Class _ii_Lii_ Boole lW-^-- GfyrigMl^^ COPVR!G!IT DEPOSSR Digitized by the Internet Arcinive in 2010 witii funding from The Library of Congress http://www.arGhive.org/details/newmapofafriGa1900gibb / //?/.CI,A445G;J2 O-v-o I X JAMES GORDON BENNETT whose lifelong interest in what before his day was " The Dark Continent " HAS been an important factor in dispelling THE darkness. Semper aliquid noui Africam adferre. Greek proverb, quoted by Pliny, Hist. Nat. viii. §42 NOV 14 1916 CONTENTS PAGE I. Great Britain in the Sudan . . i II. The Islands of Africa ... 31 III. The Last Years of the Boer War AND the Period of Reconstruction in South Africa .... 43 IV. The Two Independent States: Liberia and Abyssinia . . . 92 V. British Policy in Somaliland . 106 VI. The Colonial Ventures of Italy . 115 VII. Algeria and Tunis: the Nucleus of the French African Empire . 130 VIII. The Belgians in the Congo . . 147 IX. The First German Colony: South- west Africa - . . . • 1 73 X. The Heritage of Livingstone and Rhodes . . . . . 189 XI. The British in East Africa and Uganda . . . . . 206 viii CONTENTS PAGE XII. The Germans in East Africa . . 228 XIII. The Problem of the Portuguese Colonies 244 XIV. The British in West Africa . . 276 XV. The Germans in West Africa. . 299 XVI. The French in West Africa and the Sahara . . . • . . 312 XVII, French Penetration into Central Africa 335 XVIII. European Rivalry in Morocco before Algeciras 355 XIX. France Gets Morocco . . . 374 XX. Egypt under the Last of the Khe- dives ...... 391 XXI. Egypt Becomes a British Protecto- rate ...... 421 XXII. The Creation of the South African Union ..... 441 XXIII. The Rebellion in South Africa and ITS Aftermath .... 454 XXIV. The Conquest of the German Colonies ..... 470 CONTENTS ix PAGE XXV. African Problems for the Peace Conference 481 Index 493 MAPS FACING PAGE , I. Africa at the Outbreak of the War . . . . . Title-page II. Africa about 1850 . . . . -32 ^III. Africa in 1902 . . . .64 . IV. The Mediterranean Coast of Africa 128 V. Sketch Map Showing the German- French Boundaries in 1912 . . 360 , VI. The South African Commonwealth 448 FOREWORD WHEN The New Map of Europe was written, at the beginning of the war, I had to forego deahng in a comprehensive way with colonial questions. Only the facts, concerning ^European expansion in Africa that seemed to have direct bearing upon the diplomatic history of the ten years preceding August i, 19 14 could be in- cluded. But what has happened — and what has not happened — in Africa during the past two years revealed to me the necessity of reviewing the fifteen years of colonial development, effort and rivalry of European states in Africa, if I wanted to have a clear understanding of the forces that had driven Europe to war, of the issues that the war was bring- ing into clear light, and of the problems that would confront the Peace Conference. The facts for a book on European colonization in Africa I had been gathering for years. But I had no idea until now how important these facts were, and how essential a knowledge of them was to the student of contemporary European history. This book has been written not at all in the way originally planned, but with the illumination that has come through more than two years of living in the midst of the great conflict and writing daily upon its xi xii FOREWORD various phases. However radically and vehemently readers may differ from interpretations and conclu- sions, I hope none will feel it a loss of time to go with me through these pages that narrate the evolu- tion of Africa from the Boer War to the completion of the conquest of the last German colony by General Smuts and the combined British, Belgian, and Portu- guese armies in the autumn of 191 6. I trust that none will think lightly of my work because it is not accompanied by footnotes and a bibliography. Primary sources are the govern- mental "papers, " containing texts of treaties, official correspondence and reports, consular reports, parlia- mentary speeches and debates ; bulletins and reports of proceedings of chambers of commerce and other organizations interested in African colonization for economic, financial, political, scientific, and socio- logical reasons; and, occasionally, newspaper compte- rendus of interviews and speeches. The books I have consulted are legion. The more important ones can be found in the bibliographical lists after each colony in the Statesman's Year Book. To the summaries of events from year to year in the London Annual Register, I gratefully acknowledge constant indebtedness. For the first half of my period, these illuminating annals were written by Mr. H. Whates, Statistics are taken from the Statesman's Year Book; French, German, Belgian, and Italian publications that come under the head of primary sources men- tioned above; Augustin Bernard's Le Maroc, Angel Marvaud's Le Portugal et ses colonies, and A. P. Calvert's German African Empire. I have made FOREWORD xiii use also of my own correspondence to the New York Herald and the Philadelphia Evening Telegraph. I want to express my keen appreciation of the hospitahty and precious help I received during a visit to Africa in war time from H. H. Hussein Ka- mil, G.C.B., Sultan of Egypt; General Sir Reginald Wingate, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., etc., Governor- General of the Sudan; Sir Henry McMahon, G.V.C.O., K.C.I. E., etc., H. M.'s High Commissioner for Egypt; General Sir John Maxwell, K.C.B.,K.C.M.G., etc., Commanding the British Army . in Egypt; Hussein Rushdi Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt; Col. E. E. Barnard Pasha, C.M.G., Financial Secretary of the Sudan; Ronald Storrs, Esq., Oriental Secretary to the British Agency; Arakel Nubar Bey, French Secretary to H. H. the Sultan; Major G. B. Symes, D.S.O., Private Secretary to H, E. the Governor-General of the Sudan; Gerald Delany, Esq., Renter's Manager at Cairo; J. Edgar, Esq., sometime Professor in Cape Town University and later Editor of the Johannesburg Star; and Walter Harris, Esq., of Tangier, Times Correspondent in Morocco. Mr. Edgar and Mr. Harris were good enough to submit to the imposition of lengthy questionnaires on South African and Moroccan history, in which they have played an active and important r61e. Many a glimpse into the inside history of Egypt did I get from Artin Pasha, last of the "elder statesmen" of Egypt, who went over with me the books of Lord Cromer, Lord Milner, and Mr. Dicey, and gave me a copy of his own work on the Sudan. xiv FOREWORD To Mr. James Gordon Bennett and Mr. Rodman Wanamaker I owe the privilege of a visit to Africa in the early months of 191 6, and to Boghos Nubar Pasha continuous and hearty encouragement to undertake work in a field where his knowledge and life-long experience make that encouragement worth more than can be estimated. Herbert Adams Gibbons Villa El Farn, rue des Dunes HouLGATE, Calvados, Normandy. October, 1916. THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA The New Map of Africa CHAPTER I GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN AFTER the failure of the Khartum Relief Expedi- tion and the death of General Gordon, the ' British Government ordered Egypt and the British army to drop the Sudan. The whole Gordon and Sudan literature, which requires a separate bibli- ography and is filled with sentimentalism, misrepre- sentations, and party prejudices, is the historical monument and record of the activity of Englishmen at home and their interest in the problem of the Sudan during the decade that followed the shameful fiasco of 1884. The Gordon legend alone was in the mind of the Britisher who never left his tight little island, and who considered that fact a kind of virtue. The Mahdi reigned supreme in the Sudan, and after his death, his successor, the Khalifa, continued to exter- minate the tribes of the upper tributaries of the Nile. Fpr all British Cabinets and the British public seemed to care, the dervishes were welcome to keep the Sudan, and the early eighties were "past history." I THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA But some Englishmen did care and did not forget. In fact, there was never a moment that the thought of the eventual reconquest of the Sudan and of the re- trieving of the honor of British arms was not before them. They had the vision. They lived with eyes fixed on the goal. The uninitiable never look back of events to their causes. To them whatever of fortune through achievement falls to the other fellow is "luck." They believe that Lord Cromer blundered to fame through twenty-five years of hit and miss in Egypt, and that Lord Kitchener was "made" by the battle of Omdurman, "after all, you know, an easy butchery of crazy fanatics who had no chance at all against his superior v/eapons." The battle of Omdurman on September 2, 1898, which made possible the reconquest and redemption of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the foundation of its present splendid government, was the culminat- ing event of more than ten years of herculean ef- fort on the part of a handful of men whose enthusiasm was fortunately matched by their fore- sight, patience, and ability. The victory won at Omdurman was the beginning of a new era for the British Empire in Africa and throughout the world. History will give to those v/ho worked for it and those who won it credit for far more than the rehabilitation of the Sudan. British colonial administrators have succeeded in building an empire in spite of, rather than with the help of, their Government and the great mass of their fellow-countrymen. Problems confronting them in their field of action have never been more difficult GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN than the problem of getting and keeping support from home. London is the bete noire of the English official overseas. Cablegrams from home cause more trouble than native uprisings. In regard to foreign policy, Conservative and Liberal Cabinets are very much the same. They are guided by the fears and the hopes of General Elections, and they hate hke poison : 1. To spend the British taxpayer's money over- seas. 2. To sanction any policy that is likely to cause fighting in which British troops must be engaged. 3. To offend the nonconformist conscience. Colonial administrators who keep in mind con- stantly these three points, and who plan to get result? without coming into conflict with the Government ou any one of them, succeed in making for themselves great careers, and gain honors, if not peace of mind, Those who do not keep these points in mind never get very far in a colonial career. This is why the reconquest of the Sudan needed a decade of preparation. There was never any hope at all of convincing the British public of the necessity of pouring out blood and treasure to get back to Khartum. Unwillingness to pay the price had been the cause of the debacle of 1884. The only other possible way of accomplishing what they had in mind was to put Egypt upon a sound financial basis, and to recreate an Egyptian army that knew how to fight and that would fight. The invasion of the Sudan and the winning of the battle of Omdur- man was possible only because Lord Cromer made 3 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA Egypt's revenues exceed her expenditures and be- cause Lord Kitchener got an Egyptian army into good fighting shape. When this was accomplished — and not before then — it could be pointed out to London that Egypt could contribute both in men and money very substantially to an expedition against the Khalifa. There had to be an appeal also to public opinion in England and to the nonconformist conscience. So for years one can read in Lord Cromer's annual reports the skilfully introduced and skilfully emphasized leitmotiv of the necessity to Egypt of the reclamation of the Sudan. Never could there be security in Upper Egypt until the dervishes were crushed. Never would irrigation projects on a large scale be justi- fiable or possible until the headwaters of the Nile were under Anglo-Egyptian control. Never would the African slave trafhc be stopped until the region from the equator to Wady Haifa was policed by Europeans. Common humanity and moral re- sponsibility also demanded the reconquest of the Sudan. For the native population was rapidly dying out everywhere because of the dervish cruelties and mismanagement. Last of all, from the standpoint of European prestige, the Italian defeat at Adowa must be counteracted. Since Egyptian money and Egyptian lives were largely instrumental in the reconquest of the Sudan, and since the legal rights to the territories it would comprise rested wholly upon those of the Ottoman Empire and the Egyptian Khedives, it was impos- sible — though it would have been desirable — to 4 GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN establish an English colony or a distinct Protectorate under direct British control. Then, too, the Sudan was going to look for an indeterminable period to the Egyptian army and the Egyptian budget for soldiers and money to hold, to rehabilitate, and to develop the vast regions which Mahdiism had so cruelly oppressed and ruined. And was not the principal reason for reconquest the political security and the economic advantage to Egypt through possessing the headwaters of the Nile? The problem was exceedingly delicate, owing to Great Britain's an- omalous position in Egypt, both from the inter- national and the Ottoman point of view. A convention signed at Cairo on January 19, 1899, between the British and Egyptian Governments, stated that the territory south of the twenty-second parallel of latitude was to be administered by a Governor-General, appointed by Egypt with the assent of Great Britain. The British and Egyptian flags were to be used together. No duties were to be levied on imports from Egypt, and duties on im- ports from other countries, by way of the Red Sea, were not to exceed the Egyptian tariffs. As long as it should be necessary, Egypt was to make good the deficit in the Sudan budget. But the money invested in the Sudan by Egypt would be considered a loan, upon which interest would be paid as soon as possible. A portion of the Egyptian army should serve in the Sudan, under the command of the Governor-General, himself an officer of the Egyptian army with the rank of Sirdar. So long as the na- tions who enjoyed the privileges of a capitulatory 5 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA regime in Egypt did not demand the extension of the capitulations to the Sudan, and so long as Egypt remained under effective British control, such an arrangement, paradoxical as it seemed, was workable. It has worked out all right. But it is important to note that the exact status of the Sudan, both from the international and the Egyptian point of view, has not yet been determined. It will come up for settle- ment in the Peace Conference, when the affairs of the Ottoman Empire are liquidated, and international sanction is asked for the British Protectorate pro- claimed over Egypt since the opening of the European War.^ Once the Sudan was reconquered, Cromer and Kitchener still held to the policy of "sound financial basis" that had made the conquest possible. For they knew that the Home Government would take little interest in, and do nothing for, the Anglo- Egyptian Sudan unless it was demonstrated to them that the country could pay its way. Immediate use could be made of almost unlimited sums of money, and the temptation was great to enter upon and urge London and Cairo to cooperate in ambitious develop- ment schemes. Cromer and Kitchener were in complete accord in not falling into this trap, and when Kitchener was suddenly called away to South Africa, Lord Cromer was fortunate in finding in his successor. Sir Reginald Wingate, an administrator fully aware of the danger of grandiose schemes of rehabilitation and rapid development. The initial financial policy laid down by Lord Cromer in his ' For the Egyptian point of view, see pp. 421-440. 6 GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN address to the Sudanese chiefs at Khartum in Decem- ber, 1900, to the effect that taxes were not to be made burdensome, even if communications and develop- ments had to wait, has been faithfully and consist- ently carried out. To it more than to anything else is due the marvelous success of the Sudan admin- istration. For the Sudanese have had from the beginning the contrast of the equitable taxation of the British with that which ground them down and ruined them under the Mahdi and the Khalifa: and the British Government has not been wearied and pre- judiced against the Sudan by unreasonable demands for financial support. The cost of the reconquest was L.E. 2,412,000,^ of which the British Government paid L.E. 780,000. More money had, of course, to be invested in rail- ways, in river transport, and in irrigation. The paci- fication of the country and the rehabilitation of its inhabitants depended upon means of transportation and the cultivation of the land. Everything had been destroyed or had fallen into decay during the years of anarchy : so all kinds of public works needed a substantial budget. Popular education had to be thought of, and the expenses of the civil administra- tion and a considerable military establishment pro- vided for. But though the financial task looked so formidable as to be almost hopeless, it was success- fully grappled with, and the country saved from con- cession hunters and insolvency by the adoption and maintenance of the conservative policy of "go slow and pay as you go. " ' L.E. = Egyptian pound, approximately five dollars. 7 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA In 1903, the Egyptian Cabinet authorized an ad- vance to the Sudan for railway construction of L.E. 1,770,000 to spread over four years. This was a sound financial investment. For it was soon de- monstrated that the increased revenue through the development of transportation facilities would cut down Egypt's contribution to the annual deficit more than the interest on this money. In 1906, the Su- dan Railway administration yielded a net profit of L.E. 52,000,^ and in 1907 the Sudan Government was able to pay to Egypt, L.E. 45,000 interest on part of the L.E. 3,000,000 advanced by Egypt for capital expenditures up to the end of 1906. The Sudan Government declared that it was now in a position to assist the development of public works in the Sudan. L.E. 100,000 was set aside for public works in 1908 and L.E. 285,000 for the purchase of rails for the Atbara-Khartum Railway. From January i , 1908, the Sudan began to pay interest at 3 per cent, on L.E. 1,500,000 of the debt to Egypt. The deficit in revenue for 1908 was only L.E. 47,000, and in 1909 the ^ Over and over again in Africa the tremendous financial advantage to a country accruing from state ownership of public utilities is demonstrated. The Sudan, like South Africa, Egypt, and other countries, gets a good share of its surplus revenue from railway profits — a surplus that comes even though hundreds of miles of line are built and operated at a loss for political reasons or for the ultimate benefit of the people. One striking illustration of what the Sudan has gained from keeping its transportation out of the hands of con- cession hunters is found in the little Khartum-Omdurman tram, which plies from Khartum to the ferry leading to Omdurman. This tram line, carrying wholly natives, was begged for often at the beginning by private groups. The Government kept it, and to-day it brings a net profit of fifty thousand pounds per annum to the treasury. 8 GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN annual subvention from the Egyptian Treasury was reduced by another L.E. 10,000. This encouraged Egypt to advance L.E. 380,000 for railway extension and improvement, and the completion of Port Sudan town and harbor. In 1910, Sir Reginald Wingate was able to report that the entire Civil Administra- tion was paying its way and that the only deficit was on the military budget. As more land came under cultivation, trade would increase and the deficit disappear. Three years later there was a surplus of L.E. 40,000. The Sudan had made good. Exports increased thirty per cent, in 19I i, owing to the development of the cotton industry. In 1912, the creation of Port Sudan and the linking of the Red Sea with the Nile by railway made possible export without prohibitive transportation charges. Cotton, cattle, and sheep progressed rapidly. In 1913, the trade output jumped again, owing to the extension of the railway to El Obeid. Great Britain was supply- ing thirty-nine per cent, of the imports, and took twenty per cent, of the exports. It is no surprise, then, that the British Parliament showed itself willing to guarantee the interest on a loan of £3,000,000 for cotton cultivation in the Sudan. The Chancellor of the Exchequer explained that this outlay, in irrigation and railway extension, would develop the cultivation of cotton of the finest quality, greatly needed by England for the manufacture of her unique grades of cotton goods. A few months ago, I sat in the office of the Finan- cial Secretary at 'Khartum. Colonel Bernard is a type of officer one finds only in the British army. If 9 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA he were a Frenchman, he would never have left Paris. If he were an American, he would be one of our captains of industry, with a yacht and a summer home at Newport or Bar Harbor, and wondering how he could spend his money. We occasionally get in our army and navy men with a genius for business : but they do not stay. It may be partly due to the fact that until the Spanish War there were no tasks to challenge this type of man. But it is mostly due to the entire difference in our social system from that of Great Britain. The Colonial Empire under the British flag has been built by men who have gone into Government service for reasons of caste. Among them there has naturally been a large number, like Colonel Bernard, with marked aptitude for business. In any other country most of these men would have gone into business. In England they never dream of such a thing. In order to enjoy the privileges of caste, young men of good families are willing to leave home and friends, to live separated from their own children, and to spend the thirty to forty best years of their life in exile. They are content with an occasional visit to England and with little or no money, if only they preserve their caste. This is the secret of Great Britain's world empire. The moment the Englishman of the upper classes con- siders business as honorable a vocation as Govern- ment service, Britain's Colonial Empire will resemble France's or Germany's — or will collapse altogether. All this passed through my head as I listened to Colonel Bernard explaining, budget estimates before him, the financial policy of the Sudan, with all the 10 GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN enthusiasm and keenness and understanding of an American trying to attract capital to his latest enterprise. Without the railway across the desert from Wady Haifa to Atbara, Kitchener's task against the der- vishes would have been tenfold more difficult, and the victory of doubtful permanent value. As the in- vaders proceeded to Khartum, it was essential to lay ties and rails with unflagging haste. Only did the re-occupation seem a reality and worth while when through railway service was established from Khar- tum to Wady Haifa. As the political success of the reconquest was wholly dependent upon its proving a financial success, and as serious economic develop- ment was out of the question so long as the route through Egypt was the only exit from the country, the first task of the Government was to connect the Nile with the Red Sea by railway. In 1902, Lord Cromer pointed this out in his annual report, and the following year he succeeded in getting the Egyptian Government to furnish the money, as we have seen above. After untold difficulties with labor, and the construction of a bridge over the Atbara River, the junction was completed in 1907. Suakim was abandoned as the terminus on the Red Sea, and a harbor built some miles farther north at a hamlet which was renamed Port Sudan. The Atbara railway shops were increased and improved, and the Sudan Government itself bore part of the ex- pense of remaking the line from Khartum to Atbara. In 1908, telegraphic communication was completed with Gondokoro, on the White Nile, two weeks by II THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA steamer south of Khartum. The Blue Nile was bridged at Khartum for a railway into the Gezira district between the two rivers. El Obeid, the ter- minus of this southern railway extension, was reached in 1 91 3. A glance at the map is necessary to realize what a tremendous territory the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan covers and how impossible it is for the administra- tors of the country to pacify and civilize it com- pletely, much less to develop its resources, until more railways are built, reaching into the heart of all the different provinces. The greatest appeal to the imagination of the Brit- ish public in connection with the reconquest of the Sudan was the fulfilment of the task for which it was generally believed that Gordon had given his life, the suppression of the slave trade. Although the difficulty of this task was enormous, insurmountable even, in so far as slavery within the tribes was con- cerned. Lord Cromer felt it incumbent to mention in his report almost every year the progress of the slave suppression crusade. In 1903, he confessed his dis- appointment that the slave trade was not extinct ; in 1904, he announced a marked decrease in the slave trade; in 1905, he said that it was difficult to check slave traffic in the Kordofan province; in 1906, he be- lieved that there would still be great difficulty in sup- pressing the slave trade; and in 1907 he attributed most of the trouble in Kordofan to the anti-slavery policy to which the Government was committed. The road to abolition, he remarked in his last report, "is a very long road, and it will take years to get to the 12 GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN end of it." Improved communications, however, and the advance of colonial enterprise in British, German, Belgian, and French equatorial colonies, helped to put a stop to long-distance slave-running. The area of operations of slave merchants has been gradually circumscribed until in 19 14 the official re- port announced that slave traffic was "almost im- possible" in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. British officials who have to deal with slavery at close range, however, especially the judges, consider this statement a bit too optimistic. Slave traffic can be detected and frequently punished, when it is carried on from district to district. But within tribal limits, especially if the tribes be Moslem, even where moral certainty of definite cases of slavery exists, legal evidence is hard to obtain. Where slavery is as established an institution as polygamy, decrees bind only those who dare or who want to take advantage of them. There are cases without number, also, where the slaves are ignorant of the abolition decree, and even if it were explained to them, they would not know what it meant. ^ Education is a ^ One who has not traveled out of the beaten track has no more conception of the ignorance of people in uncivilized countries than the people of uncivilized countries have of our institutions. A word is meaningless — unless you can grasp the idea the word stands for. At the time of the proclamation of the Constitution in Turkey, I was traveling in Asia Minor. Everyone, Moslem and Christian alike, was enthusiastic about the new liberty. The Turkish word for liberty is huriet. Villagers who were celebrating the huriet looked at some photographs we had. One was a picture of an American missionary school building in Tarsus. They asked, pointing to the building, "Is this house the huriet we are so happy about? How wonderful!" And yet, colonial administrators are continually 13 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA necessary prerequisite to the functioning and en- joying of Occidental social and political institutions. Enthusiasts and sentimentalists forget the fact that our ancestors did not evolve, support, and use these institutions until we conceived and desired them as a result of education. Lord Kitchener's first visit to the Sudan after the Boer War was to open Gordon College in 1902, when he was on his way to India. In his address he as- serted his entire sympathy with the objects of the college on the lines originally conceived, although he admitted the necessity of using public funds for the advancement of primary teaching. He expressed the hope that he would be able to return in five years and find that higher education was being given at Gordon College. ^ Although Gordon College is not as yet in a position to offer courses such as are given in Robert College at Constantinople, the Syrian Protestant College at Beirut, and several Indian and Chinese universities, it is far ahead of any institution of being taken to task by the people at home because a stroke of the pen has not immediately brought home to the natives under their charge "all the benefits of our civilization." ' Lord Kitchener did not return in five years, as he hoped. But he visited Khartum again in 19 lo, and was promising himself a long tour, after he went back to Cairo as H. M.'s Agent and Consul-Gen- eral, when the present war broke out. Sir Reginald Wingate, writing to me from Khartum in June, said : " . . . I think it fell to few to get to know him as intimately as I did. Under his cold exterior beat a very warm and kind heart, but he was most successful in keeping this from the world. To this country he is a great loss, for I know his heart was in it, and he was almost worshiped by the people, from whom I have had hundreds of telegrams and letters of condolence and sympathy. " 14 GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN higher learning in Africa or Asia in the work of its research laboratories and in the cooperation it gives to the Government for the development of the resources of the country, the betterment of public health, and ethnological investigation. Gordon College is a State institution, which works with and for the Government. I wish it were pos- sible to speak here of the wonderful things that are being done by Dr. Chalmers and others in the Well- come Research Laboratories. It is a revelation of the ability and the devotion of the scientists to whom the manifold problems of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan have been a challenge sufficiently engrossing to keep them far from the great world and yet develop their genius so strikingly that the great world's attention is continually called to what they are doing and dis- covering. But it is more than that. A visit to Gordon College and the Wellcome Laboratories opens one's eyes to the methods that are being pursued by Sir Reginald Wingate and his associates, and the goal they have before them. There is no highly civilized country in the world where more constant attention is being paid to means of developing resources and better ability being invested in the study of those means than in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. In addition to the research work of Gordon College, the Department of Education has established a Cen- tral Research Farm at Khartum North. Here field experiments in growing what the Sudan might pro- duce are tried out, and practical work is done in horti- culture and forestry. At Gordon College and in three other cities, industrial workshops teach boys trades. 15 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA The criticism has frequently been made against the British administration in the Sudan as in Egypt that educational facilities are not as fully extended as they ought to be, and that the British have neglected the moral factor, and emphasized the material, in build- ing up the country. This brings up one of the most thorny problems that confront those who are en- gaged in bringing Africa and Asia under European control. On the one hand, in Egypt and the Sudan, it can be argued that there must be money before ambitious schemes of universal popular education are undertaken. Before the money can be found, the country must be developed economically. It is not that public works and material benefits are more essential than education, but that education for all is so tremendously costly that only a country whose resources are fully developed can maintain schools for its population. It is pointed out, moreover, that even if there were money, teachers would be lacking, and that it takes a whole generation to train enough teachers to meet even a portion of the needs of the next generation. On the other hand, especially in view of what we have said about the necessity of education before our Occidental social and political institutions can be wanted, understood, and taken advantage of by natives, is it not true that primary education is as necessary to a country's development as railways and irrigation, and that if the people are to benefit by material prosperity they must have a moral preparation? Although I have taught for some years in educa- tional institutions in the Near East, and have seen i6 GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN this problem at close range in half a dozen countries, I do not profess to offer a solution. But we must make a wide and determined start in primary edu- cation, and that demands teachers. To get the teachers, higher institutions are necessary. When we put boys through the colleges, few of them want to teach or do teach. They become dissatisfied — as they have every reason to be — ^with existing con- ditions. But their patriotism does not inspire in them the will to make the sacrifice and to take up the cross individually in order that their people may be brought to enlightenment. Far from following the only possible way they have of serving their country wisely, they agitate for European institutions, for social and political recognition, judging the feeling and need of the race solely by their own exotic con- dition. The curse of our Western education upon Orientals is that we try to build where there is no foundation of character. Instead, then, of having wood that takes a polish, we get a veneer that cracks at the first test. Missionaries and educators have success only with boys whom they take away from their families and bring under their home influence very early in life. But they turn out young men who are foreigners to their own people, and who have no desire or ability to go back among their own people and impart what has been given to them. Good farmers and goatherds and blacksmiths and cobblers are spoiled to make imitation * ' gentlemen. ' ' The edu- cated Oriental will not work even if he is starving. ^ ^ Several years ago I was preaching in a small inland city of Penn- sylvania. The local department store proprietor told me that a a 17 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA Educating boys in trades, as the Sudan Education Department has started to do, is an excellent thing. But it ought to be done much more widely than is being done. And money ought to be spent more freely than it is being spent in primary education. The Sudan boasts of fifteen hundred miles of railway in fifteen years, and two thousand miles of regular river steamship service, and five thousand miles of tele- graph wires. But less than five thousand Sudanese in schools of all grades, primary to college, is not a very good showing, despite the difficulties. After the Cairo Convention was arranged between Egypt and Great Britain in January, 1899, the Brit- ish Foreign Office was in a position to treat with other nations and other British colonies concerning the boundaries of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The Anglo-French Convention of 1899 settled the local difficulties raised by the Marchand expedition to Fashoda. When French obstruction and ill-will that stood in the way during the first few years of reconstruction were removed by the epoch-making Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, the frontiers with Abyssinia and the Italian colony of Eritrea were arranged by several successive agreements. The only serious difficulty after Fashoda, where Christian Arab boy from "a college somewhere out in Turkey" was in town, and that he had somehow been unable to give the boy work. He was puzzled, for the boy seemed to be strong and husky. He brought him to me after church. I thumped the fellow on the chest and back, and, turning to the merchant, said, "Put him in your packing department." "Oh! no, sir," the boy cried out ago- nizingly, "I could not. I do not want handful work. I want mind' fid work." 18 GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN Great Britain had once more to justify her presence in the Sudan by claiming to act as agent for the Egyptian Government, was when the Anglo-Egyp- tian troops occupied, in June, 1901, certain portions of the Bahr-el-Ghazal region, bordering on French Equatorial Africa and the Congo Free State. In Paris and Brussels it was contended that Great Brit- ain had encroached upon territory leased to Belgium and had exceeded her rights under the Convention of 1894. The British counter-claim wholly de- pended upon "the former rights of Egypt in the Sudan." The Sultanate of Darfur, between Kordofan and Wadai, was placed within the British sphere by the Anglo-French Agreement. Sultan Ali accepted the British_ Protectorate, and agreed to pay a tribute. But his country was never made a province of the Sudan, like Kordofan. ^ This cannot be successfully ^ Owing to the absence of effective control, German and Turkish agents were able to persuade Sultan Ali to cast in his fortunes with them. He paid no tribute in 1915, and in the spring of 1916 declared the " Jehad "[^ (holy war), stating that he had been ordered by the Khalif of all the Moslems to attack the Sudan. The railway to El Obeid made his threat of Uttle importance from the British point of view. But General Sir Reginald Wingate decided to anticipate the threatened attack, and promptly sent a column into Darfur, which occupied El Fashr. It was the Sirdar's object to prevent the possi- bility of AU making trouble for the French in Wadai: for the Elamerun operations had depleted greatly the Wadai garrisons, and Sultan Ali knew this. If the railway can now be extended from El Obeid to El Fashr, the last unoccupied province of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan will be brought under effective administrative control, and the cattle trade of the Sudan will be greatly increased. Darfur, up to this last expedition, has been one of the few countries in Africa without a European garrison. 