HHfl

m which die Army muler

acted 111 tiie t. anipaign ol 17
shewing' the . tfui'chesoj the ^dvniy
%c ifaP faces oj the Ji>nttci^nil . Ac ti 07

bv^NI* MedcalFE

1 Jr awn

avedWIV™ FaDEX

lendarur

33TH or Ouu*lesto\vii

f 'W.ronS

Fort Miller p;

Far-/ rr

yi'eerrtttnsFann
JhxrniusJItyjhts A

Still 'Water 0

Anthony's*

Mohawks K .

(Y>ht\rFtifLe

llHainston

A - ti hi (a fie

-S.-f 7 /tf f. i>r

fieri ■ e'/t*m'rtt/ e

STATE

OF THE

EXPEDITION

FROM

CANADA,

AS LAID BEFORE THE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

B Y

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BURGOYNE,

AND VERIFIED BY EVIDENCE;

WITH A

COLLECTION OF AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS,

AND

AN ADDITION OF MANY CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE PREVENTED FROM
APPEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE BY THE PROROGATION OF PARLIAMENT.

WRITTEN AND COLLECTED BY HIMSELF,

AND

DEDICATED TO THE OFFICERS OF THE ARMY HE COMMANDED.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. ALMON, OPPOSITE BURLINGTON -HOUSE, PICCADILLY,

WDCCLXXX,

T O

MAJOR GENERAL PHILLIPS,

AND THE

OTHER OFFICERS

WHO SERVED IN THE ARMY COMMANDED BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURGOYNE,

UPON AN

EXPEDITION FROM CANADA.

Gentlemen,.

Propriety and affedion alike incline me to infcribe to you the follow-
ing undertaking. We are mutual and peculiar fufferers by the event of the
campaign in 1777. You were witneffes and judges of my adions ; but I
Owed you an account of the principles which direded them.

Another motive for this Addrefs is to avail myfelf of a proper public op-
portunity to repeat to you, what I have omitted no occafion of expreffing in
Parliament, *m correfpondence, and in converfation — the fulleft approbation
*of your fervices. My errors may have been numberlefs ; your conduct has
been uniform — faithful, gallant and indefatigable. Debarred of the power
of doing you juftice before the King, thefe teftimonies are the only means to
which my efteem and gratitude can refort.

After vindicating myfelf as a commanding officer from any inattention to
yourintereft or fame, I next throw myfelf upon your judgment for my con-
dud as a friend.

You will find by this publication, and fome others, which though not
addrefl’ed to you will probably engage your curiofity, that I have been accufed

of fhrinking from the common captivity.

A 2

I have

[ iv ]

1 have been fupported under that nfperftoj* by the confcioufnefs I did not
deferve it,' and the confidence that you (to whom chiefly upon that charge
] was refponfible) would not adopt it. After the fortunes we have run to-
gether, it is not furely unworthy of belief, that I fhould rather have defired,
than avoided to partake the clofing fcetie : uniting with a due fenfe of per-
fonal attachments, the prefervation of my military fortune, and a retreat
from the diftrattions of my country. The defence of your honour and my
own, at one time, and refiftance to an affront which my nature could not
bear, at another, alone detained me here.

In regard to my political tranfacfions, I have ftated them, and I wifb
them to be confidered by my friends, apart from my miltary condufl. I
bear very high refpeft to fome eminent and ill-treated characters in our pro-
feffion, who in deference to the tranquility of government, have filently re-
figned the ftatiom which they could no longer hold with fecurity to their
honour, or benefit to the ft ate. But the option is not left to thofe, who ha-
ving a voice in Parliament are obliged to aft as citizens as well as foldiers.
The number of officers altogether of the army and navy, who with known
love to their country and profeffional fpirit equally confpicuous, have vo-
luntarily withdrawn themfelves from employment within thefe two years,,
exceeds all precedent. I do not place my name in the lift with the fame
pretenfions ; but it is not arrogant to emulate where we cannot compare ;
and I am defirous of following the high examples before me in no point
more than in that of avoiding to difturb the zeal of thofe who are now em-
ployed. The officers who have held it their duty to take part in oppofition,
have afted openly and direftly in their place in Parliament ; but they may

* The part of my treatment which I call an affront upon this and other occafions, is the rc-
fufal of my fervice in this country, even at the head of my own-regiment, or as a volunteer,
in the time of exigency, and when other officers precisely hi my own fituatlon were employed.
My complaint of this partiality lias never been officially anfwered ; it has only been evaded by
anonymous writers, who have laid it down as a pofition, that I meant to allude to the example
of ford Harrington (with which it certainly has nothing to do) and then have taken a merit in
refuting me. The pafiicular example to which I appeal is that of Lieutenant Colonel King-
fton, of the 86th regiment, appointed to that regiment, employed in it for the defence of Ply-
mouth, and a&ually now embarking with it for foreign fervice, under the fame terms of the
convention, and the fame terms of parole to the Congrefs verbatim with myfelf. Other objec-
tions, and of a nature that could not be afterwards fupported, were tried againft the Duke of
Rutland’s recommendation of this excellent officer : but the obje&ion of parole, though fully
known to be precilely the fame with that which was to peremptorily urged againft my preten-
fions, was never mentioned.

3 defy

[ V ]

defy malice to fliew an inflance wherein they have not encouraged ardour in
their profeflion. They contemplate with one and the fame fentiment the
great fupply of honourable men to occupy their places.

You, Gentlemen, ftand high in that defcription ; your trials have made
you of fterling value ; and perhaps it will be better difeerned by men in
power, when no longer viewed through the unfavourable medium of my
friendfhip. If my exhortations retain their former weight, let me be permit-
ted earneftly to apply them upon this occafion.. The examples of generals or
admirals who decline employment, refpedt only fimilar cafes ; your honour is
fecure : look not at profeliTonal difappointments ; but point all your views
to the true glory of your King and country, and truft for the reward.

O focil (ncque enhn ignari fumm ante Ala lo rum )

O fajfi graviora : dabit Deus his quoque finem .

This paflage will bring to the remembrance of fome among you a hard hour

when we before quoted it together, and not without fome cheer of mind. —

May the end of your enduring be near! And with every other wifh and
fentiment that can denote efteem, I have the. honour to be.

Gentlemen,

Your moft faithful and moft obedient

Mertford-Streei
Jan. i, i y So.

humble fervant,

J. BURGOYNE.

INTRO-

■

v. ■ ' ' *’■

INTRODUCTION.

"W HEN it becomes neceflkry for men who have aSed critical parts in
public ftations to make an appeal to the world in their own juftification, there
are many prudential confiderations which might lead them to commit the
care of it to friends, or, which is in many refpefts the fame thing, to defend
themfelves under an aflumed character. The charge of vanity ufually mace
on egotifm is thus eluded : a fuller <cope may he given to felf-love and parti-
cular refentment : even the lower vexations which attend an author are to it
great degree avoided the ill-nature of crrticifm is- feldom awakened by
anonymous- writings, and the venal pens of party lofe half their gall when the
objett of it is not perfonally and dire&ly in queftion.

But there are fituations, in which, not only general aflent feems to juftify
a man in fpeaking of himfelf, but in which alfo no little confideration- ought
to be admitted to the mind. Such will be the cafe, if lam not deceived,
when the interefls of the public are blended with thofe of the individual ;
and when his very errors may ferve as inflrudlion to others. Misfortunes
which awalcen fenfibility will be a further, and a perfuafive call, upon the
attention of the public ; and it will amount to a claim upon their jujiice, if
lie can (hew. that he has been injurioufly treated.

Upon maturely weighing thefe and feveral other circumftances, after I had
been denied a professional examination of my conduct, and difappointed of
a parliamentary one, I determined to lay before the public a hate of the expe-
dition from Canada, in 1777, in my own name. And my firft defign was
to do it under the title,, and with the latitude of Memoirs ; as a mode by
which 1 could beft open the principles of my actions, and introduce, with
molt propriety, collateral charafters, incidents, and difeufiions, as they might

occafionally tend. to illuft rate the main fubjeft.

However, in the laft feffion of Parliament, the enquiry which had not
been agreed to the year before, took place. 1 had prefTed it, and I entered

into it under all the disadvantages which attend a ftmggle with power, and

the

[ viii ]

the prejudice that power can raife againft the perfons it means to deftroy.
The utmoft that power could do was done; the Paliament uas piorogue
pending the proceedings. But though by this contrivance, a final and tor-
mal adjudication by that attguft aflembly was avoided, their minutes fiand a
facrcd record of truth and juftice, and the moft fatisfaflory rehance to which
my wifites could afpire, in offering my adions to the judgment of n.y country

at large. , ,, . ,

From that time, therefore, I refolved to publilh, inftead of Memo.rs, the

Proceedings precifely as they paffed in Parliament, and to continue my de-
fence by fuch Obfervations and Comments upon the Evidence, as 1 fhould have
had a right, and was prepared to make, had the proceedings in the houfe
continued.*

Poffibly in this latter part fome Colour of my original defign may remain.
The feenes I have been engaged in are uncommon, and it is a natural defile
to place them in a full light. The interefts concerned make that defire more
urgent ; and I dare believe they will be beft guarded by being moft ex-

* The order in which the committee in the Houfe of Commons proceeded was, to hear Sir
William Howe’s Narrative, refpc&ing his conduft whilft in command in America, and iucli
evidence as he thought proper to bring in fupport of it. They next heard my Narrative and
Evidence, refpe&ing the conduct of the expedition from Canada. Lord George Germain then
opened a defence on his part, and fummoned witnefles to lupport it. According to the arrange-
ment made by the committee, Sir William Howe and myfelf were afterwards to be heard in
reply • but the proceedings were ended by the prorogation of Parliament before the examina-
tion of Lord George’s fecond witnefs, Mr. Galloway, was clofed, and there were ftxteen or eigh-
teen more upon his lift. The order in which the following papers are placed is ift. 1 he Pre-
fatorv Speech. 2d. The Narrative. 3d. Minutes of the verbal evidence. 4th. Review of the
evidence, with Remarks and Explanations, &c. 5th. An Appendix, containing the written evi-
ctence.

[ I ]

The Speech of Lieutenant General Burgoyne, prefatory

to his Narrative.

Mr. Montagu,

"OEFORE I enter upon (he narrative, which the precedent of your late proceedings
authorifes me to lay before you, I think it a duty to the committee, to promife
that I fhall trouble them with little other matter than fuch as may be necefiary to
elucidate the tranfa&ions of the campaign 1777, in that quarter where I commanded.

I fliall keep in mind, that to explain the caufes of the difafter at Saratoga is the
principal point to which all my evidence ought to lead : but at the fame time,* I fliall
take confidence in the juftice and benevolence of my hearers, that where arguments
in exculpation of the commander can aptly be combined with a faithful reprefenta-
tion of fads, they will not be deemed foreign to the main objed under their consi-
deration.

Upon thefe ideas, though fome introdudory explanations are requifite, I Shall
fupprefs the inclination I at firll conceived, of flaring my condud from the time,
when, conjointly with my honourable friend who took the lead in this enquiry,* I
was called to the unfolicited and unwelcome fervice in America: nor will I enume-
rate the complicated circumftances of private misfortune and ill health under which
I purfued it. Prudence, as well as other propriety, is, I confefs, confulted in this
fuppreflion ; for were it feen, that an officer had blended with the refped due to
authority, warm, though difinterefted perfonal attachments •, that under a perfuafion
of the honour and integrity of the king’s fervants, he had united to his zeal for the
public caufe an intereft in their private credit and ambition j would it not be con-
ceived, that his guilt muft have been atrocious, beyond all excufe or palliation, to
induce the very men to whom his endeavours, and his faculties, fuch as they were,
had been thus devoted, not only completely to defert him, but to preclude him, as
far as in them lay, from every means of defence, and if poffible, to ruin him in the
opinion of the king, the army, and the country ? '

An earneft defire to fave, as much as poffible, the time of the committee, would

alfo diffuade me from recurring to any points previous to my inftru&ions which have
been difeufted upon former occafions; but I find that great ftrefs is ftill laid to my
prejudice upon a paper which found its way to the houfe during my abfence : I mean
the private letter to the noble lord, fecretary for the American department, dated
1 ft January, 1777 .*

The noble Lord has frequently Hated that letter' to have flipped inadvertently into
the parcel deftined for the houfe, and I give credit in that particular to hisaflertion ;

B becaufe,

* Sir William Howe*

See Appendix

No. I.

See Appendix
No. II.

? No. III.

P R E 1 A T 0 R Yj S P E E C II

becaufe, whatever other imprefiions he might have found it his inter ^ ^ whic j 1

fpeCting me, he certainly would not have th ° U ^ t is a notorious fad,
that letter tended to fix, a proper one for him t 1 rharafter (by

or I would not mention it. that it has been held a ref^on upon m ha fier by
the part of the public with whom the noble lord is unpopular) that I addieflccl

“ Thisis^n^mpmation to which I muft plead guilty s for at the time I wrote that
letter, I certainly did hold that noble lord as my friend, and I had afted to ^deferve
he lhoiUd be fo. The next ill tendency of that paper was, as the noble lord
well knows, to imprefs the public with an opinion, that I was endeavouring to
fupplant Sir Guy Carleton iu the command of the northern army-an aft, on
abhorrent to the honour of an officer and the liberality o a gent eman , an °
which, thank God, I can prove the falfthood, by irrefragable evidence upon your
table, and in a very final] compafs. I need only refer to the d.fpatehes to Sir Guy
Carleton by his aid de-camp, dated 2 2d Auguft, 1776,* four months before I came
home, to ftiew that it was at that time determined, that Sir Guy Carleton fhould
remain in Canada •, and that determination was made, as I have been informed, not
only upon the political reafoning which appears in that difpatch, but alfo, upon
great law opinions, that he could not, under the commiflion he then held under the
great feal, pafs the frontiers of his province. Sir, this confutation was urged by
me laft year j and were collateral proof neceftary to my juftification upon this iub-
jp£t, 1 could bring to your bar a tribe of gentlemen, who had imbibed imprefiions
not very favourable to the military proceedings of Sir Guy Carleton in the campaign
of 177 6 : I could Ihew that I feized numberlefs, indeed I feized every pofiible oc-
cafion to vindicate the judgment, the affiduity, the activity of that highly refpeCtable
officer, carelefs how ill I paid my court, earneft to meet every attack againft his fame;

I beg leave alfo to call the attention of the committee very particularly to one
other paper, the date of which is previous to my departure from England : it is en-
titled, “ Thoughts for conducting the War from the Side of Canada, by Lieutenant
cc General Burgoyne.”* Sir, it will be in the recollection of the committee, whe-
ther, when the conduct of the war was under confideration laft year in my abfence,
it was not underftood, that the plan of the northern expedition was formed upon that
paper as produced upon your table ? If fo, I muft afk the noble lord, why he fuffer-
ed that error to prevail ? The noble lord knew, (and it was peculiarly his duty to
declare it) that the two propofals, the firft of turning the expedition eventually to-
wards Connecticut ; and the fecond, of embarking the army in the river St. Law-
rence, in order to effeCt a junction with Sir William Howe by fea, in cafe the attempt
by land appeared “ impracticable, or too hazardous,” were erafed while the paper
was in his lordfhip’s hands.

From

PREFATORY SPEECH.

From that paper, as it appeared without erafures, naturally arofe the conclufion, that
the plan I had to execute was completely my own j upon that paper were founded, as
naturally, the doubts which have been entertained upon the peremptory tenor of my
inftrudions. I muft again afk the noble lord, upon what principle of juftice he fuf-
fered thofe impreffions to exift in this houfe? Why, in a debate in which he took a
part, did he conceal, that the circumftances in reality were totally different from
thofe upon which gentlemen reafoned; that the difcretion referved in the paper be-
fore the houfe was taken away, and confequently, that my orders were rendered ab-
folute in the ftrideft fenfe by his own alterations ?

Let any gentleman who has fuppofed I had an implied latitude for my conduct,
now compare this circumflance with the wording of the letter to Sir Guy Carleton,
dated March 26, 1777, with a copy of which I was furnifhed, and extrads from
which were afterwards the only orders I had to ad upon. *

I fhall take no particular notice of what is called the faving claufe, in the latter
part of the orders, except to give the flatted: contradidion to the luppofition that I
didated it — a fuppofition that I know is not yet abandoned by the men who firft fug-
gefted it. I have fpoke to it very fully upon a former occafion ; f and I do not wifli,
when it can be avoided, to enforce or reiterate the charges of duplicity and treachery
which muft enfue, if that claufe could be fuppofed to have reference to any condud
previous to my arrival at Albany. The circumflance of forbidding me the latitude
in the two particulars I had propofed in my plan, and many other circumftances,
clearly indicating the decided intentions and expedations of the minifters, rendered
the fenfe of the whole order taken together clear and diftind, and fhewed that the
claufe which is pretended to have left me a difcretion as to my main objed, had no
fort of relation to that objed. That claufe evidently related not to my forcing my
way, or not forcing it, to Albany, the place of my deftination, but to fuch collateral
and eventual operations as might be advifeable in the courfe of my march. It related
to the making impreflion upon the rebels, and bringing them to obedience, in fuch
manner as exigencies might require, and in my judgment might feem moft proper,
previous to receiving orders from Sir William Howe, “ of my jundion with whom I
was never to lofe view.”

Notwithftanding there has been fo much difcufiion in debate and print upon the
interpretation of abfolute orders, the committee, I am confident, will abfolve me,
though, at the expence of a few moments more, I fhould continue a fubjed upon
which the merit or blame of the future proceedings in great meafure refts.

I do not admit the pofition, that there can be no cafe in which an officer ading at a
diftance is bound at every hazard to purfue orders, that appear abfolute and decifive.

B 2 It

SeeAppcndiir
No. IV.

f The debate upon Mr. Vyner’s motion, May 28, 1778; the fpeech was pubhfticd.

PREFATORY S P E E C H.

It is eafy to conceive circumftances, which might juftify a ftate in hazarding an
army, for the fake of facilitating great and decifive objcdts. Gentlemen, converlant
in military hiftory, will recollect many examples of this principle . upon a ormer
occafion, I ftated a fuppofed cafe •* and I now entreat leave to add a real example of
peremptory orders, which happened in the courfe of my own fervice. I have ever re-
tained the impreffion, that the circumftance I am going to relate, made upon my mind
at the time-, and to thofe few who may ftill think, that in any part of my conduct, I
rafhly rifktd mv peace, my intercft or my fame, to forward the wifhes Ol others, this
prepofleffion may in fome meafure account for, and excufe my imprudence.

In the campaign of 1762, in Portugal, the Count La Lippe, a name, which, if it
finds a due hiftorian, will ftand among the firft in military fame, was placed at the
head of about 6000 Britifh troops, and a Portuguefe army, the greater part of which
was little better than nominal, to defend an extcnfive frontier againft the whole force
of Spain, and a large body of the veteran troops of Prance. TL he falvation of Por-
tugal depended folely on the capacity of that great man, which united the deepeft
political reafoning with exquifite military addrels.

I had the honour to be entrufted with the defence of the moft important pafs
upon the Tagus, and my orders were peremptory to maintain it againft any numbers,
and to the laft man.

A feledt corps of the enemy, greatly fuperior to mine, were encamped within fight
the otherTide the river, and our advanced pofts were within half mufquet fhot.

In this fituation, I received intelligence from Count La Lippe, of a defign of the
enemy to pafs the Tagus in force, about fix miles above me, and to take pofleftion of
the open country in my rear, with a large corps of cavalry, by which means all com-
munication, fupply, orfafe retreat, would be cut off.

Together with this intelligence, the Count’s letter expreflfed, cf That every delay

to the enemy in getting pofieffion of the pafs I guarded, was fo material to his
** other plans and operations, that it juftified a deviation from fyftematic rules; that,
cf therefore, after taking timely precautions to fecure the retreat of my cavalry, I
iC muft abide the confequence with the infantry •, that at the laft extremity, I muft
tf abandon my cannon, camp, &c. and with fuch provifion as the men could carry

* The cafe alluded to was put in a former debate, as follows: fuppofe the Eritifli army that invaded
Britany in 1758, had gained a complete vi&ory over the Duke D’Aiguillon ; to have marched rapidly
towards Paris, abandoning the communication with the fleet, expofing the army pollibly to great want of
provifton, and to the impra&icability of retreat, would certainly have been a meafure confummatcly def-
perate and unjuflifiable, if tried upon military fyftem : yet, will any man fay, that if that meafure muft
evidently have produced fuch alarm and confufion in the heart of France, as to have compelled the recall
of her whole force from Germany, or fuch part of it, as would have given uncontrouled fcope to the
armies under the King of Pruflia and Prince Ferdinand, that the minifter of England would not have been
judicious, though at the palpable rifk of the army, as far as capture was concerned, in ordering the ge-
neral to proceed by the moll vigorous exertions, and to force his way to Paris ?

ic upon

PREFATORY SPEEC H.

<c upon their backs, throw myfelf into the mountains upon my left, and endea-
vour, by fmall and difperfed parties, to gain a rendezvous at the northern part
“ of the province.” I muft obferve, that when thefe peremptory orders were
given, the commander was at a diftance that made all timely communication of cir-
cumftances as impoffible, as if the Atlantic had been between us; and I cannot dole
the example without mentioning the concluding part of Count La Lippe’s letter.
u He participated,” he laid, “ in the feelings with which an officer would be ftruck
for his reputation, in iuffering himfelf to be cut, and reduced to facrifice his camp,
*’ his baggage, and twenty pieces of cannon. But be at eafef continued that great
and generous man, <c I will take the meajure entirely upon myfelf > perfevere as I have
directed, and be confident of my defence and proteblion.” This was a faving claufe of a
nature very different from thofe it is the pradtice in the prefent day to pen j and if

any man doubts the quotation, I can bring pofitive evidence to the truth of it ver-
batim.

1 hus much. Sir, I thought it incumbent upon me to ftate in argument againff
die pofition that has been infilled upon, that no orders can be worded fo perempto-
lily at a dinance, as not to admit of an implied latitude, in cafe of unforefeen and
inlurmountable difficulties: but to prevent all future cavil, upon this fubjedt, I re-
queft the committee to recollect, what I have again and again repeated} that I by no
means put my defence, in paffing the Hudfon’s River, folely upon this reafoning.
On the contrary, fuppofing for the argument’s fake, I ffiould concede (which I never
have done, nor mean to do) to the noble Lord, and to every other gentleman, all they
can defire to affume upon implied latitude in given cafes, I fhould equally prove that
no fuch cafe did ex iff, as would have juffified me upon their own principle, in de-
parting from the letter of the orders under which I adted.

Having thus cleared my way to the time of my leaving England, to take upon
me the command of the Northern expedition ; I Ihall now lay before the committee
a narrative of its progrefs, in as concife and fimple terms, as the nature of the
fubjedt will allow, endeavouring to imitate the perfpicuity of the honourable gentle-
man who took the lead in this bufinefs, and not without hope of my endeavours pro-
ducing the fame effedt; and that, in the opinion of the houle, my language, as has
been expreffed of his, will be deemed the language of truth.

N A R~

K A

R A T I V E.

narrative.

NARRA-

T1VE.

IT is my intention, for the more ready comprehenfion of the whole '°

I it into three periods. The firft, from my appointment to the comma , .

end of my pur foil of the enemy from Ticonderoga r the fecund from that tone to
the paflage of the Hudfon’s River ; and the third to the hgnmg the ?°" ve “'° '

Ileft London on the 27th of March, and upon my departure from Plymouth,
findino theAlbion man of war ready to fail for New- York, I wrote to Sir W. Howe
by that conveyance, upon the fubjecT of my expedition, and the nature of my orders,
I arrived at Quebec the 6th of May. Sir Guy Carleton mrmed.ately put under my
command the troops deftined for the expedition, and committed to my management
the preparatory arrangements. From thence 1 wrote a fecond letter to S.r William
Howe, wherein 1 repeated that I was entrufted with the command of the army
deftined to march from Canada, and that my orders were to force a junflion wtth

- his excellency.

I expreffed alfo my willies, « that a latitude had been left me for a diverfion to-
“ wards Connecticut, but that fuch an idea being out of queftion, by my orders
« being precife to force the junftion, it was only mentioned to introduce the idea
“ ftill refting upon my mind; viz. to give the change to the enemy if I could, and
« by every feint in my power to eftablifh a fufpicion, that I ftill pointed tow aids

Connefticut.”

« But,” I repeated, “ that under the prefent precifion of my orders, I fhould really
« have no view but that of joining him, nor think myfelf juftified by any temp-
« tation to delay the moft expeditious means I could find to eftedt that purpofe.

I proceeded to Montreal on the 12th, and as my letters, lately laid before the houfe
* from that place* and from Quebec, will Ihew the ftate of things, I (hould not reft a
See Appendix moment U p 0n this period, were it not to add one more public teftimony, to thofe I am
not confcious of having omitted upon any occafion, of the afliduous and cordial
manner in which the different fervices were forwarded by Sir Guy Carleton. I fhould
think it as difhonourable to feek, as I know it would be impotTible to find excufe
for any fault of mine in any failure on the part of Sir Guy Carleton, or of any per-
fons who a&ed under him, in any matter refpe&ing the expedition. Had that
officer been afting for himfelf, or for his brother, he could not have fhewn more
indefatigable zeal than he did, to comply with and expedite my requifitions and
’ defires.

Certain

NARRATIVE.

Certain parts of the expected force, neverthelefs, fell fhort. The Canadian
troops, ftated in the plan at 2000, confided only of three companies, intended to be
of 100 men each, but in reality not amounting to more than 150 upon the whole; nor
could they be augmented. The corvees , which are detachments of provincials
without arms, to repair roads, convey provifions, or any other temporary employ-
ments for the king’s fervice, could not be obtained in fufficient number, nor kept to
their employments, although Sir Guy Carleton ufed every poffible exertion and en-
couragement for the purpofe. Drivers for the provifion carts, and other carriages,
could not be fully fupplied by the contractor, though no expence was fpared ; a
circumftance which occafioned much inconvenience afterwards.

To thefe unavoidable difappointments were added the difficulties occafioned by bad
weather, which rendered the roads almoft impracticable at the carrying places, and
confequently the paffage of the batteaux, artillery, and baggage exceedingly dilatory :
we had befides a great deal of contrary wind. Notwithllanding all impediments the
army affembled between the 17 th and 20th of June, at Cumberland Point, upon Lake
Champlain.

On the 2 1 ft I held a conference with the Iroquois, Algonchins,. Abenekies, and
Outawas, Indians, in all about four hundred.

This conference appears in your papers*. I< thought at the time that the cordiality
of the Indians over the whole continent might be depended upon, and their firft
operations tended to perfuade me into a belief of their utility. The prieft to whom
they feemed devoted, and the Britifh officers employed to conduCt them, and to whofe
controul they engaged to fubmit> gained advantages, and fipread terror without bar-
barity. The firft party fent out made feveral of the enemy prifoners- in the heat of
aftion, and treated them with European humanity.

During the movement of the. different corps to this general rendezvous, I wrote a
third letter to Sir William Howe. The chief purport of it was to give him “ intelli-
“ gence of my fituation at the time, andof my expectation of being beforeTiconderoga
‘ c between the 20th and 25th inftant ; that 1 did not apprehend the effective ftrength
“ of the army would amount to above- 6500 men; that I meant to apply to Sir
“ Guy Carleton to fend a garrifon to Ticonderoga when it fhould be reduced, but
“ that I was apprehenfive he would not think himfelf authorifed by the King’s orders
‘ c to comply; that whenever, therefore, I might be able to effeCt- the junction# Sir
“ William would not expeCt me to bring near the original number. I. repeated my
,r perleverance in the idea of giving jealoufy on the fide of Connecticut, and ac the
“ fame time my affurances, that I fhould make no manoeuvre. that could procraftinate
“ the great objeCt of a junction.”

I ftate thefe. different letters to Sir. William Howe merely to fhew that my concep-
tion of the precifion of my orders was not uppn after-thought, and taken up as an

excufe.

See Appendix

No. VI.

SfeAppendix

No. VJI.

N A R R A T I V E.

.. . 14 ft ;u . hut a fixed decided fentiment coeval

excufe when I found the expedition had failed , but a U.

" ith m >’ kn0 ” kdge f rrrt 1 be« leave to Rate an extraft from my orders

For a further proof of the lame fact, I be 0 -

to the army at Crown Point, June 3 =th. J'^ds were ^

it The army embarks to-morrow to approach 11 - - r

“ Of this particular expedition are critical and b regarded.

: «* “ J r *

proof to the fame effeft, and drew that the idea of forcing a way to Albany by vi-
gorous exertions againft any oppofidon we might meet, was general and fixt throug

' h My ptcZngs from the time of aOembling the army as before described, to the
date of my public difpatch from Skenelbotough, comprehending the manoeuvres
which forced the enemy from Ticondcroga, and the aArons at Skenelboroug i, Hu-
berton, and Fort Anne, are related at full in that difpatch.- . _ ,

It is the lefs neceffary to give the Committee further trouble upon this fubjedt, be-
caufe I believe no enemy can be found to arraign my conduit in thole days of uc-
cefs ■ or if there were one, he could not deprive me of the confolation, that I had his
Majefty’s full approbation and applaufe, of which it is known to many, I had a very
honourable and diftinguifhed proof.

All therefore that is neceffary before I quit this firft period of the campaign, is to
p-ive a precife Hate of the effe&ive ftrength of the army, at the time it affembled.
On the i ft July, the day we encamped before 1 iconderoga, the troops confifte o

Britifh rank and file - 37 2 4

German ditto - 3 01 ^

6740 regulars, exclufiveof artillery-men.

Canadians and Provincials, about
Indians about

250

400

650

In regard to the artillery, I think this the proper place to re&ify the mifreprefenta-
tions that have prevailed reflecting the quantity employed. It has been Hated as far
.beyond the neceffarv proportion For the number of troops, an incumbrance to their
movements, and one caufe of what has been called the fiow progrefs of the expedition.

In order to juftify this charge, a view of the whole mafs has been prefented to the
public without any explanation of its diftinft allotments •, and many have been led
to believe, that the whole was attached to the army throughout the campaign, and

fell

narrative.

fell into the enemy’s hands at laft — The intention of this reprefentation is obvious .
the allegation is falfe.

The facts, as I fhall prove them to the committee, are as follow. The whole origi-
nal train furnifhed by Sir Guy Carleton confided of fixteen heavy twenty-four poun-
ders ; ten heavy twelve-pounders ; eight medium twelve-pounders ; two light twenty-
four pounders; one light twelve-pounder; twenty-fix light fix pounders; feventeen
light three-pounders ; fix eight-inch howitzers ; fix five and a half inch howitzers ;
two thirteen-inch mortars ; two ten-inch mortars; fix eight-inch mortars ; twelve five
and a half-inch mortars ; and twenty-four four and two fifth-inch mortars. Of thefe
two heavy twenty-four pounders were lent on board a fhip for the defence of Lake
Champlain, and the other fourteen were fent back to St. John s. Of the heavy twelve-
pounders, fix were left atTiconderoga, four ditto in the Royal George ; four medium
twelve-pounders at Fort George; one light twelve-pounder at Ticonderoga; two
light fix-pounders at Fort George; four light fix-pounders at St. Johns; four light
three-pounders atTiconderoga ; five light three-pounders at St. John’s; two eight-
inch howitzers at Fort George ; two ditto at St. John’s ; two five and a half inch ho-
witzers at Fort George; two thirteen-inch mortars in the Royal George; two ten-inch
mortars in ditto ; four eight-inch mortars in ditto; four five and a half inch moi tats
at Ticonderoga; four royal mortars in the Royal George; twelve cohorns at Ticon-
deroga ; and eight cohorns in the Royal George.

The field-train therefore that proceeded with the army confided of four medium
twelve-pounders ; two light twenty-four pounders; eighteen light fix-pounders; fix
light three-pounders; two eight-inch howitzers; four five and a half-inch howitzers;
two eight-inch mortars, and four royals.

The carrying the twenty-four pounders (though they were but two) has been fpoken
of as an error, and it is neceffary therefore to inform the committee that they were of
a conftruftion lighter by 800 weight than medium twelves, and to all intents and

purpofes field artillery.

This artillery was diftributed as follows.

Frafer’s corps, eftimated at three battalions.

Ten pieces, viz.

Four light fix-pounders.

Four light three-pounders, conftrufted for being occafionally carried on horfeback.

Two royal howitzers.

German referve, under Colonel Breyman, eftimated at two battalions.

Two light fix-pounders.

Two light three-pounders, and fervedby the Hefie Hanau artillery men.

The line of Britilh, four battalions

Germans,

N A

R R A T I V E.

Germans, five battalions;

Total, nine battalions. . . one br igade for each

Three brigades of artillery, of four lix-poun else ‘

wing, and one for the center. , ,• there were allotted twenty-fix

From hence it appears that to fourteen battal ons there CQn .

pieces of light artillery. Lee,

lequently the proportion ot artillery << ■ Pnre r 0 detaching two guns to each bat-

The forming-artillery into brigades, in prefer ° a bleft

talion, has been c.ondantly pradifed in mod lervic du ^ ^ either

men, and it is produce of many advantages, as of officer ,

fingly or united, fall under the command of a fi becomes

The fervice is carried on with greater regularity, and the effect ot. me

much more formidable than when " and adop ted.

This mode of fervice was recommended by Major general r p , £

without hefitation by me, my own judgment being confirmed by an officer .of h»

great lkill and experience.

The park artillery confided of ten pieces, viz.

2 light twenty-four pounders.

4 medium twelve-pounders.

2 eight-inch howitzers.

i royal howitzers. ,

I underftood this proportion of field artillery to be the fame as that propo.od
by Sir Guy Carleton had he commanded-, it was the proportion recommended y
General Phillips, and I formed my opinion conformably to the fentimen s
refpedtable officers upon the following reafons, viz. that artillery was extreme y cm-
midable to raw troops -, that in a country of pods it was efientially neceff,y ^
the beft troops ; that it was yet more applicable, to the- enemy we were to combat,
becaufe the mode of defence they invariably adopted, and at which t aey were
yond allother nations expert, was that of entrenchment covered with ftrong abbatis,
Uinft which the cannon, of the nature of the heavieft above defenbed, and howit-
zers might often be effectual, when to diflodge them by any other means might be

attended with continued and important Ioffes.

In thefe general ideas of the ufe of artillery againft the rebel forces, I have the
happinefs to obferve, from the papers before you, the concurrence of Sir William
Howe, who ftates fimilar ideas very fully in one of his requifitions to the fecretary
of date : but further reafons for not diminifliing the proportion of guns of fuperior
calibre to fix-pounders in this train, were, firft, their ufe againft block-hou es (a
fpecies of fortification peculiar to America); fecondly, a probability that gun-boats
mio-ht be requifite for the fecurity of the water tranfport, on fome parts of the

3 Hudfon’s

NARRATIVE.

Hudfon’s River-, but principally the intention of fortifying a camp at Albany, in
cafe I fhould reach that place, flrould meet with a fufficiency of prov.flon there (as
I was led to exped) and lhould find it expedient to pals the winter there, without

communication with New-York.

With refpeft to the quantity of ammunition attached to this artillery, it ts to be
obferved, that the number of rounds accompanying the light pieces, and which
were carried in finall carts, were not more than fufficient for a day s action.

Light fix-pounders — 124 founds each.

Light three-pounders — S°° rounds.

Royal howitzers - 90 rounds.

The different referees of ammunition were chiefly conveyed by water in fcows
and batteaux ; it certainly would not have been advifable, after a communica-
tion with Canada was at an end, to depend upon precarious fuppliesfrom the fouth-
ward, and therefore it became neceffary (as far as the ferv.ee would allow) to carry
forward fuch (lores, as there was every appearance of an abfolute want of, during

the courfe of an active campaign. , . , r

Had the enemy eftablilhed themfelves in force upon the iflands at the mouth of

the Mohawk river, or on other ground equally advantageous, to have difputed the
paflao-e of that, or of the Hudfon’s River, or had they even waited an affault in their
work! at Still- Water, it is probable, that recourfe muft have been had to artillery
of the heavier nature ; in the latter cafe efpecially they muft have been ufed in order
to derive any advantage from our feizing a poll upon their left flank : I have f.nce
known, that they had iron twelve and nine-pounders mounted upon thole works,
which were in other refpedts very formidable.

The Britifh artillery-men, rank and file, were

Recruits, under command of Lieutenant Nutt, of the 33d regiment, at-
tached to the fervice of the artillery
Hefiian artillery-men, rank and file

*45

* 5 °

.73

473

Add thefe numbers to the former ftate of the army, and it will be found, that tnc

regular ftrengthwhen at the greateft confifted of 7213.

1 come now to the fecond period of the campaign, comprehending the tranfachons
from the time the purfuit of the enemy from Ticonderoga ceafed, and the corps 0/
Brigadier-general Frafer, and the 9 th regiment, rejoined the army, after the respec-
tive aftions of Huberton and Fort Anne, to the time when the army puffed the Hud-
fon’s river to attack the enemy near Still- Water.

It had proved impoffible immediately to follow the quick retreat of the enemy
farther, from the nature of the country, and the neceffity of waiting a frefh fupply

N A

r R A T I v E.

of provifions. But it appeared evident to me, that could a rapid i prog^V toward,
Albany be effeded, during rheir difperfion and panic, it would

rUC ^ r el t °iou h LX d „ i made by thofe who began a. this period to arraign my military
condudt, whether it would not have been more expedient for the purpoic of rapidity,
to have fallen back to Ticonderoga, in order to take the convenient route y
Lake George, than to have perfevered in the laborious and difficult courfe by and
to Fort Edward ? My motives for preferring the latter were theft : I confidered
not only the general impreffions which a retrograde motion is apt to make upon the
minds both of enemies and friends, but alfo, that the natural condud of the enemy in
that cafe would be to remain at Fort George, as their retreat could not then be cut
off, in order to oblige me to open trenches, and confequently to delay me, and in
the mean time they would have deflroyed the road from Fort George to Fort Ed.
ward. On the other hand, by perfifting to penetrate by the ffiort cut from Fort
Anne, of which I was then matter, to Fort Edward, though it was attended with
o-reat labour, and many alert fituations, the troops were improved in the very effien-
tial point of wood fervice; I effectually diflodged the enemy from Fort George
without a blow ; and feeing me matter of one communication, they did not think
it worth while to deftroy the other.

The oreat number of boats alfo, which mutt neceffarily have been employed for
the transport of the troops over Lake George, were by this courfe fpared for the
tranfport of the provifion, artillery, and ammunition.

The fuccefs anfwered this reafoning in every point } for by the vigilance of Gene-
neral Phillips, to whom I had committed the important part of forwarding all thene-
ceffaries from Ticonderoga, a great embarkation arrived at Fort George on July 29th.
I took poffeffion of the country near Fort Edward on the fame day, and independently
of other advantages, I found myfelf much more forward in point of time than I
could poffibly have been by the other route.

Another material motive, which could not be known by Arrangers who have rea-
foned upon this movement, was, that during the time that my army was employed
in clearing Wood-Creek and cutting roads, and the corps under Major-general
Phillips working to pafs the tranfports over Lake George, I was enabled to detach,
a large corps to my left, under Major-general Reidefel, and thereby affift my pur-
pofe of giving jealoufy to Connefticut, and keeping in check the whole country
called the Hampffiire Grants.

It was at this time Major-general Reidefel conceived the purpofe of mounting his
regiment of dragoons. In the country he traverfed during his detached command,
he found the people frightened and fubmiffive. He was induftrious and expert in

procuring

narrative.

procuring intelligence in parts of the country more remote than Bennington, and
entertained no doubt of fuccefs, were an expedition formed under the command of
Lieutenant-colonel Baum.

On the arrival of the army at Fort Edward, the great object of attention was the
tranfports from Fort George. T. he diftance was about fixteen miles, the roads
wanting great repair, the weather unfavourable, the cattle and carriages fcarce .
parr of the latter inconvenience was occafioned by the number of both that were
neceflarily detained at Ticonderoga, for the purpofe of dragging the boats and the
provifions over the carrying places, between Lake Champlain and Lake George ;
another part of the inconvenience was caufed by the unavoidable delays, in bringing
the different divifions of horfes as they were collefled in Canada through the defart,
for fuch mod of the country is between St. John’s and Ticonderoga.

It was loon found, that in the fituation of the tranfport fervice at that time, the
army could barely be victualled from day to day, and that there was no profpedt of
eftabliffiing a magazine in due time for purfuing prefcnt advantages. 1 he idea of
the expedition to Bennington originated upon this difficulty, combined with the in-
telligence reported by General Reidefel, and with all I had otherwife received.

I knew that Bennington was the great depofit of corn, flour, and ftore cattle ;
that it was guarded only by militia; and every day’s account tended to confirm the
perfuaflon of the loyalty of one defcription of the inhabitants and the panic of
the other. Thofe who knew the country beft were the molt fanguine in this per-
fuafion.

Had my intelligence been worfe founded, I fhould not have hefitated to try this ex-
pedition with fuch troops, and under fuch inftru&ions as I gave to the commanding
officer, for fo great a purpofe as that of a fupply fufficient to enable the army to follow
at the heels of a broken and difconcerted enemy. The German troops employed were
of the beft I had of that nation. The number of Britiffi was fmall; but it was the
feleCt light corps of the army, compofcd of chofen men from all the regiments, and
commanded by Captain Frafer, one of the moft diftinguiffied officers in his line of fer-
vice that ever I met with. The inftruCtions recommended theutmoft caution refpeCI-
ing pofts and fecurity of retreat, attention againft expofing the l’olid part of the detach-
ment to affront, or committing it in any inftance, without a moral certainty of fuccefs.
I touch with tendernefs and with great reluftance points that relate to the dead. My
defence compels me to fay, my cautions were not obferved, nor the reinforcement ad-
vanced with the alacrity I had a right to expeft. The men who commanded in both
inftances were brave and experienced officers. I have ever imputed their failure partly
to delufion in refpedft to the enemy, and partly to furprife and confequent confufion
in the troops.

For further explanation of my motives, and the circumftances attending the con-

SeeAppendix
No. VIII.

K A

R R A T I V E.

dua of the expedition, I beg leave prefer the houfe lately.*

houfe laft year, and more particu ar y 0 • P • j for proceeding towards

The fame letter will (hew the only refouree that rema, f ^Card a necelfary
Albany, after the difappointment of this • c*P' mon, p George. I lhall bring
fupply of provifion, and other .ndiljer ^ beyond . do ? bt , that no pof-

proof to your bar to this point >»< imcommon for gentlemen, unacquainted with
fible exertion was omitted. ... .Undine- to calculate the tranfport of

the peculiarities of the country .0 w tic and then applying the refourcesof

magazines, by meafuring the diftance upon 3 ^ m Eon to Drew their miftake.
carriage, as praflifedrn other countries I P'™ d . The diftance and the

The firft “^/^ F ^ ore t °^ F o r t Edward the Hudfon's River becomes navigable
Z a dr ain extent, and it is the conftan, practice in all tranfports to -efume the water
carriage Were it not, new impediments would anfe from lulls, worfe roads, a d
fo h an increafed diftance, as would prevent the cattle reluming to Fort George the
fame day About fix miles below Fort Edward lie the falls of Fort Miller, where
foere is another carrying-place, which, though of no confiderablc length, makes

nee ITary to unload the boats, to place the contents in carts, and to replace them
in foelh boats, at the place the river again admits of navtgat.on. The boats unloaded,

return to Fort Edward againft a rapid ftream.

Upon this Ihott Rate of fafts, gentlemen will judge of our etnbarraffinents In
the firft place, It was necelfary to bring forward to Fort Edward fourfeore or a hun-
dred boats, as mere carriage-velfels for the provifions, each boat made a hard day s
work for fr or more horfes, including the return o the horfes At the next ariy-
olace as above deferibed, it was necelfary to place a confiderable relay of horfes
to°draw over, firft, a portion of carriage boats, and afterwards the provifion, as it
arrived. I have not mentioned the great number of other boats neceOary to be
brought forward, to form bridges, to carry baggage and ammunition, and the num-
ber of carriages framed to tranfport the boats themfelves at the enfuing carrying-
places as we fhould proceed to Albany. This will be Ihewn in detail at the bar, if
the committee chufe to hear it; and I pledge myfelf, it will appear, that the dili-
gence in this iervice was extreme; that it was performed in the mod expeditious
manner poflible, regard being had to our refources, and that no delay was occafioned
by the artillery, becaufe the horfes appropriated to it were fupernumerary to thofe for
which we had 5 carts, and the artillery, not already with the army, at laft was all

brought up by its own horfes in two days.

On the 13th of September, the ftore of provifion, amounting to about thirty day’s
confnmption, was completed. I have ftated, in my letter to the fecretary of ftate,
my reafons againft proceeding with lets quantity. And it is now time to enter upon

the

A R R A T I V E.

tfce conftderation of that cbjeft, which is held by fume to b~o„cluftve upon .he

0 ^., a„ d ^

effo^.’at Bennington to procure fupplies, and to the impediments, I have juft now
, ffer tha “effort faded. Againft the latter I refer to the rentes hu down
my private letter to the fecretary of ftate, dated noth of Auguft. The Rate o
ridnns at tins important ctif.s, and my reafoning upon tt, are enprelfed ftdl more
at large in my difpatch from Albany ; 1 will now only touch them fcortly On the
one hand my communications were at an end i my retreat was infecure i the en , y
was collected in force; they were ftrongly potted ; Colonel St. Leger was re mn
f Fnrr Stanwix. Thefe were difficulties, but none of them infurmountable.
oTthe other hand, I had didodged the enemy repeatedly, when before in orce,
and more ftrongly potted, nty army was confcious of ha v,n g the fopCT.omj',
e -,trer to advance; I expefted co-operation; no letters Irom Sir \\ ill am
Sl-e Removed that elation ; that to Sit Guy Carleton had never weighed
: J hecaufe it was dated early in April, and confequently long be, ore
the°tt:cretary of ftate's inftruftions, which I mutt have fuppofetl to relate to co-ope-
ati„„ could be received. The letter of t,th July,* menttoned that General s re-
1 mn,nre ibotild Waihington turn his force towards me; indicated, as

!To“l^«pea«ion of my arrival at Albany ; and informed me, that Sir Henry

r • ran was left at New- York, and would aft as occurrences might direct. I dad
Chnton was .left t f j did knoWj that confiderable remforcement

m * ^7 i^exoeaed at New- York from England. After all, ffiould co-opera-

tion^from t w f 1 the ^hoL force of Colonel St. Leget, and Sit William John-
from belo , above> ift time t0 facilitate a retreat, though not in

rime m affift my advance. Under thefe different fuggeftions, and thefe that are more
copioufty flatted in the difpatch, to which I have referred, I read agatn my orders (I

helieve *or an hundredth time) and I was decided. c

And I am ftill convinced, that no proof that could have been roug u rom . p
dances! intelligence or reafoning, could have jollified me to my country have
faved me from the condemnation of my profeffion, or produced pardon wit in u )
own breaft, had I not advanced, and tried a battle with the enemy.

I will conclude this fubjeft, with again averting upon my honour, what . f
to fupport by evidence, though it is impoffible to bring pofmve proo to a nega-
tive, that neither General Frafer, nor General Phillips, ever offered as has been re-
ported, nor can be fuppofed to have conceived any objedion againft the paffage o

the Hudfon’s River .

See Appendix
No. IX.

No. X.

NARRATIVE.

This refolution being taken, I truth, the manner of approaching the enemy, when
explained by witneffes, will not be difgraceful to me as a foldier. a he adion, wh.cn

enfued on the 19th of September, verified my opinion of the valour of my army;
and I mull, in truth, acknowledge, a very readable fhare of that quality m the
army of the enemy. To the general defcription given in my difpatch, it will be
fit to add, by evidence, the peculiar merits of the troops in that adion. The ho-
nour of three Britilh regiments, in continual and clofe fire for four hours, all of them
fu fieri ng conf.derable lois, and one remaining with lefs than fixty men, and four or
five officers, ought not to lofe its due applaufe, becaufe it is faid, their opponents

were irregulars and militia.

A victory was at laft obtained, but the clofe of day unavoidably prevented any
immediate advantages. On the day following, it was known from prifoners and de-
ferters, that the enemy were in a poll ftrongly fortified ; but from the thicknefs of
the wood, it was impoffible to catch a view of any part of their pofition. All that
could be done, therefore, was to take up ground as near them, as the nature of the
country would admit with regard to miktary arrangement. It appears from the dif-
patch already alluded to, that the army remained in this pofition till the 9th of Octo-
ber, when the fecond adion enfued, employed in fortifying their camp, and watch-
ing the enemy, whofe numbers it was now known, had been greatly fuperior to ours
in the adion.

It may here be alked, why, as foon as it became palpable that no ufe could be
made of the vidory, 1 did not retreat ?

It will be (hewn, that on the fecond day after the adion, I received intelligence
from Sir Henry Clinton, of his intention to attack the highlands about that time,
and I was hourly in expedation, I thought a juftly founded one, of thatmeafure
operating to difiodge Mr. Gates entirely, or to oblige him to detach a large portion
of his force. Either of thefe cafes would probably have opened my way to Albany.
In thefe circumftances, could the preference upon thefe alternatives admit of a mo-
ment’s refledion ? To wait fo fair a profped of effeding at laft: the great purpofe
©f the campaign, or to put a vidorious army, under all the difadvantages of a beat-
en one, by a difficult and difgraceful retreat ; relinquilhing the long expeded co-
operation, in the very hour of its promife, and leaving Sir Henry Clinton’s army,
and probably Sir William Howe’s, expofed, with fo much of the feafon of the cam-
paign to run, to the whole force of Mr. Gates, after he Ihould have feen me on the
other fide of Hudfon’s River.

Some of the fame confiderations, and other concomitant circumftances, will, in
part, ferve to account for my not attacking the enemy during this interval ; for in this
fituation, as in former ones, my condud has been arraigned upon oppofite principles.

The

NARRATIVE. *7

The committee will obferve, that after receiving intelligence of Sir Henry Clinton’s
deftgn, different rneffengers were difpatched by different routes, to inform that officer
of my fituation, and of the time I thought I could continue in it. To have hazarded
a repul fe, under fo reafonable an expe&ation of a powerful diverfion, would, in my
opinion, have been very unjuftifiable ; but when I add, that from the backwardnefs,
or defeftion, of the few Indians that remained, the numbers of rifle-men, and other
irregulars employed on the enemy’s out-pofts, and the ftrength and darknefs of the
furrounding woods, it had not yet been practicable to gain any competent knowledge
of their pofition, I trufl every man will go with me in the fentiment, that all theic
circumftances confidered, an attack would have been confummate rafhnefs.

Another very powerful reafon, that operated on the fide of delay, was the ftate of
my fick and wounded. Numbers of the latter were recovering faft; many excellent
officers in particular ; and the more I delayed the ftronger I grew. The time alfo en-
titled me to expeCt Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger’s corps would be arrived at Ticom
deroga, and fecret means had been long concerted to enable him to make an effort to
join me, with probability of fuccefs..

Upon mature confideration of thefe and other circumftances attending this period,
come to my knowledge fince, I am clearly of opinion, that had the reinfoi cements from
England arrived in time,, to have enabled Sir Henry Clinton to have effefted the ftroke
he afterwards fo gallantly made in the highlands,, any time between the two adions, I,
ffiould have made my way.

The difpatch alluded to, proceeds to ftate the reafon that induced me to make the
movement on the yth Odober. I Ihall only add, to obviate a fuppofed error, in not
advancing my whole line, that the part remaining in my camp, operated as effedually
to keep the enemy’s right wing in check, from fupporting their left, as if it had
moved, with this additional advantage, that it prevented the danger of their ad-
vancing by the plain, near the river, and falling upon my rear.

I have reafon to believe my difappointment on that day proceeded from an uncom-
mon circumftance in the conduct of the enemy. Mr. Gates, as I have been informed,
had determined to receive the attack in his lines j Mr. Arnold, who commanded on the
left, forfeeing the danger of being turned, advanced without confultation with his ge-
neral, and gave, infteadof receiving battle. The ftroke might have been fatal on his
part had he failed. But confident I am, upon minute examination of the ground
fince, that had the other idea been purfued, I fhould in a few' hours have gained a po-
fition, that in fpite of the enemy’s numbers, would have put them in my power.

Difagreeable as is the neceffity, I muft here again, in juftice to my own army, recur to
the vigour and obftinacy with which they were fought by the enemy. A more deter-
mined perfeverance than they fhewed in the attack upon the lines, though tney weie

D finally

narrative*

finally repulfcd by the corps under Lord Balcarras, I believe, is not in any officer’s
experience. It will be the bufinefs of evidence to prove, that in the part, where Co-
lonel Breyman was killed, and the enemy penetrated, the mifchief could not be re-
paired, nor under it the camp be longer tenable.

The tranfa&ions of the enfuing night, the day of the eighth, and the whole progrefs
of the retreat to Saratoga, will be laid before the committee minutely in the courfeof
my evidence, as well as every circumftance, from the time the army arrived there to the
figning the convention. I have only to premife, that, I trull, I fhall be able to prove,
to the fatisfa&ion of the committee, that even in this fituation, I had the chance of a
favourable event. The enemy had intended to attack by the plain of Saratoga. On
the morning of the i ith, a confiderable column had a&ually palled the Filh Kill for
that purpofe during the log, which at that feafon was regular till fonretimc after lun
rife. The intention was prevented taking place, by intelligence one of their generals
received from a deferter, that I had a line formed behind the brufh-wood, to fupporc
the poll of artillery, which was their immediate objeft of attack. The general in-
flantly retreated his column, and prevented a general adlion, which my pofition, com-
pared with the propofed one of the enemy, gave me real'on to hope would have been to
my advantage.

I have likewife a fatisfa&ory confidence, that I fhall dcmonflrate that the intelligence
I Hated to the councils of war, refpe&ing the ftrength of the enemy, did not fall fhorc
in any part, and in fome parts much exceeded my own belief, particularly on the only
pofiible routes of my retreat; and that thofe polls were not taken up during my flay
at Saratoga, as has been reported, but fome of them previous to the a&ion of the
7th, and the red immediately after it.

I fhall clofe the whole of this by delivering at your table, from the hands of my fecre-
tary, an authenticated return of the force of General Gates, figned by himielf, and the
truth of it will be fupported from ocular teflimony, by every officer of the Britifh
army. Many of them are now in England, and after what has been infinuated, not to fay
charged in this Houfe, it becomes the duty of the accufers, not only to examine clofely
the officers I have called, but to produce any other witneffes, that in their thoughts
may be qualified to fpeak to the good or bad order of the rebel troops, when they
marched by in their prefence, and to their behaviour, when oppofed to our troops in
aftion.

I cannot clofe this long trefpafs upon the patience of the committee, without ex-
preffing one humble hope, that in forming a judgment upon the whole, or any diflinft
part of thefe tranfa&ions, they will be confidered as they mull have appeared at the
time j for, I believe, where war is concerned, few men in command would Hand ac-
quitted,

NARRATIVE.

quitted, if any after-knowledge of fafts and circumftances were brought in argument
againft decifions of the moment, and apparent exigencies of the occafion.

I fubmit all I have faid, fome of it, I fear, not lufficiently prepared or arranged,
with true refpeft to the committee. I fball not mention all the difadvantages, under
which I have preffed this bufinefs upon their attention. I have caufe to regret the ab-
fence of a mod confidential friend in Major General Phillips j zealous advocates, I
truft, in Major General Reidefel and Brigadier Hamilton. Much of my vindication
is in the grave with General Fraferj much with Colonel Ackland your late member.
I truft my zeal, in promoting this enquiry, as I have done, will be one mark of the
fenfe I bear of the general character of this houfe ; that however men may be biaffed
by political attachments upon common occafions, when the honour of an individual is
committed to their bands, they will alone be guided by truth and juftice. And the next
inference I Ihould wilh to be drawn, from my earneftnefs for a public appeal, is this ;
that however others may impute errors to my conduct, I am mylelf confcious of the
rectitude of my intentions.

E V I-

E V I D E

C E.

Jovis 20 ° die Matj , 1779*

Committee to confider of the feveral Papers which were prefented to the
Houfe by Mr. De Grey, upon the 19th Day of March lnft, purfuant to

their Addrefs to his Majefty.

Mr. F. Montagu in the Chair.

Sir Guy CarletoH was called in and examined by General Burgoyne as follows :

i. Q. T\0 you recollect having received a letter from the fecretary of ftate, mention-
| J ing the reafons that made it expedient for you to remain in the province of
Quebec ?

A. Yes, very well.

а. Q. What was the date of it ? .

A. I think the 12th of Auguft, 1776 — I am fure it was in Auguft.

3- Was not the date of that letter long before the return of General Burgoyne from

Canada to Great Britain ?

A. Yes.

4. During the winter, preceding the campaign of 1777, was not the artillery pre-
pared at Montreal for field fervice, upon the fuppofition that you was to command
the army beyond the frontiers of the province ?

A. It was. . ,

5. Was the proportion allotted to General Burgoyne for field fervice more than

was intended, had you fo commanded ?

A. 1 don’t precifely recolleft that — It does not ftrike me there was any great dif-
ference.' ,

б . Was the quantity of artillery decided on in concert with Major-General Phillip?,
and on his recommendation ?

A. The artillery I had prepared for the campaign, on a fuppofition I was to go my*
felf, was in concert with General Phillips. That department, as well as others, was
put under the command of General Burgoyne on his arrival •, and, I fuppofe, he fol-
lowed the fame method fo far as regarded the artillery.

7. Q. Did General Burgoyne apply to you for troops from Canada to garrifon Ticon-
deroga when he advanced ?

A. He did.

8. 'Q. What was the purport of your anfwer ?

A. That I did not think myfelf juftified to grant it by my orders — My anfwer will
appear more precifely by a copy of my anfwer to General Burgoyne.

Sir G. Carlcton.]

EVIDENCE,

IO.

O Do you recoiled that General Burgoyne informed you of the motives on which 9,
he proceeded from Skenelborough to Fort Edward by land in preference to the route by
Ticonderoga and Lake George ?

A. I do. . . . ,

Q Did you concur in his ientiments r

"t iS his condua while undergo™,

mand ‘ Again called in, and examined by other Members of the Committee.

O Whether when you propofed to take that train of artillery with you that you 12.

1 3 m Tntfoned Tt was with a view to the reduftion of the forts at Ticonderoga - or
whether you propofed to have taken with you the fame train of artillery in cale you hac

m T h 1 c wTwth "ntSK^etlle fo y m and lines at Ticonderoga., the train

° f (f wK youtow what*proportion of artillery was carried forward by the ar- »y Ge„.
my under General Burgoyne’s command after the redua.on of T.conderoga ! s 1

a Would'younot, in cafe you had reduced Ticonderoga and marched forwards .4.
towards Albany, have carried with you a train of field artillery .

A I nrobably Ihould have taken artillery with me.

O Had yoi/forefeen a neceffity of fortifying a camp at Albany, would you not
havTrarriedfome guns of the calibre of twelve pounders and light twenty-fours . _

A I s really a 8 very difficult matter off hand .0 run into all the minute operations
of a camodun ■ every meafure of that fort mud have been a matter of conftderacion
?nd deSrauon and there are a thoufand circumftances that might have determined
^u^teTt^Ito’twilhtoconcedftomthitHoufc any thing that 1 would

ETs of "ti^ftat'e L’dTuuadln’i.f ,^ 5 , as 'LtpreL^te queS ated, indtfe

** conddemlile ^ corpTas

Ihhout IrSkiy buuhe prccife number mud depend on a variety ot crcumffances,
whkh the difcretion and judgment of the officer who commands muff determine.

Q. Were not the orders you received from government pofuive, for Gen

goyn'e ° j^veiseen publilhed I underftand -Every gentleman in this Houfe

mull be a judge of thofe orders whether they »ere potaveor "«• H owe,

O Did vou not receive a letter, dated tlie 5U1 or flpru, nu.n 1

informing you that he could not fend any force to afiift the operations of General

Burgoync’s army ? William Howe relative to his operations a copy of

whfch wSTnt to General Burgoyne-I think it was not juft in thole terms, but a
copy of the letter is on the table.

15.

16.

i8.

19-

20 .

21 .

22 .

2J.

24.

25.

26..

27..

28.

EVIDENCE. [Sir G. Carleton.

Whether on that information, you confidered that you had any difcretionary
power to detain General Burgoyne after that information ?

A. Certainly not.

Whether in cafe of any difficulty that General Burgoyne might meet with on his
march, there was any latitude given to him (General Burgoyne) to retreat P

A. I faid before, that the orders were before the Houfe, who are competent to
judge on that point.

Did you yourfelf underftand thofe orders tc General Burgoyne to be pofitive ?

A. That is giving an opinion upon what perhaps may be a queftion in the
Houfe ; whereas I have already faid, the Houfe are as competent to judge as I
am.

Is the Committee to underftand from that anfwer, that you have any objedtion
of giving your opinion on that queftion ?

A. I have an objedtion to give an opinion on almoft all points.

Did you give it in orders to General Burgoyne, in cafe he met with any diffi-
culties during his march in Canada, under your command, not to proceed ?

A. I ftiould have taken care that General Burgoyne met with no difficulties in
his march in Canada ; nor do I well fee how he could.

Q^, Where do the boundaries of the province of Canada end ?

A. Between the Illinois and Point au Fer.

Is the fortrefs of Ticonderoga in Canada ?

A. No.

Q. Did your commiffion, as commander in chief of the troops in the northern
divifion, extend beyond the boundaries of Canada to Ticonderoga ?

A. That commiffion as commander in chief, I underftood, did extend fo far ;
but by the orders already alluded to, or by thofe which General Burgoyne brought out
in the fpring 1777, I underftood that my command was reftrained to the limits of the
province, and that General Burgoyne was entirely from under my command, as
foon as he pafled the limits of the province.

Q^Did you apply to the fecretary of ftate for a reinforcement of 4000 men,
as neceflary for the campaign of 1777 ?

A. I recollect when General Burgoyne was coming home in the fall of 1776, as
I was perfectly fatisfied with his condudt in the preceding campaign, I talked over
with him, in confidence, what I thought neceflary for the following campaign ;
among other things I defired him to make a memorandum to demand 4000 men, as
a reinforcement for the enfuing campaign, or at leaft for four battalions. I think
I have feen thofe memorandums were accurately ftated and laid before the
Houfe.

Q. What part of that 4000 men which you thought neceflary for the campaign of
1777, was actually fentout to Canada in that year ?

A. I do not accurately remember how many — I think a very fmall part — You may
have a very precife account from the returns.

Q^Qf that fmall part fent in 1 77 7, did not a. certain proportion arrive very late in
the year ?

A. Yes, a part arrived late,.

Q. After

Sir G. Carleton.3

E V 1 D E N C

After you had received your orders from the fecretary of date, did you appro- 29.
hend that General Burgoyne, as long as he was within the province of Canada, was
pofitively under your command ?

A. Yes, I did : as long as he was in the province of Canada, I looked on him to be
pofitively under my command ; but the load of the expedition being on his fhoul-
ders, I thought it proper that he, in all things fhould direct ; and therefore I gave out
immediate orders, that not only the troops he was to command out of the pro-
vince, but all the departments neceffaryfor the affifting his expedition, fhould comply
immediately, and without delay, with every requifition and order he fhould give.

The reafon of my doing fo was, that no time might be loft. I only required that
they fhould report to me what orders they had received from General Burgoyne. I
believe thofe orders are alfo on the table.

Ch Will you explain to the Committee what you mean by the words, load of the 30.
expedition lying on General Burgoyne' s Jhoulders ?

