BIBLIOTHEK WARBURG 
 
 ABB 50 
 
THE PROBLEM OF THE 
 EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 IN MAIMONIDES, 
 ALANUS AND AVERROES 
 
Printed at 
 
 THE JEWISH PUBLICATION SOCIETY PRESS 
 Philadelphia, Penna., U.S.A 
 
THE PROBLEM OF THE 
 EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 IN MAIMONIDES, 
 
 ALANUS AND AVERROES 
 
 A STUDY IN THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF 
 THE TWELFTH CENTURY 
 
 SAMUEL NIRENSTEIN 
 
 A THESIS ACCEPTED IN FEBRUARY 1922 
 
 IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE 
 OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE DROPSIE COLLEGE 
 FOR HEBREW AND COGNATE LEARNING 
 
 PHILADELPHIA 
 
 1924 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Introduction 1 
 
 Biography of Maimonides 6 
 
 Biography of Alanus 9 
 
 Biography of Averroes 13 
 
 The Proof of Maimonides for the Existence of God. . . 17 
 
 The Proof of Alanus for the Existence of God 26 
 
 The Proof of Averroes for the Existence of God 36 
 
 Summary of the Proofs for the Existence of God 47 
 
 Excursus: Abstract of the “Philosophy and Theology’’ 
 
 of Averroes 52 
 
THE PROBLEM OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN 
 MAIMONIDES, ALANUS AND AVERROES 
 
 A Study in the Religious Philosophy of the Tweijth 
 
 Century 
 
 Introduction 
 
 The harmonization of Reason and Religion, or the 
 demonstration of the essential agreement between the 
 truths of Faith and the truths of Knowledge, constitutes 
 the most important part of the philosophical speculation 
 of the Middle Ages. The solution of this problem was the 
 ultimate end of all rational reflection, for upon the de- 
 finition of the relation of Authority to Reason all the other 
 theses depended. The questions of the Existence of God, 
 His Attributes, the Creation of the World, Immortality, 
 Free-will and Predestination can only be discussed, after 
 it has been established that consideration of these subjects 
 lies within the power of the human intellect. In many 
 cases the explanation of the problems of Religion and 
 Philosophy ipso facto determines the explanation of other 
 problems subordinate to it. 
 
 Mediaeval Philosophy or the problem of Reason and 
 Religion was brought into existence by differences and 
 contradictions in the results attained by Greek thinkers 
 and the dogmas found in the Scriptures . 1 Prior to the 
 introduction of the philosophy of the Ancients, the Jews, 
 Christians, and Mohammedans had no philosophy of 
 
 1 The Revealed Books of the Jews, Christians, and Mohammedans; i. e., the Old 
 Testament, the New Testament, and the Koran. 
 
 1 
 
2 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 their own — and they apparently felt no need for it. They 
 had their religion and their Sacred Books, which they 
 regarded not only as containing the tenets of their faith 
 but as containing all the information necessary for man — 
 a comprehensive encyclopedia of Life. Religion was 
 the norm for all action and conduct, and by it they 
 were governed and judged. Its absolute truth was never 
 doubted, for it was the Word of the Almighty — the Law 
 given by God to His people. This Law was, to their 
 minds, consistent; its precepts were inspiring and elevat- 
 ing. As time passed, custom and precedent 2 were added 
 to it, so that it became practically complete, and covered 
 every phase of human activity. Very little independent 
 thought, therefore, was required, since the Law contained 
 everything , and its infallibility was at no time disputed. 
 
 With the advent of Greek learning, there was a percep- 
 tible change in this attitude, and the same change followed 
 acquaintance with the works of Plato, Aristotle, or the 
 Neo-Platonists. The intellectual powers, which had 
 been dormant, or busy with the development and appli- 
 cation of Dogma, now turned to these new fields. 
 
 The first example of such influence is theJewish-Alex- 
 andrian School, the result of the contact of the Jewish 
 Religion with Hellenic Culture. The philosophical system 
 of this school was incorporated into Christianity during 
 the formative period of its fundamental dogmas; but it 
 was no longer philosophy — it was dogma. In the second 
 half of the Patristic period when the theological disagree- 
 ments and Greek philosophies made their appearance, 
 rational investigation was again aroused. Orthodox Chris- 
 
 1 For the Jews the ns min. the Oral Law, etc.; for the Christians, the Pa- 
 
 pal regulations and the Decrees of the Councils; for the Mohammedans, the -<t 
 hadith, a tradition, or narration, relating, or describing a saying or an action, etc. of 
 Mohammed (Arabic-English Lexicon, E. W. Lane, London 1865; Book I, Part 2, p. 
 529, sub ^ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 3 
 
 tianity sought to refute the contentions of the Heretics 
 and firmly establish the accord between its beliefs and 
 the conclusions of reason. In the Scholastic period the 
 same issue is present: the accommodation of the philosophy 
 of the Neo-Platonists and Aristotle to the ecclesiastical 
 teachings. The identical problem faced the Jews and 
 the Arabs, who, during this time, also attempted the 
 harmonization of their religious doctrines with the current 
 philosophy. 
 
 Mediaeval philosophy, then, owes its content to two 
 sources. On the one hand, there was religion (Jewish, 
 Christian, or Mohammedan); on the other, the philosophy 
 of the Greeks. The former was their heritage, eternal 
 and infallible; but the latter appealed to their reason. 
 When they read Plato or Aristotle or the Commentators, 
 they were able to follow the arguments, they admitted 
 the syllogisms to be perfect and they understood the con- 
 clusions. This study afforded them great pleasure; and 
 soon they mastered the works of the Greek Schools. But 
 at the same time they became aware of the fact that, with 
 the aid of their intellect only, they had succeeded, under 
 the guidance of their Greek instructors, in proving the 
 Existence of God, etc. Of what use then was Revelation, 
 if one could attain to the truths of Religion without the 
 aid of Revelation? Furthermore, there were often dis- 
 crepancies between the results of Reason and the dogmas 
 of Faith. Harmonization, syncretism was the solution 
 proposed by the thinkers of the Middle Ages. 
 
 From this brief summary one might infer that Mediaeval 
 civilization passed through three separate stages, the 
 termination of each being well-marked, i.e., the Religion 
 stage, the Greek-Philosophy stage, and, thirdly, the Har- 
 monization stage. This, however, is not so. With the 
 
4 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 exception of the Religion-period 3 of each of the religions 
 mentioned, there was no temporal succession — it was 
 rather coexistence. The development of religion, the 
 assimilation of Greek thought, and the attempt to recon- 
 cile the newly-acquired philosophy with religious concep- 
 tions were at once parallel and interactionary. From the 
 fourth to the fourteenth century, each was influenced 
 and modified by the other. When the predominant phil- 
 osophy was Neo-Platonic, theological doctrines were of 
 a Neo-Platonic shade; later when it was customary to 
 view the world through Aristotelian spectacles, religion 
 received an Aristotelian coloring. Inversely, too, the 
 same was true. Neo-Platonism was interpreted in the 
 light of certain religious facts (Plato was often made a 
 Christian) and Aristotle’s rigid logic was at times slightly 
 misunderstood in order to relate it to religious dogma. 
 These manipulations, however, were not always possible; 
 some contradictions could in no manner be removed, 
 and it was necessary to define the orthodox position. 
 Naturally, the theological opinion was sustained — and the 
 great majority accepted it. The Mediaeval mind can 
 only be comprehended when we have ascertained the 
 sources of its knowledge. 
 
 It is an interesting and important fact that in the second 
 half of the twelfth century, this problem of Religion and 
 Philosophy was discussed by three prominent thinkers, 
 who belonged to the three principal religions; namely, 
 Maimonides, Alanus , 4 and Averroes. Jews, Christians, 
 
 8 In Judaism, this period anteceded philosophy by at least a thousand years. In 
 Christianity the genesis-period lasted about three hundred years. Mohammedan 
 speculation first made its appearance about three centuries after Mohammed. 
 
 4 The subject of this thesis was proposed by Doctor Henry Malter, who referred 
 to Moritz Steinschneider, Hebratsche Uebersetzungen , Berlin 1859, p. 276, where Stein- 
 schneider suggests that a critical comparison of the works of Maimonides, Abelard and 
 Averroes would make a very instructive study. The present writer, however, after 
 examining the philosophy of Abelard ( Petri Abae„ardi Opera , published by Victor 
 Cousin, Paris 1859), found that Abelard devoted most of his attention to the considera- 
 tion of the Problems of Realism and Nominalism, the Universal and the Particular, 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 5 
 
 and Mohammedans were confronted by the same question — 
 all were anxious to establish the agreement between their 
 religious tenets and the results of Reason, and to show 
 that their Faith, even when probed by the Rationalism 
 of the schools of speculative thought, would stand the 
 test. 
 
 Maimonides sets forth his views in his “Guide of the 
 Perplexed” (j’TNn 1 ?^ tibtibl, Dalalat al-Ifa’inn ) ; Alanus seeks 
 to confirm the principal doctrines of the Christian Church 
 in his treatise “On the Method of the Catholic Faith” 
 (De A rte seu de A rticulis Fidei Catholicae ) ; Averroes de- 
 sires to prove that the Koran, if properly understood, 
 is in harmony with philosophy in his “Philosophy and 
 Theology.” 
 
 A* I j jsA 1 A~ 3 C j' A 1 ’’ 3 bL*J 1 * > Cf 
 
 G * . A* jM) ^ 4 — Ljl a ^ 
 
 ^-kJl j <Jl> 4-iJl A* A’ jbJl j 
 
 In the following pages, brief biographies of Maimonides, 
 Alanus, and Averroes will be given, a resume of their three 
 systems will be presented, and a critical comparative study 
 of their philosophies will be attempted with regard to 
 sources, problems, and solutions. 
 
 and did not fully and properly take up the fundamental questions of religious philosophy. 
 His treatise Dialogus inter philosophum, Judaeum el Christianum, the title of which 
 promises a discussion of twelfth century thought, is both incomplete and unsatisfactory. 
 It is impossible on the basis of this Dialogus to define Abelard’s position in the solution 
 of the problems of mediaeval philosophy. It seemed, therefore, more advisable to 
 take as the representative of Christian thought in the twelfth century, Alanus, a dis- 
 ciple and follower of Abelard, who, though not so well known, took over and developed 
 various theories of Abelard. See “ Die Philosophie des Alanus de lnsulis ”, by M. 
 Baumgartner in Beilrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, edited by Baum- 
 ker and von Hertling, vol. II., part IV, Miinster 1896, p. 6 ff.; Alain de Lille, by Albert 
 Dupuis, Lille 1859, p. 3; Albert Stockl, Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 
 Mainz 1864, vol. I, p. 411. Alanus takes over in its entirety a great part of the 
 system of Abelard and in many instances gives a presentation more lucid than the one 
 found in his source. It is because of this capacity for assimilation and incorporation 
 that Alanus has been termed “the summary of twelfth century Christian speculation.*’ 
 
6 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 Biography of Maimonides 
 
 Maimonides (Arabic — Abu ‘Imran Musa ben Maimun 
 ibn ‘Abd Allah; Hebrew — Moses ben Maimon s 
 philosopher, Talmudist, physician, and astronomer, was 
 born in Cordova, Spain, March 30, 1135. 6 His father, 
 descended from a long line of Talmudists, was a pupi of 
 Ibn Megas, and a scholar of considerable ability. 7 From 
 him Maimonides received his rabbinical education, and 
 later studied under various Arabic teachers of his day. 
 He mastered the entire field of Jewish literature, and his 
 secular pursuits embraced metaphysics, logic, mathematics, 
 medicine, physics, and astronomy — the whole range of 
 the culture of his time. The life of Maimonides, like the 
 lives of all great men, is enveloped in legends and fables, 8 
 and it is often difficult to separate fable from fact. 
 
 Maimonides was not permitted to continue his educa- 
 tion in peace and tranquility. When he was about thirteen 
 years old, his native city, Cordova, fell into the hands 
 of the fanatical Almohades, whose motto “Islam or Death’’ 
 forced many Jews to adopt Mohammedanism outwardly, 
 and sent many others into exile. Maimonides’ father chose 
 the latter course, and after much wandering, settled in 
 Fez, in Morocco, in 1160. What led Maimonides’ family 
 to establish themselves in Morocco, the home of the in- 
 tolerant conquerors of Cordova, is not known. In Fez 
 no Jew was allowed to profess his religion, and it seems 
 that Maimon’s family also had to appear as Mohammedans. 9 
 
 6 Either Maimon or Maimun; the poets Harizi and Immanuel rhyme this 
 name with ]i and ]1. It seems that the Arabs pronounced it Maimun, while the Jews 
 said Maimon. Cf. Abraham Geiger Moses ben Maimon , Breslau 1850, p. 38, note 1; 
 H. Graetz, Geschichte der Juden , Leipzig, Band 6 (fourth edition), p. 265, note 1; M. 
 Steinschneider, Die Arabische Literatur der Juden, Frankfurt a. M. 1902, 199 ff. 
 
 8 It is worth mentioning that tradition has fondly preserved even the hour of 
 his birth — 1 o’clock in the afternoon. 
 
 7 H. Graetz, op. cit., vol. VI, p. 265 -266. 
 
 8 For some of these stories, see Gedaliah ben Joseph Ibn Yahya, n^3pn rbwhw. 
 8 Carmoly, Geiger, Munk, Graetz and others hold that Maimon and his family 
 
BIOGRAPHY OF MA1MONIDES 
 
 7 
 
 Naturally they were not happy, and their lives were insecure, 
 so that in 1165 they determined to leave Fez and sail 
 for Palestine. After a dangerous journey of one month, 
 they arrived at Acre. Maimonides visited Jerusalem and 
 Hebron; but finding Palestine poor materially and in- 
 tellectually, he went to old Cairo (Fostcit) where he and 
 his brother David derived a livelihood from their business 
 in jewels. David was the active partner, while Maimonides 
 devoted himself to study. Soon after his arrival in Egypt, 
 Maimonides’ father died; later his brother perished in 
 the Indian Ocean, and their fortune was lost with him. 
 
 Maimonides now gave up commerce, and began to 
 practise medicine. At first his practice was not very 
 extensive, but gradually his name and reputation spread, 
 until he became private physician to Alfadel, the Vizir 
 of Saladin. 
 
 Maimonides was now the greatest man in Jewry. In 
 1177 he was appointed (or recognized as) the official head 
 of the Jews in Egypt, and his Responsa were accepted as 
 authoritative. Despite these activities, professional and 
 communal, he continued his rabbinical, philosophical, 
 and scientific studies; and succeeded in putting forth the 
 greatest work in Jewish philosophy, the “Moreh Nebukim”, 
 and an epoch-making religious code “The Mishneh Torah”. 
 Maimonides died in Fostcit, December 13, 1204. 
 
 The works of Maimonides — Philosophy and Theology: 10 
 
 (1) Dalalat al-Hainn — Hebrew Title 
 
 OOUJ min — “Guide of the Perplexed.” 11 This is his 
 magnum opus, in which he develops his system in detail. 12 
 
 publicly professed their belief in Mohammed. For the opposite view see M. Fried- 
 lander, The Guide of the Perplexed , London 1910, p. xvm. A list of references on this 
 question is given by Yellin and Abrahams, Maimonides , Philadelphia, 1903, pp. 220- 
 222, notes 5, 9, and 13. 
 
 l ® For more detailed information see M. Steinschneider, Arab. Lit., p. 203 ff. 
 
 n An exhaustive list of the Moreh Nebukim Literature, (1) The Arabic Text, 
 (2) Translation, (3) Commentaries, is given by M. Friedlander, loc . cil ., pp. xxvii- 
 
 XXXVIII. 
 