19 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA done until the railway from Lake Chad to the Nile is built. Then Abeshr in Wadai and El Fashr in Dar- fur will be the two important points between the lake and El Obeid, which the Sudan Government railway reached in 1913. Very soon after the British and Egyptians went back into the Sudan, the problem of irrigation began to be studied. In 1901, Sir William Garstin reported on the possibility of using the equatorial lakes as reservoirs. Lake Victoria Nyanza was rejected be- cause a rise in its level would flood shores which were thickly populated, and half of which were German territory. Although the German factor may now be eliminated, the lake has become far more important than at the time of this report through the wonderful development of the colonies on its shores. It is hardly possible to believe that the opinion of Sir William Garstin will be revised. For the colonies bordering the lake would never consent to having the level raised and lowered for the convenience of the Nile territories. Lake Albert Nyanza presented similar difficulties, for Belgium owns the western shore. Then, too, the utility of irrigating the White Nile Valley is at the best questionable. For it passes through unreclaimable swamp lands for hundreds of miles. Irrigation in the Blue Nile Valley, and the free navigation of that river result- ing from a control of the water supply, would bring a rich return. Lake Tana, in northern Abyssinia, on the western side of Mount Gum^a, according to Sir William Garstin, would make an ideal reservoir. The surrounding country is uninhabited, and en- 20 GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN gineering difficulties are much less than in the case of Lake Victoria or Lake Albert. By her treaties with Abyssinia, France, and Italy, Great Britain became ten years ago politically in a position to carry through the Garstin scheme. It has not yet been done. Reports on the Sudan have emphasized year after year the necessity and value of irrigation, and in 1913, as we have seen above, the Imperial Parliament guaranteed a loan, part of which was to be spent in irrigating the Gezira district, on the west bank of the Blue Nile south of Khartum. The success of the Tayiba demonstration station, in this district, in raising fine staple cotton proved, just before the European War broke out, that this irriga- tion scheme was a sound proposition financially. A wonderful development in cotton growing may be expected after the plan is carried through, and cotton may before long surpass the gum of the Kordofan forests as the premier export article of the Sudan. In this necessarily incomplete survey of the Sudan, I have saved the political aspect of Sir Reginald Wingate's problem to the last, not because the task of pacification has been any less difficult or less im- portant than the solution of the financial problem, but because the extension of civil administration through military operations had to follow rather than to go hand in hand with economic development. The Khalifa escaped from Omdurman after the battle of September 6, 1898, and had to be pursued and put out of harm's way. When Sir Reginald Win- gate succeeded in killing the Khalifa and his compan- ions a year later, Mahdiism as a military menace 21 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA disappeared. But the country was vast and could not be penetrated in a few months or even a few years. The only policy with any chance of success was to direct the efforts of the Government toward the speedy amelioration of the unfortunate victims of the dervish rule, and to win their allegiance through lending them a helping hand. Their memory of Egyptian rule was hardly of a nature to recommend the new Government, and Egyptian soldiers were not looked upon as redeemers — even from Mahdiism, to which many of the most influential sheiks remained profoundly attached as a religious dogma. The British administration had to make itself known, not by force, but by winning confidence through refrain- ing from exploiting the people and giving them as much material benefit as possible in as short a time as possible. This was Sir Reginald Wingate's policy, and I have been able to see with my own eyes the magic that it has worked upon people who are fanati- cal only if you provoke them to fanaticism, and savage only if you give them reason to be. From the very beginning of the new administration at Khartum, the process of pacification has been dis- turbed only by the ineluctable necessity of enforcing prematurely a too drastic anti-slavery policy. Not often during the fifteen years from the death of the Khalifa to the outbreak of the European War has Sir Reginald been compelled to show the mailed fist. In 1903, a new Mahdi arose in southern Kor- dofan. He was immediately pursued, captured, and hanged at El Obeid. The criticism from England against his summary execution was very hard to bear, 22 GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN even though it was inspired by sentimentaHty and total ignorance of the problem with which the officials in the Sudan had to deal. From 1884 to 1 898 Mahdi- ism had meant the extinction of nearly six million lives. ^ The only way to prevent a return to the most intolerable and cruel despotism the valleys of the Upper Nile tributaries had ever known was to snuff out at the beginning every pretendant to the Mahdi's succession. In 1908, a body of ex-dervishes attacked and killed the deputy inspector of the Blue Nile province. This was just at the time the ' ' Young Egypt" party was beginning to grow formidable, and their emissaries were working everywhere in the Sudan. A punitive expedition resulted in twelve death sentences, which were commuted to life imprisonment. The pessimism of Sir Eldon Gorst's report for 1909 extended to his remarks on the Sudan. He declared that the tenth year of the occupation was full of tribal unrest, and that Mahdiism was not extinguished ^ The population of the Egyptian Sudan was believed to be between eight and nine millions at the beginning of the Mahdi's reign. Five years after the reconquest, it was still less than two millions. In the last decade, the increase has been very rapid, so that, in spite of sleeping sickness in the south, it now exceeds three millions. The steady increase in population is the most striking proof of the benefit of British rule. Intertribal warfare has ceased. Security from raiding and Government aid in combating disease make cattle-raising once more profitable. There has been immigra- tion from Abyssinia and from West Africa. Only about four thou- sand Europeans are in the Sudan. Aside from the officials and their families, the missionaries and a very few Europeans interested in development schemes and archaeology, the foreigners are Greeks and Syrians, who lend money, engage in petty commerce, and sell spirits. In Khartum street signs are in Greek. 23 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA as a faith, and had to be carefully watched and checked at every turn. There was also much law- lessness along the Abyssinian border. The most dangerous districts were so unhealthy that the only means of maintaining order was to increase the Su- danese battalions. In 1912, there was an expedition into Mongalla, and an outbreak in southern Kordof an. There were nine distinct military operations during the course of 19 14. If one had only reports to go by, one wotild gather that fifteen years of Anglo-Egyptian occupation had not brought peace to the Sudan. But one has to consider the enormous extent of the country, and the difficulties of communication. Punitive expeditions and local uprisings stand out: for they are news. When one reads the newspapers, he sees only reports of divorces. Does he argue from this that marriages are generally unhappy? ; Sir Reginald Wingate was at home on a vacation when the European War began. He hurried back to his post, and there were many who said that he would have very severe days before him. The entry of Turkey into the war was expected by the Germans to have serious consequences throughout North Africa. But especially did they hope for trouble in the Sudan. When I was in Berlin, in December, 1914, the collapse of British power in the Moslem portion of Africa and Asia was confidently prophesied. There was much faith in the fetish of Pan-Islamism. A year later, when it looked as if Germany was planning the invasion of Egypt on a large scale, and the newspapers were full of alarming reports, I 24 GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN traveled all over Egypt, and went to Khartum to see how matters stood in the Sudan. Although the Turks were reported to be moving again against the Suez Canal, and fighting with the Senussi was going on in the West, my journey of four days by rail and steamer south from Cairo was exactly as in time of peace. It was patent that no insurrectional movement was anticipated or feared by the Sudan Government. One-fourth of the British military and civil staff (there were less than four hundred in all) had been allowed to return home to rejoin regiments or volun- teer. No increase in the British effectives had been asked for, or was contemplated. For nearly a mil- lion square miles there were less than a thousand British soldiers. At the beginning of the entrance of Turkey into the war, the Sirdar received telegrams and letters from all the principal chiefs of the Sudan, expressing whole-hearted loyalty to the British Empire, and condemning the action of the Young Turks. These were published in a remarkable booklet called The Sudan Book of Loyalty. Of all who came forward at that time with declarations of sympathy and loyalty, only two have since been put under formal restraint by the Government for political intrigue with the enemy. Inside the Sudan there was only one revolt against the Government, which had to be dealt with as a mili- tary operation. It was that of a chieftain in the Kadugli district of the Nuba Mountains, who had been deceived by enemy agents into believing that the 25 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA power of the British in Egypt and the Sudan was on the point of eclipse. He surrendered at the end of 191 5. There have been no others, and it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the police and in- spection work in the Sudan, from the internal point of view, is only what is usual in time of peace. The Khalifa's proclamation of the Holy War left the Sudanese unaffected. Seeing is believing. The Egyptians are so unwar- like a race and so lacking in personal courage and daring that it was easy enough to discount the Ger- man stories about the storm that was going to break in Cairo. I did not have to go to Egypt to reassure myself on this point. But the Sudanese, from the blackest of blacks to the most chocolate-colored of Arabs, have no fear of death, and are heroes of many a charge, in the face of desperate odds, that surpasses Balaclava. The Sudanese, too, are fanatical Mos- lems, with all the zeal and enthusiasm that belongs to primitive races and neophytes. I had been living for years in an atmosphere where Pan-Islamism was the absorbing topic of conversation and the night- mare of my British official friends. So I needed to go to Khartum. By pure chance the trip into the Sudan was well- timed. I was there for the two important fetes of the year, the birthday of the Prophet {Muled~el- Nehi) and the anniversary of the visit of the King and Queen of England, who had stopped at Port Sudan on the way back from India, and held a review at Sinkat, on January 17, 1912. King's Day was celebrated by an impressive service at the Khartum 26 GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN Cathedral. After the garrison left the church, they stood on parade and Sir Reginald Wingate read a cablegram from the King. It was a stirring sight to see these few hundred British soldiers, the only mili- tary evidence of British power in the midst of war in one of the largest Moslem regions in Africa. After dinner on the evening of King's Day, Sir Reginald took me down into the Palace garden to see the Sudanese band that had been playing during the meal. We passed through the circle around the conductor, and stood in their midst while they played some Niam-Niam marches. The Sirdar was in full-dress uniform, and bareheaded. A couple of torches gave light. The black faces and weird music made me feel that I was certainly surrounded by savages in the heart of Africa. But they were savages whose affection for their big chief was evi- dent in the way they looked at him and the vim with which they played. I thought back a year, and I was in the Vaterland Cafe in Berlin. There was music, too, and I was listening to an authority on the Near East. "The Sudanese, you know," he said, "are certainly coming in with us — when they realize that the Sultan has raised the Green Standard. They are devils, and the black pagan tribes will follow readily the Moslems. They really hate the British rule. "What happened to Gordon will seem little beside this approaching tragedy, just as the Sepoy Rebel- lion will seem little compared to what is going to happen in India. " Sir Reginald Wingate asked me to go to Omdurman with him to the dervish celebration of the Prophet's 27 THE NEW MAP OP AFRICA birthday. We were a party of about thirty: the Grand Cadi, the Grand Mufti, several officers from the British regiment stationed at Khartum, Mr. More, the Civil Governor of Khartum Province, Sir Regi- nald's associates in the Government, and his personal staff. We left the Palace steps at nine o'clock in the evening for the trip on the Blue Nile to Omdurman. Our steamer was the Elfin, which was used by Gordon in the old days more than thirty years ago. At the landing-stage, about half a mile from the city walls, a great crowd of white-robed dervishes was waiting to form the guard of honor. Each held a flaming torch. The Sudan women, harking back to jungle days, greeted the Sirdar with a shrill cry, which they make tremolo by pressing fingers on their lips. Into the city past the Mahdi's tomb and the Khalifa's ruined palace we rode to a large open space, where innumerable tents were dressed for the celebration. The Omdurman municipality, the im- portant Omdehs (headmen) of the neighboring villages and various tribes, and the sheiks of the many religious orders all have their tents. With untiring physical energy and good humor and capacity for "pink lemonade" of the good old circus variety, which was forced upon us in every tent. Sir Reginald Wingate led us from place to place. No tent was too humble to be omitted, no sheik too in- significant to be passed over. One religious leader, who received the Sirdar as an equal on this night, is a cook in private life. "And a good cook, too, " the Sirdar told me. I had the good fortune to meet and talk with the 28 GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN most revered of the religious chieftains, El Sayyed Ali Morghani— now Sir Ali Morghani, K.C.M.G., for he received a knighthood from the King in the last birthday honors. Sir Ali is a modest, unassum- ing man of about forty, with a shrewd, keen mind. He knows what is going on in the world, for he asked me some searching questions about conditions in France and the Balkans. Sir Ali, who is revered as a "holy man" above all the religious leaders of the Sudan, has no doubt whatever of the sincere attach- ment of the Moslems of Africa to the cause of Great Britain. I think that he believes exactly what he told me. When Sir Reginald Wingate explained to the sheiks who I was and what I had come to the Sudan for, they nodded] their heads with satisfaction, and laughed. "Tell him to write what he sees," they declared. "We are glad that he came for the feast, for he can give the English and French and Americans a good report of us." The last tent we visited was the most important, and around it gathered all the people of Omdurman and the tribes who had come into the city for the festivities. Thousands of white-robed howling or barking dervishes were dancing and shouting, having reached the point of frenzy. We sat sipping coffee in the midst of a crowd of sixty thousand Moslems, most of whom had been followers of the Mahdi and be- lievers in the EZhalifa. The Sirdar's guard of honor was four Sudanese lancers on horse. There were no troops, either Egyptian or British. None of our party was armed. The people of Omdurman, at the 29 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA moment of the greatest religious exaltation of the year, had here in their power the Governor-General and the chief representatives of British authority in the Sudan. I know what the feeling of Moslem fanaticism and anti-Christian feeling is in an Oriental crowd. I have experienced it more than once when I knew that I was facing death. But that feeling was not here. There was real love for the Sirdar — and no hostility to the rest of us. As we were leaving the tent, one of the turbaned dervish chieftains who had followed the Sirdar to the entrance, put his left hand on my shoulder as he shook hands, and said, "I hope you have enjoyed the feast at Omdurman and will come again. " "Who is that sheik?" I asked Sir Reginald Wingate. "One of the Mahdi's sons, " he answered. 30 CHAPTER II THE ISLANDS OF AFRICA THE islands around Africa are owned by- Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, and France, and the title to their possession' generally goes far back beyond the period of European colonization of the mainland. In the old days of sailing vessels, when the route to India was around the Cape of Good Hope, islands had a unique value. There were, of course, ports of call on the mainland. But they were never free from the attacks of the savages, and did not afford security for the storing of supplies. Nor did the mainland lend itself as well as islands to economic de- velopment and the spread of civilization in the days when colonial forces were small and colonists few. Europe in Africa — on the large scale of administra- tive possession and economic development — was possible only after steamships and railways had passed the experimental stage, and when the intense production of the new industrial era created surplus population and surplus goods for which an outlet must be found. Europe did not take possession of Africa as a result of the explorations of Livingstone, Stanley, Peters, de Brazza, and others. The ex- 31 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA plorers were the pioneers of a Europe ready and need- ing to follow the path they blazed. Aside from the Madeira Islands and the Azores, which are administratively regarded as integral parts of the Republic, Portugal has the important Cape Verde group, the Bissagos Archipelago off Portuguese Guinea, and the two little islands of Sao Thome and Principe in the Gulf of Guinea, which are treated in the chapter on the Portuguese colonies. The Canary Islands are administratively a portion of the Spanish monarchy : so the minister of colonies, who once had under his control an Empire that only Britain has since been able to match, gives most of the attention of his department to the one rich little island of Fernando Po near the mouth of the Niger, far in the Gulf of Guinea. The only interest of this island, in the international scheme of things, is the fact that it commands the approach to the German colony of Kamerun, just as Zanzibar controls the approach to Germany's principal port in her East African colony. Spain has also, southeast of Fer- nando Po, a foothold on the mainland, called Spanish Guinea, which is an enclave in the Kamerun (just as the British enclave of Walfisch Bay controls the outlet of the Swakop and Kuiseb rivers in German Southwest Africa). Should Spain ever desire to part with one or all of her colonies, France has the treaty right of preemption. The British and French islands are most conven- iently placed along the trade routes around the con- tinent and across the Atlantic and Indian oceans. Great Britain has, beside Walfisch Bay, the wee 32 Canaruldi \^^ Cf> -5- CD CD EXPLO BUT NOl BY ANY INOEP£, STATE THE ISLANDS OF AFRICA HoUam's Archipelago and Possession Island off the coast of German Southwest Africa. The latter is at the northern end of Luderitzland, not far from the port of Angra Pequena. Huge Madagascar lies off the coast of Portuguese East Africa, almost parallel- ing the entire stretch from Lorenzo-Marquez in Delagoa Bay at the south to Cape Delgado on the north. The distance is not great from the Portu- guese port of Mozambique to Madagascar. In the southern part of the canal between Mozambique and Madagascar, France has the two small islands of Bassas da India and Isle de I'Europe. Between Cape Delgado, which marks the boundary of German East Africa and Portuguese East Africa, and the northern end of Madagascar, lies the Comores Archipelago, also belonging to France. Great Britain has Zanzibar and Pemba as sentinels between the German port of Dar-es- Salaam and her port of Mombasa. Farther out into the ocean, off the coast of German East Africa and north of Madagascar, Assumption, Aldabra, Astove, Saint Pierre, Providence, Cerf Islands, and the archipela- goes of Cosmoledo and Farquhar fly the Union Jack. On the way to India from Zanzibar, beyond the islands just named, are Mahe, Felicite, the Amirantes and others, which form the Seychelles. They are under British rule. Five hundred miles east of Madagascar is Mauritius, with dependent islands, which England conquered from France in 1810. In the Atlantic Ocean, on the way to South America, are Ascension Island, St. Helena, and the Tristan da Cunha group, convenient sentinels to keep the ocean for the British. 3 33 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA From the standpoint of African colonial history, British Zanzibar and French Madagascar have alone influenced European colonial policy and the history of African colonial expansion. We can eliminate all the others. But brief mention must be made of the recent history and development of Zanzibar and Madagascar. ZANZIBAR Zanzibar and its small northern neighbor, Pemba, are, like Somaliland, connected racially, historically, and religiously with Arabia rather than with Africa. They came under the control of Muscat when the Portuguese Empire began to crumble. For twenty- five years, in the early part of the nineteenth century, Zanzibar was connected politically with Muscat. It became an independent sultanate again in 1856. Not until she found Germany installed on the main- land of Africa, north of Portuguese Mozambique, and France making plans for the conquest of Mada- gascar, did Great Britain feel impelled to get posses- sion of Zanzibar and Pemba. A treaty establishing the British Protectorate was secretly made; and France and Germany were confronted with a Jait accompli. These two Powers w^ere placated by the agreements of 1890. France was given a free foot in Madagascar: and Heligoland was ceded to Ger- many. France and Germany recognized the Zanzi- bar Protectorate: and Germany paid one million dollars to the Sultan of Zanzibar for his rights on the mainland they had occupied six years earlier. 34 THE ISLANDS OF AFRICA Since the rise of German naval power, Heligoland has proved of far more importance than the British Government ever dreamed it would be. In view of what has happened since the outbreak of the war in Europe, the British must have come to the opinion that the price paid for Zanzibar was pretty high. The importance of Zanzibar as a trading center has diminished in recent years through the development of the coast ports of French and Italian Somaliland, and of German and British East Africa. The Ger- man railway from Lake Tanganyika to the coast at Dar-es-Salaam is the most important factor in pre- venting the expansion that had been hoped for in Zanzibar. The total trade has for soine years re- mained stationary at about ten million dollars. The most lucrative industry of the island remains clove- raising. In 1 90 1, the old Sultan was succeeded by Ali, a youth of nineteen, who vacated the throne after ten years of an uneventful reign. During this period, however, British control became effective, and the Pan-Islamic movement brought no serious problem. In 1 91 3, the control of the island was handed over to the Colonial Office by the Foreign Office, and a Brit- ish resident given the title of High Commissioner. Zanzibar had been separated from British East Africa in 1904, although it had been included in the original charter of the British East Africa Company. A recent movement to bring the two Protectorates under one control, as has been accomplished in British West Africa, has not yet succeeded. The problem of the Indians stands in the way. Indians 35 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA are numerous in Zanzibar. Since the abolition of slavery, they have become the real possessors of the land. As they ply the trade of money-lenders, the Arab farmers and planters are in their power. The majority of the Zanzibar Indians did not come directly from India, but are of South African origin. They left that part of the British Empire because they could not secure there the rights of British subjects. In their new home, they note the recent measures taken, and the new measures agitated, in British East Africa against Indians, and fear that incorporation with the mainland Government will once more make of them pariahs. 'The most interesting contribution of Zanzibar to the experimental solution of European colonization problems in Africa is the method of abolition of slavery. It was a peculiarly advantageous field for the tackling of this problem. Zanzibar and Pemba are islands. The inhabitants are Moslems. Islamic law is the law of the land. Mr. B. S. Cave, British Agent and Consul-General, gave a valuable review of the successive steps of the emancipation policy in a report issued in 1909. It is well worth studying. The Sultan issued a decree in 1897, ordaining that no child thereafter born could be a slave, and made provision by which slaves could obtain freedom. In eleven years eleven thousand slaves were emanci- pated. Voluntary emancipation went very slowly at first. Older slaves were naturally unwilling to accept freedom. But the gradual process of enfran- chisement did not arouse Arab fanaticism; the eman- cipated natives did not become demoralized by a 36 THE ISLANDS OF AFRICA sudden change in their status for which they were not prepared ; and local industries and agriculture suffered scarcely at all. During that time, the general and local problems arising from emancipation had been met and examined. So the experience of eleven years could be used to advantage in framing a gen- eral emancipation decree that would neither violate Moslem sensibilities nor upset the economic life of the country. In June, 1909, the Sultan signed a decree forbidding recognition by the Courts of the status of slavery in the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. Compensation was provided for slaves whose previous masters would now refuse to support them because age, ill health, or physical disability prevented them from earning a living. The rights of concubines under Moslem law would not be recognized, if concubines, taking advantage of the emancipation decree, left their former masters without consent. Nor would they have the right of custody of their children by the master whom they left. One admires the sagacity and patient wisdom of those who had to deal with the slave problem in Zanzibar. Resisting the pressure brought to bear upon them by thoughtless sentimentalists in England, and enduring misrepresentation and vitriolic denun- ciation on the part of those who had not the slightest knowledge of the subject upon which they were talking,^ the British administrators kept quietly ^ The French Abolition Decree of 1896 in Madagascar was held up as the "only right and honorable step" for Great Britain to take. The two cases were totally different, of course, Zanzibar being under 37 THE NEW MAP OP AFRICA at their task. When the moment of reaHzation arrived, the vindication of their conservative policy was complete. Emancipation in Zanzibar has been so strikingly successful that it has given heart — and a potent argument — to others who are confronted with the same perplexing task on the mainland, and who have to bear all the while insult and impugnment of motives from cranks in England. If any one believes that the only way to effect a reform is to make it immediately and sweepingly, and that the British flag must mean freedom for all over whom it is hoisted by the very fact of its being hoisted and at the very moment it is hoisted, let him read Mr. Cave's report. MADAGASCAR Madagascar is by far the largest Island depending upon the continent of Africa. The area of France is 207,000 square miles. Madagascar's 'area is 227,000 square miles. The population of the island, which is nearly a thousand miles long, is 3,200,000, of whom over 3,000,000 belong to the Malagasy race. The people are of many distinct tribes, with different languages. The most intelligent and numerous, the Hovas, number nearly a million. France got a foothold in Madagascar between 1882 and 1884, at the time when Germany and Great Britain were feverishly putting under their flags all that was left up to that time on the African mainland. Islamic law, and the harem consideration complicating the problem. Some of Zanzibar's most influential chiefs, in close connection with Mecca, had been African slave-traders. 38 THE ISLANDS OF AFRICA ' As we have seen above, after Great Britain seized Zanzibar, she agreed to leave a free field to France in Madagascar. But the Malagasy, not having been consulted, were of another mind. Queen Ranavalona, loyally sustained by the Hovas, refused to recognize the legality of "treaties" made by local chiefs for the cession of bits of coast land to France. What government would recognize a right acquired in this way? By the same token, the Protectorate was not recognized. France had to enter upon a war of conquest, and annex the island without the consent either of government or people. The Queen was deposed and sent into exile. Madagascar was declared a French possession. The Malagasy who opposed were treated as rebels. In the early days of French activity in Madagascar, there was much opposition to France and criticism of France in the British press. The agitation was fed by Protestant missionaries, who claimed that their work was ruined, and that the French were acting with great cruelty towards natives, whose only crime was love of country and liberty. But as Great Britain was at the time meditating the gob- bHng up of the Dutch republics in South Africa, the official ear was deaf to the cry of outraged humanity. The French went to Tananarive in the same year that Jameson went to Johannesburg : and Queen Ranava- lona was exiled to Algiers in the same year that Presi- dent Kruger made his desperate personal appeal to Europe. The French received Kruger with great enthusiasm, and the English held meetings in Albert Hall to wax indignant over the fate of the Queen 39 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA of Madagascar. But neither Government made the other hold back from the poHcy of arbitrary conquest. The friends of "liberty and justice and the freedom of small nationalities" did what they always have done — and no more than they always have done. They protested, and cried out against the iniquity in the world. No Government espoused the cause of Boers or Malagasy. The results in Madagascar, just as the results in South Africa, have proved distinctly beneficial to the people of the country. If the end has not justified the means, it has at least caused the means to be forgotten. The South African Commonwealth brings credit upon the working out of British colonial policy. Madagascar is a credit to France. There was much initial suffering to native races, and a great amount of injustice in the early years. This is proved by the appeal of the Native Races Protection Committee, issued in Paris in 1900, which declared that the forced labor of the Malagasy was a crying scandal; that they were in a condition of slavery worse than that which the French Government had abolished by proclamation four years before they conquered the island ; and that the taxes amounted to exploitation. It was asserted that forced labor on roads was reducing the robust male population on the island; that natives were arrested and imprisoned without trial, and then compelled to work, because they were prisoners, without pay. Similar condi- tions have prevailed in all European colonies in Africa at the beginning oj European administration. But always in British colonies, and often in French and 40 THE ISLANDS OF AFRICA German colonies, they have been remedied with the change from military to civil administration. Madagascar to-day has over two million acres under cultivation. Although rubber is the principal product, sugar, coffee, cloves, cotton, vanilla, and vegetables are raised in considerable quantity. Scientific development of forest products, govern- ment initiative in cattle breeding, and the introduc- tion of silk-worms have done much for the prosperity of the natives. Mines are being opened up. There are nearly nine thousand miles of telegraph and telephone lines. Railway construction has advanced slowly. But there are many good roads, and motor- lorries are in use extensively. The revolution in motor transport through the invention and develop- ment of the automobile has changed remarkably the problem of transport on islands. Where plantations are large and the haul to the port is not more than two hundred kilometers, it is a question whether the public interest is not better served by good roads than by railways. The planter can load the automobile truck in the field, and unload directly at the steamer. The haul is down to sea-level. The experience of the French army at Verdun furnishes an excellent means of computing wear and tear on roads, and expense of upkeep. France was beginning to find a return in Madagas- car when the Great War broke out. There was trade with France to the amount of seventy-five million francs in 191 3. Of the ten thousand ships that entered Madagascar ports during that year, nearly seven thousand carried the French flag. 41 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA Some of France's most illustrious military men, of whom notable examples are Generals Gallieni and Lyautey, made their reputation and gained the experience that has enabled them to serve their country so well in the military and civil administra- tion of Madagascar. With the different tribes and languages, and no railways through the interior, the task was arduous, and required unflagging enthusiasm as well as tact and nerve. In Morocco lately, and on the battlefields of the Marne and Meuse and Somme, France has much to be grateful for in having had Madagascar to train her chiefs. Most important of all things is the fact that the French, in spite of their bad start, have succeeded in winning the natives. Second only to the Senagalese have been the Malagasy in their zeal to serve France in this war. I had been reading last April much that condemned the French in Madagascar. Just then General Gallieni died. I went with all Paris to pass before his bier in the chapelle ardente that had been made before the church door in the courtyard of the Invalides. The guard of honor around the coffin were Malagasy. 