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ON THE 
 
 Profpe&t of a PEACE, CP. 
 
 Pc ectctatet? Stat et et es 
 
 Price Two Shillings and Six-pence. 
 
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 GREA T Mei.--. 
 
 Oo a. eee 
 Profpect of a PEACE} 
 Wherein the DemMo.irion of the 
 Fortifications of Lourtssoure 
 Is fhewn to be abfurd; 
 The Importance of Canada fully refuted ; 
 
 The proper Barrier pointed out in NorTa 
 AMERICA; and the Reafonablene{s and Neceffity of 
 retaining the FRENCH SuGAR IsLANDS. 
 
 Containing Remarxson fome preceding Pamphlets that have 
 treated of the Subjeét, and a fuccinét View of the whole 
 Terms that ought to be infifted on from Frawce ata 
 future Negociation. 
 
 By an unprejudiced OsseRveR. 
 
 Ovinino qui reipublicae prafutui funt, duo Platonis pracepta teneants usum 
 VINIBO F prey pars = : —? : 
 ut wtilitatem civium fic tucantur, uk quicguid azunt, ad eam referani, obliti 
 commodorum ; fuorwet aiterum, ut totum corpas eit UbiiCg current, ne, dium 
 
 " 4 = . y 5 4 y ad n =. , 
 partem aliquen tuentur, retiquas dejerant. Ut enim teiela, fic ratio reipub= 
 lice ad utilitatews eorum, gti commijft fant, nos ad ewrum, guibus commiffa 
 
 eff, gerenda eft, Cickro. 
 Hic, eu Africane, oftendas oportebit patrie lumin aniou, ingenii, confiliigne 
 
 tui, --- Te fenatus, te omnes boni, te focii, te Latisi intweodutur; tu eis 
 
 unus inguo nitatur civitatis falas. idem, 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed for G. Kearsuy, at the Golden Lion, 18 
 Ludgaie-itreet. MDCCLAI. 
 
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 SIR, 
 f SEMOK HK H E fubjett of a futute peace, and of my 
 
 4 1. x prefent letter; which of late fo much en- 
 
 “5 grofied the public: attention, has lain fo 
 
 ere lang dormant, that I am apprehenfive:a- 
 
 revival of it, will not meet with an equal 
 indulgence. ‘The minds of men, in general, are too 
 open to the impreffions of prejudice, and too ready to 
 propagate them, when conceived; unlefS immediately 
 eradicated upon the firft fymptonss the difeafe becomes 
 contagious, all prefcriptions ufelefs, and, at length, we 
 -have no longer a right to fpeak or think. ‘Thus reafon, 
 the brighteft ornament of the human mind, 1s fuborned, 
 and overborne by the torrent of popularity, and forced 
 to {ubmit to the giddy plaudite of a multitude. 
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 Equally free to excufe as condemn, I will acknow- 
 ledge there is fome foundation to plead the privilege of a 
 too favourable opinion ; the want of oppofition, or ra- 
 ther total filenee that hath enfued fince the publication 
 of a certain pamplet *, hath too long given the advo- 
 cates of that fyftem occafion for triumph, and caufe for 
 the moft wary of my countrymen to be, in a manner, 
 reconciled to their infinuating, but delufive arguments; 
 not only delufive as being erroneous or fuperficial in mat- 
 ter, but by mifreprefenting circumftances, and evading 
 the chief points in difpute with all the arts of fophiftry 
 and fubterfuge. ‘Thefe arts, Sir, have been carried to 
 fuch height, that I cannot fay, even with refpect to the 
 author himfelf, ** That I have lived to fee fubjeéts of the 
 “¢ greateft importance to this nation, publickly difcuffed 
 «¢ without party views or party heat, with decency and 
 &¢ politenefs, and with no other warmth than what 2 
 “¢ zeal for the honour and happinefs of our King and 
 ** country ‘* might” infpire.”’ + 
 
 If we differ thus much in matters ‘of fentiments, no 
 wonder we fhould, in matters of fad ; and that we do 
 this, and pretty largely too, will appear in the courfe of 
 thefe fheets. 
 
 I do not * affect to difcever felf-interefted views at 
 «¢ the bottom of the faireft, and moft generous conduét ;” 
 I do not affect to be fo inquifitive into ‘““human nature,” 
 Reafon and Juftice are my advoeates m our prefent dif- 
 ference. 
 
 When I faw men publifh their opinions, without pre- 
 vioufly confulting their judgment ; when | heard them 
 in a dictatorial tone exclaim, that we fhould have * a 
 
 * The intereft of Great Britain confideréd with regard to ‘her colonies, 
 
 and the acquifitions of Canada and Guadaloupe, + Id. p, 4, 
 “* trea- 
 
 
 
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 << treacherous and delufive peace *,” if not made con- 
 formable to their own ideas (though ever fo abfurd) could 
 I think it other than an offence to candour and fair rea- 
 foning, efpecially when there was fo much room to 
 doubt their fyftems by their many contradictions and in- 
 confiftencies? we were told that the French “ were tired 
 “© of Canada,” and that it ** was not worth their afk- 
 << ing:” and that, ‘ the inclemency of the climate,” 
 and ‘¢ the difficult accefs to it,” were not the only caufes 
 of this diflike, but ftill farther, ** a trade fcarcely de- 
 fraying the expence of the colony;” and yet, Sir, this 
 very colony was recommended to us by the fame author, 
 as fingly to be. preferred before all other objeéts, and 
 every other conqueft that we had, or might obtain from 
 the enemy, was to be facrificed at a future negociation. 1 
 fay, Sir, fuch feeming inconfiftencies muft excite doubts 
 of the truth of thofe faéts, or the propriety of the au- 
 thor’s hipothefis, and a defire among unprejudiced men, 
 and thofe who. know what they read, to have the fub- 
 je farther difcufled, and made confonant, at leaft, to 
 common comprehention. Though inferior in dignity 
 and fortune, my opinion, in that or any other matter, 
 might be equally ftrong and important, my love to my 
 country equally prevalent and difinterefted. If I had 
 doubts, I had a right to divulge thofe doubts, I had a 
 right to expect them to be cleared up, and to fufpend 
 my judgment till it was effectually complied with. To 
 fee, therefore, every avenue to that defirable end, forci- 
 bly ftopped up by fauch rude and hafty declarations in 
 favour. of a particular object, as that without it we 
 
 * Letter to two great men, p. 29. + Ibid, p. 30, 31. 
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 fhould ** have a treacheous and delucifive peace, we’ 
 fhould <* foon find we had done nothing *,” and the 
 like muft occafion doubts, not only of the canJour, but 
 probity of the author. 
 
 When I heard another fet of men, under the prefent 
 circumftances of the nation, and the war, urge a refti- 
 tution with fo much warmth, and without the leaft pre- 
 cedent or authority to enforce fuch an innovated doc- 
 trine, could I impute it to an over zeal, to an ardour 
 for the honour of our King and country ? Moderation, 
 Sir, is truly commendable; but it may ferve as a cloak 
 to bafe and iniquitous purpofes ; it may be profefled and 
 practifed too, not only to check ** the madnefS of tie 
 <¢ people,” but to ‘* make a virtuous and able miniftry 
 cad againit themfelves,” their judgment, and the moft 
 important interéfts of their ccuntry. If the author of 
 the Letter to two Great Men was reprehenfible for a 
 repetition of French perfidy, and a defire to fee the fti- 
 pulations of a former treaty executed previous to a fu- 
 ture peace, and was therefore to be cenfured’ as tending 
 to increafe and inflame an improper difpofition among 
 the people; how much more fo muft his accufer, who 
 pretends to be fo cautious of fomenting popular clamours, 
 and yet affords much greater caufe for them, by unjuft 
 obliquy and reproach, could telling the people, their 
 << arrogance’ would ‘¢ deitroy” the good intentions cf 
 «¢ a virtuous and able miniftry,” and the “ effects” of 
 << their victories and fuccefies ;” could telling them, they 
 s¢ had no fhare in acquiring”’ thofe ** fucceffes,” be the 
 
 means of preventing or abating this infolent mood he 
 
 complains of / Such language feemed fo fa: from being the 
 
 * Letter to two great men, p. 31, 
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 refult of decency and moderation, that I could not 
 but confider it as the venom of a former infulting fac- 
 tion : it was certainly a fure method to fow the feeds of 
 general difcontent. The populace of this kingdom are 
 born and educated in high notions of their liberties, and, 
 
 confequently, look with a watchful eye on the preroga- 
 tives of government; fo that every attempt to diminifh 
 the one, or extend the other, would quickly raife fedi- 
 tions, telling them of their pretended ** arrogance” ‘was, 
 in effect, giving them to underftand, that they made 
 themfelves free in a matter, which, though the iflue of 
 it fo very nearly concerned them, they were not to be 
 confulted in, telling them they had no fhare in acquiring 
 the “* victories and fuccefies” obtained over the enemy was 
 faying that they had not the leaft right to trouble them- 
 felves about the meafures or event of the war, for that 
 they neither fought the battles, nor bore any fhare in 
 the expences, affertions which are in every refpect falfe 
 and unjuft. Is it not they that cultivate our lands, reap 
 our harvetts, fabricate thofe manufactures which are dif- 
 fufed over the whole wo:ld, and, in fact, bring plenty 
 and riches into the kingdom ? Is it not they that furnith 
 men for our victorious armies and fleets * Is it not they 
 that receive the greateft injury from the heavinefs of the 
 taxes, and that bear all the miferies of the war by the 
 obftruction to trade in general? Is it not the middling 
 people, and thofe in fubordinate ftations, or to ufe the 
 gentleman’s own meaning, Is it not the mob who do 
 and fuffer all this‘ Wherefore then fhould they be 
 treated fo contemptuoufly ? The mite of the needy huf- 
 bandman is as worthy as the largeft donation of a peer ; 
 he fubfcribes in proportion to his ability; nay more: by 
 
 the 
 
 
 
(3 
 
 the encreafe of taxes, the livelihood. of the former is-vi. 
 fibly affected: he muft retrench his moft eflential de- 
 mands for neceflaries, while the latter only contracts 
 his fuperfluities. By the continuance of the war, the 
 former is fubject to all the infolence of office; and the 
 fcarcity of fervants, a natural confequence of fuch war, 
 of courfe much enhances the price of labour, while his 
 crops are ftill fubjeé to the fame intemperature of wea~ 
 ther; the markets to be overftocked from the want of 
 confumption ; and his commodities, being perifhable, 
 mutt be difpofed of at all events, which, at the beft of 
 times, will bear very little, if any, advancement in 
 price. Could it then be juft or reafonable to brand thefe 
 people with fuch odious epithets? It was done without 
 the leaft caufe ; they do not raife a clamour againft the 
 meafures of the government, or the continuance of the 
 war, rather the contrary ; they recommend a vigorous 
 profecution of it; but, then, they hope when a peace ts 
 made, it will be fuch, as will relieve them from a repe- 
 tition fo burthenfome. If they are over-warm in their 
 exprefiions againit the French, let it be imputed to a lit- 
 tle cbullition of .hereditary enmity. The infraction of 
 former treaties by France, her natural ambition and 
 
 treachery authorize the moft fevere reflections ; but yet 
 we do not hear the terms of tyrants, they do not carry 
 fo much the appearance of private pique to the enemy, 
 as a regard to their own fecurity, and that of all Eu- 
 
 rope. 
 
 7 refleSted the more, Sir, on this improper difpofition 
 among our writers, and pretended admonifhers, becaufe 
 ‘t was at the time of a fuppofed approaching congrefs ; 
 4 time when wnanimity ought to have been moft: preva- 
 
 . lent 
 
 
 
ee 
 
 lent throughout the kingdom, and when every head, 
 and every hand ought to have been employed for the ge- 
 neral good, with deliberation, and void of the leaft par- 
 tiality. Inftead of this, fyftems were introduced, in 
 themfelves abfurd, and rendered more fo by the manner 
 of introducing them, and fuch as tended only ‘* to em- 
 “© barrafs the negotiation, and render it a work of in- 
 “ finite difficulty. 
 
 It is not ° the beauty of expreffion *,” nor an har- 
 mony of founds that can biafs my judgment they may 
 tickle my ear, but cannot feduce my heart; I do not 
 pay fuch a blind deference to the external ornaments; I 
 read thetn as fuch ; 1 read them as introduced merely 
 Argumenti gratia, often the effects of a bad caufe, and 
 often intended to cheat people of their proper underftand- 
 ing. But.as my countrymen, in general are characta. 
 tized for their great knowledge and wifdom, 1 hope they 
 have not confidered fophiftry as fair reafoning, and fuf- 
 fered prejudice to gain too great an afcendant over them 
 at the prefent conjuncture. Impartial men fufpend their 
 judgement till the matter has been properly canvafled, if 
 they find the caufe of their pre,udices removed, they will 
 then retract their too favourable opinion ; reafon will 
 have its due influence, and will direct their approbation ; 
 but, whatever fyftem they incline to, let me remind them 
 to recolleé&t the confequence, let them likewife recollect, 
 that it is a unanimous perfeverance in their own intereft, 
 which is the only means to check future factions; and 
 that it will ever fuftain the efforts of a wife and virtuous 
 adminiftration. 
 
 And you, Sir, I flatter myfelf, will pardon this fa- 
 miliar and intrufive addrefs ; the occafion, and your own 
 
 * Int, &cy p. tf. 
 
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 public declarations prompted me, the nature of your 
 office in a manner required its You have been parti- 
 cularly diftinguifhed by a noble emulation for the good 
 of your conntry, I therefore perfuade myfelf you will 
 not condemn the weakeft effort built on that foundation, 
 and aiming principally at the fame glorious end. If J 
 have not done this before, inclination was not wanting 
 to urge me; I heard a fyftem adopted which, I was con- 
 vinced would prove detrimental to my country ; [heard 
 of the demolition of the fortifications of Louifbourg> 
 a confequence of that fyftem, with the utmoft regret; J 
 heard it with the moft pungent concern ; but then fome 
 affairs intervened, which required my abfence, at a 
 time when I had juft formed an intention of entering the 
 lifts as a writer: I therefore hoped fome one more dif- 
 engaged, would have undertook that office, an office, 
 which feemed to me altogether fo praife worthy, and 
 even incumbent on every Briton, who regarded his coun- 
 
 try, and thought as I did. Whence then ‘proceeds my 
 miftake? are the people fo prepofleffed, or tired of any fur- 
 ther difcuffion? is it from a diffidence of fufficient mat- 
 ter to promote a more nice difquifition ? or, is it from 
 the effeéts of floth? I am apprehenfive, thefe have ali 
 too much co-operated in their turns, to render a defien 
 
 of this nature, if ever fuch a one was conceived abor- 
 tive; all future expectations of it feem to have entirely 
 vanifhed ; nor fhould I now trouble you with this letter, 
 but that the love of my country, regard for you, and 
 particularly the preffing exigencies of the times, confpire 
 and urge me to the tafk. ‘The rage of war which feems 
 rather to encreafe than abate, notwithftanding the con- 
 tinued bad fuccefs of our enemies, induces me to take 
 up the pen, and makes me hope that council may be 
 
 neiiher 
 
 ’ 
 
 
 
(9 J 
 neither too late nor ineffectual ; it mutt come more ac- 
 ceptable, Sir, as being at a time when the fubject of 
 peace is revived, and, if the war is continued, where 
 the profecution of it will be the moft ferviceable. 
 
 Not bred in the {chool of flattery and adulation, my 
 letter may, perhaps, appear in a homely garb, and un- 
 adorned with the flowers of eloquence and fulfome pa- 
 negyrick 5 but let not that act againft me, nor my caufe ; 
 ] addrefs you as a plain Englifhman, not as an orator ; 
 J do not prefume to correfpond with you in court phrafes, 
 but in the rude language ofa Civilian. Nor would I intrude 
 myfelf upon you, Sir, with the impertinence of priva- 
 cy, I commit my letter to the prefs, that it may intro- 
 duce itfelfto you, if not by the voice of a multitude, at 
 jeaft from the plaufibility of a title. And I am the ra- 
 ther inclined to a publication, as I fhould be much 
 pleafed, if any gentleman differs from me in opinion, to 
 fee the fubject farther difcufled. Not blind, though 
 zealous, nor bigotted, though tenacious, I ftand open 
 +5 convidtion ; if my opinions are erroneous, let them 
 be refuted with decency, and my heart fhall thank the 
 man that better inftructs me ; but, till that is done, ex- 
 éufe me, Sir, for a little petulance and obftinacy. With 
 regard to myfelf, I can affure you, Sir, and with truth, 
 that I have not the leaft connection or intereft in giving 
 a preference to any particular object, my pen indites 
 what my heart diétates ; the fub'ect feems to me of na« 
 tional importance, and, if fuch, is worthy of your re- 
 gard, and ought to meet with your indulgence and uf- 
 soft encouragement. 
 
 You may poffibly, Sir, admire at my addrefling you 
 fingly and alone ; but when I confider your ftation, as 
 mediator between Majefty and the f.bject, and your de- 
 
 C cla- 
 
 
 
( ro } 
 
 4 . 
 elarations ever to encourage the national honour and 
 
 welfare; the one induces*me to think, that the manner 
 of conducting a future negotiation, and the terms of the 
 peace, principally depend on you; and the other like- 
 wile induces me to hope for the good effects of your 
 promifed encouragement. 
 
 You have, Sir, the endeavours of a mans, who thinks 
 much of his country, and not lightly of you, and one 
 who 1s a friend to mankind. If in the courfe.of the 
 following fheets, I fhould contribute to the caufe of ei- 
 ther, { fhould reft-fatisfied ; but if I. fhould expofe the 
 abfurdities of other fyftems, and be the means of recon- 
 ciling the proper object. of a future peace to the national 
 honour and emolument ;. if I fhould be partly the hum- 
 ble inftrument of procuring a laiting peace, my happi- 
 nefs would be compleat; my time could not be better 
 {pent, than when it proved conducive to the tranquillity 
 of menkind,. and the welfare of my country. If [ 
 fhould not fucceed, I fhould {till have that pleafing fa- 
 tisfaction, which every honeft man_feels from the up- 
 rightnefs of his intentions. 
 
 I will likewife acknowledge, Sir, I have received na 
 fmall- additional temptation to my prefent plan, from 
 the war now fubfifting between us, and the Indians on 
 the back of our fettlements in South Carolina; it hath 
 not a little confirmed me in an opinion that Canada 
 would not anfwer the mighty things, that were urged 
 in favour of its retention, atd in preference to a] other 
 objets. Upon the firft advice of this rupture, I fore- 
 faw, in fome meafure, the many difficulties we fhould 
 
 ; it has always been a maxim with me, to eonci- 
 liate the affections of the Indians, and rather be at Va- 
 riance with the French in America, than with thefe 
 
 people, 
 
 
 
CFs 
 
 people, whom I thought to be our trueft and moft na- 
 tural friends, and whom it was our intereft to be upon 
 good terms with ; and, at prefent, 1 cannot but confider 
 the differences between us, in the light of a prophetic 
 warning, not.only to provide againft the like hereafter, 
 but alfo to direct our jydgment in an enfuing negotia- 
 tion, 
 
 ‘What the event of this war will prove, I will not 
 pretend to determine ; but thus far I will fay, that the 
 deftruction of the towns of thofe Indians, has only ferved 
 to reduce them to defpair, and make them more impla- 
 cable enemies. Revenge will ftimulate them to a¢ts of 
 horror, which we may the rather expect from them, 
 as being a people that naturally ‘* delight in war, and 
 “‘ take pride in murder *”, and who meafure their 
 notions of honour in proportion to their inhumanities. 
 ‘The French have felt the effects of their favage princi- 
 ples, and fo have we, and pretty feverely too, which 
 ought to induce us to be more circumfpect in our 
 conduét for the future, Ido not mean to infinuate the 
 jeaft reflection on thofe whc promoted this war, or have 
 been inftrumental in carrying it on; we had better 
 have them open enemies, than treacherous and fubtle 
 friends. But fince we have: made the breach fo much 
 the wider, let us not leave affairs in a worfe fituation 
 
 than they were before that breach ; it would be deftroy.. ~ 
 
 ing the caufe of the war, and only tend to giye them a 
 meaner idea of our national courage and ability. The 
 way to bring them to our terms is not by negociation, 
 but by force and arms; if we exert our ftrength, they 
 will be much more ready to embrace our intereft, and 
 continue firm in our allianee; but then let not this ex- 
 
 * Intereft of Great Britain, p, 5, 
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 ertion be directed as againft a few tribes of yazabond fa- 
 
 vages, but as againft a populous and warlike nation, 
 fpurred on by the French, who connive at their rebel- 
 Jion, and who probably do, and will farther afift them 
 with ammunition, and their own forces; an aflertion 
 of the truth of which I am fully perfuaded, notwith- 
 ftanding their commander at Albama, cffered to tak 
 
 our traders into the fort, and protect them from the fa- 
 vages ; a circumitance which, I cannot but think, was 
 owing to artifice, and to a fear left we fhould divert our 
 victorious arms to that quarter. And I dread the more 
 the uncertain iffue of this war, by the repeated accounts 
 we have received from our colonies, of feveral of the 
 French Indians and Canadians being about to retire to 
 thefe parts, nay, that feveral of them were atually 
 gone, The French had confiderable fettlements at De- 
 troit and Miffilimakinac, and feveral itraggling ones a- 
 bout the fouth and weft coafts of the lakes Erie, and 
 Michigan, the inhabitants of which, upom hearing of 
 the lofs of Canada, have mott of them, very probably, 
 retired to their countrymen in Louifiana, either with a 
 view of fettling, or joining the rebel Indians for the fake 
 of plunder, which is, indeed; moft likely, as the fettlers 
 about the Jakes were chiefly civilized Indians and difband- 
 ed foldiers. 1 repeat again, Sir, if the French from Cana- 
 da have retired to thefe parts, or if the war fhould become 
 extended among the Indians, it may prove of the moft 
 fatal confequences. It is evident there is not the leat 
 dependence to be plated on the Crecks, they have mur- 
 thered fome of our traders, have neglected, if not aQu- 
 ally refuted, to make fatisfation for the infult, or to 
 deliver up the murtherers ; nay, the affemb] ly of the pro- 
 vincé has been fo confcious of the ticklifh fituation of 
 
 affairs 
 
 
 
( 43 3 
 affairs with them, that they have been afraid to infit on 
 the ufual fatisfaction. ‘Tho’ matters have not hitherto 
 been carried to any certainty cf a defection of the other 
 tribes of Indians fettled about. thefe parts from our in- 
 tereit 5 yet the retreat of the army under Col. Mont- 
 gomery, hath been productive of further infolence from 
 them, and we have tamely fubmitted to it, for fear of gi- 
 ving them the leaft offence. T he Chactaws are entirely in 
 the French intereft, and have been only reftrained from at- 
 tacking our fettlements for fear of thefe Creeks, who are 
 between them and the province of Georgia. If therefore 
 theCreeks fhould declare againtt us, the Chactaws would 
 likewife ; and both of them together can fend upwards 
 of twelve thoufand warriors to the field. The remo- 
 val of the army under Colonel Montgomery at fuch 
 a. critical juncture is, to all appearance, very abfurd, 
 The feafon of the year was too far advanced for them 
 to be of any fervice in the reduction of Canada, they 
 could be therefore ordered to New York, merely to go 
 jnto quarters, and that at a time when there was the 
 greate{t reafon for them to ftay on the frontiers of Caro- 
 jina. But as it is generally believed the regiment of 
 
 Royal Welch volunteers, and the independent compa-. 
 
 nies gone fome time fince from England, are to fupply 
 their place, I hope they will get there time enough to 
 check the enemy’s progrefs, and thei? future machina- 
 tions. Matters at prefent look but badly ; fort Lou- 
 doun is fallen, and though the Indians have raifed the 
 blockade of fort Prince George, they may return with 
 frefh vigour, as they did to fort Loudoun, and have the 
 {ame fuccefs ; in which cafe they will have full feope te 
 exercife their fury : the {calping blood-hounds would be 
 let loofe, and deftroy and depopulate our moft fertile 
 
 fet- 
 
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 fettlements ; and, ina colony, where there are three or 
 four blacks to one white, the confequences are truly 
 horrible. The inhabitants have already thought of ati 
 ing themfelves agreeable to the martial mandate. 
 
 The two Carolinas and Georgia, Sir, are likely to 
 prove very valuable colonies to their mother country, 
 are objects worthy her very tender regard, and éntitled 
 to her moft vigorous protection ; and as the war’ was, 
 moft certainly, commenced in the caufe of the colonies, 
 it is reafonable to expect, that regard fhould be had-te 
 ferve thofe who ftand in the greateft need of it. Phat 
 Canada will not anfwer the purpofe, I am convinced of ; 
 it will employ‘no fmall part of my prefent letter. But 
 before I proceed on thé mictits, give me leave, Sir, to 
 corifider what has been already faid upon 'the fubject. 
 
 The chief ob’ections made by the remarker againtt 
 retaining, Canada miay be rediiced to four, viz, 
 
 if, That. Canada, with regard to the Weft India 
 trade, would: bea very unneceffary acquifition for uS, 
 <* who have fuch immenfe-tracts;: fo: much more conve. 
 ‘< niently fituated for that. trade, and who could eafily 
 fupply five-timés the confumptionrof ours, the French, 
 and all the Weft India iflands put together, and that 
 too, at amuch eafier rate, than they can poflibly 
 have’.them *‘ git from Canada.” 
 adly, That:**:Canada, fituated-in a cold ‘¢limate,” 
 produced ** no commodity, except furs and fkins, which 
 «« fhe” could.‘* exchange for the commodities of Eu- 
 ‘<< rope; aid, confequently fhe could have little returns 
 ‘¢ to make-the Englifh merchant,” 
 adly, That, this ‘¢ trade,” when ‘* carried on with 
 France, fell fhort, in its moft flourfhing fate; of 
 140,000 |. a year.” And, 
 A4thly, 
 
 
 
(os > 
 
 4thly, That ‘* Canada, in-our hands, would not, 
 *¢ probably, yield half what it did to France.” 
 
 Thefe, Sirs I think, were objections of a very nice 
 concern to England, fuch as might have {tacgered the 
 faith of thefe who entertained any rational notions of re- 
 taining Canada; and fuch, as having been publickly af- 
 ferted, ought, undoubtedly, to have been as publickly 
 refuted before fuch a notion was indulged. 
 
 That this has:not been done, I need not forbear to 
 infift upon, I can fafely challenge any man to fhow me 
 the contrary. Even the author of the pretended Reply *, 
 who undertook to convince us of the fuperior intereft we 
 fhould have in Canada, above every other conqueft has 
 pafied over in filence every material objection made a- 
 gainit it ;. and inftead thereof, from fome words ca(ual« 
 ly dropt by the remarker, took occafion. to enter into 
 an elaborate, and indeed very unneceflary defence of out 
 American colonies ; he tells us how abfurd the infinua- 
 tions are of their future independence ; informs us of 
 the nature of population in new coutties, and ftrong- 
 ly urges the neceffity of extending our fettlements, 
 which, we are given to underftand, is the only 
 means to prevent fuch independence. Thefe are the 
 author’s: chief topics, and from thence is inferred, 
 that we muf{t keep Canada at all events. I thought, 
 when I firft read the pamphlet, and ftill do think, that 
 it is rather a defence of our northern colonies jn gene. 
 ral, than Canada. There were no doubts ftarted of the 
 value of our North American colonies, the ob ections 
 of the remarker did not reft on that point; if they had, 
 it was a doctrine every way unpopular, nor would any 
 
 * Intereft of Creat Britain, &c. 
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 éne ever entertain a fotion of giving up any part of 
 them to the French, whofe’ great power had already 
 made it neceflary to undertake 4 heavy war to check 
 them. But I éannot help obferving, that fuch trivial 
 expreflions of the remarker, as, “ the war was com- 
 ‘© menced in’ the caufe of the eototics,* and ** we know 
 << what trifling returns we have from fome of our owtt 
 *« very flourifhing” colonies in America,” feem to have 
 founded the production of ‘a pamphiet of neat fixty co- 
 lumns ; and that the fole drift of defending our North 
 American colonies, feéms to be to introduce an artful 
 mifapplication of things i in favour of Canada, as might 
 be proved from mary inftancesy 
 
 But waving all notice of this kind,’ give me leave, 
 Sirs to enter into the caufe of my prefent addrefs ; there 
 is erough to be faid upon that head, without diving into 
 idle quibbling ; ; but it may be neceflary to confides the 
 niature of Canada under the French goverriment, in ors 
 der.to deduce fomie reafonable fuggeftions of its future 
 ftuation under England. For this, Sir, I perfuade my~ 
 felf, I thal ftaiid excufed, tho’ it fhould carry me to en- 
 croach on your time, more than I could have withed, as, 
 it is the only way to come at the truth,’ and bring’ mat- 
 ters to their proper bearings. 
 
 France, Sir, at the firft forming a colony in Cansida, 
 Had 1 many difficulties to encounter, which proved almoft 
 infuperable. Common fenfe dictated to the moft fimple 
 capacity, that a country fo far to the north, muft be 
 
 fubject to many inconveniences from the inclemency of 
 the climate; the French King, therefore endeavoured, 
 in a manner, to force a fettlement by many immunities 
 
 and indulgencies granted to all who would become fet- 
 tlers; but notwithftanding the many attractions made 
 
 ufe 
 
 
 
( 17) 
 
 ufe of on this occafion, very few volunteers entered into 
 the fervice. | 
 
 The ftews were’ ranfacked for females; and thofe 
 wretches, whofe lives had been already forfeited to the 
 gallies, for their atrocious crimes, were forced to accom- 
 pany ‘them. Such was the connubial affociation, form= 
 ed‘to people this‘all-excelling Canada, a country which 
 was looked upon, even by thefe objects of mifety; with 
 an excefs of horror and‘contempt. If thefe natural dif= 
 ficulties of the country had not fubfifted, would France 
 have proceéded'to ‘thefe extremities to people it ? Would 
 fhe have given’ fuch’ large indulgencies to fettlers; at 
 leaft, would fhe have ‘continwed them, as fhe’has done, 
 if they were not abfolutely neceflary to detain . the in- 
 habitants’ in their fettlement? Thefe difficulties of the 
 country will appear‘to greater excefs, if we ~ confi- 
 der the extent of the indulgencies. © 
 
 Every fettler had not only his paflage free from Fr: france; 
 but was alloted a fettlement *, and fupplied with the ‘ne- 
 ceffary utenfils to- cultivate: fuch fettlement ; with this 
 only refervation, -that'he fhould ‘repay’ one-third of the 
 produce of his lands, till thé fum, advanced, to enable 
 him to éarty on his fettlement, ‘was ‘fully paid. The ex 
 ports-to andifrom Fran¢e, weré exempted from any im- 
 poft 6r duty; neither were they liable to any} on ‘being 
 imported in Canadayexcept Brazil? tobacco, ‘which paid 
 about twenty fhillings ftirling; per’ hundred weight, and 
 was’ intended’ mérély* to’ ‘promote’ the ‘growth: of 'that 
 act — ‘ownt coloniess’» The whole'charge: 
 
 * Acconings tothe Baron Lahontan, ‘‘ The pooreft of them have four. 
 <¢ arpents of ground in front, and thirty or forty in depth, An arpent is 
 <¢ a {pot of ground containing roo perches {quare, éach of which is eighteen” 
 «ce feet long, - See Lahontan’s-Voyage to North America, Letter 2. 
 
