 1901, another bill was introduced in favor of annexation, but upon this occasion it encountered the opposition of the Gov- ernment. :;. CHARGES ov MALADMINISTRATION. The discussions which took place on this subject of annexation were greatly embittered by the accusations of maladministration brought against the administration of the Congo State. After 1891, when the great wealth of the Congo region in rubber and ivory had become apparent, the character of the Congo administration appears to have undergone a complete change, About 1895 the Government of the Congo Free State became a trading monopoly practicing or permitting the most atrocious tj'ranny and merciless exploitation of the natives. The regulations laid down at the Berlin Conference (See article. The Berlin Conference of 1884-85) were completely • lisregarded. 4. LANSDOWNE'S DISPATCH OF AUG. .;. 1903. The agitation against these abuses w T as particularly strong in Great Britain. On August 8, 1903, the Marquis of Lansdowne, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, issued a circular dis- patch to the British representatives at the courts of the powers which had signed the Berlin act of 188-1—85, calling attention to the al- leged cases of ill-treatment of natives and to the existence of trade monopolies in the Congo Free State, stating in conclusion that the British Government would " be glad to receive any suggestions which the Governments of the Signatory Powers might be disposed to make in reference to this important question, which might perhaps constitute, wholly or in part, the subject of a reference to the Tribunal at The Hague." (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 90, pp. 530-510.) Save from Turkey, this dispatch failed to evoke any response, but public agitation on the subject continued and even increased in vio- 239 lence, particularly after the publication in February, 1904, of a re- port by Mr. Roger Casement, then British consul at Boma. 5. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, 19 04-5. » In July, 1904, King Leopold appointed a commission of inquiry to investigate conditions in the Congo and, if necessary, recommend reforms. The report of the commission was published in November, 1905. The existence of great abuses in the upper Congo was recog- nized by the report of the commission which also recommended cer- tain mild reforms. The principle of forced labor and the concessions system were, however, upheld. Certain reforms, adopted in 1906, proved illusory. 6. TREATY OF CESSION AND FINAL ANNEXATION. 1908. The agitation for annexation was now renewed. On November 28, 1907. a treaty of cession between Belgium and the Congo Free State was signed which stipulated for the maintenance of the rights, privileges, and profits of the Crown in the Congo. It was learned that these provisions stood no chance of acceptance by the Belgian Parliament or the British Government. Consequently negotiations between the Belgian King and the Belgian Premier were resumed. Great Britain let it be known that she could not approve any semi- transfer which left the controlling power in the Congo " in the hands of the present authorities." On March 5, 1908, an additional act was signed omitting the objectionable clauses in the treaty of cession. Finally in September, 1908, after a long debate which made it clear that the Belgian people did not desire colonial possessions but saw no other means of escape from an intolerable situation, the treaty of cession (as amended), the additional act, and a colonial law were accepted by the Belgian Parliament. The Congo Free State ceased to exist on November 14, 1908, its rights and obligations of sov- ereignty having passed over to Belgium. BIBLIOGRAPHY. One of the best and most reliable books on the Congo abuses is that by Vermeersch, A., La question Congolaise (Bruxelles, 1906). See also Vandervelde, E., La Belgique et le Congo (Paris, Alcan, 1911) ; Doyle, A. C, The Crime of the Congo (New York, Doubleday, 1909) ; and Morel, E. D., The Congo Slave State (Liverpool, 1903). For a reply to the latter pamphlet, see Boulger, D. C, The Congo is Not a Slave State (London, 1903). On the Annexation of the Congo, see Brunet, R., L'annexation du Congo a la Belgique et le droit international (Bruxelles, 1911). 240 For a brief account, see Harris. X. D., Intervention and Coloniza- tion in Africa (Boston, Houghton, 1914), ch. 3. Delepech, J., and Marcoggi, A. Le transfert a la Belgique do l'Etat independent du Congo. Revue de droit international public (1911), XVIII, 105-163. Payen, E. Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, vol. 25, p. 409 If. For various official documents concerning the Congo, sec Supple- ment to American Journal of International Law for 1909. Vol. Ill, pp. 5-96. For diplomatic correspondence and much other documentary ma- terial, see British Parliamentary Papers, on Africa, published dur- ing the years ranging from 1903 to 1911. See also Senate Doc. No. 147 on "Affairs in the Kongo" (Washington. Govt. Printing Office, 1909). 83. CHINO-JAPANESE RIVALRY IN KOREA, 1876-1894. 1. THE RECOGNITION OF KOREAN INDEPENDENCE, 1876-1887. A new phase in the history of the Korean quest ion wgs begun with the recognition of Korean independence by Japan in 1876. In 1882 a treaty of friendship and commerce was concluded between Korea and the United States. This was followed by similar treaties with Germany and Great Britain in 1883, with Russia and Italy in 1884, with France in 1886-87, and with Austria-Hungary in 1892. These treaties in general provided for the opening to foreign trade of certain Korean ports and the grant to foreign consuls of extra- territorial jurisdiction. (See Appendix I, 21, 24, 25, 28. 32, 41.) 2. CHINO-JAPANESE INTERVENTION, 1882-18S5. This " open door " policy was violently opposed by the " exclusion- ist' : faction in Korea, which in 1882, incited an insurrection directed mainly against the Japanese at Seoul. It resulted in the inter- vention of China and Japan and the stationing of Chinese and Japa- nese troops in Korea. In December, 1884, as the result of another in- tervention, incited by the pro-Japanese or "progressive" faction, China and Japan suddenly found themselves on the brink of war. But war was averted at the last moment by the conclusion of the treaty of Tientsin negotiated by Count Ito and Li-Hun-Chang in 1885." .:. TREATY OF TIENTSIN, APRIL 18, 1885. Both China and Japan agreed to withdraw their troops from Korea. " In case of any disturbance of a grave nature occurring in Korea which might necessitate the respective countries or either of 241 them to send troops to Korea, it is hereby understood that they shall give, each to the other, previous notice in writing of their intention so to do, and that after the matter is settled they shall withdraw their troops and not further station them there." (Hertslet, China Treaties, I. 361-362.) 4. THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1SS5 AND 1894. The Chino- Japanese treaty of 1885 paved the way for the Chino- Japanese war of 1894-1895. Yuan-Shi-Kai, the Chinese resident at Seoul, became the main support of the Korean throne. The nine years which followed (1885-1894) were marked by internal disorder in Korea and by intrigues between the various pro-Chinese, Japanese, and Russian factions. 5. THIRD INSURRECTION OF 1894. In 1894, in consequence of a third insurrection, Japanese and Chinese troops once more faced each other in Korea. Japan, in- censed by the murder of her protege Kim-ok-Kim at Shanghai, was determined to solve the Korean question by means of certain reforms, as also by the suppression of the insurrection. China, on the other hand, opposed these reforms and, ignoring the Tientsin convention, reasserted her ancient rights of suzerainty. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The best documented account of these diplomatic events is that given by Key, F., Chronique, in Revue Generale de droit international public (Paris, 1905). vol. 12, pp. 300 ff. A briefer account also based on the documents may be found in Hershey, A. S., The International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (New York, Mac- millan, 1906), pp. 40 ff. See also Longford, G. H., The Story of Korea (New York, Scribner, 1911), ch. 15; and Hornbeck, S. T., Contemporary Politics in the Far East (New York, Appleton, 1916), ch. 11. For an English version of the text of the treaty of Tientsin, see Hertslet, China Treaties (London, 1908), I, No. 61, pp. 361 ff. For the various " peace and friendship " treaties with Korea concluded by Great Britain, the United States, etc., see Treaties and Conven- tions between Korea and Other Powers (Foreign Office, 1905). 84. THE TREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI, 1895. MAIN PROVISIONS. This treaty was negotiated at the close of the Chino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 by Count Ito on behalf of Japan and Li-Hung-Chang, representing China, and was signed on April 17, 1895. (See 53706—18 16 242 Appendix 1. II.) It provided, among other things, for the com- plete independence of Korea, the cession to Japan of the Liao-tung Peninsula (including Port Arthur), Formosa, and the Pescadores, as also (ho payment to Japan of an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels. At the instance of three of the great powers (Russia, Germany, •and France) Japan was not permitted to retain the Liao-tung Penin- sula; but was required within a few weeks to agree \^ the retrocession of the LiaO-tung Peninsula. (See article. The Retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. For the text of the treaty, see llertslet, China Treaties (London, L908,) 1. No. 62, pp. 362 If. For a good brief account of its provisions and the negotiations, see Asakawa, K.. The Russo-Japanese Conflict (Boston, Houghton, 1904), p. To. 85. RETROCESSION OF THE LIAO-TUNG PENINSULA BY JAPAN, NOVEMBER 8, 1895. 1. TREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI, 1895. « By the Treaty of Shimonoseki (See article, that title), Japan had, among other things, exacted from China the cession of the Liao-tung Peninsula (including Port Arthur), which placed in Japan's hands, so to speak, the key to Peking, Manchuria, and Korea. •J. DIPLOMATIC [NTERCHANGE OK VIEWS BETWEEN THE POWERS. Naturally, the peace negotiations at Shimonoseki had been watched with the keenest interest by the leading European powers. Particu- larly alert was Russia, who realized the importance of the cession of Port Arthur from the standpoint of her own aims and ambitions. There followed an interchange of views between the foreign offices of St. Petersburg, Berlin, Paris, and London which has never been published. But it is well known that France readily acceded to the Russian desire for a joint intervention, and that Germany changed her former policy and allied herself with Russia and France in this new undertaking. Great Britain, on the other hand, veered over from the side of China to that of Japan and declined to participate in the proposed intervention. 3. THE INTERVENTION OF RUSSIA, FRANCE, AM) GERMANY. On April 23, 1895, the representative's of Russia. France, and Ger- many at Tokio joined in a "friendly recommendation" to the Japa- nese Government declaring that the "contemplated possession of the Liao-tung Peninsula by Japan would not only constitute a con- stant menace to the capital of China, hut would also render the in- 243 dependence of Korea illusory, and ilms jeopardize the permanent peace of the Far East." Accordingly, " in a spirit of candid friend- ship for Japan," they advised the Japanese Government to "re- nounce the definite possession of the Liao-tung Peninsula." This " friendly advice" on the part of the three powers was rein- forced by an augmentation and concentration of their Far Eastern fleets, and by the preparation of the army contingents in the Amur region for quick mobilization on the part of Russia. I. JAPAN RECEDES THE LIAO-TUNG PENINSULA, MEAT, 1895, Consequently, the Japanese Government decided early in May 1895, in consideration of an additional indemnity of 30,000,000 taels from China, to relinquish the whole, of the Liao-tung Peninsula. On May 10, 1895, the Mikado issued an Imperial Rescript, declining that "out of regard for peace," he had decided to accept the "advice of the friendly powers," and had commanded his Government to "negotiate with the Chinese Government respecting all arrange- ments for the return of the particular districts." In accordance with this rescript, a Chino-Japanese convention for the retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula was signed at Peking on November 8, 1895. 5. IMPORTANCE OF THE RETROCESSION. The retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula by Japan to China marks a turning point in the history of Japan, more particularly in her relations with Russia. Japan became convinced that war with Russia was inevitable and that it would come at an early date. Though hardly a fundamental cause of the Russo-Japanese War, this belief probably hastened that day. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The best documented account of this matter is given by Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflict (Boston. Houghton, 1904), ch. 1. For ;i briefer account, see also Hershey, A. S.. The International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese \Y;ir (New York. Macmillan, 1900), pp. 6-9. For the text of the Treaty of Retrocession, see Hertslet, China Treaties (London, 1908), No. 63, pp. 370 ff. 86. THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY IN CHINA, 1895-1904. 1. INTRODUCTION. The name "open-door" has been popularly given to a policy proposed by Secretary John Hay in 1899 to the chanceries of the great powers suggesting an agreement to preserve equality of com- mercial opportunity among all nations trading with and in China. L'44 The lirsl important step taken by the United States toward formal diplomatic relations with China is the act of Congress approved March 3, 1843, to " establish the future commercial relations between the United States and China on terms of nation equal reciprocity.'" This resulted in the embassy of Caleb Cushing to China and the conclusion there of a convention of peace July 3, 1844. In a covering letter transmitting his treaty Cushing recognized the obligations of all nations to Great Britain for opening China, and declared it the purpose of the United States to extend the accruing benefit to "all ( Jhristiandom." (Senate Ex. Doc. 07. 28th Cong.. 2d Sess.). To this principle of equal participation of advantages in China was {\\w America's action, in association with England and France, at the time of the Arrow War of 1857-1800. when a plenipotentiary was sent to negotiate a treaty, not in alliance but in harmony with the aims of the two European powers involved in that conflict. This treaty (of Tientsin. 1858) added nothing directly to the evolution of the open-door idea, but some extension of it was implied in a dispatch of our minister, Anson Burlingame. to Seward. June 2, 1802. urging that if the treaty powers could agree 111110112; themselves on the neu- trality of China and together secure order in the treaty ports, the interests of humanity would be subserved. He had. therefore, in agreement with the other foreign ministers at Peking, instructed the consul general at Shanghai as to the "extent of the rights and duties of American citizens under the treaty." The purpose of these in- structions was to "substitute fair diplomatic action in China for force." The Government of the United States has adhered con- sistently to these purposes — reciprocity, integrity of Chinese terri- tory, and cooperation with other treaty powers — ever since that time. 2. THE HAT DOCTRINE, 1899. Hay's denunciation of this policy was prompted by the acquisition of several strategic harbors in China by European powers soon after the defeat of China by Japan in 1805 (See articles, The Leasing of Kiaou-Chau, The Leasing of Port Arthur by "Russia. The Leasing of Wei-Hai-Wei by Great Britain), and by the delimitation of the Empire into "spheres of influence" for its exploitation and con- trol by their nationals and governments. II is declaration that the United States would insist that such ports and "spheres" must be open to the world on equal terms implied an objection on the part of the American Government to the appropriation by Euro- pean powers of Chinese territory at will. He asks (in his dispatch of September 0, 1899, to the American Embassy at Borlin) assur- ances from Germany and other powers that (1) each power within 245 its respective sphere of influence will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest it may have in China; (2) that the Chinese treaty tariff shall be applied within such spheres, unless they be free ports, and be collected by the Chinese Government; and (3) that no railway charges or dues on vessels higher than those exacted from its own nationals shall be levied in the sphere of any foreign power. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899, p. 129.) The so-called Burlingame treaty of 1808 with the United Stales especially guaranteed to China its rights respecting concessions and grants of land to foreigners, while it discouraged unnecessary dic- tation or interference in its internal affairs. As Hay was Lincoln's private secretary and personally acquainted with Seward's policy in Asia the inference is suggested that his proposals in this circular note of 1899 were based upon the declarations of our treaties and upon Burlingame's doctrine of " cooperation and fair play." These prin- ciples were accepted by France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899. pp. 128-143.) The formal acknowledgment by Germany was in von Bulow's memorandum of February 19, 1900, to Mr. White: The Imperial Government has from the beginning not only asserted but also practically carried out to the fullest extent in its Chinese possessions absolute equality of treatment of all nations with regard to trade, navigation, and commerce. If therefore the other powers interested in the industrial development of the Chinese Empire are willing to recognize the same prin- ciples, this can only be desired by the Imperial Government, which in this case upon being requested will gladly be willing to participate with the United States of America and the other powers in an agreement made upon these lines,, by which the same rights are reciprocally secured. (Foreign Relations of the United States. 1899, p. 131.) Hay's circular of September, 1899, was due largely to economic motives — the desire to preserve a potential market. By asking each power separately, each was compelled to answer by itself, and thus assent was secured to a useful principle. No concrete agreement was concluded, but Hay notified the powers that he took their adher- ence to the principle proposed to be " final and definitive." (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899, pp. 142-143.) He thus accom- plished all that diplomacy could do by itself to prevent the " spheres " in China from passing from one power to another and perhaps prevented China from being entirely absorbed through complete economic domination. 3. HAY'S CIRCULAR NOTE OF 1900. A crisis of the first magnitude confronted the sponsor for this doctrine when the Boxer uprising threatened the lives and property of all foreigners in China in the summer of 1900. (See article, The 246 Boxer Uprising.) While the legations in Pekin More still be- sieged a circular sent by Hay. July 3, 1900, to American rep- resentatives to the great powers announced the course of the United States after the restoration of order. It regarded the situation in Peking as one of virtual anarchy, and declared the purpose of the United States to act with other powers in restor- ing communication, protecting life and property, and prevent- ing the spread <>f disorder or a recurrence of such a disaster. Its policy in the premises was to seek such a solution as would bring peace, preserve China's territorial and administrative entity, and "safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trado with all parts of the Chinese Empire." (Foreign Relations of the United States. 1900, pp. 312 313.) When, during the military operations of 1900, the Europeans seized tracts in and about the city of Tientsin the American legation served notice upon the others that it might reoccupy a small tract which had formed the American concession there in 1869. The military neces- sity for this step having disappeared with the end of hostilities, the United States had no further desire to occupy the ground, especially when advised by the Viceroy Li that certain occupants of the land might involve Americans and Europeans in complications and litiga- tion. The project was relinquished in November, 1901, and the American Government remained — as it still does — without any ter- ritorial possession in China. (Foreign "Relations of the United States. 1901. 39.) 4. Tin: ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT OF 1900. The Anglo-German agreement of October 10. 1900, upholding the open-door principle, disclaimed territorial designs in China »on the part of the signatories, and indorsed the balance of power existing among Europeans located in China by ''reserving to themselves the right to come to a preliminary understanding " in case another power should make use of the existing complications to obtain territorial advantage. Japan agreed to the declaration October 29, as did the United States a little later, while expressing itself unconcerned with the threat implied in the concluding sentence. Kussia declined to recognize any new feature in the agreement. (British Parliamentary Papers, Treaty Series, No. 1, 1900.) .-,. RUSSIA AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. Russia's acts in the Amur region and Manchuria, refusing to with- draw her troops from the latter in accord with repeated promises made to Japan between 1901 and 1904 (See articles on Russo-Japanese Rivalry in Korea, 1895-1904, and The Russian Advance into Man- 247 churia, 1895-1903), precipitated the conflict of 1904-1905, known as the Russo-Japanese War. It was, in fact, a refusal on her part to uphold the open-door principle in practice, though frequently avowed upon her own initiative in her correspondence with other States. The United States had no part in the war. On January 13, 1905, Mr. Hay wrote to the representatives of the great powers dis- claiming any thoughts of reserving territorial rights or control in tin' ( Ihinese Empire, and inviting an expression of their views. (For- eign Relations of the United States. 1905, p. 1.) 6. MEANING OF THE OPEN DOOR. The Open % Door is a declaration of policy, not an assertion of international law. It calls a halt to further extensions of own- ership or control, however disguised. It seeks to arrest a proci that has continued for fhree centuries almost unchallenged in various parts of Africa and Asia. The integrity of China is a corol- lary to which the United States i- committed not from sentiment only but to preserve for present and future use the access to China as a market. "The Open Door, which in principle has received the adhesion of the western community of nations, does not stand isolated, as an unre- lated doctrine, but is a positive and formulated attitude affecting, however unconsciously of its range, the general policy of contact between the East and the West." (A. T. Mahan, The Interest of America in International Conditions, pp. 184-185.) NOTES OK AGREEMENTS AS TO CHINA'S INTEGRITY, L899-1905. 1 s!)9, September 6: Hay's circular note asking six powers to make a formal declaration approving an open-door policy in the terri- tories controlled by them in China. 1900, March 20: Hay's announcement that, as all the powers had accepted the declaration suggested, he would consider the assent given as " final and definitive." 1900, July 3: Hay's circular telegram to eleven powers of American desire to solve the complication in China so as to preserve her entity and safeguard principle of impartial and equal trade. 1900. July 7: Lord Salisbury "emphatically concurs" with the above telegram and tells Commons (August 2) that the British Government " are opposed to any partition of China." 1900, October 16: British-German Agreement to '"direct their policy toward maintaining undiminished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire.** 1900, October 29: Hay announces that eleven countries had signi- fied approval of principles stated in his telegram of July 3. 248 L902, January 30: Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty preamble de- claring the two Governments to be actuated by a desire to preserve peace and status quo and "specially interested in maintaining terri- torial integrity of China and Korea and securing equal opportunities in those countries." 1905, January 13: Hay advises seven European powers of his de- sire to "strengthen and perpetuate the broad policy of maintaining the integrity of China and the open door in the Orient." Five powers at once declare their adhesion to the policy. 1905, August 12: Anglo- Japanese alliance, first renewal, stipulates: insuring the independence and integrity of China and principle of equal opportunity. On September 6 Lord Salisbury transmits this instrument to the Russian Government, counting on the good will and support of all the powers in seeking to uphold the integrity and independence of China and the principle of equal opportunity. 1905, September 5: Treaty of Portsmouth. Japan and Russia agree to restore to China all of Manchuria occupied by their troops excepting Liaotung, and engage not to obstruct China's measures for its development ''common to all countries." d 1905, December 22: Chino-Japanese treaty confirming the Ports- mouth treaty. I BIBLIOGRAPHY. Cordier, H. Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales. Vol. Ill, pp. 433-462. (Paris, Alcan, 1902.) Conant, C. A. The United States in the Orient. (Boston, Hough- ton, 1900.) Mahan. A. T. The Problem of Asia. (Boston, Little, 1900.) Mahan. A. T. Interest of America in International Conditions. (Boston, Little. 1910.) Moore. J. B. Digest of International Law, V, 533-559. (Wash- ington, Government Printing Office, 190G.) Well documented ac- count. Thomson, H. C. China and the Powers. (London, Longmans, 1902.) Hornbeck, S. K. Contemporary Politics in the Far East, ch. 13. (New York, Appleton, 1916.) Foster, J. W. American Diplomacy in the Orient. (Boston, Houghton, 1903.) Asakawa, K. The Russo-Japanese Conflict. (Boston. Houghton, 1904.) Millard, T. F. America and the Far Eastern Question. (New York, Moffat, 1909.) Williams, F. W. Anson Burlingame. (New York, Scribner, 1912.) 249 Satow, Sir E. Cambridge Modern History. Chap. 28, in Vol. XI. ( ( 'ambridge Press, 1909. ) Clements, P. H. The Boxer Rebellion. Columbia Studies in His- tory, etc. Vol. 66. (New York, 1915.) Duvall, E. The Open Door. In Atlantic Monthly, 1900. Vol. 86, p. 382. Russia and the Open Door. In Contemporary Review, 1901, vol. 79, p. 188. For Documents, see Rockhill, W. W., Treaties and Conventions with or concerning China and Korea, 1894-1904 (Washington, Govt. Print. Office. 1904) ; Hertslet, G. E. P.. Treaties, etc, between Great Britain and China, and between China and Foreign Powers in Force, 1908 (London. Harrison, 1908), 2 vols.: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899-1904 (Washington) ; Parliamentary Papers, China, 1900 to 1905 (London). 87. LEASING OF KIAO-CHAU BY GERMANY, MARCH 6, 1898. 1. CIRCUMSTANCES. The occasion or pretext lor the seizure of the port of Tsingtau at the entrance to the Bay of Kiao-chau in November, 1S97. and the subsequent leasing on March 6. of Kiao-chau, was afforded by the murder on November 1, 1897, of two German Catholic priests. It seems probable from a statement made in the German Reichstag by von Biilow. minister of foreign affairs, on April 27, 1898 (Parlia- mentary Papers, China (No. 1), 1899, p. 07). that the German ( Govern- ment had concluded that China was about to be partitioned, and that Germany must have her share of the spoils. How Russia, which had manifested a particular interest in Kiao-chau (See article, The Cas- sini convention), was propitiated is not definitely known, though it may be readily inferred that no obstacles were placed upon the leas- ing of Port Arthur by Russia a few days later. (See article, The Leasing of Port Arthur by Russia, 1898.) However that may be, three German men-of-war appeared sud- denly, about November 17, at Kiao-chau and landed a number of marines, who seized the Chinese barracks of the port of Tsing : tau. The German Minister at Peking then presented six demands, includ- ing the preference for German capital and engineers in the future railway and mining enterprises in the Province of Shan-tung, but not including the lease of Kiao-chau. These demands having been accepted by the Chinese Government, a further demand for the lease of the bay and its surrounding territories was made and reinforced by the arrival of a German squadron under the command of Prince Henry. China yielded at once and a treaty with Germany was promptly signed on March 6, 1898. 250 2. PROVISIONS. By the terms of Section I of the treaty China " cedes to Germany on lease, provisionally for 99 years, both sides of the entrance to the Bay of Kiao-chau." China agreed that she would abstain from exer- cising rights of sovereignty in the ceded territory during the term of the lease, and conceded the exercise of the same to Germany. China also agreed, while reserving all rights of sovereignty, to permit the free passage of German troops and to abstain from taking any meas- ures or issuing any ordinances in a zone of 50 kilometers extent around Kiao-chau Bay. Chinese warships and merchant vessels would be placed upon the same basis as the ships of other nations on friendly terms with Germany, but no dues were to be demanded from them, " except those which may be levied upon other vessels for the purpose of maintaining the necessary harbor arrangements and quays." Germany agreed to protect the Chinese population in the ceded territory, "provided that the} 7 behave in conformity with law and order," and not to take their land, unless " required for other purposes," in which case compensation was to be made. Germany also agreed not to sublet the leased territory to another power. A ' special stipulation secured for Germany the right of exchanging its Kiao-chau territory for other Chinese territory more to its- liking. " Should Germany at some future time express the wish to return Kiao-chau Bay to China before the expiration of the lease, China engages to refund to Germany the expenditure she has incurred at Kiao-chau and to cede to Germany a more suitable place." The text of Sections II and III of the treaty have not been officially published, but the substance of these sections is known from unofficial publications, believed to be substantially correct. By them China agreed to permit a German-Chinese company to build two railway lines in the Province of Shantung. Germans were to be permitted to hold and develop mining property within a distance of 30 li (10 miles) of these railroads. China also agreed that if, for any enter- prise in the Province of Shantung, foreign capital or assistance was invited the first opportunity should be offered to German merchants and manufacturers. There appear to have been expressions in the treaty asserting that the provisions in regard to railways and mines were conceived only in the interests of trade and had no other design. BIBLIOGRAPHY. For the text of the German-Chinese treaty respecting the le,ise of Kiao-chau, in English, see Hertslet, China Treaties (London. 1908), I. No. 59, pp. 350-353. So far as known the sections relating to the 251 . railway and mining concessions have never been officiallv made known, but a precis taken from a Parliamentary Paper on China, No. 1 (1899), p. 152, is published in Hertslet, op. cit., p. 353. Rock- hill, W. W., Treaties and Conventions with or concerning China and Korea. 1894-1904 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1904), pp. 45-51, gives the text of the convention and a map. Par- liamentary Papers, China, No. 1 (1899), contain some important documents, especially Nos. 63-66, 77. An excellent account of the leasing of Kiao-chau may be found in Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflict (Boston, Houghton, 1904). ch. 3. See also Cordier, Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales, III, 349-361 (Paris, Alcan, 1902) ; Reventlow Deutschlands auswartige Politik, pp. 109-114 (Berlin, Mittler, 1916) ; and B. L. Putnam-Weale, Re- shaping of the Far East, I, 334-346 (London, Macmillan, 1905). 88. THE CASSINI CONVENTION, 1896. 1. INTRODUCTORY. This reputed secret agreement between Russia and China is sup- posed to have been negotiated by Count Cassini, the Russian minister at Peking in 1895. Its publication in the North China Daily News of October 28, 1896, created a sensation in the Far East and in the diplomatic world. Authorities on the Far East are divided in opin- ion as to its authenticity. Asakawa and Putnam-Weale believe that such a convention was negotiated and that the published document corresponds closely, if not completely, to the one which was signed. Cordier thinks the published document a compound of two separate agreements. The convention, if actually negotiated, was never rati- fied. The significance of the reputed convention lies in the fact that the published document, whether fully authentic or not, re- vealed substantially the terms of agreements which Cassini had obtained or was about to obtain. Disclosure contributed to the defeat of parts of the Russian program, e. g., that in regard to the Kiao- chau, while other parts were carried out through other agreements concluded between Russia and China. Among the most important of these was an open agreement (September 8, 1896) concluded be- tween the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank which provided for the construction of a railway through Manchuria con- necting the Trans-Baikal and South Ussuri lines of the Siberian railway system. (See article, The Russian Advance in Manchuria.) 2. TERMS. • The reputed convention conceded to Russia privileges of the most important nature "as a response to the loyal aid given by Russia in the retrocession of Liao-tung and its dependencies." These provisions 252 included : (a) The right to extend the Siberian Railway into Chinese territory across northern Manchuria to Vladivostok. The control of all railways built by Russia in northern Manchuria was to be placed in the hands of Russia for 30 years, at the end of which time China was to be allowed to redeem them, (b) The Russian railways in Manchuria were under "protection" of the Chinese authorities, but "owing to the fact that said railways will pass, for the greater pari, through barren and sparsely inhabited ter- ritory * * * Russia will be allowed to place special battalions of horse and foot soldiers at the various important stations for the better protection of the railway property." (c) Russians as well as Chinese were to be permitted to open and exploit any of the mines of northern Manchuria, (d) Since "Russia has never possessed a sea- port in Asia which is free from ice and open the year round," China declared herself willing to leave temporarily to Russia the port of Kiao-chau, the period of such lease being limited to 15 years. (This provision was. however, never executed, for it was made contingent upon the need of military operations.) (e) China was to fortify the ports of Port Arthur and Talien-wan (Dalny), in which task Rus- sia was to render all necessarjr assistance. China further bound her- self "never to cede them to another country," and in case military exigencies required it. "to allow Russia temporarily to concentrate her land and naval forces within the said ports." BIBLIOGRAPHY. Putnam- Weale, B. L.. The Re-Shaping of the Far East. Vol. II. App. C, p. 439 (New York, Mac'millan, 1905, 2 vols.) ; I, 174, 178, 337-345; II, 263-265, 439-444; and Cordier, Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidental. III, pp. 343-348 (Paris. Alcan, 1902) , give the text of the reputed convention and valuable dis- cussion; Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflict, 85-100 (Boston, Houghton, 1904), has also valuable discussion. For the text of the Russo-Chinese Bank agreement of 1906, see Treaties and Conventions with or concerning China and Korea, 1894-1904. ed. by Rockhill. W. W. (Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1904), pp. 212-214. 89. LEASING OF PORT ARTHUR BY RUSSIA, MARCH 27, 1898. 1. CIRCUMSTANCES. Within a few days after the forcible leasing of Kiao-chau by Ger- many (See article, The Leasing of Kiao-chau by Germany, March 6, 1898). on March 6. 1898. Russia on March 27. 1898. acquired from 253 China the lease for 25 years of Port Arthur and Talien-wan (Dalny), together with the adjacent waters. (See Appendix I, 53.) Russia had long since coveted an ice-free port, and she was now able to gratify her desire in this matter. On December 20, 1897, several Kussian warships arrived at Port Arthur — a step which was officially explained by Count Muravieff as " entirely a question of convenience for the ships " and having " absolutely no connection with the occu- pation of the Bay of Kiao-chau by Germany." 2. .MAIN PROA ISIONS. No Chinese troops of any kind whatever were to be stationed within the boundary of the leased territory, all movements of forces, whether naval or military, were to be under the control of the Russian authority. Port Arthur was to be made a closed port, open only to Russian and Chinese warships, while Talien-wan (Dalny) was to be a trading port open to the merchantmen of all nations. As a means of " restoring the balance of power in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li," Great Britain on April 8 of the same year (1898) obtained the promise of the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei. (See article, Leasing of Wei-Hai-Wei by Great Britain, 1898.) France also obtained a lease of the Kwan-chau Bay on the southeastern coast of China. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The English text of the Russo- Chinese agreement respecting the lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan may be found in Hertslet, China Treaties (London, 1908), No. 88, pp. 50 ff. The best documented story of the transaction is that given by Asakawa. The Russo- Japanese Conflict (Boston, Houghton, 1904), ch. 4. 90. LEASING OF WEI-HAI-WEI BY GREAT BRITAIN, 1898. 1. CIRCUMSTANCES. Soon after Port Arthur had been leased to Russia (See article, The Leasing of Port Arthur by Russia) on March 27, 1898, Great Britain obtained the promise of the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei in the same year, though the lease was not actually signed until July 1. (Appendix I, 56.) 2. PURPOSE. The expressed purpose of this lease, which appears to have had the approval of Japan, was to restore the balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili, which had been materially altered by the Russian acquisi- tion of Port Arthur. (Salisbury to MacDonald, British minister at Peking, March 25, 1898. Parliamentary Papers, China, No. I (1898), 254 p. 54.) The initiative in the matter appears to have been taken by the Chinese Government (MacDonald to Salisbury. February 25, 1898, ibid.). The cordial cooperation of England and Japan in the matter of this lease seems to have helped prepare the way for the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. (See article, that subject.) ;;. TERMS. "Solo jurisdiction" was secured to Great Britain over the islands in the bay of Wei-Hai-Wei and a belt of land 10 miles wide, along the entire coast of the bay. In addition Great Britain obtained the right to erect fortifications, station troop-, and "take any other measures necessary for defensive purposes" over a somewhat larger adjacent region, the extent of which was carefully defined. China, however, was permitted to maintain troops, warships, and to exer- cise jurisdiction in the city of Wei-Hai-Wei, " except in so far as may be inconsistent with naval and military requirements." Expropria- tion or expulsion of the Chinese inhabitants were specifically for- bidden. Wei-Hai-Wei was to remain in the possession of JEngland so long as Port Arthur, which had been leased for 25 years, remained in the hands of Russia. BIBLIOGRAPHY. On the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei, see especially Asakawa, K., The Russo-Japanese Conflict (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1904), pp. 125-129; Cordier, Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales, III, 366-368 (Paris, Alcan, 1902). For the text of the lease, see Hertslet, China Treaties. (London, 1908), No. 25, pp. 122-123. The most important documents bearing on the transaction are in Parliamentary Papers, China No. I (1898) and No. I (1899). Rockhill, Treaties and Conventions with and Con- cerning China and Korea. 1894—1904, p. 45. has a map. 91. THE BOXER UPRISING— NEGOTIATIONS AND SETTLEMENT. 1. EUROPEAN ENCROACHMENTS IN CHINA. 1895.-1898. The Chino- Japanese War of 1894-5 revealed the weakness of China when pitted against an enemy employing the methods of Western civilization. Following the war the great powers entered upon a rivalry in the exploitation of the commercial resources of China. In 1898 Germany by force acquired the lease of Kiao-chau (See article, that title) for a period of 99 years. Russia a little later obtained control of Port Arthur and Talienwan for a period of 25 3 T ears, the former to be open only to the vessels of Russia and China, 255 the latter to be in part only open to other nations. Great Britain the same year secured the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei for a naval station " for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia." (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900, p. 384. ) ( France had during this time secured a 99-year lease of Kwangchau Bay and in addition valuable railway and mining concessions in the Provinces of Kiang-si and Yun-nan. 2. hay's open-door policy. These proceedings were followed by the agreements or treaties between Russia and Great Britain and between Germany and Great Britain, as to what are termed " spheres of influence " in China, often without consulting the Government of that country or taking its wishes or interests into account." (Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, 415, and article, Spheres of Influence in China, 1897- 1904.) The policy of the European powers in demanding "spheres of influence," with exclusive railway and mining privileges led to the " open-door " proposal by Secretary Hay which was either explicitly or tacitly accepted by all the powers interested in China. The principles to which Secretary Hay obtained adhesion were these: (1) That there should be no interference with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called " sphere of influence " or leased territory which a power might have in China. (2) That the Chinese treaty tariff should apply equally to all merchandise shipped to and from ports within the ; ' sphere of influ- ence " unless they were free ports and that such duties should be col- lected by the Chinese Government. (3) That no higher harbor dues or railway rates should be levied upon the vessels or goods of another nationality than are levied upon the vessels or goods of the country possessing the " sphere of influ- ence." (56th Cong. 18th Sess. House Doc. No. 547.) Such were the principles of the " open-door " policy which sought to protect the sovereignty and integrity of China by aligning the interests of all the powers including China itself against the selfish exclusiveness of any one powder. 3. OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLT. A strong reaction occurred in China in 1898-99 against the foreign influences which were fast undermining the political, social, and reli- gious tenets of the country. This opposition made itself felt against all foreigners and in particular against the missionaries. It became an organized movement in connection with the Society of the Box- ers, which arose first in the Province of Shantung and rapidly 2d6 spread to the other provinces. Its avowed purpose was to drive out the foreigners and exterminate the Christians. The movement at- tained dangerous proportions in the fall of 1S90 and the American Minister Mr. Conger reported the condition to the American Gov- ernment. The American minister urged the Tsungli-Yamen to issue orders for the protection of American interests and native Chris tians. The Chinese authorities in the northern provinces were either unable or unwilling to maintain order. The revolt continued to gain headway and soon the legations in Peking were in danger. The American minister cabled home asking that instructions be given the American naval officers in Chinese waters to be ready to act in pro- tection of American lives and property. Conger received instruc- tions to cooperate with the representatives of the other powers in carrying out such measures n s might be necessary and proper for the protection of the legations and of American interests, but he wis authorized to "act independently in protection of American inter- ests when practicable, and concurrently with representatives of the other powers, if necessity arise." (Hay to Conger, June 8, L900, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900. p. 143.) While the powers were arranging to send larger forces to Peking to strengthen the legation guards an engagement took place between the foreign ships, all except the American, and the Chinese 'forts, at Taku. The forts were captured and marines landed who proceeded to the relief of the legations. Meantime the United States hurried a detachment from the American Army in the Philippines and the other powers detached forces from their nearest posts. 4. THE AMERICAN POSITION AS TO INTERVENTION. In order to set forth clearly the position of the United States in its joint action in China. Secretary Hay addressed a circular note to the cooperating powers. In tliis note he stated as the purpose of the United States ''to act concurrently with the other powers, first, in opening up communication with Peking and rescuing the Ameri- can officials, missionaries and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests: and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of disorder to other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disasters." (Circular note of July 3, 1900. to powers co- operating in China. Appendix. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901, Affairs in China, p. 12.) Mr. Hay made the further statement of policy, viz : The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solu- tion which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to 257 friendly powers i>y treaty and International Law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and Impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire. (Ibid.) This policy was hold steadily in view by the American Govern- ment throughout the negotiations and in general received the concur- rence of the other powers. .->. CHINA'S APPEAL FOR AMERICAN ASSISTANCE. The allied forces which finally marched to Peking, numbering about 20.000, succeeded in relieving the besieged legations August 14. Before this event the Chinese minister at Washington (July 20) had transmitted to the President a message from the Emperor of China requesting the friendly assistance of the United States in China's troubles. President McKinley replied, July 28, that the "friendly good offices" of the American Government would, with the assent of the other powers, be placed at the disposal of the Chinese Govern- ment upon the following conditions (Ibid., pp. 13-14) : (1) That assurance be given as to whether the foreign ministers were alive. (2) That if alive the diplomatic representatives be placed in communication with their Governments and that all danger to their lives be removed. (3) That the Chinese authorities cooperate with the relief ex- pedition. G. BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS. Four days earlier, the President had appointed W. W. Rockhill as special commissioner to examine and report upon the situation in China. Rockhill reached Shanghai August 29, and later proceeded to Peking to act as advisor to Conger. Later when Conger was given leave of absence and returned to the United States, Rockhill con- ducted the negotiations with the powers. Rockhill was directed to be guided by the policy set forth in Hay's instructions of July 3, and as supplementary thereto Hay's note to the Chinese minister in Wash- ington and the President's letter to the Emperor of China, July 23. On the 8th of August by imperial edict Li Hung Chang was ap- pointed envoy plenipotentiary with instructions to propose imme- diate cessation of hostilities pending negotiations. The United States offered to enter upon negotiations provided a portion of the relief expedition should be allowed to enter Peking and to escort the for- eign ministers to Tientsin. Although this was not granted and the powers were obliged to use force to rescue the members of the lega- tions, the United States was still willing to entertain " any overtures for a truce, and invite the other powers to join when security is es- tablished in the Chinese capital and the Chinese Government shows 5370G— 18 17 258 its ability and willingness to make on its part an effective suspen- sion of hostilities there and elsewhere in China." (Adee to Minister Wu, Aug. 22, 1900, Foreign Relations of the United Slates, 1900, p. 290.) An imperial edict of August 27 announced that Prince Ching had been invested with full discretionary power to act with Li Hung Chang in the negotiations. The Government of the United States accepted the authority of the Chinese plenipotentiaries and stated that it would authorize the American minister in Peking " to enter into relations with Earl Li and Prince Ching" as the immediate rep- resentatives of the Chinese Emperor. 7. GERMAN AND AMERICAN PROPOSALS. The German Government proposed that as a preliminary condition to diplomatic negotiations the Chinese Government should be re- quired to deliver over the real responsible authors of the crimes committed in Peking against international law. (Foreign Re- lations of the United States, 1901. Appendix. Affairs u\ China. pp. 23-24.) The United States took the position that while the perpetrators of the crimes should be held to the utmost accountability, and that while punishment was necessary to " any effective settlement which shall prevent a recurrence of such outrages and bring about permanent safety and peace in China,'' no punitive measures could be so effective as to have the punishment carried out by the Government of China itself. This it was held was only just to China in order that she should be afforded an oppor- tunity to do this and thus rehabilitate herself before the world. The United States was not " disposed as a preliminary condition to en- tering into diplomatic negotiations with the Chinese Government to join in a demand that said Government surrender to the powers such persons as according to the determination of the powers themselves may be held to be the first and real perpetrators of those wrongs." (Foreign Relations of the United States. 1900, pp. 203, 341.) The view presented by Germany was accepted by Austria-Hungary. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900, pp. 306-7.) The position of the United States was sustained by Russia. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900, pp. 375-6.) 8. HOW COOPERATION AMONG THE POWERS WAS SECURED. Foster points out that "four important declarations had been made which had done much to bring the powers into cordial relations, re- moving suspicion and anxiety as to the possible action of any one power." (Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, p. 425.) These declarations were, first, the one made by Secretary Hay in his circular 259 note of July 3; the next was the statement by Russia of August 28 that it had "no designs of territorial acquisitions in China;'' the third was the proposal on the part of Germany. September 18, that China should give over the leaders of the antiforeign movement to the allies for punishment and the answer of the United States; and the last of the four important declarations was the announcement of the agreement between Great Britain and Germany October 16 to uphold the " open-door " policy. 9. THE FRENCH PROPOSALS. Before the formal negotiations were opened the French Govern- ment, October 4, proposed as a means to secure " appropriate repara- tion for the past and substantial guarantees for the future " the fol- lowing demands (Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, p. 499) : (1) Punishment of the principal guilty parties, to be designated bv the representatives of the powers at Peking. (2) Interdiction of importation of arms. (3) Indemnities for losses to Governments and individuals. (4) Permanent guard for the legations. (5) The forts at Taku to be dismantled. (6) Occupation of two or three military posts on the road between Tientsin and Peking. 10. DEMANDS UPON CHINA BY THE POWERS. The French demands were agreed to in general by the other powers. The question arose as to the form in which the demands should be submitted to the Chinese plenipotentiaries, whether in separate notes or in a joint note signed by all the representatives. The American minister advocated a joint note on the ground that the question was w T orldrwide, that the demands would be strength- ened by unanimity, and that it would hasten a final settlement by being more effective than identic notes. (Foster, American Diplo- macy in the Orient, p. 427.) The American method was pursued and the note was signed and delivered to the Chinese representatives December 24. The note as finally drawn up contained 12 demands (Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 515-16) : (1) Mission to be sent to Berlin expressing regret for the murder of the German minister and erection of monument on spot of the murder. (2) Condign punishment to be inflicted, upon the guilty and suspension of official examinations for five years in towns where foreigners had been ill treated. (3) Reparation to Japan for the murder of the chancellor of the Japanese legation. 260 (4) Expiatory monument to be erected by the Chinese Govern- ment in each of the foreign cemeteries desecrated. (5) Interdiction of importation of arms. (6) Indemnities for losses to public and private organizations and individuals. (7) Permanent guard for each legation. (8) The Taku and other ports between Peking and the sea to be dismantled. (9) Military occupation of certain points to be agreed upon for keeping open communication between the capital and the sea. (10) Perpetual prohibition of membership in antiforeign societies. (11) Chinese commercial treaties to be amended. (12) Reform of office of foreign affairs and modification of court ceremonials. On January 16 the Chinese plenipotentiaries gave notice of their acceptance of the 12 demands. 11. PUNISHMENTS AND INDEMNITY. Two important points remained as subjects of negotiations — the question of punishments and the question of amount and manner of payment of indemnities. The foreign representatives prepared a list of a number of officials whose execution was demanded. The Rus- sian and American ministers objected to the list. Through their in- fluence and that of the Japanese minister the death penalty was con- fined to four, apart from those already punished by China, and lesser punishments were inflicted upon about 50 others. (Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, p. 429.) In regard to indemnity the United States favored a lump sum, instead of itemized individual and governmental claims. This point was finally gained. The amount of the lump sum was then debated. Sir Robert Hart, advisor of China and the allies, showed that China could not pay more than $250,- 000,000 to $300,000,000. Rockhill, the American representative, pro- posed that the lump sum should not exceed China's ability to pay and that the claims should be scaled down to that amount and that this amount should be divided equitably among the powers, the ap- portionment question if necessary to be submitted to The Hague Court (Ibid., p. 427). The American propositions were opposed, Russia and Japan alone agreeing to the reference to The Hague and Japan alone supporting the scaling down of the claims. The posi- tion of Germany on the question of indemnity was the most uncom- promising of any of the powers. She insisted on being paid to the last cent. (Rockhill to Hay. May 25, 1901. