A LETTER Addressed to Two GREAT MEN. [ Price One Shilling. ] A E R LETT Two GREAT MEN, O N T H E Prospect of PEACE; And on the Terms neceflary to be infifted upon in the NEGOCIATION. Mea quidem fententia, path qu‘^ habitura fit inftdiarum, femper ejl confulendum, Dc Offic. Lib. i. There is a Tide in the Affairs of Men, Which taken at the Flood, leads on to Fortune ; Omitted, all the Voyage of their Life Is bound in Shallows and in Miferies. On fuch a full Sea are we now a-float. And we muft take the Current when it ferves, Or lofe our Ventures. Shakesp, LONDON: Printed For A. Millar, in the Strand. MDCC i^a7 f A r T u :! e : i -i a a < I Z J A H S. io TtjrT^oa^ • t;iiiilii’ 3ni * 1.' ,r>'- jhri.O » , .'• fli ^^;: Jiv/j?»»^- ■ ^ , “ ,r>.- ' /. ■ ;''.> I 0^ ^ie ‘\:i n -I ■ i f»0 ATTr^i: . ri:J u;[l X' - ‘ /i uH 0-w iwi.f, a^Zi-x^ ! i»io Jlol t«J : v' 0 9 is Sv til ii [f^ Hfb 'h ioDtl H iltm, n« lU Ikaft ckii Ulifc artii f u J appeared chimerical, unlefs a Sifter can have a Right to fucceed in Preference to her Brother. The Peace of Nimeguen if reftored the Tranquil- quillity of Europe, which the Invafion of Holland by the French had difturbed. But fcarcely was the Peace figned before it was fhamefully violated. The Decrees of the Chambers of Re- union, by which Lewis the XIV. feized fo many Territories, to which he has not the leaft Right ; the Surprifal of Strafiurgh, and theBlockade of Luxemburgb, (hew- ed fuch a Wantonnefs of Perfidy, as no Hiftory of the moft barbarous and unpolilhed Savages could well exceed •, and juftly drew upon the common Oppreflbr, the joint Vengeance of offended Eu- rope. Who is ignorant of the Story of the Partition Treaty ? Solemnly ratified and agreed to preferve that Tranquillity which the Treaty of Refwyck had juft reftored to Europe, it was no fooner made than It was fhamefully abandoned by the Court of France •, and for fuch Reafons as will, upon every Occafion, juftify every Injuftice. The Letter of the Treaty, indeed, was violated, they muft own ; — but the Spirit of it was what ought to be attend- ed to. And by fuch a Comment, worthier of a pitiful Sophifter, than of a moft Chriftian King, his Grandfon was affifted in placing himfclf on the Throne of Spain. The Politics of Lewis the XV. have been faith- fully copied from thofe of his Great-Grandfather ; and the Behaviour of France, upon the Death of Charles the VI. is a frefh Proof, of how little Ufe are the moft folemn Treaties, with a Power that knows no Ties but thofe of Intereft. — The Treaty of Vienna had but two or three Years before *, an- C 2 • In 1738. X 1679. nexed nexed to the Crown of France, the Dutchy of rain a Ceflion which was purchafed, and purchaf- ed cheaply, by the Guarantee of the t Pragmatic SanSlion. By this Stipulation, France was under, the mod folemn Engagements to fupport the ^en of Hungary in the Polfeflion of all her ® minions. But how was the Engagement fulfilled ? Pofterity will fcarccly believe fuch bare-faced Per- fidy was pofiible, as our Times faw was aftually a- vowed upon that Occafion. Germany was, inftant-, ly, covered with the Armies of France, to allift. the Ekaor of Bavaria, in an Attempt to overturn the Pragmatic Sancton fo lately guaranteed by them, and to dethrone that Princefs whom they were bound by a Treaty, fworn to in the Name of the Holy Trinity, to protedt and defend from all her Enemies. I have brought down this Sketch of French Faith to the prefent Times ; imperfeft indeed ; but, as far as it goes, ftridly conformable to Hiftorical 'j'ruth. What Confidence then, can France ex- pe6t any of it’s Neighbours will put in her, after fo many and fuch flagrant Inftances of national Per- jury, as Ihe appears to be guilty of? The Ca- talogue of her Infidelities will ftill be encreafed j and the little Reafon that our Ifland, in particular, has to trqft Her, will ftill be more apparent, by reminding you of fome of the many Proofs, which Great Britain itfelf can appeal to, of French Inge- nuity in Treaty-breaking. — I fhall go no higher than the Peace of Utrecht, becaufe the Inftances in which it hath been violated by France, have produ- ced the prefent Vfar ; and becaufe the Enumera- tion of them will lead me, naturally, to thofe Hints which I mean to throw out, as neceflary to be at- f Treaty of Vienna, Article ic; tended [ 13 ] tended to in our future Negociatlons ; and which, if negle(3:ed, will lofe to this Nation all the Fruits of thofe Succeffes, to gain which, we have {trained every Nerve, and loaded ourfelves with a Burthen under which it is a Miracle that we have not alrea- dy funk. The War which was clofed by the Peace of Utrecht had been undertaken with Views confined, altoge- ther, to the Continent of Europe^ and carried on, though at an immenfe Expence, more to gain Con- quells for our Allies than for ourfelves. However, in the Treaty of Peace, fome Advantages and Con- ceflTions were ftipulated in Favour of the Crown of Great Britain, and it’s commercial Interefls. By the 12th Article % All Nova Scotia or Acadia^ with iCs ancient Limits, and with all it's Dependent . cies, is ceded to the Crown of Great Britain. And by the 15th Article, 'The Subjedls of France, Inhabitants of Canada, and elfewhere, Jhall not dijlurb cr.moleji, in any Manner whatever, the Five Indian Nations which are fubjebl to Great Britain, nor it's other American Allies. Let us now fee how thefe Articles have been ob- ferved. The French feem to have had two Capital Views in all their American Schemes, ever fince they have thought Trade and Commerce an Objeft worthy of their Attention. The firft was to ex- tend themfelves from Canada, Southwards, through the Lakes, along the Back of our Colonies ; by which Means they might anfwer a double Purpofe, of cutting*oflf our Communication with the Indian Nations, and of opening a Communication for themfelves, between the Rivers St. Lawrence and Mifsiftppi, and thus to join, as it were, their Colo- a Not having, in my Pofll-flion, an Original Copy of the Treaty of Utrecht, lhave made Ufe of Lambtrti's Tranflation. r 14 ] nies of Canada and Louijtana. The other Parc of their Plan, equally important, and more immedi- ately fatal to our Interefts in North America^ was to gain a Communication with the Ocean; the only Acccfs th^y now have to Canada, through the Ri- ver St. Lawrence, being ihut up half the Year. Full of this favorite Projeft of American Em- pire, foon after the Treaty oi Utrecht, they began to enlarge their Boundaries on that Continent, in direct Violation of the folemn ConcelTions they had fo lately made. As long ago as 1720, they feized and fortified the moft important Pafs in America, at Niagara ; in that very Country of the five Indian Nations, from which the 15th Article of the Treaty of ( 7 - trecht had excluded them. The infinite Confe- quence of Niagara made them lefs fcrupulous, no Doubt, about Treaties. For by Means of this U- furpation they, in a Manner, became Matters of the Lakes, and could, at Leifure, extend them- felves to the Ohio, and carry their Chain of Forts and Settlements down to the Mifsijippi. The Plan ot Ufurpaiion on the Back of our Co- lonies went on gradually and fuccefsfully from Year to Year ; the Indians owned by the Peace of Utrecht to be our Subjefls, were debauched from our Interett, and fpirited up to maflacre, and fcalp the Englijh ■, and in 1731, the Infolence of the French grew to fuch an Heighth, that they erefted their Fort at Crown-Point, in a Country indifput- ably ours ; whether conlidered as in the Center of the five Nations, or as aftually within the Limits of New-Tork. And whoever catts his Eye upon the Situation of this Fort, in the Map, will fee how greatly the Poficfiion of it facilitated the Comple- tion of the gre.it Obje and tho' after a War fo fuccefsful, much more might have been obtained for England than really * For the Particulars of the