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 of paying the civil and military officers, and repairing 
 and maintaining the fortifications was likewife vefted in 
 the crown. But notwithftanding thefe advantages, the 
 Canadians could never furmount the natural difficulties 
 of their ftation, occafioned by the intemperature of the 
 climate, and barrennefs of the foil... All the money 
 that ever centered in Canada came from France by vir- 
 tue of the royal eftablifhment (including the civil offi- 
 cers, and the military gentry fent by the French King 
 to defend the colony;) and this no fooner came to their 
 hands, than it was drawn off again by the over-ballance 
 of their trade with Old France, for Canada having no 
 other commodity wherewith to. fupply a European 
 market, but furs, their demands for European com- 
 modities, not only to fupport their own wants, but 
 likewife the Indian trade, greatly exceeded their abili- 
 ties to return in that article; they were therefore of ne- 
 ceflity obliged..to pay the deficiency in-money, or bills 
 of exchange. As a farther encouragement to the fettlers, 
 and to procure a mutual commerce, the royal eftablith- 
 ment was made accountable for. the bills of exchange ; 
 for fpecie being very little, if at all, ufed in Canada, 
 paper credit would not have been accepted as cafh, or 
 even negotiable, without fome fuch fecurity for the due 
 payment, as had been frequently experienced, to the 
 no fmall detriment of the inhabitants. Can we then 
 call Canada an opulent, or even a thriving colony, and de- 
 ferving of our moft trifling confideration, when it could 
 not depend upon its own foundation for a fupport ; when 
 it could not, at its higheft pitch of grandeur, bear its own 
 neceflary expences, or keep a part of the money fent thi- 
 ther to pay its own officers? nay, it is an undoubted 
 truth, that the running cafh of Canada (which the in- 
 
 habi- 
 
 
 
( 19 ) 
 
 habitants have been frequently obliged to circulate, not- 
 withftanding the lofs to them(felves from its inferior va- 
 lue *) has been of late years reduced fo low as within a 
 few thoufand livres, the greateft part of which of courfe 
 centered in the capital ¢+.. Was not the manner, living, 
 and employment among the Canadians in general, ever 
 fuch as denoted the extremeft indigence and poverty ? Was 
 the principal inhabitants ever to be put ona level with 
 the ordinary people of our own colonies t? Did they not 
 
 2 rather 
 
 * «Ifthe merchant fells’ his “* fkins to any private man in the coun- 
 “* try for ready money, he is paid in the current money, which is of lef 
 <* value than the bills of exchange, that the direétor of ”” the:<¢ office’” of 
 the farmers general ‘ draws upon Rochel or Paris; for there they are paid 
 “ in French livres, which are twenty fols, whereas a Canada livre is but 
 “¢ fifteen fols.” -Lahontan, page 54: 
 
 + Father Charlevoix who was in Canada in 1721, fpeaking of the fcar- 
 city of coin, fays, “ in a. word you, will be furprized, when I tell. you, 
 « that in 1706, the trade of the moft ancient of all our colonies was car- 
 “ ed on in a bottom, or capital, of no more than 650,030 livres, and 
 <¢ things have been pretty much in the fame fituation. ‘Now this fum di- 
 «vided among thirty thoufand inhabitants, is neither capable of enriching 
 «< them, nor of enabling them to purchafe the commodies of France."”. For 
 this reafon moft, part of them go fark naked, efpecially thofe that. live in 
 «< yemote habitations. ‘* They have not even the advantage of felling the 
 <¢ farplus of their commodities to the inhabitants of cities, thofe being ob- 
 << liged, in order to fubfift, to have lands in the country, and to cultivate 
 <¢ them themfelves for their own account,”’ fo. that high or low were far- 
 mers or hunters. A pretty piéture this of Canadian affluence, and well 
 worth our envy! Charleveix, Letter 4, Vol-I. p. 149. 
 
 t Charlevoix, in the parallel he draws between the Englith and French 
 colonies, has the following paragraph. ‘¢ In New England, and the other 
 « provinces of the continent of America, fubjeét to the Britith. empire, 
 «« there prevails an opulence which they are utterly ata lofs how to ufe3 
 ‘¢ and in New France, a poverty hid by an air of being in eafy. circum- 
 «« ftances, which feems not at all ftudied. Trade and the cultivation .of 
 «« their plantations ftrengthen the firfi, whereas the fecond is fupported by 
 
 « the induftry of its inhabitants, an¢ the tafte of the nation diffufes over it 
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 ( 20) 
 
 rather lead the lives of flaves both in labour and diet? 
 The inland communication between the feveral diftriéts 
 in Canada was during fummer (if it can be fo called } 
 chiefly carried on by boats and canoes; what therefore 
 could be more miferable than feeing fome paddling up 
 and down the lakes and rivers like {o many favages, for 
 the lakes and rivers, being in many parts very fhallow, 
 and in others fubject to large and dangerous cataraéts 
 were rendered unfit for any other method of Navigation ? 
 What could likewife be more miferable than feeing others 
 delving in the earth with pickaxes to break the hardened 
 furface ! ‘Their occupations in winter were ftil] worfe, 
 fome were empolyed like fo many Laplanders in guiding 
 ledges drawn by horfes} or other animals over vaft 
 tracts of {now and ice, the only method they had to keep 
 up a correfpondence with their neighbours: fome (to ufe 
 an Englifh phrafe) lived like fo many Orfons, or wild 
 men of the wood upon their dear bought fpoil from a- 
 mong the wild beafts ; and others made fhift to fubfift 
 upon the fith they got by breaking through the ice ; an 
 employment often impracticable, and at other times e- 
 qually laborious and dangerous as the others. There 
 are thofe who urge that the populoufnefs of Canada con- 
 tradict thefe aflertions ; our public papers which, fome- 
 time ago, fo much ‘vilified this French colony, feem to 
 have adopted this doétrine ; they now do all they can to 
 
 aggrandize it; they give pompous lifts of the number 
 
 <¢ fomething infinitely pleafing. The Englith planter amafies wealth, and 
 «© never makes any fuperfluous expence ; the French inhabitant again en- 
 *¢ joys what he has acquired, and often makes a parade of what he is not 
 “ pofleffed of. That labours for his pofterity ; this again leaves his off- 
 <* {pring in the fame neceffities he was in himfelf at his firR fetting out, 
 *¢ and to extricate themfelves as they can, Id, P. 113. Letter 3, 
 
 and 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
 and extent of.the. cities, .towns, \villagesy and_ villas, 
 which. they eagerly publifh with all the: affirance’ of-au- 
 thenticity, and prefume, as a certainty, of its -impor- 
 tance. But admit their accounts even to be genuine, 
 are we from thence to infer-any natural. perfection of the 
 country, or to blindly imagine it will be fo infinitely ad- 
 vantageous to ug, from this abundant population? 
 France, Sir, being a kingdom. fo;populous and exten- 
 five in .itfelf, and where agriculture is neglected, and 
 the country, for want of it, doth not grow enough to fup- 
 port its own inhabitants, need we wonder that where a 
 fettlement is formed, .and fuch large indulgencies grant- 
 ed, it fhould attra the attention of a few of. the igno- 
 norant rabble ! and that.fuch are the chief part of the 
 European inhabitants of Canada, is undoubtedly true: 
 the new fettlers are, in general, the very refufe~of 
 France, of very mean origin, and thofe who had no 
 other profpeét to get a livelihood, than by flying from 
 their native country. Need we likewife wonder that 
 their numbers have encreafed, when they have been 
 fuffered to poffefs fuch an additional territory. by en+ 
 croachments ? Suppofe, agreeable to a late calculation, 
 that Canada is one thoufand eight. hundred miles in 
 length, and one thoufand, two hundred, and fixty in 
 breadth, I would be glad to know, whether according 
 to the ufual method of calculating, the number of inha- 
 bitants are in the leaft proportion to the extent of coun- 
 try? The moft extravagant account of the French has 
 fixed the number of the inhabitants of Canada confider- 
 ably within one hundred and.fifty thoufand ;. but they are 
 generally computed at lefs than one hundred. thoufand. 
 
 Even admit the former, it-muft imply that Canada is 
 greatly deficient in. inhabitants; and therefore mutt 
 
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( 22 ) 
 
 convince us that ‘the foil is very barren, and the means 
 
 ofigetting a livelihood very difficult. It is known that 
 
 the climate about ‘Lake*Champlain, and the other lakess 
 
 which inelude their encroachments, and which they 
 have fo long been endeavouring to poflefs themfelves of, 
 is more mild, and the foil more fertile than in Canada. 
 Diveft them of thefe alone, and we fhould foon find an 
 amazing diminution in the number of inhabitants; di- 
 veft them of thefe, and we fhould foon find, if Canada 
 is reftored, as amazing a‘decreafe in their fur trade ; for 
 moft of the {kins they fend to Europe come from thence, 
 and in fuch quantity, that Lahontan tells us, that three 
 fourths of them come from thence, even in his time, 
 when the French had fuch little intercourfe with the In- 
 
 dians about thefe lakes. : 
 
 The public papers «have likewife been very liberal in 
 magnifying the fertility of Canada, but [ think with 
 very little foundation, and I believe to as little purpofe. 
 Indeed it is inconceivable to me, how a country fo far 
 to the north, and fubject to fuch piercing frofts, the 
 greater part of the year can be fo very fertile. As the 
 ' froft is apt to penetrate very deep, and continues fo long, 
 it muft render the natural quality of the earth benumb’d 
 and inactive, while it continues, efpecially as at that 
 time the farmer is difabled from giving it the neceflary 
 culture: therefore the difficulty of vegetation, in a 
 country where the extremity of the cold is fo piercing 
 and permanent the greater part of the year, is very obvi- 
 ous, and muft undoubtedly be more fo, with thofe com- 
 modities, that require a longer flay in the earth, fo attain 
 their natural perfection than others. Thus the growth of 
 wheat, which generally remains ‘nine months in the 
 
 earth even in England, muft. meet with greater obfta- 
 cles 
 
 
 
{ 9g ) 
 
 cles than barley or oats, which remain bit\about four. 
 Befides, as the furface of the earth, toa‘ confiderable 
 depth, is rendered fo hard by the froft, it muft be im- 
 poflible for the blade of ‘the plant to fhoot up fponta- 
 neoufly ; an infinite dealvof labour muft therefore have 
 been requifite among the Canadian farmers to open the 
 furrows, and give the plants all the affiftance of art in 
 their power, while they are growing; for, if the culture 
 beftowed on plants in general is beneficial, it muft cer- 
 tainly be more fo to thofe {that remain longeft in the 
 ground. 
 
 Great care muft alfo have been taken by the Canadian 
 farmers every feafon, that their lands‘were well cleaned 
 of the ftubble of the former crops, in order to render 
 them fit for the reception-of the feed, andthe neceflary 
 cultiire ; otherwife. the: plants would be- liable to be 
 rooted: up by plowing. And even admit that the foil of 
 Canada had been originally ever fo ‘fertile, it muft have 
 been greatly impaired fince ; Canada being fuch a4 
 woody country, the farmer could not remove from his 
 old farm to cultivate frefh lands at pleafure, as the diffi- 
 culty of clearing the ground of the trees and ftumps 
 muft be infinite, and in moft parts impraéticable> their 
 ufual fettlements muft therefore have loft their former 
 virtue by fuch frequent culture, and the quantity of 
 their produce muft have decreafed every fucceeding 
 year. They muft likewife have required a great deal 
 of manure, which, by its nutritive juice and warmth, 
 might qualify the foil for vegetation; and, after all the 
 difficulties.of Nature are furmounted, by this laborious 
 and expenfive toil, when the plants had acquired a con- 
 fiderable growth, is it reafonable to fuppofe that they 
 
 could 
 
 
 
could totally ,withftand every future inclemency-of wed 
 ther? Do not-even the hufbandmen of ‘England .(a cli- 
 mate. infinitely more:mild than (Canada): often. have 
 their crops blighted by one night’s froft? -and will ‘it be 
 faid, they arenot more liable'to ‘thefe calamities: in Ca 
 
 nada? and, .as,.the difficulties of growing wheat. were 
 fo great,, by reafon.of the long, ftay it required in. the 
 ground, before itcould: acquire its.naturalperfe&tion, : it 
 may. reafonably be canceived,. that-the; Canadians never 
 exported. any confiderable quantity of flour, if any\ atiall; 
 and this is a prime article of the provifion trade to the 
 Sugar Iflands, . 
 
 If we want farther proof of the climate.of Canada, we 
 need only afk .our,,brave foldiers.who-have been «there :. 
 they will, infotm: us,. that feveral.-of their moft hardy 
 comrades haye.,Joft the, fe of their: limbs merely from 
 the effets of the,weather; nays that fome of their offi- 
 cers alfo, (whofe difference of Jiving,one would’ think:a 
 fecurity, againfh this..evi)) have been:.rendered..infirm 2 
 Brigadier, Murray himfelf, if I amsnot:miftaken,. makes 
 fucha complaint in his letter, onthe furrender of Mont- 
 real and all Canada, , 
 
 The.affertion, that Canada fupplied.their.Sugar Ifands 
 with proyafions, is likewife. very. doubtful. I have al- 
 readyexplained:-myfelf with:regard to all kinds of corn, 
 which could not grow, in any abundance, not only from 
 the disfayour of ,the climate, - but ,likewife of.the foil, 
 which is a. mixture of. fand and ftones, and therefore 
 naturally very unfit ‘for, vegetation... It muft at leaft be 
 allowed, that Canada produced but a very fmall guanti- 
 ty of corn more than fufficient for the occafions of its 
 own inhabitants. I have the authority of Charlevoix: 
 
 
 
‘ e+ he ian 
 Ss 
 Bi? 
 
 (25) 
 
 levoix in this print *, the great demands the Canadians 
 had for it to give their cattle in winter, rendered it im- 
 poffible. 
 
 * « The winter (fays he) commonly begins before the vefiels fet fail 
 in order to return to France, and always in fuch a manner, as to afto- 
 “ nifh every one, except the natives of the place. The firft frofts, in a 
 “* few days, fill the rivers with ice, and the earth is foon covered with 
 *¢ fnew, which continues for fix months, and is always fix feet deep in 
 t€ places not expofed to the wind. 
 
 “¢ It is true there is no want of wood to guard againft the cold, which 
 *< very foon becomes extreme, and encroaches greatly on the fpring: but 
 *< it is, however, fomething extremely fhocking, not to be able to ftir out 
 “¢ of doors without being frozen, at leaft without being wrapt up in furs 
 s« like a bear. Moreover what a fpectacle is it to behold one continued 
 << traét of fnow, which pains the fight, and hides from our view all the 
 «< beauties of nature? No more difference between the rivers and fields, 
 «< no more variety, even the trees are covered with fnow-froft, with large 
 *€ ificles depending from ail their branches, under which you cannot pafs 
 “¢ with fafety. What can a man think, who fees the horfes with beards 
 “* of ice more than a foot long; and who can travel in a country, where, 
 “¢ for the fpace of fix months, the bears themfelves dare not thew their 
 “ faces to the weather? Thus I have never paffed a winter in this coun- 
 “* try, without feeing fome one or other carried to the hofpital, and whe 
 <¢ was obliged to have his legs or arms cut off, on account of their being 
 « benumbed and frozen. In a word, if the fky is clear, the wind which 
 ** blows from the weft, is intolerably piercing. If it turns to the fouth 
 «¢ or eaft,- the weather becomes a little more moderate, but fo thick a fnow 
 “« falls, that there is no feeing ten paces before you, even at noon day. On 
 ‘¢ the other hand, if a compleat thaw comes on, farewell to the yearly 
 “ ftock of capons, quarters of beef and mutton, poultry, and fith, which 
 «¢ they had laid up in granaries, depending on the continuance of the froft 5 
 << {o that in fpite of the exceffive feverity of the cold, people are reduced 
 “ to the neceffity of wifhing for its continuance.” Charl. p. 252, 254, 
 letter 10. 
 
 And a little after, he fays (p. 255,) “ After all, thefe colds fo long and 
 ¢ fo fevere, are attended with inconveniences, which can never thorough- 
 “¢ ly be remedied. I reckon in the firft place the difficulty of feeding the 
 cattle, which during the whole winter feafon ¢an find nothing in the 
 “* fields, and, confequently, thé preferving them muft be extremely ex- 
 “ penfive, while their ficth, after being kept fix months on dry food, muft 
 
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 ( 26 } 
 
 poffible. And if this natural fearcity of corn had not 
 fubfifted, the immenfe expence of maintaining cattle 
 and poultry with it all winter, muft ftill have greatly 
 prevented the growth of them, as indeed was the cafe, 
 for it is an undoubted truth, that many of the farmers 
 in Canada, made it a practice of killing them in au- 
 tumn, to avoid the vaft expence of maintaining them 
 during the winter: fo that the greateft part of the year 
 the inhabitants chiefly lived upon falted meats and fish. 
 And farther, to afcertain how fmall the trade was from 
 Canada to the French fugar iflands with provifions, we 
 need only enquire what quantities of beef and pork have 
 been frequently exported dire€tly from England-and Ire- 
 land, and indirectly from eur own northern colonics, 
 fometimes on their own bottom, and at others by mean 
 of their correfpondence with the Dutch and Danes. 
 Thofe articles generally comprized under the denomi- 
 nation of Lumber, they, indeed, might fend to the iflands, 
 but this was carried on in fuch a manner, as fcarce to 
 deferve our notice, and the name of a branch of com- 
 merce. ‘The demands of the Canadians, as I have faid 
 before, being greater for European commodities, than 
 they could return in furs, they generally fupplied the 
 deficiency by a cargo of lumber, which the European 
 fhips carried to the fugar iflands, and there got in ex~ 
 change fugar, coffee, indigo, &c. which they brought 
 
 «© have loft all its relifh. Gorn is alfo neceflary for the poultry, and great 
 ** care muft be taken to keep them alive during fo long a time. If to 
 “¢ avoid expence, all thofe beats are killed about the end of Otober, which 
 ** are intended for confumption, before the month of May, you may eafi- 
 ly judge how infipid this fort of yidtuals muft be, and from the manner 
 “ in which they catch fith through the ice, it appears this cannot be very 
 “* plentiful, befides its being frozen froma the very firft ; fo that itis al- 
 moft impoffible to have it frefh in the feafon, when it is mok wanted. 
 
 ‘ to 
 
 t¢ 
 
 
 
( 27) 
 to Europe, and this kind of traffic generally made near 
 a whole year’s voyage. Other fhips were folely freight- 
 ed with furs, or fometimes partly paid in bills of exchange 
 direétly for Europe ; but much the greateft part of the 
 fhips from France to Canada, reforted to the fifhery, in 
 the mouth of the river St. Laurence, and off the banks 
 of Newfoundland : fo that one way or other, they all 
 of them generally got home loaded. But is not this a 
 further proof of the extreme poverty of Canada? Cana- 
 da itfelf could not near fupply them with fufficient com- 
 modities to go freighted home, or any other market. 
 And if they had not found a remedy in the fifhery, the 
 whole colony of Canada would, very probably, have 
 been long ago neglected, or abandoned by the inhabi- 
 tants, for the imports from France muft have been con- 
 fequently much enhanced in value for want of 2 freight 
 home. In fhort, if the Canadians have in any refpect 
 become rivals, or formidable to our colonies, fo as to 
 require fuch an effeétual check, as the retention of their 
 whole country, have we not been conducive, nay have 
 we not been principals in the means of making them fo? 
 Was it not the treachery and iniquitous practices of ou, 
 traders, that alienated from us the affections of the In- 
 dians who, till then, kept in awe all Canada? Did 
 not the adminiftration neglect to reform the abufes in 
 this matter? Was it not rather conceived good policy 
 to promote diflentions among the different tribes, to urge 
 them to a war with the French, and then thamefully 
 defert them, with a view, as they themfelves found, if 
 
 not of extirpating their wHole generation, at leaft of 
 
 checking their future growth ? Did not proceedings like 
 theie, and thefe alone, foree them to carry their furs to 
 the Canadians, and to have dealings with 2 people, 
 
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 ( 28 ) 
 
 againft whom they had the ftrongeft natural pre‘udices 
 and hereditary enmity, and with whom they had. lived 
 in perpetual war? Did not the French on the contrary, 
 very much improve their good underitanding with them, 
 not only in the way of fair trade, but conformity to 
 their way of living, and intermarriage among them ? 
 Need we wonder then, that a behaviour {o oppofite had 
 fuch oppofite effects? Be the Indians ever fo deceitful 
 and vindictive, they have fenfations of humanity, and 
 ideas of genetofity ; nor can we juftly upbraid~ them 
 with treachery and barbarity, againft whom we have fo 
 largely played the fame weapons: but without morali- 
 zing farther, let me advife, that before we impeach the 
 honefty of others, we learn to be honeft ourfelves re 
 am fure it is full time. While the natives were our 
 friends, had we any apprehenfions of danger from the 
 French power in Canada? No 3 Our colonies were not 
 obliged to maintain fo many forts on their frontiers, they 
 - enjoyed all the happinefs of peace and fecurity ; if the 
 Canadians attempted any encroachments on our claims, 
 though at the diftance of two or three hundred miles 
 from our fettlements, they were conftantly drove away 
 by thefe people, fuch was their good faith and amity to- 
 ward us. Was it not their defeét alone that enabled 
 the French to purfue the ambitious {chemes they had 
 formed againft.us in America, and which they. found 
 were difregarded by our adminiftration in England? And 
 yet notwithftanding the large addition of territory they 
 acquired, and their influence over the moft diftant tribes 
 of Indians, what great advantages did France receive 
 from this their reputed invaluable colony ? Is it not real- 
 ly to be admired, is it not worth our confideration, to 
 find that its amount, in the mof flourifhing times, €x- 
 ceeded 
 
 
 
( 29 ) 
 
 ceeded little more than one hundred and thirty five thou- 
 fand pounds ; and ‘even then, that it produced no ba- 
 lance in favour of Canada ; the inhabitants never had a 
 fufficiency to return in exchange for common neceflaries : 
 and if we deduct the value of thofe commodities that 
 enabled them to carry on the trade with the Indians, 
 fuch as brandy, fire-arms, powder, blankets, and feve- 
 ral kinds of trinkets and utenfils, and the freightage of 
 them from France, what could be the amount of the 
 clear profits of thefe {kins to the merchant? Did the ex. 
 ports from Canada ever employ many fhips ? Did they 
 ever much add to the French naval power? Did they, 
 when imported, bring any confiderable addition to the 
 French revenue? fo far from it, Sir, that we were told 
 by the Remarker, and with a great deal of truth, that 
 ‘¢ the whole produce of Canada, though it were all ex. 
 ‘« ported from England, and exported compleatly ma~ 
 ‘© nufactured, would not amount to the value of” the 
 ** fingle article” of fugar from Guadalupe  unmanu- 
 ‘* factured : nor would it employ the one twentieth part 
 <¢ of the fhipping and the feamen.” 
 
 _ By the retention of Canada one would, no doubt, ex= 
 pect that the French would be entirely excluded from 
 Cape Breton, and all their right to, and fhare in the 
 fifhery. Will not then impartial men be amazed, when 
 they hear, that if we retain Canada, “ the French *” 
 are ftill to enjoy “* the right given” them by “the 13th 
 <¢ article of the treaty of Utrecht, to fith in fome parts 
 “< of thefe feas *” and that ‘* Cape Breton” is to «¢ be 
 “* left open to them,” becaufe truly this and that Great 
 ‘¢ Man conceives the refufal would be rather unreafon- 
 ** able,” and becaufe “* a few men of war kept at Hal- 
 
 * Letter to two Great Men, p. 32, 
 cé lifax, 
 
 
 
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 as ~ . Sa — ; “ -- ~ 
 
 ( 30 ) 
 
 < Jifax, will effectually prevent Louifbourg’s being agai 
 « made 2 place of ftrength.” What, ‘Sir, can we 
 think, when we fee the continuance of a mere privilege 
 fo ftrenuoufly recommended, which there is the greateft 
 reafon poffible to wifh revoked? We, Sir, who fo much 
 lament the growth of French power, and their ftrength 
 by fea; we, Sir, who have feen this very privilege abufed, 
 who have heard them treat our fifhers with all imagin- 
 able infolence and lawlefs defpotifm ; who have feen 
 them fupplant us at the foreign market even in that com~ 
 modity, which is judged fo very °* unreafonable” to re-= 
 fafe them. In fhort, Sir, we, who after a truce of about 
 eight years, from a bloody and expenfive war, and when 
 the profecution of another, has almoft reduced us to a 
 national bankruptcy, are, I am forry to fay it by fuch 
 good advice, and well concerted fechemes as this, in a 
 fair way of repeating that univerfal carnage that hath of 
 late years defolated Europe worfe than a peftilence, and 
 finking under 2 burthen that may render Britain no 
 longer a commercial kingdom, and Britons no longer 
 a free people. ) 
 
 Can we doubt, Sir, that if France was fuffered to 
 repoflefs Cape-Breton, that, fhe would repeople it 
 4nd re-fortify it; Efay, Sir, car we doubt it, when we 
 have fuch bare-faced inftances of her perfidy in the 
 
 prefent ftrength of Dunkirk, and the late encroach- 
 
 ments on ‘our colonies; the former of which they for- 
 tified under our very nofes, and the latter of which 
 they got pofleffion of by our own fupinenefs ; for we 
 were ocular witneffes of their motions, nay, were pre- 
 Vioufly acquainted with their intentions. If, im the 
 rerms of a future peace, we fhould exact a particular 
 
 ftipulation from France, that we fhouldeven be at li- 
 berty 
 
 
 
( ) 
 
 betty to take periodical obfervations and nice furveys of 
 the ftate of Cape-Breton in the times of peace, would 
 not Frrnce find the means to evade the executive part 
 of that ftipulation, even fuppofing that future admini- 
 ftrations fhould be inclined to adhere ftri€ly to the tenor 
 of it, a circumftance very much to be feared ? the fpe- 
 cial pretéxts of fheltering the inhabitants, and prote<ct- 
 ing them againft any irruption of the favages from the 
 neighbouring continent, muft be allowed to have fome 
 influence ; and being fo plaufible, would be ever pal- 
 liative of their breach of faith. ‘What then would be the 
 confequence ? Should we not foon fee Louifbourg once 
 more become that formidable bulwark, that invaluable 
 Dunkirk of America, which we ever confidered it to 
 be? Should we not again experience the defection of the 
 treacherous Arcadians ? Would not France always take 
 care to keep a numerous garrifon in Cape-Breton? 
 Would they not again carry fire and fword into our in- 
 fant fettlements in Nova Scotia? Would not our fhare 
 in the Fifhery be at theit mercy? Could a fingle fhip go 
 to Canada without paffing Cape-Breton ; Muft they not 
 even go in fight of it, excepting when the air fhould be 
 fogey, or our fhips fhould find themfelves under a ne- 
 ceffity of taking their paflage through the Streights of 
 Bellifle, a paflage infinitely more tedious and dange- 
 fous? could we, therefore, ih the time of war, avoid 
 the total deftruétion of our trade to Canada, and the 
 Fifhery, without keeping fleets to block up the port ? 
 And would not the keeping fuch fleets be always necef- 
 fary, and confequently always a vaft expence to the na- 
 tion, and fuch as, in the time.of war, would greatly over- 
 balance the amount of the exports from Canada even in 
 the time of peace? Is this the way, Sir, to procure 
 
 the 
 
 ¢ 
 
 ny e, 
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 w zt 
 
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oe Pn Sat b Ags gS MOG cree? PA ‘ 
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 (.g2 9 
 
 the much defired folid peace for, England, . and for 
 Furope? Is it the way to fhew ‘ France that” we 
 ‘* know’ our *¢ true interefts, and are refolved {teadily 
 “* to purfue them * ?”’ would not.‘¢ a peace” upon. this. 
 fyftem, be rather ‘* treacherous and delufive ?” Should 
 we not too foon experience, that Louifbourg would,. in 
 every refpect, become more formidable and detrimental 
 to us than Dunkirk ever was, or ever can be ? Would 
 not pofterity hereafter admire, that England could have 
 a M——r remarkable for his perfpicuity, and unufually 
 diftinguifhed for his attachment to the interefts of ‘his 
 country, fo egregioufly impofed on, and who could: be 
 confiftently guilty of fuch a manifeft default, blunder, or 
 whatever you pleafe to term it? in the name of decency 
 and good manners, let us not caft fuch an affront on 
 common fenfe. 
 
 I would not, Sir, judge too harfhly, I. would. be ra- 
 ther too {paring of cenfure; but how can I. refrain a 
 little ebullition of temper, when I fee a fyftem aétually 
 adopted, that is in itfelf fo abfurd and inconfiftent ; the 
 demolition of §* the fortifications of Louifbourg +,” was 
 to be the prelude to this fanciful farce, a farce which has 
 taken place in action, and, if lam rightly informed, had 
 been adopted, in the refined negociation ; it is there- 
 fore full time, before the curtain is dropt, to put.a check 
 to its future progrefs. The abfurdity of demolifhing 
 the fortifications of Louifbourg is felf evident, and the 
 more fo upon the pretence, that “a few men of war 
 «¢ kept at Hallifax, will effeGtually prevent” its « being 
 ‘“‘ again madea place of ftrength.”. The whole muft 
 
 * Letter to two great men, + Ibid, 
 
 there- 
 
 
 
a 
 
 coe < oe, 
 
 therefore » depend upon the reafonablenefs of keeping the 
 whole ifland of Cape-Breton from the hands of Frances 
 which is a point I fhall. confider hereafter: it is fuffi- 
 cient at prefent, that the retention of thefe iflands and 
 the fithery, has not been urged, by the advocates, as ai 
 inducement for retaining Canada. 
 
 I perfwade myfelf, Sit, you will excufé my converfs 
 ing with you fo freely, and delivering my fenti- 
 ments fo plainly, I. mentioned to you at my firit 
 fetting off, [had not ftudied the art of adulation, if I can 
 acquit myfelf of my prefent tafk in the language of com> 
 mon fenfe, it isasmuch I can aim at. We are all of us 
 apt, Sir, to talk prefumptively upon matters of fenti- 
 ment; if therefore I anticipate the future fituation of 
 Canada, whether intended to be retained or not, and 
 give you fomething of my ideas, or rather to afk fomeé 
 general queftions, what it would be under an Englifh 
 government, I hope I hall be entitled to the excufe. 
 
 Muft it not be allowed, Sir, that under an Englifh 
 government, fhips cannot “ come to the Weft-India 
 ‘* market from the bottom of the river St. Laurence, 
 s* with the grofs and cheap article of lumber upon a 
 “ footing with our colonies, ian of which are not 
 ‘¢ three weeks fail from them.” But as to this branch, 
 Sir, { believe, it is given up by the ftrongeft idvocates 
 of that fyftem. As an Englifh colony will not Canada 
 be fubject to certain limits, as is the cafe with our other 
 colonies? Would not this of courfe greatly reduce the 
 amount of their exports in furs? Will the Canadians 
 then have the command of the beautiful banks of the 
 Ohio, or the Great Lakes? Can they have pofleffion of 
 jands, included in the grants of other colonies, or of 
 thofe traéts, for which contraéts have been already made 
 
 with private companies? On the contrary muft not the 
 F Whole 
 
 
 
whole trade. of Canada be confined within the barren’ 
 tract to the eaft of the Upper Lake, and Hudfon’s-Bay 
 As Englifh fubjects, will not the Canadians lofe their in- 
 fluence over the Indians? would not thefe latter look 
 upon them as natives of England? and would they, in 
 in fuch cafe, carry their fkins as far as Montreal, when 
 eit: could do it fo much more conveniently at pete 
 nd Ofwego, foran equal, if not larger gratuity? | 
 But fuppofe, Sir, that the Canadians fhould have liberty: 
 given them to refort to the lakes,:and about the Forks 
 ‘of the Ohio, and have eftablifhed marts there at certain 
 feafons cf the year, would they carry the {kins to Ca- 
 nada, when they might difpofe of them fo much more 
 Conveniently to faCtors in Virginia or Maryland? The 
 heads of the rivers Potomack and Sufquehanna, that fall 
 into Chefapeak Bay, interlock with the branches of the 
 Ohio about Pitfburg, and thereby afford an inland 
 navigation from the Ohio through the Apalacheon 
 
 mountains to the Atlantic Ocean, and a carriage 
 
 thither be much fhorter and fafer, than by  navi- 
 
 gating the lakes Erie and Ontario, down the River Ca- 
 
 — 
 
 deracqui, fo to Montreal, Quebec, and up the Rive, 
 St. Laurence ? Would not likewife even-the inhabitants 
 within the precincts of Canada, confign their commo- 
 dities to factors at New-York ? Would it not be more 
 to their advantage than fending them by way of the 
 River St. Laurence? The navigation of Lake Cham- 
 plain and Hudfon’s River would be much fhorter, and 
 fafer, arid confequently much cheaper. 
 
 Thus, Sir,-would not the Canadians have all-the 
 drudgery of getting the fkins, and the Virginians; Ma- 
 rylanders, _ or New-Yorkers, the benefit of the fale? 
 Would not thefe latter likewife fupply the Canadians 
 
 with 
 
 
 
$5 37 
 
 with Englifh manufactures, &c. much cheaper by means 
 of this inland navigation, than we could direétly from 
 England by the way of the River St. Laurence? Would 
 not the greater diftance and danger of the voyage by 
 way of the River St. Laurence; and neceflary detention 
 of the fhip and crew, in difembarking their commoditiess 
 and loading again, of courfe enhance the price? Thus, 
 Sir, is it not likely that England will receive very little 
 addition in fhips or failors, by retaining Canada, at al} 
 events, much lefs than France did, tho’ fo very incon- 
 fiderable ; nay, perhaps, that{carce a dozen fhips would 
 enter the River St. Laurence bound to, any port in Ca- 
 nada within a whole year? 
 
 If the French inhabitants fhould retire from their 
 fettlements in Canada {which I am perfwaded moft of 
 them would) can we expect that it will become wel; 
 peopled from our own colonies, when we have fuch im- 
 menfe tracts on thefame continent, infinitely more com- 
 modious and inviting,’ fuch as in Nova-Scotia, about 
 the Jakes, and every part beyond the mountain? If 
 this ‘¢ objection is founded on ignorance of the nature 
 ‘¢ of population in new countries *; 1 willacknowledge 
 I am unhappy enough to deferve that cenfure ; but, if 
 the ** population ” of *¢ new countries ” depends, as I 
 conceive jt does, on ** the pleafantnefs, fertility, and 
 é* plenty of fuch new countries ¢,” and the inhabitants 
 ‘¢ encreafe in proportion as the means and facility of 
 ‘6 gaining a livelihood encreafe f,” then I do not deferve 
 that cenfure, but the author himfelf; for the climate of 
 Canada is far from being pleafant, the foil far from be- 
 
 Intereft of Great Britain, &c. pP» 45. 
 t Ibid. py 24s } Ibid. p. 25. 
 
 Pa 
 
 5° 
 ro) 
 
 wi 
 
 Wi 
 LOW 
 (yt 
 ey 
 ila 
 
 SI 
 
 eS 
 
 SPP ae Se SPs +. seeite 
 
 
 
ing fertile, nor has it a plent? of any vendible commo- 
 
 f 
 
 city. 
 
 To bel 
 inconfiftent, that Canada, Being of fo very little impor- 
 tance to France, can be fo mutch the greater to us? as 
 being the only northern colony they pofleffed, they cer- 
 tainly had it in their power to make its commodities 
 turn to greater account than we can ever expect to do? 
 You certainly, Sir, do not think we can receive greater 
 advantages from it ina commercial view than France 
 has dene before us: it is beyond poiibility. Is there not 
 rather the greateit reafon to expect that the Canadians, 
 by lofing the commerce of the great lakes and the Forks 
 of the Ohio, would decreafe in their exports of furs, at 
 Jeaft one half? Would not their demands, in that cafe, 
 on Great-Britain decreafe in proportion ? And how they 
 could find wherewithal to keep life and foul together, is 
 to me very queftionable ; for, by the Jofs of their efta- 
 blifhment on the Great Lakes, Canada would lofe very 
 few of its own proper inhabitants, although the later 
 fettlers fhould’ continue there; for thefe fettlements were 
 formed chiefly for fupporting their garrifons, and to pre- 
 ferve a communication with the Indians. 
 