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901, Appendix. Affairs in China, p. 175.) The amount of indemnities was finally fixed at 450.000,000 taels (about $333,000,000), payable in gold at the rate of exchange fixed in the 261 protocol, with interest at 4 per cent, to be paid in 39 years in semi- annual payments (Ibid., p. 176-182). The peace agreement was not signed until September 7, 1901. The other important provisions have been stated in general in con- nection with the enumeration of the 12 demands; additional stipula- tions were: River navigation to Tientsin and Shanghai to be im- proved; the Tsungli-Yamen to be abolished and succeeded by ;i new hoard, the Wai-Wu-Pu, which should take precedence over other ministers. 12. INFLUENCE 0E THE UNITED STATES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. The influence of the United States was strong in the negotiations for moderating extreme measures in punishment and modifying in- demnity claims. It supported measures needful to punish the guilty parties and to guarantee the protection of American citizens and in- terests for the future. It also strove to further "the interests of the whole world in the cause of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." (Rockhill to Hay. November 30, 1901. Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, p. 529.) The United States was desirous that China should not be impaired in territorial integrity, nor be weakened in its ability to maintain a stable government. For this reason it was necessary to act with the other powers in order to modify their action. (Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient. 432.) 13. PAYMENT OF THE INDEMNITY. In 1902 the first installment of the indemnities was paid by China. The depreciation of silver, the monetary standard of China, subse- quent to the signing of the protocol made the payment in gold very burdensome to China. She accordingly asked to be allowed to pay the installment at the rate of exchange when the agreement was made. The United States alone signified its willingness to grant the i' [uest. In 1907 the United States further manifested its generosi in the treatment of China by remitting a large part of the inde nity due the United States from China.. The amount originally fixed was $24,440,778.81. All above $11,655,492.69 was remitted. (Foreign Relations of the United States. L907, Part I, p. 174.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. DO' Foreign Relations of the United States. 1898, i 32 244. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1900, China, pp. 77-:;'."). Communications regarding the Chinese uprisings; American in- structions, joint diplomatic negotiations and final settlement. 262 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901, Appendix, Affairs in China, pp. 1 382. Report of W. W. Rockhill, commissioner to China, with documents covering the negotiations o( the powers with China. House Document No. M7. 56th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1-17. Open- door policy in China, containing report of the Secretary of State. March 26, 1900, with copies of correspondence with the various Gov- ernments concerning American commercial rights in China and the maintenance of the integrity of China. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1904, 177 184. Payment of claims and indemnities against China. Parliamentary Papers. 1910, China. Nos, 3, 4, and 5. Secretary of War Annual Reports, 1900, I, pt. 1. Staatsarchiv, vol. 64, pp. 266-298, contains the reports of the Ger- man embassy at Peking. Vol. 65, pp. 166 280, reprints the British Blue Book. ONDAKY. Moore, J. B. Digest of International Law, sees. 808-810. Judicial and well documented account. Foster. J. W. American Diplomacy in the Orient (Boston, Houghton, 1903.) Pp. 407-435. Interesting brief account. Latane, J. H. America as a World Power. (New Fork, Harper, 1007.) Pp. 100 11.°.. Account based upon the most important docu- ment--. <_roi>d interpretation. Smith. A. H. China in Convulsion. (New York. Revell, 1901.) Chaps. X-XTIT. Martin, W. A. P. The Siege in Peking. (New York. Revell, 1900.) Chap. IV. Thomson. II. China and the Powers. (London. Longmans, 1902.) Chaps. I and XIII. Clements. P. II. The Boxer Rebellion. Columbia Studies in His- tory, etc. Vol. 66. (New York, 1915.) Cordier, II. Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentals, 1860-1902, vol. 8. eh. -J 1. (Paris. Alcan, 1902.) 92. THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1902. 1. INTRODUCTION. At the close of the Chino-Japanese War of 1894 95, Russia, France, and Germany, acting in concert, deprived Japan of most of the fruits of victory. (See article. The Treaty of Shimonoseki.) There followed a general scramble for Chinese territory ami "spheres of influence." Germany, for example, seized Kiao-chau and asserted her claim over much of the Shantung Province (See article. Leasing 263 of Kiao-Chau by Germany, March 6, L898), while Russia adopted an aggressive policy in Manchuria and virtually annexed the Liao- Tung Peninsula, including much coveted Porl Arthur. (See article, Leasing of Port Arthur by Russia, March 27. 1898.) Japan and Great Britain did not stand entirely aloof from the scramble, but, in general with the United States, they endeavored to preserve the territorial integrity of China and maintain the '•open door." On January -'50. 1902, at a time when Russia was pressing China for concessions in Manchuria, Great Britain and Japan concluded a treaty of alliance. (See Appendix I. 64.) It was made public February LI, L902. 2. NEGOTIATIONS. The treaty was negotiated at London by Lord Lansdowne and Baron Hayashi. According to the account left by the latter in his Secret Memoir- the first suggestion for the treaty came through Baron Eckardstein, of the Gorman Lmbassy. who in March or April, L901, expressed to Hayashi the opinion that a triple alliance between Germany, England, and Japan would be the most effective means for the maintenance of peace in the Far East (pp. 110-120). On April 17. 1901. Hayashi firs! broached the matter to Lord Lansdowne (p. 121). Tn the negotiations which proceeded from lime to time iluring the next nine months Hayashi was much embarrassed by the de-ire of some Japanese statesmen to carry on at the same time negotiations for a Russo-Japanese convention (pp. 204-205). Mar- quis Ito visited St. Petersburg, where he had some conversation with officials of the Russian Government on the subject. Whether the negotiations with Russia was for the purpose of putting pressure on England or whether Japanese statesmen wen- divided in opinion is uncertain. The idea of including Germany in the proposed alliance seems to have been dropped temporarily soon after negotiations began be- tween England and Japan. Toward the close of the negotiation- the question of including Germany was discussed (pp. L89-191). Both Governments agreed that Ocrmany, if informed of the nego- tiation-, would be likely to use the knowledge to obtain some special advantage for herself. It was. therefore, decided that the whole matter should be kept secret until after arrangements for the treaty had been concluded. Shortly before the signing of the treaty the Japanese Government brought up the question again (pp. 191- 192). Prince von Bulow had just made a speech in the Reichstag attacking Joseph Chamberlain and using derogatory language in regard to the British Army. Public opinion in England at the moment was much irritated at the comments of the German press upon the Boer War (pp. 192-193). The time did not seem auspicious 264 for approaching Germany. In view of the charge that the British and Japanese Governments "of malice prepense excluded German) from participation" (p. 206), it should be noted that Hayashi asserts (p. 206) " that if Germany had wanted to go join the alliance she would have been admitted. From the outset, however, nothing was proposed by Germany nor was any wish to join expressed by her." It seems probable that Germany never seriously desired to be included in the alliance, but was at the time seeking closer relations with Kussia. Hayashi sums up the question of the pro- posal to include Germany in the treaty as follows (p. 195) : "On account of the strained relations between Great Britain and Germany we certainly took no special steps to induce her to join the alliance, but on the other hand, if Germany had been really sincere in her earlier overtures and had proposed to come into the alliance, a triple alliance might easily have been concluded. It is not reasonable to suppose that Germany was purposely excluded by Great Britain and Japan." 3. TERMS. 4 The contracting powers declared themselves to be "actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the ex- treme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in these countries for the commerce and industry of all nations." They disavowed aggressive tendencies in China and Korea, but recognized the right of either ally to take such measures as might be indispensable to safeguard its existing interests. In case either, in defense of such interests, should become involved in war with a third power, the other contracting parfrj was to maintain strict neutrality and endeavor to. prevent other pow- ers from joining in hostilities against its ally. In case any power or powers should attack the ally engaged in the war, the other ally must them come to its assistance. The treaty was to go into effect immediately after the date of signing and was to remain in force for at least five years. 4. CONCLUSION. The treaty was publicly announced on February 12, and a month later (March 17) Kussia and France issued a joint statement pro- fessing to find in the treaty the fundamental principles that formed the basis of their policy. (Revue generate de droit international public, vol. 9, d. 11.) The alliance did not suffice to prevent the Russo-Japanese War, but it probably helped to localize the conflict. 265 BIBLIOGRAPHY. Hayashi, T. Secret Memoirs. (New York, Putnam, 1915.) Hershey, A. S. The International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War. (New York, Macmillan, 1906.) Bushby, H. N. G. The Agreement between Great Britain and Japan. In the Nineteenth Century and After (March, 1902), vol. 51, pp. 369-382. Dolliver, A. P. Significance of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance. In the North American Review (May, 1902), vol. 174. pp. 594-605. Low, A. Maurice. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In The Forum (April, 1902), vol. 33, pp. 196-206. Stead, A. The Anglo-Japanese agreement from the Japanese point of view. In the Contemporary Review (March, 1902), vol. 81. pp. 437-445. Weale, B. L. P. The Truce in the East and its Aftermath. (New York and London, Macmillan, 1907.) The text of the treaty is given in British Parliamentary Papers, Treaty Series, No. 3, 1902; in Hershey's The International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War. pp. 26-27. 93. RUSSO-JAPANESE RIVALRY IN KOREA, 1895-1904. 1. THE MURDER OF THE KOREAN QUEEN, 1895. In Korea, immediately after the close of the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Russian and Japanese influences entered into sharp competition for ascendancy in the country. In October, 1895, the Korean Queen and her advisers, who were hostile to Japanese in- fluence, planned a coup d' etat for the purpose of disbanding the soldiers who had been trained by Japanese officers and of replacing the pro- Japanese members of the cabinet by her " exclusionist " friends. The result was a counter pro-Japanese movement to obtain complete control of the Korean Government through the seizure of the King and Queen. In the course of the execution of this design the Queen was murdered by Japanese and Korean ruffians. 2. THE RUSSIAN COUP d'eTAT, 1897. This revolting crime reacted upon its perpetrators and was speedily followed by another equally discreditable, by means of which Russia obtained control of the Government of Korea for a time. On February 10, 1896. 127 Russian marines landed at Chemulpo and immediately entered Seoul, the Korean capital. The day following the King and his entourage fled in disguise to the Russian legation, where he remained until February 20, 1897. As a result of a royal 266 edict there issued, the Korean prime minister and two other cabinet ministers were murdered, while others tied to Japan. .'.. PERIOD OF RUSSIAN ASCENDENCY, 1896-1897. A brief period of Russian ascendency over Korea now followed. Among other special privileges, the Russians obtained a valuable tim- ber concession in the Yaln Valley ami a mining concession along the Tninen River. 4. THE YAMAGATA-LOBANOFF PROTOCOL, 1896. In the summer of 180(> Japan changed her policy toward Korea and decided to seek- the cooperation of Russia. On June 1(> of this year there was concluded at St. Petersburg what is known as the Yamagata-Lobanoff protocol (Asakawa, 264). The two powers agreed to cooperate along various lines in Korea, and particularly engaged to try to abandon to Korea herself the maintenance o( armed forces and native police. But the protocol of June. 1896, was no sooner signed tlutn it was violated by Russia. During the same month in which it was signed, Russia tried to gain control of the Korean Army. During the fol- lowing year she tried to secure control of Korean finances. 5. THE NISHI-ROSEN PROTOCOL, 1898. The suspicions and opposition of the Koreans as well as the Jap- anese having been aroused by these measures. Russia deemed it ad- visable to try to conciliate Japan. Accordingly, there was con- eluded on April -J."). L898, what is known as the Xishi-Rosen protocol ( Asakawa. 271). Both powers definitely recognized the " sovereignty and entire independence o( Korea." and mutually agreed to "abstain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country." They also engaged, " in case Korea should have recourse to the counsel and assistance of either Japan or Russia, not to take any measure regarding the nomination of military instructors and financial ad- visers, without having previously arrived at a mutual accord on the subject." Russia also declared that she would not " obstruct the development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea." 6. RUSSO-JAPANESE RIVALRY, 1899-1904. But in spite of the above agreement the rivalry between Japan and Russia in Korea continued during the next five years (1800-1004). In most cases Russia appears as the aggressor, having repeatedly violated the protocols of 180C> and 1808. Japan seems to have con- fined herself mainly to commercial and industrial development. 267 7. THE ATTEMPTED LEASE OF MASAMI'O BY RUSSIA, 1899-1001. During 1899-1901, for example, the main efforts of Russia were lirected toward the acquiring of certain leases at Masampo on the southern coast of Korea with a view of transforming this valuable harbor into a naval base. But Japan succeeded in checkmating this design of Russia. 8. THE SEOUL-WIJU RAILWAY, 1894-1903. Another bone of contention between Japan, on the one side, and Russia and France on the other was the question of the construe) ion of the Seoul-Wiju Railway. In 1894 Korea had granted to Japan priority of rights in the construction of railways between Fusan and Seoul. In 1898 Japan had obtained control of the short railway line between Seoul and Chemulpo, an American concession, and in the same year Japan had obtained a definite concession from the Korean Government for the construction of the Fusan-Seoul line. Russia seems to have failed in her attempts to secure railway con- cessions. 9. RUSSIAN ENCROACHMENTS IN NORTHERN KOREA, 1903. But it was the threatened Russian encroachments in northern Korea that caused the greatest anxiety to Japan. In 1896 Russia obtained valuable mining concessions in two districts at the mouth of the Tuinen River, and later sought to extend her influence in that region. Still more menacing, however, to the interests of Japan were the attempts of Russia to obtain an actual foothold on Korean territory at Yong-am-po, on the Korean side of the Yalu River. On April 13, 1903, the Korean Government was suddenly notified that the Russian timber syndicate (in which Russian grand dukes and leading mem- bers of the Romanoff family are said to have been directly inter- ested ) would at once begin the cutting of timber on the Yalu. Early in May. Russian soldiers in civilian garb were reputed to have occupied Yong-am-po. At the same time Russian troops seemed to be mobilizing on the northern side of the Yalu. In view of the events which had been transpiring in Manchuria, as well as Korea. Japan decided to attempt direct negotiations with the Russian Government at St. Petersburg. (See article. The Negotiations preceding the Russo-Japanese War.) BIBLIOGRAPIIV. The best documented account of these diplomatic events is that given by Rey, F., Chronkjue. in Revue Generale de droit international public (Paris. 1905), T. XII, pp. 306 ff. A briefer account, also 268 based on the documents, may be found in Hershey, A. S., Interna- tional Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (New York, Macmillan, 190(5), pp. 43-52. See also Asakawa, K., The Russo-Japanese Conflict (Boston. Houghton, 1904), eh. 17; Longford, The Story of Korea (New York, Scribner, 1911), ch. 15; and Hornbeck, S. K., Contemporary Politics in the Far East (New York, Appleton, 1916) , ch. 11. The texts of the various Russo-Japanese protocols are contained in Asakawa, op. cit. 94. THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE INTO MANCHURIA, 1895-1903. 1. INTRODUCTION". The Russian advance into Manchuria may be said to have begun with the construction of the great Trans-Siberian Railroad of which the Czarevitch cut the first sod near Vladivostok in 1891. The route from Lake Baikal through the Amur Province north of the Amur River proving almost impossible, a more direct and practicable route through Manchuria was determined upon. By her successful intervention at the close of the Chino-Japanese War (See article, The Treaty of Shimonoseki) Russia had placed China under a debt of fear and gratitude — a debt which was further increase* 1 by the guarantee of a Russian loan to China on very liberal terms. Ostensibly to facilitate the execution of this loan, but really to promote Russian political as well as commercial designs in Eastern Asia, there was organized, in 1895, the Russo-Chinese Bank which soon obtained from China valuable railway concessions and other privileges. (See article. The Cassini Convention.) 2. THE BUILDING OF THE MANCHURIAN RAILWAY, 1S9 7-190 2. The necessary concessions having thus been obtained, the Chinese- Eastern or Manchurian Railway was begun in 1897. But Russia longed for a port which is ice free the entire year. This was not the case with Vladivostok. An opportunity for securing such a port and at the same time strengthening Russia's strategic position on the Pacific soon presented itself. 3. THE LEASING OF PORT ARTHUR BY RUSSIA, 1898. The German seizure of Tsing-tao in November, 1897, and the subsequent leasing of Kiao-chau (See article, The Leasing of Kiao- chau by Germany) in March, 1898, furnished a precedent or pretext that tended to palliate, though hardly to justify, a similar act on 269 the part of Russia, which demanded and obtained a lease of Port Arthur and Dalny on March 27, 1898. (See article, The Leasing of Port Arthur by Russia.) Great Britain followed by securing the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei on July 1, 1898 (See article, The Leasing of Wei-Hai-Wei by Great Britain), as a means of restoring the balance of power in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li. 4. THE SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY, 1S9S-1902. The southern branch of the Chinese-Eastern or Trans-Manchurian Railway connecting Port Arthur with the main line at Harbin was now begun, but the work was interrupted by the Boxer Rebellion. (See article, The Boxer Uprising of 1900.) 5., OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA, 1900-1904. One of the results of this momentous rebellion was the Russian occupation of Manchuria, which contributed so much toward the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War (See article, Negotiations pre- ceding the Russo-Japanese War) in 1904. In order to allay the apprehensions of the powers, the Russian Government issued a circular note on August 28, 1900 (Parliamentary Papers, China, No. I (1901). p. 113), in which it was explained that the occupation of Manchuria was only "temporary" and "had been dictated solely by the absolute necessity of repelling the aggressions of the Chinese rebels, and not with interested motives, which are absolutely foreign to the policy of the Imperial Government." Russia furthermore promised that she would not fail to withdraw her troops from Chinese territory, "provided that the action of the other powers does not place any obstacle in the way of such a measure." In spite of these assurances Russia remained in military occupa- tion of Manchuria, and a strong military force of railway guards was stationed there for the protection of the Manchurian railways. February 6, 1901, Count Lamsdorff, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, denied that Russia had concluded, or was engaged in conclud- ing, with China a convention or permanent arrangement which would give Russia new rights and a virtual protectorate in Southern Man- churia, though he admitted that the Russian military authorities had been engaged in the temporary occupation and pacification of that province. (Staatsarchiv, vol. 66. pp. 142-143.) Within a few weeks, however, after these official assurances it was learned that the Russian Government was pressing China hard to agree to the so-called Lamsdorff- Yang-yu convention. According to the sup] >osed terms of this agreement, Russia was willing to " restore " to China the whole of Manchuria, but upon such conditions as would hare rendered the so-called "restoration" wholly illusory. (No 270 authentic text of this convention has been made public. The sub- stance of it was published in The Times (London), February 28, 1901.) Supported by the protests of Great Britain and Japan. China refused to ratify this convention. It was not long, however, before Russia was found to be making fresh demands upon China as conditions for evacuation. Finally, as a result of the publication of the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 (See article, The Formation of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance), Russia agreed to sign the convention of evacuation of the same year. (See article, The Russo-Chinese Convention for the Evacuation of Manchuria, April 8, 1902, and Appendix I, 65.) 6. THE "EVACUATION" OF MANCHURIA BY RUSSIA, 1902. The so-called evacuation of Manchuria by Russia was actually begun. By October 18, 1902, six months after the conclusion of the convention of evacuation, Russia had actually handed over the Chinese-Eastern Railway to the Chinese Government and with- drawn her troops from the southwestern portion of the ^>heng- King or Mukden Province as far as the Liao River. But a consider- able number of these troops appear merely to have been transferred to other parts of Manchuria, where they were transformed into rail- way guards. By April 8, 1903, the date set for the evacuation of the Provinces of Mukden and Kiriu, it was evident from the disposition of Russian forces in Manchuria that not even a nominal withdrawal from the Provinces was intended. Early in April, 1903, seven new Russian demands were made upon China. (Staatsarchiv. vol. 69, No. 13,079.) These demands, which were rejected, included stringent measures for closing Manchuria against economic enterprises undertaken by all foreigners who were not Russian, and they practically forbade the opening of new treaty ports in Manchuria without the consent of Russia. It is not surprising that Japan, Great Britain, and the United States made strong protests. By October 8, 1903, the date set in the Russo-Chinese convention for the final evacuation of the Province of Heilung-chang, Russia was still in possession of nearly the whole of Manchuria. She still re- tained control of Xiuchwang, and had even " reoccupied " Mukden, of which there appears to have been a sham evacuation. It had, indeed, become increasingly and conclusively evident that Russia in- tended to remain in permanent occupation of Manchuria. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The most valuable and detailed documented accounts of the Rus- sian advance into Manchuria are probably those given by Asakawa, 271 K., The Russo-Japanese Conflict (Boston, Houghton, 1904), and Rey, F., Chronique, in Revue de droit international public for 1905, vol. 12, pp. 218 ff. For a brief account, based also on documentary sources, see Her- shey, A. S., International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (New York, Macmillan Co., 1906). For the main documents see Parliamentary Papers on China, British and Foreign State Papers, and the various volumes dealing with the foreign relations of the United States published as House Documents. Staatsarchiv, vol. 66, pp. 129-182, and vol. 69, pp. 37- 112, reprint the British Blue Books, China, Nos. 1 and 5 (1901), and No. 2 (1901), containing many of the most important documents. 95. THE RUSSO-CHINESE CONVENTION FOR THE EVACUA- TION OF MANCHURIA, APRIL 8, 1902. MAIN PROVISIONS. This famous convention (See Appendix I, 65), providing for the gradual evacuation of the whole of Manchuria within 18 months from the date of signature, was concluded on April 8, 1902. By its terms Russia agreed to the " reestablishment of the authority of the Chinese Government in that region" (Manchuria) on the following conditions: (a) That China "observe strictly the stipulations of the contract concluded- with the Chinese Bank on the 27th of August, 1896"; (5) "assumes the obligation to use all means to protect the railway and the persons in its employ, and binds itself also to secure within the boundaries of Manchuria the safety of all Russian sub- jects in general and the undertakings established by them." On these conditions and " provided that no disturbances arise and that the action of other powers should not prevent it," the Rus- sian Government agreed to evacuate Manchuria within 18 months in three successive withdrawals, separated by intervals of six months each. Though actually begun, the Russian evacuation even of Sheng- King, or the Southern Manchurian Province, was never carried out and the convention was never executed. (See article, The Russian Advance into Manchuria.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. For the text of this treaty (in English) see Hertslet, China Treaties (London, 1908), II, No. 90, pp. 509-512. For the French text see Parliamentary Papers, China, No. 2 (1901), No. 51. Both the French and English texts are reprinted in Asakawa, The Russo- Japanese Conflict (Boston, Houghton, 1901), ch. 13. 272 96. NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1903-1904. 1. INTRODUCTION. In view of the overwhelming evidence of aggressive Russian de- signs afforded bv the Russian advance in Manchuria and Russian encroachments in Korea (See articles, The Russian Advance in Man- churia, 1895-1903, and Russo-Japanese rivalry in Korea, 1895-1904), Japan decided to institute direct negotiations at St. Petersburg with a view of arriving, if possible, at a definite understanding or solution of the Korean and Manchurian questions. 2. THE FIRST JAPANESE PROPOSALS, 1903. On August 3. 1903. the Japanese Government proposed as a basis for any understanding between Japan and Russia (Staatsarchiv, vol. 69, pp. 212-214) : (a) A mutual engagement to respect the inde- pendence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean Em- pire^ and to maintain the "open door" in these countries; (b) a reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and of Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Man- churia. These demands were never materially altered by Japan during the negotiations, and their persistent rejection by Russia, to- gether with the latter's delay in replying and her continued prepara- tions for war, may be said to have finally precipitated the struggle. 3. THE FIRST RUSSIAN COUNTERPROPOSALS. After a delay of nearly eight weeks, Russia presented her first counterproposals to the Japanese Government, on October 5, 1903 (Ibid, p. 221). Russia not only offered less than Japan demanded respecting Korea, but imposed new conditions upon Japan in that country. Most significant of all, Russia ignored the Japanese pro- posal for a mutual agreement to respect the independence and terri- torial integrity of the Chinese Empire and to maintain the " open door" in China and Korea. Russia not only refused to make any declarations regarding her future policy in China or Manchuria, but required Japan expressly to recognize Manchuria as "in all respe. t- outside her sphere of interest." 4. RUSSIAN SIX DEMANDS ON CHINA. In the meantime Russian military activity was increasing both in Manchuria and Korea. On August 13, 1903, Admiral Alexietf, whose policy was a forward one, was appointed to the position of " Viceroy of the Far East." On September 6 Russia presented six 273 new demands on China as conditions for the final evacuation of Niuchwang and Manchuria, which were refused by the Chinese Government, acting probably at the instigation of Japan and Great Britain ( Asakawa, pp. 315-317). The conduct of the Russians on the Korean frontier became more aggravating and aggressive than ever. 5. japan's SECOND proposals. The Japanese statesmen having agreed upon an " irreducible mini- mum," Japan, in her second set of proposals, on October 30 made several important concessions (Staatsarchiv, vol. 69, pp. 224—225). These included the guarantee of the freedom of the Korean Straits, the establishment of a neutral zone extending 50 kilometers on each side of the Korean-Manchurian frontier, a " mutual engagement not to impede the connection of the Korean Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway when these railways shall have been eventually extended to the Yalu," a reciprocal engagement not to interfere with each other's treaty rights in Korea and China, and a " recognition by Japan that Manchuria is outside her sphere of special interests and recognition by Russia that Korea is outside her sphere of special interest." 6. Russia's second counterreply. In her counter-reply (Ibid, pp. 231-232), which was delayed until December 11, 1903, Russia repeated her former counterproposals, with the omission of the clause regarding Manchuria and the in- sertion of the Japanese proposal relating to the connection of the Korean and Chinese Eastern Railways. 7. japan's third overture. On December 21, 1903, Japan made a third overture to Russia (Ibid, pp. 232-233). Baron Komura proposed several slight amend- ments to the Russian counterproposals respecting Korea and the total suppression of the article providing for a neutral zone in northern Korea. 8. Russia's third reply. In the third reply of Russia (Ibid, pp. 234-235), which reached Tokio on January 6, 1904, not only was there no mention of the terri- torial integrity of China in Manchuria, but Russia again insisted upon the recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being out- side her sphere of influence. Russia, having agreed to insert a clause to the effect that she would " not impede Japan nor other powers in the enjoyment of the rights and privileges acquired by them under existing treaties with China, exclusive of the establishment of settle- ments," on condition that Japan agree not to use any part of the terri- 53706—18 18 274 tory of Korea for strategical purposes, and that she agree to the establishment of a neutral zone in northern Korea. 9. FOURTH JAPANESE PROPOSALS. On January L3, L904, Japan made a fourth set of proposals. (Ibid., pp. 235-236.) These included: (1) Suppression (in the Russian counterproposals) of the clause requiring Japan not to use any part of Korea for strategical pur- 1 >oses. (2) Suppression of the article relating to the establishment of a neutral zone. i'-\) Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being outside her (Japan's) sphere of interest, provided Russia engage: (a) To respect the territorial integrity of China and Manchuria; (b) to recognize the treaty rights, including those of settlement, of Japan and other powers in Manchuria: and (o) to recognize Korea and its littoral as being outside her (Russia's) sphere of interest. (4) Recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in Man- churia and of the right of Russia to take measures necessary for the protection of those interests. io. Russia's fourth reply. An early reply to these fourth Japanese proposals was repeatedly requested, but Russia's answer, which was a virtual reiteration of her previous counterproposals, did not reach Tokyo until February 7. L904, or the day following the severance of diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia on February G. n. japan's severance of diplomatic relations. On February 6. 1004. Japan notified the Russian Government she has " no other alternative than to terminate these futile negotiations." BIBI/IOGRAPHT. The most important documents are reprinted from the Japan Times in Staatsarchiv, vol. GO, pp. 210-24i\ The best account of these negotiations, together with the texts of the various proposals and counterproposals is contained in Asa- kawa. K., The Russo-Japanese Conflict (Houghton Mifflin & Co., Boston. 1004), ch. 10. A briefer documented account may be found in Hershey, A. S., the International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (New York, Macmillan, 1006), pp. 52-61. See also Japan, Foreign Office Correspondence Regarding the Negotia- tions between Japan and Russia (1003-1004). 275 97. THE ABROGATION OF THE JAPANESE EXTRATERRI- TORIALITY TREATIES, 1872-1894. I. .Hi: TREATIES GRANTING EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, L858 18G9. When the Western nations entered into treaty relations with Japan they secured, by the terms of the treaties, rights of jurisdiction for their consuls. The provisions of (he American-Japanese treaty of 1858 governing consular jurisdiction were incorporated in similar treaties with other western powers, 1858 L869. These conventions, subject to revision in 1872, extended exclusive consular jurisdiction, in civil matters, to ease.-; in which a citizen of a treaty power was liable to (1) a Jap- anese subject, (2) a fellow citizen. {■',) a citizen of another treaty power; in criminal matters to offense- by a citizen of a treaty power against CI) a Japanese subject, (2) a fellow or foreign citizen, (3) treaty provisions and trade regulations. The exercise of consular jurisdiction in Japan by the represi nta- tives of foreign nations frequently caused friction lei ween the con- suls and the Japanese authorities. Japan also re ented it as an offense to her national pride. Abolition of consular jurisdiction. therefore, became a fundamental object of Japanese diplomacy from 1872 to 1894-99, when success was finally attained. 2. THE JAPANESE MISSION TO THE WEST, 1872. Tn 1872 Japan dispatched five of her most eminent statesmen, headed by Prince Iwakura, to observe the institutions of western powers and to approach them on the subject of treaty revision. The United States Government received the mission cordially and ex- pressed a willingness to undertake such revision; but the European State- declined to relinquish their jurisdictional privileges without an approximation of Japanese jurisprudence to western ideas and practices. Italy did negotiate a treaty recognizing Japan's judicial autonomy, to a certain extent, but withheld ratification owing to the protests of European powers, led by England and France. :;. REFORM OK JAPANESE .1' STICE, 1871-1882. This situation made a reform of the Japanese system of justice imperative. A criminal code had been promulgated in L871 con- taining an infusion of European principles. To aid in the intro- duction of western jurisprudence, a number of European jurists weie 'united to Japan, [n L872 a department of justice independent of other branches of the Government was organized, and courts were established with judges who performed no other functions. Torture was abolished in 187i>; the following year the regulations 276 nd applying to legal practitioners and evidence were improved a modernized. Codes of criminal law and procedure, revised in accord with French models, were promulgated in L878 and came into opera- tion in L882. 4. JOINT CONFERENCE AT TOKYO, 1ST I AND IS82. The attempted revision of the treaties by a "joint conference" of the representatives of the treaty powers at Tokyo (1874) ended in failure. To obviate the difficulty of obtaining unanimous consent to revision, the Japanese foreign office negotiated separately (1878) with the powers concerned. The United States expressed its sym- pathy with Japanese efforts by the negotiation of a commercial con- vention (1ST8) establishing Japan's exclusive right to regulate its tariff and coasting trade, but contingent upon the conclusion of similar agreements with the other poAvers. Bui Japan was not able to oegotiate such treaties, largely owing to the position taken by England. In 1882 the Japanese foreign minister again undertook treaty revision by means of a joint conference at Tokyo. Nothing definite was accomplished until 1880. when agreement seemed possible on the compromise "Anglo-German project." li bound Japan to accept the establishment of mixed courts, as in Egypt, with prosecuting attor- neys of foreign birth. Upon the publication of this project public (pinion loudly denounced the foreign minister. Count Inouye. and forced the adjournment of the conference, sine die. on July 20. L887. Meanwhile, the United States promulgated its extradition treaty with Japan (1886), declaring that one reason for its conclusion was the support it would give Japan in her efforts toward judicial author- ity and complete sovereignty. 5. ABOKTIVF. TREATIES WITH THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA. AND GERMANY^ issT-i 889. The new foreign minister, Count Okuma, reverted to the policy of individual negotiation with the great powers. He secured a treaty with Mexico (1887) fully recognizing Japan's judicial and fiscal competence, the first treaty with a western country on terms of perfect equality. Conventions with the United States. Kussia, and Germany (1888-89), provided that (1) Japan should open the entire country lo foreigners wholly submitting to Japanese jurisdiction and con- cede to them the right of holding real and personal property; (2) consular jurisdiction in the treaty ports should be abolished five years after the exchange of ratifications. Accompanying draft notes engaged Japan to appoint competent foreign judges to sit with her supreme court in cases involving a foreigner and to promulgate a 277 new civil code, based on approved western model-, three years before the abrogation of consular jurisdiction in the treaty settlements. Similar proposals were made to England. An irate public, which demanded unqualified recognition of Japan as the e. Digest of International Law. sees. 847-851 (Wash- ington, Government Printing Office, 1006). Accurate, well-docu- mented account, with special attention to the part of the United States. Foster, J. W. American Diplomacy in the Orient. (Houghton Mifflin Co.. New York, 1003.) Contains a summary account of the progress of revisionist diplomacy. Hishida, S. G. The International Position of Japan as a Great Power, ch. 6. (Columbia University Studies, New York, 1905.) An admirable, concise account of the system and of the negotiations for its abolition. Lippmann, Karl. Die Konsularjurisdiktion im Orient, pp. 164- 17!. (Verlag von Yeit and Comp., Leipzig, 1898.) Gives docu- mentary references to all treaties governing consular jurisdiction, a to the treaties of 1804-18!»8. Dubois, J. La codification an Japan et la revision des traites. Revue generale de droit international public (1804), II, 111-118. Siebold, Alexander von. Japan's Accession to the Comity of Na- ns. Translated from (he German by Charles Lowe. (London, Kegan Paul. 1001.) Valuable especially for changes in Japan with special reference to the termination of extraterritoriality treaties. Annual Register, 1889. Contains a sketch of Japanese negotia- tions for treaty revision in 1888-1880. 279 DOCUMENTS. Parliamentary Papers, vol 96, Japan, No. 1 (1894) are valuable for development of Japanese law and courts, and trace in detail English negotiations with Japan, 1888-1894. See also Foreign Relations of the United States, 1871-1898 ; British and Foreign State Papers, vols. 48, 79; Treaties and Conventions between United States and other Powers since 1776 (1871) ; Compi- lation of United States Treaties in Force (1904). 98. THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE, 1899. 1. PURPOSE. The first Hague peace conference was called by Czar Nicholas II of Russia, primarily for the purpose of "seeking, by means of inter- national discussion, the most effectual means of insuring to all peo- ples the benefits of a real and durable peace, and above all, of put- ting an end to the progressive development of the present arma- ments." The conference which met at The Hague on May 18, 1899, soon realized that even a limitation of the increase of military and naval expenditure was impracticable at that time, and therefore devoted its chief energies to the secondary purpose for which it was called, namely, to devise means of securing the maintenance of a real and durable peace. 2. RESULTS. Owing mainly to the opposition of Germany, the Russian plan of inclusive and limited compulsory arbitration was rejected. But the Anglo-American plan of a so-called permanent court of arbitration was adopted in spite of the objections of the German Government, and arbitration was recommended in questions of a juridical char- acter, and especially regarding the interpretation of treaties. A code of arbitral procedure intended to facilitate arbitration was also adopted and recommended. The convention for pacific settlement of disputes also strongly recommended the use of the good offices and mediation of friendly powers in case of international disputes, and even urged a new method of settling such controversies in case of "differences of an inter- national nature, involving neither honor nor vital interests, and aris- ing from a difference of opinion on points of fact." This was to be done by the creation of international commissions of inquiry intended to facilitate a solution of such differences by an elucidation of the facts by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation. 280 In addition to the convention for the pacific settlement of inter- national disputes, The Hague conference o( L899 also agreed i<> two other conventions, three declarations, and expressed several wishes (voeux). Mosi important was the convention regulating the Laws and customs of land warfare, based on the work of the Brussels con- ference oi' L874. The conference also adapted the principles of the Geneva con- vention of L864 to maritime warfare. Ii agreed to three declarations against (a) the Launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons for five years; (6) the use of projectiles the only object of which is the diffusion o( asphyxiating or deleterious gages; and (\' private (enemy) property in naval warfare: and the bombardment of ports, towns. and villages by a naval force. It even wenl so far as to express a wish that the Governments might "examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and se&, and of war budgets," For bibliography, see article. The Second Hague Conference. 99. THE ANGLO-FRENCH ARBITRATION TREATY OF 1903. i. PROA [SIONS. The Anglo-French arbitration treaty of October M, L903 (See Appendix I. 07). pro\ ided that questions of a Legal nature or " relat- ing to the interpretation of treaties existing between the two Con- tracting Parties, and which it may not have been possible to settle by diplomacy " shall he submitted to the conn ol' arbitration provided for in The Hague Convention of L899. The agreement went on to declare that "neither (he vital interests nor the independence or honor of the two contracting parties" nor the interests id' a third State would he considered as coming under its provisions. It was provided also that before "addressing themselves" to The Hague the two parties should draw up an agreement "determining clearly the subject of dispute, the extent of the arbitral powers" and the constitution of the court and its procedure. The convention auto matically terminated at the end of five years. 2. IMPORTANCE. This convention was the (irst application of article 19 of The Hague Convention o( L899, which provided for supplementary arbitral agreements. It was the model for most of the arbitration treaties of the next live years. Delcasse persistently urged it, and the French 281 foreign office pronounced ii the "first step" in the "rapprochement" of tlic two countries. It was broughl about largely through the persistent efforts of Sir Thomas Barclay, aided by numerous French and British organizations. During the next few months Great Britain and France strengthened the solidarity of western Europe by negotiating identical treaties with JtaJy and Spain. .:. PI BLIC OPINION REGARDING THE CONVENTION. In both France and England the treaty received general approval. J n the former country some public men began to look toward the e tablishment of a Quadruple Alliance (England, France, Russia, and Italy) to counterbalance the solidarity of the German powei In the hitter the chief criticisms were directed against its limited application, Tor there was a strong feeling among business and Labor opinion thai arbitration ought to include broader questions. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Archives Diplomatiques, third 3eries, vol. 88, pp. 49 53. Barclay, Sir T. Thirty Years' Anglo-French Reminiscences, chs. 19-20. (Boston, Houghton, 1914.) Jaray, L. J. La Politique Franco- Anglaise el ['Arbitrage Inter- nationale (Paris, Peri'in, 1901). Saint-Charles, F. de, "Les accords internationaux relatifs a l'ar- bitrage (1903-1904)," in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique for 1904, No. 18, \>\>. 237 251. Emphasizes the significance of the convention for France. Annual Register for 1903, London, L904, pp. 216-217. A sum- mary of English opinions of the convention. France, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. Les Progres de 1' Ar- bitrage Obligatoire de 1903 a 1908. Without date. A chart. Maignhac, A. Le traite d'arbitrage franco-anglaise du 14 octo- bre 1903. Revue generale de droit international public. November- December, 1903. Vol. 10, pp. 799-812. SECTION IV.— 190-1-UUl. 100. THE FORMATION OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE. 1. FACTORS IN THE GENERAL [NTERNATION \\. SITUATION, 1898-1901. The salient features of the international situation, L898 -1901, wore: (a) The disappointment in France as to the possible result of the Franco-Russian alliance, when the plan for the First Hague Confer- ence was launched by Russia. August. ISOS, for such a plan seemed to block any chance Eor recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. (Fullerton, Prob- lems of Power, p. -21.) . (M The increasingly aggressive economic and military policy of Russia in the Far Easl decreased the vigor of the Franco-Russian alliance in European affairs, as Russian interest and influence in KMitral and western European affairs Lessened. (Von Biilow, Im- perial Germany, pp. 68-69.) (c) The Anglo-German official relations seemed to be steadily im- proving in spite of popular clamor as to the Boer War. Indications of this may be found in the following: (1) Anglo-German treaty of L890 which had. by implication at least, recognized England in Egypt, was now followed in 1898 by treaty (never published) relating to possible purchase and division of Portuguese African colonies. (Schmitt, England and Germany, p. 111.) (2) Salisbury at Guildhall, November 9, L899, speaking of new Anglo-German treaty as to Samoa, referred to Germany as Eng- land's closest continental friend. (The Times. Nov. 10, L899.) (■">) Chamberlain had conference with Von lb'ilow and (hive days later, November 30, spoke of necessity of alliance of Teutonic pen- pie-. (The Times. De< . 1. L899; Schmitt. op. cit, p. 1 1:».) I I ) Rosebery, February C>. L900, declared England had urged alliance on Germany in December preceding. (The Times. Feb. 16, 1900. Cf. de Caix in Questions actuelles, pp. 30 32.) (5) An Anglo-German agreement for the Open Poor and the in- tegrity of China and joint Far Eastern policy was signed October L6, 1900. (Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in Far Fast, p. 237.) C282) 283 (6) In the spring of L901 and Inter the possible share of Ger- many in Anglo-Japanese negotiations was discussed. (Hayashi, Secret Memoirs, p, 11!), and article, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of L902.) A more extensive Anglo-German alliance as to European and American matters was :>!so discussed. (Chirol, "Origins of Present War," in Quarterly Review, October. l'Jll: Thayer's John Hay, II. p. 285.) (d) The si mined Anglo-French relations prevailing. This con- dition of affairs was due chiefly to: (1) Disputes as to French fishing rights in Newfoundland. (2) Spheres of influence on the borders of Siam. (3) Control of natives in New Hebrides. (4) Boundaries in West and Central Africa. None of these alone was serious enough to provoke war, but taken together they had been the cause of friction, and England spoke of t he French " policy of pin prick ." (5) Rivalry in Egypt (See articles, The Dual Control over Egyp- tian Finances, The British Occupation of Egypt, L882 191 I. and The Soudan Question, 1881 1899) which was based on historical, financial, political, and moral grounds, flared out in the Fashoda incideni in L898. (See article, thai title.) (Ministere des affaires etrang&res — Documents diplomat iques- France el Angleterre, L887-1904, passim ; Cf. Pressens£, " England and France" in Nineteenth Century, vol. 39, p. L94; Simon, " France and England," in Contemporary Review, vol. 67, p. 783.) (6) The severe rebuff to French policy following the Fashoda in- cident, :is shown by treaty of March 21, L899, forced by danger of war with England. ( Documents diploma! iques, ( Jorrespondence rela- tif a hi convention franco-anglaise (1898), and Declaration addi- tionelle (Mar. 21, L899). Barclay, Thirty Fears, p. I'll: Debidour, Histoire diplomatique, L878 -1910. I. p. 248; Despa<_niet. Diplomatic de hi troisieme repiiblnjne. p. 741.) (r) During the South African \V:n- ;i suggested diplomatic com- bination with Russia and Germany directed against England revealed to France that the price of German cooperation was a French guar- anty of German territory, including Alsace-Lorraine — a price no French Government could afford to pay. (Debidour. op. cit., p. '204.) (/) The South African War showed England's unpopularity, and her occupation of Egypt (and the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan since 1898) lacked international authority ami legal basis. (Egerton British Foreign Policy, p. 349; Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol. 2. Parts V and VII.) () Lansdowne succeeded Salisbury a- foreign secretary in L900, and Salisbury died in L902. His policy Tor many years had involved agreements with Germany. (•I) The death of Victoria, L901, was a relief to many Englishmen (Gwynn, Dilke, vol. 2, p. 502), as she was supposed to be pro-< rerman. Edward Vll was desirous o( peace (Bernstein, Willy-Nicky corre- spondence, p. L7) and friendly to France, but it is a mistake to*$up- pose (hat prior to L905 the Bong was more than an able, sympathetic assistant in relations with France. His alleged " authorship " of the entente is decidedly questionable. (Cf. Sidney Lee's article on Ed- ward Y 1 1 in Dictionary o( National Biography.) {/>) Anglo-German relations became less friendly and England re- jected the possibility of a German alliance. The chief causes were: (1) The German naval law of L900, which was a source of alarm to England. (2) The German trade competition became sharper, and the English tariff reform movement took advantage id' this in its propaganda. (3) The German press attacked England more bitterly and public opinion on both sides was increasingly aroused on Anglo- (ierman rivalry. (Cf. Tardieu. France and the Alliances, ch. •_' ; Jaray, La politique franco-ariglaise, p. 11; B6rard, Questions ex- terienres. p. 387; Schmitt, England and Germany, p. 96 ; Lemonon, Politique britannique, ch. 7: Dennis, Tendencies in British Foreign Policy, in Proceedings American Political Science Association, L909.) (I) England found that agreements with Germany were either un- stable, as in the case of China, where von Billow soon declared that the treaty of L900 did not extend to Manchuria (Reventlow, Deutsch- lands Auswartige Politik, p. L68) , or awkward and unpopular, as in the case of the joint Venezuelan blockade. (Ibid., p. 207; Thayer, John Hay, IT, pp. 285 286.) (5) The Bagdad Railway plan proposed in 1899 did not gain English support in L903, and Koweit, at the head of the Persian Gulf, was by English action (1901) pro- tected against German influence under cover of Turkey's flag. (Lemonon, Politique britannique, p. "234.) 285 (c) The Ajiglo-Japanese alliance and the Franco-Russian declara- tion regarding the Far Easl (1902) made clear to England ;ind France the danger of friction and the difficulty of maintaining their neutrality should Japan and Russia go to war. (Hornbeck, op. fit., p. 248.) Yet both France and England wished to be neutral and unhampered in Europe. (Tardieu, Questions diplomatiques de 1004, p, 31.) All (his w;is further emphasized by the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, February, lf)04. (il) The Triple Alliance was formally renewed dune. 1002, show- ing the solidarity of central Europe continued. (c) A general movement in favor of arbitration had gained ground since 1800 and many such treaties were being negotiated. A campaign for Anglo French arbitration had begun. (Barclay, op. cit., passim; Jaray, op. cit., passim; Despagnet, op. cit., p. 787.) (/') The important work of Sir Thomas Barclay in connection with the Paris Exposition of L900, the resolutions of numero chambers of commerce, and international visits stimulated general rapprochement. (Barclay; op. cit., ch. LVIL) (ff) Sir Charles Dilke renewed his reasoned appeal- for Anglo- French understanding. (Gwynn, Dilke, II, ch. LVTI.) ::. ENTENTE CORDIALE, L903 l. The striking visit to Paris of Edward VT1 (1903) cleared l he air and caughl the imagination of Paris. A return visil of President Loubet to London was equally successful. Negotiations for a con- vention began duly, 1003, and a treaty of arbitration of October 14, 1903 (See article,, that title), aided the progress of the negotiation. Under cover of these negotiations political questions wen" discussed until March, 1904. Meantime Franco- Spanish conversations were taking place. On April 8. 1001. a general agreement was signed. It consisted of four documents: (1) A declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco; (2) a convention in regard to the Newfoundland fish- eries; (3) a declaration concerning Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides; (1) secret articles. The whole group are commonly called the Convention of April 8. 1901. 4. ANGLO-FRENCH CONVENTIONS OF APRIL 8, L904. These agreements provided (See Appendix I. 68) : (e) The surrender by France of rights on the shore of New- foundland, but retention of fishing rights, in consideration of pecuniary compensation and territorial cessions near French Gambia and east of the Niger. (I>) Delimitation of spheres of influence on the border of Siam, settlement of the customs dispute in Madagascar and adjustment of the New Hebrides matter. 