French Encroachments in Arne* rica, which I have only given a Sketch of, fee the Memorials of our CommilTaries, Dr. Mitchell's Conteft in America ; the DofiOr’s and Mr. Ey lit in in ini ■li- «!i iitm mi, sd do'. ente ifitilt dost Ski mtii Ds- jfiil di iBJ DOIL ft W' Net k/» life inctl- etiu 'til Iriii; inot 0 [ j Dunkirk is what you are intitled to by Treaties made lorng ago, and violated ; and that it fiiall not be fo much as mentioned in the in.'uing Negocia- tion, but complied with, before that Ncgociation fhall commence. Or, admitting that no ConcefTion fhould be re« quired by France in the New Treaty, in Confide- ration of a New Article to demolKh Dunkirk, place to them, in the ftrongeft Light, the tinanfwerable Reafons we have againfi: putting any Confidence in them, that fuch an Article would be better executed, than that in the treaty of Utrecht has been. If they refufe doing us this immediate Juftice, previous to the Peace ; alk them how they can ex- pedl that we fliould have any Reliance on their Sin- cerity to fulfill the New Engagements they may enter into, when they afford us fo ftrong, fo glar- ing an Inftance of Infidelity, in an Article of fuch Confequence, made fo many Years ago Can you have any Dealings with a Power, who, if he refufes this, at the very Time he is treating, affords you fuch manifefl; Proof, that his Word is not to be re- lied upon, and that you cannot trull to the Execu- tion of any Promife ever fo folemnly made ? Perhaps France may think it a D.fgrace to them, to comply with any Thing previous to the begin- ning of a Ncgociation. Tell them, that adling honourably, and doing what Juflice requires, can never be difgraceful. But it it be a D Igrace, tell them, with the Spirit of honeft Men, that we owe it them, for the greater Diigrace they put, not long ago, upon us, by requiring us to fend two Peers of this Realm to remain in France as HoHages, till we furrendered Louijburg •, an Indignity which I cannot call to mind, without Pain •, and which, I always thought was fubmitted to without Necef- fity. E It [ 26 ] It IS now our Turn to vindicate the Honour of our Nation ; and as Dunkirk was put into our Pof- feflion before the Treaty of Utrecht^ as a Pledge of the Sincerity, and to continue in ourPofleflion, till the Demolition fhould be completed ; let fome fuch Expedient be riow agreed upon ; with this Diffe- rence only, that inrtead of five Months after the Peace, the Time fixed, for the Demolition, at Utrecht, let no Peace be figned, at prefent, till this Right acquired to us by former Treaties, dnd of which we have been fo perfidioufly robbed, be adtually carried into full Execution. However, if any infuperable Difficulties fhould attend the doing ourfelvcs Juftice, on this Head, before the Peace ; if, for Inllance, which perhaps may be the Cafe, it ffiould be found that it cannot be complied with, un'efs we confent to a Cejfation of Arms, during the Time of Negociation ; rather than give France that Opportunity of recovering from its Diftreffcs, and of being protetffed from the Superiority of our Arms, before we have, finally, obliged them to accept of our own Terms of Peace (which was one Caufe of the Ruin of our Negociation at Utrecht ) I would wave infilling upon the Demoliti- on of Dunkirk, before the Treaty, and think it fuffici- cnt to demand Hoftages from them, as a Security that it fhall be faithfully complied with, within a limit- ed Time after the Treaty fhall be concluded. The Parifians had two Engliflo Milords to flare at, upon the lafl Peace ; and I do not fee why the Curiofity of our Londoners fliould not be gratifieil, in the fame Way and Two Dues Pairs of Trance be fent as Hoftages to England, till Dunkirk ceafe to be a Port. 1 know well, that Political Opinions, concerning the Importance of any particular Objedl, are as frequently dilated by Whim and Faffiion, as buil« oa [ 27 ] on folid Reafbn and Experience. Perhaps, Jbnic may think, that this is the Cafe, with Regard to the Neceflity of demolifhing Dunkirk, But, tho’ it^ may not at prefent be fo favorite an Objecl of National Politics, as it was in the Queen’s Pime ; this has not been owing to any real Change of Cir- cumftances ; but to another Caufe, to the American Difputes between the two Nations, which have been the great Objeft of the prefent War, and fcarcely permitted us, hitherto, to refleft, in what other Inftances, the Infidelities of France m ift be checked at the inlying Peace. But as this defir- able Event now approaches, we cannot forget, or forgive the Behaviour of our Enemies with Regard to Dunkirk \ and it will be equally neceflary for the Honour and for the Intereji of this Nation to make no Peace, without obtaining full Satisfadtion on this Head. It will be neceflary for t\\t Honour of the Nation to infill upon this, if it were only, to fliew 10 Europe in general, and to France \n parti- cular— 1 hat we have too much Spirit not to relent Injuries ; and too much Wildom not to take Care, w^hen we have it happily in our Power, to prevent them for the future. — But the Demolition of Dun- kirk, IS alfo neceflary, if we would take Care of the Intereji of the Nation. Such hath been our buccefs, in deftroying the Navy of France ; and fo unable doth that Kingdom now appear, to carry on US ambitious Projefts by Land, and to vie at the lame 1 ime, with England, for Dominion on the bea ; that we may rcafonably fuppofe, there is an Lnd of Breji and Toulon Squadrons, fo face our rlects •, and a future War with England, will leave the trench no other Way of diftreffing us by Sea, than to he in watch for our Merchant Ships, with numberlefs Piivateers. In fuch a piratical War, Jjunktrn, it it$ Harbour be not now deftroyed, E 2 will, f 28 ] ^ ^ r will, too late, be found to be of infinite Conle- qiicnce •, and we (liall fatally experience it again, what it was in the Queen’s Time, and in the L.an- guage of her Parliament, a IS! eft of Pyrates, m- fefting the Ocean, and doing infinite Mifchtef to ^ Tilde ^ • For thefe Reafons, therefore, Izm^o old- fafhion' ed as to txpeft that our Plenipotennaries will have this Point properly {fated lo them in their Inifruc tioris, and that Delenda eft Carthago, Demolifh Dun- ^ kirk, will be a Preliminary Article in the enfuing Negociation. The War having begun, principally, with a View to do ourfelvcs Jufiice in North America, the Reau ation of Matters, on that Continent, ought to be, and no Doubt, will be, the capital Article relating to England, in the coming Treaty. It will be necefTary, therefore, to give you my Senti- ments, on rfiis Head •, and while I do it, with all becoming Diffidence, I fhall, at the fame Time, lupport what I may offer, with Reafons appearing fo ftrong to me, as may perhaps recommend it to your {ei ther Confidcration, though it Ihould fail of producing Conviftion. Now it is with the greateft Pleafure, I would obferve, that with Regard to Ncrth America, we have nothing to afk, at the Peace, which we have not already made ourfelves Mafters of, during the War We have been bleffed by Heaven, with a Succefs, in that Part of the World, fcarcely to be paralleled in Hiftory. The Raffinefs of Braddock, the Inexperience of Shirley, the Inadivity of Lou- doun, and the Ill-fticcefs ot Abercrombie, feem only to have been fo many neceffary Means of producing that Unanimity in our Colonies, that Spirit in our ♦ See above, p. i8. Troops ; [ 29 ] Troops V and that fteady Pcrfcverance in our Mini- fters, as hath not only recovered from the Enemy all his Ul'urpations, but Lcuifiurg is an Englijh Harbour •, ^u(b(c^ the Capital ot ConodA, is al- ready in our Foffeflion ; and the Reft of that Country will fall of Courfe. It is a Profpea ftill more agreeable •, that by deftroying the Naval Force of France, our ~North American Conquefts cannot be retaken j and the Principle I would now •lay down, and which I