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L181 ..: ::..;.- . :: :: : ::: :. ..: ................................: :. .... ........ ::........ ............. .. . :::::::: · : ....-***:-** : . : : : :. . .. THE ORDER OF NATURE LONDON PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND 00. NEW-STREBT SQUARB THE 44850 ORDER OF NATURE CONSIDERED IN RETERENCE TO THE CLAIMS OF REVELATION. A Third Serics of Essays. BY THE REV. BADEN POWELL, M.A. F.R.S. F.R.A.S. F.G.S. SAVILIAN PROFESSOR OF GEOMETÁY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF Oxford. LONDON LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, LONGMANS, & ROBERTS. 1859 BL 240 “ It is the great problem of the age to reconcile faith with knowledge, -- philosophy with religion." ARCHDEACON HARE (LIFE OF STERLING, P. 121). “ Da Fidei quæ Fidei sunt." BACON. « Διά πίστεως γάρ περιπατούμεν, ου διά είδους.” . S. PAUL, 2 Cor. v.,7. PREFACE The following discussions, though properly forming a part of a series, are yet sufficiently distinct in their nature to be regarded as an independent work: considerable parts of Essays II. III. and IV. were in fact composed long ago, as amplifications of an argument pursued in some articles in a periodical, por- tions of which may be recognised in some parts of the following pages. In the present work, in the same spirit of free inquiry as in former instances, I have endeavoured to supply what, as far as I am aware, has been hitherto wanting to our theological and philosophical literature, – VOU A 4 VI PREFACL. 2 - a perfectly impartiał, candid, unpolemical, discussion of the subject of miracles, impera- tively demanded at the present day, in im- mediate connexion with the vast progress of physical knowledge : and this in not less in- timate relation to the grand result of that progress, the firm establishment of the great principle of immutable order, and thence of universal mind in nature. We are thus in- volved in the larger consideration of the whole relations of physical, to revealed or spiritual, truth; and it is to the conclusion of their independence, as relates to the essential nature of the Christian revelation, that the whole discussion tends ; while the true in-, fluence of that revelation is secured as based on the recognition of the important distinction, at once Baconian and Pauline, between the provinces and objects of reason and of faith. The present Essays are avowedly restricted PREFACE. VII ma to the physical aspect of the subject, but without at all meaning to undervalue the importance of the corresponding question of the relations of Christianity to moral and metaphysical philosophy. In many instances, however, the Christian doctrines have been formerly maintained in close connexion with physical ideas *, while those ideas, and the views taken of them, must of necessity be liable to change and improve- ment as science advances. And if some ex- pressions, apparently implying such connexion, are retained in the formularies of the Church of England, which thus acquire a modified interpretation, it must also be observed that many points, of great importance, are there left without any determination or mention. Thus, to whatever extent indi- vidual, or even general, opinion may have U * See Appendix, No. VII. VIII PREFACE. given a turn to such questions, they are un- deniably perfectly open questions to those who adopt these formularies. Of this class are the entire subjects of philosophical theism, or natural theology;— the evidences of Chris- tianity ;-the inspiration of the Bible; - the immateriality of the soul; and the nature of miracles. VUL COUT more That thus, in the moderate tone of the requisitions of the Church of England, free course is allowed to more enlightened views, without impugning a system so highly and practically valuable, — is at once the security of the established institution in an age of progress, and supplies the sure means by which eventually the advance of truth, without external innovation, will carry out its noiseless triumph over all artificial obstructions. “Hac certe mente, quæ neminem contemnit, sed nec alius amore alium ultro lædit, agere ipse et PRETACE. IX studeo et audeo : veritatis omne imperium internum, 2oxıxóv, liberale, ad omnes patere: externa autem vi atque potentia non posse, itaque etiam non debere, illud proferri: con- servato tamen ordine, et honesta ecclesice forma salva.”— SEMLER, Instit. Brev. Pref. 6, Stanhope Street, Hyde Park Gardens, May, 1859. ANALYTICAL TABLE OT OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION. CONNEXION OF THE PRESENT ARGUMENT WITH THAT OF FORMER SERIES OF ESSAYS. Page Influence of Science on Theology, direct and indirect- - 2 ESSAY I.- HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE PROGRESS OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE, AS BEARING ON RELI- GIOUS BELIEF. 11 $ 1.- THE PHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE ANCIENTS AND OF THE MIDDLE AGES. First Ideas, vague, imaginary, and mystical: out of these Science elicited: but wanting in Connexion and Sequence Ancient Cosmogonies and other physical Speculations wholly ideal: Conception of “Cosmos : " ancient Theism - - 22 Relations of early Christianity to the prevalent Philosophy 28 Mediæval Philosophy, deductive and verbal : connected with Theology - - - - - - - - - 30 Early Speculations on Natural Theology: physical Belief - 35 XII CONTENTS. $ 11.—THE EPOCH OF COPERNICUS, GALILEO, AND BACON. Page Theory of Copernicus : confirmed by Observations of Tycho: Calculations of Kepler, and Discoveries of Galileo. — The first Triumph of the inductive Philosophy - - - Antagonism of the inductive and the theological Spirit - Progress of Opinion : Montaigne : Scepticism - . - Bacon: his Philosophy and Theology: Union of Induction and Deduction : Reason and Faith distinct - - - Des Cartes : bis System founded on Theology, and purely deductive; hence it failed - - - - - - Advance in Freedom of Opinion : Hobbes, Sir T. Browne, Boyle, Pascal : speculative Theories of the 17th Century III. - THE PERIOD FROM NEWTON TO LAPLACE. Nature and Value of the Newtonian Discoveries: Influence, direct and indirect - - - - - - - 96 Philosophy of Leibnitz: metaphysical, yet advancing phy- sical Truth - - . - - - - - - 103 Origin of Geology in theological Cosmogonies - - - Progress of cosmical Speculations - - - - - 114 Philosophy of Locke: Advance of positive Views - - 121 Theistic Speculations and Scepticism - - - - 123 Progress of the Idea of universal Law:- Berkeley, Butler 128 Views of Miracles : Middleton, Hume: Theory of Causation 136 108 $ IV. — THE PERIOD FROM LAPLACE TO THE PRESENT TIMES. Completion of Theory of Gravitation : Clairault, Lagrange, and Laplace: Stability of the Planetary System - - 142 Philosophy and Scepticism in France - - - - 144 Later Researches: Unity of Sciences - - - - 151 Chemistry: Advance from Mysticism : Phlogiston - 156 CONTENTS. XIII Page Geology: Emancipation from theological View - - - 158 Progress of Discovery: Development of the Idea of “Cosmos" . by Humboldt - - - - - - - - 164 Natural History and Physiology : vital Principle: Origin of Species: lingering Remains of Mysticism - - - 167 Sir H. Davy: Epoch in Chemistry: theological Views • 179 Rationalistic Theories of Miracles - - - - - 184 • Positivism: first Principles sound : faulty in some Details : inapplicable to Religion - . - - - - - 187 Recent Natural Theology: Ersted - 198 Extensions and Prospects of Physical Science 201 Inductive Laws of Moral Order - - - - - 203 Ethnology and Archäology - - - - - - 208 CONCLUSION. Influences of Science on Moral Progress : Independence of Faith - - - - - - - - - - 211 Note: on Recent Bible Philosophy: Reviews of H. Miller, &c.: “Omphalos:" Archdeacon Pratt - - - - 218 ESSAY II. — NATURE AND REVELATION. § 1. — THE ORDER OF NATURE AS BEARING ON THEOLOGY IN GENERAL. Essential Point of all Inductive Philosophy; universal and perpetual Order - - - - - - - - 227 Apparent Limitations of Science only provisional, dependent on Progress of Discovery. — Nature unlimited: no Super- natural in Science - - - - - - - 230 Causation : no Antagonism of first and second Causes - 233 Argument of Design: narrow Views. -- Hume's Objection : wider View: Reason in Nature, distinct from Theory of Origin - - - - - - - - - 235 XIV CONTENTS. Page Cosmo-Theology; Inferences very limited. — Moral and me- taphysical Arguments not more advanced : both imply Order - - - - - - - - - - 241 Omnipotence in Nature: higher Theism beyond Science - 246 Idea of Creation not from Science: Succession of Species not miraculous: Metaphysical Argument.--- Idea of Crea- tion from Revelation - - - - - - - 250 $ II. - THE NATURAL AND THE SUPERNATURAL. Imagined interruptions in the Order of Nature: extraordi- nary and marvellous Events not interruptions : Disbelief . in occurrence of Miracles at the present day - - - 258 Belief in former Times : Magic and Witchcraft: Apparitions: Marvels not Miracles - - - - - - - 261 Supposed Spiritual Influences : Inductive Examination of Marvels: Neglect of it: Mysteries in Nature, especially Life: not real Mysteries : extraordinary Physical Influ- ences still natural - - - - - - - 263 Marvels in History: possible Explanations by Natural Causes; or by supposing Narratives fictitious - - - - 273 $ III. — REVELATION AND MIRACLES. Impressions apart from Reason : Spiritual Influence not at variance with Physical Truth - - - - - 276 Revelation, in itself, distinct from external Miracles : Hume's Objection on this point - - - - - - 279 Alleged Necessity of Miracles for Propagation of Christianity 282 Evidential Argument: value of Testimony: Fact, Matter of Testimony ; Miracle, of Opinion - - - - - 283 Antecedent Credibility : Hume's Argument: Conclusion not dependent on Experience, but on Reason and cosmical Order - - - - - - - - - - 284 CONTENTS. хү Page Different Grounds of Belief in different Ages: Philosophical Theism does not support Interruption of Nature: Scep- ticism, ancient and modern: Miracles, as parts of a greater System : various Opinions - - - - - - 296 ESSAY III. – ON THE RATIONALISTIC AND OTHER THEORIES OF MIRACLES. $ 1. — INTRODUCTION : GENERAL NATURE AND OBJECT OF RATIONALISTIC THEORIES OF MIRACLES. Difficulties of the Historical Criticism of the Gospels - 309 Divines admit some Explanations from Natural Causes, or from Critical Considerations - - - - - - 314 $ II. - NATURALISTIC THEORY OF PAULUS AND OTHERS. Explanation of Miracles from Natural Causes, and as ex- traordinary Events misapprehended or exaggerated - 319 Particular Instances in the New Testament Miracles - - 322 General Remarks : many improbable Coincidences supposed unsatisfactory as a complete Explanation - - - 332 $ III.-- THE MYTHIC THEORY OF STRAUSS. Woolston's Speculations acknowledged by Strauss - - 334 Strauss's preliminary View of the Nature and Origin of Myths: his Application of it to the Gospels : Critical Ex- amination of the Origin and Composition of the Narra- tives: their Discrepancies and fragmentary Character - 337 Instances of the Mythic Interpretation applied in Detail - 343 Remarks on this Theory: Objection from the early Belief in the Reality of the Events by Friends and Enemies: Doc- trinal Object and Application admitted: Strauss's Doctrinal View mystical and unsatisfactory - - - - - 345 XVI CONTENTS. $ IV.-- THE SUBJECTIVE THEORY OF FEUERBACH. Page His general Theory of Religion, as derived solely from In- ternal Conceptions mistaken for Outward Realities: Hence the Belief in Miracles derived from Internal Impressions 353 Difficulty in applying such an Explanation to particular Cases - - - - - - - - - - 356 $ y.- THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF EWALD. So named as descriptive of what seems the Author's Prin- ciple : Meaning obscure; but seems to imply Power of Mind or Spirit over Matter ; in some parts naturalistic - 358 $ VI. --- THE DOCTRINAL THEORY OF NEANDER. 364 Miracles regarded as subordinate Accompaniments of a Su- pernatural System of Revelation - - - - - In some Respects apparently Mythical Sense allowed : Mira- cles as Objects of Faith ; relative to the Parties addressed : Subjective: General Remarks : much left unexplained - 366 CONCLUSION. None of the Theories satisfactory as complete Solutions ; Each in some Respects worthy of Consideration : Appeal to Broad Principles ; Uniformity of Nature ; Faith in Chris- tian Doctrine - - - - - - - in 373 ESSAY IV. - THEOLOGICAL VIEWS OF MIRACLES. § 1. ---MIRACLES OF THE CHURCH, MODERN AND ANCIENT. Disposition of some to regard extraordinary Events as Mira- cles - - . - - - - - 381 CONTENTS. XVII Page Case of an alleged modern Miracle: Grounds of Belief and Disbelief - - - - - - - - 384 The Miracles of Port Royal - - - - - - 394 The Miracles of Ecclesiastical History: Arguments for and against, taken up entirely on Doctrinal Grounds - - 395 Argument from Parallelism with Scripture Miracles tells either way - - - - - - - - - 424 . § II. — GENERAL ARGUMENT FROM THE BELIEF IN MIRACLES. Formal Arguments of the old evidential Schools now dis- credited by Orthodox Divines : Internal Evidence and Spiritual Conviction upheld - - - - - - 428 This accords with Representations of the New Testament ; and with the common Grounds of Belief popularly admit- ted: Miracles regarded as Objects not Evidences of Faith 434 CONCLUSION. GENERAL RELATIONS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH TO PHYSICAL TRUTH. Physical Language of Scripture conformed to the Ideas of the Age : some Instances considered : do not affect essen- tial Doctrines - - - - - - - - 441 Great Miracles merged in Mysteries of Faith; spiritualised by the Apostles ; and in the Teaching of the Church - 455 XVIII CONTENTS. APPENDIX. Page I. On Recent Views of Organic Creation : Remarks on Dr. Bronn's Work - - - - - - 464 II. On Materialism : Remarks on a Passage in the Edin- burgh Review - - - - - - - 469 III. On Grounds of Belief: Extract from Professor Faraday - - - - - - - - 472 IV. Note on Bp. Berkeley's Theory of Vision - - 473 V. Theory of Life: Mr. Hinton - - - VI. On Causation : Extract from Mr. Buckle, with Re- marks - - - - - - - - 475 VII. Science and Creeds: Ancient Physical Belief - - 477 VIII. Documentary Evidence of the New Testament: brief Sketch of Critical Arguments, and recent Opinions 478 ERRATUM. Page 398, line 9, for “ awarded,” read “ recorded.” ERRATA. read The Erratum as printed p. xvii. should be “ For ' awarded accorded.'” P. 37, line 4, for “ remark” read " research." P. 385, line 4 of text from foot, for “ took” read" took up." P. 490, col. 2, line 15, for “ 526” read“ 256." INTRODUCTION TO THE THIRD SERIES OF ESSAYS. CONNECTION OF THE PRESENT WITH FORMER ARGUMENTS. THE ORDER OF NATURE. INTRODUCTION. former The several arguments pursued in my first series of Object of Essays under the title of “The Unity of Worlds and Essays. of Nature," were mainly directed to the one great object of illustrating the true fundamental prin- ciples of the inductive philosophy, taking up the leading idea of the unity of system pervading all nature, and this especially in relation to its bear- ing on the connection between that philosophy and theological views. Special reference was made to. several points in which physical science and religious belief seem, as it were, brought into peculiar con- tact with each other; the first and chief of which - the basis indeed of all further ideas of the kind - B 2 INTRODUCTION. is the grand inference of natural theology as derived from the extended study of the laws of the material universe. But besides this main topic, several others of scarcely less moment and importance, dependent upon it, were adverted to, especially referring to cases in which the deductions of science seemed to have any particular bearing on the doctrines or the truth of revelation. Though some of these topics were more or less fully treated, others were rather glanced at than discussed; and some of the main difficulties confessedly involved, were avowedly re- served for more full consideration than the limits of those Essays would admit. The examination of one of the questions thus de- fectively left, involving purely theological considera- tions, was the object of the second series of Essays, under the title of “ Christianity without Judaism,” or the vindication of the independence of Christianity, necessitated by the positive contradiction given to the cosmogony so essential to the Old Testament system by geological researches. In a word, the facts of geology necessarily contravene the historical charac- ter of a very essential portion of the Old Testament: INTRODUCTION. not a mere accessory or incidental statement or ex- pression, but a point vitally wound up with its whole tenor— the six days' work and the seventh day's rest. How then is the veracity of revelation altogether to be vindicated ? This is the question discussed in my second series, and the answer is, that neither this nor any such contradiction to the Old Testament, as being a system of peculiar adaptations, can affect the New. The Gospel is essentially independent of the Law in general, and especially in respect to the particular point referred to. This, of course, turns upon con- siderations purely critical and theological; and being opposed to some prevalent opinions requires to be discussed at length. Connected with the same primary question, other topics of a more peculiarly philosophical kind re- main for fuller discussion, and will form the sub- ject of the present third series. The influence of science, arising both from the nature of its general principles and the particular truths it elicits, remains to be considered in reference to the grounds of reli- gious belief, with a more special regard to certain points in which their respective claims may seem to stand in some degree opposed to each other. B 3 INTRODUCTION. science on Influence of The great truth of the invariable order of nature, theology. which was before dwelt upon as the substantial basis of all rational views of natural theology, will be found to possess a further bearing on the reception of the higher disclosures of revelation ; and we shall recognise a close connection between the extent to which researches into nature are pursued, and the degree in which the conclusions, thus established may react on some of the inferences of theology, and modify the view we must take of some points of an external and accessory kind; and the actual evidence, and thence in some measure the interpretation, of theological truth will thus take a different form at different periods, according to the existing character, and state of advance of physical knowledge. But besides these more direct results, in a wider sense, physical philosophy, as cultivated in any par- ticular age, will exercise an indirect and powerful in- fluence over the general tone of thought and reasoning of that age, which will extend itself to other subjects not immediately physical. Thus in both ways the state of natural science will manifest effects directly and indirectly bearing on that of theology; and it becomes a highly interesting and important subject INTRODUCTION. . of inquiry to trace such influence in its progress, and to follow the steps by which, from the contemplation of nature, advancing intelligence has been led to the more or less just appreciation of those higher topics which, however distinct in their nature, are often found connected with physical ideas. It will thus be desirable, as being eminently illus- Ilistorical view pro- trative of the wider argument, to take a brief retro- posed. spective historical glance at the progress of physical science in former ages, so as to follow, however im- perfectly, some general traces of its connection with natural theology, and, through that connection, its influence on the grounds of religious belief and on theology in general, whether in the way of confirma- tion or of objection, of extension or of limitation; after which we shall be in a condition to discuss more satisfactorily the general arguments involved. в 4 ESSAY I. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE PROGRESS OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE AS BEARING ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF. HISTORICAL SKETCH, ETC. I.--THE PHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE ANCIENTS AND OF THE MIDDLE AGES, § 11.—THE EPOCH OF COPERNICUS, GALILEO, AND BACON. $ III.—THE PERIOD FROM NEWTON TO LAPLACE. LAPLACE TO THE PRESENT $ IV.—THE PERIOD FROM TIMES. CONCLUSION. ESSAY I. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE PROGRESS OF PHYSICAL. SCIENCE AS BEARING ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF. $ 1.—THE PHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE ANCIENTS AND OF THE MIDDLE AGES. THE first origin and early progress of all science is Early pro- gress of involved in obscurity; yet, on general grounds, it scientific ideas. may be considered evident that the necessary arts of life must, from the nature of the case, precede all scientific speculation or inquiry; and, again, when such. speculation does begin, it seems an equally natural result that, in the infancy of intellectual pro- gress, imagination should largely predominate, and that science should not at first take the strictest or simplest form of inquiry into facts, but rather begin with widely extended yet visionary contemplation, out of which more sober and exact conclusions are only by degrees evolved. Men must live and act 12 [Essay I. & I. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Mystical origin of science. before they speculate; and when they speculate they feel and fancy before they investigate and measure- they wonder and imagine before they reason and analyse. If we look at the case historically, in its first stage, as far back as we can trace it, early science is always found involved in a large admixture of mysticism, closely combined with religious or superstitious im- pressions on the one hand, and with not less visionary philosophic theories on the other. The rudest observations of great natural pheno- mena were associated with those feelings of awe and wonder which easily accorded with a belief in super- natural influences; and some of the earliest indica- tions of this spirit were seen in the ideas of astrology, and of omens and portents supposed to be connected with human affairs; while the phenomena themselves, not reduced to laws, were ascribed to arbitrary and often conflicting supernatural agencies. But the feelings of awe and wonder first inspired by the contemplation of nature, especially in its grander aspects and phenomena, gave way by de- grees to more familiar inquiry; and thus out of mysticism we trace the first rise of philosophy, as Essay I. $ 1.] 13 ANCIENT PHYSICS. described by Aristotle 1: Sid ydp tò lavpáselv oí åv- θρωποι και νυν και το πρώτον ήρξαντο φιλοσόφειν. With the varied phenomena of nature constantly before their eyes, it was impossible that men should not gradually, and by the continued use of their senses, exercised on objects around them, arrive at some conceptions of physical truth, however imper- fect. Such knowledge, slowly accumulated, by degrees assumed some definite shape, and ideas properly be- longing to science were, in some measure, extricated from the mass of extraneous, if not prejudicial, ad- juncts in which they were involved; and thus, in some isolated departments, in early times, a few physical facts, and even simple laws and general truths, were recognised, amid the multitude of spe- culations and imaginary theories in which man's untaught fancy luxuriated. But such ideas, at the best, were unconnected No distinc- tion be- among themselves, and were mixed up with an incon- tween fact and theory. gruous mass of mystical conceits, and hardly intelli- gible abstractions. There was scarcely any definite line of demarcation drawn between fanciful hypothesis Aristot. “Metaph." i. 12. 14 [Essay I. § 1. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Instances. and physical reality, between fiction and fact. Now and then a high physical principle or a just and sound analogy was thrown out, as it were by acci- dent, or at least without any apparent sequence or connection with other truths, and amidst a mass of absurdity and error. Thus, for example, Pythagoras had asserted not only the heliocentric planetary system, but even that comets resemble planets of longer period. But, in- stead of advancing in later ages, these sound and just analogies were overpowered by the increasing subtleties of the mere technical schools, — when Aris- totle taught that comets were mere terrestrial me- teors, and refused them a place among the objects of astronomy; when others held that the earth was a flat cylinder, and the sun the size of the Pelo- ponnesus, and when the solar system gave way before the complex geocentric scheme of the Peripatetics, and a multitude of antagonistic powers, sympathies, and antipathies, were assigned as the causes of physi- cal phenomena. Anaxagoras taught just notions of the celestial dynamics when he affirmed that the heavenly bodies would fall if not prevented by their rapid motion, Essay I. $ 1.] 15 ANCIENT PHYSICS. 56 like a stone whirled round with a string;” —- De- mocritus argued the infinity of the sidereal universe, or it would collapse into a point ; — Aristarchus of Samos described the sun, with his attendant planets, as a star among innumerable stars ; — yet these sublime and just views were soon lost sight of in the crystalline spheres and firmaments of the Ptole- maists, and the distinctions between terrestrial and celestial motions of the Peripatetics. Such was the absence of sequence and connection Fragmen- tary know- which characterises the history of the ancient specu- ledge. lations, and which, in truth, results almost inevitably from the nature of the principles on which they were conducted. The physical science of the ancients was chiefly a multitude of discordant gratuitous theories, amid which we discern, here and there, some disconnected individual investigations of immense power and beauty; such as their geometry, their geometrical optics, their principles of the mechanical powers, and a few elementary applications of them. But No real when we look beyond these, we perceive that in with time. such a philosophy there was no continuous progress, no settled order according to which one truth was advance 16 [.Essay I. $ 1. HISTORICAL SKETCH. elicited out of another, no advance from the mere particular to the more general. The earlier views were often better, more sound and comprehensive, than the later. They were, in fact, all more or less conjectural, and, as such, were not dependent upon any steady advance in discovery, or the cooperation of many minds and many hands, but arose entirely out of the spontaneous conceptions of individual intellects, and were thus good or faulty, not with reference to any advance in the age, but only in proportion to the intrinsic ability and power of those individual minds. The Greek philosophers, in an early age, had asserted the dignity of physical inquiry ; an ancient astronomer had declared that man was born to study Preference the heavens. But later philosophers were bewildered to physical amid the multiplicity of systems, and thence regarded speculation. all inquiry into the world of matter as vain and un- worthy, and turned to speculations in the world of mind or spirit as a more congenial and satisfactory field. And the same idea has been re-echoed in modern times; men have turned from the path of physical and demonstrative certainty to the dubious regions of moral Essay I. § 1.] 17 ANCIENT PHYSICS. of moral disputation, and have even denounced the inquiry into nature as presumptuous and irreligious ; while they have confidently rushed into metaphy- sical speculation on topics beyond all human com- prehension. Pliny 1 thought Hipparchus impious in . making a catalogue of the stars; and an equally preposterous prejudice actuates vulgar minds even in our own days. At a much earlier period, the same spirit of jealousy and hostility against physical investigation was displayed when Anaxagoras was persecuted for showing that an eclipse was nothing but the stoppage of light by the opaque body of the moon or earth, instead of a supernatural miracle, as was then the orthodox creed. In the earliest stage to which we can trace the Ancient ideas of ancient nations, we always find conspicuous gonies. a mythological cosmogony. That of the Hindoos is of a most elaborate and abstruse kind, involving the notion of many successive creations and destructions of the world, and in its details offering many striking analogies to systems which have been upheld even in later ages. The Egyptians held a like series of cata- cosmo- ? Nat. Hist. ii. 26. 18 [Essay I. § I. SPA HISTORICAL SKETCH. 1 AY Plastic powers of nature, clysms and renovations. Among the Chinese and Peruvians, the equally marvellous fables of deluges and universal catastrophes seem to refer to later periods, and do not assume so transcendent and sublime a character as those of the Indian cosmo- gonies. Apart, however, from these visionary fancies and fabulous conceptions of creation, there are on record, even in early times, discoveries of fossil bones, shells, and other remains, which were either ascribed to fancied monsters, or else to the plastic powers of nature indulging in wanton frolics, and mocking human research by forged imitations of real objects. Among the Greeks, though some mythological ideas of a similar kind were prevalent, yet instances are not wanting of more philosophical views, sug- gested by actual observation of phenomena — as far as they went - conformable to what modern research has confirmed. Such are some of the speculations upheld by Strabo and others as to the effects of earthquakes, volcanic action, and the like, in the upheaval of strata and other terrestrial changes. It is only in an advanced state of cultivation that men have been led to acknowledge the preeminent Value of generalisa- tion. Essay I. § 1.] 19 IDEA OF COSMOS. value and higher character of all science to be in proportion to the degree of generalisation to which it has attained; in accordance with the extent of that generalisation do we perceive the vast combination of natural laws, all mutually dependent on each other, conspiring towards greater and higher prin- ciples; and begin to obtain glimpses of that unity pervading nature which is the true basis of the grand idea of “ Cosmos” — the principle of universal and perpetual law, order, harmony, and reason through- out the material universe. Ideas of this tendency were occasionally broached by the ancients amid their manifold speculations — philosophical dreams, which yet, like other dreams, sometimes chanced to prove true. Among the ancients, as the physical sciences had some ideas hardly advanced, at least to any higher generalisa- gencralisa- tions, as there were even counteracting causes im- peding any possibility of its attaining them, so we could not legitimately expect any indications of those higher conclusions just alluded to. Yet, though such conclusions could not strictly follow from existing physical data, we find a similar kind of instinctive anticipation to that noticed in some other instances ; of inductive tion. C 2 20 [Essay I. & I. HISTORICAL SKETCH. larger ideas occasionally thrown out, and reflec- tions on them sometimes followed up by the an- cient philosophers, though altogether hypothetical - happy theoretical conjectures suggested by the spirit of speculation in which they were so fond of indulging. We may perhaps exemplify this in the remarkable declaration of Cicero, so accordant with the real progress of inductive discovery, advancing from artificial systems towards natural principles:- 6 Opinionum commenta delet dies, naturæ judicia 66 confirmat ;” as well as the very just distinction drawn by Seneca as to the real object of physical inquiry, the search after natural causes as real and permanent, not arbitrary or fortuitous: -“Naturalem “ causam quærimus et assiduam, non raram et for- “ tuitam." It may, perhaps, be taken as something like a recognition of an unity in natural causes that several of the ancient schools in their speculative theories resolved all things into one primary element -- the Ionic school into water, Anaximenes into air, Hera- clitus into fire. But with these speculations there seems to have been usually mixed up some vague notion that these elements were pervaded by a kind Essay I. $ 1.] 21 IDEA OF COSMOS. 2 . of vital or creative energy; Thales is said to have held that out of water a supreme mind (volls) evolved all things. But in general there appears no disposi- tion on the part of the ancient writers to ascribe creation to their gods. Hesiod 1 supposes gods as well as men to have sprung from unknown powers of nature, and Diodorus Siculus 2 enumerates the vari- ous opinions held as to the origin of the world, in which there is little or no reference to the idea of a creative Deity; but he owns the subject to be one beyond human intelligence. A striking instance of some anticipation of more Idea of extended ideas may be found in the very earliest phase of Greek philosophy, when Pythagoras is stated to have introduced the term Kóguos, in the sense of “the order of the world,"3 and thus doubt- Cosmos, i Op. et Dies, i. 108. 2 lib. i. 3 This is distinctly asserted by Plutarch, “De Placitis Philos.” ii. 1, and in the Fragments of Philolaus, Stobæus, Eclog. p. 360. 460. Plato, though he drew a distinction between the celestial world (oủpa- vós) and the terrestrial, yet seems to apply the term koouos to the whole; affirming the universe to be a living being with a soul. Koouos Swov čuyuxov.-Timæus, p. 30. B. Aristotle maintains the same idea of the “order of the world" under the same term; though he divides it into super-lunary and sub-lunary. (Meteor. I. ii.1, and ii. 13.) According to Philolaus, some of the ancients divided the universe C3 22 [Essay I. & i. HISTORICAL SKETCH. less had some distinct perception of the grand idea implied. In this view he was followed, with less distinctness, by Plato and Aristotle. But, at a later period, the treatise “ De Mundo" (long attributed to Aristotle) contains a nearer approach to the modern view, defining Cosmos to be “the 6 connected system of all things — the order and ar- “ rangement of the whole preserved under the gods 6 and by the gods.” 1 In this passage it may be remarked that the reference to divine superintendence is introduced altogether as a foregone conclusion, and not at all as an inference from the contemplation of the order of the world. At a much later period, though the writings of into three regions: the highest and outermost Olympus, the region of fire; the next Cosmos, that of the invariably moving planets; the innermost Uranos, that of variable nature, between the earth and the moon; while the earth itself was called the “hearth of the universe" (ẻora Toũ TaeT6s). (Stobeus, i. p. 488.) Some other philosophers held separate stellar systems, each of which in itself was called a Cosmos. (Humboldt, note p. 78, transl" 1845.) 1 Κόσμος άρα έστι σύστημα εξ ουρανού και γης – και των εν τούτοις περιεχομένων φυσέων. Λεγεται δε ετέρως κόσμος, ή των όλων τάξις και dlakoounous — ÚTO BEWU TÊ Ical oid bewv Quatrouévn. (Pseudo-Aristot. de Mundo, c. ii. p. 391.) Essay I. $ 1.] 23 FINAL CAUSES. inferences Cicero bear witness to a similar appreciation of the idea of order in nature, yet we can only regard it as the expression of a sort of anticipatory vision of that grand physical application to which we can now appropriate it :--- Est enim admirabilis quædam 6 continuatio, seriesque rerum, ut aliæ ex aliis nexæ, " et omnes inter se aptæ, colligatæque, videantur.” 1 These speculative ideas, beautiful as they are, were No sound little established on any solid physical basis. From of order. the desultory and scattered character of the ancient discoveries in physical phenomena, none but partial and restricted conceptions of physical causation could be derived. Hence there could be no real or sub- stantial unity of science indicative of unity in na- ture. When they generalised on causes to the ex- tent of imagining certain powers above nature putting them in action, it was almost a matter of necessity to suppose a number of distinct, independent, and con- flicting powers. When they examined organised Final causes nature and found structures adapted to purposes, by the means beautifully fitted to ends, they could not advance beyond isolated cases, or combine those . as viewed ancients. i De Nat Deor. i. 4. C4 HISTORICAL SKETCH. [Essay I. $1. structures in one view with any great laws of unity or symmetry. But further, in the system of the world in the few instances wherein they could in any degree assign mechanical causes, they always seem to have con- sidered them as conveying the idea of fated necessity, rather than that such indissoluble connection in rea- son is the very evidence of supreme mind, and this prepossession has remained in full force in men's thoughts even to much later times,—derived no doubt from too exclusive a devotion to the ancient writings, without the corrective of a thorough study of the inductive physical philosophy. The most remarkable discussions of the ancients, as bearing on what we should now call natural theo- logy (as in the beautiful instance of the Socratic argument recorded by Xenophon"), were restricted to obvious instances of the design manifested in the structure of men and animals; and in the further application of such conclusions the points of chief interest were such as bore directly on existing ques- tions, as to worship, and sacrifices, and the influence Natural theology of the ancients. Memorab. lib. i. c. 4. Essay I. § 1.] 25 ANCIENT THEISM. exerted by the gods on nature and on the affairs of men, descending even to the lowest indications by omens, divinations, and the like. Indeed in all their discussions on these subjects we find a large admixture of reference to supernatural influences in physical events; though in some few instances a glimpse of more enlarged contemplations is opened, as for instance in the well known Ciceronian dis- cussions, —where Cleanthes, one of the speakers in the dialogue, is made to sum up under four prin- cipal heads all the most material arguments for the existence of the gods; (1.) Indications of Divine prescience given in omens and the like: (2.) The beneficial order of the seasons and fruitfulness of the earth : (3.) Marvels and signs in nature and portents above nature; and (4.) (as he admits “ eam- que vel maximam") the order and regularity of the heavenly motions. This last admission is certainly remarkable, espe- cially as compared with the former points, and in the existing state of physical knowledge. But upon the whole, even in these most favourable instances, the . Memorab. lib. i. c. l; lib. iv. c. 3, &c. 2 De Nat. Deor. lib. ii. c. 5. . 26 [Essay I. § 1. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Ancient Theistic views. view we obtain of the ancient Theistic argument is such as to impress us strongly with the fidelity of the apostolic description,- Ós deloidaluovertépous vnâs Dewpôl_“Ye are too superstitious," too much given to the fear of supernatural beings. Herodotus tells us that the ancient Persians ridi- culed the Greeks for their gods with human natures, and boasted their nobler worship of the elements; making the heavens their god:-« τον κύκλον πάντα “ To oỦpavos AtòP Kakéovies.” 2 Anaxagoras appears to have recognised one supreme intelligence; but perhaps the only more enlarged and philosophical speculations of this kind in which the ancients indulged, were either those sublime but visionary imaginations which characterise the Platonic mysteries, or else, on the other hand, the doctrine of the “animus mundi” and the pantheistic or atheistic systems with which we are familiar in their fullest development, in the Epicurean materialism, so elabo- rately and beautifully expounded by Lucretius. When a supreme deity was acknowledged, it was commonly with little reference to any practical or Acts xvii. 22. 2 Herod. i. 13). Essay I. $ 1.] 27 PLATONISM. moral influence. The Platonists held indeed that God was concerned in the affairs of men ; but the Epicureans that he was indifferent to them. The Stoics, we are told, placed Him "without the universe, “ turning about, like a potter, this mass of matter “ from without, the Platonists within, abiding, like “ a pilot, within that which he directs.” Aristotle appears to deny any external agency in the Divinity, and seems to favour Pantheism3 : an idea more distinctly traced in some parts of Virgil.4 The state of philosophy and the degree of re- Relations ference it had to any views of theology, about the Christianity period of the origin of Christianity, will be apparent prevalent philosophy. were it only from what has been observed above. It is also well known that in more immediate rela- tion to Christianity itself, that modification of Pla- tonism which was prevalent among the Hellenistic Jews, became the parent of the mystical system of Gnosticism: and in the writings of Philo it made of early to the 1 Tertullian, “ Apologia,” $ 47. 2 Polit. vii. 3. 3 Eth. Nic, vii. 8. * As (e.g.) in the passages -- . “Partem diviuæ mentis," &c. - Georg. iv. 220. ... “ Totamque infusa per artus Mens agitat molem.”—Æn. vi. 726. 28 (Essay I. $ I. HISTORICAL SKETCH. om Influence of Neo-Pla- tonism. the nearest approach to some of those ideas after- wards developed under other forms in the Christian Church. But while some of the ideas, or at any rate the language of that Platonism became incorporated with the doctrines of the Gospel, its form of Gnostic extravagance was strenuously opposed and condemned by the Apostle Paul, who expressly announced the spiritual doctrines he taught as essentially inde- pendent of all human reason or philosophy.! In the second century we find a kind of eclecticism (mainly derived from Platonism) mixed up with the Christian doctrine by some of its leading teachers, especially in the Alexandrian school; among whom Clement of that place was one of the most eminent. While somewhat later another modification of a simi- lar philosophy, proposed by Ammonius, was embraced by the learned Origen, and obtained a great influence over the theology of the Church. A more rigid party, however, strenuously opposed these innovations, and contended for the original purity of the faith. These disputes are represented | As, e.g. 1 Cor. i. 21 ; Col. ii. 18, &c. Essay I. $ 1.] 29 PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIANITY. On by some ecclesiastical historians as the first indication of an antagonism between the principles of reason and of faith. The conversion of many of the professed “philo- sophers” to the Christian faith, about the second century, of whom Justin Martyr was the most illus- trious instance, was much boasted of by many of the ecclesiastical writers, but others viewed it rather with different feelings, as productive of a tendency to corrupt the simplicity of the Gospel doctrines with the admixture of philosophical speculations alien (at best) from their real character. Of this tenor is the complaint of an author quoted by Eusebius against these philosophical converts :- “ They venture to alter the sacred Scriptures, to “ desert the old rule of faith, and to mould their “ opinions according to the sophistical precepts of “ logic. The knowledge of the Church is deserted “ for that of geometry, and they lose sight of heaven 6 while they are employed in measuring the earth. “ Euclid is perpetually in their hands; Aristotle and “ Theophrastus are their admiration; and they ex- 1 See Mosheim, " Ecc. Hist.” i. 175. HISTORICAL SKETCH. [Essay I. $. I. 6 press great veneration for the works of Galen. 66 They fall into error from the use of the arts and “ sciences of unbelievers, and corrupt the simplicity “ of the Gospel by the subtleties of human reason.” 1 Of the heathen philosophy of this period, it would appear that the prevalent theological aspect was that of Pantheism, as we learn from Augustine ?, who had himself been originally instructed in its schools. On the other hand, the polemical attacks and argumentative cavils of this so-called philosophy against the Christian doctrine, however empty and sophistical, were in those ages regarded as the most formidable assaults which the Christian cause had to sustain. Such were those of Celsus, Hierocles, the Emperor Julian, and others. Some again more artfully professed to reconcile the Christian tenets with the ancient mythologies, and thus sought to undermine the true doctrine by corrupting it. But notwithstanding the vague and desultory System of Aristotle. | Eusebius, “Ecc. Hist.” lib. v. c. 28. This is the version given by Mosheim (ubi supra); but a reference to the original will shew that this is a very free translation, though to the same purport. It is also given by Mosheim as from Eusebius himself. 2 Confessions, v. 10. Essay I. § 1.] 31 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY. Y nant in the character of much of the ancient philosophy, it yet gave rise to some few well compacted systems, framed necessarily on abstract mental ideas, and not on any true generalisation, but which were believed to include not merely the whole compass of moral, but even of physical, truth. And of those systems (without dwelling on some others which have re- tained a partial acceptance), that of Aristotle stands preeminent in the name which it acquired even in ancient times, and still more in the authority which it obtained, and continued to exercise, eventually Predomi- in uncontrolled supremacy, through the long series middle ages. of the middle ages. Yet one of its main charac- teristics in the form it then assumed, was a total forgetfulness of that inductive spirit which Aristotle himself so distinctly insisted on, and the substitution of a system of deductive reasoning supposed equally applicable to all subjects. But the really distinguishing feature of the medi- Disputes æval Peripatetic philosophy was not merely its preference for the deductive method to the neglect of the inductive, but that the deductions themselves were all of a kind not relating to realities but to words, turning, not on the connection and depend- verbal. 32 HISTORICAL SKETCH. Examples. ence of substantial truths, but on artificial combina- tion of terms; and by mere verbal quibbles of the most puerile kind men deceived one another, and often themselves, into the belief that they were making real advances in knowledge, or at any rate giving convincing proofs and demonstrations of true propositions, and refuting erroneous and heretical opinions. . To take an instance of an Aristotelian physical argument;—gravity or weight is the cause of the fall of bodies to the earth; therefore, the greater their weight the more rapidly they will fall. Again : Terrestrial motions are corrupt, celestial perfect; therefore, a body in motion on the earth's surface soon comes to rest, but the heavenly bodies move on for ever. The former, a false conclusion from true premises; the latter, a true conclusion from false premises; but both merely verbal. Thus technicalities usurping the name and func- tions of philosophic reason were permitted to assume the supremacy, and imagined capable of reducing all nature into obedient conformity to their dogmas. The actual condition of knowledge under the do- minion of the scholastic philosophy, was restricted Ptolemaic astronomy. Essay I. $ 1.] 