 I 2 Arabic text in Hebrew characters, with French translation and explanatory 
 
8 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 (2) ^12E> iTJN»n ,D’p"iD miDtP, Shemonah Perakvm — the 
 “Eight Chapters” (the introductory chapters to his com- 
 mentary on the Mishnic treatise “Abot”) — contain philo- 
 sophical and ethical material. 13 
 
 (3) The introductory sections of the Code (niD' rrafci 
 minn Hilkot Yesode ha-Torah and nijn rvo^n Hilkdt 
 De‘dt ) and the introduction to the eleventh chapter of the 
 Talmudic Tractate “Sanhedrin” (pVn) treat, in an elemen- 
 tary and popular way, of various questions of philosophy. 
 
 (4) ptMD^N nytox ’S n^po Makalah fi- Sind 1 at al- 
 Manfik — a treatise on Logic. This has been translated 
 into Hebrew, Latin, and German. 
 
 (5) rriNyD^N ’d n*?«pa Makalah fi-’l-Sa‘adah — a treatise 
 on felicity — Hebrew translation entitled nn^xro 0’p“iE> 
 Perakim be-Haslahah . 14 
 
 (6) iQtPn DDK Iggeret ha-Shemad “The Letter on Apostasy” 
 or Ott>n K>np "idnd Ma'amar Kiddush ha-Shem “Treatise 
 on the Sanctification of the Name (of God)”, an essay in 
 which Maimonides discusses forced conversions. 15 
 
 (7) p’D mjN “Letter to the South” or mpn nns 
 Petah Tikwah “The Gate of Hope”, a letter to Rabbi 
 Jacob al-Fayyumi on the critical condition of the Jews 
 in Yemen, deals with the persecution of Israel and with 
 Messianic conceptions. 
 
 (8) DTinn JT’nn “iond Ma'amar Tehiyyat ha-Metim 
 
 notes, was published by S. Munk in his monumental work, Le Guide des filgares traite 
 de Theologie et de Philosophie par Moise ben Maimon, publie pour la premiere fois 
 dans l’original Arabe et accompagne d‘une traduction frangaise et de notes critiques, 
 litteraires et explicatives, Paris 1850-1866. 
 
 18 Arabic text and German translation in M. Wolff Musa Maimunis Achl Kapitel 
 fmori, 2nd edition, Leyden 1903. Hebrew text and English translation in 
 The eight chapters of Maimonides on Ethics , J. I. Gorfinkle, New York 1912 (Columbia 
 University Oriental Studies, vol. 7). 
 
 14 Or nrbsnn ’plD Graetz, op. cit., vol. VI, note 11, page 398; M. Steinschneider, 
 Arab. Lit., p. 209. 
 
 16 DTIN Iggeret ha-Shemad was first edited by Abraham Geiger, Breslau 
 
 1850; Edelmann, Chemdah Genuza , p. 6. The authenticity of this treatise has been 
 disputed. Cf. D. S. Margoliouth, “The Legend of the Apostasy of Maimonides”, 
 Jewish Quarterly Review , vol. XIII (1901), pp. 539-541. 
 
BIOGRAPHY OF ALANUS 
 
 9 
 
 “Treatise on the Resurrection of the Dead”, written in 
 answer to opposition to his views, on this subject, at the 
 request of his pupil, Joseph Ibn ‘Aknin. 16 
 
 (9) Tmn^N ’£) n’jNpn Makalah fi-’l-Taufyid — an essay 
 on the Unity of God. Hebrew title: Turn “idnd Maamar 
 ha- Yihud. 
 
 Maimonides also w'rote masterful works on Halakah, 
 Astronomy, and Medicine; the enumeration and considera- 
 tion of these, however, lies beyond the scope of this essay. 
 
 Maimonides’ “Guide of the Perplexed” divided the 
 Jews into two hostile camps: the Maimunists and the anti- 
 Maimunists. 17 The former comprised those who agreed 
 with his harmonization of Aristotle and the Bible; the 
 latter included those who considered his views heretical. 
 The strife lasted a long time but finally the Maimunists 
 carried the day, and Moses ben Maimon stands out as 
 the “most comprehensive mind of Mediaeval Jewry.” 
 Posterity has affirmed the closing words of Yedayah 
 Bedersi’s oV'iy nrrQ “Examination of the World”. 
 “The conclusion of the whole matter is, go either to the 
 right, my heart, or go to the left, but believe all that Rabbi 
 Moses ben Maimon (Maimonides) has believed, the last 
 of the Geonim by time, but the first in rank.” 18 
 
 Biography of Alanus 
 
 Alanus ab Insulis 19 , philosopher, theologian, contro- 
 versialist, and poet, was born in Lille, northeastern France 
 (then Flanders) about 11 28. 20 We have almost no details 
 of his early life, and our information with regard to 
 his later activities is likewise scanty. It seems that 
 
 16 Cf. S. Munk, Notice sur Joseph hen Jehouda, 1842, p. 23. 
 
 17 Graetz, op. cit., vol. VII, p. 28 ff. 
 
 18 Quoted by S. Schechter, Studies in Judaism (First Series), Philadelphia 1896, 
 p. 97. 
 
 18 Also known as Alanus De Insulis, Alanus of Lille, Alanus of Ryssel, Alanus 
 of Montpellier. 
 
 28 This date of his birth is given by Bernard Haureau, “Memoire sur la Vie et 
 
10 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 he received his education in Paris, 21 and later taught 
 there. 22 Alanus must have been a very successful teacher 
 
 4 
 
 if we are to judge from the fame which he won during 
 his life-time. 23 Chroniclers of the following centuries 
 praise Alanus in the highest terms, and give him various 
 honorary titles: Doctor Universalis, Doctor ille famosus, 
 Magnus, etc . 24 Alanus did not remain in Paris; about 
 1170 he entered the monastery at Citeaux. The reason 
 for this removal is given in a very interesting legend. 
 “Alanus, after having mastered the seven liberal arts, 
 determined to reveal all the mysteries of the Trinity in a 
 public lecture. The day before the lecture, Alanus, as 
 he was walking along the bank of a river, meditating upon 
 his subject, chanced upon a child, who had made a hole 
 in the ground and was carrying water from the river to 
 this hole in a little spoon. Alanus, very much surprised, 
 asked the child what he was doing. ‘I intend to carry 
 all the water from the river into this hole,’ he answered. 
 ‘But that is impossible,’ Alanus said. ‘Not more impossible’, 
 the child replied, ‘than the task you have set for yourself.’ 
 The lecture was not delivered. Alanus left Paris and went 
 to the monastery of Citeaux, where he started as a shepherd. 
 
 quelques Oeuvres d ’Alain de Lille,” in Memoires de VAcademie des Inscriptions el 
 Belles Letlres, XXXII (1886), Part I, page 4 (M. Baumgartner, in “Alanus de Insulis”, 
 vol. II, part 4, of the Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mitlelalters, Munster 
 1896, page 3, note 5, strangely gives this essay of Haureau’s a German title). Maurice 
 de Wulf, Hisloire de la phil. scoL dans les Pays-Bas et la principality de LiSge jusqu'd 
 la revolution fran^aise, Louvain et Paris 1895, page 42, places Alanus’ birth “a few 
 years before 1128.” 
 
 So Haureau, op. cit., p. 2. Albert Stockl, Geschichte der Philosophie des 
 Mitlelalters , Mainz 1864, part I, p. 411, states that Alanus studied in Clairvaux. 
 
 22 Haureau, op. cit,. p. 4, points out that it is no objection that John of Salis- 
 bury (died 1180) does not mention Alanus among the professors at Paris, as John 
 left in 1148 when Alanus was only twenty years old. See also De Wulf, op. cit., p. 41. 
 
 28 Alberic of Trois-Fontaines says: “Apud Cistercium mortuus est hoc anno 
 (that is, 1202: Haureau misprints 1302) magister Alanus de Insulis, doctor famosissi- 
 mus et scriptor ille Anticlaudiani, qui in theologica fecit quandam Artem praedicandi 
 et contra Albigenses, Valdenses, Judaeos et Sarracenos libellum edidit succinctum ad 
 Guillelmum Montispessulani dominum”. This was probably written some years 
 after Alanus ’ death. See Haureau, op. cit., p. 9. 
 
 24 See M. Baumgartner, op. cit., page 1, notes 2, 4 and 5; page 2, notes 1, 2 and 3. 
 
BIOGRAPHY OF ALANUS 
 
 11 
 
 He was soon promoted to the rank of monk.” 25 This 
 legend contains the historical fact that Alanus lived for 
 some time at a monastery. 
 
 In 1179 Alanus took part in the third Lateran Council 
 which resulted in the condemnation of the Albigensians 
 and the Valdensians. This fact is confirmed by authentic 
 documents, and his works testify to his efforts in this field. 26 
 Alanus evidently assisted at other discussions of doctrine, 
 since he had become an authority on Catholic Christianity 
 and an able defender of its tenets. Between 1170 and 1202 
 Alanus seems to have spent considerable time without the 
 monastery — we know that after the Lateran Council he 
 lived and taught at Montpellier. He tried to retain both 
 his connection with the abbey and his relations with the 
 outside world. He died at Citeaux in 1203. 27 
 
 The most important works of Alanus in Philosophy 
 and theology are the following: 
 
 (1) De Arte sen Articulis Catholicae Fidei — ‘‘On the 
 method of the Catholic Faith.” A systematic, geometric 
 proof, in five books: Book I: The one cause of all things, 
 
 i.e., the One-and-the-same Three-God. Bk. II: The Cre- 
 ation of the world, angels and man; the Freedom of the 
 Will. Bk. Ill: Concerning the Son of God incarnated 
 
 26 A literal translation from the Latin of this legend is given by Haureau, op. cit 
 pp. 2-3. 
 
 26 This story of Alanus and the third Lateran Council is also contained in a legend 
 “The Abbe of Alanus ’s monastery (Alanus, whose former fame was unknown, held 
 the lowest rank in the abbey), having received the Pope’s order to assemble for the 
 Council, was preparing to go. Alanus, who had recovered his reason (which he had 
 lost the day before his proposed lecture on the mysteries of the Trinity), begged to 
 be permitted to accompany him. He followed the Abbe and entered by hiding under 
 the Abbe’s cloak. At the close of the debates, which were not very well argued by 
 the orthodox, Alanus asked to be allowed a few words. The Pope gave him permission. 
 Alanus rose to his feet, and in a fiery discourse refuted all the heretics. The Pope 
 upon hearing this, exclaimed: ‘Either you are the Devil or you are Alanus.’ T 
 am Alanus, ’ he admitted. The Abbe resigned and Alanus was presented with gifts 
 by the Pope. He refused them and requested instead two clerks to copy his composi- 
 tions. He wrote many books and died in the abbey.’’ 
 
 27 Haureau, op. cit ., p. 6-7. So M. Baumgartner, op. cit., p. 1, note 1; F. Ueber- 
 weg, History of Philosophy, vol. I, (Eng. Trans. G. S. Morris, N. Y. 1898), p. 401; 
 Haureau, op. cit., p. 9; and Clemens Baumker, “Die Christliche Philosophic des Mit- 
 
12 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 for the redemption of man. Bk. IV: The Sacraments 
 
 of the Church. Bk. V: the Resurrection of the dead. 
 Contained in Migne, Patrologia Latina , Paris, 1855, vol. 
 210, col. 593-617. 
 
 (2) De Fide Catholica contra Ilaereticos libri IV “On 
 the Catholic Faith against the Heretics.” A defence of 
 orthodox Christianity — and a refutation of all heresy. 
 Book I: Against the Heretics; II: Against the Valdensians; 
 III: Against the Jews; IV: Against the Pagans. Migne, 
 col. 305-429. 
 
 (3) Anticlaudianus sive de Officio Viri Boni et Perfecti: 
 Libri IX. “The Anticlaudian or On the Duty of a Good 
 and Perfect Man,” in nine Books. Migne, col. 482-579. 
 
 (4) Regulae Theologicae, “Theological Propositions.” One 
 hundred and twenty-five principles or fundamentals of 
 Christian Theology, briefly discussed. Migne, col. 617- 
 687. 
 
 (5) De Planctu Naturae , “The Complaint of Nature” 
 A philosophical satire on the faults of his day. Migne, 
 col. 429-482. English translation by Douglas M. Moffat, 
 Yale Studies in English, No. 36, New York 1908, “The 
 Complaint of Nature.” 
 
 (6) Liber in Distinctionibus Dictionum Theologicalium, 
 “A Book of Definitions of Theological Dicta” — an exe- 
 getical work, Migne, col. 687-1012. 
 
 Alanus also wrote many sermons 28 , a commentary on 
 the Song of Songs, 29 and several books on Christian dogma. 
 His style in all his works is highly individual, being in- 
 fluenced by his poetic talent and his dialectic ability. 
 
 The attainments of a long philosophical development 
 converge in Alanus. He appeared at a period of transition, 
 
 telalters” in Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophic , ( Die Kultur der Gegenwart , second 
 edition, Leipzig and Berlin 1913, Part I, Section 5), p. 377. De Wulf, op. cit., p. 
 41, Stockl, op. cit., p. 411, give 1202 as the date of Alanus’ death. 
 
 28 See Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 210, col. 197 ff. 
 
 28 Migne, col. 51 ff. 
 
BIOGRAPHY OF AVERROES 
 
 13 
 
 just before the Christian world was illuminated by the 
 introduction of the complete works of Aristotle. He 
 already knows several of the works by which the thirteenth 
 century was dominated . 30 Hundreds of years prior to 
 Descartes’ “Rationes dei existentiam et animae a corpore 
 distinctionem probantes, more geometrico dispositae,” 
 Alanus makes use of the geometric method . 31 
 
 Though his system is not complete, and there are no 
 new problems or original solutions, though he is altogether 
 a borrower who relied upon his predecessors’ ideas, yet 
 his philosophy, through its complete mastery of speculative 
 conceptions and literary form, is the best review and collec- 
 tion of the Christian thought of the twelfth century. 
 Alanus was at once the last representative of the old school 
 of philosophy based on the patristic doctrines of the Church 
 and the herald of the new philosophy of the following 
 century. 
 
 Biography of Averroes 
 
 Averroes 32 (Arabic — Abu’l-Walid Muhammad ibn 
 Ahmad ibn Rushd), philosopher, theologian, jurist, 
 and physician, was born at Cordova in 1126. He was 
 descended from a family of eminent jurists; his father 
 was Ka<ji (jurist and judge) in Cordova. 33 Averroes 
 was a very diligent student and soon became well versed 
 in the science of his time. He mastered theology, juris- 
 prudence, medicine, mathematics and philosophy, under 
 
 3 0 Through the medium of Boethius (470-525), Alanus became acquainted with 
 certain elements of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Alanus was the only Christian writer 
 of his century who mentioned Plato’s Phaedo ( Contra Haereticos, Bk. I, chap. 30, 330 A). 
 
 31 Cf. C. Baumker in Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Gorres-Gesellschaft, vol. 
 VI (1893), “Handschriftliches zu den Werken des Alanus,” p. 163, and Frangois J. 
 Picavet, Essais sur L* Histoire generate et comparee des Theologies et des philosophies 
 medievales, Paris 1913, p. 86. 
 
 32 This name is a corruption of Ibn Rushd. Ibn became in Spanish pronunci- 
 ation Aben or Aven, and Rushd was somehow turned into -roes. See Ernest Renan, 
 Averroes et V Averro'isme, Paris (sixth edition), p. 7, note 1. 
 
 3i S. Munk, Melanges de la philosophie Juive et Arabe, Paris 1857, p. 419. 
 
14 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 the instruction of the best Arabic teachers. He also came 
 in contact with the learned and famous men of his century, 
 who were attached to the Court of ‘Abd-el-Mu’min. 
 It was through the friendship of one of these philosophers, 
 Ibn Tufail, that he was presented to Caliph Abu Ya'kub 
 Ytisuf (the successor of ‘Abd-el-Mu’min) in 1163. It 
 is reported that after the introduction, the Caliph asked 
 Averroes whether the philosophers thought the heavens 
 were eternal or created. Averroes was somewhat sur- 
 prised at this question and attempted an apology to the 
 effect that he had not given sufficient consideration to 
 the problems of philosophy. The Caliph, who was quite 
 familiar with the subject, then began a discussion of this 
 problem, until Averroes, who had recovered from his 
 surprise, also stated his opinions, and explained in detail 
 the various aspects of the difficulty. The Caliph was 
 pleased, and Averroes became a favorite at the Court. 
 At the suggestion of Ibn Tufail and the Caliph, Averroes 
 undertook his work on Aristotle, which won him the title 
 of “Commentator.” 
 
