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 http://www.archive.org/details/historyofsoutham01aker 
 
A HISTORY OF SOUTH AMERICA 
 
^m — ' ' r ~:- T ---^^ 
 
 Simon Boijvak. 
 
 [frontispiece. 
 
A HISTORY OF 
 SOUTH AMERICA 
 
 1854- 1904 
 
 BY CHARLES EDMOND AKERS 
 
 WITH ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 E. P. BUTTON & CO. 
 
 1904 
 
Copy. 
 
 L. n/30 
 
 C? 
 
 .A3 
 
 
 
 Of 
 
 
 Printed in Great Britain 
 
PREFACE 
 
 A residence of fourteen years in South America, in con- 
 nection with journalistic work throughout that continent, 
 brought home to me the need of a concise history of 
 the various South American States since they attained 
 independence from Spanish control. True, such infor- 
 mation can be obtained from Spanish and Portuguese 
 chroniclers and authors of other nationalities. But to 
 seek for descriptions of many different events and periods 
 in diverse directions and varied tongues is always weari- 
 some and often impossible unless a well-stocked library 
 be near at hand for reference. To meet this want has 
 been the purpose and aim of the present work, which 
 although dealing more particularly with the past fifty 
 years, is intended also for purposes of general reference 
 by students of Latin- American history and civilisation 
 from the date of the emancipation of the Spanish 
 colonies to the present day. 
 
 I have compressed into small compass the facts which 
 have tended to mould the destinies of the South American 
 Republics, and I have endeavoured to show how the 
 national character of the people of each State has 
 assumed distinctive features as the result of local 
 
vi PKEFACE 
 
 surroundings, modified by foreign immigration and the 
 accompanying influence of methods of civilisation other 
 than those of Spanish or Portuguese origin. 
 
 To extract from many sources the requisite facts, 
 and to marshall these into order, was no easy task. It 
 was due to the aid and encouragement of many friends 
 that I persevered when my path seemed beset by insuper- 
 able obstacles. I owe much to the friendly advice of 
 Charles W. Gould and the late Lloyd M'Kim Garrison, 
 both of New York, in the earlier stages of this work. 
 In the final revision of the manuscript I was so exceed- 
 ingly fortunate as to enlist the help and sympathy of 
 A. J. Wilson, and his assistance to me was invaluable. 
 
 Some excuse is necessary for the illustrations. I 
 regret that they are not more artistic in general char- 
 acter, and in defence I must plead that they are the 
 best I could obtain under the circumstances. They 
 are inserted to give to readers of the book some idea 
 of the personal appearance of the men who play a 
 prominent part in it, a purpose I trust they will 
 accomplish. 
 
 June 1904. 
 
 C. E. AKERS. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PART I 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Some Traits of Spanish Character. Ferdinand and Isabella. Treatment 
 of Moors and Jews. The Inquisition and Intellectual Expansion. 
 Population of Spain in the Fifteenth Century. First Spanish Colonists. 
 Treatment of Natives in South America. Examples of Spanish Cruelty 
 and Treachery. Destruction of Astec and Inca Civilisation. Dissen- 
 sions in South America. Spanish Bravery. Catholicism in South 
 America. Immigration to the Colonies. Introduction of Negroes. 
 Turbulent Settlers. Political Parties in South America. Spain and 
 Decentralisation. Trade Restrictions. Causes of Dissatisfaction. 
 Spanish Monopoly of Official Posts. Incidents of Brazilian History. 
 British, French and Dutch Action. Plot for Brazilian Independence. 
 The Peninsular Wars and Brazil. The Empire Proclaimed. Abdica- 
 tion of Pedro I. Indian Population. The Tupi-Guarani Stock. 
 Araucanians and Patagonians. Aymara and Quichua. Natural 
 Resources of the Continent. Geographical Features . 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 
 
 Colonial Discontent. Weakness of the Spanish Government. Efforts of 
 Spain to Conciliate the Colonies. Action of the Regency of Cadiz. 
 Caracas and the Separatist Movement. Simon Bolivar and the 
 Struggle for Independence. General Paez. Proclamation of Colom- 
 bian Independence. Bolivar frees Ecuador and marches to Peru. 
 The Revolt in Argentina. Treaty between Argentina and Great 
 Britain. Anarchy in Montevideo. Paraguay effects a Bloodless 
 Revolution. The Struggle in Chile. The Monroe Doctrine. Mr 
 Canning and the Holy Alliance. South America after Independence. 
 Bolivar and his Political Enemies. Disintegration of Colombia. 
 Venezuela as a Republic. Ecuadorian Affairs. Dissensions in Peru. 
 Friction in Chile over Form of Government. Bolivia and General 
 Sucre. Uruguayan Developments. Conflict in Argentina between 
 Federalists and Unitarians. Advent to Power of Rosas . . 19 
 
viii CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTEE II 
 
 THE AEGENTINE EEPUBLIC 
 
 Savage Brutality of Rosas. Revolution against Rosas. Economic and 
 Social Conditions. Ambition of the Provinces to Dominate Buenos 
 Aires. Wish of Buenos Aires to Secede. Determination of Buenos 
 Aires to Appeal to Arms. Revolution under General Mitre. Victory 
 of the Insurgents at Pavon. General Mitre Installed as President. 
 The National Capital. Revolutionary Movements. Aggressiveness 
 of Lopez. War with Paraguay. Political Consequences of the War. 
 Cholera in Buenos Aires. Election of Dr Sarmiento to the Pre- 
 sidency. Educational Progress. Efforts to Advance Industrial 
 Development. Yellow Fever Epidemic. The Administration of 
 Sarmiento. The Political Situation in 1874. Cordoba and the 
 Presidential Election of 1874. Election of Dr Nicolas Avellaneda. 
 The Presidential Election of 1871. Mitre and Revolutionary Pro- 
 jects. Conspiracy against the Government. Seditious Outbreaks. 
 Political Aims of Buenos Aires. Attitude of Avellaneda. Position 
 in 1878. Propaganda of the Cordoba League. Meetings in Buenos 
 Aires. The " Tiro Nacional." Buenos Aires and Cordoba. National 
 Government Alarmed. Minister of War and the "Tiro Nacional." 
 President determines to Suppress the "Tiro Nacional." Popular 
 Demonstrations in Buenos Aires. Troops Protect the National 
 Authorities. Compromise between President and Citizens. Second 
 Mass Meeting in Buenos Aires. Advice of Dr Sarmiento. Confer- 
 ence between Governor of Buenos Aires and President. Temporary 
 Compromise. Presidential Election of 1880. Issues of Electoral 
 Campaign. Presidential Candidates. General Roca. Dr Pellegrini 
 as Minister of War. The Cordoba League. Popular Excitement. 
 Situation Strained. Buenos Aires buys War Material. Military 
 Preparations. Delay in arrival of Arms and Ammunition. 
 
 CHAPTEE III 
 
 THE ARGENTINE EEPUBLIC — continued 
 
 Military Preparations. Attempt to seize Cordoba. National Troops in 
 Buenos Aires. Provincial Authorities and the Minister of War. Riot- 
 ing in Buenos Aires. The National Government and the Provincial 
 Administration. Avellaneda abandons Buenos Aires. Hostilities 
 Commence. Strength of National Troops. Preparations for Defence 
 of Buenos Aires. Disposition of Provincial Forces. Scarcity of War 
 Material in Buenos Aires. Leaders of the Rebellion. Political Dis- 
 sensions. Dr Pellegrini. Skirmishing between National Troops and 
 Revolutionary Forces. Colonel Arias and the Volunteers. Engage- 
 ment near Olivera. Colonel Arias reaches Lujan. Defence of 
 Buenos Aires. Attack upon Buenos Aires. Hostilities on July 21. 
 Ammunition exhausted in Buenos Aires. Conference of Revolutionary 
 Leaders. Armistice on July 23. Peace Negotiations. Terms of 
 Surrender. Buenos Aires declared the National Capital. General 
 Roca elected President. The New Administration. Cordoba and 
 
CONTENTS ix 
 
 Roca. Buenos Aires and the new President. The National page 
 Policy. Absolute Power of Roca in 1881. Restraint on Military. 
 National Feeling. Improvement in Means of Communication. 
 Railway Construction. Foreign Immigration. Assisted Passages 
 for Immigrants. National Land Sales. Public Works. Revolu- 
 tionary Outbreaks. Expansion of Agricultural and Pastoral Industry. 
 Foreign Loans. Dr Pellegrini appointed Minister of War. Political 
 Intrigues. Discontent in Buenos Aires. Attitude of the Adminis- 
 tration in Electoral Matters. Foundation of La Plata. The Port 
 of Ensenada. Presidential Election. Presidential Candidates. Eco- 
 nomic and Industrial Progress. Financial Policy. Suspension of 
 Specie Payments. Inconvertible Currency . . . .51 
 
 CHAPTEE IV 
 
 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC — continued 
 
 Presidential Election. The Cordoba Clique and the Provisional Governors. 
 Dr Juarez Celman. Cordoba supports Celman. Celman Elected. 
 Roca and Celman. Uneasy Feeling. Currency Conversion. Paper 
 Money Issues. Carpet-bagging Politicians. Political Conditions. 
 Corruption in National Administration. Concessions and Monopolies. 
 Corrupt Provincial Governments. Position of Pellegrini. Adminis- 
 tration and Banking. Provincial Loans. Sale of Gold Reserves. 
 Financial Necessities. The " Union Civica." Dr Alem. Aristobulo 
 del Valle. Bernardo Irigoyen. Dr Lopez. Lucio Lopez. Provin- 
 cial Branches of "Union Civica." Feeling against Celman. The 
 Mortgage Banks. Policy of the Administration. Foreign Residents. 
 Meeting of " Union Civica." Indictment of National Administration. 
 The " Union Civica " and Celman. The " Union Civica " and Revolu- 
 tionary Measures. The Army and the " Union Civica." Date fixed 
 for Revolt. Revolution of July 26, 1890. Action of National 
 Authorities. Attack on the Plaza Lavalle. Numerous Casualties. 
 Scarcity of Ammunition. Naval Action. Bombardment of Buenos 
 Aires. Attitude of Foreign Warships. Reinforcements from Northern 
 Provinces. Consultation of Rebel Leaders. Majority favour Nego- 
 tiation. Armistice Arranged. Peace Propositions. Advice of 
 Roca and Pellegrini. Peace Concluded. Dispersion of Revolutionary 
 Forces. Casualties. Resignation of Celman. Public Temper in 
 Buenos Aires. European Opinion. Accession of Pellegrini . . 69 
 
 CHAPTEE V 
 
 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC — continued 
 
 Ministry under Pellegrini. Attitude of Roca. Public Opinion. National 
 Finances. Political Situation. Economic Conditions. Cedula Issues. 
 Inconvertible Currency. Policy of Pellegrini. Depreciation in Currency. 
 Argentina and Baring Brothers. Suspension of Foreign Debt Service. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Banking Crisis. Patriotic Loan. Banco Nacional and Banco de la 
 Provincia. Attempted Assassination of Roca. Pellegrini's Adminis- 
 tration. Discontented Feeling. Influence of Mitre. Mitre Returns 
 from Europe. Cordoba and Mitre. Roca and Mitre. The ' ' Union 
 Civica Radical." A new State Bank. Pellegrini and the "Union 
 Civica Radical. " Nomination of Dr Luis Saenz Peila. Dr Bernardo 
 lrigoyan and the " Union Civica Radical." Political Situation in 1892. 
 State of Siege. Arrest of Alem. Alem Deported. Dr Luis Saenz 
 Pefia elected President. Dr Jose Uriburu. Roca resigns Portfolio of 
 Interior. Saenz Pefia accedes to Office. Public Opinion and Pellegrini. 
 Loss of the Rosales. Officers of the Rosales sentenced to Death. 
 Saenz Pefia and Congress. Ministerial Crisis. Obstruction in Con- 
 gress. Ministry of Dr del Valle. Alem and Political Agitation. 
 Congress and the Administration. Excitement in Buenos Aires. 
 Revolt in San Luis. Revolutionary Preparations in Buenos Aires. 
 National Government and Governor Costa. National Troops and 
 Revolutionary Forces. Alem in Santa Fe. Rosario captured by 
 Insurgents. Roca commands in Santa Fe. Surrender of Alem 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC — continued 
 
 Political Conditions in 1893. Financial Policy of Saenz Pefia. Attitude 
 of Congress. The Executive and the Chambers. The Provincial 
 Mortgage Bank. Dr Lopez and Colonel Sarmiento. Death of Lopez. 
 Hostility to Saenz Pefia. Ministerial Crisis. Position in December, 
 1894. Death Sentence upon Officers of Rosales. Resignation of 
 Saenz Pena. Dr Jose Uriburu. The New Administration. Chilian 
 Boundary Question. Argentine Authorities Alarmed. Secret 
 Sessions of Congress. Credit of Fifty Million Gold Dollars. Con- 
 gress and Railway Guarantees. Financial Policy of Uriburu. Cash 
 Payments on External Debt. Political Situation in 1897. Presidential 
 Candidates. Nomination of Roca. Roca Elected. Dr Quirno Costa 
 Vice-President. Roca and the Buenos Aires Merchants. The Puno 
 de Atacama. Chilian Ultimatum. Arbitration. The Chilian Ques- 
 tion. Purchase of War Material. Legislation during Uriburu 
 Administration. Roca assumes Presidency. Contrast between 
 1880 and 1898. Expectations from Roca. Arbitration and the Puno 
 de Atacama. Meeting between Roca and Errazuriz. Visit of Roca 
 to Patagonia. Welsh Colony at Chubut. Congress in 1899. Roca and 
 the administration of Justice. Magnasco and Judicial Reform. Com- 
 position of the Chambers. Journey of Roca to Brazil. Rumours of 
 Offensive and Defensive Alliance with Brazil. Commercial Treaty 
 with Brazil. Complications in the Provinces. Irigoyen and the 
 Buenos Aires Legislature. Intervention in Buenos Aires. Outbreaks 
 in La Rioja and Catamarca. Roca and National Legislation. The 
 Conversion Law. Roca and Public Works. Visit of President of 
 Brazil to Argentina. Area of Argentina. Population. Immigration. 
 Foreign Residents. Italians. Spaniards. Basques. Other Nation- 
 alities. Predominance of Latin Blood. Climate. Growth of Cities. 
 Gregarious Nature of Argentines. Landed Proprietors. Crowded 
 Centres. Education. Minister Magnasco. Incompetency of Teachers. 
 Lack of Discipline in Scholastic Establishments. Missionary Efforts 
 for Education. Administration of Justice. Roca and the Argentine 
 Courts. Codified Law. Tedious Procedure. Corrupt Lower Courts. 
 
CONTENTS xi 
 
 Religious Conditions. The Catholic Church. Report of Sir John p aqk 
 Hunter Blair. National Character. Hospitality. Agricultural and 
 Pastoral Industry . . . . . . . 104, 105 
 
 CHAPTEE VII 
 
 PAKAGUAY 
 
 Origin of the Paraguayan War. Political Disturbances in Uruguay. 
 General Flores lands near Salto. Severe Measures increase Rebel 
 Popularity. Strained Relations between Uruguay and Argentina. 
 Complications between Brazil and Uruguay. Entente between 
 Uruguay and Paraguay. Proclamation by Lopez. Mission of Con- 
 selheiro Saraiva. Invasion of Uruguay. The Villa del Salto. The 
 Brazilian Flag Insulted. Brazil supports Revolt. Siege of Paysandii. 
 Murder of Colonel Gomez. Attitude of Argentina. Uruguayan 
 Expedition to Rio Grande. March of Brazilians and Rebels upon 
 Montevideo. Montevideo Capitulates. Withdrawal of Brazilian 
 Army. Attitude of Lopez. The Marques cTOlinda. War between 
 Paraguay and Brazil. Invasion of Matto Grosso. Engagement at 
 Neuva Coimbra. Paraguayan Administration in Matto Grosso. 
 Consternation in Rio. Brazil prepares for War. Schemes of Lopez. 
 Paraguayan Congress. Lopez and Urquiza. Paraguayan Army in 
 1865. Attack upon Corrientes. Paraguayan occupation of Corrientes. 
 Excitement in Buenos Aires. Proclamation of General Mitre. Alliance 
 between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Warlike Preparations. 
 Phases of the War. Importance of the Parana and Paraguay. Plan 
 of Campaign. No forward movement possible before June. Dis- 
 tribution of the Paraguayans. Lopez neglects to advance beyond 
 Corrientes. The Paraguayans in Corrientes. Capture of Corrientes 
 by the Argentines. Battle of the Riachuelo. Paraguayan Advance 
 towards Uruguay. Operations near San Borge. Invasion of Rio 
 Grande. Mutiny in Entre Rios. Flores appointed to command 
 the Allied Vanguard. Conditions in Uruguay. Paraguayans march 
 down the Upper Uruguay. Battle of Yatay. Defeat of the Para- 
 guayans. Occupation of Uruguayana. Surrender of Colonel 
 Estigarribia. Preparations for Defence of Paraguay. Modification 
 in Plan of Campaign. Advance of Allied Forces. Matto Grosso . 130 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 PARAGUAY — continued 
 
 Public Feeling in South America. Consultation of Argentine, Brazilian, 
 and Uruguayan Representatives. Corrientes the Base of Operations. 
 Defences of the Parana. Engagement at Paso de la Patria. Con- 
 duct of the Argentine National Guard. Raid to Itati. Reconnais- 
 sance of Paraguayan Positions. Paso de la Patria. Crossing of the 
 Parana. Over-confidence of Allies. Surprise of Allies. Advance 
 into Paraguay. Battle of May 20. Camp at Tuyuti. Lines of Rojas. 
 
xii CONTENTS 
 
 Discontent in Allied Army. Engagements July 15 and 20. Arrival vaqk 
 of Reinforcements. Expedition against Curupaitf. Engagement at 
 Curuzii. Garrison of Curuzii. Conference between Mitre and Lopez. 
 Effect of Peace Proposals. Attack upon Curupaitf. Inefficient Recon- 
 naissance. Paraguayan Victory. Breakdown of Plans. Military 
 Changes. Public Opinion in Argentina and Brazil. Paralisation of the 
 Operations. Revolution in Mendoza. Marshal Caxias' Invasion. 
 Arrival of General Osorio at Tuyutf. Forward movement. Occupation 
 of Rio Hondo. Advance under Marshal Caxias. Situation in Matto 
 Grosso. General Mitre. Attack upon Convoy at Humaita. Squadron 
 forces passage at Curupaitf. Unsatisfactory situation of the Fleet. 
 Difficult Transport. Operations at Humaita. Effort of Paraguayans 
 to recapture Tayf. Attack of Paraguayans upon Tuyutf. Heavy 
 Losses. Revolt in Argentina. Assassination of Flores. Squadron 
 forces the Humaita passage. Attack on Humaita. Squadron 
 reaches Asuncion ........ 150 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 PARAGUAY — continued 
 
 Paraguayan Attempt to Destroy Squadron. Capture of Rojas. Capitu- 
 lation of Curupaitf. Concentration of the Paraguayans in Humaita. 
 Bombardment of Humaita. Attempt to Seize the Monitor Rio 
 Grande. Assault on Humaita. Passage of Humaita again Forced. 
 Evacuation of Humaita. Attack on the Allies. Booty in Humaita. 
 Asuncion the Objective Point. Humaita the Base of Supplies. 
 Paraguayans abandon Riverside Towns. The Allied Army leaves 
 Villa del Pilar. Passage of the River Tibicuarf. Paraguayans fall 
 back. Conditions at Tibicuarf. Victims of Lopez. Paraguayans 
 in Force near the River Carabe. Passage of the River Paraguay. 
 Plan of Campaign. Attack upon Villeta. Renewal of Hostilities. 
 Capture of Villeta ....... 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 PARAGUAY — continued 
 
 Resumption of Hostilities on December 20. Work of Allied Cavalry. 
 Paraguayan Camp in the Valentine Hills. Action of December 27. 
 Defeat of the Paraguayans. Surrender of Angostura. Occupation of 
 Asuncion. Disorderly Conduct of the Allied Troops. Delay in 
 Operations. Mission of Senhor Parunhos. Provisional Government 
 at Asuncion. A new National Capital. Concentration at Oscurra. 
 Engagement at the River Manduvira. Arrival of the Conde d'Eu. 
 Military Reorganisation. Operations against Lopez in July, 1869. 
 Fight at Sapucay. Attack on Peribebuy. Lopez evacuates 
 Oscurra. Plan of Campaign of Conde d'Eu. Retreat of Lopez to 
 Caraguatay. Engagement at Yagari. Action at Campo Grande. 
 Lopez seeks Refuge in the Forests. Paraguayan Encampment near 
 the Aquidaban. Colonel Silva Tavares and Major Oliveira. Death 
 of Lopez. Madame Lynch. Treaty of Peace. Withdrawal of 
 Argentine and Uruguayan Troops. Election of President Rivarola. 
 
CONTENTS xiii 
 
 Political Representation under the Constitution of 1870. Difficulties of page 
 President Rivarola. Vice-President Salvador Jovellanos. Assassination 
 of Rivarola. Election of President Gill. Brazilian Policy in Paraguay. 
 Assassination of President Gill. Senor Uriarte. Election of President 
 Baredo. Death of the President. Vice-President Saguier. Revolu- 
 tion in 1881. Saguier Deposed. General Caballero named Pro- 
 visional President. General Caballero elected President. Election of 
 President Escobar. Condition of Country. Election of President 
 Gonzalez. Attempts at Reform. Deposition of President Gonzalez. 
 Vice-President Moriiiigo takes Office. Election of President Egus- 
 quiza. Rupture with Uruguay. Election of President Aceval. 
 Oligarchy in Control. Political Rights. Economic Conditions after 
 1870. Natural Causes and Reaction. Idleness of Male Population. 
 Improvement in General Conditions. Population during Thirty 
 Years. Immigration. Australian Socialistic Colony. Sicilian Coloni- 
 sation. Educational System . . . . . .178 
 
 CHAPTEE XI 
 
 UKUGUAY 
 
 Colorado^ and Blancos. Flores refuses Re-election. Revolt of Colonel 
 Fortunato Flores. Presidency of Dr Pedro Varela. Blanco Con- 
 spiracy. Assassination of General Flores. Execution of Rebels. 
 General Batlle becomes President. Cholera Epidemic, 1868. Forced 
 Currency. Insurrections under Maximo Perez and General Caraballo. 
 Blanco Revolution. Insurgent Successes. Engagement near Santa 
 Lucia. Government Defeat. Engagement near Corralito. Retreat 
 of General Caraballo. Insurgent Losses. Siege of Montevideo. 
 Capture of the Cerro. Public Opinion in Montevideo. Sortie from 
 Montevideo. Siege of Montevideo Raised. Operations near Puerto 
 del Ingles. Decisive Battle. Government Victory. Reorganisation 
 of Rebel Forces. Further Insurgents Defeat. Senor Gomensoro 
 accedes to Presidency. Restoration of Peaceful Conditions. Con- 
 gressional Elections. Dr Jose Ellauri. Election of Dr Ellauri. 
 Complicated Situation. Threatening Attitude of Military. Adminis- 
 tration of Ellauri. Conspiracy of Colorados netos. Assassination of 
 Colonel Castillo. Revolt in Soriano. Municipal Election in Monte- 
 video. Ministers Resign. Military Revolt. Deposition of Ellauri. 
 Provisional Administration. Senor Pedro Varela elected President. 
 Unsettled Conditions. Political Arrests. Revolution in May, 1875. 
 Revolutionary Committee in Buenos Aires. Military join Insurgents. 
 Fighting in Soriano and Paysandii. Measures against the Rebels. 
 Defeat of Insurgents. Financial Difficulties. Dictatorship of Colonel 
 Latorre. Praetorian Administration Established. Public Education. 
 Election of Latorre. Latorre Resigns. Dr Vidal as President. 
 Colonel Santos. Attack on Independent Newspapers. Increase of 
 Militarism. President Vidal Resigns. Santos succeeds to Presi- 
 dency. Discontent Spreads. Question with Italy. Irresponsible 
 Administration. Paraguayan Debt. Preparations for Revolt against 
 Santos. Dr Vidal again Elected. Revolt in Western Part of Republic. 
 Defeat of Rebels by General Tajes. Title of Captain-General granted 
 to Santos. General Santos again President. Attempt to Assassinate 
 Santos. Ministry of Dr Ramirez. Santos resigns Office. Suppres- 
 sion of Militarism. Decree exiling Santos. Election of Herrera y 
 Obes ........ 196, 197 
 
xiv CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 Uruguay — continued 
 
 Foreign Capital in Uruguay. Corrupt Administration. Revival of Mili- 
 tarism. Extravagant Financial Policy. Discontented Feeling. 
 Economic and Financial Crisis. Temporary Administration of Senor 
 Duncan Stewart. Election of Senor Borda. The Borda Administra- 
 tion. Revival of Corruption. Formation of Revolutionary Committee 
 in Buenos Aires. Depots of War Material. Congressional Elections. 
 Outbreak of Revolt. Aparicio Saraiva and Colonel Diego Lamas. 
 Condition of Insurgent Forces. Engagement at Arbolito. Government 
 Forces Augmented. Engagements at Tres Arboles, Cerro Colorado, 
 and Cerros Blancos. Insurgent Expedition in Venus. Peace 
 Negotiations. Assassination of Borda. Accession of Senor Cuestas. 
 Fresh Peace Negotiations. Peaceful Conditions Re-established. 
 Festivities in Montevideo. Death of Lamas. Policy of New Adminis- 
 tration. Attitude of Congress. Cuestas dissolves the Chambers. 
 Congress elects Cuestas to the Presidency. Military Revolt. Blanco 
 Majority in Senate. Political Situation. Cuestas and Economic 
 Situation. Climate Conditions. Area of Territory. Density of Popu- 
 lation. Foreign Residents. Immigration. Apathy regarding Educa- 
 tion. Secondary and Higher Education. School of Arts and Trades. 
 Administration of Justice. Criminal Courts. Uruguayan National 
 Character. Influence of the Church. Means of Communication and 
 Economic Progress. Industrial Enterprise. Cattle-breeding. Importa- 
 tion of Foreign Stock. Sheep Farming. Export of Sheep. Agricul- 
 ture. Viticulture. Olive Orchards. Tobacco Cultivation. Industry 
 and Taxation. Landed Proprietors. Values of Foreign Holdings. 
 Tendency of Foreign Landowners to Decrease .... 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 BRAZIL 
 
 Brazil after the Paraguayan War. Influence of Dom Pedro II. His 
 Reputation in Europe. Quick Recovery in Economic Conditions. 
 Dom Pedro visits Europe. Immigration Projects. Personality of 
 Dom Pedro. His wish to benefit Brazil. His admiration for the 
 United States. Princess Isabel and the Conde d'Eu. Church 
 Influence and the Princess. Unpopularity of the Conde. Brazil and 
 Imperial Regime. Political Situation, 1870-1880. Effect of August 
 Comte on Brazilian Character. Sao Paulo and Republican Doctrines. 
 The Emperor and Republican Ideas. Rio Grande do Sul. Reason 
 for German Settlements in the Southern Provinces. The Emperor and 
 Railway Extension. Public Instruction. The Emperor and Higher 
 Education. The Clergy and Education. Internal Development of 
 Brazil. Third Visit of Dom Pedro to Europe. Abolition of Slavery. 
 Acts in Relation to Emancipation. Treatment of Brazilian Slaves. 
 
CONTENTS xv 
 
 Troubles in Sao Paulo. Enmity of Plantation Owners to Emancipa- page 
 tion. Seditious Feeling gaining ground. Return of Dom Pedro to 
 Rio. Inconsistencies in the Parliamentary System. The Ouro Preto 
 Ministry. Unpopularity of Cabinet. Ouro Preto supported by 
 Dom Pedro. Political Position strained. Plot to overthrow Ministry. 
 Younger Officers urge Deposition of Emperor. Seditious Feeling 
 runs Riot. Military Conspirators. Generals da Fonseca and 
 Floriano Peixoto Leaders of the Movement. The Fete in Rio de 
 Janeiro. The Palace surrounded. Arrest of Dom Pedro. Public 
 Buildings occupied by Rebels. Barao de Ladario Wounded. Pro- 
 clamation of General da Fonseca. Provincial Governors support 
 Republic. Fonseca proclaimed Provisional President. Dom Pedro 
 sent to Portugal. Country accepts Change with IndiiFerence. Dis- 
 content in Sao Paulo. Monarchists and Public Life. Brazilians 
 condone Revolution. Praetorian Administration. Reaction in Sao 
 Paulo. Imaginary Plot against Government. Arbitrary Measures. 
 New Banking Laws. Misiones Question. Congress Summoned. 
 Law of Constitution. Presidential Election .... 231 
 
 CHAPTEE XIV 
 
 brazil — continued 
 
 Autocratic Administration. Sao Paulo dissatisfied. Manifesto con- 
 demning Federal Authorities. Second Manifesto accusing the 
 President. Severity of Praetorian Regime. Chambers Hostile to 
 President. Congress refuses Supplies. Coup d'etat of da Fonseca. 
 The Chambers Dissolved. Martial Law. President da Fonseca as 
 Dictator. Monarchist Conspiracies. The Public and the President. 
 General Peixoto becomes Prominent. Sao Paulo disappoints 
 Public Expectation. Rio Grande against the Dictatorship. Para 
 follows the lead of Rio Grande. Naval Revolution in Rio. Arrests 
 of Prominent Persons. President Resigns. Vice-President Peixoto 
 succeeds to the Presidency. Riots in the Capital. Congress Re- 
 assembles. Death of Dom Pedro II. New Electoral Law. Militarism 
 Dominant. Mutiny at Santa Cruz. Intervention in Local Affairs. 
 Question of New Presidential Election. Protest of Officers. Presi- 
 dent and Congress. Military Despotism. Insurrection in Rio Grande 
 do Sul. General Peixoto and Governors of States. Resignation of 
 Marine and Finance Ministers. Affairs in Rio Grande do Sul. 
 Admiral Wandelkolk and the Insurgents. Naval Revolt. Govern- 
 ment Surprised. Admiral de Mello. Prolonged Conflict not expected. 
 Determination of Peixoto. Defence of Rio de Janeiro and 
 Nictheroy. Rebel Squadron and Resources. Bombardment of Rio. 
 Panic amongst Inhabitants. Italian Incident. Indemnity Paid. Rebel 
 Ships leave Rio. Object of sending Expedition to South. Formation 
 of Provisional Government, Situation in Rio Harbour. Ville- 
 gaignon joins Revolt. Explosion at Gouvernador Island. The 
 Aquidaban and Esperanto, leave Harbour. Saldanha da Gama joins 
 Revolt, Supporters of Peixoto assert da Gama attempting Restora- 
 tion of Monarchy ........ 250 
 
xvi CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTEE XV 
 bkazil — continued 
 
 Position in December 1893. Many Persons Emigrate. Precautions to stop 
 Rebel Supplies. Peixoto orders Daily Firing against Rebel Ships. 
 Troops in Rio de Janeiro and Nictheroy. The Government Flotilla. 
 Admiral da Gama. Strain of Continuous Fighting. Ilha Gouver- 
 nador. General Telles Killed. Capture of Ilha Mocangue. Person- 
 ality of da Gama. Question of Belligerent Rights. Journey of Mello 
 to the South. Saraiva marches Northwards. Personality of Saraiva. 
 Rebel Plan of Campaign. Saraiva reaches Parana. Mello captures 
 Paranagua. Successes raise Revolutionary Prestige. Lapa Sur- 
 renders. War Material captured at Curityba. Scarcity of Ammuni- 
 tion. Rebel Casualties. Artillery Fire more effective. Government 
 Flotilla sails from Europe. Foreign Trade Suffers. Insurgent 
 Hospital Bombarded. Admiral da Gama urges Mello to send Rein- 
 forcements. The Aquidaban reaches Harbour. Rebels attack the 
 Armaeao. Incident of U.S. Admiral Staunton. Arrival of U.S. 
 Admiral Benham. Threat if United States Merchantmen Molested. 
 Situation of Rebels. Council of War. Cruiser Republica Appears. 
 Aquidaban and Republica sail Northwards. Government Flotilla 
 Arrives. Population advised to leave City. Rebel Situation 
 Desperate. Captain Castilhos grants asylum on Portuguese Men-of- 
 War. Rebel Positions Abandoned. Peixoto demands Surrender of 
 Refugees from Castilhos. Portuguese Vessels convey Rebels to 
 Montevideo. Diplomatic Relations interrupted with Portugal. Inci- 
 dent of H.M.S. Sirius. Brutal Treatment of Insurgent Wounded 
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 bkazil — continued 
 
 The Voyage of the Aquidaban and the Republica. Saraiva deceived as to 
 the Position. Mello and Saraiva. Discontent with Provisional Govern- 
 ment. Presidential Election. Dr Prudente Moraes. News reaches 
 Saraiva. Parana Evacuated. Mello organises Expedition to Rio 
 Grande. Curityba occupied without Resistance. Rebel Cause col- 
 lapses. Naval Expedition against Desterro. Rebel Expedition 
 enters Rio Grande. Threatened Bombardment of Rio Grande. Attack 
 on Rio Grande. Insurgent Troops landed in Uruguay. Mello delivers 
 Rebel Ships to Argentine Authorities. Argentine Government returns 
 Vessels to Brazil. Naval Expedition at Desterro. Aquidaban sunk. 
 Desterro occupied. Insurgents shot by Military Authorities. French- 
 men executed. Indemnity demanded by French Government. Fate 
 of Saraiva. Revolution crushed. President Moraes accedes to Office. 
 Policy of new President. Militarism decreases. Opposition to Moraes. 
 Amnesty for Rebels. Law of Constitution strictly observed. Misiones 
 Boundary settled. Outbreak at Military School. Firm Attitude of 
 President. Diplomatic Relations with Portugal resumed. Disturb- 
 ances in Rio Grande do Sul. Admiral da Gama joins Insurgents. 
 Atrocities by Troops and Rebels in Rio Grande. Battle at Campo 
 Osorio. Death of da Gama. Suspension of Hostilities. The Trinidade 
 Question. Peace arranged with Insurgents. Amnesty for Officers. 
 Suppression of Praetorian Methods. Italian Claims. Financial Legis- 
 lation. President Moraes temporarily vacates Office . 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 xvii 
 
 CHAP TEE XVII 
 
 brazil — continued 
 
 Sudden return of President Moraes to Rio de Janeiro. Plot against the i"age 
 President. Story of Antonio Maciel. The Canudos Settlement. The 
 Jagunqos and the Bahia Police. Bahia Government ask help against 
 Conselheiro. Troops sent to Canudos and defeated by Jagunqos. 
 Another Expedition to Canudos under Colonel Moreiar Csesar. Riots 
 in Rio de Janeiro. Murder of Colonel Gentil de Castro. Strong force 
 organised against Canudos. General Oscar in charge of Military 
 Operations. Situation of Expedition unsatisfactory. Heavy Casual- 
 ties amongst Troops. Followers of Conselheiro attack Troops under 
 General Oscar. Situation saved by General Savaget. Minister of 
 War at the front. Power of Religious Fanaticism. Failure to storm 
 Canudos. Siege of the Stronghold. Canudos captured, October 3. 
 Atrocities of Canudos. Withdrawal of Troops. Final Report of Opera- 
 tions. Accusations of Military Clique in Rio against Moraes. 
 Plot to Assassinate President Moraes. Murder of Minister of War. 
 Arrests made. Public Opinion and Attempt upon Life of President. 
 Presidential Candidates. Campos Salles supported by President. 
 Dr Campos Salles elected. Personality of President-elect. Critical 
 financial situation. Mission of Campos Salles to London. Fund- 
 ing Loan Agreement. Campos Salles accedes. Contrast between 
 1894 and 1898. The Amapa Question. Nebuco represents 
 Brazil. Policy of President Campos Salles. Brazilians satisfied. 
 President of Argentine visits Brazil. Fiscal Legislation. Lack of 
 strong Political Parties. Bubonic Plague in Santos and Rio. 
 Economic Development and Political Disturbances. State Govern- 
 ments. Illegitimate Taxation. Federal Courts. States and Railways. 
 Distribution of Population. Italians. State-aided Immigration. 
 Sao Paulo and the Italian Colony. German Settlements in Brazil. 
 German Colonists during Revolution. Portuguese Immigrants. 
 Brazilian National Character. Positivist Tendencies. Public Instruc- 
 tion. Number of "Illiterates." Apathy concerning Education. 
 Administration of Justice. Condition of Prisons. Capital of Minas 
 Geraes. Depreciation of Currency. Means of Communication. 
 Inadequate Railway System. State Control of Railways. Central 
 Railway a Political Machine. Telegraphs and Cables. Inefficiency 
 of the State Lines. Brazilian Waterways . . . 295,296 
 
 PART II 
 
 CHAPTEE XVIII 
 
 CHILE 
 
 Law of Constitution. Congress. The Executive. State Council. Adminis- 
 tration from 1833 to 1861. President Bulnes. President Montt. 
 
 b 
 
xviii CONTENTS 
 
 President Perez. Liberal Administration. Disaster to the Com- PAG > E 
 pafiia Church. War with Spain. Blockade of Valparaiso. Capture 
 of the O ovadonga. Bombardment of Valparaiso. Truce with Spain. 
 Foundation of Chilian Navy. Re-election of President Perez. 
 Economic Progress. President Errazuriz. Construction of the 
 Cochrane and Blanco Encalada. Railway Expansion. Presidential 
 Candidates in 1876. President Pinto. Relations between Chile and 
 Bolivia. Economic Crisis. Inconvertible Currency. Relations with 
 Argentina. Quarrel with Bolivia and Peru. President Pinto and the 
 War. Presidential Contest in 1881. Election of Santa Maria. Con- 
 gressional Elections. Treaty with Peru. Truce with Bolivia. Laws 
 of Civil Registry and Marriage. The Cemeteries. Presidential Election 
 in 1886. Origin of Parliamentary System. Early Days of Balmaceda. 
 Special Mission to Lima. His connection with Politics. Election to 
 Congress. Programme of Reformistas. Opposition to new Political 
 Movement. Balmaceda appointed Minister in Buenos Aires. Balma- 
 ceda in 1882 and 1885. Election to Presidency. Political Intrigues. 
 Ministry of Senor Carlos Antunez. Zahartii Cabinet. Congressional 
 Elections, 1888. Resignation of Zafiartu. Ministerial Changes. 
 Policy concerning Church and Education. Conflict between Congress 
 and Executive. Political situation in 1890. Dictatorial attitude of 
 Balmaceda. Senor Vicuna proclaimed Presidential Candidate. 
 Resolutions by Mass Meetings. The Comisidn Gonservadora. Pretext 
 for Revolt 321 
 
 CHAPTEE XIX 
 
 chile — continued 
 
 Preparations for Rebellion. The Navy Revolts. Capture of War Material. 
 Skirmish in Valparaiso. Occupation of Coquimbo. Engagement at 
 Pisagua. Attitude of Balmaceda. Measures against Revolution. 
 Position in January, 1891. Public Opinion. Capture of Pisagua. 
 Revolutionary Troops. Fight near Dolores. Congressionalists 
 Defeated at Huara. Occupation of Iquique. Attempt to Recapture 
 Iquique. Intervention of Admiral Hotham. Congressionalists at 
 Iquique. Defeat of Robles at Pozo Almonte. Capture of Arica. 
 Reinforcements for Tarapaca. Antofagasta Blockaded. Evacuation 
 of Antofagasta. Colonel Camus Retires into Bolivia. Occupation of 
 Caldera. The Blanco Encalada. Lull in Hostilities. Treatment of 
 Suspected Persons. Financial Difficulties. The Junta de Gobierno. 
 Revolutionary Agents. The Itata Incident. Peace Negotiations. 
 Meeting of Commissioners in Santiago. Attempt to Assassinate 
 Balmaceda. Optimistic Feeling. The Condell and Lynch. Dicta- 
 torial Tendencies of Balmaceda. Election of Senor Claudio Vicuna. 
 Richard dimming. Revolutionary Propaganda in Europe. Sym- 
 pathy with Revolutionary Cause. Armaments reach Iquique. 
 Congressionalist Army. Revolutionary Committee in Santiago and 
 Valparaiso. Embarkation of Revolutionary Army. Balmaceda and 
 the Invasion. Insurgents near Santiago. Execution of Prisoners. 
 Massacre of Lo Ganas. Tyrannical Conduct of Balmaceda. The 
 Esmeralda off Valparaiso. Landing of Congressionalists. The Central 
 and Southern Districts . . . . . , .345 
 
CONTENTS xix 
 
 CHAPTEE XX 
 
 chile — continued 
 
 Country round Quinteros. Congressionalist Army. Tactics of Defence, page 
 Battle of Concon. Congressionalist Victory. Heavy Casualties. 
 Reorganisation of Government Troops. Reinforcements from Santiago. 
 Defence of Vina del Mar. Faulty Information Concerning Valparaiso. 
 Advance on Vina del Mar. Concentration at Quilpue. Preparations 
 for Attacking Valparaiso. March to Placilla. Defence of Placilla. 
 Strength of the Armies. Battle of Placilla. Severe Losses. Occu- 
 pation of Valparaiso. Riotous Scenes. Message to Balmaceda. The 
 President Resigns his Powers. Decree of General Baquedano. 
 Political Prisoners. Unprotected state of Santiago. Arrival of the 
 Junta de Gobiemo. Disarmament of Troops .... 370 
 
 CHAPTEE XXI 
 
 chile — continued 
 
 General Baquedano Surrenders Powers. Proclamation by Admiral Montt. 
 Work of Reconstruction. Unsettled Conditions. Disappearance of 
 Balmaceda. Suicide of Balmaceda. Political Testament of Balmaceda. 
 Explanation of Suicide. New Congress. Junta de Gobiemo Resigns. 
 Admiral Montt as Presidential Candidate. Cost of the Revolution. 
 Election of Montt. Promotions for Services. Actions concerning 
 Supporters of Balmaceda. Law of Amnesty. Chile and the United 
 States. The Baltimore Incident. Message of President Harrison to 
 the U.S. Congress. Telegram from Santiago to Chilian Minister in 
 Washington. United States Ultimatum. Excitement in Chile. 
 Apology to U. S. Government ...... 383 
 
 CHAPTEE XXII 
 
 chile — continued 
 
 Real Issues of the Civil War. Political Situation in 1892. Comisidn 
 Conservadora. Increase of Naval Strength. Military Reorganisation. 
 Congressional Elections in 1894. Political Situation. Domestic 
 Legislation. Municipal Law. Conversion of the Currency. 
 Political Parties in Congress. Coalition Cabinet. Complications 
 with Argentina. Sale of the Esmeralda to Japan. Understanding 
 with Peru re Tacna and Arica. Treaty with Bolivia. A Diplomatic 
 Blunder. Presidential Contest in 1896. Election of Seiior Federico 
 Errazuriz. Congressional Elections in 1897. The Boundary Question 
 with Argentina. War Imminent. Attitude of Errazuriz. Arbitration 
 re Tacna and Arica. The Bolivian Question. The Kbnig Note. Presi- 
 dential Contest in 1901 . . . . . . .397 
 
xx CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII 
 CHILE — continued 
 
 Effect of Foreign Wars and Internal Disturbances. Movement of Popula- PAGE 
 tion. Infantile Mortality. Immigration. Araucanian Indians. 
 Physical Qualities. Tendency to Drift to the Cities. Spread of 
 Alcoholism. Drunkenness in Valparaiso and London. Regulation of 
 Liquor Traffic. Chilians and the Government. Educational Facilities. 
 Primary Instruction. Educational Statistics. German Schools. 
 Secondary and Higher Education. Religious Liberty. Church 
 Influence. Administration of Justice. Brigandage. National Char- 
 acter. Aggressive Nature of Chilians. Means of Communication. 
 State and Private Railways. Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego. 
 Industrial Zones. Mining Industry. Nitrate of Soda. Development 
 of Tarapaca. Copper Mining. Want of Transport Facilities. Silver 
 Mining. Gold and Manganese. Specimens of Minerals at Santiago. 
 Coal and Iron. Borax. Proportion of Minerals to remainder of 
 Exports. Agricultural Enterprise. Rapid Decadence after 1893. 
 Production of Wheat. The Government and Agricultural Industry. 
 Viticidture. Pastoral Industry. Sheep-breeding in Patagonia. The 
 Lumber Trade. The Fishing Industry. Manufactures. Lack of 
 Skilled Labour. Cloth and Cotton Factories. Sugar Refineries. 
 Protection for Manufacturing Interests ..... 410 
 
 CHAPTEE XXIV 
 
 THE CHILIAN-PEKUVIAN WAK 
 
 Position of Atacama. Chile and Bolivia. The Guano Deposits. Bolivian 
 Claims. Dispute in 1861. Situation in 1864. War between Peru 
 and Spain. Treaty between Bolivia and Chile. Bad Faith of Bolivia. 
 Intrigues by Peru. Treaty between Bolivia and Peru. Relations 
 between Bolivia and Chile. Chilian Capital in Atacama. Violation 
 of Treaty of 1874. Peruvian Intrigues in Bolivia. Duty on Nitrate 
 of Soda. Ultimatum of Chile to Bolivia. Occupation of Antofagasta 
 by Chilians. Declaration of War by Bolivia. Peru proposes Arbi- 
 tration. Chile declares War on Peru. Relations between Argentina 
 and Chile. Illusions of Bolivia and Peru. Naval Armaments. 
 Equipment of Chilian and Peruvian Vessels. Military Forces of the 
 Three Countries. Chilian Preparations. Inaction of Bolivia and 
 Peru. Embarkation of Chilian Troops. Occupation of Antofagasta. 
 Attack on Calama. Occupation of Tocopilla and Cobija. Blockade 
 of Iquique. Peruvian Seaboard Harried by Chilians. Bombardment 
 of Pisagua. Reconnaissance to Callao. Peruvians attempt to raise 
 Blockade of Iquique. Attack of the Huascar and Independencia on 
 the Esmeralda and Qovadonga. Loss of the Esmeralda and the 
 Independencia. Preponderance of Chilian Sea-power. Peruvian 
 Reprisals.- Chilian Discontent. Capture of the Huascar and 
 Pilcomai/o.. . . .. . . . . . 433 
 
CONTENTS xxi 
 
 CHAPTEE XXV 
 
 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR — continued 
 
 Third Phase of the War. Chilians at Antofagasta. Embarkation of pagk 
 Expeditionary Forces. Peruvians defend Tarapaca. Attack on 
 Pisagua. Retreat to San Roberto. Occupation of Junin. Skirmish 
 near Agua Santa. Attack on Chilians near Dolores. Chilian Victory. 
 Retreat to Tarapaca. Occupation of Iquique. Stand at Tarapaca. 
 Expedition under Colonel Arteaga. Battle of Tarapaca. Peruvian 
 Victory. Peruvians fall back on Arica. Defence of Arica. The 
 Chilian Advance. Engagement at Torata. Tacna and Arica 
 Isolated. Skirmish near the River Sama. Battle of Tacna. Rout of 
 Defenders. Heavy Casualties. Battle of Arica. Sinking of the 
 Manco Capae ........ 458 
 
 CHAPTEE XXVI 
 
 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR — continued 
 
 Internal Dissensions. President Prado leaves Peru. Senor Pierola heads 
 a Revolt. Blockade of Callao. Bombardment of Callao. Sinking 
 of the Janequeo. Loss of the Loa. Sinking of the Covadonqa. 
 Bombardment of Chancay, Ancon, and Chorillos. Expedition to 
 the Northern Coast. Protests from Foreign Representatives. Efforts 
 of United States for Peace. Conference on U. S. Warship Lackmvana. 
 Conditions of Chile. Chilian Preparations for Advance on Lima. 
 Army of Invasion. Occupation of Pisco and Yea. Landing at 
 Curayaco. Naval Operations off Callao. Defences of Lima. 
 Fourth Phase of War. Advance on Peruvian Positions. Battle of 
 Chorillos. Fighting on Morro Solar. Armistice arranged by Foreign 
 Diplomats. Battle of Miraflores. Lima Surrenders. Occupation of 
 the Peruvian Capital ....... 474 
 
 CHAPTEE XXVII 
 
 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR — continued 
 
 Panic in Lima. Asylum given by the Legations. Action of British and 
 French Admirals. Urban Guard. General Saavedra re-establishes 
 Order. Conduct of Chilians. Entry of General Baquedano into Lima. 
 Vessels Destroyed at Callao. Admiral Lynch Commands in Peru. 
 Government of Dr Calderon. Recognition of Calderon Administra- 
 tion by United States. Admiral Lynch overturns Calderon. The 
 Montero Government. Situation in 1882. Caceres and Guerilla 
 Warfare. Peruvian Army at Arequipa. Expedition against Arequipa. 
 Peruvians Defeated. Government of General Iglesias. Conditions of 
 Peace. Treaty between Chile and Peru. Evacuation of Lima. Ratifi- 
 cation of Treaty. Negotiations between Chile and Bolivia. Text of 
 Agreement between Chile and Bolivia. Result of the War . . 490 
 
 62 
 
xxii CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTEE XXVIII 
 
 PERU 
 
 Constitution of 1860. President San Roman. Revolution against Pezet. page 
 Dispute with Spain. Squadron under Admiral Pinzon. Incident at 
 Talambo. Memorandum of Spanish Commissioner. The Chincha 
 Islands. Action of Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador. Loss of the Triunfo. 
 Treaty between Peru and Spain. Pezet driven from Office. War 
 with Spain. Capture of the Covadonga. Suicide of Spanish Admiral. 
 Naval Fight near Abtao. Bombardment of Callao. Withdrawal of 
 Spanish Squadron. Dictatorship of Prado. Revision of Constitution. 
 Prado proclaimed President. Revolution against Prado. Reforms 
 of 1867. Election of Colonel Balta. Financial Embarrassments. 
 The Dreyfus Contract. Railway Construction. Presidential Candi- 
 dates in 1872. The Gutierrez Conspiracy. Death of Colonel Silvestre 
 Gutierrez. Assassination of Balta. Death of Colonel Tomas Gutierrez. 
 Presidency of Manuel Pardo. Economic Conditions. Revolutionary 
 Attempts of Pierola. Foreign Policy. Alliance with Bolivia. Election 
 of Prado. Revolutionary Outbreak. The Huascar and the Shah 
 and Amethyst. Treaty with Spain. Murder of Pardo. Complications 
 with Chile". Outbreak of Hostilities. President Prado commands 
 the Army. The President abandons Peru. Revolution under Pierola. 
 Fighting in Lima. Pierola proclaimed Supreme Chief. Occupation 
 of Lima. Pierola leaves Peru. Administration of Iglesias. Revolu- 
 tion under Caceres. Insurgents attack Lima. Second Assault on Lima. 
 Iglesias Resigns. Election of Caceres. Quiet Conditions. Economic 
 Crisis. Presidency of Bermudez. Death of Bermudez. Colonel 
 Borgoho assumes Office. Revolutionary Rising. Chambers Dis- 
 solved. Caceres again President. Spread of Revolution. Pierola 
 attacks Lima. Caceres Defeated. Provisional Administration. 
 Pierola Elected. Insurrection at Iquitos. Reforms under Pierola. 
 Revolution in 1898. Election of Romana. International Questions . 505 
 
 CHAPTEE XXIX 
 
 PERU — continued 
 
 Movement of Population. Effect of Wars and Revolutions. Decrease 
 of Inhabitants. Races of Peru. Conflicting Elements in Population. 
 Japanese Immigration. Infantile Mortality. Unhygienic Conditions. 
 Alcoholism. National Language. Similarity with Semitic Customs and 
 Words. Topographical Zones. Education. Primary Instruction. 
 Educational Statistics. Secondary and Higher Education. Justice. 
 Legal Procedure. Influence of the Roman Catholic Church. National 
 Character. Municipal Government. Typical Spanish Features in 
 Lima. City of Arequipa. The Commercial Situation. Trade Con- 
 ditions. Financial Situation. Contract with Bondholders. The 
 Peruvian Corporation. Internal Debt. Taxation. The Currency 
 Question. Industrial Occupations. Sugar Enterprise. Labour 
 Question. Cotton Production. Coffee and Cacao. Minor Agricul- 
 tural Products. Pastoral Industry. Llamas and Alpacas. Minerals. 
 Difficulties of Mining Enterprise. Cerro de Pasco. Silver Production. 
 Petroleum. Coal. Borax. Mining Laws. The Rubber Districts. 
 Manufacturing Industry. Cotton and Woollen Mills. Panama Hats. 
 Motive Power for Manufacturing. Development and Transport . 530 
 
CONTENTS xxiii 
 
 CHAPTEE XXX 
 
 BOLIVIA 
 
 Political Conditions before War with Chile. Conservatives and Liberals, page 
 Peruvian Intrigues. President Daza. Situation of Bolivia when 
 Hostilities Ceased. President Campero. Reform of the Constitution. 
 Negotiations with Chile. Presidency of Senor Pacheco. President 
 Arce. Argentine and Chilian Pretensions. Treaty with Argentina. 
 Indian Outbreak. President Baptista. Attitude of Chile. Senor 
 Severo Alonzo succeeds Baptista. Sedition fomented by Liberals. 
 Outbreak of Insurrection. Abdication of Alonzo. Provisional Govern- 
 ment under Pando. Casualties during the Revolution. Election of 
 Pando. Question with Chile. The Konig Note. The Acre Dispute. 
 The National Capital. Means of Communication and Seditious Out- 
 breaks. Internal Politics. The White Population. The Political 
 Significance of the Indians. Stories of Indian Ferocity. Geographical 
 Position. Disturbed Internal Conditions and Economic Progress. 
 Area and Population. Classification of Inhabitants. Bolivian Cities. 
 Topographical Features. The Four Zones. Bolivian Languages. 
 Local Colour. Native Customs. Education. Primary Instruction. 
 Secondary and Higher Education. Administration of Justice. National 
 Character. Communication with Bolivia. Lack of Internal Trans- 
 port Facilities. Industrial Enterprise. Agriculture. The Mining 
 Industry. Silver Production. Indiarubber. Pastoral Industry. The 
 Financial Situation. Commercial Conditions . . . .554 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXI 
 
 ECUADOK 
 
 Acts of Constitution. Administration of President Moreno, and his Assassi- 
 nation. Presidency of Dr Borrero. Revolt under General Veintemilla. 
 Defeat of the Government. Provisional Administration. Election of 
 Veintemilla. Veintemilla declared Dictator. Revolt against Veinte- 
 milla, and his Flight. Administration of Dr Placido Caamafio. Sedi- 
 tious Conspiracies. Election of Dr Flores, and his Policy. Presidency 
 of Dr Luis Cordero. The Esmeralda Incident. Indignation against 
 Cordero. Revolution under General Alfaro. Fight of Cordero. 
 Provisional Government under Alfaro, and his Election. Alfaro and 
 the Clergy. Conspiracies against Alfaro. Laws regarding Sedition. 
 Political Conditions and Economic Progress. Lack of Immigration. 
 Area and Population. Cities of Ecuador. Fires in Guayaquil. 
 Topography of Ecuador. Educational Progress. Justice. National 
 Character. Indian Characteristics. Means of Communication. 
 Industrial Enterprise. Pastoral Pursuits. Mineral Wealth. Financial 
 Situation. Revenue and Expenditure. Commercial Situation. Future 
 Prospects ....... . 577 
 
xxiv CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXII 
 
 COLOMBIA 
 
 Various Titles of Colombia. Internal Political Troubles. Political Parties, page 
 Election of Senor Rafael Nunez. Revolution in 1881. Settlement 
 with Costa Rica. President Laldua. General Obaldra. Liberals 
 support Senor Nunez. Boundary Question with Venezuela. President 
 Nunez in 1884. Nunez and the Conservatives. Rebellion in 1S85. Re- 
 establishment of Peace. Occupation of Panama and Colon by United 
 States Forces. President Nunez at Cartagena. Revision of the Law of 
 Constitution. Discontent between 1888 and 1892. Nunez again elected. 
 Senor Miguel Caro Vice-President. Death of Nunez. Revolt in 1895. 
 Election of Senor Sanclemente. Senor Marroquin as Vice-President. 
 Revolution in 1898. President Sanclemente temporarily Resigns. Vice- 
 President Marroquin supercedes Sanclemente. Panama Secedes. 
 Incapacity of Colombians for Independent Government. Topography 
 and Revolutionary Practices. Reason of Present Political Conditions. 
 Economic Progress and Political Disturbances. Topographical Features. 
 Climate. Area and Population. Hygienic Conditions. Education. 
 Primary Instruction. The Peasant Class and Education. Secondary 
 and Higher Education. Justice. The Roman Catholic Church. 
 Religious Seminaries. Missionary Work and the Indians. National 
 Character. Alcoholism. Industrial Enterprise. Mining. Manu- 
 factures. The Pradera Iron Works. The Panama Canal. Financial 
 Situation. Future Prospects . . . . . .591 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXIII 
 
 VENEZUELA 
 
 Internal Dissensions. Struggle between the " Yellows " and the " Blues." 
 General Blanco. Revolt under General Salazar. Policy of Blanco 
 Conspiracy in 1889. Blanco Overthrown. Election of General Palacios 
 Revolt under Crespo. Provisional Government. Crespo Elected 
 Revolution under Dr Rojas Paul. Boundary Question with Great 
 Britain. The Uruan Incident. Venezuela and the United States 
 Mr Olney and the Marquess of Salisbury. The Monroe Doctrine, 
 The United States and Great Britain. The Cleveland Message, 
 Venezuela and British Trade. Dignified Attitude of Crespo. Boundary 
 Dispute Centres in Washington. The Cleveland Commission. The 
 Arbitration Tribunal. The Award. Diplomatic Relations between 
 Great Britain and Venezuela. The Crespo Administration. Election 
 of Senor Andrade. Revolt against Andrade Administration. Death 
 of Crespo. Victory of the Revolution. Election of President Castro. 
 Modification of the Constitution. Political Division of Venezuela. 
 Seditious Practices. Revolutionary Tendencies. Climate and Topog- 
 raphy. Statistics of Population. Immigration. Municipalities. 
 Public Education. Justice. Influence of the Church. Aversion to 
 the Marriage Ceremony. The Priesthood. National Character. 
 Indian Characteristics. Industrial Enterprise. Mining Enterprise. 
 
CONTENTS xxv 
 
 Manufacturing Industry. Means of Communication. Financial pagk 
 Situation. Estimates for 1899-1900. The Commercial Situation. 
 Low Prices for Coffee. Imported Merchandise. Exports. Com- 
 parison of British and United States Trades. German Competition. 
 Future Prospects . . . . . . . .617 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXIV 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 The Republics and Internal Dissensions. Spanish and Portuguese Influ- 
 ence on the Inhabitants. South America and Cuba. Spanish Traits 
 Modified. More Peaceful Future Conditions. Measures for Consoli- 
 dation. Necessity of Closer Relations between South American 
 Republics. Free Interchange of Commodities. Europe and South 
 America. Reasons why Progress Watched. Outlet for Emigration 
 from Latin Countries. Wheat, Maize, Beef, Mutton and Coffee. 
 Simon Bolivar and the Spanish Colonies. The Ideals of Sucre and 
 San Martin. The Development of South America. United States 
 Influence. The Panama Canal. Chilian Influence on the Pacific 
 Coast. The United States and Chile. Bolivian Mineral Wealth and 
 Foreign Immigration . . . . . . 647 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRAT 
 
 Simon Bolivar ..... 
 Jose San Martin .... 
 
 Juan Martin de Puvredon 
 Map of Southern Section of South America 
 Jose J. de Urquiza . . 
 
 Mitre, Sarmiento, Alem, del Valle . 
 Roca . . . . 
 
 Juarez Celman ..... 
 Pellegrini ..... 
 
 Uriburu ..... 
 
 Map of Paraguay .... 
 
 Flores, Latorre, Santos 
 Borda, Cuestas, Aparicio Saraiva, Lamas 
 Dom Pedro II. . 
 
 Fonseca, Moraes, Campos Salles, Bittencourt 
 Map of Brazil ..... 
 Peixoto, da Gama, Mello, Gumercindo Saraiva 
 Map of Peru, Bolivia, and Northern Chile . 
 Chilian Celebrities .... 
 Balmaceda ..... 
 
 Montt, Barros Luco, Canto, Korner . 
 Map of Valparaiso and District 
 Baquedano, Pedro Montt, Errazuriz, Riesco 
 An Araucanian Type .... 
 
 Frontispiece 
 Face page 24 
 32 
 34 
 38 
 42 
 54 
 70 
 86 
 108 
 130 
 198 
 218 
 232 
 244 
 250 
 262 
 Part II 
 322 
 334 
 350 
 372 
 384 
 416 
 
XXV111 
 
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Natives of Tierra del Fuego . 
 
 
 Face page 
 
 430 
 
 PlEROLA .... 
 
 
 » 
 
 476 
 
 Caceres .... 
 
 
 >) 
 
 492 
 
 Bermudez, Candamo 
 
 
 >) 
 
 526 
 
 R.OMANA .... 
 
 
 >) 
 
 530 
 
 Inca Cup 
 
 
 a 
 
 546 
 
 Indian Hut 
 
 
 >) 
 
 562 
 
 Indians in Gala Costume 
 
 
 )> 
 
 572 
 
 Map of Northern Section of South America 
 
 • >} 
 
 576 
 
 Map of South America 
 
 
 At the end 
 
PART I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Some Traits of Spanish Character. Ferdinand and Isabella. Treat- 
 ment of Moors and Jews. The Inquisition and Intellectual 
 Expansion. Population of Spain in the Fifteenth Century. First 
 Spanish Colonists. Treatment of Natives in South America. 
 Examples of Spanish Cruelty and Treachery. Destruction of 
 Astec and Inca Civilisation. Dissensions in South America. 
 Spanish Bravery. Catholicism in South America. Immigration 
 to the Colonies. Introduction of Negroes. Turbulent Settlers. 
 Political Parties in South America. Spain and Decentralisation. 
 Trade Restrictions. Causes of Dissatisfaction. Spanish Monopoly 
 of Official Posts. Incidents of Brazilian History. British, French 
 and Dutch Action. Plot for Brazilian Independence. The 
 Peninsular Wars and Brazil. The Empire Proclaimed. Abdica- 
 tion of Pedro I. Indian Population. The Tupi-Guarani Stock. 
 Araucanians and Patagonians. Aymara and Quichua. Natural 
 Resources of the Continent. Geographical Features. 
 
 A destructive tendency was ever a prominent trait 
 of the Spaniards, as indeed it has been, and is, of most 
 conquering races ; and it had far-reaching influences 
 over the countries falling under Spanish dominion at 
 the latter end of the fifteenth century. Their inclination 
 was to crush out the civilisation of a conquered foe, 
 never to absorb its useful features. No consideration 
 was extended to established customs in regions where 
 Spanish arms proved victorious, no effort made to adapt 
 existing forms to a higher standard of moral and 
 material progress. The monarchs of Spain governed 
 by absolute authority, and this system was accepted by 
 the Spanish people. Everything foreign was regarded 
 with distrust, and, where opportunity offered, was sup- 
 pressed to make room for Spanish practices. 
 
4 INTRODUCTION 
 
 The period under Ferdinand and Isabella is regarded 
 by Spaniards as the most noteworthy epoch in the 
 national life, and it was certainly replete with striking- 
 historical events. It resounded with the clash of arms. 
 Supremacy over the Moors was won by unstinting 
 sacrifice of blood and treasure. In industrial arts the 
 vanquished foe was more advanced than the victor. 
 But the Spaniard could not stay his destroying hand. 
 He had no monopoly of savagery during an epoch when 
 brutality was a feature of the age, but his barbarity left 
 so deep an impress on South American character, that 
 it is necessary to make full reference to it in any en- 
 deavour to understand the condition of the people of 
 that continent. Without thought of future benefit to 
 Spain from Moorish industry under Castilian rule the 
 conquered enemy was driven from the land, his civil- 
 isation eliminated, the accumulated wealth of centuries 
 irretrievably dispersed. Never an effort was made to 
 assimilate what was best in the Moorish community. 
 The self-satisfied and unreasoning dogma of the 
 Spaniard ordained that Spanish methods and ideas 
 alone should be tolerated. 
 
 The treatment of the Jewish population of Spain 
 has a strong bearing upon the national character. 
 Under the thinly veiled pretext of religion, these 
 unfortunate people were mulcted of goods and chattels, 
 and threatened with untold penalties if they refused to 
 embrace Christianity. They were denounced as heretics 
 when they did abjure the faith of their forefathers. To 
 obtain wealth, Spaniards married into Jewish families 
 to such an extent, that a strain of Jewish blood had 
 become a marked racial trait in Spain at the close of 
 the fifteenth century. Yet blood relationship availed 
 nothing when the fiat went forth at the instigation of 
 the Holy Inquisition that Jews should be driven from 
 Spanish territory. Authentic records attest that 33,000 
 families were expelled under circumstances of most 
 repulsive cruelty. So hard were the conditions imposed, 
 that many of these exiles died by the wayside, starved 
 
INTRODUCTION 5 
 
 to death in consequence of Spanish authorities forbid- 
 ding them to carry away from their plenty a sufficiency 
 to sustain life, until the haven of a foreign country was 
 reached. That was four centuries ago. How little the 
 national character has changed, can be judged by the 
 treatment meted out by Spaniards to Cubans yesterday. 
 
 Nor is it strange that when other European nations 
 were awakening to the demands of progressing civilisa- 
 tion, Spain should have shown none of the intellectual 
 expansion which forced other communities onwards and 
 upwards. The iron hand of the Inquisition checked all 
 forward movement. That dread tribunal controlled the 
 mental faculties of Spaniards, and literature and art were 
 subordinated to its tyranny. It formed the medium of 
 spiteful revenge for every person ill disposed against his 
 neighbour. Its power was omnipotent, crushing all 
 individual initiative. It was the custodian of every 
 Spaniard's conscience. Resistance to its dictates 
 entailed torture and death, and generation after genera- 
 tion grew to manhood with this awful, mysterious force 
 pervading public and private life, so that the constant 
 terror of its workings dwarfed national personality. 
 
 It was no passing phase this effort of the Church in 
 Spain to terrorise men and women. It lasted for 
 centuries, and made an indelible impress upon the 
 national mind. It was unsparingly used for political 
 purposes when occasion required. From it arose the 
 tyrannical spirit and lust of killing that afterwards 
 found wide scope in the vast colonial possessions of 
 Spain. The Inquisition fostered the destructive 
 tendency in the national character emanating from 
 the internal dissension and constant warfare to which 
 Spain has been a prey from earliest ages. It en- 
 couraged every form of cruelty under pretence of 
 protection for religious belief; therefore it brutalised 
 and degraded where it professed to purify and upraise : 
 and it was under such guidance that Spain was destined 
 to impose her sway over the new world which Columbus 
 opened to her knowledge. 
 
6 INTRODUCTION 
 
 At the end of the fifteenth century the people of 
 Spain were of mixed blood, for the Spanish stock was 
 diluted with Jewish and Moorish strains. Moreover, 
 the national character had been formed under malignant 
 influences, and the outcome was narrow-minded fanati- 
 cism, carelessness as to human life, despotic conduct 
 towards all of lower rank, an absence of any impartial 
 sense of justice. A lower standard of the relation of 
 man to man, a narrower conception of public morality, 
 it would even in those days have been difficult to find 
 anywhere. It was from the scum of this fanatical 
 population that the first colonists came. Adventurers 
 who had nothing to lose at home were willing enough 
 to risk their lives in the hope of substantial reward for 
 their services. From such elements was drawn the 
 nucleus of the Spanish population of a continent already 
 claiming many millions of inhabitants and teeming with 
 enormous natural resources. In such circumstances it 
 was natural that the worst characteristics of the 
 Spaniards should become abnormally developed. Out- 
 casts in their own country, they now enjoyed unbridled 
 license, and their cupidity was unduly excited by riches 
 in the new countries open to the free exercise of their 
 evil passions. To these men killing was no murder, 
 theft no crime, treachery an everyday occurrence. 
 
 The Spanish expeditions to America and the West 
 Indies, as recorded by Spanish chroniclers, were marked 
 by ferocious cruelty, unlimited bloodshed, unparalleled 
 lust for treasure. A kindly reception by natives was 
 recompensed by the wholesale enslavement of the people 
 for enforced labour in the search for gold and other 
 wealth. Nor was any vestige of humanity shown in 
 the treatment of the various tribes thrown into bondage. 
 If food was scarce they were allowed to starve whilst 
 their masters feasted. Padre Casas relates how, when 
 lack of provisions threatened a disastrous famine amongst 
 the slaves, many of these unfortunates were butchered, 
 and the victims served out to the survivors to keep 
 them alive to work as beasts of burthen. Yet these 
 
INTRODUCTION 7 
 
 expeditions were conducted under the pretence of 
 advancing civilisation and hallowed by the presence of 
 priests. The hideous barbarities committed were 
 cloaked over by the fact that the Holy Cross was 
 planted on Pagan shores and the heathen forced to 
 accept the outward forms of Christianity. Can we 
 wonder that these creatures of misfortune at times rose 
 up in their agony and slew their oppressors ? 
 
 Nowhere does history record a more pitiful picture 
 than when the ■ Spaniards depopulated Cuba of an 
 inoffensive and friendly race. Or turn to the action of 
 Cortes towards Montezuma, or of Pizarro towards 
 Atahualpa. Yet the Church condoned the atrocious 
 cruelty practised upon the representatives of Astec and 
 Inca royalty. Upholders of Spanish traditions plead 
 that the barbarities attending the conquest of Mexico 
 and South America were in accordance with the spirit 
 of the age. Such excuse is less than half true, and 
 avails nothing when the effect upon the character of 
 succeeding generations is considered. 
 
 Nothing can be said in favour of the absolute 
 destruction of Astec and Inca civilisation. The 
 Spaniards could offer no better system of administration 
 to replace the empires so wantonly destroyed. Fear 
 that the conquered nations might rise and drive the 
 Spanish hordes into the sea decided the leaders of the 
 invading hosts to smite their victims hip and thigh. 
 The narrow-minded ideas of Cortes, Pizarro, and their 
 colleagues never recognised that the civilisation they 
 found could be turned to the inestimable advantage of 
 the Spanish Crown and these new countries governed 
 by expanding a system already established. The Astecs 
 and Incas belonged undoubtedly to a barbaric period. 
 They were pagans. In customs and habits of thought 
 they had little in common with the Spaniards, who 
 swept like a thunderbolt over their territories. But 
 they had developed a form of government well adapted 
 for the needs of the people and countries over which 
 they claimed jurisdiction. Justice was administered by 
 
8 INTRODUCTION 
 
 responsible chiefs, rapid communication between the 
 seat of the central power and the different sections of 
 the Empire was maintained, and peace so far assured 
 as to admit of agricultural and other pursuits to be 
 followed. 
 
 With full knowledge of the conditions surrounding 
 the imperial rule of Astec and Inca, the Spaniards 
 deliberately tore down the whole fabric of existing 
 order. On the principle that they were few and the 
 inhabitants of these countries many, the Spanish leaders 
 determined that the position of themselves and their 
 followers would be better secured if anarchy replaced 
 stable administration in Mexico, Peru, and elsewhere in 
 South America. The seed of unrest was thus sown 
 broadcast. It matured with amazing rapidity, and is 
 not quelled to this day. 
 
 When the fear of immediate danger from the con- 
 quered nations was removed, the Spaniards allowed their 
 hatred and jealousies of one another to emerge. The 
 disputes between the brothers Pizarro and the leader 
 Almagro are typical of the state of affairs prevailing in 
 South America in the first half of the sixteenth century. 
 Bloody battles were fought by rival factions. When 
 Almagro was defeated and captured near Cuzco in April 
 1538, 'his speedy execution followed as a natural con- 
 sequence. For Spaniard or Indian death was the penalty 
 for opposition to the clique in power. 
 
 One quality these Spaniards had to aid them in their 
 conquests. There was no lack of personal courage. 
 Ignorant they were, but of their bravery no question 
 can be raised, and the long marches of those bands of 
 armed men over vast stretches of arid desert compel 
 admiration. Although often clays without a drop of 
 water to moisten throats parched by the burning rays 
 of a tropical sun, they never despaired, but pushed 
 onwards until the goal was reached. As soldiers, 
 they presented an undaunted front, and won their 
 way in the face of incredible hardships through 
 countries where progress was ever threatened by a 
 
INTRODUCTION 9 
 
 hostile population, smarting under the knowledge of 
 cruel wrongs. 
 
 While it is hard to view with leniency the attitude 
 of the Catholic priesthood during the subjugation of 
 South America, it cannot be denied that in subsequent 
 years the clergy helped to inculcate orderly ways amongst 
 the natives. The Jesuits were active in founding settle- 
 ments where agriculture was encouraged and mechanical 
 arts taught. Schools and churches were established in 
 every section of South America. Even Paraguay and 
 the desolate regions of Patagonia were not too distant 
 to receive the earnest attention of these preachers of 
 Christianity, and missionaries were never lacking for 
 the task of exploration in these unknown districts. 
 The policy of the Church in South America is full 
 of curious contradiction. An almost indiscriminate 
 slaughter of the inhabitants was countenanced as a 
 necessary prelude to the foundation of Christianity. 
 This was succeeded by the offer of thousands of indi- 
 vidual members of the priesthood to risk their lives and 
 suffer exile to spread the faith in which they professed 
 such earnest belief. Sword in one hand, crucifix in the 
 other, these missionaries accomplished work of stupen- 
 dous magnitude. And it is due to unparalleled efforts 
 by these stalwart pioneers of the gospel in the sixteenth 
 and two succeeding centuries that Roman Catholicism 
 has now so firm a grip in South America. 
 
 For three centuries after the discovery of South 
 America, immigration from Europe was restricted to 
 natives of Spain. There was no desire to encourage 
 settlers from other countries, and obstacles were 
 thrown in the path of travellers of other nationalities 
 desirous of visiting territories under Spanish control. 
 It was only by special permission that foreign explorers 
 were allowed to reach the interior of the continent. 
 Even as late as the close of the eighteenth century these 
 restrictions were maintained, so that it was with difficulty 
 Humboldt obtained the privilege of journeying through 
 Spanish America for scientific purposes. And as for 
 
io Introduction 
 
 the immigrants from Spain, they were principally men 
 attracted by tales of great wealth in New Granada, Peru, 
 Chile, and the Bio de la Plata. These adventurous 
 spirits intermarried freely with the native women. 
 Another racial element was introduced into South 
 America during this period, for the importation of 
 slaves from Africa attained large proportions, and this 
 traffic continued until the commencement of the nine- 
 teenth century. From the mixture of Spanish, Indian, 
 and negro blood thus brought about, sprang up the people 
 who now form the principal population of the continent. 
 It is only since the dominion of Spain was cast off that 
 any considerable influx of other nationalities has 
 occurred, and even that has taken place to an impor- 
 tant extent only during the last thirty years. In these 
 circumstances it is too soon to expect to see any radical 
 alteration from the dominant traits of Spanish character. 
 In Brazil the state of affairs was almost identical, 
 Portugal following the example of Spain in her colonial 
 policy. 
 
 Unsatisfactory conditions prevailed in these colonies 
 during the sixteenth century. In the vice-royalties of 
 New Granada and Peru, where great mineral wealth 
 abounded, the Spanish population was defiant of 
 authority. The representatives of the Spanish Crown 
 held absolute power, and frequently adopted towards 
 Spaniards as well as Indians an attitude which could not 
 fail to raise bitter resentment. Provided that a Viceroy 
 could remit large sums of treasure to fill the royal purse 
 he was assured that small fault would be found with the 
 methods he employed in his administration. With no 
 redress from the Crown, the colonists often took the 
 remedy of their grievances into their own hands. Such 
 a case was the assassination of Francisco Pizarro in 
 June, 1541. From time to time similar fate befell other 
 prominent officials, for sacrifice of human life to satisfy 
 revengeful feelings was a common means to an end. In 
 1542 the promulgation of new laws for the colonies 
 caused a storm of indignation, and the first Viceroy of 
 
INTRODUCTION 11 
 
 Peru, Velasco Nunez de Vela, sent out to enforce them, 
 was defeated by the revolutionary party under Gonzalo 
 Pizarro, and killed near Quito in January, 1546. It was 
 not until eight years later that Spanish dominion was 
 again established over the disaffected districts by the 
 third Viceroy, Don Andres Hurtado de Mendoza, and 
 then only after heavy losses. 
 
 The gradual development of the population and 
 wealth of the colonies during the seventeenth and 
 eighteenth centuries resulted in a situation little under- 
 stood in Spain. Two principal political parties arose. 
 The first and more numerous comprised the native-born 
 colonials, and a certain section of Spaniards wishing 
 greater freedom for self-government than the Crown 
 was prepared to grant ; the second was composed of 
 the official element, and those Spaniards who were 
 opposed to any measure of decentralisation. Repre- 
 sentations from the Colonial Party met with scant 
 consideration at the hands of the Spanish Crown. To 
 some extent this was because communications passed 
 through the officials in South America, and complaints 
 were reported upon and smothered before reaching their 
 destination. The spirit of the age in Spain, moreover, 
 was distinctly averse to any extension of autonomy for 
 the colonies. Absolute power at home and abroad was 
 the policy of the Spanish Crown, and this alienated 
 Colonial sympathy from the mother country. 
 
 As the natural resources of South America became 
 better known in Spain, the desire of the Crown to be 
 the principal beneficiary of the riches existing in these 
 new territories was increased. Trade with foreign 
 nations was not permitted, and severe restrictions were 
 placed upon intercolonial commerce. In 1602 a custom- 
 house was established at Cordoba for the purpose of 
 levying duties equivalent to 50 per cent, of the value of 
 all commodities passing between Peru and the River 
 Plate. It was not until 1665 that this irritating restraint 
 on commercial business was relaxed, and only in 1774 
 were many of the obstacles in the way of trade be- 
 
12 INTRODUCTION 
 
 tween the various South American colonies removed. 
 Naturally, the interference of the Home Government 
 with the normal expansion of the South American 
 settlements raised violent criticism and bitter feeling on 
 the part of the colonists. From these causes began 
 that wish for independence, which became increasingly 
 evident towards the close of the eighteenth century. 
 
 Another element in the Spanish regime which caused 
 acute dissatisfaction was the exclusive nomination of 
 Spanish officials to all public offices, the claims of 
 colonial-born aspirants to take part in local administra- 
 tion being ignored. Moreover, the tendency of the 
 scattered Spanish- speaking population which had grown 
 up during three centuries was for decentralisation. 
 This sentiment met with the extreme disapproval at 
 home. Peru was the principal stronghold of Spanish 
 power, and the jurisdiction granted to the Viceroy there 
 was more widely extended than the powers invested in 
 the governments of Rio de la Plata or elsewhere ; but 
 the determination of the Spanish authorities to maintain 
 a monopoly of official appointments for Spaniards at 
 the expense of colonials, applied to all Spanish posses- 
 sions in South America, and was not restricted to Peru. 
 A distinct line was created between Spaniards and 
 colonials, and a feeling of animosity thereby developed 
 which made possible the outbreak against Spanish 
 dominion at the commencement of the nineteenth 
 century, and finally led to the independence of the 
 colonies. 
 
 Brazil boasts a more chequered history than any 
 other South American republic. It was originally taken 
 possession of in the name of the Spanish Crown by 
 Vincent Yanez Pincon. In 1500 Pedro Cabral annexed 
 a portion of its territory to Portugal, but attempted no 
 settlement. A little later Amerigo Vespucci was sent to 
 found a colony in the vicinity of the district now known 
 as Bahia. Between 1500 and 1578 some progress in 
 the work of colonisation was made, but in the latter 
 year these territories passed under control of Spain, and 
 
INTRODUCTION ]3 
 
 remained under Spanish jurisdiction until 1640. It 
 was during this period of sixty-two years that Brazil was 
 subject to constant attacks from English, French and 
 Dutch adventurers. The Dutch took possession of 
 Bahia in 1624, and for more than a score of years 
 Holland was the dominant power over the provinces of 
 the north. In 1649, however, an expedition commanded 
 by Vieyra was despatched from Portugal, and after 
 severe fighting for half a dozen years, Portuguese 
 authority was re-established. No further foreign inva- 
 sion of a serious character took place until 1710, when 
 a French squadron under Duclerc attacked the city of 
 Rio de Janeiro, but half the invading force was killed, 
 and the remainder, to the number of 500 men, captured. 
 In the following year a French fleet under Admiral 
 Duguay Trouin appeared, and Rio de Janeiro was 
 occupied in September 1711, after four days of desper- 
 ate fighting. But the French admiral merely levied 
 substantial ransom and withdrew, and from thence- 
 forth no attempt was made to wrest the colony from 
 Portugal. 
 
 In 1789 a movement was set afoot to establish the 
 independence of Brazil from Portuguese dominion, but 
 the conspiracy failed, and Tiradentes, the leader of the 
 plot, was arrested and hanged, while other prominent 
 persons implicated in the movement were banished to 
 Africa. 
 
 The Peninsular war brought a crisis of far-reaching 
 importance in Brazilian affairs. To begin with, the 
 invasion of Portugal by Napoleon in 1807 forced King 
 Joao VI. to fly the country. The monarch, with a 
 following of prominent Portuguese, including the 
 cabinet ministers, left Lisbon in November, 1807, and 
 reached Bahia in January 1808, thence proceeding to 
 Rio de Janeiro. Consequently for some years the 
 colony became the seat of the parent Government. As 
 retaliation for the invasion of Portugal, Joao VI. ordered 
 an expedition to attack French Guiana, obtaining 
 possession of that territory, which, however, was restored 
 
14 INTRODUCTION 
 
 to the French by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. The 
 same year saw the title of Brazil changed from a colony 
 to that of the Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and 
 Alagarves. In 1817 Brazil entered upon a war of 
 aggression in the south, and succeeded in capturing 
 Montevideo, but lost it again in 1823. 
 
 Additional taxation had been imposed by King 
 Joao VI. to obtain the necessary funds to sustain his 
 court, and this led to dissatisfaction. Nor was the 
 subversive spirit thus generated allayed when the king 
 threw Brazilian commerce open to the world. An 
 agitation for independence sprang up and rapidly gained 
 ground. In 1821 King Joao went to Portugal, leaving 
 his son Pedro as Regent of Brazil. For a few months 
 Pedro was able to stay the progress of the revolutionary 
 movement, but in the following year the leaders decided 
 to offer the Regent the title of Emperor, provided that 
 independence from the mother country was accepted. 
 The proclamation of Pedro as first Emperor of Brazil 
 took place on October 12, 1822, and from that date 
 Portuguese dominion in Brazil was ended, notwith- 
 standing efforts from Lisbon to enforce re-establishment 
 of colonial authority. In 1825 the independence of 
 Brazil was recognised by King Joao VI. 
 
 The reign of Pedro I. was not happy. His auto- 
 cratic administration "of public affairs was unpopular. 
 The question of republic or monarchy was discussed 
 openly, while matters drifted generally from bad to 
 worse. On the death of Joao VI. the crown of Por- 
 tugal descended to Pedro, but was renounced by him 
 in favour of his daughter Maria. The popularity he 
 gained by this act was only temporary, and in 1831 the 
 political situation became more complicated, and as a 
 result the Emperor abdicated in favour of his five- 
 year-old son, and embarked for Europe. 
 
 A Regency was formed to administer the government 
 during the minority of Pedro II. The council was 
 elective, and based on thoroughly democratic principles, 
 but was not a success. Bitter jealousy arose against 
 
INTRODUCTION 15 
 
 the men who controlled the central power, and it was 
 decided to proclaim Pedro II. as Emperor, although he 
 was only fourteen years of age. On July 23, 1840, 
 the solemn announcement of his accession to the throne 
 was made- — the beginning of a reign destined to last for 
 nearly half a century. 
 
 When the European colonisation of South America 
 began, the Indian population of the continent consisted, 
 broadly speaking, of two great racial divisions, together 
 with a group of tribes dwelling in Araucania and 
 Patagonia, where conditions of climate and surroundings 
 produced different physical characteristics. On the 
 Atlantic slope of the Andes the Indians belonged to 
 the Tupi-Guarani stock, the many sections of population 
 from Venezuela in the north to the pampas of Argentina 
 in the south showing certain similarities in customs and 
 language that leave small doubt of their common origin. 
 Naturally, in this widely separated area, the features of 
 the various tribes became modified by local circum- 
 stances, but throughout the tropical and semi-tropical 
 latitudes of the eastern section of the continent the 
 main racial characteristics indicate a common root. 
 These tribes were nomadic, and existed principally on 
 the products of the chase or the wild fruits of the 
 forests. There is little evidence of husbandry previous 
 to the arrival of the Spanish and Portuguese conquerors. 
 Three hundred years of contact with European civilisa- 
 tion completely changed the chief characteristics of the 
 mass of this Indian population. The conquerors taught 
 the natives the value of agriculture and many of the 
 industrial arts. In those three centuries the mingling 
 of Portuguese and Spanish blood with that of the 
 Indians was so great that the bulk of the population 
 plainly showed the foreign strains. In the centre of the 
 continent there are still tribes that modern civilisation 
 has not touched, but they are few, and each year the 
 number lessens. 
 
 The Araucanian and Patagonian also were nomadic 
 and of fiercer temperament than the majority of the 
 
16 INTRODUCTION 
 
 tribes living further to the north. They levied constant 
 warfare against the Spanish colonists, and in consequence 
 their numbers dwindled to insignificant proportions. In 
 recent years the Araucanian has accepted the outlines 
 of modern civilisation in that he cultivates the ground 
 for his food, and barters the produce of his flocks and 
 herds with his Spanish- speaking neighbour, but his 
 picturesque identity is disappearing rapidly as settle- 
 ment from the north encroaches on the area over which 
 formerly he held undisputed sway. The advance of 
 civilisation into Patagonia is marked by the rapid 
 extinction of the Indian inhabitant in that quarter ; for 
 he will not adapt himself to any form of industry, and 
 as his hunting grounds every year become more con- 
 tracted, his final elimination can be only a matter of a 
 very few years. 
 
 On the Pacific slope of the Andes the Spaniards 
 found very different conditions on their arrival early in 
 the sixteenth century. From north of Quito to as far 
 south of Cuzco as the Rio Maule in Chile, the Incas had 
 welded the many tribes, chief amongst these being the 
 Canas, the Quichuas, the Chancas, the Huancas, the 
 Rucanas, the Collas, or Aymaras, the Conchucos, the 
 Huamachucos and Ayahuecas, into a great community 
 over which they exercised supreme power. The two 
 languages in common use were Quichua and Aymara, 
 the latter being confined to a comparatively limited area 
 of which Lake Titicaca and Arequipa were the principal 
 centres. The people lived under settled conditions, 
 built towns and roads, and were proficient in agricultural 
 and other industries. Evidences of the public works 
 executed by them before the Spanish conquest are 
 extant to-day at Cuzco, Trujillo, and many other 
 localities throughout Peru and Ecuador. Encouraged 
 to preserve their ancient institutions and develop their 
 existing industrial pursuits, these people might have 
 adopted modern civilisation and formed a great nation ; 
 but their individuality was so far crushed out of them 
 by their conquerors that they relapsed into a condition 
 
INTRODUCTION 17 
 
 of serfdom without ambition for any effort on their own 
 behalf. 
 
 The great natural resources of South America are 
 dealt with more particularly in connection with each 
 individual state, but it can well be understood how 
 the great mineral wealth of the continent attracted the 
 Spanish and Portuguese adventurers who led the expedi- 
 tions to this new world. Gold, silver, and precious 
 stones tempted them to face the most terrible hardships 
 in their desire to attain wealth. Minerals still form one 
 of the principal sources of riches in South America, but 
 they have been outdistanced by the astounding develop- 
 ment of agricultural and pastoral industry which has 
 taken place in recent years. 
 
 The geographical position of South America is proof 
 of its value for commercial and productive purposes. 
 There is a choice of climate from tropical to extreme 
 cold, and the series of great plateaux rising from the 
 Atlantic Ocean to the Andine ranges allow settlers 
 from Europe to find congenial surroundings even in 
 tropical latitudes. The great Andine chain divides the 
 continent from north to south. On the east the country 
 from Venezuela to the delta of the Orinoco generally 
 rises abruptly from the seaboard, and between each suc- 
 cessive mountain range lie fertile valleys where soil and 
 climate are fitted for semi-tropical cultivation until 
 increasing altitude brings a lower temperature. Gold, 
 silver, and other minerals are found in this region. From 
 the Orinoco to the Amazon there is an immense area 
 watered by the tributaries of these two mighty streams 
 and largely covered by heavy forests of valuable timber 
 containing many millions of rubber trees, and embracing 
 also open grass-covered plains known as the llanos. 
 South from the Amazon until the borders of Rio Grande 
 do Sul are reached, the land rises rapidly from the ocean, 
 and the open, rolling plateaux are the characteristic 
 feature. South of Rio Grande do Sul to the borders 
 of Patagonia <are the grass plains of the Pampas formed 
 by the rich alluvial deposits washed clown from the 
 
 B 
 
18 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Andes by the waters of the Rio de la Plata, the Uru- 
 guay, the Parana and their tributaries. Patagonia, 
 although rugged and broken as a rule, contains many 
 fertile plains and valleys as well as vast stretches of 
 alkaline, arid desert. 
 
 On the western side of the continent spurs of the 
 Andes run down to the coast-line, and these are inter- 
 spersed with valleys of amazing fertility. Even in the 
 rainless section which embraces the greater part of Peru 
 and a large portion of Chile irrigation has converted 
 into gardens most of the bottom lands of the valleys. 
 In this rainless district lie enormous deposits of mineral 
 wealth in the shape of nitrate of soda, borax, copper, 
 gold, silver and other commodities. It was from Peru 
 and Bolivia that the Spanish Crown obtained fabulous 
 riches in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth 
 centuries. 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 
 
 Colonial Discontent. Weakness of the Spanish Government. Efforts 
 of Spain to Conciliate the Colonies. Action of the Regency of 
 Cadiz. Caracas and the Separatist Movement. Simon Bolivar 
 and the Struggle for Independence. Genei'al Paez. Proclama- 
 tion of Colombian Independence. Bolivar frees Ecuador and 
 marches to Peru. The Revolt in Argentina. Treaty between 
 Argentina and Great Britain. Anarchy in Montevideo. 
 Paraguay effects a Bloodless Revolution. The Struggle in Chile. 
 The Monroe Doctrine. Mr Canning and the Holy Alliance. 
 South America after Independence. Bolivar and his Political 
 Enemies. Disintegration of Colombia. Venezuela as a Republic. 
 Ecuadorian Affairs. Dissensions in Peru. Friction in Chile 
 over Form of Government. Bolivia and General Sucre. 
 Uruguayan Developments. Conflict in Argentina between 
 Federalists and Unitarians. Advent to Power of Rosas. 
 
 The beginning of the nineteenth century found the 
 Spanish colonies seething with discontent against the 
 rule of the mother country, and so ripe for revolt that 
 a spark only was necessary to fire the train. The 
 Napoleonic wars had shown the colonists the weakness 
 of the Spanish Crown at home, and the confusion 
 resulting from the orders sent simultaneously by Carlos 
 IV., Joseph Bonaparte, and Ferdinand VII. served to 
 loosen materially the ties between South America and 
 Spain. Moreover, an appeal from Buenos Aires for aid 
 in repelling British aggression had met with the reply 
 that the colonists must protect themselves as no 
 assistance could be given. This incident set men think- 
 ing of the position of the colonies towards Spain, and 
 
20 EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 
 
 when the residents of the River Plate had driven out the 
 British by their own unassisted exertions, the trend of 
 opinion everywhere in South America pronounced de- 
 cidedly in favour of separation from Spanish control. 
 
 The Spanish authorities were not altogether blind 
 to popular feeling in South America, and an effort was 
 made to quell the rising spirit of rebellion by the grant 
 of various concessions. There is, moreover, no doubt that 
 the revolutionary outbreak at Quito in 1809 thoroughly 
 roused Spaniards at home to the immediate danger of the 
 loss of the colonies, the more so as this occurred after the 
 enactment of certain measures which were intended to 
 conciliate the disaffected section of the population. 
 This movement at Quito was suppressed, but it is 
 noteworthy as the first attempt of the Spanish colonies 
 to secure their emancipation by force of arms. 
 
 By royal decree on January 22, 1809, it was 
 announced that the South American colonies were an 
 integral part of the monarchy, and, as provinces, entitled 
 to direct representation in the Cortes. Three individuals 
 for each capital were to be selected by the municipalities, 
 and from these three persons the representative to the 
 Cortes was to be chosen. Ordinances were passed, 
 mitigating the existing restrictions on colonial commerce 
 and trade. This change of policy was well received, but 
 came too late to eradicate the bitter resentment created 
 in the past. When, therefore, a year later the Regency 
 of Cadiz abolished these Ordinances, the colonists 
 determined to make a supreme effort to obtain for 
 themselves the freedom of government hitherto denied 
 to them by the mother country. 
 
 Caracas was the scene of the beginning of the 
 movement which led to emancipation. On April 19, 
 1810, the Municipal Council was constituted into a 
 Junta of Government, and refused to obey the authority 
 of the Regency, but expressed willingness to recognise 
 the sovereignty of Ferdinand VII. The movement was 
 aggravated by the arrival of emissaries from Joseph 
 Bonaparte, to request the recognition of his right to the 
 
1810] SIMON BOLIVAR 21 
 
 Spanish crown. Revolutionary outbreaks followed in 
 quick succession in Bogota, Quito, Buenos Aires, Monte- 
 video and Chile ; in Bolivia an insurrection against the 
 authorities became a separatist campaign, but Peru 
 remained loyal to Spain until a later period. 
 
 In Venezuela the real leader of the rebellion was 
 Simon Bolivar, a man of European education and great 
 wealth. Born at Caracas in 1785, he was a very young 
 man at the time his compatriots decided to enter on the 
 struggle for the control of their future destiny. Bolivar 
 after the outbreak of the revolt visited England as the 
 rebel envoy, but was received coldly, and shortly after- 
 wards returned to Venezuela, bringing a small supply of 
 arms and ammunition. At first the Spaniards were 
 unable to cope with the revolutionary movement, but 
 two years later General Monteverde, at the head of a 
 strong force of royalist troops, recovered control of the 
 greater portion of the province, and in 1812 the cause of 
 the rebels looked gloomy from all points. In that year 
 Bolivar, who had sought asylum in Curacao, collected 
 all the refugees from Venezuela and New Granada, and 
 landed with 800 men at Cartagena. Marching from 
 that town into Venezuela, he was joined by many thou- 
 sands of volunteers, and routed the Spanish forces in a 
 series of battles. On August 4, 1813, Bolivar entered 
 Caracas in triumph, and was proclaimed dictator until 
 such time as Venezuela could unite with New Granada. 
 
 But the Spaniards were not yet beaten. Under Puy 
 and Bover a bloody and energetic campaign was com- 
 menced which ended in the defeat of Bolivar and his 
 flight by sea to Cartagena in 1813. He offered his 
 services to New Granada, and the Congress at Bogota 
 accepted them on condition that Venezuela, when free, 
 should join that confederation. In 1814 came news that 
 Ferdinand VII. was sending a force of 10,000 men to 
 protect the royal interests in New Granada and Vene- 
 zuela. Bolivar, now appointed Captain-General for New 
 Granada and Venezuela, marched through Magdalena, 
 where he inflicted serious losses on the Spaniards. But 
 
22 EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 
 
 dissensions broke out between him and the revolutionary 
 authorities, with the result that the Captain-General 
 embarked for Jamaica ; while on December 6, 1815, 
 General Morilla, at the head of a Spanish army, occupied 
 Cartagena. Once again the outlook for the rebels was 
 gloomy. 
 
 Bolivar now saved the situation for the insurgents. 
 He organised a naval expedition, and defeated the 
 Spanish flotilla ; then, landing in Venezuela, he recruited 
 a large body of men under the Indian Paez and pushed 
 operations energetically and successfully against the 
 Spaniards. Campaign followed campaign with varying 
 fortune until the end of 1818, when Lopez Mendez 
 recruited and equipped in Europe some 9000 men to 
 fight for the revolutionary cause. From 1818 the 
 success of the rebellion was never in doubt. Victory 
 after victory was gained by the revolutionary arms, and 
 in December 1819 New Granada and Venezuela were 
 united under the name of the Republic of Colombia. 
 For a time the Spaniards attempted to retrieve the 
 position, but in 1821 they were crushed at the battle of 
 Carabobo, the remnants of their army retiring to Puerto 
 Cabello, and surrendering to General Paez some two 
 years later. Paez was one of the most remarkable 
 figures in the War of Independence, and is credited with 
 extraordinary heroism. It is stated that he captured 
 a flotilla of Spanish gunboats on the Apure river by 
 swimming his cavalry out and boarding the ships. 
 On another occasion he is credited with killing 40 
 Spaniards single handed in one fight. 
 
 On August 30, 1821, the constitution of Colombia 
 was formally ratified, and Bolivar was proclaimed Presi- 
 dent. He determined to free Ecuador from Spanish 
 control, as he had New Granada and Venezuela, and he 
 organised an expedition to Quito for that purpose. The 
 turning-point of this campaign was the battle of Pichincha 
 in 1822, where General Sucre destroyed the Spanish 
 army and left the road to Quito open for the advance 
 of Bolivar. The Ecuadorian capital was occupied on 
 
1822] SIMON BOLIVAR 23 
 
 June, 1822, and the country thenceforth emancipated 
 from Spanish dominion. 
 
 Bolivar now determined to march from Quito to 
 Peru to aid in the destruction of the Spanish power in 
 that country. Chile and Argentina had combined to 
 drive the Spaniards out of Peru, and in 1820 a fleet 
 under command of Lord Cochrane had defeated the 
 Spanish squadron and landed a force of 5000 men com- 
 manded by the Argentine General, San Martin, on the 
 Peruvian coast. This army had occupied Lima on July 
 28, 1821, but the Spaniards maintained a stout resist- 
 ance at Callao and other points. It was not until 1824 
 that the final battles were fought which broke down the 
 Spanish power. On August 6 of that year the forces 
 under Bolivar met the Spaniards at Junin, and gained a 
 decisive victory, due in great part to a brilliant cavalry 
 charge led by Colonel Suarez. After this action Bolivar 
 left the army in charge of General Sucre, and at 
 Ayacucho, on December 9, 1824, this officer inflicted a 
 crushing defeat on the Spanish forces under General 
 Canterac, capturing all the principal Spanish civil and 
 military officials, and putting an end to the power of 
 Spain in this section of South America. General Sucre 
 then proceeded to Bolivia, or Upper Peru as it then 
 was called, and in a very short time overcame such resist- 
 ance as the Spaniards were able to offer, and in 1825 he 
 was proclaimed the first President of that republic. 
 
 In the south of the continent the struggle for 
 independence was severe, but it was more difficult for 
 Spain to send troops and supplies to sustain her cause 
 in those far-away regions, and had the colonists on both 
 sides of the River Plate acted in unison, the conflict 
 would have been short. Unfortunately, individual 
 ambitions amongst the leaders of the movement in 
 Montevideo and Buenos Aires constantly occurred, and 
 proved of material assistance to the Spanish cause, 
 these internal dissensions preventing a decisive bloAv 
 for emancipation. 
 
 In the provinces of the Rio de la Plata the leaders 
 
24 EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 
 
 of the movement were Moreno, Rivadavia, Castelli, 
 Belgrano, and Valcarcel. In 1810 an assembly of 600 
 notables deposed the Viceroy Baltasar de Cisneros, and 
 he retired to Montevideo, still under Spanish dominion. 
 In 1814 a revolutionary army from Buenos Aires 
 captured Montevideo, but this did not end the struggle, 
 and for another two years hostilities continued between 
 the partizans of Spain and the supporters of the 
 rebellion. On March 25, 1816, a congress assembled 
 at Tucuman proclaimed Puyredon dictator, and on July 
 9 of the same year the Act of Independence of the 
 United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata was ratified. 
 A National Convention for the States forming the 
 present Argentine Confederation assembled in Buenos 
 Aires on January 23, 1825, and on February 2 Sir 
 Woodbine Parish, acting under instructions from Mr 
 Canning, signed a treaty of commerce and friendship by 
 which the independence of the new republic was 
 acknowledged. 
 
 Meanwhile Montevideo had been a centre of anarchy 
 and strife. General Artigas had been declared dictator 
 of Uruguay, and was recognised by the authorities of 
 Buenos Aires as the head of the republic of the Banda 
 Oriental. Portuguese aggression, which aimed at per- 
 manently annexing Uruguay to Brazil, brought about a 
 conflict between Brazil and Buenos Aires, and the 
 struggle continued until August 27, 1828, when, through 
 the mediation of Great Britain, a treaty was signed at 
 Rio de Janeiro acknowledging Uruguayan independence, 
 and was ratified at Santa Fe on October 4 of the same 
 year. 
 
 Paraguay secured emancipation from Spain without 
 any sanguinary conflicts with the representatives of the 
 mother country. Isolated in the interior of the continent, 
 it took some time for the revolutionary ideas of the 
 period to permeate the principal centres of population, 
 and when General Belgrano appeared in 1810, with an 
 Argentine force, to aid a revolution against Spanish 
 dominion, he was received in a most hostile spirit and 
 
H& 
 
 Jose San Martin. 
 
 [Face page 24. 
 
1818] THE RIVER PLATE AND CHILE 25 
 
 defeated in battle some forty miles from Asuncion. Not 
 long afterwards the Paraguayan leaders reconsidered 
 their attitude, with the result that on May 14, 1811, a 
 bloodless revolution was accomplished, and Dr Rodri- 
 guez de Francia and Fulgencio Yegros were nominated 
 First Consuls of the New Republic. In 1841 Francia 
 was succeeded by his nephew, Don Carlos Lopez, and 
 he by his son the notorious General, Solano Lopez, in 
 1862. 
 
 In Chile the separatist movement became active in 
 1810, and at first the colonists achieved many successes ; 
 but in 1813 an army under General Paroja re-established 
 the authority of the Spanish Crown. The Chilians 
 begged for help from the Government at Buenos Aires, 
 and in 1817 General San Martin crossed the Andes 
 with an army of 4000 strong, and on February 12, 1817, 
 gave battle to the royalist forces at Chacabuco and won 
 a decisive victory. Three days afterwards San Martin 
 with his troops and the Chilian revolutionary army 
 entered Santiago. A new Government was formed, 
 with General O'Higgins at its head, and on January 1, 
 1818, the independence of Chile was formally pro- 
 claimed. But the fighting was not yet over, and the 
 royalists, commanded by General Osorio, and reinforced 
 by 5000 men from Peru, prepared to make another 
 desperate effort to regain supremacy. In the valley of 
 Concha Rayada he inflicted a serious defeat on the 
 troops under General San Martin ; but the insurgents 
 rallied, and on April 5, 1818, succeeded in crushing 
 General Osorio at Maypu, by this victory finally securing 
 the independence of their country. 
 
 As a rule South Americans give too little importance 
 to the influence the Monroe doctrine exercised upon the 
 final outcome of their struggle for liberty. It is true 
 that no public announcement of the United States 
 policy was made until December, 1823, when the 
 Spaniards had been defeated in nearly all the colonies ; 
 but this fact detracts nothing from its paramount im- 
 portance for the South American republics. Its effect 
 
26 EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 
 
 was to prevent any attempt on the part of the mother 
 country to reconquer the Spanish colonies by her own 
 single-handed exertions or in combination with other 
 European powers. 
 
 The idea of America for the Americans was not new 
 when Mr Monroe enunciated it in the United States 
 Congress. We know that the formulation of that policy 
 was uppermost in the minds of Washington and 
 Alexander Hamilton, and Benjamin Franklin after 
 the separation of the American colonies from Great 
 Britain — indeed, it may be said that only the 
 opportunity was awaited to announce it to the 
 world. When the danger arose of the intervention 
 of the Holy Alliance to aid Spain to regain her 
 lost possessions, Mr Canning saw an occasion to 
 further British interests by the recognition of South 
 American independence as a means of adjusting the 
 balance of power, and so counteracting the influence of 
 that league of despotisms. At his instigation the 
 popular sentiment in the United States was expressed 
 in the memorable message of President Monroe. It is 
 said that Canning even went so far as personally to 
 draft the portion of the message which dealt with the 
 neutrality of the United States in European political 
 affairs, and the abstention of European aggression in 
 North and South America ; but that oft-repeated tale 
 is improbable, for Monroe did little more than formulate 
 a sentiment which had been gaining ground steadily in 
 America for fifty years. That Canning thoroughly 
 approved of the United States policy is proved by the 
 fact that, by his advice, Great Britain was the first 
 European power to recognise the independence of the 
 South American States. The first South American 
 minister accredited to the Court of St James was sent 
 by the Republic of Colombia, and Mr Canning in 
 presenting him to George IV. used the dramatic 
 expression, " Sire, I bring to you the representative of 
 a new world." 
 
 The years immediately succeeding the struggle for 
 
1827] INTERNAL DISSENSIONS 27 
 
 independence were troublous times in South America. 
 The former colonists had no clear idea of the responsi- 
 bility entailed by the liberty for which they had fought 
 and sacrificed their blood and treasure. So long as 
 Spain was the common enemy, a sense of patriotism 
 held in check, to a great extent, the internal dissensions 
 which always existed. Once the common danger dis- 
 appeared, intrigue and personal ambition ran riot, and 
 led to a condition of affairs bordering upon anarchy in 
 many of the new republics. 
 
 Simon Bolivar, the Liberator, after the extinction 
 of Spanish rule in Peru, endeavoured to bring about a 
 federation of the South American republics into one 
 great community, but his action was unacceptible to 
 Chile and Buenos Aires, and aroused bitter jealousy in 
 those states. Finding it impossible to realise his project, 
 he returned to Colombia in 1826, internal disturbances 
 in that country demanding his prompt attention. 
 Revolutions against his authority had broken out in 
 Venezuela and various districts of Colombia, and in the 
 following year a war ensued between Peru and Colombia, 
 the former insisting that Bolivar had attempted to bring 
 that country under Colombian authority. From 1827 
 to the date of his death in December, 1830, the Liberator 
 was the object of bitter enmity in Colombia, and was 
 accused repeatedly of harbouring designs to found an 
 imperial dynasty for his own benefit. He died a poor 
 man, when only forty-seven, at Santa Marta, thoroughly 
 disheartened by the turmoil of internal political dissen- 
 sion which embittered his latter years. 
 
 Immediately after the death of Bolivar, the Republic 
 of Colombia broke up into the three divisions which 
 now form Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia, the last- 
 named assuming at first the name of Nueva Granada, 
 and after various intermediate changes, finally calling 
 itself the United States of Colombia. At the first 
 election in 1831 General Santander, who had been Vice- 
 President under Bolivar, was chosen as chief magistrate, 
 and during his term treaties were made with Venezuela 
 
28 EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 
 
 and Ecuador to determine the frontiers of those states, 
 and with the Holy See to secure the recognition of the 
 republic. Panama and Colon were declared free ports 
 for twenty years to all friendly nations, and a special 
 treaty secured to the United States the privilege of 
 transporting war material across the isthmus. In 
 exchange the United States guaranteed Colombian 
 sovereignty over the isthmus against any foreign 
 government. That treaty was renewed in 1865. 
 
 When Santander completed his term of office in 
 1836, he endeavoured to secure the election of General 
 Ovando as his successor in the Presidency, but his 
 nominee was defeated by the civilian candidate Dr 
 Marquez, and this brought about a friction of the different 
 political parties which resulted in civil war from 1839 
 to 1841, that ended in the triumph of Marquez. General 
 Herran succeeded Marquez, and in turn was followed 
 by General Mosquera. In 1858, under President Mariano 
 Ospina, a Conservative, the seeds of discord between 
 Liberals and Conservatives were sown in connection 
 with the question of a Federal or Unitarian form of 
 Government, and resulted in that political dissension 
 which has embroiled Colombia in civil war lasting with 
 short intermissions to the present day. 
 
 The first President of Venezuela after the separation 
 from Colombia in 1830, was General Paez, the hero of 
 the War of Independence. Through his influence fairly 
 peaceful conditions were maintained until 1847, when 
 General Monagas, nominated by Paez, was elected. 
 From that date until the accession to power of Guzman 
 Blanco, the country was devastated by civil war pro- 
 moted by ambitious politicians or military officers. 
 President after President was deposed, the treasury 
 depleted, industrial development paralysed, during the 
 thirty years following the advent of General Monagas to 
 the Presidency. 
 
 Ecuador fared little better than Venezuela after 
 separation from Colombia, for under the first President, 
 General Flores, revolutionary movements were set afoot, 
 
1830] SOUTH AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 29 
 
 but a compromise was effected, and until 1843 fairly 
 tranquil conditions prevailed. The second President 
 was Vicente Rocafuerte, an able and highly educated 
 man of liberal ideas, and who attempted to organise a 
 civil administration and a system of public education. 
 During his term of office the independence of the 
 republic was recognised by Spain. In 1839 General 
 Flores was chosen once more, and was re-elected for a 
 third term in 1843, but overthrown in 1845 by a 
 revolutionary movement, which broke out at Guayaquil, 
 and which was instigated by Rocafuerte. From now on 
 Ecuador was torn by internal strife, only varied occasion- 
 ally by disputes with Colombia and Peru, and her 
 economic condition became lamentable in spite of the 
 occasional efforts by such men as President Moreno to 
 improve matters. Moreno, relying always on the support 
 of the clergy in political affairs, made many enemies, and 
 on August 6, 1875, he was assassinated at Quito. 
 
 The first President of Peru was Jose de la Riva 
 Aguero, who was appointed on February 26, 1823, while 
 the Spaniards still controlled a large section of the 
 country. He was deposed, and in 1827 General Lamar 
 was elected and remained in office until 1829, when he 
 was overthrown, and General Gamarra nominated in his 
 stead. For the next fifteen years the Government was 
 in the hands of various military cliques, whose leaders 
 knew little of the principles of Civil Administration, 
 and, as a consequence, internal strife was the order of 
 the day, revolution following revolution in rapid succes- 
 sion. The chief actors during this stormy period were 
 Generals Gamarra, Santa Cruz, and Salaverry, and they 
 or their nominees held power from 1829 to 1844. In 
 that year General Ramon Castilla restored order in the 
 republic, and in 1845 he was elected to the Presidency. 
 During the term of Castilla many public works were 
 undertaken and the national finances were placed on an 
 improved footing. He was succeeded by General 
 Echenique, who was deposed by a revolutionary move- 
 ment in 1855 on account of certain unpopular measures 
 
30 EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 
 
 introduced by him in connection with the internal indebt- 
 edness. Castilla then returned to power, and remained 
 in office until 1862, comparative peace being maintained 
 for the seven years he governed. Two revolutions were 
 attempted against his administration, but both were 
 suppressed. He was succeeded in 1862 by Colonel 
 Balta. 
 
 Chile nominated General O'Higgins, the patriot leader 
 in the War of Independence, as head of the Government 
 after her emancipation from Spain in 1817, and he con- 
 tinued in power until 1823. He was succeeded by 
 General Freire, who held office for three years, during 
 which period the country was a constant prey to internal 
 dissension and armed insurrection, and here, as in 
 Colombia, the nominal cause of these uprisings was the 
 question of the adoption of a Federal or Unitarian form 
 of Government. In 1827 General Pinto was elected, 
 but resigned in 1829, and was succeeded by General 
 Lastera. The opposition, headed by General Pinto and 
 General Portales, successfully attacked the Government 
 in December, 1829, and this brought Pinto again to 
 power until 1831, when he was succeeded by General 
 Prieto, under whose administration the present constitu- 
 tion of Chili was promulgated in 1833. Prieto was 
 re-elected in 1835, and continued in office until 1841, 
 when General Bulnes was nominated to the Presidency, 
 and remained at the head of affairs for ten years. 
 During his term the independence of Chile was 
 recognised by Spain. Various revolutionary outbreaks 
 occurred against Bulnes, but all were suppressed, and in 
 1851 his friend and supporter Don Manuel Montt was 
 elected to the chief magistracy. 
 
 After gaining her freedom, Bolivia in 1826 appointed 
 General Sucre President for life, but repeated insurrec- 
 tions occurred against his authority, and finally he was 
 driven from the country in 1827. General Santa Cruz 
 now succeeded to power until June, 1839, when he was 
 overthrown by a Peruvian force under General Gamarra, 
 and General Velasco was made head of the Government, 
 
1840] SOUTH AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 31 
 
 but in turn was ousted by a revolutionary movement 
 which brought General Ballivian into office in 1841. 
 He likewise was deposed, and Velasco reappeared, but 
 only to give place to General Belzu at the head of a 
 successful revolt. In 1855 General Cordoba was pro- 
 claimed President, but deposed in favour of Dr Linares 
 in 1858, who was deprived of office by a military con- 
 spiracy in 1861. General Acha was the next chief 
 magistrate, and for four stormy years he maintained his 
 position against his enemies, but in 1865 he was driven 
 out by Belzu, who in turn was killed at La Paz when 
 resisting an insurgent attack led by Colonel Melgarejo. 
 The latter, although his position was assailed constantly, 
 maintained himself in power until 1869. 
 
 Uruguay elected Fructuoso Ribera as her first 
 President in 1830, and his term of office was a record 
 of internal turmoil which led to great sacrifice of human 
 life. He was succeeded by Manuel Oribe in 1835, but 
 he gave place to his brother Ignacio Oribe. Constant 
 warfare against the Government was sustained by ex- 
 President Ribera, Oribe being aided by the dictator of 
 Buenos Aires, Juan Manuel Rosas. In 1838 Ribera 
 succeeded in capturing Montevideo, Oribe taking refuge 
 with Rosas in Buenos Aires. With the help of Rosas, 
 the refugee invaded Uruguay in 1842, and laid siege to 
 Montevideo in February, 1843. The city was defended 
 by the Italian and French legions, and a Brazilian 
 regiment commanded by Garibaldi, and the conflict was 
 maintained until 1851, Oribe then being completely 
 defeated by the Argentine General Urquiza, who had 
 advanced against him with a strong body of troops from 
 Eutre Rios. It was not until the disappearance of Oribe 
 that any semblance of peace came to Uruguay, and that 
 was of short duration, for a conflict arose with Great 
 Britain, France and Italy over claims for damages done 
 to foreign residents during the revolution. President 
 Berro was forced to give way to the demands, and by 
 doing so, incurred the hostility of his countrymen, but 
 he remained in office until the expiry of his term, and 
 

 32 EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 
 
 in 1864 was succeeded by Anastasio Aguirre, a member 
 of the Blanco Party. 
 
 Argentina was better prepared for self-government 
 than the other South American states, but here, as else- 
 where on the continent, the liberty gained by emancipa- 
 tion from Spanish rule was imperfectly understood. 
 Such men as Puyredon, Eivadavia and Moreno were 
 statesmen capable of directing the destinies of a nation 
 far more advanced in civilisation than the La Plata 
 provinces, but they did not estimate accurately the char- 
 acter of their own countrymen when it expanded after 
 the abrupt cessation of despotic control. Eivadavia 
 succeeded Puyredon, being formally appointed President 
 in 1825, and it was during his term of office that the 
 question of Unitarian or Federal Government, which 
 caused such serious dissensions in Colombia and Chile, 
 first took definite shape. He failed to grasp the fact 
 that in allowing this important point to drift he opened 
 the door for a controversy that subsequently formed 
 the pivot round which a struggle arose and caused a 
 heavy sacrifice of life, and seriously checked the develop- 
 ment of the resources of the country for more than half 
 a century. Eivadavia was in favour of Unitarian 
 Government, but at that period this meant the absolute 
 supremacy of Buenos Aires, and so was rejected by the 
 provinces. Lopez in Santa Fe, Bustos in Cordoba, and 
 Quiroga in the western territories, declined to recognise 
 the right of Buenos Aires to predominate in Argentine 
 affairs, and were ever ready to throw obstacles in the 
 way of the administration there, even to the extent of 
 refusing to send deputies to the National Congress, or 
 assisting in the war with Brazil then in progress. Under 
 these circumstances Eivadavia resigned office and was 
 succeeded by Vicente Lopez, and a compromise was 
 established between the parties. The centre of Govern- 
 ment was moved from Buenos Aires to Santa Fe, where 
 a treaty of peace proclaiming the independence of 
 Uruguay was made with Brazil. 
 
 While the question with Brazil was open the various 
 
Juan Martin de Puvredon 
 
 [Face page 32. 
 
1832] EOSAS AS DICTATOR 33 
 
 political parties had agreed to some sort of unity, but the 
 moment that incident closed the friction was renewed. 
 The Unitarians again demanded the supremacy of 
 Buenos Aires, and in December, 1828, under the leader- 
 ship of General Lavalle, they seized the Government 
 Palace. Dorrego, a Federalist, then at the head of the 
 administration, marched to Santa Fe to ask support 
 from Congress, but he was overtaken by Lavalle and 
 shot. For the next two years a fierce conflict raged 
 between the Federalists under Lopez and Quiroga and 
 the Unitarians led by Lavalle. It was during this period 
 that Juan Manuel Rosas, at the head of a body of 
 Gaucho cavalry, lent valuable aid to the Federalist 
 cause. 
 
 In December, 1829, after Rosas had defeated Lavalle, 
 the Federalists appointed him Governor and Captain- 
 General of Buenos Aires. Shortly afterwards the 
 Unitarians were defeated in Entre Rios and Cordoba, 
 and when Rosas opened the legislature in 1832 the 
 majority of the provinces pronounced in favour of the 
 Federal cause. From now on the power of Rosas 
 became absolute, and the Unitarians were hunted down 
 like wild beasts. But Rosas became suspicious of his 
 own generals, and one by one they disappeared. Quiroga 
 was assassinated at Cordoba. Lopez died suddenly in 
 Buenos Aires ; and Cullen, Reinafe and Heredia were 
 sentenced to death. Although Rosas now exercised 
 dictatorial power he was not satisfied, and on March 8, 
 1835, he arranged for a plebiscite which put all public 
 authority into his hands. 
 
 Rosas attempted to close, and for a time succeeded 
 in closing, the River Parana to foreign commerce, and 
 this led to the blockade of Buenos Aires by an English 
 and French fleet in 1845 and the forcing of the passage 
 of the river ; but he realised the uselessness of such pro- 
 ceedings, and in 1849 he signed a convention agreeing to 
 the free navigation of this waterway and also to the 
 independence of Uruguay, which country he had 
 endeavoured to annex to Argentina. These negotia- 
 
34 EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 
 
 tions the French Chambers refused to ratify in 1851, 
 and went so far as to authorise the despatch of an 
 expeditionary force to ensure the protection of the 
 rights of French settlers and French commercial 
 interests. 
 
Tho limbnrgt & 
 
 JaW3artlio]omf-w-A Co. 
 
_ 
 
 _ 
 
 AMERICA 
 
 ratify in 1851, 
 despatch of an 
 Section of the 
 ch commercial 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 Savage Brutality of Rosas. Revolution against Rosas. Economic 
 and Social Conditions. Ambition of the Provinces to Dominate 
 Buenos Aires. Wish of Buenos Aires to Secede. Determina- 
 tion of Buenos Aires to Appeal to Arms. Revolution under 
 General Mitre. Victory of the Insurgents at Pavon. General 
 Mitre Installed as President. The National Capital. Revolu- 
 tionary Movements. Aggressiveness of Lopez. War with Para- 
 guay. Political Consequences of the War. Cholera in Buenos 
 Aires. Election of Dr Sarmiento to the Presidency. Educational 
 Progress. Efforts to Advance Industrial Development. Yellow 
 Fever Epidemic. The Administration of Sarmiento. The 
 Political Situation in 1874. Cordoba and the Presidential 
 Election of 1874. Election of Dr Nicolas Avellaneda. The 
 Presidential Election of 1871. Mitre and Revolutionary Pro- 
 jects. Conspiracy against the Government. Seditious Out- 
 breaks. Political Aims of Buenos Aires. Attitude of Avellaneda. 
 Position in 1878. Propaganda of the Cordoba League. Meet- 
 ings in Buenos Aires. The "Tiro Nacional." Buenos Aires 
 and Coi'doba. National Government Alarmed. Minister of 
 War and the " Tiro Nacional." President determines to Sup- 
 press the " Tiro Nacional." Popular Demonstrations in Buenos 
 Aires. Troops Protect the National Authorities. Compromise 
 between President and Citizens. Second Mass Meeting in 
 Buenos Aires. Advice of Dr Sarmiento. Conference between 
 Governor of Buenos Aires and President. Temporary Compro- 
 mise. Presidential Election of 1880. Issues of Electoral Cam- 
 paign. Presidential Candidates. General Roca. Dr Pellegrini 
 as Minister of War. The Cordoba League. Popular Excite- 
 ment. Situation Strained. Buenos Aires buys War Material. 
 Military Preparations. Delay in arrival of Arms and Ammuni- 
 tion. 
 
 The lengthy period for which General Rosas exercised 
 absolute control over Argentina produced many evil 
 
36 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 results. At a time when a steady advance in civilisa- 
 tion and a due respect for law and order should have 
 developed, the reverse actually occurred, for Rosas had 
 strangled collective and individual initiative in public 
 and private life. 
 
 Under the tyranny of Rosas human life had small 
 value. If any man was a danger to the dictatorial 
 regime he was murdered by a band of assassins retained 
 for this purpose. Expression of public opinion was 
 thus rendered impossible. Men dared not think for 
 themselves, much less put into words their abhorrence 
 of the savage brutality of the Dictator. With all his 
 grim ferocity Rosas was not devoid of a sense of humour. 
 When relations were critical between his Government 
 and the British Minister, he made a wager that the latter 
 would be doing menial work in his household before 
 many hours elapsed. His daughter Manuelita aided 
 the plot. Next day the Minister entered the Palace 
 courtyard and found Manuelita in tears and pounding 
 maize for "masamora." H.M.'s representative con- 
 doled with her on her father's harshness in forcing 
 such drudgery on his daughter, and begged leave to 
 assist her. While the Minister was busily breaking up 
 the corn Rosas appeared "with a group of friends and 
 claimed payment of *lhe wager. It was in the province 
 of Buenos Aires, the wealthiest and most populous 
 section of the Confederation, that the ferocity of the 
 tyrant was felt with greatest severity, and it was from 
 Buenos Aires that Rosas most feared an uprising ; 
 therefore was he ruthless in his treatment of city and 
 province. After all, however, it was from the interior 
 provinces that the movement emanated which finally 
 overthrew his tyrannical power. But that did not come 
 until he had held the country in his iron grasp for 
 eighteen years. 
 
 When the revolutionary forces under General Urquiza 
 entered Buenos Aires in 1852 Rosas fled the country. 
 When he found his power broken and his life in peril 
 he turned to the British Minister for protection. He 
 
1852] DOWNFALL OF ROSAS 37 
 
 lay concealed through the day at the Legation, then, 
 disguised as an English sailor, he slipped after nightfall 
 on board a British man-of-war and was conveyed to a 
 place of safety. Until his death on March 14, 1877, he 
 lived on a farm near Southampton. His daughter Manu- 
 elita survived him, and died in London in 1892. Under 
 this man's dictatorship social and economic conditions 
 had sunk low compared to the standard of civilisation 
 elsewhere in South America. The people had been so 
 ground down by Rosas that there was little public spirit 
 left to come to the front when participation in political 
 affairs once more became possible. He left city and pro- 
 vince prostrate, and the provincial representatives, whilst 
 entertaining most vindictive feelings towards Rosas, had 
 no real sympathy with the Portenos, as the inhabitants 
 of Buenos Aires were called. The up-country provinces 
 were as eager as Rosas had been to dominate Buenos 
 Aires. They wanted her resources to sustain an Ad- 
 ministration of which they held the control. The people 
 of Buenos Aires were opposed naturally to this policy. 
 They wished to be the leading element in the Confedera- 
 tion, or, failing this, to secede and be independent. 
 Equally determined was the Provincial Party to prevent 
 control or secession. 
 
 The immediate effect of the downfall of Rosas was a 
 feeling of intense relief in Buenos Aires, and at first no 
 efforts were made to safeguard the position of the 
 Portenos in the Administration. This condition was 
 only of short duration, for the people soon realised that 
 it was necessary to bestir themselves if they did not 
 wish their interests to be subordinated completely to 
 ambitious provincial politicians. Between 1852 and 
 1860, however, the direction of public affairs was con- 
 trolled by General Urquiza in spite of various attempts 
 by Buenos Aires to assert her position. It was the 
 dictatorship of Urquiza following that of Rosas, but in 
 modified form. From time to time revolutionary out- 
 breaks occurred, but were premature and unsuccessful, 
 and meanwhile Buenos Aires rapidly gained strength. 
 
38 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 Evidently a serious struggle between the Portenos and 
 the rest of the Confederation must come. 
 
 In 1860 the tension between Buenos Aires and the 
 provinces became unbearable, and Buenos Aires deter- 
 mined to appeal to arms to settle the position it was to 
 occupy in the future. Amongst the prominent Portenos 
 was Colonel Bartolome Mitre. To this officer was 
 confided the organisation and command of the forces 
 raised. Preparations for this struggle had been in 
 progress for years before the actual outbreak, and funds 
 had been freely subscribed for purchasing arms and 
 ammunition. For once the Portenos were united. The 
 defence of the National Government was in the hands 
 of General Urquiza, who spared no effort to stem the 
 tide of insurrection. The feeling in the province of 
 Buenos Aires, however, was unanimous when hostilities 
 began in 1861, and the position of the Federal or 
 National Government at once became untenable. Both 
 city and province were evacuated by it, and the head- 
 quarters transferred to Rosario in the province of Santa 
 Fe. General Mitre moved northwards to attack the 
 national troops, and at Pavon a decisive victory was 
 gained by the revolutionary forces in October, 1861. 
 This led to the evacuation of Rosario by Urquiza, and 
 practically ended the campaign. Peace was established 
 shortly afterwards, and General Mitre installed in the 
 Presidency. 
 
 After the victory at Pavon, Buenos Aires had her 
 opportunity to decide her future position in regard to 
 the rest of Argentina. General Mitre did introduce 
 some modifications of the National Constitution. 
 Nothing was done, however, to restrict the action of the 
 Provinces. Precautions were not taken to assure the 
 proper representation of Buenos Aires in the national 
 policy in after years, nor were any practical efforts made 
 to settle the vexed problem of the site of the national 
 capital. 
 
 This question of the seat of the central administra- 
 tion was consequently provocative of constant friction 
 
Jose J. de Ukquiza. 
 
 [Face page 38. 
 
1861] PRESIDENT MITEE 30 
 
 between the provincial government of Buenos Aires 
 and the national representatives. President Mitre 
 was aware of the jealous feeling aroused in connection 
 with the claim of the National Government to permanent 
 
 lence in Buenos Aires, but he allowed the matter to 
 drift. Unexpected complications arose in other direc- 
 tions to occupy public attention, and this troublesome 
 source of inquietude remained unsolved for another 
 twenty years. 
 
 Disturbances now occurred in several of the 
 provinces. The Provincial Administrations foresaw 
 that if the Portenos were allowed to remain long in 
 control of the National Administration the result would 
 be such an addition to their power that the national 
 policy would be dictated by Buenos Aires, and it was 
 heck portmo influence that the majority of the 
 provinces joined hands against Mitre. They fomented 
 seditious outbreaks to hamper development and progress 
 in the country as a means to an end. 
 
 In addition to the complications from unsettled 
 internal conditions Mitre was confronted by a new 
 difficulty in the aggressive attitude of General Lopez, 
 the dictator of Paraguay. The belligerent policy of 
 Lopez was apparent between 1860 and 1865, but the 
 Argentines, in common with Brazil, were inclined to 
 underestimate the strength of this small inland state. 
 Events showed, however, that warlike operations against 
 Paraguay were inevitable in the near future, and so 
 negotiations for the joint action of Argentina, Uruguay 
 and Brazil, against Paraguay, were set afoot. An 
 agreement was reached, and it was determined to use 
 force to defeat the ambitious projects of Lopez. In 
 1865 the hostile proceedings of the Paraguayan dictator 
 decided the three Governments to invade Paraguay, and 
 the events of the war will be described under the 
 section devoted to Paraguayan history. They were 
 destined to produce important consequences to the 
 Portenos, for they distracted the attention of Mitre 
 from internal affairs, and permitted the provinces to 
 
40 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 undermine the political strength of Buenos Aires. The 
 long absence of Mitre in Paraguay, where he was 
 commander-in-chief of the allied army, and his inability 
 to attend to his presidential duties, enabled provincial 
 politicians to counteract his personal influence. There- 
 fore, as the time approached for the fresh presidential 
 term it became evident that the victory of Buenos Aires 
 on the battlefield of Pavon in 1861 was not enough to 
 ensure to the Portenos the preponderating power in 
 Argentine politics. 
 
 A severe visitation of cholera fell upon the city and 
 province of Buenos Aires in 1868, and proved to be 
 an important factor in the presidential election. For 
 months Buenos Aires was almost deserted, a calamity 
 that favoured the efforts of the provincial organisations. 
 So when the election was held in 1868, Dr Sarmiento, a 
 native of San Juan, obtained a substantial majority. 
 An attempt was made to dispute the validity of the 
 election, but the opposition was feeble, and the new 
 President assumed office on October 12, 1868. 
 
 Small fault could be found with the attitude and 
 policy of Sarmiento, and the animosity of the Portenos 
 quickly subsided when he became better known. 
 Sarmiento's most bitter opponents were forced to admit 
 that his Government was characterised by upright deal- 
 ing, and a desire to promote the best interests of 
 Argentina. During his presidential term he established 
 a system of public education of wider scope than existed 
 anywhere in South America. Unfortunately this educa- 
 tional development was not maintained in later years, 
 but the measures taken between 1868 and 1874 bear 
 testimony of his broad-minded policy in national affairs. 
 
 Amongst other difficulties confronting the Adminis- 
 tration, not the least was the final settlement of the 
 Paraguayan question. The sacrifice in blood and 
 treasure during the conflict had been heavy, but the 
 full effect of this expenditure was not thoroughly 
 appreciated until after Dr Sarmiento acceded to power 
 and the struggle was ended. To expand industrial 
 
1871] PRESIDENT SARMIENTO 41 
 
 enterprise in Argentina was the only remedy for the 
 situation, and the development of the great natural 
 pastoral and agricultural resources was never lost sight 
 of by Sarmiento. For the first time in Argentine 
 history the fact that peace and prosperity travel hand 
 in hand was borne home to the minds of the people. 
 
 In 1871 an epidemic of yellow fever made its 
 appearance and spread rapidly. The population of 
 Buenos Aires was then estimated at 300,000 persons, 
 and the number of victims created panic so acute that 
 five-sixths of the residents left the town. For months 
 commercial business was paralysed. According to 
 official returns the deaths in Buenos Aires between 
 January and June of 1871 reached 24,000. Two 
 members of the Municipality, Dr Hector Varela and 
 Dr Roque Perez, were conspicuous for heroic efforts to 
 alleviate the terrible distress. The conduct of these 
 two officials was depicted by Sefior J. M. Blanes in a 
 painting showing them entering a small room in the 
 poorer section of the city. On a bed lies the dead 
 father ; on the floor is the body of the mother, and 
 near her an infant crying for food. It is to the credit 
 of the European medical men in Buenos Aires that they 
 remained to fight the disease. Recovery from the 
 disturbance occasioned to commerce and trade by this 
 disaster was slow, and the evil results crippled the 
 efforts of President Sarmiento to place economic condi- 
 tions on a satisfactory basis. 
 
 In 1874 Sarmiento's Presidency terminated. In 
 spite of all difficulties, progress since 1868 had been 
 substantial. Education had advanced ; railways had 
 been extended, and respect for law and order had 
 increased. The administration of justice had also 
 improved, and there was a revival of confidence in 
 commerce and industry. Public attention now turned 
 to the question of Sarmiento's successor. Bitter feeling 
 was exhibited by both Portefios and representatives of 
 the provinces in the new election. The provinces fully 
 realised that if the choice for the Presidency lay with 
 
42 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 Buenos Aires, the Porteiios would dominate the national 
 policy, and they therefore united to defeat the porteno 
 candidate. 
 
 The political status of Argentina in 1874 was very 
 different from that now existing, for then the Confedera- 
 tion was a loosely jointed organisation of fourteen States, 
 each enjoying sovereign rights under the national Law 
 of Constitution, and each inevitably jealous of control 
 by the National Government. Danger of secession con- 
 sequently existed always, and was the principal cause 
 of civil war in this section of South America. The 
 question of any change in the constitutional law was a 
 matter of constant dispute. A proposal for Unitarian 
 in place of Federal Administration raised a storm of 
 protest, and so acute did the controversy become during 
 the dictatorship of Rosas, that the motto used by the 
 supporters of the tyrant, and appearing on many official 
 documents, was — Viva la Confederation Argentina. 
 Mueran Ids Salvages Unitarios (Long life to the 
 Argentina Confederation. Death to the Unitarian 
 savages). This party cry was emphasised by the 
 assassination of prominent persons in favour of a 
 Unitarian system. Attempts were made by Mitre and 
 Sarmiento to unite the Confederation more closely, but 
 without success, for the suspicious nature of the pro- 
 vincial politicians prevented any cordial understanding 
 between themselves and the Porteiios. Moreover, the 
 people of Buenos Aires were afraid that closer union 
 with the remainder of Argentina would tend to augment 
 provincial influence. Another impediment was the diffi- 
 culty of communication between the different provinces. 
 There were few railways, no roads, no telegraphs. A 
 journey from the interior provinces to the city of 
 Buenos Aires was a matter of weeks, sometimes months. 
 Amid such conditions it is easy to appreciate how 
 restricted the intercourse was, and how distorted 
 rumours gave rise to misunderstandings. 
 
 The city of Cordoba was the headquarters of the 
 provincial political organisations. It was by Cordoba 
 
President Mitre. 
 
 President Sarmiento. 
 
 Leandro Alem. 
 
 Aristobulo del Valle. 
 
 [Face page 42. 
 
1874] PROVINCIAL POLITICS 43 
 
 that Sarmiento had been elected in 1868, and round 
 this centre the provincial representatives rallied in 1874. 
 The provinces claimed official aid in the presidential 
 campaign. President Sarmiento had been their candi- 
 date, and by South American ethics must render them 
 assistance for the election of their nominee ; but here 
 the provincial leaders reckoned without their host. 
 Sarmiento refused to make use of his official position. 
 Nor did he evince any marked sympathy for the aims 
 of the Provincial Party. During his term of office he 
 had realised that the antagonism between Buenos Aires 
 and the rest of Argentina was the greatest obstacle to 
 the progress of the country. He considered a more 
 compact form of government with Buenos Aires at the 
 head was the true solution of the problem. The pro- 
 vincial representatives were not opposed to a consolidated 
 National Administration, but only on condition that the 
 provinces had sufficient representation to outvote Buenos 
 Aires. Cordoba was disappointed at the attitude of 
 Sarmiento, but did not lose heart, and the President 
 was so far influenced that he promised to remain neutral, 
 and strictly maintained this pledge. Other high officials 
 in his Administration had no such conscientious scruples. 
 They used all their influence in favour of the Cordoba 
 clique. It was, therefore, a surprise to nobody when 
 Dr Nicolas Avellaneda, a native of Tucuman, was 
 elected. 
 
 The situation after the election of 1874 was full of 
 complications. The Portenos were dissatisfied. They 
 claimed that General Mitre, the porteno candidate, had a 
 majority of votes, and that the returns had been falsified 
 Not improbably this was the case. 
 
 It is certain the representatives of Buenos Aires with 
 their allies from other provinces ought to have carried the 
 day. On the other hand it was not clear that the pro- 
 vincial contingent promising aid to the Portenos kept 
 faith with Buenos Aires when the voting took place. 
 Once the election of President Avellaneda had been 
 announced by the Congress there was no means short of 
 
44 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 armed force by which the decision could be reversed. 
 The relations between Buenos Aires and the provinces 
 were so strained that many Portenos strongly advocated 
 a revolutionary movement. General Mitre was not in 
 favour of a rising, and, as no other strong man was forth- 
 coming to take his place, the conspiracy did not assume 
 a really serious character. It was promptly suppressed 
 by the Government. 
 
 Many revolutionary disturbances, however, signal- 
 ised the first three years of the Avellaneda Administra- 
 tion. In some instances these outbreaks originated in 
 local circumstances, and had no connection with the 
 National Government. In others they arose from the 
 disposition of the Administration to intervene unduly in 
 provincial affairs. Buenos Aires and the provinces were 
 alike convinced the critical struggle for the final control 
 of the Confederation would take place at the next pre- 
 sidential election. Preparations were made by both 
 parties to resort to arms if necessary. 
 
 The two factors in the political situation were the 
 Portenos of Buenos Aires, supported by the province of 
 Corrientes, and the National Administration representing 
 the remainder of Argentina. Buenos Aires and her one 
 sympathiser in point of population and resources were a 
 match for the rest of the Confederation if competent 
 leaders could be found. 
 
 Avellaneda relied on a show of force to deter 
 seditious conspiracy from blazing out into open revolt 
 and involving the country in Civil War. The national 
 army was strengthened by recruits from the inland 
 sections of the republic. Supplies of arms and ammu- 
 nition were obtained, and other precautions observed as 
 the situation became more strained. Each party was 
 inclined to underrate the strength of the other, but the 
 attitude of the leaders on both sides was so aggressive 
 as to leave small hope of a peaceful solution of the 
 controversy. Ostentatious parade of military strength 
 was made to intimidate the Portenos, and the position 
 was complicated further by the provincial politicians 
 
1880] BUENOS AIRES AND PROVINCES 45 
 
 proposing to form the city of Buenos Aires into a Federal 
 District. The po7 % teno population was determined to 
 resist this proposition. A meeting of citizens was held, 
 and included General Bartolome Mitre ; Dr Carlos 
 Tejedor, the Governor of the province ; Colonel Arias, 
 the representative of the province of Corrientes ; General 
 Martin Gainza, and General Emilio Mitre. After lengthy 
 discussion of ways and means for Buenos Aires to defend 
 her rights, it was decided to found an association for rifle 
 shooting. All able-bodied men were urged to become 
 members of this club, which was incorporated as the 
 "Tiro National." In reality it was a military volunteer 
 organisation for training those who would be called to 
 arms when hostilities began. The enthusiasm of the 
 younger men in Buenos Aires for the " Tiro National " 
 was unbounded. Every Sunday thousands attended the 
 parade grounds to undergo instruction. It was placed 
 in charge of Colonel Julio Campos, an able and energetic 
 officer. 
 
 The National Government was alarmed at the 
 development of the " Tiro National." Avellaneda called 
 a council of ministers to consider what steps should be 
 taken to counteract its effect. It was decided that the 
 Minister of War should demand an explanation from the 
 principal military officers associated with the movement 
 On February 13, 1880, he accordingly requested the 
 attendance at his office of General Mitre, his brother 
 Emilio, Colonel Arias, Colonel Julio Campos, Colonel 
 Lagos, and other officers. The views of the National 
 Administration concerning the attitude of Buenos Aires 
 were stated, and the officers were informed that their 
 association with revolutionary societies laid them open 
 to a charge of treason, and that in supporting the action 
 of the Portenos they were conspiring against the Govern- 
 ment they served. The answer by these officers was the 
 resignation of their commissions. They asserted that 
 separation from the national service absolved them from 
 any ties binding them to the Administration. Hot words 
 followed, and Colonel Julio Campos left the minister in 
 
46 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 no doubt as to the course to be taken by Buenos Aires. 
 Before the meeting closed, he explained the situation in 
 these words : — •■" If there are rebels it is the National 
 Government who are the instigators of sedition. You 
 are striking at the liberty of Buenos Aires and the 
 Argentine Confederation. It is our duty to defend 
 both with all our strength." 
 
 Avellaneda thereupon determined to use force to 
 suppress the Buenos Aires military organisation. On 
 February 15, 1880, 2000 members of the "Tiro 
 Nacional " were to assemble at Palermo on the outskirts 
 of Buenos Aires. A division of the regular army was 
 encamped near the Chacarita cemetery, and orders were 
 issued by the Minister of War for these troops to take 
 up positions to command all roads leading to the parade 
 ground of the "Tiro Nacional." Batteries of artillery 
 were stationed to cover the approaches from Buenos 
 Aires. The leaders of the "Tiro Nacional" were 
 advised of this movement, and changed the rendezvous 
 to the Plaza Lorea. A demonstration through the 
 streets of Buenos Aires followed, and was supported 
 enthusiastically by the whole population of the city. 
 The Government was frightened, and orders were issued 
 for the troops at Palermo to march into Buenos Aires. 
 A collision between the two factions appeared inevi- 
 table. Later in the day, however, a compromise was 
 effected. The troops were withdrawn beyond the city 
 limits, and the Portenos quietly dispersed. 
 
 On February 16, the day following this excitement in 
 Buenos Aires, a meeting of prominent citizens was sum- 
 moned, at which violent denunciations of the Administra- 
 tion were made. Then Dr Sarmiento advised Buenos 
 Aires to disarm on condition that the other provinces con- 
 sented to similar measures ; but the Portenos refused to 
 accept this proposal, alleging that disarmament would 
 place Buenos Aires at the mercy of the Cordoba clique. 
 The result of the meeting was the nomination of a com- 
 mittee composed of Senor Felix Frias, Senor Rufino 
 Varela, and Dr Aristobulo del Valle to confer with the 
 
1880] THE AVELLANEDA ADMINISTRATION 47 
 
 Governor of the province, Dr Carlos Tejedor, and arrange 
 a modus vivendi between the National and Provincial 
 Governments. At this conference, the Governor de- 
 manded that the army should be withdrawn from the city 
 of Buenos Aires, and fair representation for the Portenos 
 be given in all questions of national policy. The Presi- 
 dent inquired if Buenos Aires would disarm if the 
 conditions asked were granted. He was told that dis- 
 armament would not be accepted, but that no parade of 
 military strength would be attempted. Avellaneda was 
 not strong enough to force an open rupture, and he 
 therefore agreed to the proposals of Tejedor in order to 
 gain time to mature his plans for future action. Thus 
 for the moment open warfare between the Portenos and 
 the National Administration was averted. 
 
 Public attention now centred upon the choice of a 
 successor to Avellaneda. The issue at stake was 
 whether Buenos Aires or the provinces, as represented 
 by the Cordoba clique, should dominate Argentina. 
 General Bartolome Mitre was the porteno leader, and 
 Buenos Aires would have nominated him for the Presi- 
 dency, but he refused. His attitude led to the selection 
 of Dr Carlos Tejedor as the porteno candidate. Dr 
 Tejedor had been Governor of the province of Buenos 
 Aires since 1878, a position which had ranked as equal 
 to the President of the Republic. General Julio Roca 
 was the candidate nominated by the provinces. He 
 was destined to become a prominent character in 
 Argentine history. 
 
 General Roca was an officer who had distinguished 
 himself in campaigns against the Indians and in com- 
 mand of troops employed to suppress revolutionary out- 
 breaks. He was born in 1843 in Tucuman, but educated 
 in Cordoba. In his professional career he had shown 
 ability for organisation and tact in dealing with his 
 colleagues. The Portenos therefore regarded his 
 military influence as a dangerous element in the present 
 situation. His prestige gained against the Indians in 
 the south of the province of Buenos Aires in 1879 was 
 
48 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 on the other hand, a powerful weapon in the hands of 
 his political supporters in the election. The result of 
 this southern campaign had been to open to colonisation 
 a vast area of territory extending as far as the Rio 
 Negro, beyond which lay the unexplored regions of 
 Patagonia. It was claimed for Roca that he was a 
 national benefactor, but his friends credited him with 
 little knowledge of politics. In this respect, however, 
 they considered him all the more suitable, because they 
 wanted a leader who would not be afraid to show a bold 
 front to any movement the Portenos might set afoot. 
 Roca was not slow to see that existing circumstances 
 offered many opportunities for his own advancement, 
 and at once accepted the situation, although he under- 
 stood more clearly than his supporters that conflict with 
 the Portenos must be decided by an appeal to arms. 
 Accordingly, his attention in 1880 was devoted to the 
 better organisation of the national army. 
 
 Amongst the supporters of Roca was Carlos Pelle- 
 grini, then a comparatively young man, having been 
 born in Buenos Aires in 1847. As Minister of War 
 under Avellaneda, he had held high political office, and 
 as Secretary to the Chambers he had acquired know- 
 ledge of political methods. Through his father, Pelle- 
 grini inherited Italian blood, and on his mother's side he 
 was connected with Mr John Bright. He was educated 
 at Harrow. It was Pellegrini who protested against the 
 resignation of Avellaneda when the national authorities 
 were threatened by Buenos Aires in February, 1880, 
 and it was Pellegrini again, when Minister of War, who 
 advocated the use of the troops by the National Govern- 
 ment to crush any attempt of the Portenos to enforce the 
 demands made through Dr Tejedor. His resourceful 
 character made him an invaluable ally to the Cordoba 
 clique in their struggle for supremacy, and they displayed 
 a keen knowledge of human nature in inducing the pro- 
 vincial representatives to combine the political ability of 
 Pelligrini with the soldierly qualities of Roca in the 
 contest. In the former they had a clever organiser and 
 
1880J THE CORDOBA LEAGUE 49 
 
 a shrewd adviser, who understood the weak points of 
 his fellow-countrymen. In the latter, they could depend 
 upon an able soldier to whom the national army was 
 devoted. 
 
 The " League," as the Cordoba clique was generally 
 called, comprised many remarkable men. Possibly they 
 were not over- scrupulous in their methods ; but indi- 
 vidually and collectively they possessed far more energy 
 and acuteness than the Portenos. The most prominent 
 names in the " League " where Dr Miguel Juarez Celman, 
 afterwards President of the Republic ; Dr Marcos Juarez 
 Celman ; Dr Iriondo, the Governor of Santa Fe ; Dr 
 Antelo of Entre Rios ; Dr Muiiecas of Tucuman ; Dr 
 Almonacid of La Rioja ; Dr Viso of Cordoba ; Dr 
 Navarro of Catamarca ; Dr Dardo Rocha, and many 
 others who played leading parts subsequently in Argen- 
 tine politics. The " League " was afforded assistance 
 and protection by Avellaneda, and this official influence 
 was a source of undoubted strength. 
 
 As the date of the election approached, excitement 
 increased. The National Party in Cordoba openly 
 advocated the confiscation of the city of Buenos Aires, 
 and its conversion into the federal capital. Although it 
 had long been understood that this policy was the aim 
 of the provinces, it had not been definitely announced as 
 one of the issues of the electoral campaign, but the fact 
 that the election of Roca inferred the immediate execu- 
 tion of this scheme tended to irritate the Portenos to an 
 extent which threatened an immediate outbreak. It 
 was to this point the Cordoba " League " wished to drive 
 their opponents. They were convinced they could cope 
 successfully with any armed conflict, because they were 
 better prepared than their adversaries in military organi- 
 sation and warlike stores. 
 
 In April of 1880 it was evident the Portenos must 
 accept the Cordoba programme or fight, and the majority 
 were in favour of fighting. War would therefore have 
 been declared against the National Government without 
 hesitation if the necessary supplies had been forthcoming, 
 
 D 
 
50 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 but notwithstanding the fact that money was available 
 for the purchase of artillery, rifles, and ammunition, the 
 Buenos Aires leaders had neglected to obtain the 
 requisite material. Orders, however, were despatched 
 to Europe for military equipment, and little could be 
 done pending its arrival. Meanwhile another effort was 
 made to avoid hostilities. General Campos was sent to 
 Cordoba to endeavour to persuade the "League" to 
 withdraw the candidature of Roca for the Presidency, 
 and to substitute some person to be mutually agreed 
 upon by representatives of both political factions. 
 Colonel Lagos went to the northern provinces to attempt 
 to induce the politicians of that section to declare in 
 favour of this policy of conciliation. These missions 
 proved futile, and both delegates returned to Buenos 
 Aires convinced that the only alternative to complete 
 submission to the political supremacy of the provinces 
 was open warfare. Preparations for the struggle were 
 now pushed ahead. The able-bodied men of Buenos 
 Aires were organised into regiments, and many thousands 
 of recruits from all grades of society came forward to 
 fill the ranks. A small portion of the arms and ammuni- 
 tion arranged for reached the porteno leaders in the month 
 of May, 1880, and it was stated that the remainder was 
 expected shortly. Under the impression that it would be 
 delivered, the Buenos Aires Government refused an offer 
 of 10,000 Remington rifles. Failure to take advantage 
 of this opportunity to increase the stock of arms proved 
 a fatal error of judgment, for, in spite of most urgent in- 
 structions, one delay after another occurred to prevent 
 the arrival of the war material, which was accordingly 
 not available when the crisis culminated. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 the argentine republic — continued 
 
 Military Preparations. Attempt to seize Cordoba. National Troops 
 in Buenos Aires. Provincial Authorities and the Minister of 
 War. Rioting in Buenos Aires. The National Government and 
 the Provincial Administration. Avellaneda abandons Buenos 
 Aires. Hostilities Commence. Strength of National Troops. 
 Preparations for Defence of Buenos Aires. Disposition of 
 Provincial Forces. Scarcity of War Material in Buenos Aires. 
 Leaders of the Rebellion. Political Dissensions. Dr Pellegrini. 
 Skirmishing between National Troops and Revolutionary Forces. 
 Colonel Arias and the Volunteers. Engagement near Olivera. 
 Colonel Arias reaches Lujan. Defence of Buenos Aires. Attack 
 upon Buenos Aires. Hostilities on July 21. Ammunition 
 exhausted in Buenos Aires. Conference of Revolutionary 
 Leaders. Armistice on July 23. Peace Negotiations. Terms 
 of Surrender. Buenos Aires declared the National Capital. 
 General Roca elected President. The New Administration. 
 Cordoba and Roca. Buenos Aires and the New President. The 
 National Policy. Absolute Power of Roca in 1881. Restraint 
 on Military. National Feeling. Improvement in Means of 
 Communication. Railway Construction. Foreign Immigration. 
 Assisted Passages for Immigrants. National Land Sales. Public 
 Works. Revolutionary Outbreaks. Expansion of Agricultural 
 and Pastoral Industry. Foreign Loans. Dr Pellegrini appointed 
 Minister of War. Political Intrigues. Discontent in Buenos 
 Aires. Attitude of the Administration in Electoral Matters. 
 Foundation of La Plata. The Port of Ensenada. Presidential 
 Election. Presidential Candidates. Economic and Industrial 
 Progress. Financial Policy. Suspension of Specie Payments. 
 Inconvertible Currency. 
 
 While the military preparations were in progress in 
 Buenos Aires in May, 1880, a coup d'etat was attempted. 
 This was to seize the city of Cordoba and make prisoners 
 
52 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 of the most prominent members of the "League." It 
 was a bold scheme. 
 
 In Cordoba a certain section of the inhabitants were 
 opposed to Avellaneda. It was with this discontented 
 faction that the porteno leaders arranged their plan of 
 action. The conspirators in Cordoba agreed to advise 
 Buenos Aires when the time was ripe. Nothing 
 occurred to interfere with the project, and in due 
 course notice was given that all now required was a 
 determined man to direct the outbreak. Colonel 
 Lisandro Olmos and a few companions went to Cordoba 
 to head the plot. 
 
 The National Authorities were not ignorant of the 
 conspiracy. But the details of the proposed coup 
 rfetat had been carefully concealed, so that the Govern- 
 ment had no definite information to act upon, and no 
 measures were taken to prevent the arrival of Colonel 
 Olmos at Cordoba. After, however, a cursory examina- 
 tion of the conditions, Olmos found that the support he 
 could count upon was limited, and the extent of discon- 
 tented feeling exaggerated. The Governor, Dr Viso, 
 and his right hand man, Dr Miguel Juarez Celman, 
 were unpopular ; but the real dissatisfaction did not 
 reach beyond a desire to be rid of these two men. In 
 spite of this Olmos determined to make an attempt to 
 fulfil his mission, hoping that the feeling against the 
 Governor would bring support if his first efforts were 
 successful. Accompanied by a dozen fellow-conspirators, 
 he sallied into the streets. Each man was armed with 
 a carbine, but had only twenty rounds of ammunition. 
 The point of attack was the " Cabildo," or Government 
 offices, where the Governor and Juarez Celman were 
 known to be. The building was occupied, and the 
 Governor and other officials captured. Thus for the 
 moment the revolutionary party controlled the situation. 
 Colonel Olmos thereupon insisted that Dr Viso and Dr 
 Juarez Celman should resign their posts, but while the 
 negotiations were proceeding firing was heard in the 
 central square. This came from the provincial troops 
 
1880] POLITICAL CONDITIONS 53 
 
 called to the assistance of the authorities. Olmos and 
 his followers endeavoured to defend the Government 
 buildings, but their supply of ammunition ran short; 
 they were overpowered and imprisoned for several 
 months. 
 
 The Cordoba incident naturally increased the strain 
 between Avellaneda and the Portenos. The troops in 
 Buenos Aires committed many outrages without being 
 checked. In consequence of friction between the 
 soldiery and the inhabitants, the Governor demanded 
 the withdrawal of the 7th regiment, but his request 
 passed unnoticed. Porteno officials now refused to hold 
 further communication with the Minister of War. 
 Neither side, however, was ready for open hostilities. 
 The National Government ordered the concentration of 
 all available troops, but did not wish to move until a 
 strong force in the field gave confidence of success. On 
 the other hand, the Portenos awaited further supplies of 
 arms and ammunition to equip several thousands of 
 volunteers, but the acquisition of this war material 
 became more difficult as the vigilance of the National 
 Authorities increased. 
 
 In June, 1880, a climax was reached. A riot occurred 
 in the streets of Buenos Aires between the presidential 
 escort and a group of residents. Shots were exchanged 
 before the interference of the police quelled the dis- 
 turbance. The incident was magnified into an attempt 
 to assassinate Avellaneda, and the National Government 
 demanded the immediate punishment of the Portenos 
 concerned. This brought the final rupture. Arms were 
 served out to the volunteers. It was arranged that 
 Tejedor should seize the President and his Ministers, 
 but Avellaneda received warning of the intended move- 
 ment ; and with the troops stationed in the city he 
 managed to join the main body of the army a few miles 
 beyond the municipal limits. With his departure from 
 Buenos Aires war commenced. 
 
 The Government forces numbered between 7000 and 
 8000 men, recruited principally from the interior pro- 
 
54 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 vinces. A large proportion of these troops had been 
 employed on active service in campaigns against the 
 Indians, and were seasoned soldiers. General Roca 
 commanded and was seconded by Dr Carlos Pellegrini, 
 the Minister of War. Care had been taken to see to the 
 efficient equipment of the army, and the artillery com- 
 prised Krupp field batteries, while the small arm was 
 the Remington rifle. In addition to the forces in the 
 vicinity of the city of Buenos Aires reserves were held 
 in readiness at Cordoba, Rosario, and other places. On 
 the River Plate were several gunboats, which, while not 
 formidable fighting machines, rendered valuable aid by 
 cutting off supplies. Buenos Aires city itself was 
 unfortified, and depended for safety on the measures the 
 porteno leaders might improvise after the outbreak of 
 hostilities. All the advantages were thus with the 
 National Government, and Roca was confident that the 
 reduction of the city could be accomplished. 
 
 When the rupture with the National Government 
 was announced, the Portehos prepared for the defence 
 with enthusiasm. Intrenchments were thrown up at all 
 likely points. Some 15,000 men were armed, and Colonel 
 Arias was despatched to the outlying districts to raise 
 additional forces. The organisation of the cavalry was 
 confided to Colonel Hilario Lagos. Money was plentiful 
 but of little use, as further supplies could not be 
 purchased. The cry everywhere was for more arms and 
 ammunition, but these two essential factors were only 
 forthcoming in limited quantities. 
 
 The leaders of the "Tiro Nacional" movement now 
 assumed control in Buenos Aires, and the people looked 
 to General Mitre for guidance in the present crisis. 
 Colonel Julio Campos was placed in command of the 
 military operations, and no efforts were spared by this 
 officer to strengthen the defences of the city. His task 
 was not easy, for the porteno troops lacked military 
 training and discipline, a want which proved a source of 
 continual weakness throughout the campaign. The civil 
 authorities of Buenos Aires rendered little aid, were in 
 
President Roca. 
 
 [Pace page 54. 
 
1880] CIVIL WAR BEGINS , 55 
 
 some ways rather a hindrance, for Governor Tejedorancl 
 his companions allowed political discussions to breed 
 dissension. A section of porteno politicians believed 
 that the show of force already made by Buenos Aires 
 would secure the resignation of Avellaneda and the with- 
 drawal of the candidature of Roca for the Presidency, 
 Others argued that the real chance of success lay in 
 attacking the national troops before they were joined by 
 reinforcements known to be expected. The majority of 
 the military officers favoured this bold course. Wrang- 
 ling and vacillation then ensued, and a decision was 
 deferred pending news from Colonel Arias as to the 
 outcome of his recruiting expedition. 
 
 Conditions in Buenos Aires were known to Roca and 
 Pellegrini, and nobody could judge better the weak points 
 of the Portenos than the Minister of War. A native of 
 Buenos Aires, he was cognisant of the character and fibre 
 of the local political disputes, and therefore counselled 
 bringing up reinforcements to make a general assault on 
 the city, urging that with the capture of Buenos Aires 
 all resistance would end. Roca agreed with Pellegrini 
 on this point, and Colonel Racedo was ordered to advance 
 from Rosario with 2500 men ; but a delay was necessary 
 to execute these plans, and hence it was not until the 
 middle of July that serious skirmishing took place 
 between the national troops and the Portenos. The 
 suburb of Flores, to the north of the city of Buenos 
 Aires, was forthwith occupied by the national troops, 
 and communication cut between the city and the pro- 
 vince. 
 
 Colonel Arias had succeeded better than he expected, 
 and sent word to Buenos Aires that he had recruited 
 10,000 able-bodied men, ready and willing to fight as 
 soon as arms and ammunition were provided. Colonel 
 Charras accordingly left the city with an escort conveying 
 a small supply of military equipment. Knowledge of 
 this move reached the enemy, who acted with such vigour 
 that the train conveying Colonel Charras was stopped 
 near the railway station of Lamis, the Colonel wounded 
 
56 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 and captured and the convoy seized. Colonel Arias 
 now decided to march to Buenos Aires with his contingent 
 and endeavour to break through the investing lines. 
 When near Olivera, some fifty miles from the city, Arias, 
 however, found himself in the vicinity of the troops from 
 Rosario commanded by Colonel Racedo and marching 
 to Buenos Aires, and in the encounter that followed both 
 sides claimed the victory. Arias at any rate succeeded 
 in accomplishing his immediate object — that of reaching 
 Lujan, and from there the road to Buenos Aires was 
 comparatively clear. Once at Lujan he resolved to push 
 forward and enter Buenos Aires through Flores, attack- 
 ing the national troops at that point, and he accordingly 
 asked that simultaneously a sortie from the city should 
 be made. The porteno leaders, however, in Buenos 
 Aires, did not approve his plans, and instructions were 
 despatched to him not to attempt the Elores road, but 
 to make his entry by the Alsina Bridge, because a very 
 strong force of the enemy occupied Flores. 
 
 This advance of Arias upon Buenos Aires was the 
 signal for the general action that decided the campaign. 
 Carrying out his instructions from portefio headquarters, 
 Arias left Lujan and marched in a southerly direction 
 to pass to the westward of Elores and cross the 
 Riachuelo River at the Alsina Bridge. By a rapid 
 movement the revolutionary division was able to avoid 
 contact with the main body of the national troops, and 
 the only fighting during the march was a series of 
 unimportant skirmishes. The vicinity of the Riachuelo 
 was thus reached without serious hindrance, and com- 
 munication established with the garrison of Buenos 
 Aires. Supplies of arms and ammunition were again 
 requested, and a small quantity was received. The 
 main positions of the defence were the Alsina Bridge, 
 the Barracas Bridge, both crossing the Riachuelo River, 
 and the point known as the "Meseta de los Corales." 
 Covering the former was Arias and the men he had 
 brought from outside ; at the second was Colonel 
 Morales with several battalions, and at the " Meseta de 
 
1880] BUENOS AIRES ASSAULTED 57 
 
 los Corales" Colonel Lagos was stationed with the 
 revolutionary cavalry and some detachments of infantry. 
 So far as possible these positions were strengthened by 
 entrenchments and such other defensive measures as the 
 scanty supply of tools and material permitted. 
 
 Meanwhile the national army was making prepara- 
 tions to attack, and the arrival of Colonel Racedo 
 brought its available strength up to 10,000 men, a 
 number, in the opinion of Roca, sufficient. It was there- 
 fore decided to attack on July 20, 1880, and a disposition 
 of the forces was made accordingly. The principal 
 resistance was expected at the Barracas Bridge, and on 
 the high ground in the vicinity of the " Meseta de los 
 Corales," the latter position acting as a support to the 
 bridge. For the assault at these two points, a strong 
 division was commanded by Colonel Lavalle. Another 
 force was detailed to attack Arias near the Alsina 
 Bridge, with instructions to make an entry into the city 
 from that quarter. If this could be done, the positions 
 at the "Meseta de los Corales" and the Barracas Bridge 
 would be untenable. 
 
 The assault commenced early in the morning, and 
 shortly after daybreak the porteno picquets were driven 
 in. The national troops found, however, the entrench- 
 ments at the Barracas Bridge more formidable than 
 anticipated. They were first checked, then compelled 
 to retire and await reinforcements, and the division 
 detached to rush the position held by Arias near the 
 Puente Alsina met no better fate. Repeatedly the men 
 advanced to the attack, but the defence stubbornly 
 resisted their onslaughts, and at the close of the day 
 no permanent advantage had been gained by the national 
 forces. On both sides the losses had been heavy, but 
 specially so on that of the Portenos, and for them also 
 the question of ammunition had become most serious. 
 On the part of the National Government the measures 
 taken ensured the necessary supplies, but the Portenos 
 had no reserve stores, and therefore, in spite of the 
 heavy casualty list amongst the national troops, condi- 
 
58 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 tions were in their favour when the attack was resumed 
 on July 21. 
 
 The instructions to Colonel Lavalle now were to 
 force the passage of the Barracas Bridge at all costs, 
 and so open a way into the city. Repeated attempts 
 were accordingly made to carry this position, but the 
 defence rendered it no easy matter. Colonel Morales 
 knew that if he could not stop the advance of the enemy 
 into Buenos Aires, the porteno cause was lost. There- 
 fore every effort was made by the defenders, and all avail- 
 able reinforcements were brought up. A foreign legion, 
 principally Italians, was posted near the bridge, and did 
 excellent service throughout the day. After a concen- 
 tration of fire by the field batteries late in the afternoon, 
 Lavalle ordered another infantry charge. By this time 
 the defence had been so weakened as to be unable to 
 withstand this final assault, and the bridge was carried 
 at the point of the bayonet. The Italian regiment 
 defended it to the iast, and was almost annihilated. 
 
 At the Puente Alsina the situation was more 
 favourable for the Porteiios, for there Colonel Arias had 
 held his position against superior numbers during 
 the early part of the fight, and so vigorously was the 
 defence maintained that the national troops showed 
 signs of demoralisation. Arias saw his advantage, and 
 sent to Campos for reinforcements in order to make a 
 sortie, but by the time this request had reached head- 
 quarters news had been received from Colonel Morales 
 that he considered his position at the Barracas Bridge 
 untenable. General Campos accordingly ordered Colonel 
 Arias to fall back over the Puente Alsina, and with the 
 capture of the Barracas Bridge by Lavalle fighting 
 ceased for a day. All advantage thus remained with 
 the National Government. 
 
 In the two days' fighting, the casualties amongst the 
 national troops amounted to 2000 officers and men killed 
 and wounded, but this heavy loss was not sufficiently 
 serious to interfere with the resumption of hostilities. 
 The defence had suffered more severely, for the number 
 
1880] CAPITULATION OF BUENOS AIRES 59 
 
 of all ranks dead and injured was calculated at 3000. 
 A factor, however, of greater importance to Buenos 
 Aires than loss of men was the scarcity of ammunition. 
 The gaps in the ranks could be filled without difficulty, 
 but the limited reserve of ammunition for the small 
 arms and artillery was barely sufficient to carry on the 
 conflict for another twenty-four hours. In these circum- 
 stances it was deemed advisable to call a conference of 
 the porteno leaders to discuss the situation. On July 
 22 both sides rested. A little skirmishing between the 
 outposts took place, but no attempt was made to force 
 another general engagement. 
 
 The meeting of the porteno leaders resulted in a 
 lengthy discussion as to the possibility of further effective 
 resistance. Opinions were divided, but the final out- 
 come was that the Papal Nuncio, Monsignor Gigi 
 Mattera, and the German Minister, Baron von Holleben, 
 were authorised to arrange an armistice to allow the 
 initiation of peace negotiations. A suspension of 
 hostilities was immediately announced, and communica- 
 tion opened between the leaders. 
 
 The National Government thoroughly understood 
 that Buenos Aires was powerless, and consequently the 
 terms the Portenos were forced to accept deprived the 
 city and province of any power. The conditions 
 were : — 
 
 " 1. The separation of the leaders from positions of 
 authority. 
 
 " 2. Disbandment of the Buenos Aires forces, and 
 surrender of arms and war material. 
 
 " 3. Participators in the revolt not to be liable to 
 legal procedure, but if in official employment to be 
 dismissed. 
 
 " 4. Pending a normal situation personal rights to 
 be respected, except where a modification was necessary 
 in consequence of the state of siege declared in force." 
 
 Onerous as these conditions were, the people of 
 Buenos Aires had no alternative but to accept them. 
 The National Government had conquered, and the 
 
60 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 Portenos could raise no objections. Dr Jose M. Moreno 
 was nominated Governor of the Province in place of Dr 
 Tejedor, the other officials in the Provincial Government 
 were changed, and quiet was once more restored, while 
 the Provincial Legislature was dissolved. 
 
 The National Government now had a free hand to 
 proclaim the city of Buenos Aires the federal capital 
 of the Republic. A National Congress assembled a few 
 weeks after the conclusion of the revolution, and one 
 of the principal measures it passed was a law making 
 the municipality of Buenos Aires the Federal District. 
 This was sanctioned on September 21, 1880. The Con- 
 gress also ratified the election of Roca to the Presidency, 
 and thus the Cordoba " League " had accomplished all 
 they had set out to do. They were masters of the 
 political situation ; they had wrested Buenos Aires from 
 the Portenos, and insured the election of their candidate 
 for the Presidency. 
 
 With the accession of General Roca the political 
 situation changed. Previous to 1880 practically each 
 province was independent. The right of the National 
 Government to exercise authority was recognised only 
 when such intervention was supported by armed strength, 
 for the same feeling that led Buenos Aires to open 
 resistance was dominant in the provinces. 
 
 The Cordoba clique had succeeded in creating 
 jealousy between the provinces and Buenos Aires to 
 the end they should combine to crush her. This action, 
 however, did not infer the right of the National Govern- 
 ment to exact obedience and respect in disputes with 
 Provincial Administrations. Continual political friction 
 was one of the principal obstacles to economic develop- 
 ment. No national policy was possible in such circum- 
 stances. This had been recognised and appreciated in 
 Buenos Aires. It was this fact that helped to bring 
 about the revolt in 1880. The Portenos wished to 
 dominate the Republic or separate from the Confedera- 
 tion. On the other hand, the provinces as represented 
 by the Cordoba clique desired to crush Buenos Aires, 
 
1880] EOCA ASSUMES THE PRESIDENCY 61 
 
 but had no intention that their action should produce 
 a strong central administration which they would be 
 forced to obey. The result of the struggle was a strong 
 central government, the real aim of the porteno policy. 
 It was attained by the support accorded to the National 
 Administration by the provinces to serve other purposes. 
 
 To reduce chaotic conditions to order ; to consolidate 
 provincial interests and ensure unquestioned allegiance 
 to the National Administration ; to teach the people of 
 Argentina that they were Argentines — this was the task 
 that Roca set himself. 
 
 Roca was an unknown political quantity to friends 
 and foes. The Cordoba politicians saw in him a soldier 
 who had been necessary to their cause, and who, from 
 motives of expediency, they had selected as their presi- 
 dential candidate. These provincial representatives con- 
 sidered that, as he had reached power through their 
 influence, he would be their instrument in all matters 
 affecting their interests ; while the Portehos regarded 
 him as a man who would have no consideration for his 
 conquered enemy, and be dictatorial where Buenos 
 Aires was concerned. They realised, also, that they 
 were unable to protest against any policy he initiated. 
 How far both parties misjudged him was soon demon- 
 strated. He astonished his supporters and opponents 
 alike by the regime he established. 
 
 President Roca was reserved in manner, but a close 
 and shrewd observer of affairs and men. He never 
 forgot services rendered him publicly or privately, and 
 yet he seldom quarrelled with his opponents. Appar- 
 ently slow to act, he kept his ear to the ground waiting 
 his opportunity, an attitude that earned him the sobriquet 
 of " el zorro " (the fox). It was appropriate, as his 
 opponents frequently discovered. His military experi- 
 ences had taught him to handle men and exact obedience. 
 The Portefios criticised him on account of many cautious 
 traits of the Argentine gaucho he showed in dealing 
 with complicated questions. This tendency was not a 
 matter for regret. It enabled him to appreciate fully 
 
62 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 intrigues against his Administration. The President 
 had visited the greater portion of Argentina, and been 
 deeply impressed with the enormous undeveloped 
 resources. How to populate these fertile lands, was a 
 subject to which he devoted careful consideration, and 
 the foundation of his policy was the expansion of the 
 national wealth. So long as friction between Buenos 
 Aires and the rest of the Republic constituted an open 
 sore, no broad-minded measures for the general advance- 
 ment of Argentina were practicable, and Roca saw that 
 political ambitions must be sacrificed for the future good. 
 Buenos Aires had attempted, and failed, to solve the 
 difficulty, and Roca decided it was sound policy to 
 deprive the Porteilos of all power for further effort to 
 obtain political supremacy. Naturally, this caused irri- 
 tation in Buenos Aires, an irritation which found 
 expression in the repeated, though ungrounded, charge 
 of vindictiveness made against the President by the 
 Portenos. Confronted with a complicated political 
 situation at the outset of his Administration, he was not 
 dismayed, nor did he ever forget that the ultimate con- 
 ciliation of the Portenos was expedient and necessary. 
 Therefore, no undue harshness was shown to the Buenos 
 Aires politicians, and they had no real cause for com- 
 plaint. Roca, by his handling of this delicate situation, 
 demonstrated clearly that underlying the ability he had 
 shown as a soldier, and which had been instrumental 
 in bringing him so prominently before the country, he 
 possessed many statesmanlike qualities. 
 
 In 1881 Roca's power throughout Argentina was 
 absolute. The army was unanimous in his favour, 
 officers and men alike prepared to support any action 
 his Administration proposed. This knowledge might 
 well have led to oppressive measures, but nothing of the 
 kind occurred, and militarism was never allowed to 
 become obnoxious to the general public. The federalisa- 
 tion of the municipality of Buenos Aires was denounced 
 as arbitrary by the Portenos. But it was the price of 
 victory, and doubtless it was intended also to humiliate 
 
1881] A NATIONAL POLICY ESTABLISHED 63 
 
 the vanquished. Roca enjoyed greater freedom from 
 outside pressure than former Presidents, and was at 
 liberty to consider the interests of the whole Republic 
 in laying down the basis of the national policy. He 
 was therefore in a position to exercise more power than 
 Rosas could boast of in the most secure days of his 
 dictatorship, and his acts, reviewed after a lapse of 
 twenty years, reveal no desire to establish a despotic 
 regime. Under Roca national feeling displaced the 
 local bickerings which had been constantly in evidence 
 and retarded progress. Hence from 1881 Argentina 
 entered on a stage of evolution destined to create unity 
 out of the former loosely -jointed confederation of semi- 
 independent States. Roca established a strong central 
 Government and a national policy based on the needs 
 of all classes. It was a complete unmooring from the 
 conditions existing when Cordoba and Buenos Aires 
 were the two poles round which an inchoate Argentina 
 revolved. 
 
 Lack of adequate means of communication had been 
 one of the principal obstacles to a close union of the 
 Argentine provinces. In revolutionary outbreaks, weeks 
 often elapsed before national troops could reach the 
 scene of disturbance. This fact was conducive to rebel- 
 lious practices. The difficulty of communication served 
 also to exaggerate local feeling, and lessen interest 
 in the progress of the country as a whole. Sarmiento 
 had recognised these conditions, and endeavoured 
 to remedy them by railways and roads, but the time 
 was not opportune for the inauguration of great public 
 works, and his ideas were carried out only to a limited 
 extent. Under Avellaneda, however, the railways pro- 
 jected by Sarmiento were opened to public service, 
 but the stormy political era between 1876 and 1880 
 deterred capitalists from further ventures. Roca de- 
 cided that the only efficient method of holding tjhe 
 provinces in check was to establish means whereby the 
 National Government could despatch military contin- 
 gents to disturbed localities at short notice. He accord- 
 
64 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 ingly proposed linking up and extending the existing 
 railway system, and this railway extension throughout 
 Argentina was a notable feature in his policy. As a 
 result of it every province of the Republic is at the 
 present time within easy access of Buenos Aires. 
 
 Together with his policy of railway extension, Roca 
 devoted close attention to foreign immigration. Agencies 
 were opened in European centres for spreading informa- 
 tion of the advantages that Argentina offered to settlers. 
 Assisted passages were provided for desirable immi- 
 grants, and arrangements made to ensure occupation 
 for fresh arrivals. The lands to the south and west of 
 the province of Buenos Aires in the possession of the 
 National Government were sold by auction at low rates 
 to open them to civilisation. Public works were inaugu- 
 rated. Docks were built at Buenos Aires, and the 
 water supply and drainage of the federal capital was 
 undertaken. 
 
 Industry grew apace now that the National Govern- 
 ment was able and willing to lend a helping hand 
 towards the material welfare of the people. The petty 
 jealousies of various political groups which had kept the 
 country in a state of turmoil were restrained, and the 
 instigators promptly called to account. It was tran- 
 quillity that Argentina needed to allow the development 
 of her vast natural resources. Both agricultural and 
 pastoral enterprise rapidly expanded. Foreign capital 
 was attracted to the country. The changed conditions 
 were due to Roca's initiative. When the Cordoba 
 politicians had selected him as their candidate they had 
 no thought of a national policy, nor was any such idea 
 in the minds of the Portenos when they attempted the 
 overthrow of Avellaneda. 
 
 To permit of Roca's progressive policy ample funds 
 were required, and in 1884 Dr Carlos Pellegrini visited 
 London to explain existing circumstances in Argentina 
 and negotiate for an issue of bonds. He was able to 
 demonstrate satisfactorily the economic and industrial 
 progress under Roca, and a loan was made for £8,333,000. 
 
1881] PELLEGRINI AS MINISTER OF WAR 65 
 
 Credit was due to him for his tact in these financial 
 negotiations, and on his return to Buenos Aires in 1885, 
 in recognition of his services he was offered, and 
 accepted, the portfolio of Minister of War, which he 
 had held before under the old administration. His 
 appointment tended further to strengthen the position 
 of President Roca, for the country had not forgotten 
 the part the new Minister had played in a similar 
 capacity under Avellaneda in 1880. 
 
 In view of the general prosperity, it would seem that 
 politicians could have small scope for opposition to the 
 Administration. There was, however, a discontented 
 element in the community. Unsuccessful candidates for 
 official offices, or those who found no pickings from the 
 existing situation, were ready to make trouble. In 
 Corrientes and Catamarca, in Santa Fe and Entre Rios, 
 disturbances of a revolutionary character were attempted, 
 but the prompt action taken by Roca never allowed 
 matters to assume serious dimensions. In the province 
 of Buenos Aires, however, where the bitter feelings 
 aroused in 1880 had not yet died away, the situation in 
 1885 threatened to culminate in open rebellion. The 
 bone of contention was interference in the elections, and 
 the Provincial Administration assumed an aggressive 
 attitude towards the National Authorities, but in the 
 end the Portefios abandoned their pretensions. 
 
 In 1881 the Government of the Province of Buenos 
 Aires had selected La Plata as the site of the provincial 
 capital. There was no settlement in the vicinity, a few 
 mud cottages only denoting the locality of the future 
 city. Plans were drawn up on a magnificent scale. All 
 public buildings were to be of large dimensions and 
 costly in construction, and before they were finished the 
 liabilities incurred were £10,000,000. Nor did this 
 satisfy the province. Having lost control of the port of 
 Buenos Aires its Administration determined to create 
 another shipping centre within the sphere of provincial 
 authority ; and in furtherance of this design a series of 
 docks were constructed at Ensenada, five miles from La 
 
 E 
 
66 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 Plata. Before the work was concluded an additional 
 £4,000,000 had been expended. The vanity of the 
 Portenos could only be appeased by thus squandering 
 the provincial resources ; but in this folly of the Provincial 
 Administration Roca had no part, although the con- 
 struction of both capital and port is frequently laid at 
 his door. 
 
 In 1885 the question of the next presidential election 
 again came up. In Argentina, as in most Latin countries, 
 there is much talk of free voting, but official influence 
 with a near semblance to coercion is in the majority of 
 cases the practice. Naturally, therefore, in the present 
 instance it was stated by the Portenos that Roca would 
 not hesitate to make use of his opportunities to his own 
 advantage, and he thought it expedient to issue a public 
 declaration that he would maintain absolute neutrality 
 in regard to the Presidency. 
 
 The possible candidates were Dr Mignel Juarez 
 Celman, Dr Bernardo Irigoyen, Dr Benjamin Gorostiaga, 
 Dr Leandro Alem and Dr Dardo Rocha. The first had 
 been prominent for some years in Cordoba, and was a 
 member of the National Congress. Mention of him has 
 already been made in connection with the abortive 
 attempt of Olmos to obtain control of Cordoba in 
 February, 1880. Dr Celman and General Roca had 
 married sisters, and on the ground of this relationship he 
 was regarded as sure of Roca's influence ; so the fact 
 that Roca had declared his intention of neutrality carried 
 little weight. That the Administration should abstain 
 from exerting its influence was foreign to tradition in 
 Argentina. In 1886 Dr Juarez Celman was therefore 
 before the country to all intents and purposes as the 
 official candidate, and if Roca did not actively assist the 
 Cordoba representative he did little to alter public 
 feeling. This tacit acceptance of the popular idea con- 
 cerning the candidature of Dr Celman was tantamount 
 to lending him official countenance. It was an attitude 
 that Roca subsequently had reason to regret. 
 
 Of the others the best known were Dr Bernardo 
 
1885] PEESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES IN 1886 67 
 
 Irigoyen and Dr Leandro Alem. The former had held 
 office as a Minister under Roca, and, although widely 
 separated on various points of policy from the Admini- 
 stration in power, he was not out of touch with the 
 National Authorities. Dr Alem was a totally different 
 character. He was a Radical leader, advocating drastic 
 methods to ensure greater purity in public life, urging 
 that no means, even that of armed revolution, should be 
 left untried to attain reforms. Alem, however, was not 
 in favour with the majority of the electors, and his chance 
 of success in the contest was hardly considered as a 
 serious factor, but he came to the front so prominently 
 at a later date that his appearance on the scene in 1885 
 is worthy of record. The fourth aspirant was Dr 
 Benjamin Gorostiaga, a judge of the Supreme Court, 
 and a man widely respected for his common - sense 
 political views ; but although accorded some support, at 
 no period of the campaign had he any real prospect of 
 success. The remaining candidate was Dr Dardo Rocha, 
 who had been Governor of the Province of Ruenos 
 Aires. His followers were carpet-baggers, keenly alive 
 to the benefit of holding office for the sake of the spoils. 
 Little sympathy was extended to him. 
 