A. I had no particular meaning ; they are words I fhould have ufed on any expedi-
tion of importance.

QHf General Burgoyne had met with very confiderable difficulties to impede his 31,
progrefs within the province of Canada, would you have thought yourfelf juftifi-
able in giving any orders to General Burgoyne, different from thofe tranfmitted to
General Burgoyne, through you, from the fecretary of Bate ?

A. Had there been any difficulties in Canada, I would not have given him up
the command.

Having given up the command to General Burgoyne, and having ordered all 32,
the troops to obey him, only reporting their proceedings to you, would you after
that, have thought yourfelf juflifiable to change the order to General Burgoyne,
upon his meeting with great difficulties on the frontiers of the neighbouring pro-
vinces ?

A. I really did not mean to evade the queftion in the leaft. It did not appear to me
poffible that there could be any difficulties. I don’t mean to fay there could not, from
the nature of the country, be difficulties in the march that might occafion delay, but
by the nature of the queflion I underftood difficulties from the enemy. In that cafe
I fhould not have thought myfelf juflifiable in giving up the command.

If you had heard, that on the frontiers, and within the province of Canada, 33.
there was the greateft reafon to think, that the refiftance of General Burgoyne’s army
was fo great as to make it, in your opinion, exceedingly difficult for that General to
force his way to Albany, would you think yourfelf juflifiable in giving different or-
ders to General Burgoyne, from thofe given by the fecretary of Bate ; or would you
have thought the fecretary of ftate’s orders for General Burgoyne’s army fo peremp-
tory that it would not be proper for vou to interfere ?

A. If I underftood the queftion as it nowftands, it is what I would have done, had
the province been invaded, or clofe on the point of being invaded, and the enemy
entering the province.

The queftion does not mean an invading army, but a refiftance from the enemy 34.
to the progrefs of General Burgoyne’s army, in the cafe ftated in the laft quef-
tion ?

A. In

E V I D E N C

E< [Sit G. Carleton.

35 -

3 6 '

A. In that cafe, that an enemy fhould befomi * fofenceof the province,,

mand) I ffiould have ordered all the "^fotcenerll Burgoyne, and have reaffum-

tt^obftruftions had been removed, within the

Supfwf^no'enemv within the ^evince of Canada bo. £**^£“5
upon the line of communication w.th Atony, . “jjj ^“.Wnk youtfelf juffi-
General Burgoyne to obey the orders g B oyne f rom thole given by the fe-

fiable in giving different orders to General B g y f Q f ftate’s orders for

cretary of ftate ; or would you have though the tecr > for you to

General Burgoyne’s army fo peremptory that it wouio n * V

interfere ? , _ , R „ rrTnvnP \ orders one tittle, that was my opinion he

A. I could not change General g > , e me my authority ; when once he

received his orders from the fame p f ould „i ve him orders, nor would he

paffed the limits of my command, I neither coum givt ’

a»g!g: n:

being no fuch cafe rf rl ? a r f ( ?rt l out the troops and all things under his com,

be loft by any unneceffary applications to me, which the ftr 61 t ) Withdrew..

might otherwife require.

Jo-ain called in.

O Should vou if you had been in General Burgoyne’s fituation, and afting un-
• de?ihe ordtrwhich you know be renewed have thought youtfelf bound to
purfue them implicitly, or at liberty to deviate from them . t j, e ut _

ft oftf^ nl C aV to h ?a U y 8 ^ =.7/ mniuT-n, ttot'all cafes poffiblc, I
Tuft have goie on, i's a vay nice thing to fay indeed ;

1 fuppofe every officer, into a mod unpleafant and anxious fituation to hav
bated within himfelf, whether he was or was not to go on. Every man mu ft dec
for himfelf. What I would have done, I really don’t know ; the ’particular fttuaj. ,
and a man’s own particular feelings, muft determine the point. If 1 ■^ t b ^
oed I would bee leave to fay, that I did not mean to evade any queftion , 1
anfwer diredly Tyet queftions may be put to me, of fo delicate a > nature, and perh
no man in the world is in a more delicate fituation, with refpeft to the prefent^ca
queftion, and the bufinefs of this Committee, than 1 am; w en q . .

put to me, I (hall pray the indulgence of the Committee, to be excufed anfwermg

Sir G. Carleton.] EVIDENCE. 2$

them, but I will not evade them. As I now underftand the meaning of the right
honourable member in the former queflions to be, Whether I fhould have taken
upon me to fuperfede the King’s orders, fuppofing I knew of any unfurmountable
difficulties in the way, as that I had information of 20,000 men at Ticonderoga,
before General Burgoyne left the province of Canada, I ffiould have told General
Burgoyne my information ? But it was General Burgoyne who was to carry the
orders into execution, and not me, and therefore it was upon his own judgment he
was to determine ; I fhould have given him my opinion, but I think I had no right
to give him orders under thofe circumftances.

Who was it that made the arrangement and diftribution of the troops that 38,
were to be left for the defence of Canada, independent of thofe under the command
of General Burgoyne ?

A. The orders that are before the Houfe are very full, and I thought very clear.

The Committee will fee in thofe orders the troops that were deftined for General
Burgoyne’s expedition, and the troops that were to remain for the defence of the
province.

Who made that diftribution ? 39 '

A. It came to me from the fecretary of ftate.

Did not the orders from the fecretary of ftate go to the detail of the fmalleft 40.
pofts within the province ?

A. The letter is before the Committee.

Queftion repeated.

A. I fhould beg for the letter to be read ; I don’t wifh to avoid any queftion, but 41.

I wifh to be accurate.

Was the diftribution of the troops preferibed to you by the fecretary of ftate, or 42.
left to your diferetion ?

A. In mentioning the number of troops which were to remain in that province, it
was there faid that thofe troops would be fufficient for garrifoning fuch and fuch
places, particularizing them.

Q. Did you ever know an inftance, in your military life, of a minifter making a 43.
diftribution of troops for the defence of a province, without taking the opinion or
leaving a great deal to the diferetion of the governor of that province, that governor
being an afting military officer of very high rank ?

A. I never had the honour to correfpond with a fecretary of ftate till I was ap-
pointed to the command of that province.

Whether you was confulted upon the practicability of penetrating from the 44*
frontiers of Canada to Albany by force, with the ftrength allotted to General Bur-
goyne for that purpofe ?

A. No ; I was not.

Are you acquainted with the paflage from New York to Canada by the Hud- 45.
fon’s River.

A. I have gone that way.

Have you obferved it with a view to military operations ? . 46.

A. No; I never made the tour having any military operations in view.

Are

E V I D E N C E.

[Sir G. Carleton,

47*

48.

49.

50.

5 l

* 7

Q. Are you acquainted with the forces which Sir W ' llll ^ er ^' s
immediate command at and about New York, on the 17th ot July, 7,7.

Q Lwofeo Sir William Howe had ta.ooo effective men, bef.de! .a (efficient
roralo.|i«lii) New York, Staten llland, and L opg Hland, to de end them .gam#
Genetal ^ Waft heron's army, fuppofmg General YV.Ih.ngtonY army m the Jerfres, near
Quibble I own, and that Sir William Howe had rece ved accounts of General Burgoync
foccefs at Ticcnderoga, and was acquainted with the orders under which General
Burgoync afted ; 1 , it your opinion that the beft movement Str W.ll.am Howe

could have made for the furpotes ot forwarding the execution of the orders, undei

which Genera! Burgoync adted, would have been to have tailed with his army from

New York to Chefapeak Bay ? ■ . . T

A. Had I had the honour to hare commanded on that fide, I do not know what I,

ftiould have done myfeif. . TT . , r v-

O. After you received the letter from Sir William Howe, informing you of h,s
intended expedition to, the fouthward, whether you did expert that Sir William.
Howe’s army could co-operate on the Hudson’s River with the northern army that

feafon ?

A. 1 don’t know. _ , , ...

Whether you thought, after the receipt of that letter, that it- was prooable:

there would be a co-operation from the iouthern army ?

A. I took it for granted, that Sir William Howe knew what he was about, and
would do what he thought beft for the public fervice. I really was fo little in-
formed of all the particular circumftance.s of his fituation and of the provinces under
his command, that I could form no judgment of the propriety or impropriety of his
co ndurt, or of the effeds of his meafures.

(X Did your information lead you to believe, that the inhabitants between Sara-
toga and Albany, were fo well affeded to his Majefly and Great Britain, as that
there would be much advantage derived from their affiftance to the King’s army ia
the profecution of General B.urgoyne’s expedition ?

A. I' had frequent accounts from that part of the country, that there were numbers
ready to take arms and join the King’s troops if they Ihould penetrate fo far.
Q^Do you mean, by penetrating Jo Jar , to Albany, or to the length the army

got ? . ... .

A. The whole extent of the inhabited country, according to the information

brought to me.

Had you no information that a formidable militia might be raifed in that
country to oppofe his Majefty’s arms ?

A. Yes ; I had fuch information.

Did you think that the force which General Burgoyne carried with him from
Ticonderoga towards Albany was fufficient to oppofe iuch force ?

A. 1 really muff beg leave to be exc.ufed anfvvering that queftion.

, If you had been confulted refpeding General Burgoyne’s expedition, knowing

the nature of that country, and the force General Burgoyne had, would you or
not have advifed fuch an enterprize ?

A*, h

E V I D E N C E.

Earl of Balcarras.]

A. If I had had the honour to command in that campaign as I had in the former,

I don’t precifely know what I Ihould have done myfeVf.

Did you give any advice for employing the lavages ? 5 ^*

A. 1 don’t recoiled that I faid any thing about them. [ jYiihdrevi .

Jovis 27 0 die Man , 1779*

Earl of Balc arras called in and examined by General Burgoyne.

Q. IN what ftation did your Lordfhip ferve in the campaigns in America, in 1776, 1.
and 1777 ?

A. 1 commanded the Britilh light infantry.

Was the Britilh light infantry continually attached to the corps under the 2.
command of Brigadier General Frafer"?

Y gg

Q^Had you occafion to obferve that General Burgoyne and General Frafer lived 3.
together in friendship and confidence ?

A. Yes, I had.

Had you reafon to believe that General Frafer was confulted by Genaral Bur- 4 *
goyne in all material operations ? #

A. I had reafon to believe that General Frafer was confulted in many material

operations. .

Does your Lordfhip know or believe that the proportion of artillery, at- 5*
tached to General Frafer’s corps through the whole campaign, was according to his
Tequifitions and defires ?

A. I underflood from General Frafer, that the proportion of artillery allotted to
him was agreeable to his own requisitions. ,

Do you recoiled the number of killed and wounded in General Frafer’s corps,
at the affair of Huberton >

A. I don’t recoiled exadly ; I think it was about 150.

What was your opinion of the behaviour of the enemy on that day ? . 7.

A. Circumftanced as the enemy was, as an army very hard prelfed in their retreat,
they certainly behaved with great gallantry.

Was it pradicable, the nature of the country, tire fatigue of the King’s troops, ?,.
the care of the wounded, and other circumstances confidered, to have pur feed the
enemy farther after that adion ?

A. It was not

E-2

evidence.

[Earl of Bslcarras.

what day General Frafer’s corps rejoined the army at

10 .

II.

1 3 -

* 4 -

* 5 *

1 6.

17,.

18.

1-9

20.

HI.

2,2

Q. Do you recoiled

Sk A?anhf9th of July ; I think that it was on that clay.

Qn what day was the action at Huberton .

A. Qn the 7th of July. f ov : n „ t he wounded from Huberton to

CA Do you recoiled the difficulties oi removing me wu

the hofpital at T iconderoga ? , j t p e difficulties attending the re-

A. From the diftance and badnefs ot the roaus, tnc u.m »

moving of the hofpital mutt have been very great. r j t0 die enemy,.

Was it pradicable, unlels the wounded had been left expoled to enem )s

to have rejoined the army fooner ?

Does ^your* Lorclrtnp recollea how .he army was employed between .hat time

“ A 1 ' m'a h iHai F w^mpto)U In opening the country and making roads to For.
Anne Jtlfe GermanVunder General Re'.defcl were detached about fourteen m.les to

,h a Do you recollect the poll the enemy abandoned upon the afcent from the
Low Country to the Pitch Pine Plains, in the march from Fort Anne to Fort Ed-

ward ?

^ I Had*e 1 e,wmy Cl mabutaed their ground on that poll, do you apprehend
that a confutable portion of artillery would have been neceflary to diflodge

A. Artillery would certainly have been of great ufe to diflodge the enemv.

Q. Did you ever fee an inftance, during your fervice in America, that the rebels
continued twenty-four hours on the fame place without entrenching ; and was it not
alfo their general practice to add abbaties to their entrenchments . ,

A. The rebels were always indefatigable in fecunug them e ves y en
ments, and in general they added an abbatis to thofe entrenchments.

Do you remember the pofition the enemy abandoned at Schuyler s Iflan .

A. I do remember to have patted fuch an poll; once. . ,

Does you Lordfhip think that pofition could have been forced without a

numerous artillery or heavy lofs ?

A. I do not think it could. , - „

Ql- From the nature of that country, do you think that port could have been

turned ? .

A. Not without greatly rifquittg the boats and portable magazines..

Q Is it poffible at any time in that country, and with a fmall army, to quit
the navigable rivers, without leaving the boats and portable magazines expoled .

A. I imagine it is not. t . 1 v c 5

Did you live in habits of intimacy and communication with General f raier

A. I did. , ,1

Q. Was General Frafer of a warmth and opennefs of temper that generally
made him communicative of his fentiments, when they differed from the fentiments

of thofe with whom he adted ? . _ ,

A. General

Earl of Balcarras.]

evidence.

24.

25-

26.

A. General Frafer’s temper was warm, open, and communicative, but referved in

m Q? r Did yofetTrhear General Frafer exprefs difapprobation of the meafure of paf- 23.
fing Hudfon’s River ?

Q W^notTa bridge conftruded of rafts, and fome boats thrown over tnat
river’, a little before the time of the attack on Bennington ?

DhTLtGeneral Frafer’s corps pafs the river by that bridge, and take poft on
the heights of Saratoga ?

O Do' you remember that bridge being carried away by the torrents and bad
weather, whereby the communication was cut off between that corps and the main

body of the army ?

Q. Was General Frafer’s corps recalled after that adion, and obliged to repafs 27.
the river in boats and fcowls ?

Q. Do' you remember General Frafer expreffing his forrow for being obliged to re- 2 8..

turn back over the Hudfon’s River ? ....

A I remember General Frafer mentioning it with regret. r

O Had the rear guard of General Frafer’s corps been attacked during that paf- 29.
fage^over the river, would not a powerful fire of artillery from the oppofite fhore
We been of ereat ufe, if not the only means of protecting them ?

h A If the enemy had attacked General Frafer, they would have found him in a
verv bad pofture ; ^t was impoffible to take a better, and, as they could not b„ fup-
porLd by Th e Hie, the only means of fafety mu ft have been to get under cover of

th Qc! Was ^here^not" an expedation and impatience of the troops in general to pafs
Hudson’s River, and advance on the enemy ?

q[ Was there not a general confidence and alacrity on the occafion 5

Q. From 6 th'efc circumftances, and your other knowledge of Ae«V • **

believe that to have made no further attempt on the enemv would have caulcd
appointment and dejedion in the troops, and refledions on the ; genera

A The troops were in the higheft fpints, and w lfhed to be led on. . -

Q, Does your Lordlhip recoiled the march up to the enemy on the morning of 33.

the 1 9th of September ?

Ch Was the combination of the march fuch, as, that not withibnding
fage of the ravines and the thicknefs of the woods, the column c j f ‘ to
march, and that of che Bririlh line, led by General
fupport each other, and fpeedily to form 111 line ol butt.., a.

gan the attack ? A. After

3 °-

3 «-

34 -

35 -

3b-

3 7 -

3^-

39 -

40.

41.

42 -

43 -

44.

45 *

46.

47 -

evidence.

[Earl of Balcarras.

A After the columns had palled the ravines, they arrived at their refpedhve
po ft s ‘ with great precifvon in point of time, and every fortunateoircumftance attend-

ed the forming of the line.

O J~fow lonpf did that a6^ion laff ? . _ .

AT The Britifti were attacked partially about one o’clock. The adtion was gene-
ral at three, and ended at feven o’clock. ■ , , r

Q From the nature of the country, was it poffible to difcern the enemy s pofi-
tionor movements, to form any judgment what attacks were in force, and what were

feints. ?

A. I think not.

Q. Did we remain matters of the field of battle .

A. We did.

A Had the field of battle been well difputed by the enemy ?

A. The enemy behaved with great obftinacy and courage. .

Was it too dark to purfue with effedt at the time the adtion ended ?

-A. It was.

Q. Did the King’s troops take up ground nearer to the enemy, the morning after
the adtion ?

A. It was rather nearer to the enemy.

Q. How near were the out- polls of General Frafer’s corps to the out-pofts of the
enemy from that time to the adtion of the 7th of Odtober?

A. I Ihould imagine within half a mile. _ f

From the nature of the country, and the fituation of the enemy s out-polts,

was it poffible to reconnoitre their pofition ? _ _ . .

A. From the nature of the country, the difficulties attending reconnoitering mute

have been very great.

Were not the riflemen, and other irregulars, employed by the enemy at out-pofts
and on fcouts, an overmatch for the Indian or provincial troops that were with the
army at that time ?

A. They were.

Was not General Frafer’s corps continually at work during the interval above-
mentioned, in fecuring their own polls, and opening the front to oppofe the
enemy ?

A. They were.

After General Frafer received his wound, on the 7th of Odtober, on whom
did the command of his corps devolve ?

A. On me.

Was you in a fituation on that day, to obferve the general difpolition of the
army, made by General Burgoyne, previous to the action ?

A. I remember two redoubts having been eredted on the left, to cover the
boats and provifions to enable General Burgoyne to make a detachment from
his army.

VVas you in a fituation to obferve the difpolition made immediately bdfore
the attack by the enemy ?

A. I only recoiled! the fituation of the two battalions of the advanced
xorpa.

After

Earl of Balcarras.]

EVIDENCE.

Q, After the retreat to the lines, were the lines attacked, and with what de- 48.

gl A.°Th?lhies were attacked, and with as much fury as the fire of fmaH arms can

ad 'a ‘Does your Lord (hip remember that part of the lines where you commanded, 49.
Being vifited by General Burgoyne during the attack ?

A. I don’t recoiled! to have feen General Burgoyne. . ,

Was the cannon of great ufe in the repulfe of the enemy in your poft ■ 50.

A. Of very great ufe. € € ,

Do you think that poft would have been tenable next morning, the enemy 51.

having pofieffion of Colonel Briemen s poft ?

A. I do not think it would. . , , M(rf „

O. Would the pofieffion of the poft by the enemy, together with the poffef- 52.

ftonof Colonel Briemen’s polls, have laid open the flank and rear of the camp of
the line ?

^\lhTthe 'retreat in the night, and the new difpofcion of the whole army made jj.
in good order and without lofs ?

^DicUhe army remain under arms, and in momentary expectation of battle, 54.
the whole of the day of the 8th ?

q. Do you remember the cot, Mon and difficulties attending the line of baggage 5 S-
in the retreat, in tire night of the 8th ?

^ Was not the retreat ne.crthelefs made in good order by the troops, and 5 S.
without lofs ?

Q Does your Lordflrip remember the weather, the ftate of the roads, the ftate 57.
of ffie cattle, and the difficulty of palling the Filh Kiln, in the retreat to Saratoga,

'“Z ^•"triS^;. 9 -^en,ly the roads

flarved for want of forage, and the bridge over, the Filh kill had been datroyeo try

it h^-e been Tibbie, from th/ftateS the fatigue of the troops, to have commned

the march farther immediately after the arrival at Saratoga .

A. The troops were greatly fatigued, and the artillery had been left on the other hde

of. the Filh Kill. v;n ? co

Q. Why were they left on the other fide of the Filh Ki . c 9 *

AT The bridge had been deftroyed by the enemy •, « was exceeding dark, and 1 do
not know whether the ford was paffable for the artillery without being firft exa-

n,l Q^ Do you remember the enemy opening a battery on the oppofite fide of Hudfon’s Co.
Paver, and the circumftances attending the opening that batteiy . ^ rp^ e

3 *

EVIDENCE.

[Earl of Balcarras.

A. The corps I commanded was at that time polled, and they fired on us at that

time, but I do not know from what direction. . , ,,

6 r. 0. Does your Lordffiip remember the ffiot from that battery going over the table

when you and ieveral officers were at dinner ?

A. I did not dine with General Burgoyne that day — I recollect hearing a cannon

fnot had difcompofed the company at the general’s cable. ,

61. Confequently mult not that battery have commanded the lord over the Huaion s

River? . , n , ,

A. I believe I laid, I did not recoiled! from what direction the ffiot came, but they

had a battery which commanded that ford.

63. CD Do you recoiled! on what day you was called, with other commanders of corps,
to the fill! council of war ?

A. On the 13th of Odtober.

64. Was there a fpot in the whole pofition to be found for holding that council,
which was not expoled to cannon or rifle-lhot ?

A. We were not fo fortunate as to find one.

65. Do you recoiled! that General Burgoyne, after Hating to the council the difficul-
ties of the fituation, declare, that nothing ffiould induce him to propofe terms to the
enemy without the general concurrence of the generals and field officers of the army,
and that he was ready to take the lead in any meafure that they ffiould think for the
honour of the Britiffi arms, or words to that effedl ?

A. I remember words to that effedl.

66 . Q. Was the concurrence unanimous for treating on honourable terms ?

A. I hope 1 ffiall Hand juftified with the members of that council, when I have the
honour to declare to this Houfe, that, our fituation appeared to them fo decided as not
to admit of one diffenting voice.

67. When Colonel Kingfton brought back the firf! propofition, wherein it was fpe-
cified by Major General Gates, that the army ffiould lay down their arms in their
entrenchments and furrender prifoners of war, does your Lordffiip remember, that
General Burgoyne, when he read them to the council, declared, he would not fet his
hand to thofe conditions, or words to that effedl ?

A. I think the words of the propofal from General Gates were. That the Britiffi
army ffiould be ordered, by word of command from their adjutant general, to lay
down their arms in the entrenchments. It was rejedled with difdain by General Bur-
gone, and the council concurred in his indignation.

68. Q. Were the counter propolals, penned by General Burgoyne, unanimoufiy ap-
proved ?

A. They were.

69. When thofe propofals had been agreed to by General Gates, but copies not
figned by either party, do you remember General Burgoyne informing the council of
intelligence he had received from a fpy in the night, and l'ubmitting to their confidera-
tion, whether it was confident with public faith, and if fo, expedient to fufpend the
execution of the treaty and trud to events ?

A. I do remember it.

70. Q. Does your Lordffiip recoiled what was the refult of that confideration ?

3 A. The

EVIDENCE.

Earl of Balcarras.j)

A. The determination of the council, on the queftion being put, was, that the pu-
blic faith was bona fide plighted.

Though that was the opinion of the majority, was there not a difference of opi- yt.
nion in the council ?

A. There was.

Were the opinions of the feveral commanding officers afked refpefting the con- 7*.
dition of their refpe&ive corps, and what might be expected from them feverally irr
dei'perate cafes ?

A. It was.

Was there not on that queftion alfo difference of opinion ? y

A. There was.

Q. After the Convention took place, did your Lordfhip fee the army of General y4«
Gates pafs in review before General Burgoyne and General Phillips ?

A. I did.

Q.. From the manner and filence of their march, the order obferved in keeping 75*
their divifions, and an apparent attention to their officers, did that army appear
difeiplined ?

A. They marched in good order and were filent, and feemed to pay attention to
their officers. Thefe are efiential points of difeipline, but I faw nothing farther
of it.

From the general behaviour of the rebel troops in the different actions in which y6.
you was prefent in the courfe of the campaign, did you think them difeiplined and
refpe&able troops ?

A. When I anfwered the laft queftion, I fpoke to the manoeuvre I faw upon the fpot.

At all times when I was oppofed to the rebels, they fought with great courage and
obftinacy.

Q. Judging by your eye, and the time the rebel army was marching in review, 77.
did you form any judgment of their number ?

A. It requires great experience to make a computation of numbers by feeing them
pafs : as far as I could judge on the occafion, they feemed to me to amount to thir-
teen or fourteen thoufand rank and file under arms.

Has your Lordfhip reafon to know or believe, that the troops that paffed in re- 78,
view were exclufive of thofe corps that had been polled on the other fide of the Hud-
l'on’s River ?

A. They were exclufive of thofe corps.

Examined by other Members of the Committee and by General Burgoyne occafionally.

Q. What was the general opinion of the army of General Burgoyne’s behaviour 79.
in adlion and in difficulty ?

A. It appeared to me, that General Burgoyne always polfelfed himfelf in every
fituation of danger and difficulty, and, I may venture to fay, it appeared lo to the
army.

. CL Had General Burgoyne the confidence of the army ? So.

A. He had.

Q. After the arrival of the troops at Cambridge, were the officers and foldiers of 81.

F the

evidence.

[Earl of Balcarras.

84.

tV,e army fattsfied with the general’s efforts to contribute to their comfort, and redrefs

their grievances ?

82. ol Was Ac »my lkisficd with the general's behaviour at the court martial held cm

C °A:ih car'ried on that profecution in perfon, and as fetch they were fatisfied with

8 , h: "u_ Did your Lordffiip ever hear any officer or foldier of that army exprefs any dills.

J ’ tis faction at the general’s returning to England ?

Q Does your Lordffiip think that the officers of that army wiffi to have their re-
fpeftwe merits ftated to their Sovereign, by the general in perlon who had tne honour

of commanding them ? „

A It was the wifhof that army that General Burgoyne fflould go to Euiope, to

iuftifv not only his own conduct, but the conduct of the army he commanded,
g, O Does your Lordffiip apprehend, that the return of General Burgoyne to that
ar mf un der perfonal diigrace, and without any diitribution of preferment among the
diftinguiffied officers of that army, would be any fort of conlolation to the troops

under captivity ? , m ._. r ,

A. General Burgoyne, at all times^ fliared the dangers and afflictions or that aimy

in common with every foldier ; as fuch they looked on him as their friend, and cer-
tainly would have received him in perfon, or any accounts of him, vuth every mark

of affedtion. , , ..... _ ,

86. Q. Your Lordffiip having faid that if the rebels had maintained then pelt, at the

afeent from the Low Countries to the Pitch Pine Plains, in the march from Foit Anne
to Fort Edward, artillery would have been of great ule to diilodge them ; will your
Lordffiip fay what kind of artillery, of what calibre, woulu have been neceliaiy for

• thatpurpofe? .

A. Any of the artillery officers now under the order of the Houfe can give a much

more fatisfadtory anfwer to that queftion than I poffibly can.

Did you fee that poft ?

A. I think l faid I did fee it.

With what kind of work was that poft fortified ?

A. I fpoke of it merely from its fituation.

Were there then any works or none d
A. I don’t recoiled! there were any works.

If the army, after taking Ticonderoga, had been embarked, and proceeded
diredtly to South Bay, would there have been any occafion to have attacked the poft at
Pitch Pine Plains at all ?

A. The army ciid proceed by South Bay, excepting a detachment of General Frafer’s
corps, and fome Germans to fupport him •, and the army affembled at Skenefborough
on the 9th or 10th of July.

t Was it neceffary to go to the poft at Pitch Pine Plains, in order to go to South

J ‘ Bay?

A. They had no fort of connection with each other.

Might not the army have proceeded to Fort Edward, and omitted the attack of

that pafs, fuppofing it had been meant to be defended ?

1 A. There

87.

88 .

89.

90.

92.

Earl of Balcarras.] EVIDENCE.

A. There were two routes to Fort Edward. General Burgoyne might ftill go the
fame route without any neceffity of attacking that poll, as there might have been
many different ways of didodging the enemy from that poll without attacking it.

In how many indances do you remember the rebels defending their entrench- 93.
ments after they had made them ?

A. We never got a view of any of their entrenchments but fuch as they had
voluntarily abandoned.

Q. Is it then to be underflood that they never defended any entrenchments ? 94.

A. They never did.

Did "you ever hear General Frafcr exprefs his approbation of the paffing of the 95 *
Hudfon’s River ?

A. I neverdid.

Q. Did you ever hear General Frafer exprefs his approbation of the Bennington 96.
expedition ?

A. That detachment was made, and the bufinefs concluded, before I ever heard of
the project or execution.

Q. Have you occafion to know, when the firfl detachment was fent out under Co- 97.
lonel Baume, where they were ordered to rejoin General Burgoyne, after they had per-
formed the fervice they were fent on ?

A. I don’t know.

Whether, in your Lordfhip’s opinion, after the lofs the rebels had fu Rained over
night, in theaftionof the 19th of September, if they had been attacked brifkly at
break of day, the next day, there was a probability that they could have flood their
ground ?

A. I have nothefitated to give an opinion upon luppofed matters, which mud have
been attended with evident and demonflrable confequences ; but I beg the indulgence
of the Houfe in declining to give any opinion upon any queflion relative to fpeculation
or judgment. Had any general officer of that army under General Burgoyne been
prelent in this country, I ffiould have confined myfelf merely to the manoeuvres of the
corps I commanded. As there is no general officer here, I wiffi to give this Houfe
every information confident with my rank in the army.

Had you any information that might indicate to you that the rebels were pre-
pared to decamp after the aft ion of the 1 9th of September ?

A. I was ignorant of any fuch intelligence being received.

Had you any information of their baggage being packed up ?

A. I have already anfwered, that I had no information at all about it.

Q. In the aftion of the 7th of Odtober, on which fide did the rebels force our lines
and make a lodgement ?

A. The lines to the right were dormed and carried.

Were the lines attacked to the left ?

A. To the left of that pod they were, but not to the left of the army.

Q^Did not the pofleffion of Fort Edward, and the country thereabouts, cut off
the retreat of any garrifon that might have been in Fort George ?

A. It undoubtedly did.

Had the army proceeded to Fort George by Ticondcroga and Lake George,
might not the enemy have remained at Fort George till the trenches were opened,
and have -dill had their retreat fecure ?

98.

99.

100.

ioi.

102.

103.

104.

F 2

A. That

E V X D E N C E.

[Earl of Balcarras.

3 6

105.

106.

A That is a matter of opinion upon fpcculation. . . , . r

Q. Do you not think that the Britifh army, being well provided with artillery, was

a probable reafon for their not defending entrenchments ?

A. The reafon they did not defend their entrenchments was, that they always

marched out of them and attacked us. „ c ,

O Does your Lordfhip think it would have been advifeable, in point of prudence,
or i uft to brave troops, who had fuffered fevere lofs, to attack an enemy the morning
after that lofs, polled within entrenchments, which it was impoffible to recon-

noitre

107.

108.

109.

no..

lu-

ll 2.

1J 3'

114

A. That attempt was tried on the 7th of O&ober, and did not fucceed.

Q. Were not the enemy reinforced between the 19th of September and the 7th of

Ocftober ?

A. I think it is likely they were. _ . ■ c . ,

O Were they likely to be in better fpirits to repel an attack the day after they had
beenrepulfed with great lofs, or when they had been reinforced, and feen an army lie

three weeks inaftive in their camp ? - , ,

A. I do not judge of the fpirit of the enemy but when I was oppofed to them

On the ftrft day of the aftion, when the enemy was repulfed on the 19th of
September, had not our army fuffered very confiderably ?

A. They fuffered very confiderable lofs. .

Q^Was not the army recruited, and in better order, on the 7th of October, than

they were on the 20th of September ? ». r ,

A. Numbers of the men who had been wounded and diiabled in the action of the
xoth, joined their corps on the 7th of October.

Was the behaviour of the enemy, oppofed to your Lordfhip, in the actions you
haveleen, luch as to make them contemptible in the eye of a foldier ?

A. I have already mentioned, that they fought at all times with courage and ob-

' ol Whether the behaviour of the enemy was fuch as to make advantages obtained
by them over hisMajefty’s troops more humiliating and difgraceful to the Britifh arms
than the fame advantages obtained by an equal number of any other troops ?

A. I myfelf felt more humiliation until 1 conftdered that thofe advantages proceeded
from the nature of the country, and not from the want of zeal or bravery in the Bri-
tifh troops.

Q. Whether the enemy’s troops were fuch bad troops as to make it more difgraceful
to have an advantage obtained by them over the King’s troops than by the like number
of any other enemy over a like number of his Majefty’s troops in the fame circum-
fiances of country ?

A. The advantages gained by the rebels over the Britifh troops proceeded from
their local fftuation, and not from the want of courage in the Britifh troops. We
■were taught by experience that neither their attacks nor refiftance was to be de-
fpifed.

Did you ever ferve againft any other troops ?

A. I commenced my fervice in America,.

O. Whether

Earl of Balcarras.] EVIDENCE. . 37

Whether the army under General Burgoyne, in general, expected co-operation 115.
in their efforts to go "to Albany, from the army under the command of Sir William

I lowe ? , . -

A. General Burgoyne gave it out in general orders, that he had every reaion to
believe that powerful armies were afting in co-operation with the army he had the
honour to command.

Do you know at what time that order was given out ?

A. The adjutant general’s books will fhew it: I think it was about the 3d of

Oftober. ,

Q^Does your Lordfhip believe that if the army under General Howe had co-
operated up the North River with the army under General Burgoyne, that the
army under General Burgoyne would have been obliged to have made the convention
it did ?

A. That is a matter of judgment. The army looked forward to that co-operation,
which they were led to underftand, by the orders General Burgoyne had given out,
with pleafure.

Ck What was the general opinion of the officers of the army in which you ferved, n$»
on that fubjeft of co-operation ?

A. I do not think my rank in the army entitles me to give my opinion on that fub-
ieft ; l ffiall ftill lefs prefume to give that of others.

J [Withdrew*

Then he was called in again, and feveral parts of the examination, particularly that
which immediately follows the place where it is faid that his Lordfhip was examined
by other members of the Committee, were read, and then the laft queftion which was
put to his Lordffiip immediately before he withdrew, was repeated, with this addition,

“ To the beft of your recolledtion and information.” 1x9,

A. I have already declined anfwering that queftion..

When did you firlt know that there was to be no co-operation from General 120.
Howe’s army, and that Sir William Howe had carried his army to Chefapeak
Bay •

A. I did not know that we were to expert no co-operation, until after the con-
vention was figned.

When did you firft hear that Sir William Howe was gone to the fouth- 121.
ward ? .

A. It was reported fo in the army about the beginning of the campaign, before
we crofted the river. _

When was that report firft confirmed fo as to make it a matter of belief . 122.

A, I never knew it was confirmed at all..

Whether you yourfelf was not furprifed or difappointed, or both, . when you 123..
firft underftood that there was not to be any co-operation from Sir William Howe,
but that Sir William Howe’s army was gone to Chefapeak Bay ? [W'th i

Again

xi 6 .

117.

[Earl of Balcarras,

E V I D E N C E.

Again called in.

124.

125.

126.

127.

128.

129.

13°.

131.

By General
Burgoyne.

Q. Whether you yourfelf was furprifed or difappointed, or both, when you
firftheard that Sir William Howe’s army was gone to Chefapeak Bay ?

A. I neither knew the object of the campaign nor its expectations, and tnere-
fore cannot fpeak to any manoeuvre of which I could not know the tendency.

Did the army in general exprefs themfelves pleafed at the news of Sir Wil-
liam Howe’s being gone to Chefapeak Bay ?

A. The anfwer to the laid queftion, as it relates to me in particular, relates to

them in general. . _ , . ...

Q. Whether your Lordfhip, as a matter of faCt, in the confideration you had in
the army, on the news of Sir William Howe’s being gone to Chefapeak Bay,
heard thole you converted with exprefs themfelves pleafed, or talk of that expedi-
tion to Chefapeak, as a powerful co-operation with General Burgoyne ?

A. I think that queftion is fully anfwered in the two preceding ones.

Q. Whether you did .not think General Howe’s fighting General Waflnngton’s
grand army, at the battle of Brandywine, was a very capital co-operation with the
army under General Burgoyne ?

A. I was not at Brandywine.

Whether you was not furprifed when you returned home to this country,, to
learn that the fecretary of ftate for the American department, had information
from General Howe, of his intentions of going to the fouthward, before General
Burgoyne departed from this country, and never communicated that information
to General Burgoyne before his departure for Canada ?

A. I have the honour to ftand before this Houfe as a military man, and
not as a politician, and cannot anfwer any queftion but thofe relative to my own
profeflion.

What was your Lordfhip’s opinion of the fpirit of your own corps ?

A. The opinion I gave in the council of war, relative to the fpirit of the corps I
commanded was, that they were willing and zealous to undertake any enterprife
that General Burgoyne would pleafe to employ them upon.

When advice was received that Sir Henry Clinton was coming up the North
River, did you apprehend the treaty of convention had gone fo far that it could
not be broken ?

A. My opinion was, with refpeft to that queftion, that all military negotiations
were fair and juftifiable, to make delays and to gain time ; I therefore thought and
declared my fentiments, that General Burgoyne was at full liberty to break off
that treaty in the ftage it then was ; and I could not conceive that the public
faith was engaged, until the treaty was a&ually figned and exchanged.

W r hether the opinion of General Burgoyne, of General Phillips, of Brigadier
Hamilton, and feveral other officers, did not coincide with your opinion in all the
matters comprifed in the laft queftion ?

A. As General Burgoyne feems defirous that I fhould anfwer that queftion, I de-
.ejare his fentiments were the fame with thofe I have now delivered. I hope that
3 the

Captain Money.]

EVIDENCE.

the other members of that council, will foon be in a fituation to ftand forward and to
declare the opinion they gave on that and every other queftion.

When the queftion relative to the point of public faith was decided, by the 132.

maioritv of the council, was not the concurrence for figning the convention una- By General
. J - . Burgoyne.

nimous ?

A. It was.

What day was it firft known that Sir Henry Clinton had taken the highlands, * 33 *
and was coming up the North River ?

A. In the night of the 16th of October. | 'Withdrew.

Captain Money called in and examined by General Burgoyne.

Q. WAS not you deputy quarter mafter general of the army under General Bur- 1.
goyne, in 1777 ?

A. I was.

After Lieutenant Colonel Carleton returned to Canada, was you the fupenor 2.
officer in that department ?

A. I wa'..

As fuch, did you make it your bufinefs from the beginning of the campaign 3.
to get a knowledge of the country ?

A. Whenever there was any oecalion to obtain the knowledge of any particular
part of the country, a party was always fent with me for that purpofe, but the
woods were fo thick that it was impoffible to go without a party.

Was you well acquainted with the country between Skeneiborough and Fort 4.
Edward ?

A. I was.

How long was the army employed in making the roads pra&icable between 3,
Skenefborough and Fort Edward ?

A. About fix or feven days in making the road between Skenefborough and Fort
Anne, and between Fort Anne and Fort Edward. I do not believe the army w T as
delayed an hour on that account ; there was a very good road made by the rebels
the year before, between Fort Anne and Fort Edward, in which road the rebels
had cut down fome few trees which took the provincials in our army fome few
hours to clear.

Does not the pofleffion of the country in the neighbourhood of Fort Ed- 6.
ward, necelfarily prevent the retreat of a garrifon that might be in Fort
George ?

A. It

EVIDENCE. [Captain Money.

A. It prevents the getting off any artillery or ftores ; but a garrifon might
get through the woods, in cafe we were in the poffeflion o t the giound in the

neighbourhood of Fort Edward. . , ,

Did not the garrifon of Fort George evacuate the fort upon tne approach of

the King’s troops toward Fort Edward ?

A. I heard they did ; I was not near enough to fee. _

0 Q. Had the army taken their route by South Bay, Ticonderoga, and Lake
George, how many bateaux do you imagine it would have taken to carry the
troops folely over Lake George, exclufive of provifions and ftores ?

A. I think between three and four hundred, which bateaux mult have been car-
vied up out of Lake Champlain to Lake Geoige. .

9. Q. What time would it have taken, as you imagine, to have drawn thoie ba-
teaux over the land, between Lake Champlain and Lake George, with the holies then
at Ticonderoga ?

A. I fuppofe a fortnight — Four hundred bateaux.

10. Q. Though there were no troops paffed over Lake George, how long did it take
before the fir ft tranfport of provifions arrived at Fort George ?

A. I can’t recoiled precifely.

ir. Q^Confidering the length of time it took to tranfport the provifions, without
the troops, over "Lake George, was not the army forwarder in their way to Alba-
ny, in point of time, by the route they took, than they could have been by the
route of Ticonderoga and Lake George ?

A. I have already faid, that it would take a fortnight to tranfport the 400 ba-
teaux from Lake Champlain to Lake George ; it therefore would have delayed the
army a fortnight longer than they were delayed to have returned from Skenefborough
by Ticonderoga, and gone acrofs Lake George.

12. Was you commifiary of horfe, as well as deputy quarter mafter general ?

A. It was.

13. Q. What is the nature of that department ?

A. It was to take charge of all the horfes furnifhed by contrad for General
Burgoyne’s army, by any fetter of inftrudions from General Burgoyne. I am di-
rected to give proper orders and diredions to the drivers, furnifhed by that con-
trad, for the purpofe of tranfporting provifions and ftores brought to Fort George,
for the ufe of the army.

14. Did you report from time to time to Major General Phillips, and take orders
from him, as well as from General Burgoyne ?

A. Yes.

1 S' Qc Were not the orders from both the generals invariable, precife, and prefling,

for uling all pofiible diligence in forwarding the tranfport of provifions ?

A. They were. There was one order which I will read, as it will fullv anfwer
that queftion : it is dated Auguft the 18th, Duer-Camp, and is in thefe words ;
“ It having been a pradice for officers to order to be taken from the provilion train,
“ in the fervice of the King for this army, the carts and horfes, for the carrying
“ baggage and other purpofes, to avoid for the future the danger and inconve-
“ niencies to the fervice, it is in the mod pofitive manner ordered, that no cart or
* ( horfe are to be ufed but for the public tranfport of the army ; nor is any officer,

2 “ accidentally

Captain Money.] EVIDENCE.

accidentally coming to any particular port, to interfere with the provifion train,

“ in any other manner than to give it every aid and affiftance, which he is on all
“ occafions to do.”

Was not the tranfport of merchandize, and even futler’s fto r es, as well j 6,
as of officers’ baggage, pofitively forbid till the tranfport of provifion ffiould be
over ?

A. There was fuch an order, and a feizure made of two barrels of Madeira,
and two barrels of rum, which were ordered to the hofpital.

Do you recoiled: General Burgoyne’s expreffing, at feveral times, particular i y,
anxiety on the fubjed of expediting the tranfport of provifions ?

A. I do remember once to have heard General Burgoyne exprefs his concern at
our not being able to bring forward a greater quantity of provifion to enable him
to proceed with the army. — I do recoiled to have heard him fay with very great
earneftnefs to General Phillips and Colonel Carleton, that one- month’s provifion
at that particular time (it was about the latter end of Auguft) would be worth
ioo,oool. to Great Britain.

Do you think that the commiflary of the waggons, and other carriages,
was authorifed to buy or hire ox-teams wherever they could be had, and that all
draught cattle taken, were appropriated to the tranfport ?

A. He received fuch directions.

How many carts and ox-teams could be muttered at any one time ? T _

A. I think only 180 carts could at any one time be muttered; the number of
ox- carts I really forget, but I believe between ao and 30.

About how many days provifion for the troops, and all other perfons fed 20,
from the King’s ftores, could that number of carriages convey ?

A. There never was any trial made, but if I may prefume to judge from the
proportion brought forward, over and above the daily confumption of the army,
ffiould fuppofe all thofe carriages would not carry more than four days provifions at
moft. I am fpeaking at random, as no trial was made.

Q;_ Did it not fometimes happen, from accidents of weather, and roads, and the 2 i.
tired ftate of the cattle, that not more than one day’s provifion could be brought
forward in a day ?

A. It did.

Q. How many hours did it take, one hour with another, to draw a bateau 2 2.
from Fort George to Fort Edward ?

A. In general about fix.

Was not the unloading the carts at Fort Edward, and embarking the contents z „
in bateaux, unloading the bateaux at the upper falls of Fort Miller, and a fecond
time unloading them at the lower falls, dilatory as it was, a more expeditious method
than it would have been to have carried the provifions the whole way in carts ?

A. I do apprehend it was not poffible, in the feeble ftate I found the horfes fur-
niffied by contract, to have brought forward the daily confumption of provifions for
that army down to Fort Miller. In the month of Auguft, in the latter end of that
month, at which time I was appointed a commiflary general of horfe, I made, on

G * the

V I D E N C E.

[Captain Money;

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

2f.

3 °'

3 1,

3 2 *

33 -

34 -

35 -

3 6 *

.hefirftof September, a general mute, and found 3 o horfea unferviceable, from

f Xwt h ,teS^r,ofproviao M at any time impeded by the bringing forward

,he A rl Th^tSrf' had G a C fcparate contraft for horles, with which they brought for-
their own ftores. I tAc recolleft that any part of the proven tram were ever

a m °" th ’ S ft0rC ° f pr0viri °" 1

foonerth^nuwM coUefW.^ ^ uuer ru ; n 0 f ,hehorfes furnilhed by contract: for [he

P T toThe aftion of the t 9 th of September ?

A. I was. , , • 1 1 n. • i

Q. Did the enemy difpute the field that day with obftinary ?

A. They did, and the fire was much heavier than ever I faw it any where, unlefs at
the^^of Fort^ Anne^ow ^ the regiments D f thc Britifh line were under that
fire ^

‘a. The three Britilh regiments (the 20th, 21ft, and 62 d) were engaged from three
o’clock in the afternoon till feven in the evening; and whilft I was a pnfonei I heard
the rebel quarter-mafter general fay, they had nine different regiments m the held, op-

pofed to the three Britifhl have named. . t ,

Do you know the lols the three Britifh regiments fuftaincd .

X can’t fay.

Q^Do you remember the ftrength of the 6 2d regiment when they came out of the

a6 A. n I can’t fpeak to the particular ftrength of the regiment when they came out of
aftion ; but I heard that they were not 100 rank and file.

How many officers were left in that regiment at the end of the action ?

A. 1 can’t anlwer that queftion.

Q. From the general ftate of the three Britifh regiments, do you think that they
would have been in a proper condition to have attacked the enemy the next morning :

A. Certainly not ; nor to go on any fervice whatever.

About what time of the day did the enemy finally give way ?

A. They gave way very often ; finally about feven in the evening.

CC Was ft practicable, at that time of the evening, and in that kind of country, to
have purfued ?

A. 1 ffiould think not. . f

Was you not often employed, between the day of that aftion and the action or

the 7th of Oftober, to reconnoitre ?

A. I was.

Was you able to obtain a view of the enemy’s pofition ?

A. I obtained a view of the pofition of the right of the rebel entrenchments.

What was the nature of their pofition to the right, with regard to entrench-
ments ?

A. They

EVIDENCE.

Captain Money.]

A. They were ported on a hill that came very near the river. On the top of the
hill was a ftrong breaft-work, at the foot an abbatis.

Q. Did it appear to you that that wing of the enemy was attackable ? 30 .

A. It is a queftion that is fcarcely in my line of fervice to anfwer ; but as there are
no general officers, nor older officers than myfelf, who ferved under General Bur-
govne, I hope no military man will think me prefuming to give my opinion on that
fubjeft. I do think that we could not have attacked the right wing of the rebel
entrenchments without rifking the lofs ol the whole army, and with little probability
of fuccefs.

Q. Could you obtain a view of the left wing of the enemy ?

ATT never law the left wing of the enemy’s entrenchments till I was taken prifoner
and concluded through their works.

On the 7 th of October was you in a fituation to fee the enemy advancing to the 4°-
attack of your left ?

A. Yes. .

Did they advance under a well ferved fire of grape-lhot from our artillery • 4 1 -

A. I was in a fituation that gave me an opportunity of feeing the directions of the
re', els’ columns •, and 1 was very much altonifhed to hear the ffiot from the enemy
fly fo thick, after our cannonade had lafted a quarter of an hour.

When the Britifh grenadiers were forced lalt from their port, what er.fued ? 4 2 *

A. I did not fee the Britifh grenadiers forced back. I faw them on their march, as
I apprehended, taking a different pofition •, at that time leveral of them broke their
ranks, but on fome aid du camps calling to them for ffiame, to continue their rank,
they marched away to their ftation in good order. A battalion of Brunfwickers that
were on the left of the artillery quitted their ground as foon as the firing began, and,
to the beft of my recoiled. ion, I did not lee they left a man behind them on the
ground. I would add, that after fome difficulty that battalion was brought to make a
land in the rear of the artillery, but in no order.

Was not that battalion brought to that Hand by the activity and exhortation of 43 ,
Major General Reidefel ?

A. I did not fee General Reidefel endeavour to flop the battalion •, but I faw
an aid du camp of his and a brigade major, with their drawn fwords, keeping them
up. I did fee General Reidefel immediately afterwards, on the right of the artillery,
with the battalion perfe&ly formed, and in good order.

Q. Do you imagine that the giving way of the battalion you firft deferibed was 44*
thecaule that the artillery on that fpot was taken, and yourfelf and Major Williams
being made prfoners ?

A. I believe it contributed, in fome meafure, towards tire lofs of the a<5lion on
that day •, but before Sir Francis Clarke died of his wounds, he told me that he
received his wound in bringing orders for the artillery and the whole of the detach-
ment to return to camp; and to the circumftance of Sir Francis Clarke’s being
wounded, I do attribute the lofs of the artillery, if not the lofs of the whole army ?

Q. Had you an opportunitv, after you was prifoner, to fee the left of the enemy’s 45*
entrenchments ?

A. I had.

G 2

4 *,

Was

EVIDENCE. [Captain Monty,

46. Q. Was the ground within cannon ffiot of the left open and commanding it ?

a! All the ground 1 law was cleared and entrenched.

47 . CL Was there not ground within cannon fhot that would have commanded that

entrenchment on the left ?

A. There was. , , , , „ , -

4.3. O Had we gained poffeffion of that ground, and been able to ereft batteries of

our heavieft guns, would not the whole line of the enemy have been enfiladed .

A. The ground alluded to was entrenched, and commanded the whole of the
rebel camp and lines. If the army had got poffeffion of that ground, I do not believe
the rebels would have ftaid one hour in their camp.

Did you ever hear, in converlation with the rebel officers, that General Ar-
nold, forefeeing that inconvenience, had marched out of his lines, and attacked,
without orders from General Gates ?

A. I did hear that General Arnold had marched out on the 7th of October, without
orders from General Gates. I did alfo hear that he advifed the going out to meet Gene-
ral Burgoyne on his march, and engaging him before he approached their lines ; and the
reafon he gave was this: If General Burgoyne fhould ever come near enough their
lines to be able to make ufe of his artillery, that he would certainly poflefs himfelf of
their camp ; that their troops in that cafe would never Hand any where ; but if, on
the other hand, the rebels fhould be defeated in the woods, the troops would, after
that, have confidence in their works, for which reafon Arnold advifed rifking an
adion in the woods before General Burgoyne came near enough to fee their works.

Examined by other Members of the Commit tee Y and by-Gentral Burgoyne occaftonally.

$ 0 . Q. Did not your fituation, as deputy quarter mafler general, lead you to mix very

much with the different officers of the army ?

A. It did.

51. CL What do you apprehend to have been the general opinion of the officers of
General Burgoyne’s conduct, as well in adion as in the many trying occafions which
have been dated by you at the bar ?

A. They entertained a very high opinion of General Burgoyne’s condud.

52. <L Had General Burgoyne the full confidence of the army under his command to
the laft moment l

A. He certainly had.

Q. What was the army’s opinion of the rebels after their retreat from Ticonde-
roga ?

A. The army in general did not think, after they had evacuated Ticonderoga, that
they would make a (land any where.

<L What was the reafon given in your army for the expedition to Bennington ?

A. I believe I cannot anfwer that queftion better than by reading an abftrad of the
General’s orders the day after that adion.

tc Augufi

Captain Money,]

EVIDENCE,

“ Auguft 1 7, Duer Camp.

“ It was endeavoured, among other objefts, by the expedition which marched to
“ the left, to provide fuch a fupplyof cattle as wouid have enabled the army to proceed
“ without waiting the arrival of the magazines. That attempt having failed of luccefs,

“ through the chances of war, the troops muft neceflarily halt fome days for bringing
“ forward the tranfports.”

Why did the army remain from the i6th of Auguft to the 13th of September, ^
before they crofted the Hudfon’s River to engage the rebels as Stillwater ?

Q. To bring forward a fufficient quantity of provilions and artillery, to enable
the general to give up his communication.

Q\_ What was the opinion of the army on their eroding the Hudfon’s River ? ,5

A. They did think it was their indifpenfible duty to proceed forward and fight the
rebels, which we heard were then at Stillwater.

Q^Did you ever forage to the right of General Frafer’s camp before the 7th of 57.
Auguft ?

A. We never foraged to the right of the camp at Freeman’s Farm, at any
one time; on the 7th of Oiftober, while the troops were in the field. General
Frafer ordered all the batmen and drivers, belonging to his brigade, to come and
forage in the rear of the troops.

Do you know what was General Frafer’s opinion on your foraging to the c 8 .
right ? > ’

A. I do know that General Frafer mentioned to me, on the 5th of Odlober,
that there was forage on the right of his camp ; but at that time the ground on
which that forage was to be met with was in pofleffion of the rebels’ advanced
poft.

Qi, Do you think your army would have been loft, if even the expedition from 59.
New York had taken place a few days fooner ?

A. If the troops had arrived at New York foon enough to have enabled Sir
Henry Clinton to have made his expedition up the North River a week fooner, I
do conceive that our army would not have been loft.

Q^What was the opinion of the rebels on Sir William Howe’s going to the 60.
fouthward.

A. I was not acquainted enough with the rebel leaders, to hear their opinion
on that queftion. I do not think that the pcafants of the country were judges of
the propriety of Sir William Howe’s condudh.

What was the opinion of the officers of General Burgoyne’s army, after it
was loft, relative to the crofting Hudl'on’s River.

A. They did think that the alternative of retreating with their army to Ca-
nada, or proceeding to Stillwater, under the neceffity of giving up his commu-
nication, to be an unfortunate fituation ; but I never heard any officers fay that
they thought General Burgoyne had done wrong ; many faid, that if they had re-
treated without Hiking an adtion, at the time Sir Henry Clinton was coming up the
North River, the army would never have forgiven him, nor would he ever have
forgiven himfelf.

Q^Was you at New York after the lofs of General Burgoyne’s army? 62;

A. Yes.

evidence.

[Captain Money.

6 ,. q! What was the opinion or the lan£U«ge of the military *t that place, relative to

c; r William Howe’s expedition to Penlylvania ? * , ... „ r> r .

A. Whatever opinion was formed of Sir William Howe s expedition o en yl-
vania, or is formed previous to this enquiry, fuch an opinion muft have been ill-
founded, as Sir William Howe’s reafons were not known, nor his mftru&ions com-

- ^ your^laft anfwer, is the committee to underftand that the opinions that

° 4 ' werTformed refpefting Sir William Howds expedition to Philadelphia, before this
cnouirv. were not in favour of that expedition ?

Qucftio" objefted “• \W,(bkm.

J 'gain called in.

, O. You have faid that the army thought it their indifpenfible duty to pafs over
5 ' Hudlon’s River— Why did they think that that meafure was particularly their in-

difpenfible duty ? , .

A. If the Hudfon’s River had not been there, the army would have thought
it their indifpenfible duty to have gone and rilked an adtion before they returned to
Canada. If I recoiled: right, I faid, that if the army had returned to Canada,
without fighting, that the army would never have forgiven the general, nor the
general have forgiven himfelf.

66. Q. Do you know the nature of the country, between the place where we palled
the Hudfon’s River and Albany, on the eaft fide of the river ?

A. Yes, I do. - , . r

Gy. Could the army have taken that route, in order to pafs the river oppofite or

near to Albany ? , .

A. The army could not have taken that route, as part of the way was a fwamp,
and on the right of the rebel entrenchments was a mountain very rugged, and not
paflable nearer than two miles from the river.

68. Q. Was it not a necelfary confequence then, that the boats muft have been aban-
doned, if the army had taken that route ?

A. I think I have faid the army could not take that route ; if the army had
marched on the eaft of the Hudfon’s River, they could not have marched near
enough to have covered their provifion bateaux from the rebel force, on the weft
fide of the river.

g 0^ Did the army under General Burgoyne, on their approach to Albany, ex-
J ' pea a co-operation of the army under Sir William Howe, upon the North
River ?

A. They did ; and this is the order of General Burgoyne, given October the
3d at Freeman’s Farm*:

“ There is reafon to be affured, that other powerful armies are adnally in cn-
** operation with thefe troops ; and although the prefent fupply of provifion is ample,
“ it is highly defirablc, ito prepare for any continuance in the field that the King s
44 Her vice may require, without the delay of bringing forward further ftores for

44 thofe

EVIDENCE.

Captain Money.]

«< thofe purpofes j the ration of bread or flour is, for the prefent, fixed at one

Are you acquainted with the North River, from New York to Al- yo.

bany ?

A. I am not. . .

Q. How many days march from Fort Edward to Albany, if no interruption from yi.

an enemy ?

A. I cannot anfwer that queftion, unlefs I am to fuppofe that a bridge was
ready formed for the troops to pafs over, on fome part of Hudfon’s River,
between Batten Kill and Fort Edward, or that there were vefl'els ready to tranfport
the troops over Hudfon’s River.

CX Is the diftance fo great between Fort Edward and Albany, that the army 72*
could not carry provifions with them to fupport them during the march ?

A. Certainly Albany is not at fo great a diftance from Fort Edward, but

that a corps of troops might certainly carry provifions fufficient for the march

to Albany. .

Qj_ Was it not underftood, that if you had arrived at Albany, that the army 73.

would find plenty of provifions there ?

A. It was generally believed, and I believe it myfelf firmly, that if the army
had got to Albany, we ftionld have found a number of loyal fubjedts, that would
have joined and done every thing in their power to have eftabliftied the army
at that place.

Q^Muft not the army, to march from Fort Edward to Albany, have necelia- y^,
rily carried a number of boats to form a bridge to pafs the river ?

A. There was no paffing the river well without a bridge of boats, and there
were not fcouls enough on that river, to make a bridge.

Q. Would not the neceftary delay, arifing from carrying forward thofe boats, y^
and throwing a bridge, fit to pafs an army, have confumed more time than it
was poflible for that army to fubfift with fuch provifion as they could carry with
them ?

A. I ftiould think it would. _ #

Q^You will give the committee what information you can, refpecting a road yo.
from Fort Edward to Albany, on the left fide of the river.

A. I have anfwered that fully.

Whether by taking a pretty large circuit, the army would have reached Al- yy,
bany, and avoided the lwamps you mentioned ?

A. Certainly not oa the eaft fide of the river, becaufe the enemy being on the op-
pofite fliore, would certainly have oppofed General Burgoyne’s army crofting the
Hudfon’s River at Albany, the river being three times the width it is at Saia-

toga.

[ 'Withdrew .

Mari is

evidence.

[Earl of Harrington.

Mart is i° die Junii , 1779.

Mr. F. Montagu in the Chair.

Earl of Harrington called in and examined by General Burgoyne.

x ’ Qi IN what capacity did your Lordfhip ferve in America in the campaign

1 777 ?

A. I was captain in the 29th regiment of foot, and went on the expedition with
General Burgoyne, with the command of the grenadier company ; I was after-
wards appointed fupernutnerary aid du camp to the general.

2. While adting as captain of the grenadier company, w r as you at the adtion
of Huberton ?

A. I was.

3. What was the behaviour of the enemy on that day ?

A. They behaved in the beginning of the adlion, with a great deal of fpirit •, but
on the Britilh troops rufhing on them with their bayonets, they gave way in great
confufion.

4. From the nature of the country, was it pradticable to purfue the enemy fur-
ther than they were purfued on that occafion ?

A. Certainly not.— I think we ran fome rifque even in purfuing them fo
far.

At what time of the campaign was it that General Burgoyne requefted your
Lordfhip to adt as his aid du camp ?

A. I think about the 12th of July.

6. Was you prefent a few days after that time, at a council held with the Indi-
ans of the remote nations, then juft arrived, under the condudt of Major Camp-
bell and Mr. St. Luc ?

7, A. Yes.

Was you prefent at a former council of the Indians held at Lake
Champlain ?

.8. A. Yes.

Q. What was the tenor of General Burgoyne’s fpeeches and injundtions at both
thofe councils refpedting the reftraint of barbarities ?

A. He abfolutely forbid their fcalping, except their dead prifoners, which they
infilled on doing, and he held out rewards to them for bringing in prifoners, and
enjoined them ,to treat them well.

evidence.

Earl of Harrington.]

Q. Do you remember being with General Burgoyne, foon after the laft council, 9.
upon a vifit to an out poft near Fort Anne ?

A. I perfectly recoiled: it.

Qi, Had General Burgoyne a confiderable efcort of Indians with him ? 10.

A; He had.

Q. Did part of that efcort, on a fcout from that poft, fall in with and' take 11.
a part of the enemy, who were laid in ambufh for the purpofe of killing or taking
the general, and thofe who were with him ?

A. They did.

Qi, What were the fentiments of the captain taken on that occafion refpeding 12.
his treatment from the Indians ?

A. He faid he was treated with much humanity, and I perfectly remember that
prilbners brought in on many other occafions by the Indians, declared that they had
been ufed with the fame degree of humanity.

Q. Does your Lordlhip remember General Burgoyne’s receiving at Fort Anne, the
news of the murder of Mifs M‘Rea >

A. I do.

Q^Did General Burgoyne repair immediately to the Indian camp, and call them to ij
council, aflifted by Brigadier General Frafer ?

A. He did.

Q;_ What pafled at that council ?

A. General Burgoyne threatened the culprit with death, infilled that he fliould
be delivered up ; and there were many gentlemen of the army, and I own I was
one of the number, who feared that he would put that threat in execution. Mo-
tives of policy, I believe alone, prevented him from it ; and if he had not pardoned
the man, which he did, I believe the total defection of the Indians would have en-
fued, and the confequences, on their return through Canada, might have been
dreadful ; not to fpeak of the weight they would have thrown into the op-
pofite fcale, had they gone over to the enemy, which I rather imagine would
have been the cafe.

Qi. -^° you remember General Burgoyne’s reftraining the Indian parties from 16.
going out without a Britifh officer or proper conductor, who were to be refpon-
fible for their behaviour ? 1

A. I do.

. D° y°u remember Mr. St. Luc’s reporting difcon tents amongft the Indians, 17.
foon after our arrival at Fort Edward ?

A. I do.

Qc How long was that after enforcing the reftraints above mentioned? 18.

A. I can t exatftly fay ; I ffiould imagine about three weeks or a month.

Q^Does y°ur Lordffiip recollebt General Burgoyne’s telling Mr. St. Luc, that 19.
e had rather lofe every Indian, than connive at their enormities, or ufine lan-
guage to that effeft ? 0

A. I do.

Q. Does your Lordfhip remember what pafled in council with the Indians at no*
Fort Edward? .

A, To

5 ®

E V

I D E N C E. [Earl of Harrington;

21 .

2 . 2 .

23 -

24.

2 . 5 .

26.

s8.

3 °

3 2,

A To the bed of my recolUaion, much the fame exhortation to aft with huma-
. A * L ° a mnrh the fame rewards were offered for Caving their pritoners.

Do you xecollea the drcumflar.ee of the Indians defirmg to return home at

that time ?

Q* Do'vo^remember * that many quitted the army without leave ?

afteTtvaS, was cufelby the ‘reftraint upon their cruelt.es and hab.ts of plan-
der ?