 The military invalids, civilized Indians, and the {pare 
 hands of the garrifon were employed in cultivating thefe 
 fetticments, but no farther than was fufficient for their 
 own wants : the Coureus de Bois went with the commo- 
 dities neceflary for the Indian trade, and brought back in 
 return their fkins. No other commercial intercourfe fub- 
 iNted between Canada and-their {ettlements about the 
 lakes. Ina word, Sir, I would be glad to know what 
 imaginary form of government we are to aflume in Ca- 
 nada ; what inverfion is propofed to be made in the civil 
 polity,and what kind of innovations in the commercial fy{- 
 
 tem , 
 
 5 
 
 
 

 
 (379 
 &em. Is England to pay all the neceflary officers of the 
 civil eftablifhment ? Is England to defray all the charges 
 of repairing and maintaining the fortifications? If fo, 
 where is the fund to do it? Muft England, likewife, be 
 obliged to keep a numerous force in Canada to over= 
 awe the inhabitants? Will not this be even neceflary 
 to bring fpecie into the colony ; for if it does not come 
 by this channel, how can it come at all ? Canada can 
 have no ballance in her favour from her own commodi- 
 ties, and, can have no money, but by virtue of the royal 
 eftablifhment: and iffuch eftablifhment was neceffary un- 
 der the French, will it not be more fo under us ? even the 
 whole value of the exports from Canada would be fearce 
 fufficient to pay its own civil officers, much lefs the 
 charges of maintaining their fortifications. Are the’im-_ 
 ports and exports to and from Canada to be exempted 
 from the ufual duties on their entry and clearance? If 
 they were fubject to fuch duties, would not the price of 
 commodities be much enhanced, and the Canadians 
 rendered more unable to pay for them? And if the ex- 
 emption was to take place, would it not be fo much 
 clear lofs to the revenue? So that in every cafe, is not 
 the mother-country fure to fuffer by retaining Canada? 
 In a word, Sir, by retaining it, we can expect it to be- 
 come no other than a colony, without trade and inha- 
 bitants. Let the advocates for the retention, give me 
 the leaft profpect of its being made of any real utility 
 and emolument to the mother country (be it ever fo 
 fmall;) and I will not avail myfelf of its very nume~ 
 rous and peculiar difadvantages, very peculiar indeed! 
 But I am apprehenfive that this cannot be done. It can- 
 not be faid, Sir, that we fhould retain Canada, becaufe 
 there is reafon to fufpeét the French will prove trouble- 
 
 fome 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 fome neighbours, we might as well apply this dotrine 
 to every colony the French are poffefied of, and even tg 
 
 
 
 France itfelf. But did the pofleffion of Canada give the 
 
 
 
 Wis French any fuperiority over us, either on the principles 
 
 
 
 of power or commerce ? Was it not our own unparal- 
 
 
 
 lelled negligence that raifed them from the very extre- 
 
 
 
 i mity of beggary and contempt, and made them become 
 
 
 
 formidable to us ? It cannot be faid, Sir, that before the 
 
 
 
 French got pofleffion of the lakes, and preyailed upon 
 ie |! our Indian allies to abandon our intereft, and take part 
 ef with them, that England had any thing to apprehend 
 from the excefiive growth of French power from that 
 | colony, fo far from this, did not our own colonies hold 
 me | Canada in fuch a piteous light, that they feldom enga- 
 bit ged v'goroufly in a war againit it? When they were in- 
 clined to correfpond with Canada in this manner, did 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 they not fet the Indians on; and did not they alone 
 prove fufficient to keep the Canadians in the moft abje@ 
 awe and fubjection ? 
 
 But wherefore fhould [ be. furprized at. finding 
 Canada ever fo deficient. for England, in a commer- 
 
 
 
 : . Pe hn * ¥ ¢ 
 Se Or tt rr eee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hi cial view, or even of any importance at all, when 
 we have been very modeftly given to underftand 
 
 
 
 
 that the ‘* propofed demand of Canada is,”’ partly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ” 
 
 iy ¢¢ founded on the little value of” it ‘* to the French * 5” 
 We ‘an aflertion fo plain and fimply honeft in itfelf, that I 
 ah believe, Sir, I had no occafion to have enlarged in the 
 Hi Hi manner 1 have done: however, as I have entered the 
 Bh i's lifts, itis fit I fhould acquit myfelf with becoming cou- 
 rage and refolution,, and fhall, therefore proceed on the 
 object of contention. Another part of the foundation 
 is faid to be ‘* the right. we have to afk, and the power 
 ‘¢ we may have to infift on an indemnification for our 
 
 i # Intereft of Great Britain, p, 4, and §- 
 i 4 ; | E CX= 
 
 
 
(See? 
 expences +.” But this is a very fhallow argument, for,’ 
 have we not, Sir, the fame right to afk, and the fame 
 poflibility (the author implies no more) of a power, to 
 infft on an indemnification as well by retaining any 
 other conqueft as Canada? Moft certainly we have, and 
 moft certainly we ought, to make our preference fubor- 
 dinate to our own interefts and not the convenience of 
 an enemy. The other part of the argument is {aid to be 
 << the difficulty the French themfelves will be under of 
 ‘<< retaining their reftlefs fubjects in America from en- 
 “‘ croaching on our limits, and difturbing our trade, 
 « and the difficulty on our parts of preventing encroach- 
 <¢ ments that may poffibly exift many years without 
 <¢ coming to our knowledge }.” But as this part en- 
 tirely depends on the objects of our demands in North 
 America, and in faét would be the only material foun- 
 dation for us to keep Canada, I fhall confider that point 
 pretty largely. Ido not mean to infift merely on the 
 difadvantages of the commerce of Canada, my intention 
 is not to: cavil upon particulars, but to obviate every 
 caufe for it hereafter. If the poffeffion of Canada would 
 give us that fecurity we want, or, at leaft, ought to 
 want, in North America, or would prove of any great 
 detriment to the future growth-of-power in France, I 
 would readily wave them as inconfiderable. I do not 
 think either of thefe will be the confequence, and hall 
 prefently give my reafons why I think fo; and if it is 
 found that Canada will not give us fuch fecurity, where- 
 fore fhould we incumber ourfelyes with it, when it 
 would prove a dead load of expence to us? and where- 
 fore fhould we pay fuch a regard to the French, when it 
 would prove a dead load of expence to them? It could 
 
 + Intereft of Great Britain, p* 5. tT ibid. 
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( 40 )} 
 
 “ 
 
 be for no other reafon than might arife from an over 
 ftrained complaifance, becaufe it would be of little va- 
 lue to them. Gai , 
 
 The fecurity defirable in Amicrica, we have Been in- 
 formed ¢ tay be confidered as of three kinds. 1ft, A 
 << fecurity of pofleffion that the French fhall not drive 
 “¢ us out of the country. 2dly,’ A’ fecurity of our plan- 
 “¢ ters from the inroads of the favages, ‘and the murders 
 «committed by them. dly,‘A fecurity that the Bri- 
 «¢ tifh nation fhall not be obliged or every new war to 
 «¢ repeat the immenfe expence occafioned by this to de- 
 << fend its poffeffions in America *.” I agree with the 
 author in the propriety of thefe heads, but when he fays 
 that ‘¢ all” thefe “¢ kinds of fecurity are obtained by fub- 
 &< duing and retaining Canada,” and that * the In- 
 
 dians” will have ** no other Europeans near them 
 
 that can either fupply them, or inftigate them againft 
 
 us + ;” I cannot but difagree with him there, it is an 
 aflertion altogether falfe and extravagant: I ¢annot but 
 think the retention of this fame Canada will be defici- 
 cient in all thefe points, and that in no fmall meafure 
 toot The author certainly could not be fo ignorant of 
 the limits of Candda, to mean as he wculd feem to im- 
 ply; he could not, with any regard to candour, or with 
 a View to benefit the fub’ect, fet up a pretence fo re- 
 pugiiant to the intent of the French fettlements in North 
 America, and the nature of their claims there. Does 
 France claim dny right to'the Ohio, as appertaining to 
 Canada? Does arly one conceive that France would fet 
 up a claim upon a principle fo abfurd? It is trite the 
 ‘grant of Louifiana to Monf. Crozat, is not of itfelf, a 
 iufficient authority to infift on any precife bouridaries to 
 
 9? 
 
 * Intereft of Great Britain, p: ro. Ibid, p, 14. 
 
 Loui- 
 
 
 
(41) 
 Louiliana ; the patent is couched in very obfcure terms, 
 and the original expreflion, in fome places, very ambi- 
 guous. — It tells us, one part of Louifiana is bounded by 
 the river Illinois, but whether by the mouth or fource of 
 that river is left undetermined, and the eaftern bounda- 
 ry is entirely fo. This obfcurity might be affected in- 
 tentionally ; and indeed with good reafon: for as this 
 fettlement was an illegal ufurpation, not only on the 
 crown of Spain, but that of England, and was put in 
 execution immediately after the treaty of Utrecht, it 
 behoved France to keep her views in this fettlement, 
 as fecret as poffible. But let us only confider with a 
 little more reflection, and the matter will illuftrate it- 
 felf. The Ohio is cut off from Canada by the interme- 
 diate territories of fome of our colonies and the Six Na- 
 tions, a people whom France has formally acknow- 
 ledged by treaty to be fubject to England, and whofe ter- 
 ritories extend over moft of the lakes, and the circumja- 
 cent country. France therefore, could not, confiftent- 
 ly with her former conduct, fhe could not, with the 
 leaft colour, affume a right to the Ohio as appertaining 
 to Canada. The nature of the French claim to all the 
 territories they aflume to themfelves in Canada and 
 Louifiana, is ftill a ftronger evidence to my prefent 
 purpofe. France fettles at the mouths of the two rivers 
 St. Laurence and Miffifippi, and on that foundation 
 builds a right to the whole extent of thofe rivers, and 
 
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 their feveral branches, and the rivers that communicate 
 with them ; it is, in fact, the only principle on which 
 fhe can found a right to the large territories claimed by 
 her in North America: therefore the Illinois, Ohio, 
 Wabache, Cherokee, and the other leffer rivers that 
 communicate with the Miffifippi were undoubtedly 
 
 a ae + ater ~ 
 
 ital apse 5:4) ers “ taal ae a i ee ‘ ~ 
 
 a 
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 G meant 
 
 
 

 
 ( 42 ) 
 
 meant to be included in Louifiana.. Befides there may 
 ftill be a more natural reafon, why the boundaries of 
 Louifiana were not primarily more clearly pointed out, 
 than an apprehenfion of the confequences arifing from 
 an illegal ufurpation. ‘Fhe grant to Crozat was the 
 effe& of a chimerical imagination, and made at a time 
 when the French were entirely ignorant of the nature 
 and extent of the country they were about to fettle, as 
 will evidently appear from a flight infpeétion into the 
 patent; and that they did not even mean to confine 
 themfelves to any particular boundaries as evidently ap- 
 pears from the refervations contained in it. And what 
 renders the affertion lefs plaufible and abfurd is, that a- 
 ereeable to the report of the commiffaries after the trea- 
 ty of Utrecht, the weftern frontier of Canada is ]i- 
 mited by the river Utawawa, which falls into the river 
 St. Laurence, near Montreal ; and, even according to 
 the modeft limitation of French hydrographers *, it in- 
 cluded only the great lakes. I will acknowledge the 
 pofleffion of Canada might fecure our northern colonies 
 of Nova Scotia, and New England; but, it is evident, 
 at the firft view, it could not in the Jeaft benckt the 
 colonies of New York, Penfylyania, Maryland, Vir- 
 ginia, the two Carolinas, and Georgia. 
 
 Agreeable to a late calculation it appeared that the 
 northern colonies of New England and New York, 
 have very near as many inhabitants as all the fouthern 
 colonics put together. We have likewife been told that 
 the fingle province of New York has upwards of fifty 
 forts to defend it againft an enemy, and that it can muf- 
 ter as many combatants as all the fouthern colonies to- 
 
 * This is agreeable to Lahontan, and moft of the French writers, &c. 
 M. de Lifle bounds one part of Louifiana by Penfylvania and New-York ; 
 and according to Le Lieur Louifiana may extend even to the North Pole. 
 gether, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cr 
 
 gether, near half of whofe inhabitants are buried alive 
 in Penfylvania, where it is made a principle of religion 
 not to fight. Why therefore we fhould be fo partial to 
 fecure our northern colonies, who are infinitely more 
 capable of withftanding an enemy, and throw all the 
 burthen on our fouthern colonies, who have a frontier 
 {o much more extended, and are in every refpec&t much 
 more incapable of defending themfelves, is very abfurd, 
 and the more unaccountable, fince fuch an unequal dif- 
 tribution of our favour, could not be of any emolument 
 to the mother country. 
 
 If the French fhould be obliged to give up the entire 
 pofleffion of Canada, they would, no doubt, endeavour 
 to fupply that lofs, by an effectual eftablifhment in Lou- 
 ifiana, where they have at prefent got a very confider- 
 able footing; and where, if they fhould ever become 
 well fettled, we fhall, too foon, too fadly, experience 
 that we have indeed done /omething; that we have 
 greatly ftrengthened. an enemy, who is already greatly 
 too ftrong, and that we have enabled them to effectuate a 
 {cheme, which may, in time, give them fuch advantage 
 over us as to endanger our own independency, as well as 
 that of all Europe: leave them Louifiana, and we fhall 
 quickly find, that an enfuing peace, will only prove a 
 truce toa more expenfive war, and a more powerful and 
 obftinate.refiftance. We are told, (from. Machiavel) 
 “¢ that a government feldom long preferves its dominion 
 <¢ over thofe who are foreigners to it; who, on the 
 ‘© other hand, fall with great eafe, and continue infe- 
 ¢¢ parably annexed to the government of their own na- 
 _s© tion, which” is proved ** by the fate of the Englifh 
 << conquefts in France.” Now, I would fubmit, whe- 
 ther the ftate of religion among the Canadians, fti!] far- 
 
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 ( 44 } 
 
 ther ageravated by the difadvantages attending them, 
 under an Englifh government, do not make this obfer- 
 vation more applicable to the prefent point ?) What great 
 and mighty good, Sir, can England hope for from a co- 
 lony eftablifhed upon a principle of religious perfecution, 
 and from fubjeéts, the beft and moft reputable of whom 
 are irrecoverably poifoned with the dregs of fuperftition ? 
 What, Sir, can England expect from a people nurtured 
 from their earlieft childhood, and educated, ‘as they ad- 
 Vance in years, in all the hardinefs and ferocity of the 
 native favage* ; a people who enjoy, by hereditary right 
 and adoption, and, indeed, whofe only patrimony. is, 
 the united good qualities of a whore and a thief? — 
 
 To expect an implicit, or paffive obedience from fuch 
 people, more efpecially as the capitulation authorizes 
 them to retain their ghoftly fathers, would be extremely 
 abfurd. Have not the colonies of New-England and 
 Nova-Scotia tafted frequent inftances of the fidelity of the 
 Acadians? Do they not even now bewail the ravages and 
 maflacres committed by them? Nay, were not thele Ca- 
 nadians who took the oaths of neutrality upon the fur- 
 render of Quebec, and were maintained with our 
 provilions, the greateft part of the winter, the fore- 
 moft in joining the army of the Chevalier Levi, and 
 the moft urgent ;for efcalading the walls though we 
 had an army at that very time in the heart of their 
 country, and another preparing to enter it from 
 another quarter? Can we doubt then, that if there 
 fhould be the leaft profpe& of a communication with 
 
 * In what light the Canadians are confidered by our colonies is remark- 
 ably illuftrated, in a late inftance of the addrefs of the aflembly of New- 
 York to General Amherft; wherein the ailembly, among ‘the advantages 
 accruing from the reduction of Canada, particularly felicitate their country 
 on-an end being put to the ravages and murders committed by “ the favage 
 
 “6 native, but more favage Canadian.” 
 
 their 
 
 a 
 
(Ses) 
 
 their countrymen in Louifiana, can we flatter ourfelves, 
 that they will not endeavour to improve it? And that 
 there will be fuch profpe&t is indifputale. Many rivers 
 afford a communication from Louifiana with the Great 
 Lakes all the way by water, except in fome of them, 
 
 {mall portages of a very few miles in the whole. 
 As Ihave faid before, the ceffion of Canada can only 
 include the Lakes; and, though the lands to the fouth 
 and weft of thofe Lakes, arein fact particularized in the 
 grants of fome of our colonies, yet the French will 
 claim aright to them, as appertaining to J.ouifiana: and 
 I will venture to affert, Sir, that leave the French in 
 pofleffion of any part of the Miffifippi, or even on the 
 other fide of that river, though the bounds between 
 our colonies, and fuch fettlement fhould be ever fo 
 clearly and accurately pointed out, that our colonies 
 will never enjoy that fecurity we feem fo defirous of 
 giving them, by retaining fuch an uncomfortable gueft 
 as Canada; and facrificing every other object to that im- 
 portant confideration, if not at the expence of our whole 
 fenfes, at leaftof the whole war. Would not the erecting 
 forts by us, at any great diftance from the Lakes; be 
 to very little purpofe, both in an offenfive and defen- 
 five view, and whether fo or not, would not the fup- 
 porting garrifons in fuch forts be attended with the ut- 
 moft expence and difficulties ? And yet, Sir, though we 
 ‘retain Canada, we mutt not only be obliged to fupport 
 forts in Canada, and about the Lakes; but, if we mean 
 to fecure the fole pofleffion of the Lakes, and the ad- 
 jacent country, which is ours of right, we muft build 
 forts at fome hundred miles diftance from thofe Lakes, 
 particularly at the junction of the River Illinois with the 
 Miffifippi, the Miamis and Wabache, with the Ohio, 
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 ( 40 ) 
 and the Ohio and Cherokee with the Miffifippi. If thi, 
 
 is not done, will they not again attack our remote forts, 
 and fecure the pafles to our moft fertile fettlements ? 
 Will they not, by means of thefe rivers, open a com- 
 munication with the Canadians, which might caufe fre- 
 quent infurrections and difturbances there, if we have 
 not a proper difciplined force to overawe them? 
 
 With regard to any future attempts from the French 
 in Louifiana on the fide of the Ohio, can our fort at 
 Pittiburg ever anfwer the purpofe of an effectual bar- 
 rier; when, at the fmall diftance of two hundred and 
 fifty miles from the capital of Penfylvania, confidering 
 that that river flows upward of 1200 miles from thence 
 before it falls into the Miftifippi? Can it be thought it 
 will prove the leaft fecurity againft future encroachments, 
 or hoftilities in the colonies of Penfylvania and New- 
 York? Might not our enemies, with the greateft 
 facility, poflefs themfelves of the whole river to the 
 weft of that port, without any obftru€tion from the 
 garrifon ? If the garrifon fhould happen to be cut 
 off from the fort, or the enemy be ftrong enough to 
 block it up, or lay fiege to it (which there is no doubt 
 they would) muft it not fall an eafy prey before any 
 reinforcement could get to it? and that done, might 
 they not again depopulate and ravage our frontier fettle- 
 ments, and carry fire and {word into the heart of our co- 
 lonies ? and, in our endeavours to retake this fort, would 
 not the difficulties we fhould have in marching an army, 
 and conveying the neceflary baggage and artillery 
 cver the mountains, render them able to baffle our 
 attempts, and maintain their ground there three 
 or four campaigns, as they have done this war ? 
 But, if they fhould find it neceflary to abandon 
 
 the 
 
Casa) 
 
 the fort from an incapacity,-either from the want of 
 ftores or men, to defend it, might they not demolith it, 
 or might they not retire down the river to fome dif- 
 tance, and attack it with greater vigour, upon receiving 
 a reinforcement ? 
 
 If they fhould not chufe to come to open violence, 
 might they not fucceed without going towards that fort, 
 and without committing any act of hoftility, by means 
 of the rivers Miamis and Wabache, both which rife 
 within a few miles of the fouth-weft coaft of Lake Erie, 
 and very near Detroit, or the Streights which join thar 
 with Lake Huron ? Would it not then be very eafy for 
 the French in Louifiana to make incurfions into our fet- 
 tlements there, if not cut off all communication from 
 thence to our colonies? The general method of trafic 
 carried on by the natives and traders in parts to the weft 
 of the Lakes, was by navigating from the upper Lake and 
 Lake Michigan into Lake Huron, and fo into Lakes Erie 
 and Ontario, after having conveyed their commodities over 
 their portage at Niagara; if to a French market, Fron- 
 tenac, or Montreal ; if to an Englifh one, Ofwego, or 
 Albany: the fingle capture of Detroit would therefore 
 effe€tually preuent any intercourfe of this kind between 
 thofe Indians and Canada, or any other of our colo- 
 nies. 
 
 Need we doubt, likewife, that they would neglect their 
 old track by the way of the River Illinois, before they 
 found out a moreconvenient one by the RiverOhio? Our 
 fettlements at Miffilimakinac cannot be confidered as a 
 proper barrier, they could make but very little oppo- 
 fition againft any enemy, much lefs againft fuch a one 
 as France at all times provided with all the requifites of 
 
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 war. In any attempt ofthe French, can we in the leaf 
 aflure ourfelves of the fidelity of the Indians ? might they 
 not with great probability become abettors in all the 
 ichemes of the French, who have acquired but too much 
 the art of conciliating the affections of the moft favage 
 among them. The tribes that inhabit thefe parts, and call 
 themfelves the Ten Nations, are as numerous as any other 
 aflociated confederacy of Indians in North America, 
 have been in ftrong alliance with the French; there ftill 
 are (tho’ in difguife) feveral of French extraction, and 
 many of them of the military kind. What therefore 
 have we not to apprehend? the forts at Miffilimakinac 
 and Detroit would have the whole force of Louifiana to 
 contend with, and very probably a combination of the 
 Indians; and thus backed, could we expect to keep pof- 
 feffion of thofe forts? Could we draw together a fuffi- 
 cient force to repel the invaders? Could we attack 
 them with the leaft advantage? Could we fupply an 
 army at fucha diftance from our proper frontier? the 
 confequences of a repulfe from fuch invaders, who come 
 prepared for flaughter, would be truly horrible ; let us 
 recollect that of Braddock’s, and tremble at the appre- 
 henfions of fuch another! 
 
 Succe{s, either by the River Illinois or Ohio, would 
 jikewife give the French a very confiderable fhare of the 
 furtrade. ‘I'he country for feveral miles between Lake 
 Erie and part of the Ohio, is reckoned the chief fpot for 
 hunting among the Indians in North-America, on ac- 
 count of the great refort of deer and beaver to the falt 
 pits which are there in great abundance: and the coun- 
 try to the weft and north of the Upper Lake is undoubt- 
 edly well fituated for the fame trade. The Indians for 
 
 feveral 
 
 
 
{ 49.) 
 
 feveral fcore miles thereabouts refort to the Englifh mart 
 in Hudfon’s-Bay. Would not then an eftablifhment 
 of the French in thofe parts, be of the greateft detriment 
 to us by lofing fo confiderable a fhare of that trade, and, 
 being fo beneficial to them, can we flatter ourfelves, they 
 would be wanting in a proper exertion to effect fuch efta~ 
 blifhment ? Nor could it be expeéted that the Indians 
 would undertake a long peregrination to difpofe of their 
 commodities to our colonies, when they might do it 
 upon their own fpot fo much more conveniently to the 
 French with equal, if not greater advantage ; for it has 
 been remarkable, that the French would rather give an 
 advanced price, than fuffer our traders to outbid them : 
 a policy encouraged by their government, which hath fre- 
 quently reimburfed the lofles of their fubjeéts in Canada 
 on this occafion. 
 
 Will not the French alfo have the fame advantage over 
 our fouthern colonies by means of the Catawba, Cum- 
 berland, and Wood rivers, and particularly that of the 
 Cherokees, a branch of which rifes near the heads of 
 the rivers Chatahoochee and Couffa, which communi- 
 cate with the Gulph of Mexico? Do not thefe rivers 
 afford the profpect of a moft extenfive intercourfe by in- 
 land navigation over the*whole country, beyond the 
 Apalachian mountains, belonging to Virginia, the Ca- 
 rolinas, and Georgia? while the French have any foot- 
 ing with the Indians in thofe parts, or hold the leaft 
 poffeffion among them, fhall we not always have broils 
 and diflentions among them ?~ The Indians beyond 
 thofe mountains are fevered from our colonies by a 
 barrier naturally ftrong and important, the Apalachian 
 mountains; and, at the fame time, greatly fecured by 
 
 this barrier againft any offenfive attempt from our colo- 
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 nies? They are, on the other hand, wholly expofed 
 so the French from the Miffifippi, particularly all the 
 Over-hill towns? 
 
 We have already experienced the difficulty of paffing 
 thofe mountains, and attacking the Indians: but their 
 fettlements being chiefly ad along the banks of the 
 Cherokee River, and its - anches, might not the French, 
 by the eafy navigation thereof, difembark, and attack 
 them in the.very beart of their country, without any of 
 the inconveniences attending a land march? Have we 
 not the greateft reafon poffible to fecure the confidence 
 of thefe Indians on the back of our fouthern colonies, 
 when they have hitherto been eftecmed the only barrier 
 to our colonies on that fide againft the defigns of the 
 French; a barrier, Sir, the more important, as thofe 
 colonies are intirely unable to defend themfelves in our 
 whole feeurity hitherto has depended, and, while the 
 French haye any fettiement on the Miffifippi, muft _al- 
 ways depend on the good inclinations towards us. But 
 can we expect this while the the French have any fettle- 
 ment on the Miffifippi? Can we hereafter expeét to en- 
 joy a union of them in our interefts, when it will be fo 
 i nconfiftent with common fenfe, and, perhaps, their na- 
 tural inclinations 
 
 But, let us farther fuppofe that, at a futrue ne- 
 gociation we fhould not only require the abfo- 
 lute ceffion of Canada, but infift likewife that the 
 French fhould confine themfelves to the weftward of 
 the Miffifippi, and leave us the whole fouth and 
 eaft territory to the very banks of that river, in- 
 cluding the great rivers Illinois and Ohio. Would 
 even this extraordinary ceffion fecure us againft the 
 future inconveniences of war, againft stietaoehineite: 
 
 Or 
 
 
 
( 51) 
 
 or aQual hoftilities ? According to the moft enlarged 
 -deas ofthe nature of population, it would be a work of 
 many {core years before fuch a large tract as that beyond 
 the mountains could become weil fettled ; tho’ I am in- 
 clined to think, that no confiderable fettlement beyond 
 the mountains will ever take place while the French are 
 pofleffed of the Miffifippi : for, only confider the nature of 
 the country beyond the mountains, divided from the coafts 
 toward the Atlantic ocean by almoft impeaetrable thick- 
 ets and rugged eminencies, with no natural nof artificial 
 roads to favour an inland carriage ; and can we expect 
 fuch inland carriage will ever fubfift ? Will not fettlers 
 have thefe difficulties to encounter; and will not the 
 neighbourhood of the French in Louifiana, ever be 4 
 check ¢o fuch as are inclined to fettle there. 
 
 Security of poffeffion, Sir, is not the leaft advantage 
 in forming colonies, nor the fmalleft temptation to invite 
 fettlers ; and that for a reafon very plain : when a man 
 continues no longer a journeyman, but fets up for him- 
 felf he does it with a view to enlarge his property, and 
 render his life more comfortable; but, if that prope:ty 
 ‘s liable to a continual danger of being taken from him> 
 and his life at the mercy of a perfidious enemy, he 
 would undoubtedly rather continue a journeyman in 
 fafety, than be a mafter at the great hazard of his 
 life ? 
 
 But, to go on with the enquiry, fhall we not, (tho’ 
 we retain Canada,) be put to an immenfe expence in 
 erecting, not ftockadoes, but refpectable forts, at pro- 
 per diftances, on the banks of the Miffifippi, all the way 
 from its rifings to its influx into the Gulph of Mexico, 
 ,n extent of fome thoufand miles? The fource of the 
 Mififippi is not yet known, but the river has bee. 
 
 H 2 tr.cel 
 
 
 
Hore epengein 
 ee 
 
 ~~. 
 
 traced upwards of nine hundred leagues, and this is a 
 frontier fo extenfive, that it will require many fcore 
 thoufand pounds annually to defend it, after the necef- 
 fary chain of forts have been ereéted to keep the French 
 within their boundaries. Muft we not likewife have 
 forts at the moft convenient paffes in the inland country 
 to keep open a communication with their refpective go- 
 vernments of Virginia, the two Carolinas, and Geor- 
 gia? And, after all thofe forts have been erected, how 
 are they to be fupplied ; and how can they be effectually 
 
 fupported ? Moft of thefe forts wil! be two or three hun-. 
 
 dred leagues diftant from the c:pitals of thofe provinces, 
 and the ufual refidence of the governors: and thofe forts 
 on the Miffifippi will be many of them near as many 
 thoufand miles; they would be in a manner divided 
 from them by a large uncultivated track, inhabited by 
 {culking parties of favages, whofe ficklenefs and natural 
 treachery we have known too much of, to confide more 
 largely in them for the future. As a people rigidly tena- 
 cious of their liberties and independency, would not a 
 frequent paflage through their territories be deemed a 
 caufe for fufpe€ting- our intentions? if the French or 
 their priefts could get privately among them, would 
 they not be apt to put the worft conftrution on 
 fuch paflage? Would they not infinuate, that we had 
 a defign to enflave or extirpate their whole genera- 
 tion? This fuggeftion would roufe their fleeping 
 fufpicious humour ; being naturally treacherous them- 
 felves, they have no better opinion of the reft of the hu- 
 man {pecies, they would quickly take umbrage from fuch 
 infinuations, which, in faét, would have a good foun- 
 dation ; for, by thefe forts we fhould entirely furround 
 them; and the frequent intercourfe between’thofe forts 
 and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( 53) 
 
 and their feats of government, we fhould become ac- 
 quainted with the moft fecret avenues of their power ? 
 Should we not then be always expofed to the effects of 
 their jealoufy ? Would not the convoys be liable to be 
 intercepted, our forts blocked up, and the garrifons 
 ftarved upon the leaft variance with them? and would 
 not the fame differences ftill fubfift between us and the 
 French about the boundaries between us ? 
 
 Both nations being fettled on oppofite banks of th, 
 Miffifippi, might it not be the means of introducing a 
 reciprocal trade very detrimental to the true interetts of 
 this nation ? Would not there always remain a fquabble 
 about the fole property of the Miffifippi ? Would it not 
 be a perpetual bone of contention? Would not both 
 claim a right to the navigation of it ? And as the French 
 no fooner form a fcheme, than they put it in execution; 
 might they not eafily interrupt the communication be-, 
 tween our forts? Might they not crofs the river, and 
 make a conqueft, not only before any reinforcement 
 could be fent, but even before proper intelligence could 
 be received of an attack ; or if fuch intelligence was re- 
 ceived before the neceflary preparations could be expe- 
 dited to relieve the garrifon? We have an inftance of 
 this in the prefent war: how difficult has it proved to 
 gain the leaft intelligence of the fate of Fort Loudoun? 
 How many times was it reported to have been taken, 
 and when it was taken, was it not with much ado cre- 
 dited ? 
 
 Befides, Sir, what would be the confequence of 
 confining the French even to the weft of the Mif- 
 
 fiffippi. The country, if we reckon to the parts in-- 
 
 habited by the fubjeéts of Spain is of much greater extent 
 than the habitable parts of Canada, the fol infinitely 
 
 more 
 
 een lteter 
 vw » ~ of owe bee _— ° 
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 ( 54 ) 
 
 more fertile, and the climate infinitely more mild. The 
 French would have many advantages there to render a 
 fettlement not only agreeable, but defirable, and they 
 would have an extent of habitable country to fecure 
 them againft apprehenfions of a conqueft by an enemy: 
 We know the reafon the French could not fupport them- 
 felves in Canada was a want of proper ftores and forces 
 which could not be conveyed to them, by any other 
 channel than the river St. Laurence; and that was 
 blocked up by our numerous fleets.. But will they be 
 liable to this inconvenience in Louifiana? might they 
 not land their ftores and reinforcements in many places 
 in the gulph of Mexico, in a traét of feveral hundred 
 miles ? 
 
 But what is more to be feared than every other ap- 
 prehenfion from this fettlement of the French on the 
 Mifiifippi, is their intercourfe with the fubjects of Spain. 
 Might they not fucceed in their encroachments here, as 
 well as they have done in Hifpaniola? We know what 
 great profits they receive from this their furreptitious 
 poflefion, and what encouragement it is to the public 
 {pirit for manufa@tures, of which it is a chief fupport ; 
 for from hence their commodities find their way to all 
 South America. Our anceftors looked with contempt 
 on the fettlement of a few buccaniers on a {pot neglected 
 by Spain, by reafon of its barrennefs and unwholefome 
 fituation; which by the bye, were exaggerated beyond 
 meafure,and yet it has been this very barren and unwhole- 
 fome fpot that has chiefly contributed to aggrandize the 
 French power. Our notions of their fettlement on the Mi- 
 Mifippi were exaétly fimilar ; we laughed at a fettlement in 
 a country which we reprefented as barren, marfhy, and 
 unwholefome, and gave it all the odious epithets that 
 | pre- 
 
 
 
 a: = Se 
 
 
 
. 
 