 The five years of Roca's Administration had given 
 ample time for the country to judge him. From a political 
 point of view there was no reason for dissatisfaction. 
 The attitude of the President towards the Provincial 
 Governments had brought happier results than was 
 expected. Economic progress and industrial develop- 
 ment had made substantial advances. The weak point 
 was his financial policy, and more particularly was this 
 the case in January, 1885, in connection with the bank- 
 note circulation, when the notes issued amounted to 
 $61,000,000. These were principally for the account 
 of the Banco Nacional and the Banco de la Provincia 
 de Buenos Aires, although some small sums belonged 
 to the provincial banks of Cordoba, Santa Fe, Salta, and 
 some private concerns. These notes were convertible 
 into gold on presentation. In the latter part of 1884 
 
68 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 the President was induced to assent to a decree 
 declaring this note issue inconvertible for a period 
 of two years. The grounds taken were that the banks 
 would be in financial difficulties if this relief was not 
 afforded. Roca resisted for a time, but in the end 
 allowed himself to be won over, and in January, 1885, 
 authorised the suspension of specie payments. Congress 
 was not in session when these decrees were published, 
 but the measure was approved and ratified by Senate 
 and Chamber on October 5 of the same year. Whatever 
 the influences used to bring about this result, there can 
 be no question that a grave error was committed, for 
 the door was thereby opened to the jobbery from which 
 the country suffered severely in after years. Roca may 
 have been convinced in his own mind that specie pay- 
 ments would be resumed at the date mentioned in the 
 decrees. But, knowing his countrymen as he did, he 
 must also have been alive to the dangerous nature of 
 the weapon he placed in their hands. At the time this 
 sinister stroke was proposed Dr Victorino de la Plaza 
 was Finance Minister. When he placed the scheme 
 before Roca the President refused to consider it, saying 
 " I will cut off my right hand before I sign any such 
 decree." Yet in a few weeks he had signed and pro- 
 mulgated the law out of which such mischief grew. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 the argentine republic — continued 
 
 Presidential Election. The Cordoba Clique and the Provisional 
 Governors. Dr Juarez Celman. Cordoba supports Celman. 
 Celman Elected. Roca and Celman. Uneasy Feeling. Currency 
 Conversion. Paper Money Issues. Carpet-bagging Politicians. 
 Political Conditions. Corruption in National Administration. 
 Concessions and Monopolies. Corrupt Provincial Governments. 
 Position of Pellegrini. Administration and Banking. Provincial 
 Loans. Sale of Gold Reserves. Financial Necessities. The 
 " Union Civica." Dr Alem. Aristobulo del Valle. Bernardo 
 Irigoyen. Dr Lopez. Lucio Lopez. Provincial Branches of 
 " Union Civica." Feeling against Celman. The Mortgage 
 Banks. Policy of the Administration. Foreign Residents. 
 Meetings of "Union Civica." Indictment of National Adminis- 
 tration. The "Union Civica" and Celman. The "Union 
 Civica" and Revolutionary Measures. The Army and the " Union 
 Civica." Date fixed for Revolt. Revolution of July 26, 1890. 
 Action of National Authorities. Attack on the Plaza Lavalle. 
 Numerous Casualties. Scarcity of Ammunition. Naval Action. 
 Bombardment of Buenos Aires. Attitude of Foreign Warships. 
 Reinforcements from Northern Provinces. Consultation of Rebel 
 Leaders. Majority favour Negotiation. Armistice Arranged. 
 Peace Propositions. Advice of Roca and Pellegrini. Peace 
 Concluded. Dispersion of Revolutionary Forces. Casualties. 
 Resignation of Celman. Public Temper in Buenos Aires. 
 European Opinion. Accession of Pellegrini. 
 
 As the date for the presidential election approached, it 
 was clear there would be no contest. The supporters 
 of Dr Mignel Juarez Celman had matters their own way, 
 and the Portenos made no attempt to challenge the 
 issue. 
 
 In Argentina the selection of the President rests with 
 
70 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 electors chosen by ballot throughout the provinces and 
 the federal district. Each province- and the federal 
 district nominates a body of electors equal to twice the 
 number of representatives returned to the National 
 Congress. These representatives assemble on June 12 
 of the last year of the presidential term, and vote for 
 President and Vice-President. The record of the voting 
 is signed by the electors and sent to the President of the 
 Senate. Copies are deposited also with the Presidents 
 of the provincial legislatures, and in the federal capital 
 with the President of the Municipality. The returns 
 from the provinces are opened by the President of the 
 Senate in the presence of Congress. Four members 
 form a committee to scrutinise the ballot papers, and 
 this committee announces the number of votes accorded 
 to each candidate. The scrutiny and announcement of 
 the result must be completed in one sitting of Congress, 
 but for all practical purposes the election is decided 
 when the electors are nominated in the provinces, the 
 subsequent votation being a matter of form only. 
 
 In 1886 a combination of provincial governors of 
 different provinces was arranged by the Cordoba clique 
 to decide the presidential question, and the official 
 influence exerted by the provincial authorities ensured 
 the success of the Cordoba candidate. In this situation 
 the Opposition was powerless, and toleration of such 
 conditions by Roca gave grounds for complaint on the 
 part of the Portenos. Buenos Aires alone amongst the 
 provinces had been warned the previous year that 
 attempts to make use of her official influence in electoral 
 matters would be severely punished. 
 
 No sooner were the electors chosen than Dr Celman 
 became an object of solicitous interest to numbers of 
 politicians and others with favours to ask. A banquet 
 at which 500 guests attended was organised in his 
 honour. These manifestations continued in rapid suc- 
 cession, and unlimited adulation was showered upon 
 him, on a man unusually susceptible to flattery. As 
 Governor of Cordoba, Celman had shown no adminis- 
 
President Juarez Celman. 
 
 [Face page. 70. 
 
1886] ELECTION OF JUAREZ CELMAN 71 
 
 trative ability, nor subsequently in the National Congress 
 had he been distinguished for legislative capacity. There 
 was thus little really to recommend him, and he had 
 been selected by his Cordoba friends as a pliant tool to 
 serve their purpose. 
 
 In Spanish, as in some other, countries, interest is 
 quickly diverted from the setting sun to the rising star ; 
 so, naturally, the attention hitherto devoted to Roca 
 was now transferred to Juarez Celman. On October 
 12, 1886, President Roca completed his six years of 
 office. Taking a broad view, there can be small doubt 
 that his Government between 1880 and 1886 was a 
 decided advance, for the main lines of Roca's policy 
 were directly beneficial to the Argentines, and the fact 
 was patent to everybody that the country had progressed 
 wonderfully under his guidance. In 1880 he had found 
 the Confederation composed of hostile units, and he 
 left it knit together by strong ties to the Central 
 Government. The mistakes he made in connection 
 with financial legislation, and his attitude in regard to 
 the election of his successor, were both errors of judg- 
 ment. They mar the record of his Administration, but 
 with these two exceptions there is no cause to cavil at 
 his direction of public affairs. 
 
 It was supposed that Roca would be the power 
 behind the throne during the Celman Administration. 
 Many persons who disliked the new President refrained 
 from expressing their feelings on account of their con- 
 fidence in the influence Roca would still exert in the 
 national policy. Dr Juarez Celman was not devoid of 
 cleverness, and in all probability he would have sought 
 the advice of Roca under other circumstances, but his 
 head had been turned by the servility shown to him. 
 His shallow nature was overcome with vanity when he 
 found himself safely seated in the Presidency, and Roca's 
 moderate views became irksome to him. Imagining 
 himself fully capable of managing national affairs by his 
 own initiative, he soon chafed at the idea of any 
 restraining hand ; and in his desire to break loose from 
 
72 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 control he was deftly encouraged by political adventurers, 
 who regarded Roca as an obstacle ' to their designs. 
 Amongst such surroundings it was only a question 
 of time for a disagreement to spring up between the 
 ex-President and his successor. No open breach 
 occurred, but in 1887 it was apparent that a coolness 
 had arisen, and that Roca would no longer dominate 
 Celman's Administration. When this stage was reached, 
 anxiety as to the future course of the National Govern- 
 ment was expressed in many directions. 
 
 Sober-minded citizens had reason for alarm. In 
 November, 1886, the President applied to Congress 
 for authority to postpone the date of the bank-note 
 conversion. The Chambers agreed to a measure defer- 
 ring it indefinitely, and a decree fixed two years from 
 January 9, 1887. Meanwhile the Provincial Bank of 
 Buenos Aires was authorised to issue a further $7, 000, 000, 
 bringing the total in circulation to $85,294,000 according 
 to an official statement in 1887. This increase in the 
 volume of bank-notes, with no addition to the gold 
 reserves, went far to destroy hopes of sound financial 
 legislation. 
 
 An epoch of carpet-bagging politicians now developed. 
 The Cordoba clique had failed to mould Roca to its 
 wishes, but it succeeded with Juarez Celman. No 
 sooner had Roca's influence been thrown aside than the 
 true situation became apparent. Political adventurers 
 filled every lucrative post, and elections for senators 
 and deputies were manipulated, and the developments 
 in 1887 proved the adage that to the victors belong the 
 spoils. Cordoba obtained absolute control of the 
 Government, and the "clique" exploited the country 
 for its individual benefit. Bribery and corruption 
 characterised the Administration to such an extent 
 that no business was possible with official departments 
 without palm-oil. Concessions for railways or other 
 public works, grants of national lands, monopolies for 
 industrial undertakings, were scattered widecast. The 
 national resources were squandered in appointments 
 
1887] FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION 73 
 
 and pickings for the host of greedy political followers 
 who swarmed from the provinces. It was a debauchery 
 of the public credit. 
 
 The example of the National Administration was 
 naturally copied by the Provincial Governments. Cor- 
 ruption of former days sank into insignificance beside 
 the orgy which now dominated local official institutions. 
 The restraining influence of Roca had kept provincial 
 authorities within bounds. His attitude and example 
 lent no encouragement to extravagant folly ; but under 
 Celman all was changed. Local politicians were able 
 to go their way without fear of after consequences, and 
 the good work Roca had accomplished during his six 
 years of office was threatened with obliteration, and no 
 wonder that the spirit of anarchy so marked previous to 
 1880 showed signs of revival in an insolent assumption 
 of sovereign rights by provincial governors. They main- 
 tained large bodies of troops and levied taxation in a 
 manner wholly inconsistent with the Law of Constitution. 
 
 Pellegrini at this juncture of affairs was an enigma. 
 He had been elected to the Vice-Presidency in 1886, and 
 in that capacity was also President of the Senate. The 
 important part he had played in Argentine politics 
 marked him as a man of ability and strength of char- 
 acter. It was felt that he should protest against the 
 conduct of the National Administration, but he made 
 no effort to avert the ruinous situation into which the 
 country was rapidly drifting. The fact of his silence in 
 regard to Celman's policy was a blot on his public 
 career which can never be eradicated. 
 
 Celman, untrammelled, reached the climax of folly 
 when, in November, 1887, he asked Congress to sanction 
 the establishment of banks of issue throughout the 
 Republic, whose notes should be guaranteed by national 
 bonds. Congress, absolutely servile, approved the pro- 
 position, and the Banco Nacional, thirteen provincial 
 State banks, and six private banking concerns, all came 
 under the new law, in virtue of which the inconvertible 
 notes were increased immediately to $161,700,000, and 
 
74 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 shortly afterwards still further augmented by an addi- 
 tional S3 5, 000, 000, emitted by the Banco Nacional for 
 account of the National Government. In order to comply 
 with this law the banks were required to purchase 
 national bonds from the Government, the latter retaining 
 in specie the value received. To obtain the necessary 
 cash the Provincial Governments borrowed abroad. 
 Celman was pressed for funds to meet the ever-increasing 
 expenditure, and forthwith utilised the specie thus 
 amassed and lying in the vaults. Soon the whole of 
 the cash was exhausted, and the National Government 
 was responsible for a note issue of $196,000,000. In- 
 directly it was liable also for the amounts owing by the 
 provinces to their foreign creditors. 
 
 The action of the President in this matter is the 
 keynote to his methods in the direction of public affairs. 
 His aim was to obtain money to satisfy his vicious 
 political circle, no matter how much he prostituted the 
 national credit in doing so. His action in connection 
 with the banks of emission was one of deliberate fraud 
 upon the country, and one from which Argentina is 
 still suffering. 
 
 In many directions mutterings of discontent were 
 heard, and the more conservative element looked with 
 dismay upon the conduct of the Administration. This 
 feeling was not confined to Buenos Aires. It spread 
 throughout the Republic, and by the close of 1887 was 
 unanimous except among the clique controlling the 
 President. As this spirit of dissatisfaction increased, it 
 became evident that only a rallying-point was required 
 for a reaction to set in. Meetings were held to discuss 
 the situation, but the discontented centres were not 
 sufficiently in touch with one another to ensure com- 
 bined action in event of a revolutionary outbreak. 
 Moreover, the troops of the National Government and 
 of the provinces supporting Celman were armed with 
 modern weapons and well supplied with ammunition, 
 while the Opposition were without rifles or cartridges, 
 and the acquisition of war material required time and 
 
1888] FOUNDATION OF "UNION CIVICA" 75 
 
 money. After many consultations the leaders of the 
 movement against the President determined to act 
 entirely within their constitutional rights. A central 
 league was formed with branches in the provinces, and 
 an agitation begun for the establishment of a National 
 Administration free from corruption and jobbery. 
 Prominent in connection with the foundation of this 
 league, hereafter known as the "Union Civica," were 
 Dr Leandro Alem, Dr Aristobulo del Valle, Dr Bernardo 
 Irigoyen, Dr Vicente Lopez, Dr Lucio Lopez, Senor 
 Leonardo Pereyra, and Dr Oscar Liliedale. 
 
 It was Alem who undertook the principal work of 
 organisation, and his energy fitted him for this difficult 
 task. His personality merits some description. The 
 father of this remarkable man had opposed the tyranny 
 of the Dictator Hosas, and was executed as a conspirator. 
 The son never forgot his father's fate. He vowed 
 vengeance against all authority not within the letter of 
 the Law of Constitution, and in memory of his vow 
 dressed invariably in black. Tall and slim, with a 
 beard reaching to his waist, his striking appearance 
 always attracted attention, while his agreeable manner 
 secured him many admirers and friends. In this 
 organisation of the " Union Civica " he saw a possible 
 means to avenge his father's death, and lie threw 
 himself into the work with untiring zest. 
 
 Dr Aristobulo del Valle was a man of quite different 
 mould. He was a lawyer, and widely trusted and 
 respected, whose power as an orator was admitted 
 by friends and foes. In giving his services to the 
 "Union Civica" he was actuated by purely patriotic 
 motives. His acts are evidence of the honesty of 
 purpose that impelled him to participate in the move- 
 ment against the Celman Administration. Dr Bernardo 
 Irigoyen, also closely connected with the "Union 
 Civica," was wealthy and well-known in political and 
 social life. He had held office under Roca, and was 
 another prominent citizen not actuated by personal 
 considerations. 
 
76 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 Dr Vicente Lopez and his son, Dr Lucio Lopez, 
 were both lawyers of high standing' in Buenos Aires, 
 They, too, joined the Opposition to Celman as the only 
 means of saving their country from financial and political 
 ruin. Seilor Leonardo Pereyra lent his aid from similar 
 motives, and his wealth and social influence made him 
 invaluable, especially as he was never backward in 
 supplying resources for the campaign. Dr Oscar 
 Lilieclale was Alem's right hand in the work required to 
 build up the " Union Civica." An able lawyer, Liliedale 
 resigned his usual occupations to devote himself to 
 these new duties. 
 
 With the assistance of such men there was little 
 reason to fear failure. The decision to form the " Union 
 Civica" was reached in the end of 1887, and throughout 
 the two following years the work of organisation was 
 pushed forward with energy. The headquarters of the 
 association were in the city of Buenos Aires, but in 
 nearly every town and village throughout the country 
 local clubs were founded to propagate the doctrines and 
 ideas emanating from the central committee. Meet- 
 ings were held in different localities, and all classes of 
 society were urged to attend. Dr del Valle and other 
 prominent men made frequent speeches to explain 
 the present condition of the Republic, and the object 
 of the "Union Civica" in raising opposition to the 
 National Administration. Pamphlets were also circu- 
 lated calling upon all Argentines to protest against 
 the danger threatened to their rights by the policy of 
 Celman. 
 
 In the city and province of Buenos Aires the inhabi- 
 tants promised active support to the "Union Civica," 
 and in Santa Fe and other provinces adhesion was 
 given. At the beginning of 1889, there was no longer 
 doubt that public feeling was aroused, and it became 
 more marked every day. So the work of the " Union 
 Civica " was pushed all the more vigorously under these 
 hopeful indications until, at the close of 1889, the 
 organisers of the movement found they could count on 
 
1889] DEVELOPMENT OF "UNION CIVICA " 77 
 
 the moral support of the majority of the population in 
 any action they took. 
 
 It is not to be supposed that this development of the 
 " Union Civica " was allowed to pass unmolested by the 
 National Authorities. Meetings were broken up, fre- 
 quently by armed force, on the ground that they were 
 convened for seditious purposes. Newspapers were 
 gagged, and editors threatened who dared to criticise 
 the doings of the Executive. Members of the " Union 
 Civica " were insulted by the police and soldiery. This 
 attitude was taken by Celman in the hope of terrorising 
 his enemies, but, blinded by his vanity, he under-rated 
 the strength of the feeling against himself and his 
 methods, and failed to realise that he was driving the 
 people to extremes, jeopardising his own future by not 
 temporising with the Opposition. 
 
 The last straw to break down public patience was 
 the policy adopted by the President in regard to the 
 Mortgage Banks. These institutions had been launched 
 for legitimate purposes — to make advances to land- 
 owners against real estate. Loans made by them were 
 secured on one half the market value of the pledged 
 properties. Under Celman, however, these banks 
 became political instruments of corruption. A note to 
 the manager signed by a high political personage, 
 ensured satisfactory negotiation of large loans on repre- 
 sented, not actual, property valuations, and the result- 
 ing issue of '"cedulas" was naturally almost unlimited, 
 threatening serious disaster to financial credit. In the 
 case of the National Hypothecary Bank the bonds 
 were guaranteed by the National Government ; and for 
 those of the Provincial Mortgage Bank the Provincial 
 Government was responsible. By the former institution 
 $135,000,000 was emitted, by the latter $374,000,000. 
 These loans were made, principally, between 1887 and 
 1890, and for the most part they were the outcome of 
 political influence brought to bear upon the directors. 
 
 The members of the " Union Civica " were convinced 
 of the justice of their cause, and determined to uphold 
 
78 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 their principles. Their opposition to the National 
 Government was conducted and organised upon lines 
 which left the authorities no valid excuse for inter- 
 ference. 
 
 There is no doubt that both Pellegrini and Roca saw 
 clearly the danger of the situation, but their advice was 
 not asked by Celman. The President also was aware 
 of the general discontent with his direction of public 
 affairs apart from the opinions of the leaders of the 
 "Union Civica," where no attempt at concealment was 
 made. He, however, regarded public sentiment with 
 contemptuous indifference, relying on the armed forces at 
 his disposal to quell any outbreak against his authority. 
 His ministers and political intimates assured him that 
 his position was impregnable, and that the wave of dis- 
 satisfaction would disappear completely. Their repeated 
 assertions that no real cause for alarm existed dispelled 
 his anxiety, and he made no effort to check the glaring 
 abuses of his Administration. 
 
 The attitude of the foreign residents in this crisis is 
 interesting. In the city of Buenos Aires they numbered 
 one half of the inhabitants. Throughout the Republic 
 the population was estimated at 4,000,000, and of these 
 no fewer than 2,000,000 were aliens, or of foreign 
 extraction. In electoral questions these people had 
 no legal standing, but in their hands was the great 
 source of national wealth, as regards both agricultural 
 and pastoral industry. The railways were owned by 
 foreign companies, and creditors abroad held the public 
 debt. Therefore the conduct of the National Govern- 
 ment was a matter of grave concern to foreign resi- 
 dents and European investors. The attitude of President 
 Celman threatened imminent danger to these important 
 interests, and when matters were approaching a crisis 
 in 1890, foreign sympathy was given unanimously to 
 the cause of the "Union Civica." This condemnation 
 of the Administration by the foreign element lent addi- 
 tional strength to the Opposition. It showed clearly 
 that Celman's methods were considered intolerable 
 
1890] FOREIGN OPINION 79 
 
 by a numerous class removed from local Argentine 
 politics, and that any decisive action for reform would 
 be regarded as a necessary measure worthy of en- 
 couragement. 
 
 Early in 1890 several popular meetings were held in 
 Buenos Aires by the "Union Civica." At one of these, 
 attended by 10,000 people at the Buenos Aires Fronton, 
 feeling against Celman reached a culminating pitch. An 
 address was delivered by Alem in which he recapitulated 
 the object of the "Union Civica "and denounced in 
 violent terms the policy of the National Government. 
 A more moderate speech by Dr Vicente Lopez explained 
 the injustice practised towards Argentina. The crux 
 was reached when Dr del Valle, in temperate terms, drew 
 up an indictment of the National Authorities. Their 
 corrupt methods were specified in detail, the deliberate 
 sacrifice of the national interests to allow the President 
 and his friends to secure wealth was described, and the 
 right of the inhabitants to save their country from ruin 
 urged. Also the determination of the "Union Civica" 
 to obtain redress was emphatically expressed. This 
 speech was received with enthusiastic applause. It 
 roused public appreciation of the situation. 
 
 This meeting at the Buenos Aires Fronton was con- 
 sidered a declaration of open hostility to the Celman 
 Administration, both by the " Union Civica " and the 
 supporters of the President. In view of the specific 
 charges of corruption and mal-administration preferred 
 by Dr del Valle, it was thought that some attempt would 
 be made by the Government to amend the worst faults 
 to which public attention had been called. Quite the 
 reverse actually occurred, for Celman and his followers 
 became still more autocratic, and corruption was more 
 undisguised. No opportunity was lost either to inter- 
 fere with the "Union Civica." The President clung to 
 the idea that he could maintain his position by force of 
 arms ; and additional troops were brought to Buenos 
 Aires and at the same time the police was increased. 
 On the one side was the tyrannical power of a small 
 
80 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 group of office-holders ; on the other, the spontaneous 
 protest of public opinion. 
 
 The determination of the Administration to attempt 
 no reforms resulted in further conferences of the prin- 
 cipal members of the " Union Civica " to decide a course 
 of action. An uprising was advocated. Assertions 
 were made that in the present state of the public temper 
 Celman and his gang would be driven from office at the 
 first announcement of a revolutionary outbreak. But 
 before reaching a definite decision it was determined to 
 ascertain the feelings of the military officers in Buenos 
 Aires. Moreover, to ensure the success of any popular 
 rising it was necessary to have a store of arms and 
 ammunition, for it was thought improbable that the 
 downfall of the President could be accomplished without 
 some bloodshed. Now the "Union Civica" had no 
 control of warlike material, the movement hitherto 
 having been conducted strictly within the legal rights 
 of the members as citizens, and it was only by the seizure 
 of one or other of the national arsenals that arms could 
 be acquired. During June, 1890, the military and naval 
 officers in Buenos Aires were therefore sounded in 
 reference to participation in a revolt. The navy showed 
 no reluctance to give active support, but with the army 
 negotiations were not so happy. In many individual 
 instances assistance was promised, and in the case of 
 the artillery at the arsenal and barracks of the Plaza 
 Lavalle adhesion was assured. This was of vital import- 
 ance to the plans of the "Union Civica," since it meant 
 a supply of rifles and 550,000 rounds of ball cartridge, 
 besides a battery of field guns with ammunition. So in 
 July, 1890, the "Union Civica" decided the time was 
 ripe, and the movement from that time developed into a 
 conspiracy against the Administration, whose leaders 
 only waited an opportune moment to proclaim a 
 revolution. 
 
 July 26 was fixed finally for the revolt. To ensure 
 against opposition from the officer in command at the 
 Plaza Lavalle arrangements were made to drug him on 
 
1890] REVOLUTION IN 1890 81 
 
 the previous evening. Before daybreak the leaders of 
 the "Union Civica" and a number of the Opposition 
 joined the garrison at the arsenal, and the revolutionary 
 forces, numbering in all some 1500 men, then took 
 possession of the Plaza, which was converted into a 
 military camp. Arms were served out to the volunteers, 
 and other preparations made to repel attack by the 
 Government troops — barricades thrown up and guns 
 posted to command the approaches, etc. The rebels 
 then determined to await developments, believing the 
 position in the Plaza Lavalle sufficiently strong to resist 
 assault. This inactivity was an error of judgment, for 
 the way to the Government Palace was unimpeded, and 
 the distance less than a mile, so that the rebels could 
 easily have seized it and placed themselves in a much 
 more favourable situation. Opinions, however, in the 
 revolutionary camp were divided as to tactics, with the 
 result that no move from the Plaza Lavalle was 
 attempted. Information soon reached the National 
 Authorities of the outbreak ; and the police and the 
 garrison were called to arms. A part of the national 
 force was immediately marched to the Plaza Libertad, 
 situated only some three hundred yards from the Plaza 
 Lavalle, and a strong detachment was stationed in the 
 Plaza Victoria to protect the national buildings. Skir- 
 mishers were likewise posted on the housetops with 
 orders to shoot down all persons suspected of connection 
 with the revolt. When daylight broke Buenos Aires 
 was transformed, and signs of armed conflict were 
 everywhere in evidence. 
 
 The insurgents had not long to wait before they 
 were aware of the proximity of the troops, for shortly 
 after 8 a.m. the attack upon the Plaza Lavalle began in 
 earnest. National forces advanced from the Plaza 
 Libertad, and, after a few rounds from a field battery, 
 attempted to storm the rebel barricades, but these were 
 defended staunchly, and in spite of repeated assaults, 
 the troops were unable to break through the insurgent 
 lines. At mid-day the attacking force was withdrawn 
 
 F 
 
82 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 from the streets leading into the Plaza Lavalle. On 
 both sides the firing was wild, and the execution done 
 was not in proportion to the expenditure of ammunition, 
 but the assailants were much exposed in their efforts to 
 force the barricades, and suffered more heavily than 
 the defenders. Casualties, however, were sufficiently 
 numerous to show the men in the Plaza Lavalle that 
 no child's play was intended. 
 
 Reinforcements were now sent by the Government 
 to the Plaza Libertad with instructions to renew the 
 attack and carry the rebel position at all costs, and next 
 day repeated attempts were made to render the situation 
 of the insurgents untenable. But the defence was well 
 maintained, and although the list of killed and wounded 
 was long, the defendants were able to hold their 
 entrenchments. The rebels, however, now discovered 
 that the small arm ammunition was running short. 
 Only 30,000 rounds remained, and investigation showed 
 that in place of 550,000 rounds of ball cartridge in the 
 arsenal when hostilities commenced there had been but 
 200,000. The wild and continuous firing by civilian 
 volunteers during the past two days had resulted in the 
 expenditure of 170,000 cartridges. This failure of 
 ammunition made necessary an immediate consultation 
 of the leaders. 
 
 Meanwhile the fleet had endeavoured to assist the 
 rebel cause. On July 27 the ships opened fire on the 
 city of Buenos Aires, ostensibly to bombard the Govern- 
 ment buildings where the President and his Ministers 
 were known to be, but the shells flew wide of the mark, 
 and while the Government Palace was untouched 
 several private dwellings and one hotel in the vicinity 
 were struck. Then the officers in command of the 
 foreign warships decided that the bombardment was 
 unjustified, and the senior officer of the Argentine 
 vessels, Captain O'Connor, was notified that if the 
 firing did not cease the commanders of the foreign men- 
 of-war in port would use force to prevent its continuance. 
 Captain O'Connor, much against his inclination, therefore 
 
1890] GOVERNMENT REINFORCEMENTS 83 
 
 suspended further action. Steps were now taken by 
 the National Government to strengthen the garrison by 
 bringing troops from the northern provinces. The 
 Governor of Cordoba was Dr Marcos Juarez Celman, 
 a brother of the President of the Republic. Cordoba 
 maintained an armed force of 4000 men, and Dr Marcos 
 Celman lost no time in despatching 2000 of these to his 
 brother's assistance. Further reinforcements of 1000 
 men were brought from Tucuman, and these two con- 
 tingents were ready to enter the city of Buenos Aires 
 on the morning of July 28. The prompt manner in 
 which this support from the provinces was hurried to 
 the National Capital was not without moral effect on 
 sympathisers with the "Union Civica," and it deterred 
 open adherence to the revolution on the part of the 
 unarmed civilian section of the population. Further- 
 more, with the arrival of these troops Celman believed 
 his position secure. He estimated that the strength of 
 the Opposition was the comparatively small group in 
 the Plaza Lavalle, and he left out of his calculation the 
 deep-rooted feeling of discontent against himself and 
 his methods throughout the Republic. 
 
 The leaders in the Plaza Lavalle were informed of 
 the arrival of the national reinforcements, and an 
 immediate decision as to future tactics became an 
 imperative necessity. Some of the military officers were 
 in favour of an attempt to cut a way through the 
 Government lines, and continue the revolt outside the 
 National Capital. In this proposal a few prominent 
 civilians acquiesced, but the principal members of the 
 "Union Civica" were in favour of opening negotiations 
 with the National Authorities to ascertain on what terms 
 a modus vwendi could be arranged. A somewhat acri- 
 monious discussion then took place, but in the end the 
 majority decided to treat with the National Government 
 for the re-establishment of peace on condition that certain 
 concessions were granted to the participators in the 
 revolutionary movement. 
 
 Accordingly, on July 28 an armistice was arranged 
 
84 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 to allow negotiations. Dr Maximo Paz, the Governor 
 of the Province of Buenos Aires, acted as mediator, and 
 Celman called upon Pellegrini and Roca for their advice 
 as to the course he should take. The terms proposed 
 by the "Union Civica" were that Dr Celman should 
 resign office, and that an amnesty be granted to all 
 persons actively participating in the revolt. When this 
 proposition was communicated to the President he was 
 inclined to treat it with contempt. He called attention 
 to the fact that the garrison had been strongly reinforced, 
 and it was only a question of a few hours when the 
 unconditional surrender of the insurgents must take 
 place unless they were to be absolutely annihilated. 
 For the rebels to demand concessions, he added, was to 
 recognise them as victors in the struggle. The more 
 sober-minded, however, among the advisers of the 
 President obliged him to listen to a different view of 
 the case. They said that the suppression of the armed 
 force in the Plaza Lavalle offered no great difficulties, 
 but that this was only a fractional part of the movement, 
 since feeling throughout the Republic was so embittered 
 that his continuance in office would assuredly lead to 
 civil war. In the face of these plain truths Celman's 
 attitude changed. The confidence he had expressed of 
 his ability to hold his own in the face of popular opinion 
 disappeared, and after further discussion the represen- 
 tatives of the " Union Civica " were informed their terms 
 would be accepted with slight modifications. On July 
 29 the negotiations were concluded, and the insurgents 
 dispersed after delivering up their arms to the National 
 Authorities. Thus the " Union Civica " had forced the 
 resignation of the President. 
 
 When the comparatively small number of combatants 
 is taken into consideration the casualty list on both sides 
 was abnormally high. The number of Government forces 
 engaged was under 3000, and the loss in killed and 
 wounded was 700 officers and men, and the strength of 
 the rebels, counting the armed civilians and the detach- 
 ment of the army participating in the revolt, was about 
 
1890] RESIGNATION OF OELMAN 85 
 
 1500. Of these 400 were killed or injured, and a few 
 civilians having no part in the quarrel were shot down 
 by the armed police. Little trouble was taken to verify 
 the intentions of any casual wanderers through the 
 streets during the hostilities. The usual treatment for 
 these inoffensive persons was a volley in their direction. 
 It is deserving of mention that several leading doctors 
 joined the rebels in the Plaza Lavalle to lend their pro- 
 fessional services to their compatriots. 
 
 On July 30 Celman's resignation was officially an- 
 nounced. It was not until this event was known publicly 
 that the real extent of the opposition to his Administra- 
 tion could be gauged. A scene of the wildest excitement 
 ensued, and by common consent holidays were kept for 
 three days. . Everywhere evidence was seen of satisfaction 
 at the turn events had taken. The depressing influence 
 of the past two years was eliminated, and Dr Juarez 
 Celman disappeared completely, few persons caring 
 what became of him. With the downfall of the Presi- 
 dent the power of his political clique was broken. In 
 no quarter was a good word heard for any official act of 
 the recent Administration. 
 
 In Europe, where keen interest was taken in Argen- 
 tine affairs in consequence of the heavy investments at 
 stake, the agitation promoted by the " Union Civica" 
 was regarded as the uprising of a deeply injured people 
 against a tyrannical and corrupt system of Government, 
 and was approved accordingly. That Celman had been 
 compelled to resign was accepted as evidence of a 
 determination in Argentina to insist on honesty in the 
 conduct of national affairs. 
 
 As Vice-President of the Republic, Pellegrini acceded 
 to the duties vacated by Celman. He had already 
 acquired a varied experience in connexion with public 
 administration, and his advent was hailed with general 
 satisfaction. Yet Pellegrini had many political enemies 
 in Buenos Aires, where the part he played as Minister 
 of War under Avellaneda was not forgotten, and his 
 conduct in making no protest against the proceedings of 
 
86 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 the Celman clique had served also to bring him discredit. 
 On the other hand, he claimed a wide circle of personal 
 friends, and could rely on them for support. The public 
 also recognised in the new President a man of ability. 
 He had no desire for the Presidency, but accepted it as 
 a duty. The responsibility of reducing chaos to order 
 offered indeed little inducement, for the administrative 
 departments were in the utmost confusion. A complete 
 reorganisation of the governmental machinery was 
 necessary, and this could not be an easy task. 
 
President Pellegrini. 
 
 [Face 'page SO. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 the argentine republic — continued 
 
 Ministry under Pellegrini. Attitude of Roca. Public Opinion. 
 National Finances. Political Situation. Economic Conditions. 
 Cedula Issues. Inconvertible Currency. Policy of Pellegrini. 
 Depreciation in Currency. Argentina and Baring Brothers. 
 Suspension of Foreign Debt Service. Banking Crisis. Patriotic 
 Loan. Banco Nacional and Banco de la Provincia. Attempted 
 Assassination of Roca. Pellegi'ini's Administration. Discontented 
 Feeling. Influence of Mitre. Mitre returns from Europe. 
 Cordoba and Mitre. Roca and Mitre. The " Union Civica 
 Radical." A new State Bank. Pellegrini and the "Union 
 Civica Radical." Nomination of Dr Luis Saenz Peha. Dr 
 Bernardo Irigoyan and the " Union Civica Radical." Political 
 Situation in 1892. State of Siege. Arrest of Alem. Alem 
 Deported. Dr Luis Saenz Peha elected President. Dr Jose 
 Uriburu. Roca resigns Portfolio of Interior. Saenz Pefia 
 accedes to Office. Public Opinion and Pellegrini. Loss of the 
 Rosales. Officers of the Rosales sentenced to Death. Saenz 
 Pefia and Congress. Ministerial Crisis. Obstruction in Con- 
 gress. Ministry of Dr del Valle. Alem and Political Agitation. 
 Congress and the Administration. Excitement in Buenos Aires. 
 Revolt in San Luis. Revolutionary Preparations in Buenos Aires. 
 National Government and Governor Costa. National Troops and 
 Revolutionary Forces. Alem in Santa Fe. Rosario captured by 
 Insurgents. Roca commands in Santa Fe. Surrender of Alem. 
 
 The first duty of Pellegrini was to form a ministry that 
 would conciliate the angry passions aroused by recent 
 events. It was no easy matter to combine a representa- 
 tion of the principal political elements with such inde- 
 pendent strength as would ensure respect for law and 
 order. 
 
 An attempt at reaction from Cordoba was possible, 
 
 87 
 
88 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 and it was necessary to guard against any danger from 
 this source. The Ministry of the Interior, therefore, was 
 undoubtedly the most important portfolio in the Cabinet. 
 It was also the most difficult to fill. One man combined 
 the necessary qualifications — General Roca. To induce 
 the former President to re-enter public life in a sub- 
 ordinate capacity, Pellegrini urged patriotism. He asked 
 Roca to aid in restoring the national prestige, and that 
 statesman ultimately consented to undertake the duties 
 until the danger from provincial politicians had passed. 
 The provincial representatives could raise no objection 
 to this appointment. Roca had been their own choice 
 for the Presidency in 1880, and his Administration had 
 been successful. Cordoba and other provinces now 
 required a strong hand to check their political intrigues, 
 and because this was the case Pellegrini appealed to his 
 former chief for assistance. 
 
 The other portfolio requiring special qualifications 
 was Finance. The Exchequer was in dire confusion, 
 and a reorganisation of the department was necessary 
 to ascertain exactly the extent of the inroads upon the 
 national purse under the late Administration. In 
 appointing Dr Vicente Lopez to this post, Pellegrini 
 acted wisely. Dr Lopez had no great financial ability, 
 but he was a man of absolute integrity and untiring in 
 his attention to detail ; his appointment was also a con- 
 cession to the " Union Civica," and was fully appreciated 
 by that association. 
 
 No difficulty was found in filling the remaining port- 
 folios, and on the whole this first ministry of Pellegrini 
 was a happy combination of various political elements. 
 Except by Cordoba satisfaction was felt on all sides. 
 Relief at the suppression of the Celman Administration 
 was everywhere else profound, and assured approval for 
 any honest Government. That the evil influence of the 
 past four years would take time to eradicate was patent 
 to everybody, and no miracles were expected from 
 Pellegrini, so that he assumed his presidential duties 
 amidst general goodwill. 
 
1890] THE FINANCIAL SITUATION 89 
 
 It was not until some weeks later that the compli- 
 cations of the situation were understood. Celman had 
 left an empty treasury and a legacy of indebtedness far 
 beyond the resources of the country. Concessions 
 carrying money guarantees for annual interest on capital 
 invested had been scattered broadcast. Congress had 
 been packed with representatives elected through official 
 influence, and with neither capability or desire to legislate 
 for the national interests. Had the "Union Civica" 
 gained a complete victory in July the intention was to 
 dissolve the Chambers. It was hardly within the 
 province of Pellegrini to advise any such drastic proceed- 
 ing, and he found himself confronted by a political 
 representation lacking in intelligence and energy to 
 initiate useful legislation to assist the country in this 
 crisis. The economic situation was a source of even 
 greater anxiety than financial conditions. Extravagance 
 in public administration produced spendthrift habits in 
 private life. Everywhere the shoe pinched now that 
 credit was contracted, and the inflation in commercial 
 concerns in Argentina between 1887 and 1890 had been 
 disastrous to the sound economic progress of the country. 
 Both the National and Provincial Mortgage Banks had 
 made borrowing easy, but if the money obtained from 
 the issue of " Cedulas " had been legitimately applied no 
 harm would have been done. Unfortunately, in the 
 great majority of cases where loans were made, the 
 money was squandered, so that when the crisis came in 
 1890 this profligacy further complicated the situation. 
 Landowners could obtain no more advances. In these 
 circumstances it was not surprising that real poverty 
 was not infrequent. 
 
 An examination of existing conditions by the new 
 Finance Minister was productive of unpleasant revela- 
 tions. The Government had no funds to meet the 
 ordinary expenses of the Administration. Obligations 
 contracted were overdue ; disorder was rampant in every 
 department, and national bankruptcy threatened in the 
 immediate future. Resources had been mortgaged to 
 
90 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC " 
 
 such an extent that there was small hope of obtaining 
 foreign financial assistance. In his dilemma the 
 President listened to short-sighted advisers who proposed 
 to issue large sums in inconvertible notes guaranteed 
 by the National Treasury. To follow advice of this 
 nature showed disinclination to face the difficulties in 
 which the country was involved, and yet the public was 
 willing to support Pellegrini in any policy for the full 
 exposure of the corrupt system in vogue under Celman. 
 Argentine credit abroad would not have suffered from 
 such action. The President, however, averse to such 
 thorough measures, cast about for a temporary reprieve 
 from the day of reckoning, and in an emission of paper 
 currency found the fatal way to defer any public explan- 
 ation of the true state of affairs. He used the printing 
 press and flooded the country with inconvertible paper in 
 order to extricate himself momentarily from his difficult 
 position, and in September, 1890, asked permission of 
 Congress to issue notes for $60,000,000. This proposition 
 was sanctioned and the emission made. It tended for 
 the moment to relieve the embarrassments of the 
 Administration, but unhappily and inevitably served 
 also to shake confidence in the President and to pave 
 the way for greater financial complications to follow. 
 
 The immediate result of this note emission was a 
 rapid depreciation in the purchasing value of the currency. 
 Argentine credit suffered, and foreign creditors became 
 more exigent for a settlement of outstanding accounts, 
 so that the financial crisis was at once aggravated, and 
 in proportion to its acuteness reacted uniformly upon the 
 national resources. In the matter of the service of the 
 external debt the Administration was largely in the hands 
 of Baring Brothers, its financial agents in London. 
 Other agents attended to the service of various provincial 
 and municipal obligations, but it was to the Barings the 
 National Government looked for assistance. In dealing 
 with Argentina the Barings had become heavily involved, 
 and when the depreciation of Argentine credit occurred 
 they were naturally the first to feel the situation acutely. 
 
1891] SUSPENSION OF DEBT SERVICE 91 
 
 So great did the pressure upon them become in conse- 
 quence of their Argentine connection, that although, as 
 it turned out, perfectly solvent, they were forced into 
 liquidation in November, 1890. This catastrophe 
 enormously increased the difficulties of Argentina, and 
 when the Administration was called upon to provide 
 funds to meet the service of the debt falling due on 
 January 1, 1891, it could nowhere obtain the required 
 accommodation. Matters dragged along until the end 
 of the year, when, without previous notification, default 
 was made. 
 
 The full effect of the four years of Celman's Adminis- 
 tration now became apparent. First of all the suspen- 
 sion of the debt service drew public attention to the 
 condition of the Banco Nacional, and disquieting rumours 
 as to its stability were persistently circulated. It was 
 urged that the Government must support the bank, and, 
 on the other hand, argued that if the Administration 
 was unable to meet the national obligations no money 
 would be forthcoming if the bank's own resources were 
 insufficient to meet its liabilities. While arrangements 
 with the foreign creditors were pending the crash came. 
 During March, 1891, the depositors in nearly all the 
 banks became uneasy, and large sums were withdrawn, 
 more especially from the Banco Nacional and the Banco 
 de la Provincia de Buenos Aires ; and in the beginning 
 of April the alarm became general, until it developed 
 into panic, which forced the Banco Nacional and the 
 Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires to close their 
 doors, several private banks following suit. The re- 
 sources of the London and River Plate Bank and the 
 English Bank of the River Plate were severely taxed, 
 but the former promptly met every obligation. The 
 English Bank also faced the run at the time, but failed 
 immediately after pressure relaxed. Pellegrini attempted 
 to save the Banco Nacional from bankruptcy. An in- 
 ternal loan was raised, and $38,000,000 subscribed, but 
 this assistance was of no avail, and as a banking con- 
 cern that institution ceased to exist. The Banco 
 
92 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 National was afterwards declared in liquidation, but the 
 Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires struggled on 
 for a time, although if possible more completely ruined. 
 This banking crisis violently disturbed the economic 
 situation, and increased the difficulty of Pellegrini's 
 position. 
 
 Early in 1891 an attempt was made to assassinate 
 Roca. It was never clearly ascertained if the would-be 
 assassin was prompted by political motives, or whether 
 the crime was the outcome of the misery and poverty 
 now a common feature. Roca was in his carriage, when 
 a shot was fired, and the bullet slightly wounded him in 
 the back, but inflicted no serious injury. The man was 
 arrested, but refused any account of his motives other 
 than that he had intended to kill the ex-President. 
 There was at this time a very strong sentiment against 
 Roca, as the populace held him responsible in great 
 measure for the hard conditions now ruling. They 
 attributed their sufferings to him on the ground that 
 through his influence Celman had been elected to the 
 Presidency. 
 
 It was evident to close observers that Pellegrini was 
 discouraged by the obstacles in his path. He felt that he 
 was only a stop-gap in the presidential office, and that 
 his short tenure was inadequate to admit any measures 
 he initiated maturing. Therefore no drastic reforms 
 were attempted by him. The Government just drifted 
 without definite policy aiming at a permanent solution 
 of any economic and financial problems, and naturally 
 this attitude did not satisfy the country. In less than 
 twelve months from the date of Pellegrini's inauguration, 
 all signs of the popular enthusiasm with which he had 
 been greeted disappeared, and public opinion in Buenos 
 Aires and many other sections of the Republic rallied 
 round General Bartolome Mitre as the only man able to 
 save the situation. 
 
 Mitre had been abroad when the revolutionary out- 
 break occurred in 1890, and did not return until May, 
 1891, when the landing of the leader of porteno political 
 
1891] GENERAL MITRE RETURNS 93 
 
 life was made the occasion of a remarkable exhibition 
 of public rejoicing. By common consent the clay was 
 observed as a holiday, and more than 50,000 persons 
 assembled near the docks and in the streets to bid him 
 welcome. The way to his residence was strewn with 
 flowers. A meeting was convened in the Plaza San 
 Martin, and a petition presented to him to become a 
 candidate for the Presidency. At first Mitre demurred 
 on the grounds of old age, but in view of the unanimous 
 support tendered he finally consented. For the moment 
 the political horizon cleared, and the public became con- 
 tented to allow the remaining eighteen months Pellegrini 
 had to serve to drag out without further indication of 
 hostile feeling. 
 
 It was soon evident, however, that Cordoba would 
 not accept the porteno representative, because Mitre in 
 power would block the ambitions of the " clique." 
 Roca was the traditional political enemy of the Portenos, 
 and it was intimated to him that every effort, even civil 
 war, would be used to prevent the election of the porteno 
 leader. A meeting was therefore arranged between 
 Mitre and Roca. They held a conference known as 
 11 El Acuerdo" which resulted in Mitre withdrawing on 
 condition that a non-party candidate was nominated, 
 and that the provincial politicians should support him. 
 This agreement again changed the situation, and was 
 subsequently the cause of important political events. 
 
 Dr Leandro Alem was the central figure of the 
 opposition to the agreement between Mitre and Roca. 
 He immediately organised a campaign against the 
 "Acuerdo," but the "Union Civica" was divided on the 
 question, and the two sections separated, the partisans 
 of Dr Alem forming the " Union Civica Radical." The 
 others continued as the "Union Civica," but quickly 
 dropped into obscurity. Associated with Alem were 
 Irigoyen, Leonardo Pereyra, Oscar Liliedale, and other 
 prominent citizens. The principles followed by Alem 
 and his colleagues were to insist upon registration of 
 voters and endeavour to obtain an election in which no 
 
94 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 compulsion or official influence was used. It was a 
 policy which attracted the younger section of the popu- 
 lation, and many recruits flocked to the new platform. 
 As Alem found his support increasing, he enlarged his 
 sphere of operations, and before the end of 1891 there 
 was not a district in the Republic where branches of 
 the "Union Civica Radical" had not been established. 
 
 The cause of the "Union Civica Radical" was 
 strengthened by the financial legislation initiated in 
 October of 1891. Finding that all attempts to revive 
 the Banco Nacional were abortive, Pellegrini determined 
 to found a new bank, which he named the Banco de la 
 Nation Argentina, and it was launched with an additional 
 note issue of $50,000,000. State banking had conduced 
 to bring about the existing economic and financial 
 difficulties, and had enabled Celman to squander the 
 national resources. No wonder, then, that the new bank 
 was regarded as but another method to revive those 
 practices, and adverse comment was heard from every 
 quarter. Discontent with the Administration was inten- 
 sified, and served to bring converts to the "Union 
 Civica Radical " with its cry for economic and political 
 reform. 
 
 One effect of the agitation promoted by Alem was 
 to throw the influence of the Government in favour of 
 the agreement between Roca and Mitre. This changed 
 the position of the "Union Civica Radical." At first 
 it was only opposed to the " Acuerdo," but now it became 
 the centre of opposition to the National Government, 
 and was credited with revolutionary designs whenever 
 a new publication attacking the national policy was 
 issued or a meeting summoned. Occasionally seditious 
 measures were advocated, but seldom of such character 
 as to warrant police interference. Yet at various times 
 the meetings were dispersed by armed force, and more 
 than once volleys were fired by the police into the head- 
 quarters of the association. 
 
 After many vacillations the "Acuerdo" Party decided 
 to nominate I)r Luis Saenz Pefia for the Presidency. 
 
1892] THE "UNION CIVICA RADICAL" 95 
 
 Other names were brought forward and rejected, and 
 Dr Luis Saenz Peha combined the conditions of the 
 "Acuerdo." A Judge of the Supreme Court for many 
 years, Dr Pena was removed from political controversies. 
 In his high judicial capacity he had won the respect of 
 Argentines and foreigners. He was sixty-eight years 
 of age, and with his experience of men and matters 
 it was thought that the national welfare would be safe 
 in his hands. 
 
 Under other conditions it is possible Alem and the 
 "Union Civica Radical" might have supported the 
 candidature of Saenz Pena. He and his followers, 
 however, found fault with the system that had brought 
 Dr Pena forward, and they refused to accept him. 
 They argued that the machinery at work for the presi- 
 dential election was a continuance of the practice 
 previously in vogue in Argentina, when the outgoing 
 President named his successor. This was claimed to 
 be at the root of the political trouble in the past, and 
 in these circumstances the " Union Civica Radical " put 
 forward Dr Bernardo Irigoyen as their candidate. 
 
 At the beginning of 1892 there were only two 
 political parties. On one side were Mitre, Roca, and 
 the Administration, and on the other Alem and the 
 "Union Civica Radical." Had Alem expressed himself 
 more moderately as to the means he proposed to employ 
 to obtain electoral and other reforms he would have 
 secured many more adherents, especially amongst the 
 higher social classes. 
 
 As the election drew closer, Alem saw his efforts 
 thwarted by the official influence of Pellegrini, and this 
 evoked violent speeches in favour of armed rebellion 
 which frightened people with large vested interests at 
 stake. They preferred to support the candidate of the 
 " Acuerdo " rather than risk a revolutionary outbreak. 
 Pellegrini was quick to see how the drift of events 
 enabled him to control the situation, and he had no hesi- 
 tation in acting promptly when an opportunity occurred 
 for a decisive move against Alem. 
 
96 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 Soon, therefore, it became evident that no real 
 contest would take place over the presidential election, 
 because no opportunity would be allowed for the 
 opposition to vote. The "Union Civica Radical" 
 would not be debarred from going to the polling 
 stations, but it was understood their vote was to be 
 returned in the minority. This tempted Alem and his 
 friends to advise a revolutionary rising as the only 
 means of protesting against such injustice. That an 
 insurrectionary movement could succeed was regarded 
 as only a remote possibility, but Alem argued that such 
 action would strengthen his cause. The intention of 
 the Opposition was reported to Pellegrini, who forth- 
 with determined on a sensational course to checkmate 
 Alem. In April rumours of impending revolutionary 
 tactics were circulated, but the National Authorities 
 apparently gave little heed to them, although in reality 
 the Government was completing its arrangements. 
 Orders were issued to confine all troops to barracks. 
 A Cabinet meeting was summoned at which a short 
 decree was drawn up declaring the city and province of 
 Buenos Aires in a state of siege. This suspended 
 constitutional privileges, and the chief of police was 
 instructed to arrest Alem and his friends as dangerous 
 to the public peace. Within a few hours the leaders of 
 the Opposition were in prison. For three days the 
 Government kept control of the telegraphs, and travellers 
 were allowed only to enter and leave the national 
 capital under surveillance, so that the discontented 
 faction could make no movement towards rebellion. 
 Then it was decided to place the prisoners on board a 
 transport, where they were confined for some weeks. 
 When all danger of a rising was over, a proclamation 
 was issued exiling Alem and his colleagues from 
 Argentine territory pending the President's pleasure ; 
 and by such high-handed action was the growing power 
 of the " Union Civica Radical " paralysed. 
 
 In due course Saenz Pena was elected, but he had 
 no hand in the action taken to prevent an electoral 
 
1892] ELECTION OF SAENZ PENA 97 
 
 contest, and never expressed any keen desire to occupy 
 the Presidency. Urged by Mitre and Roca, he accepted 
 the nomination, and, except among the "Union Civica 
 Radical " sympathisers, the presidential question was re- 
 garded with comparative apathy outside the " Acuerdo" 
 circle. Most people were adverse to developments 
 which might raise again the standard of armed 
 revolution, and were satisfied if the election of Pena 
 conduced to freedom from political disturbances. The 
 " Acuerdo " policy was viewed as expedient to save 
 friction between the Portenos and the Cordoba clique. 
 
 In accordance with this policy, a man with no 
 marked political tendencies, Dr Jose Uriburu, was 
 nominated for the Vice-Presidency. For twenty years 
 he had been absent on diplomatic missions, and at the 
 time of his selection was Minister in Chile. The choice 
 was influenced by the fact that relations between Chile 
 and Argentina were strained in connection with the 
 delimitation of the frontier between the two countries, 
 and it was held to be advisable to have Uriburu's 
 experience at hand in case grave complications 
 occurred. 
 
 With the election of Pena, Roca's work in the 
 Administration ended, and he announced his resignation. 
 There can be little doubt that his services during the 
 two years he was Minister of Interior were of immense 
 value. The provinces, always inclined to be turbulent, 
 would have resumed gladly the quarrel with the Portenos 
 after the resignation of Celman, but Roca prevented an 
 outbreak. Whenever revolutionary practices were 
 threatened he struck promptly and decisively, but with 
 the action against the leaders of the "Union Civica 
 Radical " he had small connection, although the matter 
 properly came within his jurisdiction. 
 
 On October 12, 1892, Saenz Pena assumed his pre- 
 sidential duties, and Dr Pellegrini left the Government 
 Palace after the usual ceremony almost unnoticed. 
 The wildest enthusiasm had greeted him when he took 
 the place of Celman two years before, and now the 
 
 G 
 
98 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 changed temper of the populace was marked. Excep- 
 tional difficulties had beset his Administration, and that 
 he should overcome them completely was not to be 
 expected. Nobody, indeed, anticipated that the disas- 
 trous results of the Celman period could be eradicated 
 immediately, but all required a clear statement of the 
 condition of affairs so that the complications might be 
 boldly faced. Pellegrini hesitated to take this straight- 
 forward course, and his efforts to temporise served to 
 plunge the country deeper into the mire. His patch- 
 work policy aggravated the difficulties and alienated 
 the sympathy of the more wealthy classes, who saw 
 in his acts danger to their interests. His treatment 
 of Alem and his associates was likewise viewed with 
 little favour because it savoured too much of the old 
 despotism. 
 
 In 1892 an incident occurred in connection with the 
 Argentine navy that merits mention. A squadron was 
 ordered on a cruise, and amongst the vessels was the 
 torpedo - catcher Rosales, commanded by Commander 
 Victorica, with Commander Funes acting as second in 
 authority. Off the coast of Uruguay a heavy gale was 
 encountered, by which the ships were separated. Next 
 day the officers of the Rosales landed and reported that 
 the torpedo-catcher had foundered and that the crew 
 had been embarked in boats and life-rafts belonging 
 to the ship. At the time it was remarked that the 
 officers had come ashore together instead of being dis- 
 tributed amongst the boats, but no doubt was cast upon 
 the facts as related by the two commanders, Victorica 
 and Funes. All the greater, therefore, was the sensa- 
 tion excited a few days later when a fireman of the 
 Rosales stated that the officers had deserted the vessel 
 during the storm, leaving the crew to perish. At first 
 the story received little credence, but an investigation 
 was ordered, and a categorical statement obtained from 
 the fireman of an appalling nature. According to this 
 witness, when the gale was at its height the Rosales 
 showed signs of distress, whereupon the officers ordered 
 
1892] WRECK OF THE ROSALES 99 
 
 the crew below, and rations of rum were served out. 
 Whilst the men were drinking the hatches were battened 
 down. No attention was paid to their cries, andthe 
 attempt made to force the hatches was for some hours 
 without avail, but finally they made their way on deck, 
 only to find the ship in a sinking condition and aban- 
 doned by the officers. All boats and life-rafts had dis- 
 appeared, the crew were helpless, and the Rosales sank 
 soon after they reached the deck. This one fireman had 
 clung to some wreckage when the ship foundered, and 
 been washed ashore next day. Forthwith the arrest of 
 Victorica and Funes was ordered, but both had influen- 
 tial friends, the former being a son of the Minister of 
 War, and pressure was put upon the judge before whom 
 the case was tried to bring in a verdict of acquittal. 
 To his credit the judge stood firm, and the two officers 
 were condemned to death, but the sentence was delayed 
 and in the end not executed. The affair had an impor- 
 tant bearing subsequently upon the Pena Adminis- 
 tration. 
 
 Saenz Peiia's accession to the Presidential Chair 
 brought to the front political conditions previously 
 unknown in Argentina. Hitherto the National Con- 
 gress had represented the political affinities of the 
 President, but the new President had no political follow- 
 ing upon whom he could depend for support. At first 
 the new position thus created was not understood either 
 by Pena or Congress, and his idea was to administer 
 public affairs for the general good without reference to 
 political exigencies. This had been the ostensible plat- 
 form of the "Acuerdo," but Pena did not appreciate 
 the character of Congress, and unforeseen obstacles arose 
 to paralyse his efforts. Both Senate and Chamber of 
 Deputies were opportunist, and wanted benefits for them- 
 selves, to secure which they sought an excuse to embar- 
 rass the President. His first Cabinet needed but a few 
 months of office to satisfy it of the practicable impos- 
 sibility of carrying out his policy. The President was 
 unversed in political life, and unprepared to use his 
 
100 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 official position to influence the opinions of others. For 
 thirty years he had been a member of the Judiciary, and 
 his long experience in the Supreme Court had imbued 
 him with a habit of routine which made him endeavour 
 to conduct political business on hard-and-fast rules, a 
 method doomed to failure. Concessions were expected 
 in return for support, and without such inducement 
 Congress was more inclined to throw obstacles in his 
 path than to consider any executive act upon its merits. 
 In vain ministers urged the necessity of using the Presi- 
 dential prerogative to create a political majority in 
 Congress. The President stolidly clung to his resolve 
 to make no effort in this direction, socially or politically, 
 and rumours were soon afloat that the Cabinet would 
 resign on the pretext that a group in Congress had 
 determined on a policy of obstruction. This political 
 opposition took definite shape in the begining of 1893, 
 and shortly afterwards the Ministry found its position 
 untenable. 
 
 To form a new Cabinet was no easy matter, for the 
 men eligible for ministerial appointments were disinclined 
 to come forward, and so acute did the political crisis 
 become, that the question of the resignation of the 
 President was discussed as the only way out of a dead- 
 lock. But Dr Saenz Pena refused to entertain the idea 
 of leaving office, and announced that no consideration 
 would induce him to alter his determination. 
 
 After, however, some weeks had elapsed, Dr Aristo- 
 bulo del Valle, well known in connexion with the move- 
 ment of the "Union Civica" previous to 1890, extricated 
 the President from his dilemma, by forming a Cabinet 
 moderate in respect to the opinions held by the various 
 Ministers, but with a predominant porteno influence. 
 Forthwith, provincial members of the National Congress 
 assumed a hostile attitude. 
 
 It was, however, from another cause than the porteno 
 preponderance in the Cabinet that the most violent 
 opposition arose. Alem returned from exile and was 
 elected to represent the Federal District in the National 
 
1893] CONGRESS AND SAENZ PENA 101 
 
 Legislature. The leader of the " Union Civica Radical " 
 had not forgiven Dr del Valle for his acceptance of the 
 " Acuerdo " policy, and lost no opportunity of attacking 
 his former colleague. The " Union Civica Radical " was 
 reorganised. The treatment of Alem and his com- 
 panions in 1892 added incentive to strike a blow at the 
 Administration. Alem was not in accord with the policy 
 of the provincial members of Congress, but as a matter 
 of expediency he joined hands with them whenever 
 occasion offered to embarrass the Executive, and again 
 there came a deadlock. 
 
 In Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and San Luis, the spirit 
 of revolution developed rapidly, aided by the fact that 
 their Governors had raised local troops in defiance of 
 the Law of Constitution. These armed forces were 
 enrolled for the sole purpose of preventing any attempt 
 of the residents to insist upon just treatment on electoral 
 questions or resistance to the illegal taxation levied by 
 the Provincial Governments. The worst offender was 
 Dr Costa, Governor of Buenos Aires, who, in spite of 
 repeated protests from the National Government, per- 
 sisted in maintaining a force of 3000 men, and the leaders 
 of the " Union Civica Radical " urged action against him, 
 arguing that if the Administration was too feeble to 
 enforce obedience to constitutional laws, it was time for 
 all good citizens to rise in arms and demand respect for 
 their rights. In the excited condition of public opinion 
 the Governor thought it wise to promise acquiescence to 
 the demands of the National Government, but he made 
 no move to fulfil his pledge. 
 
 A revolutionary rising in San Luis set the match to 
 the train. Tired of waiting for action by the National 
 Administration, the people there took matters into their 
 own hands and ejected the Governor, an example Buenos 
 Aires was not slow to follow. Near Campana and other 
 places not far from the National Capital, thousands of 
 citizens assembled to take up arms against the Provincial 
 Governor ; and in Barracas, a suburb of the city of Buenos 
 Aires, a revolutionary committee was formed and such 
 
102 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 arms as could be obtained served out. By the beginning 
 of August, 1893, the Opposition to Costa counted on 
 15,000 able-bodied men anxious to take the field, and 
 the limited supply of rifles and ammunition alone pre- 
 vented an immediate movement upon La Plata. Excite- 
 ment ran so high at the turn of events as to force the 
 Administration to take action. The revolutionary leaders 
 had explained to the National Government that the 
 movement was solely against the Provincial Administra- 
 tion, and expressed willingness to lay down their arms 
 if the resignation of Costa was assured, and the provincial 
 troops disbanded. The National Government saw no 
 other course open than to accept these terms, and an 
 ultimatum was despatched to La Plata ; but before a 
 settlement could be effected, a misunderstanding occurred 
 between the national troops at La Plata and the revolu- 
 tionary forces, resulting in a fight and a number of 
 casualties on both sides. No sooner, however, was the 
 news of the disbanding of the provincial troops and the 
 resignation of Costa known than the insurgents dispersed 
 to their homes, leaving the National Government to take 
 temporary control of the province, which it placed in 
 charge of Dr Lucio V. Lopez. 
 
 In Santa Fe discontent was stronger than in Buenos 
 Aires, and the leaders of the "Union Civica Radical" 
 hoped to convert the rising there into a general rebellion 
 against the National Government. "Union Civica 
 Radical "agents had conveyed supplies of arms and ammu- 
 nition to convenient localities not far from the city of 
 Rosario, and arrangements had been made through Colonel 
 Espina for a section of naval officers in Buenos Aires to 
 seize some of the torpedo flotilla and other vessels lying in 
 the Tigre River, and assist in the capture of Rosario, at 
 which town it was proposed to establish revolutionary 
 headquarters. At first the outbreak in Santa Fe thus 
 arranged for was successful, and after severe fighting the 
 insurgents captured Rosario. This thoroughly frightened 
 the National Administration, and it begged Roca to 
 command the troops. To this request he acceded, and 
 
1893] REVOLT IN BUENOS AIRES 103 
 
 after, as usual, making deliberate preparations, he took 
 the field, advancing with a strong force upon the revolu- 
 tionary positions. The immediate collapse of the in- 
 surgents followed, and Alem and other leaders of the 
 movement surrendered. They were exiled to State 
 Island, an Argentine penal settlement, for the term of 
 one year. In 1895 they were permitted to return to 
 Buenos Aires, and there Alem died in 1896. With his 
 disappearance the " Union Civica Radical " lost all power 
 as a political factor. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 the argentine republic — continued 
 
 Political Conditions in 1893. Financial Policy of Saenz Peha. Atti- 
 tude of Congress. The Executive and the Chambers. The 
 Provincial Mortgage Bank. Dr Lopez and Colonel Sarmiento. 
 Death of Lopez. Hostility to Saenz Peha. Ministerial Crisis. 
 Position in December, 1894. Death Sentence upon Officers of 
 Rosales. Resignation of Saenz Peha. Dr Jose Uriburu. The 
 New Administration. Chilian Boundary Question. Argentine 
 Authorities Alarmed. Secret Sessions of Congress. Credit of 
 Fifty Million Gold Dollars. Congress and Railway Guarantees. 
 Financial Policy of Uriburu. Cash Payments on External Debt. 
 Political Situation in 1897. Presidential Candidates. Nomina- 
 tion of Roca. Roca Elected. Dr Quirno Costa Vice-President. 
 Roca and the Buenos Aires Merchants. The Puno de Atacama. 
 Chilian Ultimatum. Arbitration. The Chilian Question. Pur- 
 chase of War Material. Legislation during Uriburu Administra- 
 tion. Roca assumes Presidency. Contrast between 1880 and 
 1898. Expectations from Roca. Arbitration and the Puno de 
 Atacama. Meeting between Roca and Errazuriz. Visit of Roca 
 to Patagonia. Welsh Colony at Chubut. Congress in 1899. 
 Roca and the administration of Justice. Magnasco and Judicial 
 Reform. Composition of the Chambers. Journey of Roca to 
 Brazil. Rumours of Offensive and Defensive Alliance with 
 Brazil. Commercial Treaty with Brazil. Complications in the 
 Provinces. Irigoyen and the Buenos Aires Legislature. Inter- 
 vention in Buenos Aires. Outbreaks in La Rioja and Catamarca. 
 Roca and National Legislation. The Conversion Law. Roca 
 and Public Works. Visit of President of Brazil to Argentina. 
 Area of Argentina. Population. Immigration. Foreign Resi- 
 dents. Italians. Spaniards. Basques. Other Nationalities. 
 Predominance of Latin Blood. Climate. Growth of Cities. 
 Gregarious Nature of Argentines. Landed Proprietors. Crowded 
 Centres. Education. Minister Magnasco. Incompetency of 
 Teachers. Lack of Discipline in Scholastic Establishments. 
 
 104 
 
1894] POLITICAL CONDITIONS 105 
 
 Missionary Efforts for Education. Administration of Justice. 
 Roca and the Argentine Courts. Codified Law. Tedious Pro- 
 cedure. Corrupt Lower Courts. Religious Conditions. The 
 Catholic Church. Report of Sir John Hunter Blair. National 
 Character. Hospitality. Agricultural and Pastoral Industry. 
 
 Quiet was re-established at the end of September 1893, 
 but the events in Santa Fe had tended to shake confi- 
 dence in the stability of the National Government, and 
 it became evident, from the general state of public 
 opinion and the aggressive attitude of Congress, that the 
 Administration of Saenz Peria would soon be disturbed 
 by further political complications. For one thing the 
 President was determined to, effect economies in the 
 national expenditure, and in accordance with this policy 
 the estimates submitted to Congress for 1894 proposed 
 to cut down expenses. Revolutionary troubles had been 
 the cause of extraordinary charges upon the exchequer, 
 and had prevented any very substantial reductions. 
 Congress opposed this policy, and the budget was not 
 sanctioned until it had been so far altered that the out- 
 goings for 1894 were higher than for the previous year. 
 The President had no alternative but to accept this 
 action of Congress, but he took care to explain that he 
 was not bound to expend in full the amounts sanctioned. 
 This incident showed the strained relations between 
 Saenz Pena and the Chambers, and demonstrated clearly 
 that he had no political following to rely upon in carry- 
 ing out his proposed reforms. 
 
 During the latter part of 1893 and the beginning of 
 1894 the province of Buenos Aires was administered 
 by the representative of the National Government, Dr 
 Lucio V. Lopez, and order was restored in the official 
 departments. One duty assigned to Lopez was an 
 investigation into the condition of the Provincial Mort- 
 gage Bank, in connection with which many accusations 
 had been made against Dr Julio Costa. A careful 
 examination of the books resulted in evidence of colossal 
 frauds. Millions of dollars had been advanced against 
 worthless security, loans having been effected through 
 
106 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 the direct influence of high officials, and prosecutions 
 were ordered by Lopez in consequence of the facts 
 brought to light. Amongst these facts was a loan to 
 Colonel Sarmiento, an officer in the National Army, then 
 stationed in the province of Entre Rios, where he received 
 news of a warrant issued against him. On his return 
 to La Plata some weeks afterwards he was arrested and 
 confined in the provincial prison, where he lay for several 
 months, until tried and acquitted. No sooner was he 
 at liberty than he grossly insulted Lopez, thus provoking 
 a duel. Although full particulars were known to the 
 police, no effort was made to hinder the encounter, which 
 took place in December, 1894. Lopez was shot through 
 the liver, and died the same evening. Colonel Sarmiento, 
 nominally a prisoner for a few days, was permitted to 
 go unpunished. 
 
 Throughout 1894 uneasy political feeling became 
 more accentuated, and in Entre Rios, Corrientes, and 
 Santiago del Estero disturbances took place that required 
 national intervention to restore order. These outbreaks 
 were caused by dissatisfaction with the local authorities, 
 but more or less were a constant source of anxiety to 
 the Administration. 
 
 When Congress met, in June, 1894, the attitude of 
 Senators and Deputies was soon apparent in marked 
 hostility to every act of the Executive. This opposition 
 was not founded on political principles. At the root of 
 it lay the fact that Saenz Peiia was not identified with 
 any party in Congress. He had made no effort to 
 organise a following, wishing to leave himself a free 
 hand to initiate reforms ; but in Argentina, as elsewhere, 
 it is impossible to govern without a controlling influence, 
 political or dictatorial. A President is therefore forced 
 either to use his prerogative to secure a majority in the 
 Chambers, or to impose his will by force. During the 
 last six months of 1894, Congress did no legislative work, 
 and both Chambers were waiting their opportunity 
 to bring about the resignation of Saenz Pena. This 
 deliberate hostility of Congress did not at first alter the 
 
1895] RESIGNATION OF SAENZ PENA 10? 
 
 President's determination to retain office, but a ministerial 
 crisis opened Pena's eyes to the gravity of the situation, 
 and he found the utmost difficulty in the formation of a 
 Cabinet. 
 
 The budget for 1895 had not been voted in January 
 of that year, so its omission left the President without 
 legal authority for the expenditure of public monies. 
 This was the issue for which the Chambers had waited, 
 and the impeachment of the President was advocated 
 if he disbursed public funds without the sanction of 
 Congress. Another incident occurred to increase the 
 friction. The two senior officers of the Rosales had 
 been condemned to death, and the sentence required the 
 President's approval before it could be executed. At 
 the end of 1894 no further excuse for delay in this 
 matter could be found, and when the subject was brought 
 before the Executive the President insisted that the 
 verdict was just, and that no extenuating circumstances 
 existed to mitigate the sentence. Ministers were divided, 
 and two members of the Cabinet resigned. Interpella- 
 tions in Congress followed, and a majority in the Chambers 
 opposed the death penalty. Saenz Peha remained un- 
 shaken in his conviction that the verdict must be con- 
 firmed. Excitement ran high, and friction between 
 Congress and the President was intense, indications 
 pointing towards an armed outbreak against the Presi- 
 dent if the execution of the two officers was approved. 
 Saenz Pena carefully considered his position, and con- 
 cluded that it was untenable. He therefore called a 
 special meeting of Congress and presented his resignation, 
 which was immediately accepted. The sentence on the 
 two officers was commuted to a term of imprisonment. 
 
 Saenz Pena accompanied his resignation with a 
 dignified message addressed to Congress explaining his 
 reasons. He pointed out he had been nominated on a 
 non-party platform, and that he had endeavoured to 
 conduct his Administration in such manner as to give 
 the country time to recuperate from recent violent 
 political disturbances ; but he was now convinced an 
 
108 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 Administration without a strong political following was 
 impossible. He showed that the financial situation had 
 improved since he assumed office, and that his Adminis- 
 tration had been conducted honestly and economically, 
 and, finally, his only thought to have been the just 
 performance of his duty towards Argentina, and that 
 rather than provoke violent extremes he retired into 
 private life. This message, moderate in tone, casting 
 recriminations at no particular persons, accurate as to 
 facts, was generally well received. With his resignation 
 Saenz Pena disappeared completely from public life. 
 
 The unfinished portion of the presidential term was 
 three years and nine months, and there was a widespread 
 belief that Dr Uriburu, who at once took the vacant 
 post, would follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, 
 since the new President was no better acquainted with 
 political methods than Saenz Pena, and had spent much 
 of his life in foreign countries, so that few personal 
 friends existed to rally round him. Unexpected influ- 
 ences, however, came into play, for Roca and Pellegrini 
 understood that a repetition of the Pena fiasco would 
 assuredly bring disastrous consequences, and mutually 
 agreed to support the Administration. This made 
 certain a working majority in the Chambers. 
 
 President Uriburu was hardly settled in office before 
 serious international complications threatened to involve 
 Argentina in a struggle in which her sovereignty over 
 large sections of outlying territory was at stake. The 
 boundary between Argentina and Chile had been a 
 subject for diplomatic negotiation for several years, and 
 a protocol signed in 1884 had laid down that the 
 frontier should be established where " the highest peaks 
 of the Andine ranges divide the watershed." This 
 wording gave rise to constant misunderstanding. The 
 Argentine representatives insisted the line should run 
 from highest peak to highest peak, while the Chilians 
 argued that the term "highest peak" inferred only the 
 highest points in the watershed. The origin of the 
 dispute lay in the fact that the idea of the framers of 
 
President Uriburu. 
 
 [Face page 108. 
 
1895] BOUNDARY QUESTION WITH CHILE 109 
 
 the treaty was that the Andine chain ran north and 
 south in one compact and massive range of mountains, 
 and not in separate and distinct ridges as is the case. 
 In view of the difficulty of the boundary commissioners 
 to agree, the matter was referred to the respective 
 governments, and in 1895 angry recriminations were 
 indulged in by both nationalities. Chile was accused 
 of assuming an aggressive attitude, and the Argentine 
 authorities became thoroughly alarmed at the turn 
 affairs had taken, and it was finally decided by the 
 Cabinet to request Congress to convene secret sessions 
 at which the Executive could explain the gravity of the 
 complications. These explanations were that the 
 Chilian Government threatened war unless their 
 demands were satisfied, and Congress was further 
 informed that the National Administration was advised 
 that Chile was preparing for war. It was pointed out 
 that Argentina lacked reserves of arms and ammuni- 
 tion. The excitement in Congress was intense when 
 these disclosures were made, and the outcome was a 
 credit of fifty million gold dollars for defensive purposes. 
 
 Early in 1895 a settlement was reached between 
 Argentina and Brazil, in regard to the territory of 
 "Misiones." After intermittent negotiations over a 
 period of fifteen years this question had been submitted 
 to arbitration. In March, 1895, President Grover 
 Cleveland gave his verdict, by which the pretensions of 
 the Argentine Government were disallowed, the award 
 admitting Brazilian claims in full. Anger at this result 
 was expressed in many quarters, but the Government 
 accepted it without demur. 
 
 One of the most disturbing political questions in 
 1895 arose from the action of Congress in reference to 
 the guaranteed railway companies. When default had 
 been made in the service of the public debt the subven- 
 tions to the companies also fell into arrear, and in 
 several cases traffic was insufficient to earn enough 
 income to provide for the maintenance of the roads. 
 Uriburu recommended to Congress the issue of 
 
110 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 $50,000,000 in bonds to enable the Government to 
 compound with the companies for past and future 
 claims. Violent debates ensued in the Chamber of 
 Deputies, during which many members expressed 
 undisguised hostility to the undertakings because they 
 were owned by foreigners, and it was only by the 
 insistence of the Administration, supported by Roca 
 and Pellegrini, that measures were finally sanctioned of 
 a kind calculated to enable the Government to come to 
 terms with the companies. 
 
 Next year was occupied chiefly in endeavours to 
 consolidate the financial position of the National 
 Government. A bill was sent to Congress for power to 
 unify the provincial external liabilities through the issue 
 of national bonds. This assumption of the provincial 
 external indebtedness was a necessary step towards the 
 rehabilitation of Argentine credit abroad, and was a 
 proof that the Executive was honest in its intention to 
 meet all obligations the Republic had contracted. By 
 the beginning of 1897 the financial position was so far 
 in order that Uriburu was able to resume cash payments 
 on the whole foreign debt, and the country now began 
 to recover from the disastrous consequences entailed by 
 Celman's administration. No sooner was this accom- 
 plished than the presidential election again began to 
 occupy public attention, but the various political parties 
 were so divided that it was no easy matter to find 
 anybody except Roca or Pellegrini able to command a 
 really important following. The majority favoured 
 Roca, and although hostile feeling still existed against 
 him on account of his connection with Celman, it had 
 considerably toned down, and the foreign residents 
 unanimously supported him. Pellegrini again was 
 popular amongst a large circle of political and social 
 friends, but his former Administration had made 
 influential people sceptical of the views he held in 
 regard to financial questions. Soon, however, it 
 became evident that if Roca accepted the nomination 
 no serious opposition would be attempted. He did so ; 
 
1898] ELECTION OF KOCA 111 
 
 the vote of the country was unanimous in his favour, 
 and after the usual formalities he was declared elected. 
 For the Vice-President the choice fell upon Dr Quirno 
 Costa, a representative member of a well-known family 
 in Buenos Aires, and a man who had rendered important 
 services to the Republic in connection with the boundary 
 question with Chile. 
 
 Barely was the electoral question settled before 
 another excitement arose. For several years the boundary 
 commissioners had been at work on the northern frontier 
 line between Argentina and Chile, and the general 
 impression was, that since the strained relations in 1895, 
 the Argentine and Chilian representatives had been on 
 amicable terms. But in July, 1898, a controversy arose 
 in connection with the delimitation of the district known 
 as the Puno de Atacama, and the commissioners could 
 not agree. The Chilian representative claimed the 
 district absolutely for his Government on the grounds 
 it was in Chilian occupation. In itself this territory 
 had small intrinsic value. Some borax deposits and the 
 prospects of minerals comprised all the visible wealth, 
 but the policy of Chile was not to give way in any 
 direction where territorial expansion was concerned. 
 The Argentine Government was convinced it had right 
 on its side, and in Buenos Aires the territory had been 
 regarded as Argentine, although there was some doubt as 
 to whether Bolivia might not lay claim to a portion of 
 it. A treaty had indeed been made with the Bolivian 
 Government deciding the partition of the Puno de 
 Atacama so far as the portion on the Atlantic slopes 
 of the Andes was concerned, and it was in connection 
 with the part allotted to Argentina by this arrangement 
 that Chile objected. So hot waxed the dispute that in 
 August, 1898, the relations between Chile and Argentina 
 became critical, and war appeared likely. Both sides 
 pushed forward preparations for hostilities, but towards 
 the end of August an ultimatum was delivered by 
 the Chilian Government demanding arbitration. The 
 Administration at first hesitated, but finally, acting on 
 
112 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 the advice of Roea, the demand was accepted and war 
 averted. 
 
 Such conditions were arranged with Chile that no 
 further trouble ought to have been possible. The 
 agreement provided for the submission of the Puno de 
 Atacama dispute to arbitration by the United States 
 minister in Argentina with one Chilian representative 
 and one Argentine commissioner, and the two republics 
 decided to refer the southern frontier question to Her 
 Britannic Majesty, Queen Victoria. Notwithstanding 
 these arrangements, an uneasy feeling still prevailed 
 that hostilities might break out, and neither State made 
 any pretence of stopping military and naval preparations. 
 Orders for arms, ammunition, and warships were not 
 countermanded, and men on both sides of the Andes 
 began to declaim strongly against the heavy expenditure 
 thus entailed. The reply to such remonstrances 
 invariably was that until the question of the boundary 
 was settled, it was necessary to maintain both powers 
 on a war footing. Thus the resources of Argentina and 
 Chile were strained to the utmost, and public works 
 neglected in order that funds might be forthcoming to 
 pay for guns and ships bought in Europe. 
 
 Uriburu left the Presidency in October, 1898. His 
 was a stop-gap administration from which little impor- 
 tant legislation had been expected. Some useful 
 measures, however, were passed between 1895 and 1898, 
 and the financial arrangement in regard to the provincial 
 external indebtedness marked one important step in the 
 rehabilitation of Argentine credit abroad, and the settle- 
 ment of the railway guarantees another. The quiet 
 dignity with which the adverse award in the " Misiones " 
 boundary dispute had been accepted was a matter for 
 congratulation, and in the negotiations with Chile the 
 purpose was to avoid armed conflict. These episodes 
 served to make patent the fact that Uriburu was acting 
 for the true interests of Argentina. In all important 
 questions the way was thus left clear for the ensuing 
 Administration, and perhaps the most satisfactory change 
 
1898] ROCA ACCEDES TO OFFICE 113 
 
 was that Congress abandoned the irresponsible attitude 
 assumed under Saenz Peiia. Both Chambers had been 
 inclined to continue against Uriburu the tactics pursued 
 with his predecessor, but the influence of Roca and 
 Pellegrini prevailed, and through their efforts obstruc- 
 tion to useful legislation was avoided. 
 
 Koca assumed the Presidency once more in October 
 1898. Eighteen years had passed since he had first 
 taken control of Argentine affairs, and the contrast 
 between then and now was most marked. In 1880 he 
 was a man untried in politics, and cordially disliked by 
 a large section of the population, but in 1898 it was 
 by the almost unanimous wish of the country that he 
 returned to power. On all sides he was assured that 
 his direction of national affairs was an absolute necessity 
 in view of the complications of the boundary question. 
 It was felt that the Republic needed a man who could con- 
 trol both Congress and the Provincial Administrations, 
 and the idea predominated that Roca's return to office 
 portended a wave of prosperity throughout the country. 
 
 The boundary question was the most important 
 matter confronting him at the outset, and arrangements 
 were made for the necessary representation before the 
 Arbitration Tribunal in England. Dr Moreno was 
 selected for this post in view of his great experience as 
 the Chief of the Boundary Commission. Early in 1899 
 all preliminary preparations for an examination of the 
 different claims were completed, and first of all the 
 dispute concerning the Puno de Atacama was submitted 
 to the Commission, as noted above, with a representative 
 of the Argentine Republic and one Chilian commissioner, 
 the initiation of proceedings being left to the United 
 States minister, Mr Buchanan. In case of disagree- 
 ment the vote of the majority was final. 
 
 Minister Buchanan followed a plan, novel but 
 effective. The documents were subjected to careful 
 investigation, and a map was marked with a line between 
 the two Republics in such localities as he considered 
 just on the evidence before him. This sketched boundary 
 
 H 
 
114 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 was divided into sections and the Commission then 
 summoned, to whom the United States Minister ex- 
 plained his ideas. There was much opposition on both 
 sides to his conclusion, for the boundary line he inserted 
 cut off Argentine pretensions in some directions and 
 Chilian in others ; but Mr Buchanan found a simple way 
 out of the difficulty, by proposing that a vote should be 
 taken concerning the line in each zone. Where the 
 boundary was adverse to Chile the Argentine com- 
 missioner voted for it, and Mr Buchanan siding with 
 him gave a majority against the Chilian representative. 
 Where the conditions were reversed, Mr Buchanan agreed 
 with the Chilian commissioner. In this manner the 
 work was concluded in three days. The justice of this 
 course was questioned, but in the end it was conceded 
 that the matter had been treated from a practical and 
 common-sense standpoint, and both Governments ac- 
 cepted the award. 
 
 The better understanding now established with Chile 
 induced Roca to propose a personal meeting with Presi- 
 dent Errazuriz to discuss the situation, and it took place 
 at Punta Arenas in the Straits of Magellan. Roca, 
 escorted by a squadron of the Argentine navy, met the 
 Chilian President there, and at their conference there 
 was much diplomatic fencing, each seeking to ascertain 
 the other's opinions as to future developments. But one 
 most practical and enlightened resolve was come by. 
 The question of expenditure on naval and military arma- 
 ments was discussed, and a mutual understanding reached 
 to restrict additional expenses in this direction. Promises 
 were also made that every endeavour would be used for 
 a peaceable solution of all causes of international trouble. 
 
 During this journey to the south, Roca visited some 
 of the colonies recently established in Argentine territory, 
 and among others the Welsh settlement on the river 
 Chubut. The colonists were asked to state any cause 
 of complaint, and the establishment of better means of 
 communication with the north was the principal request 
 preferred. The President promised to give this matter 
 
1899] ROCA AND ERRAZURIZ CONFER 115 
 
 his earnest attention, a pledge he subsequently made 
 good. Several minor abuses were suppressed, and the 
 right of the National Guard to drill on week days instead 
 of Sunday was granted, a concession made because of 
 the majority of the settlers being Protestants. Visits 
 were paid also to settlements on the Gallegos and Santa 
 Cruz rivers, and altogether the interest shown by Roca 
 in Patagonia gave decided encouragement to residents 
 there. Hitherto the welfare of these southern colonies 
 had been neglected, as they had never been regarded as 
 a factor of national importance ; but this action of Roca 
 brought to notice the fact that civilisation was spreading 
 to them, and that great areas of land, formerly regarded 
 as worthless, were now producing live stock and cereals. 
 
 Roca severely criticised the administration of justice 
 in Argentina in his message to Congress in May 1899, 
 and pronounced the existing condition of the courts to be 
 disgraceful and in need of drastic measures of reform. 
 A discussion in Congress ensued, and the Minister of 
 Justice, Dr Magnasco, was called upon for his opinion 
 concerning the direction reforms should take. In 
 response, he laid bare some of the flagrant abuses 
 practised in the Federal Courts, and made charges 
 against certain judges, which, when proved, led to a few 
 of the worst offenders being turned out of office. 
 
 The attitude of Congress in this question of justice 
 was typical, for the debates showed clearly that members 
 of both Senate and Chamber cared little for the interests 
 they represented, but much for the monthly salary of 
 $1000, an inducement of no small importance to pro- 
 vincial politicians. When to this is added incidental 
 expenses in the shape of travelling allowances and 
 other extraordinary charges, the income derived is of a 
 sufficient amount to make the post eagerly sought after. 
 However, the influence of Roca was strong enough to 
 ensure sanction for Government measures, although 
 intelligent initiation of legislative action by senators 
 and deputies to assist national progress was rarely 
 attempted. Under existing conditions the President is 
 
116 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 responsible, not only for all executive acts, but also for 
 every legislative development. 
 
 In July 1899 the President determined, from motives 
 never clearly stated, on an official visit to Brazil. Some 
 hostile feeling still remained there as a result of the 
 bitter recriminations of the Argentine press over 
 the arbitration award of the " Misiones " territory, and 
 one object of the visit undoubtedly was to eliminate 
 any remnant of this hostile sentiment. Moreover, 
 the Chilian squadron, en route from Europe to South 
 America, had made a lengthy call at Rio de Janeiro in 
 1897, and the voyage of Roca was to some extent a set- 
 off against the closer relations established subsequently 
 between Brazil and Chile. It was the first time in South 
 American history that an official visit had been paid by 
 one president of a republic to another. Early in 
 August of 1898, the squadron escorting Roca and his 
 suite arrived at Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilians were 
 lavish in their hospitality, making the occasion more like 
 a royal progress than an exhibition of republican 
 simplicity. Rio was en fete for fourteen days, but, so 
 far as practical results went, little was achieved. A 
 commercial treaty, to be sure, was signed, but the details 
 had been settled by the representatives of the respective 
 Governments before the visit of the Argentine President 
 took place. 
 
 A complicated situation meanwhile arose in Buenos 
 Aires province, where, in succession to Dr Udaondo, 
 the choice for Provincial Governor in 1898 fell upon Dr 
 Bernardo Irigoyen, whose attempt at reforms roused 
 the enmity of many members of the Provincial Legisla- 
 ture. So, presently, the local Chambers refused to 
 sanction measures proposed by the Governor, and this 
 led Irigoyen into acts of an illegal character, although 
 admittedly necessary in the conduct of the provincial 
 affairs. When, therefore, the elections for the provincial 
 Chamber of Deputies took place in 1899, a scrutiny of- 
 the returns proved that the vacancies had been filled by 
 candidates of the party in opposition to the Governor. 
 
1899] PROVINCIAL POLITICAL UNREST 117 
 
 This did not satisfy Irigoyen, who pronounced the 
 returns falsified and ordered new elections. Taking no 
 notice of this order the Chamber of Deputies assembled 
 to allow the usual oath to be taken by the new members, 
 whereupon the Governor ordered a battalion of con- 
 stabulary to occupy the legislative buildings, and resist 
 the ingress or egress of any person not specially 
 authorised by the Executive. Some members of the 
 Chamber were in the building before this order was put 
 into force and were detained inside. Both Governor 
 and Opposition appealed to the National Government 
 to intervene, and after much hesitation Roca agreed to 
 this request, so that for some months the Provincial 
 Administration remained under national control, pending 
 fresh elections for the local Chambers. The result of 
 the voting again showed a majority for the Opposition, 
 and it was supposed Irigoyen would now resign, but, 
 through the influence of Roca and Pellegrini, a modus 
 vivendi was established, in virtue of which he remained 
 in office to complete his triennial term, the representative 
 of the National Government being withdrawn. The 
 incident showed that provincial politics were still a 
 cause for anxiety. 
 
 Nor was Buenos Aires the only quarter in which 
 these provincial disturbances occurred, for subversive 
 movements were attempted in both La Rioja and 
 Catamarca, and the matter became so serious in Cata- 
 marca as to necessitate a strong force of national troops 
 to restore order, but before normal conditions were 
 re-established a collision took place. In both States the 
 bone of contention was electoral, the Opposition main- 
 taining that official influences were used to prevent any 
 free voting, and that the returns were invariably falsified 
 if unfavourable to the authorities. This was probably 
 true enough, but in all these provincial disputes Roca's 
 usual policy was to support the Governors. 
 
 During his first two years of office Roca attempted 
 little new legislation, but the initiative of Uriburu in 
 regard to the provincial external iodebtedness was 
 
118 THE AEGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 followed, and the last of these liabilities arranged for in 
 1900. A measure was brought before Congress by 
 Pellegrini in August, 1899, and supported by Poca, for 
 dealing with the currency question. It masqueraded as 
 a law of conversion, and by it complicated provisions 
 were to be made for the accumulation of funds for the 
 repayment of the inconvertible paper money ; but its 
 real object was to check a too rapid appreciation of the 
 notes, and for this purpose the official premium on gold 
 was fixed at 127 per cent. The excuse urged for this 
 law was that wages and other charges were based on a 
 high gold premium, and that if the value of the dollar 
 suddenly increased, the producing industries of the 
 country, and especially agriculture, would be ruined 
 before readjustment of general prices could take place. 
 After sharp criticism, the measure was sanctioned, and 
 the official value of the dollar became fixed at forty-four 
 cents gold for all government purposes. 
 
 The policy which Pocahad followed in regard to public 
 works during his first Administration was not neglected 
 during his second term, and in several directions efforts 
 were made to provide better means of communication 
 with outlying districts, especially in opening up facilities 
 of transport in Patagonia. It is due to him also that 
 port works at Rosario are in course of construction. 
 
 In October, 1900 the President of Brazil, Dr Manoel 
 F. Campos Salles, paid a visit to Buenos Aires, and as the 
 aggressive policy of Chile had been clearly demonstrated 
 shortly before, special care was taken to make his recep- 
 tion as imposing as possible, to encourage belief that an 
 entente existed between Argentina and Brazil. To this 
 end, three public holidays were declared, and entertain- 
 ments, illuminations, and decorations were arranged at a 
 cost of $2,000,000. Out of all this display and junketing 
 the only result was a proposal for the elimination of the 
 war debt due to Brazil and Argentina by Paraguay. 
 Both Governments agreed to consider the matter. 
 
 The Arbitration Tribunal in London practically 
 concluded the investigation of the Argentine and Chilian 
 
1901] RELATIONS WITH CHILE 119 
 
 frontier claims at the end of 1901, but the final settle- 
 ment of the boundary dispute was not reached without 
 considerable difficulty and excitement. In both Argen- 
 tina and Chile feeling gained ground that exception 
 would be taken to the award and lead to the finding 
 being rejected, thanks to extravagant rumours circulated 
 about the sections of territory claimed by each country. 
 Thus the latent jealousy between the two nationalities 
 was fanned to fever heat, and the understanding arrived 
 at in 1899 for restricting purchases of additional arma- 
 ments was forgotten. Both Governments began warlike 
 preparations on so extensive a scale that throughout 
 December, 1901, a rupture of diplomatic relations was 
 daily anticipated. Senor Alcorta, the Argentine Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs, stated roundly he would not give way 
 to Chilian pretensions, and indications in January, 1902, 
 all pointed to war. 
 
 No wonder, therefore, that representatives of the 
 principal British interests in both Republics appealed to 
 our Government to use its influence for a friendly 
 solution of the impending trouble. In response to this 
 appeal energetic action was taken, and Sir Thomas 
 Holdich was sent to inspect the disputed territory. He 
 reached Buenos Aires at the end of February, Argentina 
 and Chile being meanwhile warned that if hostile 
 preparations were continued His Majesty, King Edward 
 VII., would refuse further participation in the questions 
 now under consideration by the Arbitration Tribunal. It 
 was left to H.B.M.'s Ministers in Buenos Aires and San- 
 tiago to impress on the two Governments the disastrous 
 effect on Argentine and Chilian credit if His Majesty 
 was obliged to withdraw his good offices as arbitrator. 
 
 While the issue of peace or war was still hovering in 
 the balance, Senor Alcorta died suddenly. He had been 
 the strongest opponent of a conciliation policy, and his 
 death left the President free to deal with the question. 
 Roca's position during the critical stage of the negotia- 
 tions with Chile was most difficult. His countrymen 
 were excited and insisted on military preparations to 
 
120 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 resist Chilian demands, no matter to what extent such 
 warlike demonstrations tended to complicate the 
 situation. On the other hand, constant pressure was 
 brought to bear by the British Government to prevent 
 an outbreak of hostilities. Between these two currents 
 of influence Roca steered his way with consummate 
 tact. In the end he was obliged to give way to Chile 
 on certain points, but he did so in a manner that left 
 the Argentines small cause for complaint, and only 
 made such concessions as were necessary to ensure 
 British influence being used in Santiago to facilitate an 
 equitable settlement and restrain extreme Chilian pre- 
 tensions. Roca deserves a large meed of credit for his 
 quiet energy and dignified bearing during this crisis in 
 the national fortunes. He decided for peace, and nego- 
 tiations were immediately opened for a treaty to restrict 
 further armaments. The treaty was signed in June, 
 1902, and immediately ratified, and when, some months 
 later, the award of the Arbitration Tribunal was made 
 public, it was accepted unreservedly by both Governments. 
 President Roca completes his term of office in 
 October, 1904, and in June of this year the election of 
 his successor takes place, but on this occasion there is 
 no cut and dried issue to the presidential campaign. 
 The principal candidates are ex-President Uriburu, Dr 
 Quintana, Dr Udaondo, and, possibly, ex-President 
 Pellegrini ; all four are able men, but the latter disap- 
 pointed public expectations when he assumed control 
 after the disastrous administration of Dr Juarez Celman. 
 Many people assert that none of the four candidates 
 mentioned will be successful, but that a " dark horse " 
 will be elected.* 
 
 * On June 12, 1904, Dr Manuel Quintana and Dr Jose Figueroa 
 Alcorta were elected President and Vice-President of the Republic. 
 Dr Quintana is 68 years of age, a native of Buenos Aires, a well- 
 known politician, and the legal adviser of several of the principal 
 railway and other companies in Argentina ; Dr Alcorta is aged 42, is 
 a National Senator, and a native of Cordoba ; the friendly influence 
 of President Roca was an important factor in the election of both 
 candidates. 
 
1900] MOVEMENT OF POPULATION 121 
 
 The area of Argentina is 1,212,000 square miles, and 
 the population by the census of 1895 was 3,954,911. 
 This is a density of only 3 '3 persons to the square mile. 
 A fertile soil and kindly climate offer inducements for 
 expansion to ten times the present number, but the 
 increase of population has not been rapid in Argentina 
 in spite of many natural advantages for settlement. 
 In 1869 the number of inhabitants was returned at 
 1,837,000, and [by 1882 they had risen to 2,942,600. 
 Between that date and 1895 the census showed an 
 increase of only 1,000,000. The disturbed conditions 
 prevailing between 1870 and 1880 drove many foreigners 
 away, and the economic crisis in 1890 was responsible 
 for the exodus of many settlers who had come with the 
 intention of making a home in the country. Between 
 1857 and 1897 the number of immigrants was 1,597,299. 
 When these figures are compared with the total popu- 
 lation at the close of the nineteenth century, it is easy to 
 form an idea of the many persons frightened away by 
 troublous times. 
 
 Yet the racial features of Argentines are changing 
 with the influx of foreign blood, although this is not so 
 marked in the more isolated provinces as in Buenos 
 Aires or other centres. In the Andine territories the 
 original Spanish and Indian types remain, while in 
 Mendoza, Tucuman, Salta, and Jujuy the wealthy classes 
 are not unlike the people in the more inaccessible dis- 
 tricts of the Spanish Peninsula. In these localities the 
 labouring classes are typically Indian. 
 
 Of foreign residents Italians are numerically the 
 strongest, numbering 800,000. As labourers for railway 
 construction, agriculture, wherever manual labour is 
 necessary, it is the Italian who is employed. In retail 
 trade and minor industrial undertakings they have 
 become an established factor. Next in numerical 
 strength is the Spanish colony of 250,000. They are 
 engaged in all classes of industrial and commercial 
 occupations, and form a thrifty, orderly, and sound 
 element in the population. After the Carlist War 
 
122 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 many Basques emigrated to the River Plate, and a large 
 proportion of these people are now wealthy and influ- 
 ential. The French colony of 70,000 persons are prin- 
 cipally engaged in wholesale and retail trading, or as 
 employees and servants. There are likewise 25,000 
 Germans connected with commercial undertakings, and 
 British subjects, although only 35,000 in number, form 
 a powerful element as owners of property and repre- 
 sentatives of British investments. 
 
 An analysis of the population shows that only 70,000 
 persons are not of Latin origin, or do not inherit Latin 
 blood through father or mother. This is not surprising 
 when the recruiting grounds for immigration are con- 
 sidered. It shows conclusively that Latin traditions and 
 customs are destined to prevail in the future in this 
 section of South America. Italy, Spain, and, to a lesser 
 degree, France are the main sources of immigration, and 
 the incomers from these countries are easily assimilated. 
 With the existing population of 4,000,000, essentially 
 Latin in thought and habit, it is reasonable to suppose 
 that immigration will fail to affect the national char- 
 acteristic features of to-day to any marked extent. The 
 result may be to leave the impress of Italian or French 
 civilisation more apparent than the traits of the Spanish 
 original stock ; but it will be none the less Latin. 
 
 The growth of cities and towns in Argentina has 
 been out of proportion to the increase in the population. 
 The census of 1869 gave the inhabitants of Buenos 
 Aires city as 177,800, and by 1882 they had increased 
 to 295,000; but the returns of 1900 showed 812,000 
 living within the municipal limits. This means that 
 more than one -fifth of the entire population reside in 
 the metropolis, a massing together which by no means 
 indicates a healthy condition. Buenos Aires is not a 
 manufacturing district, nor has it other attributes to 
 justify a concentration of the population, whose effect 
 is to hinder economic development. The principal 
 industries are pastoral and agricultural, and therefore 
 every man withdrawn from farm work is a loss to the 
 
1900] GREGARIOUS PROPENSITY 123 
 
 producing power. In a country where land is lying 
 idle this gregarious characteristic of the population is 
 all the more to be regretted. 
 
 This disposition of the people to reside in crowded 
 centres rather than the country districts, is also apparent 
 in Rosario, Cordoba, Tucuman, and all other cities. Too 
 often the owners of valuable properties are content to 
 mortgage their land to obtain means to dwell in the 
 towns. In many cases the rate of interest paid is out 
 of proportion to the rental a property yields. If any 
 portion of this borrowed money was expended on the 
 land some progress would be made, but this is not the 
 case ; these loans are squandered, and the properties 
 starved, to permit the proprietors to eke out existence 
 in some local centre of civilisation. But until the bulk 
 of the land is alienated from the present owners to 
 people prepared to work on it, present conditions will 
 continue to check progress. Gradually, however, the 
 alienation of property from large holders is taking place, 
 and it is principally to this change that we owe the ex- 
 pansion in agricultural and pastoral industry which has 
 become visible during the past decade. 
 
 Probably no one element in the economic situation 
 is deserving of greater attention than primary and 
 secondary education, yet it is no exaggeration to say 
 that no subject arouses less general interest. During 
 the administration of President Sarmiento, from 1868 
 to 1874, the initiative of the Executive was conducive to 
 a liberal policy in regard to public instruction. The 
 President was deeply interested in the problem, and his 
 attitude caused the necessity of the establishment of 
 schools, especially of a primary character, to be con- 
 sidered. Many grants-in-aid were made by the National 
 Administration, and teachers were imported to inculcate 
 more advanced methods. Provincial and municipal 
 authorities also were encouraged to establish an efficient 
 system, and the work of Sarmiento took root in the 
 country. In the six years of his administration the 
 cause of both primary and secondary instruction made 
 
124 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 substantial progress, but subsequent Presidents showed 
 no such interest, and gradually the ideas of Sarmiento 
 have dropped. Occasionally some agitation is set afoot 
 for more adequate public schools, but hitherto small 
 support has been accorded to such movements. The 
 proposal of Dr Magnasco, Minister of Justice and 
 Public Instruction in 1900, to give more practical form 
 to the educational course by suppressing certain estab- 
 lishments maintained for secondary education in order 
 to substitute technical schools, was rejected by Congress. 
 At bottom, however, the little public interest shown 
 in educational questions is responsible for the absence 
 of an effective system of instruction. A smattering of 
 many subjects is taught, a sound knowledge of any one 
 is the exception. It is not that pupils are deficient in 
 intelligence, but rather that teachers are lacking in 
 experience and ability. Nor can any other result be 
 expected under existing circumstances. The payment 
 of officials is inadequate, and frequently salaries are 
 months in arrear, while lack of discipline in primary, 
 secondary, and higher education is conspicuous. Pro- 
 visions for the orderly exercise of authority in colleges 
 and schools are also most defective. Not long ago 
 regulations were enacted at the University of Buenos 
 Aires restricting the practice of smoking, and by way of 
 protest against these the students refused to attend any 
 classes. Lately, however, an interesting experiment in 
 elementary education has been commenced in Buenos 
 Aires by private missionary effort, and it promises to 
 develop into a movement of national importance. A 
 Protestant clergyman, Mr Morris, established in 1897 
 a school based on lines similar to those of the so-called 
 ragged schools in London. He met with many obstacles, 
 and little success was anticipated for this new departure, 
 but he persevered, with the result that to-day he has 
 three schools and a mission hall for his work, and these 
 are attended by 1000 pupils of the poorest classes in 
 the city. All instruction is in Spanish and is non- 
 sectarian. Extracts from the Bible are read daily, and 
 
1900] EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES 125 
 
 certain moral precepts inculcated without interfering 
 with any creed. Voluntary contributions support this 
 movement, and its expansion has only been checked by 
 lack of additional buildings and teachers. The Catholic 
 clergy in Buenos Aires attacked this experiment on the 
 grounds that it tended to proselytise the children of 
 Catholic parents, but the National Administration did 
 not take this view, and the movement received en- 
 couragement in official quarters. In 1899 the Minister 
 of Justice and Instruction, Dr Magnasco, in his annual 
 memorial to Congress recommended the adoption of Mr 
 Morris's ideas so far as to constitute the reading of the 
 Bible part of the daily instruction in every national 
 school. 
 
 Administration of justice in Argentina leaves much 
 to be desired. A quarter of a century ago the reputa- 
 tion of the Supreme Court was excellent. It was noted 
 for freedom from bribery and corruption, but this 
 standard has not been maintained in recent years. 
 President Koca in his message to Congress in May of 
 1899, called special attention to the subject, and certain 
 notoriously venal judges were removed from office, but 
 there the matter dropped. The legal system is based 
 on Spanish law, and the civil, criminal, and commercial 
 statutes are codified, but procedure is cumbersome and 
 tedious, leading to unnecessary delay in litigation, and 
 heavy expenditure. In the minor branches opportunities 
 for corrupt practices are widespread, and complaints 
 are heard in all quarters of the ignorance and venality 
 of magistrates and minor officials. To some extent this 
 is due to the scanty and irregular payment of judicial 
 representatives, for the salaries are insufficient for the 
 duties assigned to these officials. 
 
 The practice of religion in Argentina is free to all 
 creeds, the State imposing no restrictions on the 
 establishment of places of worship. To the Roman 
 Catholic Church, however, the National Government 
 lends strong support, and the influence of the Catholic 
 clergy is powerful amongst the lower classes. Super- 
 
126 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 stitious dread of the unknown induces reverence towards 
 the outward symbols of Christianity, but even amongst 
 educated Argentines clerical influence has gained ground 
 of late years, especially with the women. That the 
 Roman Catholic Church in Argentina is on a satisfactory 
 footing is, nevertheless, an open question. Sir John 
 Hunter Blair was sent a few years ago to report on the 
 general standing of the Argentine clergy, and the fruit 
 of his investigations was not flattering to the priesthood. 
 Protestants, moreover, have a strong following in Buenos 
 Aires and other parts of the republic, supporters of this 
 form of Christianity representing a large proportion of 
 the wealth of the country. Scotch, American, and Greek 
 colonies all have well-supported places of worship in the 
 national capital, and even the Salvation Army has 
 established headquarters in Buenos Aires with branches 
 in other cities. 
 
 Argentine national character bears the impress of 
 Spanish traditions, and the conservative tendency ap- 
 parent in the Spanish Peninsula still militates against the 
 rapid evolution of civilisation in these newer countries. 
 The provincial inhabitants cling to the customs of their 
 forefathers with persistent disregard of the benefits of 
 more advanced ideas. In the Argentine, as in the 
 Spaniard, there is a dislike to close attention to detail 
 in public and private life. Hospitality is a characteristic 
 trait in all classes of Argentine society, alike in city and 
 country, and rich and poor never fail to offer to the chance 
 guest the best that their home contains. In the more 
 isolated districts the people are simple and superstitious 
 to an unusual degree. Quick to resent real or fancied 
 injury, the Argentine is prone to be equally impulsive 
 in forgetting any cause of dispute. No better example 
 of these characteristics could be found than the facts 
 in connection with the many outbreaks of civil war 
 and revolutionary disturbances, and the comparatively 
 small amount of bad blood these conflicts have left 
 behind. 
 
 The past two decades have seen a complete change 
 
1900] INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 127 
 
 in the conditions of industrial development in the 
 Argentine Republic. In the year 1880 the exportation 
 of produce was confined to wool, tallow, grease in 
 various forms, hides, and horns, and agricultural pro- 
 duction was barely sufficient to supply the home demand. 
 Occasionally an abundant maize crop left a surplus for 
 shipment abroad, but previous to 1880 wheat and flour 
 were purchased in foreign countries to meet the deficit 
 for home consumption. Agricultural industry was con- 
 fined to the western section of the province of Buenos 
 Aires, the cost of transport in other districts being 
 prohibitive ; but the policy of railway extension initiated 
 by Roca in 1881 rapidly altered all tills, and in the five 
 subsequent years the development of agricultural industry 
 substantially increased. Not only did production suffice 
 for local wants, but a surplus became available for export 
 to Brazil and Europe, and from 1885 until the present 
 date, such a steady expansion has taken place, that in 
 1900 the total yield of wheat exceeded 100,000,000 
 bushels, of which 75,000,000 bushels was exported to 
 foreign markets. The cultivation of maize and linseed 
 has augmented, so that agricultural products, which 
 formed so small a proportion of the national wealth 
 twenty years ago, are now a most valuable export. 
 
 Sheep-farming is another of the principal sources of 
 wealth, and the province of Buenos Aires is the main 
 centre of the industry. Within its boundaries the flocks 
 contain 70,000,000 head. Entre Rios, Cordoba, the 
 territories of the Pampa Central, the Rio Negro, and 
 parts of Patagonia also possess fair sheep lands, some 
 20,000,000 head being scattered over these districts. 
 The conditions of this branch of Argentine farming have 
 undergone marked changes during the last two decades. 
 Formerly wool was the only product to which the sheep- 
 farmer paid attention, the tallow and skins exported 
 being only by-products. A radical improvement, how- 
 ever, was made in the class of the stock between the 
 years 1880 and 1890, and in 1890 the question of the 
 export of mutton began to occupy public attention. 
 
128 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 Experiments in this direction had been in progress for 
 some time, and from 1890 the exportation of frozen 
 meat rapidly increased. 
 
 Cattle -ranching is confined to no particular districts. 
 In every province and national territory are esiancias 
 (live stock farms) with larger or smaller herds. An 
 accurate return of the number of horned cattle has not 
 been compiled, but the estimate of 25,000,000 is accepted 
 as not far from the mark. This calculation is based on 
 the number of hides exported, and the relative numbers 
 of animals shipped abroad or slaughtered for the 
 saladeros, frozen meat and butchering establishments. 
 That the increase in the herds has been large of late 
 years is proved by the additional areas of land recently 
 stocked, and there is small reason to suppose this 
 increase will cease in the immediate future in view of 
 the great extension of natural pasturage still unoccupied 
 and the greater grazing capacity of the settled districts 
 brought about by the sowing of alfalfa (lucern). 
 
 Previous to 1880 value was placed on horned cattle 
 only in connection with the saladero establishments 
 where the meat was converted into tasajo (jerked beef), 
 or for the hides and horns. The idea of selling 
 Argentine beef in Europe had not penetrated to the 
 River Plate, but between 1880 and 1885 Durham and 
 Hereford bulls were imported, and these gave excellent 
 results when crossed with native cows. Then owners 
 of herds began to think seriously of exporting Argentine 
 cattle for European consumption, and many herds were 
 refined year after year to such an extent, that in 1890 
 there were many thousands of pure Durhams or 
 Herefords, and hundreds of thousands of half or three- 
 quarter bred animals. 
 
 In 1889 the first trial shipment of live cattle was 
 sent to Europe, but the animals were not well selected, 
 and the result was not encouraging as a business trans- 
 action. The exporters determined, however, to fully 
 test the idea of placing live stock in foreign markets. 
 Cargo after cargo was despatched between 1889 and 
 
1900] PASTORAL INDUSTRY 129 
 
 1893 to such good purpose that the trade was estab- 
 lished. Fine stock was poured into the country to 
 improve the herds, and met with ready sale, and from 
 1895 to 1900 the animal export of beeves exceeded 
 130,000 animals, valued at £2,000,000 sterling. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 PARAGUAY 
 
 Origin of the Paraguayan War. Political Disturbances in Uruguay. 
 General Flores lands near Salto. Severe Measures increase Rebel 
 Popularity. Strained Relations between Uruguay and Argentina. 
 Complications between Brazil and Uruguay. Entente between 
 Uruguay and Paraguay. Proclamation by Lopez. Mission of 
 Conselheiro Saraiva. Invasion of Uruguay. The Villa del 
 Salto. The Brazilian Flag Insulted. Brazil supports Revolt. 
 Siege of Paysandii. Murder of Colonel Gomez. Attitude of 
 Argentina. Uruguayan Expedition to Rio Grande. March of 
 Brazilians and Rebels upon Montevideo. Montevideo Capitulates. 
 Withdrawal of Brazilian Army. Attitude of Lopez. The 
 Marques d'Olinda. War between Paraguay and Brazil. In- 
 vasion of Matto Grosso. Engagement at Neuva Coimbra. Para- 
 guayan Administration in Matto Grosso. Consternation in Rio. 
 Brazil prepares for War. Schemes of Lopez. Paraguayan Con- 
 gress. Lopez and Urquiza. Paraguayan Army in 1865. Attack 
 upon Corrientes. Paraguayan occupation of Corrientes. Excite- 
 ment in Buenos Aires. Proclamation of General Mitre. Alliance 
 between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Warlike Preparations. 
 Phases of the War. Importance of the Parana and Paraguay. 
 Plan of Campaign. No forward movement possible before June. 
 Distribution of the Paraguayans. Lopez neglects to advance 
 beyond Corrientes. The Paraguayans in Corrientes. Capture of 
 Corrientes by the Argentines. Battle of the Riachuelo. Para- 
 guayan Advance towards Uruguay. Operations near San Borge. 
 Invasion of Rio Grande. Mutiny in Entre Rios. Flores appointed 
 to command the Allied Vanguard. Conditions in Uruguay. Para- 
 guayans march down the Upper Uruguay. Battle of Yatay. 
 Defeat of the Paraguayans. Occupation of Uruguayana. Sur- 
 render of Colonel Estigarribia. Preparations for Defence of 
 Paraguay. Modification in Plan of Campaign. Advance of 
 Allied Forces. Matto Grosso. 
 
 The war between Paraguay and the allied forces of 
 Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay is one of the most re- 
 
[Face page 130. 
 

1863] ORIGIN OF PARAGUAYAN WAR 131 
 
 markable events in South American history. It con- 
 vulsed the south-eastern portion of the continent for 
 several years, and was ended only by the annihilation 
 of the male population of Paraguay. The origin of the 
 struggle requires explanation. 
 
 A political party known as the Blancos had gained 
 control of Uruguay by a successful revolution against 
 President Flores, who was driven out and sought asylum 
 in Buenos Aires. In April, 1863, Flores with a few 
 companions, incited by the cold-blooded murder of a 
 number of Colorado prisoners at Quinteros, landed at 
 Salto, and there raised the standard of revolt. Collect- 
 ing a force of 1700 men, he succeeded in defeating a 
 column of Government troops in the vicinity of the Rio 
 Negro. This success brought Flores many recruits. In 
 March, 1864, the Blancos elected Dr Aguirre to the 
 Presidency, and the severe measures taken against all 
 persons suspected of revolutionary tendencies increased 
 the popularity of the revolt. 
 
 Relations between Argentina and Uruguay there- 
 upon became strained, and President Aguirre openly 
 accused the Argentine authorities of aiding the rebels. 
 Complications were also threatened between Uruguay 
 and Brazil, in consequence of the ill-treatment of 
 Brazilians for their supposed sympathy with rebel out- 
 breaks. Being thus on bad terms with both Argentina 
 and Brazil, the Uruguayan President thought to 
 strengthen his position by establishing an entente with 
 General Lopez, the Dictator of Paraguay. Lopez had 
 organised a formidable army, and was credited with the 
 ambitious design of conquering the Brazilian province 
 of Rio Grande do Sul, thus to obtain an outlet to the 
 sea for Paraguay. Naturally, therefore, the proposals 
 of President Aguirre were received by Lopez in friendly 
 spirit, and help was promised in case of hostile action 
 by Brazil against Uruguay. Brazil threatened to send 
 troops into Uruguayan territory if protection for resident 
 Brazilians was not accorded, and when this communica- 
 tion was known to Lopez, he issued a proclamation to 
 
132 PARAGUAY 
 
 the effect, that if an invasion of Uruguay took place 
 Paraguay would declare war against Brazil. 
 
 Scant courtesy was extended to Conselheiro Saraiva, 
 the envoy credited by Brazil to Uruguay in connection 
 with the complaints of Brazilian residents, in spite of a 
 squadron sent to Montevideo and an army of 4000 men 
 concentrated on the northern frontier to emphasise the 
 Brazilian demands. Relations between the two 
 Governments became further strained, and finally 
 Conselheiro Saraiva was instructed to return, his 
 mission having failed. The army concentrated in Rio 
 Grande was marched into Uruguay to protect Brazilian 
 interests, but the Uruguayan troops retired from the 
 northern districts. Then the Brazilian Government 
 ordered a suspension of the advance in the belief that 
 President Aguirre would come to terms now, when the 
 serious nature of the situation had become plain. But 
 other events meanwhile happened to bring the dispute 
 to an acute stage. Admiral Tamandare with a 
 squadron of three men-of-war ascended the river 
 Uruguay, where he encountered the Uruguayan warship 
 Villa del Salto, upon which he opened fire, forcing her 
 to seek shelter at Concordia in Argentine waters. The 
 Uruguayan vessel afterwards attempted to run past the 
 Brazilians and make for Paysandii, and being in danger 
 of capture was set on fire by her commander. Immedi- 
 ately the news of this incident reached the President he 
 cancelled all exequaturs of Brazilian Consuls ; all 
 treaties between the two Governments were burned in 
 public, and the Brazilian flag was insulted and dragged 
 through the streets. Brazil at once ordered General 
 Menna Barreto, in command of the Brazilian forces in 
 Uruguay, to join hands with the revolt under General 
 Flores against Aguirre and attack both Montevideo and 
 Paysandii. Admiral Tamandare with one steamer and 
 four gun-boats was also instructed to aid the operations 
 against the latter town. 
 
 Paysandii was held by 2000 men under Colonel 
 Leandro Gomez, and every possible precaution was 
 
1864] EVENTS PRECEDING THE WAR 133 
 
 taken for the defence of the city. The attacking force 
 consisted of 5000 rebels, 1200 Brazilian troops under 
 General Netto, and the squadron under Tamandare, 
 from which a small naval brigade was landed. The 
 assault commenced on December 6, 1864, and continued 
 throughout the day, but on December 7, hostilities were 
 suspended at the request of the naval officers in 
 command of several foreign warships in order to allow 
 women, children, and non-combatants to be conveyed to 
 a place of safety. Then the bombardment of the 
 city was resumed. News that a column of Uruguayan 
 troops under General Saa was advancing to relieve 
 Paysandii was received on December 9, and General 
 Flores, with the approval of the officers of the 
 besieging army, decided to move out and give it 
 battle. But the two forces did not meet, for 
 President Aguirre ordered General Saa to return to 
 Montevideo to aid in the defence of that city. Flores 
 accordingly went back to Paysandii, where, meanwhile, 
 Colonel Gomez had obtained fresh supplies of ammuni- 
 tion and provisions, and was prepared to make a 
 desperate resistance. Fighting recommenced on 
 December 31, and the garrison attempted to cut through 
 the investing lines, but was driven back. Reinforce- 
 ments of Brazilian troops arrived on January 1, 1865, 
 and on January 2 the place was carried by assault, 
 Colonel Gomez falling into the hands of the Brazilian 
 contingent. To avoid being sent to Brazil as a prisoner, 
 Gomez begged he might be delivered to the division 
 under General Flores. This request was granted, but 
 he was no sooner given up than he was murdered in 
 cold blood, without the knowledge of Flores. After 
 the fall of Paysandii the rebels under Flores and the 
 Brazilian forces marched to form a junction with the 
 army under Generals Menna Barreto and Osorio to attack 
 Montevideo. The squadron under Admiral Tamandare 
 sailed down the river to land the sick and wounded in 
 Buenos Aires, thence to proceed to assist in the opera- 
 tions against the Uruguayan capital. 
 
134 PARAGUAY 
 
 The attitude of Argentina, while these events were 
 passing in Uruguay, had an important bearing upon 
 subsequent developments in regard to Paraguay. 
 President Mitre, the head of the Administration, was a 
 personal friend of General Flores, and had extended a 
 large measure of protection to the latter during his 
 exile in Buenos Aires. Many Argentines had joined 
 the revolutionary cause in Uruguay with Plores, and 
 these influences drew Argentine sympathy towards the 
 rebellion. Nominally, Argentina was neutral in the 
 conflict ; but, in reality, Buenos Aires and other points in 
 Argentine territory formed the base of operations for 
 the revolution. 
 
 President Aguirre, to deter an immediate advance 
 upon Montevideo after the capture of Paysandu, 
 despatched an expedition to the eastern section of Rio 
 Grande do Sul, a move also prompted by promises of 
 assistance from General Lopez. Aguirre relied on an 
 army from Paraguay invading the western section of 
 Rio Grande, simultaneously with the entry of Uruguayan 
 troops into the eastern districts. This expedition was 
 commanded by Colonel Munoz and Colonel Aparicio, 
 and it crossed the Brazilian frontier near the Lake 
 Mirim, occupying the town of Yaguaron. The utmost 
 cruelty was practised towards the Brazilians, and neither 
 life nor property were respected. But the continued 
 occupation of this Brazilian district was impossible, 
 because the aid Aguirre looked for from Paraguay was 
 not forthcoming, and Colonel Munoz was obliged to 
 retreat after defeat by a Brazilian force commanded by 
 Colonel Fidelis. Alarmed at the threatened invasion 
 by Lopez, the authorities of Rio Grande called out 
 29 battalions of the National Guard, and this 
 force was the nucleus of the army taking part in the 
 Paraguayan War at a later date. 
 
 While these events were happening on the borders 
 of Rio Grande, the march of the Brazilian and rebel 
 forces upon Montevideo continued. Many recruits had 
 joined the revolutionary cause, so that when the com- 
 
1865] PARAGUAY DECLARES WAR IBS 
 
 bined forces invested the capital in February, 1865, 
 they numbered 14,000. The position of President 
 Aguirre was untenable when the blockade was 
 established, and accompanied by a small group of 
 followers he sought refuge in Buenos Aires ; but before 
 his flight he issued various proclamations, in one of 
 which the perfidious conduct of the Paraguayans was 
 denounced in bitter terms. With the flight of the 
 President from Montevideo active resistance ceased. 
 Dr Villalba, President of the Senate, opened peace 
 negotiations with General Flores, and on February 22, 
 1865, Flores entered the capital. Shortly afterwards he 
 was proclaimed President of the Republic. The 
 Brazilian army was withdrawn after the capitulation. 
 
 Meanwhile, General Lopez had made good his 
 menace and revealed his ambitious designs by declaring 
 war against Brazil. A Brazilian vessel, the Marques 
 (fOlinda, bound for Matto Grosso, and carrying a new 
 Governor for that province, was seized at Asuncion, the 
 capital of Paraguay, the official arrested, and the ship 
 incorporated into the Paraguayan fleet. The Brazilian 
 Minister, Viana de Lima, was given his passports, and 
 the invasion of Matto Grosso followed. Previously 
 12,000 men had been concentrated near Cerro Leon in 
 the north of Paraguay. From these troops a division 
 was detached under General Barrios and embarked for 
 Matto Grosso on December 13, 1864. 
 
 A fortnight later this expedition arrived off Nueva 
 Coimbra, an old Portuguese fort situated in the extreme 
 south of Matto Grosso. It stood on high ground 
 commanding the river, and was garrisoned by 150 
 soldiers. Its surrender was demanded, but refused. 
 Bombardment followed, and troops were landed to 
 assault the position on December 30, but the attack 
 proved unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the commandant 
 decided that further resistance was useless, and during 
 the night embarked his men on the Amambahy and 
 escaped. 
 
 After the capture of Nueva Coimbra the expedition 
 
136 PARAGUAY 
 
 advanced up the river. No resistance was made, and 
 the towns of Albuquerque, Tage, Miranda, Dourado, 
 and Corumba were occupied, so that by the middle of 
 January the southern portion of Matto Grosso was in 
 the hands of the Paraguayans. A Provincial Admini- 
 stration was established, the name of the province being 
 changed to Alto Paraguay, and the emancipation of the 
 slaves proclaimed, General Lopez thinking such action 
 would induce the negroes to make common cause with 
 the Paraguayans against the Brazilians. In this he was 
 mistaken and gained few recruits. 
 
 Lopez had good reasons for making his first campaign 
 against Brazil in Matto Grosso. There was no strong 
 force in this province to hinder the Paraguayan advance. 
 From Asuncion to Matto Grosso was only a ten days' 
 voyage, whilst from Rio de Janeiro it necessitated a 
 journey of eight weeks through a country difficult for 
 transport. Then, again, a dispute existed between 
 Brazil and Bolivia concerning the boundary line between 
 the two countries, and Lopez hoped this fact might 
 cause Bolivia to join with him against the Brazilians. 
 An alliance with Bolivia and possession of Matto 
 Grosso were strong points before invading Rio Grande. 
 With Argentina no quarrel was intended when Lopez 
 first conceived the idea of conquering new territory for 
 Paraguay. As matters eventually developed the com- 
 bination which Lopez relied upon failed. The occupation 
 of Matto Grosso proved a severe strain upon Paraguay, 
 and Bolivia refused to join in hostilities against Brazil. 
 
 It was some time before news of the invasion of 
 Matto Grosso reached Rio de Janeiro, but when it 
 became known there that Lopez had seized a section of 
 Brazilian territory, popular excitement became intense. 
 Hitherto the threat of Paraguay to open hostilities if 
 the Brazilian troops were sent into Uruguay had not 
 been taken seriously, but now military and naval pre- 
 parations were immediately undertaken for an expedition 
 of sufficient strength to enable Brazil to avenge the insult 
 offered to her flag. The army in Rio Grande was re- 
 
1865] BRAZIL PREPARES TO ATTACK 137 
 
 inforced, and instructions given it to be in readiness 
 to attack Paraguay. But to reach Paraguay it was 
 necessary to cross Misiones, and permission for this was 
 requested from Argentina. General Mitre, then Presi- 
 dent of Argentina, replied that the rivers Parana and 
 Uruguay were open to both parties to the conflict, but 
 that no license could be granted to the belligerents to 
 traverse Argentine territory. Simultaneously with this 
 Brazilian request came one of like character from General 
 Lopez, which was answered in the same terms. This 
 refusal was a greater disadvantage to Paraguay than 
 Brazil, for the latter was the stronger in naval equipment. 
 Moreover, an army of 20,000 men under General Robles 
 had been concentrated by order of Lopez at Candelaria, 
 ready to invade Rio Grande. Paraguay met with little 
 outside support. Peru and Chile to some extent 
 sympathised with the object Lopez had in view, but lent 
 no active assistance, and President Melgarejo of Bolivia 
 had already notified the Paraguayan Government that 
 he would take no part in the struggle. Argentina had 
 shown clearly that the attitude of Paraguay was un- 
 favourably regarded, while the Administration of 
 General Flores in Uruguay was prepared to render all 
 possible aid to the Brazilian cause. Paraguay was 
 therefore surrounded on all sides by hostility to the 
 aggressive policy of Lopez. 
 
 A Congress was now called in Asuncion for the 
 nominal purpose of voting supplies and passing resolu- 
 tions for the continuance of the war. It conferred on 
 Lopez the title of Marshal of the Army in place of 
 Brigadier- General, but all such meetings under Lopez 
 were absolutely subservient to his personal influence, 
 and every act approved, or resolution passed, was by his 
 direct instructions. He possessed absolutely dictatorial 
 powers before this Congress was held, but it suited his 
 purpose to be proclaimed publicly the supreme authority 
 in all matters connected with the war. 
 
 Lopez now began negotiations with General Urquiza 
 for a combination against the Color ados in Uruguay and 
 
iS8 PARAGUAY 
 
 the Brazilians, the compact including the assistance of 
 General Urquiza in the passage of the Paraguayans 
 through the Argentine provinces of Corrientes and Entre 
 Rios. The position of General Urquiza at this time was 
 one of declared hostility to President Mitre, and he was 
 a strong factor in the situation on account of his powerful 
 armed following. 
 
 When the crisis in 1865 was reached, the Paraguayan 
 army was on a stronger footing than that of any other 
 South American State. The force under arms consisted 
 of 12,000 troops of six years' service ; 6000 men who 
 had served with the colours and passed to the reserve ; 
 22,000 national guards under the leadership of trained 
 officers ; and 20,000 in recently raised levies undergoing 
 instruction. Altogether, the army comprised 45,000 
 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 5000 artillery, and the 
 supply of war material was large, purchases having been 
 effected abroad and establishments for its manufacture 
 founded at home. With these conditions in his favour, 
 Lopez boldly determined to take the offensive and 
 endeavour to carry out his policy. 
 
 In view of the hostile attitude of Paraguay two 
 Argentine warships, the 25 de Mayo and the Gaule- 
 guaij, had been despatched to Corrientes to watch events, 
 and on April 13, 1865, a Paraguayan squadron of five 
 steamers attacked them and bombarded the city of 
 Corrientes. Taken by surprise both vessels were cap- 
 tured. The city attempted resistance, but being in no 
 condition for defence presently surrendered also, and six 
 days later an expedition of 22,000 men under General 
 Robles was in possession of the whole province of 
 Corrientes, and a base of operations secured for an 
 advance upon Uruguay and Rio Grande. This suc- 
 cess encouraged Lopez, and he cared little what the 
 effect of his invasion of Argentine territory might be 
 when the news reached Buenos Aires, relying on the 
 fact that the Argentine Government was unprepared 
 for war. 
 
 The Argentines, however, had no intention of sub- 
 
1865] INVASION OF CORRIENTES 130 
 
 mitting quietly to the outrage committed by the Para- 
 guayan Dictator. After the first surprise, the inhabitants 
 of Buenos Aires held a mass meeting and marched to 
 the Government Palace to demand prompt chastisement 
 of the enemy. It was a difficult situation, for the regular 
 army consisted only of 6000 men scattered over the 
 different provinces. The President, however, issued a 
 proclamation calling for volunteers to take the field in 
 a few weeks, and in other directions the effect of the 
 occupation of Corrientes was more far reaching than 
 could have been anticipated by Lopez. President 
 Flores of Uruguay crossed to Buenos Aires to confer 
 with Mitre, and offered to make common cause against 
 Paraguay, and the Brazilian Minister, Senhor Almeida 
 Rosa, assured the Argentine Government of the wish 
 of Brazil for joint action. General Urquiza, although 
 known to be on most friendly terms with General Lopez, 
 also offered his services. The result of the deliberations 
 between Mitre, Flores, and Almeida Rosa was an offensive 
 and defensive alliance between Brazil, Uruguay, and 
 Argentina. President Mitre was given the chief com- 
 mand of the allied forces, because warlike operations 
 had begun in Argentine territory, but it was provided, 
 in case hostilities should change to Brazilian or 
 Uruguayan soil, that a general of one or other of these 
 nationalities should assume the command. All naval 
 operations were confided to Admiral Tamandare. The 
 allies agreed not to withdraw from the conflict until 
 after the conquest of Paraguay, and then only by 
 common consent, but the independence of Paraguay 
 was to be respected after the war, and the free naviga- 
 tion of the rivers Parana and Paraguay was to be 
 established for commerce and warships. Paraguay was 
 to be held liable for the cost, and the boundaries between 
 Brazil and Paraguay and Argentina and Paraguay were 
 also defined in the treaty, which was signed in Buenos 
 Aires on May 1, 1865. A protocol was subsequently 
 agreed to, by which provision was made for razing the 
 fortifications of Humaita, and the distributions of all 
 
140 PARAGUAY 
 
 loot and trophies captured, an easy victory being taken 
 as a thing of course. 
 
 Don Francisco Solano Lopez, whose ambition had 
 brought on this drama of blood, was born in 1827, and 
 was, therefore, in the prime of manhood when this crisis 
 occurred. His father, Don Carlos Lopez, was President 
 of Paraguay at his death in March, 1857, and the son 
 succeeded him. As a young man Francisco Lopez had 
 travelled in foreign countries, and he received his educa- 
 tion in Paris. It was in France that he met Madame 
 Lynch who became his mistress, and, returning with 
 him to Paraguay, fostered in his mind the ambitious 
 policy that resulted in this disastrous war. Lopez had 
 unbounded confidence in his own ability, regarding 
 himself as the Napoleon of South America. 
 
 Preparations for the campaign were matured rapidly 
 in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The war assumed 
 three distinct phases, and it is under these that the long 
 struggle can be most conveniently reviewed. The first 
 stage was confined to the operations in Corrientes, Rio 
 Grande, and Matto Grosso ; the second to the fighting 
 on the rivers Parana and Paraguay ; and the third to 
 the desperate effort of General Lopez to maintain his 
 position in Paraguay. Ultimate victory was only 
 achieved by the allies through the facilities afforded by 
 the rivers Parana and Paraguay, which permitted naval 
 operations in concert with the land forces, and gave 
 means of transport for men and supplies. Yet the 
 struggle lasted from 1865 until 1870, it being prolonged 
 by the difficult nature of the country. In favour of the 
 Paraguayans was the thick forest, and local topo- 
 graphical knowledge enabled Lopez both to draw the 
 allied forces into ambush and to make rapid marches 
 by ways unknown to them. In many of the districts 
 where the invaders encamped, the air was charged with 
 malaria, which told its tale in the heavy mortality, and 
 it was aggravated by constant exposure to tropical 
 rains. 
 
 Under their first plan of campaign, the allies concen- 
 
1865] WARLIKE PREPARATIONS 141 
 
 trated all available Argentine troops in Entre Rios and 
 the south of Corrientes. The Brazilian squadron was 
 to proceed up the river Parana and aid the land forces, 
 while General Urquiza was despatched to Entre Rios 
 to organise an irregular cavalry division. Both the 
 Brazilian and the Uruguayan contingents were to be 
 thrown upon the banks of the river Uruguay with 
 instructions to march northwards, cross the river in the 
 vicinity of Candelaria, and thence move upon Asuncion, 
 the capital of Paraguay, as soon as the Argentines had 
 driven the enemy out of Corrientes. The strength of 
 the allied army was : — Brazil 45,000, Argentina 25,000, 
 and Uruguay 5000 men. Near Concordia, in Entre 
 Rios, a camp of instruction was formed. It was con- 
 sidered probable that Lopez would make a dash into 
 Rio Grande and attempt to reach Montevideo, so, to 
 prevent surprise, observation posts were established 
 between Paysandu in Uruguay, and San Borge in the 
 north of Rio Grande. In Rio Grande national guards 
 were under arms and volunteer cavalry regiments had 
 been raised. These troops were commanded by Generals 
 Netto and Cannevaro, and were to join the army when 
 the movement to the north was begun, but unexpected 
 circumstances arose to prevent the execution of this 
 plan of campaign. The equipment of the troops was 
 deficient, transport was difficult, and supplies scarce. 
 Therefore it was not until the end of June that prepara- 
 tions had advanced sufficiently to warrant a forward 
 movement. 
 
 The distribution of the Paraguayan army consisted 
 of 6000 men in Matto Grosso ; 22,000 troops in the 
 north of the province of Corrientes ; a third division of 
 20,000 strong encamped at Cerro Leon and Humaita 
 in a position to support the forces in Corrientes ; and a 
 fourth division of 17,000 men mobilised as a final reserve. 
 After occupying Corrientes in April, 1865, Lopez hesi- 
 tated to advance further, it is difficult to say why, since 
 at the end of April there was no force between Corri- 
 entes and the frontier of Rio Grande to offer resistance. 
 
142 PARAGUAY 
 
 Anyhow, the fact that no advance was made enabled 
 the concentration of the allied forces. A probable 
 explanation lay in the fact that the inhabitants of Corri- 
 entes showed a bitter hostility, which, combined with 
 the defection of General Urquiza in Entre Rios on 
 whose assistance Lopez had counted, increased the 
 danger of a forward movement. Moreover, the reports 
 from Matto Grosso were not encouraging, and General 
 Barrios stated that the unfriendly attitude of the natives 
 there made reinforcements necessary if the sphere of the 
 Paraguayan influence was to be extended. 
 
 The main body of the Paraguayans in Corrientes 
 was concentrated near the river Riachuelo, and in June, 
 1865, a force of 2000 men under General Paunero 
 opposed their advance. To draw Paunero into a fight, 
 Lopez ordered the Paraguayan forces to make a feint 
 of retiring, at the same time sending a cavalry division 
 to outflank the Argentines. General Paunero was not 
 caught in this trap. He embarked his troops on the 
 Brazilian squadron, proceeding up the Parana until 
 opposite Corrientes, the garrison of which had been 
 reduced, and then decided to endeavour to seize the 
 town. A force of 800 troops was landed, supported 
 by a strong detachment of marines from the warships. 
 On the morning of May 25, the positions outside the 
 city were assaulted, and before nightfall the town was 
 captured, but not without severe fighting which involved 
 a loss to the Paraguayans of 500 officers and men killed 
 and wounded, besides 80 prisoners and three guns, with 
 a quantity of arms and ammunition captured. The 
 casualties on the Argentine side were 23 officers and 
 250 men killed and wounded. Next day outposts 
 reported the Paraguayans advancing in force towards 
 the city, so General Paunero re- embarked his troops in 
 view of the overwhelming odds by which he was 
 threatened. Many of the residents took advantage of 
 this opportunity to escape, and the squadron dropped 
 down the river to a section of the province not invested 
 by the enemy. This victory helped to counteract the 
 
1865] A NAVAL BATTLE 143 
 
 impatient feeling in Buenos Aires caused by the delay 
 in the advance of the allies from Concordia. 
 
 Lopez now made plans for the destruction of the 
 Brazilian squadron on the Parana. Twenty Brazilian 
 war vessels were anchored off the mouth of the Ria- 
 chuelo on June 11,1865, when, without warning, a hostile 
 fleet of eight steamers and six gunboats was seen 
 approaching. These Paraguayan ships passed the 
 anchorage of the Brazilians without discharging a shot, 
 then circled round and opened a heavy fire with 
 artillery and musketry. Although inferior in numbers, 
 the Paraguayan squadron was well equipped, and 
 the action continued with heavy losses on both 
 sides for ten hours. At one time the Paraguayans had 
 every prospect of victory, and the commander of the 
 only Brazilian ironclad recognised that the sole hope of 
 saving the day was to sink some of the hostile vessels. 
 He accordingly steamed into the thick of the enemy's 
 squadron and successfully rammed four of the Para- 
 guayan ships. This turned the day in favour of the 
 Brazilians, and the engagement ended with the total 
 defeat of the Paraguayans, four of their steamers and 
 six gunboats being sunk and a thousand officers and men 
 killed or wounded. The commander of the Paraguayan 
 squadron escaped, but was imprisoned by General Lopez, 
 and the four Paraguayan steamers left afloat retreated 
 to Humaita and took no further part in the war until 
 two years later. In this engagement the Brazilians lost 
 two vessels, and the remainder of the fleet was so much 
 damaged that it had to be taken to Esquina for repairs. 
 
 Simultaneously with the attack on the Brazilian 
 squadron, 12,000 Paraguayans under the command of 
 Colonel Estigarribia and Major Duarte were despatched 
 from Candelaria to Misiones. This force arrived at San 
 Borge, a place only weakly garrisoned, on June 15, 1865. 
 Colonel Asumpcao was in command, and after a siege 
 of five days he capitulated. The city was sacked. 
 Colonel Estigarribia did not delay at San Borge, but 
 pushed southwards distributing his division on both 
 
144 PARAGUAY 
 
 banks of the river Uruguay. The Brazilians made no 
 attempt to check the invasion, but occasionally a 
 reconnaissance in force led to skirmishes with the 
 invaders. In the most important of these the Brazilians 
 were defeated and suffered heavy casualties, besides 
 losing much valuable equipment. Lopez had anticipated, 
 that his appearance in Rio Grande would be the signal 
 for a general rising of the slaves, to whom he had pro- 
 mised freedom; but his expectations were disappointed, 
 the negroes showing no desire to revolt. 
 
 Lopez left no stone unturned to ensure the success 
 of the march through Brazilian territory. Knowing the 
 hostility of the natives of Entre Rios to Brazilians, 
 emissaries were sent to the camps of the irregular 
 cavalry raised by General Urquiza to stir up seditious 
 feeling. This was not difficult, and suddenly news 
 reached the headquarters of the allied forces in Con- 
 cordia that the Entre Rios contingent had mutinied. A 
 council of war was summoned, at which General Urquiza 
 promised to proceed to the camp and put matters right. 
 By what influence his conduct was guided, whether by 
 jealousy of General Mitre or disgust at the attitude 
 of his followers, is not clear, but he left Concordia 
 apparently to fulfil his promises, and instead of 
 doing so, retired to his estate, declining to take 
 further part in the campaign. Left without a leader, 
 the men of the Entre Rios contingent dispersed to 
 their homes. 
 
 Urquiza's defection made it necessary for the allies 
 to appoint an officer in his place. Urquiza had com- 
 manded the vanguard of the invading army, and General 
 Flores, the representative of Uruguay, begged for the 
 position, proposing that the Uruguayan contingent 
 should form the vanguard. The offer was accepted by 
 Mitre and his colleagues, and at the end of June the 
 Uruguayan division of 5000 men under Flores marched 
 from Concordia to support General Paunero, the main 
 body of the allied army remaining at Concordia. 
 
 In Uruguay the Blancos saw in the Paraguayan 
 
1865] BATTLE OF YATAY 145 
 
 troops a means to regain the control they lost when 
 Aguirre was ousted. Their leaders, accordingly, assured 
 Lopez that when his forces entered Uruguayan territory 
 they would rise and make common cause with the 
 Paraguayans against the Uruguayan Government. An 
 outbreak in Uruguay, moreover, would have entailed 
 serious complications for the allied forces at Concordia, 
 for it meant that the flank of the army resting on the 
 river Uruguay would be open to attack. This was not 
 lost upon Lopez, and he ordered Colonel Estigarribia to 
 move with all speed down the banks of the Upper 
 Uruguay. 
 
 The two columns of the Paraguayan army, marching 
 on either side of the river, made quick progress, and by 
 the second week in August, 1865, the division under 
 Colonel Estigarribia on the left bank had reached a 
 position close to Uruguayana, a town only a few miles 
 from the frontier. Here he ordered the column on the 
 right bank to make preparations to cross the river. 
 General Flores with his 5000 men was encamped on the 
 east bank of the Uruguay River at Yatay, nearly opposite 
 Uruguayana, and when informed of the Paraguayan 
 advance he at once arranged to give battle, imagining 
 the approaching force to be the main body of the 
 Paraguayan army. Word was sent to General Paunero, 
 then in the south-west of the province of Corrientes, to 
 move up to his support. Paunero responded by a series 
 of forced marches, and joined Flores on August 15. 
 Next day the Paraguayan column under Major Duarte 
 was sighted, and on August 17 the opposing forces 
 collided in a hard-fought battle that ended in the rout of 
 the invaders. The action is described in the following 
 terms by Colonel Palleja : — 
 
 The troops were paraded at an early hour and quickly marched 
 off in parallel columns. The General-in-chief gave me command of 
 four regiments of the Uruguayan brigade. Moving in the formation 
 mentioned we arrived in sight of the town. The irregular cavalry of 
 the enemy were concentrated near some farms at a distance of half a 
 league from Restauracion (Yatay). The General ordered a halt and 
 
 K 
 
i46 PARAGUAY 
 
 summoned a council of war to determine how the action should be 
 fought. My brigade was ordered to deploy by battalions, covering 
 the advance with a line of skirmishers, and to attack the enemy's 
 front. The Brazilian and Ai'gentine columns followed in rear, inclin- 
 ing towards the left to outflank the enemy. The Paraguayans 
 occupied a slope which fell away until lost in a swamp about a league 
 in extent formed by the Uruguay and another stream. The Para- 
 guayan skirmishers and sharpshooters were posted in trenches near 
 the ridge of the hill. The effective strength of the force under Major 
 Duarte comprised 3000 men, consisting of three regiments of infantry 
 and two of cavalry. 
 
 My brigade deployed, the 24th Regiment in the centre, the 
 Florida Regiment on the right, and the " Voluntarios Garabaldinos " 
 on the left. The " Libertad " Regiment acted as skirmishers in front 
 of the line. The band played the national hymn and we moved for- 
 ward to the attack. The enemy's sharpshooters in the trenches 
 received us with a heavy fire, but did not check us. We succeeded 
 in occupying the first line of the Paraguayan defence, inflicting severe 
 loss on the defenders. The Florida Regiment cut off the retreat of a 
 detachment of the enemy. When this first line was driven in we 
 discovered the main body of the Paraguayans in strong positions, and 
 were exposed to a storm of musketry fire. My men charged and 
 drove the Paraguayans back to their encampment. Here the enemy 
 attempted to re-form, but were prevented by another bayonet charge 
 and by the attack of our cavalry on both flanks, with the result that 
 they fell back to the edge of the swamp. At this period of the fight 
 sevei'al Argentine regiments came up on the left in support of the 
 24th Regiment and the " Voluntarios Garabaldinos." The Florida 
 Regiment now broke through the Paraguayan line and made prisoners 
 of a section of infantry and cavalry. The remainder of the enemy 
 dashed into the swamp and attempted to wade or swim to a place of 
 safety on the other side, but unsuccessfully. About a hundred of the 
 enemy swam out into the Uruguay and succeeded in reaching an 
 island in mid-stream. At 2.30 p.m. the fight was over. Some 250 
 Paraguayans were left dead on the field, the majority of the remainder 
 taken prisoners. Our losses were 1 officer killed, 10 wounded, 
 and 250 men killed or wounded. The wounded were numerous on the 
 part of the enemy, and special care was taken by General Flores to 
 see that they were given proper attention. 
 
 This defeat of the Paraguayan forces was the most 
 serious reverse Lopez had so far encountered, and 
 practically put an end to his plan for the invasion of 
 Rio Grande. 
 
 When news of the disaster to Major Duarte reached 
 Colonel Estigarribia he occupied the city of Uruguayana 
 
1865] OCCUPATION OF URUGUAYANA 147 
 
 and made preparations to hold that place pending further 
 instructions from Lopez. The allied forces determined 
 to invest it, and a Brazilian division under General 
 Cannevaro consisting of 8000 mounted troops, 1500 
 infantry, and eight guns, took up a position north of the 
 town. General Flores, with 1400 men, was detached 
 to aid in the siege, and Argentine forces under General 
 Paunero also assisted. The Paraguayans were thus 
 hemmed in so completely that unless help came their 
 surrender was only a question of a few weeks, for their 
 provisions and ammunition were scarce. To make 
 certain they should not escape, a further reinforcement 
 of 1000 men was brought up at the end of August by 
 Mitre, and on September 11, 1865, Dom Pedro II. and 
 his son-in-law the Conde d'Eu appeared with still more 
 troops. Up to then Colonel Estigarribia had refused to 
 entertain any proposals for capitulation, relying on aid 
 being sent to him by General Lopez ; but when, on 
 September 16, the Emperor made another proposition 
 the Colonel decided to accept it, although it was uncon- 
 ditional surrender. On September 18, Estigarribia and 
 his troops therefore marched out of the city as prisoners 
 of war. Eight guns, seven standards, and all the mili- 
 tary equipment of the Paraguayan army of invasion 
 was captured, and when Lopez was informed of it 
 all, he declared Estigarribia to be a traitor to his 
 country. 
 
 And well he might, for the loss of this division of 
 the Paraguayan army was a severe blow. Not only did 
 it reduce the troops available for active service, but all 
 hopes of an occupation of Rio Grande were annihilated, 
 and the project of controlling Uruguay by a revolution 
 of the Blancos against Flores was frustrated. But the 
 Paraguayan dictator did not despair. Recognising the 
 many difficulties attending an invasion of Paraguay by 
 the allies, he forthwith turned his whole attention to the 
 problem of resisting it. The strong positions on the 
 north bank of the Parana were fortified and garrisoned 
 by trustworthy troops. Near the Parana were 27,000 
 
148 PARAGUAY 
 
 Paraguayans under General Robles with 60 guns, and 
 General Barrios, with 10,000 men, was in the neighbour- 
 hood of Candelaria. A force of 5000 men was in 
 Corrientes, and Lopez himself was at the strongly 
 fortified position of Humaita, from which central point 
 he was able to keep in touch with the progress of 
 events. 
 
 The destruction of the column under Colonel Esti- 
 garribia and Major Duarte on the Uruguay modified 
 the allied plan of campaign. The route proposed for 
 the advance upon Asuncion entailed a long and tedious 
 march through difficult country, in which few supplies 
 could be obtained. General Mitre therefore proposed 
 that joint action should be taken by the army on shore 
 and the squadron on the river. The plan was to drive 
 the enemy out of Corrientes and then advance across 
 the Parana into Paraguay, while the squadron was to 
 keep the river open for transport purposes. After 
 some opposition this plan was accepted and prepara- 
 tions for the advance were commenced, although lack 
 of transport animals was such a severe hindrance, that 
 not until November could the allied army of 40,000 
 approach Corrientes. Small opposition was en- 
 countered on the march from the river Uruguay. A 
 few skirmishes took place with small bodies, but the 
 enemy always fell back, and when the allied army 
 appeared near the city of Corrientes, Lopez ordered all 
 Paraguayan troops to withdraw across the Parana, 
 Thus, at the end of 1865, the enemy had entirely 
 evacuated Argentine territory, and the failure of General 
 Robles to make any effective resistance to the advance 
 of the enemy through the province of Corrientes so 
 irritated Lopez that he ordered his arrest. Six months 
 after he was shot. 
 
 Affairs in Matto Grosso were just as unsatisfactory 
 to Paraguay, for the inhabitants had risen against the 
 Lopez Administration, and the position of the army of 
 occupation became precarious, the more so as Lopez 
 was obliged to withdraw a large proportion of troops in 
 
1865] EVACUATION OF CORRIENTES 149 
 
 order to strengthen his line of defence on the Parana. 
 It thus came about that at the end of 1865 the Para- 
 guayan forces in Brazilian territory were only strong 
 enough to make Paraguayan authority respected in such 
 towns as were garrisoned. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 Paraguay — continued 
 
 Public Feeling in South America. Consultation of Argentine, 
 Brazilian, and Uruguayan Representatives. Corrientes the Base 
 of Operations. Defences of the Parana. Engagement at Paso 
 de la Patria. Conduct of the Argentine National Guard. Raid 
 to Itati. Reconnaissance of Paraguayan Positions. Paso de la 
 Patria. Crossing of the Parana. Over-confidence of Allies. 
 Surprise of Allies. Advance into Paraguay. Battle of May 20. 
 Camp at Tuyuti. Lines of Rojas. Discontent in Allied Army. 
 Engagements, July 15 and 20. Arrival of Reinforcements. 
 Expedition against Curupaiti. Engagement at Curuzu. Garrison 
 of Curuzu. Conference between Mitre and Lopez. Effect of 
 Peace Proposals. Attack upon Curupaiti. Inefficient Recon- 
 naissance. Paraguayan Victory. Breakdown of Plans. Military 
 Changes. Public Opinion in Argentina and Brazil. Paralisation 
 of the Operations. Revolution in Mendoza. Marshal Caxias' 
 Invasion. Arrival of General Osorio at Tuyuti. Forward move- 
 ment. Occupation of Rio Hondo. Advance under Marshal 
 Caxias. Situation in Matto Grosso. General Mitre. Attack 
 upon Convoy at Humaita. Squadron forces passage at Curupaiti. 
 Unsatisfactory situation of the Fleet. Difficult Transport. 
 Operations at Humaita. Effort of Paraguayans to recapture 
 Tayi. Attack of Paraguayans upon Tuyuti. Heavy Losses. 
 Revolt in Argentina. Assassination of Flores. Squadron forces 
 the Humaita Passage. Attack on Humaita. Squadron reaches 
 Asuncion. 
 
 The retreat of the Paraguayans across the Parana 
 caused a revulsion of feeling in Argentina. Hitherto 
 public sentiment had demanded strong action against 
 Lopez, but when the enemy had been expelled from 
 Argentine territory the standpoint taken was that the 
 
1866] BRAZIL REJECTS PEACE PROPOSALS 151 
 
 national honour was satisfied, and further sacrifice of 
 blood and treasure unnecessary. 
 
 Urquiza was in favour of immediate peace negotia- 
 tions with Lopez, and his influence was not without 
 effect on public opinion. In Uruguay also the Blancos 
 agitated for a suspension of hostilities, and Chile and 
 Peru intimated to Argentina that they considered action 
 against Paraguay had gone far enough. The United 
 States, Great Britain, and France were of the same 
 opinion, and a discussion took place between the repre- 
 sentative's of the allies, but Brazil decided the policy to 
 be followed. The Emperor declined to treat with Lopez. 
 He reminded the Argentine and Uruguay representatives 
 of the treaty, and particularly called attention to the 
 clause stating that warlike operations should not cease 
 until the Paraguayans had been driven out of all 
 territory invaded. It had also been stipulated in the 
 treaty that no one party to the compact could retire ex- 
 cept by mutual consent, and in conclusion Dom PedroII. 
 declared that as the Paraguayans were still in the 
 Brazilian province of Matto Grosso he felt the necessity 
 of continuing the campaign, and that in case Argentina 
 and Uruguay decided for peace he should abdicate in 
 favour of his daughter, as a protest against any such 
 policy. This determined attitude carried the day, and 
 the invasion of Paraguay was undertaken. 
 
 For this, the second phase of the war, the base of 
 operations was the city of Corrientes, where large 
 deposits of war material and stores were collected and 
 hospitals erected. The allied army was distributed 
 along the left bank of the Parana from the town of 
 Corrientes to Misiones. In the arrangements the 
 squadron played an important part, being allotted the 
 duties of keeping the river free for navigation, making 
 constant reconnaissances as far north as Humaita, and 
 providing transport. 
 
 During these preparations the Paraguayans were 
 not idle. The defence of the right bank of the river 
 was strengthened. Reinforcements were brought up to 
 
152 PARAGUAY 
 
 resist the passage of the Parana, and a body of troops 
 was in readiness for a raid into Corrientes. At the end 
 of 1885, information was brought into the Paraguayan 
 camp that the vigilance of the allies had been relaxed 
 at the Paso de la Patria. General Hornos was the 
 officer in command at this point, and it was owing to 
 his over-confidence in safety from attack by the Para- 
 guayans that a raid was possible. On January 1, 1866, 
 1000 Paraguayans crossed the river and drove in the 
 Argentine picquets. The main body of this division 
 was then brought into action, and a desperate fight 
 ensued. The Paraguayans, reinforced, continued the 
 attack for the greater part of the day, but a bayonet 
 charge by the National Guard forced them finally to 
 retreat. On the side of the allies the casualties were 
 returned as 402 officers and men killed and wounded, 
 and the Paraguayans lost about 1000 men. This 
 engagement excited particular attention in Buenos Aires 
 for the reason that the rank and file of the National 
 Guard, upon whom fell the brunt of the fighting and 
 the majority of the casualties, were recruited from well- 
 known families in that city. 
 
 In February, 3000 Paraguayans were sent on another 
 expedition which crossed the Parana to Itati, where the 
 vanguard of the allied army was encamped. General 
 Elores was absent, having left General Suarez in charge. 
 The Paraguayans were inferior in strength to the 
 division under Suarez, but the latter received orders 
 from General Mitre to avoid any engagement, and fell 
 back upon San Cosme. No attempt was made by the 
 enemy to follow ; they simply destroyed the camp and 
 looted the town. 
 
 March was spent by the squadron in sounding the 
 river in the neighbourhood of Paso de la Patria and 
 reconnoitring the Paraguayan defences. Occasionally 
 skirmishes occurred between the ships and the shore, 
 but no serious engagements. The defences of the Paso 
 de la Patria consisted of a fort called Itapiru, situated 
 on a high point known as Diamante. To the left was 
 
1866] ENGAGEMENTS NEAE THE PARANA 153 
 
 the mouth of a stream where two barges, mounted with 
 artillery, a steamer, and a number of canoes were placed. 
 In front of Paso de la Patria were two long islands, the 
 western of which was commanded by the guns of the 
 Itapirii fort. On April 5 a Brazilian detachment seized 
 this latter island and fortified it. Five days later a 
 force of 1200 Paraguayans was despatched by Lopez to 
 retake the position, but failed, being driven back at the 
 point of the bayonet, losing 800 killed and wounded. 
 The Brazilian losses were also heavy, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Cabrita and several officers and men being killed, and 
 a large number wounded. 
 
 During the first two weeks in April, preparations for 
 the passage of the Parana had matured. The allied 
 army consisted of 75 battalions of infantry, 70 squadrons 
 of cavalry, with 8 batteries of light and 2 of heavy 
 artillery, and the plan was to effect the passage at Paso 
 de la Patria while the squadron bombarded the Itapiru 
 fort to distract attention. On the morning of April 16, 
 186(5, a Brazilian contingent commanded by General 
 Osorio was landed on the Paraguayan bank of the river. 
 The Argentine division under General Mitre followed, 
 and this combined force drove back the Paraguayans, 
 who retreated to a strongly entrenched camp a little to 
 the north of Fort Itapiru. Next day an attack in force 
 was made on this camp, the squadron bombarding the 
 position before the assault, and, after resisting success- 
 fully for several days, the Paraguayans set fire to the 
 camp, destroyed all ammunition and provisions they 
 were unable to remove, and evacuated it. Thus, by 
 April 25, the allies were in possession of the right bank 
 of the Parana, an advantage gained with trifling loss. 
 From this position it was possible to realise some of the 
 difficulties of a march to Asuncion. Between the Parana 
 and the strongly fortified position of Humaita was a 
 heavily wooded mountain range. To the west was thick 
 scrub and undergrowth bordering on the river Paraguay, 
 and to the east the almost impenetrable swamps of the 
 Estero Vellaco. All advantage was with the defenders, 
 
154 PARAGUAY 
 
 No wonder that the difficulty of transport was carefully 
 considered by General Mitre before deciding when the 
 advance should take place. 
 
 Yet the ease with which the passage of the Parana 
 had been accomplished and the retreat of the Para- 
 guayans from Fort Itapiru made the allies over-confident, 
 as was illustrated by the position selected by Flores for 
 his division. It was chosen more with a view to general 
 convenience than for strategic purposes, and picquets 
 were thrown out in forest country where observation 
 was difficult. The Paraguayans were quick to see the 
 weak points of this situation, and Lopez sent a force of 
 6000 men to advance through the forest from different 
 quarters, with the result that at mid-day on May 2, the 
 outposts of the allies were surrounded and cut to pieces. 
 The Uruguayan brigade was the first to get under arms, 
 and it checked the assault before the encampment of the 
 main body was reached, but matters grew desperate, 
 and to save the situation Colonel Palleja ordered 
 the Florida regiment to fix bayonets and charge. He 
 was not supported and the regiment was surrounded, 
 but after an hour of desperate fighting the main body 
 came into action and the Paraguayans were repulsed. 
 When pursuit was attempted the allies were brought 
 face to face with extensive entrenchments, known as 
 the " Lines of Pojas," and the cause subsequently of 
 severe fighting. In this engagement the Paraguayans 
 lost 3000 men killed and wounded, and abandoned 4 
 field guns in their retreat. The allies had 800 casual- 
 ties, and 4 Brazilian guns were captured and carried 
 off. 
 
 On May 20 the general advance into Paraguay began, 
 but progress was slow, and four days later, while the 
 allies were throwing up entrenchments, a sudden assault 
 was made upon them by 9000 Paraguayans, who attacked 
 in three columns, advancing against the centre and the 
 two flanks. To the right were the Argentines, in the 
 centre the Uruguayans under Flores, on the left the 
 Brazilians. The column attacking the centre was de- 
 
1866] ALLIES ADVANCE INTO PARAGUAY 155 
 
 layed by unexpected obstacles, only arriving after the 
 action had begun on the right and ■ left. Flores was 
 better prepared, therefore, to resist than the other 
 divisions. The Paraguayans made a desperate attempt 
 to break through his lines, but were repulsed. The 
 Argentines, however, were surrounded on the right, and 
 on the left the enemy succeeded in breaking through the 
 Brazilian defences and reached the outskirts of the camp. 
 In this emergency Flores detached two regiments to 
 support the left wing, when suddenly an outburst of firing 
 was heard in rear of the allies. This proved to be a 
 fourth Paraguayan column which had crept round the 
 flanks whilst the allies were occupied in repelling the 
 frontal attack. The cavalry contingent under General 
 Netto from Rio Grande was in rear of the main body, 
 and upon it fell the brunt of this fresh attack, but 
 the Paraguayans were repulsed finally at all points with 
 a loss of 5000 killed and wounded and 4 guns and 5 
 standards. The casualties of the allies were 400 killed 
 and 1500 wounded. 
 
 These two engagements opened the eyes of General 
 Mitre to the real difficulties of the situation. The army 
 was some distance from the river and unable to co- 
 operate with the squadron, and it was hampered by the 
 sick and wounded. Convoys from the Parana were con- 
 stantly attacked, and the nature of the country rendered 
 long marches an impossibility. Little resistance had 
 been anticipated south of Humaita on the river Paraguay, 
 and at this point the aid of the squadron would facilitate 
 land operations, but calculations made before the advance 
 had proved erroneous, and nothing had been known of 
 the " Lines of Rojas," which now confronted the allies. 
 What wonder then that the army generally was dis- 
 heartened at the obstacles before it. In the councils 
 of war two courses were discussed — either to retire to 
 the Parana, or to entrench the camp and hold the 
 position until the "Lines of Rojas" were captured. 
 The first proposition was abandoned on the ground that 
 it would entail political complications, and the second 
 
156 PARAGUAY 
 
 adopted. Trenches and fortifications Avere constructed 
 to ensure the camp against surprise. Preparations were 
 made for reducing the Paraguayan position by bombard- 
 ment, and no assault was to be attempted until the 
 arrival of the reinforcements now en route under the 
 Brazilian General Porto Alegre. 
 
 All this time Lopez was at Humaita elaborating 
 defensive measures against the invasion. The heavy 
 losses of the Paraguayan army during the first year of 
 the war were made good by enlisting all males capable 
 of bearing arms, this including boys of fourteen and men 
 of sixty years of age, and the misery this caused was 
 widespread. But the Dictator was determined to resist 
 the advance of the allies as long as he could obtain men 
 to fight. 
 
 Discontent now broke out between the allies, and 
 General Osorio resigned his command. Flores threatened 
 to follow this example unless supplies and reinforcements 
 were forthcoming from Montevideo. In the second 
 week of July there was no sign of General Porto 
 Alegre and his 12,000 men, but to prevent the mischief 
 from spreading Mitre decided to go on without him. 
 So, on July 15, the 4th Infantry Division under General 
 Guillermo Souza, supported by the Argentine Division 
 under Colonel Conessa, attacked at daybreak and carried 
 the Paraguayan trenches after severe fighting. Beyond 
 the trenches was an open space defended by a redoubt 
 and communicating with the fortifications protecting the 
 Paraguayan camp. The Brazilians attempted to advance 
 and storm this redoubt, but were driven back with heavy 
 loss. Beyond some cannonading and skirmishing nothing 
 further occurred until the 18th, when the allies again 
 attacked the Paraguayan defences and the redoubt was 
 captured, but at great sacrifice of life. Amongst the 
 killed was Colonel Palleja, the officer commanding the 
 Uruguayan brigade. After several days' further skirmish- 
 ing the Paraguayans were forced to retire within the 
 " Lines of Rojas," but General Mitre did not consider 
 his force strong enough to advance, for the prolonged 
 
1866] PARAGUAYAN DEFENCES 15? 
 
 fighting had cost the allies 2000 officers and men killed 
 and wounded. 
 
 Another period of inactivity therefore followed until 
 the arrival of General Porto Alegre in August, when the 
 unsatisfactory results at Rojas led to a proposal to send 
 an expedition up the river Paraguay to attack the 
 fortified town of Curupaiti in combination with the 
 squadron thence moving northwards against Humaita. 
 Success in this, it was argued, would compel Lopez to 
 withdraw his forces from Rojas to support Humaita, 
 upon which the allied army could then converge. 
 General Porto Alegre with 9000 men, and accompanied 
 by six cruisers, was accordingly told off to carry out this 
 plan, and started on September 1. An example now 
 illustrated the faulty information of the allies concern- 
 ing the nature of the Paraguayan defences. On the 
 first day the warships and transports advanced up the 
 river Paraguay they were checked by heavy artillery and 
 musketry fire, and obliged to seek shelter behind some 
 islands in mid-river. Then it was discovered that in a 
 clear space in the scrub a fort had been erected com- 
 manding the river, and a force of 2000 men forthwith 
 landed below this position, another 1000 strong being 
 disembarked as a support, the squadron covering all by 
 bombarding the Paraguayan position. Aided by this 
 cannonade the Brazilians endeavoured to advance 
 towards the fort, and as they did so the squadron was 
 obliged to cease firing for fear of hitting its own side, 
 whereupon the Paraguayans at once attacked the 
 invaders. Fighting continued for several hours, and 
 then reinforcements of 3000 men were landed. Next 
 morning the assault upon this fortified position, known 
 as Curuzu, was renewed, and shortly after fighting had 
 begun a torpedo launched from the river bank exploded 
 under the ironclad Rio de Janeiro, which foundered with 
 the majority of her officers and crew. The vessel had 
 cost 7,000,000 francs, and was considered the finest ship 
 in the Brazilian navy. The Paraguayans stubbornly 
 defended their position, but were out-numbered and in 
 
158 PARAGUAY 
 
 the end retreated, leaving the fort in the hands of the 
 invaders. Pursuit was continued by the Brazilians up 
 to the walls of Curupaiti, but this place was so strongly 
 held that they returned to Curuzu. It was a dearly- 
 bought victory, for the expedition lost 1000 men killed 
 and wounded, in addition to the disaster to the Rio de 
 Janeiro. Lopez was furious when he learned that 
 Curuzu was taken, and immediately ordered one half of 
 the officers and ten per cent, of the other survivors to 
 be executed. General Porto Alegre now requisitioned 
 reinforcements to attack Curupaiti, but the commander- 
 in-chief hesitated to accede to this request, on the 
 grounds that to weaken the force opposite Rojas would 
 expose the army to serious danger. All the Brazilian 
 generals, however, were in favour of the attack upon 
 Curupaiti as a means to open the road to Humaita. 
 Admiral Tamandare, on the other hand, opposed an 
 immediate advance, asserting that he was not prepared 
 to risk the loss of another cruiser. So General Porto 
 Alegre entrenched his camp at Curuzu and awaited 
 developments. 
 
 Meanwhile Lopez had sent a flag of truce to Mitre 
 proposing terms for peace. These were rejected by the 
 allies after a conference between Mitre, Flores, and the 
 Paraguayan representative. The senior Brazilian officer, 
 General Polidoro, was invited to be present, but refused, 
 stating that his Government had instructed him to make 
 war against the tyrant of Paraguay and not to cease 
 until the Dictator was overthrown. Lopez's proposal 
 was to make peace with Argentina and Uruguay, but 
 not with Brazil. The discussion was of short duration, 
 the first condition laid down by Mitre for any negotia- 
 tions being the absolute separation of Lopez from further 
 participation in the Government of Paraguay. When 
 this was made clear to the representative of Lopez, he 
 refused to treat. 
 
 Although General Mitre had brusquely cut short the 
 peace negotiations proposed by Lopez, they influenced 
 his judgment of the position, leading him to see in the 
 
1866] LOPEZ PEOPOSES PEACE 159 
 
 fact that Lopez had taken the first step, the sign of a 
 lessened confidence in his absolute power to resist as 
 expressed at the commencement of hostilities. Many 
 councils of war were then held, at which the Brazilian 
 generals continued strongly in favour of supporting 
 General Porto Alegre in Curuzu, and from that point 
 making the advance northwards to Curupaiti and 
 Humaita. In the end Mitre agreed to this plan of 
 campaign, and arranged that the camp at Tuyuti, the 
 position so long occupied by the allies, should be 
 entrusted to General Polidoro, and that Flores with the 
 Uruguayan division should keep open communication 
 between Tuyuti and Curuzu. Mitre with the Argentine 
 troops immediately proceeded to Curuzu. When the 
 advance to Curupaiti was begun General Polidoro was 
 to assault the Paraguayan position at Rojas. 
 
 The march to Curupaiti commenced on September 22. 
 Scouting parties sent out previously had reported 
 the vicinity clear and the main road between the two 
 places free from all obstacles, except a few entrench- 
 ments near the Paraguayan positions. Owing to recent 
 rains the difficulty of transport was increased, especially 
 in regard to artillery, and it was found necessary to 
 reduce the number of guns. The squadron was in- 
 structed to take up a position on the river opposite 
 Curupaiti and prepare the way by bombarding the forti- 
 fications, but the remembrance of the disaster to the 
 Rio de Janeiro was fresh in the mind of Admiral 
 Tamandare, and to avoid any possibility of a repetition 
 of this misforture he ordered the ships to lay off at a 
 distance to ensure safety from torpedoes. As a matter 
 of fact the squadron kept so far away that the naval 
 guns did no damage to the fort or garrison. This 
 aroused bitter recriminations by the military officers. 
 
 It was a tedious march. A mile from the Para- 
 guayan fortifications the road was cut by a fosse twelve 
 feet deep and extending across country for three miles. 
 The Argentine troops forming the left wing were able, 
 however, to cross this impediment without great diffi- 
 
160 PARAGUAY 
 
 culty, but on the far side another surprise was in store. 
 The intervening space to the fortifications was marshy 
 ground full of pitfalls and entanglements, the whole 
 commanded by artillery, which opened fire to such good 
 purpose that the column was forced back. The guns of 
 the allies were now brought into action, and under cover 
 of their fire another attempt was made to storm the 
 position, but it proved useless and the allies were 
 repulsed. Mitre retreated to Curuzu with a loss of 
 5000 killed and wounded. The casualties of the 
 defenders of Curupaiti were trifling. 
 
 The operations assigned by General Mitre to Flores 
 and Polidoro had also miscarried. General Flores had 
 failed to establish communication with Curuzu, and 
 Polidoro did not dare to attack the position at JRojas 
 until connection with Curuzu was assured. At the end 
 of September, 1866, therefore, the position was most un- 
 satisfactory, the more so that Lopez strengthened the 
 garrison of Kojas. Several changes in the higher posts 
 of the allied army now took place. Mitre returned to 
 Tuyuti, Porto Alegre resuming command of the forces 
 at Curuzu, and Flores left Paraguay for Montevideo, 
 while the Brazilian Government recalled Admiral 
 Tamandare. 
 
 Indignation was aroused in Argentina and Brazil 
 at the mishaps to the allies, and discontent with the 
 policy of the two Governments in continuing the war 
 rapidly spread. The loss of life and heavy expenditure 
 were the principal reasons urged for peace with Paraguay, 
 but the Emperor of Brazil would not listen to any such 
 proposition, and a further contingent of 10,000 men of 
 the Brazilian National Guard was embodied. More 
 ships also were fitted out, Marshal Caxias was given 
 command of the Brazilian forces, and Admiral Ignacio 
 ordered to replace Admiral Tamandare. In the middle 
 of December these two officers reached Tuyuti. 
 
 Another long period of inactivity now ensued, and 
 the result of many conferences was the conviction that 
 no further advance was possible without strong rein- 
 
1867] WAITING FOR REINFORCEMENTS 161 
 
 forcements for both army and navy. Despatches were 
 sent by Caxias and Ignacio to the Brazilian Government 
 stating what troops and vessels they considered necessary 
 to attempt a forward movement, and meantime the work 
 of the allies was confined to reconnaissance of the 
 Paraguayan lines at Rojas, and preparations for the 
 advance when reinforcements did come. An interrup- 
 tion, however, from an unexpected quarter occurred to 
 complicate matters, for a revolution broke out in the 
 Argentine province of Mendoza, and developed to such 
 formidable extent that Mitre was obliged to order 
 Paunero with 3000 men to embark immediately for 
 Rosario, and thence march against the rebels. Soon 
 affairs became so serious that Mitre himself decided to 
 take the field, and left Paraguay for that purpose. 
 
 The suppression of this revolutionary movement in 
 Argentina directly concerned the war against Paraguay, 
 for its leaders insisted on the conclusion of the war, the 
 denouncement of the alliance with Brazil and Uruguay, 
 and, finally, the secession of the State of Mendoza from 
 the Argentine Confederation. San Juan, San Luis, and 
 La Rioja provinces joined the movement, and the rising 
 threatened imminent danger to the National Government. 
 Hence General Mitre, as President of Argentina, felt 
 obliged to abandon command of the allies to go and 
 face the storm by which his administration was con- 
 fronted. He gone, the post of Commander-in-chief of 
 the allied army devolved upon Marshal Caxias. 
 
 The army now had a total effective strength of 
 35,000 men, and reinforcements of 10,000 more were 
 expected. So Marshal Caxias decided to attempt to 
 outflank the Paraguayan position at Rojas, certain 
 weakly guarded sections along the lines of the enemy's 
 trenches having been discovered. Therefore, when in 
 July, General Osorio, with reinforcements of 7000 men, 
 reached Tuyuti — his march from Candelaria having been 
 delayed by an outbreak of Asiatic cholera — Marshal 
 Caxias saw no reason to wait any longer. 
 
 He began his campaign on July 22, 1867, and a 
 
 L 
 
162 PARAGUAY 
 
 division of 6000 men was thrown forward under General 
 Osorio as a vanguard, 22,000 men under the Marshal 
 himself following. A force of 9000 men was left at 
 Tuyuti with General Porto Alegre. The advance was 
 to the east of the fortified positions at Pojas, through 
 swampy country, and the Paraguayans, abandoning 
 their trenches, marched parallel to the allies. By night- 
 fall Caxias reached the village of Pio Honda, a few 
 miles to the north of Humaita, where he cut the telegraph 
 line between that place and Asuncion. A road was 
 now opened to Tuyuti to allow transport of provisions, 
 and strong protection given to this line of communica- 
 tion. Humaita was thus cut off from the remainder of 
 Paraguay, the only other connection with Asuncion 
 being by water, and that too was to be closed by the 
 advance of the squadron. 
 
 This move of the Marshal's was the turning-point of 
 the war. For fifteen months the allies had failed to 
 push forward, but now the dangerous, if skilful, tactics 
 of the Brazilian Commander-in-chief proved successful, 
 and obliged Lopez to withdraw his outlying posts 
 towards Humaita. Marshal Caxias was quite aware of 
 the animosity that would be stirred up should he be 
 forced to abandon his advantageous position, and every 
 precaution was taken. 
 
 Meanwhile, in Matto Grosso the cause of Paraguay 
 had steadily lost ground. A fight took place between 
 two Brazilian ships and three Paraguayan, in which the 
 latter were worsted. Senhor Coelho Magalhaes, the 
 Brazilian Governor of Matto Grosso, thereupon ordered 
 his ships to Corumba and demanded its surrender. It 
 was refused, but after severe fighting the city capitulated. 
 
 General Mitre resumed command of the allies on 
 July 28, the revolutionary movement in Mendoza having 
 been suppressed, leaving the President of Argentina 
 free to take the field again. The last days of July and 
 the beginning of August passed with occasional skir- 
 mishes between detachments of the invading army and 
 scattered groups of Paraguayans, and on August 11 
 
1867] THE ADVANCE TO HUMAITA 163 
 
 some excitement was caused by an attempt to capture a 
 convoy of the allies on its way from Tuyuti. The fact 
 that the Paraguayans waited until only a small escort 
 was despatched proved them to be well informed of the 
 movements of their enemies, and in this respect they 
 showed superior organisation to the allies. A small 
 force of 400 men was sent by Lopez to intercept a 
 valuable provision train, and the Brazilian escort was 
 surprised, but some of the men escaped and gave informa- 
 tion of the disaster. General Porto Alegre immediately 
 set out with a strong force to the scene of the mishap, 
 and eventually recovered a portion of the stores. 
 
 The allies now proposed closing in upon Humaita 
 towards the south. To accomplish this the squadron 
 was ordered to ascend the river Paraguay to a position 
 near Humaita, and did so on August 15, but its position 
 was not satisfactory or free from danger. In front were 
 the guns of Humaita, and the passage was blocked by a 
 great iron chain stretching from shore to shore. In 
 rear, towards the neighbourhood of Curuzu, heavily 
 armed batteries were erected by Lopez to command the 
 river below the squadron. To force the passage at 
 Humaita was therefore no easy matter, and if any disaster 
 occurred to the army, the ships would have to run the 
 gauntlet of the guns at Curupaiti, as well as overcome 
 the formidable obstacles of recent construction near 
 Curuzu. 
 
 Difficulty of transport now hampered the allies, 
 especially in the matter of food supplies and medical 
 stores. Large deposits had been accumulated in Corrie- 
 entes, but carriage to Tuyuti and thence to the troops in 
 the field was not easy. So to increase facilities of 
 transportation every effort was made to establish 
 communication with the squadron to the south of 
 Humaita. This done, the positions of the Paraguayans 
 below that point would become untenable, and the river 
 be available for transport. Accordingly, the lines of the 
 invading army were gradually pushed westwards towards 
 the river, but progress was slow owing to the stubborn 
 
164 PARAGUAY 
 
 resistance of the Paraguayan outposts, and because a 
 large number of troops were required to the north of 
 Humaita to prevent the re-establishment of communica- 
 tion by land between Humaita and Asuncion. To 
 isolate Humaita further a force under Generals Hornos 
 and Barreto was sent to the north of the Rio Hondo to 
 occupy Villa del Pilar, which was captured on September 
 24, 1867. From this point an advance was made to 
 Tayi, a town to the south of Villa del Pilar, and this 
 was also captured after severe fighting, several batteries 
 of heavy guns being mounted at this place by General 
 Barreto to command the passage of the river, thus 
 severing communication by water between Asuncion 
 and Humaita. The Paraguayans made a desperate 
 effort to retake Tayi. On the morning of November 2, 
 three steamers and a barge conveying 3000 men appeared 
 near the town and were disembarked, but General 
 Barreto attacked this force and inflicted a severe defeat 
 upon it. 
 
 The knowledge that the allies were closing in upon 
 Humaita induced Lopez to make a strong effort. He 
 learnt that a valuable convoy escorted by three regiments 
 of cavalry and three battalions of infantry would leave 
 Tuyuti early in November, and determined to send an 
 expedition to intercept it. The Paraguayans numbered 
 6000 under General Barrios, and on the night of 
 November 2, 1867, they lay hidden near Tuyuti. Recent 
 successes had made the allies careless, and the presence 
 of the enemy was unknown until the convoy and escort 
 were suddenly attacked. Panic ensued, and the cavalry 
 and infantry regiments were cut to pieces. The Para- 
 guayans then moved forward in three columns upon 
 Tuyuti, and entered it without opposition, shooting clown 
 the troops, looting the camp, and capturing the whole 
 position before daybreak, with the exception of an 
 entrenched section in the centre. Here the remnants of 
 the allies resisted until assistance arrived. The news of 
 the disaster reached Marshal Caxias through refugees 
 who escaped from the convoy, and all available troops 
 
1868] DISASTER AT TUYUTI 165 
 
 were despatched to Tuyuti. For some hours after the 
 arrival of these reinforcements the Paraguayans con- 
 tinued the fight, but seeing themselves outnumbered 
 they finally withdrew towards Humaita. The losses to 
 the allied army in killed and wounded were 270 officers, 
 3300 men, 500 prisoners, 3 standards, 10 pieces of 
 artillery, and an immense stock of ammunition and 
 stores. On the Paraguayan side the casualties were 78 
 officers and 2271 men killed and wounded, and 151 
 prisoners. The effect of this defeat was mitigated to 
 the allies by the fact that Lopez could not follow up his 
 advantage owing to lack of troops. 
 
 Still this disaster at Tuyuti threatened to create 
 complications similar to those in Mendoza. Urquiza 
 raised the standard of revolt in Cordoba, demanding the 
 dissolution of the alliance between Argentina, Brazil, 
 and Uruguay and immediate peace negotiations with 
 Paraguay, and that revolutionary outbreak again required 
 the presence of General Mitre in Argentina. Once 
 more the chief command of the troops in the field was 
 left to Marshal Caxias, the Argentine division being in 
 charge of General Gelly y Obes. Matters in Uruguay 
 also were not satisfactory, for the Blancos hatched a 
 conspiracy there against the Administration, which 
 resulted in the assassination of General Flores. 
 
 Some weeks elapsed before the allies were able to 
 resume active hostilities, but towards the close of 1867 
 preparations were made to attack Plumaita, Curupaiti, 
 and other places. It was decided that part of the 
 squadron should force a passage past Humaita to co- 
 operate with the land forces. The vessels available for 
 action consisted of 43 ships of war, mounting 223 guns, 
 and with a total complement of 702 officers and 3779 
 men. On February 19, 1868, at 3 a.m., they steamed 
 opposite the fortifications, where they were exposed to 
 heavy fire from the batteries. The guns of the fleet 
 were concentrated upon the two barges which sustained 
 the ends of the great chain stretching across the river, 
 and so effectual was their fire, that both barges were 
 
166 PARAGUAY 
 
 sunk in a few minutes. This left the river free to 
 navigation, and the vessels steamed ahead, meeting a 
 hail of projectiles as they passed. During this firing, 
 the cable by which the Bahia was towing the 
 Alagoa parted, and thirty canoes filled with Para- 
 guayans immediately surrounded and captured her. 
 The remaining vessels reached the port of Tayi, but the 
 Para and the Tamandare were so severely damaged 
 as to be rendered unserviceable. Whilst the squadron 
 was forcing the passage of Humaita the Argentines 
 made an attack on the Paraguayan outposts on the 
 eastern side. On the south-east General Osorio also 
 advanced, while to the south General Argollo drove in 
 the enemy's picquets, and on the north Marshal Caxias, 
 with 3000 men, attacked the town of Timbo and 
 captured this place with a loss of 600 officers and men 
 killed and wounded. 
 
 After this general attack there was a lull in the 
 hostilities. The allied army had gained decided advan- 
 tages, and the cordon round Humaita had been drawn 
 much closer. Meanwhile the squadron steamed up the 
 river and reached Asuncion, the Paraguayan national 
 capital, on February 28. A few shots were fired, but 
 the bombardment ceased on the arrival of a flag of truce 
 from Senor Berges, the minister in charge of the 
 Government, with a request not to fire on an unfortified 
 city. A detachment was then landed to take possession 
 of the town, but the men were shortly afterwards 
 re-embarked, and the squadron proceeded down the river 
 to Tayi. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 Paraguay — continued 
 
 Paraguayan Attempt to Destroy Squadron. Capture of Rojas. 
 Capitulation of Curupaiti. Concentration of the Paraguayans in 
 Humaita. Bombardment of Humaita,. Attempt to Seize the 
 Monitor Rio Grande. Assault on Humaita. Passage of Humaita 
 again Forced. Evacuation of Humaita. Attack on the Allies. 
 Booty in Humaita. Asuncion the Objective Point. Humaita 
 the Base of Supplies. Paraguayans abandon Riverside Towns. 
 The Allied Army leaves Villa del Pilar. Passage of the river 
 Tibicuan. Paraguayans fall Back. Conditions at Tibicuari. 
 Victims of Lopez. Paraguayans in Force near the river Carabe. 
 Passage of the river Paraguay. Plan of Campaign. Attack 
 upon Villeta. Renewal of Hostilities. Capture of Villeta. 
 