286 (c) France accepted England's occupation of Egypt, and England agreed to development of French interests in Morocco, with com- mercial liberty, equality of taxes, customs, and railway rates guar- anteed in both dependencies, their political status unchanged and necessary reforms to be introduced. England to make effective the treaty of 1888 as to the free navigation of the Suez Canal, and France to receive guarantees as to Egyptian debt by a decree of the Khedive, thus leaving England a free hand in the administration of Egyptian revenues. Spain was to receive special treatment and a promise of no fortification opposite Gibraltar Avas given. A pledge of diplomatic support was also included. (Affaires Etrangeres, documents diplomatiques. Accords conclus entre France et l'Angle- terre, 1904.) (d) Secret articles (first published November, 1911, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101, pp. 1058-10f)9), provided for possi- bility of change of policy in Egypt and Morocco without destruction of the treaty and the possibility of Spanish acquisition of territory in Morocco under pledge not to alienate it. •» 5. GENERAL COMMENTS. France and England now chose to be friendly ; old scores were cleared off and possible quarrels were avoided. Each rejected the more or less vague possibility of exclusive accommodation with Ger- many. Both agreed to disregard the hegemony of Germany, but each w T as free to negotiate independently. The Entente stood the tests of the Dogger Bank incident, the Morocco crisis of 190."). the Algeciras conference, the Agadir crisis, and the Morocco crisis of 1911 (See articles dealing with each of these matters). It cleared the way for the Anglo-Russian Entente and helped toward common action in the Near East in 1908, 1911, and 1912-13. The attempts to secure a formal alliance were defeated, but common military and naval policies were in effect before 1910 and their significance defined by letters of Grey and Cambon of November, 1912, which were re- vealed in 1914. (See article. Naval and Military Conversations be- tween France and England, 1905-1912.) To break up the Entente became one of the great purposes of German policy from 1905 on. The Entente, however, did not become an alliance until after the out- break of the World War in 1914. BIBLIOGRAPHY. DOCUMENTS. The most important documents have been published by the British Government in Parliamentary Papers, France, No. 1 (1904), and by the French Government, Minis! ere des Affairs Etrangeres, Docu- 287 ments Diplomatiques, Accords conclus le 8 avril 1904 entre la France et l'Angleterre. (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1904.) NARRATIVES AND COMMENTARIES. Tardieu, A. France and the Alliances. (New York, Macmillan, 1908.) Brilliant broad survey. Schmitt, B. E. England and Germany, 1740-1914. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1916.) Fine general survey. Seymour, C. Diplomatic Background of the War. (New Haven, Yale Press, 1916.) Debidour, A. L'Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe, 1878-1916, 2 vols. (Paris, Alcan, 1916.) Standard manual. Fullerton, W. M. Problems of Power. (New York, Scribner, 1913.) Badly arranged, vigorous defense of France by American correspondent in Paris of the London Times. Lemonon, E. L'Europe et la politique britannique, 1882-1910. (Paris, Alcan, 1910.) Excellent general survey. Barclay, Sir Thomas. Thirty Years' Anglo-French Reminis- cences, 1876-1906. (London, Constable, 1914.) Important for early stages. Esher, Viscount. The Influence of King Edward, pp. 49-60. Val- uable for part pla} T ed by Edward VII. Gourdin, A. La politique francaise au Maroc. (Paris, Rous- seau, 1906.) Brief, impartial, historical. The Revue de droit international public (1904), XI, 621-765, has a series of important articles by leading French authorities on in- ternational affairs. The convention of April 8, 1904, is discussed in all of its various aspects. Charmes, F., and others. Les questions actuelles politiques etrangeres en Europe. (Paris, Alcan, 1907.) Clever lectures by important journalists and public men. Berard, V. Questions exterieures, 1901-1902. (Paris, Colin, 1902.) Uneven essays. Cromer, Earl. Modern Egypt. (New York, Macmillan, 1908.) 2 vols. Fundamental for Egypt. Millet, R. Notre politique exterieure de 1898-1905. (Paris, Juven, 1905.) Vigorous attack on Delcasse. Reventlow, E. zu. Deutschlands auswartige politik, 1888-1914. (Berlin, Mittler, 1915.) Pan-German partisan. Morel, E. Morocco in Diplomacy. (London, 1912.) Bitterly hostile to Anglo-French policy. Well documented. Hayashi. Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi. Edited by A. M. Pooley. (New York, Putnam, 1915.) Important; prejudiced introduction by Pooley. 288 Perris, G. H. Our Foreign Policy and Sir Edward Grey's Failure. (London, Melrose, 1912.) Liberal attack on policy of the Ententes. Murray, G. The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1915.) Defence of Grey. 101. SECRET NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE KAISER AND THE CZAR IN 1904-1905. 1. INTRODUCTION. The formation of the Entente Cordiale between France and Ens- land (See article, that title), 1904, immediately affected the balance of power in Europe. The Triple Alliance (See article, The Formation of the Triple Alliance) which Bismarck had formed with Austria and Italy had been weakened through the irrepressible conflict of interests between Austria and Italy over frontiers. Albania, and the Adriatic, and by the series of political and economic treaties which Italy had recently made with France. The Dual Alliance between France and Russia had been greatly strengthened by the Entente Cordiale between France and England. England had also made a defensive alliance with Japan in 1902. In these circumstances the Kaiser felt he must win back waning diplomatic prestige by dis- rupting or weakening the new Entente Cordiale before it should solidify into a definite alliance. Two methods were attempted by him. One was the now well-known method of attempting to use the Morocco question as in 1905-6. (See article, The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1906.) The other method was virtually unknown until the publication of the so-called " Willy-Nicky Correspondence " in Sep- tember, 1917. It consisted in secret personal negotiations between the Kaiser and the Czar, in which the Kaiser's purpose was to secure from the Czar an alliance between Germany and Russia. The main points in these negotiations follow. 2. NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ALLIANCE IN 1904. On June 29, 1901, on the very day of exchanging most friendly and pacific public utterances at Kiel with King Edward VII, the Kaiser sent the first of the " Willy-Nicky " telegrams, by which he carried on the secret negotiations with the Czar. This first message of friendly assurances and sympathy for the losses which Russia was suffering in the Russo-Japanese war was followed by others of in- creasing warmth and solicitude, in which he gave the Czar military and naval advice. Finally, on October 27, 1904, when Russian and English public opinion were greatly excited against one another on account of the Dogger Bank affair (See article, that title), the Kaiser gave the Czar the first definite hint of an alliance between Germany and Russia, which France might be forced to ioin: 289 For some time English press has been threatening Germany on no account to allow coals to be sent to Baltic ileet now on its way out. It is not impossi- ble that the Japanese and British Governments may lodge a joint protest against our coaling your ships, coupled with a " summation " to stop further work. The result aimed at by such a threat of war would be the absolute immobility of your fleet and inability to proceed to its destination from want of fuel. This new danger would have to be faced in community by Russia and Germany together, who would both have to remind your ally, France, of obligations that she has taken over in the treaty of dual alliance with you, the " casus foederis." It is out of the question that France, on such an invita- tion, would try to shirk her implicit duty toward her ally. Though Delcasse is an anglophile " enrage." he will be wise enough to understand that the British fleet is utterly unable to save Paris. In this way a powerful combina- tion of three of the strongest Continent Powers would be formed, to attack whom the Anglo-Japanese group would think twice before acting. (Willy- Nicky Correspondence, pp. 68-70.) The Czar easily fell into the snare, replying immediately. I agree fully with your complaints about England's behavior concerning the •coaling of our ships by German steamers, whereas she understands the rules of keeping neutrality in her own fashion. It is certainly high time to put a stop to this. The only way. as you say, would be that Germany, Russia, and France should at once unite upon an agreement to abolish Anglo-Japanese arrogance and insolence. AVould you like to lay down and frame the outlines of such a treaty and let me know it? As soon as accepted by us France is bound to join her ally. This combination has often come to my mind ; it will mean peace and rest for the world. (Ibid, 74—75.) The Kaiser lost no time in supplying the draft of the treaty which he himself so much desired, and tried to frighten the Czar into a hasty acceptance of it, but this time he failed. Nicholas II wished honestly to show the text of the treaty to his loyal ally, France, be- fore signing it. To this, the Kaiser objected, on November 26, 1904: It is my firm conviction that it would be absolutely dangerous to inform France before we both have signed the treaty. It would have an effect dia- metrically opposed to our wishes. It is only the absolute sure knowledge that we are both bound by treaty to lend each other mutual help that will bring the French to press upon England to remain quiet and keep the peace for fear of France's position being jeopardized. Should, however, France know that a Russian-German treaty is only projected, but still unsigned, she will imme- diately give short notice to her friend (if not secret ally) England, with whom she is bound by "entente cordiale," and inform her immediately. The outcome of such information would doubtless be an instantaneous attack by the two allied Powers, England and Japan, on Germany in Europe as well as in Asia. Their enormous maritime superiority would soon make short work of my small fleet and Germany would be temporarily crippled. This would upset the scales of the equilibrium of the world to our mutual harm, and, later on, when you begin your peace negotiations, throw 7 you alone on the tender mercies of Japan and her jubilant and overwhelming friends. It was my special wish- — and, as I understand, your intention, too — to maintain and strengthen this endangered equilibrium of the world through expressly the agreement between Russia, Germany, and France * * *. A previous information of France will lead to a catastrophe. Should you, notwithstanding, think it impossible for you to con- 53706—18 19 290 elude a treaty with ine without the previous consent of Prance, then it would be a far safer alternative t<> abstain Prom concluding any treaty at all. {Ibid., 85 7.) 3. FAILURE OF THE PROPOSED ALLIANCE OF L904. Bui the Czar was not at this time to be convinced or frightened into an alliance with Germany. The nel result of the negotiations in HUM was a coaling agreement The German Government should con- tinue to facilitate the delivery of coal to Rodjestvensky's fleet, which was then proceeding from the Baltic to the Far Bast; and in rase Japan regarded such deliveries of coal as a breach of neutrality and declared war on Qermany, then the Russian Government would "stand by Germany with all moans at its disposal" even though England should take up anus to assist her Japanese ally. (This agreement was embodied in notes exchanged at Petrograd, December 11 and L2, 1904. These are not in the " Willy-Nicky correspondence^" but were first made known by the German Government in the semi- official Norddeutsch Allgemeim Zeitung of September L2, L917.) As, however, Port Arthur fell a few daj*s after this coaling agreement was signed, and the outlook for German colliers accompanying Rod- jestvensky's fleet, and for the fleet itself, began to look very dubious, the Kaiser no longer wanted to live up to the agreement. Owing to this a coolness developed between the Kaiser and the Czar, and the " Willy-Nicky " secret telegraphic negotiations ceased for five months. A. THE BJORKO INTERVIEW, JULY 24, 1905. In July, 1905, however, the opening of peace negotiations to end the Russo-Japanese war. the diplomatic victory which Germany seemed to have secured in forcing Delcasse^s resignation, and the separation of Norway from Sweden, suggested to the Kaiser the de- sirability of making a new attempt to win the Czar into an alliance. On July 1 ( .». L905, while on a cruise on the imperial yacht Hohen- aollem, the Kaiser telegraphed to the Czar suggesting an informal personal meeting between themselves. The Czar was "delighted," and on his yacht sailed to Bjorko, south of Viborg. Here at Bjorko, on July '24, L905, took place an interview at which only the two monarchs were present. (There is. of course, no narrative of the interview in the "Willy-Nicky correspondence." but a fairly ac- curate account of what took place may be pieced together from: (a) Kaiser's telgram to Von Bulow sent the next day and published in the Norddeutsche AttgemeiGe Zeitung, Sept, L3, 1017; {/>) Kaiser's telegram to the Czar, A.ug. 2, L905, of conversations in Copenhagen a week later, printed in the "Willy-Nicky correspondence," pp, 117-121; (c) Izvolsky's recollections, published in the Paris Matin, Sept. L5, L917; and (f Germany on tli" other, In order to Insure the peace of Europe have placed themselves In accord on the following points of the herein treaty relative to ;i defensive alliance: Article I. If any European State attacks one of the two Empires, the allied party engages i<> aid the other contracting party with ;.li his military and naval forces. Abt. II. The high contracting parties engage ool to conclude with any com- mon enemy a separate peace. Abt. III. The present treaty will become effective from the moment <>f the conclusion of the peace between Etussja and Japan and may be denounced with ;i year's previous notification. Akt. i V. When this treaty ins become effective, Russia will undertake the necessary steps to inform France of it and to propose to the latter to adl to it as an ally. (Signed.) Nicholas. Wiixiam. (Countersigned. ) Von Tschibschky. * < 'or.\T Bekkkndobf. Naval .Minister BlBILEV. Such was the Treaty of Bjorko. It was not suddenly improvised on July 24, 1905. It was the culmination of plans which the Kaiser had in view ever since the Kiel regatta in June, 1904. It was what he had aimed to secure in the fall of 1904 after the Dogger Bank episode, bui being then unsuccessful, he had accepted, fautc. <■<■. the Com ling Agreement. The Bjorko treaty was in form a defensive alliance, but, taken in connection with the understanding in regard to Denmark, was obviously directed against England. It was in conflict with the spirit of the Dual Alliance and would consequently have overthrown the foundation on which Russian foreign polic had rested since 1891. The specious provision for the adhesion of France was incapable of execution as the situation then was. France, suddenly confronted by the united force of a Russo-German alii- 392 ance, would have been compelled to choose between two alternatives: Either she would have to subordinate herself as an impotent third party to a combination of two great empires, both dominated in fact by the Kriser; or she would have been forced to give up the Dual Alliance and stand isolated except so far as England offered support before the Kaiser's menacing power. To the Kaiser it would have made little difference which alternative France chose. In either case he would have extricated Germany from that position, far less favor- able than in the days of Bismarck, into which his own unwise policy had brought him: he would have an ally in case of war with Eng- land; ami Germany would again have weakened and humiliated France. 6. FAILURE OF THE PEOPOSEO ALLIANCE OV 1905. When the Czar some weeks later showed this treaty to Count Lamsdorf, Russian minister of foreign affairs, the latter "could not believe his eyes or his ears." He instantly saw the danger for France and the necessity of nullifying the treaty. He was authorized by the Czar to intrust the Russian ambassador at Berlin, Count von Osten-Sacken, with the disagreeable but necessary task of informing the Kaiser that the treaty of Bjorko was incompatible with Russia's obligations to France, and therefore could not be executed. The Kaiser, however, refused to regard this communication as final and sent the Czar strongly worded telegrams in quick succession (Oct. 12 and 15. 190.")). arguing (hat the Bjorko treaty did not collide with the Dual Alliance, and anyway " your ally has notoriouslv left yon in the lurch during the whole war. whereas Germany helped you in every way as far as it could without infringing the laws of neutrality. That puts Russia morally under obligations to us: do ut des. We joined hands and signed before Cod. who heard our vows. T therefore think that the treaty can well come into exist- ence * * *. What is signed is signed and Cod is our testator." Nevertheless the C/ar. now that his eyes had been opened by Lams- dorf, stood firm. With Lamsdorf's assistance he dispatched a Letter to William II supported by instructions which Osten-Sacken was to communicate to the German foreign office, making in unmistakable terms that the Treaty of Bjorko could not under existing circum- stances come into operation. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The telegrams between the Kaiser and the Czar have been pub- lished by Herman Bernstein. The Willy-Nicky correspondence (Xew York, Knopf, 1918). For a full account of these secret negotiations in 1904-5 see 8. B. Fay, "The Kaiser's Secret Negotiations with the Czar, 1904-5," in 203 the American Historical Review. October, 1918, where the other items of bibliographical information are indicated. 102. THE SEIZURE OF NEUTRAL SHIPS BY RUSSIA DUR- ING THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904-1905. 1. EARLY SEIZURES. A few cases of unwarranted detention and seizure of neutral ves- sels by Russian warships were reported during the early stages of the Russo-Japanese war. Thus, during the second week of the war, three neutral colliers laden with steam coal (probably destined for Japan) were seized in the Red Sea and brought as prize- into the Gulf of Suez within Egyptian territorial waters. Hen; they wen' detained for about four days while these waters were being used as a base of anchorage from which neutral vessels were overhauled, in spite of the protests of the Egyptian Government. In response to a telegraphic order from the Czar, the colliers were soon released, however, on the ground that these captures had been made before the Russian Government had formally declared coal contraband of war. L\ CASE OF THE AU.WTOX. But it» was not before midsummer of 1904 that interference with neutral trade began in earnest. The firsl case to excite serious con- troversy was the capture, on June L6, of the British collier Allanton in the straits of Korea on her return voyage from a Japanese port to Singapore. One of the grounds on which this vessel was con- demned by the Vladivostok prize court was that she had carried con I to Japan on her outward voyage. Her condemnation was a mani- fest violation of Anglo-Saxon principles of maritime law (See, e. g., the decision of Lord Stowell in the case of the Imma, '■> Rob. 168). The AUanton was subsequently released by the Admiralty Council of St. Petersburg. 3. THE ARABIA AND THE CALCHAS. Other important cases of seizure and confiscation of neutral ves- sels and their contraband cargoes were those of the Arabia and the Calchas in the latter part of July, 1904. The Arabia was a German vessel with a cargo of American flour, machinery, and railway material consigned mainly to Hongkong and Japanese ports. The cargo was shipped in the ordinary com e of trade from Portland, Oregon. The United States Government' at slice asked for the release of the vessel and its cargo, but the Russian prize court at Vladivostok condemned such portions of the cargo as 294 had been consigned to Japanese ports. The vessel, together with the remainder of the cargo, was released. The Calchas was a British steamer, largely laden with an American cargo of flour, raw cotton, lumber, etc., shipped from Taeoma and consigned to various eastern and European ports. The decision of the Vladivostok prize court was the same as Ln the case of the Arabia. Both the British and United States Governments strongly pro- tested against the Russian view of contraband as indicated by these and other actions and decisions. 4. CASK OK THE KNIGHT COMMANDER. There were many cases of the sinking and destruction by Russian warships of neutral as well as enemy merchantmen during the Russo- Japanese War. (For a Long lisl of such vessels see Takahashi. pp. •_'.:> 283.) The most interesting ami important of these cases was, perhaps that ^i' the Knight Commander. This was a British steamer with a general cargo from New York consigned to various eastern port<. She was sunk by the Vladivostok squadron on July 23, ami afterwards condemned by the Vladivostok prize court. The sinking of the Knight Commander created a storm of indig- nation in England and the British Government entered a vigorous protest. Consequently the decision of the Vladivostok court was sub- sequently reversed, and an indemnity paid by the Russian to the Brit- ish Government. :.. THE MALACCA AM) THE PRINZ HEINRICH. Another das- id' Russian seizures of neutral vessels involved the circumstances under which the righl of visit and search may be ex- orcised. In July. 1904, the two cruisers, the Peterburg and the Smolensk, belonging to the Russian volunteer Meet in the Black Sea. made their way out of the Straits of Constantinople into the Mediter- ranean in the guise of merchantmen, passed through the Suez Canal, and engaged in searching and seizing neutral (mainly British) ves- sels in the Red Sea. A fierce storm of anger was aroused in England when it was learned that the Peninsula and Orient liner Malacca, bound for far eastern ports, had been brought as a prize into Port Said through the Suez Canal on the charge of carrying contraband. Germany also resented the stoppage of the Prms Heinrich and the confiscation of a portion of her mail. Both the British and German Governments entered vigorous pro- test-. The German Government claimed that, while "the exercise of the droit de visite in the case of mail steamers may perhaps be justifiable, the confiscation of mail hairs directly contravene.-, the 2.95 provisions of international law." The Russian Government promptly disavowed this action, agreed to return the confiscated mail bags, and promised better behavior in the future. In addition to a demand for the immediate release of the Malacca, the British Government issued \\\\',\\ appears to have been a sort of ultimatum. The Russian Government was placed in the following dilemma: Either il had violated a long line of international treaties by sending commissioned warships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles in the guise of merchantmen, or it had violated one of the most cardinal principles of international law by permitting or authorizing merchantmen to exercise the belligerent rights of visit, search and capture on the high seas. The controversy with Great Britain was finally adjusted by the release of the Malacca, after a pro forma examination of the cargo and upon the formal assurance of the British Government thai the munitions of war on hoard the vessel were British Government stores. BIBLIOGRAPHY. soi Ri Foreign Relations of the United Stales. House Documents for L904-1905, Vol. I, pp. 410-440. 708-777. British Parliamentary Papers. 1905, vol. 10)5. pp. 451-484. Corre- spondence respecting contraband of war in connection with the hos- tilities between Russia and Japan. Staatsarchiv, vol. 72, pp. 32-51. The Times (London;, especially duly 16 and August 26, 29 and 30. The New York Timeg. SECONDARY ACCOUN1 8. Hershey, A. S., International Law and Diplomacy of the Ru? Japanese War. (New York. Macmillan, L906.) Pp. L36-18T. Takahashi, S., International Law Applied to the Russo-Japanese War. (New York Banks, 1908.) Pp. 310-336. Smith. F. E. and Sibley. X. W., International Law as Interpreted during the Eusso-Japanese War. (Boston, The Boston Book Co., 1905.) Holland. T. R., Les devoirs des neutres dans la guerre maritime et les evenenents recents. Revue de droit international (1900), vol. 37, pp. 359-377. Xagaoka, H., Etude sur la guerre Russo-Japonaise au point de vue du droit international. Revue generate de droit international public (1905) vol. 12, pp. 603-636. 296 103. THE DOGGER BANK INCIDENT, 1904. 1. Till'. INCIDENT, On the evening of October 23, L904, several British steam trawlers arrived at Hull, England, and reported that early in the morning of October 22 nearly M) small fishing vessels had been suddenly attacked and fired upon on the high seas by warships belonging to the Russian Baltic squadron, then on its ill-fated voyage to the Far East. The Russian vessels continued on their voyage without making the slightest attempt to save life or ascertain what damage they had done. It was soon learned that one trawler had been sunk and five others more or less damaged. Several lives were lost. 2. Tin: GOOD OFFICES OV PRANCE. British feeling was stirred to a high pitch of excitement by this event, which was regarded as the culmination of a series of Russian "outrages." "War between England and Russia seemed a possibility, when France tendered her good offices to bring about a settlement. .:. I 111'. DECLARATION OV ST. PETERSBURG, NOVEMBER 25, L904. After considerable negotiation, it was finally agreed, on Novem- ber 25, L904j that an international commission of inquiry should be appointed, consisting of live members o^ high naval rank, three of them in the service of other countries. The commission was em- powered to draw up its own form of procedure. It was further agreed that "the commission shall inquire into and report on all circumstances relative to the North Sea incident, and particularly on the question as to where the responsibility lies and the degree of blame attaching to the subjects of the two high contracting parties or of other countries in case their responsibility shall be established by the inquiry. (Art. •_> of the declaration of St. Peters- burg. For the English text of this declaration, see British Parlia- mentary Papers, Russia, No. 2 (1905), Appendix.) 4. THE NORTH SEA COMMISSION, JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1905. The North Sea commission met in Paris on January 9, 1905, and rendered its verdict on February 25. The majority held in effect that the Russian Admiral Rojestvensky was responsible for the ac- tion and results of the firing upon the fishing fleet, but that he was not personally to blame, i. e., though responsible for the firing and not justified in fact, there was an apparent justification for what he did, and he Avas not subject to trial and punishment. (For the Eng- lish text of the report of the commission, see Smith and Sibley. Inter- national Law during the Russcy Japanese War, Appendix I, p. 452.) 297 There can be little doubt thai the firing was due to ;i state of panic among the Russian officers of the fleet, induced by a fear or belief that they were in great danger of attack by Japanese torpedo boats. The Russian Government recognized its responsibility by the pay- ment of £65,000 as indemnity due the Hull fishermen. .-,. aj'I'I:.\ismi:.\t. "The institution of the North Sea Commission and its successful working under such trying circumstances must be pronounced a great victory for the principle of international arbitration. Although nominally called an International Commission of Inquiry, analogous to those provided for by Articles 9-14 of the first Hague Conven- tion, it really combined the functions of an International Court or Tribunal of Justice with those of a Commission of Inquiry, and. in accordance with the purposes for which it was organized, it passed upon the questions of 'responsibility' and 'degree of blame.' as well as inquired into and reported upon the facts or circumstances of the case. It was in fact an arbitration mi generis, of a kind new and unprecedented in the history of international relations; for it was not only applied, at a time of great excitement, to a question affecting the national honor and vital interests of both parties to the dispute, but it introduced into our administration of international justice a new T method of procedure in eases of alleged violation- of the law of nations. It has set a precedent for the establishment of tribunals combining the functions of an Internal tonal ( lourt of Arbi- t ration with those of a Court of Inquiry for the investigation and trial before the bar of the public opinion of the w T orld, of those charged with international crimes and misdemeanors or serious vio- lations of international law 7 . It is true that the accused in this case, if found guilty, were to have been punished by a national penal sanction; but the power of imposing an international censure was vested in the North Sea Commission by the Declaration of St. Peters- burg; and, although the organization and procedure of the Commis- sion may be open to criticism in matters of detail, there is no valid reason why the principles involved in this case should not be given even a more extended application." (Hershey, International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War. ^10-241.) Though this mode of settling international disputes appears to be without precedent, there have been many serious controversies to which it might have been applied with good hope of success. A number of international incidents exhibiting more or less analogy to the Dogger Bank incident are cited by Smith and Sibley, op. cit., •1 90-319. 298 BIBLIOGRAPHY. Oil the Dogger Hank incident see especially Ilershey. A. S., Inter- national law and diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (New York, Macmillan. L906), ch. s. pp. 217-&45; Higgins, A. P., The Hague Peace Conferences (London, 1909); Mandelstam, A.. "La Commis- sion Internationale d'enquSte sur I'incident de mer du Nord," in Revue generale de droit international public for 1905, Vol. 12, pp. 351- 415; Penha, De la. La commission Internationale d'enquete sur I'in- cident Anglo-Russe de la Mer du Nord (Paris, 1905); and Smith. F. E., and Sibley, N. W., International Law as Interpreted during the Russo-Japanese War (Boston, Boston Book Co., L905), pp 275- 319, 446-R.s. For documents ami diplomatic correspondence, see British Parlia- mentary Papers on Russia. Nos. l' and 3 (1905), Cd. 2350; and Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 94, pp. 450-495. 104. THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH. !. INTRODUCTION, ♦ The Russo-Japanese War was terminated by a treaty signed at Portsmouth. X. H., U. S. A., on September 5, L905. (For the text see Foreign Relations of the Lnited States. L905, pp. S-J-! S-JS: Ameri- can Journal of International Law. Supplement, I, pp. 17-22.) The envoys who signed the treaty. Baron Iutaro Komura and Mr. Kogoro Takahira lor Japan, and Mr. Sergius Witte and Baron Rosen for Russia, were formally received by President Theodore Roosevelt upon the Mayflower at Oyster Bay on August 5. Thence they were taken upon the Mayflower and Dolphin to Portsmouth, where their negotiations proceeded. •J. PRELIMINARIES OF THE NEGOTIATION. The peace conference was instituted upon the invitation of Presi- dent Roosevelt, who, on -June 8, L905, had directed identical notes to the belligerents, urging that they "open direct negotiations of peace with one another." offering to perform any service necessary thereto. and asserting that his sole purpose was "to bring about a meeting which the whole civilized world will pray may result in peace." < Foreign Relations of the United States. 1905, pp. 807-808.) Before directing the identical notes President Roosevelt had sounded the belligerents. " From the end of March," says M. Andre Cheradame (in Le Monde et la Guerre Russo-Japonaise, Paris. 1906, p. 200), "people were saying that M. Roosevelt was to be the medi- ator * * * and from dav to dav the rumors took on solidity." 299 Says Mr. Roosevelt (in An Autobiography, New York, 1914, p. 555), •• I first satisfied myself that each side wished me to act, but that, naturally and properly, each side was exceedingly anxious that the other side should not believe that the action was taken on its initia- tive.'.' Because of this delicacy in the situation the published docu ments do not show the precise nature of the preliminary inquiries. On June 2, however, it is known that the President had with Count Cassini "nominally a friendly talk," which The Nation (June 3, L905, p. 417) thought "must he regarded as a tentative proffer of good offices," and five days later, June 7, he discussed with the Japanese minister, Takahira, the probable attitude of the Japanese Government toward such overtures. (Griscom to Secretary of State, June 10. 1905, No. 274, quoting Baron Komura, in Foreign Relations of the United States. 1905, p. 809.) The identical notes were accepted without delay at Tokio ami St. Petersburg. At the former capital "the willingness of .Japan to treat for peace has been made clear for months past.'" (Outlook, June 17. 1005. p. 399.) "Those who know the real circumstam recognize that at the time the negotiations were in progress it was absolutely necessary for us to make peace," wrote Count Hayashi in his memoirs. (The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi, edited by A. M. Pooley, New York, 1915, p. 230.) But the President, as John Hay wrote in his diary after dining at the White House on June 19, " was struck with the vacillation and weakness of purpo shown by Russia." (W. R. Thayer, John Hay, New York. L915, 11. p. fc06.) Simultaneously with the acceptance of the negotia- tion by Russia the generals in command of her Manchurian armies, Linievitch and others, protested against the act (Cheradame, p. 288) : while Japan proceeded at once to overrun the island of Saghalien in order that it might he in her hands when t he envoys should convene. :;. THE NEGOTIATION. The negotiations at Portsmouth seem not to have been published by cither nation, and are revealed only through the surmises of the press. In this the Russian delegation had the advantage, for M. Witte talked freely through Dr. E. J. Dillon and won friends among the American correspondents, whereas the severe reticence of the Japanese tended to estrange the correspondents. (Hayashi, p. 233.) This was of the greater consequence because American opin- ion throughout the war had been strongly pro-Japanese. The occu- pation of Saghalien and the conclusion of a renewal of her alliance with Great Britain (at London, by Landsdowne and Hayashi. August 12, 1905. American Journal of International Law. I. Supplement, p. !.">: V, p. 105) gave to Japan a firmer foundation for her diplomacy. 300 In Russia the meeting of the Zemstvos congress and the recasting of her constitution tended to disturb her counsels. At the start Japan presented a long series of demands, to some of which Russia objected categorically. In particular, her demand for a money indemnity and the cession of Saghalien (Roosevelt. An Autobiography, p. 557), for cession of certain interned Russian ships, and for a limitation of Russian naval armament in the Far East threatened to break up the conference. Toward the end of August President Roosevelt intervened (Cheradame, p. 293), suggesting to the Russians a compromise based upon the surrender of part of Saghalien and the waiving by Japan of her claim for indemnity. Upon this basis the peace was signed September 5, 1905. 4. TERMS. In addition to provisions for the restoration of peace, resumption of commercial relations on the ante-bellum basis, release of prisoner-, ratification, and signature (articles 1, 12-15), the Treaty of Ports- mouth made provision for three important matters: (1) Korea. Russia, •'recognizing that Japan has predominant political, military, and economic interests in Korea," agreed " not to interfere or place obstacles in the way of any measure of direction, protection, and supervision which " Japan " may deem necessary to adopt in Korea" (article 2). (2) Manchuria. Both countries agreed "to completely and simul- taneously evacuate Manchuria.'" except Port Arthur and the portion of the Liaotung Peninsula covered by the Russian lease (See article, The Leasing of Port Arthur by Russia, 1898), which was transferred from Russia to Japan, and to restore it " to the exclusive administra- tion of China." Withdrawal of both Russian and Japanese troops was to begin "simultaneously and immediately" after ratification of the treaty and was to be completed within 18 months (additional article 1). Russia declared that it had "no territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in Manchuria of such a nature as to impair the sovereignty of China, or which are incom- patable with the principle of equal opportunity" (article 3). Both countries mutually pledged themselves not to place any obstacles in the way of general measures which apply equally to all nations and which China might adopt for the development of commerce and industry in Manchuria " (article 4). Russia transferred to Japan its coal mines and railroads in Manchuria (article 6). (3) Saghalin. Russia ceded to Japan its share of Saghalin and the adjacent islands (article 9). .-,. CONCLUSION. The ratifications of the Treaty of Portsmouth were exchanged at St. Petersburg and Tokio on October 15, 1905. Russia regarded the 301 treaty as a diplomatic victory. In Japan it caused rioting and min- isterial disturbance. It is not likely, as Prof. T. S. Woolsey has ob- served, " that we yet know the full truth as to the reasons underlying the Portsmouth treaty." He believed that " this was far from being a diplomatic victory for Russia * * * [nor] would it be sur- prising if the future should reveal that Japan in her inscrutable way saw that the psychological moment had come, persuaded Mr. Roose- velt to initiate negotiations in her behalf * * * and won as great a victory in diplomacy as she had done in war." (American Historical Review, April, 1907. p. 654.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. Hershey, A. S., International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo- Japanese War (New York, Macmillan, 1906), pp. 310-360; Chera- dame. Andre, Le Monde et la Guerre Russo-Japanese (Paris, Plon, 1906), pp. 288-293; Roosevelt, Theodore, Autobiography (New York, Macmillan, 1913), pp. 155; Stead, A., Peace in the Far East, in Fortnightly Review for October, 1915, vol. 81, pp. 593-603; De Martens, F., " Portsmouth Peace Conference " in North Ameri- can Review for November, 1905, vol. 181, pp. 641-618; Dillon, E. J., Story of the Peace Negotiations, in Contemporary Review for Octo- ber, 1905, vol. 88, pp. 457-488; Dillon, E. J., The Eclipse of Russia (New York, Doran, 1918) ; Text of Treaty of Portsmouth, in For- eign Relations of the United States, 1905 (Washington. 1900), pp. 824-828. 105. THE RENEWALS OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1905 AND 1911. 1. NEGOTIATIONS. As no other country joined Russia in her war against Japan in 1904-05, Great Britain did not find it necessary under the terms of the Anglo- Japanese alliance to enter the conflict. (See article. The Anglo- Japanese Alliance of 1902.) It was felt in both Great Britain and Japan, however, that the terms of the treaty of 1902 were too restricted, and on August 12, 1905, while the peace conference was still in session at Portsmouth, a new treaty was signed in London, though the fact was not announced until after peace had been agreed upon. 2. TERMS OF TREATY. The Treaty of 1905 (See Appendix I, 72) differed from that of 1902 in two significant points: First. It applied to India as well as the Far East. The earlier treaty had applied only to the Far East. 302 Second. By the treaty of 1902 each party could remain neutral if ihe other party were attacked by only one enemy. It was in virtue of this feature that England was able to remain neutral during the Russo-Japanese War. The treaty of 1905, however, stipulated (article 2) that ''if 1^ reason of unprovoked or aggressive action wherever arising, on the part of any other power or powers, either contracting party should be involved in war in defense of its terri- torial rights Or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this agreement [i. e.. "the regions of Eastern Asia and of India''], the other contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally." The alliance was. therefore, essentially defensive in character, and limited in scope to India and the Ear East. The paramount lights of Japan in Korea were recognized, provided that the meas- ures adopted by her for " guidance, control, and protection in Korea '" were not inconsistent with the principle of the open door. The treaty was to remain in force at least 10 years. 3. RENEWAL OF 1911. * On June 13, 1911, the alliance was again renewed (See Appendix T, 98) for a term of 10 years. The most important modification was the following clause: Should either high contracting party ('(include a treaty of general arbitration with a third power, it is agreed thai nothing in tie's agremenl shall entail upon such contract inn' party an obligation to go to war with the power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force. This clause was inserted because an arbitration treaty (subse- quently concluded) was then pending between Great Britain and the United States. BIBLIOGRAPHY. H. Paul, The New Alliance. In the Nineteenth Century and After, October. 1905; vol. 58, pp. 513-5-23. A. S. Hershey, The International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo- Japanese War. (New York, Macmillan, 190G.) Annual Register. 1905, pp. -217-218; 1911, p. 159. B. L. P. Weale, The Truce in the Far East and Its Aftermath. (New York. Macmillan, 1907.) Anglo-Japanese Treaty. In Independent. July 20, 1911, vol. 71. pp. 120-121. The text of the two renewal treaties, as well as that of the alliance of 1902, may be found in convenient form in The Japan Year Book for 1912 (Tokio, Japan Year Book Office, 1912) 110-413. 303 106. THE OPEN DOOR POLICY IN CHINA, 1904-1914. 1. EFFECTS OE THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. The genera] disposition of the great powers to abide by the Hay doctrine (See article, The Open-Door Policy in China. 1895-1904) as affording the greatest margin of safety in Far Eastern affairs was disturbed by the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. The political equilibrium was upset. England's fear of Russia was so far modified that she willingly recognized the hitter's predominant posi- tion in Central Asia and Mongolia, and entered into an understand- ing with her in regard to Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet (See articles. The Formation of the Triple Entente, and The Persian Question, 1906— 1D1 t ) . The Anglo-Japanese alliance was so far ex- tended as to include Japan in a defense of India. (See article, The Renewals of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 1905 and 1911.) Secretary Taft ? s visit to Japan after the Russo-Japanese War was followed by announcement of a verbal understanding to preserve the integrity of China and maintain the Open Door. A formal agreement guaranteeing this policy immediately followed the trip of the White Squadron around the world. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1908. pp. 510-512.) ■J. CONDITIONS IN CHINA. After the war of 1904—5 Manchuria remained a region of clashing interests which was likely to breed political suspicion and antagonism even if peace could be maintained. China, a vastly larger and more populous area, while politically backward and inert, has certain basic characteristics, a homogeneous people, a common language, and culture with ancient traditions, that may in time restore her to a position as a political force in the world. It could not be a matter of indifference to the United States whether or not China's integrity I e preserved during the slow process of reformation and adjust- ment. The "open door,"' which involves political equilibrium amongst the nations chiefly interested, had been threatened by Russia. On this account the popular sentiment of America sided strongly with Japan until the end of the war brought ruin to Russian presi ige in the East. After the Treaty of Portsmouth. Japan showed a disposition to recoup at least a part of her military outlay by monopolizing economic advantages in Korea and by playing the former role of Russia in Manchuria. To meet the threatened tran- ter of all her profitable trade in that province, the United States was confronted with the necessity of entering upon a partnership with one or more of the nations involved to secure a determined share of its exploitation or of renewing her attempt to unite all the powers in 304 a self-denying agreement to maintain the equality of opportunity promised in the Portsmouth treaty. The first would have been directly contrary to her traditions, her sentiment, and her repeated professions; the other was attempted when Russia and Japan began disputes about the Manchurian railways under the following oireum,- stances. 3. JAPAN AND RUSSIA EN MANCHURIA. Complaints as to Japan's violating the spirit of the "open door" in Manchuria began immediately after the. peace in 1905. A secret protocol attached to the Komura treaty with China, December 22, L905, gave Japan a new and special privilege when China promised not to construct any railway lines parallel to and competing with the South Manchurian railways. (See summary of the protocol in Millard, Our Eastern Question. 480-433.) When China tried with British funds to build an extension to the North China Railway from Hsimintiin to Fakumen, both Japan and Russia signified disapproval. The construction of the line was forbidden. To protect the rights of all nations which seemed thus to be* threat- ened. Mr. Knox, the Secretary of State, submitted a scheme that the powers, including Japan and Russia, should loan China enough money to buy all the railways in Manchuria and construct others, placing all under the administrative control of an interested commission. (Telegram — Paraphrase. Knox to Reid, November 6, 1909. For- eign Relations of the United States, 1910, pp. '234-235.) Secretary Knox advocated his plan for the Manchurian railways on the ground that "perhaps the most effective way to preserve the undisturbed enjoyment by China of all political rights in Manchuria and to pro- mote the development of those Provinces under a practical applica- tion of the policy of the open door and equal commercial opportunity would be to bring the Manchurian highways, the railroads, under an economic, scientific, and impartial administration by some plan vesting in China the ownership of the railroads through funds fur-' nished for that purpose by the interested powers willing to par- ticipate." (Ibid. p. 234.) Russia and Japan not only announced their disapproval of the scheme. \)\\i on July !. 1910. concluded a convention stipulating for the maintenance of the status quo in Manchuria (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 116, p. 60). Japan then proceeded to construe! other lines and secure control of coal mines near Mukden. The outcome of this pooling of Russian and Japanese interests in Manchuria was a partial return to the "spheres of influence" idea, which slowlv gathered momentum after the revolution, when Russia strengthened her hold upon the entire frontier marching with her boundaries, and Japan added to her industrial investments in both China and Manchuria. 305 4. THE ATTITUDE! OF THE I MTKI) STATES. All the political activities of the United States in regard to eastern Asia have steadily kept in view the integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for all nations trading there. Its Government has been credited by others with humanitarian senti- ments rather than a deaf perception of the disintegrating forces at work. NOTES ON AGREEMENTS AS TO cm\.\"s [NTEGBITI AFTEB THE PORTS- MOUTH TREATY. (Based on Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East, 444- 450. ) li)07. June 10: Franco-Japanese convention. The two Govern- ments agreed to "respect the independence and integrity of China as well as the principle of equal treatment in that country." (Amer ican Journal of International Law. I. Supplement, p. 396.) L907, July 30: Russo-Japanese convention. The contracting parties " recognize the independi nee and territorial integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity * * and engage to defend the status quo and respect for this principle by all the. pacific means within their reach." (British and Foreign State 1'apers. vol. 101, pp. L62 163.) L908, November 30: Root-Takahira agreement. Japan and the United States exchange notes recording their wish to "preserve the common interests of all powers in China by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity of all nations in that empire." (Foreign Relations of the United States. L908, pp. 510-512.) 1010, July 4: Russo-Japanese convention reiterates attachment to principles established by the convention concluded July 30, P>07, and engages to maintain the status quo in Manchuria. (British and Foreign State Paper-, vol. 10:5. p. 586.) ion. July 13: Anglo-Japanese alliance, second renewal. De- clares objeel to preserve the common interests of all powers in China. by insuring the independence and integrity of China and the prin- ciple of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nation- in China. (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 104. pp. IT:; 171.) 11>17. November 2: Lansing-Ishii agreement. Provides, among other things, for the independence and territorial integrity of China, and recognizes special interests of Japan in China based on her terri- torial propinquity. Treaty Series |of the United States] No. 630, pp.3 l (Washington, -Gov'1 Printing Office, 1917). .-.: 5700—18 1*0 306 BIBLIOGRAPHY. Bland, J. 0. 1'., Koeent K\ cuts and Present Policies in China (Lon- don, Heinemann, L912 ); pp. 297-370. Ibid., The Future of China, in Edinburgh Review, Oct., L914, pp. 427-451. Millard. T. F., Our Eastern Question (New York, Century Co., L916). Hornbeck, S. K.. Contemporary Politics in the Far East (New York. A.ppleton, L916). Putnam-Weale (B. L. Simpson'). The Fighl for the Republic in China (Now York, Do,dd, 1917), pp. 893 480. McCormick, F., The Monaco of Japan (Boston, Little, 1917). For documents, see Foreign Relations of the United States, L905 1914, and British and Foreign State Papers, rols. L01 KM. 107. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN CHINA, 1897-1904. 1. [NTRODl CTION. * A "sphere of influence," as distinguished from a territory defi- nitely transferred, or Leased for a term ol' years, or in which a settlement or concession has boon permitted or granted by treatj between China and some foreign power, denotes that portion of the territory of China within which some power or powers claim cer- tain exclusive privileges as against another or other foreign powers. 'The so-called "spheres of influence" in China were lirst sought to be established by the various foreign powers as a consequence of the military weakness revealed by (ho Chinese Government in its war with Japan of L894 and L895. Creation o\' such spheres proceeded so rapidly that within the period of L897 to 1904 almost all of China was claimed for some "'sphere ol' influence" controlled by a foreign power. The provinces claimed as special spheres of interest were usually those adjoining the possessions of the particular powers and were based on strategic and political considerations. 'The claims involved, however, not merely a deprivation of Chinese power to alienate the territory in question, bill also sought to impress a prior claim upon it in favor of the particular foreign power for railway or mining concessions or both. The spheres were in some eases created by a unilateral declaration on (he part of China made at the request of the foreign power; in others it took the form of an exchange of notes between the Chinese foreign office and the, minister of the foreign government; while, finally, it was not infre- quently embodied in a formal treaty signed by both China and the foreign power, or in a loan agreement between some ministry of (he Chinese Government and the foreign concessionaire. 307 The various foreign powers, in cases where their interesl con flicted, entered into agreements among themselves delimiting and defining their respective spheres. These agreement while not con- sidered a binding upon China, were however intended as rrotice to third powers to refrain from seeking conce ions in the sphere so defined. A brief indication of the Location of the various pher< and of the manner of their creat ion folio? 2. SHANTUNG PB01 l '■< E, GEE MAN. By the terms of the convention between the German Empire and China respecting the lea e of Kiao-chau 3igned March 6, L898, the Chinese Government bound itself in all ca *es where foreign assistai in persons, capital, or material might be needed for any purpose what ever within the Province of Shantung, to offer the said work or supplying materials in the firs! instance to German manufacturers and merchants engaged in undertakings of the kind in question." (See Appendix I. 52. See also article. The Lea ing of Kiao-chau b; Germany, L898.) On April 1!). L898, the British Government made the following declaration respecting Wei-Hai-Wei : [and formally declares to Germany thai In establ! lilng heraelf al Wei- Hai-Wel she haa no Intention of Injuring or coi g the right* and Inten of Germany In the Province of Shantung, or of creating difficulties t')."' Ii, 1903 mining conces ion in this province were granted by the Chinese Government to a French company. 1. 1 UK Y.WO'l/.l. KEGI03 . I'lM'l [SH. On February 11. L89S (See Appendix I. 51), the 1 li Yamen, in reply to a request from the British minister for "a definite assur- 308 ance that China will never alienate any territory in the provinces adjoining the Yangtze to any other Power, whether under lease, mortgage, or any other designation," replied that "the Yangtze re- gion is of the greatest importance as concerning the whole position (or interests) of China, and it is ont of the question that territory (in it) should be mortgaged, leased, or ceded to another Power.'" While not specifying the provinces otherwise than as those '"ad- joining the Yangtze," this would include the following: Kiangsu. Anhui, Kiangsi, Hupeb, Hunan, Szechuan, Kweichou, and Yunnan. On April 28, 1890, by an exchange of notes between the British ambassador at St. Petersburg and the Russian minister for foreign affairs, " Russia, on her pari, engages not to seek for her own account. or on behalf of Russian subjects or of others, any railway conees- sioi.s in the basin of the Yangtze and not to obstruct, directly or in- directly, applications for railway concessions in that region sup- ported by the British Government." (See Appendix I, (10.) :>. KWANG-TUNG A>'D KUANG-SI, FRENCH. ♦ In the exchange of notes of June 12, 1897, between the Chinese foreign office and the French minister at Peking, the second formula stated " It is understood, in compliance with Article V of the Com- plementary Commercial Convention of June 20, 1895, that in the three southern border provinces, Kwang-tung, Kuang-si and Yunnan, the Chinese Government may call upon French engineers and manu- f acurers for working mines." The article referred to provided : II is understood that China, for the exploitation <>!' its mines in the provinces of Yunnan. Kuang-si and Kuang-tung, may call upon, in the first instance, French manufacturers and engineers, the exploitation remaining, nevertheless, subject to the rules proclaimed, by the Imperial Government as regarding nationai industries. It is agreed thai railways, either these already in existence, or those projected in Annain may, after mutual agreement and under conditions to be defined, be continued on Chinese territory. (Rockhlll, 1 894-1 <)04, p. 23.) In addition to the provision contained in the exchange of notes of June 12. 1897, regarding mines in Kwang-tung, in June, 1898, and December, 1899, the French Government secured certain ex- clusive railway and mining concessions in Kwang-tung. On March 15, 1897, the Chinese foreign office, in reply to a despatch from the French minister at Peking, replied : " Our Yamen con- siders Kiung-Chou (the island of Hainan) as belonging to the terri- tory of China, which consequently exercises over it right of sover- eignty. How could it cede it to foreign nations? " (Appendix I. 47.) This island is under the jurisdiction of the Government of Kwang-tung province. 