 (55) 
 
 prejudice could devife. The foundation of thefe colo- 
 nies being fo fimilar, why may not the eventual effects 
 be fo likewife? Il am perfuaded, and I muft infift, Sir, 
 that in Louifiana, the French have infinitely a greater 
 profpect to indulge their golden views, than they had 
 from St. Domingo, or even from Canada, which we 
 feem fo much, and, indeed, fo undefervedly, to prize. 
 Before they made any fettlement in Louifiana, they told 
 us of the practicability of feizing the Spanifh mines at 
 St. Barbe;. and if they fhould not find a beneficial in~ 
 tercourfe with the Spanifh fubjects fufficient for their 
 purpofe, I dare fay that they would not be wanting in 
 induftry to provide for themfelves, which might, proba- 
 bly, end in the fame connections between their fubjects 
 in Louifiana and Mexico, as there is in Hifpaniola ; an 
 Event, Sir, we cannot be too fecure in preventing. An 
 adminiftration of Great Britain, cannot be too atten- 
 tive in preventing the:growth of. power in France, tho’ 
 at the expence of Spain, and rendering all future fchemes 
 tending to promote an union between thefe two powere, 
 abortive. A connection of intereft would engage a mu- 
 tual intercourfe, and certain immunities in favour ofa 
 trade between their refpective fubjeéts. “Thus it hap- 
 pens with the French in Hifpaniola, and fo it would 
 happen to them in Louifiana. If we admire at.the fecu- 
 rity of their pofleffions in Hifpaniola, let us do it no 
 more ; we do not attack France on that fide, for fea, 
 of offending his Catholic Majefty, who might, perhaps, 
 conftrue it as a breach of neutrality. Can it be faid, 
 Sir, that the fame reafon will not hereafter be equally 
 prevalent forthem in Louifiana. If the French fhould 
 become powerful there, the Spaniards would bé glad to 
 
 | keep 
 
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 ( 56 ) 
 
 keep on good terms with them; but hitherto the French 
 have been too diligent in their project for uniting their 
 fettlements in Canada and Louifiana, to have made any 
 confiderable progrefs toward the Spanifh fettlements. 
 The King of Spain could not, therefore, with any pro- 
 priety, take umbrage at our making a demand of this 
 encroachment. He is thought not to be fo over-partial 
 to the French, and if he was ever fo much inclined, 
 would it not be extremely imprudent, to take part with 
 them in their prefent unhappy circumftances, and would 
 it not be contrary to.the general difpofition and inter- 
 efts of his fubjeéts ? 
 
 If Ihave been happy thus far, Sir, in reprefenting 
 the infufficiency of Canada, it will be neceflary to con- 
 fider a more proper objeét to engage our attention. It 
 is abfolutely neceflary to lay fome reftraint on the Fiench 
 in North America, more than by divefting them of their 
 encroachments, merely on our northern colonies, ac- 
 cording to the Remarkers plan; for be the bounds be- 
 tween our colonies and theirs ever fo clearly diftinguifh- 
 ed, if they remain in the poffeffion of the rivers St. Lau- 
 rence and Miffifippi, they will find means to evade the 
 treaty, and again endeavour to unite their two colonies 
 of Canada and Louifiana: one or other of thefe muft 
 therefore be entirely given up to us, which of them 
 is the moft proper, and will anfwer our views the moft 
 effectually, will beft appear from the principles. upon 
 which the French have aéted in North America; and 
 even from thence, Sir, I do not doubt to make appear 
 that the preference given to Canada, is a falfe deduction 
 from juft premifes, and the mere phantom of a crude 
 imagination, We have been told, that ‘¢ the French 
 ** feem to have had two capital views in all their 
 
 <* Ame- 
 
 eee ee es 
 
(257: ) 
 
 ** their American fchemes, ever fince they have thought 
 ** trade and commerce an objeét worthy of their atten- 
 ** tion. The firft was to extend themfelves from Canada 
 ** fouthwards, thro’ the lakes along the back of our co- 
 ** lonies; by which means they might anfwer a double 
 “¢ purpofe, of cutting off our communication with the 
 <¢ Indian nations, and of opening a communication for 
 *< themfelves, between the rivers St. Laurence and Mif- 
 “¢ fifippi, and thus to join, as it were, their colonies 
 ** of Canada and Louifiana. The other part of their 
 ‘¢ plan, equally important, and ntore immediately fatal 
 “© to our interefts in North America, was to gain a 
 ‘© communication with the ocean, the only accefs they” 
 had ** to Canada through the river St. Laurence, being 
 ‘* fhut up half the year *.” Now the only method 
 to afcertain thefe principles, will be to confider what 
 active meafures have been profecuted to fecure 
 them ; and, in doing this, it will be found, that they 
 have attempted nothing toward the latter, “ part of 
 “‘ the plan”, to authorize a certainty even of the 
 fuggeltion. Their principal, their only view hitherto 
 has been, to unite Canada and Louifiana. If France 
 had not fecured the command of Lake Champlain, we 
 might have made incurfions into the very heart of Ca- 
 nada: their forts at Crown Point and Ticonderago, 
 were therefore neceflary to their own fecurity. If 
 France had intended to open a paflage to the ocean 
 through New York, would fhe not have made greater 
 progrefs before this time? They built Crown Point in 
 1731, at the time the difpute happened between Mafla- 
 chufets Bay and New Hampfhire, about their bounda- 
 ries, During this time, therefore, the French had a 
 
 moft glorious opportunity for making farther encroach- 
 * Letter to Two Great Men, p. 13 and 14. 
 | [ ments, 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 ee 
 ments. Can we doubt then, that they would not have 
 made fome attempts to effeét a fcheme we are to un- 
 derftand was held in fuch eftimation by them ? The if- 
 fue of this conteft gave France a ftill greater opportuni- 
 ty of doing it, for Lake Champlain and its territories 
 were adjudged to New Hampfhire, a colony in every 
 refpe&t unable to maintain or defend it. They after- 
 wards devolved upon New York, and the fame favour- 
 able opportunity ftill fubfifted : for the difmemberment 
 of the whole province of New Jerfey from that govern- 
 ment, and the fucceeding quarrels between them about 
 their boundaries, which were carried to fuch height, that 
 they were upon the point of cutting one another's throats, 
 and, aboveall, the primitive weaknefs of the colony of New 
 York, rendered an attempt of that nature almoft fure 
 of fuccefs. Here, therefore, thirty years are elapfed, 
 and not one fingle ftep taken to give the leaft colour to 
 fupport even a bare fufpicion of this defign of the French, 
 on which fo much weight has been impofed; but rather 
 the contrary. Did they not, after taking our fort of 
 Sarahtoga (fituate in the heart of New York) laft war, 
 
 wegzo and Fort William Henry? But how differently 
 have they acted in the profecution of their other {cheme! 
 there we cannot but admire how vigoroufly they exerted 
 themfelyes, and in what manner they fucceeded ! had 
 they not,. by means of their Forts Frontenac, Niagara, 
 Venango, du Quefne, thofe at the junction of the Wa- 
 bache with the Ohio, and the Ohio with the Mififippi, 
 and feveral other intermediate forts effected this long 
 wifhed for jun@tion. “Their opening a communication 
 with the ocean, through the province of New Ypres 
 ever intended, could not then be * egua//y important,” nor 
 
 &° more 
 
 — Pe 
 
(59. ) 
 
 “¢ more immediately fatal to our interefts,” If it was adtu- 
 ally intended, it was onlya iecondary object, or as L am 
 now inclined to think rather a confequence of their fuc- 
 cefs in the formers Fort du Quefne was to have been 
 their entrepot between their two colonies of Canada and 
 Louifiana, the link that formed the union; it might 
 therefore in that cafe, have been neceflary to have had 
 fome fuch port, as that of New York, on the Atlantic 
 ocean, to be more convenient for their middle fettle- 
 ments, and to avoid fuch a tedious navigation, as they 
 would have from thence either down the Miffifippi, or 
 up the river St. Laurence. .And even admit that France 
 had formerly held this projeét in fuch eftimation, and had 
 intended to put it in execution, it cannot, for the fu- 
 ture, merit our leaft confideration as the two colonies of 
 New. England and New York, the frontier opponents 
 againft Canada on that fide, are already  fufficient’ of 
 themfelves to extirpate the French at any time from 
 Canada. Befides the fettlement of Nova Scotia was not 
 then in agitation, but now we have fo many inhabitants 
 there, and that colony is daily encreafing in ftrength 
 and populoufnefs, the French would cut buta very in- 
 different figure in fuch an attempt hereafter. If we 
 would then remove the caufe of the French encroach- 
 ments, the effe@s will ceafe; remove them from Lou- 
 ifiana, and we fha!l experience no more incroachments : 
 remove them from Louifiana alone, and we fhall quickly 
 find Canada become the fame poor infirm colony we had 
 ever reafon to believe it to be before they fettled in Loui- 
 fiana. 
 
 The reafons I have heard given for not attacking the 
 French on the Miffifippi have been, that it would not 
 I2 | anfwer 
 
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 ( 60 ) 
 
 anfwer the expence; that the climate was unhealthy, 
 and the foil barren; and that the French were fo weak 
 there, that they could give us no caufe for uneafinefs: 
 circumftances (fay thefe knowing ones) manifefted by 
 the {mall progrefs the French have made, and the little 
 difturbance they have given us this'war; but give me 
 leave to fay, Sir, they are infinuations falfe and inju- 
 rious, and propagated to ferve particular purpofes. 
 
 It is true, for about two hundred miles from New 
 
 Orleans (the capital), the country in many parts being 
 
 fubject to inundations on account of the rifings occa- 
 fioned by the confluence of feveral large rives into the 
 Miffifippi, the water flagnates in parts that are low; 
 and the atmofphere thereby contracting a denfity and 
 dampnefs, renders a refidence, not fo much unwhole- 
 fome, as difagreeable ; but thefe inundations are perio- 
 dical ; they only happen at that feafon when the frefhes 
 mix with the waters of the Miffifippi ; and are therefore 
 inconveniencies that, one would be apt to think, might 
 be removed by making trenches to draw off part of the 
 water, and raifing the banks of the Miffifippi, where it 
 might be found neceflary to hinder the overflowing : 
 they are {chemes the French have been fome time pro- 
 jecting, and no doubt a people fo confpicuous for their 
 ingenuity and induftry, if fuffered to poflefs the country, 
 would fucceed in the attempt. 
 
 But, if the country labours under thefe difadvantages 
 towards the coaft, higher up both the foil and climate are 
 very different. ‘The foil is amazingly fertile, the climate 
 mild and falubrious, the land in general elevated, folid, and 
 level, refrefhed with breezes, and being. interfperfed 
 with the moft beautiful meadows, afford a moft delight- 
 
 ful 
 
 
 
> 
 
 9 
 ‘ 
 > 
 
 fy, 
 
 ~ 
 
 
 
 (SF 3) 
 
 ful profpect. Look up, you fee the horizon clear and 
 ferene. Look down, you fee nature all the year lavifhing 
 profufely her fweeteft gifts, on the uncultivated plains. 
 Ask thofe, Sir, who have been in Louifiana, they will 
 give you the moft pleafing ideas of the country and cli- 
 mate, we have had fuch accounts from the French *, 
 
 : whofe 
 
 * Father Gharlevoix remarking “ what pleafure it muft give to fee” the 
 « capital of this immenfe and beautiful country, increafing infenfibly, and 
 “€ to be able to fay with the beft grounded hopes that this wild and defert 
 << place, at prefent almoft entirely covered over with canes and trees, one day 
 *€ become a large and rich colony”’, fays, “* thefe hopes are founded on the 
 “¢ fituation of this city on the banks of a navigable river, at the diftance 
 « of thirty-three leagues from the fea, from which a veflel may come up 
 *¢ in twenty-four hours; on the fertility of its foil; on the mildnefs and 
 *¢ wholfomenefs of the climate in thirty degrees north latitude ; on the 
 «¢ induftry of the inhabitants; on its neighbourhood to Mexico, the Ha- 
 « vanna,. the fineft iflands of America, and laftly to the: Englith colonies.’* 
 So that from hence it appears what large ideas the French entertain of this 
 country ; and that they do not always intend to live in amity with our co- 
 lonies of Carolina and ‘Georgia. But, to. go-on with our ghoftly father. 
 << Can there be any thing,”’ fays he, ‘‘ more requifite to render a city flour 
 «¢ ifhing ? Rome and Paris had not fuch confiderable beginnings, were not 
 «¢ built under fuch happy aufpices, and their founders met not with thofe 
 <¢ adyantageson the Seine andthe Tiber, which we have found on the 
 “« Miffifippi, in comparifon of which thofe two rivers are no more than 
 *¢ brooks,” Charlevoix, vol. ii. p. 276. | 
 A little farther, he fays (p. 300 and 301) “ Ina word, I have met with 
 ‘¢ none who have been on the fpot, who have fpoken difadvantageoufly of 
 ‘¢ Louifiana, but three forts of perfons whofe teftimony:can be of no great 
 « weight: the firft, are the failors, who, from the’ road at the ifland of 
 *¢ Dauphine, have been able to fee nothing but that ifland covered witha 
 «* barren fand, and the coaft of Bilexi ftill more fandy, and have fuffered 
 «« themfelves to be perfuaded, that the entrance of the Miffifippi is imprac- 
 “€ ticable to veffels above a certain bulk ; and, that the country is uninha- 
 «¢ bitable for fifty leagues up the river. They would have been of a very 
 ‘¢ different opinion, had they had penetration enough to diftruft-thofe per- 
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 ( 62.) 
 whofe intereft it is to conceal its moft minute advantages: 
 and that fo much, that it has occafioned it to be called. 
 in derifion, the Frenchman’s paradife. 
 
 With regard to the number of inhabitants, that. is 
 eafily accounted for, and is fo plain, that one would 
 think men of fenfe could not make their objections 
 upon fo weak a confideration. It is a prudential 
 maxim among politic nations, and the prefent general 
 method of eftablifhing colonies, not to extend their 
 fettlements, before they have fecured a quiet poffeffion. 
 If'we confider then, that the French have partly met 
 with the fame difficulties, from the Cherokees, Chicka- 
 faws, and Creek Indians, as the Canadians did from 
 the Five Nations, we fhall ‘rather admire at the progrefs 
 
 *< fons who fpoke in this manner, and:to difcover the motives which mad, 
 £¢ them do fo. 
 
 ‘© The fecond are wretches, who being banifhed from France, for their 
 
 ~ 
 
 _— 
 - 
 
 crimes, or ill behaviour, true or fuppofed, or who, in order to fhun the 
 
 on 
 — 
 
 purfuit of their creditors, lifted themfelves among the troops, or hired 
 
 — 
 nN 
 
 themfelves to the plantations. Both of them looked upon this country as 
 ‘€ a place of banifhment only, and were confequently fhocked with every 
 ‘* thing: they have no tye to bind them, nor any concern for the progrefs of 
 *« a colony of which they are involuntary members, and give themfelves 
 very little trouble about the advantages it is capable of procuring to the 
 ‘© ftate, 
 
 «* The third are fuch, who having feen nothing but mifery in a country, 
 for which exceffive fums have been difburfed, impute to it, without re- 
 flection, what ought folely to be laid to the incapacity or negligence of 
 “¢ thofe who were charged with the fettling it. They are befides not un- 
 * acquainted with the reafons for publifhing that Louifiana containedin its 
 * bofom immenfe treafures, and thoughtits value to us was very near equal 
 ** to the famous mines of St. Barbe, and others ftill richer, from which we 
 <¢-flattered ourfelves we fhould beable to drive the poffeffors with eafe ; and 
 becaufe thefe ridiculous tales found credit with fools, inftead of imputing 
 << the miftake to themfelves, into which their foolith credulity had engaged 
 “ them: they difcharged their ill-humour upon this country, in which 
 ‘* they found no one article that had been promifed them,” 
 
 they 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 a ee ee 
 
 Ata 
 
 — = re 
 
C Waa 
 
 they have already made. Even fo lately as in 1729, the 
 French traders and fettlers were totally cut off, and 
 maflacred; and the Indians infefted the banks of the 
 Miffifippi fo much, that the French thought, a long 
 time after, it would be dangerous to frequent them. For 
 thefe reafons they have been many years worming them- 
 felves in the good graces of thefe people, finding all 
 their endeavours would prove fruitlefs, unlefs they could 
 gain their protection. And, indeed, it muft be ac- 
 knowledged, they have fucceeded much better here in 
 this refpe& than in Canada. Have they not, fince the 
 commencement of their eftablifhment, in the fpace of 
 lefs than fifty years, eonciliated themfelves to the natives, 
 and fecured the moft important paffes in the country, at 
 the diftance of many hundred miles from their Capital ? 
 And have they not prefumed to unite Canada and Loui- 
 fiana, though at the diftance of between four and five 
 thoufand miles from their refpeCtive capitals? Can we 
 fuppofe, the French would have attempted to put in ex- 
 ecution this project without a proper foundation for fuc- 
 cefs? Could they have fuch foundation, if the country 
 wag fo very barren and unhealthy, or not tolerably peo- 
 pled? but it is a known fact, that notwithftanding the 
 pretended intemperature of the climate, and the dif- 
 ficulty of getting up the Miffifippi to New Orleans, they 
 have already near as many inhabitants in that capital, 
 as they had in the capital of Canada. 
 
 Before the French fettled themfelves in Louifiana, they 
 were contented, with moderate bounds in Canada ; they 
 had enough of its bitters and fweets to cool them,. from 
 extending themfelves on that fide. From their fettlement 
 
 on 
 
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 ( 64 ) 
 
 onthe Mifiifippi, we may therefore date the commence 
 ment of their encroachments in North-America, and 
 their growth of power there. When Carolina was 
 fo terribly befet with the Indians in 1715, the 
 French took that opportunity to feize the fort of 
 Albama, one of the moft convenient pofts in that 
 country to affect our colonies of Carolina, and 
 which had been fettled by our traders many years before 
 the French fettled on the Miffifippi. If fuch infolence, 
 fo very foon after the treaty of Utrecht, and the execu- 
 tion of their fcheme for forming a colony on the Miffi- 
 fippi, was left unpunifhed, could we expect better treat- 
 ment for the future? If fuch expectations were enter- 
 tained, the event has convinced us of their fallacy, for 
 the French, not only ftill keep poffeffion of this fort, and 
 lay claim to the whole of the River Coufla, becaufe it 
 falls into the River Albama (whereon the fort fo called 
 by us is built) but they have fince aflumed an abfo- 
 lute title to the whole country beyond the Apala- 
 chean and Allegany mountains, drawing a line from 
 Cape Efcondido in the Gulph of Mexico acrofs the 
 mountains, quite through the heart of the colonies of 
 New York and New England, and up the Bay of Fufndy ; 
 by which means they leaye us only a very contracted 
 {kirt along the coaft much fmaller, even than the tract 
 of land between the mountains and the Miffifippi, And, 
 in order to fupport thefe pretenfions, and their intereft 
 _ with the natives, they have been conitantly fending rein- 
 forcements and warlike ftores; and even at the time of 
 negociating the laft peace, they were actually fending, 
 and did, fhortly after, fend a body of two thoufand re- 
 
 gulars 
 
( 6s ) 
 lars to Louifiana; and what numbers they have fent 
 fince the commencement of the prefent war, fufficiently 
 appears from the captures we have made of their fhips 
 bound to thefe parts, moft of whith were freighted 
 with foldiers and warlike ftores, 
 
 As we have examined Canada on the principle of fe- 
 curity, it may be expected, that the fame fhould be done 
 with regard to Louifiana ; and, in fo doing, Sir, I believe 
 every thing will be found fuitable to our defires. Sup- 
 pofe that, upon the entire ceffion of the latter to us, we 
 reftore Canada to the French, and confine them to the 
 weft within the River Utawawa and Lake Abitibis, 
 and to the fouth within Lake Champlain, the proper 
 and legal boundary between the French colonies and 
 ours: or, even fuppofe we only confine them generally 
 within the Great Lakes, will it not bea barrier infinite- 
 ly advantageous to us? Will not fuch a frontier proper~ 
 ly proteéted give us the whole command over the nu- 
 merous tribes of Indians, and fecure us much the great- 
 eft fhare of the fur trade, and from all apprehenfions of 
 future encroachments ? Can we then entertain the leaft 
 apprehenfions from the French “ at Montreal and the 
 “ Three Rivers?” Can they * crofs Champlain Lake, 
 s< and attack Crown-Point *” without firft taking Nut 
 Ifland, a place whofe natural fituation gives room to 
 think it may be made one of the ftrongeft fortrefles in 
 America? If we kept pofleffion of Nut Ifland could 
 the French have any veffels on the Lake ? Could they 
 tranfport them over land from the Riyer St. Laurence, 
 
 * Letter ta two Great Men. 
 
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 ( 66 ) 
 
 rather after they had reduced that ifland, muft they not 
 then be obliged to build fuch veflels? And fhould we 
 not ftand on a much better footing in that refpect than 
 the French could? We muft ‘have veffels on the Lake 
 previous to the capture of Nut Ifland ; and it muft be 
 allowed furely, that we could build as faft as they could. 
 But let us give the author a. little farther play. Sup- 
 pofe that the Canadians fhould have taken Nut Ifland, 
 taken or deftroyed our vefiels on the Lake, and likewife 
 the fort at Crown-Point ;’ they muft ftill take Ticon- 
 derago, and the pafs at the Saw-Mills, before they 
 make incuffidns into the fettled parts of our colonies. 
 We are likewife given to’ underftand, that ‘ if the 
 < River St. Laurence be ftill theirs, what is to enfure 
 “© ys againft an expedition to Niagara” ?” I would an- 
 {wer almoft impofiibilities, that is, if we intend to con- 
 tinue the fort there, and garrifon it, a matter 1. can 
 hardly doubt. The French from Canada muft ftill have 
 the fame difficulties to encounter, as by the way of 
 «¢ Champlain Lake ;” they muft overcome a long and 
 very dangerous navigation from Montreal; their veffels 
 muft be fuperior to ours ; and they muft likewife reduce 
 Frontenac, Ofweyo, and Toronto, before they took 
 Niagara: for what good effect could they reap from 
 the capture of that place ; and how could they keep pof- 
 feffion of it, when in the heart of the country of the 
 Indians our allies, and while we had fuch important 
 places ftill in. our hands? And even be they as expedi- 
 tious and fuccefsful as you pleafe, they cannot make 
 fuch conquefts within two years at leaft. The taking 
 of Niagara, and Ticonderago alfo, coft us three years, 
 
 * Letter, &c. p. 30." 
 
 though 
 
( 67 ) 
 
 tho’ under our very nofes, and @hen we had not near fo 
 many difficulties to encounter as the French will have. 
 And, during all this time, I fhould be glad to know 
 what we fhould be doing; I have confidered the oppo- 
 fition no more than could be expected in profound 
 peace, from the garrifons of thofe places alone: but 
 would not the Indians our allies, or the forces raifed by 
 the colonies, be able to ftop the enemies progrefs, to 
 repel them, and carry the war into the very heart of 
 Canada without any affiftance from the mother country ¢ 
 Is there likewife the leaft profpeét of the French get- 
 ting pofleffion of the. Lakes? How could they come 
 near Detroit and Miffilimakinac, more efpecially with 
 a force to attack them? Could they get to them any 
 otherwife than by navigating Lake Ontario, and from 
 thence into Lake Erie, after taking thofe forts I have 
 before mentioned? and, even after this is done, would 
 not the two forts at Detroit and Miffilimakinac, be 
 fufficiently protected by our people from Louifiana ? 
 Thus I think, Sir, Ihave fully anfwered the gentle- 
 man’s queftion with refpect to an invafion from Canada; 
 and therefore the confequences he draws from that opi- 
 nion muft ceafe.. I own, if we make this barrier in 
 North-America, Iam ‘* fo weak to be believe that they 
 <¢ will lay afide” their ‘¢ plan of ufurpation.” I dare 
 fay they will not think of ‘elbowing all our colonies 
 «© round about; I dare fay they will not think *‘* of 
 ‘© refuming the fame ambitions views of enlargement, 
 «¢ which the moft facred ties of former treaties could not 
 “é reftrain*.” Ihave thefe effential reaforis for believing 
 
 * Letter, &c. p. 78. 
 
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 ( 68 ) 
 
 and thinking fo. When’ the French firft pofleffed them» 
 felves of thefe forts, and indeed of all their encroach. 
 ments, they did not do it by violence; we were fo un- 
 acquainted with the Lakes (otherwife than by hearfay 
 and vague reports) and looked with fo much contempt 
 on the French power in Canada, and fo little confulted 
 the friendfhip of the Indians, ‘that we had not the leaft 
 apprehenfions of any bad confequences arifing from a 
 neglect of either. But our ideas are now quite changed ; 
 we have experienced the danger of the defiens of France, 
 and the neceffity of keeping on good terms with the 
 Indians, and we have forts to proteét ourfelves and 
 them, on thevery utmoft limits of our frontier, the leaft 
 attempt on which muft be by cpen violence and hofti- 
 lity. 
 
 Now Iam upon this fubje&t, give me leave, Sir, to 
 recommend fomething to attain our ends in North-Ame- 
 rica more effectually for the future. For this pur- 
 pofe, two different regulations are required; the one 
 regarding our conduct to the Indians; and the other 
 our meafures with the French. There is no oceafion to 
 have recourfe to extirpate the Indians 5 treat them only 
 With more humanity, and we fhall find them eafy of re- 
 conciliation and alliance. But, if we again fuffer the 
 French to have any intercourfe with them, we may al- 
 ways expect to have broils and diffentions. The 
 forts on our frontier will effectually hinder this, if they 
 are not fuffered to refort to them upon the principle of 
 trade. Let us remind them if they fhould réqueft this, 
 that it was upon the fame pretence they formed their 
 forts of Frontenac, Niagara, and the pafles at the other 
 lakes. With regard to the other regulation, all kind 
 of commerce between our colonies and the Canadians 
 ought 
 
 
 
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 LVRS 
 
 ( 69 ) 
 
 ought to be jcarefully prevented. Our own péople have 
 hitherto enabled. the French to undermine them in the 
 Indian trade, which they chiefly carried on with Englifh 
 commodities. Stroud’s duffils, and others of our woollen 
 manufactures were much better and cheaper in our vold+ 
 nies than thofe that could. be had in Canada of French 
 manufacture (which, by the bye, are chiefly made with 
 our own wool.) Our rum, another prime article of the 
 Indian trade was likewife to be had much cheaper than 
 French brandy. By making fuch a provifion for the 
 fecurity of our colonies, and a perfeverance in meas 
 {ures to prevent any intercourfe with Canada, our co+ 
 Jonies will enjoy all the bleffings of peace and tranquil 
 lity, will be relieved from all apprehenfions of rivalthip 
 in trade or power, and Canada will be rendered worfe 
 than nothing to the French, it will prove a burden to 
 them, ai 
 
 But there is another object till remains worthy of 
 our regard, the fithery. If we infift onthe ceffion 
 of Cape-Breton and its dependent ifles at the mouth 
 of the River St. Laurence; if we have likewife 
 our right to the coafts of Nova Scotia confirm« 
 ed, would not thefe articles alone prove of great de. 
 trument to the French fifhery. But, as this branch 
 of trade has chiefly enabled them to fupport their mas 
 rine, I think no reftriction or duty whatever can compene 
 fate for a privilege of reforting to it; and, to fhew you, 
 Sir, that I do not think ‘* the refufal of this privilege *” 
 would be ‘* fo very. unreafonable” I fhall have need 
 only to refer to the accounts of the extent of that. trade, 
 as carried on by France. .According to a computation 
 made of- this branch of the French trade the year before 
 
 * Letterto Two Gteat Men, p. 32. 
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 ( 70 ) 
 
 this war (1755) it appeared that the quantity of the fifh 
 imported by the French fhips, was 1,149,000 quintals of 
 dry fifh, and 3,900,000 mudfith ; the value of both which, 
 including 3,116 and aquarter ton of train oil drawn from 
 the blubber, ~ amounted to 926,577..10, according to 
 the prime coft of the fifh at Newfoundland; which, with 
 the addition of the freight to the feveral markets where 
 it was fold made 949,192,101. fterling : and add to this 
 the confumption of woollen manufa@tures and brandy> 
 and naval ftores made it at Jeaft a million of money per 
 annum. And this trade employed no lefs than 564 fhips, 
 befides fhallops, and 27,500 feamen. Now, if we la- 
 ment the growth of French power, as the caufe of thofe 
 wars that hath depopulated Europe for this century patt ; 
 and are convinced that our own liberties and indepen- 
 dency are founded on the fuperiority of our naval power 
 over that of France, would it not, when we fee in how 
 great a meafure this privilege has contributed, and in 
 how. great a'meafure the continuance of it is likely to 
 contribute to the French power, fo far from being **-un- 
 “ reafonable,” be unpardonable;-and the more fo, if 
 we confider the nature of the Frerich claim, a matter I 
 fhall hereafter attend to? If they have the leaft fhare of 
 it, will they not be always encroaching upon pretence 
 of building huts to refrefh their men? Will they not be 
 always encroaching on us upon pretence of building 
 ftages, and curing their fifh; revoke therefore the 
 privileges granted them on the coaft of Newfound- 
 land? But, as the French likewife carried on a 
 great trade with mud fifh, which were not under 
 a neceflity of being cured and dried, make it a 
 pain of confifcation both of fhip and freight, if 
 any of thofe fifh are found on board ; and, in order to 
 
 render 
 
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 render fuch a law ftriétly obferved and efficacious, let 
 the captors enjoy the benefit of fuch prizes; whether 
 private trading fhips, or of the royal navy: fas eff et ab 
 hofte doceri ; this practice is taught us by the French, it 
 is the prefervative of their trade to the Sugar Iflands, | If 
 it fhould be enquired how the Canadians are to fupport 
 themfelves, asthe fifh made no fmall part of their food ; 
 
 I would anfwer, that the River St. Laurence, from the ; 
 
 ifland of Anticofti to Montreal, will give them enough 
 for themfelves without reforting to Cape Breton, and 
 the banks of Newfoundland. And _— ‘o fhew you, Sir, 
 how impoffible it will be, if Cape Breton, and Se. 
 John’s, as well as Canada, are reftored to France ; for 
 the fubjects of that crown, ever to avoid encroach- 
 ments on us; give me leave to recollect the utility of 
 the former of thofe iflands to France in. that refped. 
 When they had pofleffion of Cape Breton and the 
 north-eaft part of Nova Scotia, their ftore-fhips and 
 men of war generally reforted to the harbour of Louif 
 bourg, from whence they took the opportunity of going 
 to Quebecat their pleafure. In a time of danger from 
 an enemy, they often unloaded at Cape Breton, and 
 when the feafon was fo far advanced as to oblige our 
 fleets to leave the blockade of Cape Breton, and re- 
 turn to port, they fent two or three fhips, with the 
 flores to Quebec, in which cafe they were obliged to 
 winter there. But, if this was not practicable (as was 
 often the cafe) on account of the advanced feafon, they 
 tranfporited them in winter over the ice to the coaft of 
 Nova Scotia, and by that means conveyed them to Ca- 
 nada by land. From hence it is evident, what great 
 reafon we have'to apprehend, that if France is fuffered 
 to repoflefs Cape Breton, they would likewife endea- 
 
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 ( 72) 
 
 your to repoffefs their former fettlement in the bays of 
 Gafpey, Chaleur, and Mirimichi, would they not 
 greatly ftrengthen thofe places? Would they not carry 
 fire and fword into the heartof Nova Scotia, and foon 
 make us repent of a ftep, which: we cannot, at this 
 time but think would be highly detrimental to us? But, 
 would not the retention of Cape Breton om the other 
 hand effectually prevent this ?. Would it not of courfe 
 render it extremely difficult’ for France to fupport Ca- 
 nadain a future war? The harbour of Quebec is very 
 improper and unfafe for the reception of large fhips on 
 aécount of the violent ftorms that are very frequentin the 
 River St. Laurence, and often.drive fhips in the harbour 
 on fhore: and do not thefe ftorms often prove fatal to 
 many fhips, in navigating the river to and from Que- 
 bec, by reafon of the many dangerous rocks and fhoals, 
 which even in calms, it is.often impoffible to avoid, be- 
 caufe of the fogginefs of the air? In cafe.a fleet from 
 France fhould efcape the vigilance of our fleets in the 
 Bay of Bifcay, fhould enter the Gulph of St. Laurence | 
 before our fleet from Halifax was colleéted to intercept 
 them, would they not find it very difficult, if not im- 
 Poffible, to return from thence without hazarding an 
 €ngagement which might prove fatal to their affairs ? 
 Should we not likewife have every advantage over them 
 from our inland frontier, which, by the connection with 
 the land belonging to the Hudfon’s Bay company, would 
 entirely furround all Canada, and from every part where- 
 of we might, upon any future rupture, make incurfions 
 into the very heart of Canada in different parts, particu- 
 larly by the Lakes Champlain and Ontario? Let us 
 confider, Sir, the fituation of thefe lakes, and thei r 
 
 proximity to the moft principal fettlements in Canada : 
 let 
 
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 let us confider our own colonies, proteéted by forts at 
 the moft convenient paffes ; their frontier to the weft 
 fecured by the forts of Detroit and Miffilimakinac, and 
 to the fouth by Niagara, Ofwego, Toronto, and Fron= 
 tenac on Lake Ontario, and by Ticonderago, Crown 
 Point, and Nut Ifland on Lake Champlain ; * forts 
 which might be made almoft impregnable to any force 
 from Canada, at a very moderate expence, and. upon 
 their prefent plans; let us, Sir, maturely confider thefe 
 advantages, and we may fay, with good reafon, that we 
 can at any time oblige the French to preferve peace, 
 And therefore, Sir, I cannot but think with the Re- 
 marker, that ‘* our claims before the war were large 
 ** enough for pofleffion and for fecurity too*;” and thefe, 
 Sir, are claims we can “ rightfully make + ;” and fuch 
 as will give us themoft defirable fecurity, without being 
 incumbered with the cold, barren, uncomfortable, and 
 uninviting country of Canada. 
 