 For Lopez the situation was now gloomy enough, but 
 the Dictator of Paraguay was full of resources, and 
 forthwith conceived a plan for the destruction of the 
 portion of the allied fleet lying below Humaita. In the 
 rivers Paraguay and Parana masses of verdure float 
 with the current. These camalotes, or floating islands, 
 usually excite little attention, and Lopez formed the 
 idea of lashing canoes in batches of four and covering 
 them with similar herbage. By embarking armed men 
 in these canoes and floating them down the river 
 amongst the" allied fleet, they might be able, when they 
 reached the vessels, to board the ships and kill every- 
 body offering resistance. On the night of March 1, 
 1868, this extraordinary plan was put into execution, 
 and at break of day the first of these batches of canoes 
 was abreast of the cruiser Lima when a guard boat 
 
 1G7 
 
168 PARAGUAY 
 
 stationed a hundred yards off became suspicious and 
 gave the alarm. The Paraguayans nevertheless boarded 
 the Lima and killed a number of the men on deck, but 
 the crew rallied after the first onslaught and regained 
 possession of the vessel. The other ships of the fleet, 
 now on the alert, opened fire on the camalotes as the}' 
 drifted along, and few of the 1000 men in the canoes 
 escaped death. 
 
 Soon after this abortive attempt against the allied 
 fleet, the weak points of the Paraguayan defence became 
 more apparent. The remaining positions in the " Lines 
 of Rojas" were captured by General Argollo, and all 
 resistance in this district ceased. A few days later 
 Curupaiti capitulated. This allowed a closer investment 
 of Humaita, and the allies advanced their entrenched 
 positions from the south, but this entailed severe fight- 
 ing with the Paraguayan outposts, and 200 officers and 
 men were killed and wounded. 
 
 On March 22, 1868, the Paraguayan detachments to 
 the south and east of Humaita concentrated inside the 
 fortifications, setting fire to the different camps they 
 evacuated. The allied army immediately invested the 
 stronghold. Humaita was considered impregnable by 
 the Paraguayans. Its parapets were of earth surrounded 
 by ditches 15 feet deep and 10 feet wide, filled with 
 water, and the approaches were commanded by 300 
 guns. The iron chain across the river had been replaced, 
 and at each end formidable batteries established. So, 
 after withdrawing all outposts and issuing instructions 
 for the defence, Lopez left for Tibicuari to construct 
 another stronghold in that locality. 
 
 In the beginning of April a steady bombardment of 
 Humaita was commenced by the allies, and continued 
 with little intermission for three months. At first the 
 Paraguayans returned the fire, but after a few weeks their 
 supply of powder ran short. Occasional sorties, how- 
 ever, were made by the garrison, and, although unable 
 to affect the position of the allied troops, considerable 
 losses were inflicted. To shut off means of communica- 
 
1868] INVESTMENT OF HUMAITA 169 
 
 tion between Humaita and the north, a division of 3500 
 men of the allied army under General Ignacio Rivas 
 was disembarked on the right bank of the river Paraguay 
 to occupy the country between the town of Timbo and 
 Humaita. A small column despatched to join General 
 Rivas in May was surprised and cut to pieces by a 
 Paraguayan force. In July the Paraguayans made an 
 attempt to seize the monitor Rio Grande by again 
 resorting to the device of embarking in canoes disguised 
 as floating islands, and on this occasion they succeeded 
 in reaching the vessel undiscovered, and wrought no 
 small havoc amongst the crew before the other ships 
 came to the rescue and drove them into the water. 
 
 Marshal Caxias, becoming impatient, now determined 
 to make an attempt to carry Humaita by assault. General 
 Osorio was directed to detach 10 battalions of infantry 
 and storm the section known as the Londres battery. 
 He reached the parapets of the fort on July 15, but was 
 driven back with heavy loss. The effort was repeated, 
 but only to meet a similar fate. Osorio then despatched 
 messengers to Marshal Caxias, asking for reinforcements, 
 but was ordered to retire. A few days later another 
 engagement occurred in which the allies suffered severely. 
 Five battalions of infantry were en route from the head- 
 quarter camp to join General Rivas, then near Timbo, 
 when a sudden attack was made by the Paraguayans. 
 The allies were thrown into confusion and the casualties 
 .were heavy. Fortunately a detachment sent out by 
 General Rivas arrived in time to render assistance, but 
 the total losses of killed and wounded in this fight were 
 500. 
 
 On July 21, 1868, Marshal Caxias ordered the passage 
 of the river Paraguay in front of Humaita again to be 
 forced. The purpose was to search the river for three 
 Paraguayan ships, and three vessels successfully carried 
 out the movement without suffering serious damage. 
 No sign of the hostile ships could be discovered, but 
 the moral effect of again forcing the passage of the 
 river was not without value. Five days later some 
 
170 PARAGUAY 
 
 further skirmishing occurred, but it was evident from 
 the lessening energy shown by the garrison that the 
 defence of Humaita was weakening. 
 
 Its collapse, indeed, was closer than the allies 
 imagined, for during the night of July 26, the Para- 
 guayans evacuated the town, using canoes to cross to 
 the right bank of the Paraguay, where heavy forest 
 concealed their presence. Next morning, the advanced 
 picquets of the besieging army reported that positions 
 usually occupied by sentries on the fortifications were 
 deserted, and Marshal Caxias ordered the troops to be 
 formed up in readiness for a general assault. The 
 allies did not believe the evacuation was an accomplished 
 fact, and every precaution was taken against surprise, 
 but no resistance was offered. Humaita was aban- 
 doned, the few remaining inhabitants disappearing into 
 the forest to the north with the entrance of the allies 
 into the town. More than two years had passed since 
 the allied army had crossed the river Parana, and all 
 progress had been checked by the stand at this place 
 in combination with its auxiliary positions at Pojas and 
 Curupaiti. 
 
 But the occupation of Humaita did not prove to be 
 the end of the fighting in this neighbourhood, for on 
 the night of August 2, the left wing of the allies was 
 unsuccessfully attacked in order to clear a way for 
 some canoes laden with provisions. In the swamps, 
 moreover, to the north of Humaita the effort of the 
 allied forces to capture the Paraguayans led to sanguin- 
 ary encounters, and General Pivas, to avoid further loss 
 of life, sent a flag of truce to the senior Paraguayan 
 officer proposing terms of surrender, but they were 
 refused. A bombardment of the forest where the 
 Paraguayans were concealed was ordered, and resulted 
 in 1000 of the enemy being killed or wounded. On 
 August 4 another flag of truce was sent to the Para- 
 guayans, and two days later the capitulation was 
 arranged, officers being permitted to retain their arms, 
 and all ranks allowed to reside in the territories of 
 
1868] OCCUPATION OF HUMAITA 171 
 
 the allies, except in the Argentine provinces of Corrientes 
 and Entre Eios. The total number of persons who 
 surrendered was 1230, many of them women and children. 
 When Humaita was evacuated, the total had been 3730. 
 Nearly 1000 had been killed or died of wounds, and 
 1500 had escaped by swimming the river. 
 
 Little was found in Humaita beyond a small stock 
 of provisions and some ammunition. About two hundred 
 pieces of artillery, all rendered useless for service, were 
 left in the fortifications, and sixty guns were extracted 
 subsequently from the river bottom. The great chain 
 was cut into three lengths and delivered to the Govern- 
 ments of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. In accordance 
 with the terms of the treaty of alliance the fortifications 
 of Humaita were razed to the ground. The allies 
 considered that once Humaita fell the end of the war 
 was in sight, but Marshal Caxias differed from this 
 opinion and insisted that the campaign was not nearly 
 over. It was, however, only in the face of strong 
 opposition in Buenos Aires and Brazil that the war 
 was continued and the necessary expenditure for the 
 army provided. Reconnaissance by the squadron dis- 
 pelled all doubts as to the real situation. The popula- 
 tion, undismayed by their misfortunes, were determined 
 to continue the struggle, and all proposals for the 
 establishment of a liberal form of government under 
 representative administration were rejected. Whether 
 love of country or dread of Lopez was the motive of 
 this attitude of the Paraguayans has not been explained, 
 but for the one reason or the other the population was 
 fanatical in its determination to prolong the war. 
 
 Consequently, the only course open to the allies was 
 to push on towards the north, with Asuncion as the 
 objective point, it being the general opinion that the 
 occupation of the national capital would be accepted 
 by the Paraguayans as the signal for surrender. With 
 the squadron in control on the river, this advance pre- 
 sented no very formidable difficulties, and the base of 
 supplies was changed from Corrientes to Humaita. An 
 
172 PARAGUAY 
 
 arsenal for naval purposes was constructed at Tayi, and 
 the main body of the army was concentrated at Villa 
 del Pilar in the middle of August, 1868. 
 
 In view of the fact that Asuncion and other un- 
 defended towns were at the mercy of the invaders, 
 Lopez ordered the population on the river banks to 
 abandon their houses and retire to the interior, and 
 so great was his power that the Paraguayans obeyed 
 this mandate without question, although it meant total 
 ruin to them. To some extent Lopez was influenced 
 by the belief that the allies would hesitate to proceed 
 inland on account of difficulty of transport when separ- 
 ated from the squadron. Another reason was that he 
 required every available person to aid in the construction 
 of the lines of defence he had planned. All the male 
 population were enrolled already in the ranks, and re- 
 course was necessary to the women and children for 
 digging entrenchments, and as carriers for transporting 
 ammunition and stores. 
 
 On August 26, 1868, the allies marched from Villa 
 del Pilar in a northerly direction, keeping in touch with 
 the river Paraguay. The total number of troops was 
 31,000. Marshal Caxias was Commander-in-chief, 
 General Osorio in command of the vanguard, and General 
 de Bettancourt of the rearguard. A garrison of 2000 
 men was left at Humaita. The forward movement met 
 with no resistance for the first two days. The rivers of 
 Njembuca and Montuoso were passed, and it was not 
 until arrival at the river Yacare that any sign of the 
 enemy was visible. At this point a small fort formed 
 the advanced post of the Paraguayan position on the 
 river Tibicuari, but on the approach of the allies the 
 garrison retired after firing a few shots, and the river 
 Tacuari was reached on the 28th. On the northern side 
 of this river the allies found a redoubt for the protection 
 of the right wing of the Paraguayan defence. Flanking 
 this were trenches, and here 13,000 men had been con- 
 centrated by Lopez. Marshal Caxias expected to meet 
 with a determined resistance, and decided to make a 
 
1868] LOPEZ RETIKES TO VILLETA 173 
 
 general assault. The artillery prepared the way for the 
 attack, and a heavy bombardment was commenced, but 
 met with small response from the Paraguayans, so the 
 troops moved forward to storm the position, and occupied 
 the redoubt without difficulty. 
 
 On September 1 the Paraguayans made a feint of 
 attacking the allies, but retired without any serious 
 engagement, and Marshal Caxias directed a general 
 advance on the Paraguayan defences, whose lines were 
 captured. From these the allies pushed forward to the 
 main camp of the Paraguayan forces and found it 
 deserted. Lopez had fallen back on strong positions at 
 Angostura and Villeta. 
 
 Explanation of the reason for the abandonment of 
 the trenches at Tibicuari without a struggle was found 
 in the camp. Dead and dying bodies strewed the centre. 
 Some had died of bullet wounds, others from throat 
 cutting ; lance and bayonet thrusts had caused death in 
 many cases, and the groans of the mortally wounded 
 added ghastly effect to the scene. A real or imaginary 
 plot against the life of Lopez had, it seemed, been dis- 
 covered, and he had wreaked a summary and terrible 
 vengeance upon all persons he suspected of implication 
 in this conspiracy. Amongst the victims were Senor 
 Carreras, formerly Minister to Uruguay, and who signed 
 the treaty in 1864 between Lopez and President Aguirre ; 
 Senor Berges, the Minister of Foreign Affairs ; Bishop 
 Palacios ; the Portuguese Consul, Senor Leite Pereira ; 
 Colonel Alen ; Captain Fidanza ; the mother and wife 
 of Colonel Martinez ; Senor Benigno Lopez, brother of 
 the Dictator ; General Barrios, his brother-in-law ; and 
 the priest Borgado. In addition to these well-known 
 people were several merchants, some prisoners of war, 
 and many Paraguayans serving in the army. It was a 
 massacre of most ferocious character which stamped 
 Lopez as a bloodthirsty tyrant unworthy of the slightest 
 sympathy. He was a patriot ; he became an assassin. 
 During the years of warfare against the allies many 
 instances of his severe methods had come to light, and 
 
174 PAEAGUAY 
 
 it was known that the penalty of death was enforced for 
 trifling offences ; but such acts had been condoned in 
 view of the necessity for discipline, essential in the 
 management of large bodies of troops engaged in a 
 desperate struggle against overwhelming odds. For 
 this wholesale massacre no excuse can be found, and 
 from this time forth public opinion in Argentina, Brazil, 
 and Uruguay declined to accept any solution for the 
 termination of the war that did not include the death 
 of the Dictator. 
 
 After a few days at Tibicuari, the allies marched 
 towards Asuncion, where Marshal Caxias and his prin- 
 cipal advisers thought small resistance would be offered. 
 This proved entirely erroneous. On the arrival of the 
 army at the river Canabe, the enemy was discovered in 
 force in strong positions near Angostura and Villeta. 
 Two weeks were devoted to reconnoitring these defences, 
 and the information obtained convinced Marshal Caxias 
 that the task of driving the Paraguayans from the 
 neighbourhood would be no easy one. 
 
 The towns of Villeta and Angostura were situated 
 on the left bank of the river Paraguay. Both had been 
 fortified by Lopez and were defended by artillery. The 
 headquarter camp of the Paraguayans was to the south 
 of Villeta, and 35 miles distant from Asuncion. Protect- 
 ing the camp was the fortified position of Angostura, with 
 similar characteristics to Humaita, and to the east of 
 these positions was the ridge of hills known as the 
 "Lomas Valentinas," covered with heavy forest. In 
 front of Angostura and this range of hills was the river 
 Canabe, the shores of the stream spreading out into 
 extensive swamps. Through the eastern section ran the 
 railway uniting Asuncion with Cerro-Leon and Villa 
 Rica. On the north were a series of small rivers and 
 large swamps, making any attack difficult. 
 
 The strength of the Paraguayan position was un- 
 expectedly exhibited on September 23, by a skirmish 
 near the river Canabe, where a dam had been formed to 
 flood the approaches to the trenches in front of Angos- 
 
1868] HEAVY FIGHTING ON THE CANABE 175 
 
 tura. Here the allies met with strong opposition, and 
 when reinforcements came were subjected to heavy 
 artillery fire and compelled to retire. Marshal Caxias 
 then ordered the squadron to force the passage of the 
 river past the fortifications, the army at the same time 
 advancing to attack the Paraguayans by land. Seven 
 ships succeeded in passing the Paraguayan position, 
 but not without a long list of casualties and some serious 
 injuries to the vessels. Simultaneously Marshal Caxias, 
 at the head of 20,000 men, assaulted the Paraguayan 
 trenches, but met with most stubborn resistance. At 
 one period of the fight the Paraguayans showed signs 
 of giving way, and the allies seized some of the outer 
 trenches. The Paraguayan artillery fire, however, 
 became so severe, that the attacking force was repulsed 
 with heavy loss. At the close of the day's fighting, and 
 in view of the serious nature of the situation, Marshal 
 Caxias summoned a council of war, at which it was 
 decided that General Argollo, with 2000 men, should 
 cross the river Paraguay, open a road northwards to 
 Santa Helena, and remain there under the protection of 
 the squadron. When the road was reported open troops 
 were to be sent forward and the combined forces were 
 to cross the river in the Paraguayan rear near Villeta, 
 at the same time cutting communication between Lopez 
 and Asuncion. General Argollo left on October 10, to 
 carry out the first part of this plan. 
 
 Lopez was well informed, and did not long remain in 
 ignorance of the tactics of Marshal Caxias. Under- 
 standing the difficulties in the way of the expedition to 
 Santa Helena, he was satisfied to send isolated groups 
 to act as guerillas and interfere with the construction of 
 the road by firing on the working parties. The broken 
 nature of the country served to protect these small 
 parties from danger of capture. It was a land inter- 
 spersed with swamps and divided by tributaries of the 
 river Paraguay, where the thick undergrowth had to be 
 chopped away before the column could advance. The 
 tropical nature of the climate was adverse to severe 
 
176 PARAGUAY 
 
 physical strain. Taking these factors into consideration, 
 Lopez was convinced that the expedition would be 
 months before arriving at its destination, but the Dictator 
 in his turn was wrong. To his astonishment he learned 
 at the beginning of December, that the road to Santa 
 Helena was open. He was informed also that Marshal 
 Caxias, with 2000 men, was to join Argollo at Santa 
 Helena, and that General da Silva would arrive shortly 
 at that place with 8000 troops. In the first week in 
 December this force of 12,000 men was concentrated 
 near San Antonio and ready to attack the Paraguayans 
 at Villeta. 
 
 The advance from San Antonio to Villeta necessi- 
 tated the crossing of the river Itaroro, and the possession 
 of the bridge over this waterway was essential. Aware 
 of its importance, Lopez detached fourteen battalions of 
 infantry for its defence. On December 6, 1868, the 
 allies attacked. Marshal Caxias advanced towards the 
 bridge, while General Gelly y Obes assaulted the trenches 
 at Angostura, and General Osorio led his division 
 against the fortified lines near the river Canabe. The 
 attack by Marshal Caxias was energetically carried out, 
 and the enemy compelled to retire before they destroyed 
 the bridge, so that the troops were able to cross safely 
 after severe fighting. To the south General Gelly y Obes 
 occupied the outer lines of Angostura. General Osorio 
 met with obstinate resistance near the river Canabe, but 
 captured the outlying positions of the Paraguayans. 
 When night fell the advantage to the north and south 
 lay with the allies, whose intention was to reopen 
 hostilities next morning at daybreak, but heavy rains 
 prevented fighting for several days. 
 
 Not until December 11 did the weather allow a 
 renewal of the operations, and then the Paraguayans in 
 all directions offered determined resistance to the 
 advance of the allies. Marshal Caxias on the north, 
 and General Gelly y Obes and General Osorio in the 
 south, made every effort, and the losses in killed and 
 wounded on both sides were heavy. But as the day 
 
1868] OPERATIONS RETARDED 17? 
 
 wore away the attack from the north gained ground 
 steadily, and before darkness set in Marshal Caxias was 
 in possession of Villeta, the Paraguayans leaving twenty- 
 three guns, eleven standards, and a quantity of stores. In 
 spite, however, of repeated assaults on the positions at 
 the river Canabe and Angostura, these remained under 
 control of the Paraguayans. As evidence of the severity 
 of this action, the allies lost 3000 officers and men killed 
 or wounded. Amongst the injured were Marshal Caxias, 
 General Osorio, and General Argollo. The Paraguayan 
 loss was equally heavy, General Caraballo being severely 
 wounded. Next morning opened with torrential rains 
 which continued for seven or eight days, and rendered it 
 impossible to resume hostilities, so that it was not until 
 the 20th that the allies were able to follow up the 
 advantages gained in the fighting on the 6th and 11th. 
 
 M 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 Paraguay — continued 
 
 Resumption of Hostilities on December 20. Work of Allied Cavaliy. 
 Paraguayan Camp in the Valentine Hills. Action of December 
 27. Defeat of the Paraguayans. Surrender of Angostura. 
 Occupation of Asuncion. Disorderly Conduct of the Allied 
 Troops. Delay in Operations. Mission of Senhor Parunhos. 
 Provisional Government at Asuncion. A new National Capital. 
 Concentration at Oscurra. Engagement at the river Manduvira. 
 Arrival of the Conde d'Eu. Military Reorganisation. Opera- 
 tions against Lopez in July, 1869. Fight at Sapucay. Attack 
 on Peribebuy. Lopez evacuates Oscurra. Plan of Campaign 
 
 of Conde d'Eu. Retreat of Lopez to Caraguatay. Engagement 
 at Yagari. Action at Campo Grande. Lopez seeks Refuge in 
 the Forests. Pai-aguayan Encampment near the Aquidaban. 
 Colonel Silva Tavares and Major Oliveira. Death of Lopez. 
 Madame Lynch. Treaty of Peace. Withdrawal of Argentine 
 and Uruguayan Troops. Election of President Rivarola. 
 Political Representation under the Constitution of 1870. Diffi- 
 culties of President Rivarola. Vice-President Salvador Jovellanos. 
 Assassination of Rivarola. Election of President Gill. Brazilian 
 Policy in Paraguay. Assassination of President Gill. Sehor 
 Uriarte. Election of President Baredo. Death of the President. 
 Vice-President Saguier. Revolution in 1881. Saguier Deposed. 
 General Caballero named Provisional President. General 
 Caballero elected President. Election of President Escobar. 
 Condition of Country. Election of President Gonzalez. 
 Attempts at Reform. Deposition of President Gonzalez. Vice- 
 President Morinigo takes Office. Election of President Egusquiza. 
 Rupture with Uruguay. Election of President Aceval. Oligarchy 
 in Control. Political Rights. Economic Conditions after 1870. 
 Natural Causes and Reaction. Idleness of Male Population. 
 Improvement in General Conditions. Population during Thirty 
 Years. Immigration. Australian Socialistic Colony. Sicilian 
 Colonisation. Educational System. 
 
 The situation of the allied army after the severe 
 fighting in December was unsatisfactory because the 
 
1868] HOSTILITIES RESUMED 179 
 
 forces to the north and south of the Paraguayan position 
 had failed to effect a junction, owing to the fact that 
 lines of the enemy extended from the river Paraguay to 
 the Valentine ranges, and so divided the army of invasion 
 that communication was difficult. So Marshal Caxias 
 again called a council of war, which was followed by an 
 order to General Gelly y Obes to despatch to the north 
 such reinforcements as could be spared, and to draw 
 upon Humaita for fresh troops. In the opinion of 
 Marshal Caxias, the positions at Angostura and the 
 Lomas Valentinas were the last entrenchments Lopez 
 had constructed to resist the advance. -If these were 
 captured the Paraguayan Dictator would make terms, 
 and with this end in view the Commander-in-chief 
 issued instructions for all available forces to be brought 
 into action when hostilities were resumed. 
 
 They were resumed on December 20, when a move- 
 ment from the north was begun against the positions in 
 the Lomas Valentinas, with the object of cutting com- 
 munication between that point and Angostura. From 
 the south the attack was on the entrenchments at the 
 river Canabe to break through the line and join Marshal 
 Caxias. The first advantages gained were slight, but 
 encouraging, and on the 21st Marshal Caxias pressed 
 forward towards the Valentine range, General Menna 
 JBarreto attacking the trenches of Canabe, where 
 important progress was made. Barreto ordered a feint 
 against both flanks of the Paraguayan position, and the 
 enemy detached all available men to strengthen the 
 defence at these points, leaving the centre of the line 
 weakly held. Barreto now ordered his main body to 
 advance, and the Paraguayan centre was stormed with 
 comparatively small loss. Resistance broke down com- 
 pletely after this, and Barreto was able to effect a 
 junction with Marshal Caxias. 
 
 Meanwhile valuable work was accomplished by the 
 cavalry under the Marshal. The broken country to the 
 east of Angostura had been thoroughly reconnoitred, 
 and it was discovered that the Paraguayan position con- 
 
180 PAKAGUAY 
 
 sisted of an entrenched encampment with 50 guns, in 
 which the entire population of Asuncion was concen- 
 trated. It was a formidable obstacle to face, and Caxias 
 determined to delay the attack until all available troops 
 could be collected. At daybreak on December 27, the 
 allied artillery opened upon this camp, whose guns 
 replied energetically, but parts of it, where wooden 
 and straw buildings stood, were soon in flames, and 
 presently the ammunition of the Paraguayans began to 
 run short. A general assault was therefore delivered 
 at midday, three columns attacking simultaneously. It 
 met with stubborn resistance at first, but that did not 
 last, and the Paraguayans gradually fell back into the 
 forests at the rear, where they disappeared in the thick 
 undergrowth. The casualties amongst the allied forces 
 were 1000 officers and men killed or wounded, and the 
 Paraguayan loss was heavy, but not accurately known. 
 
 There now remained only the fortifications at 
 Angostura to be reckoned with to leave the way free to 
 Asuncion, but before attempting their assault Marshal 
 Caxias sent a flag of truce with terms for the capitula- 
 tion of the garrison. These were that the troops in 
 Angostura should surrender with all the honours of 
 war. In case of refusal a threat was made that the 
 place would be assaulted and every officer shot. The 
 commandant, Major Lucas Carrillo, asked for time to 
 consider the proposal, which was granted ; and the 
 Paraguayans determined to accej)t the proffered terms, 
 marching out with flags flying and drums beating on 
 December 30. Officers were allowed absolute liberty 
 after taking oath not to bear arms again against the 
 allies. A promise was also made by Marshal Caxias 
 to them that they should be given commissions in 
 the military service of Paraguay when the army was 
 reorganised under the direction of the allies. 
 
 Next day General Juan da Souza da Fonseca-Costa 
 embarked with 1700 Brazilian troops in San Antonio, 
 and arrived at Asuncion the same evening, occupying 
 the city. The remainder of the army marched north- 
 
1869] OCCUPATION OF ASUNCION 181 
 
 wards under Marshal Caxias, and reached the same 
 place two days later; but before adequate police 
 measures were adopted many outrages were committed 
 by the soldiers. Houses were pillaged and stores looted. 
 The foreign consuls were compelled to lodge a formal 
 protest against this lawless condition of affairs, but 
 order was at length established. 
 
 Further operations against Lopez were impracticable 
 immediately after the occupation of Asuncion. The 
 troops, greatly reduced in numbers by heavy mortality 
 from wounds and sickness, were worn out with fatigue ; 
 and Marshal Caxias, tired with the long strain of the 
 previous year, and not yet convalescent from the injury 
 received in the attack upon Villeta, resigned command 
 of the army. Admiral Ignacio (Conde de Inhauma) was 
 also prostrated with illness, and died on his return 
 journey to Brazil. General de Souza, who was left in 
 command, after a careful consideration of the situation, 
 decided to make no attempt to follow Lopez pending 
 the arrival of the Conde d'Eu, who had recently been 
 appointed to replace Marshal Caxias. 
 
 During this cessation of hostilities a special repre- 
 sentative of Brazil, Senhor Parunhos, arrived in 
 Asuncion, with orders to inform his Government as to 
 existing conditions, and organise a Provisional Adminis- 
 tration. The latter task was difficult, for no civilians 
 could be induced to fill official posts. In this dilemma, 
 Senhor Parunhos decided to appoint officers from the 
 Paraguayan Legion. These officers obtained a certain 
 number of signatures to a petition praying for permis- 
 sion to elect a Provisional Government and carry on 
 the war against Lopez underthe Paraguayan national 
 flag. The three principal signatories were Jose Diaz 
 Bedoya, Bernardo Valiente, and D. F. Egusquiza. A 
 conference was held and attended by Senhor Parunhos, 
 representing Brazil, Senor Varela for Argentina, and 
 Senor Rodriguez as delegate of Uruguay. On behalf of 
 their respective Governments they signed a treaty giving 
 the right of free election to all Paraguayans residing 
 
182 PARAGUAY 
 
 in the liberated portions of the country, with power to 
 constitute a Provisional Government. The Adminis- 
 tration was to be independent so far as political and 
 administrative affairs were concerned, but subject to the 
 orders of the Commander-in-chief of the allies in military 
 matters until the death or expulsion of Lopez from 
 Paraguay. Under these provisions a Provisional Govern- 
 ment was formed. 
 
 The lull in hostilities gave Lopez time to reorganise 
 his defence, and he proclaimed a new national capital 
 at Peribebuy. From the war material remaining at 
 Cerro-Leon and Villa Rica all available ammunition and 
 stores were withdrawn to Oscurra, and new guns were 
 cast. The position selected for the next stand was 
 strengthened by carefully constructed entrenchments. 
 While this work was proceeding no opportunity was 
 lost to inflict damage upon the allies. Detachments of 
 cavalry and infantry intercepted convoys and recon- 
 noitring parties. General da Souza contented himself 
 with reinforcing such of the garrisons as were most 
 exposed to attack. He also despatched a squadron to 
 explore the river Manduvira, as Paraguayan vessels 
 had been reported lurking in that vicinity. The squadron 
 ascended the river without knowledge of the local con- 
 ditions of navigation, and found that it spread out into 
 a lagoon, from all sides of which fire was opened. 
 The ships attempted to retire, but the passage was 
 blocked. After a desperate struggle, however, they 
 succeeded in clearing away the obstruction and reached 
 the Paraguay. By land and sea Lopez thus gave evi- 
 dence of his intention to continue the struggle. 
 
 On April 16, 1869, the Conde d'Eu "arrived at 
 Asuncion to take command of the army. The military 
 establishment needed reorganisation, and the following 
 three months were occupied in necessary preparations 
 before the troops could take the field. At the end of 
 July arrangements were so far completed that the Conde 
 d'Eu decided to begin another campaign against Lopez. 
 The railway line running from Asuncion to Cerro-Leon 
 
1869] ATTACK ON PERIBEBUY 183 
 
 and Villa Rica was made the base of operations on 
 account of facilities for transport. On July 28 the 
 vanguard under General Menna Barreto set out and 
 reached Paraguari, a town ten miles to the south of 
 Oscurra, without meeting resistance ; and on August 1 
 the first and second divisions of the army under 
 Generals Osorio and Polidoro moved to the front. Two 
 days later the main body under the Conde d'Eu followed. 
 A long flanking movement was necessary to the south- 
 east to round the ridge of hills protecting Oscurra and 
 the new capital of Peribebuy. The route was first to 
 Sapucay, thence to Costa-Pocii and Valenzuela, and 
 from the latter point to Peribebuy. At Sapucay a stand 
 was made by a few Paraguayans, but they were com- 
 pelled to retreat. Between August 7 and 10 the town 
 of Valenzuela was occupied, the inhabitants deserting 
 the place, and Peribebuy sighted. It was protected by 
 entrenchments ; a deep fosse ran round the fortifications, 
 and every sign was visible that a determined stand 
 would be made. The defences, however, were badly 
 located. Surrounding hills offered excellent positions for 
 artillery, and the allies placed six batteries there during 
 the night, intending to open fire upon Peribebuy at 
 daybreak next morning ; but a delay was caused by a 
 small detachment sent out on reconnaissance being 
 surrounded and requiring the despatch of a body of 
 troops for its relief. 
 
 The action began at 4 a.m. on the 12th, by a con- 
 centration of artillery fire on the trenches and paraioets. 
 In spite of heavy losses the Paraguayans did not waver, 
 and their guns were well served. For four hours the 
 bombardment continued, the fire of the enemy slacken- 
 ing and finally dying away as the superior artillery force 
 of the assailants told. At 8 a.m. the order was given for 
 a general assault, and the artillery of the allies continued 
 to play upon the Paraguayan trenches until the advance 
 of the infantry made further firing dangerous. In spite 
 of most determined resistance the fortifications were 
 carried, and the allied cavalry thrown forward and 
 
184 PARAGUAY 
 
 charging through the camp completed the victory. The 
 garrison made no effort to escape. There were but 1800 
 of them, and of these 730 were killed, 600 wounded, 
 and 400 taken prisoners. Women and children had 
 joined in the attempt to repel the attack, and boys of 
 eight and ten years of age were captured with guns in 
 their hands. The casualties amongst the allied forces 
 were 550 officers and men killed or wounded, and 
 amongst the dead was General Menna Barreto. 
 
 When the news of the capture of Peribebuy reached 
 Lopez he decided on the evacuation of Oscurra and 
 Caacupe. The Concle d'Eu with the main body of the 
 army moved forward towards Oscurra and Caacupe 
 after the victory at Peribebuy, but the bad state of the 
 roads delayed his arrival until August 15, when he found 
 both towns deserted except by the wounded and some 
 women and children. These peoj)le were in a deplorable 
 state, and had neither food nor clothing. In Caacupe 
 some war material was found, Lopez not having had 
 time to arrange for its transport in his hasty preparations 
 for the evacuation. 
 
 The plan of operations for this attack upon Lopez 
 had been skilfully conceived, and if it had met with no 
 contretemps would have concluded the war. Unfortun- 
 ately, one section of the allied army failed in its duties. 
 The Conde d'Eu had instructed General Jose da Silva 
 to march from Asuncion to the ranges of hills lying to 
 the north of Oscurra simultaneously with the advance 
 of the main body from Sapucay towards Peribebuy, but 
 owing to a miscalculation of distance and conditions 
 he did not arrive at his destination until the 19th. By 
 then Lopez had effected his retreat into the mountain 
 ranges, where he imposed making another stand, 
 choosing the neighbourhood near Caraguatay. 
 
 The Conde d'Eu lost no time in pursuing, and on 
 August 16 came in contact with the rearguard of the 
 enemy near the river Yagari. Here the Paraguayans, 
 to the number of 6000, attempted to stop the advance 
 of the allies. Lopez spread his forces to cover a long 
 
1870] PURSUIT OF LOPEZ 185 
 
 extension of the north bank of the river, and for a time 
 held his own. At length the Conde d'Eu ordered a 
 flanking movement on the enemy's right, which was 
 successful. Once over the river this division moved 
 down on the Paraguayans and opened a heavy artillery 
 fire, followed by an infantry attack, before which the 
 foe retreated, leaving 1000 men killed or wounded. 
 The allies captured 700 prisoners and 21 guns. In 
 the allied army the losses were 600 killed and wounded. 
 
 But the road to Caraguatay was not yet clear, the 
 Paraguayans taking up another defensive position near 
 Campo Grande. Here 2000 men with 12 guns again 
 endeavoured to stay the advance, but were surprised on 
 the morning of the 18th, and beaten, the allies capturing 
 the guns and many prisoners. After this defeat Lopez 
 retired to the forest districts to the north, from there 
 waging a guerilla warfare. 
 
 For several months now the work of the allies was 
 to keep the country patrolled by small detachments 
 to prevent any concentration of the enemy, the opening 
 of 1870 finding Lopez still at large. In February, in- 
 formation was obtained that Lopez was encamped near 
 a small river called the Aquidaban. With him was his 
 mistress, Madame Lynch, his four sons, and a force 
 of 400 men. In all his misfortunes Madame Lynch 
 was his constant companion, and she was faithful to him 
 in this last phase of his stormy career. Troops were 
 despatched to attack the position Lopez now held, and 
 arrived near the Paraguayan encampment at the end 
 of February. To obtain accurate information as to the 
 defences, two officers, Colonel Silva Tavares and Major 
 Oliveira, determined to approach the lines without 
 escort. They set out on the morning of March 1, 1870, 
 and successfully eluding the Paraguayan outposts, 
 reached the confines of the camp. The enemy suddenly 
 discovered their presence, and imagining the allies were 
 upon them, fled, panic-stricken, without attempting to 
 ascertain the true state of affairs. Meanwhile the 
 attacking force, becoming uneasy at the long absence 
 
186 PARAGUAY 
 
 of the officers, had advanced and reached the camp 
 when the panic was at its height. In the confusion 
 Lopez, his Minister Caminos, and General Rasquin 
 mounted their horses to escape to the forest. The 
 broken ground prevented fast travelling, and enabled 
 the assaulting force to make a dash to cut off the 
 retreat of the three men. Caminos was killed by a bullet, 
 and General Rasquin was surrounded, and surrendered 
 after a promise that his life should be spared. Lopez 
 made a desperate effort for safety by forcing his horse into 
 the swamp formed by the Aquidaban, but the animal 
 could make no headway in the soft mud. The Dictator 
 was summoned to surrender by a corporal. His reply 
 was a revolver shot. Then a lance- thrust caused him 
 to fall from his horse, and he died a few minutes later. 
 The body was given Christian burial. 
 
 Madame Lynch, the mistress of Lopez, attempted to 
 escape with her eldest son Sancho in a carriage, but the 
 conveyance was detained by a Brazilian officer, whom 
 Sancho shot at and severely wounded. Then a soldier 
 made a thrust at Sancho with a lance and mortally 
 wounded him. Madame Lynch was conducted to the 
 senior officer on the field, General Jose da Camara, and 
 courteously treated until set at liberty a few weeks later. 
 Shortly afterwards she set sail for Europe, and lived for 
 some years in Paris. 
 
 With the death of Lopez the war was ended, and in 
 July, 1870, a treaty of peace was signed with the 
 Provisional Government. Argentina and Uruguay 
 immediately withdrew their troops. Brazil largely re- 
 duced the strength of her forces, but retained an army 
 corps of 14,000 men to ensure order. A portion of the 
 Brazilian squadron was kept also on the river Paraguay 
 to facilitate communication between Asuncion and Rio 
 de Janeiro. A law of constitution had been drawn up 
 by the Provisional Government in 1869, and in accord- 
 ance with it Senor Rivarola was declared President of 
 the Republic in August, 1870. 
 
 The struggle had lasted five years. On the one side 
 
1871] AFTEE THE WAR 187 
 
 was the influence of Lopez, with sufficient power to induce 
 the population of Paraguay to sacrifice their lives for his 
 cause, and on the other, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay- 
 faced terrible difficulties to reduce to submission a man 
 regarded as a common enemy. They only accomplished 
 their purpose after a conflict involving a vast expenditure 
 in blood and treasure. How frightful the war was for 
 the Paraguayans may be judged from the fact that in 
 1863 the population was 1,337,489. In 1871 the returns 
 showed only 221,079 persons resident in the Republic. 
 This attenuated population comprised 28,746 men, 
 106,254 women, and 86,079 children. The adult males 
 were those who from infirmity or weight of years had 
 been incapable of bearing arms. In other words, the 
 whole able-bodied male population had been sacrificed. 
 In the latter part of the struggle women had been utilised 
 as beasts of burthen, and when no longer available for 
 transport purposes were left to die by the roadside. 
 
 Cursorily glancing back at the conduct of the war, it 
 is not difficult to name the principal officers in the 
 operations. At the beginning of the struggle General 
 Flores (Uruguay) and General Paunero (Argentina) were 
 especially prominent. Subsequently came the advance 
 upon Humaita, in which Marshal Caxias (Brazil) and 
 General Osorio (Brazil) played distinguished parts. The 
 attack upon Angostura was directed by Marshal Caxias 
 (Brazil), and his victory was clue to the able assistance 
 of General Argollo (Argentina), General Menna Barreto 
 (Brazil), General Osorio (Brazil), and General Gelly y 
 Obes (Argentina). In the final phase of the war the 
 success of the operations was owing to the skilful tactics of 
 the Conde d'Eu. The squadron did not show to advan- 
 tage during the campaign except in the combat off the 
 river Riachuelo, Admiral Tamandare then commanding. 
 About the merits of General Mitre in connection with 
 the command of the allied forces, there is little to be 
 said. During his presence in the field little progress was 
 made, and several serious disasters occurred. On the 
 other hand, Mitre was the organiser of the arrangements to 
 
188 PARAGUAY 
 
 keep the army supplied with provisions and war material, 
 and it was due to his action in this direction that Marshal 
 Caxias was able to effect the capture of Humaita. 
 
 Against these many Generals and the resources of 
 three Governments, there was only the indomitable 
 energy of one man. It was not a war with Paraguay, 
 but one waged against the personality of Lopez. 
 
 By the constitution promulgated in 1870, the legis- 
 lative authority in Paraguay is exercised by a National 
 Congress of two Chambers, the Senate and the House 
 of Representatives. The Chambers are elected by the 
 people, the law providing for one Senator for every 
 12,000 inhabitants, and one Representative for every 6000 
 persons. The remuneration fixed for Senators and 
 Representatives is $1000 gold per annum. Provision 
 is made for a Cabinet of five responsible Ministers, the 
 departments being Interior, Foreign Affairs, Worship 
 and Instruction, Finance and War, and Marine. 
 
 The Administration of Cirilo Rivarola, the first 
 President under the new regime, was not without many 
 difficulties. Independent in name, the Government of 
 Paraguay was subject to the control of Brazil at the 
 cessation of hostilities after the death of Lopez. The 
 Brazilian army corps left in Asuncion when the Argentine 
 and Uruguayan forces were withdrawn dominated the 
 situation. President Rivarola found this at variance 
 with the exercise of Paraguayan initiative in national 
 affairs, and he attempted to insist on his right to inde- 
 pendent action under the terms of the treaty of 1869. 
 He was opposed by the Brazilian military and civil 
 authorities, and finding his authority undermined, re- 
 signed in 1872. Seiior Salvador Jovellanos, the Vice- 
 President, as provided in the Constitution, succeeded. 
 Rivarola had made many personal enemies during the 
 two years he was in power by his endeavours to establish 
 order and efficiency, and in revenge for his attitude 
 towards certain politicians he was assassinated soon after 
 his resignation. 
 
 Vice-President Jovellanos did little to make his 
 
1874] THE POLITICAL SITUATION i8& 
 
 period of office remarkable, and matters drifted along for 
 the following two years under the guidance of Brazilian 
 influence. But the Brazilian army of occupation was 
 withdrawn gradually in 1873 and 1874, so that when 
 President Gill was elected to the Presidency in the 
 latter year no foreign troops remained in the country. 
 
 Ambitious politicians in Rio de Janeiro now dis- 
 turbed the political calm by advocating the annexation 
 of Paraguay, contending that the river Paraguay would 
 be a satisfactory southern boundary line between Brazil 
 and Argentina. Intrigues were set afoot in Asuncion 
 to induce the Paraguayans to petition for annexation 
 to Brazil. President Gill would have nothing to do 
 with these proposals, and gave offence by his attitude. 
 His expressed determination to eradicate corruption in 
 the Administration increased his unpopularity, and in 
 1875 a conspiracy resulted in his assassination. The 
 Vice-President, Sehor Uriarte, took his place, and the 
 next three years passed in comparative tranquillity, 
 Uriarte allowing public affairs to drift, making no 
 effort to introduce measures to improve the economic 
 or political conditions. In 1875 this stop-gap Adminis- 
 tration was ended by the election of Senor Baredo, but 
 the new President had been only a few months in power 
 when suddenly he died. It was asserted he was 
 poisoned. 
 
 The death of Baredo brought into office the Vice- 
 President, Senor Saguier. For a time political condi- 
 tions remained quiet, but gradually a spirit of militarism 
 crept into the situation. Against this Saguier set his 
 face, and friction consequently arose between the officers 
 of the army and the Executive. In 1881 this feeling 
 culminated in a revolution. Little violence occurred, 
 but the army obtained control of affairs and immediately 
 deposed the President. Pending a new election, General 
 Caballero was chosen to act provisionally, and in the 
 following year he was proclaimed President. The 
 support of the army enabled him to remain in office 
 until the expiration of the presidential term in 1886, 
 
190 PARAGUAY 
 
 when Seiior Escobar was elected. The succeeding four 
 years were uneventful, but the National Administration 
 was conducted without consideration for the general 
 welfare, and military influence dominated the political 
 situation. No attempt was made to check corrupt 
 practices in official departments. 
 
 In 1890 Senor Gonzalez acceded to the Presidency. 
 For a time all went smoothly, but presently the new 
 President evinced a desire to introduce reforms, especially 
 in connection with the spending of public moneys and 
 the appointment of departmental officials. This made 
 him unpopular, and matters were brought to a crisis in 
 1894 by a conspiracy to turn him out of office. The 
 story of his deposition is remarkable. 
 
 One afternoon in May, 1894, the principal members 
 of the opposition called a meeting to decide what action 
 should be taken. Enquiries elicited the fact that the 
 army was prepared to throw in its lot with the mal- 
 contents. Two members of the House of Represen- 
 tatives were then selected to wait upon President 
 Gonzalez and inform him that his presence in Paraguay 
 was not compatible with the public interests, and that 
 he was to be deported. The delegates, revolver in hand, 
 walked to the Government Palace and looked through 
 the rooms for the President. Entering his private 
 office, they found him engrossed in business, and having 
 explained their mission, they presented their revolvers 
 at his head and requested him to accompany them 
 without noise or resistance on pain of instant death. 
 President Gonzalez acceded to this demand. Marched 
 to the barracks and handed over to the care of the 
 troops, he was next day embarked on a steamer bound 
 for Buenos Aires, and the advice was tendered to him 
 not to return to Paraguay if he had any regard for 
 his personal safety. Vice-President Mormigo was 
 then installed in office for the few months necessary 
 to complete the presidential term for which Gonzalez 
 had been elected. 
 
 In November, 1894, Seiior J. B. Egusquiza was 
 
1894] THE URUGUAYAN INCIDENT 191 
 
 chosen President. Egusquiza was tactful in dealing 
 with his opponents, and so far earned the respect of 
 Paraguayans that he was able to introduce administrative 
 reforms without creating marked hostility on the part 
 of the officials most closely affected. During his presi- 
 dency excitement occurred concerning the boundary 
 question with Bolivia, and this led to a rupture of official 
 relations with Uruguay in consequence of the Uruguayan 
 minister in Asuncion stating to his Government that he 
 considered the Bolivian claims just. This despatch was 
 made public, and on the return of the minister from 
 Montevideo he was refused permission to disembark at 
 Asuncion. The affair was patched up subsequently, 
 and relations re-established. In 1898 Egusquiza com- 
 pleted his term, and was succeeded by Senor Emilio 
 Aceval, who in turn gave place to Senor Juan B. 
 Escurra in 1902. 
 
 The Administration of President Aceval attempted 
 no drastic reforms. Occasionally projects for the better 
 dispensation of justice, the regulation of the national 
 finances, or the extension of public education, were 
 introduced. Such proposals gave rise to lengthy dis- 
 cussions in Congress, which resulted in a general expres- 
 sion of approval, but seldom crystallised into action. 
 Legislation was confined to ways and means to pay 
 salaries and military expenditure. Much more cannot 
 be expected from the oligarchy which controls Para- 
 guayan destinies. 
 
 This short sketch of political events shows the con- 
 ditions immediately after the dictatorship of Lopez. 
 The administration of the country fell into the hands of 
 a small group of politicians supported by the army, and 
 whenever this support w T as withdrawn the Opposition 
 ousted the Government. 
 
 The mass of the people care little for the political 
 liberties conferred by the Constitution of 1870. For 
 them elections, presidential and congressional, have no 
 significance. A candidate supported by the authorities 
 is returned without question. Away from the towns, 
 
i92 PARAGUAY 
 
 however, a horror of officials exists, and springs from 
 reminiscences of former years when official interference 
 meant cruelty and extortion. The people desire only 
 immunity from too heavy taxation and freedom from 
 military service. 
 
 The economic condition of Paraguay after 1870 was 
 pitiable. All industry had been abandoned, and agri- 
 culture ceased as the male population was drawn from 
 the fields by Lopez for military purposes. All the 
 able-bodied men perished, so that when the war ended 
 there were no husbands, fathers, or brothers to cultivate 
 the deserted homesteads. The remnant of the popula- 
 tion left alive had neither strength nor inclination to till 
 the ground, and sustained life on wild fruits and roots 
 of the forests. Orange groves scattered over the 
 country side proved a valuable resource in this crisis, 
 the mandate by the Dictator some years previously that 
 every inhabitant should plant orange trees thus proving 
 a boon to these starving people. The trees flourished in 
 the midst of desolation, and now yielded abundant 
 harvests. From outside no help was offered, nor did 
 the three governments at Avar with Lopez make any 
 pretence to assist the economic situation. The cattle 
 and horses had nearly all been killed during the war, 
 but Argentina and Brazil took no steps to supply this 
 deficiency. Between 1870 and 1873, therefore, the 
 Paraguayans existed more like wild beasts than human 
 beings, and hopeless despair was the keynote of the 
 situation. They did not understand the so-called 
 liberation of their country, and feared the army of 
 occupation more than they had ever dreaded the tyranny 
 of Lopez. 
 
 When prospects seemed darkest certain natural 
 forces saved the Paraguayans from extinction. A 
 majority of the population were women, many the 
 mothers of young children. The instincts of maternity 
 crushed all other feeling, and they determined on a 
 supreme effort to alleviate their distress. Rather than 
 see their babies naked and hungry, they set to work to 
 
1899] WOMEN SAVE THE SITUATION 193 
 
 raise food stuffs for themselves and their families, 
 selling the surplus to purchase the scanty clothing they 
 needed. No leaders suggested this course to them. It 
 was due to individual effort that they obtained a means 
 of livelihood by active labour. This action wrought a 
 rapid alteration in the economic conditions. The women 
 cultivated such crops as Indian corn, mandioca, and 
 similar products to meet their own necessities. They 
 made long journeys afoot to market, and where manual 
 work on the farms was impossible they manufactured 
 lace and other articles for disposal in Asuncion. That 
 heroic conduct, however, developed an unfortunate trait 
 in the few men who survived the war. No inclination 
 was exhibited by them to resume work when physically 
 fit to do so. They were content with a life of idleness 
 whilst the women laboured, and this condition has 
 altered but slightly to the present day. 
 
 Matters improved as agricultural industry revived. 
 In 1876 the crops were sufficient to meet local demands. 
 Minor industries sprang up, and the exportation of 
 oranges to the Argentine markets brought some little 
 money to the country. The trade in Paraguayan tea 
 (yerba mate) increased. Tobacco cultivation gave con- 
 siderable employment, and as industrial life expanded 
 foreign capital came for investment. This alleviated 
 poverty amongst certain sections of the population, and 
 a fertile soil and a kindly climate greatly ameliorated 
 the hardships of these miserable years. 
 
 Notwithstanding all adverse influences, the population 
 shows a substantial increase in the past thirty years. 
 At the end of the war it was returned as 221,000. In 
 1899 it was estimated at 460,000 souls, not including 
 some 60,000 or 70,000 Indians classified as uncivilised 
 and dwelling in the unexplored regions to the north. 
 Foreign immigration has been limited, and the total 
 number of foreigners now resident in the Republic does 
 not exceed 10,000. Of these 300 are British, 38 Belgian, 
 2000 Italian, 6000 classified as Argentines, Brazilians 
 or South Americans, the remainder comprising natives 
 
 N 
 
194 PARAGUAY 
 
 of Spain, France, Germany, Switzerland and Scandi- 
 navia. In 1893 an experiment was attempted by a 
 group of Australians. A concession was obtained for 
 colonisation purposes, and an expedition arrived from 
 Australia to form a settlement under socialistic auspices. 
 The basis of this New Australia was that all property 
 should be in common, and work performed for the 
 general, not individual, benefit. The experiment was 
 not successful. Disputes arose in regard to the con- 
 ditions the leader of the movement, one Lane, wished 
 to impose, and in 1896 the colony was broken up, the 
 lands reverting to Paraguay. Some of these Australians 
 were induced by Lane to found another colony, this 
 latter called San Cosme. Here the settlers gained a 
 bare living by growing fruit and vegetables, supple- 
 menting their incomes by working when opportunity for 
 employment occurred. The terms upon which the land 
 at San Cosme is held are, a free title for 80 acres to 
 each individual after compliance with certain conditions 
 of residence and area under cultivation. A further 
 experiment in the direction of colonisation has been 
 attempted by the introduction of 150 Sicilian families, 
 the land for their occupation being provided by the 
 Government. This latter departure has not proved 
 satisfactory either, and many of the colonists deserted. 
 There is no great inducement for Europeans to come to 
 Paraguay under existing conditions. The climate is 
 semi-tropical, and the bulk of the land, especially in the 
 more favoured localities, has been alienated already to 
 private individuals. 
 
 Education in Paraguay has hitherto received little 
 attention. Attendance at the schools is compulsory for 
 all children between the ages of eight and fourteen 
 years, but is not enforced, nor is it likely to be in the 
 immediate future. The population is scattered over the 
 country districts, and distance to the nearest school 
 offers an insuperable bar to the peasant classes. In the 
 towns the attendance is fair, and the official statistics of 
 1898 showed that the number of public and private 
 
1899] EDUCATION IN PARAGUAY 195 
 
 elementary schools was 358 and the aggregate of pupils 
 23,000. Asuncion boasts of a national college with a 
 staff of 15 professors and an attendance in 1898 of 205 
 students. Little attempt, however, is made to impart 
 sound mental or physical discipline. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 URUGUAY 
 
 Colorados and Blancos. Flores refuses Re-election. Revolt of Colonel 
 Fortunato Flores. Presidency of Dr Pedro Varela. Blanco 
 Conspiracy. Assassination of General Flores. Execution of 
 Rebels. General Batlle becomes President. Cholei'a Epidemic, 
 1868. Forced Currency. Insurrections under Maximo Perez 
 and General Caraballo. Blanco Revolution. Insurgent Suc- 
 cesses. Engagement near Santa Lucia. Government Defeat. 
 Engagement near Corralito. Retreat of General Caraballo. 
 Insurgent Losses. Siege of Montevideo. Capture of the Cerro. 
 Public Opinion in Montevideo. Sortie from Montevideo. Siege 
 of Montevideo Raised. Operations near Puerto del Ingles. 
 Decisive Battle. Government Victory. Reorganisation of Rebel 
 Forces. Further Insurgents Defeat. Sefior Gomensoro accedes 
 to Presidency. Restoration of Peaceful Conditions. Congres- 
 sional Elections. Dr Jose Ellauri. Election of Dr Ellauri. 
 Complicated Situation. Threatening Attitude of Military. Ad- 
 ministration of Ellauri. Conspiracy of Colorados netos. Assassi- 
 nation of Colonel Castillo. Revolt in Soriano. Municipal 
 Election in Montevideo. Ministers Resign. Military Revolt. 
 Deposition of Ellauri. Provisional Administration. Sefior Pedro 
 Varela elected President. Unsettled Conditions. Political 
 Arrests. Revolution in May, 1875. Revolutionary Committee 
 in Buenos Aires. Military join Insurgents. Fighting in Soriano 
 and Paysandu. Measures against the Rebels. Defeat of 
 Insurgents. Financial Difficulties. Dictatorship of Colonel 
 Latorre. Praetorian Administration Established. Public Edu- 
 cation. Election of Latorre. Latorre Resigns. Dr Vidal as 
 President. Colonel Santos. Attack on Independent News- 
 papers. Increase of Militarism. President Vidal Resigns. 
 Santos succeeds to Presidency. Discontent Spi - eads. Question 
 with Italy. Irresponsible Administration. Paraguayan Debt. 
 Preparations for Revolt against Santos. Dr Vidal again Elected. 
 
1865] POLITICAL PRINCIPLES 197 
 
 Revolt in Western Part of Republic. Defeat of Rebels by 
 General Tajes. Title of Captain-General granted to Santos. 
 General Santos again President. Attempt to Assassinate Santos. 
 Ministry of Dr Ramirez. Santos resigns Office. Suppression 
 of Militarism. Decree exiling Santos. Election of Hen-era 
 y Obes. 
 
 Uruguay has experienced to a marked extent the unrest 
 customary in South America, where armed revolution 
 is the climax of discontent with the authorities, or the 
 outcome of ambitious politicians seeking office. The 
 Civil War of 1863-5 had overthrown the Blancos and 
 brought in General Venancio Flores, a success due 
 to the action of Brazil against the Uruguayan Govern- 
 ment. With one exception, the revolutions since 1865 
 have been attempts by the Blancos to regain office. So 
 far as political principles go, there is little to choose 
 between Colorados and Blancos. Uruguayans profess 
 to be one or the other because their parents were so 
 before them. The emoluments of office comprise every- 
 thing the majority of politicians desire. Owing to the 
 fact that the Blancos have taken no part in the govern- 
 ment for thirty years, they are regarded as advocates of 
 reform, but the methods they followed previous to their 
 defeat in 1865 do not show that a Government under 
 their auspices would differ greatly from one guided by 
 the Colorados. 
 
 In 1867, during the war with Paraguay, General 
 Flores returned to Montevideo. The congressional 
 elections were fixed for the close of that year. Under 
 the Law of Constitution the choice of the President is 
 left to the National Congress. General Flores informed 
 the Colorados that he was not again a candidate for the 
 Presidency. When the elections took place only the 
 Colorados went to the polls, the Blancos making no 
 effort to record their votes ; and the friends of General 
 Flores, finding that no arguments would induce him to 
 again accept the Presidency, incited his son, Colonel 
 Flores, to organise a revolt to bring pressure to bear 
 upon him, the Colonel's regiment being the only one in 
 
198 URUGUAY 
 
 Montevideo. By it the Plaza Constitution was seized, and 
 barricades thrown up. The President then appealed to 
 his son to surrender, which he eventually agreed to do, 
 and the leader and others principally implicated were 
 sentenced to temporary exile. Congress assembled on 
 February 15, 1868, and General Flores then vacated his 
 office in favour of Dr Pedro Varela, the President of the 
 Senate, who under the Law of Constitution was required 
 to act as Chief Magistrate pending a new election. 
 
 Tempted by the smallness of the garrison, the Blanco 
 Party rose again, thinking they could seize the capital 
 and bring on a general rising throughout the country. 
 The conspirators proposed to seize the arms of the 
 regiment, acting as a guard of honour at the opening of 
 Congress on February 15, and then make prisoners of 
 the Senators, Deputies, and other authorities, it being 
 the custom of the troops to pile their arms in the 
 barracks when the official opening of Congress was con- 
 cluded. The authorities, however, had received notice 
 of some mischief brewing, and the regiment on duty was 
 ordered to remain under arms ; so the revolt was 
 deferred for a few days, and other plans hatched. On 
 February 19, a mob, led by Senor Bernardo P. Berro, 
 attacked the Government Palace at mid-day, and 
 obtained possession of the building ; and at the same 
 time Colonel Freire assaulted the barracks , of the 
 "Libertad" Regiment, effecting an entry after killing 
 the sentries, but the regimental commander, Colonel 
 Olave, rushed out sword in hand and cut down Freire, 
 whereupon the soldiers rallied and regained control of 
 the barracks and Government Padace. 
 
 When General Flores was informed of the revolt he 
 started for the Palace, but his carriage was stopped by 
 a group of men in the street of Juncal, and the coachman 
 shot. Flores then attempted to alight, but was stabbed 
 to death by assassins, who at once dispersed and were 
 never identified. During the attack on the barracks a 
 body of armed rebels, headed by Major Mendoza, appeared 
 in the outskirts of Montevideo, but were defeated by a 
 
General Venancio Flores. 
 
 President Latorre. 
 
 President Santos. 
 
 [Fane page 19S. 
 
1S68] RIOTS IN MONTEVIDEO 199 
 
 detachment of troops. Seilor Berro was taken prisoner 
 and shot, in company with an accomplice by name of 
 Barbot, a former commissary of police, and several other 
 conspirators. This attempt of the Blancos was a com- 
 plete fiasco. 
 
 Congress proceeded on March 1, 1868, to elect the 
 President. The three candidates were General Lorenzo 
 Batlle, a soldier of long and meritorious service, Seiior 
 Jose Candido Bustamante, and General Jose Gregorio 
 Suarez ; and General Batlle was chosen. His Adminis- 
 tration was confronted by numerous difficulties. A 
 cholera epidemic swept over the country in 1868, and 
 claimed many victims, causing also acute commercial 
 and financial disturbance. During this crisis bank fail- 
 ures involved the Government in serious financial straits, 
 to relieve which a forced currency of notes was instituted. 
 The commercial community strongly opposed this 
 measure, and refused to accept the paper money with 
 a resolution so obstinate that the Government drew 
 back. 
 
 The first two years of Batlle's Administration were 
 further complicated by an outbreak under Maximo 
 Perez, a man of considerable influence, and by a rising 
 headed by General Caraballo, an officer of high standing 
 in the Uruguayan army. The first of these was easily 
 suppressed ; the second ended by the surrender of 
 General Caraballo at Mazangano, a ford on the Rio 
 Negro. Neither movement threatened serious danger, 
 but both entailed expenses at a time when the Treasury 
 was empty. 
 
 Meanwhile the Blancos, or Whites, went on plotting 
 against the Government, and perfected arrangements in- 
 Brazilian territory or in the Argentine provinces of 
 Corrientes and Entre Rios for a strong expedition to in- 
 vade the Republic. War material — small arms, artillery, 
 and ammunition — was accumulated, and early in 1870 
 the leaders of the movement decided to take the field. 
 Accordingly, on March 5, the authorities received infor- 
 mation that Colonel Timoteo Aparicio had raised the 
 
^00 URUGUAY 
 
 standard of revolt in the north-west of Uruguay, and 
 was attracting volunteers in such numbers that in a 
 few months he was at the head of 5000 men. The 
 prestige of the insurgents was increased so much by 
 several small successes over detachments of troops that 
 the Government became seriously alarmed and made 
 vigorous efforts to raise and equip an adequate military 
 force. One army corps was organised under General 
 Francisco Caraballo to operate in the north, and a 
 second under General Suarez to protect the country 
 lying to the south of the Rio Negro. 
 
 The rebels came in touch with Suarez in September 
 near the river of Santa Lucia Chico, and on the 12th 
 an action was fought in which the Government forces 
 were obliged to fall back towards Montevideo closely 
 pursued by the enemy. Near Marohas, however, they 
 received reinforcements, and General Suarez again pre- 
 pared to take the offensive. Meanwhile General 
 Caraballo in the north of the Republic had come in 
 contact with another section of the revolutionary forces, 
 and a series of indecisive skirmishes took place. But 
 when Colonel Aparicio heard that Caraballo was pushing 
 southwards to join General Suarez, he abandoned the 
 position he had taken up in the Department of Monte- 
 video and marched to the west to intercept him. The 
 two forces met in the vicinity of Corralito, and a fight 
 ensued in which heavy losses were sustained on both 
 sides, especially by the Government cavalry. The troops 
 were able, however, to hold the positions they occupied ; 
 yet Aparicio now opened negotiations for the surrender 
 of General Caraballo, who called a council of war after 
 the cessation of hostilities on the evening of September 
 29, at which it was decided to temporise with the 
 rebel leader and, under cover of night, evacuate the 
 positions and make towards the south. The over- 
 confidence of the rebels allowed this to be done, and 
 a forced march of 36 miles was accomplished before 
 daylight. 
 
 Colonel Aparicio pursued, and his force came up 
 
1870] THE CAPITAL BESIEGED 201 
 
 with Caraballo as that commander's troops were crossing 
 the Rio Negro. Attempting to prevent this, the revolu- 
 tionists were met by a heavy fire from troops posted 
 in the scrub adjoining the river bank and driven back 
 with serious loss, leaving Caraballo free to cross and 
 embark his men in steamers for Paysandu. Aparicio 
 then marched towards the centre of the Republic in 
 search of General Suarez, who, however, effected a 
 junction with Caraballo at Paysandu, thereby leaving 
 the entire country south of the Rio Negro in the hands 
 of the rebels, who then decided to march upon Monte- 
 video and besiege it. 
 
 Recruits joined the rebels near Montevideo in such 
 numbers that their strength rose to 7000 men, and their 
 confidence to a height which made them deem the 
 capture of the capital certain. The authorities, however, 
 were not idle. Caraballo had been relieved of his com- 
 mand, and the charge of all troops in the neighbourhood 
 of Paysandu given to Suarez, who made such preparations 
 to take the field without delay as to be able in November 
 to inform the Government that he was ready. 
 
 • At Montevideo meanwhile the resistance encountered 
 by the insurgents was greater than Aparicio anticipated. 
 On November 28 the fortress at the Cerro had been 
 taken by assault after severe fighting, and on the 
 following day a number of steamboats were seized and 
 brought into the wharves near the Cerro fortress for 
 use in a sudden descent on Montevideo, but that plan 
 was frustrated. President Batlle thought strong action 
 necessary to restore confidence, and decided to make 
 a sortie from the city. Accordingly, on the 29th, a 
 column led by the President moved out against the 
 insurgent camp, which it at first surprised, but a rally 
 was made, and severe fighting ensued, ending in the loss 
 to the revolutionists of their position. The troops 
 succeeded in forcing the insurgents to abandon their 
 headquarters at the Villa de la Union. Elsewhere, 
 however, they held their ground, and after some hours 
 President Batlle ordered his troops to retire to Monte- 
 
202 URUGUAY 
 
 video. But the object of the sortie had been attained, 
 in so far as the enemy had been driven out of the Villa 
 de la Union and the river steamers recaptured. 
 
 Suarez now left Paysandu and marched to the relief 
 of Montevideo, a move of which Aparicio was ignorant 
 until the middle of December, when the troops from 
 Paysandu had already crossed the Rio Negro, and the 
 opportunity for opposing the advance at this strategic 
 point been lost. The insurgent position now became 
 untenable, since to continue the siege was to invite 
 General Suarez to make an attack on its rear, supported 
 by a simultaneous onslaught by the garrison in front, 
 when the rebel army would be caught between two 
 fires. Aparicio, therefore, raised the siege and moved 
 out to meet Suarez, to assist whom reinforcements were 
 sent by sea to Puerto del Ingles. The rebel leader 
 heard of these reinforcements, and ordered a division 
 of the insurgents to occupy this place, which it did, 
 compelling the steamers to return to Montevideo with 
 the troops. General Suarez, disappointed of this help, 
 was now in a difficult situation confronted by the 
 whole rebel army. If a defeat occurred the capture of 
 Montevideo was certain, and the cause of the Colorados 
 lost. So he decided upon a bold move, and on the 
 night of December 23 led his troops round the flank 
 of the insurgents, and by forced marches proceeded 
 towards the city. Too late Aparicio ordered the rebels 
 to pursue ; Suarez reached the capital. A bloody battle 
 was fought on Christinas Day, both sides aware that 
 the result would decide the fate of the revolution. At 
 last the repeated attacks on the insurgents told and 
 their line gave way, and Suarez pressing home his 
 advantage, retreat followed, but not until most of the 
 rebel infantry had been killed or wounded. The retreat 
 became a rout before the day closed, Aparacio abandon- 
 ing his artillery to save the remnant of his men, but 
 the pursuit was not energetic. Had it been, not a 
 rebel would have escaped. 
 
 For some months after this little was heard of 
 
1871] REVOLT UNDER APARICIO 203 
 
 revolutionary movements, but the authorities, satisfied 
 with their victory, took no steps to prevent a reorganisa- 
 tion of the rebel forces, and this apathy gave Aparicio 
 opportunity to collect groups of insurgents, so that by 
 June, 1871, he had again a force of 2500 men under his 
 command. Some artillery had been saved in serviceable 
 condition, and small arms and ammunition were fairly 
 plentiful. This reconcentration of rebels was at Manan- 
 tiales de San Juan, and, when information of their 
 increasing strength reached the Government, a division 
 under General Enrique Castro was sent to attack and 
 disperse them. This he did on July 17, when, although 
 the insurgent position was a strong one, he found the 
 rebels still so demoralised from their recent reverses 
 that no determined resistance was made. Their defeat 
 was complete ; their guns were captured, most of the 
 infantry killed, and many of the principal leaders as well. 
 A number of the rebel cavalry escaped, however, and 
 with these men Aparicio continued a guerilla warfare, 
 but he did not again succeed in raising a force of suffi- 
 cient strength to endanger the safety of the constituted 
 authority. 
 
 President Batlle, at the end of his term, was followed 
 by Sefior Tomas Gomensoro, the President of the 
 Senate, for no congressional elections could be held in 
 1871, owing to the disturbed state of the country, and, 
 therefore, no presidential election was possible until a 
 year later. 
 
 In the short Administration of President Gomensoro 
 the smouldering revolutionary trouble was settled 
 through the good offices of Argentina. An agreement 
 between the National Authorities and the rebel leaders 
 was signed on April 6, 1872. The officers implicated 
 in the insurrection were restored to the grades they held 
 before the outbreak, and a sum of $500,000 was distri- 
 buted to the followers of Aparicio. The Blancos, 
 furthermore, were allowed to nominate the jefes politicos 
 of Canelones, San Jose, Florida, and Cerro Largo. 
 Satisfaction at the establishment of peace was general, 
 
204 URUGUAY 
 
 and the elections held for Senators and Representatives 
 resulted in a representation of both political parties, but 
 with the Color ados still in a substantial majority. On 
 February 14, 1873, Dr Jose E. Ellauri was chosen 
 President of the Senate, and, in virtue of this office, 
 succeeded Gomensoro as temporary President of the 
 Republic. 
 
 The situation in Congress now changed. The prin- 
 cipal political parties still were the Colorados and the 
 Blancos, but the former split into two factions, the 
 Colorados principistas and the Colorados netos, the former 
 urging the introduction of certain reforms in the 
 Government and a participation of the Blancos in the 
 National Administration, and the netos wishing to 
 maintain the system hitherto in vogue, by which the 
 political party in power kept all offices and representation 
 in the Chambers for their supporters. It was under 
 these circumstances the presidential election took 
 place. The Colorados principistas nominated Dr Jose 
 Maria Mufioz ; the Colorados netos supported ex- 
 President Tomas Gomensoro, but Mufioz was the 
 popular candidate. 
 
 The presidential election was fixed for March 1, and 
 the supporters of both candidates worked with a will. 
 Dr Mufioz was regarded as sure of victory, but a surprise 
 was in store. A third candidate, the acting President, 
 Dr Jose Ellauri, appeared on the scene. This gentle- 
 man belonged to the same party as Dr Mufioz, and his 
 chances of election were deemed remote, but the voting 
 gave him a substantial majority. This totally un- 
 expected result was due to the fact that the Colorados 
 netos found themselves unable to elect Seiior Gomensoro 
 and unanimously voted for Ellauri, by assisting whom 
 they reckoned they could not be excluded from a share 
 in the spoils of office. When informed of his election, 
 Dr Ellauri sent his resignation to Congress, but, being 
 pressed, in the end accepted. 
 
 The new President started amid difficulties enough. 
 He imagined when he accepted the Presidency that he 
 
1873] PRESIDENT ELLAURI 205 
 
 would receive the support of the Colorados principistas, 
 but soon discovered that his former political friends 
 were little inclined to assist him. Again, therefore, he 
 announced his resignation, but no sooner was this 
 known than the senior officers in Montevideo revolted, 
 paraded their regiments in front of the Chambers, and 
 informed the Senators and Representatives that force 
 would be used to ensure the rejection of the resignation 
 when presented to Congress. So Ellauri had no help 
 for it but to remain. That satisfied the military and the 
 troops were withdrawn, but the incident left an uneasy- 
 feeling and was the cause of grave disturbances in the 
 end. And an unfortunate act of Ellauri's helped to 
 strengthen military influence in politics. President 
 Gomensoro had dismissed the officer commanding the 
 1st Regiment of Cazadores in consequence of interference 
 in elections, and the first decree published by Ellauri 
 restored this officer, Major Lorenzo Latorre, to his 
 command. 
 
 Yet Ellauri succeeded in establishing an Adminis- 
 tration generally beneficial to the Republic, and during 
 1873 and 1874 the public finances were honestly managed 
 and protection for life and property strictly enforced. 
 Such policy was not to the taste of the more reactionary 
 section of the Colorados netos, groups of whom began 
 conspiring, with the result that at the end of 1874 Colonel 
 Romualdo Castillo was assassinated in Paysandu. He 
 was a strong supporter of the President, and had enforced 
 respect for law and order. 
 
 Other disturbances followed. Colonel Maximo Perez 
 attempted an outbreak in the Department of Soriano, 
 which was suppressed ; but in January, 1875, affairs took 
 a more serious turn, the leaders of the Colorados netos 
 being determined to embarrass the Administration. The 
 election of an Alcalde for Montevideo gave them their 
 opportunity. Owing to rioting on January 1, the election 
 was postponed until the 10th, and this interval was taken 
 advantage of by the conspirators to publish libellous 
 statements about the policy and administration of Ellauri. 
 
206 URUGUAY 
 
 The candidate of the more respectable portion of the 
 community was Don Jose Varela, and the Color ados 
 netos decided to prevent his election. Accordingly, when 
 the supporters of Varela proceeded to the voting stations, 
 they were met by armed men who opened fire upon 
 them, killing and wounding a number of the most 
 prominent citizens. Such supporters of Senor Varela 
 as had arms returned this fire, and the shooting continued 
 until the arrival of a body of troops commanded by Major 
 Latorre. In consequence of this affair, several ministers 
 resigned their portfolios, accusing the President of want 
 of energy for not proceeding more severely against the 
 instigators of the outrage. The Colorados netos insisted 
 that the vacant ministerial posts should be filled from 
 their ranks. Ellauri refused, and appointed Colorados 
 principistas. This brought matters to a crisis. 
 
 Five days after the riot the troops were marched to 
 the Plaza Constitution. The senior officers drew up a 
 manifesto in which they declared the authority of Ellauri 
 at an end, and that they had determined to install a Pro- 
 visional Government under Senor Pedro Varela pending 
 a new presidential election. Dr Ellauri, powerless to 
 resist, sought asylum on a foreign warship, and through- 
 out the country the majority of the officials accepted 
 unreservedly the Provisional Government set up in his 
 place. The Blancos concentrated in Florida, placing 
 themselves under the orders of Colonel Aparicio, to 
 whom the Government sent envoys requesting his 
 adhesion to the new regime, he meanwhile having in- 
 formed Ellauri that the Blancos would lend him assist- 
 ance to regain office. Ellauri declined this offer, and 
 Aparicio then determined to recognise the Provisional 
 Government. His reward was the rank of General. 
 
 On January 22 the Chambers were convened in 
 extraordinary session to elect a President of the Republic, 
 but many dissentient members of the Senate and House 
 of Representatives absented themselves, leaving the 
 Government supporters in control. These duly elected 
 Senor Pedro Varela to the Presidency. 
 
1875] PRESIDENT PEDRO VARELA 207 
 
 The new chief magistrate's first acts did not inspire 
 confidence, for the members of the Legislature who had 
 not attended the extraordinary session were declared to 
 have forfeited their seats, and a number of military officers 
 and civilians were arrested and sentenced to exile without 
 trial. They were placed on the Puig, an unseaworthy 
 barque, and sent to sea, with instructions to the master 
 of the vessel to proceed to Cuba, and were eventually 
 disembarked on the coast of Florida, U.S.A., after many 
 weeks of hardship. 
 
 President Varela's conduct, and the fact that the 
 influence of the Colorados netos became paramount in 
 public affairs, provoked revolutionary feeling so much, 
 that in May the standard of revolt was raised in the 
 Department of Maldonado by Colonel Julian de la Liana, 
 a man of considerable local influence and a Colorado 
 principista. Seilor Enrique Yarza and Sefior Miguel 
 Yarza, prominent citizens of Rocha, joined this move- 
 ment, and many other recruits came forward, by whose 
 leaders a committee was formed in Argentina to arrange 
 for supplies of war material. It also appointed Colonel 
 Angel Munis Commander-in-chief of the rebel army. 
 In the Department of Salto the troops to the number of 
 1000 officers and men under Colonel Atanasildo Saldaila 
 joined the revolutionary cause, and in Paysandu Colonel 
 Genuardo Gonzalez and other military officers took the 
 same step. An expedition from Buenos Aires com- 
 manded by Colonel Julio Arrue was disembarked in the 
 Department of Colonia, and shortly afterwards the town 
 of Mercedes was occupied and the National Guard of 
 that district called out for service in the insurgent ranks. 
 It was a revolution supported by Colorados and Blancos, 
 without distinction of party. General Aparicio, however, 
 remained loyal to the Government, and restrained many 
 Blancos from volunteering their services to the rebels. 
 The revolt became known as la revolution tricolor on 
 account of the flag used. 
 
 In October the rebels under Colonel Arrue gained a 
 victory in the Department of Soriano, but this was 
 
208 URUGUAY 
 
 counterbalanced by advantages of the Government 
 troops in Paysandu, at Palonias, and in the neighbour- 
 hood of Tacuarembo. General Aparicio, whose experi- 
 ence gained in the Blanco revolution of 1870-2 was most 
 valuable, was given command of an army corps, and 
 allowed the insurgents little rest, while Colonel Latorre, 
 now Minister of War, took charge of the Government 
 forces in the north. At the beginning of 1875 he 
 inflicted a crushing defeat on the rebels in the Depart- 
 ment of Minas, a reverse that practically ended the 
 revolution, for the remnant of the insurgents scattered 
 in various directions, many seeking refuge in southern 
 Brazil. 
 
 The stability of the Administration, however, was 
 not established. Financial difficulties complicated the 
 situation, and accusations of malversation of public 
 funds were made against the Government. So wide- 
 spread did the general discontent become that President 
 Varela found his position rapidly verging on the 
 impossible, and few prominent persons would accept 
 office. This unpopularity was the opportunity Colonel 
 Latorre had been waiting for, and considering the time 
 ripe for action, he proclaimed himself Dictator of Uruguay 
 on March 10, 1876. He was supported by the army, 
 and Varela quietly submitted. 
 
 Colonel Latorre's Government was a dictatorship 
 with the support of the army. Civil rights were 
 suppressed, liberty of the press restricted, political 
 opponents arrested and imprisoned without trial, and 
 mysterious assassinations of persons unfriendly to the 
 authorities occurred. It was a reign of terror not 
 unlike that in Argentina under Rosas. In some direc- 
 tions, however, the influence of Latorre was exerted for 
 the benefit of Uruguay. Brigandage, common in many 
 districts, was suppressed, and security for the lives and 
 property of the inhabitants not connected with political 
 affairs was established. Attention was also given to 
 public education, and in August, 1877, a decree was 
 published providing a national school system, Senor 
 
1879] LATORRE AS DICTATOR 209 
 
 Jose Varela, who had been Director of Schools in 
 Montevideo since March, 1876, being nominated national 
 inspector of public instruction. Special taxes were set 
 apart to support the new department. After exercising 
 dictatorial powers for three years, Latorre determined 
 to be nominated Constitutional President ; so in 
 February, 1879, a Congress was convoked which elected 
 him for a term of four years from the first day of the 
 preceding March. 
 
 As President, the former Dictator made a strong 
 effort to govern in accordance with the Constitution, but 
 found his path beset by difficulties. The former political 
 parties had been so crushed as to make Latorre dependent 
 still on the military faction for any assistance he required, 
 and that was poor material with which to reorganise 
 republican institutions. For a year he struggled on, 
 but lacked the ability to carry out his projects, and or/ 
 March 13, 1880, to the general surprise, he presented' 
 his resignation to Congress, declaring that he found th< 
 country ungovernable. Congress accepted the resigna- 
 tion and elected Dr Francisco A. Vidal, a well-known 
 physician, but a man of small weight in political matters, 
 for the remainder of the legal period. 
 
 The new President was unfitted to deal with the 
 complicated situation, and one of his first acts was to 
 nominate as his minister and principal adviser Colonel 
 Maximo Santos, an officer who had been prominent in 
 the dictatorship of Latorre. In a short time Colonel 
 Santos obtained complete control, President Vidal 
 being only a figurehead. Under the last year of Latorre 
 a certain degree of liberty had been accorded to the 
 press, and independent newspapers had criticised public 
 events. This independent criticism was now directed 
 against Vidal and Santos, and the latter determined to 
 suppress it. 
 
 A mob in May, 1880, instigated from high quarters 
 and led by military officers and other officials, attacked 
 the offices of these independent news sheets and wrecked 
 them. There was no redress, and all independent 
 
 o 
 
210 URUGUAY 
 
 criticism of the Administration ceased ; which was just 
 what General Santos desired. Thenceforth, in the name 
 of President Vidal, he allotted all lucrative posts to his 
 friends and created many new offices to provide sinecures 
 for a host of needy adventurers. Militarism became 
 more rampant than ever, and in all ways he did his best 
 to prepare the way for his accession to the Presidency 
 at the end of Vidal's term. Vidal, however, did not 
 wait for the end. Finding himself powerless, he 
 determined to retire, and presented his resignation 
 on March 1, 1882. It was accepted without demur, 
 and on the same day the Chambers elected General 
 Santos. 
 
 Santos was unpopular outside his own clique, and 
 discontent was so strong that the probability of armed 
 revolution was widely discussed. For the moment, 
 however, a scarcity of arms and ammunition prevented 
 any rising. All departments were conducted on an 
 irresponsible basis. The Treasury was mulcted to 
 supply the personal needs of high officials ; the public 
 debt was increased for the same purpose ; the rights of 
 citizens were disregarded ; no redress could be obtained 
 in the courts for wrongs inflicted under the guise of 
 authority, and it needed an Italian squadron off Monte- 
 video to insure the payment of compensation for torture 
 and imprisonment inflicted on two Italians during the 
 disturbances under Vidal. Santos's only act to benefit 
 the people was the introduction of the civil marriage 
 law ; but in 1884 he ordered the return to the Govern- 
 ment of Paraguay of all trophies captured during the 
 war, and he also cancelled the claim for the war 
 indemnity, due under the treaty of 1865, between 
 Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. 
 
 Towards the end of 1885, the discontent took definite 
 form. Many Uruguayans emigrated to Argentina, and 
 there commenced military preparations for an insurrec- 
 tion. Battalions of volunteers were enrolled and war 
 material collected, and in view of these hostile prepara- 
 tions President Santos increased the strength of the 
 
1886] GENERAL SANTOS 211 
 
 army. His term expired on March 1, 1886, and 
 influenced by him the Chambers elected ex-President 
 Vidal as his successor. This meant that Santos intended 
 to continue to be the real ruler of the Republic, and it 
 is difficult to understand why Dr Vidal accepted the 
 position after his former experience, but he was per- 
 suaded to do so by the arguments and promises of 
 General Santos. At the same session the Chamber 
 appointed General Santos to be Commander-in-chief of 
 the army with widely extended powers, and these events 
 decided the revolutionary leaders to make their effort 
 without further delay. 
 
 On March 28, accordingly, an insurgent expedition 
 disembarked at Guaviyu under command of General 
 Enrique Castro and General Jose Miguel Arredondo. 
 Recruits joined from various districts, and all omens 
 pointed to a determined attempt to oust Santos from 
 power. There was, however, a lack of organisation 
 amongst the rebels, and when they were attacked by 
 General Tajes on March 30 they were forced to retreat. 
 Tajes followed up his advantage, and next day inflicted 
 a decisive defeat, sending the captured rebels to Monte- 
 video, where they were released. The failure of this 
 attempt at revolution strengthened the position of 
 Santos, who was now accorded by Congress the title of 
 Captain- General of the army, and, contrary to the Con- 
 stitution in regard to military officers, returned as Senator 
 for the Department of Flores and nominated President 
 of the Senate. In this post in virtue of his office he 
 would succeed to the Presidency in the event of the 
 resignation of Dr Vidal. Pressure was accordingly 
 exercised upon that puppet, who resigned on May 24, 
 Santos immediately assuming the duties of Chief 
 Magistrate. 
 
 In his second Administration, Santos made no 
 pretence of constitutional government. Nominally the 
 various official departments were in charge of Ministers ; 
 but the President intervened directly in all, and dis- 
 content grew apace when this became fully understood. 
 
212 URUGUAY 
 
 On the night of August 17, 1886, as the President was 
 alighting from his carriage in front of the Cibils Theatre, 
 a man named Gregorio Ortiz fired at him, the bullet 
 breaking his lower jaw. This attempt at assassination, 
 combined with the resignation of his Ministers a few 
 weeks later, and a revolutionary movement on the 
 northern frontier, convinced Santos that his intention to 
 be Dictator of Uruguay for life was not feasible, and he 
 sought a way of escape by sending for Dr Jose Pedro 
 Ramirez, a leader of the Opposition, and requesting him 
 to form a ministry on strictly constitutional lines. At 
 first Ramirez refused, and it was only after many 
 promises from General Santos that he agreed to con- 
 sider the matter. One condition imposed by Dr Ramirez 
 as a sine qua non for his participation in the Government 
 was that General Santos should retire from the Presi- 
 dency on February 14, 1887. 
 
 The new Ministry embraced such well-known men 
 as Dr Aureliano Rodriguez Larreta and Dr Juan Carlos 
 Blanco, and was known as the Ministerio de la con- 
 ciliacion. It came into power on November 4, 1886. 
 General Santos now announced his intention of making 
 a journey to Europe, alleging ill health, and on November 
 18 he placed his resignation in the hands of Congress. 
 The Chambers nominated General Maximo Tajes to 
 discharge the presidential duties until March 1, 1890. 
 Tajes wished the Ministry presided over by Dr Ramirez 
 to retain their portfolios, but a difference of opinion 
 arose in regard to the policy of the new Government, 
 and they resigned. 
 
 President Tajes had no desire to see a continuance 
 of militarism, and on December 28 issued a decree dis- 
 embodying several regiments of the army, including 
 those whose senior officers had been conspicuous for 
 interference in political affairs. General Santos, on 
 receiving this news, immediately embarked for Monte- 
 video, but on his arrival in the River Plate, he was 
 advised that Congress had passed a law exiling him 
 from Uruguayan territory. Finding it impossible to land 
 
1890] ADMINISTRATION OF TAJES 213 
 
 at Montevideo, he proceeded to Buenos Aires, where he 
 remained until his death on May 10, 1889. 
 
 Under General Tajes the Republic made substantial 
 progress. He conciliated the Opposition, and permitted 
 no military influence over the Executive. As a con- 
 sequence peace was established, and opportunity allowed 
 for the development of the natural resources of the 
 country. Means of communication were improved, and 
 the value of property rose rapidly. The better security 
 for life and property also attracted foreign capital, and 
 when Tajes retired after completing his term of office, 
 Uruguay was in more thriving circumstances than at any 
 previous time. As his successor, the Congress elected 
 Dr Julio Herrera y Obes, a Colorado who had served 
 as a Minister under Tajes. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 Uruguay — continued 
 
 Foreign Capital in Uruguay. Corrupt Administration. Revival of 
 Militarism. Extravagant Financial Policy. Discontented Feel- 
 ing. Economic and Financial Crisis. Temporary Administration 
 of Sefior Duncan Stewart. Election of Senor Borda. The Borda 
 Administration. Revival of Corruption. Formation of Revolu- 
 tionary Committee in Buenos Aires. Depots of War Material. 
 Congressional Elections. Outbreak of Revolt. Aparieio Saraiva 
 and Colonel Diego Lamas. Condition of Insurgent Forces. 
 Engagement at Arbolito. Government Forces Augmented. 
 Engagements at Tres Arboles, Cerro Colorado, and Cerros 
 Blancos. Insurgent Expedition in Venus. Peace Negotiations. 
 Assassination of Borda. Accession of Senor Cuestas. Fresh 
 Peace Negotiations. Peaceful Conditions Re-established. 
 Festivities in Montevideo. Death of Lamas. Policy of New 
 Administration. Attitude of Congress. Cuestas dissolves the 
 Chambers. Congress elects Cuestas to the Presidency. Military 
 Revolt. Blanco Majority in Senate. Political Situation. Cuestas 
 and Economic Situation. Climatic Conditions. Area of Territory. 
 Density of Population. Foreign Residents. Immigration. 
 Apathy regarding Education. Secondary and Higher Education. 
 School of Arts and Trades. Administration of Justice. Criminal 
 Courts. Uruguayan National Character. Influence of the 
 Church. Means of Communication and Economic Progress. 
 Industrial Enterprise. Cattle Breeding. Importation of Foreign 
 Stock. Sheep Fai-ming. Export of Sheep. Agriculture. Viti- 
 culture. Olive Orchards. Tobacco Cultivation. Industry and 
 Taxation. Landed Proprietors, Values of Foreign Holdings. 
 Tendency of Foreign Landowners to Decrease. 
 
 President Herrera y Obes assumed his duties at a 
 period when the attention of European capitalists was 
 drawn towards South America in connection with rail- 
 
1891] PUBLIC DEBT AUGMENTED 215 
 
 way construction and industrial enterprise. This new 
 interest had centred chiefly in Argentina, but Uruguay 
 shared it to some extent, and the Administration was 
 not slow to profit by the ease with which funds could 
 be acquired, so that the public debt was soon largely 
 augmented. But the borrowed money was not applied 
 to useful purposes, the greater part of it being absorbed 
 by annual deficits caused by unnecessary expenses for 
 political objects. The tendency of the Herrera Adminis- 
 tration was to drift back to the methods of Latorre and 
 Santos rather than to expand the reforms of President 
 Tajes. To ensure the support of the Army many con- 
 cessions were made to military officers, and gradually 
 widespread corruption crept into the administrative 
 departments, no effort being make to check abuses. 
 
 The President was clever, but perfectly unscrupulous 
 in politics and short-sighted in matters financial. 
 Extravagant expenditure at the beginning of his rule, 
 expenditure out of all proportion to the resources of the 
 Republic, therefore bore its natural fruit, and in 1891 the 
 service of the external debt could not be met. No 
 wonder that in these circumstances discontent gained 
 ground, and when the financial and commercial crisis of 
 1891-2 occurred, armed revolt was again rumoured. 
 Unsuccessful efforts were actually made to incite the 
 populace to strong measures. 
 
 The population sank into lethargy under the weight 
 of the trying economic situation which followed the 
 collapse of financial and commercial business in 1890. 
 After Herrera y Obes vacated the Presidency on 
 March 1, 1894, and pending the new election, the duties 
 were temporarily discharged by Senor Duncan Stewart, 
 President of the Senate, and not until March 21 did 
 Congress elect Senor Juan Idiarte Borda to fill the 
 vacancy. 
 
 The attitude of the new President at first was an 
 agreeable surprise. He refused to tolerate abuses per- 
 mitted by his predecessor, whose influence was eliminated. 
 Reforms were introduced and corruption restricted, but 
 
216 URUGUAY 
 
 unfortunately the Uruguayans were doomed once more 
 to disappointment, for during his second year President 
 Borda allowed matters to relapse into the old rut, until 
 towards the end of 1896 corruption had become as 
 common as ever. The national resources were 
 squandered, taxation was increased, jobbery in con- 
 nection with public works was condoned, election returns 
 falsified, civil rights disregarded- — in fact, no considera- 
 tion was shown except to the small circle immediately 
 in touch with the Government. This could only end in 
 revolution. Once more the Blancos saw an opportunity 
 to regain the position they lost in 1865. The leaders 
 were encouraged to action by the knowledge that Presi- 
 dent Borda had estranged certain sections of the Golo- 
 rados, and that friction existed between the Administra- 
 tion and several influential military officials. Thus the 
 probabilities were that while the Blancos would form 
 the backbone of the movement, outside help would 
 come from the dissentient Colorados and a portion of 
 the army. These calculations were not far wide of the 
 mark, for although little active support was given to the 
 insurrection of 1897 by the Colorados or the military, 
 there was a passive attitude of non-resistance in various 
 directions that favoured the insurgent cause. The usual 
 committee was formed in Buenos Aires to collect arms 
 and ammunition and arrange for supplies when hostilities 
 commenced. Recruits also, mostly Uruguayans, were 
 enrolled in Argentine territory, and a depot of war 
 material was formed at Bage, a Brazilian town near the 
 southern frontier of Rio Grande do Sul, in whose neigh- 
 bourhood men were to concentrate to invade Uruguayan 
 territory. Certain points in Argentina were selected as 
 the base of operations. 
 
 The Congressional elections were held in November 
 1896, when, in spite of solemn assurances that voting 
 should be free, the ballot was so manipulated that in 
 districts where the Blancos were known to be in a 
 majority the result was returned in favour of the Colo- 
 rados, fraud being resorted to wherever any doubt 
 
1897] RISING AGAINST BORDA 217 
 
 existed as to the success of the official candidate. The 
 Blaneos were indignant, and resentment against the 
 Administration became more pronounced, one group 
 going so far as to prematurely raise the standard of 
 revolt, but dispersing again when ordered by the party 
 leaders. But in February, 1897, the rebel forces entered 
 Uruguay from the north under command of Aparicio 
 Saraiva, other detachments from the west and south 
 joining the main body a few days later. Colonel Diego 
 Lamas, with a small following, came from Buenos Aires 
 shortly after the commencement of hostilities, these two 
 insurgent leaders being the men upon whom public 
 attention was centred. The former was a brother of 
 Gumersindo Saraiva, so prominent in revolutionary out- 
 breaks in Rio Grande do Sul, and had accompanied his 
 brother in the campaign against Marshal Peixoto. He, 
 therefore, had some experience of warfare and an idea 
 of the requirements of military organisation, but his 
 knowledge of military tactics was confined to guerilla 
 movements. Although a citizen of Uruguay, and owning 
 property in the Republic, Saraiva was always con- 
 sidered a Brazilian, his parents being natives of Rio 
 Grande do Sul. He was a man of little education, but 
 naturally shrewd and with considerable influence in the 
 northern districts of Uruguay. 
 
 Colonel Diego Lamas was a man of very different 
 type. His father had been a prominent officer when 
 the Blaneos controlled Uruguayan affairs previous to 
 1865, and had emigrated to Argentina when the Color- 
 ados gained the day. Educated in Buenos Aires, young 
 Lamas had entered the Argentine army, in which he 
 was a major when this revolution in Uruguay broke out. 
 He at once volunteered on the rebel side, and was given 
 the rank of Colonel, and placed in command of the head- 
 quarter staff. In reality he directed all movements of 
 the rebel forces, although General Saraiva was the 
 nominal Commander-in-chief. He was considered ex- 
 ceptionally intelligent in his profession, and his conduct 
 throughout this campaign proved him to be so. 
 
2J8 . URUGUAY 
 
 Within a few weeks of the outbreak the rebels 
 numbered 3000 men with rifles and small arm ammu- 
 nition, but no artillery. Many of the mounted men were 
 armed only with lances and revolvers, but these proved 
 useful weapons. For rations the insurgents depended 
 on cattle and sheep, and they never hesitated to confis- 
 cate such animals as they needed. Other necessities 
 were obtained from the smaller villages, or smuggled 
 from Argentina and Brazil. Horses for cavalry and 
 transport purposes were appropriated wherever found. 
 Firewood was often a difficulty, but when no timber was 
 available the fencing posts on the grazing farms were 
 cut down and used without compunction, so that the 
 damage to property was heavy in all districts through 
 which the insurgents passed. As similar practices were 
 followed by the Government troops, the losses to the 
 farmers often amounted to little short of ruin, but the 
 sufferers attributed all their injuries to the Government 
 and laid small blame on the insurgents, an unreasonable 
 attitude characteristic of the temper of the people. 
 
 The Government was aware of the movements of 
 the insurgents before and after the declaration of the 
 revolt, but there had been so many false alarms during 
 1896 that it was inclined to underrate its foes. When, 
 however, President Borda became convinced that the 
 insurrection was serious, he lost no time in concentrat- 
 ing all available troops, and in March, 1897, despatched 
 an expedition to the north to attack Aparicio Saraiva. 
 After long and tedious marches the two forces met at 
 Arbolito, where the insurgent leader had been able to 
 select his ground. This put the Government troops at 
 a disadvantage, and their attack was a failure. They 
 then retired to wait reinforcements, and under cover of 
 night the insurgents slipped away, putting many leagues 
 between them and the Government forces before the 
 following morning. All this was so far favourable to 
 the rebels that it encouraged not only those already in 
 the ranks, but prompted offers of additional men and 
 supplies. 
 
President Bord-y. 
 
 President Cuestas. 
 
 Aparicio Saraiva. 
 
 Major Diego Lamas. 
 
 [Face page 218. 
 
1897] SKIRMISHES WITH REBELS 219 
 
 The check at Arbolito opened the eyes of Borda, 
 who forthwith raised the strength of his forces until by 
 June their total exceeded 10,000 men placed under 
 General Villar as Commander-in-chief. The suppression, 
 however, of the insurrectionary movement was no easy 
 task, for the delay that occurred after Arbolito had 
 given the rebels time to establish friendly relations with 
 the inhabitants of the northern and western districts, by 
 whose help swift and early information about all move- 
 ments of the enemy became sure. 
 
 Things dragged on through June and July, the j)olicy 
 of the insurgents being no fighting except when able to 
 select most advantageous positions, or when in greatly 
 superior numbers. A few skirmishes occurred between 
 outposts, and at Cerro Colorado, Cerros Blancos, and 
 Tres Arboles, Aparicio Saraiva was forced into engage- 
 ments to keep open the road to the frontier of Brazil, 
 where the refuge of the rebels lay in case of disaster 
 overtaking them in Uruguayan territory, but in none of 
 these three engagements could either side claim a victory. 
 The insurgents, however, were able to hold their own 
 for a time, and then make good their retreat without 
 great loss of life, while the Government troops obtained 
 small benefit from the occupation of the positions the 
 rebels temporarily defended. It was marching and 
 countermarching, a kind of warfare where the services 
 of Aparicio Saraiva were invaluable. He knew every 
 inch of the country, having been engaged for several 
 years in the business of driving cattle from Rio Grande 
 do Sul to the markets of Montevideo. 
 
 But in June the revolution suffered serious loss by 
 the capture of an important expedition. The rebel 
 plans were cleverly laid. Some 400 men embarked on 
 board the steamer Venus in Buenos Aires, taking tickets 
 as ordinary passengers for Montevideo. In their luggage 
 was the equipment necessary for arming the force. No 
 suspicions were aroused, and the Venus left dock at the 
 usual hour. Clear of the harbour she was seized, and 
 the captain ordered to make for a point on the Uruguayan 
 
220 UBUGUAY 
 
 coast, the leader of the expedition informing him that 
 after landing the insurgents he would again be given 
 possession of the steamer. The captain altered his 
 course accordingly, but a few miles from Buenos Aires 
 an Argentine man-of-war was encountered, whose com- 
 mander, seeing the Venus heading for Colonia instead of 
 Montevideo, ordered her to heave-to and sent to ascer- 
 tain if anything was wrong. On learning the truth this 
 officer obliged the Venus to return to Buenos Aires, and 
 there handed her over to the authorities. The insurgents 
 were detained as prisoners for a few days and then 
 released without punishment. 
 
 At the end of July negotiations for peace were 
 initiated by President Borda, with the revolutionary 
 committee in Buenos Aires. No satisfactory terms were 
 reached, the President refusing the claims of the Blancos 
 to be allowed representation in Congress and the nomina- 
 tion of political governors of districts in which the 
 Blancos predominated. Borda demanded the uncon- 
 ditional surrender of the rebels, and the confiscation of 
 their arms and ammunition. To this proposal the 
 revolutionary leaders would not listen. So the armistice 
 proclaimed pending these negotiations was declared at 
 an end in August, and hostilities recommenced. The 
 President was blamed for not offering more lenient terms 
 when this opportunity for restoring peace occurred. 
 
 On August 25 the Uruguayan national holiday was 
 held in Montevideo, a part of the official ceremony 
 connected with which is a parade of troops and the 
 attendance of the President, Ministers, and all other 
 high authorities at a special Te Deum. President Borda, 
 at the head of the procession, left the cathedral after 
 the service, and had proceeded only fifty yards when 
 a spectator fired at him from a distance of a dozen 
 feet. The President fell mortally wounded, the bullet 
 passing through his heart, death being almost instan- 
 taneous. The assassin, who made no attempt to escape, 
 was arrested, and gave his name as Avelino Arredondo. 
 He stated he belonged to no political party, and had 
 
1897] ASSASSINATION OF BOKDA 221 
 
 killed the President because lie considered the sufferings 
 of the country were the direct outcome of the Borda 
 misrule. Nor was any further explanation vouchsafed 
 at the trial in 1899, when Arredondo was sentenced to 
 two years imprisonment. 
 
 Senor Juan Lindolfo Cuestas, President of the 
 Senate, now succeeded to the Presidency, a man well 
 known as a lawyer, and although not personally popular 
 with Colorados or Blanoos, respected by both as honest 
 and straightforward. By tradition the President was a 
 Colorado, but he had no violent feelings of partisanship. 
 
 The news of the murder of Borda was received by 
 the insurgents with mixed feelings. He had been the 
 principal cause of the revolution, but the rebels had 
 never advocated his assassination, and they feared his 
 death would be attributed to their agency. Nor did 
 they view with enthusiasm the accession to power of 
 Sehor Cuestas, taking his temporary tenure of office to 
 infer a continuance of the obnoxious regime of his pre- 
 decessor. The rebels were mistaken. President Cuestas 
 saw that peace must be re-established to avert ruin, and 
 put himself in communication with representatives of 
 the Blaneos to ascertain what terms the insurgents would 
 accept. In September a Commission consisting of Dr 
 Ramirez, Dr Larreta, Dr Berro, and other persons 
 friendly to the revolutionary cause, visited the rebel 
 headquarters and discussed with Aparicio Saraiva and 
 other leaders the details of an agreement with the 
 Government. A general amnesty was proposed for all 
 persons concerned in the insurrection ; political governors 
 selected from the Blaneos were to be nominated for 
 certain districts ; a fair representation in Congress was 
 guaranteed ; and, finally, a sum of $200,000 was to be 
 distributed to the rank and file of the insurgent forces. 
 On the other hand, the rebels were to surrender all arms 
 and ammunition and disperse quietly to their homes. 
 Pending the acceptance or rejection of these terms by 
 Congress an armistice was declared. No time was lost 
 in bringing this arrangement before the Chambers, both 
 
222 URUGUAY 
 
 of which unanimously approved it, and before the end 
 of September the arms of the insurgents were sur- 
 rendered and the men disbanded. 
 
 On the official ratification of peace a series of fes- 
 tivities took place in Montevideo, and a great demonstra- 
 tion was organised to welcome the revolutionary leaders, 
 together with such citizens as had taken part in the 
 campaign. The enthusiasm with which the townspeople 
 of all social classes entered into the preparations for 
 this reception proved how widespread was the sympathy 
 extended to the insurrection. It was the more marked 
 because all exhibition of feeling had been restrained by 
 fear of unpleasant consequences so long as President 
 Borda's Government had lasted. One event, though, cast 
 a gloom over the popular rejoicings. A few weeks after 
 the peace Colonel Lamas was riding through the out- 
 skirts of Montevideo when his horse bolted. The Colonel 
 was still suffering from a wound received in his arm 
 during the campaign, and was able to use one hand 
 only. The horse threw his rider, who died from his 
 injuries. 
 
 Many difficulties now confronted President Cuestas ; 
 the chaotic financial condition required careful attention ; 
 corrupt methods in the administrative departments had 
 to be restrained, and military influence needed clipping ; 
 and he faced them all boldly, so that before many months 
 had elapsed the worst abuses were eliminated. In the 
 reforms necessary to counteract the results of the Borda 
 regime the new Administration raised hostile feeling in 
 various quarters, especially amongst the more violent 
 section of the Colorados and certain groups of military 
 officers, but the Blancos had no cause for complaint, as 
 the President kept his promises to them. They obtained 
 a fair representation in both Senate and House of Keprc- 
 scntatives. 
 
 In February, 1898, however, the dissatisfied wing of 
 the Colorados determined to obstruct the policy of Seiior 
 Cuestas until the presidential election. The President 
 saw clearly that if they were able to do so, all his good 
 
1898] PRESIDENT CUESTAS 223 
 
 work would be undone, and to prevent this he dissolved 
 the Chambers and suspended all constitutional guarantees 
 on February 10, 1898, assuming dictatorial powers. 
 This bold stroke took his enemies by surprise, and they 
 made no further attempts to interfere. And when, late 
 in February, 1899, Congress was convoked for the 
 presidential election and Cuestas resigned office, the 
 Chamber stamped their approval, of his action by electing 
 him President for the ensuing term. 
 
 Installed anew, Cuestas continued to devote himself 
 to the reform of abuses, and ordered a large reduction 
 in the military establishment, which met with determined 
 opposition from a number of officers who, encouraged 
 by the extreme wing of the Colorado?, resolved to 
 organise a military revolt. It took place on July 1, 
 when the mutinous portion of the garrison took pos- 
 session of a section of Montevideo. The loyal troops 
 then attacked the mutineers, and for some hours shot 
 and shell screamed through the streets until the rebels 
 surrendered. Some 200 men were killed or wounded 
 before the fighting ceased. 
 
 After 1899 President Cuestas did. not add to his 
 popularity. Increased taxation created hostility to ward s 
 him, and his insistence that official interference should 
 not take place in regard to elections embroiled him with 
 the Colorado*. That voting, however, was really free 
 was proved by the fact that when, in November, 1900, 
 six vacancies occurred in the Senate, five were captured 
 from the Colorado* by the Blanco*, this victory giving 
 the latter a majority there. 
 
 On March 1, 1903, President Cuestas was succeeded 
 by Sehor Jose Batlle y Ordonez, and it was thought 
 that he would hold the balance between the two political 
 parties in such manner as to prevent open frici 
 Unfortunately this did not prove to be the case, and 
 discontent spread rapidly amongst the Blanco*, who 
 complained that the concessions granted to them, in 
 189/ were infringed. Matters drifted from bad to worse 
 during the summer and autumn of 1903, and then the 
 
224 URUGUAY 
 
 Blancos determined to resort to armed rebellion to enforce 
 their political rights. Under the leadership of General 
 Aparicio Saraiva they took the field, plunging Uruguay 
 again into that turmoil of civil war which has checked 
 the devolopment of the republic ever since emancipation 
 from Spanish dominion was secured. 
 
 Uruguay has one asset which is beyond injury by 
 any administrative action — the climate. There are no 
 extremes of temperature in summer or winter, and 
 topographical features lend themselves to desirable 
 surroundings for the settler from northern countries. A 
 rolling landscape rising to mountain ranges of 2000 to 
 3000 feet effectually bars monotony; and in the valleys 
 the streams, in most districts fringed with timber enough 
 to provide fuel for domestic purposes, afford abundance 
 of water for live stock. 
 
 In spite of climatic advantages, the population of 
 Uruguay is scanty. In 1823 an official estimate gave a 
 total of 450,000 persons, and in 1897 it was estimated at 
 but 827,485. A census of the republic, exclusive of Monte- 
 video, was taken in 1899, and showed 599,364 ; while 
 on January 1, 1900, that city and district was estimated 
 to contain 252,713 inhabitants. The total population in 
 the Republic at the beginning of 1900 was by this 
 reckoning 852,077. As Uruguay covers an area of 
 72,110 square miles, this makes the density of popula- 
 tion under 12 to the square mile, or, exclusive of the area 
 and population of Montevideo, 9 per mile. By the 
 census of 1900 the foreigners, apart from those living in 
 the city and department of Montevideo, were returned as 
 90,199. Of these, only 1383 were not of Latin origin. 
 It is therefore clear that immigration does not tend 
 much to modify national characteristics, and proof of the 
 strictly Latin character of the population is found in the 
 immigration returns from 1867 to 1890. In that period 
 54,000 immigrants, exclusive of Brazilians, landed in 
 Uruguayan territory, of whom 1066 were British and 
 1353 German, no fewer than 25,000 being Italians and 
 14,000 Spaniards. 
 
1900] EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES 225 
 
 Public instruction in Uruguay has been neglected, 
 partly in consequence of the apathetic attitude of the 
 people, and partly because the National Treasury has 
 been persistently pilfered to supply the greed of Govern- 
 ment officials, leaving but little money available to meet 
 the expenses incidental to an efficient educational system. 
 The teachers in the public schools are underpaid and 
 salaries usually months in arrear, although in this latter 
 respect an improvement took place under Cuestas. 
 Nominally, the attendance of all children between the ages 
 of six and fourteen years is obligatory at the elementary 
 schools, but small effort is made to enforce this law, and 
 in many country districts the population is so scattered 
 that distance makes a daily visit to a school-house 
 impossible. According to official statistics for 1898, 
 there were 540 public and 344 private elementary schools, 
 the rolls of the former showing an attendance of 49,733 
 pupils, and of the latter 22,509, while the numbers of 
 teachers employed were respectively 1069 and 890. This 
 shows one teacher to every 46 pupils in the public schools, 
 and one for every 26 in the private. The total number of 
 children who should have attended school in 1898 was 
 estimated at 138,200, whereas the actual rolls of the 
 public and private schools only accounted for 72,242. 
 In 1898 the cost of public elementary education was 
 $671,633 T 8 cRr, or $13ttto for each pupil. No adequate 
 system of inspection is provided. 
 
 For secondary and higher education the University 
 at Montevideo was in 1898 equipped with a staff of 91 
 professors and teachers for 684 students. The training 
 at this establishment is not satisfactory on account of 
 the superficial way all studies are pursued. Lack of 
 attention to detail is the most defective point. In 
 Montevideo there is also a School of Arts and Trades, 
 maintained by the National Commission of Caridad 
 y Beneficeneia Publico,, at which there were 243 
 apprentices in 1898. All trades are taught, and classes 
 are held for instruction in telegraphy, drawing and 
 music. In addition to the official institutions for higher 
 
226 URUGUAY 
 
 education, there are religious ones. Taking a broad view 
 of the educational question, it may be said that for the 
 richer classes there exist fair public and private facilities 
 for instruction, but for the poorer people the opportunities 
 are restricted in all directions, and the system of ele- 
 mentary education especially calls for reforms. 
 
 The administration of justice is another cause of 
 constant complaints, procedure in both criminal and civil 
 courts being tedious and costly. The criminal, civil, and 
 commercial laws are codified, and if intelligently and 
 honestly administrated, would serve. No discretion is 
 used, however, in making judicial appointments, and the 
 result is ignorant judges and magistrates. Necessary 
 reform would entail the elimination of the personal 
 influence candidates can bring to bear upon politicians 
 in power, and this is unlikely at present. In the matter 
 of criminal justice, no better example of the inadequacy 
 of punishment for serious offences can be quoted than 
 the sentence passed upon the murderer of President 
 Idiarte Borda. The assassination was committed in cold 
 blood, no extenuating circumstances were brought to 
 light, and the verdict was one of two years imprisonment 
 only. Nor is this an isolated case. Uruguayans and 
 foreigners have been murdered on many recent occasions, 
 and no severe penalties were inflicted as a deterrent to 
 such crimes in the future. 
 
 Uruguayan character is a curious mixture of narrow- 
 minded conservatism, tempered occasionally with ambi- 
 tion which inadequate mental training does not allow 
 to crystallise into deeds. Jealousy of the foreigner and 
 foreign enterprise is a marked trait. In the northern 
 districts are many families of Brazilian origin, and with 
 them all evolution is slow. They consider that what 
 was good enough for their forefathers will serve to-day, 
 and often a wealthy landed proprietor is content to dwell 
 in a hovel rather than spend a small sum to obtain the 
 commonest comforts of life. These descendants of 
 Brazilians cling tenaciously to their landed property, 
 and are loath to contract loans on their estates even for 
 
1900] URUGUAYAN CHARACTER 227 
 
 permanent improvements. The lower class Uruguayan 
 is intensely ignorant, and a prey to every description 
 of superstition, especially in regard to religion, although 
 generally apathetic as to the real tenets of Christianity. 
 The influence of the Roman Catholic Church is far- 
 reaching in Uruguay, and although the majority of the 
 male population pay small attention to religion, they 
 never rid themselves of a sense of fear of the conse- 
 quences of direct disobedience to clerical authority ; 
 but over the women the Roman Catholic clergy main- 
 tain a strong hold. In the country districts the priest- 
 hood can seldom claim a high standard of education, 
 being often recruited from the small farmer class, 
 amongst whom a knowledge of reading and writing 
 passes as a claim to scholarship. 
 
 To turn to other points of material interest : — Lack 
 of means of communication has been one of the principal 
 obstacles to the development of industrial enterprise, but 
 in recent years the construction of railways has brought 
 improvement in this respect. Much, however, remains 
 to be done. At present there are 1200 miles of standard 
 gauge railway open, the principal lines running from 
 Montevideo to the river Uruguay, with the feeders north- 
 wards to the southern frontier of Brazil. A new road 
 taps the agricultural lands in the western districts 
 towards Colonia. The capital invested in railways is 
 $70,000,000, and if the various lines, already partly built, 
 are completed, this will be increased to $97,000,000. 
 
 Away from the chief towns practically no attempt 
 has been made to build roads for wheeled traffic, and for 
 this neglect there is no excuse. Stone can be obtained 
 in all districts, labour is not abnormally expensive, and 
 the amount of bridgework required does not constitute a 
 serious obstacle. Many districts are inaccessible at the 
 present time for any form of transport except horses or 
 mules. 
 
 Nature has been beneficent to Uruguay in regard to 
 waterways, but the rivers and streams have been 
 utilised only in haphazard fashion. The construction 
 
228 URUGUAY 
 
 of a deep-water port at Montevideo is necessary to 
 provide facilities for the transhipment of cargo from 
 ocean steamers to river craft, and on the initiative of 
 President Cuestas this work was begun. Meanwhile, 
 the greater attractions afforded by Buenos Aires have 
 drawn to Argentina a large proportion of the trade 
 which belonged formerly to Uruguay. The river Plate 
 on the south offers cheap carriage for all agricultural 
 and pastoral produce if facilities for shipping were 
 available. At only one place, however, the new port 
 of Sauce, has any attempt been made to provide it. 
 The river Uruguay on the western boundary has all 
 the attributes for an excellent waterway, but want of 
 energy in the Government has prevented any effort to 
 dredge a channel through the shoals near Paysandu, so 
 that when the river is low it becomes navigable only for 
 craft of shallow draught. 
 
 Hitherto pastoral industry has been the principal 
 occupation of the Uruguayans, and in many respects 
 ideal conditions exist for stock farming. The grasses 
 are good, running streams obviate the necessity of 
 expensive wells, the undulating character of the land is 
 a safeguard against excessive damp, and the temperate 
 climate is a guarantee against disease and pests. The 
 northern half of the country is chiefly devoted to cattle, 
 the south to large sheep farms. Of late years the breed 
 of cattle has been improved by importation of Durham 
 and Hereford stock, and to such an extent that strains 
 of foreign blood run through all herds. Cattle are 
 exported abroad, but the saladero (jerked beef) 
 establishments provide the main outlet for the surplus 
 stock, this term also including the extract of meat 
 factory of the Liebig Company at Fray Bentos. In 
 1896 the number of animals slaughtered at the saladeros 
 was 703,000; in 1897, 670,000; and in 1898, 612,700. 
 The exact number of horned cattle in Uruguay is 
 difficult to ascertain. In 1898, returns showed 4,826,675, 
 but a footnote states this to be probably far short of the 
 real total. 
 
1900] INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION 229 
 
 Few countries possess greater natural facilities for 
 sheep-farming. The pasturage in the south and west is 
 rich, the lands healthy, and Uruguayan wool is clean 
 and preferred to Argentine. In 1898 there were 
 15,536,889 sheep; the value of wool exported to 
 European markets was $10,716,158, and the weight 
 41,011,562 kilos. According to these returns, the 
 approximate weight of fleece was six pounds — an 
 exceptionally heavy average. Of late years flock- 
 masters have improved the breed by the importation of 
 foreign blood. Comparatively few live sheep are 
 exported, only 114,093 in the year to which all these 
 statistics apply. 
 
 It is only in the past dozen years that agriculture 
 has become important. As better transport facilities 
 were established a marked development took place. 
 Maize, long cultivated only for local use, has now 
 become an important article of export. A few years 
 ago the quantity of wheat grown was insufficient to 
 supply home demand, and now Brazil draws a consider- 
 able proportion of her breadstuff's from Uruguay. In 
 1896 the shipments of maize were 89,895 tons ; in 1897 
 they were 1377 tons ; and in 1898, 12,575 tons. During 
 these same years the exports of wheat to foreign markets 
 were 6390 tons, 12,548 tons, and 77,231 tons. In 1896, 
 17,714 tons of flour were shipped abroad ; in 1897, 
 11,454 tons ; and in 1898, 296 tons. The area sown with 
 cereals was 1,500,000 acres in 1900. Of 22,000 farmers, 
 about one-half are owners of the soil they till. 
 
 Olives and vines are also cultivated. The first 
 vineyard in Uruguay was planted in 1874, since when 
 the industry has grown apace, so that by 1897 the 
 number had increased to 824, covering 8916 acres, and 
 containing 15,243,268 plants, whose total yield of grapes 
 in 1898 reached 7388 tons. Of this crop, 2041 tons 
 were sold as fresh fruit, and 5347 tons made into wine, 
 besides 24,149 litres of grape and 9367 litres of wine 
 alcohol. 
 
 Olive orchards have been planted near Salto and at 
 
230 URUGUAY 
 
 other places. So far the production is only sufficient 
 for the local demand, but the supply is steadily increas- 
 ing. The olive trees flourish in many districts, and are 
 a profitable investment ; but the long wait before a return 
 is obtained has hindered extension in the area planted. 
 Recently, several farmers have grown tobacco with fair 
 results, the amount sent into Montevideo in 1897 being 
 165 tons, and 260 tons in 1898. 
 
 The principal hindrance to development everywhere 
 is the exceedingly heavy taxation, which makes every- 
 thing required for the use of producers abnormally dear. 
 Undertakings that in more favourable circumstances 
 would show a fair profit, only leave a bare living wage. 
 National taxes alone amount to $18 per head, and in 
 addition there are municipal charges averaging less 
 than $5 per head. No wonder, therefore, that industry 
 is throttled, especially in a country where little wealth 
 has been accumulated. 
 
 In 1898 the total number of landed proprietors was 
 returned as 67,112, and the value of real estate as 
 $278, 704, 000. Of these owners 36, 579 were Uruguayans 
 with lands worth $143,083,809, and 30,533 foreigners 
 with estates valued at $135,620,606. Upon 2634 
 properties mortgages were registered to the value of 
 $5,501,610. The Italians are the largest foreign land 
 owners, with holdings worth $35,000,000. The Spaniards 
 follow with $32,000,000, then Brazilians with $30,000,000, 
 and French with $16,000,000. The property of British 
 subjects is valued at $10,000,000, Argentines account for 
 $5,000,000, and Germans for $3,000,000, Portuguese for 
 $1,500,000, and Swiss and North Americans for 
 $1,000,000 each. This large proportion of foreign to 
 native holders has a tendency to decrease, because many 
 children of present proprietors are born in the country, 
 and are, therefore, native citizens. The fact that there 
 are no waste lands renders it unlikely that any rush of 
 settlers from abroad can occur to counterbalance this 
 natural shrinkage of the foreign ownership. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 BRAZIL 
 
 Brazil after the Paraguayan War. Influence of Dom Pedro II. His 
 Reputation in Europe. Quick Recovery in Economic Conditions. 
 Dom Pedro visits Europe. Immigration Projects. Personality 
 of Dom Pedro. His wish to benefit Brazil. His Admiration 
 for the United States. Princess Isabel and the Conde d'Eu. 
 Church Influence and the Princess. Unpopularity of the Conde. 
 Brazil and the Imperial Regime. Political Situation, 1870-1880. 
 Effect of August Comte on Brazilian Character. Sao Paulo and 
 Republican Doctrines. The Emperor and Republican Ideas. 
 Rio Grande do Sul. Reason for German Settlements in the 
 Southern Provinces. The Emperor and Railway Extension. 
 Public Instruction. The Emperor and Higher Education. The 
 Clergy and Education. Internal Development of Brazil. Third 
 Visit of Dom Pedro to Europe. Abolition of Slavery. Acts in 
 Relation to Emancipation. Treatment of Brazilian Slaves 
 Troubles in Sao Paulo. Enmity of Plantation Owners to 
 Emancipation. Seditious Feeling gaining ground. Return of 
 Dom Pedro to Rio. Inconsistencies in the Parliamentary System. 
 The Ouro Preto Ministry. Unpopularity of Cabinet. Ouro 
 Preto supported by Dom Pedro. Political Position strained. 
 Plot to overthrow Ministry. Younger Officers urge Deposition 
 of Emperor. Seditious Feeling runs Riot. Military Conspirators. 
 Generals da Fonseca and Floriano Peixoto Leaders of the Move- 
 ment. The Fete in Rio de Janeiro. The Palace surrounded. 
 Arrest of Dom Pedro. Public Buildings occupied by Rebels. 
 Barao de Ladario Wounded. Proclamation of General da Fonseca. 
 Provincial Governors support Republic. Fonseca proclaimed 
 Provisional President. Dom Pedro sent to Portugal. Country 
 accepts Change with Indifference. Discontent in Sao Paulo. 
 Monarchists and Public Life. Brazilians condone Revolution. 
 Praetorian Administration. Reaction in Sao Paulo. Imaginary 
 Plot against Government. Arbitraiy Measures. New Banking 
 Laws. Misiones Question. Congress summoned. Law of Con- 
 stitution. Presidential Election. 
 
 The close of the Paraguayan war found Brazil exhausted. 
 The seven years' struggle in Paraguay against the 
 
232 BRAZIL 
 
 Dictator Lopez proved a heavy drain in men and money. 
 Success had cost 50,000 lives, and to maintain the army 
 Brazilian credit had been heavily mortgaged. Industrial 
 progress was severely checked by the long war, and no 
 direct benefit obtained to compensate for the expendi- 
 ture of blood and money. Brazil had rid herself of a 
 neighbour occasionally troublesome, but this was her 
 only gain in joining forces with Argentina and Uruguay 
 for bringing to an end the piratical tendencies of Lopez. 
 
 The attention of both Government and people was 
 required to set internal affairs in order, and the recovery 
 was rapid. The central figure at this period was the 
 Emperor, Dom Pedro II., and his influence at home and 
 abroad was of paramount importance to the Brazilians 
 in this crisis, for Dom Pedro inspired confidence in 
 Europe and rendered foreign loans possible. At home 
 also conviction of his probity induced many wealthy 
 Brazilians to come forward to help the Government in 
 its hour of need. A sense of security under his future 
 guidance caused free investment of capital in business 
 and industry. Soon a marked improvement was visible 
 in the general economic conditions, so that by 1875 
 the worst effects of the recent war were obliterated, 
 and Brazil was again on the high road to substantial 
 prosperity. 
 
 Shortly after the war with Paraguay the Emperor 
 decided on a journey to Europe. His object was two- 
 fold. Dom Pedro considered his presence in London 
 would assist certain financial arrangements then 
 pending ; he wished also to obtain rest after the long 
 strain imposed by the events of the preceding years. 
 Europe received the Brazilian ruler with cordial 
 sympathy, and his personality favourably impressed all 
 who came in contact with him. Facts concerning Brazil 
 and her people were explained, plans for European 
 immigration perfected, and encouragement offered to 
 European settlers to make a home in Brazilian 
 territory. 
 
 Brazil owes much to the personality of the late 
 
Dom Pedro II., Emperor of Brazil. 
 
 [Face page 232. 
 
1875] ])<)M PEDKO II. 233 
 
 Emperorl Dom Pedro II. was dignified in public and 
 private life, gentle and considerate to an unusual degree 
 
 in all his dealings with his fellow-men. His kindness 
 of heart often, indeed, led him to condone acts on the 
 part of his subjects deserving punishment and censure. 
 His dislike of autocratic authority was mistaken by 
 many people for weakness, and presumed upon at times 
 to an unwarranted extent. The Emperor's customs 
 were simple. He had no liking for ostentatious luxury. 
 His tastes lay in the direction, of literary pursuits, and 
 he wished rather to be known as savomt than to be 
 thought of in the light of his imperial dignities. He 
 attempted to master many subjects, but had insufficient 
 leisure for constant study. Foreign travel, making the 
 acquaintance of other nationalities, delving into the 
 peculiarities of Europeans and Americans, attracted the 
 Emperor's most lively interest. Attached to the Roman 
 Catholic faith by association and education, Dom Pedro 
 was yet broad-minded and tolerant on all points of 
 theological controversy. In no country in the world 
 was there greater freedom for discussion of doctrinal 
 subjects than in Brazil under his rule. The Emperor 
 was a thoroughly patriotic Brazilian, and loved to 
 wander unattended through town and country, talking 
 to this or that chance person as man to man. The 
 problem of how best to further the civilisation and 
 progress of Brazil was the keynote of Dom Pedro's 
 policy. He made close and extended study of economic 
 questions, calling to his assistance a variety of expert 
 opinions abroad and at home. His conclusions were 
 conservative, and he regarded gradual evolution as better 
 fitted to Brazilian character than the violent changes 
 that must follow wholesale adoption of American and 
 European methods of thought and action. For the 
 United States the Emperor had profound admiration, 
 and he spoke with enthusiasm of his experiences in that 
 country; but he quite realised that experiments so 
 successfully carried out in North America were im- 
 possible amongst his own people. 
 
234 BRAZIL 
 
 In sharp contrast to the personality of the Emperor 
 were those of his daughter Princess Isabel and her 
 husband the Conde d'Eu. As heiress to the Imperial 
 Throne public interest centred round the Princess and 
 her consort. Many of the traits the Brazilians most 
 loved in the father were lacking in the daughter, for 
 Princess Isabel was autocratic and reserved in manner, 
 and her ideas of religious tolerance were narrow-minded. 
 Church influence was a strong factor in her life, and 
 was unpopular so far as the more highly educated 
 classes were concerned. The Conde d'Eu possessed 
 few qualities acceptable to the people of his adoption. 
 His cold demeanour in public, accentuated by slight 
 deafness, repelled the majority of those with whom he 
 was brought into contact, and his reputation of being 
 close fisted in money matters did not add to his attrac- 
 tiveness. The fact that he was a foreigner was a point 
 which the people of Brazil were never quite able to 
 overlook, and it made his position difficult. 
 
 Possibly, feeling in regard to monarchical institutions 
 in Brazil might have been modified if the Princess had 
 chosen some scion of Portuguese royalty for her mate ; 
 but as matters stood a quarter of a century ago the 
 popular sentiment was decidedly lukewarm, if not 
 actually hostile, to the legal successor to Dom Pedro. 
 This condition of affairs was not of paramount import- 
 ance whilst the Emperor was in the prime of life, his 
 influence serving to counteract any decided discontent 
 as to future prospects ; but the seeds of dissatisfaction 
 were there, and they grew apace as old age crept over 
 Dom Pedro. It was therefore no surprise to thinking 
 people when the eruption took place in 1889, but that 
 both Princess Isabel and her husband were misjudged 
 in many respects is scarcely open to doubt. Both were 
 charitable and determined to do their duty by Brazil ; 
 but their personal unpopularity overshadowed all other 
 considerations. 
 
 Between 1870 and 1880 the political situation practi- 
 cally hinged upon the two factors of the popularity of 
 
1880] PRINCESS ISABEL 235 
 
 the Emperor and the growing dislike to Princess Isabel 
 and her husband, from which came a development des- 
 tined to alter the course of Brazilian history. The theory 
 of positivism preached by Auguste Comte and his disciple 
 Benjamin Constant found ready acceptance with the 
 Brazilians. These doctrines as interpreted in South 
 America were given a strong revolutionary and re- 
 actionary character at variance with the distinctly 
 conservative tendency hitherto a marked feature in 
 Brazilian national character. Republican societies were 
 formed, and republican principles strongly advocated in 
 different quarters. The Province of Sao Paulo was the 
 centre of the movement. It was stated by the sup- 
 porters of this agitation that no attempt would be made 
 to overthrow existing institutions during the lifetime of 
 Dom Pedro, and these assertions were made in good 
 faith at the time. 
 
 The Emperor was aware of this spread of republican 
 ideas, but took no steps to check the movement. He 
 relied upon his personal influence to counterbalance the 
 effect of subversive doctrines, and failed to realise that 
 the object of the campaign was not intended to injure 
 himself, but directed against the Princess. Thus he 
 completely underestimated the strength and significance 
 of the movement. 
 
 Meanwhile, in certain sections of Brazil, local affairs 
 were none too tranquil, and in the south trouble broke 
 out. Rio Grande do Sul contained a turbulent popula- 
 tion, whose revolt against the Imperial Authorities was 
 frequent. The province was difficult for troops to reach, 
 and the Uruguayan frontier afforded easy escape for 
 insurgents when hard pressed by Government forces. 
 Desultory skirmishing was checked only by occasional 
 concessions, or by the rebellious faction tiring for a 
 season of living in perpetual turmoil. Foreign immigra- 
 tion to these southern provinces was encouraged by 
 Dom Pedro as a check upon the turbulent spirit of 
 these people. German settlements were founded in the 
 neighbourhood of Porto Alegre in Rio Grande do Sul, 
 
236 BKA2IL 
 
 at Blumenau in Santa Catharina, and at Curityba in 
 Paranagua. In 1878 a truce was patched up with the 
 Rio Grande insurgents, and for a time order was 
 restored. 
 
 In 1880 the Emperor sought fresh means to develop 
 the natural resources of Brazil, and determined upon an 
 extension of the railway system. It was decided to 
 guarantee the interest on capital employed by foreign 
 companies in the construction of the required works, 
 and also to build certain lines at Government expense. 
 The inauguration of this policy was not long delayed, 
 and although not carried out as fully as originally 
 intended, it has proved a great help to the producing 
 power of the country. 
 
 The Emperor took great personal interest in higher 
 education, but the instruction of the labouring classes 
 was neglected, economic conditions contributing to apathy 
 in this direction. Slavery was still a legal institution, 
 and the Church retained as far as possible the direction 
 of educational progress. The priesthood in Brazil was 
 bigoted and ignorant, and made small exertion to raise 
 the intellectual level of the people. 
 
 Between 1880 and 1886 the internal development of 
 Brazil steadily continued, and the national credit rose to 
 a high level which conduced to social stability. The 
 main source of wealth was coffee-growing, but other 
 industries began to show vigorous signs of vitality, 
 especially in the direction of the manufacture of 
 textiles. 
 
 Dom Pedro determined, in 1886, on another visit 
 to Europe, his third journey abroad since the close of 
 the Paraguayan War. He went partly in connection 
 with public business, and partly to recoup his health 
 and indulge his love of travel and desire to keep in 
 touch with foreign civilisation and evolution. Princess 
 Isabel was granted the powers of E-egent during his 
 absence. It was impossible for the Emperor to 
 anticipate the momentous results arising from this 
 journey to foreign lands, and he left Brazil confident 
 
1887] DOM PEDRO VISITS EUROPE 237 
 
 he would find political affairs undisturbed, and economic 
 prosperity satisfactorily assured, on his return. 
 
 After the departure of Dom Pedro in 1887, the first 
 important act of the Princess Regent related to slavery. 
 The Emperor was an abolitionist, but he favoured the 
 gradual extinction of slavery rather than its sudden 
 suppression, for he feared that immediate freedom of 
 the negroes without compensation to owners would 
 entail grave difficulties. For one thing the financial 
 situation did not permit of adequate monetary assistance 
 to producers for the substitution of free for forced 
 labour. The Princess thought differently. She was 
 convinced the right policy to pursue was abolition 
 throughout the Empire, leaving the labour question to 
 be settled by demand and supply. Subsequent events 
 proved her to be not far wrong, but she attached too 
 little weight to the political aspect of the question. 
 
 A law known as A Lihertacao do ventre (the freedom 
 of the belly) had been enacted on September 28, 1871, 
 and provided freedom for children of slaves born after 
 that date. This measure was generally referred to as 
 the Rio Branco law, the Visconde do Rio Branco being 
 President of the Council when it was enacted. On 
 September 28, 1885, a further law provided that all 
 slaves attaining the age of sixty years were free. The 
 Emperor intended to suppress slavery, but to allow the 
 chauge to come gradually, so that slave owners could 
 make the necessary arrangements to secure free labour. 
 There was no great complaint that Brazilian slaves 
 were specially maltreated, although cases of cruelty 
 undoubtedly occurred at intervals, and not infrequently 
 neglect was apparent in the supply of food and clothing. 
 But these faults were the exception and not the rule. 
 A disturbance, however, in 1887, in the province of Sao 
 Paulo, brought the slavery question to the front. Many 
 Italian immigrants had settled in the province, and 
 these people held that slave labour interfered with the 
 class of work they were fitted to undertake. They 
 therefore encouraged desertion, and, as the local 
 
238 BRAZIL 
 
 authorities were unable to enforce the return of runa- 
 ways, an appeal was made to Rio de Janeiro for 
 assistance. Troops were thereupon despatched to Sao 
 Paulo, but the men in the ranks refused to serve when 
 they understood the duty required. The Princess 
 Regent took advantage of the incident to press for 
 immediate abolition. In vain the Ministry warned her 
 of the political danger, she turned a deaf ear to all 
 remonstrance ; and when it was hinted that such action 
 would undermine the security of the Throne, she said 
 that her Throne might be lost, but the slaves should 
 be free. Senhor Joao Alfredo Corr£a de Oliveira was 
 President of the Council, and Senhor Rodrigo Augusto 
 da Silva Minister of Agriculture, when this determina- 
 tion of the Princess was taken, and upon them fell 
 the duty of carrying into effect the royal wishes and 
 commands. 
 
 On May 7, 1888, the Minister of Agriculture 
 requested the Secretary of the Chamber of Deputies to 
 name a day and hour for presentation to the House of a 
 proposition from the Executive Power. Next day at 
 2 p.m. was designated, and the Committee appointed to 
 receive the Minister then introduced him to the 
 Chamber. After the usual formalities the Minister 
 stated : — " August and worthy Representatives of the 
 Nation, — I come by order of Her Highness the Imperial 
 Princess Regent, in the name of His Majesty the 
 Emperor, to present the following project : — 
 
 " Art. 1. Slavery in Brazil is declared extinct. 
 
 " Art. 2. All Acts to the contrary are revoked. 
 
 "The Palace of Rio de Janeiro, May 8, 1888— 
 Rodrigo A. da Silva.'" 
 
 For three days the measure was debated in the 
 Chamber of Deputies, strenuously championed by 
 Senhor Joaquin Nabuco and opposed by Senhor 
 Andrade Figueira on the grounds of the injustice of 
 immediate emancipation without money compensation 
 to the owners. But on May 10 the Act passed, and 
 next day it was submitted to the Senate and sanctioned 
 
1888] ABOLITION OF SLAVERY 239 
 
 after a discussion lasting for three sittings. The Royal 
 Decree followed on the 15th, emancipating all slaves 
 within the dominions of Brazil, and an immense show of 
 jubilation followed, public holidays being proclaimed for 
 a period of five days. 
 
 According to the last census compiled previous to 
 emancipation the total number of slaves in Brazil was 
 720,000, and no less than 600,000 of these were said to 
 be between the ages of eighteen and sixty years, classed 
 therefore as effective for active work. The assertions 
 made by the abolitionists that the total was only 
 500,000, were proved to be inaccurate by Senhor 
 Andrade Figueira in his speeches opposing the 
 measure. 
 
 Rejoicings were confined to the working classes of 
 the population and to those having no direct interest in 
 the slave question. But the great plantation owners 
 and many others pecuniarily injured opposed emancipa- 
 tion bitterly, and the effect upon this influential body 
 of people was to draw them nearer to the republican 
 propaganda which had been gaining strength for some 
 time past. We may therefore say that the final deter- 
 mination to abolish monarchy in Brazil dates from the 
 passage of this Act. No violent display was made by 
 the dissatisfied portion of the community; but sedition 
 was wide sown and encouragement thenceforth lent to 
 the ambitious group of military officers who saw in the 
 establishment of a republican administration many oppor- 
 tunities for advancement. Sao Paulo, the centre of 
 disaffection, gave evidence from time to time that some 
 upheaval might be expected, and occasionally rumours 
 of a disquieting nature drifted down to the imperial 
 capital. The leaders of the republican group were Dr 
 Prudente de Moraes Barros and Dr Campos Salles, and 
 allied with them was General Floriano Peixoto, an 
 officer in the Brazilian army. Since the overthrow of 
 the Empire each one of these three men has been 
 President of the Brazilian Republic. It was not this 
 republican caucus, however, that threatened the greatest 
 
240 BRAZIL 
 
 danger to the imperial regime, but rather the subaltern 
 officers of the army and the students at the military 
 school at Rio de Janeiro. Upon this element the 
 seditiously disposed senior military officers counted for 
 active support in any outbreak of a revolutionary 
 character. The insubordinate spirit amongst these 
 juniors was therefore encouraged, until it soon became 
 a menace to public order and military discipline. 
 
 Only vague rumours of the unsatisfactory political 
 situation reached the Emperor. There was no deliberate 
 intention to keep him uninformed ; but he was in ill 
 health, and his friends were anxious to spare him 
 unnecessary worry, and, moreover, they failed to gauge 
 the position accurately. Towards the middle of 1888, 
 however, the fact that seditious feeling was spreading 
 rapidly could not be disguised, and the return of the 
 Emperor became imperative. How far Dom Pedro 
 sanctioned the policy pursued by the Princess Isabel 
 during his absence has never been made public, but he 
 gave no outward sign of disapproval ; on the other 
 hand, he was on no very cordial terms with the Conde 
 d'Eu, the principal adviser of the Princess. 
 
 In August, 1888, the Emperor returned to Rio de 
 Janeiro, where an immense reception was organised to 
 greet him, sincere enough among the majority of 
 Brazilians. Throughout the festivities, however, there 
 was a note of uneasy feeling, and probably enough the 
 Emperor was aware of this discordant note in the pro- 
 ceedings ; but he was surrounded by his family and 
 intimate personal friends, and neither the Princess 
 Isabel nor the circle immediately about the Court 
 believed in any movement portending immediate danger. 
 Besides, the military were prominent in assisting at the 
 demonstrations of apparent loyalty and affection, and so 
 little evidence was visible that anything in the nature of 
 a conspiracy was afoot. Yet the plot was then hatched 
 for the overthrow of monarchical institutions, and the 
 conspirators only watched for a favourable opportunity. 
 They had not long to wait. 
 
1889] THE POLITICAL SITUATION 241 
 
 For years the parliamentary method of Government 
 under the imperial regime had drifted away from the 
 sound principles originally incorporated in the system. 
 Various Cabinets assumed authority to intervene directly 
 in many local affairs in a manner impolitic and irritating 
 to the community. Both Liberal and Conservative 
 Administrations were equally at fault in this respect. 
 As a result, log-rolling and favouritism had crept into 
 the life of both legislative chambers to an extent quite 
 at variance with the best traditions of Brazil. The 
 Ministry in power when the Act of Emancipation had 
 been passed was popular with the masses, but out of 
 favour with the former t slave-owners, and it resigned in 
 May, 1889. A new Cabinet was formed on June 7, 
 with the Vizconde de Ouro Preto as President of the 
 Council ; but the Ministers were chosen from the Liberal 
 Party, and were not popular with the powerful group of 
 plantation proprietors. Ouro Preto was an able and 
 loyal statesman ; but he was unable, or at all events 
 made no effort, to check the abuses which had grown 
 up in the administration of public affairs. The Opposi- 
 tion, therefore, determined to oust this Cabinet without 
 scruple as to the means employed. Dom Pedro liked and 
 respected the Vizconde de Ouro Preto, and extended 
 to him all 230ssible support without direct intervention 
 in the political situation, but the position he assumed 
 tended none the less to weaken his influence with 
 certain sections of the Brazilians. Still, the same feeling 
 which had controlled the action of the republican 
 theorists in former days animated the minds of the 
 majority now, and no desire was expressed to overthrow 
 the imperial regime forthwith. But the political 
 opponents of Ouro Preto became impatient when they 
 found that constitutional agitation failed to induce his 
 resignation, and some talk of a coup (fetat was heard, 
 with the avowed object of turning out the Ministry. 
 Certain officers of the army promised assistance, and 
 the movement was deferred only until circumstances 
 were propitious for its execution. 
 
 Q 
 
242 BRAZIL 
 
 The military element generally in Rio de Janeiro 
 were not satisfied with the political plan as originally 
 proposed. A majority of the younger officers wished 
 to depose the Emperor, and determined to seize this 
 occasion for a military rising, and proclaim a republic. 
 Dom Pedro's personal kindness towards individual 
 members of this revolutionary faction carried no weight. 
 Past favours were forgotten in view of alluring future 
 prospects, and ambitious sedition ran riot. These 
 military conspirators, in short, were clever enough to 
 see that in the existing political irritation no strong 
 effort would be made to uphold the imperial regime, 
 no matter how much regret might be felt personally for 
 the Emperor. The idea of the chief movers in the con- 
 spiracy was to seize control of public affairs in the name 
 of a republic, and then dominate the country by a 
 military administration under the guise of republican 
 institutions. General Deodoro da Eonseca and General 
 Eloriano Peixoto, two officers whose advancement in 
 the military service was due to favours extended by the 
 Emperor, were chosen as leaders of the military move- 
 ment. For weeks before the rising occurred frequent 
 discussions took place at meetings held in different 
 quarters, and the inhabitants were prepared for an out- 
 break at any moment. 
 
 On the evening of November 14, 1889, Rio de Janeiro 
 was en fete. The Emperor, then living with his family 
 at the royal palace in Petropolis, was present at a great 
 ball, to which all prominent residents of the Brazilian 
 capital were invited, and the festivities continued until 
 the early hours of the following morning, Dom Pedro 
 and his suite retiring to Petropolis before the close of 
 the entertainment. The military conspiracy determined 
 to strike on this night, and at 5 a.m. next morning the 
 Imperial Palace was surrounded by a detachment of 
 soldiers, the officer in charge being instructed to permit 
 access or egress to nobody until further orders. An escort 
 was detailed to enter the palace and take possession, 
 while a detachment despatched to Petropolis arrested the 
 
1889] THE EMPIRE OVERTHROWN 243 
 
 Emperor and brought him to Rio de Janeiro. Mean- 
 while the principal government buildings in the city 
 had been occupied by the rebels. Practically only one 
 official, the Baron de Ladario, Minister of Marine, raised 
 his voice in protest against these revolutionary proceed- 
 ings. He was in his office when the republican forces 
 arrived, and was called upon to surrender ; but refusing, 
 was shot at and wounded. He subsequently recovered, 
 and no other bloodshed occurred. Early in the morning 
 a proclamation was issued by General Deodoro da 
 Fonseca, stating that the Emperor had been deposed 
 and that a republican form of government would be 
 created for Brazil. The imperial crown was cut out of 
 the badges on official uniforms, and the present flag 
 ordered to be used in place of the Royal Standard. 
 Provincial governors were notified of the course of 
 events, and without exception adhered to the movement. 
 General Deodoro da Fonseca was then proclaimed 
 provisional President of the Republic, and nominated a 
 Ministry from the circle of his immediate supporters. 
 He intended that the supreme power should rest with 
 the military element, and in all these steps General 
 Floriano Peixoto was his principal adviser. 
 
 A few days after the military revolt, Dom Pedro and 
 his family were sent to Portugal, and with the departure 
 of the Emperor any idea in the minds of his friends of 
 an immediate effort to reverse the events of November 15 
 fell to the ground. The country accepted the change of 
 government with the utmost indifference. In Sao Paulo, 
 the centre of the real republican spirit, prominent 
 politicians were not satisfied with the manner the change 
 had been effected, but decided to await developments, 
 and endeavour later to obtain fair representation in the 
 Administration and Legislature. The supporters of 
 monarchist principles made no sign, and practically 
 dropped out of sight. 
 
 No attempt was made to confiscate the property of 
 Dom Pedro, and, subsequently, a pension was offered to 
 him, but refused. Nor was there interference for the 
 
244 BRAZIL 
 
 moment with monarchist families. They were regarded 
 as a harmless factor in the situation. It must also be 
 said, to the credit of the military conspirators, that no 
 unnecessary indignities were offered to the Emperor and 
 those who followed him into exile. The circumstances 
 of the revolt were unjustified by the causes for existing 
 discontent ; but many intelligent Brazilians condoned it, 
 on the ground that it would have occurred in any case 
 upon the death of Dom Pedro, and that if the change 
 had been made after the accession of Princess Isabel, 
 it would have entailed violence and bloodshed. As 
 matters stood in November 1889, the majority of the in- 
 habitants were satisfied that the upheaval had happened 
 so quietly, and they were prepared to wait tranquilly to 
 see the course that public affairs would take. 
 
 This comparatively apathetic attitude in connection 
 with the deposition of Dom Pedro received a severe 
 shock when the true character of the men at the head 
 of affairs became understood. Most Brazilians enter- 
 tained an innate dislike to militarism, and for more 
 than half a century under the kindly rule of Dom Pedro 
 individual rights and civil liberty had been respected. 
 A very different state of affairs now came to the fore. 
 General Deocloro da Fonseca no sooner found himself 
 securely installed as chief of the Provisional Government, 
 than he instituted a system of praetorian administration 
 at variance with all Brazilian traditions. Unbridled 
 military despotism was apparent in every quarter, and 
 officers of the army were appointed to all important 
 official posts. An ignorant soldiery was permitted 
 unwarranted license in cities and towns, but the 
 inhabitants, galled and frightened, were too timid to 
 make open protest against the injustice they suffered. 
 In the province of Sao Paulo the reaction against this 
 outburst of praetorianism was stronger than elsewhere ; 
 but no open resistance was offered. But the political 
 leaders of that province determined to make every effort 
 to place their candidate in power at the first election for 
 the Presidency. It was recognised that the outcome of 
 
Deodoro da Fonseca. 
 
 Trudente de Moraes Barros. 
 
 President Campos Salles. 
 
 General Bittencourt. 
 
 [lace page 244. 
 
1890] CHURCH AND STATE SEPARATION 245 
 
 the military plot had succeeded beyond the wildest 
 dreams of the conspirators, and that the men concerned 
 had completely lost their heads in consequence. The 
 country hoped and believed that this phase of despotism 
 was only temporary, and that it would cease when the 
 responsibilities of government were appreciated by those 
 who presided over the direction of public affairs. 
 
 On December 18, 1889, a drunken row occurred 
 amongst a group of soldiers. This rioting was magnified 
 into a seditious outbreak against the Provisional Govern- 
 ment, and a decree was issued on the 23rd, imposing 
 arbitrary Press restrictions, and providing a military 
 tribunal with powers to try summarily cases of persons 
 accused of treasonable conduct. Some arrests were 
 made, but no proof discovered that any conspiracy was 
 afoot. On January 7, 1890, the Provisional Govern- 
 ment published another decree, by which the separation 
 of Church and State was ordered. This measure created 
 lively dissatisfaction, the majority of educated Brazilians 
 contending that an Act so intimately connected with the 
 internal conditions of the country should only be enacted 
 after the consent and approval of a responsible Congress. 
 Then followed measures in connection with banking 
 laws and the emission of paper money, affecting seriously 
 trade and commerce. Another unpopular Act, in 1890, 
 was the despatch of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
 Buenos Aires to negotiate the settlement of the Misiones 
 boundary question with the Argentine Government. 
 The treaty concluded by Minister Bocayuva conceded 
 so many advantages to Argentina that Brazilians con- 
 sidered that they had been duped. 
 
 General Deodoro da Fonseca erected the former 
 provinces of Brazil into autonomous states, and from 
 these was summoned a Congress of national representa- 
 tives. This body met in Rio de Janeiro on November 15, 
 1890, and a draft Law of Constitution was submitted by 
 the Provisional Government for approval and ratifica- 
 tion. After various modifications, this law was passed 
 by Congress on February 24, 1891, one of its provisions 
 
246 BRAZIL 
 
 being that the first President and Vice-President of the 
 republic should be elected by the Congress. Next day 
 the voting for these two offices took place. As the 
 result, General da Fonseca was named President, and 
 General Floriano Peixoto, Vice-President. The total 
 number of votes cast was 234, and of these da Fonseca 
 received 129, and Dr Prudente de Moraes Barros 97. 
 The latter represented the civilian republican element 
 centred in Sao Paulo, and his defeat therefore implied 
 the continuance of the existing praetorian system. 
 
 With the Law of Constitution and the Presidential 
 election the dictatorial authority which General da 
 Fonseca had exercised unchecked for fifteen months 
 nominally ended, but subsequent events show how little 
 he allowed his actions to be controlled by the new law. 
 His election was the result of pressure upon the first 
 Brazilian Congress by the military party, and in no sense 
 represented popular feeling. 
 
 Under the Law of Constitution, the formal title of 
 The United States of Brazil was adopted. Each of the 
 former provinces became a state, administered without 
 interference from the Federal Government save for 
 defence, for the maintenance of public order, and for the 
 execution of the Federal laws. Fiscal arrangements in 
 connection with import duties, stamps, rates of postage, 
 and bank-note circulation, belong to the Federal 
 authority ; but export duties are exclusively the 
 property of the various states. The legislative power 
 is exercised by the National Congress, with the sanction 
 of the President of the republic. Congress consists of 
 two Houses, the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. 
 Provision is made for the Chambers to meet annually 
 on May 3, without convocation, unless another day be 
 fixed by law. The ordinary sessions last four months, 
 but may be prorogued or convoked for extraordinary 
 sittings. No member of Congress can contract with the 
 Executive Power, or accept any commission or paid 
 office, except such as are diplomatic, military, or imposed 
 by law. If, under ordinary circumstances, the accept- 
 
1890] THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 247 
 
 aiice of diplomatic or military employment would cause 
 the loss of the legislative services of any member the 
 consent of the Chamber to the appointment is required. 
 No member of Congress is permitted to take part in the 
 administration of any company drawing a subsidy from 
 the Federal Government. Deputies and Senators 
 receive a salary, but cannot be Ministers of State and 
 retain their seats in Congress. Deputies must have 
 been citizens for four years, and Senators must be above 
 the age of thirty-five years and have been Brazilian 
 citizens for six years. The Chamber of Deputies 
 consists of members elected by direct vote, providing 
 for the representation of the minority in proportion of 
 one for every 70,000 inhabitants, as shown by a 
 decennial census, but in such manner that no State 
 shall have less than four representatives. With the 
 Chamber of Deputies lies the initiative of all taxation. 
 The franchise extends to all citizens above twenty-one 
 years of age duly inscribed in the electoral registers, 
 with the exception of beggars, illiterates, soldiers 
 actually serving, and members of monastic orders under 
 vows of obedience. 
 
 The following table shows the number of Deputies 
 from the various States and the Federal district author- 
 ised by the Law of Constitution in 1891 : — 
 
 States. Deputies. 
 
 1. Amazones ... 4 
 
 2. Para. ... 7 
 
 3. Maranhao ... 7 
 
 4. Piauhy . . .4 
 
 5. Ceara . . .10 
 
 6. Rio Grande do Norte 4 
 
 7. Parahyba ... 5 
 
 8. Pernambuco . .17 
 
 9. Alagoas ... 6 
 
 10. Sergipe ... 4 
 
 11. Bahia ... 22 
 
 12. 
 13. 
 
 States. 
 Espirito Santo . 
 Rio de Janeiro . 
 
 Deputies 
 . 4 
 . 17 
 
 14. 
 
 Sao Paulo . 
 
 . 22 
 
 15. 
 
 Parana 
 
 . 4 
 
 16. 
 
 Santa Catharina 
 
 . 4 
 
 17. 
 
 Rio Grande do Sul 
 
 . 16 
 
 18. 
 
 Minas Geraes . 
 
 . 37 
 
 19. 
 
 20. 
 
 Goyaz 
 
 Matto Grosso . 
 
 . 4 
 . 4 
 
 21. 
 
 Federal District 
 
 . 10 
 
 Total 
 
 212 
 
 Senators, sixty-three in number, are chosen by direct 
 vote, three for each State and the Federal District, for 
 nine years. One-third of the Senate is renewed every 
 
248 BRAZIL 
 
 three years. The Vice-President of the Republic is 
 President of the Senate. 
 
 The Executive Authority is exercised by the Presi- 
 dent of the Republic. He must be a native of Brazil, 
 and have attained the age. of thirty-five years. His term 
 of office is four years, and he is not eligible for the 
 succeeding term. The constitution provides that Presi- 
 dent and Vice-President are elected by the people 
 directly by an absolute majority of votes. The presiden- 
 tial election is fixed for March 1, in the last year of each 
 presidential term. No candidate may be related by 
 blood or marriage, in the first or second degree, to the 
 actual President or Vice-President. The President has 
 the nomination and dismissal of ministers, the supreme 
 command of the army and navy, and, within certain 
 defined limits, the power to declare war and make peace. 
 With the consent of Congress the President appoints 
 the members of the Supreme Federal Tribunal and the 
 Diplomatic Ministers. No Minister can appear in Con- 
 gress, but must communicate with the Legislature by 
 letter or in conference with commissions nominated by 
 the Chamber. Ministers are not responsible to Congress 
 or to the Tribunals for advice tendered to the President 
 of the Republic. The Constitution provides for six 
 Secretaries of State at the head of the following depart- 
 ments : — (1) Finance, (2) Justice, Interior and Public 
 Instruction, (3) War, (4) Marine, (5) Foreign Affairs, (6) 
 Industry, Communications, and Public Works. 
 
 According to the new law each State must have its 
 administrative, legislative, and judicial authorities dis- 
 tinct and independent. The Governors and members of 
 the Legislatures must be elected. Magistrates must not 
 be elected or removed from office except by judicial sen- 
 tence. The Federal Executive is not permitted to 
 intervene directly in the local government of the States. 
 In cases of infringement of the Federal constitution by 
 State authorities the resource of the Federal Government 
 is an appeal to the Supreme Tribunal of the Federal 
 Districts. Provision is made for the administration of 
 
1890] EXTENDED LOCAL GOVERNMENT 249 
 
 the Federal District by an elected council, the municipal 
 authority being exercised by a Prefect appointed by the 
 President of the Republic. 
 
 This Law of Constitution was satisfactory theoreti- 
 cally from a republican standpoint ; but in several ways 
 it has proved impracticable in application. The country 
 was unprepared for the institution of the local govern- 
 ment conceded to it, independent authority in local 
 matters led to corrupt practices, and often left the 
 Federal Government powerless to correct most flagrant 
 abuses. The position accorded to the States of being 
 under no practical control by the Federal authorities 
 was an act of too sudden transition from the former 
 condition of dependent provinces. But the greatest 
 error in connection with the new law in the opinion of 
 many Brazilians was the formation of a Federal in place 
 of an Unitarian system of administration. To have 
 retained the new States in the category of Provinces, 
 with Governors nominated by the Federal Administra- 
 tion, would have reduced local expenditure and been 
 equally effective for administrative purposes. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 brazil — continued 
 
 Autocratic Administration. Sao Paulo dissatisfied. Manifesto 
 condemning Federal Authorities. Second Manifesto accusing 
 the President. Severity of Praetorian Regime. Chambers 
 Hostile to President. Congress refuses Supplies. Coup d'etat 
 of da Fonseca. The Chambers Dissolved. Martial Law. Presi- 
 dent da Fonseca as Dictator. Monarchist Conspiracies. The 
 Public and the President. General Peixoto becomes Prominent. 
 Sao Paulo disappoints Public Expectation. Rio Grande against 
 the Dictatorship. Para follows the lead of Rio Grande. Naval 
 Revolution in Rio. Arrests of Prominent Persons. President 
 Resigns. Vice-President Peixoto succeeds to the Presidency. 
 Riots in the Capital. Congress Re-assembles. Death of Dom 
 Pedro II. New Electoral Law. Militarism Dominant. Mutiny 
 at Santa Cruz. Intervention in Local Affairs. Question of New 
 Presidential Election. Protest of Officers. President and Con- 
 gress. Military Despotism. Insurrection in Rio Grande do Sul. 
 General Peixoto and Governors of States. Resignation of Marine 
 and Finance Ministers. Affairs in Rio Grande do Sul. Admiral 
 Wandelkolk and the Insurgents. Naval Revolt. Government 
 surprised. Admiral de Mello. Prolonged Conflict not expected. 
 Determination of Peixoto. Defence of Rio de Janeiro and 
 Nictheroy. Rebel Squadron and Resources. Bombardment of 
 Rio. Panic amongst Inhabitants. Italian Incident. Indemnity 
 Paid. Rebel Ships leave Rio. Object of sending Expedition to 
 South. Formation of Provisional Government. Situation in Rio 
 Harbour. Villegaignon joins Revolt. Explosion at Gouvernador 
 Island. The Aquidaban and Esperanga leave Harbour. Saldanha 
 da Gama joins Revolt. Supporters of Peixoto assert da Gama 
 attempting Restoration of Monarchy. 
 
 President Deodoro da Fonseca had learned little 
 from his experience whilst holding dictatorial power. 
 The Federal authority continued to intervene in local 
 
ji jst 
 
252 BRAZIL 
 
 short-sighted policy of not conciliating the Opposition 
 resulted in exasperating public feeling during the first 
 half of 1891, and when Congress met for the annual 
 session in June, 1891, it was evident a political explosion 
 could not be long deferred. The situation was the 
 more strained on account of distrust in regard to the 
 Baron Lucena, then Minister of Finance. 
 
 In the unpopularity of President da Fonseca lay the 
 opportunity of General Floriano Peixoto, Vice-President 
 of the Republic. Peixoto was ambitious, for in case of 
 the resignation or decease of President da Fonseca, he 
 would accede to the Presidency. Prominent in the 
 revolution against the Emperor he could count on a 
 strong following amongst the military element, and for 
 the moment he attracted the support of the civilian 
 section of Congress as the most convenient means of 
 ousting Fonseca from office. Without declaring his 
 intentions, General Peixoto became the centre of the 
 intrigue against the President. The plan adopted to 
 force the hand of Fonseca was simple. Every measure 
 sent into Congress by the Administration was blocked, 
 judicial and other appointments made by the Provisional 
 Government between 1889 and 1891 were declared 
 illegal on the grounds they were not sanctioned by the 
 Legislature, amendments to the Constitution were pro- 
 posed to curtail the presidential powers, and the 
 Chambers refused to vote supplies that the President 
 considered necessary. 
 
 In November, Congress was still in session, and 
 the relations between President and both Chambers 
 became so strained that Fonseca realised his position 
 was becoming untenable, and he determined upon a last 
 effort to make himself master of the situation. So on 
 the 3rd of the month Brazil was startled by the 
 publication of two decrees. The first was : — 
 
 The President of the Republic of the United States of Brazil, in 
 view of his explanation in a manifesto to the country, decrees : — 
 
 1. The National Congress, elected on September 15, 1890, is 
 dissolved. 
 
1891] STATE OF SIEGE DECLARED 253 
 
 2. The Nation is convoked to choose new representatives at a 
 date hereafter to be designated. 
 
 3. The Government will for this purpose issue electoral regulations, 
 ensuring entire freedom to the country in the choice of members of 
 the Chambers. 
 
 4. The new Congress will revise the Constitution of February 24, 
 of the present year, in regard to points to be made known in the 
 decree of convocation. 
 
 5. The revision will in no case relate to the constitutional 
 provisions establishing the Federal Republican form of Government, 
 and the inviolability of liberty and personal safety. 
 
 Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca. 
 Tristao de Alencar Araripe. 
 
 The second decree established a state of siege and 
 martial law in the Federal District and the city of 
 Nictheroy, the capital of the State of Rio. It was : — 
 
 Whereas, facts and circumstances related in the manifesto addressed 
 to the country, and from which it is evident there is imminent danger 
 to the preservation and stability of the republican form of Government 
 adopted in the Constitution of February 24 of the present year. 
 
 Whereas, it is most urgently necessary to check the movement for 
 restoration of monarchy and the dishonour and ruin of our country 
 which has commenced, and is clearly perceptible. 
 
 Whereas, the safety and security of the new institutions, which 
 are giving such progress and prosperity, demand prompt and extra- 
 ordinary measures to meet the exceeding grave danger now 
 threatening. 
 
 The President of the Republic of the United States of Brazil 
 decrees : — 
 
 1. The Federal District and the city of Nictheroy are declared in 
 a state of siege, and constitutional guarantees suspended for a space 
 of two months. 
 
 2. Any acts or demonstrations contrary to public security and 
 order will be severely punished. 
 
 3. The Government will appoint a commission to try summarily 
 the enemies of the Republic and those persons' who in any way 
 contribute to the disturbance of public order. 
 
 4. Citizens who may be deported for the sake of public safety and 
 the stability of the republican form of Government, shall be sent 
 without delay or trial to such place as may be hereafter determined. 
 
 5. The Government in due course will render Congress an 
 account of the exceptional measures adopted. 
 
 Federal Capital, November 3, 1891, third year of the Republic. 
 Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca. 
 Antonio Luiz Affonso de Carvalho. 
 
254 BKAZIL 
 
 By these two decrees General Fonseca arrogated to 
 himself dictatorial rights. He was again in the position 
 he seized when, as leader of the military revolt on 
 November 15, 1889, he deposed Dom Pedro II. The 
 manifesto to which reference is made in the decree was 
 a long document of 5000 words, in which the President 
 recounted the attitude of Congress towards himself and 
 the impossibility of administering public affairs. He 
 endeavoured to justify his action by declaring that the 
 Government had clear proof of monarchist plots, and 
 that the conspirators had determined to take advantage 
 of the restless feeling produced by economic and 
 financial causes to raise the standard of armed revolution. 
 In reality, the President had very little to say in defence 
 of his coup d'etat. His assertions of monarchist 
 conspiracies deceived nobody, and the population 
 extended neither sympathy or support to the course he 
 had taken. The President and General Floriano Peixoto 
 were now the two central figures in the Brazilian 
 political world, and each was playing for his own hand. 
 The President hoped by his coup d'etat to overwhelm 
 his adversary, but General Peixoto had succeeded in 
 splitting up the military following upon which da Fonseca 
 mainly relied for support, and was in touch also with 
 the Opposition in Congress. 
 
 Sao Paulo was where the principal opposition to 
 Fonseca was anticipated ; but all hopes in this direction 
 were disappointed. On the return of the State repre- 
 sentatives an attempt was made to influence public 
 opinion against the dictatorial policy of the Federal 
 authorities ; but the people were cowed by a show of 
 force. Yet in the lower Chamber of the local legislature 
 a vote of censure was carried by 16 votes to 11. In the 
 Senate a similar motion was proposed, but the arrival 
 of a detachment of soldiery induced the Senators to 
 change their proposition to a vote of confidence in the 
 President. Although martial law had not been pro- 
 claimed in the State or city of Sao Paulo, the Governor, 
 a nominee of Fonseca, exercised autocratic authority. 
 
1891] RISING AGAINST GOVERNMENT 255 
 
 From the south came the real resistance. On 
 November 9, the garrisons at Rio Grande, Bage, Pelotas, 
 and other points in the State of Rio Grande do Sul 
 declared against the action of the Federal Government. 
 On the 10th, the regiment stationed at Santa Anna de 
 Livramento revolted, and the troops at Jaguarao, Caca- 
 pava, Alegrete, and Uruguayana followed. Generals 
 Osorio, Tavares, and Astrogildo assumed command of 
 these opposition forces and occupied all important points, 
 and two days later, Governor Julho de Castilhos was 
 forced to resign office. A committee consisting of Dr 
 Assis Brazil, Dr Barros Casal, and General Rocha 
 Osorio was then appointed to administer the State, the 
 National Guard was called out, and by November 23 
 the number of men under arms prepared to dispute the 
 authority of Fonseca was 50,000. A flotilla of five small 
 vessels was also organised and the entrance to Rio 
 Grande harbour closed. 
 
 In Para armed resistance against the President was 
 determined upon, but in the remaining States no active 
 opposition was made, although his course in regard to 
 Congress was generally disapproved. 
 
 In Rio de Janeiro the navy took up the defence of 
 the Chambers. Admiral Wandenkolk and Admiral 
 Custodio de Mello were both National Deputies. They 
 decided to resort to armed force to counteract the 
 Government decrees of November 3, and the naval 
 officers of the squadron joined the movement. A 
 raid was made on the 21st upon one of the stations 
 of the Central Railway, and a quantity of material 
 and stores seized by the insurgents. The Govern- 
 ment, becoming seriously alarmed, ordered the arrest 
 of several prominent naval officers, amongst these 
 Admirals Wandelkolk and Guimaraes ; but that did 
 not stop the rising, and next day Admiral Custodio 
 de Mello boarded the cruiser jRiachuelo and assumed 
 command of the war vessels. On the morning of the 
 23rd the squadron steamed into position before the 
 city. A rumour of bombardment caused a panic, but 
 
256 BRAZIL 
 
 only a few shots were fired, one of which struck the 
 Candelaria Church. 
 
 The fact that the navy was in opposition was re- 
 garded by the President as proof that the game was lost, 
 so he held a hasty consultation with his ministers, and 
 determined to resign. This resolution come to, he sent 
 for Vice-President Floriano Peixoto and gave orders for 
 the release of Admiral Wandenkolk, at the same time 
 issuing a manifesto announcing his resignation, together 
 with the following decree : — 
 
 General-in-Chief Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca/ President of the Re- 
 public of the United States of Brazil : — 
 
 In the interests of the Nation, resolves to resign into the hands of 
 his legal substitute the charge of President of the Republic. 
 
 Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca. 
 T. de Alencar Araripe. 
 
 Some riotous scenes followed, and two newspaper 
 offices, the Diario de Commercio and Novidades, were 
 wrecked. The municipal building was raided in search 
 of the Prefect, Senhor Jose Felix, who had made himself 
 specially obnoxious by strict enforcement of recent 
 arbitrary orders, and outbursts of minor importance 
 occurred in the city. These conditions, however, were 
 of short duration, and normal quiet was restored in a few 
 hours. General Floriano Peixoto, in virtue of his office 
 as Vice-President of the Republic, assumed the Presi- 
 dency, and Fonseca retired into private life for good and 
 all, forgotten until his death in August 1892. 
 
 Peixoto's accession gave promise of better things. 
 Brazilians were aware of the part he had taken in the 
 overthrow of his predecessor, and quite understood that 
 his action was dictated by personal motives, and did not 
 forget that the Vice-President was connected with the 
 military element, which had caused much misery in the 
 past two years. The experiences, however, the country 
 had passed through since the deposition of Dom Pedro 
 II. inclined people to anticipate that the new Administra- 
 tion would be conducted on constitutional lines, and 
 
1892] INCREASE OF MILITARISM 257 
 
 militarism restrained. President Peixoto's first steps in 
 forming his ministry, and the abrogation of the decree 
 of November 3, dissolving the Chambers, helped to 
 strengthen this hopeful feeling, and the reassembling of 
 Congress on December 18, 1891, further assisted to re- 
 store confidence. On December 5 had come news of the 
 death of Dom Pedro II. It evoked such expressions of 
 regret in Rio de Janeiro and other prominent cities, as 
 served to reveal the small part that the general public 
 had taken in his deposition in 1889. 
 
 Political interest was now concentrated upon 
 Congress, and the relations between the Legislature and 
 President Peixoto. Matters went smoothly at first, 
 the President bringing no undue pressure to bear upon 
 the Chambers. A new electoral law was passed to 
 provide for an election in case of the death or resignation 
 of the President within two years of assuming office. 
 This point (Article 42 of the Constitution) is important, 
 for the reason that round it centred a bitter dispute at a 
 later period. Congress rose on the 21st of January 1892, 
 after passing a vote of confidence in the Administration, 
 and recommending that stringent measures be taken to 
 avoid a recurrence of internal political disturbances. 
 
 Peixoto, now free from the control of Congress, 
 soon showed signs of perpetuating many of the worst 
 abuses of his predecessor. Militarism became more 
 marked than at any previous period, and unmitigated 
 hostility was shown towards the Governors of States 
 who had not openly pronounced against General da 
 Fonseca when he made his coup dtdtat on November 3 
 preceding. Towards the close of January a mutiny 
 occurred at the fortress of Santa Cruz, situated near the 
 entrance to the harbour of Rio de Janeiro ; but the 
 outbreak was suppressed by two battalions of infantry, 
 this force assaulting the fort and sustaining heavy loss 
 in the attack. The President believed that the rebellious 
 act was promoted by his enemies, and cherished bitter 
 feeling towards all opposed to him, which led him into a 
 course of action carrying in its train many tragic results. 
 
 R 
 
258 BRAZIL 
 
 He surrounded himself with a clique, and to ensure the 
 adherence of these supporters, corrupt practices were 
 condoned and public monies inadvisedly expended. 
 Absolute obedience to his will was demanded, both 
 from his immediate following and from the Governors 
 of the States, and he intervened persistently in State 
 Government affairs, going so far in February, 1892, as to 
 depose the Governors of Ceara, Amazonas and Matto 
 Grosso. 
 
 As the severity of this praetorian system became 
 more unbending, popular feeling against Peixoto 
 developed, and that same month the Jornal do Comercio, 
 the leading newspaper of Brazil, expressed the general 
 sentiment by calling attention to Article 42 of the 
 Constitution. The President ignored this attack, on the 
 grounds that the election of General da Fonseca and 
 himself to the offices of President and Vice-President 
 had been effected by Congress under special circum- 
 stances, and that ordinary law did not apply. But next 
 April his answer to a protest made by 13 officers of high 
 rank, who appealed to him for a fresh presidential 
 election as the only adequate means of restoring 
 confidence, was their dismissal from the public service, 
 and the arrest of others suspected of sympathy with 
 them. 
 
 Congress assembled again in May, and to it the 
 President explained his reasons for the arrests and 
 deportations he had made, asserting that he had only 
 taken such steps as were necessary to preserve order. 
 Dissatisfaction was on the increase in both Chambers, 
 but Peixoto could have secured a majority to confirm 
 his determination to hold no fresh presidential election. 
 He did not attempt, however, to obtain the legal 
 sanction of Congress to his conduct. On the other 
 hand, the Chambers took no steps to express disapproval 
 of his attitude, or to prevent the intervention of the 
 Federal Government in the States. For the remainder 
 of 1892 matters drifted in an unsatisfactory manner, and 
 the Administration gradually developed into despotism. 
 
1893] RISING IN RIO GRANDE DO SUL 259 
 
 Dr Jullio de Castilhos regained control in Rio Grande 
 do Sul, a position he had been forced to resign in 
 November 1891, and the inhabitants, incensed at his 
 return to {Dower, revolted under the leadership of 
 Gumercindo Saraiva. In other directions revolutionary 
 outbreaks were threatened. 
 
 The year 1893 opened with ominous murmurings of 
 discontent and frequent rumours of revolutionary con- 
 spiracies. The President was aware of the popular 
 sentiment, but only became the more severe in his 
 treatment of persons suspected of political intrigue and 
 consolidated his military resources for a determined 
 resistance if armed revolt broke out. In April, Admiral 
 Custodio de Mello resigned his portfolio as Minister 
 of Marine, and in a letter severely criticising the Presi- 
 dent complained that the Ministry was ignored by the 
 Executive. The Finance Minister, Dr Serzedello Correa, 
 went out with him. 
 
 In Rio Grande do Sul the spirit of revolt spread 
 rapidly, the insurgent leader Gumercindo Saraiva being 
 a man with a genius for organisation and guerilla 
 warfare. A small store of munitions of war was 
 obtained through agents in Uruguay, a larger amount 
 was captured from the Government troops, and the 
 President was compelled to despatch strong reinforce- 
 ments for the southern garrisons, these and other 
 military operations involving a heavy drain upon the 
 national exchequer. A rising in Rio de Janeiro was 
 talked of in June, but no movement was attempted. In 
 the following month, however, Admiral Wandenkolk, 
 with a handful of men, seized the Brazilian coasting 
 steamer -Jupiter, and entered Rio Grande to aid the 
 insurrection there ; but the move proved abortive, for 
 the city did not respond, and Government reinforcements 
 were promptly brought from the interior. Admiral 
 Wandenkolk, finding himself powerless against superior 
 forces, then left Rio Grande for the north ; but when off 
 Santa Catharina, his vessel was captured, and all the 
 conspirators brought to Rio de Janeiro as prisoners. 
 
260 BRAZIL 
 
 At length, on September 6, the standard of revolt 
 was raised in the harbour of Rio de Janeiro by Admiral 
 Custodio de Mello on board the armoured cruiser 
 Aquidaban. The plans of the conspiracy had been care- 
 fully matured, but an inkling of them had reached the 
 Government, which strove to discover the nature of the 
 plot and the persons implicated. These efforts were 
 unavailing, and it was a surprise to both the authorities 
 and the public when the entire squadron in the harbour 
 broke into open insurrection. In explanation of his 
 conduct, and in justification to the officers and men 
 supporting the movement, de Mello issued the following 
 manifesto : — 
 
 Fellow Citizens : 
 
 The revolutionary movement of November 23 had no object but 
 the restoration of a constitutional regime which, to the amazement 
 of the whole nation, and especially of all who were responsible for the 
 establishment of Republican Government, had been annihilated by 
 the coup d'etat of November 3. 
 
 The sole purpose of the dictatorship of November 3 was to create 
 administrative irresponsibility and spread the belief that the people, 
 unable to establish and maintain free institutions, had submissively 
 bowed to the yoke of an autocracy. 
 
 You know the part which, through force of circumstances, it was 
 my lot to take in that memorable period of revolutionary action. I 
 served the interests of the people on November 23, which, in virtue 
 of my honour as a sailor and my duties of a citizen, my country had a 
 right to demand I should defend. 
 
 And if after that day to my humble home there came a share of 
 public authority, it was not due to suggestions of vanity, but to political 
 responsibility resulting from the revolution, which had created a new 
 state of affairs. 
 
 In the Government I sought to maintain my patriotic aspirations, 
 contending for the supremacy of the Constitution and submission to 
 the law. 
 
 While I was a Minister not a single day passed over my head that 
 did not find me engaged in the defence of popular rights and liberties 
 against the encroaching and absorbing action of an Administration 
 which, concentrating in its grasp all the political functions of the 
 nation, tended, by usurpation after usurpation, outrage after outrage, 
 to scale the ramparts of political power and annul all constitutional 
 privileges. 
 
 Against the Constitution and against the integrity of the nation, 
 the head of the Executive has mobilised the national army, placed it 
 
1893] THE NAVY REVOLTS 261 
 
 on a war footing, and utilised it to terrorise Santa Catharina and Rio 
 Grande do Sul. 
 
 And against whom ? Against foreigners and alien enemies ? No ! 
 The President of the Republic has armed Brazilians against Brazilians ; 
 he has raised legions of so-called patriots, spreading mourning, want, 
 and desolation in every nook and corner of the Republic, for the sole 
 object of gratifying his personal caprices and strengthening and per- 
 petuating the supremacy of his tyrannical dictatorship. 
 
 Promising to be the sentinel of the Treasury, the President has 
 perjured himself and deceived the nation, opening with sacrilegious 
 hand the public exchequer to a policy of bribery and corruption, thus 
 abusing the authority which, in an evil hour, the revolution of 
 November 23, 1891, placed in his hands. 
 
 Bankruptcy is knocking at our doors, followed by a long train of 
 misfortunes and disasters. 
 
 Fellow citizens ! The Republican Administration has descended to 
 all kinds of abuses. 
 
 Mutilated and violated, the Constitution is no longer recognised as 
 the supreme law of public liberty. 
 
 In this wretched situation I can no longer remain inactive. The 
 nation longs to be free from a Government that humiliates it. The 
 time has arrived for regaining rights and liberties repressed and 
 trodden under foot. 
 
 In the life of a nation, as in that of an individual, there are 
 moments of decisive action. 
 
 To preserve our country from humiliation ; to uphold the 
 principles of liberty which human honour consecrates ; to transmit 
 unstained to our children a free government in Brazil — this is our 
 present situation. 
 
 Events have so ordained. 
 
 An officer in the navy, a Brazilian, and a citizen of a free country, 
 I once more take the field of revolutionary action, to give battle to 
 the destroyers of the Constitution, and to restore the sway of law, of 
 order, and of peace. 
 
 No longing for power, no selfish aspirations for control by violence, 
 leads me into this revolution. 
 
 That the nation may prove its ability for sovereignty under 
 Republican Government, is my desire, the supreme ambition of my 
 mind, and my purpose at the present time. 
 
 Long live the Brazilian nation. 
 
 Long live the Republic. 
 
 Long live the Constitution. 
 
 Custodio Jose de Mello. 
 
 Federal Capital, September 6, 1893. 
 
 This pronunciamiento of Admiral Mello embodied 
 the feeling of most naval officers, for the navy was on 
 
262 BRAZIL 
 
 unfriendly terms with the army, and had been persist- 
 ently ignored and slighted since the establishment of the 
 Republic in 1889. When Admiral de Mello, therefore, 
 determined to head the revolt, he relied upon this hos- 
 tility to draw to his aid nearly all the officers of his own 
 branch of the service, and the fact that he had been one 
 of the prominent leaders in the successful revolt against 
 General da Fonseca was also important, and undoubtedly 
 attracted many Brazilians to his side. 
 
 The civilians actively participating in the revolt were 
 a group of members of Congress and others, who joined 
 Admiral de Mello on board the Aquidaban on the morn- 
 ing of September 6. That any prolonged conflict should 
 occur, was not expected. The revolutionary movements 
 in 1889 and 1891 had been of short duration, and similar 
 brevity was anticipated now. It was thought President 
 Peixoto would tender his resignation, or that a modus 
 vivendi would be reached in a few days at furthest. 
 But the sympathisers with the revolt and the peaceable 
 section of the inhabitants were mistaken. Whatever 
 faults Peixoto may have had, they did not include a lack 
 of energy and determination, and a wish to resist the 
 uprising was the dominant feeling amongst his sup- 
 porters. But his decision to defend his position at all 
 costs resulted in a prolonged and bloody struggle 
 between the two factions. 
 
 The defences of Rio de Janeiro and Nictheroy were 
 strengthened. Sangbag breastworks were thrown up 
 along the water-front in all positions where a landing 
 was likely, and cavalry patrolled the streets. Batteries 
 of artillery were mounted on the hills commanding the 
 bay ; martial law was proclaimed in the Federal District, 
 and in the States of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Parana, 
 Santa Catherina, and Rio Grande do Sul. The 
 President personally inspected the defensive measures. 
 Orders for war material were sent to Europe and the 
 United States, and negotiations were opened for the 
 purchase of war-vessels to take the offensive against 
 the ships under command of Admiral de Mello. The 
 
President Peixoto. 
 
 Admiral Saldanha da Gama. 
 
 Admiral Custodio de Mello. 
 
 GUMERCINDO SARA1VA. 
 
 [Face page 262. 
 
1893] STRENGTH OF THE REBELS 263 
 
 military element rallied round the Government with few 
 exceptions. 
 
 In possession of the insurgents were the warships 
 Aquidaban, Republica, Trajano, Orion, Javary, Marajo, 
 Marcilio JDias, Guanabara, Amazonas, Madeira, Sete de 
 Septembre, Iguatemy, Aragaary, the cruiser Almirante 
 Tamandare, and five torpedo-boats ; also the Brazilian 
 merchant steamers Uranus, Venus, Marte, and Jupiter. 
 Government steam-launches were captured, and utilised 
 for warlike purposes. The rebels occupied the naval 
 depot at the Armacao, near Nictheroy, but, after remov- 
 ing all stores and ammunition needed for immediate use, 
 abandoned the position. In the first few days, the fleet 
 was busy laying in coal and supplies ; the former was 
 taken from deposits in the bay, the latter from ware- 
 houses near the water-front, and consisting for the most 
 part of dried beef and recently imported stores. Occa- 
 sional skirmishes took place, but no serious fighting. At 
 the Armacao, however, matters bore a different aspect, 
 for Peixoto had reinforced the garrison of Nictheroy, 
 and every attempt of the rebels to land in the vicinity of 
 that city was disputed. Eort Villegaignon remained 
 neutral at the opening of the struggle, and was watched 
 anxiously by both factions. It was the headquarters of 
 the marine infantry and. heavily armed with guns of 
 large calibre, and its proximity to Rio de Janeiro gave 
 it great strategical importance. Cobras Island was held 
 by a garrison that also stood aloof from any active 
 participation in the revolt. The naval school at 
 Enxadas Island, in charge of Admiral Saldanha da 
 Gama, followed the example of Villegaignon, while the 
 forts of Santa Cruz, Sao Joao Baptista, and Lage 
 remained faithful to Peixoto. 
 
 Civilians were apathetic, few thinking that there 
 would be serious fighting, even after the suspension of 
 all traffic in the harbour had brought home to people's 
 minds the fact that something of the nature of civil war 
 had broken out. But, on September 12, this apathy 
 was abruptly disturbed when Admiral de Mello ordered 
 
264 BRAZIL 
 
 all merchant vessels and foreign warships to leave the 
 usual anchorage and move further up the bay, and next 
 morning took up a position commanding the city. 
 When, about 9 a.m., the guns of the forts at Santa 
 Cruz and Sao Joao opened an ineffective fire upon the 
 rebel ships, and an hour later the fleet began to bombard 
 the Government forts and certain points in the city, 
 ail was immediately confusion. The population, panic- 
 stricken by the shot and shell thrown at the town, fled 
 en masse to the suburbs, never pausing to note that the 
 naval guns were directed chiefly against the war arsenal, 
 the city being spared as much as possible. All day the 
 fight went on, and the squadron then withdrew out of 
 range of the guns of the forts. The Aquidaban had 
 been struck several times by shells from Santa Cruz, 
 but no serious damage occasioned to hull or machinery. 
 