33 MEDIÆVAL ASTRONOMY. to a very narrow range. The Ptolemaic astronomy was, perhaps, the best and most advanced portion of the system, since it undeniably afforded the means of actually computing the planetary motions within such limits of accuracy as the age demanded; and it professed nothing beyond giving a sort of mathe- matical representation of those motions which it assigned to the heavenly bodies, as being carried round in their crystalline spheres by the primum mobile; beyond this, it was neither attempted, nor would it have been right, to inquire into the causes of those motions. In speaking of the astronomy of the middle ages, Astrology it must not be overlooked in how large a degree it was upheld and cultivated, in reference to its appli- cation to the more noble and important uses of astrology. The nature and pretensions of those two branches of science were, indeed, by no means well discriminated, even by philosophical writers; and the patronage which the former received at the hands of most of the sovereigns of those times, arose almost entirely from their sagacious appreciation of its utility in relation to the latter more valuable art. Intimately connected with this sublime principle of . 34 [Essay I. $ 1. HISTORICAL SKETCH. General. physics. the dominion of the stars over the affairs of men, was the view entertained of comets as the omens and harbingers of the fate of kings and nations. In other branches, and the study of nature gene- rally, a few scholastic dicta and dogmas, derived from metaphysical abstractions, supplied the place of all more extended inquiries of a physical kind, which, it was held, were at best uncertain, which might be indefinitely dangerous, and which were, therefore, to be prohibited altogether, unless carried on strictly in accordance and subservience to the rules and principles authoritatively laid down. Such formulas and technicalities must of course suffice for lower truths, since they had been applied with such exalted sanction as the interpreters of the highest doctrines of the Church. The schoolmen argued in familiar syllogisms on the most awful mysteries of heavenly things; and in ages when the light of discovery was too feeble to display any glimpse of the real system of nature, the human intellect was deemed powerful enough to penetrate far and wide into the regions beyond nature. In such a state of physical and cosmical science, Influence on natural theology. Essay I. $ 1.] 35 NATURAL THEOLOGY. Sebonde. it is clear there could be nothing resembling what would now be regarded as a philosophical natural theology, derived from the evidences of order and arrangement in nature. Under a more mystical point of view, however, some speculations were put forth in the period in question, among which we may find occasional indi- cations of somewhat more worthy conceptions. Perhaps the earliest modern writer of a professed Writings of treatise on natural theology was Raimond de Se- bonde?, professor of medicine at Barcelona, in the early part of the fifteenth century. In his " Theo- logia Naturalis, sive. Liber Creaturarum,” he pro- fesses to develope truths latent in nature, which may disclose to man both the perfections of God and the right clue to the understanding of Scripture. He dwells much on the impossibility of misinter- preting the book of nature, while that of revelation is open to every kind of false comment. Hence the certainty with which we may rely on the former as the key to the latter. The application of the method proposed is found in a kind of analogy between na- Sce Hallam's · Lit. of Europe," i. 192. D 2 36 [Essay I. $ 1. . HISTORICAL SKETCH. tural and divine things, followed out in a somewhat fanciful and mystic style. In fact, not only in those ages, but for long afterwards, “natural theology" had but a vague meaning, and, at the best, consisted in illustrations and confirmations from the works of nature, in support of the belief in the existence and perfections of the Deity already assumed and presupposed: not in the discussion of the question,- to what legitimate inferences of this kind does the independent examination of nature rightly conduct us? The idea of creation, in particular, was always as- sumed in the first instance; the argument was solely as to the perfection of the Creator. It was never inquired, what is the evidence of the origin of exist- ing things; unless, indeed, the interminable meta- physical disputations of those ages for and against the thesis of the eternity of the world may come under that designation. Aristotelian The dominion of the Aristotelian philosophy over philosophy adopted by the European schools during the middle ages was the Church. complete, and was upheld with the full authority of the Church, with the manifest motive, that as it pro- fessed to systematise all knowledge, and to confer a deductive power as the sole means of arriving at Essay I. $ 1.] 37 SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY. truth, so by this means all knowledge was restricted within prescribed limits; no additions could be made to a system already perfect and complete; all fresh discovery was impossible, all original teniark and inquiry prohibited, and the dominion of the ecclesi- astical dogmas (all defensible and deducible on the scholastic principle) was unalterably secured. Under the outward profession of submission to the Mediæval scepticism, decrees of the Church and devotion to the Aristotelian philosophy in the middle ages, so often vaunted as peculiarly ages of faith, more deeply inquiring writers' have, however, traced no slight indications of a very prevalent spirit of scepticism in religion, not unnaturally arising out of the disputatious cha- racter of the school theology. But it is worthy of remark, that this scepticism was for the most part of a metaphysical cast, and little connected with any physical ideas. Those who might secretly deride the metaphysical mysteries of which they made such a parade in their professed formularies, yet sank in the lowest prostration before physical prodigies and supernatural influences. Yet some few instances See Hallam's “Lit. of Europe," i, 190. D 3 38 [Essay I. § I. HISTORICAL SKETCH. were not wanting of minds superior even to these pre- · judices in the darkest periods; among whom Roger Bacon was the most conspicuous. His physical inno- vations were chiefly those which brought down on him the animosity of the ecclesiastical authorities. The Peripatetic doctrine, as embodied in the dogmas of the schoolmen, even to its physical details, was closely mixed up with the mediæval theology. None of its subtleties could be disregarded without endan- gering the doctrines of the Church. The theology and the physics of the age formed a closely com- pacted system. No one point, however apparently insignificant, could be displaced from its position without perilling the stability of the whole. Hence the tenacity with which the ecclesiastics clung to every proposition of the scholastic physics. Their whole creed was in jeopardy if substance and accident, occult qualities, the essential perfection of celestial phenomena, and the corruption of terrestrial, were called in question. Antipodcs. We may cite, as a curious illustrative instance, i On this point see Bp. Hampden, “ Bampton Lectures,” Oxford, 1833, pp. 191, 334. Essay I. $1.] 39 SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY. + science with the disputes sometimes raised in those times, as to the figure of the earth, and the existence of antipodes. Lactantius argued elaborately on the absurdity of supposing the possibility of human beings so situ- ated; Augustine denied their existence as irrecon- cilable with Scripture; and Boniface, Archbishop of Metz, placed such beings out of the pale of salva- tion. The consequences of this alliance, or rather mis- Collision of alliance, of religion with the philosophical system of theology. the day, such as it was, were necessarily the abuse and perversion of both. A false philosophy gave support to a corrupt religion; and the first refu- tation of the philosophical errors, and the gradual introduction of better views of the natural world, could not but be the occasion of a collision between science and theology ; just as the most elementary instruction in geography dispels from the mind of the Hindoo the ideas of the seven oceans and the seven continents surrounding India, and with them discre- dits the whole authority of the sacred books of the Brahmins. ? Whewell, “ Hist. of Ind. Sciences,” i. 254. 256. D4 HISTORICAL SKETCH. [Essay I. & II. $ 11. — THE EPOCH OF COPERNICUS, GALILEO, AND BACON. modern science. Commence- On the first dawn of what is commonly called the ment of revival of letters, after the retrograde period of the dark ages, but which may be more properly desig- nated as the first commencement of civilisation in, at least, northern and western Europe, science had evinced some signs of vitality, and even promising symptoms of advance, while yet under the dominion of the Aristotelian schools. The mathematical literature of the ancients was, . perhaps, the first department cultivated; and this, from the nature of the subject, could hardly excite much suspicion or opposition. It was, however, the necessary precursor of the more dangerous innova- tions which shortly followed in its train in the physical branches. System of The theory of Copernicus (1543) is a splendid monument of the power of simple analogical con- jecture, when its course is in happy accordance with the great principles of nature, to anticipate what the Copernicus. Essay I. $ 11.]. 41 COPERNICUS.—KEPLER. labours of centuries of observation have been em- ployed in confirming, and transcendent mathematical skill in demonstrating. But its simplicity and unity are the characteristics which peculiarly mark it out as connected with those higher contemplations to which we are now referring. It opened the door to the conception of one common cause of the planetary motions, of one universal principle of order and arrangement pervading the system ; — the first real glimpse obtained of the true Cosmos. Within a century, this bold, if not wholly original, Kepler. .conception received its great corroboration and ex- tension in the grand discovery of the three laws rate observations of Tycho (1609_1618) and the mechanical and astronomical discoveries of Galileo, which followed in rapid succession with the invention of the telescope, to verify and extend the predictions of Copernicus. We have before noticed the extent to which the Verbal verbal spirit of the Peripatetic logic had fixed itself in the intellect of the 15th and 16th centuries: so deeply had it taken root that we find the very same style of argument sometimes adopted by the 42 [Essay I. $ II. HISTORICAL SKETCH. defenders as well as the assailants of the new doc- trines. Thus, Nicolas of Cusa argued against the central position and fixity of the earth that “ since there is no “ circumference to the system there can be no centre." And in the same strain, on the other side, the Sieur de Beaulieu affirmed it to be a proposition absurd in geometry as it is against faith and reason to make the circumference of a circle fixed while the centre is moveable. We cannot, however, be surprised at the slow progress made by such novel ideas even among the more educated classes. The new theory seemed to contradict the evidence of the senses; and as an eloquent writer has observed, “ the glorious de- “lusion of the rising and setting sun could not be “ overcome.”l All impressions, associations, and pre- judices were arrayed against the new doctrine, which only the few were even competent to understand. In the disputes which arose as to the Copernican theory, and still more extensively, half a century .CU | Mr. Everett's Address on the Opening of Albany Observatory, U. S., 1856, p. 97. Essay I. $ 11.] 43 GALILEO. to the of Galileo. later, in those which the discoveries of Galileo called Opposition forth, we trace the first decisive conflict of the discoveries positive physical philosophy with the scholastic metaphysical spirit of the age; and in the more serious hostility and persecution which it encoun- tered from the ecclesiastical authorities, we see the same antagonism with the erroneous theological principles then maintained. These events form, perhaps, the first great epoch where we may contemplate the real influence which the advance of physical discovery was beginning to exercise on subjects and opinions, which, though of a different kind, could not fail to be materially affected by the general movement. . The influence of the metaphysical forms of rea- Philosophi- soning, in those times adopted even in physical theological mysticism. questions, directly cooperated with the theological spirit of the age, in that they both tended to involve the subject in mystery, which it is the distinguish- ing character of the inductive principle to clear away. Thus, the single experimental fact exhibited by Galileo, — so utterly confounding to the Aristote- lians, as by necessary consequence it impugned cal and 44 [Essay I. $ 11. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Science divested of mystery. their entire system, — that weights of ten pounds and of one fell from the top of the tower at Pisa in exactly the same time; and the simple reason that each of the ten must fall in exactly the same time, whether united in one mass or falling singly, — however obvious in itself, — was highly important for dispelling the mysticising spirit which then involved and obscured physical truth equally whether it arose from a metaphysical or from a theological source. By this and other simple experiments, Galileo divested the laws of mechanics of the obscurity and confusion with which the Peripatetic system had invested them, and prepared the way for the novel and startling doctrine that the same laws of motion would apply to bodies in the heavens as to those on the earth. After the investigation of the simpler mechanical powers, from the date of the discoveries of Archi- medes, eighteen centuries elapsed before the solution of the problem of the inclined plane was effected by Stevinus: and the great algebraist Cardan could not conceive the composition of forces: so entirely were the minds of men incapacitated by confused Essay I. $ 11.] 45 GALILEO. vance of principles. metaphysical notions, which mystified the plainest truths. It was thus long before the simple philosophical Slow ad- principles announced by Galileo obtained acceptance. inductive Even Kepler did not acknowledge the sufficiency of the law of inertia to preserve the motions of the planets; and imagined animal forces or supernatural agency for the purpose. In other words, in accor- dance with his age, he did not apprehend the simple proposition that a body in motion must go on till its motion is stopped or altered; and whatever stops or alters it is a new force. The followers of Copernicus long felt a difficulty as to the preservation of the parallelism of the earth's axis, and imagined three distinct motions impressed upon it, orbital, rotatory, axial: not understanding that the third is a necessary part and consequence of the second. The Peripatetic dogma was that a body could only be moved by something in contact with it. They had not attained the abstract notion of free motion retained after impulse. Hence the main difficulty of the Copernican system to their minds. It was on this ground that the Ptolemaists could only conceive, 46 [ESSAY I. S II. HISTORICAL SKETCH. - the planets as being carried round their orbits by the motion of the solid crystalline spheres, like the hands of a clock; just as even at the present day we have heard of some who fancy this to be the case with the moon. Nothing was more difficult at first than to accept the simpler idea of free motion under the influence of cosmical forces; or to appreciate the analogy of all the celestial motions, as being of the same kind, or the connection of impulsive with rota- tory force. Such instances are important, as they point to the necessity for clearing the subject of all obscurity of ideas whether of a metaphysical or supernatural kind; if we would adhere to the simplicity of nature, and above all, of seizing upon just analogy as the true key to the unity of principle and harmony of · causation pervading the whole. Theological The persecution of Galileo has been oftener de- persecution. claimed against than fully reflected on. Galileo maintained the positions of the advancing inductive philosophy, on the grounds of demonstration and ex- periment; but beyond the strict limits of either, he reasoned and generalised on the broad basis of sound analogy in a manner utterly subversive of the re- Essay I. $ 11. ] GALILEO. Galilco. ceived Aristotelian dogmas, which, at all events, had no better ground to stand upon, without any regard to ulterior consequences or existing prejudices. He boldly proclaimed the most unpalatable truths: he asserted the motion of the earth round the sun, de- grading it from its high central supremacy to the humble position of a very secondary member of a system of many tributary worlds. He affirmed its Heresies of rotation on its axis, thus destroying the notion of up and down in the universe, of a heaven above, or a hades beneath; in both propositions directly contra- dicting numerous passages of Scripture and the es- tablished creed of the Church, besides maintaining many minor doctrines negativing points of the scho- lastic philosophy, which had become incorporated with the ecclesiastical system, and the denial of which perilled the most sacred dogmas. And in the mechanical and physical points, as well as by the aid of his telescope, he aggravated the matter by urging, not vague speculations, but unassailable facts. At all this, the spirit of orthodoxy necessarily took alarm. Some of its most favourite tenets and che- rished pretensions were directly assailed. The words of Scripture and the decrees of the infallible Church 48 [Essay I. $ 11. HISTORICAL SKETCH. were equally set at nought. The earth was displaced from its proud position as the “central hearth" of the world, which even pagan philosophers had as- signed to it; and still more, it was in great danger of losing the higher title demanded for it as the seat of moral supremacy, the sole centre and fountain of spiritual blessing in the whole universe. These and other not less heretical positions Galileo had openly proclaimed and defended, in defiance of the authority of the Church and to the disparage- ment and subversion of its claims. But he did more; by questioning one part he opened the door to questioning others; he unsettled men's minds and sowed the seed of future unknown heresies, whose evil fruits might be beyond calculation. That he was subjected to the power of the Inqui- sition, and escaped worse consequences only by a forced nominal submission and recantation, is then neither to be wondered at nor to be regarded as an isolated case of the ignorance and barbarism of the age, or of the tyranny of the Roman Church resenting an attack on its particular assumptions. It is simply the true exemplification and type of the antagonism of all arbitrary religious systems, Case of Galileo not pecu- liar. Essay I. $ 11.] 49 PERSECUTION OF SCIENCE. 49 LU strengthening themselves upon error and invested with power, against every successive advance in phi- losophical discovery and enlightenment of the public mind:— against a progress which the upholders of such systems with good reason dread as dangerous to their assumptions. It is but a significant instance of the hostility which must always result, while either established priesthoods, or the more independent pro- phets of fanaticism and expositors of popular prejudice, continue to ally themselves and their cause with dark- ness and ignorance rather than with light and know- ledge, to associate religious truth with physical error, and thus expose the doctrines of Christianity to the reproach of being an appeal rather to the blindness and infirmity, than to the information and higher sense of mankind; tacitly confessing that it is unable to stand the test of advancing inquiry, rather than seeking to identify it with all that tends to en- lighten, to elevate, and to benefit the human race. The question has been discussed with some curio- sity, why Copernicus was not subjected to the same persecution as Galileo ? and reasons have been found by some writers in the comparatively abstract nature of his speculations, the calm tone in which he pro- HISTORICAL SKETCH. [Essay I. $ 11. Attempts at com- promise posed them, his own high position in the Church, his deference to those in authority, and the like con- siderations. But a truer solution probably may be found in the fact that the first copy of his work was only laid before him in his last illness, and nature did but forestall the persecutors. The glosses of Foscarinus to torture the text of Scripture into accordance with the fact of the earth's motion were as empty as ineffectual, and the retro- grade movement of Tycho (even though a Protes- tant) was simply an absurd renunciation of philoso- phical truth from a desire to conciliate prejudices, which after all never will be nor can be conciliated. Like all such compromises, it satisfied neither party, and was speedily consigned to oblivion. It is only worth alluding to in connection with the first-men- tioned scheme, as both were the very counterparts, and ought to have been the warning, of the similar attempts of those who, down to the present day, are continually aiming at the very same thing as to the other parts of science which equally contradict the expressions of Scripture. The mysticism of numbers was a superstition which had infected philosophy from the days of TC Remains of inysticisın, Essay I. $ 11.] 51 MONTAIGNE. Pythagoras. Galileo's announcement of the satel- lites of Jupiter was denied, because it would invade the sacredness of the number 7, which hitherto included the planets. But at a much later period even Huyghens, when he had discovered one satel- lite of Saturn, declared the system complete, be- cause 6 primary and 6 secondary planets made up the perfect number 12. These are curious exem- plifications of the tendency of the human mind to repose on false analogies, and speculate on grounds utterly remote from all real physical con- ceptions. Some light is thrown on the state both of philo- Philosophy of Mon- sophy and of religious belief about the end of the taigne. sixteenth century, in the instance of one of the most brilliant and enlightened writers of the period, by the essays of Montaigne (1580); who, though professedly a moralist, yet in several places, and especially in his celebrated defence of Sebonde (from which, as Mr. Hallam observes, that writer is chiefly remembered), wanders far from his professed subject, into an almost unlimited range of observations on topics of natural history, physiology, and physics, according to the views of his day and the philosophies of the ancients, E 2 52 [ESSAY I. $ II. . HISTORICAL SKETCH. with especial reference to the question of the extent of human knowledge and the powers of human rea- son, and not without a bearing on the higher question of religious belief. Montaigne's physical views are of course in accord- ance with the yet unformed ideas of his age. Thus, as to the system of the world, he remarks that the motion of the heavenly bodies round the earth was believed for ages, till some of the ancient philosophers placed the sun immovable in the centre. Of late Copernicus has revived this theory. “But,” he asks, “how do we know that a better may not in its turn “ be proposed, as one philosophical system has always “ been superseded by another?” And he elsewhere argues that all physical science is dependent on the senses, which are, after all, continually liable to deception. He was wholly incompetent to appre- ciate the grand argument of physical analogy, which mainly determined the conclusions of Copernicus. He nevertheless approves of the belief in a plurality of inhabited worlds 3, arguing from the universal in- fluence of the Divine beneficence. 1 Montaigne's Essays, vol. ii. p. 386. ed. 1793. 2 Ibid. ii. 417. * Ibid. ii. 309. Essay I. $ 11.] 53 MONTAIGNE. Yet his remarks on our knowledge, or rather ig- norance, of the Deity are of the most just and en- lightened kind. He complains that human ignorance leads men presumptuously to prescribe to God, and to argue upon his dealings, as if they were those of a man: to call some things miraculous and others natural; to ascribe great events to God? as particular interventions, as if smaller events were not so. In spite of the reasonableness of these views, we yet observe some singular inconsistencies, the expo- nents of the mind of the age, rather than of the in- dividual. He mentions3 instances of prodigies from ancient writers, without seeming in the least to dis- credit them, and dwells in detail upon the ecclesias- tical miracles in entire faith, making it wholly a question of testimony and authority, without a thought, or a disposition to entertain one, as to the broad question of the grounds of physical credibility. He appears also to admit the influence of the stars on human affairs, and other omens and predictions.4 Montaigne has been pointed out as one of the | Montaigne's Essays, ii. 311. 3 Ibid. i. 233. 2 Ibid. ii. 316. 4 Ibid. ii. 186. E 3 HISTORICAL SKETCH. earliest modern examples of philosophical scepticism. This, however, must refer rather to general principles than to avowed views on any particular points of belief in religion, or in the supernatural generally. The state of physical ideas in his time was not such as to in- duce any extended question on points of that nature. His scepticism was displayed entirely in subjects of other kinds — in moral, literary, and critical ques- tions. He evinces, indeed, a general distrust of the powers of the human intellect?, and repeatedly en- larges on its weakness, the diversity and uncertainty of all opinions, and the impossibility of arriving at a general consent on any subject. If he allude to some alleged marvels as being merely fortunate coin- cidences, believed to be miraculous, under the in- fluence of particular circumstances and prepossessions, he yet fully submitted to the dogmas of the Church in all matters of religious belief. In particular, he regarded with undisguised alarm the innovations of Luther and the reformation, as setting up human reason and private judgment, which, by natural con- I See Buckle’s “ Hist. of Civilization," vol. i. p. 475. ? Montaigne's Essays, iii. 390. Essay I. $ 11.] 55 MONTAIGNE. sequence, he conceived, could end in nothing but in 6 an horrible atheism.” 1 Some, indeed, have doubted the sincerity of Mon- taigne in his professions of belief in all the won- ders to which the Church then demanded assent. We have before alluded to the probable existence of much latent scepticism in the middle ages; and it Sceptical tendencies. can hardly be questioned that, at all events, the whole religious system of those times, by no very remote consequences, would have a strong tendency towards encouraging a liberalised kind of belief among the thinking class ;-when religious doctrines were inseparably mixed up with so much of the marvellous, and when those who reflected at all on the nature and grounds of their faith would, after all, perceive that the Church by no means de- manded a philosophical conviction, in fact, repudiated the very use of reason, and the appeal to evidence, and required only an assent of faith, a profession of obedience to its decrees. The immense multiplication of miracles in the middle ages, or rather the continual appeal to the | Montaigne's Essays, ii. 166. E 4 56 [Essay I. $ 11. HISTORICAL SKETCH. supernatural implied in the whole religious system then upheld, must naturally have produced the effect of assimilating all such alleged manifestations to each other, and placing them all alike, in general estima- tion, on the same debased level. Amid innumerable legends all distinction of fact and fiction was lost. No one part could be questioned more than another. And thus, to the apprehension of those at all superior to such indiscriminate credulity, an equally indiscri- minate incredulity would be the natural result. The vulgar took all these marvels equally for truth, the more enlightened for fable; and, as being all alike professedly essentials of the faith, the whole belief would be conformed to the same mythical standard. The belief in witchcraft, and other kindred super- - stitions, was almost universal in the sixteenth cen- tury. Yet in the minds of a few who could reason, Qant. Voer Reginald Scot tion of witchcraft. ? Of the fearful excesses to which the belief in witchcraft led in the merciless persecution and execution of innumerable persons accused of it, even down to a much later period, some striking exemplifications are given in Mr. R. Chambers's interesting volumes “ The Domestic Annals of Scotland,” 1858. It has been remarked by another writer, Mr. Dockeray (Egeria, 1854), that this zeal in the exposure of witchcraft seems to have supplied in the Protestant Church the place of the miracles in the Romish as a triumph over the powers of darkness evincing divine aid. Essay I. $ 11.] 57 WITCHCRAFT. some doubts were beginning to suggest themselves; and though this was perhaps little connected with any advance of physical knowledge, yet it could not but indicate some progress in rational and philo- sophical ideas of the supremacy of nature. Of this a striking instance is afforded in Reginald Scot, who freely exposed such supernatural pretensions in his “ Discovery of Witchcraft," I 1584, wherein he ex- pressly denied to Satan any power of controlling na- ture. He even appears to have advanced further, and has been interpreted as disposed to call in question or explain away supernatural interposition altogether. The existence of some degree of scepticism of this kind about the period in question is attested by an allusion of Shakspeare, which is remarkable, con- sidering the general state of opinion and tenor of belief in his day:- “ They say miracles are past, and we have our “philosophical persons, to make modern and familiar, 5 things supernatural and causeless.” 2 1 See Hallam’s “Lit. of Europe,” ii. 135. 2 « All's Well,” &c., act ii. sc. 3. In this passage nearly all the editions place the comma after “ things,"—though the original folio has no stop till the end, -- and thus make the .sentence contradict itself. 58 [Essas 1. $ II. HISTORICAL SKETCH. -- Theories of the world. It has been supposed by some that this passage is an allusion to R. Scot: but it may rather be asked, was it not more probably the comprehensive and philosophical genius of the great poet which anti- cipated forms of speculation as yet undeveloped, though possibly floating on the mind of the age ? The various speculative theories of the world which emanated chiefly from Italian writers in the sixteenth century, as those of Cesalpin, Telesio, and Jordano Bruno, can perhaps hardly come under the descrip- tion of physical philosophy, though they each em- brace a sort of general scheme of the constitution of nature. Their systems were indeed mostly of a very visionary character. That of Bruno (1580) has perhaps attained most celebrity from the cruel per- secution to which it exposed him. He seems to have maintained a doctrine differing little from that of Pantheism. In the more properly physical department he boldly asserted the Copernican system, and up- held a plurality of inhabited worlds; in these respects - The punctuation here adopted, which restores it to sense, was suggested to me by a friend: but I have since found it in an edition published by Stockdale, 1790, 8vo. Essa 59 THEORIES OF THE UNIVERSE. 11 more fully evincing a participation in the progress of a sounder and more substantial philosophy. If the instances just cited are not examples of the direct advance of physical science, yet they at least show the light of the age, such as it was, reflected on physical conceptions, and exhibiting both the character of such conceptions and their relations to religious belief, as then entertained.- We now proceed, however, to a period little advanced in date, but greatly so if measured by scientific progress, — marked by the prophetic de- clarations of the father of modern inductive philo- sophy. The views of Bacon and the tendency of his Principles of Bacon. philosophy. are marked throughout by the elevated nature of their bearing on the grounds of religious belief. The same master mind which dictated the more purely philosophical part of the system, is equally conspicuous in its higher applications, and especially in the expression of conceptions of the sublime inferences from the order of the natural Advancement of Learning, 1605; De Augmentis, 1623; Novum Organon, 1620. 60 [ESSAY I. S II. HISTORICAL SKETCH. world. If we sometimes find such expressions con- formed to the ideas or, at any rate, the language of the age, — as in the instance of the antithesis of “First” and “Second Causes," referred to as if they were conceptions of the same kind, — yet in other cases we must recognise views not only in advance of his age, but eminently capable of in- structing the present. His opinion of final causes', and his often quoted remark,—respecting their barrenness in a scientific sense and regarding them as not neglected, but 6s wrongly placed,"—if properly attended to, would have anticipated and superseded volumes of modern discussion. While the observation that physical causes do not really withdraw us from the admis- sion of Divine Providence, is a little vitiated in its free and full application, when, instead of re- garding them as the very exponents of that Pro- vidence, he talks of the belief in it as the last resource, — 6 ad Deum et Providentiam confum “ giant." 2 His admired maxim, that a superficial philosophy 1 De Augmentis, lib. iii. c. 4. p. 186. ed. 1624. 2 Ibid. p. 189. Essay I. $ 11.] 67 BACON. UC inclines men to atheism, a deeper to religion', ap- plying directly to the very dubious physics and metaphysics prevalent in his age, has yet a prac- tical truth in it for all ages, provided men are led to look for that religion solely in a region beyond that of positive science; not as mixed up with ob- jects of sense and affections of matter, but as ex- isting in the world of spirit. And when he pursues the subject further towards indicating the class of truths to which natural theo- logy and the use of reason alone are competent to conduct us, he draws some distinctions which are marvellously in advance of the speculations com- monly current even in later times. That natural. light and the contemplation of the works of creation may teach the existence, but by no means the nature, and still less the will, of the Deity2; -- that no such investigation can ever bring us to a knowledge of Divine mysteries ; – that “the senses perceive natural truth, but are blind “ to divine, as the sun lightens the earth, but hides “ the stars; ” — that natural science is for the de- De Augmentis, bk. i. p. 9. ? Ibid. bk. i. pp. 7, 8. 62 [Essay I. $ II. HISTORICAL SKETCH. struction of atheism, not the construction of reli- gion !;- that the light of nature may teach us the Divine power and wisdom, but not the Divine image or likeness — are propositions which stand the test of the highest advances of modern philosophy. In defining the respective provinces of reason and of faith, and urging the importance of keeping them separate, and observing that the neglect of such distinction leads only to the serious injury and perversion alike of philosophy and of religion ; - and again, that to derive religion from philo- sophy is to seek the living among the dead, to derive philosophy from religion to seek the dead among the living ?, -- he gives utterance to a lesson which has been reiterated in vain to successive races of Bible philosophers and Scripture cosmo- gonists. Bacon regards the study of the book of nature as “the true key to that of revelation,"3 both as opening the intellect to the true meaning of “ Scripture from the general rules of reason and UCI i De Augmentis, bk, jii. c. 2. p. 156. ? Ibid. bk. ix. p. 534. 3 Ibid. bk. i. p. 51. Essay I. $ 11.] 63 BACON. “ language,” and as urging the necessity for inquir- ing into its contents. These are indeed wide and somewhat vague expressions, and such as might at the present day be applied by some to an extent which the author perhaps did not contemplate. But in some other points we still recognise a Some lingering predominanoe of the theological ideas which cha- influerices of dog- racterised the age. When, for example, from the matism. very just remark that false religions forbid the use of reason while Christianity encourages it', he carries out the use of reason to the explanation of Divine mysteries, there appears a little incon- sistency with some of his former admirable distinc- tions; unless indeed we rest in the ambiguity of the sentence, and suppose the entire meaning to refer to what he immediately enlarges on — that all revelation is an accommodation of Divine things to our finite apprehensions. In one passage indeed Bacon appears to carry out the principle of faith to a somewhat strange extreme; when he alleges that “ the more irrational (absonum) iss and incredible any divine mystery is, the greater : De Augmentis, bk. ix, c. i. p. 529. 64 [Essay I. $ 11. HISTORICAL SKETCH. “s the honour we do to God in believing it, and so “ much the more noble is the victory of faith.” 1 Again, admitting that truths of revelation stand entirely on the basis of that authority, and are thus “authypostatæ," he contends that reason is yet competent to deduce conclusions logically from them? - the very assumption which gave rise to most of the preposterous dogmas of the scholastic theology. Rather as these truths are not conclu- sions of reason, so neither can they fairly be made premises for it. One of the most remarkable indications of pre- valent influences may be noticed in the instance of the inquiry - censured indeed by Bacon, if car- ried out in the spirit of fanciful speculation, but admitted if kept within sober and rational bounds - into the nature of angels and spirits, as also of demons, with whom are associated, by a singular analogy, not only vices in morals, but poisons in physics.3 In a more scientific point of view it is also i De Aug. lib. ix. p. 527. In the earlier English version “ On the Advancement,” &c. these paradoxical expressions are omitted. ? Ibid. p. 530. 3 Ibid, bk, iii. p. 158. Essay I. $ 11.] 65 BACON. system of curious to notice the question which Bacon dis- View of the cusses as an exemplification of his method — the the world. truth of the received Ptolemaic astronomy – dis- tinctly putting it as a point to be inquired into, and stating the argument on the one side, as, — that the motion of the stars from east to west is very rapid, in consequence of their distance from the earth ; that of the outer planets, Saturn and Jupiter, less so; that of the inferior planets, still less; that of the atmosphere, though perceptible within the tropics, very little; and by induction, therefore, that of the earth absolutely nothing l: while, on the other side, the inquiry is to be diligently pursued whether there are any equally good arguments in favour of the imaginary hypothesis of Copernicus beyond its simplicity and beauty, which he fully admits.? Bacon, indeed (in his “Thema Cæli"), speaks of the fixity of the earth as that “which seemed to him the more true opinion,” though he, in the same work?, Nov. Org. lib. ii. $ 36, p. 207, ed. 1813. 2 This case becomes the more interesting to state correctly since it was misapprehended by Laplace, who represents Bacon as arguing exclusively in favour of the Ptolemaic system. - Essai Philos. sur les Prob. p. 170, ed. 1814. s Thema Cæli, ix, p. 253, 66 [Essay I. § II. HISTORICAL SKETCH. expressly admits the solar system as far as the two inner planets Venus and Mercury, yet, in the “ De- scriptio Globi Intellectualis," dwells on the difficulties with which he conceived the Copernican hypothesis attended; and especially expressed his wish for some system based on substantial physical grounds, which, doubtless, was not yet the case with the Copernican.' The direct argument of Gilbert in its favour (“De Magnete," 1600), as well as the poetical recommenda- tion of Milton, and, not least, the amusing paradoxes of Wilkins, tended to open men's minds to the con- sideration of so novel a theory in England, before the great movement towards the end of the same century. Before the inductive philosophy was established, and consequently before the grander truths of uni- versal order could have been thoroughly accepted in all their extent and consequences, it would be vain to seek for any enlarged philosophical views on the question of interruptions of the laws of nature. Bacon?, when he maintains with so much truth that “miracles were never wrought to convince I See Whewell's “ Hist. of Ind. Sciences," i. 386. : De Aug. bk. iii. ch. 3, p. 156. Essay I. § 1r.] 6 BACON. atheists,” and assigns as the reason that God's ordi- Miracles. nary works are sufficient for that purpose, overlooks the more powerful reason that no miracle could be received at all without a previous belief in the Divine Omnipotence, even in a very positive and extended sense. When he adds that miracles were for tħe conviction of the idolatrous and superstitious, he perhaps approaches nearer to the admission of the adaptation of such evidence to the narrowness and ignorance of those to whom it was addressed. In estimating his opinions on the subject of the supernatural, we must not omit to remark the caution which he lays down in another place respecting the strict scrutiny to be used in collecting recorded instances of marvels, monstrous productions of nature, and the like. “ Above all," he adds, 56 every relation must be considered suspicious “s which depends in any degree on religion, as the “ prodigies in Livy.” 1 On the other side, we must notice his somewhat far-fetched homage to the miracles of Christ, as having conferred the highest glory on medicine?, as i Nov. Organ. ii. Apb, 29. * De Aug. iv. 2. F 2 68 [Essay I. $ 11. HISTORICAL SKETCH. well as his more devout reflections on them in his “ Meditationes Sacræ." The inestimable value and importance of the one grand Baconian maxim, “Give unto faith the things which are of faith," and its great significance in relation to the modern advance in physical general- isation, has been commented on in former essays. It is to the full and complete realisation and appli- cation of this broad principle that we may look with confidence for removing a mass of objections and difficulties from philosophical sources which have embarrassed and obscured Christianity, and have been often held forth as fatal to its cause. Such diffi- culties, however, disappear when it is simply con- sidered that, however forcibly urged in reference to matters of sense, properly subjects of reason, they are inapplicable when the question is one of faith, and refers to truths of a totally different order. We must not forget to mention that remarkable production Bacon's “ Confession of Faith," not pub- lished till 1641, fifteen years after his death ; a production which has excited the admiration of the more strict dogmatists, as exhibiting a remarkable Bacon's “Confession of Faith." Essay I. $ 11.] 69 BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. character testimony to the orthodox creed. We may remark in it, that besides a profession of belief in the crea- tion as well as in the Incarnation, the true resurrec- tion, and visible ascension of Christ, he expressly declares that He showed Himself “ a Lord of nature in His miracles.” It is, however, material to remark that these declarations are put forth as articles of of faith,” which we must fairly understand, in accord- ance with his own profound and most important distinction between faith and knowledge. As to the general tone, spirit, and character of General the Baconian philosophy, some degree of misappre- of the Baconian hension very commonly prevails. By some it is philosophy. degraded into mere utilitarianism, aiming only at practical advance in the arts of life. By others, its « inductive” character, in the narrow sense of the term, as opposed to “deductive,” has been insisted on, but just in the same erroneous light as an exclusively deductive character has been assigned to the Aristotelian system; whereas its founder expressly made induction of the most primary im- portance. The Baconian method is essentially a combination of both processes; and the material dis- tinction is, that whereas in the Aristotelian method VOU F 3 70 [Essay I. S II. HISTORICAL SKETCH. U the deduction sets out from first principles assumed on mere ideal, or even verbal, abstractions, the Baconian deduction necessarily sets out from some principles originally inductive, however simple and elementary. . But the followers of Aristotle did not act up to the principles of their master; and the system de- generated into one purely deductive and fruitless, because it neglected to appeal also to induction. This system, therefore, became a failure, as after it did the Cartesian, because the deductive and inductive methods were disjoined, and the latter not even recognised. The Baconian system triumpbed, be- cause the two processes were closely united and mutually dependent. Test of true If the power of permanently advancing and con- philosophy. stantly enlarging the boundaries of knowledge by its inductive discoveries, while, by its deductions, it fully keeps pace with and even outstrips and predicts the progress of experiment, be the cha- racteristics of a true philosophy, by this test we i See this upheld and exemplified, “ Unity of Worlds," Essay I. 31. p. 21, et seq. 2nd edit. Essay I. $ 11.] 71 BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. at once recognise the superiority of the Baconian method. The philosophy of Aristotle, because it affected to be unalterable, was transitory; while that of Bacon and Galileo, because it is ever in change and move- ment, is permanent. Thus alone can any philosophy be the true in- terpreter of nature; and by showing itself conform- able at once to nature and to reason, attending alike to fact and to theory, can alone elicit those indications of universal reason which pervade nature. One highly distinctive characteristic of the modern Rejection of authority. inductive philosophy, is the principle of unlimited freedom of inquiry, and a rejection of the trammels of authority under which older systems were ham- pered and impeded from all real progress. The inductive spirit acknowledges no dominion of one mind over another, except so far as one may be more fully instructed and guided by the supreme authority of nature than another. And this is only in matters of opinion where an experienced judg- ment, conferring a more enlarged view of natural analogies, comes to the aid of sensible evidence, F 4 HISTORICAL SKETCH. [Essay I. $ 11. systems. independent observation, diligent and accurate col- lection of facts. Lingering So deeply had men's minds been impressed with influence of ancient the peculiarities of the scholastic philosophy and its theories, so congenial to men's fancies, of imaginary, occult, and mystic powers and properties in matter, that, even under the new system, it was long before inquirers could altogether divest themselves of such conceits; and even to the present day science has hardly perhaps effectually cleared itself of them to all apprehensions. At any rate, we trace numerous instances of such influence pervading at least the language of philosophical writers, if not rendering the conception of better views difficult and uncon- genial. Philosophy The state of philosophy in the earlier part of the in the 17th century as seventeenth century, notwithstanding the great move- bearing on theology. ment made by Bacon and Galileo, was by no means as yet such as to be capable of leading to enlarged views of the great idea of universal order in nature, even if it could have been considered at all proved in the then state of discovery. On the other hand, the spirit of technical metaphysics retained a strong hold on the conceptions, and guided the Essay I. $ 11.! 