 Give me leave, Sir, to intereft you a little farther on 
 this matter. We have, for along time, looked with an 
 
 invidious eye on the Spanifh fettlement at Cape Florida, 
 
 which we thought endangered our colonies of Georgia 
 and Carolina; and the invafion of the former from 
 thence confirmed this opinion. We thought likewife 
 a conqueft of it would give us greater advantage over 
 their trade ; we therefore returned the falutation, by an 
 attack on St. Auguftine, but were neceffitated to aban# 
 don the enterprize, with the lofs of many lives. Whence 
 then this forgetfulnefs, this partial influence of ca- 
 price! a regard for a prefent occafion has been’ too 
 much the defect of former treaties; let our confidera- 
 
 * Remark. p. 19. 
 F Intereft of Great Britain, &c. p. 45 
 t10n 
 
 
 

 
 (74 ) 
 tion for the future fucceed in the enfuing. The laft 
 war feemed to have opened our eyes, we thought we 
 could then difcoyer whence France and Spain might 
 hurt us moft, and where we micht have the fame ad- 
 vantage over them: but now, when the opportunity 
 offers, we feem to have forgot the being and nature of 
 fuch conceptions. Louifiana does not want attractive- 
 ne{s, it is the only object that can fecure us in North- 
 America; it is much more worthy our commercial views 
 than Canada, the commodities of which are the fame as in 
 our northern colonies, and cannot be of any particular 
 benefit, when we have already fuch plenty of them 3 
 and that, without retaining Canada, we fhould, merely 
 by clipping it of its encroachments, enjoy more than 
 half its profits. But, with regard to the produce of Loui- 
 fiana, fhould we not preferve to ourfelves a monopoly of 
 tobacco, for which the foil and climate is every way fit, 
 and which there is the greateft reafon to believe the 
 French would engrofs to themfelves as they had done 
 the fugar trade, if they were fuffered to poffefS a coun- 
 try fo convenient for fuch a valuable commodity ? Should 
 we not likewile rear great quantities of indigo and cot- 
 ton, articles much wanted in our manufactures, and: 
 which we have been often obliged to purchafe of thofe 
 very enemies with whom we are now at war, and whofe 
 chief fyitem was to overturn our conftitutions? and 
 even in thofe marfhy parts adjoining to the Gulph of 
 Mexico is not the land ft for moft kinds of vegetables 
 and nutriment for men and cattle? May not the inha- 
 bitants raife more than enough to fupply their own de- 
 mands, and alfo a fhare for the Leeward Iflands, a trade 
 for which it is conveniently fituated ; for, tho’ they can’t 
 take 
 
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 take a dire& coutfe to them by reafon of the ftrong curs 
 rent, they may fall through the Gulph of Florida into 
 the Atlantic Ocean, and have a fhorter paflage than 
 fiom any other of our colonies? The eftablifhment of 4 
 little manufactory has been attempted in‘Georgia, would 
 it not be as practicableiin Louifiana? Do not the cli~ 
 mate and.great number of mulberry-trees that grow’ fo" 
 plentifully there, afford a moft pleafing profpe& of 
 bringing that {cheme to perfection’? might not tea like- 
 wile be.produced, when nearly in the fame latidude as 
 Pekin, in China, and the feafons are not very different ? 
 the produce of this commodity from our own colonies, 
 would,be a real benefit to the nation, as it would not only 
 bring great profits to the revenue, but likewife preferve’ 
 that fpecie in the kingdom which we fo:much lament 
 the lofs. of by tliis trade to the Eaft-Indies, The in- 
 land country is' remarkable for an abundance of the beft 
 timbers,, no doubt more fit for navigation in hot cli= 
 mates, than thofe from-our northern colonies, which are 
 apt te fplit: while, onthe other hand, thofe from hot 
 climates maintain their firmmefs, and are proof againft 
 thofe deftruétive vermin, called wood ants, that make. 
 fuch- havock in the bottoms of fhips made of timber 
 from.a hot climate. Muft not the timber of Leuifiana 
 be likewife more fit for the ufe of the fugar planters, 
 who have fuch a large demand for them for carriages, 
 fugar mills, &c. and! which they have hitherto been 
 fupplied: with by the Dutch, at a great diftance and 
 great price, from Barbituis and Efquebe? Is it not more 
 than probable, that the logwood-of Honduras (which 
 has caufed fuch a long difpute between’ us and the Spa~ 
 niards) if tranfplanted here, would-enable us to fupply 
 La our 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 ( 76 ) 
 
 ourfelves with that valuable commodity of our owrt 
 growth? they thrive in a marfhy foil, therefore there is 
 the greateft reafon to think they would on the coafts 
 of Louifiana. Might not the cochineal be alfo produced 
 there, when the Opuntia grow in fuch abundance in 
 Mexico, and bring an annual income into Spain of 
 near a million of money? As there are fuch great quan- 
 tities of wild vines there, might not wine be produced ? 
 ‘This would be another great faving to the nation’ as 
 they might anfwer as well as thofe which we buy of our 
 enemies. In-a word, might not every commodity with- 
 in or near the Tropics, thrive in Louifiana? But what, 
 
 Sir, would greatly add to the value of this fettlement to 
 England, would be its proximity to the Spanith fubjeéts of 
 Mexico. No doubt our manufactures,notwithftanding the 
 ftrongeft prohibition, would find a vent there with the 
 fame facility as thofe of France do by the way of St. 
 Domingo. - The poffeffion of Louifiana would likewife 
 give us an infinite advantage over St. Auguftine, and a 
 greater advantage over the flotas from Vera Cruz than 
 Jamaica has over the galleons from Carthagena. In going 
 to the Havanna from Vera Cruz, the fhips are oblied 
 to crofs the Gulph of Mexico, and the currents being 
 
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 very ftrong from the north fea againft the coafts of Loui- 
 fiana and Florida, and thro’ the Gulph of Florida, the 
 fhips from Vera Cruz are'often drove on thofe coafts - 
 and the Gulph of Florida being the paflage homeward 
 bound from the Leeward and Windward Iffands, and 
 the neighbouring continent, the poflefion of Louifiana 
 would therefore ‘prove of the greateft bencht to. our 
 cruizers and privateers. ‘We fhould thereby be much 
 better enabled to. reduce Cuba and St, Auguftine; our 
 
 “ trade 
 
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 trade would become greatly extended in thofe. valuable 
 parts, and in future times might we not fucceed by an 
 invafion in the Bay of Campeachy ? the capture of Vera 
 Cruz would cut off the communication between Spanith, 
 
 North, and South America, and enable us to get poflef-| 
 
 fion of the mines of Mexico. 
 
 And this fole poflefion of the Mitifippi, would. be: 
 
 the more beneficial to us, Sir, as we fhould thereby 
 have the whole country beyond the mountains at our 
 own difpofal and pleafure. Settlers would refort there 
 becaufe they could be under no apprehenfions from an 
 enemy 5 and, becaufe the many difficulties of a land 
 carriage, from thence to the Atlantic Ocean would be 
 removed, as they might fend their commodities all the 
 way by water to New Orleans, by means of the many 
 large and navigable rivers, that communicate with. the 
 Miffifippi.. Settlers would’ refort. there, .becaufe they 
 might be in hopes to extend themfelves within the neigh- 
 bourhood of the Spanifh fubjeéts of New Mexico. And, 
 in fhort, Sir, by this poffeffion of Louifiana, England 
 would be effectually relieved from anapprehenfion of the 
 independence of her colonies from their great populouf- 
 nefs, and the fpirit of manufacturing among them, oc- 
 
 afioned by the want of poffeffions for the inhabitants to 
 
 extend themfelyes, and a fufficient quantity of land to’ 
 
 keep them employed in agriculture. 
 
 Thefe, Sir, are reafons why I think Louifiana an 
 object every way fo defirable, and, infhort, theadvan- 
 tages we fhall reap from this acquilition, bid fo fair that 
 without it (whether we conquer it or not) we fhal] 
 have, I will not fay, “‘ a treacherous,” but “a delu- 
 ‘* five peace.” We need not therefore be told with fo 
 
 much 
 
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 ( 78 ) 
 
 imirch vehemence by a late popular author *, that an 
 “¢ expedition to the Miflifippi ” would be fo very ** ufe~ 
 ‘& lefs” ashe feems to imagine. 
 
 Tam fenfible, Sir, it would be a work of infinite dif- 
 ficulty to perfuade the French to cede all their poffef- 
 fions on this continent. I believe, it is not the pro- 
 pofed defign of the war, and I would by no means urge 
 fucha:notiom; not only becaufe I think it would not be 
 altagether agreeable to good policy’; But particularly, 
 becaufe: I would defire no more in North-America thar 
 was confiftent with fecurity, as it would not only feem 
 unreafonable, but be unneceflary, as wecan have the moft 
 defirable fecurity, without demanding Canada, and asfuch 
 demand muft. of courfe:greatly leflen our demands-where 
 I think, they are: more immediately wanted. Let the 
 French: have Canada then, under fuch reftri@ions as I 
 have: premifed, only by clipping them of Louifiana and 
 their other encroachments, and you will reduce it to 
 the:ftate it was im at the treaty of Utrecht; leave the 
 French Canada, and we fhall findthem more defirous of” 
 cultivating the arts of peace than thofe of war; and 
 they will find it more deéfirable, and to their intereft to 
 live-in. amity with their neighbours, nay, in fome awe of 
 them, am end that can be attained by noothermeans than 
 thus fecuring ourfélves, and fubje€ting their commerce 
 and marine to the fuperiority of our own. This, Sir, 
 being a chief caufe of my prefent addrefs, is an object, 
 I flatter myfelf, I have hitherto attended to ; it is an 
 obje& I fhall, in the enfuing fheets, ever ftrive princi= 
 pally to: keep in view. 7 
 
 * Confiderationa on the German Wary Ps 130, 
 
 Having 
 
Le mh C,rtC—eSeS CU .|.-.hmlCU 
 
 (79 ) 
 
 Having, I think Sir, fufficiently enlarged on the proper 
 barrier to be infifted on in North America, I fhall next 
 proceed to confider the other part of my argument, the 
 reafonablenefs and neceflity of ; retaining the Freiuch 
 Sugar Iflands. 
 
 It-muft be admitted, Sir, that the pretence of our 
 having fugar land enough, is falfe; for, without con- 
 fidering the nature of the foil in our own iflands, and 
 the great detriment done to the land by continued cul- 
 ture, can we fuppofe, that if our fugar planters could 
 fupply Ireland and North America with the produce of 
 their own plantations, that they would pay the traders 
 from thence in fpecie, or bills of exchange for their 
 commodities of Jumber and provifion? And, that they 
 do this, I find by an eftimate, extracted from the entries 
 in the public offices of Jamaica, not long before the 
 commencement of this war, computed upon an average 
 of three years; whereby it appeared, that the annual 
 imports, from North America to that ifland alone, were 
 ninety-four thoufand two hundred pounds, and the 
 exports from thence twenty-two thoufand, two hundred 
 and twenty-two pounds ten fhillings. The northern 
 colonies, therefore, received a ballance of fixty-four 
 thoufand, nine hundred and feventy-feven pounds, ten 
 fhillings in money or bills ofexchange ; and even {carce 
 a third part of the value of thofe exports was in the ar- 
 ticle of fugar. I make no doubt, but that the balance 
 has been in like proportion from the Leeward Iflands. 
 Befides, Sir, it muft be morally impoffible, if our colo- 
 nies do not produce more than feventy thoufand hogf- 
 heads of fugar annually, according to the largeft calcula- 
 tions, and Great Britain alone confumes every year fix 
 
 . parts 
 
 
 
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 ( 80 } 
 
 parts out of the feven, that there can be any qnantity of, 
 fugar exported to the North American dblonies and [re- 
 land. A late author, fpeaking of the demz ind of fugar 
 inthe latter, tells us, that “* it may be reafonably ima- 
 << gined, that the French have, in a great’ meafure, 
 
 << fupplied the people of Ireland with fugars, for ‘bic 
 ‘¢ annual confumption of fugar in Ireland above thirty 
 ‘¢ years ago, 1s valued by Mr. Dobbs at more than fix- 
 <¢ ty thoufand pounds; and, as the confumption of tea 
 “< is greatly increafed fince that time, the confumption 
 “© of fugar hath eae gg kept pace wit it *.” Te 
 is true, that the exports of fugar from our plantations 
 have not been fo great as might have been expeéted; 
 but then there is fomething to be made in anfwer to it, 
 without laying fo much weight upon a fuppofed com- 
 bination among our fugar planters: for “ the creat 
 ¢¢ confumption of rum in this kinedom put the Britith 
 ‘¢ fugar planters upon diftilling fuch great quantities of 
 «¢ melaffes, as not to leave a fufficiency thereof to fup- 
 ply the demands of the North American colonies ; and 
 “« this obliged the fugar planters to pay money for a 
 «< confiderable proportion of the provifions, lumber, &c 
 
 <¢ wherewith they were fu jae from New England 
 << and other northern colonies +.” The northern tra- 
 ders, and thofe from Ireland not finding their market 
 among our own planters, were therefore induced to get 
 fugar elfewhere, and this they did from the French, who 
 fometimes received the value of that commodity 1 in lum- 
 ber, provifions, &c. and at other times in money, of 
 bills of exchange ; both which were very accep- 
 
 * State of the Britith fugar colony trade, by Maflie, p. 16. 
 
 } State of the fugat trade, pe Iq. 
 
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 ( 81 ) 
 
 table to the French planters. So that * the balance 
 ‘** which the fugar planters from time to time” re~ 
 ** ceived. on the trade with England” was ‘ the 
 *¢ fund by which” the northern traders paid ‘* for 
 ‘call the commodities elfewhere bought from the 
 ‘* French with money; and the fpecie which ” they 
 ** received “* for provifions, lumber, &c. fold in the 
 *¢ Britifh fugar-colonies, and all the French fugars, 
 “¢ manufactures, &c. fradulently imported there” were 
 ‘¢ paid for out of the money received from this nation. 
 *¢ None of thofe vaft loffes” did ‘ in the leaft affe& 
 ‘< the Britith fugar planters,excepting in particular cafes> 
 ‘* for the Britifh wealth, which they” diffipated “* by 
 “< thofe feveral means” was ‘ conftantly replaced by 
 “* other wealth, received from their mother country *. 
 The fugar planters thinking themfelves injured by 
 thefe dealings of the North American colonies, lament- 
 ed the lofs of their money, as taken from their own 
 pockets, and carried to the French, with many bitter 
 reflections and acrimony. ‘The northern traders recri- 
 minated in their turns, and hence enfued that great 
 quarrel between them, which anfwered no other end 
 than expofing themfelves, and opening the eyes of 
 others in their mother country, who could not hope 
 
 to fee any remedy being put to it. The fugar plan- 
 
 ters expofed the underhand trade carried on by the 
 
 nort*ern traders; and the northern traders as bitter- 
 ly inveighed againft the combinations and exorbitant 
 demands of the planters, which occafioned them, as 
 
 * State of fugar trade, p. 14. 
 
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 they faid, to go to a foreign market. Thefe diflentions 
 ftill {ubfift > the time is favourable for putting an end to 
 them, and to form that equilibrium, which is neceflary 
 to render both dependent on their mother country.. The 
 caufe of complaint arifes from the difproportion of our 
 fugar colonies to thofe of the nor thern colonies, the latter 
 entirely fubfifting upon the former, ‘which. is their only 
 market, and can alone enable them to pay for the ma- 
 nufactures of Great Britain... Agricultureand farming are 
 the employments and livelihood of our northern colonies : 
 if therefore they can’t find a vent for their commodities 
 among our own people, they muft do it elfewhere: andy 
 if they cannot do that, they muft apply themfelves to 
 fome other occupation. For inftance, if the North A- 
 metican farmer cannot find a vent for his grain, provi- 
 fions, horfes, &c. can he fupply himfelf with the ne_ 
 ceflary utenfils for his bufinefs, and the conveniences of 
 life ? he may indeed feed his family, but he can’t cloath 
 them : and, if his commodities. are fuch,,-that, they 
 cannot procure vent at a foreign market, he muft fet up 
 manufacturing: and, if this fhould take effect among 
 our North American colonies, will it not render them 
 independent of. England? We are, indeed told, and 
 with a great deal of feeming warmth, that *¢ no man 
 *¢ who can have a piece of land’of his own, {ufficient 
 “* by his labour to fubfift his family in plenty, is ‘poor 
 ‘¢ enough to be a manufacturer, and work for a maf- 
 ‘¢ ter *.” But this docirine is fubje& to many excep- 
 tions. If aman has ‘“ a piece of land of his own ” 
 the fubliftence of ‘* his family in plenty” depends. on 
 
 * Entereft of Great Britain, p: 18. 
 the 
 

 
 Very ay EP ST 
 
 ( 83 ) 
 the fertility ofthat land, and not only. the quantity, but 
 the quality of the produce. He may alfo have: more than 
 <¢ fufficient to fubfift his family in plenty” with the pro- 
 duce, but then he may not have enough to procure them 
 the other conveniences of life. Not only this, but 2 
 plenty of the fame commodity, generally renders the 
 fale very precatious ; and, if fold, the profits are often 
 fo fmall, as fcarce to defray the charges of fufte- 
 nance, and the neceffary inftruments of hufbandry. 
 Great plenty and induftry are therefore incompatible ; 
 and fome new method of working toa greater advan- 
 tage, will always follow. 
 
 Befides, if'** the natural livelihood of the greateft 
 << population of a country is manufactures *”, is it not 
 a ftrong reafon to fear the northern colonies; for they 
 are by much the niore populous of any in North Ame- 
 rica, confidering the extent of their fettléments ? And 
 even in anfwer to the fingle article mentioned’ by the 
 Remarker of thé manufa&ture of “ hats,” we are only 
 told, that ‘* the beaver fkins are not now to be had in 
 «¢ New England, but from very remote places, and at 
 <¢ oreat pricest;” fo that, even upon that confideration, 
 the manufacture of hats is not reje&ted out of good-will, 
 but their incapacity of fupplying themfelves with the 
 beaver-fkins as cheap as ftom England. But be the 
 places ever fo remote, and the prices ever fo great, 
 the New-Englanders can certainly have them as cheap 
 as wein Old England, . 
 
 Give me leave, Sir, to lay before you what an inge- 
 nious gentleman lately {aid on the ftate of our northern 
 
 * Intereft of Great Britain, p. 40. | 
 M 2 colo- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 ( 84 ) 
 
 colonies. ‘* Thefe colonies,” fays he, ‘ having penty 
 
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 44 
 
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 of provifions amongft themfelvyes, and even a large 
 quantity for exportation, they take nothing of this 
 nature, but fome lrifh beef, butter, and pork; and 
 thefe they will not want long ; and thofe colonies 
 having interfered with Great Briiajn in thecorn trade 
 to feveral of her foreign markets, Great Britain and 
 Ireland can expect to receive no great benefit from the 
 plantations in thofe articles. We have hitherto fur- 
 nifhed them with a great quantity of their materials 
 for wearing apparel, houfhold furniture, filk, woollen, 
 and linen manufactures; but, if they fhould eftablifh 
 the linnen and woollen manufactures amongft them- 
 felves, and encourage every other’ fpecies of arti- 
 ficers to fettle amongi{t them, our plantations may, at 
 length, prove detrimental, infitead of beneficial to 
 the three kingdoms. 
 
 ** If it fhould be deemed good policy in Great Bri- 
 tain to fuffer her northern colonies to fupply them- 
 felves with all wearables, and all furniture, as well 
 as all kinds of provifions ; may not this prove a pre- 
 paratory fitep towards their becoming capable of fup- 
 plying other nations herewith, unlefs they are kept 
 under fuch proper reftrictions, as may prevent thofe 
 injuries to their mother country, 2s wel! as to Scot- 
 land and Ireland, 
 
 «¢ The primary eftablifhment. of thefe colonies was 
 intended principally for the bufinefs of planting, not 
 for that of manufa&turing.. However wile and ne- 
 ceflary it may be to indulge them in fome degree in the 
 latter; yet the natural confequence thereof, fhould 
 be effectually guarded againft for the benefit ofthe 
 
 © whole 
 

 
 ( 85 ) 
 
 whole nation; for we well know, that the habit of 
 <* manufacturing in a few capital articles will beget 
 *¢ that in more; handicraftsmen in one branch of ma- 
 ‘¢ nufactural and mechanical bufinefs beget others; and, 
 “¢ as the neceflaries of life, and the price of labour are 
 “¢ likely to grow. cheaper. and cheaper amongft them, 
 “< fhould we not keep a ftri@ eye, that the infant is not 
 “¢ reared in a way to prove detrimental ; and, at length, 
 ruinous to the intereft of her parent? While thefe 
 ‘< colonies fhall not be capable of manufacturing fo 
 “<< cheap as Great Britain and Ireland, it will remain 
 ‘< their intereft rather to take what they have been 
 ‘< wont to do of them: but, fo foon as they fhail be 
 ** able to furnifh themfelves equally cheap, we muft 
 “* expect to lofe all that exportation: and, if they are 
 “¢ permitted to go thofe lengths, it is eafy to judge what 
 ‘s farther ftrides: they will attempt to go, unlefs they 
 “¢ are duly reftrained in their career of manufacturing 
 ‘¢ by the wifdom of the Britifh legiflature *,” 
 
 Frome hence, Sir, it is evident, that an imputation 
 of the fpirit of manufacturing among our northern co- 
 lonies is no new topic, it is in faét what has engaged the 
 concern of not a {mall part of this nation. But itis a 
 lamentable misfortune in politics as well as in religion, 
 that there are thofe who have eyes, but feenot, and thofé 
 who have ears but hear not, and who never have an 
 feeeling, but when calamities become realized, and it is 
 too late to provide againft them. Ought we not, Sir, 
 at leaft to endeavour to prevent thefe threatening fymp- 
 toms? Ought we not to cherifh every fcheme that 
 _ tends to the welfare of our colonies, and that will ren- 
 
 c 
 
 ao 
 
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 & 
 
 “ 
 
 * Great Britain’s Commercial. Intereft explained and improved, by Poftle- 
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 (86° ) 
 
 der them more benefical to theit mother country, than 
 they have been, or are at prefent, likely to. be here- 
 after * do-not all'the apprehenfions of this fpirit of ma- 
 nufacturing among our northern colonies arife from the 
 difproportion’ between them, ‘dnd the fugar iflands ? and 
 do not all'the evils that reful¢ fromthis difproportion 
 fall_on the mother country? For we not only lofe the 
 great balance we pay to the Sugar Iflands to the yearly 
 amount of many fcore thoufand pounds, whichis moft of 
 it carried to our enemies, but we likewife lofe the benefit 
 we might otherwife receive’ from the northern colonies. 
 Tn juftice therefore to candour and truth, it muftbe own’d, 
 that the advocates for retaining the French Sugar IMlands, 
 have this {upertority over their adverfaries, and the bi- 
 
 gots to°'Canada. The intereft of our Sugar Iflands is 
 inféparably aniiexed to their mother country ; they re- 
 
 ciprocally depend’ on each other: and even 6tir own 
 North American‘colonies; in a great meafure depend’on 
 the Sugar Iflands; it is they that take off their dumber, 
 corn, and provifions, their ftaple commiodities}which 
 would:otherwife become ufelefs to them, or detrimental 
 to'their mother country, by interfering with her in thofe 
 
 commodities .to the European: market. 
 tis:true, the pofleffion’ of the Neutral Ifands of Tax 
 bago, St. Lucia’ and. St.Vincent, would, in’ a great 
 meafure,. obviate the caufé of the loffes, occafioneéd by 
 the want of a fufficient quantity of fugar; but thén we 
 fhould not diminifh’ the trade of France} and fKotlld 
 receive: veryilittle addition to our own bya fhare 
 of that: trade to Europe, we could never catry 
 the fuganmto a foreign’ market: > that branch° would 
 {till remain wholly in the hands of France; . For, 
 as 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 as long as France has more ‘than fufficient for her 
 home confumption, fhe can always under-fell us 
 ata foreign market, allowing only for the advan- 
 tazes fhe has in the fmallnefs of the duty on plantation 
 produce ;» but confidering the other natural advantages 
 that France. has over, us, in the number of inhabitants, 
 fhe could do it from that caufe alone, becaufe the price 
 ef labour muft be of courfe fo much the cheaper. Do 
 not the French buy beef and mutton, and other provi- 
 fions, for half the price we pay for them here? Is 
 not-their inland carriage near fixty per cent. cheaper 
 than in England? .Do they not fell their cloth ma- 
 nufaétures twenty-fave pounds per cent. .cheaper : than 
 our traders? And isnot their feamen’s wages lower by 
 ene half than that of ours? The only method therefore 
 to bring that trade into our hands, is by retaining Mar- 
 tinico. and Guadalupe, as well as the-Neutrah Iflands; 
 and then France will have little, if any more than fuf- 
 ficient for her home confumption. It is, Sir, the only 
 method. whereby we .can retain a fhare of the com- 
 merce of Europe .in that: commodity, and. procure a 
 larger ‘demand for, our manufactures among our northern 
 colonies: it is, Six, the only, method that can.relieve us 
 from, all apprehenfions of the independency of thofe co- 
 lonies on. their mother..country.:. and. thefe, Sir, are 
 advantages that willbe purchafed ap the expence of - 
 France, our more than, mortal enemy. 
 
 But, not to.confine ourfelves, Sir, merely to the in- 
 jury, the lofs of fuch a valuable branch of trade would 
 prove to:France, and benefit to ourfelyes, it may be ea- 
 
 ‘fily. forefeen, what injury our ewn iflands and, trading 
 fhips 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 ( BB ) 
 fhips might receive from the French keeping poflefion 
 of Martinico and Guadalupe, or even either of them ; 
 fuppofing the French fhould, upon that condition, give 
 up their pretenfions to the Neutral Iflands, and fhould 
 fuffer us to acquire a full pofleffion of them. Could our 
 colonies even then enjoy the profpect of fecurity? Could 
 they be relieved from apprehenfions of an attack? or, 
 would our trading fhips be a whit the lef expofed to the 
 privateers of the enemy? Till thefe ends are attained, 
 the Sugar Iflands cannot be deemed fecure, till thefe 
 ends are attended, Britons cannot fay their interefts 
 have been properly attended to 3 they cannot fay 
 that the M tr has availed himfelf and his coun- 
 try “* of a fuccefsful war, in the attainment of an ad- 
 ‘* vantageous peace.” Only confider, Sir, our iflands of. 
 Tabago, Barbadoes. St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Domini- 
 ca, Antigua, Montferrat, Nevis, St. Chriftophers, &c. 
 iflands that feem to convey large ideas of their extent 
 and produce, tho’ inferior in. both to Martinico and 
 Guadalupe ; only confider, Sir, the French poffeffed 
 of thofe two large iflands, more ftrong, convenient, 
 and important in every refpeét than our own, and fitu- 
 ated in the very center of them, and you cannot, Sir, 
 but comply with me in an Opinion, that the fecurity I 
 am fo ftrenuous for, is no unworthy object of your con- 
 fideration: and the more fo as the fhips from Europe 
 bound to the Leeward and Windward Iflands; the Ca. 
 raccas, Carthagena, New-Spain, and the whole coaft 
 of the Gulph of Mexico, trike Defeada firft, a fmal] 
 French ifland within fight of Guadalupe, and at no 
 great diftance from Martinico. If the French fhould 
 
 formally 
 
 
 
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 formally and fully cede to us the Neutral Iflands, upon 
 condition of being fuffered to enjoy Martinico and Gua- 
 dalupe, muft we not expect that they will endeavour to 
 fupply that lofs, by making themfelves more powerful 
 in thofe iflands ? Wouldnot thofe iflands receive a great 
 addition of inhabitants by the removal of thofe from the 
 fettlements they have already formed in the Neutral 
 Iflands? Would not France, by being thus confined 
 to Martinico and Guadalupe, make them more {trong 
 and formidable in the number of white inhabitants, 
 fortifications and foldiers? And this additional ftrength 
 is the more to be apprehended from thofe iflands, whofe 
 natural advantages of fituation are fuch as to require 
 very little affiftance from art to make them more fo. 
 
 And, in a word, would not France, by being 
 poffefled of thefe two  iflands alone, be in every 
 refpect more formidable to us among the Leeward 
 Iflands, than when fhe was poflefled of the Neutral 
 Iflands ? Would not our.trade, by the poffeffion of the 
 latter be confequently more expofed to the enemy ? 
 Would not England always be obliged to keep two fe- 
 parate fleets on the Leeward Ifland ftation, each of them 
 ftrong enough to encounter a fleet of France ? I fay, 
 Sir, would not England be obliged to do this ; I appeal 
 to you, Sir, I appeal, to the gentlemen of the navy, 
 who muft know fomething of the fituation of thofe 
 iflands, and the. winds and currents in thofe feas? 
 
 And thefe natural difadvantages are the more to be . 
 
 feared, when we recollect, that feveral of our tran- 
 {ports, in their paflage only from Baffeterre in Guada- 
 Jupe to Fort Louts in Grandterre, were, from the great 
 difficulty of turning to windward, full three weeks be- 
 
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 ( 90 ) 
 
 fore they got to that place. Englifh habour in Antigua 
 (the beft port we were poflefied of in that part of the 
 world for the reception and fecurity of large fhips) was 
 the general rendezvous of the Britifh fleet on that fta- 
 tion, and thereby gave protection to Montferrat, Nevis, 
 St. Chriftophers, and the leffer iflands to the weftward 
 of them, which having no harbour for the reception of 
 a fleet, would otherwife have been too much expofed to 
 the enemy from Martinico and Guadalupe who might 
 frequently have failed to either of them within a few 
 hours. Now, Sir, would not the fame reafon induce 
 us to keep another fleet in the port of /e petite carcenage 
 in St. Lucia, a port one of the beft, and that might be 
 made one of the moft fecure and formidable of any in 
 America? Would not this, Sir, be highly neceflary for 
 the protection of that ifland, which is almoft within 
 fight of Martinico? Would it nor, Sir, be highly ne- 
 ceflary for the prote€tion of St. Vincent, Tabago, and 
 Barbadoes, which have no convenient port for the recep- 
 tion of a fleet, and would be confequently in the greateft 
 danger from an enemy? ‘The fate of thefe laft iflands mutt 
 therefore depend on the fate of St. Lucia, in the fame 
 manner as Montferrat, Nevis, St. Chriftopher’s, and 
 the leffer iflands to the weftward of them depend on 
 Antigua. 
 
 It is evident therefore, that the danger of all the 
 Sugar Iflands, falling into the hands of France, though 
 we fhould become fully poffeffed of the Neutral Iflands, 
 js far from being impofiible, and fo diftant as fome may 
 imagine, as it entirely depends on fortuitous events. If 
 St. Lucia was loft, or its beft harbour ruined, could 
 
 we 
 
) 
 
 We maintain ourfelves in St. Vincent and Tabago? 
 And, if the fame fhould -happen to Antigua, would it 
 not greatly endanger Dominica, Montferrat, Nevis, 
 St. Chriftopher’s, &c.. for, by lofing that protection 
 they had from the fleet at Antigua, and there being no 
 convenient port in the neighbourhood, and fuch as 
 would anfwer the purpofe of Englifh Harbour in Anti- 
 gua, what could hinderthe French from attacking thofe 
 iflands, and reducing them? Or to put the moft moderate 
 conftruction on this circumftance, how could we hin- 
 der the French from intercepting all our navigation to 
 and from Europe to thofe iflands? And, that we can- 
 not hope to put a ftop to the great damages done our 
 trade by the privateers of the French, othewife than by 
 an entire conqueft of a// their pofleffions, we have too 
 wofully experienced. And, if we cannot do it now, 
 while the French power has fuffered fuch a check in 
 the reduétion of Guadalupe, when their fleets have 
 been deftroyed, when the few fhips they have left dare 
 not come out of port’to their affiftance; and, when we 
 have in thofe feas, a fleet of upwards of twenty fhips, 
 and great part of them of the line, to block up Marti- 
 nico, what can we expect hercafter? Could our mere 
 chant fhips pafs without a convoy fuperior to the fleet of 
 France on that flation? And, could any trade bear the 
 immenfe expence of fuch convoys! If we had not twa 
 large {eparate fleets on this ftation, at St. Lucia and An-= 
 tigua, our fleets muft of courfe rendezvous at one of 
 them; and, in that cafe, might not the French attack 
 the other; and, after intelligence fhould be re- 
 ceived of fuch attack by our fleet, ani the fhips were 
 collected and ready to fail, might not the winds prove 
 
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 fo unfavourable as to prevent their timely arrival to 
 give the neceflary affiftance ; more efpecially if the fleet 
 was at Antigua, and the attack made on St. Lucia? 
 And, to conceive, Sir, what we have to apprehend 
 from fuch an attack, only confider the different efta- 
 blifhment of the French in thofe iflands from that of 
 our own; it will naturally lead you into ftronger re- 
 flections on the danger we are expofed to from that 
 quarter, than any thing I can fay on the fubject. In 
 1676, the number of White Men in Barbadoes alone 
 was computed to be twenty thoufand (befides women 
 and children) and eighty thoufand negroes; but mark 
 the revolution. within. thefe late years; in 1724 the 
 number of White Men in that ifland; able to bear 
 arms, was only four thoufand eight hundred and twelve, 
 according to the reprefentation from the board of trade; 
 and about the year 1740, the number of Negroes there 
 was ufually fixty thoufand, which may ferve to give us 
 fome idea of the number of Whites then there. In 
 r701, the French ifland colonies of Martinico, Gua- 
 dalupe; St. Domingo, Cayenne, Grenade, Mariga- 
 lante, &c. contained eight thoufand eight hundred and 
 y White Men, and forty-five thoufand fix hundred 
 Giacks, according to the reprefentation of the French 
 council of commerce; but, by a calculation made in 
 17535 the French then had, in the faid colonies, up- 
 wards of fifty-one thoufand and five hundred White 
 Mien fit to-beat! arms, independent of many thoufands 
 of failors employed in the trade of the co/onies, and 
 
 three. hundred fixty~four thoufané and eight hundred 
 
 vty 
 ~ 
 
 - 
 : 
 
 ft 
 
 _ 
 
 Haves of both {exes: andthe general computation within - 
 
 thefe 
 

 
 ( 493 ) 
 
 thefe late years has been, that the French have one White 
 Man to every three Negroes; whereas the Englifh have 
 enly one White Manto twenty Negroes; an aflertion no 
 lefs amazing than true! A Britifh M r, Sir, ought 
 to keep a watchful eye on thefe dangerous fymptoms; he 
 ought to confider of what great utility this branch of 
 trade is to France, and what it would hereafter prove 
 to Great Britain; he ought to confider what danger 
 there is to be apprehended of the lofs of the. moft im- 
 portant of our iflands; and to put the leaft confideration 
 on the matter, how likely our whole trade is to become 
 in their power. And, that we cannot put a ftop to this 
 evil, I have already fhewn; nay, we Cannot even ex- 
 pect to prevent their fleets getting in and out of a fingle 
 port in Martinico alone, as they have done whenever 
 they pleafe, and they have it always in their power to 
 avoid an engagement: for, to ufe Care M—re’s 
 own words, ** from the: almoft conftant lee currents, 
 “* it being very difficult for fhips to get to windward, it 
 “< muft be always in the enemy’s choice, whether they 
 ‘¢ will come to a general aétion or not.” . From hence, 
 Sir, we may conclude to what little effe& it would be 
 to keep fleets on that ftation, while the French have 
 either. Martinico or Guadalupe; fuch fleets wil] only 
 prove an unneceflary expenge to the nation; unnece(- 
 fary becaufe they muft be employed in. fruitlefs- cruizes 
 again{t the enemy; and unneceflary, becaufe they muft 
 hear of, and often fee our trading fhips carried into a 
 French port without being able to prevent it. 
 