 On the night of September 18 heavy firing was 
 heard from Santa Cruz, Lage, and Sao Joao. This was 
 occasioned by the warships Republica, Marcilio Diaz, 
 and the armed merchantmen Uranus and Pallas passing 
 the forts at the mouth of the harbour. Three of these 
 vessels ran out unharmed, but the Pallas was struck 
 and her machinery badly injured when abreast of the 
 military school, where for eight hours she lay crippled 
 and exposed to the fire of the forts, with a number of 
 civilian sympathisers aboard, all of whom considered 
 themselves lost. A few threw themselves into the sea 
 and swam to shore, there to be captured and shot down 
 by troops. The engineers of the Pallas, however, did 
 not lose heart. Unable to repair the damage to the 
 principal machinery, they got the ship under weigh with 
 an auxiliary engine. Before this was accomplished, 
 some twenty men were killed or wounded, but at length 
 the Pallas steamed away at a speed of three miles an 
 hour to the southward. 
 
 The object of sending the Republica and her con- 
 sorts to southern waters was to establish a Provisional 
 Government, thus giving a rallying point to Brazilians 
 who wished to join the revolt. Direct communication 
 
1893] PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 265 
 
 was established also with the rebels in Rio Grande do 
 Sul. The plan was for the fleet in Rio de Janeiro, 
 and the people of Rio Grande do Sul to make common 
 cause against Peixoto, and the island of Desterro, in 
 Santa Catharina, was selected as a convenient place to 
 establish the Government. The city of Desterro, the 
 State capital, being weakly garrisoned, surrendered in 
 October, and a Provisional Government was immediately 
 formed, Captain Lorena being proclaimed President and 
 furnished with a ministry to carry on the adminis- 
 tration. 
 
 Little change occurred in the harbour of Rio de 
 Janeiro during the remainder of September. At the 
 instigation of the foreign diplomatic corps a com- 
 promise was arranged, by which the squadron refrained 
 from firing upon the city, provided no artillery was 
 mounted within the town limits. Foreign vessels were 
 allowed to load and discharge in the harbour so long as 
 no war material was landed. Constant skirmishing 
 took place near Nictheroy, and in the vicinity of the 
 Armacao ; and on October 9 the white flag, which the 
 insurgents had taken as their distinguishing emblem, was 
 seen flying from the flagstaff of Fort Villegaignon, proof 
 sufficient that the garrison had thrown in their lot with 
 the revolt. It was impelled to do so by the action 
 of the Government in cutting off the water supply and 
 refusing further issue of rations. 
 
 During November the progress of the revolution 
 was marked by a daily exchange of artillery fire 
 between the Government forts of Santa Cruz and Sao 
 Joao, and the insurgent stronghold Villegaignon and the 
 warships. Admiral de Mello now determined to go 
 south to Desterro to confer with the Provisional Govern- 
 ment, and Admiral Saldanha da Gama agreed to take 
 over command of the rebel forces in the harbour. An 
 incident occurred at this time, resulting in the death of 
 two officers, a boatswain, and an ordinary seaman of 
 the British squadron. A party from H.M.S. Sirius 
 and H.M.S. Racer landed close to the powder magazine 
 
266 BRAZIL 
 
 on Ilha do Gouvernador, then in possession of the 
 insurgents. About 3.40 p.m. on November 3, the 
 Mattoso powder deposit, containing seventy tons of 
 powder, blew up with a terrific explosion, killing a 
 number of Brazilians in the vicinity, and, it was supposed, 
 injuring some British sailors. Search parties from the 
 British squadron found that Lieutenant Beauchamp 
 Mowbray, of the Sirius, Lieutenant C. G. Tupper, of 
 the Racer, and Boatswain Harris, of the Sirius, were 
 dead, and seaman Lynch so severely injured that he 
 succumbed shortly afterwards. The only trace of the 
 two officers was some uniform buttons. The explosion 
 was expected ashore, and was probably the work of a 
 Government agent, but the facts were never disclosed. 
 
 On November 30 Admiral de Mello determined to 
 carry out his intention of visiting Desterro. At mid- 
 night, the Aquidahan, accompanied by the steamer 
 EsperanpOr, got under weigh. The Esperanga escaped 
 unscathed. The Aquidaban was struck in several 
 places, but not seriously damaged. 
 
 When de Mello left at the end of the month for 
 Desterro, Admiral Saldanha da Gama, a man of great 
 influence, published a manifesto to explain his posi- 
 tion, in which he declared his wish to see affairs in 
 Brazil on the same footing as existed previous to the 
 revolution of November 15, 1889, and the people free to 
 choose the form of government that they desired. This 
 was twisted by the friends of President Peixoto to 
 mean that Admiral da Gama was fighting to re-establish 
 the imperial regime. That the Admiral preferred 
 Monarchy to Republicanism there was no doubt ; but 
 he most emphatically and repeatedly reiterated that he 
 had no intention of forcing any particular form of 
 Government upon Brazilians. What he always said 
 was, " Let them choose for themselves." Notwithstand- 
 ing these denials, the effect of his manifesto was to 
 weaken sympathy from a section of the population, 
 who, whilst holding President Peixoto in detestation, 
 were strong believers in the ethics of Republicanism. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 brazil — continued 
 
 Position in December 1893. Many Persons Emigrate. Precautions 
 to stop Rebel Supplies. Peixoto orders Daily Firing against 
 Rebel Ships. Troops in Rio de Janeiro and Nictheroy. The 
 Government Flotilla. Admiral da Gama. Strain of Continuous 
 Fighting. Ilha Gouvernador. General Telles killed. Capture 
 of Ilha Mocangue. Personality of da Gama. Question of 
 Belligerent Rights. Journey of Mello to the South. Saraiva 
 marches Northwards. Personality of Saraiva. Rebel Plan of 
 Campaign. Saraiva reaches Parana. Mello captures Para- 
 nagua. Successes raise Revolutionary Prestige. Lapa Sur- 
 renders. War Material captured at Curityba. Scarcity of 
 Ammunition. Rebel Casualties. Artillery Fire more effective. 
 Government Flotilla sails from Europe. Foreign Trade Suffers. 
 Insurgent Hospital Bombarded. Admiral Da Gama urges 
 Mello to send Reinforcements. The Aquidaban reaches Harbour. 
 Rebels attack the Armacao. Incident of U.S. Admiral Staunton. 
 Arrival of U.S. Admiral Benham. Threat if United States 
 Merchantmen Molested. Situation of Rebels. Council of War. 
 Cruiser Republica Appears. Aquidaban and Republica sail North- 
 wards. Government Flotilla Arrives. Population advised to 
 leave City. Rebel Situation Desperate. Captain Castilhos 
 grants asylum on Portuguese Men-of-War. Rebel Positions 
 Abandoned. Peixoto demands Surrender of Refugees from 
 Castilhos. Portuguese Vessels convey Rebels to Montevideo. 
 Diplomatic Relations interrupted with Portugal. Incident of 
 H.M.S. Sirins. Brutal Treatment of Insurgent Wounded. 
 
 In December, 1893, civil war appeared inevitable. The 
 people wanted peace, but they were too supine to take 
 up arms to end the conflict. While the insurgents had 
 many sympathisers, Peixoto was upheld by the military 
 and a numerous political following, and he now allowed 
 
 267 
 
268 BRAZIL 
 
 his vindictive passions to overcome all caution. Legal 
 guarantees were suspended under martial law, and no 
 act of the authorities towards citizens could be criticised 
 by the courts. Suspicion surrounded every person who 
 was not an ardent supporter of the Peixoto Adminis- 
 tration, and arrests were the order of the day amongst 
 all classes of society. The prisons were filled with 
 insurgent sympathisers, opportunity being taken to 
 gratify personal spite by denouncing private enemies 
 as being implicated in seditious plots against the Govern- 
 ment, and thousands of peaceful people fled the country. 
 Prominent persons, unable to escape on account of the 
 strict supervision over transport from Rio de Janeiro, to 
 avoid arrest lay hidden whilst this reign of terror lasted. 
 The President understood that if he could stop 
 supplies reaching the rebel squadron, the insurgents must 
 abandon the harbour or surrender. For the rebels to 
 take the warships away, meant the continuance of the 
 fight elsewhere in Brazil, and this was not to the liking 
 of Peixoto. His object was to prevent the squadron 
 running the gauntlet of the forts and batteries. At the 
 same time, he redoubled the precautions to hinder the 
 insurgents receiving provisions. Whilst knowing that 
 the squadron had a fair stock of ammunition, the Presi- 
 dent argued that with sufficient provocation for fre- 
 quent artillery and rifle fire, the supply would soon 
 be exhausted. To draw the rebel fire, artillery was 
 mounted on both sides of the harbour, and a daily duel 
 between the Government batteries and Villegaignon, 
 assisted by the naval vessels, took place. The National 
 Guard was called out, and volunteer regiments raised, 
 until, at the end of 1893, the troops in Rio de Janeiro 
 and Nictheroy exceeded 20,000, well armed with 
 repeating Mannlicher rifles, and amply provided with 
 ammunition. The vessels Peixoto had ordered in 
 Europe and the United States were now reported ready, 
 and consisted of the converted steamer Old, re-named 
 the Nictheroy, and armed with a Zalinski dynamite gun, 
 several 6-inch quick firers, and a number of machine 
 
1894] POSITION OF THE INSURGENTS 269 
 
 guns ; the torpedo-catcher Aurora, re-named the Gustavo 
 Sampaio ; and six sea-going torpedo boats. Peixoto's 
 design was to attack the rebel squadron under the 
 protection of the fire from the forts and batteries. 
 
 The position of Admiral Saldanha da Gama in the 
 harbour was a difficult one. His object was to keep 
 the attention of the army concentrated upon Rio de 
 Janeiro, to allow more freedom for the revolutionary 
 movement in the South ; but the rebel squadron was in 
 an ineffective condition, and was not capable of taking 
 the offensive. The monitor Javary had been sunk by 
 a 9-inch shell, and the Aquidaban and the Repuhlica, 
 the two most serviceable vessels in the navy, were at 
 Desterro. Villegaignon fortress, moreover, had suffered 
 severely from the converging fire of Sao Joao, Santa 
 Cruz, and Cragosta. Its casualties in men had been 
 heavy, and rations were getting difficult to obtain. For 
 the moment there was ammunition, but the Admiral 
 knew the stock would be exhausted if a general action 
 occurred, and the strain was beginning to tell on officers 
 and men. The Government troops now became more 
 aggressive, and forced da Gama to active measures to 
 denude his ships of their crews to obtain men for 
 landing-parties. In December, for instance, Peixoto 
 ordered General Telles with a strong body of men to 
 occupy the Ilha do Gouvernador, hitherto in undisputed 
 possession of the insurgents. This entailed a force 
 being landed from the squadron, and in the sharp fight 
 that followed (the rebels commanded by Admiral da 
 Gama in person), the Government troops were routed 
 and General Telles and a number of officers and men 
 killed. The area of the island was of too great extent, 
 however, to permit of permanent occupation by the 
 rebels, so the position was evacuated and immediately 
 occupied by Government troops. 
 
 Sharp fighting also occurred on the island of 
 Mocangue, which afforded excellent positions for 
 artillery to annoy the rebel squadron. Peixoto ordered 
 a battery of Krupp guns to be mounted there, and so 
 
270 BEAZIL 
 
 effective was its fire that Admiral da Gama resolved to 
 silence it. His attack was made with excellent judg- 
 ment. Early one morning several ships were moved 
 into position to bring a cross-fire to bear upon the 
 trenches, and half an hour before daybreak 300 officers 
 and men were landed, taking the Government troops by 
 surprise. In less than an hour, the Krupp battery, a 
 machine gun, and some eighty prisoners were captured, 
 with a loss on the Government side of 35 killed and 
 wounded, against 3 killed and 9 wounded among the 
 insurgents. 
 
 The personality of the Admiral alone kept the revolt 
 
 alive. Luiz Felipe Saldanha da Gama was a man of 
 
 exceptional ability, who had become Rear- Admiral in 
 
 the Brazilian navy after long service. A descendant of 
 
 Vasco da Gama, he had the pride of family tradition 
 
 deep-rooted in his heart. The subservience of political 
 
 principles to personal motives had no place in his life. 
 
 He had travelled extensively, and his knowledge of 
 
 English, French, Italian, Spanish and German enabled 
 
 him to profit from his journeys. Whilst holding aloof 
 
 from political affairs in Brazil, he frequently expressed 
 
 to his more intimate friends his contempt for the 
 
 politicians who had dragged his country down since the 
 
 abolition of the imperial regime. He condemned the 
 
 dictatorial methods of Peixoto, and at heart was a 
 
 devoted servant of the exiled royal family. His 
 
 personal inclination was for its restoration, but he never 
 
 proposed to re-establish monarchy by force. At the 
 
 beginning of the revolt he was in charge of the Naval 
 
 School, and it was in part due to this fact that he got 
 
 drawn into the revolutionary movement. The cadets, 
 
 in age ranging from 16 to 21, were determined to join 
 
 their comrades on the squadron, and Admiral da Gama 
 
 could not reconcile his mind to take the offensive against 
 
 the officers, and more especially the cadets, with whom 
 
 he had been so long associated. Towards President 
 
 Peixoto and his Administration he was bound by no 
 
 ties, and naturally he decided to support his friends. 
 
1894] SALDANHA DA GAMA 271 
 
 His energy was stupendous. Day and night he worked 
 at details in connection with the insurgent vessels, 
 inspecting every post, looking after the supply and 
 purchase of rations, visiting hospitals, and personally 
 superintending every warlike operation in the bay. His 
 personal bravery gave those under him confidence in the 
 presence of the gravest danger. No wonder, then, that 
 with da Gama at the head of the revolt in the harbour, 
 Peixoto should feel anxious. 
 
 In the beginning of 1894, the question of the recog- 
 nition of the insurgents as belligerents arose. The Pro- 
 visional Government in Desterro instructed its agents 
 abroad to press for recognition, on the grounds that the 
 insurgents practically controlled the southern section of 
 Brazil ; that they had established a government ; that 
 this government was equipped with machinery of office, 
 and that it maintained both military and naval forces to 
 support its authority. To the squadron this recognition 
 was of the highest importance, because it would have 
 given the right to establish a blockade and cut off food 
 supplies, and it was failure to obtain the belligerent 
 rights that ultimately led to the collapse of the revolt. 
 Without them the power of the rebel squadron was 
 greatly restricted, inasmuch as it could not deter 
 foreign merchantmen from entering the harbour. 
 
 Admiral Mello, after leaving Rio de Janeiro in the 
 Aquidaban, proceeded to Ilha Grande, the national 
 quarantine station, and occupied the Government 
 buildings without resistance on the part of the detach- 
 ment of troops forming the island garrison. Two days 
 later the Admiral sailed for Desterro to confer with the 
 rebel government. It was determined to send for 
 Gumercindo Saraiva, who, with 4000 men, was on the 
 northern frontier of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, 
 where he had fought a series of victorious engagements 
 with the Government forces, capturing much additional 
 war material. In place of lances and other obsolete 
 weapons, with which his men were armed at the outbreak 
 of the revolt, they had now modern rifles. Ammunition 
 
272 BRAZIL 
 
 was difficult to obtain ; but supplies for Government 
 troops were seized, and a small quantity purchased in 
 Uruguay. The Rio Grande insurgents were without 
 much military discipline, but obedient to their chiefs, 
 and, being well mounted and accustomed to country life, 
 were a mobile force. On receiving this message from 
 the Provisional Government at Desterro, the rebel leader 
 decided to move northwards with the majority of his 
 army, leaving the command of the insurgent operations in 
 Rio Grande in the hands of General Tavares, a man of 
 wide experience in guerilla warfare. His instructions 
 were to harass the Government troops, but avoid serious 
 engagements. Early in January Saraiva arrived at 
 Desterro, the mainland not far from the German settle- 
 ment, bringing with him Colonel Salgado, a former officer 
 in the Brazilian artillery. 
 
 Saraiva was an interesting personality. One of a 
 family of nine brothers, he was born near the Uruguayan 
 frontier, where his parents were landed proprietors and 
 cattle owners. He thus belonged to the class most 
 injured by misrule in Rio Grande do Sul, and his dislike 
 to governmental officials had caused trouble on various 
 occasions ; so that, when the revolutionary movements 
 broke out, he was a ready recruit. Knowing the country 
 intimately from experience gained in driving cattle 
 through Rio Grande and Uruguay, he was invaluable for 
 guerilla tactics, and his natural talent for organisation 
 soon brought him into prominence. His command over 
 men was remarkable. He assumed the position of a 
 semi-feudal chieftain, and demanded absolute obedience. 
 He was now 46 years of age, could boast little education, 
 but possessed a quiet dignity of manner and a fund of 
 sound common sense in everyday affairs. His habits of 
 living were simple ; the open air, with the earth for a bed 
 and his saddle for a pillow, pleased him as well as a 
 comfortably furnished house, and he was devoid of 
 fear. 
 
 The plan of campaign proposed by the Provisional 
 Government was for the Rio Grande forces to march 
 
1894] REBELS ADVANCE FROM SOUTH 273 
 
 through the central districts of Santa Catharina, cross 
 into Parana, and advance on the city of Curityba by way 
 of Lapa. Simultaneously, Admiral de Mello was to 
 proceed with the cruiser Rejniblica and the armed trans- 
 ports Uranus and Pallas to Paranagua. A railway 
 connects Curityba with the seaport, and the possession 
 of the two points meant control of the State of Parana. 
 The armed transports were to be utilised to convey 
 troops locally recruited in Santa Catharina to occupy 
 Paranagua and the adjacent country. This plan was 
 accepted by Saraiva, and by the middle of January, 
 1894, word was received from him that his march 
 northwards had met little opposition. Where fighting 
 had occurred, he had been successful. He added that 
 the garrison of Lapa was surrounded and its capitulation 
 daily expected, and that he would be at Curityba by the 
 end of the month. Admiral da Mello now started with 
 his expedition, and the Republica with two armed 
 transports entered Paranagua. Landing parties seized 
 the port. The city made a show of resistance, but after 
 20 of the garrison had been killed or wounded the force 
 of 350 officers and men surrendered, and a considerable 
 amount of war material was captured. Many of the 
 prisoners enlisted in the rebel ranks. This success was 
 important for the insurrection, because it gave the 
 Provisional Government a port from which revenue 
 could be collected to defray expenses. Order was 
 quickly established in Paranagua and the vicinity. 
 
 Mello's victory added prestige to the revolutionary 
 cause, and enabled the insurgents to occupy Curityba 
 and other important points without further resistance. 
 The town of Lapa surrendered, the garrison being 
 allowed transport out of the rebel zone. Situated on a 
 hill rising from rolling plains, Lapa was considered to be 
 impregnable. The surrounding slopes were strongly 
 defended by trenches, and Saraiva feared the losses he 
 might sustain in any attempt to carry the place by 
 assault; but a small naval brigade of 150 officers and 
 men obtained permission to rush the position, and 
 
 s 
 
274 BRAZIL 
 
 earned the two outer lines of entrenchments. The 
 place then capitulated. 
 
 On the occupation of Curityba, the warlike stores 
 captured included two Krupp batteries of 6 guns each, 
 3 Nordenfelt machine guns, a supply of artillery ammuni- 
 tion, and 150,000 rounds of Mannlicher rifle ball cartridge. 
 Two Italian regiments were now recruited from colonists 
 settled in Parana, and the total available insurgent 
 forces in February raised to more than 6000 men, fairly 
 well equipped. It was proposed to advance to Sao 
 Paulo, but Saraiva decided that his men and horses 
 needed rest after their long marches from the south, 
 influenced in this decision by the knowledge that to the 
 northward lay the yellow fever region. 
 
 Saldanha da Gama heard of these victories in the 
 south, and he redoubled his attempts to prevent troops 
 being despatched from the Brazilian capital to check 
 the advance to Sao Paulo. Feints of landings were 
 made daily, and the waste of ball cartridge was heavy. 
 Casualties also augmented steadily, and at the end of 
 January, the Admiral send word to Mello that he 
 required reinforcements of men, ammunition, and food 
 to maintain his position. 
 
 Peixoto, likewise, was untiring in his efforts, and the 
 artillery fire from Santa Cruz, Sao Joao, Gragoata, and 
 the batteries mounted at the Armacao improved. In 
 spite of reverses in the south, the President never 
 wavered in his determination to subdue the revolt. In 
 January, the vessels purchased in Europe and the United 
 States were ordered to rendezvous at Pernambuco. The 
 plan was to station them off the entrance of Rio de 
 Janeiro to prevent the ingress or egress of insurgent 
 vessels, and to cut off rebel supplies. If this was in- 
 sufficient to induce the surrender of the insurgents, 
 Peixoto proposed to open fire from every gun near 
 the bay, and simultaneously to attack the insurgent 
 squadron with his ships. 
 
 During the revolt commerce and shipping suffered 
 severely. Passenger and cargo traffic was not altogether 
 
1894] SITUATION AT RIO DE JANEIRO 275 
 
 suspended on account of the protection extended by the 
 foreign men-of-war, but restriction as to working hours 
 and the danger to the crews from stray bullets was so 
 great, that the port was practically closed for ordinary 
 business. Admiral da Gama realised that the more 
 impediments he could throw in the way of foreign ship- 
 ping entering the harbour the more difficult would the 
 situation be for the Government, for less trade entailed 
 less revenue. With the exception of the Custom-house 
 duties the Government practically had no income, and 
 thus was forced to resort to emissions of inconvertible 
 paper money. Feeling on both sides became more em- 
 bittered as the conflict was prolonged, and absolute 
 military despotism prevailed in Rio de Janeiro. So 
 intense had vindictive feeling become that the insurgent 
 hospital on Enxadas Island was bombarded, although a 
 Red Cross flag floated over the buildings, and on one occa- 
 sion six shells were thrown into the hospital, killing two 
 patients. Another day two projectiles struck the prin- 
 cipal ward in the main building. A remonstrance to 
 Peixoto elicited the reply that the firing was not intended 
 for the hospital, but directed at an armed launch crossing 
 the bay. A second protest was submitted, pointing out 
 that a number of wounded prisoners were under treat- 
 ment at Enxadas, and after this the hospital was not 
 molested. Admiral da Gama treated his prisoners most 
 humanely. They were placed on a transport, regular 
 rations issued, and the wounded cared for in the insurgent 
 hospitals. 
 
 By February da Gama found his position so critical 
 that he sent another urgent request to Mello for rein- 
 forcements and supplies. The Aquidaban arrived, but 
 brought neither men nor provisions, and the accounts 
 given by her commander in regard to hesitation on the 
 part of the insurgent leaders to move on Rio de Janeiro 
 were not satisfactory. The artillery fire from the 
 Armacao now became so aggressive that da Gama 
 decided to assault the position and endeavour to occupy 
 it permanently. On the evening of February 7 a force 
 
276 BRAZIL 
 
 of 35 officers and 600 men were landed on the island 
 of Concecao, with the intention of attacking next morn- 
 ing ; but transport arrangements went amiss, and the 
 men remained under cover all day. At 1 a.m. next 
 morning the force was embarked in barges, and con- 
 veyed by steam launches to the spots selected for landing. 
 Shortly after 3 a.m. the first shot was fired, and after 
 some hard fighting the insurgents obtained possession of 
 the naval arsenal and advanced towards Nictheroy, 
 hoisting the rebel flag at daybreak over the Armacao. 
 Heavy firing continued in the vicinity of Nictheroy, and 
 here a serious check occurred. The Government troops 
 were retiring when strong reinforcements opportunely 
 arrived, obliging Admiral da Gama to retreat to the 
 barges, himself wounded in the neck, and many of his 
 force dead or disabled. The troops endeavoured to 
 prevent the re-embarkation of the rebels, and a desperate 
 conflict ensued ; but, aided by the machine guns of the 
 cruiser Liberdade and several armed launches, the naval 
 force finally succeeded in reaching their boats. This 
 was not accomplished until the Admiral had been again 
 wounded in four places. The insurgent loss altogether 
 was 22 officers and 156 men killed and wounded. 
 This attempt to capture the Armacao further crippled 
 the rebel resources. The casualties amongst the 
 Government troops reached 700 officers and men, but 
 could be better borne. 
 
 In October, 1893, Rear- Admiral Staunton of the 
 United States navy was in command of the U. S. squadron 
 in Brazilian waters. Admiral de Mello, then at the 
 head of the naval revolt, paid a formal visit to the United 
 States Admiral, and was received on board the flagship 
 with the usual courtesies. Admiral Staunton returned 
 the visit, and was given the customary salute. President 
 Peixoto notified Washington of this interchange of visits, 
 and asserted that such action was tantamount to recog- 
 nising the rebels as belligerents. Washington cabled 
 the recall of Admiral Staunton, and in January Admiral 
 Benham arrived. He reached Rio de Janeiro with no 
 
1894] ATTITUDE OF U.S. ADMIRAL 277 
 
 very friendly feelings towards the insurgents, and had 
 no intention of allowing the rebels to interfere with 
 United States merchant shipping, or of recognising rules 
 tacitly admitted hitherto by foreign vessels. In the third 
 week in February two United States merchantmen 
 entered the harbour and proposed to draw up to the 
 quays to discharge. Admiral da Gama notified the 
 masters of these vessels that they could not moor to 
 the wharves, as the district was within the field of fire 
 between the ships and the shore, and no vessels were 
 allowed in that zone. The shipmasters appealed to the 
 United States Admiral. Benham ordered the merchant- 
 men to go up to the wharves, and notified da Gama that 
 he would open fire upon the insurgent squadron if any 
 interference was attempted. The United States warships 
 in harbour were the New York, Charleston, San Francisco, 
 Detroit, and Newark. Admiral da Gama could make 
 no effective resistance in the face of this superior force. 
 The merchantmen were ordered to heave-to when abreast 
 of the cruiser Trajano, and the Detroit immediately 
 fired two shots at the rebel vessel. The merchantmen 
 then were allowed to pass unmolested. This blow to 
 the prestige of the rebel cause was great, because it 
 showed clearly that the insurgents would no longer be 
 permitted to interfere with shipping and commerce. 
 
 The combined effects of the repulse at the Armagao 
 and the action of the United States Admiral led da 
 Gama to the conclusion that his situation was desperate. 
 He had recovered from the wounds he received on 
 February 9 with the exception of the injury to his left 
 arm, the upper tendons of which had been severed by 
 a fragment of shell, and on February 19 summoned a 
 council of officers, to which he explained the position and 
 asked the members to decide whether they wished to con- 
 tinue the fight, or would authorise him as their leader to 
 make terms with Peixoto. He pointed out that no 
 supplies or reinforcements had come from the south, in 
 spite of repeated and urgent requests ; but the officers 
 unanimously decided to prolong the struggle. The 
 
278 BRAZIL 
 
 Admiral then said he would again appeal to Mello for 
 reinforcements before discussing a change of policy, and 
 once more a message was sent to Desterro. To this the 
 reply was that Mello had left for the north in the cruiser 
 Republica, which appeared on the 23rd off Rio. The 
 rebels imagined that the reinforcements so sorely needed 
 had come, and it was decided that the Aquidaban should 
 communicate with de Mello. After consultation with 
 the senior officers of the squadron, da Gama determined 
 that it would be useless for Mello to enter the harbour 
 unless his force was sufficient for a landing at Nictheroy. 
 If the reinforcements were not strong enough for this, 
 the suggestion was that the two vessels should proceed 
 to Bahia and demand the surrender of that city. At 
 4 a.m. on the morning of February 24, the Aquidaban 
 was under weigh. Search-lights on various heights 
 showed her movements, and as she steamed down the 
 bay, firing from the forts and batteries was fast and 
 furious. Taking his ships within fifty yards of the 
 walls of Santa Cruz, the commander, Alexandrino de 
 Alencar, fired a broadside when abreast, and then 
 steamed out to sea without discharging another shot. 
 The gunnery at the forts was better than on former occa- 
 sions, and one shell passed through the funnel and 
 another completely wrecked the lower bridge ; no 
 other serious damage occurred. 
 
 Clear of the fire of the forts, Captain Alencar made 
 for the Republica to confer with Mello. The views of 
 Saldanha cla Gama were explained, and Mello said that 
 an accident to the machinery of the transport accom- 
 panying him from Desterro necessitated the return of 
 the vessel to port. In these circumstances the Admiral 
 considered it useless to enter Rio, and decided to steam 
 northwards to Bahia in company with the Aquidaban. 
 
 In the harbour of Rio de Janeiro comparative quiet 
 ensued. Admiral da Gama waited for news from the 
 north, expecting daily to hear of the success or failure 
 of the expedition. On shore President Peixoto made a 
 final disposition of the troops pending the arrival of 
 
1894] PREPARATIONS TO ABANDON RIO 279 
 
 the Government warships. The artillery duel between 
 the forts on the mainland and Villegaignon and the 
 rebel ships continued, but no other aggressive measures 
 were attempted ; but the constant shelling of Villegaignon 
 for four months by Santa Cruz and Sao Joao has 
 reduced the fortifications to a shapeless mass of ruins, 
 and although the guns were intact it was evident the 
 position must soon be untenable. The bomb-proof 
 casemates no longer afforded protection to the garrison. 
 In February a 9-inch shell from Sao Joao penetrated 
 during the dinner hour, killing 7 and wounding 35 men. 
 
 Admiral da Gama determined to evacuate the harbour 
 of Rio de Janeiro as soon as he received information of 
 the fate of Mello. If the expedition proved a success, 
 the insurgents were to be transported to Bahia ; if a 
 failure, to the south. Orders were given to provision 
 and coal the insurgent vessels. The remaining warlike 
 stores were distributed amongst the vessels, and arrange- 
 ments made to disable such launches and ships as were 
 not considered in a fit state to run the gauntlet of the 
 batteries and forts. Whilst the vessels were preparing 
 for sea, the armed transport Venus was struck by a 
 shell and foundered, and a valuable stock of provisions 
 and ammunition was lost in her. 
 
 Whilst da Gama was waiting for news from Mello, 
 the vessels Peixoto had purchased in Europe and the 
 United States arrived off the entrance to the harbour 
 on March 7. Peixoto then issued notice to the inhabi- 
 tants that on the 13th all forts and batteries would open 
 fire upon the insurgents, and that the new vessels would 
 also attack. It was added that batteries posted in the 
 city would join in the action, and that a bombardment 
 by the rebel squadron might be anticipated. The 
 population was therefore advised to leave the town, and 
 certain localities were specified as free from danger. 
 Panic followed ; men, women, and children fled to 
 escape the threatened danger, and business was at a 
 standstill. 
 
 Next day da Gama learned that the Aquidaban was 
 
280 BRAZIL 
 
 at Desterro and the Republica at Parangmi, and that 
 no attempt had been made either to capture Bahia or 
 to send reinforcements to Rio de Janeiro. He naturally 
 regarded this news as proof that Mello had played him 
 false, and a council of war was called at which da Gama 
 explained the desperate situation, pointing out, however, 
 that it might be possible to run the ships out of the 
 harbour and proceed to the south, although the operation 
 would be attended by extreme danger. The Admiral 
 offered to treat with Peixoto, surrendering his own 
 person if the safety of the officers and men under his 
 command was assured. This proposal the council 
 rejected, and finally it was decided to leave da Gama 
 to act as he deemed fit. 
 
 The Admiral determined not to risk sacrifice of life 
 by attempting to run past the batteries and ships, and 
 to appeal to the senior naval officer of the Portuguese 
 squadron then in the port for asylum. Captain Castilhos 
 acceded at once to the request, promising to receive 
 the insurgents on board the Portuguese men-of-war Min- 
 dello and Alfonso Alberquerque and land them in neutral 
 territory. Arrangements were commenced immediately 
 for abandoning the ships and Fort Villegaignon, and on 
 the night of March 12 the rebels left their stations and 
 embarked on the Portuguese vessels. 
 
 On the following day the programme announced by 
 Peixoto was executed. As there was no response from 
 the rebels, the order was given to cease firing, and the 
 news rapidly spread that the insurgents had given up 
 the fight. Detachments of troops were sent to occupy 
 Villegaignon and the islands of Cobras and Enxadas, 
 and arrangements made to take charge of the deserted 
 ships. Peixoto was furious that da Gama and his 
 officers had escaped him, and sent a peremptory demand 
 to Captain Castilhos for the surrender of the insurgents. 
 This was curtly refused, in spite of a threat that the 
 Portuguese ships would not be permitted to leave the 
 harbour with the rebels on board. Captain Castilhos 
 informed his Government of his action, pointing out 
 
1894] INCIDENT OF H.M.S. SIRIUS 281 
 
 that the surrender of the insurgents to the authorities 
 meant the summary execution of the greater number of 
 officers and men. In reply the Portuguese Government 
 ordered Captain Castilhos to proceed to Montevideo with 
 the rebels, but not to allow them to land until further 
 instructions. He sailed unmolested for the south three 
 days later, and diplomatic relations between Portugal 
 and Brazil were forthwith broken off. 
 
 A few days after the close of the revolt in Rio an 
 incident nearly brought about complications with the 
 British Government. Lieutenant Hotham, navigating 
 officer of H.M.S. Sirius, landed from a launch on Enxadas 
 Island to take sights and correct chronometers. The 
 military officers in charge of the island ordered his 
 arrest, refusing to listen to explanations, and seizing the 
 launch. After some hours had elapsed, another launch 
 was sent to enquire the reason for Lieutenant Hotham's 
 delay. On learning the facts, Captain Pipon demanded 
 the instant release of his officer, and pending a reply 
 moved the Sirius into a position to open fire on the 
 Nictheroy and others of the new vessels belonging to the 
 Government. Dismayed at this determined attitude, the 
 authorities at once released Lieutenant Hotham. The 
 commander of the Sirius further demanded the British 
 flag to be hoisted on board the senior Brazilian naval 
 officer's ship then in port, and duly saluted. Peixoto 
 acceded. 
 
 The wildest excesses took place after the collapse of 
 the rebels. The insurgent wounded left in hospital at 
 Enxadas were neglected and abused, and such civilian 
 attendants as had remained on the island for hospital 
 duties were imprisoned and flogged. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 brazil — continued 
 
 The Voyage of the Aquidaban and the Republica. Saraiva deceived as 
 to the Position. Mello and Saraiva. Discontent with Provisional 
 Government. Presidential Election. Dr Prudente Moraes. 
 News reaches Saraiva. Parana evacuated. Mello organises 
 Expedition to Rio Gx - ande. Curityha occupied without Resistance. 
 Rebel Cause collapses. Naval Expedition against Desterro. 
 Rebel Expedition enters Rio Grande. Threatened Bombardment 
 of Rio Grande. Attack on Rio Grande. Insurgent Troops 
 landed in Uruguay. Mello delivers Rebel Ships to Argentine 
 Authorities. Argentine Government returns Vessels to Brazil. 
 Naval Expedition at Desterro. Aquidaban sunk. Desterro 
 Occupied. Insurgents shot by Military Authorities. Frenchmen 
 executed. Indemnity demanded by French Government. Fate 
 of Sai-aiva. Revolution crushed. President Moraes accedes to 
 Office. Policy of new President. Militarism decreases. Opposi- 
 tion to Moraes. Amnesty for Rebels. Law of Constitution strictly 
 observed. Misiones Boundary settled. Outbreak at Military 
 School. Firm Attitude of President. Diplomatic Relations 
 with Portugal resumed. Disturbances in Rio Grande do Sul. 
 Admiral da Gama joins Insurgents. Atrocities by Troops and 
 Rebels in Rio Grande. Battle at Campo Osorio. Death of da 
 Gama. Suspension of Hostilities. The Trinidade Question. 
 Peace arranged with Insurgents. Amnesty for Officers. Sup- 
 pression of Praetorian Methods. Italian Claims. Financial 
 Legislation. President Moraes temporarily vacates Office. 
 
 Admiral de Mello's two ships parted company two 
 days after leaving Rio owing to a defect in the machinery 
 of the Republica, so the ships instead of going to Bahia 
 turned south, and while the Aquidaban went to Desterro 
 to await further instructions the Rejniblica steamed to 
 Paranagua, and on March 3 reached port. Three days 
 
1894] INSURGENTS OCCUPY CURITYBA 283 
 
 later Admiral de Mello arrived at Curityba. The 
 majority of the insurgent forces were in the vicinity 
 of Punto Grosso, some seventy miles distant from 
 Curityba, but connected with that city by railway, and 
 it was from this point General Saraiva journeyed to 
 meet the Admiral. 
 
 At the council of war held on Saraiva's arrival the 
 Admiral did not represent the position of da Gama as 
 critical. A forward movement would be politic, he said, 
 but was not a necessity to save the situation, and possibly 
 Mello did not himself believe in the desperate nature of 
 the insurgent position in Rio. Nothing definite 
 resulted ; but some dissatisfaction was expressed at the 
 attitude of the Provisional Government, and Saraiva 
 resented the attempt of the Desterro authorities to 
 control his movements. He was willing, he said, to 
 co-operate with them under certain conditions, but 
 would not recognise their right to issue orders in 
 connection with his forces. A Governor was then 
 elected for the State of Parana, civil authorities 
 nominated for the districts held by the insurgents, and 
 thanksgiving masses celebrated in the principal churches 
 for the deliverance of this section of the country from 
 the domination of Peixoto. 
 
 March 1 was the date of the presidential election, 
 and Dr Prudente cle Moraes Barros was declared 
 elected ; but the insurgents insisted that the proceedings 
 were invalid, on the ground that no voting had taken 
 place in the States of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa 
 Catharina, and Parana. That these three States did 
 not participate in the election was due to the disturbed 
 conditions in southern Brazil. To Dr Prudente de 
 Moraes Barros personally the rebels had no cause for 
 objection. 
 
 It was not until March 15 that news of the 
 collapse of the revolt in Rio de Janeiro reached 
 Curityba. Mello and Saraiva were in the city when the 
 telegram announcing the surrender of Saldanha da 
 Gama was received. To Mello the disaster could not 
 
284 BRAZIL 
 
 have been unexpected, to Saraiva it was an absolute 
 surprise, and in Curityba, Paranagua, and Desterro the 
 effect was consternation and panic. Civilians who had 
 lent active assistance to the insurgents made arrange- 
 ments to leave the country, and on all sides the situation 
 was regarded with most gloomy forebodings. General 
 Saraiva called a meeting of his senior officers to discuss 
 the situation, and all expressed the wish to return to 
 Rio Grande do Sul. They resolved to evacuate Curityba 
 at an early date, and Saraiva communicated this decision 
 to Mello. A new plan of campaign was then drawn up. 
 Saraiva with his forces was to march towards the north- 
 western districts of Rio Grande, and Mello was to 
 proceed to Desterro, there to organise a squadron and 
 embark a body of troops from Santa Catharina and 
 attempt the capture of the city of Rio Grande. Early 
 in April Saraiva evacuated Curityba, leaving only the 
 local levies recruited after the capture of the district in 
 January, but these rapidly melted away, and by the 
 middle of April there was no insurgent organisation to 
 check the advance of troops from Sao Paulo. 
 
 The Federal capital being now in no further danger, 
 President Peixoto prepared, an army to restore the 
 representatives of his Administration to office in the 
 southern States. A division of 5000 troops was concen- 
 trated at Sao Paulo, but the march to Curityba was 
 long and tedious, and it was not until the end of April 
 that the army approached the city, where no resistance 
 was offered. The officials nominated by the insurgents 
 fled or secreted themselves as best they could, and in 
 the course of a few days the Government was in full 
 possession of the whole State. Thus the collapse of the 
 rebel cause was complete, and it only remained to assert 
 the Federal authority in Santa Catharina, for which 
 purpose a naval force was organised. 
 
 The expedition under Admiral de Mello, consisting 
 of the cruiser Repiiblica and three armed transports, the 
 latter conveying 1400 men commanded by Colonel 
 Salgado, left Desterro early in April, and reached the 
 
1894] ATTACK ON RIO GRANDE DO SUL 285 
 
 harbour of Rio Grande safely on April 10, when a 
 demand was sent to the authorities for the surrender of 
 the garrison. The city was threatened with immediate 
 bombardment unless it capitulated. Only a weak 
 garrison was available for its defence, the majority of 
 the troops having been sent into the interior of the 
 country to attack scattered groups of insurgents. The 
 commander, General Argollo, asked for time to consider 
 the proposal of Admiral de Mello, and sent for rein- 
 forcements. Meanwhile the foreign consuls met and 
 decided to represent the necessity of allowing time for 
 the foreign residents to remove to a place of safety 
 before a bombardment took place. Mello granted 24 
 hours to allow non-combatants to evacuate the town, 
 and that delay proved fatal, permitting reinforcements 
 to reach the city. At the expiration of 24 hours the 
 HepMica opened fire on the town, and the rebel troops 
 were landed between the city and the coast - line. 
 Trenches had been constructed in this zone, and were so 
 strongly held, that in the severe fighting which ensued 
 the casualties amongst the invaders numbered 150 killed 
 and wounded. Repeated attempts were made to carry 
 the trenches, but without success, and after the struggle 
 had continued for eight hours Colonel Salgado decided 
 to retire. This brought the attack on Rio Grande to an 
 end, although the Republica still continued to throw 
 occasional shells into the town with little effect. A few 
 buildings were damaged, but the loss of life was trifling. 
 Mello was now convinced of the abortive nature of the 
 expedition, and decided to make no further attempt of 
 an offensive character against Rio Grande. After 
 lingering in the vicinity for a day longer, the insurgent 
 vessels put to sea, and two days later were sighted off 
 Uruguay. There Colonel Salgado and his men dis- 
 embarked, and were immediately disarmed by the 
 Uruguayan authorities. Mello took the ships to the 
 River Plate, and anchored off the port of Ensenada, 
 whence he sent a despatch stating that he wished to 
 surrender to the Argentine Government. The crews 
 
286 BRAZIL 
 
 were then landed, and Argentine officials took charge of 
 the cruiser and transports, which were at once put at the 
 disposal of the Brazilian Government and in due course 
 handed over. 
 
 This fiasco removed another difficulty from the path 
 of President Peixoto, but there was still the problem of 
 Desterro to be solved. The Aquidaban and several 
 small vessels were at that port, and would have to be 
 reckoned with, so in April the flotilla of torpedo boats 
 was despatched to the coast of Santa Catharina with 
 instructions to find the Aquidaban and sink her. On 
 the morning of April 16, in a dense fog, the Gustavo 
 Sampaio was cruising in the neighbourhood of Desterro 
 when she was discovered by the look-out on the 
 Aquidaban, which at once opened fire with her machine 
 guns. The Gustavo Sampaio discharged two torpedoes 
 and steamed away. Later on in the day the German 
 cruiser Ancon sighted the Aquidaban, and noticed she 
 was partially submerged. On closer examination it was 
 discovered that the vessel was aground and abandoned, 
 with a gaping hole in her side. Notification was sent 
 to Rio de Janeiro, and Peixoto ordered the flotilla to 
 advance and take possession of the insurgent head- 
 quarters at Desterro. 
 
 No resistance was offered. Colonel Moreira Csesar 
 was appointed military commandant, and by orders of 
 the President the members of the Provisional Govern- 
 ment were arrested on a charge of sedition. A similar 
 fate overtook all naval and military officers and civilians 
 who had participated directly or indirectly in the 
 insurrection, and no time was lost in bringing the 
 prisoners before a specially appointed military tribunal. 
 In nearly every instance death sentences were passed, 
 approved by Peixoto, and executed forthwith. Captain 
 Lorena, the President of the Provisional Government, 
 and his fellow-prisoners were shot. It was a scene of 
 wholesale slaughter carried out under direction of the 
 military. Rebellion is a serious offence, and merits 
 severe punishment ; but adequate castigation and the 
 
1894] COLLAPSE OF INSURRECTION 287 
 
 execution of the rank and file of a body of men who had 
 surrendered after a long struggle entered into from 
 political motives, are two different things. Nor was this 
 scene of revenge confined to Desterro. Throughout the 
 States of Santa Catharina and Parana persons impli- 
 cated in the insurrection were seized and shot down. 
 These events were ample justification for the action of 
 the Portuguese senior naval officer in the harbour of Rio 
 for the protection he accorded Admiral da Gama and 
 his companions. 
 
 Amongst the victims were three French citizens, 
 Buette, Etienne, and Muller, engineers practising their 
 calling in Desterro. After the city came under the 
 domination of the insurgents they were employed on 
 work connected with repairs to rebel ships, but took no 
 part in the warlike operations. Yet they were charged 
 with aiding and abetting the revolt. The French 
 Government took up the matter energetically when the 
 facts were made plain, and after a searching investiga- 
 tion demanded a heavy indemnity. The affair was 
 settled by the payment of 900,000 francs. 
 
 Little was heard of Gumercindo Saraiva and his army 
 of 4000 men, and no wonder, for after leaving Curityba 
 early in April continuous bad weather was encountered, 
 transport animals failed, and war material was aban- 
 doned. Food too became scarce, so that before the 
 frontier of Rio Grande was reached half the force was 
 on foot. Malarial fever then decimated the ranks, and 
 worst of all the frontier of Rio Grande was occupied by 
 Government forces. Constant skirmishes took j)lace, 
 and in May, Saraiva was shot through the heart by a 
 spent bullet while returning with his staff from a recon- 
 naissance of the enemy's position. His loss was a death- 
 blow to the cause of his followers, and the remnant of 
 these formerly victorious insurgents determined to march 
 into Argentine territory and lay down their arms. One 
 column crossed the river Uruguay into Misiones, another 
 made for a point further south and reached the Argen- 
 tine province of Corrientes. In Rio Grande do Sul a 
 
288 BRAZIL 
 
 guerilla warfare was maintained by scattered groups, 
 but the backbone of the movement was broken. 
 
 The revolution was crushed after eight months of a 
 civil war in which thousands of lives had been sacrificed, 
 the public exchequer loaded with additional indebted- 
 ness, and social and economic unity thoroughly dis- 
 ordered. No wonder that the majority of educated 
 Brazilians did not believe that the election of Dr 
 Prudente de Moraes Barros would be verified by his 
 accession to office, and looked forward to a period of 
 military despotism, with General Peixoto as Dictator. 
 
 Happily these gloomy forebodings were not fulfilled. 
 On November 15, 1894, Peixoto surrendered the presi- 
 dential office, and although in military circles mutterings 
 of discontent were heard, no outbreak occurred. With 
 the accession to power of Dr Prudente de Moraes Barros, 
 the personal influence of Peixoto as a factor in Brazilian 
 political life disappeared. He died on June 29, 1895. 
 
 The new President was of different calibre to his 
 predecessor. Dr Prudente de Moraes Barros belonged 
 to the political group in Sao Paulo which had led the 
 republican propaganda for some years before the deposi- 
 tion of Dom Pedro II., was a republican from conviction, 
 and had been the presidential candidate of the civilian 
 element in the Constituent Congress which elected 
 General Deodoro da Fonseca in February, 1891. 
 
 It was supposed that the choice of the representative 
 of Sao Paulo was the consideration offered by Peixoto 
 for that State not joining the revolutionary movement. 
 The Paulistas were opposed to the Peixoto Administra- 
 tion, and they needed small encouragement to have 
 thrown in their lot with the insurgent cause when 
 Saraiva was at Curityba. When animosity against 
 President Peixoto was highest, Dr Moraes was an- 
 nounced as the official candidate for the Presidency, 
 and the selection implied his success. Peixoto could 
 unquestionably have declared himself Dictator in 1894, 
 and that he did not is to his credit. Guilty of inhuman 
 cruelties to his fellow-countrymen, holding in his hands 
 
1895] PRESIDENT MORAES ACCEDES 289 
 
 the power to proclaim himself Supreme Chief, he yet 
 refrained. 
 
 Dr Moraes was a lawyer by profession, and opposed 
 to the use of armed force in connection with public 
 administration. His career had shown him to be 
 possessed of an impartial judgment in political affairs, 
 and that he had no vindictive feelings towards his 
 opponents. Leading a life simple and free from any 
 suspicion of ostentatious display, his quiet determination 
 in public affairs had gained him the respect of the more 
 intelligent Brazilians, and his integrity and straight- 
 forwardness were beyond question. A marked alteration 
 was accordingly apparent at once in the methods of 
 public administration. Praetorian government dis- 
 appeared, and military habits no longer dominated 
 national politics. Legal rights were respected, and 
 protection for life and property assured under the new 
 ruler. Naturally there was strong opposition in some 
 quarters, and the supporters of the policy of the late 
 administration promoted intrigues and fomented diffi- 
 culties. But this discontented faction was powerless in 
 the face of the unanimous approval accorded to the 
 altered manner of conducting the national affairs. The 
 people had tasted freedom, and were not willing to 
 submit again to dictatorial tyranny. 
 
 On January 3, 1895, the President further consoli- 
 dated his position by granting an amnesty to all enlisted 
 men of the army, navy, and police who had taken part 
 in the revolution. The commissioned officers were not 
 included, but it was made to cover the cadets of the 
 naval school. This action and other measures showed 
 that the public administration was to be carried on in 
 strict compliance with the terms of the Law of Consti- 
 tution, and satisfied all reasonable expectations. 
 
 About the same time (January 6) the dispute between 
 Brazil and Argentina in connection with the Misiones 
 territory was settled in favour of the Brazilian claims. 
 
 The discontent in the army at the firm determination 
 of President Moraes to eliminate military influence from 
 
290 BRAZIL 
 
 national politics took active form in March. General 
 Jacques had been appointed Commandant of the Military 
 School, and was most unpopular with the students. 
 Instigated by outside intrigues, the 390 officers and 
 400 cadets undergoing instruction decided to make a 
 demonstration hostile to the Moraes Administration. 
 So, on reaching the establishment at 10 a.m. on the 
 morning of March 15, General Jacques was saluted 
 with insulting remarks concerning President Moraes, 
 and cheers for Peixoto. The General at once reported 
 the affair, and instructions were issued to close the 
 school. The officers on the rolls were ordered to report 
 for duty, and the 400 cadets were dismissed. A brigade 
 of troops was marched to the school at 3 p.m., and the 
 order concerning the students was read to them on 
 parade, the cadets being informed they must resume 
 civilian clothing and leave the premises. Officers and 
 students together then attempted to create a riot in the 
 streets. Many were arrested, and 32 officers were sent 
 as prisoners to the forts of Santa Cruz and Lage. 
 Forty more were confined at army headquarters. The 
 attitude of President Moraes in regard to this outburst 
 was proof that he was free from any leaning towards 
 militarism. 
 
 Diplomatic relations were now resumed with Portugal 
 through the good offices of the British Government. 
 The Portuguese Government stated that the protection 
 granted to the insurgents had not been intended as an 
 affront to Brazil, an explanation that the President 
 accepted. 
 
 Rio Grande do Sul was now again in a disturbed 
 condition. Aparicio Saraiva, a brother of Gumercindo 
 Saraiva, had collected the remnant of the insurgent 
 forces which had invaded Parana and Santa Catharina 
 the previous year, and with these defied the authorities. 
 The movement was not against the National Govern- 
 ment, but undertaken to oust Governor Castilhos from 
 office. Admiral da Gama and some 400 officers and 
 men from the naval revolt were in Buenos Aires, and 
 
1895] FRESH OUTBREAK IN RIO GRANDE 291 
 
 they decided to throw in their lot with the Rio Grande 
 rebels. Some successes were obtained at first over the 
 Government troops, but the country was tired of the 
 constant turmoil in the south ; yet, though the removal 
 of Governor Castilhos would doubtless have induced the 
 insurgents to lay down their arms, his supporters were 
 numerous and influential, and could easily have changed 
 front and made trouble in their turn. President Moraes 
 did not feel justified in deposing Castilhos — an act, in 
 his opinion, savouring of the methods of the former 
 re'gime— so negotiations with the rebel leaders were 
 attempted without satisfactory results. At this juncture 
 Admiral da Gama took the field. Up to the time of his 
 arrival on the scene the conflict had been carried on 
 with the greatest barbarity, quarter on neither side 
 being expected. An eye-witness described what occurred 
 when 400 Government troops fell into the hands of a 
 strong party of insurgents, in these terms : — 
 
 The prisoners were penned into a cattle corral, a guard surround- 
 ing the spot to prevent any attempt at escape. A man would ride 
 into the yard and lasso a prisoner as though he were a bullock. 
 Dragging his victim a few yards away, he would dismount, draw his 
 long knife, and deliberately cut the prisoner's throat. This operation 
 was repeated until half of the men in the corral were killed. The 
 remainder were reserved for similar treatment the following day. 
 
 This is horrible enough, but on June 24, the outbreak 
 met with a reverse that destroyed any hopes of success 
 its partisans may have entertained. At Campo Osorio, 
 Admiral da Gama and 374 officers and men were 
 surrounded by Government troops, commanded by 
 Colonel Joao Francisco. A desperate struggle ensued. 
 Five times the troops assaulted the rebel trenches, and 
 were repulsed with heavy loss. Then, the ammunition 
 of the insurgents becoming exhausted, they endeavoured 
 to break through the enemy's lines, and some succeeded. 
 Many others were killed or captured, and Admiral da 
 Gama was wounded and his retreat cut off. To avoid 
 being taken prisoner, he committed suicide, and his body 
 
292 BRAZIL 
 
 was found some clays later horribly mutilated. The 
 circumstances of his death decided public opinion 
 that this warfare in Rio Grande must be ended, and 
 negotiations were again opened with the insurgent 
 leaders, a suspension of hostilities being declared 
 meanwhile. 
 
 It is difficult to understand the motive of Saldanha 
 da Gama in joining the revolutionary movement in Rio 
 Grande do Sul. He explained his action to his friends 
 by stating that he believed Moraes would be simply a 
 nominee of Peixoto, and that when he understood the 
 policy of the President he was too far committed to 
 withdraw from the movement in Rio Grande. Pie 
 preferred to sacrifice himself rather than appear to act 
 treacherously towards the rebel leaders. 
 
 An unexpected excitement arose in July, when 
 H.M.S. Barracouta, acting under instructions from Her 
 Majesty's Government, proceeded to Trinidade, a 
 deserted island lying about 651 miles to the eastward 
 of the Brazilian coast, and there hoisted the British 
 flag. The object was to facilitate the laying of a direct 
 cable from England to Argentina, and the British 
 claimed that the island had been occupied in 1700, and 
 a British colony established in 1781, adding that the 
 island was barren and possessed little fresh water. 
 The Brazilian Government asserted that Portugal had 
 possession in 1795, and, with the independence of 
 Brazil, Trinidade became Brazilian. Public feeling ran 
 high, and anti-British demonstrations were held in Rio 
 and elsewhere. The matter was carefully investigated 
 by the British Government, and the claim to the island 
 withdrawn. 
 
 Negotiations for the pacification of Rio Grande do 
 Sul now approached a climax. General Innocencio 
 Galvao de Queiros, commanding the troops in Rio 
 Grande, represented the Federal authority ; General 
 Jose da Silva Tavares acted on behalf of the insurgents. 
 The conditions submitted to President Moraes were : — 
 
 1. Unrestricted enjoyment of the rights and privi- 
 
1895] PEACE IN RIO GRANDE 293 
 
 leges appertaining to Brazilian citizens under the 
 Federal Constitution. 
 
 2. The political reorganisation of the State of Rio 
 Grande do Sul. 
 
 3. The right to claim compensation for losses 
 sustained. 
 
 The President acceded to the first and third of these 
 conditions, but refused the second on the ground that he 
 had no power to act under the Law of Constitution. 
 General Tavares, in reply, stated that the revision of 
 the State Constitution demanded by the insurgents was 
 not expected from the Executive, but that Congress 
 should take such action as would ensure lasting peace. 
 On August 23 a formal agreement of peace was signed, 
 the second condition being left to Congress, whereupon 
 the President immediately ordered a reduction of the 
 army in the south. Arrangements were made for the 
 insurgents to deliver up their arms, and on October 21, 
 1895, an amnesty was sanctioned for all offences in 
 connection with revolutionary practices previous to 
 August 23, 1895, but providing that officers in the 
 army and navy should not be permitted to return to 
 duty for a period of two years. 
 
 The remainder of 1895 passed without sensational 
 events. President Moraes steadily adhered to the policy 
 he had initiated on accession to office, and the change the 
 new regime had affected in a single year was remark- 
 able. Civil rights had been upheld. Dictatorial inter- 
 ference by the Central Government in local affairs had 
 been suppressed. The pacification of Rio Grande do 
 Sul had been achieved. An amnesty had been granted 
 to the participators in the outbreaks of 1893 and 1894. 
 
 In 1896 some excitement was caused by the insist- 
 ence of Italy that claims of Italian residents for damages 
 to property and persons during the revolutionary period 
 of 1893-4 should be promptly settled, but the dispute 
 was arranged by the payment of cash indemnities in 
 certain cases, referring others to arbitration. The 
 Legislature took up the question of fiscal taxation, 
 
294 BRAZIL 
 
 the Chamber of Deputies being decidedly in favour of 
 a heavy protectionist tariff' Many new internal taxes 
 were imposed, and the scale of duties on imported 
 merchandise augmented. The condition of the national 
 finances caused serious apprehension, for the effects of 
 the disastrous occurrences from 1889 to 1894 were 
 now felt, and the Government was unable to devise 
 a remedy. In November, 1896, President Moraes, on 
 the advice of his physicians, obtained leave from Con- 
 gress to vacate, temporarily, his office, and confided his 
 presidential duties to Dr Victorino Pereira, the Vice- 
 President, retiring to the country to rest. 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 
 brazil — continued 
 
 Sudden return of President Moraes to Rio de Janeiro. Plot against 
 the President. Story of Antonio Maciel. The Canudos Settle- 
 ment. The Jagungos and the Bahia Police. Bahia Government 
 ask help against Conselheiro. Troops sent to Canudos and 
 defeated by Jagungos. Another Expedition to Canudos under 
 Colonel Moreira Caesar. Riots in Rio de Janeiro. Murder of 
 Colonel Gen til de Castro. Strong force organised against 
 Canudos. General Oscar in charge of Military Operations. 
 Situation of Expedition unsatisfactory. Heavy Casualties 
 amongst Troops. Followers of Conselheiro attack Troops under 
 General Oscar. Situation saved by General Savaget. Minister 
 of War at the front. Power of Religious Fanaticism. Failure to 
 storm Canudos. Siege of the Stronghold. Canudos captured, 
 October 3. Atrocities at Canudos. Withdrawal of Troops. 
 Final Report of Operations. Accusations of Military Clique in 
 Rio against Moraes. Plot to Assassinate President Moraes. 
 Murder of Minister of War. Arrests made. Public Opinion and 
 Attempt upon Life of President. Presidential Candidates. 
 Campos Salles supported by President. Dr Campos Salles elected. 
 Personality of President - elect. Critical financial situation. 
 Mission of Campos Salles to London. Funding Loan Agree- 
 ment.- Campos Salles accedes. Contrast between 1894 and 
 1898. The Amapa Question. Nabuco represents Brazil. Policy 
 of President Campos Salles. Brazilians satisfied. President of 
 Argentina visits Brazil. Fiscal Legislation. Lack of strong 
 Political Parties. Bubonic Plague in Santos and Rio. Economic 
 Development and Political Disturbances. State Governments. 
 Illegitimate Taxation. Federal Courts. States and Railways. 
 Distribution of Population. Italians. State-aided Immigration. 
 Sao Paulo and the Italian Colony. German Settlements in 
 Brazil. German Colonists during Revolution. Portuguese 
 Immigrants. Brazilian national character. Positivist Tend- 
 encies. Public Instruction. Number of " Illiterates." Apathy 
 
 295 
 
296 BRAZIL 
 
 concerning Education. Administration of Justice. Condition of 
 Prisons. Capital of Minas Geraes. Depreciation of Currency. 
 Means of Communication. Inadequate Railway System. State 
 Control of Railways. Central Railway a Political Machine. Tele- 
 graphs and Cables. Inefficiency of the State Lines. Brazilian 
 Waterways. 
 
 President Moraes unexpectedly returned in March, 
 1897. His reason for doing so was a plot against 
 his administration, the discontented military element 
 having taken advantage of the President's absence to 
 stir up seditious feeling, aided by certain deputies, 
 formerly ardent supporters of Peixoto. Suspicion fell 
 on the Vice-President, and his arrest was ordered. A 
 coup d'etat was intended, and of this the President had 
 been warned, but his prompt action disconcerted his 
 enemies and prevented the conspiracy from coming to a 
 head. 
 
 Another cloud now appeared on the horizon, with 
 momentous results, for it entailed a war in the interior 
 of Brazil against a force that had never been known 
 to exist. The antecedents are curious. 
 
 In 1861 a man named Antonio Maciel lived in 
 Pernambuco with his mother. He possessed fair 
 education and moderate fortune, but had married 
 against his mother's wishes. Jealousy sprang up 
 between parent and wife. Maciel's mind was poisoned 
 by his mother's constant insinuations that she had proof 
 of the wife's infidelity. She told her son to secrete 
 himself in the bushes at the foot of the garden, and that 
 shortly after nightfall he would see his wife meet her 
 lover. To the wife a similar story was told, and in the 
 evening the mother donned male costume and approached 
 the trysting-place she had indicated to husband and 
 wife. In the darkness Maciel saw, as he thought, his 
 wife and her lover, and fired first at the one and then at 
 the other, killing both. Overcome by remorse, he 
 apprised the authorities of his crime, and was con- 
 demned to a long term of imprisonment, but at the 
 end of a year was pardoned. He then determined to 
 
1897] ANTONIO CONSELHEIRO 297 
 
 devote the remainder of his life to missionary work in 
 the interior of Brazil, selecting what is known as the 
 sertao for his field, a district inhabited by people 
 descended from Indians mingled with Portuguese blood, 
 who have little in common with the Brazilian of to-day. 
 Known as Jagungos, they live on the products of the 
 chase. Although provided only with antiquated 
 weapons, every man is armed, and their wants are 
 few; only a little Indian corn to add to their diet of 
 fish and game, a small supply of cloth for the rough 
 garments they wear, and a stock of powder and lead 
 for their firearms. It was to these savages Maciel set 
 out, and in the course of thirty-five years he came to be 
 regarded by them as a prophet. 
 
 Antonio Conselheiro, as this man was called by his 
 followers, preached no recognised form of religion. He 
 merely taught the Jagungos that there was a life here- 
 after they could attain under certain conditions of 
 living on earth, inculcating, however, many fundamental 
 principles of Christianity, civilisation, and a belief in a 
 Supreme God. From time to time chapels were built 
 in different districts, and round these settlements sprang 
 up. One such place was Canudos, some 300 miles from 
 Bahia, and there the authorities of Bahia thought it 
 necessary to nominate a magistrate. This official 
 became involved in an intrigue with a Jagungo woman, 
 and becoming afraid of remaining at Canudos he obtained 
 an appointment in a neighbouring district, taking the 
 girl with him. Antonio Conselheiro, in 1896, sent out 
 men to cut wood for building purposes, and these people 
 came to the vicinity where the former Canudos 
 magistrate was. Thinking they were searching for 
 him, he sent police to drive them from the district. A 
 fight ensued, and the police were worsted. Bahia was 
 asked for assistance, and 200 men arrived, but proved 
 unable to cope with the Jagunpos, who, believing the 
 Government wished to turn them out of their settle- 
 ments, determined to resist. 
 
 The Governor of Bahia then appealed to the Federal 
 
298 BRAZIL 
 
 Government for aid, and an expedition under command 
 of Major Febronio was organised, to which was added a 
 number of police from Bahia. In January the march to 
 Canudos began, and the camp of Antonio Conselheiro 
 was reached at the end of the month. Ordered to 
 surrender, the Jagungos refused, and Febronio determined 
 to take the place by assault. But the troops were 
 repulsed, 50 officers and men killed or wounded, and 
 the expedition forced to retire towards Queimadas, 
 suffering severely during the retreat. Quantities of 
 arms and ammunition fell into the hands of the enemy. 
 
 The Federal Government now decided to send a 
 strong force against Canudos, and a column of 1500 
 men was organised, including a battery of field artillery, 
 and strengthened by 400 armed police. The command 
 was given to Colonel Moreira Caesar, and in February 
 1897 the advance began. Queimadas, 180 miles to the 
 north- east of Bahia, was the base of operations, and for 
 the greater part of the distance railroad communication 
 was available. Thence the country was rugged and 
 broken, and heavy undergrowth afforded excellent cover 
 for the enemy. Colonel Moreira Caesar, however, was 
 confident of success. Underestimating the strength of 
 the enemy, the expedition was pushed forward rapidly, 
 and small precautions taken to avoid surprise. The 
 inevitable followed ; on March 2, the column was ambus- 
 caded, the troops thrown into confusion, and Colonel 
 Moreira with many officers and men killed. Panic 
 ensued ; the guns were abandoned, rifles and ammuni- 
 tion thrown away, and stores of all kinds left lying by 
 the roadside. News of this disaster reached the 
 Government three days later, the telegram from Bahia 
 stating that fugitives arriving at Queimadas reported 
 the annihilation of the expeditionary force, but after 
 three or four days further particulars showed that the 
 loss of life was not so great as at first supposed. 
 Stragglers drifted back, and when the final muster of 
 the survivors was made, some 1100 men were present. 
 
 Colonel Moreira Caesar had been one of the prominent 
 
1897] EXPEDITIONS TO CANUDOS 299 
 
 members of the military regime under Peixoto. So it 
 was now asserted by his former followers that the 
 Canudos movement was the outcome of monarchist 
 intrigues, and that the fault of the disaster lay with the 
 Administration for not dealing more harshly with all 
 persons of monarchist tendencies. Serious rioting 
 ensued in Bio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. The offices 
 of the newspapers Apostolo, Liberdade, and Gazeta da 
 Tarde in the former city, and that of Commercio in 
 the latter, were sacked, and other buildings were damaged, 
 on March 7. Next day the mob again assembled, and 
 Colonel Gentil de Castro, the editor of the Jornal do 
 Brazil, a newspaper professing monarchist leanings, was 
 assassinated at the Sao Francisco Xavier station. 
 Attempts were also made to murder the Visconde de 
 Ouro Preto and Senhor Affonso Celso, but a powerful 
 police force brought into the city restrained the mob 
 from further violence. 
 
 A strong army corps was forthwith organised, for it 
 had become evident that another repulse would bring 
 serious complications. For one thing, a victory for 
 Antonio Conselheiro would draw to his standard 
 thousands of Jagimgos and give additional incentive to 
 repeat the disgraceful scenes of March 7 and 8 in Rio. 
 Orders were issued for the regulars at all stations to 
 concentrate at Bahia, and several States aided by sending 
 local regiments, so that by May the force consisted of 
 10,500 troops. General Cantuaria was given charge of 
 the Bahia military district, General Arturo Oscar 
 directed the field operations, with General Savaget as 
 second in command. Oscar pushed on towards Canudos 
 in June, but was greatly hampered by want of transport, 
 and had much difficulty in provisioning the troops. 
 The Jagwigos gave the expedition no rest, laying 
 ambuscades in all directions. 
 
 As Oscar approached Canudos the tactics of Antonio 
 Conselheiro became bolder, and his persistent attacks 
 had already cost the troops 1000 casualties. The men 
 were wearied by long marches over barren stretches of 
 
OOUntry, and worn poorly supplied with provisions and 
 ammunition. If therefore became necessary to suspend 
 the advanoe, and ( lolonel Madoiros with a strong brigade 
 was detaohed, to OOnvoy the wounded to Monte Santo 
 
 and bring back supplies. This was understood by 
 Conselheiro to mean that the troops were afraid to 
 approach Dearer to Oanudos, so the Jagunpos assembled 
 
 in force and surrounded Oscar's camp, which was located 
 in a position commanded by abrupt hills, from which 
 a continuous lire was maintained. Soon the situation 
 became critical, but relief was afforded by Savaget in 
 command of a column 2000 men, which had marched 
 
 through Sergipo to effect a, junction with General Oscar 
 near Oanudos. At the beginning of July he arrived at 
 Ooeorobo, six miles to the north of ( -anudos, and fought 
 
 a severe action, in which the general and (> officers were 
 wounded, the casualties amongst the rank and file 
 exoeeding 200 men. In spite of this loss General 
 Savaget continued his advance, and reached Oscar just 
 when matters Looked most gloomy. There the com- 
 bined forces remained on the defensive awaiting the 
 return of Oolonel Madeiros with supplies. 
 
 When the Government understood the difficulties 
 confronting General Oscar, further reinforcements of 
 8500 men were ordered io Bahia. Additional artillery 
 was also sent to the front, and heavy siege guns 
 were despatched bo reduce the fortified positions in 
 the neighbourhood. This brought the total number of 
 troops employed in the operations up to 14,000, and no 
 more could be furnished without Calling out the National 
 Guard. The Minister oi' War, General Bittencourt, 
 proceeded to Bahia io superintend the arrangements for 
 the campaign. Public interest was centred upon the 
 movements oi' the troops. No attention was paid to 
 repeat i^l assertions in certain quarters that the main 
 source oi' strength for the JagwnpOS was the support. 
 they obtained from monarchist centres, for they were 
 false. The Jagunpos were religious fanatics with a blind 
 faith in the personality of Conselheiro, and their ability 
 
1897] CANUDOS BESIKGF/I) 301 
 
 to resist troops lay in the fact, that every inch of the 
 country was familiar to them, enabling them to move 
 quickly from one position to another whenever the 
 expedition advanced. Being also skilled marksmen, 
 they made the best use of the ammunition at their 
 disposal, and the arms and other war materials captured 
 from Colonel Moreira C;csar and other expeditions gave 
 them means of defence. Their successes at the com- 
 mencement of the struggle tended to convince them that 
 they wci'c in the right in a conflict regarded l>y them as 
 an attack upon their religious practices, 
 
 While waiting for the reinforcements and supplies, 
 General Oscar moved to a hill two miles from Canudos, 
 known as Favella. The position was undesirable owing 
 to scarcity of water, l>ut it was possible to use artillery 
 fire from this point against the headquarters of the 
 fanatics. On July 18 Oscar attempted to storm 
 Canudos, and the troops succeeded in capturing a portion 
 of the town, but wca'c, ultimately driven back with the 
 loss of 800 killed and wounded. Oscar then determined 
 to remain entrenched on the Favella hill until the arrival 
 of the reinforcements from Bahia. 
 
 A. long siege now ensued, varied by attempts to 
 assault the outlying portions of tin; settlement and by 
 sallies of the fanatics to dislodge their enemies from 
 the positions from time to time captured. During 
 August and September the bombardment continued, 
 but a stone church building in the centre of the town 
 was still intact at the commencement of October, and 
 this formed the rallying [joint for the JagimgOS when 
 their trenches became untenable from shell fire. General 
 Oscar had intended forcing the surrender of Canudos 
 by shutting off supplies, and becoming impatient at the 
 determined resistance offered, decided to order a general 
 assault. When October came and the besieged town 
 showed no signs of capitulating, the troops available for 
 the attack numbered 5500, and with these the advance 
 was made on October V,. A desperate encounter followed, 
 but the defence was unable to resist superior force, and 
 
302 BRAZIL 
 
 finally succumbed. The church was only carried after 
 a fierce fight, in which the remnant of the fanatics shel- 
 tered by its stone walls were killed. Terrible scenes 
 ensued. All discipline was lost ; many of the houses 
 and huts in which women and children had taken refuge 
 were set on fire, the occupants perishing in the flames 
 or deliberately shot down when endeavouring to escape, 
 no mercy being shown. How many were killed is not 
 known, but the bodies of 450 lighting men were counted. 
 A few prisoners, however, were saved from the general 
 massacre, and brought, some to Bahia, some to Rio, but 
 they refused to speak of their life at Canudos. A body, 
 reported to be that of Antonio Conselheiro, was found 
 buried under the church. It was asserted he had been 
 killed several days before the final battle. 
 
 With the fall of Canudos the war ended, although 
 bands of Jagun^'os were still reported in different districts, 
 and information reached General Oscar that they were 
 concentrating in force at Caypam. At the approach of 
 troops, however, they dispersed, and nothing more serious 
 than the interchange of a few shots occurred, so at the 
 end of October the evacuation of the district was ordered. 
 The total losses in this campaign were placed at from 
 5000 to 6000 officers and men killed and wounded. 
 
 Just when the situation of the troops in the Canudos 
 campaign was causing President Moraes keenest anxiety, 
 his political enemies in Rio de Janeiro were endeavour- 
 ing to throw discredit upon the Administration. The 
 military, or jacobino, element persistently asserted that 
 the cause of the non-success of General Oscar at the 
 beginning of the campaign was due entirely to the 
 President refusing adequate supplies. Rioting incited 
 by these malcontents occurred in the streets of Rio on 
 the publication of any unfavourable news, and in Con- 
 gress attempts were made by Deputy Francisco Glycerio 
 and others of the former Peixoto clique to embarrass the 
 action of the President. In spite of these intrigues, 
 President Moraes fulfilled his duties with a dignity 
 and quiet determination worthy of all praise. 
 
1897] MINISTER OF WAR ASSASSINATED 303 
 
 The Minister of War remained in Bahia to super- 
 intend the withdrawal of the troops. Necessary details 
 being settled, General Bittencourt returned to Rio to 
 make his final report to the President. A week later 
 a tragedy occurred. The jacobinos, unable to create 
 serious embarrassments for the Administration during 
 the Canudos campaign, determined on other means to 
 attain their ends. Intimidation of prominent officials 
 was attempted by anonymous letters, in which the 
 assassination of public men was hinted at. No notice 
 being taken of these communications, the desperadoes 
 plunged into crime. 
 
 On November 4, 1897, President Moraes, accom- 
 panied by the Minister of War and his staff, boarded the 
 steamer Espirito- Santo to welcome General Ruy Barbosa, 
 and at 1 p.m. landed at the arsenal. A cry was heard 
 of " Long live the memory of Floriano Peixoto," followed 
 by shouts of "Long live the President of the Republic," 
 and amid the noise a soldier forced his way through the 
 crowd and levelled a pistol at the President, but it missed 
 fire. A blow from Colonel Mendes de Moraes felled 
 the would-be assassin, and cries of "Kill him, kill him," 
 rose from various quarters. The President and Minister 
 of War protested against the slaughter of the criminal. 
 A struggle ensued in the attempt to disarm the soldier, 
 who in the course of it drew a long knife and wounded 
 Colonel Mendes de Moraes, and slightly injured other 
 bystanders. The Minister of War rushed forward to 
 assist, and was stabbed thrice, dying in a few moments. 
 Examination of the pistol with which the murder of the 
 President was attempted, showed the weapon to be 
 loaded in both barrels with Comblain bullets. The 
 assassin was Marcellino Bispo de Mello, a native of 
 Alagoas, and a private in the 33rd Regiment. 
 
 Investigation revealed a political conspiracy to 
 assassinate Dr Moraes, in which certain of the jacobinos 
 were directly concerned. Martial law was proclaimed in 
 the Federal District to allow the police authorities a 
 free hand in making arrests of suspected persons. 
 
304 BRAZIL 
 
 Various people whose complicity in the conspiracy was 
 undoubted were arrested, amongst whom was Major 
 Diocletiano Martyr, accused of being the intermediary 
 who arranged the crime. The details as they were 
 unfolded showed the conspiracy to be widespread. 
 
 For the first time since the institution of republican 
 government in Brazil, public opinion made itself heard, 
 and most emphatically condemned the attempt upon 
 the life of Dr Moraes, and it made him secure of approval 
 for his methods of administration. He felt he would 
 be supported in measures he took to prevent any relapse 
 to a praetorian system. Therefore no clemency was 
 extended to the jacobinos, who were made to comprehend 
 that any further attempt to disturb public order would 
 be punished with a heavy hand. Thus cowed, they made 
 no effort at further opposition. 
 
 The presidential election for the period beginning 
 November 15, 1898, now began to occupy public atten- 
 tion, and the candidates supported by President Moraes 
 and his administration were Dr Manuel Campos Salles 
 for President, and Dr Rosa E. Silva for Vice-President ; 
 the former had been Governor of the State of Sao Paulo, 
 the latter was a prominent citizen from Pernambuco. The 
 opposition candidates were Senhor Lauro Sodre, formerly 
 Governor of Para, and now a member of the Senate, 
 and Dr Fernando Lobo from Minas Geraes, and also 
 a Senator. Senhor Sodre was a young army officer of 
 considerable ability. Dr Lobo could lay claim to small 
 qualification for office, for he had been one of the most 
 subservient members of the Peixoto Administration. 
 
 Official influence is the main factor in all South 
 American electoral contests, and the fact that Dr Campos 
 Salles could count upon President Moraes and his friends 
 was ample assurance that he would be elected. The 
 President had chosen wisely, for Dr Campos Salles was 
 experienced in public affairs and commanded the respect 
 of the Conservatives. Under his rule Sao Paulo had 
 prospered. Moreover, that State was the centre of 
 sounder republican ideas than any other section of 
 
1898] ELECTION OF CAMPOS SALLES 305 
 
 Brazil. Campos Salles had sufficient private fortune 
 to place him above the suspicion of seeking office for 
 personal gain. 
 
 The opposition candidate represented the methods 
 of Fonseca and Peixoto, favouring intervention in the 
 local affairs of states and the use of armed force to 
 carry out any policy the Administration desired. His 
 supporters comprised professional politicians, needy 
 adventurers, ambitious military officers — all the elements 
 which had caused disaster and suffering during the 
 previous decade. President Moraes realised the danger 
 to Brazil if the opposition should win, and determined 
 that official influence should be used unsparingly in 
 favour of Campos Salles. 
 
 The election was held on March 1, and Dr Campos 
 Salles was declared successful. Some clamour was 
 raised by the opposition on the ground of unfair treat- 
 ment by the Government, but the majority of intelligent 
 people listened with scant courtesy to this tirade of 
 abuse directed against the President and the supporters 
 of his policy. They did well, for in the President-elect 
 the Brazilians had a man whose political ideas were in 
 accordance with the changes wrought by President 
 Moraes in the administration of public affairs. Dr 
 Campos Salles was a republican from conviction, who 
 for several years before the deposition of Dom Pedro II. 
 had assisted in spreading the republican propaganda. 
 An able lawyer, whose ambition was to govern Brazil 
 by the terms of the Law of Constitution, he accepted 
 the responsibilities laid upon him with the full deter- 
 mination to do his duty at all costs. 
 
 In the early part of 1898, the full effects of the 
 financial mismanagement, coincident with the disturbed 
 internal conditions of the country since 1889, became 
 apparent, and rendered some arrangement necessary 
 with the national creditors to save Brazil from default. 
 The President determined to open negotiations with the 
 holders of the foreign debt, and to Dr Campos Salles 
 was confided the mission of visiting Europe and devising 
 
 u 
 
306 BRAZIL 
 
 a plan to give time for the Brazilian Treasury to recover. 
 The President-elect was courteously received in London 
 and elsewhere, and after hearing his explanations, an 
 agreement was made with the Rothschilds. Cash 
 interest payments were suspended for three years dating 
 from July 1, 1898, and bonds issued instead for the 
 amount due. Sinking funds were suspended for twenty 
 years, but Campos Salles promised he would use every 
 effort to ensure a resumption of interest payments in 
 cash in 1901. The success of this mission added greatly 
 to the prestige of the President-elect. 
 
 President Moraes completed his tenure of office on 
 November 15, 1898, and the contrast between the 
 conditions at this date and when he acceded to power 
 calls for more than passing mention. At the earlier 
 date the dictatorial regime of Peixoto held Brazil in an 
 iron grip, and personal liberty was at the mercy of a 
 tyrannical Administration. In Rio Grande do Sul the 
 revolutionary movement threatened again to plunge the 
 Republic into civil war; intervention in the local affairs of 
 the different States had bred discontent ; corruption was 
 rampant in the administrative departments ; the Press 
 was muzzled, and the right of public meeting denied. 
 Everywhere public welfare was absolutely uncared for 
 by the Government. In the teeth of determined 
 opposition President Moraes established order in public 
 affairs. Undeterred by threats of assassination, he broke 
 the vicious influence of the jacobinos, and pacified Rio 
 Grande do Sul. His administration was conducted 
 according to the Law of Constitution, civilians' rights 
 respected, and the Press allowed full license. The 
 heavy expenditure in connection with the warlike 
 operations against Canudos had prevented the rehabili- 
 tation of financial credit, but the arrangements made by 
 Dr Campos Salles were such as to give ample oppor- 
 tunity for recovering stability. 
 
 A misunderstanding had arisen in 1897, on the 
 frontier of French Guiana, threatening to bring compli- 
 cations between the two Governments. To avoid these, 
 
1899] FISCAL ^LEGISLATION 307 
 
 President Campos Salles determined to submit the 
 question to the arbitration of the President of the 
 Swiss Republic, and in April, 1899, Dr Nabuco went 
 to Switzerland as the Brazilian representative. His 
 nomination was of some significance, for he belonged to 
 the Monarchist Party, and had refused hitherto to serve 
 the Republican Administration in any capacity, and his 
 acceptance of this mission meant that the hostile feeling 
 which monarchists professed towards the republic had 
 disappeared. The policy of the new Administration was 
 a continuation of the methods established by President 
 Moraes, and that fact alone caused most Brazilians to 
 rally round the Government. 
 
 The President of Argentina visited Brazil in August, 
 1899, the first instance of the President of one South 
 American Republic officially visiting another. President 
 Roca was escorted by a squadron of the Argentine navy, 
 and accompanied by a large staff of naval and military 
 officers, and his visit was not without some result, for 
 a commercial treaty between Argentina and Brazil was 
 signed, and shortly afterwards ratified. 
 
 The first and second sessions of Congress in the 
 presidential term of Campos Salles were occupied with 
 fiscal legislation. The chief source of revenue to the 
 Central Government came from duties levied on imported 
 merchandise, and this was found to be inadequate to 
 cover the national expenditure. To provide additional 
 income the amount of the duties was increased, and 
 new taxes were levied by excise stamps for all articles 
 in everyday use. Personal motives occasionally led to 
 opposition to the fiscal Acts that Congress was asked 
 to sanction, but the subject was not made a party ques- 
 tion, and members of Congress were opportunists for 
 the most part. Nominally the political parties were the 
 repvMkanos, the federalutas repuhlfcamz, and an insig- 
 nificant group professing to hold monarchist opinions. 
 No strong party organisation existed, the members of the 
 different political sections voting from personal motives 
 without regard to party principles. An alleged mon- 
 
308 BRAZIL 
 
 archist conspiracy was discovered ill February, 1900, 
 and a number of arrests made ; but the majority of the 
 prisoners were released after a detention of a few days, 
 and the movement met with no general support from 
 the people. The appearance of bubonic plague in 
 Santos in 1899, and Rio in 1900, marked the end of the 
 century. In Santos the epidemic has been stamped out 
 by the energetic action of the authorities, but in Rio the 
 disease threatens to become endemic. 
 
 The last two years of the Campos Salles Administra- 
 tion calls for no special mention except in connection 
 with the dispute over the Acre territory with Bolivia. 
 The negotiations were conducted on both sides in a 
 moderate spirit, with the result that the way was 
 paved for a treaty between the two Governments, which 
 was signed in 1903, and subsequently ratified. On 
 November 15, 1902, Dr Rodriguez Alves, a former 
 Governor of Sao Paulo, was installed as Chief Magistrate, 
 and his term does not expire until 1907. Since his 
 accession to power there has been no disturbance of 
 public order. 
 
 Economic development in Brazil has been retarded 
 by disturbed politics, and the unwieldy character of the 
 existing constitution of the Republic. The semi-inde- 
 pendence of the States in the Federal Union renders 
 local administration cumbrous and costly, and opens the 
 door to corruption. In rich and populous districts the 
 necessary revenue may be forthcoming to sustain a host 
 of local officials, but in the poorer sections the demands 
 made on the inhabitants are so exhausting that develop- 
 ment is strangled. Promising industries are crushed 
 by taxation, often of an illegal character. Nominally 
 there is the right of appeal to the Federal Courts against 
 unjust impositions of State authorities, but this right 
 avails little, on account of the heavy cost entailed. 
 Another disadvantage arising from the sovereign rights 
 of the States is the hindrance they cause to railway 
 extension, as from each State through which a new 
 railway passes a concession must be obtained. Onerous 
 
1903] ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 309 
 
 conditions are accordingly imposed by the local govern- 
 ments at the time of construction, and also after the 
 railway is open to the public service. The Law of 
 Constitution of 1891 was on lines that presupposed 
 the population of Brazil to equal that of the United 
 States in capacity for self-government, and in the recog- 
 nition of sparsely populated districts as semi-independent 
 communities an even greater license is conceded than 
 in North America. The broad result is that local 
 administrations abuse their power, partly through ignor- 
 ance, partly from corrupt motives. 
 
 Brazil, with an area of 3,209,878 square miles, was 
 credited by the census of 1890 with a total population 
 of 14,333,015; classified as whites, 5,000,000; half-breeds 
 of Indian, negro, and white blood, 6,500,000; negroes, 
 3,500,000; and Indians, 400,000. The whites comprise 
 descendants of Portuguese settlers, foreign immigrants 
 from Portugal, Italy, and Germany, and a few South 
 Americans from other parts of the Continent ; but the 
 colour line between them and negroes is only slightly 
 observed, in spite of the fact that slavery existed until 
 1887. This enumeration gave a density of 4 J persons 
 to the square mile. From Italy has come a steady flow 
 of immigration for the past fifteen years. Previous to 
 the abolition of slavery, the coffee planters and other 
 employers of labour realised that immigration must be 
 encouraged to maintain the great producing industries, 
 and the result of representations to the Imperial 
 authorities was a propaganda in Europe to show the 
 advantages that Brazil offered for settlement. After the 
 suppression of slavery in 1887, the demand for labourers 
 rapidly increased, and both Italians and Portuguese 
 came in large numbers. Good wages were earned, and 
 the heavily taxed lower classes of Italy were eager to 
 travel to the coffee plantations of Sao Paulo and Minas 
 Geraes. The Portuguese prefer the cities, and gain a 
 living as servants, in shops, as boatmen, and at small 
 trades. State-aided immigration was undertaken by 
 the Government, and Italians principally benefited by 
 
310 BEAZIL 
 
 the free passages to Brazil, so that by 1892, the number 
 in the country was reported by the Italian legation to 
 exceed 1,000,000. Sao Paulo is the centre for these 
 immigrants from Italy. Its climate appeals to them, and 
 the work on the plantations and in the city of Sao Paulo is 
 congenial. How far these incomers will become assimi- 
 lated to the Brazilian it is not yet possible to say. At 
 present the majority remit their wages to their homes 
 in Italy, do not intermarry largely with Brazilians, and 
 seldom form binding social ties. Occasionally, however, 
 they buy plots of land, and when this occurs they become 
 fixed residents of Brazil, but such instances are not 
 common. Hitherto these people from Southern Europe 
 have been inclined rather to adopt Brazilian habits and 
 customs than to impart those of their own nationality. 
 
 The German settlements in the South are destined 
 in the future to play an important part in Brazilian 
 national life. At Porto Alegre and elsewhere in Rio 
 Grande do Sul the number of German residents exceeds 
 50,000, and Santa Catharina and Parana contain other 
 colonies all sufficiently strong to retain their own 
 manners and traditions, and hitherto showing small 
 inclination anywhere to lose them. In the revolutionary 
 period, 1893-5, these settlers held aloof from the struggle 
 and maintained the strictest neutrality, indifferent to 
 local politics. So strong was this apathy that in the 
 larger settlements armed guards were established by the 
 residents for their protection against marauding attempts 
 on their property, and neither Government nor revolu- 
 tionary troops were permitted to enter their territory. 
 The Germans are agriculturists and cattle owners, and 
 although few among them have acquired wealth, they 
 are in a fairly prosperous condition. Those German 
 colonies, however, formed by Dom Pedro II. at Petro- 
 polis, Novo Friburgo, and the neighbouring districts 
 occupy land which is poor and broken by rugged 
 mountain ranges. So they only make a bare living by 
 growing vegetables, fruit, and minor agricultural products, 
 and their progress is slow compared to that of their 
 
1903] THE FOREIGN RESIDENTS 311 
 
 fellow-countrymen in Rio Grande do Sul and Santa 
 Catharina. 
 
 The Portuguese become so intimately associated 
 with Brazilians that they practically lose their national 
 identity. They intermarry with their Brazilian 
 neighbours, and express no intention of returning to 
 Europe except for an occasional visit. Brazil becomes 
 their home, and their children grow up with Brazilian 
 ideas of life. The number of Portuguese who take out 
 naturalisation papers is not great, but this is due largely 
 to apathy. Moreover, by retaining their nationality 
 they are exempt from military service, and this is a 
 privilege they do not care to forego, unless for direct 
 compensation in the shape of official employment. As 
 a rule, they are thrifty and industrious, and form a 
 valuable addition to the labour supply. 
 
 The dominant note of Brazilian character comes 
 from the Latin stock which colonised this section of 
 South America. Circumstances have modified ideas in 
 many respects, but not to an extent to alter the funda- 
 mental principles underlying and governing action and 
 line of thought. Into the solemn mystery surrounding 
 the traditions of the Catholic Church have crept super- 
 stitious African legends, and intermingled with these 
 are traces of Indian folk-lore. The product is an 
 imagination ready to receive without reasoning passing 
 impressions, and in this soil the doctrines of Auguste 
 Comte took ready root on minds lacking in mental 
 balance, producing many evil fruits. Mental perspective 
 is contracted, and lacks energy to strike boldly in new 
 directions. Examples of the want of sound judgment 
 on the part of prominent Brazilians in recent years are 
 found in Admiral de Mello during the revolt of 1893-4, 
 in General Saraiva's hesitation to march northwards 
 after his victories in Parana, and in Admiral Saldanha 
 da Gama's resolve to join the hopeless cause of the Rio 
 Grande insurgents. General da Fonseca when President, 
 General Eloriano Peixoto, President Moraes, when he 
 allowed the country to be dragged into a war entailing 
 
312 BKAZIL 
 
 the sacrifice of the lives of 5000 soldiers without an 
 effort to negotiate with Antonio Conselheiro, all behaved 
 like men swayed by fixed ideas. Added to the tropical 
 conditions in which life is passed, there is an absence of 
 mental training in youth, and a social system extremely 
 lax in regard to a moral standard of everyday conduct. 
 Belief in spiritualism is widespread, and at times 
 inspires these naturally timid people with a fanaticism 
 that carries them blindly into peril. The average 
 Brazilian is not lacking in intelligence, but his mind 
 fails to stand the strain of mastering intricate detail. 
 This want of thoroughness has caused Brazil many 
 troubles in the past, and is a standing menace to the 
 country in the future. 
 
 To permit satisfactory evolution of Brazilian 
 character, education must be placed on a different 
 footing from the present. Under the existing system 
 it is not compulsory. Public instruction, in so far as 
 the primary and secondary stages are concerned, is under 
 the control of State and Municipal authorities, over 
 whom the Federal Administration exercises no jurisdic- 
 tion. Higher education, however, is in the hands of 
 the Central Government. The establishments comprise 
 two medical schools, four law colleges, four military 
 schools, one naval school, and a school of mines. The 
 number of students is 3000. In addition, there is the 
 Lyceum of Arts and Trades, with accommodation for 
 2500 pupils, and five special schools with facilities for 
 600 students ; while the Gymnasio National, a secondary 
 school, is maintained by the Federal Government, the 
 States having the right to found similar institutions. 
 All other secondary schools are private concerns, and 
 the result of this inadequate system was clearly demon- 
 strated in 1889, when the official returns showed 7500 
 public and private primary schools, attended by 300,000 
 pupils. The following year no fewer than 8,365,997 
 persons were returned as "illiterates," unable to read or 
 write, and since then the number of illiterate persons 
 has increased. The States render no educational returns 
 
1903] DEFECTIVE EDUCATION 313 
 
 to the Federal Government, and only Sao Paulo makes 
 a real effort to grapple with this grave problem. Even 
 there the measures taken are efficient only in cities and 
 towns. 
 
 The importance of this vital national question does 
 not appeal to the majority of Brazilians. They were 
 indifferent to it under the Empire, and remain so at the 
 beginning of the new century. Dom Pedro took 
 personal interest in higher education, and was never 
 slow to suggest improvements, but gave little heed to 
 primary education, and the Republican authorities have 
 allowed matters to run on in the old grooves, attempt- 
 ing no reforms. Indeed, the standard of higher educa- 
 tion has suffered from the withdrawal of the protection 
 afforded it by Dom Pedro ; and where other nations 
 have increased facilities for educating the lower classes, 
 Brazil has retrograded. No wonder if in these circum- 
 stances the majority of the inhabitants are wrapped in 
 ignorant superstition and make no advance towards a 
 higher civilisation. 
 
 With a defective educational system, it is not sur- 
 prising that the administration of justice is on an 
 unsatisfactory footing. Brazilian law is codified, and 
 in the hands of impartial and intelligent judges would 
 meet the necessities of criminal and civil proceedings ; 
 but corruption is common in all branches of the judiciary, 
 and the cost of litigation is abnormally high. Delay of 
 decisions in contested cases is one serious complaint ; 
 and an investigation into the condition of the principal 
 prison in 1899 in Rio de Janeiro (Casa da Detencao) 
 brought to light grave abuses. Prisoners arrested for 
 trivial offences were kept in confinement without trial 
 for months, in some instances for years. Ten and 
 twelve prisoners were crowded into cells intended to 
 hold four only, with the excuse of "no room." No 
 discrimination of class was made, hardened criminals 
 and offenders for petty illegal acts being herded together. 
 The prison was condemned as insanitary by medical 
 experts, and.no discipline was observed. The scandal 
 
314 BRAZIL 
 
 led to some reforms in this particular establishment, 
 but nothing was done towards reform all round. 
 
 An extraordinary experiment deserves mention in 
 the State of Minas Geraes. Ouro Preto was formerly 
 its capital, but in 1891 it was decided to remove head- 
 quarters to a more suitable spot, and the authorities 
 selected the valley of Bello Horizonte, fifty miles distant 
 from Ouro Preto. There was no sign of town or 
 hamlet in the vicinity, nor was it the centre of any agri- 
 cultural or pastoral industry ; but it was picturesque, and 
 struck the fancy of the officials, and straightway they 
 ordered a city to be built — no light task, as the State 
 Government soon found to its cost. A railway was 
 laid to give access to the valley, but as the plans of 
 construction were presented the heavy expenditure for 
 the project became obvious. Government buildings, 
 theatres, municipal offices, barracks, and other costly 
 edifices were required, and all planned on royal scale. 
 A water-supply too was provided, the streets paved, 
 electric light and gas installed, and other expenses 
 incurred, so that votes were always exceeded, and in 
 1892 the works were perforce suspended for want of 
 money. All revenue was then mortgaged to permit a 
 resumption of construction, and at length the new city 
 was sufficiently advanced for habitation. Bello 
 Horizonte was declared the local capital in 1898, and 
 the Government transferred to it. 
 
 Economic progress in Brazil has also been retarded 
 by the financial difficulties of the Federal Government, 
 resulting from reckless expenditure of the national 
 resources to combat revolutionary outbreaks and satisfy 
 the demands of the corrupt circle surrounding the 
 Presidency from 1890 to 1894. The depreciation of 
 the currency was due to the mismanagement of the 
 national finances, and occasioned the ruin of many 
 families who possessed fixed sources of income. It 
 also disturbed the wages of employe's and labourers, 
 reducing their earnings. To the effects of the reduced 
 purchasing power of the inconvertible notes was added 
 
1903] MEANS OF COMMUNICATION 315 
 
 the burthen of heavy extra taxation, rendered necessary 
 by obligations contracted in former Administrations. 
 These two influences caused widespread poverty amongst 
 all classes of Brazilians, and paralysed economic progress. 
 Reaction has begun, but has not yet overcome the results 
 of former errors. 
 
 Lack of more adequate means of communication is 
 still felt severely in Brazil, for the length of railways 
 open for public service is only 9000 miles, in a country 
 only 300,000 square miles smaller than the United 
 States. This limited facility for transport hinders 
 development in every direction, and it is due to it that 
 the interior of the country remains unknown and un- 
 populated. Under the Empire many railway lines were 
 projected, and a few constructed, partly by the Central 
 Government, partly by private enterprise, under a 
 guarantee of a fixed rate of interest on capital invested. 
 Under the Republic the nation attempted to obtain 
 control of all railways where the right of purchase was 
 recognised by the concession, and it was then the system, 
 now controlled by the Leopoldina Company, passed 
 under State management. The Government found 
 itself unable successfully to direct the system acquired, 
 and to earn the money due for interest on the bonds 
 issued to cover the cost of purchase. As national 
 property, the railway became the refuge of political 
 adventurers, all posts being given away as recompense 
 for political service rendered or promised. No wonder 
 that the line could not earn enough to cover the cost of 
 maintenance ; so after long litigation the bondholders 
 regained possession of their property, and enough was 
 earned within two years to pay a dividend. The Central 
 Railway of Brazil, which has remained under State 
 control, is a parallel instance, doing duty as a pension 
 list. Political patronage secures a favourable response 
 to applications for employment. No attempt is made 
 to manage the State railways on a commercial basis, and 
 the result of the ignorance of the employes is that a 
 valuable property is a constant drag upon the national 
 
316 BRAZIL 
 
 resources instead of yielding a handsome profit. The 
 desire for State control of the railway systems is found 
 everywhere in South America, and for a reason not 
 far to seek. A railway organisation becomes one of 
 the most powerful of political machines when run under 
 State auspices, the employes being dependent for their 
 positions on the Government. Presidential or congres- 
 sional elections are more easily manipulated when the 
 railway employe is aware that the penalty for voting 
 against the Government is instant dismissal. The result 
 in Brazil has been that the projected lines to unite 
 Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Sul with Rio de Janeiro 
 have not been built, the loss through systematic State 
 mismanagement having left each Administration with 
 only limited funds for railway extension. Notwith- 
 standing, the Government has remained unwilling to 
 give private companies the right to provide means of 
 transport. 
 
 The same jealously of private enterprise has been 
 shown in connection with the telegraph service. If the 
 Government could maintain efficient telegraphic com- 
 munication there could be no cause for complaint, but 
 this is not the case. In Brazil it is no infrequent occur- 
 rence to send a message to some interior town the day 
 before starting for it, and to arrive twenty-four hours 
 ahead of the despatch announcing the intended visit. 
 So far, however, as submarine cables are concerned, the 
 Government has no control beyond a heavy tax levied 
 on the receipts of the companies, and the right to place 
 irritating restrictions on the despatch of all messages, 
 even ordinary business communications, in time of 
 revolutionary trouble. Recently the cable service has 
 been extended, additional communication to Europe 
 being established via Senegal in 1891, thus giving an 
 alternate route. Cable connection between Para and 
 Manaos, a distance of nearly 1000 miles, has also 
 been recently opened. 
 
 In the matter of utilising her waterways to best 
 advantage, Brazil is behind the times. The Amazon, 
 
1903] BRAZILIAN WATERWAYS 317 
 
 with its many tributaries, presents possibilities for 
 development that have been allowed to rest in the 
 background. Steamer accommodation provided by ships 
 flying the Brazilian flag is totally inadequate to fulfil 
 the wants of the travelling public, or to carry freight 
 at reasonable rates. 
 
PART II 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 CHILE 
 
 Law of Constitution. Congress. The Executive. State Council. 
 Administration from 1833 to 18G1. President Bulnes. President 
 Montt. President Perez. Liberal Administration. Disaster to 
 the Compania Church. War with Spain. Blockade of Valparaiso. 
 Capture of the Covadonga. Bombardment of Valparaiso. Truce 
 with Spain. Foundation of Chilian Navy. Re-election of 
 President Perez. Economic Progress. President Ernlzuriz. 
 Construction of the Cochrane and Blanco Encalada. Railway 
 Expansion. Presidential Candidates in 1876. President Pinto. 
 Relations between Chile and Bolivia. Economic Crisis. Incon- 
 vertible Currency. Relations with Argentina. Quarrel with 
 Bolivia and Peru. President Pinto and the War. Presidential 
 Contest in 1881. Election of Santa Maria. Congressional 
 Elections. Treaty with Peru. Truce with Bolivia. Laws of 
 Civil Registry and Marriage. The Cemeteries. Presidential 
 Election in 1886. Origin of Parliamentary System. Early Days 
 of Balmaceda. Special Mission to Lima. His connection with 
 Politics. Election to Congress. Programme of Reformistas. 
 Opposition to new Political Movement. Balmaceda appointed 
 Minister in Buenos Aires. Balmaceda in 1882 and 1885. 
 Election to Presidency. Political Intrigues. Ministry of Sefior 
 Carlos Antuiiez. Zanartii Cabinet. Congressional Elections, 
 1888. Resignation of Zaiiarti'i. Ministerial changes. Policy con- 
 cerning Church and Education. Conflict between Congress and 
 Executive. Political situation in 1890. Dictatorial attitude of 
 Balmaceda. Sefior Vicuna proclaimed Presidential Candidate. 
 Resolutions by Mass Meetings. The Comision Conservadora. 
 Pretext for Revolt. 
 
 The Law of Constitution, under which Chile is 
 governed, was voted by the representatives of the nation 
 in 1833. Although it has been modified from time to 
 
 X 
 
322 CHILE 
 
 time to meet the developments of unforeseen conditions, 
 in its fundamental points it remains unaltered to the 
 present day. Administration is vested in three branches 
 —legislative, executive, and judicial. The legislative 
 power consists of the National Congress, comprising 
 two assemblies, a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. 
 The Senate is composed of members returned by the 
 direct vote of the provinces for a term of six years in 
 the proportion of one Senator for every three Deputies, 
 and the Chamber of Deputies comprises representatives 
 chosen by the direct vote of the departments for a term 
 of three years, in ratio of one Deputy for every 30,000 
 inhabitants or any fraction of not less than 15,000. 
 Voting is cumulative, and the franchise is extended to 
 all male citizens of twenty-one years of age who can 
 read and write. The Executive is exercised by the 
 President of the Republic, elected by indirect vote for a 
 term of five years, in the month of June preceding the 
 expiration of the existing presidency, the new chief 
 magistrate taking his seat on the 18th of the September 
 following. By an amendment to the Law of Constitu- 
 tion enacted in 1871, the President is not eligible for 
 re-election at the close of his term. In questions of 
 legislation the President has a modified right of veto, 
 but a Bill returned to the Chambers may become law if 
 a majority of the members are present and a two-thirds 
 vote is obtained. The President is assisted by a 
 Cabinet of seven ministers, namely : — Interior ; Foreign 
 Affairs ; Worship and Colonisation ; Justice and Public 
 Instruction ; Finance ; War and Marine ; and Industry 
 and Public Works ; and the Constitution further provides 
 for a Council of State, consisting of the ministers holding 
 portfolios ; five members nominated by the President, 
 these to include a member of the Courts of Justice, an 
 ecclesiastical dignitary, a general or admiral, an official 
 of the Finance Department, one ex-minister or diplo- 
 matic agent ; and six members chosen by Congress. It 
 is the Council's duty to advise the President, and to act 
 as a check upon him in his conduct of public affairs. 
 
Chilian Celebrities. 
 
 [Faci: page 322. 
 
1841] AUTOCRATIC PRESIDENTS 323 
 
 From the date of the Law of Constitution in 1833 
 until 1861, the Government was conducted more on the 
 lines of a Dictatorship than a Republic. It was not 
 designed in the Constitution that this dictatorial 
 tendency should exist ; but in view of subversive out- 
 breaks and the turbulent character of the Chilians, 
 extraordinary powers were granted from time to time, 
 principally for the suppression of revolutionary risings, 
 and these included power to suspend constitutional 
 guarantees, muzzle the expression of public opinion, 
 imprison and exile political suspects without trial, and, 
 in fact, to adopt any arbitrary measures that the Presi- 
 dent might consider necessary to secure his absolute 
 authority. Moreover, the Law of Constitution permitted 
 the re-election of a President at the expiration of his 
 term of office ; and this led to the custom of extend- 
 ing the presidential period to ten years, a prolongation 
 conducive to autocracy. It was in such circumstances 
 that President Prieto developed dictatorial tendencies 
 previous to 1841, and the system showed no signs of 
 modification under President Bulnes between 1841 and 
 1851. Bulnes was a soldier, and had small idea of any 
 method of administration other than by force, and all 
 attempts to dispute his authority were crushed with an 
 iron hand. 
 
 In 1851 Manuel Montt acceded to the Presidency, 
 and public opinion confidently looked for a decisive 
 change in the Government. Montt was a civilian and a 
 judge of the Supreme Court, and he was regarded as a 
 man who would insist upon personal liberties being 
 respected ; but unfortunately a revolution occurred a few 
 days after his installation, and stern measures were 
 adopted to quell the outbreak. It may have been that 
 this subversive movement exerted a direct influence on 
 his attitude, or possibly the fact that ex-Presiclent 
 Bulnes was a power in the presidential councils was 
 responsible for his policy ; but in any case the first five 
 years of Montt's Administration showed no improvement 
 in the position of the Chilians in regard to civil and politi- 
 
324 CHILE 
 
 cal liberty. It was not that Montt was an unjust man 
 in the literal sense of the word, indeed his reputation is 
 rather the reverse ; but he was impatient of the slightest 
 wish to dispute his authority ; and although during the 
 latter live years of his Administration, from 1856 to 
 1861, a greater degree of political and civil liberty was 
 apparent, this satisfactory development was crushed by 
 the occurrence of another insurrection in the provinces 
 Atacama, Aconcagua, Talca, and Concepcion, an out- 
 break which led to a renewal of the drastic measures of 
 former years, persons suspected of sedition being treated 
 with the utmost severity. Practically from 1833 to 
 1861 the administration of the country was so conducted 
 that the people were excluded from all participation in 
 the affairs of the Government, and it was due to this 
 fact that the country was so constantly a prey to those 
 internal dissensions which served to hinder all economic 
 progress and substantial prosperity. 
 
 The year 1861 marked a new departure. Seiior 
 Jose Joaquin Perez succeeded President Montt on 
 September 18, and it was evident from the commence- 
 ment of his Administration that Chile was about to 
 enjoy a freedom unknown in the past. One of Perez's 
 first acts was to annul the decrees of expatriation 
 against persons who had taken part in former subversive 
 plots, and throughout the country this action was 
 warmly applauded by all classes. Nor were the Chilians 
 disappointed in their expectations, for the expression of 
 public opinion was encouraged and criticism of the 
 Government invited instead of being treated as a crime, 
 as had previously been the case. The extraordinary 
 powers conceded heretofore to dictatorial presidents 
 were neither asked for nor required by Perez, and the 
 people recognised that the oppression which had weighed 
 so heavily upon them since their independence from 
 Spanish dominion was eliminated. They felt that it 
 was no longer an autocratic President, but the Legisla- 
 ture which ruled Chile. 
 
 Two years after Perez assumed office a disaster, of a 
 
1863] BURNING OF COMPANIA CHURCH 325 
 
 magnitude unparalleled in Chile, occurred in Santiago. 
 On the afternoon of December 8, 1863, a special service 
 was celebrated in the old Jesuit church of the Compania. 
 The interior of the building was decorated profusely 
 with tapestries and hangings in honour of the occasion, 
 and a profusion of candles and lamps gave added effect 
 to the scene. Towards the end of the afternoon the 
 church was densely crowded with women and children 
 of all ranks of society, when suddenly a current of air 
 caught one of the high hanging draperies, bringing it in 
 contact with a lighted candle, and in a moment this dry 
 curtain was on fire. The wind caused the flames to 
 spread with utmost rapidity, and before any effort could 
 be made to check the fire the interior of the church 
 was a mass of burning hangings and woodwork. A 
 panic ensued, and all present made a rush for the doors, 
 with the result that every exit became jammed. Women 
 and children were trodden under foot and crushed to 
 death in their frantic attempts to escape. Soon the 
 doorways were heaped with the bodies of the dead and 
 dying, impeding all outlets. In the interior of the church 
 the conflagration raged, and the shrieks rose high above 
 the din of falling timbers as beam after beam crashed 
 down on the heads of the unfortunate victims. The 
 news of the catastrophe spread quickly through the 
 city, and fathers, husbands, and brothers rushed to the 
 scene, only to find themselves helpless to give aid to 
 their dear ones imprisoned within the walls. For two 
 hours the flames continued, in spite of all efforts to 
 subdue them ; but at 9 a.m. the roof of the burning 
 building fell in, and the holocaust was complete. Two 
 thousand persons had perished in the course of less 
 than a couple of hours, and there were few families in 
 Santiago but mourned some relative amongst the dead. 
 A few bodies were recognised and claimed by relations 
 for burial, but the vast majority were past all identifica- 
 tion, and the corpses were carted to the cemetery and 
 there interred in a common tomb, over which a 
 monument was subsequently raised. 
 
326 CHILE 
 
 While the Perez Administration proved so satis- 
 factory for the Chilians at home, it was during this term 
 that the country became involved in war with Spain. 
 The outbreak of hostilities between Spain and Peru 
 in connection with the quarrel concerning the Chincha 
 Islands, caused the President and his advisers to imagine 
 that if Spain was victorious the Spaniards would 
 endeavour to regain control over South America. 
 Regarding the Spanish attitude as distinctly menacing, 
 the Chilian Government proposed that, in company 
 with Bolivia and Ecuador, common cause should be 
 made with Peru, and in 1865 these four South American 
 republics were united against such power as Spain 
 could send across the seas to attack them. The policy 
 of Perez was supported enthusiastically in Chile ; but 
 the country was unprepared for war, and towards the 
 latter part of 1865 a Spanish squadron blockaded 
 Valparaiso, and considerable damage was inflicted upon 
 the trade of that city. Chile possessed only one warship, 
 the Esmeralda, commanded by Captain Juan Williams 
 Rebolledo, and in January 1865, when this vessel was 
 cruising to the north of Valparaiso, she captured the 
 Spanish gunboat Covadonga and took her prize into 
 Coquimbo. The incident so affected Admiral Pareja, 
 the Spanish officer in charge of the blockading squadron, 
 that he committed suicide on his flagship, the Villa de 
 Madrid. Irritated by the loss of the Covadonga and 
 the death of Admiral Pareja, the Spanish Government 
 sent out the Numancia, commanded by Captain Mendez 
 Nunez, and other vessels, with orders to exact reparation 
 from the Chilians. Captain Nunez assumed charge of 
 the Spanish fleet on his arrival in Chilian waters, and 
 decided that the shortest way to accomplish his mission 
 was to bombard Valparaiso, although that seaport was 
 undefended. On March 31, 1866, at 9.30 a.m., four 
 Spanish ships fired on the town for three hours, aiming 
 chiefly at the custom-house sheds, because they were 
 filled with valuable merchandise. When it was seen 
 that these biuldings were in flames and other sections of 
 
1866] VALPARAISO BOMBARDED 32? 
 
 the city were burning, the order to cease firing was 
 given, but not until damage to the estimated value of 
 $14,000,000 was done. 
 
 After the bombardment, the Spanish squadron left 
 Valparaiso and did not attempt to interfere again with 
 the Chilians. In 1867 a truce was made between Spain 
 and Chile, and twelve years later, in 1879, a treaty of 
 peace and friendship was signed ; but even after a lapse 
 of thirty-five years bitter feelings exist against the 
 Spaniards on account of that bombardment. One re- 
 sult of the war was that the Chilians realised that they 
 required ships and forts to defend themselves in future 
 against foreign aggression, and the foundation of the 
 navy, which rendered such signal service a few years 
 later, was laid by President Perez, when he gave instruc- 
 tions for building the OHiggins and Chacabuco. Forts 
 were also constructed for the defence of Valparaiso, and 
 attention generally was given to the question of military 
 and naval armaments. 
 
 As had been the custom, Perez was re-elected for 
 another presidential term. In some quarters exception 
 was taken to this proceeding, on the grounds that the 
 time had arrived to amend the Law of Constitution 
 where it concerned the re-election of the President. 
 Perez informed the deputations waiting upon him in 
 connection with this matter that they had full liberty of 
 public meeting to discuss such questions, and a free 
 Press to circulate their ideas. This attitude conciliated 
 the Opposition in regard to his election, but on the other 
 hand a legitimate agitation was set afoot to amend the 
 law in respect to the eligibility of Presidents for a 
 second consecutive term, and in 1871 a reform was 
 sanctioned which precluded re-election at the expiry of 
 the regular presidential period. As this was the first 
 time any such action had been attempted by consti- 
 tutional means, it marks an important step in Chilian 
 political evolution. 
 
 In addition to the satisfactory political conditions 
 established by Perez, his Administration was noteworthy 
 
328 CHILE 
 
 for economic progress. Railways projected by President 
 Montt were finished and opened for traffic, and tele- 
 graphic communication was established throughout the 
 central districts. Public instruction was encouraged, 
 and schools and colleges founded by aid of the Govern- 
 ment at the initiative of Seiior Barros Araiia, who 
 represented to Congress the necessity of a more ex- 
 tended system of education. Measures were taken to 
 provide more adequate means of protection for life and 
 property than had formerly existed, and the efforts 
 in this direction encouraged the establishment of new 
 industries in country districts where settlers had pre- 
 viously been afraid to reside because of the prevailing 
 lawlessness. 
 
 Senor Federico Emizuriz was elected to succeed 
 Perez, and he assumed office on September 18, 1871. 
 The new Chief Magistrate entered upon his presidential 
 duties under different auspices to his predecessors. In 
 the Senate he had supported the amendment of the 
 Constitution regarding the ineligibility of Presidents for 
 re-election, and through his influence Congress had 
 approved the measure. During his Administration the 
 country enjoyed exceptional peace at home and abroad, 
 and the political and civil liberties permitted under 
 Perez were strictly respected and in some directions 
 amplified. In one matter Emizuriz rendered his country 
 a service which proved of the utmost importance at a 
 slightly later stage. In 1871 Peru possessed a navy 
 consisting of several modern ships, and this gave her a 
 preponderating power in her dealings with her neigh- 
 bours. Emizuriz recognised that Chile was at a serious 
 disadvantage, in consequence of her naval inferiority, 
 whenever complications arose with the Peruvian 
 Government, and to remedy this drawback the 
 President in 1873 ordered the construction in British 
 shipyards of the ironclads Almirante Cochrane, Almirante 
 Blanco Encalada, and the gunboat Magallanes. It was 
 not until after his death that occasion occurred to use 
 these men-of-war for fighting purposes, but when the 
 
1873] THE CHILIAN NAVY 329 
 
 time did come his forethought proved the salvation of 
 the Chilians. 
 
 The policy of Errazuriz in regard to public works 
 was especially beneficial. Loans were raised in London, 
 and the money expended on extending the railway 
 system ; the Valparaiso custom-house sheds destroyed 
 during the Spanish bombardment were remodelled and 
 rebuilt ; the Congress Hall in Santiago was erected, and 
 other improvements initiated. Perhaps one of the most 
 remarkable features of his Administration was that 
 throughout his term the same Minister of the Interior 
 held office without interruption, and this permitted a 
 continuity of policy that would have been impossible if 
 he had been hampered by ministerial changes. 
 
 The question of the presidential election created 
 general interest in 1876. In former years the retiring 
 President had nominated his successor ; but in 1876 
 more liberal ideas prevailed, and the Chilians were 
 called upon to decide for themselves to whom the 
 Government should be entrusted. The candidates were 
 Senor Benjamen Vicuna Mackenna, Senor Miguel Luis 
 Amunategui, and Senor Anibal Pinto. Mackenna was 
 a distinguished historian, and had served his country in 
 different public capacities ; Amunategui had been a 
 professor of the National Institute, was a well-known 
 writer, and had been Minister of the Interior under 
 Perez ; while Pinto was a man of good standing, who 
 had held the portfolio of War under Errazuriz. Senor 
 Pinto won, and on September 18, 1876, assumed his 
 presidential responsibilities. 
 
 Pinto was destined to rule Chile during a most 
 critical period. The war with Bolivia and Peru altered 
 the course of Chilian history and character, and 
 President Pinto was far from the generally accepted 
 ideal type of citizen to face the great national crisis 
 which confronted the country in 1879. He was quiet, 
 inclined to studious habits, and a strong advocate for 
 peaceful measures, and yet he showed no sign of 
 faltering when his Administration became involved in a 
 
330 CHILE 
 
 bloody and costly war in which the lives of 20,000 of 
 his countrymen were sacrificed. 
 
 Before the outbreak of war, and while relations with 
 Bolivia caused constant anxiety, President Pinto had to 
 deal with a difficult and unforeseen situation. The 
 country was plunged into a severe economic crisis due 
 to depression in the mining industry, and the revenue 
 shrank to such an extent that the available funds were 
 barely sufficient to meet the ordinary expenses. Gold 
 and silver coin was shipped abroad by the commercial 
 community in payment of liabilities, and this brought 
 a monetary crisis. The Administration suggested a law 
 to relieve the banks from specie payments, which was 
 sanctioned, and an inconvertible note issue established. 
 The currency complications date from this period, and 
 they have proved ever since a constant obstacle to com- 
 mercial prosperity and economic development. To add 
 to the trouble, the dispute with Argentina concerning 
 the boundary line gave cause for serious alarm, and it 
 became so acute in 1878 that hostilities between the two 
 countries appeared likely to occur ; but, happily, the 
 tact shown by the President conciliated the angry 
 passions on both sides of the Andes, and a treaty was 
 signed which removed for the time any danger of a 
 rupture. 
 
 The question of relations with Bolivia has been 
 dealt with under the description of the war of 1879 ; it 
 is unnecessary here to enter into the details of that 
 controversy beyond noting the fact that the President 
 never wavered in his determination to protect Chilian 
 rights in Bolivia, even when his policy in this respect 
 entailed an appeal to arms to support his convictions. 
 Pinto considered the rupture with Peru inevitable, and 
 he accepted the situation as the only possible one for 
 the general welfare of Chile. From the moment of the 
 outbreak of hostilities he was untiring in his efforts to 
 furnish the army in the field with supplies of men and 
 equipment, and he personally supervised the details of 
 the various expeditions, besides devising expedients to 
 
1881] PRESIDENT PINTO 331 
 
 obtain the funds necessary for the conduct of the 
 campaign. Throughout the period when the success or 
 failure of the Chilian cause hung in the balance, Pinto 
 kept a cool head and clear judgment in regard to the 
 operations by land and sea, and his confident atti- 
 tude materially assisted in bringing about the final 
 victory. 
 
 In 1881 came the question of the election of a 
 successor to Pinto. A number of prominent politicians 
 requested the President to advise in the selection of a 
 candidate ; but to this appeal he replied that he had 
 nothing to do with the election of his successor, and no 
 arguments could induce him to depart from his deter- 
 mination to refrain from exerting his official influence. 
 The candidate upon whom the choice fell was Seiior 
 Domingo Santa Maria, who assumed office at the usual 
 date in 1881. Seiior Pinto survived his term of office 
 for three years, dying in Valparaiso in 1884. 
 
 President Santa Maria had passed through many 
 vicissitudes in his political career. In 1848 he had 
 been in the public service as Intendente of Colchagua, 
 and afterwards held other posts ; but during the Presi- 
 dency of Senor Manuel Montt he was implicated in 
 revolutionary outbreaks and condemned to banishment. 
 On his return to Chile in 1864 he was named Minister 
 of Finance by President Perez ; later he was the repre- 
 sentative of Chile to the Government of Peru; subse- 
 quently he was appointed a judge of the Court of 
 Appeal ; and under President Pinto he had held the 
 portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Interior. The new 
 President, as a Liberal, opposed the introduction of 
 clerical influence into political affairs, and this led to 
 bitter opposition to his Administration on the part of 
 the Conservatives, who represented the Church Party. 
 It was in consequence of this opposition, which was 
 subsequently strengthened by different groups of 
 Liberals, that he brought official influence to bear in 
 the Congressional elections of 1882, his object being to 
 create an absolute majority in his favour in the 
 
332 CHILE 
 
 Chambers ; but his action was severely criticised, and 
 led to violent obstruction to all legislative measures 
 brought forward by his Administration, and when in 
 1885 he adopted a similar policy in the elections, he 
 again brought upon himself an avalanche of abuse. 
 
 In spite of this opposition to his Administration, the 
 President succeeded in carrying through some important 
 measures. The treaty of peace with Peru was signed and 
 ratified, and a truce was celebrated with Bolivia ; and two 
 measures were passed, most directly affecting internal 
 affairs in connection with the laws relating to civil 
 registry and marriage. Until these laws were enacted 
 the priests alone controlled the registers for the inscrip- 
 tion of births, deaths, and marriages, but the new laws 
 provided special officials for the purpose, and the 
 registration of all marriages, births, and deaths was 
 made compulsory. Another reform was the freeing of 
 the cemeteries for the burial of all persons, whereas 
 formerly only those belonging to the Roman Catholic 
 religion were permitted interment in consecrated 
 ground. These reforms were carried in the teeth of 
 the most violent resistance from the Church Party. 
 
 When the term of Santa Maria approached comple- 
 tion he selected Senor Jose Manuel Balmaceda as his 
 successor, and threw all the weight of his official 
 influence in favour of his choice. The Conservatives 
 and those Liberals who were in opposition made a 
 determined fight against Balmaceda, but the official 
 support accorded to him finally secured his return. 
 
 The action of Santa Maria in using official influence 
 in the Congressional election of 1882, and again in 1885, 
 was due to the curious phase into which political pro- 
 cedure in the Chambers had drifted. Ideas of Liberal 
 Government had gradually evolved the unwritten law 
 that the resignation of the ministry should follow an 
 adverse vote on any administrative measure ; in other 
 words, the ministry was only justified in holding office 
 when it represented a majority in Congress. This 
 development was the result of the agitation by the 
 
1885] PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE 333 
 
 Liberals to secure a parliamentary system of govern- 
 ment ; but there was one important defect in the 
 adoption of this procedure which then, and since, caused 
 unexpected complications. No power is given to the 
 President to dissolve the Chambers when an adverse 
 majority exists, and it was the effort to secure a 
 substantial majority in the Legislature that induced 
 Santa Maria to act as he did in 1882 and 1885. The 
 so-called parliamentary procedure has been productive 
 of similar practices in succeeding Administrations, and 
 must continue to do this until the power of ordering a 
 dissolution of the Chambers is vested in the President. 
 The alternative can only be the introduction of a system 
 making the Ministry practically independent of Con- 
 gress, as is the case in the United States. 
 
 Senor Balmaceda acceded to the Presidency on 
 September 18, 1886, and his term was destined to be 
 marked by stirring events, covering a notable period in 
 Chilian history. A brief description of himself and his 
 policy will therefore help towards a better understanding 
 of the situation from 1886 to 1891. 
 
 Jose Manuel Balmaceda was born in 1838, and in 
 his childhood autocratic government was the keystone 
 of Chilian politics. His father had been an intimate 
 councillor and supporter of President Manuel Montt, 
 and throughout the revolutionary risings of 1851 and 
 1859 he enthusiastically espoused the cause of his friend. 
 Young Balmaceda was educated under clerical influence, 
 and an inclination to asceticism was ingrained in his 
 nature. After completing his studies he wished to take 
 priestly orders, but his father strongly opposed the 
 Church as a career, and in 1864 he obtained an appoint- 
 ment for his son as a member of a special mission to 
 Lima, to attend a South American Congress called to 
 discuss the attitude of Spain towards Peru in connection 
 with the question of the Chincha Islands. When, a 
 year later, Jose Balmaceda returned, he no longer thought 
 of devoting his life to the priesthood, but rather to 
 politics or diplomacy. Finding for the moment no 
 
334 CHILE 
 
 opening in these directions, he occupied himself with 
 the management of his father's country estates, and 
 shortly afterwards married the Senorita Emilia Toro 
 Herrera, a member of one of the most prominent 
 families of Santiago. 
 
 During his life in the country, Balmaceda did not 
 allow himself to lose touch with political developments. 
 The closing years of the Perez Administration saw the 
 change from dictatorial rule to Constitutional Govern- 
 ment, and the more advanced thinkers of the younger 
 generation then established the Reform Party, taking for 
 their motto the word "Libertad," and giving expression 
 to their views at meetings and through the newspaper 
 La Libertad, a journal founded in 1866 by the 
 brothers Arteaga Alemparte to disseminate through the 
 country a creed for the advancement of political liberty. 
 Among these reformers Balmaceda took his place, and 
 soon became one of the most prominent advocates of 
 the new doctrines. At the elections for the Chamber 
 of Deputies in 1870, Balmaceda was a candidate for the 
 Department of Carelmapu, and after a hard contest was 
 victorious. From that date until his death, he was 
 constantly before the people of Chile as a participator 
 in political developments. 
 
 On September 26, 1875, the reformistas convened a 
 meeting, and adopted the following programme as the 
 political basis of their party :■ — 
 
 1. Equality and independence of the different public administrative 
 departments. To guarantee this, the establishment of the following 
 principles : — 
 
 (a) Independence and responsibility of the judicial power. 
 (jA Organisation of the franchise on the popular lines of liberty 
 of suffrage and non-intervention of official influence in 
 electoral matters. 
 
 (c) Reform of the municipal power, and independence in local 
 
 affairs. The limit to such power being that municipal acts 
 must harmonise with the general welfare. 
 
 (d) Separation of Church and State upon the following principles : 
 
 (1) Subjection of all religious communities to common law ; 
 
 (2) Suppression of special laws and privileges ; (3) Freedom 
 
President Balmaceda. 
 
 [Face page 334. 
 
1875] POLITICAL REFOPM 335 
 
 of the cemeteries to all religious sects ; (4) Establishment of 
 
 civil registry and civil marriage. 
 (e) Encouragement of public education by State and Municipality. 
 
 Liberty of instruction and profession, the latter qualified by 
 
 the necessity to prove competence. 
 (J") Equal distribution of the charges levied by State or Munici- 
 pality. 
 (g) Reform of the Law of Constitution to make practicable these 
 
 ideas, and where necessary a modification of civil and 
 
 administrative laws. 
 
 These political ideals emanated from Balmaceda, and 
 explain his later career. That some of them were 
 impracticable, was shown subsequently, but this does 
 not minimise the historical importance of the action of 
 the reformistas. It marked an upheaval in Chilian 
 political life, and the new doctrine was vigorously 
 preached by Balmaceda and his colleagues in and out 
 of Congress. The effect was to create a more general 
 interest in political affairs, for the new principles gained 
 ground steadily in spite of bitter opposition by the Con- 
 servatives and the supporters of the Clerical Party. 
 
 When war with Bolivia and Peru broke out in 1879, 
 the attitude of Argentina was most important to Chile. 
 The boundary question required careful diplomatic 
 treatment to ensure Argentine neutrality, and an able 
 representative in Buenos Aires was indispensable. 
 Balmaceda was selected for this post by President 
 Pinto, and his mission was successfully fulfilled. For 
 a year Balmaceda remained in Argentina, and then he re- 
 turned with the assurance that Argentina would neither 
 press her claims in respect to the disputed territory or 
 lend active assistance to the enemies of Chile. Soon 
 after this the question of the presidential election came 
 up, and efforts were made to bring him forward, but 
 Balmaceda decided not to enter the electoral campaign 
 on his own behalf, preferring to act as a leader of the 
 party in favour of Senor Santa Maria, who, in due 
 course, was elected, and it was only natural a portfolio 
 in the Cabinet should be offered to Balmaceda. He 
 accordingly became Minister of Foreign Affairs in Santa 
 
336 CHILE 
 
 Maria's first Cabinet. In view of the existing inter- 
 national complications this was a most important post, 
 and it afforded him a wide scope for his abilities. 
 
 The policy of Santa Maria in connection with the 
 Congressional elections led to a Cabinet crisis in 1882, 
 entailing the resignation of the Prime Minister, Sefior 
 Jose Francisco Vergara, and this portfolio was accepted 
 by Balmaceda. It is not easy to reconcile his retention 
 of office with the political principles he enunciated 
 between 1870 and 1879, for then one of the factors 
 upon which greatest stress was laid was the non-inter- 
 vention of the Government in elections. On the other 
 hand, three of the principal objects for which the 
 re/ormistas had contended — the freeing of the cemeteries, 
 the establishment of civil registry, and the civil marriage 
 l aw — were now brought forward. Apparently Balmaceda 
 considered himself justified in remaining in office to 
 assist the passage of these reforms, which were presented 
 to Congress in 1882 and 1883, and duly approved. 
 When the question of the separation of Church and 
 State came before the Chambers a year later, Balmaceda 
 again fell away from the programme of 1875, supporting 
 the union of Church and State, with the modification of 
 liberty of worship rather than absolute separation. In 
 defending his conduct in the Senate, he stated that he 
 considered too rapid a change from existing conditions 
 was injurious to the true welfare of the country. 
 
 When the Congressional elections took place in 
 1885, official influence was again utilised to obtain 
 majorities. Nor did Balmaceda, then Minister of 
 Interior, raise any protest against a practice he had 
 condemned so frequently in public and private, and for 
 his attitude he was attacked in the Chamber of Deputies 
 and the Senate. His conduct was placed in a worse 
 light by the publicity given to a telegram despatched by 
 him, and referring to preparations then being made for 
 the proclamation of a presidential candidate to succeed 
 Santa Maria. It was urged that this telegram demon- 
 strated the intention of the Administration to interfere, 
 
1885] BALMACEDA AND THE ELECTION 337 
 
 and the incident attracted unusual attention, as it was 
 known that the presidential candidate of the Liberals 
 was no other than Balmaceda. In consequence of 
 these attacks and of the fact that he was the presi- 
 dential candidate, Balmaceda resigned in January of 
 1886. 
 
 Opposed to Balmaceda for the Presidency was Senor 
 Jose Francisco Vergara ; but it was soon clear that he 
 had no chance of success, and he withdrew from the 
 contest. The Conservatives refused to take part in the 
 election, alleging that the influence of the Government 
 was exercised on behalf of Balmaceda, and that, con- 
 sequently, they had no chance of fair treatment at the 
 polls. In these circumstances Balmaceda was unopposed, 
 and on June 25, 1886, was declared elected, his election 
 being ratified by Congress on August 30. Preparations 
 were made by his friends to celebrate his success by a 
 banquet in his honour ; but he declined any such mani- 
 festation, and this refusal, although applauded by the 
 Press, offended a section of the Liberals, and developed 
 serious consequences at a later period. 
 
 The majority in Congress were Liberals when 
 Balmaceda assumed the Presidency in the middle of 
 September, but the party had split into factions, called 
 respectively Liberals, Nationals, Dissentient-Liberals, 
 and Radicals, although so far as political doctrine was 
 concerned small difference existed. During the violent 
 debates in 1884 in connection with the separation of 
 Church and State, all Liberals approved the theory of 
 the measure ; but they were at variance on the method 
 and the time. It was anticipated that Balmaceda would 
 receive general support in the Chambers ; and that he 
 did not was due to the fact that the various groups 
 posing as Liberals were more swayed by personal motives 
 than by strict adherence to political principles, and this 
 led them often to oppose the Administration without 
 just cause. It was the ambition of Balmaceda to reunite 
 the Liberals into one strong party, and to this end his 
 first ministry was composed rather of representatives 
 
 Y 
 
338 CHILE 
 
 from the groups likely to oppose his policy than of men 
 who could be relied upon for support in an emergency. 
 His first Cabinet consisted of Sen or Eusebio Lillo, 
 Interior ; Sen or Joaquin Godoy, Foreign Affairs ; Sen or 
 Pedro Montt, Justice, Worship, and Public Instruction ; 
 Senor Augustin Edwards, Finance ; and Senor Evaristo 
 Sanchez, War and Marine. Apparently these appoint- 
 ments gave satisfaction at first to the majority in 
 Congress, but in a very few weeks political intrigues 
 brought a,bout complications. 
 
 The result of these intrigues was in evidence when 
 the Chambers met in October, six weeks after the 
 presidential inauguration. At the preliminary session 
 to elect officers the Deputies chosen were in political 
 unison with the Cabinet, but at the next meeting the 
 Conservatives allied themselves with the various groups 
 opposed to the Administration, refused to ratify the 
 elections, chose officers of their own political colour, and 
 formed a strong majority against the Ministry. As the 
 estimates for the ensuing year had not yet been sanc- 
 tioned, a deadlock was certain unless another Cabinet 
 was appointed, and the Ministry resigned on November 
 25. A new Cabinet was formed on the last day of the 
 month, and in its composition Balmaceda again showed 
 his wish to unite the different Liberals into one party. 
 The Ministers were Carlos Antuilez (Liberal), Interior ; 
 Francisco Freire (Liberal), Foreign Affairs ; Adolfo 
 Valderrama (National), Instruction ; Augustin Edwards 
 (National), Finance ; and Nicolas Peha Vicuna (Liberal), 
 War and Marine. This gave a preponderance of port- 
 folios to the Liberals, whereas that advantage had been 
 with the Nationals in the former Ministry. The spirit 
 of opposition to the President when he had been only 
 a few weeks in office was a foretaste of after events ; 
 but he failed to grasp the fact that in his efforts for 
 uniting the Liberals he was laying the foundation of 
 troubles that would render his own position untenable 
 in the end. 
 
 The situation at the beginning of 1887 was unpleasant 
 
1887] CONGRESS AND BALMACEDA 339 
 
 to contemplate. There was no doubt that the tactics 
 of the Opposition which had brought about the resigna- 
 tion of the Ministry under Senor Lillo would be repeated 
 after the Chambers reassembled for ordinary sessions, 
 and the President was powerless to remedy this state 
 of affairs. The apparent solution lay in a real unification 
 of the Liberals, and Balmaceda determined on another 
 attempt in this direction. In June, 1887, the Ministry 
 under Senor Antimez resigned office. A new portfolio 
 —that of Industry and Public Works — had meantime 
 been created, and this gave six, instead of five, appoint- 
 ments to the Cabinet. Balmaceda now nominated two 
 Liberals, two Nationals, and two Dissident-Liberals : — 
 Anibal Zanartii (Liberal), Interior ; Miguel Luis Amuna- 
 tegui (Dissident), Foreign Affairs ; Pedro Lucio Cuadra 
 (Liberal), Justice ; Augustin Edwards (National), 
 Finance ; Manuel Garcia de la Huerta (Dissident), War 
 and Marine ; and Pedro Montt (National), Industry and 
 Public Works. This Ministry was the longest lived 
 of any under his Administration, remaining in office 
 until April, 1888, the only modification during that 
 period being the appointment of Senor Augusto Matte 
 to the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, rendered vacant by 
 the sudden death of Senor Amunategui. 
 
 Congressional elections were held in March, 1888, 
 and, although everything passed off quietly, the occasion 
 gave rise to many new developments. The Opposition 
 accused Balmaceda of using official influence to secure 
 the return of candidates favourable to himself, and the 
 President denied that the elections had been other than 
 perfectly free. In one sense, possibly, this assertion was 
 made in good faith, for no open corruption was apparent 
 and no disturbance of public order occurred ; but there 
 was no doubt that indirectly the President did bring 
 pressure to bear, following in this respect the example 
 of Santa Maria in 1882 and 1885. Subsequent events 
 demonstrated the truth of this statement. Many 
 members of Congress who owed their seats to the 
 protection extended by the President were no sooner 
 
340 CHILE 
 
 in office than they opposed the Administration, and the 
 immediate outcome of these elections was the resignation 
 of the Ministry in consequence of serious disagreement 
 between Senor Zanartii and Balmaceda. This resigna- 
 tion marks an important epoch, because from that date 
 the tone of Congress was invariably hostile to Balmaceda, 
 and, as a consequence, between April, 1888, and October, 
 1890, no fewer than ten Cabinets were appointed. The 
 leaders of these various Ministries were : — Senor Cuadra, 
 April 12, 1888; Barros Luco, November 2, 1888; 
 Lastarria, June 11, 1889; Ramon Donoso Vergara, 
 October 23, 1889 ; Manuel Sanchez Fontecilla, November 
 7, 1889 ; Adolf o Ibanez, January 1, 1890 ; Sanfuentes, 
 May 30, 1890; Belisario Prats, August 11, 1890; and 
 Claudio Vicuna, October 15, 1890. 
 
 Political turmoil such as these changes implied was 
 galling to a man of the ambitious character of Balmaceda. 
 To reform the intellectual and economic state of the 
 Chilian people was his aim, and in many ways he found 
 his projects impracticable, but he grasped the fact that 
 if he controlled Congress he could settle many vexed 
 questions retarding the material development of the 
 country. The status of the Church in Chile was regarded 
 by him as requiring clear definition, the footing on which 
 clerical influence stood being incompatible with existing 
 circumstances. Public education was a subject to which 
 he devoted careful study, but here his efforts at advance- 
 ment were blocked by the hostility of the Chambers. 
 Public works were needed and persistently advocated 
 by him ; but the antagonistic attitude of Congress 
 interfered with his plans in this direction also, and the 
 continuous friction between the Executive and the Legis- 
 lature altered the character of Balmaceda until he felt 
 he stood alone. Gradually in the struggle he developed 
 dictatorial tendencies, which became more pronounced 
 when he realised that his efforts to unite the Liberals 
 were doomed to failure. In some respects he owed 
 his disappointment to the fact that he was in advance 
 of his time, and before his death he realised he had 
 
1889] DISTURBED POLITICAL CONDITIONS 341 
 
 gone too fast for the people lie wished to aid and 
 regenerate. 
 
 The conflict between the President and Congress 
 reached an acute stage in 1889. An accusation was 
 made to the effect that the President was preparing the 
 way for a nominee of his own to succeed him, and he 
 was requested to declare categorically that he would 
 make no use of his influence in the presidential election 
 of 1891. This met with a curt refusal, and everywhere 
 the Chilians realised that the strained relations existing 
 between the Chambers and the Executive might lead to 
 serious consequences. As the hostility in Congress 
 became more marked the autocratic tendencies of 
 Balmaceda were accentuated, and finding that the 
 parliamentary system hampered his Administration, he 
 insisted on his right to name his ministers and kee]3 
 them in office in spite of an adverse majority in the 
 Chambers. This called forth a clamour of indignation, 
 and Congress determined to refuse supplies until the 
 President modified his attitude. In the end Balmaceda 
 was obliged to give way : he nominated a Cabinet in 
 accordance with the wishes of the Chambers. Not 
 until this was done was the budget for 1890 sanctioned. 
 
 In 1890 it became evident that a definite rupture 
 between the Executive and Congress was inevitable, 
 and the two questions which had created difficulties 
 in 1889 recurred with increased vigour. The first 
 was that of a representative as opposed to a parlia- 
 mentary system of government. Balmaceda had again 
 changed his Cabinet, and the Chambers refused support 
 to the new ministers ; but the President stubbornly 
 held his ground until matters reached a deadlock. He 
 then temporised with Congress, but the breach had 
 become so wide that no permanent solution of the 
 quarrel was possible, and all attempts to conciliate the 
 conflicting interests were unavailing. On October 15, 
 when Congress was not in session, Balmaceda appointed 
 a Ministry under the leadership of Senor Claudio Vicuna, 
 which was at variance with the ideas of the majority of 
 
342 CHILE 
 
 Senators and Deputies, and the effect was to further 
 embitter the Opposition. 
 
 It was thought that the impossible situation into 
 which the Administration had drifted would lead to the 
 resignation of Balmaceda ; but he showed no inclination 
 to take this way out of the difficulty, and he let it be 
 understood that he was determined to govern the 
 country irrespective of the opinion in the Chambers. 
 From October, 1890, he assumed almost dictatorial 
 powers, surrounding himself with men whom he could 
 depend upon to do his bidding, and assuming an attitude 
 directly opposed to the doctrines he had preached at 
 the commencement of his political career. By his 
 action he alienated the sympathy of many people who 
 had watched with interest the widening of the breach 
 between himself and Congress ; moreover, there was no 
 longer any doubt that he would use his influence un- 
 sparingly to ensure the election of his successor, and on 
 March 8, 1891, his nominee, Senor Claudio Vicuna, then 
 Minister of Interior, was proclaimed the presidential 
 candidate by a convention assembled in Santiago. 
 
 How great the tension between the President and 
 the Opposition had become in October, 1890, is seen by 
 a resolution passed at a mass meeting held in Santiago 
 on the 15th of that month. This was : — 
 
 1 . That the President has broken his word of honour as both man 
 and governor, in organising a ministry not supported by Congress. 
 That he is unworthy of confidence, and has shown from the first his 
 intention to intervene in electoral questions. 
 
 2. That the Common Conservadora merits a vote of thanks for 
 having assumed its constitutional role in defence of the prerogatives 
 of Congress. 
 
 3. That all citizens, without distinction of political colour, should 
 unite to offer resistance by legal means so long as the Government 
 acts according to the Constitution, and by all possible means when 
 the Government oversteps that Constitution. 
 
 The Comidon Conservadora referred to at this 
 meeting is a body of six Senators and eight Deputies 
 appointed by the Chambers to safeguard the interests of 
 
1890] THE COMISION CONSERVADORA 343 
 
 Congress when that body is not in session. On October 
 16, 1890, this committee sent a note to the President 
 requesting that Congress be convoked, and in reply 
 received only an acknowledgment of the communica- 
 tion. On November 21 following, the committee again 
 demanded that the Chambers be summoned, and five 
 days later it was advised by Balmaceda that "the causes 
 which determined the closing of the extraordinary 
 sessions of the National Congress on October 15 last 
 are still existing, and the time has not yet arrived for 
 the Chambers to be convoked." The Comision Conserm- 
 dora continued to protest against various acts of the 
 Administration, and on December 10 advised the 
 Executive that after December 31 there would be no 
 authorisation for maintaining the army and navy unless 
 such expenditure was sanctioned by the Legislature. 
 
 All these indications showed that the breaking point 
 was near. The Executive was acting within the letter 
 of the Law of Constitution, but it was abundantly clear 
 that the attitude of Balmaceda would lead to some 
 illegality which would give the Opposition an opportunity 
 of revolting against his authority, and early in January, 
 1891, a decree issued by Balmaceda afforded this 
 pretext. This decree was : — 
 
 No. 40 — . Santiago, 5 of January, 1891. 
 
 His Excellency decrees : — ■ 
 
 That Congress has not despatched the Law of Estimates for the 
 present year. 
 
 That it is impossible, pending the promulgation of the said law, 
 to suspend the public services without endangering internal order 
 and external security. It is therefore decreed : 
 
 Pending the sanction of the Law of Estimates for 1891, those 
 approved by the law of December 31, 1889, shall remain in force. 
 
 Let this be registered, communicated, published, and inserted in 
 the Gazette of Laws. 
 
 Balmaceda. 
 Claudio Vicuna. 
 Domingo Godov. 
 Ismael Perez Montt. 
 J. M. Valdes Cuevas, 
 J. F. Gana. 
 G, Mackenna. 
 
344 CHILE 
 
 This act was illegal, and was issued in the face of the 
 communication of December 20, 1890, from the Comision 
 Consermdora to the Executive, and it proved to be the 
 signal for the outbreak of a civil war which devastated 
 the country for a period of eight months. 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 
 chile — -continued 
 
 Preparations for Rebellion. The Navy Revolts. Capture of War 
 Material. Skirmish in Valparaiso. Occupation of Coquimbo. 
 Engagement at Pisagua. Attitude of Balmaceda. Measures 
 against Revolution. Position in January, 1891. Public Opinion. 
 Capture of Pisagua. Revolutionary Troops. Fight near Dolores. 
 Congressionalists Defeated at Huara. Occupation of Iquique. 
 Attempt to Recapture Iquique. Intervention of Admiral Hotham. 
 Congressionalists at Iquique. Defeat of Robles at Pozo Almonte. 
 Capture of Ai'ica. Reinforcements for Tarapaca. Antofagasta 
 Blockaded. Evacuation of Antofagasta. Colonel Camus Retires 
 into Bolivia. Occupation of Caldera. The Blanco Encalada. 
 Lull in Hostilities. Treatment of Suspected Persons. Financial 
 Difficulties. The Junta de Gobierno. Revolutionary Agents. 
 The Itata Incident. Peace Negotiations. Meeting of Commis- 
 sioners in Santiago. Attempt to Assassinate Balmaceda. 
 Optimistic Feeling. The Condell and Lynch. Dictatorial 
 Tendencies of Balmaceda. Election of Sefior Claudio Vicuna. 
 Richard Cumming. Revolutionary Propaganda in Europe. 
 Sympathy with Revolutionary Cause. Armaments reach 
 Iquique. Congressionalist Armjr. Revolutionary Committee in 
 Santiago and Valparaiso. Embarkation of Revolutionary Army. 
 Balmaceda and the Invasion. Insurgents near Santiago. 
 Execution of Prisoners. Massacre of Lo CaTias. Tyrannical 
 Conduct of Balmaceda. The Esmeralda off Valparaiso. Landing 
 of Congressionalists. The Central and Southern Districts. 
 
 Previous to the decree of January 5, 1891, which 
 set moving active revolutionary measures, extensive pre- 
 parations had been made for armed revolt : many of the 
 principal naval officers had been sounded, and found 
 willing to lend assistance in the movement against 
 Balmaceda. Interviews took place on January 3, 1891, 
 
346 CHILE 
 
 and on the two subsequent clays between Captain Jorje 
 Montt, the senior naval officer at Valparaiso, and Senor 
 Waldo Silva and Senor Ramon Barros Luco, and 
 arrangements were made for the squadron to be ready 
 on the night of January 6 ; the former as Vice-President 
 of the Senate, and the latter as President of the Chamber 
 of Deputies, were to board the ships as the representa- 
 tives of Congress in the movement. On the evening of 
 January 6, Senor Silva and Senor Barros Luco, with 
 several deputies and friends, embarked on the Blanco 
 Encalada, and at midnight that vessel, accompanied by 
 the Esmeralda and the OHiggins, left Valparaiso 
 harbour for Quinteros, where the Cochrane and Magal- 
 lanes were lying. Next morning the commanders 
 assembled on the Blanco Encalada, when the communi- 
 cations exchanged between the Vice-President of the 
 Senate, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, and 
 Captain Montt, were read, and the object of the 
 rebellion against Balmaceda was explained, the com- 
 manders expressing approval, and announcing their 
 adhesion to the revolution. The position was then 
 explained to the junior officers and crews, after which 
 the ships returned to Valparaiso. 
 
 The remainder of January 7 was occupied by the 
 squadron in taking possession f the Huascar, some 
 steam launches, and the vessels of the Chilian South 
 American Steamship Company, these latter being 
 required as transports, and on January 8 the Cochrane 
 and Magallanes sailed north to establish the blockade of 
 Iquique. On the same day the Congressionalists seized 
 a valuable cargo of war material recently arrived for the 
 Chilian Government in the German steamer Cleopatra, 
 consisting of 4500 Mannlicher rifles, and the Esmeralda 
 went south to Talcahuana and captured all stores at 
 that naval station. On January 10 a skirmish occurred 
 in the harbour of Valparaiso between boats belonging 
 to the squadron and the shore batteries, in which 
 several men were killed and wounded. Next day a 
 party disembarked from the Esmeralda at Lebu, and an 
 
1891] OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR 347 
 
 expedition from the transport Angamos captured a 
 detachment of rural police at Quillota. The OHiggins 
 and the transport Amazonas arrived off Coquimbo on 
 the 12th, and after some skirmishing that place was 
 occupied. The town of Serena was entered without 
 resistance, and Ovalle was visited on the same day, the 
 result of the expedition being the capture of 400 rifles, 
 a considerable quantity of ammunition, and a large 
 amount of coal and other necessaries. 
 
 Four clays later, the Magallanes appeared off Pisagua, 
 in the Province of Tarapaca, and landed a party to take 
 possession of the town, the garrison joining the rebel 
 cause. In the next few days the squadron visited 
 various ports, and occasional skirmishes occurred when 
 resistance was offered ; but no serious fighting took 
 place until January 21, when an attack was made by 
 the Government troops upon Pisagua, to endeavour to 
 regain possession of that town. A sharp engagement 
 ensued, in which the Congressionalists lost 5 killed and 
 1 officer, and 13 men wounded ; and on January 23 
 another engagement occurred in this vicinity without 
 decisive result. A third action took place on January 
 26 ; the attacking force consisted of 400 men commanded 
 by Major Marco Aurelio Valenzuela, and in this fight 
 the Congressionalists were worsted and obliged to 
 re-embark their men, leaving 8 officers prisoners in 
 the hands of the enemy. 
 
 On the morning of January 7 the Intendente of 
 Valparaiso had advised Balmaceda of the revolt of 
 the squadron, and a meeting of the Cabinet was called 
 to discuss the situation. An outbreak had been 
 expected ; but the fact that the whole of the navy had 
 joined the movement came as a surprise to the President 
 and his Ministers, and the question of a compromise 
 with the Congressionalists was considered, but dismissed 
 as impracticable. The President explained the measures 
 to be taken, and a decree was issued under which he 
 assumed absolute powers. Under this authority he 
 became Dictator, and all constitutional guarantees were 
 
348 CHILE 
 
 suspended. Orders were issued for the suppression of 
 newspapers in sympathy with the rebellion, directions 
 were given for the augmentation of the army to 40,000 
 men, and the military forces were declared to be on a 
 war basis, the pay of officers and men being raised fifty 
 per cent. Preparations were made for the concentra- 
 tion of the army at various points, and an order was 
 published prohibiting the sale of arms and ammunition. 
 The officers and men of the navy were proclaimed 
 rebels, but a reward of two years' pay was offered to the 
 crews of any men-of-war if the vessel in which they 
 were serving deserted the revolutionary cause to support 
 the Government. 
 
 On January 29 the towns of Serena and Coquimbo 
 were reoccupied by Government troops, the Congres- 
 sionalist garrison having been withdrawn two days 
 previously and sent north to Tarapaca, and on the last 
 day of the month Balmaceda ordered reinforcements of 
 300 men under command of Colonel Eulojio Robles to 
 proceed to Patillos in Tarapaca, and march thence to 
 support Iquique. The command of the army was 
 entrusted to General Jose Francisco Gana, General 
 Jose Velasquez was appointed Chief of Staff, and 
 Colonel Julio Banados Espinosa named Military 
 Secretary. It was evident that Balmaceda was deter- 
 mined to make every effort to maintain his position, and 
 his resolution was not shaken by the discovery of a 
 military conspiracy in Santiago. This attempt against 
 the Government was frustrated by the vigilance of 
 General Barbosa, the result being the arrest and 
 imprisonment of Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Alamos, 
 Major Gatica, and other officers. 
 
 The position at the close of January, 1891, showed 
 every prospect of a long struggle. The revolution con- 
 trolled the sea, but had established no permanent footing 
 on shore ; and Balmaceda had a formidable army with 
 which to dispute all attempts of the Congressionalists to 
 gain possession of any large section of territory, although 
 lack of transport prevented him throwing a strong force 
 
1891] PUBLIC OPINION 349 
 
 into Tarapaca, the locality where the rebels intended to 
 concentrate before attempting an advance on Santiago 
 or Valparaiso. During the first three weeks of the 
 revolt the people of Chile had time to consider the 
 situation, and broadly speaking the balance of opinion 
 was in favour of the Congressional Party. There was 
 no spontaneous uprising in aid of the rebellion, but 
 sympathy was demonstrated in indirect ways by all 
 classes. The majority of the Chilian aristocracy had 
 openly joined the revolt, and expressed their willingness 
 to contribute their money and personal services in the 
 fight against Balmaceda, and this action of the more 
 wealthy section of the community naturally influenced 
 the views of a large portion of the population. 
 
 An interesting decision as to the legality of the Acts 
 of Balmaceda was given in the Supreme Court on 
 January 10, 1891, and was representative of the drift 
 of public sentiment. Six judges were called upon to 
 decide whether two men of the army should be tried by 
 military or civil process, and by a majority of two votes 
 the Court ordered the men to be delivered to the civil 
 tribunal, on the ground that Congress had made no 
 provision for military forces and that the army had no 
 legal standing. This verdict served to support the Act of 
 Deposition, signed by eighty-nine members of Congress, 
 in which the signatories declared that Balmaceda was 
 no longer recognised as President. The document was 
 published in the Heraldo newspaper on January 7, and 
 by that means circulated through the country. On the 
 other hand, Balmaceda had a large circle of friends who 
 stood firmly by him, and this, in conjunction with the 
 fact that the resources of the Government at the out- 
 break of the revolution were infinitely greater than those 
 of the Congressionalists, drew many supporters to his 
 side. 
 
 In the beginning of February the warlike operations 
 assumed a more serious character, and on the morning 
 of the 6th, the Cochrane, OHiggins, Amazonas, and 
 Cachapoal appeared off Pisagua, where the Magallanes 
 
350 CHILE 
 
 was lying. The garrison of that town consisted of 300 
 men under Major Valenzuela, the officer who had 
 effected its recapture on January 26. A detachment of 
 300 men was landed from the ships to the north of the 
 town, and a similar force on the south, these troops 
 being instructed to converge towards the heights of "El 
 Hospicio " and assault the position and guns at that 
 point, and as soon as they were well advanced the ships 
 opened a heavy fire on the fortifications of the town. 
 The position at " El Hospicio " was captured with little 
 difficulty, and the Congressional forces then descended 
 to attack Pisagua, the garrison surrendering after resist- 
 ing for a couple of hours. The casualties on the side of 
 the defence were 2 officers and 10 men killed, 1 officer 
 and 28 men wounded, and Major Valenzuela and 250 
 officers and men were taken prisoners ; and the loss on 
 the side of the revolution was 8 killed, and 1 officer and 
 10 men wounded. Four guns, 160 rifles, 101 
 Winchester carbines, and a quantity of ammunition 
 and stores fell into the hands of the victors ; and from 
 this date Pisagua remained in the possession of the 
 Congressionalists. After this success the revolutionary 
 leaders set to work to organise an effective land force, 
 and men were brought from various points on the coast 
 and drilled and disciplined. Recruits were also 
 obtained from the mining districts in the vicinity of 
 Pisagua, and in less than a fortnight 2000 men were 
 under arms. 
 
 General Kobles, who had arrived at Patillos on 
 February 2, and reached Iquique next day, now marched 
 with a force of 339 officers and men in the direction of 
 Pisagua. He intended to attack that place after making 
 a junction with a detachment sent to meet him from 
 Tacna ; but when nearing the station of Dolores on 
 February 15, he found that a strong revolutionary force 
 had come from Pisagua to intercept his advance. So he 
 took up a position on the hill of San Francisco, the site 
 of a memorable battle in 1879, and there awaited 
 developments. At 3 p.m. the Congressionalists opened 
 
ADiMIRAL Jorje iMontt. 
 
 Ramon Barros Luco. 
 
 General Canto. 
 
 General Korner. 
 
 [Face page 350. 
 
1891] REBELS VICTORIOUS IN TARAPACA 351 
 
 fire with their artillery, and under protection of the guns 
 the infantry was pushed forward ; in a couple of hours 
 it was evident that Robles could not hold his ground, 
 and he retired towards the railway to await reinforce- 
 ments from Iquique. In the fighting on the hill and 
 during the retirement the casualties were heavy, only 
 108 men escaping, amongst the officers killed being 
 Colonel Villagras and Lieutenant- Colonel Riquelme, 
 while 6 others were taken prisoners ; the revolutionary 
 loss was 1 officer and 15 men killed, and 54 officers and 
 men wounded. This defeat of Robles led to unexpected 
 events. 
 
 The news of the disaster at Dolores and the request 
 for assistance by Robles caused consternation in Iquique. 
 Colonel Soto, in command of the garrison, determined to 
 take the majority of his troops to where the survivors of 
 the recent fight were encamped, and he joined Robles on 
 February 16, the combined force numbering 800 men. 
 On the following day Robles decided to march to Huara, 
 and intercept the advance of the enemy towards Iquique, 
 and he arrived at that place at noon. At 3 p.m. notice 
 was brought in that the enemy was in sight, the Con- 
 gressionalists' strength being estimated at 1200 men, 
 and a few minutes later the struggle began. The positions 
 selected by Robles were exceptionally well adapted for 
 defence ; in spite of repeated assaults by the rebels, the 
 Government troops held their ground, and at 5 p.m. a 
 cavalry charge threw the attacking forces into disorder. 
 General Urrutia, fearing a disaster, decided to retreat, 
 and it was only the lack of mounted men on the part of 
 the Government forces that prevented this retreat 
 becoming a rout. The Congressionalists were obliged 
 to leave their dead and wounded on the field, and 1 
 field gun, 4 machine guns, and 200 rifles were aban- 
 doned, besides the loss of 10 officers and 240 men 
 killed and wounded, and 1 officer and 78 men taken 
 prisoners. The Government casualties were 1 officer and 
 35 men killed, and 12 officers and 120 men wounded. 
 
 The departure of Colonel Soto from Iquique was 
 
352 CHILE 
 
 unavoidable in view of the situation of E-obles ; but it 
 left the town without an adequate garrison for defensive 
 purposes, and the commander of the Blanco Encalada 
 was quick to take advantage of the opportunity afforded 
 to obtain possession of the city. On February 16, 1891, 
 he demanded its surrender ; the Intendente replied that 
 he had no forces to resist, but stipulated that private 
 property should not be injured, or personal violence 
 offered, and at 10.30 a.m. the town was occupied by a 
 detachment from the squadron. 
 
 Three days later, Colonel Soto with a small force 
 arrived early outside the city, and penetrated into the 
 streets without being discovered. The garrison from the 
 squadron only consisted of 40 men, these being quartered 
 in the Custom-house ; but before Colonel Soto could 
 reach this building the alarm was given, and the defenders 
 opened fire. Reinforcements were now sent ashore from 
 the Blanco Encalada, and a brisk musketry action was 
 maintained for an hour. At 8 a.m. the guns of the 
 Blanco Encalada and the Esmeralda began firing, and 
 soon afterwards a large portion of the town was in 
 flames. The danger of the total destruction of Iquique 
 was so apparent, that Admiral Hotham, who was in the 
 roadstead on his flagship, sent Captain Lambton to 
 arrange an armistice between the combatants, and 
 invited Colonel Soto to meet the Congressional repre- 
 sentatives on the Warspite, in order that some under- 
 standing might be reached and further injury to property 
 prevented. At this conference it was decided that 
 Colonel Soto should retire his force to the suburb of 
 Cavancha and there deliver all his arms, both officers 
 and men being free afterwards to remain in Iquique, or 
 proceed in a revolutionary transport to any Chilian port 
 they selected. By this arrangement the Congression- 
 alists were left in quiet possession of Iquique, and the 
 stores and war material accumulated at that place, these 
 including half a million rounds of rifle ammunition and 
 a considerable sum of public money. 
 
 The Congressionalists now made Iquique their head- 
 
1891] BATTLE OF POZO ALMONTE 353 
 
 quarters, and immediately proceeded with the organisa- 
 tion of military forces in order to establish control over 
 the Province of Tarapaca. Meanwhile the possible loss 
 of Tarapaca spurred Balmaceda to further exertions, and 
 reinforcements were sent to Robles to enable him to 
 regain his lost ground. Expeditions were despatched to 
 Arica, and in all 1000 men were landed to join Robles 
 in the Pampa of Tamarugal. But by now the leaders 
 of the revolution had also organised a division ready to 
 take the field, and on March 6, 1891, these troops, under 
 command of General Holley, were in the neighbourhood 
 of Pozo Almonte, where Robles was encamped, the 
 Government forces numbering 1300 and the Congres- 
 sionalists 1600. At 7 a.m. on the 7th the action com- 
 menced with artillery fire at a range of 5000 yards, from 
 rising ground which had been selected on the preceding 
 day, and General Robles, holding a strong position, felt 
 confident he could repel the rebel attack. 
 
 On the advance of the Congressional infantry against 
 his left wing, Kobles ordered the troops on the right to 
 be thrown forward to attack the revolutionary flank. 
 This movement was cleverly executed, and the advancing 
 enemy was practically surrounded ; but the revolutionary 
 leader saw the danger, and hurrying up all available 
 reserves saved the situation, after a desperate struggle 
 which at times developed into a hand-to-hand conflict. 
 For the next two hours a stubborn resistance was offered 
 by the Government troops, but they were gradually 
 forced back, and to make matters worse their ammuni- 
 tion ran short, so that before noon the battle was over 
 and the Congressionalists absolute masters of the field. 
 Few of the Government force escaped, and their artillery 
 was abandoned in the railway station of Pozo Almonte. 
 Robles had been shot in the left ankle about 9 a.m., and 
 at 11.30 a.m. was mortally wounded ; it was stated that 
 he was subsequently bayonetted as he lay in a dying 
 state on a hospital stretcher, although proof of this 
 atrocity is lacking. 
 
 So far as accounts made public by officials of both 
 
 z 
 
354 CHILE 
 
 sides can be believed, the loss on the part of the Govern- 
 ment troops was 11 officers, including General Robles, 
 killed, and 12 wounded, besides 23 taken prisoners. Of 
 the remainder of the force, 400 were reported as killed 
 or wounded, although this was probably below the actual 
 figure, and 380 captured. The casualties of the Con- 
 gressionalists were 7 officers and 76 men killed, and 4 
 officers and 156 men wounded, while 165 men were 
 returned as "missing," these latter probably having died 
 of wounds through being overlooked by the ambulance 
 23arties sent out after the fighting ceased. This gave a 
 total of killed and wounded in this engagement of 831 
 officers and men out of a total force of 2900 engaged. 
 In this encounter the war material captured by the 
 Congressionalists included 11 guns, 4 machine guns, and 
 800 rifles. 
 
 The victory at Pozo Almonte gave the rebels control 
 of Tarapaca, and the defeat and death of Robles left the 
 Government no rallying -point for reinforcements. Any 
 attempts to reconquer the province inferred an invasion 
 by long and tedious marches from the south, for by sea 
 the transport of troops had become impossible. The 
 refugees from Pozo Almonte made the best of their way 
 to Arica, but the two or three hundred survivors were 
 no longer a fighting force. In the beginning of April, 
 the Cochrane, OHiggins, Abtao, Aconcagua, and Maipu 
 arrived off Arica and demanded the surrender of the 
 garrison, but this was refused by Colonel Arrate, the 
 officer in command. A force of 1500 men was dis- 
 embarked from the ships to attack the town, and then 
 Colonel Arrate ordered the evacuation of the city, retiring 
 in the direction of the river Sama, and reaching Peruvian 
 territory on April 7. The armament of the troops was 
 delivered to the Peruvian authorities, and the force of 
 84 officers and 569 men was sent to Arequipa, where 
 it remained until peace was restored. Tacna and Arica, 
 as well as Tarapaca, were now in undisputed possession 
 of the revolution. 
 
 To attempt the relief of General Robles, a column 
 
1891] REBELS OCCUPY ANTOFAGASTA 355 
 
 2000 strong, commanded by Colonel Hermogenes Camus, 
 had been landed at Antofagasta at the end of February. 
 The plan was to march across the Atacama deserts and 
 enter the Pampa of Tamarugal to reach the district 
 where Robles was encamped, and this journey was a 
 matter of weeks if all went well with the expedition. 
 Colonel Camus had proceeded as far as Quilloga when 
 news arrived of the annihilation of the Government 
 troops at Pozo Almonte, and he decided it was useless 
 to continue the march in the face of this disaster. The 
 order was given to return to Calama, a station of the 
 Antofagasta railway close to the Bolivian frontier, and 
 this place was reached at the end of the third week in 
 March. One reason that decided Colonel Camus to adopt 
 this course was the insubordinate conduct of the men 
 under his command, and this became so serious that he 
 was obliged to disarm a portion of his force. Arriving 
 at Calama, the information received was unsatisfactory, 
 and Camus determined to delay any further movement 
 until he was joined by Senor Villegas y Silva, the Inten- 
 dente of Antofagasta. 
 
 Since March 16 Antofagasta had been blockaded, 
 and on the 17th the officer in command of the Blanco 
 Encalada had notified the Intendente that measures 
 would be taken to suspend the railway service and cut 
 off the water supply of the town, both railway and water 
 distillery being commanded by the guns of the war- 
 ships. On March 18 a detachment of 35 men of the 
 garrison mutinied, joined the revolution, and were taken 
 on board the Blanca Encalada. On the 19th a division 
 of Congressional troops under General Holley landed at 
 Celoso, close to Antofagasta, and Senor Villegas, the 
 Intendente, decided to retire with the garrison to the 
 interior and join Camus at Calama. This he did, the 
 garrison of 514 officers and men proceeding by train to 
 Calama, and reaching that place early the following day. 
 The town of Antofagasta was thus left free for the 
 occupation of the revolutionary forces, and it was taken 
 possession of by General Holley without resistance. 
 
356 CHILE 
 
 A reconnaissance was made from Antofagasta towards 
 Calama to ascertain the position and strength of the 
 division under Camus, and some skirmishing occurred, 
 but no serious fighting. Holley considered it advisable 
 to send north for reinforcements, and the advance to 
 Calama was postponed until the 29th. Meanwhile, 
 Camus, who had decided to enter Bolivian territory, 
 travelled by rail with his division to Huanchaca, and 
 there all armament was surrendered to the Bolivian 
 authorities, an encampment being formed at Uyuni 
 preparatory to the journey over the Andes into Argentina, 
 thence by way of Mendoza and the Uspallata pass to 
 Santiago. On April 5, 1891, this force set out, and after 
 inarching 660 miles on foot throughout the wild, moun- 
 tainous regions of the Cordillera, and travelling 1200 
 miles by rail from Jujuy to Uspallata, finally reached 
 Santiago on May 17, a performance which showed 
 wonderful power of resistance to hardship and fatigue. 
 Thus, on March 29, Calama was occupied by Congression- 
 alists, and the whole province of Atacama fell under 
 their control. 
 
 The Congressionalist leaders now determined to take 
 possession of the port and district of Caldera, and this 
 was accomplished on April 22 without resistance from 
 the small garrison. The detachment of troops at Caldera 
 and the surrounding district consisted of 600 men of 
 the Husares de Santiago, commanded by Colonel Stephan, 
 and this officer finding all other means of retreat cut off, 
 decided to follow the example of Colonel Camus and 
 march over the mountains into Argentine territory and 
 thence to Chile. This was another remarkable under- 
 taking, as deep snow was met in the pass of Uspallata 
 and elsewhere, but it was successfully accomplished, 
 and Colonel Stephan and his men reached Santiago in 
 the middle of July, 1891. 
 
 The ease with which the towns on the coast had 
 been occupied tended to make the rebel officers over- 
 confident, and this led to a serious misfortune after the 
 occupation of Caldera, when the Blanco Encalada was 
 
1891] SINKING OF BLANCO ENCALADA 357 
 
 left to guard that port. In the possession of the Govern- 
 ment were two torpedo-boats, the Lynch and Condell, 
 and President Balmaceda ordered these vessels to cruise 
 northwards towards Caldera, to see if an opportunity 
 offered for the destruction of the revolutionary squadron. 
 On the morning of April 23, at 4 a.m., these two boats 
 crept into the harbour where the Blanco Encalada was 
 anchored, and approached within a hundred yards with- 
 out being discovered, and the Condell discharged three 
 torpedoes in rapid succession, but without effect. The 
 Lynch was more fortunate, and her second torpedo struck 
 the Blanco Encalada amidships, causing her to founder 
 in five minutes, drowning 12 officers and 207 men. 
 Both the Condell and Lynch escaped without serious 
 damage, although exposed to a hot fire from the Blanco 
 Encalada and the shore. When outside Caldera Bay, 
 they fell in with the revolutionary armed transport 
 Angamos, and nearly succeeded in capturing her, but 
 were prevented by the appearance of another vessel, 
 supposed to be the Esmeralda. 
 
 After the sinking of the Blanco Encalada, a lull 
 occurred. The Congressionalists were awaiting arms 
 and ammunition from Europe and the United States 
 before attempting an attack on the main positions of 
 Balmaceda at Santiago and Valparaiso, and meanwhile 
 the organisation of additional troops was carried on at 
 Iquique and other centres. In this preparatory work 
 the Congressionalists were aided by Colonel Korner, a 
 German officer who had been attached to the Chilian 
 army before the revolt. 
 
 The escape of Colonel Korner from Valparaiso when 
 he started for the north to join the insurgents is an 
 example of the difficulties in the way of Congressional 
 sympathisers who wished to take active part in the 
 revolt. Every steamer was watched, and no opportunity 
 occurred for Korner to embark. At last, with the 
 connivance of some friends, he was coopered up in a 
 barrel and shipped as cargo, not being released from his 
 voluntary confinement until the ship was well out at sea, 
 
358 CHILE 
 
 Balmaceda was still confident he could hold his own 
 in spite of the reverses he had suffered. An army of 
 40,000 men was concentrated in the central and 
 southern districts of Chile ; two men-of-war, the Presi- 
 dente Pinto and Presidente Errazuriz, were expected 
 shortly from Europe, and several torpedo-boats, in 
 addition to the Lynch and Condell, were prepared for 
 service. Unfortunately for himself, Balmaceda now 
 adopted a more severe policy against all persons 
 suspected of complicity in the revolution, and his 
 conduct alienated much sympathy. On May 15, two 
 sergeants of the 7th Regiment, Benigno Pena and Pedro 
 Pablo Meza, were condemned to death on a charge of 
 treason, and shot ; on May 23, similar treatment was 
 accorded to Gregorio Vera, Juan Ovalle, Ramon Santi- 
 banez, and Juan Grammer, in consequence of an attempt 
 to seize the torpedo-boat Guale, and other executions 
 followed. Balmaceda now found that he was short of 
 funds to meet the heavy expenses entailed by the war, as 
 a large proportion of the Chilian revenues were derived 
 from export duties on nitrate of soda, and this source of 
 income had passed into the hands of the Congres- 
 sionalists when they obtained control of Tarapaca. In 
 these circumstances he issued Treasury notes, and 
 utilised the specie reserve which had been accumulated 
 for the conversion of the paper money emitted during 
 the Chilian- Peruvian war, both these measures entailing 
 a serious disturbance of economic and financial condi- 
 tions. 
 
 In April the Congressionalists organised a Provi- 
 sional Government at Iquique with Captain Jorje Montt 
 at the head of the Administration. The arrangements 
 for military and naval operations devolved upon this 
 Junta de Gobierno, as the Administration was officially 
 styled in public documents, and it was responsible for 
 all appointments, and for the necessary supplies of war 
 material for the campaign. 
 
 General Estanislao Canto, who had been nominated 
 Commander-in-chief of the Congressional army, was an 
 
1891] THE IT AT A INCIDENT 359 
 
 energetic organiser, and he was fortunate in having 
 Colonel Korner as his right-hand man ; but regiments 
 of soldiers without arms and ammunition were of little 
 avail, and it was to the provision of an adequate supply 
 of war material that the attention of the Provisional 
 Government was principally devoted. Agents were 
 employed in England, on the Continent of Europe, and 
 in the United States, to purchase the required equip- 
 ment, and money for this purpose was plentiful from 
 the duties on the export of nitrate of soda from 
 Tarapaca and the assistance of wealthy supporters. 
 The principal difficulty lay in the shipment of warlike 
 material from foreign ports, for the agents of 
 Balmaceda were active in denouncing the embarka- 
 tion of arms and ammunition. For the purpose of 
 evading these restrictions, the transport Itata was 
 despatched to a point near San Diego in California to 
 bring supplies ordered by the Junta, the cargo consist- 
 ing of 5000 rifles and 2,500,000 cartridges. This was to 
 be transferred from a sailing ship off the island of San 
 Clemento, and the Itata left Iquique in April on this 
 important mission. 
 
 In due course the Itata received her cargo, and 
 apparently everything was ready for the homeward 
 journey, when an unexpected difficulty arose. The 
 representative of Balmaceda in the United States 
 notified the authorities of the Itata's presence in 
 United States waters, and gave particulars of her 
 mission. Orders were issued to prevent the steamer 
 leaving the port, and a marshal was placed on board, 
 the officer in command, Captain M. Tejeda, being 
 advised that he could not sail pending a decision as to 
 the action to be taken. Captain Tejeda, well aware of 
 the anxiety with which his cargo was expected at 
 Iquique, slipped out of San Diego carrying the United 
 States marshal with him, and a man-of-war was sent in 
 pursuit, but was unable to overtake him. Knowing 
 some United States naval vessels were off Iquique, 
 Tejeda took his ship into Tocopilla, reaching that port 
 
360 CHILE 
 
 on June 3, 1891, and there he received telegraphic in- 
 structions to proceed to Iquique without disembarking 
 any portion of the cargo. The Itata entered the harbour 
 of the latter port a little before midnight on June 3, and 
 was directed by the revolutionary authorities to anchor 
 near the United States warships. 
 
 The Junta de Gobierno was unable to refuse the 
 demand of Admiral MacCann that the Itata should be 
 sent back to San Diego, and there submitted to the 
 jurisdiction of the United States courts, although this 
 entailed a long delay in the delivery of the arms and 
 ammunition, and possibly even the confiscation of the 
 cargo. No argument would induce the American 
 Admiral to modify his attitude, and the Congression- 
 alists were forced to order the vessel north. On 
 June 13, a guard from the United States cruiser 
 Charleston arrived on board the Itata, and at 8 p.m. 
 she left for San Diego with the Charleston as a con- 
 voy. It was a bitter disappointment to the rebels and 
 a triumph for Balmaceda that this cargo was not dis- 
 embarked, and as events turned out the vessel was 
 detained in San Diego until the following October. 
 
 On April 19 the Junta received a communication 
 from E-ear- Admiral Hotham to the effect that he had 
 been requested by the British Minister in Santiago, Mr 
 John Gordon Kennedy, to inform the Congressionalists 
 that in his opinion and that of the German Minister, 
 Baron Gutschmid, Balmaceda would open peace negotia- 
 tions, and he desired to know if the Junta would be 
 willing to discuss the subject. Admiral Hotham further 
 stated that he was prepared to give passage to Valparaiso 
 in the Warspite to the commissioners appointed to 
 represent the Congressionalists. The Junta agreed to 
 follow the suggestion of the British and German 
 Ministers, and nominated a commission to discuss terms 
 for a cessation of hostilities, the commissioners being 
 M. Concha y Toro, E. Altimirano, C. Walker Martinez, 
 Gregorio Donoso, B. Prado, Pedro Montt, and Eduardo 
 Matte. A safe conduct was issued by Balmaceda for 
 
1891] A PEACE CONFERENCE 361 
 
 these representatives to proceed to Santiago and be free 
 from molestation until May 15, and on May 3 they held 
 a preliminary meeting. It was then found that it was 
 not the good offices of the British and German Ministers 
 that had been accepted by Balmaceda, but those tendered 
 by the representatives of the United States, France, and 
 Brazil ; but it was deemed advisable to continue the 
 negotiations in spite of this change. A second meeting 
 was held, at 8 p.m., in the house of the United States 
 Minister, Mr Patrick Egan, and a third conference took 
 place on the following day. On May 5 the com- 
 missioners placed in the hands of the mediators the con- 
 ditions upon which they were willing to make peace, and 
 this document stated : — " In the name of our colleagues, 
 we offer to lay down our arms if the Constitution and 
 Laws of the Republic be re-established in full vigour, 
 with the declaration and acknowledgment of nullity of 
 all acts executed in open violation of the Constitution 
 and Laws. The constitutional and legal situation must 
 revert to where it was on December 31, 1890, for the 
 purpose of eliminating from the Boletines decrees which 
 have exceeded the faculties of the Executive. As an 
 example of our meaning, we cite the decree ordering the 
 elections of senators, deputies, and municipal authorities 
 in March last. The citizens deriving offices from those 
 illegal elections cannot be recognised as representatives 
 of the people. We would point out that the Courts of 
 Justice ought to sit with all the attributes of jurisdiction 
 provided by our laws, and that the numerous decrees 
 dismissing public employes must be revoked where such 
 officials are protected by public guarantees. The 
 legitimate Congress, whose power still subsists, should 
 be immediately convened, for the purpose of arranging 
 future elections and providing for the expense of main- 
 taining the public Administration. In other words, we 
 ask for the re-establishment of the Government on a 
 constitutional basis. In the second place, we ask for 
 substantial guarantees that any agreement will be loyally 
 executed." This document was signed by the seven 
 
362 CHILE 
 
 commissioners, although not without objection on the 
 part of Senores Prado, Concha, Matte, and Altimirano, 
 who desired to insert a clause providing for the resigna- 
 tion of Balmaceda. It was pointed out, however, that 
 this would be the certain consequence of the abrogation 
 of all decrees since the end of 1890, and that the 
 demands were less personal if Balmaceda were not 
 directly mentioned. 
 
 Next day the mediators, Mr Egan for the United 
 States, M. A. Defrance, the French charge d'affaires, 
 and Senhor E. de B. Cavalcanti de Lacerda for Brazil, 
 communicated the general tenor of these terms to 
 Balmaceda through his Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 On learning the proposed conditions Balmaceda expressed 
 surprise that the revolutionary representatives should 
 have asked so much, but consented to give further 
 consideration to the proposals before sending a reply ; 
 meanwhile, unfortunately, an incident occurred that 
 caused negotiations to be broken off. About 4.30 p.m. 
 on the same day that the terms of the Congressionalist 
 commissioners were communicated, Balmaceda with the 
 members of his Cabinet left the Congress Hall and had 
 no sooner reached the street than they were approached 
 by two men on horseback, who threw a bomb on either 
 side of the President and galloped away. One of these 
 bombs exploded, but caused no injury, and the other 
 failed to burst. The general idea in Santiago was that 
 the affair was a farce, and was not intended to do any 
 harm ; but this was not the opinion of the Cabinet, 
 and Minister Godoy insisted that it was the work of 
 sympathisers with the revolution. It was then decided 
 to cancel the safe conducts issued to the commissioners, 
 and order their arrest and imprisonment, and it was 
 only the firm attitude of the representatives of the 
 United States, France, and Brazil that prevented this 
 being done. Balmaceda refused to continue the negotia- 
 tions, and the commissioners, whose safety was carefully 
 provided for by the three foreign ministers, proceeded to 
 Valparaiso and embarked for the north, 
 
1891] FAILURE OF PEACE PROPOSALS 363 
 
 An attempt was made at the end of May, by the 
 United States Minister, to renew these negotiations, and 
 a communication to that effect was made by Admiral 
 MacCann to the Junta de Gobierno. At the same time 
 a suggestion was put forward for a cessation of 
 hostilities until September 18, the date when the new 
 presidential term would commence ; but to this latter 
 proposal Balmaceda refused to listen, and in consequence 
 nothing was accomplished. 
 
 On May 27 the Government of Bolivia issued a 
 decree recognising the belligerency of the Junta de 
 Gobierno, and that a state of civil war existed in Chile ; 
 but this was the only Government to adopt this attitude 
 in spite of every endeavour to induce other South 
 American Administrations to take a similar step. The 
 desire for this recognition was to prevent Balmaceda 
 obtaining supplies of war material, as he had done in 
 the case of the transport Aquila purchased in Buenos 
 Aires in July ; another important reason was that the 
 two new cruisers Presidente Errazuriz and Presidents 
 Pinto were now ready to leave France, and substantial 
 delay in the departure of these vessels could only be 
 effected by the revolutionary agents if the belligerent 
 status of the Congressionalists was recognised. 
 
 In June the supporters of Balmaceda were opti- 
 mistic. The sinking of the Blanco Encalada and the 
 incident of the Itata raised hopes of ultimate victory, 
 and the fact that the two cruisers constructed in France 
 were reported ready increased their confidence. It was 
 proposed to organise a squadron comprising these two 
 new cruisers, the torpedo-boats Condell and Lynch, 
 some smaller vessels of the same class, and the armed 
 transports Imperial and Aquila, arrangements for the 
 purchase of the latter steamer from the Veloce Company 
 being well advanced. 
 
 Pending the arrival of the cruisers and the Aquila, 
 the Condell and Lynch were sent on predatory excur- 
 sions to the section of the seaboard controlled by the 
 Congressionalists ; to a certain extent these tactics were 
 
364 CHILE 
 
 successful, the superior speed of the two torpedo-boats 
 rendering them immune from capture. They made 
 their appearance at Pisagua, Iquique, Chailaral, Taltal, 
 and Antofagasta while the Junta de Gobierno was 
 waiting for war material to equip the army for the 
 invasion of the central districts. Throughout June and 
 July, Balmaceda showed the greatest energy in augment- 
 ing the strength of his army, and at the beginning of 
 August the number of men under arms from Coquimbo 
 to Valdivia was 50,000, the bulk of these being con- 
 centrated for the defence of the National Capital, 
 Valparaiso, and Coquimbo. 
 
 As Balmaceda became more confident of success 
 he developed marked dictatorial tendencies. In June 
 he made preparations for the election of his successor, 
 although at the time he did not control one-half of 
 Chile. The candidate supported by the Government, 
 Senor Claudio Vicuna, was unopposed, and was declared 
 elected. In many other ways Balmaceda developed 
 despotic attributes ; every day suspected persons were 
 arrested, the case of Mr Richard Gumming raising strong 
 feelings against the Administration. This man was 
 born in Chile of British parents, but the fact of his birth 
 in Chilian territory subjected him to Chilian laws. The 
 charge against him was complicity in a plot to seize the 
 torpedo-boats Gondell and Lynch : and doubtless he had 
 knowledge of this conspiracy, for in common with the 
 majority of men of his class he was in sympathy with 
 the Congressionalists. He was tortured into an admis- 
 sion of being cognisant of the plot, and a court martial 
 condemned him to death. His execution took place on 
 July 12, and created a profound sensation. 
 