would recommend it to you to adopt, is, not to give up any of them. And I rfiall now endeavour to prove to you, that fuch a Demand may be infifted upon, without giving the Enemy any Pretence for accufing us of Infolence to- wards them ; and cannot be omitted without giv- ing the Nation juft Reafon to complain, that we have confented to a treacherous and deluftve Peace. It cannot, furely, ever enter the Imagination of a Britijh Adminiftration, to make Peace, without, at leaft, keeping in our Pofieflion, all thole Places, where the French had fettled themfelves, in Viola- tion of former Treaties, and from which we have, fortunately, driven them. Upon this Plan, then, we fhall, at the Peace, be left in l-’ofle(Tion not only of the Peninfula of Acadia, but of All Nova Scolia, according to its old Limits ; the Bay Fundi, and the River St. John. — The important Conejuefts of Crown Point, and Niagara, will not be relinquilh- ed •, and Fort du S^uefne, and the Country near the Ohio, will remain Ours. They <.re already Ours ; the French know they cannot get them back during the War, and they do not txpe£lthac we fhall give them up at the Peace. But though Care fhould be taken to keep all thofe Places juft mentioned •, fomething more muft be done, or our American Colonies will tell you you have r 30 ] have done Nolhi-’g. In a Word, you mufl keep Canada, otlicrways you lay the Foundation of an-- other War. 1 he NccdTity of this may be placed in fo ftrik- ing a V'itw, as to filence the Lreuch Flcnipotentia- ries, and to convince all Eut^ope, of the Juftice of our Demand. Aik the French, what Security they can give you, if we reftore Canada to them, however re- {hained in its Boundaries, that they will not again begin to extend them at our Expcnce > If the Tieaty of Utrecht could not keep them from En- croachments, what Realon can we have to fuppofe the future Treaty will be better obferved ? If the I'rench a e left at Montreal, and the three Rive s, can we be certain they will not again crols the Champlain Lake, and attack Crown- Point ? If the liiver St. Lawrence be ftill theirs, what is to infure us againft an Expedition to Niagara ? Can v.e Hat- ter ourfelves, that a People, who in full Peace, erc6fed thofe two ! ortrelTes, in diredl Violation of their Faith plighted at Utrecht, will be reftrained, by any future Treaty, from attemptin.:, alfo in full Peace, to recover them p After having feen the French carrying on a regular Plan of Ufurpation, in North America, for thefe Forty Years pad, fliall we be fo weak as to believe that they will now lay it afide No, depend upon it, if the French 'hink it worth their while to afi< back that Fart of North America, which was their own, they mean to take a proper Opportunity, n't Elbowing all our Colonies round about, and of refuming the fame ambitious Views of Enlargement which the mod facred Ties of fo' mer IVeaties could not redrain. The Triuh of the Matter is, they were tired of Canada. The Inclemency of the Climate, the difficult Accels to it; and a Trade darcely defr.ay- ing C 31 ] ing the Expcnre of the Colony, would lon^r ^ao have induced them to abandon it, if the I%n of exicnding its Boundaries, at the F.xpence of the t-nglijh-, and of opening its Communication with Lcuiftana and with the Ocean, had nor made them pcrievere. Canada itfclf is not worth their afk- ing ; and if they do defire to have it reftored to them, it can only be with a View to repeat the fame Injuries and Infidelities, to punifh which, we en- gaged in the prefent War. Unlefs, therefore, we be refolved, ‘!x;itb cur Eyes open, to expofe our- fcives to a Kepetition of former Encroachments ; unlefs we would choofe to be obliged to keep great Bodies of Troops, in Amsricay in full Peace, at an im.menfe Expence ; we can never confent to leave the French any Footing in Canada. If we do not exclude them, ahfolutely entirely from that Country ; we fliall foon find we have done nothino-. Let the T. reaty be drawn ever fo accurately ; let the Boundaries between Canada and our Colonies, bedefcribed ever fo pr.cifcly, and regulated ever fo much, in our Favour ; what has happened al- ready, ought to teach us what we may expeft a- ga n; the future Treaty will be obferved no bet- ter than the former have been ; Ufurpation and Encroachment will gradually revive ; and thus fhall we have thrown away all our SuccelTes •, fo many Millions will have been expended to no Purpofe ; and the Blood of fo many thoufands of our brave Countrymen fpilt, only to remind us, that thouo-h we knew how to conquer, we knew not how to im- prove, perhaps, the only Opportunity we fliall ever have, of putting it out of the Power of France to violate its Faith. I take it for granted that, in the future Nego- ciation, the Ifland of Cape B eton will follow the bate of ^iebec\ I fliall only obferve with Regard [ 3 ^ 3 to it, that though the Harbour and Fortification of Lotiijbcurg be of infinite Service to France ; it can be of little or no Ule to England, if Canada be left to us. It is of Confequence to hrance, as a Retreat to their Ships fifiiing on the neighbour- ing Banks oi Newfoundland ^ and as a Security to the Entrance of tiie Gulph of 5*/. Laurence, BiK the Poffeffion o{ Newfoundland itfelt, makes Louijbourg of no Utility to the Engiifh, in the former Refpeft and Halifax, where we ii *vc a good Harbour, an- fwers very nearly the latter kurpofe. Upon this View therefore, may vve not hope and expe6t, that, the Neceflity of Lotiifbourg having end- ed with the Conquelf of Ffuebcc, its Fate will be de- termined, without troubling the French Plenipoten- tiaries ? Without waitmg tor a Longrefs, let Orders be forthwith fent to demolifh it, io as not to leave one Stone upon another, of tiie Fortifications ; to remove the Inhabitants to Nova Scotia, a better Country ; and to leave the Ifland, a b^re and bar- ren Rock ; the State it was in, before the Peace of Utrecht gave Leave to France to fortify it. If the Right given to the French by the i ^th Article of the fame Peace, to I ifh in forne Parts of thole Seas fliould be continued (and I could wifh to fee it continued, as the' Kefulal of it would be rather un- reafonable) let Cape Breton unfortified, and ungar- rifoned be left open to them *, and a few Men of War kept 2,1 Halifax, will effeilually prevent Z.^w- ifbourg*Ss being again made a Place of btreng h. If you adopt this Meafure, 1 fhould be inclined to think, France will lee that you know your true Interefts *, and that you are refolved fteadily to pur- fue them. And it they fhould make any Remon- ftrances agamft it, tell them they may follow Example and demolifh, if they pleafe, the Forti- fications of Mahon \ which we fee them poffcfs with T S3 ] with as great Indifference as we remember the Cir- cumitances of its Lofs, with Shame : Which, as being of no Ul'e to them they will notdefire to keep, and which, having been kept, by us,^at an l:x- pcnce, not counterbalanced by its Utility, we fhall not be very fanguine about recovering. Or, rather tell them, that in demolilhing Louijbourg, before the Peace, we only copy a former Example given us by themfelves, when their Troops were employed in difmantling the Frontier Towns in Flanders., at the very Time that their Plenipotentiaries at Aix la Chapelle were confenting to give them up. The Plan which I have had the Honour of fketch- ingout to you, befides being fo reafonable in itfelf, is perfectly agreeable to that Moderation expreffcd by his Majefty, in his Speech, of«;/ having entered into the IVar with Views of Ambition. The PofTef- fion of Canada., is no View of Ambition ; it is the only Security the French can give us, for their future Regard to Treaties. We have made other Conquefts, of great Importance, our Management of which will give us fufficient Means of fhewing our Moderation. And though 1 fhall not prefume to give any Opinion about the future Difpofal of them, I think, however, I may be allowed to hint, that “ the PofTefTion of Guadaloupe” an additional fugar ifland, when we have fo many of our own, ought not to be infilled uprn fo ftrcnuoufiy as to make it a neceffary Condition of the Peace. And though “ Senegal and Goree" are of real Import- ance in the Slave and Gum Trades, our own A~ frican Settlements have hitherto fupplied us with Slaves, fufficient iox our American Vaxpoies-. And the Trade for Gum is, perhaps, not of Confe- quence enough to make us Amends for the annual Mortality, which we already lament, of our brave Countrymen, to guard our African Conquefts. The F People People of Eng'andy therefore, will not, 1 believe, blaaie the giving them back, for a valuable Con- fideration, — provided Canada be left to us. To cor.f: ;er this Affair in its proper Light, it will be neceff ry to refletfl on the infinite Confe- quence of North America to this Country. Our Coiotiies there contain above a Million of Inhab.