 Whoever will look into the feveral lifts of captures 
 made by privateers from Martinico, and carried in 
 there fince the reduétion of Guadalupe, will find to 
 
 what 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ——— no — 
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 a a oe ee ee, 
 
 
 
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 ( 94 ) 
 
 what ‘exceffive lofles we are liable from the capture of 
 fhips by that fingle ifland: they will even find that, in- 
 ftead of being benefited by fuch a confiderable acquifi- 
 tion as Guadalupe, our tradehas in effect fuffered by it. 
 I would not be mifunderftood in this; I do not mean to 
 infinuate the leaft prejudice againft the retention of 
 Guadalupe, that ifland alone would certainly be a great 
 lofs to the enemy, and of much importance to us, both 
 as an addition to our fugar trade in times of peace, and 
 fecurity to that trade in time of war: but the reafon we 
 have not experienced the latter, has been owing to the 
 injudicious terms granted to that ifland on its furren- 
 der, whether from defign or inadvertency, I will. not 
 pretend to determine. By the capitulation, the men 
 belonging to privateers, and all others who had no pro- 
 perty in the ifland, were at liberty to retire to Marti- 
 nico: and, with regard to thofe that ated in a military 
 Capacity, and in defence of the ifland, whether belong- 
 ing to Guadalupe, Marigalante, or Martinico, it was 
 particularly infifted on that they fhould be fent to the 
 latter only, and fhould carry with them their arms, bag- 
 gage, fervants, &c. But, asthe mention of this fo fre- 
 
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 quently occurs in the articles, I am inclined to think it 
 was intentional ; and that for the following reafons. 
 The intercourfe between Martinico and France had 
 met with fuch interruption, that the French gave over 
 all thoughts of carrying on their commerce in their 
 own bottoms, and their Dutch carriers meeting with 
 the like obftru@ion, the inhabitants of Martinico had 
 long found it difficult to fupply themfelves with a fuffi- 
 ciency of provifions. This was the general opinion 
 
 among the people in our own iflands ; to which fome 
 added, 
 
 
 
ET a —— === == = =——— =—— = = —_——— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (95 ) 
 
 added, that they had already maintained. themfelves a 
 long time by the mere capture of our ftore-fhips.. The 
 intention therefore of confining fuch an additional num- 
 ber of inhabitants to the fingle ifland of Martinico, 
 which could not fupply the demands of its own. proper 
 inhabitants, muft have been to ftarve it to a furrender. 
 But the event has proved the abfurdity of this {cheme. 
 By the great increafe of failors and landmen, their pri- 
 vateers have increafed in proportion; and thofe being 
 {mall and full of men, have made great hayock among: 
 our trading fhips, notwithftanding the much boafted 
 ttrength of our fleet. Indeed it muft be acknowledg’d, 
 they have had but too much reafon to be merry at fight- 
 ing us with our own weapons! I fhould be forry to in- 
 fer the leaft reflection onthe late Com re on that 
 ftation, ‘my ‘intention is not to calumniate our of- 
 ficers, nor cavil with them about the nature of their 
 duty: this, perhaps, has been an abufe already too 
 much lavifhed on the fubjeét. We know what papers 
 have been diftributed among our iflands of the moft in~ 
 jurious contents *, and how freely thofe iflanders have 
 
 I Se 
 
 
 
 32. Se = SS ee eee ae <eSes ec Saee 
 ~ poe. ~ 2 = = a =~ _ ae SSS -~* _ = 
 
 exprefied 
 
 * The following, (copies of which were ftuck up’ on all the tavern 
 doors in a certain ifland, the firft night after the arrival of a late C———re 
 on that ftation ; a fuccefsful attempt on the enemy) may ferve to convey 
 
 
 
 fome ideas of the refpeét paid to fome of our officers this war. 
 
 On C 
 
 He is the emblem of fear, 
 
 
 
 --re J---N M---r, 
 
 The foe to his country, 
 The enemy to courage, 
 
 The feorn of the populace, 
 The fcandal of Britain, 
 
 A ° - <2 EN "SRS $e Sete ae 
 eels be arg ot cwes Oe res =. 4 7 4 c 
 FS ee ey Ne SPS Oe eh eee Ry Pee ee yO 
 
 =~ 
 
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 | ( 96) 
 
 expreffed themfelves in open converfation. The com- 
 
 2S ee 
 
 plaint feems to have arofe from this principle, viz. that 
 it was practicable for the fquadron to anchor in Port- 
 Royal bay, between Fort Negro and I’Ifle des Ramieres, 
 whereby the French men of war under M. Bompart 
 could not have got out, and the privateers, finding no 
 entrance there for them and their prizes, muft have gone 
 either to Port St. Piere, or to Grenade, either of which 
 were to be blocked up by a fingle frigate. Now, the 
 queftion that arifes, is not whether there was danger to 
 be apprehended in blocking up Fort-Royal, but whe- 
 ther it was practicable. I do not pretend to determine 
 this point: there are thofe it more nearly concerns to 
 doit. C re M—re was an officer of muth efti- 
 mation among the people; if his conduét was faulty, 
 he ought to have defended it; it was a duty he owed 
 himfelf, his fovereign, and his country : he fhould con- 
 fider, that credulity is often the aflociate of flander; 
 and that, when a man’s charater is defamed, if he 
 does net difprove the charge, it is generally reckoned 
 an admiffion of his guilt. 
 
 But admitting, Sir, that Martinico cannot be blocked 
 up fo effectually as to enfure the fafe navigation of our 
 trading fhips, is it not a very fufficient reafon for at» 
 
 ye —— 
 Pe eee oe 32 
 SS a oe. 5 ro. 
 
 ae 
 es 
 
 r= = 
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 peso ee 
 
 
 
 LP ap 
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 4, I 
 
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 | 
 
 The patron of cowards, 
 
 — 
 
 The contempt of good men, and 
 The ruin of the navy; 
 in fhort, but words are wanting to fay what, 
 ~ Say all that’s mean, low, bafe, and he is that, 
 
 Sr et Erasee 
 x —— 
 
 PHILO VERITATISs, 
 PHILO JUSTITIA. 
 
 ———- 
 
 tempting 
 
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( 97 ) 
 
 tempting to reduce it? When the enemy’s privateers 
 from Martinico alone, have taken near a hundred {ail 
 of our fhips in lefs than three months, muft it not give 
 fome idea of the great detriment we fhall be liable to 
 hereafter? Muft it not caufe diffatisfattion among the 
 mercantile part of the nation to find this nufance not 
 attempted to be. removed? And, even fuppofing it 
 fhould be found neceflary to give up Martinico at a 
 peace (which I hope will not be the cafe) the nation 
 would {till receive no fmall advantage from the tem- 
 porary poffeffion of it; as we fhould thereby effectu- 
 ally obtain the defired fecurity, and reduce our enemy 
 to the neceflity of fubmitting to an equitable accom- 
 modation. 
 
 I take it for granted, that an addition of Sugar 
 Iflands would be an inducement to retain Senegal and 
 Goree. It has been acknowledged, that thofe places 
 ‘¢ are of real importance in the flave and gum trades ;” 
 but then it is urged, that ** our own African fettle- 
 ‘¢ ments have hitherto fupplied us with flaves fufficient 
 ‘¢ for our American purpofes: and the trade for gum is, 
 ‘¢ perhaps, not of confequence enough to make us 
 ‘¢.amends for the: annual mortality, which we al- 
 “¢ ready lament, of our brave countrymen, to. guard 
 ** our African. conquefts *.” That we — have hi- 
 therto fupplied our own. occafions. for flaves, is true; 
 but that we have greatly decreafed in that branch of 
 trade, and the French have near intirely fupplanted us’ 
 in it within thefe late years, not only by fupplying them- 
 felves, but the fubjects. of Spain likewifle, is equally true. 
 Befides, did they not openly encroach on our rights and 
 
 * Letter totwo Great Men, p. 33. 
 privi- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 yaw a ee 
 
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 SSS 
 
 
 
 
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 ( 98 ) 
 
 privileres in Africa, as well asin America, and that in 
 the moft important fettlements we were pofleffed of? 
 Did they not endeavour to fupplant us at our capital 
 fettlement; Anamaboe? Did they not do the fame at 
 Whydah, and in the rivers Sierra Leone and Sherbro? 
 Did they not enjoy a great fhare of the trade of thofe 
 places? Did they not do the fame in the River Gambia ; 
 for, not content with cutting off the communication 
 between the fettlements of our company, and a’ branch 
 of the River Senegal, which falls into the Gambia, by 
 ereGting a fort at the junction of theferivers, did they 
 not ereét another fort at the mouth of the River Gam- 
 bia, oppofite to a fort of our own, and within our un- 
 doubted territories ? Did they not do this without mo- 
 leftation from us ? Did they not even take upon them- 
 felves to fire upon our trading veffels, though within 
 fuch our undoubted’ rights, and under our very: forts? 
 And fhall we then again put it in the power of France to 
 repeat thofe infolences? Shall we thus paffively let them ‘ 
 go unpunifhed ? Shall we fuffer them again to engrof 
 the whole gum trade ? Shall we fuffer them to retain, as 
 of right, an extent of coaft of five hundred miles from 
 Cape Blanco to the River Gambia?» And, in a word, 
 fhall we fuffer them to exclude us from the whole Afri- 
 can-trade ; for this will probably be the certain confe- 
 quence of their repoflefling Senegal and Goree ? The 
 lofs of the flave trade muft be very great to this na- 
 tion, not only becaufe we have entirely loft all thare 
 of that trade to the Spanifh colonies, but likewife, 
 becaufe it is the only trade we can carry on with 
 the French Sugar Tflands with any advantage ; for they 
 will pay us in {pecie for flaves, when they will not for 
 
 any 
 
 
 
( 99 ) 
 
 any other commodity. Not only this, but the gum * 
 from hence is an effential.article in our manufactures, 
 as well as thofe of France; and the prohibiting the 
 future fale of it to them would be of infinite prejudice 
 to the fuccefs of their manufactures. And, can it be 
 faid, Sir, that Senegal and Goree are not of confe- 
 quence enough to make us amends for the lofs of a few 
 lives, when it is computed that the pofleffion of them 
 has brought into the French Eaft-India company, a 
 clear annual income of five hundred thoufand pounds ; 
 and, when: the retaining thefe fettlements alone would 
 fully aniwer our views in the Eaft Indies, without 
 making any demands there. But, as. affairs in this 
 quarter of the world have been hitherto pafled over in 
 filence,..I_ would beg leave to make a little digreffion on 
 thatyhead.. Our trade there is in the hands of a private 
 company, and is likewife, in fome refpects, difadvan- 
 tageous to the nation. ‘The people, therefore, could 
 not but be diflatisfied, at feeing.a particular intereft pre- 
 ferred to a general one. But, as the climate there makes 
 haveck enough among the fubje@s of this kingdom; 
 without having recourfe to the deftruétive weapons of 
 war, I think we ought,. if, poffible, to;preyent our be- 
 ing involved in a war there for the future. Adopt there- 
 fore the fyftem of France; Jet Madrafs laf&t war, and 
 Fort St. David this war be your precedent. Let Kari- 
 
 cal, Pondicherry, and Port Dauphin at Madagafcar, be 
 
 effectually demolifhed: even prevent. them from be- 
 
 * The value of this branch of trade alone, may be the more eafily con- 
 ceived, when it is confidered, that, in the year 1755, the French imported 
 no lefs than two millions feven hundred thoufand pounds of gum; which 
 was fold to us at twelve pounds per hundred, 
 
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 coming formidable to us hereafter, by filling “up ‘their 
 ports with old fhips, &c. It would be a work of many 
 years before France-could repair thefe lofles, even fup- 
 that we fhould reftore their African fettlements ; 
 
 but, if we rétain them, the company would, very’ pro- 
 _ - 
 
 bably, foon become bankrupt, and tl 
 
 .e trade of France 
 to the Eaft-Indies intirely annihilated. And to convince 
 you, Sir, of the great utility of the African trade'to the 
 French Eaft-India company, only confider the amazing 
 power and extent of trade the French have acquired in 
 the Eaft-Indies within thefe very few years. It was the 
 famous Colbert that eftablified an Eaft-India company 
 in France: he protected it with his authority, fupported 
 it with his money, and, in fhort, took “upon? himfelf 
 the whole burden of it. His endeavours were not ufe- 
 lefs ; ‘he left it in ‘a thriving condition. But fome time 
 after his deceafe, matters took a different turn it 
 could be no longer made’ advantageous, ‘no not’-even 
 equivalent to the charges incurred in cafrying’it om 
 Some merchants of St. Maloes took it upon themfelves 
 in I710, upon giving ten per cent. upon the whole pro- 
 fits they made by the fale of their goods; and it long 
 femained ‘ina languifhing condition in their hands. 
 But the company, and that trading to Africa, being 
 aflociated together, they have been. made to afift each 
 other, or rather Senegal and Goree have fupported both. 
 Before the laft wary the French never made any confi= 
 derable head in the Eaft-Indies; and, we need not 
 doubt, but that they have rofe to fuch a height of power 
 there, merely by ‘thefe very African fettlements. If 
 the profits were not fo great from the latter, could the 
 French company maintain a flect of feven or eight fhips 
 
 of 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 (‘ 101- ) 
 
 of the line in’ the Eaft-Indies, to protect, their -fettle- 
 ments there *? And do our company evén maintain one 
 fhip of the line.there? In a word, on the retention.of 
 thefe pretended worthlefs African fettlements, and our 
 vigilance to prevent any intercourfe from France to 
 them, depend the continuance of our fugar trade, and 
 the fure depreflion-of that of France, -It is from Africa 
 alone, they have been enabled to become fo formidable 
 in the Eaft-Indies, and to monopolize the fugar trade ; 
 it is from. Africa alone, they can hope to fupport their 
 fhare of that trade in St. Domingo, Grenade, and 
 Equinodtiai France. 
 
 As the latter has been recommended as.a more proper 
 objec of our regard than the French Caribbec Iflands, it 
 may be. neceflary to. take fome, notice of that matter. 
 The author. may recollect the objections to “our poffef- 
 fing not, only Senegal and Goree, but likewife Guada- 
 lupe, were chiefly founded upon a remonftrance, that 
 the expence of lives, occafioned by the intemperature 
 of the climate, would not allow of it. Therefore his 
 obfervation, that the Ifle of Cayenne, and its appen- 
 <¢ dix Equinoétial France, having but very few inha- 
 s¢ bitants, and thofe eafily removed, would , be.an.ac- 
 © quifition every way fuitable to our fituation ‘and de- 
 s¢ fires t+,” was.altogether needlefs. A great advantage 
 we fhould reap by the retention of Martinico and Gua- 
 dalupe, would be.the great addition of {ubjects to this 
 
 * In the two firft engagements bétweeh M. Dache and Vice-admiral Po- 
 cocke, ‘there were but two king’s fhips in the French fquadron, and-one of 
 them was only a frigate of twenty-fix guns, 
 
 _ F Intereft of Great Britain, p, 46. 
 
 king- 
 
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 ( 102 ) 
 
 kingdom, as moft of the inhabitants would undou btedly 
 réffiain there. Nor do I fee that Cayenne and Equi- 
 noétial France would be the afylum of many of the re- 
 fugees from “ Jamaica, Barbadoes, &e *”, ‘There is 
 not the leaft temptation to invite this refuge. Being fo 
 very near the line, Cayenne is extremely hot and un- 
 wholefoine, nor is the foil in any wife fertile; for the 
 inhabitants have not only very few commadities of any 
 fort for exportation, but they cannot éven produce pro- 
 vilions enough to fupply their own wants. The coaft 
 of Equtinodial France is very low, and the country be- 
 ing fubject to frequent inundations, the natives are often 
 obliged to build their huts in trees to avoid being drown- 
 ed. Is it to be thought we can make this colony turn 
 to greater account than the French? they have been in 
 pofleffion of the country about one hundred and thirty 
 yeats, and Icannot fay I ever heard of any confiderable 
 exports they made from thence. ‘There is no fear to be 
 apprehended of any great increafe of French power 
 from this quarter ; they are hemmed in by three very 
 jealous powers, the Portuguefe of Brazil, the Dutch of 
 Surinam, and in the inland country, by barbarous and 
 uncivilized tribes of Indians, inveterate enemies to all 
 Futopean fettlers. And, fhould the French éver afford 
 us occafion for jealoufy there, we might foon reduce 
 then; for, though pofleffed of an extent of coaft of 
 about one hundred and forty miles in length, they have 
 not a fingle port all the way. The fecurity of Equi- 
 noétial France depends on the Ifle of Cayenne; the 
 {ecurity of that ifland depends on the fort, and that fort 
 
 * Intereftof Great Britain, p. 46. t Ibid. 
 , Ve. 4 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 ( 103 ) 
 
 is very trifling, and fhips may-anchor i¢lofe ynder the 
 fortifications, 
 
 Ithink, Sir, I have already fufficiently provedithe 
 neceflity of requiring fuch ceflions from the enemy as 
 I have premifed, both onthe ‘principles of trade,-and 
 fecurity of our rights and properties; but as many fen- 
 tentious, or rather quibbling objections have been raifed, 
 in-orderto avoid the imputation of . fubterfuge and eva- 
 fion, 1 would beg leave to animadvert a little on-them, 
 The principles of thefe objections may be reduced -te 
 four: 
 
 I, That by retaining them, we fhould fhow a fpirit 
 of.ambition. | 
 
 Il. That they will be but of little benefit to us. 
 
 Ill. That they are to.‘ be looked upon as given 
 
 <¢ back to France for a moft important confideration, | 
 
 “¢ if they can be the means of extricating the King of 
 “< Pruffia from any unforefeen diftrefles,” and 
 
 IV. That, if the King of Pruffia “* fhould extri- 
 * cate himfelf’ from the dangers that furround him” 
 we fhould ‘‘-employ them to recover out of the hands 
 “¢ of France thofe towns of ‘Flanders, gained for the 
 ‘¢ Auftrian family, by the valour, and at the expence 
 of England, and which have been fo  perfidioufly 
 “ facrificed +.” | | 
 
 In‘fupport of the firft objeftion, we are told by ‘the 
 Remarker, that “* the views which every ftate ought 
 << to ‘have at the making of peace may be reduced into 
 «© two: 1.’To attain thofe objects for which fhe went 
 
 * Letter to two Great Men, p. 41. + Ibid, p. 42. 
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 ( 104 ) 
 
 “to war; and, 2. To receive fome feafonable indénj= 
 <¢ nification for the charges fhe has incurredin Carrying 
 ‘¢ it on.” And weare farther given to underftand, that 
 “¢ without openly avowing fome views of ambition, no 
 *¢ nation c2n poffibly claim more.” 
 
 With regard to thefe political axioms, confidered in« 
 differently, they are very problematical ; but, confidered 
 as'relative to each other, certainl y very contradictory. 
 The firft had better have been omitted, it can’t be made a 
 fixed general rule ; for, upon that principle, every ftate 
 that goes to war with the view of extending its terri- 
 tories, at the expence of its neighbours, or even of re- 
 ducing them to her fubjeétion, has the liberty, nay, 
 ought to attain them, as being the objec? for which fhe 
 wentto war. The otheris a dire& Contradi@ion to it. 
 
 I believe the Remarker would ‘not reject my admiffion 
 of refting the whole upon his fecond axiom, by infert- 
 ing the words equivalent and fecurity; for, whena 
 {tate goes to war in defence of her right or property, no 
 fecurity can be reafonable unlefs equivalent, that is, 
 unlefs it fully fecures that property ; nor can any indem- 
 nifcation be reafonable, unlefs full fatisfaction is made 
 for the charges incurred in carrying it on. The Re- 
 marker afks, that ‘* if France, influenced by a dread 
 * of exertion of the Britifh power, had.given up Nova 
 «¢ Scotia, with its ancient and true boundaries, had de- 
 “¢ molifhed their fort. inthe province of New York, 
 <¢ had removed themfelves from the Ohio, and renounced 
 ¢ all claim to that territory; and that, on thefe con» 
 * ceflions, the miniftry had then ceafed from hottilities, 
 ‘* without requiring, or even claiming Canada, whether 
 
 ce we 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 ( 89 ) 
 
 ‘¢ we fhould have had a treacherous and delufive peace.” 
 No doubt, thefe were terms, that fo far from meeting 
 with a refufal, would have been greedily accepted ; but 
 let me add, that they were terms we had a right to de- 
 mand, upon a double confideration ; firft, as being fti- 
 pulated in former treaties ; and, fecondly, as rightfully 
 belonging to us. But wherefore can thefe rcftitutions 
 by France (for they can be called by no other name) be 
 the ne plus ultra of our demands? Does not the differ- 
 ent ftate of affairs at prefent require a different confi- 
 deration than they did at the beginning of the ‘war? 
 After having been obliged to enter into a tedious, 
 bloody, and expenfive war, to recover thofe rights, 
 muft it not be both reafonable and juft to require a full 
 indemnification, as well as a full fecurity, for the charges 
 incurred in fupporting thofe rights; and likewife the 
 charges occafioned by the unnatural extent of fuch war, 
 even without reflecting on the perfidy and ambition of 
 France, the rivalfhip between us for fuperiority, and 
 the neceffity of curbing their power to give us that fu- 
 periority. 
 
 As the Remarker’s moderation was modern doétrine, 
 I could wifh, and, I think, it ought to have been, ufh- 
 ered in with the ufual formalities, either of cuftom to 
 authorize, or fome notable reafons to prove, the necef- 
 fity of a change, and the ufe of it for the future. As 
 this has not been done, I am apprehenfive that the Re- 
 marker could not invent matter fufficient to fupport his 
 argument, and therefore it muft fall to the ground. 
 Among the ancients, it was the cuftom for the victors 
 
 to proportion their demands according to their fuccefles : 
 
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 bare fecurity and indemnification were not then the Ad 
 
 plus ultra of moderation ; they were terms held in little 
 or no eftimation, and that even among the rcligious’ 
 fews, and the wife and equitable republican flates of 
 Greece and Rome. Nor, in fact, can I comprehend 
 the meaning of the propofed indemnification, regarding 
 only the charges incurred in carrying on a war, be- 
 gan on the principle of felf-prefervation, it muft be very 
 unreafonable, and is therefore applicable to the prefent 
 war between us and France. Can France indemnify 
 us for the lofs of the many thoufand fellow-fubjecis we 
 lament? Can France indemnify us for the ravages and 
 iaffacres perpetrated by her in North America? Ought 
 not thefe to bear fome weight in refpect to indemnifica- 
 tion? Ought not France to indemnify the Hanoverians 
 and Heffians for the ravages committed in their country é 
 Ought fhe not to indemnify then? for thé contributions 
 raiféd upon them, and the confifcations of their revenue ? 
 And to fhew you, Sir, how we may extend the fpirit of 
 this fame word indemnification, which the Remarker fo 
 much harps upon, we néed only recollect the treaty of 
 1701; between Jewis the Fourteenth and his grandfoa 
 the Duke of Anjou, whereby Flanders and the Mila- 
 nefe were exprefsly ceded to the French kirig, as an in- 
 demnification for the charges incurred bye Himtn ad- 
 yancing the Duke of Anjou to the throne of Spain. 
 Whencethen proceeds the neceflity of ths great change 
 in the maxims of war? and whence this fpirit of ref- 
 titution? Are kines lefs ambitious ? Are they more obe 
 fervant of the obligatory ties of good neighbourhood, 
 and their ewn fot folerin engagements ! No: the de- 
 
 vaitation 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 C90») 
 
 vaftation of -whole provinces, the demolition of cities, 
 and the maffacre of mankind, are made fubordihate to 
 the caprice of majefty; the groundwork of the moft 
 folemn treaties is intereft and convenience, and they 
 are kept no longer than they anfwer the bafe purpofes of 
 making them. However, as I was willing to convié 
 myfelf of any error in this refpe&t, I have made it my 
 bufinefs to confult Machiavel, Grotius, and Puffen- 
 
 dorf, authors who have much diftinguifhed themfelves 
 
 en the matters of policy and war. I fhall not give any 
 
 quotations from them in oppofition to the Remarkers 
 pinion; as it is upon a French principle, I {hall 
 content myfelf with fetting forth what two very noted 
 French authors have faid upon this fubject.. The cele- 
 brated author of I’Efprit des Loix, {peaking of the right 
 of war, hasthefe words: “* The life of government,” 
 fays he, is like that of man; the latter has a right to 
 “© kill in cafe of natural defence; the former have a 
 “¢ right to wage war for their own prefervation. —In 
 ** the cafe of natutal defence, I havea right to kill, 
 becaufe my life is, in refpeét to me, what the life of 
 &* my antagonift is tohim: in the fame manner, a ftate 
 that wages war, is like that of any other being *,” 
 This is all Montefquieu fays of the matter; and, 
 from hence it is evident, that he confiders the right of 
 war as abfolute, and unlimited, without any refervation 
 of the reafonablenefs of a mere indemnification, 
 
 The ingenious M. Vattel treats much more largely 
 and explicitly on this point. Telling us of the right a ftate 
 has to fecure itfelf, and tomake demands upon the prin- 
 
 «¢ 
 
 & Vol, I, book Xe ch, 4, Pa 193s 
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 ciples of fecurity, he fays, ‘¢ It is fafeft-to -prevent the 
 
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 evil, when it can be done. A nation has a right to 
 refift an injurious attempt, andto make ufe of force, 
 and every honeft means againft the power that is ac- 
 tually engaged in oppofition to it, and even to anti- 
 cipate its machinations, always obferving, not to at- 
 tack it upon vague and uncertain fufpicions, in order 
 to avoid expofing itfelf to become an unjuft aggref- 
 for. 
 
 <¢ When the evil is done, the fame right of fecurity 
 authorizes the offended to endeavour to obtain a 
 Compleat reparation, and, if neceflary, to employ 
 force for that purpofe. 
 
 “¢ In fhort, the offended has a right to provide for 
 his fecurity for the future, and to punifh the offen- 
 der, by infliGing upon hima pain capable of deterring 
 him afterwards from the like attempts, and of inti- 
 midating thofe who fhall be tempted to imitate him: 
 he may even, if neceflary, put the aggreffor out of 
 the condition to injure him. He makes .ufe of his 
 right in all thefe meafures, when guided by reafon; 
 and, if any evil refults from it to him who lays him 
 under the neceffity of afling thus, hecan accufe none 
 but his own injuftice. 
 
 “«¢ Ifthen there is any wherea nation of a reftlefs and 
 mifchievous difpofition, always ready to injure others, 
 to traverfe their defigns, and to raife domeftic trou- 
 ‘ bles, it is not to be doubted, that all havea right to 
 
 S join, in order to reprefs, chaftife, and put it ever 
 e<é 
 
 after out of its power to ga them. Such fhould 
 be the juft fruits of the policy. which Machiavel 
 “* praifes 
 
 
 

 
 
 I a 
 
 
 
 { 93) 
 
 s* praifes in Cefar Borgia, The conduct followed by 
 <¢ Philip the Second, king of Spain, was adapted to, 
 <¢ unite all Europe againft him ; and it was from juf 
 «© reafons, that Henry the Great formed the defign of 
 «© humbling a power, formidable by its forces, and per- 
 «¢ nicious by its maxims *. 
 
 If I have recourfe to. precedents from modern hiftory, 
 can I find the fpirit of reftitution, or even sncidiec ictal 
 a prevailing fyftem, or ever adopted by any power? 
 ‘The treaty of Ofnabrug in 1648, between Sweden and 
 the Emperor, is,a pattern of the prefent maxims .of 
 war, ufed in refpeét both to the rights of war and in- 
 demnification. By this treaty a. ceflion was made to 
 victorious Sweden of all the Hither Pomerania, the 
 Ifle of Rugen, Stetin, and fome other places in the Far- 
 ther Pomerania, the mouths of the Oder, Wifmar, the 
 Archbifhoprick of Bremen, and the Bifhoprick of Ver- 
 den. And what, Sir, was the indemnification made 
 the Elector of Brandebourg, to whom part of Pome- 
 rania belonged? Had he not the archbifhoprick of Hal- 
 berftadt, the Principality of Minden, the county of 
 Hohenftein, and the Archbifhoprick of Magdebourg, an 
 indemnification of much greater value and extent than 
 the country taken from him? How came Pruffia re- 
 pofleffed of the greateft part of Pomerania? How came 
 Bremen and Verden_in the hands of the Danes, and 
 now of his prefent majefty? In fhort, was I to enu- 
 merate every treaty of this kind, it would appear there 
 was no ftate in the empire, ner no kingdom in Eu- 
 rope, but what has changed its mafter, or had part of 
 
 * Book ¥, chap. iv, 
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 (94 } 
 its ancient territories taken from it, or others added te 
 it. But the behaviour of France in Europe on this 
 head, within about this century paft, without refle@- 
 ing on her conduct in America and the Indies, is a fuf- 
 cient authority for us to begin to adopt this ufage our- 
 felves. Has fhe not got Alface and Loraine on the fide 
 of Germany; of Artois, the Cambrefis, part of Flan- 
 ders, Hainault, and Luxemberg on the fide of the Ne- 
 therlands; and Roufillon, formerly a part of Catalonia, 
 on the fide of Spain? But, becaufe we have not hitherto 
 taken example ftom .Franee: in this refpect, or rather 
 becaufe we have fo egregioufly neglected our own ine 
 terefts hitherto, is it a reafon that we fhould not for the 
 future ; when a deviation ftom this condu@ is actually 
 ~ the only way to relieve us from that burthenfome debt 
 which the nation groans under, and is the only method 
 to infure us internal peace and tranquillity ? 
 
 Having already explained myfelf with regard to. the 
 point of fecurity, I thall now cenfider how far the ob- 
 jects I have before recommended, are confiftent with a 
 xeafonable indemnification, according to the Remarker’s 
 plan: Lam perfwaded they will not even exceed the 
 Bounds of that conftruGtion, without having any weight 
 on the principles of fecurity, and the ufage of other 
 powers. I {fall therefore beg leave to recapitulate fome- 
 thing of thofe objects, in order to form an idea of their 
 extent. | 
 
 I believe, ‘Sir, it will be acknowledged, that, with 
 regard to Louifiana, the French have not the Jeait pre~ 
 tence to it as of right: their fettlement was an ufurpa- 
 tp on the juft claims of the Spaniards of Mexico, and 
 
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 (95 ) 
 
 the Englith fubjeds of Carolina and Virginia ¢ for, tho? 
 not actually inhabited, it was included in the grants te 
 their refpective colonies, and always cenfidered as their 
 property. The French claim of actual pre-eccupancyy 
 might as well extend to different parts in South Ame- 
 rica and the Eaft-Indies, where maniy large tracts, not 
 pofleffed by the Spaniards, Portuguefe, and Dutch, are 
 
 looked upon as belonging to them: nor, in fat, is a 
 
 want of actual pofleffion in the forming foreign colo- 
 nies, ever confidered as an impeachment of the claim. 
 The retention of that country cannot be confidered ag 
 
 given up to us by way of indemnification: by retain- 
 
 ing it, we only remove them from their encroach- 
 ments, and require the quiet pofleffion of our owny 
 which we have found by experience it would be dan- 
 gerous for them to. keep any longer. 
 