O HaTyou reafon to believe that the expedition to Bennington was much
defined by General Reidefel, and that it was his wifh to have it conduced by Lieu-

‘“r'k’SS 1 aiw^s ‘'imagined in the army, that it was his wilh and that
Colonel Baume was appointed to the command of it m compliment to

hl Q^Did you know the corps of Britiffi, commanded by Captain Frafer, which

m A C P They f t werr i) volunteers from the Britifh regiments, and alfo ftoo< J
very high in the opinion of the army, from their gallant behaviour on all

occafions. remember General Burgoyne’s vifiting the detachment after it was
aflenibled, and conferring with Colonel Baume ?

Q Did Colonel Baume appear fatisfied with the ftrength of his corps ?
jt I converted with cilonel Baume, and with feveral officers under h,
command, and they appeared perfectly fatisfied, at leaft I heard no complaint
from them; the only anxiety they expreffed was, left the deftination of that

corns ffiould become known to the enemy. . . . . • ■ l, „

Q. Does your Lordffiip remember General Burgoyne’s receiving, in the night a
letteT from Lieutenant Colonel Baume, expreffing he found the enemy in greater
force than he expelled ?

Q* T Do' you remember Sir Francis Clarke, General Burgoyne’s aid du
camp, being tent with orders to Colonel Breyman to march immediately to
fuppovt him ?

Did you communicate the fame order to General Reidefel at the fame

time ?

Q. Was Colonel Breyman the neareft corps for the purpofe of that fupport ?

Q^Did Brigadier General Frafer at all times treat your Lordffiip with great
confidence? 4 . T w9 -

Earl of Harrington.]

EVIDENCE.

5 *

35 -

36 .

A. I was often with General Frafer, and he frequently talked without referve upon
matters which he was not particularly bound to conceal. There were certain matters of
intelligence which it would have been improper for him to mention to any body. In
this cafe I cannot boaft fo much of his confidence, as to fuppofe that he would have
opened his mind to me on matters which he would have concealed from the reft of
his friends.

Q^Have you not frequently been prefent when General Burgoyne and General 33.
Frafer difeuffed the object of the campaign, and converfed freely on the circumftances
of the time ?

A. I have.

Did your Lordfliip ever, in prefence or abfence of General Burgoyne, hear Ge- 34.
neral Frafer exprefs a dilapprobation of pafling the Hudfon’s River ?

A. 1 never did ?

Do you know or believe that the idea of forcing our way to Albany was pre-
valent throughout the army ?

A. In every converfation I had with different officers of the army, I never remem-
ber once to have heard it doubted, but that we were to force our way.

Q_. Did the army pafs the Hudfon’s River with alacrity?

A. It is impoffible for any army to have been in higher fpirits than they were
at that time, or more defirous of coming to an engagement with the enemy.

Q^Do you not conceive, that to have remained pofted behind the Hudfon’s
River, at the time the army pafled it and advanced, would have caft a damp on the
fpirits of that army and a reflection on their General ?

A. From the eagernefs of the army to advance and the great uneafinefs that
was difcernible through it on every delay, I apprehended that it could not have been
otherwife ; and I think that General Burgoyne’s charatter would not have flood
very high either with the army, this country, or the enemy, had he halted at Fort
Edward.

Q. Do you recoiled the march up to the enemy on the 19th of Septem-
ber ?

A. I do.

(X Will you pleafe to deferibe it ?

A. The army marched in three divifions ; the German line flanking, the artillery
and baggage purfued the courfe of the river through the meadows, and formed
the left-hand divifion ; the Britifh line marched parallel to it at feme diftance through
the woods, and formed the centre divifion ; General Frafer’s corps, with the grena-
diers and light infantry of the Germans, were obliged to make a large detour through
the woods, and formed the right hand divifion or column. Beyond this, on the
right, there w'ere, as I underftand, flanking parties of light infantry and Provin-
cials ?

Q. Was the country, over which the army pafled, interfered with a deep
ravine ?

A. It was one of the deepeft I ever faw.

Q. Which column was firft attacked ?

A. The advanced party, confifting of the picquets of the centre column, being fent

H 2 forwards.

38.

39 -

40.

41.

5 *-

EVIDENCE. [Earl of Harrington.

forwards, under the command of Major Forbes, to explore the way by which that
column was to pafs, fell in with a confiderable body of the rebels, polled in ahoufe
and behind fences, which they attacked, and after a great deal of fire, the detach-
ment nearly drove in the body of rebels ; but on finding that the woods quite
round them were filled with the enemy, they were obliged to retire to the main
body.

42. Q, Was the march fo performed that when General Burgoyne formed the fine of
the Britilh infantry, General Frafer’s corps were ready upon their right to fupport
them ?

A. General Frafer, on hearing the fire of Major Forbes’s party, detached two com-
panies to fupport them, which came up juft after that engagement was over; and
on their appearance the enemy finding that our troops were in ftrength, quitted the
poll they had before occupied, and, immediately after this, the whole line was formed
with the utmoll regularity. I would explain, that when I fpeak of the line, I do not
include the left hand column which was compofed of Germans, and which did not
come into the fine or into action till late in the day.

4.1. How long did the adtion lalt ?

A. From three o’clock, I think, till very near eight.

44. How long were the 20th, 21ft, and 62d regiments engaged ?

A. During the greateft part of that time.

45. Was the adtion well difputed by the enemy ?

A. It was, very obftinately.

4 6 . Was your Lordlhip near the perfon of General Burgoyne during that adtion,
except when you were employed to carry orders ?

A. Yes.

47. Q.. Were not different attempts made by the General’s orders to charge the enemy
with bayonets, and did not thofe attempts fail by the heavinefs of the enemy’s fire
and thicknefs of the woods ?

A. There were many attempts made for that purpofe, and they all failed except
the lafl, when the Britifh troops finally drove them out of the field.

48. Qi When part of the German troops did get into adlion that day under General
Reidefel, how did they behave ?

A. I heard their behaviour fpoke of in the higheft terms ; they marched up to
the enemy with great coolnefs and fteadinefs, and gave them, as I was told, three
vollies by word of command from their officers.

49. Can your Lordlhip fpeak to the lofs fuflained by the three Britifh regiments,
the 6 2d in particular?

A. The lofs was very confiderable ; but I don’t recoiled the numbers.

50. Qe Were thofe three Britifh regiments in a condition to have attacked the enemy
the next morning ?

A. 1 heir numbers were fo reduced, that I apprehend they were not.

51. Q* From the lofs of killed and wounded, particularly of officers, would it have

been defirable to have brought thofe three regiments into adtion for the next ten
days ?

A* In lefs than ten days the ftate of thofe regiments certainly would not have

been

EVIDENCE.

Earl of Harrington.]

S 3

been much mended ; I therefore apprehend, that if they were nut in a condition to
be brought into adlion the next morning, their inability would have ftill continued
for tho e ten days.

(L Had the army made a movement to gain the left of the enemy’s entrench- 52.
mencs before the redoubts were conftrudted that commanded the plain near the river,
would not all the bateaux, flores, and hofpitals have been expoled to attack ? .

A. It certainly would have been fo.

CL Do you recoiled! the fcarciry of forage on the weft-fide of the river ? 53.

A. I do perfedlly.

CL Would not the bridge of boats, conftrudted for the purpofe of foraging to 54 -
the eat! fide, have alfo been expofed before the redoubts, above mentioned, were
raifed ?

A. They certainly would, had it not been for thofe redoubts and a work called
the 77 te du pont, which was raifed for the protection of the bridge.

Q. Do you recoiled! how long it took .to raife thofe redoubts, to throw the bridge, 55..
and raife the Tete du pont ?

A. If I recoiled! right, the bridge itfelf was finilhed in one night ; the making and
compleating the other works took fome cays.

<LDoes your Lordlhip remember General Burgoyne mentioning to you in 56..
confidence, the receipt of a letter from Sir Henry Clinton, and his hourly ex-
pedfation of his attacking the Highlands, and his opinion that his fuccefs there
muft diflodge the enemy without attacking their entrenchments ?

A. I pdrfedlly recoiled! the General’s mentioning all this to me.

CL Was you near General Burgoyne in the adtion of the 7th of Odtober? 57.,

A. I was.

<L Do you recoiled! what orders you carried ? 58.

A. I do.

<L What were they ? S 9 -

A. The fir ft orders I recoiled! to have carried, were to poll fifty men under the
command of a captain of the 20th regiment, to the left of the detachment of the
army, in order, in fome meafure, to join them to the advanced works of General
Frafer’s camp, and, in cafe of any accident, to protedt the detachment, fhould they
find it neceflfary, to retire thither.

The next orders I carried were to Major General Phillips, at the end of the adlion,
acquainting him, that as that detachment feemed much difordered from the enemy
having turned both their flanks, that it was neceflfary to draw it as foon as pofiible
back to the camp, which feemed menaced with an attack ; the care of this General
Burgoyne committed to General Phillips, while he himfelf returned to the camp, in
order to take proper meafures for its defence. On our return thither the works of
the camp were actually attacked as General Burgoyne had forefeen, and I was then em-
ployed to colled! what troops I fhould meet, and to order them to thofe parts where
they were moft wanted. Soon after this, the enemy having got round the right of
our camp, we expedled an attack upon our rear, and I then was dilpatched with
orders from General Burgoyne to Brigadier General Hamilton, for all the works in

EVIDENCE. [Earl of Harrington.

the rear of the camp, which had been previoufiy conftrudted, to be manned with
i'uch foldiers as he could fpare from the defence of the front.

Does your Lordfhip know what orders Sir Francis Ciarke w T as charged with,
at the time he received his wound?

A. I met Sir Francis Clarke as I was fearching for General I hilhps, and ac-
quainted him with my orders, telling him at the fame time, that as the thick-
nefs of the wood might prevent my finding General Phillips diredtly, I wifhed he
would affift me, in order that no time might be loft in delivering thofe orders ; that
was the laft time I faw Sir Francis Clarke, and I believe that foon afterwards he re-
ceived the wound of which he died ?

Was it dark before General Burgoyne had a certainty that Col. Breyman was
killed, and his poft carried by the enemy ?

A. It was fo dark that the officer, who I believe firft brought the intelligence of
it, feeing a number of men round the fires of that camp, took them for Germans,
and was not convinced of his error till he was fired upon by them, as they proved
to be a party of the enemy who had forced the works.

62. Did General Burgovne ufe any efforts to rally the Germans who were
returning from the adtion, and to perfuade them to recover Colonel Breyman’s
poft ?

A. Fie certainly did his utmoft endeavours for that purpofe, which however were
ineffedtual from the darknefs of the night, and the entire confufion in which they
were.

63. Q. Were any other troops at hand that could have been fpared for that pur-
pofe ?

A. There certainly were not ; every regiment w r as occupied in defence of its own
lines which were not certainly overmanned.

64. In the heat of the adtion do you recoiled!: feeing General Pveidefel about the
time that the Germans, on the left of the Britiffi artillery, were giving way ?

A. I do.

65. W as not General Reidefel exerting himfelf to reftore order in his troops?

A. General Reidefel appeared to me to have behaved, on that occafion, in every
way as became a brave and intelligent officer.

66 . Qi, Wa s the retreat of the army in the night of the 7th made in good order, and
a new pofition taken by the time it was day -light ?

A. It certainly was.

• Qi, Was the army under arms the whole day of the 8 th, and in continual expecta-
tion of adtion ?

A. 1 hey were, and indeed were cannonaded during the greateft part of that day,
and the advanced corps in particular, who were polled on a hill, were under almoft
a continual fire from the riflemen of the enemy.

68. Do you recolledt the circumftance of General Frafer’s funeral on the afternoon

of that day ?

A. I do, perfedtly well ; the redoubt in which he was buried was very heavily
cannonaded during the ceremony, and even previous to this they fired at thofe who

attended

Earl of Harrington.} EVIDENCE. 55

attended the corpfe on its way thither, which I fuppofe was accidental, and pro-
ceeded from the enemy’s feeing a number of people together.

Q. Who were the chief pe. Ions who attended that funeral ? 69.

A. All the generals of the army, their aid du camps, and I believe all thofe who
were not attached to any particular poft, which at that time were very few.

Q. Was the retreat of the army on the night of the 8th, and on the day and part 70.
of the night of the 9th, made in good order ?

A. It was made in perfect good order.

Q. What was the weather on the day of the 9th ? ji.

A. Exceeding wet. 72*

What was the ftate of the troops, in point of fatigue^ when they arrived at
Saratoga ?

A. They certainly muft have been much fatigued, from the length of time they
had been under arms, and more particularly fo from the badnefs of the roads, occa-
fioned by the rains.

Q. When it was day-light the next morning, did you fee any part of the enemy 73V
upon the plain at Saratoga, on the ground where our artillery was afterwards
pofted ?

A. I don’t recolledt.

Does your Lordfhip recollect feeing a corps of the enemy on the other fide the 74..
Hudfon’s River oppofite to Saratoga ?

A. Perfectly well ; and they feemed in force.

Do you remember the circumftance of a battery opening from that corps ? 7 5*

A. I do perfectly well. The general. General Phillips, and feveral other gentle-
men were at dinner. We were all obliged to remove, from finding ourfelves in
the range of that battery.

Q. We being in the range of that battery, muft it not neceffarily have com- 7
manded the ford on tire Hudfon’s River ?

A. It certainly did command that ford.

Do you recollect Lieut. Col. Sutherland being fent with a detachment of 77..
regulars and provincials from Saratoga, to cover a party of workmen employed to
repair bridges, and render the road practicable 2

A. I perfectly recolleft it.

Do you recolkdt for what reafon Colonel Sutherland and the regulars were re- 7#..
called ?

A. I underftood it was on the apprehenfion of an aftion.

Does your Lordfhip recoiled different fcouts bringing reports of the enemy’s 79..
being in poffeifion of the country between Saratoga and Fort Edward, on both fides
©f the river ?

A. 1 do.

Q. Do you remember General Burgoyne’s mentioning, in confidence to you, dif-
ferent ideas of forcing the ford over Hudfon’s River ; of cutting away by the ene-
my’s right, and attempting a rapid march to Albany ; or by a night march to gain,
the fords above Fort Edward ?

A. I do perfectly remember that he mentioned to me all thofe ideas*

Q. Did

5 6

EVIDENCE.

[Earl of Harrington.

gj CL Did you ever hear of an offer made by General Phillips to make his way to
Ticonderoga with a body of troops ?

A. No. . .

n Q. In the intimacy in which you lived with Major General Phillips, myfelf, and

B2 ' the officers in General Phillips’s family, do you not think you ffiould have heard of
fuch an offer had it been made ?

A. I apprehend that I ffiould have heard of ir.

Did your Lordffiip hear of General Phillips offering to attempt an efcape
through the woods, with one or two guides, for the purpofe of putting himfelf at
the head of the troops at Ticonderoga, for the future defence of that place ?

A. I heard it mentioned fince I came to England, in fome common converfa-
tion ; but I never heard it hinted at while I was in America.

CL The day before the council of the generals and field officers was called, can
your Lordffiip fpeak of the flate of things in general at Saratoga ?

A, The flate of our army w ? as certainly as bad as poffible. Their numbers were
few, their provifions ffiort, and their pofition not a good one, owing to the nature
of the country, which rofe to the diflance of fome miles, one hill overtopping that
which was next to it.

g c CL Do you know any officer of that army who, in that fituation, thought we had
* ’ a right to more than honourable terms ?

A. Our fituation, in the apprehenfion of every one there with whom I converfed,
did not entitle us to more.

86 CL Did the army in general look on the terms obtained, namely, the power of
ferving their country in other places, to be advantageous as well as honourable, and
more than they had a right to expeft ?

A. I believe they certainly did; and that few perfons in the army expe&ed fo good
terms as thofe which were granted.

Examined by other Members of the Committee , and by General Burgoyne occafionally .

CL Did the Indians leave the army till after the battle of Bennington ?

A. Great numbers did, and at many different times.

CL Were not fome Indians on the expedition to Bennington ?

A. There were.

CL Was the expedition originally fentout to Bennington ?

A. My fituation in the army not entitling me to be in the council of war, and not
being employed on that expedition, I was of courfe not entrufled with the orders that
were given to Col. Baume.

CL Have you reafon to fuppofe that General Reidefel or Colonel Baume had a par-
ticular knowledge of that part of the country, fo as to make it particularly proper
to give Colonel Baume the command of that expedition ?

A. I believe there was no officer in that army of lufficient rank to have com-
manded fuch an expedition, who ever had been in that particular part of the
country.

<L H ie

87.

88 .
89.

Earl of Harrington.] EVIDENCE. 57

Q. The intention of the expedition being, as appears by the papers on the table, 91.
to found the difpofition of the people of 'that country, was that part of the coun-
try peopled with Germans, as many other parts of the country are?

A. 1 can’t exaftly fpeak to the defeription of the people of that country, as I
was never there myfelt; but there were employed on that expedition numbers of
provincials, many of whom were of that very country ; and I apprehend that the
common foldiers of a regular army are not the immediate people who are expelled
to found the minds of any country to which they are fent.

As your Lordlliip mentioned the alacrity with which the army paffed the 92.
Hudfon’s River, did the army in general think thcmfelves at that time inadequate to
the purpofe of forcing their way to Albany ?

A. The opinions of an army, who cannot be acquainted with the intelligence that
has been received, are often erroneous. The army was in high fpirits, and did nor,

I believe, doubt of reaching Albany.

Did the General then doubt of reaching Albany ? 93.

A. I really don’t know.

Were the rebels’ entrenchments completed on the 19th of September ? 94,

A. I never faw the entrenchments at all.

How was our army employed between the 19th of September and the 7th of 95.
October ?

A. The army itfelf was employed in ftrongthening its pofition.

Did it take the army eighteen days to strengthen its pofition before it made any 96.
movement?

A. I can’t exactly fay. They were working all the time.

What works were executed in that time ? 97.

A. There were numbers of redoubts erected; the tete-du-pont; lines before the
camp; outworks to the lines, in which guards and picquets were placed; and bat-
teries,

Q. How many redoubts were erefted ? 98.

A. 1 think in all there muff have been five or fix.

Was the eredting thofe works full.employment for eighteen days ? 99.

A. I am not an engineer, or I certainly fhould endeavour to anfwer that queftion.

Were all thofe works neceffary, in your opinion, for an army that meant to jco.
march forward and attack the enemy ?

A. They were neceffary in our particular fituation, being within half a mile of the
enemy, to whom we were oppofed, and being inferior in numbers.

Does your Lordlhip know whether the enemy thought it neceffary to fortify 10I>
themlelves with redoubts ?

A. I don’t know what the fpecies of their fortification v/as ; but I have been
always told that great labour had been employed on their works ; and what fmall part
I faw of them convinced me of it.

Cb. Had you not information from deferters or friends what the enemy was 102.
doing ?

A. My fituation in that army did not entitle me to receive that intelligence. When
any perfon came to me to inform me that he had been employed in gaining fuch in-
telligence, mar duty was to bring him to the General.

I Was

evidence.

[Earl of Harrington.

103.

104.

105.

106.

107.

108.

109.

110.

1 1 1.

1 12.
*i3-

1 14.

115.

Was it not a matter of notoriety in the army, that the enemy received reinforce-
ment between the 19th of September and the 7th of October ?

A. The manner of receiving intelligence in an army feldom tranlpires ; the army
might guefs, but I believe they knew nothing.

Was it not underftood that the rebels had fuffered a much greater lofs than

the king’s troops on the 19th of September ?

A. It was.

Was not the whole, or nearly the whole, of the rebel army engaged.

A. I don’t know ; I apprehend the whole was not engaged.

Was our army in general, in your apprehenfion, in as good a condition on
the 20th of September as the rebel army, who had iuffered much more ?

A. The rebel army was fo numerous that their lofs was not equally felt with
ours.

What number had you reafon to fuppofe the rebel army confifted of on the 19th
of September ?

A. I always underftood they were very numerous. I never heard their numbers
exaftly.

Was not the fcarcity of forage forefeen by every body ?

A. Thofe with whom I converfed did not forelee it to the extent in which we expe-
rienced it.

Was it prudent, in your Lordlhip’s opinion, to bring, or attempt to bring, up-
wards of fourteen hundred horfes to attend the army, in a country fo deftitute of forage ?

A. I never heard that the horfes in our army were thought too numerous. On all
occafions a fcarcity of them was complained of.

Q. Do you know how many horfes were allowed for the baggage of each
regiment ?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Does your Lordfhip know how many horfes were employed about the train
of artillery ?

A. I don’t recollect ; but the returns are on the table.

Was the heavy artillery brought back from Stillwater, on the retreat of the
army to Saratoga ?

A. We had loft fomefmall part of it, and the reft: was brought to Saratoga.

Did the bringing back of that artillery delay that retreat or not ?

A. An army with cannon certainly cannot march fo rapidly as one without
cannon ; but cannon always creates a delay which armies have been content to put
up with.

Q. Was it neceffary, in your opinion, in the fituation in which the army retreated,
to make their retreat as expeditious as poftible ?

A. The army appeared to me that it did make its retreat as expeditious as pof-
fible.

Q. Would the leaving of heavy artillery behind, in your opinion, have made a
difference of four miles in the march ?

A. I can’t conceive that it would. The enemy were in force behind us; not
having numbers to contend with them, it would have been a very defperate circum-
ftance to have abandoned our cannon, in cafe of an attack.

4 Was

EVIDENCE.

Earl of Harrington.]

Were the heavy artillery, in efTe<ft, of any ufe in that retreat?

A. I don’t recolledt as it happened, that they were of any other ufe than that of
their not being turned againft us.

Might not thole cannon have been fpiked, and their trunnions have been
knocked off, to have rendered them ufelefs ?

A. I underftand that the fpikes in cannon are eafily removed, and that it is not
an cafy matter, I believe almoft an im portability, with any tools that are carried in
an army, to knock off the trunnions of brafs cannon.

Might not the retreat have been accelerated by leaving behind a great part of
the baggage ?

A. 1 don’t think it would. I do not remember that we were ftopt on account
of any particular impediment.

Q;_ Does your Lordlhip know at what time intelligence was received in General
Burgoyne’s army of the failure of Colonel St. Leger’s expedition ?

A. I think it mull have been in the month of Auguft.

Was not that before the palling of Hudlon’s River ?

A. I don’t recoiled: the exadt date of receiving that intelligence.

Was it in the month of Auguft ?

A. I cannot tell. I heard of it fome time after by accident.

Was there any heavy artillery with the army, properly fo called ?

A There was none of the heavy fort j we had medium twelve-pounders, and
two twenty-four pounders, which we took from the enemy at Quebec, which were
very much lighter than thofe twelve-pounders.

From the ftate of the fatigue of the troops, when they arrived at Saratoga,
do you apprehend they could have continued their march though there had been
no artillery ?

A. The army was certainly very much fatigued. I believe they could have got
but very little further. They certainly were not in a ftate for a long march.

If the battle expedred at Saratoga had been on the plain, would not the
heavieft artillery we had have been one of our bell dependencies ?

A. It certainly would ; it would have given us a manifeft: fuperiority in that
particular.

Q. If the army had not been provided with the number of horfes they had, by
what means would their provilions or bateaux have been transported in places where
the river was not navigable ?

A. The tranfportation of the bateaux and provilions could not certainly have
been carried on.

Qi, Were there not fuch places on the Hudfon’s River between Fort Edward
and Albany ?

A. There were.

Q. Is it not at any rate a principal objedt w ith every army, and of a retreating one
in particular, to preferve their artillery if it be portable, even at the expence of
fome labour and delay ; and for the ufe they might be of to them afterwards, as
well as on the retreat ?

I 2 A. I

1 16.

II 7*

x iS.

119.

120 .

1 2 I .
122 .

123.

By Gen. Bur-
goyne,

124.

By General
Burgoyne.

I2 5*

By General
Burgoyne.

126.

By General
Burgoyne.

127.

By other
members.

EVIDENCE, [Earl of Harrington.

-A* I apprehend the cannon are feldom abandoned , but through abfolute ne-

ceffitv

108 O. Whether in general you can inform the committee, whether the army had

a confidence in the general ? ' , . T , . , ,

'j'hey certainly had a confidence in the general, and 1 do noi believe that

thev have altered their opinion. ...

-i Q. Did the army then in general, and the officers in particular, entertain a
1 2C - > ' favourable opinion of the general’s conduct, capacity, and attachment to them
in the various feenes in which he was engaged, and more particularly on very

trying occafions ? ....

A. I don’t recoiled that any officer, with whom I have had converiation, has
ever exprefled himfelf in different terms, and I believe there never was an army
more defervedly pleafed with the conduct of their general.

0i Whether the army exprefled any diflatisfadion at the general’s return home;

6 ' that is, whether they thought he came with any purpofes not friendly to them,
or looked on themfelves as deferted by him ?

A. I was not with the army when General Burgoyne came away ; but I have
converfed with many officers who have come from it, and they exprefs no dif-
fatisfadion on that head, much lefs looked on or confidered General Burgoyne’s
intentions as inimical to them.

1 3 1 What was the ftate of the American artillery, and how was it ferved ?

A. Except on a few occafions, I do not remember their having made much
ufe of their cannon •, I thought on thofe occafions that they ferved them flovvly,
but not ill.

I 3 2 * Whether all circumftances confidered at the time of the affair of Saratoga,

the retreat of the army was pradicable, either with or without artillery ?

- A. I thought it was impradicable.

J 33 * Whether after the convention at Saratoga you went to Albany?

A. Yes.

J 34 ’ Qi. Whether you had any opportunity of obferving the nature of the country,
if it w'as ftrong or wood) r , clear or open ?

A. Very ftrong and woody, and a great number of hills.

I 35 > What was the diftance ?

A. I don’t exadly recoiled ; about thirty-two miles.

136. Q^Was the fituation of Albany a ftrong fituation, or was it commanded by
hills round it ?

A. The fituation of Albany was in a bottom very much commanded.

137. Q- If the army had penetrated to Albany, from whence might they have drawn
their ibbfiftence, if the country had been againft them ?

A. I don’t know enough of the country to anfvver that queftiom
13S. Qi, Muflrthey not have drawn their fubfiftence from New York ?

A. I apprehend fo, if they were not mafters of the Mohawk country.

I 39* Q^Had you any opportunity of observing the extent of clear or cultivated coun-
try round Albany ?

A. I can’t very juflly deferibe it, not having gone out of the town of Albany, from
the time I came into it,, till I embarked for New York.

Q. Do

Major Forbes.]

evidence.

O Do you think that, circumftanced as the army was after the engagement of
the 19th of September, it would have been more advantageous to have returned than

to have flayed and fortified the camp ? . ,

A. As matters have turned out, it certainly might ; but I believe no one thought
. . 1 IVitbarezv.

fo at that time. L

Major Forbes called in and examined by General Burgoyne..

WAS you major of the 9th regiment, and prefent with that regiment in
the action near Fort Anne ?

A. I was.

o What was the behaviour of the enemy on that occahon ?

A. At half paft ten in the morning, they attacked 11s in front with a heavy and
well-dire&ed fire; a large body of them pa fled the creek on the left, fired from a
thick wood acrofs the creek on the left flank of the regiment ; they then began to
re-ctofs the creek, and' attack us in the rear: we then found it neceflary to change
our ground, to prevent the regiments Being furrounded ; we took poll on the top
of a high hill to our right. As foon as we had taken poft the enemy made a
very vigorous attack, which continued for upwards of two hours , an tney cer-
tainly would have forced us, had. it not been for fome Indians that arrived and
gave the Indian whoop, which we anfwered with three cheers; the rebels ioon al-
ter that gave way.

What command had you on the 19th of September .

A. I commanded the p acquets of the Britifh.

Q. Was you attacked on the march, and with what degree of vigour .

A. I was attacked with great vigour- from behind railed fences, and a hou e, y
a body of riflemen and light infantry.

Was you wounded in that affair ?

A. Very early in the day. ..... .. „ c

Do you remember General Burgoyne bringing up the- Britifh line to fup-

port you, and forming at the firft opening of the wood ?

^ I ci o

Q. Did General Frafer’s corps arrive precifely in time to occupy the heights on
the right of the Britifh line when the aftion began ?

A. It did, and two companies of light infantry came to my fuppoit.

Where did General Burgoyne pofl the 9th regiment ? A ,

140.

2..

Z-

4 -

5 *

7 -

S..

6 2

evidence.

io.

IT.

12 .

*3-

14 -

I 5*

j6.

*7-

18.

[Major Forbes.

A. As foon as they came out of the wood, they filed oft to the right, and
were drawn off at a fmall diftance from the left of General Frafer’s corps, with
orders to occupy two houfes, one company in each, and defend them to the laft
extremity.

Had you an opportunity in that fituation to obferve the ftrefs of the

aflion ?

A. I had while we remained in that pofition,

Q. What was the progrefs of it ?

A. The twenty-firft and fixty-fecond regiments were drawn up on our left,
and were attacked about three o’clock on the fame ground where the picquets
had been attacked. About that time I heard a great deal of firing to my right
with the advanced corps ; an officer came up to General Burgoyne, and acquainted
him that the enemy were endeavouring to turn the left of the fixty-fecond regi-
ment, on which he difpatched an aid-de-camp with orders to the twentieth regi-
ment to form on the left of the fixty-fecond ; immediately after, fome compa-
nies of the light infantry came to occupy the ground the ninth were drawn up
on ; the ninth were then ordered behind a deep ravine, to form a corps-de-
referve I faw nothing of the adtion after that.

What was the ftrength of the ninth regiment on that day before they fuftain-
ed any lofs ?

A. On the 15th of the month the weekly return was given in, and, to the
heft; of my recollection, they were two hundred and fifty and odd rank and file
fit for duty.

What was the ftrength of the other regiments in the Britifh line ?

A. I cannot fpeak with any certainty, as I did not fee the returns ; but on
talking with different commanding officers ■: the four Britifh regiments were about
one thoufand one hundred, and the advanced corps about one thoufand two hun-
dred.

Q. Where was the twenty-fourth regiment ?

A. With the advanced corps.

Q. Where was the forty-feventh regiment ?

A. Six companies of the forty-feventh regiment that were with that army, were
employed as a guard to the bateaux and provifions, and two with the advanced
corps.

Qi, Where were the other two companies of that regiment left ?

A. One at Fort George, and another on an ifland in Lake George.

Q^Of the eleven hundred which compofed the line on that day, do you know
how many were loft and difabled in the adlion ?

A. I have heard the furgeon of the hofpital fay, that there were more than
five hundred of the whole in the hofpital, but I can’t fpeak to how many of
the line.

Qi Can you fay how many were killed ?

A. I can’t.

Can you fay how many officers were killed and wounded ?

A. I can’t immediately.

Were

Major Forbes.] EVIDENCE. 1

Q^Were the Britilh troops in a condition to have attacked an enemy in in- 19.
trenchments after the aCtion ?

A. After the action of the 19th, I went to the hofpital to get my wounds
dreffed, and did not join the regiment till the 8th of Odtober ; I can’t there-
fore give an opinion of my own : but I have heard feveral officers fay, they
did not think it would have been prudent or right from the lofs they had fuftained
the day before.

Cb Did the regiments begin to be encreafed in their flrengt.h from the recovered 20.
men to any confiderable degree in lefs than eight or ten days ?

A. Not that I know of. I was at the hofpital at the time.

Q. Being in the hofpital, had you occafion to know that the regiments were 21.
ftronger from the receipt of their recovered men on the 7th of Odlober, than
they were at any time between the 19th of September and that day ?

A. I know that feveral men were difeharged from the hofpitals fo far recover-
ed as to enable them to do their duty.

At what time did the troops arrive at Saratoga ? 22-

A. About eight o’clock at night on the 9th.

Do you know how long the troops had then been under arms, and without 23.
repole or regular refrefhment ?

A. From the 7th in the morning.

Had they been in a&ion, or in continual expectation of aCtion, during that 24-
whole time ?

A. I was in the front of the army, and I heard a great deal of firing in the rear,
and we conftantly expeCted and looked for an attack.

Did the battery of the enemy on the other fide of the river at Saratoga com- 2 £.
mand the fort on that river ?

A. It did.

Was the ground fuch on our fide as would have enabled our artillery to have 26.
fileuced that battery ?

A. It did not appear to me that it could.

Had the paffage of the ford been effected, and the army have proceeded to- 27.
wards Fort Edward, on the eaft fide of the river, mull they not neceffarily have
palled Batten Hill ?

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. Do you remember the ford at Batten-Hill ? 28.

Y £§

Would it have been poffible for the army to have parted that ford without 29.
artillery to cover them, and the enemy polled on the other fide ?

A. Certainly not. I had an opportunity of feeing the twentieth regiment pafs
that ford without an enemy to oppofe them, and they took a confiderable time,
owing to the depth of the water, the rapidity of the current, and the (tones being
remarkable flippery, fo that feveral of them fell into the river.

Was you prefent at all the councils of war to which the field officers of the 20-
army were called at Saratoga ?

A. I was.

Q_Do>

3*-

E V I D E N C E.

[Major Forbes,

O. Do you remember whether General -fiurgoync ft a ted the difficulties of the time,
and that he mentioned his readinefs to undertake any meafure they mould think for the
honour of the Britiffi arms ?

A. I do remember it. ... 111

q. Was the council unanimous to treat with the enemy on honourable terms i

A. They were. , , ,

Q. When the firft terms propofed by General Gates were read to them, were they

unanimous to rejed them ?

A. They were. . . „ , ., , , , .

0 After it was decided by a majority of the council that the treaty could not

be fufpended without breach of faith, were not the council then unanimous to fign it

on that day ? .......... r .

A. As the majority of the council had given it as their opinion that the public faith

was pledged, the council thought that there was no time to be loft, and that it ought to

be figned immediately.

Examined by other Members of the Committee and by General Burgoyne occafmally.

35 -

3 6 -

37-

38.

39-

40.

41.

Do you know or apprehend that the rebel camp was completely entrenched on
the 19th of September ?

A. I don’t know.

Had you any reafon to believe from information that they completed their en-
trenchments afterwards ?

A. I underftood they had — T don’t fpeak from authority.

Q. Had you reafon to think that the rebels received confiderable reinforcements
between the 19th of September and the 7th of Odober?

A. I did not hear that they had.

Q. Suppofing the rebels to have received reinforcements, should any acceflion of
ftrength to our army from the recovery of any number you can fuppofe of the 500
that were in the hofpital, be equal to a reinforcement of even 500 men received by the
enemy ?

A. I cannot take upon me to fay.

From being in the hofpital yourfclf, how many of the 500 do you judge
joined the army ? *

A. I can’t pretend to fay. \

Q. Do you judge in your own opinion, putting all the circumftances you can toge-
ther, whether the enemy were more likely to be forced on the 20th of September or a
day or two after, than on the 7th of Odober ?

A. It is impoffible for me to judge — I did not know their ftrength on the
19th of September, or what reinforcements they received before the 7th of
Odober.

Cb Did you apprehend the army might have made their retreat good to Canada
immediately afcer die adion of the 19th "of September ?

A. That

Major Forbes.]

evidence.

A. That depended entirely on circumftances.

Judging from the circumftances you then knew, what is your opinion *

A. I was not more acquainted with the circumftances of the ioth of September
than with thofe of the 7th of Ortober. F r

Q^If the army had had three weeks more provifions when they began their retreat
retreat ^ * material cir cumftance to them towards making good their

A. The army could have defended themfelves longer in their entrenchments at Sa-
ratoga if they had had more provifions.

Q. Had you known, immediately after the aftion of the 19th of September, that

a letter had been received from Sir Henry Clinton, mentioning his intention to attack
t re highlands about that time, would you have thought either a retreat or an immediate
attack on the enemy ad vifeable ?

A % Certainly not.

Do you know whether a council of war was called on the 20th of September
or immediately after the engagement of the 19th of September?

A. I don’t know that there was.

QjDid the army in which you ferved, in its approach to Albany, expert a co-ope-
ration from Sir William Howe on the North River ? * *

A. We did.

Do you believe if the army under Sir William Howe, inftead of going
r ^ e Cheiapeak to Philadelphia, had operated upon the North River
to eftert a junction with General Burgoyne’s army, confidering alfo the panic
tliat prevailed after the taking of Ticonderoga, that the army under General
Burgoyne would have been made prifoners ?

A. I fhould think not.

TiSiulerogaT ***** ^ ° Ppofuion from the rebel arm X after the taking

A. I did not.

liami-Iou°"s arT f r ° Unds d ' d yOU fo P ofitive1 }’ expert a co-operation with Sir Wil-

A. f rom General Burgoyne’s orders.

Q. Did you ever fee General Burgoyne’s orders ?

A. Every day during the campaign.

a^* r ' V wbat ° K |et s °t General Burgoyne did you expert a co-operation ?

. ’arly in Ortober General Burgoyne gave it out in orders that there were po-
werful armies of the King’s then co-operating with ours.

Did not thofe orders give fpirits to General Burgoyne’s army ?

us fpiritr^ 38 ° Ur 3rmy W3S ’ CVery prolpea of reinforcement muft certainly give

in ortober ?° U eVer any co-operation before thofe orders of General Burgoyne’s

r\ ^ aS u gene J al i y taPcec * op * n f it e army, but not by authority.

VVhether, if the operations of Sir Henry Clinton on the North River had taken

° n 352 VCfy co-operation

K A. It

42 .

43 -

44 -

By General
Burgoyne.

45 .

By other
Members.

46.

47 *

48.

49.

50.

5 r *

52.

53 -

54 -

[Capt. Bloomfield,

E V

I D E N C E.

55 *

56.

57 -

< 8 .

59 '

A. It might have been attended w. partkoUlTwit^regard to provifions, was General
Bu^r.™"t&you mentioned thofe encouraging hopes of co-operation

" executed, is no, _

oftaV. anfwer very elfitoally the purpofo of , diverfi o».

^I^tltere h^d^bee^a^om^Uo^war^n^e^^ciT of September, or immediate.,
after^the engagement of the t 9 th, (hould you have known of tc ?

Q Whether ranftdenng the circumftances of Sir William Howe's having car-
Q. W netner, “ >n . , » , B you f upp ofed, or ever heard it fuppofed,

Xat armory cSton would have attempted his operations up the North
Ri” r fooner Sn he did, or previous to the arnval of hts retnforcemen, from

Europe ? s . r -Clinton's ftrength, or his orders, nor the force

the enemy had to oppofe him, it is impoffible for me to anfwer that quef-

‘‘“q What effect had it on the fpirits of General Burgoyne's army when they found
the ^ was to be no co-operation between that army and the army of Sir William

Howe ^

A. We never knew but that there was to be a co-operauon. ' Withdrew.

Captain Bloomfield, of the Artillery, called in, and examined by

General Burgoyne.

1. Q^IN what capacity did you ferve in the campaign in America in 1776 and
1777 ?

A. I was major of brigade of the royal artillery. -

a. Q. Was you employed by General Phillips, on your return to England, ai
the campaign of 1776, to folicit a further i'upply of artillery for the lervice 0

the enfuing campaign ? , r vr u Pt .

A. On my leaving General Phillips at St. John’s, in the month or Novern »■
1776, I was charged with a letter to Sir Guy Carleton, wherein he recommen
4

Capt. Bloomfield.] EVIDENCE.

it to make a demand of a further fupply of artillery and {lores for the com-
plete equipment ot an additional number of gun-boats for the fervice of Lake
Champlain in the eni'uing campaign, and likcwife for the boats themfelves to
be fent out in frame-work. Sir Guy Carleton, on pcrufing the letter, difap-
proved of the boats being fent out, but approved of the demand of the (lores
and ardllery agreeable to General Phillips’s requeft, and they were accordingly
lent out in the beginning of the year 1777.

Ql At what time did you join the army in the campaign of 1777? 3.

A. 1 joined the army at Ticonderoga on the 23d of July.

Qc, Did .you live in^ the family of General Phillips, and had you occafion to 4.
know his fentiments refpefting the artillery department ?

A. I did chiefly live with the general, and had frequent occafion to know his
fentiments on the fubjedt of the artillery in the courle of my duty as brigade-
major. 0

Did you know, or had you reafon to believe, that the proportion of ar- 5.
tillery employed that campaign was according to the opinion and recommenda-
tion of General Phillips ?

A. I can have no doubt but that an officer of General Phillips’s rank and
extenfive experience muft have determined that point.

Qi, W hat was the diftnbution of the artillery after the enemy evacuated Ti- 6 .
conderoga ?

A. I he light brigade of artillery proceeded with the army by the way of
Skenelborough ; the park brigade and {lores were conveyed acrofs Lake George
in bateaux.

Q. Was not a confiderable portion of artillery of the heavieft kind either left 7.
at St. John’s, fent back from Ticonderoga, or difpoled of in veflels ?

A. It was : there were left at Ticonderoga fix heavy twelve- pounders, one light
twelve-pounder, four light three-pounders, four royal mortars and twelve co-
horns. Left on board the Royal George, two heavy twenty-four- pounders, two
thirteen-inch mortars, two ten-inch mortars, four eight-inch mortars, four royal
mortars and eight cohorns. Sent back to St. John’s in the Radau, fourteen

heavy twenty-four-pounders, two eight-inch howitzers. Left at Fort George,
four medium twelve-pounders, two light fix-pounders, two eight-inch howitzers,
two royal howitzers. With Colonel St. Leger’s expedition to Fort Stanwix were
fent two light fix-pounders, two light three-pounders, four cohorns. Left at St.
John’s, four light lix-pounders, five light three-pounders, four cohorn mortars :
that was the diftribution of artillery that remained after the army had quitted
Fort George. The quantity of artillery brought forward with the army were
four medium twelve-pounders, two light twenty-four- pounders, eighteen light
fix-pounders, fix light three- pounders, two eighteen-inch howitzers, four royal
howitzers, two eight-inch mortars, four royal mortars.

Q. Was not that park artillery, tho’ confifting of fome twenty. four-pounders g
and fome twelve pounders, properly field artillery ?

A. They certainly were, and have ever been conlldered as fuch on all field
fervices. Heavy artillery is of a diflimfi: nature, and confiderably heavier than
guns of the fame calibre w T hich we had in the army.

K 2

Q. Have

EVIDENCE. [Capt. Bloomfield.

9 -

.7 0 .

I I.

12 .

* 3 -

14.

* 5 *

16.

17.

18.

Q, Have you ever known a left proportion than the brigaded artillery, which
was attached to the line and to the advanced corps, allotted to the fame num-

0t A? f The proportion of field artillery certainly fhould vary both in quantity
and nature according to tire variety of circumftances under which the army is to
ad •, the ufual allotment of light field pieces are two to each battalion and
from a calculation of the number and ftrength of General Burgoynes army, I do
not conceive that our light field artillery exceeded that proportion.,

Q. What do you apprehend was the propofed ufe of artillery in the country,

in which we were to ad? r , r .

A. To diflodge the enemy from fuch polls as every where prefent themlelves

in that part of the country, and from which it may be impofiible to diflodge
them without artillery of a more confiderable calibre than light fix-pounders.

O. Do vou remember the pofition which the enemy evacuated at Schuylei s
Iflahd ?

A. I do perfectly. .

Q. Had that pofition been maintained, would not artillery of the heavieft
nature we had have been particularly ferviceable ?

A. Provided the poll could not have been turned, and the enemy had made
ufe of every advantage which the ground gave them, I have no doubt but the
park artillery would have been abfolutely neceflary.

Had the pafTage of the Hudfon’s River, or of Batten Kill been difputed,
would artillery of that nature have been ferviceable ?

A. Doubtlefs it would.

Had the enemy taken a pofition at the Forks of the Mohawk River,
would artillery of that nature have been ferviceable ?

A. From the imperfect manner in which I faw that ground, it appeared ca-
pable of being made extremely defenfible, and, of courle, that fort of artillery
would have been ferviceable.

Had the army reached Albany, and it had been found expedient to for-
tify a camp there for the winter, would artillery of that nature have been

neceflary ?

A. There can be no doubt of it.

What do you apprehend to be the chief ufe of howitzers and fmall
mortars in the field.

A. I apprehend they are of inSnite fervice againft, all kinds of log work, ab-
baties, and againft entrenchments.. The fmall mortars are particularly ufeful
againft redoubts and other works where the enemy are confined within a fmall
fpace.

Are not log works a fpecies of fortification peculiar to that country ?

A. I never faw any elfewhere.

Q^Was the carrying forward the artillery from Lake George to the place where
the army crofted the Hudfon’s River any impediment to the tranfport of pro-
vifions ?

A. The tranfport of our artillery and ftores were conftantly made by horfes

attached

Capt. Bloomfield.} EVIDENCE. h

attached to our department, and therefore I do not conceive it did in any man-
ner interfere with the tranfport of provifions — I mean to confine myfelf in this
anfvver to the tranfport from Fort George to the Hudfon’s River ; for after crof-
fmg the river we had fome oxen and horfes attached to the fervice of the ar-
tillery, which I believe were before employed in bringing forward provifions and
bateaux.

What time did it take to bring forward the park artillery from Fort George 19,
to the bridge of boats over the Hudfon’s River ?

A. The light brigade and the artillery of the park, with their proper propor-
tion of (lores and ammunition, had their horfes, carriages, and drivers conftantly
attached to them ; it therefore required no more time to carry thole (lores than
was neceffary for the carriages themfelves to pals from Fort George to the
Hudfon’s River •, but with refptft to the referve which was afterwards tranf-
ported by water in bateaux, I believe two days with all our carriages would eafily
have conveyed them to the Hudfon’s River.

Q. Do you remember the pofition of the King’s troops from the time of the 20.
attack on the 19th of September to the attack on the 7th of October?

A. Yes.

Had the army made a movement to gain the left of the enemy’s en- 2 re-
trenchments without previoufly conftrufting redoubts on the heights that com-
manded the plain, would not the bateaux, provifions and hofpital have been
left open to an attack from, the enemy’s right ?

A. They would have been left expofed undoubtedly.

Q. Were nor the largell guns we had the. propereft pieces of artillery for thofe 22.
redoubts ?

A. I think if was a fervice that was exaftaly adapted to them.

Q. Do you remember the difpolition made by General Burgoyne on the 7th
of Oflober ?

A. I do.

Qo At what, time was you wounded in that attack ?' 2 4 *

A. I believe in about twenty minutes after it commenced..

What circumftance of the aftion did you oblervc before you was wound- 25.
ed, particularly refpedling the artillery and the enemy’s advancing under the lire
of the artillery, and what happened to the troops polled immediately on the left
of the artillery ?

A. The ground on which the artillery was polled was a clear fpot, in a great
meafure lurrounded by woods, the ikirts of which on our left was dillant
about two hundred yards where the attack firft began. The two medium twelve-
pounders were polled on a frnall eminence, nearly in the center of this cleared,
lpot between the German picquets and a detachment of the Heffe Hanan regi-
ment. On the enemy’s column approaching, the fire of the twelve-pounders and-
the four fixes was immediately directed towards the enemy’s column, notwith-
standing which, they drew up along the fkirts of the wood behind trees, and
after driving in the Germans, kept a pretty warm fire of mulketry on the guns
and the troops polled about them *, foon after this I heard a firing on the right

towards

E V I D

E N C E.

[Capt. Bloomfield.

, i , r ^ f rnm us by a wood on which the light infan.

“«e a poStn ve.7 commanding ground. ' On their retreating, as alfo the twenty.
Kh'^imen, wi jwas drawn up I^'oTth^

!i l"rv-At this moment 1 received my wound, and therefore can give no farther
account of the circumftances of that day’s action.

Examined by other Members of the Committee.

26.

27 *

28.

29.

3 °-

3 1

3 2

Q. What was the number of horfes in general employed for the artillery af-

ter the march from Ticonderoga ? . t . r> ••n *ti

A. The whole number of horfes detached with the Britifii artillery, previous

to the pairing the Hudfon’s River, was about four hundred.

How many would have been neceffary for the field pieces attached to the

bauahons only^ ^ ders a£ four hor f cs each ; fix three-pounders at three

horfes each, and two royal howitzers at three horfes each : the remainder were for
park artillery, ammunition, and ftores of all kinds to accommodate the army on

its march. ... ...

Q. Was the 1 forage for thefe horfes procured in the country on their march,

or brought from a diftance ?

A. A quantity of oats was brought forward from Canada, but with refpect to
other forage they were under the neceffity of collecting it in the neighbourhood

of the encampment. , c , ,

Q. How many waggons might the bringing on that quantity or oats employ .
A. I believe the quantity of oats after palling Fort Edward was fo trifling

that I don’t believe it loaded one waggon. ...

After the army arrived at Fort Edward, did any delay or not arue to its
forward progrefs from bringing on the park artillery, waiting for horles and ri-
vers for that purpofe, or to provide forage? .

A. The park artillery remained at Fort Edward no longer than was neceliary
during the time the army remained in that neighbourhood : I do not know or
any delay whatever from the want of horfes and drivers. Had the park artillery
moved forwards looner, no end could have been anfwered by it, beiore the bri ge
was thrown over the Hudfon’s River.

Were there any gun-boats fent out to Quebec for the campaign 17 7° •

A. There were.

Were there a fufficient number fent out, in your opinion ? ,

A. It appeared that the naval force was fuperior to that of the rebels, from t e
event of that engagement ; and therefore I conclude, that for the ufes of that cam-
paign there were a fufficient number.

Did you apprehend, before the event of the a 61 ion on the lakes, that the num-
ber was fufficient, and went out in time ? . txr

A. vie

EVIDENCE.

Capt. Bloomfield.]

A. We had received very exaggerated accounts of the rebel force on the lakes,
and therefore uncommon exertions were ufed to render our force as formidable as
polfible and probably fome time was loll, and the campaign in fome degree
retarded, from that cireumftance.

Would the campaign have been retarded fo long if a greater number of gun- 34.
boats had been fent out ?

A. Certainly not.

What number of artificers were fent to Canada for the campaign in 1776 ?

A. I don’t immediately recolledt the exatft number ; but I think Colonel Chriftie
engaged about two hundred. I know of no others being fent out.

Do you know of more being alked for by the artillery or engineers, as necelfary 3 6.
for the campaign ?

A. I did hear of fome fuch intention ; but at this diftance of time I cannot parti-
cularly anfwer that queftion.

Q^_ Whether the number of artificers fent out for that campaign were, in any 37.
degiee, fufficient for the purpofe of carrying it on ?

A Certainly not. We were under the neeeffity of coliefling all the artificers that
could be met with in Canada tor the armament of St. John’s only, moft of the
bateaux being built by private c ontradt.

Q. Were nor the operations of that campaign confiderably retarded, for want of 38.
the number of artificers that were alked for and not granted ?

A. Had the number of artificers been greater, there can be no doubt but the
work would have gone on much falter. With refpedt to the artificers being de-
manded, I have already faid l do not recolledt the number.

Were there not horfes necelfary for conveying the ftores and ammunition 39 -
necelfary for the field train ; and how many ?

A. The belt anfwer to that queftion will, I apprehend, be a ftate of the number of
horfes actually attached to the feveral brigades of artillery, fince the allotment of
ftores and ammunition were exactly proportioned to the number of pieces which
thev accompanied. Anfwer in-

[The brigade attached to the advanced corps of light artillery confifted of
eighty-five—] > fhe detail.

How many horfes might have been {pared, if the heavy park of artillery had 40.
not attended the army ?

A. It would have made a difference of two hundred and thirty-feven horfes.

Q. Was the army furnilhed with carts to have employed thofe two hundred and 41.
thirty-feven horfes ?

A. I really cannot anfwer that queftion of my own knowledge.

[Withdrew.

Jovis

EVIDENCE.

Lieut. Col. Kingfton.j

J&vis 3° die Junii, I 779 -

Lieutenant Colonel Kingston called in, and examined by Gcneial Burgoyne.

2 .

3 -

4 -

5 -

Q. IN what capacity did you aft in the campaign of 1777 ?

A. As deputy adjutant general of the province of Quebec ; I acted as adjutant
general of the army under General Burgoyne, and alfo as fecietary to General Bur-

g0 Q!*Did not that double capacity, and the confidence with which General Burgoyne
treated you, lead you to the knowledge of the material circumflances attending that
campaign ?

A. I looked on myfelf to be in the entire confidence of the general.

Did General Burgoyne give any orders for the augmentation of artillery de-
ftined for this expedition, after his arrival in Canada ?

A. There was no fuch order went through me ; nor did I hear of any fuch order
being given.

Q? Have you reafon to believe that the proportion of artillery employed was ac-
cording to the opinion and recommendation of Major General Phillips ?

A. I believe General Burgoyne had the greateft confidence in General Phillips’s
knowledge and abilities; and I believe the proportion of artillery to have been
arranged between General Phillips and Sir Guy Carleton, becaufe I don’t know of
any direftions given by General Burgoyne upon that head.

What were the orders given, at the opening of the campaign, refpefting the
incumbrances of baggage ?

[The witnefs refers to the orderly book, which he had with him .

Read the orders.

They are the original orders, written by myfelf at the time.

[Reads."] “ Extrafts from orders iflfued by Lieutenant General Burgoyne at Montreal,

dated 30th May, 1777.

“ The regiments deftined for the expedition under General Burgoyne are to
“ leave in their refpeftive ftores their blanket coats, legging, and all baggage
“ that can be fpared during the fummer months ; the officers are depended on
“ not to encumber the fervice with more baggage than ffiall be abfolutely ne-
“ cefiary for a campaign where the movements may be expefted to be fudden
“ and alert ; the portion of bateaux to each regiment will be regulated on thofe
“ principles.”

6. Q. Were thofe orders afterwards enforced ?

A. Orders

7 3

Lieut. Col. Kingflon] EVIDENCE.

A. Orders were iffued again to the fame purport, dated Skenefborough Houfe,
July 1 2.

** [ Reads.} “ It is obferved that the injunction given, before the army took the field,
“ relative to the baggage of officers, has not been complied with ; and that the regi-
“ ments in general are encumbered with much more baggage than they can poffibly be
“ ffipplied with means of conveying, when they quit the lake and rivers ; warning is
“ therefore again given to the officers, to convey by the bateaux, which will loon
“ return to Ticonderoga, the baggage that is not indifpenfibly neceffary to them •,
« or upon the firft fudden movement, it muff inevitably be left upon the ground.
“ Such gentlemen as ferved in America the laft war may remember that the officers
“ took up with foldiers’ tents, and often confined their baggage to a knapfack for
“ months together.”

Q. Have you a letter from General Burgoyne to General Reidefel, on the fubjefl
of the incumbrance of baggage ?

A. I have an extract of it, taken from the original letter in the letter-book. It is
as follows :

Extract of a Letter from Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne to Major General Reidefel, dated Head
Quarters at Skenejhoi ough, the iKth July, 1777.

“ Je vous fupplie de faire en forte, que l’efprit de l’ordre par rapport
“ a le renvoye des baggages des officiers a Ticonderoga aye lieu.^

“ Les baggages des officiers Britanniques font deja renvoyes, et il n’en
« rede a plulieurs qu’une petite tente, et un valife. C’eft reelement pour
“ l'intereft de l’officier a la fin, que je fuis fi porte a cet article.”

TRANSLATION.

“ I requefl you to take meafures that the fpirit of the order refpeefting
“ the fending back officers’ baggage to Ticonderoga may have due force.

“ The baggage of the Britiffi officers is already gone, and many of them
* s have only retained a fmall tent and one cloak bag. It is really for the in-
“ tereft of the officers, in the end, that I am fo preffing upon this fubjedl.”

Q^When the contract was made for horfes and carts at Montreal, was it the
general opinion of the perfons of belt intelligence confulted, that the number was
more or lefs than neceffary for the fervice on w’hich we w r ere going ?

A. In general converfation on that fubjett I remember to have heard it (aid, that
though they were infufficient, we might expedf to find additional fupplies in the
country. I have extracts of letters here that paffecl between General Burgoyne and
General Phillips on that fubjeft. They are extracted from the original letter copy-
book.

Llave you the returns, or extracts of the returns, of the ftrength of the army

at all the different periods of the campaign ?

L A. I

9 -

See Appen
dix.

10 .

EVIDENCE.

[Lieut. Col. Kingfton.

A. I have extrafts from the returns.

ii. What was the ftrength of the regular troops, at the higheft, at the opening of

the campaign, rank and file, fit for duty ?

A. The firft returns I received on the firft of July,

The Britifh were 3576 fit for duty.

Germans 2919 do.

6489

I fpeak folely of the army under Lieut. General Burgoyne.

12. What were the numbers of the artillery, and the corps under Lieutenant
Nutt, attached to the fervice of the artillery ?

Britifh artillery 257

Germans 1 00

Recruits under Lieut. Nutt 154

13. Were there any other troops in the army that could be called regulars ?

A. There were Canadians, Provincials, and Indians ; but I never confidered them
as regulars, becaufe they were not difciplined.

14. Can you ftate about what was the number of the Canadians ?

A. The Canadians were 148 the higheft number.

jj' Q. The Provincials ?

A. I would be undcrftood to fpeak to the opening of the campaign the firft of July.
They were low then, and enereafed afterwards. They were then 83.

16. The Indians ?

A. Between three and four hundred. It was very difficult to collect what their
number was exadbly.

17. Was the army ever fo high in numbers. Provincials and Indians excepted, as
at that period ?

A. I believe it never was. On the 3d of September additional companies joined
the Britifh, to the amount of about 300 men ; but from killed and wounded, and the
garrifon left at Ticonderoga, the army was at no time equal to its firft number.

18. What was the force left at Ticonderoga ?

A. The firft garrifon confifted of 462 Britifh, rank and file, 448 Germans, rank
and file •, making 910 in the whole.

19. Q. Do you remember the difficulties which attended moving the wounded to
Ticonderoga, after the aftion at Huberton ?

A. I remember to have heard they were very great. Different propofitions were
made for the removing them, fuch as biers and hand-barrows, which were fo very
incommodious, that I remember to have been told that the wounded would rather
be left where they were than move in the then ftate of their wounds by fuch con-
veyances.

20. Do you know what were General Burgoyne’s motives for detaching General
Reidefel with a large corps of troops to the country in the neighbourhood of Caf-
tleton ?

A. I don’t remember to have been prefent when General Reidefel received his
orders or inftrudtions ; but I underftood it was to create an alarm towards the Con-
nedticut, to give encouragement to the loyal inhabitants, if any fuch there were,,
and to protect thofe that were wounded at Huberton or thereabouts.

Was

Lieut. Col. Kingfton.] EVIDENCE.

Was the removal of thofe wounded effected long before General Reidefel was 21.
recalled from Caftleton ?

A. 1 believe not; for I am not quite certain that the whole were moved when Ge-
neral Reidefel returned to the army at Skenefborough, a day or two before the firft
divifion of the army moved towards Fort Anne.

Q. Have you any papers written by General Burgoyne between the time he was 22 .
at Montreal and the time he left Skenefborough, explanatory of the motives on
which he aCted ? See Appen-

A. I have. They are extracts from the original letter-book. dix.

Are you acquainted with any fafts that will alcertain whether, on the army’s 23.
arriving at Fort Edward, it was forwarder in its progrel's towards Albany, in point
of time, than it would have been had it taken the route by Ticonderoga and Lake
George ?

A. In anfwer to that queltion I have to fay, the army, by taking that route, was
a-head of the tranfport of provifions, which, for the greater parr, went from Ticon-
deroga by the route of Lake George.

Ck At our firft arrival at Fort Edward, and previous to the roads being mended, 24.
in what proportion did provifions arrive at our camp P

A. Very little more than for the immediate confumprion.

Q. Have you the memorandum-books of Sir Francis Clarke ? 25.

A. Yes.

Ck Do you know them to be his hand-writing ? 26.

A. I am fully convinced of it, having feen him enter many of the articles in thele
books.

Ck, Has there been any alteration or addition fince you had them ?

A. None.

What was the chara&er of Sir Francis Clarke refpeCting his accuracy ? 28.

A. I never faw an officer more attentive to the duties of his ftation than Sir Francis
Clarke, and always found him exceedingly accurate in the remarks he made.

Q. Are there any memorandums refpefting the arrival of provifions at that 29.
time ?

A. There are feveral.

Ck, You will read two or three ? 30.

A. {-Reads."] — “ Fifth Auguft. Victualling of the army out this day. and from
“ difficulties of the roads and tranfports, no provifion came in this night.”

“ Sixth Auguft. — At ten o’clock this morning, not quite enough provifions arrived
** for the confumption of two days.”

Q^Was it in general underftood, from the combined intelligence received by 31.
General Reidefel, while he was detached to Caftletown, and that received by Ge-
neral Burgoyne from the Provincials in his camp, that there were many well affcCted
inhabitants towards Bennington, who would ffiew themfelves on the approach of
troops ; and that there was dejedtion and fubmiffion among the party attached to the
congrefs in that country ?

A. I did hear feveral reports to that purpofe.

L 2

Have

. 32 -

See Appen-
dix.

33 -

3 4 *
35 *

3 6 -

37 '

EVIDENCE.

[Lieut. Col. Kingfton,

q Have you the original rough draft of the expedition to Bennington as preferred
to General Burgoyne from General Reidefel » with General Burgoyne s alterations and

additions ?^e ^ ^ h draft of the propofals for the expedition to Benning-

ton-* but not being prefent at the time, I can’t fay whether thofe propofals were deli-
vered by General Reidefel or not ; but I know of alterations made in thofe propofals
by General Burgoyne, from a knowledge ot his hand-writing.

Noie The witnefs delivered in to the Committee the original rough draft of the

Tnfl-rnftions. with a fair copy.

Whether you have reafon to know that all the erafures and alterations in that

plan "were made before the expedition took place ?

A. I believe they were, from the reading of it.

Q. Do you remember taking this plan to General Phillips the day General Bur-
rroyne went to Fort George to infpeCt the tranfport of provifions ?

^ A. I do remember it very well •, it was the rough draft I took.

Q. What were General Phillips’s fentiments upon it ?

a! I remember General Phillips and I had a long converfation on the flownefs of
the arrival of the tranfport of provifions % and he faid he looked on this as a very good
idea •, that he faw no objection, and alked me if 1 knew of any.

Do you remember fhewing the plan to General Frafer ?

A. I do very well.

Q. What did he exprefs on the fubjeCt ? __

A. He defired me to leave it with him till the afternoon for his confideration. He
came himfelf to my tent the next morning early ; he exprefifed himfelf to me in a
manner that conveyed a difapprobation of the Germans being employed in it. 1
think 1 : obferved to him that fince the honour gained by the advanced corps at Hu-
berton, I believed General Reidefel was defirous of having the Germans employed.

I mentioned to General Frafer my ideas of provifions being obtained by that expedi-
tion, and the army thereby enabled to get quicker on to Albany than waiting for the
flow tranfport from Fort George. General Frafer faid fomething about Germans, which
I don’t recolleft; which brought this remark from me. I defired General Frafer,
from the friend&ip he had. for General Burgoyne, if he faw any real objection
to this plan, to exprefs himfelf fully and freely to General Burgoyne himfelf •, that
the fcouts of the army and the guides were attached to his the advanced corps, and
he might, through them, perhaps know more of the nature of the country than
1 did T and therefore I prefled him to mention his objections, if he had any, to
General Burgoyne. I think he faid, but am not quite certain, ‘ f the Germans are
“ not a very aCtive people ; but it may do.” I prefled him at parting to go to
General Burgoyne, if bethought it would not do. He faid No, and went off.

CK Were not many of the Provincials in the army of the country about Benning;
ton, and towards the Connecticut ?

A. I can’t pretend to fay they were from that country ; but I underftood many of
them were well acquainted with that country.

Lieut. Col. Kingfton.]

evidence.

0^ Do you remember Captain Sherwood in particular ?

A. I do very well.

(V Was he of that country ?

AT I underftood he was of that neighbourhood. ^ nfn1t . nn an

O. Did you ever hear Colonel Skeene, or any other Provincial, confulted on an

eviction into that country, exprefs any apprehenfion ot its iuccels .

A I never did. Sir Francis Clarke told me he had received favourable accounts
from Colonel Skeene-, and I believe after part ot the expedition had tactn

pl q 6 * Are there any memorandums of Sir Francis Clarke’s, refpecting the expedi-
tion to Bennington ?