42 CHAPTER III THE LAST YEARS OF THE BOER WAR AND THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICA BOTH from a military and political ' point of view, the year 1900 brought great disappoint- ment to the British Cabinet and to the commanders of the British army in South Africa. It had been confidently expected that the over- whelming odds against the Boers would result in a few months in the complete collapse of their power, if not of their will, to resist. But the arrival of Lord Roberts and the surrender of Cronje's army in Febru- ary did not prove to be "the beginning of the end." Although Ladysmith was relieved in March, and Mafeking in May, the task seemed almost as formi- dable as at the beginning. The British had to con- tend with the undisguised sympathy of the Boers in Cape Colony for the cause of the RepubHcs. As war prisoners frequently escaped from Simonstown, Cronje and his army were deported to St. Helena. Although most of the Cape Colony rebels, after the withdrawal of the Free State commandos in March, took advan- tage of Lord Milner's amnesty proclamation, the Boers of the Colony continued to use political weapons 43 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA against the British. There was a ministerial crisis in June. Many members of the Cape Colony- Assembly were under arrest for treason, and yet the new Pregressive Government had only a majority of six. Lord Roberts sailed from Cape Town on December 1st, fully satisfied that he was leaving to Lord Kitchener a guerilla warfare that could not last out the winter. Five days after his departure, an Afrikander Congress met at Worcester which passed resolutions disapproving the attitude of Lord Milner, denouncing the British conduct of the war, declaring that the white population of South Africa would be ex- terminated if peace were not soon made, and demand- ing that the Repubhcs be allowed to retain their independence. In Europe, French public opinion was bitterly hostile to Great Britain. Queen Victoria and the Prince of Wales, no less than Chamberlain and other members of the Government, were sub- jected in France to a campaign of caricature and scathing criticism hardly less violent than that which Kaiser Wilhelm, the Crown Prince, and von Beth- mann-HoUweg have experienced since August ist, 1 9 14. President Kruger was received with hysterical enthusiasm in Paris. In view of the changes of the last fifteen years, it is curious to have to record that it was Kaiser Wilhelm 's refusal to receive Kruger that checkmated the Boer hopes of receiving sub- stantial aid from Europe. Early in 1901 martial law had to be declared throughout Cape Colony. In Natal, as well as in Cape Colony, Ministers, unable to depend upon 44 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION parliamentary support, were driven to the ineluctable necessity of acting illegally. The Cape Parliament was twice prorogued. Newspapers were suppressed, and editors prosecuted. Trials for treason in Cape Colony and Natal resulted, in some cases, in the imposition of the death penalty. On August 7th, Lord Kitchener issued a drastic proclamation, which announced the annexation of the Orange Free State and the "late South Afri- can Republic." He declared that "Her Majesty's Forces are in possession of the seats of government, the whole machinery of administration, and the principal towns and railway lines of these two terri- tories; that only a few burghers are still under arms and, being short of ammunition, are unable to carry on regular warfare. Her Majesty's Government is determined to put an end to a state of things which is aimlessly prolonging bloodshed and destruction and inflicting ruin upon the great majority of inhabitants, who are anxious to live in peace and to earn a Hveli- hood for themselves and their families." Therefore, Lord Kitchener, under instructions from Her Majes- ty's Government, declared that the leaders of the Boer armies who did not surrender before September 15th would be permanently banished from South Africa, and that "the cost of the maintenance of the families of the burghers in the field who had not surrendered by September 15th would be recoverable from such burghers and be a charge upon their prop- erty movable and unmovable in the two colonies." Lord Kitchener was disappointed in the effect of this measure. It only exasperated the Boers, and 45 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA strengthened their will to resist to the bitter end. Ten thousand Boers were holding in check a British army of over two hundred thousand. Their hatred of the British was increased by the drastic step which Lord Kitchener felt compelled to take of establishing concentration camps, and of extending the area of "pacified" territory by means of a chain of block- houses. The terrible mortality among women and children in these concentration camps called forth a unanimous protest from the civilized world, which was especially strong in England itself. Who does not remember the bitter indictment of Miss Hobb- house's pamphlets? In July, 1124 children died from lack of milk; in August, 1525; in September, 1964. Many Boers who lost their loved ones in these concentration camps, and of whom a striking example is General Hertzog, have never forgotten the wrongs inflicted upon innocent non-combatants during those awful days. ^ ' I was living in London at this time, and know that the stories of Miss Hobbhouse, W. T. Stead, and others, were accepted as true. But Lord Kitchener, when he finally left South Africa, did not hesitate to state in his farewell speech: "The Commander-in- Chief has special pleasure in congratulating the Army on the kindly and humane spirit which has animated all during this long struggle. Fortunately for the future of South Africa, the truth of this matter is known to our late enemy, as well as to ourselves; and no misrepre- sentation from outside can prevail in the long run against the actual fact that no war has ever yet been waged in which combatants and non-combatants on either side have shown so much considera- tion and kindness to one another." The truth of the matter is that women and children — all non-combatants for that matter — cannot help suffering horribly as a result of the invasion of the territory in which they live. If we condemn the fact of invasion, naturally the responsibility for resultant suffering and mortality falls upon the 46 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION Lord Milner, speaking at Johannesburg in January, 1902, declared that the only possible way of ending the war was to "squeeze" the Boers until they made overtures of their own accord. So the line of block- houses was remorselessly extended. Lord Kitchener was aided appreciably in hastening the inevitable end by enlisting the services of five thousand burghers who had surrendered. Under the renegade General Vilonel, these "National Scouts" ("handsuppers, " they were contemptuously called by the other Boers) contributed a skill in guerilla warfare and an in- valuable typographical knowledge of the country to the final efforts of the British army. For the im- mediate purpose of finishing the war quickly, the use of the "handsuppers" was eminently successful. But it resulted in a bitter feeling, which has persisted Government that ordered the invasion and the army that carried out the order. But once that is said, is it not true that suffering and death cannot be prevented, or even always mitigated, when prevention or mitigation comes into conflict with military necessity? Lord Kitchener spoke with a clear conscience as a soldier, whose first duty was to accomplish his mission. Concentration camps and the blockhouse system resulted in the British victory. No other course of action was possible. Since all the cattle had been driven off the farms, where could fresh milk have been obtained? The children were victims of the war. It is not open to doubt that the British authorities did all they could to make the suffering and mortality as light as possible. If the concentration camps had not been established, it is probable that all the women and children would have died. The only direct responsibility that falls upon the army which executed orders given to it by the Home Government is from mistakes of judgment in placing some of the camps in un- suitable and unhealthy locations. But even here military men would argue that the exigencies of the situation necessitated the establishment of the camps in such places. 47 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA until now, against the men who sold out the cause. The irreconcilables among the Boers have never ceased to maintain that the treachery of the renegades alone made possible British success. The "hands- uppers" were excommunicated by the Dutch Re- formed Church. Although the ecclesiastical ban was afterwards lifted, they have been considered ever since as outcasts even by those who are now loyal British subjects. General Delarey's success in defeating and taking prisoner Lord Methuen in March was the last victory for the Boers. In fact, when Delarey released Lord Methuen, in order that he might receive proper medical attention for his wounds, Boer magnanimity could not be interpreted otherwise than as a confes- sion that power of resistance had reached its end. Negotiations were begun on March 23rd. Kitchener and Milner had unequivocally stated that the restoration of Boer independence was out of the question. But the conference of burghers, which met at Vereeniging on May 15th, made the following proposals after three days of heated dis- cussion: the relinquishment of foreign relations and embassies; the acceptance of the protectorate of Great Britain; the surrender of a portion of the territory of the South African Republic; and the conclusion of a defensive treaty with Great Britain in regard to South Africa. When Kitchener and Milner declined to discuss these proposals, or tele- graph them to Mr. Chamberlain, and dictated terms of unconditional surrender upon which the burghers were to give a plain yes or no answer, General De 48 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION Wet urged the delegates to continue the war. But "handsupping" had now become so prevalent that common sense determined the burghers to submit to the inevitable. As General Delarey put it, "If the meeting insisted on a continuation of hostilities the nation would be driven into 'handsupping'; thus the war would end in dishonor and disgrace." The terms dictated by Great Britain, and accepted at Vereeniging, contained ten stipulations : I. Unconditional surrender, and recognition of Edward VII. as lawful Sovereign. 2. Burghers in the field outside the limits of the two former Repub- lics and all prisoners of war to be returned to their homes as soon as transportation and means of sub- sistence made this possible. 3. No burghers sur- rendering or returning to be deprived of personal liberty or property. 4. Immunity from legal action, civil or criminal, of burghers for any acts in connection with the prosecution of the war. 5. The Dutch language to be taught in public schools, where the parents of the children desire it, and to be allowed in courts of law, when necessary for the better and more effectual administration of justice. 6. The possession of rifles, subject to the taking out of a license, to be allowed to persons requiring them for their protection. 7. Military administra- tion to be succeeded by civil government at the earliest possible date, and, as soon as circumstances permitted, the introduction of representative in- stitutions, leading up to self-government. 8. The question of granting the franchise to natives not to be decided until after the introduction of self-govern- 4 49 THE NEW MAP OP AFRICA ment. 9. No special tax to be imposed on landed property in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony to defray the expenses of the war. 10. The appoint- ment of a commission, on which local inhabitants would be represented, for assisting the restoration of the people to their homes and their rehabilitation, and for this purpose the granting of £3,000,000 to compensate war losses suffered by the burghers: but no foreigner or rebel to be entitled to the benefit of this clause. There were eighteen thousand Boers left to sur- render. The war had cost Great Britain twenty-two thousand in killed alone. Lord Milner became Governor of the Transvaal on June 21st, and two days later Lord Kitchener left South Africa, having accomplished a task which proved conclusively that there had been no mistake in choosing the victor of Omdurman to solve the most aggravating military problem that had ever confronted a British general. There may be conflicting opinions, which history cannot reconcile, concerning the causes and the jus- tice of Great Britain's war of conquest against the Boers. There can be no doubt about the benefit that has resulted from it for the Boers themselves, for the British Empire, and for the whole world. The Boer War marks a distinct step forward in making Africa a white man's country. If we take the attitude that the white man should leave to indigenous elements the territories they have occupied (or, to put it more accurately, partially occupied) from the beginning of our knowledge of these terri- 50 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION tones, we deny that our civilization has a right to exist and to prevail. We deny the logic and the justice of the forces that have contributed to make the worid what it is to-day. We deny that the Aryan race has had and still has a mission, and that that mission seems to have been peculiariy entrusted to the Anglo-Saxon element of the white race. The process of civilization is always painful, always fraught with temporary injustice, always prejudicial to the immediate interests of native races which refuse assimilation and resist enlightening influences. If we are going to denounce and deplore Anglo- Saxon domination in South Africa, the conquest of the aboriginal races on the North American continent and the gradual absorption of weaker ' European elements by the Anglo-Saxon must be denounced and deplored. When we view and comment upon events as they happen, we are ashamed to hold that the end justifies the means. But when we review and judge events with the perspective of years, is it not human nature to approve whatever has happened, when the results are unquestionably beneficial? Only the man who would like to see Africa still a "dark continent," completely out of touch with Europe and America, can indulge in destructive and vindictive criticism of European colonization in Africa. In passing judgment upon the activities of the different European states in Africa, there is only one sensible criterion — the results. So I have refrained from going into an appreciation of the causes of the Boer War, and have limited my account of the conflict between Boer and Briton to what was 51 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA strictly necessary in order to introduce the work of evolution that has been going on in South Africa since 1900. The same point of view, the same method of treatment is adopted throughout this book. If the British Government, after the Boer War, had tried to exterminate the Boers, or to assimilate them violently and summarily, if they had denied to the Boers either the economic or political liberty they had enjoyed before, or that which they had a right to expect as British subjects, the Boer War would rightly be considered as a war of aggressive conquest, harmful to the interest of South Africans of all races, and would have resulted in a decade or more of terrorism. But, from the very day peace was signed, Great Britain began to work constructively for the happiness and well-being of all South Africans, irrespective of race. Local passions and prejudices tried to frustrate this typically Anglo- Saxon ideal. But generations of experience and of training, inbred with excellent tradition, had made the British Government uncannily wise in judging and dealing rightly with colonial problems. The first test came immediately after the peace of Vereeniging. The British Cabinet refused to be persuaded by South African "Imperialists" to suspend the Cape Colony Parliament on the ground that it would refuse to pass measures necessary for the pacification of the country. Rather than start in upon the delicate task of reconciliation and recon- struction by adopting an unconstitutional policy for expediency's sake, it was rightly believed to be 52 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION better to risk the overthrow of a ministry favorable to the British Government. The ImperiaHst or Progressive Opposition was guided by Dr. Jameson rather more wisely than his past career would have indicated. In the years of reconciliation, a great deal is due to the wonderful growth, through re- sponsibility, of this man who had led the Raid that bears his name. It is curious how invariably radicals, hotheads, and extremists become conservative when power is placed in their hands. With each suc- ceeding year. Dr. Jameson became more moderate and charitable, and more able to impose moderation on his followers, many of whom advocated in the press and on the platform the policy of Prussia in Alsace and Lorraine. The problems that confronted the British Govern- ment in South Africa were so many and so complex that Mr. Chamberlain decided in the autumn of 1902 to go to the Natal, Cape, Transvaal, and Orange River Colonies, so that he might investigate the post- bellum situation firsthand. His ostensible reason was to study the question of introdu'cing Chinese labor on the indenture system. When the inter- rupted work of the mines in the Transvaal was re- sumed, it had been found that only fifty thousand natives were willing to work, although three times that number were imperatively needed. White labor on an extensive scale was considered too costly. But the underlying motive of the Premier's visit was political rather than economic. It was his ambition to bring together the Dutch and English parties in Cape Colony, to discuss frankly with 53 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA the defeated Boer leaders in Pretoria and Bloem- fontein the practical questions involved in recon- struction, and to appeal to the Dutch everywhere "to let bygones be bygones." During this visit in the winter of 1902- 1903, Mr. Chamberlain found that the settlement of the South African question had only begun with the Peace of Vereeniging. There were all sorts of cur- rents, and cross currents, involving the parliamentary regime in Cape Colony; the economic relations be- tween Natal and Cape Colony and the two newly conquered colonies, especially in the way of railway agreements and railway extensions; the introduction of Chinese labor, to which all parties were opposed (the only thing the British and Dutch were in ac- cord upon in Cape Colony!); the repatriation of the Boers upon the breaking up of the concentra- tion camps, return of prisoners and distribution of the three million pound grant; the settlem.ent of Crown lands ; and the assessing of a war debt upon the defeated republics. Mr. Chamberlain was not sure that public opinion in England would receive favorably the proposition of Lord Milner to solve political difficulties by the introduction of British settlers upon Crown land. He found that the difficulty of pacification in South Africa was mostly through hostility to the National Scouts. The Boers insisted that it had not been the understanding that any portion of the three million pounds was to go to "handsuppers, " that any grants to them would be open to the suspicion of payment of promised bribes to traitors and renegades, as 54 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION the "handsuppers" were regarded. At Pretoria, in answer to Mr. Chamberlain's plea for union, the Boers pressed for claims and advantages far beyond what the treaty had assured them. Mr. Chamberlain warned them that future amnesty and self-govern- ment would not come through pressure. At Bloem- fontein a deputation of Boers headed by General Christian De Wet told Mr. Chamberlain that there were many irreconcilables among the Boers, especially in what had been the Free State, and complained that the terms of peace were not being carried out. The real trouble was animosity against the National Scouts. Mr. Chamberlain and General De Wet both lost their temper, and a rather undignified scene followed. In connection with the labor question, the mine- owners of the Rand^ declared to Mr. Chamberlain that, as the immediate future of South Africa de- pended upon the extension of the gold industry, the importation of indentured Chinese was the only thing that could save the situation. The possibility of employing whites, they said, was out of the ques- tion, not only on account of the high wages demanded, but because whites could not do heavy manual work in a country inhabited by people of an inferior race without sinking to the economic level of the blacks. Hindoos were not of the physical build demanded for working in mines, and, if imported in large quantities, would end by demanding the right, ' By the Rand is meant the mining area from Spring to Rand- fontein, a gold reef of thirty to forty miles, including Johannesburg and all the mining townships. 55 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA as British subjects, to remain. For the blacks, on the other hand, it was contended that the scarcity of labor for the mines was due to the unwillingness of mine-owners to pay wages that would compete with the considerably higher wages offered for public works and railway construction. The labor question was serious, not only from the standpoint of the mine-owners, but also from the standpoint of the entire white population of the colony. Half the stamps on the mines were idle for lack of labor. As the mines used coal and furnished the principal receipts for the railways, economic rehabilitation and development could not be hoped for so long as the mines were not being fully worked. Unless this question could be solved, the Boer War would have been fought in vain: for upon the Transvaal mines depended the economic prosperity of the whole of South Africa, and the justification of extensive rail- way construction, which alone could develop the agricultural resources of the four colonies and of Rhodesia. It was fruitless to talk of a war loan, unless the Transvaal was put in the position of meeting the interest on the loan. The task of the Home Government was compli- cated by conflicting sentiments in the British electo- rate. There was a universal feeling that the tremendous sacrifice of treasure and of blood made by England should not result in an additional burden on the British taxpayer, while trade with South Africa (which had increased in ten years from nine million pounds to twenty-six million pounds) was diminished. On the other hand, the nonconformist 56 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION conscience and labor sentiment were hostile to the adoption of a program in South Africa that would mean the infringement of personal liberty and the denial of the principles which apologists had advanced in justification for undertaking the war. No post- factum substantiation must be given to the accusa- tion so often made that the war had been instigated by and fought for the mine-owners. The general result of Mr. Chamberlain's visit to South Africa was the adoption by the Imperial Government of the only policy that would avoid going from Scylla to Charybdis. The Cabinet tried, with varying fortunes at first, but with ulti- mate success at last, to base its South African policy upon the principle that South African questions be decided in the final analysis by South Africans, and that London abstain from overriding colonial wishes in regard to colonial interests. Extreme care, how- ever, had to be exercised in finding out what really was the opinion on all these questions. Imperialist and Boer fanatics did their best to retard union, although the former thought they were working for it. For the extreme elements in both parties tried to make the Cabinet believe that they voiced the sentiments of the people, and to influence the Cabinet to decisions inimical to the real interests of South Africa. Because the years between the treaty of Vereenig- ing and the establishment of the Commonwealth developed problems that are being faced or that will have to be faced soon in all African colonies, it is important to set each one of them forth in more 57 THE NEW MAP OP AFRICA detail than would otherwise be justifiable in a book whose scope includes the whole of Africa. Then, too, it must be remembered that the formation of the Commonwealth, which could come only after these questions had been for years in the melting-pot, is a justification of Great Britain's r61e in Africa, and the goal towards which all the States who are colonizing Africa must equally work. For the sake of avoiding confusion and in order to make these problems stand out beyond their South African setting, I deal with each one of them separately, and do not attempt to coordinate them chronologically between 1902 and 1910. THE MINES AND THE PROBLEM OF WHITE, BLACK, AND CHINESE LABOR The accusation against the mine-owners that they were endeavoring to compel blacks to work for a wage lower than could be obtained in the open market does not seem to be substantiated by the facts. I have been told by competent observers that the failure to secure native labor in 1903 was mainly due to the unsettled state of the country and the reluctance of the natives to leave their krals until they had con- fidence that order was restored. As they had been very prosperous during the war and had saved money, they did not feel the necessity of working. Where in the world do negroes work when they have money? If one bears in mind the fact that the Rand enter- prises involved wholly " uitlanders, " and that the Boers were exclusively agriculturalists, it is possible 58 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION to look for an economic motive underlying the political one. Farmers who could afford to give the blacks ten shillings a month at the most, regarded mines, with the wage rate of two pounds fifteen to three pounds with food, as the cause of their in- ability to get sufficient labor. All along, since gold was discovered in the Transvaal to the present day, animosity against the "uitlander" has been kept alive for this very patent reason. Far from sym- pathizing with the contention that the mine-owners were willing to give the blacks too little, the Boer farmers have complained of the blacks being too well paid. They have frequently tried to get the Govern- ment to legislate in their favor, but without success. When it comes to white labor versus black labor, the cause of the failure to run the mines with white labor is neither wages nor climate. It is a social question. The white man will not work alongside the black man. He is physically able to do as much, if not more work, than the black, but he will not do the same work. Labor leaders in South Africa have failed utterly in their efforts to demonstrate that mines could be worked by whites, for the simple reason that white laborers, even when starving, refuse to do "niggers' work." White men demand positions in which there is not hard manual labor. It seems amply demonstrated that there is no place in South Africa for the white man who has no trade, and no opportunity to develop his own land. The poor white problem has become acute in South Africa. Europeans without a trade or commercial aptitude, and without money to develop land, are 59 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA discouraged from coming into the Commonwealth: for the white man who has no other resource than his hands is apt to become a charge upon the community and a menace. The South African Labor Party has now come to a position where it opposes only the use of natives who are brought into the labor market from outside the Commonwealth. As to the rate of wages that it is possible for mine- owners to pay, it must be remembered that practically all the mines of the Rand are low grade propo- sitions, and are worked sometimes to a depth of seven thousand feet. Many miles of reef are now unworked because the ore is too low grade to yield a profit, even at the native rate of wages. Some mines have paid nothing to their shareholders for years, and others are just above the margin of pay- ability. Even if it be admitted that the cost of administration and the capitalization are in many cases excessive, a sUght increase of wages would wipe out the margin between profit and loss in the most carefully run and most conservatively capi- talized mine. The sentiment against the introduction of Chinese labor was greatly strengthened in England by the resignation of Commissioner of Mines Wyebergh and Mr. Monypenny, Editor of the Johannesburg Star, who had been a brilliant advocate of the British cause during the war. Mr. Wyebergh championed the employment of white unskilled labor, denying that it would be impracticable or excessively costly. He charged that the financial houses on the Rand had unduly influenced the policy of the Government. 60 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION Mr. Monypenny refused to use his pen "in the interest of the mine-owners." There were un- doubtedly two sides to the question, but when one tries to view it from the standpoint of the immedi- ate interest of the Transvaal, takes into consideration the safeguards that it was proposed to put arouind the introduction of this new element into South Africa, and remembers that Chinese labor was proposed only temporarily as an experiment, it is difKcuit to understand the strong opposition that the suggestion aroused. In the beginning of 1904, when Lord Milner saw that the Transvaal and Orange River Colony budgets were going to have a deficit of nearly seven hundred thousand pounds, he cabled to London for permission to introduce an ordinance to enforce Chinese labor, stating that opposition to such a measure was dying down, and declaring that white men would leave the Transvaal if it were not done. The Legislative Council passed the ordinance, and royal assent was published on March 12th. The first shipload of one thousand coolies sailed from Hongkong on May 5th. Australia cabled a protest to London. Public opinion in Cape Colony was frankly hostile. The influential Boers signed a statement to the effect that the overwhelming majority of Boers was un- alterably opposed to the introduction of Asiatics under whatever conditions. Boer opposition, how- ever, as one can gather from the statement of General Botha, was largely dup to the fact that they believed such a step should not be taken before the responsible Government promised by the Treaty of Vereeniging had been granted. 61 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA At the beginning of 1905, there were 35,000 Chinese on the Rand and by the end of July the number had increased to 43,000. Strikes and assassinations in the compounds were followed by many Chinese breaking loose. White women were attacked. Then the Boers demanded of Lord Selborne that they be permitted to carry arms in defence against the Chinese, and that the immigration cease. ^ The Chinese claimed that they had been imposed upon, and did not realize that they were coming to Africa to be virtual prisoners. Immediately after the fall of the Balfour Cabinet in December, 1905, Lord Elgin ordered by cable the stopping of the importation of Chinese, pending the decision to grant responsible government to the colony. During that year, a thousand Chinese had already been repatriated for violation of contract or disorderly conduct. Repatriation continued in 1907 and 1908, as indentures expired. By the end of July, 1908, only five thousand were left, and the last left early in 1910. If the intention of the experiment of Chinese labor was merely to set the wheels of industry working quickly so that the country could pay its way (as ^ The Boers were really In favor of Chinese labor, though for sentimental reasons they professed not to be. Chinese recruitment for the mines enabled the Boers to get cheap Kafhr labor for the farms, which they never could do in competition with the mines. There was actually a proposal made in Parliament by a Transvaal member in 19 13 to re-introduce Chinese labor for the mines on the ground that it would help the farmers to get Kaffir labor cheaper than was then possible. It found universal support among the Transvaal farmers. 62 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION practically the whole revenue of the Transvaal was derived directly or indirectly from the mines), the experiment was far from being a failure. Its warmest supporters had not tried to defend it, or to establish it as a permanent institution. INDIAN COLONIST RIGHTS AND INDIAN IMMIGRATION A bitter grievance of the British press against the Kruger administration had been its treatment of Indian British subjects. The British Government's technical ground for coming into open- conflict with the Transvaal Government was the violation of the London Convention. For disabilities were imposed upon British Indians as to residence and freedom to pursue their legitimate callings in the Transvaal. But after the Boer War the treatment of British Indians was not remedied. Facts were laid before Parliament to show that rights enjoyed under Kruger had actually been curtailed by the new British administration! In 1904 the Government of India made a formal protest. Parliament was reminded of the old grievance against Kruger, and how the thesis at that time had been adopted by the British Government in dealing with the Transvaal, that the London Convention applied to all British subjects, irrespective of race, creed, color, or language, so that Indians had the right to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the Transvaal, without restrictions. There has been no difference between Kruger's treatment of the Indians and that of the Government 63 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA which ousted him. No protest from Calcutta, even when backed by London and the press, had any effect. Upon this question there is perfect soHdarity between EngHsh and Dutch in South Africa. The thesis of South Africa is that unrestricted right of entry to Indians will lower the whole standard of living for the white man and make his existence in the country impossible. It is the same thesis as is adopted regarding Asiatic immigration by California and our other western States, by Canada and by Australia. It has extended to the European settlers of British East Africa. Questions of justice, fair play, higher considerations of national interest fall on deaf ears when the Anglo-Saxon is asked to let in the Asiatic. He simply will not do it. There is no argument. Only those who are far away from the "yellow peril" and who would not be affected them- selves by unrestricted Asiatic immigration espouse the cause of Japanese, Chinese, and Indians. I am not approving or condemning. I simply state the fact. After nine years of futile protest, the British Viceroy in India decided to give up the struggle. All that is asked for now is liberal treatment of the Indian already in the country. The South African Commonwealth, no more than Kruger, has not ac- cepted the London Convention. Nor will it ever do so. THE Transvaal's war "contribution" One great question which Mr. Chamberlain went to South Africa "to settle" was the financial situa- 64 NO R T H A T IL A N r I SOUTH A t\l A r AI SHOWING THE. Ol AMONG EUR BRITISH lis ii- j--. tA FRENCH I I GERMAN L_ I ITALIAN l I PORTUCU. L_ I SPANISH 9 zoo 4no « T [ 1 I THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION tion of the new colonies. He announced at Johannes- burg that the Imperial Government would submit to Parliament a bill to guarantee a loan of thirty- five million pounds sterling, secured by the assets of the Transvaal and Orange River colonies, to pay existing debts of the former governments, to provide for expenditures for pubhc works, land settlements, and new railways. There could be no reasonable opposition to this bill. For it was imperative to put a firm financial foundation as soon as possible under the new colonies, and to make possible the develop- ment of the territories through Government initiative. This was to the interest of all the inhabitants of the colonies. But when Mr. Chamberlain added that a second loan of thirty million pounds would be floated, to be considered as a war debt secured on the assets of the Transvaal, for the purpose of paying the conquerors a portion of the expenditure of the conquest, and that the first ten million pounds of this loan was to be taken up by local mine owners, a howl of protest was raised that never ceased. The Boers maintained that their future could not be mortgaged in this way, and pointed out that the question of a war contribution was not mentioned in the stipulations of the Treaty of Vereeniging, and was contrary to the spirit, if not to the text, of Article 9. They said only that if Great Britain thought it worth while to under- take a war, which had not been of their seeking, in order to conquer them, it was up to the British to foot the bill, and look for compensation in pride over s 65 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA the extension of their sovereignty and in profit from the development of their trade. When it came to floating the first ten million pound installment of the Transvaal war loan, Lord Milner realized that the colony was in no position to pay the interest even on this one-third. He let London know clearly how much he feared the result of the imposition of this obligation. He felt strongly that the dissatisfaction resulting among the Boers would be a serious obstacle to reconciliation and reconstruction. The agitation was great at that moment against the Chinese Immigration Bill. So the British Government decided to postpone the measure. At a congress in 1905, General Botha, speaking against the provisions of the proposed constitution, declared that ten capitalists had imposed a war loan upon the people without their consent. A day of humiliation and prayer was appointed in the Dutch churches. When responsible government was finally granted to the Transvaal, Great Britain wisely decided to forego entirely the war contribution arranged by Mr. Chamberlain with the mining mag- nates. Whenever it is a question of colonial prob- lems, common sense eventually wins every time in British Cabinet councils. They knew well that one of the first acts of the Transvaal Government would be to repudiate the debt. They were happy enough to see the way clear to a solution of the Transvaal problem without borrowing trouble over the question of a few million pounds. 