 This work of explaining, analyzing and amplifying the 
 oooks of Aristotle, Averroes continued for many years, 
 and his productions in this field are extensive. In 1169 
 he was appointed Kadi in Seville; in 1171 he returned to 
 Cordova and it was at this period that he wrote his great 
 Commentaries. 34 In 1182 we find him again at Morocco, 
 where he was made physician-in-ordinary to the Caliph; 
 later he was appointed Grand-Kadi of Cordova. Under 
 the Caliph Ya'kfib-Almansfir (the son of Abu Ya'kjjb) 
 who ascended the throne in 1184, Averroes continued to 
 enjoy privileges and honors. Despite his high position 
 at court, Averroes gradually began to be suspected of 
 heresy or disbelief. The causes which led to this suspicion 
 
 34 E. Renan, op. cit., page 18. 
 
BIOGRAPHY OF AVERROES 
 
 15 
 
 have given rise to many conjectures. 35 The true reason 
 was, no doubt, Averroes’ philosophy. Although he out- 
 wardly 36 conformed to all the rites of the Mohammedan 
 religion, his philosophical views were entirely in dis- 
 agreement with the faith of Islam. This feeling against 
 Averroes grew in strength, until he was finally exiled to 
 Elisana (Lucena) near Cordova by AlmansOr in 1195/6. 37 
 At this time, edicts were enacted forbidding the “danger- 
 ous” sciences, and ordering all books pertaining to them 
 to be burned. Shortly afterward, however, there was a 
 return to philosophy, and Averroes was recalled to Morocco. 
 Averroes did not live long after his return to favor. He 
 died in 1198 . 38 
 
 The works of Averroes in Philosophy are: 
 
 (1) Tahafut 'l-Tahafut — Destruction of the Destruction, 
 a refutation of Al-Gazali’s “Destruction of the Philosophers.” 
 
 (2) De Substantia Orbis or De compositione corporis 
 codes tis. 
 
 36 Some Arabic sources attribute Averroes’ loss of favor to his having failed to 
 give the Caliph his honorary titles, when he wrote in his “History of Animals”, “I 
 saw a quadruped of this species (the giraffe) in the house of the Berbers”. Averroes 
 omitted the various royal epithets, and was very discourteous in referring to the Caliph 
 as merely the “king of the Berbers” (‘Abd-el-Wahid and Ibn-Abi- ’Usaibi'a). Another 
 account relates that Averroes denied the story of a tribe of ‘Ad (see Sura XXVI, 1 23— 
 139 et al., cf. George Sale’s translation, London and New York, p. 123, note c, and 
 the Preliminary Discourse , p. 4 ff) believed to have been annihilated by an earthquake; 
 thus, of course, he was a disbeliever (El-Ansari.). ‘Abd-el-Wahid also tells that the 
 enemies of Averroes procured a manuscript in which the following words of a certain 
 ancient author were quoted: “The planet Venus is a Deity.” This was taken from its 
 context and shown to Almansur. Averroes was accused of Polytheism. Munk, 
 op. cit., page 424 ff; Renan, op. cit., p. 20-22. 
 
 36 Munk seems to doubt the sincerity of Averroes’ religious sentiments (Me- 
 langes, p. 424, 455). Max Horten, Texte zu den Streite Zwischen Giauben und Wissen 
 im Islam , Die Lehrevom Propheten und der Offenbarung bei den Islamischen Philosophen 
 Farabi , Avicenna , und Averroes (on the title page misprinted Averraes), Bonn 1913, 
 p. 25, says: “It is not at all questionable that Averroes considered himself a believing 
 Muslim ”, The reason for his disgrace is quite clear — it was the fanaticism of the Almo 
 hades. See Munk, Melanges , p. 426; Duncan B. Macdonald, The Development o. 
 Muslim Theology , Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory , New York 1903, p. 255 
 256. 
 
 37 The fable confirmed by Leon the African that Averroes took refuge with hi$ 
 friend and disciple Maimonides has no foundation in fact. Maimonides did not know 
 Averroes. It was in 1190 that Maimonides (then in Egypt) first became acquainted 
 with the works of Averroes. See Renan, op. cit., p. 20, and note 1, Munk, op. cit.. 
 p. 425, and note (1); Steinschneider, Hebrdische Uebersetzungen, 49, note 35. 
 
 38 December 10, 1198. 
 
16 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 (3) Two treatises on the Union of the Separate Intellect 
 with Man. 
 
 (4) A treatise on the Material Intellect or on the Possib- 
 ility of Union (extant in Hebrew). 
 
 (5) An Abstract of Logic. 
 
 (6) Prolegomena to Philosophy. 
 
 (7) Commentary on the Republic of Plato. 
 
 (8) Commentaries on Alfarabi. 
 
 (9) A Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics of 
 Nicolas of Damascus. 
 
 (10) A treatise: Does God know the particulars? 
 
 (11) A treatise: On the Intellect and the Intelligible. 
 
 (12) A commentary on the book of Alexander of Aphro- 
 disias on the Intellect. 
 
 (13) Questions on “De Anima.” 
 
 (14) Questions on “De Caelo et Mundo.” 
 
 (15) Commentaries (of various natures) on the Physics, 
 the Posterior Analytics, the De Caelo et Mundo, the Rhetoric, 
 the Poetics, the Metaphysics, the Nicomachean Ethics, 
 and other works. 39 
 
 Theology: 
 
 (1) A critique of the various opinions on the accord 
 between philosophy and theology — Arabic text published by 
 Marcus Joseph Muller. Also in Hebrew. 
 
 (2) Methods of Demonstration for the religious dogmas. 
 Arabic text published by M. J. Muller. Also in Hebrew. 
 
 (3) An appendix to (1), also published by M. J. Muller. 
 
 Besides other works on Philosophy and Theology, 
 
 Averroes made important contributions to Jurisprudence, 
 Astronomy, Grammar, and Medicine. 40 
 
 The influence of Averroes upon his co-religionists was 
 very slight, but his views made a profound impression 
 upon Jewish and Christian thought of the thirteenth and 
 
 39 See Renan, op. cit. , p. 6t. 
 
 40 A complete list of Averroes’ works is given by Renan, op. cit., pp. 61, 65-79 
 
THE PROOF OF MAIMONIDES 
 
 17 
 
 fourteenth centuries. Practically all the works of Averroes 
 that have come down to us are in Hebrew or in Latin 
 translations; the Arabic original is comparatively rare. 
 
 Averroes nowhere pretends to have founded a system 
 of philosophy; he merely wanted to be the Commentator 
 of Aristotle, whom he revered. Though we cannot speak 
 of a Mohammedan philosophy in the proper sense of 
 the term, the Arabs not only transmitted but also developed 
 the Greek systems of philosophy to a considerable extent. 
 To this work Averroes, “the greatest Arabic Peripatetic,” 
 made the most important contributions. 
 
 The Proof of Maimonides for the Existence of God 
 
 The proofs of Maimonides for the Existence of God are 
 based altogether on Aristotle . 41 These proofs presuppose 
 a knowledge of the various works of Aristotle, especially 
 the Metaphysics. Maimonides considers it superfluous 
 to enter into an explanation of the various principles, as 
 he did not write his books for “mere tyros ”, 42 but for those 
 already advanced in their studies, and perplexed by ap- 
 parent contradictions between the tenets of Science and 
 those of Belief. In the preface to Part II of the Moreh , 
 he summarizes the groundwork of Aristotelian thought in 
 twenty-six propositions. From these propositions he 
 formulates his proofs for the Existence of God. “Twenty- 
 five of the propositions which are employed in the proof 
 for the existence of God, or in the arguments demonstrating 
 
 41 Isaac Husik, A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy , New York 1916, 
 p. 253. The thirteenth chapter of this book (pp. 236-311) gives an excellent ex- 
 position of Maimonides* philosophical system. 
 
 42 Moreh , Introduction, Munk, Guide , I, p. 6-7 
 
 Arab. n-Pto i”inaoVV nVi nriD) 1 ? 1 ? o’nsn mna p:V« D’Vi. 
 
 Heb. jvya D’^nnD^ «*7i o^ia oranV nrn rman ptn. 
 
 "It is not here intended to explain all these expressions to the unlettered or to mere 
 tyros." For all citations from the Moreh given in English we have made use of the 
 translation of M. Friedlander, The Guide of the Perplexed , London and New York 
 1910. 
 
18 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 that God is neither corporeal nor a force connected with 
 a material being, or that He is One, have been fully es- 
 tablished and their correctness is beyond doubt. Aristotle 
 and the Peripatetics who followed him have proved each 
 of these propositions. There is, however, one proposition 
 which we do not accept, namely, the proposition which 
 affirms the Eternity of the Universe, but we will admit it 
 for the present, because by doing so, we shall be enabled 
 clearly to demonstrate our own theory” ( Moreh , II, In- 
 troduction). 43 
 
 The following is a list of the twenty-six propositions of 
 the Aristotelians : 44 
 
 1. The existence of an infinite magnitude is impossible. 45 
 
 2. The simultaneous existence of an infinite number 
 of bodies possessing magnitude is impossible. 
 
 3. An infinite series of causes and effects cannot exist 
 even if they are not magnitudes, e.g. intellects. 
 
 4. Change is of four kinds (1) in substance: Genesis 
 
 and destruction, (yeveais Kai (pdopa), (2) In Quantity, 
 
 48 Munk, Guide, II, p. 3. 
 
 nio 'by iNn-Q 1 ™ ’Bi iinVnVn nil rrnjiN ’b iNrino^K mmpoVN 
 
 IP nV rirroD nhVd rioipo ppyi odd hiki hddn row ddj ’b nip kddj k 1 ? 
 rionpai nh:d mnni *73 jama ’by id mya ,di id din tin ip ntud 'v ’b 
 
 rionpoVN i^ni p«D ndd nuVndd ]mann i*?ia ]«b ND’Von on 1 ? nhd^d: mron 
 
 .Q^Ny'rN Dip ’n 
 
 kVi *|n n 1 ? invn ^y o’nsiDai ,n^yn’ m^«n nitoxn ovpa jitVn insr maipnn 
 pBD ]’N riBinn oir'jy «a o^ia .nimpn onpyi van ,in« ioe> nVyn’ amen ,1113 na 
 nDipm ,DnD nn« ^a by nsm o”N 0 on p nnw 'di Ted'-in n»y naa ,onD naia 
 niDip N’n N’nn noipnm ,hon» ioa nsioa mpiao nuan’ nra ’a ,na on 1 ? mu nnn 
 
 .□'nyn 
 
 44 Complete references to the various works of Aristotle in which they occur are 
 given in Munk’s excellent edition, Le Guide des £gares, II, pp. 3-28. 
 
 46 Maimonides’ conception of the Infinite is taken from Aristotle; if we wish to 
 understand Maimonides’ proofs for the Existence of God, we must first explain 
 Aristotle’s Infinite. In chapter 2 of Book II (a l\arrov) of the Metaphysics, Aris- 
 totle postulated that infinite regress (rd /SaSifeiv ets aw eipov) is impossible; there 
 must be a unitary and superior uncaused cause, from which everything else is derived 
 and to which everything else is attached. From this it would follow that the infinite 
 cannot exist. This is not to be taken so unqualifiedly, for the twenty-sixth proposition 
 of Aristotle states that time and motion are eternal. This is an infinite and yet it 
 is possible. Aristotle’s first proposition means that the actual infinite cannot exist — 
 for example, there cannot exist actually a line infinite at both ends, or a line which is 
 
THE PROOF OF MAIMONIDES 
 
 19 
 
 Quantitative change {av^rjas Kai 4>6i<ns), (3) In Qua- 
 lity* Qualitative change (aXXofcoors) . In place, Motion 
 of translation (< popa ). 
 
 5. Every motion is change and the passing of the po- 
 tential to the actual. 
 
 6. Motions are either essential, or accidental, or for- 
 cible or partial. 
 
 7. Everything subject to change is divisible. 
 
 8. Everything which is moved per accidens is neces- 
 
 infinitely divisible cannot be actually divided infinitely. But an infinite can exist 
 potentially — i. e. only a part being realized at a time, and some part being realized 
 at every time. The species, which Aristotle posits as eternal, are of this nature; and 
 there are other illustrations. Aristotle’s idea of the infinite can best be summarized 
 by a diagram. 
 
 A 
 
 B 
 
 C 
 
 D 
 
 E 
 
 F 
 
 G 
 
 Each of the horizontal chains (A, B, C, etc) are series of motions, existing simultaneous- 
 ly. Take any motion “VI E“ for example. “VI E“ is moved by “V E ,” “V E“ 
 in turn by “IV E“ etc. As this is a series existing actually, that is, simultaneously, 
 all moving and being moved in the same moment, we must come to an ultimate un- 
 moved cause, “I E“ Whatever motion we start with, we finally stop at “/”. “1“ 
 then is the Prime Mover. This only applies to coexistent motions. 
 
 Each of the vertical chains “ I “ “11“ “111“ etc. are series of causes and effects, 
 where the cause is prior to the effect. The causes and effects are not coexistent; it is 
 a potential infinite, which, according to Aristotle, is possible. Take any link “IV F.“ 
 This is caused by “IV E“ which is caused by “IV D“ etc. This is a process in time, 
 and is infinite. The same is true of each of the vertical series. They are coeternal 
 with the Prime Mover “I ”, yet dependent upon it for their existence, since in the hori- 
 zontal series, each link ultimately leads to “/”. Thus the horizontals, ‘A,’ ‘B,’ *C,’ 
 are finite with the Uncaused Cause as the starting point; the vertical series are infi- 
 nite, coeternal with the uncaused cause, and parallel to it. 
 
 I II III IV V VI 
 
 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 
 
 i i i i i i 
 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 
 
 I I I I I I 
 
 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 
 
 I I I I I I 
 
 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 
 
 I I I I I I 
 
 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 
 
 I I I I I I 
 
 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 
 
 I I I I I I 
 
 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 — 0 
 
20 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 sarily at rest — therefore there can be no perpetual acci- 
 dental motion. 
 
 9. Every body which moves another is itself moved at 
 the moment it causes motion. 
 
 10. “Being in” a body means being in it as an accident 
 or as constituting the essence of the body; in both cases 
 it is a power in a body. 
 
 11. Certain things dependent upon body are accidentally 
 divided with the division of the body; e.g. color. Soul 
 and intellect are indivisible. 
 
 12. Every power which occupies all parts of a body is 
 finite. 
 
 13. Only the circular motion or motion of translation 
 can be continuous. 
 
 14. Motion of translation antecedes and is fundamental 
 to the other motions. 
 
 15. Time is an accident accompanying motion and in- 
 herent in it. One cannot exist without the other. What- 
 ever does not come under the category of motion is with- 
 out time. 
 
 16. The incorporeal is not subject to number unless it 
 is a force in a body, when it is numbered with the matter. 
 Intelligences cannot be numbered except from the point 
 of view of being causes and effects of each other. 
 