IsThere any that marks the diftance between Batten Kill and Bennington ?

£j;;i « From 'Xe'momh^of Batten Kill, Eaft, for two miles ; then ftrike off
South Faff for about fifteen miles to Cambridge -, and to on about twelve miles

Q. ^Have °you* the original letters, written from Colonel Baume to General Bur-

g °A 6 Thev'tr^ere. °" ^ ' [Hr delivered them in to the Committee .

Q, Is there any memorandum of Sir Francis Clarke’s marking the time when
Colonel Breyman was ordered to march to lupport Colonel Baume . .

A \_Reads.~] “ 15th Auguft. Exprefs arrived from Sancoick at five in the morn-

: nrv . fAi-i.c dp referve ordered to march. .

“ S i6th Auguft. During the night, exprefs arrived from Sancoick with an account
of the repulfe this evening of a detachment of ours on an expedition. .

« Sunday 17th Auguft. The general went up to the twentieth, regiment, ad-
vanced on the road & to Sancoick, and met the corps de referve, the men ot that

Do 'y ou 1 recolleft what ^time of the day it was General Burgoyne met Colo.-

nelBreyman on his return on the 17th ?

A T thirk it was fometime between one and three o clock-

Have you the inftrudtions given by General Burgoyne to Colonel- Skeene on

-that expedition ?

a “'there any 0 ' 'memorandum of Sir Francis Clarice's, of any intelligence received
from* Colonel St. Leger about this time ?

A There is of the 1 2th of Auguft. „ „ _ _ . „

f Reads.] “ This morning received intelligence of an aftion near Fort -tanwix.
After the failure of the expedition to Bennington, can you fpeak to the ef-
forts made for forwarding provifions ? f , f r under .

A I know that very great efforts were made both before and alter. I under
flood that General Burgoyne and General Phillips had been both at different times
at Fort George to forward the provifions, and I believe fubfequent to the 1 new s
from Bennington. The quarter-mafter-general (I mean Captain Money), was fent

39 -

40 .

AIo

4 *.

43 -

44 -

See the Ap*
pendix.

45 -

((

4 6 ..

47 -

See the Ar
pendix.

49 -

7 8

5 °

Fee the Ap-
pendix.

5 1,

5 . 3 -

54 '

55 '

See the Ap-
pendix.

56.

57 -

58.

59 -

60.

EVIDENCE. [Lieut. Col. Kingftofl.

by General Burgoyne to Fort Edward, and I believe to Fort George, to colled
all horl'es and teams poffible, and to make every exertion to bring forward the
provifions.

Q^Have you the calculation, made by the commifiary- general, of the carriages
and horl'es necell’ary for different given quantities of provifions ?

A. It is here. I believe it is the original.

b)id the march of the artillery from Fort George to the bridge of boats over
Hudlon’s River, interfere with the tranfport of provifions ?

A. I have had many converfations with General Phillips and the quarter-mafter-
general about the tranfport of provifions, and never remember to have heard from
them, or any other perfon, that the march of the artillery interfered in anv manner
With the tranfport of provifions. y

Qi, About what time did the additional companies arrive?

A. The 3d of September.

’ Qi y ] 7 was ^ ate of the army when we pafied the Hudfon’s River >

A ' % !’ e . turn 8 oes to the ift of September.

Britifh, fit for duty under arms, 2635 rank and file.

Germans — jy tl

rerarfS exciufe Aem! j ° ! " ^ ** 3d ° f Se l >,ember > fo *!»

time? Wllat WaS ^ ftrength the artiller y and Lieutenant Nutt’s corps at that

return. 1 bdieVe the “ WaS Veiy lktle variation in either of them bom the former

n( 2 rllTc° U , Ge [ era |,. Burgoyne’s application to Sir Guy Carleton for a gar-
nfon from Canada for I iconderoga, before he paffed the Hudfon’s River ? S

nth” of Tuly C f 7 r !? S l°” K letter L °/ T °f neral Bur g°y ne t<> Sir Guy Carleton, the
rv w u 777, d the 2 9 th of July, *777-

the mmn of the in the ftren S th of the arm 7 between

tne return of the 1 ft of September, and the aftion on the 10th ?

terfal. ^ ° r tW °’ but the lofs was n °t material in that in-

aftion where C rher^ \°^ ^ ^r rv ‘ ce ’ j k l,7 0U ever know any inftance of a day of
per for baZJl JIT T dedud ™ S from the effe&ive length upon pa-

tal contingencies ? S *' at " menj CafC ° f the fick ’ and other indifpenfible regimen-

A. Lapprehend there muft always be deductions of that fort.

deduction for rtTJarf ^ lT there not a confk, erable additional
A !tmi4 ? r and defence of the bateaux and movable magazines ?

O wT ° f n COUrfe , ® ak * an a dditional drain from the army. & *

ticular fervice? 3 " e 3 ° f the fo rty-feventh regiment appropriated to that par-
A. It generally was ; I believe always fo.

““p« * ■»-

4 A. I

EVIDENCE.

Lieut. Col. Kingfton.]

A. I believe the four regiments of the line engaged that day amounted to lit-
tle more than one thoufand one hundred men on the fpot under arms in the ac-
tion.

What lofs did the Britilh fuftain in that a&ion ? 6r.

A. Killed, wounded, and prifoners, rather more than lefs than five hundred.

<L Can you fpeak particularly to the lofs of the line ? 62.

A. I believe about feventy-fix killed rank and file, and between two hundred
and forty and two hundred and fifty wounded, and about twenty-eight or thirty
miffing and prifoners.

<L, Do you recolleft the ftrength of the 20th regiment when they made their 6 3,
laft charge on the enemy ?

A. 1 do very well. I was by General Phillips when the orders were given for
that charge ; he was then in the front of the line : the ranks appeared to be
very thin, the regiment were much fatigued with the length of the a&ion, but
moved on to the charge with fpirit.

CL Do you remember General Burgoyne going up to the fixty-fecond regiment 64*
immediately after the firing ceafed, and the report that was made to him by the
commanding officer of the ftate of that regiment ?

A. I remember it, and the officer reporting the great lofs they had fuflain-
ed in the aftion ; I faw them, and they appeared to be very confiderably reduced
in number.

Q. Do you remember the officer mentioning that they had not above fifty or fixty 65^
men in the regiment ?

A. I can’t fpeak pofitively to that ; but in my own judgment they did not ex-
ceed that number.

CL Were not both the field-officers wounded ? 66.

A. Colonel Anftruther and Major Harnage were both wounded, and a great many
other officers were killed and wounded, and the regiment fuffered greatly.

CL To what degree did the men of the artillery fuff’er in that adfion ? 67*

A. I think, but am not quite certain, that the number that were with four guns
amounted to forty-eight. I faw Captain Jones, who was a very gallant man, and
commanded thofe four guns, killed, and fome other officers wounded, and I be-
lieve about thirty fix of the men were killed and wounded. I fhould in juflice
to the artillery fay, that I think it is not in the power of men to keep a bet-
ter fire, both of round and grape-fhot, than was fucceffively maintained for feveral
hours that day.

CL From your experience in the fervice, do you conceive it would have oc- 684 .
curred to any officer, to engage troops, if he could poffibly avoid it, in the fitua*
tion in which the Britifh line was the day after that action ?

A. The experience of an officer of my inferior rank does not lead to much ;
but I fhould have been forry to have given orders to thofe regiments, after the
gallant fufferings of that day, to have attacked an army reported, both from our
fpies and our prifoners, to be very near if not more than four times the num-
ber of our whole force : add to this, the country was a very thick wood, and

the

EVIDENCE. [Lieut. Col. Kingfton,

69.

70.

71 -

73 .

73 -

74-

the fituation of the rebel camp, I believe, could not by any means be recon-
noitred within that fpace of time.

Q_Do you remember General Burgoyne receiving a letter from Sir Henry
Clinton the day but one after that atfion, informing him, that he intended about
that time an attack on Fort Montgomery ?

A. I do remember his receiving a letter from Sir Henry Clinton about that time ;
it was the 2 2d of September.

Q, Do you imagine that any officer knowing of that letter would have enter-
tained thoughts of immediately renewing an attack upon the enemy ?

A. As far' as an opinion of an officer of my inferior rank goes, I fhould not
have thought of it, nor did I hear any officer of any rank exprefs fuch an idea
at that time.

From what you knew of the country, did you not believe that a fuc-
cefsful attack from Sir Henry Clinton during the time we lay at that camp,
would either have diflodged General Gates entirely, or have obliged him to de-
tach confiderably from his army ?

A. I remember our fcouts giving information, that a bridge was laid over
the Hudfon’s River, very near the enemy’s camp ; and it was the opinion of
fome very confidential men that were employed in that army in that capacity,
and were much under the direction of General Frafer, that on the approach of
Sir Henry Clinton’s army, the army of Mr. Gates could not fland us, but would
crofs the river, and go towards New England. Whether the idea was right or
wrong, I can’t tell.

Did you ever hear fuch perfons, or any others, exprefs an idea, that the
enemy would have taken the fame meafure on our advancing to attack them
without that co-operation ?

A. I don’t remember to have heard any fuch thing.

Q, Do you imagine that any officer knowing of Sir Henry Clinton’s letters,
would have thought it proper to retreat after the adlion of the 19th of Sep-
tember ?

A. I never heard any officer exprefs an idea of that fort. I don’t know what
officers might be within the knowledge of fuch a letter; but I lived intimate-
ly with General Phillips, General Frafer, and with Mr. Twifs, the engineer ;
whether the letter was in their knowledge or not, I don’t know' : but I never
heard them exprefs fuch an idea.

Q. Did you ever hear any officer of that army, though unacquainted with
the letter, before or fince the time, exprefs a difapprobation of the meafure of
remaining in that camp without either attacking or retreating ?

A. Neither then or at any time while I remained in America, and of courfe
not fince.

Q. From your converfation with the chief engineer, and from other circum-
flances, have you reafon to know, that every poffible means were ufed after
the adtion of the 19th, to obtain a knowledge of the ground on the enemy’s

* * '

Lieut. Col. Kingfton.} EVIDENCE. 81

A. I had frequent converfations with the chief engineer on that fubjeCt. I be-
lieve his attention was given to that point almoft every day, and a knowledge of
that ground I underftood to be very difficult to be obtained.

Was not the right of the enemy deemed impracticable.. 7^

A. I had no opportunity myfelf of feeing the right of the enemy ; but I un-
derftood from others, that the pofition was too ftrong to-be attacked with any pro-
fpeCt of fuccefs.

Were there not frequent confutations held between General Burgoyne, Ge- 77.
neral Phillips and General Frafer, previous to the movement up to the enemy on
the 7th of October ?.

A. I underftood there was fcarce a day pafled without filch confultation ; I be-
lieve no day after the aCtion of the 19th.

Did you conceive that the chief purpofe of that movement was to attain 7?.
a knowledge of the left of the enemy’s pofition, and if expedient to attack them
there ?

A. I underftood it was.

Did it appear to you,, that the force left in camp, under General Hamil- 79.
ton, was more than fufficient to keep the enemy in check .

A. I don’t think it was.

From the intimacy and confidence in which you lived with General Bur- 80..
goyne and General Frafer, do you imagine any difagreement of opinion could have
iubfifted between them without your knowledge ?

A. I think I muft have heard of it..

Q^Do you know any inftance, but more efpecially refpeCt'ing the periods of 8 r ,
palling the Hudfon’s River, the aCtion of the 19th of September, and that of
the 7th of OClober, wherein General Frafer exprefled a difapprobation of Gene-
ral Burgoyne’s meafures ?

A. I do not : but I would beg leave to oblerve, that upon the plan to
Bennington, General Frafer had exprefled a different opinion, with refpeCl to em-
ploying the Germans. At the time of palling the Hudfon’s River, and after it
was crofled, I had a great deal of converfation with General Frafer : he feemed.
to exprefs fatisfaCtion in the manner in which the troops had pafled.

In the aCtion of the 7th of October, after the German troops on the left 82.
of the artillery had given way, did you obferve General Phillips and General
Reidefel. in perlon ?

A. I was with General Phillips at different times, and I faw General Reide-
fel more than once they were both very aCtive, and exerted themlelves very
much to form the broken troops, and to make the retreat as regular as the cir-
cumftances w’ould permit.

Q. What was the laft time you faw Sir Francis Clarke in that aCtion, and do you 83.’
know what orders he was carrying ?

A. It was after the retreat was become very general. Sir Francis Clarke
alked me, if I had given any orders to the artillery to retreat ? I told him, that
as there was a major-general of the artillery in the field, who was confefled'
by the army to be a very excellent officer, I would not take on myfelf, as ad-

M jutant-

EVIDENCE.

[Lieut. Col. Kingfton.

iutaot-general, to give orders to any part of the artillery. Sir Francis Clarke told
me that a difpofition had been made for a general retreat and that he was
going with orders from General Burgoyne to bring off the artillery. About the

mftant we were parting, a very heavy fire came upon us from the enemy, and

1 have fince had reafon to believe, that Sir Francis Clarke received his wound

84 dt (^On "the day of the 8th, do you remember the enemy forming a line in the
meadows, and making a demonftration of attacking us ?

A. I do remember it very well, and that there was a great deal of cannonading

g r Do you remember alfo a cannonading in the afternoon, about the time of

General Frafer’s funeral ? . „ . r r T ,

A I think I fhall never forget that circumftance. General rraler, I under-
flood had defined to be buried privately, in one of the redoubts that had been
raifed for the protection of our magazines and (tores •, as the corpfe was pafilng

by General Burgoyne, General Phillips, and I believe General Reidefel, and

feveral other officers, out of refpeft to General Frafer’s memory, and to do him
honour in the eyes of the army, notwithftanding his requeft, attended his fune-
ral into the redoubt. The enemy were in this inftance, I thought, very defec-
tive in point of humanity ; they pointed a gun or two at that very redoubt,
and kept up a brifk cannonade during the whole of the funeral fervice, which
was performed with great folemnity and very deliberately by Mr. Biudenel, the
chaplain. I never faw fo affecting a fight.

86. Do you remember on the march to Saratoga feeing a corps of the enemy at

work on the plain of Saratoga ?

A. I do very well ; a working party, and what appeared to be a battalion or
more drawn up as a covering party.

gy 4 Was that the corps that afterwards took port on the oppofite fide of the

river ?

A. I believe it was the fame corps I faw afterwards palling the ford.

88. After the arrival of the army at Saratoga, was Lieutenant Colonel Suther-

land detached with a command to cover a party of workmen to repair bridges
and roads, in order to continue the retreat on the weft fide of the river ?

A. He was ordered with a party to repair bridges and loads on the weft
fide.

819. Q. Do you remember on what account Colonel Sutherland and the party were
recalled ?

A. I believe it was on information given by our fcouts, that the enemy were
preparing to attack us in great force.

90. Have you further reafon to know that a geneaal attack on that day was

really intended by the enemy?

A. There was particular caution fent round to all the troops to he prepared
for that attack, as it was expedled it would be attempted under cover of a
very thick fog then prevailing. After the convention had taken place, a gene-
ral officer in the rebel fervice acquainted me, that fuch an attack was intended,

J and

EVIDENCE.

Lieut. Col. Kingrton.J

and from information, I believe from deferters, or from tbeir own fcouts, that our
army was exceedingly well prepared to receive them, that they would be very
much expofed when they came on the plain to our artillery, he not only re-
treated with his command, but lent word to another general officer to retreat
alfo. The other general officer was his fenior ; but he bad taken that upon him,
from the fear of the confequences of fuch an attack, of which he fent word
to General Gates, who approved and confirmed his order.

Q. Previous to the council of war to which the field officers were called, do 91.
you remember it being determined in the council of the- generals, to try a night
march, abandoning the carriages and baggage, and orders being given for the
delivery of as much provifions as the men could carry ?

A. I do remember fuch a determination very well,

"What prevented the execution of it ? 92.

A. I underftood there were fuch difficulties in getting out the provifions, that
the delivery of the necefiary provifions could not be accompiilhed.

Q. Had we intelligence the next day from different fcouts, that the enemy was 93.
in pofleflion of the country in force, on both fides the Hudfon’s Puver, between
us and Fort Edward ?

A. I underftood, from fome of the fcouts that we had been accuftomed moft to
depend on, that the enemy were fo ported.

Have you real'on to know that the intelligence General Burgoyne rtated to the 94.
council of war on this fubjedt was true ?

A. I was affured by one of the general officers who conducted us towards Boftorv
that troops of theirs were in the pofition that our fcouts had given us information
of.

Did you learn at the fame time at what period thofe ports were taken up by 9,5.
the enemy, whether before or after our arrival at Saratoga ? *

A. I have extracts of minutes made at that time, from the mouth of the ge-
neral officer I mentioned.

\_ReadsS \ — ■“ When the king’s army was returning to Saratoga, a brigade of
il fifteen hundred men were potted on the eaftfideof the Hudfon’s River, to difpute
“ the ford, and two thoufand men more were ported between us and Fort Edward,

,( on the fame fide of the river.” — Fourteen hundred more alfo were ported oppofite
to Saratoga, a little above the other party I mentioned before, to prevent our paf-
fing the Hudfon’s River. Fifteen hundred of thofe I have mentioned were ported
on or before the 5th of October. The others, I remember very well now to have
heard, were ported previous to the 7th of October.

Q. Have you an extradt of the laft council of war at which the field officers ©6,
affifted ?

A. The extradt is true, excepting the names of the officers, and the votes they
gave. I have the original paper, with the names of the officers that compofed the See Appea.
council ; and I believe their opinions. [The extract produced, dix.

Did you ever hear of a propofal made by General Phillips, to make away 97-
from Saratoga to Ticonderoga with a body of troops ?

M 2,

Never

8 +

evidence.

{Lieut. Col. Kingfton,

.9$.

Tor the 011-
giiKil return,
fee the Ap-
pendix, No*

XVI.

A. Never with a body of troops ; but I remember to have heard Genejai Phillips
make an offer, which I thought a very fpirited one, to rifk his life in attempting,
with one or two of our beft guides, to find a paffage to Ticonderoga, and do his
utmoft for the defence of that garrifon, as an artillery officer, fhould the enemy
attack that fortrefs after the convention ffiouldtake place.

Q. Have you the return of General Gates’s army, figned by himfelf ?

A. I have ; but I have forgot to bring the original. I have the extrad.

r Reads."] “ Copy from General Gates’s return, from his camp at Saratoga ;

16 th Oftober, 1777 .

“ Brigadiers —

— 12

“ Colonels —

— 44

“ Lieutenant Colonels

— — 45

“ Majors —

— 49

“ Captains —

— 344

“ Firft Lieutenants

— J 3 2

“ Second Lieutenants

— — 3 26

“ Enfigns —

— 345

“ Chaplains —

— 5

“ Adjutants

— — 42

“ Quarter-mailers —

— 44

“ Paymafters —

— 3°

“ Surgeons —

— 37

“ Mates —

— 43

“ Serjeants —

— 13 9 2

“ Drummers —

— 636

ct p ie fent fit for duty

— i3> 216 *

thefe laft are rank and file.

becaufe the others are met

* c Sick prefent —

— 6 22

“ Sick abfent —

— 73i

* e On command —

— 3 8 7 5

“ On furlow

— — 180 /

I believe “that the men on command were explained to me by General Gates to
have been detached from his army, in the rear and upon the flanks of the king’s
troops, previous to the convention.

. 99 . Do you apprehend that that return includes the corps that were on the other

fide of the Hudfon’s River, immediately oppofite to Saratoga ?

A. I do recoiled: the name of one of the general officers who was on the other
fide of the Hudfon’s River, included in Mr. Gates’s return, and therefore I imagine
the men under his command are included alfo. When I fay one, I do not mean to
have underftood that the other two general officers, the one who was ftationed
with a party oppofite to Saratoga, and the one who was ftationed on the fame fide
of the water, between us and Fort Edward, are not alfo included in General
Gates’s return.

Qi,Do

Lieut. Col. Jungfton.J

EVIDENCE.

XOI.

S02.

10 ?.

Do * Iie returns to which you referred of our army ftate the effe&ive ftrcngth, ico
at the time of figning the convention ?

A. 1 hey do ftate the rough number, collected at that time, of men prefent and
under arms. 1

State the numbers.

The Britifh appeared to have been 1905

Germans — 1594

I can’t be anfwerable for the corredtnefs of thofe numbers, as they were taken in
a great hurry.

Q. Can there poflibly be a miftake of many hundreds ?

A. I can ftate from a monthly return of thefirft of November, fit for dufv.

Britifh — _ 20861

Germans — j 5^ ^ } Bank and file.

There, might be people recovered from their wounds who were difcharged from
the hofpital, and had joined the corps ; or there might have been a miftake in the
return, juft before the convention, in the confufion of the army at that time.

Qo B)o you remember what palled refpedting the military cheft, while the treaty
of Saratoga was depending ?

A. I do remember that it was ftrongly recommended to the commanding officers
of corps to take fumsof money from the paymafter general, on account of fubfiftence
then due to their regiments ; and I believe a great deal of money was fo dirtributed,
and regularly accounted for to the paymafter general on the fubfequent fettlement of
the pay of the army.

Q. What became of the reft of the money in the military cheft ?

A. It was taken by the paymafter general to Albany.

Qo Did any part of it fall into the hands of the enemy i

A. Not a fhilling that I ever heard of.

Qi, Was any proportion of it loft, embezzled, or fecreted ?

A. If any fuch thing had happened, I think the paymafter general would have
applied to me immediately. Never having heard, then Or at any time after, of
any lofs having been luftained, I do not believe there was any lofs fuffered in the
retreat or after it.

Qi Was the fecret fervice account, during the campaign, kept by you ?

A. It was.

Q. Could you produce the feveral articles of that account, if called on for
it ?

A. I have either a copy of it at home of my own, or from the paymafter
general.

Qr. Did General Burgoyne ever appropriate any part of that expenditure to the 109.
extraordinaries of his own expences, or to any other purpofe for his own ufe ?

A. Never that I know of.

Q. Muft not you have known it if it had been fo ?

A. Certainly.

CL. Were there not occafions where General Burgoyne paid-, from his own purfe,
expences that, in the opinion of others, he might have been juftified in placing to
the public account ?

A. I

104.

105.

106.

107.

108.

1 10.

in.

i 12 .

11 3 .

1 14.
JI5.

116.

117.

it 8.
119.

)ao.

EVIDENCE.

Lieut. Col. Kingdom]

A. I remember to have been told by other gentlemen, that expences of that fort
General Burgoyne had been at, ought to have been charged in that manner.^

Q. What was the nature of thofe expences ? , . A

A They were prefents to people who had diflinguifhed themfelves, and in afts
of charity to women who had loft their hufbands, and other occafions which it was
very proper for a general officer to give, and very proper to put into a public

aC Q^ Had not General Burgoyne, from his fituation, all the expences attending

a Commander in Chief ? .. c .

A He certainly had, from being obliged to keep a public table for the entertain-
ment and refreshment of officers and others coming to head quarters, on duty or
bufinefs ; and I know thofe expences to have been very great, fiom the exceeding
high price of all the articles of life in that part of the world. .

Did General Burgoyne ever receive more than the appointment of a lieutenant

general ?

A Never.

Q. Was there not a board of general officers appointed at Cambridge, to infpect
all the accounts of the campaign ; and did not General Burgoyne regulate the pay-
ment of the battalions by the report of that board ?

A. There was fuch a board, and the payments were regulated according to the

report of that board.

Upon the whole of what you know of General Burgoyne’s receipts and
expences, do you believe he was, in his own purfe, a gainer or a fufferer in the

campaign 1777 ? . ,

A. I really believe his appointments were not equal to his expences in that

campaign.

Examined by other Members of the Committee and by Central Burgoyne

occafionady.

What were the numbers of the effective Brittfh, at the opening of the cam-
paign 1777, including officers and non-commiflioned officers ?

A. I have not thofe returns ; but they were fent to the Commander in Chief,
and my extracts are for the rank and file.

Can you anfwer that queftion with refpeeft to the Germans ?

A. My extra&s are the fame both for the Britifhand the Germans.

What was the greateft number of Provincials in the army at any time in the
campaign ?

A. I believe the only queftion that has been afked refpedting them was at the be-
ginning of the campaign ; they were then eighty-three. On the firft of September
they amounted to about fix hundred and eighty, which was the greateft number
they ever amounted to.

Q. What do you mean by Provincials ?

EVIDENCE.

Lieut. Col. Kingfton.J

A. I underfland them to be inhabitants of that country, affembled under officers
who were to have had different commiflions, provided they had ever amounted to
certain numbers.

Do you include Canadians under the name of Provincials ? l2l

A. I believe, in the former part of my evidence, the Canadians were ftated to be
one hundred and forty-eight, and diftinguiffied from the Provincials.

Was General Burgoyne’s fecond order of the twelfth of July, relating to the im
k a gg a g e > ftri&ly complied with ?

A. I conceive it was the duty of the commanding officers of regiments to enforce
an obfervance and obedience to the general orders.

Was it actually enforced in fuch a mannor to the degree you thought it fhould 123,
have been ?

A. I am not quite pofitive whether there was not another order iffued after-
wards.

[ Queftion repeated. ] I2 ,

A. I never had any report made to me by a commanding officer of any corps, of
that order not being complied with.

Q. What was your own ocular obfervation of the quantity of baggage carried 12?.
with the army ; and did it appear to you that that order could have been fairly com-
plied with ?

A. I own I don’t recoiled, not hearing any complaint nor attending to it. The
quarter matter general of the army mutt naturally know more of the baggao-e than
the adjutant general.

Do you know what allowance of waggons was made to a regiment ? 126.

A. I don’t recoiled any waggons that we had to allow.

Q^, Was none of the baggage brought down in wheeled carriages ? 127,

A. Several officers, I believe, bought waggons and carts of the country people
for their own ufe ; but I do not remember any of the king’s carts or waggons being
appropriated to the carriage of officers’ baggage. It might be, but I don’t recoiled
it.

Q^Can you fay, in a general way, how many horfes might be employed in car-
rying the baggage of the army, including officers’ horfes ?

A. I never had any information upon that fubjed ; it did not belong to my de- 129.
partment, and I had much bufinefs on my hands.

Qi, How was the regimental baggage carried ?

A. I believe chiefly in bateaux.

Qi, How was it carried when there was no water-carriage ? 1

A. I can’t fpeak to that point, having had no information on that fubjed ; and
when I fpeak of bateaux, I fpeak generally, having had no information on the
fubjed. . 1 3 1.

Q. Can you fay, in a general way, how many women attended the army ?

A. I had really fo much to do that I had not much leifure to pay much attention to
the ladies ; and I know very little of their beauty or their numbers.

Would not the feeding of two thou&nd women be a confiderable objed with 152.
refped to the provifions of the army ? **

A. I

133*

*34*

*35*

i 3 6.

*37-

138.

J 39*

evidence.

[Lieut. Col. Kingfton.

A. I ibould have been very furry to have had two thoufand women to have

“!q"how *at women were there, if not two thoufand ?

A I would wilh to give the lioufe every information in my power, w hencan
fteek w th ny degree If accuracy or tolerable guefs. I have lien the commif-
fLy of Fovifions renrrn, and I think the number of women returned, at v,aualled

dra s°°“ s mom ’ t£d would havc bee “ of

“^i'IwuIT very much wiftied thofe few dragoons we had could have been
mounted, becaufc, though in that part of America that I law they might not have
ten neceflary or ufeful to have made a charge, I think thofe light dragoons might
be alwavs applied to very ufeful fervices.

Q. How many had you of thofe dragoons ? _ „ ,

A. They are included in the ftrength of the Germans, ana I really do not re-
member their particular number. , ,

Q. If none or lefs of the park of artillery had been brought forward, would there

not have been horfes to have mounted thofe dragoons ?

A. I believe there might have been horfes enough taken from the artillery, or
from the provifion train, to have mounted thofe dragoons, if it had been thought
more expedient to have employed the horfes in that manner ; but they were hired
orcontraded for, for the fpecial purpofes of carrying provisions, and bringing on
the artillery, and never meant by the perfons who furnifhed the conti act tor t e ra-

goon fervice. . e

If a fmaller quantity of baggage had been carried, might not the officers hav

fpared fome of their baggage horfes for mounting the dragoons ? .

A. I never met with an officer who had horfes to fpare. I know Sir rrancis
Clarke and myfelf wiffied to buy horfes to carry our own fervants ; cared very
little what expence we were at, and yet I could not obtain any.

Do you know of any corps or party finding their way back to Ca-

A. I never heard of any corps finding its way there and I underftood from
the guides who were with us, previous to the convention’s taking place, that
if that was attempted, we mutt break into fmall parties, and go by what is

called Indian paths. T

Suppofing there was a fmall party that found its way to Canada by In-
dian- paths, do you think it would have been poffible for. an army to have done

the fame ? ,

A. My idea of that muft be founded upon the report of thofe guides who
had ferved us very faithfully as fcouts upon former occafions, and who inform-
ed me that we muft break into very fmall parties, to have any chance of mak-
ing our way through the woods to Canada ; and I remember that when General
Phillips offered to attempt to find his way to Ticonderoga, it was talked of and
looked on to be as defperate as gallant.

Q. If any party did make its way to Canada, do you not fuppofe it m«it

L)C

140.

EVIDENCE.

Lieut. Col. Kingfton.J

be that party of provincials that ran away while they were employed to repair
roads, and that were never heard of afterwards ?

A. I remember fame were reported to have run away who were making roads,
and it is likely to have been that party.

Q. When you mentioned the higheft number of provincials, did you mean 141,.
that they were all armed ?

A. I know that they were not all armed. We had not arms for them.

CL Of thofe that were armed, fome refpeftable perfons excepted, were they 142*
much to be depended upon ?

A, A very great part of them were fuch as I fhould have placed very little de-
pendence upon..

CL Before the army left Canada, was there not a ftridt order, that not more than 143.
three women a company ftiould be fuffered to embark ?

A. I do know there was fuch an order iffued, and I never heard any com-
plaint of its having* been broke through. I don’t recolledt the date of that or-
der, or I would have turned to my book, and ftated to the houfe, upon the
firft qutftion relative to the number of women that were employed on our ex-
pedition.

Q^ls it not the cuftom in all armies victualled from the king’s ftores, to pro- 144.
hibit the delivery of provifions to any women over and above the number allowed
by order ?

A. It was cuftomary in all places where I ferved in the laft war, and very
ftrong and peremptory orders were given on that fubjeCl to the commiflaries in
our army.

CL Do you not then . believe, that all women who follc/wed your army were 145 -
fed from the ration of the men they followed, or found their prov-ifion in the
country ?

A. I remember, upon alking the commiflaries how there came to be fo few
women in the provincial returns, I was told, it was the cuftom for them to be
fupplied out of the men’s rations.

CL Were the women conveyed on baggage carts or horfes,. or did they walk 14 6 .
a -foot ?

A. I never heard of the women’s being- tonveyed on baggage carts or the king’s
horfes.

CL If the women neither employed the king’s horfes,, nor confumed his pro- 147,.
vifions, do you think they were more of impediment, or of comfort to the king’s
troops ?

A. I never underftood from my converfation with the commanding officers, or
others, that the women were any impediment.

CL ^ after t^ e taking of Ticonderoga there was any doubt in the army in which 148.
you ferved, of their being able to reach Albany ?

A. I don’t remember to have heard any doubts exprelfed upon that fubjeft, mean-
ing foon after the taking Ticonderoga.

CL Was it generally underftood in the army, that it was was well fupplied with 145.
all the neceflaries, appointments- for war, and articles proper for forwarding the
expedition to Albany?

Ns A. I

EVIDEN C E. [Lieut. Col. Kingflon.

A. I always underftood that the army had been very well fup, plied with every
thing.

150. Q, Do you believe, if the fecretary of ftate had ordered the army under Ge-
neral Howe to co-operate with the army under General Burgoyne for the North
River, with a view to have formed the junction of the two armies, that the
difafter which befel General Burgoyne’s army could have happened ?

A. If a junction could have been formed, I fhould apprehend that Mr. Gates’s
army might have been diflodged, and that the misfortune at Saratoga would not
have happened. This is only matter of opinion.

*5i* Do you apprehend., that if the army under Sir William Howe had ope-

rated on the North River, with a view to died, a jundion, that fuch a junc-
tion would have taken place ?

A. I had an opinion while in America, that if the- expedition which came up
the Hudfon’s River under General Vaughan, could have have been there about
the time of our adion of the 19th of September, that Mr. Gates would have
found it difficult to have kept his army together, if he had not crofied over
the Hudfon’s .River .towards .New England. But this is mere matter of private
opinion.

I 5 Z - If you are of opinion, that the troops -under General Vaughan would have

had lb powerful an died, even fo late as September, what effed do you think
Sir William Howe’s army, affifted by all the fleet and craft, would have had
as early as the beginning of July, immediately after the impreffion which took
place among the enemy after the defeat at Ticonderoga ?

A. I did not know what force there was under the command of General Vaughan,
nor do I even now know; but I fhould -think molt certainly, that a great army
upon the Hudfon’s River near Albany, would have contributed very much to our
making our way to Albany.

J 53 - Qu ^ ave y° u ever confidered what were the caufes of the failure of the ex-
pedition under General Rurgoyne, and to what do you impute it ?

A. I looked upon our force not to be equal to the forcing our way to Al-
bany without fome co-operation.

15 4* Qc Where -then did you expedt that co-operation ?

A. I had no where to expebl it frqm, but up the Hudfon’s River from New
York ; and the fuccefs of Colonel St. Leger’s expedition would have been of
ufe certainly.

_ Qt If General W afhington’s army had not been diverted, would it not have
impeded, or flopped the progrefs of any army up the Hudfon’s River.

A. I don t know the ftrength of General Wafliington’s army, nor the nature of
t e countiy between Albany and New Vork.; and therefore I .cannot form any
judgment of what would have happened.

2 5 6 - you not of opinion that there are very flrong paffes or pofts on that

A. I found them -very flrong between Ticonderoga and Albany, and from re-
ports of military men of high reputation in the fervice, I have underftood there
Were many very flrong pofts between New York and Albany.

J 57 * Sc. Prom whence is the account of the ftrength of Mr. Gates’s army taken?

4 A. From

EVIDENCE.

Lieut. Col. Kingfton.j

A. From a return voluntarily given by General Gates to me for my own fatis-
fadtion when at Albany, and that return was figned by General Gartes.

Have you that return ?

A. I gave it to General Burgoyne ; I faw it to-day ; he has it.

Was it by content of General Gates that the foldiers after the convention re-
tained their cartouch-boxes ?

A. They retained their belts, and I really don’t recolledt whether their car-
touch boxes were in general retained or not : but talking with Mr. Gates when
the king’s troops marched by with the accoutrements on, Mr Gates aiked me
(we had been old acquaintance formerly) whether it was not cuftomary on field
days for arms and accoutrements to go together ? I told him, there was nothing
faid in the convention that I had agreed to with him relating to the accou-
trements, and that he could have no right to any thing but what was ftipulated
in that treaty. He replied, “ You are perfectly right;” and turned to fotne of
the officers in their fervice by, and faid, “ If we meant to have had them, we ought
“ to have inferted them in the convention.” ( Withdrew .

REMARK.

Review of the Evidence ; its fever al Parts compared with the
prefatory Speech and Narrative ; and additional Remarks and
Explanations,

T H E noble Lord who is at iflue with me upon this occafxon has, in a great mea-
fure, deprived me of the benefit of a reply, properly fo called, becaufe he has
produced no defence. His Lordfliip certainly has been accufed by me in many
inftances of a very ferious nature. If he is really willing that his political, and my
military conduct fhould be tried by fads alone, I certainly have not fbewn lefs incli-
nation than his Lordfhip for that left; but, taxed as I avow he has been by me, with
proceedings derogatory to the obligations which ought to fubfift between man and
man, I really expeded, as I believe did the Houfe of Commons and the public, to
have heard from him fome juftification in thofe refpeds. Inftead of that, the noble
Lord, in opening the fubjeds to which he propofed to call evidence, touched fo
flightly upon the branch of the enquiry in which we are parties, that a Arranger would
hardly have thought there fubfifted a diipute between us. His Lordfliip contradicted
nothing that I have alledged refpeding his conduct or my own ; he flrated no circum-
ftance of blame againft me, except he meant as fuch the enterprize of Bennington,
which he qualified with the epithet “ fatal,” and pronounced to be the caufe of all
the fubfequent misfortunes. He paflfed entirely over the tranfadions at Saratoga.
Of forty officers or more, belonging to the Convention troops, then in England, one
only was propofed to be called on his Lordlhip’s part, viz. Lieutenant Colonel
Sutherland, of the 47th regiment, upon parole from the Congrefs, and ading with a
corps of the Fencible Men in North Britain •, but, upon further reflection, his Lord-
fliip thought proper to difpenfe with the attendance of this officer j and the only
witnefs under order of the Houfe was Mr. Skene. No man was better qualified to
give an account of the proceedings at Bennington ; and I heartily lament that the
public is deprived of his teftimony.

But although I am thus left in pofieffion of the evidence, uncontroverted by the
noble Lord, I avail myfelf of my right of doling the caufe, for the fol-
following purpofes : firft, to colled from the minutes (which, in an enquiry of this
nature, are unavoidably prolix and difarranged) the fcattcred parts, and apply them
to fads, under diftind and feparate heads. Next, to examine whether the fads (which,
from the filence of the noble Lord, I am to afifume as admitted by him) are in any
refped invalidated by the crofs examination of the witnefles by other gentlemen. And

O laftly,

The condu&
of Lord G.
Germain ,
during the
enquiry.

Claim of G.
Burgovne to
dole the
caufe.

Mode of pro*
ceeding.

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

laftlv, to explain fuch circumftances, and anfwer fuch new and collateral objedions, as

have been pointed at in the fame crols examination, and were omitted, or only (lightly

noticed in my opening, becaufe they did notexift, or were not deemed poffible objefts

of blame or cavil. In purfuing thefe purpofes, I (hall confider the proofs precifely

in the order of the fades to which they are produced.

In fm nation Though the nr ft circumftance I took notice of in my opening, viz. my conduft

aftcTimfair re ^P e< ^’ n o Sir Guy Carleton, was rather an infinuation than an allegation againft me,

ly by Sir Guy I thought it right that it lhould be the firft overthrown by evidence ; for while it
Carleton, . , . , r r .

overthrown remained in any degree ol force, it gave a general tinge, as it was meant to do, to
evidenc’ Vn w ^°^ e caL, fe. I could not but expedt even the virtuous prejudices of the human

heart to be againft me, whilft it was poffible to be conceived that in abfer.ee of the
commander in chief, to whom I had adted fecond ; whofe attention I had conftantly

See Sir Ouy
Carle ton’s
evidence, qu.

2 i 3 *

Afperfion
from the pa-
per, No. HI.

refuted.

experienced •, and with whofe confidence I was then honoured; [ had pradtifed un-
manly and adulatory intrigue to fuperfede him in a favourite objedt of command.

There are few worfe modes of betraying a fuperior officer to be found upon the records
of dishonour ; and whoever reflects upon the degree of odium with which the mod
palliated adts of that fpecies have been received by mankind, will not wonder at or
condemn my impatience, in applying my firft queftions to Sir Guy Carleton to that
particular objedt. Clear as my juftification flood by the letter formerly referred to,
(No. II.) I (hall be forgiven for obtaining, though with fome redundancy, a full and
fatisfadtory confirmation of my innocence, from the verbal teftimony of the party
whom I was fuppofed to have injured.

It may be proper here to obferve, that the abovementioned afperfion, to which I
have fo oiten adverted, and at which I have drove in vain for due terms to exprefs my
indignation, was not the only one caft upon me refpedting Sir Guy Carleton. When
impartial and candid men revolted at the infinuation of my treachery, my prefumption
and inlolence (a lefler but (till a calumnious charge) was pointed out in that part of the
paper (No. III.) that treats of the force to be left in Canada, and the difpofition of it.
I am pleafed with the queftions in the crofs examination of Sir Guy Carleton, marking
thepreferibeddiftributionof the troops, fifr. (38, 39,40, 4 r, 42, 43.) becaufe tfatt
enquiry affords me an opportunity of juftifying myfelf in a point which I have not
taken notice of before. I he pods, and the troops which I imagined would be ne-
ceffiiry to occupy them, were fpecified merely to (hew that the number of 3000 was
mdifpenfibly requifite for the defence of the province. The whole of that detail con-
curred with General Carleton’s requifitions for reinforcement, and with my reafonin*
upon thofe requifitions ; and when I affert, as I now do, that I never prefumed to
fugged the neceffity or propriety of forming a detail of pods, (thus given for informa-
tion)

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

information) into precife orders for the general upon the fpot, I am fure the fecretary
of ftate will no more contradict that affertion than he has done any other I have
made.

When in the fame paper I confidentially communicated my reafons for preferring
certain corps to others, I was actuated by the fame principle of offering every opi-
nion that could conduce to make the intended fervice effectual. I thought it a juft
claim in an arduous undertaking, to have my own choice of the troops ; and I am
perfuaded Sir Guy Carleton never took ill of me, either that claim, or a fubfequent
one in the fame paper, of being held free from any imputation of delay, till I fhould
be clear of the province of Quebec. With an unfeigned confidence in Sir Guy Carle-
ton, I thought it a precaution fully juftinable, to fecure myfelf againft others, in the
numerous and complicated departments under him, who might be found lefs equi-
table than he is.

I know I have before complained of the production of thefe fecret communica-
tions ; but after fo many precedents as the laft Seffion furnifhcd, of withholding
parts of correfpondences from Parliament, upon the plea that they might affeCt in-
dividuals, the noble Lord’s filence upon thofe complaints, gives me a right ftill
to comment upon the finifter purpofes that are to be aferibed to the production of
that paper at length, rather than by extraCt. Thofe purpofes were various ; but it
muft be confeffed one, and only one, good effeCt may refult from a review of them,
viz. It may ferve as a falutary caution to any officer, who fliall for the future be ad-
mitted into confultation with the fame minifter, how he commits himfelf by an opi-
nion of men and things.

The next point that I entered upon previoufly to my narrative, was the tenor of
my orders, and I believe it was generally expeCted that the noble Lord would have
taken fome notice of the faCt I alledged, that every diferetionary latitude which I had
propofed was erafed, while the plan was in his hand. As his Lordfhip had fo much com-
mented upon the nature of peremptory orders, as a general queftion, in my abfence, it
would have been fair in him to have reafoned upon them after that important and
decifive circumftance was laid open.

The general idea of forcing a way to Albany , which the army at its outfet con-
ceived, by reafoning upon the apparent principles of the campaign, without partici-
pation of the letter of the orders is clear, from the general tenor of the evidence.
I wifhed, it is true, to have heard more copioufly the fentiments of Sir Guy Carleton,
becaufe he had full participation of the orders. From the temper and judgment that
always direCt his conduCf, he declined giving an opinion at the bar upon what might
become a queftion in the Floufe. But I have fince (upon requeft) received his per-
miffion to publifh a letter from him to me, dated foon after the Convention of Sara-

O a toga,

No. nr.

Apology for
fpecif} ing
corps.

Remarkable
circumftance
refpectingthe
conftrudtion
to be put up-
on my orders.

The general
opinion of the
army upon
forcing away
to Albany,

9 6

Strength of
the army.

Proportion
of artillery.
Evidence of
Capt. Blom*
field, from
queft. 4. to 9.

The ufes of
it. Captain
Blomfield
fromqueftion
10 to 17,
Evidence of
Lord Balcar-
ras, from
queftion 14.
to 19.

Lord Balcar-
ras’s crofs
examination,,
queft. 93,94.

Lord Balcar-
ras, queft. 8.
Lord Har-
rington,
queft ion 4*

March from
Skenefbo-
roughtoFort
Edward.

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

toga, which is in the Appendix No. X. and with this reference I clofe my re-
view of the prefatory matter which I laid before the Committee.

Review of the firjl Period.

Moll of the circumftances ftated in my Narrative refpedting the firft period of the
campaign, were, from their nature, to be eftabliftied by w r ritten teftimony ; and the
papers, No. VII. and VIII. in the Appendix, were added to thofe before produ.
ced for that purpofe ; but the returns of the troops, No. XI, are moreover au-
thenticated by the proper official authority, the adjutant general, and the detail of
the artillery, by the Major of brigade in that department.

From the evidence of the latter, is alfo confirmed all that I advanced refpedting the
opinion and recommendation of Major General Philips, for the proportion of artille-
ry employed ; for the moderate quantity of it, comparatively with the principles and
practice of other fervices, and for the great expedted ufe of artillery in the country
where we were to adt.

Had thefe opinions been merely fpeculative, the intelligence of the perfons from
whom they came would have given them fufficient authority. But fortunately they
are verified by fadts ; for it appears from a multitude of evidence, that the enemy
made the true ufe of local advantages : they fortified every pafs or proper poll : the
nature of the country, and the neceffity of keeping the banks of rivers, made it
impoffible to turn thofe polls : had I wanted therefore artillery, I could not have
proceeded any given ten miles, but at a heavy expence of my bell troops. When it
was found that I was provided with that forcible arm, the enemy invariably quit-
ted their entrenchments, either to retreat, or fight upon ground where they fuppofed
artillery could be leaft effedtually employed. I am to thank the honourable member,
whatever his intentions might have been, who by his crofs examination placed the
expediency of carrying the train I did, in fo clear a view.

The only remaining fadt of the firft period to which verbal evidence is appli-
cable, viz. The impoffibility of following the enemy further than they were follow-
ed in their precipitate retreat from Ticonderoga, is eftabliftied by Lord Balcarras, and
by Lord Harrington.

Review of the fecond Period.

In entering upon the evidence which refpedts the firft tranfadtion of the fe-
cond period, viz. the match from Skenefborough to Fort Edward, I cannot help
4 obferving

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

obferving how much of the blame imputed to me has been occafioned by mifrepre-
fentation from perfons whofe bufinefs it was to decry my actions 5 and by uncom-
mon miftakes in the geography of the country by thofe to whom my aftions were
mifreprefented. By the crofs examination of Lord Balcarras it muft be fuppofed,
that the perfons who fufpedted I erred in not taking the route by South Bay after the
fucceis at Ticonderoga, did not know where South Bay was. They feem equally ig-
norant of the fituation of Pitch-pine Plains , by the queftion immediately following
the former one ; and it mud have been a furprife to the enquirers to find that the
route which they were inclined to approve, was precifely that which the main body
of the army took under me in perfon, and with fuch effeCt, as to come up with the
rear of the enemy and drive them from their fortified poft at Skenefborough, with the
lofs on their part of five armed veffels and all the reft of their water-craft.

But it may be faid, this part of the crofs-examination, though incomprehenfible in
point of geography, ftill applied to the queftion taken notice of in my narrative, viz.
“ Whether it would not have been more expedient to return to Ticonderago, and
• c take the route by Lake George, than to proceed, as I did, by the Pitch Pine Plains
“ to Fort Edward ?”

I fhall not recapitulate the various motives I have before ftated in fupport of that
preference, having publickly in my favour the opinion of an officer fo enlightened in
military fcience, and fo well acquainted with the country as Sir Guy Carleton ;* and
never having heard a difference of opinion in any other officer of a like defcription,
to reft much more upon a fubjeCt fo fupported by reafoning and by fuccefs, might be
conftrued an attempt to divert the attention of my examiners from points lei's de-
fenfible. I therefore lhall only add two fhort remarks ; the one, that the faCt of
gaining confiderable time by allotting the whole fervice of the water-craft to the
tranfport of provifion and ftores over Lake George, inftead of employing great part
of it for the tranfport of the troops is inconteftably proved by the evidence of Cap-
tain Money and Lieutenant Colonel Kingfton : the other, that to have reached Fort
Edward with the troops fooner than the 29th of July (the day that the firft em-
barkation of provifions arrived at Fort George) would not only have been ufelefs,
but alfo highly impolitic ; becaufe the fubfiftence of the troops at Fort Edward, be-
fore the arrival of that embarkation, muft have been brought by land carriage
through much difficult road all the way from Fort Anne, when, on the contrary,
by remaining in the neighbourhood of Skenefborough till the paffage of Lake George
was effected, exclufively of the confiderations of covering the removal of the ho-
fpital of Huberton, and alarming the Connecticut by the pofition of General Reide-
fel’s corps, the army was commodioufly fupplied by water-carriage.

* See alfo the map of country.

Miftakes in
geography.

Lord Balcar-
ras, queft.90.

Queftion 91,

Sir Guy Car-
leton, queft.
9, 10.

Confiderable
time gained
by the army
taking the
route to Fort
Edward by
land.

Captain Mo-
ney, queft. 4.
to queft. 1 1 .
Lieut. Col.
Kingfton,
queft. 23.

The

9 8

Feeding the
army.

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

The next circumftance for examination, according to the order of the Narrative,
is the tranfport of the magazines of provifions, See. from Fort George ; and it is
highly incumbent upon me to fhew the difficulties of that operation, becaufe, if they
were avoidable, it mull be acknowledged one of the principal grounds upon which
I vindicate the plan of the expedition to Bennington will fail me.

But I am perfuaded, every candid examiner will firfl indulge me in a fliort paule.
The charges It will be recollected, that this is the only part of the campaign upon which the no-
agamtt'tfie Lord has la ' lcl hls finger, as judging it productive of the fubfequent events. The
Lt. General’s crofs-examination had already been prefled upon the fame ideas. Such want of know-
thiTpaiVoV ledge of the nature of tranfport in that country has been betrayed ; fo much prepof-
the cam- feflion of unnecefTary delays has appeared ; fuch emphafis of quellion has attended
every circumftance of my conduCt at this period, that I fhall Band acquitted of pro-
lixity, if I preface the application of the fubfequent evidence by a more comprehen-
Surveyof hl« five and complete furvey of the difficulties and anxieties of my flotation than I thought
difficulties was neceflary before.

The combination of arrangement for feeding the army might, in fad, be ftated to
have extended even to Ireland ; for fome part of the fupply depended upon the vic-
tualling fleet which was prepared in that country, according to my requifition before
I left London, and had not reached Quebec when the army took the field. Thete-
dioufnels of the navigation from Quebec to the mouth of the Sorel need not be again
deferibed. The next embarraffment was to manage the conveyance for that part of
the fupply which came from Montreal, and which was much the greateft, without
interfering with the tranfport which with equal neceffity was to be expedited up the
Saint Lawrence to Lake Ontario, for the fervice of Colonel St. Leger’s expedition,
and the immenfe ftores (then neceflarily upon the move alfo) for the winter main-
tenance of the upper country. To thefe might be added a lift of chances and incon-
veniences, incident to the carrying places between Chamblee and Saint John’s; the
uncertaintainty afterwards of the pafiage over Lake Champlain, and Lake George;
the laborious and flow operations of drawing the boats over the ifthmus which di-
vides the two Lakes. Thefe together make a fyftem of embarraflments and difap-
pointments hardly to be conceived by thofe who have not experienced them.

But although the whole of this arrangement (the furnilhing the upper country ex-
cepted) was made under my diredion, I have been content to date my difficulties
from the lodgement of the fupplies at Fort George ; and I have touched the other
parts only to fhew more perfpicuoufly the unfairnefs of judging of an American cam-
paign upon European ideas. How zealoufly foever a general, in fuch an undertak-
ing as mine, may be ferved by the chiefs of departments (and much praife is due

from

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

from me upon that fcore) for one hour he can find to contemplate how he Jball fight his
army, he muji allot twenty to contrive how to feed it.

The behaviour of the Indians is a circumftance too material to be palled over in a
review of the anxieties in this part of the campaign. I had difcerned the caprice,
the fuperllition, the felf-intereftcdnefs of the Indian character from my firft intercourfe,
even with thofe nations which are fuppofed to have made the greatcft progrefs towards
civilization : I mean with thofe called the domiciliated nations near Montreal. I h d
been taught to look upon the remote tribes who joined me at Skenefboroug, as more
warlike ; but a very little time proved that, with equal depravity in general principle,
their only pre-eminence confifted in ferocity. The hopes I had placed in their wild
honour, and in the controul of their conductors, which, as I ftated before, at firft had
been promifing, were foon at an end ; and their ill-humour and mutinous difpofition
were nunifcft foon after my arrival at Fort Edward. The apparent caufes of their
change of temper were the refentment I had ftiewn upon the murder of Mifs Macrea,
and the reftraints I had laid on their difpofition to commit other enormities ; but I
never doubted that their evil paffions were fomented, and their defection completed by
the cabals of the Canadian interpreters. Rapacity, felf-intereft, and prefumption. are
the charafteriftics of thefe men, with fome few exceptions. The acquifition of the
Indian language has ulually been a certain fortune to a man with an artful head and a
convenient confcience.

To check the old practices of peculation in thefe men. Sir Guy Carleton, with great
judgment, had given the fuperintendency of the Indian department to Major Campbell
and Captain Frazer, gentlemen of the higheft integrity. The Britilh officers employed
folely in the military conduCt of that department, were alfo felected with equal pro-
priety. The interpreters had from the firft regarded with a jealous eye a fyftem
which took out of their hands the diftribution of Indian neceffaries and prefents ;
but when they found the plunder of the country, as well as that of the government,
was controuled, the profligate policy of many was employed to promote diffention,
revolt, and defertion.

I take this occafion to acquit Monfieur St. Luc of any fufpicion of his being con-
cerned in thefe factions ; but I believe he difcerned them. He certainly knew that
the Indians pined after a renewal of their accuftomed horrors ; and that they were be-
come as impatient of his controul as of all other, though the pride and intereft of
authority, and the affeCtion he bore to his old aflbciates, induced him to cover the real
caufes under various frivolous pretences of difcontent, with which I was daily tor-
mented, but to which I conftantly attended : and though I differed totally with Saint
Luc in opinion upon the efficacy of thefe allies, I invariably took his advice in the

management

Behaviour of
the Indians,

Lord Har-
rington from
queft.6 to 23.

St. Luc#

100

Lord Har-
rington’s
qu. latl re-
ferred to.

Lord Har-
rington’s qu.
laft referred

to.

& ib. qu. 87.

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

management of them, even to an indulgence of their moft capricious fancies, when
they did not involve the diffionour of the King’s l'crvice and the difgrace of huma-
nity. The council of the 4th of Auguft was held at his preffing inftance •, and in
that council, to my great aftonifhment (for he had given me no intimation of the de-
fign) the tribes with which he was moft particularly connected, and for whom he in-
terpreted, declared their intention of returning home, and demanded my concurrence
and affiftance. The embarraffment of this event was extreme. By acquiefcing, I
voluntary relinquifhcd part of my force that had been obtained with immenle charge
to government, that had created high expectation at home and abroad, and that in-
deed my own army was by no means in condition to difpenfe with ; becaufe, depend-
ing upon the fuppofed affiftance of this much over-valued race for fcouts and out-
pofts, and all the leffer, but neceffary fervices, for giving due repofe to the camp,
the Britiffi light-infantry had been trained to higher purpoles : they were deftined to
lead in the general and decifive combats I expeCted in the woods, and could not be
fpared, or rifked, or harraffed, without palpable confequences of the moft difagree-
able kind.

On the contrary, I was convinced a cordial reconciliation with the Indians was only
to be effefted by a renunciation of all my former prohibitions and an indulgence in
blood and rapine : I had not a friend in the department in whom I could confide except:
Major Campbell, Captain Frazer, and the other Britifh officers : their ignorance of the
languages, and the very probity of their characters, rendered them of no weight in
Indian councils. An anfwer, neverthelefs, was to be made upon the moment ; and
the part I took was to give a firm refufal to their propofition, and to adhere to the
controuls I had before eftabliffied ; but, with a temperate reprefentation of the ties of
faith, of generofity, and honour, to join every other argument confiftent with thofe
principles which I could devife, to perfuade and encourage them to continue their
fervices.

This fpeech appeared to have the defired effeCt. The tribes neareft home affeCted
to feparate from the others, and only preffed for permiffion to return in parties to
gather in their harveft, propofing to relieve each other ; which was granted. Some
of the remote tribes alfo feemed to retraCl their propofitions, and profeffed a zeal for
the fervice •, but the defertion took place the next day by fcores, loaded with fuch
plunder as they had collected ; and it continued from day to day, till fcarce a man
that had joined at Skenefborough remained. This whole tranfaClion, I aver, was
before the plan of Bennington was formed. It appears fo from the evidence produced
upon the crofs examination by the gentlemen to whom I am obliged upon fo many
occafions, for elucidating different fubjeCts ; and the precife date could have been

further

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

further fupported by a memorandum of Sir Francis Clerke; but I thought that refe-
rence fuperfluous in a matter fo notorious.

That MonfieurSt. Luc, anxious for the credit of his favourite troops, and invited
by the propenfity he found in the minifter to liften to any whifpered intelligence, in
contradiction to that he received from the General himfelf ; that, under thefe tempta-
tions, that wily partizan fhould mifplace dates, and confound caufes, neither furprifes
nor offends me. With this expofition of fa<5t, I leave him in full poffeffion of his
petulancy refpeCting my military talents ; and am concerned at no effeCt of his com-
ments or communications, in the minifter’s clofet or in the news-papers,* except as
they may have tended to fupport the general fyftem of deception which haS fo long
and lb fatally influenced his Majefty’s advifers. The Indian principle of war is at
once odious and unavailing •, and if encouraged, I will venture to pronounce, its con-
fequences wall be feverely repented by the prefent age, and univerfally abhorred by
pofterity.

But to proceed to the furvey of other difficulties of the time. Great attention was
due to the management of the German troops.

The mode of war in which they were engaged was entirely new to them ; tempta-
tions to defert were in themfelves great, and had been enhanced and circulated among
them by emiffaries of the enemy with much art and induflry. Jealouly of predilection
in the allotment of pofts and feparate commands ever fubfifts among troops of different
Hates; and a folid preference of judgment in the commander in chief often appears a
narrow national partiality.

I confefs I was much affifted in maintaining cordiality in an army thus compofed,
by the frank, fpirited, and honourable character I had to deal with in Major General
Reidefel ; — a character which was very early impreffed upon my mind, and which
no trials of intricacy, danger, and diftrcfs, has ft nee effaced ; but addrefs was Hill
requifite to fecond his zeal, and to diffufe it through the German ranks; and I
ftudied to throw them into fituations that might give them confidence in them-
felves, credit with their prince, and alacrity in the purfuit of an enterprife, which,
when its difficulties were confidered, in faCt required enthufiafm.

Other parts of the alliance, though not liable to fufpicion of treachery, like the
Indians, nor of confequcnce to be fo much attended to as the Germans, neverthe-
lefs had their perplexities. The Canadians, were officered by gentlemen of great

* One of thole comments Lord George Germain thought proper to flate, in a fpeech in the Hotife
of Commons. His Lordfhip gave me a chara&er in the words ufed by Mr. St. Luc, in a converfatiori
between them.— u 11 ell brave, mais lourdcomme un Allemand.”

The letter alluded to was add reded to me from Canada, after Mr. St. Luc’s voyage from England*
I do not know to whom the duplicate was addrefled, but he certainly was a perfon of diligence ; for it
appeared in the news -papers the fame day I received the original.

P con-

fot

German

troops*

Chara&er of
M.G. Reidc*
fel.

The Cana-
dian troops.

rofc

Provincial

carps..

Other critical

embarrafs-

nieitfs.

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

condition in their country, but were not to be depended upon. Inflead of the enter,
prifing and daring fpirit which diftinguifced the character of that people under the
French government, was fubftituted a longing after home, the effedt of difufe of
arms and long habits of domeftic enjoyments j and this difeafe (mal de fayz) is
carried in them to a greater proverbial extreme than in any other people to whom
the term is more commonly applied.

It was neither eafy to keep thefe people together, nor to' fupport the ideas of re-
fpedt which the enemy entertained of them from the remembrance of the formerwar.
The only manner of effecting the latter purpofe was to fhew them occafionally at a
diftance, but rarely to commit them upon parties where they were likely to fall in
with the beft cktfles of the Rangers oppofed to us : perhaps there are few better in
the world than the corps of Virginia Riflemen, which adted under Colonel Morgan.

The Provincial Corps, of which I had two in embryo, and feveral detached par-
ties, were yet a heavier tax upon time and patience. They were compofed of pro-
feffed Loyalifts, many of whom had taken refuge in Canada the preceding winter,
and others had joined as we advanced. The various interefts which influenced
their adtions rendered all arrangement of them impracticable. One mans views went
to the profit which he was to enjoy when his corps fhould be complete ; another’s,
to the protection of the diftridt in which he refided; a third was wholly intent upon
revenge againft hisperfonal enemies ; and all of them were repugnant even to an idea
of fubordination. Hence the fettlement who fhould adt as a private man, and who
as an officer, or in whofe corps either fhould be, was feldom fatisfadtorily made
among themfelves •, and as furely as it failed, fucceeded a reference to the Com-
mander in Chief, which could not be put by, or delegated to another hand, with-
out diffatisfadtion, encreafe of confufion, and generally a lofs of fuch fervices as they
were really fit for, viz. fearching for cattle, afcertaining the practicability of routes,
clearing roads, and guiding detachments or columns upon the march.*

Such were the embarraffiments of my mind, added to the many neceflfary avoca-
tions of command purely military. It will likewife be remembered that Lieutenant
Colonel St. Leger was, at this time, before Fort Stanwix : every hour was pregnant
with critical events. The candid and unprejudiced, reflecting upon fuchafitua*
tion, will check the readinefs of their cenfure : far be it from me to contend that I
did not commit many errors : I only hope to have proved, that they are not thofe

* 1 would not be underftood to infer, that none of the Provincials with me were fincere in their
loyalty ; perhaps many were fo. A tew were of diftinguifhed bravery, among which it would be unjuft
not to particularize Mr. Fiftar, who fell at Bennington, and Capt. Sherwood, who was forward in
every fervice of danger to the end of the campaign. I only maintain that the interefts and thepallions
of the revolted Americans concenter in the cauie of the Congrefs ; and thofe of the Loyalifts break
and fubdividc into various purfuits, with, which the caufe of the King has little or nothing to do.

which

review of the evidence.

103

; Fault or em-
ploying Ger-
mans, Lord

13410 137.

which have yet been fpecifically pointed at, and whatever blame may be imputable to
me in other inftances, my late examiners are not jutlly intitled to triumph on any of

their difeoveries. v .. .

And now for the expedition to Bennington as it (lands upon evidence. to B' nning-

The queftions upon the crofs examination are fo explanatory of the hints which ton ,
fell from the noble Lord afterwards, that one would almoft imagine the hints were
originally defigned to precede. It will be regular for me, therefore to , confider
them in that manner, and, from the whole I am to colled, that the faults meant
to be eftablifhed are, that I employed Germans to found the difpofition of a coun-
try in which no Germans refided: that the mounting dragoons was unneceflary:
that the range given to the expedition was too great : that it was not original y
defined for Bennington : that the force was inadequate.