- t nts, \v1h) arc moftly fupplied with the Manufac- tures of Great Britain i our Trade to them, by em- ploying innumerable Sliips, is one great Source of our maritime Strength ; by fupporting our Sugar lilands with th. ir Provifions, and other Necella- rics, they pour in upon us all the Riches of the IFcji f dies\ we carry their Rice, and Fobacco, and Filh, to all the Markers of Europe •, they pro- duce Indigo, and Iron ; and the whole Navy of England may be equipped, with the Produfts of Engl/}) America. And if, notwithftanding our having loft feveral Branches of Commerce we formerly enjoyed in Europe and to the Levant, wc have ftill more Commerce than ever •, a greater Dc- mard for our Manufaffures, and a vaft Incrcafe of our fiiipping ; what can this be owing to, but to the Trade to our own American Colonies ; a 'I'radc- which the Succeflesof this War, will render, every Day, more and more advantageous ? If this Matter, then, be confidered, in the above Light, by th fe whom I now addrefs, they will make our North American Conquefts the fine qua non of the Peace, as being the only Method of guarding our invaluable PofTcliions there, from Ufurpations and Encro climents -, and they will look upon every orher Conqueft, we have made, or may make, in other Parts of the World, as Inftruments put into our Hands by i'rovidence, to enable us to fettle Affairs on the Continent of Europe, as advantage- oufly to our Allies, as our Gratitude could wifh, and as their Fidelity doth deferve. Here, [ 35 J Here, then, let me change the Scene, and hav- ing fettled our Affairs in Canada (would to God they were fo fettled at the Peace !) permit me to ii- nifh my Plan of Negociation, by giving my Sen(i- ments on the Part w e ought to aft, to obtain a pro- per Settlement of Affaiis m Germany. If a great Number of Allies can make them- felves formidable to a common Enemy, during the Operations of the War, they are apt to ruin every Advantage they may have gained, by quar- relling amongft themfelves, when they begin their Negociations for Peace. Like an Oppcfition. in our Parliament, carried on againft an overgrown Mihlftcr, all Sorts of Parties and Connexions, nil Sorts of difigreeing and contradidory Iiuereffs, join againft him, at firft, as a common Enemy •, and tolerable Unanimity is preferved amongfl them, fo long as the Fate of tliis Parliamentary W ar con- tinues in Sufpence. But when once they h .ve dri- ven him to the Wall, and think themfelves fure of Vitftory ; the Jealoufies and Sufpicions, which, while the Conteft depended, had been (lifted, break out; everyone who (hared in the Fatigue, expedts to (hare in the Spoils ; feparate Interefts counter-, acft each other; feparate Negociations are fet on F’oot ; till at laft, by untimely and m rcenary Divi- fions, they lofe the Fruits of their Victory, and the Objedl of the common Refentment is able to make Terms for himfelf*. This was exaftly the Cale, in the Conteft between Ltzvis XU'. and the I'rinces of Eurcpe united againft him, before the Peace Utrecht ; and the unhappy Divifions of the Allies (Divifions too likely to have fprung up, * The true Fjiilory of the Tranfaiflion here alluded to, may, poffibly, fome Time or other, appear ; though, as yet, wc arc perfuaded, the World knows very I. tile ol F 2 even [ 36 ] even tho’ there had not been a Party in England.^ who to gratify their private Refentments, blew up the Coals of Difiention) gave the French the Means of procuring more favourable Terms of Peace, than they could well have hoped after fo unfuccefsful a War. I have mentioned this, with a View to obferve, that the Circumftances of the prefent War on the Continent are very different *, no fuch unfortunate Difiinion feems pofllble to happen to us, though it may happen amongft the Confederates who are en- gaged on the fame Side with France., againft Hano- ver and the King of Pruffia. It may be collefted from more than one Hint dropt in the Courfe of this Letter, that 1 am no Friend to Continental Meafures in general ■, efpeci- ally fuch continental Meafures as engaged us dur- ing the three laft Wars, as Principals when we feemed eager to ruin ourfelves, in Support of that Auftrian Family whom we now find, with unparal- leled Ingratitude, and incredible Folly, in clofe Alliance with France. But the Continental Mea~ fares now adopted by England were neceflary, both with Regard to Our Honour and Our Intereft. Hanover has been attacked by France, on a Quar- rel entirely EngHdo ; and tho’ Care was taken, by the Ad of Settlement, that England fhould not be involved in Wars on account of Hanover-, yet Gra- titude, Honour, the Reputation of cur Country, eve y Motive of Generofity, bound us, not to al- low the innocent Eledorate to be ruined for Eng- land's American Qiiarrel with France. In Regard to ot:r Intereft, no Englifb Miniftcr, however in- flexible, in his Attachment to his native Country, could have devifed the Means of malting the bell Life of our American Conquefts, if the French could have treated with Hanover in their Hands. It was with [ 37 ] with a View to prevent this, to oppofe the French in their Projefts in Germany^ the Succefs of which would have been fo detrimental to England^ that we bonejily and wifely have formed and have main- tained the Army now commanded by Prince Ferdi- nand ; and have entered into an Alliance with the King of Prujfia. But tho’ this was a Meafure of Prudence, it was fcarcely poffible for the wifeft Statcfmen to forefce all thofe great Confequences which it hath already produced. The Efforts which tht French have made in Germany, and the Refiftance they have there met with by the Care of the BritiJ}} Adminiftration ; have contributed more than perhaps we could ex- pe<5f, to cur Succefs in America, and other Parts of the \\orld. Full of the Project of conquering Ha- nover, France faw herfelf obliged to engage in ex- orbitant Expcnces •, Armies were to be paid, and maintained in Weflphalia and on the Rhine-, vafi: Sums were to be advanced to the Court of Vienna always as indigent as it is haughty ; the ravenous Ruffians, and the degenerate Swedes, would not move, unlefs allured by Subfidies •, and the Mouth of every hungry German Prince was to be ftopr, with the Louis D’ors of France. Involved in Ex- pences thus enormous, our Enemies have been prevented from ftrengthening themfelves at Sea, where England had mod Keafon to dread their be- coming ftrong. The infinite Advantages which this Nation hath reaped from the German War, are indeed now fo well underftood, that we have leen the greateft Enemies of this Meafure acknowledge their Miftake. 