 17. Everything which is moved has necessarily a mover — 
 either extrinsic or intrinsic. 
 
 18. When a thing passes from potentiality to actuality, 
 the cause of this motion is another extrinsic thing. 
 
 19. Every Existent which has a cause is a “possible” 
 existent. 
 
 20. Every necessary Existent receives its Existence 
 from no cause. 
 
 21. No composite is a necessary existent. 
 
THE PROOF OF MAIMONIDES 
 
 21 
 
 22. Every body is necessarily a composite of Matter 
 and Form — and has accidents. 
 
 23. That which has a certain Possibility in its essence 
 may at a certain moment not exist actually. 
 
 24. That which is something potentially, necessarily 
 has matter, for possibility is always in matter. 
 
 25. The principles of a composite individual substance 
 are matter and form. There must necessarily be an agent 
 or mover, which moves the substratum to receive the form; 
 this is the proximate mover. The starting point for the 
 investigation of motion is the study of the Mover and the 
 Moved. It is the important statement of Aristotle “Matter 
 cannot move itself ” 46 that leads to consideration of the 
 existence of the First Mover. 47 
 
 These twenty-five propositions, Maimonides continues, 
 are all true, and proved in the Physics and Metaphysics 48 
 by Aristotle and his commentators. Some are very 
 simple, almost self-evident, while others are based on 
 difficult and complicated premises. But they are all 
 developed in the works of the Philosophers, and “I have 
 already stated that it is not my intention to copy the 
 books of the philosophers.” 49 Only those propositions 
 will be referred to which have a direct bearing upon our 
 present problem. 
 
 To these twenty-five propositions Maimonides fully 
 assents. Aristotle has proved them, and his proofs are 
 valid. The Twenty-sixth, however, Maimonides cannot 
 grant, despite the fact that Aristotle considers it more 
 
 48 Metaphysics, X, XII, 6, 1071b 29-30 — ov yap 7 } ye v\rj Kiurjaet abri) 
 eavrr]v. 
 
 47 t 6 TTp&TOV KLVOVV. 
 
 48 Physics =■ Arabic 3NriO d/cpodcis Heb. yDPn 1SD; Metaphysics- 
 
 Arabic fijPSt^K ~iy3 ND 3«n3 Heb. JDDH 1IW HD "ISO. See Guide, I. p. 380, note 2. 
 
 49 Munk, part II, p. 23: 
 
 Arab. nh’b riBDN^N 3n3 n^ttpD^n nin pa d’^ -jnD^y« ipi. 
 
 Heb. 13 D’DiDi^’Bn ibd p’nyn 1 ? nrn idkdh nra pp -pnsnin 1331 . 
 
22 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 deserving of belief than any of the others. The proposi- 
 tion is: 
 
 26. Time and motion are actual and eternal. Accord- 
 ing to this, Aristotle is forced to assume the existence of 
 an actual constantly moving body, i.e. the heavens, which 
 are not subject to genesis and destruction, since this motion 
 is eternal. The thing that moves is finite, and the path 
 is finite, but the repetition is infinite, which can only be 
 circular motion (Prop. 13). This is, of course, the acci- 
 dental infinite, that Aristotle here assumes (the existence 
 of an infinite number of things which follow one after 
 the other). This proposition Aristotle seems to regard 
 as true, but I believe that he did not consider his proofs 
 absolute. His commentators consider it as fully estab- 
 lished. The Mutakallimun, 50 on the other hand, deny 
 the accidental infinite altogether. My position is that 
 Aristotle’s view is neither established, nor impossible; it 
 is possible. We will grant him this principle tentatively; 
 we shall proceed with our proof and later return and give 
 our reasons for rejecting this proposition. 
 
 Maimonides now turns to the proofs for the Existence 
 of God. The chief proof is the one based on the Aristotelian 
 principles of motion. 
 
 We see motion in the world, the four different kinds 
 (Prop. 4). Matter, 51 which cannot move itself (Prop. 25), 
 is being moved; and therefore has an agent. This motion 
 cannot go on ad infinitum 52 (Prop. 3); it can only be 
 continued until we come to the outer sphere, the first 
 of the several kinds of motion (Prop. 14). The sphere 
 must also have a mover (Prop. 17), either outside or inside. 
 There are four alternatives: (1) If outside, the mover is 
 a body like the sphere; (2) or it is an incorporeal thing, 
 
 *« Arab. poVanD Heb. 0H31D. 
 
 rj v\rj =■ materia =» Arab. HIND*. Heb. ")Din 
 62 Ad infinitum = Arab. iTNrn Heb. 
 
THE PROOF OF MAIMONIDES 
 
 23 
 
 e.g., an Intelligence. (3) If inside, it is an internal cor- 
 poreal power divisible with the sphere (Prop. 10, 11), 
 or (4) an internal indivisible power (Prop. 10, 11). 
 
 The first alternative is untenable, for if the mover is 
 a body like the sphere, it must itself be in motion (Prop. 9) 
 and must have another to set it in motion; and the other, 
 if a body must be moved by still another, and so on ad in- 
 finitum. This is impossible (Prop. 2). 
 
 The third is impossible. The sphere is corporeal and 
 therefore finite (Prop. 1) and its power must be finite (Prop. 
 12), since it is distributed throughout the sphere (Prop. 
 11). Thus it cannot cause infinite motion (Prop. 26). 
 
 The fourth is also impossible since this power could 
 not cause infinite motion by itself; for a soul that moves 
 its body is itself moved per accidens (Prop. 6), and what- 
 ever moves accidentally must come to rest (Prop. 8); 
 consequently the thing moved by it will stop. 
 
 Thus, only one alternative remains: (2) an incorporeal 
 thing — a Separate-Intelligence, not a composite. It is 
 not moved per se nor per accidens, and is therefore indi- 
 visible and unchangeable (Prop. 7,5). This is God. 
 There cannot be two Gods — because absolutely incorporeal 
 existences are not subject to number (Prop. 16) except in 
 so far as one is cause and the other effect. Since there 
 is no motion in God, there can be no time (Prop. 15). 
 
 “The result of the above argument is consequently this: 
 the sphere cannot move ad infinitum of its own accord; 
 the Prime Motor is not corporeal nor a force residing in 
 a body; it is One, unchangeable, and in its existence is 
 independent of time. Three of our postulates are thus 
 proved by the principal philosophers.” 53 
 
 61 Munk, Guide , part II, p. 36. 
 
 Arab. rrttnD rionn nnKn -pri’ ;k ^no -^bVk ;k id^k Kin hi ipa 
 
 D’V Ik 1 ? -nn’ k 1 ? iriKi niKi odj ’s nip k 1 ?! kdd: in d’ 1 ? n^nnn ’s ‘tik^k 33d^>k ]ki 
 .riBO^KB^K K^B Kn^jj pro ’n*?K hVkdd rin'rn^K h nim jkdq wnnpn nmii 
 
24 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 This is the first proof of Maimonides for the existence 
 of God, and is taken over almost bodily from Aristotle. 54 
 The other proofs (three in number), which Maimonides 
 employs to establish the existence of God, were developed by 
 the Mohammedan Peripatetics (Alfarabi and Avicenna ss ) ; 
 but they too based their demonstrations on the Aristotelian 
 propositions enumerated above, so that these three proofs 
 are also due to Peripatetic influence. 
 
 Maimonides’ second proof is as follows. If one element 
 of a composite of two components exists separately, the 
 second element must also exist separately. We see in 
 the world things which “cause motion’’ and “are moved”. 56 
 We also find things which “are moved” only, but which 
 do not impart motion. Therefore, there must exist some- 
 thing which “causes motion,” while it is itself “not moved.” 
 Since this object is not subject to motion, it is indivisible, 
 incorporeal and independent of time, as was shown in 
 the first proof. 
 
 Maimonides’ third proof is as follows. No one doubts 
 that things actually exist, e.g. things perceived by the senses. 
 With respect to these things, there are three possible alterna- 
 tives: (1) They are all eternal (at both ends); (2) None are 
 eternal; (3) Some are and some are not. The first is clearly 
 inadmissible, for we continually see things coming into 
 existence. The second is likewise inadmissible, for there 
 would be a possibility of all things coming to an end. This 
 possibility would at some time be realized, since a pos- 
 sibility which can never be actualized is not a possibility. 
 
 Heb. .n’nxj nyun ioxy yw nppn p nsioa nrn pyn p i: 1 ? naa run 
 
 mano initoxo ptw non®’ n 1 ? inn ronri ana na nVi an nrn myuna niwton naonn 
 .□’DiDi^sn ’awn nsio Dn*^y ie>y new niVtw vbvn on ,prn 
 
 64 See note 44. 
 
 66 Alfarabi (died 950) and Avicenna (died 1037); for a brief summary of their 
 philosophies, see The History of Philosophy in Islam by Tjitze J. De Boer, translated 
 into English by E. R. Jones, London 1903, p. 108 ff, and p. 132 ff ; also Ignaz Goldziher, 
 “Die Islamische Philosophic des Mittelalters” in Die Kultur der Gegenwart , Part I, 
 section 5, p. 301 ff. 
 
 *• “Cause motion”; “are moved”® Arab, yinn® "pnnn® Heb. iy'P®iyyUn\ 
 
THE PROOF OF MAIMONIDES 
 
 25 
 
 Such a possibility must have been realized at some time 
 in the past, motion is eternal (Prop. 26) and genesis and 
 destruction in the various species has no beginning — at 
 that time there would be nothing — which can cause noth- 
 ing. But we find things existing, e.g. ourselves. We 
 therefore must conclude that there is an eternal being, 
 not subject to genesis and destruction, whose existence 
 is necessary (the third alternative). 
 
 The necessity of this Existent is not dependent upon any 
 cause (Prop. 20); it has absolute existence (Prop. 21) 
 and it cannot contain any plurality 57 (Prop. 21). It 
 follows that it cannot be a body nor a power residing in 
 a body (Prop. 22). 
 
 There cannot be two absolutely necessary existents; 
 for, in that case, they would not be necessary existents 
 per se, or through their essence; but through that property 
 added to the essence of each, viz. the element of necessary 
 existence. 
 
 Furthermore, the essence of a being which by itself 
 constitutes its species, is of the utmost perfection. It 
 can in no way be reconciled with the principle of dualism; 
 for if there were two, and both had a differential element, 
 they would be composite, and could not be the first cause 
 (Prop. 19). If one only contained a differential ele- 
 ment, it could not be ultimate. If there were no dif- 
 ferential element, both would be one. In any case, we 
 must posit Unity . 58 
 
 “It is now clear that there must be a being with absolu- 
 tely independent existence, a being whose existence cannot 
 be attributed to any external cause, and which does not 
 include different elements this being is God’’. 59 
 
 ” Plurality, Arab. TH3n= Heb. ’131. 
 
 M Unity, Arab. TITin=Heb. "lirP. 
 
 69 Munk, Guide , II, p. 41-42. 
 
 Arab, fhni nnNi -itanyio -n rbn ors 1 ? if . no on ]x "ibJ7N Kin sons ]mnn ips 
 
 in Kim ...n’D nonn t6i miii^ 330 k 1 ? in 
 
26 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 The fourth proof of Maimonides reads as follows. We 
 constantly see things passing from potentiality to actuality. 60 
 An external agent is necessary to bring about this change 
 (Prop. 18). This agent was potential, when the thing was 
 potential, and became actual in actualizing the thing. 
 It was at first potential either because of some obstacle 
 in the agent itself, or because of the absence of a certain 
 relation between the agent and its effect. To remove this 
 obstacle or to establish the required relation, another agent 
 is necessary; the latter, in turn, needs an agent for itself, 
 and so on ad infinitum. But this is impossible (Prop. 3); 
 we must therefore come to an agent which is constant, 
 and in no sense potential (Prop. 23). The agent cannot 
 be material but must be free from matter (Prop. 24). 
 “The immaterial being that includes no possibility what- 
 ever, but exists actually by its own essence is God. 
 Since He is incorporeal, as has been demonstrated, it 
 follows that He is One” (Prop. 16). 61 
 
 The Proof of Alanus for the Existence of God 
 
 The chief proof that Alanus adduces for the Existence 
 of God is based on the Idea of Causality; he argues a 
 posteriori and gradually reaches the conception of a Prime 
 Cause by deductions from several premises which he 
 formulates at the beginning. In itself this method does 
 not indicate that it will lead to a proof for the Existence 
 of God, it seems rather a consideration of the Problem 
 of Causality. It is not until the discussion ends with 
 
 Heb. nnana loxy nrnaa niK’xon a”ino kxd: vrv ]ryn nr 'sb nsioa nKann naa n:n 
 
 a®n inn ...naann ia ]’ki .miK'XD 1 ? nao pK n®K ton 
 
 90 Potentiality: Arab nip = Heb. na; Actuality: Arab ^ys = Heb. ^yB. 
 
 61 Munk, Guide , II, pp. 43-44. 
 
 Arab. pan npi nt^N 1 ™ in nnKia niiio in ^a k^xk n’s ]tOD« k 1 ? pnanDD^Ni 
 nnry noiKD^K nonpo^K 's nan K»a nroti ins odi k 1 ? nut 
 Heb. 1331 rpan’) m^xn Kin losya kxdi Kin ^>aK bbi la mn®BK pK i®k Vna:m 
 nn®y vvn nDnpna nan® ioa ,nn« Kin a"K »pa irw nKann 
 
THE PROOF OF ALANUS 
 
 27 
 
 the demonstration of the necessity of a Prime Cause, that 
 its nature as an argument for the Existence of God be- 
 comes evident. In addition to this proof (the only one 
 which he develops systematically and at length) Alanus 
 refers to the theological ideas of world-harmony and world- 
 order; and at times approaches a conception somewhat 
 similar to Aristotle’s proof from Motion. 
 
 The Causality- Proof 62 is the subject of chapters 1-12 
 in the De Arte seu Articulis Catholicae Fidei. But before 
 Alanus undertakes the development of this argument, he 
 enumerates in the Prologus several Definitions, Postulates 
 and Axioms. Among the Definitions, he includes Form, 
 Matter, Substance, Accident, Motion, and others . 63 
 The postulates are three in number. (1) Every composite 
 has a cause which makes it a composite. (2) Infinite re- 
 gress is impossible. (3) Attributes of caused things which 
 are attributed to causes, but are not inherent in those 
 causes, are attributed to those causes from the point of 
 view of effect and causality . 64 The Axioms which enter 
 into the Proof for the Existence of God are the following: 
 (1) Everything receives its existence from that which brings 
 its cause into existence; (2) Every cause is antecedent 
 to and more worthy than its effect; (3) Nothing is prior 
 
 62 Georg Griinwald in “Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Mittelalter bis zum 
 Ausgang der Hochscholastik ”, Munster 1907 ( Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic 
 des Mittelalter s, Band VI, Heft 3), treats very briefly of this Causality Proof of Alanus. 
 He fails, however, to give a clear and detailed exposition of the development of this 
 proof — he merely quotes several passages from the De Arte and translates them. In 
 most instances, he has used Baumker’s corrections (see his remarks, p.61, notes 2 and 4. 
 It is surprising that he has overlooked Baumker’s readings in his quotations on page 
 62, note 1, and page 65, note 2). 
 
 63 The quotations from the various works of Alanus are based on Migne’s Patrolo - 
 gia Latina , vol. 210, as corrected by Clemens Baumker in Philosophisches Jahrbuch 
 der Gorres-Gesellschaft, Band VI (1893), p. 163-175, 417-429. The corrections of 
 Baumker (who has manuscript authority in every case) are indicated here by an as- 
 terisk at the beginning followed by the letter B , and the page number of the Philosophi- 
 sches Jahrbuch at the end. The reading of Migne is preceded by the letter M. 
 
 84 Haec tria sunt, quae peto, seu petitiones. Primum, cuiuslibet compositionis 
 causam componentem esse; secundum, nullius rei causam in infinitum ascendere; 
 tertium, quae * causatorum sunt et (B. 166 M. creatorum) causis * attribuuntur (B. 
 166. M. attribuimus), nec insunt, per effectum et causam * illis (B. 166 M. illius) 
 attribui. De arte fidei catholicae {D. A. Prologus M. 598 B.). 
 