309 (i. YUNNAN, BRITISH AND FEENCH. The Province of Yunnan is claimed both by Great Britain and France as a sphere of influence, the former by reason of geographical propinquity to Burma, and the latter by reason of propinquity to Tongking. Great Britain, by the conventions of March 1, 1894, and February 4, 1897 (See Appendix I. >'■'>. t6), secured commercial privileges, mining and railway concessions. I France, by the convention of June "20, 1895, reaffirmed in the ex- change of notes of June 12. ls'.>7, received mining and railway con- cessions. (Appendix I, 48.) By a joint declaration made at London on January 15, 1896, by Great Britain and France "The two Governments agree that all commercial and other privileges and advantages conceded in the two Chinese Provinces of Yunnan and Szechuen, either to Great Britain or France, in virtue of their respective conventions with China of the 1st of March, 1894, and the 20th of June. 1895, and all privileges and advantages of any nature which may in the future be conceded in these two Chinese provinces, either to Great Britain or France, shall, as far as rests with them, be extended and rendered common to both Powers and to their nationals and dependents, and they engage to use their influence and good offices with the Chinese Government for this purpose." (British and Foreign State Papers. vol. 88, p. 15.) SZUCHUAN, BRITISH AND FRENCH. An agreement by the Huayi Co., established by the Szuchuan Min- ing Bureau, and Mr. Morgan, an English merchant, signed April 14. 1899, provided for the working of mines in Szuchuan. According to a "Memorandum on railway and mining concession - secured by France, and French companies in China," as published in the French Yellow Book of 1900 (See Appendix I, 02), the French consulate at Chungking, in July, 1899, secured from the mining bureau of Szuchuan concessions for the working of certain mines. According to the joint declaration made at London on January 15, 1890, by Great Britain and France, all privileges conceded to either powfer in Szuchuan as in Yunnan shall be extended and ren- dered common to both powers and to their national. (Ibid.) 8. EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA, JAPANESE. Japan has recently asserted a claim to special interests in that portion of Mongolia lying north of the Great Wall and adjacent to Southern Manchuria, known as Eastern Inner Mongolia. This did not, however, receive formal recognition on the part of China until the exchange of notes of May 25, 1915. 310 9. THE TERRITORY WITHIN THE GREAT WALL (CHIHLI), BRITISH. By an agreement signed at Peking on April 29, 1902, between the British minister and the Chinese Government it was agreed "that the construction of any new railway within a distance of 80 miles of any portion of the existing lines shall be undertaken by the administrations general of the Imperial Northern Railways." The original loan agreement of June 7, 1898, for the construction of this railway also provided for the rights of mining coal and iron on each side of the proposed lines. (Rockhill, 1891-1901, pp. 317-319.) 12. THE REGION NORTH OF THE GREAT WALL NORTH MANCHURIA, OUTER MONGOLIA. On April 28, 1899. by an exchange of notes between the British ambassador at St. Petersburg and the Russian minister for foreign affairs. "Great Britain engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, di- rectly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions* in that region supported by the Russian Government." (Parliamentary Papers. China. No. 2 (1899), pp. 87-89.) On June 1, 1899, the Chinese foreign office sent a note to the Russian minister at Peking stating that "if railways are in future built ' from Peking to the north or to the northeast toward the Russian border," China reserves the right to construct such roads, but that if it is proposed to have such construction undertaken by another nation, the proposal shall be first made to the Russian Government." The Russian minister in his reply of June 17, 1899, acknowledging the receipt of the foregoing, referred to its as agree- ing that if railways are in future built from Peking to the north or to the northeast toward the Russian border, no matter in what di- rection " Russia should be given the preference." 13. CONCLUSION. The notes sent by Secretary Hay in 1899 to the various powers in regard to the maintenance of the "open door" in China (See Appen- dix I, 61), and to which formal assent was given by all the powers, related to "spheres of whatever influence" and was not intended to be restricted in its operation to leased ports. The subsequent agree- ments concluded by Russia with China providing for exclusive priv- ileges in Manchuria were considered by Secretary Hay as violations of the pledges made to the United States. The policy was seriously threatened at the time of the Boxer Rebellion (See article, The Boxer Uprising), when, as a consequence of the military expedition under- taken by the powers and the occupation of Chinese territory by for- 311 eign troops, it was feared that advantage might be taken of the occasion to seek the extension or addition of spheres of influence. This was, however, forestalled by the Anglo-German agreement of 11)00, to which the other powers adhered. (Appendix 1, 03.) The Russo-Japanese War of 1904—5 resulted in a shifting of the spheres of influence of the respective powers in Manchuria and Mongolia, while as a result of the military operations conducted by Japan against Germany, following the outbreak of the European War in 1914, there resulted a replacing of German influence by that of Japanese in the Province of Shantung. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Rockhill, W. W. " Treaties and Conventions with or concerning China and Korea, 1894-1904." (Washington, Government Print- ing Office, 1904.) Supplement to the foregoing, containing treaties, etc., concluded between October. 1904, and January, 1908. Published by the Department of State, Division of Far Eastern Affairs as In- formation Series No. 4-A, and printed at the Government Printing Office, Washington, 1908. A third volume, bringing the agreements down to date, is now in preparation, compiled by W. V. MacMurray, of the Department of State, and which will shortly be published by the Carnegie Institute at Washington, D. C. Hertslet. China Treaties. (London, 1908.) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1897-1910. Millard, T. F. " Our Eastern Question." (New York, The Cen- tury Co., 1916.) Appendix contains the text of diplomatic docu- ments respecting China. Map, p. 381, shows the division of China into spheres of influence. Moore, J. B. Internationa] Law Digest. (Washington, Govern- ment Printing Office, 1906.) Vol. V, pp. 533-552. Westlake, J. International Law. (Cambridge, University Press, 1910.) Part I, pp. 130-136. Tvau, T. Z. The Legal Obligations Arising Out of Treaty Rela- tions Between China and Other States. (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1917.) Gowen, H. H. An Outline History of China. (Boston, Sherman, 1913.) 108. RAILWAY CONCESSIONS IN CHINA, 1863-1914. 1. INTRODUCTION. The history of railway development in China prior to 1914 may be divided into three periods. In the first or experimental stage, 1863- 1894, the opening years were characterized by attempts to persuade the Chinese to permit the building of railways, and the closing years 312 by efforts on the part of the Chinese to construct a railway net with- out the aid of foreigners. The second was the so-called "battle of concessions" period, 1895-1905. In the third, 190(5-1911, China at- tempted to formulate a national policy in regard to railroads. •2. THE WOOSUNG RAILWAY, 1876. China's railway history began with the Woosung Railway, of 2 feet 6 inches guage, built by foreign enterprise and formally opened on June 30, 187(5. It was subsequently " redeemed '' by the Chinese, and in 1877, the rails were torn up and shipped to Formosa. Ten years later, however, a railway was in operation between Long- shan and Tientsin — the nucleus of the present Peking-Mukden Kail- way — and in L897 the section from Peking to Tientsin was opened. This article deals mainly with the second of these periods. Con- cessions authorizing the construction of railways were sought for as part of the mechanism by which spheres of influence might be estab- lished (See article, Spheres of Influence in China, 1897-1901), terri- tory acquired by lease for a definite term of years, and commercial, financial, mining, and even strategic rights and privileges exploited. A very complicated situation was thus developed, involving China in disputes with the powers and the powers with each other. .;. THE SCRAMBLE FOR RAILWAY CONCESSIONS, 1895-1905. The scramble for concessions began in 1895, when France and Russia claimed from the Chinese Government some compensation for the services rendered in connection with the retrocession to China of the Liaotung Peninsula, which had been ceded to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. (See article. The Treaty of Shimonoscki.) In treaties signed on June 8, 1895,. France, in addition to a rectification of the frontiers between China and Indo-China and the grant of mining rights in Yunnan Province, obtained the right to extend the military railways already built, and those in prospect, in Indo- China, into Chinese territory (Archives Diplomatique?, second series, vol. 56, pp. 340-343). Russia in 1896 (See Article, The Cassini con- vention) obtained the right to construct a railway across the Man- churia from a point near Stretensk. on the main line of the Trans- Siberian Railway, to Vladivostok, a distance of some 1,400 miles, 960 of which were to be in Chinese territory. This concession was ex- tended two years later, March 27, 1898 (Rockhill, Treaties, China, and Korea, 1*94-1904, pp. 51-52). permitting Russia to construct a line from a point on the road mentioned above (Harbin) to Port Arthur, approximately 400 miles. In 1897 (Convention of February 4, 1896, Rockhill, Treaties, China and Korea, 1891-1904, pp. 40-44) Great Britain obtained a :U3 concession to connect Burmah and Yunnan Province by rail, and what was still more significant, perhaps, a guarantee from China that she would not alienate to any other power any part of the Yangtsze Valley. In this same year Germany seized Kiao-chau Bay. and in March of 1898, in a formal convention, obtained among other things the right to construct a triangular system of railways in Shantung Province. (See article. The Leasing of Kiao-chau by Germany, 1898.) As a result of these concessions, China permitted the establishment of four systems of railways, three of them designed to bring her neighbors by rail to her doors, the Russians on the north and the French and British from the south and west, the fourth establishing Germany on the borders of the metropolitan province. Without any doubt these concessions were mainly for strategic purposes. 4. RAILWAYS CONSTRUCTED OH CONTROLLED BY CHINA. In an altogether different category from the four systems men- tioned above are several railway enteprises which were initiated more or loss by China. Their construction was undertaken for com- mercial purposes, though even in these cases political considerations were of some importance. First, the Peking-Hankow line, a trunk line of some (550 or 700 miles in length, was granted to a Franco- Belgian syndicate in May, 1907. The concession involved the build- ing of the road only. (Roekhill, Treaties, 1891-1901, pp. 225-230.) Construction was begun in 1898 and the road was opened to traffic in December, 1905. It was built from a loan of £1,500,000 from Franco- Belgian capitalists, which was redeemed in 1908 from a loan of £5,000,000 from Anglo-French capitalists secured upon sundry taxes. The railway reverted to Chinese control on January 1, 1909. In 1898 the British obtained a number of concessions for the con- struction of railways in the Yangtsze Valley and in south and south- western China (Ibid., pp. 281-304). The British and Germans together obtained the right to build a line from Tientsin to Pukow, opposite Nanking. The construction of the northern (German) sec- tion of this line was begun on July 1, 1908, and it was formally completed on March 31. 1913. The construction of the southern (British) section line was begun in February, 1909, and opened to traffic in June, 1912. The Peking Syndicate, an Anglo-Italian com- bination, obtained mining and railway concessions in the Provinces of Shansi and Honan north of the Yellow River (Ibid., pp. 305-308). The Russo-Chinese Bank secured the right to build a line from Chengting, on the Peking-Hankow road, to Taiyuan, the capital city of Shansi Province (Ibid., pp. 309-310). French capitalists in Sep- tember. 1899. signed an agreement by the terms of which thejr ob- tained the right to construct the Lungchow-Xanking road. 314 ... THE ATTEMPT TO FORMULATE A NATIONAL RAILWAY POLICY, 1S9S. This period of concession grabbing was brought to an end by the action of the Chinese Government in creating in August, 1898, the board of mines and railways, which along with the Tsung-li Yamen. memoralized the throne to the effect that "with the exception of the trunk and branch lines already arranged for and sanctioned, the construction of which will be proceeded with in order, no other lines shall be undertaken for the present." The memorial was approved by the throne and its contents notified to the powers. About the time this decree was issued the British minister in Peking in a dispatch, subsequently printed in the Blue Book, "Affairs of China" (No. 1, (1889)* pp. 341-317) summarized the concessions granted to all nations up to November 23, 1898. The total length of line represented was approximately 6,420 miles, divided according to the nationality of the concessionaries as follows: British. 2,800 miles in 9 different concessions: Russian, 1,530 miles in 3 different concessions; German, 720 miles in 2 different conces- sions: Belgian. 750 miles in 1 concession; French. 120 miles in 3 different concessions: and American, 300 miles in 1 concession. SITUATION IN 1910. In 1916 China possessed 6,167 miles of railways, with 2,300 miles more under construction. An imperial edict of May 9, 1911, ordered that all trunk lines, under construction or projected, were to be taken over by the government, while branch railways were to be allowed to be undertaken by the people according to their ability. This order, which contributed greatly to the unrest that resulted in the revolution of 1911, had special reference to the Szeclman-Hupeb Railway and the Canton-Hankow Railway. Under the Republic there has been a deeper sense of the advantages of a national system, and steps have been taken to nationalize railway expansion in China. China has in mind a vast program of railway expansion, but lacks the financial resources to carry it out. BIBLIOGRAPHY. SOURCES. British Parliamentary Papers, Chinese Affairs, volumes for the years 1891-1901. French Documents Diplomatiques, China, volumes for the years 1894-1901. Rockhill, vV. W. Treaties and Conventions with and concerning China and Korea (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1901). Contains nearly all of the important concessions. 315 SECONDARY COOKS. Anderson, G. E. Eailway Situation in China. Special Consular Reports. (No. 48, Washington, D. C, 1911.) Hornbeck, S. K. Contemporary Politics in the Far East. (New York, Appleton, 1916.) Chaps. XII and XVII. Hsu, M. C. Railway Problems in China. (New York, Columbia University, 1915.) A doctoral dissertation which contains (Chap. Ill) a brief account of the subject under consideration. Kent, P. H. Railway Enterprise in China. (London, Edward Arnold, 1907.) In the appendices to this book are printed a num- ber of agreements between China and the concessionaries. It also contains a series of excellent maps. 109. CHINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1905-1914. 1. INTRODUCTION. Some of the most important Chino- Japanese relations during 1905- 1914 are covered by the article. The Question of South Manchuria. 1904-1914. But there remain some considerations of general policy and a few particular incidents illustrating that policy which should be considered. 2. TREATY OF PEKING, 1905, AND SECRET PROTOCOLS. The limitations imposed upon Chinese activities in Manchuria by Japan in the Treaty of Peking, signed on December 22, 1905. and more especially in the secret protocols of the same date (Rockhill, Treaties Relating to China and Korea, 1904-1908, pp. 131-140), were not relished by the Chinese. This was particularly true of article 3 of the secret protocols (See Millard, T. F.. Our Eastern Question, p. 431), which bound the Chinese Government, "for the purpose of protecting the interests of the South Manchurian Railway, not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of said railway, any main line in the neighborhood of and parallel to that railway, or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of the above- mentioned railway." 3. CHINESE POLICY OF OBSTRUCTION. Consequently China followed a policy of obstruction to Japanese- plans, more particularly in connection with the Fakumen Railway scheme (See article. The Question of South Manchuria. 1904-1914) and the Antung Railway controversy. This policy was later abandoned to a certain extent, more espe- cially after the Russo-Japanese entente of 1910 (See article. The 316 Question of South Manchuria); but Chinese susceptibilities were fre- quently outraged by Japan's conduct apropos of certain incidents which occurred from time to time and which were calculated to dis- turb the harmony of Chino- Japanese relations, had such harmony existed. I. Till' (HANOI, I AFFAIR, 1911. There were many such incidents, but only a lew of them attained wide publicity. One of these was 1 he Changli affair. On September 11, 1911, some Japanese soldiers at the railway station in Changli (just outside of Manchuria) filched some fruit from a Chinese ped dler. A Chinese policeman who delected them in the act. compelled them to restore the stolen goods. Thai nighl the soldiers returned and provoked a quarrel with another peddler. The policeman again interfered when 40 armed Japanese soldiers appeared and, surround- ing the station, demanded from (he Chinese officer at the station the surrender of the policeman. Upon being asked to return the next day, the enraged Japanese not only killed the Chinese officer, but fired into a group of Chinese policemen and civilians with the result that four policemen and one civilian were killed. After Loot- ing the railway station the Japanese soldiers also Looted the Chinese police station. When a Chinese magistrate arrived on the scene, he was seized by the Japanese, taken to their barracks, and threat- ened with death unless ho signed a report of the proceedings which they had written. There being a divergence in the Chinese and Japanese version of the facts in the ease, both sides appointed members of a commission which, after an investigation, confirmed the Chinese version. China then made four moderate demands for compensation, but these were ignored until nearly a year later, when the Japanese Government agreed to pay $13,000 (in Mexican currency) to the families of the five murdered policemen and to order their railway guards to apolo- gize to the Chinese magistrate at Changli. 5. THE NANKING AFFAIR, 1913. Another of these incidents was the Nanking affair. When Nanking was surrendered by the rebels on September ;> >. L913, there followed several days of riot and looting. Among others two Japanese bar- bers and two shopkeepers were killed. The Japanese Government at once made the following six demands: (1) The execution in the presence of the Japanese consul of the soldiers who killed the Japanese and looted the Japanese shops, as also the execution or severe punishment of their superior officers. ( k J) That (Jen. Chang Hsun and his officers be severely repri- manded immediately after the execution. 317 (3) That Gen. Chang proceed in person to the Japanese consulate, and express his regrets, (4) That an indemnity be paid to the families of the dead and to the proprietors of the shops that were looted. (5) That the entire regiment to which the guilty soldiers belonged should march to the Japanese consulate and salute with their arms. (6) That the Chinese Government apologize to the Japanese Gov- ernment. These demands were accepted by the Chinese Government and an indemnity of $641,845 (Mexican) was paid. BIBLIOGRAPHY. On Chino-Japanese relations during this period see especially: Hornbeck, S. K., Contemporary Politics in the Far East (New York; Applcton. L916), chs. II & L5; Millard, T. F., America and the Far Eastern Question (New York, Moffat, L909), passim: Law- ton, L., Empires of the Far Fast (in 2 vols., London. Richards, 1912), Vol. [I, Book VII, passim; Millard, T. F., Our Eastern Question (New York, Century Co., 1916), ch. 1; and various works by B. L. Putnam Weale. For an account of the Changli and Nanking incidents see ('row, C, Japan and America (New York, McBride, 1916), pp. -211-247. 110. JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH KOREA, 1904-1910. 1. TREATY OF 1804. On February 23, 1904, within a few weeks after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan negotiated a protocol with the Korean Government in which she guaranteed the "independence and terri- torial integrity of the Korean Empire," and agreed to protect Korea against the "aggressions of a third power or internal disturbances.' 1 In return the Korean Government undertook to "place full confi- dence in the Imperial Government of Japan, and adopt the advice of the latter regarding improvements in administration." It also gave to Japan the right to "occupy, when circumstances require it, such places as may be necessary from the strategical point of view." (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 98, p. 842.) 2. THE PROTOCOL OF 1904. On August 22, 1904, a new agreement was signed. By the third article Korea agreed: "When concluding any treaty with a foreign power or other important transaction in the nature of agreements granting special rights to individual foreigners, and so forth, the Korean Government will consult the Government of Japan." Korea 318 also agreed to engage two officials recommended by the Japanese Government. One was to act as financial adviser. His advice was to be " sought and followed in all financial matters." The other was to serve as diplomatic adviser. His advice was to be " sought ami fol- lowed in all international questions of an important nature." (Ibid., vol. 98, p. 843.) .-,. CONVENTION OF 1905. On November 17, 1905, Marquis Ito. acting for Japan at Seoul, secured the signing of a convention which gave Japan complete con- trol over the external affairs of Korea. The Government of Korea agreed "'not to conclude hereafter any act or engagement having an international character except through the medium of the Govern- ment of Japan.'' A Japanese resident general was to reside at Seoul "primarily for the purpose of taking charge of and directing matters relating to diplomatic affairs/' (Ibid., vol. 98. pp. 1139-1140.) 4. CONVENTION OF 190 7. * Three Koreans, who claimed to act by the authority of the Em- peror of Korea, appeared at the Hague during the Peace Conference of 1907 and issued an appeal to the delegates. Their action, if author- ized, was a violation of the convention of 1905. The incident led directly to a situation which resulted in the abdication of the Em- peror of Korea m favor of the Crown Prince on July 19 and the con- clusion on July 24 of a new convention which gave Japan control over the internal affairs of Korea. By the terms of this instrument Korea agreed to " act under the guidance of the Resident-General in respect to reforms in administration;" "not to enact any laws, ordinances. or regulations, nor to take any important measures of administration without the previous assent of the Resident-General ; " that appoint- ment and dismissal of all high officials should be made upon the con- currence of the Resident-General. Korea also agreed to " appoint as Korean officials Japanese subjects recommended by the Resident- General " and that no foreigners should be engaged without his con- sent. (Ibid. vol. 101, p. 280.) 5. THE TREATY OF ANNEXATION, AUGUST 2 2, 1910. The attempt to govern Korea indirectly by a Resident-General en- countered internal disturbances and difficulties. In 1909 Marquis Ito, who had recently retired from the office of Resident-General, wa • assassinated and an attempt was made shortly afterward to kill the Korean prime minister. This condition of affairs led to the treaty of August 22, 1910. by which Korea was formally annexed to Japan. (See Appendix I, 96.) 319 BIBLIOGRAPHY. There does not appear to be any thoroughly impartial secondary account of Japan's diplomatic relations with Korea during the years 1904-1910. Hurlbert, Homer B., The Passing of Korea (New York, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1906), has given an account with a strong anti- Japanese bias; and Ladd, G. T., In Korea with Marquis Ito (Xew York, Scribners, 1908), with an equally strong pro-Japanese bias. For an excellent article on "La situation internanonale de la Coree," see Rey, F., in Revue generale de droit international pub- lic " (1906), vol. 13, pp. 40-58. Rene Terriou, Le Status international de la Coree anterieurement au 29 aout 1910 (Paris, Giard, 1911) ; B. L. Putnam- Weale, The Truce in the East, chapter 3 (Xew York, Macmillan, 1907) ; Maurice Courant in La Vie politique dans les deux mondes, vol. I, pp. 457- 462; vol. IV, pp. 433~441, and Perrinjaquet in Revue generale de droit international public, vol. 17, pp. 532 - 548 (1910), write from a pronounced anti-Japanese point of view. For the texts of the various treaties and conventions, see British and Foreign State Papers, vols. 98, 101, 103. For the Treaty of Annexation, see Japan Year Book for 1912 (Tokio, 1912), pp. 630- '631. The Annual Reports on Reform and Progress in Chosen (Korea) for the years 1907 to 1911, issued by the Japanese Govern- ment-General (Seoul, 1908-1911), furnish valuable data on condi- tions and events in Korea. 111. CHINA AND THE SIX POWER LOAN SYNDICATE, 1908-1913. 1. THE CHINESE RAILWAY LOAN, 19 09. American financiers first showed an interest in Chinese develop- ment in connection with the Canton-Hankow Railway enterprise in 1898, when the American China Development Co. was formed. In 1909 China was planning to complete the Canton-Hankow Railway, and English, French, and German banking groups were ready to advance to China the necessary funds. With the support of the Administration, an American financial group was formed which asked to be permitted to participate in this loan to China. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1910, pp. 243-245.) The European groups objecting, the State De- partment took up the matter directly with the Chinese Government, which promptly recognized the justice of the American request and decided that the American group must be included in the negotia- tions of the four power loan for the Hankow Railway (Ibid.). This 320 loan agreement was concluded in May, 1010 (Ibid., -281-28-2). (See article. The Open-Door Policy in China, 100-1-1014.) 2. THE REORGANIZATION LOAN, 1911-1913. After Yuan Shi-kai had succeeded in mastering the Revolution of 1011 and had been selected as temporary President of the new Chinese Republic, he planned to make a large loan from the powers for his schemes of so-called "reorganization. 1 ' Russia and Japan, though debtor nations, forced their way into the four power loan group or syndicate, which thus became a six power group. The negotiations for this loan lasted two years. The six power loan syndicate un- doubtedly aimed at a monopoly of loans to China. (Hornbeck. p. 303.) ' There was much opposition to this syndicate in China and much jealousy and wrangling between the powers. But by the spring of 1013 matters had become pretty well adjusted, and a revised proposal was submitted to the Chinese Government, only to be rejected be- cause of the evident attempt to exercise political control indirectly through financial means. 3. PRESIDENT WILSON'S DECLARATION, 1913. Such were conditions in China when President Wilson and Mr. Bryan succeeded Mr. Taft and Mr. Knox. Within a few weeks after his inauguration in March, 1013, President Wilson declared: The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administra- tive independence of China itself, and this administration does not feel that it ought, even by Implication, to be a party to those conditions. The responsibil- ity on iis part which would !>e Implied in requesting the bankers to undertake die loan might conceivably go the length in some unhappy contingency of forcible interference in the financial and even the political affairs of that .ureal Oriental Stale just now awakening to a consciousness of its power and its Obligations to its people. (American Journal of International Law, VII, 338.) Upon this announcement the American group promptly with- drew from the six power syndicate. Though the remaining five powers continued their negotiations with China and finally made her a loan of $125,000,000, the defection of the United States marked the beginning of the dissolution of the group. The British Govern- ment stood for a time by its pledges to the group, but finally yielded to the pressure of British public opinion and lifted the embargo on the independent investment of British capital in China. The loan power syndicate was at an end. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Most of the documents are in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1000 and 1010. Hornbeck, S. K.. Contemporary Politics in 321 the Far East (New York, Appleton, 1916), pp. 391-396, gives a clear, concise account. For details see The Far Eastern Review since 1904 (Shanghai, G. B. Rea). 112. THE QUESTION OF SOUTH MANCHURIA, 1905-1914. 1. THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH, 1905 (SEE APPENDIX I, 73). By the Portsmouth treaty of September 5, 1905, Russia recognized Japan's paramount interest in Korea and engaged not to interfere with measures which Japan might find it necessary to take there. Russia transferred to Japan the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur, the railway line south of Chang-chun and appur- tenant coal mines — that is to say, all Russian interests and special rights in South Manchuria. The two countries agreed to withdraw their troops completely within 18 months, reserving the right to maintain guards along the railways. They engaged to restore to China the administration of the places evacuated. Russia disavowed the possession in Manchuria of " any territorial advantages or prefer- ential or exclusive concessions to the impairment of China's sover- eignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity." Both powers promised " not to obstruct any general measure common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce and industries of Manchuria " ; and to use " their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and in no way for strategic purposes," except in the Liao- tung Peninsula (See article, The Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905). 2. THE PEKING ("kOMURA") TREATY, 1905. On December 22, 1905, Baron Komura (who had represented Japan at Portsmouth) secured at Peking a treaty (See Appendix I, 75) wherein China confirmed Japan's new position. China consented to the transfer of rights, which Russia had made in respect to Man- churia, to Japan. The Japanese engaged in regard to the leased territory and the construction and exploitation of railways, " so far as circumstances permit, [to] conform to the original agreements concluded between Russia and China." China promised to open 16 new towns in Manchuria " for international residence and trade." China agreed that Japan might " improve " the railway line which she had constructed from Antung to Mukden during the war. Each country guaranteed the other most-favored-nation treatment on the Manchuria-Korea frontier. 53706—18 21 322 3. THE SECRET PROTOCOLS. In connection with the Peking treaty of 1905, there was also framed and signed a set of secret protocols (Ibid). The most important article was the following : The Chinese Government engages, for the purpose of protecting the interests of the South Manchurian Railway, not to construct prior to the recovery by them of the said railway, any main line in the neighborhood of and parallel to that railway, or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of the above mentioned railway. This engagement was destined to have a telling and disastrous effect upon China's subsequent efforts to hold her own in Manchuria and upon the endeavors of foreign competitors to avail themselves of the existence of the supposed rights of " equal opportunity " in South Manchuria. Another of the articles, No. 9, provided that : If no objection be offered on the part of Russia respecting the navigation of the Sungari (by Japanese vessels), China shall consent to such navigation after negotiations. -» This is the key to a portion of the Russo-Japanese agreement of 1916. 4. JAPAN'S POSITION IN MANCHURIA, 190 5. Japan had declared both at the beginning and at the end of the war that she was saving Manchuria for China. Japan evicted Russia, not from Manchuria, but from South Manchuria; she took Russia's place in South Manchuria, leaving Russia in North Manchuria. During the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese people had come to expect a huge cash indemnity from Russia. There developed among them now the impression that the United States had pre- vented their diplomats from securing this at Portsmouth. Marquis Ito had arranged tentatively with Mr. Harriman for the sale of the railway lines in South Manchuria to the latter. Baron Komura vetoed this arrangement and elaborated among Japanese statesmen the policy whereby Japan should secure in Manchuria the indemnifi- cation which she had not been able to secure by negotiation. Japan had actually secured through the war and the Portsmouth treat}' great gains. By the treaty she escaped the necessity of taking the chance of a further conflict; she gained a free hand in Korea, a free hand in the Liaotung Peninsula for at least the next 18 years, exclusive rights in the zone of the South Manchurian Rail- way for the next 34 years at least, the sweeping pledges of the secret protocols with China. And while the Portsmouth negotiations were in progress, she had secured the amendment of the Anglo-Japanese agreement which made the alliance both defensive and offensive and 323 assured her the future support of Great Britain. (See article. The Renewals of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, 1905 and 1911.) 5. CONSTRUCTION OF THE PORTSMOUTH TREATY. When at various times since 1905, it has been complained that Japan has interpreted the Portsmouth treaty very broadly, the reply has been forthcoming that the Portsmouth treaty is an instrument whose construction is to be determined by and between the contract- ing parties, Japan and Russia — and in so far as it was ratified by her, China, and that it is not the concern of other powers. This is correct only in so far as the construction put upon the clauses of that treaty or of the treaties accessory thereto does not interfere with the principles of the open door and equality of opportunity to which both Russia and Japan have subscribed in pledges which are essentially international in character. 6. JAPAN'S RIGHTS IN MANCHURIA. By the Portsmouth treaty Japan came into possession in Man- churia of 700 miles of railway, 7,054 square miles of railway zone, certain mines, and 1,300 square miles of land in the leased territory. Russia retained 1,000 miles of railway lines and 513.63 square miles of land. The possession of railway lines means possession of the strategic and economic keys to Manchuria. The main points of disagreement between the Japanese and Chinese Governments have been with regard to: (1) Railway con- struction; (2) mines and timber concessions; (3) certain adminis- trative and territorial matters. 7. THE SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY COMPANY. By imperial ordinance of June 7, 1906, the Japanese Government organized the South Manchurian Railway Co. Nominally an in- dependent company, the South Manchurian Railway has been in fact an instrument of the Japanese Government. This became clear in 1913. The South Manchurian Railway Co. was given very wide powers. By imperial ordinance of July 31, 1906, the government general of Kwantung (the leased territory) was organized. This was amended January 10, 1908. The Kwantung government and South Manchurian Railway Co. have between them performed, most of the functions of a colonial railway administration. 8. THE ANTUNG-MUKDEN RAILWAY. China agreed in the treaty of December 22, 1905, that Japan might " improve " the Antung-Mukden railway, the work to be begun within one year and to be completed within two years thereafter, the 324 whole line to be purchased by China at the end of 15 years after completion. This would coincide with the year of the expiration of the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, 1923. The Japanese did nothing toward the improving of the line until three years later. They then set about a complete reconstruction. This occasioned diplomatic controversies with China, during which Japan threw soldiers into the region and proceeded with the construction. On August f>, 1909, Japan delivered to China an ultimation. The Chinese then signed the agreement which Japan proposed (August 19, 1909). Japan constructed a first-class broad gauge line which connects the Korean Trunk Line with the Manchurian trunk lines and the Trans-Siberian. Along this line iron and coal mines are being developed. 9. BRANCH RAILWAY LINE TO YINGKOW (NEWCHWANG) . After some controversy concerning rights based on Article III of the Eusso-Chinese railway agreement of June 24, 1898, Japan and China arrived at an agreement in Article II of the Manchurian con- vention of September 4, 1909. (Appendix I, 92.) The Tashichao- Yingkow branch of the South Manchurian railway line was to be held by Japan and to be delivered up to China at the expiration of the term of the concession of the South Manchurian line. This made Newchwang another base for Japan's commercial operations. There is at Newchwang a Japanese " concession " and a Japanese " railway settlement." 10. THE HSINMINTUN-FAKUMA RAILWAY SCHEME. On November 8, 1907, an agreement was concluded between the British firm of railway constructors, Pauling & Co., and the British and Chinese corporation on the one side, and the Chinese Govern- ment on the other, providing for the construction of a railway from Hsinmintun to Fakumen. This was to be a 50-mile extension of the imperial railways of North China. China had contemplated this extension for several years and tentative agreements of date as early as 1898 had a bearing on the question. In the 1907 project, British- business interests and the Chinese Government were concerned. In October, 1907, and in January, 1908, Japan protested; the protests were based on article 3 of the secret protocols to the Komura treaty of 1905 and on provisions of the Eusso-Chinese treaty of April 8, 1902. From whatever point of view the controversy is considered, Article VIII of the Eusso-Chinese convention of March 27, 1898, should be kept in mind: This railway concession [the original South Manchurian] is never to be used as a pretext for encroachment on Chinese territory, nor to be allowed to interfere with Chinese authority or interests. (Hertslet, China Treaties, I, 208.) 325 The dispute was settled, temporarily at least, by the signing of the Manchurian convention of September 4, 1909, between China and Japan. (See Appendix I, 92.) There, by Article I, " The Gov- ernment of China engages that in the event of its undertaking to construct a railway between Hsinmintun and Fakumen it shall arrange previously with the Government of Japan." 11. THE KNOX " NEUTRALIZATION " SCHEME. In 1909, Mr. Knox, then Secretary of State, resolved to submit to the consideration of the powers a scheme for the neutralization of the railways built and to be built in Manchuria. This he regarded as a logical following up of the efforts which Mr. Hay, as Sec- retary of State, had made on behalf of the " open-door " policy. Mr. Knox proposed that the powers, especially the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Russia, Germany, and France should together loan China the money which would be necessary to purchase the interests of Japan and Russia and to construct further railway lines in Manchuria. To China would be left all her sovereign rights in Manchuria. China's right to buy back the existing lines in 1913 was to be anticipated. (See article, The Open Door in China, 1904- 1914.) For the time being the lines were to be placed under inter- national control. It appears that the Knox proposals were deliberately made public in St. Petersburg while still in the stage of confidential diplomatic suggestions. The Russian and the Japanese press denounced both the project and the proposer. The Japanese Government had long since committed itself to the Komura and Katsura policy of Man- churian exploitation, and the Japanese people looked upon Man- churia as theirs by right of conquest. In January, 1910, both Japan and Russia officially announced their disapproval of the Knox pro- posals. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1910, pp. 245-251.) 12. MINES AND TIMBER CONCESSIONS. In the summer of 1907 the Chinese asked for the restoration of a part of the Fushun mines and some others. The matter was disposed of in the Manchurian agreement of September 4, 1909, Articles III and IV. (Appendix I, 92.) The net result is that Japan works and controls the coal mines in South Manchuria. A dispute between China and Japan with regard to the Chientao region on the Korean-Manchurian boundary was disposed of in part by the " Chientao convention " of September 4, 1909. (Albin, Grands Traites, 501-503.) The dispute concerning the operation of the Yalu timber conces- sion was settled by a compromise in an agreement signed on May 14, 1908. 326 13. REDUCTION OF CUSTOMS DUTY AT TALU RIVER. When the Antung-Mukden Railway was completed in October, 1911, the Japanese Government made representations to the Chinese Government asking that Japan be given the benefit at Antung of reduced, customs rates such as Russia enjoyed on the Russia-China frontier. (France and Great Britain enjoyed similar privileges on other frontiers.) The Japanese claim was based on the most- favored-nation provision in the Japan-China treaty of December 22, 1905, article 11. The Japanese request was granted, and went into effect on June 2. 1913. As a consequence, goods entering South Man- churia, at Antung. by rail from Korean points other than New Wiju, enjoy a reduction by one-third of the customs duties. 14. RUSSO-JAPANESE CONVENTION OF JULY 4, 1910. The Russian Government confirmed practically everything that Japan had acquired and accomplished in South Manchuria, as well as Japan's position with regard to the Knox neutralization scheme, in the Russo-Japanese convention of July 4, 1910. In this by Article II : " Each * * * engages to maintain and respect the status quo in Manchuria, resulting from the treaties, conventions, and other arrangements concluded up to this day between Japan and Russia, or between either of these two powers and China." (Albin, 504.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. For the fullest treatment of these matters, see Millard, T. E., The New Far East (New York, Scribner, 1906) ; Ibid, America and the Far East (New York, Moffat, 1909) ; Ibid, Our Eastern Question (New York, The Century Co., 1916) ; Lawton, L., The Empires of the Far East (London, 1912, in 2 vols.) Vol. II, Bk. 7, pp. 1109-1358; Putnam-Weale, B. L., The Truce in the East (New York, Mac- millan, 1907), passim (See index-Manchuria, Japan in). For a good brief account of " Japan in South Manchuria," see Hornbeck, S. K., Contemporary Politics in the Far East (New York, Appleton, 1916), ch. 15. For texts of treaties and documents, see Rockhill, W. W., Treaties, Conventions, Agreements, Ordinances, etc., relating to China and Korea (Oct., 1904-Jan., 1908), (Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1908) ; Traites et conventions entre l'Empire du Japon et les puis- sances etrangeres, Ministere des affaires etrangeres (Tokio, 1908) ; Millard, T. E., Our Eastern Question (New York, Century Co., 1916), Appendices, pp. 393 ff.; Putnam-Weale, B. L., The Fight for the Republic (New York, Dodd, 1917), Appendices; The Japan Year 327 Books (Tokio, 1906-1917), since 1906 (See chapters on "Diplo- macy"; and The Far-Eastern Review (Manila, P. I., Shanghai, and Yokohama) since 1904 (See especially for Railway concessions). 113. THE THIBET QUESTION, 1880-1914. 1. POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA. It is important to understand that the territory occupied by Thibetans and popularly known as Thibet is divided, generally speaking, into First: Indefinite districts on the Chinese frontier bordering the Chinese provinces of Kansu and Szechuen, controlled by small Chinese military forces and recognizing no secular allegiance to the Dalai Lama. They are under local kings or chiefs and comprise a number of ecclesiastical fiefs. Second : The much greater extent of territory governed by the secular and religious head of the Lama Buddhists, known as the Dalai Lama, who resides at the city of Lhasa. (The Tashi Lama, head of the monastery at Tashilhunpo, is recognized by some wor- shipers to have superior religious rank.) The political relations described below pertain to the Lhasa Gov- ernment, that of the Dalai Lama or grand lama, the Chinese re- gions of Thibet coming under the authority and administration of Peking. From 1720 to the present day Thibet has been a State varying in extent of autonomy, but always subject to China, and paying, for- merly real, but for many years nominal and insignificant, tribute to Peking. It is a very unproductive farming and cattle raising country of miserable poverty, ignorant and backward. Its military force is almost nothing. 2. RUSSIAN INTRIGUE. In 1880, at a time when Great Britain feared the aggressive de- signs of Russia in various parts of the world, a buriat lama named Dorjieff went down to Lhasa, became intimate with the Dalai Lama and remained with him for a number of years. Dorjieff proposed a Russian protectorate, encouraged hostility to Great Britain and in- vited the Dalai Lama to visit St. Petersburg. Both the Chinese resi- dent at Lhasa (called an ambban) and the British authorities in India looked with suspicion on developments resulting from Dor- jieff's intrigue. A few arms were imported from Russia, and Thi- betan encroachments took place on the Indian frontier State of Sikkim. 328 3. THE BRITISH EXPEDITION OF 1904. In 1004 ;i British military mission under Col. (later Sir) F. E. Younghusband, marched with unimportant opposition to Lhasa, whence the Dalai Lama fled with Dorjieif to Urga in northern Mon- golia near the borders of Siberia. With those high lamas who re- mained behind Young-husband negotiated a treaty (See Appendix I, 09) stipulating that frontiers were to be respected; marts to be established at three towns — Gartok, Gyantse, and Yatung; Thibet was to pay an indemnity of £r>00,000 (subsequently reduced to a third of that sum) : that no part of the territory of Thibet would be alienated to a foreign power; and no power was to receive any eon- cession in Thibet, territorial or mercantile, or to concern itself with the government of Thibet, without the consent of the British Gov- ernment. The indemnity was to be paid in 75 annual installments, and the Chumbe Valley was to be occupied by the British until pay- ment had been made. In 1900 a ratifying convention (See Appendix I, 09) was signed be- tween China and Great Britain approving the Lhasa agreement. Britain engaged to annex no Thibetan territory and not to interfere in the administration of Thibet. China undertook to permit no other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal ad- ministration of Thibet. 4. THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION OF 1907. The Anglo-Russian convention of August 31, 1907 (See Appendix I, 81, and article, The Formation of the Triple Entente), recognized the suzerain rights of China in Thibet, agreed that neither Britain nor Russian should seek concessions there, and that neither should retain an official representative at Lhasa. 5. CHINO-THIBETAN RELATIONS, 1910-1911. In 1910, after a dispute between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama, the latter fled to India because the Chinese sent troops into Lhasa. He was followed to the frontier by the Chinese troops and was deposed by an imperial decree of the Manchu court. He appealed to the British for support, which they declined to give, though they notified the Chinese Government that they expected the Chinese troops to respect the frontiers of the North Indian States of Butan and Sikkim. Within a year the anti-Manchu revolt so disorganized Chinese power that the Chinese troops withdrew. The Dalai Lama was able to return to Lhasa and immediately proclaimed his independence of China, and many of the Thibetans made preparations for fighting •> 29 Chinese troops. In some regions conflicts actually occurred. The British Government in 1911 informed the Peking Government that they would not permit China again to send military forces into Thibet — meaning evidently that portion of Thibet governed by the Dalai Lama. But this is not taken to mean that the British deny the protection of a sufficient bodyguard to the Chinese Amban. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Thibet, and our relations with it. Quarterly Review, vol. 214, pp. 45-00 (1911). Payen, E. Les Anglais au Thibet. Annales des sciences politiques, vol. 19, pp. 569-580 (1904). For the British Expedition of 1904, see Loudon, P., The Unveiling of Lhasa (London, 1905). On Anglo-Thibetan Relations, see British Parliamentary Papers, East India (Tibet), Cd. 5240 (1910). For the texts of the conventions of 1904 and 1906 between Great Britain and Thibet, see Hertslet, China Treaties (London, 1908), Vol. I, No. 32, pp. 202-208. 114. THE MONGOLIAN QUESTION, 1881-1915. 1. INTRODUCTION . The vast stretch of territory in Central Asia known as Outer Mongolia has been tributary to China since 1G91 A. D., though the Chinese appear to have admitted the right of the Mongols to local autonomy or self-government. 2. THE RUSSO- CHINESE TREATY OF 1881. The Russo-Chinese treaty of 1881 (Hertslet, China Treaties, I, 483-491), which, among other things, included articles relative to Mongolia, gave to Russia the right to place consuls in certain cities of Turkestan and Mongolia, as also the right to trade free of all duties. Furthermore, Russian merchants were permitted to buy ground and build houses, shops, and warehouses in cities where Russian consulates should be established. In addition to these privileges, a zone was established along the Russo-Chinese frontier within which all imports and exports to or from either county should be entirely free of duty. The treaty of 1881 was renewed in 1891 and 1901, and was again due for renewal on August 20, 1911. In 1910 Russia repeatedly called the attention of the Chinese foreign office to alleged infractions of the treaty by Chinese officers, and there were other differences which clearly showed that the terms of the treaty were not interpreted in the same way by the two governments. 330 3. THE CONFERENCE AT URG \. 1 9 1 1 . In July, 1011, owing to the penetration of numerous Chinese colonists into Mongolia in quest of bind and trade, a number of Mongol princes and lamas held a conference at Urga to consider the situation. They decided to send a deputation to St. Petersburg to ask for Russian aid and protection. Russia appears to have agreed to use her good offices with China, and. accordingly, made certain, representations in favor of the Mongols at Peking, which do not seem to have home immediate fruit. 4. THE MONGOLS DECLARE THEIR INDEPENDENCE, 1911. Taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution of 1011. the Mongols held a second confer- ence in the latter part of 1911, and formally declared Outer Mon- golia independent of China. The Hutukhtu of Urga was chosen Emperor and crowned with great ceremony on December 28, 1011. The independence of Mongolia received no recognition except by Thibet 5. THE RUSSO-MONGOLIAN AGREEMENT OF 1912. On November 3, 1012 (See Appendix I, 106), an agreement be- tween Russia and Mongolia was signed in which Russia pledged her aid in the maintenance of Mongolia's autonomy and the right to have her own army, as also to exclude Chinese colonists and troops from her soil. -In return for this aid and protection, Mongolia granted to Russians certain rights and privileges, such as the right of free trade, to lease and own real property, of fishing, lumbering, mining, etc. 6. THE RUSSO-CHINESE DECLARATION OF 1913. The Chinese were considerably stirred by these events and there was some talk of war at Peking, but a serious crisis was averted by the Russo-Chinese declaration signed on November 5, 1013. (See Appendix I, 111). By the terms of this declaration, Russia recog- nized the suzerainty of China over Outer Mongolia, and China, on her part, acknowledged its autonomy. The convention expressly agreed to the principles set forth in the Russo-Mongolian agreement of 1012 and assented to the stipulations regarding Russian commer- cial privileges set forth in the protocol to that agreement. 7. THE RUSSO-MONGOLIAN RAILWAY AGREEMENT OF 1914. On September 30, 1014 (See Appendix 1, 112) , Russia entered into a railway agreement with Mongolia by the terms of which she ob- 331 tained the right to advise Outer Mongblia in deciding what railway lines were to be built in thai region, thus practically assuring Rus- sian control over any future Mongolian railway lines. 8. THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OP L915 BETWEEN RUSSIA, CHINA, AND MONGOLIA. The keystone of this whole structure was to have been the tri- partite agreement between Russia, China, and Mongolia which was signed on June 7, 1915. (See Appendix I, 114.) This agreement in- cludes the following provisions: (1) Outer Mongolia recognized the Chino-Russian convention of 1913, which acknowledged China's suzerainty over her, and ex- pressly engages not to negotiate treaties with foreign powers re- specting political and territorial matters, although treaties respect- ing commercial and industrial matters are permissible. (2) Both Russia and China recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia and agree to abstain from all interference with the in- ternal administration of Outer Mongolia. (3) Chinese imports into Outer Mongolia are to be free of all duties and Russia's right to free trade in Outer Mongolia is con- firmed. (4) Chinese jurisdiction over Chinese residents of Outer Mon- golia is retained, but Chinese-Mongol mixed cases are to be adjudi- cated, Chinese and Mongol authorities acting conjointly. In Russo- Chinese mixed cases the Russian authorities may take part in de- ciding and drafting the judgment, even in actions heard in the Chinese court, and in which a Chinese is defendant. 9. China is bound to consult Russia and Outer Mongolia in regard to all questions of a political or territorial nature. Thus, while China is nominally recognized as suzerain, Outer Mongolia is prac- tically under the joint protection of Russia and China according to the terms of this agreement. BIBLIOGRAPHY. An excellent article on " The Relations between China, Russia, and Mongolia," by E. T. Williams is published in The American Journal of International Law for 1916, Vol. X, pp. T98-808. There is also a good account in The China Year Book for 1916 (New York, Dalton, 1916), pp. 571 ff. For the texts of the various agreements of 1912-1915, see Supple- ment to American Journal of International Law for 1915, Vol. X, pp. 239-258. For the text of the Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1881, see Hertslet. China Treaties (London, 1908), No. 85, pp. 483-91. 332 115. THE MOROCCO CRISIS OF 1905-1906. 