73 THEOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS. C S speculations of philosophers as well as divines. Hence, while abstractions of a very recondite kind characterised the theological disquisitions of some of the keenest intellects of the age, and, in several cases, led to serious difficulties and objections with reference to the higher doctrines of revelation, there was little disposition to enter on any kind of question as to the relations of that revelation to physical truth. Indications of the tendency of views, in any case, on the one side, are often to be collected from writings which obtain repute on the other. Thus we may gain some notion of the character of scepti- cism at the period in question from what was confessedly the standard treatise on the evidences of religion, that of Grotius “De Veritate” (1627), Hugo Grotius. in which it is remarkable that, in respect to mira- culous evidence, while the author dwells largely on testimony, authority, conformity to the Divine attri- butes, and other like topics, and combats a variety of objections, he yet never makes the slightest allu- sion to any influence of physical considerations as affecting the question; and the fact that his work should have so long sustained its reputation as the 74 HISTORICAL SKETCH. To text book on the subject, shows how little the main question of later times was formerly so much as recognised or thought of. As a further single instance, it may be added, that when we consider what the state of physiology must have been before the circulation of the blood was admitted (which was only announced in 1628), we shall hardly be surprised at the strange physiological theory adopted by Grotius, in order to maintain the tenet of the resurrection of the same body, which among other points of physical belief was anciently much insisted on.? Lord Lord Herbert of Cherbury 3, in his book “De Ve- Herbert of Cherbury. ritate," &c. (1624), while, in accordance with his metaphysical scheme of intuitive elements as the source of all real conviction, he anxiously engaged in elaborating what he conceived a philosophical view of religious truth; yet, in the more tangible province of the material world, he not only fully admitted the general credibility of interruptions of See especially bk. i. $ 13; bk. ii. $ 5 ; bk. iii. $ 7. 2 De Verit, lib. ii. § 10. 3 See especially “ De Verit." p. 230; and his “ Memoirs," published by IIorace Walpole, 1764. Essay I. $ 11.] DESCARTES. nature, but firmly relied on such supernatural at- testations in his own times and personal experi- ence. But we must now glance, however cursorily, at a Philoso- phy of system of philosophy, which, though brilliantly con- Descartes. ceived, eminently concurring with the advance of thought in its day, and attaining such general influ- ences as to supplant for a time the hitherto received Aristotelian method, was yet destined in its turn, in- deed from its very nature, eventually to yield before the steady progress of the real inductive principles of Bacon and Galileo. The philosophy of Descartes, aiming at an expla- nation of the whole system of the world on a common physical principle, must be regarded (hypothetical as it confessedly was) as powerfully tending to support the idea of universal and invariable physical causa- tion, and thence the grand conception of cosmical order, though incapable then of receiving that de- tailed proof on which it now rests. The higher bearing of the system was indeed manifest from the deductive nature of the whole method, deriving even its physical principles from the primary assumption of the Divine existence and perfections, and thence HISTORICAL SKETCH. [Essay I. $ 11. Cartesian theism. 217 ILLU arguing downwards to natural causes all thus linked in one chain with the primary. influence of presiding supreme intelligence. The spirit and tendency of the whole Cartesian philosophy with reference to theology was suffi- ciently marked and peculiar. Descartes totally re- jected the study of final causes. On the other band, his proof of the existence of a Deity was of that abstract kind which consisted with his entire theory; it was the simple existence of the idea of God in the mind; the cause of which, he argues, can only be its reality; just as he made thought the only proof of our own existence. Descartes Again, the philosophy of Descartes was throughout reception of revelation.“ preeminently characterised by asserting the unlimited supremacy of human reason, and the total rejection 111 11 ! Descartes, in laying down the primary laws of motion, says :- “ Atque ex hac eâdem immobilitate Dei, regulæ quædam sive leges “naturæ cognosci possunt, quæ sunt causæ secundariæ ac particulares “diversorum motuum quos in singulis corporibus advertimus." He then proceeds to deduce some of the primary laws of motion and force : and after giving the proof of one part of the theorem of collision of bodies, he continues, " Demonstratur etiam pars altera ex immutabili- “ tate operationis Dei, mundum eadem actione qua olim creavit continuo “jam conservantis.”- Principia Philos. p. ii. $ 37. 2 Principia Philosophiæ, pt. i. $ 28. (1644.) Essay I. $ 11.] DESCARTES. of external authority. Yet, notwithstanding the adoption of this high standard in philosophy, he professes an entire acceptance of the mysteries of faith and the truth of revelation as matters not cognisable to reason; as is abundantly testified by a passage towards the very commencement of the systematic exposition of his principles; where he distinctly asserts that matters communicated by Divine revelation ought to be believed, though they may be beyond our comprehension, such as the mys- teries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, and gene- rally, he adds, that both in the Divine nature and in creation there may be many things beyond our com- prehension. In deducing all physical action from the “immutability of the Deity” and thus making it equally in its nature invariable, he yet expressly admits an exception with regard to “such mutations 1 “ Credenda esse omnia quæ a Deo revelata sunt quamvis captum “ nostrum excedant. . . . Ita si forte nobis Deus de Seipso vel “ aliis aliquid revelet quod naturales ingenii nostri vires excedant, qualia “jam sunt mysteria Incarnationis et Trinitatis, non recusabimus illa credere quamvis non clare intelligamus. Nec ullo modo mirabimur “multa esse tum in immensâ ejus naturâ, tum etiam in rebus ab “ eo creatis, quæ captum nostrum excedant." - Cartesii Princip. Philos. p. 7. 78 [Essay I. $ 11. HISTORICAL SKETCH. “ as are made in matter, by evident experience or “ Divine revelation.” 1 Yet in spite of these and the like professions, Descartes, not without reason, from the mere fact of his opposition to the scholastic philosophy, lived under constant apprehension of persecution from the eccle- siastical authorities; assailed on all sides by calumnies and anathemas ? he only escaped actually suffering from the hands of the sacerdotal functionaries by finding an asylum in the court of Queen Christina of Sweden, where, as is well known, he ended his days a victim to the climate. The broad profession of faith made by Descartes, though supported by his disciples Malebranche and De la Forge, was modified by a seasonable degree of caution on the part of one of his most eminent followers, Rohault, whose “Physics” was long the text-book of the Cartesian doctrine, and who observes, “it is unbecoming philosophers on all occasions Followers of Descartes. ? Principia, pt. ii. 36. ? In illustration of the kind of accusations which the polemical spirit of the time brought against the philosophy of Descartes, even among Protestants, the reader may refer to Bp. Stillingfileet's “ Origines Sacræ," vol. i. p. 417, ed. Oxf. 1797. Essay I. $ 11.] 79 HOBBES. “ to run to miracles and Divine power ;" I thus afford- ing at least an indication of the increasing discrimi- nation of the age as to the proper character and limits of philosophical investigation. The celebrity of Hobbes depends almost entirely Hobbes. on his metaphysical, moral, and political writings (1642-78). His speculations on physical as well as theological subjects evince little philosophical en- largement of ideas, and are conceived much in the formal scholastic spirit then prevalent. Yet the increasing influence of more positive principles may be traced in the precision of his conceptions on many points of philosophical inquiry, and his assertion of unlimited freedom of opinion is indicative of the spirit of progress. In regard to higher subjects, he certainly ap- His theological pears to evince a clear appreciation of the value views. of the Baconian maxim distinctive of the pro- vinces of reason and of faith ; “ Dignius credere quam scire." In his most celebrated work (especially in the chapters on religion in general, and that entitled Robaults - Physics," pt. i. c. 10. He died 1675. HISTORICAL SKETCH. . [Essay I. $ 11. “ De Civitate Christianâ ”)!, his discussion on these subjects almost wholly consists of formal dogmatic expositions in the most literal sense of the accepted creed. In one passage indeed, he introduces a caution against mixing up physical with religious doctrines; but in the sequel it appears that this refers only to guarding against transubstantiation. He supports at length the received evidential argument from miracles, exactly in the formal manner of theologians, as the only proof of a Divine revelation; though admitting the qualifying appeal to internal evidence of the worthiness of the doc- trine.2 In the physical portion of his “ Elementa Philo- sophiæ” he evinces in general little advance beyond the ideas of the age; though, on some points, a singularity of opinion or expression strikes us. Thus, he expressly maintains that opinions respecting the magnitude or the origin of the universe, ought properly to be left to theological authorities to Physical views. I Leviathan, ch. xiv, and ch. xxxiii. 2 Ibid. ch. xii. and ch. xxxvii. Essay I. $ 11.] 81 HOBBES. decide. And on similar questions appeals to the authority of Scripture supported by that of miracles, the customs of our country and the reverence due to the laws. In one passage, indeed, speaking of the interpreta- tion of some parts of Scripture, he ventures so far as to affirm that we must not adopt too literal a sense; as in the instance of the assertions of the immo- bility of the earth and the like; observing that the object of revelation is not to teach philosophy, but religious faith and duty.3 He evinces a just discrimination with respect to the popular prejudice against second causes, assert- ing distinctly on the contrary, that “ignorance - - - - . } T. Hobbes's “ Opera Omnia Philos." Amst. 1678; “Elem. Philos.” p. 204. ? Ibid. p. 205. “Quæstiones igitur de infinito et æterno sciens præ- “ tereo, contentus eâ doctrina circa mundi magnitudinem et originein “ quam suaserint Scripturæ sacræ, et quæ illas confirmat miraculorum “ fama, et mos patrius, et legum reverentia debita," 3 « Argumenta quæ a formula dictionis sumantur, firma non esse : " Quoties enim loquitur Scriptura sacra de terra ut immobili, quam “ tamen philosophi hodie fere omnes moveri censent signis evidentissi- “ mis ? Scriptura sacra est a prophetis et apostolis ad docendum non “ pbilosophiam (quam ad exercitium rationis naturalis contemplationibus “ disputationibusque hominum reliquit Deus), sed pietatem et salutis “æternæ viam.”—Leviathan, C. viii. p. 41. HISTORICAL SKETCH. [Essay I. $ 11. so of second causes makes men fear some invisible 66 agent like the gods of the Gentiles; but the inves- “ tigation of them leads us to a God eternal, infinite, " and omnipotent," and he pursues the argument to show that this ignorance of second causes conspiring with certain common prejudices, as those relating to supposed spiritual and supernatural beings, and the like, are the natural source of all corrupt and super- stitious forms of religion. But again, as to the ground of belief in revelation, he avows, “we have no certain knowledge of the “ truth of Scripture, but trust the holy men of God's “ church, succeeding one another, from the time of “ those who saw the wondrous works of Almighty 66 God in the flesh.” 2 Upon the whole what surprises us is that a man professing theological views so little distinguishable from the most orthodox creed of his day, should have been obnoxious to charges of scepticism and even of atheism, did we not know how liberally those The same argument is more expanded in his " Leviathan;" c. xii. p. 55. ? Humau Nature, c. ii, Essay I. $ 11.] SIR T. BROWNE. Browne. epithets are bestowed from mere personal or party animosity. The publication of Sir T. Browne’s “ Inquiry into Sir T. “yulgar and common Errors” (1646) has been justly commented on as a remarkable case of the advanc- ing influence of the enlightenment of the age on a mind previously given to superstition and credulity in no ordinary degree, as evinced in his earlier work the “ Religio Medici," (1633): and the author's able remarks on subjection to authority, neglect of in- quiry, and the spirit of credulity as the main sources of popular and philosophical error 2 are doubtless urged in the true spirit of progress. Though when we look to the details, we must make much allow- ance for the slowness with which progress manifests 2O ման itself. We must recognise the ideas of the age in the earnestness with which he introduces and denounces as the main source of all errors, the malignity of the devil, continually engaged in a warfare ågainst truth, obscuring and misleading men's minds, and propa- 1 Buckle, “ Hist. of Civilization," i. 334. 2 Vulgar Errors, bk. i. ch. 5. G 2 HISTORICAL SKETCH. [Essay I. $ 11. gating every kind of delusion, not only on moral and religious points, but even on physical and common subjects. And among these deceptions of Satan, the most notable are the practices of magic, witchcraft, and the like 1; which by his agency, men took for realities. It is sometimes impossible to repress a smile at the author's cautious insinuations of possible doubt- fulness in some cases of the most incredible ab- surdities; or at the elaborate learning he brings to bear on them; as in arguing against the exist- ence of the Griffin and of the Phønix?; or his recondite speculation on the physiology of Adam and Eve. His remarks on the possible interpretation of the history of Lot's wife and other Scripture miracles by a figurative philology 4 may find their parallel in some modern speculations, though he prudently concludes, “ with industry we decline such para- so doxes and peaceably submit unto the received “ acceptation.” 5 i Vulgar Errors, bk, i, ch. 10, 11. 3 Ibid. bk. v. ch. 5, 5 Ibid. bk, vi. ch. 1. 2 Ibid. bk. iii. ch. 11, 12. 4 Ibid. bk, vii. ch. 11. Essay I. $ 11.] MYSTICISM. His profession of scepticism as to the commonly received antiquity of the earth, resolves itself into insisting on the falsity of all the ancient traditions of the heathen nations and the entire discrepancies in the chronology of the Hebrew, Samaritan and Septuagint versions of the Old Testament, rendering them all alike unworthy of credit: Lastly, not to multiply instances, the author's elaborate discussion' to illustrate the Divine wisdom in making the sun to move round the earth, which is fitly ordained to be stationary in the centre, and his several arguments in support of the beneficent design of this arrangement, might have afforded a valuable lesson to many modern writers on final causes. A singular exemplification of the extent to which Mysticism of R. Fludd. the contradictory notion of making faith the basis of science, was carried about the period of which we are treating, may be found in the strange system of R. Fludd (who had previously been known for some anatomical researches, also curiously connected with mystical ideas), in which he makes the writings i Vulgar Errors, bk. vi. ch. 5. G 3 8 Ô [Essay I. S II. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Mystical medicine. of Moses the basis of what, by a strange misnomer, he calls, “ the Christian science of creation!” The worthy precursor of the Hutchinsonian mysticism.' From the earliest ages the medical art had been more or less connected with the supernatural. Hence it is not surprising that even in later times when philosophy assumed so much of the mystical form, a similar character should attach itself to medical speculation, as was strikingly exemplified in the extraordinary doctrines of Paracelsus; which long continued their hold on the profession, especially in Germany. It was in the same spirit that the Rosicrucians pretended that they had only to look on a patient to cure him. Van Helmont embellished the Paracelsian doctrine with additions of his own: he held that the object of medicine was to regulate the “archæus ” — the ruling immaterial principle of life and health, — to which he ascribed a mysterious and separate existence, and placed the seat of it I « Philosophia Moysaica, in qua Sapientia "et Scientia Creationis et “ Creaturarum sacra verèque Christiana (cujus Basis est Lapis An- s gularis Jesus Christus) ad amussim explicatur Authore Rob. Fludd, « alias de Fluctibus. Gardæ, 1638." His former works were entitled 6 Anatomiæ Amphitheatrum," &c. 1623; and “ Medicina Catholica," &c. 1629, Essay I. & 11.] BOYLE. in the stomach : in this point doubtless showing some practical discernment. Any reference to the philosophy of the 17th Boyle.' century must be very defective if it omitted the mention of Boyle. In the experimental investigation of nature he was undoubtedly one of the most laborious and distinguished, as well as one of the foremost to advocate the new method, and to vindi- cate the principles of the inductive philosophy against the numerous prejudices with which it had then to contend. His physical researches were nearly all made some years before the publication of the Newtonian disco- veries; and in estimating his opinions we must make considerable allowances for the state of knowledge as well as for the then prevalent tone of reasoning. Hence, for example, we shall rather regard it as a proof of his enlightenment that after referring to the received scheme of the Ptolemaists, he speaks with greater favour of “the Copernicans, — that growing “ sect:" or that though a believer and a labourer in alchemy, he was anxious to support its pretensions on rational and chemical grounds. His more metaphysical and theological reasonings G4 HISTORICAL SKETCH. [Essay I. $ 11. were (as might be expected) marked throughout by the peculiarities of his time. His discussion on natural theology, and his vindication of the study of “second causes," as in no way really detracting from the admission of a “first cause," are, of course, carried on in the spirit of that philosophy, which had not yet analysed the idea of causation. He believed the whole universe subservient to the well-being of man, for whom he says “God originally “ created, and has vouchsafed by miracles to alter the “course of nature.”? While speaking of the Mosaic narrative, which he regards as designed for a real physical record, he adds, “ though, that in most other “ places of the Scripture when the works of nature are “ mentioned but incidentally in order to other pur- “ poses, they are spoken of rather in a popular than “ accurate manner, I dare not peremptorily deny." 2 And in a like tone of extreme caution he insinuates (following Bacon) that the examination of the book of nature may be valuable for the better understanding of the volume of revelation. 1 Usefulness of Exp. Philos. p. 24. 1665. 2 Ibid. p. 29. Essay I. $ 11.] ROYAL SOCIETY. super- Some illustration of the state of ideas at the period Natural and now referred to may be collected from the circum- natural knowledge. stances attending the first commencement of the Royal Society, of which Boyle was one of the founders; in whose original charter it was expressly laid down that its object was the advancement of “natural knowledge” understood as opposed to “su- . pernatural.” It was probably chiefly to satisfy the public mind on this point that Bishop Sprat (one of its earliest members) wrote his “ History of the “Royal Society” (1667); which is in fact simply a popular exposition of some of the chief subjects which then engaged the researches of its members, to show that they were not followers of occult arts; while in a higher spirit he enlarges on the tendency of such studies, as eminently favourable to arming the minds of their votaries against the influence of fanaticism and superstition; doubtless aiming at the morose and ignorant prejudices of the puritanical party, which had so recently been dominant. In fact the belief in the occult arts was at this Demoniacal period beginning to undergo a gradual process of · subversion, at least among the better educated. It may be worth remarking that it was in connection influence. 90 [EssẢY İ. $ II. HISTORICAL SKETCH. lascal. with the subject of witchcraft, that a Dutch theolo- gian, Bekker (about 1690, in his “Monde Enchanté”). followed up the denial of all real power to evil spirits, by extending his speculations to the cases of Demo- niacs related in the Gospels, and endeavoured to ex- plain them by natural causes: an attempt afterwards so largely carried out by Semler and the Rationalists. In Blaise Pascal we must recognise one of the brightest ornaments as well of science as of theology, in the age in which he lived. In him we find a com- bination of high and diversified excellence seldom united in the same individual ;-transcendent powers of mathematical and physical investigation, joined with equally high ability in moral reasoning, clothed with glowing eloquence, and all absorbed in a pré- dominating spirit of intense religious feeling. Of his geometry, only some colossal fragments remain; in physics, the earliest generalisations of atmospheric as well as hydrostatic pressure are associated with his name, while his “Thoughts” (not published till 1670, some years after his death) are perhaps the chief monument of his powers of philosophical and moral discussion applied to theology, and made subservient to the defence of the Christian doctrine. Essay I. $ 11.] 91 PASCAL. In regard to more positive evidential arguments, whether in regard to natural or revealed religion, his expressions and mode of reasoning betray some vague- ness. Pascal's belief in miracles appears to have received a powerful support from his conviction of the miracu- lous cure of his niece, Madlle. Perier, by the touch of the Holy Thorn. Such a faith would be little in accordance with the modern evidential distinctions; and we may thus account for some expressions in his writings which might otherwise be imagined of scep- tical tendency; while his appeal to the principle of faith, and his avowed preference for the practical ar- gument that it is safer to believe, --are but in accord- ance with the general spirit of the Roman Catholic theology.. Yet his philosophical mind is continually evincedin remarks which bear a profound examination; as, for example in the emphatic sentence: “Reason ' confounds the dogmatists, —nature, the sceptics.” The latter part of the 17th century abounded in Speculative speculations of a mixed physical and metaphysical the world. kind, which in one sense may seem to be related to the advance of the study of natural order, though in another they were rather its hindrances as leading the systens of 92 (Essay I. $ II. HISTORICAL SKETCH. thoughts to conceptions but alien from the legitimate. method of prosecuting it. One of the most celebrated. of these speculative theories was that of the erudite Cudworth (“The Intellectual System of the Universe,” 1678), in which, among other metaphysical concep- tions of great abstruseness, he indicated in a very remarkable manner the increasing sense of the inva- riableness of natural order, by introducing what he termed the principle of “plastic nature," 1 in order to account for the operations of physical laws without the continual direct agency of the Deity. But his description of this principle is of so confused and mystical a kind, that it can convey little if any real philosophical meaning. He speaks of the “reluc- tance and inaptitude of matter," as if the Deity had to contend against it. Other writers appealed to what they termed “OC- casional causation, as well as various hypotheses, nearly all originating out of some modifications of the Cartesian philosophy, or rather, perhaps, a kind of transition condition between it and the more advanced inductive system, which soon tended to | Intell. System, iii. 37. Essay I. $ 11.] 93 GASSENDI. set aside such speculations, or at least to keep them separate from all real and exact physical views. These metaphysical theories did not directly aid in esta- blishing any legitimate generalisation of the laws of matter, and could lead to no substantial advances in the study of nature. Yet they should not pass without notice, especially when taken up, as they were, by such men as Gassendi, Pascal, and others, as indicative of a more enlarged spirit of inquiry and research than the exclusive devotion, whether to the Aristotelian or the Cartesian systems, had hitherto allowed. Gassendi, indeed, in his “Institutiones Philoso- phiæ," maintained more purely inductive principles, and especially attacked the metaphysical principles of Descartes in his “Disquisitio Mathematica” (about 1680). Hence some writers have drawn a distinction between two great European schools: the metaphy- sical, or Cartesian, and the mathematical, or that of Gassendi; and, following this distinction, have ranked in the former sect Leibnitz, and in the latter Newton. Among the theories referred to, the abstruse spe- Spinoza. culations of Spinoza were almost entirely of a meta- physical kind, and led to an extensive pantheistic and necessitarian system. Yet, in accordance with HISTORICAL SKETCH. S General tendency of meta- pbysical theories. existing physical ideas, he seems to have admitted the supernatural, though he argues that the actual boundary between it and the natural cannot be de- termined till the whole extent of nature shall become known to us '; unless, indeed, we interpret this as a virtual rejection of any such distinction. But, while in a strictly physical point of view, these theories are of little value, there is still one feature common to them all; however metaphysical, how- ever little directly founded on physical induction, however hypothetical, however mystical, visionary, or even delusive; yet, they all agree in this, that they were professedly philosophical theories, they were clesigned at least to be results of the pure exercise of reason; and avowedly admitted no other authority. They were intended for generalisations of conclu- sions and truths extending to all nature, and sup- posed to include the whole system of the world. They, therefore, would necessarily imply some general idea (however faulty in its details or its foundation) of universal law and order; and the mere recogni- tion of such a principle, leaving nothing either to See especially Epist. 23. 1677. METAPHYSICAL THEORIES. 95 arbitrary intervention or to inexplicable destiny, but professing to conceive everything regulated by law and explicable by reason, was a recognition of the only true philosophical basis of all scientific know- ledge, pointing at least to some conception of the unity of all nature. 96 [Essay I. § 111. 96 . HISTORICAL SKETCH. - § II. --- THE PERIOD FROM NEWTON TO LAPLACE. The Newtonian epoch, DzOn. WITHOUT having adhered rigidly to the order of chronology, we now arrive at that. grand epoch which disclosed to the intellectual world views of the physical universe, and an effectual clue to their further explanation, never before attained, never since surpassed, and never to be superseded, in the discoveries of Newton, especially the system of universal gravitation. The inductive laws of Kepler were wholly un- connected with any conception of mechanical causes, or with the physical views of Galileo :-- Gravitation had been hinted at by Bacon, or even earlier : - the diffusion of the force in proportion to the square of the distance was more distinctly conceived by Bullialdus, but in no relation to orbital motion :- Horrox had exhibited experimentally the combina- tion of impulsive and central force, in the revolu- tion of a freely suspended pendulum :— the ancients en S Essay I. $ 111.] 97 NEWTON. . S discoveries, had discovered the properties of the conic sections :- But no one had combined these scattered elements. Newton, listening to suggestions unheard by Newton's others, though continually addressed to all, in the spontaneous fall of bodies to the earth, by a force which he argued must be the same for planets as for apples, — verified the idea by calculation; solved the difficulty of elliptic orbits, giving the dyna- mical demonstration of Kepler's laws, by the aid of the peculiar geometry he had opportunely also himself created ; extended the same theory to comets, and advanced to at least a general investi- gation of the mutual disturbances of the moon and planets; the figure and density of the earth; the tides; and the precession of equinoxes ; --all conse- quences of one and the same grand principle. To estimate the magnitude of these discoveries, we Value of his researches. should place ourselves in imagination in the posi- tion of an age to which all these great phenomena appeared isolated and unconnected; when the only idea of moving force was that of mere carrying, like the arm of a lever; when vague ideas of “animal force” or peculiar “ virtue” furnished the only conceptions of physical agency; and the whole 98 [Essay I. $ 111, HISTORICAL SKETCH. Circum- stances of universe was a mystical body, animated by a no less mystical species of vitality, not resolved into any definite mode of action or capable of calculation. In looking at the immense advance effected by his history. these pre-eminent discoveries, and the incalculably beneficial results which have flowed directly, and still more indirectly, from them, we cannot but in- cline to view the circumstances under which they were effected, and which were in several respects remarkable, in connection with the peculiar intel- lectual and personal character of Newton himself; the precise estimate of which seems a problem which none of his biographers or commentators have been fully able to solve. No great discoverer was, perhaps, ever less influ- enced by his own discoveries, or seemed to value them so lightly. He made the capital invention of fluxions (1666), and kept it a profound secret for twenty years; thus allowing Leibnitz to fore- stall him in the announcement of what was prac- tically the same method. He had effected, but mislaid and forgotten, the important demonstration of elliptic orbits, though he recalled it when pressed by Halley (who, with Hooke and Wren, bad in vain C Essay I. $ 111.] 99 NEWTON. attempted it), and, at his request, composed the whole of the Principia within eighteen months ?; but when two thirds of it were printed (at Hal- ley's expense), Newton wanted to suppress the lat- ter part containing the whole application to the planetary system, and was only induced by Halley's urgent remonstrances to allow the whole to appear (1687). When his invaluable optical discoveries were attacked, he repented their publication be- cause he was “deprived of his tranquillity for the “ sake of a shadow” —- an elevation of philosophy which certainly few have attained. The transcendent intellectual might which enabled Character and opin- him at once to solve the great problem of the me- ions of chanism of the planetary world, to analyse light, and to discover the mathematical key to the treasure- house of all nature, contrasts strangely with his in- difference or even reluctance to following up or mak- ing known these splendid researches; and his far deeper absorption in some pursuits hitherto not explained, but which are now known to have been Newton. ? Professor Rigaud's “ Essay on the Publication of the Principia," p. 92. Oxford, 1838. I 2 100 [Essay I. S III. HISTORICAL SKETCH. His meta- physical theology. those of alchemy. Again, when he had reluctantly been induced to bring out the most splendid phy- sical investigations, he turned from those fields of real and demonstrative science, in which he had reaped so rich a harvest, with just the same, or perhaps more satisfaction to the shadowy regions of mysticism, and the solution of the prophetic visions of the Apocalypse. Newton's grand inference from the vast cosmical views he had disclosed (expressed in the celebrated “ Scholium," at the end of the Principia), has been the theme of much admiration. “ This most beauti- “ ful system of planetary motions,” he argues, “could “not originate otherwise than in the wisdom and s dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being;" and from this idea of origination he then proceeds to enlarge on and deduce the nature and attributes of that Divine Being, though in the technical language of the period ; and still further in the queries, at the end of the “Opticks”) he inculcates yet more precise metaphysical ideas of the Divine Es- sence, in modes of thought and expression which are 1 Brewster's "Life of Newton," ii. 93. &c. Essay I. $ III.] 101 NEWTON. tions of the eminently characteristic, and afford illustrations of the influence of the metaphysical spirit of that age on so great a mînd. Again the idea of the imme- diate physical action of the Divine power in con- stituting the system and communicating motion to the planets, is more minutely dwelt upon in his letters to Bentley. • In the state to which, by his unparalleled dis- Perturba- coveries, he had brought the investigation of the system. celestial motions, there was still a great desideratum in regard to the full explanation of the details of the lunar and planetary perturbations. The former, he avowed, were left imperfect; and for the latter his researches could only lead him to the inference that in process of time they would so accumulate as to bring all things into confusion, and thus he expressed his belief that after a time Divine inter- position would be necessary to restore the system to order. Thus familiar with the assumption of Divine in- Miracles and mysteries. tervention in nature, he maintained a belief in the miracles of the Church during, at least, the first three centuries ; though he speaks of the narratives of the demoniacs as "the language of the ancients for cur- I 3 102 [Essay I. S III. HISTORICAL SKETCH. “ing lunatics.”! Even with this slight exception, the general absence of all question as to the physically marvellous, in his views, contrasts remarkably with his hesitation as to points of doctrinal mystery. It was evidently under a strong feeling of this kind that he so keenly contested the genuineness of two well-known doubtful texts, then upheld as the strongholds of ortho- doxy; and there can be no doubt that his opinions, like those of his friends Locke and S. Clarke, leaned considerably towards Arianism, doubtless under the influence of metaphysical views of the Divine Unity. Remoter It is not in the immediate personal opinions of the great inventor and discoverer, nor in those of his Newtonian philosophy. cotemporary disciples, that we can always look for the full influence of the spirit of his philosophy, especially in those respects in which it may extend beyond the mere letter of the actual physical truths, however grand and comprehensive, which it an- nounces, to other subjects not apparently or directly connected with them, and producing remoter effects on the general condition of mind and tone of thought. communicated by the diffusion of these views and influences of the 1 Brewster's Life, ii. pp. 319, 320. Essay I. $ 111.] 103 LEIBNITZ. their adoption in the course of the higher education of succeeding generations. Perhaps a not less considerable, but very distinct Philosophy of Leibnitz, kind of influence, was exerted by the philosophy of Newton's great cotemporary — and, in one point, his rival — Leibnitz. He had been the first actually to furnish the great instrument of mathematical investigation for the whole modern mechanical philosophy — which Newton had indeed long before conceived, but did not publish—in his method of differential calculus (1684). The physical philosophy of Leibnitz was of a more abstruse and deductive nature than that of Newton; his speculations on motion of a more tran- scendental kind. He was desirous of referring all phenomena to a common principle, including the rotations and revolutions of the earth and planets, gravitation, magnetism, light, and other physical modes of action; the great principle concerned in them all he makes to be “æther," and adds — “is enim fortasse est ille spiritus domini qui super aquis ferebatur.”1 S 1 Hypothesis Physica Nova, et Theoria Motus Abstracti, p. 9. Lond 1679. E 4 104 HISTORICAL SKETCH. Monads. um To his “monads” it is difficult to affix any certain physical meaning; and when he deduces as a conse- quence that the universe is bound together into one continuous and coherent whole, in the abstract lan- guage he employs, it is impossible to decide whether he fully apprehended, or intended to assert, the real immutability of natural laws. The same may be said of the “pre-established harmony,” which is so fundamental a principle of his system. It, at all events, seems clear that these conceptions were closely connected with, indeed founded upon, the idea of the Divine perfections. · Leibnitz's idea of the “plenum ” of all creation seems to be nearly identical with that of “con- tinuity," or the denial of any break or gap in the order of things; but his precise physical application of it is obscure. Assuming the Divine will as the basis, he makes the general law of the universe to be nothing else than the totality of all special laws, which, divested of mysticism, seems little better than tautology. His maxim “ Universum maximo gaudet ordine” i Continuity and order. i See “ Principia Philosophiæ Leibnitzii," by Hanschius, pp. 139, 143. 1728. Essay I. $ 111.] 105 LEIBNITZ. and his application of the “pre-established harmony" as the source of certainty in all events, are wholly based on theistic considerations. In fact, his entire philosophy was conceived in Theological principles. close connection with theological views by deductive argument from the assumed perfections of the Deity; whence he came to consider the whole question of the moral government of the world and the per- plexed problem of evil, in his “Theodicée.” For our present purpose it is only necessary to remark that the influence of Leibnitz's philosophy was no doubt, on the whole, favourable to the advance of real physical truth. Though itself of a metaphysical character it still tended to deliver phy- sical inquiry from the dominion of the narrow scholastic systems; and furnished ideas of a kind far more conformable to the inductive philosophy. It is chiefly in connection with the “pre-established Miracles. “harmony” that Leibnitz is led to discuss the subject of miracles; but it must be confessed that his ex- pressions are somewhat obscure. He holds that the laws of nature are not arbitrary, but are imposed in accordance with Divine Wisdom. " Ainsi,” he says, “le miracle n'est une exception de 106 [Essay I. & III. HISTORICAL SKETCH. “ ces lois que parcequ'il n'est pas explicable par la “ nature des choses.” 1 In his correspondence with Dr. Clarke, he dwells on the difference between wonderful natural events and miracles ?, and among the latter, includes ex- pressly the commencement of the celestial motions, and the origin of plants and animals. Yet he elsewhere allows that all things are in some sense miraculous. In another part of his writings, however, he expressly includes in the class of “miracles, pro- “ perly so called, creation, annihilation, and the in- 6 carnation of the Son of God.” 5 Upon the whole it is by no means clear to what extent he actually held any views approaching the principle of physical, universal, and invariable order, except as essentially dependent on, and animated by the Divine volition which was the basis of his. philosophy, not a deduction from it. ? Leibnitzii Opera Omnia, ed. Dutens. vol. ii. pt. 1. p. 101. 1778.. 2 Ibid. p. 141. s Ibid. p. 168. Ibid. pt. 11. p. 61. 5 See “Principia Philosophiæ Leibnitzii," p. 173. 1728. The editor or compiler Hanschius gives this from a letter of Leibnitz to kimself. Essay I. $ III.] 107 LEIBNITZ. His multifarious discussions are almost exclusively of a metaphysical, and often merely verbal character, on questions then deemed all important, but which at the present day would excite no interest, and to which he makes the really tangible points of positive science wholly subordinate. Yet in reference to the higher considerations of Order of natural order, we may take as a far more distinct nature. The following passages may illustrate the nature of the author's views on the points here referred to : — “l'Harmonie préétablié écarte « toute notion de miracle des actions purement naturelles, et fait aller “ les choses leur train réglé, d'une manière intelligible : au lieu que le s système commun a recours à des influences absolument inexplicables ; " et que dans celui des causes occasionelles, Dieu, par une espèce de “ loi générale, et comme par un pacte, s'est obligé de changer à tout 6 moment le train naturel des pensées de l'âme pour les accommoder aux “ impressions des corps, et de troubler le cours naturel des mouvemens “ du corps selon les volontés de l'âme ---- ce qui ne se peut expliquer que “ par un miracle perpétuel : pendant que j'explique le tout intelli- “ giblement par les natures que Dieu a établies dans les choses.” — Leibnitz, Considérations par les Principes de Vie, &c., Opera Omnia, vol. ii. pt. I. p. 40, 1778. “ Unde nollem cum Malebranchio dicere Deum legibus generalibus “ derogare quotiescunque ordo exigit ; neque enim uni legi derogat “ nisi per alium legem magis adplicabilem ; et quod ordo postulat, non “ potest non esse conforme regulæ ordinis, quæ ex legibus generalibus “ infima non est. Miraculorum (rigidissime sumptorum) character " est, ut per rerum conditarum naturas explicari non possint." - Leibnitz, Tentamen Theodicea, Opera Omnia, i. 280. 108 [Essay I. S III. HISTORICAL SKETCH. illustration of his views, the remarks which Leibnitz makes in his well-known letter to the Princess of Wales, where among the objections he raises to Newton's doctrines, he refers particularly to their theological bearing, and observes, that according to Newton the system needs frequent interposition, that it is here requisite for God “to wind up “his watch from time to time:” that His work is left imperfect, and needs occasional mending: and then more distinctly adds: — “ According to my opinion the same force and “ vigour always remains in the world, and only “ passes from one part of matter to another, agree- “ ably to the laws of nature and the beautiful 6 pre-established order. And I hold that when 56 God works miracles, he does not do it in order " to supply the wants of nature, but those of “ grace. Whoever thinks otherwise must needs 6 have a very mean notion of the wisdom and power r of God.” 1 In one particular, indeed, Leibnitz advanced in the region of positive physical speculation beyond many Geological theories of Leibnitz. i Brewster's “Life of Newton,” ii. 285. Essay I. § 111.] 109 LEIBNITZ. of his age. His theory of the earth ?, when yet no substantial geology existed, though purely hypotheti- cal, yet approached very closely in character to the modern views : but it is more worthy of notice that he desisted from fully following it out, on the ground of its opposition to public prejudice, avowedly per- ceiving the necessary contradiction of all such in- quiries, followed out independently as matters of science, to the received Mosaic Cosmogony; when in his day it could only be a conflict of first principles, and ground of the whole investigation, since no detailed examination of facts had substantiated any of the results which now constitute the actual points of contradiction. In this point, as in some others, Leibnitz offers a Views of Newton. striking contrast to his great English cotemporary; the thoughts of Newton were also engaged on the same subject; and we have a long letter from him to Dr. T. Burnett, on his “ Theory of the Earth,” in which Newton enters into minute critical details on each point of that hypothesis to reconcile it with i Protogea, $ 21, published in 1749, but written before 1700; see Hallam's “Lit. of Europe," iv. 590. :110 [Essay I. $ III. HISTORICAL SKETCE. Halley's geological views. the Mosaic narrativel; the physical authority of which, however he may interpret its details, he all along assumes as beyond question. Thus he ob- serves : “ as to Moses, I do not think his description “ either philosophical, or feigned; but that he de- “scribed realities in a language adapted to the sense “ of the vulgar.” 2 The same subject was also much discussed by Halley 3; but in a far more independent and philoso- phical manner; contending that the appearances presented by the earth's crust could not be accounted for by the then received Diluvial theory, but must be remains of a former world or even several such before the creation of the present. On another occasion 4 he adduced other argu- ments for the antiquity of the earth; but thought it necessary to suggest, that this long period might be consistently supposed anterior to the creation of man: and that the six days might bear a figura- tive sense.5 i Brewster's “ Life of Newton," ii. 447. 2 Ibid. p. 450. 3 Phil. Trans. 1687 and 1724. Ibid. vol. xxix, p. 296. 5 These speculations were doubtless quite sufficient with some cotem- porary authorities to represent H alle- ESSAY I. $ 111.] COSMOGONICAL THEORIES. 111 hypothesis. The prevalent theory in the latter part of the Diluvial 17th century was, that all appearances of changes or violent action presented by the earth's crust were due to the universal deluge of the Hebrew Scriptures. Yet various other speculations were occasionally Other visionary started, indicative at least of a feeling that something theories. more was wanted to give a consistent account of the earlier stages of the earth's formation. But these speculations were, for the most part, of a very visionary nature, and were in no degree rendered more philosophical by their admixture with the appeal to the Scripture narrative. Ray (1692), though professedly admitting natural Instances. causes, yet mixed up indiscriminately the conclusions of science with the authority of the Bible, and even of the Fathers of the Church. We have just before alluded to T. Burnett's Burnett. “ Sacred Theory of the Earth ” (1690), which, by its very name, betrays its nature, and presents a series WIN tical and irreligious kind. For a very able and elaborate refutation of these charges, the reader is referred to a paper by the Rev. S. J. Rigaud (now Bishop of Antigua), in the Memoirs of the Oxford Ashmolean Society, vol. ii. 112 [Essay I. S III. HISTORICAL SKETCH. · Whiston. of visionary imaginations, which he nevertheless seriously imagined gave support to the Scripture account; the strange text of Newton's comments, and the fit object of Butler's satire. Woodward. Woodward (1695), though in many respects a rational inquirer, evinced it his chief anxiety to make every fact accord with the Mosaic narrative, which was then generally regarded as if it were intended for a precise record of physical facts. The extravagancies of Whiston's theory (1696), in which he labours to show that “the creation, the “ deluge, and the final conflagration of Scripture are sagreeable to reason and philosophy,” employing as a main agent the supposed collision with a comet, are rendered the more striking by the fact, that the man who on religious grounds could believe such physical marvels reconcilable to science, at the same time was nevertheless an acute critical sceptic as to doctrinal mysteries, and rejected the Trinity as contrary to reason ! Hutchinson And here it should not be omitted, that the origi- nal collector of the fossils on which Woodward theorised, and which form the basis of the Cambridge Museum, was John Hutchinson, who somewhat later and his school. Essay I. $ 111.] 