28 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 to or more worthy than itself. 6s From this enumeration 
 Alanus proceeds to his proof. His starting point is 
 the statement: “Whatever is the cause of a cause, is 
 the cause of the caused .” 66 If A is a thing caused by B 
 which in turn has a cause C, A whose cause is B will re- 
 ceive its existence through C. All are agreed that a thing 
 receives its existence through that which brings its cause 
 into existence . 67 B brings A into existence, since it is 
 its cause. C is the cause of B. Therefore, A receives its 
 existence from C. The proposition “Whatever is the cause 
 of a cause is also the cause of the caused” is now clear . 68 
 
 An accident essentially depends upon its subject; or 
 from the point of view of cause, the subject is the cause 
 of the accident. The preceding proposition stated that 
 whatever is the cause ( C ) of the cause ( B ), is also the 
 cause of the caused (A ) ; we may now substitute the sub- 
 ject (which is the cause of the accident) for B, and the 
 accident which is the thing caused for A, and our propo- 
 sition will read: “Whatever is the cause of the subject 
 is the cause of the accident .” 69 
 
 Nothing can cause itself or give itself existence . 70 
 How can one prove this? An opponent might say: “On 
 the contrary, a thing may be able to give itself existence.” 
 
 « Communes autem conceptiones sunt hae: Prima, omnis res habet esse per illud, 
 quod causam eius perducit ad esse. Secunda, omnis causa prior et dignior est suo 
 causato. Tertia, nihil est prius, vel dignius vel altius se ipso. D. A ., Prologus 598 B. C. 
 
 66 Propositio I. Quicquid est causa causae, est causa causati. D. A., Bk. I, 
 ch. 1. M. 597 D. 
 
 67 See note 65 — the first Axiom: Prima etc. 
 
 68 Sit enim causatum A, cuius causa B\ causa autem B sit C; A habebit esse 
 per C, cuius causa est B. Sed secundum primam animi conceptionem, omnis res habet 
 esse per illud quod causam illius ad esse perducit. Sed B perducit A ad esse; est enim 
 eius causa; C autem est causa B. Ergo secundum illam communem animi conceptionem , 
 A habet esse per C. Ergo A a descriptione causae C, etiam causa A, et sic patet 
 
 propositum. We have given the reading of B. 167 throughout, as the reading of 
 
 M. is altogether corrupt. D. A. I, 1, 597D-598D. 
 
 69 II Omnis causa subjecti est causa accidentis. Accidens enim ex descriptione 
 
 ipsius habet esse per subiectum, ergo a descriptione causae, subiectum est causa 
 accidentis. Sed praecedens theorema est: Quicquid est causa causae, est causa 
 
 causati. Ergo omnis causa subiecti est causa accidentis. D. A. I. 2, 598D-599A. 
 
 to HI Nihil se ipsum composuit, vel ad esse perduxit. D . A., I. 3 f 599A. 
 
THE PROOF OF ALANUS 
 
 29 
 
 Let us assume this possibility: it gives itself existence, 
 
 and is therefore the Cause 71 of itself. This means that 
 it must be antecedent to and more excellent than itself, 
 according to the second Axiom 72 , i. e. exist before it ex- 
 isted, which is, of course, impossible . 73 We must conclude, 
 then, that our proposition was correct . 74 
 
 Matter cannot be actual without form, nor can form 
 be actual without matter . 75 Matter by definition is a 
 ‘discrete’ (contrasted with a continuous) thing , 76 and 
 the essential characteristic of a discrete thing is either 
 to differ or to be the basis of a difference. The second 
 alternative must be ruled out, since matter is neither 
 quality nor form (these obviously are the causes of dif- 
 ferences). The first alternative must therefore be true: 
 Matter is different, but to be different means to have a 
 form or quality. One half of our proposition is now proved. 
 Matter cannot be without form . 77 
 
 We can also demonstrate that there can be no form 
 in actuality without matter, since it is the form which 
 distinguishes its substance from all other substances . 78 
 In order to accomplish this, it must be in its subject. 
 
 7 1 Alanus defines ‘cause’ in his Prologus: Causa est per quam habet aliquid 
 esse, quod dicitur * causatum (B. 166 M. creatumcatum [ = creatum] for catum [ =■ causa- 
 tum]) D. A., 597C. 
 
 72 See note 65, Axiom 2: Omnis causa prior et dignior est suo causato. 
 
 73 Because of Axiom 3 note 65, Tertia, nihil est etc. 
 
 74 Immo dicit adversarius: aliquid se ipsum composuit, vel ad esse perduxit. 
 Ergo ipsum habet esse per se: ergo est causa sui ipsius ex descriptione causae: ergo 
 est prius set dignius se ipso per secundam animi conceptionem. Sed hoc est contra 
 tertiam communem animi conceptionem. Nihil enim est prius vel dignius se ipso. 
 Ergo impossibile est quod aliquid se ipsum composuit, vel ad esse perduxerit. D. A., 
 I,3,599A. 
 
 76 Alanus bases his view of composition on the Aristotelian principles of matter 
 and form, that by means of this and the Causality idea, he may reach an ultimate cause. 
 IV. Neque subiecta materia sine forma, neque forma sine subiecta materia actu 
 potest esse. D. A. 4, 599B. 
 
 76 Materia est res discreta formae susceptibilis. D . A., 597C. 
 
 77 Si enim subiecta materia est, ergo res discreta est: ergo a descriptione discreti 
 differt, vel differre facit. Sed non differre facit, quia neque est proprietas, neque 
 forma; ergo differt; ergo a descriptione eius, quod est differre, ipsa est informata propri- 
 etatibus; ergo est formae subiecta; ergo non est sine forma. D. A., I, 4, 599B. 
 
 7 » Forma est quae ex concursu proprietatum adveniens a qualibet alia sub- 
 ntsiat afacit suum subjectum aliud esse. D. A. 597C. 
 
30 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 Matter is a necessary component in a subject. Therefore 
 there can be no form apart from matter . 79 
 
 We must now turn to the consideration of substance . 80 
 Substance, it is agreed, is composed of matter and form; 
 in other words, it receives its existence from matter and 
 form: matter and form cause substance. As we have 
 just explained, matter and form cannot exist independently 
 of each other. Form and matter become actually existent 
 through their composition; that is, the composition is 
 the cause of their existence. Since form and matter 
 cause substance, by proposition I (Whatever is the cause 
 of the cause — i. e. in this case, form and matter — is also 
 the cause of the caused — i. e. the substance) the composition 
 of matter and form is the cause of substance . 81 
 
 Thus every substance has a threefold cause, viz. the 
 matter, the form, and the composition of the two; and, 
 each of these three components has one and the same 
 cause . 82 The first part of this proposition follows from 
 the preceding argument. The second part is proved by 
 the first postulate (petitio ). 83 Since every composition 
 must have a cause which makes it component, there is 
 some cause for the composition of matter and form ; 84 
 
 79 Similiter est *a (B. 167 M. in) descriptione formae. Forma enim facit suum 
 subiectum esse aliud a qualibet alia substantia. Ergo forma est in subiecto, ergo in 
 subiecta materia. Et sic habetur propositum. D. A. I, 4, 599B. 
 
 80 Substantia est quae constat ex * subiecta (B. 166. M. Substantia) materia vel 
 forma. D. A. Prologus 597C. 
 
 81 V. Compositionem formae ad materiam esse causam substantiae. Sub- 
 stantia enim constat ex materia et forma. Ergo habet esse per formam et materiam. 
 (M — Ergo. .. materiam.) Ergo materia et forma sunt causa substantiae. (M -f 
 compositionis per primam petitionem;. Item, nec forma nisi componatur materiae, 
 nec materia nisi componatur formae, actu esse possunt, sicut prius probatum est. 
 Ergo forma et materia actu habent esse per compositionem earum; ergo compositio 
 est causa existentiae earum. Sed existentia earum est causa substantiae: ergo per 
 primum theorema compositio formae ad materiam est causa substantiae. Quidquid 
 enim est causa causae, est causa causati. D. A., I, 5, 599C. 
 
 82 VI. Cuiuslibet substantiae est triplex causa, scilicet materia et forma, et 
 earum compago, quarum trium eadem est causa. D. A., I, 6, 597C. 
 
 88 Primum, cuiuslibet compositionis causam componentem esse. D. A., 598B. 
 
 84 Since the cause of the cause (i. e. Matter and Form) is the cause of the caused 
 (i. e. the composition), all three have the same cause. 
 
THE PROOF OF ALANUS 
 
 31 
 
 and the same is also the cause of matter and form . 85 
 
 All things subject to the category of number either 
 are different or cause difference. For number is the alto- 
 gether discrete. If anything is subject to number, it 
 must necessarily be discrete , 86 and by definition of dis- 
 crete, it must be the basis of a difference . 87 
 
 Nothing is its own cause. This is deduced immediately 
 from proposition III. Nothing can cause its own compo- 
 sition or bring itself into existence, which means that 
 nothing exists per se. Therefore nothing can be its own 
 cause . 88 
 
 Every inferior (not self-dependent) cause has a supreme 
 (ultimate) cause. This is an obvious conclusion from the 
 second proposition. If there can be no infinite regress, 
 we must reach a Prime Cause . 89 
 
 This systematic geometric proof has led us to a highest 
 cause, without which we cannot understand the existence 
 of things. In fact the very existence of things was the 
 starting point for our proof. We have developed the 
 conception of this prime cause in nine propositions; we 
 have posited this ultimate as necessary on the basis of 
 causality. It remains for us now to investigate into the 
 nature of this ultimate, to see if it has the characteristics 
 which we attribute to Divinity. 
 
 The tenth proposition states: The supreme cause is 
 
 85 VI. Cuiuslibet (Note 82). Prima pars huius theorematis ex praecedenti robur 
 assumit. Secunda autem pars per primam petitionem probatur. Cum autem cuius- 
 libet compositionis aliqua est causa componens, ergo compositionis formae ad materiam 
 aliqua est causa, ergo ipsa causa compositionis compaginisque et materiae et formae, 
 quod mediante theorematae praecedenti probatur. D. A., I, 6, 599A. 
 
 86 See notes 75, 76, and 77. 
 
 87 VII Quaecumque sub numero cadunt, differunt, vel differre faciunt. Numerus 
 enim discretorum est summa. Ergo si cadunt sub numero, discreta sunt; ergo a 
 descriptione discreto differre faciunt. D. A., I, 7, 600A. 
 
 88 VIII. Nihil est causa sui. Hoc a tertio theoremati fidem accipit: Nihil enim 
 se ipsum composuit, vel ad esse perduxit. Ergo nihil est per se; ergo nec est sui 
 causa. D. A., I, 8, 600A. 
 
 89 IX. Cuiuslibet inferioris * causae (B. 168 M. esse) suprema causa. Nullius 
 enim rei causae in infinitum ascendunt, sicut secunda proponitur petitione. D. A, f I, 
 9, 600A. 
 
32 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 neither part of a composite, nor is it internally composite . 90 
 For let us assume the supreme cause to be composite in 
 either sense. In any composite, there is a cause which 
 makes it a composite, by Postulate I. The cause is 
 either the one we are considering or it is another. It 
 cannot be the one we are discussing, for it would then be 
 its own cause, which is impossible (Proposition VIII). 
 If it is another, by Axiom II it is superior to the thing of 
 which it is the cause. This other, then, is the supreme 
 cause, and not the composite. The only two alternatives 
 we have stated are both impossible. Therefore, the su- 
 preme cause is in no sense a composite . 91 
 
 Furthermore the supreme cause is neither quality nor 
 form. Since both of these are necessarily existent in a 
 composite 92 and the supreme cause is not in a composite, 
 it is neither quality nor form . 93 
 
 It follows from the preceding arguments (Proposition X) 
 that this supreme cause is absolutely simple, whence it is 
 clear that there is one supreme cause for all things, in 
 order to be able to discuss this ultimate, we call it God . 94 
 Now, if an opponent (a heretic or a Manichaean) argues 
 that there is not one supreme cause only, let us assume 
 several supreme causes, two at least. If they are subject 
 to the category of number, they are either themselves 
 different or are the basis of a difference (Proposition VII). 
 
 90 Causa suprema neque componitur alicui neque ipsam aliqua componunt. 
 D. A., I, 10, 600A. 
 
 91 X. Causa suprema Nam sive hoc, sive illud sit, compositionis illius est 
 
 aliqua causa componens per ipsam primam petitionem, quae causa componens aut 
 est ipsa causa, de qua agitur aut alia. Sed ilia, de qua agitur, esse non potest. Nihil 
 enim est sui causa. Ergo alia est ab ea, de qua dicitur. Sed omnis causa est superior 
 (M +a) suo causato per secundam communem animi conceptionem, ergo ilia est superi- 
 or, et suprema causa, quod est impossibile. D. A., I., 10, 600A-B. 
 
 92 See note 78. 
 
 93 XI. Causa suprema neque proprietas neque forma. Non enim componitur 
 alicui, ergo nec est proprietas, neque forma. D. A ., I, 11, 600B. 
 
 94 XII. Causam supremam simplicissiman, esse oportet. Unde manifestum 
 est unam tantum esse omnium causam supremam, quam ratiocinandi gratia dicimus 
 Deum. D. A ., I, 12, 600B. Comp, also Regulae Theologicae 63, 65 1C. Prima sub- 
 stantia non recipit maius vel minus. 
 
THE PROOF OF ALANUS 33 
 
 They cannot be the basis of a difference, since by hypo- 
 thesis they are neither quality nor form (Proposition XI). 
 One alternative remains: they are themselves different. 
 By definition of “differing” they must contain attributes 
 or forms, in other words they are composites. Every 
 composite has a supreme cause (Proposition I). Therefore 
 they have a cause or causes, and cannot themselves be 
 supreme causes, which is contradictory to the hypothesis . 95 
 We thus arrive at a prime cause, God, by means of the 
 causality conception. 
 
 Before we proceed to the exposition of the other im- 
 plied proofs for the existence of God in the works of Alanus, 
 let us give a brief summary of his chief proof, which we 
 have discussed at length. 
 
 I The cause of the cause is the cause of the caused. 
 
 II The cause of the subject is the cause of the acci- 
 
 dent. 
 
 III Nothing can give itself existence. 
 
 IV Neither matter nor form can exist separately. 
 
 V The composition of matter and form causes Sub- 
 
 stance. 
 
 VI The three-fold cause of Substance is Matter, Form, 
 and Composition. 
 
 VI I Things subject to number differ or cause a difference. 
 
 VIII Nothing is its own cause. 
 
 IX Every inferior cause has a supreme cause 
 
 X The supreme cause is in no sense composite. 
 
 XI The supreme cause is neither quality nor form. 
 
 XII The supreme cause is absolutely simple — we call 
 it God. 
 
 96 . .corollarium autem* indirecte (B. 168 M. inductum) probatur. Si enim ad- 
 versarius dicat. .non unam tantum esse causam supremam ponantur ergo plures: 
 . .cadunt sub numero; ergo differunt vel differre faciunt, per septimum theorema. 
 Sed neutra differre facit, quia neutra est proprietas nec forma. .Ergo differunt. Ergo 
 per discriptionem eius, quod est differre, causae illae sunt informatae proprietatibus 
 vel formis; ....Sed compositionis cuiuslibet aliqua est causa suprema. .ergo non 
 sunt supremae causae; quod est contra hypothesim. D. A. % I, 12, 600C. 
 
34 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 Alanus in his various works makes reference to three 
 other proofs for the existence of God, none of which he 
 attempts to explain or develop, as he does in the case of 
 the causality proof. These three proofs are nowhere made 
 the subject of a separate discussion; they merely occur 
 in some minor connection, usually in support of some 
 other argument. 
 
 In Contra Hcereticos, the first of these three subordinate 
 proofs is found, the proof from Creation. Creation which 
 is an established fact is taken as the foundation of a proof 
 for God’s existence . 96 “As the Apostle says, through 
 those things which have been created, the Philosophers 
 can comprehend the invisible things of God .” 97 Creation 
 necessarily implies a Creator or a God. 
 
 A proof for the existence of God from the wonder and 
 harmony of the world is alluded to by Alanus in the first 
 book of Contra Hcereticos. “Philosophers have learned 
 God’s power from the magnitude of things, His wisdom 
 from the beauty of things and His Divine Goodness from 
 the harmony of things.” 98 This proof is very old; Augus- 
 tine employs it , 99 and after him, many philosophers make 
 use of it. Perhaps it was for this reason that Alanus did 
 not consider it worthy of a detailed analysis. 
 