1. THE GERMAN EMPEROR AT TANGIER, MARCH 31, 1905. On March 31, 1905, the German Emperor appeared dramatically at Tangier, Morocco, and said : It is to the Sultan in his position as an independent sovereign that I am paying my visit to-day. I hope that under the sovereignty of the Sultan a free Morocco will remain, open to the peaceful rivalry of all nations, without monopoly or annexation, on the basis of absolute equality. The object of my visit to Tangier is to make it known that I am determined to do all in my power to safeguard efficaciously the interests of Germany in Morocco, for I look upon the Sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign. (Staatsarchiv, vol. 73, p. 117.) It should be recalled that when this challenge to France and Eng- land was delivered, the Russian Army had just been defeated at Mukden (in February, 1905). The speech itself was a denial of that principle of the Anglo-French convention of 1904 (See article, The Formation of the Entente Cordials), which had declared that it appertained to France to preserve order in Morocco and ft) " pro- vide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, finan- cial, and military reforms which it may require." (British and For- eign State Papers, vol. 97, p. 39.) In short, Germany demanded that Morocco be placed under international instead of French control, and a reversal of French policy which almost necessarily involved the dismissal of M. Delcasse, the main French architect of the Entente Cordiale. (See article. The Resignation of Delcasse, 1905.) 2. THE CONFERENCE AT ALGECTRAS, 1906. After long negotiations between France and Germany during the summer of 1905, it was finally arranged that the conference for the consideration of the Moroccan question should meet at Algeciras, opposite Gibraltar, in southern Spain, in January, 1906. The conference which consisted of delegates from France, Ger- many, Morocco, Great Britain, the United States, Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal. Russia, and Sweden, met on Janu- ary 6 and continued in session until April 7 when the final act was signed. Throughout its sessions, Great Britain gave her hearty support to France, who may, in general, be said to have enjoyed the support of Russia, Italy, the United States, and the smaller States. In fact, it can hardly be said that Germany received any hearty or sympathetic support except from Austria. 3. THE ACT OF ALGECIRAS. The Act of Algeciras (See Appendix I, 77), consisting of 123 articles, laid down the " threefold principle of the sovereignty and 333 independence of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his domin- ions, and economic liberty without any inequality." Apart from regulations for the suppression of the traffic in arms and the better collection of taxes, the main provisions concerned the organization of a police force and a State bank. The organization of the police was entrusted to French and Spanish officers. The capital of the bank was divided into 14 equal shares, of which one share was allotted to each of the 12 signatory powers and the other two to interested French banks. Thus, while France and Spain were to act as the mandatories of the powers in the matters of banking and the police force, in reality they were given a privileged position. 4. APPRAISEMENT. The speech of the Kaiser at Tangier was not an impulsive personal utterance, but was delivered in pursuance of the advice of the German Imperial Chancellor, Prince von Billow. (See Biilow, Imperial Ger- many, p. 81.) German action in the matter, Billow subsequently declared, was due to the fact that Germany " was not inclined to recognize the new situation created without her consent by the Anglo- French Moroccan treaty and the action of France in that country." (Ibid.) Germany sought, according to Biilow. to substitute an in- ternational agreement for the joint arrangement made by France and England in 1904. (Ibid. See article. The Formation of the Entente Cordiale.) Though the entire German aim in the Morocco crisis of 1905-1906 can not be ascertained and established by indisputable evi- dence, since many of the documents have not yet been published, there seems no reason to doubt that the main purpose of the German Government was to break up the recently established Entente Cor- diale between France and England. German statesmen appear to have believed that the danger of a general European war, created by the Kaiser's speech, would frighten the British public, that conse- quently the British Government would leave France in the lurch, and that in the exasperation which would follow the Entente Cordiale would disappear. The course of events showed that these calcula- tions rested upon a false premise. The Entente Cordiale emerged from the crisis strengthened, instead of destroyed. By the action of Germany a strong impulse was given toward the formation of the Triple Entente. (See article, that title.) For other phases of the Morocco question see articles listed in the table of contents under sections three and four. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The most complete study of this phase of the Moroccan Question is by Tardieu, A., La Conference d'Algeciras (Paris, 1908). See also Maurice, L., La politique marocaine de l'Allemagne (Paris, 1916), 334 chs. 1-2; Diercks, G., Die Marokkofrage unci die Konferenz von Algeciras (Berlin, 1906). ch. 8; Closs, H., West-Marokko deutsch (1911) ; Wirth, A., Die Entscheidung iiber Marokko (1911) ; Bernard A., Le Maroc (Paris, 1913) ; Morel, G. D., Morocco in Diplomacy (Smith, Elder & Co.. London, 1912) or (same book under new title) Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy (London. 1915). The latter writer must be read with eaution, as he is undoubtedly strongly biased against France and extremely critical of British policy. For documents dealing with the Congress of Algeciras and the negotiations leading up to it, see General Act of International Con- ference at Algeciras and an additional protocol. By the President of the U. S. A., A Proclamation (Washington. Govt. Printing Office, 1907) ; Deloncle, L., Statut International elu Maroc (Paris, 1912, 2d eel.) pp. 55 ff. ; Tardieu, La Conference d'Algeciras (Paris, 1908). Appendices: Ministere des affaires etrangeres, documents diplomatiques, Affaires du Maroc (Imprimerie nationale, Paris, 1905) ; and Staatsarchiv, vol. 73, pp. 1-306. See also Morel, E. D., Morocco in Diplomacy (London, 1912), Appendices. Prince von Biilow, Imperial Germany, pp. 77-85 (London, Cassell, 1913), gives in brief form an authoritative account of the German official version of the crisis. 116. THE RESIGNATION OF M. DELCASSE, 1905. 1. INTRODUCTION. The occasion of M. Delcasse's resignation, June 6, 1905. was his opposition to the demand of Germany that the Moroccan question be settled not by France and England alone, but by a general confer- ence of European powers. The French Government decided to ac- quiesce in the demand of Germany and M. Delcasse resigned. 2. STEPS LEADING TO THE RESIGNATION. The convention between France and England of April 8, 1904 (See article, The Formation of the Entente Cordiale), which was brought about largely by the efforts of M. Delcasse, gave to France a free hand in Morocco and immensely strengthened her position in Europe. The convention having laid the foundation, the structure of the Entente Cordiale was quickly erected. This could not fail to be displeasing to Berlin, but at first it was treated with some indifference. (See the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of March 25. 1904, and the speech of Count von Biilow in the Reichstag on April 12, 1901. Affaires du Maroc. 1901-1905.) A year later, however, Germany showed open and determined opposition by the visit of the Kaiser to Tangier (See article, The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1906). It is significant to note that this 335 visit took place but a few weeks after the decisive defeat of Russia, the ally of France, by Japan at Mukden. Germany now made it plain that there was to be no more " Tunisification " of Morocco. In the address which the Kaiser gave on that occasion he asserted the independence and sovereignty of Morocco in unequivo- cal language. " The demands of Germany to be consulted about Moroccan affairs" writes Count von Billow (Imperial Germany, p. 98) " were thus announced to the world. * * * Our object was to substitute an international settlement by the signatory powers of the treaty of Madrid for the one-sided arrangement between England and France." The German Government not only objected to the arrangement it- self, but complained that Germany had received no formal notifica- tion of it. (Comte de Cherisey, charge d'affaires de la Republique francaise a M. Delcasse, Tangier, February 11, 1905. In Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905, p. 196.) In answer M. Delcasse, while admitting that he had failed to make immediate formal notification, reminded the German Government that even before the signature of the agree- ment with England he had informed the German ambassador to France of its tenor, and that as its terms had been made public by British authorities immediately after its signature, he had not. thought it necessary to send to the German Government information which it already possessed. (M. Delcasse, Ministre des affaires etrangeres a. M. Bihourd, Ambassadeur de la Republique franchise a Berlin, Paris, 14 avril, 1905. Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905, p. 211.) Germany now declared that she was supporting the desire of the Sultan in demanding a general conference, but according to France there was a suspicious connection between the arrival of a German agent at Fez and the expression of this desire. (M. Saint-Rene- Taillandier, Ministre de la Republique franchise en mission a Fez a M. Delcasse, May 13, May 27, May 30. Affaires de Maroc, 1901-1905, pp. 221, 223, 225.) Meanwhile Germany's demands for a general conference became more and more insistent. The chief obstacle to the holding of such a conference was M. Delcasse, who continued an unwavering opposition. On June 6. 1905, he resigned. 3. REASONS FOR M. DELCASSe's RESIGNATION. From what has preceded it is a natural inference that his resigna- tion was due in part at least to German pressure but there was like- wise opposition to him from within France. Accounts differ in the stress which they lay on the various factors involved. A. Opposition from within. — This was chiefly from two sources. (1) From the socialists and pacifists. — So great was their hostility that on April 20. M. Delcasse offered his resignation but subsequently 336 withdrew it. (See Journal offieiel. April 1, and April 7, 1905. Also Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique, II. 19.) This hostility, according to one of the pacifists, was due not to dislike of the entente with England, but to the use which M. Delcasse was making of it and to the war which such use was likely to bring about. (Pressense, Eng- land. France. Germany and the peace of the world. In Contem- pory, August 1905. 88: 152-162.) The extent of this opposition has been much exaggerated by German writers. Oncken (Events which led up to a world war in Germany in relation to the World War, pp. 4-65-466) asserts that M. Dclcasse's attitude aroused the indignation of all conscientious Frenchmen. (2) From French financiers who wanted peace. — This was voiced by M. Eouvier, the president of the conseil who, it is said, was per- sonally jealous of M. Delcasse. (See Debidour II, 19, also Blenner- hassett, " French and German relations," in Fortnightly Review. August, 1905, 81: 236-243.) It seems, too, that the Government feared that France was not ready for war. B. Opposition from without. — Besides the general German oppo- sition to M. Delcasse involved in opposition to his policy, tlfere was at least one attempt to bring about his resignation by direct pressure on French public opinion. This was an interview with Prince Henckel de Donnersmarck published by Le Gaulois on June — , 1905. (See Appendix I, 71.) While documentary proof that this interview was inspired by the German Government can not be adduced, the in- ference that it was so inspired is so clear as to leave scarcely any doubt about the matter. The closing words of this famous interview, taken in connection with the whole tone of the utterance, show" how direct and menacing was this virtual demand for the retirement of M. Delcasse. " Believe the word of the German who has alwavs had great svm- pathies with you. Give up the minister whose only aspiration is to trouble the peace of Europe, and adopt with regard to Germany a loyal and open policy, the only one which is worthy of a great na- tion like yours, if you wish to preserve the peace of the world." There is much difference of opinion as to how large a share this in- terview had in bringing about the retirement of M. Delcasse. 4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF M. DELCASSe's RESIGNATION. At all events, on June 6 at a meeting of the Cabinet at which he defended his position, M. Delcasse found that the Government would not support him and promptly resigned. This time his resignation was accepted. It was thus made clear that in accepting his resigna- tion the French Government, rather than risk a war with Germany, acquiesced in her demand for a general conference. 337 Immediately after the retirement of M. Delcasse two very com- petent observers commented: If we may judge by the present temper of the French Chamber, henceforth no Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will be tolerated in France whose policy or power is disagreeable to the German Kaiser, the German Chancellor, or the German war party. (E. J. Dillon, " Foreign affairs," in Contemporary Review, July, 1905, 88:147.) The fall of M. Delcasse 1 is the most important event in European politics since the conclusion of the Dual Alliance. It is the first patent result of the collapse of Russia's power in Europe, and opens a new chapter in French politics. (A. F. Harrison, " Germany and Morocco," in Nineteenth Century, July, 1905, 58: 35.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. I. DOCUMENTS AND NEWSPAPERS. Ministere des affaires etrangeres. Documents diplomatiques, Af- faires du Maroc, 1901-1905. (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1905.) This work is popularly referred to as Le Livre jaune and is the most valuable source for the correspondence of France with her agents in Morocco and with Germany. Le Livre blanc. A translation by le Comite de l'Afrique frangaise of a German work analogous to le Livre jaune. See above. Journal officiel. Senat. Debats parlernentaries. Compte rendu. 1 avril, 1905. Journal officiel. Chambre des deputes. Debats parlementaires. Compte rendu. 7 avril, 1905. Le Gaulois, juin, 1905. Le Temps, 6, 7, 8 avril, 1905. Die Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, March 25, 1904. Deloncle, L. Collection Diplomatique. Statut International du Maroc. Second edition. (Paris, Lechevalier, 1912.) Convention collection of the most important treaties and conven- tions. II. SECONDARY SOURCES. Tardieu, A. La Conference d'Algesiras, histoire diplomatique de la crise marocaine. (Paris, Alcan, 1917.) A scholarly work, well documented. The author is honoraiy first secretary in the French diplomatic service. Tardieu, A. France and the Alliances. The struggle for the bal- ance of power. (New York, Macmillan, 1908.) A more popular work than the preceding. Pages 170-185 deal with the resignation of M. Delcasse. The author criticizes M. Delcasse for not having taken more energetic action in regard to Morocco directly after the convention of 1904 with England. 53706—18 22 338 Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe depuis le Con- gres de Berlin jusqu' a nos jours. (Paris, Alcan, 1917. 2 vols.) A scholarly work well documented. Berard, V. L'AfFairc marocaine. (Paris, Colin, 1906.) Has a chapter on Le Disaccord franco-allemand in which the documents are analyzed with care. Billow, Prince Bernard von. Imperial Germany. Translated by Marie Lewenz. (New York, Dodd, 1914.) Supports with vehemence the stand of Germany. Modern Germany in relation to the great war. By various Ger- man writers, translated by W. W. Whitelock. (New York, Ken- nerley, 1916.) Diercks, G. Die Marokkofrage und die Konferenz von Algeciras, 1906. Reventlow, Ernst Graf zu. Deutschlands auswartige Politik. (Berlin, Mittler. Dritte Autlage. 1888-1914. 1916.) Pan-German view. MAGAZINE ARTICLES. Pressense, F. de. Collapse of Russia, Fall of M. Delcasse and the Anglo-French "Entente." In Nineteenth Century, July, 1905, vol. 58, pp. 22-33. Pressense, F. de. England, France, Germany, and the peace of the world. In Contemporary Review, Aug. 1905, 88 : 152-162. This and the preceding are an arraignment of Delcasse from the point of view of a pacifist. Blennerhassett. R. French and German Relations. In Fort- nightly Review, vol. 84, pp. 236-243 (Aug., 1905). Financial reasons for the fall of M. Delcasse stressed. Dillon. E. J. Delcasse. In Contemporary, July, 1905, 88 : 145- 147. Criticises France for having submitted to Germany. Harrison, A. F. Collapse of Russia (Germany and Morocco). In Nineteenth Century. July, 1905, 58:34-42. Connects the Moroccan situation with the defeat of Russia. 117. ITALY AND MOROCCO. 1. INTRODUCTION. Shortly after the adjustment of the Fashoda affair, France, under the leadership of M. Delcasse, Minister of Foreign Affairs, began to seek understandings with countries whose good will and support she might hope to obtain for her aspirations in regard to Morocco. There were three such countries, Italy, Spain, and England. The direct interest of Italy in Morocco was very small. But as a Medi- 339 terranean power she was in a position to cause serious embarrassment for France if she should choose to exert her influence for that purpose. 2. THE AGREEMENTS OF 1000 AND 1902. The general rapprochement between France and Italy, 1898-1902 (See article, that title), facilitated the negotiation of an understand- ing in regard to Morocco. The arrangement which was made appears to have been embodied in two conventions or agreements con- cluded in 1900 and 1902. As the documents have not been pub- lished, the precise terms of the understanding can not be definitely stated. It appears, from ministerial statements in the French and Italian chambers and from interviews and obviously inspired news- paper articles, that Italy agreed to give its support for securing to France a free hand in Morocco, while France recognized Italy's claims in regard to Tripoli. The conclusion of this understanding left France free to arrange understandings with England and Spain, whose interests in Morocco were larger and more direct (See articles, The Formation of the Entente Cordiale and Spain and Morocco). BIBLIOGRAPHV. See bibliographes of articles. The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1906 and The Morocco Crisis of 1911. 118. SPAIN AND MOROCCO. 1. INTRODUCTION. At the opening of the present century Spain alone among Eu- ropean countries possessed a direct territorial interest in Morocco. The two cities of Ceuta and Tetuan, opposite Gibraltar and Melilla, 135 miles to the east, on the Mediterranean, the three island pre- sidios lying off that coast, and the settlement at the Rio del Oro on the Atlantic coast, constituted the sole remnant of the former world- wide colonial empire of Spain. These holdings in Morocco had never been of any real value to Spain, owing to the intense mutual hatred of Spaniard and Moor; their commerce was slight and the inhabi- tants of the hinterland, the Riff, rigorously set upon any Spaniard who ventured beyond the walls of any town. 2. FRANCO-SPANISH AGREEMENT OF 1902. After the disastrous American war of 1898, Spanish opinion be- gan to dream of a forward policy in Morocco, and conversations were opened betwen Madrid and Paris. In 1902 a secret Franco- Spanish treaty was made which provided that " if through the weak* 340 ness of the Moi i Government, through ; ts impotence to secure order and security, or for any other reason, the maintenance of the status quo becomes impossible" the limits within which each coun- try should have the right to reestablish tranquillity should be de- nned according to the plan outlined in the convention in detail. ( American Journal of International Law. vol. 8 5 pp. 869-871.) The arrangement virtually provided for a contingent partition of Morocco. A.s the British Government had not yet reached an un- derstanding with France this convention was not made public and no action under it was taken. 3. ANGLO-FRENCH MOROCCO AGREEMENT OF 1904. On April 8, 1904. France and England reached an understanding in regard to Morocco. (See article. The Formation of the Entente Cordiale.) Article 8 of the Morocco-Egypt declaration declared that the two governments would " take into special consideration the inter- ests which that country [Spain] derives from her geographical posi- tion and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean," and in article 3 of the secret articles, published in 1911, it was agreed that "a certain extent of Moorish territory ad- jacent to Melilla, Cent a. and other presidios should, whenever the Sultan ceased to exercise authority over it. come within the sphere of influence of Spain; that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including the heights on the right bank of the Sebou shall be intrusted to Spain." In return for these concessions Spain was to accept the principle of the open door in Morocco for 30 years, she was not to erect any fortifications or strategic works be- tween Melilla and the heights commanding the right bank of the Sebou (article 7), and she must " undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence" (article 3 of the secret articles). (For the Morocco-Egypt declaration, together with the secret articles, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101. pp. 1053-1059.) 4. FRANCO-SPANISH AGREEMENT OF 1904. Armed with this agreement France proceeded to negotiate with Spain. The public Franco-Spanish declaration of October 3, 1904, obliged both Governments to uphold " the independence and integ- rity of the Moorish Empire, under the sovereignty of the Sultan," and a secret convention of the same date provided a contingent plan for its partition (Revue generale de droit international public, vol. 19, pp. 19-24 d). Spain was accorded the entire Moroccan littoral on the Mediterranean, with the hinterland stretching beyond the 341 mountains of the Kiff and including the part 01 Elkazar on the Atlantic, the Rio del Oro was extended northward and eastward to the watershed between the Wadi Draa and the Wadi Sus, including a section of the French Sahara (map in Statesmen's Year Book. 1912. plate 3). Within her zone Spain was to enjoy all the rights recognized for France by the Anglo-French agreement of April 8, 1904, for 15 years. Spain, moreover, agreed to take no action with- out the consent of France, unless the continuance of the political status quo became impossible or the Moroccan Government should be unable to maintain order, in which case Spain might exercise her right of action without regard to France. 5. TANGIER, 1905. It has been asserted, but without adequate proof, that a knowledge of this agreement, communicated in some way to Berlin, led the German Government to make the dramatic intervention signalized by the presence of William II at Tangier, where on March 31. 1905, he publicly declared for the maintenance of the integrity of Morocco and independence of the Sultan. Out of this grew the critical situa- tion of June to September. 1905, which ended only when France agreed to submit the Morocco question to an international conference (See article, The Morocco Crisis of 1905-6). 0. ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE, 1906. Before entering the conference of Algeciras. France and Spain concluded a secret agreement on September 1. 1905 for common ac- tion and for the policing of certain ports within the zones allotted to each and for the regulation of certain economic matters (De- loncle, Statut International du Maroc, p. 360). France later con- ceded that Casablanca, which lay in the French zone, should be policed jointly by French and Spanish agents. At Algeciras the duty of organizing an international police in Morocco and the crea- tion of a State bank were intrusted to the French and Spanish Governments. The Spanish were to control the police at Tetuan and Laraiche and to share the control with the French at Tangier and Casablanca; in the matter of the bank Spain was allowed to contribute only one-fourteenth of the capital, as opposed to three- fourteenths allotted to the French. In May, 1907 conventions were signed by Spain with France in regard to preserving the status quo in the Mediterranean, which, together with the restrictions of the act of Algeciras, seemed to postpone indefinitely any actual parti- tion of Morocco. 342 7. SPANISH AND FRENCH OPERATIONS IN MOROCCO, 1907-1911. So far the harmony of France and Spain had been maintained. But when in 1907 the French commenced military operation at Casa- blanca, though not until after they had requested Spanish collabora- tion, Spanish opinion began to grow restive, and the Franco-Ger- man convention of February 8, 1909 (See article. The Morocco Con- vention of 1909), which was concluded without reference to Spain, made the tension between Paris and Madrid acute. When disturb- ances broke out around Melilla in July. 1909, Spain assumed that she also enjoyed liberty of action and sent a military force to the Riff. The operations dragged out so long and so large a force (50,000 men) had to be employed that France became distinctly suspicious. Nor was the situation improved when in 1911, follow- ing the French expedition to Fez. the Spanish occupied Laraiche and Elkazar. without previous consultation with France. Finally, however, in July, 1911, a modus vivendi was reached by which Spain agreed to withhold her hand until the conclusion of the negotiations then in progress between Germany and France (See article. The Morocco Crisis of 1911). S. FRANCO-SPANISH AGREEMENT, 1912. When the treaty of November 4, 1911, secured German recognition for the French protectorate in Morocco, negotiations were resumed between France and Spain. The Spanish Government was disposed to insist upon the letter of the convention of October 30. 1904, but the French contended that as France had paid dearly to Germany for the settlement of November, 1911, Spain should make some com- pensation to France. In the end Spain obtained by the convention of November 27,1912 (Revue generale de droit international public, vol. 20, p. 9d), somewhat less territory than she had been promised in 1904 (map in Statesmen's Yearbook, 1913, p. 8). Within her' zone Spain received practically a free hand. As France was respon- sible, under the act of Algeciras, for the services of Government loans, it was agreed that Spain, Avhile collecting the customs within her zone, should pay over to France 7.95 per cent of the total customs collected in the previous year (about $100,000). Tangier, at the demand of Great Britain, was placed under international control. From that town to Fez a railroad was to be constructed by a single company, the French supplying 56 per cent of the capital, Spain 36 per cent, and other countries 8 per cent, if they desired. The partition of Morocco was thus finally effected. Spain was. on the whole, very liberally treated, and doubtless it was the recognition of this fact which led to a distinct political reapproachment between 343 France and Spain in the autumn of 1913, a rapprochement which proved to be of inestimable value to France when the World War broke upon her in 1914. BIBLIOGRAPHY. See the bibliography of article, The Morocco Crisis of 1911. Pinon, Rene. L'Empire de la Mediterranee (Paris, Perrin, 1904). Rouard de Card, E. Les Relations de l'Espagne et Maroc (Paris, Pedone, 1905). Written without knowledge of the secret treaties of 1904 and 1905. Tardieu, A. France et Espagne. Revue des Deux Mondes, Decem- ber, 1, 1912. Important narrative. Andrews, G. F. Spanish interests in Morocco. American Politi- cal Science Reviev. November, 1911. Written without knowledge of the secret treaties. London Times, passim, especially November 28 and December 18, 1912. Jaray, G. Les accords franco-espagnols de 1902 a 1912. Revue des Sciences Politiques, Jan.-Feb., 1913. pp. 90-102. Basdenant, J. Le traite franco-espagnol du 27 novembre 1912. Revue generale de droit international public, vol. 22, pp. 433-464 (1915). Maura, G. La Question du Maroc au point de vue espagnol. Translated from the Spanish. (Paris, Challamel, 1911.) Valuable study by a member of the Spanish Cortes. Vidal E. La Politique de l'Espagne an Maroc (Montpelliei. Firmin, 1913). Important study. Contains texts of the most im- portant of the secret agreements. Deloncle, L. Collection Diplomatique. Statut International du Maroc. Second edition. (Paris, Lechevalier, 1912.) Contains texts of the important documents. 119. THE RED SEA CONVENTION OF DECEMBER 13, 1906. 1. EUROPEAN INTERESTS IN RED SEA REGION. After the construction of the Suez Canal there developed among the European powers serious rivalry for control of the country bor- dering on the Red Sea. Through this region lay the road to the British possession in the Orient and to the French island of Mada- gascar. Italy chose this as the field for her colonizing activities, and in 1905 Germany sought and obtained commercial and economic con- cessions from King Menelek. French, British, and Italian terri- tories, surrounding Abyssinia were the occasion for a rivalry, often 844 bitter, but the friendly feeling which prevailed between the three countries after about 1902 led them to seek amicable agreements re- garding their claims. 2. THE RED SEA CONVENTION. The Red Sea convention, sometimes known as the Agreement re- specting Abyssinia, was signed by Italy, France, and Great Britain on December 13. 1906. It followed the usual lines of such agree- ments (See Appendix I, 79), stipulating Cor the maintenance of tS re " political and territorial status quo in Ethiopia as determined by the stale of affairs at present existing" and as established by past agreements of the signatory powers with each other and with the na- tive tribes and states. No one of the contracting parties was to seek concessions in the regions included in the agreement that might injure either of the other parties. They agreed to abstain from intervention in the internal a flairs of Abyssinia, and to endeavor to maintain its integrity. They pledged themselves to act together for the mainte- nance of each other's territorial possessions in East Africa. Pro vision was also made for a division of railway concessions. At the same time provision was made to stop the unauthorized shipment of arms into any of the territories controlled by the three powers, in Ethiopia, along the Red Sea littoral, the (iulf of Aden, and tin- In- dian Ocean. :;. ABYSSINIA A PARTY TO Till'. CONVENTION. The arrangements were all made during the summer of 1906, but the signing of the convention was delayed until the approval of King Menelek could be obtained. He favored the settlement which was finally signed at London on December L3. Since then, with the cooperation of the Abyssinian Government, the Red Sea regions have been peaceful, and railway construction especially has been greatly expanded. BIBLIOGRAPHY. La Vie Politique dans les deux Mondes, 1906-1907, vol. 1 (Paris, Alcan, 1908), pp. 429-432. A good brief discussion. Vincent, Ernest, " Le Port d'Aden et les Interets Francais dans la Mer Rouge/" in Bulletin du Comite de L'Asie Franchise for Jan- uary, 1906 (Paris, 1906), pp. 14-18. A good presentation of French interests. Annual register for 1906 (London, Longmans, 1907), pp. 317-318. Summary. Text in Albin, Pierre, Les Grands Traites Politiques . . . depuis 1815 jusqu'a nos jours (Paris, Alcan, 1912), *pp. 408-414, and in American Journal of International Law, I, Supplement, 226-231. 345 120. THE PERSIAN QUESTION, 1906-1914. I. PERSIA IN 1 900. Persia is aboul equal in size to the Spanish Peninsula, France, and Germany, but its area is occupied largely by mountains ;niy a group of ministers chosen and removable by himself, themselves part of a larger group of nobles and favorites from whom he selected also his governors of provinces. This form of government, never long effective of good results, had undergone decay to the point where it is hard to discern in either the Shah, his ministers, or governors, anything like patriotism or public responsi- bility, but only the desire to lead as luxurious lives as possible and to accumulate personal wealth and influence. There was no proper law, justice, police, army, or tax system; roads were unsafe; and life, personal liberty, and property most insecure. Looking without, Persians saw all of the four neighboring States, Russia, Britain, Turkey, and Afghanistan, holding great territories once owned by Persia, and the first three were strongly suspected of ardent designs upon what was left. See Parliamentary Papers of British Parlia- ment for 1909 (Cd. 4581), vol. 105, p. 1-6. Summary of events for the year 1906. Also Sykes, P. M., History of Persia, II, 487^99.) 2. THE INAUGURATION OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT, JANUARY, 1906, TO OCTOBER 7, 1907. The defeat of Russia by Japan and the revolutionary movement in progress in the Czar's dominions perhaps brought to a head the agi- tation in Persia against misgovernment and the mortgaging of the country's resources for money to be squandered. Toward the close of 1905 a number of prominent merchants and Moslem clergymen took 34G sanctuary (bast) in the principal mosque of Teheran, and refused to come out until reforms wore granted. (E. (i. Browne, The Persian Revolution of L905-1909, Cambridge, L910, pp. L12 ff.) This pecu- liarly Persian weapon was so effective that about January 21 the Shah promised, among other things, to dismiss an obnoxious min- ister and assemble an elected "House of Justice." The refugees came out, but as happened often thereafter with similar royal promises, the Shah neglected to take action. After further agi- tation and some bloody repression, the method of Sanctuary was again used, this time with success. Late in July about 1l\000 of the prominent men of Persia took up residence in the summer garden of the British legation, and demanded a constitution and a representative assembly. The Shah yielded to all the demands <>f August ■*>. 1906. (The text of the Shah's Firman is given by Browne. E. (J., op. <■>'/., 353 354. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101. p. 526.) An electorial law was published on September '.). (The text in Browne. E. (!.. op. dt., 355-361.) Elections were held, and the first Persian Mejlis, or parliament, assembled on October 7. Thi: body promptly refused to sanction a new loan from Russia and Eng land, and its leaders rapidly drew up a constitution. The Shah signed this on December 30, a few days before his death, and his successor, Mohammed Ali. though at heart opposed to limiting his powers, also signed. The original Persian constitution (text in Browne, E. (}.. op. cit., 362 371 ; Hamilton. A.. Problems of the Middle East, 393-403; Brit- ish and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101, pp. 527-534), in 51 articles, dealt with the establishment of the assembly and its duties, limita- tions, rights, and methods of doing business, and proposed a senate. Full ministerial responsibility was not granted, but extensive finan- cial control was provided. The new assembly came into action but slowly, being without ex- perience and party organization, and hindered by the opposition of the Shah and his ministers. It procured the dismissal of the un- popular Belgian director of customs, M. Nans, and voted to seek a French financial adviser. It tried unsuccessfully to erect a national bank with Persian capital. On October 1 the leaders of the con- servatives, wearied with continued disorder, joined forces with the constitutionalists, lea vino- the Shah almost alone in opposition. As a consequence, he accepted on October 7 the supplementary consti- tutional laws (Browne. E. G.. op. c'/t.. 372—384 : Hamilton, op. <'/t.. 403 434; British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101. pp. 534-542), which in 107 articles defined much more clearly (he organization of the. government, including full ministerial responsibility to the two chambers. On November 12 he appeared before the assembly and took the oath demanded of him by article 39 of the supplementary 347 laws, "to preserve the independence of Persia, safeguard and protect the frontiers of my kingdom and the rights of my people, observe the fundamental laws of the Persian constitution," etc. 3. THE ANGL0-BUS8IAN CONVENTION OF L907. Meantime, on August 31, 1907, the British and Russian govern- ments had signed the famous convention regarding the affairs of Afghanistan, Thibet, and Persia. (See article, The Formation of the Triple Entente. The text of the convention is in British and For- eign State Papers, vol. 100, pp. 555-500. The debates in the House of Lords on February 6 and 10, 1908, and in the House of Commons on February 17 are of great interest.) England had been interested in Persian trade for three centuries, and for at least one century had claimed special interests in the Persian Gulf. Russia had first seized Persian territory two hundred years before, had greatly increased her influence there in the nineteenth century, and with the loans and the new tariff of 1900 to 1903 had obtained a considerable hold upon Persian financial affairs. Russia's defeat by Japan, and the success of the Anglo-French Entente, together with England's desire to se- cure the peace of the world more firmly, especially against the grow- ing ambitions of Germany, Led to negotiations of which something was known some time before their termination. (Browne, E. G., op. cit., 175 says for " more than two years." A question was asked in the British Parliament about pending negotiations with Russia on March 29. 1906: Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, vol. 154, p. 1534.) The agreement provided for amicable relations between England and Russia, who had been suspicious rivals almost constantly for nearly a century. Two spheres of influence were marked off in Per- sia. Russia's sphere in the north of Persia contained 48 per cent of the area, 72 per cent of the population, 11 of the 12 largest cities, and 7 of the 11 principal trade routes. (See Statesman's Year Book, year 1916, p. 1221, and Lord Curzon's speech in the House of Lords, Feb- ruary 6, 1908. Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series, vol. 183, pp. 999- 1024, esp. pp. 1004-1010.) Britain's sphere was in the desert country of the southeast, containing 22 per cent of the area, 7 per cent of the population, 1 of the 12 largest cities, and 1 of the 11 chief trade routes. There remained a third zone which contained 30 per cent of the area, and 21 per cent of the population. British trade inter- ests were slight in the British sphere, extensive in the unallotted sphere, and predominant over the Russian in Yezd and Ispahan of the Russian sphere. Article 5 proposed joint action in case of default in payment of debts to the two countries. Both in the convention and the public announcements of the time it was strongly affirmed that the independence and integrity of Persia were to be maintained. 348 (See the official statement to the Persian Government, Sept. 11, 1907, in Parliamentary Papers, 1909 (Cd. 4581), p. 48, and 1912 (Cd. 6077), p. 1.) The exact sense in which these assurances were intended to be un- derstood has since been the subject of much controversy. On the one hand they have been interpreted, especially by critics of Sir Ed- ward Grey's foreign policy, as constituting a pledge that the free action of the Persian Government would suffer no material abridg- ment and that neither Russia nor Great Britain would seek to estab- lish a permanent controlling power in any pari of Persia. On the other hand it has been held that the article of the convention relating to the independence and integrity of Persia should not be interpreted in such a way as to destroy or materially restrict the operation of the articles which create the spheres of influence and that these arti- cles clearly look forward to political control and possibly to annex ation. Subsequent events indicate that the latter was the Russian, but perhaps not the British view. The debates in Parliament ishow that Russia was not willing to enter into the convention for less than the surprisingly large area conceded to her and that England was so eager to come to an agreement with Russia that she made a willing sacrifice. Quite apart from the controversy over the correct interpretation there has been and probably will long continue to be much difference of opinion in regard to the fairness and wisdom of the convention of 1907. England, acting in her own interest and in the interest of the Persian people, doubtless hoped to restrain Russia from gaining control over Persia, and during four years succeeded to a consider- able extent. But as will be seen, when the crisis of 1911 came (See article. The Morocco Crisis of 1911) England Avas driven by the exi gencies of the international situation and the implication of the convention of 1907 into the support of Russia in a series of acts which materially infringed the integrity and independence of Per sia and left among the Persian peoples a hatred of both empires. Seriously threatened by the growth of German ambitions and bound by the convention of 1907 liberal Britain was forced into a position of alliance with autocratic Russia in a course of action which amounted to a virtual dismemberment of the country and was largely, if not chiefly, responsible for the failure of the movement for the establishment of a constitutional government. The Persians declined to take notice of this agreement about their country to which they had been in no sense a party^, and only recog- nized it four years later under force majeure. Their reply of Nov. 7, 1907 (Parliamentary Papers, 1909 (Cd. 4581), p. 73), contains the following words : " The above-mentioned agreement having been 349 concluded between the British and Russian Governments, therefore its provisions will concern the aforementioned Governments who have signed the agreement." March 20, 1912, the following state- ment was made : " The Persian Government will take care to conform their policy with the principles of the convention of 1907, and they take note of the assurances contained in the preamble of that con- vention." (Parliamentary Papers, 1912-13 (Cd. 6103), p. 4.) 4. THE STRUGGLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS WITH SHAH MOHAMMED ALI TO THE DATE OF HIS ABDICATION, JULY 16, 19 09. It was soon evident that a solemn oath meant nothing to Mo- hammed Ali. On December 15. 1907, he arrested and imprisoned the Prime Minister, and attempted a general coup d'etat. He lacked sufficient organization and military force, however, and the Mejlis speedily obtained the upper hand. The country continued to be in disorder, and the Turks, wishing their share of Persia, violated the western frontier. In February, 1908, an attempt was made upon the Shah's life. The new nationalist press continued virulently to attack the Shah and his supporters. On June 1 he was compelled to dismiss from office a number of his friends. On the 12th of the month the Russian Government, which seemed at times to possess an uncanny foreknowledge of events, proposed to the British to sup- port the Shah against the Nationalists. (Parliamentary Papers, 1909 (Cd. 4581), p. 124.) Sir Edward Grey refused, but a new force of Russian troops was brought to Julfa. The Shah had already left Teheran for a palace outside and was gathering forces. On June 23 the Shah's troops, of whom the nucleus was the Persian Cossack regiment commanded by the Russian Col. LiakhofF, bombarded and destroyed the Parliament House and won the city. (E. G. Browne quotes letters to show that Col. Liakhoff was under Russian orders, and was complimented by the Tsar for his part in this coup d'etat. Op cit, 221-225; 432-436 (Russian text).) Patrols were placed, even about the British Legation. Col. Liakhoff became military gov- ernor of Teheran and rigidly enforced the Shah's will. The consti- tution was hustled out of sight. But the rest of Persia was not con- tent with this subversion of popular participation in the Govern- ment. Tabriz, the most important city of western Persia and the second in size, raised a standard of resistance which probably saved Constitutionalism in Persia. This example was followed in many places, and when the spring of 1909 came, although 'the Russians occupied Tabriz in April on the pretext of protecting foreigners, forces gathered from many quarters and proceeded to march toward the capital. The Russian consulates and legations, supported by the British, vainly attempted to turn back the Constitutionalists. (Ibid., 350 I'h. x, gives an account of this revolution. Sec also Parliamentary Papers. L909 (Cd. 4733), pp. 35 ad finem; L910 (Cd. 5120), pp. L-69.) They had also pressed the Shah on April L ;, J to restore constitutional government. On May .'>, alarmed for his throne, and bearing in mind no doubt the recent deposition of Abdul Hamid 11, he yielded, and promised 1*> summon a second Me j lis. It was too late: the Constitu- tionalists had had enough of him. They continued their advance on the capital. Though additional Russian troops were brought to Resht, ready to come to Teheran, the Constitutionalists anticipated them, and on July L6 the Shah took sanctuary with his friends, the Russians, an act of abdication, .".. THE SECOND I" \KI I A M F.N'l . The ex-Shah was pensioned oil' (Parliamentary Papers, L910 (Cd. .M-_M>). p. L28. The negotiations give an interesting example of Ori- ental bargaining; see this and previous dispatches) and the Regency for the new Shah, his 13-year-old son, Ahmad Mirza, was given to the head of the royal Kajar tribe. The actual control for some weeks was in the hands of a self-appointed committee, called the National Council, which appointed ;i cabinet and arranged for the election of the new Mejlis. (Browne. E. G., op. cil.. 322, 327.) The latter body met November L5, L909, and was in session slightly over two years. During most of this time progress in the direction of reform was slow. There were difficulties between the cabinets and the parlia- ment. Internal disorder continued, so that in October, L910, the British Government gave notice that if in three months the southern roads were not made secure. British troops would be sent in. (Par- liamentary Papers, 1911 (Cd. 5656), p. 97 (Oct. 14)). The problem of reorganization seems to have depended on finance; (See answer of Persian Government, Ibid., pp. 106-9; and elsewhere in dispatches.) The Government Lived from hand to mouth, with- out money to organize police or military forces for restoring order. Taxes had fallen off, and the customs receipts were heavily pledged to the support of the foreign Loans. The French financial adviser, M. Bizot, was regarded with suspicion from the first, (lie arrived in April, 1901s. and complained that no one would give him informa- tion. Parliamentary Papers. 1909 (Vd. 4581), p 118.) PCngland and Russia were willing, almost anxious, to lend money, even a large Loan, but the Nationalists steadily refused the suggested con- ditions, which involved control of the expenditure of the money loaned, and thereby foreign interference in the internal affairs of Persia. (Jan. 6. 1910, the Russian foreign minister suggested that a large loan be made so " that Russia and England will be in a posi- 351 tion to insist on the institution of an effective financial control.'*) Continual suspicion and irritation arose from the prolonged ores ence of Russian troops in Tabriz. Kazvin. and Ardebil. In May, 1910, il was resolved to employ foreign advisers. Russians. French, and Belgians were feared. Sweden was invited to lend officers to or- ganize a gendarmerie, and in September it was suggested that the United States be asked to supply a treasurer-general. (This pro posal was made in the assembly, Sept. 6, 1910. The cabinet objected for reasons that they could not state publicly. The majority in the assembly favored it at once, showing confidence in Americans. Par- liamentary Papers, 1911 (Cd. 5656), p. 94.) This measure was ap- proved, and in February, 1911, Mr. Morgan Shuster was appointed to the new position, with four American assistants. Negotiations were now completed for a loan, which would give the new foreign advisers the means wherewith to work. (See Loan contract, ibid., pp. 60-62. The interest rate was 5 per cent.) 6. MR. SHUSTEB IX PERSIA AND THE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION, TO JANUARY 7, 191 2. It is hard to pronounce upon the Shuster episode and sustain every interpretation with unimpeachable documentary evidence. The fol- lowing account seeks to approach the truth. (It is based on a fairly wide reading ad hoc, in th.e British Blue Book. The Parliamentary Debates. Mr. Shuster's own writings, periodical and journalistic articles, etc. See the bibliography. It is not possible in the space available to give numerous references.) Mr. Shuster was an honest and capable business man. He as- sumed that Persia was an independent nation whose finances were in a bad way. and planned to restore them in the shortest possible time by the best methods and the most suitable agents. The British Government would have been pleased to hare him do exactly this, but the Russian Government felt differently. Mr. Sinister made a remarkable beginning in the eight months of his residence, and there can be little doubt that, had he been allowed to remain, Persian financial affairs would now be vastly transformed for the better. He arrived May 12, 1911. and promptly won the complete confi- dence of the Persian Government and assembly. On May 30 and June 13 laws were passed giving the finances of Persia completely into his hands. An unpleasantness occurred with M. Mornard, In- spector of Customs, a Belgian supposed to be under Russian influ- ence, who objected to being placed under Mr. Shuster. This diffi- culty was accommodated. Mr. Shuster decided that there was need of a treasury gendarmerie to police the collecting of taxes. He found Major Stokes, military attache of the British legation at 352 Teheran, to be the man best lit tod for tho headship of this force. Major Stokes wished to accept the position, and the British Govern- ment was not at first adverse, provided he would resign his commis- sion in th* 1 Indian army. (Sir Edward Grey's telegram <>i' July 21 says: " Before Major Stokes accepts command lie will have t«> resign his commission in the Indian army. Yon may tell Treasurer-general this." (Parliamentary Papers. L912-13 (Cd. G104), p. 100.) This gave Russia an entering wedge. She objected that Major Stokes would have authority in north Persia, and demanded either the appointment of a citizen of a small European country, or some compensation by the appointment of a Russian officer to a similar command. Mr. Sinister was linn in refusing to obey suggestions from outside, and Russian anger arose. On July is the ex-Shah passed through Russian territory from his residence in Odessa and landed in Persia. Though denials were made, it is inconceivable that in a country as carefully policed as Knssia he could have done this without ollicial knowledge. ^Sir Ed- ward Grey endeavored to have the Russian Government bring him back, but Knssia refused, appealing to the principle of noninterfer- ence, with which she henceforth played last and loose. (Parliamen- tary Papers, 1012-13 (Cd. CIO I). p. 98. Ibid. (Cd. 6105), p. 46.) The Agadir incident was up (See article, The Morocco Crisis of 1011) and probably in order to retain Russian support against Germany the British Government swung around to the Russian point of view, until in the final crises of 1011 Russia dictated her terms and Eng- land advised Persia to accept them. In the process the self-determi- nation of Persia received grievous impairment. Russia's intentions in Persia and the possibility of her shifting to the German side were illustrated by the "Potsdam Accord " of 1910- 11. (See article, that title.) (Text in American Journal of Inter- national Law, vi, supplement 120-2, April, 1012. Russia's interven- tion in Persia (her ultimatum was given Nov. 11) came immediately after the conclusion of the Moroccan agreement, Nov. 4. In the St. Petersburg Agreement, which embodied the results of the Pots- dam Accord. Russia declares that she " intends to obtain from the Persian ( rovemment a concession with a view to creating a network of railways in northern Persia." Russia also promised Germany that she would ask for a concession from Teheran to Khanikin, to join a branch of the Bagdad railway. Liberal terms were promised Ger- many, and Russia was not to oppose the Bagdad railway. In the light of this agreement it is evident that if England, by refusing to follow Russia in November, 1011, had broken the A nglo-Rnssian understanding, the Triple Entente might have been broken up by the transfer of Russia to the German side. 353 Mr. Shuster, feeling the growing opposition of the Russian Gov- ernment, supported by the Britii h, wrote in response to an attack of the London Times upon him a letter to the Times which was more truthful than diplomatic. (London Times, Nov. 9, 10, 1911.) This letter was later translated and circulated in Persia, with his knowl- edge, bill not, by his orders. (Parliamentary Papers, 1912-13 (Cd. 6105), p. 88, Dec. 2. ) Sir Edward Grey said thi letter made the situation " impos ible." (Parliamentary Debates, 1911, 5th . tics, vol. 32, p. L56; Parliamentary Papers, L912-13 (Cd. 6105), p. 82.) As ;i matter of fact, it was the Russian interpretation of the convention of 1907 which made Mr. Shuster's whole plan to restore Persia impossible. More tactful behavior on hi part might have de- layed, hut could hardly have influenced the outcome. In November Mr. Shuster appointed some British subjects to treasury positions in the Russian sphere of influence. Thi: action, when ;i quarters, no revision of the convention of 1007, in the direction of dividing the unallotted zone, was made. Sir Edward contented him- self with suggesting that recent changes in Persia had not been to Britain's advantage, and there was therefore more reason why "they should be sure of the south and of their commercial interests in the central /one." (Parliamentary Papers, 1913 (Cd. 6807), p. 173, Sept. 25, 1912.) On December 30, L913, a call for an election to a third Mejlis was issued. Elections were carried through but slowly. On July 21, 1!)1 i. the young Shah, now 16 years old, was solemnly recognized to be of age and the regency was terminated. As yet a majority of the new .'m ■ jli had not reached Teheran, and he took the constitu- tional oath before as many as could be assembled of the members of the second Mejlis. Persia thus arrived at the threshold of the World War with the constitutional regime nominally in force. Order in finances, road control, and city government had improved a little, but were -till vei-y imperfect. Russia was still in firm occupancy of the north, and was building a railway from Julfa to Tabriz (opened Maj -. 1916). M. Mornard, who had succeeded to Mr. Shuster's office but nol to his place in Persian confidence, resigned September 1, 19] 1. and another Belgian, M. Heynssens, was appointed. Britain had continued to press gently for the summoning of the new assembly, the policing of the roads, and the withdrawal of the Russian troops. Russia had been inactive since the crisis of 1911. BIBLIOGRAPHY. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL. List of works in the New York Public Library relating to Per (History, Muhammadan Period, pp. 32- 15.) X. V.. 191i do British and Foreign State Papers: Vol. 100. pp. 555-00. The Anglo-Russian Convention, Aug. 31, 1907: vol. 101, p. 526, Shah's rescript establishing the Assembly, Aug. 1, 1900: pp. 527-534, Per- sian Constitution, December 30, 1900: pp. 5-34-542. Persian Constitu- tional Lav-, Oct. 8. 1907; vol. 102. p. 900-7, Anglo-Russian Note, Sept. 11, 1907: vol. 103. pp. 644-974, Correspondence respecting the affairs of Persia, 1907-10. British Parliamentan- Papers. 356 Correspondence respecting the affairs of Persia, December, L906, to November, L908. L909 (Cd. 1:581), v. L05. Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Persia: L909 (Cd. 4733), \. LOS; L910 (Cd. 5120), v. L12; l'.'ll (Cd. 5656), v. L03; L912 L3 (Cd. 6104), v. L22; L912 13 (Cd. 6105), v. Li L912-13 (Cd. 6264), v. L22; L913 (Cd. 6807), v. 81; L914 (Cd. 7280), v. 101. This series o( White Papers gives a continuous his- tory (subjeel to probable omission of some documents) of A.nglo- Russo-Persian relations from L906 to L913. See also, L912 L8 (Cd. 6077) and (Cd. 6103), v. L22, and L914 (Cd, 7053), v. 101. Parliamentary Debates. The A.nglo-Russian Contention of Au- gust 31, 1 ( .M)7. was debated in the House of Lords on February 6 and 10. L908, and in the House of Commons on February 17. (See 4th Series, v. L83.) Questions on the Persian situation were numerous thereafter. A Long debate on Sir Edward Grey's foreign policy in- volving much incidental discussion of the Persia question, was held in the House of Commons November 29 and December 1 1. 1911. HOOKS. Sykes, P. M., Lieut. Col. A History of Persia. 2 vols. (London. Methuen, L915.) Vol. 2 contains (in pocket) a map of Persia. 37 by ;>1 inches, on a scale of 1 inch to 40 miles. (Marked S. D. O. 1912.) The historical narrative runs only to 1906. Bibliography, pp. 513- 5 1 8. Curzon, George N. (now Earl Curzon of Kedleston). Persia and the Persian question. 2 vols., London, L892. Map. end of v. 1, Persia, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan, 26 by 22 inches, 1 inch to (50 miles. Turner and Shawe, London. Several detail maps. A work of very high repute, based on extensive travel and study, all done with special reference to the political situation. Jackson, Prof. .V. Y. W., Persia, past and present. (New York, L906.) Map of Persia ?, 24 by 20 inches. I inch to 68 miles. by W. and A. K. Johnston, Edinburgh. The hook is of great value for history, archaeology, geography, etc.. hut avoids politics. The Times History of the War. London. Published weekly. Part 139: Persia and the War, v. 11. pp. 317 356. Reviews the pre- vious history. Chirol, Sir Valentine. The middle eastern question. (London. 190:').) Map, p. 500, of Persia and adjoining countries, 20 by 10 inches, 1 inch to 7 ( .> miles. Whigham, II. J.. The Persian problem. (New York, 1903.) Five small maps, with special reference to roads, ports, and railways. The author believed Russia was gaining rapidly on Britain in Persian a Hairs. - 357 Desmorgny, G. Lit Question persane et la guerre (Paris, Sirey, L916). By a French scholar, formerly in tl ice of the Persian government. Browne, E. (>.. The Persian revolution of 1905-1909. Cambridge, 1910. Map, 11 by 9 inches, showing- spheres of influence in Persia. Appendix A contains "The bases of the Persian Constitution," in- cluding The Farmdn of August 5, 190G ; Electoral Law. September 9, L906; Fundamental Laws, December 30, 1906; Supplementary Fun- damental Laws, October 7, 1907; New Electoral Law, July 1, 1909. Prof. Browne is an ardent friend of the Nationalist cause in Persia. Hamilton. Angus. Problems of the Middle East. London, 1909. Anglo-Russian Convention, pp. 187-228. Persia and the Powers, pp. ('»_' 155. Appendices contain the Persian articles of the Anglo- Russian Convention of 1907, and the Persian Constitution, includ- ing Electoral Law, September 9, 1906, Fundamental Laws, December 30, 1906, and Supplementary Fundamental Laws, October 7, 1907. Berard, Victor, Revolutions de la Perse. Paris, 1910. 1 map. (See also articles in Revue de Paris, 1909.) M. Berard is a French publicist of great knowledge and ability. Fraser, David. Persia and Turkey in revolt. Edinburgh. 1910. Shuster, W. M., The Strangling of Persia. New York. 1912. See also "Shuster's own story." in Hearst's magazine for 1912. Mr. Shuster sets forth frankly and fearlessly his view, that Russia and England in their own interests deliberately crushed down the na- tionalist aspirations of the Persians. PERIODICAL ARTICLES (ARRANGED CHRONOLOGICALLY). Dillon, Dr. E. J., in a number of sections on foreign affairs in Contemporary Review, gives an excellent idea of the Russian view gards Persia, of which view he was an ardent supporter. London Spectator. A number of well-written editorials from 1907 on take the attitude that the peace of the world is England'- great- est interest, and that Persia is incapable of self-government, and her destruction is of small importance. Calchas (pseud.). The Anglo-Russian Agreement. Fortnightly Review, v. 88, pp. 535-50. November, 1907. Approves. Believed weak nations should be divided up. Wanderer (pseud.). The reform movement in Persia. Contem- porary Review, v. 94, pp; 97-105. July, 1908. A balanced discus- sion, bringing out especially well the religious aspect of the move- ment. Hamilton, Angus, The Persian crisis. Fortnightly Review, v. 90, pp. 201-211. August, 1908; The prosped in Persia. Fortnightly Review, v. 93, pp. 102-112. January. 1910. A friend of Persia who believes the country incapable at present of self-government. 358 Blake, Maurice B., Our weak policy in Persia, Nineteenth Cen- fury, v. 67, pp. 544-9. March, 1910. England should stand firmly against the Russian attacks on the independence of Persia. Morrell, Philip, Our Persian policy. Nineteenth Century, v. 71. pp. 40-47. January, 1912. A discussion, sympathetic to Persian in- dependence, of the Sinister crisis. Fraser, Lovat, The Problem of Persia. Edinburgh Review, v. 216, pp. 489-512. October, 1912. Review of Shuster's book and Parlia- mentary Papers, 1909-12. Mr. Fraser believes that the Persian Na- tionalists caused their own downfall and that Sinister failed be- cause he relied only on them as represented in the Mejlis. He de- nies al] influence of Russian interference and looks, forward to a partition of Persia. Browne, E. G., The present situation in Persia. Contemporary Re- view, v. 102, pp. 631-642. November, 1912. Friendly to the Na- tionalists. Wilson, S. G., The Russian occupation of northern Persia. Mos- lem World, v. 3, pp. 339-349. October, 1913. Favorable to Russian ownership as allowing greater opportunity for Christianity. Eastern problems and British interests. Quarterly Review, v. 219, pp. 284-90. July. 1913. Discusses the proposed Trans-Persian rail- way. Desires Persian autonomy. Lawton, L., The situation in Persia. Dublin Review, v. 155, pp. 138-145. July, 1914. Shows Russian penetration of northern Per- sia by growth of trade, financial control, land purchase, settlement of peasants, etc. MAPS. See references in connection with books above. Provisional Edition of International Map, compiled by Royal Geographical Society for Geographical Section of General Staff. Scale 1 to 1,000,000; 1 inch to 15.78 miles. Five Persian sections have been completed (July, 1918) : Tabriz, Resht, Teheran, etc. Preliminary draft of map being prepared by American Geograph- ical Society showing Western Asia on a scale of 1 to 9,000,000. Per- sia appears in the middle of the map. 121. THE FORMATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE. 1. INTRODUCTION. The Triple Entente was a somewhat loosely joined combination, consisting of Russia, France, and England, which existed from 1907 to 1914. Within the combination France and Russia were bound to- gether by a close alliance (See article. The Formation of the Dual Alliance between France and Russia, 1887-1894). England had no 359 alliance with either country, but had understandings with France, through the Entente Cordiale (See article, The Formation of the Entente Cordiale), and with Russia through the convention of August 31, 1007. German historians and publicists assert that the creation of the Triple Entente was inspired by hostility toward the German Empire, and that the purpose of its organizers was to bring about the "En- circlement of Germany," i. e.. to surround Germany with a circle of enemies who were united to thwart every effort for the extension of German influence in the world, and were only awaiting a favorable opportunity to destroy Germany by direct attack. The theory has never been supported by adequate documentary evidence or by any argument which will bear critical examination. The conception rests wholly upon distorted inferences. In fact, the Triple Entente was organized for the purpose of pre- serving the peace of Europe by the creation of an effective balance of power. It was a strictly defensive combination intended to serve as a counterpoise to the tremendous and aggressive power exercised by Germany in virtue of its military strength and its domination over the Triple Alliance, consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. 2. CONDITIONS LEADING TO THE ENTENTE CORDIALE. A growing uneasiness in regard to Germany's aggressive intentions in 1904 led to the formation of the Entente Cordiale (See article, that title). Other contributing factors were: (a) A desire on the part of France to concentrate her colonial interests and to be rid of various causes of petty troubles with Great Britain, notably in the policy of M. Delcasse, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1898-1905. (/->) A reaction in Great Britain against her recent Germanophile policy and her bickerings with France and a wish to abandon her po- sition of "splendid isolation." (See article, The Formation of the Entente Cordiale.) 3. TERMS OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE. The most important features of the convention which led directly to the Entente Cordiale were: (1) The public agn < ment. — Relates chiefly to Egypt and Morocco, each Government giving the other free hand, but disavowing an intention to change the political status of these countries, and each agreeing to respect the rights of the other under existing treaties. The. two Governments will give one another diplomatic support in order to carry out the agreement. 860 [ !) /'//<■ sttcrri articles, [f either Government is compelled l>y ticos "to modify their polioy in regard i<> Egypt «>r M«> i occo " the engagements in regard to freodom of 1 rade, to the pa; sago of the Sue Canal, and to the fori i Meat ions <>f the Straits of Gibr alter are to remain intaot, If legislative reforms prove neces n\ In either coUntrj ither Government will refuse to examine the propo nils of the other, i 'omponsal i»>n [a t » » bo made i<> Spain, i . NEGOTIATION OK Til K \ \<.i t ' i.t IAN CONVENTIONS 01 I HOT, The continued existence <>f the chief impelling motive which had led to the formation of the Entente Cordiale and especially the ox perienco of Europe during the Morocco cri is of 1908 100(1 | rti tic that title) induced Russia and (J real Britain i" seek i" adjust their outstanding differences, with lli«' further aim of bringing about :• relation between them which, in conjunction with the Dual Alliance between Franco and Russia (See article, thai title) and the Rntente Cordiale betweon Prance and England, would virtually create a combination con run." of France, Russia, and England, ropre sonting sufficient power to counterbalance iln> Triple Alliance, domi nated bj Germany, and thoroby (•> preserve ilu> peace of Europe. The suggestion for such an agreement l' an A.nglo Russian accord had long been advo cated bj somo British public ally the seri< tide 1\\ Calchn i in the Fortnightly Review for 1900 1901 and n il of the by Ren6 Henry in A.nnalcs de Sciences Politiqnes, vol. L7, pp, il- 168, March, I'.M'M. Negotiation began soon afterwan freemen! was reached and a convention signed on AugusI 31, 1907, i i i; m N 1 1 1 i i : i CONVENTION ( A l'PKN DIX I, 8 1 ) , The mosl importanl features of the convention were: (1) /', Tlu- British and Russian spheres in Persia are marked <>ii(. The revenues of Persia are to be devoted l<> tlu> same purposes as in tin* past. 1 1' changes are necessary in (l>o control of the revenue, the Governments i<> a friondly exchange of idoas with a view to an agreement. (See article, The Persian Ques lion, L90Q IIM t.) I \ fijluni:'- Great l^rit a in has no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan and will not encourage anj measures there against Russia. Ru ree thai Afghanistan is outside her sphere of influence Rnd will conduct all relation with Afghan •11 tin . I he Bril nent. ( Ireal Britn i II not interfere in the internal government of Afghanistan nor annex anv 80 I--., i of it. pro idi 'I i he .'■ rneei fulfil i his ( ><> k Hi-, agri '■ to equalil of commercial oppoi I A r,"li;ini tan, Thiht i 'I h< i ■■<> ( "> • i i .1' . i I- oi China and will re pec( the territorial inte/ ofThibi ill with Thibet only through the Chini c Govemmenl I] Bend > repri to Lhasa ; ' noi an pledge of th< re • nues of 'I hibet. - le 'I be 'I hi Qu«sti< i,. I [91 I ) BllihUXl i- mour, Chai The Diplomatic Bad 'I of th< i rfl 101 i. - ' II- i n, 1 ale Uni Pr< . 1016 I ( h VII, "The Diplomatic Revolution," is the best briei i I of the cau* . leading to the formation of the Triple Entente, and of the formal ion and it /<• a] imitt, B, E England and Germa (Princeton I Pre . 1916.) < \>- pter I •"■ dmirable accoui reference to A.nglo-Gcrman relal o dieu, A ri'lr*'. I A Hi. I oi : 'I < Macmillan ( o . L0O I.) A more full and vt Mui/;. Gilbert. The Foreign Poli< oi Edward { > 1006 ' >rd, 'I I/ Clarendon Press, L915.) he !'•■' ind cl< ■ e of the Ei gl Blancard, \*. S. \'. L'accord Anglo Ku Be du 31 aoftt 1007. Annale d< polil 3, pp. 36 ed, M. \V. 'J he Hapsburg Anarch ble, 1014). Gi d and I ! D The I ( !oi d a le Pub i -74 '77. 'I lie \,\,. 211 2 Mo '1:1; D ( don Press, 'I he E lie A rticle) . pp. 11. . pp. 1 5. 'I 15. E ( '.' - Di p - of the War ( B< 1015.) 'I le. Pub P i 544 . n. Th 'I l/<- A nglo-B on of ' g 31, l'> r ' of I.'. I JO. 1908, :in) stipulated for the establish- ment of separate consular services, but provided that '"The relations of the separate consuls to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to the Embassies hall be regulated by laws of the same wording which can not. be altered nor abolished without the consent of the authori- ties oi both Kingdoms." In reality nothing was arranged, for the two countries found it impossible to agree on the terms of these identical laws. Sweden wished to keep the Norwegian consular service under control of the foreign office; Norway insisted upon an independent administration. 363 4. NORWAT ANNULS THE CTNION. King Oscar was firm in his opposition to the Norwegian consular legislation, but no Norwegian ministry would assume responsibility for his action by remaining in office. He finally admitted his inability lo form a government and the Storthing proclaimed that the King has ceased to act as King of Norway. This meant the dissolution of the union. Sweden, after sonic hesitation, agreed under conditions formulated in the protocol of Karlstad October 23, L&05, and definitely established by the conventions of Stockholm of October 26. 5. CONVENTIONS OF STOCKHOLM. These were five in number and provided that (!) all differences between (he I wo countries which. could not be settled by diplomacy should be submitted to The Hague tribunal, except qu ns involv- ing the "independence, integrity, or vital interests" of either coun- try. (2) The common frontier was to be neutralized. (3) The Lap- landers were to be allowed their ancient rights of pasturing their reindeer on both sides of the border. ( ! ) Reciprocal rights for tran- sit of goods through both countries was established for a period of thirty years. (5) For lakes and waterways common to both countries, each s,. TERMS OK BALTIC CONVENTION, APRIL ::•"., L908. This agreement (Sec Appendix I. 84) declared the purpose of the four contracting powers to preserve the status quo in the lands encir- cling the Baltic. In case this were threatened the;: bound themselves to enter into communication with one another with a vi;-w to agreeing upon such measures as they might consider advisable in the interests the maintenance of the. statu quo. A memorandum was added that the convention "could in no manner be invoked when there was a (in: .-! ion of tie exercise of the righ< ; of sovereignty of the high contracting parties in (heir respective possessions." This was done at the instance of Russia, who was unwilling to he a party to a pledge (hat the Aland Cslands hould not be fortified. Sweden was anxious for such a guarantee, bul Russia firmly refused to repeal her humilia- tion of 1855. 366 I. NORTH SEA CONVENTION, APRIL l'". 1908. The parties to the North Sea convention were Great Britain, Ger- many, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, ami Sweden. It provided (See Appendix [, 83) for the status quo in the North Sea in terms similar to the Baltic arrangement. It was accompanied also by the memorandum regarding sovereignty. 5. SIGNIFICANCE. These conventions together constituted a single arrangement for the small States of northern Europe. Norway ami Belgium were not included, for their integrity had already been guaranteed, the former by the treaty of November, VM)7 (See article, The Separation of Norway from Sweden), the latter by the treaty of L839. Sweden was the greatest gainer by the conventions, for since the separation from Norway she had been left uncertain about any guarantee from the great powers. Denmark felt that her position was strengthened. The Dutch appeared indifferent, for as one of their writers ex- pressed it: "Holland exists by the grace of England and France." They regarded the German promises as of "no value" but relied upon the strength of her two other great neighbors. The agreements Left unsettled the question as to whether or not the Baltic was a closed sea. The fact that any agreement was pos- sible led many to hope that a more kindly feeling was developing in European politics. German papers pointed to Hie arrangement a.s an evidence thai their country had no thought of aggression. BIBLIOGRAPHY. La Vie Politique, L907 L90S, vol. 2, pp. 253 256. (Paris, AJcan, 1908.) A good brief account. " Britannicus," Northern Question in North American Review for August. 1908. vol. 188, pp. 2^7-2-17. Discusses the significance of the conventions. North Sea and Baltic Agreements in Fortnightly Review for May, 1908. vol. SO, pp. 932-935. Brief comments. Annual Register lor L908. (London. Longmans, L909.) pp. 303 364. Summary of opinions. Floeckher, A. de. La Convention relative a la Baltique* et la ques- tion de la fortification des iles d'Aland, in Revue generale de droit international public. L908, vol. L5, pp. 271-275. A German view. Also an article by the same writer, vol. 15, pp. L25 L29. Gurchen, Viscount de. La Question de la Baltique et la Question Danoise, in Questions diplomatiques et coloniales for 1908, vol. 25, pp. 829-831. 367 Dutch view of the North Sea Agreement in Review of Reviews for August, 1908, vol. 38, pp. 242-243. Extracts from Dutch news- papers. Texts of Baltic Convention in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101 (London, 1912), pp. 974-975. Text of North Sea Convenl ion in Ibid., pp. 179-180. 124. THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE, 1907. 1. PUBPOSE. Acting upon the request of the Interparliamentary Union, Presi- dent Roosevelt suggested on September 21. 1904, the meeting of a Second International Peace Conference, and recommended the fol- lowing questions as proper subjects of consideration: (1) The ques- tion- for the consideration of which the First Hague Conference bad expressed a wish thai a future conference be held. (See article, The First Hague Conference, L899.) (2) The negotiation of arbitration treaties between the nations represented at the conference to be con- vened. (3) The advisability of establishing an international con- gress to convene periodically for the discussion of international questions. Owing, however, to the continuance of the Russo-Japanese War until September 5, 1905, to the outbreak of the Russian revolution which followed, and to the further delay caused by the meeting of the Third Tan American Conference, the Second Hague Conference did not meet until June 15, 1907. President Roosevelt generously conceded the honor of calling the Se ond Hague Conference to Czar Nicholas IT, who, for obvious reasons, omitted the subject of "limitation of armaments" from the Russian program. But Great Britain insisted upon raising this important question, and the United States was determined to ask for a consideration of the so-called Drago doctrine in a modified form, i. e., the question of forbidding the use of armed force for the re- covery of contract debts unless arbitration were refused, or ii of failure to submit to an arbitral award. Owing mainly to the opposition of Germany, Austria, Japan, and Russia, the British Government failed in its attempt to -"cure a con- sideration of the question of a limitat ion of armament or restrict ion of military expenditures. Germany even opposed the insertion of the words "more urgent than ever" in the resolution which was adopted confirming the resolution of 1899 relative to this matt< r. 2. RESULTS. Though the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 failed in many respects to meet the expectations even of conservative stafo 368 men and international jurists, it must be admitted that it was, on the whole, a considerable success. The fact that the principles laid clown in its conventions were violated in a wholesale manner by the Central Powers during the World War increased the measure of con- demnation which the world at large passed upon the atrocities com- mitted by the armies of those powers. The final act of the conferences included the following 13 con- ventions : (I) Convention (of 97 articles) for the pacific settlement of international disputes — a revision of the convention of 1899 dealing with this subject. The codes of procedure bearing upon arbitration and international commissions of inquiry were considerably enlarged and elaborated, and a short code for arbitration of a more summary procedure added. The various projects for obligatory arbitration were defeated, owing mainly to the opposition of Germany. But in the final act the conference declared itself unanimously in favor of the "principle" of compulsory arbitration, and declared that " certain disputes, in particular those relating to the interpreta- tion of treaties and application of the provisions of international agreements may be submitted to compulsory arbitration without re- striction." (II) Convention (of 7 articles) respecting the employment of force for .the recovery of contract debts. This was a modification of the Drago doctrine known as the Porter resolution which practically prescribed obligatory arbitration in one class of cases, namely, con- tract debts. A majority of the powers represented at the Second Hague Conference (though many of those who signed subsequently failed to ratify) agreed " not to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the government of one coun- try as being due to its nationals," unless the debtor State refused to arbitrate or failed to submit to the arbitral award after having ac- cepted arbitration. (III) Convention (of 8 articles) relative to the opening of hos- tilities. This convention declared, in effect, that hostilities are not to begin without prior warning in the form either of a declaration of war or an ultimatum, and it also provided for notice to neutral powers. (IV) Convention (of 56 articles) regarding the laws and customs of land warfare. This was a revision of the Hague Code of 1899. (V) Convention (of 25 articles) regarding the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land. (VI) Convention (of 11 articles) relative to the status of enemy merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities. (VII) Convention (of 12 articles) relative to the conversion of merchant ships into warships. :J69 (VIII) Convention (of 13 articles) relative to the laying of sub- marine mines. This convention was very imperfect, and was only concluded for a period of seven years. (IX) Convention (of 13 articles) respecting bombardments by naval forces in time of Avar. This convention applies to naval war- fare the rules governing bombardment on land. (X) Convention (of 28 articles) for the adaptation of the prin- ciples of the Geneva Convention of 1906 to maritime warfare. It relates to the treatment of the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked in naval warfare. (XI) Convention (of 14 articles) relative to certain restrictions on the exercise of capture in maritime warfare. This convention in- cludes provisions relating to the inviolability of postal correspond- ence; the exemption from capture of vessels engaged in coast fishing, etc. ; and regulations regarding the disposition of the crews of enemy merchant ships captured by a belligerent. (XII) Convention (of 57 articles, with an annex showing distribu- tion of judges) relative to the establishment of an international prize court. This convention did not go into effect, owing to the failure of the contracting parties to ratify it. Opposition to the convention was very pronounced in England. (XIII) Convention (of 33 articles) respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war. In addition to the above conventions, the Second Hague Peace Con- ference renewed " for a period extending to the Third Peace Confer- ence " the declaration of 1899 prohibiting the " discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other new methods of a similar nature." The conference made the notable recommendation that the signa- tory powers adopt a project or draft of a convention (consisting of 35 articles) for the organization of a court of arbitral justice as soon as they shall have reached an agreement upon the selection of judges and the constitution of the court. To remedy the defects of the Hague Tribunal, or so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration (which was not really a court, but a mere list or panel of judges), the Second Hague Conference attempted to create a so-called Court of Arbitral Justice. Put its labors in this respect were unsuccessful. A draft convention providing for the organization of such a court was elaborated and readily adopted in plenary session, but the conference was unable to agree upon a mode of selection for the appointment of judges. The project was, therefore, merely recommended to the signatory powers for negotiation and agreement. The following additional "wishes" and recommendations (voeux) were expressed: (1) That " in case of war the proper civil and mili- 53706— IS 24 370 tary authorities make it their very special duty to insure and protect the maintenance of peaceful intercourse, and notably the commercial and industrial relations, between the peoples of the belligerent States and of neutral States." (2) That " the powers settle, through special conventions, the situation, in respect to the support of military charges, of foreigners residenl within their territories." (3) That "the elaboration of regulations relative to the laws and customs of maritime warfare may figure in the program of the next conference, and that in any case the powers apply, as far as possible, in maritime warfare the principles of the convention relative to the laws and customs of war on land." (4) That the powers hold a "third peace conference, which might take place within a period similar to that which has elapsed since the preceding conference, on a date to be set by joint agreement among the powers." BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE TWO HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907. The best documented and most authoritative accounts of the Hague conferences in English are the following: Higgins, A. P., The Hague Conferences and Other International Conferences (Cambridge, University Press, L909) ; Holls, F. W., The Peace Conferen eat The Hague (New York, Macmillan, L900) ; and Scott, J. B., The Hague Peace I !o iferences of L899 and L907 | Ba] more, Johns Hopkins Press, 1909. in 2 vols.). For briefer accounts, see Hull, W. I., The Two Hague Conferences (Boston, Ginn, 1908) ; and Lawrence. T. J.. International Problems and Hague Conferences (London. 1909). Among the best accounts in French and German are the following: Lapradelle, G. de, La Conference de la paix, in Revue generale de droit international public for 1899, VI, pp. 651-846; Lapradelle, G., and Politis. N., La deuxieme conference de la paix. Revue de droit international public (1909). \\T, 385-437; Renault L., and Bour- geois, L., L'oeuvre de la Have. Annales des sciences politiques, vol. 23, pp. 429—167; Lemon on. E., La seconde conference de la paix (Paris, 1908) ; Fried, A. H., Die zWeite I laager Konferenz (Leipzig, L907) : Meurer, Ch., Die Haager Friedenskonferenz (in 2 vols., Miin- chen, 1905-07) : Nippold, O., Die zweite Haagerkonferenz (Leipzig, 1908); and Renault. L., LVuvre de la Have (Paris, 1908). For texts of the Hague Conferences, see especially Higgins, A. P., The Hague Peace Conferences (Cambridge, 1909) ; Scott, J. B., Texts of the Peace Conferences at The Hague (Boston, Ginn, 1908) ; Ibid., The Hague Conferences of L809 and 1907 (Baltimore, 1909), Vol. II; and Supplement to American Journal of International Law for 1908, Vol. II. 371 125. THE REVAL INTERVIEW, 1908. 1. INTRODUCTION. In June, 1908, Edward VII paid a visit to the Czar at Revai. As i!i An tro-Russian ;■■<■■■:,]•<] in regard to Macedonia, the Miirsteg pro- gram, had recently broken down (Si tide, The M ia i (^ tion, 1878-1908), and as the situation in Macedonia called impera- tively for action, there was a widespread belief in Germany and Austria-Hungary thai the purpose of the meeting was to arrange for a plan of joint English and Russian action in a form hostile to I interests and wishes of Austria-Hungary. 2. THE FACTS REGARDING THE BEVAL MEETING. The fa<-i regarding (lie Reval interview, •> far as known, seern to be as follow The King and Queen of England Left Charing Cros on the evening of June .">. L908, arriving ■■■' R< val escorted by warships on June 9. Here they were visited by the Czar and the Imperial family, a visit which they at once returned on the [mperial yacht. The speeches at the staff banquet in the evening laid sti on the effect of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1007 in drawing the two countries together and in consolidating the peace of the world. The press announced that Sir Charles Hardinge and M. Isvolsky, who had accompanied their respective sovereigns, had come near to a complete agreement on the projected reforms of Macedonia. The meeting at Reval appears to have been greeted with great satisfaction by the Russian press as a further step in the rapproche- ment between England and Russia and as strong ntee of I ropean peace. It was the belief of a good many competent observers that the Reval interviews probably, and quite without any intent on the part of the British and Russian Governments, hastene I the out- break of the Turkish Revolution. (See article, that title. ) BIBLIOGRAPHY. For the main facts, see Annual Register for 1908, pp. 131 and 320; Steed, H. W., Hapsburg Monarchy, 237-238 /London. Consta- ble, 1914). Reventlow, Deutschlands auswlirtige Politik, 1888-1014 (Berlin Mittler, 1916), gives a distorted Pan-German version of the interview. 126. THE TURKISH REVOLUTION OF 1908-9. 1. CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION. The revolution was in essence the overthrow of the Sultan's auto- cratic power by the upper class Turks, and the substitution therefor of parliamentary government under their control. The earlier at- 372 tempi to secure constitutional government, connected with the name of Midhat Pasha and resulting in the constitution of December 23, 1876, was a failure, due to the lack at that time of any feeling for its necessity among the ruling caste. Thirty years of increasingly centralized government, the universal espionage which made all life miserable, the assassination or exile of all who opposed the regime in the slightest detail, the loss ol' territory and of prestige, the con- sciousness thai the economic penetration of the foreign powers could end only in the dissolution of the Empire, forced I he Turks of all classes to consider the constitution their only salvation. The leaders in Paris studied, in detail successful revolutions of th« past, arranged their differences as between radical and conservative, invited in the other nationalistic revolutionary parlies, especially the Armenians, but retained control in their own hands. ' •_'. OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION. The revolution seems to have been hastened by the announcement of Austria in February, 1908, that a railroad would he built through Novibazar, linking up the Bosnian and Salonika Lines, which would bring all the western part of the Balkan peninsula under Austrian influence, and by the Reval interview ( See article, that title). The disturbance in Macedonia had brought together Large numbers of Turkish troops. The common soldiers were unpaid and wasting their time, the officers were unable to preserve order and dissatis- lied with the presence of the foreign officers, who were a constant reminder that the days of the Empire were numbered. Emissaries sent out from Paris found a good reception, and the revolution was proclaimed duly 6, 1908. At first foreigners thought little of it. but adhesion was rapid. Troops sent against the rebels refused to light. Freedom was proclaimed for the Christians, and safety for foreign in- terests. The Sultan suddenly surrendered by granting a constitution xm\ calling for an election. The rule of Abdul Hamid had been supported by Germany, even through the Armenian massacres. Popular feeling naturally turned against it. while France, the home for many years of the leaders of the Young Turks, and England, the friend of liberty, were much favored. In their turn, they ac- claimed the revolution as a marvel, which it was in many respects. During this period, the grand vizier, Kiamil Pasha, was Anglophile. English and French aid largely was used in reconstructing the gov- ernment. 3. GROWTH of GERMAN INFLUENCE. The new regime was soon discredited by the declaration of inde- pendence by Bulgaria, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by 373 Austria, the declaration of annexation of Crete to Greece (See articles on those subjects). Whether all these were the result of the intrigues of the Central Powers they played the game of those powers. Long negotiations were needed to settle the railroad question in Bulgaria; the return of Xovi Bazar did not prevent a boycott of Austrian goods by the Turks; the questions remained for long irritating. The new Parliament assembled December 17, not without frauds and the stir- ring up of racial hatreds, with the possibility of foreign troubles. Against the party supported by the Committee of Union and Prog- ress, devoted to centralization, Ottomanization, and destruction of special privileges for national, religious, or foreign interests, was the liberal party, in touch with Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian. Arab, and Albanian nationalists, suspected of alliance with the Sultan and re- action. Kiamil Pasha found his support here and was forced to resign. Himil Pasha was less strongly English. The capital was temporarily secured by the troops of the Sultan (April 13) , but troops loyal to the revolution were called up from Macedonia, the city was retaken on the 24th, and three days later Abdul Humid was deposed and Mehmet V ascended the throne. The Young Turks had been greatly aided in their march on Constantinople by the expert advice of the Central Powers and especially of the Neue Freie Presse of Vienna. The military party had been pro-German because of their German training, in Germany or under Von der Goltz. As the revo- lution became more military, those who remembered Paris played less part. The Adana massacres and the failure to adequately punish those responsible, caused a corresponding coolness of the English and French toward the Young Turk. The growing power of Enver Pasha, the "hero of the revolution," was also thrown toward tier- many. In spite of all this, it is probable that at the beginning of the World War the majority of responsible officials and thinkers in Tur- key were not pro-German. BIBLIOGRAJ'IIV. Every discussion of the Eastern question and every book of travel tells the story of the regime of Abdul Hamid. Perhaps the best col- lection of the facts, with special reference to the revolution they produced, is La Revolution Turque, by Victor Berard (Paris, Colin, 1909). Eyewitnesses were for the most part interested in the pictur- esque details of the fraternization of the various hostile races, to the exclusion of more important matters. Sir Edwin Pears has given an excellent account out of an unusually wide and accurate knowledge in Forty Years in Constantinople (New York, Appleton, 1916). Of the hundreds of more or less valuable accounts and discussions in the magazines we may note as of especial importance those by 374 Georges Gaulis in Le Journal des Debats and by E. J. Dillon in the Contemporary Review and also the notes of the Fortnightly Review. A complete presentation of the documents of diplomatic character in the Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 107, 251ff; vol. 109, 219ff; the old constitution is given, vol. 107, 25411. See also Staats- archiv, vol. 78, pp. 245-311. An excellent presentation of the parliamentary questions is given by A. H. Lybyer, The Turkish Parliament, Proceedings of the American Political Science Asso- ciation, vol. 7 (1910), 65ff. For the revolution in its historical background, le V te de la Jonquiere, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman (Paris, Hachette, 1914). 127. THE ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, 1908. 1. INTRODUCTION. Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin gave Austria-Hungary the right to "occupy and administer" Bosnia-Herzegovina (See articles The Congress of Berlin and Austria-Hungary and the Balkan Settlement of 1878). At the time there was a widespread expectation that within a few years the Provinces would be formally annexed to the Dual Monarchy. A variety of circumstances, connected with both the for- eign and internal affairs of Austria-Hungary, prevented any serious effort to convert occupation and administration into annexation. As time passed objections of the domestic order ceased to be as pro- nounced as in the years soon after 1878. Under the leadership of Count Aehrenthal, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Government of the Dual Monarclry found in the Turkish revolution of 1908 (See article, that title), a convenient opportunity for annexation. The Government of the Dual Monarchy alleged that the Turkish Revolution in 1908 made it necessary for Austria-Hungary to define her position in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The constitutional reforms announced by the Young Turks required that Turkey grant a degree of autonomy to the provinces and representation in the Turkish Par- liament. This made it necessary, in the interest of the welfare of the provinces, that Austria-Hungary should no longer leave their status ill defined. 2. PREPARATION FOR ANNEXATION. Vienna was probably determined on an early annexation after the revolt broke out in Turkey in July. Though Isvolsky, Rus- sian minister of foreign affairs, was told that the act would take place " au moment favorable" and with ample warning, Russia was not notified until October 3, and the other powers were uninformed until October 6. The diplomacy of Aehrenthal, minister of foreign affairs of Austria-Hungary, was perplexingly intricate. (Steed, 246-251.) 375 3. ANNEXATION PROCLAIMED. On October 6 a circular note to the powers announced the evacua- tion of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, and the grant of constitutional autonomy to Bosnia-Herzegovina. (See Appendix I, 86.) On Oc- tober 7 the Emperor-King announced to the inhabitants of the prov- inces his reasons for annexation. (See Appendix I, 87.) 4. SETTLEMENT WITH TURKEY. On October 8 the Porte protested to Vienna that the Treaty of Berlin and the convention of Constantinople could be altered only by the consent of the signatory parties. (See Appendix I, 88.) A Turkish boycott on Austrian goods caused such losses that on No- vember 22 Pallavicini, ambassador of Austria-Hungary at Constanti- nople, promised concessions if the boycott was raised. Kiamil Pasha ordered it stopped on December 5. On January 11 Pallavicini offered the Porte £2,200.000 to compensate for Turkish property in the prov- inces, this payment, he asserted, having nothing to do with the annexation (Aktenstiicke, nos. 9^-95). This and other compensa- tions Avere embodied in the protocol of February 26. by which Turkey recognized the annexation. (Appendix I. 90.) 5. CONFLICT WITH SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO. On October 7 Serbia demanded complete restoration of the Treaty of Berlin or compensation (Archives diplomatiques, third series, vol. 109. pp. 291-292). Montenegro demanded that Antivari be freed from Austrian control. Milovanovitch, minister of foreign affairs of Serbia, was urged by the powers to avoid hostilities and await an in- ternational conference. He replied that Serbia wished a recognition of Serbian and Montenegrin integrity, and the strip between the Sandjak and Bosnia-Herzegovina as a buffer between Austria and Turkey. 6. ATTITUDE OF THE POWERS. The attitude of the powers was as follows : The interests of Eng- land and France were not directly concerned. Russia was anxious to bring the matter before a congress of the powers (Dipl. Akt. no. 87 Beilage). Italy was bound by the Triple Alliance. Germany ap- proved a fait accompli, but wished Austria to go no further. ( Albin, 233-234; Annual Eegister, 1908, 322.) Aehrenthal would consent to a congress only with the proviso that the annexation should not be discussed, but should be simply ratified as a matter of legal form (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 109, p. 296). A plan for the congress was drawn up, but Austria-Hungary pronounced it un- acceptable (Aktenstuekc. no. 89 Beilage). 376 7. WHY NO CONGRESS WAS HELD. The idea of a congress was abandoned for two reasons: The atti- tude of Germany and the retreat of Russia, Serbia, and Montenegro. The Berlin Government, supporting Austria-Hungary, insisted that annexation be excluded from discussion, and that no compensation be given Serbia and Montenegro without Austria's consent. In the Reichstag, on December 7, Von Biilow said that Germany would stand by her ally. In March. 1909, he notified Russia that, if Russia intervened to aid Serbia, in case of war Germany would sup- port Austria. Russia at once recognized the annexation. 8. SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO YIELD. In February and March, 1909, Austria mobilized three army corps and the Danube flotilla, and demanded categorical renunciation of the Serbian claims. As Russia had withdrawn her support early in March (Aktenstiicke, no. 117), Serbia on March 31 renounced her opposition to annexation and promised to restore her army to the status of the spring of 1908. (See Appendix I, 91.) On April 6 Montenegro renounced her opposition in return for the suppression of article 29 of the Treaty of Berlin, giving Austria con- trol of Antivari (Aktenstiicke, no. 178). 9. SETTLEMENT AMONG THE POWERS. As the powers most nearly concerned agreed to the annexation, the remaining powers consented to the suppression of article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. Italy consented April 11, Germany April 7, Eng- land April 17, Russia and France April 19 (Aktenstiicke. nos. 179, 182, 18o-187). 10. RESULTS. The results of annexation for Austria were an indemnity of £2,200,- 000 to Turkey; trade losses by tho, Turkish boycott; £14,000,000 for the mobilization of the army: the alienation of most of the powers from Austrian policy; and a heavy obligation to Germany. The whole episode became the starting point and was in large measure the immediate cause for the series of events, all of them connected with the affairs of the Turkish Empire, which filled the years 1908 to 1914 and led directly to the World War. See also article. The Bosnian Crisis of 1908-190!). BIBLIOGRAPHY. DOCUMENTS. Austria-Ministerium des Auessern. Diplomatische Aktenstuecke betreffend Bosnien und Hercegovina Oktober 1908 bis Juni 1909. 377 (Wien, K. K. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1909.) Official publication of important dispatches from Austrian Archives. Albin, P. Les Grands Traites Politiques. Recueil des principaux textes diplomatiques depuis 1815 jusqu'a nos jours. Paris, Alcan, 1912.) Contains important documents not printed in the Austrian collection. Archives Diplomatiques. third series, vol. 109, pp. 278-303. YEARBOOKS. The Annual Register 1908, 1900. Valuable record of course of the crisis. Viallate, A. La vie politique dans deux mondes 1908-1909. Jellinek, G. ; Laband, P. ; Piloty, R. edit. Jahrbuch des oeffent- lichen Rechts der Gegenwart 1908-1909. SECONDARY AUTHORITIES. Koyitch, D. S. L'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine et le droit international public. Dissertation. University of Paris. (Paris, 191-2. ) Krunsky, B. L'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine en 1908: etude de droit international et l'histoire diplomatique. Disserta- tion. University of Paris. (Paris, 1912.) Steed, H. W. The Hapsburg Monarchy, pp. 238-263 (London, Constable, 1914). Valuable account by well-informed Vienna cor- respondent of the London Times. Fournier, A. Wie wir zu Bosnien kamen. (Vienna, 1909.) An historical sketch by one of Austria's best historians. The authorized Austrian publication and apologia. Von Sosnosky, T. Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreichs-Ungarns seit I860. 2 vols. (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1913-1914.) PAMPHLETS. Cvijie, Prof. J. L'annexion de la Bosnie et la Question Serbe. Paris, 1909. The Belgrade point of view at its best. Masaryk, Prof. T. G. Der Agramer Hochverratsprozess und die Annexion von Bosnien und Herzegovina. (Vienna, 1909.) By a prominent Czech publicist. Sisic, Prof. F. Nach der Annexion. Eroerterungen, geographi- scher, ethnographischer, und staatsrechtlicher Fragen, Herzegowina- Bosnien betreffend. Zagreb, 1909. MAGAZINE ARTICLES. Blaskovich, Alex. de. L'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine. La Nouvelle Europe. Annee I. 5-23. 1909. 378 Blociszewski, J. L'annexion de La Bosnia et de I'HerzSgovine. Revue generale de droit international public XVII,417 L9 (1910). Austrian Defense of the Annexation. Evanovitch, M. R. Europe and the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fortnightly Review, vol.85, I -IS (1000). Pinon, R. La Politique europeenne et l'annexion de la Bosnie- Herzegovine. Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. 51, 839-873 (1000). Vesnitch, M. R. L'annexion de la Bosnie-HerzegoVine et le droit international. Revue de droit international et de legislation com- pared. 2e sci ie, vol. 11, 123-11. MAPS. [nstitut Imperial et Royal GSographique militaire de Yienne, Carte generale de la Bosnie-Herzegovine. Vienna, 1892. 1 : 800,000. In Capus, 6. A t ravers la Bosnie et I'Herzegovine. Paris, 1806. The best map available. Cvijic, J. ("arte ethnographique de la nation Serbe. Paris, 1000. 1:2,750,000. In Cvijid, J. L'annexion de la Bosnie et la question Serbe. Paris, 1000. Freytag, (J., and Berndt. Handkarte von Montenegro und den angrenzenden Gebieten Oesterreichs-Ungarns, Serbiens, und Al- baniens. Wien, 1913. Holder, A. Map of Bosnia- Herzegovina. 1:1,800,000. In Ashboth, J. An official tour through Bosnia-Herzegovina. London, 1800. Kiepert, II. Die oeuen Grenzen auf der Balkan Ilalbinscl, nach den Bestimmungen des Vertrags von Berlin. Berlin, L878. 1:3.- 000,000. Olivier, B. Ethnic, linguistic,, geographic, etc., charts in La Bosnie et I'Herzegovine. Paris, 1001. 128. THE AUSTRIAN OCCUPATION OF NOVIBAZAR, 1878-1909. I. ORIGIN OF THE OCCUPATION. In planning the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina before the Treaty of Berlin, it seemed desirable to Austria to have a foothold in the Sanjak of Novibazar. A double purpose would be served thereby, of keeping Montenegro and Serbia apart, and thus hinder- ing the impulse of the Serbo-Croats toward political unity, and of holding the door open for an advance of i, if ' ,( >t by politi- cal control, at any rate by commercial penetration, toward Salonica. The proposal was broughl forward at the session oi' the Congress of Berlin on June 28, and despite protests from the Turkish plenipo- 379 tentiaries, on July 4 and July 10, was adopted on July 11, with no other change (ban a sentence appended concerning agreement as to details. 2. TREATY OF I5KRLTN. Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin provided as follows: ivernment of Austria-Hungary, nol desiring to undertake the ad- i] <>i' the Sanjab of Novibazar, which extends between Serbia and Monl 'o in ;i southeasterly direction to the other side of Mitrovitza, Hi" Ottoman Government will continue to exercise Its functions there. Neverthe- less, in order to ;issur<> the maintenance of the new political state <>f affairs, as well us freedom arid security of communications, Austria-Hungary reserves the righl of keeping garrisons and having military and commercial nfids in' Hi" whole of this pari <>!' the ancienl Vilayel of Bosnia. To this end the Governments of Austria-Hungary and Turkey reserve to themselves i<> e<»nu> to :in understanding on Mi" details. (See Appendix I, 17.) On the same day that I lie Treaty of Berlin was signed, for reasons which are still obscure, Iiussia, entered into a secret convention with Austria-Hungary binding her not to raise any objections if. in conse- quence of inconvenience arising from the maintenance of Turkish administration, Austria-Hungary should he brought to occupy Novi- bazar definitively as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Steed. Hapsburg Monarchy, 213. Text in Albin, Grands Traites, 234.) 3. AUSTRO-TTJKKISII CONVENTION OK APRIL J 1 . 1879. In the convention of April 21. 1870. between Austria-Hungary and Turkey (Hertslet, 2855-9; articles 7-10, and annex), the Emperor- King undertook to give notice beforehand of the time when his troops should enter the sanjak. Questions concerning their sub- sistence, quartering, etc.. were to be arranged by the authorities and commanders of the two Governments, and all expenses were to he paid ))Y Austria. The presence of the Austrian troops was nol to interfere with the function of Ottoman administrative officers, judi- cial or financial. The Porte might also maintain regular troops, hut not irregular, in the same places, " on a footing of perfect equal- ity with regard to their number and military advantages, and (lie freedom of their movements." Austria would for the time being place troops only at three points on the Lim, namely, Pribol, Prie- poliye, and Bielopoliye, to a total number of between 4.000 and 5.000 men. I. OCCUPATION, I 879 -1908. This wry limited occupation began on September 10. 1879. Bie- lopoliye was presently exchanged for Plevlye. The Austrians ap- pointed only one civil official. Good relations were steadily main- tained between the Austrian and Turkish officials, largely due on 380 (lie Turkish side t<> the friendliness of Ferik Suleiman, pasha for many years in Plevlye. The area garrisoned by the Austrians was after a time set off as a separate sanjak (thai of Plevlye) by the Turks. (Miller, in Cambridge Modern History, XII. p. 401.) The inhabitants of the sanjak had no affection for (he Austrians, bu1 nothing occurred l<> disturb the situation for almosl :'><> years. A\'1umi I Iw question of railways was taken up actively early in L908, Baron Aehrenthal asked permission of Hie Porte to survey a railway through Hie .sanjak from Uvats in Bosnia to Mitrovit/.a. The Serbians presented as a counter proposal, with the support of Italy and Russia, a line across from the Danube 1<> San Giovanni di Medua. Action was prevented by the outbreak of the*Turkish Revo- Inlion. 5. TERMIN \Tlox, i 908 l 909. October 5, I ik)s. Austria announced (lie annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Porte protested, ami Turkish popular opinion was expressed by a boycotl on all Austrian goods. Austria withdrew her troops from Novibazar on October 28. Afler long negotiations (he iToung Turk Government was obliged to conform to the situa- tion, and in the treaty of February 26, L909, Austria obtained the cession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but renounced all her rights in the Sanjak of Novihaxar. In the course oi ihe next few weeks, (he powers signatory of (he Treaty of Berlin consented to (he abolition of (he 25th article. The reasons which led (he Austro-Hungarian Government to with- draw from Xovihaxar are nol fully known. Il is believed that Italy demanded withdrawal as (he price for Italian recognition of the an- nexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and (hat the Austrian genera] staff reported the true strategic line of advance toward Salonica to lie along (he valley of (he Morava in Serbia. (Seton- Watson, Contem- porary Review, vol. 101, p. :'>•_!('>. ) Sec also (he article. The Bosnian Crisis of L908 L909. BIBLIOGRAPHY. See bibliography of articles on Congress of Berlin and on Annexa- tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 129. THE BULGARIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 1908. I. [NTRODUCTION. The (rea)ies of San Sbl'ano and Berlin (1878), to which (he principality of Bulgaria owed its legal existence, though providing 38] for practically complete autonomy i'ur the principality, recognized ;n favor of Turkey certain ill-defined rights of suzerainty over Bul- garia. (Sec articles, 'I he Congress of Berlin, and Bulgaria and The Balkan Settlement of 1878.) Ordinarily these rights were of little value to Turkey and limited very slightly the independent action of Bulgaria. There was, however, in Bulgaria a strong desire \'<>i com plete independence. Prince Ferdinand on several occasions sounded the courts of Russia and Austria in regard to the matter, but was advised to wait. The Turkish Revolution of July, L908, furnished an oppori unity. 2. THE DECLARATION OF TORNOVA. On October 5, 1908, Prince Ferdinand formally proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria at Tornova. (See Appendix 1, 85.) All the circumstances of the occasion indicate that the declaration was issued in consequence of an understanding previous ly arranged bet w een i he Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian Governments. The decision not to defer the declaration until a later time was probably due to a fear lest the powers, coming info dispute over the action of the Dual Monarchy, would forbid Bulgaria to take any action as to independ- ence. The decision was to confront Europe with a fail accompli. 3. NEGOTIATIONS, OCTOBER, L 908, TO APRIL, 1909. The course taken by Bulgaria was an act of defiance toward Turkey, owing to its suzerain rights, and an infraction of the Treatj of Berlin (1878), to which all of the powers were parties. It there- fore led to a period of acute tension, marked at limes by consid- erable military preparation, between Bulgaria and Turkey and to a complicated negotiation. In the first phase of this negotiation Russia supported Turkey in a decided manner; Germany pursued a rather equivocal course; France and England used their influ- ence at Constantinople to prevent war. In the second and final phase, Russia, changing its attitude, contributed in large measure to facilitate a financial transaction which paved the way for a settle- ment. The attitude of the powers; throughout was that they would consent to modify the Treaty of Berlin as to this matter whenever Bulgaria and Turkey should compos*; their differences, but that the independence of Bulgaria could not be recognized until that had been done. 4. SETTLEMENT AND RECOGNITION. The main obstacles to a pacific adjustment between Bulgaria and Turkey w ntimental and financial. Tin-key at an early' date indicated willingness to recognize the independence of Bulgaria upon the payment of a sum of money of an amount to be determined. 382 Turkey demanded that the sum to be paid include the arrears of tribute and a share of the Ottoman debt. The amount demanded was also placed at a high figure. Bulgaria replied that it would not buy its independence, but would conquer it. At a moment when the situation had become very threatening, with Turkey demanding a rectification of the frontier and both States again making extensive military preparations, Russia came forward with a plan which quickly paved the way to a solution. The plan allowed Turkey, as compensation for claims of all sorts, a sum amounting to 125,000,000 francs, which was substantially the final amount claimed by the Turks', while Bulgaria was willing to pay only 82ijQ00,000 franc -. Payment was to be made by way of reduction in the installments on the sums due to Russia from Turkey by the Treaty of Berlin (1878). Russia, in turn, agreed to accept from Bulgaria the sum of only sj.000,000 francs. (The agreements are in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 102, pp. 384—387.) Turkey, therefore, signed a conven- tion at Constantinople, April 9, 1909, recognizing the independence of Bulgaria (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 102, pp. 386- 387). Recognition by the powers promptly followed. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The best detailed account is an article by Georges Scelle, L'lnde- pendance bulgare, in the Revue genera le de droit international pub- lic, vol. 16, pp.521-649 (especially 540-541, 623-649) . The writer was a strong admirer of Ferdinand of Bulgaria. Some of his interpre- tations arc unduly favorable to Ferdinand, but his statements of fact are generally accurate. Part of this account, with some alteration, has been reproduced in the American Journal of International Law. Vol. V, 144-177, 394-413, 680^714; VI, 86-106, 659-678, in articles entitled Studies on the Eastern Question, and Bulgarian Independ- ence. The same writer has a shorter account in the Annales des sciences politiques, vol. 25, pp. 465-489. There is an excellent short account by Rene Henry in La vie politique dans deux mondes, 1908- 1909 (Paris, Alcan, 1910), 305-308. T. J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law (London, Macmillan, 1910, fourth edition), discusses briefly the status of Bulgaria prior to independence. The Bulgarian Government published a Green Book dealing with the whole matter. 130. THE BOSNIAN CRISIS OF 1908-1909. 1. INTRODUCTION. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hun- gary in October, 1908, led to a controversy between the Dual Mon- archy and Turkey. (See article, The Annexation of Bosnia-Herze- 383 govina.) It also led to international complications which for several weeks early in 1909 threatened to end in a general European Avar. This was the Bosnian crisis. 2. OCCASION FOR THE CRISIS. By article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, 1878 (See Appendix I, 17), Austria-Hungary was permitted to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina. This arrangement was made in consequence of an under-landing between Russia and the Dual Monarchy, entered into on the eve of the Russo- Turkish War of 1877-1878 (See article, The Austro-Russian Accord of 1877) and of the support given to the Austro-Hungarian claims by England and Germany at the Congress of Berlin. As the provinces were inhabited chiefly by Serbs, and as a route across that region would afford Serbia the most convenient form of the long-desired access to the Adriatic, the Serbian agents at the Congress of Berlin tried to protest against the arrangement. (See article, Serbia and the Balkan Settlement of 1878.) But the congress would not even hear the protest. From the beginning of the occupation Austria-Hungary counted upon ultimately obtaining permanent possession. Serbia, however, continued to hope that the provinces, or at least such a portion of them as would give access to the Adriatic, would some day be secured to her. The crisis in 1908-1909 sprang from the fact that Serbia believed that she must prevent the consummation of annexation by Austria-Hungary or give up permanently her long-cherished hopes. 3. SERBIAN DEMANDS. Soon after the proclamation of annexation Serbia called a part of the reserves to the colors and lodged a vigorous protest with the powers, demanding either a return to the status quo ante or compen- sations calculated to assure the independence and material progress of Serbia (Archives diplomatiques, third series, vol. 109, pp. 291- 292). Serbian newspapers demanded a strip of territory extending across Novi-Bazar and Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Adriatic. The Government of the Dual Monarchy refused to receive the Serbian protest. It denied that Serbia had any right to raise a question as to the annexation. 4. ATTITUDE OF THE POWERS. For a time the attitude of the powers was uncertain. With the exception of Germany, whose attitude at first was extremely re- served, all of the powers objected to the action of Austria-Hungary, but apparently more to the form than to the fact of annexation. 384 As the controversy developed Germany came quickly and decidedly to the support of its Austro-Hungarian ally. Jn Russia public opinion expressed itself strongly in support of Serbia. The Rus- sian Government, which at first had shown a disposition to do no more than record a formal protest against the infraction of the Treaty of Berlin, responded by supporting the demand first made by Turkey for an international conference t<> consider the matter. (Aktenstiicke, No. 87 Beilage.) The British and Italian Govern- ments then supported this demand with considerable vigor, while France sought to play a conciliatory role. 5. NEGOTIATIONS FOB A CONFERENCE. * Austria-Hungary declared that it was not opposed on principle to a conference, but made its acceptance depend upon the program for (he conference, which it insisted must be agreed upon in advance. It took the position that the conference ought not to discuss the validity of the annexation, but should confine i elf to registering the measure as a fait accompli. Russia, after considerable exchange of opinion with the other powers, submitted a project for a program which included an item dealing with advantages to be accorded to Serbia and Montenegro. (Aktenstiicke, No. 50.) Austria-Hungary, in reply, did not flatly reject the Russian proposal, but suggested that the advantages for Serbia and Montenegro should be economic only. While the discussion was in progress the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment was endeavoring to prevent the calling of the proposed con- Eerence by settling its controversy with Turkey. Such a settlement was arranged in principle on January'12, 1909. (Ibid., No. 95.) After that Aust ria-Ilungary claimed that there was no longer any occasion for the meeting of a conference. 6. SERBIA FORCED TO YIELD. Popular feeling in Serbia did not abate. There was a strong demand that opposition to the annexation should be pushed vigor- ously. To avert the danger of war. Russia proposed to the powers a collective demarche at Vienna and at Belgrade. Germany promptly refused to take part, while Austria-Hungary hastened to make known that it would refuse to receive any such proposition. Learn- ing that France and England were not inclined to lend their sup- port. Russia quickly dropped the proposal. The crisis was brought to a close in a manner which involved a triumph for Austria-Hungary over Serbia and for Germany and Austria-Hungary over Russia— a triumph which left behind it much bitterness of spirit in the states which were forced to yield. The humiliation that Russia and Serbia were compelled to endure was un- 385 doubtedly a very considerable factor in determining the whole course of events which from that date led directly to the World War. The precise manner in which Serbia was forced to yield was at the time veiled in a good deal of mystery, giving rise to numerous conflicting accounts of just, what happened. Complete information is not yet available. It is clear, however, that Russia, under some form of strong pressure from Germany, was forced to abandon Serbia. The Kaiser subsequently asserted that he stood beside bis ally, Austria-Hungary, "in shining armor" (Archives diplomatiqu third series, vol. L15, p. 375), while. Prince von Biilow declared that "the German sword had been thrown into the scale of European decision" (Biilow, Imperial Germany, p. 51). Even then Serbia yielded only under constraint from all the powers. Her humiliation was recorded in the declaration she was forced to send to Vienna (March 81, L909).: Serbia recognizes that the situation created In Bosnia-Herzegovina does not. Involve any Injury to the rights of Serbia. In consequence, Serbia will conform to the decision which the powers are going to take in regard to article 25 of the treaty of Vienna. Serbia, conforming to the advice of the powers, agrees to renounce H" 1 attitude of protest and opposition which she lias taken since the month of October of Iasl year. She agrees to modify the line of her political conduct in regard to Austria Btungary and to live In the future on good terms With it. In conformity With this declaration and confident of the pacific in- tentions of Austria-Hungary, S< rbia will bring back her army, in the matter of organization, distribution, and of state of activity, to the situation existing in the spring of 1908. She will disband the volunteer bodies and will prevent the formation of Irregular bands upon her territory. (Archives Diplomatiques, third serie . vol. 1 10, pp. 'J(;:}-264.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. W. Beaumont in La vie politique dans les deux mondes — 1908- 1900 ( edited by A. Viallate, Paris, Alcan, 1910), pp. 100 187 gives probably the best short account. It is rather pro-Austrian but well documented and gives essential facts. A. Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe depuis le Congres dc T>orlin jusqu'a nos jours (Paris, Alcan, 1910, 2 vols.), IT. 113-124. Prince l>ernhard von Biilow, Imperial Germany, 50-54 (London. Cassell, 1914). ■ See also bibliography of article, The Annexation of Bosnia-Herze- govina, 1908. 131. THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION, 1878-1908. 1. MACEDONIA AND TUB TREATY OF BERLIN. The, region known as Macedonia may be roughly defined as (he basins of the Vardar. Struma, and Mesta Zara Rivers, except the headwaters of the Struma. Nowhere in the Balkan peninsula or in 5370G— 18 25 386 the Near East are races and nationalities so inextricably intermin- gled as in Macedonia. The population includes large numbers of Bulgars, Greeks, Serbs, Roumanian YTacks, Turks, and Jews. Much of the difficulty of the Macedonian problem lies in the common an- tagonisms of these peoples, and in the ambitions of the neighboring Balkan Stales, and in the sympathy of their inhabitants !'or the Macedonian members of their own nationality. The strategic po lion of Macedonia, especially Salonika, controlling one of the princi- pal highways of trade between the Near East and central and westerii Europe and the Drang nach Osten ambitions of the Dual Monarchy added to the complexity and difficulty of the problem. • That the Mace- donian question developed into an almost constant source of anxiety to the diplomatists and statesmen of Europe for many years prior to 1914 and became in large measure the emisa causans of the Bal- kan wars of 1912-1913, thereby contributing materially to the out- break of the World War, must be imputed in large measure to the Balkan settlement arranged by the Congress of Berlin. (See article, The Congress of Berlin, and other articles dealing with the Balkan settlement of 1878.) The Treaty of San Stefano (See article, that title) had included marly all of Macedonia in the Great Bulgaria which Russia de- signed to establish. But the Congress of Merlin, influenced by a natural and not wholly unjustified suspicion of Russia, decided thai Macedonia should rem:'. in under Turkish rule with only a few vague guarantees for improved government. Experiences soon showed that these guarantees were Wholly ineffective. The decision to leave Macedonia under Turkish rule was the fatal error of the Congress of Berlin. ■2. BALKAN RIVALRY IN MACEDONIA, 1885-1897. Turkish administration, despite the projected law of vilayets of 1880 (a measure agreed upon between the Turkish Government and European commissioners, but never promulgated; La Joncquiere, II. 158; a brief abstract is given in Hertslet, 2990-'J!) < .>r> ) . went on unchanged, embodying the customary evils of Turkish rule. Condi- tions were perhaps no worse than for generations past, but they were becoming more and more out of harmony with the advancing time-'. The Bulgarian Revolution of 1885 altered the situation (See article. thai title). The people of the strengthened principality began to aid their still subjugated brethren. At firs! 'ley \\ 65. For Macedonian affairs in L902, pp. 44-47: Instructions regarding vilayets.) 5. Tin: MUBZSTEO PROGRAM, 1903. It was felt that the Sultan's plan did not go far enough, and in February, 1903, Austria-Hungary and Russia transmitted a memo- randum, which urged the use of foreign officers to command the new gendarmerie, that Mohammedans and Chrisf ian.-, should compose it 388 in proportion to population, and belter financial arrangements for the support of the scheme. (La Joncquiere, IT, 164. Archives Dip- lomatiques, third cries, vol. 85, pp. 279-292. Austro-Russian project analyzed, pp. 288 291. Also vol. 88, pp. 106-112.) Thisplan met with the approval of the oilier powers. (London Times, Feb. L9, L903; pp. 3, 5; and Feb. 25, L903, p : 5). The Porte accepted the modifications, but matters became much worse in th L903, and it was evi- dent thai more must be done. The Emperors of Austria and Russia met a! the end of September, and their chancellors, Counts Golu- chowski and Lamsdorff, proceeded to draw up the new "Murzsteg program," which was intended to strengthen and elaborate the plan of February (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 88, pp. L23 IL'7). Austrian and Russian civil agents were to be attached to the in- spector. A foreign general was to c rid the gendarmerie, and cer- tain much-needed administrative and judicial improvements were to be made with the participation of the Christian population. (La Joncquiere, H, 164-166.) The Porte bent before the will of the great powers, the new generals were appointed, and the other changes taken in hand. In 1904 the Bulgarian and Turkish Gov- ernments agreed on measures for the prevention of the activities of irregular armed bands. The situation was improved somewhat, but brigandage did not cease. Nor did the Turkish officials, who resented the presence of foreign officers, mend their ways materially. 6. BRITISH NOTE OF M \Y L8, L906. In 1905 the British Government, feeling that further steps should be taken, took the initiative in proposing financial reforms. (Miller, Ottoman Empire. I IT.) This resulted in a note of May 18, 1906, aimed mainly at securing more revenues to support the administration in Macedonia (the three vilayets of Saloniki, Monastir, and ITskub). The, Porte, of course, accepted the recommendation, especially since it was accompanied by the consent of the powers to increase the du! on goods imported into Turkey. But anarchy continued, and threatened to make of Macedonia a shambles and a desert. It was evident that the attempt at set (lenient by Turkish reform could have no success. T. kNGLO-RUSSIAN PROJECT FOB REFORMS, 1908, The difficulty was thai the agreement of Austria and Russia, in suppressing their mutual rivalry, suppressed also nearly all action. A wholly new face was put upon affairs by the understanding arrived at between England and Russia on August 31, 1907. (Sec article. The Formation of the Triple Entente, and Appendix I, 81.) The opposition of 50 years' duration was changed into harmonious action. 389 the effect of which speedily became apparent in Turkish affairs. In March of 1908 the former arrangements For Macedonia were pro- longed for six years. Sir Edward Grey set forth in the House "1' Co] (Parliamentary Debates, fourth series, vol. 1 s 1 pp. L692 1708) a plan which would take the step, so Long deferred, of virtually withdrawing the region from Turkish control. Mace- donia was to have a governor general nominated by the powers, and the number of Turkish troops was to b< reduce d. Russia joined promptly in the recommendation, adding furth in the direc- tion of strengthening European control. (Miller, Ottoman Empire, 448. La Joncquiere, II, 169.) The legal so ity of '1 urkey was to he insisted upon in order to check the ambitions of the neighbor- ing small nal ions. The project created ' great emotion in Turkey, and, in conjunction with the Reval rvicw (See at thai title), was one of the elements which led to the Revolution of July, 1908. The Yoi Turks expected to save Macedonia for Turkey by a com] i ige of government. The powers and the Balkan willingly gave (hem a chance, and the whole structure and scheme of foreign inter- ference was immediately withdrawn. BIBLIOGRAPHY. DOCUMENTS. Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 85, pp. 9 r >">: vol. 88, pp. L06 L30 print valuable docu the French Yellow Books and from Russian and German nc srs. aatsarchiv, vol. G8, pp. 1-120, reprints numerous documents of 1900-1903 from the British Blue Books. ■ rtslet, Sir Edward. The Map of Europe by Treaty. Vol. 1. 1-1891. (London. L891.) Albin. Les grands trails p< recueil des principaux tes diplomatiques depuis 1815 jusqu'a nos jours. (Paris, A 'can, 1912.) BOOKS. Brailsford, 11. M. Macedonia; its races and their future. (Lon- don. Methuen. 1906.) Eliot, Sir Charles ("Odysseus"), Turkey in Europe. New edi- tion. (London. Arnold, 1908.) Miller. The Ottoman Empire (Cambridge, University Press, L913.) Young. George. Nationalism and War in the Near East. (Ox- ford, Clarendon Press, 1915.) Pp. 81-116. Contains discussion and reflection rather than narrative of events. 390 Berard, V. La Macedoine. 2d edition. (Paris. Colin, 1000.) Also by the some author: Pro Macedonia (Paris, Colin, 1904) and Le Sultan, l'lslam et les Puissances. (Paris, Colin, 1907.) Voinor, I. F. La Question Macedoine et les Reformers en Turquie. (Paris. 1905.) Draganof. La Macedoine et les Rcformes. (Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1906.) Villari, Luigi. The Balkan question. The present condition of the Balkans and of European responsibilities. By various writers, (London. Murray. 1905.) Contributions by a number of well-in- formed writers. Steed, H. W. Hapsburg Monarchy (London, Constable, 1914). By the well-informed correspondent of the London Times at Vienna. Cabuet, A. La question d'orient dans l'histoire contemporaine, 1821-1905. (Paris, Dujarric, 1905.) Abbott. G. F. A Tour in Macedonia. (London, Arnold, 1903.) Durham. Edith. The Burden of the Balkans. (London, Arnold, 1905.) Wyon, R. The Balkans from within. (London, Finch, 1904.) King-Lewis, G. Critical Times in Turkey. 1904. AETICLES. Hulme-Beaman, A. The Macedonian Question. Fortnightly Re- view, March, 1891. pp. 427-138. Macedonia and the Macedonians (author's name not given). Con- temporary Review, September, 1895. pp. 305-325. The Macedonian Problem and its Factors. Edinburgh Review. October, 1901. pp. 390. Engelhardt. E. La question macedonienne. Revue de droit inter- national public (1905-1906), XII, 544-551, 636-644; XIII, 29-40, 164-174. Rangier. A. L'intervention de l'Europe dans la question de Mace- donie. Revue de droit international public (1906). XIII. 178-200. Scott-James. R. A. The Austrian Occupation of Macedonia. Fort- nightly Review, November. 1905. pp. 894-903. Pears, Edwin. Macedonia and the Neutralization of Constanti- nople. Contemporary Review. February. 1907. pp. 153-173. An English Traveler and Writer. The danger spot of Europe. World's Work, August, 1907, pp. 9243-52. Buxton, Noel. Diplomatic Dreams and the Future of Macedonia. Nineteenth Century. May. 190s. pp. 722-33. Dillon, E. J. Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. Contemporary Review, March. 1908, pp. 365-73. A British Policy for Macedonia. The Living Age, March, 1908, pp. 813-15. Entente between Austria and Russia. Fortnightly Re- view. March, 1908, pp. 539-519. 391 ETHNOGRAPHICAL MAPS 0*' THE BALKAN PENINSULA, SHOWING MACEDONIA. Boue, Ami. Ethnographical Map of Europe, in the first edition Berghaus's Physicalischer Atlas. 1849. Lejean, G. Ethnographie cle la Turquie d'Europe. Contains large and very clear map showing nationalities of Turkey in Europe (Greece excepted). Based on maps of A. Balbi and Ami Boue, cor- rected by observations of travelers and of two authors on journeys. Mackenzie, G. Muir, and Irby, A. P. Travels in the Slavonic Provinces of Turkey in Europe. London, 1867. Facing p. xv. Map of the south Slavonic countries. " From Frohlich's Map of the Austrian Empire, and Lejean's Map of the Nationalities of Turkey in Europe, corrected here and there " by observations of travelers. Berghaus. Physicalischer Atlas. 1892. Map 67 is a careful ethno- graphical map of Europe based oh Ami Boue's contribution of a similar map to the first edition of 1849. Die Geographische Zeitschrift, vol. 3. 1897. Map showing areas inhabited by Greeks, and suggesting a suitable geographical area for Greece, and a larger area showing practicable frontiers which would contain most of the Greeks. Debes. Handatlas. 1911. Map 12c shows ethnography of Europe. Dominian, L. The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe. (New York, Holt, 1917.) Facing p. 334: Map— part of Europe showing languages having political significance. " Based on sheet no. 12c (September, 1911), Debes Handatlas and other sources." The same map is given at the close of vol. 1, no. 2, of "A league of nations," World Peace Foundation, Boston, December, 1917. 132. THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION, 1908-1912. 1. THE TURKISH REVOLUTION OF 19 OS. Early in 1908 Russia and Austria-Hungary fell out over the exe- cution of the Mi'irzsteg program ( See article on The Macedonian Ques- tion, 1878-1908), by the terms of which a system of reform had been instituted in Macedonia. In January, 1908, Baron Aerenthal announced that Austria-Hungary had applied for permision to sur- vey the ground for a railroad to connect the terminus of the Bosnian Railway with the line running from Metrovitza to Salonica. Russia was especially disturbed by this announcement, which she regarded as destructive of the joint action which she and Austria-Hungary had been commissioned by the powers to exercise over Macedonia. Baron Aerenthal promptly dispelled all doubts as to the correct- ness of Russia's inference by declaring that the special task of Rus- sia and Austria in Macedonia was concluded. In June, 1908, King 392 Edward of England and Czar Nicholas met at Reval and drew up a further program for the pacification of Macedonia. The execution of this program was interrupted by the startling series of events which transpired during the latter half of 1908. (See article, The Reval Interview.) On Juty 24, 1908, the bloodless revolution by which the rule of Abdul Hamid was overturned and the Young Turk regime estab- lished in the Ottoman Empire was effected; on October 5 Prince Ferdinand proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria; on October 6 the Emperor Francis Joseph announced the formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Hapsburg dominions; and on October 12 the Cretan Assembly voted the union of the island of Crete with the Kingdom of Greece. 2. THE YOUNG TURK PROGRAM AX!) MACEDONIA. The belief of the Young Turks that a regeneration of the Empire was necessary to prevent the inevitable and irretrievable loss of European Turkey precipitated the revolution of 1908, and the paramount plank in the program of regeneration was the solution of the Macedonian problem. The policy which the Young Turk adopted to solve the Macedonian problem was to strengthen the Moslem element and to enroll Christians in the army. 3. MOSLEM MIGRATION TO MACEDONIA. After the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (See article, that title) by Austria-Hungary the Young Turks sent agents into those countries to induce the Moslem population to emigrate to Macedonia. These immigrants, or muhadjer . ;. were called, were settled by the Government in those districts where the Moslem population was weak. The experiment, which was not without precedent, proved dis- astrous. The element which could be induced to emigrate was ignor- ant, unruly, fanatical, and economically worthless. The presence of this lawless, malcontent element in Macedonia ended in irretrievable disaster for Turkey. They readily united with the Albanian Moslem immigrants to perpetrate the succe: sion of massacres in 1912 which resulted ultimately in the formation of the Balkan Alliance. (See article, that title.) 4. MACEDONIA A XI) MILITARY SERVICE. The second policy adopted by the Young Turks to secure the loyalty of their Christian subjects in European Turkey was the abolition of the Karadj or head tax, by which Christians were ex- empted From military service, and the enrolling of them in the army. This policy w as attractive in theory but impracticable in application. The social, educational, temperamental, and religious incompati- 393 bility of Moslems and Christians, and the unspeakable and criminal conditions of the service rendered the plan of forming mixed regi- ments, officered exclusively by Moslems, a dismal failure. This system of obligatory military service was used from its inception as a means of extortion and terrorism; Jews and Christians who were financially able were forced to pay the £40 prescribed for exemption, and those who were unable to pay were practically reduced to mili- tary servitude. Under these conditions the Christian elements pre- ferred exile, and between 1909 and 1914 Turkey lost hundreds of thousands of its best subjects by emigration. 5. RESULTS OF YOUNG TURK RULE IN MACEDONIA. The net result of the emigration and settlement of the muhadjers and the enrollment of the Christians for military service was that the people of Macedonia definitely abandoned the advocacy of auton- omy under the suzerainty of the Sultan and sought to enlist the assistance of the Balkan States to emancipate them from Turkish rule. 6. CONCLUSION. The failure of the Young Turk policy in Macedonia and the series of outrages perpetrated there between 1909 and 1912 induced the Balkan States to compose their differences and to enter into the Balkan League. This league was i:>erfected by a series of treaties, the first of which was signed on March 13, 1912, by Serbia and Bulgaria and the- second by Greece and Bulgaria on May 10, 1912. On September 22, 1912, the defensive alliance of Greece and Bul- garia was followed by a detailed military convention. (See article 1 The Formation of the Balkan Alliance of 1912.) In the spring of 1912 occurred the successful Albanian uprising. The Albanian insurgents were joined by a part of the Turkish troops who had been operating against them and presently demanded the cession to them of the entire vilayets of Monastir and Uskub. This demand aroused Greece and Serbia. Bulgaria was stirred to action by the massacre of Macedonian Bulgars at Kotchana and Berana. On August 14 a popular demonstration was held at Sofia to demand immediate autonomy for Macedonia and Thrace or war against the Porte. On August 26 Bulgaria agreed that war should be declared in October. In September the members of the Balkan League ap- pealed to the powers to join them in demanding immediate and radical reforms in Macedonia. On October 8 the powers presented an identical ultimatum at Sofia, Belgrade, Athens, and Cettinje. On the same day Montenegro declared war on Turkey. On the 14th Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece presented their ultimatum. On October 18 the Porte declared war on Bulgaria arid Serbia, and on the same day Greece declared war on Turkey. 394 BIBLIOGRAPHY. H. A. Gibbons. The New Map of Europe. (New York. Century, 1914.) J. A. R. Marriott. The Eastern Question. (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1917.) J. E. Gueshoff. The Balkan League. (London, Murray. 1915.) English translation. Contains many original documents of first-rate importance, including the Balkan treaties of 1912. See also bibliography for article, The Macedonian Que tion, 1878- 1908. 133. THE CRETAN QUESTION, 1897-1908. 1. CRETE AND THE GRECO-1URKISH WAR OF L897, Insurrection in Crete early in 1897 led directly to the Greco- irkish War of thai year (See article that title). The ' i reek s, beaten by German-trained Turkish troops, called on the powers, who, before mediating, demanded that Cretan autonomy under Turkish suze- rainty, instead of the annexation of the island by Greece, be accepted by the Greek Government. Greece submitted. The heads of the Cretan insurrection, although with great reluc- tance, also accepted the idea of the autonomy of Crete. While the powers found difficulty in settling peace terms and in securing a governor for Crete, the admirals, despite trouble caused by the pres- ence of Turkish troops, restored order and introduced reforms. 2. SETTLEMENT OF 1S9S-1S99. In April, 1898, Germany and Austria left the European conceit on the Cretan question because of their growing interest in Turkey and withdrew their ships from the blockade. Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy thereupon divided Crete into four departments which they severally administered, Canea being occupied by a joint force. The powers urged the departure of the Turkish troops, who were still troublesome. Turkey, having delayed with characteristic subterfuges, finally yielded, and on November 28, 1898, the last Turk- ish troops left Crete. On November 26, 1898, largely at the suggestion of Russia, the powers having scoured Europe for a Cretan governor acceptable to all, invited Prince George of Greece to be high commissioner of the powers in Crete for three years. He accepted, the blockade was soon raised, and December 21, 1898, he landed on the island. The ad- mirals having handed over the government to him, requested their own recall, and only a few foreign troops and the stationnaires re- mained. The Cretan flag was raised. Tranquillity followed, but 395 Moslems departed in great numbers, the 1900 census showing them only about one-ninth of the population, as against about one-third in 1881. In April, 1899, a constitution drafted by Venizelos and presented by a constitutional assembly, was promulgated, according to which foreign affairs were to be determined by the representatives of the four protecting powers at Rome. 3. TRANQUILLITY UNDER PRINCE GEORGE, 1899-1904. In 1899. things seemed to go well, but soon trouble developed. The Cretans were restless under Turkey; some wanted complete inde- pendence; some annexation to Greece (the stronger movement) ; many were at odds with the administration, which they charged with extravagance, inefficiency, and neglect. Further annexationist appeals were made to the powers, who, though determined to maintain peace and the status quo (especially Germany and Austria, desirous of humoring Turkey, to advance their interests and hinder those of Russia), and fearing the opening of the Balkan question, still felt that that question must be solved. The situation between prince and deputies became very strained in 1901. The unpopularity of Prince George was due to the fact (1) that his repeated attempts (1900-1904) failed to influence powers toward annexation, and (2) that he unwisely seemed to take meas- ures toward perpetuation of the existing arrangement, regarded by Cretans as only temporary. Differences developed between his parti- sans and those of Venizelos, who, now a popular hero, became head of the insurgent movement. Naturally opposed to autonomy, he gradually yielded to it as a " further stage toward the realization of the national ideal.'' 4. ATTEMPTED UNION WITH GREECE, 19 04-19 0G. In July and August, 1904, at the request of the Cretans, Prince George again appealed to the powers for annexation to Greece. The powers refused (April. 1905), and the revolutionary movement gained full sway. Union with Greece was again proclaimed. On July 30, 1905, the powers put Crete under martial law and interna- tional troops occupied the chief cities. In November, 1905, Venizelos conferred with the consuls of the powers who granted concessions, but refused to alter the status qiio. Fighting stopped (July-September, 1906) ; Prince George resigned, claiming unwillingness to rule under new conditions, but really forced thereto by insurgents. 396 King George, asked by the powers to nominate a Greek subject, designated M. Zaimis as high commissioner. Order was restored. The powers failed to solve the Cretan question fast enough for the Cretans. 5. CRETE AND THE TURKISH REVOLUTION OF 1908. In May. 1908, the powers announced that soldiers would gradually be withdrawn when order should be assured, and began withdrawal on announcement from M. Zaimis that order was guaranteed. The Young Turk revolution at Constantinople, Jury, 1908, was fol- lowed by stirring events in the Balkans (on October 5, the. proclama- tion of Bulgarian independence, and on October 7, the*annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). On October 7. also, Crete proclaimed union with Greece (ratified by Chamber October 12). M. Zaimis had left Crete October 3 "provisionally," and in his absence the Cretan Chamber appointed an executive commission (including lizelos) [o govern in the name of King George till Greece should take charge. Turkey protested. On October 28, 1908, the powers, declining either to recognize or repudiate the union, and anxious to allay the resentment of the Young Turks on the one hand and the ardor of Greek unionists on the other, promised that the matter would be made the subject of negotiations with Turkey, provided order was maintained and the rights of Moslems respected. The close of 1908 left the matter in this anomalous situation. See article, The Cretan Question, 1908-1913. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Marriott, J. A. R. The Eastern Question. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1917.) Driault. La question d'Orient. (Paris, Alcan, 1914.) Andrews, Charles M. The Historical Development of Modern Europe. (New York, Putnam, 1898.) Gibbons, H. A. The New Map of Europe. (New York, Century Co., 1914.) Cambridge Modern History, vol. XII. (New York, Macmillan. 1910.) Kerofilas. C. Eleutherios Venizelos. (London. Murray. 1915.) Hazell's Annual, 1903-1907. (London, Hazell, 1886.) The International Year Book. 1899-1902. (New York, Dodd, 1899.) The New International Year Book, 1908. (New- York, Dodd, 1909.) 397 134. THE CRETAN QUESTION, 1908-1913. 1. INTRODUCTION. The years of 190G to 1912 witnessed a signal exhibition of the Inability of the powers to decide upon an enforceable policy in regard o Crete. During this period, at first, the affairs of Crete were controlled by a concert of six powers, but soon Germany and Austria withdrew, leaving England, France, Italy, and Russia in charge. Germany and Austria then began cultivating a closer connection with Turkey. li. PROCLAMATION OF UNION AVITH GREECE, OCTOBER, 1908. From December 21, 1898, till 1906, Prince George of Greece ruled Crete under direction of Russia, Italy, France, and England. When he resigned the four nations asked him to appoint a high commis- sioner in his stead. He chose Zaimas, a Greek, who governed till October, 1908, when, upon the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria and the declaration of Bulgarian independence, the Cre- tans proclaimed a union with Greece. Turkey, of which Crete was a nominal possession, at once protested to the powers. Negotiations dragged along. (See article, The Cretan Question, 1897-1908.) 3. EFFORTS FOR RECOGNITION, 1908-1912. During the- period October. 1908, to October, 1912, the status in Crete was more than ever anomalous. The Cretan Assembly had proclaimed the union of the island with Greece. The Greek Govern- ment was anxious for annexation, but did not dare to proclaim it for fear of offending the powers. They, in turn, were unable to agree upon a settled line of policy as to the Cretan question. Meanwhile the Turkish Government, under the sway of the Young Turks, was pursuing a vigorously hostile policy toward all Greeks on account of the Cretan situation. In 1909 the powers announced that they would withdraw their garrison from the island, but would keep four warships in its waters, at the same time warning Greece not to annex Crete and Crete to maintain its autonomous government under a high commissioner. During the year there was considerable rioting at Canea, and it was necessary at one time for an allied force of marir to land and pull down a Cretan flag from over Canea. In 1910 the sentiment for union with Greece had become so earnest that four additional warships were sent to the island by the protecting powers. To the demand of the Cretans for union the powers answered that no negotiations would be taken up till the Cretans had established a stable government. Turkey, in the meantime, was requesting of the 398 powers that thej settle the Cretan question. In 1910 the Cretan offi- cers were required by their Government to take an oath of allegiance to Greece. This the Moslems refused to do, and the powers threat- ened (o Land troops and take possession. The Cretan Government lost control of the situation almost completely in 11)11, but the powers still held that i( was not n propitious time to settle the fate of the island and ordered (he status quo maintained. Early in 1912 the Cretans elected delegates to the Greek Assembly, but these were pre- vented from sill inn- by I he interposition of Great Britain acting for (he powers. I. CRETE AM) THK BALKAN WARS. « Finally, on the outbreak of the First Balkan War, Cretan delegates were seated, October 12, 1912, in the Greek Assembly. Cretan in- dependence was formally acknowledged by the Treaty of London. May 30, L913, the island being ceded by Turkey to the Balkan allies. Neither the Treaty of Bucharest, at the end of the Second Balkan War. nor the Treaty of Athens, signed by Turkey and Greece on November 11, 1913, contained any express mention of Crete, but the signing of the treaties amounted to a virtual recognition on the part of Turkey and all the Balkan States that Crete had become an in- tegral pail of the Kingdom of Greece. Recognition of" the fait aceompliby the powers was finally obtained in December, L913. BIBM0GRAPIIY. Gibbons, II. A. The New Map of Europe, ch. 13. ■ (New York, Century, 1914.) Marriott, J. A. R. The Eastern Question. (Oxford. Clarendon- Press. L917.) Xicolaides. N. Les grecs et la turquie. (Brussels. Th. Dewa- richet, 1910.) Ion. T. P. The Cretan Question. American Journal of Interna- tiona] Law, April, 1910, IV, 276-284. Clear, concise account to 1910. Cavaglieri, Das Kretaproblem, Jahrbuch des Volkerrechts, II, Pari two, pp. 339 303. Dillon, E. J. Contemporary Review, vol. 97, pp. 110-P2S (Janu- ary, 1910), and vol. 98, pp. L19-128 (July, 1910). Brooks, S. The Cretan Problem. Living Age, vol. 275, pp. 437- ['69. 135. THE CASABLANCA AFFAIR, 1908-9. I. ORIGIN. On September 25, L908, six deserters, (hive of German nationalit and three non-Germans, from the French Foreign Legion, then in occupation at Casablanca, Morocco, under a safe conduct issued by 399 the German consul and under the personal protection of the chan- cellor of the consulate, aided by a Moroccan soldier attached to the consulate, attempted to take passage upon a German vessel. The deserters were seized by the French officials after considerable vio- lence. 2. CLAIMS. The arrest of the deserter gave rise to a controversy between the French and the German governmnts, in the course of which the fol- lowing claims were advanced : For France. — (1) Germain had no right to afford protection to persons in Morocco not of German nationality. (2) The territory within French military occupation in Morocco was subject to ex- clusive French jurisdiction, and therefore Germany had no authority to protect even the three deserters of German nai ionality. For (icrinany. — (1) The deserters of German nationality were, by virtue of the extraterritorial jurisdiction which by treaty Ger- many exercised within Morocco, subject to the exclusive jurisdic- tion of the German consul at Casablanca. (2) The forcible arrest was a breach of the inviolability of consular agents. (&) The de- serters of German nationality should be given up. ::. AGREEMENT FOE ARBITRATION. On November 10, 1908, a protocol was signed at Berlin by which France and Germany agreed to submit all questions to arbitration and to express regrets following the decisions which the arbitrators should render. Each party was to choose two arbitrators from the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, and these four should choose an umpire. Germany chose Guido Fusinato, of Italy, and Dr. Kriege, of Germany. France chose Sir Edward Fry, of England, and Louis Renault, of France. The four then selected H. L. Hammarskjold. of Sweden, as the fifth member. By article 1 the tribunal was charged with the decision of all questions, both of law and fact, thus following the example set by Great Britain and Russia in the Dogger Bank case (See article, thai title). Meetings of the arbitrators were held from May 1 to May 19 and the award was given May ±1. l. ARGUMENTS BEFORE TIIK HAGUE TRIBUNAL. For France. — The French argued that the German consul acted contrary to both the principles of international law and the regula- tions of the German consular establishment, which recognize that Ger- mans employed without authorization in civil or military services of foreign states are not entitled to protection. Precedents of similar 400 instances of desertion at Port Said in 1895 and Cairo in 1900, in which German consuls refused to grant protection to Germans, were cited. The consul also violated international rights belonging to a military occupant of foreign soil. Immunity from local jurisdic- tion attaching to the occupant implies not only that the troops are under military law, but that all offenses against the army come under the same jurisdiction. For Germany.— Germany argued that German nationality was not lost by enlistment in the service of a foreign state; that Germany had by treaty complete jurisdiction over all Germans in Morocco; that the French troops were not in military occupation, but were acting merely as police, and that pacific occupation did not have the same juridical and legal effects as military occupation; conse- quently the powers of the occupant were no greater than those of the occupied state; therefore the consular jurisdiction obtained from Morocco by treaty was unchanged. 5. THE AWARD. The award showed evidence of an attempt at a political com- promise rather than a clear-cut legal decision. Reasoning that there was a case of conflict between the two jurisdictions, and that "the jurisdiction of the occupying army ought, in case of conflict, to have the preference when the persons belonging to this army have not left the territory placed under the immediate, actual, and effective control of the armed force," it was held that " a grave and manifest fault " had been committed in attempting to have embarked on a German steamship deserters from the French Foreign Legion who were not of German nationality, and that the German consulate had not, "under circumstances of this kind, the right to grant its pro- tection to deserters of German nationality." It was also held that the French military authorities ought to have respected as far as possible the actual protection exercised over these deserters by the German consulate, and that under the circumstances the force used by the French authorities was not warranted. The French military authorities, however, were not called upon to surrender the deserters. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Scott, J. B., editor. The Hague Court Reports. (New York, Oxford Press, 1916, pp. 110-120.) Contains a brief of the case, with trans- lations of the official documents. Pages 476-486, French texts of the same. Wilson, G. G. The Hague Arbitration Cases. ( Boston: Ginn & Co., 1915.) Page; 8-2-101 give on parallel pages the French and English texts of the above. 401 The American Journal of International Law, III (1909), pages 176-178, 755-700, an English translation of the agreement for arbi- tration and the award of the tribunal with brief comments. Stowe]], E. C., and Munro, H. F., International Cases. (Boston, Houghton, 1910). Pages 377-385 contain abstracts of the same, to- gether with extracts. Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 112 (1909), pages 43-58 give the texts of the documents in both French and German. Gidel. G. L'arbitrage de Casablanca. Revue de droit interna- tional public, XVII, 320^07. Valuable, detailed study. 136. THE MOROCCO CONVENTION OF 1909. 1. FRANCE AND MOROCCO, 1906-1009. The Act of Algeciras conferred upon Fiance and Spain the task of organizing an international police in the open ports of Morocco (See, article. The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1900). The natives pro- tested against this by killing several Frenchmen, and as a result the French Government sent troops into several Provinces; this in turn provoked a rebellion against the reigning Sultan and ended in his deposition. The new ruler, Mulai Hafid, was now presented with a program of reforms and a bill of expenses for the French military operations. For the former the continued presence of French troops was necessary, for the latter a loan from the French Government, and it was with great reluctance that Mulai Hafid signed the convention of March 4, 1910. (See Appendix I, 95.) This agreement did not destroy the sovereignty of the Sultan, but many considered it scarcely in keeping with the Act of Algeciras, holding it must result in the establishment of a French protectorate. 2. CONVENTION OF FEBRUARY 8, 1909. This development, even in its early stages, was not favorably regarded in Germany. The German Government thereupon de- vised a new policy. By a convention signed on February 8, 1909 (See Appendix I, 89), it frankly recognized "the special politi- cal interests " of France in Morocco and declared itself " resolved not to impede those interests." In return the French Govern- ment, " firmly attached to the maintenance of the integrity and inde- pendence of the Shereefian Empire," was "resolved to safeguard the principle of economic equality, and consequently not to obstruct German commercial and industrial interests in that country." Both Go^ ernments," being equally anxious to facilitate the execution of the Act of Algeciras," agreed not to " pursue or encourage any measure 53706—18 26 402 ■ of a nature to create in their favor or in that of any power an eco- nomic privilege, and to associate their nationals in affairs for which the latter may obtain a concession." 3. EFFECT OF THE CONVENTION. Tims Germany had, apparently, conceded the fundamental point — the political interests of France — which she had refused to recog- nize in 1905. The Act of Algeciras was virtually superseded. But the German policy was not understood in French circles. To the Germans the important feature of the convention of 1909 was the pledge to associate Frenchmen and Germans in affairs for which they might obtain concessions. When, therefore, the ^German Govern- ment, on June 2, 1909, proposed to establish an economic condo- minium of French and German financiers in Morocco, the French Government was completely taken aback. Too late it perceived that it had pledged itself to a policy which, a clear violation of the open door, would place Morocco industrially and commercially at the mercy of Germany and might severely strain the entente with Great Britain. For the next two years the Quai d'Orsay vainly endeavored to find some escape from this agreement, but all the schemes proposed fell short of the minimum demanded by Berlin. 4. MOROCCO, 10 00-1911. Meanwhile conditions in Morocco went from bad to worse, culmi- nating in rebellion in 1911 against Mulai Hafid, who appealed to the French for assistance. This was granted, a French column entering Fez on May 21. The German Government now gave warning that such a step meant the reopening of the entire Morocco question, and frankly told the French ambassador in Berlin that the French must retire from Fez or abide by the convention of 1909. But realizing that the French could not, under the circumstances, evacuate Fez, the German Government on July 1, 1911, notified the powers signatory to the Act of Algeciras that the gunboat Panther had been dispatched to the port of Agadir. (See article on Morocco Crisis of 1911.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. See bibliography for article, The Morocco Crisis of 1911. 137. THE MOROCCO CRISIS OF 1911. 1. ORIGIN OF THE CRISIS. The Morocco crisis of 1911 arose out of the dispatch of the Ger- man gunboat Panther to Agadir on July 1. (See article, The Morocco Convention of 1909.) The ostensible ground for this 403 action was the request of German firms in Agadir for protec- tion in the disordered state of the country. But inasmuch as there were no German subjects at Agadir and the port was not open to Europeans, it was clear that the real motive was a desire to reopen the whole question. The German Government resented the complete failure of the convention of 1909, and determined now, by a show of force, to prevent a further French penetration unless France would negotiate for a final settlement of the problem. 2. THE GERMAN PURPOSE. It is highly probable that Germany hoped to break up the Triple Entente. It is also probable that at the beginning of the affair Ger- many expected to obtain part of Morocco for itself, counting upon the known military weakness of France and the confusion in Eng- land produced by the struggle over the House of Lords to prevent serious opposition. 3. FIRST STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. • The absolute reserve of Sir Edward Grey and his insistence that Great Britain must be consulted in any arrangements concerning Morocco ; the attitude of Mr. Balfour, who declared that the opposi- tion would support the Government in its policy; the rally of all shades of French opinion; these circumstances, and perhaps also some pressure from Russia, apparently caused the German Govern- ment to reconsider. At any rate, as early as July 7, the German ambassador in Paris informed the French Government that Ger- many cherished no territorial aspirations in Morocco and would negotiate for a French protectorate on the basis of " compensation " for Germany in the French Congo region and the safeguarding of her economic interests in Morocco. Thus the first stage of the nego- tiations was safely passed. But stormy times vert 1 still ahead. 4. GERMAN DEMANDS. The German terms, as presented on July 15, while containing an offer to cede the northern part of the Cameroons and Togo! and. de- manded from France the whole of the French Congo from the River Sangha to the sea (Documents diplomatiques, Maroc, 1912, pp. 414-415) : to which was later added the transfer of France's right to the preemption of the Belgian Congo. The Germans also showed every disposition to limit the scope of the French protectorate and to seek for themselves special economic privileges, in the spirit of the convention of 1909 (See article, The Morocco Convention of 1909). So great a price France was not prepared to pay, and she refused 404 the German demand. The danger lay in a continued French refusal and a continued German insistence. The dispute would then be thrown back on Morocco. 5. ENGLISH ACTION '. THE MANSION HOUSE SPEECH. . It was to obviate this danger that Great Britain now intervened; she was pledged to support the policy of France in Morocco and would do so to the very end; on the other hand, she would not inter- fere in, and would heartily support, any reasonable accommodation between France and Germany, that is, any settlement in Africa which France, acting as a free agent, was disposed „to make. As the German Government had so far made no statement of its policy to the British Government. Mr. Lloyd George, at the request of Sir Edward Grey, delivered on July 21 his famous Mansion House speech, in which he declared that national honor was more precious than peace: a speech everywhere construed, especially in view of the orator's pacifist Leanings, as a definite warning to Germany that she could not impose an unreasonable settlement on France. A difficult week followed, in which certain British naval preparations were made, while the foreign secretary and the German ambassadors were hold- ing exceedingly stiff conversations. But the speech had done its work. The Wilhelmstrasse. impressed also, perhaps, by panicky con- ditions on the Berlin Bourse, became conciliatory, giving assurance that designs on Morocco formed no part of its program, and reaching an agreement with France, in principle, as to the future settlement. G. SECOND STACK OF NEGOTIATIONS. In spite of all this, little progress was achieved. It was officially admitted that the situation was "grave," and on August 18 the ne- gotiations were broken off. the German Government taking ad- vantage of a railway strike in England to revive certain pretentions with respect to Morocco. After a long consultation with his Govern- ment, the French ambassador in Berlin on September 4 resumed his conversations with the German foreign office. On the 9th there was a great crash on the Berlin Bourse, also renewed rumors of military and naval preparations on both sides. But in the end good sense pre- vailed. On October 4 the two negotiators initialed a convention which gave France a protectorate de facto in Morocco, although the term was not used; in return she pledged herself most explicitly to observe the principle of the open door. 7. CONVENTIONS OF NOVEMBER 4, 1911. The French Government was now willing to discuss the compen- sation to be awarded Germany in the Congo. On November 2 it was 405 agreed thai Germany should receive two prongs of French territory which would bring the Cameroons in touch with the Congo and Ubangi Rivers at Bonga and Mongumba, respectively, while Ger- many surrendered the Duck's Beak in the Lake Chad region. The only difficulty arose over the German demand that France transfer lo Germany her right of preemption to the Belgian Congo; but with the assistance of the Russian Government a formula was found hv which any change in the status of the Congo was reserved to the decision of the powers signatory of the Berlin African act of 1885. (See article, The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.) On Novem- ber 4, 1911. the Morocco and Congo conventions (See Appendix I, 100) were signed in Berlin, a letter from the German foreign secre- tary to the French ambassador being annexed, in which Herr von Kinderlen-Waechter recognized the right of France to erect her protectorate in Morocco. 8. APPRAISEMENT. The settlement was a great triumph for France, secured by the manifestations of national solidarity at home and the diplomatic assistance of Great Britain. Many Frenchmen regretted the cession of French territory, but Morocco was certainly far more valuable than the Congo, and above all the Republic had scored a distinct victory over the mighty Empire which had defeated it in 1870-1871. In Germany there was a corresponding discontent, which mani- fested itself in bitter criticisms of the Imperial Government's diplo- macy and in violent outbursts of hatred for Great Britain, whose intervention was believed to have spoiled the German game. It is also to be observed that the land which Germany received was valuable chiefly as the entering wedge for further penetration of the Belgian Congo. Such designs had long been suspected, and they were proved by a conversation between the French ambassador in Berlin and the German foreign minister, Herr von Jagow, in the spring of 1014, in which the latter declared that Belgium was not in a position to develop the Congo adequately and ought "to give it up" (Belgian Grey Book, 11, 1915, no. 2, Baron Beyens to M. Davignon, April 2, 1914). If, as has been recently stated by so eminent a personage as Herr August Thyssen, the German Emperor and his general staff in the year 1912 decided upon a world war (Current History Magazine of the New York Times, March, 1918, p. 480), it is most probable that the reverse sustained in this diplo- matic bout with France and Great Britain was a decisive factor, for it had been brought home to the war lords of Berlin that diplomati- cally the Triple Entente was stronger than the Triple Alliance. It must also have been clear to them that the sympathy of the world had been with France in the controversy of 1911. 406 ri.. Nothing has been s;iid about the secret negotiations cod ducted between M. Caillaux, the French prime minister, and Baron von Jancken, of the German foreign office. As yet the facts are not fully known. There is much different E opinion as to whether the final settlement was grea"tly affected by the tortuous diplomacy of Caillaux. BIBLIOGR \!'liV. DOCUMENTS. Eiouard de Card. E. Documents diplomatique pour servir h L'his toire de la question marocaine. (Paris. 1913.) » Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. Affaires du Maroc, L901 L912. 6 volumes. (Paris. !!)().. l:»L'.) Auswaertiges Ami Weissbuecher. Berlin, 1905. Morel, E. 1). Morocco in Diplomacy. Appendix. (London. Smith. 