113 HUTCHINSON. obtained celebrity from some singular speculations, which in truth were but the legitimate development of the principle of those just adverted to. He had devoted himself to the study of the Hebrew Scriptures till he came to regard them as a treasure-house not only of religious, but of scientific knowledge; and as designed to reveal a complete scheme of physical philosophy; of course entirely at variance with all inductive principles, and especially with the Newtonian theory, which he pretended to refute; he published his system under the title of “ Moses's Principia” (1724), and in a succession of smaller productions continued to illustrate and enforce the same ideas. This perversion of all sound philosophy never- theless attracted numerous disciples, including some eminent theologians of that and the following period, who were alarmed at the progress of the Newtonian views. Rejecting all independent natural science, their system of necessity discarded all natural theo- logy, avowedly deriving the very belief in a God from revelation alone ; in this particular running into the opposite extreme from the metaphysical systems of theism then so much in vogue. 114 [Essay I. S III. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Some sounder The only corrective can be found in a more just appreciation of the proper provinces both of natural science and of Scripture, of reason and of faith. Yet more rational principles were in some degree inquirers. recognised, in regard to the theory of the earth. Lister (1678) was perhaps the first to point out the evidence of extinction of species ; in which he was followed by Hooke, who suggested the idea of: “ a chronology” derived from them. He appears to have possessed the true spirit of philosophic inde- pendence in proposing his views; yet, to answer objections, appealed to Scripture; though by inter- pretations of a very singular kind. Halley had broached somewhat bold reasonings as to the extent of the universe, and startled many minds by the announcement of his conclusion, from the distribution of the fixed stars in space, that the stellar world must be absolutely infinite.2 On the other hand, he had also entered on a specu- lation as to the supposed effect of an ethereal medium on the planetary motions, tending to contract their Other cosmical specula- tions. 1 In 1668, but not published till in his Posthumous Works, 1705. 2 Philos. Trans. 1720, vol. xxxi, No. 364. art. 5. Essay I. $ 111.] 115 COSMICAL SPECULATIONS. 115 orbits; whence he concluded that these bodies would ultimately fall into the sun, and that the world must sooner or later come to an end and be destroyed; and thence argued that it also had a beginning; a point which, he observes, had not before been proved physically, and which he deemed of great impor- tance. These may be taken as specimens of the best cosmological speculations of the period. But on such subjects, a variety of fanciful theoretical ideas, unconnected with any real analogies or sound phi- losophy, long continued to engage the thoughts even of some eminent philosophers; and show the extent to which a view to ulterior results or fore- gone prepossessions was allowed to fetter the simple prosecution of philosophical truth. The idea of Halley, who in accordance with Whiston) believed that the Mosaic deluge was a properly physical catastrophe, occasioned by the close approach of the same great comet which spread such terror on its return in 1680, has found advocates even in modern times. And the still grander theory of Buffon that the planets were all fragments of the sun, struck off by the collision of a comet, has been fully rivalled I 2 ]16 [Essay I. S III. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Comets. by that of a more modern astronomer, who ascribed the origin of the asteroids to some inexplicable ex- plosion of a larger planet which once occupied their place in the system. It is in the doubtful region on the outskirts of positive science that the in- fluence of general views is often best perceptible. Perhaps one of the most immediately striking in- stances of the slow progress of true cosmical ideas has been afforded in the views entertained respecting comets. From the ominous dread they inspired in ancient times, as portents of coming evil, mankind seem hardly to have recovered even down to the pre- sent day. But the chief source of alarm, in later times at least, has perhaps been the belief so long kept up of their solid nature, doubtless derived from a very natural supposed analogy with the solid planets, and the consequent dangers of a possible collision. This terror was greatly heightened by the speculations of Newton in calculating on this supposition the enor- mous amount of the heat such bodies must acquire in their close approach to the sun, which would be suffi- cient to burn up the earth, if they only passed near it after their perihelion. The alarm rose to an awful height on the occa- Comet of 1680. Essay I. $ 111.] 117 COMETS. sion of the enormous comet of 1680, when Halley, after announcing that this terrific visitor was fast approaching the earth, and at one o'clock on the 11th of November, 1680, would be at about the distance of the moon; and that it must, at the very ieast, materially affect the seasons, and disturb the earth's, orbit, and length of the year, by its vast mass, exclaims, “But may the great good God avert “ a shock or contact of such great bodies moving “ with such forces (which, however, is manifestly “by no means impossible), lest this most beautiful “ order of things be entirely destroyed, and reduced “into its ancient chaos!” 1 It may be easily imagined what must have been the terror excited by such fearful foreboding, so solemnly and unreservedly expressed by so acknow- ledged an authority. Yet, after all, this fearful body passed off without the slightest mischief or perceptible disturbance, thus positively disproving the supposition of its solidity. So again the dreadful comet of 1456, which spread Progress of cometary such consternation over Europe, in connection with physics. See Hind on the Comet, 1856. I 3 118 HISTORICAL SKETCH. the inroads of the Turks, that the Pope ordered special prayers to avert the omen, at its reappear- ance in 1531 was harmless; — in 1607 formed one of the first objects of study to the disciples of Galileo ; — and in 1682 afforded Halley the means of calcu- lating its orbit, and for the first time predicting its return as an obedient member of our system, — so conspicuously verified in 1758 and 1835. The last panic, perhaps, of this kind, was that which occurred in France with respect to the comet of 1832, whose nebulosity crossed the earth's orbit. Arago with difficulty allayed these fears in a season- able publication, which tended powerfully to diffuse more rational views. It has required all the increasing enlightenment of observation and analogical reasoning to convince men, at the present day, that having determinate orbits, and obeying the same law of gravitation, these bodies can announce nothing but the undevi- ating regularity and beauty of the universal system; that all comets accurately observed have been proved to be transparent; that they consequently cannot be heated by the sun's rays; that having compara- tively no mass, they can exercise no sensible attrac- Essay I. S III.] 119 PLURALITY OF WORLDS. aQ11 tion on the solid planets, though liable to great perturbations from them ; that a collision would be unfelt; while the possible points of such collision, from the positions of the orbits, are of the most extreme rarity; and if one were to occur, the only results we could expect would be phenomena of a gaseous or electric kind. The progress of cometary physics affords a good exemplification of the advance from superstitious terror to the conception of cos- mical order and enlightened truth. Arising directly out of the extension of cosmical Plurality of views, the confessedly conjectural speculation as to the existence of intelligent and spiritual inhabitants in other worlds of our system or in other stellar systems, comprehensively termed the “plurality of worlds,” affords another specimen of the spirit in which discussions of topics lying on the frontiers of philosophy have been taken up. The arguments of Huyghens 2 and Fontenelle in former times, and of others in later, evince the different points of view Jyorlds. ch LUI 1 See « Unity of Worlds," Essay II. 2 Cosmotheoror, 1693. "I 4 120 [Essay I. S III. HISTORICAL SKETCH. in which such doubtful questions will be regarded by different classes of minds. But to whatever diver- gence of opinion real philosophical arguments may have led different individuals, we cannot but remark on the main defect which has characterised nearly all these speculations on either side, arising from mixing them up with considerations of a kind which of necessity impaired and destroyed the philosophical character of the entire inquiry, which have too much pervaded nearly all the speculations on this question ; unimportant, indeed, in itself, but inter- esting as an exemplification of the state of opinion, and the appreciation of philosophical principles. In fact, the subject is still too little regarded, simply as one of fair inductive analogy, and too exclusively with reference to its supposed bearing on theological con- siderations; asserted by some because they fancied it necessary for the vindication of the divine per- fections to imagine a peopled universe; denied by others, because they seriously feared the Christian religion would be subverted by supposing other spiri- tual worlds. The popularity acquired by Fontenelle's “ Plurality of Worlds” (1685) was shared by his “ History of Essay I. $ 111.]: 121 LOCKE. Oracles ” (1687), which has been regarded 1 as an evi- dence of advancing freedom of opinion. The oracles of antiquity, in particular, are examined by him with more severe and enlightened criticism than had hitherto been employed, unless by Van Dale (from whom he borrowed), and who had previously ven- tured so far as to set them down as mere human impostures, instead of demoniacal delusions, as had been the more orthodox belief. The great intellectual impulse excited by the dis- Philosophy coveries of Newton extended itself in different ways to all the thinking minds of the age,—to none more earnestly or fully than to that of his friend Locke: and though the bent of his genius lay in another direction, yet the influence of the emancipating and renovating principle of the physical movement, — “the new philosophy,” – was preeminently shown in the positive and definite character of Locke's re- searches, and more emphatically in the power with which he cleared away the rubbish of the old mystical metaphysical notions of innate ideas and other kindred conceits. This alone was in itself a grand of Locke.... i See Hallam's “Lit, of Europe," iv, 503, 122 [ESSAY I. $IIT. HISTORICAL SKETCH. step towards a more distinct and comprehensive philosophy; and the modes of thought thus incul- cated would react upon physical and cosmical specu- lation, though the state of knowledge was not as yet quite ripe for their full application. Yet, as to the relative advance of physical as compared with metaphysical, philosophy, the state of Locke's own opinions is instructive when he came to speculate on higher subjects. His anxiety to prove the credibility of Christianity' by making out its conformity to human reason, and his con- tinual endeavour to explain away what is mysterious in doctrine, contrast strongly with the brief and summary manner in which he discusses miracles?, manifestly ignoring any connection of the subject with higher physical views. In truth, notwithstanding the grand physical ad- metaphysi- Ýances of the seventeenth century, and the general cal and physical intellectual movement which could not fail to be in spirit. some degree consequent upon it, neither that age, nor even a great part of the next, was by any means Contrast of the See his “ Reasonableness of Christianity," 1695. 2 Essay, bk. i. ch. xvi. § 13. Essay I. § 111.] 123 NATURAL THEOLOGY. on natural as yet entirely emancipated from the mystical and metaphysical character, which a later school re- gards as a necessary preliminary phase to the more “positive” spirit of a purely physical philosophy. Thus, in relation and coordination with the philo- As bearing sophy, the natural theology of that period was of theology. the abstract and à priori cast, typified in the writ- ings of Locke, S. Clarke, Cudworth, and Wollaston, who, setting out from high abstruse first principles, attempted a deductive system of technical and formal propositions, embodying precise views of the divine nature and attributes, and thence the moral scheme of man's relation to his Creator, and of his condition in this life to that in another. When a physico-theology, in its more proper sense, was attempted, it consisted wholly in following out in nature proofs, confirmations, and illustrations of the Divine perfections previously assumed, instead of attempting to deduce the latter from the former. Such was the line of argument of Boyle, Ray, and Derham, as it has since been that of the most gene- rally popular writers on the subject; the safest course, undoubtedly, however defective in a philo- sophical sense; and even when they have attempted 124 (Essay I. $ 111. HISTORICAL SKETCH. As bearing on higher doctrines. a more strictly à posteriori line of argument from design and final causes, they still occasionally betray the lingering dominion of systematic prepossessions, or else are constrained to fall back on popular belief and the common religious sense of mankind, on which, of course, there can be no dispute. Nothing can more clearly exemplify the philo- sophical animus of a less advanced age than the prevalent subordination of the positive physical ele- ment to the ideal and metaphysical ; when spiritual and invisible things essentially inscrutable to reason become subjects of eager controversy and cavil, while the study of the sensible world, the proper subject of human intellect, is disregarded, and its higher bearings unperceived. Thus, under such a system, dogmatic views of the nature and mode of the Divine existence became topics of serious difficulty and dispute, while the grand conception of universal physical order and its sublime consequences was little appreciated; and the idea of suspensions of natural laws and contradic- tions to physical truth passed unchallenged, especially when associated with points of religious belief. Faith was made matter of logic, while science was to be Essay I. $ 111.) SCEPTICISM OF THE 17TH CENTURY. 125 squared to a conformity with revelation. Spiritual mysteries were made subjects of scepticism, physical marvels the essence of religion. . It was probably against the tendency to scepticism, The “Analyst." on points beyond all rational investigation, that the celebrated argument of Bishop Berkeley's “ Analyst” (1734) was directed, as urging the inconsistency of some men of science of that day, who objected to mysteries in religion, yet accepted without question “ the mysteries of the fine and abstruse geometry," } as they were then obscurely and insufficiently ex- pounded. Upon the defects of the demonstrations then given, Berkeley's argument was triumphantly raised. Now that the subject has been fully an- alysed, and the foundations of the infinitesimal cal- culus have been clearly explained, this argument has indeed become inapplicable; but it may still sug- gest better discrimination as to those topics which are legitimate matters for the investigation of reason, and those which belong to a different order of .con- ceptions. It was very long, in fact, before philosophy could He recurs briefly to the same idea in a note in the “ Siris," p. 130. 126 [Essay I. $ III. HISTORICAL SKETCH. effectually cast off the remains of the old scholastic tone of thought, which led to a spirit of syllogising upon points of religious doctrine, as if they were real tangible objects, within the grasp of the reasoning faculties, while, on the other hand, by a strange perversity, higher physical generalisations and con- templations were thought presumptuous and profane. Thus, the considerations of the grander bearings of cosmical theory were unperceived, and any philosophic discussion of alleged interruptions of natural order was altogether beyond the apprehension even of many to whose speculations it might have been supposed congenial. If anywhere we might perhaps expect some indi- cations of a disposition to discuss such topics, under the influence of the advancing philosophy among the professed “Free-thinkers” and the Deists of the seventeenth and early part of the eighteenth cen- turies. But the tenour of their writings is for the most part of a kind entirely different from any *enlarged philosophical and especially physical specu- lation. Tindal argued wholly on moral and critical grounds, in his attempt to make out that Christianity was “as Deists of the 17th century. Essay I. $ 111.] SCEPTICISM OF THE 17TH CENTURY. 127 old as the creation,” and nothing more than a repub- lication of the law of nature; as did also Toland, in endeavouring to reduce its peculiar doctrines to mere general truths of reason and morals:-- but with little or no reference to miracles. Collins attacked pro- phecy as containing no proper predictions; and the appeal to it as being only arbitrary adaptations of passages to the events of Christianity. Morgan and Chubb, from the handle given by the puritanical con- fusion of Christianity with Judaism, rejected the former along with the latter. Bolingbroke, profess- ing to purify religion from its corruptions, reduced it to a mere shadow of Deism, or something less. Shaftesbury assailed the alleged interested nature of religious motives as connected with future retribu- tion, as well as other points of belief, with refined satire; as did Mandeville and others with coarser and more offensive scoffing. The low and unscientific views of this class of Unphiloso- phical views writers, and indeed of the age, when they touched of sceptics. on the subject of the supernatural, may be exempli- fied in the instance of Blount, who, in order to decry Christianity, endeavoured to revive the credit of the miracles of Apollonius of Tyana as superior to those 128 [Essay I. § 111. HISTORICAL SKETCH. of Christ! while Chubb argued rather against points of evidence than on any higher ground. But it is not in polemical attacks on religion, like those just referred to, nor indeed in any controversy of the kind, that we can look for a worthy and candid discussion of a wide and delicate philosophical question. The school of writers just glanced at have, indeed, now, for the most part, been deservedly forgotten; they are here alluded to only to show how little direct connection the sceptical speculations of that period had with the progress of physical science, a topic equally unnoticed in the replies of the advocates of revelation in that agel, clearly showing that it was never agitated. It is an indication of the very slow advance of true conceptions of the universality of physical order, that even the acute author of the “Characteristics » 2 should notice as an argument on the atheistic side worthy of mention, the allegation of some persons that all order and design might be limited to the Slow ad- vance of the idea of (irder. i As, e. g. Leslie's “ Short and Easy Method with Deists,” 1694. 2 Vol. ii, p. 298. (1699.) Essay I. $ 111.] · 129 BISHOP BERKELEY. minute speck in the universe to which our actual knowledge is confined, and which they imagined might be wholly exceptional in its constitution, while on every side around nothing but blind chance, total anarchy, and eternal chaos might prevail, with- out any trace of law or mind. Even professed Atheists, at the present day, would reject so unphilo- sophical an idea with contempt.. And here we cannot omit to recognise one of the Bishop Berkeley. most remarkable instances of philosophical genius perhaps of any age, in a writer already cited, Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. Without pretending to dwell on the vast questions of materialism or idealism, or the other profound metaphysical and psychological inquiries, for which he is so justly celebrated ?, in connection with the present subject it can only be remarked that his elevated speculations in general, as well as his more precise controversial discussions, were well calculated to meet the meta- physical spirit of his time, in reference to the grander questions of religious belief; though they would i Principles of Human Knowledge, 1710; Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous, 1713; Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher, 1732 ; Siris, i Discourse on Tar Water, 1744, enlarged 1752. 130 HISTORICAL SKETCH. appear to have little bearing on any physical conse- quences, or with those invariable relations of matter which are the sole objects of positive science, and are still the same, in whatever sense its existence be defined. The laws of matter remain, though matter itself disappear from our view. The laws of nature are laws of reason and mind. Of Bishop Berkeley's physical views, perhaps the clearest idea may be formed from the celebrated “ Siris,” in which, commencing from a plain practical His physi- cal views. LULUUL believed peculiarly efficacious in the cure of a vast variety of diseases, he by no violent transition di- gresses to the constitution of man, to the reciprocal influence of body and mind; and from the operation of medicines to the chemical theories of his day; whence the principles of “fire, spirit, or æther," are discussed according to the doctrines of the ancient philosophers; and in connection with the modern views (alluding specially to Newton) the “lumi- nous æther” is made the source of light and of vitality. His varied and discursive remarks bear on nearly all points of physical philosophy as then pursued : Essay I. $ 111.] . 131 BISHOP BERKELLY. : nature and from it. the nature of motion!, attraction, repulsion, and other modes of action affecting matter. But what chiefly concerns our present purpose is to remark the very distinct references he makes, in several places, to the great principles of natural order, and to the Order in inference of presiding intelligence. He repudiates inference the notions of fate and chance?, and enlarges on the idea of a soul pervading nature , carefully drawing distinctions in order to avoid Pantheism. A few extracts will best exhibit his views on these points. Thus he observes 5: “Mechanical laws of nature or motion direct us “how to act and teach us what to expect. Where in- “ tellect presides there will be method and order; and “therefore rules; -- which, if not stated and constant, “would cease to be rules. There is a constancy in all “ things, which is styled the course of nature.” ... Again : “There is a certain analogy, constancy, and uni- “ formity in the phenomena or appearances of nature “which are a foundation for general rules; and these 1 ? Also discussed in his very early treatise “ De Motu," &c. ? Siris, p. 130. 3 Ibid. p. 138. # Ibid. p. 289. 5 Ibid. p. 109, $ 234. 2 132 [Essay I. $ 11. HISTORICAL SKETCH. “ are a grammar for the understanding of nature, or “ that series of effects in the visible world whereby we “ are enabled to foresee what will come to pass in the “natural course of things.” 1 And yet more precisely as to the inference? :- “ The order and course of things and the experi- “ments we daily make shew there is a mind that go- “verns and actuates this mundane system, as the pro- “per real agent and cause; the inferior instrumental “ cause is pure æther, fire, or the substance of light." Indeed, the unity of view in which Berkeley, in this work, invests physical truth, has led a recent writer (who seems thoroughly to have imbibed his spirit) to speak of the “Siris” as a work which "might properly have been entitled "Cosmos, for “it is a survey, comprehensive and rapid, yet discrimi- “native, of the characteristics of intellectuality im- “pressed upon the great and the minute in the pro- “ceedings of nature; and this not especially with “ reference to final causes, which may be imagined “ without being real, but by demonstrating the reality “of characteristics which are simultaneous with, and Siris, p. 120, $ 252. 2 Ibid. p. 70, § 154. Essay I. $.111.] 133 BISHOP BUTLER. - . . “involved in, every process and result, and absolutely “present before us.” 1 Among other theological writers, some advance . towards a recognition of the grand idea of natural order, and its consequences, may be traced in the early part of the eighteenth century. Thus W. Wollaston (an ancestor, it is believed, of the cele- Wollaston. brated physicist of our time), in his “Religion of “ Nature Delineated” (1726), threw out some hints towards viewing alleged instances of Divine interpo- sition, as not being arbitrary interruptions of nature, but regular parts of some greater system. But in a far higher degree, though not professedly directed to the cultivation of physical science, the acute and comprehensive mind of Bishop Butler owned the Bishop influence of its advance. The argument of the cele- brated “Analogy” (1736) implies, from its very design, a considerable reference to the study of the natural world; and, in fact, the author evinces a far wider grasp of the general scope of physical philosophy than was at all approached by any of the theological Butler. Egeria, by B. Dockray, i. 284, London, 1857. : 2 § 5, p. 103. K 3 HISTORICAL SKETCH. writers of his day except Berkeley. His notion of the extent of natural order, and the real subjection of all events to laws, however unknown to us!, is remarkable for that age, and instructive to the present. More particularly, he observes, that we know some mena, as earthquakes, storms, famines, pestilences, and the like, we know nothing of the laws : “So “that they are called accidental, though all reason- “able men know certainly that there cannot in “ reality be any such thing as chance, and conclude - that the things which have this appearance are “the result of general laws and may be reduced “ into them.” Our actual knowledge of the laws of nature ex- tends but a little way, “it is only from analogy that “We conclude the whole of it to be capable of being “ reduced into them.” Setting out from the assumption of Theistic views, Butler's defence of Revelation and miracles refers to the analogy between them and the ordinary provi- ? Analogy, part 11. chap. iv. $ 3. Essay I. § 111.] 135 MIRACLLS. dential government of the world; so that objections against the one apply equally to the others. Yet we cannot but notice that the argument turns upon a singular kind of distinction, which could not now be sustained, between “common” and “extra- ordinary” natural phenomena; representing, for ex- ample, comets, and electric or magnetic phenomena, as if exceptional parts of astronomy or of physics, instead of being intimately bound up by continuity with their most essential principles, as they are now seen to be. The view entertained of supernatural interposition, Views of the super- if understood as implying suspensions of natural laws, natural. regarded as an abstract philosophical question, must depend wholly on the progress of ideas respecting the universal order and dependence of physical causes. Some discussions bearing on this subject were pur- sued by writers in the early part of the eighteenth century, who do not appear to have been directly influenced by physical conceptions, but took up their respective views rather on more restricted grounds of a critical or theological kind. Analogy, p. 233, ed. 1907. K 4 136 [Essay l. $ 11I. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Woolston. Middleton. In this class may be reckoned Woolston', who interpreted the Gospel miracles as not being real occurrences, but allegorical representations of the Christian doctrines, — the precursor of the mythic theory of Strauss. About the same time, Dr. Conyers Middleton, in his “ Letter from Rome” (1729) attacked the mira- culous pretensions of the Roman Catholic Church, and thus found himself involved in a much wider argument; so that Protestant theologians took alarm. And afterwards, from his “Introductory. Discourse,” followed by his larger work, “A Free Enquiry into Miraculous Powers, &c.” (1749), he was accused of impugning Christianity altogether, a charge against which he repeatedly protested. As to the nature of the grounds on which he proceeded, his inquiry is . mainly directed to the mere details of testimony, to the nature of the alleged marvels, and the character of their advocates; all which he rejects as unworthy of credit, though he observes, “ that God can work - Six Discourses on the Miracles of Christ, published successively (1727—29) by T. Woolston, B.D., sometime Fellow of Sidney College, Cambridge. Essay I. $ TII.] 137 MIDDLETON. . Q “miracles when He pleases, I dare say none will “ deny."i In some respects, however, he appears to adopt wider and more philosophical grounds of criticism, as when he observes, “ the testimony of facts, as offered to “our senses in this wonderful fabrick and constitution “ of worldly things, may be properly called the tes- “timony of God himself,....;"2 and contends that we must take this as our guiding principle in judging of the credibility of miracles; which he further explains by remarking, that the inquirer, “by accustoming “his mind to these sublime reflexions, will be pre- “pared to determine whether those miraculous inter- "positions so confidently affirmed to us by the primi- “tive fathers, can reasonably be thought to make a “part in the grand scheme of the divine administra- “ tion, or whether it be a truth that God, who created “all things by His will, and can give them what turn “He pleases by the same will,” should work such low and unworthy prodigies as the author represents those of the ecclesiastical writers to have been.3 ? Vindication of the Free Enquiry, p. 33, 1751. 2 Free Enquiry, pref. p. x. ? Vindication of Free Enquiry, p. 8. 138 HISTORICAL SKETCH. IL Hume. This is not the place to enter on criticism; but it is within the scope of our present object to remark that the turn thus given to the argument is far from that which the true cosmical principle would suggest, while the ground assumed is one which must appear of rather a hazardous nature, as the argument might easily be pushed farther than was probably con- templated. The progress of ideas on this very important ques- tion, would here bring us, by natural connection, as well as in order of time, to the celebrated spe- culations of Hume (1752) and the controversies which have arisen out of them. The principles thus in- volved will in fact form the direct subject of a future Essay. With reference to the present purpose it is only desirable here to observe, that in the specula- tions of Hume we still hardly trace a clear and com- manding conception of physical order and law, as the real basis of all discussion of such subjects. He con- tinually intermixes and confuses the consideration of testimony in human affairs with that applying to physical phenomena, and loses sight of the distinc- tion between physical and moral possibility, between credibility in cases involving the laws of matter and Defective physical views. Essay I. $ 111.) 139 HUME. those depending on moral volition ; while his con- tinual adoption of a sarcastic, and too often an offen- sive, tone, derogates greatly from the purely abstract and dispassionate character which ought to distin- guish a high philosophical discussion. In another part of his writings, Hume also dis- cussed the common argument from design, objecting to the inference, that from supposing an artificer in human works, a like conclusion holds in respect to the origin of the universe. But the entire argument had not at that period received the extension it can only attain from the true conception of universal order, as the correlative, almost the synonym, of universal mind.3 As an instance of the confined notions of Hume on physical sub- jects (in some measure those of his day), we may notice the example which he introduces of the imagined occurrence of a darkness over all the earth for the first week of 1600. If sufficiently attested, he justly observes, philosophers ought, instead of doubting, to accept the fact, and investigate the cause; but the reason he assigns is as follows: “ For the decay, corruption, and dissolution of nature is an event “ rendered probable by so many analogies that any phenomenon which “ seems to have a tendency towards that catastrophe comes within the “ reach of human testimony, if that testimony be very extensive and « uniform.” — Essays, vol. ii. p. 134, ed. 1800. 2 Dialogue concerning Natural Religion, Works, vol. ii. p. 446. s See “ Oxford Essays," Essay v. p. 185, 1857. 140 DI HISTORICAL SKETCH. . [Essay I. $ 111causation, IDC Doctrine of There is, however, another point in the specula- tions of Hume to which we can refer with far higher satisfaction, and which has a direct bearing on the entire view of physical philosophy:-his masterly analysis of the doctrine of causation in his “ Essay on Necessary Connection.” In this celebrated dis- cussion he completely demolished the ancient mys- tical idea of an efficient power or energy existing in one physical fact, mode of action, or combination of conditions, to bring about or produce another; and contended with unanswerable force that all we can affirm is the invariable sequence of the one fact upon the other. The announcement of this great principle was of a magnitude commensurate with Locke's demolition of innate ideas, and like it marks an epoch in the history of philosophy. Yet that this view was taken up on somewhat limited grounds, and has appeared to require extension in its conditions, is no disparage- ment to its validity as an essential principle, and as clearing the ground for all positive physical philo- sophy. It has of course been vehemently assailed by See “Unity of Worlds,” Essay I. $ iv. Essay I. $ 111.] 141 HUME. some, and accepted with such modifications by others of later metaphysical schools, that in their hands the subject has retrograded almost to its original mysti- cism. I have elsewhere endeavoured to give this doctrine that slight modification which alone it seems to require in order to vindicate its true application to philosophy; the true “necessary connection," in law and reason,—the subordination of effect to cause, - in the higher degree of generality of successively more comprehensive physical principles. 142 [ESSAY I. $ IV. HISTORICAL SKETCH. IV. — THE PERIOD FROM LAPLACE TO THE PRESENT TIMES. Idea of Cosmos Idea of In the age of Newton it may be truly said the great from the principle of cosmical order and unity of worlds could Newtonian discoveries. by no means be held to have been completely esta- blished or demonstrated, however perceptible to the eye of philosophical analogy. The broad idea might have been seized upon by some few of great compre- hensive and contemplative genius; but the full deve- lopment and detailed proof of the truth could not be said to have been attained or accomplished, even in regard to our system, till the researches of Clairault had removed the obvious outstanding difficulties of the lunar theory; and the grand truths deduced theoreti- cally from one and the same great principle of gravi- tation, announced by Laplace and Lagrange, had ein reduced the planetary inequalities to fixed order; and tary system. by demonstrating that they must be all periodical, Stability Essay I. $ Iv.] 143 SUCCESSORS OF NEWTON. assured the perpetual stability of the system, so that its very irregularities are all regular, its aberrations recur in successive cycles, its deviations are but oscillations, — “Immense pendulums of eternity," says Pontecoulant, “which beat ages as ours beat 6 seconds!” The great importance of the discovery of the “stability of the solar system” cannot be too highly estimated, whether in regard to its scientific magni- tude and difficulty, or to its essential bearing on the principle of “ Cosmos," from the disastrous conse- quences which would result from the accumulative effects of secular (or non-periodic) irregularities. I cannot better sum up the subject than in the conclud- ing words of a passage in which the first historian of astronomy in our age gives the most condensed, yet luminous, — detailed and masterly, — yet clear and popular, abstract of the entire investigation: “ The “ laws which thus regulate the eccentricities and incli- “ nations of the planetary orbits, combined with the - invariability of the mean distances, secure the per- “ manence of the solar system throughout an indefi- “ nite lapse of ages, and offer to us an impressive indi- “ cation of the supreme intelligence which presides 144 [Essay I. & IV. HISTORICAL SKETCH. cism. sover nature, and perpetuates her beneficent arrange- “ ments.” 1 French The great and rapid advances made in the mathe- philosophy and scepti- matical and physical sciences in France, during the latter part of the eighteenth and beginning of the present century, have been universally acknowledged. But it was also notoriously the fact that almost simultaneously an extensive profession of scepticism in religion, and even of atheism, took place in that country. It is, however, abundantly evident that the great majority of those writers who advocated irreligious principles were not mathematicians or physical philosophers, but men of literature, metaphy- . sicians and politicians. Nevertheless it has been the practice with some parties indiscriminately to set down all the astronomers and men of science in France as Atheists, and to allege as the ground that in their mathematical and scientific writings they omitted all reference to theological considerations, a charge to which its absurdity affords a sufficient reply. CO Grant's “ History of Physical Astronomy,” London, 1852, p. 56. I am glad to take this opportunity of acknowledging how much I am indebted to this masterly work in many parts of the present sketch. Essay I. & iv.] 145 LAPLACE. UVU in science. A scientific treatise on any branch, even if it be Omission of final causes one which affords the most striking evidences of no defect order and design, is perfectly complete without alluding to that inference; and when the reader cannot but make that inference it is infinitely stronger in proportion as it does not appear to have been specially contemplated in the method of argument, or urged upon him by the author. The French writers on science have been remark- able for preserving clearly and justly this division and distinction of departments. And when we add the consideration that most of these works were produced under the profession of the Roman Catholic faith, which has always reposed on a basis inde- pendent of reasoning or evidence, — which it even repudiates as inevitably leading to unbelief, — we have a sufficient explanation (were it needed) of the omis- sion of reflections or arguments of a theological kind in works devoted to mathematical and astro- nomical calculation or physical research. It has been a peculiarly protestant prejudice to be every- where looking for arguments and proofs in support of faith ; and might easily be construed into a con- fession of its weakness. 146 [ESSAY I. SIF. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Views of Laplace. To take a single instance:- Laplace has been commented on with a marked expression of regret (in the review of his great work by Playfair ?) be- cause in expounding the grand principle of the stability of the planetary system, and the remarkable combinations of conditions in the orbits and masses, on which it depends, he did not make the slightest reference to final causes; — “ the only blemish,” the critic observes, “We have to remark in his admirable work.” The omission, he admits, might have arisen from supposed irrelevancy to the immediate subject, or the like motives; but he adds his own conviction that it would have been but a legitimate subject of inquiry, as to these conditions, “whether any ex- “planation of them can be given, and whether, if “ not referable to a mechanical cause, they may not “ be ascribed to intelligence." This sentence exhibits at once a proof of the depth of the impression alluded to even in such a mind as that of Playfair; and an indication of the influence of what, in the present state of the inquiry, must be seen to be merely the old and narrow prejudice of opposing Final Causes. Playfair's Works, iv. 319; or Edinb. Rev. vol. xi. 1808. Essay I. $ Iv.). 147 LAPLACE. LL mechanical causes to intelligence. If the arrange- ments alluded to could be shown to be the results of still higher mechanical causes, it would but furnish a still higher proof of intelligence instead of being antagonistic to it; mechanism is the very exponent of mind. It has been so often repeated as to be generally believed that this omission of reference to Divine design in the work of Laplace was objected by Napoleon to the author; who simply replied, “I had no need to adopt that hypothesis;” in fact the most truly philosophical answer, since to adopt it would have been preposterously to found science on faith. Laplace in his “Essai Philosophique sur les Pro- Testimony and the su- babilités ” (1795) has entered at large into the dis- pernatural. cussion of testimony as applied to extraordinary and supposed supernatural events. The calculation of the value of testimony as an abstract point, is of course easily reducible to mathematical expressions." It is, however, only in reference to the consideration of alleged events so intrinsically improbable that no testimony can counterbalance their abstract incredi- bility, that he refers incidentally to the constancy of the laws of nature as a paramount law of belief.? He Essai, &c. p. 76, ed. 1814. L 2 148 [Essay I. § iv. HISTORICAL SKETCH. afterwards instances the miracles of the holy thorn at Port Royal, and laments the credulity of such men as Racine and Pascal in asserting them; and of Locke in maintaining generally, supernatural inter- position, when he believed the necessity for it would render it credible. He goes into some other considerations as to the necessary weakening of all testimony and destruction of records with the progress of time, and mentions the singular conclusion of the able but eccentric English mathematician Craig !, who, in applying cal- culation to the evidences of Christianity, inferred that the world would end when the probability of the truth of Christianity should in this way become exhausted as it were by old age, a period which his calculation fixes in A. D. 3150. In Laplace's views it is remarkable how entirely the calculating mind of the great mathematician fixes itself almost exclusively on the value of testimony. He does not put forth in due prominence the broad principle of universal order and physical constancy, which afford so far higher a ground from whence to 1 Essai, &c. p. 85. Ilis singular work is entitled “ Theologiæ Christianæ Principia Mathematica,” 1699. Essay I. $ 1v.] 149 LAPLACE. view the whole question; a principle which he had himself borne so conspicuous a share in establishing, and of which the same essay) contains some remark- Nebular theory. able illustrations in sketches of his cosmical specula- tions. The motions of all the planets, rings, and satellites (those of Uranus being then undetermined), both orbital and rotatory, in one direction, and nearly in one plane, and with orbits of very small eccen- tricity, compared especially with the case of comets, where opposite conditions prevail, form a continuous system of effects, which could only be due to one distinct primitive cause. Hence he reasoned, especially from the combined considerations of the nebulous zodiacal light mass, and the internal heat of the earth, to the conception of the nebular theory, and the idea that in the process of consolidation the common impulse may have been communicated. Such an hypothesis, how- ever conjectural, was of course set down by many as nothing less than a deliberate system of atheism. In like manner it has been generally stated that many of the other eminent French astronomers, 1 Essai, &c. p. 118, cd. 1814; more fully in his “Expos. du Système du Monde.” L 3 150 (Essay I. S IV. HISTORICAL SKETCH. mathematicians, and physicists, about the period in question, adopted irreligious views; — in many in- stances, on little evidence beyond such as has been just described. Yet, in some cases, the charge was certainly better justified. The astronomer Lalande is said to have declared that in the heavens he could find no trace of a Deity;—though this is after all no more than has been asserted by many theologians. Lalande was, however, undeniably the friend and àssociate of Voltaire; and with other men of science joined in the work of the celebrated “Encyclo- pedia,” among whom one of the most eminent was D'Alembert. D'Alembert. The indications which this transcendent mathe- matician gave of his sceptical views in religion, appear almost entirely in his correspondence; and they would seem to have been rather of that class dependent on general estimation of moral evidence than on any positive physical generalisation. His intimate friend, the Abbé La Harpe, has described his ideas summarily by saying, “He only thought See “ Oxford Essays," No. v. 1857. Essay I. S IV.] D'ALEMBERT. “ the probabilities were in favour of theism, and 6 against revelation. ... He tolerated all opinions ; “ and this disposition made him think the intolerable “6 arrogance of the atheists odious and unbearable. "I do not think he ever printed a sentence which 5 marks either hatred or contempt of religion.” But we must fairly view the opinions of such men on theological subjects as having been framed with reference to the narrow dogmatic creed professed among their contemporaries, and under a dominant ecclesiastical system, against which they felt a not înreasonable hostility, and as having probably little relation to any higher conceptions. At this particular conjuncture too there were other and far more stirring causes in operation to produce a violent revulsion of opinions than those merely due to calm philosophical speculation, and into the vortex of which men of science were some- times drawn rather in spite of their philosophy than in consequence of it. The indirect influence of advancing conceptions of Indirect influence : the grand principle of the uniformity of nature, and of physical views. the indissoluble chain of physical causes, has mani- fested itself occasionally in more enlarged minds not L 4 152 [Essay I. S IV. HISTORICAL SKETCH. - - - - - - - Gibbon. habitually directed to physical pursuits; and when we find indications of such ideas in the writings of a classical and philosophical historian, we may nevertheless regret a tendency not sufficiently to discriminate between the legitimate view of physical order and the independence of spiritual truth, which, indeed, the accepted theology of past ages tended to confound together. The following expressions of Gibbon will exemplify this remark: --" The laws of nature were frequently suspended for the benefit of the Church.” He also observes in another place, “In modern times a latent, “ and even involuntary, scepticism adheres to the “ most pious dispositions. Their admission of super- “ natural truths is much less an active consent than a “ cold and passive obedience. Accustomed long since “ to observe and to respect the invariable order of “ nature, our reason, or at least our imagination, is “not sufficiently prepared to sustain the visible action “ of the Deity." 