1 hey now confefs that if we had not refifted France, in tier Projetfls of German Conquefts, her beft Troops had not been deftroyed ; her own Coafts would have been better protefled ; fhe would r 38 ] would have been able to pay her /Imericnn Concerns •, England mio been threatned, fo ferioudy, with • be afraid of parting with thofe ^ f which have conquered, at ® ^;V Time In a Word, that univerfal Bankruptcy, which hath crowned the DiftrefTes of and mves England greater Reafon of Exultation, than rny Event of the War, might have been prevent- ed. It is entirely owing to the German Part of the War that France appears thus low in the political Scale of Strength and Riches •, that fhe is found to be a finking Monarchy, nay a Monarchy already funk. And, perhaps, it might be an Inquiry wor- thy of another Mcntefquieu^ to aflign the Caufes cf the Rife and Fall of the French Monarchy ; and to point out thofe lilent Principles of Decay which have, in our Times, made fo rapid a Progrcfs, that France, in 1712, alter upwards of twenty Years almoft conftant War, maintained againft all Europe^\was ftill more refpe( 3 :able, and lefs exhauft- ed than it now appears to be, when the/«^/e Arm of Great Britain is lifted up againft her, ^d the War has lafted no more than three or tour Years. If this then be the State of the W ar in Germany •, if England be bound to take a Part in it, by every Motive of Honour and Intereft ; and if tne infinite Advantagesithath already produced, be ftated fair- jv_the Inference I would draw, and which I believe the whole Nation will alfo draw, is, that we fhould continue to exert thofe Endeavours whi^ have been fo efFcdual, in defeating the Defigns of France to get PofielTion of Hanever. His Maiefty, as Eleftor of Hanover, has no Views of Ambition ; His Country has heen attacked cn/y becaufe it belcnged to the King of Great Britain : and nothing more is required ot us, but to be true to ourfelves, by neglefting no Step that may pre- [ 39 3 vent Hancver from falling again into the Hands of France^ after having been fo miraculoufly refcued from the Contributions of the repacious Richlieu, and faved from the Military Defen of Belleijk. — I need not fay any 1 hing of the Glory acquired by that Army, which notwithftanding it’s great Inferiority, hath driven the French twice from the Wefer to the Rhine. I Ihall only obferve, that the next Cam- paign (if another Campaign Ihould preceed the Peace) will, in all Probability, lofe us none of the Advantages we have gained, on that Side ; if our Army, ftill headed by Prince Ferdinand who has already gained fo many Laurels, be rendered more formidable, as I hope it will, by fending to it feme ‘Thoufands more of our national Troops who now, fince the Conqueft of Canada^ and the Defeat of the long threatned Invafion, have no other Scene of Adlion left, but to contribute to another Viftory in Germany. It would be a very pleafing Profpeft, if we could fpeak. with equal Confidence, and Probability of Succefs, concerning the future Operations of the King of Pruffia. However, when we refledt on the amazing Difficulties he has had to ftroggle with j attacked on every Side by a Number of Confede- rates, each of whom, fingly,one would have thought, an equal Match for his whole Strength ; bearing up, at the fame Time, againft the formidable Power of the Houfe of Auftria ; the brutal Ferocity of the Ruffians-, the Attacks of the Swedes-, the Armies of the Empire; and, at one Time, having the ad- ditional Weight of the French Arms upon him ; when, I fay, we refle«5l on the uncommon Difficul- ties this magnanimous Prince has to refill, we mull rather exprefs our Wonder, and our Satisfadlion that his Situation is ftill fo refpedlable, than indulge our Fears, that it is likely to be worfe. The fever- C 40 1 eft Checks he has met with during this War^ have only ferved to fheW how calm he poflefTes himfelf under Diftrefs, and how ably he can extricate him- fclf. The Hour of Adverfity has called forth all his Abilities, and if he has failed fome times, from too great an Eagernefs to conquer, he has always been able to retrieve his Affairs, and like Anteus^ gain- ed frefli Strength from every OverthroWi And, upon this Principle, 1 flatter myfelf, his ? ruffian Majcfty will flill be able to fecure to himlelf the great r Part, if not the whole of Saxony for his Winter Quarters, and to recruit his Army, no Doubt much lhattered with it’s I.oflcs and Fatigues, before the opening of an- other Campaign, It is to be hoped alfo, that bcfides the amazing Refources He has flill left in his own unbounded Genius, and the generous and effetlual Support which his Connexion with England., affords him •, the Power of the Confede- racy againft him may be broken, by difuniting the Confederate s. Hiftory fatisfiesus how feldom a Con- federacy of many Princes, has ever ruined a Angle Powerattacked. I have givenoneinftanceof thisal- ready, when I fpoke of the Grand Alliance againfl Lewis XIV, and the League of Cambray againfl the Venetians, in the 1 6 th Century, is an Inftance flill more remarkable. But, if contrary to our Hopes, our vViflies, our E'ndeavours, this fliould fail ; if his Pruffian Maje- fly, like a Lion caught in the Toils (after a Re- finance already made, which will hand him down to Poflerity as the greateft of Men) fhould at lad be unable to defend himfelf } let him not defpair while he is in Alliance with Britain: For I would inculcate a Doftrine, which I th nk will not be unpopular 4 [40 unpopular amongft my Countrymen, and which, therefore, I hope, will not be oppofed by our Mi- nifters, That whatever Conqtiejis we have inade, and whatever Cor.quejis we may Jlill make^ upon the French, except North America, which muft be kept all our own ; jhould be looked upon as given back to France for a moft important Conjideration, if it can he the Means of extricating the King of Frufiia/rc»> any unforefeen Diftreffes. Perhaps my Notions on this Subjedl may feem to border on Enthufiafm but, however, I can- not but be perfuaded, that Things are come to that Pafs in Germany, that the Ruin of the King of Prujfia will be foon followed by the Ruin ol the Proteitant Religion in the Empire The blind Zeal of the bigotted Aujirian Family will have no Check, If the Head and Proteiflor of the German Prote- ftants be deftroyed •, and the War begun only to wreft Silefia from him, will, in the End, be found to be a War that will overturn the Liberties and Religion of Germany. If, therefore, the noble Perfeverance of the King of Prujfia the Efteem of a generous People ; if his Fidelity tb bis Engagements, which has contributed to fave Hanover and to ruin France, can demand our Gra- titude i if the Danger of the only Proteftanc So- vereign in Germany, able to preferve the Privileges of his Religion from being trampled under Foot, can call forth the warm Support of this Proteftanc Nation ; may I not hope, may I not be confident, that our Minifters will di(5tate, and our People approve of Terms of Peace in his Favour, tho’ they Ihould be purchafed by relinquiftiing lome of our Conquefts •, while the Pofleflion of Canada will be fo reafonable a Bound to the Demands we may make for ourfelves ? G I [ 42 ] I have ftated this Point, upon a Suppofition that the Event of the War may turn out to the Difadvantage of the King of Prujp.a. But * J ^ Fortune, the Capacity, the Perleverance of that Great Prince, fhould enable him (as I think we may Oill hope) to extricate himfelf from the Dan- gers that furround him— it may be aflced, What is to be done with the Conquefts which, befides Canada, we (hall be in Poffeflion of when we treat of a Peace ? — My Propofal is honeft, and per- haps will not be treated as chimerical : Employ them to recover out of the Hands of France thofe Towns of Flanders, gained for the Aujtrian Family by the Valour, and at the Expence of England-, and which have been fo perfidioufly facriliced. A Britijh Adminiftration muft tremble at the Prof- pec't of feeing Newport and Ofiend become French Property, and, therefore, fhould ufe their utmoft Endeavours to prevent this at the Peace -, tho