 Abroad the Congressionalist agents worked hard 
 for the revolutionary cause. The conditions leading up 
 to the revolt were explained in the United States, 
 Europe, and in South America. In North America 
 the representatives of the Junta de Gobierno were Senor 
 Pedro Montt and Senor Trumbull ; in Europe the task 
 was confided to Senor Augusto Matte and Senor 
 
1891] CONGRESSIONAL MISSIONS ABROAD 365 
 
 Augustin Ross ; in Bolivia to Senor Juan Gonzalo 
 Matta ; in Argentina to Senor Adolfo Guerrero and 
 Senor Alvaro Bianchi Tupper ; and in Peru to Senor 
 Javier Vial Solar. The mission to the United States 
 was unfortunate in regard to the Itata, but Matte and 
 Ross in Europe materially helped the rebels ; not only 
 was war material obtained and shipped to Chile, but in 
 May and June the departure of the two cruisers so 
 anxiously expected by President Balmaceda was kept 
 back until the revolutionary leaders had time to organise 
 the invasion of the central districts. In Argentina, 
 Guerrero and Tupper raised obstacles to the sailing of 
 the transport Aquila, and they also supplied the Junta 
 with information of all movements of Balmaceda's 
 forces. In Peru, the task of Senor Solar was to delay 
 the steamer Mapocho, induce the authorites not to allow 
 the return to Chile of the troops who had entered 
 Peruvian territory after the conquest of Tarapaca and 
 Tacna by the Congressionalists, and to secure supplies 
 for the revolutionary forces, these three objects being 
 successfully attained. 
 
 In Santiago and Valparaiso revolutionary committees 
 worked unceasingly against Balmaceda. It was a most 
 dangerous position for sympathisers with the Congres- 
 sionalists ; but they did not flinch, and the progress of 
 the revolution and the disasters to the Government 
 troops were made known, and the effect of these 
 successes counteracted the influence of Balmaceda in 
 many districts where his authority was still recognised, 
 and, furthermore, means were found to smuggle many 
 recruits to the north for the revolutionary army. 
 General Baquedano, the Commander-in-chief of the 
 Chilian army previous to the outbreak of the revolt, was 
 favourably disposed towards the Congressionalists, as 
 were many prominent people in high places, who, 
 without open adhesion to the revolt, did much to alienate 
 sympathy from Balmaceda. 
 
 On July 3, 1891, the transport MaijJO arrived at 
 Iquique with a cargo of arms and ammunition. This 
 
366 CHILE 
 
 war material was purchased by Sehor Ross in Europe, 
 and despatched on the steamer Waudle to San Sebastian 
 Bay in Tierra del Fuego, and there the Maipo had 
 taken over the cargo. The shipment comprised a 
 battery of 6 Krupp mountain guns, with 1700 shells 
 and 1000 shrapnels; 5000 Gras rifles, with 2,000,000 
 cartridges ; 1,970,000 Mannlicher cartridges ; and a 
 supply of ammunition for the squadron. 
 
 Now that arms and ammunition were available, no 
 time was lost. The regiments recruited at Iquique, 
 undergoing military instruction, were equipped and 
 drafted to points in the south and new regiments raised, 
 principally from the miners working in the nitrate of 
 soda districts. At the end of July a notification was 
 sent to the revolutionary committees in Santiago and 
 Valparaiso that the advance of the Congressional army 
 might be expected in August, and that the date would 
 be signalised by the appearance of the Esmeralda off 
 Valparaiso. The total strength of the proposed expedi- 
 tion was 9300 men, and the force was divided into 
 three brigades, the first being concentrated at Huasco, 
 the second and third at Calclera. Here transports were 
 in readiness, and, on August 16, the order was given to 
 start the expedition ; and the vessels, convoyed by the 
 squadron, set out for the south. This was the crisis of 
 the revolutionary movement, for less than 10,000 men 
 were to attack an army of 40,000 strong. Failure 
 meant the collapse of the revolutionary cause ; but the 
 leaders were confident of success ; the troops were 
 thoroughly well armed and equipped, they were the 
 best fighting material in Chile, and they had enlisted in 
 the revolutionary ranks of their own free will. More- 
 over, the Junta had information from Santiago and 
 Valparaiso that desertions from the army of Balmaceda 
 would be numerous when the expedition landed, and 
 this proved to be the case. 
 
 Balmaceda received notice of the preparations of the 
 Congressionalists, and made plans to repel the invasion. 
 Strong positions were selected in the neighbourhood of 
 
1891] THE ADVANCE TO THE SOUTH 367 
 
 Concon aud Placilla, to check an advance upon Valparaiso, 
 for it was known that the landing would be near 
 Quinteros, and it was for the object of bringing 
 the invaders immediately face to face with a difficult 
 situation that Concon was chosen as a first line of 
 defence, while Placilla, a few miles to the south, served 
 admirably as a second line. The Government was con- 
 fronted by imexpected difficulties when it was known 
 that the invasion was close at hand. Armed groups 
 made their appearance in the neighbourhood of Santiago 
 and caused serious embarrassment to the authorities by 
 destroying railway bridges and generally interrupting 
 communication between Santiago and Valparaiso, and 
 on August 14 one of these groups attempting to destroy 
 the bridge near Quilipue' was surprised by a patrol 
 detached for the protection of the line, and a skirmish 
 ensued, in which the corporal of the patrol was killed. 
 On the same afternoon, four men were arrested on a 
 charge of being implicated in the revolution, and were 
 tried by summary court martial, condemned to death, 
 and executed on August 20. 
 
 Balmaceda now adopted measures of the utmost 
 severity. Orders were given to show no mercy to any 
 insurgents captured, and it was under these instructions 
 that the massacre of "Lo Canas" took place. Fifty 
 young men, all members of well-known families in 
 Santiago, assembled at "Lo Canas," probably with the 
 intention of forming a party in connection with the 
 revolution, and on the morning of August 19 they were 
 surrounded by Government troops. No attempt was 
 made at defence, for few of the young men were armed, 
 but the troops fired into the house and killed twenty-one 
 of the occupants. Fifteen escaped, although several 
 subsequently died of wounds, and fourteen were captured 
 and imprisoned until the fall of Balmaceda, On August 
 18 another group of seven young men were arrested in 
 Santiago. 
 
 It was these occurrences towards the close of his 
 Administration that caused Balmaceda to be characterised 
 
368 CHILE 
 
 as tyrannical and cruel. When the end of the contest 
 approached, the strain affected his mind to such a degree 
 that the value of human life sank into insignificance 
 when compared to any question of his own supremacy. 
 Political suspects were flogged and tortured in the 
 prisons to make them reveal the names of sympathisers 
 with the rebellion. That these practices were directly 
 ordered by Balmaceda is improbable, but that he was 
 ignorant of them is impossible. The latter part of the 
 revolutionary period was a reign of terror, and it was 
 this fact that contributed to the downfall of the man 
 in whom centred the moving spirit of the resistance to 
 the Congressionalists. With the sympathy of the 
 majority of the inhabitants on his side, Balmaceda could 
 have defied the power and wealth arrayed against him 
 in the ranks of the revolution, and this sympathy he 
 had to a large extent at the commencement of the 
 movement ; but he lost it entirely through the attitude 
 he subsequently adopted. 
 
 On August 18 the Esmeralda appeared off Valparaiso 
 and fired three guns. This was the signal agreed upon 
 by the Junta to notify the friends of the Congressionalists 
 that the disembarkation of the revolutionary army would 
 take place within forty-eight hours, and it proved to be 
 the death-knell of all hopes that Balmaceda may have 
 had for the re-establishment of his authority. On the 
 following day sixteen vessels assembled fifty miles to 
 the south of Valparaiso with the army under the 
 orders of General Estanislao Canto, the revolutionary 
 Commander-in-chief, accompanied by General Holley, 
 Minister of War in the Junta. In the evening a pro- 
 clamation was read to the troops on the transports, 
 giving a general explanation of the object of the expe- 
 dition, and a distribution of two days' rations and a 
 supply of ammunition was then made. 
 
 At six o'clock next morning, the Condor and Huemul, 
 accompanied by the transport Bio-Bio, entered the bay 
 of Quinteros and made a careful search for submarine 
 mines. On reporting the bay clear, the Pisagua 
 
1891] THE LANDING AT QUINTEROS 36S 
 
 Regiment was landed from the Bio-Bio to occupy the 
 village of Quinteros, and the remaining transports came 
 up, the disembarkation of the troops being effected in 
 sixteen barges towed by steam launches, each barge 
 carrying 110 men, and by 10 p.m. the army was ashore. 
 Notice of the disembarkation was despatched to 
 Balmaceda by Major Athas, who was stationed at 
 Quinteros to observe any approach of the enemy, and 
 after advising the appearance of the fleet the telegraphic 
 apparatus was destroyed and the wires cut. 
 
 The news of the landing at Quinteros spread rapidly 
 through Valparaiso and Santiago. It was evident from 
 the temper of the people that any decided revolutionary 
 success would make the position of Balmaceda untenable, 
 and that if the Government forces were defeated in the 
 central districts, no attempt could be made in the south 
 to prolong the struggle. 
 
 2 a 
 
CHAPTEE XX 
 
 chile — continued 
 
 Country round Quinteros. Congressionalist Army. Tactics of 
 Defence. Battle of Concon. Congressionalist Victory. Heavy 
 Casualties. Reorganisation of Government Troops. Reinforce- 
 ments from Santiago. Defence of Vina del Mar. Faulty 
 Information Concerning Valparaiso. Advance on Vina del Mar. 
 Concentration at Quilpue. Preparations for Attacking Val- 
 paraiso. March to Placilla. Defence of Placilla. Strength of 
 the Armies. Battle of Placilla. Severe Losses. Occupation of 
 Valparaiso. Riotous Scenes. Message to Balmaceda. The 
 President Resigns his Powers. Decree of General Baquedano. 
 Political Prisoners. Unprotected state of Santiago. Arrival of 
 the Junta de Gobierno. Disarmament of Troops. 
 
 Between Quinteros and Concon is the river Aconcagua, 
 a deep stream with steep hills rising on either side, but 
 which can be forded at the village of Colmo and also at 
 Concon bajo. The advance of the Congressionalist army 
 was confided to Colonel Korner, chief of staff to General 
 Canto, who was acquainted with the country near the 
 Aconcagua and with the Concon district to the south, 
 and he realised the importance of occupying the valley 
 of the river before the enemy could concentrate in force 
 to obstruct the passage of the fords. 
 
 No time was lost after the disembarkation. The 1st 
 Brigade, commanded by Colonel Anibal Frias, was sent 
 on as the different regiments reached the shore, and was 
 ordered to concentrate on the right bank of the 
 Aconcagua in the direction of Concon bajo, six miles 
 
1891| BATTLE OF CONCON 371 
 
 distant from Quinteros, but it was not until 10 p.m. 
 that they were assembled at this point. The 2nd 
 Brigade was ordered to the village of Colmo, but did 
 not reach its destination until 7.30 a.m. on the following 
 day ; and the 3rd Brigade, the last to disembark, camped 
 for the night four miles to the north of Conc6n bajo. 
 The total strength of the revolutionary army was 9284 
 officers and men. Scouting parties were thrown out, 
 and reported that the enemy had taken up positions 
 on the left bank of the river, extending from Colmo to 
 Concon bajo. 
 
 No small confusion arose amongst the Balmacedists 
 when the news of the landing and advance of the Con- 
 gressionalists was received. Only the Valparaiso and 
 Santiago Divisions were ready to take the field, the 
 former commanded by General Alcerrica, and the latter 
 by General Barbosa. The effective strength of these 
 two divisions was 8500 men, but owing to detachments 
 detailed for various purposes the number of the troops 
 at Concon on August 21 only reached 6322. The 
 Coquimbo Division had not come in, and the Conception 
 forces only marched for Santiago on the day of the 
 disembarkation of the Congressional army, so that the 
 superiority of numbers lay with the attacking force. 
 With this knowledge before them, the senior officers 
 of the defence were divided in opinions as to the tactics 
 to be followed, General Alcerrica advising a retirement 
 to Vina del Mar and the occupation of the heights near 
 Miramar ; but to this General Barbosa objected on the 
 ground that any retrograde movement would be disastrous 
 in its effects upon the discipline of the troops, and this 
 argument eventually decided the point. 
 
 The battle was begun at 7.30 a.m. on August 21 by 
 the Congressional artillery of the 1st Brigade opening 
 fire upon the left flank of the enemy, with a view to 
 discover the position of the guns of the defence. To 
 this cannonade there was no response, and rifle fire was 
 then directed against the huts on the left bank of the 
 river, which were forthwith evacuated. The 2nd Brigade 
 
372 CHILE 
 
 had now reached Colmo, and the Armstrong battery 
 opened on the enemy, the guns of the Government 
 forces replying. A brisk artillery duel was maintained 
 for an hour, and meanwhile a reconnaissance of the two 
 fords was made by the Junta's troops. The one opposite 
 Colmo was found practicable so far as the depth of 
 water was concerned, but the ground to the left of the 
 river was broken and afforded admirable cover for 
 defence. At Concern bajo the conditions were more 
 favourable, the ford being only three feet deep, the 
 ascent to the heights on the south side of the river 
 comparatively easy, and the position only weakly held, 
 so it was decided to take the 1st Brigade over the river 
 at Conc6n bajo while the 2nd Brigade engaged the 
 enemy at Colmo, where the main body of the Govern- 
 ment troops were concentrated. The 1st Brigade of 
 the Congressionalists crossed the river without serious 
 losses, occupying the heights on the left bank near 
 Concon bajo shortly before noon, and, once well across, 
 the brigade swung round and attacked the left flank of 
 the enemy, while the guns of the squadron seconded the 
 movement by shelling the plateau on which the main 
 body lay. 
 
 The supporters of Balmaceda made a stubborn stand 
 and disputed every inch of ground, but at 2.30 p.m. 
 reinforcements were brought up to the assistance of the 
 1st Brigade, and a portion of the 2nd Brigade was thrown 
 over the river to push home the assault on the right, and 
 half an hour later the Government forces began to run 
 short of ammunition. Thereupon the Congressionalist 
 troops perceptibly gained ground, and shortly before 
 4 p.m. the Government forces were driven from their 
 positions and the victory of the revolutionary army was 
 complete. Pursued by the Congressionalist cavalry, the 
 retreat quickly developed into a rout ; the men threw 
 down their arms and scattered in all directions, a large 
 number being taken prisoners, while others reached 
 villages in the neighbourhood and discarded their 
 uniforms. 
 
Map to illustrate 
 
 THE CAPTURE OF 
 VALPARAISO 
 
 [Face page 372. 
 
1891] HEAVY CASUALTIES 373 
 
 That night the Congressionalist army encamped on 
 the heights occupied by the supporters of Balmaceda the 
 previous day. The casualties on both sides had been 
 heavy, and the victors reported 19 officers and 197 men 
 killed and 49 officers and 482 men wounded, besides 122 
 missing, probably drowned during the passage of the 
 river. The loss on the part of the Government troops 
 was 1700 officers and men killed and wounded and 
 1500 officers and men taken prisoners, while the whole 
 of their artillery, consisting of 18 pieces and 4 
 machine guns, was captured. Amongst the wounded 
 was Colonel Hermogenes Camus, the officer who had 
 directed the march through Bolivia and across the 
 Andes after the evacuation of Antofagasta by the 
 Government authorities. 
 
 The survivors of the army of Balmaceda straggled 
 along the road to Quilpue and were collected and re- 
 organised by General Barbosa, but when mustered this 
 remnant only reached 2000. General Alcerrica pro- 
 ceeded to Vina del Mar to make preparations for the 
 defence of that locality and Valparaiso, the garrison, 
 including the police, at the latter place comprising 1300 
 men, it having been reinforced on the 22nd by the 
 advanced guard of the Concepcion Division, which had 
 reached Santiago on the afternoon of the 20th and been 
 sent forward to endeavour to reach General Barbosa 
 before the battle of Concon. The Congressionalists 
 neglected to seize the railway between Santiago and 
 Concon after their victory, and this negligence resulted 
 in 8000 Government troops being transferred from 
 Santiago to Valparaiso during the day and night of the 
 22nd. In view of these reinforcements the capture of 
 Valparaiso was not easy, and General Alcerrica, in 
 spite of the recent reverse, waited confidently in Vina 
 del Mar for the attack. 
 
 On the morning of August 22 the revolutionary army 
 was still resting from the fatigues of the previous forty- 
 eight hours, when information reached General Canto 
 that both Vina del Mar and Valparaiso were denuded 
 
374 CHILE 
 
 of troops and would be an easy prey to the Congression- 
 alists if an immediate advance was made. Probably 
 this information was correct in substance when des- 
 patched to the Commander-in-chief, for it was reasonable 
 to suppose that railway communication with Santiago 
 had been cut, as was intended by General Canto after 
 the victory at Concon, but the troops detailed to destroy 
 the line had failed to carry out their instructions, and 
 this enabled the reinforcements to reach Valparaiso. 
 Of the strength of the garrison in Valparaiso and Vina 
 del Mar the information was quite inaccurate, but acting 
 on the supposition that the place was weakly held, an 
 advance on Vina del Mar was ordered. For this 
 operation the 2nd and 3rd Brigades were directed to 
 move forward on the night of the 22nd until close to 
 Viila del Mar, then take up positions on the heights 
 for a sudden attack on the town, the assault being fixed 
 for daybreak on August 23. It was intended that the 
 place should be carried by a bayonet charge, and the 
 revolutionary artillery was so placed as to command 
 the town and the fort of Callao in order to protect the 
 infantry advance and silence the guns, while the 1st 
 Brigade was to cover the retirement of the attacking 
 force if the movement was unsuccessful. In accordance 
 with these dispositions the advance began during the 
 night. 
 
 Unexpected difficulties were encountered, and the 
 2nd and 3rd Brigades did not reach their positions until 
 6 a.m. in daylight and all chance of surprising the 
 garrison lost. Under the altered conditions the com- 
 manders of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades requested further 
 instructions from the Commander-in-chief, and pending 
 his decision the Congressional artillery opened fire on 
 the fortress of Callao, while the Cochrane and Esmeralda 
 also bombarded this fort from seawards, but little 
 damage was done by the artillery fire on either side. At 
 10 a.m. orders were received to withdraw the 2nd and 
 3rd Brigades, and later all the troops were retired 
 beyond reach of the artillery at Vina del Mar to a 
 
1891] CONCENTRATION AT QUILPUE 375 
 
 position on the heights of Las Cruces. The casualties 
 during the day were insignificant, only 1 officer and 2 
 men being wounded. 
 
 The fact that Valparaiso and Vina del Mar were 
 strongly held led the Congressionalists to reconsider 
 their position. The mistake of not cutting the railway 
 communication between Santiago and Valparaiso after 
 Concon was clearly recognised and it was too late to 
 repair the error, but it was obvious that immediate 
 action must be taken to deprive Balmaceda of easy 
 transportation from Santiago to the seaboard. For this 
 purpose it was determined to concentrate the army at 
 Quilpue and block the passage of trains at that point. 
 In accordance with this plan the 2nd Brigade marched 
 on the night of August 23, reaching Quilpue early on 
 August 24 without encountering resistance, while the 
 3rd Brigade destroyed the line at Salto before retiring to 
 Quilpue. From information gleaned at this point it was 
 ascertained that during the previous twenty-four hours 
 thirteen trains conveying 8000 troops had passed through 
 the station en route to Valparaiso, and also that Generals 
 Barbosa and Alcerrica were in Valparaiso, and that 
 Balmaceda had been in Quillota and Quilpue that 
 morning. The 1st Brigade was ordered to make a feint 
 of attacking, and then retire on the evening of August 24 
 towards Quilpue, bringing the guns and stores disem- 
 barked by the squadron at Concon bajo ; to further 
 deceive the enemy, orders were issued for camp fires to 
 be lighted on the evening of the 24th, and replenished 
 before the position was evacuated. The distance from 
 the encampment of the revolutionary army to Quilpue 
 was only six miles, but the mountainous nature of the 
 country and bad condition of the roads from the heavy 
 rainfall prevented the rearguard of the 1st Brigade 
 reaching that place until after daybreak on August 25. 
 With the exception of a small force sent on reconnais- 
 sance duty towards Pena Blanca, the troops were per- 
 mitted to rest on August 25. 
 
 The object of General Canto now was to attack 
 
376 CHILE 
 
 Valparaiso from the south-east. In order to do this it 
 was necessary to obtain possession of the heights near 
 Placilla and Las Zorras, and it was decided to advance 
 from Quilpue to Las Cadenas, a hamlet on the Placilla 
 road, ten miles in a direct line from Quilpue. It was 
 thought inadvisable to march out of Quilpue by daylight, 
 as the movement could be seen by the enemy's outposts 
 on the heights near Salto, and orders were given to start 
 at 1.30 a.m. on August 26 ; but a delay occurred, and it 
 was 6.30 a.m. before the 1st Brigade, forming the 
 rearguard, left Quilpue, and, consequently, news of the 
 movement reached the authorities in Valparaiso. The 
 heavy state of the roads made the march to Las Cadenas 
 a long affair, and the circuitous route followed increased 
 the distance to 25 miles. The troops were wearied from 
 want of sleep, lost their formation and straggled out, and 
 it was not until daybreak on August 27 that the army 
 reached its destination. Soon after leaving Quilpue a 
 squadron of the Husares de Colipulli, commanded by 
 Major Julio Padilla, joined the Congressionalists and was 
 incorporated under the title of Husares Constitutionales. 
 The intention of General Canto had been to occupy the 
 heights of Placilla at daybreak on August 27 ; but the 
 disorganised condition of the men made this impossible, 
 and the attack was postponed until 8 a.m. on the 28th, 
 to allow the troops rest and food before going into 
 action. 
 
 The retirement from Vina del Mar on August 24 
 surprised Balmaceda's generals, and they imagined that 
 the enemy had returned to Concon bajo to re-embark, or 
 had marched inland to attack Santiago. A reconnais- 
 sance on the 25th discovered the Congressionalists at 
 Quilpue. General Barbosa insisted that the revolutionary 
 forces intended to re-embark ; but General Alcerrica 
 maintained that an attack would be made on Valparaiso 
 from Placilla, and events proved this conclusion to be 
 correct, for on the 26th a telegram from Colonel Juan 
 de Dios Leon, who was reconnoitring between Salto and 
 Quilpue, informed the authorities that the Congression- 
 
1891] BATTLE OF PLACILLA 377 
 
 alists had followed the direction of the Casablanca 
 cartroad towards Placilla. 
 
 From this it was evident that the enemy intended to 
 converge upon Placilla, and preparations were com- 
 menced by Barbosa and Alcerrica to occupy the heights 
 of Alto del Puerto with the main body of the Govern- 
 ment troops. At half-past three in the afternoon the 
 division near Vina del Mar was advanced to Las Zorras 
 and Alto del Puerto, the vanguard reaching this position 
 at ten o'clock next morning, the 27th. As had happened 
 with the Congressionalists, the heavy state of the roads 
 made marching difficult, and the men were worn out 
 with fatigue when they arrived at their destination. A 
 reconnaissance in the direction of Las Cadenas reported 
 the enemy in full strength five miles distant. The 
 Government troops concentrated on the heights at 
 Placilla numbered 9200 officers and men, and the 
 strength of the revolutionary forces was almost the 
 same, the gaps in the ranks from the fighting at Concon 
 having been filled by volunteers from the prisoners taken 
 on that occasion and by deserters from the Government 
 army. The defence had 40 guns and 4 machine guns, 
 while the revolutionary army was equipped with 50 
 guns and 10 machine guns ; but this preponderance of 
 artillery was counterbalanced by the more advantageous 
 position held by their opponents. 
 
 The plan of the revolutionary leaders for the attack 
 upon Placilla on August 28 was simple. The artillery 
 was directed to take up positions on the high ground 
 near Las Cadenas fronting the Alto del Puerto and to 
 the east of the road to Placilla, with orders to concen- 
 trate all fire on the enemy's guns, and was protected by 
 the 3rd Brigade. The 1st and 2nd Brigades were to 
 advance to positions on both sides of the Placilla road, 
 and to press forward gradually for a frontal attack on 
 the Alto del Puerto, but inclining to the left to outflank 
 the right wing of the defence. Part of the cavalry was 
 in rear of the 2nd Brigade to protect the left, and the 
 remainder was in rear of the 3rd Brigade ready for any 
 
378 CHILE 
 
 emergencies, and, if necessary, to support the right 
 wing. The Commander-in-chief remained with the 3rd 
 Brigade. 
 
 The position of the Government troops was ex- 
 ceptionally strong, and extended on both sides of the 
 Pl-acilla road, with the right and left flanks resting 
 on deep ravines. From Placilla to the Alto del Puerto 
 the ground rose gradually, and afforded excellent cover 
 and a clear field of fire. The cavalry was posted in 
 rear of the line in a dip in the Valparaiso road, the 
 bulk of the artillery being massed in the centre, but 
 a few guns were detached towards the right. The 
 reserves were kept close to the cavalry in rear of the 
 centre. 
 
 At 7 a.m. on August 28, the Congressionalist advance 
 began. The 1st Brigade led the attack, and crept up 
 within half a, mile of the enemy's lines before fire opened, 
 but at 7.30 a.m. the artillery on both sides commenced 
 a heavy cannonade which lasted for an hour. Shortly 
 before 9 a.m. General Canto saw that the 2nd Brigade, 
 which should have supported the 1st Brigade, had 
 drifted to the left to obtain the protection of some 
 broken ground and was not able to reinforce the leading 
 troops, rendering the position of this section extremely 
 critical. Reserves from the 3rd Brigade were immedi- 
 ately thrown forward, and at 10 a.m. all available troops 
 of the revolutionary force were engaged in the first line. 
 The advance was disputed at every step, the defence 
 maintaining a heavy rifle and artillery fire, and the 
 Congressionalists being checked for some time by the 
 ravines and wire fences ; but a bayonet charge by the 
 Esmeralda Regiment against the left flank of the defence 
 at half- past ten carried that section of the position, and 
 immediately afterwards the Congressional cavalry charged 
 the line and captured several guns. The infantry now 
 broke through the defence at all points and a hand-to- 
 hand fight ensued ; but it lasted only a few moments, 
 and then the defenders threw down their arms, some 
 surrendering, others taking to flight. By eleven o'clock 
 
1891] CONGRESSIONAL VICTORY 370 
 
 the battle was over, and the last hopes of Balmaceda 
 were shattered. 
 
 When defeat was certain, General Alcerrica attempted 
 to escape on horseback, but was pursued by some 
 cavalry-men, against whom he fired several shots from 
 his revolver. His horse fell dead, and the General 
 attempted to proceed on foot, but realised this was 
 impossible. Near by was a house, and rushing into this 
 shelter he expired a few moments afterwards from his 
 wounds. The death of General Barbosa was more 
 tragic. The Commander-in-chief of the Government 
 troops took refuge in the residence of Senor Soto on 
 the Alto del Puerto, and was followed by half-a-dozen 
 troopers, against whom he attempted to defend himself, 
 shutting himself into a dark room and wounding three 
 soldiers as they tried to enter the doorway. Then 
 Ensign Fuenzalida appeared with his revolver in hand 
 and forced his way into the room, a duel ensuing in 
 which the General was twice wounded without injuring 
 his adversary. When his ammunition was exhausted, 
 Barbosa drew his sword to attack his opponent ; but he 
 was overpowered by the troopers, dragged outside, and 
 there killed in cold blood, his body being pierced with 
 lance thrusts and hacked by sabre cuts. 
 
 The casualties on both sides were heavy. The action 
 had lasted scarcely four hours, but when the rolls were 
 called the losses of the victors were found to be 22 
 officers and 463 men killed and 83 officers and 1041 
 men wounded, besides 199 missing — a total of 1800 ; 
 and on the part of the defence, the returns were 941 
 killed and 2422 wounded— a total of 3363. 
 
 At 12.30 p.m., an hour after the firing ceased at 
 Placilla, Valparaiso was occupied by a detachment of 
 Congressional troops, the garrison offering no resistance ; 
 but the torpedo-boat Lynch opened fire, although she 
 was soon overpowered. At 3 p.m. General Canto 
 arrived, and two hours later the squadron under Admiral 
 Montt anchored in the bay. The friends of Balmaceda 
 were given asylum on the German man-of-war Leipzig, 
 
380 CHILE 
 
 and the United States cruisers San Francisco and 
 Baltimore, but the majority of the population were 
 satisfied at the turn affairs had taken, and readily 
 accepted the change of authority. Unfortunately no 
 efficient measures were taken during the first night for 
 policing the city, and many of the victorious troops 
 became drunk, with the result that scenes of rioting and 
 disastrous incendiary fires occurred. Patrols were forced 
 to shoot down 300 persons before order was established, 
 and the actual monetary loss from damage done to 
 property was estimated at $3,000,000. 
 
 It was from the officer in command of the Govern- 
 ment troops at Limache that Balmaceda first received 
 information of the defeat at Placilla. On August 28 
 constant telegraphic messages were exchanged between 
 Limache and Santiago, but it was not until 7.30 p.m. 
 that a telegram from Quillota, sent by Colonel Vargas, 
 definitely conveyed news of the disaster. The message 
 read : — " Arrived here, several officers of defeated army. 
 They say defeat is complete. Our men fought without 
 bravery or enthusiasm, and in crisis of struggle laid 
 down arms and passed over to enemy. Generals Barbosa 
 and Alcerrica dead. Senor Claudio Vicuna and Senor 
 Banados shut up in Municipal Building, Valparaiso, and 
 that city in power of Opposition. Nothing more for 
 me to do here. I march with my men to Santiago — 
 Vargas." Balmaceda was in consultation with his 
 ministers when this despatch reached him, and he at 
 once proposed to take measures for the defence of 
 Santiago, pointing out that in and near the national 
 capital was a force of 7000 men, and with these a strong 
 resistance could be made ; but when the full nature of 
 the disaster was known, and the fact appreciated that 
 the loyalty of the troops could not be depended upon, 
 Balmaceda realised it was useless to continue the struggle. 
 He decided to resign office and transfer his presidential 
 powers to General Baquedano, who was known to be 
 in sympathy with the revolutionary movement, under 
 the condition of protection for the persons and property 
 
1891] RESIGNATION OF BALMACEDA 381 
 
 of all those who had supported his Administration, and 
 this General Baquedano promised. The last official act 
 of Balmaceda was the following document, issued next 
 morning : — 
 
 Santiago, August 29, 1891. — Gregorio Cei'da y Ossa, Intendente 
 of the Province. Whereas : 
 
 His Excellency the President of the Republic has decreed as 
 follows : — 
 
 Considering that in resisting the armed revolution begun on 
 January 7 by the squadron I have complied with my simple duty of 
 maintaining the principle of authority, without which Government is 
 impossible. 
 
 That my patriotism and duties as a Chilian have placed a limit to 
 my efforts. It does not become an honest Governor to prolong a 
 struggle that cannot be maintained with reasonable prospects of 
 success. 
 
 That the result of the last battle near Valparaiso has been 
 unfavourable to the cause I sustain. I have therefore resolved to 
 end a conflict that reflects little credit to the Republic and the 
 common welfare. 
 
 Decree : 
 
 That citizen General of Division Senor Don Manuel Baquedano 
 remains at the head of the Government. I therefore charge all 
 chiefs, officers, soldiers, Intendentes, governors, and other officials to 
 render him proper respect and obedience. 
 
 Let this be published and communicated by telegraph. 
 
 Balmaceda. 
 Manuel A. Zanartu. 
 
 General Baquedano immediately issued the follow- 
 ing short decree : — 
 
 I provisionally accept the charge confided to me, in order to 
 preserve public order. 
 
 Two reasons prompted Balmaceda to select General 
 Baquedano. In the first place, he was popular in con- 
 sequence of the prestige he had gained as the victorious 
 leader of the Chilians in the war against Peru, and in 
 his capacity as a soldier he would be fitted to deal with 
 the present situation ; and, secondly, Baquedano was 
 known to be on friendly terms with the Congressionalist 
 leaders, although taking no active part in the conflict. 
 
382 CHILE 
 
 Practically, therefore, the resignation of Balmacecla in 
 his favour was equivalent to a surrender to the Junta de 
 Gobierno, and in these circumstances Balmaceda con- 
 sidered that the promise of protection in regard to his 
 supporters would be respected. 
 
 The abdication of Balmaceda was soon known. It 
 caused consternation on the part of his followers and 
 exultation to his enemies. Official returns show that 
 448 persons had been incarcerated in the prisons of 
 Santiago as political offenders during the latter months 
 of the civil war ; as the majority of these belonged to 
 families of high social position in Santiago, it is easy to 
 imagine the bitter hostility existing, and that these 
 people and their friends determined to be revenged for 
 their injuries. On the morning of August 29, the police 
 in Santiago ceased to resist, the men deserting to the 
 country districts and carrying their arms with them. 
 The military forces refused to perform duty, and the 
 town was absolutely unprotected. Sufferers under the 
 late Administration saw their opportunity, and they 
 organised bodies of men to wreck the properties of the 
 most prominent supporters of Balmaceda. Lists of 
 houses to be sacked were made out and handed to the 
 leaders of different gangs, and two hundred residences 
 were completely gutted ; but no personal violence was 
 offered, nor was riotous behaviour in evidence. It was 
 not until the afternoon of August 29 that General 
 Baquedano was able to organise an adequate police 
 force, and by then the destruction had ceased. 
 
 On August 30 Colonel Emilio Korner reached 
 Santiago to arrange for barrack accommodation for a 
 part of the Congressionalist army, and the day following 
 the Junta de Gobierno arrived, and became the de facto 
 Government of Chile. It only remained now to disarm 
 the troops stationed at Coquimbo and in the south, and 
 this was accomplished without difficulty within fifteen 
 clays. 
 
CHAPTER XXI 
 
 chile — continued 
 
 General Baquedano Surrenders Powers. Proclamation by Admiral 
 Montt. Work of Reconstruction. Unsettled Conditions. Dis- 
 appearance of Balmaceda. Suicide of Balmaceda. Political 
 Testament of Balmaceda. Explanation of Suicide. New Con- 
 gress. Junta de Gobierno Resigns. Admiral Montt as Presi- 
 dential Candidate. Cost of the Revolution. Election of Montt. 
 Promotions for Services. Actions concerning Supporters of 
 Balmaceda. Law of Amnesty. Chile and the United States. 
 The Baltimore Incident. Message of President Harrison to the 
 U.S. Congress. Telegram from Santiago to Chilian Minister in 
 Washington. United States Ultimatum. Excitement in Chile. 
 Apology to U.S. Government. 
 
 On the arrival at Santiago of the Junta de Gobierno, 
 General Baquedano immediately surrendered the powers 
 with which he had been invested by the decree of 
 Balmaceda on August 29. In a communication to the 
 Junta, dated August 31, he gave an account of his 
 actions during the three days that he was in charge of 
 public affairs. 
 
 Baquedano described the absolute confusion follow- 
 ing the abdication of Balmaceda. All prominent officials 
 under the recent Administration had left their posts, 
 and many of the senior officers of the army had fled the 
 country. Telegrams from all districts revealed dis- 
 organisation in the provinces, and that with the dis- 
 appearance of Balmaceda the machinery of government 
 had been temporarily suspended. Baquedano accom- 
 plished as much as was possible in the circumstances to 
 
384 CHILE 
 
 resolve order out of chaos, and officers in whom he felt 
 confidence were placed in command of the regiments 
 forming the garrison of Santiago. Governors of Provinces 
 and Intendentes of Departments were nominated, and 
 prominent citizens of the National Capital were called 
 upon for their advice in connection with the situation. 
 The result of these measures was that comparative 
 tranquillity had been restored before the appearance in 
 Santiago of the Junta, and the task now before the 
 Provisional Government was to continue the work of 
 reconstruction that Baquedano had begun. 
 
 After the Provisional Government assumed charge, 
 Admiral Montt issued the following proclamation : — 
 
 Fellow Citizens : 
 
 After eight long months of bloody combats I arrive at the 
 National Capital, having accomplished the task entrusted to me by 
 the delegation of the National Congress in the roadstead of 
 Valparaiso. 
 
 I heartily congratulate the country, the navy, and the army, that 
 have so bravely contributed to the most noble and holy cause that has 
 ever convulsed this Republic. 
 
 The Empire of the Constitution and Laws is assured throughout 
 the Republic. 
 
 I now call on all Chilians, without distinction of political colour, to 
 co-operate in the re-establishment of public order, and the realisation 
 of that great work of peace that the Nation has confided to us. 
 
 Fellow countrymen : 
 
 In action and in work look for the remedy from the evils created 
 by the dictatorship, with the confidence that you will be protected 
 and sheltered by the forces that from to-day are the zealous 
 guardians of public order. 
 
 Jorje Montt. 
 
 Santiago, September, 1891. 
 
 The work of reconstruction proceeded rapidly. 
 Elections were ordered for Senators and Deputies, and 
 for the presidential electors, and the Appeal Courts 
 reopened after having been suspended since March 2, 
 1891, by order of Balmaceda. A large proportion of 
 the army was disbanded. The Executive decreed that 
 all members of the judiciary dismissed by Balmaceda 
 should be reinstated, and all appointments made after 
 
General Baquedano. 
 
 Pedro Montt. 
 
 President Errazuriz. 
 
 President Riesco. 
 
 [Face page. 3S4 
 
1891] AFTER THE REVOLUTION 385 
 
 January 1, 1891, cancelled. Practically the first fifteen 
 days of the Provisional Government was occupied in 
 undoing the acts of Balmaceda during the previous eight 
 months. 
 
 In the towns matters soon settled clown, but in the 
 country districts affairs were not so satisfactory. 
 Deserters from the army and police had taken to the 
 hills after Conc6n and Placilla ; most of these men had 
 arms and ammunition, and they developed into bandits. 
 The south and centre became infested with groups of 
 these robbers, and life and property in outlying districts 
 was continually menaced. To such an extent did these 
 marauders strike terror that prosperous farming districts 
 were abandoned, and the authorities have not been able 
 to eradicate this pest in the twelve years that have passed 
 since the revolution, its suppression to-day having 
 become a most serious problem. 
 
 Much interest was aroused concerning Balmaceda 
 after his abdication. He had disappeared absolutely, 
 mysteriously, and neither friend nor foe knew where to 
 look for him. After signing the decree transferring his 
 powers to Baquedano, the late President passed from 
 the public rooms of the Casa de Moneda to his private 
 apartments, there meeting his wife and a group of 
 intimate friends. A few minutes later he left the 
 building accompanied by Senor Manuel Zanartu, the 
 Minister of the Interior, Senor Cerda y Ossa, Intendente 
 of Santiago, and Senor Luis Vergara. After driving for 
 a short distance, he and his friends descended from the 
 carriage, dismissed the coachman, and proceeded on foot 
 to the Argentine Legation. They knocked, and the 
 door was opened by the Argentine Minister, Senor 
 Uriburu, Balmaceda entering the house after taking 
 leave of his companions. It had been arranged that 
 Senor Uriburu should give the President shelter if 
 necessity arose, and a room at the top of the building 
 had been prepared for his reception. Here Balmaceda 
 lay concealed for twenty days, his wife and family being 
 transferred to the protection of the United States 
 
 2 B 
 
386 CHILE 
 
 Legation, where they remained until all danger had 
 disappeared. 
 
 The intention of Balmaceda had been to surrender 
 to the Congressionalist leaders, but this course was 
 abandoned when he understood the intense hostility 
 against himself. The alternative to his first idea was 
 escape from the country under protection of the diplo- 
 matic corps ; this was feasible, but was rejected by him 
 as too undignified a proceeding. It was impossible to 
 prolong indefinitely his stay in the Argentine Legation, 
 and in the middle of September Senor Uriburu and his 
 guest discussed the best plan to follow. It was arranged 
 that Senor Uriburu should inform the Provisional 
 Government of Balmaceda's presence in his house and 
 request advice, and then the minister was to take 
 Balmaceda, accompanied by Senor Concha y Toro and 
 Senor Carlos Walker Martinez, to any locality indicated 
 by the authorities. In this maimer no attention would 
 be called to him in his passage through the streets. On 
 September 10, Senor Uriburu was to have carried out 
 this programme, but on the morning of that day 
 Balmaceda ended his troubles by taking his own life. 
 Torn by doubts as to the fairness of any trial if he 
 placed his fate in the hands of his enemies, and dis- 
 tracted by fear that his hiding-place would be discovered 
 by the mob, he resolved to commit suicide rather than 
 face the results of the storm he had raised. 
 
 The death of Balmaceda is described by his friend 
 Senor Julio Banados Espinosa as having taken place in 
 the following manner. He rose early on the morning 
 of September 19, attired himself in black clothes, and 
 then opened a door leading from his bedroom to a 
 balcony. There he stood for some moments looking at 
 the great snow-covered ranges of the Andes glowing in 
 the sunlight. He closed the door, carefully arranged 
 the furniture, and lay down on his bed at 8 a.m. A few 
 moments later a pistol shot was heard by Senor Uriburu 
 and his wife, and they sent a servant upstairs to ascertain 
 what had occurred. The messenger returned with the 
 
1891] SUICIDE OF BALMACEDA 387 
 
 information that Balmaceda was dead, and Sefior 
 Uriburu, calling on Senor Carlos Walker Martinez to 
 accompany him, ascended to the apartment. The body 
 was lying on the bed with a wound in the right breast, 
 and it was evident that death had been instantaneous. 
 On the pillow was a letter addressed to Senor Uriburu, 
 in which Balmaceda declared his intention of committing 
 suicide as the only means of escape from his difficulties. 
 
 The authorities were at once notified of the tragedy 
 in the Argentine Legation, and at noon a committee 
 assembled to verify the cause of death. It consisted of 
 the following members : — Jose Uriburu ( Argentine 
 Minister) ; J. Arrieta (Uruguayan Minister) ; Baron 
 Gutschmid (German Minister) ; E. de B. Cavalcanti de 
 Lacerda (Brazilian Minister) ; Jose Barcelo ; Carlos 
 Lira ; J. J. Aguirre ; M. Concha y Toro ; Domingo 
 Toro y Herrera ; C. Walker Martinez. The burial took 
 place at 7.30 in the evening, and the body was carried 
 to the cemetery in a public conveyance of the commonest 
 kind, the ceremony being unattended by mourners. A 
 picquet of cavalry was detailed to accompany the corpse 
 from the Argentine Legation to the cemetery, but no 
 hostile manifestation was attempted. 
 
 Among the letters written by Balmaceda on the day 
 before his death was one jointly directed to Senor 
 Claudio Vicuna and Senor Julio Banados Espinosa, and 
 this document is designated by his friends as his political 
 testament. In this letter Balmaceda pleads justification 
 for his actions during the civil war and for the general 
 drift of his policy. In regard to existing principles of 
 Government in Chile, a clear opinion is expressed that 
 they must inevitably bring a deadlock between the 
 Chambers and the Executive, and he says : — " The 
 parliamentary system has triumphed on the field of 
 battle, but this victory will not prevail. Either investi- 
 gation, convenience, or patriotism will open a reasonable 
 way to reform and the organisation of a representative 
 government, or fresh disturbances and painful occurrences 
 will happen among the .same people who united for the 
 
388 CHILE 
 
 revolution, and who remained united to assure the 
 result, but who will end by divisions and conflicts." 
 He sets forth his idea of a satisfactory government for 
 Chile in these terms: — "Only in the organisation of a 
 popular representative government with independent 
 and responsible powers and easy means to make that 
 responsibility effective will there be parties of a national 
 character, derived from the will of the people and ensuring 
 harmony between the different powers of the State." 
 This latter criticism shows that Balmaceda understood 
 the defects of the existing constitution of Chile. His 
 prediction as to disturbed political conditions has been 
 justified since by the confusion in Congress during the 
 presidency of Errazuriz, and later under Riesco, and 
 which has made useful legislation almost impossible. 
 The contrast between the ideas of Balmaceda in 1891 
 and the convictions he expressed at the beginning of his 
 political career are interesting, for from 1870 to 1880 
 he was the apostle of a political movement for the free 
 exercise of a parliamentary system. When holding 
 ministerial office after 1881 under President Santa 
 Maria, he found that the existing Constitution was incom- 
 patible with this doctrine, and from 1886 until 1889 he 
 believed the key to the situation was the unification of 
 the Liberals and a solid majority to support a Liberal 
 Cabinet. For this end he laboured unceasingly, but in 
 1890 he was convinced that this was impossible, princi- 
 pally owing to the personality of the members of 
 Congress, and then he advocated a representative 
 Government on the model of the United States rather 
 than that any attempt should be made to perfect a 
 parliamentary system. 
 
 In a letter to his brothers, written on the eve of his 
 death, Balmaceda says : — " I could escape ; but I would 
 never run the risk of the ridicule any disaster to such an 
 attempt would entail, and which would be the beginning 
 of vexatious humiliation which I could not endure for 
 myself or for my family " ; and this is probably the true 
 explanation of his action in taking his own life. He was 
 
1891] THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 389 
 
 a proud man, who could not bear the thought of the 
 insults he anticipated if he was arrested and brought to 
 his trial, and to fall from the possession of absolute 
 power and be treated as a criminal was more than he 
 could endure. He thought of suicide, and his imagin- 
 ative temperament was fascinated by the idea of death. 
 One sharp pang rather than a period of lingering torture 
 at the hands of his enemies was his dominant impression. 
 To assert that he was insane when he killed himself 
 would be quite erroneous, as his letters of September 18 
 and the morning of his death show that his mind was 
 perfectly clear. He had become morose by constant 
 brooding over his misfortunes ; to die as he did was in 
 some sense to pose as a martyr for his faults, and to him 
 the fascination of that idea was irresistible. By his 
 death Chile lost one of the most remarkable men she 
 ever produced. 
 
 On November 10, 1891, the newly elected Congress 
 met, and the Junta de Gobierno, consisting of Admiral 
 Montt, Senor Waldo Silva, and Senor Ramon Barros 
 Luco, resigned the powers they had held since the 
 outbreak of the revolution. In reply to their communi- 
 cation to this effect, the Chambers stated that it was the 
 unanimous desire of Congress that Admiral Montt should 
 continue to discharge the presidential duties until such 
 time as a Chief Magistrate was elected, and under these 
 circumstances he remained in office. The question of 
 the presidential election now occupied public attention, 
 and the convention called to select a candidate decided 
 on Admiral Montt by a large majority, and finally he 
 accepted the nomination, although he had made no 
 effort to influence people in his favour and showed no 
 strong desire to become a politician. 
 
 The Provisional Government abolished the " Tesoreria 
 General de la Escuadra" on November 21, an office 
 created during the revolution to account for official 
 expenditure, and some interesting details of the expenses 
 of the late Administration and the cost of the revolution 
 were made public. Between January 7 and August 21, 
 
390 CHILE 
 
 1891, Balmaceda had devoted $73,446,104 towards 
 defraying expenses in connection with warlike opera- 
 tions, and during the same period the Congressionalists 
 had expended $11,794,654. The contrast is evidence of 
 the better management of the Opposition, and it shows 
 that Balmaceda would soon have exhausted his avail- 
 able funds even if the decisive defeats at Concon and 
 Placilla had not occurred. The amount of arms and 
 ammunition that reached Chile after peace was re- 
 established, and which had been despatched from 
 Europe in July and August, proved that the Congres- 
 sionalists possessed ample means to continue the 
 struggle for a more lengthy period than was required. 
 
 On December 18 the election for the presidential 
 electors took place, and there was at once small doubt 
 that the feeling of the country was in favour of a con- 
 tinuance in power of Admiral Montt, for when two days 
 later the Chambers met to scrutinise the presidential 
 votes, the result showed that Montt had been unani- 
 mously elected. He assumed the Presidency on 
 the 26th. 
 
 During November the Chambers agreed to various 
 promotions and rewards for services rendered during the 
 war. Jorje Montt, who held the rank of a Post-Captain, 
 was made Vice-Admiral ; Captain Francisco Molina was 
 promoted Rear- Admiral ; and many other steps were 
 given to naval officers. Generals Estanislas del Canto 
 and Adolfo Holley were gazetted Generals of Division, 
 and Colonel Emilio Korner was promoted to General of 
 Brigade and granted a gratuity of $20,000. The part 
 Senor Waldo Silva and Senor Barros Luco had taken 
 was not forgotten, and to each was accorded the 
 honorary rank of Vice-Admiral, entitling them to 
 receive the customary salutes and honours of that 
 grade Avhen visiting Chilian men-of-war ; furthermore, 
 the right of free carriage for their personal correspond- 
 ence, and also the privilege for themselves and their 
 friends of travelling on State railways without payment. 
 Senor Waldo Silva was allotted a pension of $9000 
 
 
1891] HONOURS AWARDED BY CONGRESS 391 
 
 annually ; on his death, shortly afterwards, his family 
 was conceded a yearly subvention of $5250, and 
 Congress also ordered a monument to his memory at 
 a cost of $12,000. In addition to other honours 
 conceded to Senor Ramon Barros Luco, he was pre- 
 sented with a library valued at $10,000. 
 
 The question of the persons who had supported 
 Balmaceda came before the Chambers in December, and 
 it was held that the higher officials of the late Adminis- 
 tration were guilty of high treason and could not be 
 included in a general amnesty. The law passed on 
 December 25 extended free pardon to all partisans of 
 Balmaceda except members of the Cabinet between 
 January 1 and August 29, 1891, and those who had 
 served during that period as members of Congress, 
 judges, members of the Council of State, diplomats, 
 persons signing the bank-note emissions, legal advisers 
 to the military tribunals, and senior military and naval 
 officers, yet only some 400 persons in all were excluded. 
 Subsequently the law was modified, and on August 28, 
 1893, amnesty was extended to all persons except those 
 responsible for the events at "Lo Caiias," and the 
 Ministers of State who had signed the decree for 
 dictatorial powers to maintain military and naval forces 
 without the consent of Congress. Two years later even 
 this restriction was withdrawn, and Senor Claudio 
 Vicuna and his friends were relieved of all impediments 
 to their return to Chile. 
 
 At the end of 1891 and the beginning of 1892 
 relations between Chile and the United States became 
 strained. The question of the transport Itata and the 
 attitude assumed by the United States had aroused 
 hostile feeling, and this had become accentuated by the 
 presence of the U.S. warship San Francisco in Quinteros 
 Bay on the morning of August 20, when the Congres- 
 sionalist army disembarked. The San Francisco reached 
 Quinteros at 2.30 p.m. on that day and immediately 
 returned to Valparaiso, arriving at the latter place at 
 5 p.m., when Admiral Brown at once sent an officer 
 
392 CHILE 
 
 ashore with a cable despatch in cypher to advise the 
 authorities in Washington of the progress of events. 
 The Congressionalists interpreted this as a device for 
 providing information of their movements to Balmaceda, 
 moved to take that view by the fact that the United 
 States had not been favourable to the Congressionalist 
 cause. In a letter dated September 8, 1891, being then 
 aware of the erroneous conclusions formed as to the 
 reason of his visit to Quinteros, Admiral Brown explained 
 matters to Mr Egan, and stated that he had received 
 information early on August 20 that the Congres- 
 sionalists were disembarking, that the Government 
 authorities anticipated an important engagement at 
 Quinteros, and that he then decided to steam down to 
 the scene of the expected fighting. He proceeds : — " I 
 arrived at Quinteros Bay at 2.30 p.m. Seeing no signs 
 of a battle, I returned to this port. Dropping anchor 
 at 5 a.m., I sent an officer ashore with a cablegram that 
 had to be submitted to the Intendente to allow its 
 transmission. My message to the Secretary of the Navy 
 of the United States was in cypher, and nobody could 
 become possessed of its substance." The Congres- 
 sionalists were convinced that he was acting in the 
 interests of Balmaceda, and this engendered a spirit of 
 hostility, the unfriendly feeling being augmented by the 
 fact that after the battle of Placilla asylum was given 
 on the San Francisco and the Baltimore to Ministers 
 Domingo Godoy, Ismael Perez Montt, Julio Bailados 
 Espinosa, and other refugees. Friction was increased 
 by a protest from the United States Minister, Mr 
 Egan, complaining to the Provisional Government that 
 "the Legation is constantly surrounded by secret police 
 without any justifiable motive, persons are arrested and 
 sent to prison simply because they have been seen to 
 enter the Legation, and some of my employes and servants 
 are actually prisoners." Communications on this subject 
 were exchanged between Mr Egan and Seiior Matte, 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on September 26, the 
 former submitted a document containing a deposition 
 
1891] THE UNITED STATES AND CHILE 393 
 
 made by a Mr Raycraft concerning his arrest and 
 imprisonment after leaving the Legation, details descrip- 
 tive of nineteen other such arrests having been previously 
 forwarded. Seilor Matte stated that the Legation was 
 extra-territorial and had the right to grant asylum, but 
 the streets in the vicinity could claim no such privilege, 
 and that if it was in the interests of public order any 
 persons found in those streets would be apprehended by 
 the police. It was natural that Chilians who had sup- 
 ported the Congressionalist cause regarded United States 
 citizens with some animosity, and on October 16, when 
 this unfriendly feeling was running high, Captain Schley 
 of the U.S.S. Baltimore gave 116 petty officers and men 
 shore liberty. This was unwise of Captain Schley in 
 view of existing sentiments, and also because the sailors 
 who had been long confined on board ship, as might 
 have been anticipated, took advantage of their freedom 
 to drink freely. A dispute arose between a group from 
 the Baltimore and some Chilian sailors, and friends on 
 both sides joined in the quarrel until some hundreds 
 were engaged in the melee. Knives and revolvers were 
 freely used, with the result that Quartermaster Riggin 
 of the Baltimore was killed and several of his shipmates 
 wounded, one of these so severely that he shortly after- 
 wards died. 
 
 This affair was reported to Washington, Captain 
 Schley stating that the police of Valparaiso encouraged 
 the disturbance, and on October 26, under instructions 
 from his Government, Mr Egan demanded satisfaction. 
 In reply Senor Matte stated that as legal proceedings 
 had been instituted to bring the culprits to justice, no 
 further steps could then be taken, and on October 30 
 he forwarded to Mr Egan the report of the Intendente 
 of Valparaiso demonstrating the good conduct of the 
 police in the riot. Affairs were at this pass when 
 President Harrison sent his annual message to Congress 
 on December 9, 1891, accompanied by the report of the 
 Secretary of the Navy, one from Mr Egan, and one from 
 Captain Schley. Reference was made to the right of 
 
394 CHILE 
 
 asylum, and regret was expressed that the Chilian 
 Administration showed so little inclination to treat 
 courteously with a friendly nation. The remarks of 
 President Harrison, cabled to Santiago, caused an out- 
 burst of indignation, and on December 11 Seiior Matte 
 explained in the Senate the relations existing between 
 Chile and the United States, denying the accusations 
 formulated by President Harrison, and reading a telegram 
 to Senor Pedro Montt, the Chilian representative in 
 Washington. 
 
 This telegraphic despatch brought matters to a crisis. 
 The text was : — 
 
 Santiago, December 11, 1891. 
 Senor Pedro Montt, Washington. 
 
 Referring to the report of the Secretary of the Navy and the 
 message of the President of the United States, I think it opportune 
 to say that the data on which the report and the message is based 
 are erroneous or deliberately inexact. 
 
 In regard to refugees. No threats of cruel treatment have been 
 emitted, no attempts have been made to take such persons from 
 the Legation, nor has any request been preferred that they should 
 be handed over 
 
 The house and person of the Minister, in spite of indiscretions and 
 meditated provocations, has not been molested, as is evidenced by 
 eleven communications in September, October, and November. 
 
 In respect to the sailors of the Baltimore, there is neither accuracy 
 or truth in what is said in Washington. 
 
 The affair took place in the worst quarter of the city — the 
 " main-top " of Valparaiso — and between people who are not models 
 of discretion or temperance. When the police interfered and quelled 
 the riot there were some hundreds of men in the locality, the police 
 force being more than half a mile distant when the disturbance 
 commenced. 
 
 On October 26 Mr Egan sent a communication couched in pur- 
 posely aggressive and irritating language, as is seen by the copy and 
 reply despatched October 27. On October 18 investigation into the 
 affair was begun, but delayed by the non-attendance of the men from 
 the Baltimore, and by pretensions and unnecessary denials on the 
 part of Mr Egan. 
 
 This Department has never initiated any provocation, maintaining 
 an attitude which, if prudent and firm, has never been aggressive, 
 nor will it be one of humiliation whatever interested persons may say 
 to the contrary in Washington. 
 
 The telegrams, communications, and letters forwarded to your 
 Excellency contain the truth, the whole truth of what has happened 
 
 
1891] THE BALTIMORE INCIDENT 395 
 
 in these questions, in which bad faith has not been shown by this 
 Department. Mr Tracy and Mr Harrison have been led into error 
 concerning us, the people and the Government. Their instructions 
 in regard to impartiality and friendship have not been attended to 
 either at the present time or previously. If there have been no 
 complaints against the Minister and the naval officers, it is because 
 the facts, public and notorious in both Chile and the United States, 
 have not been allowed to carry weight, however strong the proofs. 
 The appeals put forward by Balmaceda and the concessions made in 
 June and July, the affair of the Itata, the Sa?i Francisco in Quinteros 
 Bay, and the conduct of the cable companies, are proofs of this 
 assertion. 
 
 It is absolutely inexact that the North American sailors were 
 attacked in different localities at the same time. The investigation 
 being not finished, it is unknown whom or how many the culprits may 
 be. Your Excellency must have the communication of November 9, 
 replying to Mr Egan, as well as that in which he is asked for evidence 
 which he has not desired to give, notwithstanding he stated he had 
 proofs to indicate the homicide and other culprits in the affair of 
 October 16. This and all other communications will be published 
 here. Your Excellency should have them translated and published 
 also in Washington. 
 
 Meanwhile, deny everything that may be contrary to these advices, 
 and feel confident in the exactness of your position, as we are, in the 
 certainty of the right of our cause, and the final result for Chile in 
 spite of intrigues from below and threats from above now confronting 
 us. Matte. 
 
 Senor Montt, the Chilian Minister in Washington, 
 communicated this telegram verbatim to the United 
 States Government. The result was an ultimatum on 
 January 22, 1892, through Mr Egan to the Chilian 
 authorities, to the effect that an indemnity must be paid 
 for the injury to the men of the Baltimore, and that 
 the amount be left to the decision of the Supreme 
 Court of the United States. Excitement amongst 
 Chilians ran high when affairs reached this stage, and 
 the question of war was freely discussed. A certain 
 section of the population clamoured for an appeal to 
 arms, but President Montt took a more calm view of 
 the situation. The telegram sent lo Senor Pedro Montt 
 had been a mistake, and the only sensible course was 
 to withdraw it to avoid the disastrous consequences of 
 a rupture with the United States. A new Ministry was 
 
396 CHILE 
 
 formed, in which Seilor Luis Pereira assumed the 
 portfolio of Foreign Affairs, and on January 25, 1892, 
 a despatch was sent to the Chilian minister in Wash- 
 ington instructing him to withdraw the note presented 
 on December 11, and inform the United States Govern- 
 ment that no insult had been intended : furthermore, 
 that an indemnity on account of the Baltimore incident 
 would be paid. On the 28th a telegram was received 
 from Washington to the effect that the United States 
 Government considered the question ended, and on the 
 30th a communication from Mr Egan to the Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs definitely confirmed this information. 
 On July 13 following, Mr Egan was notified that the 
 sum of $75,000 was at the disposal of the United 
 States Government for distribution amongst the families 
 of the men killed or injured on October 16 in Valparaiso, 
 and the U.S. Minister promptly accepted this offer. 
 
CHAPTER XXII 
 
 chile — continued 
 
 Real Issues of the Civil War. Political Situation in 1892. Comision 
 Conservadora. Increase of Naval Strength. Military Reorganisa- 
 tion. Congressional Elections in 1894. Political Situation. 
 Domestic Legislation. Municipal Law. Conversion of the 
 Currency. Political Parties in Congress. Coalition Cabinet. 
 Complications with Argentina. Sale of the Esmeralda to Japan. 
 Understanding with Peru re Tacna and Arica. Treaty with 
 Bolivia. A Diplomatic Blunder. Presidential Contest in 1896. 
 Election of Senor Federico Errazuriz. Congressional Elections 
 in 1897. The Boundary Question with Argentina. War 
 Imminent. Attitude of Errazuriz. Arbitration re Tacna and 
 Arica. The Bolivian Question. The Konig Note. Presidential 
 Contest in 1901. 
 
 President Montt had been elected by the supporters 
 of a parliamentary system as opposed to a representative 
 regime, for in the recent struggle the real point at issue 
 was whether Congress should conduct the national 
 business through a Cabinet chosen with the consent and 
 support of the Chambers, or if the Executive in the 
 shape of the President and his nominees should alone 
 govern. 
 
 The advocates of the parliamentary system had won 
 the day, and the principles they preached became firmly 
 established for better or worse with the downfall of 
 Balmaceda. Montt accepted the presidency under 
 these conditions, and showed that he intended to 
 abide by the responsibilities they entailed. In one 
 respect he was well adapted to deal with the political 
 
398 CHILE 
 
 position ; he had been a naval officer all his life, and 
 had taken no part in politics, and it was immaterial to 
 him whether his Cabinet represented a Conservative 
 or Liberal majority in the Chambers. As was to be 
 expected after the desperate struggle in 1891, the 
 Congress was composed of members with a common 
 political platform who were not inclined to differ 
 immediately on legislative questions, and in these 
 circumstances political reconstruction after the recent 
 upheaval went on so rapidly that by the middle of 1892 
 a normal situation was established. 
 
 Previous to 1892 the rights and interests of Con- 
 gress when not in session were safeguarded by a com- 
 mittee of six Senators and eight Deputies elected for 
 that purpose. The duty of this committee was to 
 notify the President when privileges of the Chambers 
 were endangered, and to suggest the convocation of 
 Congress whenever such a course appeared desirable. 
 In 1890 this committee, known as the Comision 
 Conservadora, had so notified the President, but had 
 only obtained a reply that he considered the time 
 inopportune for extraordinary sessions. It was the 
 action taken in regard to Balmaceda which led to a 
 reform in the Law of Constitution, and the proposal 
 which was approved by the Chambers in 1892 delegated 
 to the Comision Conservadora the power to convene 
 Congress in extraordinary session without reference to 
 the President, thus securing a permanent check on the 
 Executive. The Comision Conservadora represents the 
 majority in the Chambers, and in the event of the 
 President retaining a Ministry not representative of this 
 majority, the Comision Conservadora can force a crisis. 
 The first time this right was exercised was in March, 
 1901, when Congress was convoked to oust a Coalition 
 Cabinet and replace it by Liberals. 
 
 President Montt had taken to heart the lessons of 
 the war with Peru and the later experience of the 
 revolution against Balmaceda in regard to the effect of 
 naval power, and naturally his attention was turned to 
 
1892] INCREASE OF NAVAL ARMAMENT 399 
 
 the efficiency of the Chilian navy. As a sailor he 
 knew what he wanted, and as President he was able to 
 put before Congress the information necessary to secure 
 the credits required for the purchase of ships and war 
 material, with the result that orders were given for the 
 construction of the new Blanco Encalada, the OHiggins, 
 and the Esmeralda. Congress showed no reluctance to 
 vote this expenditure, for the question with Argentina 
 was pending in 1893 and 1894 when the heaviest of 
 these liabilities were contracted, and the Chambers were 
 content to accept the suggestion of the President that 
 Chile to be safe must be strong for defensive and 
 offensive purposes. Nor was the army neglected, and 
 under the direction of General Korner many reforms 
 were introduced. German officers were brought to 
 Chile ; the equipment of the cavalry and infantry was 
 improved ; the artillery was made the subject of special 
 attention ; and in an unostentatious manner Montt so 
 managed that whilst political and economic reconstruc- 
 tion was proceeding in 1892 and 1893, the naval and 
 military forces were raised to a high state of proficiency. 
 In 1894 the political situation became more compli- 
 cated. The Congressional elections were free from 
 interference by the Executive, President Montt not 
 being a politician, and showing no desire to be involved 
 in electoral questions. His advent to the Presidency 
 had been due in great part to such intervention by 
 Balmaceda, and his honest nature would not allow him 
 to throw his convictions to the wind and use his 
 influence to secure the return of men on whom he could 
 depend for political support in an emergency. As a 
 result, a number of representatives who had admired 
 Balmaceda were elected to the new Congress, and at 
 once the division of parties in the Chambers rendered 
 legislation difficult. The newcomers were principally 
 Liberals, but they formed a compact party, known as 
 Balmacedistas, and were ever ready to unite with other 
 dissentient sections to throw difficulties in the way of 
 domestic legislative measures. It was in consequence 
 
400 CHILE 
 
 of this subdivision of parties that frequent ministerial 
 changes occurred in the latter half of Montt's term. In 
 the first two years of his Presidency four Cabinets had 
 been nominated ; but special circumstances occurred in 
 1892 and 1893, and the first Ministry, under Senor 
 Irarrazaval was forced to resign in consequence of the 
 Baltimore incident, after only holding office for a month. 
 The second, under Senor Barros Luco, remained in 
 power for eighteen months, and it was then reorganised 
 for personal reasons ; Senor Edwardo Matte became the 
 leader of the Cabinet, but Senor Barros Luco again took 
 office after a few months. Then came a Ministry under 
 Senor Pedro Montt in 1894, and it was in this latter 
 year that the political complications caused by the 
 division of parties became really troublesome, no 
 Ministry since having been strong enough to hold office 
 for more than a few months at a time. 
 
 The domestic legislation to which President Montt 
 gave most attention was a law for the local government 
 of the municipalities, and the means to establish a 
 sound currency. Hitherto the various townships had 
 been dependent on the National Government for all 
 public works, no expenditure being permitted without 
 the sanction of the Executive and no appointments 
 made except through the Administration, this system 
 resulting in the neglect of local needs. Montt wished 
 to decentralise the municipalities and allow municipal 
 corporations to raise revenue from local sources, and to 
 make them responsible for the administration of their 
 own districts. The theory was sound, the more so as 
 there is a weakness in Chile, as in most Latin countries, 
 to rely solely for initiative and financial aid on the 
 Central Government. After much discussion a measure 
 creating municipal corporations was sanctioned, although 
 not without a strong opposition, owing to the fact that 
 local government restricted political influence and patron- 
 age. By the law of 1891, the only check the National 
 Government retained over the municipalities was that 
 the intendentes, governors, or sub -delegates should 
 
1894J CONVERSION OF THE CURRENCY 40i 
 
 preside over meetings of the municipal councillors and 
 suspend any action they considered prejudicial to public 
 order. 
 
 The question of the establishment of a gold standard 
 currency raised stormy debates in Congress, and personal 
 motives caused many members of both Chambers to 
 oppose the Government policy. Many Senators and 
 Deputies were landed proprietors and employers of 
 labour, others were interested in mining enterprises or 
 the production of nitrate of soda ; and to these the 
 conversion of the notes at a fixed rate inferred a loss, 
 in so far as wages would be paid in same number of 
 dollars although the intrinsic value would be greater. 
 The benefit to the general credit of the Republic from a 
 sound monetary system was not considered by the 
 individuals adversely affected by the measure. The 
 value of the dollar had been forced down to the 
 equivalent of a franc, and the Government proposed to 
 convert at the rate of eighteen pence. The first intention 
 had been to establish a rate of twenty-four pence ; but 
 this was abandoned in view of the violent opposition 
 aroused, and in the end the compromise of an eighteen- 
 penny rate was made and the law approved and pro- 
 mulgated in 1895. 
 
 It was during the discussions on the conversion 
 question that the unwieldy composition of Congress 
 was clearly seen. Liberals were split into three groups, 
 any one of which in conjunction with the Conservatives 
 could force the Cabinet to resign. The friends of the 
 late President after the elections of March, 1894, made 
 any unification of the Liberals impossible ; they would 
 only agree to join with the other groups as the dominant 
 factor of the party, and to this the Liberals as a whole 
 would not consent. The Conservatives alone were not 
 strong enough to command a majority, so the only 
 possible combination was a coalition of Conservatives 
 and some one group of Liberals. Further instability 
 was introduced by the occasional efforts made to unify 
 the Liberals, which, although never permanently success- 
 
 2 c 
 
402 CHILE 
 
 ful, tended to unsettle political stability and cause 
 frequent changes in the Ministry. In these circum- 
 stances it was not surprising that little useful legislation 
 was enacted between 1894 and the termination of 
 Montt's presidential term. 
 
 In 1895 the Argentine Government became aware 
 of the largely increased expenditure by Chile for naval 
 and military purposes, and this was interpreted as a 
 menace in connection with the boundary dispute. It 
 was answered by a credit of $50,000,000 for the purchase 
 of ships and other war material to counterbalance the 
 Chilian preparations, and this was the beginning of the 
 ruinous policy which dominated the two countries 
 between 1895 and 1901. Any acquirement of war 
 material on the one side of the Andes was met by 
 corresponding purchases on the other, irrespective of 
 cost. Of the two, Chile was better able to stand this 
 constant call for money, the export duties on nitrate of 
 soda providing a large and easily collected revenue, 
 whereas Argentina was hampered by financial difficulties, 
 a legacy from the Celman Administration ; but Chile 
 found that her rival was determined to keep pace with 
 her at any cost. 
 
 Montt consented in 1894 to a transaction reflecting 
 little credit upon his judgment. That was the year of 
 the Chino-Japanese war, and Japan was in need of 
 additional cruisers. A proposition was made to 
 purchase the Chilian warship Esmeralda, but a direct 
 sale of this vessel to the Japanese Government consti- 
 tuted so flagrant a breach of neutrality that it was 
 considered inadvisable, so a nominal disposal of the 
 Esmeralda to the Government of Ecuador and her 
 subsequent transfer to Japan was suggested, and to this 
 the Chilian authorities assented. No doubt the price 
 was high and the bargain a good one in the sense that 
 enough money was obtained by Chile to purchase a 
 more modern vessel, but it provoked much adverse 
 criticism on the policy of the Administration. 
 
 It was during the Presidency of Admiral Montt that 
 
1895] INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS 403 
 
 the period fixed under the Treaty of Ancon for the 
 Chilian occupation of the provinces of Tacna and Arica 
 expired. The plebiscite to decide the permanent 
 ownership of that territory should have taken place in 
 May, 1894, but the internal conditions of Peru were 
 complicated by an 'outbreak of revolution against Presi- 
 dent Caceres, and for the moment the Peruvian Govern- 
 ment was unable to negotiate on the subject of the form 
 in which the vote should be taken. Moreover, the 
 resources of Peru were at such low ebb that she was in 
 no position to make payment to Chile of the indemnity 
 of $10,000,000 stipulated by the treaty of 1883, and an 
 understanding was reached between the two Govern- 
 ments to take no action until a more opportune occasion 
 arose. 
 
 Some attention was devoted to the Bolivian question 
 by the Montt Administration with the view to a definite 
 treaty of peace between the two countries, and the 
 recognition of the sovereign rights of Chile over territory 
 occupied after the war of 1879, and in May, 1895, a 
 treaty was signed by which Bolivia agreed to transfer 
 the territory in question, but with the condition that the 
 Chilian Government ceded a port to her on the Pacific 
 seaboard. The districts of Tacna and Arica were to be 
 handed over to Bolivia to satisfy this desire for an outlet 
 to the coast, provided that the settlement with Peru re- 
 sulted in favour of Chile, and in event of Tacna and Arica 
 not passing to Chilian ownership, another port was to be 
 given. This treaty was rejected by the Chilian Congress, 
 and it was an error of the Administration to have 
 negotiated on any basis which presupposed the right of 
 Bolivia to a seaport. The mention of Tacna and Arica 
 as territories to be transferred to Bolivia was also a 
 diplomatic blunder, for the Chilian authorities were 
 perfectly cognisant of Peruvian feeling about them and 
 the anxiety invariably demonstrated to recover their 
 possession. For Bolivia to obtain control of Tacna and 
 Arica was especially galling, because it was the treaty of 
 alliance with Bolivia that involved Peru in the war with 
 
404 CHILE 
 
 Chile, and the idea that Bolivia should benefit by her 
 misfortunes and become the owner of her lost provinces 
 naturally hurt Peruvian pride. Peru has since raised 
 many difficulties in negotiating with Chile in connection 
 with Tacna and Arica, all in great measure due to the 
 proposals made by Chile to Bolivia ; but on the other 
 hand the problem was not easy for Chile. Hostile 
 feeling against Argentina was strong ; in event of war, 
 Bolivia as a friend was valuable, and as an enemy to be 
 feared, and it was this consideration that inspired the 
 negotiations in 1895. 
 
 At the beginning of 1896 the question of the Presi- 
 dency came before the country. The field was open to 
 any candidates the various political parties desired to 
 bring forward, President Montt declining to take any 
 part in the electoral contest and all the members of his 
 Administration being neutral spectators. Only two 
 candidates, however, came forward, Senor Federico 
 Errazuriz and Senor Vicente Reyes ; the former 
 supported by the Conservatives and a section of the 
 Liberals, the latter by Liberals and Radicals. Senor 
 Errazuriz was the son of a former President, was 
 wealthy, and had social and political influence. Senor 
 Reyes had been a member of Congress, had held 
 ministerial office and other public posts, and was 
 respected for his statesmanlike qualities and general 
 ability in dealing with public questions. Both candi- 
 dates worked hard, and when the decision of the 
 electors was given there was only a majority of one 
 vote in favour of Errazuriz, who assumed office on 
 September 18, 1896. Admiral Montt returned to his 
 naval duties, and was shortly afterwards appointed 
 Director- General of the Navy. 
 
 On the whole Montt's Administration was satisfactory, 
 in view of the difficulties created by the conduct and 
 downfall of Balmaceda. Moderation in the treatment 
 of opponents was necessary when the Congressionalists 
 came into power after a bloody and hard-fought cam- 
 paign, and moderation was the keynote of Montt's 
 
1896] PRESIDENT ERRAZURIZ ELECTED 405 
 
 policy. His Government accomplished more in the 
 direction of reconstructing political and economic life 
 than could have been achieved by brilliant statesmanship 
 unrestrained by a desire to restore domestic harmony. 
 Immediately after the success of the Congressionalists at 
 Placilla instances of personal violence to some of the 
 supporters of Balmaceda did occur, but once Montt was 
 in control of affairs after August 31, 1891, all outrages 
 of this nature ceased. In one respect the period between 
 1891 and 1896 was hampered by unexpected difficulties, 
 for an economic and commercial crisis made the adminis- 
 tration of public affairs more complicated than would 
 otherwise have been the case ; but for the causes of that 
 crisis the Government cannot be held responsible. They 
 were due to agricultural depression from a series of poor 
 crops, the low price of silver and copper, the result of 
 the excessive issue of inconvertible paper currency by 
 Balmaceda, and the overtrading which occurred at the 
 end of 1891 and the beginning of 1892 ; but in spite of 
 those difficulties, when Montt left the Government 
 confidence in Chile and her institutions was firmly 
 re-established. 
 
 Within six months of the accession of President 
 Errazuriz the Congressional elections took place, and 
 the result accentuated the political confusion in the 
 Chambers. The Liberals became more divided than 
 formerly, and, although able to claim a majority 
 whenever they united, they could never agree amongst 
 themselves to sink their differences and form a strong 
 combination to support a Cabinet of their own political 
 colour. Crisis followed crisis in rapid succession, and it 
 was only when Congress was not in session that a 
 Ministry could expect to remain in power. The outcome 
 was an absolute lack of continuity of policy in all 
 matters connected with domestic legislation, for before 
 any Ministry could formulate ideas of what action should 
 be taken in regard to any question it was succeeded by 
 a new Cabinet imbued with different opinions. There 
 is a touch of comedy in the manner President Errazuriz 
 
406 CHILE 
 
 treated this political confusion, and especially the crisis 
 in April of 1901. When excitement was running high 
 at the deadlock in the formation of a Ministry he sailed 
 away to Robinson Crusoe's island to spend a week there, 
 out of reach of the telegraph and other worries of modern 
 civilisation. 
 
 But the most serious question which confronted 
 Errazuriz was the dispute with Argentina. Grave 
 differences of opinion arose in connection with the 
 delimitation of the frontier, the principal cause of the 
 inability of the representatives of the two Governments 
 to agree being the interpretation of the wording of the 
 treaty. The Chilian authorities claimed that it was 
 intended that the divisional line should be the highest 
 peaks of the Andes where these divide the watershed ; 
 the Argentines insisted that this clause meant only the 
 highest peaks of the Cordillera of the Andes. Con- 
 stant friction had complicated the question to an 
 alarming extent between 1890 and 1898, and in the 
 latter year an impasse occurred through the insistence of 
 both parties on their respective claims. Congress took 
 up the question, warlike speeches were made, and the 
 public mind unduly excited. Not content to leave the 
 affair in the hands of the Executive, both Senators and 
 Deputies created embarrassments by demanding to 
 know the exact stage of the negotiations, at times 
 even publicly advocating an appeal to arms, and so 
 excited the Chilian people that crowds shouting for 
 war paraded the streets of Santiago. Preparations 
 were pushed forward for the mobilisation of an army 
 of 50,000 men, and matters had gone so far in August 
 of 1898 that an outbreak of hostilities appeared inevit- 
 able. What further complicated the situation was the 
 fact that in Congress a numerous group of politicians 
 wished to overthrow the sound currency standard estab- 
 lished under Montt, and looked upon a war as offering 
 an admirable opportunity for their purpose. The war 
 scare became so intense in the third week in August 
 that the banking institutions of Chile were threatened 
 
1898] ARGENTINA AND CHILE 407 
 
 with a severe financial crisis, and Congress insisted on a 
 suspension of the conversion until such time as calm 
 was restored, a proceeding that reflected small credit on 
 the Chambers. 
 
 When war was expected almost daily, Errazuriz 
 took upon himself the direction of the question with 
 Argentina, demanding that the dispute be submitted to 
 arbitration, the northern section to be decided by the 
 representative of the United States Government in 
 Argentina assisted by a Chilian and an Argentine com- 
 missioner, and the southern by Her Majesty Queen 
 Victoria. At first Argentina was inclined to resist 
 these terms ; but it was peace or war, and in the end 
 she chose peace. It was largely due to the attitude of 
 President Errazuriz at this extremely critical period that 
 war was averted. 
 
 During the Errazuriz Administration lengthy negoti- 
 ations took place with Peru for a settlement of the Tacna 
 and Arica question. The difficulty of establishing any 
 mutual understanding between the two Governments 
 arose from a divergence of opinion in regard to the 
 interpretation of the Treaty of Ancon in respect to the 
 voting qualification of the residents in Tacna and Arica. 
 That treaty says : — " A plebiscite shall decide by popular 
 votation if the territory of these provinces shall remain 
 definitely under the dominion and sovereignty of Chile, 
 or if they shall continue to form part of the territory of 
 Peru." The Chilian representatives in the negotiations 
 maintained that in a plebiscite of this nature all residents 
 within the territories in question were entitled to vote, 
 but Peru contended that the right was restricted to 
 Peruvian citizens. By an agreement in April, 1898, 
 known as the Billinghurst - Latorre Protocol, it was 
 proposed to submit the disputed points to the arbitra- 
 tion pf the Queen -Regent of Spain, but the Chilian 
 Congress refusing this proposition, a deadlock in the 
 negotiations occurred and no solution of the question 
 has yet been reached. 
 
 The efforts of Errazuriz to settle the Bolivian ques- 
 
408 CHILE 
 
 tion also proved abortive. In September, 1900, a note 
 was presented by Senor Konig, the Chilian Minister in 
 Bolivia, to the Government, offering a basis for a treaty 
 of peace between Chile and Bolivia, but in which the 
 cession of any seaport in Chilian territory was expressly 
 excluded. This communication conveyed the additional 
 information that if Bolivia refused a settlement the 
 Chilian Government would feel constrained to denounce 
 the agreement of truce executed in 1884. This note 
 practically amounted to an ultimatum, and provoked 
 such adverse expressions of opinion in the majority of 
 the South American Republics that the Chilian Govern- 
 ment considered it politic to deny that it was authorised. 
 Viewed from a neutral standpoint, there is small reason 
 why Chile should be exceptionally magnanimous in her 
 treatment of Bolivia. The treaty signed in 1895, but 
 subsequently rejected by the Chilian Congress, accorded 
 valuable concessions to Bolivia, and while that treaty was 
 pending ratification Bolivia ceded to Argentina the 
 territory of the Puno de Atacama, which Chile con- 
 sidered as belonging to the districts occupied by her in 
 accordance with the terms of the truce with Bolivia in 
 1884. In this matter Bolivia acted in bad faith, and 
 after such conduct it is unreasonable to suppose that 
 Chile would make unnecessary concessions to her. 
 
 Once more, early in 1901, a presidential election 
 came up. In February, Senor Pedro Montt was pro- 
 claimed a candidate in Valparaiso, supported by the 
 Conservatives and the Liberal - Democractic Party. 
 Senor Montt had a long record of public service to 
 recommend him to the electors of Chile, having been a 
 prominent member of several Ministries and a member 
 of Congress for a quarter of a century. In certain 
 quarters hostility was shown to his candidature for the 
 personal reason that in the two revolutions occurring 
 during his father's presidential term many families had 
 been harshly treated, and their descendants entertained 
 bitter feelings against the son of the man who had 
 successfully maintained his position. Montt's opponent 
 
1901] PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 409 
 
 was Senor Jerman Riesco, whose candidature was pro- 
 claimed by a convention of Liberal Senators, Deputies, 
 and ex-Congressmen held in Santiago in March. Senor 
 Riesco was a member of the Senate, but had taken 
 little part in political life, and in the voting for several 
 days the nomination hovered between Senor Ramon 
 Barros Luco, one of the principal leaders of the revolt 
 against Balmaceda, and Senor Claudio Vicuna, the 
 President-elect in 1891 ; but neither of these could 
 obtain the required majority, and they withdrew their 
 names. 
 
 For once the majority of the Liberals sank their 
 differences and combined to defeat Senor Montt, and 
 Senor Riesco was elected in June, 1901. His Adminis- 
 tration has been chiefly remarkable for the final settle- 
 ment of the dispute with Argentina in 1902. A few 
 weeks after the presidential election, the condition of 
 Senor Errazuriz, who had never enjoyed robust health, 
 developed alarming symptoms, and these finally caused 
 his death. For some time previously his duties had 
 been discharged by the Prime Minister, Senor Zanartii, 
 who now continued at the head of the Administration 
 until the inauguration of President Riesco on September 
 18, 1901. 
 
CHAPTER XXIII 
 
 ch ile — continued 
 
 Effect of Foreign Wars and Internal Disturbances. Movement of 
 Population. . Infantile Mortality. Immigration. Araucanian 
 Indians. Physical Qualities. Tendency to Drift to the Cities. 
 Spread of Alcoholism. Drunkenness in Valparaiso and London. 
 Regulation of Liquor Traffic. Chilians and the Government. 
 Educational Facilities. Primary Instruction. Educational 
 Statistics. German Schools. Secondary and Higher Education. 
 Religious Liberty. Church Influence. Administration of Justice. 
 Brigandage. National Character. Aggressive Nature of Chilians. 
 Means of Communication. State and Private Railways. Pata- 
 gonia and Tierra del Fuego. Industrial Zones. Mining Industry. 
 Nitrate of Soda. Development of Tarapaca. Copper Mining. 
 Want of Transport Facilities. Silver Mining. Gold and 
 Manganese. Specimens of Minerals at Santiago. Coal and 
 Iron. Borax. Proportion of Minerals to remainder of Exports. 
 Agricultui-al Enterprise. Rapid Decadence after 1893. Pro- 
 duction of Wheat. The Government and Agricultural Industi'y. 
 Viticulture. Pastoral Industry. Sheep-breeding in Patagonia. 
 The Lumber Trade. The Fishing Industry. Manufactures. 
 Lack of Skilled Labour. Cloth and Cotton Factories. Sugar 
 Refineries. Protection for Manufacturing Interests. 
 
 Economic development in Chile has been checked for 
 the past twenty-five years by international complications 
 and internal disturbances. The war with Spain in 1865 
 occasioned heavy monetary losses to the community, 
 especially in the trade centre of Valparaiso, and after 
 the country had recovered from its effects it was plunged 
 into a crisis by the quarrel with Bolivia and Peru. 
 
 This second war was a heavy drain on the country 
 owing to the necessity of sending an army to the front. 
 
 
1903] FOREIGN AND CIVIL WARS 411 
 
 The able-bodied men engaged in industrial pursuits 
 were required for military service in such large numbers 
 that between the years 1879 and 1882 the remainder 
 of the population consisted in great part only of old 
 men, women and children, and in such circumstances 
 rapid economic progress could not be expected. A few 
 years of peace followed the victory of the Chilians, and 
 then came the events of 1891 to throw the country once 
 more into confusion. After the downfall of Balmaceda 
 economic conditions were unsatisfactory, for the struggle 
 had shaken the Republic to its foundations, and from the 
 evil effects Chile is still suffering, her troubles having 
 been aggravated during the last decade by constant 
 alarms of a possible outbreak of hostilities with Argentina 
 and by unstable domestic politics. Constant wrangling 
 in Congress has so engrossed the attention of the 
 Chambers that no time has been available for the con- 
 sideration of the true interests of the country, and the 
 largely increased naval and military expenditure has left 
 no revenue to aid in the development of the country's 
 resources. 
 
 In the economic evolution of Chile the movement of 
 population is an important factor, and the small rate of 
 its increase a serious drawback. In the ten years 
 between 1885 and 1895 the population has increased by 
 only 184,825 to a total of 2,712,145, of whom 1,240,353 
 were urban and 1,471,792 rural. As Chilian territory 
 comprises 290,000 square miles, the average is but nine 
 inhabitants to the mile. In 1895 the average death-rate 
 was 34 per thousand, and very much higher in the cities. 
 Santiago being credited with 72 and Valparaiso 67 per 
 thousand ; in the former city 12,057 deaths were 
 registered in 1899 and only 10,379 births, while in 
 Valparaiso the figures were 6256 deaths and 6408 births. 
 The high death-rate in Chile is accounted for by the 
 heavy infantile mortality from contagious diseases, 
 inadequate attention, hereditary alcoholism, and a 
 general absence of hygienic precautions. 
 
 Immigration is small, and the number of foreigners 
 
412 CHILE 
 
 in the Republic in 1895 was placed at 72,812. Of these, 
 42,105 were Europeans, 701 citizens of the United 
 States, 28,986 natives of other South American countries, 
 and 1020 other nationalities ; the total increase in the 
 foreign population between 1885 and 1895 being only 
 7812 persons. The European residents include 8296 
 Spaniards, 7809 French, 7049 Germans, 7587 Italians, 
 and 6241 British. In the southern districts near Valdivia 
 are many Germans, whilst in Valparaiso and Iquique 
 the British community is largely represented, the 
 remainder of the foreign population being scattered over 
 the country, with, however, one-third of the French 
 residents in Santiago. A comparison of immigration to 
 Chile with that to Argentina and Brazil is much to the 
 advantage of the latter countries ; and this is an im- 
 portant fact in view of the low rate of increase amongst 
 the natives, since it means that in a few years Chile must 
 be overshadowed by the numerical superiority of her sister 
 republics, unless means can be found to bring about an 
 improvement. Undoubtedly Santiago could be improved 
 to the benefit of public health ; but effective action in 
 this or any useful direction requires men at the head of 
 affairs who will work wisely and patiently for the wel- 
 fare of the community, and such men are not prominent 
 in Chile to-day. 
 
 The Indian population of Araucania is rapidly dis- 
 appearing, becoming merged with the mixed race of 
 Spanish and Indian blood forming the majority of the 
 Chilians, or dying out, as such Indian races do when 
 brought into contact with modern civilisation. With 
 the elimination of the Araucanians Chile loses a 
 picturesque element in her civic life. In the past they 
 were regarded as dangerous to the community, and 
 hunted down unmercifully, they in turn raiding settle- 
 ments and committing outrages whenever opportunity 
 offered ; but for the last twenty years they have steadily 
 shrank in numbers and gradually drifted out of the 
 more central districts to the forest country of the 
 south. They seldom care for steady work, and, as a 
 
1903] ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 413 
 
 rule, live in abject poverty, subsisting on the produce of 
 small patches of cultivated ground and such wild food 
 and game as they can find in the woods. 
 
 In physique the Chilians are a more hardy race than 
 is generally found in South America. They are moun- 
 taineers or live by the seashore, where they grow to man- 
 hood, always fighting the forces of nature. Thus they 
 have developed in all classes a sturdy quality in the strain 
 of Spanish blood which showed its value when they 
 measured strength with the Bolivians and Peruvians, 
 and was proved again in the desperate struggle which 
 took place in 1891, but to some extent this hardiness 
 has been undermined in recent years by a marked 
 tendency of the rural population to drift into the towns 
 and by the steady spread of alcoholism. Town-crowd- 
 ing is due to the decline of the agricultural industry, owing 
 to poor harvests and the absence of adequate security for 
 life and property in the country districts, but the 
 excessive consumption of strong liquors dates many 
 years back. The Chilians were addicted to drink before 
 the war with Bolivia and Peru; but it expanded the 
 habit, for the soldiers found liquor plentiful during the 
 campaigns, and after the war ended and the troops 
 returned home the increase of drunkenness became most 
 noticeable. To such a height has the abuse of alcohol 
 now grown in Chile that official statistics show the 
 consumption to be nearly four gallons of raw spirit 
 annually per head of population, liquor mostly of the 
 worst quality. Spirit distilled from rotten wheat, 
 potatoes, maize, and the refuse from the wine-making 
 establishments, is the poison eating into the life of the 
 Chilian nation, and the Government is supine in the 
 matter, while private crusades attempted by a few clear 
 sighted individuals have been powerless as yet to check 
 the evil. As an example, compare Valparaiso in 1898 
 with London. Valparaiso has a population of 140,000 
 inhabitants, London one of 5,000,000 ; in Valparaiso 
 there were six hundred more cases of drmikenness dealt 
 with by the police authorities than came before the 
 
414 CHILE 
 
 London magistrates in the same year ; probably the 
 disparity would be even greater, but in Chile arrests for 
 intoxication are seldom made unless individuals are 
 unable to walk or dangerous to their neighbours. 
 
 It is in the regulation of the liquor traffic and the 
 alleviation of the conditions of the agricultural com- 
 munity that the Government has failed in its duty dur- 
 ing the last few years, and this inaction has helped 
 to intensify the economic depression from which the 
 country is now suffering. Primarily the fault lies with 
 Congress, where Senators and Deputies are too busy 
 attending to their own small political interests to pay 
 any attention to the public welfare, but the Executive 
 must also bear a portion of the blame. If the President 
 was determined to prevent the Chilians from dropping 
 into the threatened abyss, he would find strong support 
 for his policy ; but no such energetic movement has 
 been hinted at, and matters drift from bad to worse 
 with hardly a protest. It is clear that unless the liquor 
 traffic is controlled and agricultural industry revived, the 
 prosperity which Chile enjoyed in former years will be 
 greatly curtailed. 
 
 There is another serious peril. A quarter of a 
 century ago the Chilians were self-reliant and cared 
 little for official assistance, and it is only necessary to 
 compare the national feeling in 1875 with that in 1904 
 to recognise the change that has occurred in this respect. 
 Before the war with Peru the Government was poor 
 and had a hard struggle to pay its way, but the capture 
 of Tarapaca suddenly made Chile wealthy to an extent 
 never previously contemplated. The duties levied on 
 exported nitrate of soda brought into the exchequer a 
 large and constantly increasing revenue, and gradually 
 the Chilians realised that with these abundant resources 
 official positions could be created and life made easy in 
 various ways. In the past twenty years people of all 
 classes have therefore come to look on the Government 
 as a milch cow, and succeeding Administrations have 
 not possessed sufficient determination to resist this 
 
1903] EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS 415 
 
 popular inclination. This is a fast growing evil to-day 
 in Chile, and one every year more difficult to abate. 
 Chilians of twenty-five years ago only insisted on liberty 
 to work for themselves : Chilians of the present time 
 want no work as long as funds are forthcoming from 
 official sources for their support. 
 
 Education has received considerable attention from 
 the Government at various periods, but there is still 
 much room for improvement. Primary education has 
 been sacrificed to permit greater support to be extended 
 to higher education, with the result that the class of 
 inhabitants which benefits most by the bounty of the 
 State is the one best able to defray the cost for itself. 
 This tendency of the influential classes to monopolise 
 the State revenues has led the authorities to neglect the 
 general progress of the population and pander to a 
 comparatively limited circle. 
 
 How matters stand in regard to elementary educa- 
 tion may be judged by the official returns published for 
 1895, the most recent available. The census showed that 
 out of a total population of 2,712,145 only 756,893 
 persons, or 28 per cent., were able to read and write. 
 The number of children between the ages of five and 
 fifteen was given as 674,955, of whom 141,829 were 
 enrolled on the registers of public and private schools ; 
 but the actual attendance at public schools for the year 
 was 33,746 boys and 36,861 girls, and 15,885 boys and 
 10,409 girls more went to private schools, these figures 
 showing that only 96,901 children were receiving 
 instruction out of the total of 674,955 who should 
 have been at school. Nor is the condition of affairs in 
 Santiago at all satisfactory, for out of a population of 
 256,413 only 116,556 could read and write, while the 
 number of children between the ages of five and fifteen 
 was 47,025, of whom only 13,066 attended school. 
 
 Public instruction is gratuitous but not obligatory. 
 This freedom and the apathetic indifference of the 
 public combine to ensure the scanty attendance of the 
 children. In 1899 the number of public schools was 
 
416 CHILE 
 
 1403, and of private 445, the latter including 148 schools 
 for boys, 50 for girls, and 247 for both sexes ; the public 
 and private schools combined numbering 1848, equal to 
 one school for 365 children, so it is clear that the facili- 
 ties for primary education are inadequate, and would be 
 shockingly so did thirst for knowledge replace indiffer- 
 ence among the masses. Instruction in the 1403 public 
 schools in 1895 was conducted by 452 masters and 296 
 assistants, and by 978 mistresses with 573 assistants — a 
 total staff of 2299 ; but the payment of these teachers is 
 at a very low rate, often barely sufficient to provide 
 actual necessities of life, and never inviting enough to 
 secure the services of highly-trained professionals. 
 
 In the south, where the Germans are numerous, 
 elementary education is on a much better basis. The 
 schools at Yaldivia, Llanquihue, Osorno, and other 
 places are under German preceptors, and the contrast 
 between these establishments and those left to Chilian 
 direction is most marked. The Government recognises 
 the benefit these German schools confer upon the 
 community, and encourages their existence by an 
 annual subvention. In many of them the language used 
 is German, Spanish being taught only on certain days 
 in the week, but all the formalities required by Chilian 
 law are duly fulfilled. 
 
 The supervision of education in Chile is delegated to 
 a Council of Public Instruction, comprising the Minister 
 of Public Instruction, the Rector and the Secretary- 
 General of the University, the five senior members of 
 the Faculties, the Rector of the National Institute, 
 three members nominated by the President, and two 
 delegates elected by the University — in all fourteen 
 members. This council has the right to decide what 
 qualifications are necessary for teachers, and also to 
 maintain a general check on the educational courses and 
 the standard required for periodical examinations. 
 
 For secondary and higher education, colleges and 
 lyceums have been established in Santiago and the 
 provinces, and thirty are open, the principal being the 
 

 
 ' 4 ^Jur 
 
 An Araucanian Type. 
 
 [Face page 412. 
 
1903] THE CHURCH IN CHILE 417 
 
 National Institute at Santiago, where 1168 pupils 
 attended in 1899. Scholarships are given there, and in 
 1899 the number of students obtaining money premiums 
 was 104. Instruction is free, but the cost of individual 
 maintenance must be defrayed from private funds, the 
 average expense to the State in 1899 for each student 
 under instruction being $218 T w. The number of 
 students attending the thirty colleges in the Republic in 
 1899 was 4996, and the professors employed 419. There 
 are eight colleges for girls, at which the average attend- 
 ance in 1899 was 896 pupils, whose studies were 
 superintended by 8 male and 87 female professors. In 
 addition to the colleges and lyceums directly administered 
 by the State, there are Church seminaries to which 
 annual subventions are paid by the Government, and 
 others under control of the clergy, which are without 
 public assistance. 
 
 At Santiago is the State University, where degrees 
 in law, mathematical sciences, medicine, and fine arts 
 are granted, and some 1700 students were inscribed on 
 the rolls in 1899, 573 degrees being conferred in that 
 year. In addition to the State University there is the 
 Catholic University conducted strictly under the auspices 
 of the Church, and this institution also confers degrees 
 which are recognised by the State for legal and other 
 professions. At both universities the instruction im- 
 parted is sound, and in many cases it is directed by 
 specialists of Chilian or foreign nationality. In all 
 phases of secondary and higher education the careful 
 supervision of the authorities is noticeable, the more so 
 when the neglect of primary instruction is considered. 
 
 In Chile there is religious liberty for all creeds, but 
 the Roman Catholic faith is protected by the State and 
 forms an important factor in the national life. In 1899 
 the funds devoted by the Government in aid of the 
 Church and the various religious institutions was 
 $942,508. Both politically and socially, the Catholic 
 Church has a widely extended influence, and is 
 extremely wealthy apart from the assistance it receives 
 
 2d 
 
418 CHILE 
 
 from the State. Practically all Chilians are Roman 
 Catholics, but of the foreigners some 16,000, chiefly 
 Germans, British, Scandinavians, North Americans and 
 Austrians, out of a total foreign population of 72,000, 
 are Protestants. 
 
 The administration of justice in Chile leaves much 
 to be desired. Complaints are frequent that the 
 formalities of the courts are often so unwieldy as to 
 render equitable dispensation of the laws a practical 
 impossibility. The sum allotted from the national 
 revenues in 1899 for the maintenance of the judiciary 
 was $1,881,360, which is more than adequate payment 
 for the duties entailed. The laws are codified, and 
 would meet the public needs if reforms were introduced 
 to expedite civil and criminal procedure, and, as 
 elsewhere in South America, the system is based on 
 the Spanish laws in force when these countries were 
 colonies of Spain. While the courts are unsatisfactory 
 the condition of the police is infinitely worse, and pro- 
 tection for life and property can hardly be said to exist 
 in any outlying districts, and even near Santiago and 
 Valparaiso cases of assault and highway robbery in 
 broad daylight daily occur. An organised system of 
 brigandage has developed of late years, and although 
 the authorities are perfectly cognisant of this condition 
 of affairs, no steps are taken to clear the country of a 
 pest which retards progress and threatens ruin to many 
 branches of industrial enterprise. 
 
 The Chilian national character has undergone a 
 marked change in recent years. Previous to the war 
 with Peru the dominant note was a desire for peace 
 and ample opportunity for industrial pursuits. The 
 people were ready to fight if forced into a corner, though 
 never anxious for an appeal to arms. But the victories 
 over the Bolivians and Peruvians convinced the Chilians 
 that they were superior to their neighbours as a fighting 
 race, and pride buried the former wish to avert any 
 serious conflict. Aggressiveness became dominant both 
 in public and private life, but would have done little 
 
1903] NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 419 
 
 harm had it not been accompanied by those other 
 influences already mentioned which modified the qualities 
 that had enabled Chile to defeat her adversaries, the 
 debasing influences of sudden wealth. Thus the evolution 
 of the last twenty years has been productive of arrogance 
 of bearing, and the old self-reliant spirit has given place 
 to bluster and an inclination to make the Government 
 the universal provider. The more wealthy section of 
 the population still retains its shrewdness, but warped 
 by aggressive tendencies, and the lower class imitate 
 their betters. It is hence no exaggeration to say that 
 the dominant traits of the national character to-day are 
 brusqueness, aggressiveness, and a tendency to domineer, 
 arising from the belief that prestige as a fighting people 
 and the financial resources of the Government will carry 
 Chile successfully through all international difficulties. 
 In one respect the Chilians have an advantage over other 
 South American countries, they are patriotic because 
 they are still one people without any constant influx of 
 foreign blood to lessen or alloy their ideals as Chilians 
 of the cause for which they must fight and, if necessary, 
 give their lives. 
 
 Economic development has been severely checked 
 by inadequate means of communication and transport. 
 For years railway extension has been contemplated, but 
 through lack of funds or political disturbances the work 
 has made slow progress, and there is a decided disinclina- 
 tion to permit private enterprise to provide the additional 
 means of communication so urgently needed. The out- 
 come is that the railways at the commencement of 1901 
 were only 2890 miles in length, of which the State owns 
 1460 and private enterprise 1430 miles. In the central 
 centre and south the greater part of the system is 
 controlled by the Government and in the north chiefly 
 by private owners. The management on the State 
 owned lines is the cause of constant complaint— service 
 irregular, rolling stock deficient, accidents and loss of 
 life frequent — while on the railways belonging to private 
 enterprise few of these defects are found. But the 
 
420 CHILE 
 
 lesson carries no weight with the Government, for State 
 lines are an admirable political machine, to alienate which 
 would raise the most violent opposition amongst poli- 
 ticians. 
 
 In a mountainous country such as Chile roads as 
 well as railways are necessary to allow the natural 
 resources to be developed. Money is regularly voted 
 for repairs to existing highways and the construction of 
 new ones, but only a small proportion of the funds so 
 provided is legitimately expended. Dishonest contractors 
 benefit to a large extent by the appropriations, so the 
 agricultural and mining industries struggle along as best 
 they can, and must be content with mule tracks because 
 the authorities will make no effort at improvements. 
 The sea affords a means of easy transport ; but roads 
 and railways are needed to reach the coast, and shipping 
 facilities required to enable the produce to be handled. 
 
 In one district, however, economic progress during 
 the past decade has been exceptionally rapid. The 
 Straits of Magellan have undergone a development 
 which has converted barren wastes into wealth -producing 
 properties, and the sheep farming industry has been 
 the backbone of this movement. The town of Punta 
 Arenas, in the centre of these districts, from an insignifi- 
 cant village has become a thriving city of 10,000 
 inhabitants, and streets lighted by electricity have taken 
 the place of the mud tracks of ten years ago. Hovels 
 have been replaced by comfortable houses, and on all 
 sides are signs of vigorous prosperity in this southern 
 corner of Patagonia, Tierra del Fuego also sharing in 
 this development. 
 
 For convenience in reviewing industrial enterprise 
 in Chile, the country may be roughly divided into four 
 zones. The most northern of these sections lies between 
 the parallels of latitudes 18° to 27°, and includes the 
 provinces of Tacna, Tarapaca, Antofagasta, and a part 
 of Atacama. In these districts are narrow valleys, a 
 limited water supply, no rainfall, sparse vegetation, and 
 a comparatively healthy climate. On the coast are 
 
1903] INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 421 
 
 depositions of guano ; a few miles inland is found nitrate 
 of soda and borax ; and further in the interior are 
 mines of copper, silver, gold, sulphur, and other minerals, 
 this section being devoted to mining enterprise. 
 
 The zone lying between latitude 27° and 32°, and 
 comprising part of Atacama and the provinces of 
 Coquimbo and Aconcagua, contains deposits of copper, 
 silver, iron, manganese, lead, cinnabar, and other metals, 
 and fertile valleys watered by streams from the Andine 
 ranges permit extensive agriculture. The third section 
 is between latitude 32° and 43°, and contains the 
 Provinces of Valparaiso, Santiago, O'Higgins, Colchagua, 
 Curico, Talca, Linnares, Maule, Nuble, Concepcion, 
 Bio -Bio, Arauco, Malleco Cautin, Valdivia, Llanquihue, 
 and the northern part of the island of Chiloe, and is 
 chiefly agricultural, especially in the great central valley 
 extending from Santiago to Valdivia. In this zone are 
 the coal-mining districts near Concepcion and Arauco. 
 The fourth section is the country lying between latitude 
 43° and 57°, and here the mainland is rugged and 
 mountainous, while an archipelago is formed by the 
 islands of Chiloe, Guaitecas, Guayaneco, the Magallanes, 
 and Tierra del Fuego. The characteristic features are 
 heavy forests, valleys suitable for grazing cattle and 
 sheep, and an abundance of fish in the vicinity of the 
 islands, industrial enterprise consisting principally of 
 cutting lumber, breeding sheep and cattle, and fishing. 
 
 It is from the mining industry that Chile draws her 
 principal wealth. The chief branch is the extraction 
 and preparation of nitrate of soda for exportation, and 
 the development of this enterprise during the past quarter 
 of a century has been large. In 1878, when the nitrate 
 districts were under Peruvian and Bolivian control, the 
 total amount shipped was only 7,023,000 Spanish quintals 
 of 102 pounds weight, and in the two succeeding years 
 the production fell away during the war. By 1881, 
 Tarapaca, the centre of the nitrate industry, was under 
 Chilian administration, and a revival of the industry took 
 place, the exportation reaching 7,734,000 Spanish quintals, 
 
422 CHILE 
 
 a steady increase occurring until, in 1884, no less than 
 12,152,000 quintals were sent abroad. A crisis in the 
 nitrate market then resulted from over-production, and 
 in 1885-6 the shipments decreased twenty-five per cent., 
 but this check was only temporary, and in 1889 the 
 exportation rose to 20,182,000 quintals, and in the 
 following twelvemonth further increased to 28,373,000 
 quintals. Again the markets were flooded, and for 
 three years smaller shipments were made, a widespread 
 opinion existing that an annual output of 20,000,000 
 quintals was the largest amount the world could absorb. 
 The propaganda to demonstrate the value of nitrate as 
 a fertiliser altered previously existing conditions, and 
 once more the exportation increased, the amount shipped 
 in 1895 being 27,285,205 quintals, rising in 1898 to 
 28,468,110 quintals, and in 1899 to 30,209,192 quintals. 
 In 1900 it increased to 31,549,653 quintals, valued at 
 eight millions sterling — equal to two-thirds of the total 
 value of Chilian products exported to foreign countries. 
 It is evident from these figures that the acquisition of 
 the nitrate districts of Tarapaca from Peru entirely 
 revolutionised the industrial enterprise of Chile, the 
 production of nitrate becoming the factor of most im- 
 portance. 
 
 How important the industry has become, apart from 
 the value of the product, can be judged from the fact 
 that in fifty-eight establishments for the extraction and 
 preparation of nitrate 18,914 persons were employed 
 in 1900, and no fewer than seven seaports are now 
 dependent for their existence on the traffic shipments. 
 Through these seven ports the export in 1899 was — 
 Pisagua, 77,465 tons; Junin, 112,243 tons; Caleta 
 Buena, 262,136 tons; Iquique, 674,397 tons; Tocopilla, 
 150,505 tons; Taltal, 90,546; and Antofagasta, 22,328 
 tons. 
 
 The danger that the nitrate deposits may be shortly 
 exhausted and leave Chile bereft of this great source of 
 wealth is not one to be seriously contemplated at present, 
 for careful surveys show that in 1899 there still remained 
 
1903] PRODUCTION OF NITRATE OF SODA 423 
 
 the following quantities of raw material — Tarapaca, 
 private property 407,160,000 quintals, and owned by 
 the Government 165,888,513 quintals; Toco, private 
 138,112,000 quintals, and Government 87,726,769 
 quintals; Aguas Blancas and Antofagasta, 153,000,000 
 quintals in private hands; and at Taltal, 151,984,500 
 quintals privately owned — giving a total of 1,103,871,782 
 quintals still to be extracted. Allowing for a large 
 annual increase in production, the life of these grounds 
 is not less than twenty-five years, and in all probability 
 other deposits will be discovered before the present 
 ones are exhausted. The capital invested in the nitrate 
 industry and the railways to transport the output to the 
 ports is estimated at £12,000,000, the greater portion 
 belonging to foreigners, principally British. 
 
 Next in importance to nitrate in Chilian mining 
 industry is copper. In former years Chile held second 
 place in the world's production of this metal, but low 
 prices prevailing for a lengthy period so injuriously 
 affected the Chilian mines that the output sank until 
 the average annual exportation was only 20,000 tons. 
 Better values for the last three years have brightened 
 prospects ; many new ventures have been started, and 
 when these reach the producing stage, shipments will 
 show a decided increase. Of low-grade ores Chile has 
 an unlimited supply, but lack of adequate means of 
 communication has rendered impossible any systematic 
 attempt to work the deposits, and it has only been when 
 they are exceptionally rich that successful ventures have 
 been made. Transport in the copper districts is by 
 mules, no roads being available for wheeled traffic. 
 The condition of the copper -industry is one urgently 
 requiring energetic action on the part of the Govern- 
 ment, for with an adequate system of roads and railways 
 to cheapen the cost of working and admit of low-grade 
 ores being mined at a profit, the output could be increased 
 threefold, and long before the nitrate grounds of Tarapaca 
 are exhausted, copper mining would be ready to fill the 
 void in industrial life that must occur if the exportation 
 
424 CHILE 
 
 of nitrate of soda declines. The authorities are aware 
 of the enormous wealth contained in the copper deposits, 
 and they know that difficulty of transport is the principal 
 cause of the unsatisfactory condition into which the 
 industry has fallen ; but no steps are taken to remedy 
 the evil, and this supine policy has prevented Chile from 
 reaping any great benefit through the recent high prices 
 for the metal. It is not that the Government is without 
 funds for the work necessary to place the copper industry 
 on a satisfactory basis, for the revenues derived from 
 the export of nitrate are sufficient to establish means of 
 communication throughout the copper districts ; but 
 these resources annually disappear in unnecessarily 
 heavy naval and military expenditure, or are utilised to 
 maintain employes whose services could be dispensed 
 with, and the country be the better administered. 
 
 Silver mining has suffered from the prevalence of 
 low prices. The same difficulties which have prevented 
 the development of the copper industry have caused the 
 abandonment of a large proportion of the silver enter- 
 prises, and mines that were profitable when prices were 
 higher can only be worked at a loss with silver at its 
 present value, not on account of any lack of moderately 
 rich ore, but because the cost of carriage renders expenses 
 abnormally high. The average annual export of silver 
 for the last few years has been 5,000,000 ounces, and 
 under improved conditions this amount might be doubled 
 or trebled. Gold mining is only attempted to a small 
 extent, and the total amount of this metal exported in 
 1898 was valued at only £183,621. Of manganese 
 21,000 tons are annually shipped abroad, and the quantity 
 could be largely augmented. Other metals and minerals 
 are exported in small parcels. In no way can an idea 
 of the mineral wealth of Chile be better obtained than 
 by an inspection of specimens in the museum at Santiago, 
 and a glance at this collection shows how widely 
 extended is the mineral area, every specimen being 
 tabulated with data indicating in what district it was 
 found. 
 
1903J THE MINING INDUSTRY 425 
 
 Coal mining is another most important branch of 
 Chilian industry. At present it is confined to the mines 
 of Concepcion and Arauco, but deposits exist further 
 to the south on the Pacific coast, near Punta Arenas in 
 the Straits of Magellan, and in Tierra del Fuego. One 
 million tons are mined annually in the Concepcion and 
 Arauco districts, and while the coal is described as 
 "dirty," and not equal to English or Australian, it is 
 the custom of steamers homeward bound to Europe to 
 take supplies at Coronel or Lota, and vessels on the 
 Chilian coast use it, as also the Chilian fleet and rail- 
 ways. For gas-making this coal is stated to be excep- 
 tionally good. So far, the production from the mines in 
 Concepcion and Arauco has been restricted by the 
 scanty labour supply, and the quantity mined has been 
 insufficient for the local demand, importation from Europe 
 and Australia consequently taking place to a considerable 
 extent ; but the future development of this industry is 
 assured, all that is needed being additional capital to 
 increase the output and so permanently exclude foreign 
 coal from the Chilian markets. 
 
 The existence of coal over widely distributed areas 
 is especially valuable in view of the fact that iron ores 
 are abundant in the central and southern districts, and 
 with coal and iron in close proximity there should be 
 no doubt of industrial expansion in the future. Hitherto 
 the price of Chilian coal has prohibited undertakings for 
 the manufacture of iron and steel ; but such conditions 
 cannot last, and signs are not lacking that a change is 
 coming. The deposits are so extensive, that instead of 
 a million tons, four times that amount should be available, 
 and competition will lower existing prices to European 
 and United States rates. The establishment of smelting 
 works and factories to supply local demand for iron and 
 steel must follow. 
 
 One other mineral product must be mentioned, viz., 
 borax, the export of which has assumed large proportions 
 of recent years. The annual output is estimated at 
 3200 tons, shipped principally from Antofagasta, but in 
 
426 
 
 CHILE 
 
 Tarapaca large deposits exist, although few attempts 
 have been made to turn them to aceount. But the 
 industry is destined to grow. 
 
 To understand the paramount importance of mining 
 in the industrial life of Chile, it is only necessary to 
 glance at the exports in 1899, and the proportion of the 
 different products in the list. The following table 
 shows : — 
 
 National Exportation, 1899. 
 
 Dollars of 
 18 pence. 
 
 Per cent, 
 of total. 
 
 1. Products of mining enterprise 
 
 2. „ agricultural enterprise . 
 
 3. „ manufacturing enterprise 
 
 4. „ viticultural enterprise . 
 
 5. „ pastoral enterprise 
 
 6. „ various enterprises 
 
 7. Gold and silver coin exported . 
 
 8. Merchandise nationalised 
 
 9. Coin re-exported .... 
 
 
 137,637,603 
 
 10,597,870 
 
 3,862,117 
 
 328,615 
 
 5,050,108 
 
 1,460,424 
 
 2,595,577 
 
 1,172,164 
 
 401,655 
 
 84-39 
 650 
 2-36 
 0-20 
 3-09 
 0-89 
 1-59 
 0-73 
 0-25 
 
 Total of exports 
 
 
 163,106,133 
 
 100-00 
 
 With 84 '39 per cent, of the total value of products 
 shipped abroad, it is clear that the mineral industry is 
 the backbone of Chilian prosperity. 
 
 Agricultural enterprise in Chile has shown most 
 unmistakable decadence in recent times. Twenty-five 
 years ago the farming industry was the real mainstay 
 of the country ; it afforded means of livelihood to more 
 than two-thirds of the population, and landed pro- 
 prietors resided on their estates and superintended their 
 properties. Wheat was a principal article of export to 
 Europe, and between 1880 and 1890 Chilian grain was 
 a factor of some importance in the Liverpool market. 
 The production of barley, although not so great as 
 wheat, was also large. To achieve this result necessi- 
 tated steady and laborious application by the majority 
 of the inhabitants, and this gave a sturdy tone to the 
 
1903] AGRICULTURE 427 
 
 national character at the critical period when Chile was 
 confronted with difficult problems, the solution of which 
 depended in great measure on ability to face physical 
 hardships of unusual severity. After 1880 the condition 
 of agricultural industry changed, and a tendency arose 
 for the owners of properties to congregate in the cities, 
 the administration of the farms being deputed to agents 
 and managers. At first this altered state of affairs made 
 small difference in the output of farm products, because 
 the men left in charge were, as a rule, old servants who 
 faithfully executed the duties entrusted to their care. 
 Other causes, however, were at work to undermine the 
 supremacy of agriculture in Chile. The development of 
 the nitrate industry in Tarapaca called for able-bodied 
 men from the central and southern districts, and the 
 attraction of high wages drew many thousand agricultural 
 labourers to the north. 
 
 When the civil war of 1891 occurred agriculture was 
 drifting to a critical stage, and the effects of the struggle 
 between Balmaceda and Congress was to accelerate its 
 decline, the thousands of men killed and wounded 
 creating a shortage of labour in the central districts. 
 The military regime during the greater part of 1891 
 unsettled the entire population, and produced a constant 
 stream of immigration from the rural districts to the 
 towns. Then came the disbandment of the troops 
 when peace was re-established, and the alarming increase 
 in brigandage. These untoward changes were not at 
 first noted owing to the extensive areas of new agri- 
 cultural lands opened in the south during the years 
 immediately preceding 1891. Cultivation of the virgin 
 soil of these new districts gave heavy yields of grain, 
 and counterbalanced the decreasing production of the 
 older agricultural areas. But it was not long before the 
 newer districts also began to suffer, and the harvest of 
 1892-3 was the last which left any large surplus of grain 
 for export, and the decadence of agricultural enterprise 
 became rapid after 1893. Inclement seasons accentuated 
 the depression, and lack of protection for life and property 
 
428 CHILE 
 
 made residence a practical impossibility in many of the 
 rural districts. Therefore the habit of landed proprietors 
 to leave everything in connection with their estates in 
 the hands of agents became general, and led to the 
 neglect of farming, each year witnessing a decrease in 
 production. To such an extent has the mischief now 
 spread, that in place of an annual exportation of 200,000 
 tons of grain, the present supply is insufficient to meet 
 home demands, and in 1901 cargoes of wheat were 
 brought from Australia and the United States to make 
 good the local deficiency. In 1899 the value of all 
 agricultural products shipped abroad only represented 
 6 1 per cent, of the total export trade, and even this small 
 proportion has been reduced in the last three years. 
 
 The decay of agriculture explains to a great extent 
 the extreme poverty among the mass of the Chilians, for 
 in the central districts, where the country is most 
 densely inhabited, nothing has taken its place. How 
 great the shrinkage has been may be judged from the 
 value of the surplus products derived from agricultural 
 pursuits, which is now estimated to be worth £400,000 
 as against £3,000,000 a few years ago ; in other words, 
 the average gain for each of the 2,000,000 persons 
 directly or indirectly dependent upon agriculture has 
 been reduced from thirty shillings per head to four 
 shillings. Nor are any adequate steps attempted by the 
 Government to remedy this condition of affairs. While 
 money is lavished on the naval and military forces, no 
 effort is made to establish an efficient constabulary to 
 protect farmers from the depredations of the hordes of 
 robbers infesting with impunity the rural districts. The 
 construction of roads and railways to aid in cheapening 
 the cost of farming is sometimes discussed by the 
 Executive and Congress, but nothing practical has been 
 initiated in recent years, and on all sides Chilian agri- 
 cultural prospects are gloomy in the extreme. 
 
 That the Government could accomplish much towards 
 the salvation of the country's agriculture, is evident to 
 the most unpractical eye. Water is the one essential 
 
1903] NECESSITY OF IRRIGATION WOBKS 429 
 
 thing in the central and northern districts, for irrigation 
 is the keynote to agricultural enterprise in Chile, and a 
 cheap water supply would immensely benefit the farmers. 
 It is for the Government to elaborate a practical plan for 
 storing the abundant supplies in the mountain ranges, 
 and to regulate this distribution to districts at present 
 under cultivation, and also over the large areas of desert, 
 as on the eastern slope of the pampa of Tamarugal, 
 which only require moisture to develop amazing fertility. 
 That any obstacle exists to prevent adequate protection 
 for life and property is not even suggested ; the Govern- 
 ment is simply lacking in energy and initiative. Roads 
 and railways are a question of the necessary money to 
 defray the cost of construction, and the selection of 
 competent and honest contractors to execute the work 
 required. Money the Government would have in plenty 
 if a more economical system guided the general adminis- 
 tration of the revenues, and honest contractors can be 
 found quickly enough if no favouritism is shown in the 
 choice. Such improvements need a policy of progress, 
 and that of the Chilian Government during the last few 
 years has been one of drift. 
 
 Viticulture is another industry of considerable 
 importance, the climate being exceptionally favourable 
 for vineyards, especially in the central districts, where 
 they chiefly are. Of late years, the area planted had 
 increased substantially, and the quantity of wine now 
 made is sufficient to meet the home demand. While, 
 however, improvements have been introduced in the 
 process of the manufacture of both red and white wines, 
 there is still room for progress, for the product now 
 placed on the market has certain acid qualities that 
 militate against its sale in foreign countries, and 
 effectually prevent its introduction abroad in spite of 
 many trials. By some people this acidity is attributed 
 to the excessive amount of copper in the soil, by others 
 to a faulty process in the manufacture, but an investiga- 
 tion by experts would probably solve the doubt and 
 find the remedy. Meanwhile, vine growers and Govern- 
 
430 CHILE 
 
 pent alike do little or nothing. A species of brandy 
 known as "pisco" is also largely manufactured, and 
 finds a ready local sale, while another produce is 
 "chicha," a liquid made from fresh fruit, and not 
 unlike cider. 
 
 Pastoral industry shows a tendency to increase ; but 
 the live stock is insufficient to meet home requirements, 
 and the custom has been to import annually herds of 
 cattle from Argentina to supply the Chilian markets. 
 Lately, a heavy tax has been imposed on imported 
 animals to encourage local industry, and the higher 
 prices now ruling should be an inducement to stock 
 breeding on a more extended scale. In the central 
 districts, cattle and sheep are raised to a large extent 
 on lucerne, and the quality of the meat is excellent, but 
 it is in the south that the development of the industry 
 may be expected to make most progress, for there 
 millions of acres at present lie waste which might pro- 
 fitably be stocked. Gradually these districts are being 
 utilised ; but here again comes the necessity for pro- 
 tection against the gangs of bandits, and until measures 
 are taken to suppress them, the development of this 
 branch of industrial enterprise must be restricted. In 
 Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego sheep breeding has 
 been successful, and the sheep thrive in spite of severe 
 winter seasons, although in years of exceptional snowfall 
 heavy mortality occurs amongst them. It is the sheep 
 farming near Punta Arenas which has caused that 
 locality to develop from a convict settlement into a busy 
 trading centre within the last twenty years. 
 
 Of the less important rural industries, the principal 
 are apiculture, in the province of Llanquihue, whence 
 some 70,000 barrels of honey are annually exported to 
 Europe ; the lumber trade in the south ; and fishing. 
 The southern districts of Chile are rich in valuable 
 timber, but difficulty of access to the forest regions from 
 the seaboard has hindered development of the lumber 
 trade, and timber is imported from abroad in large 
 quantities instead of utilising the native resources. 
 
[Face page 430. 
 
1903] MANUFACTURES 431 
 
 This anomaly is unlikely to last long now, and once the 
 natural wealth of the forest area is understood and 
 appreciated, and means of transport provided, it will 
 supply all home wants and leave an ample surplus for 
 export. 
 
 No systematic efforts have been made to develop 
 the fisheries, which in the southern waters contain a 
 vast variety of fish. Fishing merely provides desultory 
 occupation for a small proportion of the inhabitants on 
 the coast, and an irregular supply to the towns. The 
 oyster beds of Chiloe are worked to some extent, but 
 never sufficiently to meet the demand of the northern 
 markets. Recently, cod-curing and lobster-canning 
 works have been started on the island of Juan Fernandez, 
 Robinson Crusoe's Island, the centre of one of the 
 richest fishing grounds in the world, and some 400 miles 
 from Valparaiso. 
 
 Manufacturing industry has not made great progress 
 in Chile in spite of the fact that raw material and fuel 
 are abundant, and labour cheap. The reason for this 
 backwardness is to be found to some extent in the 
 absence of skilled labour to direct the working of 
 factories, and the lack of capital to initiate new under- 
 takings. Breweries, however, have been erected at 
 Valdivia, Valparaiso, Santiago, Concepcion, Limache, 
 and other places, and the beer consumed in the country 
 is almost exclusively of local manufacture. Tanneries 
 also are established on a comparatively extensive scale, 
 especially in the vicinity of Valdivia, while at Concep- 
 cion cloth and cotton factories on a limited scale are 
 now producing textiles of fair quality, and flour mills 
 have been built in different districts. The manufacture 
 of biscuits, too, is a thriving industry, rapidly ousting 
 the foreign article. Sugar refineries import the raw 
 material and supply local demand, and iron foundries 
 have proved a profitable enterprise, important works of 
 this description existing at Valparaiso and elsewhere, 
 but the raw material is foreign. Recently, the duties 
 on many articles of imported merchandise have been 
 
432 CHILE 
 
 increased in the hope that the higher tariff would induce 
 an extension of domestic manufactures, an expectation 
 to some extent realised, factories for the production of 
 soap, candles, matches, cigarettes, and many other such 
 articles having been established. Circumstances in 
 Chile are so favourable that the existing apathy in 
 regard to the production of home-made goods cannot 
 possibly continue much longer. Both on the score of 
 economy and because such enterprises can be made 
 profitable, there is every reason for the Chilians to 
 extend manufacturing enterprise in all its branches. 
 Energetic action and the introduction of skilled 
 mechanics to superintend the work, is all that is neces- 
 sary to ensure a satisfactory result for such undertakings. 
 
CHAPTER XXIV 
 
 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 Position of Atacama. Chile and Bolivia. The Guano Deposits. 
 Bolivian Claims. Dispute in 1861. Situation in 1864. War 
 between Peru and Spain. Treaty between Bolivia and Chile. 
 Bad Faith of Bolivia. Intrigues by Peru. Treaty between 
 Bolivia and Peru. Relations between Bolivia and Chile. Chilian 
 Capital in Atacama. Violation of Treaty of 1874. Peruvian 
 Intrigues in Bolivia. Duty on Nitrate of Soda. Ultimatum of 
 Chile to Bolivia. Occupation of Antofagasta by Chilians. 
 Declaration of War by Bolivia. Peru proposes Arbitration. 
 Chile declares War on Peru. Relations between Argentina and 
 Chile. Illusions of Bolivia and Peru. Naval Armaments. 
 Equipment of Chilian and Peruvian Vessels. Military Forces of 
 the Three Countries. Chilian Preparations. Inaction of Bolivia 
 and Peru. Embarkation of Chilian Troops. Occupation of 
 Antofagasta. Attack on Calama. Occupation of Tocopilla and 
 Cobija. Blockade of Iquique. Peruvian Seaboard Harried by 
 Chilians. Bombardment of Pisagua. Reconnaissance to Callao. 
 Peruvians attempt to raise Blockade of Iquique, Attack of the 
 Huascar and Independencia on the Esmeralda and Covadonga. 
 Loss of the Esmeralda and the Independencia. Preponderance of 
 Chilian Sea-power. Peruvian Reprisals. Chilian Discontent. 
 Capture of the Huascar and Pilcomayo. 
 
 The dispute in regard to territorial rights over the 
 seaboard of Atacama leading to the conflict between 
 Chile and Bolivia in 1879, and involving war with Peru, 
 was of long standing, and requires explanation to make 
 clear the cause of a struggle which forms a landmark in 
 South American history. After Bolivia, Chile, and Peru 
 secured independence from Spanish domination, little 
 attention was paid to Atacama. This section of country 
 433 2 E 
 
434 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 was regarded as worthless for colonisation ; but so far as 
 any authority was concerned, Chilian jurisdiction was 
 generally recognised. Chile claimed sovereignty over 
 these districts by virtue of the title derived from the 
 provisions made for the Chilian vice-royalty by the 
 Spanish authorities in laws and ordinances relating to 
 the Indies. But 1840 brought a change, for at that 
 date the value of guano as a fertiliser became better 
 understood in Europe, and the demand for it led to 
 inquiries as to the supply from the west coast of South 
 America. An expedition despatched by the Chilian 
 Government in 1841, discovered guano deposits at 
 various points on the seaboard of Atacama, and this 
 led to a law to regulate exportation, sanctioned by the 
 Chilian Congress on October 31, 1842. It was in 
 reference more particularly to the district between 
 south latitude 29° and 23° that the Chilian authorities 
 took action, and it was a complete surprise when, in 
 1843, the Bolivian charge d'affaires, Senor Olaneto, on 
 behalf of his Government, claimed recognition of 
 Bolivian jurisdiction as far south as latitude 26° to a 
 point where the river Salado discharges into the Pacific 
 Ocean. A revision of the Chilian titles was made and 
 published in 1845, the result being favourable to Chilian 
 pretentions ; and to the memorandum containing the 
 Chilian argument no answer was given by Bolivia, and 
 for a time the matter dropped. In 1847 Bolivia again 
 demanded, and was refused by Chile, the recognition 
 of rights in Atacama ; but war now broke out between 
 Bolivia and Peru, and the dispute was laid on one side 
 for the moment. 
 
 In 1858 the question of Atacama was again raised 
 by Bolivia. Chilian rights were energetically defended 
 by Senor Ger6nimo Urmeneta in a note dated July 11, 
 1859, and the discussion was continued in 1861 by Senor 
 Jose Maria Santibanez, in charge of the Bolivian Legation 
 at Santiago, and Senor Manuel Alcalde, the Chilian 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs. Senor Alcalde pointed 
 out that the Bolivian claims were inconsistent : that 
 
1863] EVENTS PRECEDING THE WAR 435 
 
 in 1843 Bolivia had demanded that the river Salado, at 
 the 26th parallel, should be recognised as the boundary ; 
 that in 1861 the 24th parallel was mentioned as the 
 frontier ; that acts had been committed by Bolivian 
 authorities derogatory to the persons and- property of 
 Chilian citizens, and that it had been necessary to 
 station the Chilian warships Esmeralda and Chile on 
 the Atacama coast as a protection for Chilian interests. 
 Sharp notes were exchanged between the two Govern- 
 ments during the following three years, relations gradually 
 becoming more strained, until in March, 1863, the quarrel 
 was aggravated by the Bolivian Congress at Oruro 
 authorising the Administration to declare war against 
 Chile if no other solution of the dispute appeared possible. 
 In October, 1864, diplomatic relations between the two 
 Governments were suspended, and an appeal to arms to 
 decide the question seemed inevitable. 
 
 At this juncture events were influenced by the un- 
 expected outbreak of hostilities between Spain and Peru. 
 The South American Republics regarded the action of 
 Spain as evidence of her desire to attempt to recover 
 possession of her former colonies, and they determined 
 to prevent this. Bolivia and Chile decided to sink their 
 differences and make common cause with Peru, and 
 nothing more was heard of war between Chile and her 
 neighbour. In place of hostile action the claimants to 
 Atacama signed a treaty on August 16, 1866, providing 
 for the boundary between Bolivia and Chile at the 24th 
 parallel of south latitude, and further that the zone 
 lying between the 23rd and the 25th parallel should be 
 subject to the common jurisdiction of both Governments 
 for the exploitation of the guano deposits and mineral 
 products, the revenue from these two sources to be 
 equally divided. Bolivia agreed to make the Bay of 
 Mejillones the only port through which traffic in guano 
 should be permitted, with the condition that Chile 
 should nominate an official to intervene in any matters 
 concerning Chilian interests. It was provided also that 
 neither of the contracting parties could alienate their 
 
436 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 rights to any foreign Government or private enterprise, 
 but in event of a desire to dispose of them they could 
 only do so to one or other of the parties to the treaty. 
 Private interests in Mejillones affected by this arrange- 
 ment were to be compensated by a payment of $80,000 
 by each Government. This last clause was fulfilled by 
 Chile, but not by Bolivia. 
 
 Chile regarded this settlement as a final solution 
 of the long-standing dispute, and it would have been 
 had Bolivia kept faith, but, unfortunately, her Adminis- 
 tration acted contrary to the letter and spirit of the 
 compact. In 1871 a liquidation of the revenue account 
 for the guano deposits and duties on mineral products 
 in the common zone requested by the Chilian authorities 
 resulted in the refusal of the Bolivian Government to 
 make the payments required by the agreement of 1866, 
 and this attitude excited unusual indignation in Chile, 
 as the work in the zone between the parallels 23° and 
 25° was conducted chiefly by Chilian capital and 
 labourers. Explanation of the Bolivian action was 
 found in the intrigues set afoot by Peru to hinder 
 friendly relations between Bolivia and Chile, and the 
 motive was the desire to establish a monopoly for the 
 exportation of nitrate of soda. The agreement of 1866 
 stood in the way, as by it Chilian enterprise could work 
 freely, and to ensure resistance to the Chilian demand 
 for the observance of the treaty, Peru made a secret 
 compact with Bolivia in 1873. 
 
 The feeling between Chile and Bolivia now became 
 so strained that war was again threatened. Chile, 
 however, had no desire for an outbreak of hostilities, 
 owing to the inadequate footing upon which her military 
 and naval forces had been maintained for some years 
 past. So after a long diplomatic controversy matters 
 were arranged by a treaty dated August 6, 1874, by 
 which Chile agreed to renounce the zone between the 
 23rd and 25th parallels of latitude and to resign her claim 
 to a share of the duties collected under the treaty of 1866. 
 On the other hand, Bolivia accepted the proposal that 
 
1874] BOLIVIAN AND CHILIAN TREATY 437 
 
 export duties on mineral products from this zone should 
 not be increased, and that Chilian capital, industries, and 
 persons should not be subjected to higher taxation than 
 was in force at the date of the treaty. These conditions 
 were to remain unaltered for twenty-five years ; but it 
 was this question of taxation that brought the final 
 rupture five years later. 
 
 The treaty of 1874 afforded protection for Chilian 
 industry in Atacama, and considerable capital was 
 invested in mines and the exploitation of nitrate of soda, 
 the labourers employed being chiefly of Chilian nation- 
 ality and the majority of the inhabitants Chilians, 
 Bolivians showing no tendency to become more numerous. 
 Bolivia, however, regarded with little favour the flourish- 
 ing condition of affairs resulting from the introduction 
 of money and labour from Chile, because the treaty of 
 1874 prevented additional taxation, and it was not long 
 before complaints were heard of the attitude of the 
 Bolivian authorities towards Chilian citizens and of 
 attempts to levy higher duties. Moreover, Peruvian 
 intrigue was again busy because competition, resulting 
 from the development of the nitrate of soda industry in 
 Atacama, threatened to interfere with the monopoly 
 established in the Peruvian province of Tarapaca, and 
 the object of Lima was to induce Bolivia to place a 
 heavy duty on the exportation of nitrate of socla from 
 Atacama to check production and maintain better prices 
 in Europe. The fact that such action inferred a breach 
 of faith with Chile created no scruples in the minds of 
 Peruvian diplomatists, and their councils so far prevailed 
 that in 1875 an attempt was made by the authorities 
 at Antofagasta to impose a tax of three cents per 
 quintal on all shipments, but this was abandoned after 
 protest by the Chilian Government. 
 
 At this period Peru was considered the superior of 
 Chile in both naval and military strength. It was due 
 to this fact that Peruvian influence was so strong in 
 moulding the attitude of Bolivia, for the understanding 
 between Peru and Bolivia in 1873 was an alliance for 
 
438 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 mutual defence against Chile, and it was this supposed 
 source of strength that induced Bolivia to act in defiance 
 of her treaty obligations. In 1877 strained relations 
 arose between Chile and Argentina about the boundary 
 between the two countries, and Peru thought this 
 dispute gave a favourable opportunity to urge Bolivia 
 to impose once more a heavy duty on the export of 
 nitrate of soda. Peru was convinced that the strength 
 of her army and navy, combined with the hostility of 
 Argentina, would prevent Chile from making any attempt 
 to compel Bolivia to respect Chilian rights. Bolivia, 
 under the advice of President Hilarion Daza, listened 
 to Peruvian counsels, and on February 14, 1878, the 
 Congress resolved that all nitrate of soda exported 
 should be subject to a duty of ten cents the quintal. 
 This was done in the face of the revocation of the duty 
 imposed by the municipality of Antofagasta in 1875, 
 because "there exists the treaty of limits with Chile, 
 by which no new taxes can be collected." The bad 
 faith of Bolivia caused earnest remonstrance from Chile, 
 but to no effect, and demands were made on the principal 
 nitrate company in Antofagasta. On the refusal of the 
 manager to pay $90,000 on account of the new tax, he 
 was imprisoned and the property confiscated. 
 
 In view of these developments it was imperative for 
 Chile to act. Diplomatic representations met with no 
 satisfactory response, and on January 3, 1879, the Chilian 
 charge d'affaires in La Paz notified the Bolivian Govern- 
 ment that if the law of February 14, 1878, was enforced, 
 he was instructed to ask for his passports. The Chilian 
 representative added :— " The Government of Chile 
 considers it also convenient to inform you that the con- 
 tinued refusal to suspend the law in question renders 
 null and void the treaty of 1874, and consequently Chile 
 considers as resumed all rights she had legitimately 
 over the territory that treaty refers to prior to 1866. 
 For this reason Chile, in the present unfortunate 
 emergency, which she has not provoked, nor been able 
 to avoid, will take such measures as she deems necessary 
 
1879] CHILIAN ULTIMATUM 439 
 
 to defend her rights." On January 20, 1879, the Chilian 
 Government instructed its representative to press for 
 an immediate answer to the ultimatum of January 3. 
 The Bolivian Government refused to consider the 
 suspension of the export duties, and diplomatic relations 
 were broken off on February 10. Four days later, 
 Chilian troops landed at Antofagasta and took possession 
 of the city and adjoining district without any formal 
 declaration of war. It was only when news of the 
 occupation of Antofagasta reached the Bolivian Govern- 
 ment that the conviction was brought home to the 
 authorities that Chile intended to fight, and even then 
 the Chilian strength was underestimated by both Bolivia 
 and Peru. After the landing of the Chilian troops at 
 Antofagasta, the Bolivian Government declared war, 
 and a proclamation to that effect was issued on March 
 1, 1879. 
 
 During the perpetration of these hostile acts near 
 Antofagasta, the Peruvian special envoy at Santiago, 
 Senor Jose Antonio Lavalle, proposed that Peru should 
 arbitrate between Chile and Bolivia. In answer to this 
 offer Senor Lavalle was reminded of the alliance of Peru 
 with Bolivia in 1873, and he expressed ignorance of any 
 such compact. It has never been quite clear whether 
 this assertion was made in good faith, but the Chilian 
 Government had possessed a copy of the treaty since 
 1874, and it was only natural to suppose that the head 
 of such an important mission as that entrusted to Senor 
 Lavalle had been informed of a factor vitally affecting 
 his negotiations. The propositions submitted by Senor 
 Lavalle were : — (1) That Chile should evacuate Anto- 
 fagasta pending the decision of the dispute by arbitra- 
 tion ; (2) that a neutral administration should be 
 established in the territory evacuated, this to be 
 maintained under the guarantee of Chile, Bolivia, and 
 Peru ; (3) that all revenues from these territories should 
 be equally divided between Chile and Bolivia after 
 payment of the local administration. These proposals 
 were not to the liking of the Chilians, who saw in them 
 
440 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 a repetition of the bad faith already shown by Bolivia, 
 with the further complication of Peru as a party to any 
 fresh dispute. Under these circumstances Sefior 
 Lavalle was informed that Peruvian mediation was 
 unacceptable, and this notification was followed by the 
 Peruvian envoy being handed his passports. 
 
 The temper of the Chilians was now thoroughly 
 aroused. Peruvian intrigues had resulted in a dispute 
 between Chile and Bolivia, involving an armed conflict, 
 and the offer of mediation on the part of Peru was 
 regarded as only a diplomatic move to further injure 
 Chilian interests. The existence of the secret treaty 
 between Peru and Bolivia was considered a directly 
 hostile act ; in these circumstances the Chilians deter- 
 mined to strike home at Peru and endeavour to make 
 that country pay dearly for the part she had played, 
 and for this reason, on April 5, 1879, war against Peru 
 was declared. 
 
 In the published accounts of the attitude of Chile at 
 this crisis there is a tendency of most writers to throw 
 the whole blame of the war upon the Chilians, on the 
 ground they acted in a purposely aggressive manner to 
 enable them to carry out a plan of conquest and 
 territorial aggrandisement ; but the facts of the case do 
 not justify such assertions. In the long-standing 
 dispute in connection with Atacama Chile had ceded 
 rights to which she considered herself justly entitled 
 rather than push matters to extremes, and in 1865, when 
 she might have deprived Bolivia of all participation in 
 dominion over Antofagasta, she held her hand and 
 elected to make considerable sacrifices to assist the 
 Peruvians in the Spanish conflict. It is true that this 
 policy was dictated by the idea that the action of Spain 
 towards Peru portended common danger to South 
 America, but it did not necessarily entail the surrender 
 to Bolivia of the substantial advantages that country 
 gained by the treaty of 1866. Again, in 1874, Chile met 
 the Bolivian demands in a conciliatory spirit, and in 
 consideration of a solemn covenant by Bolivia she 
 
1879] CHILE DECLARES WAR ON PERU 441 
 
 renounced all sovereignty over the zone between the 
 23rd and 25th parallels of latitude on condition that 
 certain protection was extended to Chilian citizens and 
 industries. It has been explained how lack of good 
 faith by Bolivia rendered this treaty a dead letter, but 
 there is also another aspect of the case to which little 
 attention has been devoted. Chilian energy and Chilian 
 capital converted Atacama from a worthless desert into 
 a nourishing industrial centre ; and yet this important 
 fact carried no weight with the Bolivian authorities. 
 
 Nor can any great blame be attached to Chile for 
 declaring war against Peru. The secret treaty of 1873 
 was proof of the part Peru had played in the policy of 
 Bolivia, and the fact that Peru was bound to come to 
 the assistance of Bolivia to repel the Chilian invasion of 
 Atacama showed that the action taken by Chile was the 
 only wise course she could adopt under the circum- 
 stances. 
 
 The outbreak of hostilities found matters far less 
 favourable than the Bolivian Government had anticipated 
 when the determination had been reached twelve 
 months previously to force the Chilian question to a 
 crisis. The dispute between Argentina and Chile had 
 assumed a more conciliatory aspect, all prospect of 
 armed conflict between those two countries having 
 disappeared for the moment, and no active assistance 
 could be expected from that quarter. This attitude of 
 Argentina enabled Chile to concentrate her whole 
 available strength in the north, and so unexpected a 
 change in the relations between Argentina and Chile 
 was the first serious disappointment Bolivia experienced 
 in the conflict, a feeling accentuated by the fact that the 
 policy of Peru was by no means as magnanimous as 
 Bolivia desired. When war with Chile was inevitable, 
 Bolivia claimed fulfilment of the treaty obligations 
 secretly contracted with Peru in 1873 ; but the Peruvian 
 Government vacillated for some time, then only agreed 
 on condition that Bolivia undertook to indemnify it for 
 all expenses incurred. 
 
442 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 For many years popular belief in South America 
 had been that in naval and military equipment Peru 
 was more than a match for Chile, and that Bolivia 
 could place an army in the field fully capable of defend- 
 ing her territory against Chilian aggression, and it was 
 the general opinion that Chile would be overpowered by 
 the combined strength of the Bolivians and Peruvians ; 
 but estimates of the relative fighting capacities had been 
 formed without close attention to the preparations the 
 Chilians had made in event of an emergency. Chile 
 recognised that in any war with Peru and Bolivia the 
 control of the seaboard would be of paramount value, for 
 the railways of Peru which supplied Bolivia ran at right 
 angles to the coast, and the possession of their outlets 
 was of the utmost importance. With this object in 
 view, the Chilian Government since 1870 had steadily 
 increased the naval forces. Peru, on the other hand, 
 had allowed matters to drift, and little attention had 
 been given to possible future developments. The 
 country was embarrassed by careless and corrupt 
 Administrations, which left no funds available for the 
 purchase of ships and war material, and a complete 
 reversal of former conditions was found when the war- 
 cloud burst in 1879. Chile possessed two powerful 
 ironclads of modern construction, designed by Read, and 
 built at Hull in 1874-5 ; these were the sister ships 
 Almirante Cochrane and Blanco Encalada, of 3560 tons, 
 2920 horse-power, and each carried six 9-inch M.L. 
 Armstrong guns of 12 tons, a number of light guns, and 
 two Nordenfelt machine guns. They had armour nine 
 inches thick at the water-line and six to eight inches 
 round the battery, and both were fitted with twin screws. 
 In addition to these two formidable vessels there were 
 two sister corvettes, the Chacabuco and the (JHiggins, 
 of 1670 tons and 800 horse-power, armed with three 
 150-pounder 7-ton Armstrong guns, and four 40- 
 pounders ; the Magallanes, armed with one 150-pounder 
 and two small guns ; the Abtao, with three 150-pounders ; 
 the Covadonga, a wooden screw gunboat, captured from 
 
1879] NAVIES OF CHILE AND PERU 443 
 
 the Spaniards in 1866, of 600 tons, and armed with 
 two 70-pounders and three small guns ; the Esmeralda, 
 a wooden corvette built in 1854, of 850 tons, carrying 
 twelve 40-pounders on the upper deck ; and ten steam 
 transports. 
 
 The Peruvian navy consisted of the Huascar, built 
 at Birkenhead by Messrs Laird in 1866, of 1130 tons, 
 300 horse-power, and armed with two 10-inch Arm- 
 strong 300-pounders and two 40-pounder Whitworths. 
 The armour round her revolving turret was five and a 
 half inches thick, and she had a belt of four and a half 
 inches, but such protection was useless against the guns 
 on the Cochrane or the Blanco Encalada. The next 
 ship was a broadside ironclad, built in London in 1865, 
 called the Independencia, of 2004 tons, 550 horse-power, 
 protected by four and a half inches of armour, and 
 equipped with twelve 70-pounders on the main deck, 
 two 150-pounders, four 32-pounders, and four 9-pounders 
 on the upper deck. In addition to these vessels, there 
 were the wooden corvettes Union of 1150 tons, 400 
 horse-power, and armed with twelve 70-pounders and 
 one 9-pounder; and the Pilcomayo, of 600 tons, 180 
 horse-power, and armed with two 70-pounders, four 
 40-pounders, and four 12-pounders. There were also 
 the monitors Atahualpa and Manco Capac, purchased 
 from the United States in 1869, each of 2100 tons, with 
 ten inches of armour on the turrets, and carrying two 
 15-inch smooth-bore Rodman guns; but these vessels 
 were little more than floating forts for coast defence, 
 the Atahualpa being stationed permanently at Callao 
 and the Manco Capac at Arica. 
 
 A comparison of naval forces shows that Chile had 
 twice the number of sea-going vessels, double the 
 aggregate tonnage, and a hundred per cent, greater 
 weight of metal. Moreover, the complement of both 
 officers and men in the Chilian fleet was superior in 
 seamanship and fighting qualities to that on the 
 Peruvian warships, several of the officers having served 
 in the British navy, and the majority of the men being 
 
444 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 recruited from the hardy fisherman class living on the 
 southern coast. Amongst the Chilian officers were many 
 whose names indicated British extraction, these includ- 
 ing Condell, Cox, Christie, Edwards, Leighton, Lynch, 
 Macpherson, Pratt, Rogers, Smith, Simpson, Souper, 
 Stephens, Thomson, Walker, Warner, Williams, Wilson, 
 and Wood. It was a complete revelation to South 
 America when the strength of the Chilian navy was 
 understood and appreciated, and it was not until the 
 war began that Peru realised how entirely she had 
 underestimated the fighting capabilities of the fleet with 
 which she was confronted. 
 
 With regard to the military forces the balance was 
 also in favour of Chile, if not so much in numbers, most 
 assuredly in equipment and physique. On a peace 
 footing, the army comprised 2500 infantry, 800 artillery, 
 and 700 cavalry, and a force of 25,000 national guards, 
 this latter being raised to 55,000 on the declaration of 
 war. The men were clothed in a thoroughly workman- 
 like outfit of tunic and trousers of brown holland, a cap 
 of the same material, and a pair of untanned brown 
 leather boots, and the rifle used was the Gras or Com- 
 blain. The artillery was provided with Krupp and 
 Armstrong field guns, and some Gatlings and Norden- 
 felts, and the cavalry was well mounted, and armed with 
 sabres and Winchester rifles. Officers and men had 
 received practical instruction as a result of the constant 
 raids they had undertaken against the Araucanian 
 Indians in the south. As a whole, the Chilian army 
 was a fairly compact fighting machine and by no means 
 badly disciplined. 
 
 At the time of the declaration of war, the Peruvian 
 military forces comprised five battalions of infantry, each 
 containing 500 officers and men ; three regiments of 
 artillery, with a total strength of 1000 officers and men ; 
 and two brigades of cavalry, these numbering 780 officers 
 and men ; and there was the constabulary, with an 
 effective total of 5400 of all ranks. This gave a fighting 
 force of 9680 officers and men ; but a decree shortly 
 
1879] ARMIES 445 
 
 after the outbreak of hostilities authorised the increase 
 of the national army to 40,000, and a subsequent order 
 on December 26, 1879, called to the ranks the entire 
 male population between the ages of eighteen and 
 thirty, the remainder between thirty and sixty being 
 embodied in the reserve. The regular army was clothed 
 in uniforms of white cotton cloth, and the infantry armed 
 with the Martini-Peabody rifle. The cavalry was pro- 
 vided with Winchester repeating rifles, but was so 
 poorly mounted as to be incapable of effective service, 
 and the artillery equipment was indifferent, the majority 
 of the guns being of local manufacture, and inadequate 
 to cope with the modern weapons of the Chilians. The 
 bulk of the army consisted of Indians only understanding 
 Quichua, who had small stomach for fighting for the 
 Spanish- speaking people by whom they were ruled ; but 
 when kindly treated they proved patient and obedient, 
 and capable of sustaining great fatigue when required 
 to make forced marches over long stretches of desert 
 country, where only most scanty rations of food and 
 water were available. 
 
 The Bolivian army was composed chiefly of Aymara 
 Indians. On paper, a large number were liable for 
 service, but the Bolivian authorities had been so 
 totally unprepared for an outbreak of war that when 
 hostilities commenced the only available arms were 
 1500 Remington rifles, and even for these the stock 
 of ammunition was very limited. 
 
 It was clear that by land and sea Chile was more 
 ready for action than her adversaries when the crucial 
 moment arrived, and it was not long before the superiority 
 of her preparations told its tale in an unbroken list of 
 successful engagements. 
 
 In view of a probable refusal by Bolivia to rescind 
 the tax on the exportation of nitrate of soda, military 
 preparations had been pushed forward by Chile, so that 
 by February an army corps of 6000 men was ready to 
 embark, fully equipped with artillery and reserves of all 
 necessary war material. Transports were waiting at 
 
446 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 Valparaiso to take the troops on board whenever orders 
 were issued to that effect. 
 
 The Chilian Government was determined that if 
 warlike operations were necessary an expedition should 
 take the field immediately, and not waste valuable time 
 which the enemy might employ to arrange defensive 
 measures for the protection of Antofagasta and other 
 points, and this energy was in marked contrast to the 
 attitude of Bolivia and Peru. These States left the 
 three important seaports of Antofagasta, Cobija, and 
 Tocopilla undefended, or held by small garrisons and a 
 scanty police force inadequate to repel any organised 
 attack. No effort was made to fortify the landing-places 
 in the possession of Bolivia, nor did the Peruvian 
 Government send naval aid, in spite of its fancied 
 superiority at sea — a supineness totally without excuse ; 
 for although the Chilian preparations were effected 
 quietly, no great degree of secrecy was observed, and 
 the representatives of Bolivia and Peru had ample 
 opportunity to inform their respective Governments of 
 the trend of events. The only feasible explanation is 
 that both Bolivia and Peru were convinced that the long 
 period of peace which Chile had enjoyed when this 
 crisis arose would render rapid and effective warlike 
 preparations impossible. Moreover, the concessions 
 made by Chile on former occasions when hostilities 
 with Bolivia appeared probable, deluded her adversaries 
 into the belief that she would not fight ; but all such 
 illusions were soon destroyed. 
 
 On February 8, 1879, the embarkation of the Chilians 
 began, and by the 14th the transports convoyed by 
 Chilian warships appeared off Antofagasta. Five 
 hundred men were immediately landed under command 
 of Colonel Sotomayor, and took possession of the town 
 without resistance, the Bolivian authorities retreating to 
 the village of Calama, a distance of eighty miles from the 
 coast-line. Any attempt at opposing the invasion would 
 have been futile, for the majority of the population of 
 Antofagasta were Chilians, and the small garrison was 
 
1879] OCCUPATION OF ANTOFAGASTA 447 
 
 quite incapable of coping with the invaders. The 
 occupation of Antofagasta was the first act of hostility 
 in the war, and the prompt manner in which it was 
 executed boded well for the subsequent success of the 
 Chilian arms. 
 
 Colonel Sotomayor immediately seized Caracoles, the 
 centre of a rich mining district about thirty miles in- 
 land from Antofagasta, and here also no resistance was 
 attempted, the authorities evacuating the place on the 
 approach of the Chilians. For the next few weeks 
 little was done, the time being occupied in concentrating 
 troops at Antofagasta, enrolling local forces recruited 
 from the Chilian residents in Atacama, and establishing 
 local administration under Chilian authority. In March 
 it was decided to despatch an expedition to Calama to 
 capture that place and completely shut off the Bolivians 
 from access to the seaboard through Atacama, and 
 orders for an expedition were issued ; and on March 
 21st Colonel Sotomayor left Caracoles to occupy the 
 place, which lay to the north on the main road from the 
 seaport of Cobija. The expedition numbered 600 men, 
 and to oppose it at Calama was a small garrison of 
 refugees from Antofagasta and Caracoles under the 
 leadership of Dr Zapata, the Prefect of Antofagasta. 
 Next evening the Chilians reached the vicinity of the 
 town, and found the bridge over the river Loa destroyed ; 
 but access was possible by two fords, the lower one 
 known as Topater, and the upper as Huaita. At 
 daybreak on the 23rd, the attack was begun by the 
 cavalry, which was divided into two detachments, one 
 going towards the Huaita ford and the other towards 
 Topater. Infantry in tw o columns supported the advance 
 which the artillery planted on high ground covered. 
 
 The Bolivian position was admirably adapted for 
 defence, and in the face of any determined opposition 
 would have presented many difficulties, but the tactics 
 of the Chilians proved thoroughly successful. Both 
 columns crossed the stream, and converging on the 
 village soon made short work of the defence. The 
 
448 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 garrison evacuated the neighbourhood, retiring by 'the 
 Potosi road across the Andes. They left 20 men 
 dead on the field, and carried off such of the wounded as 
 were able to bear transportation ; and as the total force 
 of the Bolivian garrison was only 140 officers and men, 
 this meant that one-third were killed or wounded before 
 the evacuation took place, while the Chilian troops had 
 only to record 20 casualties. 
 
 In itself of no great military importance, this affair 
 at Calama none the less gave the Chilians undisputed 
 control of Atacama, and it was also the only occasion 
 when the Bolivians attempted to check the advance of 
 the enemy into their territory. Furthermore, the success 
 raised Chilian prestige, and greatly encouraged all ranks 
 of the invading army. After the capture of Calama, 
 Sotomayor proceeded with a small detachment down 
 the valley of the river Loa to Tocapilla, but found the 
 squadron under Rear-Admiral Williams Rebolledo 
 already in possession, as also of Cobija. So, on the 
 29th, Sotomayor returned to Antofagasta, leaving 
 Colonel Ramirez, who had commanded the infantry in 
 the attack on March 23rd, at Calama. 
 
 The short period between the successful expedition 
 to Calama and the declaration of war by the Chilian 
 Government against Peru was occupied in accumulating 
 men and warlike stores at Antofagasta to make this 
 town a base for future operations. The squadron was 
 ready to steam northwards to harry the Peruvian sea- 
 board when instructions arrived from headquarters, and 
 on April 5, when the declaration of war against Peru 
 was issued, the vessels under command of Rear- Admiral 
 Rebolledo sailed to establish the blockade of Iquique, 
 and inflict all possible damage on Peruvian commerce. 
 
 For the next few months the war was confined to 
 naval operations. The object of Admiral Rebolledo 
 was the capture or disablement of the Peruvian war- 
 ships, in order that the Chilian army might be thrown 
 forward without fear of interruption of communication 
 with the base of supplies. To embarrass the Peruvian 
 
1379] CHILIAN SQUADRON OPERATIONS 449 
 
 Government, the Chilian admiral was instructed to 
 destory all facilities on the Peruvian coast-line for the 
 shipment of guano and nitrate of soda, thus suspending 
 the chief source of the national revenue. Piers and 
 wharves were demolished, and lighters wrecked at 
 different ports visited by the Chilian ships, and when 
 resistance was attempted, as at Mollendo on April 17, 
 the towns were shelled, and in some cases serious 
 damage was inflicted on defenceless places, a bombard- 
 ment of this nature occurring at Pisagua on April 18. 
 This town was one of the principal ports of shipment 
 for nitrate of soda, and contained 4000 persons, of whom 
 many were foreigners. The garrison consisted of a 
 detachment of Peruvian infantry, so that the town was 
 not entirely without protection, although unprovided 
 with artillery. Without communicating with the 
 municipal authorities, the Blanco Encalada and the 
 (JHiggins despatched their boats inshore to destroy 
 the lighters moored near the Custom-house. These 
 were private property, and when the owners understood 
 the intention of the Chilians they opened fire on the 
 boats, and the Peruvian soldiers also began firing from 
 the shelter of rocks near the seashore. An attempt was 
 made to land, but frustrated by the garrison, and the 
 Chilian ships then bombarded the town for two hours, 
 setting many of the principal buildings in flames, amongst 
 the houses destroyed being that of the British Vice- 
 Consul, and those of many other foreign residents. 
 This done, the Chilian vessels steamed away. 
 
 The Chilians have been severely criticised for this 
 systematic destruction of property, and for the bombard- 
 ment of towns which were practically defenceless. It 
 must be remembered, however, that it was important 
 for their cause that the Peruvian Government should 
 be deprived of revenue, and this must be accepted as 
 partial justification for the policy followed. In regard 
 to Mollendo and Pisagua, the excuse was made that 
 resistance was attempted by the occupants of those 
 towns, and that consequently they were liable to attack. 
 
 2 F 
 
450 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 Iquique, the principal seaport of the province of 
 Tarapaca, was blockaded immediately after the 
 declaration of war, and this point formed the rendezvous 
 of the Chilian vessels whilst harrying the coast-line. 
 The Peruvians showing no inclination to come 
 southwards to attack the blockading squadron, Admiral 
 Rebolledo decided to make a reconnaissance to Callao, 
 and started from Iquique with the Blanco Encalada and 
 the OHigglns on May 16, 1879, leaving the Esmeralda 
 and the Covadonga to maintain the blockade. On the 
 same day, General Prado, the President of Peru, set 
 out from Callao to take command of the Peruvian Army 
 concentrated at Tacna. The squadron accompanying 
 the President consisted of the Huasear, commanded by 
 Captain Miguel Gran ; the Independencia, in charge of 
 Captain Moore ; and three transports. The Chilian 
 vessels kept well out to sea to conceal their movements, 
 while the Peruvian squadron steamed as close inshore 
 as safety permitted, so the ships passed without sighting 
 each other. On arriving at Arica and disembarking 
 General Prado and his staff, Captain Grau received 
 information of the departure of Admiral Rebolledo from 
 Iquique, and the fact that only two vessels were left to 
 maintain the blockade. As Arica is only sixty miles 
 from Iquique, here was an opportunity thrown in the 
 way of the Peruvians to capture the Chilian vessels and 
 raise the blockade, and Captain Grau determined to 
 proceed to Iquique with the Huasear, and ordered the 
 Independencia to keep him company. The two ships 
 left Arica on the night of May 20, and at daybreak next 
 morning they were close to Iquique. 
 
 Early next morning Captain Prat, in command of 
 the Esmeralda, saw the Peruvian vessels approaching, 
 and signalled to the Covadonga to prepare for action. 
 Captain Prat found time for a short conversation with 
 Captain Condell of the Covadonga before the engagement 
 began, and it was decided that in spite of the over- 
 powering strength of the Peruvian vessels the fight 
 should be continued as long as either ship could keep 
 
1879] NAVAL ACTION OFF IQUIQUE 451 
 
 afloat. At 8 a.m. the action commenced by the Huascar 
 opening fire on the Covadonga, but almost immediately 
 the Independencia passed directly towards the Covadonga, 
 apparently with the intention of ramming the Chilian 
 ship, and the Huascar turned her attention to the 
 Esmeralda. Captain Prat had endeavoured to take the 
 latter vessel into shoal water near the shore when the 
 enemy approached ; but a boiler burst, and the Esmeralda 
 was almost helpless with a steaming capacity of only 
 three miles an hour. 
 
 As the Huascar drew near, the Esmeralda gave her 
 a broadside, but without inflicting serious damage, 
 owing to her guns not being heavy enough to penetrate 
 the armour of her opponent. A continuous cannonade 
 was then maintained between the two vessels at a 
 distance of 1000 yards, the Huascar not being able to 
 approach nearer to her adversary in consequence of the 
 shoal water. Meanwhile the Covadonga, keeping close 
 into the shore, had drawn away to the southward closely 
 pursued by the Independencia. After the fight between 
 the Esmeralda and the Huascar had been some time in 
 progress, the fire from a shore battery obliged the 
 former vessel to move further out to sea, and soon 
 afterwards a shell from the Peruvian ship struck her 
 close to the water-line, exploding and killing several 
 men and setting fire to the vessel. The flames were 
 soon extinguished, but the corvette was in sorry plight, 
 unable to move on account of her damaged machinery 
 and at the mercy of her antagonist, but showed no signs 
 of surrender. Captain Grau now determined to end 
 the struggle, and rammed the Chilian ship on the j)ort 
 side, abreast of the mizen mast. As the Esmeralda and 
 the Huascar came together, Captain Prat, sword in one 
 hand and revolver in the other, sprang on board the 
 Peruvian ship, calling upon officers and men to follow 
 him, but the vessels parted so quickly that only one 
 man, Serjeant Aldea, was able to join his commanding 
 officer. Captain Prat rushed along the deck of the 
 Huascar unheeding the demands to surrender, and after 
 
452 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 killing a signal- officer, Lieutenant Velarde, was himself 
 shot down, Serjeant Aldea sharing his fate. The com- 
 mand of the Esmeralda now devolved upon Lieutenant 
 Luis Uribe, and he, like his predecessor, showed no 
 indication of striking his flag. 
 
 Captain Grau now made a second attempt to ram at 
 11.30 a.m., and on this occasion the Huascar struck the 
 Esmeralda on the starboard bow at an angle of 45\ 
 The water rushed in through the aperture, filling the 
 engine-room, extinguishing the fires, and flooding the 
 magazine, the men serving in this section of the ship 
 perishing, as time did not permit their escape. As the 
 ships came in contact for the second time, Lieutenant 
 Ignacio Serrano and a dozen sailors repeated the action 
 of Captain Prat, leaping on to the deck of the Huascar 
 and attacking the crew, but both officer and men were 
 shot before they could inflict any injury upon the 
 Peruvians. The Esmeralda was now a wreck, the guns 
 and engines useless, half the crew killed or wounded, 
 and the ship settling down, but still the Chilians would 
 not surrender. Captain Grau decided to ram a third 
 time, and the Huascar struck her adversary full on the 
 starboard side abreast the main chains, and at the same 
 moment discharging her guns into the doomed vessel, 
 which two minutes later sank. Out of a crew of 200 
 officers and men only 50 were saved, clinging to pieces 
 of wreckage, and picked up by the boats of the Huascar. 
 Half an hour after the Chilian ship went down Lieutenant 
 Uribe was rescued, having kept himself afloat by means 
 of a hammock under each arm, and being completely 
 exhausted when taken out of the water. The engage- 
 ment had lasted four hours, the casualties on board the 
 Huascar being comparatively few owing to the protection 
 afforded by the turrets, and the ship herself was practi- 
 cally uninjured, the guns of the Esmeralda being too 
 light to inflict serious damage. 
 
 To turn to the fortunes of the gunboat Covadonga in 
 her efforts to escape from the Peruvian ironclad Inde- 
 pendencia. Captain Conclell took his ship as close into 
 
1879] WRECK OF THE INDEPENDENCE 453 
 
 the land as he dared, to entice his pursuer into shoal 
 water, and although a desultory fire was maintained 
 from the ironclad, no serious injury was done to the 
 gunboat. When nearing Punta Gruesa, ten miles south 
 of Iquique, Captain Condell, finding that the Independemia 
 was rapidly overhauling him, tried a cunning movement. 
 Near Punta Gruesa is a patch of rocky ground with 
 only enough water for a small vessel to pass safely, and 
 the Covadonga steamed over this shoal. Captain Moore, 
 excited by his chase of the Chilian vessel, followed at 
 full speed, and in a few minutes the Independemia was 
 a total wreck on the rocks. Captain Condel now 
 manoeuvred his ship into a position out of reach of the 
 enemy's guns, and opened a cannonade on the stranded 
 vessel, which he continued until the approach of the 
 Huascar obliged him to seek safety in flight. The 
 Huascar was forced to remain by the Indspendencia to 
 rescue her crew, and the Covadonga reached Antofagasta 
 without mishap. 
 
 The loss of the Independeneia was a heavy blow to 
 the Peruvians. It left the Chilians an overwhelming 
 predominance of sea power, for, with the exception of 
 the Huascar, the Chilian squadron had now nothing to 
 fear, and it was only a question of time when that ship 
 should be captured. That the Huascar gave serious 
 trouble to the Chilians before her capture was due to 
 the able and energetic manner in which she was handled 
 by Captain Grau. After the disaster of the Independeneia 
 Captain Grau took the Huascar to Callao, and on this 
 voyage the Blanco Encalada was encountered on June 3, 
 but Grau out-manoeuvred her after exchanging a few 
 shots, and reached his destination on June 7. 
 
 During the next few months Grau in the Huascar 
 rendered invaluable services to Peru. The presence of 
 this warship paralysed the advance of the Chilian army 
 of invasion. Cruising up and down the coast, she 
 evaded the enemy's squadron, and kept the Chilian 
 authorities in a constant state of alarm by making sudden 
 and unexpected appearances and destroying property at 
 
454 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 Carrizal, Chanaral, Huasco, Antofagasta, Tocopilla, 
 Taltal, and Caldera, the destruction she caused being 
 in the nature of reprisals for the damage inflicted by the 
 Chilians at Peruvian ports. On July 23 she captured 
 the Chilian transport Rimac carrying a regiment of 
 cavalry and 300 horses, and on August 17 she entered 
 Antofagasta and engaged the Chilian men-of-war Magal- 
 lanes and Abtao, these vessels being only saved through 
 the protection afforded by the heavy guns mounted on 
 shore. In this action the first torpedo was used during 
 the war. It was a " Lay," and launched from the 
 Huascar against the Abtao, but through faulty mechanism 
 it turned in the water and came straight back towards 
 the Peruvian ship, which was only saved from disaster 
 by the presence of mind of Lieutenant Diaz Canseco, 
 who jumped overboard and deflected its course. This 
 was one of the acts of heroism during the war, of which 
 there were many examples on both sides. 
 
 Discontent in Chile grew apace, in consequence of 
 the inability of the squadron to prevent the Huascar 
 from paralysing military operations, and finally became 
 so strong that it was decided to overhaul thoroughly 
 the various men-of-war and supersede Admiral Rebolledo 
 as Admiral-in-chief; but this latter step was rendered 
 unnecessary by his resignation on account of ill-health, 
 and Rear- Admiral G-alvarino Riveros took his place, 
 hoisting his flag on the Blanco Encalada. On October 1, 
 the Chilian squadron, ready for sea, sailed northwards 
 to hunt down the Peruvian cruiser. Arica was first 
 visited, and there information was obtained that the 
 Huascar and the Union were cruising to the southward. 
 Admiral Riveros now ordered the Cochrane commanded 
 by Captain Latorre, and accompanied by the Loa and 
 the OHiggins, to cruise off Mejillones Bay, whilst he in 
 the Blanco Encalada and attended by the Covadonga 
 and Matias Cousino, the latter an armed transport, kept 
 a look-out for the enemy further to the south. 
 
 By this time the rank of admiral had been conferred 
 on Captain Grau by the Peruvian Government as a 
 
1879] CAPTURE OF THE HUASCAR 455 
 
 recognition of his energy and gallantry. On the morning 
 of October 8, the Huascar with the Union was near 
 Antofagasta steaming quietly to the northward, when 
 the smoke of three steamers was descried near Point 
 Angamos. They proved to be the Chilian squadron 
 under Riveros, and Admiral Grau steamed away to 
 avoid a fight. His ships seemed to have every chance 
 of avoiding the enemy, when suddenly the Cochrane, 
 Loci, and OHiggins appeared on the horizon. Escape 
 was now impossible, and Grau determined to fight the 
 matter out to a finish. The Union was ordered to 
 make the best of her way out of the course of the 
 Chilian vessels, and this, owing to her high speed, she 
 successfully did, while the Huascar prepared for the 
 unequal combat she was obliged to face. 
 
 The fight was interesting apart from the fact that 
 it was one of the decisive incidents in the war. It was 
 the first action that had occurred between modern 
 ironclads, and for that reason alone the result claimed 
 Avorld-wide attention. The first shot was fired from the 
 turret of the Huascar when the ships were 3000 yards 
 apart, and it fell short. The second and third rounds 
 were equally ineffective, but the fourth struck the water, 
 ricochetted, and pierced the armour-plating of the 
 Cochrane, although doing no serious damage. The two 
 vessels were gradually closing whilst the engagement 
 progressed, but hitherto the Cochrane had been silent. 
 At 2000 yards distance Captain Latorre gave the order 
 to fire, and the two heavy guns opened, the projectiles 
 damaging the hull of the Peruvian ship, the fourth shot 
 striking the turret of the Huascar, and temporarily 
 disabled the revolving gear. The two vessels were now 
 at close range, and an attempt was made by Admiral 
 Grau to ram his opponent, but the twin-screws of the 
 Cochrane enabled Captain Latorre to manoeuvre so 
 quickly as to render this effort abortive, and subsequent 
 attempts of the Huascar to ram were equally 
 unsuccessful, owing to the good judgment and clever 
 manner in which Latorre handled his ship. 
 
456 THE CHILIAN-PERtTVIAN WAR 
 
 Shortly before 10 a.m., thirty-five minutes after the 
 first shot had been fired, a shell from the Cochrane 
 struck the conning tower of the Huascar, in which were 
 Admiral Grau and his flag-lieutenant, and the projectile 
 exploded inside the structure, killing both occupants, the 
 Admiral being mutilated to such an extent that only his 
 right foot and leg were identified as part of the man 
 who had been the foremost figure in the Peruvian navy. 
 Soon after this catastrophe the Blanco Encalado reached 
 the scene of action, and when within 600 yards of the 
 Huascar opened fire. A series of misfortunes now 
 overtook the Peruvians. After the death of Grau his 
 place was taken by Captain Elias Aguirre, the next 
 senior officer, but he was decapitated by a shell a few 
 minutes after assuming command, and Captain Manuel 
 Carbajal, who then took charge, was severely wounded. 
 Lieutenant Rodriguez was next in seniority, but had 
 hardly time to realise his responsibilities before he was 
 killed ; and Lieutenant Enrique Palacios who was left in 
 command was so badly injured before the close of the 
 action that he was forced to relinquish his post to 
 Lieutenant Pedro Garezon. One hour after the fight 
 began the dead and dying were littered in all directions 
 over the deck, and the number of casualties rapidly 
 increased. 
 
 At half- past ten, an hour and twenty minutes after 
 the first shot had been fired, the Huascar was com- 
 pletely disabled. The explosion of a shell in the turret 
 had put one of the heavy guns out of action, the steam 
 steering-gear was injured, and both the hull and upper 
 work of the vessel were seriously damaged. At one 
 time the Chilians imagined the Huascar had surrendered, 
 owing to the colours being shot away, and there was a 
 lull in the firing, but the flag was run up again and the 
 fight recommenced. Further resistance on the part of 
 the Peruvians was now useless, and one hour and forty 
 minutes from the beginning of the engagement the 
 Peruvian flag was hauled down. Lieutenants Simpson 
 and Rogers, and an engineer, with half a dozen sailors 
 
1879] CHILIAN CONTEOL AT SEA 457 
 
 and four marines, were sent from the Cochrane to take 
 possession of the prize. Lieutenant Simpson was 
 received by Lieutenant Garezon, and a formal surrender 
 of the vessel was made. The scene on the decks was 
 evidence of the severity of the punishment the Peruvian 
 cruiser had sustained. Mutilated corpses lay in every 
 corner, and of a total complement of 193 officers and 
 men when the Huascar went into action, 64 had been 
 killed or wounded. The ship was burning near the 
 conning tower, and had three feet of water in the hold, 
 and the survivors of the crew were ordered to help to 
 extinguish the fire, and were kept at the pumps until 
 the water-tight compartments were closed and all 
 danger past ; they were then treated as prisoners of 
 war. Of the crew on the Huascar, thirty were 
 Englishmen, twelve of other foreign nationalities, and 
 the remainder Peruvians. 
 
 The Chilian squadron with their prize proceeded to 
 Mejillones Bay, and there the interment of the remains 
 of Admiral Grau and his companions was attended with 
 all due honours. The Huascar was then taken to 
 Valparaiso and, after undergoing the necessary repairs, 
 incorporated into the Chilian navy. After this action 
 the only warships remaining to the Peruvians were the 
 Pilcomayo and the Union ; the former was captured on 
 November 17, 1879, but the latter evaded seizure to the 
 end of the war. The result of the capture of the 
 Huascar was to leave the Chilians masters of the sea on 
 the Pacific coast of South America, and to remove all 
 obstacles in the way of the advance of the invading 
 army into Peruvian territory. 
 
CHAPTER XXV 
 
 the chiltan-peruvian war — continued 
 
 Third Phase of the War. Chilians at Antofagasta. Embarkation of 
 Expeditionary Forces. Peruvians defend Tarapaca. Attack 
 on Pisagua. Retreat to San Roberto. Occupation of Junin. 
 Skirmish near Agua Santa. Attack on Chilians near Dolores. 
 Chilian Victory. Retreat to Tarapaca. Occupation of Iquique. 
 Stand at Tarapaca. Expedition under Colonel Arteaga. Battle 
 of Tarapaca. Peruvian Victory. Peruvians fall back on Arica. 
 Defence of Arica. The Chilian Advance. Engagement at Torata. 
 Tacna and Arica Isolated. Skirmish near the River Sama. 
 Battle of Tacna. Rout of Defenders. Heavy Casualties. Battle 
 of Ariea. Sinking of the Manco Gapac. 
 
 The first phase of the war ended with the occupation 
 of Antofagasta, Calama, and other districts of Atacama. 
 The second was concluded by the fight in which the 
 Huascar was taken by the Blanco Encalada and the 
 Cochrane, and which signalised the elimination of Peru- 
 vian naval power ; and the third covers the advance of 
 the Chilian forces into Peruvian territory. 
 
 In the beginning of October, 1879, the army of 
 invasion concentrated at Antofagasta numbered 7000 
 men, and other troops were in readiness at Valparaiso 
 to be pushed forward as opportunity arose. On October 
 9, the day after the capture of the Huascar, orders were 
 issued for the embarkation of the forces assembled at 
 Antofagasta, and active preparations were immediately 
 commenced, the command of the expedition being con- 
 fided to General Escala, Senor Rafael Sotomayor, the 
 War Minister, accompanying the army. The loading of 
 
1879] INVASION OF TARAPACA 459 
 
 the transports were carelessly and hurriedly effected, 
 and in the anxiety to have all ready to sail as soon as 
 possible the bulk of the hospital appliances, ambulances, 
 and medical stores were left behind. The actual destina- 
 tion was kept a profound secret, and beyond a general 
 idea of a landing in Tarapaca nothing was known. By 
 the 28th preparations were complete, and the expedition, 
 now swelled to 10,000 officers and men, set sail for the 
 north. The force consisted principally of infantry, but 
 included 850 cavalry well mounted and equipped, and 
 30 long-range field guns of modern type. The fleet 
 comprised 15 transports under convoy of 4 men-of- 
 war — the Cochrane, the OHiggins, and two other vessels. 
 Not until after leaving Antofagasta was it announced 
 that the objective point was Pisagua on the Tarapaca 
 coast. 
 
 It was no easy matter for the Peruvians to organise 
 adequate defensive measures to repel the invasion. The 
 long coast-line of 1400 miles was an insuperable source 
 of weakness, more especially on account of the barren 
 and mountainous character of the land, which prevented 
 the rapid movement of troops from one point to another, 
 a difficulty aggravated by the fact that the Chilians now 
 controlled the sea and could concentrate on any part of 
 the seaboard at short notice-. It was supposed naturally 
 that the Province of Tarapaca, with its great wealth, 
 would be first attacked by the invaders, and efforts were 
 made by the Peruvians to strengthen the defences there. 
 In October the troops in Tarapaca numbered 9000 
 officers and men, commanded by General Juan Buendia, 
 with Colonel Belisario Suarez as chief of staff, and 
 supported by many prominent officers, amongst whom 
 were Colonel Manuel Velarde, Colonel Justo Pastor 
 Davila, Colonel Andres Avelino Caceres, Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Lubiaga, Colonel Villamil, the latter in com- 
 mand of the Bolivian detachment stationed at Pisagua, 
 and Colonel Isaac Recarbarren, military Governor of 
 Pisagua. General Daza, the President of Bolivia, who 
 had reached Tacna in April, was ordered to march to 
 
460 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 Tarapaca and reinforce the division under General 
 Btiendia ; but he delayed his departure, from motives 
 of cowardice it was said, and did not arrive before 
 disaster had overtaken the Peruvians, nor did he at any 
 time render assistance of value. The artillery consisted 
 of 16 old-fashioned bronze guns, so antiquated as to be 
 powerless against the modern weapons of the Chilians. 
 
 Pisagua now became the centre of operations. It 
 is an open roadstead, the shore slightly curving inwards 
 where the town is situated, and cliffs of an altitude of 
 over a thousand feet rise abruptly behind the buildings 
 of the settlement, leaving only a narrow strip of level 
 ground for the dwellings of the residents. On either side 
 of the town a small fort had been constructed, with one 
 gun in each. The railway from the town to the nitrate 
 districts zigzagged up the face of the cliffs until reaching 
 the summit station known as El Hospieio, thence running 
 over the level pampa of Tamarugal. Six miles to the 
 south is the open roadstead of Junin, also a port of 
 shipment for nitrate of soda. On November 1, 1879, 
 General Buendia arrived at Pisagua on a tour of inspec- 
 tion and found that the garrison consisted of 600 Boli- 
 vians commanded by Colonel Villamil, and, in addition, a 
 corps of 800 men recruited from boatmen and labourers 
 in the harbour, in charge of Colonel Recabarren. 
 
 At daybreak on November 2, steamers were reported 
 rapidly approaching the Pisagua roadstead, and shortly 
 afterwards the 15 transports and 4 men-of-war forming 
 the Chilian expedition were abreast of the town. The 
 garrison was then posted to resist the landing of the 
 army of invasion, the Bolivian troops under Villamil 
 being stationed along the zigzag of the railway to "El 
 Hospieio," and the battalion commanded by Recabarren 
 placed near the railway station and wherever the houses 
 offorded cover and allowed a clear range of fire, while 
 the two forts were manned by detachments of Peruvian 
 artillery. Hostilities commenced by the bombardment 
 of the forts by the Cochrane and O'Higgins, and the fire 
 was so accurate that the gun in the southern fort was 
 
1879] BATTLE OF PISAGUA 46i 
 
 soon disabled and the northern fort abandoned. The 
 necessity of putting these two guns out of action caused 
 delay, and it was not until 9.30 a.m. that the boats with 
 the first detachment of the Chilian troops left the 
 transports, the landing being protected by the squadron, 
 whose fire was principally directed against the Bolivians 
 holding the railway line. Colonel Pecabarren was 
 severely wounded early in the engagement, but Colonel 
 Villamil from half-way up the cliff actively encouraged 
 his men to repel the invaders, and General Buendia from 
 the summit near " El Hospicio " watched the development 
 of the fight. The garrison of Pisagua was powerless to 
 impede the disembarkation of the Chilians, and although 
 a sharp rifle fire was maintained when the landing was 
 effected, it was soon silenced by the heavy guns and 
 musketry from the ships. General Buendia had sent 
 for reinforcements early in the day, but these did not 
 arrive in time to take part in the action, and at 10.30 
 a.m. the Chilians had possession of the town and 
 advanced to clear the face of the cliff. By eleven o'clock 
 the position of the defenders had become untenable, and 
 Buendia ordered a retreat, the remnant of the garrison 
 assembling at San Roberto, ten miles from Pisagua, and 
 marching to Agua Santa on the following day, a troop 
 of cavalry of 94 sabres commanded by Captain Sepulveda 
 forming the rearguard. In this action the defence lost 
 500 men killed and wounded, and the Chilian casualties 
 were returned as 235, many of the wounded dying through 
 want of proper attention, owing to the ambulances and 
 medical stores having been left at Antofagasta. 
 