 The third of these proofs bears a striking similarity to 
 Aristotle’s proof from motion. 100 “Every mutable thing 
 points to something immutable, every movable thing points 
 
 96 See M. Baumgartner, Die Philosophie des Alanus de Insulis , Munster 1898, 
 p. 107, note 5. This proof is really the Causality proof, but emphasis is here placed 
 on Creation. 
 
 97 Contra Hcereticos I, 7, 314B. Dixit enim Apostolus, quod per ea quae facta 
 sunt, invisibilia dei conspiciuntur a philosophis (Rom. I, 20) Th. Aquinas, “Summa 
 Theologica” Bk. I, ch. 2. Abelard and Peter Lombard also use this quotation from the 
 Apostle as a proof for the existence of the Creator. 
 
 98 C. H ., I, 7, 314B. Per rerum magnitudinem intellexerunt philosophi dei 
 potentiam, per rerum pulchritudinem eiusdem sapientiam, per earundem ordinem 
 divinam bonitatem. 
 
 99 De Civitate Dei XI, 4. 
 
 100 Physics VIII 5, 256a. Metaphysics XII 6, 1071b. 
 
THE PROOF OF ALANUS 
 
 35 
 
 to something which is at rest.” 101 The existence of 
 mutable and movable things leads necessarily to the exis- 
 tence of an immutable, unmoved thing. In Book III we 
 find the same idea. “Just as all plurality which is divisible, 
 proceeds from indivisible unity, so all variable things 
 emanate from the Invariable Creator.” 102 Change 103 in 
 the world clearly indicates one who is its cause, i.e. God, 
 omnipotent and eternal. 
 
 Alanus has now proved the existence of an ultimate 
 cause, the highest pow'er, which is one in the strictest sense 
 of Unity (Proposition XII). Maimonides and Averroes, 
 after attaining to this conception, have rationally demon- 
 strated the Deity of their Faith, and the proof is complete. 
 Alanus, however, must continue his exposition. He has 
 reached the Unity, but the Trinity which is the same 
 (or another aspect of Unity) must also be deduced. In 
 chapters 24-30 he presents his solution of the problem; 
 he states the premises from which the Trinity is derived 
 and attempts to show that it is compatible with the other 
 divisions of his system. 
 
 Like the other great Christian thinkers of the twelfth 
 century, Alanus expended much labor and thought in 
 presenting the Trinity in the light of reason by means of 
 analogies, comparisons, and symbols. 
 
 Just as there is a threefold cause for a substance (Prop. 
 XI) so is there a threefold effect in one and the same Creator : 
 the three persons of the Trinity; the Father, the Son and 
 
 101 C. H., I, 5, M. 311 A. Omne enim mutabile insinuat aliquid esse immuta- 
 bile; omne mobile insinuat aliquid esse quietum. And C. H. I, 8, 315R. Oportet esse 
 immutabilem. 
 
 102 C. H. Ill, 4, 405C. Sicut ab unitate indivisibili, omnis procedit pluritas, 
 quae divisibilis est, ita a creatori invariabili omne procedit variabile. 
 
 108 Alanus enumerates six kinds of motion (following Aristotle in ‘the Categories’) 
 Motus est accidens, quod attenditur secundum aliquam mutationem. Motus sex 
 sunt species: Generatio, corruptio, augmentum, diminutio, secundum locum mutatio, 
 
 alteratio. See “The Categories of Aristotle” by I. Husik, Philosophical Review , 
 1904. 
 
36 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 the Holy Ghost. 104 The entire Trinity must function 
 in each of the three. 105 The entire conception of the 
 Trinity and our discussion of it can only be in figurative 
 terms. 106 The members of the Trinity are equal with 
 respect to power and nature. 107 The essence of the three 
 persons is one, and none is different from the other. 108 
 Anything predicated of the Divine Essence is applicable 
 to the three persons. 109 The trinity of the persons is 
 the Unity of Deity . 110 
 
 All these proofs, however, for the Existence of God are 
 neither irrefutable nor altogether convincing: absolute 
 necessity cannot be attributed to them. They merely 
 guide us to the assumption of the existence of God, 
 but they do not constitute proof in the strict sense, and 
 cannot be termed Knowledge. In the case of the Trinity 
 it is all the more so; it can at best be represented only 
 “figuraliter.” But even the carefully developed causality 
 proof for the existence of God is not cogent. “We can 
 not comprehend God through Knowledge, we can only 
 comprehend Him through Faith.” 1,1 
 
 The Proof of Averroes for the Existence of God 
 
 . The proofs of Averroes for the Existence of God, as 
 contained in the second part 112 of his Philosophy and 
 Theology, namely the “Speculative Dogmatics,” 113 are 
 
 »®« D. A., I. 24. and C. H., Ill, 3. 403B. 
 
 D. A., I, 25. 
 
 106 D. A., I, 26. Alanus means that the proof of the trinity is not absolute. Cf. 
 B.iumker, op. cit, p. 112. 
 
 107 D. A., I, 27. and C. FI., III, 4, 405D. 
 
 loo D. A., I. 28. ioo D. A., I, 29. no D. A., I, 30. 
 
 in D. A., I, 17, 601 C: Deum nulla scientia, sed sola fide deprehendimus 
 
 H2 The brief title of the first part of this work of Averroes is “The Accord between 
 Religion and Philosophy”. It occupies pages 1-27 in M. J. Muller’s edition. In 
 this treatise Averroes presents the views of the various Arabic schools on the question 
 of the harmonization of religion and philosophy, and the attitude to be adopted 
 towards the Koran. After an analysis and criticism of these theories, Averroes gives 
 his own solution. An abstract of this treatise, a necessary prerequisite for an 
 understanding of Averroes’ philosophy, is given in an Excursus. 
 
 n* Marcus Joseph Muller, op. cit., pp. 27-128. The proof for the Existence of 
 God is contained in pp. 28, 1, 17-47, i.2. 
 
THE PROOF OF AVERROES 
 
 37 
 
 based entirely on the Koran, and conclusions deduced from 
 verses contained in it. Before he takes up the problem 
 of the existence of God, Averroes says: “I shall begin 
 with the determination of those things, which the Law- 
 giver desired that all should believe with respect to God, 
 and the methods which he employed in the Koran for this 
 purpose. We shall begin with the way which leads to 
 the knowledge of the Creator, the fundamental dogma 
 of the Moslem. But (before we proceed to the exposition 
 of our own views), we shall discuss the opinions of the various 
 schools (in Islam).” 114 
 
 The best known schools of our time are four in number : 
 (1) The Ash'ariyya, (2) the Mu'tazila, (3) The Bitiniyya, 
 and (4) the Hashwiyya. I1S Each has different theories 
 concerning the Divinity, and each believes its views have 
 been handed down from primitive Islam. In truth, 
 this is not so, most of their dogmas being later innovations 
 and interpretations. 
 
 In the following discussion only those principles will 
 be considered which are absolute articles of faith. 
 
 The existence of God, and the other principles, accord- 
 ing to the Hashwiyya, must not be subjected to rational 
 investigation; they are commanded by Authority, and this 
 is sufficient to insure their truth. In other words, they 
 
 111 31 ^ L tilli 3-* \j 
 
 J ibV 
 
 3* j 3. 
 
 ,jl .>CJ_ jtLA djl if il Ivdl 2 J 
 
 0 (J 3JI lillr »1 j\ jfx 31 J --JJ <, — aiSlJl 
 
 diJi J, Page 28. 1. 12-17. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) See Martin 
 
 Schreiner, “Zur Geschichte des As'aritenthums” ( Huitieme Congrls International 
 des Orientalistes . Part II, Section 1. Leyden 1893). 
 
 (2) See H. Steiner: Die Mu 1 taziliten oder die Freidenker im Islam , Leipzig, 1865. 
 
 (3) See Scharast&ni, trans. by Haarbrticker, Halle 1850, Part I, pp. 221-230. 
 
 (4) See G. von Vloten. “Les Hachwia et Nabita” 11th Congress of Orientalists, 
 Paris, 1899. 
 
38 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOI) 
 
 deny that the Existence of God can be demonstrated by 
 the human intellect. This view can easily be refuted, 
 since the Koran itself enjoins the speculative consideration 
 of His Existence (Sur. II, 19 et al.). “If so”, one may ask, 
 “why did not the Prophet give a philosophical demonstration 
 ol the Existence of the Creator, before he called men to 
 His service?” The answer to this is evident. All Arabs 
 believe in God instinctively, and it was not necessary for 
 the Prophet to establish this truth for them. 
 
 The Ash'ariyya, on the other hand, maintain that the 
 Existence of God lies within the proper field of the reason ; 
 but in their proofs they make use of non-Koranic methods. 
 They start with the proposition, that the world is created, 116 
 which is based upon the premise that bodies are composed 
 of indivisible created atoms. This theory in itself is very 
 difficult to understand, but even granting it, does the 
 Creator follow from creation? Is He eternal or created? 
 If the latter, we can go on ad infinitum. If He is eternal, 
 His action must likewise be eternal. The only solution pos- 
 sible is to hold that a created action can come from an 
 eternal Agent. But the Ash'ariyya will not, admit this, 
 for they believe that everything which is connected with 
 a created thing is itself created. And, again, if things 
 are created, the Agent at one time acts and at other times 
 does not act; there must be a cause, then, which changes 
 the state of the Agent. This cause also must have a cause 
 which sets it in action after non-action, and so on ad 
 infinitum. 
 
 The Ash'ariyya attempted to answer these questions 
 by saying that a created action may originate from an 
 eternal Will. This, however, does not remove the difficulty, 
 for a creation cannot come from an eternal Will without 
 the medium of Action. There are three distinct elements: 
 
 116 Compare Maimonides’ examination of the Kalam, Moreh, Book I, ch. 71. 
 
THE PROOF OF AVERROES 
 
 39 
 
 the thing, the Will (which is the cause of the Action), 
 and the Action (which is the cause of the Creation) ; were 
 this not so, we would have a creation without an agent. 
 The Ash'ariyya have merely made the Action a middle, 
 but the problem remains the same. 
 
 Furthermore, this eternal Will co-existed with the non- 
 existence of the creation an infinite time, for the creation 
 was non-existent an infinite time. This Will enters 
 actuality together with its creation, after the cessation 
 of an infinity of time. As the infinite cannot end, this 
 is, of course, absurd. 
 
 And again, if the eternal Will is to cause a certain Action, 
 a new element must enter which was not previously present. 
 If we do not assume this, in what way will the Existence 
 of the Action be distinguished from its non-Existence? 117 
 
 In addition to the difficulties we have mentioned, there 
 are many other doubts : the Koran could not have commanded 
 investigation according to these methods, for it would be 
 an “obligatio ultra posse.” We must rule out the argu- 
 ments of the Ash'ariyya for two important reasons. 
 First the masses cannot comprehend them, and secondly 
 they are not demonstrative. 
 
 We referred previously to the proofs generally employed 
 by the Ash'ariyya to prove the Existence of God. One 
 of them (and this is the most familiar) is based upon 
 three premises: (1) Substances 118 are inseparable from 
 accidents; 119 (2) Accidents are created; (3) Anything 
 connected with creation is itself created. 
 
 Let us take these up individually. (1) Substances are 
 inseparable from Accidents. When applied to ordinary 
 
 117 Cf. Maimonides, Moreh, II, ch. 14 (5th Method) where there is a somewhat 
 similar discussion. 
 
 118 J* y’T Substance. 
 
 u* , ^ jC. Accident. 
 
40 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 bodies, this premise is quite evident, but when used with 
 reference to atoms, 120 various questions arise. In the 
 first place, the existence of the atom is not known per se, 
 and philosophers are not agreed as to its nature. The 
 Ash'ariyya maintain that the existence of the atom is 
 almost axiomatic. When we say that the elephant is 
 bigger than the ant, we mean that it has more parts or 
 atoms. The elephant is not one simple existence, but a 
 composite of atoms, which separate with the destruction 
 of the body. The Ash'ariyya erred in their atom con- 
 ception because of a confusion of contiguous and continuous 
 quantity; contiguous quantity, which is only applicable 
 to numbers, they apply to bodies (continuous quantities). 
 If continuous quantity were equivalent to contiguous 
 quantity, the science of Geometry would coincide with 
 the science of Arithmetic, which is obviously not true. 
 
 We may also ask the Ash'ariyya: “When the Atom has 
 come into being, what happens to the ‘coming into being’ ?” 
 ‘Coming into being’ is an accident, and when something 
 has come into being and exists, the accident is removed, 
 which can never happen according to the Ash'ariyya, 
 for accidents cannot be separated from their subjects. 
 
 Furthermore, if the Existent comes from the non-Existent, 
 with what is the action of the agent connected? In order 
 to obviate this difficulty, the Mu‘tazila were compelled to 
 assume some Being in non-Existence. Both of these 
 schools must necessarily admit the Existence of the Vacuum. 
 “These doubts, as you see, Dialectics cannot dispel. This 
 then should not be made the starting-point for the Know- 
 ledge of the Deity, at least not for the masses. The true 
 Methods of attaining to a comprehension of God are clearer 
 than these, as will be explained later.” 121 
 
 120 ^ V yi-l Atom. Cf. Maimonides’ refutation of the Kal&m, 
 
 Proposition I: “The Theory of Atoms.” Moreh, I, ch. 73. 
 
 — tX" j Ac o V— 1^.5^ 1 o «-k^.3 
 
 121 
 
THE PROOF OF AVERROES 
 
 41 
 
 The second premise of the Ash'ariyya, “All accidents 
 are created” is as perplexing as their first premise, which 
 states that bodies are created. We must assume that 
 what we perceive by our senses to be true in the case of 
 certain bodies and accidents, is also true in cases where 
 we are unable to make use of our senses. 
 
 Time is an accident, but it is impossible to form a 
 conception of its being created. Every created thing 
 must be preceded in time by its non-existence, and the 
 priority of anything can only be understood in terms of 
 time. If time were created, would there be time before 
 time? 122 The same is true of space. If space exists 
 as a Vacuum, the creation of this Vacuum must be preceded 
 by another Vacuum and so on ad infinitum. The only 
 fact that the Ash'ariyya succeed in proving is that the 
 accidents, which the sense perceives as created, are created. 
 All the rest is mere rhetorical quibbling. 
 
 The third premise of the Ash'ariyya, “Everything that 
 is connected with a created thing is itself created” — rests 
 on a homonymy. The expression “that which is not in- 
 dependent of a created thing” may be understood in two 
 ways: (1) that which is not independent of the category 
 of created things, or (2) that which is not independent 
 of this particular created thing. When interpreted ac- 
 cording to (2), the proposition is true; namely that something 
 connected with this particular created thing is itself created. 
 If taken in the first sense, however, it is clearly untrue, 
 because an infinite number of successive accidents may 
 enter into one eternal subject. The later scholastics saw 
 
 j .A-* AjL J I V o' lili 
 
 L« O-i^ ^jA <L)| JAA (jlj J Jj J 
 
 _U> LJ ji JV> Page 33, 1. 18-21. 
 
 Cf. Th. Aquinas “Surama Contra Gentiles”, Bk II, ch. 33, where a similar 
 argument is given in the name of those "probare volentium aeternitatem mundi.” 
 The solution of this problem is contained, ibid., ch. 36, 
 
42 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 the weakness of these premises and attempted to strength- 
 en them by adducing proof to eliminate the possibility 
 in (1) just mentioned. They claim that if this were so, 
 there could never be any accident in the subject, since an 
 accident could only exist in the subject after the termination 
 of an infinite number of successive accidents, which is 
 absurd. They illustrate their point by the following. 
 One man says to another: “I shall not give you this Dinar 
 until I shall have given you an infinite number of Dinars.” 
 This comparison, when analyzed, does not hold. There 
 is here a definite beginning (the time when the conversa- 
 tion of the two men took place) and a definite end (the 
 time when the Dinar was to be given) and in between there 
 is an Infinity, which is obviously impossible. It does 
 not follow from the absurdity of this illustration, that 
 their proposition, “that which is to come into existence 
 after the cessation of an infinity of things cannot come into 
 existence at all,” is true. An endless series may be of two 
 kinds, either circular, or linear. If it is circular, it is 
 naturally and essentially infinite, unless some hindering 
 cause enters; e. g. if there is Sunrise, there must be Sunset, 
 and vice versa. In the second case, however, where the 
 infinite exists in a line, e.g. the human species, it can only 
 be endless per accidens; for example in the continuation 
 of the human species, it is not impossible for the Creator 
 to bring forth an infinity of individuals, using different 
 instruments to accomplish this eternal action (that is, 
 using the father, or generator, to produce the son). 
 