thofe Endeavours may ftrve the Court of Vienna, whofe Ingratitude to Britain never will be forgot- ten ; tho*, at the fame Time, I muft own we lhall draw no fmall Advantage from it. N e (hall learn, for the future, to prefer our own Intereft to that of others ; to proportion our Expences on the Continent to the immediate Exigencies of our own Country, and never to afiift a new Ally, without remembering how much we did for OW and what Return we have had ! I have, now, nearly executed my principal De- fign, in the prefent Addrefs ; which was to give my Thoughts on the important Bufinefs of the ap- proaching Treaty. And if it be conduced with as much Ability, as the War has been carried on with Spirit and Succefs, there is great Room for ’ flattering ourfelves, that the Voice of the Publick demands no Advantages or CeiTions, in Favour of [ 43 ] England, which the Minifters of England are not rcfolved to infift upon. But amidft the fignal Succefles of our Arms, which give us fo reafonable an Expedaiion of an honourable Peace, and have exalted our Country to the highcft Pinnacle of Glory and Reputation abroad — I wifli it could be faid that our Conjiitu- tion was not greatly in Danger of being hurt, and al- moft loft, at Home . — I fliall beg Leave to take this Occafionoftouchingthis equally melancholy and im- portant Subjedl } with a View, not to blame, butto lament ; not to bring any railing Accufat on againft thofe who are now in Power, but to exhort and to excite them to endeavour, before it be too late, to add to the Services they have done their Country, in faving it from the open Attacks of France, the ftill more important Service of faving our Confti tution, which fome unhappy Circumftances of our prefcnt Situation have already greatly changed, and feem to threaten with intire Deftrudlion-, — Nay, I may fay, would have adually dcftroyed, if it were not lor the good Heart of our gracious Sovereign, who fcorns to take Advantage of them. Confiderably above an hundred Millions of Debt, the Sum we muft be obliged to fit down with, at the End ol the prcfent War, is a Burthen which, however immenfe. Experience has taught us, con- trary to all Theory, we lhall be able to bear with- out Bankruptcy. As our Expcnces have increafed, we have found, contrary to the Predidlions of gloomy Politicians, that our Abilities to bear them have increafed alfo. — But tho’ our Debts be not too great for the Riches of our Country, they are much too great for the Independency of its Confti- tution. For, when I confider the infinite Depen- dance upon the Crown, created by Means of Them, throughout the Kingdom, amongft all Degrees of G 2 Men j f 4+ T Men ; when 1 refleft on the many Thoufands or Placemen, of every Denomination, who are em- ploy -d in the Col'eaior, of the vaft Variety of Taxes now levied on th ; Public; and take a lie- view of a far grea t Number of Servants of the Crown, both Civil and Military, for whofe Sup- port fo confiderable a Share of the public Revenue is let apart, too many of whom, I fear, might be temp-ed to aflilf in extending the Influence of the Prerogative to the Prejudice of public Liberty ; when I confider our vaft Load of Taxes, in this Point of View, I cannot help obferving the amaz- ino- Revolution in our Government which this fin- gle Article has brought about ; nor enough lament the unhappy Circumftances of Affairs, and the Neceffities of the War which have forced us to an annual Expence, unknown to former Times, and which will aimoft be incredible to Pofterity. I believe I can venture to fay upon Memory, that the Expences of the War, for all King William'% Reign, about i 3 Years, were not, at a Medium, above 3 Millions and a half a Year; and Queen Anne's, tho’ the laft Years were exorbitant, were little more than 5 Millions. What they are now 1 figh to think on. Twelve or Fourteen Millions ar^ demanded without Referve ; and, what is ftill more, voted without Oppofuion. Nay. of fo lit- tle Confequence is it now thought, by our Repre- fentatives, to deliberate on the weighty Bufinefs of raifing Money on the Subjeft, that fcarcely can Forty of them be got together, to hear the Efti- mates for at Icaft One hundred and four /core Fkoufand Men, for fo many we have now in our Pay ; and to borrow Eight Millions, the Sum by which our Expences exceed our Income. Thefe are alarming Confiderations ; but another ObjeA, no Icfs threatening the Ruin of our Confti- tution, alfo prefents itfelf. lam [ 45 1 I am old enough to remember what Uncafinefs and Jealoufies difturbed the Minds of all true Pa- triots, with regard to Handing Armies, and mili- tary Eftablifliments. Principles of Liberty in ge- neral, and, in particular. Whig Principles, excited this Uneafinefs and produced thofe Jealoufies, which, from Time to Time, have been a fruitful Source of Parliamentary Debate. It was no longer ago than the late King’s Time, that the veiling Courts Martial, in Time of Peace, with the Power of pu- nilhing Mutiny and Defertion with Death, was car- riedinthe Houfeof Commons by a fmall Majority Nay, that a Court Martial, however limited in its Jurisdiftion, was inconfiftent with the Liberties'of a free People, in Time of Peace, was the Doftrine of Whigs in thofe Days ; it was the Doftrine, in par- ticular, of Sir Robert Walpole then in Oppofition j whofe remarkable Expreflion, in this great Debate, “ That they who gave the Power of Blood,gaveBlood,'’ never can be forgotten. And though afterwards when he came to be a Minijler, he was better reconciled to Handing Armies and Mutiny Bills, in Time of Peace, feventeen thoufand Men, was all the Army he durft alk; yet even that Demand produced an annual Debate ; and the annual Reafon, on which he founded the Necef- fity of his Demand — being the Danger from the Pretender and the Jacobites-, was the HrongeH Proof, that even in Sir R. Walpole's Opinion, the Kcdudlion in the Army Ihould take Place, when this Danger from Difaffeftion Ihould ceale. But how are Things changed ? — I own indeed that a- midH the Dangers of this War, and the Threats of an Invafion, the vaH Army now on our Efta- • In 1717-18 the Numbers on the Divifion were 247 to 2:9. ' blifh- r 4^ ] blifhiTicnt, is neceffary : But what I lament is to fee the Sentiments of the Nation fo amazingly re- conciled to the Profpeift of having a far more nu- merous Body of regular Troops, kept up, after the Peace, than any true Lover of his Country in -former Times thought, could be allowed without endangering the Conftitution. Nay, fo unaccount- ably fond are we become of the military Plan, that theEreftion of Barracks, which, twenty Years ago, would have ruined any Minifter who Ihould have ventured to propofe it, may be propofed fafe- ly by our Miniflers now a-Days and, upon Trial, be found to be a favourite Meafure with our Patri- ots, and with the Public in general. But what I lament as the greateft Misfortune that can threaten the public Liberty, is to fee the Eagernefs with which our Nobility, born to be the Guardians of the Conftitution againft Prerogative, folicit the Badge of military Subjedtion, not merely toferve their Country, in Times of Danger, which would be commendable, but in Expectation to be continued Soldiers, when 7'ranquillity fhall be rc- fiored, and to be under military Command, during Life. When I fee this ftrange, but melancholy Infatuation, fo prevalent, I almoft defpair of the Conftitution. If it fhould go on in Proportion as it has of late, I fear the Time will, at laft, come, when Independence on the Crown, will be exploded as unfafhionable. Unlefs another Spirit poflefs our Nobility ; unlefs they lay afide their Military Trap- pings ; and think they they can ferve their Coun- try more effedfually as Senators than as Soldiers, what can we expedi but to fee, the Syftem of mili- tary Subordination extending itfelf throughout the Kingdam, univerfal