 I believe, Sir, it will be likewife acknowledged, 
 that France, does not claim any title to Cape Bre- 
 ton, St. John; &c. as appertaining to Canada, or be- 
 caufe they are fettled there: they rather do it by a fo- 
 jemn permiffion fromus. Therefore, I apprehend, the 
 ceffion of Canada would not give us the fole property in 
 thofe iflands, and the fifhery, unlefs particularly fpeci- 
 fied in an article of a future treaty; and, if Canada is 
 reftored, would not fuch a demand feem much more 
 reafonable, and be more eafily complied with? But, in 
 this.cafe, I think, Sir, we have anundoubted right, and 
 very fufficient reafons to exclude France from thefe 
 iflands and the fifhery. Before the treaty of Utrecht, 
 the French never fettled Cape Breton, which was al- 
 ways confidered as belonging tous; but, being by that 
 
 treaty 
 
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 ( 96 ) 
 
 treaty obliged to cede Nova Scotia and Newfoundland; 
 which they had endeavoured to conquer, and thereby 
 monopolize the fifhery to themfelves, they were fuf- 
 fered to poflefs Cape Breton, St. John, &c. mérely for 
 conveniency of carrying on a fhare in the fifhery. ~ But 
 it was with the utmoft difficulty the then miniftry gave 
 France even that liberty. In the preliminaries delivered 
 to M. Mefnager, it was particularly infifted on, that 
 France fhould not refort to it upon, any pretence what- 
 Jsoever ; but, as France made great proteftations ofher 
 good faith, and honeft intentions, the feverity of that 
 article was thereupon mitigated. However, in order to 
 keep her from every pretence for encroachments on 
 Newfoundland and the coaft of Nova Scotia, fhe had 
 liberty given her to fettle Cape Breton and the other 
 fmaller iflands; andthis was the rather done, as thofe 
 iflands were reputedly fo barren and woody, that they 
 were not thought worth fettling by us. 
 
 With refpect to the fifhery, France originally paid a 
 duty of five per cent. to England for the bare liberty of 
 reforting to it; acertain acknowledgment of our having 
 an exclufive right to that branch of trade: their right 
 therefore, as well to Cape Breton and the other fmaller 
 iflands im the mouth -of the River St. Laurence, as to 
 the fifhery, can asife only from permiffion, or, at moft; 
 # mere-conditional grant. If then the intent of thefé 
 privileges, or grants, which ever you pleafe to term 
 
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 them, have (been converted to different purpofes, and 
 made to act principally againft ourfelves, fo as to render 
 even our independence, as a nation, very precarious 3 
 muft it not be bothireafonable and juft to reaflume the 
 fale property ? Can it be confidered in any other light 
 
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 than the revocation of privileges, which have becoiné 
 furfeited from the very nature and intent of theif 
 prant ? 
 
 By reftoring Canada, we fhould therefore havea moft 
 evident balance in our favour on the fide of North 
 America, and a greater right to infift on an indemnifica* 
 
 tion from another quarter: and this, Sir, I have referred 
 to the French Sugar Iflands and African fettlements, as 
 being fuch as would prove of the greateft detriment to 
 the French, and the greateft benefit to us. Much has 
 been faid by the Remarker upon the fufficiency of the 
 fingle ifland of Guadalupe in this refpe&, but I think 
 with very little reafon and propriety. We are told by 
 that gentleman, that ** without eftimating the lands 
 é< the houfes, the works, and the goods in the ifland, 
 «< the flaves, at the loweft valuation, are worth up- 
 << wards of one million, two hundred and fifty thou- 
 *¢ {and pounds fterling.” But what is all this to the 
 purpofe ? Had the Remarker feen the articles of capi- 
 tulation to the inhabitants of that ifland, his memory 
 
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 muft have been very defective, or himfelf guilty of great 
 partiality : if he had not feen thefe articles, he ought 
 to have done it, before he took upon himfelf to talk fo 
 roundly. He will excufe my freedom, when he findss 
 that if Guadalupe is ceded to us at a-peace, this very 
 «« Jand, the houfes, woiks, and goods” are fubject ta 
 He fold as private property to theirfulleft value; for, not 
 only all Englifh fubjects are abfolutely excluded, from 
 having a pofleffion in the ifland during the war, but itis 
 particularly exprefled in the 11th article of the capitu- 
 jation, that ** if at the peace the ifland fhould be ceded 
 
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 ( 114 ) 
 
 €€ to the King of Great Britain, then fuch of the inha- 
 és bitants, as do not chufe to liye under the Englifh 
 «< povernment, fhall be permitted to fell their poffef- 
 *< fions, moveable and immoveable, and retire where- 
 
 <¢ ever they pleafe, for which purpofe a reafonable time 
 
 6 
 
 Al 
 
 fhall be allowed ;” only with this refervation, of dif- 
 pofing of them ‘* to none but Englith fubjeéts.” From 
 hence it is evident, that before any fubject of England 
 gets a pofleilion, or fettlement in that ifland, even fup- 
 pofing it fhould be ceded to us at a future peace, he 
 muft pay an ample and full confideration for it to the 
 French owner; and, as moit of our own fugar fettle- 
 ments are worn out with culture, and thofe of Guadas 
 lupe are reputedly fo fertile, we need not doubt, but 
 thofe inhabitants who chufe to remove, will do it with 
 as much advantage to themfelves as they can. As mat- 
 ters ftand upon-this bottom, | do not fee the leaft pre- 
 tence for eftimating the. value, or taking the leaft ac- 
 count of the “ land, houfes, works,” or ‘ goods.” 
 They are vetted in their former owners, and.are to re- 
 main fo, unlefs alienated by a legal purchafe; and the 
 Englifh muft pay the ufual price for the commodities im- 
 ported from thence into England, in common with 
 thofe of our own lands. Was the fole property of the 
 «¢ land, houfes, works, and goods” in the ifland, 
 vefted in the crown of France, and the inhabitants, up- 
 ona ceffion to England, liable to be fent off the ifland 
 without-any fatisfaction for their pofleflions,. and the 
 money, raifed upon the fale of fuch. pofleffions, was to 
 be applied in difcharge of any national debt, or incum- 
 brance, then I grant the argument would hold; but at 
 preient 
 
 
 

 
 ( 115 ) 
 
 prefent it is intirely out of the queftion : private property 
 in Guadalupe cannot be of any emolument to the pub- 
 licin England; the only advantage to be received from 
 it, by way of indemnification, will be merely from the 
 enereafe of the revenue, and the clear gains of the Bri- 
 tifh merchant: and, in this light, I will venture to af- 
 firm, it will not indemnify us for the grants of one fingle 
 year, much lefs of the whole war. 
 
 But [cannot help obferving here, that the Remarker 
 was fo warm fora moderation, and fo chagrined at 
 what he confidered as an affront offered to France, that 
 he was not only apt to forget himfelf in many other re- 
 fpects than this, but alfo feemed to have an inclination 
 to affront England. The demolition of the fortifications 
 of Dunkik by France, ‘‘ as a preliminary proof of 
 «her fincerity in’ 
 
 b J 
 
 an. ‘*¢ enfuing negociation *, ” 
 could not be an ** idea” fo ‘¢ altogether extravagant,” 
 nor fo ‘¢ little juftified by precedent or reafon” as the 
 Remarker feemed to imagine: if it had, there was ftill 
 an effectual alternative propofed by the means of ¢ hof- 
 <‘.tages.” But the great ambition and treachery of 
 France is) certainly a fuficient ‘‘ reafon” for infifting 
 on this method of humiliation, and fhowing them, that 
 they muft pay a better regard to treaties for the future. 
 Had we not already feen two treaties bafely violated ? 
 and had we the /eaf reafon to fuppofe, that France 
 would be more pun€tual in the performance of her fu- 
 ture engagements than fhe had been heretofore ? Nor, 
 indeed, can I in theleaft conceive, how the execution 
 of a former ftipulation can be deemed an affront to 
 any nation. But, if the demolition of Dunkirk, pre- 
 
 * Letter to two Great Men, p. 24, 
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 ( 116 ) 
 
 Vious to a ncgociation, had not been a forfeiture due to 
 a former ftipulation entered into by France, we were 
 {till juftified in making fuch a demand by precedent; 
 nor could fuch a demand without this < precedent” 
 have come under the leaft denomination of an affront, 
 comparatively with what France has received hereto- 
 fore. .The Remarker muft know what infolence was 
 ufed by two Dutch deputies to minifters from France, in 
 a {tation wherein every power pay them refpeét as re~ 
 prefentatives of majefty, If the latter barely mentioned 
 the impoffibility of complying with a particular de- 
 mand, they were told with an air, and ina tone of au- 
 thority and contempt, that there were but two methods 
 to bring obftinate people to terms, perfuafion or €on- 
 ftraint ; and that, if the former would not influence the 
 ‘French king to .a compliance, they fhould only oblige 
 him to it by the latter: and this was behaviour and lan- 
 guage, at atime, when the French king ¢ even cons 
 “ fented to execute before the peace was figned, ‘the 
 ** moit rigorous articles of a plan drawn up by his ene- 
 ** mics; for inftance, ‘thofe of delivering into their 
 <* hands fuch a number of ftrone towns, which they 
 «¢ were to pofiefs ia full property ; of entrufting them 
 *< with fome more as pledges, and a fecurity of perform- 
 .*f ing his words of demolifhing. others under. the no- 
 *¢ tion of their .giving umbrage and apprehenfion sto 
 <* thofe very enemies, who pretended to prefcribe the 
 «¢ law, and ditated the terms ofa treaty; which” French 
 king himfelf. had reafon to believe, ¢° they had no in- 
 $* tention to conclude.*,”. Can any thing be more ex- 
 preflive of the fubmifiion of France to the authority of 
 * Torcy’s Memoirs, vol. ii, p. 41, 42. 
 
 their 
 
 
 
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 ( 117 ) 
 
 their conquerors, who demanded the execution of manp 
 articles as preliminaries; the mott inconfiderable of 
 which was much more. confiderable than this demolition 
 of the fortifications of Dunkirk? But the above terms 
 were not the only ‘“ preliminaries of peace,” nor the 
 only mortification to French pride. To humble Frances 
 and lay a greater check on her future growth of powers 
 the deputies infifted on the refervation of making w- 
 terior demands, and that France fhould fubmit to thofe 
 demands, even after the figning of the pre/iminaries, and 
 a ceflation of arms, nay, it was even deemed infolent 
 in the French minifters to requeft an explanation of the 
 nature and extent of thofe Gemands: ** it was fufficient 
 <¢ that it was injurious to France, and diminifhed the 
 << king’s power +.” In fhort, Sir, were not every one 
 of thefe articles offered on the part of France, fo many 
 << preliminaries to the preliminaries of peace :” for they 
 were not to be the definitive terms of the peace, but 
 merely ‘¢ as pledges, and a fecurity of fubmitting to 
 «© others?” It is true, the States had no {mall rea- 
 fon for their inveteracy againft France: they had 
 experienced her oppreflive defigns and haughtinefs in 
 the preceding wars of 1672 and 1688; when. they 
 had ufed their utmoft to prevent a rupture. It would be 
 too tedious to recolle& the moaderate views of France, 
 with regard to theformer of thefe wars, wherein the 
 
 French monarch aéted with all the marks of arrogance 
 
 and tyranny, againft a people who had juft made them- 
 felves diftinguifhed in the eyes of all Europe, by a glo- 
 rious ftruggle for religion and liberty againft the arbi- 
 trary power of Spain for eighty years together. There- 
 
 t Ibid, p, 62, 
 
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 fore, Sir, theStates, in making the ufage of France the 
 model of her own, was but acting upon the principle of 
 retaliation; a principle, Sir, eftablifhed by the law 
 of Nature, and the law of nations; a principle that 
 can never be deemed an infringement of juftice and 
 moderation, nor will ever come under the denomina- 
 tion of tyrantly or ambition, when made ufe of to curb 
 an overgrown power; anda principle, Sir, that fingly 
 and alone would give us fufficient * reafon”’, and fuffi- 
 cient right to inflict the moft fevere forms to humble 
 French pride, and debilitateFrench power. Have they not 
 carried on their malicious defigns againft us to greater 
 excefs than ever they did againft the States ? Have they 
 not hired affaffins to kill our kings, and caufed frequent 
 tumults and rebellions in the heart of our country ? Have 
 they not carried devaftation into our moft fertile colo- 
 nies? and, in fhort, what have they not perpetrated 
 in their efforts to reduce us to a ftate of beggary and 
 fervitude ? Have they not likewife encouraged preten-= 
 ders to the throne of this kingdom, contrary to their 
 motft folemn engagements? Do they: not even {till fup- 
 port fuch pretenders,and actually fupply them with money, 
 with aview to make them tools fubfervient to their future 
 fchemes? If we have hitherto evaded their {nares, if 
 they have not been able to make fuch an impreffion on 
 us, asthey did onthe Dutch in the war of 1672, who 
 are we to thank; not their good intentions and efforts, 
 but the kind-nfluence of Heaven, which infpired us with 
 that precaution, and enabled us to make that refiftance 
 which have hitherto put it in our power to avoid the im- 
 pending wreck, and which Aow lays before us the glo-' 
 
 rious 
 
 
 

 
 ( 119 } 
 
 rious opportunity of effe@tually preventing it hereafter ?) 
 
 Not, Sir, that I would from hence infer, that, this, 
 demolition of the fortifications of Dunkirk preyious to 
 a negociation, or even pofterior to a pacification, is an 
 object fo very important as fome have been induced to. 
 believe: my fole intention is to fhow, that it would not 
 be fo very unreafonable. 
 
 I admit the circumftances of this war are fomething 
 
 different from that wherein the: Dutch made. fuch de- 
 mands on France; but then this. difference is.not: fo 
 fuperlatively great, nor our fuperiority fo exceffively little, 
 as to require fuch a vaft change and diminution. It is, 
 true, France was then opectid by. a confederacy of. 
 powers, but fuch a confederacy that was latterly greatly, 
 divided ;-each affociate being, in the terms to France, 
 for making every thing to his own advantage., Nog 
 only this, but.the great damage done to our trade by the 
 enemies privateers, the diflentions in England, the mif- 
 carriage of the expedition to Canada under Brigadier 
 Hill, the apprehenfions of the defect of Portugal, Savoy, 
 and fome of the contingents of the empire, the former 
 of which power had then lately. fuftained an_immen{e 
 lofs by an attack made by a French fquadron at St. Sal- 
 vador, the capital of the Brazils; and particularly, the 
 va/? expences-of a war, which the parliament had de- 
 clared impraéticable, and the death of the emperor Jo- 
 feph, without any other heir than Prince Charles, 
 whereby the chief object of the war, the prevention of 
 an union of the French and Spanifh monarchies, was 
 likcly to become equally dangerous by a union of the 
 
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 ( 420 ) 
 
 Spanifh monarchy with that of Germany, in a tmarine# 
 rendered a peace abfolutely neceffary. 
 
 Let us now caftan eye on the prefent war. Here, ins 
 deed, we fee France at the head of a confederacy, but 
 fuch a one, as is without money, and, I had amoft faid, 
 without men; and a confederacy, that has already ex- 
 erted their utmoft efforts to very little effe&. And there 
 are two very fubftantial reafons why France cannot ex. 
 tend the war, as fhe did then, as lately fuggefted.  rft, 
 It is not fo confiftent with her true intereft, by reafon 
 of the largenefs of her foreign colonies, and the extent 
 of her trade from thence to an European market: for, 
 if France cannot keep up her correfpondence with fo- 
 reign countries, nor tranfport her commodities to her 
 correfpondents or factors there, fuch correfpondents 
 muft defert their factories, or be obliged to have recourfe 
 to other powers that can fupply them. Holland, nay, 
 England might not profit a little from this their diffi- 
 culty. By the protection given by our fleets to the na- 
 vigation of the merchant fhips, they would, no doubt, 
 ufe their utmoft endeavours to fupplant the French, and 
 introduce our own manufactures. 2dly, The allies of 
 France being moft of them mercenaries, and the others 
 unable to fupport the neceffary expences of the war them- 
 felves, the whole burden falls on France. Will the Ruf 
 fians, will the Swedes, will the Saxons, will the Wirtem- 
 burghers act without the payment of their fubfidies? 
 Will the Ottoman court look with unconcern upon the 
 motions of Ruffia and Auftria, if France fufpends her 
 Jargefles, when {uch large offers may be made on the 
 
 ’ part of Great Britain and Proffia? Muft not therefore 
 
 the 
 
 a 
 

 
 
 
 (em. ) 
 
 the neceflary remittances to preferve a fuperior intereft 
 among thofe powers, occafion a much greater demand 
 for money in France, than ata time when fhe fought 
 upon her own bottom, and was, latterly, much affifted 
 by the meafures of Spain? The extent of the French 
 trade to their foreign colonies, and among the feveral 
 powers of Europe, muft likewife have producea a con- 
 fiderable amount to the French revenue, without being 
 felt among the inhabitants: of courfe the lofs of that 
 addition to the revenue, by the obftruction of their 
 commerce, muft retider other taxes more neceflary and 
 more burthenfome. We may therefore affure ourfelves, 
 that if France is inclined to hearken to peace, when at 
 the head of fuch an alliance, it is from her incapacity 
 to continue the war. Great quantities of plate have 
 been already melted into fpecie in that kingdom : 
 let the war go ona little longer, and the next thing: 
 we fhall hear done, will probably be the raifing the 
 dixmes of the eftates. In fhort, Sir, we had bet- 
 ter catry on the war with vigour. a year or two 
 longer, than have another at the end of eight or ten 
 years, which will be the certain confequence, if we do 
 not effeétually diftrefs France now we have it in our 
 power. Let us not difcard the glorious opportunity of 
 giving a lafting peace to ourfelves and all Europe, when 
 it fo readily offers; an “ opportunity, ” Sir, per- 
 s* haps the only one, we fhall ever have of putting 
 << it out of the power of France to violate its faith for 
 
 s* the future *.” 
 
 * Letter totwo Great Men, p. 32% 
 
 R 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 The reafonable retention of thefe French pofleffions, 
 and the expediency of continuing. the war, being pre- 
 mifed, let us now confider the fecond objection as to 
 their fufficiency, for us. 
 
 I have already explained myfelf upon our views in 
 North-America, the next ‘that comes under my confi- 
 deration, is the objection made to retaining the French 
 Sugar Iflands.. With regard to our poileffion of Gua- 
 dalupe, we have been told, <¢< That.a country fully in- 
 ‘¢ habited by any nation, is no proper pofleffion for 
 “* another of different manners, language, and relj- 
 << gion*.” Now, I fhould be glad to know from the 
 author, why this objeGion is not equally cogent againtt 
 Canada, where the inhabitants are fo remarkably ad- 
 dicted to bigotry and fuperftition, and where, under an 
 Englifh government, they are liable to be reduced to the 
 utmoft infignificancy and poverty? Speaking of the po- 
 
 pulation of Canada but a few lines before, the fame’ 
 
 author fays, ‘‘ many” (of the. inhabitants) <¢ will 
 ** chufe to remove, if they can-be allowed to fell their 
 <* Jands, improvements, and effects” (which they are fince 
 authorized to do by the capitulation >) and that « the 
 “¢ reft will in lefs than half a century from the crowds 
 “¢ of Englith fettling round and among them, be blend- 
 “¢ ed and -incorporated with our people both in Jan- 
 “* guage and manners.” |. This fuppofition, I think, 
 Sir, ought to -have an equal influence in favour of Gua. 
 dalupe, where every thing is infinitely more favourable 
 to indulge fuch an expectation. But the candid gentle- 
 
 * Interef of Great Britain, p, 46, 
 
 man 
 
 ers KEW "s a. 
 
_ = 
 Pa 
 
 “2s 
 
 —— RE 
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 (123 ) 
 
 man is here guilty of great partiality : he does not in the 
 leaft controvert, or exprefs a doubt of the affertion of 
 the Remarker, that’ “‘ the hand of government” was 
 that ** many 
 “¢ of thefe people” were ‘* already eftablifhed in this 
 ‘¢ ifland, and” had £* connetions of every kind with 
 
 ? 
 
 “¢ heavy on the Proteftants of France :’ 
 
 ‘s thofe of their own at home; and” that might ** we 
 ‘© not hope and expect that this” might ** be an in- 
 <¢ ducement to many others to make this their retreat, 
 ‘¢ and that the colony ” might ‘* be enriched by them,” 
 he omits taking any notice of thefe matters, as if they had 
 never been mentioned. But there is fomething farther, 
 I would beg leave to addrefs to that gentleman and his 
 _ brother advocates on the fame fcore. Let them enquire 
 how many there are of Englifh and Dutch extraétion, 
 fettled im the French Sugar I[flands, particularly with 
 regard to the latter; becaufe, | have heard, that the 
 expulfion of the Dutch from Brazil by the Portuguefe 
 in 1640, contributed, in no fmall meafure, to their 
 eftablifhment. ‘Thefe are not the only reafons why we 
 may expect the prefent inhabitants of Martinico and 
 Guadalupe, if thofe iflands fhould be ceded to -us,. to 
 remain there; there is another argument {till more 
 ftrong and tempting. Brandy being the produce of 
 France, the diftilling the melafles of fugar was ftrongly 
 prohibited by the French government, whereby the in- 
 habitants of their illands fuftained a great lofs, for the 
 article of rum alone, made from the melaffes, has been 
 acknowledged to defray the charges of cultivating and 
 producing the fugar; and, had not the French gover- 
 nors by virtue of a difpenfatory power they have in 
 
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 (124 ) 
 
 their commifions, fuffered the inhabitants to procure.a 
 vent for their melafles among our people of North A- 
 merica, they could never have underfeld us in the 
 fugar trade, as they have done between thirty and forty 
 per cent. cheaper, A trade fo prejudicial to,our own 
 fugar planters, caufed great clamours from them; the 
 legNlature interfered, but that only tended to convince 
 us, that ‘* men will be tempted to {muggle whenever 
 ‘© the profit furpafies the rifk ; and that rifk confifts lefs 
 ** in the punifhment, than in the means of eluding all 
 <* perquifitions.” Do not our colonies, even now, in 
 the time of open war, carry on a very extenfive trade 
 with the French iflands in fhips under the denomination 
 of flags of truce? By fuch intercourfe as this, the French 
 have been familiarized to us, and the great gains they 
 will receive by this large and uncontrouled branch of 
 trade, willbe fo great, that, as I have faid before, that 
 confideration would be fufficient of itfelf to reconcile the 
 moft zealous enthufiafts to our government. But then 
 we are told, that it will be impoflible to prevent a trade 
 with France, and that even ‘‘ fuppofing we can ef- 
 ** fectually ”? do this, *¢ one hundred thoufand pounds 
 <¢ will fupply them with Britifh manufactures; and 
 «¢ that the other two hundred thoufand pounds will be 
 “¢ {pent in France in the education of their children, 
 and fupport of themfelves,) or elfe to be laid up there, 
 “« where they will always think their home to be *.” 
 This, Sir, feems tobe the principal objection urged 
 againit retaining Guadalupe, and, I own, would have 
 
 * Intereft of Creat Britain, p. 47, 
 
 great 
 

 
 ( 125 ) 
 
 _great weight with me, if I conceived it to be as repre- 
 fented ; but, as‘i do not coincide with the gentleman 
 upon the conftruction of the article of the capitulation 
 to the inhabitants, upon which he founds this argo- 
 ment, I will prefently give him my reafons why I dif. 
 fer from him in thispoint. “The 13th article of the ca- 
 pitulation runs thus, ‘* The inhabitants fhall have li- 
 << bertyto fend their children to be educated in France, 
 é¢ and to fend for them back, and to make remittance 
 “ to them whilft there.” Now it is certain, the 
 full fenfe of the article is very vague and indeter- 
 _minate, but we are not from thence to infer the 
 propriety of every impertinent fugceftion. Gene- 
 ral words are defective of themiclves, if we credit 
 the law of reafon, nay, common fenfe, which tells us, 
 Generale nihil certi implicat. If this maxim is ever re- 
 garded, it ought to be more particularly fo in the prefent, 
 
 cafe. True, there is an implied infinity ; but infiityin a 
 
 matter, that muft, from the nature of things, be temporary 
 and variable, is very abfurd.— An argument alone fuffi- 
 cient to overturn the gentleman’s opinion: but not to: 
 infift merely on that, let us confider the circumftances 
 of the cafe. Hadthe inhabitants entertained the leaft 
 expectations (though ever fo diftant) of enjoying fuch 
 an extraordinary privilege under an Englith govern- 
 ment; had they in the leaft fufpected that they could 
 
 ake fuch a demand confiftent with the authority of our 
 commanding officers, would they not have intimated 
 their inclinations more openly ? If the implication was 
 meant to extend ad infinitum, would not the anfwer 
 have been more particular and explicit? But, could the 
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 ( 126 ) 
 
 commiffions of our officers give them fuch an unlimited 
 authority ? Could they have a licence given them to fettle 
 the jurifdiction and civil polity of that ifland ad infini- 
 tum? No Sir, they certainly could not; their com- 
 miffions could not extend fo far: they could make no 
 change in the fyftem of government; they could not 
 grant any immunity or indulgence, that was not /imited 
 either by time, or condition. ‘Thus we fee all the arti- 
 cles that have a tendency this way, are granted with a 
 refervation, or actually referred to the pleafure of his 
 majefty. Had fuch a privilege been even fufpected to 
 extend fo far, and was fo readily granted, need we 
 doubt that the modeft Marquis de Vaudreuil would have - 
 held his filence on that head,- when he had fuch an ex- 
 cellent example? Iam convinced therefore, that this 
 privilege was intended to extend no farther than the 
 continuance of this war: and even if it had, we may 
 reafonably-compute, that not one half of the inhabi- 
 tants would fend their children to be educated in France, 
 ina religion fo different from their own, and in a coun- 
 try whence their forefathers had been expelled by a ree 
 ligious perfecution. 
 
 f admit, that the poffeffion of Guadalupe alone will 
 ftop the privateering bufinefs but little*” ; the French, 
 being ftillin pofleffion of the large, ftrong, and conve- 
 nient ifland Martinico, would have it in their power to 
 annoy us as much as ever: an aflertion we have already 
 experienced the truth of. But then, I do not think, 
 that ‘* our obtaining pofleffion of all the Caribbees, 
 
 * Intereftof Great Britain, p, 46, 
 would 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 a 
 
 ("127 ) 
 © would be more than a temporary/benefit *:,”” it is.a 
 very ridiculous argument, and ‘the reafon given for it 
 much the fame, viz. °* becaufe it would neceflarily foon 
 «© fill the French part of , Hifpaniola with-french inha= 
 “¢ bitants, and.thereby make it five:times more:valuable 
 *¢ in time of peace, and little. lefs than impregnable 
 << in time of war; and would probably end, in a few 
 
 <“ years, in the uniting the whole of that great and. fer-’ 
 
 “ tile ifland under a French government ; : their own’ 
 
 ‘© fhare of which”? we are toldj;a few a lines after; 
 
 <* would, if well cultivated, grow more fugar than is 
 << now grown in all their Weft-India iflands+.” [| 
 
 will not caf fuch a’ refle@ion on the author’s know-. 
 ledge to doubt he finds himfelf convinced of his error in 
 
 thefe.points., He muft know, Sir, that France,: tho’ 
 
 _ 
 
 pofleffed of all the Caribbees,..would encreafe: her ’ 
 
 ftrength, as much as poffible, in Hifpaniola, as it gives 
 her fo great a command of the windward paflage, and 
 they find their fettlements prove fo very beneficial to 
 them, both by their private intercourfe with the fub- 
 jects of Spain, and the produce of their lands; more 
 efpecially as the Spanifh goverment is not-fo well af- 
 fected to them as formerly : he mruft know, Sir, that the 
 French part of Hifpaniola is feparated on the land fide 
 from that belonging to Spain, by.a barrier of mountains, 
 and that they have already poflefled. themfelves of the 
 whole extent of the coaft they lay claim to: he muft 
 know, Sir, that the prohibitions of all intercourfe bes 
 
 tween the two fettlements are very great, and encreafe 
 * Intereft of Great Britain, p. 46. t Ibid, p, 49. 
 
 every 
 
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 ( 128 ) 
 
 every day: he muft know what large improvements the 
 French: have made, what an additional number of in- 
 habitants they have received within thefe few years, and 
 that they have already made greater exports of fugar and 
 other commodities annually from thence, than from all 
 their W eft-India iflands put together *. | 
 That the French ‘ cannot at prefent make war 
 “¢ with England, without expofing thofe advantages 
 ‘f while divided among the numerous iflands they now 
 ‘¢ have, much more than they would, were they pof- 
 *t fefled of St. Domingo only +,” though’ it feems fo 
 
 * The following extraét of the imports into France from their Weft. 
 
 India fettlements fot the year 1755, (the year before this war) will ferve. 
 
 to convince us of the truth of this, and likewife fet aright the enormous’ ac- 
 Sounts that have‘been publifhed of the value of the French Sugar Iflands, 
 Guadalupe alone being faid to produce atinually near fiftythoufand hogtheads 
 of fugar. 
 
 Exports from St, Domingo for the year 1755, 
 
 106,200 hogfheads of fugar 
 
 22,000 lb, - - coffee 
 184,000 - - - cotton 
 - 900j000 ~ - ~- indigo 
 230;000 «+ = - ginger 
 182,000 - - -  pimento 
 
 Ditto, from Martinico, Guadalupe, Grenade, &¢, 
 
 26,0oco hogfheads, firft fugar 
 23,200 = - «- 2d 
 
 $900 ~ - = 3d 
 16,390- - - brown 
 
 
 
 62,470 in all 
 3»600,000 coffee 
 573,00 cotton 
 $2,000 ginger | 
 ¢ Intereft of Great Britain, p. 48, 49. 
 clear 
 
 et, is Rg Se i ea Oye eee. s 
 

 
 
 
 ( 429 ) 
 
 clear to the author, is not fo with me. Their trade is 
 certainly more extenfive ; but then, the more ports they 
 lave, the greater oppoitunity they have of efcaping our 
 cruizers, and the more fo in,thefefeas, where the winds 
 and currents render it fo dificult to get up with them, 
 Our own trade likewife muft be much niore expofed ta 
 the enemy. And I am fo far convinced of the vaft ad- 
 
 1 
 , 
 
 vantages we fhould receive from a pofleffion of ail the 
 Caribbees, that I think no ftone ought ta be left un- 
 turned to fecure that defirable object: and; ih order to 
 facilitate this fcheme, it is abfolutely requifite, as I have 
 faid before, that our right to the Neutral Iflands fhould 
 be fully confirmed at the peace: The pofleffion of Mars 
 tinico and Guadalupe would otherwile be of yery little 
 benefit to us; as the enemy would foon render them- 
 felves as formidable as ever from thefe iflands, 
 
 If the French power in Hifpaniola is at prefeht fo 
 much to be dreaded; and there is fo much to be appre= 
 hended from their future growth, is it not a moft co- 
 gent reafon for reftraining them amohg the Caribbees, 
 fnce we cannot do it there? And this reftraint is the 
 mare neceflary, as it has been long fufpected, that the 
 French have an eye on our invaluable ifland Jamaica: 
 and their being fo remarkably tenacious of their pre- 
 tenfions to the Caribbees, and fortifying} themfelves 
 there fo ftrongly, tell us; that they have a view, not 
 only of canquering Jamaica, but even entirely exclud- 
 ing us from the fugar trade. Self-prefervaticn there- 
 fore, requires that we fhould exert our utmoft to pre- 
 vent {ach dangerous defigns, And the great advantage 
 ef this poffefion of all the Caribbees would, be the 
 
 S fooner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 —— 
 =i, 
 
 ss aguas ail - sien tease AOR STATS ’ —— 
 — Ss . 174 tS ee ee SS Rig ater hie S . — een — 
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 i ae SOE APE eee eg wi ge 
 
 ( 130 } 
 
 fooner felt, as we fhould find ourfelves relieved from 
 the great expence and lofs of -fubjects, entailed upon 
 the nation, by keeping fuch a numerous ficet among 
 thofe iflands. As the French fhips, in going to their 
 ports in Hifpaniola muft neceflarily pafs fome of the 
 Caribbees, a few {mall cruizers about thofe iflands, af- 
 fifted by;the privateers, would give a pretty good account 
 of them; and thofe that fhould efcape there, would 
 {till run a greater hazard before they got into the ports 
 they were bound to, in Hifpaniola, which might be 
 eafily blocked up by the fleet, we fhould be able to keep 
 at Jamaica. 
 
 With regard to the third objection, the fuccefs of his 
 Pruffian wajefty renders it unneceflary. The laft glo- 
 rious vi€tory obtained by that monarch feems once more 
 to have eftablifhed him; his good genus ftill does, and 
 ftill may triumph over the malevolence of his enemies ; 
 but if, contrary to the general wifhes, he fhould’be 
 obliged to fubmit, can it be reafonable,’can it be ne- 
 ceflary, to expedt, that England fhould facrifice her 
 conquefts made from France to reinftate him? We 
 have already gone farther than was confiftent with pru- 
 dence, the principles of the war, and even your own 
 promifes, Sir; we have paid him an immenfe annual 
 tribute, or fubfidy, no matter which, to enable him, 
 according to the letter of the treaty, to ‘* keep up and 
 
 augment his forces,” when fuch augmentation has not 
 
 been made, and our neceflities have been much more 
 prefiing and neglected; we have prodigally thrown 
 away the lives of our countrymen in his caufe; I fay in 
 his caufe, Sir, otherwife the convention of Clofter- 
 
 Severn 
 
 ~ ite 
 
2 
 
 a ee 
 
 
 
 
 
 (aga) 
 
 Severn had never been broke. Let us. not then carry 
 extremities till farther ; let not a blind partiality pre- 
 cipitate us into greater extravagances: the liberties. of 
 Germany, do not, cannot require that we fhould build 
 the foundation of his eftablifhment.upon the ruins of 
 our own. Iam the more furprized at this propofal, as 
 coming from him who fo much laments the * vaft load 
 ‘6 of taxes and necefiities of ” a ** war’ which he own, 
 ‘© have forced us to an annual expence, unknown to 
 «¢ former times, and which will almoft be incredible to 
 ‘© pofterity.*” Ought we not rather to do every thing in 
 our power to diminifh that “* vaft load of taxes”, and to 
 prevent the melancholy caufes of it hereafter ? Can the 
 giving up to France her North American encroach- 
 ments, her Sugar Iflands, or African fettlements: tend 
 to this purpofe? Is there not, on the contrary, the 
 createft reafon to apprehend fhe would, by either of them, 
 c y recover her former ftrength, and foon oblige us 
 
 7 
 
 * ’ _— 
 quicki 
 | 
 
 to fupport another war equally burthenfome and ex~ 
 tenfive, after we had, by our ceconomy, rendered the 
 effects of this lefs grievous? Nor in fact do I fee what 
 foundation there is for fuch a propofal, nor that it 
 would anfwer the end. I am perfuaded, that upona 
 deprefiion of the King of Pruflia, were we .even, in 
 hopes. to extricate him, to purchafe the intervention 
 ied ood offices of France, atever fo dear a price, they 
 would have but little effeét.. And wherefore fhould we 
 pay, homage to, oF feek an alliance with France in a 
 matter which it is her intereft to purfue, without either 
 
 * Letter to two Great Men, p. 41. 
 