 These remarks, although incomplete, show that these 
 methods are neither demonstrative nor suitable for the 
 masses. 
 
 The second method of the Ash'ariyya, mentioned above, 
 rests upon two premises. The first premise is as follows: 
 It is possible for anything to be different from what it 
 
THE PROOF OF AVERROES 
 
 43 
 
 actually is — it might even be its opposite; in other words, 
 nothing is true per se. The world might be larger or smaller, 
 it might have a different form, any motion might be 
 changed, the stone might fall upwards, and the fire tend 
 downward, etc. 
 
 The other premise states that the possible’ 123 is 
 created and has an Agent or Creator, who is the cause 
 of its being one of tw r o possible things rather than the 
 other. 
 
 The first premise has a semblance of truth only at first 
 glance; upon investigation it is found to be mere rhetorical 
 talk. If it were true that everything might be different 
 from what it is — and even opposite, what would be the 
 meaning of Wisdom and Knowledge? There would be 
 no value at all in knowing how to make a thing best serve 
 its purpose; and yet each thing can best serve its purpose 
 in a certain way only. The situation in our discussion may 
 be compared to the difference in the views of a craftsman 
 and that of an unskilled person with respect to any object. 
 The craftsman, who has made a study of the object, re- 
 alizes that to be useful it must be made in a definite manner 
 and possess certain qualities. The unskilled person, who 
 has no proper comprehension of the object, fails to per- 
 ceive that it would be imperfect it if were in any way dif- 
 ferent; to him, it might serve its purpose as well, even though 
 altered in many respects. Creation must be compared 
 to skilled work which, as the craftsman knows, cannot be 
 otherwise than it is. God, the Craftsman par excellence, 
 has created each thing to subserve some definite end, 
 were it in the slightest particular different, it would be 
 unsatisfactory. If the Ash'ariyya carry this premise to 
 its logical conclusion, they would have to maintain that 
 
 
44 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 one might see through the ear, and smell through the eye, 
 etc. 
 
 This first premise is also developed by Avicenna, 124 
 who posits every existent, with the exception of God, as 
 ‘possible’ or ‘contingent’ when considered per se. There 
 are two classes of these contingents: (1) Contingent with 
 regard to the Creator and its own Essence; (2) Necessary 
 with regard to the Creator, but contingent with regard to 
 its Essence — the necessary essence in each case is the 
 First Agent. It would follow from this that the essence 
 of things would change — for a ‘contingent’ would become 
 a ‘necessary’, which is clearly incorrect. But this is not 
 the place to discuss Avicenna’s doctrines. 
 
 The second premise stated is that “the Contingent is 
 created”. This proposition is not at all clear, and the 
 opinions of scholars are not in agreement. Plato admits 
 the possibility of the eternity of a contingent thing; Aristotle 
 denies it. “This is a difficult question the truth of which is 
 only known to the masters of the art of demonstration.” 125 
 
 Abu’l-Ma'ali Al-Guaine attempts to clarify these premises 
 by adducing others: (1) The Contingent must have a 
 Determinator, i.e. an agent who causes it to realize this 
 possibility rather than another; (2) This Determinator 
 must necessarily be endowed with Will ; 126 (3) Anything 
 that exists in consequence of Will is created. The contingent 
 must emanate fiom the Will, for there are but two possi- 
 bilities — either from Nature or from Will; and Nature 
 cannot produce one of two similar contingents but must 
 produce both. Since the world might occupy a position 
 in the Ether (i. e. the Vacuum) different from the position 
 
 124 L-w, • , I . 
 
 ‘ » 
 
 126 VI jC- 
 
 ^Jl 4 P. 39. 1. 19-20. 
 
 124 S-djI. 
 
THE PROOF OF AVERROES 
 
 45 
 
 it now occupies, Abu M-Ma'ali deduces that it was created 
 through Will. This conclusion of Abu ’1-Ma‘ali is true, 
 but the premise regarding the world in a Vacuum is in- 
 correct or at least not clear, for they are compelled to 
 assume the eternity of this Vacuum, which, if created, would 
 require another antecedent Vacuum, etc. 
 
 The meaning of the third explanatory premise of Abu’l- 
 Ma'ali — ‘Anything that exists in consequence of Will is 
 created’ — is not at all evident. Will belongs to the cate- 
 gory of the Correlative and is inseparable from the realiza- 
 tion of the thing willed — if one exists actually the other 
 does also, e.g. father and son. If the Will which is actual 
 is eternal, the Willed which is actual must also be eternal. 
 Other complications enter into this discussion, which make 
 it an impossible subject for the masses, a fact which the 
 Koran recognized, making no mention either of an eter- 
 nal will or created will and merely remarking that the Will 
 is the cause of created things (Sur. XVI, 42). Thus these 
 methods of the Ash'ariyya are neither evident as philosophi- 
 cal proofs, nor are they the methods of Religion. “The 
 methods of religion have two characteristics; first they are 
 evident, second, they are simple, not composite, i.e. the 
 premises are few in number and the conclusions are not 
 far removed from the premises .” 127 
 
 The methods that the Sfifis adduce are not based on 
 syllogistic proof. They maintain that in order to ascend 
 higher and comprehend Truth, one must emancipate 
 oneself from the restraints imposed by the passions and 
 reach a certain state of ecstasy. We do not deny the 
 value of suppressing the passions as an aid to speculation — 
 but we will not admit that this suppression at once brings 
 
 127 ij jSSy o! £ ^idl ^i*Jl 
 
 — 13^1 1 1 * 1 ^ t bJ 1 ^ 
 
 J jV I P.41,1.18-21. 
 
46 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 about knowledge. The methods of the Sfifis are not suit- 
 able for all people and are not the “Proper way”, for the 
 Koran commands speculation in these matters. 
 
 As regards the Mu'tazila, we have not as yet received 
 their books in Spain, but it seems that their methods are 
 essentially the same as the methods of the Ash'ariyya. 
 
 If then all the methods of the various schools just men- 
 tioned are unsatisfactory and valueless, what is the correct 
 method to be pursued in this investigation? The correct 
 and proper method is the one contained in the Koran. 
 If we examine this carefully, we shall find that it is com- 
 posed of two parts: (1) the provision made for the comfort 
 and happiness of man in that all existent things were 
 created for his sake — the Proof from Providence ; 128 
 (2) the wonderful creation of the existents, for example, 
 the production of organic life, sense-perception, and in- 
 tellectual cognizance — the Proof from the wonderful 
 creation. 129 
 
 The first proof is based on two principless; first, that 
 all existents were created for man, and second, the har- 
 mony in the world must necessarily be brought about by 
 an agent — it cannot be merely the result of chance. The 
 first principle is self-evident — all things serve man, e.g. 
 the regulation of day and night, the sun and moon, 
 animals, plants, inorganic bodies etc., the construction 
 of the parts of the human organism etc. 
 
 The second principle also rests upon two premises — first 
 that the Existents were wonderfully created, which re- 
 quires no elucidation, Sur. XXII, 72, and second, that 
 every created thing has a creator, which is also self-ex- 
 planatory. In order to attain to a true conception of the 
 
 S.LJl JJo. 
 
 £l^V1 JJo. 
 
 120 
 
SUMMARY OF THE PROOFS 
 
 47 
 
 wonderful creation, one must study the Essence of things, 
 Sur. VII, 184. 
 
 These two proofs are the religious proofs. The verses 
 of the Koran, which consider the existence of God, are 
 of three kinds; some contain the Proof from Providence, 
 some the Proof from the wonderful creation, and some 
 include both. 
 
 Among the first class, we may enumerate Sur. LXXVIII, 
 6, 7; XXV, 62; LXXX, 24. As illustrations of the second 
 class, we may cite Sur. LXXXVI, 6; LXXXVIII, 17; 
 XXII, 72; VI, 79. The third class is exemplified by Sur. 
 II, 19, 20; XXXVI, 33; III, 188. Sur. VII, 171; III, 16; 
 XVII, 46 also refer to this problem. 
 
 These two proofs — Providence and Creation — are suited 
 to the requirements of both the Scholars who have a deep 
 insight, and the Masses who consider matters super- 
 ficially. The difference between them is merely one of 
 degree — the difference between the Craftsman and the 
 unskilled observer. 
 
 Summary of the Proofs for the Existence of God 
 
 MAIMONIDES 
 
 ALANUS 
 
 AVERROES 
 
 There are four 
 proofs for the Ex- 
 istence of God. 
 
 I. God’s Existence 
 follows from the 
 Aristotelian prin- 
 ciples of motion. 
 
 II. If one compo- 
 nent exists sepa- 
 rately, the other 
 
 The Existence of 
 God can be proved 
 from the principles 
 of causality, by sev- 
 eral propositions. 
 I. Since nothing can 
 give itself exis- 
 tence, i.e. nothing 
 is its own cause, 
 there must be a 
 
 The methods of the 
 Ash'ariyya, the 
 Mu'tazila, the 
 Batiniyya and the 
 Hashwiyya are nei- 
 ther demonstrative 
 nor ! are they suit- 
 able for the masses. 
 The proofs for the 
 Existence of God 
 
48 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 MAIMONIDES 
 
 must also. There- 
 fore "causing mo- 
 tion” exists sepa- 
 rately. 
 
 III. If there is 
 a ‘possible’ ex- 
 istent, there must 
 also be a ‘necessa- 
 ry’ existent. 
 
 IV. God’s Exis- 
 tence follows from 
 the Aristotelian 
 principles of poten- 
 tiality and actu- 
 ality (like I). 
 
 ALANUS 
 
 supreme cause, in 
 no sense composite. 
 It is thus neither 
 quality nor form : 
 it is absolutely 
 simple, it is God. 
 II. Minor proofs, 
 (a) Creation im- 
 plies a Creator; (b) 
 Harmony must be 
 caused; (c) Change 
 must have a cause. 
 
 AVERROES 
 
 as contained in the 
 Koran are two in 
 number. 
 
 I. The Proof from 
 Providence: (a) All 
 things were created 
 for man. (b) Har- 
 mony must neces- 
 sarily be caused. 
 
 II. The wonder- 
 ful creation : (a) 
 
 Existents are won- 
 derfully created, 
 (b) Creation must 
 have a Creator. 
 
 The above summary presents in outline form the proofs 
 of Maimonides, Alanus and Averroes for the existence 
 of God. A comparison of these proofs discloses several 
 interesting facts. (1) Maimonides’ proofs are clearly 
 the most scientific and intellectual, (2) Alanus attempts a 
 combination of the philosopher’s view with the opinion 
 of the masses, (3) Averroes gives the orthodox, popular 
 exposition. It remains to be seen if any one of the three 
 has succeeded, and if so, to what degree. 
 
 Maimonides, as has been explained before, bases him- 
 self on Aristotle, the recognized authority in philosophy 
 and science in the second half of the twelfth century. 
 In general, Maimonides accepted Aristotle’s theories, and 
 undertook to prove the Existence of God on Aristotelian 
 hypotheses — not that the Existence of God needed any 
 proof (according to Maimonides), but it could best be 
 
SUMMARY OF THE PROOFS 
 
 49 
 
 shown that philosophy and religion were not in conflict by 
 deducing the fundamental postulates of religion from the 
 propositions of the great philosopher. In his argument 
 Maimonides is strictly logical and scientific — he states 
 his premises, announces the conclusion which he will 
 try to reach, and proceeds with his proof. All this, no 
 doubt, involves an obsolete philosophy and the value of 
 such disquisitions may be questioned, since Aristotelian ism 
 is now completely discarded. But this criticism can apply 
 to almost everything in the past which has been super- 
 seded by something else in the present — and because 
 of its generality fails specifically. If carried to its logical 
 conclusion, every opinion of every philosopher which 
 has been discarded (and there are very few which remain 
 unshaken) is of no value; the history of philosophy will 
 therefore add nothing to our knowledge! The mere 
 statement of this reasoning shows its absurdity. One 
 cannot judge any philosopher by the relevancy of his 
 philosophy to the thought of to-day, but rather to the 
 views and beliefs of his own century and the centuries 
 which preceded it. This is the criterion which we must 
 use for our estimate of Maimonides. The Existence of 
 God was a fact known through Revelation and it permitted 
 of no doubt. On the basis of creation and the Bible it 
 was evident to and beiieved in by the masses. From the 
 Harmony and Providence, the people felt that it was un- 
 questionably so; to their minds no proof was necessary. 
 But from the point of view of philosophy, none of these 
 presentations were satisfactory; the trained intellect could 
 easily refute them all. Maimonides undertook to show 
 that the theses were true, even if the common proofs for 
 them could be rebutted; and this he does by demonstrat- 
 ing the existence of God from Aristotelian premises, In 
 a word, Maimonides’ position is this: God exists — we 
 
50 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 all know it, some in one way others in another. The or- 
 dinary man relates this truth to Creation, Providence, 
 Harmony, etc. But the philosopher sees fallacy in these 
 assumptions. He must start with science and with Aristotle, 
 which Maimonides does, and demonstrate that from this, 
 too, the existence of God inevitably follows. The impor- 
 tance of this harmonization of Maimonides is best evidenced 
 by the fact that his solution dominates the Jewish and 
 Christian thought of the thirteenth century. 
 
 Alanus has one main proof for the existence of God: 
 the Causality Proof, which he develops at great length; 
 Maimonides’ third proof is a similar argument. This 
 development of Alanus is interesting because of his ap- 
 plication of geometric methods to philosophical demon- 
 stration. Alanus does not consider this Causality-proof 
 as irrefutable, as has been stated above. “They (the proofs) 
 merely guide us to the Assumption of the Existence of 
 God — but they do not constitute proof in the strict sense, 
 and cannot be termed Knowledge.” As minor proofs, 
 Alanus gives: (1) Creation implies a Creator; (2) Harmony 
 must be caused; (3) Change must have a cause. It has 
 already been explained that Maimonides does not give 
 these minor proofs, since he considers them as the views 
 of the masses and therefore well-known. The proof of 
 Alanus for the existence of God resolves itself into Maimon- 
 ides’ third proof. 
 
 Averroes is an apologist for the Koran, in his treatise 
 “The Accord between Religion and Philosophy”. He 
 gives the popular conceptions, and supports them by verses 
 from the Koran. It is difficult to see in this work, Averroes 
 the greatest commentator of Aristotle, to whom Aristotle 
 was the infallible judge of all things. His proofs are the 
 minor proofs of Alanus, which Maimonides does not con- 
 sider worthy of any mention at all, since they are “for the 
 
SUMMARY OF THE PROOFS 
 
 51 
 
 masses”. Thus the question arises: “What accord has 
 Averroes brought about between the views of philosophy 
 and religion on the subject of the Existence of God ?” 130 
 The answer is evident, “None”, and he does not attempt any. 
 He wrote his treatise “The Accord between Religion and 
 Philosophy” for the masses and therefore gave the proofs 
 of the masses. Demonstration, he says, is for “the elect”. 
 
 From the foregoing it is apparent that Maimonides gives 
 the best harmonization of the views of religion and philoso- 
 phy on the question of the Existence of God , since he attempts 
 to reach the truths of Religion through the hypotheses of 
 Reason. Alanus’ proof is the third proof of Maimonides 
 plus the opinion of “the masses.” Averroes considers 
 the popular arguments as given in the Koran to be the most 
 satisfactory, since they are intelligible to all. 
 