66 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION GRANTING RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT TO THE TRANSVAAL AND THE ORANGE FREE STATE We have spoken of the wise decision of the Home Government to resist the demand of the extreme EngHsh party in Cape Colony for suspension of the Colonial Parliament on the ground that it would refuse to pass measures necessary for the pacification of the country, and also of the representations made to Mr. Chamberlain at the time of his visit to the Transvaal and the Free State during the winter after the Treaty of Vereeniging was signed. Mr. Chamber- lain told the Boers that the British Government and the British people were in entire sympathy with the principle of self-government, and that the promise of the Treaty of Vereeniging concerning the establishment of responsible government would be fulfilled at the earliest possible moment. But he warned the Boers that agitation and pressure would retard rather than hasten the day when responsible government would be granted. Mr. Chamberlain's warning might have come true had the Conservative Cabinet remained firmly in power, and had not the advocates of the union of the South African colonies felt that delaying re- sponsible government menaced the success of their plan. From the very beginning the Boers did agitate for responsible government, and they brought pres- sure to bear — unrest and racial animosity in the Transvaal and the Free State, political manoeuvering in the Cape Parliament, economic threats in Natal, 67 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA and a powerful sentimental propaganda in England. When one reads the history of the years between the end of the Boer War and the downfall of the Chamberlain-Balfour Ministry, and wades through the mass of polemical literature on both sides, he marvels at the courage of the decision to give in to the Boers on this question when they were still showing themselves bitter and intractable. The Boers did not want responsible government under the terms granted to them — it had to be all their way or no way at all. The decision to give responsible government is a notable proof of the intuitive genius of the British as empire-builders. The Boer agitation in both the conquered republics had much to feed upon, and was skillful in grouping itself around questions concerning which there was the strongest sort of public sentiment in England. In the stand they took on some of these "moral issues," the Boers were undoubtedly insincere. They were making a bid for support in England. They opposed the introduction of Chinese labor; the imposition of the war loan ; what they called the running of the country by the mine-owners; Mr. Chamberlain's scheme to increase the taxation of blacks in order to make them work; the sacrifice of agricultural interests to mining interests; the dis- crimination against their language; the quartering of a big garrison upon them; and the "mulcting" of the Transvaal, especially in the matter of railways, to help Cape Colony and Natal. Many of the claims and assertions of the Boers were untrue. But they won the electorate in England at a moment when 68 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION Liberalism, the Labor party, and the nonconformist conscience were coming to their own. Nothing is more admirable in the world than the intuitive response of the Anglo-Saxon to an appeal for "fair play." Anglo-Saxon public opinion, for fear that it might not be "playing the game," demands that Government officials lean over backwards in order to do the square thing by a vanquished foe. . The detailed history of the local struggle from the end of 1902 to the end of 1905 is not material. We need only to give the result. A step was made towards changing the post-bellum regime in the Transvaal early in 1905, before the Conservatives had to quit the Government. On December 22, 1905, the new Liberal Colonial Secretary, Lord Elgin ordered by cable the suspension of Chinese labor, importation, "pending the decision by the Imperial Government as to the grant of responsible govern- ment to the Transvaal Colony," In fairness to the Conservative Cabinet, one must say that they had every reason to feel perplexed during the summer and autumn of 1905. For the 'Boers, moderates and extremists, were united in demanding that the Free State should receive responsible government at the same time as the Transvaal, and in main- taining that the constitution proposed for the Trans- vaal by the Orders in Council of March 31, 1905, was unsatisfactory in many of its details, and in its entirety "a breach of the terms of peace." One of the principal objections — and in this the Boers were perfectly right — was that the proposed constitution did not exclude from the franchise the Army of 69 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA Occupation. The soldiers were contemptuously re- ferred to in the Boer protests as "hired foreigners." General Botha, upon whom Englishmen of clear head and foresight were already placing their hopes" of the future, denounced the constitution. He claimed that the Free State had been a party to the Treaty of Vereeniging on equal terms with the Transvaal, and that ten capitalists had more in- fluence with the British Government than all the inhabitants of the Transvaal Colony. Throughout the year 1906 — the first year of Liberal Government in England — the agitation waxed strong. Some Boers left for the Argentine, and others began to trek to East Africa. General Beyers, campaigning for Het Volk,^ said: "The tree chopped at Vereeni- ging is sprouting again. A people bound together by blood and tears cannot be lost." The contention of Mr. Lyttleton, who drafted the constitution, was that self-government meant party government, and that if party government were conducted along racial lines, the result would be disastrous. The fact that the mining interests were lobbying in London for the support of the constitution in its original form alienated rather than gained English advocates. The British Government gave in on the provisions ' Het Volk (the people) was the name of a newspaper published in Pretoria long before the war. The political organization of that name was the party in the Transvaal which began to agitate for responsible government immediately after the Treaty of Vereeni- ging, and which later spread to the other colonies. Het Volk is frequently used as a general term to describe the Boer party in politics. 70 . . THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION allowing British garrisons to vote and directing that EngHsh alone be used in debates. The military were excluded, and pariiamentary procedure was made bilingual. It also yielded in the matter of the Free State self-government. Responsible govern- ment was granted to the Transvaal on December 6, 1906, and eleven days later Parliament was told that the Free State also would receive responsible government. The Free State was granted a con- stitution on June 5, 1907. The first elections under the constitution were held in the Transvaal in January, 1907. Het Volk won. A Johannesburg newspaper declared that the cabinet would be almost an exact replica of the staff of the Boer army. It was not quite that: but General Botha was Premier and General Smuts, Colonial Secretary. Although the local English residents, blinded by prejudice, could not see it, the begin- ning of responsible government under such splendid leaders pointed to a future which was realized in a most remarkable way in 1914. General Botha sent a message to the English people in defense of Het Volk. He declared that the Boers could not forget the generosity and the token of confidence of the British nation in granting them responsible govern- ment, and said that the question of the flag and sovereignty -had been settled for all time. In November, 1907, the Dutch party gained a sweeping victory in the first Orange Free State elections. Thirteen of the thirty-eight members of Parliament were returned unopposed by Het Volk. There was no racial conflict outside of Bloemfontein. 71 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA The Dutch gained all except eight seats in Parlia- ment. Both in the Transvaal and in the Free State, the Dutch pronounced themselves in favor of federa- tion. But in the Free State they were much more extreme and jealous on the question of the main- tenance of the Taal language. The Free State Boers were also determined that in the future South African Commonwealth, Cape Colony should not give the natives right to vote, and Natal should withhold the franchise from coolies and other Asiatics. In the general election of 1908, the Dutch party in Cape Colony secured a working majority. This made the Dutch supreme in three colonies. The Dutch of Cape Colony were quite at one with the Opposition under Dr. Jameson in desiring federation. In spite of the almost universal condemnation of the policy by English residents of South Africa, granting responsible government to the former Republics was from the first a success. How it has worked out is told in a later chapter. THE TAAL AGAINST ENGLISH IN THE SCHOOLS Nations cling to their language because they feel that language is the sign of nationahty. As one speaks, so one thinks; as one thinks, so one is. Great nations, strong and advanced and numerous, prove their belief in the essential importance of language by the efforts they make as individuals and small communities, when surrounded by foreigners, to 72" THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION maintain their language and pass it on as a precious heritage to their children. They prove it by the efforts they make as governments to ground and solidify their political influence in .their possessions by spreading their language as rapidly as possible among subject races. Small nations demonstrate their belief in the national importance of language by the almost insane pride and jealousy they show- in defense of their tongue. Subject races put their faith in language as the medium for awakening and sustaining national feeling, and keeping alive hopes of future emancipation. Is it to be wondered at, then, that the Dutch have put the language ques- tion first and foremost in their political program in South Africa? Are they to be blamed or to be denounced as fanatics because they hold dear to the living tangible sign that binds them to the past in the land which their fathers colonized and conse- crated by their blood? The Anglo-Saxon is at his worst — is insufferable even — when he is engaged in controversies where his tongue is involved. He simply cannot see the other man's point of view, and he does not want to see it. He believes that he has the best language God ever made just as firmly as he believes that his is the best race God ever made. We have a perfect right to our opinion (I say we because I am Anglo- Saxon by blood and tradition just as much as any Englishman), but have we a right to become im- patient at and get angry with and look contemptu- ously upon the man who does not agree with us for the very good reason that he is not one of us ? 73 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA From the day the Treaty of Vereeniging was signed, the language question received far more prominence than it ought to have had. In standing by his language, and insisting that it should be preserved in legislative assemblies and courts and schools, the Boer was acting by the instinct that moves every man. He was led to make it a great and bitter political issue, and to believe that it loomed up as the most important thing on the political horizon, because of the lack of considera- tion of the English element in South Africa. Instead of sympathizing with the Boer in his outspoken expression of a natural instinct, his language was ridiculed and his motive for maintaining it inter- preted as purely political, with something sinister in it and subversive of public peace. The attitude of the English in South Africa (fortunately not offi- cials representing the Home Government, but English residents) toward the Boers on the language question has been exactly the same as the attitude of the Prussians and Russians toward the Poles. There is not space to go into a history of the conflict over the language question. It is very much the same as that which one finds in many parts of Europe to-day, and has the usual features: espousal of the subject language by the Church; establishment of schools supported by private sub- scription, and taught largely by the clergy; refusal to use the alien language in courts and public assemb- lies; insistence upon the retention of the subject language in public schools; establishment of institu- tions of higher education — even to universities — 74 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION where the medium prescribed is the native lan- guage. As in everything else in South Africa, the extremists on both sides failed to carry the day. Imperturbable in the face of bitter criticism, High Commissioners refused to embody in reports to London the assertions of the Imperialists that the Boers were plotting treason through their solicitude for their native tongue, and the Home Government refused to give credence to these assertions when they came through other sources. The greatest credit in finding a modus Vivendi is due to moderate Boer leaders, who braved the criticism of their own followers in the determination to follow a fair and intelligent policy in the relation of the two languages. The result has been as satisfactory as can be expected under the exceedingly difficult and delicate circumstances of two races living side by side, neither of which is very good at reconciling itself to the idea of "live and let live." The Taal is used throughout the Union as the sole medium for instruction, if it is the mother language, for the first two or three years. Then English is introduced as a language, not as a medium. In the towns, English is the medium because it is the mother language of the majority of the children, and Dutch is optional and taught as a language. Boer children when they leave school now under- stand English, if they have gone through the sec- ondary school course. English has gained greatly everywhere in Dutch-speaking communities. Al- though Dutch pastors foster the Taal, they cannot, 75 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA except in the "backwoods districts, " oppose English. For in so doing they would fatally militate against the possibility of higher education, which is not obtainable in the Taal. And the maintenance of Boer supremacy in South Africa depends wholly upon the higher education of the younger Boers. The danger from remaining ignorant is greater than the danger of becoming denationalized through higher education. In considering the movement to make the Taal a language for secondary and higher education, it must be remembered that this patois, with its large admixture of Kaffir and English words, is unfortun- ately not enough akin to Dutch to make possible the borrowing of Dutch literature and the use of Dutch text-books. Having no extensive literature, and the Afrikanders being without the financial means and energy and ability to make text-books in Taal for more than primary classes, it is easily seen that secondary education is impossible for the Afrikanders unless they learn some foreign language. As their fortunes are now cast in with the English, it is only common sense that secondary and higher education be in the English language. It is just as hard for the Afrikander to learn good Dutch as to learn good English. He has a thousand uses for English, and a wealth of literature to draw upon. Learning Dutch, then, which he never has a chance to use and whose literature is comparatively cir- cumscribed, is sentimental folly — a protest that is a boomerang, reacting upon him against his best interests. 76 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION CONFLICTING LOCAL INTERESTS OF CONTIGUOUS COLONIES UNDER THE SAME FLAG HASTEN UNION In colonies where the European population, outside of military and civil officials, is very small, the interests of contiguous colonies under the same flag are easily adjusted. The French and British in their West African colonies, and the British in ar- ranging the boundaries and economic interests of East Africa, Uganda, and the Sudan, had little difficulty. Decisions were made in Paris and London, and the colonists had no say in the matter. If advice was asked, it was not necessarily followed. France brought her West African colonies under a common administrative control by a Presidential Decree. ^ Great Britain incorporated Lagos in Nigeria and later joined Northern and Southern Nigeria, by Orders in Council. French Equatorial Africa had to cede large and important parts of her territory to Germany on word from Paris. Great Britain de- prived Gambia and Nigeria of hinterland for the sake of making a good bargain with France over matters that concerned neither of these colonies. In South Africa the situation was totally different. Here the colonists were so numerous that they had to be let alone to settle their own affairs. Long before the Boer War, there was friction between Natal and Cape Colony over many matters, but principally over the carrying trade with the two Dutch republics. When the Orange Free State and the Transvaal became British colonies, the conflict 77 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA of local interests, instead of being remedied, became more acute. To add to the difficulties of the Home Government, Rhodesia, now contiguous British territory on the north and very rapidly developing, had interests that conflicted in many ways with the four British colonies in the south. One illustration alone will suffice to show the particularism of the colonies, the judicious restraint exercised by the British Cabinet in adopting a strict non-intervention policy, and the lesson forcibly taught that safety and strength for the future to all the colonies lay in union alone. The shortest haul from the Rand mines in the Transvaal to the sea was through Portuguese East Africa to the port of Lorenzo Marques on Delagoa Bay. Portuguese territory formed the entire western and seaward boundary of the Transvaal. From Portuguese territory the Transvaal recruited annu- ally an essential amount of native labor. When Lord Milner, on December i8, 1901, signed with the Governor of Portuguese East Africa a temporary agreement, maintaining the former treaties between Portugal and the Transvaal Republic, he took the only course possible under the circumstances. The surrender of the Boers was a matter of months. For the rehabilitation of the Transvaal all the rail- way outlets to the coast were necessary, especially this shortest one through Portuguese territory; and the Transvaal would need all the labor it could recruit from every source. Lord Milner bound the new colony in general to the terms established in 1875 for traffic between the Transvaal and Lorenzo 78 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION Marques. The former tariffs were maintained; equal treatment in the Transvaal for merchandise coming from Lorenzo Marques with that entering by Cape Colony and Natal ports; obligation to furnish to the Portuguese railway a fixed amount of freight every day; application to civil traffic from Lorenzo Marques to the Transvaal of the same principles and rules which govern the traffic of similar character coming from the Cape and from Natal ; alcohol and liquors not to be taxed more than if they came from the Cape and from Natal ; freedom of recruiting native labor for the Transvaal in Portu- guese territory and right of the Portuguese authorities to supervise at Pretoria and Johannesburg the ful- fillment of the contracts entered into with natives thus recruited. The Lorenzo Marques Railway had reached the Transvaal frontier only in 1890 and Pretoria in 1894. Before that time the Cape and Natal railways had a monopoly of imports to and exports from the Transvaal'. The profits were very great, and the two colonies had only each other as rivals. Between the time the Portuguese railway was opened and the outbreak of the Boer War, the Cape Railway saw its carrying trade with the Transvaal reduced from eighty per cent, of the total trade to thirty- seven per cent. Of this Durban in Natal received only three per cent. The other forty per cent, went to Lorenzo Marques. The loss was not only in railway receipts. There were port dues, better facilities of transport through the coming of more ships, quay dues, warehouse dues, and large sums 79 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA made by longshoremen and others who handled the freight from ships to railway. Cape Colony and Natal both thought that the incorporation of the Transvaal in the British Empire would certainly mean the return to them of this valuable traffic. They were terribly upset when Lord Milner decided to maintain the treaty with Portugal. Powerful influences were set in motion in London to have Lord Milner's decision revoked. But the British Government stood firm. They saw clearly that if they allowed to be taken away from Lorenzo Marques the carrying trade which was the chief source of revenue for the whole Portuguese colony, Portugal would retaliate by forbidding her natives to go to work in the Transvaal. Pressure could not be brought to bear on Portugal on this point, because British colonies in Africa were doing the very same thing in regard to each other in order to conserve for themselves the labor of natives who were willing to work. Almost half the native labor in the Transvaal mines came from Portuguese East Africa. To jeopardize this valuable source of native labor was, in Lord Milner's opinion, a danger much greater than that of offending Cape Colony and Natal. When the Transvaal received self-government, the situation became worse for the two old British colonies. From^:i902 to 1907, they had tried every means of bringing the Transvaal to terms. But what could be done against a simple fact of geography? Lorenzo Marques is only about one-third as far from the Rand as Cape Town. It is more than a hundred 80 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION miles nearer the Rand than Durban. Even with equal tariffs, the sliortest route was preferable. By- lowering their tariffs to meet those of Lorenzo Marques, Cape Town would operate at a loss and Durban with no gain. In order to meet the de- ficit incurred in railway receipts by the Portuguese competition. Cape Colony and Natal raised their customs duties against the Transvaal. A tariff war ensued. At this point, common sense pre- vailed. The colonies got together, and discussed their common interests. From this discussion was bom the federation, the story of which is reserved for a later chapter. But even after the conferences for discussing federa- tion were long under way, the Transvaal warned Cape Colony and Natal that too high duties, or duties against the Transvaal's particular interests, would lead to a refusal to enter the Union. To show the other colonies how independent she could be, a delegate from Portuguese East Africa was invited by the Transvaal to the conference of Pretoria. The Transvaal was willing, if necessary, to trade entirely through Lorenzo Marques! Just on the eve of the Commonwealth, the Trans- vaal signed a treaty with Portugal regulating the recruitment of native labor, the railway and port of Lorenzo Marques traffic, commercial relations, and the customs question. The treaty guarantees to Lorenzo Marques from fifty to fifty-five per cent, of the maritime traffic of the Rand and other princi- pal centers of the^Transvaal. In return, Portuguese East Africa allows the Transvaal to recruit labor, 6 8i THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA The treaty caused a violent outburst in Natal. The municipal council of Durban cabled to London, demanding that the treaty be denounced. But London turned a deaf ear. Salvation in this case, as always, was for the Home Government not to override decisions made by a colony for her own interests. Such a course would be justified only if the colony were acting in a way prejudicial to imperial interests. When they saw they could get no help from home, the inhabitants of Natal, who had not the strong racial feeling that was working for union in Cape Colony, decided that the future lay in agreement with and not in opposition to the rich and powerful inland neighbor. Union, as is often the case between nations as well as between individuals, came from seeing the folly of conflict rather than from feeling the desire for harmony. a flourishing colony with extensive semi- independent native areas inconveniently placed: the problem of natal Natal ceased to belong to the Cape of Good Hope over fifty years before the formation of the South African Commonwealth, and after 1856, was a dis- tinct British colony. It is separated from Cape Colony on the south of Griqualand East, in which the native population is very large. Between Natal and the Orange Free State Hes Basutoland. Between Natal and the Transvaal are Zululand and 82 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION Swaziland, which form the angle of the valuable little Delagoa Bay comer of Portuguese East Africa. From Durban, the port on the Indian Ocean, a railway runs into Griqualand East, by way of Pietermaritsburg. But it does not join up with the Cape Railway. Another line, running north- west, bifurcates at Ladysmith, one branch going west into the Orange Free State, and the other due north to Pretoria. The Orange Free State branch makes a semicircular curve around Basutoland to Bloemfontein, which is almost directly west of Pietermaritsburg. The Transvaal branch skirts Zululand and enters the Transvaal without passing through the Free State. Basutoland is a high plateau of nearly twelve thousand square miles, broken by several mountain ranges. It contains the headwaters of the Orange River. The protectorate is not an integral por- tion of the South African Commonwealth. Like Bechuanaland, it is under the direct control of the Crown. But its Resident Commissioner depends upon the High Commissioner for South Africa. In all this territory, larger than Belgium and as large as Holland, there are hardly more than a thousand Europeans among a native population of over four hundred thousand. European settlement, in fact, is prohibited. The native government is exercised by chiefs, who owe allegiance to a paramount chief. Swaziland, from 1903 to 1906, was controlled by the Transvaal. But since 1906, its government is like that of Basutoland. There are only a thousand whites among a population of over one hundred 83 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA thousand. The British Crown has kept the authority over these native regions because the whites of the neighboring colonies have not shown that they are capable of governing justly homogeneous native populations. ^ Zululand, since 1897, has unfortunately formed an integral part of Natal. Between the Tugela River and the Swaziland and Portuguese boundary, the population is practically all native. Except along the coast and on the western edge, Zululand is served by no railway. The European population of Natal has grown three hundred per cent, in the last forty years, while the native population has increased only fifty per cent. But even now among the million and a quarter inhabitants of Natal, there are less than one hundred thousand Europeans and about one hundred and fifty thousand Indians and Chinese. The * In 1907, taking heart at the interest and sympathy aroused in England over the Zulu question, a deputation of native chiefs visited London, although they had previously been informed that their mis- sion would be fruitless, to expose the griefs and discontent of the Swaziland natives. In 1909, when Lord Selbome visited Swaziland, in reply to the protest of the native chiefs of their unwillingness to enter the South African Union, the High Commissioner warned them that amalgamation was inevitable. In the same year, Lord Selbome opened the National Council of Basutoland. The as- sembled chiefs told him that they were afraid of being incorporated forcibly in the Union. Lord Selborne replied that Basutoland would sooner or later have to come into the Union, but that the British Crown would see to it that native rights inland and all other matters would be fully guaranteed. There is no doubt about the fear, resulting from Zululand's unhappy experience, among the natives of the protectorates of coming under the Government of the South African colonists. 84 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION native population numbers almost a million. Natal has not only the largest proportion of black popula- tion of the provinces of the South African Common- wealth, but it is cut off from its neighbors by territories wholly native, and in two of which the na- tives have managed to maintain semi-independence. Natal's Indian and Chinese problems, owing to the long settlement of Asiatic elements in the colony and their great number (as we have just said, they outnumber the Europeans), have been all along totally different from those of the neighboring colonies. ^ Similarly, Natal's native problem has for the British taken the place in Natal of the Boer problem in the other colonies. Zululand wars and "punitive expeditions" were being carried on for twenty years before the in- corporation of 1897. The troubles of Natal did not end then. After a long lull, a revolt broke out in northern Zululand in the beginning of 1906. The natives refused to pay the poll tax. The attack of armed natives upon police in February led to the proclamation of martial law and a punitive expedi- tion. Twelve natives, who had murdered a white policeman, were sentenced to death by court martial. Lord Elgin, Colonial Secretary, interfered by cable to urge a retrial by civil court on account of public opinion in England. The Natal Ministry at once resigned. The colonists bitterly denounced the interference of the Home Government. The Colonial ^ In 1908, the Indians of Natal subscribed the necessary funds to carry on a campaign in the Transvaal and in England on behalf of the Transvaal Indians. 85 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA Office withdrew its opposition, after learning that the Governor of Natal approved the sentence, and the natives were executed on April 2d. The incident, however, led to the first important clash between advanced Radicals and Imperialists in the New Liberal Parliament. Just as in Germany, the Socialists defended the natives, and claimed that the authority of the British Crown, by means of British troops, was being executed far away from the con- trolling influence of public opinion in England, to oppress and take vengeance upon a weak African race for the benefit of colonists. The Government, between two fires, declared that the matter of the executions had been gone into thoroughly, that the first telegram of Lord Elgin had not been in the nature of a remonstrance but rather a request for information, and that when full information was received, the Cabinet realized the justice and necessity of the sentence. After the execution the Zulus renewed their re- sistance to white authority. Several chiefs led the rebels with great energy. The British troops, seconded by Natal militia, carried on a ruthless war of extermination against the Zulus, and killed without mercy those who were found with arms in hand. The Zulus lost three thousand five hundred in a little over two months. When one criticizes the campaign of the Germans against the Hereros, which was just drawing to a close at this time, it must not be for- gotten that the British campaign in Natal, in pro- portion to the rebel effectives in the field, was just as merciless and just as disastrous to the Zulus as the 86 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION German campaign to the Hereros. So disgraceful was the conduct of the Natal troops that the Bishop of Zululand felt impelled, much against his will, to publish the information he had gathered of robbing kraals and native women, stealing stock, and shoot- ing natives and throwing their bodies out to rot. By the end of July over three million dollars had been spent in putting down the uprising. A commission was appointed to inquire into the reason for the growing gulf between whites and blacks, and to find if the natives had just ground for discontent against the whites. The report of the commission in July, 1907, was unanimous in declaring that the natives hated the "whites and distrusted the Government. Government action seemed to have done nothing at all to raise the economic and moral level of the blacks. The rebellion was due to a desire to return to the old mode of tribal and family life. Was this not natural, especially as the whites had not, by their new and different method of government, done anything appreciable to benefit the blacks? In the autumn of 1907, it was believed that Dinizulu and other chiefs were preparing a new rebellion. Dinizulu, when the Natal Government threatened to send an expedition against him, surrendered voluntarily. A new Governor was sent to Natal. Early in 1908 he pardoned the rank and file of those who had been implicated in the rebellion. But Dinizulu remained in jail. An English advocate, who came out to defend him, found that the attitude of the local authorities made impossible a fair trial 87 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA under English law. It was charged that the Natal authorities continued martial law in Zululand to protect local officials, who had been guilty of whip- ping and shooting natives, and to prevent Dinizulu from getting witnesses for his defense. In 1909, after a long trial, Dinizulu was found guilty of "harboring rebels," and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. The Natal Government had been unable to establish his complicity in the rebellion. There was still disaffection of a serious character in Zululand when the South African Commonwealth was formed. Federation improved the chances of the Zulus to receive fair treatment, which they certainly never had had from the Natal colonists. The geographical position of Natal, and the large proportion of native tribes of semi-independent character surrounding the colony, made the task of government extremely difficult. But there can be no doubt that the white men acted exclusively for their own interest, and that when the natives pro- tested against the collection of taxes, the benefit of which was never proved to them, they were treated as rebels, tracked down like wild beasts, and killed in their own country. In this brief review of Natal relations with the Zulus, I have tried to be perfectly fair, and state simply the facts. They are very sad. When one considers the better fortune of the Basutos, neighbors of the Zulus, and the favorable opinion held of their Paramount Chief, Letsie, and his recent successor Griffith, by the British authorities, the wisdom of keeping native populations, where they are homo- THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION geneous and considerable in number, directly under the control of the Crown, is clearly demonstrated. British military and civil officials, who came out from England and who bring to the treatment of native problems and the management of the weaker races splendid ideals of fairness and justice, have always succeeded in keeping peace and winning the respect, if not the affection, of native tribes, and the confidence of their chiefs. But where natives are put under the control of colonists, and at the mercy of local militia officers and men, who are swayed by prejudice and vengeance, the results are what they were in the Zulu expedition of 1906 — a disgrace to civilization and Christianity. One cannot insist too strongly upon the difference between public school and university men from England and men who have risen to the top in the African colonies, often by doubtful means. The latter are too frequently "bounders" of the worst sort, intolerant and in- tolerable when they have a little authority in their hands. The story of federation is reserved for a later chapter. But this summary of the years of recon- struction in South Africa would be incomplete without a word about the two men who represented the British Government in the delicate office of High Commissioner during a period when courage and insight and tact were the sine qua non of success in piloting safely the four colonies to the harbor of federation. It was a decade when recalcitrant Boers and fanatical loyalists were doing all in their 89 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA power to obstruct the course. Lord Milner repre- sented the British Crown until March 1905. He resigned on the eve of the granting of responsible government to the Transvaal. Lord Selborne was High Commissioner during the four years before the establishment of the Commonwealth. Lord Selborne 's resignation, coming just before the Union was formed, was not regarded in South Africa as being due to his wife's health. The Liberal Government was anxious to put Herbert Gladstone in some suitable post outside of England, and Lord Selborne fell in with their plans. Lord Selborne was not at all of the same caliber as Milner. But he was a new broom and had not been involved in the Boer War or in the years of crisis and conflict that followed. His popiilarity with the Dutch was largely due to the great and intelligent interest he took in agriculture, which led to an appreciable promotion of the well-being of the Boers. He did not make the mistake of considering railway and other economic problems too largely from the industrial point of view. General Botha has probably since regretted saying in 1908 that "Lord Milner's rule was the most unfortunate thing that had ever happened to the Transvaal." Many statements, due to the political passion of the moment, cannot be fairly held as the real judgment of the one who made them, even at the time they were made. For the sake of assuring the rallying of all elements to the Imperial program that he kept constantly in mind, Lord Milner may have used his official position too strongly against 90 THE BOER WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION the Afrikander party, of which General Botha was the leader. But the present soundly established prosperity of the Transvaal is largely due to Lord Milner's initiative. The German in him betrayed itself sometimes in a political attitude that was open to objection. But it enabled him at the same time to lay the foundations for the educational, agricul- tural, and industrial development of the Transvaal, Lord Milner established a flourishing agricultural school, with research laboratories and model farms, which is changing the whole agricultural system. In the face of great difficulties he inaugurated educational reforms with the hand of a master. He had the financial sense of a Cromer in studying and taking lessons from the budget. His resig- nation showed keen political insight and at the same time self-abnegation, Just when the work of years was coming to fruition, he left to others the joy of realization. For he saw that his unpopularity among the Dutch was retarding reconciliation. Botha and Smuts and Merriman were ready to cooperate with a British official. But, even if they had been willing personally to work together with Milner, they could not have drawn, their supporters with them. So Lord Milner insisted that his resignation be accepted, not because of ill health, or because he had lost his grip, but because he knew that another would find it easier to carry out the program he had inaugurated. 91 CHAPTER IV THE TWO INDEPENDENT STATES: LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA PRACTICALLY every part of Africa has been brought under some form of European administrative control, with fixed bound- aries, during the last fifteen years. Only two small states are still independent. Liberia in the west and Abyssinia in the east have succeeded in escaping "assimilation" or "protection." But during the past twenty years neither has been with- out its days of anxiety. Liberia owes her independ- ence to the fact that she is the one protege of the United States in Africa. Abyssinia was saved by the courage of her late Emperor Menelik, who alone of all African sovereigns was able to contest successfully the armed invasion of a European Power. He had the luck to try the fortune of arms with the unwarlike Italians. Abyssinia has since escaped through the mutual jealousy of Italy, Great Britain, and France, whose colonies surround her on all sides. The two independent states hold less than three and one-half per cent, of the area, and about two and one-half per cent, of the p6pulation of Africa. 