2 These expressions, while they convey philosophical convictions of physical causation, imply a want of 1 LULU ? Decline and Fall, ch. xv. vol. ii. p. 194, ed. 1825. ? Ibid. p. 147. Essay I. & Iv.] PROGRESS OF COSMICAL VIEWS. 153 clear discrimination between “supernatural truths" of the spiritual world, and alleged supernatural events in the material, — which are wholly distinct. The beginning of the present century (as before Progress of cosmical noticed) witnessed the completion of the triumph of views. the system of gravitation in solving and reconciling all the seeming anomalies and outstanding difficulties of the lunar and planetary motions, consummated at the present day, in regard to those of Uranus, by the discovery of an exterior disturbing planet, predicted by the calculations of Leverrier and Adams, and verified by the telescopes of Gallé and Challis. More minute supplementary enlargements in the details of mutual attractions are still from time to time demanded, as new and minute inequalities are detected, and both observation and theory go on hand in hand continually increasing in precision of detail and amplification of developement, in that perfect accordance which can alone spring from real sources profoundly seated in the nature of things. To these must be added the extension of the order Extension of gravita- of our system by the discovery of new members all tion. obedient to its one law,-satellites of Neptune, Saturn, and Uranus, observed by Lassell and Bond; the 154 [Essay I. & Iv. HISTORICAL SKETCH. whole ring of planetoids circulating in what may truly be called a nebulous mass between the orbits of Jupiter and Mars, all controlled by gravitation:- now also proved to extend even to the incalculably remote systems of double and multiple stars; and probably also influencing the motion of the com- ponent parts of nebulæ, surmised from their spiral forms exhibited by the gigantic reflector of Lord Rosse, and exemplified in our own region by the motion of our sun with his attendant system, doubt- less orbital, among the fixed stars, the members of our cluster, — a revolution in which those other members all very probably partake. On our own globe, again, that amid the immense complication of conditions which affect the tides, many local points in their theory are as yet incom- plete, can neither excite surprise, nor sanction any doubt of the principle. Besides these grand mechanical laws and theories, there are wide fields of inquiry of a more purely physical kind, to which increasing attention is con- tinually being devoted, giving rise to an immense multiplication of new investigations, and even of entire new departments of experimental inquiry. Terrestrial physics. Essay I. Şiv.] 155 UNITY TAT OF NATURE. YDI · The first positive physical evidence of the orbital motion of the earth (from which its rotation is a consequence), obtained from the discovery of the aberration of light of the stars (due to that motion combined with the progressive propagation of light) by Bradley (1727), has been followed out in our own day by the mechanical proofs of its rotation . furnished by the ingenious experiments of Foucault (1850–54.) But in a more extended degree it has been re- Connection and con- served to our own times to connect the properly tinuity of sciences. mechanical views, which reach to the remotest regions of the visible universe, with the study of the physical agencies at workswithin the range of our experimental knowledge; to prove the propagation of light from the depths of space to our organs by an unvaried succession of inconceivably minute vibrations with direct physical evidence of its velocity; the elec- tricity of comets; the magnetic influence of the sun; to carry out the vast range of investigations belonging to terrestrial and atmospheric physics, by which even storms are beginning to be reduced to law; above all, to evince the continuity of physical causes through the expanse of past time by geological 156 (Essay I. $ IV. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Chemistry and alchemy. research ; as through the immensity of space by the extension of stellar and nebular astronomy; through the minutest forms of life by microscopic animal- cular physiology; and through subdivisions infinitely smaller in the system of atoms, invisible to any microscope by following out the laws of chemical combination. Chemistry undeniably took its rise out of the labours of the alchemists. Some very rational philo- sophers have maintained, on sound principles, the possibility of a change of properties, when so closely allied as those which distinguish the metals. But alchemy was essentially mystical: and the objection to it was not that (like the attempts at perpetual motion) it aimed at an object, in itself physically absurd or impossible, but that it sought that object by means alien from those of any sound principles of science : it looked to secrets hidden from all but favoured adepts; it appealed to means of success connected with the invisible and supernatural; it hoped to accomplish the discovery of truths in nature. by talismanic agency beyond nature, and to acquire a dominion over matter by the interposition of spirit. Essay I. $ IV.] 157 INT CHEMISTRY.—PRIESTLEY. Oy zuc Hence the incompatibility of such pursuits with real physical progress. But even after chemistry had emerged from the Phlogiston. dreams of the alchemists, and the ineffectual accumu- lations of the empirics, in one of its earlier phases, the theory of Phlogiston furnishes a further exempli- fication of the predominance of mysticism. And when eminent men on either side disputed the ques- tion, the point peculiarly to be noticed was the fun- damental deficiency of any idea of what Phlogiston was supposed to be. We properly talk of electricity, of gravitation, or even of æther, as physical agents, whose nature is indeed unknown, but which are pre- cisely definable in their effects; but Phlogiston, no one of its advocates could define even by its properties. It was simply an instance of the lingering dominion of mysticism over science, which the progress of induc- tion was not yet sufficiently developed to cast off. In connection with chemistry, we cannot omit the Priestley. name of Priestley, who was at once, one of the most distinguished extenders of the boundaries of the science, and also remarkable for the boldness of his theological opinions. His intellectual character was, however, marked by extraordinary singularity and 158 HISTORICAL SKETCH. inconsistency :-“nemo unquam sic impar sibi,” may with truth be applied to him. His science appears to have been as little consistent with itself as his theology. He made the grandest advances in pneu- matic chemistry, and may be said even to have created the science, — yet he firmly believed in Phlogiston and upheld it against advancing evidence. In theology,-he attacked Gibbon, and denounced Hume, with the most orthodox animosity as the champion of Christianity, while he disowned most of its received doctrines; he believed in prophecies but rejected mysteries; he saw in the events of modern Europe the fulfilment of the predictions of the Old Testament, yet explained away the doctrines of the New; he rejected the divinity of Christ, yet devoutly expected his real bodily return to reign on earth 1; such incoherencies of genius are, however, always instructive. We before noticed the degree to which the specu- lations of antiquity, relative to geological or, cosmo- gonical questions, were mixed up with mythological Origin of geology. See Lord Brougham's " Lives of Men of Literature and Science," pp. 413, 419, 423. Essay I. $ IV.] 159 PROGRESS OF GEOLOGY. - visions. And it has been seen to how great an ex- tent, even in more modern times, the whole progress · of investigation on this subject has been beset by hindrances, arising out of theological views; rather, we might almost say, the science of geology has emanated out of certain points of theological belief, for which men thought they had found proofs in physical facts which, however, they had entirely mis- interpreted. By. slow degrees, and in full and con- stant antagonism to such prepossessions, has the free and real interpretation of those facts struggled and fought its way to acceptance. In earlier times, the few bolder inquirers who Mystical ventured to use their own understanding, and to appeal independently to inductive evidence, yet always thought it necessary to pay homage to the prejudices of the day, by assuming a tone of apolo- getic respect; while the many who pursued such speculations did so solely in a spirit of entire subser- viency to the received creed, and on the avowed prin- ciple of valuing every discovery as it seemed to support that creed, and suppressing or distorting it if it seemed of contrary tendency. We have before adverted to some instances of this kind; but among views. 160 [Essay I. $ IV. HISTORICAL SKETCH. these we have also acknowledged the more indepen- dent researches of a few. Thus, following in the steps of Lister, Hooke, and Leibnitz, we find at a later period Michell, and some few others, but more pre- eminently Hutton, standing forth on the same high philosophical ground. Such men, labouring on such principles, could not fail to encounter the full force of hostile prejudice which was engendered by the continual existence of the same bigoted spirit under Protestantism which had displayed itself under Romanism; with only this difference, that in the former case it is more inexcusable, as being more preposterously inconsistent with a system wholly founded on free inquiry. The Romanists opposed the motion of the earth as contrary to the dogma of an infallible Church ; the Protestants denounced its antiquity, as contrary to the infallibility of the Hebrew Scriptures. In neither case, however, could these erroneous ideas be dispelled but by the ad- vance of better perceptions of the distinct nature, provinces and objects of science and of Christianity, of physical and of spiritual truth. It is, however, undeniable that by far the greater body of English writers on these subjects, even down English geological writers. Essay I. $ 1v.] 161 PROGRESS OF GEOLOGY. - to our own times, when they did enter on any real physical investigation, evinced a complete subser- viency to theological ideas, though framing hypotheses, or even professedly investigating facts on principles supposed to be philosophical. They assumed the Scripture narrative as literal revealed truth, and then sought confirmation of it in natural facts; while yet they would only allow those facts to be interpreted in conformity to Scripture! Yet such has been the infatuation from the days of Whiston and Catcott down to those who in more recent times have culti- vated geology on principles which they founded on faith and yet called them science. The evidence of the true influence and progress Pure in- ductive of philosophical principles in this grand department principles of foreign of science-grand in itself — but more transcendently geologists so in relation to the “ Cosmos," as carrying back the dominion of physical law through the abysses of past time,- in its earlier stages, was found where perhaps we might least have looked for it-among the Italian writers. The mantle of Galileo descended in some measure on Vallisneri and Moro, and more amply on Generelli, though a Carmelite monk. The two former adopted perfectly rational theories, as far as M 162 [Essay I. & IV, HISTORICAL SKETCH. they went, of the causes of geological phenomena as then known (1721-1746). Yet Moro tried to adapt his views to the six days, but Generelli's “ Illustra- tions of Moro” (1749) display the true philosophic spirit. He protests, in the first instance, against the introduction of supernatural agency, and undertakes to explain the phenomena “ without violence, “ without fiction, without hypothesis, and without 6 miracles.” 1 How these Italian philosophers escaped the Inqui- sition it is difficult to imagine, especially as the far less bold speculations of Buffon brought down on him the visitation of the Sorbonne, and necessitated a recantation. Recent in. However, we here perceive perhaps the first great the English advance in true philosophical ideas of geology, and the anticipation and prototype of the real inductive independent views of Hutton, and Lyell, under the vivifying influence of whose principles the English school of geologists is but now beginning to cast off the lingering remnants of its hereditary bondage to mystical paroxysms, occasional recurrences of chaos fluence on school. i See Lyell's “Principles of Geology," ch. ii. Essay I. Siv.] 163 PROGRESS OF GEOLOGY. and creation, subversions and renewals of the order of nature, and miraculous originations of new species out of nothing: – In a word, the spirit of invoking the supernatural to cover our ignorance of natural causes, and then ungratefully discarding its aid whenever natural causes are found sufficient. Such tendencies in English cultivators of science their continental fellow-labourers have been too po- lite to ridicule otherwise than by justly boasting their own freedom from a semitic influences.” But so wide has the diffusion of a knowledge of geo- logy now become, that the juster view of the case is beginning to be extensively appreciated, and perhaps even more eagerly taken up among thinking and in- quiring men, though not practical geologists, who have brought unprepossessed minds to the examina- tion of the subject. The advance of information on such points is forcibly illustrated in the deeply instructive narrative of Prof. F. W. Newman', who relates his surprise, at an early stage of his progress, on hearing Dr. Arnold declare the narrative of the Deluge to be mythical, Phases of Faith, p. 110, 1st ed. 164 [Essay I. & iv. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Cosmical view of comets, and the Mosaic cosmogony to be of no real impor- tance to the Christian faith. Indeed in the existing state of opinions, from the extensive consequences entailed, affecting the entire popular conception of the design and application of Scripture, the diffusion of such views must eventually create an epoch in theology hardly less marked than that of the Refor- mation.' The progress of cometary astronomy has been al- ready noticed as destructive of the superstitious no- tions associated with those bodies in earlier times, and even down to a later period; but at the present day more important are the contemplations opened to us by the view of such vast aerial substances of a diffuse consistence, still retaining coherence and obeying the law of planetary motion, when even far beyond the utmost limits of our system, where, nevertheless, solar gravitation is thus proved to extend ; many of them being also drawn into our system from incalculable depths of space : while, as to their vast numbers, (more than 200 having orbits calculated, we may well agree with Kepler, that there are “as many in I See “ Christianity without Judaism.” Essay I. § iv.] 165 NEBULAR THEORY. with nebu- the universe, as fishes in the sea.” Such reflections cannot fail to exalt our conception of the enormous powers existing in nature, but in all their vastness still controlled by the supremacy of law, order, and mind. The study of these remarkable bodies is not un- Connection connected with more theoretical views of cosmical lar theory. arrangements. They have been regarded as the re- maining representatives of the older nebulous state of things, which has passed away by the gradual condensation of matter originally in this form, into solid planets, from which these highly rarefied por- tions of the original mass have escaped. Yet these bodies, whose fittest terrestrial representation may be found in the assemblage of “gay motes which people the sunbeams," occupy. vast spaces, the tails of some of them stretching over the whole extent of planetary distances :— again, we observe the zodiacal light-mass filling the entire area of the earth’s orbit: -- the singular system of nebulous planetary comets of short periods, of which five members with aphelion distances ranging only a little beyond the orbit of Jupiter, have now been verified; and whose mear distance so remarkably coincides with that of the planetoids ; -- of these latter probably vast numbers DI 3 166 HISTORICAL SKETCH. exist; every successive application of, higher tele- scopic power rendering more of them visible; though doubtless the mass are below all possible visibility: we have also those innumerable multitudes of me- teoric bodies, which are so probably conceived to revolve in rings aggregated in more truly nebulous masses, and yet regular members of the cosmical group, occasionally attracted to the earth : ~ phe- nomena which all tend to carry our thoughts back to the period when the solid planets -- the larger of them of so small density -- may have been conso- lidated out of the nebulous mass into which the pri- mitive heat had vaporised all cosmical matter, in which all kinds of thermal and electric agencies producing opposing motions would by consequence generate rotations; a state of heat of which our earth at least still exhibits the effects in its cooled crust and its internal fusion, at such depths as freely admit of its occasional manifestation at the surface. Speculations founded on these principles are of course hypothetical ; but guided by just analogies they tend to connect our view of the present with the past, and afford a uniting link between urano- graphy and the past history of the earth disclosed by geology. Essay I. $ 1v.] 167 HUMBOLDT. of cosmical Snow In the field of physical inquiry there still remain Completion doubtless vast regions of discovery unexplored: the principle. amount of what we know is trifling indeed compared with that of the unknown; but the inductive spirit assures us that it is only waiting to be made known, and that what appears now most obscure will as- suredly some day be as clearly understood as what is now well-known, though once equally obscure : and farther, that there is no real mystery in nature, nothing which is in itself essentially incapable of being understood. But it is more especially that union and combina- tion of different branches of science, when brought to bear upon each other, of which we have noticed some striking instances, besides the immense exten- sion of modern discovery in so many newly opened channels, and the lofty generalisations to which it has led, which have been required in order to realise and to justify the elevated conceptions, — which the science of the present day presses upon us with ra- pidly accumulating force, – of the true and worthy idea of Cosmos, first fully and emphatically brought Humboldt's into the position it ought to occupy in general esti- mation by the great and masterly work of Humboldt. Cosnios. 114 168 [Essay I. S IV. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Natural history. It would be almost superfluous to dwell on the vast modern enlargement given to the natural-his- tory sciences, by the immense extension of research and exploration into the haunts of nature in all quarters of the globe,- a research which has been incessantly carried on with ever increasing results confirmatory of the most recondite systems of order, according to which the types of all organic life, whether vegetable or animal, are evolved in never ending variety and profusion : while with the aid of comparative physiology all those complicated rela- tions of structure and function have been elucidated, which so conspicuously indicate the deeply-seated analogies which pervade all the arrangements of nature, and show the intimate relation of one portion to another in the most beautiful adjustment and har- monious adaptation, and thus unconsciously inspire those higher contemplations which the laboured pro- cesses of reasoning may fail to teach. The physiological sciences have been longer than others under the dominion of a narrow and mystical spirit, mainly dependent on the hypothesis of some peculiarly mysterious and supernatural principle as the source of vitality and of all animal functions. Physiology long mystical. Essay I. § 1v.] 169 . PHYSIOLOGY. . Again, it has been in a kindred spirit that, even in the more advanced inquiries of modern times, the appeal has been made to final causes as the primary Final guiding principle in the investigation of organised structure, instead of regarding that idea as the ulterior result --- a striking exemplification of the neglect of Bacon's caution that final causes were too often “wrongly placed” in science: made the begin- ning when they should be the end ;—the seed when they should be the fruit. Undue predominance had been given to this view from the happy accident of its valuable application in the great discovery of Harvey. But here, as in other sciences, the same contest between the mystical and the positive prin- ciple was long carried on. Even the brilliant dis- coveries of the school of Cuvier were much mixed up with the indications of this narrower view; and those who looked only to more limited conclusions could not see the higher bearing of the struggle be- tween the older school of teleology and the advocates of the newer and more transcendental doctrine of “ unity of composition” laid down as the true basis Unity of of philosophical method in these sciences by Geoffroy tion. St. Hilaire and his disciples, which the fuller exten- causes. composi- 170 [Essay I. $ IV. HISTORICAL SKETCH. _ Theory of life. sion of the inductive logic must entirely sanction, and every successive generalisation must tend to confirm. The nature of the vital principle is of all subjects of this kind, perhaps, the least as yet understood, and therefore has been the most involved in mysti- cism. We may, nevertheless, feel assured that it will one day be completely reduced to some mode of physical action in accordance with fixed laws, even if the explanation should be found to include some physical or chemical agent not yet recognised. Fol- lowing in the steps of those processes of investiga- tion by which the circulation of the blood, the system of respiration, and other portions of the animal economy now best understood, have been made known, every fresh research and discovery in physiology clears up, and traces the connection of some series of vital functions to the like ex- quisitely adjusted combination of physical action. Chemistry, on the one hand, succeeds in effecting continually closer approximation to the synthesis, as it has done so extensively to the analysis of organic structures. And it is thus indisputably the converging point of these varied researches, ulti- Essay THEORY OF LIFE. Essa I. $ 1v.] mately, however remotely, to establish a physical theory of the vital principle.' If beyond physical principles we entertain other ideas of a different kind bearing on the mental con- stitution of man, these clearly require a distinct, yet still inductive, examination; and still further, any higher moral or religious considerations bearing on the subject can only be conceptions of a totally different order independent of all scientific deduc- tions, superadded by the creation of faith. And the same assurance applying to existing life Life in Geological must also be equally extended (on the same principle) epoch. to the past, and to all those marvellous changes in species which geological epochs disclose to us, and which, occurring as part of a regular series, and giving rise to equally regular results connected on every side with other events going on by natural As a specimen of the prejudice still existing on this subject, I extract the following notice of a physiological communication made to the British Association, from its Report (1857):- Prof. Alison's 6 views were chiefly directed to oppose the modern tendency of • medical investigation, which he regarded as likely to degrade the « science to that of a subordinate department of chemistry on the one “hand, and of mechanical science on the other, omitting the one “ consideration of that indispensable though less intelligible class of “ phenomena which are known to be vital.-P. 109. 172 . [Essay I. § Iv. HISTORICAL SKETCI. Du S causes, must themselves be equally referred to natural causes. The case of paleontological speculation is but an exemplification of what must be the course of progress in all parts of physical inquiry-all alike con- ducive to the final establishment of the universality and eternity of law and order, continuity and intel- ligence; while the question of the first origination of all things is one which science is necessarily, and must ever be, incompetent to disclose, or even to conceive.! The question as to the origin of new species in past epochs ought to be one simply of rational philo- sophical conjecture as to the most probable mode in which, conformably to natural analogies, it might be imagined to have taken place. Yet, instead of a calm discussion of this kind, which is all that could be attainable, the subject has been the mere battle- Unphiloso- phical spirit of discussion. 1 While on this subject I cannot omit to take this occasion of re-. cording a protest against the now prevalent but barbarous use of the term “ Biology.” Bios never means “ life" in the sense of “ vitality :" it means the "life" of a man as progressing in time, his birth, actions, and death. Plato has “Blos Swas,” the lifetime of life. (Epinom. 982 ) Unfortunately the term “ Zoology," which would be the proper one for this branch of science has been already appropriated to what ought to have been called “ Zoography :" but there is still - Zoonomy," the science of the laws of life, open to adoption, and at any rate much better than “biology ;" which, if it mean anything, would be a theory of the facts of biography. Essay I. $ 1v.] : 173 NEW SPECIES. field between extreme visionary fancies on the one side and obstinate prejudice and bigotry on the other. Instead of the real discussion of comparative proba- Origin of species. bility in supposing the production of new forms either out of inorganic matter directly, or by modification of existing organised types indirectly,—the ideas started seem to have referred to the metaphysical paradox of origination of existence out of nothing; or the like ideal speculations, which were, yet more unreason- ably, mixed up with the cause of revealed religion. Such was the spirit in which several speculative theories broached on this subject : were met. The original hypothesis of Lamarck, and the more recent philosophical romance of the “ Vestiges of Creation," were alike accepted or encountered in the same totally unphilosophical manner. Even men of sci- ence have not discriminated between what are pro- fessedly hypothetical, yet legitimate, conjectures, and what are real scientific conclusions, and have ob- 3 Thus a parallel case in the plurality of worlds is well described by “Huyghens, as one — Gubi verisimilia invenisse laus summa est, et “ indagatio ipsa rerum, tum maximarum, tum occultissimarum habet “ oblectationem. Sed verisimilium multi sunt gradus, alii aliis veritati “ propiores, in quo diligenter æstimando præcipuus judicii usus ver- "titur." – C. Ilugenii Cosmotheoros, p. 10, 1698. 174 [Essay I. $ Iv. HISTORICAL SKETCH. jected to the one as if proposed in the other cha- racter; while theological animosity has been excited in equal absence of a power of distinction between the proper field of scientific speculation, and that of religious faith. The same narrow temper was equally displayed when certain experimentalists had alleged, even if erroneously, the actual development of organic life by physical means, and when, instead of fair criticism and repetition of trials, their experiments were de- nounced as impious, ridicule substituted for inquiry, and anathemas for refutation. In general, we may observe, that confusion of ideas and mysticism in speculation, when displayed in science, evince the intensity in which they must influence the whole tenor of the thoughts. Such notions must be deeply seated indeed to affect rea- soning on subjects from which they might seem most alien, and which are so eminently calculated in their own nature to demand and to encourage clearer and more rational views. When then this tendency is evinced even in science, it is not wonderful that it should exist in a tenfold degree in subjects of a more obscure nature, and thus more congenial Spirit of mysticism. Essay I. $ Iv.] 175 SUPERSTITION. &c. to its influence. Mysticism in science is the un- failing index to superstition in theology; as, on the other hand, the rejection of the one is a consider- able step towards an emancipation from the other. That in ignorant ages such appearances as those Astrology, of comets, or even brilliant meteors, should inspire terror, is not surprising. But the mere fact of the configuration of the planets we might suppose would hardly attract notice. Yet, from the importance assigned to these conjunctions by astrology, they have kept some hold on public apprehension. It is on record that, in 1682, a remarkable conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn produced an extraordinary alarm in Scotland. There are still to be found serious believers in stellar influence; but under a different form it is only the same astrological spirit which survives in some who attach a religious importance to a conjunc- tion of several of the planets together, which Laplace calculates took place B.C. 4004, the date assigned by the Hebrew chronology to the creation ; between which and a planetary conjunction, it is impossible * R. Chambers, “Domestic Annals of Scotland,” vol. ii. 456, 1858. 176 [Essay I. § iv. HISTORICAL SKETCH. &c. to see any rational connection; but even in a bib- lical point of view, the Septuagint translation, made from older versions now lost, places the date much earlier, and thus would subvert the horoscope. Mesmerism, In those subjects which lie, as it were, on the frontiers of positive science, and are at present ne- cessarily matters of mere speculative conjecture, though there may be little tending to advance real inductive truth, yet in the discussion of them we may often find much that is instructive in regard to the mode and character of the reasoning commonly applied to such investigation. Of this class are the whole range of questions so much agitated in our days, respecting what are termed mesmerism, electro-biology, and other allied forms of influences on the human organisation, as yet little under- stood, or even properly inquired into, which yet ought, from their nature, to be fair and proper subjects for that strict inductive examination which they have hardly ever received. They have, on the contrary, been almost universally abandoned to the most utterly unscientific modes of treatment; and, instead of calm criticism, have been made subjects of childish and superstitious credulity or sense- Ulc VID Essay I. § 1v.] MATERIALISM. LOON less controversy, as if questions of faith instead of facts. In phrenology we have another instance in which Phrenology. violent partisanship, on either side, has divested of its true philosophic character what ought to be simply a branch of inductive inquiry. Calmly viewed, it exhibits only a set of the most unexpected relations, at first collected and examined in the most purely empirical manner, in complete absence of any theory; out of which, by slow degrees, a system has been elicited, of which it can only be said, that at present it exhibits just that sort of rough, general coherency which, in spite of numberless objections in detail, gives an assurance of something too deeply seated in truth to be put down as mere random coincidence or fanciful delusion. By theological polemics, of course, the opprobrium of materialism and necessitarianism has been liberally heaped on the disciples of Gall and Spurzheim, with the same regard to fairness, and even competent know- ledge of their system, as is usual in similar cases. The question of materialism has been much agi- Material- tated in connection with physiology, and has been too often taken up even by some eminent physiologists, 1 ism. N 178 HISTORICAL SKETCH. in a spirit far removed from that of philosophic freedom. Thus Cuvier eagerly pressed arguments against materialism in the spirit of alarm, probably not per- ceiving the utter harmlessness of the doctrine, sup- posing it could be established. Nor is the reasoning which he adduces less remarkable for its irrelevancy to the real point at issue. “Materialism,” he con- tends, “is a very hazardous assertion, because we “ have, after all, no real proof of the existence of “ matter." And in this reasoning he has found many followers and admirers. But it is apt to be over- looked that our proofs of the existence both of matter and of mind stand upon exactly the same level, and really turn upon the definition of “existence ;” while the question whether intellectual phenomena can be ascribed to any modification of matter acting, or acted upon, under particular conditions, is totally independent of any speculations as to the mode in which we conceive the existence of matter. Among the varied and heterogeneous forms which the spirit of mysticism assumes, none, perhaps, has been more imposing, as seeming to connect itself with philosophical views, than Pantheism. The Modern Pautheism, Essay I. $ 1v.] 179 SIR H. DAVÝ. opinions of Spinoza were, at least in part, probably derived from speculations of a far higher antiquity, which influenced not only the Greek philosophy (as before remarked) but the more ambitious and transcendental systems of the orientals. Thus, in modern times, there has been a strong leaning to such ideas on the part of men whose profound clas- sical learning, and knowledge of the ancient philoso- phies was uncorrected by imbibing the more positive ideas and defining tendencies of modern physics 1 : and even those who, on religious grounds, have strenuously rejected Pantheism, have yet been dis- posed to concede the high philosophical and tran- scendental character of a speculation so essentially visionary and full of moral contradictions. But to return to the domains of real science,-to breathe the free air of philosophical truth,—we ad- vance to a great modern epoch. Amid the grand scientific advances of our own times, Sir H. Davy. no man has done more to give an entire new form to electro-chemical philosophy, by his splendid dis- coveries, or to crown abstract principles with invalu- I See Sewell's “ Foræ Platonicæ," p. 312, N 2 180 [Essay I. S IV. HISTORICAL SKETCH. abilities. : His physical able practical inventions, than Sir Humphry Davy. discoveries. Without dwelling on the vast range of new views opened by the decomposition of potash, and the various applications of galvanism, which prepared the way for the more extended discoveries of Faraday, it would be difficult to cite an instance of wider intellectual grasp than that by which he united under a single generalisation such apparently remote facts as that red-hot iron becomes dark by contact with cold bodies, and that flame surrounded by wire gauze is safe in an atmosphere of explosive gas. His general When we examine the records of his life and correspondence, and his various productions on sub- jects distinct from his own science, we cannot but acknowledge and admire his varied and high powers of eloquent discussion, his vivid imagination, and animated expression of feeling. And though his geology was of the catastrophic school, his metaphy- sics of a vague kind, and his political economy such as would now be rejected, yet these were the common opinions of his earlier days. His theolo- On higher subjects, if we take as the fundamental exponent of his views the avowal that his entire belief in a Deity was founded on an instinctive in- gical views. Essay 181 Essa I. § 1v.] . SIR FSIR . H. DAVY. DAVY(D ternal feeling', not farther to be analysed, this might perhaps be supposed to dispense with all philoso- phical reasoning or speculations on the subject; and we need think little of an insinuation of Pantheism made by one of his biographers ?, or of an early poem entitled “Spinozism," the tenour of which is wholly opposed to its title, and which contains merely devout reflections on the works of creation. His grand argument was that the unerring innate instinct of animals is nothing else than the imme- diate influence of the Deity. And it is on the analogy of this instinct extended to man that he professedly based all religious sentiment and belief in the Divine existence, as well as the idea of revela- tion from Him. But in pursuing this idea he puts forward some further speculations which perhaps some may consider as more open to question. Thus he observes :- “ What is the instinct of animals but an immediate Revelation “ revelation ? And they have more instinct in pro- miracles. “ portion as they have less reason. In the infancy of and . i Dr. Davy's “ Life of Sir H. Davy," vol. ii. p. 89. 2 Dr. Paris's “ Life of Sir H. Davy,” vol. i. p. 124. 3 Dr. Davy's “Life of Sir H. Davy," vol. ii. p. 73. N 3 182 HISTORICAL SKETCH. C “ human society, man being a more perfect animal, “ required more moral instinct or revelations to pre- serve his social existence. Now even the rudest “people are accessible to the more civilised; and “ special revelations are no longer necessary. “ It is quite certain that in these revelations no “ new ideas were given, and no new impressions re- “ ceived; even the supposed presence of Deity may “ have been an imagination of a human form, and “ the miracles delusions of the human mind, though “ clearly disposed to those delusions by the existence of the instinct; and this indeed is in accordance “ with the Divine wisdom and power, as it is much “ more easy for mind to produce an ideal conviction “ of satisfied appetite than to create a new quantity “s of matter, which must have been the case if the “ few small loaves and fishes had been sufficient to “ satisfy the multitude in the wilderness." I Again:-“ The flight of the quail and the migra- 6 tion of the landrail are, in fact, miraculous. ... “ The meteoric stones in our time are a miracle of “ nature.” ? Dr. Davy's “ Life of Sir H. Davy," vol. ii. p. 75. Essay I. $iv.] 183 SIR H. DAVY. Yet he says in another place, - “ The occasional miracles and gleams of prophecy “ seem intended to demonstrate Divine interference " or power.” 1 Without going into minute criticisms on these expressions we cannot fail to recognise in them the general result of the enlarged physical views of the philosopher, of a more comprehensive kind than were usually avowed at the time, though conceived in an entirely religious spirit. From what we can collect in other respects, Sir Humphry Davy's view of Christianity would appear to have been rather of that cast which identifies it with assumed moral relations of man to his Creator and the aspirations of the soul to a reunion with Him based on metaphysical views of an imma- terial principle, than on any precise interpretation of the New Testament. In the general character of the expressions just quoted, we may recognise the commanding view of natural order which a just philosophy supports, while the difficulty felt in regard to alleged cases of 1 Dr. Davy's “ Life of Sir H. Davy,” vol. ii. p. 79. N 4 184 [ESSAY I. Siv. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Rational- ism, ta interruption in the chain of physical causation led to the idea of accounting for them by particular suppositions of a nature more open to question. The development of this idea in its more proper theological relations had commenced at an earlier period, but attained (as before remarked) its fullest growth (some may say its perversion) in the early part of the present century among a school of theo- logians in Germany, giving birth to the several speculations emphatioally termed rationalism ; more especially referring to the external historical view of the origin of Christianity and the attempt to obviate the rejection of the miracles by explaining them as real events due to natural causes, according to the ideas of the age described as supernatural, or misun- derstood and exaggerated by traditional repetition. These researches, commencing with the limited and partial comments of Semler in the last century, and terminating with the more complete theory of Paulus in the present, claimed a relation to the philosophy of the age; and the farther prosecution of the same primary object in our own day, has been carried out by an entire rejection of those theories, to found a totally different one on critical grounds, by Essay I. S IV.] 185 RATIONALISM. Strauss', and to introduce a peculiar view of the Strauss. mythic nature of the entire. New Testament narra- tive (and which together with the former theory will be the subject of separate examination in a future essay), which is here alluded to as professedly con- nected by Strauss with scientific views and philoso- phical advance. Thus, speaking of his own competency for the work he had undertaken, he lays claim to at least one qualification, — “a disposition and spirit emancipated “ from certain religious and dogmatical prepossessions, “ which happily the author has acquired by philoso- “phical studies;” while he justly applauds the philo- sophic spirit which pursues truth “ with a scientific 'indifference to results and consequences.” 2* Again, speaking of the general tendency in certain stages of civilisation, especially in ancient times, to mix up history with recitals of the marvellous, he adds, “ There is no such thing as the purely histo- “rical sentiment, so long as men do not comprehend “ the indissolubility of the chain of finite causes, and “ the impossibility of miracles; a comprehension in 1 Life of Jesus, preface to 1st ed. p. 8, French transl. 2 Ibid. p. 10. 186 [Essay 1. $ IV, HISTORICAL SKETCH.. Other in- stances of the same influences. “ which so many are wanting even at the present “ day.” 1 If such have been the results of the direct in- fluence of philosophic studies in reference to this material subject, we may recognise their indirect reflection on a very differently constituted mind, exhi- bited in the declaration of one of the most distin- guished ornaments of the English Church in our own times, the late excellent Archdeacon Hare;- attesting that such convictions may be perfectly com- patible with the most sincere and devoted adherence to Christianity, when he emphatically puts the ques-. tion, “whether in the pure ore of the Gospel, the “ physically marvellous be not a separable alloy." 2 The whole of this most important question will form the express subject of subsequent discussion. But we may here just observe that many, while they fully recognise the principle of this last remark, may equally feel the difficulty of any practical solution of the question in detail: a difficulty which the same author perhaps, in some measure, avows when he affirms it to be “the great problem of the age to i Life of Jesus, i. p. 79, French transl. 2 Life of Sterling, p. 63. Essay I. Siv.] 187 POSITIVISM. “ reconcile faith with knowledge, philosophy with s religion." I Nor can we omit to notice another declaration from a writer of a very different stamp, which, on quite an opposite side, practically acknowledges nearly the same thing :- Mr. Hugh Miller observes, “ the battle of the evidences will have to be fought “on the field of physical science;" 2 in obvious ap- prehension for the issue, subversive as it must be of that Judaical theology which he adopted. It may be added, that there appears at the present day, among various eminently religious parties (per- haps without much connection with physical views), a decided recession from the old evidential argument of miracles, to rest their cause on moral and internal grounds of conviction: and even to discuss the na- ture of miracles in a way which, we cannot but sus- pect, may evince some indirect reflection of the light of advancing philosophy. Throughout the preceding sketch we have re- Positive philosophy. marked the legitimate tendency of all true science towards a more definite and positive character ; IU | Life of Sterling, p. 121. ? Footprints, p. 121. 188 [ESSAY I. S IV. Y HISTORICAL SKETCH. M. Comte's system. less mixed up with gratuitous theories, particularly with those resting on metaphysical grounds, and (more especially) less influenced by views of a higher kind, which, however important for their own exalted purposes, are misplaced in philosophy, and at once lose their proper character and influence and destroy that of science, when unwisely introduced into its discussions. The most recent and complete development of these principles and the systematic embodiment of them, carried out indeed into more precise details, and involving an elaborate exemplification of their application in what professes to be a complete scheme of human knowledge, constitutes the “ Posi- tive Philosophy" as expounded by M. Comte. To the subject of this system. it will be pecu- liarly necessary to devote a few remarks, as at once eminently characteristic of the science of the age and bearing pointedly on the object of the present essay. M. Comte regards all science as capable of classifi- cation, according to the degree of perfection at which each branch has arrived in connection with certain conditions of the human mind and cultiva- tion of the faculties employed in bringing it to per- Stages of advance. Essay I. & Iv.] 189 POSITIVISM. gradual process of improvement in the correct appre- hension of first principles, and an emancipation from peculiar prepossessions which always at first impede its advance, and in this respect he considers that every science must necessarily pass through three (1.) The “ Theological” stage is that in which the mind seeks “ absolute cognitions” and views of the intimate nature of things, and represents all phenomena as produced by a direct arbitrary action of superior beings. (2.) In the “Metaphysical” state this supernatural agency is replaced by scarcely less mysterious ab- stract principles, supposed inherent in matter, and an imagined real existence or operation by efficient causation, ascribed to what are purely intellectual abstractions. (3.) In the - Positive” state, both of these former modes of conception are strictly banished from philo- sophy, and no ideas admitted but those which simply result from inductive generalisation. 1 Philos. Positive, vol. i. p. 4, et sem. 190 [Essay I. & IV. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Omissions in Conte's system, In this state the mind renounces all idea of seeking absolute knowledge of the essence of things, and contents itself only with their invariable relations, and endeavours successively to reduce them to higher and fewer first principles. . In the extended scheme of the whole cycle of sciences which the author traces out in connection with this view, there seem, however, to be two grand omissions: - M. Comte excludes from his scheme the wave- theory of light, because he regards it as involving the hypothesis of the real existence of an universally diffused ether, and thus being, as yet, in the “meta- physical” condition. But in point of fact, to what- ever extent some philosophers may have speculated on the physical existence of such a medium, it is not true that it is essentially supposed in the undulatory theory of light. All that is asserted is the existence of vibration or alternating motion, as affording the means by which a vast range of the phenomena of light are reduced to mechanical explanation, and which is as strictly “positive" a principle as any which he admits. Another more singular omission is that of geo- logy from the list of “positive" sciences. This is . Essay I. Şiv.] 191 POSITIVISM. the more remarkable as few branches afford a more complete exemplification of the author's own prin- ciple, as indeed the remarks in a preceding part of this essay abundantly exemplify:- showing its purely theological origin; its progressive advance, though still enveloped in mystery; its present final emancipation from mysticism, and its reduction to purely natural causes and positive principles. The real bearing of the more positive form of Bearing on theology. modern science on the higher question of religious belief according to views developed in the foregoing remarks will be sufficiently evident. In this respect the author of the “positive philosophy" appears to have fallen into misconceptions which have seriously impaired the value of his otherwise profound and important remarks to a far greater degree than the defects already noticed. It will be necessary to offer a few illustrations in support of this remark. The author instances especially the science of astronomy as that which has arrived at the most perfect condition and is now in the most purely “positive” state, being completely freed from all theological and metaphysical ideas, and thus afford- ing the most prominent instance in support of his 192 [EssẠY I. $ 1v. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Final causes. assertion, that “all real science is in radical and “necessary opposition to all theology."1 Again he observes that no science has given “ more terrible blows (than astronomy) to the doc- “ trine of final causes — generally regarded by the “ moderns as the indispensable basis of all religious “ systems—though it is in reality only a consequence from them." ... “The single knowledge of the “ motion of the earth ought to destroy the first “ foundation of this doctrine — the idea of the uni- “ verse subordinated to the earth, and by consequence " to man." In these expressions we may trace simply a con- fusion of thought between an opposition of science to theology and an independence of it. Science necessarily and correctly rejects all appeal to theo- logy as its basis, or as influencing its conclusions : but it does not follow that those conclusions are therefore opposed to theology. That "final causes,” in the narrow sense in which alone the author regards them, are really a con- sequence from theological views, not the basis of I Philos. Positive, vol. ii. p. 36. 2 Ibid. p. 37. ESSAY I. § 1v.] : 193 POSITIVISM. . them, is perfectly just and true; but it does not follow that astronomy, or any other science, dis- parages or nullifies them; and it is only in a very false sense that they have been or can be associated with the subordination of the universe to the earth and to man ;-a point eminently necessary to be dwelt upon, as striking at the root of many spe- culations indulged in even at the present day, which violate and vitiate all true principles of philosophy for the sake of supporting a narrow and superstitious religious doctrine. Another of his arguments is, that the elements of the solar system are not in fact “ ordered in the “ most advantageous manner, and science easily per- “ mits us to conceive a better arrangement.”! But were this true, it offers not the smallest disparage- ment to the grand inference of mind from the actual order of the universe. Again, he observes: “By the development of the “ true mechanism of the heavens, since the time of “ Newton, all theological philosophy, even the most “ perfect, has been totally deprived of its principal LUU 1 Philos. Positive, vol. ij. p. 37. 194 [Essay I. & IV. HISTORICAL SKETCH. “ intellectual office, -- the most regular order being " thenceforth conceived as necessarily established and “ maintained in our world, and even throughout the 5 entire universe, by the simple mutual constitution of its different parts.”] If this remark (as may be presumed) simply means that the office of reason and philosophy in respect to theology was in past times mistaken, it is perfectly just. Reason and science give the evidences of reason in nature, evinced by those universal laws; but with. theo- logical doctrines they have no concern. Again, speaking of the stability of the system, he says: “ This grand notion, presented under " a suitable aspect, may without doubt easily be “ made the basis of a series of eloquent declama- “ tions having an imposing appearance of solidity. “ And nevertheless, a constitution equally essential “ to the continued existence of animal species is a “ simple necessary consequence, according to the “ mechanical laws of the world, of certain con- “ ditions characterising our solar system.” 2 The eloquent declamations alluded to are doubt- less often vitiated by the fallacious reasoning they Philos. Positive, vol. ii. p. 37. 2 Ibid. p 38. ESSAY I. 1v.] 195 POSITIVISM. opposition involve. But the simple fact that this security and conservation of the system is the direct result of mechanical laws, is itself the proof of the unity of principle, the exponent of recondite adjustment, pervading the mechanism of the planetary world. Thus the material defect of M. Comte's view, Positive principle and that which has justly exposed it to the most not in serious objection, is, that he does not merely place to theology theology apart from science, but rejects and dis- owns theology altogether. Now, with the strictest acknowledgment of the positive principle in phi- losophy, it does not at all follow that other orders of conceptions do not exist beyond the region of science, beyond the analysis and deductions of reason, or the dominion of the positive system, -in fact, such are the whole range of moral and ästhetic sentiments, — all matters of taste, of feeling, and of imagination ; — and such must be all those higher ideas of spiritual and invisible things which are the proper objects, not of knowledge, but of faith, and which, from their nature, can never enter into the range of philosophical investigation, and can consequently be in no hostility to the strictest posi- tivism in science. 02 196 [Essay I. $ IT. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Just in physics, but mis- applied in morals. This defect is sufficiently glaring; but it becomes immensely more so when we proceed to the more constructive part of M. Comte's system. The broad fundamental principle of positivism in philosophy appears to be no more than the just and legitimate development of the true inductive idea analysed rigidly up to its first principle, and excellent when applied within the proper province of science to the various branches of real physical inquiry. But just as M. Comte's system thus far is in principle (with the exceptions before noticed), his method lamentably fails when applied to the more mixed subjects which include any reference to hu- man nature, its relations and affections, moral and social; more especially to subjects involving ästhetic considerations, and, above all, those appealing to any higher contemplations. It is in this point of view that the more applied parts of the system display a strange inconsistency with all legitimate and en- larged philosophy, and have no real connection with the physical portions of his own speculations. His views here exhibit a contraction of ideas, and a degradation of science, in miserable retrogradation towards the old notion of making our subordinate POSITIVISM. 197 positivisni, little planet the virtual centre of the universe, and the grovelling utilitarianism which ignores all higher inquiries as useless, in a strain worthy of the nar- rowest bigotry of the dark ages. From this he proceeds to what, by a strange mis- Religion of nomer, he terms the “Religion of Positivism,” when he had before announced his very principle as essentially at variance with all religion. This, however, is a religion without a God! whose object is limited to the narrowest positive development of human nature; yet exhibiting a tissue of imprac- ticable chimæras befitting the wildest fanaticism; a “worship of humanity," with an organised intel- lectual hierarchy, a calendar of “positive” festivals and social sacraments, which is destined to supplant CV and to regenerate the world ! 1 The fundamental delusion or deception is to call such a system religion. Men cannot worship facts, or bow down to demonstrations. All religion, as such, ever has been and must be a thing entirely See the “ Catechism of Positive Religion," by A. Comte : translated by R. Congreve, London, 1858. CO 03 198 [Essay I. S IV. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Recent progress of natural theology. sui generis, and implies mystery and faith, how- ever rightly allied to knowledge, and susceptible of à variety of external forms, according to the diver- sity of human character and the stages of human enlightenment. The contempt with which M. Comte affects to treat the great argument of natural theology has manifestly arisen from the pitifully contracted point of view in which alone he had ever been led to contemplate it, and in which, it must be con- fessed, its advocates have been too much given to exhibit it. · The most enlarged view of the entire subject was that so elaborately unfolded by Kant1; who, while he critically analysed and exposed the defective pre- tensions of the transcendental metaphysical reasoning of a former age, dwelt emphatically on the true con- ception of the external physical evidence, based on the essential distinction between the strict conclu- sions of science and those higher forms of con- templation to which the moral and religious sense of mankind in all ages inclines them, and which Kant. CON- i See “Oxford Essays,” 1857, Essay V.; and Cousin's “ Lectures on Kant." ESSAY 199 RECENT NATURAL THEOLOGY. writers. constitute the real source of all practical views of the subject. . Among our own writers the discussion has cer- English tainly assumed an aspect of higher and more scientific pretension in recent times. Some have professed to improve upon Paley, in following up a more strictly analytic and à posteriori form of the argument; but their expositions, luminous and forcible as they may be, still usually appeal more to foregone conclusions than to philosophical conceptions. In the numerous recent works on this subject which have attained popularity, we cannot but ob- serve that facts and instances, examples and infer- ences in detail, have indeed been produced in rich and increasing profusion, as the stores of scientific knowledge of nature, have been continually aug- mented by ever expanding research. Yet compa- ratively little advance has been made in the higher analysis of those conventional modes of argument, to whose stereotyped forms most writers on the subject seem to consider themselves pledged to adhere. The illustrations of Lord Brougham, the cri- ticisms of Bishop Turton, and the stores of erudition and science poured forth by the writers for the 04 200 [Essay I. & IV. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Bridgewater and Burnett prizes, though they have abundantly illustrated and powerfully enforced the accepted convictions of universal and natural feel- ing, have, upon the whole, effected little in the higher philosophy of physico-theism, the logic of which is in fact the only point in dispute. Amid these illus- trations, however (to take one instance), we cannot but notice the favourite tendency with many of these writers to dwell on the effects of a resisting medium, or the motions of the solar system, as ultimately destructive to the earth and planets, by absorbing them all in the sun. But supposing this granted, it is difficult to see in what way it would conduce to the evidence of the Divine perfections. Among the treatises just alluded to, doubtless that of Dr. Whewell ? stands prominently higher, both in its general scientific tone, and more especially in vindicating for the principle of the reduction of facts, under laws, the high position it ought to occupy in the general argument. The same may be said with respect to the preeminence of the idea of order in nature, as asserted in the work of Dr. Tulloch.? ann 1 Bridgewater Treatise, 1833. 2 Second Burnett Prize, " Theism," &c. 1854. CU ESSAY I. & Iv.] 201 : ERSTED. But for a more truly philosophical survey of the Ersted. higher principles of reasoning on these points we must refer to the writings of Ersted, who, already highly distinguished in science, — by a single dis- covery (1820), effected after profound theoretical reflection, yet with truly surprising practical sim- plicity, — at once created a new science, conferred on mankind a new art, a new sense and means of com- munication between the remotest nations, — and who has also at the close of his life, in a valuable work', bequeathed to the world his application of the con- clusions of science, to the support of physico-theo- logy, -- a work to which such ample reference has been made in former essays as to render any more particular mention of it in this place needless, but which (with immaterial exceptions), in almost every point, sanctions and corroborates the views advanced in those essays. To render a survey of the recent progress of science Correlation in any degree complete, we must advert, however briefly, to that widely extended field of investigation now opened to our contemplation (mainly originat- of forres. The Soul iu Nature, &c.; translation, London, 1852. See - Unity of Worlds,” Essay I. 202 [Essay I. S IV. HISTORICAL SKETCH. ing out of the discoveries of Ersted) in the grand and comprehensive theories of the correlation of phy- sical forces, elucidated by Grove, and extended as they have been by the transcendental investigations of Joule, Rankine, and W. Thomson, to universal prin- ciples of the equivalence of dynamic action, under whatever variety of form or physical agency the same primary and unalterable amount of mechanical energy may be disguised. Speculations which, be- sides their high theoretical and scientific value, seem to bear with a peculiarly direct significance on the pro- found principles of universal order and unity of system in nature which our present argument contemplates. In all these branches of discovery, and the effects achieved by individual energy, we cannot overlook the immense aid to all scientific labour, which, espe- cially in later times, has been obtained from the association and union of such energies, thus giving them increased power and systematic direction in the institution of public scientific bodies, academies, and Effects of scientific institu-, tions. societies. • In the middle ages, amid surrounding barbarism and ignorance, the foundation of universities was a step of immense importance ; and to those noble Essay I. & iv.] 203 MORAL ORDER. laws of the institutions has been due no small share of the cul- tivation by which after ages have so largely pro- fited. But in all institutions there may usefully exist a distinction of functions. Some are for creat- ing knowledge; some for accumulating, systematising, and teaching; some for diffusing and familiarising; some for applying and practically making use of it. Among the results of the progress and extension Inductive of physical inquiry, few perhaps are likely to be of moral world. greater and more salutary importance than the ap- plication of inductive investigation to that vast range of subjects - not absolutely coming under the designa- tion of physical science, at least not as yet reduced to physical causes, which refer to the condition of society, the state of public health, the value of human life, the tendencies of human conduct, of social institutions, and the like points of inquiry, to all which the principle of inductire generalisation is now being applied; and however vast the field, yet the prosecution of such a research, in proportion as it acquires more precise development and demonstra- tion, it may be fairly expected, will ultimately tend to establish the order of the moral world on a basis as fixed and universal as that of the physical. 204 [Essay I. S IV. HISTORICAL. SKETCH. In several departments of inquiry, such laws are now being gradually traced and established, by which we find human actions and human affairs generally are regulated, upon an average, to a degree of certainty and exactness which seems mar- vellous when compared with their seeming capri- ciousness in individual cases, and which we can hardly doubt is closely connected with some recon- dite laws of a physical kind, though their relation is as yet little understood, or even conjectured. We must, of course, allow for a considerable amount of fluctuation in particular cases, if we are to admit the operation of the free moral volition of individuals. But it is precisely from the conflicting and anta- gonistic action of such a multitude of opposing and | For some excellent remarks on the nature and importance of this rising branch of inquiry, the reader is referred to the admirable address of Lord Stanley, M.P., on opening the Statistical Section of the British Association, 1856. See Report, Sectional Proceedings, p. 122. It can hardly be necessary to add that the whole subject has received by far the most complete elucidation yet given in the masterly work of Mr. H. T. Buckle, “ The History of Civilisation in England,” vol. i., Intro- duction, 1857; the argument of which essentially involves the prin- ciple and application of this deduction of the invariable causes affecting human conduct and progress and the condition of society and of na- tions, based on accurate statistical data, and tending to philosophical generalisation of the highest interest. Essay I. $ 1v.] 205 MORAL ORDER. independent varieties of individual will and action that the ultimate balance and uniform mean results are obtained and preserved. Founded on the universal recognition of laws, Supported by high long ago hinted at by Bishop Butler, even in events authorities. where they least appear, this branch of inquiry may be said to have been almost created as a science within our own times. In a higher point of view, it has also been re- cognised and advocated, with his accustomed ability and force, by Professor Sedgwick, who observes : - “ We are justified in saying that, in the moral as “ well as the physical world, God seems to govern 66 by general laws. . ... I am not now contending “ for the doctrine of moral necessity; but I do affirm “ that the moral government of God is by general “ laws, and that it is our bounden duty to study “ those laws, and, as far as we can, to turn them to “ account. Another eminent writer, the late Mr. Combe, has Mr.Combe's evinced not less zeal and ability in advocating the same cause, even to a more detailed practical extent. views. See above, p. 134. 2 Studies of Cambridge, 5th ed. 206 [Essay I. § 1v. HISTORICAL SKETCH. He has enlarged on the great principle of acknow- ledging law and order in the course of all events !, in contradistinction to continual interposition, and has earnestly contended that the people should be every- where instructed to recognise “ the sacredness of nature," 2 and that it should be made an essential point in education to interpret the natural arrange- ment and order of the world as the true manifes- tation of its providential government --- an object which as yet has been too much neglected and undervalued. 3 Of these arrangements, he points out that man himself constitutes an important integrant part; and ? Relation of Religion and Science, 4th ed. 1857, p. 11. 2 Ib. p. 159. 3 “ In religious teaching," Mr. Combe observes, “the grand prin- s ciples represented are all supernatural, and the revelations of the “ Divine will in nature, as a basis of morals and religion, are excluded “ from schools, colleges, churches, and social consideration. .. “ The Divine laws of religion, morality, and practical conduct revealed « in nature, are nearly banished from the pulpit, and few attempts 6 made to harmonise them with Christianity.” (Ib. p. 220.) In these complaints, there is, in general, too much truth. Yet we have witnessed some brilliant exceptions, as in the Sermons of the Rev. Charles Kingsley, especially those on Pestilence, as well as a recent dis- course of Dr. Lee, published by Royal command, entitled “What Christianity teaches respecting the Body," 1857. Essay I. $ 1v.] 207 MORAL ORDER. that his influence, as affecting the course of events and the actions of his fellow-creatures, is mainly due to superiority of intellect in some individuals over the rest; and this is traceable (according to the author's views) to the conformation of its physical organ, the brain, “which,” he observes, “is the in- “ strument through which God conducts the moral “ government of the world.” 1 Nevertheless, as might be expected, the progress Bearing on religion, of this branch of inquiry has been viewed with suspicion, and has excited hostility from its real or supposed bearing on religion. As, in former ages, comets and eclipses were viewed as supernatural pro- digies, and the appearances of the heavens as por- tending or influencing human affairs, so that to question this belief was held equivalent to atheism, in like manner, down to a much later period, in the same spirit, have storms, inundations, pestilences, droughts, and famines been believed to be similar direct interpositions; and as these have been, by degrees, reduced to natural laws, the charge of im- piety has been raised, just as it was in the former 1 L1 1 Relation of Religion and Science, p. 118. 208 HISTORICAL SKETCH. and case. And thus, when the results of human actions and moral agency, on the wide scale, are beginning to be found traceable to some determinate laws, it is not surprising that the accusation of an irreligious and immoral tendency in such inquiries is set up, and the array of facts and figures denounced as an impious denial of Providence, instead of being, as it is, the very proof of it, from the indication it so extensively affords of the profoundly adjusted order with which the Divine moral and social government of the world is carried on. Archæology If, to remarks of this kind, we add those of a Ethnolɔgy. kindred description relative to the history and origin of nations, races, languages, of arts and civilisation, so widely cultivated of late, derived from the same purely inductive kind of inquiry, unfettered by tra- ditional prejudices, or a reference to objects or asso- ciations alien from those of pure science, — however excellent in themselves, — we shall acknowledge, in the results and in the spirit of inquiry generated by the pursuits of archæology, social history, philology, and ethnology, some of the grandest advances in the influence of philosophical views and the emancipa- tion of thinking minds from long inherited errors Essay I. $ Iv.] 209 ARCHÆOLOGY. and confined notions, -- too often incongruously mixed i which that belief cannot fail to be purified and strengthened. As ethnological researches have advanced, those Origin of who have most extensively cultivated them have mankind. the high antiquity of man; and we cannot here omit, as the most remarkable recent instance of this kind of archæological research, the important investigation of Mr. Horner, by borings through the sedimentary deposits of the Nile, in which, at a depth corresponding (on the average rate of depo- sition) to a period of 13,000 years ago, were found fragments of pottery, proving the existence of man comparatively civilised. Others have speculated on the probability of distinct original species of the human See Proceedings of Royal Society, No. 29, p. 128. ? On this point, the following remark is eminently deserving of con- sideration : - “ Isolated traditions, met with in many different places “ on the earth's surface, .... derive the whole human race from a “ single human pair. The wide diffusion of this belief has sometimes “ led to its being assumed as a primitive recollection among mankind. But this very circumstance rather informs us that nothing traditional “and nothing historical lies at the root of the persuasion, but merely c the similarity of the human faculty of conception, which leads to the P 210 [ESSAY I. S IV. HISTORICAL SKETCH. race; some of which, at remote periods, many con- ceive to have been of a type lower in the scale, and perhaps forming a connecting link with the inferior animals. But whatever may be thought of these specula- tions abstractedly, when we hear them denounced by some parties as immensely dangerous, we have only to reflect how utterly unconnected any such physical points must be with the doctrines of Chris- tianity, so peculiarly directed to the spiritual condi- tion of man, and the things of another world. 6 same explanation of the same phenomenon. Many similar myths “ have very certainly arisen, without historical connection, out of the " similarity of man's poetical and speculative constitution."—W. Hum- boldt, “ On the Diversity of Languages and Nations, &c.:" quoted by A. Humboldt, Cosmos, p. 387, 1st translation, 1845. Essay I.] 211 CONCLUSION. CONCLUSION. influence IN thus, however briefly and imperfectly, tracing General the main features which have marked the progress of the inductive of physical knowledge during a succession of ages spirit. up to our own times, it cannot fail to have been remarked, that, if we look to what must confessedly be regarded as the highest and most valuable result of such advance, we find it evinced, not so much in the mere discovery of particular truths, however im- portant, as in its more indirect effects on the general tone of mind and habits of thought, and in those. more enlarged and enlightened views which the free- dom of inductive generalisation, combined with the caution of inductive precision, tends to produce, to foster, and to extend. The most marked feature of what we may call the Progress from con- moral influence of physical advance is, perhaps, the formity to nature,. confidence of the human mind in its own resources; subject only to the condition that those energies are P 2 212 (Essay I. HISTORICAL SKETCH. always employed and applied in subordination to the great principles and analogies of nature, and based on the ever-increasing conviction of the universality and immutability of natural order. Commensurate with the conformity and subjection of all human reasoning and human skill to these great principles, must be its increasing power and its progressive triumphs in the special applications of science as such; and equally so will be the advance towards those more elevated views and sublime con- templations, which are more worthily followed out precisely as they are in closer conformity to the same great natural analogies. Of the slow progress made in this respect, in the earlier stages even of the modern philosophy, we have seen remarkable evidence, both in the general tone of speculation in those times, contrasted with that displayed by a few bolder spirits; and even in the inequality of some great minds with themselves – elevated as they were on some subjects, yet evincing on others an entire subjugation to received Emancipa- prepossessions. Yet, if the spirit of the inductive tion from prejudice. school boast above everything a freedom from the dictation even of learned authority, it ought, in a Essay I.] 213 CONCLUSION. V pre-eminent degree, to exempt its followers from paying homage to vulgar prejudice and illiterate bigotry. Some even of the most exact discoverers in nature Higher generali have not afforded the best examples of the influence sation. of that higher philosophy, to which their invaluable physical advances were the essential preliminaries and substantial basis. But those who have taken more comprehensive views, in conformity to real in- ductive principles and natural analogies, and have thus emancipated themselves from time-sanctioned errors, will be recognised in their claim to the title of philosophic instructors of human intellect, and lights of human belief; especially in reference to those higher contemplations to which positive science may point, but cannot conduct us. We have before adverted to the indirect and re- mote influence of science on the opinions and ideas of the age. This is a point the importance of which was long ago recognised by Bishop Berkeley, who remarks 1 : – "Prevailing studies are of no “ small consequence to a state, the religion, man- I Siris, p. 158, $ 331. P 3 214 [Essay I. HISTORICAL SKETCH. Modern scepticism sources. “ners, and civil government of a country ever tak- “ing some bias from its philosophy, which affects “ not only the minds of its professors and students, “ but also the opinions of all the better sort, and the 6s practice of the whole people, remotely and conse- “ quentially indeed, though not inconsiderably.” We can form some idea of the actual state of from moral religious belief among the educated and cultivated and meta- physical classes at any period from the published opinions and tone of the literature of that period, though it may be by no means easy, or even possible, to trace exactly how far that state of opinion may be directly connected with the progress of science or the pur- suits of philosophy. Yet so far as we can reason- ably speculate on such a point, it can hardly be doubted that, at the present moment, though there exists among us a very considerable amount of scep- ticism, and even positive and avowed disbelief in Christianity as a Divine revelation, or in its peculiar doctrines in detail, that disbelief may be in all cases traced up to the influence, not of physical, but of metaphysical and moral speculation. And if we venture to look at all to individual examples, it may be confidently affirmed that scarcely Essay I.] 215 CONCLUSION. one single instance, among ourselves at the present day, can be adduced of a physical philosopher who has published or avowed opinions hostile to the Christian doctrines, while several have written in defence and support of them. If such men feel the necessity for enlarged views of universal order, and discard the idea of physical interruptions, this has in no instance led to any rejection of the moral and spiritual teaching of the Gospel. Among the great mass of those devoted to mathematical, astrono- mical and experimental research,—to chemical, phy- siological, and geological studies, we might, perhaps, rather say, there exists an indisposition to enter at all on inquiries or speculations connected with higher topics; yet this is invariably coupled with the ex- pression and the feeling of deep respect for subjects which they may think it beside their province to discuss. There is a species of influence over the progress of Intellectual mind and civilisation, consequent on the extension of influence of physical scientific discovery, too manifest to require com- improve- ment, which yet ought not to be omitted in the enumeration of such influences — the vast impulse and moral ment. P4 216 [ESSAY I. HISTORICAL SKETCH. and extension given to intellectual advance by means of physical improvement and inventions in the arts of life. It may seem trite and obvious, but it is not less material, to record among the means of en- lightenment, even on the most sublime topics, such now familiar instruments and aids as the printing- press, the steam power, the electric telegraph, the methods of mitigating suffering and prolonging life, and the annihilation of time and distance. The improvers of the conditions of existence, the dif- fusers and perpetuators of knowledge, must ever rank with the creators of the knowledge and en- lightenment so applied and extended. The contemplation of such marvellous indications of the power of mind over matter, cannot but raise salutary reflections on the higher nature and affinities of mind; and the community of thought, thus ex- tended between different regions and races, cannot but result in inducing greater liberality of sentiment. The empire of intellect is seen to have its proper limits in the world of matter; while the separate dominion of faith is supported in a region beyond the discussions of reason; and which ought, therefore, to be sanctified by peace and charity. ESSAY I. ] 217 CONCLUSION phi ends faith In its higher relations, the advance of the induc- where tive philosophical spirit at once assures the grand evidence of universal intelligence, and tends to dispel begins. all superstitious fancies by which the truth is ob- scured and degraded ; while again it precisely points out the limit necessarily imposed on all philosophical inferences as to religious doctrine, and demands the surrender of all such sublime conceptions to the more fitting and paramount jurisdiction of faith. Thus, advancing philosophy unhesitatingly dis- owns contradiction to physical truth in matters pro- perly amenable to science, however they may have been associated with religious belief; but, beyond the province of scientific knowledge, reason acknow- ledges a blank and a void, which can only be filled up by conceptions of a totally different order, originating from higher sources, in no way opposed to reason, as they present no ideas cognisable by it, but solely objects of spiritual apprehension, derived from Divine revelation. 218 [Essay I. NOTE. RECENT BIBLE-PHILOSOPHY. NOTE. RECENT BIBLE-PHILOSOPHY. 1. AFTER the repeated references already made to the subject of that radical misconception at once of science and of theology, which leads to the idea of connecting the language of the Bible with the discoveries of science, or to the attempt to reconcile them when they are in con- tradiction, it might seem superfluous to add any remarks on the subject. But there are incessantly appearing speculations of this kind, the productions of a class of minds incapable of philosophical reasoning, yet ever discussing scientific subjects ; on whom the force of repeated refutation is lost, and who are continually coming forward with re- vivals of thrice-rejected and exploded fallacies, — some of which thus nevertheless demand a brief notice. 2. After the examination into which I have entered, of the whole argument of Mr. H. Miller's works, both in a former) and in the last instance, I can only add an expression of surprise that so leading and liberal a journal as the “Edinburgh Review” should have so far lost sight of all sound philosophy, and shown itself so far behind the advance of enlightenment, as to introduce, in 1 Unity of Worlds, Essay III. $ 3. 2 Christianity without Judaism, Appendix No. xviii. Essaº I. NOTE.] 219 RECENT BIBLE-PHILOSOPHY. a recent articlel on the works of the author just named, a new attempt to revive the credit of Bible-Geology. The whole argument proceeds on the assumption, — as if un- controverted, -of the authority of the Judaical Scrip- tures in the matter. It is nevertheless carried on with a prudent ambiguity of expression, in which the writer avoids committing himself on philosophical points; while at length he is constrained to reduce the whole alleged accordance of Scripture with geology to the mere general resemblance of the two in the assertion of a progression in the introduction of the forms of organic life: an asser- tion which, it is well known, is nevertheless denied by some geologists altogether; and which is manifestly untrue in the only sense in which it could here apply, viz. in the separate pre-existence of the vegetable world to the animal, and even in the commencement of animal life with the simplest forms. This is, however, an im- portant confession. If this be all that even the “ Edin- burgh Review” can adduce, the cause may be well pro- nounced hopeless; and we may trust that attempts to uphold it will not be repeated. 3. Such ideas however are fully in keeping with those of another writer in the same journal, who, while he assigns me very undeserved honours in science, seems incapable of perceiving the nature of my arguments, or appreciating the grander bearings of physical phi- losophy, and to whose apprehension the simple principles of inductive generalisation and of natural theology, as I have endeavoured to expound them, appear startling “paradoxes”! Edinb. Rev. July, 1858. 220 [ESSAY I. NOTE. RECENT BIBLE-PHILOSOPHY. 4. The critique first referred to too manifestly betrays a disposition to bow to the ignorance and bigotry of the Puritanical school, one of whose more ardent sup- porters in the “ British and Foreign Quarterly," 1 is only worthy of notice, in that he nowhere pretends to deny, but distinctly admits, the existence of the direct contradiction, though he throws the blame of it on the geologists! But these, as well as other instances, afford marked symptoms of the extent to which that school feel, and are beginning to confess the formidable nature of the inroad made on their Judaical tenets by the advance of sound geology. 5. In this kind of discussion, a certain class of minds have been prone to entangle themselves in a metaphysical puzzle, arising out of the idea of time: and to allege that, because geological periods were not measured by the standard of human consciousness, they may therefore have been really compressed into almost momentary duration, — as if that would in any degree affect the succession of geological events, or reconcile them to the Hebrew cosmogony. 6. But the most extraordinary instance of the total misconception, not only of all geological evidence, but of the first principles of all philosophical investiga- tion, has been exhibited in a recent publication 2 by an author who has hitherto enjoyed a reputation as a naturalist, - in which he makes a serious attempt to revive what is the same practically (though he repudiates it abstractedly) with the old dream of organic fossils 11UU I No. liv, p. 421. 2 Omphalos, &c. By P. H. Gosse, F.R.S., 1857. ESSAY I. Note.] RECENT BIBLE-PHILOSOPHY, 221 being altogether delusive sports of nature; he regards them, in fact, as mere resemblances of real forms, produced in the miraculous process of the simultaneous and sudden creation of the whole world and all things in it in the Mosaic six days. This speculation affords a singular specimen of the extent to which one absurdity may be speciously justi- fied by stringing on to it another still more preposterous. The argument stands, in fact, thus:- The first of existing plants, animals, and men were all created suddenly out of nothing: therefore full-grown; therefore bearing all the marks of previous growth and development, as e. g. trees with concentric rings, Adam and Evel with the um- bilicus (oupadós, hence the title of the book). In like manner, therefore, the crust of the earth exhibits like fallacious marks of successive deposits: therefore those deposits show fallacious organic remains; therefore those remains display individually the fallacious appearances of successive growth! &c. &c. There is in all this a kind of perverted ingenuity, which reminds us more than anything of the occasion- ally acute theories of mental aberration : while the author's "pro-chronic” periods seem possibly allied to the recondite metaphysical idea before adverted to. If we could reason at all on such a visionary basis, it would seem rather a more natural conclusion that miracu- lously created forms should be free from all such marks of progressive growth, to evince their supernatural origin. This was the recondite idea long ago so elaborately discussed by Sir T. Browne, "Vulgar Errors," book v. ch, 5. 1646. 222 [ESSAY I. NOTE. RECENT BIBLE-PHILOSOPHY. But the radical fallacy lies in the assumed idea of sudden formation out of nothing, which is altogether alien from science, and inadmissible into its nomenclature: unless (as custom has in some manner sanctioned it) the term “creation” be regarded as merely designed to cover our ignorance of the actual mode of origin. The whole speculation merely affords a good exem- plification of the preposterous consequences to which any attempt to reason on the theological and metaphysical idea of “creation” inevitably must lead us; and thus only suggests the stronger caution against all such mis- use of the term and of the idea, as must arise from the introduction of it into science. But it is needless to add more, as this theory has received so able and merited a demolition in the anni- versary address to the Geological Society, by its late President, Major-Gen. Portlock, R.E., F.R.S. &c., 1858. 7. But there have been some recent discussions appa- rently belonging to the same class, which exhibit charac- teristics of so peculiar a kind, as to induce rather a different estimate of their real tendency from that which their professions might lead us to entertain. So com- plete, in fact, is the concession these writers really make of all the substantial points, so manifest the evasions and subterfuges they exhibit, that we can only regard them as disguised allies, merely offering a nominal homage to the prejudices of a religious party; a pro- fession in name, covering a denial in substance, as transparent as that of the Jesuit commentators on See Unity of Worlds, 2nd ed. p. 453. Essay I. Note.] 223 RECENT BIBLE-PHILOSOPHY. Newton, in their professions of unlimited deference to the ecclesiastical dogmas: — “ Cæterum latis a summis 6 pontificibus contra telluris motum decretis nos ob- “ sequi profitemur;” — while they directly contravened them in promulgating, illustrating, and demonstrating the prohibited doctrines. So at the present day, the writers alluded to make great boast of evincing the entire “reconciliation of Science and Scripture," the “ Harmony of the two Records,” and the like, in their title- pages; while their whole argument directly nullifies such professions, or pretends to fulfil them in so singularly accommodating a sense, as amounts to a virtual abandon- ment of the pretension. These remarks are suggested by several recent works, more especially by a late much commended publication of the Ven. Archdeacon Pratt), a writer so highly emi- nent in mathematical and mechanical science, as to claim for any views he may advance the most respectful con- sideration, while his name gives currency to his opinions with a considerable religious party. The whole view of the subject presented in the work referred to is this :- As the Scripture in former times seemed opposed to the motion of the earth and the ex- istence of antipodes,—so now it seems opposed to the incalculable antiquity of the earth, — to the existence of light and living creatures “ before the six days," - to death before the fall,---to “ specific centres of creation,” -and the like; and seems to assert an universal deluge, Scripture and Science not at Variance. By J, H. Pratt, Archdeacon of Calcutta, 2nd ed. Lond. 1858. 224 [Essay I. NOTE. RECENT BIBLE-PHILOSOPHY. and other points of a physical kind. But all this, in reality, only from “ false interpretations,” from which it is now “ delivered.” So again it seems to teach a com- mon origin of the human race, — a common primeval language, — and other similar tenets. But these, we. are told, are only " false conclusions deduced by its votaries ;”—false interpretations, which yet are identical with the very words ; — fallacious conclusions, which, notwithstanding, are directly asserted in the very terms : and, nevertheless, the “historical authority” of the passages, and their “surpassing importance,” are to be strictly maintained! ESSAY II. - NATURE AND REVELATION. NATURE AND REVELATION. § I. THE ORDER OF NATURE AS BEARING ON THEOLOGY IN GENERAL. $ II.--THE NATURAL AND THE SUPERNATURAL. I.REVELATION AND MIRACLES. ESSAY II. NATURE AND REVELATION. $ 1.—THE ORDER OF NATURE AS BEARING ON THEOLOGY IN GENERAL. HAVING, in the last essay, briefly surveyed the main features which have characterised the progress of physical science in successive ages, in regard to its influence more or less immediate on religious belief, and having glanced at the main arguments and inferences of a theological kind, which have been directly, or indirectly connected with its gradual disclosures in past times, we now proceed to consider more in detail the nature of those reasonings, and the legitimate conclusions founded on physical knowledge, in its existing stage of advance, which have reference to these more sublime contempla- tions. • Q2 228 NATURE AND REVELATION. (Essay II. $ 1. Recapitula- tion of pre- ceding argument. With this view, it will be necessary briefly to recapitulate the argument before pursued. In the earlier part of the former essays, after having dis- cussed the nature and principle of inductive reason- ing', and the theory of cause and effect 2, involving the rejection of the idea of efficient power, as among the last lingering remains of the old mysticism, - after having dwelt on the ultimate unity of principle which must really pervade all nature, as it pervades all science, the interpreter of nature3, I proceeded to illustrate and enforce4 the grander argument of universal and perpetual harmony and adjustment of physical causes, which leads to the recognition of a moral cause. The very essence of the whole argument is the invariable preservation of the principle of order: not necessarily such as we can directly recognise, but the universal conviction of the unfailing sub- ordination of everything to some grand principles : of law, however imperfectly apprehended or realised in our partial conceptions, and the successive sub- ordination of such laws to others of still higher Invariable laws, Unity of Worlds, Essay I. $ 1. 3 Ibid. $$ 11. III. 2 Ibid. § iv. 4 Ibid. § va Essay II. $ 1.] 229 COSMOS. exceptions, generality, to an extent transcending our concep- tions, and constituting the true chain of universal causation, which culminates in the sublime con- ception of the COSMOS. It is in immediate connection with this enlarged No real view of universal immutable natural order, that I have regarded the narrow notions of those who obscure the sublime prospect, by imagining so un- worthy an idea as that of occasional interruptions? in the physical economy of the world. The only instance considered was that of the alleged sudden supernatural origination of new species of organised beings in remote geological epochs. It is in relation to the broad principle of law, if once rightly apprehended, that such infer- ences are seen to be wholly unwarranted by science, and such fancies utterly derogatory and inadmissible in philosophy; while, even in those instances pro- perly understood, the real scientific conclusions of the invariable and indissoluble chain of causation stand vindicated in the sublime contemplations with which they are thus associated. ? Unity of Worlds, Essay I. S v. and Essay III. Q3 230 [Essay II. $ I. NATURE AND REVELATION. order. LI Essential To a correct apprehension of the whole argument, principle of universal the one essential requisite is to have obtained a complete and satisfactory grasp of this one grand principle of law pervading nature, or rather con- stituting the very idea of nature ;—which forms the vital essence of the whole of inductive science, and the sole assurance of those higher inferences, from the inductive study of natural causes, which are the indications of a supreme intelligence and a moral cause. The whole of the ensuing discussion must stand or fall with the admission of this grand principle. Those who are not prepared to embrace it in its full extent, may probably not accept the conclusions : but they must be sent back to the school of induc- stive science, where alone it must be independently imbibed and thoroughly assimilated with the mind of the student in the first instance. Limits to On the slightest consideration of the nature, the the study of nature. foundations, and general results of inductive science, we see abundant exemplification at once of the legitimate objects which fall within the province of physical philosophy, and the limits which, from the nature of the case, must be imposed on its investi- gations. We recognise the powers of intellect fitly Essay II. $ 1.] 