In regard to the firft of thefe charges, relative to the employment of Germans,
it would be wafte of time to add to the full anfwcr given by Lord Harrington. Co-
lonel Kingfton has anfwered the queftion refpeaing the mount, ng the dragoons ,
and moreover it will be remembered, that the collecting horfes was by no means ij e „, Col.
confined to that fervice. They were requifne for carrying the baggage of the annoy, on -

exprefled in the inftru&ions to Colonel Baume, to the amount of .500. This
circumftance may have (truck feme gentlemen, as confirming the ,dea that the bag.
vave attending the army was of enormous bulk. I requell a fufpei.ee of judgment
upon this article, till I come to the proper place of explanation . and I revert ,0 the
part of the charge which feems of molt importance, via. the extent of the march,
as deferred in the Inllruaions, compared with the ftrength of the detachment, &c ^

It can hardly efcape obfervation, what ftrength to my defence upon ns point fpeaing B , n .
may be derived from advocates who were not expefted to appear in my behalf. For oingron
i° take fupport from the noble Lord himfelf, and all who have believed ,n h, s late -
afiertions, or adhered to his favourite doftrines, by pleading that I undertook the
expedition to Bennington upon report, ftrengthened by the fuggeftion of#er/«»r »/

Z erperiene, tied "Pence in America ; who had lan prefatt on the. fpot when the rebel-

lioi broke ml ; and whofe information had been much refpe&edby the adminiftiation

in England , that the friends to the Britifi cauje mere as five to one, and that they

lamed only the appearanee of a proving force ,0 fhew themfeh'S. Some cmicfers

upon the adequacy of the force I employed, may delert the caulc of me noble

Lord but will He maintain, that a recruit of force from the enemy s country was Th.ji-rd

a wild expectation, when the recruiters, provincial colonels, governors, land pro- t , k „ ?

prietors, and popular leaders of the party who glory in the deflation of Tory

were upon the fpot, and perfonally interefted in the lev.es ? He muft purely ftand

forth my advocate in this point, or entirely forget the reafoning he held to Sir \\ il- Ce Win>

p 2 liam

See the Iti-
ilruftions
and all other

104

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

liam Howe, when without the advantages of fuch recruiters; againft the belief
of the General himfelf ; unprepared to repair the difappointment, if difappoint-
inent enfued, in a meafure of fo much more magnitude, and fo much lefs real en-
couragement, He referred to that expedient of recruiting from the enemy, what he
had not ftrength to fupply from the national troops.^

This I muft infill is an unanfwerable defence, with refpedl to the noble Lord, and
thofe who think with him ; for it is Uriel and pofitive coincidence with their opi-
nions, pad and prelent — and if I faid it will be 1b vvich thofe to come, my prophecy
would be authorized by the convi&ion and triumph which Mr. Galway’s evidence,
refpedting the loyalty of the Americans, feemed to produce in the parties to whom
I allude.

But in due refpeft to other judges, it is incumbent upon me to date a more fe-
rious defence.

As Lieutenant Colonel Kingdon cannot prove juridically that the rough draft
of the defign which ended the affair of Bennington was the fame which was deliver-
ed by General Reidefel, and I am unwilling upon memory to incur a poffibility of
midake, even in an immaterial circumdance that refpedls an abfent friend, I am
content it fliould be confidcred as an iincertaintainty, and I drop all ufe that could
be drawn from the original compofftion. It will fully anivver my purpofe to adhere
to the bare adertion which I am fure will never be contradi&ed, that Major Gene-
ral Reidefel originally conceived an expedition for the purpofe of mounting his
dragoons, and fupplying the troops in general with baggage-horfes ; that I thought
his idea might be extended to much greater ufe, and that the plan was confidered,
amended, and enlarged, in concert with him. Therefore upon the abftradl
ground and reafon of the meafure, I might urge, that it was fupported by naked
military principle, according to the fentiments of a general of great natural talents,
and long fervice under the firft mailers of the age. It is proved, that the fame fen-
Kin'gfton’s* timents were ratified by the full approbation of Major General Phillips, an officer

^ueft. 0 f fiinilar defeription, to whom the plan was communicated; and if a fingle part of

the fame plan, mentioned to be at firft difapproved by Brigadier General Frazer,
continued to be fo after explanation, that difapprobation did not appear. In-
deed the utmoft that can be drawn from the evidence of Lieutenant Colonel

* In a letter from Lord George Germain to Sir William Howe, dated May 28, 1777, after acknow-
ledging that the force for the campaign would be fhort of the General’s requifitions, is the following
paragraph.

“ If w6 may credit the accounts which arrive from all quarters, relative to the good inclinations of
“ the inhabitants, there is every reafon to exp ctl that your fuccefs in Penfylvania will enable you to
“ raife from among them fuch a force as may l e fufficient for the interior defence of the province,

and leave the army at liberty to proceed to offenfive operations.”

The whole of the letter, from which the above is an extra#, is curious, and may be fecn in the
Parliamentary Regiiter, No. 68.

King-

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 105

Kingfton, or any other witnefs, amounts to no more than an implied wiffi in the
Brigadier to have conduced the expedition at the head of his diftinft corps. It was
the fa< 5 fc. Devoted to glory and prodigal of life ; earneft for the general fuccefs of
the campaign, and particularly anxious for every plan adopted by the man he loved,
die grudged a danger or care in other hands than his own. It was not envy or dis-
paragement of the German troops, but zeal and impatience for employment, that
influenced his predilection for the Britifh. I honoured the principle, while I re-
ftrained it ; and I referved his ardour and judgment for a fecond movement,
which required thole qualities much more than the expedition to Bennington did,
according to any intelligence or appearance of things at the time. It will be ob-
ferved from the evidence, that the whole of Brigadier Frafer’s corps was thrown
over the river, and actually polled at the opening of the plain near Saratoga, when
Col. Baume marched ; and the defign was, upon the firft news of Baume’s fuccefs,
to have pufhed that corps to take pofleflion of the heights near Stillwater, and to
have intrenched there, till the army and the provifion could have joined, by which
means the whole country on the well fide the river, to the banks of „ the Mohawk,
would have been our own.

But moreover it is to be obferved, that Major General Reidefel was far from being
ignorant, as has been fuggelled, of the nature of the country, or the profellions of
the inhabitants. He was juft returned from commanding a detached corps at a
confiderable dillance from the main army, in the very heart of the country from x

which the enemy’s force at Bennington was afterwards fupplied. He fpoke the
Englifh language well ; he was affiHed by many natives of the belt information.

It is evident, that the brave but deceived officer who commanded the detach-
ment, was induced to deviate from the cautions prefcribed in the inllruClions. A
plan drawn by an engineer upon the fpot is added to the evidence produced to the
committee, to fhew more clearly where that deviation happened. It appears alfo
in proof, that the meafures taken to relieve Colonel Baume, upon the news of
his difficulty, were the moll fpeedy that could be ufed, and would have been time- Lord Far-
ly, had not Colonel Brieman’s march been more tardy than could have been fuppoled agfo
poffible. I take the fa£t as Hated in his own account, without impeaching his cre-
dit with regard to the obllacles he defcribes. But as a farther vindication of the
intelligence and principle upon which the original llrength of the detachment was
framed, and the mere accident which made even error poffible, I requell admif-
fion for the proof of a new fa<El which I did not know it was in my power to bring,
till after Captain Money had left the bar of the Houfe of Commons ; and as I was
precluded from calling him a fecond time, by the abrupt clofe of the proceedings,

I had no other way of laying it before the public, than by Hating the quellion in

writing.

i oS

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

writing, and requiring his authority to publilh the anfwer, which I obtained, and

thev 3 .FC 3.S follows * . , r

a Do you know arty circutr.ftance rtfpefting an uneapefted reinforcement re-
ceived by the rebels at Bennington near the time of the action ?

A “ A few days after 1 was prifoncr in the rebel camp, fome of their officers
« told me, that it was a providential circumffimce, that General Starks was comtng
.. through Bennington with .hoc militia of the New-IIampffi.re Grants, to join
.< their main army near Albany, for the guard on the provifion at Bennington did
.. not amount to more than 400 men , and that on his hearing of a detachment of
■< our army being only four or five miles from him, he with the guard, and what
„ militia could be collefted in the neighbourhood, attacked and defeated the de-
«* tachment, as well as the reinforcement that were on their march to join them.

.. The rebel officers alfo informed me, and I have feen accounts that agree with
« what I then heard, that during the aftion General Starks was 'luckily joined
" bv Colonel Warner with a confiderable body of men. 1 have frequently heard
“ our officers fay that were in this adion, that had Colonel Baume retreated four
" miles, and recrofied the river he paficd the day before, and taken pod there,
when he found by information he could not proceed, and had wrote for a rem-
“ forcemcnt, he would have met Colonel Brciman coming to his affiitance, and
would not have rifqued the loft of his corps, which by his inltruftions were fo
•' Itronoly recommended, as not even to rifque a confiderable lofs. This, Sir, is
„ as n °, ly as poffible the anfwer I fiiould have given had the queftion been alked

« me in the Houfe of Commons. J. Money.

This piece of evidence will ferve to fhew that it was not the fuccefs of the rebels
’’ at Bennington that animated the militia to afiemble, and march in the caufe of the
Congr efs ? and he muft be of fteady faith indeed in American loyalty who can fuppole
I much of it really exifted in the country of the Hamplhire Grants (howfoever it had
been affefted and profelfed) when he reflects, not only that General Starks and Colonel
■ Warner were not oppofed in collecting their men, though my army, then in a tide of
! fuccefs, were near at hand ; but alfo that not a loyalift was found earneft enough to
convey me intelligence.

It will likewife appear, from this piece of evidence, when compared with the map^
of the country and the difpofition of the troops, that had not the accidental patfage ot
the detachments under Starks and Warner been exceedingly critical, it could not
have availed.— Forty-eight hours fooner, they would have: joined General Gates ; and
he tfroiild hardly have detached them, or any other part of his force, back to Benning-
ton, even though he had heard of a movement to my left •, becaufe he muft have

known that the whole of Frafer’s corps lay ready to march rapidly upon him from my

right.

jo?

review of the evidence.

ricrht. Forty-eight hours later, the blow would have been ftruck •, and the (lores,

coil fitting of live cattle, and flower, with abundant carriages to convey it, would have

been out of reach. _ _ n

Another reflection will be apt to arife in fpeculative minds upon this lubjeci,

viz. on what nice chances depends the reputation of an officer who afts under fei-
fifh and ungenerous employers! Such men not only with- hold the fair protection that
would arife from an explanation of his motives, but are the firtt to join the cry of
the uninformed multitude, who always judge by events. Thus every plan receives
a colouring in the extreme ; and is denominated (often with equal injuttice) a fatal

error or a brilliant enterprize.

But it dill may be faid, the expedition was not originally defigned againft Ben-
nington. I really do not fee to what it could tend againft me, if that fuppofition Lord Har-
are in a great degree admitted. 1 hat fome part of the force was'defigned to a6t ^gton, q.
there, will not be difputed by any who read Colonel Baume’s inftruCtions, and con-
fult the map. The blame or merit of the defign altogether, mutt reft upon the mo-
tives of expediency ; and it is of little confequence whether the firft and principal di-
rection was againft Bennington, or Arlington, or any other diftridt, as my intelligence
might have varied relpefting the depofits of corn and cattle of the enemy. At the
fame time I muft obferve it is begging thequeftion, to argue that Bennington was not
the real, original objedt, becaufe Bennington was not mentioned in the draft of in-
ftruCtions. A man nuift indeed be void of military and political, addrels, to put
upon paper a critical defign, where furprize was in queftion, and every thing
depended upon fecrefy. Though it were true, that I meant only Bennington,,
and thought of nothing lefs than the progrefs of the expedition, in the extent of
the order, I certainly would not now affirm it, becaufe I could not prove it; and
becaufe it would feem, that I fearched for remote and obfcure jollification, not re-
lying upon that which was manifeft ; but furely there is nothing new or improbable in,
the idea, that a general (hould difguife his real intentions at the outfet of an expedi-
tion, even from the officer whom he appointed to execute them, provided a commu-
nication with that officer was certain and not remote.

This review of the affair of Bennington, tho* long, I truft will not be deemed mif-
placed; and from the different parts of it, I think, will clearly beeftablifhed the few
following aflertions.

id. That the defign upon Bennington was juftified by the circumftances of the
time.

2d. That there was no reafon to fuppofe the force of the enemy there greater than

what the detachment was adequate to defeat.

3d. That when the force was difeovered to be greater, the ill confequences would.

have been avoided had not Colonel Baume deviated from his inftruClions, by commit-
ting

io8

Difficulty of
forming a
magazine af-
ter the difap-
pointment at
Bennington.
Lieut. Col.
Kingfton, q.
2 \ to 31.

Capt. Mo-
ney, q. 20;
and for the
general ac-
count of the
efforts ufed
fee the fame
evidence from
q. 12 to 25.

REVIEW OF TIIE EVIDENCE.

tino- his regular force in the woods inftead of fortifying a poll in the open country,
and exploring the woods only with the Indians, Canadians, and Provincials, fupported
by Captain Frafer’s corps, who were complete mailers of fuch bufinefs.

4 th. That after Colonel Baume had committed that error, it would have been re-
trieved had Colonel Brieman’s reinforcement accompliftied their march in the time
they ought to have done.

rth. That the ftrength of the enemy was merely accidental.

And as a final obfervation, I will add, that when a mimfter Hates a common acci-
dent of war, independent of any general action, unattended with any lofs that could
affeft the main ftrength of the army, and little more than the mifcarnage of a forag-
ing narty to have been fatal to a whole campaign, of which he had directed the pro-
orefs^ and apportioned the force, he makes but an ill compliment to h,s own judgment.
° The next clafs of proofs in regular progreffion, applies to the difficulty of bringing
forward a magazine of provilion, after the difappointment of obtaining live ftock and
flower at Bennington. It has been (hewn, by the evidence of Captain Money Lieu-
tenant Colonel Kingfton, and the authentic memorandums of Sir b rancis Clarke, that
early in the month of Auguft it was no eafy talk to fupply the daily confumpt, on o
the Ly Our powers were afterwards, in feme degree, encreafed by the arrival of
moic contrail horfes, acquificions of more ox-teams from tire country, and the great
vigilance exerted in the departments of the quarter-mafter-general and inffecftor,

whofe afliftants had been augmented. , , , ,

A minute inveftigation of this operation I am fenfible will be thought dry, and

oerhaps unneceffary, by general readers-they will pafs it over— but there are thofe
vvho have laid much ftrefs upon a wafte of time, and who take delight in tracing the
fmall parts of a fubjeft with fcrupulous exaftnefs. With fuch it is my duty, as a per-
fon on my defence, to enter into detail, and I will lay my ground m the quelhon put to

Cantain Money in his crofs-examination and his anfwer.

Q. Why did the Army remain from the .6th of Auguft to the. 3 th of September
« before they crofted the Hudfon’s-River to engage the Rebels at Stillwater •

A. “ To bring forward a fufficient quantity of provifions and artillery, to enable the

General to give up his communication. ’ .

With all the powers of conveyance poffible to be muftered, Captain Money computes
land his computation tallies nearly with the table formed by the Comm.flary-Gcneral)
that five days provilion, viz. fourfor forming the magazine and one for da, ly confump-

tion, was the moft that could be conveyed at once. . , of weather

To bring this to an average 1 will affnmeonly two days for acciden s of weatlie ,

roads, fatigue of cattle, breaking of carriages, and other common difa.ymtmen^

this is much Icfs time than according to the evidence might be

This computation it would take ten days to convey the magazine -

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 109

The ftage from thence to the encampment and intended depofitary muft not be computed
by diftance but by impediments. The rapids of the river and the different carrying-
places have been deferibed by the witneffes, and it refults that this ftage was much
longer in point of time than the former one. It was not poffible to keep the tranfports
going at both ftages together for the ten days mentioned, becaufe there were not boats
in the river fufficient for more than the daily fupply; nor could they have been conveyed
there in that time by any poffible means, for thefe real'ons ; the boat carriages, which
were of a conftrudion fimilar to timber carriages ufed in England, were only twelve
in number, and each carriage employed fix horfes or four oxen to draw it ; and could
any other means of draft for boats over land have been contrived, or cattle have been
fupplied from the artillery, or any other department, all would have been ufelefs * be-
caufe the boats themfelves, to a greater amount than thofe above fpecified, were
wanting till after the whole of the provifion tranfport between Ticonderoga and
Fort George, upon which they were employed, was finifhed, and it had barely kept
pace fo as to fupply the land tranfport between Fort George and Fort Edward.

I defire only an allowance of fifteen days for the carriage over the fecond ftage,
and it will thus take, in the whole, twenty-five days to form the magazine alone.

I claim no additional allowance of time for conveying one hundred boats, at leaft,
through the difficulties of land and water, in the two ftages, but comprife that labour
among the reft: of the laft fifteen days. It muft be neverthelefs obferved, that even
this number jwas fhort of what was wanting, and, to fave time, all the artificers
were employed in building fcouls (fourteen of which were finifhed during the tranf-
port) to make water craft, in the whole fufficient to carry the magazine forward, after
the communication Ihould be at an end. The new caulking the boats, though indifpen-
fibly neceffary to great part of them, after paffing the lakes loaded, and afterwards
being ffiaken and damaged by land carriage, is another work which I throw into the
laft fifteen days of the tranfport, or into the fubfequent four days, which muft at the
leaft be allotted for loading the magazine, and arranging the order of its proceeding
both in refped to navigation and defence. This was committed to very expert naval
officers, and was matter of no trivial concern, or eafv execution.

The whole bufinefs, according to the above reprefentation and calculation, both
which are founded upon evidence, w'ould have taken twenty-nine days : twenty-
feven only were employed, viz. from A-uguft the 16th to September the 13th. The
exertions in fad:, outwent the calculation ; and I challenge the moft minute fpecula-
tifts, to try the time and the powers we pofleffed, by every poffible diftribution of
carriages and cattle, different from that which w T as pradifed, and I will venture to
fay none will be foutid lefs dilatory.

It appear* clearly in proof, that no impediment to this tranfport was occafioned by
the interference erf the artillery ; but it has ’been implied by r fome queftions in the crofs

0. examina-

I JO

Lieut. Col.

Kingfton, q.
^ to 8 inciu-
five, and
fiom x 2 2 to
T30.

review of the evidence.

;r;;; n t ot s ’e S ^ ’•*

was nof.o be drfpenfed rf«h, and con equenri, (Q thc .Lfpor, „( *,

I befides have (hewn, that they eou c lm w mi Haken they are who fuppofe

boats-; and to employ meht of artillery horles to convey pro-

an advantage was to be obtaine ) ^ > dditlom , fea , that they could have

l:ZuX^f « « «*■« «*» - more ,han " £re m

ufe already. . rn t i ie tranfport, is another ac-

^'-tenant Colonel Kington and

Captain Money * „ f ;f, on a „d other tores, for about thirty

a£g time poflible, it now beeonres neceffiry to ~

bat Wes ever to » '

* I 2

To a field officer

A captain ’ „

A fubaltern *

A furgeon and mate

A chaplain " _

»«“*'■ tents, two horfes to each

company

2 do.

1 do.

2 do.

1 do.

do.

-a.——

Thc horfes for the fiveBrittth j^jbattilton^ a ^ 10 ^' arn0Un .”^ 0 ^

,hat bd “ 8 ,he - d,ife " n “ ,n - 3 vo

portion to their ftrength _ _ I0 ° Q ,fc

Breyman’s corps - " Total for t h e regiments of the regulars

staff.

Two map 01 generals

ISttSSUe, general, 'anti hi, '.Man,.
German ditto * „

The hofpital * w

Total' of ftaff

1 2
16
1 2
1 2
30

1 1 1

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

the queftion, which has been very much canvafled in print, and by the crofs exami-
nation, appears to have made impreffion upon feme gentlemen ; whether this prepara-
tion might not have been difpenfed with, and the army have reached Albany by a ra-
pid march, the foldiers carrying upon their backs a fufficiency of provifion to fupport
them during the time.

It is very natural for men of all deferiptions, to apply the idea of a rapid march o
a diftance of fifty miles, for it is not more meafuring in a ftreight line from Fort Ed-
ward to Albany, and it will be proper to confider the principle and praCUbility of fucl>
march, with refpeCt to two diftinCt periods, the one before, the other after the at-
tempt upon Bennington.

With refpeCt to the firfl, it will be remembered, that in the ftate the roads tnen
were, and with the refources then to be employed, no provifion before-hand was
attainable. Therefore, to have brought the plan of a rapid advance within the
compafs of a poflibility, the operation mull have begun by marching the whole
rapidly backward, in order to load the men with their packs of provifions. How
the troops, zealous as they were, would have relilhed a ftep fo uncommon in its
nature, and productive of fo much unexpected fatigue, particularly how the Ger-
mans would have been fo perfuaded of the neceffity as to have undertaken it with
good will, cannot be afeertained.

But thefe doubts apart, it remains to be confidered, how the troops were to pafs
two very large rivers,* the Hudfon and the Mohawk, without previous provifion for
a bridge, or water-craft for conveying large bodies at once. Every concellion a
fanzine projector can defire (hall be made upon this point alfo ; the contrivance of
rafts, bound together by twigs and (trips of bark, as in faCt was praAifed at this
very period for the paffage of Frafer’s corps over Hudfon’s River, fhall be admits
equally practicable for the whole army •, and in argument be it traded to c ranee to
pafs the Mohawk in the fame way ; or fhould it fail, let recourfe be had to the
ford, which is known to be practicable, except after heavy ram , near ScheneCtady,

about fifteen miles from the mouth of the river- ,

Thefe conceffions granted, we will fuppole the army on the bank of t le u on s

River, where they afterwards palled it. , c r .

The idea of a rapid march will of courfe be exempt from all thought o. pei.onal

incumbrances (provifion exempted) and the foldier will ftand reprdented in tne

. . . - . ^ if. Irnrilim pnramiu

Queftion
made, whe-
ther the army
might not
have proceed-
ed to Albany
without
(lores ?

Ideaol a rapid
inarch.

-imagination,

trim and nimble as he is feen at an exercife in an Englifh encamp-

I .R R E G

Canadians Indians, and Provincials
Artificers -

U L A R S.

Total of irregulars

200

Recapitulation of the whole diftlibtition
q ^ 2 meat—

3 12

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

ment — Indeed it is necefiary he fhould be confidered in that form ; for nothing can
be more repugnant to a project of rapidity, than the foldier’s load, were he to carry

all the articles belonging to him in a campaign.*'

But it rnay be faid, and with truth, that troops are ufually relieved from a con-
fiderable part of this burthen, and many examples of this relief may be brought
from the general cuftom of fervice, and from many movements of General Howe’s
army in particular — nay more, it was a frequent practice of the very army in quef-
tion, to march free from knapfacks and camp equipage. The Wigwam, or hut
con ftru died of boughs, may be made a very wholfome fubftitute for a tent ; and
when vidtual can be cooked before-hand, even the camp kettle for an expeditious
march may be laid afide. All thefe examples are admitted : but they all imply
conveniencies for the feveral articles to follow, and to be brought up in due time.
In our cafe they mufl have been loft irrecoverably.

Will it be argued, that fome medium might have been devifed ? And although
it were impoffible, confiftently with the idea of rapidity, to carry forward more
provifion than for bare fuftenance during the march, yet carts might have been
found fufficient to carry the men’s knapfacks, and camp kettles, and other indifpen-
fible articles? This fuppofition would betray a great ignorance of the country.
From Saratoga to Albany there is only one road pra&icable for wheel carriage.
There are many places where by deftroying the bridges over deep gullies which dif-
charge themfelv.es into the main river, a pafTage would be rendered impoffible, not
only for a wheel carriage, but a horfe. There are others where the road is bounded
by the river on one fide, and by almoft perpendicular afcents covered with wood on
the other. Here the very fhort work, of felling a few trees would flop all pafTage.
The expence of time to remove thefe obftruttions, or to make new roads, would have
brought famine. All notion, therefore, of conveying any articles more than could
be carried upon men’s fhoulders muft ceafe. The notion of artillery, even the fmal-
left pieces, muft alfo ceafe of courfe, not even a little ammunition-tumbril could
have found its way.— An eafy facrifice to the theorifts, who have maintained the
inutility of artillery : but any officer who has feen the ground of this fuppofed
march, would point out a dozen paflfes, not to fpeak of the pafTage of the Mohawk,
where, ftrengthened with abattis and' fuch other works as the rebels are expert in
making in a very few hours, five hundred militia would flop for a time, ten times
their number of the beft. troops in. the world who had not artillery to affift them.

* They confift of a knapfack, containing his bodily neceflaries, a blanket, a haverfack with provifions,
a carteen, a hatchet, and a fifth (hare of the general camp equipage belonging to his tent. Theie arti-
cles (reckoning the provifion to be for four davs) added to his accoutrements, arms, and fixty rounds
of ammunition, make a bulk totally incompatible with combat, and a weight of about fixty pounds.

Having

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

Having ftated thefe objections to the principle of a rapid march, let us now,
from the knowledge that has been fince obtained of circumftances, confider what
would have been the certain confequences of the attempt.

Thofe who are acquainted with the capricious workings of the tempers of men,
will not wonder at the difficulty of prevailing upon a common foldier in any exi-
gency to hufband his provifions. In a fettled camp, the young foldier has very
fhort fare on the fourth day after delivery : but upon a march in bad weather and
bad roads, when the weary foot flips back at every ftep, and a general curfe is
provoked at the weight that caufes the retardment, he muft be a patient veteran,
and of much experience in fcarcity, who is not tempted to throw the whole con-
tents of the haverfack into the mire. He feels the prefent incumbrance grievous —
Want is a day remote. — c< Let the General find afupply: it is the King’s caufe
and the General’s intereft — he will never let the foldier be ftarved.”

This is common reafoning in the ranks. I ftate it for thole who have not feen-
fatiguing fervice, and may have a judgment to form upon it. It need not be ap-
plied to the prefent confideration •, for had the march taken place at the time it
ought to have done, upon the principle of the defenders of that fcheme, the time
thatFrafer’s corps firft paft the river upon the bridge of rafts, wafte would only have
confpired to accompliffi in three days a ruin that with the belt hulbandry would have
been inevitable in fix : for the fame fall of rain which it has been fliewn in evidence
actually carried away the bridge a very few days after it was conftruCted, neceffarily
made the ford of the Mohawk for an advance, and every ford of the Hudfon’s River
for a return, impaffable. It hardly need be noticed, that a flood muft have made
any ufe of rafts, could they have been timely obtained, equally impracticable. The
army, therefore, would have become victims to famine, without a blow, or a Angle
effort of the enemy. Saratoga muft have been the anticipated feene of furrender,
without other conditions than the mercy of fuftenance ; the whole force of Mr.
Gates would have been loofe to co-operate with Mr. Wafhington, with the fineft
feafon of the campaign before them ; and the General of the northern army, with-
out a ffiadow of profeflional defence, and precluded from the plea ufually fo per-
fuafive, that he fought hard before he failed, muft have met the cenfure of his So-
vereign and ajuftly offended country, with none to fuppoit him but the prefent
advocates of a rapid match. Could his dependence have been fure even upon them ?
Would they not rather have adhered to their oppofite and original fyftem (for
ftrange as it is, the fame men have fupported both) and- have aflerted, that it was
extreme raftinefs to crols the Hudfon’s River at all ?

If what I have laid in objection to the principle and practicability of a rapid march
to Albany, previous to the attempt upon Bennington, has weight, very little
need be added on the fubjeCt afterwards, bccaufe every objection will multiply up-

Col. St. Le-
ger’s letter.
No.V.

review of the evidence.

on the mind of the moil curfory obferver. I lha» only call the attention to a very
few effential circumftances. The enemy was in force •, a proo o ns mg o
that Mr. Gates quitted his pofition behind the Mohawk, wh.ch was his
ftronoeft, and advanced to Stillwater. The force found at Bennington upon the
march from the Hampfhire Grants to the main army, proved the vigour and ala-
crity of the enemy in that country. The circumftances of the action at Benning-
ton eftablifhed a yet more melancholy convi&ion of the fillacy oi any epen ence
upon fuppofed friends. The noble Lord has laid, that * never defpaired of the
campaign before the affair of Bennington > that I had no doubt of gaimng Albany
in as fhort a time as the army (in due condition of fupply) could accomphfti the
march.” I acknowledge the truth of the affertions in their fulled extent • all my
letters at the time ftiew it. I will go further, and in one lenfe apply with the noble
Lord the epithet “ fatal” to the affair of Bennington. The knowledge I acquired
of the profeffors of loyalty was « fatal,” and put an end to every expectation
from enterprise unfuftained by dint of force. It would have been excefs of fren-
zy to have trufted for fuftenance to the plentiful region of Albany. Had the nwch
thither been practicable in all refpeCts, and even unoppofed, (which nobody will
think would have been the cafe) the enemy finding the Briuih army uniuppLed,
would only have had to compel the Tories to drive the cattle and deftroy the coin
or the corn mills, and the convention of Albany inftead of Saratoga muft have fol-
lowed Would the Tories have rifen ? Why did they not rife round Albany and
below it, at the time they found Mr. Gates’s army increafing by feparate and di-
itinct parties from remote diftances? They were better qualified by their iituation

to catch the favourable moment than I was to advife it. Why did they not rife in
that populous and as fuppofed well affected diftrift, the German Flats, at the time
St. Leo-er was before Fort Stanwix ? A critical infurreftion from any one point of
the compafs within diftance to create diverfion, would probably have fecured the

fuccefs of the campaign. „ . . ,

But to revert to the encreafe of reafons againft a rapid march after the affau of
Bennington. It was then alfo known, that by the falle intelligence refpecting the
ftrenmh of Fort Stanwix, the infamous behaviour of the Indians, and the want of
the promifed co-operation of the loyal inhabitants, Lieut. Col. St. Leger had been
obliged to retreat. The firft plaufible motive in favour of hazardous hafte the fa-
cilitating his defeent of the Mohawk, was thus at an end. The profpeCt of finding
the enemy difperfed it has before been fhewnwas ovei.

The impofiibility of preferving a communication was alfo evident. Was the ar-
my to have proceeded to aftion without hofpital ftores, as well as without vie ual .
The general who carries troops into fire without precautions to alleviate the certain
confluences, takes a fure ftep to alienate the affedions, and deftroy the ardour of

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. ”5

the foldier — he exa&s more than human fpirit can furnifh. Men need not be ha-
bituated to fields of battle to be convinced of this truth. Let the mind reft for a
moment on the objects which will rife within it after the mention of adtion, and then
re fled, there is not a mattrafs for broken bones, nor a cordial for agony and faint-
nefs. They who talk of thefe rapid marches, fuppofe no oppofition, or no fuffer ing-
in confequence of oppofition. The hundreds of wounded men to be cruelly aban-
doned (if the reft could be prevailed upon to abandon thofe whole cafe might the
next day be their own) make no part of the confideration of thefe gentlemen of
precipitate imaginations. But officers who are refponfible to God and their coun-
try for the armies they conduft, cannot fo eafily overlook fuch oojeCfs •, and muft be
patient at leaft till a few hundred beds, and a proper proportion of medicine and
chirurgical materials, can be brought up for troops that are to fight as well as to
march.

The confideration of rapid movement has run into much length : the ftrefs laid
upon it in the crofs-examination, was the caufe. I beg leave very fhortly to reca-
pitulate the principal points, and fhall then difmifs it to the public judgment, with-
out great apprehenfion of having it renewed even in fpeculation.

Had a proper ftore of ’ive cattle been obtained by the expedition to Bennington,

(and by the bye it will be remembered, that had the loyalifts of the country been
really of the number and defeription reprefented, that acquifition might have been
made without an aaion) all the carriages might have been appropriated folely
to the conveyance of flour, hofpital accommodations, entrenching tools, and other
ablolute neceffaries •, and a rapid march to Albany might have been hazarded.

After the expedition to Bennington had failed of that great purpofe, had a gar-
rifon for Ticonderoga been attainable from Canada, and the force then at Ticon-
deroga been brought forward, to eftablifh a poft of communication, and fecure a-
paflage of the river by a fortified bridge, and redoubts upon the heights which
every 5 where command the river, on one fhore or the other, a forced march might
Hill have been juftifiable, becaufe a retreat was fecure: but, diverted of both thefe
refources, a rapid movement muft inevitably have led to rapid ruin.

Having gone through all the material points previous to the 13th of September,
and fhewn, I truft, by diftindt evidence, as well as realoning, the expediency o.
the march from Skenefborough to Fort Edward •, the principle of the expedition to
Bennington ; the caufe of its failure; the efforts ufed to bring forwards the provi- Review of the
fion and neceflary ftores, and the impracticability of proceeding without thofe
ftore s •, the attention of the reader will now be carried to a review of the meafure Hudfon’s
of parting the Hudfon’s River on that day.

I entered pretty fully, in my Narrative, into the principles which then actuated

me; and 1 (hall not enlarge upon them. I have only to requeft every man who

has

IT 6

Lord Bale ar-
ras’s queft. 3
and 4, 2 1 to
2$, 30 to 32.
Lord Har-
rington’s, 32
to 37.

Capt. Mo-
ney, 36, 61,
end 65 to 68.
Brigadier
Lrafer’s ien-
timents.

Progrefs of
the falie-
hoods propa-
gated*

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

lias been led to doubt whether I was required by duty, fituation, the voice of the
army, and the voice of reafon, to advance and fight, to follow the confideradon of
thofe principles, with a revifal of the applicable part of the verbal evidence, and
I will then venture further to appeal to their judgment, whether, inftead of being
required, I was not compelled, by the ftate of things, to act as I did ; even inde-
pendently of the peremptory tenor of my orders, which, confident in the ftrength
of my cafe, I have purpofely omitted, upon this occafion, to reconfider.

In regard to the point fo much agitated in this country, though with no founda-
tion whatever from any thing that happened in America, Brigadier Trafer sjenti-
ments upon this meafure of pafiing the Hudfon’s River, it would be trifling with
the patience of the reader to recapitulate and point the evidence to a matter which
I do not believe there is a man fo prejudiced as now to difpute, viz. that that officer
joined in opinion and impatience with the reft of the army. But though the falfe-
hoods fo grofsly and fo long impofed upon the public, relpefting this matter, are
no more, it may not be unworthy curiofity to explore their origin and trace their
progrefs.

It is not difficult to difeern that the fufpicion of difference of opinion in the army,
upon the meafure of palling the Hudfon’s River, arofe from the paragraph in my
public letter from Albany to the Secretary of State, wherein I lay that I had called
no council upon that lubjeft, but had acted upon my own judgment of the peremp-
tory tenor of my orders.

That a man, chief in authority, fhould take entirely upon himfelf a meafure ot
doubtful confequence, and upon mere principle preclude himfelf from any future
means of drifting or dividing the blame that might enfue, appeared incredible at
Whitehall : the greater part of that political fchool concluded the profellion of luch
candour rauft be a fineffe, and that, in faft, the General had not communicated
with his officers, becaufe he knew opinions would have been againft him.

When little minds think they have got a clue of littlenefs it is wonderful with what
zeal and dexterity they purfue and improve it. Correfpondence and intelligence
were not wanting ; difappointed jobbers, difearded fervants, diffatisfied fugitives of
every fort, fpies, tale-bearers, and lycophants, whom it is to the honour ol a Gene-
ral to have his enemies, and a difgrace to Office to encourage, abounded in town ;
and the primary idea once given, it was carried forward by very ready affiftar.ee, and
ever, logical deduction. As thus :

The General declares in his difpatch, he called no man into council upon the
meafure of pafiing the Hudfon’s River: 'Therefore, his officers differed in opinion
upon the expediency of advancing.

To differ in opinion upon that expediency, they muft conftrue his orders not to be
peremptory : Therefore , he ftands fingle in the interpretation he put upon his orders.

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

If his officers faw that he was unadvifedly and defparately leading his army to
death, they would certainly remonftrate : Therefore , they remonftrated.

The remonftrance would naturally be made to him by fuperior officers : Therefore ,
the conclufion follows ; Major General Phillips and Brigadier General Frafer actu-
ally made a remonftrance againft paffing the Hudfon’s River.

General Reidefel, who was next in rank to General Phillips, feems to have been
forgotten. He was probably overlooked in the eagernefs to get at General Frafer,
on whofe name the important ftrefs was laid, and for two palpable reafons j the one,
that his name flood high in the public eftimation, and greatly as it deferved *fo to
Hand, perhaps it acquired, upon this intended ufe, more juftice from fome quarters
than it would otherwife have received.

The fecond and more prevalent reafon was, that Brigadier General Frafer was
dead.

Thus then flood the affertion when I arrived in England : <c Major General Phillips
and Brigadier General Frafer remonftrated againft paffing the Uudfon’s River , which
movement was the caafe of all the fubfequent misfortunes .” And having traced this
falfehood to its maturity, it now may be equally curious to follow its decline.

After my arrival in England, the friendffiip, and general conformity of fentiment
between General Phillips and me became more known. He was alive, and might
poffibly foon return. His name was therefore withdrawn from the remonftrance,
and referved, in cafe he did not return, to give colour to a fecond falfehood, *
then kept back, but fince produced as one of the laft efforts of malignity in the
courfe of the late enquiry.

The firft public occafion that offered was feized by me to pledge my honour
upon the whole ftory of difagreement of opinion being falfe; and I dared any man
to produce a letter or a fentence, from Brigadier Frafer or any other officer, to
authorife a fufpicion of its being true. Lieutenant General Frafer, upon the fame
occafion in the Houfe of Commons, voluntarily and generoufly entered into my
juftification, upon the authority of his correfpondence with his late relation, and
the knowledge of his general fentiments.

The falfehood was immediately fo far weakened, that the word Remonftrance was
changed into Opinion . “ Brigadier Frafer' s opinion was againft paffing the Hudfon's
River j” and thus it remained, now and then affifted and cherifhed, when it was
very languid, by a whifper, “ that there were Jlill letters to be produced till the
late enquiry took place ; and the evidence of Lord Balcarras, Lord Harrington,

_ * That General Phillips offered to conduct a .part of the army from Saratoga to Ticonderoga. Sec
this falfehood refuted, in the evidence of Lord Balcarras, Col. Ki'gfton, &c,

R Colonel

1*8

The com-
ments of an
inferior offi-
cer no pro-
per teft of
a fuperior’s
conduct.

Comparative
view of the
campaigns in
1759 and
* 777 -

REVIEW of the evidence.

r lonel Kinnfton &c. gave the death blow to the laft Haggling efforts of that
Colonel Ki 0 > & ndfon’s River was obliterated ; every com-

calumny. The ralhnefs of paffing he Hud on R e ^ d ,

meat upon that/W ftep was fuddenly dropt at 1 d ; fappro banon, re-

rnonftrance > m S” minifter was as nimble as his confederates,

- exclaimed upon th . of ^ ^xioo, to derive from

A „d her. If hall 1 for evidence again* me.

that grave which has bee no flvfled Brigadier Frafer’s efteem. As a de-

As a foldier I avow a P r ‘de .n having e ^ precedfnt of , chief

fendant I am lenfible I have dwe up . b teft 0 f his actions,

in Command fuffering the comments of an mfenor ^ ^

requires an apology to my pro c 1 . , and 1 was impatient to confute

rafter. His approbation gave a grace to m id fene^and ^ ^ ^

the calumny that fa^rd the moft pernicious and pre-

ever was praftifed to midead the public, and ,0 bettay the

•a. • — « “• r, r “ :t

half fentences, to depreciate an o - ^ ^ itemptible in the extreme j

feeblenefs of vengeance that, in its ^ £ principle and effects,

but it calls for our indignation w en we ex and the a bfolute extinction of

They operate to the very inver ion o ^ P^ Qr can efficac i ou ny be exer-

every idea upon which comman o g informers 5 to render camps

*—'«“*

t:: h a™ the c “ ofmy

ro ^re"fi d id p ;:*

- - — - ofLord

Amherft, in the year x 759. t0 divide the enemy’s force,

with fuch concurrence, that,

and at the fame time to direft th e le y e P ob . e£ls of the

though feparate and remote, they Ihould affift each other. ^

■review of the evidence.

armv to which I allude were to reduce Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and the ulti-
mat e and moft important one was to efTeft a junction with Mr. W olfe before Quebec
Thus far there is great fimilarity between the plans of the two campaigns, except
that the points from which the armies marched, and to which they were defhned,

the Spring 1759, the army, then aflembled at Albany, took the field as early
as the feafon would admit : but fuch were the natural impediments of thecounuy
that though fupported by the unanimous zeal of the inhabitants, and furmfhed with
abundant fupplks of draft cattle, carriages, water-craft, and every other neceffary ;
the feveral departments well direfted, and no enemy to oppolt 1 the march, the Ge-
neral (Lord Amherft) was not able to commence the attack of Ticonderoga til he
7 thof July, when the enemy abandoned that poll, and retreated to Crown Po nt
The diftance from Albany to Fort George is between fixty and feventy miles,
naflao-e over Lake George to Ticonderoga about forty miles.

P The General had reafon to believe that Crown Point would be g.ven up at ht*
approach as precipitately as Ticonderoga had been. He did not, however, reach it,
/diftance of thirteen miles, and water-carriage at will, till the 14th of Auguft.

Was it at that time alked by the minifter or his adherents, what was the a, my

doin'* not to purfiie a flying enemy? Not to purfue when the whole country

behind was their own, and magazines, baggage, hofpitals, and every other necefla ,
mioht follow at leifure, and in feeurity ! When it was forefeen an encreafe of fleet

:/ to be conftrudted at Crown Point, ,0 obtain the fupetiomy over the enemy upon

Lie Champlain, and confequently that every day’s delay, in becoming mate of
that Doft, rilked the campaign !

Although thefe enquiries were not then fuggefted to the public, an anfwer to
them has been given, greatly to the honour of the General, in a very impartial hi-
of that time. - The army was employed in repairing the fortifications at
* Ticonderoga i and the General took his meafures with the fame care as if he ex-
's pefted an oblfinate defence, and attempt to furpnfe him on his marc .

The enemy aaually did abandon Crown Point on the approach of the General,
the , /h ofZgs.lt 1 and, as foon as in pofleffion of that poll, he fet about fortify-
in „ it K he had done Ticonderoga. The time conformed in that operation, and in
bulldinv new velTeis, brought it to the middle of Oftober before the General could
cmbark° upon the L.ake. A fufpence, undoubtedly, of great anxiety; for the
peat end of the campaign, the junaion of the two armies, upon winch the reduc-
•_ nf all Canada was thought to depend, was unattained.

But did the minifter or his adherents then cavil at the tardinefs of that armyr-
Enterprifing, fanguine, and impetuous as was the charaaer of that "unite.

lv 2

120

Appenix*
No, Xlt.

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

councils, there was not lefs energy in his protection. The nation, not a party, were
his adherents ; and his word was a fiat of fame. Pie bellowed emphatic praifes on
his General •, and a failing campaign became part of that bafis, from which he has
afcended to the high honours he now defervedly pofiefles.

It would be great prefumption, and it is far from being intended, to draw any
parallels or inferences from the campaigns of 1759 and 1777, except fuch as merely
apply to confumption of time under 'fimilar circumftances. In other points the
pretenfions of the refpe&ive Generals may be as different as their fortunes ; or, to
make a much clearer diftin&ion, and a yet ftronger contrail, as wide afunder as the
aufpices under which they ferved, thofe of Mr. Pitt and of Lord George Germain.

ObfervationSy &c. r effecting the third Period.

“ A feries of hard toil, inceffant effort, ftubborn adion, till difabled in the col-
« lateral branches of the army, by the total defection of the Indians, and the defer-
« ti«n or timidity of the Canadians and Provincials, fome individuals excepted ■,
“ difappointed in the laft hope of any timely co-operation from other armies j the
« regular troops reduced, by Ioffes from the bell parts, to 3500 fighting men, not
« 2coo of which were Britilh ; only three days provifions, upon fhort allowance,
<< in (tore-, inverted by an army of 16,000 men, and no apparent means of retreat
" remaining, I called into council all the generals, field officers, and captains com-
ct manding corps, and by 'their unanimous concurrence and advice, I was induced
« to open a treaty with Major General^Gate’S, &c.”

Such was the fummary of affairs given in my letter from Albany to the fecretary
of ftate. At the time it was written, I little expeded to have occafion for any
other teftimony of my adions •, and it has therefore been fuppofed, that I gave them
a colouring more fpecious than exad. This is the ftage of my defence in which I
am defirous to bring that matter to judgment ; and I have quoted the above paf-
fage, exprefsly to lead the attention of every examiner to the whole of that letter.
Let it now be confidered, unitedly with my late narrative, and both be compared
in detail with the evidence — I am bold to flake my caufe upon the iffue — And reft-
ingupon thefe references, my comments upon this period, though it is the moft im-
portant, will be fhorter than upon either of the former : the proofs alfo are more
colleded, and the matters controverted or ftarted in crofs-examination are fewer.

The firft remark I have to make is, that while the managers of the minifter’s
caufe have never admitted a doubt of the reality of thofe movements in the cam-
paign, with the propriety of which their ingenuity promifed them even a coloura-
ble caufe of cavil, they haye had the addrefs, when any little fkill and condud were
generally acknowledged, to call the exiftence of fuch movements into queftion. I
cannot make this remark more pertinently than at prefent, when the march of the

army,

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. l2t

army, preceding the adtion of the 19th of September, is in its due place the objedt
of notice — “ A pretty combination of columns and deployments compofed at Al-
bany, and very fit for a Gazette.” This fort of language I believe mofi: perfons
have heard, who have converfed with the dependents or runners of office, and it
will be my excufe for fubmitting to the judgment of my profeffion a plan of the
movement. It will fhew in fome degree the difficulties that the nature of the coun-
try oppofed to a combined march of columns ; and at the lame time the difadvan- March f0 the
tage (I might fay the certain defeat) that mull: have been fuftained, had the army enemy on the
been only in one column upon the ground where it was attacked, or had the com- p&v. Sept ‘
bination of the other columns, thofe of General Frafer in particular, been lefs exadt
to the point of time in which it was expedient they fhould arrive and form.

I o prove that this march was not compojed at Albany, I refer to feveral witnefles,
but particularly to the Earl of Harrington. His fituation, as my aid-de-camp,
gave him a general knowledge of a movement, that an officer employed in the execu- Lord Ba|
tion of a fingle part of it could not have acquired. It will be confidered by all who las >
know the qualities of my noble friend, as very honourable to the difpofitions of that M^/Forbes,
day, that they are fo circumftantially retained in fo diftinguifhing a mind ; and for ( l ue ^ 3 to 7!
my own part, I cannot commit them to military judgment under a better truft than ringtoK"'
the accuracy of his defcription. queft. 38 to

I fhall not therefore detain the reader an inftant longer from a fubjedt fo worthy 4 " IJ, ' Iulne ‘
his attention, as the evidence refpedting the behaviour of the troops in the enfuino-
events of that day.

Few adtions have been charadterized by more obftinacy in attack or defence. The
Britifh bayonet was repeatedly tried ineffiedlually. Eleven hundred Britilh foldiers,
foiled in thefe trials, bore inceffant fire from a fucceffion of frefli troops in fuperior A&ion of
numbers, for above four hours ; and after a lofs of above a third of their numbers J 9 th Se P u
(and in one of the regiments above two thirds) forced the enemy at laft. Of a de- Lord Har
tachment of a captain and forty-eight artillery men, the captain and thirty-fix were rington’s
killed or wounded. i hefe fadts are marked by a concurrence of evidence that no 4 ^indtifive •
man will difpute. ”1 he tribute of praile due to fuch troops will not be want- Lord Balcar-
ing in this generous nation ; and it will as certainly be accompanied with a juft por- CapoVlo-’'

tion of ffiame to thofe who have dared to depreciate or fully valour fo confpicuous my ' 26 10

who have their ears open only to the prejudice of American cowardice j and having Maj. Forbes,
been always loud upon that courtly topic, ftifie the glory of their countrymen to Ue°ut°0,l
maintain a bafe confiftency. Kingfton” \j

It will be obfervable from the accounts of the killed and wounded, that the lofs to6 7-
°‘ officers in ail the adtions of the campaign was proportionably much greater than
tnat of tne private men : and as this oblervation applies particularly to the action,
we are confidering, it inay not be improper to account for it in this place.

The

1 22

Reafcnof the
ditpropor-
tion of kijlcd
an<l wound-
ed.

Proceedings
.of the army
after the ac
tion.

C.rofs-exa-
inination of
Lord Balcar-
ras, queft. 98
to 100.

Ditto of Lord
Harrington,
qo and 106.
Lieut. Col.

Kingfton,68.

Maj. Forbes,
19.

Capt. Mo-
ney, 32.
Lieut- f Col.
Kingdon, 69
to 76.

Lord Har-
rington, 56.
Lord Balear-
ic, queft.
'JGQ,

review of the evidence.

The enemy had with their army great

barrel pieces: thefe, during an en & ag , fhifting tlieir ground,

tac laments, and the teas of their own line.

In this a&ion, many placed them ® . • any par t of our line without

and there was feldom a minutes interval of fmoke in any p

officers being taken off by Angle fl.ot. wou \d be of great ufe againft this

lt will naturaUy be ftippofed, 'f o f t J""mtd after the gr°eat defer-

mode of fighting. I ie exarrq. n f them was to be brought within the found

tion proved the contrary, for not a man of f ^ viceof this nature-,

of a rifle f hot . T he Canadians ^ whic h I noticed before, their bed

but befides the change in their mi t n. a penera l damp upon the

officer was killed early in the action, w uc i e ^ t0 0p p 0 fe

corps. A few of the Provincials were : ^.cea^ - ^ ^ fo fmall> as not

as markfmen, were the German chaffiurs, tnou = n

to be one to twenty of the enemy 0 f the army after this aSion will

The crofs-exam, nation upon the proce = parliamentary enqm-

fc« the folly there would be ,n bringing a military ^ ^ t|k very

ry, upon the preemption that any ’ pairs o ^ thcm more inquif.tive, and

-want of pradticai knowledge in t q , hey wou ld otherwife be : form-

much more tenacious of doubts an urmi by a long an d f ev ere aftion,

fiance ; I do not believe that with an y ^ queftion of stacking the

and deprived of an uncommon portion * man of profeffional judgment :

enemy next morning would have occuire ‘ knowledge could be obtained than

s r= =i ^

"a”’ -o”" - "■'> — •' “•

fiftence. thoughts of military men from attacking a few days

Equally remote ™' d b ' ^ a lcmr f rom Sir Henry Clinton, in.orming

FMt Momgomery ‘° be “

as at that very time. ^ , • t i e j r ba^o-age packed, if that circum-

The queftions relating to the enemy .. » °= is anot her proof how

fiance was meant as an indication that they meant to ^ ^ thefc

•Cap,, tireen, aid d. camp to Major General !£ ' Jfet.io". ““J

owing to the captain happeiui’ig little

ior the general.

I2J

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

little the queftioners knew of fervioe. It does not appear in evidence how the faCt
was : but no officer will difpute, that if the enemy had not only packed their bag-
gage, but actually conveyed it to the other fide the river, they would have aCted
conformably to the general practice of fervice when aCtion is expeCted ; and to no
circumftance of fervice more than to that when it is refolved to difpute a poll to
the laft extremity.

Upon the whole of my fituation at that time, I am fo confident that it was the
part of an officer to fortify and wait events, that I am only further intent to prove
that I fortified properly, the nature of the ground and my feveral purpofes confi-
dered. Upon this principle I fubmit the plan annexed. It will alio ffiew the na
ture of the ground between the two armies, and ferve to explain the difficulties the
witnefies exprefs of taking a view of the enemy's left : but it will be confidered,
that befides thefe apparent obftacles to a near approach, the enemy abounded in
militia, which fupplied out -polls and fcouts, that could by no means be driven
in without making the army liable to a general aCtion.

As for any other intelligence than what could be obtained by eye-fight it was
generally contradictory, always imperfeCt ; the deferters were often fufpicious, the
prifoners very few. I never faw any inftance of fervice where it was fo difficult to
obtain information. Among people fpeaking the fame language with ourfelves, and
many of them profeffing the moll favourable difpofitions, fcarcely any could be pre-
vailed upon, by rewards or principle, to rifk his perfon for the purpole of intelligence.

In regard to the crofs-examination, refpeCting the time neceflary for the con-
ftruc'ion of the redoubts and other works, I neither thought it worth while to con-
teft it at the time, nor lhall I conteft it now, though nothing would be more
eafy than to ffiew that there was a great deal of neceflary labour which the queftions
did not lead to, and confequently the witneffes could not with propriety enter into,
the explanation of them. But what makes the confumption of time to me imma-
terial is, that I place my juftification upon the expediency of waiting the co-opera-
tion from Sir Henry Clinton. It is in proof, that I received a letter from him the
day after the aCtion of the 19th,* informing me that he meditated an attack upon
Fort Montgomery as at that very time. And as I have already faid, that I fliould have
thought it the part of madnefs to have rilked an attack upon the enemy, in the weak
Hate of my army, for fbme time after the late aCtion, and under the expectation of
fo powerful a diverfion ; fo fliould I have deferred it longer, even after being recruit-
ed from the hofpital, on account of the fame expectation, and the further chance
of the reinforcement of Colonel St. Leger’s corps, and perhaps a convoy of provi-

* The original letter is in my pofTeffion, but could not be produced without difcovering a fecret
mode of conveying intelligence that it might be improper to make public.

fions

Plan No. V.

124

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

Hons from Ticonderoga : fo far am I from conceiving the paft delay blameable, that
I acknowledge the meafure of the 7th of Oaober was precipitated by fome days, by
the forage being become fo fcarce, that a fupply could only be obtained by a move-
ment of the army.

If any perfons have fuppofed, that what hits been called the inactive ftate of the

army at this period was a ftate of reft, they are as much miftaken as they would

be if they fuppofed it in any other circumftance comfortable. From the 20th of

tionof^he" September to the 7th of October, the armies were fo near, that not a night paired

army from w ; t l 10Ut firinfr, and fometimes concerted attacks upon our advanced picquets ;
20th Sept, to f , . ...

7th Oct. no foraging party could be made without great detacnments to cover it j it was the

plan of the enemy to harrafs the army by conftant alarms, and their fuperiority of

numbers enabled them to attempt it without fatigue to themfelves.

By being habituated to fire, our foldiers became indifferent to it, and were capable
of eating or fieeping when it was very near them : but I do not believe either officer
or foldier ever flept during that interval without his cloaths, or that any general
officer, or commander of a regiment, paffed a fingle night without being upon his
le"s occafionally at different hours, and conftantly an hour before day-light.

Lord Balcar- The circumftances in general of the action of the 7th of October Hand in that ar-
•ras, 46, &c. ra°-ement in the evidence of the Earl of Balcarras, Earl of Harrington, Lieut. Col.
“ 7 , Kingfton, and Captain Money, and have been fo little controverted by crofs-
& c - t ^ , examination, that any length of comment upon them is unneceffary. I will only
Kingfton° ’ obferve, that the movement of the enemy under General Arnold, mentioned in my
77 , Narrative, is confirmed as far as circumftantial teftimony can confirm it, by Captain

nejvj 5 to "48 Money. And if there can be any perfons, who, after confidering that circumftance.
See alfo Plan and the pofitive proof of the fubfequent obftinacy, in the attack upon the poll of
V. Lord Balcarras, and various other actions of that day, continue to doubt, that the

Americans poffcfs the quality and faculty of fighting (call it by whatever term they
pleafe) they are of a prejudice that it would be very abfurd longer to contend with.

But though comments upon this part of the evidence may be fpared, the remem-
brance of what I perfonally underwent cannot fo eafily be fuppreffed i and I am fure
I fhall not outrro the indulgence of the candid, if in delineating fituations fo affeCt-
j n( y, 1 add feelings to juftification. The defence of military conduCt is an interefting
point of profeffional honour j but to vindicate the heart, is a duty to God and to

fociety at large.

Few conjunctures in the campaign I nave been defcnbing, few, perhaps, upon
military record, can be found fo diftinguifhed by exigencies, or productive of fuch
critical and anxious calls upon public character, and private affeCtion, as that which
now took place.

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

In the firft place, the poficion of the army] was untenable, and yet an immediate
retreat was impoffible ; not only from the fatigue of the troops, but from the neceffity
of delivering frelh ammunition and provifions.

The Ioffes in the adtion were uncommonly fevere. Sir Francis Clarke, my aid-de-
camp, had originally recommended himfelf to my attention by his talents and dili-
gence : as fervice and intimacy opened his charadter more, he became endeared to
me by every quality that can create efteern. I loft in him an ufeful affiftant, an amia-
ble companion, an attached ftiend : the ftate was deprived by his death, of one of
the faireft promifes of an able general.

The fate of Colonel Ackland, taken priloner, and then fuppofed to be mortally
wounded, was afecond fource of anxiety — General Frafer was expiring.

In the courfe of the adtion, a (hot had paffed through my hat, and another had torn
my waiftcoat. I Ihould be forry to be thought at any time infenlible to the protect-
ing hand of Providence ; but I ever more particularly confidered (and I hope not
fuperftitioufly) a foldier’s hair-breadth cfcapes as incentives to duty, a marked renewal
of the trujl of Being, for the due purpofes of a public ftation ; and under that reflection
to lofe our fortitude, by giving way to our affedtions ; to be diverted by any poffible
felf-emotion from meeting a prefent exigency with our beft faculties, were at once
dilhonour and impiety.

Having therefore put aflde for a time my private fenfations, it has been {hewn that
I effedted an entire change in the pofition of the army before day-light. The plan will
fhew the new ground taken up. Early in the morning of the 8th, General Frafer
breathed his laft — and .with the kindeft expreffions of his affedtion, his laft requeft was
brought me, that he might be carried without parade by the foldiers of his corps to
the great redoubt, and buried there. The whole day of the 8th of October was cor-
refpondent to this inaufpicious beginning. The hours were meafured by a fuccefilon
of immediate cares, encreafing doubts, and melancholy objedts. The enemy were
formed in two lines. Every part of their difpofition, as well as the repeated attacks
upon Lord Balcarras’s corps, and the cannonade from the plain, kept the troops in
momentary expectation of a general adtion. During this fufpenfe, wounded officers,
fome upon crutches, and others even carried upon hand-barrows by their fervants, were
occafionally afeending the hill from the hofpital tents, to take their ffiare in the adtion,
or follow the march of the army. The generals were employed in exhorting the
troops.

About fun-fet the corpfe of General Frafer was brought up the hill, attended only
by the officers who had lived in his family. To arrive at the redoubt, it palled with-
in view of the greateft part of both armies. General Phillips, General Reidefel, and
myfelf, who were (landing together, were {truck with the humility of the proceffion :

S They

I2 5

Lord Balcar-
ras, 5;.

Lord Balcar-
ras, 53.

Lord Har-
rington, 66.
Plan, No. VI.
State of
things on
the 8th.

Lord Har-
rington, 67,
&c.

Gen.Frafer’s

funeral.

light march
f the 8th.

ord Har-
ington, 70,
nd from 1 1 2 .
* 118.

Jontinuance
f the march
n the 9th.

review of the evidenc e.

1 • 1 _ j hppn reminded, mi^ht conftrne it ncgltft.

They who were ignorant tut P nva ^> ‘ ;id reftrain our natural propenfity to
We could neither endure that that en fued cannot be better

pay our laft attention to us ltina.n rent witncffcs * The inceffant cannonade

rr::

marked a charafter of that junfb * h ^ i| ^L^ lh e canvas and' to the
the pencil of a matter tnat tne ,, t friend 1 I conttgn thy memory,

faithfu. page of a more important “ £^"d their erioi, find doe
There may thy talents, thy manly virtues, their P c

diftinaion-, and long may they fumvey long alter

Ihall be t°rg° tten - , f f ffave p i ace to the perplexities of the

nrhp rpfleftions aniinor from tncie lccncb i r r

night. A defeated army was t0 rct "“ if ' ^1 nTe^lry tehind.'" We" Ire
fuperior in front, and occupying ftro = p ^ of rca[a xhe ,jjf_

equally liable upon that march to e ““ “ circumftances’ would admit j and

riJce Tn critical fLtions can only teach. The baggage, whtch could only move «
„ column, and in a narrow road, fell into the confufion whtch ,t ts tmpoffible for
caution to guard againft in the dark, becaufe a Angle acc, dent of an overturn or a

broken wheel, or even the ftu P‘^ “ r Ihould

the ‘troops, and ciders were fent to Major Genera, Phillips, who
commanded the rear guard, in cafe he was attacked, to pay attenuon only to the mam
ob^ft of covering the troops , or, if occafton were, of taking a pofitton to gtve them

‘“It'dav-bmak the next morning the army had reached very advantageous ground,
anfUookf a pofition in which it would have been very deferable to rece.ve the enen^
A halt was neceffary to rcfrefh the troops, and to give time to the bateaux, loaded

ftanding the correfpondent movement ot the army.

* Particularly Lieutenant Colonel Kingfton, «$.

127

review of the evidence.

The above purpofes being effected, the army proceeded in very fever* weather,

and through exceedmg bad „„ cra l f at i g ue, this day was remark-

Befides the contrnuatron of *®c“lt« g ^ ^ be oroitKd .

ableforacircumftancc of pnta e drft Ackl a„d’s paffage through the

The circumftance to which I allude is L/iay rx^ 1

enemy’s army, to attend her wounded hulband, then 1 : en pn ™ ^ abrupt]v or fu- Extraordi.

The progref, of this lady with the army could ha, y J a wonderful ^"pri.

perfluoufly introduced were tt only ( f °' f ' ^ pifture of L fpirit, the «««-•

u ‘ wn tbc chaIle aKl
" to z

fliew what the 1UXUr5 f S W J re " ( t he tccorm^atTonsTrepared for the two Lieut Col.
the army was encumbered, what were tn . Kmgfton,

V , j that are prravely fuppofed, in the crofs examination, to hate tol I3tt0I}3 .

thoujand women that are gr y pi as well a s falfe, would have

lowed with the baggage. "u^efutation but t hat it was malicioufly intended •,
been a fitter queffions, but by the perfons

not, lam con ten , y prejudice what they defpaired of effeamg by

^ - pretenfions of having fought hard, they

tould not allow the army even the claim upon the good-nature of the natron, of

h tLfholev r er 'confide, ' pan of this ftory as fo far unconnefted with the immediate
f j rnurfuine the line of evidence upon the retreat to Saratoga) as to

nit i “ST? X well Hand by itfelf! and I venture to think that this
one example of patience, fufTering, and fortitude, wrll be permuted to pals wit out

cenfure or obloquy. * When

* Lady Harriet Ackland had accompanied her hufoand

’^cu?,Ter;St n ln Jliu T.o't’enfity od^elve, to atteud. n psoov

ami the crofled the Lake Champlain

to join him

Grafted by the artificers of the artillery, lomething nmiiar g^nacliers, which were attached to

great roads' of hngland. Major Ackland ^ commanded th* B,„Wh grejia Qf fhc a TUcir

General Frafer’s corps ; and confeqnenrly were always the mu [hclc fixations a

Gt nations were often fo alert, that no perfon flept out ot their cuan tent,

£) 2

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

128

When the army was upon the point of moving after the halt defcribed, I re-
ceived a melTage from Lady Harriet, fubmitting to my decifion a propofal (and
expreffmg an earneft folicitude to execute it, if not interfering with my defigns)
of parting to the camp of the enemy, and requefting General Gates’s permifllon to
attend her hufband.

Though I was ready to believe (for I had experienced) that patience and for-
titude, in a fupreme degree, were to be found, as well as every other virtue,
under the moil tender forms, I was aftonifhed at this propofal. After fo long an
agitation of the fpirits, exhaufted not only for want of reft, but abfolutely want of
food, drenched in rains for twelve hours together, that a woman Should be capable
of fuch an undertaking as delivering herfelf to the enemy, probably in the night,
and uncertain of what hands fhe might firft fall into, appeared an effort above
hunian nature. The aftiftance I was enabled to give was fmall indeed; I had not
even a cup of wine to offer her*, but 1 was told Ihe had found, from fome kind and
fortunate hand, a little rum and dirty water. All I could furnifti to her was an
open boat and a few lines, written upon dirty and wet paper, to General Gates,
recommending her to his proteftion.

tent, in. which the major and Lady Harriet were afleep, fuddenly took fire. An orderly ferjeant
of grenadiers, with great hazard of fnffocation, dragged out the firft perfou he caught hold of. It
proved to be the major. It happened, that in the fame inilant the had, unknowing what file did,
and perhaps not perfe&ly awake, providentially made her efcape, by creeping under the walls of
the back part of the tent. The firft object (lie faw, upon the recovery of her lenfes, was the major
on the other fide, and in the fame inftant again in the fire, in fearch of her. I'he ferjeant again
faved him, but not without the major being veiy feverely burned in his face and different parts of the
body. Every thing they had with them in the tent was confirmed.