92 LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA LIBERIA Liberia was constituted as an independent repub- lic in 1847 by freed American slaves, the first of whom had settled on the West African coast during the administration of James Monroe, twenty -five years before. The capital is called Monrovia in memory of the initial settlement. Liberia is the only country in Africa where electors must be exclusively of African blood. The United States undertook, by the treaty of 1862, to aid Liberia, when necessary, to preserve her constitutional form of government and her independent existence. In 1885, boundaries were settled with Great Britain in regard to Sierra Leone Colony on the north, and in 1892 with France for the frontier with the Ivory Coast Colony. For the first half -century of Liberia's existence, little that was satisfactory and definite could be established concerning the viability and success of the experiment of a negro state. It was only when Sierra Leone and other British West African colonies began to develop, and when France began to organize and consolidate her "spheres of influence" into col- onies with local administrative and economic organ- ization, that a comparison could be made, and a conclusion reached. Events since 1 900 seem to prove conclusively that Liberia, under negro control, has little hope of becoming the rich and prosperous mod- ern state that could exist on the West African coast. For the country possesses, climatically and in wealth of soil and forest, practically the same conditions that one finds in British and French and German West 93 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA Africa. The development since 1900 of Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Guinea, Togoland, Dahomey, Nigeria, and Kamerun are set forth in this book. He who reads, sees ! There are about twelve thousand negroes of Amer- ican descent in Liberia, and about fifty thousand of the population of nearly two millions, including these twelve thousand, can be said to be civilized, i. e., amenable to constituted authority. Liberians effec- tively control twenty to twenty-five miles inland from the coast. They have few good roads, and no railways. In 1905, the Government was bankrupt. The only portion of revenue not yet mortgaged was the sale of postage stamps. The trade with Great Britain was largely in spirits; and the drink traf- fic was demoralizing the country. The spread of drunkenness among the wild native tribes of the hinterland was checked only by the opportune appearance of the Mohammedan propaganda. The lack of effective control of the natives in the interior became a serious international question when France and Great Britain began to penetrate and organize administratively adjacent regions. For recalcitrant natives took refuge in Liberian territory, and year after year raiders from Liberia seriously upset the normal conditions France and Great Britain were working to establish within their spheres. The anarchy of the Liberian hinterland became intolerable between 1905 and 1910, and the powerlessness of the Liberian Government to exercise effective control over the interior tribes might have led to the partition of Liberia, had not the United 94 LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA States been willing, with the consent and goodwill of Great Britain, France, and Germany, to send a gunboat to Monrovia, and to offer to supervise the reorganization of the Government on a solid financial basis. In 1910, a commission sent out by the United States recommended that the United States take over the debt of Liberia, recreate the administration, use good offices for settling frontier disputes with France and England, and consider the question of having a coaling station on the coast. Both Liberia and the United States declared that there was no question of an American protectorate. But the United States undertook to reorganize the military and frontier police forces, and an international com- mission, under an American official, took charge of the revenues of Liberia. The following year a loan of nearly two million dollars was subscribed by Amer- ican, British, French, and German banks to put Liberia on her feet, and give her a fresh start. But the anarchy of the interior and the raids across the frontier had cost Liberia about two thousand square miles of territory, which was taken over by France in a new frontier agreement signed in 191 1. A "rectification" of frontier on the north was also made with Great Britain during the same year to the advantage of Sierra Leone. The British colony had already occupied the territory, which it was claimed was essential to Sierra Leone's internal peace: Liberia's compensation was a small sum of money. In 1913, the British soap firm of Lever Brothers leased twelve thousand square miles (about one- fourth of the territory of Liberia) for five dollars a 95 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA square mile. The firm was to have the monopoly of gathering and preparing the fruit of the oil palm, the uncontrolled use of the land, and the exclusive priv- ilege of trading with natives. Germany regarded this agreement, which was a virtual transference of sovereignty to British subjects, as an infringement of treaty stipulations, and entered a protest against it. It seems perfectly clear that after the present war, an effective American protectorate will be the only means of keeping Liberia alive — unless Monroe's doctrine prevents the salvation of Monroe's colony. ABYSSINIA The recent history of Abyssinia is a little more encouraging than that of Liberia, thanks to the fact that at the moment of peril from European encroach- ment a fearless, intelligent, and energetic ruler was at the head of the nation. The Abyssinians are not a seafaring people, and the territories to the north and east and south-east along the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean nominally acknowledged Turco-Egyptian sovereignty before the British invasion of Egypt. They are inhabited by Arabic Moslem tribes, in close contact with Mecca, while the Abyssinians are mostly Christians. After the rise of the Mahdi in the Sudan, and the British withdrawal in 1884, Italy occupied the Arabic-speaking territory on the north, and a large piece of Somaliland on the south-east. France made effective the occupation, instead of proclaimed 96 LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA in principle some twenty years earlier, of the western shore of the straits leading from the Gulf of Aden into the Red Sea. England took over from the wreck of the Sudan a portion of the southern side of the Gulf of Aden. The fortunes of these territories, though intimately bound up with Abyssinia, are treated in another chapter. Italy, new to colonial problems, felt that the mo- ment was opportune to join her portion of Somaliland with Eritrea by extending her power over Abyssinia. In 1889 a treaty was signed with Emperor Menelik in which Italian trickery introduced an all-important discrepancy between the Italian text and the Am- haric text. The Italian text bound Abyssinia to deal with the European Powers through Italy : while this was optional in the text that Emperor Menelik could read. When he discovered how his good faith had been imposed upon, Menelik protested against the treaty in a powerful letter to Queen Victoria in 1893, probably at the instigation of France and Russia. But Abyssinia was given only "moral support" by Europe. War with Italy resulted, and ended in a disastrous defeat of the Italians at Adowa in 1896. Italy was compelled to sign a new treaty at Adis Abeba, recognizing the complete independence of Abyssinia. This treaty afterwards received in- ternational recognition. Menelik's reputation in Europe was great. For he acted admirably towards his vanquished enemy, and did not make the mis- take of believing that all Europeans were like the Italians, watching to take advantage of him — and supported by a weak army ! : 7 97 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA During the trying period that followed the recon- quest of the Sudan, he cooperated with the British in their effort to reestablish order in the territories contiguous to Abyssinia, gave a British syndicate a gold-mining concession, and allowed Britivsh engineers to inspect the Sobat region and the White Nile sources as a possible route for the Cape-Cairo Rail- way. In 1 901, he combined with the British in military operations against the Mullah Mohammed along the SomaUland frontier. He was always open to suggestions as to ways and means of stopping gun-running and slave-trading. In the extension of European influence in Africa, native rulers have come into conflict with European Powers, and have lost their independence for two reasons. First, they have not understood the im- portance of fixing boundaries, and have lacked the power or will to prevent raiding from their territories into those under European control. European ad- ministrators, in order to pacify the territories they governed, had to look to the sources of disorder. This led punitive expeditions on farther than origin- ally intended. Native sultans and kings and tribal chiefs who could not keep order in the European sense of the word were compelled to accept "protection." As no native sultan or king or chief could ever keep order in the European sense, Africa gradually fell under European control. Second, they had been the enemies of "progress" in the European sense of the word. Not wanting to develop their countries themselves, they have refused to allow outsiders to do so, and have resisted prospectors and concession- ers LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA hunters and traders until complaints of the outsiders have ended by embroiling them with the outsiders* Government — which was generally just waiting for the chance. The history of Kruger and Stein is no different from that of a thousand petty native rulers. Menelik impressed his neighbors with his good faith, and never gave them a loophole to encroach upon his kingdom. He did his best to prevent trouble arising for them from Abyssinian territory, and he was always willing to have frontiers exactly delimited. He welcomed civilizing influences, and did not turn a deaf ear to concession-hunters. But he made it the cardinal principle of his dealings with foreigners to have concessions arranged by treaty with governments and not with individuals. Thus he put the Powers on their honor not to aUow Abyssinia to be cheated! In 1900, the northern frontier dispute with Italy was settled by tacitly allowing Italy to occupy a portion of the high plateau, without which Eritrea would have been hardly worth while for Italy to hold. In 1902, a treaty with the British fixed the boundary of the Sudan, gave the British the right to construct a railway through Abyssinian territory to connect Uganda and the Sudan, and pledged Abys- sinia to grant no concessions and undertake no works that would obstruct the flow of tributaries into the Nile. This made feasible Sir William Garstin's pro- ject of utilizing Lake Tsana for irrigation, and se- cured the fertility of the Blue Nile regions. Dr. Rosen went to Adis Abeba in 1904 as special 99 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA envoy of the Kaiser. He was accompanied by an escort of cavalry, especially chosen for their height and clothed resplendently. The showiness of the mission led all the world to suppose that its signifi- cance was political rather than commercial. But Germany did not then try, nor has she since tried, to secure more in Abyssinia than equality of treatment with other nations. The German and Austrian comm^ercial treaties were signed the following year, and have expired since the beginning of the present war. As Abyssinia is surrounded on all sides by the enemies of Germany, the question is bound to come up at the Peace Conference, or very soon after, whether the agreements entered into by Great Bri- tain, France, and Italy compel the Abyssinians to accept for transit and shipment at their ports goods to and from Abyssinia irrespective of ownership and destination. The desire to extend into every sphere of colonial activity the spirit of the Agreement of 1904 led France and Great Britain to negotiate an Abyssinian Convention, to which Italy adhered. The independ- ence and territorial integrity of Abyssinia were guaranteed by the three Powers, and the sovereign rights of the Emperor were to be respected. No con- cessions were to be granted to one Power prejudicial to the interests of the other two. No matter what internal complications might arise in Abyssinia, in- tervention could come only as the result of a common understanding, and limited to the protection of the legations and the lives and property of foreigners. The neighboring territorial interests of the three con- 100 LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA tracting Powers, and the possible effect upon them of Abyssinian internal disorders, were set forth and mutually recognized. The railway line from Dji- bouti to Adis Abeba should be owned by a French company, but equal privileges over the line and at the port should be given to the subjects of the other two Powers. The railways that might be built west of Adis Abeba were to be constructed by Great Britain, and that connecting the two Italian colonies from north to south by Italy. Great Britain was to be allowed a railway through Abyssinia from her Somali- land to the Sudan. Any of the contracting Powers could veto any agreement made by one of the others with Abyssinia, should the Power judge the' agree- ment prejudicial to her interests. This agreement, like many others that have been made between European states concerning African and Asiatic interests, has absolutely no international or national sanction. Turkey, Persia, Morocco, Egypt, China, Siam have had the same experience as Abyssinia. Their present and their future have been tentatively disposed of with no consideration what- ever either for their wishes or their interests. Nor have the agreements, as a general rule, been sub- mitted for discussion and approval to the Parlia- ments of the nations which have made them. What is worst of all, nations that are not a party to the agreements, and that have not been consulted in their making, may find in some future emergency that a situation of fact, with no legal or moral sanc- tion, has been established that is wholly contrary to their interests. So far as I know, the Anglo-Franco- loi THE NEW MAP OP AFRICA Italian Agreement of 1905 has not injured the inter- ests of any individual or nation in Abyssinia, or the interests of Abyssinia herself. But it might easily have done so. Perhaps it secretly has done so. It certainly will do so after this war, unless the prin- ciple of international sanction for agreements of this character be established. ^'In October, 1907, Menelik issued a decree con- stituting a cabinet on the European model, and appointed ministers for the various departments. The following month he enjoined free compulsory education for all boys up to twelve. The State was to provide schools and teachers. Cabinet councils were begun, but the education decree could not be very widely and effectively enforced. Ever since that time there has been, in spite of internal troubles, steady, even if slight, progress. ^ Just at the time of his ambitious projects, Menelik had a stroke, and he gradually became paralyzed. Frequent to the point of becoming a joke were the newspaper reports, generally from Italy, during the period 1907 to 191 3, announcing the death of Mene- ' The will of Lady Meux, who bequeathed her collection of Ethiopian MSS. to Emperor Menelik and his successors, made a great stir in 191 1. Scholars were indignant that the precious parchments should go to a place where they would be inaccessible and in danger of destruction (although they had been preserved there for over a thousand years). But there is something splendid in the Puritanism of the noblewoman who considered herself the holder of stolen goods and under obligation to make restitution. The MSS. were part of the plunder of the British Expedition of 1868. What would happen to the British Museum and the Louvre and other "collections," if the public conscience became as sensitive about enjoying the results of thievery as did Lady Meux's! 102 LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA lik. Each time they were contradicted, and when he finally passed away in December, 191 3, many newspapers refused to publish once more the familiar biography. Menelik's long illness was a great misfortune to Abyssinia, and it is still too soon to estimate the injury done by the anarchy of the regency to the Kingdom surrounded by land-hungry neighbors. In 1909, Lidj Yeassu, Menelik's grandson, who was thirteen, and the husband of the seven-year-old Princess Romaine, granddaughter of the old Emperor Johannes, was chosen as the successor. He, by his own blood and that of his wife, would reconcile the rival factions of the Imperial family. Not- withstanding the heralded harmony, civil war broke out, and dragged on, with varying fortunes, for several years. Italy feared the breaking away from authority of the tribes on her Eritrean frontier, especially after the Tripolitan War began, and there was some ap- prehension of raiding in the Sudan. The anarchy caused no particular difference in the Somaliland situation, because Great Britain already had her hands full there, and the responsibility for the Mullah could in no way be chargeable to Abyssinian unrest. The troubles in Abyssinia seem to have been con- fined to the rival court factions : for the country as a whole remained quiet throughout the years of Mene- lik's illness. However, there was apprehension in Adis Abeba just before the outbreak of the European War over the sudden and inexplicable strengthening of Italian forces in Eritrea. Was Italy going to 103 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA ' "hold up" the young King for another slice— the third it would be since the battle of Adowa — of the northern plateau? What effect the war is going to have on the fortunes of Abyssinia is unknown. Certainly there is no ground for attacking the territorial or political in- tegrity of the country. For Abyssinia has not lent herself to German intrigues, and given cause for the Allies to punish her. What propaganda against the British and Italians can be traced to Abyssinia, has its origin in purely Moslem centers. The bulk of the Abyssinians, still Christian in spite of the great wave of Islam that has been sweeping over their country, have not believed in the possibility of a Turkish reconquest of Egypt and the Sudan. My dear friend, the late Col. C. H. M. Doughty-Wylie, V. C, British Consul at Adis Abeba, wrote me at the end of the first winter of the war that conditions in Abyssinia gave him absolutely no cause for present or future alarm, and that he was "consumed with impatience" so far away from the war. Two months later he fell in the first landing at the Dardanelles. At the end of September, 191 6, a movement that had long been gathering force and popular support came to a head. While Emperor Lidj, who is just approaching his majority, was at Harar — probably he had fled in fear of assassination — an assembly of the principal Abyssinian chiefs at Adis Abeba voted to dethrone him, and elected Uizorosso Uditu, a daughter of Menelik, Empress of Abyssinia. The patriarch of the Abyssinian Church, Mathias, sol- emnly pronounced Lidj an apostate, and unbound 104 ' LIBERIA AND ABYSSINIA all his chiefs and subjects and his army officers from their oath of allegiance. The charge against Lidj seems to be that he favors the adoption of Islam as the religion of state. If they had been inclined to listen to the Turco- Germans, the Abyssinians could have made much trouble for the Allies. It remains to be seen whether their attitude will receive its proper reward. 105 CHAPTER V BRITISH POLICY IN SOMALILAND SOMALILAND is the most eastern portion of the African continent, comprising the coast lands of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean in the peninsula that ends in Cape Guardafui. It is in- habited by nomad tribes of mixed Negro and Arab blood. The Arab strain is marked in the tribes on the north side in the French and British spheres. The tribes become more African in the Italian sphere. The inhabitants of the Juba region in the colony portion of Italian Somaliland (Benadir) are black. But throughout Somaliland the religion is Moslem, and the tribal characteristics and customs are more akin to those of the Arabian peninsula than to Africa. This whole region was nominally a portion of the Ottoman Empire, and fell to Egypt when the Khe- dives threw off the authority of the Turkish Sultan. The abandonment of the Sudan by Egypt in 1884 left Somaliland without legal political suzerainty. Great Britain had too recently become Egypt's protector, and was too uncertain of her own position and authority in Egypt to lay claim to a vast, in- choate and imperfectly known territory. She was careful only to have to make sure that no "other 106 BRITISH POLICY IN SOMALILAND European Power should instal itseK along the shore of the gulf opposite Aden. So Italy took the Indian Ocean coast line, and France occupied the African side of the strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. Invoking a treaty made with the ruler of Obock in 1862, she extended her sovereignty around the bay to Zeila, the western end of the British sphere. These three Somaliland colonies, with their protectorates, and the ItaHan colony of Eritrea, north of French Somaliland, shut off Abyssinia from the coast. For twenty years their hinterland boundaries were unsettled. But after the Anglo-French accord of 1904, France, Great Britain, and Italy arrived at an understanding con- cerning their common frontiers, their boundaries with Abyssinia, and their economic and political relations with the inland Christian monarchy. The French made a port at Djibouti in 1888, and started to build a railway south to tap Abyssinia. In the minds of French Imperialists Djibouti began to assume a great importance in the last decade of the nineteenth century: for they dreamed of a railway across Africa from west to east, passing from Lake Tchad, through Abeshr and El Fashr, by the Upper Nile Valley and the Sobat River to Adis Abeba, and ending at Djibouti. This dream was rudely shattered by the Fashoda incident. Since then, French Somali- land has become content to be an outlet for Abys- sinia trade, and to develop its own resources. Owing to its fortunate position, its very good harbor, and its railway, the colony has prospered. There are coast fisheries and important salt mines. In the year before the War of 1914, over four hundred steamers 107 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA entered Djibouti, and the import and export trade from Abyssinia reached eight million dollars. So long as France remains friends with Great Britain and Italy, the colony has no political importance. Nor has Italian Somaliland been of international political interest since Abyssinia was made inviolate by Italy's 1905 agreement with France and Great Britain. Italian Somaliland could have played a r61e in African history, only had Italy remained faithful to the Triple Alliance. For then, the Ger- mans would have had a foothold to injure the British in the Sudan and East Africa, and to oppose Franco- British interests in Abyssinia. British Somaliland, however, has had an interesting history since 1900, which has not been without strong influence upon the general colonial policy of Great Britain. In narrating this history, we must remem- ber that British policy in Somaliland had been guided not by the advantages to be gained from developing the Protectorate, but by the geographical posi- tion of British Somaliland, which has given it an im- portance far beyond its present or potential economic value. It is not far from Aden, and its inhabitants are in constant communication with the tribes of the Arabic peninsula, both on the Red Sea and Persian Gulf sides of the desert. Because of the position of Imperial Britain as a Moslem Power, the British have been anxious about their authority in Somali- land, and have made great efforts and sacrifices, and incurred great expense, to maintain it. At the beginning of the twentieth century, there arose in British Somaliland a menace to British 108 BRITISH POLICY IN SOMALILAND authority in the spreading political power of Mullah Mohammed Abdullah, the son of an Ogdan shepherd, who had founded a Mahdi sect near Berbera ten years before. After Kitchener's reentry into the Sudan, it was vital for the pacification of the southern provinces that no source of Moslem fanaticism find its way, through the Islamic pro- paganda in Abyssinia, into the valleys of the Blue and White Nile. So the suppression of the Mullah was decided upon, and an agreement was made between Great Britain and Abyssinia for, a com- mon action, in which the frontier should be con- sidered as non-existent. The Mullah's forces were broken up, but he escaped. In 1902, he once more appeared in British Somaliland with larger strength than ever. A British force, which followed him into the Haud Desert, was badly defeated. Troops had to be sent from Aden and India, and the question arose as to whether a serious expedition should be undertaken to destroy the Mullah, regardless of expense or of loss of life. While the Foreign Office was debating, the Mullah sent a message to General Manning, demanding a recognition of his sphere of influence and removal of restriction on the importation of arms. A hundred National Scouts of the ostracized Boers volunteered for service. Italy allowed the use of her territory for the passage of British troops and patrolled her Somali coast to prevent the importation of arms. During the year 1903, the operations were incon- clusive. The British had three severe setbacks, and the Mullah raided at will. In some mysterious way 109 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA the Mullah seemed to be getting all the arms and ammunition he wanted ; Abyssinian cooperation was strikingly ineffective. In the face of bitter criticism, the Foreign Office decided on a policy of "watchful waiting " throughout 1904. The Indian troops were sent home, and the British and Italian Governments arranged to give the Mullah grazing rights, in return for his pledge to keep the peace. The Mullah agreed to allow freedom of trade in his sphere, except in the case of slaves and arms. In 1905, the British Government laid down the policy that there was no obligation to conquer the Mullah, so long as he remained tolerably peace- keeping. Great Britain would not allow tribes under her protection to be molested, but they, on their side, should do everything in their power to defend them- selves. They could not, however, do this unless they were given arms and ammunition. But would arm- ing these tribes be a violation of the Brussels Con- ference Act, which prohibited allowing arms to go to natives who were not under effective administrative control? The debates on the subject showed clearly the unwillingness of the Cabinet to sanction the expenditure required to organize administratively territories from which there could be no reasonable hope of financial return. The revenue for 1904 had decreased nearly £5000, and the expenditure had in- creased £25,000. The extension of the French railway from Djibouti into Abyssinia had^seriously diminished the trade through Zeila. For several years the Home Government policy no BRITISH POLICY IN SOMALILAND seemed to be justified by the absence of serious incon- venience or disturbance. In 1907, the country was normal enough for two EngUsh ladies, accompanied only by native servants, to spend several months at big game shooting in the interior. But in 1909, the Mullah again became active, and declared that there could be peace between him and the British only if his authority in the hinterland were not threatened. Reinforcements were sent from India, and a detachment of the King's African Rifles from Mombasa. A Military Governor was appointed for Somaliland. But Parliament was opposed to opera- tions in the interior. Without sufficient forces to insure safety, it seemed only inviting trouble to main- tain the advanced posts. They were withdrawn. In March, 1910, notwithstanding raids on friendly tribes and several small victories for the Mullah, the Government decided to withdraw to the coast. In- terior posts were given up. Peace did not follow this withdrawal. It was naturally interpreted as a confession of weakness. The Mullah had more prestige than ever. There was no more truth in the reports of his death than in those of the death of Menelik. A ferment of anti-European feeling drove the natives who had shown themselves notoriously Anglophile to the coast to seek protection. When the report of Sir William Manning was published in London, the Somaliland controversy seized the public mind. Sir William said that the friendly tribes were being armed to repel raids: for, although the Mullah was certainly not organizing his forces to invade the protectorate, there would III THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA undoubtedly be raids against unarmed friendlies. Lord Curzon complained in the House of Lords that the friendly tribes, because of loyalty to Great Britain, were now left to the mercy of their enemies, that the difficulties of Italy's problem were increased, and that British prestige had been greatly injured. The Earl of Crewe and other members of the Upper House contended that the only safe, honorable, and far-seeing policy was to send out immediately a large expeditionary force. Lord Lansdowne gave a re- sume of the reasons of Imperial interest that had prompted the occupation of Somaliland opposite Aden. He showed how Great Britain had necessa- rily been led from the coast to the interior, and as- serted that the appearance of the Mullah imposed obligations upon the British towards those who had submitted to the protectorate. Members of the House of Commons also denounced the evacuation as ill-timed and premature. ' The debates in Parliament and the press revealed that the underlying motive of British colonial policy was to put nothing into a country that could not be got out of it with interest. Colonial policy has a financial basis. Colonies are a national investment. The British tax-payer sanctions no expenditure where future profit is not reasonably in sight. There were only two justifiable reasons for a Somaliland expedi- tion. The first was the probability of an economic development that would bring back the money it was to cost. The second was the defense of the larger general interests of the Empire. Somaliland did not seem likely to pay its way, or to help British 112 BRITISH POLICY IN SOMALILAND trade. The Government was not of the opinion that the Mullah could make trouble in Africa for other British possessions, or hurt British prestige in Arabia and the Persian Gulf. The friendly tribes would be provided with arms. Then they could defend them- selves — just as they would have to do anyway, if there were no British protectorate. The financial argument of 1905 was still potent in 1910, and was reinforced by the report of 191 1, which showed that expenses had amounted to three times the revenue, although the administered area was now limited to the Berbera, Zeila, and Burhar districts along the coast . In 1 9 1 1 the ' ' political department ' * was abolished, and some troops disbanded. After two years of an anomalous regime, the crush- ing defeat of a British camel corps, which was saved from annihilation only through the attackers' shortage of ammunition, showed how intolerable, from the point of view of prestige, was the protectorate that did not protect merely because it was a protectorate that did not pay. In spite of protests and a wide- spread agitation, the Cabinet refused to give up the policy of "watchful waiting." Indian reinforce- ments once more arrived from Aden. But no puni- tive expedition followed. Before many months it was realized that the defeat at Dulmadoba was having serious consequences in Somaliland, and that loss of prestige was jeopardizing British interests. A state of war and anarchy pre- vailed. There was fear that the Mullah, who had again been raiding the friendly tribes of the interior, might attack Berbera. The House of Commons 8 113 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA was asked in February, 1914, for £25,000 "to meet additional expenses entailed upon Somaliland in connection with the activity of the Mullah. The camel corps was twice increased. Mr. Harcourt explained to the House of Commons that Burao, eighty miles inland, and an intermediate post were to be re-occupied. But the Government did not intend to attempt to pacify the interior, or to send a punitive expedition against the Mullah. The Mullah was old, and in an advanced stage of dropsy. He could no longer lead the dervishes, and, having been excommunicated by Mecca, was only a robber. None regarded him longer as a prophet. The wise policy was to go as far as Burao, and await the Mullah's death. But Mullahs, like Villas, are feline in their insolent holding on to life. The Mullah's answer was to send cavalry within firing distance of Berbera. More troops were demanded from Aden in July. A few weeks later there were other fish to fry. London's attention was centered on the German advance towards Paris. The dervishes were still on the offensive in Novem- ber, 1 9 14. Cannon and naval aeroplanes were used to put them to flight. It was their first experience with shell fire. But the encounter must have taken place pretty near the coast. In spite of greater pre-occupations, there was constant anxiety about Somaliland until the revolt of the Sherif of Mecca against the Turks in the sum- mer of 1 91 6 sounded the last stroke of the death- knell that had long been tolling to the German hopes of Mohammedan help against their enemies. 114 CHAPTER VI THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY PORTUGAL, Spain, England, and France had an excellent start — a start of centuries — in Africa. Because her energies were expended exclu- sively upon the New World, Spain never got very far. ^ Portugal still holds two large colonies in Africa as the inheritance of days of glory and enterprise. Great Britain entered Africa by conquest and exploration. From the beginning of her colonization there was the strong motive that Africa was on the way to India and Australasia. To France, Africa was neighboring territory, just across the Mediterranean from her own coast. Russia had vast adjacent territories in Asia, and did not need to be interested in Africa. The three States that formed the Triple Alliance before the present war achieved their unity after the ^ Although the colonies of Spain in Africa represent to-day all that is left of her vast colonial empire, they are not of enough interest to warrant special mention. For the Canary Islands are considered and treated as a part of Spain, just as the Madeira Islands are part of Portugal. There remain the Rio d'Oro, which is the Atlantic end of the Sahara desert; and two bits of mainland, very small, and five islands, of which Fernando Po is the only important one, in the Gulf of Guinea. France has the right of preemption, if Spain wants to sell any of these colonies. The fortunes of Spain in the Rif are treated in the chapter on Morocco. THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA best of Africa had been preempted: and the choice bits outside of European sovereignty or protection were being gathered in by the two Occidental Powers while the three Central Powers were finding them- selves in the new status resulting from the events of the decade 1 860-1 870. Austria-Hungary, her hands always full at home, has not aspired to colonies. United Germany was slow to awake to the political and economic advan- tages of a colonial Empire. But Italy, long before her unity was established, was inspired by the hope of a partial reincarnation of imperial Rome and medieval Venice. One finds the Risorgimento literature permeated with the idea that the new Italy must become mistress of the Mediterranean, with sovereignty over the north coast of Africa, and predominant influence in the territories freed by the gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. ^ Italians had never given up intimate connection with the African and Ottoman Mediterranean coast line. Curiously enough, nearest home, they had been largely supplanted in Dalmatia by the Slavs and in the Ionian Islands by the Greeks. But they still remained in ^gean and Levant ports. Al- though the nineteenth century saw a marked cultural conquest by France of the Near East, Italian has survived as a language of communication with the foreigner in all the Levant ports. Italians settled in great numbers in Egypt, Tunis, and Algeria. Everywhere they competed with Greeks for small commerce and the carrying trade. ' See my New Map of Europe, pp. 123, 125-6, 241. 