1912.) Rapports parlimentaires de M. Long el M. P. Baudin. Paris,1912. (Reporl to the French Parliament.) The American Journal of [international Law, VI. Supplement, pp. II 66. Contains a good selection of documents bearing on this and earlier phases of the Morocco question. Staatsarchiv, vol. 83, pp. 18-348. 8ECONDABT GENERAL. Bernard, A. Le Maroc (Paris, Alcan, L913.) Anliin. E. Morocco To-day. (London, Dent, L906.) ""Well word) reading." Sir Harry II. Johnston. Meakin, B. TheMoorish Empire. (London, Sonnenschein, L899.) Dupuy, E. Comment nous avons conquis le Maroc, 1845 P.)PJ. (Paris. Roger, 1913.) Another summary. Piquet, V. Le Maroc (Paris, Colin, 1917.) M. Piquel lias writ- ten a number of handy volumes on the North African colonies. SECONDAB1 DIPLOMATIC. Schmitt, B. E. England and Germany, 1740 L914. (Princeton University Press, L916.) Pp. 228 240, no:'. 345, give the fullest ac- count in English. Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique, 18T8-1916, II, ch. 5. (Paris. Alcan, l!>17.) t'inon. P. L'Empire de la Mediterranee, chapters i vi. (Paris. Perrin, 1904.) Invaluable for the period before L904. Tardieu, A. La Conference d'Algesiras. (Paris. Alcan, 1906.) The standard work on the crisis of L905 1906. 407 Tardieu, A. France and the Alliances. (New York, Macmillan, 1908.) in certain chapters a briefer account of the crisis of 1S05 will be found. Tardieu, A. Le Mystere d'Agadir. (Paris, Callman-Levy, 1912.) The standard and most, illuminating account of the crisis of 1011 and its antecedents. Tardieu, A. Cinq ans dc la politique marocaine, in Revue polit- ique et parlementaire, 10 November, 1008. St. Victor, S. B. La geriese de I'accord franco-allemand. Revue des sciences politiques, vol. 26, pp. 908 927 (1911). Harris, N. D. Intervention and Colonization in Africa. (Boston, Houghton, L913.) Pp. 243 289. Useful, but not very critical. Morel. E. D. Morocco in Diplomacy. (London, Smith Elder. 1912.) Bitterly critical of French and British diplomacy; one-sided and unreliable; but valuable for documents. The German case is presented here so well that no German books are cited. 138. THE POTSDAM ACCORD, 1910. 1. REASONS FOR THE ACCORD. Germany desired to counterbalance the effect of the Reval meet- ing. (See article, The Reval Interview.) The growth of German in- fluence in Persia after the Persian Revolution threatened Russia's interests. After the expiration of the Russo-Persian Railway agree- ment in 1910, Russia faced the prospect of Germany's linking the Bagdad Railway with Teheran, before the Russian line, Baku- Teheran, was finished. (London Times, Aug. 21, 1911.) Germany faced the possibility of a competing line from the north, compromis- ing the Bagdad Railway plan. 2. TUP: POTSDAM MEETING. On November 4, 1910, the Tsar arrived at Potsdam for a 30-hour visit to the Kaiser. At Potsdam and Berlin Sazonoff had long con- versations with Kiderlein-Waechter and Bethmann-Hollweg. The negotiations thus begun continued through the winter 1910-11. 3. INTERPRETATION. On November 10 Sazanoff declared to the Novoe Vremya that the discussions had not involved in any way the stability of the Triple Entente. They had concerned Russian and German interests in Turkey and Persia. Complete consonance had been established. (See Appendix I, 97.) On Decemher 10 Bethmann-Hollweg said in the Reichstag that Germany gladly admitted Russia's i pedal interests in Persia. The 408 former mutual confidence had been reestablished. (Verhandlurgen des Reichstags, vol. 232, p. 3561. ) A few months later the understand- ing reached at Potsdam was translated into a convention, signed at St. Petersburg, August 19, loll. (See Appendix I. 00.) 4. TERMS 01 THE ACCORD. The (wo powers agreed (hat Russia had special interests in Persia, while Germany had only commercial aims. Germany would seek no concessions in North Persia. Russia undertook to conned the spur from the Bagdad Railway with the railway system of North Persia, by a branch from Teheran, to he built within a specified term of years. Russia would not hinder foreign financial participation in the Bagdad Railway. Both nations would facilitate international traffic without differential treatment on the aforesaid connecting line. 5. RESULTS OF THE ACCORD. English policy hostile to the Bagdad Railway appeared to have been isolated and discredited. Germany obtained an open door for her trade in Persia. The Sadidjeh-Khanikin branch promised to be very profitable. Russia agreed not to hinder foreign investment in the Bagdad project. German accord with Russia furnished a lever against Austrian unruliness. (Garvin, J. L., in Fortnightly, vol. 95, 1!) 1-208.) Russia obtained recognition of her sphere of influence in North Persia. The Triple Entente was still intact, though weakened so far as Persia and Arabia were concerned. German projects for branches north from Mosul. Xissihin. and llarran were abandoned. The Turkish project for a railway. Trebizond-Erzerum, thence across the Persian frontier to Tabriz, was abandoned. The Bagdad plan was safe from Russian competition. (London Times. Jan. 9, L911.) If Germany failed to keep promises, Russia could retaliate by de- clining to build a connecting link from the future Persian Railway. (Novoe Vremya, Nov. s. L9i0.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. The London Times: Nov., Dec.. 1010: Jan., Apr., Aug.. 1011. Contains foreign press comment, and texts of some speeches, as well as text of the accord. Ma/el. as- sqra, at the head of deep water navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab, to the mouth of the Tigris, and finally to a port, not specified, on the PersiamGulf. The concession was authorized in 1899, after the visit of the 'Kaiser to the Sultan in 1898. Great influence was exerted on the Sultan to secure this concession, which was looked upon by the Ger mans as -assuringg greaj market for their goods and capital in the development of the district traversed, and even in some quarters ai ;i means of colonization and of the acquisition of political power in Asia-Minor. The firman for the concession was finally issued in 1!>03. It was for ninety-nine years, assured high kilometric guaran- tees, gave mining rights in a twenty kilometer zone on each side of the line, important electric power and other privileges, and the right to build ports at Bagdad, Bassora, and at the Persian Gulf terminus. r~ 410 It required the formation of :i Turkish corporation to operate the concession. Strong hostility to the project developed in Russia and France, and the British government, al first indifferent, look an unfriendly attitude. Russia feared the economic competition with her projected railways through Persia and opposed the road vigorously. The German syndicate intended to finance the project largely in France and England and also wanted the Indian. mail contracts. It, there- fore, proposed that French and English interests should be associated in the company. The Germans, however, refused to le1 control out of their hands, so these plans for obtaining foreign financial aid with government approval came to nothing. In spite, however, of official opposition, a large amount of French money was obtained for the enterprise through a strong French group of bankers, and with this and money provided through the Deutsche Bank the road, was finished. The building of the road was financed by the sale of Turkish bonds. The Government issued its bonds to the company, secured by thi> kilometric guarantees, which in turn was secured on the rev- enues of i\\v provinces traversed foe the first series, for the second and third on the surplus revenue turned over to the Government by the commission of the debt, and on revenues of provinces traversed for the balance. The bonds were sold by the Deutsche Bank, for the concessionaire company, with a small brokerage fee; the share capital was small. 2. THE KOWEIT [NCIDENT, 1899 I'm::. British main opposition to the execution of the Bagdad Railway project was based upon its political aspects, more particularly the menace to Britain's position in Egypt and India. British diplomacy succeeded in preventing the consummation of one cherished German design, namely the extension of the railway from Bassorah to the Persian ( dill. In January, JH!)!>. the Sheikh of Koweit, denying that he was a vassal of the Sultan, secretly accepted the protection of the I5ritish Government, in return for a promise not to <'(^\' any territory with- out the consent of Great Britain. Consequently he refused to lease or sell terminal facilities to the Germans in J'.)00, and was protected against German and Turkish intrigue by British cruisers. In 1901 Turkey was virtually forced to PeCOgnize his independence, and in May, 1903, Lord Lansdowne, then British foreign secretary, an- nounced that, Great Britain "would regard the establishment of a naval base or a fortified port in the Persian Gulf as a Aery grave menace to British interests, and would certainly resist if by all means at her disposal." 411 i .".. THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT, 1 Albanian, and finally demanded that Greece evacuate Albanian territory by De- cember 31, 1912. (Quoted, Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales, vol. 36, p. 621.) The Greek reply (November 3) denied these charges and declared that the trouble arose from the inclusion of Greek pop- ulation in Albania. (Quoted Ibid., vol. 36, p. 622.) December 13 Sir Edward Grey sent a note to all the powers urging postponement of date for Greek evacuation of Epirus, division of contested terri- tory (without waiting for completion of the work of the commis- sion) between Greece and Albania, and compensation for Greece in the acceptance of her claims in the iEgean Islands. (Ibid., vol. 37, p. 1. Note paraphrased. It has not been published.) This com- promise, evidently aimed at saving the peace and ending a dangerous question, was accepted at once by France and Russia and finally (De- cember 31) w r ere agreed on in principle by the powers of the Triple Alliance, but securities were demanded that Greece would evacuate at the agreed time. (Ibid., vol. 37, p. 105, note quoted.) After an- other interchange of notes an agreement was reached between the powers on the general basis of Sir Edward Grey's first proposals. (Notes quoted or paraphrased, Ibid., vol. 37, p. 374.) Collective notes of the powers to Turkey and Greece were accepted by both with relation to Epirus boundary and settlement of iEgean Islands. But Greece, in her note of acceptance also demanded: (1) guarantees of religious equality for Greek Christians in Albania; (2) rectification of frontier; (3) permission for Greeks in Southern Albania to be en- rolled in the Albanian gendarmerie as a protective measure. The first and last of these were accepted by the powers, the frontier recti- fication was refused. (Collective note of April 24, Ibid., vol. 37, p. 558.) On April 27, Greece finally evacuated Albanian Epirus and the question was closed. See also the article. The Albanian Question in the Balkan Crisis of 1913. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Marriott, J. A. R. The Eastern Question. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1917.) The best brief account of the situation. 437 Lamouche, L. La naissance cle l'etat Albanais. Revue politique et parlementaire, vol. 80, pp. 220-239. May, 1914. The course of events can be readily followed through 1913 and early 1914 in the reviews of foreign policy (a) Foreign Affairs by E. T. Dillon in the Contemporary Review, (b) Chronique de la Quinzaine by Francois Charmes in the Revue des Deux Mondes. Both are exceedingly well-informed, Dillon being especially close to the Greek Government. 148. THE EFFORT TO PREVENT OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND BALKAN WAR, 1913. 1. THE TREATY OF LONDON, MAY 30, 1913. The Treaty of London (See article, The Treaty of London, 1913) signed on May 30, 1913, settled the frontier line between the Balkan States and Turkey, but left conflicting claims between themselves unsettled. On June 9 the London Peace Conference met for the last time, the attempt to reach an agreement on the points left unsettled by the Treaty of London having been abandoned and a protocol adopted leaving it to the Balkan States to supplement the treaty by direct conventions. 2. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN GREECE AND BULGARIA. Of this there was, however, very little prospect. There was, in the first place, the dispute between Greece and Bulgaria respecting their respective shares of Macedonia. The Greeks had occupied Salonika, which Bulgaria greatly desired, and Bulgaria found herself in pos- session of Thrace, which she did not much care for. 3. DISPUTE BETWEEN SERBIA AND BULGARIA. There was a similar dispute between Bulgaria and Serbia, the lat- ter being in possession of that section of Macedonia of which Monas- tir is the center — a city and section that Bulgaria claimed as her portion. Bulgaria insisted that Serbia execute the arrangements agreed upon as to the future frontier between the two States in the treaty of March 13, 1912 (See article, The Formation of the Balkan Alliance of 1912). But Serbia maintained that the creation of an independent Albania invalidated the provisions of the treaty. (For the Serbian point of view see the speech of Pashitch, the prime min- ister, in the Skupshtina on May 28. The Times (London), May 29, 1913.) 4. ALLIANCE BETWEEN SERBIA AND GREECE, 1013. After their return from London, Premiers Vcnizelos and Pashitch, representing Greece and Serbia respectively, made an offensive and 438 defensive alliance for 10 years directed against Bulgaria, and mili- tary conventions were arranged. (See Appendix I, 108.) 5. THE CZAR PROPOSES TO ACT AS ARBITRATOR. On May 28, Serbia demanded that Bulgaria should renounce her rights under the treaty of March 13, 1912. (See article, The Forma- tion of the Balkan Alliance of 1912, section 4.) The Czar of All the Russias then stepped in as peacemaker, sending, on June 8, an iden- tical telegram to the Kings, of Bulgaria and Serbia, offering to act as arbitrator in this " fratricidal war," in accordance with the terms of their treaty of alliance. * Neither of the disputants appears to have desired the arbitrament by the Czar, but both agreed to submit to Russian arbitration (The Times (London), June 13, 1913), Serbia and Greece proposing that each of the three countries involved reduce its army one-fourth, in order to facilitate a pacific solution of the controversy. 6. BULGARIA BEGINS THE SECOND BALKAN WAR. But in the meantime a new cabinet had been formed in Bulgaria, where the warlike Dr. Daneff replaced the pacific M. Gueshoff as premier. On June 15, Bulgaria proposed simultaneous demobiliza- tion on condition that the contested districts should be occupied by mixed garrisons. Under circumstances which are still somewhat obscure, on June 29, Bulgaria began the Second Balkan War by an attack on the Serbian and Greek positions. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The best and most important accounts of these matters are probably those to be found in the Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Washing- ton, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914) , pp. 49-69 ; and The Annual Register for 1913 (Longmans, London, 1914), pp. 347-357. See also Hanotaux, G., La Guerre des Balkans et l'Europe, 1912-13 (Paris, 1914), chs. 31 and 34; Ford, C. S., The Balkan Wars (Press of the Army Service Schools, 1915), Lect. 3; Gueshoff, J. E., The Balkan League (London, Murray, 1915), ch. 4; and Schmitt, B. E., The Balkan Revolution (Reprint from Western Reserve Uni- versity Bulletin, Vol. XVII, No. 3) ; Marriott, J. A. R., The Eastern Question (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1917). For treaties and documents see Nationalism and War in the Near T£ast. By a Diplomatist (George Young) (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1915), Appendices; and Gueshoff, J. E.. The Balkan League (Lon- don. Murray, 1915), Appendix. . 439 149. THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST, AUGUST 10, 1913. 1. NEGOTIATION. The Treaty of Bucharest was concluded on August 10, 1913, by the delegates of Bulgaria, Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece. As Bulgaria had been completely isolated in the Second Balkan War, and as she was closely invested on her northern boundary by the armies of Roumania on her western frontier by the allied armies of Greece and Serbia, and in the East by the Turkish Army, she was obliged, in her helplessness, to submit to such terms as her vic- torious enemies chose to impose upon her. All important arrange- ments and concessions involving the rectification of the controverted international boundary lines were perfected in a series of committee meetings, incorporated in separate protocols, and formally ratified by subsequent action of the general assembly of delegates. 2. TEliJIS. By the terms of the treaty (See Appendix I, 109), Bulgaria ceded to Roumania all that portion of the Dobrudja lying north of a line extending from the Danube just above Turtukaia to the western shore of the Black Sea, south of Ekrene. This important territorial concession has an approximate area of 2,687 square miles, a popula- tion of 286,000, and includes the fortress of Silistria and the citieb of Turtukaia on the Danube and Baltchik on the Black Sea. In ad- dition, Bulgaria agreed to dismantle all existing fortresses and bound herself not to construct forts at Rustchuk or at Schumla or in any of the territory between these two cities, or within a radius of 20 kilometers around Baltchick. 3. Serbia's gain in territory. The eastern frontier of Serbia was drawn from the summit of Patarika, on the old frontier, and followed the watershed between the Vardar and the Struma Rivers to the Greek-Bulgarian boundary, except that the upper valley of the Strumnitza remained in the possession of Bulgaria. The territory thus obtained embraced cen- tral Macedonia, including Ochrida, Monastir, Kossovo, Istib, and Kotchana, and the eastern half of the sanjak of Novi-Bazar. By this arrangement Serbia increased her territory from 18,650 to 33,891 square miles and her population by more than 1,500,000. 4. Greece's gain in territory. The boundary line separating Greece from Bulgaria was drawn from the crest of Mount Belashitcha to the mouth of the Mesta River, 440 on the zEgean Sea. This important territorial concession, which Bulgaria resolutely contested, in compliance with the instructions embraced in the notes which Russia and Austria-Hungary presented to the conference, increased the area of Greece from 25,014 to 41,933 square miles and her population from 2,660,000 to 4,363,000. The territory thus annexed included Epirus, southern Macedonia, Salon- iki, Kavala, and the iEgean littoral as far east as the Mesta River, and restricted the iEgean seaboard of Bulgaria to an inconsiderable extent of 70 miles, extending from the Mesta to the Maritza, and giv- ing access to the JEge&n at the inferior port of Dedeagatch. Greece also extended her northwestern frontier to include the great fortress of Janina. In addition, Crete was definitely asigned Ito Greece and was formally taken over on December 14, 1913. 5. Bulgaria's gain in territory. Bulgaria's share of the spoils, although greatly reduced, was not entirely negligible. Her net gains in territory, which embraced a portion of Macedonia, including the town of Strumnitza, western Thrace, and 70 miles of the TEgean littoral, were about 9.663 square miles, and her population was increased by 129,490 (Carnegie Re- port, p. 418). 6. APPRAISEMENT OF THE TREATY. By the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest, Roumania profited most in proportion to her sacrifices. The unredeemed Roumanians live mostly in Transylvania, the Bukovina, and Bessarabia, and therefore the Balkan wars afforded her no adequate opportunity to perfect the rec- tification of her boundaries on ethnographic lines. The humilitating terms imposed on Bulgaria were due to her own impatience and intemperate folly. The territory she secured was relatively circumscribed; she had failed to emancipate Macedonia, which was her avowed purpose in entering the war ; she lost the dis- tricts of Ochrida and Monastir, which she especially coveted ; she was assigned only a small line on the Aegean, with the wretched port of Dedeagatch; and she was obliged to forfeit her ambition as the leader of the Balkan hegemony. Greece, though gaining much, was greatly dissatisfied. The ac- quisition of Saloniki was a triumph; she was assigned the port of Kavala and the territory eastward at the insistence of the King and the army and contrary to the advice of Venizelos; in the northwest Greece encountered the opposition of Italy by urging her claims to southern Albania; in the assignment of the Aegean Islands she was profoundly dissatisfied; and she still claims 3.000,000 unredeemed conationals. 441 The fundamental defects of the .Treaty of Bucharest were that (1) the boundaries which it drew bore little relation to the nationality of the inhabitants of the districts affected, and that (2) the punish- ment meted out to Bulgaria, while perhaps deserved in the light of her great offense in bringing on the Second Balkan War, was so severe that she could not accept the treaty as a permanent settle- ment. While Serbia, Greece, and Roumania can not escape a large share of the blame for the character of the treaty, it should not be forgotten that their action at Bucharest was in large measure due to the settlement forced upon the Balkan States by the great powers at the London conferences. (See articles on the Treaty of London, 1913, and the Albanian question in the Balkan crisis of 1913.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. BOOKS. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.. Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Washington, Carnegie Endowment, 1914). Gibbons, H. A. The New Map of Europe. (New York, Century Co., 1914.) Marriott, J. A. R. The Eastern Question. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1917.) Hayes, C. J. H. A Political and Social History of Modern Europe. (New York, Macmillan, 1917.) 2 vols. MAGAZINE ARTICLES. Duggan, S. P. European Diplomacy and the Balkan Problem. Political Science Quarterly, March, 1913. Vol. 28, pp. 95-122. Duggan, S. P. The Balkan Adjustment. Political Science Quar- terly, December, 1913. Vol. 28, pp. 627-645. Joerg, W. L. G. The New Boundaries of the Balkan States and Their Significance. Bulletin of the American Geographical Society. Vol. 45, 1913. Map. SOURCES. Text of the treaty in the American Journal of International Law, VIII, Supplement, pp. 13-27. 150. THE GRECO-SERBIAN ALLIANCE, 1913. I. CIRCUMSTANCES. Even before the signing of the Treaty of London (See article, The Treaty of London) on May 30, 1913, during the interval between the First and Second Balkan Wars (See article, The Effort to Prevent the Outbreak of the Second Balkan War), Bulgaria showed signs of renewing the struggle. 442 As early as May of that year the Bulgarians had attacked Greek ■outposts, and it was in anticipation of more serious attacks that the Serbo-Greek alliance was formed, June 1, 1913. 2. TERMS. By the terms of the treaty of alliance (See Appendix I, 108) the two states agreed upon a mutual guarantee of territory, promised not to come to any separate understanding with Bulgaria in regard to the division of the former Turkish territory in Europe, drew a common boundary line for the two states, defined a Serbo-Bulgarian boundary line which was to be claimed, and bound themselves ""to afford assist- ance with all their armed forces," if Bulgaria "should attempt to impose her claims by force." The alliance was to last for at least ten years. The treaty included a stipulation that it "be kept strictly secret." By this treaty Serbia secured, as she hoped, the possession of Monastir and the surrounding districts, and Greece secured Saloniki and Ka valla. The treaty was, of course, one of reciprocal obligation. If Bulgaria threatened Greece, Greece was entitled to call upon Serbia for aid. Should Serbia be attacked by Bulgaria, Greece was bound to go to the aid of Serbia. The latter contingency actually arose in the autumn of 1915. Serbia was attacked in the rear by Bulgaria during the Austrian invasion at that time. Premier Venizelos who, almost since the beginning of the Great War, had favored the participation of Greece on the side of the allies, strongly advocated the fulfillment of the obligations which Greece had contracted toward Serbia, and this both on grounds of law and policy. King Constantino and his adherents took a different view. They maintained that the obligations which Greece had incurred toward Serbia only applied to the case where Bulgaria, acting independently, attacked Serbia and did not apply to the situation created by a gen- eral European war. The view of the matter taken by the King and his friends prevailed, Venizelos was dismissed from power and office in the most unconstitutional fashion (i. e., after his triumphant vindication at the polls), and Serbia was left to her fate. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The most important documents were published by the Greek Gov- ernment after the overthrow of King Constantine. They have been reprinted in American Journal of International Law, vol. 12. Sup- plement, pp. 86-108 (April, 1918). On the Greco-Serbian alliance, see Venizelos, Greece in Her True Light, trans, by Xanthaky & Sakellarios (N. Y., 1916). passim; 443 Passaris, M., L'Entente et la Grece (Geneve, 1917) by a Greek parti- san of King Constantine; Headlam, J. W., Belgium and Greece (London, Hodder, 1917) ; and Annual Register for 1915, pp. 254 ff. 151. THE TREATY OF CONSTANTINOPLE, 1913. 1. INTRODUCTION. During the Second Balkan War Turkey took advantage of the helpless plight of Bulgaria to recover Adrianople. The powers thereupon " most categorically " demanded the evacuation of Adrian- ople in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of London, but failed to enforce their demand. Bulgaria having made terms with her other enemies — Greece, Serbia, and Roumania — by means of the Treaty of Bucharest (See article, The Treaty of Bucharest), decided to negotiate directly with the Porte. 2. TERMS OF THE TREATY. Negotiations began on September 3, 1913, and the treaty was signed on September 29. The Enos-Midia line was preserved, but was made to curve northward from the Black Sea and westward across the Maritza in such a way that Turkey obtained not only Adrianople, but also Kirk Kilisse and Demotica. The Bulgarians were not even left masters of the one railway leading to Dedeagatch, their sole port on the Aegean Sea. BIBLIOGRAPHY. For brief accounts see Schmitt, B. E., The Balkan Revolution (Reprint from Western Reserve University Bulletin, Vol. XVII, No. 3), pp. 48-50; and Annual Register for 1913, p. 355. For text of the treaty, see American Journal of International Law, VIII, Supplement, pp. 27-45. 152. THE PROJECTED AUSTRIAN INTERVENTION IN SERBIA IN 1913. The ex-premier of Italy, Signor Giolitti, in a speech delivered in the Chamber of Deputies on December 5, 1914, revealed the fact that in 1913 Austria-Hungary had planned to attack Serbia. He said that on August 9, 1913, he had received the following telegram from the Marquis di San Giuliano : Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the casus foederis of the Triple Alliance. 444 He replied : If Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is clear that a casus foederis can not be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defense, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. The fact that the Treaty of Bucharest was signed on the day fol- lowing- Giolitti's receipt of the telegram reveals Austria's motive as a desire to prevent Serbia from profiting by the conclusion of a highly advantageous treaty. The telegram indicates that the assassination of the Archduke was the occasion rather than the cause of Austria's ultimatum, to Serbia: and it reveals the reason for Austria's action yi July, 1914. in omitting to notify Italy in advance of her demands upon Serbia. The authenticity of the telegram is established by the fact that the Austrian Government has not denied it. Its contents are brought into relief by the statements of M. Pichon, ex-minister of foreign affairs of France. The Paris correspondent of II Giornale d'ltalia reported (December 29, 1914) a conversation which he had with M". Pichon on the subject of Giolitti's disclosure. M. Pichon said that in June, 1913, when he was minister of foreign affairs, at the time of the affair of Scutari, the Italian Government had informed him that Austria had notified it of her intentions with regard to Serbia, and that the Italian Government had replied that the casus foederis was not applicable. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The text of Signor Giolitti's speech is in the appendix to the Serbian Blue Book. Comment by M. Pichon in Giornale d'ltalia, December 29, 1914. R. Fester, Giolitti's Enthullung, in Deutschland der Grossere (ed. by P. Rohrbach, Kiepenheuer, Weimar), 1915, p. 151. 153. NAVAL AND MILITARY CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE, 1905-1912. 1. INTRODUCTION. In 1904 the Entente Cordiale was developed by the two countries. It was not an alliance, but the parallel policies pursued by the two States and the fact that each had reason to fear the hostility of Ger- many brought them to plan joint military and naval action in case of specified contingencies. 2. MAY AND JUNE, 1905. That some such arrangements had been already made as early as May or June, 1905. seems probable from the somewhat guarded lan- guage used by Delcasse in an interview in the " Gaulois." (July 12, 445 1905, quoted Morel, Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy, p. 94.) In Oc- tober, 1905, M. Lausanne in the " Matin " (Morel, p. 94) declared that in the final session of the cabinet before his resignation, Delcasse had asserted (See article, that title) that England was willing to mobilize her fleet, seize the Kiel Canal, and land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Hol- stein. Jaures declared that a member of the cabinet told him the same, soon after the meeting (Morel, p. 95). The "Matin" state- ment received a carefully worded denial in England, and was prob- ably incorrect as to details. 3. IN 1906. In the latter part of the Morocco crisis of 1905-1906 France ap- proached Sir Edward Grey with the request that he authorize naval and military conversations between England and France (Grey's speech, August 3, 1914.) Grey consulted a portion of the cabinet, iater all of the cabinet, and it was agreed that the conversations should take place, provided that they did not bind either Govern- ment to specific action. These conversations occurred " from time to time " up to 1912. (Grey to Cambon, November 22, 1912.) 4. IN 1912. November 22, 1912, Grey, after gaining the acceptance of the cab- inet (speech of August 4, 1914), put in writing, in a letter to Cam- bon, the hitherto verbal arrangement as to these conversations. If either nation had grave reason to fear an unprovoked attack the two governments were to consult together as to cooperative measures to be taken. About the same time, almost certainly through agreement, the British Navy was, as far as possible, concentrated in the North Sea and that of France in the Mediterranean. It was this arrange- ment, which left the northern coast of France defenceless, and brought Grey to state to the German Ambassador that England would defend these coasts if they were attacked by Germany. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Parliamentary Debates, August 3, 1914. Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the outbreak of the European War. (London, Stationery Office, 1914.) Schmitt, B. E. England and Germany. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1916.) Gives the essential facts. Morel, E. D. Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy. (London, National Labor Press, 1915.) Bitterly hostile to policy of Sir Edward Grey, must be used with caution. Nielson, F. How Diplomats Make War. (New York, Heubsch (2nd edition), 1916.) Disconnected account, but with some addi- tional data. Also bitterly hostile to Grey. 446 154. MILITARY CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND BELGIUM, 1906-1912. 1. INTRODUCTION. During the decade preceding the outbreak of the World War Germany was engaged in the construction of a number of railroads leading to the Belgian frontier. As there did not appear to be any considerable economic need for these roads their construction ex- cited alarm. There was widespread belief in Belgium, France, and England that the real purpose of the roads was to facilitate an in- vasion of France across Belgian territory. The English military authorities, alarmed at the situation and fearing lest Belgium should be overrun by German troops before England and France could come to the aid of the Belgians, began the consideration of plans by which English assistance could best be given if there should be need. 2. NEGOTIATIONS OF 190H. In order to secure effective cooperation in the working out of a de- fensive scheme, Lieut. Col. (later General) Barnardiston, the military attache of the British Embassy at Brussels, opened negotiations with Gen. Ducarne, the Belgian Chief of Staff. These negotiations were confined to the formulation of a plan by which a British expedition- ary force should cooperate with the Belgian Army in case of the vio- lation of Belgian neutrality by Germany. The negotiators agreed that British troops should enter Belgium only after Belgian neutral- ity had been violated by Germany. No convention or agreement of any kind was drawn up. The negotiations did not bind either party to any given course of action. Later in 1906 further conversations took place between Ducarne and Gen. Grierson, the British Chief of Staff during the French review at Compiegne. 3. NEGOTIATIONS OF 1912. In 1912 further progress of the German plans for strategic rail- ways brought about a second series of conversations between Lieut. Col. Bridges, British military attache at Brussels, and Gen. Jung- bluth, then Belgian Chief of Staff. In these conversations Col. Bridges argued that British troops ought to be landed even before the actual invasion of Belgian territory by German troops began, on the ground that Belgium alone could not defend herself against Germany and that British aid would arrive too late if England should wait for a Belgian invitation to assist. Against this view Gen. Jungbluth protested and insisted that no troops should be landed until asked for by the Belgian Government. This attitude of the English attache appears to have caused some nervousness in Bel- 447 gium, and on April 7, 1913, Sir Edward Grey, who was probably in- formed of the general tenor of these negotiations, wrote to the English minister at Brussels a letter to be shown to Belgian Gov- ernment. In it he disclaimed any intention on the part of the .British Government to violate Belgian neutrality and promised that England would not be the first to send troops into Belgium (quoted, Scott, II, p. 1032). 4. GERMAN PUBLICATION AND ANGLO-BELGIAN RErLIES. After the German occupation of Belgium the reports of these con- versations were found in Brussels and published, November 24, 1914 (a summary was given Oct. 13, 1914), by the Norddeutsche Allge- meine Zeitung. An attempt was made b} r the Germans to show that the reports proved that Belgium had forfeited its neutrality prior to 1914. The British and Belgian Governments in reply pointed out (1) that all the military plans discussed during the course of the conver- sations in both 1906 and 1912 were for the contingency of a war in which Germany in attacking France would violate the neutrality of Belgium; (2) that no convention had been arranged, as the Germans alleged; (3) that in view of German threats against Belgian neutral- ity, especially in the matter of the German railroads leading to the Belgian frontier, England and Belgium had a right to enter into nego- tiations for appropriate action to meet the threatened danger. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The most important documents have been indicated above. The Brussels documents published by the German government have been reprinted by Scott, J. B., Diplomatic Documents relating to the outbreak of the European War, II, 837-860, and the Belgian docu- ments published in reply, I, 492-511. 155. THE ATTEMPTED ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL AGREE- MENT, 1907-1914. 1. OPENING OF DISCUSSION. During the decade which preceded the outbreak of the World War there was much discussion in regard to projects for an Anglo-German agreement to limit naval armament. Consideration by statesmen charged with official responsibility for naval policy started with an article by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannermann, the English prime minister, in the first number of The Nation (London, March 2, 1907), inviting Germany to discuss the whole problem. Von Bulow re- fused to consider it. (Reichstag speech, April 30, 1907.) 448 2. SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE. The British Government endeavored to have the matter taken up •it the Second Hague Conference, but Germany refused to attend if this question was raised. (Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace, p. 11.) At the conference a British delegate read a declaration that England was ready to exchange naval estimates with any power with a view to mutual reduction. (2nd Conference de la Paix, Actes et Documents, I, pp. 94-95.) 3. NEGOTIATIONS, 190S. In the summer of 1908 the British Government again endeavored to come to an understanding with Germany. Edward VII explained to the German Emperor at Cronberg during his visit to Germany that naval rivalry aroused suspicions and embittered relations, then friendty and natural between the two countries. William II de- clared he would rather go to war than discuss this question, and the foreign office was equally decisive in refusal. (Cook, Ibid., pp. 13-14.) England tried to get the Austrian Emperor to use his influ- ence, but with no result. (Hardin, Monarchs and Men, p. 33.) Edward VII is believed to have returned to the charge in his visit to Berlin in February, 1909. (Schmitt, p. 184.) 4. PROPOSAL TO RETARD CONSTRUCTION, 1909. Both sides then began building warships at great speed until Ger- many reopened the conversations with a speech by Von Tirpitz in the Reichstag. (Eeichstag speech, March 17, 1909.) England paid no attention to this, but in the summer of 1909 the new German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, endeavored to secure British neu- trality in case of a continental war, promising in return to " retard " her construction without abandoning the program mapped out up to 1918. (Cook, Ibid., p. 20.) This offer was refused as inadequate. 5. FINAL EFFORT AT AGREEMENT, 1910-11. After some informal exchange of views, the German chancellor proposed (Reichstag speech of Dec. 10, 1910) that England and Germany exchange views and form an understanding as to their economic and political interests, and in return for this understand- ing Germany would agree not to increase the German program. The British Government was considering this when the German Emperor intervened and declared he would not consent to any pro- gram binding Germany not to enlarge her naval program. (Cook, Ibid., p. 25.) On March 30, 1911, the German chancellor in the Reichstag declared (Reichstag speech of that date) that any attempt 449 to limit naval armaments was impracticable. In late 1911, just before the Haldane mission (See article, The Halclane Mission, 1912), Sir Edward Grey indicated acceptance of a proposal that both sides should exchange views on naval matters. This was left unanswered. (Cook, Ibid., p. 25.) From that time on conversations ceased, ex- cept as the matter was discussed in connection with the Haldane Mission to Berlin. (See article, that title.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. Sir Edward Cook. How Britain Strove for Peace. (London, Macmillan, 1914.) Based on " authoritive sources," evidently the British foreign office. Leaves little to be added. B. E. Schmitt. England and Germany. (Princeton University, 1916.) Probably the best account of Anglo-German relations. In this phase based mainly on Cook and speeches in Reichstag and Commons. Clear and adequate. E. von Reventlow. Deutschlands auswartige Politik. 2d edition. (Berlin, Mittler, 1915.) More general, but presents the German view. The diplomatic corespondence is summarized in Sir Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace. The facts given have never been denied by Germany except in one detail. The article of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannermann which opened the proposal is in The Nation (London) for March 2, 1907. Bethmann-Hollweg's proposition of 1910 is to be found in the Reichstag debates under date of December 10, 1910. His refusal to consider further propositions is to be found in Reichstag debates under date of March 30, 1911. 156. THE PROJECTED ANGLO-GERMAN ACCORD, 1914. 1. IMPROVED ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS, 1913-14. After the Morocco crisis of 1911 (See article, that title), the rela- tions between England and Germany were somewhat improved by the cooperation of the two Governments during the Balkan wars of 1912-13 and their success in localizing those conflicts. A large section of English public opinion, including many influential Radi- cals, insistently urged such a policy and the English Government was manifestly anxious to bring about more amicable relations with Germany. Consequently there was some lessening of distrust on the part of both nations, and an Anglo-German rapprochement seemed possible, at least in respect to certain differences. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg repeatedly stated that "ever since he had been chancellor the object of his policy had been to bring about an understanding with England," and Prince Lichnow- sky, the German ambassador to London, was sincerely desirous of bringing about an understanding between the two countries. 53706—18 29 450 2. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND, GERMANY, AND TURKEY, 1914. Negotiations between England and Germany seem to have been initiated early in 1913. By June 29, 1914, the day after the assassina- tion of the Archduke Ferdinand, various agreements relating to the Portuguese colonies in Africa, the Bagdad Railway, and other mat- ters had been made on the part of England and Germany, in some of which Turkey also was included. Some of the agreements with Turkey had been signed, but those with Germany, though ready for signature, had not been signed, pending the completion of certain negotiations between Germany and Turkey. Differences of opinion over the question of publication seems also lo have been a cause for delay. The British Government desired publicity, tfut the German Government objected to the publication of the projected agreement as to the Portuguese colonies in Africa. (Lichnowsky Memorandum, pp. 287-291.) 3. THE ANGLO-GERMAN-TURKISH AGREEMENTS OF 1914. These agreements have never been published, but their general scope and purport is well known, from the revelations made by Sir Edward Grey to the House of Commons on June 29, 1914, and from the Lichnowsky Memorandum. It appears that Great Britain withdrew her claim to participate in the construction of the Bagdad-Bussora section of the Bagdad Railway in re- turn for the assurance that the section beyond Bussora or to the Persian Gulf would not be built without British consent. Great Britain thus obtained the assurance that the Bagdad Railway would not go beyond Bussora. British traffic was to enjoy equal rights and equal rates on the whole Bagdad line, as a guaranty of which two Englishmen were to be admitted to the board of directors. The navigation of the Tigris was recognized as a distinct British interest. Great Britain admitted the suzerainty of Turkey over the Sheikh of Koweit, on condition that his autonomy be not interfered with, and that the status quo, or predominance of British interests in the Persian Gulf, be recognized. In return for these concessions the British Government agreed to the increase of the Turkish customs to 15 per cent. The projected treaty in regard to the Portuguese colonies in Africa is described by Lichnowsky as a highly advantageous arrangement for Germany (Memorandum, pp. 281-287). It was to have been a revision of the secret Anglo-Germany treaty of 1898 (See article, The Question of the Portuguese Colonies). 4. CONCLUSION. Though the projected accord of 1914 related exclusively to colonial matters, it is clear that on the part of Sir Edward Grey it was in- 451 tended to have a wider significance. It was manifestly intended to further the realization of a hope which he had expressed to Count Metternich in 1912 at the moment when it had become apparent that the accord with Germany then sought by the British Government could not be secured. (See article, The Haldane Mission to Berlin, 1912.) Count Metternich in a dispatch to the German Government on March 27, 1912, reported that in conversation with him Grey had " emphatically declared that he did not intend or wish to drop the negotiations, but, on the contrary, he hoped that the intimate rela- tions, for which a wa}^ had been paved, would be further extended, and that an agreement on colonial territorial questions would be fur- ther striven for, and that after some time had elapsed negotiation- for a political agreement similar to that which Great Britain had proposed would be resumed. After a lull had set in regarding the present naval questions a political agreement which proved the good will of both Governments, together with an agreement on colonial questions, would not fail to have a favorable effect on public opinion in both countries, and, he hoped, would also exert an indirect influ- ence on the armament question." (North German Gazette, Sept. 7 or 8, 1915. Reprinted by the London Times, Sept. 9, 1915.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. For Sir Edward Grey's account of the Anglo-German-Turkish Agreements of 1914, in the House of Commons, British Parlia- mentary Debates, Commons, fifth series, vol. 64, pp. 114—117. For the account of Lichnowsky, see the Smith and Munro edition of The Lichnowsky Memorandum in No. 127 of International Con- ciliation, pp. 279-295. See also the comment of the editors, pp. 234-236. For a good brief secondary account, see Schmitt, England and Germany (Princeton, University Press, 1916), pp. 368-373. 157. THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE OF 1909. 1. CALLING OF THE CONFERENCE. The Second Hague Peace Conference (See article, that title) had agreed upon a project for the organization, with appropriate sphere of jurisdiction, of an international prize court, but failed to draw up a code of international maritime laws to govern its decisions. There was a general feeling that this state of affairs should be remedied. The British Government took the initiative, and on February 27, 1908, sent a circular note to the other leading maritime powers pro- posing a naval conference to consider questions of contraband, block- ade, continuous voyage, destruction of neutral prizes, unneutral serv- 452 ice, enemy character, conversion of merchantmen on the high seas, transfer to a neutral flag, and the question of domicile or nationality as determining enemy ownership of property. The invitation was accepted, and the conference which met at Lon- don on December 4, 1908, was attended by delegates from the follow- ing 10 naval powers : Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Russia, Japan, Austria, Hungary, Netherlands, and the United States. 2. THE DECLARATION. The results of the deliberations of the conference, which continued into February, 1909, was a declaration consisting ofi 9 chapters, 70 articles, and an official report to serve as an official commentary upon the various articles of the declaration. The most important features of the declaration were as follows (figures in parentheses refer to articles) : PRELIMINARY PROVISION. "The Signatory Powers are agreed that the rules contained in the following chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law." Chapter I — Blockade, definition. A blockade must really prevent access to the enemy coast line in order to be effective (2), but its effectiveness is a question of fact (3), and a blockade is not regarded as raised if the force is withdrawn by stress of weather (4). A blockade must be applied to ships of all nations, although the commander of the blockading force may give permission to a war ship to enter and leave a blockaded port (6), and in circumstances of distress to a neutral vessel provided she neither discharges or ships cargo (7). These provisions are but the rules worked out by the courts in the application of the Declaration of Paris, 1856. DECLARATION AND NOTIFICATION. To be binding a blockade must be declared by the blockading power or its naval authorities (8) and notified to the neutral powers by the blockading power and to the local authorities by the com- mander of the blockading force (11). The declaration must indi- cate (a) the date on which it begins, (6) the geographical limits, (c) the period in which neutral vessels may depart (9). This notifi- cation is presumed to give knowledge to all vessels leaving a neutral port subsequent to the notification (15). These rules for declaration and notification follow the American and English practice rather than the French, Italian, Spanish and 453 Swedish, "which require notification to each individual vessel as it approaches the coast line, and the entry of such warning on the ship's papers. LIMITATIONS. A blockade must not extend beyond the ports or coast line belong- ing to, or occupied by, the enemy (1). The blockading force must not bar access to neutral ports or coast line (18). Neutral vessels may not be captured for violation of blockade, except within the area of operations of the warships detailed to render the blockade effective (17). PENALTY FOR BREACH OF BLOCKADE. The penalty for the violation of a blockade is capture and con- demnation — this liabilit} 7 continues as long as the pursuit continues (20). The cargo is also condemned, unless it be proved that at the time of the shipment of the goods the shipper neither knew nor could have known of the intention to break the blockade (21). The liability for attempted breach thus depends upon' knowledge, actual or presumptive (14, see Notification). If a vessel has not actual presumptive knowledge she is notified and the warning entered upon her papers (16). If through the negligence of the officer commanding the force no declaration of blockade has been notified to the local authorities, or no period has been mentioned within which vessels may come out, neutral vessels may come out and pass free (16). Whatever may be the ultimate destination of a vessel or her cargo she can not be captured for breach of blockade if at the moment she is on her way to a nonblockaded port (ID). Chapter II — Contraband, definition. The Declaration of London divided commodities into four classes: (a) Absolute contraband, which included articles generally used solely in war (22 contains the list) ; (b) conditional contraband, which included articles susceptible of use in war as well as peace (24 contains list) ; (c) articles which were not susceptible of use in war and which may not be declared contraband (28 and 29 contain the list) ; (d) articles susceptible of use in war which were to be pro- visionally excluded but might be added to the conditional contraband list by means of a declaration to that effect (25). PENALTIES. Absolute contraband is liable to capture if it be shown to be des- tined for the territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy or for the armed forces of the enemy. " It is immaterial whether the 454 carriage of the goods is direct or entails transshipment or a subse- quent transportation by land" (30). This is but a statement of the doctrine of Great Britain and the United States regarding contin- uous voyages. Proof of the destination is furnished by the ship's papers unless she is clearly out of her course (32) and is complete when (a) the goods are documented for discharge in an enemy port or for delivery to the armed forces of the enemy, (b) when the vessel is to call at enemy ports only or is to touch at any enemy port or meet the armed forces of the enemy before reaching a neutral port for which the goods are documented (31). „ Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be des- tined fur the use of armed forces, or a government* or department of (he enemj Slate, unless in (his Latter case the circumstances show- that the goods can not in fact be used for the purposes of war in progress (33). Enemy destination is presumed it' goods are con- signed to enemy authorities or a contractor in enemy country who supplies articles of this kind, a fortified place, or base of the enemy. Such presumption does not arise if it is sought to condemn a mer- chant vessel herself when so destined. If these presumptions do not arise I lie destination is supposed to be innocent (34). Conditional contraband is not liable to capture except when the vessel is bound tor the territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces, and when it is not discharged in an intervening port. The ship's papers are the proof unless the vessel is found clearly out of the course indicated by her papers (35). Xol withstanding the foregoing, conditional contraband, if shown to have the destination referred to in 33, is liable to capture in cases v here the enemy country has no seaboard (36). Thus the doctrine of continuous voyage which is allowed in the case of absolute contraband is rejected for conditional contraband except where the country has no seaboard. This was contrary to the desire of England, who believed that the destination of the goods, not the vessel, should determine the character of the goods. Contraband goods are liable to condemnation (39). Goods lie- longing to the owner of the contraband and on the same vessel are also liable to condemnation (42). Vessels carrying contraband, absolute or conditional, may be cap- tured anywhere at any time throughout their voyages, but may not be captured if the carriage of the contraband is completed (37, 38). Vessels carrying contraband may be condemned if the contraband reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or freight forms more than one-half the cargo (40). If the vessel is released she may be compelled to pay cost and expenses (-11). Contraband articles on board a vessel encountered on the high seas, but unaware of the out- 455 break of hostilities or of the declaration of contraband or without opportunity to discharge the contraband, can not be condemned except on payment, nor is the vessel condemned. Vessels are deemed to be aware of a state of war or of the declaration of contraband if they have left a neutral port subsequent to notification of contra- band or an enemy port after the outbreak of hostilities (-43). A vessel not liable to condemnation on account of the proportion of contraband on board may, when circumstances permit, be allowed to turn over the contraband and proceed. This contraband the captor may destroy (44). Chapter III. — Unneutral Service. The Declaration of London makes a distinction between unneu- tral services which are similar to the carriage of contraband and un- neutral services which vest the neutral with enemy character. (Op- penheim, II, 524.) (a) Unneutral services analogous to the carriage of contraband render the vessel liable for condemnation, and consist in (1) special voyages with the view of transporting individual passengers who are embodied in the armed forces of the enemy or with a view to the transmission of intelligence in the interest of the enemy. (2) Knowl- edge of either owner, charterer, or the master that the vessel is trans- porting a military detachment of the enemy or one or more persons who, in the course of the voyage directly assist the operations of the enemy (45). ( b ) Unneutral service vesting the ship with enemy character con- sists in (a) taking a direct part in the hostilities, (b) being under the control of an agent of the enemy government on board the ship, ( .0 o. ^V v x ^, <3> ^ ■^ r.N 3 *^ r - > i •v- 1 ^ ^. \\' ■/> V x •, c> Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 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