This accident happened a little time before the army palled the Hudfon’s River. It neither altered
the refolution nor the chearfulnefs of Lady Harriet; and (lie continued her progrefs, a partaker of
the fatigues of the advanced corps. The next call upon her fortitude was of a different nat .re, and
more difirefsful, as of longer iufpenfe. On the march of the 19th, the grenadiers being liable to
action at every ftep, file had been directed by the major to follow the route of the artillery and bag-
gage, which was not expofed. At the time the action began file found herfelf near a fmall uninha-
bited hut, where file alighted. When it was found the action was becoming general and bloody, the
furgeons of the hofpital took pofielfion of the fame place, as the moft convenient for the firft care of
the wounded. Thus was this lady in hearing of one continued fire of cannon and mufketry, for
four hours together, with the prefumption, from the poft of her hufband at the head of the grena-
diers, that he was in the moft expofed part of the a&ion. She had three female companions, the-
Earonefs of Reidefel and the wives of two Britifh officers, Major Harnage and Lieutenant Reynell
but in the event their prefence ferved but little for comfort. Major Harnage was foon brought to
the furgeoris, very badly wounded ; and a little time after came intelligence that Lieutenant Reynell
was fliot dead. Imagination will want no helps to figure the ftate of the whole groupe.

From the date of that aftion to the 7th of October, Lady Harriet, with her ufual ferenity, flood
prepared for new trials ! arid it was her lot that their feverity encreafed with their numbers. . She
was again expofed to the hearing of the whole aiftion, and at laft received the (hock of her individual
misfortune, mixed with the intelligence of the general calamity, the troops were defeated, and Major
Ackiand, defperately wounded, was a prifoner.

The day of the 8th was pafied by Lady Harriet and her companions in common anxiety, not a tent,
nor a (bed being (landing, except what belonged to the Hofpital, their refuge was among the.
wounded and' the dying.

4. Mr.

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

12 9

Mr. Brudenell, the chaplain to the artillery (the fame gentleman who had offi-
ciated fo fignally at General Frafer’s funeral) readily undertook to accompany her,
and with one female fervant, and the major’s valet de-chambre (who had a ball which
he had received in the late adtion then in his fhoulder) fhe rowed down the river to
meet the enemy. But her diftrefies were not yet to end. The night was advanced
before the boat reached the enemy’s out-pofts, and the centinel would not let it
paft, nor even come on fhore. In vain Mr. Brudenell offered the flag of truce,
and reprefented the ftate of the extraordinary paflenger. The guard, apprehenfive
of treachery, and punctilious to their orders, threatened to fire into the boat if it
ftirred before day light. Her anxiety and fuffering were thus protraCted through fe-
ven or eight dark and cold hours ; and her reflections upon that firft reception could
not give her very encouraging ideas of the treatment fhe was afterwards to expect.
But it is due to juftice at the clofe of this adventure to fay, that fhe was received
and accommodated, by General Gates with all the humanity and refpedt that her rank,,
her merits and her fortunes deferved.

Let fuch as are affeCted by thefe circumftances of alarm, hardlhip and danger,
recolleft, that the fubjeCt of them was a woman ; of the moft tender and delicate
frame j of the gendeft manners ; habituated to all the foft elegancies, and refined
enjoyments, that attend high birth and fortune ; and far advanced in a ftate in
which the tender cares, always due to the fex,. become indifpenfibly neceflary. Her
mind alone was formed fur fuch trials.

I now return to the army, which arrived in the night at Saratoga, in fuch a ftate
of fatigue, that the men for the moft part had not ftrength or inclination to cut
wood and make fires, but rather fought deep in their wet cloaths upon the wet
ground under the continuing rain, and it was not till after day-light that the artil-
lery and the laft of the troops pall the Fifh Kill, and took a pofition upon the heights
and in the redoubts formerly conftruCted.

The interval between taking that pofition, and the conclufion of the treaty, is
the folemn crifis in which I confider myfelf as peculiarly accountable to my coun-
try. And if all the circumftances mentioned by me, in my own vindication, in
j my Letters, or my Narrative, are not eftablifhed, and many of them rtrengthened
by pofitive proof; if every furmife of a furrender on my part, while there was a
poffibiiity of avoiding it by fight, by manoeuvre, or by retreat, is not done away j
if even in the laft extremity, it does not appear I was ready and forward to prefer
death to difhonour; if the evidence I have adduced is not clear, diftinCt, and direCt
to thefe points, the public odium, piercingly as it affects a fenfible breaft, would
be far fhortof the punifhment I deferve.

I cannot but confider it as one encouragement under this appeal, and it is no fmall
one, that though very few parts of my preceding conduct have efcaped theferutiny of

crofs-

Arrival of
the army at
Saratoga.
Lord Har-
rington, 71,.
&c.

Lord Balear-
ic, 57, &c.

Interval be-
tween the
arrival at Sa-
ratoga and
figning the
convention*.

* 3 °

Lord Har-
rington, 74.
to 76.

Lieut. Col.
Kingfton, 86.
See the plan.
Lieut. Col.
Kingfton, 91
92.

Lieut. Col.
Kingtlon,9
94 >

Lieut. Col.
King(lon,88,

89, 9.).

See the plan.
No. VII.

Lord Har-
rington, 84,
85,86.

Lord Balcar-
ras, from 60
to the end.
Maj. Forbes,
2 2 to 29.
Lord Balcar-
ras, 64.

review of the evidence.

.^.examination, not a material tranfaftion of this crifts has been controverted or
, I bee leave to recapitulate the tranfa&ions upon which I re y.

6 T“s proved by the evidence of the Earl of Harrington and Colonel K.ngfton,

... the Lemy was polled on the call fide the river to guard the ford.

It u further proved by the evidence of Lieut. Col. ’

t ^"^“^mpt^ prevented by the impoffibility

, dino rite delivery of neceffary provifion. The fame witnefs goes on to (hew,
a ‘ " ° ’ t dr . it was evident, that had the delivery been poffible, the attempt

H Hill have failed, for we then received intelligence of the enemy bemg pre-
r„fly in poffieffion, in force, of the country on both fides the river beeweenus and

F Whit W the J armv was lying day and night upon their arms “ in anxious hope of
While tm. y / e ' , defirable expectation, an attack from

“ fuccour from our fnends, or » the ne« dcfiwb^ P Colonel

“ the enemy”! 1 cannot omit obfemog It would be im-

Kingfton) how near the lift expectation was g P . h y reql ,e(l the

prop* to pronounce pofmvely what wot, d I ten he (ft <1 the

attention of my military readers to the plan of The 8™"^ J

I 1 t™ r.irrefs The diipofition of the enemy ocui D y
probabd.ty of fucceis P effort upon the plain, they muft have

in different columns, and to make g h of grape-toot, a crofs

formed under the fire of all our park am e , & hm ^ ^

foe from the artillery and mufketry of the fupported by thc

mufketrv of the 20 th regiment, been the advantage, which though

Germans, in front , added chtro-e upon an open plain. I am

always wifbed for we never a attain ^ * . fh me when [ i am ent the accident that
perfuaded the general judgment wi » actually to have paffed

prevented the enemy’s defign (when <6 iar — mm, * thc

the river with one column) as o

whole campaign. . , . £ ar i 0 f Harrington :

The ftate of things after this difappotntmentisg V h the ir provif.ons

.. It was as bad as poffible i the numbers of the army were , ^

“ (hort, their pofidon not a good one, o«mg to _tie and MaJ „ r For bcs,

Hate is corroborated by the evidence of the Earl o 1 the whole

with the additional circumftance, that there was not a fpot
pofition which was not expofed to cannon or rifle fhot.

. -It was alfo in contemplation to force a way tack _to Atoy. hjj 1 [ he 'JJKjjSSjton’* evi-
their pods weakened their right, fo as to have made the ettoit pomme.

dcnce.

f letter from Albany to the fccretary of date.

REVIEW of the evidence.

The minutes of the firft council of war prove the unanin'ty of opinion for open-
ing the treaty ; and it is proved by the evidence of Colonel Kingfton, that the force
of the enemy was actually greater, and their pofition ftronger, than the intelligence
I had received and laid before the council of war reprefented them.

It is proved by the fulleft evidence, that the terms fir ft propofed by the enemy
were inftantly and unanimoufly rejected by the council of war as dishonourable.

The fame unanimity in approving the terms I propofed and obtained, is equally

inconteftably eftablilhed.

And laftly, two papers are produced, and authenticated beyond a pomoility of
cavil, the one General Gates’s return figned by himfelf, (hewing the effe&ive ilrength
prefent of the rebel army, the other, the minutes of the laft council of war, (hew-
ing that even fupported as I was by the unanimity of the former councils, in open-
ing and conduding the treaty, I was repugnant to the figning of it, upon a flight
hope entertained of a remote relief— (a hope arifing from fome intelligence received
in the night of Sir Henry Clinton’s moving up the North River) and gave my voice
againft a majority accordingly; that I at laft thought myfelf compelled to yield
to the majority upon “ the uncertainty of the intelligence, and the improbability
« of General Clinton’s motions being effectual if true ; upon the doubts entertained
C< of fome part of the troops, if the negotiation of the treaty ceafed, and of a greater
« part for want of bodily ftrength, if defperate enterprises were to be afterwards
“ undertaken ; and laftly, upon the reflection that a mifcarriage of fuch enterprifes
«C mu ft be fatal to the whole army, and that even a victory could not five it.”

To this mafs of evidence, appofite and direCt to every fad effential to myjuftiff-
cation, I beg leave to add the opinion of the army, that the terms obtained were
better than the fituation of things gave us a right to exped. For a proof that fuch
was their opinion, I refer to the teftimony of Lord Balcarras.

A fair judgment upon recent events is hardly to be expeded, efpecially while
many prejudices are alive. It will be allowed me to affume, what no one has ever
ventured to deny, that there may be a combination of circumftances under which an
army may be juftified in treating with an enemy. That the army under my com-
mand was under fuch circumftances at Saratoga is alfo generally acknowledged :
but what is not denied to me from my own fituation, is attempted to be withheld,
by fome, on account of the quality of the enemy. They fugged that there lhould
be no treaty with rebels. It is unneceffary in anfwer to have recourfe to hiftory.
I will not take defence from treaties between Spain, the haughtieft power of the
world, and the arch- rebel the great Prince of Orange; nor between Charles the
Firft and the arch-rebels the Englilh Parliament .(for fuch in both inftances they
were called) I need only refer to the examples exifting at that time in America,

2 and

* 3 »

Appendix,
No. XV.
Lieut. Col.
Kingfton, 91,
&c.

Maj, Forbes,

3 1 fo 34-
Lord Balcar-
ras, 65 to 73.

Appendix,
N . XVI.
Appendix,

No. XVII.

See alfo Lord
Balcarras,
13°, 13 1,

I 3 <2#

Lord Balcar-
ras.

Lord Har-
rington.

Reflexions
upon the
convention.

132

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE.

and fince much improved on at home. My fuperior officer in America with the
approbation of government, had treated upon different occafions with General
Waffiin°ton. The Britiffi government in its higheft colleftive authority, the King
in Parliament, has fince commiffioned five members of that Parliament, the one a
peer the others of eminent ftation in military and civil capacities, to treat with
rebels, 1 had almoft faid to fue to rebels for peace, by the furrendcr of almoft every
principle for the maintenance of which they had profecuted the war.

Thus highly juftified in treating with rebels, I am at a lofs to difeover by what
poffible mode of defence I .could have acquitted myfelf to God or my country,
when the brave and intelligent officers of my army unanimoudy refolved, upon
military principle, precedent and reafon, that the treaty was expedient, and the
terms honourable, if I had delivered them up to certain deftru&ion, or even to be

prifoners at diferetion. . . . ,

If the informed and dilpaffionafe part of mankind ffiould agree in fentiment with

■the unanimous voice of the army, upon the convention of Saratoga, furely to
impute to it the final lofs of the army is too palpable an injuftice long to remain
upon the minds of the moft prejudiced. The convention exprefsly preferved the army
for the fervice of the ftate. According to that convention a truce was made during
the war, between that army and the enemy, in America, and it now might have
been afting againft the Houfe of Bourbon in any other part of the world. The
army was loft by the non-compliance with the treaty on the part of the Congrefs;
and that violation of faith no man will ever be found to juftify

1 will not decide how far it was encouraged in America, by the perfuafton that
the miniftry of Britain had neither power nor fpirit to redrefs the wrong; and that
they had funk the nation fo low, in point of refpeft, that the world would over-
look where ffie was concerned, an aftion that would have excited, in any other
cafe ’ univerfal cenfure and indignation. But whatever motives the Congrefs may
have had, the tamenefs and filence with which the Britiffi minifters have borne
this outrage, is aftoniffiing. That men fo conftant and fo prodigal in their anger
againft the Congrefs, as never before to have failed in expreffing it, even in cafes
where it bordered upon being ridiculous, ffiould on a fudden become cold an
mute and dead to feeling, in a cafe where refentment was juftly founded, can
hardly be accounted for, except upon the principle that it was better to fupprels
the jufteft cenfure upon a power they detefted, than that even a particle of unme-
rited odium ffiould be wanting to load the man whom they were refolved to deprefs.

appen-

CONCLUSION.

X AM not aware that in the preceding Review of Evidence I have neglected any
part eflential to my defence. I do not reckon as fuch, that part which applies to
the management of the public purfe. The calumny defigned to wound me upon
that head was too grofs to fucceed : it perifhed in its birth, and fcorn is the only
fentiment excited by the remembrance of its momentary exiftence. In regard to
the more plaufible objections pointed againft my conduct, I have not only endea-
voured to meet them in the crofs-examination, but have learched for them in every
place where I could fuppofe them to originate or be entertained. If fome have
efcaped, I fhall (land excufed, when it is recollected how they have grown and
changed from one (hape to another, and that it has never been my fortune to be
confronted with an avowed and regular accufer — I defpair of ever being l'o : but I
defire it to be underftood, that although I am earned: in this mode of defence, I
am fofar from declining another, that I (hall think it one very happy circumftance
of the pad: enquiry, if any thing contained in it Ihould have effect hereafter to pro-
duce an enquiry by court-martial.

It would not be an ungrateful talk to follow the defence of the campaign with a
detail of the occurrences which happened between the time of figning the conven-
tion and my leaving America. Many of them would be found curious ; and the
cares and perplexities in which I bore a principal and mod: painful part, would
create a new intereft in the minds of my friends : but I do not think myfelf at
liberty, upon the plan I laid down at my outfet, to enter into matter where no blame
is imputed or implied. If my proceedings during that interval deferve any credit,
I am content with that teftimony of it, which I may aflume from the filence of my
enemies.

I have not the fame reafons for palling over the tranfa&ions in which I have been
engaged dnce my return to England, becaufe blame, and of a very atrocious na-
ture, has been imputed to me. But as the principal of thefe tranfabtions are already
before the public, I lhall mention them very briedy ; and merely to introduce con-
ne&edlv fuch further thoughts upon them as could not with propriety be dated upon
any former occafion.

Immediately after my arrival, a board of general officers was appointed to en-
quire into the caufes of the failure of the expedition from Canada. This enquiry
was made the foundation of an order again!!: my appearing at court.

The board reported, that they could not take cognizance of me being under
parole — “the prohibition from the King’s prefence neverthelefs ftill remained in force.

* S I had

* 3 *

CONCLUSION.

I had recourfe to parliament for enquiry •, and openly, and repeatedly, and ftrenu-
„1 ca. ed u p „„ the nunifters «o join iffue with me before that tribunal Objec-
tion was taken againft immediate enquiry, becaufe Generals S,r Guy Carlet n and
Sir William Hole who might be parties were abfenti but « was evtdently the dtf-
pofition of the houfe, that an enquiry fhould be inftituted the enfuing feffion.

1 I pledged myfelf zealoufly to profecute that meafure ; I accuied nunifters of inj -
rids treatment towards myfelf , and it became my duty, upon octal, ons wtth which
Z own affairs had no conneftion, to exprefs deeper refentments of their conduft

“"n'thisftatt of things parliament was prorogued on the 3 i of June. On the 5'i
cf Jme, I received the firft ordef to repair to Bofton as loon as I had tried the Ba
waters The order and my anfwer, repreientmg the hardlhip of being fen
unheard, and the fecund conditional order, with entire flight of my reprefentations,
a"e too well known ,0 require repetition : but there are two crcumftances attend, ng
‘the dates of thefe orders with which I was not acquainted till long after, and which

have never vet been tcilven notice of. . , .

The one is, that at the very time I was told that my prefence was material , and

(as the fecond letter from the fecretary at war expreffed) of Jo much importance to the
troops detained prijoners in New England , that it muft not be difpenfed with at that
very time, it vfas determined to ratify the convention, according to the requifi ion
of the Con-refs •, and to tranfmit the ratification through other hands, and without
any participation with me, or employment of me, in carrying it to a conclufion
I: was very poffible, the troops might have been failed for England before I a
replied America, had I even complied as early as the condition of either orde
could poffibly be conftrued to preferibe. But at all events, the circumftance could
not but ferve to mark to me the true intent and meaning of the order beyond a po i-
bility of miftake — that it was an order of vindictive punijhment ; an my pre ence
with^the troops, if I reached America in time, was material and important to mark
lo thm the degree of difgrace to which I was reduced. The terms are a mockery,
and an infult upon common fenfe, if applied, in the fituation in which I was placed,
to the fervice of the King, or the confolation of the troops. Such a difplay of ven-
geance might indeed be intended to apply to their prudence, and to act as a cau-
tion and warning how at their return they fhould fupport a General under the extre-
mity of the King’s difpleafure * , ,

The other circumftance attending thefe dates is not lefs remarkable, viz.

- In tim« when tKe mamtenanco oftlhe clothe of Ae

niftration, the King’s name is introduce y o ice ■ influence of monarchy, the language of

mercy. The

CONCLUSION.

*35

The determination of changing the nature of the war, as afterwards declared by
the commiffioners in America, muft have been taken at this time.

I am very much difinclined to believe, that the confideration of my perfon as a
proper vidtim upon that occafion was ever regularly and formally debated in the
cabinet: but I cannot think it uncharitable to the individual adviferof the Crown,
whoever he was, who could projedt fuch an order, to fuppofe, that if upon the firft
exercife of the extremes of war on the one fide, and in the ardour of retaliation on
the other, it had fo happened, that an objedt fo well to be fpared as an obnoxious
and difgraced Lieutenant General, had opportunely prefented itfelf to the enemy’s
rigour, and had been detained in their prifons, the order for the voyage would not
have been thought, by that individual, quite thrown away. Detention, with or
without the troops, of a troublefome and bold complainant, could not be immate-
rial or unimportant to fuch a perfon, and the order was of an import
“ — To make affurance double fure —

“ And take a bond of fate — -
“ That he might tell pale-hearted Fear it lied.”

The living prefence of an injured man is, perhaps, more oft'enfive and infup-
portable to the fight of a mean injurer, that the fpedtre of him would be after
death.

But to return to the fadts I was recapitulating.

I remained under the conditional order in England.

The enfuing feflion, the parliamentary enquiry now laid before the public took
place. It ended, as has been ftated, in July, 1779.

In September, I received a fevere reprimand, a denial of a court-martial, and a
prohibition of fervingmy country in its exigence, though other officers precilely in
my fituation were employed — I refigned.

The blame laid upon me for the part I took in thefe tranfadlions is, that intem-
perately and fadtioufiy I engaged in oppofition ; that I was guilty of difobedience
to the King’s orders ; and it has been added in a late publication, that even my de-
fence of my condudt is a libel upon the King’s government.

I think I have perceived, that the firft part of thefe charges, a raffi engagement
in oppofition, is not combated by fome who wifii me well fo ftrenuoufiy as other
imputations have been. It may poffibly have appeared to friendly and prudential
obfervers, as a palliating plea for a reftitution to favour upon fome future occafion,
to have to fay, that I had adted upon the fudden impulfe of paffion •, and the fequel
might be, that I had repented, and would offend no more.

Without doubting the kindnefs which fuggefts thefe e.xcufes, I have been im-
pelled by principles too forcible, and have taken my part too decidedly, to look
for a refource in thofe or any other fubterfuges. It would be inconfiftent and dis-
honourable in me to withhold a public declaration upon this occafion, in addition

* S 2 to

CONCLUSION.

to thofe I have made upon others, that I engaged in refinance to the meafures of
the court upon mature refleftion ; that after collefting in my mind all the lights
upon men and things which my experience and obfervation could furnilh, I be-
lieved that the conftitution of England was betrayed : and neither blaming or
fufpefting any men who conceived different opinions, and afted upon them, I
thought it a point of time in which a man believing as I did was called upon to
facrifice to his country. The teft of this motive, it is true, mud reft between God
and my confidence : but let it not be fuppofed that I added blindly — the path of
intereft,. a broad and beaten track, lay clearly before me from the time I arrived
in England. Supple joints, and an attentive eye, always giving, way to power, on
one fide,, and fometimes pufliing my friends into the dirt on the other, would have
carried me fafely through. I even believe, that the ad'vifer of the letters I lately
alluded to would rather have feen me in that track, than in the other which he pre-
fcribed for me acrols the Atlantic.

As little would I be fuppofed to want difcernment of the path I took for
the barefaced preferences, rewards and punifhments held forth for parliamentary
condudt, were among the moft glaring parts of the fyftem I had contemplated.
And it was impoffible to doubt, that as a delinquent there , I fhould be prefled both
by art and vengeance to the end the enemies I had provoked forefaw — the lofs of
my profeffion and the impoverifhment of my fortune. I truft it will be. an inno-
cent revenge on my part, to fnew them I can bear my condition firmly j and that
I am incapable of redeeming what I have loft, were it ever in my option, by die
difavowal of a fingle principle I have profefied.

I come now to the fecond charge, difobedience of orders ; and in a point that
fo nearly touches the very effence of military charafter, I truft I fhall not tref-
pafs upon the patience of the reader, if I treat it a little more at large than I have
done in my correfpondence with the fecretary at war.

I admit that fubordination and implicit obedience, as applied to the operation
of arms, are primary principles in the military fyftem. An army is a mere name
without them. The officer who hefitates to meet certain death upon command,
deferves to receive it from the hand of the executioner.

But there are poffible exceptions to thefe general principles, efpecially out of the
field, in the moft abfolute fervices - y and in the Britilh fervice they are known and
marked, and co-exiftent with the military eftablifhment itfelf, in the mutiny aft,
which confines obedience to legal commands. An army muft again be garbled
like the army of Cromwell (which God avert !) before an order could be executed,
like that of Cromwell, for garbling the parliament.

A high fpirit will contraft the limits of obedience ftill more ; with illegal, he
will rejeft difhonourable commands ; and he will follow the reafoning I have al-
ready premifed, and ftate it as a maxim thus: he who obeys at the expence of for-
tune,

*37

CONCLUSION,

tune, comfort, health and life, is a foldier ; he who obeys at the expense of honour is a
fave.

But I may be afked by fome difeiplinarians, who is to be the judge in thefe nice
definitions of obedience ? It is uncommon military doftrine, I may be told, to rea-
Jbn upon the King’s orders' — I confefs it is fo. Since the reign of James the Second,
in the Britifh ftrvice it never has been neceffary. We have been ufed in this age,
to fee the King’s name give wings and infpiration to duty. Difcipline, in this
country, has been, ra-ifed upon perfonal honour — a firmer bafis than fear or fervility
ever furnifhed : and the minider who firft fliakes that happy confidence ; who turns
military command to political craft ; who dares to ufe his gracious Sovereign’3
name as an engine of date, to glut his own anger, or to remove his own fears, he is
amongft the word enemies to that Sovereign. But Ibould his purpofes go further
(a confideration of far greater magnitude to the public) and fhould it be leen that
the royal name was brought forth for the difcipline of parliament, the minider d)'
ufing it would be not only an. enemy to his Sovereign, but a traitor to the conditu-
tion of the date.

I will dole the defence of my principles refpefting military fubordination by re-
ference to an anecdote well authenticated and not very remote.

An officer in. a neighbouring nation, for fome error he had committed in a day
of battle, received a blow from his prince who commanded in perfon. Tlie officer
drew a, pidol, and his fird movement was to point it at his mader ; but the next
(and it was indantaneous), was to turn the muzzle, and difeharge the ball into his
own heart. Though- my cafe differs both in the provocation and the confequence,.
in many circumdances my conduct may judly be fupported upon the fame princi-
ple. I receive an affront that a liberal fpirit cannot endure ; and in a name, againft
which no perfonal refentment can be purfued,. nor indeed entertained : but a fuicide
of my profeffionaL exidence (if I may be allowed the phrafe) is preferable to the
date in which the affront placed me. In one indance only I renounce the parallel —
God forbid I fhould be thought, even in a burd of paffion, to have pointed at
my Sovereign ! It was not from his- hand I received’ the blow.

I fhall folicit the reader’s attention very little further : but I feel the necelfity of
repeating my application to- the candour of the public,, both as a writer and an
appellant. Defence,, and imputation of blame to- others, are naturally interwoven
in my caufe : it required a more didintt conception, and an abler hand than mine,,
to keep them always apart, and open to feparate view. In fome parts fny defence-
may be weakened by this deficiency of fkill : but I have no right to offer the fame
excufe for differing any blame to red upon others beyond what I thought myfclf
judified to fupport.

Upon this principle, I think it jud, at taking leave of the fecretary of date for
the American department, briefly to enumerate the only fatts and propofitions re-
3 , fpecting

i 3 8

CONCLUSION.

fpeding the plan of* the expedition from Canada, that I think clearly maintainable

againft him.

Firft fad. It is clear that the plan of a jundion of the greater part of the forces in
Canada with the army of Sir William Howe, was formed in the year 1776, when Sir
William Howe was in full fuccefs ; when his whole force was in the neighbourhood
of New York, or in the Jerfies, and Mr. Wafhington was beaten, and at theweakeft.

Second fad. This plan of a jundion was continued (and upon juft reafoning) in
the clofe of the year 1776, when Sir William Howe’s firft propofal of operations for
the enfuing campaign arrived. Thofe propofols were made upon the datum of a
number of troops, fufficient to furnifh, befides the main army, an offenfive army of
10,000 men, rank and file, to ad on the fide of Rhode Ifland, by taking poffeffion
of Providence, and penetrating from thence into the country towards Bofton ; and
another offenfive army, not lefs than 10, coo, to move up the North Rivei to Alba-
ny, exclufive of 5000 for the defence of New York.

In either of the above cafes, the plan of jundion could hardly have failed of fuccefs.

Third fad. On the 23d of February, Sir William Howe’s alteration of the firft
plan was received, and he then propofed to ad with the greater part of his force on
the fide of Philadelphia, at the opening of the campaign, and to enable him fo to
do, to defer the offenfive plan from Rhode Ifland till the reinforcements Jhould arrive ,
and to deftine only 3000 men to ad defenflvely upon the lower part of the Hudfon’s
River.

Fourth fad. On the 3d of March, the fecretary of ftate fignified his Majefty’s
entire approbation of this deviation from the plan firft fuggefted.

From thefe fads arifes my firft propofition, that at the time the change of plan
for Sir William Howe’s operations was adopted, by which no offenfive force was to
remain upon the Hudfon’s River, nor a diverfion probably to take place from
Rhode Ifland, the plan of my operations, the fuccefs of which would probably de-
pend in a great degree upon co-operation and diverfion, ought to have been changed
like wife : inftead of that, it was enforced and made pofitive by the refufal of the
latitude I had propofed of ading upon the Connedicut, or, in cafe of exigency,
embarking the troops and effeding the jundion by fea.

Fifth fad. On the 19th of March, a letter from Sir William Howe, by the fecre-
tary of ftate, acquainting him, that a brigade of Britilh and fome companies of bri-
gadiers and light infantry had been withdrawn from Rhode Ifland, which made the
force left there merely defenfive. The fome letter mentions the piofpect^ tie

mv had of bringing ro,ooo men into the field. .

Sixth fad. I did not leave England till the beginning of April, by which time

the fecretary of ftate muft have known, or ought to have known, that no depen-

dance could be placed upon reinforcements from England arriving at New Yor in

time for Sir William Flowe to refume the intention he had deferred, viz. a diverfion

from

139

CONCLUSION.

from Rhode Ifland, or of making the force upon the Hudfon’s River adequate to
offenfive operation.

Hence arifes my fecond propofition, that the latitude I had propofed, or other
expedients of precaution, ought then at lead: to have been adopted : inftead of
which, I was fuffered to fail, ignorant of Sir William Howe’s plans, and ignorant
of the defalcation or the delays in the reinforcements deftined for him. The con-
fequence was, that neither his letter to Sir Guy Carleton, put into my hands after
my arrival in Canada, nor his letter to me of the 17th of June, informing me of
his deftination for Penfylvania, removed my expectation of co-operation, becaufe I
was to fuppofe, that fubfequent to the dates of either of thofe letters, he would re-
ceive orders from the fecretary of ftate refpeCting the junction, and alfo a timely
reinforcement.

Seventh fact. The fecretary of ftate makes no mention of the northern expedi-
tion in any of his difpatches to Sir William Howe at the end of March, when my
orders were fixed, nor in the month of April. And it is a further fact, that I am
perfuaded will not be contefted, that he did not mention any orders or recommenda-
tions relative to co-operation verbally to Sir W T illiam Howe’s aid-de-camp, or any
other confidential perfon who failed about that time.

The firft mention made of the necefilty of co-operation was in the fecretary of
ftate’s letter of the 18 th of May, wherein his Lordlhip cc Tr lifts that whatever he
[&> William Howe~\ may meditate , it will be executed in time to co-operate with the
army ordered to proceed from Canada

The propofition clearly juftified by thefe faCts is, that if the fecretary of ftate had
thought proper to fignify the King’s expectation of a co-operation to be made in
my favour in the month of March or beginning of April, as in confiftency he ought
to have done, it would have arrived before Sir William Howe embarked his army,
and in time for him to have made a new difpofition : but inftead of that, this very
material injunction was not difpatched till it was almoft phyfically impofllble it
lhould have any effeCt. And fo indeed it happened, for Sir William Howe received
it on the 16th of Auguft, at a diftance from Hudfon’s River too great for any de-
tachment from his own army to be made in time, could it even have been lpared ;
and the reinforcement from England, upon which Sir William Howe depended to
ftrengthen Sir Henry Clinton, was much later ftill — too late (as it has been fhewn)
to enable that general with all his activity and zeal to give any effectual fupport.

Indeed the conduCt of the fecretary of ftate, in inferting this paragraph, in his
letter of the 1 8th of May, when it could not avail, after omitting it when certainly
it would have been timely, feems fo prepofterous, that it can only be explained by
one faCt. It tranfpired about that time, that Sir William Howe’s army was deftined
for Penfylvania, and people who had confidered the force of the enemy to be collect-
ed from the northern provinces began to be alarmed for my army. It is well known

(though

14 ®

CONCLUSION.

( though 1 cannot afcertain the date) that an officer of very great ability and a per.
fefi knowledge in the country through which I was to pafs, as foon as he ear no
difpof.tion was made for a fupport from New York, foretold to the fecretary of (late,
or his near friends, the fall of my army. Under this apprehenf.on it might appear
to the fecretary of ftate a proper caution, that an expectation of co-operation Ihou d

exift under his hand. ..

If plans fo inconfiftently formed, and managed by the fecretary of ftate with fo

much feerning confidence, as to mifiead his generals, and io much leal referve as to
deftroy them, fiiould be defended by that infatuated belief then entertained of
the inability of the enemy to refill, I (hould beg leave to ftate as one proportion
more, that after the experience of their aftions at Trenton and many other places,
” d the intelligence of their new levies received from Sir William Howe, fiich con-
fidence was an additional fault, and perhaps a more pernicious one than any I have

“ Thus much for the noble Lord in his public capacity. What lhare of the perfe-
cution I have fuftained (more than 1 have direffly exprefied ,n d.fterent parts of my
defence) are imputable to his private councils, is not within my knowledge . but
if in (peaking of my perfeentors in general, I may be thought fomeumes to have
ufed ftrong terms, I have only to fay, that having advanced no faft which am not
able and refolved to maintain, 1 have not felt myfelf called upon ,n applying
thole faffs for any further attention, than to preferve the language of a gentleman,
which is an attention due to myfelf as well as to the public. It is open and manly

enmity alone that unites refped with refentment.

I wilh 1 could as eafily apologife for all the other faults with which this under-
takin" abounds as a compofition. At a time when fo many pens are employed,
I muft not ex-peft to be (pared. I lhall treat with filent refpeft any comments that
arc fairly founded and delivered with liberality r and with contempt, equally filent,
the common inveaives of the political prefs. This appeal is not to reft upon li-
terary criticifm, or party deputation, but upon the broad equity of my country.
I know that prejudice and malice will vanilh before the man who dares to fubmit
hisaftions to that teft-If acquitted there, I feel I am not degraded r and have
not a fenfation within my breaft which does not at the fame time allure me,

not be unhappy.

J. burgoyne.

appen-

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated N*. I,

Hertford-Streer, j/? January, 1777.

My Lord,

My phyfician has prefled me to go to Bath for a fliort time, and I find it requi-
fite to my health and fpirits to follow his advice: but I think it a previous duty to
afiu re your Lordfliip, that fliould my attendance in town become necefiary, rela-
tively to information upon the affairs of Canada, I ihall be ready to obey your
fummons upon one day’s notice.

Your Lordfhip being out of town, I fubmitted the above intentions a few days
ago perlonally to his Majefty in his clofet ; and I added, “ That as the arrange-
ments for the next campaign might poffibly come under his royal contemplatTon
before my return, I humbly laid myfelf at his Majefty’s feet for fuch aftive em-
ployment as he might think me worthy of.”

1 his was the fubftance of my audience, on my part. I undertook it, and I now
report it to your Lordfliip in the hope of your patronage in this purfuit; a hope,
my Lord, founded not only upon a juft fenfe of the honour your Lordlhip’s friend-
ftup muff reflect upon me, but alfo upon a feeling that I deferve ir, in as much
as a folid refpetSfc and fincere perfonal attachment can conftitute fuch a claim.

I leave in the hands of Mr. D’Oyley fuch of the memorandums confided to me
by General Carleton as require difpatch, fhould your Lordlhip think proper to
carry them into execution.

I a ^° leave in that gentleman’s hands the copy of an application relative to boats
ior the artillery, and which I take the liberty to fubmit to your Lordfliip as well
worthy of confideration, upon the fuppofuion that the enemy fliould arm upon
Lake George, and that any operation fliould be advifeable by that route.

I likewife leave the difpofition of winter quarters, which I received by the laft
fhip from Canada. I find no difpatch is come to your Lordfliip by that occafion,
and I conceived thofe papers might be of ufe.

I have the honour to be.

My Lord, &c.

J. Burgoyne.

Extrait of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Guy Carleton, dated White- ^ 0 . II,

hall, 22d Auguft, 177 6.

THE rapid fuccefs of his Majefty’s arms, in driving the rebels out of Canada,
does great honour to your condiiA, and 1 hope foon to hear that you have been
able to purfue them acrofs the lakes, and to poflefs thofe pofts upon the frontiers
which may effe&uallv fecure j our province from anv future infult.

His

A P P

E N D I X.

No. III.

• • in chief of his forces in Canada,

His Majefty, in ^P oint '"^S on to th e frontiers of his provinces bordering -

was pleafed to extend your comm ffio |j£ neceffary for the completing your

thereupon, wifely forefeetng, that it g beyond the limits of your

plan of operations that you fooold hes yollj ’that you will, by your
own government. I troft, before thts lmer re^ X of a „ the rebd f orces ,

feint and activity, have beared the ° ireffion „f the lakes. That

a^,d will have taken the proper meaft 1 ^ to acquaint you, that there

fervice being performed, his Majei y ^ undertaken, which will require

ftill remains another P ar * °^ y bon the reftoring peace, and the eftablifh-

all your abilities and the ftncfteft Canada! It S an objeft of the greateft

ing good order and legal governme attending it are imm'enfe; but his

importance to this country, the difficulties «^* ience> for carrylng it into
Maiefty depends upon your zeal, an P > happinefs of his fubje&s, corn-
execution. His Majefty, ever anxiou d be loft in beginning fo important

mands me to inform you, that nc > tim be detaching Lieutenant-General

a work, and that you .do fcd i^i n k moft proper, with that part of

Burgoyne, or fuch other officer as yo imme diate defence of your province, to
your forces which can be fpared fiom i , cive tQ the f UCC efs of the army aftmg

carry on fuch operations as (hall be moft c detached to commu-

on the fide of New-York; and that you ^he^officer^ of General

nicate with and put himfelf, as | foon a P ^ • dge neC eflary to proceed with
Howe, you will order fuch artillery as J ' . ^ ann on and military ftores were

this detachment ; and as a great quantity y have been j n the hands of the

fent, upon the fuppofition tha^^b G ° neral Howe, fupply him with fuch

£& y a°„d ft W o"’s as^n^ay'not be wanted for the proton of Canada.

thoughts for conducing the War from the Side of Canada.

By Lieutenant-General Burgoyne.

WHEN thelaft ftiips came fiom Quebec, a report keels of
have been founded upon pofitive evidence, that the were refolved to exert

feveral large vefiels at Sken^oroug an f fleet during the winter,

their utmoft powers, to conftruft a n exer tions, in fuch a degree as to

I will not, however, give credit to cx " L * k Champlain early m the

imagine the King’s troops will be P re ^ e ^ g J^ n f^ P C rown Point
fummer, but will fuppofe the operattons of thearmy to * down every ffible

-InTin ^ /of « T,co„ y deto g a t the dtffietent

works there are capable of admitting twe | v a - ’ q’ wbb a confiderable naval

I will fuppofe him alfo to occupy Lake George wttn ^ ^ campaig „ .

ftrength, in order to fecure his retreat, and al er d„ roads from

and it is natural to expedt that be wtll ake me^afure. ^ ^ (hc ftron

Ticonderoga to Albany by the wa) ° w . . i Kind’s army to carry
ground at different places, and thereby obltgtng the Ktngs army weight

P OQ

APPENDIX.

weight of artillery with it, and by felling trees, breaking bridges, and other obvious
impediments, to delay, though he Ihould not have power or fpint finally to refill,

itS Th°e g enemy thus difpofed upon the fide of Canada, it is to be confidered what
troops will be 7 neceflaryf and what difpofition of them will be moil proper to pro-

(I mean ( exclufively of the troops left for
the fecurity of Canada) ought nottoconfift oflels than eiglit thoufand regulars, rank
and fil« The artillery required in the memorandums ot General Carleton, a corps
of watermen, two thoufand Canadians, including hatchet-men and other workmen,

“urtot^pedThai^inforcetnen. and the equalling .hips may all be
ready to fail from the Channel and from Corke on the laft day of March. I am ^per-
fuaded that to fail with a fleet of tranfports earlier, is to iubjeT government to
lofs and diLplTment. It may reafonably be expefted that they will reach
Quebec before the aotli of May, a period in full time for opening the campaign.
The roads, °and the rivers and lakes, by the melting and running oft of the fnows,

P robably admitted of labour
inthe docks r»ill take to, granted that the fleet of lad year, as well bateaux as
armed vefleis, will be found repaired, augmented, and fit for immediate fcrvice.

T™e magazines that remain of provifion, 1 believe them not to be abundant, w.ll

nrobablv be formed at Montreal, Sorel and Chamblee.

' 1 conceive the firlt bufinefs for thofe emrufted with the chief powers, Ihould be

to fcledt and poll the troops deftined to remain in Canada; to throw up the military
flora and provlfion with £l poffible difpatch, in which fervtce the abovementioned
“ " ' P r0 ™ y potted, will greatly a&ift ; and to draw the army deftmed for ope-
mion to Cantonments, within as few days march of St. John’s as convemently may
be I fcould prefer cantonments at that feafon of the year to encampment, as
the around is very damp, and confequently very pernicious to the men, and
more^efoeciallv as they will have been for many months before ufed to lodgings,
heated wUh Aovefor between decks in (hips; all %fe operates may be put
in motion together, but they feverally require fome obfervation. ,

i ZCid S that the troops left in Canada , fuppofmg the numbet ment.oned

in my former memorandum to be approved, migl t e ma e Rank and File.

The 31ft regiment, Britifli, excluftve of their light company ^of
grenadiers

Maclean’s corps —

The 29th regiment

The ten additional companies from Great Britain
Brunfwic and Hefte Hanau to be taken by detachments or com-
plete corps, as Major General Reidefel lhall recommend,
leaving the grenadiers, light infantry and dragoons compleat
Detachments from the other Britilb brigades, leaving the grena-
diers and light infantry complete and fquaring the battalions

•equally —

111

448

300

448

560

— 650

606

3006

T 2

appendix.

My reafon for felefting the 31ft regiment for this duty is, that when I faw it
laft it was not equally in order with the other regiments lor fervices of adhvity.

I propofe the 29th regiment as it is not at prefent brigaded.

I propofe Maclean’s corps, becaufe I very much apprehend defertion from fuch
parts 1 of it as are compofed of Americans, ftiould they come near the enemy.

F In Canada, whatfoever may be their difpofition, it is not fo eafy to effeft it.

And I propofe making up the refidue by detachment, becaufe by felling the
men lead calculated for fatigue or lead accudomed to it, which may be equally
good foldiers in more confined movements and better provided fituations, the
eflfe&ive drength for operation is much greater and the defenfive drength not

f mud beo- leave to dare the expeditious conveyance of provifion and dores
from Quebecf and the feveral other depofitaries, in order to form ample magazines
at Crown Point, as one of the mod important operations of the campaign, becaufe
it is upon that which mod of the red will depend. If failing vedels up the St.
Lawrence are alone to be employed, the accident of contrary winds may delay
them two months before they pafs the rapids of Richelieu, and afterwards St. Peter s
Lake; delays to that extent are not uncommon, and they are only to be obviated
by having a quantity of fmall craft in readinefs to work with oars. From the
mouth of the Sorrel to Chamblee, rowing and tacking is a fure conveyance if
diffident hands are found. From Chamblee to St. Therefe (which isjud above
the Rapids) land-carriage mud be ufed, and great authority will be requifite to

fupply the quantity neceflary. .

A bufinefs thus complicated in arrangement, in iome parts unulual in practice,

and in others perhaps difficult, can only be carried to the^defired effefl: by the
peremptory powers, warm zeal, and confonant opinion ot the governor ; anc
though the former are not to be doubted, a failure in the latter vindicated, or
feemfng to be vindicated, by the plaufible obdruftions that will not fail to e
fuggeded by others, will be fufficient to crufh fuch exertions as an officer ot a
fanguine temper, entruded with the future conduct of the campaign, and who e
perfonal intered and fame therefore confequentially depend upon a timely out-let,

would be led to make. . t , A __

The aflembly of the favages and the Canadians will alfo entirely depend upon

Under thefe confiderations, it is prefumed, that the general office !L® m P^° yccl
to proceed with the army will be held to be out of the reach of any po i e ame
till he is clear of the province of Canada, and furnilhed with the propofed

rU The S navigation of Lake Champlain, fecured by the fuperiority of our naval
force, and the arrangements for forming proper magazines fo eltabliihecl as to
make the execution certain, I would not lofe a day to take pofleuion o row
Point with Brigadier Frafer’s corps, a large body of favages, a body of Canadians,
both for fcouts and works, and the beft of our engineers and artificers well luppnea

with intrenching tools. . „ r

The brigade would be fufficient to prevent infult during the time neceiiary ior
collecting the ftores, forming magazines, and fortifying the pofts ; all w ic

fhould be done to a certain degree, previous to proceeding in force to I icon -

roga i

APPENDIX.

roga j to fuch a degree I mean as may be fuppofed to be effected in time of tranf-
porting artillery, preparing fafcines, and other neceffaries for artillery operations ;
and by keeping the reft of the army back during that period, the tranfport of
provifions wil be leffened, and the foldiers made of ufe in forwarding the convoys.

But though there would be only one brigade at Crown Point at that time, it
does not follow that the enemy ffiould remain in a ftate of tranquility. Corps of
favages, fupported by detachments of light regulars, ffiould be continually on foot
to keep them in alarm, and within their works to cover the reconnoitering of
general officers and engineers, and to obtain the belt intelligence of their ftrength,
pofition, and defign.

If due exertion is made in the preparations Hated above, it may be hoped that
Ticonderoga will be reduced early in the fummer,. and it will then become a
more proper place for arms than Crown Point.

The next meafure mud depend upon thofe taken by the enemy, and upon the
general plan of the campaign as concerted at home. If it be determined that
General Howe’s whole forces ffiould aft upon Hudfon’s River, and to the fouth-
ward of it, and that the only objeft of the Canada army be to effeft ajunftion
with that force, the immediate poffeffion of Lake George would be of great con-
fequence, as the mod expeditious and mod commodious route to Albany ; and
ffiould the enemy be in force upon that lake, which is very probable, every effort
ffiould be tried, by throwing favages and light troops round it, to oblige them to
quit it without waiting for naval preparations. Should thofe efforts fail, the
route by South Bay and Skenefborough might be attempted, but confiderable diffi-
culties may be expefted, as the narrow parts of the river may be eafily choaked
up and rendered itnpaffable, and at bell there will be neceffity for a great deal of
of land carriage for the artillery, provifion, &c. which can only be fupplied from
Canada. Imeafeof fuccefs alfo by that route, and the enemy not removed from
Lake George, it will be neceffary to leave a chain of polls, as the army proceeds,
for the fecurities of your communication, which may too much weaken fo fmall an -
army.

Left all thefe attempts ffiould unavoidably fail, and it become indifpenfibly
neceffary to attack the enemy by water upon Lake George, the army at the outfet
ffiould be provided with carriages, implements, and artificers, for conveying
armed veffels from Ticonderoga to the lake.

Thefe ideas are formed upon the fuppofition, that, it be the foie purpofe of the
Canada army to effeft a junftion with General Howe, or after co-operating fo far
as to get poffeffion of Albany and open the communication to New-York, to
remain upon the Hudfon’s River, and thereby enable that general to aft with his
whole force to the fouthward.

But ffiould the ftrength of the main American army be fuch as to admit of the
corps of troops now at Rhode. Ifland remaining there during the winter, and afting
feparately in the fpring, it may be highly worthy confideration, whether the moft
important purpofe to which the Canada army could be employed, fuppofing it in
poffeffion of Ticonderoga* would not be to gain the Connefticut River.

The extent of country from Ticonderoga to the inhabited country upon that
river, oppofite to Charles Town, is about fixty miles, and though to convey artil-
lery and provifion fo far by land would be attended with difficulties, perhaps more

than

appendix.

S±^wa*

molefting the rear or mterrupung the ^voys^Hupf , an(J Rhode , 0and

Siest eSd u^ rf.e ctntVicut it .s no't ^.anguine an expeflatton that
all the New England provinces wl11 bc ™ J “” d b) omkteTin" the beginning of thefe

papers toto.e'theTlfa of SSMte eVery

o^eS; l°ol1a «-e arm y <hou,d he rei,

■ v^w of the

may bear the lort of detachment piopo et y y 0 f the campaign, from the

it is to be confidered . thattt 1 ^ U Qf Reparation for the lakes, being the

advanced feafon and unavoiaaDie y it fnrrefs 0 r mv expedition

reduaion of Crown Point anti Ticonderoga ”” thofe

had opened the road to Albany, no gre differs ■ becaufe the feafon of the

firft operations. The cafe in the P re( '" t “ e ' S ^ n f con r e „ u e„tly the efta-
year affording a profpeft of very exten ive P ^ necelTary. The army ought

and ftillremain

any thing that probably can be oppofed to it. nc eeffary for this diverfion

Nor, "to argue from U^bth^ ts fo mu^ * SYnew that Genetal Schuyler

this year, as was required for the la » , M ohawk. When the different fitu-

with athoufand men, 'was fortified upon of General Howe, the early

ations of things are cSrJefficui from Rhode lfland, &c.

tnvafion from Canady the threat ^ of i' lldl f orce as that of Schtilyer can be

it is not to be imagined that any dc , , not therefore propofe it of more

fuppHed by the enemy for the Mohawk. be wudently afforded) than Sir

(and I have great diffidence : whether _ fo > much i can b' P™ y > hundred

pl °&arize the fecond brigade becaufe tlie ffrff is propofed

Canada force, the two brigades will

"d i^t, upon examination of the

army, that the force is not fuffic.ent for proc^ng upon the aMve to b£c>

fair profpedt of fuccefs, the alternative f bv fea o?to be employed fepa-

in order to effeft ajunaion with General Howe by lea, or to oe cmp j

APPENDIX.

rately to co-operate with the main defigns, by fuch means as fhould be within their
ftrength upon other parts of the continent. And though the army, upon examina-
tion of the numbers from the returns here, and the reinforcements defigned, fhould
appear adequate, it is humbly fubmitted, as a fecurity againft the poflibility of its
remaining ina&ive, whether it might not be expedient to entruft the latitude of
embarking the army by fea to the commander in chief, provided any accidents du-
ring the winter, and unknown here, fhould have diminiflied the numbers confider-
ablv, or that the enemy, from any winter iuccefstothe l'outhward, fhould have been
able to draw fuch forces towards the frontiers of Canada, and take up their ground
with fuch precaution, as to render the intended meafure impra&icable or too ha-
zardous. But in that cafe it muft be confidered that more force would be reqmreu
to be left behind for the fecurity of Canada, than is fuppofed to be necefiary when
an army is beyond the lakes ; and I do not conceive any expedition from the lea can
be fo formidable to the enemy, or fo effedtual to clofe the war, as an invafion from
Canada by Ticonderoga. This laft meafure ought not to be thought of, but upon
pofitive convi&ion of its necefiity.

Hcrtford-Street , Feb. 28th, 1777* J* Eurgoyne *

Fx trail of a Letter from Lord George Germain to General C arleton, dated
Whitehall, 26 th March, 1777.

MY letter of the 2ad Auguft, 1776, was intrufted to the care of Captain Le
Maitre, one of your aid-de-camps ; after having been three times m the Gulph of
St. Lawrence he had the mortification to find it lmpofilble to make his panage to
Quebec, and therefore returned to England with my difpatch ; which, though it
v^s prevented by that accident from reaching your hands in due time, I neverthelefs
think proper to tranfmit to you by this earlielt opportunity.

You will be informed, by the contents thereof, that as foon as you fhould have
driven the rebel forces from the frontiers of Canada, it was his Majefty s pleafure
that you fhould return to Quebec, and take with you fuch part of your army as in
your' judgment and dilcretion appeared fufficient for the defence of the province ;
that you fhould detach Lieutenant General Burgoyne, or fuch other officer as you
fhould think moll proper, with the remainder of the troops, and direct the officer
fo detached to proceed with all polhble expedition to join General Howe, and to

put himfirif under his command. . . , u • n

^ With a view of quelling the rebellion as foon as pofllble, it is become highly ne-
reffarv that the molt fpeedy jun&ion of the two armies fhould. be effected $ anc,
therefore, as the fecurity and good government of Canada abfolutely require your
prefenee there, it is the King’s determination to leave about 3 coo men under your
command, for the defence and duties of that province, and to employ the remainder
of your army upon two expeditions, the one under the command of Lieutenant Ge-
neral Burgoyne, who is to force his way to Albany, and the other under the com-
mand of Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, who is to make a diverfion on the Mohawk

Rl Asthis plan cannot be advantageoufly executed without the afintance of Cana-
dians and Indians, his Majefty ftrongly recommends it to your care, to furmfh both

CaUC*

No. IV.

VU1

appendix.

expeditions with good and fufficient bodies of thofe men •, and I am happy in know-
in 0- that your influence among them is fo great, that there can be no room to ap-
prehend you will find it difficult to fulfil his Majefty’s expectations.

In order that no time may be loft in entering upon thefe important undertakings,
General Burgoyne has received orders to fail forthwith for Quebec-, and that the in-
tended operations may be maturely confidered, and afterwards carried on in fuch a
manner as is molt likely to be followed by fuccefs, he is directed to confult with you
upon the fubjeCt, and to form and adjuft the plan as you both (hall think molt con-
ducive to his Majefty’s fervice.

1 am alfo to acquaint you, that as foon as you (hall have fully regulated every
thing relative to thefe expeditions (and the King relies upon your zeal, that you will
be as expeditious as the nature of the bufinefs will admit) it is his Majefty s plea,
fure that you detain for the Canada fervice , .

The 8th regiment, deducting loofor the expedition to the Mohawk
Battalion companies of the 29th and 31ft regiments — “

Battalion companies of the 34th, deducting 100 for the expedition to the

Mohawk — ~ v

Eleven additional companies from Great Britain —

Detachments from the two brigades —

Detachments from the German troops —

Royal Highland emigrants —

460

896

348

616

300

650

500

377 °

You will naturally conclude that this allotment for Canada has not been made
without properly weighing the feveral duties which are likely to be required. His
Maiefty has not only confidered the feveral garrifons and polls which probably it may
be neceffary for you to take, viz. Quebec, Chaudiere, the difaffected panlhes of
Point Levi, Montreal, and polls between that town and Ofwegatche, Trois Rivieres,
St Tohn’s, Sele aux Noix, La Prairie, Vergere, and fome other towns upon the
louth Ihore of St. Lawrence, oppofite the ifte of Montreal, with polls of communi-
cation to St. John’s, but he hath alfo reflected that the feveral operations which will
be carrying on in different parts of America mull necelfanly confine the attention
of the rebels to the refpeCtive fcenes of aftion, and fecure Canada from external at-
tacks and that the internal quiet which at prefent prevails is not likely to be in-
terrupted, or if interrupted, will foon be reftored by your influence over the inha-
bitants j he therefore trufts that 3000 men will be quite iuflicient to anfwer every

P °L^ e Hkewffie d ’his Majefty’s pleafure that you put under the command of Lieute-
nant General Burgoyne , . ,

The grenadiers and light infantry of the army (except of the 8th regiment and

the 24th regiment) as the advanced corps under the command of Brigadier

General Frafer „ , , „ , ,

Firft brigade, battalion companies of the 9th, 21ft, and 47th regiments,
duCting a detachment of 50 from each corps, to remain in Canada
Second brigade, battalion companies of the aoth, 53d, and 6 2d regiments,
duCling 50 from each corps to remain as above

Carried over

de-

1568

1194

APPENDIX.

Brought over 39 j6

All the German troops, except the Hanau chaffeurs, and a detachment of 650, 3217
The artillery, except fuch parts as (hall be neceffary for the defence of Canada.

Together with as many Canadians and Indians as may be thought neceffary for this
fervlce • and after having furnilhed him in the fulled and compleateft manner with
artillery, (lores, provifions, and every other article neceffary for his expedition,
and fecured to him every affiffance which it is in your power to afford and procure
you are to give him orders to pals Lake Champlain, and from thence, by the mod
vigorous exertion of the force under his command m proceed with all expedition
to Albany, and put himfelf under the command of Sir W ilium Howe.

From the King’s knowledge of the great preparations made by you lad year to
fecure the command of the lakes, and your attention to this part of the fervice du-
. ,.,; nr pr hiq Maieftv is led to expeit that every thing will be ready for Ge-
neral Burgoyne’’s pafling the lakes by the time you and he (hall have adjufted the

^ l" i°^the King’s further pleafure that you put under the command of Lieutenant

Colonel St. Leger, __ IOO

Detachment from the 8th regiment ^ __ f 0(y

Detachment from the 34th regiment — __

Sir John Johnfon’s regiment of New York — _ ^

Hanau chaffeurs

675

'TY.o-PfW v'irh a diffident number of Canadians and Indians j and after having fur-
together with ... ft provifions, and every other neceffary am-

n.ihed him w.th p °P" : “h fccuredto him every affiftance in' your power to afford
cle for his expedition, and feeu ^ J ecd forthwith to and down the Mo-

hat f River ’J Albany, and put himfelf unde? the command of Sir William Howe.

I fhal 4 ke to Sir William Howe from hence by the firft packet - but you will
never helefs endeavour to give him the earlieft intelligence of this meafure, and alfo
direft Lieutenant General Burgoyne, J Colonel ScUgi

William Howe Y^itl ahtfcme time in/them, that, until .Key fhall have
Williarn ^owe. x u w - n - m Howe i t j s his Ma efty’s pleafure that they aft as

eTmay Squirt a^diX^er^they fhi. /udfe moft proper for mak
” r; muft never view of thlr intended junftions with Sir William
How D e as th e or Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger fhould hap-

£3l” £ be” qualified to fuppli the place of thofe whom his Majefty has m fits
wifdom at prefent appointed to conduit thefe expeditions.

Copy

APPENDIX.

N<>. v.

Cep'- of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgovne to Lord George Germain, dated

Quebec, May 14, 1777.

[Private.]

My Lord,

I TAKE the opportunity of a vefiel difpatched by Sir Guy Carleton to England,
to inform your Lordfhip of my arrival here the 6 th inftant. And though my prefent
fituation, as adting under a fuperior upon the fpot, may make an official correfpon-
dence unneceffary, I cannot perfuade myi'elf I ffiall not appear guilty of impropriety
in affuming the honour of a private and confidential one, relatively to the objeds of

my deftination. *

From my prefent information, I have reafon to expect the preparations for open-
ing the campaign to be very forward on our part. Due exertions were ufed in the
courfe of the winter, and the uncommon mildnefs of the weather greatly favoured
them, to convey provifions to Chamble and St. John’s. One large victualler ar-
rived after I left the St. Lawrence laft November; all refidues of other victuallers
have been collected ; I am in hopes of finding a fufficiency of provifion to enable
me to crofs the Lake Champlain at leaft, without the arrival of the Corke fleet. I
hope alfo to find artillerv ftores enough to feel the pulfe of the enemy at Ticondero-
ga Should their fituation and refolution be fuch as to make great artillery prepa-
rations requifite, I ffiall certainly be under the neceffity of waiting at Crown Point
the arrival of the ordnance ffiips from England. A good body of the Indians I am
allured are ready to move upon the firft call, and mealures are taicing for bringing

them forthwith to proper redezvous. _

I cannot fpeak with fo much confidence of the military affiftance I am to look for
from the Canadians. The only corps yet inftituted, or that I am informed can at
prefent be inftituted, are three independent companies of 100 men each, officered
by Seio-neurs of the country, who are well chofen ; but they have not been able to
eno-ao-e many volunteers. The men are chiefly drafted from the militia, according
to a late regulation of the legifiative council. Thofe I have yet feen afford no pio-
onilb of ule of arms — aukwark, ignorant, difinclined to the fervice, and fpiritlefs.
Various reafons are affigned for this change in the natives fince the time of the
Erench government. It may partly be owing to a difufe of arms, but I believe
principally to the unpopularity of their Seigneurs, and to the poifon which the
emiffaries of the rebels have thrown into their minds. Should I find the new com-
panies up the country better compofed, or that the well affedted parties can be pre-
vailed upon to turn out volunteers, though but for a ffiort occafion, as they did laft
year, I ffiall move Sir Guy to exert further meafures to augment my numbers.

The army will fall ffiort of the ftrength computed in England ; the want of the
camp equipage, cloathing, and many other neceffary articles, will caufe inconve-
nience; I am neverthelefs determined to put the troops deftined for my command
immediately in motion ; and, affifted by the fpirit and health in which they
abound, I am confident in the profpedt of overcoming difficulties and difappoint-
ments. . c

Having fettled all meafures with Sir Guy Carleton, both for this purpofe and for
the expeditious tranfport of the ftores as they may arrive, and having already dif-
patched inftrudtions to Captain Lutwidge, who commands the fleet upon Lake
r Cham-

APPENDIX.

Champlain, to fecure the navigation, in which I clearly fee he will find no trouble,
I fhall proceed in perfon this afternoon for Montreal, and from thence make my final
arrangements for purftiing the King’s orders.

I fhould think myfelf deficient in juftice and in honour, were I clofe my letter
without mentioning the fenfe 1 entertain of General Carleton’s conduct ; that he
was anxioufiy defirous of leading the military operations out of the province, is eafi-
ly to be difcerned •, but his deference to his Majefty’s decifion, and his zeal to give
effect to his meafures in my hands, are equally manifeft, exemplary, and latisfaCtory.
I (hall take every pofiible means to tranfmit to your Lordfliip an account of my pro-
ceedings from time to time, and have the honour to be, with perfect refpeCt,

Your Lordfiiip’s moft obedient and moft humble fervant,

J. Burgoyne.

P. S. I have mentioned nothing of intelligence concerning the enemy, con-
cluding that Sir Guy Carleton will tranfmit the material part of it, and in a manner
more full than in my power to do. I underftand they have laboured hard to
ftreno-then Ticonderoga, and threaten a vigorous refiftance there, and that they
have built fome veflels on Lake George, as your Lordfliip may remember I had
forefeen.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated Second

Montreal, May 19, 1777. No,V ’

My Lord, .

I HAD the honour to write to your Lordfliip the day I left Quebec, having rea-
fon to imagine this letter may reach that place in time to be difpatched with my
former one, I cannot omit the occafion to inform your Lordfliip, that the hopes I
exprefied of being able to put the troops in motion without waiting the arrival of
the fleets from England and Ireland, are confirmed.

The only delay is occafioned by the impracticability of the roads, owing to late
extraordinary heavy rains, and this difficulty will be fpeedily removed, by exerting
the fervices of the pariflies as foon as the weather clears. In the mean time, I am
employing every means that water carriage will admit for drawing the troops and
ftores towards their point. I trull, I fhall have veflels fufficient to move the army
and ftores together, and in that cafe, will take poll at once, within fight of Ticon-
deroga, and only make life of Crown Point for my hofpital and magazine.

A continuation of intelligence from different fpies and deferters, confirms the de-
ficxn of the enemy to difpute Ticonderoga vigoroufly. They are alfo building bow-
gallies at Fort George, for the defence of that Lake, &c. fortifying on the road to

Skenelborough. . .. r .. r ,

It is configned to the New England colonies, to furnilh fupplies or men and pro-
vifion to oppofe the progrefsof my army, and they have undertaken the talk, upon
condition of being exempt from fupplying Mr. Wafhington’s main army.

It is my defign, while advancing to Ticonderago, and during the liege of that
port for a fiegc I apprehend it muft be, to give all pofiible jealoufy on the fide of
Connecticut. If I can by manoeuvre lead the enemy to fufpeft, that after the reduc-
tion of Ticonderago, my view's are pointed that way, the Connecticut forces will be

U 2 very

A P P

E N D I X.

No. VI.

wy couriers of paving .hair own frontier, and I may gain a Hart that may ,nncU

expedite and facilitate my P r ^ re ® whatever demonftration I may endeavour to

im^feon remake no movement that can procraftina.e the great

okjea of my orders. x ^ ^ honour t0 ke , & c. J. Burgcyhe.