116 THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY Unfortunately for Italian hopes, France and Great Britain had no idea of allowing the new State to become a menace to their hegemony in the Mediter- ranean. Historic claims and economic considera- tions are worth nothing, unless there is the force of arms to make them good. In the early eighties Eng- land installed herself in Egypt, and France took Tunis. Italy's indignant protests fell on deaf ears. She joined the Triple Alliance, and with Germany, her companion in ill luck, started to see what scraps she could pick up that had fallen from the Anglo- French table. The withdrawal of Egypt and Great Britain from the Sudan gave Italy what seemed to be the only possible opening for the planting of her flag in Africa. A stretch of the Red Sea coast between Suakim and the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb was occupied, because Great Britain did not care enough about this country to oppose the occupation. After the fall of Khartum and the abandonment of the Upper Valley of the Nile, the British had kept a garrison at Suakim as a starting point of future reconquest. The French, on the other hand, could prevent Italy from control- ing the western bank of the passage from the Red Sea into the Gulf of Aden by virtue of "prior claims, " dating back to 1862, but which were not taken ad- vantage of until 1884. The territory, with an unde- fined interior occupied by nomad Arab tribes, was organized in 1890 as the colony of Eritrea. Its chief port, Massowah, is the natural port of northern Abyssinia. Farther to the east, the Italians entered Somali- 117 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA land, and gradually proclaimed and tried to extend their sovereignty over the long stretch of coast land from Cape Guardafui to the mouth of the Juba River, a distance of one thousand miles. Not much of the north side of the Cape, on the Gulf of Aden, could be occupied, because the British were installed at Berbera, and refused to allow the littoral of the gulf opposite Aden "to fall into the hands of another Power. " Most of this territory, which is now called "Somaliland Colony and Protectorates," is still under the actual control of several Sultans, who nominally acknowledge the King of Italy — so long as he does not bother them. The southern end, at first called Benadir, is the colony. The port of Mogadisho is the capital. A glance at the map will show that these two Italian possessions touch Abyssinia on the north and on the south-east, where the colonial adminis- tration is effective. It was the Italian ambition to extend their influence over Abyssinia. In this way, they would have had two possessions of great value, and railways to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean would have carried to and from the outside world the trade of a rich and well-populated country. But they tried to accomplish this by a shabby trick, the disastrous results of which are narrated in the chapter on Abyssinia. The battle of Adowa in 1896 was a crushing blow to Italian colonial aspiration in East Africa. Abys- sinia remained independent, established friendly re- lations with France and Great Britain, and by the wonderful development of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 118 THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY and the creation of the French port of Djibouti, with its railway into Abyssinia, the two Italian possessions have not developed as was expected before Adowa. Two advantageous frontier rectifications since the Treaty of Adis Abeba have given Eritrea a portion of the high Abyssinian plateau, without which the colony would have had no economic excuse for exist- ence. As it is, the revenue is far below expenditures for civil administration. Italy has to make good a substantial deficit, and pay the charges of a consider- able military force besides. Seventy-five miles of railway had been completed when the Tripolitan War broke out, and this was found to be very helpful in keeping the colony quiet. Eritrea, being opposite Arabia, was the nearest point of contact of Italy and Turkey. Her ports in the Red Sea enabled Italy to prevent much communication and gun-running between the Senussi of the Tripolitan hinterland and Arabia. The transit trade of Massowah has become more important of recent years, though not at all what it ought to be, if we compare the volume of trade with that of other African ports whose hinter- land is much less advantageous. Were it not for pearl-fishing, palm nuts, and a little gold-mining near Asmara, Eritrea would cost Italy more than the voters of the colonial budget are probably willing to pay. During the first year of the present war, the Massowah hide exports (some coming from the British Sudan !) were a very precious help to Germany, who got them safely through the Mediterranean under the Italian flag. Owing to the intractability of the native Sultans 119 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA and the successes of the Mullah Mohammed in defying the British in the neighboring colony, the Somaliland Protectorate has never meant much more than trouble and a valuable ground for wireless telegraphy experiments. But the Benadir Colony in the south has been organized and developed on sound lines since 1908, and Italy is beginning to sell on a large scale her cotton goods and other manufactured products to the natives, and get commission and transport profit out of a growing export cattle trade. After the bitter disappointment on the confines of Abyssinia, Italy began to concentrate her energies upon Tripoli, the last Ottoman possession in Africa. A policy of "pacific penetration" was begun, and might eventually have been successful, had it not been for the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the starting point of a new era in the history of the eastern Mediterranean. At the beginning of the twentieth century Abdul Hamid, engrossed in his pan-Islamic policy, looked upon Tripo^ as the joyer of the renaissance of Turk- ish influence in Africa. The religious propaganda of Islam had been making rapid strides in Africa, and the Sultan planned to use his position as Khalif to counteract the political arrangements of the Euro- pean Powers for the final partition of Africa. He did not hope for much aid from Egypt. But in the hinterland of Tripoli, the Senussi sect could be used to resist, under his aegis, the spread of infidel rule in the Sudan and the Sahara. France and Great Britain, after the Fashoda in- cident, had divided the interior of North Africa into 120 THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY spheres of influence, and France had arrived at an understanding with Italy, by which Italian ambitions in Tripoli and French ambitions in Morocco were reciprocally sanctioned. Acting upon his perfect right, for he had not been consulted, the Sultan of Turkey objected to the Anglo-French Sudanic agree- ment, and refused to recognize it. When he lost what he believed would be a valuable and active local support by the death of the Grand Senussi in 1902, he showed the only possible means of effective protest by putting a strong Turkish garrison at Bilma for the protection of the Tripolitan hinterland, and let it be understood that the Turks would proceed immediately to extensive military operations for bringing under effective control Turkish territory up to Lake Chad. As long as France and Great Britain were mutually distrustful and suspicious of each other in North Africa, and as long as Abdul Hamid could make trouble for the French by his strong influence over the Bey of Tunis, there seemed to be some hope of Turkish ambitions being realized. But France and Great Britain compounded aU their colonial rivalries by the Agreement of 1904. The old Bey of Tunis died in 1906, and was succeeded by a ruler who had been brought up under European influence, and was wholly loyal to the French. The Sultan's only hope from that moment lay in superior military force. This he did not have. So the Sudan, and later the whole of Tripoli, was lost to the Ottoman Empire. It was not a bad thing for French ambitions that the Turks tried to get into the hinterland of Tripoli. 121 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA For it enabled France, without violating her Italian agreement, to anticipate Italy, and to define what had always been a vague boundary. In June, 1906, the Turks sent a secret expeditionary force to occupy the desert oases, of which Djanet was the chief. France protested to the Porte, declaring that Djanet was outside of Tripoli, which the French claimed extended no farther than Ghat. The Sultan had to issue an irade^ recognizing that Djanet was in the French sphere, and countermanding the instructions given to the Turkish army in Tripoli to penetrate the Sudan. But after the Young Turk Revolution, many irades of Abdul Hamid were repudiated. When the French Ambassador at Constantinople tried to get a clear understanding about the hinterland 'of Tripoli, he met with a rebuff. So he warned his Government against the dangers to which the French in North Africa might be exposed. The fear was soon realized. In the autumn of 1909, the Turks began to show un- wonted activity in the Sudan. It appeared that the Senussi sect was taking great comfort in Turkish promises. The Young Turks had an easy task in arraying the Arab tribesmen against France. For the only remaining outlet to the slave trade was by way of Borku to Tripoli. I was away from Turkey during that winter, and was living in Paris. It was common knowledge there that the French were meeting with serious opposition in the hinterland of Tripoli, and that their losses were heavy. But little was allowed to be published, for France wanted to keep on friendly terms with Turkey, 122 THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY and preferred to think that the Sudan opposition was due to local causes. Ottoman troops, however, occupied the oasis of Kafura, a Senussi center, and there were reports from Constantinople of the Turk- ish intention to cooperate with the Senussi to estab- lish control over the caravan route across the eastern Sahara from Lake Chad. There was an enormous traffic of arms, the effects of which are still felt, from Tripoli to the desert tribesmen. Italian intervention could not have been looked upon by France with an unfriendly eye: for it drew bellicose tribesmen into the Turkish service in Tripoli, and left France a free hand. Shortly after entering upon her war of aggres- sion, Italy annexed the African province of Turkey. But her politicians had no more idea than her soldiers of the interior of the country, what its boundaries ought to be, or what they were going to be. When Turkey finally agreed to oppose no longer the Italian occupation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, the British in Egypt had occupied Solium, and France was firmly established in the oases of the Tripolitan hinterland. There was no intention of allowing Italy, any more than Turkey, to enter the Sudan! In the second Ottoman Parliament, I heard Nadji Bey, deputy for Tripoli, pleading with the Young Turks to follow the only policy that would save his country. He said: "Do not have any doubt about the fact that Tripoli is to-day economically in the hands of the Italians, and that we are traversing a period of serious transition. Let me confine my illustration to public instruction. The Italians have a dozen 123 THE NEW MAP OP APRICA fine schools, and our Ministry has not known how to establish a single one since the constitution. There are four old schools, but they still lack professors, because there is no money to pay them. The Italian schools provide for the needs of thirty-two thousand inhabitants, whose children receive an education which has nothing in it of Ottoman. More than twenty thousand Jews are to-day won over to Italy. We have a population of a million and a half Mos- lems, deprived of educational facilities. Instead of establishing schools, you are occupied with forming school districts on paper. Comrades, the Turkish language is lost for our subjects in Tripoli. If you were to compare our schools with those of the Italians, you would weep. To-day " Here Nadji Bey was interrupted by a loud clam- our, and his speech remained unfinished. It had no effect. Nothing was done. As we have seen, the Young Turks were devoting their energies and money to stirring up trouble in the Sudan, thus playing into Italy's hands. Por France and Great Britain would now welcome the realization of Italy's ambition. On September 27, 1911, Italy presented to the Sublime Porte an ultimatum, demanding consent in forty-eight hours to an Italian Protectorate over Tripoli. Turkey naturally ignored the ultimatum. Italy declared war, and sent an expedition to occupy Tripoli. The war lasted for a year, and was confined (since Italy feared getting the ill-will of the other Powers) to Tripoli, with the exception of a futile demonstration at the Dardanelles and the occupation of Rhodes and other islands of the Dodecanese. The 124 THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY formation of the Balkan League, in September, 1912, and the inevitable approach of a new war, induced Turkey to consent to the loss of her last African province. By the treaty of Ouchy, October 15, 1 91 2, Turkey was not asked to recognize the Italian conquest, but merely to grant complete autonomy to Tripoli. The Turkish army was to be withdrawn from Tripoli and Bengazi, after which Italy was to withdraw her army from the ^Egean Islands. Commercial and diplomatic relations were to be resumed, and Italy was to take over Tripoli's share of the Ottoman Public Debt. ^ The impotence of Turkey to resist Italy's occupa- tion of Tripoli was due solely to the fact that Italy had control of the sea. It was impossible to send reinforcements and supplies of ammunition and arms. But, in spite of this handicap, Italy did not have brilliant success during the year of continual fight- ing. She was not fighting Turkey, but the natives of Tripoli, backed by powerful support from the Senussi and Arab tribes of the hinterland. Italy signed the Treaty of Ouchy in order to induce Turkey to use her influence to reconcile the Arabs to the Italian occupation. To accomplish this, Italy maintained her occupation of the islands of the Dodecanese, on the ground that Turkish officers were still in Tripoli, organizing and keeping alive what Italy now called the "rebellion" of the natives. ^ The story of the "pacific penetration, " the attempt of the Young Turks to check it, the Italo-Turkish War, and the negotiations which ended in the Treaty of Ouchy (Lausanne) is told in detail in The New Map of Europe, pp. 241-262. 125 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA This was perfectly true. I know many Young Turks who went to Tripoli, and never came home. They are even now by no means all dead. Their attitude was well expressed by one of them who went out to Africa after the Balkan War was ended, in May, 1 91 3. Like many of his friends, he was going to Egypt, and if he could not succeed in getting through there, knew how it could be done by way of Tunis. He said to me, when I went down to Galata to see him off: "I know that Turkey is dying, and that Islam is dying. How can I do better than die with my country and with my religion? And where can I make the sacrifice more worth while than in Tripoli against the Italians?" The Turks have affection for the French, and re- spect for the English. They have great faith in the ability of the Germans, and more or less sympathy with the German way of going about things, and getting things done. They have too much in com- mon with the Russians, in blood and nature, not to be rivals. But the Italians they regard in the same light as the Greeks, untrustworthy morally and weak physically. They may accept as a social and military equal the Englishman, the German, the Frenchman, the Austrian, the Hungarian, the Pole, and the Rus- sian — but never the Italian. It is necessary to make this statement, and to add that the Arabs adopt practically the same view, in order to explain how difficult is Italy's task in Africa. If a man re- spects you, you can conquer or ignore his hate. Italy will never make a success of African coloniza- tion unless she effaces the impression of Adowa, 126 THE COLONIAL VENTURES OF ITALY which her four years in Tripoli have tended only to confirm. While progress in Cyrenaica was too slow in 191 3 to admit of organization of the new colony, for the tribes were uncompromisingly hostile and uncon- quered and the Italians had to stick to the coast, much was done in Tripoli to make a good impression at home and on the outside world. The city itself was transformed in a few months, and it was esti- mated that eleven thousand Italians, outside of the military forces, were already in the new colony. The country was being explored for mines and other possible ways of exploitation, and railways along the coast to the Tunisian frontier and inland to Ghadames were being surveyed. Shortly before the European War broke out, Italy reported that quiescent conditions were prevailing on the other side of the Mediterranean, and the re- vised Treasury statements showed that the acquisi- tion had cost up to 19 14 over two hundred and twenty -five million dollars. The army losses have never been completely compiled. If Tripoli had really been acquired, and if Italy were quit of the problem of conquest with even a huge sum of money and heavy loss of life, perhaps some would think the game worth the candle. The articles that have appeared in European and American reviews and newspapers about the value of Tripoli have aroused a great deal of interest, and resulted in much speculation. Directly opposite views have been set forth, and argued with plausi- bility. Tripoli supported a large population and was 127 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA a source of much wealth to ancient Rome. Why not to-day? Is it in Tripoli, as throughout the territories of the Ottoman Empire, the blight of Islam? Or was wealth and fertility magnified and exaggerated in classical history? Did what seems to us of no account appear to the Romans and Greeks a great deal? But we have refutation of this in our actual knowledge of their wealth: and, if architecture is a criterion, would a little seem much to those who built Baalbek and Palmyra? Or is Tripoli a hopeless proposition because of the truth of the theory of climatic changes? Out of the confusion of opinion one does gain, however, a pretty good idea that Tripoli is to-day the least promising portion, potentially as well as actually, of the north African coast. Again we see strikingly illustrated the handicap that confronts in the twentieth century the Powers who achieved unity and ability for extra-European expansion after the best of Asia, Africa, and the islands had already been occupied. Considering the colonial activity in these later Powers, we must add to the handicap of having to take the leavings the fact that we are too prone to judge the ability and qualifications of these new- comers by comparison with what the "old hands" are able to do after generations of experience. In writing this very chapter the thought has occurred to me that I have been judging Italy by what France or Great Britain could have done under similar cir- cumstances. But let it be remembered that when France first entered upon her African Mediterranean 128 C ^J^ ^ come into the enjoyment of economic and political ^ equality, they feel keenly the withholding of thei social equality that it is not in the nature of the white ^ man to grant. The advocacy of segregation on a wholesale scale is the logical development of local segregation. Custom, sanctioned by law, enforces ( separate transportation facilities, separate schools, ' separate residence quarters, separate hotels, and sepa- rate restaurants. To the educated and refined negroes, travel is hell. How can they help suffering ^ Rhodesia was very hostile to this bill, fearing its passage would result in a wholesale exodus northward of blacks and poor whites. 447 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA from being made pariahs? Others, who through no fault of their own have not white blood in their veins, are driven by their social ostracism to become criminals. When one studies this problem from the psychological point of view, the frequency of the unspeakable crime is not surprising. Adequate pro- tection of the white woman is the nightmare of South Africa fully as much as of the American Southern States. When Lord Gladstone revised the death sentence in a Rhodesian rape case, he found that white men who lived in communities where they were outnumbered or equalled by negroes would never admit the possibility of extenuating circumstances in a crime of this sort. His ignorance or lack of appre- ciation of local conditions led him to commit an unpardonable blunder. There was a howl of in- dignation from one end of South Africa to the other. ) European civilization has brought also to South ( Africa the war between capital and labor, which has ; developed in exactly the same way as in all states where there is universal manhood suffrage. As we have explained in describing the problems of South Africa before the union, the early days of the labor movement on the Rand were not very successful, be- cause there was no unemployment, and because the native labor question, with its social side, complicated the problem. Later, the white men engaged in min- ing grew to the number of nearly fifty thousand, and there were a hundred and fifty thousand European industrial workers scattered throughout the Union. The emigrants to the Transvaal from England were 448 THE SOUTH AFRICAN UNION almost all of them strong trades-union men, and brought their ideas and their propaganda with them, although British imperialism, even in the new country, was anathema to them. They fraternized with the Boers who had drifted from the farms to the cities. In- ternational socialism took no account of racial antago- nism between Briton and Boer. In the last general election the Labor party returned four members to the Union Parliament. There have been strikes in I South Africa, and very serious labor riots. The ( police and military had to be called out in Johannes- i burg in 1913, and there was street fighting- that re- ' suited in considerable loss of life. Seventy per cent, of the rioters were Afrikanders, but all the leaders were English. Most of them, like Bain and Crawford, had been in America, and brought to the' solution of South African labor problems methods they learned in Colorado and West Virginia. From the first days of the Union, General Botha has been the commanding figure in South Africa, and General Smuts has been the loyal coadjutor of General Botha. The Boers formed a majority of the electorate in the Cape, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal. They form a majority- of the electorate in the Union. It is clear, then, that from the moment the Boer War disenfranchisements were terminated in the Cape, and the two former republics were granted self-government, there was no hope of an imperial policy except by the aid of the Boers themselves. Had the Boers all been recalcitrant and unwilling to consider that they had anything to give to or receive from the British Empire, self-govern- 29 449 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA merit would inevitably have led to civil war and the revoking of the constitutions, or complete separation from Great Britain. ^ But General Botha as Premier of the Transvaal, and Mr. Merriman as Premier of the Cape Colony, formed Boer parties that were favorable to a South African Union under the British flag, and to reconciliation with the British element in the colonies. ^ Lord Gladstone offered General Botha the premier- ship of the Union of South Africa until a general election ' could be held. A coalition ministry was proposed, with the inclusion of Dr. Jameson and some of the British party, but General Botha was keen enough to realize that if he took the English into his bosom, he would estrange much of the Boer support he needed to carry out the reconciliation program he had in mind. So he made General Smuts Minister of the Interior, and included General Hertzog, who represented the extreme Boer party of the Orange Free State. Gen- eral Botha stated that his program would be: the unification of the white population, sympathetic treatm.ent of natives and colored persons, the preven- * The Dutch Reformed Church has a membership of nearly seven hundred thousand, more than half the total population of European descent in South Africa and Rhodesia combined. The official census figures of 1904 and 191 1 show that the population of the Orange Free State increased more than five times as fast as the population of Cape Colony and Natal. The Transvaal increased over four times as fast. The Boers have much larger families than the British. Their distribution, also, is stronger. They are not congregated in cities. They have lands and permanent sources of wealth. Unfor- tunately, the alarmingly large class of "poor whites" has a large Anglo-Saxon element in it. THE SOUTH AFRICAN UNION tion of Asiatic immigration, a broad and conciliatory- educational policy, and everything that would tend to a rapid economic development. In the general election on September 15, 1910, ' General Botha's Nationalist party, comprised wholly/ of Boers, carried 67 out of 121 seats. So he had| a majority over the British, the irreconcilable^ Boers, and the labor members combined. We can-/ not go into the political history of the next few years. General Botha was greatly helped in keeping down racial animosity by the splendid attitude of Dr. Jameson, who had the political wisdom- and the patriotism to continue to support unwaveringly General Botha after the coalition ministry project was refused by Botha. Dr. Jameson had to resist the pressure of his political friends, and to stand the criticism of the British section of the press. It is not too much to say that Dr. Jameson's policy was almost as important a factor in making the Union successful as General Botha's. These two men were imbued with the spirit of "live and let live. " They had rare moral courage in the midst of the passion and prejudice and blindness of many of their political associates. In 1913, the split that had long been expected V among the Boers was made definite by the with- drawal of General Hertzog from the Botha Minis- try. A new party was formed, which called itself the National party. General Botha's moderate Boers preferred the title of South African party. Although General Hertzog, who was at one time a' judge in the Free State, has always remained a fanati- 451 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA cal Afrikander and has never abandoned the early Krugerism in his attitude toward the uitlanders, he has unconsciously — perhaps involuntarily — devel- oped by his intimate contact with the English social graces and a breadth of vision. It is impossible to believe that his fanatical opposition to the imperial deal reflects his own sober judgment. The benefit that South Africa receives from British sovereignty, the inevitable triumph of English over Taal, and the impossibility of reviving the old pastoral simplicity of Boer life must certainly be realized by a man of his keen intellectual gifts. What one honestly believes, and the position one assumes in public for sentimental and political reasons, are often radically different. General Hertzog, unlike General Christian De Wet, did not involve himself in the rebellion of 1914. But he was outspoken in his opposition to a South African campaign against the German colonies, to the Enemy Trading Bill, and to proposals to interne German subjects in the Union and put their property under sequestration. In the general election of 191 5, General Botha lost thirteen seats, and continues to hold office only by the support of the British party. The political situa- tion is very much involved at present, owing to the unusual external and internal problems aroused by the war. At present, General Botha is between two fires. Many Boers believe that he is too British, and is sacrificing the interests of South Africa to those of a decadent and disappearing Empire. Most of the British tell him that he has not the backbone to be loyal in the sense they have of that word. Recently, 452 THE SOUTH AFRICAN UNION in desperation, when he was being pressed to disre- gard the Boer opposition to the measure to increase the pay given to South African contingents in the Imperial army, General Botha turned to the British members of his Parliament, and cried, "You ought not to press me! You know I am standing on the brink of a volcano. " If they have any sense, the British in South Africa will not press too hard the man to whom they owe the fact that their flag is still waving throughout the Union. 453 CHAPTER XXIII THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS AFTERMATH / A T a special session of the Union Parliament on ZA September 14, 19 14, a resolution was passed I by ninety-two to twelve declaring that the House was whole-heartedly determined "to take all /measures necessary for defending the interests of the Union and for cooperating with his Majesty's Imperial Government to maintain the security and / integrity of the Empire. " But even the loyal Dutch of the Commonwealth were for the most part opposed I to an expedition into German Southwest Africa. They felt, for they knew their countrymen; that it ' was asking too much of the Boers to call upon them ' to be aggressively British, and to fight, when they ' were not being molested, for the interests of the Empire of which they were an unwilling part. Their fears were immediately justified. General Beyers, Commander-General of the Union /Defense Force, resigned the day after the close of the j special session of Parliament. His letter of resigna- ' tion expressed surprise at Great Britain's newly awakened anxiety to protect small nations. As a Boer, it was impossible for him to believe that the 454 THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA reasons given for British interference to save Belgium were anything else than hypocritical cant. When Beyers was called a traitor by the English section of the press, Boer loyalists, although they considered the tone of Beyers's letter a bit strong, declared that he was a man whose honesty could not be doubted, and that he had acted from the purest motives. It is difficult to judge the working of the mind of a man who believes he is a patriot. For the sake of his country, almost any man lies and dis- simulates, exonerating himself on the ground of patriotism. Beyers probably thought he was doing what was right. But certainly his action would have been less open to suspicion of bad faith had he resigned the post which bound him to British alle- giance before the British troops had been withdrawn for service in Europe, and before he had taken part in the councils that planned the campaign against German Southwest Africa. General Smuts, in accepting the resignation of Beyers, pointed out that the plan of operations decided upon had been recommended by Beyers, and that there was no hint given by Beyers, when the campaign was discussed, of his opposition to a campaign against the Germans or of his intention to resign. General Smuts denounced General Beyers also for having communicated the letter of resignation to the press before it was given to the Government, and for his insinuation that the loan of £7,000,000 granted to South Africa by the Imperial Parliament was a bribe to induce the Commonwealth to take part in the war. The campaign against the Germans, which is 455 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA described in another place, had already begun when Lieutenant-Colonel Maritz, who commanded the force in the northwest of Cape Colony, rebelled. On October 8th, Maritz refused to acknowledge an order relieving him of his command, and imprisoned the men who brought the order. Their commander, Major Bouwer, who was sent back with an ultimatum from Maritz, reported that the traitor had German guns and a German force at his command, and was sending as prisoners into German Southwest Africa all the Union officers and men who refused to de- nounce their allegiance to Great Britain. Martial law was immediately proclaimed throughout the Commonwealth. There is no doubt that the great majority of the Boers of the Orange Free State, and possibly a good half of those in the Transvaal and the Afrikander districts of Cape Colony, were potential rebels. British authority in the Commonwealth depended upon the loyalty of the more important of the Afri- kander leaders, and particularly upon General Botha and General Smuts. It is not too much to say that if these two men had adopted the same attitude as General Hertzog, South Africa would have thrown off British allegiance, or at least would have made impossible the expedition against German South- west Africa. Maritz's action, on the other hand, would have had no serious results were it not for the defection of General Beyers and General Christian De Wet. For his commando was routed and fled into German territory in less than three weeks. But at that 456 THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA moment rebellion broke out in the Orange Free State and in Western Transvaal, De Wet command- ing in the former and Beyers in the latter. On October 21st, General Christian De Wet made a speech at Verde, a town in the north of the Free State, in which he declared that though he had "signed the Vereeniging Treaty and sworn to be faithful to the British flag, the Boers had been so downtrodden by the miserable and pestilential English that they could endure it no longer. His Majesty King Edward VII. had promised to protect them and had failed to do so. " When De Wet and Beyers took the field, they were joined by three members of the Union Parliament, and by Mr. Wessel Wessels, a member of the Defense Cou)icil of the Union. Preachers of great influence in the Dutch Church went through the country calling upon the people to take arms against the British. Among the Dutch clergy a statement was circulated in which Maritz was warmly defended. In this statement one finds a sentence which furnishes food for thought to those in England to-day who are cursing the memory of Sir Roger Casement and failing to lay any blame whatever upon Sir Edward Carson for what has happened recently in Ireland "Next year (19 15) it will be twenty years since Jameson made his raid on the Transvaal to steal our coiintry, to kill our Government, to destroy our existence as a people, and in addition our nationality forever, and in aU that time we have never had the good fortune to meet a single Englishman or English- woman who condemned the raid, not to speak of 457 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA detestation and of making Jameson out to be what Maritz is now being made out to be. " The manifesto of the rebelHon was signed by Beyers, De Wet, Maritz, Wessels, Pienaar, and Fourie. It has not been pu^bHshed in the press, and is worth quoting, to indicate what the rebels had in mind "When we iSubscribed to the Treaty of 'Vereeniging and laid down our arms, we were a crushed and beaten people, driven to the verge of starvation and despair by the dishonorable tactics of a vigorous and power- ful enemy — our resources exhausted and our homes destroyed — but we accepted the inevitable, and were content to forego our nationhood and oyr liberties for the sake of the future of our people. We were prepared to keep our allegiance to Great Britain, as long as we could do so v/ith honor to ourselves and without ingratitude to our friends. Now, however, we are called upon to choose between this doubtful claim upon our loyalty to a relentless conqueror, and our gratitude to a friendly nation, which extended its sympathy and help in the time of danger. We are being betrayed into this act of base ingratitude either by the folly or treachery of our own Govern- ment. Was it not enough to ask us to forget the terrible scenes we witnessed a few years ago, either as men on the field of battle, fighting for our hard- won freedom, or as youths flying with our despairing women-folk from our burning homesteads, or in the concentration camps seeing them dying in thousands around us, but must we now be compelled to take up arms against a nation that gave us a helping hand in our troubles, and plunge our people into the horrors of an extremely doubtful European War? For our part we are prepared to shed the last drop of blood 458 THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA ] rather than be guilty of such cowardly baseness, and we call on all those who love honor and friendship and gratitude to assist us in resisting it. We have no wish to shed the blood of the people of South Africa, English or Dutch — far from it — but we must em- phatically declare that the members of the present Government have betrayed their trust, and no longer represent the real feelings of the people of South Africa. We most emphatically declare it to have been a gross libel on the honor of his countrymen for General Botha to lead the Imperial Government to believe that the Afrikander people were willing to enter into active and unprovoked hostilities against the German nation, with which they had no possible quarrel, and to which, indeed, they are closely united by ties of blood, friendship, and of gratitude. It was clearly his duty to inform the Imperial Government that, while it could rely upon their passive loyalty and obedience, it was too much to expect that they would willingly and openly invade German territory. The consequence, therefore, of the present civil strife must rest, morally, at any rate, on his shoulders and those of his Government. For ourselves, we shall not lay down our arms until the Government is removed from office, and all idea of invading German territory is frankly abandoned. We are fully aware of the gravity of our position, but no other course consistent with honor was open to us, and we leave our motives to be finally judged by the honorable instinct of all men. Expediency may demand that we be regarded and treated as rebels, but justice and truth will always proclaim our conduct as inspired by the truest patriotism. We do not desire to set up a Republic or any other form of Government, against the wishes of the majority of our fellow- citizens. All we ask is that the people as a whole be allowed to say whether or not they wish to declare war against Germany, or any other nation. We wish 459 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA to govern ourselves in our own way without fraud or coercion from anyone, and we call upon the people to assist us in attaining that ideal. " The rebellion was crushed by the energy and decision of General Botha and General Smuts, who put unhesitatingly all the weight of their influence with the moderate section of the Afrikanders and of their military skill and organizing ability into the task. General Smuts recalled part of the little army that had been sent to occupy the coast towns of German Southwest Africa, and succeeded in raising in three weeks thirty thousand armed volu,nteers, most of them Boers. General Hertzog and ex- President Steyn, whose allegiance was doubtful, realized immediately that the rebellion would not succeed, and did everything in their power to open up negotiations between the Government and the rebels. But General Smuts, master of the situation when he saw that the rebels could not muster more than ten thousand armed men and had to depend upon a junction with the Germans for ammunition, cannon, and reinforcements, declared that he could not treat with rebels. They must be run to the ground and forced to surrender unconditionally. So prompt was the action of the loyalist forces that the rebels were never able to form a junction of their own commandos, much less to get in touch with the Germans. Only a few hundred men with General Kemp were able to reach German territory. Within seven weeks all the Boers in arms, except those who got away with Kemp, were killed, captured, or sur- 460 THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA. rendered voluntarily. General Beyers was drowned in trying to cross the Vaal River on December 9th. At the end of December the last rebels were dispersed. About seven thousand in all had surrendered or were captured. On the day the rebellion was announced, a promi- nent Transvaal Boer said: ''Without organization, arms, ammunition, or supplies; without a known grievance or cause, or definite aim; without a com- mon plan or an acknowledged leader; they move, like the ants, the locusts, and the springbok, as if an unknown law of nature compelled it. Who can understand the Boers? They are my people, but they beat me!"