 While the action at Pisagua was proceeding, General 
 Escala, the Chilian Commander-in-chief, had landed at 
 Junin, six miles to the south, and occupied that 
 neighbourhood. The Chilian troops were now jDushed 
 forward from Pisagua to obtain possession of the rail- 
 way line to Agua Santa, a distance of fifty miles, and 
 on November 4 a reconnaissance was made by Colonel 
 Jose Vergara with 175 troopers. He encountered the 
 Peruvian rearguard under Captain Sepulveda on the 
 
462 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 6th, close to Agua Santa, and a fight ensued, in which 
 the Peruvians were cut to pieces, 70 of them being 
 killed ; the Chilian loss was only trifling, owing to the 
 fact that they were better armed and mounted than their 
 opponents. After this skirmish the Chilians occupied 
 the line of railway between Pisagua and Agua Santa, 
 the main body being camped near Dolores on the road 
 from Iquique to Arica, where there was an abundant 
 supply of fresh water, and which was near the hill of 
 San Francisco, a naturally strong position. With the 
 railway to connect with the base of Pisagua and to 
 carry water from Dolores to the detachments on the 
 lines of communication, the Chilian position was excep- 
 tionally strong. By November 19, 1879, a force of 6000 
 men with 32 guns had been concentrated at San 
 Francisco, and reinforcements were close at hand if 
 the Peruvians attacked in superior numbers. 
 
 General Buendia determined to attempt to dislodge 
 the Chilians from Dolores and San Francisco. His idea 
 was that if he could seize the water supply at Dolores, 
 the enemy would be forced to fall back on Pisagua, and 
 even that place might become untenable. Throughout 
 the pampa of Tamarugal the lack of fresh water is a 
 serious obstacle, and the distances between sources of 
 supply are usually great ; and, moreover, the Peruvian 
 troops were short of provisions, and immediate action 
 was a necessity unless the whole province was to be 
 evacuated. Nominally, the Peruvian army in Tarapaca 
 amounted to 10,000 men, but when concentrated at 
 Pozo Almonte the number had dwindled to between 
 6000 and 7000. Hopes were entertained that the 
 Bolivians under President Daza would arrive, but on 
 November 18 news was received that he had turned 
 back to Arica. Notwithstanding this disappointment, 
 General Buendia decided to carry out his plans for 
 attacking the Chilian position near Dolores, and on 
 November 16 he started from Pozo Almonte for that 
 purpose. 
 
 It was a long and tedious march over a barren, 
 
1879] PERUVIAN DEFEAT AT DOLORES 463 
 
 alkaline desert, and not until the morning of the 19th 
 did the Peruvians come within striking distance of the 
 Chilians. They were able to occupy the establishment 
 of " Porvenir " before the action commenced, so obtain- 
 ing fresh water, and the buildings serving as the head- 
 quarters for General Buendia. The attack was deferred 
 until the afternoon, to enable the men to rest after a 
 fourteen-mile march since daybreak, but meanwhile a 
 reconnaissance was made by Colonel Espinar, who 
 reported that conditions were favourable for a flanking 
 movement on the San Francisco position at a point 
 where the Chilian artillery was much exposed. 
 
 At 3 p.m. the Peruvian division, commanded by 
 General Lavadenz and guided by Colonel Espinar, was 
 ordered to attack the Chilian flank and attempt to 
 capture the artillery, while another column under General 
 Villegas advanced to the foot of the San Francisco Hill ; 
 but the enemy was not taken by surprise, and a heavy 
 artillery fire met the advance. In spite of this, the 
 Peruvians gained ground and the Chilian gunners 
 wavered, but at this critical moment Colonel Espinar 
 was shot through the forehead and killed. Immediately 
 following this disaster a body of Chilian infantry came 
 up and delivered an effective bayonet charge which 
 saved the Chilians' guns, and support now arriving, the 
 Peruvians were driven back towards the "Porvenir." 
 The frontal attack by General Villegas proved equally 
 unsuccessful, the General being severely wounded early 
 in the action, and the Chilians working round the 
 Peruvian flanks forced their assailants to retreat with 
 heavy loss. At 5 p.m. the battle was over, and a decisive 
 victory had been won by the Chilians. No attempt 
 was made to follow the defeated Peruvians beyond 
 "Porvenir," although it was evident that an energetic 
 pursuit would have converted the defeat into a rout and 
 prevented the enemy from rallying again in this district. 
 The casualties on the Chilian side were 208 killed and 
 wounded, the Peruvian loss being 220 dead, 76 wounded, 
 and 100 men taken prisoners. 
 
464 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 General Buendia retreated across the pampa of 
 Tamarugal to the village of Tarapaca, He began this 
 toilsome march of thirty miles across the desert shortly 
 before midnight on the day of the battle, Colonel Suarez 
 being sent ahead to arrange for rations. Tarapaca was 
 reached on November 22, the guns having been abandoned 
 en 7-o ute owing to the great difficulty of transporting 
 them over the sandy ground. The army was joined on 
 the 26th by Colonel Rios and the garrison of Iquique, 
 this town having been evacuated when news of the 
 defeat at Dolores was received. This disaster to the 
 Peruvians was far-reaching in effect, for when the 
 garrison evacuated Iquique, the Prefect of the town, 
 Senor Lopez Lavalle, took refuge on board the British 
 warship Shannon, and on November 20 the city was 
 given up to the Chilian squadron. The practical out- 
 come of the action at Dolores was to place the Chilians 
 in absolute control of the nitrate of soda districts, the 
 source from which the Peruvian Government had derived 
 the larger portion of the national revenues. 
 
 The town of Tarapaca to which the Peruvians 
 retreated is situated at an elevation of 3800 feet above 
 sea level. It lies in a fertile valley watered by a stream 
 from the Andine ranges, but which is narrow and not 
 capable of supporting a large population. It was 
 impossible to keep the whole force concentrated in the 
 neighbourhood of the town, and General Buendia 
 decided to send the vanguard up the valley to the 
 village of Pichica, distant fifteen miles. The force 
 remaining at Tarapaca to bear the brunt of any sudden 
 attack from the Chilians consisted of the Commander- 
 in-chief and his staff and 2500 infantry, but this portion 
 of the army was without artillery or cavalry, and had 
 suffered greatly from the privations endured in the long 
 inarches and hard fighting which had taken place since 
 the hivasion commenced. Food was scarce, ammunition 
 running short, and they were generally in no condition 
 to cope with the Chilians, now elated with victory; 
 nevertheless General Buendia determined to make one 
 
1879] ADVANCE TO TARAPACA 465 
 
 more stand, if the enemy followed him across the pampa 
 of Tamaragal. 
 
 Buendia was not long kept in suspense. General 
 Escala, in command of the Chilian army, shortly after 
 the victory at Dolores and the surrender of Iquique, 
 detached 2000 infantry, 150 cavalry, and 10 guns, under 
 Colonel Luis Arteaga to proceed to Tarapaca and attack 
 the Peruvians. This expedition left the railway station 
 of Dibujo on November 26, marched half-way across 
 the pampa that day, encamped for the night at Lluga, 
 and continued the advance at daybreak. At 10 a.m. 
 on the 27th, the force, marching in three columns, was 
 close to Tarapaca, and its approach not discovered until 
 within half a mile of the Peruvian lines. 
 
 The hills on both sides of Tarapaca rise abruptly to 
 a height of 1200 feet, and from the slopes the valley can 
 be dominated by rifle fire. The object of the Chilians was 
 to seize these ridges and compel the surrender of General 
 Buendia and his force. One of the Chilian columns 
 was directed to march to the point where the valley 
 debouches into the plain, and to advance up the slope to 
 the village, in order to prevent all possibility of the 
 Peruvians breaking away in that direction. When the 
 alarm was given, the Peruvians were forced to fight and 
 endeavour to hold the ground they occupied, or to 
 retreat towards Pichica, where lay the remainder of 
 their army, for in front and on both flanks they were 
 hemmed in by the Chilians. 
 
 General Buendia lost no time in making his disposi- 
 tion for the defence. A division commanded by Colonel 
 Andres Caceres was ordered to the ridge to the right of 
 Tarapaca to meet the enemy advancing on that flank, 
 and a second division was sent to the right, the 
 Commander-in-chief with a small force remaining to 
 protect the village from a frontal attack. A messenger 
 was despatched to the officer commanding at Pachica, 
 summoning him to bring up all available troops in 
 support of the defence. At 10.30 a.m., the division 
 under Colonel Caceres gained the crest on the right, and 
 
 2 G 
 
466 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 at once became heavily engaged with the Chilian 
 column commanded by Colonel Santa Cruz. At first 
 the advantage appeared to be with the Chilians, but the 
 Peruvians were reinforced by the arrival of the Iquique 
 detachment under Colonel Rios and slowly gained 
 ground. Both Colonel Zubiaga and Lieut. -Colonel 
 Manuel Suarez, commandant of the 20 de Mayo 
 Regiment, two of the ablest Peruvian officers, were 
 killed in the first quarter of an hour; but still the 
 Peruvians pressed forward against their enemies, and a 
 charge forced the Chilians to fall back and abandon two of 
 their Krupp field guns. The Peruvians again charged, 
 and the Chilian infantry was obliged to retreat, in spite 
 of supports under Colonel Arteaga, the commander of 
 the expedition, having hurried up to assist Colonel 
 Santa Cruz. By noon the Peruvians had further 
 advanced and captured another section of the Krupp 
 field battery, and this artillery was now utilised against 
 the Chilian infantry. Finally the Chilians fell back from 
 the heights and took up a position near the mouth of 
 the Tarapaca valley, the cavalry under Colonel Villagran 
 forming an efficient check to any attempt of the 
 Peruvians to follow up the success they had gained on 
 the right of the valley. 
 
 While this fighting took place on the right, an attack 
 had been made on the town of Tarapaca by a detach- 
 ment of Chilian infantry advancing up the valley. To 
 repel this, the Peruvian troops on the heights on the 
 left were brought down to the valley, and these with 
 the force remaining in the village with General Buendia 
 resisted so effectually that the detachment under Colonel 
 Ramirez was obliged to seek shelter at the place to 
 where the column under Colonel Santa Cruz had 
 retreated. Colonel Ramirez was so severely wounded 
 during the fighting, that he was left on the field and 
 taken prisoner by the Peruvians. It was now 3 p.m., 
 and five hours' hard fighting had taken place, and while 
 the Peruvians were exultant with the success they had 
 attained, they were exhausted. The Chilians were also 
 
1879] PERUVIAN VICTORY 467 
 
 discouraged, and were with difficulty rallied and again 
 led to the attack. Reinforcements from Pachica began 
 to arrive about 3.30 p.m., and when information of this 
 fact reached Colonel Arteaga, he ordered a general 
 retreat across the pampa of Tamarugal, considering that 
 further attack on the Peruvians would be useless. It 
 was carried out immediately, unmolested by the Peruvians 
 owing to lack of cavalry, but the Chilians left with the 
 enemy 8 guns and 1 standard. This was the one 
 substantial Peruvian victory during the war. The 
 Chilian loss was 687 officers and men killed and 
 wounded and 52 prisoners, the Peruvian casualties 
 being 19 officers killed, 16 wounded, and 236 non- 
 commissioned officers and men killed and 262 wounded 
 — giving a total, exclusive of the men captured, of 1220 
 casualties during an engagement of five hours. The 
 Chilian attacking force engaged consisted of 2000 officers 
 and men, with 10 guns, and the Peruvians numbered 
 2500 at the commencement of the fight, and 1000 
 officers and men arrived from Pichica towards the close 
 of the action in response to the summons of General 
 Buendia when the advance of the Chilians was first 
 known. During the early part of the action the 
 superiority in the numbers of the Peruvians was 
 counterbalanced by the fact that they were without 
 artillery ; towards the end they were not only in greater 
 force, but also had the use of the guns captured from 
 the Chilians, and it was in view of these circumstances 
 that Colonel Arteaga ordered the retreat. 
 
 After the battle of Tarapaca the Peruvians continued 
 preparations for retreating to Arica. The route taken 
 was along the foot of the great mountain ranges of the 
 Andes, and necessitated the crossing of long stretches of 
 barren desert where water and food supplies were 
 always difficult, and often impossible, to obtain. Arica 
 was reached finally on December 18, with the troops in 
 sorry condition from the many hardships that they had 
 undergone. Both General Buendia and Colonel Suarez, 
 the chief of staff, were placed under arrest and charged 
 
468 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 with the loss of Tarapaca, but were subsequently released 
 without trial and appointed to important commands. 
 Three days after the departure of the Peruvians from 
 Tarapaca an expedition was sent from Dibujo, under 
 charge of Colonel Urriola, to bury the Chilian dead and 
 bring in any wounded who might be found near where 
 the action of November 27 had been fought. 
 
 Tarapaca now securely occupied, the Chilian authori- 
 ties turned their attention to the Peruvian army concen- 
 trated at Arica and Tacna. Arica was the principal 
 seaport of southern Peru, and was closely blockaded by 
 the Chilian squadron. It was defended by 20 rifled 
 guns, 10 of them mounted on the Morro, a high table- 
 like cape to the south of the town, and the remainder 
 distributed over the forts of 2° de Mayo, Santa Rosa, 
 and San Jose on the north beach, and under the 
 protection of these forts was anchored the » monitor 
 Manco Capac, supported by a small torpedo brigade 
 organised by Lieutenant Prado. During December, 1 879, 
 and the opening months of 1880, the Chilian squadron 
 kept the garrison and inhabitants in a state of constant 
 alarm by occasional bombardments of the fortifications. 
 The command of the troops at Tacna and Arica devolved 
 on Admiral Montero, President Daza having been re- 
 placed by Colonel Eleodoro Camacho as the senior 
 officer of the Bolivian contingent. The Peruvian army 
 numbered 6000 officers and men and the Bolivians 
 4000, making a total defensive force of 10,000 to resist 
 the Chilian invasion. In April, General Campero arrived 
 from Bolivia and assumed the chief command, Admiral 
 Montero remaining under his orders in charge of the 
 Peruvians, and Colonel Camacho in a similar position 
 with the Bolivians. 
 
 General Manuel Baquedano had succeeded General 
 Escala in command of the Chilian army, and on 
 February 24, 1880, he ordered the advance on Tacna 
 and Arica to begin. A force of 10,000 men was 
 embarked at Iquique and Pisagua, and on February 26 
 a landing was effected at Yio and Pacocha, further 
 
 
1880] INVASION OF TACNA 460 
 
 reinforcements of 4000 men being disembarked on 
 February 28. The port of Ylo was eighty miles to the 
 north-west of Arica, and Pacocha only five miles from 
 Ylo. The object of General Baquedano was to isolate 
 the Peruvian and Bolivian forces at Tacna and Arica, 
 and cut off communication between those places and the 
 fertile district of Moquegua, of which Ylo is the seaport. 
 Moquegua was thus an important point for the Peruvians, 
 as from it supplies could be drawn for the maintenance 
 of the army. An expedition was landed also at Islay on 
 March 8, to occupy Mollendo, the port for Arequipa, 
 under Colonel Orozimbo Barbosa. Ylo is connected 
 with Moquegua by railway, and no opposition was 
 encountered by the Chilians on the advance to that 
 place on March 20, but at Torata, ten miles beyond 
 Moquegua, a Peruvian force under Colonel Gamarra was 
 entrenched in a strong position, and it was necessary to 
 dislodge the enemy from this stronghold. On March 
 22 General Baquedano attacked, preparing the way 
 for the assault by heavy artillery fire, and detaching a 
 column to make a detour and surprise the garrison by 
 a flank attack. For an hour the defenders held their 
 ground; but finally they were driven from their 
 entrenchments, leaving 28 killed and many wounded on 
 the field. The capture of Torata effectually closed all 
 communication between Tacna and the north of Peru, 
 and the Peruvian army at Tacna and Arica was now 
 surrounded. On the north was the Chilian force of 
 14,000 men under Baquedano, and on the south was the 
 province of Tarapaca in Chilian occupation. The Chilian 
 squadron held possession of the sea to the west, and at 
 the back of Tacna rose the vast mountain ranges of the 
 Andes, preventing any rapid movement to the east. 
 
 The eighty miles which separated the Chilian position 
 at Ylo from Tacna is traversed by two fertile valleys, 
 through which flow the rivers Locumba and Sama. 
 Preparations were begun for the march to Tacna, and a 
 reconnaissance of the intervening ground was made by 
 Colonel Vergara, and on April 17 an engagement took 
 
470 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAK 
 
 place between the mounted troops with Vergara and a 
 force of Peruvian cavalry under Colonel Albarracain, in 
 which the latter was cut to pieces, leaving 150 dead 
 bodies on the field. On April 27 a general advance 
 upon Tacna was ordered, the troops marching by easy 
 stages until reaching the vicinity of Buenavista in the 
 valley of the river Sama on May 20, 1880, and it was 
 here that Senor Sotomayor, the Chilian Minister of War, 
 was taken suddenly ill and died. He was the man who 
 had originated the plan of campaign in Tarapaca and 
 Tacna, and his loss was severely felt. The Chilian 
 advance was continued, and on the night of the 25th the 
 army encamped within six miles of Tacna, near which 
 place the bulk of the Peruvian and Bolivian forces 
 were concentrated. 
 
 To check the Chilian attack, General Campero had 
 selected a position on the summit of some barren hills to 
 the north-west of Tacna, with deep ravines on either 
 side, while the front sloped away at a sharp angle. 
 Here entrenchments were thrown up and the troops 
 enjoined to remain under cover as much as possible. 
 The centre of the defence was entrusted to Colonel 
 Pinto, and the left wing was commanded by Colonel 
 Camacho. On the right were the Peruvian troops in 
 charge of Admiral Montero, with Colonel Velarde 
 acting as chief of staff, and here also was Colonel 
 Belisario Suarez, already well known in connection with 
 the Tarapaca campaign. General Perez, a Bolivian 
 officer, was chief of the staff of the whole army. 
 
 The action was commenced at 10 a.m. on May 26, 
 by heavy artillery fire from the Chilian long-range 
 Krupp guns, and continued for an hour, and then 
 General Baquedano ordered a general assault. The 
 Chilian infantry advanced in four columns, each 2400 
 strong ; the first under Colonel Amengual attacked 
 the left of the Peruvian position, while the second and 
 third columns, led by Colonels Amunategui and Barcelo, 
 were directed against the enemy's centre, and the fourth, 
 commanded by Colonel Barbosa, assaulted the right 
 
1880] BATTLE OF TACNA 471 
 
 flank, where Admiral Montero was stationed. At noon 
 the battle was at its height, when suddenly the left 
 wing of the defenders gave way. General Campero 
 immediately sent reinforcements to support Colonel 
 Camacho, and the Chilians were forced back down 
 the hill ; but at this critical moment a cavalry charge 
 enabled them to rally. With the assistance of a con- 
 centration of artillery fire on the defenders' left, the 
 attack was again pressed home, and this second assault 
 was too much for the men under Camacho. At 2 p.m. 
 the left of the position was carried, and at the same time 
 the right wing gave way and the centre was overpowered, 
 the defeat of the Peruvians and Bolivians being complete. 
 General Campero with the remnant of the army retreated 
 through the Tacna valley towards Bolivia, reaching La 
 Paz without interference from the Chilians. The casual- 
 ties on both sides were exceptionally heavy, the Chilians 
 losing 2128 officers and men killed and wounded, and 
 the Peruvians 147 officers and 1500 men killed, and 
 1500 officers and men wounded. The forces engaged 
 numbered 14,000 Chilians and 8000 Peruvians and 
 Bolivians, and the severity of the fighting may be gauged 
 by the fact that one -quarter of the combatants were 
 killed or wounded in an action of only four hours' 
 duration. 
 
 After the victory at Tacna preparations were made 
 to capture Arica, where a Peruvian garrison of 2000 
 strong under command of Colonel Francisco Bolognesi 
 still held out. On June 2, 1880, General Baquedano 
 ordered a force of 4000 men in charge of Colonel Lagos 
 to proceed to Chacalluta, a short distance from Arica. 
 The fortifications in the neighbourhood of Arica had 
 been strengthened, and additional sand-bag defences 
 constructed on the Morro Hill to render it more formid- 
 able from the land side. Towards the sea the face of 
 this hill is a perpendicular cliff, 700 feet high. The 
 artillery at Arica has already been mentioned ; but extra 
 guns had been mounted on the Morro, bringing the total 
 number to nine, and a few Gatling guns had also been 
 
472 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 placed on the summit, so that it was one of the most 
 formidable obstacles the Chilians had met. 
 
 On June 5, 1880, General Baquedano sent a flag of 
 truce to the town with a summons to surrender, which 
 was refused. The Chilian Commander-in-chief then 
 gave orders to begin the bombardment of the place, and 
 next day the squadron opened fire, and was answered 
 by the forts and the guns of the Manco Capac. Some 
 damage was done to the Covadonga during the day, 
 while 28 men were killed and wounded on the Cochrane. 
 General Baquedano now determined to assault the forts 
 and defences at the Morro Hill on June 7, and all 
 preparations were made accordingly by Colonel Lagos. 
 Of the Chilian force, 1000 men were detailed to attack 
 the forts on the beach, 2000 were to storm the Morro 
 where the sand-bag defences had been constructed, and 
 1000 men were held in reserve for emergency. 
 
 The Chilian arrangements were conducted with the 
 utmost secrecy. Through the night camp fires were 
 kept burning by cavalry patrols to delude the enemy, 
 and meanwhile the troops crept up to the positions 
 assigned to them, in readiness to assault at the first 
 glimpse of daylight. So effectually was the operation 
 executed, that at dawn the Chilians were within a few 
 yards of the outer works protecting the Morro without 
 having been discovered, and a rush was made, the newly 
 constructed forts carried, and the defenders bayoneted. 
 Simultaneously the redoubts on the beach were seized 
 and the Morro Hill captured, in spite of a heavy fire 
 from the garrison, but only after desperate hand-to-hand 
 fighting, in which 600 Peruvians were killed. By 8 a.m. 
 the Chilians were in complete possession of Arica and 
 all the defences in the neighbourhood. When Captain 
 Lagomarsino of the Manco Capac saw all was lost, he 
 ordered the crew into the boats and opened the valves 
 of the monitor, and in a few minutes the vessel sank, 
 thus preventing her from falling into the hands of the 
 enemy. The total Peruvian casualties were returned as 
 700 officers and men killed and 100 wounded. Permis- 
 
i860] CAPTURE OF ARICA 473 
 
 sion was granted by the Chilian authorities for the 
 Peruvian steamer Limena to proceed to Arica and 
 remove the wounded to Callao, this being the more 
 necessary as Arica was crowded with the wounded of 
 the battle at Tacna on May 26. The Chilian loss in 
 the storming of the forts and the Morro Hill was com- 
 paratively trifling, owing to the defence being taken by 
 surprise. 
 
 The third phase of the war was concluded with the 
 occupation of Tacna and Arica. The invasion of Peru- 
 vian territory had been accomplished, the Chilians being 
 now in complete possession of the southern section and 
 controlling the nitrate of soda industry and the shipment 
 of guano, the two principal sources of revenue upon 
 which Peru had relied. 
 
CHAPTER XXVI 
 
 the chilian-peruvian war — continued 
 
 Internal Dissensions. President Prado leaves Peru. Senor Pierola 
 heads a Revolt. Blockade of Callao. Bombardment of Callao. 
 Sinking of the Janequeo. Loss of the Loa. Sinking of the 
 Covadonga, Bombardment of Chancay, Ancon, and Chorillos. 
 Expedition to the Northern Coast. Protests from Foreign 
 Representatives. Efforts of United States for Peace. Confer- 
 ence on U.S. warship Lackcmana. Conditions of Chile. Chilian 
 Preparations for Advance on Lima. Army of Invasion. Occupa- 
 tion of Pisco and Yea. Landing at Curayaco. Naval Opera- 
 tions off Callao. Defences of Lima. Fourth Phase of War. 
 Advance on Peruvian Positions. Battle of Chorillos. Fighting 
 on Morro Solar. Armistice arranged by Foreign Diplomats. 
 Battle of Miraflores. Lima Surrenders. Occupation of the 
 Peruvian Capital. 
 
 While Peru was suffering many misfortunes in the 
 south the situation was further complicated by the 
 outbreak of internal dissensions at the National Capital. 
 The President, General Mariano Prado, in view of these 
 unsettled political conditions, had resigned command of 
 the army at Tacna to Admiral Montero on November 
 26, 1879, and returned to Lima to resume his presi- 
 dential functions. 
 
 In the absence of the President his duties had been 
 discharged by the Vice-President, General La Puerta, 
 and on his return to Lima he published a manifesto 
 announcing his resumption of office and stating that he 
 would use every effort in his power to retrieve the 
 recent national disasters. This document was dated 
 December 2, 1879, and the astonishment of the public 
 
1880] DISTURBANCES IN LIMA 475 
 
 can be imagined when, sixteen days later, the President 
 issued a decree to the effect that under powers granted 
 to him on May 2, 1878, he was proceeding abroad on 
 urgent public business, and that the Vice-President 
 would fill his post during his absence. Prado had no 
 sooner left than indignation became general, and roused 
 the populace to armed revolt against the constituted 
 authorities, the insurrection being headed by Seiior 
 Nicolas Pierola. Fighting took place in the streets of 
 Lima, and on December 22nd the insurgents obtained 
 possession of Callao. The Vice-President then resigned 
 office, and on December 23 Seiior Pierola entered 
 Lima, and was proclaimed the Supreme Chief of the 
 Republic. While the army at Tacna was making a 
 last effort to check the Chilian invasion these turbulent 
 events in the National Capital effectually prevented any 
 assistance in the quarter from which aid was naturally 
 expected. 
 
 The position of Peru was desperate when Seiior 
 Pierola assumed control of the Administration. It was 
 too late to avert disaster in Arica, for that port was 
 blockaded by the Chilian squadron, and this prevented 
 the despatch of reinforcements for the garrison. 
 Nothing could be done except to strengthen the 
 defences of Callao and Lima in view of the fact that 
 Chile, flushed with her success in Tarapaca, had already 
 made her preparations for the invasion of Tacna and 
 Arica, and was evidently determined to carry the 
 campaign still further into Peruvian territory when she 
 had disposed of the troops under Admiral Montero and 
 General Campero, and established an unbroken line of 
 communication between Arica and Valparaiso. 
 
 If any doubt existed in regard to the intention of 
 Chile to prolong the war beyond the southern districts, 
 it was dispelled on April 10, 1880, for on that date a 
 Chilian squadron commanded by Rear- Admiral Riveros 
 appeared off Callao, and notified the authorities and 
 foreign representatives that the blockade of the port 
 was established. Neutral merchant vessels were allowed 
 
476 THE CHILXAN-PEKTJVIAN WAR 
 
 eight days to leave the roadstead, the Chilian admiral 
 declaring that he would feel at liberty to bombard the 
 town at the expiration of that period. It was not until 
 nine months later that this blockade was raised. 
 
 Callao is built on a spit of land in a bay facing 
 northwards, eight miles from Lima, and connected with 
 that city by two lines of railway. Separated from 
 Callao by the Boqueron Channel is the island of San 
 Lorenzo, and for some unexplained reason this was not 
 fortified by the Peruvians. This island became the 
 headquarters of the blockading squadron, and proved 
 of great value to the Chilians during the operations. 
 The defences of Callao consisted of two round towers, 
 one armed with two 500-pounder Blakeley guns, the 
 other with four 300-pouncler Vavasseurs, and protected 
 by earthworks were two 1000-pounder smooth-bore 
 Rodman guns. On the beach were two revolving 
 armoured turrets called "Junin" and "Mercedes," the 
 former to the north, the latter to the south of the town, 
 and each equipped with two 500-pounder Armstrong 
 guns. Between these two turrets were the forts 
 " Ayacucho" and "Santa Rosa," in both of which two 
 500-pounder Blakeley guns were mounted. In various" 
 positions were the batteries "Maypu," "Provisional," 
 "Zepita," "Abtao," "Pichincha," and " Independencia," 
 with two, five, eight, six, four, and six 32-pounders 
 respectively. The harbour defence monitor Atahualpa, 
 the cruiser Union, three school ships, a Herreschoff 
 torpedo-boat, and several steam launches were moored 
 inside the basin of the port- works. A torpedo brigade 
 was formed to aid in the defence of the harbour, and 
 submarine mines were laid in the Boqueron Channel 
 and elsewhere. 
 
 The blockading squadron consisted of the Blanco 
 Encalada (flagship), the Huasca?% Angamos, Pikomayo, 
 and Matias Cousifio, and in May it was rendered more 
 effective by the addition of a number of fast torpedo- 
 boats, two of which, the Fresia and Janequeo, were 
 built by Yarrow. These two vessels were seventy feet 
 
Nicolas de Pierola. 
 
 [Face pane 476. 
 
1S80] CALLAO BLOCKADED 477 
 
 in length, with a speed of eighteen knots, and both 
 carried a Hotchkiss machine gun, and the Janequeo was 
 fitted with three McEvoy patent duplex outrigger 
 torpedoes. A third torpedo-boat was the Guacoldo,. 
 built in the United States for the Peruvian Government, 
 and captured by the Chilian transport Ama zones when 
 making the voyage from Panama to Callao. The two 
 other torpedo-boats were the Colo-colo and Tucapel, 
 built by Thorneycroft, and armed with machine guns 
 and outrigger torpedoes. 
 
 On April 22 and 23, 1880, the fleet bombarded Callao 
 at ranges of from 5000 to 7000 yards, and the attack 
 was answered by the forts, little damage being done on 
 either side. On May 10 another bombardment took 
 place, the forts and batteries again replying, and a 
 school ship and several barges were sunk and some 
 injury inflicted upon the dock works. On the other 
 hand, the Huascar was struck three times during the 
 engagement, one shot rendering her steering-gear 
 unserviceable, and another penetrating her side and 
 flooding one of her compartments. On May 25, the 
 Chilians sustained a serious reverse by the loss of the 
 torpedo-boat Janequeo. In company with the Guacoldo 
 this vessel was cruising near the entrance to the docks 
 before daybreak, and suddenly found herself close to 
 the Peruvian armed steam launch Independencia com- 
 manded by Lieutenant Galvez. Chase was given, and 
 on closing with his adversary Lieutenant Senoret of the 
 Janequeo endeavoured to destroy the launch with his 
 port torpedo ; but as the projectile was discharged 
 Lieutenant Galvez heaved a 100 -lb. case of powder on 
 the deck of the Janequeo and exploded it with a pistol 
 shot. The torpedo-boat sank at once, her commander 
 and crew escaping in a boat, and the Independencia 
 foundered immediately afterwards from the effect of the 
 torpedo explosion, by which eight of her crew also were 
 killed, Lieutenant Galvez and seven of his men being 
 rescued by the Guacoldo. The result of the loss of the 
 Janequeo was greatly increased vigilance by the Chilians, 
 
478 THE CHILIAN-PEEUVIAN WAR 
 
 and the utmost care was taken to prevent the recurrence 
 of a similar disaster. 
 
 The Chilians, however, were destined to suffer other 
 mishaps during the blockade. On July 3 a vessel was 
 seen in the direction of Ancon, a port sixteen miles to 
 the north of Callao, and the armed transport Loa was 
 despatched to overhaul this craft. On nearing her the 
 captain sent an officer on board to examine the ship, 
 and he found the vessel at anchor, but abandoned. 
 The cargo consisted of fresh provisions, and on this fact 
 being reported to Captain Pena of the Loa, orders were 
 given to tow the prize alongside and tranship the 
 contents to the transport. As the last of this cargo 
 was being hoisted on board a violent explosion occurred, 
 making a gap of 15 feet in length in the side of the 
 Loa at the water-line, and in five minutes the Chilian 
 vessel sank, with her perishing Captain Pena, three 
 officers, and fifty men. Thirty- eight of the crew were 
 saved by the boats of the foreign men-of-war which were 
 lying four miles away at the time. The cause of the 
 explosion was never explained, but was attributed to an 
 infernal machine placed at the bottom of the cargo of 
 the prize, and so arranged as to go off when relieved 
 from the pressure of the freight in the hold. 
 
 Another disaster was the loss of the Covadonga. 
 The Chilian Admiral had detached this ship from the 
 squadron to blockade the port of Chancay, a little to 
 the north of Ancon, and in charge was Commander 
 Pablo Ferrari. In the bay of Chancay a launch with 
 a smart gig astern was observed anchored near the 
 shore, and the launch was fired upon and destroyed, a 
 boat being then sent from the Covadonga to bring the 
 gig alongside. The boat proved uninjured and service- 
 able in appearance, and orders were given to hoist her 
 on board the Covadonga, but while she was being hauled 
 up to the davits an explosion occurred of such force 
 that the starboard side of the Covadonga was crushed, 
 and she <sank. Captain Ferrari and a number of the 
 crew were drowned, but fifteen men escaped in a boat 
 
1880] LOSS OF THE COVADONGA 479 
 
 and reached the Chilian sloop Pileomayo, and forty-nine 
 were saved by clinging to the upper rigging, and being 
 subsequently rescued by Peruvian shore boats. It was 
 supposed that an infernal machine had been placed in 
 the double bottom of the boat, and exploded under the 
 strain of lifting her out of the water. The loss of this 
 vessel was a source of the greatest annoyance to the 
 Chilians, for the Covadonga had been captured from the 
 Spaniards in the war of 1866 and was a valued trophy, 
 and she had been instrumental in the destruction of the 
 Peruvian ironclad Independemia, and was for that 
 reason highly prized ; moreover, she had only recently 
 been refitted and equipped with modern armament. 
 In retaliation for the destruction of the Loci and Cova- 
 donga the bombardment of the undefended towns of 
 Chancay, Ancon, and Chorillos was ordered by Admiral 
 Riveros, but little serious damage was done. 
 
 The Chilian Government now determined further to 
 embarrass the Peruvians by sending an expedition north- 
 wards to lay waste the country between Callao and 
 Payta, and for this service Captain Patricio Lynch of 
 the Chilian navy was selected. Captain Lynch was 
 born in Chile of Irish descent, and had served eight 
 years in the British navy ; he was an able and energetic 
 officer, and at this time sixty years of age. The purpose 
 of the expedition was to paralyse all trade and commerce 
 on the northern coast of Peru, and to destroy any 
 property providing supplies to enable the Peruvian 
 Government to carry on the war. A force of 3000 men 
 was organised, and in September, 1880, Captain Lynch 
 proceeded to carry out his instructions. The coast 
 towns of Huacho, Supe, Chimbote, Salaverry, Truxillo, 
 Pacasmayo, Eten, Chiclayo, Lambayeque, and Payta 
 were visited, all Government property in the shape of 
 railways and wharves were rendered useless, and all 
 villages and farms within easy reach of the seaboard 
 wrecked. In some cases this brought strong protests 
 from representatives of foreign governments when 
 residents of foreign nationality were the sufferers, but 
 
480 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 such expostulations did not alter the Chilian policy. 
 After laying waste the northern section of Peru, Captain 
 Lynch returned to Arica. 
 
 An effort was made by the United States to end the 
 struggle in October 1880. On the 6th, Mr Osborn, United 
 States Minister at Santiago, addressed a communication 
 to the Chilian Minister of Foreign Affairs suggesting a 
 conference to discuss terms for peace, and offering the 
 good offices of the United States. It was further pro- 
 posed that in event of the Chilian Government accepting 
 this suggestion, the meeting of the delegates from Chile, 
 Peru, and Bolivia should be held on an United States war- 
 ship off Arica, and that the representatives of the United 
 States at Santiago, Lima, and in Bolivia should be present. 
 The Chilian Government was willing a meeting should 
 take place, and a conference was arranged for October 
 22, on board the United States corvette Lackawana, then 
 lying at Arica. The delegates from Chile were Colonel 
 Vergara, the Minister of War, Seiior Eulogio Altamirano, 
 and Seiior Eusebio Lillo. Peru was represented by 
 Captain Aureteo Garcia y Garcia, and Senor Antonio 
 Arenas, and Bolivia sent Senor Mariano Baptista and 
 Senor Juan Carillo. The three United States repre- 
 sentatives present were Mr Osborn, Minister to Chile, 
 Mr Christiancy, Minister to Peru, and Mr Adams, 
 Minister to Bolivia. At the opening of the conference 
 Mr Adams stated that the United States representatives 
 would take no part in the discussion, although they 
 would render any assistance possible by friendly co- 
 operation and through the good offices of his Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 The business of the conference now commenced. 
 A memorandum of the terms on which the Chilian 
 Government was willing to make peace was submitted, 
 the conditions including the absolute cession by Peru of 
 the Province of Tarapaca to the south of the valley of 
 Camarones ; the relinquishment by Bolivia of her coast 
 province to Chile, thejpayment of $20,000,000, of which 
 $4,000,000 was to be in cash ; the return to Chilian 
 
1880] CHILIAN TEEMS REJECTED 481 
 
 citizens of all private property seized during the war ; 
 the surrender of the transport Rimac ; the abrogation of 
 the treaty of alliance between Peru and Bolivia ; the 
 retention by Chile of the Peruvian provinces of Moquegua, 
 Tacna, and Arica until peace was established ; and, 
 finally, an obligation on the part of Peru that Arica 
 should remain unfortified. With the submission of this 
 memorandum, the first meeting concluded and the 
 conference adjourned. At the second meeting, Senor 
 Arenas (Peru) stated that the Chilian demands were 
 based on the right of conquest without regard to equity, 
 and that if they were not modified all hope of an 
 agreement must be abandoned. To this Senor Alta- 
 mirano replied, that Chile must be compensated for the 
 sacrifices she had made, and that the conquered province 
 of Atacama owed its prosperity and development to 
 Chilian capital, energy, and labour. Senor Baptista 
 (Bolivia) admitted that Chile by reason of her success 
 might rightly claim an indemnity, and he proposed that 
 she should remain in occupation of the territory which 
 she now held until that indemnity had been received out 
 of the revenues of those districts, but he could not accept 
 the idea of a permanent alienation of the area in question. 
 Captain Garcia y Garcia proposed that the matter 
 should be referred to the arbitration of the United 
 States Government, but this was promptly rejected by 
 the Chilian representatives, and they also refused to 
 consider the payment of an indemnity as suggested by 
 Senor Baptista. With this the futile conference ended. 
 Immediately after preparations were begun by the 
 Chilians for an advance from Tacna towards Lima. The 
 expeditionary force organised to attack Lima consisted 
 of 30,000 men, in three divisions. The first comprised 
 9000 officers and men, and was commanded by Captain 
 Patricio Lynch ; the second, under General Sotomayor, 
 numbered 9500 ; the third was 6560 strong, and was in 
 charge of Colonel Lagos ; and in addition to these three 
 divisions, a reserve of 1250 officers and men was held in 
 readiness to follow the main body when all preparations 
 
 2h 
 
482 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 were completed. With the army were 77 guns, 8 
 Gatlings and 2 Nordenfelts. The composition of the 
 force was : — Infantry, 1008 officers and 22,169 men; 
 cavalry, 91 officers and 1301 men ; artillery, 103 officers 
 and 1486 men — a total of 1202 officers and 24,956 men. 
 In addition to this combative force, there was the 
 commissariat, ambulance corps, teamsters, and camp 
 followers, which raised the total of the army to more 
 than 30,000. General Baquedano was Commander-in- 
 chief, General Maturana the chief of staff, Colonel 
 Velasquez in charge of the artillery, and Colonel Letelier 
 commanded the cavalry. The Chilian authorities fully 
 understood that the object they had in view would not 
 be attained without desperate fighting, and they took all 
 precautions to avoid possible disaster; the army con- 
 tained the best of the fighting forces of Chile, and no 
 expense was spared in the matter of equipment. On 
 November 19, the first division under Captain Lynch 
 disembarked at Pisco, which was occupied with practi- 
 cally no resistance from the small Peruvian garrison ; 
 and then the valley and town of Yea were seized. 
 Captain Lynch had instructions to march to the north 
 from Pisco to Curayaco Bay, 107 miles distant, where 
 the remainder of the expeditionary forces would be 
 landed, and which was the base for the final advance on 
 Lima. Captain Lynch remained at Pisco until the 11th 
 of December before attempting to move northwards to 
 Curayaco. 
 
 The landing of the main body of the Chilian army at 
 Curayaco began on December 22, 1880, and was com- 
 pleted in two days, when a force of cavalry was immedi- 
 ately pushed forward to occupy the valley of the river 
 Lurin, twelve miles from Curayaco, the district being held 
 by a weak Peruvian garrison quite incapable of effec- 
 tual resistance. On the 27th a detachment of Peruvian 
 cavalry was surprised by Colonel Barbosa and captured, 
 leaving the valley clear of the enemy and free for the 
 advance of General Baquedano, and on the 25th the 
 division under Captain Lynch which had marched from 
 
1880] THE ADVANCE TO LIMA 483 
 
 Pisco formed a junction with the main body. On 
 December 28 the expedition moved forward to the 
 river Lurin and encamped in a position ten miles from 
 the first line of the Peruvian defences of Lima, and in 
 the valley of the Lurin a halt was made for fifteen days 
 while the country round Lima was thoroughly recon- 
 noitred and final preparations made for the attack. 
 
 While the Chilian army was gradually approaching 
 Lima the blockade of Callao was closely maintained by 
 the Chilian squadron, and on December 6 the last 
 action of the war in which the navy was engaged took 
 place. A Peruvian launch with a lighter in tow was 
 observed outside the Callao docks, and the torpedo- 
 boats Fresia, Tucapel, and Guacoldo steamed in to 
 intercept her. The launch opened fire from two 40- 
 pounder Armstrong guns on her pursuers, and the shore 
 batteries joined in the cannonade. This brought up the 
 squadron, and a bombardment of the forts began, the 
 firing lasting for an hour and a half. The Fresia was 
 struck by a shell and foundered, but was subsequently 
 raised and repaired ; and a shell from the Angamos hit 
 the Peruvian cruiser Union lying in the dock basin, and 
 caused considerable damage, but no other serious injury 
 was done. 
 
 The futility of the peace conference on the U.S. 
 warship Lackawana in October, 1880, brought home to 
 the Peruvian authorities the fact that they must prepare 
 to meet the Chilians in the vicinity of the National 
 Capital. There remained no doubt now that the 
 invasion had Lima as its objective point, and prepara- 
 tions for resistance were begun with feverish haste. By 
 a decree of the Government all able-bodied men between 
 the ages of sixteen and sixty were enrolled in the army 
 for defensive purposes, and after the landing of the 
 Chilian expedition at Curayaco all public offices and 
 commercial establishments were closed between the 
 hours of 3 and 6 p.m. by official orders, to allow the 
 army of defence to be drilled and disciplined, the tolling 
 of the Cathedral bell notifying the men when their 
 
484 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAK 
 
 attendance was required. These measures were directed 
 by Seftor Nicolas Pierola, and resulted in the organisa- 
 tion of 26,000 men in the fighting ranks and a reserve 
 numbering 18,000, although a large proportion of this 
 latter body was unfit for active service. The vast 
 majority of the men in this army were recruits, and the 
 time for imparting military training was so short that 
 the bulk of the troops could only be regarded in the 
 light of raw levies when the final struggle occurred. 
 The army was organised in four divisions, commanded 
 respectively by Colonel Suarez, Caceres, Davila, and 
 Iglesias. In the matter of artillery the Peruvians were 
 very deficient, the total number of field guns only 
 reaching 100, most of these being of local manufacture, 
 and of such poor quality as to be of little use against 
 the modern equipment of the Chilians. 
 
 When information of the Chilian landing at Curayaco 
 was received in Lima, Sefior Pierola determined to form 
 a first line of defence on the range of low hills situated 
 immediately to the south of the town of Chorillos. 
 Close to the sea at this point rises the high bluff known 
 as the Morro Solar, and this was selected as the 
 extreme right of the Peruvian position. The top of 
 Morro Solar is 2000 feet above sea level, and from 
 there to the eastward is a chain of hills, of which the 
 most prominent are Santa Teresa and San Juan. The 
 length of this defensive line was eight miles, and it was 
 intersected by three roads connecting Lima with the 
 Lurin valley, by which route the Chilians were expected 
 to advance. Trenches were thrown up and guns 
 posted in all commanding positions so effectively that 
 in the hands of trained troops the line would undoubtedly 
 have been a most formidable obstacle to overcome, but 
 the natural strength of the position was counteracted by 
 the lack of military experience of the rank and file of 
 the men. This first line of defence was ten miles from 
 Lima, and a second line was formed six miles from the 
 city, the right flank resting upon the village of Miraflores, 
 thence extending in a north-easterly direction for four 
 
1881] THE PERUVIAN DEFENCE 485 
 
 miles until reaching the hill of San Bartolome, which 
 rises to a height of 1476 feet above sea level. This 
 second line was over farm lands, where fields were separ- 
 ated by mud walls which were loopholed and transformed 
 into efficient cover for infantry, and they constituted a 
 serious impediment to the manoeuvring of any cavalry 
 the attacking force might throw forward. The positions 
 selected were regarded as impregnable by Senor Pierola 
 and his staff, and they looked forward with confidence 
 to the result of the battle. 
 
 The fourth phase of the war was now at hand. 
 From his encampment near the river Lurin the Chilian 
 Commander-in-chief sent out a strong force on January 9, 
 1881, under Colonel Barbosa, to make a reconnaissance 
 on the left of the Peruvian position, and a slight 
 skirmish took place. Senor Pierola, anticipating a 
 general attack in this quarter, immediately reinforced 
 the position by detailing the division under Colonel 
 Davila to assist the defence of this part of the line. 
 The project of moving the whole Chilian army to the 
 north-east of Lima and so outflanking the Peruvian 
 position had been carefully considered by General 
 Baquedano, but the idea was abandoned in view of 
 the information brought in by Colonel Barbosa, and 
 also because it necessitated a march of fifteen miles 
 over waterless desert with the probability of a hard 
 fight when the troops were tired ; moreover, this 
 flanking movement entailed the army losing touch with 
 the ships. In these circumstances General Baquedano 
 decided to advance with his left wing resting on the sea 
 shore, and to make a frontal attack on the first line of 
 the Peruvian defence. 
 
 On the evening of January 12 orders were issued 
 for the advance, the plan being to deliver the attack at 
 daybreak on January 13, and if possible take the enemy 
 by surprise. The First Division, under Captain Lynch, 
 formed the left wing, and marched parallel to the 
 seashore, with instructions to assault the Peruvian 
 positions between the Morro Solar and Santa Teresa, 
 
486 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 then to occupy Chorillos. The Second Division, com- 
 manded by General Sotomayor, was in the centre, and 
 was ordered to force the Peruvian line near San Juan, 
 and form a junction with the First Division at Chorillos. 
 The Third Division in charge of Colonel Lagos was on 
 the right, and to it was assigned the duty of holding the 
 enemy's left in check and supporting General Sotomayor 
 if necessary. The reserves under Colonel Martinez 
 were in the rear between the left and centre, with 
 instructions to support Captain Lynch or General 
 Sotomayor as occasion required. The details of the 
 march were carried out successfully, the army arriving 
 in front of the Peruvian position shortly before midnight, 
 and there resting until daylight. 
 
 The Peruvian right on the Morro Solar was in charge 
 of Colonel Iglesias with a force of 6000 men ; the centre, 
 in which were the hills of Santa Teresa and San Juan, 
 was commanded by Colonel Andres Caceres ; on the 
 left was Colonel Davila ; the strength of the centre and 
 left was each about 6000 men. The Fourth Division 
 of the Peruvian army under Colonel Suarez formed the 
 reserve. Seilor Pierola, acting as Commander-in-chief 
 of the Peruvians, had his headquarters at Chorillos, and 
 with him were General Buendia, Admiral Montero, 
 General Silva, the chief of staff, Captain Garcia y Garcia, 
 and a number of other officers. 
 
 At dawn on January 13 the Chilians attacked, and 
 the division on the left under Captain Lynch first 
 became engaged, but the action was soon general along 
 the line. For the first hour the defenders at the base 
 of the Morro Solar held their ground tenaciously, 
 although subjected to a heavy fire from the Chilian 
 squadron in addition to that of the division led by 
 Captain Lynch. In view of this obstinate resistance, 
 General Baquedano ordered the reserves under Colonel 
 Martinez to attack the Peruvian right wing on the 
 flank extended towards Santa Teresa, and the enemy 
 gave way at this point, retreating up the hill of Morro 
 Solar. Meanwhile, at 6 A.M., the centre under General 
 
1881] BATTLE OF CHOKILLOS 487 
 
 Sotomayor had carried the defences in front of San 
 Juan by a brilliant and daring bayonet charge. At 
 7.30 a.m., two and a half hours after the commencement 
 of the battle, the defending army was in full retreat, 
 and this was soon converted into a rout by the Chilian 
 cavalry charging the fugitives again and again. The 
 Peruvian centre under Colonel Caceres maintained a 
 show of order in the retirement, and fell back upon 
 Chorillos, but with this exception, and the troops under 
 Colonel Iglesias concentrated on the hill of Morro 
 Solar, the army of the first line of defence was dispersed. 
 The Morro Solar was surrounded, but the position 
 was admirably adapted for defensive tactics, and 
 Captain Lynch found the task before him no easy 
 matter. After three hours' heavy fighting, the Peruvians 
 were driven to exposed ground, where a steady artillery 
 fire was brought to bear upon them ; and seeing that 
 their case was hopeless, Colonel Iglesias surrendered to 
 save further sacrifice of life. The combat was now 
 transferred to Chorillos, where Colonel Caceres with 
 2000 and Colonel Recabarren with 1000 men were 
 making a last stand ; but the Second Chilian Division 
 under General Sotomayor finally carried the town at 
 the point of the bayonet, losses on both sides being 
 heavy. After the capture of Chorillos, the army was 
 halted preparatory to attacking the second line near 
 Miraflores, and to this place Senor Pierola, who had 
 escaped from Chorillos when he saw the day was lost, 
 had proceeded to direct the defence. In this engage- 
 ment the Chilian losses were 800 officers and men 
 killed and 2500 wounded, and the Peruvian casualties 
 amounted to 5000 officers and men killed, 4000 
 wounded, and 2000 officers and men taken prisoners. 
 This was a total loss of 12,300 officers and men killed 
 and wounded out of 42,000 engaged. 
 
 The 14th of January was spent by the Chilians in 
 attending to the wounded and burying the dead, and in 
 making a reconnaissance of the second line of the 
 Peruvian defence. Plans were drawn up for attacking 
 
488 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAH 
 
 this last obstacle to the entry into Lima, and General 
 Baquedano decided to assault the position on January 
 15, but was deterred from doing so by representations 
 from the foreign diplomatic corps in Lima, who 
 requested an armistice to allow time for Senor Pierola 
 to consider if further bloodshed could be avoided. It 
 was at the suggestion of Senor Pierola that this 
 diplomatic intervention took place, and the representa- 
 tions were made to General Baquedano by Sir Spencer 
 St John, Minister for Great Britain, M. de Vosges, 
 Minister of France, and Senor Pinto, Minister for 
 Salvador. The Chilian Commander-in-chief agreed to 
 suspend hostilities until midnight on January 15, but 
 only on condition that certain movements of troops then 
 in course of execution should be concluded. To this the 
 foreign diplomatists assented, but added a rider to the 
 effect that the main body of the Chilian army should not 
 advance from the position it then held. The Ministers 
 returned to Miranores and communicated the terms of 
 the armistice to Pierola ; but hardly an hour had elapsed 
 before heavy firing was heard, and it was found that 
 General Baquedano had himself unwittingly broken the 
 terms of the armistice by riding out with his staff in 
 front of the Chilian line. Some Peruvian artillery, mis- 
 taking this for an advance of the Chilians, had opened 
 fire, and at 2 p.m. the action became general. 
 
 Twelve thousand Peruvian troops were concentrated 
 on this second line, partly the survivors of the battle of 
 Chorillos, and partly men from the reserves who had 
 not been engaged in the former action. After a 
 bombardment of the position by the Chilian artillery 
 and the squadron consisting of the Blanco Encalada, 
 the Huascar, Pilcomayo, O'Higgins, and Toro, the Third 
 Division of the Chilian army, led by Colonel Lagos, 
 advanced in skirmishing order under the protection of 
 the field guns. A desperate charge on the Peruvian 
 right at 4.30 p.m. carried that part of the defence after 
 a severe struggle. On the left, the defenders, supported 
 by five redoubts and the artillery mounted on the 
 
1881] BATTLE OF MIRAFLORES 489 
 
 heights of San Bartolome and San Oistoval, made a 
 stubborn resistance ; but they were forced back when 
 the Chilian line was reinforced and additional batteries 
 brought into action, and at 5 p.m. only the Peruvian 
 centre remained to be taken. Half an hour later, this 
 section of the defence was overcome by another bayonet 
 charge ; and at 6 p.m. all firing ceased, the Peruvians 
 taking refuge in flight. Senor Pierola, when he saw 
 that the victory of the Chilians was inevitable, rode off 
 accompanied by General Buendia, Colonel Suarez, and 
 Captain Garcia y Garcia, and reached the town of 
 Cauta situated in the mountains and at some distance 
 from the seaboard, and many other Peruvian officers 
 escaped from the field and found asylum in the 
 mountainous regions of the interior. In this engage- 
 ment the Chilians lost 500 officers and men killed and 
 1625 wounded, and the Peruvian casualties were 3000 
 killed and wounded. At Miraflores, the number of 
 Chilians in the fighting line was 13,000, and out of a 
 total of 25,000 officers and men engaged on both sides, 
 the casualties were 5125, a clear proof of the severe 
 nature of the combat. The total loss in killed and 
 wounded in the two fights was 17,425 of all ranks — of 
 these, 5425 were Chilians, and 12,000 Peruvians. 
 
 The result of the battle of Miraflores left Lima at 
 the mercy of the invading army. Early on January 16, 
 Senor Rufino Torico, the Municipal Alcalde, tendered 
 the formal surrender of the National Capital to the 
 Chilian Commander-in-chief, and on the following day 
 General Cornelio Saavedra, with a division of 4000 
 troops, took possession of the city. 
 
CHAPTER XXVII 
 
 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR — Continued 
 
 Panic in Lima. Asylum given by the Legations. Action of British 
 and French Admirals. Urban Guard. General Saavedra 
 re-establishes Order. Conduct of Chilians. Entry of General 
 Baquedano into Lima. Vessels Destroyed at Callao. Admiral 
 Lynch Commands in Peru. Government of Dr Calderon. 
 Recognition of Calderon Administration by United States. 
 Admiral Lynch overturns Calderon. The Montero Government. 
 Situation in 1882. Caceres and Guerilla Warfare. Peruvian 
 Army at Arequipa. Expedition against Arequipa. Peruvians 
 Defeated. Government of General Iglesias. Conditions of 
 Peace. Treaty between Chile and Peru. Evacuation of Lima. 
 Ratification of Treaty. Negotiations between Chile and Bolivia. 
 Text of Agreement between Chile and Bolivia. Result of the 
 War. 
 
 The approach of the invading army towards Lima had 
 created panic amongst the peaceable inhabitants of the 
 city. Stories had been set afloat of the atrocities com- 
 mitted by the Chilians in the south of Peru, and 
 although obviously exaggerated, they found credence in 
 the ears of a section of the population only too willing 
 to believe accounts of outrages committed by the 
 victorious troops. 
 
 When all able-bodied men were withdrawn from the 
 city to swell the fighting ranks for the defence, affairs at 
 Lima were in bad plight. No police were left to 
 preserve order amongst a numerous class of vicious 
 characters who avoided military service by skulking in 
 the slums, and robbery and murder were committed 
 
1881] OCCUPATION OF LIMA 491 
 
 almost with impunity, adding terror to the situation. 
 The foreign legations were crowded with refugees of all 
 ranks of society, and the British Legation became an 
 asylum for hundreds of people, Peruvians and foreigners 
 alike begging a resting-place within its friendly doors. 
 The crowd of persons asking admittance was so great 
 that additional buildings were annexed, and even then 
 many of the refugees were forced to live and sleep in 
 corridors, passages, and outhouses for lack of better 
 accommodation. Other foreign representatives followed 
 the example of Sir Spencer St John, and provided pro- 
 tection for the rush of panic-stricken applicants. 
 Imbued with the idea that Lima would be looted by 
 the Chilians, the Peruvian families buried or hid away 
 all valuables in the shape of plate, jewellery, and 
 pictures — in fact everything not too bulky to be stowed 
 into a small compass. Luckily for the townspeople, the 
 British and French Admirals assisted in the prevention 
 of undue excesses, and detachments of bluejackets and 
 marines were landed from the foreign warships to guard 
 the Legations and suppress serious rioting. An Urban 
 Guard was recruited from the foreign residents, and 
 armed for patrol duty in the streets and suburbs. Nor 
 were these precautions unnecessary, for after the 
 Chilian victories at Chorillos and Miraflores fugitives 
 from the Peruvian army poured into the city, and were 
 only checked from committing excesses by the steps 
 that had been taken to maintain order. In some cases 
 the authority assumed by the detachments from the 
 men-of-war and the Urban Guard required to be 
 enforced by strong measures, but the determined atti- 
 tude of the men who had taken control saved Lima 
 from any outrage by an unprincipled rabble. 
 
 The action of the foreign representatives and the 
 
 British and French Admirals in regard to the entry of 
 
 I the Chilian forces into Lima after the battle of Mira- 
 
 ! nores was deserving of the highest commendation. 
 
 They insisted that it would be inadvisable to allow the 
 
 troops, flushed with victory, to take possession of the 
 
492 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 city immediately after the rout of the Peruvian army, 
 and they were so firm in their attitude that the Chilian 
 Commander-in-chief deferred to their request for a short 
 delay before the army assumed possession of the 
 Peruvian capital, and it was for this reason that the 
 Chilian troops did not arrive in Lima until January 
 17, 1881. Immediately the Chilians were in possession 
 measures were taken by General Saavedra to guard 
 against disturbances, and in twenty-four hours order 
 was re-established and quiet ensured by. peremptory 
 punishment when necessary. 
 
 Unfortunately the accusations levelled against the 
 Chilians of acts of vandalism during the military occupa- 
 tion of Lima have some foundation in fact. The 
 property of the Peruvian Government was confiscated 
 to an unnecessary extent, an instance in point being the 
 seizure of scientific instruments intended for the Lima 
 Observatory and their transmission to Santiago, and 
 little effort was made to safeguard certain national 
 property deserving of careful consideration. A battalion 
 of infantry was quartered in the national library, where 
 a collection of most valuable books and manuscripts 
 had been accumulated, and numbers of the volumes 
 disappeared, priceless manuscripts were taken from the 
 cases and thrown away or sold for a few dollars by a 
 soldiery ignorant of their worth. Many artistic trea- 
 sures were appropriated by unscrupulous Chilians 
 without the knowledge of their superior officers, and 
 the owners were too terrified to make complaint in the 
 proper quarter ; but innumerable thefts were committed 
 by persons entirely unconnected with the army of 
 occupation, and such robberies were invariably attri- 
 buted to the Chilian troops. Away from Lima the 
 Chilian soldiers undoubtedly did treat the Peruvians 
 with unnecessary harshness in districts to which 
 expeditions were despatched, but such conduct could 
 only be expected when due appreciation is given to the 
 material of the Chilian forces ; moreover, Peru was a 
 conquered country, and the inhabitants could not 
 
General Caceres. 
 
 [Face page 496 
 
1881] ACTS OF VANDALISM 493 
 
 expect any kid-glove courtesy. In the towns per- 
 manently garrisoned by Chilian troops all depredations 
 were quickly suppressed by the military authorities, and 
 hostile feeling between natives and soldiers was allowed 
 small scope for the disturbance of public order. 
 
 On January 18, 1881, the Commander-in-chief of 
 the Chilian army with his staff made a formal entry 
 into Lima and occupied the presidential palace. 
 Arrangements were commenced for the establishment 
 of a temporary administration for the city and surround- 
 ing districts, and officials were appointed to take charge 
 of the municipal revenues and attend to the distribution 
 and disbursement of the funds collected. The blockade 
 of Callao was raised and the port opened to international 
 trade, and the reconstruction of the economic life of the 
 occupied districts, which had been thoroughly dis- 
 organised during the past twelve months, was under- 
 taken with as little delay as possible. 
 
 When the news of the defeat of the Peruvian army 
 reached Callao, the naval authorities determined to 
 destroy the vessels in the harbour to prevent them 
 falling into the hands of the Chilians. The Union was 
 dismantled of her armament and wrecked, the coast- 
 defence monitor Atahualpa was sunk, and the school 
 ships Apurimac, Meteoro, and Maranon, and the trans- 
 ports Rimac, Chalaca, and Talisman were destroyed. 
 In view of the fact that the conquest of Peru was 
 accomplished when this action was taken, it is not 
 surprising that the destruction of these vessels pro- 
 foundly irritated the Chilians. 
 
 Towards the end of March, General Baquedano 
 resigned command of the army of occupation and 
 returned to Chile, his successor being Admiral Patricio 
 Lynch, who had been promoted to flag rank for his 
 services during the campaign. The task of Admiral 
 Lynch required more than ordinary ability to accomplish 
 in an efficient and successful manner. The Chilian 
 Government was anxious to make peace with the 
 Peruvians, and to withdraw its troops from Permian 
 
494 THE CHILIAN-PEEUVIAN WAP 
 
 territory under a satisfactory treaty, but the difficulty 
 was that no representative Peruvian Government existed 
 with which to deal. An attempt was made to open 
 negotiations with Senor Pierola, but he and his friends 
 were irreconcilable to any terms which included the 
 permanent cession of Peruvian territory to Chile, and 
 it was only on those conditions that the Chilian 
 Government was prepared to discuss peace proposals. 
 With the consent of the military authorities, a meeting 
 of prominent citizens was called in Lima, about one 
 hundred representatives attending, and Dr Francisco 
 Garcia Calderon finally agreed, as the result of this 
 conference, to undertake the responsibity of forming an 
 Administration. With the sanction of Admiral Lynch, 
 the village of Magdalena, three miles from Lima, became 
 the headquarters of the new Government, and here Dr 
 Calderon formally assumed his functions as President 
 on March 12. A ministry was appointed, Admiral 
 Montero was nominated as Vice-President, and a 
 meeting was summoned of the Congress existing be- 
 fore the invasion of Lima by the Chilians. A certain 
 number of these legislators assembled in due course at 
 Chorillos in the military college, that building having 
 been placed at the disposition of the Peruvians by order 
 of Admiral Lynch. 
 
 On June 23, 1881, the Government presided over by 
 Dr Calderon was formally recognised by the United 
 States, and for a time matters appeared to be in a fair 
 way towards the reconstruction of a National Adminis- 
 tration. The stumbling-block proved to be the action 
 of the Congress in refusing authorisation to the President 
 to agree to terms of peace with Chile which were based 
 on a permanent alienation of any section of Peruvian 
 territory, and the Congress was dissolved on August 23, 
 leaving President Calderon without authority to treat 
 with Chile. In September, 1881, Admiral Lynch sus- 
 pected Dr Calderon of intriguing with the scattered I 
 Peruvian forces in the interior of the country for further 
 resistance against the Chilians, and also of endeavouring 
 
 
1881] THE CALDERON ADMINISTRATION 495 
 
 to induce the United States to intervene between Peru 
 and Chile. Whether these suspicions were confirmed or 
 not subsequently has never been made clear, but acting 
 on them the Admiral caused the Calderon Administra- 
 tion to be disbanded, and the President exiled to Chile 
 as a person dangerous to the maintenance of public order. 
 In these circumstances Admiral Montero, in view of the 
 fact that he had been chosen Vice-President under 
 Calderon, arrogated to himself the position of President 
 of Peru, and in August he proceeded to Arequipa, where 
 the Peruvians were still in possession, and there formed 
 a government. His first ministry consisted of Captain 
 Camilo Carrillo, Minister of Interior ; Dr del Valle, 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs ; Dr Epifanio Serpe, Minister 
 of Justice ; Dr Oviedo, Minister of Finance ; and Colonel 
 Manuel Velarde, Minister of War. This Government, 
 although not recognised by Chile, was accepted by the 
 Peruvians, the more readily as Senor Pierola had 
 resigned his powers to an Assembly convoked by him 
 at Ayacucho on July 28, 1881. The delegates then pro- 
 claimed the former Supreme Chief as Provisional Presi- 
 dent ; but, on November 28, Pierola again resigned, and 
 leaving Peru retired into private life. 
 
 Many unexpected complications arose during 1882 
 to prevent Chile from obtaining the desired treaty of 
 peace to enable her to withdraw the army of occupation. 
 In the mountainous districts of the interior to the east 
 of Lima the remnants of the Peruvian forces had been 
 collected by Colonel Andres Caceres, and a guerilla 
 warfare was initiated against all isolated Chilian detach- 
 ments that could be attacked with a fair prospect of 
 success. The presence of these groups of armed men 
 necessitated constant small expeditions of Chilian troops 
 to the interior of the country, and tended to a condition 
 of uneasiness militating against Chilian interests. 
 Towards the close of the year the position was rendered 
 still more difficult by the concentration of a Peruvian 
 force of 5000 men at Arequipa, where a supply of arms 
 and ammunition was obtained through Bolivia, whose 
 
496 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 Government bought war material in Buenos Aires, 
 conveying it by way of La Paz and Lake Titicaca to 
 Admiral Montero. When 1883 opened, there appeared 
 no better prospect of a settlement between Chile and 
 Peru than immediately after the capture of Lima. 
 
 Admiral Lynch was not easily daunted, and he 
 determined to act so energetically against the armed 
 groups in the interior and the Administration at 
 Arequipa as to convince the Peruvians of the futility of 
 further resistance. Detachments of troops were 
 despatched against the guerilla bands of Colonel 
 Caceres, with instructions to allow them no rest until 
 they were crushed, and these orders were resolutely 
 carried out. Against the Peruvians at Arequipa 
 stronger measures were necessary, and a w r ell-equipped 
 expedition was prepared to attack the district ; the 
 troops detailed for these operations were embarked at 
 Callao in July, 1883, and reached their destination early 
 in the following month, when a series of skirmishes at 
 Huamachuco and elsewhere occurred, in which the 
 Peruvians were worsted, Arequipa was captured, and 
 the Administration of Admiral Montero broken up, and 
 Admiral Lynch then determined to make another effort 
 to bring the Peruvians to listen to proposals for a treaty 
 of peace. For this purpose he turned to General 
 Iglesias, the officer who had commanded the division on 
 the hill of Morro Solar on January 13, 1881. 
 
 General Iglesias held more common-sense views on 
 the subject of making peace than his compatriots in the 
 central and southern sections of Peru, and previous to 
 the overtures made by the Chilian Commander-in-chief 
 he had called a convention of his fellow-countrymen in 
 the northern districts to discuss the advisability of some 
 arrangement, no matter at what sacrifice, to ensure the 
 speedy retirement of the Chilians from Lima and the 
 central districts. The majority of the people in the 
 north was in favour of a policy that would restore the 
 National Capital to them, even if this entailed the 
 permanent alienation of Tarapaca ; and when, in August, 
 
1883] ADMINISTRATION OF IGLESIAS 49? 
 
 1883, a proposal was made by Admiral Lynch to 
 General Iglesias to organise a National Government 
 with which the Chilian authorities could treat it was 
 favourably received, and an Administration was formed 
 by Iglesias with the co-operation of his friends. Chilian 
 support was extended to the new Government, and 
 early in October matters had so far advanced that the 
 basis of a treaty of peace between Chile and Peru was 
 discussed. Shortly afterwards the conditions were 
 formally accepted, and on October 23, 1883, they were 
 signed provisionally by the representatives of the two 
 Governments. It was the only course Peru could 
 adopt at the time to ensure the departure of the Chilian 
 army, and it was undeserving of the bitter opposition 
 shown by Colonel Caceres and his followers and by the 
 supporters of Montero. 
 
 The terms of the treaty did not differ greatly from 
 the conditions proposed by the Chilian representatives 
 at the abortive peace conference held on the Lackawana 
 in the harbour of Arica on October 6, 1880 ; but certain 
 modifications were made in view of the existing financial 
 condition of Peru, the principal being the reduction of 
 the Chilian claim for a money indemnity, otherwise the 
 basis of the negotiations, especially in regard to the 
 absolute cession to Chile of Tarapaca and the temporary 
 occupation of Tacna and Arica, remained unchanged. 
 The wording of the treaty is important, as it has been a 
 political factor ever since in both countries and must 
 continue to be the keynote of the situation for some 
 time to come. This document, known as the Treaty of 
 Ancon, reads : — 
 
 TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE 
 REPUBLICS OF CHILE AND PERU. 
 
 The Republic of Chile on the one part, and the Republic of Peru 
 on the other, wishing to establish friendly relations between the two 
 nations, have determined to celebrate a Treaty of peace and friend- 
 ship, and with this object have named and appointed their pleni- 
 potentiaries, to wit : — 
 
 His Excellency the President of Chile appoints Senor Jovino 
 
 2 I 
 
498 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 Novoa, and His Excellency the President of Peru nominates Senor 
 Jose Antonio Lavalle, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Senor Mariano 
 Castro Zaldivar. The before-mentioned plenipotentiaries, after 
 having shown their full powers and authority, and these being in due 
 and correct form, have agreed upon the following articles : — 
 
 Article 1st. — Relations of peace and friendship are re-established 
 between the Republics of Chile and Peru. 
 
 Article 2nd. — The Republic of Peru cedes to the Republic of Chile, 
 perpetually and unconditionally, the territory of the coast province of 
 Tarapaca, the limits of which are : — On the north, the valley and river 
 of Camarones ; on the south, the valley and river of Loa ; on the east, 
 the Republic of Bolivia ; and on the west, the Pacific Ocean. 
 
 Article 3rd. — The territory of the provinces of Tacna and Arica, 
 limited on the north by the river Sama, from its origin in the Andes 
 coterminous with Bolivia to its mouth where it flows into the Pacific 
 Ocean ; on the south, by the valley and river Camarones ; on the east, 
 by the Republic of Bolivia ; and on the west, by the Pacific Ocean, 
 shall remain in the possession of Chile, subject to Chilian laws and 
 authorities, during the term of ten years, to be counted from the date 
 of the ratification of the present Treaty of Peace. The term having 
 expired, a plebiscite shall decide by popular vote if the territory of 
 these provinces shall remain definitely under the dominion and 
 sovereignty of Chile, or if they shall continue to form part of the 
 territory of Peru. The Government of the country in whose favour 
 the provinces of Tacna and Arica shall be annexed shall pay to the 
 other ten millions of dollars ($10,000,000) Chilian silver money or 
 Peruvian soles, of equal percentage of fine silver and of equal weight 
 as the former. A special protocol, which shall be considered an 
 integral part of the present Treaty, shall establish the form in which 
 the plebiscite shall take place, and the terms and conditions in which 
 the ten millions of dollars shall be paid by the nation remaining in 
 possession of Tacna and Arica. 
 
 Article ith. — In conformity with the disposition of the Supreme 
 Decree of February 9, 1882, by which the Government of Chile 
 authorised the sale of a million tons of guano, the net product of this 
 substance, after deducting all expenses, as indicated in Article 13 of 
 the said Decree, shall be divided in equal parts between the Govern- 
 ment of Chile and the creditors of Peru whose titles of credit appear 
 to be based upon the security of guano. On the termination of the 
 sale of the million tons referred to, the Government of Chile will 
 continue delivering to the creditors of Peru the 50 per cent, of the 
 net proceeds of guano sold, as laid down in Article 13 of the before- 
 mentioned Decree, until the debt of the creditors is wholly paid or 
 the guano deposits in actual exploitation are exhausted. The product 
 of the guano deposits that may be discovered in the future in the 
 territories ceded to Chile shall belong exclusively to the Chilian 
 Government. 
 
 Article 5th. — If deposits of guano be discovered in the territories 
 
1883] TREATY OF ANCON 499 
 
 remaining under the dominion of Peru, both Governments in common 
 accord, in order to avoid competition in the sale of this substance, 
 shall previously determine the proportions and conditions under 
 which each shall dispose of this fertiliser. This stipulation shall also 
 refer to the existence of guano already discovered that may remain on 
 the Lobos Islands at the time of the delivery of these islands to Peru, 
 in conformity with Article 9 of the present Treaty. 
 
 Article 6lh. — The creditors of Peru to whom the concessions 
 referred to in Article 4 are made shall submit, for the due qualifica- 
 tions of their titles and other proceedings, to the regulations estab- 
 lished by the Supreme Decree of February 9, 1882. 
 
 Article 1th. — The obligation accepted by the Government of Chile 
 under Article 4, of delivering 50 per cent, of the net product of guano 
 from the deposits actually in exploitation, shall hold good if the 
 extraction takes place in conformity with the existing contract based 
 on the sale of one million of tons, or if it be effected by virtue of 
 another contract for the exclusive account of the Government of 
 Chile. 
 
 Article Sth. — Except in virtue of the declarations specified in the 
 preceding Articles, and of the obligations the Government of Chile 
 has spontaneously accepted under the Supreme Decree of March 28. 
 1882, regulating the nitrate property of Tarapaca, the aforesaid 
 Government of Chile will recognise no claims of any class affecting 
 the new territories acquired by the present Treaty, whatever may be 
 their nature and antecedents. 
 
 Article 9th. — The Lobos Islands will continue to be administered 
 by the Government of Chile until the existing guano deposits have 
 furnished one million tons of guano, as stipulated by Articles 4 and 7. 
 When the million tons have been extracted, the islands will be 
 returned to Peru. 
 
 Article 10th. — The Government of Chile declares that there shall 
 be ceded to Peru, from the day that the present Treaty shall be 
 constitutionally ratified and exchanged, the 50 per cent, corresponding 
 to that Republic from the product of the guano from the Lobos 
 Islands. 
 
 Article 11th. — While no special treaty is made, the mercantile 
 relations between the two countries shall subsist in the same status as 
 existed before April 5, 1879. 
 
 Article 12th. — The indemnity owing by Peru to Chilians who have 
 suffered damages on account of the war shall be determined by a 
 tribunal of arbitration, or by a mixed international commission, 
 immediately after the ratification of the present Treaty, and in the 
 form established for the conventions recently agreed upon between 
 Chile and the Governments of England, France, and Italy. 
 
 Article 13lh. — -The contracting Governments recognise and accept 
 the validity of all administrative acts and judicial sentences made and 
 passed during the occupation of Peru, derived from martial law 
 exercised by the Government of Chile. 
 
500 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 Article lith. — The present Treaty shall be ratified and the 
 ratifications exchanged in the city of Lima as soon as possible, and 
 within a maximum period of one hundred and sixty days counting 
 from this date. 
 
 In proof of which, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and 
 sealed it with their private seals. 
 
 Dated at Lima, the twentieth day of October, in the year of our 
 Lord One thousand eight hundred and eighty-three. 
 
 Jovino Novoa. 
 J. A. Lavalle. 
 Mariano Castro Zaldivar. 
 
 While this treaty between Chile and the Govern- 
 ment established by General Iglesias was opposed by 
 the irreconcilable section of Peruvians, it was considered 
 by the Chilian authorities as sufficiently binding to 
 meet the exigencies of the case, and preparations were 
 commenced for the withdrawal of the army of occupa- 
 tion. On October 22, 1883, the city of Lima was 
 evacuated, and the troops embarked for Chile as rapidly 
 as circumstances permitted ; but a force of 5000 men 
 was retained in camp at Chorillos pending the ratifica- 
 tion of the treaty by the Chilian and Peruvian 
 legislatures, and also to support the Administration of 
 President Iglesias until the ratification was an accom- 
 plished fact. The treaty finally was ratified on May 8, 
 1884, and a few weeks later the last of the Chilian 
 troops sailed from Peru on their homeward journey — 
 five years and three months after the declaration of war 
 in 1879. 
 
 While the Treaty of Ancon brought the war with 
 Peru to an end, there remained the question with 
 Bolivia. Negotiations had been opened in 1882 for 
 concluding a permanent peace with that country, but 
 were abortive in consequence of the insistence of the 
 Bolivian Government that Chile should treat simultane- 
 ously with Peru and Bolivia in the matter. A second 
 attempt to bring about an understanding with Bolivia 
 proved equally futile, on account of the Government of 
 the latter country imposing the condition that Chile 
 should recognise the Administration of Admiral 
 
1884] CHILIAN AND BOLIVIAN TRUCE 501 
 
 Montero in Peru. After the Treaty of Ancon the 
 Bolivian Government took a more sensible view of 
 the situation, and in December, 1884, a special mission, 
 consisting of Senor Belisario Salinas and Senor Boeto, 
 was despatched to Santiago to open negotiations. The 
 envoys demanded the territories of Tacna and Arica 
 for Bolivia in compensation for the coast region now 
 held by Chile ; but to this proposition the Chilian 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that the territory in 
 question was not the absolute property of Chile, and, 
 therefore, could not be ceded to a third party. As the 
 Bolivian representatives insisted in their demands, the 
 Minister stated that apparently it was impossible at 
 present to conclude a treaty of peace on terms satis- 
 factory to the two Governments, and he suggested that 
 a truce should be drawn up and formulated in order to 
 place relations on a better footing and bring about a 
 definite cessation of hostilities until a more opportune 
 occasion arrived to reopen the negotiations for a treaty 
 of peace. After some discussion the Bolivian envoys 
 consented to this suggestion, and what has been known 
 since as the " Pacto de Tregua " was signed on April 4, 
 1884. The text of this compact reads :• — 
 
 AGREEMENT OF TRUCE BETWEEN CHILE AND BOLIVIA. 
 
 Until the opportunity of celebrating a definite Treaty of Peace 
 between the Republics of Chile and Bolivia shall arise, both these 
 nations duly represented, the former by the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, Senor Anicleto Vergara Albano, and the latter by Senor 
 Belisario Salinas and Senor Boeto, have agreed to an Agreement of 
 Truce on the undermentioned basis : — 
 
 1. The Republics of Chile and Bolivia celebrate an indefinite 
 truce, and, in consequence, they declare the state of war terminated, 
 and that the same cannot be again carried on unless one of the 
 contracting parties notifies the other with at least one year of 
 anticipation of its determination to resume hostilities. In such case 
 the notification shall be made directly, or through the diplomatic 
 representative of a friendly nation. 
 
 2. The Republic of Chile, during the period this Agreement is in 
 force, shall continue to govern according to Chilian law the terri- 
 tories situated between 53° S. and the mouth of the river Loa, these 
 
502 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 territories being bounded on the east by a line drawn from Zapalegui 
 from the intersection of the frontier of the Argentine Republic to the 
 volcano of Licancaur. From this point the boundary extends to the 
 summit of the extinct volcano Cabana, thence in a direct line to the 
 spring of water found to the south of Lake Ascotan, and from this 
 point the limit will be a straight line terminating on the volcano of 
 Ollagua. From Ollagua the divisional line shall run to the volcano 
 of Tua, thence joining the frontier between Tarapaca and Bolivia. 
 In ease of difficulties arising, both parties shall appoint a commission 
 of engineers to fix the limits as herein indicated by the landmai-ks 
 described. 
 
 3. The property and goods confiscated from Chilian citizens by 
 Government edict, or by the order of civil and military authorities, 
 shall be immediately returned to their owners or representatives, and 
 the products the Government of Bolivia may have received from 
 these properties shall also be returned upon the necessary proofs 
 being submitted. The damages suffered by Chilians shall be indem- 
 nified upon good and sufficient proof of the extent of the injury being 
 brought before the notice of the Bolivian Government. 
 
 4. If no settlement can be reached by the Bolivian Government 
 and the injured parties in respect to the amount of indemnity to be 
 awarded, the disputes shall be submitted to a commission of arbitration 
 composed of three members, one named by Chile, one by Bolivia, 
 the third selected by Chile from the representatives of foreign nations 
 resident in Chile. 
 
 5. Commercial relations shall be re-established between Chile and 
 Bolivia. In future raw material produced in Chile and articles manu- 
 factured in that Republic shall enter Bolivia free of all duties or 
 custom-house dues ; and Bolivian productions of the same class and 
 manufactured on the same terms shall enjoy a like freedom in Chile 
 on their importation and exportation through a Chilian port. The 
 commercial freedom of Chilian and Bolivian manufactures and the 
 enumeration of these products shall be the subject of a special 
 protocol. Nationalised merchandise entering through the port of 
 Arica shall be considered as foreign merchandise for purposes of 
 custom-house entry. Foreign merchandise introduced into Bolivia 
 via Antofagasta shall have free passage, but subject to such measures 
 as Chile may adopt to check smuggling. Until a special convention 
 is made, Chile and Bolivia shall enjoy the commercial advantages and 
 freedom that either nation accords to the most favoured nation. 
 
 6. At the port of Arica foreign merchandise shall, even when 
 entered for consumption in Bolivia, pay the duties in force under the 
 Chilian tariff, and this merchandise shall not pay any further duties 
 in the interior. The sums received in payment of these duties shall 
 be distributed as follows : — 25 per cent, shall be applied as duties 
 received for goods to be consumed in the territories of Tacna and 
 Arica, and to defray the cost of custom-house administration, the 
 remaining 75 per cent, shall be for account of Bolivia. This 75 per 
 
1884] CONDITIONS OF THE TRUCE 503 
 
 cent, shall be distributed in the following manner : — 40 units of the 
 total shall be retained by the Chilian Administration to liquidate the 
 claims for which Bolivia may be responsible under Article 3 of this 
 Agreement, and for the amortisation of the Bolivian loan raised in 
 Chile in 1867 ; the remainder shall be handed over to the Govern- 
 ment of Bolivia in cash or drafts to its order. The loan of 1867 
 shall be considered in regard to payment as being on equal footing 
 with the sums due for damages caused during the war to personal 
 property. The Bolivian Government when it thinks proper is at 
 liberty to examine through its agents the accounts of the Arica 
 custom-house. As soon as the indemnity specified in Article 3 has 
 been paid, and the motive for the retention of the 40 units ceases, 
 Bolivia is at liberty to establish custom-houses in the interior of her 
 territory if such a course be considered fit. In the event of this 
 being done, foreign merchandise imported via Arica will be permitted 
 free passage at that port. 
 
 7. Any acts of the subaltern authorities of either nation that tend 
 to alter the situation formed by the present Agreement of Truce, 
 especially where they may concern the limits of the territory in 
 Chilian occupation, shall be suppressed and punished at the official 
 request of the respective Governments. 
 
 8. As the object of the contracting parties in celebrating this 
 Agreement of Truce is to prepare and facilitate the way for a solid 
 and stable Treaty of Peace between the two Republics, they promise 
 to reciprocally act in a manner conducive to that end. 
 
 This Agreement shall be ratified by the Government of Bolivia 
 within the term of forty days, and the ratifications exchanged at 
 Santiago during the coming month of June. 
 
 In proof of which the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chile and 
 the Plenipotentiaries of Bolivia who showed their respective 
 authorisation and powers, signed in duplicate the present Agreement 
 of Truce at Valparaiso, on the fourth of April, in the year One 
 thousand eight hundred and eighty-four. 
 
 A. Vergara Albano. 
 Belisario Salinas. 
 Belisario Boeto. 
 
 The various points stipulated having been subse- 
 quently regulated by a protocol, the ratifications of this 
 agreement of truce were exchanged in Santiago on 
 November 29, 1884. This agreement is not only 
 important as formally terminating hostilities, but also 
 as having a direct bearing on the long-standing dispute 
 which has now reached an acute stage. 
 
 The result of the struggle brought about by the 
 
504 THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR 
 
 intrigues of Peru in Bolivia was a complete reversal of 
 the expectations with which South America generally 
 had viewed the approach of the conflict in 1879. The 
 strength of Chile by land and sea was then unknown, 
 and hardly even suspected, by the two countries which 
 dared her to go to war or lose all the privileges she 
 claimed for Chilian capital and labour in the Atacama 
 districts. The outcome of the conflict left Peru in a 
 condition of economic collapse and financial ruin, both 
 in regard to public resources and private enterprise, 
 and Bolivia lost her maritime territory and became 
 isolated in the interior of South America. Chile 
 enlarged her dominion and obtained control of districts 
 that offered an immediate rich return to compensate 
 her for her sacrifices, and provided a permanent outlet 
 for capital and industry which assured great additional 
 wealth to her people, and she won for herself recogni- 
 tion as the paramount military and naval power on the 
 west coast of South America. 
 
CHAPTEK XXVIII 
 
 PERU 
 
 Constitution of 1860. President San Roman. Revolution against 
 Pezet. Dispute with Spain. Squadron under Admiral Pinzon. 
 Incident at Talambo. Memorandum of Spanish Commissioner. 
 The Chincha Islands. Action of Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador. 
 Loss of the Triunfo. Treaty between Peru and Spain. Pezet 
 driven from Office. War with Spain. Capture of the Covadonga. 
 Suicide of Spanish Admiral. Naval Fight near Abtao. Bombard- 
 ment of Callao. Withdrawal of Spanish Squadron. Dictatorship 
 of Prado. Revision of Constitution. Prado proclaimed President. 
 Revolution against Prado. Reforms of 1867. Election of 
 Colonel Balta. Financial Embarrassments. The Dreyfus Con- 
 tract. Railway Construction. Presidential Candidates in 1872. 
 The Gutierrez Conspiracy. Death of Colonel Silvestre Gutierrez. 
 Assassination of Balta. Death of Colonel Tomas Gutierrez. 
 Presidency of Manuel Pardo. Economic Conditions. Revolu- 
 tionary Attempts of Pierola. Foreign Policy. Alliance with 
 Bolivia. Election of Prado. Revolutionary Outbreak. The 
 Huascar and the Shah and Amethyst. Treaty with Spain. Murder 
 of Pardo. Complications with Chile. Outbreak of Hostilities. 
 President Prado commands the Army. The President abandons 
 Peru. Revolution under Pierola. Fighting in Lima. Pierola 
 proclaimed Supreme Chief. Occupation of Lima. Pierola leaves 
 Peru. Administration of Iglesias. Revolution under Caceres. 
 Insurgents attack Lima. Second Assault on Lima. Iglesias 
 Resigns. Election of Caceres. Quiet Conditions. Economic 
 Crisis. Presidency of Bermudez. Death of Bermudez. Colonel 
 Borgoiio assumes Office. Revolutionary Rising. Chambers 
 Dissolved. Caceres again President. Spread of Revolution. 
 Pierola attacks Lima. Caceres Defeated. Provisional Adminis- 
 tration. Pierola Elected. Insurrection at Iquitos. Reforms 
 under Pierola. Revolution in 1898. Election of Romana. 
 International Questions. 
 
 For the first four decades after the proclamation of 
 independence in 1821, Peru was a prey to internal 
 
506 PERU 
 
 disturbances, which checked economic development and 
 material prosperity. In 1860, during the presidency of 
 General Castilla, a reform of the Law of Constitution 
 was effected, and under its statutes the Government 
 has since been conducted. 
 
 In 1862 the election to the presidency of General 
 San Roman took place, and was formally ratified by 
 Congress in October of that year, but the President 
 only survived his inauguration a few months, dying on 
 April 3, 1863. The first Vice-President was General 
 Pezet, at the time absent in Europe, and, pending his 
 return, the presidential duties were discharged by 
 General Canseco in virtue of his position as second 
 Vice-President. In August, 1863, General Pezet arrived 
 and assumed control of public affairs, continuing at the 
 head of the Administration until 1865, but in this latter 
 year he was deposed and obliged to fly the country in 
 consequence of a revolutionary movement initiated by 
 General Prado and actively supported by General 
 Canseco. 
 
 The motive alleged by Prado and Canseco for the 
 revolt against Pezet was his vacillating policy in the 
 dispute with Spain, which reached an acute stage in 
 1864, finally leading to an outbreak of hostilities between 
 the two countries. In 1860 certain claims were put 
 forward by a group of Peruvians who held bonds of the 
 debt contracted in the Spanish colonial period, and who, 
 through the influence of the authorities in Madrid, 
 hoped to obtain recognition of these obligations by the 
 Peruvian Government. While the question was under 
 discussion, a Spanish naval squadron commanded by 
 Rear- Admiral Pinzon was despatched to the west coast 
 of South America, nominally for scientific purposes and 
 exploration, which arrived in Peruvian waters in 1863. 
 This was considered a menace by the authorities, and 
 the relations between the two Governments became 
 strained. The situation was complicated further by an 
 unfortunate affair which occurred near Talambo in the 
 Province of Chiclayo. In the locality was a settlement 
 
1863] SPAIN AND PERU 507 
 
 of Spanish Basques, and a quarrel arose between these 
 settlers and some Peruvians, resulting in a fight in which 
 a Basque and a Peruvian were killed. A demand from 
 Madrid for immediate satisfaction accentuated the exist- 
 ing hostility between the two Governments. 
 
 A special Commissioner, under the title of Comisario 
 regio, was now sent from Madrid to investigate the 
 Talambo affair. The Peruvian authorities declined to 
 receive this representative unless the nature of his 
 mission was clearly defined, and Senor Eusebio Salazar y 
 Mazarredo, the Commissioner, presented a memorandum 
 in which it was stated that no treaty of peace existed 
 between Spain and Peru ; that the former country con- 
 sidered the truce in force at an end ; and Spain further 
 claimed the right to regain possession of her lost colony 
 if such policy was deemed advisable. This note occa- 
 sioned intense indignation in Peru, and when on April 
 14, 1864, the Spanish squadron took possession of the 
 Chincha Islands the cry for war was everywhere popular. 
 Moreover, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia, alarmed at the 
 attitude assumed by Spain, gave the Peruvians assur- 
 ance of active support in event of hostilities breaking out. 
 Soon after the occupation of the Chincha Islands a dis- 
 agreement took place between the Spanish Commissioner 
 and Admiral Pinzon, and resulted in Senor Salazar y 
 Mazarredo returning to Europe. 
 
 The Government of Spain now showed an inclination 
 to draw back from extreme measures, and Lima was 
 notified that both Commissioner and Admiral had 
 exceeded instructions, and that the seizure of the 
 Chincha Islands was not approved in Madrid. Admiral 
 Pinzon was relieved, and his command transferred to 
 Admiral Jose Manuel Pareja. The accidental destruc- 
 tion of the warship Trianfo by fire reduced the Spanish 
 naval forces in Peruvian waters to the frigate Resolution 
 and the gunboat Covadonga. Matters now assumed a 
 more pacific aspect, and negotiations were begun for a 
 settlement of the dispute. General Vivanco was 
 nominated by President Pezet to treat with Admiral 
 
508 PERU 
 
 Pareja ; after lengthy discussion a treaty was celebrated, 
 providing for the evacuation of the Chincha Islands by 
 the Spaniards on condition that Peru defrayed the cost 
 of the Spanish expedition and became responsible for 
 the bonds of the former colonial debt. Congress was 
 not in session when this treaty was made, nor was it 
 called together to consider the arrangement, and the 
 document was signed on January 27, 1865. On the 
 same day, it was ratified by President Pezet. 
 
 When the conditions of this agreement with Spain 
 were made public there was pronounced dissatisfaction 
 with the Administration, and these hostile symptoms 
 ripened into a determination to oust the President from 
 office. On February 28 the standard of revolt was 
 raised by General Prado in the city of Araquipa, and 
 from all sections of the country people flocked to join 
 the movement. By the end of June a formidable army 
 had been organised to attack Lima, where Pezet had 
 concentrated all his available strength. The revolu- 
 tionary forces were designated the Ejercito restaurador 
 de la honra national, the leaders expressing the intention 
 of leaving no stone unturned to cancel the treaty with 
 Spain, and proclaiming General Canseco, the second 
 Vice-President of the Republic, the head of the National 
 Government. In October a rapid march was made 
 towards Lima, and on November 6, 1865, the National 
 Capital was captured, President Pezet seeking refuge 
 on board a British warship anchored off Callao. 
 
 The control of public affairs was offered to General 
 Canseco by the victorious revolutionary army, but was 
 declined. In these circumstances public opinion 
 favoured the nomination of General Prado, and on 
 November 8, 1865, he assumed direction of the 
 Government. Arrangements were made with Chile for 
 an offensive and defensive alliance on December 5, 1865, 
 and similar action was taken in regard to Ecuador and 
 Bolivia. On January 14, 1866, war against Spain was 
 declared, and the Peruvian squadron, reinforced by the 
 newly acquired corvettes Union and America, was 
 
1865] VALPARAISO BOMBAKDED 509 
 
 ordered to attack the Spanish vessels. The latter 
 comprised the Resolution, the Villa de Madrid, the 
 Numancia, the Berenguela, and the Blanc a, the four last- 
 named ships having arrived recently from Spain. The 
 Covadonga had been captured in January by the Chilian 
 man-of-war Esmeralda, and her loss had preyed so 
 greatly on the mind of Admiral Pareja that he com- 
 mitted suicide, his place being taken by Captain Castro 
 Menclez Nunez. On February 6 the Spanish squadron 
 attacked the Peruvian and Chilian vessels in the vicinity 
 of Abtao ; but it was beaten off after two hours' fighting, 
 and the Spanish Commander then decided to bombard 
 Valparaiso, putting this resolution into effect on March 
 31. The Spanish ships then sailed northwards, appear- 
 ing off Callao on the morning of April 25, and on the 
 following day Captain Nunez notified the foreign consuls 
 that he intended to attack the fortifications of the city, 
 and would allow four days for foreign residents to move 
 to a place of safety. During this respite the Peruvian 
 authorities worked unceasingly to strengthen the 
 defences, and succeeded in mounting 50 guns. 
 
 On the morning of May 2, 1866, preparations for 
 the bombardment were made by the Spanish squadron. 
 Shortly before midday the enemy entered the bay, 
 taking up a position close to the land, the Numancia open- 
 ing the action and being answered by the Merced tower, 
 the engagement then becoming general, and the ships 
 and shore batteries maintaining a vigorous cannonade. 
 An hour after the firing commenced, the Villa de Madrid 
 was so badly injured that it was necessary to tow her 
 out of the port, and shortly afterwards the Berenguela 
 was observed making signals that she was in a sinking 
 condition. Meanwhile the defence suffered severely. 
 A shell from the Numancia burst between the two guns in 
 the Merced tower and exploded a supply of powder, 
 killing the Minister of War and causing other casualties. 
 At 5 p.m. the Spanish ships ceased firing, and withdrew 
 to the shelter of San Lorenzo Island, five miles from 
 Cailao. In the engagement 200 Peruvians were killed 
 
510 PERU 
 
 and 500 wounded, while the Spanish loss was heavy, no 
 fewer than 40 men being killed and 200 wounded. 
 None of the vessels escaped without serious damage. 
 
 No further offensive operations were attempted by 
 the Spaniards, partly on account of a scarcity of 
 ammunition, and partly for lack of sufficient force to 
 effect a landing. After remaining at San Lorenzo for 
 ten days, Captain Nunez sent a notification ashore to 
 the effect that having inflicted severe punishment upon 
 the Peruvians he intended to raise the blockade, and set 
 sail for Spain. This decision of the Spanish Commander 
 was due to the knowledge that the two new Peruvian 
 war vessels, the Huascar and the Independencia, were 
 daily expected, and that these modern ironclads would 
 prove formidable antagonists for the squadron under his 
 command. On May 12 the Spanish ships left San 
 Lorenzo homeward bound, and the war was ended ; but 
 it was not until some years later that a treaty of peace 
 between the two countries was signed. 
 
 After the close of the hostilities with Spain the 
 direction of public affairs remained in the hands of 
 General Prado, pending a return to normal political 
 conditions, and during a period of fourteen months he 
 exercised dictatorial powers. By a decree dated 
 July 28, 1866, presidential and congressional elections 
 were ordered, and reforms in the Law of Constitution 
 were submitted to the new Chambers for consideration. 
 Whilst the proposed alterations were under discussion 
 General Prado was proclaimed Provisional President. 
 The projected reforms met with determined opposition, 
 and this discontent found expression in a revolutionary 
 movement headed by Castilla. In September, 1867, the 
 revised law was approved by Congress, and promulgated, 
 the immediate result being the proclamation of General 
 Prado as Constitutional President. Following on the 
 heels of this event came a further outburst of revolt 
 near Arequipa, General Canseco being chosen leader of 
 the opposition to Prado, and his supporters demanding 
 the abrogation of the reforms of 1867, and a return to 
 
1867] REVOLUTION AGAINST PRADO 511 
 
 the Law of Constitution of 1860. Resistance to General 
 Prado gained further strength in November, 1867, by a 
 rising near Chiclaya headed by Colonel Jose Balta, and 
 matters soon reached a critical stage. 
 
 At this juncture the President decided to take the 
 field in person to crush the revolt. Congress was 
 adjourned, the presidential duties entrusted to General 
 Luis La-Fuerta, and Prado at the head of the army set 
 out for Arequipa. That place was reached without 
 encountering serious obstacles ; but an effort to assault 
 the city proved abortive, and, disheartened at this 
 reverse, Prado retreated to Lima, arriving at the National 
 Capital on January 6, 1868. Finding public opinion 
 decidedly adverse to his cause, he determined to resign, 
 and next day abandoned the country to seek asylum in 
 Chile. 
 
 After the flight of President Prado the adminis- 
 tration of public affairs was assumed temporarily by 
 General Canseco, representing the victorious revolution. 
 The constitutional reforms introduced by Prado were 
 revoked, the law of 1860 again declared in force, and 
 Congress convened for July 28. A presidential election 
 was ordered, and on August 2 Colonel Jose Balta was 
 proclaimed Chief Magistrate, his selection being due to 
 the fact that he was one of the principal opponents to 
 General Prado in the matter of constitutional reform, 
 and because he was thought to possess administrative 
 ability. 
 
 President Balta found his post no sinecure. The 
 financial situation was most unsatisfactory, the result of 
 constant internal turmoil and the war with Spain, and a 
 reorganisation of the public services was necessary in 
 consequence of the existing corruption and inefficiency. 
 One of the main sources of the national revenue was 
 the shipments of guano to Europe, and from this product 
 Balta proposed to obtain funds to defray the obligations 
 of the National Administration. In 1869 a contract 
 was celebrated with Messrs Dreyfus & Co. of Paris, 
 for exportation of all guano from Peru up to 2,000,000 
 
512 PERU 
 
 tons, in return for monthly payments of 700,000 soles as 
 long as the shipments continued. This arrangement 
 temporarily relieved the Administration, the income 
 obtained sufficing to meet the expenses of government 
 and cover the service of the indebtedness. But Presi- 
 dent Balta was not contented with placing the financial, 
 situation on a fairly sound basis, and he determined on 
 a policy which included the construction of public works 
 to establish communication from the seaboard to the 
 interior to develop the natural resources of Peru. For 
 this purpose loans were contracted in Europe, the 
 outstanding obligation of £4,000,000 being raised to 
 £15,000,000 in 1870, and further increased to £50,000,000 
 in 1872 ; railways were built to many districts hitherto 
 inaccessible, and to all appearances the country was on 
 the eve of an era of prosperity. While there is no 
 doubt Balta's policy was guided by a patriotic sense of 
 duty in regard to these public works, it must be re- 
 cognised as shortsighted, and his schemes for better 
 means of communication and transport were too 
 vast for Peru in view of the limited immediate benefit 
 accruing to the national exchequer. With the stop- 
 page of credit abroad before the new undertakings 
 were completed, the heavy obligations contracted were 
 a most onerous burthen, and finally caused national 
 bankruptcy. 
 
 As the close of Balta's term drew near an unsettled 
 feeling was apparent. Seven candidates came forward 
 for the presidency, four being military officers ; but the 
 majority of the electors were in favour of Senor Manuel 
 Pardo, who had shown his ability as director of the 
 Municipality of Lima. In July, 1872, sinister rumours 
 were afloat of a military conspiracy to establish a 
 dictatorship, and precautions were taken to guard the 
 Government palace and other official centres ; but Balta 
 had confidence in the senior military officers, and he did 
 not fear any serious danger. It was not until a few 
 days before the expiration of the presidential period 
 that this conspiracy came to a head. 
 
1872] THE GUTIERREZ CONSPIRACY 513 
 
 In the army were three brothers, by name Gutierrez, 
 and ranking as colonels. On July 22, 1872, at 2 p.m., 
 Colonel Silvestre Gutierrez with a company of the 
 Pichincha Regiment arrested Balta, and confined him in 
 the prison of San Francisco, and at the same time 
 Colonel Marcelino Gutierrez occupied the principal 
 square in Lima with the Zepita Regiment together with 
 a battery of artillery, and proclaimed the revolution with 
 the cry of Viva el Caronel Tomas Gutierrez! Muera 
 el traidor Balta ! An armed force was despatched to 
 the Congress Hall, the Chambers dispersed, and orders 
 issued to seize Seiior Manuel Pardo ; but the President- 
 elect had escaped to Callao and embarked on the 
 warship Independencia, the officers and crew of that 
 vessel and the remainder of the squadron remaining 
 faithful to his cause. Congress then issued a manifesto 
 declaring Colonel Tomas Gutierrez and his fellow 
 conspirators guilty of treason, and public opinion showed 
 no sympathy with the outbreak ; but for the moment 
 the military element was in control, and Colonel Tomas 
 Gutierrez was proclaimed Supreme Chief of Peru. Only 
 four days, however, after the arrest of Balta, a reaction 
 against the conspiracy took marked form. As Colonel 
 Silvestre Gutierrez was entering the railway station for 
 Callao, a group of persons raised the cry of Viva Pardo ! 
 Fuera Gutierrez! Colonel Gutierrez turned and fired 
 his revolver four times at these people. The shots were 
 answered, and Colonel Gutierrez fell close to the entrance 
 door of the railway station, mortally wounded. On the 
 news of his death reaching his brother Marcelino, who 
 had remained in charge of General Balta, an order was 
 given for the President to be shot, and he was immedi- 
 ately assassinated. The murder of the President roused 
 the people of Lima and Callao against the. Gutierrez 
 family and Colonel Tomas Gutierrez, who shut himself 
 up in the Santa Catalina barracks with a small force 
 and here was besieged by the populace. A sortie was 
 made to endeavour to clear the surrounding streets, but 
 it proved unsuccessful, and the supporters of the Dictator 
 
 2k 
 
514 PERU 
 
 were overpowered and Colonel Gutierrez was killed by 
 the mob. 
 
 While these events were occurring in Lima the 
 people of Callao had risen against the garrison com- 
 manded by Colonel Marcelino Gutierrez and he was 
 forced to retreat to the forts near the city, where 
 preparations were made to open fire on the town with 
 the heavy guns, but a stray bullet struck the Colonel 
 and caused his death. He was buried immediately in 
 one of the ditches of the Baquijano cemetery, and it 
 was not until some hours later that the inhabitants of 
 Callao learnt he had been killed. With the loss of 
 Marcelino Gutierrez the last resistance of the dictatorial 
 movement disappeared. The populace took absolute 
 control of affairs in spite of the protests of the Vice- 
 President, Senor Mariano Herencia Zevallos, and Lima 
 gave full vent to the wave of passion that had instigated 
 the reaction against the Gutierrez family. The bodies 
 of Tomas and Silvestre Gutierrez were dragged to the 
 principal square on the afternoon of July 26, and there 
 were hanged to lamp-posts for the inspection of the 
 inhabitants. The corpse of Marcelino Gutierrez was 
 disinterred at Callao and brought to Lima to be treated 
 in similar fashion ; while the remains of President Balta 
 were removed from the prison and conveyed to the 
 chapel of Santa Rosa de Vitervo, and there installed 
 with ceremonious state. On the morning of July 27, 
 the bodies of Colonels Tomas and Silvestre Gutierrez 
 were discovered suspended to two spires of the Cathedral. 
 At midday they were lowered to the ground and, with 
 that of Marcelino Gutierrez, were burned in the principal 
 square, all endeavours of the leading citizens to stop 
 this proceeding being unavailing ; and after this holocaust 
 was ended, the ashes of the leaders of the recent con- 
 spiracy were scattered to the winds as a last indignity. 
 
 By July 28 order was re-established in Lima and 
 Callao, and the first Vice-President, Senor Mariano 
 Zavallos, assumed the duties of Chief Magistrate for 
 the few remaining days of the unexpired term for which 
 
18721 PRESIDENT PARDO ASSUMES OFFICE 515 
 
 Colonel Balta had been elected ; on the same date Con- 
 gress met, and on August 1 proclaimed Senor Manuel 
 Pardo duly elected to the Presidency. On July 31 the 
 funeral of Colonel Balta took place in the Cathedral at 
 Lima, and was conducted with all pomp as a State 
 ceremony. 
 
 President Pardo assumed office on August 2, 1872, 
 and his Administration initiated many reforms. He 
 represented the civilian interests of Peru as opposed to 
 the long series of military Governments which had con- 
 trolled the country in former years, and his policy was 
 guided by a desire to improve the country and restrain 
 the spirit of militarism which had played so important 
 a part hitherto in the national destinies. Public instruc- 
 tion was a subject to which attention was specially 
 devoted, and schools for primary education were estab- 
 lished on a comparatively extensive scale. Scientific 
 and technical colleges were founded, and educational 
 facilities encouraged and supported where privately 
 initiated. Military and naval requirements were not 
 neglected, and a naval academy was created, and schools 
 instituted for the instruction of non-commissioned officers 
 of the army. Reforms in military organisation were 
 introduced, and plans approved for placing the National 
 Guard on a serviceable footing. Of the public works 
 completed during the Pardo Administration, the most 
 notable were the railway from Lima to Magdalena, the 
 monument at Callao in memory of the defence of that 
 city against the Spanish squadron, and the public hospital 
 known as the "2 de Mayo." 
 
 Notwithstanding the endeavours of President Pardo 
 to advance the highest interests of Peru, a spirit of 
 discontent was openly manifested during his Adminis- 
 tration in both the northern and southern districts, and 
 on several occasions this dissatisfied feeling took the 
 form of armed revolt. The principal instigator of these 
 conspiracies was Senor Nicolas de Pierola, and on 
 November 1, 1874, he disembarked with a body of 
 insurgents from the steamer Talisman at Pacocha, pro- 
 
516 PERU 
 
 ceeding thence to Moquegua and Torata, and finally 
 occupying a strong position known as "Los Angeles." 
 When the news of this expedition reached Lima, the 
 President asked permission from Congress to conduct 
 in person a force of Government troops to the neighbour- 
 hood of Torata to re-establish public order, and the 
 Chambers approved the proposition. Pardo lost no 
 time in putting his plan into execution, and with several 
 regiments of the regular army, strengthened by a few 
 battalions of the National Guard, a rapid march was 
 made against the insurgent headquarters at " Los 
 Angeles," and that stronghold was carried by assault. 
 With this defeat of the insurgents in the south the 
 movement against the Government was crushed, for 
 while Pardo directed these operations near Torata 
 another expedition was despatched against the rebels 
 in the northern provinces and no formidable resistance 
 encountered. A few skirmishes occurred, but the 
 Government troops were everywhere victorious and the 
 opposition soon melted away, and in the first few months 
 of 1875 order was once more established. 
 
 The weak point in the Administration of Pardo was 
 his foreign policy. The financial situation had become 
 extremely complicated owing to heavy obligations con- 
 tracted during the preceding presidential period, and in 
 consequence of the decreased value of guano and nitrate 
 of soda, the two principal sources of the national revenue. 
 To obtain relief from financial liabilities, Pardo con- 
 ceived the idea of creating a monopoly for the production 
 of nitrate of soda, and to effect this two things were 
 necessary. The first was the expropriation of the nitrate 
 properties in the hands of private owners, and the second 
 was joint action with the Bolivian authorities in restrict- 
 ing the output of nitrate of soda to ensure abnormally 
 high prices. So far as the expropriation of private 
 ownership in the Tarapaca district was concerned, no 
 great difficulties stood in the way, for the concessions 
 were subject to the right of the Government to assume 
 control of the nitrate fields in return for adequate 
 
1875] FOREIGN POLICY OF PARDO 517 
 
 monetary compensation, if such a course was considered 
 desirable. When the policy of the President was laid 
 before Congress, the consent of both Chambers was 
 readily obtained, but with Bolivia many obstacles 
 occurred. The port of Antofagasta was the subject of 
 long controversy with Chile, and had been ceded to 
 Bolivia under conditions which prohibited export charges 
 on any products of Chilian industry in the Atacama 
 districts, and under such circumstances it was useless 
 to restrict the output of nitrate of soda in Tarapaca. 
 The only effect of such action would be to give an 
 enormous impulse to production near Antofagasta. It 
 was under these conditions that the Peruvian authorities 
 endeavoured to induce the Bolivian Government to 
 adopt a policy in regard to the Atacama nitrate industry 
 similar to that proposed for Tarapaca ; as this entailed 
 direct violation by Bolivia of her treaty obligations to 
 Chile, it was only in return for the protection Peru 
 could offer under an offensive and defensive alliance 
 that the Bolivian Government consented. As a result 
 of many negotiations, a secret alliance was celebrated 
 between Bolivia and Peru in 1873, the ultimate conse- 
 quences of this compact being the war of 1879-83 
 between Chile and the allies ; but the disastrous events 
 which signalised this compact of Peru and Bolivia did 
 not take place during the Pardo Administration, and it 
 was left to his successor to face the calamities his policy 
 entailed. 
 
 When the term of President Pardo was approaching 
 completion, the question of his successor excited wide 
 attention. The two candidates brought before the 
 electors were General Mariano Ignacio Prado and Rear- 
 Admiral Lizardo Montero, and the former, although 
 absent from Peru, carried most weight. General Prado 
 had commanded the garrison at Callao when the 
 Spanish squadron attacked that city on May 2, 1866, 
 and his name was always associated with the successful 
 defence of the town. Pie was elected by the popular 
 vote, and returned from Chile to assume his office, his 
 
518 PERU 
 
 presidency proving to be one of the most stormy periods 
 in Peruvian history. Internal disturbances and a 
 disastrous foreign war caused loss of territory and 
 subsequent acute economic and financial depression, 
 which lasted for twenty years. 
 
 Seiior Nicholas Pierola promoted a series of 
 intrigues and conspiracies against the constituted 
 authorities in 1876, and these resulted in a rising 
 near Moquegua. The movement was suppressed by 
 the defeat of the insurgents at Yacango, but only after 
 severe fighting, in which both sides sustained heavy 
 losses. Some eighteen months later another revolt was 
 organised by Pierola at Callao, and on this occasion the 
 rebels seized the monitor Huascar, and proceeded to 
 Pacocha. A decree of the Government declared the 
 Huascar a pirate, and two British men-of-war, the Shah 
 and Amethyst, attempted her capture. A severe 
 engagement took place near Pacocha, and the in- 
 surgents on the Huascar found they were outmatched 
 and their capture only a matter of time. Pierola then 
 determined to capitulate to an admiral of the Peruvian 
 navy in the neighbourhood rather than allow the Huascar 
 to fall into British hands. With the surrender of the 
 Huascar the revolution ended, and Pierola left the 
 country for Chile ; but his influence continued to be a 
 disturbing factor in the political situation. 
 
 The year 1878 was memorable for two other events 
 besides the revolution ; these were the celebration of a 
 treaty of peace and friendship with Spain, and the 
 assassination of the ex-President, Seiior Manuel Pardo. 
 By the terms of the treaty Spain recognised the in- 
 dependence of Peru, and the differences which occa- 
 sioned hostilities between the two countries in 1865-6 
 were finally adjusted. The murder of Senor Pardo was 
 one of those acts by which the history of South America 
 has been so frequently besmirched ; when President of 
 the Republic, he had performed his duties with consci- 
 entious honesty, and the effect of his foreign policy 
 between 1872 and 1876 was not apparent at the time of 
 
1878] ASSASSINATION OF PARDO 519 
 
 his death, and could not, therefore, be quoted to his 
 detriment. At the date of his assassination he was 
 President of the Senate, and in Congress had supported 
 a measure for certain military reforms by which no 
 non-commissioned officer could rise to commissioned 
 rank. On September 22, 1878, as he was leaving the 
 Senate Chamber after a discussion of these measures, he 
 was shot at and killed by the sergeant of the guard on 
 duty at the Congress Hall, a man named Montoyo. 
 President Prado entered the Congress Hall a few 
 moments after Senor Pardo was murdered, and when 
 he asked who had committed the act, Sergeant Montoyo 
 was indicated. The President ordered the man to be 
 shot, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs urged that if 
 such action was taken the people would infer that the 
 President had instigated the murder and insisted upon 
 the execution of the sergeant to remove all evidence. 
 This argument prevailed, and Sergeant Montoyo was 
 arrested and subsequently tried and condemned to 
 death, his execution taking place a few months later. 
 Towards the close of 1878 the political situation 
 gave many indications of complications with Chile in 
 consequence of strained relations between the latter 
 country and Bolivia in connection with the nitrate 
 industry of Atacama. The inclination of President 
 Prado was adverse to war with Chile ; but this was not 
 the feeling of the majority of the inhabitants, and 
 public opinion lost no opportunity of attempting to 
 force the hand of the Government. In 1879 the Chilian 
 authorities despatched an expeditionary force to occupy 
 Antofagasto and the vicinity, and no active measures 
 were taken by General Prado to restrain this aggres- 
 sion. Discontent augmented ; Prado was accused of 
 sympathy with Chile as the outcome of his long resi- 
 dence in the latter country, and dissatisfaction at his 
 attitude grew apace. Possibly, if left to follow his 
 own policy, Prado might have avoided war, but this 
 could only be accomplished by breaking faith with 
 Bolivia. In these circumstances, and in view of public 
 
520 PERU 
 
 opinion, the President decided to abandon all idea of 
 conciliation, and to accept the alternative of an inter 
 national conflict. On April 5, 1879, the Chilian Govern- 
 ment formally declared war against Peru, and the 
 struggle, which ended in such appalling disaster for the 
 latter country, now actively commenced. 
 
 President Prado, in view of the national danger from 
 the Chilian invasion of Tarapaca in 1879, decided to 
 take command of the army in the south, and Congress 
 agreed to this course. The operations in 1879 are 
 recorded in the description of the war between Chile, 
 Bolivia, and Peru, and it is not necessary to refer to 
 the campaign further than to mention that the disastrous 
 outcome resulted in internal political changes deserving 
 of a place in history. In November, 1879, Prado, con- 
 vinced that Peru could not stem the Chilian advance, 
 returned to Lima, and in a letter published on 
 December 2 announced his arrival in the National 
 Capital, and his determination to use every effort to 
 retrieve the misfortunes which had befallen Peruvian 
 arms. Sixteen days after this document was made 
 public he issued a decree entrusting the Administration 
 to the Vice-President, General La Puerta, stating that 
 he intended to absent himself from Peruvian territory 
 under the permission conceded by the Chambers on 
 May 2, 1878, and next day he embarked at Callao for 
 Europe, abandoning his country to any consequences the 
 war with Chile might entail. 
 
 The unpatriotic action of General Prado at this 
 crisis has never been explained. He was not lacking 
 in physical courage, as had been demonstrated when he 
 commanded the defence of Callao against the Spanish 
 squadron on May 2, 1866 ; but the services he had 
 rendered to his country in former days could not con- 
 done his conduct in leaving Peru when calamities were 
 falling thick upon her, and his action caused an out- 
 burst of indignation. It was now that Senor Nicolas 
 de Pierola again became prominent. Pierola was 
 residing in Chile at the outbreak of hostilities between 
 
1879] REVOLT UNDER PIEROLA 521 
 
 that country and Peru in 1879, and on the declaration 
 of war in April of that year he offered his services to 
 the Peruvian Government. This offer was accepted, 
 and Pierola returned to Lima, and was nominated to 
 an important military post. On the flight of Prado the 
 moment was opportune for him to seize the direction 
 of public affairs, and he organised a revolutionary 
 movement to oust the authorities then in power. The 
 obstacle to the immediate success of this conspiracy 
 was the opposition offered by General Manuel Gonzalez 
 de La Cotera, then Minister of War, who decided to 
 support the Vice-President, General de La Puerta, and 
 counted on the garrison of Lima for aid. The first 
 indication that mutinous designs were entertained by 
 the troops was the refusal of Colonel Arguedas to 
 detail a guard for duty at the Palace. General de La 
 Cotera immediately marched against Colonel Arguedas, 
 but was forced to retire by the heavy fire of a number 
 of disaffected citizens on the house-tops. At this 
 juncture, Pierola, with another body of mutineers, 
 appeared, and a fusillade was maintained for some 
 hours in the principal square of the city, the casualties 
 being 60 killed and 200 wounded. Soon afterwards 
 the police joined the revolutionary cause, and the 
 position of the Government momentarily became more 
 critical. On the evening of December 21 Pierola with his 
 supporters marched against Callao, occupying that city 
 without resistance early next day. The Archbishop of 
 Lima now intervened in the struggle and persuaded Gene- 
 ral de La Puerta to end the conflict by tendering his 
 resignation, and on December 23, 1879, Pierola entered 
 Lima once more, and was proclaimed Supreme Chief of 
 the Republic pending the outcome of the war with Chile. 
 Seiior Pierola at once commenced energetic measures 
 to defend Peru against the Chilian invasion by organising 
 additional bodies of troops, and by fortifying and occupy- 
 ing a number of strategic positions. The Peruvians were 
 so far satisfied with the man now at the head of affairs 
 that no active opposition was raised to his assumption 
 
522 PERU 
 
 of dictatorial attributes. But the efforts of Pierola 
 proved abortive to check the victorious onward progress 
 of the Chilians, and reverse followed reverse in the 
 course of the ensuing twelve months until the occupation 
 of Lima in January, 1881, crowned the tale of defeat. 
 After the disasters of Peru had culminated in the 
 rout of the defence at the battle of Miraflores, the 
 power of Pierola for the time was ended, and he retired 
 to the interior of the country, and there unsuccessfully 
 endeavoured to organise further resistance ; but finding 
 such action of little practical avail, he returned to 
 Lima under the protection of a safe-conduct issued by 
 the Chilian authorities, and then left the country, to 
 reside first in Europe and afterwards in Chile. Pierola 
 was still a young man, having been born on January 5, 
 1839, and could count on support from the Church Party, 
 for he had been educated at Arequipa, a stronghold of 
 clerical influence. In spite of the fact that under the 
 Administrations of Sefior Pardo and General Prado he 
 had been a constant menace to public order, he retained 
 a powerful following, and was destined at a later period 
 to play an important part in the national history. 
 
 From 1881 to 1884 the political developments in 
 Peru are more particularly connected with the occupa- 
 tion of the country by the Chilians as the immediate 
 consequence of the war, and as such are described in 
 the account of that struggle. The thread of the present 
 story, therefore, is picked up at the point where the 
 evacuation of Peruvian territory by the Chilian forces 
 took place. General Miguel Iglesias had been installed 
 as President by the assistance of the Chilian authorities, 
 although he was not recognised by a dissentient section 
 of the population of which General Caceres was the 
 leader ; but as it was with the Administration of 
 President Inglesias that the Treaty of Ancon was 
 celebrated, and as this treaty was accepted by the 
 Peruvians, he must be regarded as formally ranking 
 amongst the list of presidents holding office since the 
 country became independent of Spain. 
 
1884] DISTURBED INTERNAL CONDITIONS 523 
 
 From 1884 to the end of 1885 the country was torn 
 by internal dissensions. Iglesias was supported in 
 Lima by the people approving the treaty of peace made 
 in October, 1883, and which had led to the withdrawal 
 of the Chilian army of occupation ; but Chilian influence 
 in 1884 was still strong, and on this support General 
 Iglesias could rely at the commencement of his Admini- 
 stration. The opposition was concentrated at Jauja, 
 and it was from this point that General Caceres 
 organised his forces to attack the de facto Administration. 
 On March 8, 1884, the Chambers formally ratified the 
 Treaty of Ancon, and peaceful relations were established 
 with the Chilian Government ; but this fact carried 
 small weight with General Caceres and his friends, and 
 their preparations were continued for the invasion of 
 the territory over which the Iglesias Administration 
 was acknowledged. In July and August of 1884 
 the forces under Caceres approached the National 
 Capital, and on the 24th of the latter month Lima was 
 attacked ; but the garrison of the city succeeded in 
 holding its own, and Caceres was repulsed with such 
 heavy loss that a retreat to Arequipa was ordered to 
 allow him to reorganise his army. For the next year 
 constant skirmishes occurred between the two parties ; 
 but no decided successes were gained by either side, 
 although Caceres was enabled to strengthen his position, 
 and towards the close of 1885 he made a second attempt 
 to capture Lima. In November of that year he moved 
 to the vicinity of the Peruvian capital, and on December 
 1, 1885, attacked the city, and after hard fighting he 
 occupied the upper portion of the town as far as the 
 Plaza de la Inquisicion. Next day Caceres and Iglesias 
 held a conference, and both leaders agreed to resign 
 their pretensions to a council of Ministers comprised of 
 Senor Antonio Arenas, Senor Jose Sanchez, Monsenor 
 Manuel Tovar (now Archbishop of Lima), General 
 Manuel Velarde, and Senor Pedro Correa y Santiago. 
 The duties of this council were to take steps for the 
 election of the President, Vice-President and Members 
 
524 PERU 
 
 of Congress, and to administer public affairs until the 
 political situation became normal. Immediately after 
 surrendering his power to this council, Iglesias left the 
 country, while Caceres remained in Peru and worked 
 actively for his election to the Presidency, His efforts 
 were successful, and in May, 1886, Congress declared 
 him chosen as Chief Magistrate, and with his accession 
 to office on June 3, 1886, all serious internal political 
 disturbances ceased for the time. 
 
 The Administration of President Andres Caceres 
 from 1886 to 1890 was barren of historical events. The 
 people of Peru were wearied with a condition of warfare 
 that had existed first with Chile and afterwards against 
 the authority of Iglesias, and little energy was left to 
 foment disturbances against the authorities. Every- 
 where was misery and poverty, for Peruvian industrial 
 enterprise had been ruined in the struggle against Chile, 
 and the spirit of the inhabitants was so far broken that 
 small scope remained for the establishment of new 
 undertakings. The national resources dwindled away 
 to insignificant proportions, the revenue was barely 
 sufficient for the maintenance of the Government, and 
 no funds were available for the assistance of the 
 sufferers in the recent defence of the country against 
 the Chilian invasion or the internal disturbances 
 occurring between 1884 and the end of 1885. In such 
 circumstances the Administration of Caceres lived from 
 1886 to 1890. Towards reconstruction nothing was 
 attempted, and public affairs were allowed to drift in 
 haphazard fashion. The national income supported a 
 small favoured clique, but when this limited circle was 
 satisfied nothing was left for the alleviation of the 
 general distress. When the term of Caceres ended in 
 1890, the official candidate, Colonel Morales Bermudez, 
 was declared elected, and no opposition to this arrange- 
 ment was suggested. 
 
 The first and second Vice-Presidents for the term 
 of Colonel Morales Bermudez were, respectively, Seilor 
 Pedro A. del Solar and Colonel Borgono. This fact is 
 
 
1890] PRESIDENT BERMUDEZ ELECTED 525 
 
 important, as on it hinged a subsequent revolutionary 
 movement which spread through the country in 1894, 
 and which was only ended after a severe struggle, 
 entailing heavy loss of life. Between 1890 and 1894 the 
 power behind the Government was Caceres, and under 
 his guidance the Bermudez Administration conducted 
 public affairs in uneventful fashion. No effort at im- 
 provement was made, nor was there any attempt to check 
 the corruption rampant in every official department. It 
 was only natural that discontent arose among a large 
 section of the inhabitants, and this feeling became more 
 marked as the population began to recover from the 
 state of depression which prevailed at the close of the 
 war with Chile. Under Caceres the Government had 
 been practically a military dictatorship, and small change 
 in the system occurred under Bermudez because of the 
 influence of his predecessor over the Administration ; 
 but the civilian element recognised that a continuance 
 of dictatorial methods was a direct obstacle to sub- 
 stantial progress, and an agitation was set afoot to 
 secure the election of a civilian to the Presidency when 
 the term of Bermudez expired. It was not the intention 
 of Caceres to allow the control of affairs to slip through 
 his hands, and he handled the situation in such manner 
 as to prevent his opponents obtaining their object by 
 constitutional means. At the commencement of 1894 
 it was evident that he had so manipulated matters that 
 he would be proclaimed President when the formal 
 result of the election was announced. 
 
 An unexpected event marred the intrigue. President 
 Bermudez died suddenly on April 1, 1894, three months 
 before the expiration of presidential term, and the first 
 Vice-President, Senor Pedro del Solar, should have 
 succeeded. Senor Solar represented the civilian element, 
 and his advent to office did not accord with the views 
 held by General Caceres ; so, to avoid the complications 
 likely to arise if he did, Caceres induced Colonel Borgono, 
 the second Vice-President, to seize control of the 
 Government. This illegal proceeding provoked a 
 
526 PERU 
 
 revolutionary rising in the south, which was nominally 
 headed by Senor Solar, but in reality directed by Pierola 
 from Chilian territory. The Chambers were opposed to 
 the course taken by Colonel Borgono, and in view of 
 this hostility he dissolved the Congress and ordered 
 elections to be held to secure representatives to support 
 the new Administration. In due course the Chambers 
 constituted under these conditions met in Lima, and 
 shortly afterwards Caceres was proclaimed President, 
 assuming office formally on August 10. 
 
 The revolutionary movement was continued against 
 General Caceres, and found many supporters ; but the 
 army was opposed to it, and for several months the 
 insurgents made no substantial progress. Arms and 
 ammunition were not easy to obtain, and little money 
 was available for the purchase of supplies, but Pierola 
 gradually succeeded in overcoming the difficulties in the 
 formation of a force of sufficient strength to march on 
 Lima. From September, 1894, to February, 1895, a 
 series of skirmishes occurred with the troops, but no 
 marked advantage was obtained by either side. Mean- 
 while the strength of the rebel army had grown steadily, 
 and in March, 1895, an order was issued by Pierola to 
 concentrate near Lima, in response to which 5000 
 insurgents assembled on March 15 and 16, in the 
 locality indicated. For the defence of the National 
 Capital Caceres counted on 4000 men, but many of the 
 officers could not be trusted if the insurgent cause 
 showed signs of success. 
 
 On the morning of March 17, 1895, the rebel army 
 under Pierola attacked, and after desperate street fight- 
 ing the upper portion of the city was captured. For the 
 next two days the struggle continued ; but the sympathy 
 of the residents was obviously with the revolutionary 
 cause. Caceres became convinced that further resist- 
 ance was useless, and under the protection of the 
 foreign diplomatic corps he abandoned Lima for Callao, 
 where he embarked on a neutral vessel. In the three 
 days' fighting 3000 men lost their lives, either killed or 
 
[Face page 526. 
 
1895] REVOLUTION AGAINST CACERES 527 
 
 dying afterwards from wounds, and as many more were 
 more or less seriously injured. When the triumph of 
 the revolution was assured, steps were taken to restore 
 order ; but some days elapsed before the streets were 
 cleared of the dead and dying, and normal conditions 
 re-established. Credit is due to Mr Alfred St John, at 
 the time H.B.M.'s Consul in Peru, for arranging a 
 suspension of hostilities on March 19, and it was 
 through his representations that Caceres was induced 
 to abandon a hopeless struggle and accept the protec- 
 tion of the foreign diplomats. The purpose of Mr St 
 John was to avoid further bloodshed. 
 
 A Provisional Administration was now formed 
 under Seiior Candamo, assisted by Senor Villaran, Seiior 
 Espinosa, Senor Malpartida, and Senor Bustamante y 
 Salazar. Elections were held, and the dictatorial 
 methods of Caceres replaced by a constitutional regime, 
 and when a condition of law and order had been 
 reinstated, a presidential election was ordered. This 
 resulted in the choice of Pierola ; and on September 8, 
 1895, the new President was installed in office, once 
 more assuming control of Peru after an interval of 
 fourteen years. The country had obtained the object for 
 which the struggle of 1894-5 had been undertaken, and 
 military ascendency gave place to civil administration. 
 
 President Pierola had only been a few months in 
 power when an insurrection broke out in Iquitos, in the 
 interior of the Republic, near the principal tributaries of 
 the Amazon, but the movement did not meet with much 
 sympathy, and was suppressed without great difficulty 
 in 1896. Several reforms with important bearing on 
 the political and economic life of Peru were introduced 
 under the new Administration, and an electoral law was 
 voted by which a committee of nine members was 
 entrusted with the examination of all electoral returns 
 and the proclamation of successful candidates for the 
 Legislature. In the constitution of this committee two 
 representatives were nominated by the Senate, two by 
 the Chamber of Deputies, four by the Supreme Court, 
 
528 PERU 
 
 and one by the President with the consent of the 
 Ministry. Another important measure was the legal- 
 isation of marriages performed by foreign diplomatic 
 ministers, consuls, and ministers of dissenting churches, 
 when such contracts were duly inscribed in the civil 
 registers. A third reform was the adoption of a gold 
 currency in place of a fluctuating silver one, the new 
 coinage providing for the introduction of a gold piece of 
 equal fineness and weight to the pound sterling, and 
 also for this latter coin to be exchangeable for ten silver 
 soles of 100 cents. In 1899, shortly before the expira- 
 tion of the presidential period, another attempt at 
 revolution was made, the alleged motive being the 
 temporary suppression of the electoral committee created 
 under the Law of 1897. The leader of the movement 
 was Senor Durand, a man who had played a prominent 
 part in the rebellion against Caceres ; but the rising did 
 not find favour, and although it lingered on for some 
 months, no really serious fighting took place. In July, 
 1899, the country was called upon to elect a successor to 
 Pierola, and the choice fell on Senor Romaila, a member 
 of a well-known family of Arequipa. Pomana had been 
 educated at Stoneyhurst in England, and graduated sub- 
 sequently as a civil engineer at King's College, London, 
 and, although he was a man of little experience in politi- 
 cal life, his election met with unanimous approval. 
 
 On September 8, Senor Pomana was installed as 
 President. The revolutionary movement under Durand 
 gave intermittent signs of existence, but prompt measures 
 were taken to bring it to an end, and when 1899 drew 
 to a close little evidence remained of any desire to 
 dispute the authority of the Administration. The whole 
 population wished for peace, to allow opportunity for 
 economic * development and industrial progress, and, 
 consequently, the Pomana Administration was not 
 embarrassed by serious internal disturbance, although 
 petty political intrigue was not lacking on the part of 
 ambitious politicians desiring to create difficulties to 
 serve the purposes of themselves and their friends. 
 
1903] INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS 529 
 
 During the past five years a greater sense of tranquillity 
 has been experienced than was known at any former 
 period in Peru since the establishment of republican 
 institutions, and the people are fully alive to the bene- 
 fits arising from the existing internal peace. In May, 
 1903, Senor Manuel Candamo was elected to succeed 
 Senor Romafia in the Presidency, and his selection en- 
 sured a continuance in power of the party which had so 
 greatly helped to further the prosperity of the country.* 
 
 In regard to international questions, the most 
 important is that open with Chile in connection with 
 the ownership of Tacna and Arica. The settlement of 
 this matter should have taken place in 1894 by the 
 terms of the Treaty of Ancon, but Peru was then in 
 such an unsettled state from internal complications that 
 it was impossible to open negotiations on the subject. 
 For the past ten years every attempt at a satisfactory 
 agreement has proved abortive. Peru mistrusts the 
 policy of Chile, and believes she is determined to remain 
 in possession, and acting in this spirit the Peruvian 
 Legation has been withdrawn from Santiago and no 
 further effort is being made to bring about an under- 
 standing. This attitude is regrettable, for the absence of 
 a definite agreement with Chile keeps an old sore open. 
 
 In 1895 the dispute with Colombia regarding the 
 boundary with that Republic was brought to an 
 amicable conclusion by the withdrawal of part of the 
 claims put forward by the Colombian Government and 
 the reference of the remaining points to the arbitration 
 of the Spanish Crown, but a similar controversy with 
 Ecuador has still to be settled. With both Bolivia and 
 Brazil the boundary of Peru has yet to be definitely 
 fixed, but in neither case should there be any difficulty 
 unless unexpected complications arise. 
 
 * President Candamo died at Arequipa on May 7, 1904, and for 
 some weeks previously during his illness the Government was admini- 
 stered by Vice-President Calderon. Senor Calderon is a member of 
 the Civilista Party, and took part in the opposition to President 
 Caceres, which ended in overturning the military regime that was in 
 force from 1884 to 1895. 
 
 2L 
 
CHAPTER XXIX 
 
 peru — continued 
 
 Movement of Population. Effect of Wars and Revolutions. Decrease 
 of Inhabitants. Races of Peru. Conflicting Elements in Popula- 
 tion. Japanese Immigration. Infantile Mortality. Unhygienic 
 Conditions. Alcoholism. National Language. Similarity with 
 Semitic Customs and Words. Topographical Zones. Education. 
 Primary Instruction. Educational Statistics. Secondary and 
 Higher Education. Justice. Legal Procedure. Influence of 
 the Roman Catholic Church. National Character. Municipal 
 Government. Typical Spanish Features in Lima. City of 
 Arequipa. The Commercial Situation. Trade Conditions. 
 Financial Situation. Contract with Bondholders. The Peruvian 
 Corporation. Internal Debt. Taxation. The Currency Ques- 
 tion. Industrial Occupations. Sugar Enterprise. Labour 
 Question. Cotton Production. Coffee and Cacao. Minor 
 Agricultural Products. Pastoral Industry. Llamas and Alpacas. 
 Minerals. Difficulties of Mining Enterprise. Cerro de Pasco. 
 Silver Production. Petroleum. Coal. Borax. Mining Laws. 
 The Rubber Districts. Manufacturing Industry. Cotton and 
 Woollen Mills. Panama Hats. Motive Power for Manufactur- 
 ing. Development and Transport. 
 
 The question of the movement of population is one of 
 the many serious problems confronting Peru at the 
 present time. No census has been taken since 1876, 
 when the total number of inhabitants was returned as 
 2,621,844 ; but these statistics were based largely on 
 guesswork, and the figures given cannot be accepted as 
 accurate, although they are an indication of the state of 
 affairs a quarter of a century ago. 
 
 Since 1876 the conditions have been materially 
 modified. The war with Chile resulted in the deaths 
 
 530 
 
President Romana. 
 
 if dee page 530. 
 
1903] ECONOMIC SITUATION 531 
 
 of 30,000 able-bodied men by land and sea between 
 1879 and 1883, and as many more died of wounds 
 received and hardships endured in Tarapaca, Tacna, 
 and Arica, the vicinity of Lima, and in the desultory 
 warfare in the interior after the Chilian occupation of 
 the National Capital. In the revolutionary movements 
 against Iglesias in 1884 and 1885, and in the rising 
 against Caceres in 1894 and 1895, the loss of life was 
 also heavy, and the misery resulting from this constant 
 turmoil since 1876 has told its tale with overwhelming 
 effect, and caused unusually high mortality in both towns 
 and country districts. Weakened by privation from an 
 insufficiency of the common necessaries of life the 
 people have been unable to withstand sickness, and 
 ordinary ailments have proved as disastrous as serious 
 epidemics would have been under different circum- 
 stances. The outcome is that districts fairly well 
 populated when the census of 1876 was compiled are 
 now practically deserted, and everywhere semi- 
 abandoned villages are striking proof that a shrinkage 
 of the population has occurred with startling rapidity. 
 Nor has the urban population increased to counter- 
 balance the diminution in the rural districts, for in most 
 cases there is also a marked falling off in its numbers. 
 The authorities have hesitated to order another census 
 through a disinclination to show the true state of 
 affairs, but the opinion of well-informed persons who 
 have devoted attention to the matter is that an accurate 
 census to-day would fall short of 1.500,000 — about one- 
 half of the population in 1876. 
 
 The people of Peru comprise several distinct races, 
 each with its clearly defined traits. The dominant 
 element consists of the descendants of the Spanish 
 conquerors ; but, naturally, in a community where the 
 ruling element is small in numerical proportion to the 
 subjugated population, a mixture of races occurred. In 
 the course of the last four centuries, Indian blood has 
 filtered into the veins of the Spanish residents, and few 
 exceptions to this rule are found at the present time ; 
 
532 PEEU 
 
 and amongst the Indian population, forming the great 
 mass of the inhabitants, the evidence of a Spanish strain 
 is also apparent in every district, although dwarfed by 
 the preponderance of native blood. In place of Spanish 
 blood raising Indian civilisation to a higher level, it has 
 been thrown into the background by the superior weight 
 of surrounding circumstances. Apart from the Spanish 
 and the Indian sections are the negroes and Asiatics, 
 the former brought to the country from Africa, and the 
 latter introduced as labourers after the emancipation of 
 the slaves. A mongrel element has arisen in more 
 recent years from a mixture of negro blood with Spanish 
 and Indian, and Asiatic with Indian and negro and 
 that of Spanish descent. Little love is lost between the 
 varied people who make up the present population, and 
 racial quarrels are common. According to statistical 
 returns in the census of 1876, no less than 75 per cent, 
 of the total population consisted of Indians ; 23 per 
 cent, was classified under Cholo (mixed Indian and 
 Spanish) and Zambo (mixed negro and Spanish) ; the 
 remaining 20 per cent, was of Spanish descent, 18,000 
 Europeans, and 25,000 Asiatics, principally Chinese. 
 With the exception of the Chinese, who have decreased 
 during the last three decades, the proportion of nation- 
 alities is now only slightly different from the census of 
 1876. 
 
 Immigration is practically nil. From Europe a few 
 persons drift to the country, and from South American 
 states individuals find their way to Peru, but the 
 departure of foreign residents counterbalances any 
 addition to the population from outside sources. 
 Recently, the experiment of introducing Japanese for 
 work as labourers was attempted, but did not prove 
 satisfactory. There is little inducement for foreigners 
 of European or American nationality to choose Peru 
 for permanent settlement ; the climate is uninviting for 
 the inhabitants of northern Europe, and the people 
 from southern zones find more suitable conditions 
 prevailing in Argentina and Brazil, where Italians, 
 
1903] MOVEMENT OF POPULATION 533 
 
 Spaniards, and Portuguese meet with large colonies of 
 kindred blood. 
 
 There are two principal causes tending to check 
 increase in the population of Peru. The first is the 
 unprecedented rate of infantile mortality, the absence 
 of all proper attention and nourishment for newly-born 
 infants being the reason alleged for this unsatisfactory 
 condition. Extreme domestic poverty is certainly con- 
 ducive to carelessness in regard to children, and an 
 inability to attend to their welfare ; but the natural 
 physique of the Indian is not sturdy, and this inclination 
 to bodily weakness is unduly fomented by the unhygienic 
 conditions under which the poorer portion of the 
 inhabitants dwell in town and country, and no attempt 
 is made by national or municipal authorities to remedy 
 the existing unsanitary state of affairs. The second 
 factor threatening the depopulation of Peru is alcohol- 
 ism, the abuse of strong drink largely contributing 
 towards the debility which characterises the infantile 
 population. It is impossible that the offspring of 
 drink-sodden fathers and mothers can grow to maturity 
 with sound health, and unfortunately poverty is no 
 obstacle to indulgence in spirituous liquor. The local 
 manufacture of cheap drink is extensive, and the product 
 is sold at such low prices that for a few cents a large 
 quantity can be purchased. The impurity of this cheap 
 spirit is notorious, and the harmful result from its 
 constant use cannot be overestimated. The Government 
 could mitigate the evil by imposing restrictive taxation 
 on its manufacture ; but no steps have been taken in 
 this direction, and it is to this supine attitude in regard 
 to national hygiene and the liquor traffic that many of 
 the economic difficulties of to-day can be traced. The 
 depopulation of the country means the ruin of industrial 
 enterprise for lack of labourers, a condition yearly 
 more keenly experienced, and which must be rapidly 
 accentuated unless effective measures are adopted to 
 check its course. 
 
 While Spanish has been the official language of 
 
534 PEPU 
 
 Peru since the conquest of the Inca Empire, a very 
 large proportion of the inhabitants retain the vernacular 
 of Quichua in some districts, Aymara in others ; in some 
 sections of the country these latter tongues are the only 
 means of communication, and this fact is one evidence 
 of the limited efforts for the education of the poorer 
 classes. Both Quichua and Aymara contain many 
 words of Semitic origin, and this similarity suggests the 
 theory that the Inca people were not the aborigines of 
 South America, but descendants of Asiatics. Although 
 no satisfactory evidence has been discovered to support 
 this supposition, there are many customs and practices 
 of the Indians which bear striking resemblance to those 
 in vogue during the later Babylonian era. 
 
 For rough purposes of topographical description, 
 Peru may be divided into four zones. These are the 
 districts bordering on the coast-line, the lower ranges 
 and valleys of the country a short distance inland, the 
 great Cordillera of the Andes, and the section sloping 
 to the tributaries of the Amazon. On the coast-line 
 there is almost no rainfall, except in the territory a few 
 degrees south of the equator, and in the second zone 
 little rain falls, but the valleys are fertile on account of 
 abundant water from the rivers fed by snow from the 
 high altitudes. The third zone comprises the great 
 Andine ranges, many sections of these lying above the 
 perpetual snow-line ; and the fourth consists of 
 mountainous forest country broken by high ridges and 
 deep valleys, the altitude rapidly descending until the 
 vicinity of the rivers Napo, Maranon, and Beni is 
 reached, where the climate is moist and warm, and the 
 country clothed with dense vegetation. 
 
 Elementary education is more backward in Peru 
 than in Chile or Argentina. Nominally, primary instruc- 
 tion is compulsory, but no efforts are made to secure 
 the attendance of children by the various municipalities 
 which control the system. So lax are the methods that 
 no regular returns are furnished to the National Govern- 
 ment, and no regular inspection is attempted. As a 
 
1903] EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS 535 
 
 rule, the payment of teachers is on so low a scale that 
 few persons can be induced to give their services. In 
 addition to other defects, no attempt is made to bring 
 the Indian population under educational influence, and 
 this section of the inhabitants, by far the most numerous 
 in Peru, is regarded as so far beyond the pale of 
 modern civilisation that only a minute proportion arrive 
 at maturity with a knowledge of reading and writing. 
 Under such conditions, no wonder the religious orders 
 control the educational system of the country, for in 
 many cities clerical schools are maintained and the 
 children are sent to these in preference to the public 
 establishments. 
 
 According to a report recently submitted to Congress 
 by the Minister of Justice, Worship, and Instruction, 
 the number of schools open for primary education in 
 1898 was 1465, and of these 1152 were under official 
 and 304 under private control. The number of pupils 
 attending the official schools was computed at 32,904 
 boys and 15,830 girls, and the attendance at the private 
 establishments was returned as 6643 boys and 5355 girls. 
 If these figures are approximately correct, the number 
 of children between five and fifteen years undergoing 
 elementary instruction was 60,663, or 10 per cent, of 
 that part of the population to which the law of com- 
 pulsory education applies. The cost of primary instruc- 
 tion was 476,889 soles, about 238,000 gold dollars, an 
 average per head of $4.90 for the twelve months. The 
 number of male certificated teachers employed in public 
 schools was 349, and uncertificated 661, and of female 
 certificated teachers 450, and uncertificated 158, while 
 the attendance in each school was 43, and the average 
 salary paid to teachers in the public schools was 162 
 gold dollars. While these statistics are published under 
 official authority, they cannot be considered reliable, 
 returns being only forwarded by a small proportion of 
 the municipalities. 
 
 For secondary education there are twenty-two colleges 
 for males and one for females, and the cost of their 
 
536 . PERU 
 
 maintenance is defrayed from the national revenue. 
 The number of students inscribed in 1898 was 1984, 
 the average attendance 1403 ; out of 1562 students 
 examined 1186 satisfactorily passed the required test, and 
 the cost per student for the year was 103.50 gold dollars. 
 The requirements of higher education are met by four 
 Universities, situated respectively at Lima, Arequipa, 
 Cuzco, and Trujillo, the San Marcos University at Lima 
 being the most ancient in America, its charter having 
 been granted by Carlos V. in 1551. The Universities 
 have faculties of jurisprudence, medicine, political 
 science, theology, and applied science, and degrees are 
 granted in these subjects. In 1898 the number of 
 students matriculating was 1551, and 1220 under- 
 graduates passed satisfactory final examinations. For 
 technical education a school of mines and civil engineer- 
 ing was founded at Lima in 1874, and there is also an 
 agricultural college, while High Schools under British, 
 German, and Italian superintendence exist and are fairly 
 well supported. 
 
 The educational system of Peru inclines more to the 
 benefit of the classes able to pay for instruction than 
 towards the mass of the inhabitants with no available 
 funds for such purposes. For the Indian, who possesses 
 many qualities in the shape of aptitude for industrial 
 occupations, nothing is done, nor has any effort in this 
 direction been made since the Spanish conquest de- 
 stroyed Inca civilisation. 
 
 The administration of justice in Peru could not be 
 more unsatisfactory than it is, and to designate as justice 
 the manner the laws are administered is to convey an 
 erroneous impression. To obtain a favourable verdict 
 bribery must be practised, and it is a question of who 
 has the longest purse when a decision is reached. To 
 this widely sweeping assertion there are no exceptions, 
 the Supreme Court being no cleaner than the lower 
 tribunals, it differs only in that payment must be on a 
 higher scale. An example of the existing conditions 
 occurred recently, when an important suit involving 
 
1903] THE JUDICIARY 537 
 
 250,000 gold dollars was pending in the Supreme Court. 
 On the bench were five judges, and the evidence on one 
 side was clear and concise, leaving no doubt of the 
 rights of the case. A few days before judgment was 
 delivered, the principal litigant received information that 
 an adverse verdict would be given unless a bribe was 
 forthcoming, and not having the necessary funds, he 
 applied to a banker for an advance of 10,000 gold dollars 
 to buy a third vote, explaining that he had secured two 
 others. The loan was obtained, and after a favourable 
 judgment was pronounced the 10,000 dollars were paid to 
 the member casting the deciding vote. In this case a 
 just verdict was bought, but it happens quite as often 
 that injustice is obtained by similar means. 
 
 The judicial officials are, as a rule, too ignorant to 
 turn to best use the legal power entrusted to them. 
 They are so inadequately remunerated that they are 
 tempted to corrupt practices at every turn, and it is 
 due to these circumstances that blackmailing has become 
 of such common occurrence. No redress can be obtained 
 as affairs are conducted to-day, and the most hopeless 
 feature of the situation is that the ordinary citizen does 
 not appreciate the necessity for an impartial administra- 
 tion of justice. He has a vague idea that there are such 
 persons as honest judges in other parts of the world, 
 but he is not sure that an upright judiciary in Peru 
 would be an unmitigated blessing. 
 
 The influence of the Roman Catholic Church in Peru 
 is widespread, and its power is felt in both public and 
 private life. The city of Arequipa is the clerical strong- 
 hold, and the fact that better educational facilities are 
 afforded by its religious institutions than elsewhere in 
 the Republic enables the influential standing of the clergy 
 to be maintained to an unusual extent in national affairs. 
 It is worthy of note that in the many revolutionary 
 movements the possession of Arequipa has almost 
 always been the turning-point of the revolt, and when 
 public opinion in that city is in accord with the inhabitants 
 of Lima, the Government has no reason to fear serious 
 
538 PERU 
 
 complications. The reverse is disastrous, and it was so 
 in 1884 in the rising against Iglesias, and again in the 
 movement headed by Pierola in 1894-5, when President 
 Caceres was driven from office. In regard to domestic 
 life the dominating influence of clerical authority is most 
 marked, even to the dress of women when attending 
 church services ; and it is an unwritten edict that they 
 appear au religious functions in the manta in place of 
 hat or bonnet ; so rigorously is this enforced, that it is 
 seldom any member of a congregation dare infringe the 
 custom. While the men may not be imbued with 
 marked religious inclination, they dread disobeying the 
 authority of the Church, and among the Indian popula- 
 tion the Catholic priesthood is regarded with superstitious 
 awe and fear. The memories of the cruelties of past 
 centuries have been handed down, and the conduct of 
 the clergy in recent years has not inspired any great 
 confidence in the reserved and timid nature of Quichuas 
 or Aymaras, and the fact cannot be ignored that the 
 parish priest in outlying districts has been corrupt and 
 oppressive. Of course exceptions are to be found, and 
 there are men who labour to perform good work in the 
 face of many difficulties, but these are in the minority. 
 
 Any diagnosis of the national character of the Indian 
 population is difficult, for there is little in common 
 between the descendant of the Spaniard and the survivor 
 of the Incas. The Peruvian Indian is reserved in all 
 intercourse with the race which conquered him, and the 
 stamp of a vanquished people is everywhere apparent. 
 He has little individuality, and small effort is ever made 
 by him to adopt the methods and ways of the conquerors. 
 There is no communication of thought between Spaniard 
 and Indian, the former still retaining the traits of the 
 victor, and the latter an attitude of patient endurance 
 and suffering which has become ingrained, and beyond 
 this cloak the inner man seldom emerges. Nor is there 
 anything in the life of the Indian to induce any effort 
 for a higher ideal. The civilisation of the Incas was 
 crushed beyond any hope of reconstruction, and nothing 
 
1903] NATIONAL CHARACTER 539 
 
 has replaced it. From a fairly high standard of intelli- 
 gence enjoyed five hundred years ago, the Indian has 
 sunk to a level little better than that of brute creation ; 
 these people labour that they may gain a livelihood, but 
 beyond this their mental capacity does not reach. 
 
 Municipal government in most of the cities is far 
 behind the times. To a great extent this is due to the 
 poverty-stricken conditions prevailing in recent years, 
 and even in the National Capital, at Arequipa, and in 
 Callao, little effort is made to safeguard the inhabitants 
 from disease. In the municipalities foreigners are 
 accorded equal rights with natives, and in many cases 
 foreign residents are chosen as alcaldes. In Lima some 
 progress has been made recently in lighting and paving 
 the streets, but the city lags far behind other South 
 American centres in regard to modern improvements. 
 Lima, however, has some redeeming features contrasting 
 favourably with the other more modern communities. 
 It is a bit of old Spain, and four centuries have failed to 
 erase the typical features of Spanish architecture im- 
 planted by the colonists who followed Pizarro from the 
 Mother Country. Thoroughfares flanked by flat-roofed 
 houses with their overhanging balconies of carved 
 wood ; great doorways leading to gaily-coloured court- 
 yards ; open, sun-bleached squares at intervals ; iron 
 gratings over doors and windows, rusted with age, 
 uncared for, but artistic ; these and other reminiscences 
 of Spain and Spaniards are found at every turn. In the 
 cathedral lies the body of Pizarro, the founder of Lima, 
 his remains encased in a glass coffin, to satisfy the 
 curiosity of the wayfarer. From the cathedral steps on 
 the one side can be seen the quarter where the con- 
 spirators assembled to assassinate the first viceroy of 
 Peru, and on the other side of the square is the 
 Government Palace where he was done to death. His 
 murderers crossed the Plaza, forcing an entrance to the 
 vice-regal residence, and to escape his assailants Pizarro 
 took refuge in the chapel, the assassins killing him on 
 the altar steps. Changes there have been, but the main 
 
540 PERU 
 
 outlines of local colour are hardly modified since the 
 time when the conqueror of Peru was struck down by 
 the men he had led so often to victory. 
 
 A story illustrates the small intelligent interest 
 taken by Peruvians in the history of their country. 
 One day Mr Galenga, the Times correspondent, was 
 visiting the cathedral in company with the Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs, and paused to examine the body of 
 Pizarro. He remarked on the peculiar shape of the 
 head, and said it showed many features similar to 
 Indian skulls he had seen in Peru. " That is not 
 extraordinary," said the Minister, " nearly all Peruvians 
 have Indian blood in their veins." 
 
 Another spot in the Peruvian capital which carries 
 one back for many long years is the Plaza de la 
 Inquisicion. The headquarters of that awful institution 
 were lodged in the building now used as the Congress 
 Hall, and under the great shade trees surrounding this 
 place and giving grateful protection from a tropical sun, 
 was where men and women were sacrificed for refusing 
 to acknowledge a religious faith for which they had no 
 sympathy. Many houses in the Inquisition Square at 
 the present time were standing when those helpless 
 victims were dragged from the torture chambers to 
 suffer the last penalty a distorted fanaticism could 
 devise. 
 
 Callao gives rise to other feelings, for it is a modern 
 town created when Peru was wealthy and her foreign 
 trade flourishing. The bombardment by the Spanish 
 squadron in 1866 laid a portion of the city in ashes, and 
 the war with Chile completed the ruin. The trade is 
 gone, the town reduced to one-quarter its former im- 
 portance, and the population decreased to one-third of 
 the number it contained in prosperous times. 
 
 Arequipa as a city has a personality distinct from 
 other Peruvian centres. Often have the streets been 
 laid in ruins by earthquakes, and to guard against such 
 destruction every room in the one-storied dwellings is 
 built like a cell, the curved stone roof of each chamber 
 
1903] CITIES OF PERU 541 
 
 rendered strong by the presence of a heavy keystone. 
 Towering over the city is the great mountain of the 
 Misti, regarded with superstitious awe by the inhabitants, 
 and from its snow-capped peak come puffs of smoke, 
 inducing a sense of mystery that time cannot modify. 
 In Arequipa black-robed priests are in every street ; and 
 the fact that it is the stronghold of Catholicism can 
 never, never be forgotten, for clerical influence dominates 
 the community, and controls political and social life to 
 an extent that is mediaeval in effect. 
 
 Commerce in Peru has passed through many 
 vicissitudes in the last quarter of a century. When 
 the exportation of guano reached high-water mark 
 money was abundant, and the trade of the country was 
 benefited proportionately ; but the outbreak of the war 
 with Chile in 1879 was a severe blow to the commercial 
 community, and all business interests suffered in direct 
 ratio to the gravity of the reverses sustained by the 
 Peruvian arms at sea and on land. 
 
 The restoration of peace and the evacuation of 
 Peruvian territory by the Chilians was followed by 
 internal disturbances, and this effectually checked any 
 revival of commercial prosperity. The producing 
 centres of Peruvian industry were paralysed, owing to 
 the large percentage of able-bodied men who had been 
 killed or crippled in the war, and because the country 
 had lost the wealth of the nitrate fields of Tarapaca and 
 a part of the guano deposits, on which the value of 
 exports had largely depended in former years. Stagna- 
 tion in all branches of trade was inevitable, and the 
 importance of Peru as a market for foreign mer- 
 chandise dwindled to small proportions. It is true 
 that between 1886 and 1894 no serious internal dis- 
 turbances took place ; but corruption in the public 
 administration during that period provoked such uneasy 
 feeling that lack of confidence in the future prevented 
 any expansion of trade, and when the revolution of 
 1894-5 broke out, the probability of any immediate 
 revival of commerce was nipped in the bud. With the 
 
542 PERU 
 
 accession of President Pierola in 1895 prospects became 
 brighter, and continued to improve steadily until 1898, 
 when the influence of a more settled political situation 
 became clearly apparent and trade showed indications 
 of expanding. The volume of imports and exports 
 increased and a more hopeful spirit in everyday 
 business transactions developed, an improvement that 
 has continued and that promises to attain substantial 
 proportions in the next decade. 
 
 Peru, therefore, shows signs of emerging from the 
 intricate complications created by reckless borrowings 
 and the irresponsible administration of former days. 
 An external indebtedness which, with arrears of interest 
 on the bonds, amounted to £54,000,000 in 1889, has 
 been compounded for by a contract made to transfer to 
 the bondholders for a term of sixty- six years the State 
 railways and other privileges, including an annual 
 money subsidy of £80,000. The outcome of this trans- 
 action was the formation of the Peruvian Corporation, 
 a company in which the Peruvian State creditors 
 became ordinary shareholders. In this way Peru was 
 relieved of her debt charge, the bondholders perforce 
 accepting the terms offered as the only chance left to 
 them. But the contract has proved a fruitful bone of 
 contention, and has consequently done more to check 
 the rehabilitation of Peruvian credit abroad than any- 
 thing else. Under the agreement the Corporation 
 undertook to construct extensions of the existing 
 railway system, the understanding being that the 
 annual subvention would be utilised to defray the 
 interest on the capital required for this purpose. But, 
 as was evident to impartial observers, tins subvention 
 was greater than the national resources could bear, and 
 the Government soon dropped into arrears with the 
 payments, whereupon the Corporation abandoned the 
 construction of the additional railways until such time 
 as the terms of the contract were fulfilled. The dispute 
 has dragged on to the present date, the Government 
 declaring that the Corporation has forfeited valuable 
 
1903] THE PERUVIAN CORPORATION 543 
 
 concessions granted under the agreement of 1890 
 through not completing the required railway extensions. 
 The Corporation has a nominal capital of £9,000,000 in 
 ordinary shares, £7,500,000 in 4 per cent, preference 
 shares, and debentures in circulation for £3,700,000, out 
 of an authorised issue of £6,000,000. For some years 
 it was necessary to reduce the debenture interest to 
 3 per cent., but in 1901 the earnings were sufficient to 
 admit of a higher rate, and in 1903 payment in full was 
 made. 
 
 The internal indebtedness of the Peruvian Govern- 
 ment consists of the following obligations :— 
 
 Soles. 
 
 1. Interest-bearing funded debt . . 26,600,000 
 
 2. Non-interest-bearing funded debt 
 
 3. Floating debt 
 
 4. Various claims 
 
 Total 
 
 5,140,000 
 
 4,000,000 
 
 500,000 
 
 36,240,000 
 
 Interest on the interest-bearing funded debt is paid 
 at the rate of 1 per cent, annually, and the stock is 
 quoted in the local markets at 7 per cent, of the face 
 value of the bonds. The non-interest -bearing debt is 
 being liquidated at the rate of 20,000 soles per month by 
 public tender. From these figures it will be seen that 
 the present total indebtedness is small. 
 
 The revenue of £1,300,000 sterling is derived from 
 custom-house duties levied on imported and exported 
 merchandise, yielding about 60 per cent, of the total j 
 from internal taxes, which are farmed out and 
 represent 20 per cent, of the receipts ; from the salt 
 monopoly ; posts and telegraphs ; and various small 
 items aggregating about 1,000,000 soles annually. Of 
 the expenditure, 25 per cent, is due to the Department 
 of War and Marine ; an equal amount is devoted to 
 charges in connection with National Finances ; the 
 Ministry of Interior absorbs 20 per cent. ; 15 per cent, 
 is nominally expended on Justice, Worship, and Educa- 
 tion ; and the remainder is credited to the conduct of 
 
544 PERU 
 
 foreign affairs, Congress, and public works. While 
 the revenue is not large, it has augmented considerably 
 in the last five years, and with improving commerce 
 there is a prospect of a substantial increase in the 
 receipts of the custom-house, so that the actual position 
 of the Government is by no means unsatisfactory. The 
 country is poor ; but there is no heavy burthen of 
 indebtedness to be confronted, and so long as internal 
 peace endures, the resources should be sufficient to 
 enable certain improvements to be effected and to 
 obviate the danger of any serious deficit. 
 
 Peru has been through the general experience of 
 South American republics in regard to the question of 
 currency. Silver took the place of gold as the circulat- 
 ing medium, then came the inconvertible note issue ; 
 and in the epoch of the war with Chile the resources of 
 the Government were reduced to such a low ebb that 
 further emissions of paper money were made. Gradu- 
 ally the value of the notes became depreciated to such 
 an extent as to be practically worthless, and a silver 
 currency was then again established ; but the fall in 
 value of this metal resulted in such violent fluctuations 
 in the exchange rate of the sol that the authorities 
 determined to revert to a gold standard. So, during the 
 Administration of President Pierola in 1898, gold once 
 more became the standard currency of the Republic. To 
 make matters more easy, the value of the pound sterling 
 was fixed by law at 10 soles, the half-sovereign being- 
 legal tender for 5 soles, and a limited number of 
 Peruvian libras of equal fineness and weight as the 
 English sovereign were coined, the supply being gradu- 
 ally augmented during the last five years. Thus the 
 present coinage is simple and convenient ; 1 libra equals 
 10 soles, 1 sol 100 cents, and the change from a silver 
 to a gold standard was effected without producing serious 
 difficulties, although at the time it was enforced the 
 exchange value of the sol was only equal to 40 gold 
 cents, while the new law arbitrarily raised the legal 
 value to 50 gold cents. 
 
1903] INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 545 
 
 Industrial occupation in Peru is principally confined 
 to agriculture and mining. The growth of cane and the 
 manufacture of the juice into sugar is one of the chief 
 sources of wealth, and affords employment to large 
 numbers of labourers. The total production of sugar at 
 the present time is about 150,000 tons annually, this 
 amount comparing favourably with the returns of half a 
 dozen years ago, when only 70,000 tons were available 
 for export after the home demand was covered. In 
 many districts the climate offers exceptional advantages 
 for the sugar industry ; in the valleys the soil is rich, and 
 when water can be obtained for irrigation the yield is 
 unusually prolific. The fact that rain seldom falls has 
 two advantages which are lacking in Cuba and other 
 islands of the West Indies ; first, a very high density in 
 the juice, and, consequently, less difficulty in evaporation 
 during manufacture ; and secondly, the grinding of the 
 canes can be continued the year round, because there is 
 no wet season. This dryness is of undoubted value, as 
 smaller machinery is required than in countries where 
 the milling can only be conducted during the short 
 period when dry weather prevails, and the saving 
 effected in the amount of capital required in a manu- 
 facturing plant permits of the production of sugar at 
 such an unusually low cost as allows profits to be made 
 even in years when prices were depreciated by the keen 
 competition of beet sugars grown under the continental 
 bounty system. 
 
 At present the area under cultivation with cane is 
 estimated to be 150,000 acres, and an additional 50,000 
 acres on the estates is utilised to maintain the work 
 animals employed in the fields and to grow food for the 
 labourers. In the course of the next few years the 
 yield from this area should reach 200,000 tons annually, 
 and as the local demand rarely exceeds 20,000 tons, the 
 surplus available for shipment abroad will form a valu- 
 able item in the national wealth. One, however, of the 
 great difficulties in the sugar industry is an adequate 
 labour supply, the field hands employed being Indians, 
 
 2 M 
 
546 PERU 
 
 negroes, and Chinese. As regards the Indians the 
 condition of affairs is not satisfactory. Occasionally an 
 ample supply of labourers can be obtained ; but the men 
 only work when they require money for special purposes, 
 and cannot be depended upon at all seasons of the year. 
 Negroes make fairly good plantation hands; but their 
 number is limited, and they prove refractory and trouble- 
 some when employed on equal terms with Chinamen 
 or Indians. Chinamen have given the best results, but 
 for some years past the Chinese Government has refused 
 to allow emigration to Peru, and the number at present 
 in the country is rapidly diminishing. A few years ago 
 800 Japanese coolies were introduced for plantation 
 work ; but they proved deficient in physique and unable 
 to withstand the long hours and severe strain incident 
 to cane cultivation, and the experiment has not been 
 repeated. 
 
 In former years Great Britain was the market for 
 the bulk of Peruvian sugars, but the trade has changed. 
 The United States and Chile have been the principal 
 purchasers since 1898, the refineries of those two 
 countries offering better terms to producers than could 
 be obtained in Europe. Shipments of sugar to New 
 York are made by way of Panama, and by direct 
 steamers via the Straits of Magellan ; and notwith- 
 standing the heavy freight charged, the Peruvian product 
 competes successfully in New York with that of Cuban 
 origin. 
 
 The cultivation of cotton is another important 
 industry in Peru. In 1898 the quantity exported was 
 6712 tons, the United States being a purchaser of 655 
 tons, and the bulk of the remainder being shipped to 
 Great Britain. There are six cotton mills in Peru, these 
 chiefly producing the cheap calicoes in use among the 
 poorer classes. Cotton seed and oil cake is also 
 exported, the amount sent abroad in 1898 being 3322 
 tons and 1469 tons respectively. One of the principal 
 cotton-producing centres is Piura in the north, but there 
 the crop is dependent on a precarious rainfall and the 
 
Gold Drinking-Cup of the Inca Period. 
 (Now in possession of C. W. Gould of New York.) 
 
 [Face page 54(3. 
 
1903] AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIONS 547 
 
 yield is frequently scanty, whereas in those sections of 
 the country where the fields can be irrigated, this risk is 
 reduced to a minimum. A large proportion of Peruvian 
 cotton is long staple fibre, and is used in many foreign 
 factories for mixing with silk and other material. 
 
 Next to cotton in importance comes coffee. This 
 industry was only attempted on an extensive scale 
 during the last decade, and the total area under cultiva- 
 tion is only 6000 acres, the average annual export being 
 1300 tons, and, in addition, about 800 tons is consumed 
 locally. The districts in which the development of coffee 
 plantations has principally taken place are Chanchamayo 
 and the Pirene, the industry having been fostered by the 
 Peruvian Corporation to give value to the land owned 
 in that neighbourhood ; but the difficulties in the way of 
 cultivation have greatly hindered expansion, labourers 
 having been scarce and transport to the seaboard 
 exceedingly costly. At present the coffee is carried on 
 mules or donkeys for a journey of seven or eight days 
 before the nearest railway point is reached, and small 
 profit is left to the grower when all charges are paid. 
 The cultivation of cacao is attended with similar 
 obstacles. Cuzco is the centre of the industry, and in 
 1898 the surplus available for export to foreign countries 
 was 618 tons, the bulk being sent to Germany and 
 Bolivia. Rice is grown to some extent, and the quantity 
 shipped abroad annually is 5000 tons. Peruvian bark, 
 the coca leaf, some cocaine, and other minor articles 
 find a market outside the country. 
 
 Pastoral industry is not attempted on any extensive 
 scale. Cattle breeding is confined to an effort to meet 
 local demand for beef animals, and the supply is often 
 inadequate. The hides are utilised for manufacturing 
 leather, a surplus of 2127 tons remaining for export in 
 1898, and of this the United States purchased 509 tons, 
 the greater part of the rest being shipped to Great 
 Britain. Sheep are raised for mutton and wool, but 
 are not numerous, and goats for meat and their skins. 
 Llamas and alpacas are bred for beasts of burthen and 
 
548 PERU 
 
 for the wool they give, the total of this wool shipped in 
 1898 being 3488 tons. A considerable quantity of this 
 material is required in the woollen factories at Lima 
 and Arequipa, and a certain amount is consumed by 
 the Indians in the manufacture of handmade fabrics 
 for use by themselves. Alpaca wool is valuable ; but as 
 the animals are only clipped once in every two years, the 
 yield is not sufficiently remunerative to induce any great 
 addition in the number bred. Besides, climatic condi- 
 tions in Peru offer only limited inducements for pastoral 
 industry, and little development in this direction can be 
 anticipated in the future. 
 
 It is in minerals that the great natural wealth lies. 
 At present the immense deposits of copper have been 
 worked to a most limited extent, silver mines have been 
 developed only when exceptionally rich ores have been 
 found, and the search for gold has seldom been systema- 
 tically attempted. Difficulty of transport and disturbed 
 internal conditions have been two prominent factors 
 against mining enterprise, and are largely responsible for 
 the small output to-day, the total value exported hitherto 
 not exceeding 6,000,000 gold dollars annually of recent 
 years. It is only since 1898 that the copper deposits 
 have received careful attention in view of a possibility 
 of opening them up to commerce. The Cerro de Pasco 
 district has long been worked for silver, and although 
 copper was known to exist in that neighbourhood, it was 
 considered worthless in view of the heavy cost of trans- 
 port to the seaboard ; but a rise in the value of this 
 metal placed matters on a different footing, and investi- 
 gation into the character of the deposits near Cerro de 
 Pasco revealed the fact that the ore was extremely rich 
 and could be obtained in immense quantities. All 
 expert mining engineers who have visited the district 
 since 1898 are agreed as to the great possibilities of the 
 industry, and in spite of the many difficulties of com- 
 munication with the coast, much development has taken 
 place, copper worth 1,500,000 gold dollars having been 
 shipped abroad in 1899. In 1900 the exportation 
 
1903] MINERAL RESOURCES 549 
 
 remained stationary, but in 1901 much greater activity 
 was noted. The project of a railway to connect Cerro 
 de Pasco with the Central Railway of Peru is now in 
 course of realisation, and once this is finished the pro- 
 duction of copper ores in Cerro de Pasco will expand to 
 5000 tons per month instead of 1000 tons as at present, 
 if credence be given to the opinion of experts who have 
 examined the districts. According to apparently trust- 
 worthy reports on these deposits, the supply of ore, 
 averaging from 30 to 40 per cent, of copper, can be 
 calculated in millions of tons, and in the vicinity is coal 
 for smelting purposes. Transport to the seaboard and 
 capital for development are the two things required to 
 place the industry on a sound commercial basis, and 
 both these requisites will be forthcoming through the 
 aid of American energy, which has now taken the matter 
 in hand. 
 
 The district of Cerro de Pasco promises also to add 
 largely to the silver production of Peru. Its great silver 
 mines have been flooded for a long period, but a company 
 has been formed to drain them by a tunnel, at an 
 estimated cost of 600,000 gold dollars. At present the 
 value of silver exported from Peru is 3,500,000 gold 
 dollars annually ; but with the draining of the flooded 
 district this should be doubled, and possibly more than 
 doubled. Naturally, the low prices for silver during the 
 past few years have affected this branch of mining, but 
 in spite of that many mines have been steadily worked 
 over a wide area. 
 
 While gold is known to exist in considerable quan- 
 tities in Peru, there has not been as yet any great 
 development in this branch of mining, and as a rule 
 the discoveries of payable gold have been made in 
 localities difficult of access, and where the climate has 
 been a deterrent. In the districts of Carabaya and 
 Sandia valuable mines have been worked during the 
 last few years, and fair quantities of gold recovered from 
 both quartz reefs and alluvial washings, and all informa- 
 tion tends to indicate that these sections of the country 
 
550 PERU 
 
 are comparatively rich ; but until better protection for 
 life and property is accorded, and communication with 
 the littoral made easier, there is no great prospect of 
 rapid development. Probably the best known of the 
 Peruvian gold mines is Santo Domingo, in Carabaya, 
 which has been worked by a North American syndicate. 
 
 Petroleum is found in large quantities in the north, 
 and more especially in the department of Piura, and 
 £400,000 has been invested in undertakings to work 
 the oil fields, the bulk of it British. The principal 
 concern is the London Pacific Company, established at 
 Talara, near Payta, where several wells have been sunk 
 to a depth of 900 feet, and the crude oil is run through 
 pipes for 6J miles to the refining works at Talara. 
 Kerosene is made for local use in Peru, and crude oil 
 is shipped to supply fuel to various factories and railways, 
 but no export trade in this product has been created. 
 Coal is found at Cerro de Pasco, Trujillo, and Hualgayoc, 
 and the deposits are stated to be extensive, but lack of 
 transport has prevented it from reaching the seacoast 
 for general use. Several railways are projected to tap 
 the coal districts, and it is probable that one or other 
 of these schemes may take practical form in the near 
 future. 
 
 The discovery of an extensive borax deposit in a 
 locality forty-five miles to the south-east of Arequipa 
 led to an industrial development of considerable import- 
 ance. The property was purchased by a British syndicate, 
 and a company known as "Borax Consolidated" com- 
 menced active operations. In 1897 the amount exported 
 was 11,850 tons ; in 1898 the total shipped fell to 7177 
 tons ; but the work is continued energetically, and has 
 brought prosperity to the neighbourhood. The supply 
 comes from a lake covering an area of 51,000,000 
 metres, and the thickness of the deposit is stated to 
 be from 8 to 10 inches. 
 
 In one respect the Government could aid materially 
 in the development of mining enterprise of all descrip- 
 tions. The mining laws in force are defective in many 
 
 
1903] DEFECTIVE MINING LAWS 551 
 
 directions, but especially because they permit unjust 
 claims against companies or individuals who have pur- 
 chased properties in good faith and invested money in 
 development work. In many such cases the claims 
 put forward are of a blackmailing order, yet no redress 
 can be obtained in the Peruvian courts because of the 
 expense and worry the proceedings entail, and the know- 
 ledge that these practices are frequent deters capitalists 
 from investing in Peruvian mining ventures. 
 
 In the forest regions on the Atlantic slope of the 
 Andine ranges Peru has a source of wealth not yet 
 touched, although the districts watered by the tributaries 
 of the river Amazon contain vast numbers of rubber- 
 yielding trees. Occasionally, however, expeditions are 
 despatched by private enterprise to collect the gum, 
 and in the vicinity of Iquitos, a point on the upper 
 waters of the Amazon to which ocean-going steamers 
 regularly ply, the gathering of rubber has become an 
 established industry. In 1898 a route was opened from 
 the terminus of the Oroya railway to Iquitos to facilitate 
 communication with Lima, and this highway runs from 
 the end of the line to Puerto Bermudez on the Pichis 
 river, thence a service of steam launches under Govern- 
 ment supervision is established to connect with Iquitos. 
 Twenty days is required to make the journey from Lima 
 to Iquitos under existing conditions, while previous to 
 the opening of this route Iquitos was inaccessible for 
 all practical purposes from the seaboard of the Pacific. 
 It is difficult to estimate the amount of rubber annually 
 exported from Peruvian territory, for a percentage of 
 the total yield is forwarded through Brazilian ports and 
 is classified as coming from that country. In 1898 the 
 official returns showed that 1525 tons had been shipped, 
 and it is safe to calculate that the quantity actually 
 collected in Peru and sent abroad does not fall short 
 of 2000 tons annually at the present time. In the 
 future, when communication to the rubber districts 
 becomes less difficult, the annual exportation should sub- 
 stantially increase. Other products of the Peruvian 
 
552 PERU 
 
 forests are Peruvian bark, dye woods, and many valuable 
 classes of timber, but the lack of transport renders the 
 timber useless, although with altered conditions it will 
 be an item of no little importance in the national 
 resources. 
 
 Manufacturing industry is confined to six cotton 
 mills ; two factories for the production of woollen fabrics, 
 one at Lima and the other at Arequipa ; a match factory 
 at Callao, in which United States capital is invested ; 
 concerns for making soap and candles ; a brewery and 
 ice manufactory at Lima ; the local trade in bootmaking 
 and other leather work ; and the manufacture of straw 
 hats near Payta and Piura. The hats are made from a 
 fine straw imported from Ecuador, and are known 
 abroad under the name of Panama ; the finer kinds 
 so delicate in workmanship that they can only be made 
 at night, because the heat during the daytime renders 
 the straw too brittle for weaving. In 1898 the value 
 of the shipments was 53,000 gold dollars. At many 
 places in Peru abundant water supply is available for 
 motive power, and coal will be easy to obtain when 
 transport to the districts in which the deposits lie is 
 established, so that there is no reason why manufactures 
 should not expand. 
 
 But development is everywhere checked by deficient 
 means of communication and transport. At the begin- 
 ning of 1901 the total length of railways open was 
 917 miles, and of these, 816 miles belonged to the 
 Peruvian Corporation, 47 miles were worked by the 
 National Government, and 21 miles were in the hands 
 of private companies ; but the majority of these lines are 
 quite isolated from each other, and lateral branches are 
 everywhere needed to tap areas of territory rich in 
 mineral and agricultural resources. The Cerro de 
 Pasco district is a case in point, where great wealth lies 
 unutilised on account of difficulty of access, and the 
 non-production of coal in Peru is another example of 
 this lack of equipment. At present the conveyance of 
 all merchandise to and from the interior is largely 
 
1903] INADEQUATE MEANS OF TRANSPORT 553 
 
 dependent on the use of mules, donkeys, or llamas, a 
 method at once costly and tedious. Roads for wheeled 
 traffic are found only in a few isolated instances near 
 populous centres close to the coast-line, and where 
 these have been constructed they are seldom properly 
 maintained. 
 
 While the attention of the Government has been 
 repeatedly called to these shortcomings, little practical 
 effort is made towards improvement. Occasionally 
 money is voted for road-making, as was done in the 
 case of the opening up of communication to the Iquitos 
 district ; but one such experiment exhausts all available 
 funds, and years elapse before anything more is 
 attempted. Possibly the resources of the National 
 Exchequer may be too limited to permit substantial 
 expenditure on means of transport ; but the difficulty 
 might be overcome by granting concessions to private 
 individuals for the construction of roads and railways, 
 and the establishment of more adequate wharf accom- 
 modation at the various ports. In time, doubtless, 
 better means of communication will be created ; but 
 until then, the expansion of industrial enterprise must 
 be slow. 
 
CHAPTER XXX 
 
 BOLIVIA 
 
 Political Conditions before War with Chile. Conservatives and 
 Liberals. Peruvian Intrigues. President Daza. Situation of 
 Bolivia when Hostilities Ceased. President Carapero. Reform of 
 the Constitution. Negotiations with Chile. Presidency of 
 Senor Pacheco. President Arce. Argentine and Chilian 
 Pretensions. Treaty with Argentina. Indian Outbreak. 
 President Baptista. Attitude of Chile. Seiior Severo Alonzo 
 succeeds Baptista. Sedition fomented by Liberals. Outbreak 
 of Insurrection. Abdication of Alonzo. Provisional Government 
 under Pando. Casualties during the Revolution. Election 
 of Pando. Question with Chile. The Konig Note. The 
 Acre Dispute. The National Capital. Means of Com- 
 munication and Seditious Outbreaks. Internal Politics. 
 The White Population. The Political Significance of the 
 Indians. Stories of Indian Ferocity. Geographical Posi- 
 tion. Disturbed Internal Conditions and Economic Pro- 
 gress. Area and Population. Classification of Inhabitants. 
 Bolivian Cities. Topographical Features. The Four Zones. 
 Bolivian Languages. Local Colour. Native Customs. Educa- 
 tion. Primary Instruction. Secondary and Higher Education. 
 Administration of Justice. National Character. Communication 
 with Bolivia. Lack of Internal Transport Facilities. Industrial 
 Enterprise. Agriculture. The Mining Industry. Silver Pro- 
 duction. Indiarubber. Pastoral Industry. The Financial 
 Situation. Commercial Conditions. 
 
 The political condition of Bolivia, after its independ- 
 ence from Spain and until comparatively modern times, 
 is aptly illustrated by an anecdote told of the treatment 
 of a Consul for Holland by a certain President. The 
 Consul, who had suffered serious injury through illegal 
 action of the Executive, personally demanded protection 
 
1879] POLITICAL SITUATION 555 
 
 from the President, and the latter stated he was aware 
 of the circumstances but could not interfere. "But," 
 said the Consul, " I represent the Paises Bajos " (Low 
 Countries). "Well," replied the President, "I control 
 the Paises Altos (High Countries), and if you make 
 trouble, I will put you in prison and keep you there." 
 
 Previous to the outbreak of war with Chile in 1879, 
 political development in Bolivia was practically confined 
 to the centralisation of the Administration in the hands 
 of a limited group of whites. This oligarchy contained 
 two factions, classified under the designation of Con- 
 servatives and Liberals ; but there was little difference in 
 their political principles, and no very marked variety 
 distinguished their policy when in office. The terms 
 Conservative or Liberal merely served as a political war- 
 cry for ambitious politicians anxious to control public 
 affairs, and for this reason they have survived through 
 the many political vicissitudes of the past quarter of 
 a century. 
 
 In the decade between 1869 and 1879, Peruvian 
 intrigues were active in Bolivia, and exercised marked 
 influence on the policy of the Government, more especi- 
 ally in connection with the attitude assumed towards 
 Chilian citizens and Chilian enterprise near Antofagasta 
 and other districts of Atacama. The result of this 
 intriguing was an offensive and defensive alliance in 
 1873, which subsequently led to disastrous results to both 
 countries. As details of this treaty and its consequences 
 are described in the account of the war of 1879, it is 
 only necessary to make this slight reference to them 
 here. When the conflict with Chile broke out in 1879, 
 President Hilarion Daza was head of the Executive in 
 Bolivia, and it was due to his short-sighted policy and to 
 the fact that he lent a ready ear to the insinuating 
 suggestions of the Peruvian representatives, that Bolivia 
 drifted into a struggle from which no satisfactory result 
 was looked for by those who had any knowledge of the 
 facts. The incapacity of Daza was only too fully 
 demonstrated as warlike operations developed and mis- 
 
556 BOLIVIA 
 
 fortunes rapidly accumulated, for when the crisis came he 
 lacked energy to organise resistance to the Chilians, and 
 made no effort through diplomatic channels to mitigate 
 the disaster into which he had plunged his country. 
 
 Bolivia was in sorry plight when hostilities ceased. 
 The maritime provinces on the Pacific Ocean were 
 occupied by the Chilians ; the Peruvian territory of 
 Tacna and Arica, through which the larger proportion 
 of the foreign commerce of Bolivia passed, was in their 
 hands ; and the control of the valuable deposits of 
 nitrate of soda in Atacama was lost. The country had 
 become landlocked as a result of the war, and was in 
 so friendless a situation that no effective resistance was 
 possible to any terms the victors might propose. 
 Thorough disorganisation in domestic affairs was the 
 natural consequence of these misfortunes, and confusion 
 was at its height in foreign relations also when, in 
 December, 1879, Daza was deposed, and a temporary 
 Administration formed for the remainder of his term of 
 office. 
 