231 LIMITS OF SCIENCE. employed in the study of nature, but indicating no conclusions beyond nature; yet pre-eminently leading us to perceive in nature, and in the invariable and universal constancy of its laws, the indications of universal, unchangeable, and recondite arrangement, dependence, and connection in reason. It is the province of science to investigate nature, —it can contemplate nothing but in connection with the order of nature,- it cannot point to any- thing out of nature. But if in any case the resources of explanation on inductive and natural grounds seem exhausted, — if philosophy, after examining any outstanding case, acknowledge it beyond its existing powers, it is not therefore beyond all investigation. If at any par- ticular point science find a present limit, what is beyond science is not therefore beyond nature; - it is only unknown nature; when we cease to trace law, we are sure that law remains to be traced. When science imposes a limit, it can do so only The natural and the provisionally. The case may be beyond present super- views, but not beyond future discovery. The limits of the study of nature do not bring us to the con- fines of the supernatural. natural. Q4 232 [Essay II. § I. NATURE AND REVELATION. No limits to nature, onlimits it Whatever amount of the wonderful and marvellous we may encounter in the research into nature, or the investigation of facts, those cases of wonder (assumed to be pefectly established as to the facts or appear- ances,) can only to the eye of reason be left as ex- traordinary phenomena awaiting their explanation: which, — if they be only properly examined, - they will be sure at some future period to receive. It was (as before remarked) the argument of Spinoza that we cannot pretend to determine the boundary between the natural and the supernatural, until the whole of nature shall be open to our knowledge. But in the then state of physical philo- sophy it was not perceived that no extension of natural knowledge could possibly enable us to dis- cover the supernatural, the very conception of which belongs to a totally different order of things; — or that, as we now acknowledge, the inductive principle can point to no such boundary, and recognise no such distinction, in any objects of its investigation. From the very conditions of the case, it is evident that the supernatural can never be a matter of science or knowledge; for the moment it is brought within the cognisance of reason it ceases to be supernatural. Essay II. $ 1.] 233 SUPREME MIND. LUGU reason in . If nature could really terminate anywhere, there we should not find the supernatural, but a chaos, a blank, — total darkness, — anarchy, — atheism. But though the utmost extension of inductive Supreme science can only lead us further into the realm of nature. natural order, so far from being at variance with, or beyond, the idea of natural order, nothing can be more pre-eminently in accordance with it than the grand inference from those highest generalisations in the study of physical causes which lead to what is essentially manifested in their invariable uniformity and recondite dependence, the existence of universal reason and supreme intelligence. It thus belongs properly to the function of reason to acknowledge universal reason, - of intellect to recognise infinite intelligence, as pre-eminently har- monising with its own operations, by which the indi- cations of universal mind are discovered, or rather as that of which itself is but an humble part and reflection. From what has been before observed, it is readily Causation. seen how little satisfactory the simple and positive view of causation must be to the imaginative and mysticising tendency of the human mind, which is ever seeking some conception of efficient 234 [Essay II. $ 1. NATURE AND REVELATION. First and second causes. power , instead of a necessary connection in reason and generalisation only. It is to this tendency that we may trace the linger- ing disposition to dwell on the old antithesis of “ First Cause” and “ Second Causes;” and hence to keep up the vulgar prejudice against the study of the latter as injurious to the belief in the former. Feuerbach's This idea forms a prominent topic in the remark- able speculations of Feuerbach ?, who traces it to a supposed fundamental opposition between internal religious sentiment and the contemplation of external nature: so that, as he says, “religion is abolished “ when second causes are interposed between God “and man,” nor can it be denied that from the con- fused way in which these subjects have been con- stantly treated by popular writers, he is able to find Feuerbach's view. Sir W. Hamilton, after enumerating not less than seven different theories of causation, at length proposes his own;—which a professed admirer admits is not at all more satisfactory! (Discussions, &c., p. 611. See•Mansel's “ Bampton Lectures : Oxford, 1858," 382, &c., and Prolegomena, 135, 309.) Another not less eminent metaphysician proposes the following: “We are unable to conceive an absolute commencement of phenomena; * hence we suppose the same phenomenon previously existing under “another form," &c. . . . which constitutes the succession of cause and effect! (Cousin, “ Hist. de la Philos. du Dis-huitième Siècle,” leçon 19.) 2 Essence of Christianity, transl. p. 180. Essay II. $ 1.] FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES. 235 numerous examples apparently corroborative of his view. The whole tenor of my previous argument', is, however, directed to show that the fundamental idea is grounded on an entire misconception, and that the apparent opposition disappears before the simplicity of advancing physical truth, and the consideration that the terms “First” and “Second Causes” must refer to classes of ideas wholly distinct from each other. That the study of physical causes is the sole real clue to the conception of a moral cause; and that physical order, so far from being opposed to the idea of supreme intelligence, is the very exponent of it. We thus see the importance of taking a more Narrow views of enlarged view of the great argument of natural the argu- theology; - and the necessity for so doing becomes design. the more apparent, when we reflect on the injury to which these sublime inferences are exposed, from the narrow and unworthy form in which the reasoning has been too often conducted. Thus, to take a prominent instance, it is from the restricted form in which the argument from design has been commonly put, and the untenable inferences ment from See “ Unity of Worlds," Essay I. $ v. 236 NATURE AND REVELATION. . to which it has been stretched, that the objections raised by Hume and others acquire any force. Humes. The reasonings referred to are those contained in objections. his well-known “Dialogues on Natural Religion," where we may take, as characteristic instances, the following expressions:- . “If we see a house we conclude with the greatest “ certainty that it had an architect. . . . But surely “you will not affirm that the universe bears such a “ resemblance to a house, that we can with the same “ certainty infer a similar cause. ...." Again :—“But can you think, Cleanthes, that your “ usual philosophy has been preserved in so wide a “ step as you have taken, when you compared to the “ universe, houses, ships, furniture, machines ; « and from their similarity in some circumstances, “inferred a similarity in their causes ? Thought, “ design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and s other animals, is no more than one of the springs “ and principles of the universe, as well as heat “ and cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred “ others which fall under daily observation. It is an “active cause by which some particular parts of “ nature, we find, produce alterations on other parts. Essay II. $ 1.] 237 DESIGN. parallel. :“But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be trans- ferred from parts to the whole ?" In these and the like remarks, Hume doubtless betrays his not unusual neglect of precision, and lays his argument easily open to criticism : and it is triumphantly replied 2 that the real argument is not for “ similarity," but for “analogy." But call it by what name we will, the essential Cases not point is, that we cannot reason from the case of a work of human design, which is a definite contrivance, to answer a specific known purpose, the work of a finite agent, limited by the circumstances and con- ditions of the case,—to the structure of the infinite universe, in which we can infer no final design or purpose whatever: which is perpetual in its adjust- ments, offering no evidence of beginning nor end, - only of continual orderly changes; however the limited evidence in some of its parts, of adjustment of means to ends, may warrant the conjecture of other higher unknown purposes. The argument, as popularly pursued, proceeds on Narrow the analogy of a personal agent, whose contrivances are personal agent. view of | Dialogues on Nat. Religion, pt. ii. ; Works, vol. ii. pp. 446, 448. ? Mansel's “ Bampt, Lect.” p. 354. 238 [Essay II. $ 1. NATURE AND REVELATION. Necessity for wider views. limited by the conditions of the case and the nature of his materials, and pursued by steps corresponding to those of human plans and operations :—an argu- ment leading only to the most unworthy and anthropo- morphic conceptions. Yet such have been the now confessedly injudicious modes of expression adopted by some approved writers on the subject. The satisfactory view of the whole case can only be found in those more enlarged conceptions which are furnished by the grand contemplation of cosmical order and unity, and which do not refer to inferences of the past, but to proofs of the ever present mind and reason in nature. If we read a book which it requires much thought and exercise of reason to understand, but which we find discloses more and more truth and reason as we proceed in the study, and contains clearly more than we can at present comprehend, then, undeniably, we properly say that thought and reason exist in that book irrespectively of our minds, and equally so of any question as to its author or origin. Such a book confessedly exists, and is ever open to us in the natural world. Or, to put the case under a slightly different form ; — when the astronomer, the physicist, The book of nature. Essay II. $ 1.] 239 THE BOOK OF NATURE. the geologist, or the naturalist, notes down a series of observed facts or measured data, he is not an author expressing his own ideas,— he is a mere amanuensis taking down the dictations of nature : his observation book is the record of the thoughts of another mind : he has but set down literally what he himself does not understand, or only very imperfectly. On fur- ther examination, and after deep and anxious study, he perhaps begins to decipher the meaning, by per- ceiving some law which gives a signification to the facts, and the further he pursues the investigation up to any more comprehensive theory, the more fully he perceives that there is a higher reason, of which his own is but the humble interpreter, and into whose depths he may penetrate continually farther, to dis- cover yet more profound and invariable order and system ; always indicating still deeper and more hidden abysses yet unfathomed, but throughout which he is assured the same recondite and im- mutable arrangement ever prevails. That which it requires thought and reason to Reason understand, must be itself thought and reason. That the order which mind alone can investigate or express, must be itself mind. And if the highest conception exists in of nature. 240 NATURE AND REVELATION. This dis- tinct from the origin of nature. attained is but partial, then the mind and reason studied is greater than the mind and reason of the student. If the more it be studied the more vast and complex is the necessary connection in reason disclosed, then the more evident is the vast extent and compass of the intelligence thus partially mani- fested ; and its reality as existing in the immutably connected, order of objects examined, independently of the mind of the investigator. But considerations of this kind, just and transcen- dently important as they are in themselves, give us no aid in any inquiry into the origin of the order of things thus investigated, or the nature, or other attributes, of the mind evinced in them. The real argument for universal Intelligence, manifested in the universality of order and law in the material world, is very different from any attempt to give a form to our conceptions, even by the language of analogy, as to the nature or mode of existence, or operation of that intelligence: and still more different from any extension of our inference from what is, to what may have been, from present order to a supposed origination, first adjustment, or planning of that order. Limits of natural theology. COSMO-THEOLOGY. 241 By keeping these distinctions steadily in view, we appreciate properly both the limits and the extent and compass of what we may appropriately call COSMO-THEOLOGY." i On this point I will cite the opinion of a theologian who has been looked up to as of the highest orthodoxy and learning in the English church, and who will not be suspected of any undue bias towards phi- losophical views,—the late Bishop Van Mildert. His testimony, there- fore, is the more striking to what is here maintained as the legitimate view of a strict and positive philosophy in regard to natural theism. “ All “ researches into nature,” he says, “terminate abruptly; and we must “stop short at an immeasurable chasm between the creature and the “ Creator," .... (Boyle Lectures, vol. ii. p. 65.) Again : “ The “ study of physics has nothing in common with theology properly so “ called, either as to its principles, or the subjects on which it is em- “ployed, or the end which it proposes. In physics it is impossible to “ proceed beyond second causes, or the instrumental agents of the ma- “ terial world. The first cause will still be as remote as ever from our “ view, and the immaterial world will still elude our researches.” (Ibid. P. 97.).....“ In short, natural philosophy being confined to sen- “sible and material objects, cannot attain to even a glimpse of spiritual “ truth ; and consequently is incapable, per se, of instructing men in "s what it most concerns them to understand, - the knowledge of God, “ or even of man, so far as he is a spiritual and intellectual being.” (Ibid. p. 98.) . He then proceeds to extend the same inference from the physical to the moral sciences. If it be objected that this view is at variance with St Paul's assertion (Rom. i. 19, &c.), divines of the same school reply, that in fact the Apostle's argument is not an assertion of an abstract philosophical con- clusion, but of the practical truth that the heathen themselves acknow- ledged and professed a belief in a Deity (on whatever grounds) and yet did not act up to it. Even in a reasoning point of view, the Apostle, 242 [Essay II. & I. C NATURE AND REVELATION. Appeal to UITUU moral science, Admitting, then, at any rate, the very limited nature and extent of the conclusions derivable from physical philosophy, it has been the aim of a con- siderable section of writers on Natural Theology to contend that higher views of the Divine nature and perfections are to be obtained from the contemplation of metaphysical and moral truth." 7 perhaps, appeals to the speculative philosophy then prevalent; but the present remarks refer to modern inductive science, which is more limited in its aims. I have elsewhere noticed that some other writers of much authority in very different schools of theology, have agreed in the same opinion, and have even carried it to the extreme of denying any inferences what- ever from natural science as bearing on these higher views. This, I apprehend, arose from their deficiency in physical knowledge, which disqualified them from perceiving the great principle of physical order and its consequences as the indication of, or, rather, as synonymous with, reason and mind in the natural world. See “ Oxford Essays,” 1857, Essay y. į It has even been common with writers of this class to express an absurd kind of jealousy of physical science, and to demand, in a hostile tone, “ What right has philosophy to build on material principles alone, 66 and not to take mind into account?” (Mansel's “ Bampton Lectures," Oxford, 1858, pp. 190, 191) and to contend that moral truths “ are “ facts of experience to the full as real and certain as the laws of the “ planetary motions and chemical affinities." It is simply amusing to notice the self-complacent ignorance of a writer, who thinks he is hitting hard at physical science by dilating with satisfaction on the humiliation of the astronomer who can com- pute the remotest future position of the planets, but (sad mortification of his vanity!) cannot predict the state of his own health or the direc- tion of the wind to-morrow! But it is far from amusing to find such Essay II. $ 1.] 243 MORAL ARGUMENTS. The phenomena and laws of mind ought undoubtedly to be taken into account, so far as they have been traced, as indicative of higher mind, as those of moral sense and conscience are of a higher principle of moral order and source of goodness. But on these subjects we can hardly be said really to possess any fixed data or determinate laws on which to reason, until different parties shall be as well agreed even on the most elementary principles of moral and metaphysical, as they are on those of physical, truth. The actual claims of moral science to establish a foundation for these more sublime truths are very slight: The old à priori metaphysical theistic argu- ments and schemes of the Divine perfections, (espe- cially from the exhaustive criticisms of Kant,) have been generally discredited, not only by philosophers ?, sentiments endorsed by an able and learned writer, in a work produced at the present day under the special sanction of the university of Oxford. And it is unjustifiable, in the present state of knowledge, for any one to pretend to reason on such topics, who betrays such misapprehension of the very nature and principles of all physical philosophy, as to argue, “ if it be true that the researches of science tend towards (though who “ can say they will ever reach?) the establishment of a system of fixed “and orderly recurrence," &c. &c. (Mansel's “ Bampton Lectures," 189.) * See above, Essay I. $ 1v. R2 NATURE AND REVELATION. [Essay 11. § 1. Higher sources of religious couviction. but by the admission of the most orthodox divines 1; in the views of the same kind which others have sought to substitute, we can find little which seems more satisfactory. To attempt to reason from law to volition, from order to active power, from universal reason to distinct personality, from design to self-existence, from intelligence to infinite perfection, is, in reality, to adopt grounds of argument and speculation entirely beyond those of strict philosophical inference, and it would be more consistent openly to avow the insufficiency of scientific views for realising those loftier contemplations and theistic conceptions than to gloss over the difficulty by an ambiguous and mystical metaphysical phraseology; and owning the inadequacy of reason, to recur to faith. And, in fact, the most candid of such reasoners usually, in the end, fall back on the simple appeal to the common feeling and general religious sense of mankind in the belief in a Deity, an appeal which, however just in itself, is simply a confession of the insufficiency of philoso- phical reasoning — the only point in dispute. 1 1. For a fuller discussion of this subject, see my Essay, No. V. in the “ Oxford Essays" for 1857. Essay II. $ I.] 245 IMMUTABILITY. with But to whatever extent any such metaphysical and Moral truths pot moral theistic systems may be supposed established, at variance still, referring, as they do, to an order of truths physical. essentially distinct from those of the physical world, and of a kind almost wholly internal, ideal, and sub- jective, it is manifest, from the nature of the case, they can in no way affect, or come into collision with, the general conclusion of universal order evinced by physical science, though they can hardly fail to . confirm it. At the utmost a physico-theology can only teach All pbiloso- phy results a supreme mind evinced in the laws of the world of in law and order. matter, and the relations of a Deity to physical things essentially as derived from physical law. A moral or metaphysical theology (so far as it may be substantiated) can only lead us to a Deity related to mind, or to the moral order of the world. Physical science may bring us to a God of nature, moral or metaphysical science to a God of mind or spirit. But all philosophy is generalisation, and therefore essentially implies universal order; and thus, in these sublime conclusions, or in any infe- rences we may make from them, that principle must hold an equally prominent place. If we indulge in R 3 246 [Essay II. $ I. NATURE AND REVELATION. Divine attributes as learned from natural tbeology. any speculations on the Divine perfections we must admit an element of immutable order as one of the chief. The firm conception of the immutability of order is the first rudiment in all scientific foundation for cosmo-theology. Our conclusion cannot go beyond the assumption in our evidence. Our argument can lead us only to such limited notions of the Divine attributes as are consistent with the principle of . “ Cosmos.” If we speak of “wisdom,” it is as evinced in laws of profoundly adjusted reason; if of “power," it is only in the conception of universal and eternal maintenance of those arrangements; if of “infinite intelligence,” it is as manifested throughout the infinity of nature; and to whose dominion we can imagine no limit, as we can imagine none to natural order. If we attempt to extend the idea of “power” to infinity, or what we call the attribute of “ Omnipo- tence,” in conformity with a strictly natural theology, it can only be from the boundless extent to which we find these natural arrangements kept up in in- cessant activity, but unchangeable order ; — the unlimited, and we believe illimitable, expansion, both Limited view of power. Essay II. $ 1.] 247 OMNIPOTENCE. volition. tence in the in time and space, of the same undeviating regu- larity with which the operations of the universally connected machinery is sustained. The difficulty Law and which presents itself to many minds, how to recon- cile the idea of unalterable lari with volition (which seems to imply something changeable), can only be answered by appealing to those immutable laws as the sole evidence and exponent we have of supreme volition; a volition of immutable mind, an empire of fixed intelligence. The simple argument from the invariable order Omnipo- of nature is wholly incompetent to give us any con- order of ception whatever of the Divine Omnipotence except as maintaining, or acting through, that invariable universal system of physical order and law. Any belief which may be entertained of a different kind must essentially belong to an order of things wholly beyond any conclusions derived from physical phi- : losophy or cosmo-theology. A Theism of Omnipo- tence in any sense deviating from the order of nature must be entirely derived from other teaching : in fact it is commonly traceable to early religious impressions derived, not from any real deductions of reason, but from the language of the Bible. nature. a ) R4 243 (Essay II. § I. NATURE AND REVELATION. Natural natural. Natural Natural theology does not lead us to the super- theology not super- natural, being itself the essential and crowning principle of the natural: and pointing to the su- preme moral cause or mind in nature: manifested to us as far as the invariable and universal series and connexion of physical causes are disclosed: obscured only when they may be obscured; hidden only when they may be imagined to be interrupted. The super- natural is the offspring of ignorance, and the parent of superstition and idolatry: the natural is the as- surance of science, and the preliminary to all rational views of Theism." Higher The highest inferences to which any physical phi- theism beyond losophy can lead us, though of demonstrative force natural science. as far as they reach, are confessedly of very limited extent. It is a mistake to confound with the de- ductions of science these more sublime conceptions and elevated spiritual views of a Deity,-a personal God,—an Omnipotent Creator,--a moral Governor, -a Being of infinite spiritual perfections, -holding * An able critic puts the case very forcibly and concisely: "Super- “stition consists not in the belief in this (a supreme) cause; but in “ the supposition that its action is occasional rather than eternal, par- “ tial rather than universal.” — Edinburgh Review, No. ccxviii. p. 485. ESSAY II. $1.]. 249 LIMITS OF INFERENCE. - of higher relations with the spirit of man;-- the object of worship, trust, fear, and love; – all which concep- tions can originate only from some other source than physical philosophy. These are conclusions which science must confess entirely to transcend its powers, as they are beside its province to substan- tiate. I have spoken of the necessary limits of all scien- Limitation of inferences tific. deduction. To obviate serious misconception it not a denial is material to insist on the distinction that while the truths. boundary line, by which the deductions of science are so necessarily limited, is thus carefully drawn, this is by no means to be misunderstood as if it were meant as a negation of higher truths; but only that they are of another order. On the contrary, the point especially insisted on in the former essays was, that the extremely limited extent of strict in- ferences from the order of nature forms the very ground for looking to other and higher sources of in- formation and illumination if we would rise to any of those more exalted contemplations. In any concep- tions of the nature or attributes of God or man's re- lations to Him we can only look to other sources of information and conviction of quite a different order DU 250 [Essay II. § I. NATURE AND REVELATION. from those which science can furnish. Those higher aspirations which so many pure and elevated minds own, can only be satisfied by disclosures belonging not to the province of natural philosophy or any de- ductions from it-whose utmost limits in this respect we have thus far endeavoured to indicate, — but to something beyond, and properly belonging to the higher jurisdiction of moral or spiritual convictions. But cosmo-theology, though incapable of anticipat- ing any such sublime truths of a moral and spiritual revelation, is in no way opposed to them; but, on the contrary, as far as it extends, may be serviceable, as in some measure opening the way for them. It has been already observed that strict science offers no evidence of the commencement of the ex- isting order of the universe. It exhibits indeed a wonderful succession of changes, but however far back continued, and of however vast extent, and almost inconceivable modes of operation, still only changes; occurring in recondite order, however little as yet dis- closed, and in obedience to physical laws and causes, however as yet obscure and hidden from us. Yet in all this there is no beginning properly so called: no commencement of existence when nothing existed Idea of creation not from science, Essay II. $ 1.]. 251 CREATION. IU before: no creation in the sense of origination out of non-existence, or formation out of nothing:-Even without referring to that metaphysical conception, or more properly metaphysical contradiction, -to imagine anything which can be strictly called a be- ginning, or first formation, or endowment of matter with new attributes, or in whatever other form of expression we may choose to convey any such idea, is altogether beyond the domain of science, as it is an idea beyond the province of human intelligence. The nebular theory may be adopted in cosmology, or the development hypothesis in paleontology — or any other still more ambitious systems reaching back in imagination into the abysses of past time; yet these are only the expositions of ideas theoretical and ima- ginary, but still properly within the domain of physical order, and even by them we reach no proper com- mencement of existence. More than half a century ago, Dr. Hutton announced the first ideas of a natural geology, and boldly declared, “In the economy of the “world I can find rio traces of a beginning, no pros- “pect of an end,” and all the later progress of science has pointed, as from its nature it must do, to the | Lyell's “Principles," p. 54, 8th ed. 252 NATURE AND REVELATION. . [Essay II. $ 1. Successive creations same conclusion, nor can any other branch of science help us further back than geology. In a word, geology (as Sir C. Lyell has so happily expressed it) is “the autobiography of the earth," but like other autobiographies it cannot go back to the birth. But the successive introductions of new species of organic life in the epochs of past terrestrial changes are imagined by some to be instances of direct inter- vention. This question was indeed discussed in the former essays 2 but with reference to the object of the present, it may be desirable briefly to place before the reader the principal points of the case; from which it will be seen that the argument fails in several essential particulars. . . In the first place such commencement of new forms of existence were events not arbitrary, nor discon- nort arbi- trary; ? By the upheaval of strata, says Humboldt, “ an animal and a vege- “ table existence which has passed away is brought to light. .... the “ distinction of old organic forms and the appearance of new. A few “ of the older still show themselves for a time among the newer forms. “ In the narrowness of our knowledge of original production, in the “figurative language with which this circumscription of view is con- .6 cealed, we designate as new creations the historical phenomena of “ change in the organisms tenanting the primæval waters and the. up- - lifted dry land.” — HUMBOLDT's Cosmos, p. 289, 1st transl. 1845. 2 See “ Unity of Worlds," Essay III. $ iv. p. 503, 2nd ed. ESSAY II. $ 1.] 253 SUCCESSION OF SPECIES. 253 . some gene- nected, but regularly recurring in successive epochs, always connected with the other physical changes going on in these epochs, however little the laws con- necting and regulating them are as yet known; but this mere fact of the frequent regular recurrence of part of such changes proves distinctly that they were not ral law. casual suspensions or interruptions of the order of nature, but essential parts of it: As indeed is ren- dered more undeniably evident by the circumstance that they were in every instance not isolated acts, but the commencement and establishment of a series of simply natural results, –a succession and continu- ance of the species so generated, by ordinary natural causes. On all sound inductive principles, these events Not inter- must be held to have taken place in strict accordance with natural laws and with the regular order of physical causes, however little we may at present be able to trace precisely what the laws of their pro- duction actually were: and even withoạt alluding to any theory of development, we must look to some great unknown law of life, of which the permanence of species under certain conditions, is only a subor- dinate part and particular case. ruptions, 254 [Essay Il. § 1. NATURE AND REVELATION. mencement but com-' of natural order. Not miraculous. But on any supposition, to apply the term “mir- acle” to a series of events repeatedly occurring, and always productive of a regular series of natural consequences, would be a change in the use of lan- guage little accordant with the usual professions of those who advocate the belief in such interposition; and in other respects it is obvious that these changes in the natural world, before the existence of the human race, were wholly alien in their entire cha- racter and circumstances from any of those alleged supernatural manifestations, with which some would compare them." The idea of the first origin of matter, or of creation out of nothing, as it certainly has no phy- sical evidence, has by some been supported on so- Metaphysi. cal argu- . ment for creation, 1 Some valuable remarks bearing on these topics will be found in an interesting and able work of Sir H. Holland, and in which he urges the maintenance of the great law of unity of composition as co-ordinate with that of diversity of species. (“Chapters on Mental Physiology," p. 223.) And while he makes some just criticisms on the theories of Lamarck and of the “Vestiges," as to certain hypothetical modes of expression in which they indulge (Ibid. p. 242), he is yet disposed to allow the just claims of fair scientific speculation on such subjects; and especially as to the unknown cause of life and generation, he expressly avows the truly philosophic expectation that, by the progress of discovery, it may come to be as little mysterious as tbat of nutrition and other best known processes. (Ibid. p. 230.) Essay II. § 1.] 255 METAPHYSICAL VIEWS. 255 called metaphysical grounds; chiefly by the argument that the eternity of matter would imply its self-exis- tence, or invest it with the attributes of Divinity. But both the idea of self-existence and that of unintelli- ligible; creation out of nothing are equally and hopelessly beyond the possible grasp of the human faculties, how then can we pretend to reason, or infer anything respecting them? In a word, we cannot advance a single real step from the bare negation of physical evidence of the origin of matter. Feuerbach reflects on the low views of a certain incon- class of writers, “the narrow rationalising man who “ does not look at the Cosmos," as being prone to adopt the notion of a supernatural “ creation” in the first instance, and thenceforth allowing the created world, once adjusted, to go on by itself. Thus, as he says, “inconsistently admitting supernaturalism in “ one instance, but denying it in all others.” The idea of “ creation” he observes, implying an act of simple volition or thought, in no way accounts for the origin of the world of matter, which cannot arise out of thought. But this applies to metaphy- sistent. 1 Essence of Christianity, p. 190. 2 Ibid. p. 84. 256 NATURE AND REVELATION. Idea of creation solely from revelation, sical, not to physical, speculation, which, as I have expressly contended, in no way pretends to ascend to the idea of a first origination of material existence.? In truth, the more attentively we consider the subject, the more clearly does it appear that both the term “ creation” and any idea we may attach to it are really derived solely from impressions of a religious nature. And as the source of such a con- ception is entirely distinct from any teaching of science, so it becomes important that the representa- tions thus obtained should never be confounded with scientific conclusions, or mixed up with the body of physical truth; but kept carefully and essentially dis- tinguished. 1 The belief in a creation of matter out of nothing was altogether unknown to the ancient Greek philosophy. (See Plato, “ Timæus," p. 37; Aristot. “Phys.” viii. 1.) Among the modern metaphysicians, Fichte contends that such an idea is inconsistent with the philosophy of the absolute, and denounces it as the fundamental error of meta- physicians. He traces it to Jewish, or even heathen sources. (Works, v. 479.) Sir W. Hamilton thinks it only conceivable as “the evolution of “ existence from possibility into actuality, by the fiat of the Deity.” (Disc. 620.) But how does this help the difficulty ? Mr. Mansel, after citing these authorities, much more truly admits that “creation is to human thought inconceivable.” (“Bampt. Lect.” 79.) Essay II. $ 1.] 257 SCRIPTURAL VIEW. The idea of creation is wholly one of revelation, accepted by faith; and if guided by Christianity the assertion of it will rest in the general expression, and will never degenerate into an admixture with the obsolete cosmogonies of older dispensations : “ By faith we understand that the worlds were “ framed by the Word of God.” 1 1 Heb, xi, 3. 52 258 [Essay II. $ 11, NATURE AND REVELATION. $ 11. —THE NATURAL AND THE SUPERNATURAL. nature. Imagined In former essays ? I adverted to the case of some who interrup- tions of the have imagined the possibility of occasional interrup- order of tions in the grand scheme of universal order, law, and causation, thus producing, as far as they might extend, a corresponding interruption and contraven- tion to the evidence of supreme intelligence. Such ideas can only occur to those who have failed to grasp the great inductive principle of invariable uniformity and law in nature. Marvellous In all ages, it is true, cases of unusual and extra- ordinary events have occurred which become objects of wonder, but are very differently viewed, according to the state of knowledge. Even in the present day, such instances, among the ignorant, credulous, or prejudiced, are often associated with unworthy superstitions. events. 1 Unity of Worlds, Essays I, and III. ; see especially pp. 112, 507, 2nd ed. Essay II. $ 11.] 259 MODERN SCEPTICISM. But allowing for such exceptions, it is beyond question the prevalent, and, we may say, even the universal opinion, among all unbiassed, educated, and thinking persons, that “the age of miracles has ceased,” that in the present day prodigies and marvels do not occur. Yet, if we endeavour to analyse or explain this general persuasion, it seems difficult to account for it, or to reconcile it with some of the strongest ten- dencies of human prepossession in quite an opposite direction, or even with the belief of the same parties with respect to the past. . Why, then, do men so universally and habitually Disbelief in discredit the occurrence of miracles at the present the present day? It is not that very marvellous events do not occur, or even some firmly believed to be miraculous by certain interested parties. It is hardly even a question of evidence: the gene- rality of mankind habitually assume antecedently that miracles are now inadmissible; and thus, that any reported case must be in some manner explained away. There is some general law of human belief, or rather disbelief, which influences men far more powerfully than can be counteracted by the strongest miracles at day. $ 2 260 NATURE AND REVELATION.. [ESSAY II. § 11. Antecedent credibility. allegations of particular apparent instances to the contrary. In a general point of view, the importance to be attached to the consideration of antecedent credibility is often not sufficiently attended to. Yet, in all matters of ordinary belief, and even in scientific conclusions, our convictions, to a much greater extent than is sometimes imagined, depend more on our im- pressions as to the antecedent probability of events than on the actual details of testimony, or examina- tion into facts. Such examination is often very slight; and yet we feel satisfied; it is just enough to give some exemplification, for instance, of the truth; which we embrace, rather from a general persuasion of its accordance with experience or established analogy; or, on the other hand, from the absence of such analogy and the violation of such probability, we are disposed to reject even apparently attested facts. And the slightest reflection shows that it is almost entirely on this kind of previous conviction, as to the natural order of events, that the existing universal opinion rests as to alleged supernatural occurrences at the present day. A ESSAY II. $ 11.] 261 'MAGIC AND WITCHCRAFT. supernatu- ences. ic and witchcraft. In this point of view, it becomes not irrelevant Instances of former nor uninstructive, to glance at some of those cases belief in of belief in the supernatural, which in past times ral infu- enjoyed so considerable a reputation, and exercised so powerful an ascendency over men's minds. For example, the belief in magic and witchcraft, Magic and at the present day the mere subject of a tale or a jest, within comparatively modern times was com- mon, and within a few centuries universal; so that to call it in question was held impious and atheistic. A full and critical inquiry into the actual causes of the prevalent utter and universal disbelief on these points, would be highly instructive. All the obvious resources of explanation of particular alleged cases, as originating in delusion, imposture, exaggerated or wholly fabulous narratives and traditions, or the · like, may easily be called into play: but it is not a rejection of particular instances on the ground of individual deficiencies of evidence, or well-grounded suspicions of fraud, delusion, or the like, which will explain the case: it is the common and total abandon- ment of the very notion of all such influences, except among the grossly ignorant and infatuated, that is to be accounted for, and the general fact 83 262 NATURE AND REVELATION. Appari. tions. points to causes far more deeply seated than any such mere sceptical criticisms in particular instances. To take another exemplification of the silent pro- gress of opinion, how completely has the belief in apparitions (once so serious a subject of dispute), at the present day subsided into the physiology of ocular impressions; and even if there be apparent exceptions from time to time alleged, not easily réconcilable with that theory, how firm seems to be the general persuasion that they must really be explicable by some kind of physical causes, though at present we may be unable to conjecture precisely in what way. Whence, then, it must be asked, arises this uni- versal scepticism and rejection, not of this or that particular instance, but of the very notion of such appearances being really supernatural ? Can we ascribe it to anything but some real advance in the general admission and conviction of the grand inductive principle of the uniformity of natural causes ? Proceeding, however, downwards to our own times, and looking at the course of things around us at the present day, we may affirm that many truly mar- VE Essay II. $ 11.] 263 MESMERISM. vellous and unaccountable events, open to examina- Marvels not miracles. tion, and well authenticated, are occurring from time to time, within daily experience, which in an ignorant age would unquestionably have been set down as miraculous. It would be impossible to imagine greater pro- digies, for example, or occurrences more truly marvellous, than those which, after every rational allowance for parties deceiving, or being deceived, or both together, all candid inquirers now admit to be substantiated in regard to somnambulism, and the kindred effects ascribed to mesmerism, or other allied influences; some of which partake in a startling degree of the characteristics of ancient miracles,—and by some have been even specially dwelt upon as the physical explanation of them.' And yet no unbiassed See a “Manual of Animal Magnetism,” by A. Testé, M.D. transl. London, 1843, especially ch. i. $ 3; also Menzel's “ Literature of Ger- many,” transl. vol. i. 196 ; and, as having an intimate bearing on the whole subject, no reader should omit to consult the profoundly interest- ing and instructive little volume, “Letters on the Truths contained in Popular Superstitions,” by the late Herbert Mayo, M.D. Edin. 1849; also, for some very remarkable testimonies of eminent philosophers, and generally a very just estimate of the inductive evidence of the facts ascribed to mesmerism and other analogous causes, the reader is re- $ 4 264 NATURE AND REVELATION. Supposed spiritual influences commonly rejected. and reflecting person now for a moment considers these phenomena to be miraculous. . If, indeed, some manifestations of an apparently analogous class to those last alluded to, have been imagined connected with spiritual influences of a peculiar kind, it has only been by some parties, ferred to “The Philosophy of Necessity” by C. Bray, Esq., London, 1841, vol. i. p. 137, et seq. also be found in the able and interesting little work of Sir H. Holland, before cited, “ Chapters on Mental Physiology," 2nd ed. 1858. The author makes some acute observations on mesmerism as due to nervous affection, and not really related to the individual operator (p. 93, et seq.); mentioning some material facts from personal observa- tion (note, p. 102). After speaking of mesmerism and the like effects as referred by many to mysterious causes, he adds, with respect to electro-biology, “The results exhibited by the biologists, analogous in “ kind and equally striking, are not alleged to proceed from any such “ mysterious agency, but come before us fairly as the very curious effect “ of excitement of various kinds upon certain peculiar temperaments.” (p. 100.) The author sets down spirit-rapping, table-turning, &c., as cases wholly different from those of mesmerism (note, p. 343); and for his remarks on the alleged supernatural character of such manifestations, see the same volume, p. 99. In all such apparent phenomena there must of necessity be some actual muscular action, however unconscious, on the part of the operators. Sir H. Holland mentions a case, which he personally examined, of the alleged analogous action of the divining rod, when he fully assured himself there was an unconscious muscular action on the part of the Essay II. $ 11.] 265 SPIRITUALISM.' . strongly prepossessed in favour of such a theory, and whose view is entirely disputed by others, however fully they may admit the absolute facts. Moreover, the precise difficulty which the supporters of such views have to contend with, in gaining credit for their statements, is not the rejection of testimony, or the allegation of specific objections in particular instances, but arises from a general spirit of disbelief in influences of a supernatural kind, or the reality of spiritual agency imagined to occasion the phe- nomena. No unbiassed witness, after making every allowance for the possibility of deception, whether intentional or unintentional, of collusion or of: simple hallucination of ideas, has ever supposed the real part of the phenomena in such instances as “spirit-rapping," table-turning, and the like, to be due to anything else than some physical mode of action, connected most probably with some peculiar affections of the nervous system, at present ill under- stood: but which only requires to be carefully noted, examined, recorded and analysed, (which they have not yet been to any sufficient extent,) and we may then be certain they will, in due course of experi- mental research, be ultimately found perfectly con- US 266 [Essay II. § II. NATURE AND REVELATION. formable to some great determinate laws, which the science of the future will elicit. In a word, cases of the kind referred to, so far as they are regarded as physical phenomena, must be admitted as legitimate subjects for fair physical and inductive examination. In so far as they are alleged to be of a supernatural kind, not referable to some physical laws, they must be absolutely discarded from all philosophical inquiry. And the usual source of confusion is, that the parties who profess to examine them have not made up their minds in which class they are prepared to consider them." Inductive To apply generally the principles of strict induc- inquiry into marvellous tive inquiry: if a marvellous event were supposed to the present occur within our own sphere of observation, we should events at day. | The whole subject of mesmerism and the allied manifestations, is probably yet in a state in which it would be premature to attempt any generalisations : the one point to which attention should be fixed being merely that all the phenomena must necessarily be subject TO SOME physical laws. An attempt, however, to maintain such a law has been made by Mr. J. Baird (British Assoc. 