^ On the whole, the observation of this British sympathizer (probably an official) was just. In one particular, however, he was wrong. There was a "known grievance." There was a "cause. " There was a "definite aim" — not definite from the military point of view, but certainly definite politically. I have taken the pains to read through a great deal of polemical literature on this subject. There is still much confusion, much contradiction of fact, and too little perspective to get a comprehen- sive idea of what happened in South Africa only two years ago. But certain facts do stand forth uncon- tradicted. And, in looking at the rebellion of 19 14 from the point of view of what preceded it and what ^ I am indebted to an anonymous writer in the Round Table (London) for March and September, 191 5, and June, 19 16, for valu- able articles on the background and consequences of the rebellion. They are admirably and sanely written, as are all the articles of this indispensable review. 461 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA has followed it, there is possibihty of forming a judgment that may not need radical revision. I' It has not been proved either that the rebellion / was inspired by German agents, or that it was an j organized attempt to regain independence. If it had been the former, the trials of the ringleaders would certainly have brou^ght out the fact. If it had been the latter, much more enthusiasm for the cause could have been aroused in South Africa by a plain statement when the first commandos took the field. It was not well enough and wisely enough organized a movement to be considered separatist in character. More than this, it is exceedingly doubtful that men like De Wet and Kemp and Beyers — or any other important Boer, in fact — were interested, or would risk anything, for a movement to regain independ- ence. Influential Boers did not want a restoration of the old order. They knew that any movement for independence would be prejudicial to their own in- terests as well as to those of the Boer nation. Had the movement been organized by German agents or by plotters against the British Crown, it certainly would have been postponed until a more favorable momient. The prevalent view in South Africa is that the leaders drew blindly ignorant followers after them in the hope that their movement would lead to the downfall of the Botha-Smuts regime, and the coming to power of a real Afrikander Cabinet. They counted on Botha and Smuts not getting enough Boer support to oppose them. After they had actually taken arms, they would have been willing to stop the movement 462 THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA without a single shot being fired if Botha and Smuts had signified their intention to resign, and go before the country in a general election. To a certain extent, this interpretation is true. But English writers have not been willing to come out squarely with a statement of the issue the Hert- zog-Steyn party wanted referred to the country. The rebels were the extremists and hotheads of the opposition to Botha and Smuts. The issue was this : no aggressive campaign should be undertaken against German Southwest Africa, especially by an army drafted into service, without consulting the. country. The proposal of the Imperial Government that South Africa undertake the conquest of the neighboring German colony with Commonwealth forces, accepted by General Botha, was the one and sole cause of the rebellion. General Botha knew that the Boers did not want to fight. He decided to draft an army. A portion of the Boers resisted. They called it "an armed protest" and not "a rebellion." As we have seen elsewhere, ever since the forma- tion of the Commonwealth, the unadulterated Afri- kanders, while accepting the British "yoke," stood squarely against the Imperialists in maintaining that their ideal was a South African Commonwealth, united with the British Empire only as a matter of convenience. They were willing to Hve in harmony with their fellow-citizens of British origin in the development of a Commonwealth, and to give al- legiance to the British Crown, so long as the British did not attempt to use South Africa for serving general British interests. The Imperialists, on the 463 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA other hand, maintained that South Africa was now an integral part of the British Empire, and that all should be loyal to the "mother country." But England was not the mother country of the Boers ! The outbreak of the European War brought the test. Was South Africa also at war with Germany? Did allegiance mean the necessity of the Boers taking up arms to attack a nation against whom they had no grievance and with whom they were united by traditional ties of blood and sympathy? Only if the Germans invaded South Africa, and not before that time, ought they to be called upon to fight. What interest had they in the quarrel between England and Germany? What advantage would come to them from shedding their blood to conquer the Ger- man colony ? The fate of German Southwest Africa did not interest them, and anyway it would be de- cided upon the battlefields of Europe, and not by anything they might do or by any sacrifice they might make. This was the opinion of a great major- ity of the Boers. Had it not been the opinion of a great majority, the Government would not have been afraid to put the issue before the country in a general election. Immediately after the rebellion was put down, the question arose as to the punishment to be meted out to the rebels. On November ii, 1914, General Botha stated that all who surrendered voluntarily before November 21st would not be criminally pro- secuted at the instance of the Government, except those who had taken a leading part in the rebellion or who had committed acts in violation of the rules 464 THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA of civilized warfare. On December loth, the Prime Minister declared: "Let us remember that this has been a quarrel in our own South African household, that all of us will have to continue to live together in that household in the future, and while we do our duty in seeing that never again shall there be a recurrence of this criminal folly, let us be on our guard against all vengeful policies and language, and cultivate a spirit of tolerance, forbearance, and merciful oblivion of the errors and misdeeds of those misguided people, many of whom took up arms without any criminal intention. While just and fair punishment should be meted out, let us also re- member that now, more than ever, it is for the people of South Africa to practice the wise policy of forgive and forget." On December 20th, he reiterated his plea to the British element to try to understand how the Boers must feel. "For the loyalist Boers," he said, "it has been an unhappy, indeed a tragic ordeal, to have to hunt down and fire upon men — some of them their relatives, many of them their friends — who were once their comrades in arms. The Dutch loyalists regard the whole rebellion as a lamentable business, upon which the curtain should be ri;ng down with as little declamation, as little controversy, as little recrimination as possible. The loyal com- mandos have had a hard task to perform. They have performed it. The cause of law and order has been, and will be, vindicated. Let that be enough. This is no time for exultation. Let us spare one 30 465 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA another's feelings! Remember, we have to live together in this land long after the war is ended!" It would have been well if General Botha's wise words had been heeded. But racial animosity was strong — stronger than it had ever been since the days of the Boer War. South Africans of British extraction, unable to put themselves in the other man's place, clamored for drastic punishment. They declared that the loyalist Boers had done only their duty, and that the rebels must be tried and executed. They insinuated that the loyalist Boers had, during the course of the campaign, carried their feeling for the rebels so far, that they tried to do as little killing as possible, with the result that the lives of many British loyalists, fighting for the flag, were needlessly sacrificed. The rebels who had been Government officials or who held positions in the National Defense forces were tried by court martial and dealt with according to the law. One of the signers of the proclamation, Fourie, was executed on December 21st. The punishment of the others was left to Parliament, which met on February 26, 19 15. For the leaders it was decided that, after being tried for high treason before a competent court, and found guilty, imprison- ment with or without hard labor for life, or for a term of years, or a fine not exceeding £5000 might be imposed. The rank and file of those who had not taken advantage of the amnesty offer of November 2 1st were dealt with by a general clause imposing certain civil disqualifications for a period of ten years. 466 THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA But they were not disenfranchised. General Botha was extemely anxious not to lay himself open to the charge made so tellingly against Dr. Jameson in Cape Colony after the Boer War, that he used the punish- ment of disenfranchisement to reduce the electoral power of his opponents. The curtain would have been rung down very quietly on the rebellion, and its aftermath, from an internal point of view, might not have increased the racial antagonism already existing, had it not been for the outcry raised in Parliament and in the loyalist press throughout the Union against these very wise measures. General Botha found himself denounced by the English loyalists for having been afraid to fulfil his duty in punishing the rebels; while his Boer opponents continued to declare that he had sold himself to the English by acknowledging that there had been a rebellion at all! From the standpoint of immediate Imperial policy, the cooperation of South Africa in the conquest of German Southwest Africa and German East Africa was a great success. Had the rebellion not occurred, the expedition to Southwest Africa, composed as it originally was almost wholly of soldiers of British extraction (for General Botha at the very beginning of the rebellion found himself compelled to withdraw the obligation to serve, knowing that it could not be enforced), would have been a long-drawn-out affair, if not a failure. As it was, the loyalist Boer com- mandos, who put down the rebellion, furnished a splendid army for Southwest Africa, and have been since a factor in the conquest of East Africa. Accord- 467 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA ing to the Round Table, nearly seventy thousand men were under arms against the rebels and in the Southwest African campaign. Twent^^-four thou- sand are in British East Africa in the autumn of 191 6. Seven thousand five hundred joined Kitchener's army at their own expense, and eleven thousand are serving in France and Egypt and Macedonia with the overseas contingents. The proportion of Boers in the British army to-day is naturally not nearly as great as that of volunteers of British extraction. But it means a lot to the British Empire that young Boers are serving voluntarily in her army. j From the ulterior standpoint, one may have at this time misgivings about the wisdom of using South African troops for the conquest of the German colonies. Conquered as they have been by South African blood. Great Britain is not free to use them as pawns for bargaining in the Peace Conference. This may cause considerable embarrassment at the end of the war. Sufficient to the day, however, is the evil thereof. In South Africa, since the rebellion, there have been disquieting events to prove that anti-British feeling is still strong. In the general election of October 20, 191 5, General Botha's strong majority dwindled to half. The radical Boers, who call themselves the Nationalist Party, won twenty-seven seats. General Botha has a majority now only with Unionist (British loyaHst) support. When the Enemy Trading Bill came before Parliament, Gen- eral Hertzog stated bluntly that his part German ancestry did not permit him to view Germany as an 468 THE REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA Englishman would. The Nationalists, and some of General Botha's followers as well, fought this bill tooth and nail. They fought equally a bill to raise the pay of volunteers fighting overseas to the amount given by Canada and Australia, although this had been insisted upon by the entire English-speaking section of the electorate at the polls, and was sup- ported by the labor members. General Botha's own party was so much in sympathy with the Nationalists on the question of refusing to burden the South African taxpayer more than was absolutely essential to pay the men who were fighting Britain's battle, that General Botha could not press the matter. He declared to the Unionists, when they tried to get his support for the measure, ''You have no right to press us. I assure you, we are standing on the brink of a volcano, and you know it. " When Lord Kitchener's tragic end was reported, there was much satisfaction in the Transvaal. In the Orange Free State, some towns held public celebrations. Racial strife and antipathy will not cease in South Africa as long as one element in the population de- sires to have the relation of the Commonwealth to Great Britain that of a colony to the mother country. This will never be. But it is possible for Boer and Briton to live in harmony side by side and to fuse eventually into one race — a race markedly Anglo- Saxon — if Great Britain is content to have her flag wave there as a symbol rather than as a reality. 469 CHAPTER XXIV THE CONQUEST OF THE GERMAN COLONIES rr-i \ •' I ^HE successive declarations of war during the first few days of August, 1914, left the four German colonies in Africa, and the Germans in other parts of Africa, in a hopeless situation. The mastery of the sea was assured to the enemies of Germany when Great Britain decided to join them. There was no help, then, from the outside. Togo- land and Kamerun were completely surrounded by colonies of the Allies. In Southwest Africa Germany had Portugal on the north, and in East Africa on the south. On the other frontiers were the enemy. From the very beginning, Portugal, the ally and de- pendent of Great Britain, was a constant threat to these two colonies. There were many thousands of German subjects living outside of German territory in other African colonies. They had refuge only for a year in Italian colonies. There was nowhere else in Africa where they were unmolested, except in Abyssinia and Liberia, and the wee colonies of Spain. But even in Spanish Morocco and internationalized Tangier the Germans were not safe. In the new French Protectorate of Morocco, at the very beginning of the war, conspiracies of German 470 CONQUEST OF THE GERMAN COLONIES consuls and merchants were discovered. Those who could get away fled into the Riff and to Spain. The rest were interned. Some, against whom complicity in plots could be proved, were tried before French courts-martial and shot. In Tripoli, German con- sular officials and others whom the Italian authorities claimed were military officers in disguise were found to be in relations with Arab "rebels." Some were imprisoned, and others expelled. There was no v immunity for Germans in French and British and Bel- / gian colonies. In some parts they were treated with ^ leniency at first. But the news of German successes i and German excesses in Europe, coupled with the desire to put out of the way commercial rivals, led ' to imprisonment in concentration camps and forcible / liquidation and sequestration of business interests j everywhere. There were very many old established German residents in the South African Commonwealth, and some in Rhodesia. Among them were men who had contributed in a most important way to the develop- ment of South Africa, In fact, the older German firms had been the invaluable coadjutors of Cecil Rhodes in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The Boers were very friendly to the Ger- mans, and even after the rebellion and the South- west Africa campaign public sentiment would not allow bona fide German residents of the Common- wealth to be molested. The sinking of the Lusitania, however, led to disgraceful riots in Johannesburg and elsewhere. Germans were maltreated, and their homes and business places looted and destroyed. 471 THE NEW MAP OP AFRICA The British element in the Commonwealth agitated in Parliament, after the passage of an Enemy Trading Bill, for the internment of all Germans and the se- questration of their properties. Only the return of a Parliament in the general election of 191 6 in which General Botha's moderate Boers were caught without a majority between British and Boer fanatics has saved the Germans from experiencing a fate similar to that of those in British Crown Colonies. I The Germans of Egypt were not more immune, owing to the peculiar status of the country, than were / the Germans of Morocco. They were interned in con- centration camps. Their extensive business interests / were put into the hands of receivers appointed by the British authorities, and forcibly liquidated. From the very first day of the war, Germany had no hopes for Togoland, whose geographical position put the colony at the mercy of France and Britain. There were less than two hundred Germans in the colony, who had military training, and they could muster only a thousand natives. The British sent a force from the Gold Coast to occupy Lome on August 6, 1914. At the same moment, a French army invaded Togoland from Dahomey. The Germans offered to capitulate, if given honors of war. Un- conditional surrender was demanded. The Germans retired into the interior to Kamina, where the most powerful wireless station in Africa, which could com- municate with Berlin, had just been completed. On August 22 d, the Germans attacked the combined French and British forces between Atakpame and the coast. Beaten back, they destroyed the wireless 472 CONQUEST OF THE GERMAN COLONIES station, and surrendered on August 28th. The con- quest of Togoland was completed in the first month of the war. In the other three colonies, the Germans expected ^ to be able, not only to resist successfully, but to make things hot for their enemies throughout Africa. In ' Southwest Africa they relied upon a Boer rebellion. In Kamerun, they expected to arouse the adjacent / French Sudan and Northern Nigeria against France and Great Britain. In East Africa, they expected ^ aid from Arabia, Egypt, and the Sudan. But the disloyalty of the Boers in South Africa, as we have seen in the last chapter, did not materialize into a serious danger for the Commonwealth. And the ) Germans were all wrong in their calculation of the effect the alliance with Turkey and the proclamation / of the Holy War would have upon Islam in North and Central Africa. Not for a moment was French , or British authority seriously menaced in any African colony. One might put the statement a , little more strongly. Far from being embarrassed by holding Moslem colonies and protectorates in Africa, France and Great Britain have found in these pos- sessions a source of strength and great aid in prosecut- ing the war. African Moslems have constituted a ^ very precious element in the French armies in Europe. Giving tit for tat and a little more, Great Britain ' has turned the tables on the Turks and Germans who counted her possession of Egypt a military weakness, and has used Egypt to wean away the Shereef of ' Mecca from his allegiance to Turkey. What fighting France and Italy have had to do in 473 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA Morocco and Tripoli was in no sense a repercussion of the European War, but the continuation of mili- tary operations of the ante-bellum period. In all I Africa, only the Sultan of Darfur responded to the ^ Khalif 's call to the Holy War. He waited nearly two 1 years, and when he was getting ready to make trouble r in the Sudan, he was quickly suppressed by a small ' expeditionary corps from Kliartum. ^ The only other fighting in Africa, outside of that involved in the conquest of the German colonies, was on the western and eastern frontiers of Egypt. On the west, the Senussi, who had been carrying on 4, very successful campaigns against the Italians in the Tripolitaine, attacked the British at the end of 191 5. They occupied Solium, and advanced at several points towards the Nile valley from the Libyan Desert. But they were very soon driven out of Egyptian territory, and suffered heavily. In the east, the Turks advanced across the Isthmus of Suez, 1 and attacked the Canal in March, 191 5. The at- ' tempt was unsuccessful. In 191 6, the British kept a I large army on the Canal, which they had fortified I very carefully.^ At the time of this writing, the ^ See above, pp. 19 (note) and 341. * I had the privilege of visiting the British army on the Suez Canal in January and February, 1916. In the latter month, the system of defenses had been worked out sufficiently for the visitor to get a good idea of the plan and a firm conviction that the Germano-Turks would never attack successfully the Canal. The General Staff detailed an officer to show me the first lines to the east of the Canal, and allowed me to see the maps they had made of the Isthmus. Whatever fault there had been in 191 5, it is sure that a year later the British were in a position not to be caught napping again. 474 CONQUEST OF THE GERMAN COLONIES British forces have cleared the Turks out of the Isthmus, and are waiting only for the progress of the Arab rebellion against Turkey to cooperate with the Shereef of Mecca in the occupation of Palestine. German Southwest Africa was quite unprepared to repel an invasion. The Germans had no army in the colony. Since the Herero War, peace had reigned and the Germans had devoted themselves to eco- nomic development. In spite of absurd stories that have been written to the contrary, the armed forces of the colony were only large enough to do police duty, and their supply of arms and ammunition did not enable them to offer serious resistance to the overwhelming forces General Botha was able to bring against them. The situation had possibilities for the Germans, only if the Boer rebellion had been successful, or if all the Boers had refused to bear arms against them. : 'The Southwest African campaign demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt either that Germany was not expecting a war with Great Britain, or that, in case of war, there was no intention to stir up the Boers. This statement may be con- tested. But it is difficult to see how a General Staff such as the German one has proved itself to be would not have been organizing and preparing thoroughly for years in Southwest Africa, if Southwest Africa had been in the plan of future military operations. The operations of General Botha are uninteresting : for when an army of fifty thousand, well equipped for every possible need, goes after an army of five thousand in a country where supplies are lacking and munitions once used cannot be renewed, what is there 475 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA to write about? The Commonwealth forces were not very well handled, for they allowed the Germans to escape time after time. When the capital, Wind- huk, was occupied on May 1 2th, after the Common- wealth forces had been four months in the field, the Germans retired to the north. When they were followed to Grootfontein, and there was nothing to retire to except bush, and no food to be found along the only line of retreat, the Germans, to the number of thirty-five hundred, surrendered on July 9, 1915. The Germans, against overwhelming odds, main- tained their force practically complete. One does not know whether to credit German skill or to dis- credit the skill of General Sir Duncan Mackenzie, who seemed totally unable to get any good out of all the advantages he possessed. . In Kamerun and East Africa, while the odds in the way of supplies were equally great against the Ger- / mans, they were not overwhelmed by a huge army as in Southwest Africa. So they were able to get the / best out of skill and resourcefulness, courage and endurance. The bitterest enemy of the Germans must acknowledge that their defense in Kamerun I and East Africa stamps the officers who conducted the troops in these two colonies as the very best sort of sportsmen. In Kamerun the Germans held out for a year and a half, and then succeeded in avoiding capture. In East Africa, after more than two years ' of being cut off from the outside world, they are still in the field, with a navy and four armies against them. As there were not many German troops in Kam- 476 CONQUEST OF THE GERMAN COLONIES . erun, and the British in Nigeria beHeved they would be received by the Kamerun natives as Hberators, they counted on a six weeks' campaign to destroy or capture the German forces in Kamerun. On August 25, 1 9 14, a Nigerian force crossed the frontier. In the following week two other British columns in- vaded Kamerun. The Germans brought up their mobile native troops with lightning rapidity, and drove back into Nigerian territory the invaders. On the coast, owing to the protection of warships, French and British troops were able to effect landings at the ports. At the mouth of the Kamerun River, Duala, the capital, was occupied, and forty thousand tons of German shipping captured. The war continued throughout the whole year of 191 5, all three of the belligerents employing black troops. When the Allies were able to bring up their heavy guns against a fortified post, the Germans had no chance whatever. But they held out each time until the Allies had ex- pended an enormous amount of invaluable ammuni- tion, and destroyed the buildings and supplies that could not be moved. Never once were their ene- mies able to surround them. Their three thousand black soldiers, led by two hundred and fifty white officers, completely baffled the efforts of Major-Gen- eral Dobell's eight thousand British, French, and Belgian soldiers. When their ammunition gave out, they had so manoeuvered their retreat as to be able to cross to safety into Rio Muni, the little Spanish enclave in Kamerun. Admirable as the Kamerun campaign was, from the German point of view, it was rivalled by that in 477 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA East Africa. The Wangoni rebellion, in 1906, had taught the Germans in East Africa what the British and French had long known, the value of recruiting and training native soldiers. The mistake of the Herero rebellion in Southwest Africa was not re- peated. White troops were recalled, and some natives from German New Guinea introduced to in- corporate with East African levies. During the eight years between 1906 and 1 9 14, the Germans in East Africa paid great attention to native troops, and built up a splendid army. When war was declared in 1 914, they did not wait to be invaded. They crossed into the Belgian Congo, attacked posts in Rhodesia, and threatened the British East African frontier. On the lakes, there was naval warfare. Until the Home Governments of their enemies were able to give serious attention to the problem of the conquest of East Africa, the Germans were fairly evenly matched with their neighbors. For there were not many troops in British East Africa and Uganda, and practically none in Rhodesia and Nyasaland, save what were absolutely essential for police purposes. There were twenty thousand black troops in the Belgian Congo. But the Belgian authorities felt they had their hands full in looking after their own territories, and were content to re- main on the defensive. At the beginning of 1915, three companies of British Indian infantry, who were holding the post of Jasin in German territory, were surrounded by Ger- man black troops, who forced them to surrender, after an attempt at relief had failed. It was, on a 478 CONQUEST OF THE GERMAN COLONIES very small scale of course, a prelude to Kut-el-Amara. The Indians were sacrificed to the rashness of their British officers, who were betrayed by overconfidence and disdain of the enemy into an unjustified forward movement that ended in humiliation. At the end of 1 91 5, the Germans were in possession of the whole of the East Africa colony, coast line and boundaries as well as interior. It was decided to call upon the South Africans to conquer the colony, and General Smith Dorrien was appointed to command the invasion. Early in 19 16, the British General re- signed his command "for reasons of health" — the polite and invariable formula — and was succeeded by General Botha. Germany's declaration of war upon Portugal brought another enemy into the field. , The reports from East Africa during the spring and summer of 191 6 were very vague. But each official bulletin brought the news of a new success for the ' combined South African, Rhodesian, Portuguese, Belgian, Indian, and British armies. On September , 4th, Dar-es-Salaam was captured, and on the i8th, ' the two last footholds of the Germans on the coast ^^ fell into the hands of the British. The whole line of railway across the colony was occupied before the end of September. It is probable that when this book goes to press, the conquest of the last German colony in Africa will have been completed. As there is no neutral territory to which they can retire, the Germans will be compelled to surrender. The story of the Great War in Africa has demon- strated two things, one of which was not expected by 479 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA the Germans, and the other of which was not expected by their enemies. J The collapse of their hopes of Islamic uprisings, or rather a coordinated Islamic movement in North / and Central Africa, is a severe blow to Germany and her allies. By the same token, it is a remarkable testimony to the hold France and Great Britain have over the natives under their flags. I The ability of German officers in Kamerun and East Africa to command the loyalty of their native * troops and the cooperation of the inhabitants of these two colonies is a big surprise to France and ' Great Britain, and disproves the thesis that the na- tives of the portions of Africa over which Germany '' ruled were eager to welcome British and French / liberators. In conclusion, by the test of this cataclysm, which has brought half of Europe against the other half, one can affirm the stability of European institutions in Africa, and the lack of desire or power of the in- habitants of any part of Africa to change the political status under which they have been brought during the last two decades. 480 CHAPTER XXV AFRICAN PROBLEMS FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE IF one maintains that the attitude of tHe Powers towards the problems that come before the Peace Conference depends upon the military position of the two groups of belligerents at the time the armistice is signed, he can see no use in discuss- ing peace problems. For there will be no peace problems. The victors will refuse to consider problems. They will impose conditions on the time- honored basis of '' Vce victisl" It will be a peace in which superior force is the decisive factor, not only the combined superior force of one group of belligerents over the other, but the comparative superior force of the states in the victorious group. If peace is made on this basis, the war will have been fought in vain. Europe will remain an armed camp. The victors I will need standing armies to maintain their terms. ' The vanquished will hope to reverse the decision of force by building up bigger armies than they ever ' had before and by diplomatic intrigue. France did | this after 1815 and 1870, Russia after 1854 and ( 31 481 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA \1878, and Austria-Hungary after 1859 and 1866. Great Britain all the while was guided by the sole j consideration of throwing in her sword to prevent , any continental Power from becoming strong enough , to menace her world supremacy. But in this war, from the very beginning, France and Great Britain have made the issue a moral one. They appeal to the whole world for sympathy and for support on the ground that they took up the sword for the sake of humanity. Premier Viviani, in the Chamber of Deputies, and Prime Minister Asquith, in the House of Commons, solemnly declared in the name of France and Great Britain that these two Powers were not fighting for territorial aggran- dizement, but for the principles of international law and the freedom of small nations. Germany, on the other hand, was convicted before the court of world opinion of being the aggressor and actually starting the war, and of attacking Belgium wholly without provocation, although she had assumed the international obligation to maintain Belgian neutral- ity. Russia's recent record was worse than that of Germany, and her cruelties in the initial cam- paigns fully as shocking. Neutral public opinion throughout the whole world, however, sustained unhesitatingly the cause of the Entente Allies. There was deep sympathy with the wrongs inflicted upon little Belgium and little Serbia. There was disgust of German methods of beginning and con- ducting the war. But most of all, neutral public opinion rallied to the Entente Allies because of belief in the sincerity of the appeals made for its 482 UNSETTLED AFRICAN PROBLEMS sympathy on the ground of fighting the battle of humanity. The small neutrals in Europe are at the mercy of the combatants. Whatever they may think, the expression of their thoughts is muzzled by geo- graphical and economic conditions. Even if they were free to translate thought into action, the force they could muster would not count for much on sea or on land. The South American states are de- pendent upon foreign capital, foreign products, foreign markets, and foreign steamship lines. They must acquiesce in the general international decisions of the United States and Europe. The three large South American coimtries, Brazil, Chile, and Argen- tina, have combined only about ten per cent, of the population of European origin that the United States possesses. In wealth and resources as well as , in population, the important neutral is the United States. By institutions and by blood, it is natural that the overwhelming majority of Ameri- cans should sympathize with France and Great Britain. But one cannot insist too strongly upon the point that the people of the United States do not hate — ■ do not even dislike — the people of Germany. What they do hate is the picture of Germany that has been held up before them during the war — a nation, gone mad by lust for power and blood and destruction, blindly upholding a ruler and statesmen who have upset the peace of the world, trampled upon small nations, and violated the principles of humanity in order to dominate the world. In sharp relief to 483 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA this picture is that of the Entente Allies, nobly struggUng to save the world from Prussian militar- ism, sacrificing themselves to defend humanity, and pledged to a peace that will establish the world upon a new basis of justice and freedom for all mankind. As long as the pictures remain as they are, the Entente Allies are assured of American sympathy. If they are the victors, and go to the Peace Confer- ence to fulfil the pledges of their statesmen, with the intention of establishing peace on a durable basis, they will have American cooperation and American support. As this cooperation and sup- port will be a precious asset, it is the duty of Ameri- can writers, who have loyally supported from the very beginning the cause of the Allies, to present and to discuss problems of the future Peace Confer- ence in a spirit of frankness. In international relations, the African settlement is going to be as important and as significant for the future as have been the African developments. The history of Africa in the last generation, and especially in the decade immediately preceding the war, shows the vital part of European rivalry in Africa in forming the alliances and in stirring up the friction that made a European War inevitable. Unless the African settlement is made upon a basis of broad statesmanship, the peace treaty will con- tain embers of a fire unquenched, ready to break out again when fresh fuel is thrown upon it. The great question is this: Will Germany be ex- cluded from Africa, or will she be readmitted to 484 UNSETTLED AFRICAN PROBLEMS cooperate in the development of the continent on a basis that will give satisfaction to the abilities and necessities and aspirations of the German people? The partisan, in the heat of the conflict, opens his eyes in amazement and indignation at this question. He denounces you as a pro-German. If you con- vince him that you are sincere in your friendship, he asks how you can be so naive as to expect the AUies to return to Germany what they have taken from her. "We have Germany at our mercy. She is beaten. She and aU her partners must pay the price of their crime against civilization.' Do you not believe in punishment?" This reasoning is precisely that of Germany in 1870. Germany declared to the world that she was not fighting the French, but was mercifully ridding them of their War Lord, who was trying to lead France along the path followed by the first Napoleon. But the lust of pillage and conquest caught the Germans with the first victories. The resistance of France maddened them. They told the neutral world they could not afford to be kept in continual jeopardy by the militarist ambitions of France. They must annex territory (which had once been German) to protect themselves against French aggression. The memory was still aHve of the invasion of Germany by the first Napoleon, and they burned to wipe out the humiliation of Jena and Napoleon's entry to Berlin. They had to bring France to her knees and punish her. The punish- ment was a boomerang. Instead of securing the tranquillity of the next generation, the Treaty of 485 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA Frankfort has brought disaster upon the children of those who imposed it upon France. Aside from the argument of punishment, the only- justification of France and Great Britain for re- taining the German colonies would be: economic ne- cessity of keeping the colonies; or the claim that Germany had forfeited her right to them, through barbarous treatment of the natives or incapacity to administer and develop the colonies. A survey of the distribution of African territory, and the history of the last decade of European colonization in Africa, are sufficient to make invalid both these grounds.