 The next occupant of the Presidency was General 
 Narcisco Campero, who, like his predecessor, was a 
 soldier, but who entertained intelligent ideas as to the 
 immediate necessity of establishing peace with Chile 
 and reducing internal disorders. He introduced the 
 Law of Constitution of October 28, 1880, under which 
 Bolivia is at present administered. By its provisions 
 the executive power is vested in a President, elected 
 for a term of four years by direct popular vote, and 
 not eligible for re-election when that term expires, with 
 the legislative authority in the hands of a Congress 
 of two Chambers — the Senate and the Chamber of 
 Deputies. The suffrage is granted to all adult male 
 Bolivians qualified by a knowledge of reading and writ- 
 ing. The Senators, 18 in number, are chosen for a 
 term of six years ; the Deputies, of whom there are 64, 
 are elected for four years. Senators and Deputies 
 receive a salary of 200 pesos per month, and an allowance 
 to cover travelling expenses — the latter no small item 
 
1880] LAW OF CONSTITUTION 557 
 
 in consequence of the long journeys necessary in a 
 country where roads are few and railways almost 
 unknown. The Law of Constitution provides for two 
 Vice-Presidents and a Ministry with five portfolios, viz., 
 Foreign Relations and Worship, Finance and Industry, 
 Government and Colonisation, Justice and Public 
 Instruction, and War. In each department the supreme 
 political, administrative, and military authority is vested 
 in a prefect nominated by the President. 
 
 In the direction of restoring internal order and 
 peaceable relations with Chile, President Campero 
 accomplished results which, if not all that could be 
 desired, were a distinct relief to the community. 
 Administrative functions resumed a normal course after 
 a period of confusion following the collapse of the 
 Bolivians in their struggle with Chile, and in 1882 
 negotiations were opened with Chile, with the result 
 that in 1884 the Pacto de Tregua (Agreement of Truce) 
 was signed. Five months afterwards the presidential 
 period expired, and Campero resigned office to his 
 successor, Senor Pacheco. 
 
 President Pacheco's Administration lasted from 
 August, 1884, to August, 1888, but was not remarkable 
 for occurrences exercising permanent influence on the 
 national history. Internal affairs drifted along without 
 any substantial effort to improve them. The modus 
 vivendi established by President Campero with Chile 
 continued in force, and no attempt was made to bring 
 about a modification of the agreement, or to celebrate 
 a permanent treaty of peace in place of the temporary 
 truce patched up in 1884. At the expiration of his 
 term Pacheco was succeeded by Senor Arce, the official 
 candidate for the Presidency, and who had been declared 
 elected. 
 
 President Arce had not been long in office before he 
 turned his attention to the Chilian question. The 
 Bolivian Government was in no position to negotiate 
 directly with Chile for a mitigation of the conditions 
 imposed in 1884, and Arce determined to appeal to 
 
558 BOLIVIA 
 
 Argentine sympathy to strengthen the case of Bolivia 
 in her anxiety to regain a seaport on the Pacific, and 
 a section of territory which would allow the passage of 
 Bolivian commerce to the seaboard under the Bolivian 
 flag. The President in approaching the Argentine 
 Government was influenced by the fact that the jealous 
 feeling existing between Argentina and Chile would 
 ensure a hearing for any proposals put forward by 
 Bolivia, and he was not far wide of the mark. Sefior 
 Baptista was nominated Minister to Argentina, and the 
 Argentine authorities were carefully sounded about 
 supporting Bolivian pretensions for regaining some 
 portion of the lost territory. 
 
 The idea of any direct alliance between Bolivia and 
 Argentina found small favour in the latter country if 
 such action was for the sole purpose of assisting the 
 Bolivians, and a further proposal was then made that 
 Bolivia should join the Argentine Confederation. While 
 this project held out many possibilities to the Argentines, 
 it was not acceptable to the Bolivians, and after con- 
 siderable discussion the matter was dropped. A treaty 
 was concluded finally in 1891 by Senor Baptista with 
 Argentina, by which the latter country agreed to support 
 the Bolivian cause, but only on the understanding that 
 the question of the absorption of Bolivia by Argentina 
 should be brought forward again when an opportunity 
 occurred. Subsequent events in the Administration of 
 Senor Baptista, after he succeeded Arce in the Presi- 
 dency, made this compact a dead letter. 
 
 Apart from this endeavour to enlist Argentine 
 sympathy in favour of Bolivia, little of interest occurred 
 during the Arce Administration. An outbreak of the 
 Indian population took place in consequence of certain 
 arbitrary acts committed by the Government in con- 
 nection with land to which the Indians laid claim, and 
 had been accustomed to farm for generations. The 
 rising was not a serious danger to the Government, and 
 was suppressed without extraordinary effort, although 
 not without a considerable sacrifice of life amongst the 
 
1891] NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA 559 
 
 national forces and the deaths of a large number of 
 Indians in the skirmishes that occurred before peace 
 was restored. 
 
 In August of 1892 President Arce vacated the 
 Presidency in favour of Senor Baptista, for whose 
 election official influence had been unsparingly used. 
 The new President thoroughly approved the policy of 
 the former Administration in regard to Argentina as a 
 set off against Chile, and endeavoured to consummate 
 the task initiated by his predecessor, but events occurred 
 that put an end to the attempt. 
 
 In 1893 the Chilian authorities became aware of the 
 negotiations between Bolivia and Argentina, and immedi- 
 ately took steps to annul the friendly understanding the 
 two neighbours had established, with such effect that a 
 protocol was signed by which Chile promised to concede 
 to Bolivia a port on the Pacific and made many other 
 concessions that the Bolivians deemed of paramount 
 importance to their welfare. Whether these conces- 
 sions were made in good faith or not is impossible to 
 say, but they were never carried out in the spirit put 
 forward from 1893 to 1895, when they formed the 
 subject of negotiation between President Baptista and 
 the Chilian Government. The practical result was to 
 tie the hands of Baptista in dealing with Argentina 
 and to give time for Chile to decide, without undue 
 haste, upon the most advantageous attitude to adopt 
 towards the critical nature of the developments. While 
 all remained unsettled the term of President Baptista 
 expired, and in August, 1896, he was succeeded by 
 Senor Severo Fernandez Alonzo, who had occupied 
 the post of Minister of War under the Baptista Ad- 
 ministration and was the official candidate for presi- 
 dential honours. 
 
 President Alonzo had not been many months in 
 office before discontent was fomented by his political 
 adversaries. The so-called Liberal Party had long 
 been kept out of power, and now, under the leadership 
 of Colonel Pando, determined to make a strong effort 
 
560 BOLIVIA 
 
 to obtain control of public affairs. The nominal issues 
 on which the movement was based were an agitation 
 for a decentralising reform of the Law of Constitution, 
 by which the Departments would become self-governing 
 Provinces, and to make the city of La Paz the National 
 Capital. Alonzo was aware of the inclination of 
 Colonel Pando to head the revolutionary outbreak ; but 
 he hoped to draw him to his side by making various 
 personal concessions to him, one being the grant of a 
 large tract of land in the rubber districts, which for a 
 few months so occupied Pando's attention that he 
 temporarily left political matters alone. On his return 
 from these lands the question of revolution was again 
 discussed, and in 1898 armed insurrection broke out 
 against the Administration. 
 
 At first the insurgents made little progress. Ammu- 
 nition and arms were difficult to obtain, and the uprising 
 was practically confined to guerilla warfare in the out- 
 lying districts. Towards the close of the year, however, 
 Colonel Pando succeeding in collecting a supply of war 
 material, and with the aid of these fresh consignments 
 of rifles and cartridges he raised strong contingents 
 from the Indian population to swell the rebel ranks. 
 Matters now began to look serious for President Alonzo, 
 and his cause was sensibly weakened in the early part 
 of 1899 by the desertion of many military officers to the 
 insurrection. The revolution was further strengthened 
 in April, 1899, by a series of successful skirmishes, the 
 prestige of which brought many recruits, so that 
 gradually the position of Alonzo became untenable. 
 District after district fell into the hands of his enemies, 
 and, finally, in July he decided to abandon the Presi- 
 dency — a resolution carried into effect when he with 
 his immediate supporters left the country by way of the 
 railway from Oruro to Antofagasta to take refuge in 
 Chile. 
 
 Immediately after a Provisional Government was 
 formed under Colonel Pando, and measures were taken 
 to hold a presidential election. The Chambers were also 
 
1899] ELECTION OF PRESIDENT PANDO 561 
 
 convened and other normal conditions re-established. 
 It is interesting to note that with the success of the 
 insurrection against the Alonzo Administration, the 
 question of any reform of the Law of Constitution for 
 the extension of self-government to the Departments 
 was dropped, as well as the agitation for making La 
 Paz the National Capital. The two objects for which 
 the revolution had been ostensibly supported were 
 entirely lost sight of, and the fact at once became 
 obvious that the movement had been initiated only to 
 oust President Alonzo and his followers, and to permit 
 the Liberals under Colonel Pando to obtain control of 
 the country. 
 
 Although the insurrection had continued for eighteen 
 months and reports of battles and heavy losses of life 
 on both sides had been freely circulated abroad, the 
 actual number of casualties throughout the period of 
 disturbance was extremely limited. In place of the 
 thousands of men supposed to have been killed and 
 wounded during the operations, the official reports 
 published after the restoration of peace showed that 
 only 157 deaths had occurred, and that the number of 
 wounded was not large. Some difficulty was experi- 
 enced in disarming the Indians, who had formed a 
 strong section of the insurgent forces, but it was 
 accomplished in the end without serious trouble. 
 
 In due course the presidential election was held and 
 Colonel Pando formally declared Chief Magistrate, for 
 no opposition was offered, his defeat of President Alonzo 
 having given him such prestige that he carried all 
 before him when the question came before the con- 
 stituencies. The term of Colonel Pando expired in 
 1904. He had been confronted with some intricate 
 problems, but he held common- sense views on domestic 
 and international affairs, and proved of service to Bolivia 
 when the complicated dispute with Chile required much 
 tact, and also w T hen occurrences in connection with the 
 district of Acre threatened to strain relations with 
 Brazil. 
 
 2n 
 
562 BOLIVIA 
 
 The crux of the dispute with Chile is the keen 
 desire of Bolivia to recover a seaport on the Pacific. 
 In 1895 the Chilian Government promised to concede 
 an outlet to the coast-line as the consideration for a 
 definite treaty of peace by which Chilian ownership 
 of the territory occupied since the war of 1879 should 
 be formally recognised. Certain developments occurred 
 which prevented Chile making this concession, and at 
 the close of 1900 a note was presented to the Bolivian 
 Government by Senor Konig, the Chilian minister, 
 suggesting other means of settling the differences 
 between the two countries without the seaport. This 
 new proposal is not palatable to the Bolivians, but it is 
 difficult to see how they can obtain better terms. They 
 have no military force to resist the conditions Chile 
 may impose, and active assistance from Argentina 
 cannot now be expected. In regard to Acre the danger 
 lay in the possibility of a conflict with Brazil through 
 the majority of the inhabitants being Brazilians ; but, 
 with the exception of an insignificant portion, the 
 territory was recognised as belonging to Bolivia by 
 boundary treaties between the two countries. The 
 inhabitants, however, objected to the establishment of 
 Bolivian authority, and this feeling led to the proclama- 
 tion of Acre as an independent State, a step followed in 
 1900 by the despatch of troops under General Velesco to 
 overthrow the new Republic and install Bolivian officials. 
 Early in 1901 Velesco reported that his mission had 
 been successful, and the dispute has since been settled 
 amicably by mutual concessions embodied in a treaty 
 defining the boundary, signed in November, 1903. 
 
 The existing arrangement as to the National Capital 
 is inconvenient for the inhabitants, and unsatisfactory 
 from a political point of view. The official seat of 
 Government alternates between La Paz, Sucre, Oruro, 
 and Cochabamba, and the Congress is convoked some- 
 times at one and sometimes at another of these places, 
 with the result that Government offices have to be moved 
 and archives transferred at great expense and risk. 
 
[Face page 564. 
 
1904] THE NATIONAL CAPITAL 563 
 
 Only a few years ago a baggage train conveying most 
 important documents and official records was crossing a 
 swollen ford when the animals were swept away, and a 
 large amount of most valuable Government property 
 was irretrievably lost. Sucre is generally regarded as 
 the political headquarters of the Government, but the 
 Constitution obliges Congress to hold sessions at all 
 these places, and official work is consequently dis- 
 organised and retarded. While Sucre is central and 
 has a suitable climate, it is so isolated that the journey 
 occupies a week by horse or mule from the nearest 
 railway. La Paz is the commercial capital and is fairly 
 easy of access, and from time to time agitations arise 
 calling for it to be made the permanent centre of 
 Government. Individual interests have hitherto pre- 
 vented this change, although it would be for the general 
 benefit of the community. 
 
 It is the difficulty of communication throughout 
 Bolivia that makes its political organisation so insecure 
 whenever discontent is fomented against the Adminis- 
 tration. A district up in arms against the Government 
 can be assured of ample time to organise rebellion 
 before the authorities are able to send troops into it. 
 Permanent political quiet cannot be anticipated until 
 the problem of transport between the principal centres 
 of population is solved. 
 
 In the political situation of Bolivia there are two 
 principal factors with which the Government has to 
 reckon in the question of the preservation of peace. 
 The first is the comparatively scanty white element of 
 the population, with whom, however, a revolutionary 
 outbreak is the invariable product of discontent, and it 
 is the office-seeking proclivity of this section of the 
 inhabitants that most frequently leads to disturbances. 
 Moreover, when one or other of the political parties 
 obtains control, it is seldom that anything short of 
 actual force can again bring the Opposition into power. 
 Practically, all elections for the Presidency and National 
 Congress are a farce, and official influence is so unstint- 
 
564 BOLIVIA 
 
 ingly exercised to ensure the return of the Government 
 candidate that no peaceable political combination is 
 allowed sufficient latitude to attempt to secure a 
 majority at the polls. Hence the governing element 
 has become an oligarchy, sometimes represented by 
 so-called Conservatives, as was the case before the 
 uprising of 1898, and at others by an equally restricted 
 circle of Liberals, as at present. 
 
 The second prominent force in the political life of 
 the Republic is the Indian and half-caste, or cholo, 
 population. So far as active participation in public 
 affairs is concerned, the Indians and cholos show no 
 desire to exercise the privileges they are entitled to 
 under the Constitution ; but when any question affecting 
 lands or other property arises care is necessary to 
 avoid serious disturbances. The low standard of 
 intelligence amongst this portion of the inhabitants 
 does not permit them to discriminate in regard to the 
 justice of measures dealing with landed property. In 
 their eyes long residence on any section of national 
 territory constitutes a claim to ownership with which 
 the Government has no manner of right to interfere, 
 and their great numerical superiority makes it no light 
 matter for the authorities to disregard this feeling. 
 It often serves to restrict the development of mineral 
 and agricultural resources that the Government may 
 desire to foster. 
 
 Apart from this question of land occupancy the 
 Bolivian Indians are docile when treated with ordinary 
 justice, the many stories circulated illustrative of their 
 tendency to serious crimes being much exaggerated. 
 For example, in 1899, a Swede, his wife of Bolivian 
 nationality, and a companion, also a Swede, took a 
 journey to the seaboard when the last revolution was in 
 progress. On arriving at a frontier village the party 
 were told by the authorities that they could not proceed 
 without the necessary written permission to leave the 
 country. Having none such they were detained 
 pending enquiries. A hut was allotted to them in the 
 
1904] INDIAN ATROCITIES 565 
 
 village, and the Indian population crowded round to 
 satisfy their curiosity about the newcomers. At this 
 the travellers became alarmed, took it into their heads 
 that the Indians intended to murder them after torture, 
 and opened fire with their rifles on the villagers. 
 When their ammunition was nearly exhausted, the first 
 Swede shot his wife, and then the two men committed 
 suicide. This incident was characterised far and near 
 as a brutal murder by the Indians, whereas the facts of 
 the case did not justify any such assertion. At present, 
 the Indian inhabitants are controlled by caciques, or 
 native chiefs, and it is through these that the Govern- 
 ment is forced to work when measures affecting this 
 part of the population are enacted. The Indian 
 standard of intelligence must be raised to a higher level 
 before any other system of administration is possible. 
 
 The geographical position of Bolivia in South 
 America and its resources are not dissimilar to the 
 characteristic features of the Transvaal. Access to the 
 seaboard, however, has been secured to the Transvaal 
 by various lines of railway, whereas only in the western 
 section of Bolivan territory has any attempt been made 
 to provide facilities of transport. Like the Transvaal, 
 the chief source of wealth lies in the mineral deposits, 
 but difficulty of communication has prevented any ade- 
 quate development of the mining industry. 
 
 As already detailed, many causes have arisen in 
 Bolivia in the last quarter of a century to check pro- 
 gress and accentuate its isolation, and only now are 
 indications becoming visible that some practical attempt 
 will be made to break down the barriers which caused 
 the country to be regarded as a terra incognita to 
 Europeans and North Americans, in spite of the records 
 of fabulous riches extracted by the Spaniards between 
 1600 and 1800. 
 
 While Bolivia claims 840,000 square miles of terri- 
 tory, the actual area under her jurisdiction is con- 
 siderably less, the Department of Antofagasta containing 
 29,910 square miles which must be considered as 
 
566 
 
 BOLIVIA 
 
 Chilian, because Chile sticks to it. Futhermore, the 
 ownership of one section of territory is claimed by 
 both Bolivia and Brazil, the whole of it being included 
 in the official estimates of the extent of Bolivia. The 
 eight Departments of which the area is approximately 
 known are : — 
 
 Departments. 
 
 Area, 
 square miles. 
 
 Population. 
 
 1. La Paz de Ayacucho 
 
 2. Potosi 
 
 3. Oruro 
 
 4. Chuquisaca (Sucre) . 
 
 5. Cochabamba 
 
 6. Beni 
 
 7. Santa Cruz de la Sierra 
 
 8. Tarija 
 
 
 
 171,130 
 52,100 
 21,350 
 39,890 
 21,430 
 100,580 
 126,340 
 34,610 
 
 593,779 
 360,400 
 189,840 
 286,710 
 360,220 
 
 26,750 
 112,200 
 
 89,650 
 
 Total 
 
 
 
 567,430 
 
 2,019,549 
 
 This estimate of a population of 2,019,549 was made 
 in 1893, and shows an average density of 3*5 persons to 
 the square mile, and it includes all classes of whites, 
 half-breeds, civilised and wild Indians. Approximately, 
 there are 250,000 persons of white blood ; 500,000 half- 
 breeds ; 1,000,000 domesticated Indians, and 250,000 
 uncivilised Indians. 
 
 La Paz, with a population of 62,320, is the chief 
 city, and the recognised commercial centre. It lies at 
 the foot of the beautiful mountain of Yllamani, in the 
 basin forming the head of the Yungas Valley at an eleva- 
 tion of 11,000 feet above sea level, within reach of 
 perpetual snow on the one side and semi-tropical 
 valleys on the other. So marked a feature is this 
 proximity to extremes of hot and cold that the saying 
 is common in La Paz that two messengers despatched 
 in the early morning can return in time for the midday 
 meal, the one bearing ice for the household and the 
 
1904] PRINCIPAL CITIES 567 
 
 other pineapples and such tropical fruits. Sucre, the 
 present political capital, has a population of 27,345, and 
 is situated at an elevation of 7000 feet above sea level, 
 in the midst of an agricultural district. Other important 
 towns are, Oruro, with 15,900 residents ; Cochabamba, 
 with 20,530; Santa Cruz, with 12,100; and Tarija, with 
 11,942. 
 
 For topographical description, Bolivia may be 
 divided into four zones. The first contains the higher 
 peaks and mountain ranges above the line of perpetual 
 snow. Next comes the great plateau, lying at an 
 altitude between 10,000 and 14,000 feet above sea level, 
 and there the principal mineral deposits are known. 
 In these regions the mean temperature seldom exceeds 
 43° P. At the northern end of this plateau, at an 
 altitude of 13,000 feet, is the great inland sea of 
 Titicaca, replenished by melting snows from the 
 Andes. Within sight of Titicaca is the snow-capped 
 peak of Sorata and the magnificent pyramid -shaped 
 mountain of Yllimani — two of the most remarkable 
 features of the Cordillera of the Andes. The third 
 zone comprises the semi-tropical valleys, at elevations of 
 from 4000 to 8000 feet, for the most part containing soil 
 and climate adapted for all sub-tropical agricultural 
 enterprise. The fourth section embraces the low-lying 
 lands sloping towards the river Paraguay, and the rivers 
 Madera and Beni, and other tributaries of the Amazon. 
 Here the conditions are tropical, the climate moist, and 
 the country clothed with dense vegetation. In these 
 localities the Indians classified as uncivilised are chiefly 
 found, their means of sustenance being the products of 
 the chase or fruit and roots which grow wild in the 
 forests. 
 
 While Spanish is the official language of Bolivia, it is 
 by no means universal. Among the Indians, the use of 
 Quichua or Aymara, and in some districts Guarani, is 
 more common than Castilian. The half-breeds are 
 inclined to adopt the language of their surroundings 
 rather than that of a higher civilisation, and they more 
 
568 BOLIVIA 
 
 often grow to maturity accustomed to speak Aymara or 
 Quichua than Spanish. One of the most curious 
 linguistic traits in Bolivia is that frequently in a 
 district where Quichua is the common means of com- 
 munication, an isolated settlement is found where 
 Aymara is commonly used. The explanation is that 
 the practice of the Inca dynasty was to transport bodily 
 a whole community inclined to disaffection, the tribe 
 participating in seditious practices being removed to 
 some distant spot and refused permission to communi- 
 cate with people of its own clan. Thus the exiles 
 preserved their language and customs, and their 
 descendants to-day, after five centuries, retain the 
 habits of their forebears. 
 
 Bolivia is rich in local colour. The troops of llamas 
 patiently journeying from sunrise to sunset, with their 
 loads of 100 lbs. weight strapped upon their backs, 
 are constantly in the path of the traveller, and following 
 these beasts of burthen are the Indian drivers, trudging 
 along through the heat of the day barefooted, and dressed 
 only in cotton trousers and shirt, with a rough home- 
 spun poncho over their shoulders and a broad-brimmed 
 hat of coarse straw on their heads. Each carries his 
 pouch of coca leaves and box of lime, and with no more 
 sustenance than is obtained by chewing these two 
 ingredients, they cover long stretches of country without 
 feeling the pangs of hunger. The custom of the 
 Bolivian Indians is to spin yarn for their domestic use 
 as they tramp monotonously after the llamas, carrying a 
 wooden spindle for the purpose, and it is in this manner 
 that much of the wool from the alpacas and vicunas 
 passes through the first stage of manufacture for the 
 clothing used by the peasant classes. In the cities the 
 Indian characteristics of these people are markedly 
 apparent, and in the market-places the vendors spread 
 their wares on the ground and squat beside their scanty 
 stores of local produce, to await the coming of a pur- 
 chaser. The women, with bright-coloured handkerchief 
 on head and neck, make typical examples of Inca 
 
1904] NATIVE TRAITS 569 
 
 civilisation, and their ceaseless chatter in the drawling 
 Aymara heightens the effect, and leaves an impression 
 that modern methods and European ways have made 
 small alteration in the prevailing customs of centuries 
 ago. 
 
 The authorities have paid little attention to the 
 subject of the education of the majority of the popula- 
 tion, although nominally primary instruction is gratuitous 
 and obligatory ; but the latter clause is a dead letter for 
 all practical purposes, and no efforts are made to enforce 
 the attendance of children at the schools. Public 
 elementary education is in charge of the various muni- 
 cipalities, and in 1897 there were 366 primary schools, 
 on which an aggregate sum of 139,566 bolivianos (silver 
 dollars) was expended, while, in addition, there were 
 121 private establishments for elementary instruction, 
 and 82 industrial schools ; at which in all there were 
 36,690 pupils enrolled, or less than 2 per cent, of the 
 total population. Difficulties of language are one reason 
 why the attendance is sparse, the instruction being in 
 Spanish while the common idioms are Quichua, Aymara, 
 or Guarani ; but it is more to the apathy of the people 
 in all matters concerning the education of their children 
 that the slow progress of primary instruction is due. 
 The majority of the domesticated Indians have no 
 ambition to acquire a knowledge of reading and writing, 
 and until this attitude is greatly mitigated it is unlikely 
 that education in Bolivia will show substantial advance- 
 ment. 
 
 Secondary instruction is provided for by eight 
 colleges, five establishments under the direct autho- 
 rity of the Roman Catholic Church, and four lyceums, 
 the number cf teachers employed being 91, and of 
 students under instruction 2057. For higher educa- 
 tion there are six universities with 506 students in 
 1895, and at four of these medical science is taught. 
 Seminaries exist for the education of aspirants to the 
 priesthood, and were attended in 1897 by 146 students. 
 There is a military college with 60 pupils under a staff 
 
570 BOLIVIA 
 
 of nine professors, and three schools of arts and trades 
 founded at the initiative of the Salesian Mission, the 
 members of this Order imparting a knowledge of the 
 ordinary mechanical crafts. Bolivia is a field offering 
 wide scope for missionary work in connection with 
 education, and it is from this direction rather than 
 through action by the Government that improvement 
 may be expected in the immediate future. 
 
 Justice in Bolivia is administered by a Supreme 
 Court, eight District Courts, and a number of local minor 
 courts presided over by magistrates empowered to deal 
 with petty crimes. The judiciary is corrupt and legal 
 process is dilatory and costly, and in the civil courts 
 blackmailing practices, especially in connection with 
 mining claims, are so notorious that few people refer 
 disputes to the judicial power, preferring to pay or make 
 some other arrangement to avoid legal proceedings, no 
 matter how far in the right they may be. Bolivian law, 
 as that of other South American states, is founded on 
 that existing under the former Spanish regime, is codified 
 in all branches, and not ill-adapted to serve the ends of 
 justice if intelligently and impartially administered. 
 
 In any attempt to analyse Bolivian national char- 
 acter, it must be remembered that the whites have 
 retained to a great extent the methods of thought and 
 habits of life of their Spanish forefathers, and the fact 
 that they have been brought in contact with little else 
 has resulted in the maintenance of Spanish customs to 
 even a more marked degree than in Argentina, Chile, or 
 Peru. Bolivia's isolation has tended to restrict the 
 mental perspective of the whites to narrow limits in both 
 political and private affairs, and living for generations 
 amongst Indians, who are treated as an inferior race not 
 far removed from serfdom, has developed an arrogant 
 bearing out of keeping with surrounding circumstances. 
 
 It is with Indian rather than Spanish character that 
 interest lies ; but the descendants of the Incas were so 
 crushed by their Spanish conquerors that pride or 
 national spirit has small place in their lives. They are 
 
1904] NATIONAL CHARACTER 571 
 
 simple people enough, asking little more than to go 
 their ways in peace, and so long as they are not under 
 alcoholic influence they seldom interfere with any way- 
 farer, be he Bolivian or stranger; but unfortunately 
 they have developed the curse of drink to an abnormal 
 extent, and in their cups they are often dangerous. 
 Nominally they are Christians, and recognise the authority 
 of the Roman Catholic Church in all matters pertaining 
 to religion, and their superstitious tendency makes them 
 show outward reverence to Church ritual ; but their 
 general ignorance on all subjects beyond their limited 
 domestic life renders it unlikely that they hold any 
 religious convictions. It is this same ignorance that 
 strengthens the influence of the clergy, and causes the 
 priesthood to be regarded with superstitious awe. 
 While easily led, these Indians are difficult to drive, and 
 in many cases where trouble has occurred among the 
 workmen in the mines, the cause has been traced to 
 some stupidity interpreted by the Indians as an injustice 
 in the method of superintendence rather than to any 
 deliberate tendency on their part towards criminal acts. 
 There are five routes by which Bolivia communicates 
 with the outside world, the principal one for traffic being 
 Antofagasta, the centre of the seaboard seized by Chile 
 in 1879. Between this outlet and the Bolivian town of 
 Oruro, a distance of 600 miles, a twenty-eight inch 
 gauge railway has been built under the auspices of the 
 Huanchaca Mining Company, and between these two 
 points the journey is made in three days. Owing to 
 the narrow gauge and the sharp curves on this line, the 
 trains are only run in daylight, and then at slow speed. 
 The second route is by Arica, in the occupation of the 
 Chilians, thence by train to Tacna, a distance of forty- 
 seven miles ; from Tacna a journey of six days on mule- 
 back over mountain ranges, ascending to 15,000 feet, 
 brings the traveller to La Paz. A third route is via the 
 Peruvian port of Mollendo by railway to Arequipa and 
 Puno, thence by steamer across Lake Titicaca to Bolivian 
 territory, and from the shores of the lake to La Paz, 
 
572 BOLIVIA 
 
 distant thirty-five miles. On the north, Bolivia is acces- 
 sible by the Amazon to the rivers Beni and Madera. 
 On the south, a route, formerly much frequented, ran 
 through Tupiza to the frontier of Argentina, thence to 
 Salta or Jujuy to Tucuman, and thence to Rosario or 
 Buenos Aires. This route is no longer much used now 
 that the railway runs between Oruro and the port of 
 Antofagasta. There is a project afoot to extend the 
 Argentine railway system from Salta or Jujuy, the 
 present terminal points, to the central districts of 
 Bolivia, whose Government would arrange for the con- 
 struction of the sections of the line within its territory, 
 and the execution of this proposal will give Bolivia 
 direct railway communication with the river Plate. 
 This would mean an immense advance, the journey 
 to Europe becoming possible in twenty-five days in 
 place of six weeks as now. No great outlay is in- 
 volved, the estimated cost of the line from the southern 
 frontier to the town of Sucre being but £3,000,000, a 
 small amount in comparison to the benefit to be con- 
 ferred. 
 
 Not only is access to Bolivia difficult and tedious, 
 but when once the country is reached there is a lack of 
 all modern methods of transport everywhere. Roads 
 for wheeled traffic do not exist except in very few places, 
 and then only for limited distances ; passengers and 
 cargo are carried on muleback, ten or twelve days' travel 
 in such fashion being of common occurrence. No 
 wonder progress of all kinds is checked. During the 
 dry season on the high plateau, of which Oruro is the 
 centre, it is possible to haul cargo in carts over a large 
 area of country, and industrial expansion has taken 
 place to a restricted extent ; but in the wet season in 
 these districts, and at all times of the year in many 
 others, when agricultural or mineral products must be 
 carried on mules or llamas, the heavy cost and the delay 
 attendant on the conveyance of merchandise and produce 
 is an insuperable bar to the development of industry 
 and trade. Railways and roads are everywhere needed, 
 
o 
 
 o 
 
 [Face page 572. 
 
1904] INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 573 
 
 but, once established, capital and energy will be forth- 
 coming to push forward commerce and production. 
 
 Agriculture makes little progress in Bolivia, and the 
 cereals produced are insufficient to meet home necessities, 
 limited though the consumption of bread stuffs is. In 
 the plateau lands near La Paz and Oruro, and in the 
 country between these two cities, barley is grown, and 
 a considerable area annually sown with potatoes ; but the 
 yield of both crops is meagre, in consequence of poor 
 soil and the constant frosts which occur at night during 
 summer. The potatoes are partly consumed fresh, and 
 partly made into what is known as chuno, by a process of 
 freezing and drying. The wants of this primitive people 
 are few, and with a stock of c/iufio, some coarse barley 
 or maize meal, and a supply of coca leaf to keep off the 
 cravings of hunger, most Indian families exist the year 
 round in a condition which in their imaginations is one 
 of comparative comfort, animal food being looked upon 
 as a luxury and only indulged in by the poorer classes 
 on holidays. 
 
 The semi-tropical valleys produce fruit in great 
 abundance, and there the banana, pineapple, yam, and 
 sweet potato form the principal diet. In sections of 
 the lower lands, especially those in the Yungas Valley, 
 the cultivation of coffee and cacao is carried on, and 
 here also are the principal plantations of coca. Both 
 the coffee and cacao of Bolivia have a high reputation, 
 and small shipments are regularly made to Chile and 
 Argentina ; but the bulk of the produce is required to 
 meet the local demands, while in regard to the coca leaf 
 the small surplus finds its way abroad chiefly in the 
 form of cocaine. Sugar-cane is grown in the valleys, 
 and utilised for distillation into rum, only a very small 
 proportion being manufactured into sugar. 
 
 It is in the mineral wealth of Bolivia that the main 
 industrial enterprise is centred. According to ancient 
 records in connection with the Royal Mint at Potosi, the 
 gold and silver bullion shipped to Spain between the 
 date of the Spanish conquest and Bolivia's independence 
 
574 BOLIVIA 
 
 reached the value of £120,000,000. But for the last 
 hundred years all mining industry has been checked 
 by internal disorders, and the development of the rich 
 deposits known to exist that might have taken place has 
 yet to occur —probably within the next decade. In 
 spite, however, of many difficulties, silver mining has been 
 conducted on a comparatively large scale, notably so by 
 the Huanchaca Company, which exported 8,000,000 
 ounces annually between 1892 and 1897. In the latter 
 year the lower workings of the Pulacayo mine, from 
 which this Company extracted the bulk of its ores, were 
 flooded with hot water and temporarily abandoned ; but 
 steps are now being taken to drain it. Other important 
 silver-mining districts are Colquechaca, output 1,500,000 
 ounces annually ; Oruro, the same ; Guadaloupe, 700,000 
 ounces ; Potosi, 400,000 ounces ; and other districts with 
 an aggregate yield of 3,000,000 ounces annually. In 
 normal circumstances the total yearly output of the 
 Bolivian silver mines is 15,000,000 ounces, and this 
 weight could be doubled if adequate facilities of 
 transport existed. 
 
 Another valuable metal to which attention in 
 Bolivia has been turned of late is tin. Hitherto the 
 chief deposits worked have been those near Huanuni in 
 the district to the south of Oruro, and the amount 
 shipped abroad through Antofagasta 7000 tons annually, 
 but the high prices ruling render probable a substantial 
 increase in the near future. Copper is mined to some 
 extent, 3000 tons in the form of barilla passing through 
 Mollendo each year for shipment to Europe, but such 
 minerals as antimony, bismuth, and borax are only 
 exported on a small scale. About gold mining little is 
 known beyond the fact that prospectors report rich 
 alluvial and quartz deposits in different localities ; but 
 they lie, as a rule, above the line of perpetual snow, or 
 in such isolated spots as the Tapnani Kiver, and diffi- 
 culties of communication have prevented their develop- 
 ment. 
 
 Another valuable product of which the extent is not 
 
1904] NATURAL RESOURCES 575 
 
 yet known is rubber. Throughout the great forest area 
 adjoining the rivers Beni and Madera rubber trees exist 
 in great numbers, and expeditions are sent from time to 
 time to collect the gum, the bulk of which is shipped 
 down the Amazon, passing through the Brazilian port of 
 Para on its way to foreign markets. It is estimated by 
 the Bolivian authorities that the yearly amount gathered 
 in Bolivian territory exceeds 5000 tons of a value of 
 £1,200,000. Of other forest products a small quantity 
 of Peruvian bark (Cinchona) is collected on the Atlantic 
 slope of the Andes and exported to Europe. In the 
 province of Santa Cruz, and to the south-east of the 
 Republic, are lands suitable for pastoral enterprise, and 
 in some of these districts herds of cattle are numerous. 
 
 Bolivian state finance places no obstacle in the way 
 of the future development of the country, the public 
 debt being insignificant and taxation comparatively light. 
 The monetary unit is the silver dollar, known as the 
 boliviano. At present the mint at Potosi issues only 
 silver coins of 50 cents, 20 cents, 10 cents and 5 cents, 
 and 10 and 5 cent nickel pieces. In 1896 the national 
 revenue was 3,566,777 bolivianos, and the expenditure 
 4,264,681 bolivianos, the principal sources of revenue 
 being the duties levied on imported merchandise and 
 exported products, the sale of stamps and stamped 
 paper, and the amount collected from licenses. 
 
 Bolivia's external debt originated in the claims for 
 damages done to the properties of Chilian citizens in the 
 war of 1879, but the total amount outstanding in 1898 
 was only 1,084,555 bolivianos. Its service is met by 40 
 per cent, of the duties on merchandise for Bolivia passing 
 through the Chilian custom-house at Arica, these being 
 collected by Chilian authorities at that port. The 
 Government had an internal debt in 1898, consisting of 
 advances from banks and other borrowings amounting 
 to 3,707,541 bolivianos, so the total debt of all kinds was 
 only 4,000,000 bolivianos, or about £400,000. 
 
 The commerce of Bolivia is principally in the hands 
 of Chilian, German, and native merchants, the two first 
 
576 BOLIVIA 
 
 having a strong hold over both wholesale and retail 
 trade. Imports, consisting chiefly of hardware, liquors, 
 cotton and woollen textiles, silks and ready-made 
 clothing, were valued in 1897 at 24,467,100 bolivianos, 
 and exports at 23,121,320 bolivianos, comprising silver, 
 bullion, copper, tin, bismuth, antimony, rubber, hides 
 and skins, and other articles of minor value. 
 
 In spite of the backward economic condition of 
 Bolivia and her people there are signs of substantial 
 progress, at least in the direction of mineral development. 
 For the last few years many districts have been care- 
 fully prospected by experts ; the result is seen already 
 in the beginning of fresh mining ventures. Once the 
 question of transport is solved, progress is assured. A 
 flourishing mining industry will bring immigrants from 
 all parts of the world, whose arrival must eventually 
 effect a decided change, let us hope for the better, in its 
 national life. 
 
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CHAPTER XXXI 
 
 ECUADOR 
 
 Acts of Constitution. Administration of President Moreno, and his 
 Assassination. Presidency of Dr Borrero. Revolt under General 
 Veintemilla. Defeat of the Government. Provisional Admini- 
 stration. Election of Veintemilla. Veintemilla declared Dictator. 
 Revolt against Veintemilla, and his Flight. Administration of 
 Dr Placido Caamano. Seditious Conspiracies. Election of Dr 
 Flores, and his Policy. Presidency of Dr Luis Cordero. The 
 Esmeralda Incident. Indignation against Cordero. Revolution 
 under General Alfaro. Flight of Cordero. Provisional Govern- 
 ment under Alfaro, and his Election. Alfaro and the Clergy. 
 Conspiracies against Alfaro. Laws regarding Sedition. Political 
 Conditions and Economic Progress. Lack of Immigi'ation. 
 Area and Population. Cities of Ecuador. Fires in Guayaquil. 
 Topography of Ecuador. Educational Progress. Justice. 
 National Character. Indian Characteristics. Means of Com- 
 munication. Industrial Enterprise. Pastoral Pursuits. Mineral 
 Wealth. Financial Situation. Revenue and Expenditure. 
 Commercial Situation. Future Prospects. 
 
 Ecuador, in common with Colombia and Venezuela, 
 has passed through stormy times since the country- 
 became a separate Republic as a result of the civil war 
 in New Granada after independence from Spanish 
 dominion was established. It was first created a 
 Republic by the Act of Constitution dated May 11, 
 1830, but since that year no fewer than ten Acts have 
 been sanctioned by assemblies summoned to effect 
 radical alterations for the conduct of the Adminis- 
 tration. 
 
 These different Acts and their duration are im- 
 
 577 . 2 Q 
 
578 
 
 ECUADOR 
 
 portant. They were approved and promulgated at the 
 following places :— 
 
 Place. 
 
 Duration. 
 
 1 . Riobaniba 
 
 2. Ambato 
 
 3. Quito . 
 
 4. Cuenca . 
 
 5. Quito 
 
 6. Guayaquil 
 
 7. Quito . 
 
 8. Quito 
 
 9. Ambato 
 10. Quito . 
 
 
 
 
 1830-1835 
 1835-1843 
 
 1843-1845 
 1845-1850 
 1850-1852 
 1852-1859 
 1861-1869 
 1869-1876 
 1877-1883 
 1883- 
 
 The Law of Constitution of 1883, promulgated in 
 1884, was amended in 1887 and again in 1896. Each 
 change inferred a complete political upheaval, and was 
 rarely achieved without severe fighting and heavy 
 sacrifice of life. So it is not difficult to understand 
 why Ecuador has been racked by internal dissensions in 
 the past three-quarters of a century. The early portion 
 of her political history relating to the struggle against 
 the Spanish Crown and the revolutionary movements 
 between 1830 and 1870 has been already told, and it 
 is with the record of the last thirty years that this 
 chronicle deals. 
 
 In 1875 an unsettled political situation existed under 
 President Moreno. The suppression of a series of 
 revolutionary outbreaks and the severe punishment of 
 the leaders of these movements led to a feeling of bitter 
 hostility against the President, the outcome of which 
 was a conspiracy for his assassination, which was carried 
 out in August, 1875, when he was murdered at Quito. 
 Dr Borrero succeeded, but discontent with his Adminis- 
 tration also spread rapidly, and in the following year 
 General Veintemilla, the military commandant of 
 Guayaquil, headed a revolt. By seizing Guayaquil, the 
 
18761 REVOLUTION UNDER VElNTEMILLA 579 
 
 principal port of Ecuador, the leaders of this insurrection 
 were able to cut off supplies from the Government and 
 obtain the war material they needed, thus making the 
 position of President Borrero difficult from the first. 
 For months strong efforts were made to reduce the 
 rebels to submission, but with little success. Towards 
 the close of 1876 the insurgent forces commanded by- 
 General Veintemilla advanced into the interior, and a 
 decisive battle was fought near Galte on December 14 
 with the Government troops under General Aparicio. 
 It ended in a complete victory for the revolutionists, 
 who occupied Quito shortly afterwards without further 
 serious opposition. President Borrero, finding his 
 position untenable, left the country, and a Provisional 
 Administration was established under General Veinte- 
 milla, who was virtually invested with dictatorial 
 powers. 
 
 In 1878 this victorious leader of revolt determined 
 to be legally appointed to the Presidency, and ordered 
 an election accordingly, thereby getting himself declared 
 President for the next four years. The first half of 
 this period passed in comparative quiet, Veintemilla's 
 enemies lacking strength to make any effective demon- 
 stration against his authority ; but the discontented 
 feeling was only latent, and became more apparent as 
 his presidential term drew to a close. The General 
 saw that he could not secure continuance of power if 
 he was dependent on a free election, and in 1882 he 
 took matters into his own hands by declaring himself 
 Dictator, assuming absolutely autocratic powers. This 
 action defeated itself, setting on foot a revolutionary 
 propaganda which brought on a general rising early in 
 1883. For some months the Dictator maintained his 
 position ; but his authority rapidly became undermined, 
 and, finding his cause hopeless, he fled the country on 
 July 9, after having been its strong man for seven years. 
 Little had been attempted though, under his Adminis- 
 tration, towards improving the state of the country, his 
 tyrannical methods of government causing constant 
 
580 ECUADOR 
 
 intrigues against him and entailing heavy drains on the 
 exchequer to maintain sufficient force to hold his enemies 
 in check. 
 
 After the fall of Veintemilla the Administration was 
 temporarily confided to Dr Placido Caamano, and in 
 February, 1884, a presidential election was held, which 
 made him chief magistrate for the usual term ; but the 
 friends of the fallen dictator had no idea of permitting 
 the new President to discharge his duties in peace. 
 Revolutionary outbreaks were fomented in various 
 quarters, but the majority of the Ecuadorians gave 
 them little support, being tired of a continual state of 
 warfare. So the Government experienced small diffi- 
 culty in suppressing conspiracies which never developed 
 sufficient importance to be really dangerous to public 
 authority. In 1888 the term of President Caamano 
 ended, and the election held in February of that year 
 put Dr Antonio Flores in his place. 
 
 In comparison to former Administrations, that of 
 President Flores proved to be the most enlightened yet 
 known. Civil rights were respected, and reforms intro- 
 duced in many directions to check the corrupt practices 
 which had developed to marked extent in every depart- 
 ment of the Government. The question of primary 
 instruction for the people was given serious considera- 
 tion, and several projects were proposed to place this 
 important factor on a satisfactory footing. Four years 
 of office was too limited a period to permit of the 
 majority of the reforms President Flores advocated 
 being put into practice, and he actually accomplished 
 little more than to prepare the way for the subsequent 
 realisation of his ideas ; but what he did succeed in 
 was to reduce to order the chaos into which the Govern- 
 ment had drifted before his assumption of the Presidency. 
 That the people of Ecuador appreciated his policy and 
 methods of Government was proved by the fact that 
 during his term no serious attempts were made to 
 disturb the public peace, a state of affairs foreign to 
 Ecuador these many years. When in 1892 Dr Flores' 
 
1891] PRESIDENT FLORES 581 
 
 term closed, he refused to allow himself to be renomi- 
 nated for all his supporters could say. So Dr Luis 
 Cordero took his turn in February 1892. 
 
 The public hoped that Cordero might amplify the 
 reforms introduced into the administration of national 
 affairs by President Flores, and that projected improve- 
 ments would crystallise into facts ; but it was doomed 
 to disappointment. The new President was only a few 
 months in office before the corrupt methods which his 
 predecessor had tried to eliminate became again pain- 
 fully apparent, and, this seen, discontent spread so 
 rapidly that before he had been a year at the head of 
 affairs active conspiracies for his downfall were afoot. 
 These internal troubles involved extraordinary expendi- 
 ture which the treasury could not bear, and in July, 
 1894, default took place in the service of the external 
 debt. 
 
 In November of that same year Cordero lent himself 
 to a transaction that brought about a movement which 
 eventually led to his ejection from the Presidency. The 
 war between China and Japan was in progress, and the 
 Japanese Government, desirous of acquiring warships, 
 sounded Chile on the subject of the purchase of the 
 cruiser Esmeralda. The Chilian Administration was 
 fully aware of the breach of international law entailed 
 by the disposal of this vessel in view of active hostilities 
 between the Chinese and Japanese, but at the same 
 time urgently wished to sell. Under these circumstances 
 President Cordero was approached with an offer of a 
 substantial commission in money if he would arrange 
 for the vessel to be transferred from the Chilian flag 
 to that of Ecuador, and subsequently handed over to 
 Japanese representatives in Ecuadorian waters. A firm 
 in New York acted for Japan, and the transfer of the 
 cruiser to Ecuador was made in the harbour of Val- 
 paraiso, whence the vessel was taken to Chatham Island, 
 in the Galapagos group, and there turned over to the 
 Japanese. 
 
 When this flagrant abuse of the national flag was 
 
582 ECUADOR 
 
 known an outburst of violent indignation occurred, 
 giving the opportunity "that the enemies of the President 
 had been waiting for. They took advantage of it to stir 
 up a popular rising, and under the leadership of General 
 Eloy Alfaro a revolutionary movement was organised 
 and supported in nearly all districts. Guayaquil, the 
 commercial capital of Ecuador, was occupied, and became 
 an important element in the success of the insurgent 
 cause. President Cordero was not to be driven from 
 power without a struggle, and collecting all available 
 forces he determined to retain possession of Quito and 
 trust to some lucky stroke of fortune for means to 
 defeat the rebels if they attempted to attack the city. 
 For nearly a year the country was a prey to the desultory 
 warfare between the Government and the insurgents, 
 but gradually Cordero found his enemies gaining strength, 
 and in 1895 he realised that his position was no longer 
 tenable. Unable to make terms with the rebel leaders, 
 the President fled the country, leaving public affairs at 
 the mercy of General Alfaro and his friends. 
 
 An Administration was now formed by General 
 Alfaro, who took the title of Supreme Chief of the 
 Nation with dictatorial functions, and no change was 
 made in this autocratic form of Government until 1897, 
 when he determined to be proclaimed the constitutional 
 President of the Republic. This was done on February 
 6, when the Dictator became legal President for a term 
 of four years ending in February, 1901. The new head 
 of the State lost no opportunity of curtailing the power 
 of the Church, no easy matter in a country where the 
 inhabitants were so priest-ridden. This attitude of 
 Alfaro towards the clergy aroused bitter hostility in 
 many quarters, and on more than one occasion efforts 
 were made to fan it into revolutionary action against 
 the authorities ; but the various seditious outbreaks that 
 took place between 1896 and 1900 were not of serious 
 importance, and were for the most part nipped in the 
 bud before the leaders could consolidate their resources. 
 Alfaro was therefore able to maintain his position until 
 
1901] IMMUNITY FOR SEDITION 583 
 
 the end of his term, and was succeeded in office by 
 General Leonidas Plaza, elected under official influence 
 as usual. 
 
 Unfortunately the laws of Ecuador are of small avail 
 in checking revolutionary outbreaks, and until stronger 
 penalties are provided against seditious practices there 
 is little hope of durable peace. When political motives 
 are pleaded in excuse of treasonable acts punishment is 
 seldom inflicted, and only in rare instances is the 
 property of persons taking part in insurrections con- 
 fiscated. Under the Law of Constitution, passed in 
 1883 and promulgated in 1884, the death penalty for 
 political offences was abolished. This was modified in 
 1887 and again in 1896, and now reads : — " There shall 
 be no death penalty for political offences except in the 
 case of those who are armed and organised as regular 
 military forces, and shall attempt any armed movement 
 against the constitutional authorities." Practically 
 every civilian can conspire with impunity against the 
 Government, risking only his life if he happens to be 
 present at a fight, but not endangering his civil rights 
 in event of defeat, and no change in this respect appears 
 likely soon to take place. Nominally, the authorities 
 are placed in power by the people ; in reality, the 
 Government is in the hands of two small political 
 factions, neither of which wishes to see any radical 
 change. Although the Indians were admitted to the 
 rights of citizenship in 1896, they take no part in the 
 political life of the country, which is left to the white 
 population, who form only 7 per cent, of the total. 
 
 It is easy, therefore, to understand why Ecuador 
 has had few opportunities for economic development. 
 Occasionally an interval of quiet, such as the Adminis- 
 tration of President Flores, has allowed some progress 
 to be made, engendering hope of a change for the better 
 in the future : but these periods of lucidity have been 
 brief, and the result is seen to-day in the extremely 
 backward state of civilisation in this part of South 
 America. Ecuador, too, has been so isolated from the 
 
584 ECUADOR 
 
 remainder of the world that neither European nor 
 North American example has counted for much in her 
 evolution, and no immigration except from other South 
 American countries has taken place since her independ- 
 ence. A few foreigners have wandered into the 
 country, but only in such limited numbers as to have 
 no influence, and what civilisation there is has been 
 inherited from Spanish ancestors. What should have 
 been normal progress has been hindered at every turn 
 by the unrestful state of internal politics, that constant 
 bar to all moral expansion and material development. 
 
 To turn to details. The area of Ecuador is stated to 
 be 120,000 square miles ; but no survey of the country 
 has been made, and the figures given are necessarily far 
 from accurate. A similar vagueness exists in regard to 
 the number of inhabitants, but the estimate of popula- 
 tion now generally accepted places the total number of 
 inhabitants at 1,270,000, including 100,000 whites, 
 300,000 of mixed blood, and 870,000 Indians. If 
 these estimates of area and population are relatively 
 correct, they mean a density of only 1*5 inhabitants to 
 the square mile, which is smaller than in any other South 
 American State. 
 
 Of the towns of Ecuador the national capital, Quito, 
 has a population of 35,000, and contains 1800 inhabited 
 houses. The city is very old, for it was at Quito that 
 Atahualpa held his court. It stands at an altitude of 
 10,000 feet above sea level, and is seven days from the 
 port of Guayaquil in the present state of communica- 
 tion. As the political centre of the country alone is 
 Quito important ; for it enters but little into either the 
 commercial or economic side of national life, no trade 
 radiating from it, and no produce of any value coming 
 from its vicinity. Guayaquil is the headquarters of all 
 commercial business, both imports and exports being 
 centred at this port, and 30,000 persons dwelling in the 
 municipal limits in addition to a considerable floating 
 population, due to the fact that it is the only seaport at 
 which foreign shipping regulariy calls. This city is 
 
1903] ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 585 
 
 built chiefly of wood, and has been singularly unfortunate 
 in damage by fire, a conflagration taking place in 1899, 
 when nearly one-third of the buildings were totally 
 destroyed, followed by another almost equally disastrous. 
 The other important cities of Ecuador are Cuenca, with 
 25,000 inhabitants ; Riobamba, with 12,000 ; Ambato, 
 Loja, and Latacunga, each with 10,000. 
 
 The three principal topographical features of Ecuador 
 are the low-lying lands on the sea coast and near the 
 river Guayas, the great mountain ranges of the interior, 
 and the valleys that intersect them. The flat country 
 near the seaboard contains a large area of fertile soil, 
 but the malarious climate precludes all idea of the land 
 being available for settlement by immigration from 
 abroad. In the valleys at elevations of 4000 feet and 
 upwards, the climate is temperate and combined with 
 rich virgin lands, suggesting a possibility of develop- 
 ment some day when means of transport are created to 
 overcome the physical obstacles to locomotion which 
 now hinder all progress. From the higher mountain 
 ranges rise up the great peaks of the Andes, among 
 which the most notable are Cayambi, Antisana, Cotopaxi, 
 Llanganati, Sincholagua, Sangai, Sara-urcu, Tunguragua, 
 Collanes, and Assnay in the eastern Cordillera ; and 
 Chimborazo, Illiniza, Casalagua, Cotacachi, Pichincha, 
 Corazon, Atacazo, Chiles, Carahuiraso, Yana-urcu, and 
 Quilindana to the west, all covered with perpetual snow. 
 At the junction of the eastern and western Cordilleras 
 is the mountain of Imbabura, remarkable for its vast 
 eruptions of mud and water. Cayambi is situated 
 exactly on the equator, and is consequently distinguished 
 from every other snow-capped peak in the world, and is 
 the highest mountain of the eastern Cordillera. Chim- 
 boraso, the " Mountain of Snow," in the western 
 Cordillera, is one of the most beautiful peaks in South 
 America and rises to 21,420 feet. 
 
 Ecuador economically is the most backward of all 
 South American countries, and not least in education, 
 for which little has been accomplished since the effort 
 
586 ECUADOR 
 
 made by President Flores between 1888 and 1892. 
 For primary instruction, there are 1090 schools, and 
 the number of pupils on the rolls in 1898 was 68,380, 
 but the attendance is most irregular. Instruction is 
 gratuitous and obligatory ; but no adequate measures 
 are taken to enforce the attendance of the children to 
 which the law applies, nor is it possible to do so in 
 many cases owing to the difficulty of communication in 
 the districts of the interior. As in Colombia and 
 Venezuela, the lower classes are apathetic, and slow to 
 take advantage of existing facilities. For secondary 
 and higher education, there are 35 schools, and 9 other 
 establishments for more advanced instruction ; and at 
 Quito there is the University, with a staff of 32 
 professors and an attendance in 1898 of 216 students. 
 University Faculties exist also at Guayaquil and Cuenca, 
 and technical and commercial schools at both Quito 
 and Guayaquil. In all matters of education, the 
 Church until recently has exercised a strong influence, 
 but latterly the attitude of President Alfaro towards 
 the clergy has tended to restrict the direct interference 
 of the priesthood, especially in primary instruction. 
 
 In the administration of justice, Ecuador lags 
 behind the standard of other republics in South 
 America — a severe condemnation, for in none is it on a 
 satisfactory footing from the standpoint of modern 
 civilisation. Less is heard abroad of corrupt methods 
 in the Ecuadorian courts because the number of foreign 
 residents is limited, but the entire system is degenerate. 
 The laws, as in all former Spanish colonies, are founded 
 on those in force before independence, and reproduce 
 the worst faults of the Spanish system, with the 
 additional mischief of interpretation by ignorant officials, 
 who possess neither capacity nor intelligence to dis- 
 charge the duties of their posts. The Supreme Court 
 is at Quito, and there are six superior courts which sit 
 at different centres, with the addition of 33 superior, 
 and 359 subordinate magistrates to deal with civil, 
 criminal, and commercial cases in the country districts, 
 
1903] NATIONAL CHARACTER 587 
 
 while Consular courts are held at Quito, Guayaquil, 
 and Cuenca. Ecuador has only one penitentiary, at 
 Quito, and in this male and female prisoners convicted 
 of serious crimes are confined ; but as a general rule, the 
 people have small tendency towards really serious 
 offences, although petty crime is frequent in all parts of 
 the country. The police system is under municipal 
 authority, with the exception of a small force maintained 
 by the National Government at Quito and elsewhere 
 for special duty. 
 
 In any consideration of the national character of the 
 Ecuadorians the fact must be always remembered that 
 there is only a small community of white residents, 
 people of European origin, who retain the characteristic 
 features of their Spanish ancestry, modified by local 
 conditions and the effect of many generations of life 
 amongst Indian tribes treated as a lower race, whose 
 lot is not far removed from the slavery under Inca rule. 
 The preponderance of Indian blood has been so great, 
 that in mixed marriages the offspring has been absorbed 
 into the Indian population, burying there the traits of 
 character inherited from the alien race that conquered 
 the land 400 years ago, and amongst this Indian 
 population the influence of the Roman Catholic Church 
 is paramount. The majority of the people are ignorant 
 and superstitious, and the outward forms of Christianity, 
 as preached by the Catholic priesthood, appeal forcibly 
 to their imaginations ; but that they possess intelligent 
 ideas of the principles of religion is doubtful, although 
 they are fearful of the penalties they are taught to 
 expect for direct disobedience to priestly injunctions. 
 It is difficult to conceive the existence of any other 
 mental condition amongst a race whose traditions 
 include the fate meted out to Atahualpa under the guise 
 of Christianity, and who have never known modern 
 civilisation except such as was forced on them by 
 the Spanish conquerors. 
 
 Means of communication in Ecuador are most 
 primitive. The one railway open to public service 
 
588 ECUADOR 
 
 connects Duran, near Guayaquil, with Chimbo. It is 
 58 miles long, and is to be continued to Quito, con- 
 siderable work in this direction having been accom- 
 plished under a concession granted in 1896. The 
 difficulties, however, in the way of bringing this 
 enterprise to a successful termination are great and 
 the available traffic on the route so limited that con- 
 nection with Quito depends on the ability of the Govern- 
 ment to maintain substantial monetary subventions 
 to the constructors. Of roads there are few, except a 
 highway built to facilitate communication between 
 Quito and Guayaquil for 115 miles, which of recent 
 years has fallen into bad repair, and bridle paths are 
 the means by which the conveyance of passengers and 
 cargo to the interior is effected. The rivers Guayas, 
 Daule, and Vinces afford waterways to the lower lands 
 at the foot of the western Cordillera, and a service of 
 steamers carries the traffic, the majority of these river 
 boats being the property of an American Syndicate. 
 
 Industrial enterprise, with the exception of the 
 production of food stuffs for home consumption, has 
 been confined chiefly to the cultivation of cacao, mostly 
 in the neighbourhood of the river Guayas, where the 
 rich soil is moist and the climate warm, all admirably 
 adapted for it. In 1895 the cacao shipped abroad 
 reached 16,122 tons; in 1896 the amount was 15,327 
 tons ; and in 1897 the total exports were 14,800 tons, 
 valued at £960,031. Coffee is also grown to some 
 extent, and the area of the plantations is increasing, the 
 value sent abroad in 1896 being £94,105, and a year 
 later £49,640, a decrease due to the fall in prices. 
 Sugar is manufactured, but only a small quantity is 
 exported. Large tracts covered by rubber trees exist 
 in the forests, and the collection of the gum has attracted 
 some attention since high prices ruled, with the result 
 that in 1897 the shipments were valued at £47,232. 
 Stock-keeping is only attempted on a small scale, neither 
 climate nor general conditions offering strong induce- 
 ments for cattle breeding. Although mineral wealth, 
 
1903] INDUSTRY AND PRODUCTION 589 
 
 and especially gold and silver, is known to exist, 
 attempts at systematic mining work have been few ; but 
 at Zarama, in the province of Oro, quartz crushing is 
 carried out with ore averaging over 1 ounce to the ton, and 
 at Esmeralda a company is extracting gold by hydraulic 
 methods from gravel beds which are stated to yield 50 
 cents to the cubic yard. A little gold is annually 
 washed by the Indians in different parts of the country, 
 but not in sufficient quantities to be important. Other 
 minerals known to exist, but not worked, are petroleum, 
 copper, iron, lead, and coal. With improved means of 
 transport the mining industry may develop and become 
 an important source of wealth, but until the mountainous 
 districts are made accessible by railways or roads all 
 progress must be difficult. 
 
 The foreign indebtedness of Eucador is her share of 
 the Colombian external obligations when the separation 
 of Venezuela and Ecuador from Colombia took place, 
 the original amount allotted to Ecuador being £1,820,000 
 in 1830. At intervals payments were made to the 
 bondholders, although in 1891 the arrears of interest 
 reached £428,640, and in 1892 an arrangement was 
 made by which the capital of the debt was reduced to 
 £750,000 ; but in 1894 its service again fell into default. 
 In 1898 the bonds in circulation amounted to £693,160, 
 and arrangements were then made by the concessionaires 
 of the projected railway to Quito to assume responsibility 
 for this obligation as one of the conditions of the conces- 
 sion. While there is a large internal floating debt due by 
 the Government to various creditors, no details of this 
 liability are available. To meet all expenses the revenue 
 is £1,000,000 in round figures, 70 per cent, of this being 
 derived from Custom-house duties, and the remainder 
 from taxes on cacao, real estate, rum distilled in the 
 country, tobacco, the salt and gunpowder monopolies, 
 stamps and stamped paper, and the receipts of the 
 telegraph department. As a rule the revenue falls 
 short of the expenditure, and it is in consequence of 
 these recurring deficits that the floating debt has been 
 
590 ECUADOR 
 
 acumulated. The commerce of Ecuador has been 
 severely depressed recently on account of low prices for 
 cacao and coffee. Yet the value of imported merchandise 
 has averaged £1,000,000 annually during the past few 
 years, and the exports £1,200,000 for same period. 
 
 The future of Ecuador is wrapped in obscurity. 
 The condition of the people could be greatly improved 
 by education and a more honourable and impartial 
 administration of justice, but without immigration from 
 abroad it is difficult to see how present characteristic 
 defects are to be eliminated within reasonable time, and 
 there is no incentive to immigration from the north. It 
 is possible that the opening of the Panama canal may 
 influence affairs beneficially by bringing Ecuador within 
 easier reach of the outside world ; but the assistance 
 towards economic progress can be little more than 
 tentative until better means of transport to the interior 
 of the country exist, and before substantial development 
 can occur railways and roads must be constructed, and 
 of this there is small present prospect. 
 
 
CHAPTER XXXII 
 
 COLOMBIA 
 
 Various Titles of Colombia. Internal Political Troubles. Political 
 Parties. Election of Sefior Rafael Nunez. Revolution in 1881. 
 Settlement with Costa Rica. President Laldua. General 
 Obaldi'a. Liberals support Sefior Nunez. Boundary Question 
 with Venezuela. President Nufiez in 1884. Nunez and the 
 Conservatives. Rebellion in 1885. Re-establishment of Peace. 
 Occupation of Panama and Colon by United States Forces. 
 President Nunez at Cartagena. Revision of the Law of Consti- 
 tution. Discontent between 1888 and 1892. Nunez again 
 elected. Seiior Miguel Caro Vice-President. Death of Nunez. 
 Revolt in 1895. Election of Seiior Sanclemente. Seiior 
 Marroquin as Vice-President. Revolution in 1898. President 
 Sanclemente temporarily Resigns. Vice-President Marroquin 
 supercedes Sanclemente. Panama Secedes. Incapacity of 
 Colombians for Independent Government. Topography and 
 Revolutionary Practices. Reason of Present Political Conditions. 
 Economic Progress and Political Disturbances. Topographical 
 Features. Climate. Area and Population. Hygienic Con- 
 ditions. Education. Primary Instruction. The Peasant Class 
 and Education. Secondary and Higher Education. Justice. 
 The Roman Catholic Church. Religious Seminaries. Missionary 
 Work and the Indians. National Character. Alcoholism. 
 Industrial Enterprise. Mining. Manufactures. The Pradera 
 Iron Works. The Panama Canal < Financial Situation. Future 
 Prospects. 
 
 The present Republic of Colombia has been known 
 under several different titles since it was a Spanish 
 colony. In 1819 the inhabitants obtained their inde- 
 pendence from Spain, and on December 27 of that year 
 the country was officially proclaimed as the United 
 States of Colombia. On February 29, 1832, the territory 
 
592 COLOMBIA 
 
 was divided into three States, each with independent 
 Administrations under the names of Venezuela, Ecuador, 
 and the Republic of New Granada. 
 
 Under the reformed Constitution of April 1, 1858, 
 this Republic of New Granada was altered to a con- 
 federation of eight States, and adopted the title of 
 Confederation Granadina. Another alteration occurred 
 on September 20, 1861, when it was constituted into 
 the United States of New Granada with nine States ; 
 and on May 8, 1863, a new Law converted the Republic 
 into the United States of Colombia. Again, in August, 
 1886, another revision of the Law of Constitution 
 abolished the autonomous privileges of the several 
 States, and changed them into provinces administered 
 by Governors nominated by the President of the 
 Republic, the original designation of the Republic of 
 Colombia being once more adopted. Colombia, in 
 common with Venezuela and Ecuador, has been the 
 scene of constant internal strife during the nineteenth 
 century, which has checked the moral and material 
 development of the community at every turn, and for 
 the present there are no indications of immediate radical 
 change in this respect. The opening of the new century 
 found the country devastated by armed insurrection 
 against the constituted authorities. 
 
 The two great political parties in Colombia are the 
 usual Conservatives and Liberals, and it has been the 
 endless struggle for office between these two factions 
 that has caused constant recurrence of revolutionary out- 
 breaks. While, however, the incentive for frequent 
 bloodshed between the two parties is largely due to a 
 desire of the opposition to enjoy the spoils that fall to 
 the Administration and its friends, there are yet certain 
 clearly defined political principles forming a raison d'etre 
 for a difference of opinion as to which faction should 
 govern. The Conservatives are essentially the Church 
 and State party, and they wish to establish clerical 
 influence as a dominant factor in all educational 
 questions. The Liberals advocate the severance of 
 
 
1875] CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERALS 593 
 
 Church and State, education on a basis entirely free 
 from Church influence, and a general restriction of the 
 power the priesthood has hitherto exercised in political 
 and domestic affairs. Doubtless the Liberals have 
 grounds for their objection to the influence the clergy 
 have wielded in the past, and the part they play to-day 
 in the national destinies ; but too often the movements 
 ostensibly set afoot for a more progressive policy in the 
 public Administration have degenerated into attempts 
 to obtain control of the Government for the personal 
 ends of ambitious political adventurers who are far from 
 seeking reforms for the general welfare ; and while the 
 principles of the Liberals may be worthy of support the 
 instruments chosen for their execution are too often 
 faulty. Under these circumstances the Conservatives, 
 aided by Church influence, have maintained their position 
 as the dominant faction in spite of the strenuous efforts 
 of their political adversaries. 
 
 For the five years previous to 1880, during the presi- 
 dencies of Aquiles Parra and Trujillo, the Liberals made 
 steady progress in national politics, although unable to 
 command a majority for the presidential election. 
 Under President Trujillo several reforms were initiated, 
 greater political freedom was permitted, efforts were 
 made to place the national finances on a more satis- 
 factory basis, and material prosperity was increased by 
 a substantial reduction in the public indebtedness. As 
 a result, the Liberal representation in Congress became 
 an important force in politics ; and in 1880, when 
 President Trujillo completed his term of office, the 
 question of the nomination of his successor created deep 
 public interest. The Liberals, convinced that they 
 could not then hope to bring in a man of their own 
 political colour as Chief Magistrate, determined to 
 support the candidacy of Senor Rafael Nunez, a member 
 of the Conservative party, but strongly imbued with 
 advanced ideas in regard to public administration. By 
 following this course, they hoped to gain ground to an 
 extent that would enable them at no distant date to 
 
 2p 
 
594 COLOMBIA 
 
 claim a majority over their opponents, hopes not 
 unjustified although events occurred to deter their 
 fulfilment. While President Nunez was prepared to 
 deal fairly with the Liberal Party, many of his Conserva- 
 tive supporters held different views on the subject, and 
 they forced him in 1881 to bring official influence to 
 bear in various electoral matters and appointments to 
 high offices, to the detriment of the Liberal cause. 
 These unpopular acts led to an armed uprising in the 
 provinces of Cauca and Antioquia supported by a 
 number of the Liberal leaders, and although the move- 
 ment was suppressed by the authorities, this was only 
 done at a considerable sacrifice of life. The result of 
 the outbreak was injurious to Liberal influence, and it 
 left the Opposition powerless to resist the nomination 
 for the Presidency of the Conservative candidate, Senor 
 Laldua. 
 
 During the period President Nunez was in power, 
 important questions came up for settlement or discussion. 
 The long-standing dispute concerning the boundary with 
 Costa Rica was definitely settled in July, 1880. A 
 proposal for the confederation of the Republica of 
 Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador was made in the 
 Chamber of Deputies, and approved by that branch of 
 the legislature, but fell through in consequence of 
 objections raised by Venezuela and Ecuador to the terms 
 on which the amalgamation of the three countries was 
 projected. Efforts were also made by Nunez to deal 
 with the education problem, but not with much success, 
 although increased facilities for primary instruction were 
 provided and attention drawn to some of the defects of 
 the existing system for secondary and higher education. 
 
 President Laldua, who succeeded Nunez, was only a 
 brief period in office when he died suddenly in 1883, 
 and this led to the accession of the Vice-President, 
 General Otalora. The Liberals now determined to 
 make another attempt to improve their position, and 
 decided to support the candidacy of Senor Nunez, rely- 
 ing on his progressive policy to help their cause. Nunez 
 
1884] NUNEZ AGAIN ELECTED 595 
 
 was in Europe at this time, but in April, 1884, while 
 still absent, he was elected to succeed General Otalora. 
 The only event of importance occurring during the short 
 presidential term of General Otalora was the settlement 
 of the boundary dispute with Venezuela, which it was 
 agreed in 1883 to refer to the arbitration of the Spanish 
 Crown. A Commission of five members was nominated 
 by King Alfonso XII. to investigate the contending 
 claims, but the decision was not reached until eight 
 years later, in April, 1891, when the Queen-Regent of 
 Spain gave her verdict. 
 
 With the assumption of office by Nunez in 1884, 
 there began a period in which he was virtually Dictator 
 of Colombia, occupying a similar position to that of 
 General Guzman Blanco in Venezuela, and he kept the 
 control until his death on September 18, 1894. His 
 ideas had undergone a marked change during his visit 
 to Europe, and the Liberals soon recognised to their 
 dismay that the man they had assisted to power had 
 become saturated with the opinions they most disliked 
 amongst the Conservatives. This change meant that 
 the influence of the Church again became paramount 
 in politics. The Liberals found themselves stripped of 
 the concessions they had obtained under former Adminis- 
 trations, and all participation in public affairs was 
 denied to them. If they wanted to be heard it was 
 clear that the only course open to them was to take 
 sword in hand and by force of arms win for themselves 
 a recognition of their civic rights. Discontent spread 
 rapidly in 1884, and in the beginning of the ensuing 
 year several conspiracies were discovered. In outlying 
 districts the standard of revolt was raised, and in April, 
 1885, the insurrectionary spirit had so far developed 
 that, with little warning, the country was plunged into 
 a civil war of more serious proportions than any which 
 had taken place since the Colombians fought the 
 Spaniards for their freedom. 
 
 The rebellion centred mainly in the provinces of 
 Panama, Boyaca, Magdalena, and Cundinamarca, and 
 
596 COLOMBIA 
 
 Generals Reyes and Velez were its principal leaders. 
 While the Government was not taken by surprise at the 
 outbreak of the insurrection the strength of the 
 insurgents was underrated, and before an adequate 
 number of troops could be placed in the field the rebels 
 had obtained several successes, adding greatly to their 
 prestige and bringing many recruits to their ranks. 
 President Nunez was not wanting in energy when 
 occasion demanded, and in the course of a couple of 
 months he had 10,000 men equipped and ready for 
 service. Several engagements were fought with the in- 
 surgents in July, 1885, the legal forces generally obtaining 
 the advantage because better supplied with arms and 
 ammunition. These repeated reverses discouraged the 
 leaders of the revolt, a feeling accentuated when they 
 found desertions from their cause becoming every day 
 more frequent. At the end of July peace negotiations 
 were proposed by the Government, and General Reyes 
 and his companions, in view of the fact that they now 
 saw small chance of victory, agreed to lay down their 
 arms. Accordingly, on August 4, the formal surrender 
 of the rebel leaders took place, and, on September 5, 1885, 
 a proclamation announcing the restoration of peace 
 throughout Colombia was issued by the Government. 
 The result of this struggle was that the Administration 
 of President Nunez and the Conservative Party obtained 
 absolute control of the country. All war material 
 possessed by the insurgents was confiscated, and the 
 Liberals found themselves with their hopes shattered, 
 and with no prospect in the immediate future of being 
 able to offer effective resistance to any policy Nunez and 
 his friends might pursue. 
 
 During this rebellion active hostilities occurred on 
 several occasions on the Isthmus of Panama. From 
 Colon on the Atlantic to Panama on the Pacific coast, 
 runs the railway built by a company registered in the 
 United States, and working under a concession from 
 the Colombian Government. By the terms of this con- 
 cession the railway company was permitted to appeal 
 
1885] AMERICAN TROOPS AT PANAMA 597 
 
 for protection to the United States Government, should 
 their property be threatened by internal political dis- 
 turbances, and Colombia agreed in such event to put 
 no obstacles in the way of troops landed by that 
 Government in response to the appeal. Now in 1885 
 the civil war in Colombia did seriously menace the rail- 
 way traffic, and in this emergency the officials of the 
 company applied to the Administration of President 
 Cleveland for protection. It promptly complied, landing 
 detachments of marines at Colon and Panama to occupy 
 those towns and insure the railway against molestation. 
 This is interesting, as an example of armed forces from 
 the United States being disembarked in foreign territory 
 to protect a private corporation, for the Panama Railway 
 Company certainly comes under that description, no 
 matter how important its maintenance may be for 
 United States national interests in connection with 
 transcontinental trade. 
 
 When President Nunez returned to Colombia after 
 his election to the Presidency in 1884, he had pleaded 
 physical incapacity as an excuse for not residing in 
 Bogota, the National Capital, and not without reasonable 
 grounds, for Bogota stands 10,000 feet above sea level, 
 and Senor Nunez was not in good health. While 
 nominally President of the Republic, he exercised his 
 authority through a deputy, directing affairs from his 
 own house near Cartagena. This was highly incon- 
 venient, in view of the fact that the journey from 
 Cartagena to Bogota could not be accomplished in less 
 than ten days, that telegraphic communication was 
 irregular, and that no important action could be under- 
 taken without the personal knowledge and consent of 
 the President. When the revolutionary troubles in 
 1885 seriously menaced his Administration, he tem- 
 porarily emerged from his retirement and assumed 
 the direction of the Government, but when peace was 
 restored and certain measures necessary to guard against 
 a repetition of the recent disturbances arranged, he 
 returned to his home to rule by deputy as before. 
 
598 COLOMBIA 
 
 To safeguard the country against further revolutionary 
 movements, a drastic reform in the Constitution was 
 promulgated on August 6, 1886. It provided for the 
 abolition of the federal system of government, the States 
 being deprived of their semi-independent administrations 
 and becoming provinces under the control of a governor 
 nominated directly by the President ; and in each 
 Province or Department a local assembly, elected by 
 the inhabitants, was created to superintend local affairs. 
 The life of the National Congress- — Senate and House 
 of Representatives — together with the presidential term 
 was extended to six years, in place of two as hitherto, 
 and other minor changes decreed. Murder had hitherto 
 been punishable by imprisonment for only ten years, 
 and by allowances for good behaviour during confinement 
 this could be reduced to two-thirds of the sentence, but 
 by the new act the penalty became death. The Press 
 was made responsible for libellous and seditious publi- 
 cations, and other means were taken to check the spread 
 of disaffection. After the promulgation of this revised 
 law Nunez was again elected President for the six 
 years to August 7, 1892. In 1888 Senor Carlos Holguin 
 was appointed to discharge provisionally the duties of 
 the head of the Administration, but the real control 
 remained as formerly in the hands of President Nunez, 
 and all important matters were submitted to him at 
 Cartagena for his advice and approval. 
 
 For a brief period there was comparative internal 
 peace. The defeat of the revolutionary movement 
 organised by the Liberals in 1885 had been so decisive 
 that no immediate outbreak was possible, but the spirit 
 of insurrection was scorched, not killed. The Opposi- 
 tion began secretly to arrange plans of action against 
 opportunity, and between 1888 and 1892 the discontented 
 faction fomented a feeling of irritation and dissatisfaction 
 against Nunez, and more than once this took the form 
 of armed resistance ; but such local risings were sup- 
 pressed with small difficulty, and when, in 1892, the 
 term of Nunez expired, his hold upon the country was 
 
1892] DEATH OF NUNEZ 599 
 
 so strong that he was again installed for the ensuing 
 six years. The plea of ill-health was once more put 
 forward as an excuse to avoid residence at Bogota, and 
 his duties were as before delegated to the Vice-President, 
 Seiior Miguel Caro. For the next two years no develop- 
 ments of special interest occurred, but the Liberals 
 gained ground in many directions, and from time to 
 time incidents happened tending to show that a serious 
 movement against the Government would not be long 
 deferred. Nunez died in September, 1894, and his 
 death was the signal for a renewal of the internal 
 disturbances which his Administration had held in 
 check for nine years. 
 
 As Vice-President of the Republic, Senor Miguel 
 Caro assumed the Presidency for the unexpired portion 
 of the term for which Nunez had been nominated in 
 1892. Once again the Liberals determined to make an 
 effort to wrest control of the country from the Con- 
 servatives, their leaders imagining that success would 
 be less difficult against the new President than against 
 his predecessor ; but in this they were mistaken. 
 Revolt broke out in several districts, but little progress 
 was made against the Government forces ; and although 
 the revolutionary movement was not entirely stamped 
 out, it never attained greater proportions than those of 
 a desultory guerilla warfare conducted in inaccessible 
 mountain regions. It was never dangerous to the 
 Administration, but it served the purpose of the Liberals 
 in keeping alive a spirit of unrest under cover of which 
 intrigues could be set afoot for a more widely extended 
 conspiracy at a later date. Such was the state of 
 internal affairs until 1898, when President Caro's term 
 expired. 
 
 To succeed Caro the Conservatives chose Senor M. 
 A. Sanclemente, a man imbued with the extreme political 
 views of his party and a strong supporter of clericalism. 
 The Vice-President nominated was Senor J. M. Mar- 
 roquin, and it soon became evident that he was a man 
 to be reckoned with. No sooner was President 
 
600 COLOMBIA 
 
 Sanclemente in the chair than the insurrection promoted 
 by the Liberals rapidly assumed more serious propor- 
 tions, and in Antioquia, Cauca, and Panama the 
 insurgents gained ground in spite of all efforts of the 
 Government to check them. Arms and ammunition 
 were obtained by the rebels from Venezuelan sources, 
 but the supply was limited, and it was due to this that 
 greater results were not obtained by the insurrection. 
 President Sanclemente, then eighty years of age, was 
 unable to withstand the strain, and, his health giving 
 way, he temporarily abandoned his duties to the Vice- 
 President, Senor Marroquin. 
 
 In spite of the attempts of the Vice-President to 
 crush the insurrection, the rebels held their ground at 
 nearly all points and gained occasional success. On the 
 Isthmus of Panama severe fighting occurred, and the 
 insurgents succeeded in capturing the city of Panama 
 and the town of Colon, but subsequently were forced 
 to evacuate both positions on the arrival of reinforce- 
 ments of Government troops. During the latter months 
 of 1900 reports were published by the Government from 
 time to time that the rebellion has been completely 
 suppressed, but how little reliance could be placed on 
 such statements is shown by the fact that some revolu- 
 tionary success almost invariably occurred within a few 
 days of these announcements. Such an event was the 
 sinking of the steamer Lautaro off Panama in January, 
 1902, when General Alban, Governor of Panama, on 
 board at the time, was drowned. 
 
 In 1900 Vice-President Marroquin determined to be 
 President in name as well as act. With the assistance 
 of a group of his political friends in Bogota, a plan was 
 formed to depose President Sanclemente and proclaim 
 Senor Marroquin as President, and this plot was executed 
 without resistance. Marroquin was duly recognised as 
 President for the unfinished portion of the term for 
 which Sanclemente was chosen, and which expires on 
 August 7, 1904. Sanclemente died eighteen months 
 after his deposition. 
 
1900] THE PANAMA QUESTION 601 
 
 In 1900 the question of the construction of the 
 Panama Canal was actively taken up by the United 
 States Government. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which 
 .had been a stumbling-block, was abrogated in 1901, and 
 a new agreement reached with the British Government 
 by which the United States was to construct an inter- 
 oceanic canal. The next step was the negotiation of 
 treaties with Colombia, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica for 
 the right to build a waterway, and these were duly 
 signed and subsequently ratified by Nicaragua and 
 Costa Rica, but rejected by Colombia. It was under- 
 stood that Colombia could have been placated by an 
 increased money indemnity, but this was unacceptable 
 in Washington. Colombian opposition therefore threat- 
 ened to deprive Panama of the immense benefit antici- 
 pated from the construction of the canal, and to transfer 
 it to Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Here was the 
 Opposition's opportunity. For three years the revolu- 
 tionary leaders had preached the doctrine that opposition 
 in Bogota to a canal treaty was a deathblow to Panama, 
 and this bore fruit when the treaty was rejected in 
 1903. The people of Panama, incited by the insurgent 
 leaders and others interested in the Isthmus, announced 
 the secession of Panama from Colombia, and proclaimed 
 it an independent republic in November, 1903. The new 
 State was recognised immediately by the United States 
 Government, and aid was lent by American warships 
 to prevent the landing of Colombian force to suppress 
 the revolt. By this help the insurgents for the moment 
 gained their object and obtained a territory, where they 
 could not only participate in the Government, but also 
 secure a place for the organisation of future action 
 against the Administration at Bogota. As for the 
 United States, they have doubtless removed an obstacle 
 to the Panama route for the canal, but in the manner 
 of doing so they have roused hostility and suspicion 
 throughout every section of Latin America. 
 
 This short epitome of Colombian events during the 
 past quarter of a century seems to demonstrate the 
 
602 COLOMBIA 
 
 incapacity of the inhabitants for independent Govern- 
 ment. On the part of the rulers there is a constant 
 tendency towards dictation and absolutism, and the con- 
 sequence is a widespread spirit of unrest. The Liberals 
 foment dissatisfaction by every means in their power to 
 assist their own political aim, the overthrow of the 
 Conservatives ; but whether Liberals or Conservatives 
 be in power there is small prospect of contentment with 
 political surroundings, for what has occurred during the 
 past twenty-five years has happened ever since the 
 revolt against Spanish jurisdiction. The result of 
 generation after generation growing to manhood amongst 
 a series of insurrectionary outbreaks, is an utter want 
 of appreciation of the benefits of peace and administra- 
 tive stability. Colombia does not stand alone in this 
 respect, for similar conditions prevail in Ecuador and 
 Venezuela. Moreover, the topography of these countries 
 lends itself to revolutionary practices ; in the mountain 
 fastnesses of the northern part of South America it is 
 easy to defy with impunity any law which the Govern- 
 ment of the day may wish to enforce, and the naturally 
 unruly temperament of these Latin people is thereby 
 encouraged. 
 
 The present-day insurgents of Colombia are not far 
 separated from brigands, and the political character 
 given to the revolutions is generally a cloak to cover 
 illegal forms of pillage and rapine. It is from such 
 elements that political adventurers of one or other party 
 factions, striving to control the Administration, draw 
 elements for armed revolt against the authorities, and 
 the rank and file of the men who enter the contest know 
 little, and care less, about the merits of the cause. It 
 is convenient for them to maintain the fiction that they 
 are engaged in this or that struggle for patriotic motives, 
 rather than be classified as robbers and outlaws, and 
 this spirit makes armed insurrection easy in Colombia. 
 Nor does any punishment follow an unsuccessful re- 
 bellion. Property is seldom confiscated, treason is 
 rarely made an offence demanding severe castigation, 
 
19WJ PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION 603 
 
 participation in seditious conspiracies entails no loss 
 of civic rights ; this immunity being probably due to the 
 fact that the individual privileges of citizens are so 
 mythical as to be thought little of where respect for law 
 and order is practically unknown. In this part of South 
 America, the general conditions more closely resemble 
 the early middle ages in Europe than anything in modern 
 civilisation ; the injured must seek redress by the sword, 
 or bear without remonstrance all indignities heaped 
 upon them. 
 
 Both Conservatives and Liberals in Colombia strive 
 to rule the country by a limited oligarchy. The Con- 
 servatives have done this during the last two 
 decades ; and the Liberals, in attempting to reach the 
 same end, have never been chary of sacrificing human 
 life or devastating the country. "When it is remembered 
 that more than fifty per cent, of the population cannot 
 read or write, it is easy to realise how small a part in 
 the lives of the people any political action of the 
 Government can play ; and in such circumstances it is a 
 farce for the leaders of the political parties to urge, as 
 they constantly do, that the inhabitants are in favour of 
 any particular policy. President Nunez showed his 
 appreciation of this state of affairs by revising the Law 
 of Constitution in 1886, and reducing the semi- 
 independent States to Departments over which 
 governors appointed by the Central Government 
 exercised absolute control. To deem the Government 
 of Colombia republican in principle is therefore mislead- 
 ing, if not absurd. 
 
 Colombia suffers as an organic State from the nature 
 of the country and the extreme difficulty of intercom- 
 munication. With the exception of the district border- 
 ing on the headwaters of the river Orinoco, and, to a 
 less important extent, the territory touching the tribu- 
 taries of the river Amazon, Colombia consists of a net- 
 work of mountain ranges rising to elevations of 12,000 
 to 14,000 feet. As the crow flies, the distance to the 
 headquarters of any Department may be only 200 miles, 
 
604 COLOMBIA 
 
 but the journey over mountains and valleys occupies 
 many days. Communities are thus isolated from the 
 outside world and from each other, and communication 
 with the National Capital is only possible at compara- 
 tively long intervals by the tedious process of saddle 
 mules, with poor accommodation by the wayside. Each 
 district is perforce wrapped up in its own small life, and 
 the advent of strangers is uncommon. Little knowledge 
 of what passes in the outside world is disseminated 
 amongst the residents, with the result that the mental 
 perspective of the people is abnormally contracted. It 
 is easy, therefore, to understand that when a representa- 
 tive of the National Administration comes from Bogota 
 to make a change, generally an increase, in taxation, or 
 to perform other attributes of government distasteful to 
 these people in the wilderness, he meets with a short 
 shrift if he insists on carrying out his instructions in 
 defiance of the popular will. In many parts of the 
 interior the people are practically savages, and in such 
 districts as the country inland from Buenaventura travel- 
 ling is impossible for a foreigner, in consequence of the 
 hostility of the natives. 
 
 It is difficult to see how immediate improvement is 
 to be effected. All hinges on the question of better 
 facilities for transport and communication, and so long 
 as these are absent, there is small hope for the better- 
 ment of the political status of the inhabitants. The 
 problem to be solved is to find money for the con- 
 struction of railways and roads to unite the isolated 
 districts with Bogota or some other centre, and so open 
 the way for a consolidation of the scattered units of 
 population into one homogeneous nationality. With the 
 establishment of transport through the country, foreign 
 immigration will filter into the Republic in search of the 
 natural wealth that lies waiting for the hand of man to 
 give it to the world, and contact with foreigners will do 
 much to broaden the ideas of the Colombians in regard 
 to the advantages of modern civilisation. Efforts have 
 been made by different Administrations to interest 
 
1904] ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 605 
 
 European capitalists in providing railway transport for 
 Colombia, but the bad faith shown towards such 
 undertakings has deterred all progress. If the 
 Government could assure adequate protection for capital, 
 a railway system of sufficient proportions to remove the 
 obstacles now choking development would be speedily 
 provided, and the fact that no such protection has been 
 forthcoming has stopped all progress. Nor are there 
 any indications that immediate marked change in this 
 respect is probable ; but the fact must be borne in mind 
 that the Atlantic coast of Colombia is only five days by 
 steamer from New York, and it is almost inevitable that 
 in time the influence of the United States will extend 
 to this quarter and overcome the obstacles now existing 
 to moral and material advancement. 
 
 Under existing circumstances, almost insuperable 
 obstacles check industrial and commercial expansion ; 
 there is no inducement for the investment of capital to 
 exploit the latent wealth when vested interests are 
 threatened continually by civil war or insurrectionary 
 outbreaks, and labourers for mining or agricultural 
 undertakings are subject to compulsory conscription in 
 the Government ranks or revolutionary forces. The 
 same causes equally hinder moral progress ; education, 
 especially primary instruction, is neglected, and the 
 administration of justice is on a low standard and deeply 
 tainted with political corruption. On all sides the 
 interests of the people are lost sight of in the struggle 
 for place and power. 
 
 The principal topographical features of Colombia 
 are the great mountain ranges rising precipitously from 
 the seaboard ; the fertile valleys intersecting this region ; 
 and the vast plains stretching away towards the river 
 Orinoco, known as the llanos. In the mountain ranges 
 lies the mineral wealth that proved so strong an 
 attraction to the early Spanish settlers ; the valleys are 
 abundantly watered by rivers and mountain streams, 
 and the soil is rich ; and the plains to the south-east 
 provide all the requirements for pastoral industry. 
 
606 
 
 COLOMBIA 
 
 Climatic conditions vary, as in Venezuela, with the 
 elevation above sea level. The malarious belt lies on 
 the shores of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, stretches 
 across the isthmus of Panama, and embraces certain 
 areas of the low-lands in the vicinity of the Orinoco and 
 the Amazon. The valleys above 3000 feet have a 
 temperate climate not unlike the late spring in northern 
 countries, and there is no menace to health for 
 Europeans who may settle in these districts, the heat 
 seldom interfering with outdoor work during the 
 daytime. On the high peaks of the mountain ranges 
 snow is often seen, and in cases such as the Sierra 
 Nevada, at 23,779 feet the line of perpetual snow is 
 reached. Thus there is the choice of climate from 
 tropical to extreme cold, the mean average temperature 
 at Bogota being 63° Fahrenheit. 
 
 The estimated area of Colombia is 513,938 square 
 miles, about one-sixth that of the United States. Of 
 this, 330,756 square miles lie to the north and the 
 remainder to the south of the equator. No census has 
 been taken since 1870, when the population was 
 2,951,323, but an official estimate published in 1881 
 showed 3,878,600 inhabitants distributed as follows : — 
 
 
 
 
 Density 
 
 
 
 Departments. 
 
 sq. miles. 
 
 Pop. 
 
 per 
 
 sq.mile. 
 
 Capital. 
 
 Pop. 
 
 Antioquia 
 
 22,316 
 
 470,000 
 
 21 
 
 Medellin 
 
 40,000 
 
 Bolivar 
 
 21,345 
 
 280,000 
 
 13 
 
 Cartagena . 
 
 20,000 
 
 Boyaca 
 
 33,351 
 
 702,000 
 
 21 
 
 Tunja . 
 
 8,000 
 
 Cauca . 
 
 257,462 
 
 621,000 
 
 2-4 
 
 Popayan 
 
 10,000 
 
 Cundinamarca 
 
 79,810 
 
 569,000 
 
 7 
 
 Bogota 
 
 120,000 
 
 Magdelena . 
 
 24,440 
 
 90,000 
 
 3-7 
 
 Santa Marta 
 
 6,000 
 
 Panama 
 
 31,571 
 
 285,000 
 
 9 
 
 Panama 
 
 30,000 
 
 Santander 
 
 16,409 
 
 555,600 
 
 35 
 
 Bucaramanga 
 
 20,000 
 
 Tolima 
 Total 
 
 18,069 
 
 306,000 
 
 17 
 
 Ibague 
 
 12,000 
 
 504,773 
 
 3,878,600 
 
 7-7 
 
 
 
 
1904] VITAL STATISTICS 607 
 
 This estimate includes 220,000 uncivilised Indians, 
 the majority of whom dwell near the Orinoco. One- 
 third of the population is classified as white, the 
 remainder as half-breeds or Indians. Of negroes the 
 number is limited, and they are principally found on the 
 Isthmus of Panama or in the neighbourhood of Buena- 
 ventura on the Pacific coast. 
 
 Accurate vital statistics are impossible to obtain, 
 and the official returns are little better than guess- 
 work, but they must be accepted as some indication of 
 the standard of health. In 1898 the death-rate was 21 
 per 1000 inhabitants, and of this 20 per cent, was 
 credited to infants of less than twelve months, and 30 
 per cent, to children under five years of age. Epidemics 
 of smallpox are frequent and the mortality heavy, and 
 yellow fever occasionally breaks out in the malarious 
 districts of Panama and other towns near the sea coast, 
 no proper precautions being taken to check the spread 
 of the disease. With ordinary sanitary measures in the 
 cities and towns the general hygienic conditions would 
 compare favourably with many countries in the world 
 far removed from tropical latitudes, for it is only on the 
 low-lying lands on the sea coast and near the Orinoco 
 that the prevailing conditions are inimical to health, and 
 these districts only comprise one-fifth of the total area. 
 
 Colombia has the reputation in South America of 
 possessing more than average educational facilities, and 
 in higher education there may be some foundation for 
 this, but in primary instruction the methods are defective 
 and unsatisfactory from every point of view. Elementary 
 education is controlled by the municipal authorities, and 
 money grants-in-aid are made by the National Govern- 
 ment, but no adequate supervision is attempted by the 
 Central Government to ensure the maintenance of the 
 requisite number of schools, nor is any inspection made 
 to see that a satisfactory standard is reached. Primary 
 instruction is free, but not obligatory. Large numbers 
 of children naturally, therefore, receive no tuition, but 
 to some extent this is due to the sparsity of the popula- 
 
608 COLOMBIA 
 
 tion and the difficulty of reaching school in districts 
 where the mountainous country renders all journeying 
 arduous. In addition to these physical obstacles there 
 is the apathetic indifference of the peasant class to 
 education, and they care little whether their offspring 
 can read and write even when schools are near at hand 
 and the benefit of primary instruction has been carefully 
 explained to them. The children themselves are seldom 
 sufficiently interested in their own welfare to attend 
 school voluntarily, but more striking evidence of the 
 small value placed on education is found in the fact that 
 peasants who have learned to read and write in their 
 youth practise these two accomplishments so rarely that 
 they forget entirely these rudiments of knowledge a few 
 years after reaching manhood. 
 
 Statistics about education are also far from reliable, 
 the national authorities complaining that the munici- 
 palities are dilatory and careless in making the returns, 
 therefore such figures as are given must be considered 
 partly guesses. The number of primary schools is 
 stated to be 1820, and the children on the rolls 86,000, 
 showing that only 2 '2 per cent, of the total population 
 is receiving elementary instruction, even allowing for 
 the regular attendance of all children enrolled. In all 
 probability the actual attendance does not average more 
 than 15 per cent, of the population — a result telling its 
 own tale. For secondary education there are 34 public 
 and private colleges to which the children of more 
 wealthy parents are sent, the private concerns being 
 under the guidance of the Roman Catholic Church. 
 For the education of teachers there are 15 normal 
 schools, and at these 600 students attend ; while the 
 requirements of higher education are filled by four 
 Departmental and one National University, with a total 
 attendance of 1100 students. The four technical schools 
 are patronised by 800 pupils, and a School of Arts is 
 attended by 160 students. There is also an Artisans 
 Institute and a Salesian Institute, the former with 150 
 and the latter with 200 pupils. Bogota has a national 
 
1904] THE JUDICIARY 609 
 
 free library containing 40,000 volumes, and a museum 
 where national products and antiquities are exhibited. 
 
 The Government annually devotes 400,000 gold 
 dollars to education, a sum inadequate for the require- 
 ments, but little improvement can be expected until 
 present conditions are radically changed. In place of 
 the miserable pittance doled out to the teachers in 
 primary schools, a living wage must be regularly paid, 
 and the system of public education superintended by 
 the National Government ; adequate inspection of 
 schools should also be provided for, and the attendance 
 of the children made obligatory. 
 
 The administration of justice in Colombia is on no 
 more satisfactory footing than in Venezuela and 
 Ecuador, the procedure in the courts being dilatory 
 and costly, and corrupt practices frequent. But con- 
 stant protests against this state of affairs pass unheeded, 
 and no attempt at reform has been made during the 
 past quarter of a century. Both civil and criminal law 
 is codified, and does not in itself offer ground for serious 
 complaints. It is only the interpretation that fails. 
 The basis is Spanish law, as everywhere in Latin 
 America, and the Supreme Court consists of seven 
 members appointed for life, who elect one of their 
 number as President for four years. Superior tribunals 
 sit in the various departments, where are also inferior 
 courts and a number of magistrates (jueces de paz) 
 appointed for the rural districts, these officials frequently 
 gaining considerable local power and using their influ- 
 ence most unjustly. The National Government 
 maintains a police force of 1000 men to ensure order 
 in the capital and at a few other points, but these men 
 are more often utilised as troops to suppress revolu- 
 tionary outbreaks than for ordinary police duty. The 
 municipalities furnish local police, occasionally effective, 
 at other times affording no protection against crime. 
 
 The influence of the Roman Catholic Church is still 
 most powerful, in spite of the edict issued by the Arch- 
 bishop of Bogota in 1874, forbidding the clergy to take 
 
 2q 
 
610 COLOMBIA 
 
 part in political questions. It permeates the Adminis- 
 tration now, and a large proportion of the educational 
 establishments, especially secondary schools, are under 
 its direction. It has a widespread influence over both 
 upper and lower classes in the affairs of everyday life, 
 and it regards with intense jealousy any attempt of 
 other religious sects to establish places of worship. 
 The law admits the right to practise all creeds provided 
 that they are not contrary to morality or subversive to 
 the public welfare, but this concession has only been 
 taken advantage of to a limited extent, Catholicism being 
 so deeply rooted that there is small scope for missionary 
 work of other denominations. Numerically, moreover, 
 the Roman Catholic Church is strong, with an arch- 
 bishop, 10 bishops, 8 vicars-general, and 2170 priests 
 in holy orders, serving 270 Catholic churches and 312 
 chapels, while monastic and religious orders occupy 10 
 houses with 750 inmates. In every diocese there is a 
 seminary for training students for the priesthood over 
 which the State has no control, nor does it contribute 
 towards their support. The opportunity offered to the 
 priesthood to educate and civilise is of a most wide 
 description, but little taken advantage of; for, as in 
 many other South American countries, the priesthood is 
 often recruited from the lower strata of the community, 
 and the men have neither tradition nor ambitious desire 
 to spur them on to the work of regeneration so urgently 
 required. Foreign priests from Spain and Italy, of 
 whom there are many in Colombia, make no determined 
 effort either to bring about any strong reaction against 
 the low moral standard everywhere apparent. 
 
 In national character the white Colombians resemble 
 their Spanish ancestors more closely than elsewhere, 
 owing to the isolated position of their country during 
 the latter half of the nineteenth century. Few foreigners 
 visit Bogota by reason of its inaccessibility, and this has 
 caused the Spanish spoken by its residents to retain more 
 purity of pronunciation than elsewhere in South America. 
 In nearly all circumstances the people are courteous and 
 
1904] EFFECTS OF ALCOHOLISM 611 
 
 hospitable to compatriots and strangers without distinc- 
 tion — a survival of the custom of extending shelter to 
 the traveller when facilities of transport were even more 
 difficult than at present. In Bogota and some of the 
 older settlements at high elevations, the principal families 
 have kept the race pure, with seldom any strain of Indian 
 blood ; but on the low-lying lands near the Orinoco and 
 in the valleys close to the sea coast, the copper-coloured 
 skins and the general features of the natives show far 
 more of Indian than white blood. 
 
 The drink curse, prevalent here, accounts to some 
 extent for the inertia of the national character, and it is 
 curious that this love of strong drink is chiefly confined 
 in South America to people living in high altitudes. In 
 Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Mexico the con- 
 sumption of alcohol, as in Colombia, is abnormally great, 
 whereas in Argentina, where the bulk of the population 
 dwells in the plains, drunkenness is rare. No effort is 
 made in Colombia to check this blight, whether by the 
 Government or the clergy, and its evil effects are seen in 
 the high infantile mortality and the frequency of criminal 
 violence in all parts of the country. 
 
 Industrial occupation in Colombia includes agri- 
 culture, coffee and cacao production, pastoral industry, 
 mining, the collection of indiarubber for export, and a 
 few minor local manufactures. In farming, little energy 
 or initiative is shown, although both soil and climate 
 over a large area are well adapted for cereal and root 
 crops, and the annual output is insufficient for home 
 demands, considerable quantities of breadstuffs being 
 imported annually. With cheap land suitable for wheat, 
 barley, maize, and other grains, and with local labour 
 fairly abundant and cheap, such a condition can only be 
 explained by the disturbed internal state of the Republic 
 and the indolence of the population. 
 
 Coffee has hitherto formed the staple industry, but 
 the low prices of late years have seriously menaced the 
 prosperity of the plantations. In 1895 the total exported 
 was 20,504 tons, valued at 8,504,312 dollars ; and in 
 
612 COLOMBIA 
 
 1896, 28,521 tons, worth 10,474,752 dollars ; but in 1897 
 the total fell to 17,564 tons. In addition, however, to 
 these shipments, a further allowance of 5 per cent, must 
 be made for Colombian coffee despatched through the 
 Venezuelan port of Maracaibo, and not appearing in the 
 Colombian returns. The area under cultivation covers 
 75,000 acres, and the bean is of high grade, bringing 
 much better prices than the Brazilian product, a fact 
 that has enabled the majority of the plantation owners 
 to continue working their properties in spite of the low 
 prices of the last few years. The area devoted to cacao 
 is not large, the output being principally used for home 
 demand. Sugar-cane is also cultivated, and the juice 
 manufactured into rum and sugar for local use. Tobacco 
 is raised in some districts and made into cigars and 
 cigarettes, also for home consumption. 
 
 Of other vegetable products, the most important is 
 indiarubber, collected in the forest area near the 
 Orinoco and the tributaries of the Amazon. Its 
 increased value in recent years has turned attention to 
 this commodity, and the number of expeditions sent 
 into the forests has been greatly augmented, but there 
 is still room for expansion. Ivory nuts are another 
 article of value in exports, and dyewoods, copaiba and 
 balsam of tolu also figure. Official statements classify 
 no less than 68*8 per cent, of the population as engaged 
 in agricultural pursuits or dependent on agricultural 
 production for a livelihood. 
 
 Pastoral industry is widely distributed, live stock 
 being reared in nearly all valleys where cultivation of 
 the soil is attempted, and also on the lower lands wher- 
 ever grass is abundant. It is, however, on the llanos, 
 the great plains stretching away towards the Orinoco, 
 that the principal centre of the cattle breeding is found. 
 No reliable statistics of the number of animals are I 
 available, but it is estimated that the horned cattle 
 reach a total of 3,500,000. The herds are composed of 
 small-bodied, long-horned animals, descendants of the 
 live stock brought from Europe by Spanish colonists, 
 
 
 
1904] INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 613 
 
 and practically no attempt has been made to improve 
 the breed by introducing foreign blood. The hides of 
 these cattle are valuable, and during the scarcity of beef 
 animals in Cuba in 1898 and 1899 many shipments of 
 bullocks were made to that island from Cartagena. 
 Both sheep and goats are raised to supply the local 
 demand for wool and mutton, and swine are bred for 
 home use, but with the exception of cattle pastoral 
 industry in Colombia is unimportant. 
 
 The great mineral wealth of the country is almost 
 untouched, but how important the mining industry was 
 formerly may be judged from the fact that during the 
 300 years of Spanish dominion gold and silver to the 
 value of £60,000,000 was extracted in various sections of 
 what is now Colombian territory. At present mining 
 enterprise is directed towards the search for gold and 
 emeralds, little attention being paid to the large deposits 
 of silver-bearing ore known to exist. From the depart- 
 ment of Antioquia, gold to the value of £40,000 has been 
 exported annually of late years, and in all other districts 
 the average annual output is reputed to be between 
 £600,000 and £800,000. In 1891 the number of mines 
 on which taxes were paid was 4961 ; of these, 3398 were 
 in Antioquia, 794 in Tolima, and 571 in Cauca. Deposits 
 of coal are found, and iron ore of exceptionally rich 
 quality is abundant. Other minerals known, but not 
 worked in consequence of difficulty of transport, are 
 copper, platinum, tin, cinnabar, petroleum and sulphur. 
 The salt mines are a Government monopoly and form a 
 valuable source of revenue. In July, 1899, a wild 
 outburst of speculation occurred in connection with 
 emeralds, gems to the value of £800,000 changing hands 
 in a few weeks, and often at higher prices than their 
 value in foreign markets. 
 
 Manufacturing industry exists on only a very limited 
 scale. A few establishments are found, but play no 
 part in the national life, the most important concern 
 being the Pradera Iron Works situated to the north-east 
 of Bogota, whose plant has a daily capacity of thirty tons 
 
614 COLOMBIA 
 
 of pig-iron ; and the manufacture of wrought iron, rails, 
 sugar mills, castings for machinery, and other articles for 
 local use is carried on with some success. Near these 
 works are deposits of coal, iron, limestone, sand, 
 manganese, and fire-clay. Other branches of manu- 
 facture comprise breweries, distilleries, soap and candle 
 factories, tanneries, leather works, and cigar and cigarette 
 making. With coal close at hand and raw material easy 
 to produce, there is no reason why manufacturing enter- 
 prise in Colombia should not expand under properly 
 directed energy. 
 
 That Colombia will benefit by the completion of the 
 canal across Panama cannot be doubted. Up to the 
 present time the expenditure on the works has been 
 772,545,412 francs by the old, and 65,000,000 francs by 
 the new company, but for a very large proportion of this 
 sum there is nothing to show. The transit trade across 
 the isthmus averages 130,000 tons for outward and 
 120,000 tons for homeward freights annually, and this 
 will increase substantially when the canal is opened, if 
 the statistics and estimates of the United States Panama 
 Canal Commission are approximately correct. 
 
 The financial situation in Colombia is not a happy 
 one. The external indebtedness in 1896 was £3,514,442, 
 chiefly due to British creditors ; in 1897 new bonds for 
 £2,700,000 were issued to cancel this obligation, these 
 to bear 1J per cent, interest, increasing at the rate of J 
 per cent, every three years until 3 per cent, is reached ; 
 but the debt is again in default. The internal funded 
 debt is 6,000,000 pesos, and the floating obligations 
 7,000,000 pesos, but the situation is complicated by an 
 inconvertible paper currency issued by the Government 
 through the Banco Nacional, and amounting to 50,000,000 
 pesos. The exchange value of these notes constantly 
 fluctuates, and complicates all commercial business. On 
 the Isthmus of Panama the Colombian silver dollar of 
 25 grammes weight and '825 fine is in use, and for 
 purposes of convenience the national revenue and 
 expenditure is calculated in this money, and also the 
 
1904] 
 
 THE NATIONAL FINANCES 
 
 615 
 
 published statements of Colombian trade. The exchange 
 value of the silver dollar varies from 45 to 50 cents in 
 United States currency. While the French metric 
 system has been adopted for the legal standard of 
 weights and measures, it is seldom used in commercial 
 transactions in the interior, the Spanish pound of 
 1102 pounds avoirdupois, the arroba of 25 pounds, and 
 the cargo, of 250 pounds, being generally accepted ; but 
 corn is measured by the fanega. Lineal measurement is 
 calculated on the basis of the vara of 80 centimetres. 
 
 The national revenue and expenditure is sanctioned 
 by the Congress for biennial periods. The budgets of 
 1893 to 1900 were :— 
 
 
 Revenue. 
 
 Expenditure. 
 
 1893-1894 
 1895-1896 
 1897-1898 
 1899-1900 
 
 Pesos. 
 
 22,312,381 
 26,266,300 
 34,361,000 
 34,305,000 
 
 Pesos. 
 
 33,502,386 
 35,773,882 
 35,771,013 
 34,000,000 
 
 The principal sources of revenue are the Custom- 
 house duties on imported merchandise and exported 
 produce, these producing 18,697,823 pesos in 1896, and 
 13,256,353 pesos in 1897, but in this latter year the 
 export duty on coffee was abolished. Other taxes 
 contributing are the charge on the meat-drying establish- 
 ments {saladeros), the sale of stamped paper, the match 
 monopoly, the cigarette monopoly, and the receipts of 
 the post and telegraph offices. Of the expenditure the 
 War Department absorbs annually 5,000,000 pesos, and 
 a much larger sum in years when revolution is active. 
 
 Future development is dependent on the freedom 
 from internal disturbance, and improved transport 
 facilities. With great natural advantages of soil and 
 climate, mineral wealth, large forest reserves of valuable 
 timber, and admirable conditions for pastoral enterprise, 
 
616 COLOMBIA 
 
 rapid progress would take place if a strong Administra- 
 tion was established. Moreover, the comparative 
 proximity of Colombia to the markets of the United 
 States is a factor that will benefit her greatly when 
 internal tranquillity is assured. With peace from political 
 disputes will come the construction of railways and 
 other means of transport, and the land and mineral 
 deposits will no longer be allowed to lie idle. 
 
 
CHAPTER XXXIII 
 
 VENEZUELA 
 
 Internal Dissensions. Struggle between the " Yellows " and the 
 " Blues." General Blanco. Revolt under General Salazar. 
 Policy of Blanco. Conspiracy in 1889. Blanco Overthrown. 
 Election of General Palacios. Revolt under Crespo. Provisional 
 Government. Crespo Elected. Revolution under Dr Rojas 
 Paul. Boundary Question with Great Britain. The Uruan 
 Incident. Venezuela and the United States. Mr Olney and 
 the Marquess of Salisbury. The Monroe Doctrine. The United 
 States and Great Britain. The Cleveland Message. Venezuela 
 and British Trade. Dignified Attitude of Crespo. Boundary 
 Dispute centres in Washington. The Cleveland Commission. 
 The Arbitration Tribunal. The Award. Diplomatic Relations 
 between Great Britain and Venezuela. The Crespo Administra- 
 tion. Election of Senor Andrade. Revolt against Andrade 
 Administration. Death of Crespo. Victory of the Revolution. 
 Election of President Castro. Modification of the Constitution. 
 Political Division of Venezuela. Seditious Practices. Revolu- 
 tionary Tendencies. Climate and Topography. Statistics of 
 Population. Immigration. Municipalities. Public Education. 
 Justice. Influence of the Church. Aversion to the Marriage 
 Ceremony. The Priesthood. National Character. Indian 
 Characteristics. Industrial Enterprise. Mining Enterprise. 
 Manufacturing Industry. Means of Communication. Financial 
 Situation. Estimates for 1899-1900. The Commercial Situation. 
 Low Prices for Coffee. Imported Merchandise. Exports. Com- 
 parison of British and United States Trades. German Competi- 
 tion. Future Prospects. 
 
 The political history of Venezuela is an almost unin- 
 terrupted record of internal dissension, armed uprisings, 
 civil war, and an absence of all respect for law and order. 
 Since the Venezuelans threw off Spanish dominion in 
 
618 VENEZUELA 
 
 1830, after a long-drawn struggle, and obtained their 
 independence as a part of Nueva Granada, no fewer 
 than fifty-one revolutionary movements have swept over 
 the country, and of these eleven overturned the Govern- 
 ment of the day and obtained control of public affairs. 
 
 The great majority of these insurrections were the 
 outcome of ambitious designs of politicians desirous of 
 the spoils of office, and it was easy for such men to 
 collect a following and take the field once that arrange- 
 ments were made to acquire arms and ammunition. To 
 the Venezuelan there were many inducements to revolt 
 against the legal authorities, for rebellion meant oppor- 
 tunity for looting, freedom from manual labour, sub- 
 stantial reward if the movement was victorious, and 
 the fact that if the peasant class did not join the 
 insurrection they were impressed into the Government 
 ranks and obliged to fight with no prospect of remunera- 
 tion when hostilities ended. 
 
 The period now under review begins when General 
 Guzman Blanco was the central figure on the stage, and it 
 was in the long struggle between the " Yellows " and the 
 "Blues" that he first became prominent. The former 
 ostensibly represented a Liberal policy, and the two 
 factions may be considered as the Liberals and Con- 
 servatives of Venezuelan political life, but so far as 
 fundamental principles were concerned in actual methods 
 of Government there was no choice between them. 
 From 1847 to 1870 there was continual friction between 
 the "Yellows" and the "Blues" for the upper hand, and 
 it was not until the country was brought to the verge 
 of ruin by the civil war lasting from 1866 to 1870 that 
 the former obtained a decisive success. Blanco, who 
 had been a leading personality on the winning side 
 during this five years conflict, was now called upon to 
 undertake the reorganisation of the political and economic 
 situation, and to deal with the financial chaos to which 
 the national exchequer was reduced. He was then 
 forty-one years of age, having been born in 1829, and 
 was clever and ambitious, iairly well educated, and 
 
 
1870] GUZMAN BLANCO 619 
 
 possessed remarkable energy and determination of 
 character. 
 
 Although nominally elected President for the usual 
 term, Blanco became virtually Dictator of Venezuela for 
 twenty years, his authority being absolute between 1870 
 and 1889. He actually occupied the Presidency from 
 1870 to 1877, again from 1879 to 1884, and also from 
 
 1886 to 1887 ; but when not formally in the chair he 
 exercised power through one of his partisans, whom 
 he placed at the head of the Executive on the under- 
 standing that all official acts must be submitted to him 
 for his approval, and that the policy of the administration 
 at home and abroad should be dictated by him. The 
 position of Blanco was not undisputed by his enemies, 
 for many efforts were made to oust him from power, 
 and one of these, headed by General Salazar, threatened 
 serious consequences, but this was finally crushed in 1872 
 and the insurgent leader captured and shot. Although 
 the government of Blanco was autocratic, it was not 
 without substantial benefit in many directions to the 
 Venezuelans. The construction of railways was en- 
 couraged, roads into the interior for wheeled traffic were 
 opened, improvements were effected in the principal 
 cities, the building of a harbour at La Guayra was 
 undertaken, and measures were adopted to encourage 
 foreign trade. Blanco spent the years when his sub- 
 stitutes filled the Presidency in Europe, accredited as 
 Minister Plenipotentiary to France, and directing Vene- 
 zuelan affairs from Paris. To all outward appearance 
 his popularity was assured after his first years of power ; 
 statues were erected to him in Caracas and other centres, 
 and he was commonly depicted as the "Illustrious 
 American " and the regenerator of his country. 
 
 Underlying this outward show of satisfaction with 
 the Blanco regime there was a current of deep hostility 
 only awaiting opportunity to come to the surface. In 
 
 1887 General Lopez was placed in office by Blanco as 
 his substitute for the ensuing two years, Blanco then 
 proceeding to Paris, as was his custom. An active 
 
620 VENEZUELA 
 
 conspiracy was set afoot in 1888 to excite public opinion 
 against the Administration, and in 1889 this movement 
 came to a head, the Venezuelan Congress declaring that 
 the Republic would no longer endure the dictatorship of 
 Blanco, and driving his nominee, Dr Rojas Paul, who had 
 succeeded General Lopez, from the Presidency. Once 
 the power of Blanco was broken, the bitter feeling long 
 dormant against him burst out with unrestrained fury. 
 A mob took possession of the principal streets of Caracas, 
 the statues of Blanco, of which there were half a dozen 
 in different parts of the municipality, were thrown from 
 their pedestals and broken in pieces, and pictures of the 
 Dictator were torn from their frames and cut to strips. 
 Every possible insult was offered to the man who for 
 many years had controlled Venezuelan destinies, and the 
 temper of the people was such that they talked openly 
 of assassination if he attempted to return. 
 
 While there was no justification for the usurpation 
 of dictatorial power by General Blanco, in some respects 
 the continuity of policy it ensured was distinctly advan- 
 tageous to the Venezuelans. The country enjoyed a 
 more quiet condition of internal affairs between 1872 
 and 1887 than at any period in its history, and economic 
 amelioration progressed steadily in so far as expansion 
 of industrial enterprise was concerned. Moreover, it 
 was under Blanco that the national finances were placed 
 on a fairly satisfactory footing, and the debt service 
 attended to with a certain degree of regularity. In 
 1887 his autocratic character was clearly demonstrated 
 by his attitude towards Great Britain in connection with 
 the boundary dispute between Venezuela and British 
 Guiana, when he insisted that the question of the owner- 
 ship of all territory to the west of the river Essequibo 
 should be submitted to arbitration. Her Britannic 
 Majesty's Government pointed out that certain sections 
 of this region were indisputably British, and that no 
 arbitration in regard to such portions was possible, but 
 that where doubt existed, as in the case of the country 
 near the Uruan and Cuyuni rivers, they were prepared 
 
1889] REVOLT UNDER CRESPO 621 
 
 to meet the views of Venezuela. In reply to this com- 
 munication, General Blanco sent the British Minister, 
 Mr St John, his passports. Although efforts were made 
 by Blanco to induce the Government of the United 
 States to bring pressure to bear on Great Britain in 
 connection with this dispute, they were unavailing at the 
 time, and it was not until nine years later that active 
 measures were taken in Washington for a settlement of 
 the question. After the events of 1889, Blanco made no 
 attempt to regain control of Venezuela, and settled 
 down with his family in Paris, where he died in 1898. 
 
 After the overthrow of Blanco, the Congress elected 
 General Palacios for the statutory term of two years. 
 His Administration was uneventful, except for a proposal 
 to reform the Law of Constitution to extend the presi- 
 dential term from two to four years, and to effect some 
 other minor modifications, and on the question of this 
 extension of the presidential period important develop- 
 ments arose. In 1892 President Palacios completed 
 the two years for which he had been elected, but insisted 
 that the reform of the law then projected entitled him 
 to remain until 1894, and his refusal to vacate office led 
 to the outbreak of a serious revolution under the leader- 
 ship of General Joaquin Crespo. It was not until 
 October, 1892, after many months of severe fighting, that 
 peace was restored by the victory of the insurgents and 
 the flight of Palacios and his ministers from the country. 
 A Provisional Government was then installed under 
 General Crespo, the Chambers convened, and the reform 
 in regard to the four years tenure of the Presidency 
 approved and promulgated. In the following year the 
 election was held, the choice falling on General Crespo, 
 the leader of the recent revolt; and in March, 1894, the 
 new President assumed his duties, but had not been 
 long in power before a revolutionary movement, instigated 
 by Dr Rojas Paul, broke out. Although this insurrection 
 lingered on with some show of force until February, 
 1896, it was never really dangerous to the Administra- 
 tion and was only supported in the outlying districts. 
 
622 VENEZUELA 
 
 General Crespo himself took the field in command of 
 the Government troops, and his success against the 
 insurgents added to his prestige and popularity. 
 
 Illustrative of presidential authority in Venezuela, a 
 story is told of an occasion when General Crespo was 
 ailing and ordered by his doctor to a small village near 
 La Guayra for change of air. One of the Ministers 
 protested that by law the President could not leave the 
 Federal District without permission from Congress, and 
 that this village was outside such limits. " Make it part 
 of the Federal District at once," said Crespo. Forthwith 
 a decree was issued to that effect. 
 
 Early in 1895 the Guiana boundary question again 
 cropped up. The authorities of British Guiana had 
 established a police post on the river Uruan, in territory 
 claimed by Venezuela, and the Venezuelan Government 
 instructed their representative to eject the British officials 
 and occupy the disputed ground. These orders were 
 executed, the two British European police officers, 
 Inspector Baker and sub-Inspector Barnes, arrested and 
 conveyed inland, and the half dozen native constables 
 ordered away from the locality, the British flag being 
 hauled down and that of Venezuela hoisted at the post. 
 Strong representations were forwarded to the Britisl 
 Government by the authorities at Demerara when news 
 of this occurrence was received. These communications 
 were repeated on the return of Inspector Baker and his 
 companion, who had been released by the Venezuelans 
 "after suffering some weeks of confinement and consider- 
 able hardships. With no direct diplomatic relations with 
 Venezuela, the British Government could only proceed 
 through the German Minister, who was in charge of 
 British interests in Caracas, to ask for an explanation 
 of the affair. President Crespo gave little satisfaction 
 by his reply, and for several months nothing was heard 
 from either side ; but the fire was only smouldering, and 
 soon burst into flame. 
 
 In the middle of 1895 the Venezuelan Government 
 was informed that a demand would shortly be made by 
 
1895] THE URUAN INCIDENT 623 
 
 Great Britain for an apology and indemnity for the 
 incident on the river Urnan. In these circumstances 
 President Crespo decided to lay the matter before the 
 United States Government for advice and assistance, 
 and the situation was explained to Mr Olney, then 
 Secretary of State, by Sefior Andrade, the Venezuelan 
 Minister in Washington. In July and August, 1895, 
 notes were exchanged between Mr Olney on behalf of 
 the United States Administration, and the Marquess of 
 Salisbury in regard to Venezuela. Mr Olney brusquely 
 demanded that the difference between Her Majesty's 
 Government and that of Venezuela in connection with 
 the boundary between the latter country and British 
 Guiana should be submitted to arbitration. The Uruan 
 affair was only a side issue in this controversy, the 
 policy of the Monroe doctrine being the motive ostensibly 
 given for the action of the Washington authorities, based 
 on the supposition that the British Government was 
 deliberately encroaching on Venezuelan territory. The 
 reply of Lord Salisbury to Mr Olney was most temperate 
 in tone, and he pointed out that the title of Great 
 Britain to that part of South America over which juris- 
 diction was claimed by the authorities of British Guiana 
 was abundantly clear and thoroughly established, with 
 the exception of a comparatively small area which Her 
 Majesty's Government had repeatedly offered to submit 
 to arbitration. 
 
 This answer did not satisfy President Cleveland and 
 Mr Olney. A further request for arbitration on practi- 
 cally the same basis as that made by the Venezuelan 
 Government in 1887 was put forward, and this brought 
 strained relations between the United States and Great 
 Britain. Meanwhile, preparations were in progress for 
 the formal demand on Venezuela by Her Majesty's 
 Government for reparation for the treatment of the two 
 police officials, Inspector Baker and Sub-Inspector 
 Barnes. There was no change in the situation until 
 December, 1895, but on the 18th of that month, 
 President Cleveland sent a message to Congress which 
 
624 VENEZUELA 
 
 nearly caused an outbreak of hostilities between Great 
 Britain and the United States. He declared that unless 
 Her Majesty's Government agreed to the demands of the 
 United States Administration concerning arbitration in 
 connection with the Venezuelan question, force would 
 be used to compel the evacuation of all such territory 
 as a Commission appointed by the United States authori- 
 ties considered rightfully belonged to Venezuela. This 
 action of President Cleveland placed the dispute between 
 Great Britain and Venezuela on an altered footing, and 
 the Uruan incident dropped into insignificance beside the 
 complication which hoav threatened to develop into a 
 war between two great nations. Although the demand 
 for compensation for the outrage on the two British 
 police officials was made in due time, and £1500 paid by 
 the Venezuelan Government to settle the affair, the 
 matter no longer occasioned any interest in view of the 
 more important question which had arisen. 
 
 When the news of the Cleveland message reached 
 Venezuela, a scene of frantic excitement ensued. The 
 text of the document was cabled to Caracas, printed 
 copies were immediately posted in every section of the 
 city, and the announcement of the attitude of the United 
 States in the dispute with Great Britain was telegraphed 
 far and wide throughout the country, meetings being 
 held to applaud the action taken by President Cleveland 
 and to shower abuse on the British. Processions 
 paraded the streets of Caracas with banners and flags, 
 speeches were made glorifying the magnanimous conduct 
 of the United States in protecting republican institutions 
 in South America, patriotic displays of all kinds were 
 the order of the day ; but the Venezuelans entirely failed 
 to distinguish between the policy of President Cleveland 
 as prompted by a desire to establish a principle of the 
 Monroe doctrine, and the situation created by the attack 
 on the British police post on the river Uruan. In the 
 minds of the great majority of the people the idea was 
 fixed that the United States had taken up the cudgels 
 for Venezuela because Great Britain had demanded 
 
1895] THE GUIANA BOUNDARY DISPUTE 625 
 
 reparation for the outrage perpetrated on the British 
 representatives, and that from motives of philanthropy 
 the moral and material force of the Americans was to be 
 used to drive the British out of all territory to which 
 Venezuela laid claim, as well as to prevent any aggressive 
 action by England in connection with the Uruan 
 incident. In speeches delivered to crowded meetings in , 
 Caracas, this theory was advanced in such form as to 
 amount to a definite statement of fact that the conflict 
 between the United States and Great Britain was a 
 struggle between republican and monarchial institutions, 
 and that all the republican governments of the world 
 would join forces with the United States in the contest. 
 It is no wonder that the people lost their heads under 
 the influence of inflammatory rhetoric of this description, 
 gravely expounded by leading members of the Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Leagues were formed in Caracas and at other points 
 hostile to British trade, the members binding themselves 
 to purchase no merchandise of British origin, and pre- 
 parations were begun for the embodiment of the militia 
 forces in event of the outbreak of war between the 
 United States and Great Britain, while the project of 
 an invasion of British Guiana was freely discussed. 
 Batteries were mounted near La Guayra to protect the 
 harbour against attack from the sea, and the newspapers 
 were replete with bellicose articles, urging the people to 
 show patriotic feeling in every possible manner ; but in 
 spite of all this excitement few cases occurred where 
 personal outrage was offered to British residents in 
 Venezuela. Only one authenticated instance is recorded, 
 and that was in connection with the British Vice-consul 
 in the town of Barcelona, on the river Orinoco. This 
 man was a merchant, and his life was menaced by a 
 group of ill-disposed neighbours ; threats were made to 
 the effect that his property would be destroyed if he did 
 not abandon the city, but the authorities intervened 
 before mischief could be done. 
 
 In the carnival festivities in February, 1896, the 
 
 2 k 
 
626 VENEZUELA 
 
 feeling of hostility against the British reached its height. 
 It is customary to arrange representations of prominent 
 events, and these are paraded through the principal 
 thoroughfares during carnival week, and on this occasion 
 some clever emblematic devices were to the fore, in which 
 Venezuela and Great Britain were the chief figures. 
 Venezuelan soldiers dragging British troops and sailors 
 along the streets formed a centre of attraction and 
 roused the wildest enthusiasm amongst the spectators, 
 while caricatures of Englishmen, many of these extremely 
 comical, were another favourite exhibition. In equal 
 ratio to the hostility towards everything British was the 
 sympathy for all designs representative of the United 
 States ; but the carnival proved to be the culminating 
 point of the excitement, the temper of the people 
 rapidly cooling down when they realised that for the 
 present there would be no war between England and 
 America. A slight recrudescence of hostile feeling 
 occurred in March, when a rumour reached Caracas that 
 a British squadron had called at the Island of Curacoa, 
 bound for Venezuela, to enforce the demand for indemnity 
 in connection with the Uruan incident, but this flash in 
 the pan died away when it was found that Her Majesty's 
 Government held no such intention. While the 
 Venezuelans still bore a latent hostility towards Great 
 Britain, no sign of it was visible on the surface in April, 
 1896, and all resolutions in regard to the cessation of the 
 purchase of British goods disappeared completely, the 
 people discovering that a large portion of the merchandise 
 they most needed could be imported more cheaply from 
 Great Britain than elsewhere, and this was sufficient to 
 counterbalance the agitation set afoot against the 
 trade. 
 
 The one man in Venezuela who never lost his head 
 while these developments were taking place between 
 the British and the United States Governments was 
 President Crespo, and his attitude throughout the 
 controversy was worthy of all praise. He was quiet 
 and dignified, reserved in regard to the questions at 
 
1896] THE CLEVELAND COMMISSION 627 
 
 issue, and showed no outward sign of hostility towards 
 the British. Crespo took a sensible view of the situation, 
 asserting that he neither wished nor expected to see 
 war result from the action of the United States 
 Administration in connection with the boundary dispute, 
 but sincerely hoped that the question of the frontier 
 would now be settled once for all by arbitration, and 
 that a long-standing cause of dissatisfaction would be 
 thereby eliminated. It was this moderate attitude of 
 the President that led to the peaceable arrangement for 
 the payment of the indemnity to Her Majesty's Govern- 
 ment on account of the Uruan affair, in spite of the 
 strong opposition this policy evoked on the part of many 
 politicians entertaining more narrow-minded views. 
 
 All interest in the boundary question was now 
 transferred to Washington, where the Commission 
 nominated by President Cleveland to inquire into the 
 validity of the Venezuelan claims held constant sittings. 
 Venezuela was represented by Sefior Andrade, the 
 Minister accredited to the United States, by Mr 
 Storrow, a well-known lawyer of Boston, and by Mr 
 Scruggs, a former diplomatic representative of the 
 United States in Caracas. The task of this Commission 
 was to examine all documentary evidence bearing on 
 the Venezuelan cause, and to report to President 
 Cleveland the result of the inquiry, but it was not long 
 before the inconvenience of this arrangement became 
 evident to the United States authorities. There could 
 be at best only an ex-parte statement under the 
 circumstances, for Great Britain was unrepresented, 
 although it was chiefly with British interests that the 
 Commission was concerned. An investigation of this 
 nature could only lead to a communication to Her 
 Majesty's Government of the deductions drawn by the 
 Commission in Washington, and if these were favourable 
 to Venezuela, to a further request for arbitration. Under 
 such conditions the danger of war between the United 
 States and Great Britain would again be imminent, a 
 possibility which President Cleveland had no wish to 
 
628 VENEZUELA 
 
 provoke, in view of the injurious effect on financial and 
 commercial interests such action would entail. Towards 
 the end of 1896, therefore, a modus vivendi was 
 suggested for an arbitration tribunal to decide the merits 
 of British and Venezuelan claims, the representatives of 
 those two nations in Washington formulating the 
 arrangement. A treaty in this sense was signed on 
 June 14, 1897, and the tribunal subsequently met in 
 Paris under the presidency of Dr Martens, a most 
 distinguished Russian jurist. With the acceptance of 
 this arbitration by Great Britain and Venezuela, the 
 intervention of the United States in the matter ceased, 
 and the Commission appointed by President Cleveland 
 was dissolved, no report of its proceedings being 
 submitted. In October, 1899, the award of the Paris 
 tribunal was given, and, although not satisfying the- 
 extreme pretensions of the Venezuelan advocates, was 
 loyally accepted by General Crespo. This decision was 
 closely in accord with the delimitation shown by the 
 Schomburk line, but while giving Barima Point and the 
 Cuyuni gold fields to Venezuela, it confirmed the British 
 title to 60,000 square miles of the territory claimed by 
 the Venezuelans. Diplomatic relations were subse- 
 quently renewed between Great Britain and Venezuela, 
 Mr Haggard being appointed Minister-Resident at 
 Caracas, and Dr Pietri representing Venezuela at the 
 Court of St James. 
 
 In March, 1898, the presidential term of General I 
 Crespo expired, and he vacated office in favour of his; 
 successor. His Administration more nearly satisfied I 
 the needs of the country than any former one had done, , 
 and although he was a soldier and attained power 
 through a successful revolutionary movement, he gave no ) 
 place to militarism in his direction of public affairs. 
 His Government was firm without being despotic, and 
 he showed undeniable tact in dealing with domestic and I 
 foreign questions, and that the people felt confidence in I 
 him was demonstrated by the improvement in the public 
 credit during his term of office. 
 
1898] ELECTION OF ANDKADE 629 
 
 To succeed General Crespo, the choice fell on Senor 
 Andrade, the Venezuelan Minister in the United States. 
 It was not an unnatural choice, in view of the important 
 services he had rendered in connection with the 
 boundary question, for it was due to the course 
 followed by him in his diplomatic relations with the 
 Cleveland Administration that the intervention of the 
 United States between Venezuela and Great Britain 
 occurred, and the attitude assumed by President 
 Cleveland in the matter was precisely what the 
 Venezuelans most desired. Although the candidature 
 of Senor Andrade was supported by General Crespo, no 
 undue influence was brought to bear on the Federal 
 Council to secure his election ; moreover, none of the 
 other aspirants to presidential honours combining such 
 substantial claims to the position. When the decision 
 of the Council was made public, the general impression 
 was favourable to the new president, and he assumed 
 office with the good wishes of nearly the whole 
 community. 
 
 Senor Andrade did not prove a success as President, 
 and his temporary popularity soon disappeared. His 
 weak and vacillating policy in regard to internal politics 
 created discontent, and afforded the opportunity that 
 the Opposition had awaited to sow the seeds of sedition. 
 Towards the end of 1898 the promoters of this revolu- 
 tionary spirit decided that the time had arrived for 
 armed insurrection against the Government, and the 
 standard of revolt was raised in the western districts 
 and in the State of Carabobo ; but it was not the wish 
 of General Crespo to see President Andrade ousted 
 from office, and he took the field in command of the 
 Government troops to suppress the outbreak. The 
 insurgents were scantily supplied with arms and 
 ammunition, and could make little progress against the 
 legal forces, the operations being confined chiefly to 
 guerilla warfare. Gradually, therefore, order was restored 
 under the direction of Crespo, and early in 1899 the 
 movement was apparently nearing its end, but unfortun- 
 
630 VENEZUELA 
 
 ately for the Government a disaster occurred at this 
 stage to change the current of events. In a skirmish 
 between a small body of troops and a band of rebels a 
 stray bullet struck General Crespo in the head, killing 
 him instantly, and his death at once brought about a 
 revival of the insurrection. In a few months the 
 insurgents were in control of the greater portion of the 
 country, and prepared to march on Caracas, and it was 
 evident that the Government cause was lost. On the 
 approach of the rebel army President Andrade, with his 
 ministers, abandoned the capital and sought refuge inl 
 the Dutch colony of Curac^oa. 
 
 A period of anarchy ensued, but at length order was 
 re-established by the revolutionary leaders, and a Pro- 
 visional Government formed. General Castro, who had 
 been prominent in the revolt against Andrade, was 
 elected President, and although various conspiracies 
 were hatched against his authority, they were suppressed 
 without difficulty. The disturbances in 1899 had 
 brought many financial and economic afflictions in their 
 train, notably widespread distress after the restoration 
 of peace, and the fall in the price of coffee, the staple 
 export from Venezuela, tended to accentuate the 
 general distress. Under these circumstances it was not 
 surprising that the exchequer was without funds to » 
 meet the public obligations, the expenditure in 1898 and I 
 1899 having been abnormally heavy in consequence of I 
 internal disturbances, and the end of the nineteenth i 
 century found Venezuela in the position of a defaulting! 
 Government on the internal and external public debts, 
 and in such economic distress that discontent was- 
 apparent amongst all sections of the population. 
 
 In February, 1902, General Castro was again elected 
 to the Presidency, and during his second term of office 
 some interesting events occurred. Damage to the 
 property of foreign residents had been extensive in the 
 various revolutionary outbreaks during recent years, and 
 claims for compensation were preferred against thei 
 Government. No consideration being accorded to these i 
 
1902] BLOCKADE OF LA GUAYRA 631 
 
 demands, the matter passed into the hands of the 
 foreign diplomatic representatives, and to them, also, 
 no satisfaction was given. When diplomacy failed, 
 Great Britain, Germany, and Italy determined to use 
 force as the only means of securing a just settlement for 
 their subjects. Towards the end of 1902 the three 
 powers established a blockade of La Guayra and seized 
 the Custom-house, announcing that they would remain 
 in possession until sufficient funds had been collected to 
 satisfy their demands. Through the mediation of the 
 United States a protocol was signed on February 13, 
 1903, agreeing to refer the dispute to the Hague 
 Tribunal, and the conditions were set forth in a treaty 
 on May 7 of the same year. Under this agreement not 
 only the blockading powers, but all other nationalities 
 were entitled to claim for damages suffered. On 
 February 22, 1904, the award of the Hague Tribunal 
 was given, and while admitting claims of all nationalities, 
 it established a precedent in International Law in that a 
 preferential right to the 30 per cent, of the Customs dues 
 set aside was allowed to the three powers which had 
 taken active steps to enforce payment, and that only 
 after their claims were satisfied could other nations 
 participate. The United States Government was 
 requested to execute the award. 
 
 The Venezuelan Law of Constitution differs from 
 that of other South American States, and requires some 
 explanation for the political situation to be understood. 
 Congress appoints a Federal Council consisting of 19 
 members for two years, and this Council elects a President 
 from its own members, who is also President of the 
 Republic for a term of four years under the modification 
 introduced in 1893, and since extended to six years. 
 Congress comprises the Senate and House of Repre- 
 sentatives, three Senators being elected for each State 
 for four years by the local Legislatures, and representa- 
 tives in the proportion of one to every 35,000 inhabitants 
 are chosen by popular, direct and public election. Until 
 1881 the political division of Venezuela was twenty-one 
 
632 VENEZUELA 
 
 States and their territories, but in that year the country 
 was rearranged into eight States, the Federal District, 
 two national settlements, and eight territories. These 
 States are :— Miranda, Carabobo, Bermudez, Zamora, 
 Lara, Los Andes, Falcon and Zulia, and Bolivar. The 
 territories were : — Goajira, Alto Orinoco, Amazonas, 
 Colon, Yurnari, Caura, Delta and Armisticio ; but in 
 1891 the territory of Yuruari was reincorporated into 
 the State of Bolivar, so that only seven of the eight 
 territories created in 1881 now exist. In 1899 a 
 measure was sanctioned for the re-creation of the twenty 
 States under the Act of 1864, and this was again 
 modified by a decree dated August 4, 1900, by which 
 the Republic was apportioned into the fifteen political 
 divisions already described. 
 
 Before leaving the subject of politics in Venezuela, 
 attention must be called to one clause in the Law of 
 Constitution which offers a premium on revolutionary 
 practices and explains why the country is a constant 
 prey to internal disturbance. It is specially enacted 
 that insurgents taking up arms from political motives 
 shall be accorded belligerent rights, and that all property 
 of persons participating in political risings is exempt 
 from confiscation. In other words, any ambitious 
 citizen can join a rebellion with a light heart, knowing 
 that he cannot be punished for treasonable acts, and that 
 his vested interests in land or other property are safe 
 whether the cause he supports emerges victorious or 
 defeated from the struggle. So long as these conditions 
 continue there can be small hope for peace in this 
 insurrection-ridden community. 
 
 With half a hundred revolutionary outbreaks in a 
 period of seventy years, the economic development of 
 Venezuela has necessarily been slow. Presidents and 
 Administrations disappeared with such startling rapidity 
 in the first forty years of Venezuelan Independence, that 
 little opportunity occurred for careful consideration of 
 the means best fitted to promote the general welfare. 
 Even when measures of improvement were initiated, 
 
1904] CLIMATE AND TOPOGEAPHY 633 
 
 political disturbances invariably arose to obstruct con- 
 tinuity of policy in the proposed reforms. 
 
 It was not until General Guzman Blanco acceded to 
 power in 1870 that any practical effort was made to 
 inaugurate a system permitting mental and material 
 development, to assume definite shape, the first by the 
 institution of elementary education, and the second by 
 the advent of an epoch of comparative peace which gave 
 breathing space for industrial enterprise to expand ; 
 but after his overthrow backsliding took place as a 
 consequence of constant internal unrest. A prospect of 
 a more happy state of affairs opened under General 
 Crespo between 1894 and 1898, but his successor was 
 unable to maintain this improvement. For the last 
 seven years, therefore, Venezuela had been a prey to the 
 intrigues of unscrupulous politicians, and the attendant 
 evils of ever-recurring conspiracies against the authorities, 
 and, as a consequence, the economic situation has been 
 confronted by innumerable difficulties. 
 
 The climate and topography of Venezuela are factors 
 of such variable quantities as to require description. 
 The coast line on the northern and eastern boundary is 
 swampy and unhealthy at all seasons in consequence of 
 malaria ; but this low-lying land only extends for a very 
 short distance into the interior, precipitous mountain 
 ranges then rising abruptly to 5000 feet above sea level, 
 and at the back of these lofty chains are great valleys 
 where a fertile soil and abundance of water offer many 
 facilities for coffee plantations and other branches of 
 agricultural industry. In one of these valleys is the 
 city of Caracas, at an elevation of 3000 feet above the 
 sea, and endowed with the climatic attributes of per- 
 petual springtime. There is little variation in tempera- 
 ture the year round, the thermometer in the shade 
 seldom marking higher than 76° F. during the daytime 
 or falling below 65° at night. These conditions are 
 repeated in more or less degree in the succession of 
 valleys in the mountain area, the greater or lower 
 altitude modifying heat or cold. Where districts are 
 
634 VENEZUELA 
 
 above an altitude of 2000 feet the climate is not injurious 
 to immigrants from northern countries ; malarious fevers 
 are few, and epidemic disease rarely encountered. 
 Towards the south-west the character of the country 
 changes, the mountain ranges disappearing and giving 
 place to great open plains stretching away to the banks 
 of the river Orinoco, at which point heavy forest 
 replaces the grass lands of the more central districts. 
 These open plains are the llanos, and here the climate is 
 hot and humid, malaria playing havoc with residents 
 accustomed to live in temperate regions. With the 
 exception of the llanos the greater portion of Venezuela 
 is heavily wooded with excellent timber trees of many 
 different kinds. 
 
 In regard to population, no accurate statistics are 
 available, the census returns being unreliable. In 1873 
 official figures showed a total population of 2,032,476 ; 
 in 1891 this estimate was increased to 2,323,527, com- 
 prising 1,137,139 males and 1,186,388 females. In 1890 
 the Indian population was given as 326,000 ; of these, 
 66,000 were classified as independent, 20,000 as under 
 control, and 240,000 as civilised. In 1894 another esti- 
 mate gave 2,444,816, including 44,129 foreigners of the 
 following nationalities : — Spanish, 13,558 ; Colombians, 
 11,081; British, 6154; Dutch, 3729; Italians, 3179; 
 French, 2545 ; Germans, 962. The area of Venezuela, 
 after deducting the 60,000 square miles awarded to 
 Great Britain by the arbitration proceedings in 1899, is 
 placed at 533,943 square miles. The distribution of the 
 population in 1891 is shown by the following table. 
 Information regarding the movement of population is 
 seldom published, the latest returns being for 1889. 
 These show 6705 marriages, 76,187 births, and 55,218 
 deaths, as taking place during the twelve months. Of 
 immigration there is little ; in 1890 the arrivals were 
 1555, but these were offset by an equal number of 
 departures. During the last few years there have been 
 occasional endeavours to induce foreigners to settle, and 
 contracts were made subsequent to 1896 for the intro- 
 
1904] 
 
 POPULATION 
 
 635 
 
 duction of immigrants to form colonies on national lands, 
 but nothing has really been done. 
 
 State. 
 
 Area, 
 sq. miles. 
 
 Population 
 
 1891. 
 
 Population 
 
 per 
 
 sq. mile. 
 
 Federal District . 
 
 45 
 
 89,133 
 
 1,980-7 
 
 Miranda 
 
 
 33,969 
 
 484,509 
 
 14-2 
 
 Carabobo 
 
 
 
 2,984 
 
 198,021 
 
 60-6 
 
 Bermudez . 
 
 
 
 32,243 
 
 300,597 
 
 9-3 
 
 Zamora 
 
 
 
 25,212 
 
 246,676 
 
 9-6 
 
 Lara . 
 
 
 
 9,296 
 
 246,760 
 
 26-5 
 
 Los Andes . 
 
 
 
 14,719 
 
 336,146 
 
 22-8 
 
 Falcon and Zulia 
 
 
 
 36,212 
 
 224,566 
 
 6-2 
 
 Bolivar 
 
 
 
 88,701 
 
 50,289 
 
 0-5 
 
 Various Territories 
 
 
 290,562 
 
 146,830 
 
 0-5 
 
 Total . 
 
 
 
 533,943 
 
 2,323,527 
 
 4-3 
 
 Of Venezuelan cities the most important are Caracas, 
 with a population of 72,429; Valencia, with 38,654; 
 Maracaibo, with 34,284 ; Barquisimeto, witli 31,476 ; 
 Ciudad de Cura, with 12,198; Barcelona, with 12,785; 
 Ciudad Bolivar, with 11,686 ; and Guanara, with 
 10,880. Little has been accomplished in the matter of 
 improvements by the municipal authorities of these 
 towns. Caracas, the National Capital, is without 
 drainage, and has a deficient water supply, is ill-paved 
 and dirty, and the enforcement of ordinary hygienic 
 regulations are entirely neglected. Of other Venezuelan 
 cities Valencia is the most attractive, broad streets 
 shaded by well-grown trees lending a picturesque 
 appearance to the thoroughfares. 
 
 In regard to public education, Venezuela is one of 
 the most backward of the South American States, and 
 previous to 1870 no system existed for public instruc- 
 tion. It was due to General Guzman Blanco that free 
 elementary schools were established, and the attendance 
 of children between the ages of six and fourteen made 
 
636 VENEZUELA 
 
 obligatory ; but the law of compulsory attendance has 
 never been enforced, and children who should be 
 receiving instruction are sent by their parents to work 
 on the coffee plantations, or occupied in other employ- 
 ments. There are 1415 Federal elementary schools, 
 and 150 maintained under the different State Govern- 
 ments, and the number of pupils on the rolls is returned 
 as 100,026, but the attendance is not regular. For the 
 Federal institutions the sum annually expended is 
 2,500,000 francs, or about 20 francs for each child 
 enrolled. Away from the towns no effort is made to 
 furnish primary instruction for the children of the 
 labouring classes, the employers of thousands of workers 
 on the principal coffee estates finding neither school 
 houses nor teachers. Occasionally, rudiments of educa- 
 tion are imparted by the parish priests, but such 
 innovations receive small encouragement from the 
 plantation owners, and seldom lead to substantial result. 
 For secondary education there are twenty-two colleges 
 for boys and eleven establishments for girls, and also 
 twenty-six private institutions, while for higher educa- 
 tion two Universities exist. On the Federal colleges 
 and universities the National Government spends 
 annually 850,000 francs, an amount totally inadequate 
 for the purpose. Among the lower social classes in 
 Venezuela, the question of public instruction is regarded 
 with apathetic indifference, and parents consider them- 
 selves hardly used when some unusually zealous official 
 insists on the attendance of children at the public 
 schools. 
 
 The administration of justice is based on a very low 
 standard, and corruption is deep-rooted in both higher 
 and lower branches of the judiciary. The laws are 
 codified, but the procedure is tedious and costly, and 
 all litigation is avoided as much as possible, no matter 
 how just may be the cause in dispute. The necessity 
 of purifying the judicial system is not appreciated by the 
 Venezuelans, even the more highly educated section of 
 the population being content to allow matters to rest 
 
 
1904] CHURCH INFLUENCE 637 
 
 in the existing unsatisfactory condition rather than exert 
 their influence to eradicate the scandal which present cir- 
 cumstances constantly provoke. In the various munici- 
 palities detachments of police are maintained, but they are 
 more often utilised as armed troops to suppress seditious 
 outbreaks than as constables. Murder, robbery, and 
 other serious crimes are of common occurrence, and are 
 regarded with indifference. 
 
 The influence of the Roman Catholic Church in 
 Venezuela is of a negative character. So far as the 
 educated men are concerned, the tendency towards free 
 thought in matters religious is strongly developed ; but 
 whether this attitude arises from the restraint imposed 
 by Church ritual on their methods of life, or is the 
 result of a careful consideration of religious belief, is not 
 clearly defined. With the women of the higher social 
 classes the Catholic doctrines are predominant, and the 
 rites and ceremonies of the church sincerely venerated ; 
 but it is with the lower grades of the community that 
 the Venezuelan clergy have most power. The ignorance 
 of the peasantry is so dense that superstition plays a 
 great part in their lives, and the priesthood can instill 
 into their minds an outward respect for religious forms 
 and dread of direful consequences to follow disobedience 
 to priestly injunctions. In one respect, however, the 
 clergy have failed to impress on the peasant classes a 
 standard of morality similar to that appertaining to most 
 other countries. In so far as the ceremony of marriage 
 is concerned, the lower grades of the community do not 
 conform to modern ideas, and more often than not the 
 man and woman living together and bringing up a family 
 of half a dozen children are not married. Frequently it 
 is the woman who objects to being legally bound, aver- 
 ring that she has a stronger position when simply 
 cohabiting with the man than if he could claim any 
 legal rights as a wife. Nor is any social degradation 
 attached to this form of concubinage, which probably 
 originated in the fact that the fees charged by the 
 priests for a marriage ceremony are unduly heavy, often 
 
638 VENEZUELA 
 
 prohibitive. Hence the "free love" habits, and no 
 arguments on the part of the clergy of to-day have been 
 successful in changing the practice of past generations. 
 An example of the attitude of the peasants towards 
 marriage is related by a French priest in one of the 
 country districts. A woman brought her child to him 
 to be baptised, and was asked the name of the father. 
 "No se, Senor Padre," was the reply, in a tone per- 
 fectly unconscious of any uncommon occurrence. The 
 priesthood in Venezuela is recruited from men of low 
 intellectual ability, and no endeavour is made by its 
 members to formulate a means by which the people's 
 morals may in this respect be improved. The clergy 
 are content to find their limited authority respected, 
 and show small desire for any expansion of the narrow- 
 minded train of reasoning that now controls their 
 action. 
 
 There is a tale concerning the present Archbishop 
 of Caracas which endears him to the Venezuelans. One 
 day his carriage mules jibbed when ascending a steep 
 hill, and the language of the driver became more forcible 
 as his efforts to make the animals move proved unavail- 
 ing. The Archbishop put his head out of the window 
 and called, " No tanto liomhre, no tanto " in reproof, and 
 alighted to try his powers of persuasion. He had driven 
 mules in his youth, and warmed to his work with a will, 
 forgetting his episcopal dignity until reminded of his 
 position by a voice behind him remarking, "No tanto 
 liombre, no tanto." Thereafter that exjjression came into 
 general use whenever bad language overstepped con- 
 ventional limits. 
 
 The national character has hardly reached a stage of 
 development to permit an accurate diagnosis. Among 
 the upper social grades Spanish traits are toned down 
 by local surroundings, but are always present. The 
 white Venezuelans are impulsive in all political affairs, 
 and impatient of control, the insubordinate spirit showing 
 as plainly now as in former days in Spain when it led 
 to pronunciamientos on the part of influential men at 
 
1904] VENEZUELAN CHARACTER 639 
 
 variance with the authorities. These features are to-day 
 characteristic of the educated classes, and account in large 
 measure for the political turmoil in which the country 
 is so often involved. The uneducated masses have a 
 greater proportion of Indian than Spanish blood ; they 
 preserve the national traits of their Indian forefathers, 
 and although the level of their intelligence is low, yet 
 they are crafty and cunning in their dealings to an extent 
 not suspected at first by the casual observer. Simple in 
 their habits of life, these people care little for modern 
 civilisation, nor have they at present any ambition to better 
 their social condition ; content with a hand-to-mouth 
 existence, they rarely make any provision for the future. 
 They are clay awaiting the hand of the potter to mould 
 them into shape, and years must elapse before their 
 animal and half savage existence is sufficiently expanded 
 to allow of mental development. 
 
 Industries and occupations in Venezuela may be 
 divided into three groups : — The cultivation of coffee, 
 cacao and sugar-cane ; the raising of cattle ; and gold 
 mining. The principal wealth is derived from coffee, the 
 exportation in recent years averaging 50,000 tons annually, 
 worth, approximately, £2,000,000. There are now 33,000 
 coffee plantations in the country, and the cultivated area is 
 200,000 acres. As a rule, the bushes are protected from 
 the sun by shade trees planted when the estate is first 
 opened. It is seldom that any great care is shown in 
 the methods of cultivation. Two or three times each 
 year the grass and weeds are cleared away, and after 
 the crop is gathered the bushes are pruned, nature then 
 doing all else that is needed to bring abundant crops 
 for the ensuing season, and it says much for soil and 
 climate that with this minimum of labour the plantations 
 in most districts have yielded heavily. In a few instances 
 coffee plantations are owned by foreigners, but the 
 industry is controlled by Venezuelans. 
 
 The cacao plantations are conducted on similar 
 lines, and there are 5000 estates devoted to the pro- 
 duction of this article, the amount shipped abroad in 
 
040 VENEZUELA 
 
 1897 being 4000 tons, chiefly from La Guayra, and 
 worth £200,000. In addition to the crude cacao ex- 
 ported, a certain quantity annually finds its way into 
 foreign markets in the form of manufactured chocolate, 
 that from Caracas being especially esteemed for its 
 purity and flavour. 
 
 For the cultivation of sugar-cane the conditions in 
 Venezuela are not particularly favourable, but there are 
 1100 estates devoted to it, although as a rule the 
 output has been limited, and in some cases not more 
 than a few tons of sugar were manufactured. Often 
 the machinery employed is of most primitive descrip- 
 tion, and wooden rollers for crushing the cane turned 
 by horses or mules are frequently seen in operation. 
 The inducement to cultivate cane and manufacture 
 sugar has been the prohibitive duty imposed upon 
 foreign sugars, this charge amounting to one franc the 
 kilo, but recently this high tariff has been modified, 
 and the industry may be expected to diminish rapidly, 
 if not to disappear altogether in the course of a few 
 years. 
 
 To the growth of cereals little attention is paid. A 
 small amount of maize is produced for home use, but 
 the cultivation of wheat is rarely attempted, flour being 
 imported to supply the needs of the population. Yams, 
 beans, and other vegetables are grown to meet local 
 demand, but agricultural farming is everywhere neglected, 
 in spite of the favourable conditions prevailing in various 
 districts. 
 
 The principal centre of pastoral industry is in the 
 llanos, the great plains stretching away to the river 
 Orinoco. No accurate information as to the number of 
 horned cattle in Venezuela is available, the calculation 
 made in 1888 of 8,476,300 head being obviously at fault, 
 and a revised estimate in 1896 of from 4,000,000 to 
 5,000,000 being hardly more definite. This section 
 where cattle breeding establishments are situated is 
 difficult of access, and details in regard to the industry 
 are scanty. The herds consist of long-horned, small- 
 
1904] 
 
 MINERAL RESOURCES 
 
 641 
 
 bodied animals, descended from the cattle introduced 
 by the Spaniards when this country was first colonised, 
 and at present there is no market to which they can 
 be shipped, so that they are only of value for their 
 hides. Other branches of pastoral industry are the 
 breeding of goats and sheep, the total number being 
 estimated at 6,000,000. Of horses and mules Venezuela 
 contains 600,000; of donkeys, 850,000; and of swine, 
 2,000,000. In 1898 the total amount of hides and 
 skins shipped abroad was 3440 tons. 
 
 The mining industry is chiefly confined to the 
 neighbourhood of the Cuyuni River and the Yuruari 
 Territory, the once famous Callao mine, from which 
 fabulous profits were obtained, being in this latter locality. 
 The quantity of gold exported from these districts between 
 1884 and 1897 was :— 
 
 
 Ounces. 
 
 
 Ounces. 
 
 1884 
 
 233,935 
 
 1891 
 
 49,050 
 
 1885 
 
 172,037 
 
 1892 
 
 46,560 
 
 1886 
 
 217,135 
 
 1893 
 
 47,950 
 
 1887 
 
 95,352 
 
 1894 
 
 52,925 
 
 1888 
 
 71,594 
 
 1895 
 
 47,588 
 
 1889 
 
 88,834 
 
 1896 
 
 60,674 
 
 1890 
 
 85,931 
 
 1897 
 
 43,500 
 
 The falling-off in the amount of gold is due to the 
 rich placer mining having become exhausted, and the 
 difficulty of transport for heavy machinery to work the 
 quartz reefs near the Callao property. Projects have 
 been made during the past decade to build a railway 
 into this district, but none of the suggestions put forward 
 have materialised. Gold is also found in other districts, 
 but no important undertakings have been attempted. 
 On the right bank of the river Orinoco is an immense 
 deposit of hematite ore, from which trail shipments have 
 been made to Philadelphia with encouraging results, but 
 
 2s 
 
642 VENEZUELA 
 
 the property has been the subject of lengthy litigation and 
 development has been retarded. Silver mines exist in 
 the States of Bermudez, Lara, and Los Andes. Other 
 minerals, such as asphalt, sulphur, lead, copper, and tin 
 are also found. Coal is mined, but is of poor quality 
 and seldom used. The salt deposits, a Government 
 monopoly, constitute a valuable resource, and the income 
 derived from them in 1894 reached 1,727,490 francs. 
 Under more settled conditions there is little doubt that 
 mining enterprise is capable of rapid development and 
 extension. 
 
 Of manufacturing industry there is none in Venezuela 
 except a few concerns for preparing chocolate, some 
 distilleries and breweries, and a few cigar and cigarette 
 factories. Practically all manufactured articles in use 
 are imported from abroad. There is no reason why this 
 should be the case, the rivers and streams providing 
 abundant water for motive power to drive machinery, 
 and raw material being available for the manufacture of 
 most goods in common use. 
 
 Additional facilities of transport are urgently needed 
 for the economic development of Venezuela. At present 
 only 529 miles of railway are open to the public service, 
 and these lines are built only to give access to the high- 
 lands from the sea coast, none existing for transit to the 
 central districts. Roads for wheeled traffic have been 
 constructed in some districts, but so little attention has 
 been paid to their maintenance that they are frequently 
 impassible, and resort is necessary to mules and donkeys 
 for the conveyance of merchandise, a method at once 
 costly, inconvenient, and tardy. In a matter which is 
 of vital importance to industrial progress, the authorities 
 maintain a most apathetic attitude. Under Blanco an 
 effort was made to encourage railway enterprise, but the 
 bad faith of subsequent Administrations in regard to the 
 obligations contracted with the various companies has 
 deterred the investment of fresh capital for extending 
 the railway system. Until, therefore, the present 
 impediments are mitigated or removed, it is impossible 
 
1904] PUBLIC DEBT 643 
 
 that the great natural resources can be thoroughly 
 recognised or adequately developed. No practical effort 
 is made to utilise the river Orinoco and its tributaries 
 for the development of the rich territories near this 
 magnificent waterway, although in the neighbourhood 
 are forests of valuable timber, large areas where india- 
 rubber exists, and districts where many medicinal barks 
 and herbs can be obtained. These riches remain 
 untouched for lack of transport. 
 
 The financial situation of Venezuela is unsatisfactory, 
 although the public indebtedness is not inordinately 
 large. This is due more to the circumstance that the 
 credit of the country has not been sound enough to 
 allow large borrowings, rather than to any unwillingness 
 of successive Administrations to contract loans. The 
 foreign debt originated in the share of the old Colombian 
 debt assumed by Venezuela when the two States separ- 
 ated, and in 1834 the amount allotted to Venezuela was 
 £1,888,396, and there is £906,400 for arrears of interest. 
 In 1881 bonds for the conversion of this debt were 
 issued for £2,750,000, the amount in circulation in 1897 
 being £2,638,400, and since then the service has been 
 in default. In 1896 a further external obligation was 
 contracted to settle claims made by the railway com- 
 panies for a sum of 50,000,000 bols., representing 
 £1,949,742, but no interest on this loan has been paid 
 since July, 1898. The internal bonds in circulation 
 amount to 79,783,511 francs, and, in addition, there 
 is a floating debt of 30,000,000 francs. The total of 
 the public obligations outstanding at the present time 
 may be placed at £10,000,000, including arrears of 
 interest. 
 
 The financial difficulties have arisen through an 
 excess of expenditure over revenue, a product of revolu- 
 tionary outbreaks, and a lax administration of the 
 exchequer. For the year 1899-1900 the revenue and 
 expenditure were estimated to balance, but a heavy 
 deficit occurred in consequence of further insurrectionary 
 troubles. The estimates for that year are a fair inclica- 
 
644 
 
 VENEZUELA 
 
 tion of the normal resources and expenses. They 
 were : — 
 
 Revenue. 
 
 Bolivars. 
 
 Expenditure. 
 
 Bolivars. 
 
 Customs Duties . 
 Stamps 
 
 Internal Taxes . 
 Transit Dues 
 Salt Taxes . 
 
 „ (additional) 
 Mining and Lands 
 
 Total 
 
 26,000,000 
 2,669,680 
 2,593,300 
 4,722,500 
 900,000 
 1,960,000 
 32,000 
 
 Public Services . 
 Internal Debt 
 External Debt 
 
 „ (loan of 1S90) 
 
 Foreign Claims 
 Public Works 
 State Subventions 
 
 Total 
 
 19,893,456 
 4,967,000 
 2,155,203 
 3,000,000 
 887,321 
 2,340,000 
 5,654,500 
 
 38,877,480 
 
 38,877,480 
 
 The transit dues consist of the additional duties on 
 imported merchandise levied by the National Govern- 
 ment in place of the interstate charges formerly made by 
 the several States, and nominally are returned to the 
 different States, or expended for their benefit in the 
 construction of public works. Customs duties form the 
 principal source of revenue, the duties on imported goods 
 being 40 per cent, of the invoice value. There is little 
 possibility in the near future of any substantial expansion 
 of the national income, the poverty of the population 
 being so pronounced that any large increase of internal 
 taxation is impossible. 
 
 Commercially the country has been embarrassed 
 during the last few years by the low price for coffee. It 
 is the practice of merchants to make advances against 
 the coffee crop and recoup themselves from the proceeds 
 of the sales, and the drop of 50 per cent, in value in the 
 course of four or five years restricted all transactions of 
 this kind. This, combined with the effect of internal 
 political disturbances, hurt all trade. Although the 
 Venezuelans are numerically in the majority, Germans, 
 British, French, Italians, Dutch and Spaniards, are all 
 interested in the general business of the country. During 
 
 ' 
 
1904] COMMERCE 645 
 
 the past seven years the value of imported merchandise 
 has averaged 100,000,000 francs, exports being worth 
 slightly more. In 1898 Venezuela purchased British 
 goods for £468,822, and sold to England produce worth 
 £45,599, and during the same year the imports from the 
 United States were $2,704,908, while Venezuelan articles, 
 chiefly coffee, to the value of $7,722,564 were sent to 
 New York. These figures show that the United States 
 purchases 40 per cent, of the total exports of Venezuela, 
 and sells to her only 12 per cent, of her imports. Great 
 Britain, on the other hand, in 1898 sold to Venezuela 
 12 per cent, of her total imported merchandise and 
 bought 1J per cent, of her surplus produce, and this 
 proportion was approximately maintained in the four 
 years from 1895 to 1898. The balance of Venezuelan 
 trade goes to Germany, France, Holland, Italy and 
 Spain. For imported merchandise the position of 
 Germany in comparison with other countries is steadily 
 improving, German manufacturers taking more pains to 
 study the wants and peculiarities of the Venezuelan 
 trade, and the system on which German trading is 
 conducted being more convenient for the buyer on 
 account of longer credits and other concessions accorded. 
 The country is rich in resources, and has a soil and 
 climate unrivalled for many valuable products for which 
 the world has need. Mineral wealth exists and virgin 
 forests remain untouched. The geographical position 
 also offers many advantages, the journey from New York 
 to Caracas taking only five days now, and capable of 
 being greatly expedited if any inducement arose. It 
 is unlikely that Venezuela can remain many years longer 
 an unknown land, only occasionally coming before the 
 eyes of the world in connection with some such incident 
 as the controversy between the United States and Great 
 Britain in 1895, or when exceptionally bloodthirsty 
 revolutionary outbreaks occur. As yet there are no 
 indications of the dawning of peaceful times, and at the 
 opening of the twentieth century insurgents were every- 
 where up in arms. It would seem that nothing short of 
 
646 VENEZUELA 
 
 iron despotism can give breathing space to the unfortu- 
 nate people, and there is no present sign of deliverance 
 either through a prolonged dictatorship or of the advent 
 among the ruling classes of a higher conception of 
 patriotic duty. 
 
 
CHAPTER XXXIV 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 The Republics and Internal Dissensions. Spanish and Portuguese 
 Influence on the Inhabitants. South America and Cuba. 
 Spanish Traits modified. More Peaceful Future Conditions. 
 Measures for Consolidation. Necessity of Closer Relations 
 between South American Republics. Free Interchange of 
 Commodities. Europe and South America. Reasons why 
 Progress watched. Outlet for Emigration from Latin Countries. 
 Wheat, Maize, Beef, Mutton and Coffee. Simon Bolivar and the 
 Spanish Colonies. The Ideals of Sucre and San Martin. The 
 Development of South America. United States Influence. The 
 Panama Canal. Chilian Influence on the Pacific Coast. The 
 United States and Chile. Bolivian Mineral Wealth and Foreign 
 Immigration. 
 
 A witty diplomatist in one of the South American 
 republics not long since remarked to a deputation of 
 merchants coming to him with claims against the Govern- 
 ment to which he was accredited, "Gentlemen, you 
 appear to think that this is a country equipped with a 
 Government with which I can deal. It is nothing of 
 the sort. It is a hunting ground." 
 
 Hitherto there has been only too much cause to 
 justify the sarcasm underlying this diplomatic jest. 
 Glancing back over the period which this history covers, 
 there is everywhere the sense of human sacrifice, the all- 
 pervading smell of bloodshed, no matter whether the 
 country under review is Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, or 
 Paraguay ; the first three are torn and bleeding from 
 internal dissensions, and Paraguay still mourns for her 
 
 647 
 
648 CONCLUSION 
 
 victims in the unequal struggle against an invading army 
 of vastly superior numbers and resources. Is it possible 
 to think that this section of South America has yet 
 emerged from a condition of affairs that in the course of 
 the last forty years outrivalled the worst epoch of the 
 Middle Ages in the Old World? From the troublous 
 times in Europe before and after the fifteenth and 
 sixteenth centuries, sprung nations hardened by the 
 lessons of adversity taught by experience in the severe 
 school of civil wars when men fought for a principle 
 rather than suffer unjust oppression. Spain with her 
 grasping policy of obtaining all possible tribute from her 
 colonies and her methods of bringing pressure to bear 
 on individuals under the doctrines of the Inquisition, 
 drove her subjects across the seas into a revolt that only 
 ended with freedom from the Spanish yoke. In that 
 struggle the South American colonists were deserving of 
 all sympathy. It was an uprising against the worst form 
 of tyranny. The unanimity of this feeling was irresistible, 
 victory a natural consequence, but Spain learnt nothing 
 from the disasters she suffered. The history of the 
 South American revolt was repeated in Cuba, under not 
 dissimilar circumstances, until the intervention of the 
 United States Government in 1898. The question 
 raised by investigation into affairs of these South 
 American republics is whether they have profited as 
 they should have done after their hard-fought battle for 
 their independence. The feeling against a continuance 
 of Spanish dominion had many sound reasons to justify 
 its existence ; but the colonists were Spaniards after 
 they gained their freedom, and Spanish character was 
 then, and is now, the prominent influence amongst the 
 inhabitants. The strain is inherited. It is to this fact 
 that revolution, civil war, political turmoil and other 
 calamities can be traced ; for this reason the river Plate 
 has made such tardy economic progress, in spite of 
 magnificent natural advantages. Yet there are signs 
 that the influence of Spanish character is slowly losing 
 its baneful grip over this continent. After a century of 
 
1904] CONCLUSION 649 
 
 unrest the truth is coming home by degrees to the 
 people that there is something more satisfactory than a 
 condition of affairs where the hand of every man is 
 against his neighbour. The old spirit is not yet 
 eliminated ; but it is nearing its end, and to Argentina 
 belongs the credit for having prepared its funeral dirge. 
 The lesson that freedom does not mean anarchy has 
 taken long to learn, but every year it is better under- 
 stood. 
 
 The new century opens with the dawn of peace in 
 this quarter of the globe. Possibly it may be the false 
 light seen in eastern countries before the real daylight is 
 at hand, but it is none the less a signal that darkness 
 cannot endure much longer. Seditious movements in 
 Argentina are out of fashion to-day. Small tendency is 
 shown towards a revival of practices that brought little 
 else than misery. In Uruguay evolutionary progress has 
 been slower than in Argentina. Political conditions are 
 such that the demon of armed strife is harder to kill in 
 consequence of the bitter feud between Colorados and 
 Blancos. Yet it is nearing its end, although the two 
 factions have again met on the field of battle. Even 
 Paraguay, with the disjointed elements which constitute 
 its Government, is drifting away from insurrectionary 
 methods, and slowly adopting the theory and practice of 
 conducting public affairs without recourse to the throat- 
 cutting policy of a few years ago. 
 
 If these republics would suppress their military 
 establishments and rid themselves of the armaments they 
 have collected, tranquillity would be ensured. They are 
 fond of posing as large nations while still in their 
 swaddling clothes. The possession of great stores of 
 war material is a temptation to try conclusions with their 
 neighbours. Even in this respect, however, improvement 
 is noticeable. There is less disposition nowadays to rush 
 into a quarrel, and the growing desire for internal and 
 external peace is a most hopeful sign. 
 
 What is necessary to consolidate peace is the adequate 
 administration of justice throughout these republics, 
 
650 CONCLUSION 
 
 protection for civil rights, and a more liberal system of 
 public education. No great ability, no extraordinary 
 effort, no costly expenditure of money, is necessary to 
 achieve these results. Honest administration, supported 
 by the goodwill of the inhabitants, is all that is required 
 to place these countries on a sound basis. The present 
 position of the River Plate Republics and Brazil is an 
 anomaly. Relations between Argentina, Uruguay, 
 Paraguay, and Brazil should be drawn closer. For these 
 countries to maintain impassible trade barriers in the 
 shape of tariff restrictions is folly. A zolherein estab- 
 lishing free interchange for all merchandise could only 
 prove beneficial. Buenos Aires in such circumstances 
 would become the acknowledged metropolis of this 
 section of the Continent. With extended intercourse, an 
 expansion of mental perspective would follow. This 
 would lead to the Governments taking joint action in 
 all matters of general interest in this part of the world. 
 
 It is often asserted that the European has small reason 
 to pay close attention to River Plate affairs, on account 
 of the isolated position of Brazil and Argentina. This 
 may have been true in the past, but is so no longer. 
 There are two substantial reasons for watching develop- 
 ments in these republics. The first is that the temperate 
 regions of South America provide an outlet for the 
 surplus population of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and France. 
 The Anglo-Saxon has a choice of British Colonies to 
 which to emigrate, and the Teuton there finds also con- 
 ditions to his taste. The United States provides a 
 further field for both these nationalities. In the case of 
 the people of Latin countries the situation is different. 
 In South America the surroundings are in accordance 
 with their traditional customs. For the Spaniard and 
 Portuguese there is the inducement of a like language, 
 while for the Italian the difference is easily overcome. 
 The River Plate Republics are so essentially Latin in 
 character that they form the natural resting place for the 
 people of European Latin countries, who may be forced 
 to leave their homes in consequence of increasing com- 
 
1904] CONCLUSION 651 
 
 petition in the struggle for existence. To these people 
 the River Plate or Brazil is a haven of refuge. Under 
 improved economic conditions it will become infinitely 
 more attractive for the inhabitants of over-crowded 
 European centres. 
 
 The second reason why Europe cannot afford to 
 neglect progress in the River Plate and Brazil is because 
 South America is rapidly taking rank as one of the 
 principal purveyors of food for European markets. 
 Wheat, maize, coffee, beef and mutton are received in 
 constantly increasing quantities from this quarter, and a 
 sudden cessation of supplies would entail serious conse- 
 quences to those countries which are accustomed to 
 depend upon shipments of cereals, coffee, and meat from 
 Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. It is not, however, 
 with the possibility of decrease, but with the probability 
 of a substantial increase, of the supply of food stuffs that 
 Europe is most concerned. Argentina and Uruguay at 
 present export to Europe 100,000,000 bushels of wheat 
 and 50,000,000 bushels of maize annually. This amount 
 will be trebled in the next decade, and that means cheap 
 bread stuffs for Europe. It has another bearing also 
 upon the European situation. So long as production in 
 cereal crops steadily augments in the River Plate, the 
 agricultural industry in Europe must be confronted with 
 prices leaving small margin of profit to the farmer. 
 
 In regard to the meat trade with Europe, the River 
 Plate has no cause to fear competition by the United 
 States or the British colonies. The United States will 
 soon have no surplus to send abroad, the rapidly increas- 
 ing home population annually requiring additional 
 supplies. The conditions of the River Plate trade are so 
 much more favourable than those for Australia or New 
 Zealand that the latter countries cannot compete success- 
 fully in beef, and only to a moderate extent in mutton. 
 When it is remembered that Argentina and Uruguay 
 possess more than 30,000,000 head of horned cattle and 
 130,000,000 sheep, it will be recognised they must be a 
 factor of special interest to Europe, the more so as there 
 
652 CONCLUSION 
 
 is ample room to double these numbers. Nor is the 
 River Plate unknown in smaller matters. The British 
 Government recently purchased in Argentina 35,000 
 horses and mules for military service in South Africa, 
 and relies on further supplies whenever necessity arises. 
 It is therefore evident that the progress of these countries 
 will be closely watched. 
 
 The prosperity of these River Plate Republics rests 
 entirely in the hands of their people. If they are 
 desirous of better administration they must look to 
 themselves to obtain it. They cannot regard corrupt 
 practices with apathy until stirred into action by some 
 political leader who sees in the conditions of the moment 
 an opportunity to further his own ambitious designs. 
 The people must look to the education of their children. 
 It is from the residents, whether natives or foreigners, 
 that a movement for reform in the judicial system must 
 come. They must cut themselves adrift from the 
 lethargy prevailing hitherto in regard to economic pro- 
 gress. They must break away from the idea that all 
 efforts for improvement should be initiated by the 
 authorities. The system of paternal government so 
 long in vogue has proved a failure. It is a relic of 
 Spanish and Portuguese Administration. The time has 
 come to discard it. The Press is free. The right of 
 public meeting is not denied. Through these two 
 agencies much good can be effected if the people are 
 determined to help themselves towards better things. 
 Plato says that the people of a country obtain the 
 government they deserve. That maxim should be driven 
 into the brains of the population of the River Plate 
 Republics and Brazil. 
 
 So much may be said for the present conditions 
 in the principal countries on the east coast of South 
 America ; on the west coast of the continent and in the 
 northern sections the developments of the last century 
 have brought about many characteristics of a different 
 complexion. 
 
 When Simon Bolivar, abandoned by his former 
 
1904] CONCLUSION 653 
 
 friends, was dying, he wrote his political testament, 
 reviewing the tragedy of his life in connection with the 
 struggle of the Spanish colonies for independence, and 
 their conduct after they became sovereign States. He 
 tells nothing of his bitterness of heart at the ingratitude 
 of a people who had conferred on him the title of 
 Liberator, and then accused him of seeking self- 
 aggrandisement ; but he comments on the deathblow to 
 his hopes of establishing a New Spain across the seas, 
 and the inability of his fellow-countrymen to appreciate 
 the sacred boon of liberty that his hand had won for 
 them. This historical document concludes sadly with 
 the words, " I have ploughed in the sea." 
 
 It is impossible not to sympathise with Bolivar in his 
 disappointment over the failure to realise his ideals in 
 connection with the great heritage of the Spanish 
 Colonists. If we turn to San Martin and Sucre we find 
 that they underwent experiences similar to those of 
 Bolivar, for the people they had served so faithfully 
 requited their patriotism with abuse and ingratitude. 
 Like Bolivar, they reached the conclusion that they had 
 laboured in vain for the happiness and welfare of their 
 compatriots and country. The idea of those three great 
 leaders was the establishment of a Confederation of 
 Spanish America, embracing the whole southern continent ; 
 they appreciated the vast natural resources of this section 
 of the world, and they saw that with unity of interests 
 amongst the different groups of colonists one great com- 
 munity would combine such elements of strength as to 
 be practically unassailable by outside influence. They 
 realised before they died that internal dissensions made 
 the fulfilment of their dream impossible, and they resigned 
 all hope that even at a later period a fusion of interests 
 might be effected. A feeling of despondency in the 
 present gave a gloomy colouring to future prospects, and 
 Bolivar, Sucre, and San Martin all expressed doubts of 
 the outcome of the change they had wrought when they 
 helped to wrest the colonies from Spain. From the 
 ashes of the shattered hopes formed when independence 
 
654 CONCLUSION 
 
 was first won, have now risen communities widely differ- 
 ing in national character and material interests. 
 
 That the development of South America can long 
 continue at the present tardy pace is not possible, for 
 all the elements for great commercial prosperity are 
 there, save one. Population only is lacking to create 
 the necessity for the exploitation of the vast natural 
 resources lying almost untouched at the present time, 
 and it cannot be many years before the overcrowded 
 centres of Europe must disgorge millions of their inhabi- 
 tants to these sparsely inhabited regions. When that 
 stage arrives the transformation will be rapid, and with 
 increased population life in South America will radically 
 alter. Where a livelihood is possible to-day with a 
 minimum of labour, competition will banish the indolent 
 habits which now check producing power at every turn. 
 With coal and iron, immense mineral deposits of all 
 kinds, extraordinary facilities for every branch of 
 agricultural and pastoral industry, and with easy access 
 to districts where all tropical products are found, there 
 is the practical certainty of substantial progress in the 
 future. It will be a natural development when it comes, 
 and it will crush the existing incapacity for public 
 administration which has throttled advancement in all 
 South American States. 
 
 For some years past it has seemed that the influence 
 of the United States might enter so far into South 
 American politics as to form the starting-point of a new 
 era for Latin America. Strong efforts have been made 
 by the North Americans to cement a warmer friendship 
 with the South American Republics by the promotion 
 of the Pan-American Congress in Washington in 1888 
 and a similar conference in Mexico in 1901. The 
 championship of the Venezuelan cause against Great 
 Britain in 1895 was another proof of the anxiety at 
 Washington to extend American influence in South 
 America, but unexpected incidents have counteracted 
 these endeavours to create closer ties between the two 
 continents. The misunderstanding with Chile in con- 
 
1904] CONCLUSION 655 
 
 nection with the " Baltimore " dispute in 1891 engendered 
 ill-feeling in that quarter, and is not yet forgotten, and 
 the recent action of Mr Roosevelt's Government in 
 regard to Panama has roused distrust all over South 
 America. There has been for many years a lack of 
 confidence on the part of Spanish-speaking Americans 
 in regard to the policy of the United States, and in view 
 of the Panama affair a long time must elapse before this 
 is removed. Under such conditions it is probable that 
 European rather than North American influence will 
 play the more important part in the immediate future 
 development of the States which have inherited the old 
 Spanish dominions. 
 
 Of course, the proximity of the United States to 
 Venezuela and Colombia must not be forgotten, nor the 
 fact that the construction of the Panama canal will bring 
 United States interests into closer touch with the 
 northern section of the southern continent. No matter 
 how great the hostility of Colombians and Venezuelans 
 may be, they cannot ignore the influence of their northern 
 neighbour, and it must be weighed carefully in any 
 consideration of future developments in these two 
 countries. United States capital is invested already in 
 a few undertakings in both Colombia and Venezuela, 
 and will extend in other directions, and any attempt to 
 obstruct legitimate business enterprise will involve a 
 conflict with Washington which can only result to their 
 detriment. With Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Para- 
 guay circumstances are different, for those countries are 
 in closer communication with Europe than with New 
 York, and a constant stream of European immigration 
 helps to foster commercial relationship and friendly 
 feeling. 
 
 It is not to be expected that the opening of the 
 Panama canal will exercise any very great influence on 
 the trade of South America in the immediate future. 
 For several years past the railway across the isthmus 
 has worked in harmony with the steamship lines having 
 business relations with Colon and Panama, and through 
 
656 CONCLUSION 
 
 freight rates have been established at prices which have 
 permitted cargo from the Pacific coast to be sent direct 
 from Peru and Ecuador to the United States and 
 Europe. No doubt the canal will lead to cheaper 
 transport, and this will encourage increased production 
 on the southern coast, but the reduction in cost will not 
 be sufficient at first to swell the volume of trade to any 
 great extent. As regards passenger traffic, the canal 
 will be a distinct gain, avoiding the tedious and expensive 
 transhipment now incidental to a journey to South 
 America via Panama, and it will make intercourse 
 between the Pacific coast and New York and Europe 
 more frequent, thus improving future economic condi- 
 tions ; but this influence can only extend gradually, and 
 will not show substantial results for another generation. 
 
 At present Chilian influence is dominant on the 
 Pacific Coast of South America. Since the war with 
 Peru and Bolivia, the political position of the Adminis- 
 tration in Santiago has been strengthened and extended 
 whenever opportunity offered, and it has now an important 
 bearing on the conditions existing from the isthmus of 
 Panama to the Straits of Magellan. In Bolivia, the 
 attempt of Argentina to oppose the Chilian policy has 
 not been successful, but it may enter into the situation 
 at a later date when communication between Buenos 
 Aires and Sucre becomes less difficult by the extension 
 of the Argentine railway system to join the lines now 
 projected by the Bolivian Government. The over- 
 powering military and naval strength of Chile has given 
 her a free hand to pursue any policy she has wished for 
 the past twenty years in regard to Peru, Ecuador, and 
 Bolivia, but no effort has been made to establish such 
 commercial relations with those countries as to bind 
 them to her by strong commercial ties. Indeed, rather 
 the reverse has been the case, and the arrogant attitude 
 of Santiago in recent dealings with her neighbours has 
 created deep-rooted hostility both in Bolivia and Peru. 
 