[In Lieutenant-General Burgoyne’s, June 22, 1777-]

Chiefs and Ware iqks an d the patron of all who feek and deferve

THE great King, ou fatisfaftion the general condudt of the Indian tribes

his protection, has confident with T^o fagacious and too faithful to be

from the beginning of t ie rou , , v j 0 | atec j rights of the parental power

deluded or corrupted they have ^obferved ak) ne, the refufe of a

they love, and burned to vim ica - mifreprefentations, the fpecious al-

fmr.ll tribe, at the firft were led afire , an^he mm ^ ^ reb j s are

^fe^'and alf of v^htch Ae^eniploved for that effedt, have fared only in the end
to^enhance the holt of th'e tri£s in generai, ^ \Z

few and how contemptible aie t e a P bablv have before this day hid their faces

a and over 5 this vafi con-

tinent, are on the fide of juftice, of law, an c ^ ' e . ? tke King your father’s
The reftraint you have P^JS^STS.’^S.. affect could have
call to arms, the hardeft pro , 1 mark of your adherence to that principle

^ * is mMua,iy the

defpifed, and his farther patience w °^’. O ppreffions in the provinces that ever dif-

would withold redrefs from Sins for me, the General of one of

graced the hiftory of mankind. I renrefentative to releafe you from thole

his Majefty’s armies and in might of

bonds which your obedience impofe • enem j es of Great-Britain and

peace, and happinefs-deftroyets of commerce,

^S^laTou, the chiefs of his ^

Princes his allies, efteemyouas brothers in . , . examp i e s ; we know

Ihip, we will endeavour reciprocally to giv<- 1 • p n ternrize and your

how to value, and we will ftrive to imitate your Pg eve ^ fK f,. ora t he dilates of
con (fancy to reftft hunger, wearmefs, and pam. Be it o\ . , our

appendix.

“ fufpend the vp-Hfted ftroke, to

orlTriS; wherever tLy'are dlfcovered,^^ fuf,,efted, and to dr-

lemble, is, to a generous mind, ^^'^l^^loined to your principles of affec-
Ferfuaded that your magnanirm y ’ ^ m ; nds t han the military rank

lion to the King, will give me fti ei con i ^ f er i ous attention to the rules which 1

obfervation during the carn^gn.

I pofitively forbid bloodfhed when you a,e n0 ^ OI |f° b e £ eld f acr ed from the knife
Aged men, women, children, and puloners,

or hatchet, even in the time of adual coni i . but you fhall be called to

You (hall receive compenfation for the pnloners you ta*e, o )

account for fealps. „ which have affixed an idea of ho-

In conformity and indulgence to you ° , take die fealps of the dead,

nour to fuch badges of vl£tor >'’ y ^. ^ )flt - 10 „ . but on' no account, or pretence,
when lulled by your fire, and in .' be taken from the wounded, or even dying;

or fubtlety, or prevarication are the) heW tQ kU1 men in that condition,

,hM tWs p roteaton, ° the woun<kd ’ W0B ' <lbe

‘^StgslTaffius, incendiaries .

whatever army they may belong, ft.! '■ ^ “f Jf

muft be given you by order, and I muft be j ^ a£h of barbarity towards
Should the enemy, on their pa«, dare s alfo to retaliate ; but till fevetity

thofe who may fall into their han s » 1 . y r heavts this folid maxim, it cannot

fhall be thus compelled, bear immoveable 1 y wort hy fervice of your alli-

be too deeply impreffed, that the g ,eat e{ ^ fathe J an d never-failing prote&or,
ance, the fincerity of your zeal to the Ki , of * r fteady and uniform adhe-

£d fo&° thofe to whom his Majefty has intruded the three-
tion and the honour of his arms.

A,Jwcr from m oli Chief of the Iroquois.

I », n a up in the name of ail the

;;rcttar«

\Ve BoLi^bu, we have loved our fa, he,

and our hatchets have been fharpened upon our aff-tho . ln

xiv

APPENDIX.

No. VII.

30th June.

1 ft July.

In proof of the fincerity of our profefiions, our whole villages able to go to war,
are come forth. The old and infirm, our infants and wives, alone remain at
home.

With one common affent we promife a conftant obedience to all you have ordered,
and all you fliall order ; and may the Father of Days give you many and fuccefs.

Copy of a Letter from General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated Skenefborough,

July 1 ith, 1777.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordfhip, that the enemy, difloged from Ti-
conderoga and Mount Independant, on the 6th inftant, and were driven, on the fame
day, beyond Skenefborough on the right, and to Humerton on the left, with the
lot's of 128 pieces of cannon, all their armed veffels and bateaux, the greateft part
of their baggage and ammunition, provifion, and military ftores, to a very large
amount.

This fuccefs has been followed by events equally fortunate and rapid. I fubjoin
fuch a detail of circumflances as the time will permit; and for his Majefty’s further
information, I beg leave to refer your Lordfhip to Captain Gardner,- my aid de camp,
whom I thought it neceflary to difpatch with news fo important to the King’s fervicc
and fo honourable to the troops under my command.

Journal of the late principal Proceedings of the Army.

Having remained at Crown-Point three days to bring up the rear of the army, to
eftablifh the magazines and the hofpital, and to obtain intelligence of the enemy,
on the

I ordered the advanced corps, confifting of the Britifh light infantry and grenadiers,
the 24th regiment, fame Canadians and Savages, and ten pieces of light artillery,
under the command of Brigadier General Frafer, to move from Putnam Creek,
where they had been encamped fome days, up the weft fhore of the lake to Four-
Mile-Point, fo called from being within that diftance off the fort of Ticoderoga.
The German referve, confifting of the Brunfwick chafleurs, light infantry and gre-
nadiers under Lieutenant Colonel Breyman were moved at the fame time to Richard-
fon’s farm, on the eaft fhore, oppofite to Putnam Creek.

The whole army made a movement forward. Brigadier Frafer’s corps occupied
the ftrong poft called Three-Mile-Point, on the weft fhore ; the German referve the
eaft-fhore oppofite : the army encamped in two lines, the right wing at the Four-
Mile-Point, the left wing nearly oppofite, on the eaft fhore.

The Royal George, and Inflexible frigates, with the gun-boats, were anchored at
this time juft without the reach of the enemy’s batteries, and covered the lake from
the w r eft to the eaft fhores. The reft of the fleet had been fome time without guns,
in order to aflift in carrying provifions over Lake Champlain.

The enemy appeared to be pofted as follows. A brigade occupied the old French
lines on the height to the north of the fort of Ticonderoga. Thefe lines were in good
repair, and had feveral intrenchments behind them, chiefly calculated to guard the
north-weft flank, and were further fuftained by a block-houle. They had, farther to

2 their

appendix.

their left, a port at the (aw-mills, which are at the foot of the carrying- place to
Lake George, and a block-houfe upon an eminence above the mills, and a block-

houfe and hofpital at the entrance of the lake.

Upon the right of the lines, and between them 'and the old fort, there were two

new block-houles and a confiderable battery dole to the v\ ater edge. _

Itfeemed that the enemy had employed their chief induftry, and were in the grea-
teft force upon Mount Independence, which is high and circular , and upon the ium-
mit, which is Table Land, was a ftar fort, made of pickets, and well fuppl ed
with artillery, and a large fquare of barracks within it. 1 he foot of the hill, on the
fide which proje&s into the lake, was intrenched and had a ftrong abbattis clofe to i
water. This intrenchment was lined with heavy artillery pointed down the lake
flanking the water battery, above deferibed, and iuftained by another battery ab u
half wav up the hill. On the wed fide the hill runs the main river and in its palTa^e
is joined by the water which comes down from Lake George. I he enemy had leie
abridge of communication, which could not at this time be reconnoitred On the
eaft fide of the hill the water forms a final 1 bay, into which falls a rivulet alter ha\ ing
encirculed in its courfc part of the hill to the fouth eaft. The fide to the fouth could

not be feen, but was deferibed as inacceffible. , , T «

About nine in the morning a fmoke was obferved towards Lake George, and the July 2.
Savlges brought in a report Lt the enemy had fetfire to the further block-houf^ and
had abandoned the finwmills, and that a confiderable body were advancing from the
lines towards a bridge upon the road which led froir .the faw-m, Us towards the right
of the Britilh camp. A detachment of the advanced corps was immediat y p
Ircb, unier Command of Brigadier Frafer, fupported by the
fome liaht artillery, under the command of Major General Phillips, v it }

proceed to Mount Hope, which is to the north of the lines, to reconnoitre the enemy s
pofition, and to take advantage of any poft they might abandon or be drnen Irom
The Indians under Captain Frafer, fupported by his company of markfmen, were
left ed to make a circuit to the left of Brigadier Frafer’, Ime o march and endea
vnur to cut off the retreat of the enemy to their lines ; but this deiign milcarriea
through the impetuofiry of the Indians, who attacked too foon, and in front; and
rhe^emrrny rvere thereby able to retire with the lofs of one officer and a few men Hied,

and one officer wounded. Major General Phillips took pofleffion of the very a \

^s joft of Mount. Hope this night, and rhe enemy were thereby em.rely cur off

from all communication with Lake George. _ r , i , _ The firft July 3.

Mount Hone was occupied in force by General Frafer s whole corps, lhe tint J y 6

Britilh brigade, and two entire brigades of artillery. The fecond bnga e, ri l ,
encam ped^ipon the left of the firft, "and the brigade of Gall having been drawn from
the eaft ffore to occupy the ground where Frafer’s corps had originally been , the
ine became compleat extending from Three- Mile-Point to the vveftermoft part of
EXe on the fame dayf Major General Reidefel encamped on the eaft ffore
in a paraflef line with Three-Mile- Point, having puffed the referve forward n “ r
rivulet which encircles Mount Independence. The enemy cannonaded the camps of
Mount Hope and of the German referve during moft part of this day, but with i

CffC The army worked hard at their communications and got up the artillery, tents, July 4.

ba Jgage a^d provifions , the enemy at intervals continued the cannonade upon the

camps, which was not in any inftance returned. rp^ c

Xv i

5th July.

6 th July.

APPENDIX.

The Thunderer Radeau, carrying the battering train and ftores, having been
warped up from Crown Point, arrived this day, and immediately began to land

Lieutenant Twifs, the commanding engineer, was ordered to reconnoitre Sugar
Hill on the Couth fide of the communion from Lake George into Lake Champlain,
which had been poffeffed in the night by a party of light infantry. It appeared at
firft to be a very advantageous poft, and it is now known that the enemy had a coun-
Cil feme time ago upon the expediency of poTeffing it; but the idea was rejefted,
upon the fuppofition that it was impoffible for a corps to be eftabhffied there m
force. Lieutenant Twifs reported this hill to have the entire command of
the works and buildings both of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, at the
d. fiance of about 1400 yards from the former, and 1500 trom the latter; that the
Ground mi^ht be levelled fo as to receive cannon, and that the road to convey
them, though difficult, might be made prafticable in twenty -four hours. This
hill alfo commanded, in reverfe, the bridge of communication ; lav/ the exaft fnu-
ation of their vefiels ; nor could the enemy, during the day, make any material
movement or preparation, without being diicovered, and even having their num*

It was determined that a battery ffiould be raifed on Sugar Hill tor light twenty-
four pounders, medium twelves, and eight-inch howitzers. This very arduoui
work was carried on fo rapidly that the battery would have been ready the next

It is a duty in this place to do fome juftice to the zeal and activity of Major
General Phillips, who had the direction of the operation, and having mentioned
that moft valuable officer, I truft it cannot be thought a digreffion to add, that it
is to his judicious arrangements and indefatigable pains, during the genera uper-
Intendency of preparation which Sir Guy Carleton entrufted to him m the winter
and fpring, that the fervice is indebted for its prefent forwardnefs. preva-

lence^ contrary winds and other accidents having rendered it impoffible or any
neceffaries prepared in England for the opening ©f the campaign, yet to reach the

Ca Soon after day-light an officer arrived exprefs, on board the Royal George,
where in the night 1 took up my quarters, as the moft centrical fl >j uatl0n > wlth
information from Brigadier Frafer that the enemy were _ retiring, andffiat hew as
advancing with his picquets, leaving orders for the brigade

thev could accoutre, with intention to purfue by land. . T ^% m h °^ i P en f J

difcernible, as were the Britiffi colours, which the Brigadier had fixed upon the
fort^f Ticonderoga. Knowing how fafely I could truft

I turned my chief attention to the purfrnt by water, by wn.ch route I underltood
6 ne column were retiring in two hundred and twenty bateaux, cover y

“The 1 B gfeat S bridge of communication, through which a way was tobeopejied,
was fupported by twenty-two funken piers of large timber, at nearly equal di-
ftancesV the fpace between were made of feparate floats, each about fifty feet
long, and twelve feet wide, ftrongly faftened together by chains and rivets , and
alfo faftened to the funken piers. Before this bridge was a boom, mad. ^y

3 ^

APPENDIX.

large pieces of timber, fattened together by rivettcd bolts and double chains, made
of iron an inch and an half fquare.

The gun-boats were inftantly moved forward, and the boom and one of the
intermediate floats were cut with great dexterity and difpatch, and Commodore
Lutwidge, with the officers and feamen in his department, partaking the general
animation, a paflage was formed in half an hour for the frigates alfo, through im-
pediments which the enemy had been labouring to conftruft fince laft autumn.

During this operation Major General Reidefel had patted to Mount Indepen-
dence, with the corps, Breyman, and part of the left wing. He was directed to
proceed by land, to fuftain Brigadier Frafer, or to aft more to the left, if he law it
expedient fo to do.

The 6zd regiment Britifh, and the Brunfwick regiment of Prince Frederick,
were ftationed at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, in the place of the parties
of bralers brigade, which had been left in pottettion of the artillery and ftores,
and the reft of the army was ordered to follow up the river as they could be col-
lefted, without regard to the place in the line.

About three in the afternoon I arrived with the Royal George and Inflexible ;
and the beft failing gun-boats at South Bay, within three miles of Skenefborough,
at which latter place the enemy were potted in a ftockaded fort, and their armed
gallies in the falls below.

The foremott regiments, viz. the 9th, 20th, and 21ft, were immediately dif-
embarked, and al'cended the mountains with the intention of getting behind the
fort, and cutting off" the retreat of the enemy ; but their precipitate flight rendered
this manoeuvre ineffeftual. The gun-boats and frigates continued their courfe to
Skenefborough Falls, where the armed veflels were potted. Captain Carter,
with part of his brigade of gun-boats, immediately attacked, and with fo much
fpirit, that two of the veflels very foon ftruck ; the other three were blown up,
and the enemy having previoufly prepared combuftible materials, let fire to the
fort, mills, ftorehoufes, bateaux, &c. and retired with the detachment left for
that purpofe, the main body having gone off when the troops were afeending the
mountain. A great quantity of provifions and fome arms were here confumed,
and mod of their officers’ baggage was burnt, funk, or taken. Their lofs is not
known; about 30 prifoners were made, among which were two wounded officers.

During thefe operations upon the right, Brigadier General Frafer continued his
purfuit to Caftletown till one o’clock, having marched in a very hot day from four
o’clock in the morning till that time. Some ftragglers of the enemy were picked
up, from whom the Brigadier learned that their rear guard was compofed of chofen
men, and commanded by Colonel Francis, one of their beft officers. During the
time that the men were refrefhing, Major General Reidefel came up, and arrange-
ments for continuing the purfuit having been concerted, Brigadier Frafer moved
forward again, and during the night lay upon his arms, in an advantageous fltu-
ation, three miles nearer the enemy.

At three in the morning he renewed his march, and about five his advanced
fcouts difeovered the enemy’s centries, who fired their pieces and joined the main
body. The Brigadier obferving a commanding ground to the left of his light
infantry, immediately ordered it to be pofiefied by that corps; and a confiderable
body of the enemy attempting the fame, they met. T{ie enemy were driven back

X to

xvii

7th July.

xvm

8th July.

appendix.

to their original poft » the advance

^ S£».?5&

enemy long defended t »«” ^ Capetown road by the grenadiers, they
repulfed, and prevented P'“ S n and upon a fecond repulfe, attempted their

rallied, and renewed the . aa ‘°" • a „ ren £|iers fcrambled up a part of that afeenr,

retreat by Pitsford Mountain. 1 ,hc gren ^ fummk before them, which threw
appearing almoft inacceffi e, o , fuperior in numbers, and consequent y

them into confufion j they we ! Speftation of the Brunfwickers, had

in extent, and the brigadier, in mom Y l At this critical moment General.

latterally drawn from his left to th * e firing, arrived with the foremoft

Reidefel, who had preffed on, up o . ^ o-renadiers and light infantry,

of his columns, via. the chaffeurs ^ HU 1= TourS to take i he extended upon
His judgment immediately P°' . p- j got into aftion with great gallantry.

Brigadier Frafer’s left Bank. 1 • h ' C ™J£L leaving dead upon the field Colonel

rr'othet^ofiicers,

Xt’fe^catt^'eribbake-ns, and »6 men were made pttfoners i a ove

200 ft and of arms were alio taken , pno . ao . eme nt amounted to 2000 men. The
The number of the enemy befor ^ t he parties left the day before

Britifh detachment under Bngad co nfifted only of 850 fighting men

at Ticonderoga not having been able ” j“ ci ent for its praife. Should the

The bare relation of fo fignal be f ore the German brigade came up,

attack againft fuel, inequality of ^ numbers tbat the enemy might have
feem to require explanation, it Qn a f u dden found themfelves too

efcaped by delay; that the adv ^ n , C ^ “ etreatinff . and that Brigadier Frafer had
near the enemy to avoid aftion wi °The tUfference 0 f time in their

fuppofed the German troops to be very n for a fhare in the glory and

arrival was merely accidental. The Gjmans p^ ^ ^ the exertions of Bnga-
they arrived in time to obtain ** • nuanC e of that uniform intelligence, aftivity

prevented any of i»di-

were ftill retreating, the oth . This was effeded, but with great

Fort Anne, and obferve the enemy s m ■ and the bridges broken. The

difficulty, as the roads w «re a moft »r p ^ in dragging fifty batea " x ^^

°f < tr ° OP : to "facilitate the movement of the reft of the

firft 'brigade to Fort Anne, to d ' n ^|^\VrcXnel Hill (9th regiment) that thd
A report was received from \ . confiderable body of freffi ij> en .» .

enemy had been reinforced in the ni^l Y but he would maintain his

he could not retire with his regimen brigade were ordered to

ground. The two remaining regiments ot the nrit D their

their march* and upon fecond intelligence of the enemy* and firing being heard,
the 20th regiment was ordered forward with two pieces of artillery, and Major
General Phillips was fent to take the command. A violent ftorm of rain, which
lafted the whole day, prevented the troops from getting to Fort Anne fo roon as
was intended ; but the delay gave the 9th regiment an opportunity of diftinguifh-
ing themfelves* by {landing and repulfing an attack of fix times their number.
The enemy finding the pofition not to be forced in front* endeavoured to turn it ;
and from the fuperiority of their numbers that inconvenience was to be appro*
hended *, and Lieutenant Colonel Hill found it necefiary to change his pofition in
the height of action : fo critical an order was executed by the regiment with the
utmoft fteadinefs and bravery. The enemy* after an attack cf three hours* were
totally repulfed, and fled towards Fort Edward, felting fire to Fort Anne* but
leaving a faw-mill and a block-houfe in good repair, which were afterwards pof *
fefled by the king’s troops.

The 9th regiment acquired, during their expedition, about thirty prifoners,
fome ftores and baggage* and colours of the id Hampfhire regiment.

One unlucky accident happened, to counterbalance, in fome degree* this fuc-
cefs. Captain Montgomery, an officer of great merit* was w'ounded early in the
adtion, and was in the adt of being drefled by the iurgeon when the regiment
changed ground ; being unable to help himfelf, he and the furgeon were taken
prifoners. I fince hear he has been well treated, and is in a fair way of lecovery

at Albany. . _ . . r

The army very much fatigued (many parts of it having wanted their provilions
for two days, almofl the whole their tents and baggage) afiembled in their prefent
pofition. The right wing occupies the heights of Skencloorough in two lines;
the right flank to the mountains, covered by the regiment of Reidefel s dragoons,
cnpotence-, the left to the Wood Creek.

The Brunfwick troops under Major General Keidefel upon Caftletown River,
with Breyman’s corps upon the communication cf roads leading to Putney and
Rutland the regiment of Hefle Hanau are ported at the head of Fart Cieek* to
preferve the communication with the camp at Caftletown River* and fccure the

bateaux. .

Brigadier Frafer’s corps is in the centre* ready to move on either wing of the

The fcattered remains of the enemy are at Fort Edward, on the Hudfons
River, where they have been joined* as 1 am informed, by General Putnam, with

a considerable corps of frefh troops. .

Roads are opening for the army to march to them by Fort Anne, and the ooci
Creek is clearing of fallen trees* funken (tones* and other obftacles, to give panage
to bateaux for carrying artillery, ftores* provifions and camp equipage. 7 hele aie
laborious works 5 but the fpirit and zeal of the troops are fufficient to lurmount
them. Some little time muft alfo be allowed for the fupplies of provifions to
overtake us. In the mean time all poffible diligence is ufing at 7 lconderoga to
get the gun-boats* provifion veflels* and a proper quantity of bateaux into Lake
George. A corps of the army will be ordered to penetrate by that route* which
will afterwards be the route for the magazines s and a jun&ion of the whole is in-
tended at Fort Edward. r

X -2 I trani-

9th and
10th July.

No. VIII.

appendix.

, mnfmit to your Lordfliip herewith returns of the killed and wounded, and Hits
of fuch pOTS of T proviffons and (lores, taken from the enemy, as could be colleSed

in lb (lion a time. ( ^ ^ honour t0 be> v'itlr the greareft refpeft,

Y our I ordfhips, &c.

On of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated
D J Skenefborough, July n, 1777- [Private.]

HAVING eWen your Lordfliip a detail, in my public letter of this date of the
latfttalraaionl I now do myfelf the honour to Bate to y our Lordfhip, fuch ctreum-
ftance S as appear to me mom and propofed

ro SiSj. one from 1 She

county, are confident of fuccefs a y , , with fpirit. Sir Guy Carleton

embryo, but very protnifing ; t jey av ’ tQ fiR u occa {ionally, and' the agree-

has given me blank commiffion ’ be fo effe&ive, till two thirds of

ment with them is, that the commiffions are not to ^ ^ arms>

the battalions are raifed. Some hunche s nrofefline themfelves loyalifts, and

have joined me f, nee 1 have penerated this Voligh I

wifhing to ferve, feme to the en j h ’ ave not hefitated to receive them, and

am without inftrudhons upon J -.’ n. ^ officers till a decifion can be made

as faft as companies can be formed, 1 ^ them particularly upon detach-

upon the meafure by my fupenors. Dr0 curine cattle ; their real ufe 1 expedt

ments, for keeping the country in > • ^ troops : but the impreflion which will

will be great in the preservation of pr0 vincials be feen afting vigorouily in the

raufe^the^ngf vriir be'y’et more advantageous, and, 1 truft, fudy juffify .he ex-

Pe The mamfcfto, of which I ' ndo ^g r ,j£ r “he raXr^iUnofinihe^imvet of
herewith fend a duplicate, as gtea ^ efforts to counteract it. 1 hey

from .he demen, par. of the manifefto, they, and no. the

King's troops, ate the «««. «( e no mmti „ n of .he Indians, in the

y„„r Lordft.p havc ’ ‘ ffib | e to draw them in many tefpects from the

purfuit from Ticonderoga. fi , 1 • acknowledge this is not the only inftance

plunder of that place, and I a^name If under the management of their

in which I have found little • t fted rea Vons,’in all the caprices and humours

7Sd%Ste“: bt lei they grow mote untenable and imponuna.e upon

APPENDIX.

XX’.

every new favour ; were they left to themfeives, enormities too horrid to think of
would enfue, guilty and innocent, women and infants, would be a common prey.

This is the character of the lower Canadian Indians, who alone have been uith
the army hitherto. I am informed the Outawas, and other remote nations, who are
within two days march of joining me, are more brave and more tradable ; that they
profels war, not pillage. They are under the dire&ions of a M. St. Luc, a Canadian
gentleman of honour and parts, and one of the beft partizans the French had laft war,
and of one Langlade, the very man who projected and executed with thefe very na-
tions the defeat of General Braddock. My firft intention was to turn this whole
corps to the Connecticut immediately, to force a fupply of provifions, to intercept
reinforcements, and to confirm the jealoufy I have in many ways endeavoured to ex-
cite in the New England provinces ; but finding that the enemy are labouring to re-
move their magazines from Forts George and Edward, and every where deftroying
the roads, and preparing to drive and burn the country towards Albany’, I have de-
termined to employ them, to prevent, if poffible, by their terror, the continuance of
thofe operations. And after arriving at Albany, they may be employed to renew’ the
alarm towards Connecticut and Bofton.

Your Lordfhip will pardon me if I a little lament that my orders do not give me
the latitude I ventured topropofe in my original projeCt for the campaign, to make a
real effort inftead of a feint upon New England. As things have turned out, were I
at liberty to march in force immediately by my left, inftead of my right, I fhould
have little doubt of fubduing before winter the provinces where the rebellion origin
ginated.

If my late letters reach Mr. Howe, I ftill hope this plan may be adopted from Al-
bany ; in the mean while my utmoft exertions fhall continue, according to my in-
ftruCtions, to force a junction.

I have fent fome Indians through the woods, in the hope of their reaching St.
Leger, with the account of my progrels ; now is the critical time for his pulh upon
the Mohawk. I have certain intelligence that all the country round Fort Stanwix is
in alarm t but I imagine it proceeds from the appearance of fome Savages detached
by Colonel Butler, not apprehending St. Leger can be got quite fo forward.

Camp near Saratoga , Augujt 20, 1777.

To Lord George Germaine.

My Lord,

IN my laft difpatch (a duplicate of which will be inclofed herewith) I had the
honour to inform your Lordfhip of the proceedings of the army under my command
to the 30 th of July.

F'rom that period to the 1 5th of Auguft every poffible meafure was employed to
bring forward bateaux, provifions, and ammunition from Fort George to the firft
navigable part of Hudfon’s River, a diftance of eighteen miles, the roads in fome
parts deep, and in others wanting great repair. Of the horl'es furnifhed by contract
in Canada not more than a third part was yet arrived. The delay was not imputable

Second
No. VIII.

APPENDIX.

to negleft, but to the natural accidents attending fo

of land and water carnage. l< '^dd'^vere added to affift the tranfport ; but thefe
country through which 1 had marched, ^ J ^ . jUr pofes of feeding the army,

relources together Exceeding heavy rains augmented the

and forming a magazine at the lame , tcn or twelve oxen upon a Angle

impediments. It was often neceffa y . | days above ftated, there were

bateau-, and after the utmoft blteaux in the river,

not above four days ptovifion before han * ^ ^ before Fort

Intelligence had reached me that ~ Qf the enemy oppofed to me was at

Stanwix, which was defend . m outh of the Mohawk.

Stillwater, a place between Saratoga «k * °[ hc utmoft confequence at tins
A rapid movement forward the Mohawk without putting

period. The enemy could notha c d S t Leger fhould have fucceeded •, and
them Elves between two fires, in c-fc Colonel • • ° muft ekher therefore have

at beft being cut off by my arm) 1 Aihanv or have palled the Hudfon s

flood an aftion, have fallen back towards Al W or have I* ^ of thcfc

River, in order to tore > ^had boon enabled to advance, Colo-

meatures they had taken, fotha ° b iffifted, a junction with him probab.y

nel St. Leger’s operations would have been Xo maimam the commu-

fecured, and the whole country of the f ovett £ nt fo as to be fupplied by daily
nication with Fort George during _ s an obvious impoifibility. The

degrees at a diftance, continually increa S ’ . • 0 f po fts. Efcorts for every fepa-
army was much too weak to have afforded “ . l or cou ld any have been made

rate tranfport would have been a ftill g reater ^ ia ' ’ the enemy might take in one
fo ftrong as to force their way through fuefe ‘Lercus ml &. Had the
night’s march from the White Creek, where t y hend i ng fo palpable an ad-

:r/;:x n p5i y tTiy P te

^ f0,wari1 “ *

the tranfport muft have ceafed behind, re linqui(h the favourable opportuni-

The alternative therefore was fho t * ^ ^ e p ources of fupply.

ty of advancing upon the enem) , f unn lies in live cattle, from a large trad of

} It was well known that the enemy H Ar i; no -ton and other parts of the

country, pffed by the route of conveyed'ftonr thence

Ham pfhire Grants, to Benmn^to , , r w u ee i carriages was alio formed a

Jo the main army. A large depoflt of con, a d of vvheel ca ^ Mmbers m

difpatch : fuccefs would a,fo have

Officer well

to command. He had under him -oo mm Britifh, all the Canadian volun-

fel, Captain Frafer’s niarkfmen, which Ww the country, ioo Indians, and

teers, a party of the Provincials who P^^XLsoonzn. The
two light pieces of cannon ; the whole det ^ n fted w hU e thel ight troops felt

inftruSions were pofitive to keep the regular coips poltea * their

appendix.

their way, and not to incur the danger of being furrouoded, or having a retreat
cut ofF

In order to facilitate this operation, and to be ready to take advantage of its fuc-
cefs the army moved up the eatl ffiore of Hudfon’s River. On the 14th, a bridge
was* formed of rafts, over which the advanced corps palled and encamped at Saratoga.
Lieutenant Colonel Breyman’s corps were polled near Batten Kill, and upon intelli-
gence from Colonel Baume, that the enemy were ftronger at Bennington than ex-
pected, and were aware of his attack, that corps, confiding of- the Brunfwick gre-
nadiers, light infantry and chaffeurs, were fent lorward to fuftain him.

It fmee appears that Lieutenant Colonel Baume, not having been able to complete
his march undifeovered, was joined at a place called Sancoix Mills, about four miles
fhort of Bennington, by many people profelling themfelves to be Loyalilts. A pro-
vincial gentleman of confidence who had been fent with the detachment, as knowing
the country and the character of the inhabitants, was fo incautious as to leave at liber-
ty fuch as took the oath of allegiance. „ . . r . ...

His credulity and their profligacy caufed the firlt misfortune. Colonel Baume vvas
induced to proceed without fufficient knowledge of the ground. His defign was be-
trayed • the men who had taken the oaths were the firft to fire upon him ; he vvas
attacked on all fides. He Ihewed great perfonal courage, but was overpowered by

^During this time Lieutenant Colonel Brey man was upon the march through a hea-
vv rain ; and fuch were the other impediments dated in that officer s repoit, of bad
roads, tired horfes, difficulties in palling artillery, carriages, &c. that he was from
eight in the morning of the 1 5 th to four in the afternoon of the following day making

about twenty-four miles. , f , , .

He engaged, fought gallantly, and drove the enemy from three feveral heights ,
but was too late to fucoour Colonel Baume, who was made prifoner, and a confioera-
ble part of his dragoons were killed or taken. The failure of ammunition, from the
accidental breaking to pieces of a tumbril, unfortunately obliged Lieutenant Colonel
Breyman to retire conquering troops, and to leave behind two pieces of cannon, be-
fides two which had been loft by Lieutenant Colonel Baume. The Indians made
good their retreat from the firft affair, as did Captain Frafer, with part of his compa-
ny and manv of the Provincials and Canadians. , , . . ,

7 The lofs, as at prefent appears, amounts to about 400 men, killed and taken in both
adtions, and twenty-fix officers, moldy prifoners; but men who were difperled in
the woods drop in daily. A correct return lhall be tranfnutted to your Lordlhip the

^This^my Lord, is a. true date of the event. I have not dwelt upon errors, be*
caufe in many indances they were counterbalanced by fpirit. 1 he enemy will of
courfe find matter of parade in the acquifition of four pieces of cannon . u
apart they have fmall caufe of exultation ; their lofs in .killed and wounded being,
more’ than double to ours, by the confeffion of their prifoners and defeiters, an o
manv inhabitants who were witneffes to the burial of their dead.

The chief fubjedt of regret on our fide, after that which any lofs of g al ' ant ™
naturally occafions, is the dilappointmerit of not obtaining live cattle, and the lofs of
time in bringing forward the magazines.

xxiii

Xxiv

No. IX.

appendix.

This heavy work is now nearly completed, and a new bridge of boats is thrown
over the Hudfen’s River, oppofite to Saratoga, the former one of rafts hating been
carried away by the fwell of water after the late continual rains. \Y hen enabled to
move nothing within my fcale of talent fhall be left unattempted to fulfil his Maje-
Ay’s orders, and I hope circumftances will be fuch, that my endeavours may be in fomc
degree afiifted by a co-operation of the army under Sir W llliam Howe.

I have the honour to be, with great refped,

Your Lordfhip’s

moft obedient and mod humble fervant,

(Signed.) J. Burgovne.*

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated
Camp , near Saratoga, Auguft 20, 1777.

[Private, j

My Lord, . r

I NEED not enlarge upon the concern I have in communicating any limiter events.

I am perfuadcd your Lordlhip will give me credit for partaking every fen timent that
your Lordlhip, or any other man warmed with principle and zeal in this Cornell, can

feC Jn regard to the affair of Saintcoick, I have only to add to the public account that
if ever there was a fituation to juftify enterprize and exertion, out of the beaten track
of military fervice, it was that in which I found myfelf. Had I fucceeded, I ou
have effeded a jundion with St. Leger, and been now-before Albany. And I flatter
myfelf, 1 need only mention thofe views, to Ihew that in hazarding this cxpedi ion
had the founded: principles of military reafoning on my fide, viz. that the advantages
to be expeded from fuccefs were in a great degree fupenor to the evils that could at-
tend mifcarriage. The fecondary purpofes, to which I alluded in the public letter,
were to try the g affedions of the country ; to complete the Provincial corps many re-
' cruits for which were unable to efcape from their villages without a force to encou-
rage and proted them ; and to diftrad the councils of the enemy, by continuing their

jealoufy towards New England. , . .

Major General Reidefel has preffed upon me repeatedly the mounting his dragoons,
the men were animated with the fame defire, and I conceived it a moft fav0 “ r * "
cafion to give into their ideas and felicitations, becaule in exerting their zeal to tulhl
their favourite purpofe, they neceflarily would eflfed the greater purpofe of my own.
The reft of the troops were feleded from fuch as would leaft weaken the iolid ftrengt 1
of the army, in cafe of ill fuccefs ; and I thought it expedient to take a little trial of
the Provincials and Canadians before I might have occafion for them in more impor-

13 Thf original detachment could not have been made larger wi thout opening roads
and other preparations of time, nor fhould I have thought it juftifiable to expofe the
beft troops to lofs upon a collateral adion. Had my inftrudions been followed or
could Mr. Breyman have marked at the rate of two miles an hour any given twe ve
hours out of the two and thirty, fuccefs would probably have enfued, misfortune
Would certainly have been avoided. I did not think it prudent, in the prefent cnir,
to mark thefe circumftances to the public fo ftrongly as I do in confidence to^your

* The letter that follows, No. 9, is alfo materially referrable to No. 8.

APPENDIX,

Lordfhip j but I rely, and I will venture to fay I expedt, becaufe I think juftice wdli
warrant the expectation, that while, for the fake of public harmony, that neceflaryprin-
ciple for conducing nice and laborious fervice, 1 colour the faults of the execution,
your Lordfhip will, in your goodnefs, be my advocate to the King, and to the world,;
in vindication of the plan.

The confequences of this affair, my Lord, have little effcdt upon the ftrengtb or
fpirits of the army ; but the profpedt of the campaign in other refpedts, is far lefs
profperous than when I wrote laft. in fpite of St. Leger’s vidlory, Fort Stanwix holds
out obflinately. I am afraid the expeditions of Sir J. Johnfon greatly fail in the
riling of the country. On this fide I find daily reafon to doubt the fincerity of the re-
folution of the profeffing loyalifts. I have about 400, but not half of them armed,
who may be depended upon ; the reft are trimmers, merely actuated by intereft. The
great bulk of the country is undoubtedly with the Congrefs, in principle and in zeal ;
and their mealures are executed with afecrecyand difpatch that are not to be equalled.
Wherever the King’s forces point, militia, totheamount of threeorfourthoufandaffemble
in twenty-four hours ; they bring with them their fubfiftence, &c c. and, the alarm over,
they return to their farms. The Hamplhire Grants in particular, a country unpeopled
and almoft unknown in the laft war, now abounds in the moft adtive and moft re-
bellious race of the continent, and hangs like a gathering ftorm upon my left. In all
parts theinduftry and managment in driving cattle, and removing corn, are indefati-
gable and certain ; and it becomes impradticable to move without portable maga-
zines. Another moft embarraffing circumftance, is the want of communication
with Sir William Howe ; of the meffengers I have fent, I know of two being
hanged, and am ignorant whether any of the reft arrived. The fame fate has pro-
bably attended thofe difpatched by Sir William Hotve ; for only one letter is come to
hand, informing me that his intention is for Penfylvania ; that Wathington has de-
tached Sullivan^ with 2500 men to Albany ■, that Putnam is in the Highlands, with
4000 men. That after my arrival at Albany, the movements of the enemy muft
guide mine ; but that he wifhed the enemy might be driven out of the province be-
fore any operation took place againft the Connedticut ; that Sir Henry Clinton remain-
ed in the command in the neighbourhood of New- York, and would adt as occurrences
might diredf.

No operation, my Lord, has yet been undertaken in my favour : the highlands
have not even been threatened. The confequence is, that Putnam has detached two
brigades to Mr. Gates, who is now ftrongly polled near the mouth of the Mohawk-
River, with an army fuperior to mine in troops of the Congreis, and as many militia
as he pleafes. He is likewife far from being deficient in artillery, having received all
the pieces that were landed from the French (hips which got into Bofton.

Had I a latitude in my orders, I fhould think it my duty to wait in this poution,
or perhaps as far back as Fort Edward, where my communication with Lake George
would be perfectly fecure, till fome event happened to aftift my movement forward •,
but my orders being pofitive to“ force a junction with Sir William Howe,” I appre-
hend I am not at liberty to remain inadtive longer than {hall be neceffary to colledt
twenty-five days provifion, and to receive the reinforcement ol the additional com-
panies, the German drafts and recruits now (and unfortunately only now) on Latte
Champlain. The waiting the arrival of this reinforcement is of indilpenfible neceffity,
becaufe from the hour 1 pafs the Hudfon’s River and proceed towards Albany, all

Y fafety

XX. VI

A P

p end I x.

No. X.

fafety of communication ceafcs. I mull the ' wafeSglon^tSn

left will take poll behind me. I have pm out of ^ ,l,e,t crickal, de-

the time neceflary for the foregoing ? u 'f°^£^^L anicS( it 1 a * nd hardly juftifiable

landing on dentate” I mean

but by orders from the , rhnuali T fho'uldmeet with infurmountable difficul-
my Lord, that by moving foon, though T ihoum me back t0 T icon-

ttes to my progrefs, I fliall at ea iav the diftance encreafed, and the march

remain in the country. wfaw that I was to be left to purfue my

When I wrote more confidently , I little forelaw without a ny co-operation

way through luch a traft of wuntty, a ifon D f Ticonderoga would fall to my

from New- York ; nor did I then tin nk - t ^Ve that poll in weaknefs, and

- more of a retreat, bur at

tu tonify there and await SkW. to the bread of the King.

Whatever may be my fate m> Lord ’^ubmit y ^ mQtives become public ^

r„d "5toS?.£&££ t-hatever decifron may be patted upon my conduft,
^“ve” can be°expedted from men devoted to their King and

COlUUr> ' I'have the honour to be, &c. j. Burgoyne.

P. S. Upon re-perufing this letter, ChL-

have exprefled myfelf, 1 mean tQ impUt e the delay to any thing but

aSdenTs^nmdoTme^to Cornell Sir Guy Carleton’s reafoning upon not complying
with my requifitions to garrifon Ticonderoga, I only lament .

Dear Sir, , tV,* i <tth have fince heard from the

I have received yours of the fecon n 1 , ^ which is a neat event , carried

rebel army of your being in pofleffion o Ticonderoga, £*£'**“* md Quebec*

without lofs. I have received your t ^°, l e J/Y contents. There is a report of a.
your latl of the 14th May, and lha o er the letter difcovered in a double

metfenger of yours to me having been ^ the letter »f i, has tran-

wooden canteen, you will know if it was of an Y ^ 9 you propofe, in your

fpired to us. I will obferve the fame rules in writ & y i Y - letters

A V P E N D 1 X.

letters to me. Waflrington is waiting our motions here, and has detached Sullivan
with about 2500 men', as I learn, to Albany. My intention is for Penfylvama,
where Iexpeft to meet Wafhington,- but if he goes to the northward contrary to my
expectations, and you can keep him at bay, l}c. allured I (hall foon be ahei him to

relieve you. • . ,

After your arrival at Albany, the movements of the enemy will guide yours ; but
my wifhes are,- that threnemy be drove out of this province-before any operation takes
place in Connecticut. Sir Henry Clinton remains in the command here, and will
aft as occurences my direft. Putnam is in the highlands with about 4000 men.
Succefs be ever with you.

Yours, &c.

William Howe.

Sir Guy Carleton’s Letter*

g j ^ Rebeck, November 12, * 777 *

I received your letter of the 2oth of Oftober, with your public difpatches by
Captain Craig, the 5th inftant, and heartily condole- with you upon the very di a-
greeable accounts they contain, all which I fincerely lamented, both on the public

This unfortunate event, it is to be hoped, will in future prevent minifters fr
pretending to direft operations of war, in a country at three thoufand miles di-
ftance of which they have fo little knowledge as not to be able to diftmguifh between
good,’ bad, or interefted advices, or to give pofitive orders in matters, which trom
their nature, are ever upon the change ; fo that the expedience or propriety of a mea-
fure at one moment, may be totally inexpedient or improper in the next.

Having given over all hopes of being relieved this fall. I determined upon fending
home Captain Foy, to furnifh his Majefty’s confidential fervants, and my fucceffor
with the bell: information in my power, of the date of affairs in this province, tha.

they may form the better judgment of what they have to do.

xxvb

Second
No. X.

Army from Canada under Lieutenant General Burgoyne.
Total Rank and File, i/c/July, 1777. [Sick included.]

No. XI.

Britifh.

9th regiment
20th
2 iff:

24th
47 th

54 ^

528

5 ?^

428

5 2 4

Carried over 2660

Britifh. Brought over 2660

53d — — 537

6ad — . . - 54 i

Grenadiers and light infantry com-
panies from 29th, 3 1 ft, and 34th
regiments 3 2 9

Carried over 4067

This letter, which was never printed before, only regards the view of the evidence, page 96.

Y 2

appendix.

xxv in

Brought over 4067
Left in CSRada out of the above 343

Britiih. Total — 3,724

Germans, 1 ft July 37 2 7
Left in Canada 7 1 1

For the campaign, Germans 3 °> l6

Regular troops, total — 6,740

Garrifon left out of the above at
Ticonderoga.

Britiih rank and file 462

German rank and file 448

910

To force a paffage to Albany 5,850

3ft July, Britiih artillery — 257

German artillery — 100

Bat men, fervants, 2 cc. in the above.

Recruits under Lieut. Nutt *54

Canadians — * 4 ®

Indians never more than 500

Before Septemb. fell off to 90
Provincials at moft — 682

1 ft October, no more than 456

In September the additional com-
panies joined near Fort Miller,
in all — — 300

Regulars killed, wounded, and prifoners
in the campaign, 1777.

Britiih.

Killed.

Wounded.

Prifoners.

Total

Officers
Serjeants
Drummers
R. & File

l 5

207

549

1 9

449

1285

Germans.

Officers

l 6

Serjeants

Drummers

R. & File

141

2.25

575

94 *

No. rn Firjl JpptoH* from Major General Phillips relative „ Korfis. Dated Montreal,

June 4, 1777*

T TAKE the liberty of informing your Excellency, that therehas yet been no arrange*

^ler/st^

I have the honour to be Sir,

Wltl Your S Excellency’s moft obedient and moft humble fervant,

M. Phillips, Major General,

commanding the royal artillery in Canada.

His Excellency 4

Lieutenant General Burgoyne,

APPENDIX.

xxix

Copy of a Letter to Major General Phillips, refpe&ing Horfes . Dated Montreal,

June 4, 1777.

S I R,

I have the honour of your letter of this day’s date, informing me that no arrangement
has yet been made for moving the field artillery by land ; and that upon the beft infor-
mation you can obtain, neither carriages nor horfes can be procured on the other fide
Lake Champlain nearer than Albany.

In coniequence of this reprefentation, I have to requeft you, to give in your opinion
upon the mode of procuring horfes and carriages from this country, combining the
confiderations of difpatch, fufficiency, ceconomy towards government, and I wilh to
know the opinion as foon as poffible.

I am with trueft regard, Sir,

Your obedient humble fervant,

J. Buugoyne, Lieutenant-GeneraL

Major-General Phillips*

Extracts of Letters from Major General Phillips, &c.

Extraft of a Letter from Major General Phillips to Lieutenant General Burgoyne.

Montreal , June 5, 1777*

I HAVE the honour of your Excellency’s letter to me of yefteiday, in anfwer to
one I wrote on the fubjeftof the field-artillery being fupplied with horfes, &c. &c.

You are plea-fed’, Sir, to order me to give an opinion upon the mode of procuring
horfes and carriages from this country, combining the confideration of difpatch,
fufficiency, and ceconomy towards government.

There are but two modes of procuring horfes for the fervice, fuppofing the country
is not to furniffi them upon Corvees, the one is by purchafing of horfes upon the
account of government, the other by contract.

The firth of thefe modes has always appeared to me difficult, uncertain, and full
of openings for every fpecies of impofition, and the cxpenee uncertain. — Government
muft truth various people to buy horfes, and in this country :t viilnot be poffible to
procure any perfons w ho w .i not im media- eh purfue the views of gaining money to
themlelves with a confideration for the K; ' A ! i to this, that it will be-

, come fuch a charge, that man; commiffaries mult be appointed, and various other
officers of that Sort, See, which being a mixture of inipedlors into the purchafes of
horfes, and net cffiarily alfo at times the being purchaiers, it will be difficult ever to
afeertain the price, and feklom that the goodnefsof horfes can be depended on.

I have feen in my fervice this mode attempted, -but it has to my knowledge failed.
I muft allow, that could it be carried into execution com mete, it v. ould be the cheapeft
for government: but taking into confideration the various impofmons which will a rife,
and that the letting out on a plan of this nature will require a very large fum of mo-
ne]r.

XXX

appendix.

i y r\ v*e intrufted into various hands, I freely
ney, perhaps from op.oool. to }»£*»£ • The comraftiug for a terrain mu!*
give it as my opinion that it is not a & 1 ^ re(luccs the whole to a very (imple,

her of horfes at a fixed puce for th ends in the fetung out, by making as

and therefore generally a certal P P 1 ' : £ * government as can be. And being fo

cheap, as fair, and juft a barga . their duty, by attending to the receiving

made, that the military and cm - • The conttador has his mterert lo dl-

of horfes only as they -^arc fitting- as up0 n failure it ceales, that he will

of government w,U be that it be Cone honelUy

"1 SfiWa Excellency’s orders, and given an opinion winch 1 fubnnt
entirely to your coflfideration.

I BEG the favour of you to cakuUte whu numba f„ r conveying by

fingthem fuch as are in common rife 'n C J" ' „ ltl , abl)llt ,ooo gallons ot rum,

Extract of a Letter to Sir Guy Carleton.

Montreal, June 7 , *777*

r + rn v nnr Excellency the necefiity of being
HAVING had the honor to yprefen y for the art nlery, vital, and

provided with a certain number ot horfes d^ ^ be obligK l to qu „ the border
other indifpenfible purpofes of the a ™J> - . f our Excellency that fuch pro-

oMre lakes and rivers , & corvfc, and that , propofed

vifion could not be made by the oral y b , pre carious, dilatory, ana

without compulfion upon the country the eh Excellency propofals for con.

expenfive ; I have the honour now to lay ^Tnillery, and 500 carts, with two
trads for an expeditious iupply

horfes each, for the other purpofo. cq t0 offer any judgment upon the

I am too ignorant of the prices o _ D uaintance wU h Mr. Joidan,

reafonablenefs of thefe propofals •, nor Xave M y 1 | q fons can be found equally

or other motive for wilhing him the P re f^ V thus F far interfered, upon a con-
capable, refponfible, and expedition- Kino’s orders dired, and taking all pofiible

Salon,' after confiderlng the route *e &ng^ °r ^ w£ pr0CK d, that to do-

methods of information upon the \u[ p > d the expedition,

pend upon the country altogether wot the public expence as much *

F Your Excellency will obferve, thatm order to ^ be adequate to the

ooffibk, I have reduced this requifitt expedition for the reft i f 00 cans

Fervice, and I mean to trull to the ie ources P General Phillips means

S barely carry fourteen days provifions at a time, and j w

XXXI

A P P E N D I: Xr

to demand as few horfes as pofiible, fubjeCt to whatever future augmentations future
fervices may require-, the prefent number wanted will be about 400 ; there will then
remain unprovided for (for expeditious movement) the tranfport of bateaux from
Lake George to Hudfon’s River, and the carriage of the tents of the army, and many
other contingencies that I need not trouble your Excellency to point out to you.

1 .. r.i

Extrafl of a Letter to General Harvey.

Montreal, May 19, 1777.

YOU have permitted me, as formerly, to write to you confidentially. I take the
firft conveyance to renew a correfpondence fo pleafing and honourable to myfelf, and
that may, in fome cafes, become beneficial to the public fervice. It fhall never be
employed but to convey truths, to do juftice to faffs and perfons, and to fecure
mylelf in the continuance of an elteem fo valuable to me as yours againft appearances
and mifreprefentations.

I have reafonto be exceedingly fatisfied with all that has been done, and with molt
things that are doing : exertions have been made during the winter, which was remark-
ably favourable, in all the departments, and preparations are very forward ; thole
that have been committed to the directions of General Phillips have been executed
with a diligence, precifion, and forefight, that entitle- him to the fulleft praife. The
troops are in a Rate of health almolf unprecedented, and their fpirits and general
improvement are equally objects of great pleafure and promife. To this agreeable
reprefentation I have the happinefs to add, that Sir Guy Carleton has received me and
the orders I brought in a manner that, in my opinion, does infinite honour to his
public and private characfer.

That he fhould have wifiied for the lead in a&ive and important military operations,
is very natural. That he thinks he has fome caufe of refentment for the general tenor
of treatment he has received from fome of the minifters is difcernible -, but neither his
difappointment nor his perfonal feelings operate againft his duty -, and I am convinced
he means to forward the King’s meafures, entrufted to my hands, with all the zeal
he could have employed had they relied in his own.

My intention is, during my advance to Ticonderoga, and fiege of that poll, for
a fiege I apprehend it mult be, to give all pofiible jealoufy on the fide of Connecticut.
If I can by manoeuvre make them fulpeft that after the reduction of Ticonderoga my
views are pointed that way, it may make the Connecticut forces very cautious of
leaving their own frontiers, and much facilitate my progrefs to Albany. I mention
this intention only to Lord George and yourfelf, and I do it left from any intelligence
of my motions that may reach England indireCtly, it fhould be fuppofed I have lufter-
ed mylelf to be diverted from the main objeCt of my orders. The King and his
Majefty’s minifters may reft allured that whatever demonftratrons I may endeavour to
impofe upon the enemy, I fhall really make no movement that can procraftinate my
progrefs to Albany.

One thing more occurs. I had the furprife and mortification to find a paper
handed about at Montreal, publilhing the whole defign of the campaign, almoft as
accurately as if it had been copied from the Secretary of State’s letter. My own cau-
tion.

XXKli

appendix*

-i,, i, 3 c been let into the fecret. Sic
•tion has been fuch that not a man in my ov> '" 1 '[ therefore led to doubt whether

o" Cartoon's, I am confident, has .been England, andwilhyon

imprudence has not been oorniAii md P V erv affectionate compliments, whether

would afk my friend D’Oyley ta ^ h °™ ift J ial communication that he can fufpeft .to
there is any perfon within tne lm- f nce here, except as tar as regards St.

, bi S a nS* may b=V moft prejudicial conferee in other

.cal” and Should be guarded again it.

Extra® of a Letter to General Harvey.

Camf m He River Bmq^mar

I HAVE had to comend agarntr r nnieaoentlv the paffage of the bateaux and
practicable at the carrying places, an A c q^ J winc {. Indeed the combination

exceedingly dilatory, befides a ‘ Aivity Ld fometimes difobedience in the

of land and water movement toads, unknown in other fervices,

country, and a thoufand otner ^ 1 ti on this upon my own account, as I do

difconcert all arrangements. I <-.c • n . ■ • prov i n l ce of Canada j but I mention
not hold tnyfclf refponfible for delay, • ^ infinite merit in overcoming the

r, (sir knowledge and tefources, donot

aniwer their predi&ions and expectations. ^ brigadiers of this army. Sir

I have been exceedingly drftreffed in 1 reg^d ^ an extra a of a letter

Guy Carleton, tire day l to° k appointment of thole gentlemen, but

from the Secretary at War, fair brigades out of the province of

graphical limits of Canada, and iupp « kifind myfelf at the head ot an army to
fo be employed folely in the and poffibly of time,

undertake a fiege, and after* P - J betwe en ? the Lieutenant General, com-
without a fingle mtermedrate Bntim ^ ^ It wou ld be prepofterous

manding pro tempore in chief and a be ^ a$ an officer , upon the mipoffib^
and impertinent in me to lay one w y w | t h fuch a total deficiency of ftaff.

lity of methodizing or his intentions to me m

Had Lord Barrington condefcended t impropriety. As it is, I muft

London, I think 1 could have convinced h 1 tl ofe gentlemen bearing a

•conclude that the fpirit ot the order g in t |e fame army ; and
higher rank and pay than lemor lieutena tilfthe iunefion takes place,

that therefore there can be no fault in keep „ Ja a t ;u f uc h time as I .am m

In other words, l look upon mine to be the ‘ ^ - d coniequently

communication with General Howe, fo as to make part ot his force, Without

xxxm

APPENDIX.

without meafuring degrees north and fouth, that the arrangements made in Canada,
and approved of by the King, remain in force till that time. .

I am perfuaded, my dear General, you will fupport me in this liberty, if (uch it is
to be called, not only as the abfolute order and method of the lervice depends upon it,
but all'o to avoid to thefe gentlemen, who have really great merit, the vexation an ^
the ridicule of being deprived of their rank and pay in the hour of that very lemce,
with a view to which their appointment was originally made. I think 1 can anlwer,
that the iunftion made, and the reafons for reverting to their former ranks, become
obvious, they will fubmit to his Majelly’s pleafure without a murmur.

Exiratl of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoync to General Plarvey.

Head Quarters, Skenefborough, July it, i 777-

THE mere compliment of fervice I have given to the troops in orders, and in the
relation defigned for the Gazette, is not doing them fufficient juftice. It is a duty
in me further, through you, and 1 know I fliall impofe a pleafing talk on you, to
affure the Kino- that their behaviour is as uniformly good in the camp as in action.

After what° I have publicly mentioned of Frafer I am lure I need not preis you m
his favour. I cannot but feel confident in the hope that his Majefty s giate will fan
its way through all obftacles to prevent fo difeouragmg a circumftance as the return
of this^ o-allan ° officer to the mere duty of lieutenant colonel, at the head of one batta-
lion after having given afcendancy to the King’s troops and done honour to his
profeffion, by the molt fpiriced aftions in critical periods of two fucceflive cam-

r ^You will obferve, Sir, both in the public letter and l in the order of battle which
Capta ; n Gardner will put into your hands, that Major General T hillips is oceaii in v
emploved feparately from the ftridl line of his department. This does not proceed
from inattention to the explanation of his M a jetty’s pleafure two years ago-, but from
abfolute neceffity. The itaff being computed without any Bnufii major general, 1>« i-
fadier Fmfer being polled where he is of infinite ufe, at the head of the advanced
corns the lervice would fuffer in the moll material degree u the talents of Genera
Pin Hips were not fuffered to extend beyond the limits of the artillery, am. I n< e
mvfclt fully iuftified in continuing the great uie of his afliftance under this ex ten i ( >n,
bv what 1 underftand to be the fignification of the King’s pleaiure to.ir Guy ai - »

vf z . That this meafure mujl not be made a precedent, but not forbidding it during t ie

Pr tlaacter myfelf the King will be fatisfied with the diligence ufed in taking the field
as well as with the i'ubfequent operations ; if not, my difappointment can only proceed
from my own deficiency in flaring the embarraflments I found, notwithUandmg p -
vkrus preparations and cordial alliances. Remote fixations of the troops currents
wTnds roads want of materials for caulking the veffels, inactivity and defert.on of
the Canadian corvees, were all againtl me. A great difficulty lay in providing hoi.es
and carriao-es for the bare tranfport of provifions and tents, when we ffiould arrive at
Fort G^ra? or any other place where the army ffiould have no reiource of water
carriage 1 found an active and I think a reafonable contractor, who lupplied
th^ neceffity at a much cheaper rate than it could have been done any other way.

XXXIV

appendix.

I inclofe a copy of the contraft to the hdif^ If provifions

ferve that I have limited the num e ^ , affiftance of officers baggage and the

and tents, trotting to the co^ry for that J judged 8 ^! in not

other attirail of an army- - P i d tb ; s precaution been omitted, 1 lhould be

t tufting. to the country or mo re , to, I ad uns waK ,. M Tico „deroga.

bound faft to the Ipot w ieie . 1 > f J r ar l e ton to grant commiffions to two pro-

I avow alio to you my advice <° General Ci> C o„„.y, by a Mr. JeSop

vincial battalions, to be rai * cotumiflions llrould not take place till two

and a Mr. Peters, upon “ndmou tha nmvinda Co PS, afting vealouil, in the King’s
thirds of the corps lhould be effeftive, provincial coys, a ’ in f a ft b be

caule, mult have great impren.on upon publ, . op nm" and 1 will,
of fingttlar ufe to the cale and pie crvation & f urt h er to receive and to pav

Upon this principle, therefore \ S of Ticonderoga, Ld

fuch loyalifts as have come in t t ■ ^ er tQ grant commiffions, I poll the

wifli to be employed. Ihou^ P » p ure can be decided by thofe who

officers, and form them into companies till the meaiure c

S3gs^na*K» £»

vent fuch being done by others. pofition, to clear roads and

1 am indifpenfrbly obliged to wait fome time on this pom a ftock of

make bridges, which is great labour in this and pr0 vifion veffels to

provifion, andalfoto give ^rffilt^fke and fecure the ’future route of the maga-
be put into Lake George to fcour th » t jme that the force is ready to

vines. I propofe to poflef. Fort EdW « *^ ^ 0 “ evacuate Fort George,
move down the lake, by which mean , lt ^ J n wh ile I have ordered Reidefei
the garrilon muft inevitably be caug . poffible feints of a march

to make roads, reconnoitre the country, and mah al ^omer P
to the Connefticut, and by fome other meafures I hope to give

Instructions for Lieutenant Colonel Amendments made by Gen. Burgoyne.
Baume, on a fecrei expedition to the Con-
necticut River .

[The erajnresvoerc made by Gen. Burgoyne*']

THE object of your expedition is to
try the affeftions of the country, to
difconcert the councils ot the enemy, to
mount the Rcidefel’s dragoons, to corn-
pleat Peters’s corps, and to obtain large
lupplies of cattle, horfes, and carnages.

The feveral corps, of which the m-
clofed is a lift, are to be under your
command.

* The evafures are printed in Italics, and the amendments in die eppofiu cd

appendix.

XXXV

Amendments by General Burgoyne.

The troops muft take no tents, and
what little baggage is carried by officers
muft be on their own bat horfes.

You are to proceed by the route from
Batten Kill to Arlington, and take poll
there, Jo as to fecure the pafs from Man-
chejler. You are to remain at Arlington
till the detachment of the Provincials,
under the command of Captain Sher-
wood, ffiall join you from the fouth-
ward.

You are then to proceed to Manche-
fter, where you will take poft fo as to
fecure the pafs of the mountains on the
road from Manchefter to Rockingham ;
from hence you will detach the Indians
and light troops to the northward, to-
ward Otter Creek. On their return, and
alfo receiving intelligence that no enemy
is in force in the neighbourhood of Rocking-
ham (i) you will proceed by the road over
the mountains to Rockingham, where you
will take poft. This will be the moft
diftant part on the expedition. (2)

You are to remain there as long as ne-
cejfary to fulfil the intention of the expediti-
on from thence (3) and you are afterwards
to defcend by the Connecticut River to
Brattlebury, and from that place, by the
quickeft march, you are to return by
the great road to Albany.

During your whole progrefs your de-
tachments are to have orders to bring in
to you all horfes fit to mount the dia-
goons under your command, or to ierve
as bat horfes to the troops, they are like-
wife to bring in (4) faddles and bridles as
can be found. (5)

Your parties are likewife to bring in
waggons and other convenient carriages,
with as many draft oxen as will be necef-
fary to draw them and all cattle fit for
flaughter (milch cow’s excepted) which
are to be left for the ufe of the inhabi-
tants.

(1) upon the Connecticut River ,

(2) And mufi be proceeded upon with
caution, as you. will have the defile of the
mountains behind you, which might make
a retreat difficult ; you muft therefore en-
deavour to be well informed of the force of
the enemy's militia in the neighbouring coun-
try.

Should you find it may with prudence be
effected.

(3) while the Indians and light troops are
detached up the river.

(4) together with as many-

(5) The number of horfes requifite, le-
fides thofe neceffary for mounting the regi-
ment of dragoons, ought to be 1300. If
you can bring more for the ufe of the army
it will befo much the better.

7. z

SXXV1

A P

p E N D I X.

tants. Regular receipts, in the form
hereto fubjoined, are to be given m all
places where any of the abovementioned
articles are taken, to fuch perlons as have
remained in their habitations, and other-
wife complied with the terms of General
Burgovne’s manifefto •, but no receipts
to be given to fuch as are known to be
acting in the fervice ot the rebels. (6).

Amendments by General Burgoyne.

(6.) As you. will have with you perfons
perfetlly acquainted with the abilities of the
country , it may perhaps be advifeable to
tax the fever a l difl riffs with the portions of
the fever al articles, and limit the hours for
their delivery *, and ftoould y ou find it necej
ceffary to move before fuch delivery can be
made, hojlages of the moft refpeti able people
fhould be taken , to fecure their following
you the enfuing day. All poffible mans are
to be ufed to prevent plundering. _

yjs it is probable that C.aptara Sher -
wood, who is already detached to thefouth-
ward, and will join you at Arlington, will
drive in a cor.fiderable quantity of cattle
and horfes to you, you will therefore fend
in this cattle to the army, with a proper
detachment from Peters's corps, to cover
them, in order to difen cumber yourfelf-, but
you muft always keep the regiments of dr a-

goons comp a 51. ?

The dragoons them/elves muft nde> ana
take care of the horfes of the regiment
Thofe horfes which are deftined for tbe uje
of the army mujl be tied together by firings
often each, in order that one man may lead
ten horfes. You will give the unarmed men
of Peters's corps to conduct them, and inha-
bitants whom you can truft. 2 ou muft al-
ways take your camps in good pofttion ; but
at the fame time where there is pafture, and
you muft have a chain of centinels round
your cattle and horfes when grazing.

Colonel Skeene will be with you as much
as poffible, in order to afftft you with his
advice , to help you to diftinguijh the good
Jubjebis from the bad, to procure you thebejt
intelligence of the enemy , and to chufe thofe
people who are to bring me the accounts of

day or two, you muft always entiench toe
camp of the regiment of dragoons, in order
never to rifk an attack or affront from the
enemy .

APPENDIX.

Amendments by General Burgoyne.

You will ufe all poffible means to
make the country believe that the troops
under your command are the advanced
corps of the armv, and that it is intend-
ed to pafs the Connedicut on the road
to Bolton. You will l.kewile have it
infwuated (7) that the main army from
Albany is to be joined at Springfield by
a corps of troops from Rhode Ifland.

You will fend off occafionally cattle or
carriages, to prevent being too much ^cum-
bered v and will give me as frequent intelli -
pence of your Situation as poffible.