^ Even were there reasonable doubt here, is not the heavy loss of men and money during the present war going to retard the administrative and economic development of the colonies France and Great Britain already possess? Is it wise to assume new obligations? If the Entente Allies have in mind the destruction of Prussian militarism, this can be best accomplished by giving Germany a large part in the development of Africa. The student of German politics during ^ The reports of British consuls in the German colonies, and of governors and other officials of adjacent British colonies, from 1906 to 1 9 13, are high in their praise of German efficiency and Ger- man courtesy, and of the fact that British trade and traders received fair treatment. Commerce was far easier and more profitable for British in German than in French and Portuguese colonies. Several officers of the British army, speaking since the present war began, have assured me that in boundary commissions and other common tasks, they got along better with the German officers than with those of any other nation in Africa. "They are really more our sort, you know," was the candid confession. 486 UNSETTLED AFRICAN PROBLEMS the past fifteen years is convinced that sufficient popular support for army and navy credits was gained by the German Weltpolitik advocates only because they were able to convince the electorate of the necessity of colonies, both for excess popula- tion and for markets, and that the rivals of Germany were doing all in their power to grab what was left of the world and to prevent Germany from getting her "place in the sun." The population and re- sources of Germany increased marvelously since the accession of the present Kaiser. The advocacy of a policy of estabHshing overseas dominions, where great markets for exports could be developed, raw materials grown, emigrants saved to Deutschtum, and German KuUur and language spread, was re- sisted for many years by the German electorate. But in recent years imperialism, fostered by these i arguments, has become no less attractive to the i Germans than to the French and British. ^ National instinct is the same the world over. ^ Englishmen think exactly as Germans do. In a visit to New Zealand in 19 16, Sir Rider Haggard declared: "We are anxious to see that the men who leave Great Britain . . . remain somewhere within the shadow of the British flag, and do not settle in the United States or Argentine or some other foreign country . . . the Empire cannot afford to lose these people. . . . No expense is too great and no thought too high to give to the problem of how to retain within the Empire our own citizens." Commenting on this state- ment the Auckland Star said: "The material progress and strength necessary for safety depend upon man-power, and the Empire must see that that power is conserved by every possible means. Emigration to places beyond the Empire must be vigorously dis- couraged. . . . The point to be emphasized now is that men and women desirous of a change must be kept within the Empire." The Round Table for September, 19 16, remarks that Sir Rider 487 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA The Germans bubbled over. Perhaps they ought not to have done so. But could they have helped it ? Where did they have a good chance to expend the newly-created excess of national energy and national pride and national creative longing ? When a bottle is overflowing, and you try to keep in the cork, the bottle breaks, and the hand that pressed down the cork gets hit by flying pieces of glass. A repetition of the act is folly. Here is the kernel of the European problem. After an unsuccessful war, if their eyes are opened to the unwelcome truth that they have been deluded by their leaders into fighting a policy of encircle- ment that had no truth in it, the German people will themselves make short work of the Kaiserism, JunkerivSm, and Prussian militarism we abhor. But I ' if their colonies are taken from them, and they are shut off from trading with Africa and Asia and Aus- tralasia, they will find in the peace terms of their } enemies ample justification for having fought the war, ( and will give their Kaiser and his statesmen and ( generals credit for having done their best to avert the j conspiracy whose existence will have been proved . in their eyes by the fact of its success. Instead of being chastened and repentant, they will be defiant. Instead of mourning the useless sacrifice of fathers , and sons, of husbands and brothers, the dead will be I martyrs of a sacred cause, whose memory will keep alive the determination to devote energies and brains, Haggard's appeal is curiously like those made by Froude in 1870 in his articles on England and her colonies in volume ii. of SJiort Studies on Great Subjects. 488 UNSETTLED AFRICAN PROBLEMS and to consecrate the new generation, to the build- \ ing up of a new war machine. The enemies of ^ Germany could not prevent this. You can knock ^ a man down. But if you want to keep him down, you must sit on him, and keep sitting on him. He who imposes his will upon another by force generally becomes the victim of his victory. There is another extremely important considera- tion that should convince statesmen of the wisdom of welcoming Germany to a more important part than she has yet had in the development of European civilization in Africa. There are ninety million / Germans in Central Europe. If they are barred | from overseas development, they will own Poland in \ spite of the efforts of the Poles and Russians, and ' they will be masters of the Balkan Peninsula and | Asia Minor. Many Germans have been opposed ' to the colonies, and are glad now that their country has been put out of Africa, for the very reason that all the energies and resources of Germany might be redirected to the Drang nach Osten. The only way ( to prevent Germany from remaining, even after a -, crushing defeat, the greatest military and political ; factor in Europe is to give her an outlet — an ample > outlet — in Africa. The policy of trying at every ' turn to forestall the hesitating development of German colonial enterprise was highly successful in Africa and elsewhere. It gave to Great Britain and France larger colonial empires and commercial and political advantages, of which the Occidental Powers have made excellent use. It obstructed German "intrigues" in Asiatic Turkey and Persia. 489 THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA It prevented Germany from establishing coaling- stations and naval ports. But it is exacting now a fearful toll of French and British lives. Were the gains worth the price that is being paid? One doubts seriously whether they were gains — or even diplomatic advantages. A river, deflected from one j channel, finds another. If it does not, it bursts over I the dam, and gets back into the old channel. It does not stop running. The natural economic laws at iwork in the world cannot be set aside by diplomatic combinations. You cannot get rid of a fact by re- fusing to see it. From the physical as well as the intellectual standpoint the Germans are the most powerful ethnic group in Europe. They are un- rivaled in their energy, their discipline, and their commercial and scientific ability. In number, they equal, if they do not surpass, the Russians. Their geographical position is the strongest of the European races. Damn them if you will; but there they are. The United States is vitally interested in a wise and politic settlement of the European War. We have potent reasons, aside from resentment over the Belgian invasion, the nefarious activity of sub- marines, and the intrigues on American soil, to wish for the destruction of Prussian militarism and the return of the German people to the rest of the world's way of looking at things. We have no faith in Russia. Her attitude toward Poland and toward the Jews is as abominable as it was before the war. The only explanation of the failure of liberal public opinion in France and Great Britain to come out generously and impressively in favor of Poles and 490 UNSETTLED AFRICAN PROBLEMS Jews is that political blackmail — unofficial, perhaps, but none the less powerful — has kept London and Paris newspapers silent. The alliance of Russia and Japan fills us with the gravest misgivings about the future of China. The time is not far distant when duty and interest may impose upon us inter- vention in the Far East. An unbridgeable chasm | between the Occidental Powers and Germany will lead to an alliance of Germany with Russia and Japan i to dominate Asia. This is not prophecy. On your I " chessboard, you can point out moves and combina-/; tions of moves from study of and experience in otherl games. You cannot, of course, foresee what movei' the player will make. But you can tell him what \ will happen if he makes the move. The siu-est means of establishing the security of Europe against Prussian militarism is to take away from the reactionary elements in Germany the arguments by which they have won and hold the support of the German electorate. A regenerated, democratic Germany, cooperating with the rest of Europe and with America in the work of developing and civilizing the world, will be born out of this war, if internationalism, instead of nationalism, and the higher interests of humanity, instead of the particu- lar interests of the strongest, are the ruling factors of the Peace Conference. The happiness of our children, in a world where peace and harmony reign, depends much upon the new map of Africa. 491 INDEX Abbas Hilmi, Khedive of Egypt, 399-400 ; character and oppor- tunities, 421, 423; deposed, 424 Abdul Aziz, Sultan of Morocco, 362 et seq., 378 et seq.; agrees to abdicate, 383 Abyssinia, 96-105; Italy and, 97, 99; Emperor Menelik, 97, 99, 102, 103; Dr. Rosen Kaiser's envoy to, 99-100; German and Austrian com- mercial treaties, 100; French and British convention, loo-ioi; death of Emperor Menelik, 103; civil war in, 103; future of, 104 Adowa, battle of, 1896, 4; defeat at crushing blow to Italian colonial aspirations in East Africa, 118 Africa, European development of, possible only with increase of transportation facilities and production, 31; islands of, 31-42; Boer war marks a step forward in making it a white man's country, 50-51; colo- nial adventures of Italy in, 1 1 5-1 29; Spanish colonies in, 115 n.; Germany's entrance into, 173-174; stability of European institutions in, 480 African problems for the Peace Conference, 481-491 ; will Ger- many be excluded from Africa at end of European War?, 484-486 ; considerations in favor of giving Germany a part in development of Africa, 486-490; American interest in a wise settlement, 490-491 Afrikander Congress at Wor- cester, December, 1900, 44 Agadir incident, 388 Albert, King of Belgium, visits Congo, 162 Albert Nyanza, Lake, unavail- able for irrigating the Sudan, 20 Algeciras, European rivalry in Morocco before, 355-373; Conference of 1906, 373, 374, et seq. Algeria and Tunis, the nucleus of the French African Empire, 130-146; French enter Algeria in 1830, 132; French occu- pation of Tunis sanctioned, 133; Tunis and Morocco the keys to France's house in Africa, 134 and n.; Tunis invaded, 134; Algeria con- quered during reign of Louis Philippe, 135; French govern- ment of, 135 et seq.; Algeria did not prosper till inhabi- tants were given voice in government, 137-138; Alge- rian trade with France and commercial development, 138- 139; education in Algeria, 139-140; extension of Algerian territory, 141; Tunis invaded and French Protectorate es- tablished, 141; early economic progress of Tunis, 142; politi- cal advantages to French of holding Tunis, 143-144; crux of French problem in northern Africa, 144-146 Ali, Sultan, of Darfur, 19 and n. Anglo-French agreement of 1899, 18; of 1904, 18, 368, 369 493 INDEX Angola, or Portuguese West Africa, 257-263 Ashanti, revolt of, 282-283 Atbara, railway to, 11 Atbara River, bridge over, 11 Basutoland, 83 Belgians in the Congo, 147-172; see also Congo Bernard, Colonel, Financial Secretary at Khartum, 9-10 Beyers, General, 70; a leader in rebellion in South African Union, 454 et seq.; drowned, 461 Bismarck, telegram to German Consul at Cape Town, 174 Boers, result of the Boer War a benefit to, 50-51; oppose introduction of Chinese labor in South Africa, 61-62; agi- tate for responsible govern- ment, 67-68; demand that Orange Free State be given responsible government at same time as Transvaal, 69; determined that franchise shall not be granted to natives and coolies, 72; con- flict over use of Taal in South African schools, 74-76 ; opposed to attacking German South- west Africa, 454; potential rebels, 456; form most ^of army of General Smuts which crushes rebellion in South African Union, 460; attitude of, towards Great Britain and in European War, 463-464; in conquest of German South- west and East Africa and in overseas contingents, 467- 468; see also Boer War, Trans- vaal, South Africa, and Orange Free State. Boer War, last years of, 43-49; British disappointment at pro- longation of, 43; Afrikander Congress denounces British conduct of, 44; French public opinion hostile to Great Brit- ain, 44; Kaiser Wilhelm's refusal to receive President Kruger checkmates Boer hopes of aid from Europe, 44; martial law proclaimed in Cape Colony, 44; _ Lord Kitchener's proclamation of August 7, 1 90 1, 45; concentra- tion camps, 46-47 and n.; "National Scouts" in, 47-48; defeat of Lord Methuen the last Boer victory, 48; Boer independence out of the ques- tion, 48; Vereeniging Confer- ence, May 15, 1902, 48-49;' terms of peace, 49-50; British loss in, 50; result of war a benefit to Boers and the whole world, 50-51 Botha, General, 66, 70; influence in South African Union, 449 et seq.; aids in crushing re- bellion in South African Union, 460 British in East Africa and Uganda, 206-227 British East Africa, boundaries, 206 ; frontiers established, 211; administration, 212; pacifica- tion and economic develop- ment, 212-214; native dis- turbances, 214-215; mission- ary work, 215-216; white colonization, 217 ef seq.; con- flict between settlers and chartered company, 218 et seq.; opposition to Jews and Asiat- ics, 219-221; to limited lease- hold of land grants, 221-223; to favoritism toward natives, 223-225; to government with- out representation, 225-226; settlers in the European War, 227 British West Africa, 276-298; four colonies in, 276-277; see Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast Colony, and Nigeria. Bu Hamara, revolt of, in Morocco, 366-369; death of, 384 n. 494 INDEX Cairo, convention signed Janu- ary 9, 1899, at, 5-6 Canary Islands, 32 Cape Colony, see South Africa and South African Union Cape to Cairo Railway, 196 Cape Verde Islands, 252-253 Casement, Roger, report on the Congo, 1 51-152 Central Africa, see Nyasaland and Rhodesia Central Africa, French in, 335- 354 . . Chad, Lake, environing colonies, 335 Chad Military Region, 338, 340 Chamberlain, Joseph, decides to visit South Africa, 53; his problems and action there, 53 et seq.; result of his visit, 57; proposed Transvaal war "contribution," 64-66; pro- mise and warning to Boers, 67 Chinese labor in South Africa, 61-63 Churchill, Winston, on Uganda, 207-208 Concentration camps, in Boer War, 46; mortality in, 46 and n. Congo, the, Belgians in, 147- 172; Congo Free State es- tablished, 147; area and boundaries, 147-148; history for first ten years of twentieth century a sad and revolting page of history, 149; question of Belgium's fitness for stewardship of, 150 et seq.; report of Mr. Casement on, 151-152; Lord Cromer on, 152-153; indignation in Bel- gium at Casement and Cromer reports, 154; Com- mission of Inquiry appointed, 155; its report, 155-156; King Leopold cedes Congo Free State to Belgium, 157; atti- tude of Great Britain and Germany towards the trans- fer, 158-159; Belgian promises not believed in England, 160; death of King Leopold raises hopes of awakening of Belgian conscience, 162; visit of King Albert to Congo, 162; condi- tions improving, 163; native right to land ownership, 163- 164; railway construction, 165-167; products of, 168- 169; administration and finance, 169-171; future of, in connection with adjust- ments at end of European War, 171-172 Congo Free State, see Congo Congo, French, 338 Congo River, 147 et seq. Congress, Afrikander, 44 Conquest of German African colonies, 470-480 Cromer, Lord, 2; on necessity to Egypt of reclamation of the Sudan, 4; financial policy for the Sudan, 6-7; points out need of railway from Nile to Red Sea, 1 1 ; on slave trade in the Sudan, 12; on Belgian misgovernment of Congo, 152- I53_; in Egypt, 397-398 et seq.; native judgment of his ad- ministration, 408-409 Cyrenaica, Turkey withdraws opposition to Italian occupa- tion, 123; Italian progress in, in 1913, 127 Dahomey, 312, 313, 317-320 De Brazza, M., investigation of conditions in French Congo territories, 343-345 Delagoa Bay, failure of British effort to claim, 265 Delarey, General, defeats Lord Merthuen in Boer War, 48 Dernberg, Dr., on conditions in German East Africa, 240 De Wet, urges continuance of Boer War, 49; leader in re- bellion in South African Union, 457 et seq. Djibouti, 107 495 INDEX Dulmadoba, British defeat at, 113 East Africa, see British East Africa, German East Africa, Portuguese East Africa Education in Algeria, 139-140 Educational facilities in the Sudan, 16-18 Egypt, necessity to, of reclama- tion of the Sudan, 4; conven- tion with Great Britain, January 19, 1899, 5-6; loans to the Sudan, 8-9; under the last of the Khedives, 391- 420; necessity to Great Brit- ain of control of Suez Canal, 393; British enter, 394; inter- national status of, 395; real control in British hands, 396; economic progress, 398; "Young Moslem," move- ment, 401; Islamic agitation, 402; Nationalist propaganda, 402 et seq., 410-413; change in Anglo-French relations, 404- 405; Turkish boundary dis- pute, 406; native judgment of Lord Cromer's administration, 408-409; Sir Eldon Gorst succeeds Lord Cromer as Consul-General, 409; Copts secede from Nationalists, 412; Colonel Roosevelt's speech, 413-414; action of the Copts, 414-417; death of Sir Eldon Gorst, 418; Lord Kitchener succeeds him, 418; strength- ens Britain's hold in Egypt, 419-420; character and oppor- tunities of Khedive Abbas Hilmi, 421-423; Khedive de- posed, 424 ; entrance of Turkey into European War creates new situation in Egypt, 425; troops sent to, 426; made a British Protectorate, 428; Turkish attack upon, 430; military protection strength- ened, 431-432; value of, to Great Britain, 432-433; des- tiny of, 433; dissatisfaction 496 with British rule in, 434-439; internal government the real problem in, 440 Elgin, Lord, orders suspension of Chinese labor importation in South Africa, 69 El Obeid, railway extended to, 9, 12 Eritrea, 119 European War, outlook in Sudan at opening of, 24-25; Morocco a principal cause of, 37^-377 y African problems for the Peace Conference, 481- 491; issues in, and neutral attitude towards combatants, 482, et seq.; American interest in a wise settlement of, 490- 491 Fashoda, Marchand expedition to, 18 _ Fashoda incident, 336 Fez occupied by French, 385 France, and Sudan boundary disputes, 18-19; African islands of, 33 ; efforts to secure Morocco, 358 et seq.; gets Morocco, 374-390; occupa- tion of Morocco begins, 380- 381; negotiations with Spain and Germany over Morocco, 385 et seq.; Morocco placed under protection of, 389 French African Empire, see Algeria and Tunis French Equatorial Africa, 338 French in Central Africa, 335- 354; distribution of territories in Central Africa, 335; con- quests and territorial adjust- ments, 336-337; Chad MiH- tary Region, 338, 340; Gabun, 338-339; Middle Congo Col- ony, 338, 339; Ubangi-Shari- Chad Colony, 338, 339; mal- administration of Congo terri- tories, 342 et seq.; abuses of Ccnccssionnaire system, 343, et 'seq.;_ de Brazza investi- gating commission and its report, 343-345 ; effect of reve- INDEX French in Central Africa — Con^d. lations of de Brazza report, 350; effect of Central Africa on moral sense of the white man, 351-352; qualities neces- sary for administrative officers, 352; reasons for respective personnel of French army and colonial service, 353-354 French in West Africa and the Sahara, 312-334; Gabun, 312, 313; Dahomey, 312, 313, 3i7-32o;Guinea, 312, 313, SH! Ivory Coast, 312, 313, 314- 316, 319; Senegal, 312, 313, 322; Senegambia, 313, 324; the "open door" principle and German effort to gain commerce of French colonies, 319-321; cotton culture, 322; economic difficulties and terri- torial adjustments, 323; Sene- gal-Niger Colony, 324-325; British and German colonies disturb the continuity of French territory and influence, 325-327; colonizing difficul- ties, 327-328; economic progress, 328-329; West Africa a training school for army officers and a reser- voir of troops, 329-330; fron- tiers delimited, 330; pacifica- tion of the Sahara, 331-332; economic and labor problems, 332-334 Gabun, 312, 313, 338-339 Gambia, 276-277 Garstin, Sir William, and irriga- tion in the Sudan, 20-21 German African colonies, con- quest of, 470-480 German East Africa, 228-243; most important of German colonies, 228-229; boundaries, 229-230; German East Africa Company and de- velopment of its territories, 230-231; German colonial expansion in Central Africa prevented, 232; claim that Germany acquired African colonies by trickery un- founded, 232-233 ; German pioneers in East Africa discouraged at home, 234 et seq.; railway development, 234-237; administrative or- ganization of the colony started, 237; rigid bureau- cracy a handicap, 238; Ger- man idea of treatment of Mohammedanism, 238-240; Dr. Dernberg on conditions in, 240; increase in trade, 241; German pubUc opinion cham- pions cause of natives, 241- 242; abolition of serfdom demanded, 242; resistance of colony to British invasion, 243; conquest of, 476-479 German East Africa Company, 231 German Southwest Africa, 173- 188; boundaries, 173; entrance of Germany into Africa, 173- 174; German method of colonization, 174-175; Ger- man development hampered by British possession of Wal- fisch Bay, 176; agriculture difficult, 176; Land Bank established, 177; metals in, 178; diamond fields, 178-180; German administrative and colonization plans, 180-182; native uprisings, 183-185; transformation effected by war, 1 86 ; increase of colonists, 186; crisis of 19 10, 187; con- quered by the South African Commonwealth army in 19 15, 188, 475-476 German West Africa, 299-311; see Togoland, Kamerun Germans in Africa, hopeless situation of, at opening of European War, 470; treat- ment of, in British, French, and other colonies, 470 et seg^. Germany, and the Congo ques- tion, 158 et seq.; Rhodes believes harmony with, essen- 32 497 INDEX Germany — Continued. tial to Great Britain's peace and to accomplishment of plans in Africa, 246-248; unpublished treaty with Great Britain in 1898, regarding Africa, 247; and Great Brit- ain drift apart, 248; declares war on Portugal, 275; working against France in Morocco, 356 ei seg^.; intervention in Morocco, 372 ; negotiations with France as to Morocco, 385 et seq. Gladstone, Lord Herbert, first Governor of South African Union, 443 et seq. Gold Coast Colony (British), 276; Ashanti revolt, 282-283; Northern Territories added to, 283; valuable market for British trade, 284; mining wealth, 284-285; Togoland conquered, 285 Gordon College, 14-15 Gorst, Sir Eldon, report for 1909, 23-24; Consul-General of Egypt, 409; death of, 418 Great Britain, in the Sudan, i- 30; drops the Sudan, i; vision of reconquest of the Sudan, 2 ; problems of colonial administrators, 2-3 ; im- possibility of direct protec- torate over Sudan, 4-5; con- vention with Egypt regarding Sudan, January 19, 1899, 5-6; guarantees interest on loan for Sudan, 9; and Sudan boundaries, 18-19; African islands of, 32-33; dictates terms of peace at end of Boer War, 49; loss in Boer War, 50; policy in Somaliland, 106- 114; and the Congo question, 151 et seq.; Portugal in vassal- age to, 244-245; Rhodes sees peace and prosperity for, and accomplishment of African plans, only in harmony with Germany, 246-247; unpub- lished treaty with Germany in 1898 regarding Africa, 247; and Germany drift apart, 248 ; agreement with France in 1904, 248; agreement with Russia in 1907,248; alarm in, over possibility of Germany getting coaling stations and naval bases in Portuguese colonies, 249-250; willing to fight to maintain her world supremacy, 251; working against France in Morocco, 356 et seq.; enters Egypt, 394; holds real control of Egypt, 396; economic progress of Egypt under, 398; deposes Khedive of Egypt, 424; makes Egypt a British Protectorate, 428; South African Union most remarkable achievement of British statesmanship, 444; see also under names of British African colonies. Grey, Sir Edward, and affairs of the Congo, 158, 160 Guinea, 253-254 Guinea (French), 312, 313, 314 Hafid, Sultan of Morocco, nego- tiations with France, 383 et seq. ; signs treaty with France, 389 Hertzog, General, head of ex- treme Boer party in South Africa, 450 et seq. Het Volk, Boer political party, 70-71 Het Volk, Pretoria newspaper, 70 n. Hobbhouse, Miss, on concen- tration camps, 46 Hohenlohe, Prince, on treatment of Mohammedanism, 238-239 Hussein Kamel, becomes Sultan of Egypt, 428; on destiny of Egypt, 433 Ignorance of uncivilized peoples, 13 n. Indian colonist rights and In- dian immigration in South Africa, 63-64 498 INDEX Irrigation in the Sudan, 20-21 Islands of Africa, 31-42 Italy and Abyssinia, 97, 99 Italy, colonial adventures of, in Africa, 1 15-129; Risorgimento literature of, 116; Italians settle in northern Africa, 116; occupy strip of Red Sea coast and enter Somaliland, 117- 118; battle of Adowa, 1896, 118; concentrates attention in Tripoli, 120; annexes African province of Turkey, 123; war with Turkey, 124; treaty of Ouchy, 125; progress in Cyre- naica in 1913, 127; value of Tripoli, 127-128; repercus- sion of European War proves that Italy had not conquered Tripoli, 129 Ivory Coast Colony (French), 312, 313, 314-316, 319 Jameson, Dr., leader of Im- perialist or Progressive Oppo- sition in South Africa, 53; effect of his policy on success of South African Union, 451 Kaiser Wilhelm, see Wilhelm II. Kamerun (German colony) , boundaries of, 299-300 ; acquired by Germany, 304; extension of colony, 305-306; products, 306; maladminis- tration, 307-308; railway and telegraphic communication, 310; education in, 311; con- quest of, 476-477 Khalifa, escapes from Omdur- man, 21; killed, 21 Khartum, railway connection with, 11; King's Day at, 27 Kitchener, Lord, 2, 4, 6, 11; opens Gordon College, 14; proclamation of August 7, 1 90 1, 45; declines to consider proposals of Vereeniging Con- ference, 48; leaves South Africa, 50; Consul-General in Egypt, 418 Kruger, President, reception in Paris, 44; Kaiser Wilhelm refuses to receive, 44 Labor problems in South Africa, 58-63 Ladysmith, relief of, 43 Leopold II. of Belgium and Congo Free State, 147, 150, 151, 155, 156, 157, 159; death of, 1909, 162 Liberia, 93-96 Livingstone, David, explorer, and Central Africa, 189-190 Lorenzo IMarques, and contro- versy over Transvaal traf&c, 78-82 Madagascar, history and de- velopment of, 38-42 Mafeking, relief of, 43 Mahdism in the Sudan, 21-24 Manning, Sir William, report on Somaliland, III Marchand expedition, 18 Mauritania, 313, 324 Menelik, Emperor of Abyssinia, 97, 99, 102, 103 Methuen, Lord, defeated and taken prisoner in Boer War, 48 Meux, Lady, will of, 102 n. Middle Congo Colony, 338, 339 Milner, Lord, 47; declines to consider proposal of Vereen- iging Conference, 48; becomes Governor of Transvaal, 50; proposition to solve political problems in South Africa, 54; opposes Transvaal war "con- tribution," 66; prosperity of Transvaal largely due to, 91; advocates idea of imperial unity in South Africa, 442 Mohammedanism, German idea of treatment of, 238-240 Morocco, one of keys to France's house in Africa, 134 and n.; European rivalry in, before Algeciras, 355-373; influence of Moroccan affairs on world war, 355; French efforts to 499 INDEX Morocco — Continued. secure, 358 et seq.; crisis in, begins in 1901, 362; revolt of Bu Hamara, 366 et seq.; Anglo- French Agreement of 1904, 368, 369; first German inter- vention in, 372; Conference of Algeciras arranged, 373; Act of Conference futile, 374 et seq.; acquired by France, 374-390; a principal cause of the European War, 376-377; French occupation begins, 380-381; Abdul Aziz ab- dicates, 383; tactics of Sultan Hafid, 383 et seq.; French occupy Fez, 385 ; independence over, 385; French negotia- tions with Spain and Germany, 385 et seq.; treaty signed placing the country under French protection, 389; paci- fication of, 389-390 Mullah Mohammed Abdullah, rise of power of, in Somaliland, 109; British policy regarding, no; again becomes active, III et seq. Mustafa Kamel and Nationalist agitation in Egypt, 402 et seq. Nadji Bey, 123-124 Natal, the problem of, 82-89; see also Soitth Africa and South African Union National Scouts, hostility to, 54-55 Niger, see Senegal-Niger Colony Nigeria, boundaries, 276-277; made a separate colony in 1886, 286; administrative changes in, 286-287; popula- tion and area, 287; agitation against liquor traffic in, 288- 290; conquest of hinterland; 290-294; cotton-growing ex- perimentation, 295-296, his- tory of, indicates the secret of British success in African colonization, 296-298 Northern Territories added to Gold Coast Colony, 283 Nyasaland, 189-195; boundaries, 191; population, 192; re- cruiting of natives for work outside the Protectorate pro- hibited, 192-193; native antagonism, 193; spread of Mohammedanism, 194-195 Omdurman, battle of, 2 ; Khalifa escapes from, 21; celebration of the Prophet's birthday in, 27-30 Orange Free State, annexed to British Empire, 45; constitu- tion granted to, 71; elections in, 71 ; rebellion in, 457 et seq.; see also South Africa, South African Union, and Boer War Ottoman Empire, British for- eign policy in middle of nine- teenth century built on its maintenance, 392 Ouchy, treaty of, 125 Peters, Dr., and development of German East Africa, 230 efueg. Portugal, national debt of, 271; anti-colonial policy of radicals, 272; attitude in European War, 274-275; Germany de- clares war on, 275 Portuguese colonies in Africa, 244-275; Portugal in vassal- age to England, 244-245; delimitation of Portuguese possessions by other coloniz- ing Powers, 244-251; increase of German trade in, 249; Great Britain alarmed at possibility of Germany getting coaling stations and naval bases in, 249-250; extent of, 251; enumeration of, 252; Cape Verde Islands, 252-253; Guinea, 253-254; Sao Thome, and Principe, 254-257; Por- tuguese West Africa, or Angola, 257-263; Portuguese East Africa, 263-271 (see Portuguese East Africa) ; nature of Portuguese colonial administration, 271; colonics a question of international 500 INDEX Portuguese colonies — Continued. importance, 273-274; pros- pect of retention of, 275 Portuguese East Africa, 263- 271 ; geographical position, 263; importance of possession by Portugal to Great Britain and France, 263-264; failure of British attempt to claim Delagoa Bay, 265; trade ri- valries, 266-267; problem of, 267-269 ; chartered companies, 269-270; revenues parasitical, 270-271 Portuguese West Africa, or Angola, 257-263 Principe, 254-257 Railways in Sudan, 8, 9, 11, 12 Rand, the, 55 Rebellion in South African Union, 454-469 Rhodes, Cecil, and South Cen- tral Africa, 189-191; and South African Company, 195; Boer War essential to accom- plishment of his plans, 197; divergent British and Boer opinion of, 197 n. ; saw peace for Great Britain and realization of his African plans only in harmony with Germany, 246- 248; effort to accomplish this, 247-248 Rhodesia, boundaries, 191; be- ginning of development of, 195; environing states and their relation to railway and other development, 195-198; agitation for expropriation of Chartered Company, 199- 202; land problem, 200, 201 and n. ; development of South- ern Rhodesia, 203; efforts to attract immigration, 203; rapid development of North- ern Rhodesia since 1910, 204; stays out of South African Union, 442 Risorgimento literature of Italy, 116 Roberts, Lord, 43, 44 Sahara, French in, 324, 325, 331-332 / Sao Thom^, 254-257 Selborne, Lord, High Com- missioner in South Africa, 90 Senegal, 312, 313, 322 Senegal-Niger Colony, 324-325 Senegambia, 313, 324 Sierra Leone, 276, 282; revenue, 278; hut tax causes revolts, 278; secret cannibalistic socie- ties, 279-280 Slave trade in Sudan, 12-13 Slavery, in Zanzibar, 36-38; abolished by French in Mada- gascar, 40; defunct in Egypt, 398 Sleeping sickness, 208-209 Smuts, General, supports Gen- eral Botha in South African Union, 449 et seq.; aids in crushing rebellion, 460 Somaliland, British policy in, 106-114; location and popula- tion, 106; Anglo-French ac- cord of 1904, 107; French Somaliland, 107; Italian Somaliland, 108; geographical position of British Somaliland, 108; rise of power of Mullah Mohammed Abdullah in, 109; policy regarding Mullah laid down, no; Mullah again becomes active, iii et seq.; British withdraw from interior posts. III; Sir William Man- ning's report, in; discussion in British Parliament and press, 112-113; British defeat at Dulmadoba, 113; dervishes still on the offensive in Novem- ber, 1 9 14, 114 South Africa, last years of Boer War and reconstruction pe- riod, 43-91 ; evolution in, since 1900, 52; Mr. Chamberlain decides to visit, 53; labor problem, 53; other problems to be settled, 54 et seq.; hos- tility to National Scouts in, 54-55; result of Mr. Chamber- lain's visit to, 57; the mines 501 INDEX South Africa — Continued. and the problem of white, black, and Chinese labor, 58- 63; Indian colonist rights and Indian immigration, 63-64; the Transvaal war "contribu- tion," 64-66; granting re- sponsible government to the Transvaal and Orange Free State, 67-72 ; the Taal against English in the schools, 72-76; conflicting local interests of contiguous colonies under the same flag hasten union, 77-82 ; the problem of Natal, 82-89 South African Commonwealth, army conquers German South- west Africa, 188 South African Company, begins development of Rhodesia, 195 ; charter extended, 200 South African Republic an- nexed to British Empire, 45 South African Union, 441-453; Colonial Convention, 442 ; Union formed by royal pro- clamation, December 2, 1909, 443 ; government ownership of railways in, 444-446; negro question in, 446-448; war between capital and labor, 448-449; Boers form a major- ity of electorate in, 449; politi- cal parties and movements in, 449-453; rebellion in, 454-469; martial law proclaimed, 456; manifesto of rebels, 458-460; Generals Botha and Smuts crush rebellion, 460; causes of rebellion and attitude of Boers, 461 et seq.; racial animosity strong, 466; Boers in conquest of German South- west and East Africa and in overseas contingents, 467-468 ; anti-British feeling still strong, 468-469 Southwest Africa, see German Southwest Africa. Spain, interests in Morocco and negotiations with France, 385 et seq. Spanish colonies in Africa, 115 n. State ownership of public utili- ties, in the Sudan, 8 n.; in South African Union, 444-446 Suakim abandoned as railway terminus, 11 Sudan, the, Great Britain in, 1-30; dropped by Great Britain, l; battle of Omdur- man made possible reconquest of, 2; British vision of recon- quest of, 2; Great Britain's problems in, 2-3; necessity to Egypt of reclamation of, 4; impossibility of direct British Protectorate over, 4-5; con- vention of British and Egyp- tian governments, January 19, 1899, 5-6; exact status not yet determined, 6; financial policy for, 6-7; cost of recon- quest, 7; public works, 8-9; State ownership of public utilities, 8 n.; commercial development, 9; railways in, 11-12; extent of territory, 12; slave trade, 12-13; Gordon College, 14-15; educational facilities, 16-18; boundary adjustments, 18-19; irriga- tion problem, 20-2 1 ; Sir Regi- nald Wingate's administra- tion of, 21-30; population, 23 n.; outlook at opening of European War in 1914, 24- 25; only one revolt against the Government, 25-26; King's Day in Khartum, 27; celebration of the Prophet's birthday at Omdurman, 27-30 Sudan Book of Loyalty, The, 25 Sudanese, characteristics of, 26 Sudan, Port, railway terminus on Red Sea, 9, 11 Suez Canal, 393 et seq. Swaziland, 83 Taal, the, against English in South African schools, 72-76 Tana, Lake, advantages for irrigation of the Sudan, 20-21 Tangier, French increase troops 502 INDEX Tangier — Continued at, 371; visit of Kaiser Wil- helna to, 372 Togoland (German colony) , con- quered by Gold Coast forces and French, 2S5; boundaries of, 299; acquirement of, by Germany, 300; development of, 301-303; cotton growing in, 309; railway and tele- graphic communication, 310; education in, 31 1 ; conquest of, 472-473 Transvaal, proposed war con- tribution," 64-65; Great Britain decides to forego the "contribution," 66; respons- ible government granted to, 71; first elections in, 71; prosperity of, largely due to Lord Milner, 91; rebellion in, 457 et seq.; see also South Africa, South African Union, and Boer War. Treaty of Vereeniging, see Ver- eeniging Conference. Tripoli, Italy concentrates atten- tion in, 120; lost to Ottoman Empire, 121; rivalry of Euro- pean nations and Turkey regarding, 121 et seq.; Italo- Turkish War mostly confined to, 124; value of, 127-128; repercussion of European War proves that Italy had not conquered, 129 Tuaregs, 331 Tunis, one of keys to Prance's houseinAfrica,i34and n.; 141- 144; see also Algeria and Tunis. Turkey, ambitions regarding Sudan and Tripoli, 121 et seq.; war with Italy, 124; treaty of Ouchy, 125; impotence to resist Italy's occupation of Tripoli, 125 Turks, feelings towards the various European nationali- ties, 126 Ubangi-Shari-Chad Colony, 338, 339 Uganda, British Protectorate declared, 206; importance of, 207, 208; sleeping sickness, 208; progress of Christianity in, 209-210; agricultural de- velopment, 210 Union, South African, see South African Union. United States, and Liberia, 93, 95; interest in a wise and politic settlement of European War, 490-491 Vereeniging, Conference at, 48; proposals of, declined, 48; accepts terms of peace for ending of Boer War, 49 Victoria, Queen, 44 Victoria Nyanza, Lake, rejected for irrigating the Sudan, 20 Vilonel, General, 47 Von Trotha tries to "stamp out" rebellion in German South- west Africa, 184 Wady Haifa,' railway to Atbara, II Walfisch Bay, possession of, by British hampers German de- velopment in Southwest Africa, 176 Wellcome Laboratories, 15 West Africa and the Sahara, French in, 312-334; see also British, German, and Portu- guese West Africa. Wilhelm II., Kaiser, refuses to receive President Kruger, 44; visit to Tangier, 372 Wingate, Sir Reginald, 6; on Lord Kitchener, 14 n.; anticipates threatened attack of Sultan All, 19 n.; his ad- ministration of the Sudan, 21- 30 "Young Egypt" party, 23 "Young Moslems" in Egypt, 401 "Young Turks," 122 et seq. Zanzibar, history and develop- ment of, 34-38 Zulnland, 84 et seg. 503 LiiHP^^"^ Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. Neutralizing agent: IVlagnesium Oxide Treatment Date; IVIay 2003 PreservationTechnologies A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive Cranberiy Township, PA 16066 (724)779-2111