 The ideas of all three are to-day obsolete. Our system 
 of philosophy cannot assimilate them. We say they 
 have failed in their attempt — but will it ever be possible 
 to bring within the scope of finite understanding that 
 which transcends human experience? 
 
 180 See Leon Gauthier, Accord de la Religion el de la Philosophie, traits d’lbn 
 Roschd, traduit et annot£, Alger 1905, p. 147 ff. , and p. 178, note 3. “Though he 
 (Renan) mentions Muller’s edition of the three treatises (of Averroes) he clearly did 
 not read them.” 
 
52 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 EXCURSUS 
 
 ABSTRACT OF THE “PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY” 
 
 OF AVERROES 
 
 THE ACCORD BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 
 
 * 111 The purpose of this work is to determine the relation 
 between Religion “ and Philosophy i. e. Is philosophical 
 and intellectual speculation c permitted by religion; and 
 if it is permitted, is its pursuance optional or obligatory? 
 
 Philosophy is investigation into the nature of the Ex- 
 istent. This all will admit. But the Existent is the Cre- 
 ated, and the Created leads at once to the Creator. It 
 follows, therefore, that from the point of view of religion, 
 philosophy is either necessary or leads to a proper under- 
 standing of religion. The Koran has commanded the 
 study of logic and the other sciences in numerous places, 
 e. g. Sura LIX, 2; VII, 184 ; f2] III, 88 etc. But knowledge 
 of the Existent can only be obtained through intellect and 
 reflection, which consists in deducing the unknown from the 
 known by means of the syllogism/ The syllogism, then, 
 is essential, and we must perfect ourselves in the use of it, 
 until we attain to Demonstration ' (airodei&s) ■ That 
 we may detect Fallacy, we must first study Inference. 
 Thus in order to obey the Command of religion, with res- 
 pect to investigation of the Existent, we must become 
 
 ♦The numbers in brackets refer to the pages of the Arabic text, published by 
 Marcus Joseph Muller, “Philosophic und Theologie von Averroes" in Monumenta 
 Saecularia of the Koniglich Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Miinchen 185Q. 
 
 (a) ^ Religion. 
 
 (b) 4 i^l % Philosophy. <t>i\oao<t>La. 
 
 (c) Speculation. 
 
 (d) « A+i Syllogism. 
 
 (e) Demonstration inr68ei£is. 
 
ABSTRACT OF THE “PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY” 53 
 familiar with all these preliminaries which are as necessary 
 
 f31 
 
 for thought as tools are for work. 
 
 The jurist f always uses reason to guide him, for he 
 must decide issues: the Theologian should do the same. 
 
 The argument on the basis of Innovation 8 cannot be 
 raised, for we can reply: The same applies to the Jurist 
 
 who is continually “innovating”, yet no one considers it 
 a violation of the principles of the Koran. However, 
 the majority of theologians recognize inference, and reason. 
 
 It is the duty of every investigator to know what his 
 predecessors have said on the subject, for no one can by 
 himself develop a science, as is true of the jurist’s art (4) . 
 Whether this predecessor is a co-religionist or not does 
 not concern us, e. g. the instrument we use for slaughter, 
 whether it originates from a co-religionist or not — as long 
 as it fulfils all the requirements, is permitted. We must 
 know what earlier philosophers have thought. If their 
 opinions are correct, we shall accept them ; if they are not, 
 we shall comment upon them. This is the method by which 
 we can come to know the Creator : first, creation must be es- 
 tablished, which leads to the things created, which in turn 
 leads to a Creator. We must make a systematic investiga- 
 tion, and we as the later investigators should attempt 
 to derive some benefit from all who investigated earlier. 
 Take mathematics, for instance; suppose we did not have 
 our science of geometry or astronomy. Could any man, 
 however wise, discover the relative size of the earth and 
 the sun, etc, except by means of Revelation or something 
 similar to Revelation? If one were to tell him that the 
 sun was one hundred and fifty or one hundred and sixty 
 times as large as the earth, he would consider that person 
 
 (f) <JLi Jurist. 
 
 (g) Innovation. 
 
54 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 insane, yet this fact is indisputable. The same is true 
 of the science of Jurisprudence 15) — no science can be 
 produced by an individual. How much more so the Science 
 of Sciences — Philosophy! And if we find anything in 
 the works of our predecessors in agreement with truth, 
 we ought to be happy and thank them for it; if, on the 
 other hand, it is contrary to the truth, we must point it 
 out as false and dangerous, but we cannot blame them for 
 it. The purpose of the Books of the Ancients is the same 
 as our own. If one who is talented and has moral virtues 
 is hindered from pursuing this work, the way that leads to 
 the knowledge of God is closed. The fact that one may 
 err in philosophical speculation because of the insufficiency 
 of his talents, or misunderstanding in his studies, or inabil- 
 ity to control his passions, or lack of proper teachers, * 
 ought to deter no one from the study of philosophy, since 
 error exists per accidens J and not per se.* f6] One who for- 
 bids the study of philosophy or any other science to a fit 
 person, is like one who tells a thirsty person not to drink 
 water, because some people choke by drinking. 
 
 We Moslems are convinced of the truth of our faith 
 and are certain that we can reach happiness through it. 
 But the methods of comprehending God and creation 
 (which our religion enjoins) are not the same for all people. 
 Some believe because of Demonstrative* Proofs, others 
 base their opinions on Dialectic ” 1 Propositions, and a third 
 
 (h) Science of Jurisprudence. 
 
 (i) Cf. Maimonides, Moreh, I, chap. 34; Munk, Guide, I, pp. 118-130, who gives 
 
 five reasons: (1) Difficulty of the subject, (2) Limitations of the human mind, (3 
 
 many prerequisite sciences, (4) natural disposition, (5) material necessities. 
 
 (j) v ^ Accident. 
 
 v ^ Per accidens. 
 
 (k) ^er se. 
 
 (l) See footnote (e;. 
 
 (m) Jlo>. Dialectic. 
 
ABSTRACT OF THE “PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY” 
 
 55 
 
 class is satisfied with Rhetorical ” statements. Our 
 Divine Law, in calling men to its precepts, has employed 
 these three methods . 171 
 
 Demonstrative speculation (the highest form of thought) 
 cannot in any way conflict with the fundamentals of 
 Religion, since truth is not contradictory to truth. If 
 Demonstrative Speculation leads to a certain conclusion, 
 we must seek the decision of the faith upon this subject. 
 If we find no decision, all is well. If religion does discuss 
 this matter, it will either agree with or oppose the conclusion 
 of reason. If they coincide, all is again well. If, however, 
 they are at variance we must find an interpretation , 0 a 
 simile or an allegorical (homonymous) use of words. In 
 every case where there is an apparent disagreement, 
 there will be an interpretation . 181 
 
 The principle (or method) of interpretation is accepted 
 by all Moslems, but its application in specific cases is often 
 a matter of controversy. The question may now arise: 
 In what instances is interpretation permitted? If the 
 agreement is universal, it allows no interpretation; when 
 there is dissent, interpretation may enter. It is not 
 difficult to show that there has been dissent in almost 
 every question, for agreement in theoretical issues is not 
 like agreement in practical things. 
 
 On what grounds, then, did Abu Hamid (Al-Gazali) 
 accuse Abu Nasr (Alf&rabi) and Avicenna of heresy, P be- 
 cause of their views with respect to the Eternity ? of the World, 
 God’s knowledge of Particulars, r and Resurrection *? 1101 
 
 (n) Rhetoric. 
 
 (o) jU* Interpretation. 
 
 (p) j+s&S Heresy. 
 
 (q) pJUd! p-Vii Eternity of the world. 
 
 (r) Particulars. 
 
 (s) Resurrection. 
 
56 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 We answer: In the first place, he does not make this ac- 
 cusation absolutely; and secondly, there can be no heresy, 
 since there can be no agreement because of interpretations, 
 which can only be imparted to those who have attained 
 to the use of Demonstration and Interpretation. 
 
 Abu Hamid erred when he accused the Peripatetics of 
 believing that God has no knowledge of Particulars. They 
 merely say that His knowledge is not similar to ours / 1 ' 1 
 which is also true in the case of Universals. “Knowledge” 
 is a homonym like JG- (a great, momentous, affair or 
 a small, paltry affair) or ft (daybreak, dawn or dark 
 night). Accusing philsophers of heresy has no meaning 
 at all. 
 
 The entire problen of the Eternity or “Newness” M of 
 
 the world resolves itself, I think, into a mere difference of 
 
 words — and essentially, the philosophers agree. There 
 
 are three categories of Existence — two extremes and a 
 
 mean. The first extreme is a Thing caused by an agent, 
 
 [ 12 ] 
 
 composed of matter and form, and generated in time, 
 e. g. the various bodies, water, air, etc. The other extreme 
 is a Thing, uncaused, made out of nothing, and is not sub- 
 ject to time, e. g. God. The mean, a Thing made out of 
 nothing not preceded by time yet created by an agent, 
 i. e. the world in its totality, is the Existence that has oc- 
 casioned much strife and discussion. All posit future 
 time as endless, but there is a division of opinion with 
 respect to past time. The scholastics and Plato hold 
 that past time is finite, while Aristotle and his school main- 
 tain that it is infinite. Be this as it may, this mean, or 
 the World in its Totality, resembles the Eternity — extreme 
 in some phases and in others like the simple created Thing. 
 
 (t) i)1 Homonymy. 
 
 (u) “Newness**. 
 
ABSTRACT OF THE “PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY” 57 
 
 The scholastics v view the world from the latter extreme 
 and call it Created — the Aristotelians see it from the side 
 of the Infinite and therefore designate it as Eternal. Fun- 
 damentally it is a question of terminology. 1131 We may 
 add here that the Koran seems to hold eternity at both 
 ends; the Scholastics are compelled to resort to interpretation 
 to derive their theses from the Koran. These questions 
 are very difficult. The person who solves them correctly 
 deserves praise, but he whose solutions are not correct should 
 not be blamed if he is a “fit” person, since this is not a 
 matter of free will, but of necessity (i. e. rational 
 conclusions). 1141 
 
 Errors are of two classes. (1) A pardonable error in 
 a fit person, e. g. the case of a skilled physician who makes 
 a wrong diagnosis. (2) An absolutely unpardonable error, 
 i. e. a misconception in the Principles of Religion, e. g. 
 the Belief w in God, Prophecy, * and Blessedness y in the 
 Future Life. The three methods of proof, 1151 mentioned 
 above, lead to the knowledge of these principles. 
 
 For those who cannot obtain through Demonstration 
 what the “Men of Demonstration” have deduced, God 
 has given parables and likenesses. This is what we mean 
 by exoteric and esoteric interpretation. 1161 Some pas- 
 sages of the Koran (those which in their literal sense 
 belong to the Principles) must not be interpreted. Others, 
 on the contrary, must be given an exoteric meaning. There 
 is still a third class, where there is a difference of opinion 
 as to the propriety of interpretation. 
 
 To which of these three classes does Eschatology belong? 
 We answer: There is no consensus of opinion on this sub- 
 
 (v) ,j Scholastics. 
 
 (w) <lJU j\ ji I Recognition of God. 
 
 (x) o Prophecy. 
 
 (y) Blessedness. 
 
58 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 [ 17 ] 
 
 ject. Some understand it in its literal sense, others 
 prefer interpretation, and the interpretations vary. A 
 “man of demonstration” who errs here is to be excused. 
 In this consideration of Eschatology, we have reference 
 to its Nature, not to its Existence, which is one of the 
 Principles. 
 
 Interpretations should only be imparted in demonstrative 
 books (contrary to the view of Abu Hamid). It is 
 the duty of the learned to interdict the masses from demon- 
 strative works; for this study, which, in the case of the fit, 
 guides them to a proper understanding of the faith, in 
 the case of the unfit, would alienate them from their re- 
 ligion. 
 
 The purpose of the religious law is to teach true Know- 
 ledge, and true Practice. True Knowledge is the knowledge 
 of God and Things according to their essence, and especially 
 the knowledge of the religious law and Blessedness in the 
 future life. (191 True Praxis, practical wisdom, consists 
 in doing those things which will lead to blessedness, 
 and abstaining from those things which will cause the op- 
 posite. There are two divisions of the practical wisdom. 
 
 (1) Outer physical actions, under the head of Jurisprudence; 
 
 (2) Psychic action, such as thankfulness, patience, etc. 
 Knowledge is of two kinds: verifiable 2 and conceptual. 00 
 
 There are three methods of securing verifiable know- 
 ledge: Demonstration, Dialectic, Rhetoric. Conceptual 
 knowledge comprises the Thing in Reality and its image. 
 All these methods are employed by religion, 1201 and form 
 the basis of the following classification. (1) Inferences, 
 in which the premises, based on apparent truth or mere 
 
 (z) ^ Verification, 
 (aa) j Conception, 
 (bb) Premise. 
 
59 
 
 ABSTRACT OF THE “PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY” 
 
 opinion, may be true, and in which the conclusions ** are 
 taken as real, not as figurative. These must not be in- 
 terpreted. (2) Where the premises, based on apparent truth 
 or opinion, are true, but the conclusions are figurative. 
 These must be interpreted. (3) Where the premises based 
 on probability or opinion are not true, but the conclusions 
 give the real thing. This is the opposite of (2) and must 
 not be interpreted. (4) Where the premises, based on 
 probability or opinion are not true, and the conclusions 
 are figurative. Scholars may interpret such inferences, 
 but the masses** must be content with the literal sense.^ [2 ' ] 
 
 In accordance with this classification, there will be three 
 
 categories of people: (1) Interpreters in no case, (2) 
 
 Dialectic Interpreters, (3) Interpreters — the masters of 
 
 [ 22 ] 
 
 Demonstration, those adept in the science of Philosophy. 
 
 If interpretations are revealed to the multitude, it will 
 lead to heresy, since the literal meaning will be removed, 
 but the interpretation will not be comprehended. In- 
 terpretations should not be published in dialectic and rhe- 
 torical works. If we are asked by “men of Dialectic or 
 Rhetoric,” we must reply: “The question is difficult; 
 God alone knows the interpretation.” Those who pub- 
 licly point out obscure verses, or indicate contradictions, 
 are the cause of the great harm. One might compare 
 them to a man who censures a skilled doctor, interested 
 in the health of people, for giving “general” rules for 
 health. This man invalidated these general rules by 
 showing their inapplicability in certain instances. The 
 people lose their faith in these rules, and since this man 
 
 (cc) ( PI. ry Conclusion. 
 
 (dd) * ^>\ y>. Scholars, the “elect”. 
 
 (ee) j Masses. 
 
 (ff) j* Ikj Literal Sense. 
 
60 
 
 PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD 
 
 cannot make them proficient in the medical science, are 
 left with nothing. 1231 
 
 The true interpretation is the faith 88 which was given 
 to man. Because of the view that interpretation should 
 be imparted to all, various parties, enmities etc. arose 
 in Islam, e. g. The Mu‘tazila and the Ash‘ariyya. [241 A 
 large part of the Ash'ariyya build their theories on pure 
 
 hh 
 
 sophistry. They deny many important principles, e. g. 
 accident, the influence of things upon each other, cause, 
 etc. From these, other sects branch off — some emphasize 
 speculation, others belief. If we are now asked: “In the 
 face of such controversy, what are the true methods in 
 our religion?” we answer: “Those given in the Koran.” 
 When interpreted, the interpretation must be clear, and 
 
 [25J 
 
 more evident than the literal sense (which can hardly be). 
 
 In the first period of Islam, when all was taken literally, 
 people were more religious; later, when interpretation was 
 introduced, disagreement arose. 
 
 The religious propositions contained in the Koran have 
 three properties: (1) They are conducive to Happiness; 
 (2) They are graduated and suited to the various classes 
 of thinkers; (3) They contain the key to their interpretation. 
 
 There should be no problem of Reason and Authority, 
 for “Philosophy is the friend and foster-sister of Religion.” 
 
 (gg) LI Faith. 
 
 (hh) 4.U ... a -■ Sophistry. 
 

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