It is highly probable that the corps
tinder Mr. Warner, now fuppoled to be
at Manchefter, will retreat before you
but fhould they, contrary to expecta-
tion, be able to colled in great force,
and poll themfelves advantageoufly, it
is left to your difcretion to attack them
or not, always bearing in mind that your
corps is too valuable to let any confide
table lofs be hazarded on this occatiom
Should any corps be moved from. Mr.
Arnold’s main army, in order to inter-
cept your retreat, you are to take as
ftron" a poll as the country will afford,
and fend the quickeft intelligence to me
and you may depend on my making fuch
a movement as fhall put the enemy be-
tween two fires, or otherwife efteduaily

fuft i a t n is yC imagined the progrefs of Ae
whole of this expedition may be efteded
in about a fortnight, but every move

ment of it rauft depend upon your fuccefs

in obtaining fuch fupply of provifions as
willenable S you to fubfift for your ^return
to the army, in cafe you can get no
more. (8)

you will return with the regiment Oj
dragoons mounted, you muff always have a
detachment of Captain Frafer’s or Peters s
corps in front of the column, and tree fame in

the rear , in order to prevent your falling into

an ambufeade when you march through the

woods.

(7) inftnuatt

xxxv iu

All perfons ading in committees, or
any officers ading under the c ire£tl °
of Congrefs, either civil or military, are
to be made prifoners.

C8 - ) And ffonld not the army be able to
reach Albany before your expedition Should
be completed,.. I will find means to fend you
notice of it, .and give your route another di-

re£iion ' n Batten

xxxviii

APPENDIX.

Batten Kill, 12 th Augujt, 177-

I H AD the honour of acquainting your Excellency, by a man lent yefterday
evening by Colonel Skeene to head-quarters, of the feveral corps under my corn-
man "being encamped at Saratoga, as well as of my intention to proceed the next
n omin' affive o’clock > the corps moved at that time, and marched a mile, when

Suals IVom y JE-Uency . tire -^-w^ed at

Zt's which “pLT, as they fern rather to be founded on the different interells and
feelings of the people who « cl ®™ v *™- honoor tobe , moft re fpeafully.

Your Excellency’s moft obedient and humble fervant,

J 17 Ratthu

The reinforcement of fifty chafieurs, w nich
your Excellency was pleated to order,
joined me laft night at eleven o clociv.

General Burgoyne.

Cambridge , 13th Auguft , 1777.

IN confeouence of your Excellency’s orders I moved this morning at four
o’cVod' with the corps under my command ; and after a march of hxteen miles
arrived a rCambridge P at four in the evening. On the road 1 received intelligence of
forty or fifty of the rebels being left to guard fome cattle. 1 immediately orderec
thirty of the provincials and fifty favages to quicken their march, in }^P es t0 ^ '
nrize* them. P They took five prifoners in arms, who declared tnemfelves to be in
the fervice of the Congrefs ; yet the enemy received advice of our approach, ant
abandoned the houfe they were pofted in. The provincials and favages continued
their march about a mile, when they fell in with a party of fifteen men, who fired
upon our people, and immediately took to the woods with the greateft precipita-
X ^ The fire was quick on our fide, but I cannot learn if the enemy fuftained
43 nv lofs A private of Captain Sherwood’s company was the only one who was

nightly wounded in the thigh. From the many people woo came ^
ton they amee that the number of the enemy amounted to 1800. 1 will be Ftticu

arlv carefuk on my approach at that place, to be fully informed of their ftrength
and' fituation, and^ake the precautions ncceffary to fulfil both the orders an

of cattle, carts, and waggons taken here, as they
have not been as yet colleded. A few horfes have been alfo brought in, but am
W to acquaint Jour Excellency that the favages either *^**££g
what is not paid for with ready money. If your Excellency would allow me to
purchafe the horfes from the favages, ftipulating the price, I think they m. b bt be
procured cheap, otherwife they ruin all they meet with, their officers and int ^P-
*ers not having it in their power to controul them. Your Excellency may 1. \ ^

appendix.

on hearing how I proceed at Bennington, and' of my fuccefs there: praying my re-

fpe&ful compliments to General Reidefel,

I am, moft refpedtfully, Sir,

Your moft obedient and humble fervant,

F. Baume.

P. S. The names of the men taken in arms are as follows,

George Duncan, John Bell,

David Slarrow, Matt. Bell.

Samuel Bell,

Hugh More, a noted rebel furrendered himfelf yefterday evening.

The exprefs left Cambridge at 4 o’clock on the morning of the 14th of Auguft.

S, R Sancoick, \ 4th Auguft, 1777, 9 o'clock.

I have the honour to inform your excellency, that I arrived here at eight in the
morning, having had intelligence of a party of the enemy being in pofleffion of a
mill, which they abandoned at our approach, but in their ufual way fired from the
bufhes, and took their road to Bennington ; a favage was {lightly wounded ; they
broke down the bridge which has retarded our march above an hour, they left m
the mill about feventy-eight barrels of very fine flour, 1000 bufhels of wheat, 20
barrels of fait, and about ioool. worth pearl and pot alb. I have ordered thirty pro-
vincials and an officer to guard the provifion and the pafs of the bridge. By five pri-
foners taken here, they agree that 1500 to 1800 men are in Bennington, but are fup-
pofed to leave it on our approach ; I will proceed fo far to-day as to fall on the
the enemy to-morrow early, and make fuch difpofition as I think neceffary from the
intelligence I may receive. People are flocking in hourly, but want to be armed ,
the favages cannot be controuled, they ruin and take every thing they plea e.

I am.

Your excellency’s moft obedient,

humble fervant,.

TT a ttmt?

Bes; your excellency to pardon the hurry of this letter*
it is wrote on the head of a barrel.

General Burgoyne..

I requeft the favour of you to proceed with Lieutenant Colonel Baume, upon an
expedition of which he has the command, and which will march this evening, or

to-morrow momi g. ^ t0 try t h e affeftions of the country ; to difconcert the

councils of the enemy ; to mount the regiment of Reidefel dragoons to compleat
Lieutenant Colonel Peters’s corps, and to procure a large fupply of horfes fortheufe
cf the troops* together with cattle and carriages* The

Injtruftions to Colonel Skeene, upon the expedition to Bennington .

xxxxix

A P P

E N D I X.

. j. • • + A rl i n rrt-nn mid hlanchedcr, and 1H Cafe

The route marked for this expedition i rea °f orce upon the Connecticut river,

it Iho uld be found that the enemy is no _ ^ ant \ defcend the river from thence

» pars fofArr,„gton, Colonel Petets

“ithS'en "forward for Benkngton, and afterwards are to jour at
Arlington. f ,, i 10 rfes an d cattle taken from the country.

- depending upon a knowledge of the eountry
for carrying his inftruaions niro «ecutton.^ a(BftjncC) particularly m having

U LdtSS .“{country

-“ bytb£armyfro!K

Rhode Iflatid. t i, e re quifites of the fervice with every

I need not recommend to you “ C °J 'burning; than ; and it may be proper to m-
principle of humanity in the mode o - g £ and hov f es being taken for

£e m futur c ”w“n y be1o rk^hVLcroy when they fliall prefume to force them, and

drive them voluntarily to my camp. ^ ^ ave t ^ e honour to be, &c. See. See.

J. Burgoyne.

CALCULATION

CALCULATIONS of the Number of Carts that will carry Provifions for the following Number of Men.

Number of Men for
io,coo Men Carts
£COO Men Carts
4000 Men Carts
3000 Men Carts
2.CCO Men Carts
icoo Men Carts
jeo Men Carts

Day. E

)ays. T

Days. I

Days. ]

Jays. I

Days. ]

Jays. ]

Days. ]

Days.

1 1

Days.

1 2

Days. '

Days; .

Days . 1

V 5

Days.

' 1

l 6

Days.^i

Days.

1 r 0

Days.

“3

i S o

188

226

263

200

338

375

413

452

49 °

526

5 *H

600

638

678

716

75°

1125

2250

3375

132

! 5 °

169

188

207

226

245

263

282

3 °o

3*9

339

358

375

S 6 3

1 125^1688

3 °

i °5

120

1 35

150

165

180

*95

210

225

! 240

255

07O

285

300

45 °

9 °° | 1 35 °

> 12

2 3

102

”3

124

135

i 47

158

I69

l80

192

203

2x4

225

338

676

1014

s 8

3 °

105

”3

120

128

i 35

143

150

225

45 °

675

:s 4

i 5

3 1

”3

226

339

ts 2

3 °

S 2

3 6

JI 3

‘7 1

The above Table made, allowing 3 pounds weight to the Ration and 8oo pounds to the Cart Loam

Nathaniel Day, Comrn.lLry Ueneral.

xlii

appendix.

Extras .fa Letter from Lieut, mat General ^ dal,i

Head- Quarters, at SkeneJlorough llouje , wtb July, 1777.

I REQUEST your Excellency to take into confideration the expediency of fupply.

p rocMd ’ the dr ; i ? f “ p ° n fr y fft

poKrTibconnderable ; - ^

and to awe the country that .f tha fi ft *m .nuu E intelligence is

SSS « Saratoga. ^ t« Edwarlis alfo

“ Youfexce"^ »|fl am fore agree .with' KnfidS'™ 5te

f fZ“ Sarfam^e’^'the difficulties that- atife fro,

the manner in which^the^ “aid V!wn lITthi beginning oT th°e

order ami afterwards repeated, that 3000 men were held fuffiamt for the defence of
ThatlTvLt you would'not he jollified in taring for the putpo: e of that garttlon,

h An!? noTwithftandiL the corns 'for the Canada fervrce are precilely named by
the Secretary of State, \ would further fubmit whether, upon my preffing requifition,
Se tSJm ght not juftifiably be furnifhed by detachment, even though there wm
no overplus under the following words of the order ; after having fecured to him
fUemenant General Burgoyne) every ajftfi ance which it is in your power to afford and

EX £%££&» Santis Soffit! fo ^m'wiffi a proper
force m attack Fort George on Jhat fide, while with the mam of the :army as foon asre

5SSS KlhlTfo 'Z confequenriy^prevenMhe fuccour oi

retreat of that garrifon*.

Extras of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne, to Sir Guy Carlcton, Head-
Quarters, near Fort Anne, July 29th 1777 -

THE confiruftion your excellency puts upon the ordera of the &eretary of tote,
is too full and decifive for me to prefume to trouble you fort cr l r

a garrifon for Ticonderoga from Canada, I mult do asweUasIcan, but I am ue
your Excellency, as a foldier, will tank my fituatron a Utile difficult. Abteaen^ ^
my communication muft either ruin niy army entirely, or nrevent a breach,

force to redore, which might be the lofs of the campaign. It P ft

Ticonderoga and Fort George muft be in very refpedable V tQ

befides have pofts at Fort Edward and other carrying-places. Thefe dr * ms * d .
common accidents and Ioffes of fervice, will necefl'anly render me very > n ‘ en ° r

APPENDIX.

xliii

point of numbers to the enemy, whom I mud expeft always to find ftrongly polled.
I afk pardon for dwelling fo much upon this fubjedt, and have only to add my re-
queft to your Excellency to forward the additional companies as expedidoufly as
may be.

Copy of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne's Letter to Colonel Baume.

Near Saratoga, Auguft 14, 1777. Seven at Night.

SIR,

THE accounts you have fent me are very fatisfaflory, and I have no doubt of every
part of your proceeding continuing to be the fame.

I beg the favour of you to report whether the road you have palled is practicable,
and if fo, if it is convenient for a confiderable corps with cannon.

Should you find the enemy too ftrongly polled at Bennington, and maintaining
fuch a countenance as may make an attack imprudent, I wifh you to take a poll where
you can maintain yourlelf till you receive an anfwer from me, and I will either fupport
you in force, or withdraw you.

You will pleafe to fend off to my camp, as foon as you can, waggons, and draft
cattle, and likewife fuch other cattle as are not neceffary for your lubfitlence.

Let the waggons ^nd carts bring off all the flour and wheat they can that you do
not retain for the lame purpofe. This tranfport mull be under the charge of acom-
milfion officer.

I will write you at full to-morrow in regard to getting horfes out of the hands of the
favages.

In the mean time any you can colleCl from them, fit to mount the regiments, at a low
price, lhall be allowed.

I am with great elteem, Sir,

Your moll obedient humble fervant.

J. Burgoyne.

Colonel St. Leger’s Account of Occurrences at Fort Stanwix.

A MINUTE detail of every operation fince my leaving La Chine, with the de-
tachment entrulled to my care, your Excellency will permit me to referve to a
time of lefs hurry and mortification than the prefent, while I enter into the interfiling
feene before Fort Stanwix, which I invelted the 3d of Auguft, having previoufly
pulhed forward Lieutenant Bird of the King’s reigment, with thirty of the King s
troops and two hundred Indians, under the dire&ion of Captains Hare and W ilton,
and the chiefs Jofeph and Bull, to feize fall hold of the lower landing-place, and there-
by cutoff the enemy’s communication with the lower country. — ft his was done with
great addrefs by the lieutenant, though not attended with the effe<Sl I bad promifed
mylelf, occafioned by the flacknefsof the Meffafagoes. The brigade of provifion and
ammunition boats I had intelligence of, being arrived and difembarked before this

party had taken poll. ,

A a » l nc

A a 4

lxlv

A P P

END* X.

The fourth and fifth were employed j" fa ^[ e g fabou? 2 of 'oL^uXeTfnd" fifty
Creek (which the enemy, With ” e ff ^ u °p oa i <e a U p) and the making a tempo-
men, for fourteen days had miles from the fort, fora

rary road from Pine Ridges upon F ‘dr Creek, artUlerv . the firft was effected

prefent fupplyot provifion and tie r ^‘ P aflifted by Captain Harkimer of the

“0 “■"**

days provifion, in two days. • j lw mv difeoverinm parties on the

On the ,.h, in the evening, mtelhgence a nved I bt my h.lnove i b y Genml-
Mohatvk River, that a reinforcement o etght ^untjted a > lhat
Herkimer, were on their march torehe g » garrifoh be-

11 ant at Orilka, an Indian iettlement, fort in the mor-

ing appnfed of their march l>y our me , ,] e p vvamp 1 did not think it pru-
ning, through what was tlwi^i ar » l ~j f ^ ^ J rackcd b y,a fally from the

dent to wait tor them, and thereby n j > , ved me in front. I therefore de-

garrifon in the rear, while the reimorcei ^ 17 ‘ covert ly as circumftances

termined to attack them on the march, eitnei \ i y jr; n > s tr00 ps in

Should offer. At this time, I had not two ^ hundred and fifty of the King s trooj^ rf

camp; the various and e . xt ^¥ v 5°^ r V an d therefore, could not fend above eighty
entering into, having employed the reft , and them f $ir John ,

white men, rangers and troops inc - u (f > , . k is ma rch that evening at

Johnfon put himfelf at the head of this party, an g ^ morn ; ne . The im-

five o’clock, and met the rebel corps at t c a enemy (forgetting the

petuofity of the Indians is not to be described on the fight of th^enemy ^ ^

judicious difpofition formed by Sir John, ? n f ®S‘ ec , uld b ’e on both flanks

fuffer the attack to begin with the troops in ‘ ^ enemy’s rear an op-

and rear) they rotted to, hatchet » haiui, and.th^ ^^ « ^ ^ ^

portunity toefcape. In relation to the vi<L° r }> • , efcahecPonly ferved to fpread

whole had fallen ; nay more fo, as the two hunched (I m * ft be
the panic wider ; but it was not fo with 1 1 - nr > » k;ded and the like number

underftood Indian computation, being on y a chiefs and confidential warriors

wounded, and in that number fome of their fa ouute ch efs ml c G e-

were flain.) On the enemy’s fide almoft all the 1 mention, that the four

neral Herkimer has fince died of his wounds Ins _ | [ fet out the evening

men detached with intelligence of the maich of th ^^ n account of the defeat,

before the a^ion, and confequently the ^“STat which, as I

and were in pofleflion only, ot the time appou towards Lieutenant Bird’s

fufpected, they made a fally with two hundred ^d fifty men towar cn .

poll, to facilitate the entrance of the relieving corps, or bnn D
gagementj with every advantage they wi < their rear, while they

Captain Hoyes was immediately detached to ™ ' n i f c taln Hoyes, having
engaged the lieutenant. Immediately upon the departuie 1 cowar dly Indian,
learned that Lieutenant Bird, milled by the information of a cowar y
that Sir John was preffed, had quitted his poll to march to his advance, m ^

APPENDIX.

lxvii

the detachment- of the King’s regiment, in fupport of Captain Hoyes, by a road in
fight of the garrifon, which, with executive fire from his party, immediately drove
the enemy into the fort, without any further advantage than frightening forne
fquaws and pilfering the packs of the warriors which they left behind them. After
this affair was over, orders were immediately given to compleat a two-gun battery,,
and mortar beds, with three ftrong redoubts in their rear, to enable me, in cafe of
another attempt, to relieve the garrifon by their regimented troops, to march out a
larger body -of the King’s troops.

Captain'Lernoult was fent with iio men to the lower landing place, where he
eftablilhed himfelf with great judgment and ftrength, having an enclofed battery
of a three-pounder oppofed to any fally from the fort, and another to the fide of
the country, where a relief muff approach; and the body of his camp deeply en-
trenched and abbatifed.

When by the unabating labour of officers and men (the ffnallnefs of our num-
bers never admitting of a" relief, or above three hours ceffation for fleep or cooking)
the batteries and redoubts were finifhed, and new cheeks and axle-trees made for
the fix- pounders, thofe that were fent being reported rotten and unferviceable.

It was found that our cannon had not the leaft effect upon the fod-work of the.
fort, and that our royals had only, the power of teizing, as a fix-inch plank was a
fufficient fecurity for their powder magazine, as we learnt from the deferters.,
At this time Lieutenant Glenie of the artillery, whom I had appointed to a£t as
affiftant engineer, propofed a converfion of the royals (if I may ufe the exprefiion)
into howitzers. The ingenuity and feafability of this mealure ftriking me very
Itronrdy, the bufinefs was fet about immediately, and Toon executed, when it was
found that nothing prevented their operating with the defired effect but the diftance,
their chambers being too fmall to hold a fufficiency of powder. There was nothing,
now to be done but to approach the town, by fap to fuch a diftance that the ram-
part might be brought within their portice, at the fame time all materials were
preparing to run a mine under their moft formidable baftion. .

In the midft of tliefe operations intelligence was brought in by our fcouts, of a
fecond corps of 1000 men being on their march. The fame zeal no longer animated
the Indians ; they complained of our thinneis of troops and their former Ioffes.

1 immediately called a council of the chiefs ; encouraged them as much as I could ;
promifed to lead them on myfelf, and bring into the field 300 of the beft troops.
Thev liftened to this, and promifed to follow me, and agreed that I mould iecon-
noitre the ground propereft for the field of battle the next morning, accompanied
by fome of their chief warriors, to fettle the plan of operations. When up° n If ®
mound appointed for the field of battle, fcouts came in with the account of the firft
number iwelled to 2000; immediately after a third, that General Burgoyne s army
was cut to pieces, and that Arnold was advancing, by rapid and forced marches,
with 20CO men. It was at this moment I began to fufpeft cowardice in fome, an ‘
treaion in others ; however I returned to camp, not without hopes, with the al-
fiffance of my gallant coadjutor, Sir John Johnfon, and the influence of the fup -
intending colonels, Claus and Butler, of inducing them to meet the enemy. A.
council, according to their cuftom, was called, to know their relolutions, befoie the
breaking up of which*! learned that 200 were already decamped. In about an hour

appendix.

thev infixed that I Ihould retreat, or they would be obliged to abandon me. Had
no other party to take, and a hard party it was to troops who could do not lung
without them, to yield to their refolves; and there. ore propofedra retire at „ .
fending on before my fick, wounded, artillery, 8tc. down tie oo. .,

veri-nsr them by our line of march. , - . ^ , n

Tins did not fall in with their views, which were no lefs than treacheroufly com-
mitting ravage upon their friends, as they had loll the opportunity of doin D it
upon 'their enemies. To effect this they artfully caufed meffengers to come in,

one after the other, with accounts of the nearer approaches of the rebels > one and
the laft affirmed that they were within two miles of Captain Leinoult s poll. N
g ring endlc credir to this, and keeping ro my rdolution ot rerumg by night, they
frew furious and abandoned! feized upon the olbcers liquor and clear hs, nfpde
of the efforts of their fervants-, and became more formidable than the enemy we
had to expeft. I now thought it time to call in Captain Lernou.t s poll, retiring
the Wops in camp to the ruined fort called William, ,n the front oto
garrifon, not only to wait the enemy, if they thought proper t0 W/

reft the boars from the fury of the favages, having fent forward Captain Ho> es,
with his detachment, with one piece of cannon, to the place where 1 0 .
flood, to receive the troops who waited the arrival or Captain Leinou .
the boats wereefcorted that night beyond Canada Creek, where no danger was
be apprehended from the enemy. The creek at this place bending rom tie roa^
has a deep cedar fvvafnp between. Every attention was now turned to the mouth
of the creek which the enemy might have pofieffed themfelves of by a rapid
march by the Oneyda Caftle. At this place the whole of the little army arrived by
twelve o’clock at night, and took poft in fuch a manner as to have no feais of any
thin" the enemy could do. Here we remained till three o clock next morning,
when the boats which could come up the Creek arrived, or rather that the lafcally
part of^ all nations of the Indians would fuffer to come up ; and proceeded acrofs
SL Oneydf o the ruined fort of Brereton, where I learnt that to boats were
rtUl hboiSmr down the creek, after being lightened of the beft part of thetr freight
by the Meffafagoes. Captain Lernoult propoied, with a boat tull of aimed men,
m reoafs the lake that night, to relieve them from their labour, and fupply them
with provifion. This tranfaftion does as much honour to the humanity as to the

83 C) n ''my' arrival ^ t & th e Onondago Falls I received an anfwer to my lett J r fr ^
vour Excellency, which ffiewed, in the cleared: light, the feenes of treachery that
Ld been praftifed upon me. The meffenger had heard indeed on his way that they
Ae S.C kind of rabble as'Wore, but that' there was not an enemy

W £n2r my 1 wm joined by Captain Lernoul^ with f he

ciry my detachment down! which I mean to do with every ^ "oXedTrcX
.he moment this buf.nefs is effeacd, for which purpofe I nave ordered here

(now. The Hoop is already gone from this with her full lading. officers

APPENDIX.

xlvn

Officers from each corps are fent to Montreal to procure neceffaries for the men,
who are in a moil deplorable fituation from the plunder of the favages, that no time
may be loft to join your army.

I have the honour to be, with the greateft refpedt.

Sir, your Excellency’s moll obedient,

Ofwego, Aug. 1 7, 1777. and moft faithful fervant,

Barry St. Leger.

His Excellency General Burgoyne.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated

at Albany, loth Oftober, 1777.

My Lord,

NO poflibility of communication with your Lordlhip having exifted fince the
beginning of September, at which time my laft diipatch w r as lent away, I have to re-
port to your Lordlhip the proceedings of the army under my command from that
period : a feries of hard toil, incefiant effort, ftubborn adtion ; till difabled in the
collateral branches of the army by the total defection of the Indians •, the defertion or
timidity of the Canadians and Provincials, fome individuals excepted ; difappointed in
the laft hope of any timely co-operation from other armies the regular troops re-
duced by lofles from the bell part to 3500 fighting men, not 2000 of which were
Britilh •, only three days provilions upon Ihort allowance in ftore •, inverted by an army
of 16,000 men, and no apparent means of retreat remaining, I called into council all
the generals, field officers, and captains commanding corps, and by their unanimous
concurrence and advice, I was induced to open a treaty with Major General Gates.

Your Lordlhip will fee, by the papers tranfmitted herewith, the difagreeable pro-
fpedt which attended the firft overtures and when the terms concluded are compared,
I truft that the fpirit of the councils I have mentioned, which under fuch circum-
ftances dictated inftead of fubmitting, will not be refufed a ffiare of credit.

Before I enter upon the detail of thefe events, I think it a duty of juftice, my Lord,
to take upon myfelf the meafure of having parted the Hudfon’s River, in order to
force a partfage to Albany. I did not think myfelf authorifed to call any men into
council, when the peremptory tenor of my orders and the feafon of the year admitted
no alternative.

Provifions for about thirty days having been brought forward, the other neceffary
ftores prepared, and the bridge of boats completed, the army parted the Hudfon’s
River on the 13th and 14th of September, and incamped on the heights, and in the
plain of Saratoga, the enemy being then in the neighbourhood of Stillwater.

The whole army made a movement forward, and incamped in a good pofition in a
place called Dovacote.

It being found that there were feveral bridges to repair, that work was begun under
cover of ftrong detachments, and the fame opportunity was taken to reconnoitre the
country.

The army renewed their march, repaired other bridges, and encamped upon ad-
vantageous ground about four miles from the enemy.

The enemy appeared in confiderable force to obftrinft the further repair of bridges,
and with a view, as it was conceived, to draw on an adlion where artillery could not

No. Xlv.

i5tlu
1 6th.

17 th.

1 8 th.

xW'iil

Sept. 19

A P P E K D I "X*

■ be employed. A {mall lofs was fuftained in Ikirrmfliing, but the work

ThfXes of , great ravine, and other roads towards the enemy, having been

reconnoitred, the army advanced in Colonel Brey man’s corps,

Brigadier General Frafer’s corps, g the heights,

made a circuit, in order to pah tue 1a' 1 the riaht. Thefe corps moved in

and afterwards to cover the march ot the ^ ^ upon the ir fronts

three columns, and had the India , * * fon pa £Tcd the ravine in a direft line

and flanks. Ihe Britifh line led -by * P they rained the fummit, where they

lbuth, and formed in onto of and to enable the left wing

SlSSrT 5 K uX *£' ™ds of Mgj General

» d y The 47 th regiment guarded

the bateaux. . • ,n«, retied to edve notice of all the columns

The fignal guns, whicn had been previou y ^ “ nd two o’clock, the march

being ready to advance, having «n of the Britifh line were foon fired

continued. The fcouts a id - ’ fff , ^ about an hour’s march, the picquets,

s f r d “ 1 ^ in force ’ andoblise

to give ground, but they foon r Z^edVheTroops. A few cannon-fhot dif-

On the firfl: opening of the w „i C nuets had been attacked, and Brigadier

upon a very advantageous height or ithe : rig t of ^ combinat - l0n 0 f the march.

In the meantime the enemy, , not with a view of turning the line upon

had moved in great force out 0 t eir . f Brigadier General Frafer, counter-

the right, and being checked by the Britifh.

lort ’ howevernear ’ may

effefted without a poffibihty of weir being £ c °^ re v ^ ous attack on the Britifh line.
About three o’clock the aft ion be hlfa The enemy being continually

and continued with great obftinacy all aker f • and regiments, moft

»«■““ — the 9 "’ had ten

as were part of the light ««°alfo of fervice , but it was

J'^STadvaUe S 'evacuate , l heights where Brigadier General bra.er was

polled otherwife than partially ar.d occalion.a • through a difH-

P Major General Phillips upon fitft M™g the uh him J Major Williams

cult part ot the wood to the feene o , t t i>ood indebted to that gallant and

and four pieces of artillery, and from , that , ^ '“ocularly lot rearing the
judicious fecond, for inceffant an n “ fuperiority of fire, and to

^ Major

APPENDIX.

*lix

Maior-Gcneral Riedefel exerted himfelf to bring up a part of the left wing, and
arrived in time to charge the enemy with regularity and bravery

luft as the li°-ht clofed, the enemy gave ground on all fides, and left us com
pktely mafters of the field of battle,, with the lofs of about five hundred men oa
their fide, and, as fuppofed, thrice that number wounded.

The darknefs preventing a purfuit, the pnfoners were few. TWadier-

The behaviour of the officers and men in general was exemplary. Brigadier
General Frafer took his pofition in the beginning of the dav with great . ^F>ent &

fuftained the aftion with confiant prefence of mind and vigour. Brigadier-Gener l
Hamilton was the whole time engaged and acquitted himfelf with great honour, ac-

^Th/artiflery in°general was diftingudhed, and the brigade under Captain Jones.

who was killed in the action, was confpicuoufly fo day took a

The army lay upon their arms the night of the igth, and. the ^ 3
pofition nearly within cannon ffiot of the enemy, fortifying their right, exfe "
S their left to the brow of the heights, fo as to cover the meadows th ough
which the p-reat river runs, and where their bateaux and hofpitals were pla .
The 47th regiment, the regiment of Heffe Hanau, and a corps of Provincials in.

camped in the meadows as a further fecurity. • , l t i, e nrecedihp-

Tr was foon found that no fruits, honour excepted, were attained by the precemn

victory? tte enemy working with redoubled ardor ,o ftrengthen theft left : theft

me of his indention to at 0 — wa< , t u e on ] v meffengerof many

of his letter, which was the lath H^e aSd lim thatW reached'

tssatissst asps*;; 1 *...-. „ *.

pofition, if P?® ’ e 'two’foUowin^ fwo officers in difguife, and other conS-

i“feKnd Tcktl a ed fortifying my camp and watching the enemy, whofe

"?,hou M o-he 3 d cf O^t^diminim £ «*££*» £

order ro lengthen out the piov^ons. l Canada were clearly forefecn,,-

SfSK “ libmy fuch “

ari Thft S TOnfidTra^^ofefaft^f^cib^m deK^ine^^ft^abi^^evCTta^aOong as
poffible, and I reafoned thus. The expeditio ftould be devoted. A critical.

fecfwft£MT 8 Wa<hiiigron might poffibly decide the fate

appendix.

of the war; the failure of my junftion with Sir Harry Clinton, or the lofs of my
retreat to Canada could only be a partial misfortune. f

In this fituation things continued till the feventh, when no intelligence haying
been received of the expedted co-operation, and four or five days for our limited
.fl ay in the camp only remained, it was judged advifable to make a movement to
the enemy’s left, not only to difcover whether there were any poffible means of
forcing a pafiage fhould it be necefiary to advance, or of diilodging him for the
convenience of a retreat, but alfo to cover a forage of the army which was in the
greateft diftrefs on accouut of the fcarcity.

A detachment of fifteen hundred regular troops with two twelve pounders, two
howitzers, and fix fix-pounders, were ordered to move, and were commanded by
myfelf, having with me Major-General Phillips, Major-General Reidefel, and
Brigadier-General Frafer.

The guard of the camp upon the heights was left to Brigadier-General Hamilton
;and Specht, the redoubts and the plain to Brigadier General Gal! ; and as the force
of the enemy immediately in their front confifted of more than double their num-
bers, it was not poifible to augment the corps that marched, beyond the numbers
above ftated.

I formed the troops within three-quarters of a mile of the enemy’s left, and
Captain Frafer’s rangers, with Indians and Provincials, had orders to go by fecret
paths in the woods to gain the enemy’s rear, and by (hewing themfelves there to
keep them in a check.

The further operations intended, were prevented by a very fudden and rapid attack
of the enemy on our left, where the Bntifh grenadiers were ported to fupport the
left wing of the line. Major Acland at the head of them iuftamed the attack with
great refolution •, but the enemy’s great numbers enabling them in a few minutes to
extend the attack along the front of the Germans, which were immediately on the
right of the grenadiers, no part of that body could be removed to make a fecond
line to the flank, where the ftrefs of the fire lay. The right was at this time en-
gaged, but it was foon obferved that the enemy were marching a large corps round
their flank to endeavour cutting off their retreat. 1 he light infantry and part of the
24th regiment which were at that port were therefore ordered to form a fecond line,
and to fecure the return of the troops into camp. While this movement was pro-
ceeding the enemy pufhed afrefh and ftrong reinforcement to renew the action upon
the left, which, overpowered by a great fuperioritv, gave way, and the light in-
fantry and 24th regiment were obliged to make a quick movement to fave that point
from being entirely carried, in doing which, Brigadier-General frafer was mortally

wounded. # c ,

The danger to which the lines were expofed becoming at this moment or the
moft ferious nature, orders were given to Major-General Phillips and Reidefel to
cover the retreat, while fuch troops as were moft ready for the purpofe, leturned
for the defence of them. The troops retreated hard preffed, but. in good order ;
they were obliged to leave fix pieces of cannon, all the horfes having been killed,
and moft of the artillery-men, who had behaved as ufual with the utmoft bravely
under the command of Major Williams, being either killed or wounded.

The troops had fcarcely entered, the camp when it was ftormed with great fury,
the enemy rullung to the lines under a fevere fire of grape-fiiot and fmall arms.

APPENDIX.

The poft of the light infantry under Lord Balcarras aftifted by fome of the line,
which threw themfelves by order into the intrenchments, was defended with great
fpirit, and the enemy led on by General Arnold was finally repulfed, and the General
wounded ; but unhappily the intrenchments of the German referve, commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Breymann, who was killed, were carried, and although
ordered to be recovered, they never were fo, and the enemy by that misfortune
gained an opening on our right and rear. The night put an end to the a£lion.

Under the difadvantages thus apparent in our fituation, the army was ordered to
quit the prefent pofition during the night and take poft upon the heights above the
hofpital.

Thus by an entire change of front, to reduce the enemy to form a new difpofition.

This movement was effected in great order and without lofs, though all the artillery
and camp were removed at the fame time. The army continued offering battle to
the enemy in their new pofition the whole day of the 8th.

Intelligence was now received that the enemy were marching to turn the right,
and no means could prevent that meafure but retiring towards Saratoga. . The army
began to move at nine o’clock at night, Major-General Reidefel commanding the
van-guard, and Major-General Phillips the rear.

This retreat, though within mulquet-fhot of the enemy, and encumbered with
all the baggage of the army, was made without lofs, but a very heavy rain and the
difficulties of guarding the bateaux which contained all the provifions, occafioned
delays which prevented the army reaching Saratoga till the night of the 9th, and
the artillery could not pafs the fords of the Fifh-kill till the morning of the 10th.

At our arrival near Saratoga, a corps of the enemy, between five and fix hundred,
were difcovered throwing up intrenchments on the heights, but retired over a ford of
the Hudfon’s River at our approach, and joined a body polled to oppofe our paffage
there.

It was judged proper to fend a detachment of artificers under a ftrong efcort to re-
pair the bridges and open a road to f ort- Edward on the weft fide of the river. The
47th regiment, Captain Frafer’s markfmen, and Mackoy’s Provincials, were ordered
for that fervice, but the enemy appearing on the heights of the Fifh-kill in great
force, and making a difpofition to pafs and give us battle : the 47th regiment and
Frafer’s markfmen were recalled ; the Provincials left to cover the workmen at the
firft bridge run away upon a very flight attack of a fmall party of the enemy, and
left the artificers to efcape as they could, without a pofiibility of their performing

any work. ' . .. . ,

During thefe different movements the bateaux with provifions were frequently
fired upon from the oppofite fide of the river, and fome ot them were loft, and
feveral men were killed and wounded in thofe which remained.

The attacks upon the bateaux were continued, feveral were taken and retaken, Oftober

but their fituation being much nearer to the main force of the enemy than to ours, it n_

was found impoffible to fecure the provifions any otherwife than by landing them
and carrying them upon the hill : this was effected under fire, and with great

The pofiible means of further retreat were now confnlered in councils of war,
compofed of the general officers, minutes of which will be tranlmitted to your

L ° rdlh ‘ I> ' , bl The

The only one that feemed at all-

Edward with the troops carrying their provifio P carriages out of the

of repairing bridges, £ p^Swarf, or th°e ford above it.

queftion, it was proposed to to » h returne d with intelligence that the enemy

Before this attempt could be Md po flefled a camp in force on the high
were intrenched oppoie port-George with cannon. They had alfo parties

ground between Fort-Edwar . „ j DO ft s f 0 near to us, upon our own

Sown the whole lEore to watch our to ^

fide of the water as muft prev , j joined by new corps of militia and vo-

«Ef“ 0 ” ihk dmeth e^n ZTontin'oally upon their arms, and were cannonaded in

to cLl into all parts of the line, though w.th-

'account of the ptoviftons was taken, and the cireuntftances

officers and captains co— f

SliSonS

— r

fiderable corps from Hubei ton „ , ’d Lake Georcre, and on the morning

of^the TicJideroga^and ^otmf Independence.^Tfhe
&stSg ^ "P " “f S & altd^ai the Portage

made prifoners ; a block-houfe, commanded by L eu ena ^ a brave

the furprifed vefTei wa« ^brought ^^e mhfbrmyour
After dating and lamenting fo fata a want of vigilance,

Lordlhip of the fatisfaclory events which followed f uc h

The enemy having twice fummoned Brigadier General rowen, ana i

great conunendations to the regiment of 1 nn ? tioned

appendix.

tvoned at Mount Independence. The Brigadier alfo mentions with great applaufe the
-behaviour of Captain Taylor of the sift regiment, who was accidentally there on his
route to the army from the hofpital, and Lieutenant Beecroft of the 24th regiment,
who with the artificers in arms defended an important battery.

On the 24th inftant, the enemy, enabled by the capture of the gun-boats and ba-
teaux which they had made after the furpriie of the (loop, to embark upon 1 .ake

George, attacked Diamond Ifland in two divifions. _

Captain Aubrey and two companies of the 47th regiment, had been polled at that
ifland from the time the army puffed the Hudfon’s River, as a better fituat.on for the
fccuritv of r fto™ at the fouth end of Lake George than Fort George, which ,s on
the continent, and not tenable againft artillery and numbers The enemy were re-
puifed by Captain Aubrey with great lofs, and purfued by the gun-boats under his
command to the eaft ftiore, where two of their principal veffels were retaken, together
with all the cannon. They had juft time to let fire to the other bateaux, and retreated

OV Ybe<T kavTto refer your Lordlhip for further particulars to my aid- de-camp. Lord
Peterlham, and I humbly take occafion to recommend to his Majefty s notice that no-
bleman, as one endued with qualities to do important fervices to h.s country in ever)
ftation to which his birth may lead. In this late campaign in particular, his beha-
viour has been fuch as to entitle him to the fulleft applaufe, and I am confident his
merit will be thought a fufficient ground for preferment, though deprived of the eclat
and fort of claim which generally attends the delivery of fortunate dilpatches.

I have only to add, my Lord, a general report ol the killed and wounded •, I do
not dve it correa the hurry of the time and the feparation of the corps having ren-
3 1 3 t • nnffhle’to make it fo. The Britilh officers have bled profufely and moft
honourably^ thofe who remain unwounded have been equally forward, and the gene-
ral officersVrom the mode of fighting have been more expoied than in other Cervices.
Amon" the reft of this ftation, I have had my efcapes. It depends upon the kntence
his Matefty fhall pafs upon my conduft ; upon the judgment of my profeffion, and f
the impartial and refutable parts of my country, whether I am to efteem them blef-

fings or misfortunes. j haye the honour t0 be,

(Signed.)

J. Burgoyne.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated
J Albany, 20 th October, 1777.

[ Private , by Lord Peterlham.]

I , HAVE Bole to add to my public letter refpeaing the courfe of unfuccefsful

dettaking, J ndcr as pofiri*.. ^ 'SSSs wiThe'only

rituiTiveome! S'tta rnfirJ. junction with Sir William Howe or at lead a
paffage to Albany’, was the principle, 'the letter, and the fptm of my orders. ^

APPENDIX.

Jiv

Indeed the appearances at the time I paffed the Hudfon’s-River, though fubjedt to
doubt in fome in dances, as I then wrote your Lordfliip, were upon a general view,
fuch as I am perluaded would have rendered inadion cenfurable, had my orders, inftead
of being peremptory, been difcretionary. Promiles of the profefling loyal ills were not
then brought to the teft ; the fpirit of the enemy, in combat againft regular Britilh
troops, had only been tried at Ticonderago, at Huberton, at Skenefoorough, and
Fort Anne ; in all which places it had failed ; the total difappointment of effedual co-
operation, could not beforefeen orl'uppofed ; and fure I am, had I then made luppo-
fition that any thing like what has happened, might have happened, and remained
cautioully polled, no exertion attempted, my condud would have been held indefen-
fible by every clafs and diftindion of men in government, in the army, and in the
public.

The expediency of advancing being admitted, the confequences have been honou-
rable misfortunes. The Britilh have perfevered in a ftrenuous and bloody pro-
grefs. Had the force been all Britilh, perhaps the perfeverance had been longer ; but
as it was, will it be faid, my Lord, that in the exhaulled fituation deferibed, and in
thejaws of famine, and invefted by quadruple numbers, a treaty which laves the army
to the {late, for the next campaign, was not more than could have been expeded ? I
I call it faving the army, becaufe if fent home, the ftate is thereby enabled to fend forth
the troops now deftined for her internal defence ; if exchanged, they become a force to
Sir William Howe, as effedually, as if any other jundion had been made.

I fhould now hold myfelf unjuftifiable if I did not confide to your Lordllnp, my
opinion, upon a near inlpedion, of the rebel troops. The Handing corps which I
have feen, are difeiplined. I do not hazard the term, but apply it to the great funda-
mental points of military inllitution, fobriety, fubordi nation, regularity and courage.
The militia are inferior in method and movement, but not a jot lefs fciviceable in
woods. My conjedures were very different after the affair of Ticonderago, but lam
convinced they were delufive ; and it is a duty to the Hate to confefs it.

The panic of the rebel troops is confined, and of Ihort duration ; the enthufiafim is
extenfive and permanent.

It is a juftice to Major General Phillips, to inform your Lordfliip, that when thecrins
of our fituation at Saratoga arrived, he very handfomely offered to hazard his perfon
by making a circuit through the woods, and attempt to throw himfelf into 1 icondera—
go, to defend that place, fhould it be the objed of the enemy to endeavour the re-
taking it. , -

In regard to myfelf, I am funk in mind and body; but while I have a faculty of
either, it fliall be exerted for the King’s fervice. I fhall wait in the neighbourhood of
Bolton, the orders of Sir William Howe.

I have the honour to be,. See*

J. Burgoyne.

Minutes

APPENDIX.

Minutes of a Council of War, held on the Heights of Saratoga, Oft. 1 2. No. XV.

Present.

Lieutenant General Burcoyne, Major General Philips,

Major General R.eidesel, Brigadier General Hamilton.

THE Lieutenant General Hates to the council the prefent fituation of affairs.

The enemy in force, according to the bed intelligence he can obtain, to the amount
of upwards of 14,000 men, and a confiderable quantity of artillery, are on this fide
the Fifh-kill, and threaten an attack. On the other fide the Hudfon’s River, between
this army and Fort Edward, is another army of the enemy, the numbers unknown ;
but one corps, which there has been an opportunityiof obferving, is reported to be about
1500 men. They have likewife cannon on the other fide the Hudfon’s River, and
they have a bridge below Saratoga church, by which the two armies can communi-
cate.

The bateaux of the army have been deftroyed, and no means appear of making a
bridge over the Hudfon’s River, were it even practicable from the pofition of the
enemy.

The only means of retreat, therefore, are by the ford at Fort Edward, or taking the
mountains in order to pafs the river higher up by rafts, or by any other ford which is
reported to be practicable with difficulty, or by keeping the mountains, to pals the
head of Hudfon’s River, and continue to the weftward of Lake George all the way to
Ticonderoga ; it is true, this laH palfage was never made but by Indians, or very
fmall bodies of men.

In order to pafs cannon or any wheel carriages from hence to Fort Edward, fome
bridges mult be repaired under fire of the enemy from the oppofite fide of the river,
and the principal bridge will be a work of fourteen or fifteen hours j there is no good
pofition for the army to take to fuftain that work, and if there were, the time Hated
as necelfary, would give the enemy on the other fide the Hudfon’s River an opportunity
to take pofl on the flrong ground above Fort Edward, or to difpute the ford while
General Gates’s army followed in the rear.

The intelligence from the lower part of Hudfon’s River is founded upon the con-
current reports of prifoners and deferters, who fay it was the news in the enemy’s camp,
that Fort Montgomery was taken; and one man, a friend to government, who ar-
rived yeHerday, mentions fome particulars of the manner in which it was taken.

The provifions of the army may hold out to the 20th; there is neither rum nor
fpruce beer.

Having committed this Hate of fafts to the confideration of the council, the Gene-
ral requefis their fentiments on the following propofitions.

iH. To wait in the prefent pofition an attack from the enemy, or the chance of fa-
vourable events.

2d. To attack the enemy.

3d. To retreat repairing the bridges as the army moves for the artillery, in order to
force the palfage of the ford.

4th. To retreat by night, leaving the artillery and the baggage; and fhould it be
found impracticable to force the palfage with mui'quetry, to attempt the upper ford,
or the palfage round Lake George.

5th. In

lvi

appendix.

In cafe the enemy, by extending to their left, leave their rear open, to march

rapidly for Albany. ... ,, , ,

Upon the firfl propofition refolved, that the lituation would grow worfe by de-
lay, that the provifion now in flore not more than fufficient for the retreat, fhould
impediments intervene, or a circuit of country become neceffary ; and as the enemy
did not attack when the ground was unfortified, it is not probable they will do it

now, as thev have a better game to play. t

The fecond unadvifable and defperate, there being no poffibility of reconnoi-
tering the enemy’s pofition, and his great fuperiority of numbers known.

The third impracticable. . .

The fifth thought worthy of confideration by the Lieutenant-General, Major-
General Phillips, 0 and Brigadier-General Hamilton ; but the pofition of the enemy

yet gives no opening for it.

Refolved, that the fourth propofition is the only refource, and that to effett it,
the utmofl fecrecy and filence is to be obferved ; and the tioops are to be put in
motion from the right in the flill part of the night, without any change in the

dl N° r B.°It depended upon the delivery of fix days provifion in due time, and upon
the return of fcouts, who had been fent forward to examine by what route the army
could probably move the firfl four miles undifcovered, whether the plan fhould take
place on that day, or on the morrow.

The fcouts on their return reported, that the enemy’s pofition on the right was
fuch, and they had fo many fmall parties out, that it would be impoffible to move
without our march being immediately difcovered.

Minutes and Proceedings of a Council of War, ctnfiJHng of all the general Officers and
Field Officers, and Captains commanding Corps , on the Heights of Saratoga,
October 13.

THE Lieutenant-General having explained the fituation of affairs, as in the pre-
ceding council, with the additional intelligence, that the enemy was intrenched at
the fords of Fort Edward, and likewife occupied the ftrong pofition on the Pine-
plains between Fort George and Fort Edward, expreffed his readinefs to undertake
at their head any enterprife of difficulty or hazard that fhould appear to them within
the compafs of their flrength or fpirit. He added, that he had reafon to believe a
capitulation had been in the contemplation of fome, perhaps of all, who knew the
real fituation of things ; that upon a circumftance of fuch confequence to national
and perfonal honour, he thought it a duty to his country, and to himfelf, to extend
his council beyond the ufual limits ; that the affembly prefent might juftly be
efteemed a full reprefentation of the army ; and that he fhould think himfelf unjufti-
fiable in taking any ftep in fo ferious a matter, without fuch a concurrence of fenti-
ments as fhould make a treaty the aft of the army, as well as that of the general.

The firfl queftion therefore he defired them to decide was. Whether an army ot
3S00 fi°-hting men, and well provided with artillery, were juflifiable, upon the
principles of national dignity and military honour, in capitulating in anypoffible

fltoation? Refolved.

appendix-

Ivii

Refolved, nem. con. in the affirmative.

Queftion 2. Is the prefent fituation of that nature . #

Refolved, nem. con. That the prefent fituation juftifies a capitulation upon ho*

"The Lkutenant-General then drew up the mefiage, marked No. 2, and laid it
before the council. It was unanimoufly approved, and upon that foundation the

tre oao°b P er ne xt Major Kingfton having delivered the meffiage marked No 2. return-
ed with the propofals marked No. 3, and the council of war being aflembled again,
the Lieutenant-General laid the propofals before them, when it was refolved unani-
moufly to rejeft the 6th article, and not to admit of it in any extremity whatever.

The Lieutenant-General then laid before the council the anfwers to Major-General
Gates’s propofals, as marked in the fame paper, together with his own preliminary

propofals, which were unanimoufly approved of. _ , r .

F October 1 c. The council being aflembled again, Major-General Gates s anfwers
to Lieutenant-General Burgoyne’s propofals were laid before them, whereupon it
was refolved, that they were fatisfaftory, and a fufficient ground for proceeding to
a definitive treaty.

No z Major Kingfton delivered the following Mcjfage to Major-General Gates*

October 14,

AFTER having fought you twice,. Lieutenant-General Burgoyne has waited
fome days mhif prelnt portion, determined to try a thud confl.d agamft any

numbers, and the difpofition of your
treat upon that idea. General Burgoyne would propofe a h in any Vx"r-

the time neceflary to communicate the preliminary terms y > Y

mity,. he and his army mean to abide.

No. q. Major-General Gates’s Propofals ; together with Lieutenant-General Burgoyne’s
3 Anfwers.*.

I. General Burgoyne’s army bring exceeding

andbaggage^taken ** ^ ^ ^

* iU nevcr

admit that their retreat is cut off, while they have them . The

II. The officers and foldiers may keep the baggage t> |

generals of the United States never permit individuals to be pillaged. ^

v C

APPENDIX.

lviii

III. The troops under his Excellency General Burgoyne will be conducted by
the mod convenient route to New England, marching by eafy marches, and fuf-
ficiently provided for by the way.

Anfwer. This article is anfwered by General Burgoyne’s firft propofal, which
is here annexed.

IV. The officers will be admitted on parole ; may wear their fide-arms, and
will be treated with the liberality cuftomary in Europe, fo long as they, by proper
behaviour, continue to deferve it ; but thole who are apprehended having broke
their parole, as fome Britifh officers have done, muft expedt to be clofe confined.

Anlwer. There being no officer in this army under, or capable of being under
the defcription of breaking parole, this article needs no anfwer.

V. All public ftores, artillery, arms, ammunition, carriages, horfes. See. 8cc.
muft be delivered to commifiaries appointed to receive them.

Anfwer. All public ftores may be delivered, arms excepted.

VI. Thefe terms being agreed to and figned, the troops under his Excellency
General Burgoyne’s command may be drawn up in their encampments, where they
will be ordered to ground their arms, and may thereupon be marched to the river
iide, to be palled over in their way towards Bennington.

Anfwer. This article inadmiffible in any extremity. Sooner than this army will
confent to ground their arms in their encampment, they will rulh on the enemy,
detertnined to take no quarter.

VII. A ceflation of arms to continue till fun-fet, to receive General Burgoyne’s
anfwer.

(Signed)

Camp at Saratoga, Odt. 14.

Horatio Gates,

Major Kingfton met the Adjutant-General of Major-General Gates’s army, Octo-
ber 14th, at fun-fet, and delivered the following meflage :

If General Gates does not mean to recede from the 6 th article, the treaty ends
at once.

The army will to a man proceed to any a ft of defperation, rather than fubmit
to that article.

The ceflation of arms ends this evening-

No. XVI.

RETURN of the Army of the United States, commanded by Major General Gates, Camp at Saratoga ,

October 16, 1777.

Officers prefent •

' ^ and Bile.

Commijjioned. Staff. mifiimtd.

Brigades^

Brigadiers , 1

Colonels .

’S

Majors,

Captains,

— * f'

F/r/? Lieutenants,

Second Lieutenants,

“ '■> 1
•

<*3

1 Adjutants, 1

«rK

< — *■

Drums and F ; fcs,

Prcfent Jit for Duty,

67 c£ prefent.

On Furlough,

Total,

Brigadier General Ninon’s

2 7

2 5

4 ,

4 |

104

5 2

| I2 S 7

SS;

1481

Poor’s

2 3

3 |

I 10

S°

i 1 x 3 2

Tsj

1316

Learned’s

I 2 1

; 1498

1658

Glover’s

4 :

I 20

I 77 6

-f-

Paterfon’s

108

1255

1458

Warner’s

1572

1850

Stark’s

2 7

IOI

220

2 5

3 2

X 9 X 9

x 3°3

• Bailey’s

j 1

897

148

x 3

IOI 1

Whipple’s

2 7

2 S

I 2

104

I 12

897

I0 75

Brickett’s

2 3

776

3 1

869

Fellows’s

. 2

XI 3

J 3 2

3 1

884

1097

Woolcut’s

2 C

2 S

843

949

Ten Brock’s

> 4

; 2 4

r 22

105

987

553

x 4

1673

Artilleries

) c

) I

- 5

> 1

2 2

1 2

438

x 7

I 25

49 °

Cavalry

0 c

> I

: f

; 6

» 7

> 2

: c

321

I 2

346

Total

■ 1

•45

14 ^

) 344

fc 33 2

! 326

> 343

; 4 2 '44

- 3 C

x 39 2

! 636

I32l6

! 622

: 731

3^75

180

18624

N. B. Exclufiye of the numbers in the above Return, there are, the upper ftaffof the army, the bateau men, the artificers, and
followers of the camp. _ _ .

Colonel Morgan’s corps of rifle-men, and the light-infantry, are included in the brigades.

S ■ (Signed.) HORATIO -

GATES, Major General.

*— ♦

No. XVII.

A P P E N D I X.

Extracts from the Minutes of the lajl Council of War , excepting the names of the officers^

and. the notes they gave.

CLu F.STION.

"General Gates having, in anfwer to General Burgoyne’s mefiage, given a folemn
affirmation on his honour, that no detachment has been made from his army during
the negotiation of the treaty, is the treaty, in its prelent fituation, binding on this
army, or is the general’s honour engaged for the figning it ?

[Here follow the names of the officers as they voted.]]

The lieutenant general’s opinion being clear, that he is not bound by what has
pafled, he would not execute the treaty upon the foie confideration of the point of
honour, notwithftanding the refpe&able majority againft him.

He is likewife far from being convinced that this army, by great exertions and
by great enduring in point of provifions, might not yet be relieved ; but he is com-
pelled to yield on the following' conf derations.

The treaty was generally thought a mod advantageous one before the intelligence
arrived. That intelligence is refuted, and ocular demonftration of its falfity pledged
as far as relates to General Gates’s force .; the other parts are only founded on hearfav,
and not to be depended upon.

Should General Clinton be where reported, yet the diftance is fuch as to render
any relief from him improbable during the time our provifions could be made to laft.

declares his poll untenable, and fays, if this convention is not

■figned, he apprehends there will be confiderable defertion.

fays he thinks the 47th regiment not to be depended on.

- - - - - — is of the fame opinion.

thinks the 6 2d regiment is dilheartened by the fituation of their poll:,

;and not equal to their former exertions.

Several officers think the men in general feem to have got the convention in their
heads as defirable.

Many of the belt officers are abfent by ficknefs and wounds from all the corps.

Though the other officers at the head of the Britiffi corps think they can anfwer
for the fpirit of their men, if attacked on their prefent ground, it is evident the moft
fanguine do not think any part of the army in that elevation and alacrity of fpirit ne-
ceffary for undertaking defperate enterprizes.

To break off the treaty now renders a future renewal of it hopelefs, as our condi-
tion mnft every hour grow worfe.

A defeat is fatal to the army. A vidtory does not lave it, as they have neither
provifions to advance nor retreat againft an enemy who by experience we know are
capable of rallying at every advantageous poft.

And that the life and property of every provincial and dependant of this army
depends upon the execution of this treaty.

POSTSCRIPT

APPENDIX, lxi

POSTSCRIPT to the APPENDIX.

{Though the following Letters are not referred to in any Part of the Defence,
it is hoped they will not be deemed fuperfiuous.]

ExtraFt of a Letter from Major General Phillips, to Lieutenant General Burgoyne,
dated Cambridge, September 29, 1778.

My Dear Sir,

THE Bofton news papers, have given extradls from Englifh and New York
papers, wherein you are mentioned ; your arrival, your fpeeches in parliament
and a variety of other matters concerning you. I do not always give credit to
news papers, and therefore, the publishers at Bofton will excufe me, if in the in-
ftance of news I do not give them, in my opinion, more veracity than I allow the
news compilers at London.

I will not plague you about our fituation, as you will know it, by my alluring
you it is almoft exadtly as you left us j fo no more about it. The troops here de-
pend upon you their chief, in whatever may relate to them j their intereft ; their
honour. It is not doubted but you will exert yourfelf, that the officers may gain
preferment in common, with other parts of the army. That you will have the
goodnefs to exert yourfelf in behalf of their fituation, refpedting the very great
expence of living, and endeavour to procure the allowance of forage money. And
in fiiort, that you will ufe all your powers of perfuafion and intereft for thefe
troops, which have ferved under you with zeal, and with honour ; and endeavour,
by ferving their fituation and promoting their honour, to alleviate misfortunes
which nor fortitude nor valour could prevent, and which they fuffer, however, with
refignation aud patience. I am moft perfectly convinced of your affectionate, I
will fay your grateful regard for us all ; and I leave myfelf and the troops to your
friendly care *, to your humanity ; to your honour.

You cannot expedt a letter of entertainment ; I have not even a power of making
it one of intelligence. It fhall be however, a letter of perfedt fincerity, and in
ithe fulleft fenfe of it I profefs to be.

My dear Sir,

Your very fincere Friend, and faithful Servant,

(Signed) P HILUPS *

P. S. I enclofe you the Copy of a Memorial to the Secretary at War, I am fure
you will affift it.

Copy

appendix.

lxii

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord Amherft, incloftng the
Memorial referred to in the above > dated November 6 , 1778*

My Lord, .

THE heavy misfortune I fuftain in being precluded the King s prefence, touches
me in no point more nearly, than in the prevention of doing juftice to the various
and extenfive merits of the army I had the honour to command. That the con-
fequences of my fuppofed, or real errors, ftiould involve pretenfrons and interefts
of fo many gallant officers is a painful reflection ; and it can only be alleviated by
the trueft fenfe of the truft to be repofed in your Lordffiip, for the general protec-
tion of the fervice. The inclofed memorial was accompanied with expreffions
of reliance, in the name of the whole army, upon my efforts to fupport it. 1 he
officers in New England little conceive my prefent fituation : I take the firfl: oppor-
tunity to tranfmit their caufe to your Lordfhip’s happier aufpices, with this folemrv
declaration, which I have mentioned upon different public occafions, and which
1 can omit no occafion to repeat, that there is not a Britiffi officer who ferved
under me during the campaign of 1777* to whom I can impute blame •, that the
inftances are very numerous wherein particular diftin&ion is due; and as a body,
they have a claim to my fincereft refpe£t for their zeal in the King s fervice, and
to my utmoft gratitude for their attention to me perfonally.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

J. Burgoyne

FINIS.

ADVERTISEMENT.

In Plan IV. the third and fourth pofitions of the army in the engagement of
I 9th of September may appear upon a curfory view to want precifion. The ine-
qualities of the ground could not be diftinctly marked upon fo fmall a fcale ; and
the continual Ihift of the pofitions of feparate corps, as they were attacked by corps
of the enemy, which frequently, from the thicknefs of the wood, they did not
fee, made it equally difficult to mark regularly the pofition of the whole at any
one time.

The pofition of the armies on the 8th of September in Plate V. requires alfo
fome explanation. P’rom the fmallnefs of the fcale, the pofition of the enemy
could only be fhewn upon the plain near the river j but it is to be obferved, it
extended over the ground of General Burgoyne’s former encampment, and in front
of the redoubts upon the hill.

N. B. The papers refpe&ingthe expedition to Bennington, referred to by miftake,
tinder No. IV. page 103, will be found in the Appendix under No. XII. after
Lieutenant Colonel Baume’s inftruttions.

The account of the expedition of Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, referred to
alfo, by miftake, under No. V. will be found in the Appendix under No. XIII.

dCTJOJST at

< wulw B rigadier Gecn'^Feazee,
^jijwTizdlif Major Ge JV : z JReidesEL ,
on tlie 7 PlJtily 17 7 7.

Drawn by V. Gerlach. DeffuJy Quarter Master General
Engraved byVP^F a den .

Paces to an Inch

London Tublipied as the rice directs Feb ? j ^nfio , by WEaden Charing Crojs .

Position of the Detachment

under

Lieut 1 . Col .'Buium,

WALM8COCK near BENNINGTON

3 fie wing* the Attacks of the Enemy
on the iff r f*. August ljjy •

Drawn by Lieut 1 . Dnrnford Engineer
Engraved by "W? Laden 1700 .

Position of the Detachment

tfttdcr

Lie tit / Coi .'/incuM,

WALMSCOCK near BENNINGTON

Shewing- the Attacks of the Enemy
on the A ug'ii&t ly .

Drawn ly LieutVDxiraibrd Engineer.^

ilf .9

^ ii -SL Q a

!i j^rwr 1

. Ilifea

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, 1 , dm „ t i> *•’ 1 A t

♦ a 1 1 ■ i» A /

a ■> "■ ‘-a. »..

AiJL-*-

References .

K.lteid&relk Dragoons .

B . Rangers .

C . American Volunteer# .

D . German Grenadiers .

E . C/iafteurs .

E . Houses, Tofts of Canadians
G . Bodies of the Enemy .

to an Inch

boo

London J x uLli/h’d as die dec directs, Feb ?1 'Si 180, tvW. Faden , CJiari/ig Oof

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Plan ofthe encampment
andPosiTION of the ARMY under

HIS EXOEL.LT LT GENERAL BURGOYNE

,rA .S’ WORDS HorrsJE
on Hud son’s River near Stillwater

on *\ eftf '. ly anMr the PotHtunu tyj/bad part off/ieA-rniy
. engaged ontke i<j ^Sefit?' i^-j’j.

Drawn by W! C .^ViUdnson ]J.()2. d ]ieyj. t sd/d t Druj 1 ^
Engraved /n'WV 1 Fa don ,

Scale of 1'iOO Yards.

^ 7Oo“‘ , " f ’'‘“llO0 40O m ““"‘ m ““““‘ l ‘j^00 SZ* ^ 00 JUOO

Xandoti, published as thesict directs, by JYJfadeti, ( haling C /vss , Feb. v lH l l 7tf0.

wmm m

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£ A- sk >£»***

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PLAINT of the O AM PME 1ST T

and. P O SIT I O^ST o f th e AR MY tuid er

MIS EXCELLTLT GENERAL BURGOYNE

✓rA SWORD S HOTTSJE

on Hud s oris River ne ar S tiUwater

* th

oh defitdywiUi t/u Po&itunu oj 7/t atfto rt of V// cA rnvif
engaged* on the nj f^SehtT iq-jg
Drmwi by A V. C YVYlldnson lf (?2- d ]legj. ^ruf 1 !

Erujrcived by\P^ Fa den .

Scale of l'l OO Yard r.

100 'lOO 400

Jiondot /> published as thesict directs, by Whculen, l ‘haring t ross / Feb. v J^ l l 7&0.

Scale of liooYanL

Pl^LNT of the EN CAMFMENT

ICC ICC

andPosiTION of the AKMY under
^^^^JHlSEXCHJ,LrLTGE]\£JHAI.BUKGOYNE
at JiecflM IT A' Hkio h TS

on Hudson's River near Stillwater

ENEMY'S CAM l
at Stillwater.

onMie 20

> 'ffi.t?junth of* 'the

• E ettichm (wt 9/ c.///i f/ieActi4?n of t//e j ‘Oof f .

; , % L '//icJP cdifiott of ///cA/nrty on tfic S .

\ :;^ : ;P&seP r(m7t 4 k 1 v: C .liilkiiis on TA^ZRrt/. i 4/'r. ^/u/f - -J

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ift

Zondon , published ,

lh t^irt directs by Wilt den, Charniy tbosj , Feb II fl WO.

lRMY under KGE^BURGOrNE took at SARATOGA
[remained till THE CONVENTION was iigned

\rraved by W7 n Fadcn .

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PLAN OF THE l 3 O S I T I ON ■which the ARMY tinder IA GEYABURGOINE took at S ARAT O G A

on the io th of Scntcmbor ijjj , and mwlncli it remained till THE CONVENTION was ligned.

Eno rated by W n Eadm .

Scale of Nads

...

it'®

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ft&£

of ES/lcrnf^

under Coll Morgan

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