 The extension of United States influence to Panama 
 brings an important factor into play. It is questionable 
 
1904] CONCLUSION 657 
 
 whether distrust of United States intentions or dislike 
 of Chilian pretensions will be the stronger, but in any 
 case it may be taken for granted that one will be used 
 against the other when opportunity offers. It is not 
 unlikely that Chile may now bestir herself to establish 
 more friendly relations with Bolivia and Peru, for she 
 has much to lose and nothing to gain by allowing United 
 States influence to undermine her position on the 
 Pacific seaboard. She can consolidate her interests by 
 agreeing to generous terms for the settlement of the 
 Tacna and Arica question with Peru, and by certain 
 concessions to Bolivia. On the other hand, if she does 
 not adopt some such policy she must become more and 
 more isolated as time passes, and as the great natural 
 resources of Argentina develop, Chile's political import- 
 ance in South America will become dwarfed. 
 
 It is from Bolivia that a great and sudden economic 
 upheaval is likely to come and prove the beginning of a 
 new era of development in South America. The vast 
 mineral wealth of that country cannot fail to attract 
 immigration from all quarters when once the difficulty 
 of transport is solved, and the solution of the problem is 
 within reasonable distance now that the extension of the 
 Argentine railway system to the Bolivian frontier has 
 been arranged. The deposits of gold, silver, tin and 
 copper in Bolivia offer inducements unequalled in South 
 America for profitable mining enterprise, and their 
 existence is becoming known gradually to the outside 
 world. 
 
 THE END 
 
 2t 
 
mam 
 
INDEX 
 
 Abtao, Chilian Warship, 354, 442, 454 
 
 Aceval, Emilio, President of Paraguay, 
 191 
 
 Acha, Gen. , President of Bolivia, 3 1 
 
 Aconcagua, Chile, 324, 421 
 
 Aconcagua River, 370 
 
 Aconcagua, Chilian Warship, 354 
 
 Acre Territory, Dispute between Brazil 
 and Bolivia, settled 1903, 308, 561- 
 562 
 
 Acuerdo Party in Argentina, see under 
 Argentina 
 
 Adams, Mr, U.S. Minister in Bolivia, 
 480 
 
 African Negroes in South America, 10 
 
 Agriculture: in South America, 17; in 
 the River Plate Republics, 651-652 ; 
 in Argentina, 127 ; in Paraguay, 
 192 ; in Uruguay, 228-230 ; in Chile, 
 426-429; in Peru, 545; in Bolivia, 
 573 ; in Ecuador, 588 ; in Colombia, 
 611-613 ; in Venezuela, 640-641 
 
 Agua Santa, Peru, 461-462 
 
 Aguas Blancas, Chile, 423 
 
 Aguero, Jose de la Riva, President of 
 Peril, 29 
 
 Aguirre, Anastasio, President of Uru- 
 guay, 32, 131-135 
 
 Aguirre, Capt. Elias, Peruvian Naval 
 Commander, 456 
 
 Aguirre, J. J., of Chile, 387 
 
 Alagoa, Warship, 166 
 
 Alamos, Lieut.-Col. Gabriel, of Chile, 
 348 
 
 Alban, Gen., Governor of Panama, 600 
 
 Albano, Anicleto Vergara, of Chile, 501 
 
 Albarracain, Col., Peruvian Commander, 
 
 470 
 Albuquerque, Brazil, 136 
 Alcalde, Manuel, of Chile, 434 
 Alcerrica, Gen., of Chile, 371-380 
 Alcoholism: in Chile, 413-414; in 
 Colombia, 611 ; in Peru, 533 
 059 
 
 Alcorta, Senor, Argentine Minister of 
 
 Foreign Affairs, 119-120 
 Aldea, Serjeant, 452 
 Alegre, Gen. Porto, in the Paraguayan 
 
 War, 156-163 
 Alegrete, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, 
 
 255 
 Alem, Dr Leandro, 
 
 Candidate for the Presidency of 
 
 Argentina, 66, 67 
 Organiser of the Union Civica in 
 
 Argentina, 75, 79 
 Dr Alem and the Union Civica Radical 
 in Argentina, 93-96, 102-103 
 Alen, Col., 173 
 Alencar, Capt. Alexandrino de, of 
 
 Brazil, 278 
 Alfaro, Gen. Aloy, President of Ecuador, 
 
 582, 586 
 Alfonso XII. of Spain, 595 
 Alfonso Alberquerque, Portuguese War- 
 ship, 280 
 Almagro at Cuzco, 8 
 Almirante Blanco Encalada, Chilian 
 
 Warship, 328 ; in the Chilian Peru- 
 • vian War, 442-443, 449-458, 476, 
 
 488; in the Chilian Civil War, 
 
 1890-1, 346, 352, 355-357 ; destroyed, 
 
 1891, 357 
 Almirante Blanco Encalada, New 
 
 Chilian Warship, 399 
 Almirante Cochrane, Chilian Warship, 
 
 328 ; in the Chilian-Peruvian War, 
 
 442-460, 472; in the Chilian Civil 
 
 War, 1891, 346, 349, 354, 374 
 Almirante Tamandari, Brazilian Cruiser, 
 
 166, 263 
 Almonacid, Dr, of La Rioja, 49 
 Alonzo, Severo Fernandez, President 
 
 of Bolivia, 1896, 559-560 
 Altamirano, Eulogio, of Chile, 360, 362, 
 
 480-481 
 Alto del Puerto, Chile, 377-379 
 
660 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Alves, Dr Rodriguez, President of 
 
 Brazil, 1902, 308 
 Amambahy, Paraguayan Ship, 135 
 Araapa Dispute between Brazil and 
 
 French Guiana, 306 
 Amazonas, Brazil, 258 
 Amazonas, Brazilian Warship, 263 
 Amazonas, Chilian Transport, 349, 477 
 Ambato, Ecuador, 585 
 Amengual, Col, Chilian Commander, 
 
 470 
 America, Peruvian Corvette, 508 
 Amethyst, British Warship, 518 
 Amunategui, Miguel Luis, of Chile, 329, 
 
 339 
 Amunategui, Col., Chilian Commander, 
 
 470 
 Ancon, Peru, 478-479 
 Ancon, Treaty of, Oct. 20, 1883, 497- 
 500 ; ratified, May 8, 1884, 332, 403, 
 407, 500, 523, 529 
 Ancdn, German Cruiser, 286 
 Andes Mts., 567, 585 
 Andrade, Seiior, 
 
 President of Venezuela, 629-630 
 Other References, 623, 627 
 Angamos, Chilian Transport, 347, 357, 
 
 476, 483 
 Angostura, Paraguay, 173-180 
 Antelo, Dr, of Entre Rios, 49 
 Antioquia, Colombia, 594, 600, 613 
 Antofagasta, Chile : 
 
 Antofagasta in the Chilian Civil War, 
 
 1891, 355-356 
 Antofagasta in the Chilian-Peruvian 
 
 War, 439, 446-448, 454, 458 
 Antofagasta Province, 420, 565-566 
 Bolivian Province and Town, 437-438 
 The Port of Antofagasta, 422-423, 425, 
 517,571, 574 
 Antunez, Carlos, of Chile, 338, 339 
 Aparicio, Col. Timoteo, 
 
 Uruguayan Commander, 134 
 Leader of Blanco Revolution in Uru- 
 guay, 1870-72, 199-203, 206, 208 
 Aparicio, Gen., of Ecuador, 1876, 579 
 Apostolo, Brazilian Newspaper, 299 
 Apurimac, Peruvian Schoolship, 493 
 Aquidaban River, 185-1S6 
 Aquidaban, Brazilian Warship, in the 
 
 Revolt in Brazil, 1893-94, 260-286 
 Aquila, Chilian Transport, 363, 365 
 Araffitary, Brazilian Warship, 263 
 Arana, Barros, of Chile, 328 
 Araucanian Indians, 15, 412 
 Arauco, Chile, 421, 425 
 Arbolito, Uruguay, 218-219 
 Arce, Senor, President of Bolivia, 1884, 
 
 557 
 Arenas, Antonio, of Peru, 480-481, 523 
 
 Arequipa, Peru : 
 
 A Clerical Stronghold, 537, 541 
 Other References, 16, 354, 495-496, 
 
 508, 510, 511, 536, 539, 540 
 Argentine Republic : 
 Custom-house at Cordoba, 1602, 11 
 British Aggression, 19 
 Revolution at Buenos Aires, 1810, 21 
 Struggle for Independence, 23 
 Viceroy Baltasar de Cisneros deposed, 
 
 1810, 24 
 Puyredon, Dictator, 1816, 24, 32 
 Act of Independence of the United 
 
 Provinces of the Rio de la Plata 
 
 ratified, 1816, 24 
 Treaty between Argentina and Great 
 
 Britain, 1825, 24 
 President Rivadavia, 1825, 32 
 Federal or Unitarian Form of Govern- 
 ment, 32, 33, 42 
 Buenos Aires as the centre of Govern- 
 ment, 32 
 Vicente Lopez, President, 32 
 Centre of Government moved to Santa 
 
 Fe, 32 
 Conflict between Federalists and 
 
 Unitarians, 33 
 Defeat of Gen. Lavalle by Rosas, 
 
 1829, 33 
 Rosas, Governor and Captain-General 
 
 of Buenos Aires, 33-37 
 River Parana as a Waterway, 33 
 French Expedition, 1851, 34 
 Tyranny of Rosas, 34 
 Revolution under Gen. Urquiza and 
 
 Flight of Rosas, 1852, 36-37 
 The Portefios of Buenos Aires, 37 
 
 et seq. 
 Tension between Buenos Aires and the 
 
 Provinces, 38 
 Revolution in Buenos Aires against 
 
 Gen. Mitre, 1860, 38 
 Victory by Gen. Mitre at Pavon, 1861, 
 
 38, 40 
 Gen. Mitre, President, 1861, 38-40, 42 
 The National Capital, 38 
 Strained Relations between Argentina 
 
 and Uruguay, 1864, 131, 134 
 Aggressive Policy of Gen. Lopez of 
 
 Paraguay towards Argentina, 39. 
 The Paraguayan War — Argentina, 
 
 Uruguay, and Brazil against 
 
 Paraguay, 1865-1870, 39, 130-195, 
 
 210 
 Paraguayan Occupation of Cor- 
 rientes, Apr. 1865, 138-139, 141- 
 142. 
 The Alliance between Argentina, 
 Brazil, and Uruguay, against 
 Paraguay, May 1, 1865, 139, 210 
 
INDEX 
 
 661 
 
 Argentine Republic — continued 
 The Paraguayan War — continued 
 Recapture of Corrientes by the 
 
 Argentines, May 25, 1865, 142 
 Defection of Gen. Urquiza in Entre 
 
 Rios, 144 
 Evacuation of Corrientes by Para- 
 guayan Troops, 1865, 148 
 Corrientes the Base of Operations of 
 the Allied Troops, 1865, 151- 
 152 
 The Parana River, 151-154 
 The Argentine National Guard, 152 
 Engagements at Paso de la Patria, 
 
 etc., 1866, 152, 153 
 Engagement at Tuyuti, Nov. 1867, 
 
 164-165 
 Peace, July 1870, 186 
 Other References to the Paraguayan 
 War, see under Paraguay 
 Revolution in Mendoza, etc., 1867, 
 
 161 
 Cholera in Buenos Aires, 1868, 40 
 Ur Sarmiento, President, 1868, 40-41, 
 
 43, 123 
 Yellow Fever in Buenos Aires. 1871, 
 
 41 
 Political Status of Argentina in 1874, 
 
 42 
 Cordoba and the Presidential Election 
 
 of 1874, 43 
 Dr Nicolas Avellaneda, President, 43- 
 
 47,52 
 Corrientes and the Portenos, 44 
 The Tiro Nacional (Volunteers) of 
 
 Buenos Aires, 45-46 
 The Cordoba League, 46, 70 
 Buenos Aires and the Provinces, 47 
 Boundary Dispute with Chile, 1878-79, 
 
 330, 335 
 Gen. Roca and Dr Tejedor, Candidates 
 
 for the Presidency in 1880, 47 
 Carlos Pellegrini, Minister of War, 
 
 1880, 48, 54, 55 
 The Portenos and the Cordoba Pro- 
 gramme, 49 
 Military Preparations of Buenos Aires, 
 
 50 
 Conspiracy against Cordoba, 51-53 
 Rioting in Buenos Aires, 53 
 Commencement of Civil War, 53 
 Defence of Buenos Aires, 54 
 Col. Arias and the Volunteers, 55 
 Engagement at Olivera, 56 
 Assault on Buenos Aires, 56-59 
 Armistice and Peace Negotiations, 59 
 Terms of Surrender of Buenos Aires, 
 
 59. 
 Dr Jose M. Moreno, Governor of 
 Buenos Aires, 60 
 
 Argentine Republic — continued 
 
 Buenos Aires Federal Capital, 1880, 
 
 60, 62 
 Roca, President, 1880, 60-68, 71 
 Conciliation of Portenos, 62 
 Absolute Power of Roca, 62 
 Railway Extension, 63 
 Industrial Prosperity, 64 
 Foreign Loans, 1884, 64 
 Pellegrini Minister of War, 1885, 65 
 Revolutionary Outbreaks, 65 
 Discontent in Buenos Aires, 65 
 La Plata, Provincial Capital of Buenos 
 
 Aires, 65 
 New Docks at Ensenada, 65 
 Candidates for the Presidency, 1885, 
 
 66-68 
 Financial Policy of Roca, 67 
 Suspension of Specie Payments, 68 
 Dr Victorino de la Plaza, Finance 
 
 Minister, 68 
 Dr Miguel Juarez Celman, President, 
 
 . 1886, 69-86 
 Mode of electing a President, 69-70. 
 Roca and Celman, 71-72 
 Currency Conversion and Paper Issues, 
 
 72 
 Administrative Corruption, 72-73 
 Pellegrini as Vice-President, 73 
 Financial Necessities, 73-74 
 General Discontent, 74 
 The Union Civica, 75-86 
 The Mortgage Banks under Celman, 77 
 Foreign Residents and the National 
 
 Government, 78 
 Open Hostility to the Government, 79 
 General Revolt, July 1890, 80-85 
 The Navy and the Rebel Cause, 82 
 National Reinforcements, 83 
 Armistice and Peace Proposals, 83-84 
 Argentina, and the Bolivian Question 
 
 with Chile, 1888, 557-558. 
 Resignation of President Celman, 
 
 1890, 84-86 
 
 Pellegrini, President, 1890, 85-98 
 Gen. Roca, Minister of the Interior, 
 
 88, 97 
 Dr Vicente Lopez, Minister of Finance, 
 
 88 
 The Financial Situation in 1890, 88-91 
 Argentina and Baring Brothers, 90 
 Patriotic Loan, 92 
 Attempt to assassinate Roca in 1891, 
 
 92 
 Treaty with Bolivia, 1891, 558 
 Col. Camus of Chile in Argentina, 
 
 1891, 356 
 
 The Argentine Legation in Chile and 
 Ex-President Balmaceda of Chile, 
 1891, 385-387 
 
662 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Argentine Republic — continued 
 Pellegrini's Administration, 92 
 Gen. Bartolome Mitre and the Presi- 
 dency, 92 
 Agreement between Mitre and Roca, 
 
 93, 94 
 Dr Leandro Alem and the Union 
 
 Civica Radical, 93-96, 102-103 
 A New State Bank, 94 
 Dr Luis Saenz Pena, Acuerdo Candi- 
 date for the Presidency, 94 
 Dr Bernardo Irigoyen, Union Civica 
 Radical Candidate for the Presi- 
 dency, 95 
 Political Parties in 1892, 95 
 Dr Pena, President, 1892, 96-108 
 Dr Jose Uriburu, Vice-President, 96 
 Wreck of the Bosales, 98, 107 
 President Pena's Policy, 99-108 
 Cabinet of Dr Aristobulo del Valle, 
 
 100-101 
 Return of Dr Alem, 100, 103 
 Revolt in San Luis, 101- 
 Governor Julio Costa of Buenos Aires, 
 
 101-102, 105 
 Dr Lucio V. Lopez, Governor of 
 
 Buenos Aires, 102, 105-106 
 Revolution in Buenos Aires and Santa 
 
 Fe, 101-103 
 Political Conditions in 1893, 105 
 President Pena's Financial Policy, 105 
 The Executive and the Chambers, 106 
 Hostility to President Pena and Minis- 
 terial Crisis, 107 
 Resignation of President Pena, 1895, 
 
 107-108 
 Dr Uriburu, President, 1895, 108-113 
 The Chilian Boundary Dispute, 1895, 
 
 108-109 
 The Misiones Dispute with Brazil, 137, 
 
 245 ; settled, 1895, 109, 112, 116, 
 
 289 
 Chile and the Negotiations between 
 
 Bolivia and Argentina, 1893-96, 
 
 559 
 Congress and Railway Guarantees, 
 
 109-110 
 The Financial Position in 1897, 110 
 Gen. Roca, President, 1897, 110-120 
 Dr Quirno Costa, Vice-President, 111 
 The Chilian Boundary Dispute, 1898, 
 
 406-407 
 The Puno de Atacama Dispute with 
 
 Chile and Bolivia: in 1898, 111- 
 
 112; in 1899, 113-114 
 Conference between President Roca 
 
 and President Erraguriz of Chile, 
 
 1899, 114 
 Reform of the Federal Courts, 1899, 
 
 115, 125 
 
 Argentine Republic — continued 
 
 Dr B. Irigoyen, Governor of Buenos 
 
 Aires, 1898-99, 116-117 
 Unrest in La Rioja and Catamarca, 117 
 The Currency Question, 118 
 Public Works, 118 
 Sefior Alcorta, Minister of Foreign 
 
 Affairs, 119-120 
 Visit of President Roca to Brazil, 1899, 
 
 116, 307 
 Commercial Treaty between Argentina 
 
 and Brazil, 307 
 Visit of President Salles of Brazil to 
 
 Buenos Aires, 1900, 118-119 
 Argentina and the Bolivian Question 
 with Chile: in 1888,557-558; in 
 1891, 558; in 1893-96, 559 
 The Puno de Atacama Dispute be- 
 tween Argentina, Chile, and 
 Bolivia: in 1898, 111-112; in 
 1899, 113-114; in 1900, 407 
 Argentine Boundary Disputes with 
 Chile : in 1878-79, 330, 335 ; in 1895, 
 108-109 ; in 1898, 406-407 ; in 
 1901-2, 119-120 
 Treaty between Argentina and Chile, 
 
 June 1902, 120 
 Increase of the Navy, 1895-1901, 402 
 Candidates for the Presidency, 1904, 
 
 120 
 Argentina To-day, 049-652 
 Population, 64, 121-12J 
 Education, 41, 123-1^5 
 Administration of Justice, 125 
 Religion, 125-126 
 National Character, 126 
 Railways, 63, 109-110 
 Finance and Industries, 64, 67-68, 72- 
 74, 77, 88-92, 94, 105, 110, 118, 
 122, 127 
 The Welsh Settlement on the Chubut, 
 
 114-115 
 Patagonia, 9, 15, 114-115, 118, 430 
 Tierra del Fuego, 420, 421, 425, 430 
 Argollo, Gen. , in the Paraguayan War, 
 
 166, 168, 175-177, 187 
 Argollo, Gen., of Brazil, 285 
 Arguedas, Col., of Peril, 521 
 Arias, Col., of Corrientes : 
 His Campaign in Buenos Aires, 54-59 
 Other Reference, 45 
 Arica : 
 Chilian Invasion and Capture of Arica 
 
 from Peru, 1880, 468-473, 481 
 Bolivia and Perii and the Chilian 
 Occupation of Arica, 403-404, 407, 
 473, 498, 502, 529, 556 
 Other References, 354, 420, 450, 575 
 Armacao, near Nictheroy, Brazil, 263, 
 274, 275-277 
 
INDEX 
 
 663 
 
 Arrate, Col., of Chile, 354 
 
 Arredondo, Avelino, Assassin, 220-221, 
 
 226 
 Arredondo, Gen. Jose Miguel, in 
 
 Uruguay, 211 
 Arrieta, J., of Uruguay, 387 
 Arrue, Col. Julio, in Uruguay, 207 
 Arteaga, Col. Luis, Chilian Commander, 
 
 465-467 
 Arteaga Alemparte Brothers, 334 
 Artigas, Gen., Dictator of Uruguay, 24 
 Asiatics in Peru, 532-534, 546 
 Astecs of Mexico and South America, 
 
 7,8 
 Astrogildo, Gen. , of Brazil, 255 
 Asumpcao, Col. , in the Paraguayan War, 
 
 143 
 Asuncion, Paraguay, 135, 162, 166 
 Atacama District : 
 
 The Guano Deposits and the Nitrate 
 Industry and the Disputes between 
 Bolivia and Chile, Peruvian In- 
 trigues in Bolivia, and the Chilian 
 War with Peru and Bolivia, 1879- 
 84, 433-504, 517, 555-556 
 Other References, 324, 356, 420, 421 
 Atahualpa, 7, 584, 587 
 Atahualpa, Peruvian Monitor, 443, 476 ; 
 
 destroyed, 1881, 493 
 Athas, Major, of Chile, 369 
 Australians in Paraguay, 194 
 Avellaneda, Dr Nicolas, 
 
 President of Argentina, 43-47, 52, 63 
 His Attitude to the Tiro Nacional, 45- 
 47 
 Ayacucho, Peru, 23, 495 
 Ayahueca Indians, 16 
 Aymara Indians and Aymara Language, 
 16, 534, 538, 567-569 
 
 Bage, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, 216, 
 
 255 
 Bahia, Brazil: 
 Early History, 12-13 
 Bahia and the Jaguncos, 297-303 
 Bahia, Warship, 166 
 Baker, Inspector, and the Uruan Incident 
 
 in British Guiana, 1895, 622-628 
 Ballivian, Gen., President of Bolivia, 31 
 Balmaceda, Jose Manuel, 
 Biographical, 333 
 
 His Political Ideals, and His Participa- 
 tion in Chilian Politics, 1851-86, 
 334-337 
 President of Chile, 1886, 332-385 
 His Administration, 338-340 
 Conflict between the President and 
 Congress and Revolution in Chile, 
 1891, 341-382 
 His Dictatorial Attitude, 347 
 
 Balmaceda — continued 
 Attempted Assassination of President 
 
 Balmaceda, 362, 364, 367 
 Abdication of President Balmaceda, 
 
 1891, 380-382 
 Suicide of Balmaceda, 1891, 385-387, 
 
 389 
 His Political Testament, 387-388 
 Balta, Col. Jose, 
 
 President of Peru, 1862, 30 
 Leader of Revolt in Peru, 1867, 511 
 President of Peril, 1868, 511-513 
 Assassination of Balta, 1872, 513-514 
 Baltimore, U.S. Cruiser in Chilian 
 Waters, 1891-92, 380, 391-396, 400, 
 655 
 Banados, Senor, of Chile, 380 
 Baptista, Mariano, 
 President of Bolivia, 1892, 559 
 Other References, 480-481, 558 
 Baquedano, Gen. Manuel, 
 Chilian Commander in the Chilian- 
 Peruvian War, 468-473, 482, 485, 
 486, 488, 493 
 Acting President in Chile, 380-384 
 Other Reference, 365 
 Barbosa, Col. Orozimbo, Chilian Com- 
 mander, 469, 470, 482, 485 
 Barbosa, Gen. Ruy, 303, 348, 371-380 
 Barbot, Conspirator in Uruguay, 199 
 Barcelo, Col., Chilian Commander, 470 
 Barcelo, Jose, of Chile, 387 
 Barcelona, Venezuela, 635 
 Baredo, President, of Paraguay, 189 
 Baring Brothers and Argentina, 90 
 Barnes, Sub-Inspector, and the Uruan 
 Incident in British Guiana, 1895, 
 622-628 
 Barquisimeto, Venezuela, 635 
 Barracouta, British Ship, at Trinidade, 
 
 Brazil, 292 
 Barreto, Gen. Menna, Brazilian Com- 
 mander, 132-133, 164, 179, 183, 184, 
 187 
 Barrios, Gen. , Paraguayan Commander, 
 
 135, 142, 148, 164 
 Barros, Dr Prudente de Moraes, see 
 
 Moraes (Dr) 
 Basques in Argentina, 121 
 Batlle, Gen. Lorenzo, President of 
 
 Uruguay, 1868, 199-203 
 Batlle, Jose, y Ordonez, President of 
 
 Uruguay, 223 
 Bedoya, Jose Diaz, 181 
 Belgrano, Gen., Revolutionary Leader 
 
 in Argentina and Paraguay, 24 
 Bello Horizonte, Brazil, 314 
 Belzu, Gen., President of Bolivia, 31 
 Benham, Adm., in Brazilian Waters, 
 276-277 
 
664 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Berenguela, Spanish Warship, 509 
 Berges, Senor, of Paraguay, 166, 173 
 Bermudez, Col . Morales, President of 
 
 Peru, 1890,524-525 
 Bermudez, Venezuela, 642 
 Berro, President of Uruguay, 31 
 Berro, Dr, of Uruguay, 221 
 Berro, Bernardo P., Conspirator in 
 
 Uruguay, 198-199 
 Bettancourt, Gen. de, in the Paraguayan 
 
 War, 172 
 Billinghurst, Latorre Protocol, Apr. 1898, 
 
 407 
 Bittencourt, Gen., Minister of War in 
 
 Brazil, 300, 303 
 Bio-Bio, Chile, 421 
 Bio-Bio, Chilian Transport, 368-369 
 Blanca, Spanish Warships, 509 
 Blanco, Guzman, President of Venezuela, 
 
 28, 618-621, 633, 635 
 Blanco, Dr Juan Carlos, of Uruguay, 
 
 212 
 Blanco Encalada, see Alniirante Blanco 
 
 Encalada 
 Blancos of Uruguay, 131, 144, 147, 151, 
 
 165, 197-207, 216-224, 649 
 Blanes, J. M. , Artist, 41 
 " Blues " of Venezuela, 618 
 Blumenau, Santa Catharina, Brazil, 236 
 Bocayuva, Minister, of Brazil, 245 
 Boeto, Belisario, of Bolivia, 501 
 Bogota, Colombia, 21, 597 
 Bolivar, Simon : 
 Liberator, 652-653 
 
 Leader of Rebellion in Venezuela, 21 
 Dictator of Venezuela, 21 
 President of Colombia, 22, 27 
 Emancipator of Ecuador, 22 
 His Part in the Emancipation of Peru, 
 
 23 
 His Failure to federate South American 
 Republics, 27 
 Bolivia : 
 
 Insurrection in 1809, 21 
 Emancipation from Spain, 1825, 23 
 Gen. Sucre, President, 1826, 23, 30 
 Gen. Santa Cruz, President, 1827, 30 
 Gen. Velasco, President, 1839, 30 
 Gen. Ballivian, President, 1841, 31 
 Gen. Velasco, re-elected President, 31 
 Gen. Belzu, President, 31 
 Gen. Cordoba, President, 1855, 31 
 Dr Linares, President, 1858, 31 
 Gen. Acha, President, 1861, 31 
 Boundary Dispute between Bolivia and 
 
 Brazil, about 1864, 136 
 Gen. Belzii re-elected President, 1865, 
 
 31 
 Col. Melgarejo, President till 1869, 31, 
 137 
 
 Bolivia — continued 
 
 Bolivia and the Paraguayan War, 
 
 1865, 136 
 Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile, and Peru, and 
 the War with Spain, 1865-66, 
 326 
 The Guano Deposits and the Nitrate 
 Industry of Atacama and the Dis- 
 putes between Bolivia and Chile, 
 Peruvian Intrigues in Bolivia, the 
 Chilian Warwith Peru and Bolivia, 
 1879-84, and the Chilian Occu- 
 pation of Atacama, Tacna, Arica, 
 etc., 433-504 
 Chile and Bolivia and the Atacama 
 
 Guano District, 433-436 
 Bolivian Claims, 1843-64, 434-435 
 Treaty between Bolivia and Chile, 
 
 1866, 435-436 
 Bad Faith of Bolivia, 1871, 436 
 Secret Compact between Peru and 
 
 Bolivia, 1873, 436, 441, 517 
 Treaty between Bolivia and Chile, 
 
 1874, 436-437, 440 
 Peruvian Intrigues, 437-438, 555 
 Export Duty on Nitrate of Soda, 
 
 1878, 438 
 Chilian Ultimatum, Jan. 3, 1879, 
 
 438 
 Occupation of Antofagasta, etc. , by 
 Chilians, Feb. 1879, 439, 446- 
 447, 519 
 Bolivian Declaration of War against 
 Chile, Mar. 1, 1879, 439, 440, 
 441 
 Peruvian Proposal of Arbitration, 
 
 439-440 
 The Bolivian Army, 445 
 Calama captured by Chilians, Mar. 
 
 23, 1879, 447-448 
 Battle of Tacna, May 26, 1879, 468- 
 
 471 
 Battle of Arica, June 7, 1879, 472- 
 
 473 
 Bolivia and the Chilian Demands, 
 
 1880, 480-481 
 Truce (Pacto de Tregua) between 
 Chile and Bolivia, Apr. 4, 1884, 
 332, 500-503 ; ratified, Nov. 29, 
 1884, 503-504, 557 
 Bolivia and Peru, and the Chilian 
 Occupation of Tacna and Arica, 
 403-404, 407, 468-473, 481, 498, 
 502, 529, 556 
 Peruvian Intrigues and Bolivian 
 Export Duties in Atacama, 
 436-439 
 The Chilian Occupation of Atacama 
 and the Nitrate Industry lost to 
 Bolivia, 437, 517, 555-556 
 
INDEX 
 
 665 
 
 Bolivia — continued 
 The Guano Deposits, etc. — continued 
 Bolivia, Chile, and Peril, and the 
 Chilian Occupation of Tarapaca, 
 421-422, 516 
 Argentina and the Bolivian Question 
 with Chile : in 1888, 557-558 ; in 
 1891, 558 ; in 1893-96, 559 
 Dispute with Chile as to Seaport, 
 
 1900, 562 
 Other References to the Chilian- 
 Peruvian War, etc., see under 
 Chile, Peru 
 Political Conditions before 1879, 555 
 Conservatives and Liberals, 555 
 Hilarion Daza, President, 438, 459-460, 
 
 462, 555 
 President Daza deposed, 1879, 556 
 Temporary Administration, 556 
 Gen. Narcisco Campero, President, 
 
 1880, 556-557 
 Law of Constitution, Oct. 28, 1880, 
 
 556-557 
 Negotiations with Chile, 1884, 557 
 Senor Pacheco, President, 1884, 557 
 Senor Arce, President, 1888, 557 
 Argentina and the Bolivian Question 
 
 with Chile, 1888, 557-558 
 Treaty between Bolivia and Argentina, 
 
 1891, 558 
 Indian Outbreak, 1891, 558 
 Col. Camus of Chile in Bolivia, Mar. 
 
 1891, 356 
 Bolivia and the Revolution in Chile, 
 
 May 1891, 363 
 Senor Baptista, President, 1892, 559 
 Argentina and the Bolivian Question 
 
 with Chile, 1893-1896, 559 
 Severo Fernandez Alonzo, President, 
 
 1896, 559-560 
 Insurrection of the Liberal Party under 
 
 Col. Pando, 1898-99, 560-561 
 Provisional Government under Col. 
 
 Pando, 1899, 560 
 Col. Pando, Chief Magistrate, 561 
 The Puno de Atacama Dispute between 
 
 Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile : in 
 
 1898,111-112; in 1899, 113-114; in 
 
 1900, 407 
 Dispute with Chile as to Seaport, 1900, 
 
 562 
 The Acre Territory Dispute between 
 
 Brazil and Bolivia settled, 1903, 
 
 308, 561-562 
 The Constitution, 556-557 
 National Capital, 562-563 
 Political Situation, 563-564 
 Cities of Bolivia, 566 
 Topographical Features, 567 
 Population, 564-566 
 
 Bolivia — continued 
 Stories of Indian Atrocities, 564-565 
 Indian Traits, 568-569, 571 
 Language, 567 
 Education, 569-570 
 Administration of Justice, 570 
 National Character, 570-571 
 Railways and Transport, 571-572 
 Agriculture and Industries, 573-575 
 Mineral Wealth, 574-575, 657 
 Financial Situation, 575-576 
 Future Prospects, 576 
 Bolivia To-day, 656-657 
 Bolognesi, Col. Francisco, Peruvian 
 
 Commander, 471 
 Bonaparte, Joseph, and the Spanish 
 
 Crown, 19, 20 
 Borax : in Chile, 424-425 ; in Peru, 550 
 Borax Consolidated (Syndicate), 550 
 Borda, Juan Idiarte, 
 
 President of Uruguay, 215-221 
 Assassination of Borda, 220-221, 226 
 Borgado, Priest, 173 
 Borgono, Col., Vice-President of Peru, 
 
 1890, 525-526 
 Borrero, President, of Ecuador, 578-579 
 Bover, Gen., in Venezuela, 21 
 Boyaca, Colombia, 595 
 Brazil : 
 Early History, 12-15 
 A Spanish Colony, 12 
 Portugese Action, 12 
 Bahia, &c, under Spanish Rule, 12 
 Holland in possession of Bahia, &c. , 1 3 
 Portuguese Authority re-established, 
 
 1649, 13 
 French Attacks on Rio de Janeiro, 
 
 1710 and 1711, 13 
 Joao VI. of Portugal and the 
 Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and 
 Alagarres, 1808-15, 14-15 
 Pedro I., 1822, 14 
 Independence recognised, 1825, 14 
 Boundary Dispute between Bolivia 
 
 and Brazil, 1864, 136 
 The Paraguayan War, 1865-1870, 130- 
 195: 
 Strained Relations between Uru- 
 guay and Brazil and the 
 Mission of Conselheiro Saraiva 
 to Uruguay, 131-132 
 Adm. Tamandare and the Uru- 
 guayan Warship Villa del Salto 
 on the River Uruguay, 132 
 Brazil and the Revolt in Uruguay 
 
 under Gen. Flores, 132 
 Paraguayan Declaration of War 
 
 against Brazil, 1864, 135 
 Invasion of Matto Grosso by Para- 
 guayans, 1864, 135-137, 148 
 
666 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Brazil — continued 
 The Paraguayan War — continued 
 Capture of Paysandii by Brazilians, 
 
 Jan. 2, 1865, 133 
 Alliance between Argentina, Brazil, 
 and Uruguay against Paraguay, 
 May 1, 1865, 139 
 Naval Battle on the Riachuelo River 
 and defeat of Paraguayans, 
 June 11, 1865, 143 
 Invasion of Rio Grande by Para- 
 guayans, 144 
 Paraguayan Occupation of Uru- 
 guayana, Sept. 18, 1865, 146- 
 147 
 The Lopez Administration in Matto 
 
 Grosso, 148 
 Decision of Brazil and Allied Forces 
 
 to invade Paraguay, 151 
 Disaster to the Rio de Janeiro, Aug. 
 
 1866, 157-158 
 Brazilian Victory at Curuzii, Aug. 
 
 1866, 157-158 
 The Situation in Matto Grosso, 162 
 Other References to the War in 
 Paraguay, see under Para- 
 guay. 
 Brazil after the Paraguayan War, 
 
 231-232 
 Pedro II., Emperor, 1840-89, 14-15, 
 
 232-244 
 Princess Isabel and the Conde d'Eu, 
 
 234-240 
 Positivism and Republican Principles, 
 
 235 
 Sao Paulo and the Republican Move- 
 ment, 235-239, 243, 244, 246, 251, 
 254 
 Revolt in Rio Grande do Sul, 1878, 
 
 235-236 
 Development of Brazil, 236 
 Pedro's Visits to Europe, 232, 236 
 Princess Isabel, Regent, 236-240 
 Emancipation of Slaves, 237-238 
 Sao Paulo and the Slavery Question, 
 
 237-240 
 Sedition, 239-240 
 Return of Pedro, 1888, 240 
 Vizconde de Ouro Preto's Administra- 
 tion, 241 
 Military Conspiracy under Gen. 
 Deodoro da Fonseca and Gen. 
 Floriano Peixoto, 242-243 
 Deposition of Pedro and Republican 
 Form of Government established, 
 1889, 243-244 
 Separation of Church and State, 1890, 
 
 245 
 Law of New Constitution passed 
 1891, 245-249 
 
 Brazil — continued 
 Gen. Deodoro da Fonseca, President, 
 
 1891, 246-256 
 Gen. Floriano Peixoto, Vice-President, 
 
 246-256 
 The United States of Brazil, 246 
 Praetorian Administration, 244, 251 
 Manifestoes condemning Federal 
 
 Authorities and accusing Presi- 
 dent da Fonseca, 251 
 The Chambers dissolved, and Martial 
 
 Law established, Nov. 3, 1891, 
 
 252-254 
 Rising in Rio Grande do Sul against 
 
 the Government, 255-256 
 Naval Revolt in Rio de Janeiro, 255- 
 
 256 
 Resignation of President da Fonseca, 
 
 1891, 256 
 Gen. Floriano Peixoto, President, 
 
 1891, 256-288 
 Abrogation of the Decree of Nov. 3, 
 
 257 
 Article 42 of the Constitution, 257, 
 
 258 
 Deposition of the Governors of Matto 
 
 Grosso, Amazonas, and Ceara, 
 
 258 
 Military Despotism, 258 
 Dr Julho de Castilhos in Rio Grande 
 
 do Sul, 259 
 Resignation of Adm. C. de Mello and 
 
 Dr S. Correa, 259 
 Revolt in Rio Grande do Sul under 
 
 Gumercindo Saraiva, 259 
 Adm. Wandenkolk, Leader of Insur- 
 rection, 259 
 Naval Revolt under Adm. C. de 
 
 Mello, 1893, 260-266 
 Adm. Mello's Manifesto, 260 
 Martial Law, 262 
 Warships of the Insurgents, 263 
 Bombardment of Rio de Janeiro, 264 
 Expedition to the South, 264 
 Provisional Government at Desterro 
 
 with Capt. Lorena as President, 
 
 1893, 265-286 
 Fort Villegaignon in revolt, 265 
 Explosion at Gouvernador, 266 
 Adm. de Mello at Desterro, 265, 266 
 Adm. S. da Gama in Command of 
 
 Rebel Forces, 265, 266-283 
 Civil War, Dec. 1893, 267 
 The Government Flotilla, 268 
 Firing against the Rebel Squadron, 
 
 269, 279 
 Fighting at Gouvernador and Mo- 
 
 cangue, 269 
 The Insurgents as Belligerents, 271 
 Adm. de Mello at Desterro, 1894, 271 
 
INDEX 
 
 667 
 
 Brazil — continued 
 
 Gumercindo Saraiva in the North, 271 
 
 Adm. de Mello's Expedition with the 
 
 Republica and seizure of Para- 
 
 nagua, 273 
 
 Occupation of Curityba and Lapa by 
 
 Rebels, 273 
 Peixoto's Plan of Campaign, 274 
 Attempt of Rebels to capture the 
 
 Armacao, 275-276 
 U.S. Adm. Staunton and Adm. de 
 
 Mello, 276 
 U.S. Adm. Benham and the Revolt, 
 
 277 
 Situation of Rebels, 277-278 
 Adm. de Mello and the Republica and 
 
 the Aquidaban, 278-280 
 Loss of the Venus, 279 
 Rebel Council of War, 279-280 
 Adm. da Gama and Insurgents con- 
 veyed by Portuguese Warships 
 to Neutral Territory, 2S0-281 
 Diplomatic Relations between Portugal 
 
 and Brazil broken off, 281 
 End of the Revolt in Rio de Janeiro, 
 
 280-281, 283-284 
 Incident of the Sirius, 281 
 Adm. de Mello at Curityba, 283 
 Council of War of Insurgent Leaders, 
 
 283 
 Dr Prudente de Moraes Barros, 
 
 President, 1894, 283-304, 306 
 Rebel Attack on Rio Grande do Sul, 
 
 284-286 
 Insurgent Troops landed in Uruguay 
 and Rebel Ships delivered to 
 Argentine Authorities, 285-286 
 Naval Expedition against Desterro, 
 
 286 
 Capt. Lorena and Insurgents shot, 
 
 286-287 
 French Victims and Indemnity to 
 
 France, 287 
 Death of Gumercindo Saraiva, 287 
 Revolution crushed, 288 
 Amnesty to Rebels, 1895, 289 
 Outbreak at Military School, 290 
 Diplomatic Relations resumed with 
 
 Portugal, 290 
 Revolt in Rio Grande do Sul against 
 Governor Castilhos led by Aparicio 
 Saraiva and Adm. da Gama, 290- 
 293 
 Peace in Rio Grande do Sul, 292-293 
 England and Trinidade, 292 
 Claims of Italian Residents, 293 
 Financial Legislation, 293 
 Temporary Retirement of President 
 Moraes and Dr Victorino Pereira, 
 Acting-President, 1896, 294 
 
 Brazil — continued 
 
 Return of President Moraes, 1897, 296 
 Antonio Maciel or Antonio Conselheiro 
 
 and the Jagunco Settlement at 
 
 Canudos, 296 
 Expedition under Col. Moreira against 
 
 Canudos, 1897, 298 
 Repulse of Col. Moreira, 298 
 Riots in Rio de Janeiro, 299 
 Second Expedition under Gen. Oscar 
 
 against Canudos, 299-302 
 Jacobino Riot in Rio de Janeiro, 302 
 Murder of Gen. Bittencourt, Minister 
 
 of War, 303 
 Conspiracy against President Moraes, 
 
 303-304 
 Dr Manuel Campos Salles, President, 
 
 1898, 304-308 
 Dr Rosa E. Silva, Vice-President, 304 
 Critical Financial Situation, 305 
 Condition of Brazil, 1894 and 1898, 
 
 306 
 Brazil and the Chilian Revolution, 
 
 1891, 361-362 
 Boundary Dispute between Bolivia 
 
 and Uruguay, 1894, 191 
 The Misiones Dispute with Argentina, 
 
 137, 245, settled in favour of 
 
 Brazil, 1895, 109, 112, 116, 289 
 The Amapa Question with French 
 
 Guiana, 1899, 307 
 Visit of President Roca of Argentina 
 
 to Brazil, 1899, 116, 307 
 Commercial Treaty between Argen- 
 tina and Brazil, 307 
 Visit of President Salles to Buenos 
 
 Aires in 1900, 118-119 
 Fiscal Legislation, 307 
 Bubonic Plague, 308 
 Dr Rodriguez Alves, President, 1902, 
 
 308 
 The Acre Territory Dispute between 
 
 Brazil and Bolivia settled, 1903, 
 
 308, 561-562 
 
 Economic Conditions, 305-307, 308- 
 
 309, 651 
 Population, 309-310 
 
 German Settlements, 235-236, 310 
 
 Portuguese in Brazil, 311 
 
 National Character of Brazilians, 311 
 
 Education, 312-313 
 
 Administration of Justice, 313 
 
 Bello Horizonte, 314 
 
 Railways and Transport, 236, 315- 
 317 
 
 Telegraph Service, 316 
 Brazil, Dr Assis, of Brazil, 255 
 Brown, Adm., U.S. Commander, 391- 
 
 392 
 Bubonic Plague in Brazil, 308 
 
668 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Buchanan, Minister, and the Chilian 
 Boundary Dispute in 1899, 113 
 
 Buendia, Gen. Juan, Peruvian Com- 
 mander in the Chilian-Peruvian War, 
 459-467, 486, 489 
 
 Buenos Aires, see under Argentina 
 
 Bulnes, Gen., President of Chile, 30, 
 323 
 
 Bulwer-Clayton Treaty, 1850, 601 
 
 Bustamante, Jose Candido, Candidate 
 for the Presidency in Uruguay, 
 199 
 
 Bustamante, Senor, of Salazar, of Peru, 
 527 
 
 Bustos in Argentina, 32 
 
 Caacupi, Paraguay, 184 
 
 Caamafio, Dr Placido, President of 
 
 Ecuador, 1884, 580 
 Caballero, Gen. , President of Paraguay, 
 
 189 
 Cabral, Pedro, and Brazil, 12 
 Cabrita, Lieut.-Col., Brazilian Com- 
 mander, 153 
 Cacao-Growing : in Peru, 547 ; in 
 Ecuador, 588 ; in Venezuela, 639- 
 640 
 Cacapava, Brazil, 255 
 Caceres, Col. Andres Avelino, 
 
 Peruvian Commander, 459, 465, 484, 
 
 486, 487, 495-497 
 Leader of Revolt against President 
 
 Iglesias, 1884-85, 523-524 
 President of Peru, 1886, 524-525 
 President of Peru, 1894, 526-527, 531, 
 
 538 
 Other Reference, 522-523 
 Gachapoal, Chilian Warship, 349 
 Caciques of Bolivia, 565 
 Calama, Atacama District, 355, 356, 446- 
 
 448 
 Caldera, Chile, 356-357, 366, 454 
 Calderon, Dr Francisco Garcia, President 
 
 of Peru, 494-495 
 Caleta Buena, Chile, 422 
 Callao, Fortress in Chile, 374 
 Callao, Peru : 
 
 Spanish Bombardment, May 1866, 
 
 509-510, 517, 520 
 The Gutierrez Conspiracy, 1872, 513- 
 
 514 
 Revolt under Pierola, 1878, 518 
 Blockade by Chilians, 1880-81, 475-479, 
 
 483, 493 
 Other References, 23, 443, 515, 539, 
 540 
 Camacho, Col. Eleodoro, Bolivian Com- 
 mander, 468, 470-471 
 Camalotes or Floating Islands, 167-168 
 Caminos, Senor, of Paraguay, 186 
 
 Campero, Gen. Narcisco, 
 
 Bolivian Commander, 468, 470-471, 475 
 President of Bolivia, 1880, 556-557 
 Campo Grande, Paraguay, 185 
 Campo Osorio, Rio Grande do Sul, 291 
 Campos, Col. Julio, in Buenos Aires, 45, 
 
 50, 54, 58 
 Camus, Col. Hermogenes, of Chile, 355- 
 
 356, 373 
 Cana Indians, 16 
 Canabe River, 174, 175, 177 
 Candamo, Manuel, 
 
 President of Peru, 1903, 5'^9 
 Other Reference, 527 
 Candelaria, 137 
 Canelones, Uruguay, 203 
 Cannevaro, Gen., 141, 147 
 Canning, George, referred to, 24, 26 
 Canseco, Gen., 
 
 Leader of Revolts in Peru, 506, 508, 
 
 510-511 
 Provisional President of Peru, 511 
 Canseco, Lieut. Diaz, Peruvian Naval 
 
 Commander, 1879, 454 
 Canterac, Gen., in Peru, 23 
 Canto, Gen. Estanislao, of Chile, 358, 
 
 368, 370-379 
 Cantuaria, Gen. , of Brazil, 299 
 Canudos, Brazil, and the Jaguncos, 296- 
 
 302 
 Carabaya, Peru, 549-550 
 Caraballo, Gen. Francisco, 
 Commander in the Paraguayan War, 
 
 177 
 Leader of Revolt in Uruguay, 199 
 Commander of Troops against Blanco 
 Revolution in Uruguay, 200-201 
 Carabobo, Venezuela, 22, 629 
 Caracas, Venezuela, 20, 619, 620, 624, 
 
 633, 635 
 Caracoles, Atacama District, Chile, 447 
 Carbajal, Capt. Manuel, Peruvian Naval 
 
 Commander, 456 
 Carelmapii, Chile, 334 
 Carillo, Juan, of Bolivia, 480 
 Carlos IV. of Spain, 19 
 Carlos V, 536 
 Caro, Miguel, President of Colombia, 
 
 1894, 599 
 Carreros, Senor, 173 
 Carrillo, Capt. Camilo, of Peru, 495 
 Carrillo, Major Lucas, in the Paraguayan 
 
 War, 180 
 Carrizal, Chile, 454 
 Cartagena, Colombia, 22, 597 
 Casal, Dr Barros, of Brazil, 255 
 Casas, Padre, quoted, 6 
 Castelli in Argentina, 24 
 Castilhos, Capt., Portuguese Naval Com- 
 mander, 280-281 
 
INDEX 
 
 669 
 
 Castilhos, Julho de, Governor of Rio 
 
 Grande do Sul, 255, 259, 290-291 
 Castilla, Gen. , 
 Leader of Revolt in Peru, 1866, 510 
 President of Peru, 29, 30, 506 
 Castillo, Col. Romualdo, assassinated, 
 
 205 
 Castro, President, of Venezuela, 1899 
 
 and 1902, 630-631 
 Castro, Gen. Enrique, in Uruguay, 203, 
 
 211 
 Castro, Col. Gentil de, of Brazil, 299 
 Catamarca, Argentina, 117 
 Catholic Church : 
 
 The Inquisition, 4, 540 
 Catholicism in South America, 7, 9 ; 
 in Argentina, 125-126 ; in Uruguay, 
 227 ; in Brazil, 236, 245 ; in Chile, 
 417 ; in Peru, 537 ; in Bolivia, 
 571 ; in Ecuador, 587 ; in Colom- 
 bia, 609-610 ; in Venezuela, 637- 
 638 
 Question of Separation of Church and 
 State in Chile, 1884, 336, 337 
 Cattle-Farming, etc. : in Argentina, 
 128; in Uruguay, 228; in Chile, 
 430 ; in Peru, 547-548 ; in Columbia, 
 612-613 ; in Venezuela, 640-641 ; in 
 the River Plate Republics, 651-652 
 Cauca, Colombia, 594, 600, 613 
 Cauta, Peru, 489 
 Cautin, Chile, 424 
 Cavalcanti, E. de B. de Lacerda, of 
 
 Brazil, 362, 387 
 Caxias, Marshal, of Brazil, in the Para- 
 guayan War, 160-188 
 Cayambi, Ecuador, 585 
 Caypam, Brazil, 302 
 Ceara, Brazil, 258 
 Celman, Dr Marcos Juarez, 49, 83 
 Celman, Dr Miguel Juarez, 
 
 Candidate for the Presidency of Argen- 
 tina, 66 
 President of Argentina, 69-86 
 Roca and Celman, 71-72 
 Celman's Mai-Administration, 72-86 
 The Union Civica and Revolt against 
 
 Celman, 75-86 
 Other References, 49, 52 
 Celosa, Chile, 355 
 Celso, Affonso, of Brazil, 299 
 Cemeteries freed in Chile, 332, 336 
 Cerda, Seiior, y Ossa, of Santiago, 
 
 Chile, 385 
 Cerro Colorado, Uruguay, 219 
 Cerro Largo, Uruguay, 203 
 Cerro Leon, Paraguay, 135-141 
 Cerro de Pasco, Peru, 548-549, 550, 552 
 Cerros Blancos, Uruguay, 219 
 Chacabuco, Chile, 25 
 
 Chacabuco, Chilian Corvette, 327, 442 
 Chalaca, Peruvian Transport, 493 
 Chaharal, Chile, 364, 454 
 Chanca Indians, 16 
 Chancay, Peru, 478-479 
 Chanchamayo, Peni, 547 
 Charleston, U.S. Cruiser, 277, 360 
 Charras, Col., 55 
 Chiclayo, Peru, 479 
 Chile : 
 
 Revolution, 1809, 21 
 The Separatist Movement, 1810, 25 
 Spanish Rule re-established, 1813, 25 
 Royalists defeated at Chacabuco, 1817, 
 
 25 
 Government under Gen. O'Higgins, 
 
 1818, 25, 30 
 Royalist Victory at Concha Rayada, 
 
 1818, 25 
 Defeat of Royalists at Maypii, Apr. 5, 
 
 1818, 25 
 Independence secured, 1818, 25 
 Gen. Freire, President, 1823, 30 
 Federal v. Unitarian Form of Govern- 
 ment, 30 
 Gen. Pinto, President, 1827, 30 
 Gen. Lastera, President, 1829, 30 
 Gen. Pinto again President, Dec. 1829, 
 
 30 
 Gen. Prieto, President, 1831, 30, 321- 
 
 323 
 Gen. Prieto again President, 1835, 30, 
 
 323 
 Gen. Bulnes, President, 1841, 30, 323 
 Independence of Chile recognised by 
 
 Spain, 30 
 Manuel Montt, President, 1851, 30, 
 
 323-324 
 The Law of Constitution, 321-322 
 The Presidential Term, 322, 327 
 Administration, 1833-61, 323-324 
 Jose Joaquin Perez, President, 1861, 
 
 324-327 
 Fire at the Compania Church, Santiago, 
 
 1863, 325 
 Chile and the Paraguayan War, 1865, 
 
 137, 151 
 War with Spain of Chile and Peru, 
 1865-66, 326-327, 508-510 
 Spanish Bombardment of Valpa- 
 raiso, Mar. 31, 1866, 326, 509 
 Capture of the Coradonga from 
 
 Spain, Jan. 1866, 326, 509 
 Truce with Spain, 1867, 327; and 
 
 Treaty with Spain, 1879, 327 
 Other references to the War, see 
 under Peril 
 Foundation of the Chilian Navy, 327 
 Re-election of President Perez, 1866, 
 327-328 
 
670 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Chile — continued 
 
 Federico Errazuriz, President, 1871, 
 
 328-329 
 New Warships, 328 
 Public Works, 329 
 Candidates for the Presidency, 1876, 
 
 329 
 Anibal Pinto, President, 1876, 329- 
 
 331 
 Economic Crisis, 330 
 Boundary Dispute with Argentina, 
 
 1878-79, 330, 335 
 Treaty with Spain, 1879, 327 
 The Guano Deposits and the Nitrate In- 
 dustry of Atacaraa and the Dis- 
 putes between Bolivia and Chile, 
 Peruvian Intrigues in Bolivia, the 
 Chilian War with Peru and Bolivia, 
 1879-84, and the Chilian Occupa- 
 tion of Atacama, Tarapaca, Tacna 
 and Arica, 433-504 
 Atacama and Its Guano, 433 
 Chilian Vice-Royalty, 434 
 The Chilian Exportation Law, 1842, 
 
 434 
 Bolivian Claim, 1843, 434, 435 
 Revision of Chilian Titles, 1845, 
 
 434 
 Bolivian Demands, 1847, 434 
 Bolivian Demands, 1858, 434 
 Further Discussion,1859-61, 434-435 
 War threatened between Bolivia and 
 
 Chile, 1863-64, 435 
 Treaty between Bolivia and Chile, 
 
 1866, 435-436 
 Bad Faith of Bolivia, 1871, 436 
 Secret Compact between Perii and 
 
 Bolivia, 1873, 436, 441, 517 
 Treaty between Bolivia and Chile, 
 
 1874, 436-437, 440 
 Peruvian Intrigues in Bolivia, 437- 
 
 438 
 Bolivian Export Duty on Nitrate of 
 
 Soda, 1878, 438 
 Chilian Ultimatum to Bolivia, Jan. 
 
 3, 1879, 438-439 
 Occupation of Antofagasta, etc. , by 
 Chilians, Feb. 1879, 439, 446- 
 447, 519 
 Bolivian Declaration of War against 
 Chile, Mar. 1, 1879, 439, 440, 
 441 
 Peruvian Proposal for Arbitration, 
 
 439-440 
 Chilian Declaration of War against 
 Perii, Apr. 5, 1879, 440-441, 520 
 The Chilian Fleet, 442-444 
 Military Forces, 444-446 
 Capture of Calama, Mar. 23, 447- 
 448 
 
 Chile — continued 
 
 The Guano Deposits, etc. — continued 
 Occupation of Tocopilla and Cobija, 
 
 448 
 Blockade of Iquique, 448 
 Bombardment of Pisagua, 449 
 Naval Action off Iquique, May 20 ; 
 and Loss of the Esmeralda, 450- 
 453 
 Peruvian Reprisals, 453-454 
 Capture of the Huascar, Peruvian 
 
 Warship, Oct. 8, 454, 457 
 Capture of the Pilcomayo from Peru- 
 vians, Nov. 17, 457 
 Invasion of Tarapaca, Oct., 458-460 
 Battle of Pisagua, Nov. 2, 460-461 
 Occupation of Junin, 461 
 Skirmish near Agua Santa, Nov. 6, 
 
 461-462 
 Battle at San Francisco, Dolores, 
 
 Nov. 16, 462-464 
 Occupation of Iquique, Nov. 20, 464 
 Battle of Tarapaca, Nov. 27, 465- 
 
 467 
 Invasion of Tacna and Arica, Feb. 
 
 1880, 468-470 
 Battle of Tacna, May 26, 470-471 
 Battle of Arica, June 7, 472-473 
 Blockade of Callao, 1880, 475-479, 
 
 483 
 Loss of the Janequeo, May 25, 477 
 Loss of the Loa, July 3, 478 
 Loss of the Covadonga, 478-479 
 Bombardment of Chorillos, etc., 
 
 479-480 
 Efforts of the United States for 
 
 Peace, Oct. 1880, and Confer- 
 ence on the Lackaioana, 480- 
 
 481 
 Chilian Demands rejected, 481 
 Preparations for Advance to Lima, 
 
 481-485 
 Occupation of Pisco and Yea. Nov. 
 
 1880, 482 
 Naval Action at Callao, Dec. 6, 483 
 Battle of Chorillos, Jan. 13, 1881, 
 
 485-487 
 Fighting on Moro Solar, Jan. 13, 
 
 487 
 Armistice, Jan. 15, 488 
 Battle of Miraflores, Jan. 15, 488- 
 
 489, 522 
 Occupation of Lima, Jan. 16, 489- 
 
 500 
 Vandalism of Chilians in Lima, 490- 
 
 493 
 Adm. Patricio Lynch, Commander 
 
 in Peru, 493-497 
 Capture of Arequipa, Aug. 1883, 
 
 496 
 
INDEX 
 
 671 
 
 Chile — continued 
 
 The Guano Deposits, etc. — continued 
 Treaty of Peace (Treaty of Ancon) 
 between Chile and Peru, Oct. 
 20, 1883, 497-500 ; ratified, May 
 8, 1884, 332, 403, 407, 500, 523, 
 529 
 Evacuation of Lima, Oct. 22, 1883, 
 
 500 
 Truce (Pacto de Tregua), Apr. 4, 
 1884, between Chile and Bolivia, 
 500-503 ; ratified, Nov. 29, 1884, 
 332, 503-504 
 Bolivia and Peru and the Chilian 
 Occupation of Tacna and Arica, 
 403-404, 407, 468-473, 481, 498, 
 502, 529, 556 
 Chilian Occupation of Atacama, 437, 
 
 517, 555-556 
 Chilian Occupation of Tarapaca, 414, 
 420-423, 437, 480, 498, 516-517, 
 520 
 Argentina and the Bolivian Question 
 with Chile : in 1888, 557-558 ; in 
 1891, 558 ; in 1893-96, 559 
 Bolivian Dispute with Chile as to 
 
 Seaport, 1900, 562 
 Other References to the War, see 
 under Bolivia, Peru 
 Domingo Santa Maria, President, 1881, 
 
 331-333, 335, 336 
 Congressional Elections, 1882, 1885, 
 
 332-333, 336 
 Jose Manuel Balmaceda in Chilian 
 
 Politics, 1851-86, 333-337 
 The Reform Party and La Libertad, 
 
 334 
 Programme of the Reform Party, 1875, 
 
 334, 336 
 Civil Registry, 332, 336 
 The Civil Marriage Law, 332, 336 
 The Freeing of Cemeteries, 332, 336 
 Question of Separation of Church and 
 
 State, 1884, 336, 337 
 Jose Manuel Balmaceda, President, 
 
 1886, 332-382, 387-389 
 The Cabinet, Oct. 1886, 338 
 The Cabinet, Nov. 1886, 338 
 The Cabinet, June 1887-Apr. 1888, 339 
 Congressional Elections, Mar. 1888, 
 
 339 
 Ten Cabinets, Apr. 1888-Oct. 1890, 340 
 Argentina and the Bolivian Question 
 
 with Chile, 1888, 557-558 
 Conflict between President and Con- 
 gress, 1889-90, 341-344 
 The Comision Conservadora, 1890, 342- 
 
 344, 398 
 Treaty between Bolivia and Argentina, 
 1891, 558 
 
 Chile — continued 
 
 Pretext for Revolt, Jan. 1891, 343 
 Preparations for Rebellion, 345 
 Naval Revolt, 345 
 Occupation of Coquimbo and Serena, 
 
 347 
 Fighting at Pisagua, 347 
 Attitude of the President, 347 
 Serena and Coquimbo reoccupied by 
 
 Government Troops, 348 
 The Act of Deposition published in the 
 
 Heraldo, Jan. 7, 349 
 Surrender of Pisagua to Congres- 
 
 sionalists, Feb. 6, 349-350 
 Fight near Dolores and Defeat of Gen. 
 
 Robles, Feb. 15, 350-351 
 Congressionalist Defeat at Huara, Feb. 
 
 16, 351 
 Occupation of Iquique, Feb. 16, 351- 
 
 352 
 Attempt to recapture Iquique and 
 
 Intervention of Adm. Hotham, 
 
 Feb. 19, 352 
 Gen. Robles defeated at Pozo Almonte, 
 
 Mar. 7, 353-354 
 Arica, Tacna, and Tarapaca in posses- 
 sion of Revolutionists, 354 
 Occupation of Antofagasta, Mar. 20, 
 
 355 
 Occupation of Calama, Mar. 29, 356 
 Occupation of Caldera, Apr. 22, 356 
 The Blanco Encalada torpedoed, Apr. 
 
 23, 357 
 Treatment of Suspected Persons, 358 
 Financial Difficulties, 358 
 Provisional Government on Junta de 
 
 Gobierno under Capt. Jorge Montt, 
 
 358 
 The ltata Incident, June, 359-360, 391 
 Peace Conference at Santiago, May 
 
 5, 360-362 
 Attempted Assassination of the Presi- 
 dent, 362 
 The Condell and the Lynch and the 
 
 Case of Richard dimming, 363- 
 
 364 
 Sympathy with Revolution abroad, 
 
 364-365 
 The Congressionalist Army, 365-366 
 The President's Attitude to the Revolu- 
 tionists, 366-368 
 Massacre of Lo Canas, Aug. 19, 367 
 Landing of Congressionalists at Quin- 
 
 teros, Aug. 18, 368-370 
 Strength of the Revolutionary Army 
 
 and of the Balmacedists, 370 
 Battle of Concon, Aug. 21, 371-373 
 Advance on Vina del Mar, 373-374 
 Concentration of Congressionalist 
 
 Troops at Quilpue, 375 
 
672 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Chile — continued 
 
 Battle of Placilla, Aug. 28, 376-380 
 Occupation of Valparaiso, Aug. 28, 
 
 379 
 Resignation of President Balmaceda, 
 
 Aug. 29, 380-382 
 Gen. Baquedano, Acting President, 
 
 Aug. 29, 1891, 380 
 The Junta de Gobierno at Santiago, 
 
 382, 383, 389 
 Resignation of Gen. Baquedano, Aug. 
 
 31, 1891, 383-384 
 Proclamation of Adm. Jorje Montt, 
 
 Sept. 1891, 384 
 Work of Reconstruction, 384-385 
 Suicide of Balmaceda, 385-387 
 Political Testament of Balmaceda, 387- 
 
 389 
 New Congress, Nov. 1891, and Resig- 
 nation of the Junta de Gobierno, 
 
 389 
 The Tesoreria General de la Escuadra 
 
 abolished, 389 
 Cost of the Revolution, 389-390 
 Adm. Montt, President, 1891, 390- 
 
 405 
 Promotion for Services, 390-391 
 Law of Amnesty, 391 
 Strained Relations between Chile and 
 
 the United States, 1891-2, 391-396 
 The Baltimore Incident, 380, 392-396, 
 
 400, 655 
 Message of President Harrison to the 
 
 U.S. Congress, Dec. 9, 1891, 393 
 Telegram from Santiago to Chilian 
 
 Representative in Washington, 
 
 Dec. 11, 1891, 394-395 
 United States Ultimatum to Chile, 
 
 Jan. 22, 1892, 395 
 Apology to U.S. Government, 395- 
 
 396 
 Real Issues of the Civil War, 397 
 Political Situation in 1892, 398 
 Increase of the Army and Navy, 398- 
 
 399, 402 
 The Irarrazaval Ministry, 1892, 400 
 The Barros Luco Ministries, 400 
 The Eduardo Matte Ministry, 400 
 The Political Situation in 1894, 399-400 
 The Pedro Montt Ministry, 1894, 400 
 New Municipal Law, 400 
 Conversion of the Currency, 401 
 Political Parties in Congress, 401-402 
 Complications with Argentina, 402 
 Argentina and the Bolivian Question 
 
 with Chile, 1893-96, 559 
 Sale of the Esmeralda to Japan, 1894, 
 
 402, 581 
 Understanding with Peru re Tacnaand 
 
 Arica, 1895, 403-404 
 
 Chile — continued 
 
 Candidates for the Presidency, 404 
 Federico Errazuriz, President, 1896, 
 
 404-409 
 Congressional Elections, 1897, 405-406 
 Conference between President Roca of 
 
 Argentinaand President Errazuriz, 
 
 1899, 114 
 Jerman Riesco, President, 1901, 408- 
 
 409 
 Boundary Disputes with Argentina : 
 
 in 1878-79, 330, 335 ; in 1895, 108- 
 
 109; in 1898, 406-407; in 1901- 
 
 1902, 119-120 
 The Puno de Atacama Dispute between 
 
 Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia : in 
 
 1898, 111-112; in 1899, 113-114; in 
 
 1900, 407 
 Final Settlement of Dispute with 
 
 Argentina, 1902, 409 
 Treaty between Argentina and Chile, 
 
 June 1902, 120 
 Effect of Foreign Wars and Internal 
 
 Disturbances, 410-411 
 Movement of Population, 411-412 
 Araucanian Indians, 412 
 Alcoholism in Chile, 413-414 
 Chilians and the Government, 414- 
 
 415 
 Education, 328, 415-417 
 Religion, 417-418 
 Administration of Justice, 418 
 National Character, 418-419 
 Finance, Economic Development, 330, 
 
 419-432 
 Railways, Roads, etc., 328, 419-420 
 Mineral Wealth, 421-426 
 Nitrate Industry, 421-423 
 Copper, 423-424 
 Silver, 424 
 Coal, 425 
 Borax, 425-426 
 Agriculture, etc. , 426-431 
 Vine-Growing, 429-430 
 Cattle and Sheep-Farming, 420, 430 
 Fisheries, 431 
 Manufactures, 431-432 
 Chilian Influence on the Pacific Coast, 
 
 656-657 
 Chile, Chilian Warship, 435 
 Chiloe Id., 421 
 Chimboraso, Ecuador, 585 
 Chimbote, Peru, 479 
 Chincha Ids. , Peru : Dispute with Spain, 
 
 1864, 326, 333, 507-508 
 Chinese in Perii, 546 
 Cholera : in Buenos Aires, 40 ; in 
 
 Uruguay, 199 
 Cholo People in Peru, 532; in Bolivia, 
 564 
 
INDEX 
 
 673 
 
 Chorillos, Peru : 
 
 Battle, Jan. 13, 1881, 486-487 
 Other References, 479, 484 
 Christiancy, Mr, U.S. Minister in Peru, 
 
 480 
 Christianity in South America, see 
 
 Catholic Church 
 Chubut River, Argentina, 114-115 
 Chuno, 573 
 
 Cisneros, Viceroy Baltasar de, of Argen- 
 tina, deposed, 24 
 Ciudad Bolivar, Venezuela, 635 
 Ciudad de Cura, Venezuela, 635 
 Civil Registry in Chile, 332, 336 
 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1850, 601 
 Cleopatra, German Steamer, 346 
 Cleveland, President, 
 
 His Verdict in the Misiones Dispute, 
 
 1895, 109, 112, 116, 289 
 The President and the Boundary 
 Dispute between Venezuela 
 and British Guiana, 1895, 622- 
 628 
 Coal in Chile, 425 
 Cobija, Chile, 446, 448 
 Cobras Island, Brazil, 263, 280 
 Cochabamba, Bolivia, 562, 567 
 Cochrane, Lord, in Peru, 23 
 Cochrane, see Almirante Cochrane 
 Cocorobo, Brazil, 300 
 Coffee-Growing : in Peru, 547 ; in 
 Ecuador, 588 ; in Colombia, 611-612 ; 
 in Venezuela, 539, 644 
 Colchagua, Chile, 421 
 Colla Indians, 16 
 Colmo, Chile, 370-372 
 Colo-Calo, Chilian Torpedo-Boat, 477 
 Colombia : 
 
 Spanish Rule, 10 
 Revolution at Bogota, 1810, 21 
 Bolivar in New Granada, 1813, 21 
 Gen. Morilla at Cartagena, 1815, 22 
 New Granada and Venezuela under 
 the Republic of Colombia, 22, 
 591-592 
 Bolivar, President, 1821, 22 
 Secession of Venezuela and Ecuador, 
 
 (9. v.), 27, 591-592 
 Gen. Santander, Chief Magistrate, 
 
 1831, 27 
 Panama and Colon Free Ports, 28 
 Panama Treaty between the United 
 States and Colombia, 28 ; renewed, 
 1865, 28 
 Dr Marquez, President, 1836, 28 
 Gen. Harran, President, 28 
 Gen. Mosquera, President, 28 
 Mariana Ospina, President, 28 
 Federal v. Unitarian Form of Govern- 
 ment, 28 
 
 Colombia — continued 
 The United States of Colombia, 1819, 
 
 591-592 
 The Confederacion Granadina, 1858, 
 
 592 
 The United States of New Granada, 
 
 1861, 592 
 The United States of Colombia, 1863, 
 
 592 
 The Republic of Colombia, 1866, 592 
 Internal Political Troubles, 592 
 Political Parties, 592-593 
 President Trujillo, 593 
 Rafael Nunez, President, 1880, 593- 
 
 594 
 Revolution in 1881, 594 
 Settlement of Boundary Dispute with 
 
 Costa Rica, 594 
 President Laldua, 1883, 594 
 General Otalora, President, 1883, 594 
 Boundary Question with Venezuela, 
 
 595 
 Rafael Nunez, President, 1884, 595 
 President Nunez and the Conservatives, 
 
 595 
 Rebellion in 1885, 595-596 
 Occupation of Panama and Colon by 
 
 United States Forces, 596-597 
 Revision of the Law of Constitution, 
 
 1886, 598 
 President Nunez re-elected 1886, 598 
 President Nunez re-elected 1892, 598 
 Miguel Caro, Vice-President, 599 
 Death of President Nunez, 1894, 599 
 Miguel Caro, President, 1894, 599 
 Revolt in 1895, 599 
 Boundary Dispute with Peru, 1895, 
 
 529 
 M. A. Sanclemente, President, 1898, 
 
 599 
 J. M. Marroquin, Vice-President, 599- 
 
 600 
 Revolution in 1898, 600 
 J. M. Marroquin, President, 1900, 600 
 The Panama Canal and the Secession 
 
 of Panama, 1903, 601, 614, 655- 
 
 656 
 Topography and Revolutionary 
 
 Practices, 602 
 Political Situation, 1904, 603-604 
 Economic Conditions, 604-605 
 Topographical Features and Climate, 
 
 605-606 
 Area and Population, 606-607 
 Hygienic Conditions, 607 
 Education, 607-609 
 Administration of Justice, 609 
 The Roman Catholic Church, 609-610 
 National Character, 610-611 
 Effects of Alcoholism, 611 
 
 2 U 
 
674 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Colombia — continued 
 Agriculture and Industries, 611-614 
 Financial Situation, 614-615 
 Future Prospects, 615-616 
 Colon, Colombia : 
 The Port, 28, 655 
 Occupation by United States Forces, 
 
 1885, 596-597 
 Capture of Colon by Insurgents, 1900, 
 600 
 Colonia, Uruguay, 207 
 Colorados of Uruguay, 131, 137, 197-204, 
 
 216-224, 649 
 Colorados Netos of Uruguay, 204-207 
 Colorados Principistas of Uruguay, 204- 
 
 207 
 Colquechaca, Bolivia, 574 
 Columbus referred to, 5 
 Comisario Regio in Peru, 507 
 Comision Conservadora in Chili, 342-344, 
 
 398 
 Commercio, Brazilian Newspaper, 299 
 Comte, Auguste, and His Theories in 
 
 Brazil, 235 
 Concecao Id. , Brazil, 276 
 Concepcion, Chile, 324, 421, 425, 431 
 Concha, Sefior, y Toro, of Chile, 360, 
 
 362, 386, 387 
 Concha Rayada, Chile, 25 
 Conchuco Indians, 16 
 Concon, Chile, 367, 370-375 
 Concordia, Argentina, 132, 143-145 
 Condell, Capt., Chilian Naval Com- 
 mander, 450, 452-453 
 Condell, Chilian Torpedo-Boat, 357, 363, 
 
 364 
 Condor, Chilian Warship, 368 
 Conessa, Col., 156 
 Conselheiro or Maciel, Antonio, and the 
 
 Jaguncos of Canudos, 296-302 
 Constant, Benjamin, Positivist, 235 
 Copper : in Chile, 423-424 ; in Peru, 
 
 548 
 Coquimbo, Chile, 326, 347, 348, 364, 
 
 382, 421 
 Cordero, Luis, President of Ecuador, 
 
 1892, 581-582 
 Cordoba, Gen., President of Bolivia, 
 
 30 
 Cordoba, Argentina, see under Argen- 
 tina 
 Coronel, Chile, 425 
 Corralito, Uruguay, 200 
 Correa, Pedro, y Santiago, of Peru, 
 
 523 
 Correa, Dr Serzedello, of Brazil, 259 
 Corrientes, Argentina, in the Para- 
 guayan War, 138, 140-143, 151-152 
 Cortes, Fernando, Conqueror of Mexico, 
 7 
 
 Corumba, Brazil, 136 
 
 Costa, Dr Julio, Governor of Buenos 
 
 Aires, 101-102, 105 
 Costa, Dr Quirno, Vice-President of 
 
 Argentina, 111 
 Costa Rica : 
 
 Boundary Dispute with Colombia, 
 
 594 
 Costa Rica and the Panama Canal, 
 601 
 Cotton Industry in Peru, 546-547, 552 
 Covadonga, Spanish Gunboat, 326, 507 ; 
 captured by Chilians, Jan. 1866, 
 326, 509; in the Chilian-Peruvian 
 War, 442, 450-454, 472 ; destroyed, 
 1880, 478-479 
 Cragosta, Brazil, 269 
 Crespo, Gen. Joaquin 
 
 Leader of Revolution in Venezuela, 
 
 1892, 621 
 President of Venezuela, 1894, 621- 
 
 628, 633 
 President Crespo and the Boundary 
 Dispute between Venezuela and 
 British Guiana, 622-628 
 Death of Gen. Crespo, 630 
 Cuadra, Pedro Lucio, of Chile, 339, 
 
 340 
 Cuba under Spanish Rule, 5, 7, 648 
 Cuenca, Ecuador, 585, 586, 587 
 Cuestas, Juan Lindolfo, President of 
 Uruguay in 1897, 221-223; in 1899, 
 223 
 Cullen, Gen., of Argentina, 33 
 Gumming, Richard, in Chile, 364 
 Cundinamarca, Colombia, 595 
 Curayaco, Peril, 482 
 Curico, Chile, 421 
 Curityba, Paranagua, Brazil, 236, 273, 
 
 283, 284, 287, 288 
 Curupaitf, Paraguay, 157-160, 168 
 Curuzii, Paraguay, 157-160 
 Cuzco, Peru, 8, 536, 547 
 
 Daule River, 588 
 
 Davila, Col. Justo Pastor, Peruvian 
 Commander, 459, 484-486 
 
 Daza, Gen. Hilarion, President of 
 Bolivia, 438, 459-460, 462, 555-556 
 
 Defrance, A. , in Chile, 362 
 
 Desterro, Santa Catharina, Brazil, 265, 
 266, 271, 272, 280, 284 
 
 Detroit, U.S. Warship, 277 
 
 Diario de Commercio, Brazilian News- 
 paper, 256 
 
 Dios Leon, Col. Juan de, of Chile, 376 
 
 Dolores, Tarapaca, 350, 351, 462 
 
 Donoso, Gregorio, of Chile, 360 
 
 Dorrego of Argentina, 33 
 
 Dourado, Brazil, 136 
 
INDEX 
 
 675 
 
 Dreyfus & Co., of Paris, 511-512 
 
 Drink Traffic, see Alcoholism 
 
 Duarte, Major, in the Paraguayan War, 
 
 143-148 
 Duclerc and Brazil, 13 
 Durand, Senor, of Peru, 528 
 Dutch in Brazil, see under Brazil 
 
 Echeniqtte, Gen., President of Perti, 
 
 29 
 Ecuador : 
 Defeat of Gonzalo Pizarro at Quito, 
 
 1546, 11 
 Revolution at Quito, 1809, 20, 21 
 Battle of Pichincha, 1822, and 
 
 Emancipation of Ecuador by 
 
 Bolivar, 22 
 Separation from Colombia, 1830, 27, 
 
 577, 591-592 
 Gen. Flores President, 1830, 28-29 
 Vicente Rocafuerte, President, 29 
 Gen. Flores re-elected President, 
 
 1839 and 1843, 29 
 Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and 
 
 the War with Spain, 1865-66, 326- 
 
 327 
 Acts of Constitution, 1830-96, 577- 
 
 578 
 Administration of President Moreno, 
 
 1875, 27, 578 
 Assassination of President Moreno, 
 
 1875, 578 
 Dr Borrero, President, 1875, 578-579 
 Revolt under Gen. Veintemilla, 1876, 
 
 578-579 
 Defeat of the Government, 579 
 Gen. Veintemilla, President, 1878, 
 
 579 
 Gen. Veintemilla, Dictator, 579 
 Revolt against Gen. Veintemilla, 1883, 
 
 579 
 Dr Placido Caamafio, President, 1884, 
 
 580 
 Dr Antonio Flores, President, 1888, 
 
 580, 583, 586 
 Dr Luis Cordero, President, 1892, 581 
 The Esmeralda Incident, 1894, 402, 
 
 581 
 Revolution against Dr Cordero, 1894, 
 
 582 
 Provisional Government under Gen. 
 
 Alfaro, 1895, 582 
 Boundary Disputes, 1895, 529 
 Gen. Alfaro, President, 1897, 582 
 Gen. Alfaro and the Clergy, 582 
 Conspiracies against Gen. Alfaro, 582 
 Gen. Leonidas Plaza, President, 1901, 
 
 583 
 Laws regarding Sedition, 583 
 Political Conditions, 583 
 
 Ecuador — continued 
 
 Economic Conditions, 583 
 Area and Population, 584 
 Cities of Ecuador, 584 
 Topographical Features, 585 
 Education, 586 
 
 Administration of Justice, 586 
 National Character, 587 
 Railways, 587-588 
 Industry and Production, 588-589 
 Financial Situation, 589-590 
 Future Prospects, 590 
 Education : in Argentina, 41, 123-125 ; 
 in Paraguay, 194 ; in Uruguay, 208, 
 225-226; in Brazil, 312; in Chile, 
 328, 415-417 ; in Peru, 515, 534-536 ; 
 in Bolivia, 569-570 ; in Ecuador, 
 585-586; in Colombia, 607-609; in 
 Venezuela, 635-636 
 Edwards, Augustin, of Chile, 338, 339 
 Egan, Patrick, U.S. Minister in Chile, 
 
 1891, 361-362, 392-396 
 Egusquiza, E. D., 181 
 Egusquiza, J. B. , President of Paraguay, 
 
 1894, 190-191 
 Ejercito Restaurador de la Honra 
 
 Nacional in Peru, 508 
 Ellauri, Dr Jose, President of Uruguay, 
 
 1873, 204-206 
 England and South America : 
 British Action in Brazil, 13 
 British Aggression in Argentina, 19 
 Treaty between Argentina and 
 
 England, 1825, 24 
 British Action in Uruguay, 1828, 24 
 English Recognition of the Independ- 
 ence of South America, 26 
 Conflict with Uruguay, 31 
 England and the Paraguayan War, 
 
 1865, 151 
 Adm. Hotham and the Chilian Revolu- 
 tion, 1891, 352, 360 
 The Siriusin Brazilian Waters, 1893-94, 
 
 265-266, 281 
 The Racer in Brazilian Waters, 1893, 
 
 265-266 
 Occupation of Trinidade, Brazil, 1895, 
 
 292 
 Boundary Dispute between Venezuela 
 and British Guiana, 1887, 620-621 
 Boundary Dispute between Venezuela 
 and British Guiana, 1895-99, 
 622-628, 654 
 England and the Chilian Boundary 
 Disputes, in 1895, 108-109; in 
 1899, 111-112, 113-114; in 1901, 
 119-120 
 Blockade of La Guayra, Venezuela, 
 by England, Germany, and Italy, 
 1902, 631 
 
676 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Ensenada, Argentina, 65, 285 
 
 Entre Rios, Argentina, 138, 140-144 
 
 Enxadas Id., Brazil, 263, 275, 280, 281 
 
 Errazuriz, Federieo, President of Chile, 
 1871, 114, 328-329, 388, 404-409 
 
 Escala, Gen., Chilian Commander, 458, 
 461, 465 
 
 Escobar, President, of Paraguay, 190 
 
 Escurra, Juan B., President of Paraguay, 
 191 
 
 Esmeralda, Ecuador, 589 
 
 Esmeralda, Chilian Warship : in Ata- 
 cama, 1863, 435 ; in the War with 
 Spain, 1866, 326; in the Chilian- 
 Peruvian War, 1879, 443, 450-452 
 destroyed by Peruvians, 1879, 452 
 
 Esmeralda, New Chilian Warship, 399 
 in the Civil War in Chile, 1891, 346 
 366, 368, 374 ; sold to Japan, 1894 
 402, 581 
 
 Esperanra, Brazilian Ship, 266 
 
 Espina, Col., 102 
 
 Espinar, Col., Peruvian Commander, 463 
 
 Espinosa, Senor, of Peru, 527 
 
 Espinosa, Col. Julio Banados, of Chile, 
 348, 386-387, 392 
 
 Esperito-Santo, Ship, 303 
 
 Estanislas, Gen., del Canto, of Chile, 
 390 
 
 Estero Vellaco, 153 
 
 Estigarribia, Col., Paraguayan Com- 
 mander, 143-148 
 
 Eten, Peru, 479 
 
 d'Eu, Conde, 
 
 Commander in the Paraguayan War, 
 
 147, 181-187 
 Other References, 234, 240 
 
 Favella Hill, Canudos, 301 
 Febronio, Major, of Brazil, 298 
 Federal v. Unitarian Form of Govern- 
 ment : in Colombia, 28 ; in Chile, 30 ; 
 in Argentina, 32, 33, 42 ; in Brazil, 
 249 
 Felix, Jose, of Rio de Janeiro, 256 
 Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, 4 
 Ferdinand VII. of Spain, 19, 20, 21 
 Ferrari, Pablo, Chilian Commander, 478 
 Fidanza, Capt., 173 
 
 Fidelis, Col., Brazilian Commander, 134 
 Figueira, Andrade, of Brazil, 238, 239 
 Fisheries of Chile, 431 
 Flores, Antonio, President of Ecuador, 
 
 1888, 580, 583, 586 
 Flores, Col. Fortunato, in Uruguay, 197 
 Flores, Gen. Venancio, 
 
 President of Ecuador, 1830, 1839, and 
 
 1843, 28-29 
 Leader of Revolt in Uruguay, 1863-65, 
 131-135 
 
 Flores, Gen. V. — continued 
 President of Uruguay, 1865, 135, 197- 
 
 198 
 President Flores in the Paraguayan 
 
 War, 139-160, 187 
 Assassination of Gen. Flores, 1868, 
 198 
 Flores, Buenos Aires, 56 
 Florida, U.S., 207 
 Florida, Uruguay, 203, 206 
 Fonseca, Gen. Deodoro da, of Brazil : 
 Leader of Military Conspiracy, 242- 
 
 243 
 Provisional President of Brazil, 243- 
 
 245 
 President of Brazil, 246-256 
 Fontecilla, Manuel Sanchez, of Chile, 
 
 340 
 France and South America : 
 
 French Action in Brazil, 1711, 13 
 Portugal and French Guiana, 1807- 
 
 15, 13-14 
 Conflict with Uruguay, 1851, 31 
 Conflict with Rosas in Argentina, 1894, 
 
 33-34 
 France and the Paraguayan War, 1865, 
 
 151 
 France and the Revolution in Chile, 
 
 1891, 361-362 
 French Victims in Brazilian Revolt, 
 and Brazilian Indemnity to France, 
 1894, 287 
 French in Argentina, 122 
 Francia, Dr Rodriguez de, First Consul 
 
 in Paraguay, 25 
 Francisco, Col. Joao, of Brazil, 291 
 Franklin, Benjamin, referred to, 26 
 Freire, Col., in Uruguay, 1868, 198 
 Freire, Gen. , President of Chile, 1823, 30 
 Freire, Francisco, of Chile, 1886, 338 
 Fresia, Chilian Torpedo-Boat, 476, 483 
 Frias, Col. Anibal, of Chile, 370 
 Frias, Felix, 46 
 
 Fruit-Growing : in Paraguay, 192 ; in 
 Uruguay, 229-230 ; in Chile, 429 ; in 
 Bolivia, 573 
 Fuenzalida, Ensign, of Chile, 379 
 Funes, Naval Commander, 98-99, 107 
 
 Gainza, Gen. Martin, 45 
 Galenga, Mr, of the Times, 540 
 Galvez, Lieut., Peruvian Commander, 
 
 477 
 Gama, Adm. Saldanha da, 
 
 Personality of Adm. da Gama, 270 
 Commander of Rebel Forces in Brazil, 
 
 1893, 265-283 
 Leader of Revolt in Rio Grande do 
 
 Sul, 1895, 290-293 
 Other References, 263, 311 
 
INDEX 
 
 677 
 
 Gamarra, Col., Peruvian Commander, 
 
 1880, 469 
 Gamarra, Gen., 
 
 President of Peru, 1829, 29 
 Peruvian Leader in Bolivia, 1839, 30 
 Gana, Gen., Jose Francisco, of Chile, 
 
 348 
 Garcia, Capt. Aureteo, y Garcia, 
 
 Peruvian Commander, 480-481, 486, 
 
 489 
 Garezon, Lieut. Pedro, Peruvian Naval 
 
 Commander, 456-457 
 Garibaldi, Gen. , in Uruguay, 31 
 Gatica, Major, of Chile, 348 
 Gazeta da Tarde, Brazilian Newspaper, 
 
 299 
 Gelly, Gen., y Obes, Argentine Com- 
 mander, 165, 176, 179, 187 
 Germany and South America : 
 
 Blockade of La Guayra, Venezuela, 
 by England, Germany, and Italy, 
 1902, 631 
 Germans in Argentina, 122 ; in Brazil, 
 235, 310 ; in Chile, 416 
 Gill, President, of Paraguay, 189 
 Glycerio, Francisco, of Brazil, 251, 302 
 Godoy, Domingo, Minister in Chile, 
 
 1891, 362, 392 
 Godoy, Joaquin, Minister in Chile, 1886, 
 
 338 
 Gold : in Peru, 549 ; in Colombia, 613 ; 
 
 in Venezuela, 641 
 Gomensoro, Tomas, President of 
 
 Uruguay, 203, 205 
 Gomez, Col. Leandro, in the Paraguayan 
 
 War, 132-133 
 Gonzalez, President, of Paraguay, 1890, 
 
 190 
 Gonzalez, Col. Genuardo, of Paysandii, 
 
 1875, 207 
 Gorostiaga, Dr Benjamin, Candidate for 
 
 the Presidency of Argentina, 66, 67 
 Gouvernador Id. , Brazil, 266, 269 
 Gragoata, Brazil, 274 
 Grammer, Juan, of Chile, 358 
 Grande, Ilha, Brazil, 271 
 Grau, Adm. Miguel, Peruvian Naval 
 
 Commander, in the Chilian-Peruvian 
 
 War, 450-457 
 Great Britain, see England 
 Guacoldo, Chilian Torpedo-Boat, 477, 
 
 483 
 Guadaloupe, Bolivia, 574 
 Guaitecas Id., 421 
 Guale, Chilian Torpedo-Boat, 358 
 Gualeguay, Argentine Warship, 138 
 Guanabara, Brazilian Warship, 263 
 Guanara, Venezuela, 635 
 Guano : 
 Exports from Peru, 1869, 511-512 
 
 Guano — continued 
 The Guano Deposits of Atacama and 
 the Disputes between Bolivia and 
 Chile, the Chilian-Peruvian War, 
 1879-84, and the Chilian Occupa- 
 tion of Atacama, 433-504 
 Guano in the Lobos Ids., 498 
 Guaviyii, Uruguay, 211 
 Guayaneco Id., 421 
 Guayaquil, Ecuador, 578, 582, 584, 586, 
 
 587 
 Guayas River, 588 
 Guerrero, Adolfo, 365 
 Guiana, British, and the Venezuelan 
 Boundary Dispute : in 1887, 620- 
 621 ; in 1895-99, 622-628, 654 
 Guiana, French, 
 
 Portugal and French Guiana, 1807- 
 
 15, 13-14 
 Amapa Dispute with Brazil, 1897-99, 
 306 
 Guimaraes, Adm., of Brazil, 255 
 Gustavo Sampaio, Brazilian Torpedo- 
 Catcher, 269, 286 
 Gutierrez, Cols. Marcelino, Silvestre, 
 and Tomas, Peruvian Conspirators, 
 513-514 
 Gutschmid, Baron, in Chile, 360, 387 
 
 Haggard, Mr, referred to, 628 
 Hague Tribunal, 631 
 Hamilton, Alexander, referred to, 26 
 Harrison, Benjamin, and the Relations 
 
 between Chile and the United 
 
 States, 1891, 393-395 
 Heraldo, Chilian Newspaper, 349 
 Heredia, Gen. , of Argentina, 33 
 Herran, Gen., President of Colombia, 28 
 Herrera, Emilia Toro, Wife of President 
 
 Balmaceda, 334 
 Holdich, Sir Thomas, and the Chilian 
 
 Boundary Question, 119 
 Holguin, Carlos, of Colombia, 598 
 Holleben, Baron von, 59 
 Holland : Dutch Action in Brazil, 13 
 Holley, Gen. Adolfo, of Chile, 353, 355- 
 
 356, 368, 390 
 Homos, Gen., in the Paraguayan War, 
 
 164 
 Hotham, Adm. , of the Warspite, in Chile, 
 
 1891, 352, 360 
 Hotham, Lieut., of the Sirius, in Brazil, 
 
 1894, 281 
 Huacho, Peru, 479 
 Huaita Ford, Atacama, Chile, 447 
 Hualgayoc, Peru, 550 
 Huamachuco, Peru, 496 
 Huamachuco Indians, 16 
 Huanca Indians, 16 
 Huanchaca, Bolivia, 356 
 
678 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Huanchaca Mining Company, Bolivia, 
 571, 574 
 
 Huara, Chile, 351 
 
 lluascar, Peruvian Monitor : built 1866, 
 443 ; in the Peruvian War with 
 Spain, 1866, 510; in the Peruvian 
 Revolution, 1878, 518 ; in the Chilian- 
 Peruvian War, 1879, 443, 450-454; 
 captured by Chilians, 1879, 455-458 ; 
 Chilian Monitor in the Chilian- 
 Peruvian War, 1880-81, 476-477, 488 ; 
 in Chilian Civil War, 1891, 346 
 
 Huasco, Chile, 366, 454 
 
 Huemel, Chilian Warship, 368 
 
 Huerta, Manuel Garcia de la, of Chile, 
 339 
 
 Humaita, Paraguay, in the Paraguayan 
 War, 1865-68, 139, 141, 148, 157, 162- 
 171 ; bombarded by Allies, Apr.- 
 July 1868, 168-171 
 
 Humboldt, Alexander von, referred to, 9 
 
 Husares Constitutionales of Chile, 376 
 
 Ibanez, Adolfo, of Chile, 340 
 Iglesias, Gen. Miguel, 
 Peruvian Commander in the Chilian- 
 Peruvian War, 1881, 484, 486, 
 487 
 President of Peru, 1883, 496-497, 522- 
 524, 531, 538 
 Ignacio, Adm., Brazilian Commander 
 in the Paraguayan War, 160, 161, 
 181 
 Iguatemy, Brazilian Warship, 263 
 Imperial, Chilian Transport, 363 
 Incas of Peru, 7, 8, 16 
 Independencia, Peruvian Ironclad : built 
 1865, 443 ; in the Peruvian War with 
 Spain, 1866, 510; in the Chilian- 
 Peruvian War, 1879, 443, 450-453; 
 destroyed, 1879, 453, 479; Other 
 Reference, 513 
 Independencia, Peruvian Armed Steam 
 
 Launch, 477 
 Indians: of South America, 15, 412; of 
 Peru, 532-533, 538, 546 ; of Bolivia, 
 558-559, 565, 568-571 ; of Ecuador, 
 587 
 Inquisition, 4, 540 
 Intemperance, see Alcoholism 
 Iquique, Tarapaca : 
 Peruvian Port, 448 
 Naval Battle between Chile and Peru, 
 
 1879, 450-452 
 Chilian Port in the Chilian Civil War, 
 1891, 346, 348, 351-353, 360, 364- 
 366 
 Other References, 412, 422 
 Iquitos, Peru, 527, 551, 553 
 Irarrazaval, Seflor, of Chile, 400 
 
 Irigoyen, Dr Bernardo, 
 Candidate for the Presidency of 
 
 Argentina, 66, 67 
 Partisan of the Union Civica, 73 
 Partisan of the Union Civica Radical, 
 
 93 
 Governor of Buenos Aires, 116-117 
 Iriondo, Dr, of Santa Fe, 49 
 Isabel, Princess, 
 
 Regent of Brazil, 234-240 
 Her Emancipation of the Slaves, 237- 
 240 
 Italy and South America : 
 Conflict with Uruguay, 1851, 31 
 Uruguayan Question with Italy, 1882, 
 
 210 
 Brazilian Question with Italy, 1896, 293 
 Blockade of La Guayra, Venezuela, 
 by England, Germany, and Italy, 
 1902, 631 
 Italians in Argentina, 121 ; in Brazil, 
 237, 309 
 Itapirii, Fort, Paraguay, 153 
 Itaroro River, Paraguay, 176 
 Itata, Chilian Transport, 359, 391, 395 
 Itati, Argentina, 152 
 
 Jacobinos of Brazil, 302-304 
 
 Jacques, Gen., of Brazil, 290 
 
 Jaguarao, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, 
 255 
 
 Jaguncos of Canudos, 296-302 
 
 Janequeo, Chilian Torpedo-Boat, 476- 
 477 
 
 Japan : 
 Japanese Purchase of the Chilian 
 Warship Esmeralda, 402, 581 
 
 Japanese in Peru, 532, 546 
 
 Jauja, Peru, 523 
 
 Javary, Brazilian Warship, 263, 269 
 
 Jews in Spain, 4, 6 
 
 Joao VI. of Portugal in Brazil, 13 
 
 Jornal de Brazil, 299 
 
 Jornal de Comercio, Brazilian News- 
 paper, 258 
 
 Jovellanos, Salvador, President of Para- 
 guay, 1872, 188 
 
 Juan Fernandez, 431 
 
 Jueces de Paz in Colombia, 609 
 
 Junin : 
 
 Battle, Aug. 6, 1824, 23 
 Other References, 422, 460, 461 
 
 Junta de Gobierno in Chile, 358-382, 
 383, 389 
 
 Jupiter, Brazilian Merchant Ship, 259, 
 263 
 
 Kennedy, John Gordon, in Chile, 360 
 Konig, Senor, Chilian Minister in 
 Bolivia, 1900, 408, 562 
 
INDEX 
 
 679 
 
 Korner, Gen. Emilio, in Chile, 357, 359, 
 370, 382, 390, 399 
 
 Lackawana, U.S. Corvette, at Arica, 
 Oct. 1880, 480, 483, 497 
 
 La Cotera, Gen. Manuel Gonzalez de, 
 of Peru, 521 
 
 Ladario, Baron de, of Brazil, 243 
 
 Lage, Brazil, 263, 264 
 
 Lagomarsino, Capt., Chilian Naval 
 Commander, 472 
 
 Lagos, Col. Hilario, in Argentina, 1880, 
 45, 50, 54, 57 
 
 Lagos, Col., Chilian Commander, 1880- 
 81, 471-472, 481, 486, 488 
 
 La Guayra, Venezuela : 
 
 Blockade by England, Germany, and 
 
 Italy, 1902, 631 
 Other References, 625, 640 
 
 Laldua, President, of Colombia, 594 
 
 Lamar, Gen., President of Peru, 29 
 
 Lamas, Col. Diego, Leader of Rising 
 against President Borda of Uru- 
 guay, 217 ; assassinated, 222 
 
 Lambayeque, Peru, 479 
 
 Lambton, Capt., in Chile, 352 
 
 Lapa, Brazil, 273 
 
 La Paz, Bolivia, 561, 562, 563, 566 
 
 La Plata, see under Argentina 
 
 La Puerta, Gen. Luis de, Vice-President 
 of Peru, 474-475, 511, 520-521 
 
 Lara, Venezuela, 642 
 
 La Rioja, Argentina, 117, 161 
 
 Larreta, Dr Aureliano Rodriguez, of 
 Uruguay, 212, 221 
 
 Las Cadenas, Chile, 376-377 
 
 Las Cruces, Chile, 375 
 
 Lastera, Gen., in Chile, 30 
 
 Las Zorras, Chile, 376-377 
 
 Latacunga, Ecuador, 585 
 
 Latin America and Pan-American Con- 
 gresses, 654 
 
 Latorre, Capt., Chilian Naval Com- 
 mander, 454-455 
 
 Latorre, Major Lorenzo, 
 
 Commander in Uruguay, 205, 208 
 Dictator of Uruguay, 208-209 
 President of Uruguay, 209 
 
 Lautaro, Steamer sunk off Panama, 1902, 
 600 
 
 Lavadenz, Gen., Peruvian Commander, 
 463 
 
 Lavalle, Gen., in Argentina, 33, 58 
 
 Lavalle, Jose Antonio, of Peru, 439-440, 
 498 
 
 Lavalle, Lopez, of Iquique, 464 
 
 Law : Administration of Justice ; in 
 Argentina, 115, 125 ; in Uruguay, 
 226; in Brazil, 313; in Chile, 418; 
 in Peru, 536-537 ; in Bolivia, 570 ; in 
 
 Law — continued 
 
 Ecuador, 586-587 ; in Colombia, 609 ; 
 in Venezuela, 636-637 
 Lebu, Chile, 346 
 Leipzig, German Warship, 379 
 Letelier, Col., Chilian Commander, 482 
 Liberdade, Brazilian Cruiser, 276 
 Liberdade, Brazilian Newspaper, 299 
 Libertacao do Ventre, 237 
 Libertad,, Chilian Newspaper, 334 
 Liliedale, Dr Oscar, of Argentina, 75-76, 
 
 93* 
 Lillo, Eusebio, of Chile, 338, 339, 480 
 Lima, Viana de, of Brazil, 135 
 Lima, Peru : 
 
 The Gutierrez Conspiracy, 1872, 513- 
 514 
 
 Insurrection, 1879, 475 
 
 Chilian Occupation, Jan. 16, 1881, 489 
 
 Attack of Lima by Rebel Armies, 
 1884-85, 523 ; 1895, 526-527 
 
 San Marcos University, 536 
 
 The Plaza de la Inquisicion, 540 
 
 Other References, 483, 536, 537, 539, 
 551, 552 
 Lima, Cruiser, 167-168 
 Limache, Chile, 380, 431 
 Limefia, Peruvian Steamer, 473 
 Linares, Dr, President of Bolivia, 31 
 Linnares, Chile, 421 
 Liquor Traffic, see Alcoholism 
 Lira, Carlos, of Chile, 387 
 Listarria, Senor, of Chile, 340 
 Llamas, 568, 572 
 
 Liana, Julian de la, in Uruguay, 207 
 Llanos, 17, 605, 612, 634, 640 
 Llanquihue, Chile, 416, 421, 430 
 Loa, Chilian Armed Transport, 454-455 ; 
 
 destroyed, 1880, 478-479 
 Lobo, Aristides, of Brazil, 251 
 Lobo, Dr Fernando, of Brazil, 304 
 Lobos, Ids., 499 
 Lo Cafias, Chile, 367 
 Locumba River, 469 
 Loja, Ecuador, 585 
 Lomas Valentinas (Hills), 174, 179 
 London Pacific Company, 550 
 Lopez, Gen., of Venezuela, 1887, 619 
 Lopez, Benigno, 173 
 Lopez, Don Carlos, First Consul in Para- 
 guay, 25 
 Lopez, Gen. Francisco Solano, 
 
 Biographical, 140 
 
 First Consul in Paraguay, 25 
 
 Dictator of Paraguay, 39 
 
 Gen. Lopez and Uruguay, 131, 134 
 
 His War against Brazil, 135 
 
 Gen. Lopez in the Paraguayan War, 
 39, 135-186 
 
 Marshal of the Army, 137 
 
680 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Lopez, Gen. Francisco Solano — cont. 
 
 Death of Gen. Lopez, 1870, 186 
 Lopez, Dr Lucio V. , 
 
 Governor of Buenos Aires, 1893, 102, 
 
 105-106 
 Dr Lopez and Col. Sarmiento, 105-106 
 Lopez, Dr Luzio, and the Union Civica 
 
 in Argentina, 1887, 75, 76 
 Lopez, Dr Vicente, 
 President of Argentina, 32, 33 
 Partisan of the Union Civica, 75, 76, 79 
 Minister of Finance in Argentina," 88 
 Lorena, Capt., Provisional President of 
 
 Brazil, 265-286 
 Los Andes, Venezuela, 642 
 Los Angeles, Peru, 516 
 Lota, Chile, 425 
 
 Lubiaga, Lieut. Col., Peruvian Com- 
 mander, 459 
 Lucena, Baron, of Brazil, 252 
 Luco, Ramon Barros, of Chile, 340, 346, 
 
 _ 389-391, 400 
 Lujan, Buenos Aires, 56 
 Lynch, Capt. Patricio, Chilian Com- 
 mander in the Chilian- Peruvian War, 
 479-480, 481-487, 493-495 
 Lynch, Madame, referred to, 140, 185, 
 
 186 
 Lynch, Chilian Torpedo-Boat, 357, 363, 
 364, 379 
 
 MacCann, Adm., of the United States, 
 
 and the Revolution in Chile, 1891, 
 
 360, 363 
 Maciel or Conselheiro, Antonio, and the 
 
 Jaguncos of Canudos, 296-302 
 Mackenna, Benjamen Vicuna, of Chile, 
 
 329 
 Madeira, Brazilian Warship, 263 
 Madeiros, Col. , of Brazil, 300 
 Magalhaes, Coelho, 162 
 Magalhaes, Col. Marciano de, of Brazil, 
 
 251 
 Magallanes, Chile, 421 
 Ma/jallanes, Chilian Gunboat, 328, 346, 
 
 347, 349, 442, 454 
 Magdalena, Colombia, 21, 595 
 Magdalena, near Lima, Peru, 494 
 Magellan, Straits of, 420, 425 
 Magnasco, Dr, of Argentina, 115, 124, 
 
 125 
 Maipo, Chilian Transport, 365, 366 
 Maipu, Chilian Warship, 354 
 Maypii, Chile : Battle Apr. 5, 1818, 25 
 Maldonado, Uruguay, 207 
 Malleco, Chile, 421 
 Malpartida, Seiior, of Peru, 527 
 Manantiales de San Juan, Uruguay, 203 
 Manco Gapac, Peruvian Monitor, 443, 
 
 468, 472 
 
 Manduvira River, 182 
 
 Manuelita, Daughter of Dictator Rosas, 
 
 36-37 
 Mapocho, Chilian Steamer, 365 
 Maracaibo, Venezuela, 612, 635 
 Marajd, Brazilian Warship, 263 
 Maranon, Peruvian Schoolship, 493 
 Marcilio Lias, Brazilian Warship, 263, 
 
 264 
 Maria of Portugal, 14 
 Maronas, Uruguay, 200 
 Marquez, Dr, President of Colombia, 28 
 Marquis d'Olinda, Brazilian Ship, 135 
 Marriage Laws, etc. : in Uruguay, 210 ; 
 
 in Chile, 332, 336 ; in Peru, 528 ; in 
 
 Venezuela, 637 
 Marroquin, J. M., 
 Vice-President of Colombia, 599-600 
 President of Colombia, 600 
 Marte, Brazilian Merchant Ship, 263 
 Martens, Dr, referred to, 628 
 Martinez, Col. , of Chile, 486 
 Martinez, Carlos Walker, of Chile, 360, 
 
 386-387 
 Martyr, Major Diocletiano, Brazilian 
 
 Conspirator, 304 
 Matias Cousino, Chilian Transport, 454, 
 
 476 
 Matta, Juan Gonzalo, 365 
 Matte, Augusto, of Chile, 339, 364 
 Matte, Eduardo, of Chile, 360, 392-395, 
 
 400 
 Mattera, Mgr. Gigi, 59 
 Matto Grosso, Brazil, 135-136, 140-142, 
 
 149, 151, 153, 162 
 Maturana, Gen., Chilian Commander, 
 
 482 
 Maule, Chile, 421 
 Mejillones, 435-436, 454, 457 
 Melgarejo, Col., President of Bolivia, 31, 
 
 137 
 Mello, Adm. Custodio de, of Brazil : 
 Leader of Risings in Rio de Janeiro, 
 
 255-256, 259, 286 
 His Manifesto, Sepr. 1893, 260 
 Other References, 251, 311 
 Mello, Marcellino Bispo de, Assassin, 303 
 Mendez, Lopez, in Venezuela, 22 
 Mendoza, Don Andres Hurtado de, 11 
 Mendoza, Major, in Uruguay, 198 
 Mendoza, Argentina, 161 
 Mercedes, Uruguay, 207 
 Meteoro, Peruvian Schoolship, 493 
 Mexico : 
 Spanish Conquest of Mexico, 7, 8 
 Montezuma and the Astecs, 7 
 Meza, Pedro Tablo, of Chile, 358 
 Minas, Uruguay, 208 
 Minas Geraes, Brazil, 309, 314 
 Mindello, Portuguese Warship, 280 
 
INDEX 
 
 681 
 
 Mines and Mineral Wealth : of South 
 America, 17, 654 ; of Chile, 421-425 ; 
 of Peru, 548-551 ; of Bolivia, 573- 
 574 ; of Ecuador, 589 ; of Colombia, 
 613-614 ; of Venezuela, 641-642 
 Miraflores, Peru : 
 
 Battle, Jan. 1881, 488-489, 522 
 Other References, 484, 487 
 Miranda, Brazil, 136 
 
 Misiones Dispute between Brazil and 
 Argentina, 137, 245 ; settled, 1895, 
 109, 112, 116, 289 
 Mitre, Gen. Bartolome, 
 
 Leader of the Portefios, 38, 47 
 President of Argentina, 1861, 38-40, 
 
 42 
 President Mitre in the Paraguayan 
 
 War, 134-166, 187 
 Candidate for the Presidency of Argen- 
 tina, 1874, 43 
 His Attitude to the Tiro National of 
 
 Buenos Aires, 45 
 Mitre and Roca, 92-93, 94 
 Other References, 54, 161, 165 
 Mitre, Gen. Emilio, 45 
 Mocangue, Brazil, 269 
 Molina, Rear-Adm. Francisco, of Chile, 
 
 390 
 Mollendo, Peru, 449, 469, 574 
 Monagas, Gen., President of Venezuela, 
 
 28 
 Monroe Doctrine and South America, 25- 
 
 26, 623 
 Monte Santo, Brazil, 300 
 Montero, Adm. Lizardo, 
 
 Peruvian Commander, 468, 470, 474, 
 
 486 
 Candidate for the Presidency of Peru, 
 
 1875, 517 
 Vice-President of Peru, Mar. 1881, 494 
 President of Peru, Aug. 1881, 495, 501, 
 506 
 Monteverde, Gen. , in Venezuela, 21 
 Montezuma and the Astecs, 7 
 Montoyo, Sergeant, Assassin, 519 
 Montt, Ismael Perez, of Chile, 392 
 Montt, Adm. Jorge, 
 
 Chilian Naval Commander, 34f>, 379 
 Provisional Government at Iquique 
 (Apr. 1891) under Capt. Montt, 
 358 
 Proclamation of Adm. Montt, Sept. 
 
 1891, 384, 389 
 President of Chile, Dec. 1891-Sept. 
 
 1896, 390-405 
 His Administration, 397-405 
 Montt, Manuel, President of Chile, 30, 
 
 323-324 
 Montt, Pedro, of Chile, 338, 339, 360, 
 364, 394-395, 400, 408-409 
 
 Moore, Capt, Peruvian Naval Com- 
 mander, 450, 453 
 Moors in Spain, 4, 6 
 Moquegua, Peru, 469, 481, 518 
 Moraes, Col. Mendes de, 303 
 Moraes, Dr Prudente de, 
 Republican, 239, 251 
 President of Brazil, 1894, 283-304, 306 
 The President and the Pacification of 
 Rio Grande do Sul, 1895, 290-293 
 Temporary Retirement of President 
 
 Moraes, 1896, 294 
 His Return to Rio de Janeiro, 1897, 
 
 296 
 The Canudos Campaigns, 296-302 
 Conspiracy against President Moraes, 
 303 
 Morales, Col, in Buenos Aires, 56, 58 
 Moreira, Col., 
 
 Military Commandant at Desterro, 286 
 Commander of Expedition against 
 Canudos, 298-301 
 Moreno of Argentina, 24, 32 
 Moreno, President, of Ecuador, assassin- 
 ated, 1875, 29, 578 
 Moreno, Dr, and the Chilian Boundary 
 
 Commission in 1899, 113-114 
 Morilla, Gen. , at Cartagena, 22 
 Morinigo, President, of Paraguay, 1894, 
 
 190 
 Morris, Rev. Mr, of Buenos Aires, 124- 
 
 125 
 Morro Hill, Arica, 471-473 
 Morro Solar: Fighting, Jan. 13, 1881, 
 
 484, 486-487 
 Mosquera, Gen., President of Colombia, 
 
 28 
 Mowbray, Lieut. Beauchamp, 266 
 Munecas, Dr, of Tucuman, 49 
 Municipal Government, etc. : in Chile, 
 400 ; in Peru, 539 ; in Venezuela, 
 635 
 Munis, Col. Angel, of Uruguay, 207 
 Mufioz, Col., in Brazil, 134 
 Munoz, Dr Jose Maria, Candidate for 
 the Presidency of Uruguay, 204 
 
 Nabuco, Joaquin, of Brazil, 238, 307 
 Napoleon and the Peninsular War, 13 
 Navarro, Dr, of Catamarca, 49 
 Negroes : in South America, 10 ; in Peru, 
 
 532 
 Netto, Gen., Brazilian Commander, 133, 
 
 141, 155 
 New Granada, see Colombia 
 New York, U.S. Warship, 277 
 Newark, U.S. Warship, 277 
 Nicaragua and the Panama Canal, 601 
 Nictheroy, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 253, 
 
 262, 263, 265, 266 
 
682 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Nictheroy,. Brazilian Warship, 268 
 
 Nitrate Industry of Atacama, Tarapaca, 
 etc., the Dispute of Peru with Chile, 
 and the Chilian Occupation of Ata- 
 cama, Tarapaca, etc., 414, 420-423, 
 437, 480, 498, 516-517, 520, 555-556 
 
 Novidades, Brazilian Newspaper, 256 
 
 Novo Friburgo, Brazil, 310 
 
 Novoa Jovino, of Chile, 498 
 
 Nuble, Chile, 421 
 
 Nueva Coimbra, Brazil, 135 
 
 Numancia, Spanish Warship, 326, 509 
 
 Nunez, Capt. Castro Mendez, Spanish 
 Naval Commander, 326, 509-510 
 
 Nunez, Rafael, President of Colombia, 
 1880, 593-594 ; 1884-94, 595-599 
 
 Nunez, Velasco, de Vela, 11 
 
 Obes, Dr Julio Herrera y, President of 
 
 Uruguay, 213-215 
 O'Connor, Capt., of Argentina, 82 
 O'Higgins, Gen., in Chile, 25, 30 
 O'Higgins, Chile, 421 
 O'Higgins, Chilian Corvette, 327 ; in the 
 
 Chilian-Peruvian War, 1879-81, 
 
 442, 449-460, 488; in the Chilian 
 
 Civil War, 1891, 346, 347, 349, 354 
 O'Higgins, New Chilian Warship, 399 
 Oil Industry in Peru, 550 
 Olaiieto, Sefior, of Bolivia, 434 
 Olave, Col., in Uruguay, 198 
 Oliveira, Major, in the Paraguayan War, 
 
 185 
 Oliveira, Joao Alfredo Correa de, of 
 
 Brazil, 238 
 Olivera, Argentina, 56 
 Olmos, Col. Lisandro, at Cordoba, 52, 
 
 66 
 Olney, Richard, and the Boundary 
 
 Dispute between Venezuela and 
 
 British Guiana, 623 
 Oribe, Ignacio, President of Uruguay, 
 
 31 
 Oribe, Manuel, President of Uruguay, 
 
 31 
 Orinoco River, 643 
 Orion, Brazilian Warship, 263 
 Ortiz, Gregorio, Assassin, 212 
 Oruro, Bolivia, 562, 567, 571, 574 
 Osborn, Mr, U.S. Minister at Santiago, 
 
 480 
 Oscar, Gen. Arturo, Commander in 
 
 Expedition against Canudos, 299- 
 
 302 
 Oscurra, Paraguay, 184 
 Osorio, Gen., in Chile, 1818, 25 
 Osorio, Gen., Brazilian Commander in 
 
 the Paraguayan War, 133, 153-187 
 Osorio, Gen. Rocha, of Brazil, 1891, 255 
 Osomo, Chile, 416 
 
 Ospina, Mariano, President of Colombia, 
 
 28 
 Otalora, Gen., President of Colombia, 
 
 594-595 
 Ouro Preto, Vizconde de, of Brazil, 241, 
 
 299 
 Ouro Preto, Brazil, 314 
 Ovalle, Juan, of Chile, 358 
 Ovalle, Chile, 347 
 Ovando, Gen. , of Colombia, 28 
 Oviedo, Dr, of Peru, 495 
 
 Pacasmayo, Peru, 479 
 
 Pacheco, Sefior, President of Bolivia, 
 
 1884, 557 
 Pacocha, Peru, 468, 515 
 Pacto de Tregua, Apr. 4, 1884, 332, 501 ; 
 
 ratified, Nov. 29, 1884, 503, 557 
 Padilla, Major Julio, 376 
 Paez, Gen., 
 
 Hero in the War of Independence in 
 
 Venezuela, 22 
 President of Venezuela, 28 
 Palacios, Bishop, referred to, 173 
 Palacios, President, of Venezuela, 1 889, 
 
 621 
 Palacios, Lieut. Enrique, Peruvian 
 
 Naval Commander, 1879, 456 
 Pallas, Brazilian Merchant Ship, 264, 
 
 273 
 Palleja, Col., on the Battle of Yatay, 
 
 145-146 
 Palomas, Uruguay, 208 
 Pampas, 17 
 
 Panama, Isthmus and Canal : 
 Treaty with the United States, 28 ; 
 
 renewed 1865, 28 
 Panama Canal, 28, 601, 614, 655-656 
 Secession from Colombia, 1903, 601 
 Other References, 595, 600 
 Panama City : 
 Free Port, 28 
 United States Troops, at Panama, 
 
 1885, 597 
 Capture of Panama by Insurgents, 
 1898, 600 
 Panama Hats, 552 
 Pando, Col., 
 Leader of Insurrection in Bolivia, 1898- 
 
 99, 560-561 
 Chief Magistrate of Bolivia, 561 
 Para, Brazil, 255, 575 
 Parci, Warship, 166 
 Paraguay : 
 Early Catholic Missions, 9 
 Defeat of Gen. Brengano, 1810, 24 
 Emancipation from Spain, 1811, 25 
 Dr R. de Francia and F. Yegros 
 nominated First Consuls, 1811, 
 25 
 
INDEX 
 
 683 
 
 Paraguay — continued 
 
 Don Carlos Lopez, First Consul, 1841, 
 
 25 
 Gen. Francisco Solano Lopez, First 
 
 Consul, 1862, 25 
 Aggressive Attitude of Gen. Lopez 
 
 towards Argentina, 39 
 The Paraguayan War — Argentina, 
 Uruguay, and Brazil against 
 Paraguay, 1865-70, 39, 130-195, 
 210 
 Origin of the War, 131-135 
 Extente between Uruguay and Para- 
 guay, 131 
 Alliance with Bolivia, 136 
 Gen. Lopez and Uruguay, 134 
 Declaration of War in Brazil, 1864, 
 
 135 
 Invasion of Matto Grosso, 1864, 135- 
 
 136 
 Capture of Nueva Coimbra, Dec, 
 
 1864, 135 
 Congress at Asuncion, 137 
 The Army in 1865, 138 
 Occupation of Corrientes, Apr., 1865, 
 
 138-139, 141-142 
 Alliance between Argentina, Brazil, 
 and Uruguay against Paraguay, 
 May 1, 1865, 139, 210 
 Importance of the Parana and Para- 
 guay Rivers, 137, 139, 140 
 Plan of Campaign, 140, 141, 148 
 Distribution of the Army, 141 
 Recapture of Corrientes by the 
 Argentines, May 25, 1865, 142 
 Battle of the Riachuelo, June 11, 
 
 1865, 143 
 
 Advance towards Uruguay, 145 
 
 Operations near San Borge, June 15, 
 1865, 143 
 
 Invasion of Rio Grande, 144 
 
 Mutiny in Entre Rios, Argentina, 
 144 
 
 Gen. Flores appointed Commander 
 of the Allied Vanguard, 144 
 
 Conditions in Uruguay, 145 
 
 Battle of Yatay, Aug. 17, 1865, 145 
 
 Occupation of Uruguayana, Sept., 
 1865, 146-147 
 
 Surrender of Col. Estigarribia, Sept. 
 18, 1865, 147 
 
 Preparations for Defence of Para- 
 guay, 148 
 
 The Lopez Administration in Matto 
 Grosso, 148 
 
 Consultation of Argentine, Brazilian, 
 and Paraguayan Representa- 
 tives, 150 
 
 Peace Proposals refused by Brazil, 
 151 
 
 Paraguay — continued 
 
 The Paraguayan War — continued 
 Corrientes as the Base of Operations, 
 
 151 
 Defences of the Parana, 151, 152 
 Engagements at Paso de La Patria, 
 
 152, 153 
 Raid to Rati, Feb., 1866, 152 
 Reconnaissance of Paraguayan Posi- 
 tions, 153 
 Engagements on the Parana, Apr., 
 
 1866, 153 
 Camp near Fort Itapiru, 153 
 Surprise of Allies, 154 
 Advance into Paraguay, 154 
 Battle of May 20, 1866, 154 
 Discontent in Allied Army, 156 
 Engagements of July 15 and 18, 1866, 
 
 156 
 Expedition against Curupaite, 157 
 Engagement at Curuzii, Sept. 2, 
 
 1866, 157 
 Garrison of Curuzu, 158 
 
 Peace Proposals by Lopez, 158, 159 
 Attack upon Curupaiti, Sept., 1866, 
 
 159-160 
 Military Changes, 160 
 Marshal Caxias's Invasion, July, 
 
 1867, 161-162 
 Occupation of Rio Hondo, 162 
 Situation in Matto Grosso, 162 
 Operations at Humaita, 163, 164, 
 
 165, 166 
 Capture of Villa del Pilar, and Tayi, 
 
 Sept. 1867, 164 
 Engagement at Tuyutf, Nov., 1867, 
 
 164-165 
 Capture of Rqjas, 1868, 168 
 Capitidation of Curupaiti, 1868, 168 
 Bombardment of Humaita, Apr., 
 
 1868, 168 
 
 Attempt to seize the Monitor Rio 
 
 Grande, 169 
 Assault on Humaita, July, 1868, 
 
 169 
 Occupation of Humaita by the 
 
 Allies, July, 1868, 170-171 
 Conditions at Tibicuari, 172-173 
 Fighting on the River Canabe, Sept. , 
 
 1868, 175, 176, 177, 179 
 Assault on Agostura, Dec. , 1868, 176, 
 
 177 
 Capture of Villeta, Dec, 1868, 177 
 Hostilities resumed, Dec 20, 1868, 
 
 179 
 Action of Dec 20, 1868, 180 
 Surrender of Agostura, Dec 30, 
 
 1868, 180 
 Occupation of Asuncion, 180 
 Mission of Sefior Parunhos, 181 
 
684 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Paraguay — continued 
 
 The Paraguayan War — continued 
 Provisional Government at Asun- 
 cion, 182 
 Engagement at the River Manduvira, 
 
 182 
 Fight at Sapucay, July, 1869, 183 
 Attack on Peribebuy, July 12, 1869, 
 
 183-184 
 Evacuation of Oscurra and Caacupi 
 
 by Lopez, 184 
 Engagement at Yagari, Aug., 1869, 
 
 185 
 Action at Campo Grande, 185 
 Death of Lopez, Mar., 1870, 186 
 Treaty of Peace, July, 1870, 186 
 Uruguay and the War Indemnity, 
 210 
 Death of Gen. Lopez, Mar., 1870, 
 
 186 
 Cirilo Rivarola, President, 1870, 186- 
 
 188 
 Population of Paraguay, 1870, 187 
 Political Situation, 188-189 
 Resignation of President Rivarola, 
 
 1872, 188 
 Assassination of Ex-President Rivarola, 
 
 1872, 188 
 Salvador Jovellanos, President, 1872, 
 
 188-189 
 Senor Gill, President, 1874, 189 
 President Gill assassinated, 1875, 189 
 Senor Uriarte, President, 1875, 187, 
 
 189 
 Senor Baredo, President, 1875, 189 
 Senor Saguier, President, 1875, 189 
 Gen. Caballero, President, 1882, 189 
 Senor Escobar, President, 1886, 190 
 Senor Gonzalez, President, 1890, 190 
 President Gonzalez deposed, 1894, 
 
 190 
 Senor Morinigo, President, 1894, 190 
 J. B. Egusquiza, President, 1894, 190- 
 
 191 
 Boundary Dispute with Bolivia, 191 
 Relations with Uruguay, 191 
 Emilio Aceval, President, 1898, 191 
 Juan B. Escurra, President, 1902, 191 
 The Constitution of Paraguay, 188 
 Agriculture, etc., 192 
 Population, 187, 193 
 Australians at San Cosme, 194 
 Education, 194 
 Paraguay River, 139-140 
 Parana, Brazil, 283, 310 
 Parana River : 
 
 The Parana as a Waterway, 33 
 The Parana in the Paraguayan War, 
 137-148, 151-154 
 Paranagua, Brazil, 273, 280, 284 
 
 Pardo, Manuel, 
 
 Candidate for the Presidency of Peru, 
 
 512-513 
 President of Peru, 1872, 515-517 
 Assassination of Pardo, 1878, 518-519 
 Pareja, Adm. Jose Manuel, Spanish 
 
 Commander, 326, 507-509 
 Parish, Sir Woodbine, in Argentina, 24 
 Paroja, Gen. , in Chile, 25 
 Parra, Aquites, President of Colombia, 
 
 593 
 Parunhos, Senhor, of Brazil, 181 
 Paso de la Patria, 152, 153 
 Patagonia : 
 Catholic Missions, 9 
 Patagonian Indians, 15 
 Public Works, 118 
 Sheep-Farming, 430 
 President Roca in Patagonia in 1899, 
 114-115 
 Patillos, Chile, 348 
 
 Paul, Dr Rqjas, of Venezuela, 620, 621 
 Paunero, Gen., Argentine Commander 
 in the Paraguayan War, 142-147, 
 161, 187 
 Pavon, Argentina : Battle, Oct., 1861, 38, 
 
 40 
 Paysandii, Uruguay, 132-133, 201, 202, 
 
 205, 207, 208 
 Payta, Peru, 479 
 Paz, Dr Maximo, Governor of Buenos 
 
 Aires, 84 
 Pedro I., 14 
 Pedro II. : 
 
 His Personality, 232, 233 
 
 Emperor of Brazil, 14-15, 232-244, 313 
 
 Pedro and the Paraguayan War, 147, 
 
 151, 160 
 His Visits to Europe, 232, 236 
 His Return to Brazil, 1888, 240 
 Deposition of the Emperor, and His 
 
 Return to Portugal, 1889, 243 
 Death of Pedro, 1891, 257 
 Peixoto, Gen. Floriano, of Brazil 
 Republican, 239 
 
 Leader of Military Conspiracy, 242 
 Vice-President of Brazil, 245 
 President of Brazil, 1891, 256-288 
 Revolt against the President, 258-288 
 Pellegrini, Carlos, 
 Biographical, 48 
 Argentine Minister of War in 1880, 54, 
 
 55 
 Argentine Minister of War in 1885, 65 
 Vice-President of Argentina in 1886, 
 
 73 
 President of Argentina, 85-98 
 Other Reference, 110 
 Pelotas, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, 255 
 Pena, Capt., Chilian Commander, 478 
 
INDEX 
 
 685 
 
 Pefia, Benigno, of Chile, 358 
 Pena, Dr Luis Saenz, 
 
 Candidate for the Presidency of Argen- 
 tina, 94-96 
 President of Argentina, 96-108 
 His Financial Policy, 105 
 His Resignation, 107-108 
 Pena Blanca, Chile, 375 
 Peninsular War and Brazil, 13 
 Pereira, Leite, 173 
 Pereira, Luis, of Chile, 396 
 Pereira, Dr Victorino, Vice-President of 
 
 Brazil, 294, 296 
 Pereyra, Leonardo, of Argentina, 75-76, 
 
 93 
 Perez, Gen., Bolivian Commander, 470 
 Perez, Jose Joaquin, 
 
 President of Chile, 1861, 324-327 
 
 His Policy in the War with Spain, 
 
 1865-66, 326-327 
 President of Chile, 1866, 327-328 
 Perez, Col. Maximo, Leader of Revolt 
 
 in Uruguay, 199, 205 
 Perez, Dr Roque, of Buenos Aires, 41 
 Peribebuy, Paraguay, 182, 183 
 Pernambuco, Brazil, 274 
 Peru : 
 
 Inca Civilisation, 7, 8, 16 
 
 Spanish Rule, 8, 10, 12 
 
 Defeat of Almagro at Cuzco, 1538, 8 
 
 Francisco and Gonzalo Pizarro, 8, 10- 
 
 11, 539-540 
 Viceroy Velasco Nunez de Vela de- 
 feated near Quito, 1546, 11 
 Don Andres Hurtado de Mendoza, 
 
 Viceroy, 11 
 Spanish Monopoly of Official Posts, 12 
 The Aymara Indians, 16, 534, 538 
 Struggle for Independence, 23 
 Spanish defeated by Lord Cochrane, 
 
 1820, 23 
 Gen. San Martin at Lima, Callao, 
 
 etc., 23 
 Defeat of Spanish by Bolivar at Junin, 
 
 Aug. 6, 1824, 23 
 Spanish defeated by Gen. Sucre at 
 
 Ayacucho, Dec. 9, 1824, 43 
 Jose de la Riva Aguero, President, 
 
 1823, 29 
 Gen. Lamar, President, 1827, 29 
 Gen. Gamarra, President, 1829, 29 
 Gen. Santa Cruz and Gen. Salaverry, 
 
 29 
 Gen. Ramon Castilla, President, 1845, 
 
 29, 30 
 
 Gen. Echenique, President, 29 
 President Echenique deposed, 1855, 
 
 29 
 Gen. Ramon Castilla, President, 1855, 
 
 30, 506 
 
 Peru — continued 
 
 Constitution of, 1860, 505-506 
 Col. Balta, President, 1862, 30 
 Gen. San Roman, President, 1862, 506 
 Gen. Pezet, Vice-President, 506-508 
 Gen. Canseco, Second Vice-President, 
 
 506 
 Disputes with Spain, 1863, 506-508 
 Spanish Squadron in Peruvian Waters, 
 
 1863, 506-508 
 Incident at Talambo, 1863, 506-507 
 Revolt under Gen. Prado and Gen. 
 
 Canseco, Feb.-Nov., 1865, 506-508 
 Gen. Prado, President, 1865, 508-511 
 Peru and the Paraguayan War, 1865, 
 
 137, 151 
 Alliances with Chile, Ecuador, and 
 
 Bolivia, Dec, 1865, 326-327, 508 
 The Chincha Ids., Dispute between 
 
 Spain and Peru, 1864-65, 326, 333, 
 
 507-508 
 War with Spain of Chile and Peru, 
 
 1865-66, 326-327, 508-510 
 Naval Engagement near Abtao, 
 
 Feb. 6, 1866, 509 
 Spanish Bombardment of Val- 
 paraiso, Mar. 31, 326-327, 509 
 Spanish Bombardment of Callao, 
 
 May 2, 509-510, 517-520 
 Withdrawal of Spanish Squadron, 
 
 May 12, 510 
 Other References to the War, see 
 under Chile 
 Dictatorship of Gen. Prado, 510 
 Revision of the Constitution, 1867, 
 
 510 
 Gen. Prado, Constitutional President, 
 
 1867, 510 
 Revolt against President Prado under 
 
 Gen. Canseco and Col. Jose 
 
 Balta, 1867, 510-511 
 Gen. Luis de La Fuerta, Vice- 
 President, 511 
 Resignation of President Prado, Jan. 
 
 6, 1868, 511 
 Gen. Canseco, Acting President, 511 
 Constitutional Reforms of 1867 re- 
 voked, 511 
 Col. Jose Balta, President, Aug. , 1868, 
 
 511-513 
 The Financial Situation, 511-512 
 Public Works, 512 
 The Gutierrez Conspiracy in Lima 
 
 and Callao, 1872, 512-514 
 Assassination of President Balta, 1872, 
 
 513-514 
 Mariano Herencia Zevallos, Vice- 
 President, 514 
 Manuel Pardo, President of Peru, 
 
 1872, 512-513, 515-517 
 
686 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Peru — continued 
 Reforms, 515 
 Revolt under Nicolas de Pierola, 1874, 
 
 515-516 
 Pardo's Foreign Policy, 516-517 
 Secret Alliance between Bolivia and 
 
 Peru, 1873, 436, 441, 517, 555 
 Gen. Prado re-elected President, 1875, 
 
 450, 474-475, 517-520 
 Gen. La Puerta, Vice-President, 474 
 Conspiracies under Nicolas de Pierola, 
 
 1876 and 1878, 518 
 Treaty with Spain, 1878, 518 
 Assassination of Ex-President Pardo, 
 
 Sept. 22, 1878, 518-519 
 The Guano Deposits and the Nitrate 
 Industry of Atacama, and the 
 Disputes between Bolivia and 
 Chile, Peruvian Intrigues in 
 Bolivia, the Chilian War with 
 Perii and Bolivia, 1879-84, and 
 the Chilian Occupation of Ata- 
 cama, Tarapaca, Tacna and Arica. 
 433-504 
 Atacama and its Guano Deposits 
 and Nitrate Industry, 433 et 
 seq., 519-520 
 Peruvian Intrigues in Bolivia, and 
 Secret Treaty between Peru and 
 Bolivia, 1873, 436, 441, 517, 
 555 
 Peruvian Intrigues in Bolivia, 1875- 
 
 78, 437-438, 555 
 Peruvian Proposal of Arbitration 
 between Bolivia and Chile, 439- 
 440 
 Chilian Declaration of War against 
 Peru, Apr. 5, 1879, 440-441, 520 
 The Peruvian Navy, 443 
 Military Forces, 444-445 
 President Prado, Commander of the 
 
 Peruvian Army, 474, 520 
 Operations of the Chilian Squadron, 
 
 448-449 
 Pisagua bombarded by Chilians, 
 
 449 
 Naval Action off Iquique, May 20, 
 and Loss of the lndependencia, 
 450-453 
 Peruvian Reprisals, 453-454 
 The Huascar captured by Chilians, 
 
 Oct. 8, 454-457 
 The Pilconiayo captured by Chilians, 
 
 Nov. 17, 457 
 Chilian Invasion of Tarapaca, 458- 
 
 460, 520 
 Battle of Pisagua, Nov. 2, 460-461 
 Chilian Occupation of Junin, 461 
 Skirmish near Agua Santa, Nov. 
 6, 461-462 
 
 Perii — continued 
 The Guano Deposits, etc. — continued 
 Battle at San Francisco, Dolores, 
 
 Nov. 16, 462-464 
 Chilian Occupation of Iquique, Nov. 
 
 20, 464 
 Battle of Tarapaca, Nov. 27, 465- 
 
 467 
 Adm. Montero in Command of the 
 
 Peruvian Army, Nov. 26, 1879, 
 
 474 
 Chilian Invasion of Tacna and Arica, 
 
 Feb. 1880, 468-470 
 Battle of Tacna, May 26, 470-471 
 Battle of Arica, June 7, 472-473 
 Blockade of Callao by Chilians, 
 
 1880, 475-479, 483, 493 
 Chorillos, etc., bombarded by 
 
 Chilians, Sept. 1880, 479-480 
 Efforts of the United States for 
 
 Peace, Oct., 1880, and Confer- 
 ence on the Lackaioana, 480- 
 
 481 
 Chilian Demands rejected, 481 
 Pisco and Yea occupied by Chilians, 
 
 Nov., 1880, 482 
 Naval Action at Callao, Dec. 6, 
 
 483 
 Defences of Lima, 483-485 
 Battle of Chorillos, Jan. 13, 1881, 
 
 485-487 
 Fighting on Morro Solar, Jan. 13, 
 
 487 
 Armistice, Jan. 15, 488 
 Battle of Miraflores, Jan. 15, 488- 
 
 489, 522 
 Lima occupied by Chilians, Jan. 16, 
 
 489-500 
 Panic in Lima, 490-491 
 The Urban Guard, 491 
 Chilian Acts of Vandalism, 492-493 
 Peruvian Guerilla Warfare against 
 
 Chilians, 1882, 495-496 
 Capture of Arequipa by Chilians, 
 
 Aug., 1883, 496 
 Gen. Iglesias and Peace, 496-497 
 Treaty of Peace (Treaty of Ancon) 
 
 between Chile and Peru, Oct. 
 
 20, 1883, 497-500 ; ratified, May 
 
 8, 1884, 332, 403, 407, 500-501, 
 
 523, 529 
 Lima evacuated by Chilians, Oct. 
 
 22, 1883, 500 
 Tarapaca ceded to Chile, 498 
 Chilian Occupation of Tarapaca, 
 
 414, 420-423, 437, 480, 498, 516- 
 
 517, 520 
 Chilian Occupation of Tacna and 
 
 Arica, 403-404, 407, 468-473, 
 
 481, 498, 502, 529, 556 
 
INDEX 
 
 687 
 
 Peru — continued 
 The Guano Deposits, etc. — continued 
 Chilian Occupation of Atacama, 437, 
 
 517, 555-556 
 Other References to the War, see 
 under Bolivia, Chile 
 President Prado's Flight to Europe, 
 
 Dec, 1879, 474-475,520 
 Conspiracy under Nicolas de Pierola, 
 
 Dec, 1879, 475,520-521 
 Resignation of Gen. de La Puerta, Vice- 
 President, Dec, 1879, 520-521 
 Nicolas de Pierola, President, 1879, 
 
 475, 520-522 
 Dr F. G. Calderon, President, Mar. 12, 
 
 1881, 494-495 
 Adm. Montero, Vice-President, 494 
 Adm. Montero, President, Aug. 1881, 
 
 495 
 Ministry of Capt. Carailo Carrillo, 495 
 Nicolas Pierola, Provisional President, 
 
 1881, 495 
 Gen. Miguel Iglesias, President, 1883, 
 
 496-497, 522-524 
 Revolt under Gen. Caceres, 1884-85, 
 
 523-524 
 Gen. Caceres, President, 1886, 524-525 
 Col. Morales Bermudez, President, 
 
 1890, 524-525 
 Pedro A. del Solar and Col. Borgofto, 
 
 Vice-Presidents, 525-526 
 Col. Arrate of Chile in Peru, Apr., 1891, 
 
 354 
 Gen. Caceres, President, 1894, 526 
 Revolt under Pierola, 1894-95, 526-527, 
 
 538 
 Provisional Government under Sefior 
 
 Candarao, 1895, 527 
 Pierola, President, 1895, 527-528, 542, 
 
 544 
 Insurrection in Iquitos, 527 
 New Electoral Law, 527-528 
 Civil Marriages, 528 
 Boundary Dispute with Colombia, 
 
 1895, 529 
 Other Boundary Disputes, 529 
 Sefior Romaiia, President, 1899, 528- 
 
 529 
 Revolution under Sefior Durand, 528 
 Manuel Candamo, President, 1903, 529 
 Population, 530-534 
 Races of Peru, 531-534 
 Alcoholism, 533 
 Language, 533-534 
 Topography, 534 
 Education, 534-536 
 Administration of Justice, 536-537 
 The Catholic Church, 537-538, 540, 541 
 National Character, 538-539 
 Municipal Government, 539 
 
 Peru — continued 
 Finance, 541-544 
 Industries, 545-552 
 Sugar-Growing, 545-546 
 Cotton Industry, 546-547, 552 
 Coffee, etc., 547 
 Cattle and Sheep, 547-548 
 Mineral Wealth, 548-550 
 Oil, 550 
 
 Guano Exports, 1869, 511-512 
 Borax, 550 
 
 Rubber, Gum, etc. , 551-552 
 Manufactures, 552 
 
 Railways, Roads, etc., 549, 551, 552- 
 553 
 Peruvian Corporation, 542, 547 
 Petroleum Industry in Peru, 550 
 Petropolis, Brazil, 310 
 Pezet, Gen., President of Peru, 506-508 
 Pichincha, Ecuador, 22 
 Pierola, Nicolas de, 
 
 Peruvian Conspirator, 1874, 515-516 ; 
 
 1876, etc., 518 
 Leader of Revolt in Peru, 1879, 475, 
 
 520-521 
 President of Peru, 1879, 475, 520-522 
 Commander in the Chilian-Peruvian 
 
 War, 1880-81, 484-489, 494 
 Provisional President of Peru, 1881, 495 
 Leader of Revolt in Peru, 1894-95, 526, 
 
 538 
 President of Peru, 1895, 527-528, 542, 
 544 
 Pietri, Dr, referred to, 628 
 Pilcomayo, Peruvian Sloop, 443 ; captured 
 by Chilians, 1879, 457, 476, 479, 488 
 Pincon, Vincent Yanez, and Brazil, 12 
 Pinto, Gen., President of Chile : in 1827, 
 
 30 ; in 1829, 30 
 Pinto, Anibal, President of Chile, 1876, 
 
 329-331 
 Pinto, Col., Bolivian Commander, 470 
 Pinto, Sefior, Salvador Minister in Peru, 
 
 288 
 Pinzon, Rear-Adm. , Spanish Com- 
 mander, 506, 507 
 Pipon, Capt., of the Sirius, 281 
 Pirene, Peru, 547 
 Pisagua : 
 Pisagua in the Chilian-Peruvian War, 
 
 1879, 449, 459-461 
 Pisagua in the Chilian Civil War, 1891, 
 
 347, 349-350, 364 
 Other References, 422, 449 
 Pisco, Peru, 482 
 Piura, Peru, 546, 550 
 Pizarro, Francisco, 
 Pizarro and Atahualpa, 7, 584, 587 
 Founder of Lima, 539-540 
 Other References, 8, 10 
 
688 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Pizarro, Gonzalo, 8, 11 
 
 Placilla, Chile, 376-380 
 
 Plague in Brazil, 308 
 
 Plate River Republics, 650-652 
 
 Plaza, Gen. Leonidas, President of 
 
 Ecuador, 1901, 583 
 Plaza, Dr Victorino de la, Minister of 
 
 War in Argentina, 68 
 Polidoro, Gen., Brazilian Commander in 
 
 the Paraguayan War, 158-160, 183 
 Population : of South America, 9-11, 15- 
 16, 650 ; of Paraguay, 193 ; of Brazil, 
 309; of Chile, 411-412; of Peru, 
 530-534 ; of Bolivia, 566 ; of Ecuador, 
 584 ; of Colombia, 606-607 ; of 
 Venezuela, 634-635 
 Portales, Gen., in Chile, 30 
 Portenos of Buenos Aires, see under 
 
 Argentina 
 Porto Alegre, Brazil, 235, 310 
 Portugal and South America : 
 
 Portuguese Dominion of Brazil, 1500- 
 
 1578, and 1649, 12-14 
 The Portuguese Seat of Government 
 
 in Brazil, 1808, 13 
 Invasion of French Guiana, 1808, 13 
 Joao VI., 1807-21, 13 
 Pedro I., 1822, 14 
 Portuguese Aggression in Uruguay 
 
 till 1828, 24 
 Pedro II., 1840, 14, 232-244, 257, 313 
 The Portuguese and Brazilian Insur- 
 gents in 1894, 280-281 
 Diplomatic Relations between Portugal 
 and Brazil broken off, 281 ; and 
 resumed, 1895, 290 
 Portuguese in Brazil, 309, 311 
 Positivism in Brazil, 235 
 Potosi, Bolivia, 574 
 Pozo Almonte, Battle, Mar. 7, 1891, 353- 
 
 355 
 Pradera Iron Works, Colombia, 613 
 Prado, B. , of Chile, 360, 362 
 Prado, Gen. Mariano Ignacio, 
 Leader of Rebellion in Peru, 1865, 506- 
 
 508 
 President of Peru, 1865, 508-511 
 Defender of Callao against Spain, 1866, 
 
 517, 520 
 President of Peru, 1875, 450, 474-475, 
 
 517-520 
 Commander of the Peruvian Army in 
 the Chilian-Peruvian War, 1879, 
 450, 474, 520 
 His Flight to Europe, Dec, 1879, 474- 
 475, 520 
 Prado, Lieut, of Peru, 468 
 Prat, Capt., Chilian Naval Commander 
 in the Chilian-Peruvian War, 450- 
 451 
 
 Prats, Belisario, of Chile, 340 
 Presidents Errazuriz, Chilian Cruiser, 
 
 358, 363 
 
 Presidente Pinto, Chilian Cruiser, 358, 363 
 Prieto, Gen., President of Chile: in 
 
 1831, 30, 321-323 ; in 1835, 30, 323 
 Puerto del Ingles, Uruguay, 202 
 Puiff, Ship, 207 
 Pulucayo Mine, Bolivia, 574 
 Puno de Atacama Dispute between 
 
 Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia : in 
 
 1898, 111-112; in 1899, 113-114; in 
 
 1900, 407 
 Punta Arenas, Chile, 420, 425, 430 
 Punta Gruesa, Chile, 453 
 Punto Grosso, Brazil, 283 
 Puy, Gen., in Venezuela, 21 
 Puyredon, Dictator, in Argentina, 24, 32 
 
 Queimadas, Brazil, 298 
 
 Queiros, Gen. Innocencio Galvao de, of 
 Brazil, 292 
 
 Quichua Indians and the Quichua Lan- 
 guage, 16, 534, 538, 567-569 
 
 Quilloga, Chile, 355 
 
 Quillota, Chile, 347, 375 
 
 Quilpue, Chile, 373-376 
 
 Quintana, Dr, Candidate for the Presi- 
 dency of Argentina, 120 
 
 Quinteros, Chile, 131, 346, 368-369, 370, 
 391-396 
 
 Quiroga, Gen., in Argentina, 32, 33 
 
 Quito, Ecuador, 21, 579, 584, 586, 587 
 
 Raceoo, Col., in Buenos Aires, 55, 56, 
 
 57 
 Racer, British Ship, 265-266 
 Railways: in Argentina, 64, 109-110; in 
 
 Uruguay, 227 ; in Brazil, 236, 315 ; 
 
 in Chile, 328, 419-420; in Peru, 512, 
 
 515, 551-552; in Bolivia, 571-572; 
 
 in Ecuador, 587-588 ; in Colombia, 
 
 604 ; in Venezuela, 642 
 Ramirez, Col. , Chilian Commander, 448, 
 
 466 
 Ramirez, Dr Jose Pedro, of Uruguay, 
 
 212, 221 
 Rasquim, Gen., of Paraguay, 186 
 Raycraft, Mr, in Chile, 393 
 Rebolledo, Rear-Adm. Juan Williams, 
 
 Chilian Naval Commander, 326, 448- 
 
 454 
 Recarbarren, Col. Isaac, Peruvian Com- 
 mander, 459-461, 487 
 Registration Law in Chile, 332, 336 
 Reinafe, Gen. , of Argentina, 33 
 Religion in South America, see Catholic 
 
 Church 
 Republic, Brazilian Warship, in the 
 
 Revolt in Brazil, 1893-94, 263-285 
 
INDEX 
 
 689 
 
 Resolution, Spanish Frigate, 507, 509 
 Reyes, Gen., of Colombia, 596 
 Reyes, Vicente, of Chile, 404 
 Riachuelo River, 56, 143 
 Riachuelo, Brazilian Cruiser, 255 
 Ribera, Fructuoso, President of Uruguay, 
 
 31 
 Riesco, Jerman, President of Chile, 1901, 
 
 388, 409 
 Riggin, Quartermaster, of the Baltimore, 
 
 393 
 llimac, Chilian Transport : captured by 
 Peru, 1879, 454 ; in the Chilian- 
 Peruvian War, 1880, 481 ; destroyed, 
 Jan. 1881, 493 
 Rio Branco Law, 237 
 Rio Grande, Brazil: 
 
 Rio Grande in the Paraguayan War, 
 
 134, 141, 144 
 Revolt in 1878, 235-236 
 Revolt in 1893, 259, 265 
 Attack on Rio Grande by Rebels, 
 
 Apr., 1894, 284-286 
 Revolt, 1895, 290-293 
 Rio Grande, Monitor, 169 
 Rio Honda, 162 
 
 Rio de Janeiro, see under Brazil 
 Rio de Janeiro, Brazilian Warship, 157 
 Riobamba, Ecuador, 585 
 Rioja, Argentina, 117, 161 
 Rios, Col., Peruvian Commander, 464, 
 
 466 
 Ptiquelme, Lieut. -Col., of Chile, 351 
 Rivadavia, President of Argentina, 24, 32 
 Rivarola, Cirilo, President of Paraguay, 
 
 186, 188 
 Rivas, Gen. Ignacio, in the Paraguayan 
 
 War, 169, 170 
 Riveros, Rear-Adm. Galvarino, Chilian 
 
 Commander, 454-455, 475, 479 
 Robles, Gen., Paraguayan Commander, 
 
 137, 138, 148 
 Robles, Gen. Eulojio, of Chile, 348-354 
 Roca, Gen. Julio, 
 
 Candidate for the Presidency of 
 
 Argentina, 47, 54, 55 
 President of Argentina, 60-68, 71 
 His Administration, 61-68 
 Roca and Celman, 71-72 
 Argentine Minister of the Interior, 88, 
 
 97 
 Attempted assassination of Roca in 
 
 1891, 92 
 Mitre and Roca, 93, 94 
 Commander in Santa Fe, 102 
 Again President of Argentina, 110-120 
 His Meeting with President Errazuriz 
 
 of Chile, 114 
 His Visit to Patagonia, 114-115 
 His Visit to Brazil, 1899, 116, 307 
 
 Rocafuerte, Vicente, President of 
 
 Ecuador, 29 
 Rocha, Dr Dardo, of Argentina, 49, 66- 
 
 67 
 Rocha, Uruguay, 207 
 Rodriguez, Senor, of Uruguay, 181 
 Rodriguez, Lieut. , Peruvian Naval Com- 
 mander, 456 
 Rogers, Lieut., Chilian Naval Com- 
 mander, 456-457 
 Rojas, Argentina, in the Paraguayan 
 
 War, 154-161, 168 
 Romaila, Senor, President of Peru, 1899, 
 
 528-529 
 Rome, Church of, see Catholic Church 
 Rosa, Almeida, of Brazil, 139 
 Rosales, Torpedo-Catcher, wrecked, 98, 
 
 107 
 Rosario, Santa Fe, Argentina, 38, 56 
 Rosas, Juan Manuel, 
 His Action in Uruguay, 31 
 Governor and Captain-General of 
 
 Buenos Aires, 33 
 His Attitude towards French Settlers, 
 
 33-34 
 Tyranny and Downfall of Rosas, 36- 
 37 
 Ross, Augustin, 365, 366 
 Rubber Industry : of Peru, 551 ; of 
 Bolivia, 575 ; of Ecuador, 588 ; of 
 Colombia, 612 
 Rucanas, 16 
 
 Saa, Gen., Uruguayan Commander, 
 
 133 
 Saavedra, Gen. Cornelio, Chilian Com- 
 mander, 489, 492 
 Saguier, President, of Paraguay, 1875, 
 
 189 
 St John, Mr, in Venezuela, 1887, 
 
 621 
 St John, Alfred, British Consul in Peru, 
 
 1895, 527 
 St John, Sir Spencer, British Minister in 
 
 Peru, 1881, 488, 491 
 Salado River, 434-435 
 Salaverry, Gen., in Peru, 29 
 Salaverry, Peru, 479 
 Salazar, Gen., of Venezuela, 619 
 Salazar, Eusebio, y Mazarredo, of Spain, 
 
 507 
 Saldana, Col. Atanasildo, of Uruguay, 
 
 207 
 Salgado, Col., of Brazil, 272, 284-285 
 Salinas, Belisario, of Bolivia, 501 
 Salisbury, Marquis of, and the Boundary 
 
 Dispute between Venezuela and 
 
 Guiana, 623 
 Salles, Bernardino de Campos, of Brazil, 
 
 251 
 
 2x 
 
690 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Salles, Dr Manoel F. Campos, 
 
 Personality of Dr Campos Salles, 
 
 305 
 Republican, 239, 251 
 President of Brazil, 1898, 304-308 
 His Visit to Europe, 306 
 His Visit to Argentina, 1900, 118- 
 119 
 
 Salt Mines : in Colombia, 613 ; in Vene- 
 zuela, 642 
 
 Salto, Uruguay, 131, 207 
 
 Sama River, 469 
 
 San Bartolome (Hill), Peru, 485, 489 
 
 San Borge, Brazil, 143 
 
 San Clemento, California, 359 
 
 San Cosme, 152, 194 
 
 San Cristoval (Hill), Peru, 489 
 
 San Diego, California, 359, 360 
 
 San Francisco, Dolores, Peru, Battle of, 
 1879, 462-463 
 
 San Francisco, U.S. Cruiser, in Chilian 
 Waters, 277, 380, 391-392, 395 
 
 San Juan, Argentina, 161 
 
 San Juan (Hill), Peru, 484, 486-487 
 
 San Lorenzo, Peru, 476, 509-510 
 
 San Luis, Argentina, 101, 161 
 
 San Martin, Gen., Argentine Com- 
 mander, 23, 25, 653 
 
 San Roman, Gen., President of Perii, 
 1862, 506^ 
 
 Sanchez, Evaristo, of Chile, 338 
 
 Sanchez Jose, of Peru, 523 
 
 Sanclemente, M. A., President of Colom- 
 bia, 1898, 599 
 
 Sandia, Peru, 549 
 
 Sanfuentes, Sen or, of Chile, 340 
 
 Santa Anna de Liviamento, Brazil, 255 
 
 Santa Catharina, Brazil, 283, 310 
 
 Santa Cruz, Gen., in Peru, 29; in 
 Bolivia, 1827-39, 30 
 
 Santa Cruz, Col., Chilian Commander, 
 1879, 466 
 
 Santa Cruz, Bolivia, 567, 575 
 
 Santa Cruz, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, 
 257, 263, 264, 265, 269, 274, 279 
 
 Santa Lucia Chico, River, 200 
 
 Santa Maria, Domingo, President of 
 Chile, 1881, 331-333, 335, 336 
 
 Santa Teresa (Hill) Peru, 484, 486 
 
 Santander, Gen. , President of Colombia, 
 27, 28 
 
 Santiago, Chile : 
 
 Fire at the Compaflia Church, 1863, 
 
 325 
 Other References, to Town and Pro- 
 vince, 348, 356, 365, 380-384, 411- 
 412, 416, 421, 431 
 
 Santibanez, Jose Maria, of Bolivia, 434 
 
 Santibanez, Ramon, of Chile, 358 
 
 Santo Domingo, Peru, 550 
 
 Santos, Gen. Maximo, 
 
 Chief Adviser to President Vidal of 
 
 Uruguay, 209-210 
 President of Uruguay, 1882, 210-211 
 Commander-in-Chief, 211 
 Revolt against Gen. Santos, 211 
 Captain-General, 211 
 President of Uruguay, 1886, 211-212 
 Attempted Assassination of President 
 Santos, 212 
 Sao Francisco Xavier, Brazil, 299 
 Sao Joao Baptista, Brazil, 263, 264, 265, 
 
 269, 274, 279 
 Sao Paulo, Brazil : 
 
 Sao Paulo in the Republican Move- 
 ment, 235-239, 243, 244, 246, 251, 
 254 
 Sao Paulo and the Slavery Question, 
 
 237-240 
 Other References, 264, 265, 284, 283, 
 299, 309-310 
 Sapucay, Paraguay, 183 
 Saraiva, Aparicio, 
 Leader of Risings in Uruguay, 217- 
 
 222, 224 
 Leader of Rising in Rio Grande do Sul, 
 290 
 Saraiva, Conselheiro, Brazilian Envoy to 
 
 Uruguay, 132 
 Saraiva, Gumercindo, Leader of Revolt 
 
 in Brazil, 259, 271-287 
 Sarmiento, Col., and Dr Lucio V. Lopez, 
 
 1894, 106 
 Sarmiento, Dr, President of Argentina, 
 
 1868-74, 40-41, 43, 63, 123-125 
 Saraget, Gen., of Brazil, 299-300 
 Schley, Capt., of the Baltimore, 393 
 Scruggs, Mr, referred to, 627 
 Seguier, Vice-President, of Paraguay, 
 
 189 
 Senoret, Lieut., Chilian Commander, 
 
 477 
 Sepulveda, Capt., Chilian Commander, 
 
 461 
 Serena, Chile, 347, 348 
 Sergipe, Brazil, 300 
 Serpe, Dr Epifanio, of Peru, 495 
 Serrano, Lieut. Ignacio, Chilian Naval 
 
 Commander, 452 
 Serzedello, Major, of Brazil, 251 
 Sete de Seplembre, Brazilian Warship, 263 
 Shah, British Warship, 518 
 Shannon, British Warship, 464 
 Sheep-Farming, etc. : in Argentina, 127- 
 128 ; in Uruguay, 228-229 ; in Chile, 
 420, 430; in Peru, 547-548; in 
 Colombia, 612 ; in Venezuela, 641 
 Silva, Gen. , Peruvian Commander, 486 
 Silva, Gen. Jose da, in the Paraguayan 
 War, 176, 184 
 
INDEX 
 
 691 
 
 Silva, Rodrigo Augusto da, of Brazil, 238 
 Silva, Dr Rosa E., Vice-President of 
 
 Brazil, 1898, 304 
 Silva, Waldo, of Chile, 346, 389-391 
 Silver: in Chile, 424; in Peru, 549; in 
 Bolivia, 573-574; in Venezuela, 
 642 
 Simeao, Jose, of Brazil, 251 
 Simpson, Lieut, Chilian Naval Com- 
 mander, 456-457 
 Sirius, British Ship, 265-266, 281 
 Slavery: Emancipation of Slaves in 
 
 Brazil, 237-240 
 Sodre, Lauro, of Brazil, 304 
 Solar, Javier Vial, 365 
 Solar, Pedro A. del, Vice-President of 
 
 Peru, 1890, 525-526 
 Soriano, Uruguay, 207 
 Soto, Col., of Chile, 1891, 351-352 
 Soto, Seiior, of Chile, 1891, 379 
 Sotomayor, Gen., Chilian Commander, 
 
 446-448, 481, 486-487 
 Sotomayor, Rafael, Chilian War Minister, 
 
 458, 470 
 South America (see also Argentina, 
 Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
 Ecuador, Paraguay, Patagonia, Peru, 
 Uruguay) : 
 Geographical Position, 17 
 Mineral Wealth, 17, 654 
 Agriculture, etc., 17, 651 
 The Spanish Conquest of South 
 America and Spanish Colonial 
 Policy, 6-10 
 Emancipation of South America from 
 
 Spanish Rule, 12-34, 653 
 Proposed Federation of Republics, 27, 
 
 653 
 The Republics and Internal Dissen- 
 sions, 647 
 Spanish and Portuguese Influence, 648- 
 
 650 
 The River Plate Republics, 650-652 
 Pan-American Congresses, 654 
 The United States and South America, 
 
 651-657 
 The Monroe Doctrine, 25-26 
 The Panama Canal, 28, 601, 614, 655- 
 656 
 Souza, Gen. Guillermo, in the Para- 
 guayan War, 156 
 Souza, Gen. Juan da, in the Paraguayan 
 
 War, 180-182 
 Spain : 
 Traits of Spanish Character, 3 
 Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, 4 
 Treatment of Moors and Jews, 4 
 The Inquisition, 4, 540 
 The People of Spain in the 15th 
 Century, 6 
 
 Spain — continued 
 Early Spanish Colonists and their 
 Treatment of Natives in South 
 America, etc., 6 
 Spanish Colonial Policy, 10 
 Emancipation of Spanish Colonies, 
 
 12-34, 653 
 Peruvian Disputes with Spain, 506- 
 
 507 
 Spanish Squadron in Peruvian Waters, 
 
 1863-64, 506-507 
 The Talambo Incident in Peru, 1863, 
 
 507 
 Dispute with Peru re the Chinch a 
 
 Ids., 1864, 326, 333, 507-508 
 Chilian War with Spain, 1865-66, 326- 
 
 327 
 Peruvian War with Spain, Jan. 14, 
 
 1866-May 12, 1866, 508-510 
 Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile, and Perii, 
 and the War with Spain, 1865-66, 
 326-327, 508 
 The Govadonga captured by Chilians, 
 
 Jan. 1866, 326, 509 
 Naval Engagement of Spain against 
 Chile and Peru near Abtao, Feb. 
 6, 1866, 509 
 Spanish Bombardment of Valparaiso, 
 
 Mar. 31, 1866, 326-327, 509 
 Spanish Bombardment of Callao, May 
 
 2, 1866, 509-510, 517, 520 
 Chilian Truce with Spain, 1867, 327 ; 
 
 and Treaty, 1879, 327 
 Spanish Arbitration in the Boundary 
 Dispute between Venezuela and 
 Colombia, 1883-1891, 595 
 Spain and Cuba, 5, 7, 648 
 Spanish Influence in South America, 
 648-650 
 Staunton, Adm.,in Brazilian Waters, 276 
 Stephan, Col., of Chile, 356 
 Stewart, Duncan, of Uruguay, 215 
 Storrow, Mr, 627 
 Suarez, Col., in Peru, 1824, 23 
 Suarez, Gen., in the Paraguayan War, 
 
 1866, 152 
 Suarez, Col. Belisario, Peruvian Com- 
 mander, 1879-81, 459, 464, 467, 
 470, 484, 486, 489 
 Suarez, Gen. Jose Gregorio, 
 
 Candidate for the Presidency in 
 
 Uruguay, 1868, 199 
 Commander of Troops against Blanco 
 Revolutionists in Uruguay, 1870, 
 200-202 
 Suarez, Lieut. -Col. Manuel, Peruvian 
 
 Commander, 1879, 466 
 Sucre, Gen., of Bolivia : 
 
 Commander at Pichincha, 1822, 22 
 President of Bolivia, 1825, 23, 30, 653 
 
INDEX 
 
 Sucre, Bolivia, 562, 563, 567 
 Sugar-Cultivation : in Peru, 545-546 ; in 
 
 Venezuela, 640 
 Supe, Peru, 479 
 Switzerland and the Amapa Dispute 
 
 between Brazil and French Guiana, 
 
 306-307 
 
 Tacna : 
 
 Chilian Invasion and Battle of Tacna, 
 
 May 26, 1880, 468-471, 481 
 Bolivia and Peru and the Chilian 
 Occupation of Tacna, 403-404, 
 407, 498, 502, 529, 556 
 Other References, 354, 420 
 Tacuarembo, Uruguay, 208 
 'Page, Brazil, 136 
 Tajes, Gen. Maximo, 
 
 Commander in Uruguay, 211 
 President of Uruguay, 212-213 
 Talambo, Peru, 506-507 
 Talara, Peru, 550 
 Talca, Chile, 324 
 Talcahuano, Chile, 346 
 Talisman, Peruvian Transport, 493, 515 
 Taltal, Chile, 364, 421, 423, 454 
 Tamandare, Adm., Brazilian Com- 
 mander, 132, 133, 139, 158-160, 187 
 TamandarS, see Almirante Tamandard 
 Tamarugal, Chile, 429, 462 
 Tarapaca (see also Iquique) 
 
 The Nitrate Industry, the Dispute of 
 Peru with Chile, and the Chilian 
 Occupation, 414, 420-423, 437, 
 480, 498, 516-517, 520 
 Borax in Tarapaca, 426 
 Battle of Tarapaca, 1879, 464-467 
 Other References, to Town and Pro- 
 vince, 354, 459, 462 
 Tarija, Bolivia, 567 
 
 Tavares, Gen., Jose da Silva, of Brazil, 
 255, 292-293, in the Paraguayan 
 War, 185 
 Tayi, Paraguay, 164, 172 
 Tejeda, Capt. M., of Chile, 359-360 
 Tejedor, Dr Carlos, 
 Governor of Buenos Aires, 45, 47 
 Candidate for the Presidency of 
 Argentina, 47, 53 
 Telegraph Service in Brazil, 316 
 Telles, Gen., of Brazil, 269 
 Tesoreria General de la Escuadra in 
 
 Chile, 389 
 Tibicuari, Paraguay, 173-174 
 Tierra del Fuego, 420, 421, 425, 430 
 Timbo, Argentina, 166 
 Tiradentes of Brazil, 13 
 Tiro Nacional (Volunteers) of Buenos 
 
 Aires, 45-46 
 Titicaca Region, 16 
 
 Toco, Chile, 423 
 
 Tocopilla, Chile, 359, 422, 446, 448, 454 
 Tolima, Colombia, 613 
 Topater Ford, Atacama, Chile, 447 
 Torata, Peru, 469, 516 
 Torico, Rufino, of Lima, Peru, 489 
 Toro, Domingo, y Herrera, of Chile, 387 
 Toro, Chilian Ship, 488 
 Tovar, Manuel, Archbishop of Lima, 523 
 Trajano, Brazilia.n Warship, 263, 277 
 Transvaal referred to, 565 
 Tres Arboles, Uruguay, 219 
 Trinidade, Brazil ; British Occupation, 292 
 Triunfo, Spanish Warship, 507 
 Trouin, Adm. Duguay, and Brazil, 13 
 Trujillo, President, of Colombia, 593 
 Trujillo, Peru, 536, 550 
 Trumbull, Senor, 364 
 Truxillo, Peru, 479 
 
 Tucapd, Chilian Torpedo-Boat, 477, 483 
 Tucuman, Argentina, 24 
 Tupi-Guarani Indians, 15 
 Tupper, Alvaro Bianchi, 365 
 Tupper, Lieut. C. G. , 266 
 Tuyuti, Argentina, in the Paraguayan 
 War, 159-165 
 
 Udaondo, Dr, 
 
 Governor of Buenos Aires, 116 
 Candidate for the Presidency of 
 Argentina, 120 
 Union, Peruvian Corvette : in the War 
 with Spain, 1866, 508 ; in the 
 Chilian - Peruvian War, 1879-81, 
 443, 454-457, 476, 483; wrecked, 
 1881, 493 
 Union Civica in Argentina, see under 
 
 Argentina 
 Union Civica Radical in Argentina, see 
 
 under Argentina 
 Unitarian v. Federal Form of Govern- 
 ment : in Colombia, 28 ; in Chile, 
 30; in Argentina. 32, 33, 42; in 
 Brazil, 249 
 United States : 
 The United States and South America, 
 
 651-657 
 The Monroe Doctrine, 25-26 
 The United States and the Paraguayan 
 
 War, 1865, 151 
 The United States and the Chilian- 
 Peruvian War, Oct., 1880, 480-481 
 The United States Forces in Colon and 
 
 Panama, 1885, 596-597 
 The United States and the Boundary 
 Dispute between British Guiana 
 and Venezuela, 1S87, 620-621 _ 
 The Chilian Transport Itata detained 
 at San Diego, Cal., 1891, 859- 
 360, 391, 395 
 
INDEX 
 
 693 
 
 United States — continued 
 
 Patrick Egan and the Peace Conference 
 
 in Chile, May, 1891, 361-363 
 Strained Relations between the United 
 
 States and Chile, 1891, 391-396 
 The San Francisco at Quinteros, 1891, 
 
 380, 391-392, 395 
 The Baltimore Incident at Valparaiso, 
 
 1891, 380, 392-396, 400, 655 
 The U.S. Squadron in Brazilian Waters. 
 
 1893, 276-277 
 Arbitration in the Misiones Dispute 
 between Brazil and Argentina in 
 1895, 109, 112 
 The United States and Spanish Misrule 
 
 in Cuba, 5, 7, 648 
 Minister Buchanan and the Chilian 
 Boundary Question in 1899, 113- 
 114 
 The United States and the Venezuelan 
 Boundary Question, 1895-99, 622- 
 628, 654 
 The Panama Canal, 28, 601, 614, 655- 
 656 
 Uranus, Brazilian Merchant Ship, 263, 
 
 264, 273 
 Uriarte, President, of Paraguay, 1875, 
 
 187, 189 
 Uribe, Lieut. , 452 
 Uriburu, Dr Jose, 
 Argentine Minister in Chile, 1891, 385- 
 
 387 
 Vice-President of Argentina, 1892, 97 
 President of Argentina, 1895, 108-113 
 Candidate for the Presidency of Argen- 
 tina in 1904, 120 
 Urmaneta, Geronimo, of Chile, 434 
 Urguiza, Gen., 
 Leader of Revolution in Buenos Aires, 
 
 1852, 36-38 
 Commander in the Paraguayan War, 
 
 137-144, 151, 165 
 Other Reference, 31 
 Urriola, Col., 468 
 Urrutia, Gen., of Chile, 351 
 Uruan River Incident in the Venezuelan 
 
 Boundary Dispute, 623-624 
 Uruguay : 
 Montevideo captured by Brazil, 1817 
 
 and 1823, 14 
 Revolution in Montevideo in 1809, 21 
 Gen. Artigas, Dictator, 24 
 Portuguese Aggression, 24 
 Independence acknowledged, 1828, 24 
 Fructuoso Ribera, President, 1830, 31 
 Manuel Oribe and Ignacio Oribe, 
 
 Presidents, 1835, 31 
 Warfare of Ribera against Ignacio 
 Oribe aided by Rosas of Buenos 
 Aires, 1838-51, 31 
 
 Uruguay — continued 
 Conflict with England, France, and 
 
 Italy, 31 
 President Berro, 31 
 Anastasio Aguirre, President, 1864, 32, 
 
 131 
 Civil War, 1863-65, 131, 197 
 The Blancos, 131, 144-147, 151, 165, 
 
 197-230 
 The Colorados, 197-204, 230, 649 
 Gen. Venancio Flores, Leader of 
 
 Revolt, 1863-65, 131-135 
 Strained Relations between Argentina 
 
 and Uruguay, 131, 134 
 Relations with Paraguay, 131, 191 
 Strained Relations between Uruguay 
 
 and Brazil, 131-132 
 Brazilian Mission of Conselheiro Saraiva 
 
 to Uruguay, 132 
 Paysandu captured by Brazilians, Jan. 
 
 1, 1865, 132 
 Villa del Salto fired on, 132 
 Uruguayan Expedition to Rio Grande 
 
 do Sul, 134 
 Peace Negotiations, Feb. 1865, 135 
 Gen. Venancio Flores, President, 1865, 
 
 135, 197-198 
 Alliance between Argentina, Brazil, 
 and Uruguay against Paraguay, 
 May 1, 1865, 139 
 War against Paraguay of Uruguay, 
 Argentina, and Brazil, 1865-70, 
 see under Paraguay 
 President Flores in the Paraguayan 
 
 War, 139-160, 187 
 Revolt of Col. Fortunato Flores, 1867, 
 
 197 
 Dr Pedro Varela, President, 1868, 198 
 Blanco Conspiracy and Assassination 
 
 of Gen. Flores, 1868, 198 
 Gen. Batlle, President, 1868, 199-204 
 Cholera Epidemic, 1868, 199 
 Outbreaks under Maximo Perez and 
 
 Gen. Caraballo, 199 
 Blanco Revolution under Col. Aparicio, 
 1870-72, 199-203 
 Fighting at Corralito, etc. , 200 
 Siege of Montevideo, 201-202 
 Defeat of Insurgents, 202, 203 
 Peace, 1872, 203 
 Tomas Gomensoro, President, 1872, 
 
 203, 205 
 Colorados Netos and Colorados Princi- 
 
 pistas, 204 
 Candidates for the Presidency, 1873, 204 
 Dr Ellauri, President, 1873, 204-206 
 Assassination of Col. Romualdo Cas- 
 tillo, 1874, 205 
 Revolt in Soriano, 1875, 205 
 Municipal Election in Montevideo, 205 
 
694 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Uruguay — continued 
 Pedro Varela, President, 1875, 206-208 
 Political Exiles, 207 
 La Revolucion Tricolor, 207-208 
 Major Lorenzo Latorre, Dictator, 1876, 
 
 208-209 
 Mapr Latorre, President, 209 
 Dr Francisco A. Vidal, President, 1880, 
 
 209-210 
 Gen. Maximo Santos, 209-210 
 Gen. Santos, President, 1882, 210-211 
 Dr Vidal re-elected President, 1886, 211 
 Gen. Santos, Commander-in-Chief, 211 
 Revolution against Gen. Santos, sup- 
 pressed by Gen. Tajes, 211 
 Gen. Santos re-elected President, 1886, 
 
 211 
 Attempted assassination of President 
 
 Santos, 212 
 The Ministerio de la Conciliacion of Dr 
 
 Jose Pedro Ramirez, 212 
 Gen. Tajes, President, 1886, 212-213 
 Dr Julio Herrera y Obes, President, 
 
 1890, 213-215 
 Financial Crisis, 215 
 Administration of Duncan Stewart, 215 
 Juan Idiarte Borda, President, 1894, 
 
 215-221 
 Revival of Corruption, 216 
 Boundary Dispute between Bolivia and 
 
 Uruguay, 1894, 191 
 Congressional Elections, 1896, 216 
 Revolution under Aparicio Saraiva and 
 
 Col. Diego Lamas, 1897, 216-220 
 Fighting at Arbolito, Cerro Colorado, 
 
 etc., 218-219 
 The Venus Insurgent Expedition, 219- 
 
 220 
 Armistice and Peace Negotiations, 220 
 Assassination of President Borda, 1897, 
 
 220-221, 226 
 Juan Lindolfo Cuestas, President, 1897, 
 
 221-223 
 Peace, 221-222 
 
 Policy of the New Administration, 222 
 Juan Lindolfo Cuestas, President, 1899, 
 
 223 
 Military Revolt, 1899, 223 
 Jose Batlle y Ordonez, President, 
 
 1903, 223 
 Blanco Rebellion, 223-224 
 Climate, 224 
 Population, 224 
 Education, 208, 225-226 
 Administration of Justice, 226 
 National Character, 226 
 Religion, 227 
 
 Railways, Waterways, etc., 227-228 
 Agriculture, etc. , 228-230, 651 
 Landed Proprietors, 230 
 
 Uruguay River, 132, 137, 141, 144-146 
 Uruguay, Warship, 132 
 Uruguayana, Brazil, 146-147, 255 
 Uspallata Pass, Argentina, 356 
 Uyuni, Bolivia, 356 
 
 Valderrama, Adolfo, of Chile, 338 
 Valdivia, Chile, 416, 421, 431 
 Valencia, Venezuela, 635 
 Valentine Hills, Paraguay, 179 
 Valenzuela, Major Marco Aurelio, of 
 
 Chile, 347, 350 
 Valenzuela, Paraguay, 183 
 Valiente, Bernardo, 181 
 Valle, Dr del, of Peru, 1881, 495 
 Valle, Dr Aristobulo del, 
 
 Partisan of the Union Civica in Argen- 
 tina, 1887, 75, 76, 79 
 
 Dr del Valle's Ministry, 1893, 100-101 
 
 Other Reference, 46 
 Valparaiso, Chile : 
 
 Bombardment by Spanish, 1866, 326- 
 327, 509 
 
 Skirmish at Valparaiso, Jan. , 1891, 346 
 
 Occupation by Congressional Troops, 
 Aug., 1891, 379-380 
 
 The Baltimore Incident, Aug., 1891, 
 380, 392-396 
 
 Other References to Town and Pro- 
 vince, 364, 365-366, 368, 373-376, 
 410-413, 418, 421, 431 
 Varela, Senor, of Argentina, 1869, 181 
 Varela, Dr Hector, of Buenos Aires, 
 
 1871, 41 
 Varela, Don Jose, 206, 209 
 Varela, Dr Pedro, 
 
 President of Uruguay, 1868, 198 
 
 President of Uruguay, 1875, 206-208 
 Varela, Rufina, 46 
 Vargas, Col., of Chile, 380 
 Veintemiila, Gen., of Ecuador, 578-580 
 Vela, Velasco Nunez de, 11 
 Velarde, Gen. Manuel, Peruvian Com- 
 mander, 459, 470, 495, 523 
 Velarde, Lieut., 452 
 Velasco, Gen. , President of Bolivia, 30, 
 
 31 
 Velasquez, Gen. Jose, of Chile, 348, 482 
 Velesco, Gen., of Bolivia, 562 
 Velez, Gen., of Colombia, 596 
 Venezuela : 
 
 Caracas and Emancipation from 
 Spanish Rule, 20 
 
 Rebellion under Simon Bolivar, 21 
 
 Bolivar, Dictator, 1813, 21 
 
 Gen. Paez's Operations against the 
 Spanish, 22 
 
 Venezuela and New Granada under 
 Colombia, 1819, 22 
 
 Battle of Carabobo, 1821, 22 
 
INDEX 
 
 695 
 
 Venezuela — continued 
 Separation from Colombia, 1830, 27 
 Gen. Paez, President, 1830, 28 
 Gen. Monagas, President, 1847, 28 
 Internal Dissensions since 1830, 617- 
 
 618 
 Struggle between the Yellows and the 
 
 Blues, 618 
 Gen. Guzman Blanco, Dictator, 1870- 
 
 89, 28, 618-621, 633, 635, 642 
 Revolt under Gen. Salazar crushed 
 
 1872, 619 
 Boundary Dispute with British Guiana, 
 
 1887, 620-621 
 Gen. Lopez and Dr Rojas Paul, 1887- 
 
 89, 619-620 
 Conspiracy in 1889, 620 
 Gen. Blanco deposed, 1889, 620 
 Gen. Palacios, President, 1889, 621 
 Settlement of Boundary Dispute with 
 
 Colombia, 1891, 595 
 Revolt under Gen. Joaquin Crespo, 
 
 1892, 621 
 Provisional Government, 621 
 Gen. Crespo, President, 1894, 621-628, 
 
 633 
 Revolt under Dr Rojas Paul, 621 
 Boundary Dispute with British Guiana, 
 
 1895-99, 622-628, 654 
 The Uruan Incident, 622-623 
 Venezuela and the United States, 623 
 United States and Great Britain, 623 
 President Cleveland's Message to 
 
 Congress, Dec. 1895, 623-624 
 The Cleveland Commission, 1896, 627 
 The Arbitration Tribunal in Paris, 
 
 1897, 628 
 The Award of the Tribunal, Oct. 1899, 
 
 628 
 Sehor Andrade, President, 1898, 629 
 Revolt, 1898, 629 
 Death of Gen. Crespo, 1899, 630 
 Victory of the Revolution, 630 
 Gen. Castro, President, 1899, 630 
 Gen. Castro, President, 1902, 630-631 
 Question of Compensation for Damage 
 
 to Foreign Residents, 1902, 630- 
 
 631 
 La Guayra blockaded by England, 
 
 Germany, and Italy, 1902, 631 
 Award of the Hague Tribunal, Feb. 22, 
 
 1904, 631 
 Law of Constitution, 621, 631-632 
 Political Divisions, 831-632 
 Seditious Practices, 632 
 Revolutionary Tendencies, 632 
 Climate and Topography, 633-634 
 Population, 634-635 
 Municipalities, 635 
 Education, 635-636 
 
 Venezuela — continued 
 
 Administration of Justice, 636 
 Religion, 637-638 
 Marriage, 637-638 
 National Character, 638-639 
 Agriculture and Industries, 639-640 
 Mineral Resources, 641-642 
 Transport, 642 
 Financial Situation, 643-645 
 Future Prospects, 645-646 
 Venus, Brazilian Merchant Ship, 1879, 
 263 ; Brazilian Armed Transport, 
 destroyed, 1894, 279 
 Venus, Insurgent Expedition to Uru- 
 guay, 1897, 219-220 
 Vera, Gregorio, of Chile, 358 
 Vergara, Col., Chilian Minister of War, 
 
 1880, 480 
 Vergara, Col. Jose, Chilian Commander, 
 
 1879-80, 461, 469-470 
 Vergara, Jose Francisco, of Chile, 336, 
 
 337 
 Vergara, Luis, of Chile, 385 
 Vergara, Ramon Donoso, of Chile, 340 
 Vespucci, Amerigo, and Bahia, 12 
 Victorica, Naval Commander, 98-99, 107 
 Vicuna, Claudio, of Chile, 340, 341, 342, 
 
 364, 380, 387, 391, 409 
 Vicuna, Nicolas Pefia, of Chile, 338 
 Vidal, Dr Francisco A., President of 
 Uruguay: 1880,209-210; 1886,211 
 Vieyra, and Brazil, 13 
 Villa de Madrid, Spanish Warship, 326, 
 
 509 
 Villa del Pilar, Paraguay, 164, 172 
 Villa del Salto, Uruguayan Warship, 132 
 Villagran, Col. , Chilian Commander, 466 
 Villagras, Col., of Chile, 351 
 Villalba, Dr, of Uruguay, 135 
 Villamil, Col., 459-461 
 Villar, Gen., Commander in Uruguay, 219 
 Villaran, Sefior, of Peru, 527 
 Villegaignon, Fort, Brazil, 263, 265, 268, 
 
 269, 279, 280 
 Villegas, Col., of Chile, 1891, 355 
 Villegas, Gen., Peruvian Commander, 
 
 1879, 463 
 Villeta, Paraguay, 174, 177 
 Vina del Mar, Chile, 371-376 
 Vinces River, 588 
 Vine-Growing in Chile, 429 
 Viso, Dr, of Cordoba, 49, 52 
 Vivanco, Gen., of Peru, 507 
 Vosges, M. de, French Minister in Peru, 
 
 488 
 Vulcarel in Argentina, 24 
 
 Wandenkolk, Adm. , of Brazil, Leader 
 of Insurgents in Rio de Janeiro, 255- 
 256, 259 
 
696 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Warspite, British Warship, 352, 360 
 
 Washington, George, referred to, 26 
 
 Wauclle, Steamer, 366 
 
 Welsh Settlement on the Chubut River, 
 114-115 
 
 West Indies : 
 
 Spanish Expeditions, 6 
 Spanish Rule in Cuba, 5,7, 648 
 
 Yacango, Peru, 518 
 Yagari River, Paraguay, 184 
 Yaguaron, Brazil, 134 
 Yarza, Enrique and Miguel, of Uru- 
 guay, 207 
 Yatay, Battle of, Aug. 17, 1865, 145-146 
 Yea, Peru, 482 
 
 Yegros, Fulgencio, First Consul in 
 
 Paraguay, 25 
 Yellow Fever in Buenos Aires, 41 
 Yellows of Venezuela, 61 S 
 Ylo, Peru, 46S-469 
 
 Zaldivar, Mariano Castro, of Peru, 498 
 
 Zambo People in Peru, 533 
 
 Zanartu, Anibal, of Chile, 339, 340, 409 
 
 Zanartii, Manuel, of Chile, 385 
 
 Zapata, Dr, of Antofagasta, 447 
 
 Zarama, Ecuador, 589 
 
 Zevallos, Mariano Herencia, Vice- 
 President of Peru, 514 
 
 Zubiaga, Col., Peruvian Commander* 
 466 
 
 OLIVER AND BOYD, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH 
 

 

 
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