 S 2 | of 
 
 
 
oe » CE A ae SS See OR eT 
 
 (“432° ) 
 
 of thefe unneceflary temptations? for can it be in any 
 degree the true intereft of France, either to humbie the 
 power of Ruffia, or agerandize that of Aufiria? The 
 independency of Germany, a confquence of its fupe- 
 riority over France, depends on a union of the feveral 
 ftates under one head. If, therefore, a rival as raifed 
 in the empire, if the power of that rival is founded on 
 the humiliation, or aceite ig nin on the euthority of 
 the other, they will both entertain a mutual jealoufy 
 
 _ — Tre 
 = 
 Sg te ne og ee 
 oS ee SS ee ee 
 
 of each other, and oppofition will be the reigning prin- 
 ciple of their meafures ; the ‘one to recover its loft rights, 
 
 EOS SS SS eS 
 
 and the other to matntain its new acquired power. If 
 the States take different parts in this divifion, muft it 
 not weaken the whole body, and render it more fuf- 
 ceptible of a conqueft by a powerful invader? It has, 
 therefore, been always thought, and till will be thought 
 good policy by, the French, to promote fuch a divifion 
 in the empire. Have they not hitherto always encouraged 
 the flighteft pretenfions of an upftart ftate to encounter 
 the imperial authority ? Dothey not now, pay fubfidiesta 
 feveral of the eleCtors? Do they not kéep their troops 
 jn pay as auxiliaries, and 1s it not with a view to employ 
 
 a 
 
 them againit their neighbours, and thereby debilitate 
 
 if 
 
 B, WnL 
 ae 
 ; 
 
 4 
 
 ) 
 
 j 
 
 t 
 
 the power of the whole? But if France finds that, now 
 fhe has effeftna'ly gained her ends, by feeing two pow- 
 
 ee ee YS 
 
 erful rivals in the empire ever ready to thwart éach 
 
 a 
 — ar ree goto 
 
 other, the only way to recover her colonies, is by being 
 
 for the prefent a little remifs in working them up to 
 deftroy each other effectually, can we be fo weak to 
 
 imagine fhe will prefer her connections with the houfe 
 
 = 
 te met ee 
 
 2 ee 
 
 ie ie. “xs 
 
 of Auftria, which, in fact, are fepugnant to her for- 
 
 nab) 
 
 mer 
 
 — a  e 
 — wer Anke 
 
 nae 4 ae ners — ey 
 — ne DEEL - > 
 
 r= cere see Pr. a, =~ 
 
 
 

 
 (133) 
 
 mer policy, and prejudicial to her moft darling interefts, 
 rather than accept of peace from a victorious enemy, and 
 engage ina fyftem, which is eyen now greatly to her 
 advantage to purfue? And admitting, Sir, that France 
 fhould for the prefent engage in this our fyftem, can any 
 one fay it will be any hindrance to her making another 
 general confufion hereafter ? 
 
 But, as I faid before, I think the intervention of France 
 to reinftate the king of Pruflia would be to no effect? 
 Can we be fo weak to fuppofe, that the emprefles of 
 Ruffia and Auftria, and the King of Poland, as Elector 
 of Saxony, would forego the long-wifh’d-for opportu- 
 nity of plucking his feathers? Would they not divide 
 
 ‘the fpoil as avowedly confeffed by treaties, notwith- 
 
 ftanding the defeétion and utmoft difpleafure of France? 
 Befides, has not France, by her acceflion to thefe trea- 
 ties, become a principal in the confederacy? And 
 would not fuch intervention be adeyiation from the 
 caufe of the alliance, and the declared motives of enter- 
 ing the empire? But, let us fuppofe (argumenti gratia) 
 that we could fo far prevail with France as to caufe her 
 defection from the confederacy, and give her affiftance 
 in conjunétion with us to reinftate him, could we re- 
 ceive any relief in the end by it? Could France, after 
 being reduced to fo low an ebb by the fatalities of this 
 war, enter into another againft three fuch great pow- 
 ers? Could fhe make any great impreflion again{t them 
 vi et armis? Certainly not; our intention, in making 
 
 an alliance with France, would be therefore loft, and 
 
 many might be the evils refulting from this fyftem, _ It 
 was our alliance with France that firft raifed her to be a 
 naval power; let us not then, in the name of common 
 
 fenfe, 
 
 eS 
 o> as 2 B22’ 
 
 iP 
 Hh 
 Cie 
 i, 
 
 ii 
 ‘s 
 
 oe 
 
 a a 
 
 
 
nti . —_— —_ ‘ 
 * _ biel r ‘i a * —~ > 
 = ot FES « LID LETS AILS dis + AR 
 - es Pine 6 pias DE 
 
 ( 234 ) 
 
 fenfe; when we are bewailing thefe our former errors, 
 plunge ourfelves into others more inexcufable. The 
 treaties between the King of Prufia and us, engage that 
 neither party fhould make a feparate peace; if then, 
 from the neceflity’ of his circumftances he fhould. be 
 obliged to fubmit- to that extremity, who is it that 
 breaks the compact? Are we not at liberty to chufe 
 
 whether we will be a party to.fuch feparate peace or 
 
 
 
 not? The reduction of H r would certainly be the 
 confequence of that of the King of Prufa: but where 
 ean be the leaft pretence for giving up our conquefts to 
 
 redeem that e —te? The retention of this country 
 
 
 
 > has been fo clearly demonftrated, as being in- 
 confifterit with the conftitution of the empire, as gua- 
 rantee of the treaty of Weftphalia, and even the im- 
 pofibility of her holding it. by reafon of its being fepa- 
 yated from France by feyeral intermediate ftates, that I 
 belicve there is no farther occafion for enlarging on that 
 Head. But, fuppofe that France fhould make a con- 
 queft of H.- r, what hurt would a temporary poffef- 
 fion be to the inhabitants ‘of that e 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dan! 
 
 ——e 
 
 ee PL 
 ety eet bh > 
 — Someta gs 
 
 land? If, out of revenge to the perfevcrance oF our 
 
 - ry 1} a 4 ae oO a 
 res, France fhould caufe thee —te to be ra- 
 
 
 
 ed, might we not retaliate the fame ufage on their 
 coaks and foreign colonies? Would not the bare appre- 
 
 ‘henfiens of fuch a return be fufficient to overawe France 
 from this extremity ? Befides, Sir, our feeming neglect 
 
 “of H——t would fhow France, that Great Britain will 
 
 . —<*asl aeey ‘ 
 
 not always forego her national concerns to preferve that 
 —te in tranguillity; and that, though we can 
 sake up arms in defence of the liberties of the empire, 
 | we 
 
 
 
 © 
 
 
 

 
 (135 ) 
 
 we can lay them afide, when they interfere with out 
 national honour and welfare it will: likewife open the 
 eyes of the ‘nfatuated Auftrians ; it will fhow them, that; 
 if they fight againft themfelves and: common fenfe, they 
 are not always to expect Great Britain to take part with 
 them, at the great expence of the lives of her fubjects, 
 and to purchafe a peace for them, at the greater expence 
 of ‘her treafures. 
 
 The fourth objection is of the fame piece with the 
 foregoing 5. and therefore, I think, ‘is already partly 
 anfwered, if all occafion of ftarting the fubject had not 
 been removed before. On the 28th of November, 1757; 
 Major-general Yorke prefented a memorial on this fub- 
 ject to the States:General, whereby it appears, that by 
 the 14th article of the treaty of Utrecht, figned April 
 11, 1713, ‘ It is agreed, that no province, fort, 
 << town, orcity of the Netherlands, or of thofe which 
 ‘“¢ are given up by his Catholic Majefty, fhall ever be 
 << ceded, transferred, or given, OF fhall ever devolve 
 “‘ to the crown of France, or any prince, OF princefs 
 << of the houfe or line of France, either by virtue of any 
 << gift, exchange, marriage contract, fucceffion by 
 << will, or by any other title whatfoever, to the power 
 << and authority of the moft Chriftian King, or of any 
 <¢ prince or princefs of the houfe or line of France.” — 
 And by the fame memorial it is flated, that ** in the 
 «¢ barrier treaty, thofe very ftipulations are repeated in 
 <<! the firft article. His Imperial and Catholic, Majefty 
 <¢ promifes and engages, that no province, city, town. 
 sc fortre(s, or territory of the faid country, fhall be 
 <¢ ceded, transferred, ‘given, or devolve to the crown of 
 
 «© France, 
 
 
 

 
 ( 136 ) 
 
 é France, or to any other but the fucceflor of the 
 ¢¢ German dominions of the houfe of Auftria, either by 
 <¢ donation, fale, exchange, marriage contraét, heri- 
 ‘** tase, or teftamentary fucceffion, nor under any other 
 6 pretext whatfoever; {fo that no province, town, oF 
 “* fortrefs, or territory of the faid Netherlands, fhall 
 ‘© ever be fubject to any other prince but to the fuccef- 
 “¢ for of the ftates of the Houfe of Auftria alone; except 
 ‘* what has been yielded by the prefent treaty to the 
 ‘* faid lords the States-General.”— On the 25th of Ja- 
 nuary follewing, Count d’Affry the French minifter; 
 prefented a memorial in anfwer to thefe reprefentations, 
 and therein is the following paragraph ; * It is there- 
 ** fore, by exprefs command of the king my matter; 
 ** that I declare to your High Mi¢ghtinefles, that the 
 “¢ jatroduction of French garrifons into Oftend and 
 **« Nieuport, had no other motive than what I have juft 
 ** mentioned ia this memorial, (the Emprefs Queen’s 
 ‘* being under an ab/olute neceffity of employing al her 
 *¢ forces to defend her hereditary dominion§ in Ger- 
 ‘© many.) ‘That his majefty’s troops fhiall remain there 
 © only to the end of the prefent war: and that they 
 ‘* fhall even march out fooner, if the emprefs queen 
 © fhall defire it; and that they fhall march out the yety 
 ** moment that fhe fhall intruft the guard of thofe twe 
 *< places to her own troops.” Now, what can be more 
 fienificant and expreflive than the terins of thefe ftipu-~ 
 lations, both on the part of the emprefs-queen, and the 
 French king ; and what more fpecious and obligatory 
 than the promifes contained in d’Affry’s memorial ? Cari 
 we think that the emprefs queen would give up the whole 
 
 com- 
 
 Lae ce one i lege 
 

 
 
 
 (437°) 
 
 ésthmand of Flanders,and.the great emolument fhe receives 
 from their being portsopen to trading fhips, if fhe could 
 
 pofibly avoid it ? If fhe had ever made any private con- 
 
 tract with Frarice fot the fale of thofe places; would fhe 
 hot be glad to evade the executive part of fuch cofi- 
 tra&t? Is fhe hot; in het private and public characters 
 faid to run all lengths to fatisfy her infatiable Juft of 
 power and avatice? therefote; if France fhould retain 
 thofe places in oppofition to her remonftrances; would 
 hot England, Holland, afd the Getman ftates, all join 
 to take them by main force ? But, if the emprefs queen 
 thould fuffer herfelf to be prevailed upon to acknow- 
 ledge them as French property; and we fhould be in- 
 clined, by proftituting our own acquifitionsy to redeem 
 them out of the hands of France, what fecurity could 
 the emprefs queen give, what foundation could we have 
 to hope, that fhe would not play the fool again? If 
 both fhe and the French king break through fuch fo- 
 jemn and explicit compacts, will they not break thro’ 
 any thing? And what weight could we put in the faith 
 of majefty, and the tenor of treaties, when we have 
 feen them fo bafely perverted, and fo perfidioufly vio- 
 jated? Would not our kindnefs to her be ratber an in- 
 ducerhent for her to repeat her folly over again! It 
 woulds in faét; be putting fo much clear money in her 
 pocket, and fhe might, by the fame rule, mortgage 
 thetn at pleafure 5 
 hot have as much occafion for redeeming them hereafter, 
 as we have at prefent ? I will own, Ido not “ tremble 
 s¢ at the profpect of feeing Newport and Oftend be- 
 
 s¢ come Frefich property :” I do not think © a’ Britifh 
 Tt admi- 
 
 and will it be faid, Sir, that we fhall 
 
 ‘ < 
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 Re 
 tea 
 ie 
 
 Nees Sie aaere 
 a . , 2 oe 
 
 hw ee, s: eA . 
 
 Cease 
 
 a hae Ug 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ( 238/) 
 
 é¢ adminiftration” need fo much precaution, to ** ufe 
 ¢¢ their utmoft endeavours'to prevent this at the peace*.”” 
 Rather let us admire the pleafing opportunity of morti- 
 fying our very good allies the Dutch, as well as the 
 ‘Auftrians, and of fhowing them that we can retain a 
 juft idea of their *° ingratitude :” let us now, Sir, for 
 once begin to * learn to prefer our own intereft to that 
 of others, and to proportion our expences on the 
 <¢ continent to the immediate exigencies of our own 
 «< country :” let us demonftrate to all Europe a gene-~ : 
 tous refentment of their injurious treatment of a people, 
 who gave them liberty and power, ‘even that power, 
 which we now would cherifh, and which they as un- 
 worthily proftitute to fordid avarice and ambition: let 
 us, Sir, for once evinee, that we have an adm— ni 
 proof againft a German cabal, and who will not give 
 room to another count Gallas to tell usy we ** have ac- 
 é¢ quired a pennyworth of glory, which the emprefs 
 «© queen would buy if fhe had money enough.” If 
 there fhould be this neceffity (which I am at a lofs to 
 conceive) of redeeming Oftend and Newport, who is 
 the moft interefted to do it, England or Holland? Can 
 | the pofleffion of Oftend and Newport hurt the former 
 more than Dunkirk has done? And, if they could; 
 might they not be conftantly blocked up by a fingle fri- 
 gate? And I will venture to hazard an opinion, Sir, 
 that, notwithftanding the mighty things faid of Dun- 
 kirk, our trade has not fuffered in any proportion by 
 the privateers of that port, as by thofe of St. Maloes, or 
 
 
 
 ee 
 oe ieee 
 
 # Letter to twe Great Meh, p. 42. + Ibid 
 
 a | 
 
 ep 
 
 nn 
 
 Bay- 
 
 ro 
 
 mn 
 
 . - 
 mp henna 
 ~ ieee 
 
 = 
 
 a ee ea ig 
 a ~~ euhgiin 
 

 
 
 
 ( 139 ) 
 
 Bayonne. The vicinity of Oftend and Newport to_ 
 the territories of Holland, would enable France to pour 
 in upon the Dutch both by Jand and fea ; if then they 
 muft be redeemed, let Mynheer draw his purfe-ftrings ; 
 he is the moft likely to fuffer. 1 fhould even be glad to 
 fee a treaty made with France, wherein the names of 
 Auftria and Holland, and every thing that has relation 
 to them were omitted: fuch a treaty would be truly 
 Britifh. Let thofe good allies fifh for themfelves ; it 
 will not be a little ferviceable to us ; they will learn to 
 prize our friendfhip the better for the future, And fuch 
 atreaty would not, in fact, be of any bad confequence. 
 to thofe powers; for, by retaining the French colonies, 
 and keeping a fuperiority over their navy, we fhould be 
 ever able to command refpect from. France, and give 
 the neceflary protection to our allies, and the indepen 
 dency of the Germanic conftitution. 
 
 Thus far, Sir, have I gone in purfuance of my pro- 
 mife ;. but, before I conclude, there is fomething more 
 remains, the attempts on Louifiana and Martinico, ob- 
 jects that require your moft particular and immediate 
 attention, befare we ‘* fend fome thoufands more of our 
 <¢ national troops” and recall our troops in Canada *‘ to 
 <¢ contribute to another victory inG y #6 «ft 
 is full time to put in execution the fchemes againft thofe 
 places, ‘f ever intended ; it is already the full feafon to 
 order, to expedite, the proper ftores and forces to be 
 ready to a early in the Spring. If difpatch was ufed, 
 
 
 
 #* Letter te two Great Men, p- 31. 
 
 1.2 i we 
 
 
 
‘ 
 
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 Sia 
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 ~ nae 
 
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 ( 140 ) 
 
 we might probably have fuch fuccefs as would enable:thé 
 greater part of the forces on thofej fervices, to come: 
 bome time enough to fupply the place of others to be 
 fent to this fame G y, if it faould: be found fo 
 yery eflentially neceflary. ‘Guadalupe capitulated the 
 latter end of April, and, it is very probable, neither 
 Louifiana, hor Martinico, would hold out longer thay 
 the latter end of May. It’is true, our expeditions will 
 take place later 3 but the French at Guadalupe had then 
 a ftrong and powerful friend and neighbour ‘at Marti- 
 ICO, and was every hour in expectatiqn of a reinforce- 
 ment of land forces from thence, and the afliftance of 
 the fquadron of M. Bompart. But neither Louifiana, 
 nor Martinico can have fuch expectations now, they have 
 "10 neighbour to fapply them with ftores and forces, and 
 tio fufficient fleet from France to protect them. ‘The 
 governors of thofe places therefore, upon the lofs of New 
 Orleans, and Fort-Royal, out of compailion to the in- 
 habjtants, would undoubtedly rather furrender, than fer 
 fire and {word carried into the very heart of their fet- 
 tlements. But {uppofe they fhould hold out Tonger, and 
 
 
 
 the French fhould have a mind to try another cams 
 
 
 
 paigh inG —y, arid we to exert our utmoft to pres 
 vent their defigns there, Prince Ferdinand is at prefent 
 ftrohg enough to employ the whole French forces with 
 an army of upwards of eighty thonfand men, moft 
 of them as ‘good foldiers as are to be found in all Lu- 
 rope, and fuch as would afford the French pretty good 
 paftime. However, if it fhould be thought too weak, 
 I cannot fee why we might not, ‘without any hindrance 
 
 _ to thefe expeditions, flill fpare ten oF twelve regiments 
 
 teu . RF a ° a 
 
 Me, 
 
 a ee eee UU Rs ees Oe - 
 
 ee. 
 

 
 
 
 ( 141) 
 
 pf infantry, and fix or eight of cavalry to reinforce him, 
 We have at. prefent in England and Ireland about forty 
 regiments of infantry and cavalry, befides the foot- 
 guards and independent companies. Twenty regi-. 
 ments will certainly be enough for our home a~cafions, 
 when we are not under the leaft apprehenfions of an in= 
 yafion, and haye fuch an eftablifhed militia in arms. — 
 In reckoning only twenty regiments at home, I would 
 imply, that the remaining eight might be: employed 
 againit Martinico, whilt.thofe from Canada made the 
 attempt on Louifiana.. f 
 With regard to the practicability of thefe attempts, 
 I believe, Sir, they are fcaree to be doubted. The mia- 
 tion is pretty well convinced, that Martinico might 
 haye been ip our hands at, prefent, if proper meafures 
 had been taken. .The whole fecurity of that ifland de- 
 pends on Fort-Royal, which lays low, in a bottom, 
 furrounded_ by. unfortified eminencies ; 4 footing there 
 would have enfured. the reduction of ‘the whole ifland. 
 But the misfortune was, an officer commanded, whe 
 was intirely unft for the bufinefs: — but de mortuis: 
 nil nifi bonurt. I do not reflect on his good intentions, 
 but a man, i9 his advanced years, 1s fubje& to the infir- 
 mities of atures his conceptions become obtufe and 
 languid, and his conftitution incapable of the neceflary 
 fatigues of his office. An officer, fent to fuch a Clie 
 nate, and on fuch acommand, ought to have all the 
 advantages of youth, and a lively genius. I have fince 
 often thought it happy for the old gentleman, that he 
 died there 5 for had he caine home, there is great reafon 
 to 
 
 
 
- salad Nine den hells aie mae ee ki a 
 ~ - = - nn —s Ve 
 
 
 
 “a9 os = xe! 
 ~ —~ SS 
 RSE SE St a ee = 
 
 (142 ) 
 
 to believe his condu& would have required a ftrict exe 
 amination, and, perhaps, the amende honourable. 
 
 ~ With regard to the attempt on Louifiana, might’ not 
 the troops, under ‘colonel Byrd and major Hamilton, 
 with the affiftance of the other provincial’ troops, act 
 with vigour the enfuing campaign againft the Indians; 
 who would, upon hearing fuch a” force ‘was coming 
 againft them, very probably fubmit to any-terms ; and 
 then, by the affiftance of our Indian allies, might not 
 the army march againft the French fettlements about 
 
 Kappa; or, if'that fhould not be thought practicable, by 
 
 reafon of the length of the march to it, might they not 
 move to the weftward, and retake our long loft fort of 
 Albama? The troops from Canada (which would cere 
 tainly form an army of five or fix thoufand men) might, 
 with the affiftance of the fquadron at Jamaica, in the 
 
 mean time, make an attack on the French forts in the 
 Gulph of Mexico ; ; and, though fhips of burden might 
 meet with difficulty in getting up the Mififippi to New 
 
 Orleans (which they eertainly will, if they. do not go 
 hefore the frefhes come down the river ;) yet the army 
 might, in aday or tw 0; ‘march up by land, and would, 
 no doubt, foon make a conquett of it, as the fort, tho” 
 formed upon a regular plan, is weak, and built‘on a bad 
 
 foundation : and, as frigates of thirty and forty guns 
 
 can get up the channel, they would, no doubt, greatly 
 contribute to the fuccefs of the land attack. Balize, 
 Mobile, and a’ few other forts might, during this time, 
 be reduced by the large fhips, and, in this cafe, the in- 
 terior country muft fubmit. 
 
 And 
 
 ms. - 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 bh 
 
 DS ae * 
 
 ( 143) 
 And now; Sir, before I. entirely take my, Icavé of 
 
 you, permit me to hope the fame fteadinefs of your 
 mind, and the fame yigorous profecution of the war, 
 
 which have hitherto gained you fuch unufual credit from 
 
 your country. There are fome, and not a fmall nums 
 ber neither, who have made it their bufinefs to propagate 
 a notion, that we have no occafion to.undertake any 
 more offenfive expeditions againft them, becaufe, forfooth 
 (as they fay) ‘* we can have already conquered more 
 << than we hope to retain; and therefore, that it would 
 «s be putting the nation to-an immenfe expence to no 
 <¢ manner of purpofe.” But how can we be faid to do 
 too much detriment to fuch an enemy as France; an 
 enemy, who fill carries on the war with all the viru- 
 lence of infernal fury, arid who we know to be our nae 
 tural rival? And, I can farther tell thefe gentlemen, that 
 our prefent conquefts are not to be retained, becaufe of 
 their extent, but becaufe they are unnecefjary to be re- 
 tained, and would be of /ittle value to Great Britain; 
 fuch as Canada, and their Eaft-India fettlements. I 
 own, Sir, fuch infinuations have chagrined me much, 
 Wherefore are they become fo predominant? Can they 
 be in the leaft conducive to the honour and welfare of 
 Great Britain? By conquering more, do we not ferve’ 
 ourfelves moft effectually ? Have we not thereby an op- 
 portunity to confult our true intereft, and what places 
 axe moft worthy our confideration ? Shall we not thereby 
 difcover their value to France, and convenience to our~ 
 folves? Shall we not attack them in the tendereft part, 
 reduce them to a neceflity of fubmitting to our 
 
 and 
 terms more fpcedily ? France, Sir, is not to be confi- 
 dered 
 

 
 ( 144 ) 
 dered in the common clafs of adverfaries, but as the me? 
 dangerous rival; a rival; whofe great extent of powet 
 is much to be feared; a rival; ever vigilant to prototé 
 meafutes that aré diametrically ifconfiftent with our 
 welfare and fecurity ; == arival, whofe interefts are, int 
 every refpect, incompatible with ours, and whofe equa 
 lity of power with that of our own, is both unnatural 
 and impoffible. When I confider; Sir; all thefé cir- 
 ecumftances, can I think fuch exceffive moderation arifes 
 from a good caufe ? Can you, Sir, think it made out of 
 friendfhip to yourfelf or the public? Let us recollee, 
 Sir, with what ignominy we have treated our negocia« 
 tors at the treaty of Utrecht, and with what confufion 
 we ¢all to mind the terms of that peace, which, I will 
 not fcruple to fay, Sir, gained us much larger ceffions 
 than are at prefent recommended by the moft zealous 
 and immoderate ftickler againft France. Gibralters 
 Minorca, and Newfoundland; are ever to be efteemed 
 invaluable acquifitions. Befides, Sir, there were fe4 
 ¥zral immunities to be granted in favour of our com- 
 merce ; the fole property of St. Chriftopher’s was givert 
 up; and Dunkirk was io be effeCtually demolifhed,. an 
 article then deemed of more confequence than all the 
 reft, and of which no promife or depofit was reckoned 2 
 fufficient pledge for the performance : it Was given into 
 our pofleffion before any treaty was concluded om. Had 
 
 our miniftry made larger demands, they would certainly 
 
 have been complied with. They did not omit then 
 épon a pretence of moderation, but becatife Frarce had 
 no other obje&t worth their afking. "We had very little 
 to appréhend from their fugar colonies, or-Canada; the 
 
 nation 
 

 
 
 
 (145 ) 
 nation was feldom involved in a diteét war with tk 
 French in the latter, only to humour the Five Nations 
 who at that time over-awed all Canada. They had 
 done us. much injury in Newfoundland and St. Chtifto- 
 pher’s: thefé were quietly given’up to us, without the 
 leaft dificulty. What more then could we require? 
 And yet, Sir; thefe were terms granted only to. draw 
 us off from a confederacy, which, upon our defection, 
 was ftill able to have over-run all France; a confedes 
 racy, Sir, that; bent upon the total fubverfion of France, 
 was then carrying on the war againft her with the ut; 
 moft rigour, and for which we had, notwithianding, 
 procured a moft advantageous barrier, at the good liking 
 of our gracious queen, from thofe very enemies which ig 
 was treating fo unmercifully, 
 
 What, Sir) can I think, when I have -feen thefe ina 
 finuations prevail ; when I have feen England have forty 
 thoufand men idle the gréateft part of a year, and no 
 ¢xpedition undertakert to opprefs the common enenty ! 
 Does it not feem as if méderation was adopted ? If it 
 was deemed fo very dangerous to ou? continental af 
 fairs, to fend any forces upon a foreign attempt, might 
 they not have beén employed on the French coaft ? 
 While the war lafts, it muft be juft to exert ourfelves 
 to the utmoft againft our common efiemies, and to da 
 them the greateft detriment we can: it is éven incumbent 
 on us, in order to put a fpeedy conclufion to it ;. efpe- 
 cially, when we find, that if thefé enemies fubmit to 2 
 peace, it will be, becaufe they cannot carry on: the 
 war any longer. Might not our large ufelefs fleets a¢ 
 the Leeward Iflands be employed in deftroying the 
 French forts at Grenade and Cayenne? Might we not 
 U bombard 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
| 
 
 =. 
 
 == 
 
 ans 
 
 Qe 
 
 — 
 
 
 
 a rr? - Lat *> fo er ues 2 ae Sp PS ne ys - 
 
 a a 
 ~ fof 
 ed C ja * = 
 
 ( 146°) 
 
 Lombard St. Malces and Havre-de-Grace to mote ef 
 fo than we have done! in fhort, Sir, might not our 
 men of war be aswell fhattered in deftroying a French 
 fort, as infruitlefs. cruizes, and playing at bo-peep be- 
 Fore French ports t And I cannot think, Sir, but that 4 
 ball, from a French cannon or mufket, would be much 
 wore ag reeable toa Britifh tar, than dying a lingering 
 death by the fcurvy, in watching the enemy's mot ions. 
 The glorious 1759 had near frightened the French toa 
 feparate peace the inglorious 1760 feems to have given 
 themsfrefa courage 5 they talk of nothing but carrying 
 on the war with vigour, and, in, concert with their al- 
 lics. Has mot, Sir, the countern nanding the late expe- 
 dtion (which was, indecd, fuficient to have put Paris 
 ‘tfelf into confufion, and countermanded, no body 
 knows how nor wherefore) rather excited them toda con- 
 tinuanc e of the war? Have they not-been apt to think 
 too favourably of Engl: lif humanity and moderation, of 
 father, have they not bad reafcn to think that we have 
 adopted French fick'eneis, and. are tired of victory and 
 riecefs?. From whatever. caufe, Sir, that expedition 
 
 , 
 was countermanded, let me 1av, it was Ccrogatory to 
 Cc , " an a oe Af, P mses 41 > ran 
 the hofiour of the nation. se! having the troops 
 
 % tp } - L : hs + sa are af a) > “«* 1. “ . 
 re olieéted trom tne mot dilftant quarte ers oj the tWwo-dl DY- 
 doms, a great ilu mber Oi traniports Kept in Pay’, ana 
 
 waiting for them.; and then after thefe trocps had got 
 
 > 
 
 to. thcir deftined ports, to be embarked Re ta be dil- 
 
 nna LOT 
 embarked again, muft create fufpicions not very favour- 
 » ae | ’ > _\ er 3532 {; Q "Cc nt t 2 
 able, either to the plan, or the direGors. of its:execu- 
 
 tion. The nation, Sir, has made large-fupplies, they 
 
 vould not lament them, ‘when they fee the rectitude-ot 
 theit 
 
 ee 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ( 147 ) 
 their application: but, when they fee thefe fupplies 
 
 profulely lavifhed away by thoufands, and are ig- 
 
 norant of the caufe, muft they not complain, and 
 
 think rather cenforioufly ? To fay, Sir, the opportu- 
 
 nity of fuceeeding in that plan was loft, is abfurd: 
 
 there’ were other objeéis, perhaps of much more im- 
 portance to this nation, and, I am fure, of much lefs 
 difficulty, remained unattempted, and which it was the 
 very feafon to put in execution. 
 
 Wre have indeed heard, that another expedition is 
 adopted: fhips have been fheathed, the forces ordered 
 to embark, and what, for a long time, feemed rather 
 intended to amufe the people, and bully France, ‘is, ac- 
 cording to appearances, upon the point of excution. 
 Let me hope, Sir, it may not mifcarry at the laft! Let 
 me hope, Sir, as 1 have reafon to think from the fheath- 
 ing of the fhips, that it is directed againft Martinico ! 
 if I am wrong in that conjecture, at leaft permit me to 
 hope it will immediately occur to your confideration. 
 If that ifland ought to be taken, proper meafures ought 
 to be taken immediately to put it in execution. We 
 find our numcrousdcets do not hinder the French land- 
 ing forces and ftores of all kinds: the little fquadron 
 under M. Macarti, landed upwards of five hundred 
 foldiers at Martinico the latter end of laft Summer; and 
 M. Dugue Lambert, with three or four fhips more un- 
 der his command, failed lately with five hundred of the 
 royal grenadiers, and great quantities of warlike ftores. 
 Tf we would therefore take Martinico, we muft be ex- 
 
 peditious ; the longer the attempt is delayed, the more 
 impracticable we fhalb find it, 
 | Remems 
 

 
 PP es 
 
 _ > are =; or it Tar Fe eer oe 
 SUMO 5 iLO E PEE TA MOTTE oe a Ee Se CS . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 o 4 i 
 
 ( 148 ) a 
 
 y 
 
 Remember, Sir,-that. this is the nice junGture; tha - as 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 critical moment, when you are to give your country 
 
 Dy 
 . ¥ L “ol Pic 4 3 i 
 the welcome proofs of the brightnefs of your genus, and X 
 
 the elevated fentiments of your foul. .Great Britain 
 
 ath unanimoufly referred itfelf to the aufpicious name if 
 and perfon of P—'T :. you received the proftered fervice 3 
 hike a man who thought nobly, and intended to acquit ve 
 himfelf. moft honourably ; and. we have hitherto ‘flat ‘ 
 tered ourfelves you have adhered to. thefe principles, bi 
 Even .now the -atttntion of our fenators, of all good , 
 men, and true Britons, is fixed on you; on you alone i 
 they depend, waiting, with the impatience of people 4 
 who are over-burdened with a load they want to re- ; 
 lieve themfelves of, the time when they may exprefs ! 
 
 their gratitude deferyedly; and when youy Sit, may. ex 
 
 - ie 
 pect it.as a {mall tribute due to fuch a elorious victory. 
 
 Remember, Sir, in whatever capacity you act, and in , 
 whatever public ftation you -are employed, that noble 4 
 fentiment.of John de Witt, which he applied to.the . 
 Dutch ; be it ever uppermoit in your thoughts, and ever : 
 your une:ring principle in deed. . <6 Navigation ” (faid 
 he) “* the “fifhery, commerce, andmanufactures, are } 
 *< the four pillars of the fate. they ought not te be de- 
 “¢ pbilitated, or incommoded by any incumbrance whats ; 
 « foever ; it is they give fubfiftence to the inhabitants, r 
 ‘* and bring riches into the country.” an 
 
 Fam, Str, &c. 
 ‘ 
 An unprejudiced; Obferyery: e 
 
 
 
. 
 is 
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 gi PO we nent Se ep a Pee 
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