Dependance upon Government nfluencing every Rank of Men, and the Spirit, nay [ 47 ] hay the very Form of the Conftitution deftroyed ? We have generally beaten the French^ and always been foolifh enough to follow their Fafliions; 1 was in Hopes we fhould never have taken the Falhion of French Government •, but from our numerous Armies, and the military Turn of our Nobility, I am afraid we are running into it as fait as we can. And, unlefs fomething can be done, to bring back our Conftitution to its firft Principles, we fhall find, that we have triumphed, only to make ourfelves as wretched as our Knemy •, that our Conquefts are but a poor Compenfation for the Lofs of our Liber- ties; in a Word, that, like PFolfe, falling in the Arms of Victory, we are moft glorioully — undone ! But though I have drawn io melancholy a Pic- ture, of the Dangers which threaten us with the Lofs of our Liberties, it is wich no other Defign, than to exhort thofe who are placed at the Helm, to fee about the Repairs of our lhattered Veflel, as foon as Ihe can be brought fafe into Har- bour. After the Peace is once fettled, it ought to be the great Object of our Minifters, to devift every Expedient, and to adopt every Plan, tliat may extricate this unhappy Conftitution from the Dangers I have deferibed. Confidering the low Ebb of France, we have fome Reafon to hope that when Peace is once reftored, upon folid Terms, it will not foon be interrupted. Much, therefore, may be done during thofe Years of Tranquility ; if our Minifters be diligent and faithful in this great Work of reviving the Conftitution. The facred, and inviolable Application of the Sinking Fund, which the Increafe of our Trade, and other Circumftances, have fo greatly augmented, and muft ftill augment, will operate gradually, and cf- fcdualiy. Univerfal and invariable CEconomy, muft t +8 ] tnuft be introduced into every Branch of Govern- ment j the Revenues of the Kingdom may be vaftly increafed by adopting Schemes that will pre- vent Frauds, and leflen the Expence of Collec- tion ; innumerable unneceflary Places may be abo- liflied, and exorbitant Perquifites, in thofe we leave, may be reftrained ; Attention muft be had to the Morals andPrinciples of the Nation, and the Revival of Virtue and of Religion will go hand in hand, with the Revival of Liberty. But no Objeff will deferve more Attention, than our Military En- croachments on Conftitutional Independance. When this War (hall be over, there will be lefs Reafon, than ever, for numerous Armies. The Kingdom now happily being united, and DifafFec- tion to the Royal Family at an End, we need fear no Rebellions among ourfelves *, and Invafions from France are lefs likely than ever. Befides, by the Care and Perfeverance of fome Patriots, we have acquired a new internal Strength, a Militia trained up to be ufeful, and confequently, we may without any Danger to the Public, reduce the N umber of our Guards and Garrifons, fo low, as to deftroy great Pait of the huge Fabrick of Military Influ- ence and Dependance. But whatever you do, if you mean to reftore the Conftitution, you muft fecure the Dignity and Independance of Parliament. After pairing fuch Laws as may tlill be necelTary to prefer ve the Freedom of Elections, from Influence of every Sort to punilh Bribery both in the Elec- tors and in the Elected fomething, perhaps, may ftill be done by Way of Place-bill, to leflen mini- Iterial Influence over Parliaments, without having Recourfe to an OUverian S&\i-denying Ordinance ; or to fo total an Exclufion of Placemen as was eftablilhed, in the original Atft of Settlement. And. f 4? ] And an Houfe of Commons thus cho!en, and thus made independent, now that Jacobitifm is rooted our, can never be formidable but to thofe who have Reafon to tremble. Such an Houfe of Commons, will co-operate with the Adminiftration in every Plan of publick Utility, and at the fame Time inquire carefully into the Abufes of Govern- ment ; Supplies wijl be voted j but only in Pro- portion to the real Income and Abilities of the Na- tion •, and we may expeft to fee, what we have not fcen above thefe fo.ty Years, a Parliamentary Gommiffion of Accounts ereifled to inquire into the Difburfement of near Two Hundred Millions! And unlefs we fee this, foon, I lhall look upon our Conftitutio'n, as loft, for ever. Thefe, and many fuch Regulations, as thefe, may^, under an honeft and virtuous Adminiftration, be adopted when once Peace is reftored : And the, Profpeft of feeing them adopted, and fteadily pur- fued, keeps me from defpairing altogether of the Commonwealth. To you, therefore, whofe Power, moft likely, will not terminate with the War ; and whom I have prefumed to addrefs, with Regard to the Terms that ftiould be demanded, to fecure us from a perfidious Foe-, To you, My Lordy ar d Sir^ let me earneftly recommend, the ftill more impor- tant Care, of faving us, from ourfelves ; and as you have with an Utianimity,^ that doth you both great Honour, directed our Councils, fo as to humble France, let me intreat you to preferve your Union, till it re-invigprate the almoft loft Powers of the Brilijh Conjiitution. If you have any Regard to Virtue, to Liberty, to your Country ; if you would live gre. t, and die lamented ; if you would Ihine in Hiftory, with our H Clarendons [ 50 ] Clarer.dons and Southamptcns ; let not this Oppor- tunity, perhaps, this laft Opportunity of faving Britijh Liberty, and Independence, be thrown a- way. You, my l,ord, whofe Rank, whofe exten- five Influence, and perfonal Authority, have given you the Preeminence, in public Affairs, as it were by Frefeription •, much will depend upon you, in the carrying on this important Work. But when I direfl my Addrefs to you, 5/V, you muft be con- feious that befides the general Expeftations we have from you, as a Lover of Your Country, we have your own repeated Promifes, and Declaration'-, to make us flatter ourfelves that you will not Hop fhort, in your Schemes of national Reformation. Not tutored in the School of Corruption, but lifted, from your earlieft Years, under the Banner of Pa- triotifm ; called into Power, by popular Approba- tion, and ftill uniting, the uncommon Charaders of Minifter and Patriot ; favourite of the Public, and Servant of the Crown ; be not offended, Sir, if I remind you, not to Difappoint that Confidence the Public places in your future Endeavours to prop the finking Conftitution. Nor let it ever fall from your Memory, that the Nation expedls from your Virtue, your CEconomy, your Plans for Li- berty, during the future Peace, as great Advantages as we have already gained, from your Spirit, your bold Councils, and vigorous Eflorts, in carrying on the prefent.War. Perhaps I grow too warm, on a favorite Sub- jeft ; and, therefore, from Schemes which cannot take Effecft, till the War be clofed, let me turn your Attention again, for a little while longer, to the Objeft immediately before our Eyes — the in- fuing Conferences for Peace. And, with Regard to thefe, though I fuppofe, they will hegitiy before the C 51 ] the Winter be ‘over, I think there is fome Realbn, for be ng ot Opinion that vve muft have another Campaign, before they can be finally clofed. France is too low, to think ferioufly of a Peace, without making fome delperatc Effort, She never would have expofd her Weaknefs to all jEartipc, by fo fhametui and fo humbling a Bankruptcy She never would have ruined her public Credit, and melted her Plate, the laft Keiburce, when every other ha> been exhaufted, only to receive Terms from England. No, (he knows fhe is un- done, for ever, if fhe gets no footing in Hanover \ and, therefore, vve may expedl to fee another At- tempt made for that Purpofe. But, if we are not wanting to ourfelves, another Attempt, will end, as unfortunately for her, as the former have done ; and her Ruin only b* more confirmed. In the mean while, I make no Doubt, the Plenipotentiaries will meet at a Congrefs ; but the Events of the Field, muft regulate the Deliberations ot the Cabinet. \Vc, no Doubt, fhall be firm in our Demand', •whatever they are-, and the French will endeavour to gain Time, to know whether there is any likeli- hood of obliging us to oflTcr them better. In this Situation, then, France muft hear with I'crror, that without breaking our national Faith, without injuring private Property, without giving exorbi- tant Premiums, we have already provided for the Supplies of another Year (and Supplies for Tears may rtill be had) to meet them- -not in Ame- rica ; there they are no more ; — not on the Ocean— the Deftruftion of their Fleets leaves that Empire free to us - but once more, on the Plain' ot another Mindeny again to feel and to confefs the Superiority of Britijh Valour. [ 52 ] I have only a Particular or two, to add, be- fore I conclude. And I cannot help congra- tulating the Public, on the Wifdom of our Manner of Opening the Ncgociation for Peace. I mean to obfetve, that our Minifters have hap- pily got rid of a Set of very ufelefs, or very per- nicious Gentlemen called Mediators^ by apply- ing diredlly to. the Enemy himfelf. Nothing can be more ridiculous than the Figure of the Pope's Nuncio, and the Ambaflador of Venice, adting the Farce of Mediation at Munfter, for feveral Years, while the War went on, till its Events regulated the Terms of Peace. The Mediation of injignificant Powers is therefore abfurd ; and the Danger of cal- ling in a povcerful Mediator, who may threaten to declare againft you, if you do not fubmit to his partial Dccifions, is too obvious to be infilled upon. You have done wifely, therefore, to keep the Ne- gotiation in your own Hands ; the Nation, from this Inftance, has a full Confide. nee that her Inte- refts, are Ikilfully condut5ted> and, therefore, I fhall only add, another Particular, which however fub- ordinate, will, no Doubt be attended to by you j though fome late Negotiators of ours, with Prance, negledled it. The French, by taking the Lead in Europe of late, have, of Courfe, been able to introduce their Language as the common Vehicle of the Senti- ments of other Nations, in all public Negociations ; fo that, perhaps, the French is the only Tongue, by the Chanel of which Plenipotentiaries and Mi- nifters of different Countries, can converfe. But when the Negociation is to be put into Writing, and to be drawn up in that Form which is to be binding upon all the Parties, and figned jointly by the treating Powers, neither the Honour, nor the Liteitft of the State, ought to allow us, to accept of the Original Treaty in the Native tongue of our Enemies. The Honour of the Nation forbids this ; as it would be a Confcflion of Superiority, to which Svitaifty at no Time, much Icis after fo glorious a War, fhould fubmit •, efpecially as we cannot fub- mic to it, without giving the Enemy a real Ad- vantage, and laying the Foundation for future Cavils. — Cardinal Mazarine, in his Letters, boafts, that by a latent Ambiguity and Nicety in the French Stile, he had been able to out- wit Don Louis de Haro, in the Conferences at the Pyrenees. And a much later Inftance, in which we ourfelves were partly concerned, fhould confirm us, in our Refu- lal to treat with the French in their own Language. —I mean the famous Capitulation of the Dutch Gzxnion oi Fournay xa 1745; which, though only reftrained from afUng, for a lim ted Time in any of the Barrier Towns *, as the Dutch believed, when they accepted of plie Capitulation, was foon after interpreted by France, as tying them up from adting in any Part of the World ; and might have been fatal to this Country, if the Rebellion in Scot- land, to afiift in quelling which the Dutch lent us thofe very Troops, had been fo fuccefsful, as to oblige us to put our Foreign Allies to the Teft. We have no great Reafon, no more than other Nations, to truft Gallic Faith, as appears from the many Inftancesof their unpalliated Perfidy which I have colleded above. Let us not, tliercfore, be *.I have not the original Capitulanon before me, but I remember, pretty exactly on what the Cavil turned. The Troops were not to adl, I think, for two Years,, in any of the Places Us plus reculees de le Barnere, The Dutchy no doubt, un- derftood, de la Earriere to be the Genitivt Cafe, but the French faid they meant it in the Ablative^ fo [ 54 ] lb weak as to give them Room for obtruding upon us, any fallacious Interpretations of the Words, in which they plight their Faith. 1 hey are too ready to break it when the Terms are ever fo clear ; and, therefore, let us take Care not to give them that Advantage which fuperior Skill in their own Lan- guage, naturally confers, and which upon fomc future Occafion, they may improve toour Detriment. Let the original and autbentic Copy of the Treaty, therefore be in a dead Language, the Phrafes of wl'.i .'h cannot vary, and whole Meaning is equally underftood by both Parties. We had once a very learned Plenipotentiary in Queen Elizabeth's Time, who, in a Negociation with Spam^ when it came to be debated in what Language the Treaty fhould be made, ludricoufly enough propofed to the Spa- niard,, who was giving himlelf Airs of Superiority, to treat in the Language of his Mafier’s Kingdom of Jerufalem. But leaving the Hebrew, for our Divines •, I w'ould only have cur Negociators treat in Latin : Which ieemed, as it were by Preferip- tion, to have a Right to be the Language of the Public Law of Europe ; till fome late Inflances have fliewn that the French was beginning to be fubftituted in its Room ; by the Lazinefs orNeg- Icul of thofe who treated. As we are fanguine in our Hopes of a much better Peace than we had at Utrecht, with Regard to the Terms ; let it not, be worfe than that at Utrecht, which preferved the Old Cuftom of fettling the Negociation in Latin. We then had a Bifhop indeed, as Plenipotentiary; but without having Recourfe to the very learned Bench, orchoofing a Plenipotentiary ixom Cambridge (I hope in a little Time one may join the other Univerfity, without giving Offence) the Negociators at the cn- fuing fuing Peace, rmy be accommodated with Latin enough for the Purpofe I nxention, at a very mode- rate Expence if their Secretary or Chaplain can- not alTift them. ^ c begin to be ludicrous on fo ferious a ouqect, It IS Time to have done ; And my Ad- drefs has already fwelled to fuch a fize as furprizes myklr, as much, as I fear it will tire the Reader. However, the vaft Variety of f a<5fs, and Particulars, which naturally offered themfelves to me, and which could not be omitted without hurting the Connex- ion, and weakening my Argument, will, perhaps, procure Indulgence for fo long a Pamphlet : And, for the fame Reafon, I flatter myfeif, that if I fhould happen to have been miflakenin any Thing I advance, to have erred in a Date, or to have mif-quoted a Treaty, fome Allowances will be made to me, as I have been obliged to truft much to my Memory, for want of a proper Opportuni- ty of confulting many of thofe Books, which fur- nilh the Materials I have made Ufe of. However, I believe a candid Reader, will find no capital, at leaft, no wilful, Miftake. I am far from the Vanity of thinking that my Notions on the important Subjeft of the Peace, are a regular Plan or Syftem for the Adminiftra- tion to proceed upon. 1 throw them out, only as loofe Hints for my Superiors to improve as they may think proper. Should there be any Weight in all, or any of them, you, my Lord and Sir, will be able to work them into Utility for this Kingdom, If they are not worth your Notice ; as I am an anonymous Writer, and hope never to be known, I can neither lofe nor gain Reputation by 2 " II by them. All T can fay, if they are neglri£lcd, is Operant et oleam perdidi. I am, . • My Lord and Siiv* Yours, 'J-.3 F ' ‘ r' ^