1855; Sect. Proc. 120), who regards the alleged fascination of birds by serpents, and other effects, such as table- turning, electro-biology, &c., to be all referable to the one principle of what he calls “mono-ideo-dynamic action,” or the possession of the whole mind by one idea, which for the time neutralises all volition which might otherwise be exerted in opposition, producing involuntary and unconscious muscular action, the effects of which are attributed to external agency. Essay II. $ 11.] 267 INDUCTIVE EXAMINATION. first endeavour to sift carefully the nature of the apparent fact, so as to be certain we have a correct apprehension of the real conditions; and this the more strictly and searchingly in proportion to its more unusual character: in whatever respect it might seem doubtful or difficult to interpret; we should be the more careful to wait for further instances; or endeavour, if possible, to repro- duce them experimentally, — to vary the form of the phenomenon, and assure ourselves fully of all the circumstances, until we were thoroughly satisfied of the true character of the whole case, and able to refer it actually or probably to some known class of facts; or should we altogether fail in doing so, then the event must be set down as an outstanding ap- parent anomaly, awaiting its solution; still we should feel sure that it is a part in the great scheme of physical order, however seemingly extraordinary, and that it assuredly will, sooner or later, receive its ex- planation from the advance of physical discovery." The following passage of Laplace has a direct bearing on the fore- going remarks : “ Events may be so extraordinary that they can hardly “ be established by testimony. We should not give credit to a man “ who should affirm that he saw an hundred dice thrown in the air " and they all fell on the same faces. If we had ourselves been spec: “ tators of such an event, we should not believe our own eyes till we 268 NATURE AND. REVELATION. - [Essay II. § II. Neglect of · Such examination, however, is too commonly examina- neglected. Extraordinary events ! occur which at- tion into marvellous events. “ had scrupulously examined all the circumstances, and assured our- “ selves that there was no trick or deception. After such an examina- • tion we should not hesitate to admit it, notwithstanding its great “ improbability, and no one would have recourse to an inversion of the “ laws of vision in order to account for it. This shows that the proba- 66 bility of the continuance of the laws of nature is superior, in our esti- “ mation, to every other evidence, and to that of historical facts the 6 best established. One may judge, therefore, of the weight of testi- “mony necessary to prove a suspension of those laws, and how falla- « cious it is in such cases to apply the common rules of evidence.” — LAPLACE, Essai Philosophique sur les Probabilités, p. 76, ed. 1814. See also some remarks on this passage by Prof. Playfair, “ Works," vol. iv. 437. ? While revising this passage, the following announcement catches my attention, apparently from a sober matter-of-fact observer : - Times, Dec. 4, 1858. -- “ Last night, at fifteen minutes to nine, it s being very dark and raining heavily, I was ascending one of the steep “ hills of this neighbourhood, when suddenly I was surrounded by a 66 bright and powerful light, which passed me a little quicker than the “ ordinary pace of man's walking, leaving it dark as before. This day I have been informed that the light was seen by the “ sailors in the harbour, coming in from the sea and passing up the 66 valley like a low cloud. JABEZ Brown, Boscastle, Dec. 1." Had this occurred to an ancient saint or ecclesiastic, or to a modern enthusiast or Jesuit, what might not have been made of it! Independently of extraordinary and unexplained natural phenomena, we have constant instances of the assertion, on perfectly respectable authority, of marvels of quite another class. To take a single instance : --the loss of weight in the human body, alleged to take place when sup- ported in a particular way by the hands of other persons, is one of these impossibilities which has yet been firmly believed. I have heard it positively affirmed by veracious, educated and well-informed persons, in Essay II. S 11.] 269 MIRACLES OF NATURE. tract momentary notice, are never examined, and soon forgotten ; and it is by this neglect, that ignorance and superstition are fostered. Some of these wonders, indeed, are of a purely visionary kind, the mere creations of over-heated imagination or excited nerves"; still they all require and deserve to be accurately examined and recorded, and thus alone can we hope to arrive at any sound explanation of their nature if real, or the exposure of them if imaginary or fraudulent. There are, indeed, always to be found some who Some dwell are fond of dwelling on instances of the marvellous, ries in as if opening a door to the supernatural; and others, who perhaps confusedly and inadvertently use lan- guage to the effect that we are surrounded by wonders and miracles, inscrutable to our faculties. But, as before observed, there are no real mysteries in nature: what is to-day a miracle, may become a well-known phenomenon, subject to law, to-morrow; and assuredly will eventually be so, if inductive on myste- nature; perfect good faith, that a solid mahogany table has been seen to rise from the ground and its surface to move in waves! With such instances before us at the present day, where shall we limit human credulity, and even honest delusion ; to say nothing of cases wbolly fabulous or fraudulent? 270 [Essay II. § 11. NATURE AND REVELATION. especially life ; inquiry be steadily carried out. The supernatural continually recedes and disappears from our view, and the dominion of nature, order, and intelligence, daily advances. More especially in all that relates to the pheno- mena of life, and the influences, so little as yet understood, of various kinds, affecting it, there has been ample room for those who feel so disposed to indulge in the belief of the supernatural and mys- terious. But, in a scientific point of view, all such imaginations must be strictly banished. The laws of life, and the principle of vital action, are, by degrees, becoming the subjects of inductive physio- logical examination; they are now much better understood than they were at no remote date of the past; and will be far more completely known a few centuries hence. But life is still nature; it is the very essence of nature; and all the miracles of nature connected with it are simply natural pheno- mena, just as much really subject to law, as those best known. In some cases of apparently marvellous occur- rences, after due allowance for possible misappre- hension or exaggeration in the statements, it might not real mysteries. Extraor dinary influences. Essay II. $ 11.] 271 PHYSIOLOGICAL AFFECTIONS. be conceded that the event, though of a very singular kind, was yet not such as to involve anything abso- lutely at variance even with the known laws of nature: - very remarkable coincidences of events;- very un- usual appearances;- very extraordinary affections of the human body;—such, especially, as those astonish- ing but well-ascertained cases of catalepsy, trance, or suspended animation ;-very marvellous and sudden cures of diseases; — the phenomena of double consciousness, visions, somnambulism, and spectral impressions;— might, perhaps, be included in this class, and subject to such natural interpretation be entirely admissible. Other instances might, how- ever, be recounted of a kind more absolutely at variance with natural order, such, e. g. as implied a subversion of gravitation, or of the constitution of matter; descriptions inconceivable to those impressed with the truth of the great first principle of all induction, the invariable constancy of the order of nature. In such cases, we might imagine a misapprehen- sion or exaggeration of some real event, or possibly some kind of ocular illusion, mental hallucination, or the like. But whatever supposition we might 272 NATURE AND REVELATION. [Essay II. § II. adopt, the guiding conviction of the uniformity of nature must still be the paramount law of belief, however little its precise application to the par- ticular case might at present be understood.1 | It was with a view to cases of this kind that some considerations were thrown out in the former essays (Unity of Worlds, Essay I. $ 111. p. 113, 2nd ed.) which it may be useful here briefly to re- peat. I there maintained that in all cases of apparent interruptions or anomalies, the inductive philosopher will fall back on the primary maxim, that it is always more probable that events of an unaccountable and marvellous character are parts of some great fixed order of causes unknown to us, than that any real interruption occurs. And further, what may now appear the most mysterious, and at present least under- stood, we may be assured will get hereafter be explained by the future extension of discovery. But I have further urged, that when we carry out this principle it becomes a necessary caution that it may still be difficult or impossible to apply these considerations in detail, and to suggest particular inter- pretations in subordination to these paramount principles; yet this will not invalidate their general truth; nor need it lead us into extravagant and gratuitous speculations to bring about a precise explanation for which the circumstances do not furnish sufficient data. A truly ra. tional inquirer will be content to let such difficulties await their solution : and, so far from being anxious always to seek such explanations in precise theories, he will own that too minute a solicitude to refer every case to KNOWN causes, may tend to keep out of sight the broader prin- ciple that they may be referable to some causes as yet UNKNOWN, but still parts of the same universal order: too minute a spirit of hypothesis may even lead to the disparagement of that principle when, in any in- stance, such more particular attempts at explanation are found to fail. Thus, in reference to some cases already alluded to; in the present state of science, of all subjects, that on which we know least is, perhaps, the connection of our bodily and mental nature, the action of the one Essay II. $ 11.] IN MARVELS IN HISTORY273 . times. Such would be the principles guiding our con- Belief in miracles victions as to the marvellous, in occurrences at the in former present day or within our experience. As, however, we look backward in the records of past times, we discover the prevalence of a more general disposition to accredit miraculous pretensions. And, as we recede into still earlier periods, we are less surprised at the recurrence of statements of the marvellous, and tales of the miraculous, which increase upon us, especially as connected with the state of popular belief in those ages. In all such cases a new ele- ment, that of historical testimony, is introduced into the discussion. on the other, and all the vast range of sensations, sympathies, and influences in which those effects are displayed, and of which we have sometimes such extraordinary manifestations in peculiar' states of ex- cited cerebral or nervous action, somnambulism, spectral impressions, the phenomena of double consciousness and the like, as well as in- stances of suspended animation. In such cases science has not yet advanced to any generalisations; results only are presented which have not as yet been traced to laws. Yet no inductive inquirer for a mo- ment doubts that these classes of phenomena are all really connected by some great principles of order. If, then, some peculiar manifestations should appear of a more extra- ordinary character, still less apparently reducible to any known prin- ciples, it could not be doubted by any philosophic mind that they were in reality harmonious and conspiring parts of some higher series of causes as yet undiscovered. 274 NATURE AND REVELATION. Marvels in history. We have adverted to the kind of examination we should make of a marvellous event occurring before our eyes. The same critical scrutiny could not be applied to a marvellous event recorded in history, But, in general, if such an event be narrated, espe- cially as occurring in remote times, it would still become a fair object of the critical historian, to endeavour to obtain, if possible, some rational clue to the interpretation of the alleged wonderful narra- tive. And in this point of view, it is sometimes possible that, under the supernatural language of a rude age, we may find some real natural phenomenon truly described according to the existing state of knowledge. But marvels and prodigies, as such, are beyond the province of critical history and scientific know- ledge; they can only be brought within it when, either certainly or probably, brought within the domain of nature. It is almost needless to add, in reference to any such historical narrative, that it is of course presumed, as preliminary to all philosophical specu- lation, that we have carefully scrutinised the whole question of testimony and documentary authenticity, on purely archæological and critical grounds. Essay II. $ 11.] 275 : MYTHS. But in other cases, where such marvels may seem still more to militate against all historical proba- bility, and where attempts at explanation seem irrational, we may be led to prefer the supposition that the narrative itself was of a designedly ficti- tious or poetical nature. And this alternative opens a wide and material field of inquiry, which can only be adequately entered upon by those who unite in an eminent degree the spirit of philosophic in- vestigation with accurate, critical, philological, and literary attainments; and which embraces the entire question of the origin and propagation of those various forms of popular fiction which are, and have been in all ages, so largely the expression of reli- gious ideas; and often convey, under a poetical or dramatised form, the exposition of an important moral or religious doctrine, and exemplify the re- mark, that parable and myth often include more truth than history. I 2 276 [Essay II. § II. NATURE AND REVELATION. - . REVELATION AND MIRACLES. 10 Some im- In the preceding portion of these remarks, we have pressions not ad adverted only to that class of truths, which are dressed to intellect. connected with external nature, reduced to laws, - and the evidence of sense elaborated by reason into science. But no extent of physical investigation can warrant the denial of a distinct order of impressions and convictions wholly different in kind, and affect- ing that portion of our compound constitution which we term the moral and spiritual. A spiritual That impressions of a spiritual kind, distinct from revelation not incon- any which positive reason can arrive at, may be made sistent with physical on the internal faculties of the soul, is an admission philosophy. which can contravene no truth of our constitution, mental or bodily. Nor can it be reasonably disputed on any physical ground, that, under peculiar con- ditions, such spiritual impressions or intimations, in a peculiarly exalted sense, may be afforded to some LUCU Essay II. $ 111.] 277 REVELATION. highly gifted individuals, and worthily ascribed to a Divine source, thus according with the idea we attach to the term “revelation." On other grounds it may perhaps be argued, that such a mode of communicating high spiritual truth is suitable to the truths communicated ; that spiritual things are exhibited by spiritual means; moral doc- trines conveyed through the fitting channel of the moral faculties of man. But all we are at present concerned to maintain is, that both the substance and the mode of the disclosure are thus wholly remote from anything to which physical difficulties can attach, or which comes under the province of sense or intellect. But then, in accordance with its nature, the The spiri- objects to which such a revelation refers must be not matter of know- properly and exclusively those belonging to moral ledge. and spiritual conceptions : whether as related to what we experience within ourselves, or pointing to and supposing a more extended and undefined world of spiritual, unseen, eternal, existence, above and beyond all that is matter of sense or reason, of which science gives no intimation — apart from the world of material existence, of ordinary human action, or AL tual world, T 3 278 [ESSAY İL. S III. NATURE AND REVELATION. tion to the physical world. even of metaphysical speculation, wholly the domain and creation of faith and inspiration. Such a world, it is acknowledged, is disclosed by Christianity as the subject of a peculiar revelation, presenting objects which are wholly and exclusively those of faith, not of sense or knowledge. The spi Thus it follows, in regard to revelation in general, ritual, in no adica that so far as its objects are properly those which are in their nature restricted to purely religious and spiritual truths, we must acknowledge that in these, its more characteristic and essential elements, it can involve nothing which can come into contact or collision with the truth of physical science, or in- ductive uniformity ; though wholly extraneous to the world of positive knowledge, it can imply nothing at variance with any part of it, and thus can involve us in no difficulties on physical grounds. And those who reason most extensively on the Divine perfections are usually foremost to allow that our most worthy conception of Divine interposition is that of spiritual manifestation in the disclosure of the Divine will and purposes for the salvation of man. It is the very aim and object of philosophy to 10 Essay II. § 111.] 279 SPIRITUAL TRUTH. point to broad principles of unity, continuity, and analogy, in all physical events; though there are many who (as one of the most able writers of the age has expressed it), being “unable to compare, suppose “ that everything is isolated, simply because to them " the continuity is invisible." I . But in matters altogether alien from physical things, or even the moral order of this world, -- in spiritual, unseen, ånd heavenly things, from their very nature, no such analogies can be found or expected; they are essentially distinct in kind and order. Thus, a purely spiritual revelation, as such, stands Revelation on quite distinct grounds from the idea of physical from interruption. Yet this distinction has been conti- nually lost sight of, while it is of the most primary importance for vindicating the acceptance of such revelation as the source of spiritual truth. Such a confusion of ideas so essentially distinct constitutes a main defect in the argument of Hume: who, at the conclusion of his Essay on Miracles, seeks to extend the inference by contending that what has distinct miracles. | Buckle, Hist. of Civil. vol. i. p. 478, note. T4 280 [Essay II. & III. NATURE AND REVELATION. confusion between physical evidence. C Hume's been urged with respect to miracles, will equally between apply to prophecy, and, in fact, to revelation and moral altogether, which is properly as miraculous; “So .“ that,” he finally observes, “upon the whole, we “may conclude that the Christian religion not only “was at first attended with miracles, but even at this 6 day cannot be believed by any reasonable person 56 without one. Mere reason is insufficient to con- 6 vince us of its veracity: and whoever is moved by “ faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued “miracle in his own person, which subverts all the “principles of his understanding, and gives him a. “determination to believe what is most contrary to “ custom and experience.” 1 This passage exhibits a remarkable and charac- teristic instance of the way in which a thinker, so acute on many subjects, confounds together things essentially distinct, in his anxiety to push his argu- ment beyond its legitimate application. It affords a striking confirmation of what was observed before, of how little he appreciated any enlarged view of natural order, or discriminated between physical and moral evidence. An argument on natural grounds, 1 Essays, vol. ii. p. 138, ed. 1800. Essay II. $ 11.] REVELATION AND FAITH. 281 281 UL : - which might correctly apply to physical miracles, might not apply at all to moral, or still less to spiritual influences; for the obvious reason that man's spiritual nature (in so far as it exists apart from his physical nature) is in no way amenable to any natural analogies, or subject to natural laws; and a spiritual revelation, as such, is never even ima- gined to be a violation or interruption of any laws of sense or even of mind; but is always conceived as something essentially distinct and apart from them. It is this which constitutes the very ground of its admissibility; it is in its nature something wholly beyond the province of philosophy, whether physical or metaphysical; and thus can offer nothing in an- tagonism to it.. The “lame and impotent conclusion” of the Faith dis- tinct from passage above quoted cannot but strike every one science. “What is contrary to custom and experience!” — to designate the vast idea of cosmical order, or to confound a violation of it with that spiritual influ- ence which cannot “subvert the principles of the “ understanding,” since from its nature it does not at all appeal to the understanding, or to the laws of reason, with which it professedly and essentially disclaims all connection. 282 NATURE AND REVELATION. by some. Necessity · Abstractedly, then, it must be admitted that the idea for miracles maintained of revelation, as above viewed, is entirely distinct from all admixture with external influences, and inde- pendent of the notion of any special sensible inter- vention. Yet it has often been maintained, and has been, perhaps, the most commonly received view, that such external interposition is necessary for attesting the disclosure of Divine communications. Such was the argument of Paley and others of an older school; but at the present day, we cannot but perceive that it is greatly losing ground, even in the estimation of orthodox theologians. Physical But those who have felt the greatest difficulty in admitting physical miracles, have no hesitation in accepting the assertion of any amount of purely moral and spiritual influence, even to the extent of those exalted conditions of soul in which the favoured and gifted disciple was enlightened by immediate disclosures of Divine truth, or endowed with internal energies, and spiritual powers, beyond the attainment or conception of the ordinary human faculties: And Theistic reasoners have held it more consonant with the Divine perfections to influence mind than to disarrange matter. It was the argument of Origen, and has since been and moral miracles. Essay II. § 111.] 283 ÉVIDENTIAL ARGUMENT. of the often repeated under various forms, that to suppose Propagation the success of Christianity in the world effected by Gospel. such simple means and humble instruments as its history describes, without the aid of miracles, would be to admit a greater miracle than any of those called in question. But it seems to be overlooked, that the alternative is merely one between physical miracles, and the moral miracle of the conversion of the world without them. And it would clearly be open to us to accept the latter : to admit an interposition of moral and spiritual influence to any extent, rather than one of physical interruption. The question of miracles as connected with the Evidential Christian revelation has been usually discussed with very little reference to the foregoing considerations, or indeed to any philosophical views. But as such dis- cussion in its received form has been largely mixed up with prevalent opinions, it may be desirable to make a few remarks on its grounds and nature. Perhaps the greater number of those writers who have treated the question, especially in former times, have made it rest almost entirely on the ground of testimony. Nor is this consideration one which can be overlooked, however at the present day it may discussion. 284 NATURE AND REVELATION. [Essay II. S III. Value of testimony. be seen to be subordinate to other and more general reasonings. So far as the simple question of human testimony is concerned - the value attaching to it, and the probabilities of its failure,—it is reducible to a matter of calculation; and apart from all ante- cedent considerations, has been followed out by mathematical analysis. Thus it has been considered generally by Laplace, and more special and elaborate investigations, applying to such cases as those in question, have been given by Mr. Babbagel and Mr. Young. 2 Any such abstract conclusions, however, will receive material modification when we come to enquire into the actual circumstances of the documentary evi- dence, and the transmission of the testimony or the apparent origin of the records of it. It must indeed be recollected that the whole ar- gument presupposes that the documentary evidence has been satisfactorily investigated. In whatever light we have been led to regard the Gospels, as to their origin, authorship, materials, or mode of com- Documen- tary autho- rity. | Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, Appendix, note E. 2 A paper, “On Hume's Argument,” printed separately, 1844, by T. R. Young, late Professor of Mathematics at Belfast; the details of the calculation being contained in his “ Essay on Probabilities." Essay II. $ 111.] 285 TESTIMONY. position, it is still, as it were, only by a reflection of that light that the miraculous relations can be viewed. The character of the latter is inseparable from that of the former. At the present day it is not a miracle but the narrative of a miracle, to which any argument can refer, or to which faith is accorded." In reference to the belief in miraculous narra- Indiscri- tives generally, some instructive suggestions may be belief. derived from the case of the celebrated Rammohun Roy, who, in his endeavours to convert his country- men even to the Unitarian form of Christianity, found the great difficulty in regard to the miracles, not from their scepticism but from their credulity. They did not at all question the miracles of the Bible, but appealed to wonders wrought by their own saints and deities ten thousand times more mar- vellous, and this on testimony apparently as strong. 2 minate | Vanini indeed went further, and objected that the Christian doc- trines were in this point of view “ Confirmatas non miraculis, sed “ scripturâ, - cujus nec originale ullibi invenitur, - quæ miracula facta “ recitet."--Amphitheatrum, fc., p. 366, 1615. 2 His own remarks are as follows : “ If all assertions were to be in- “ discriminately admitted as facts merely because they are testified by “ numbers, how can we dispute the truth of those miracles which are " said to have been performed by persons esteemed holy among the 286 NATURE AND REVELATION. Fact, mat. ter of tes. timony, miracle, of opinion. But material as, in reference to the subject of the last remark, is the discussion of testimony, it must still be observed that in the general and abstract point of view this is really but adventitious to the question of miracles: and that supposing all doubt as to testimony were entirely removed, as in the case of an actual witness having the evidence of his own senses to an extraordinary and perhaps inexplicable “ natives of this country ? (India.) The very same argument pursued “ hy the editor (of the “Friend of India') would equally avail the “ Hindoos. Have they not accounts and records handed down to them “ relating to the wonderful miracles stated to have been performed by “ their saints, such as Ugustyu, Virghistu, and Gotum; and their gods “ incarnate, such as Ram, Krishnu, and Nursingh; in presence of their * cotemporary friends and enemies, the wise and the ignorant, the “ select and the multitude ? Could not the Hindoos quote, in support “ of their narrated miracles, authorities from the histories of their s most inveterate enemies, the Jeins, who join the Hindoos entirely in “ acknowledging the truth and credibility of their miraculous aç- o counts ? “ Moosulmans, on the other hand, can produce records written and “ testified by the cotemporaries of Mohammed, both friends and “ enemies, who are represented as eye-witnesses of the miracles as- “cribed to him ; such as his dividing the moon into two parts, and “ walking in sunshine without casting a shadow. They assert, also, 66 that several of those witnesses suffered the greatest calamities, and “ some even death, in defence of that religion.”- Rammohun Roy, 2nd Appeal, p. 225, quoted in Combe's “Relation between Science and w Religion,” 4th ed. p. 147, in which able work the whole case of this remarkable man's convictions is fully discussed, especially in connection with his phrenological development Essay II. § 111.] 287 BELIEF IN MIRACLES. fact, still the material enquiry would remain,-is it a miracle? It is here, in fact, that the essence of the question of credibility is centred — not in regard to the mere external, apparent, event, but to the cause of it—not to the mere impression on the senses of the witness, but to the nature of the source whence it is derived. · This is the distinction so ably and largely insisted on by Dean Lyall.? After some criticism of Hume's Essay, he proceeds thus:-- “Nevertheless, the proposition itself, which he . s endeavours to establish, but most certainly does “not, is, I imagine, an indubitable truth. Assuredly, $ the credibility of a miracle cannot be established “ on human testimony. Not, however, for the rea- “sons assigned by Hume, because human testimony “is fallible, but because human testimony is not the “proper proof. This will be immediately apparent, “ if we consider for a moment what is the precise “ signification of the word miracle."" He then goes on to explain his meaning by draw- ing the distinction between an exctraordinary fact, - Propædia Prophetica, Diss. II p. 391. 1840. NATURE AND REVELATION. (Essay II. S III. Antecedent . credibility. Antecedent which is a proper matter for human testimony,--and the belief in its being caused by Divine interposi- tion, which is a matter of opinion, and consequently not susceptible of support by testimony, but de- pendent on quite other considerations. This passage may, perhaps, appear startling to some readers, but the remark is surely substantially just and important, and the distinction laid down by such undeniable theological authority in fact involves the essence of the question, and makes it turn on the consideration of the general grounds of antecedent credibility, on which the opinion or belief in the miraculous nature of an event really rests. It is the antecedent view of credibility which is the substantial principle really involved in the cele- brated argument of Hume; though so ill expressed, and so imperfectly brought out, as to lay his reason- ing open to obvious criticism,--of which his oppo- nents have not been slow to avail themselves. The mistake originates in the author's attempt, at the very commencement of his Essay, to identify the principle of his argument with that of Archbishop Tillotson against transubstantiation. Now Tillotson's argument amounts to this: that Hume's argument. 1 Essay II. § 111.] 289 - HUME289 'S ARGUMENT. the external evidence of Christianity altogether is weaker than the evidence of our senses ; — since it depends only on testimony to what was the evidence of the senses to the Apostles. It cannot, therefore, prove anything against the evidence of our senses. But transubstantiation contradicts the evidence of our senses?; therefore, were it ever so distinctly stated in revelation, it is not to be received. To apply the parallel, however, it becomes neces- sary to show that a miracle contradicts the testimony that Hume endeavours to establish as precisely equivalent the testimony of “experience” which is founded primarily on the evidence of the senses. But in adopting the term “ experience," and mak- Experience ing his argument mainly turn upon it, he exposed analogy. that argument to the criticisms of a host of oppo- nents, — of whom none availed themselves more skilfully of that oversight than Paley, — retorting and It is singular that so eminent a divine as Archbishop Tillotson should have overlooked the fact that transubstantiation does not con- tradict the evidence of the senses; since its assertors freely admit that the wafer and the wine still remain such to the senses, even to chemical analysis. These are only the outward accidents. It is the substance which is cbanged, which is not an object of the senses : it is a mystery of faith. See the “ Trent Catechism," pt. ii. ch. iv, quest. 25--43. 290 [Essay II. S III. NATURE AND REVELATION. Physical order. upon him the complete petitio principii involved in his expressions; if nothing is to be believed contrary to “experience,” every new fact must be denied. But the question really turns upon far wider and higher considerations. If for the word “experience" Hume had substituted “analogy," or something to the same effect,—the question would have presented itself under a very different aspect, and it would have been evident that we must recur to evidence of a far higher kind in order to its determination. . The real question does not relate to the evidence of the senses but of reason: not to experience in the limited sense of the word, but to the general ground of our convictions, the whole basis of the inductive philosophy;—and turns essentially on the views we have arrived at, of the order of the natural world, and the chain of physical causation. And here we must particularly attend to the dis- tinction between the evidence for those grand con- clusions in nature, and that which we have in regard to events connected with human affairs, a distinction of which Hume loses sight; and continually refers to the questions of credibility and testimony affect- ing the one class of facts and the other, as if they Physical and moral evidence. Essay II. § 111.] 291 PHYSICAL CREDIBILITY. belief in ages. i rested on the same kind of conviction alike, and without a due appreciation of the great principle of the permanence of physical laws. We have observed that a miracle is a matter of Grounds of opinion 1: and according to the ordinary view, the different precise point of opinion involved in the assertion of a miracle--is that the event in question is a violation or suspension of the laws of nature: a point on which opinions will chiefly vary accord- ing to the degree of acquaintance with physical philosophy and the acceptance of its wider princi- ples ; - especially as these principles are now un- derstood, and seen to imply the grand conception of the universal Cosmos, and the sublime conclu- sions resulting from it, or embodied in it. If, in a less critical view, former ages entertained Physical views of more unrestricted notions of supernatural influence, the present and justified them by metaphysical theories of the Divine perfections, especially of omnipotence, to the extent of supposing interruptions in the order of nature; the more strict and scientific physico-theology of the present day fails to carry us beyond the indications of mind in order, law, arrangement, and age. AU | Above, p. 288. 02 292 [ESSAY II. $ III. NATURE AND REVELATION. cal.theism support miracles. of power in the sense of upholding that universal and invariable system of order. Metaphysi If in former ages the spirit of metaphysical specu- does not lation led theologians to abstract theories of the Divine perfections, whence they reasoned downwards to an omnipotence over nature, and a providence of special interruptions, such reasonings have obtained less acceptance at the present day. It was formerly a popular argument that He who created nature can, when necessary, suspend it, or, to meet emergencies, adopt extraordinary measures; as if “emergencies" could occur to omniscience, or “necessity” to omni- potence! Indeed, in modern times, those who have most largely dwelt on the à priori Theistic argument (valeat quantum) have been led from it to the rejection of all interposition as inconsistent with infinite perfection." Progress of The progress of opinion on such questions, has been opinion on these points, in some measure indicated in the historical survey before taken. The metaphysical spirit of an older philosophy indisposed or disqualified even the most | For instance, such are the arguments of Wegscheider (" Instit. Theol.” § 12.), and of Theodore Parker (“ Theism,” &c., p. 263). See also Mansel's “ Bampt. Lect.” p. 185, 1858. 2 See Essay I. p. 124. Essay II. § 111.] ANCIENT AND MODERN BELIEF. 293 philosophical inquirers from perceiving the relative importance and bearing of physical truth. Their Theistic arguments were based on technical abstrac- tions, and overruled all physical inferences. Hence both the belief and the scepticism of different ages has taken its character. Men formerly, and even at present under metaphysical influences, have cavilled at mysteries, but acquiesced in miracles. Under a more positive system, the most enlightened are the first to admit spiritual mysteries as matters of faith, utterly beyond reason, though they find deviations from physical truth irreconcilable to science. For- merly, the most philosophical theologians found subjects of keen dispute or doubt in the mode of the Divine hypostasis, — in the homoöusion, - in the mazes of predestination, foreknowledge, freewill and evil; which no human intellect can grasp: while yet no question occurred to them in the really tangible subjects of the material world, in accepting a creation of all things out of nothing in six days, — an universal deluge, subversions of physical laws, and interruptions of the order of nature. The great difference in the mode of viewing these and the like questions, between different ages, is aces Grounds of belief in different U 3 294 [Essay II. S III. NATURE AND REVELATION. mainly dependent on the advance of physical know- ledge, and the increasing perception of the great cosmical principle. As we have before seen, even in comparatively modern times, this principle can hardly be said to have been fully developed, or its force adequately appreciated, even by some philo- sophers. And as we recede to the testimonies of still more ancient periods, and view the records of miracles in connexion with the existing state of knowledge and intelligence, we must recognise the more universal influence of predisposing causes on the adoption of the belief in the supernatural. Some distinction too of this kind may not be uncon- nected with the characters of race and country: the Oriental mind, in this respect, has perhaps some tez- dencies different from the European. But, in regard both to nationality and to time, the entire diversity in the mode and nature of conceptions on such points, between ourselves and the contem- poraries of the origin of Christianity, must ever be borne in mind in these questions. It may perhaps be allowable to illustrate the case, by imagining a sort of reversal of the conditions; by conceiving for a moment that any of the wonders of the present Ancient scepticism. i Essay II. $ 111.] ANCIENT AND MODERN BELIET. 295 age, the miracles of modern science, the revelations of the telescope or microscope, a steam-carriage, or electric-telegraph,—could have been made known to an intelligent Jew in the Apostolic Age. He would, make no doubt as to the fact, if properly authenti- cated; but would, as a matter of course, set it down as a supernatural interposition, whether divine or demoniacal. This, in fact, would, to his mind, con- stitute the main ground of its credibility: To spiritual power, he would say, nothing is impossible. But suppose him told that all these marvellous effects are nothing but the mere operations of natural causes, applied by human skill, this would be too much for his faith: No, he would say, natural causes and human skill could never produce anything like this; it is the finger of God, or the power of a spirit! To. the ancient Oriental and the modern European mind the order and force of the reasoning are exactly inverted. What to one would be the sole ground of belief, would to the other constitute the very . occasion of doubt... In fact, in this as in all other cases, we must recollect how entirely the grounds of conviction are altered with the state of knowledge. 94 296 [Essay II. $ III. NATURE AND REVELATION. Modern scepticism. Miracles regarded as parts of some more compre- hensive sy:tem. Of old, the sceptic professed he would be convinced by seeing a miracle. At the present day, a visible miracle would but be the very subject of his scepti- cism. It is not the attestation, but the nature of the alleged marvel, which is now the point in ques- tion. It is not the fallibility of human testimony, but the infallibility of natural order, which is now the ground of argument: and modern science cannot conceive religious truth confirmed by a violation of physical truth. On such considerations as the foregoing, many of the most serious inquirers into this subject (even of very different schools) have agreed in the necessity for having recourse to some wider principles in their view of miracles than the old assumption of sus- pensions of the laws of matter, the admission of which they acknowledge inconsistent with the pre- sent state of physical knowledge. Thus to many who are anxious to uphold miracles, it has appeared a. more satisfactory view of the case to recur to a broader basis, and one more conformable to wider views of natural laws. Thus it has seemed more philosophical, and more in conformity with the grounds of natural theology, Essay II. $ 11.] MIRACLES SUBJECT TO LAW. to appeal to some wider principle of law and order: to suppose miracles rather parts of some more comprehensive system, -and that there is no real breach of extended analogy,-of a kind connected by larger principles of uniformity, however unknown to us. Some such view has in fact been adopted by the best and most approved advocates of Christianity, even of very opposite schools. Derived, perhaps, from the philosophy of Leibnitz, — suggested by Bishop Butler, recognised by Bishop Watson?, - it has been in different degrees upheld by Dean Lyall3 and Dr. Arnoldº, advocated by the learned dissenting divine Dr. Pye Smith, and illustrated from the mathematical analogies of intermittent laws by Mr. Babbage. 6 Bishop Butler indeed seems to have conceived that Views of eminent the providential government of God consisted of two writers. schemes, as it were, running parallel with each other, Butler. the one ordinary, the other extraordinary, both re- Bishop * Analogy, pt. ii. ch. iv. $ 3. 3 Prop. Proph. p. 392. 5 Scrip. Geol. 88, 101. 2 Third Letter to Gibbon. * Mod. Hist. p. 137. O Ninth Bridgew. Treat. 99. 298 NATURE AND REVELATION. 1 its own laws. This at least is what may be collected from the most material passage, where his argument is to this effect. After enlarging on the real sub- ordination of all nature and all ordinary events to some general laws, to however large an extent, as yet unknown to us, he concludes, - it is a fair argument “ that God’s miraculous interpositions may “ have been all along in like manner by general “ laws of wisdom.” “ Thus that miraculous powers should be exerted” at particular times, and under particular circumstances only, as in various cases which he enumerates, ..... “ all this may have “ been by general laws. These laws are unknown “ to us; but no more unknown than the laws” of many natural events; of which it is yet “ taken “ for granted that they are as much reducible to “ general laws as gravitation.” I In this argument, however, it must be observed that the general admission of miraculous interposi- tion is assumed, and the antecedent credibility of such physical intervention does not enter into the question. In other places, indeed, it is evident that | Analogy, pt. ii. ch. iv. § 3, p. 262, ed. 1807. Essay II. $ 111.] 299 BISHOP BUTLER'S VIEW. the author makes “revelation” and “miracles” sy- nonymous ; - or at least conceives no distinction between a spiritual or moral interposition (which involves no possible question) and a physical, where alone the modern difficulty applies. . But the argument mainly depends on a distinction in the parallel thus drawn between the moral and the natural order of things; that, in the former, miracles and ordinary providence differ, in the same way as in the latter certain peculiar cases differ from the ordinary operations of nature. Thus he observes:—“Miracles must not be com- “pared to common natural events, or to events which, “ though uncommon, are similar to what we daily “ experience; but to the extraordinary phenomena “ of nature. And then the comparison will be be- “tween the presumption against miracles and the "presumption against such uncommon appearances, " --suppose as comets, and against there being any “such powers in nature as magnetism and electricity, “so contrary to the properties of other bodies not “endued with these powers. And before any one See especially “ Analogy," p. 227, ed. 1807. 300 NATURE AND REVELATION. “ can determine whether there be any peculiar pre- “sumption against miracles more than against other * extraordinary things, he must consider what, on “ first hearing, would be the presumption against “ the last-mentioned appearances and powers to a “person acquainted only with the daily, monthly, “ and annual courses of nature respecting this earth, “and with those common powers of matter which “we every day see."!. Thus then, according to this distinguished and philosophical prelate, we may perceive that miracles or special interventions are to be supposed to stand in the same relation to ordinary providence, as that in which comets, magnetism, electricity, or other more striking and singular instances of natural phe- nomena stand with respect to the more common and universally observed facts of the regular planetary motions—of gravitation of the pressure of the air and the like;-a relation which, in the present state of our knowledge, is absolutely one and the same. More par- Some divines have gone into more detailed sup- application. positions and applications of the same principle. ticular | Analogy, pt. ii. ch. ii. $ 3, p. 233, ed. 1807. Essay II. $ 111.] 301 OPINIONS OF DIVINES. X U SU Thus, Athanase Coquerel? connects very similar Athanase Coquerel. views with an extensive doctrinal speculation on the divine powers and operations concerned (as he con- ceives) in the work of redemption, on which he supports the idea that miracles are preordained parts of that series of designed operations and not sus- pensions of nature. Such speculations, it is to be observed, rest entirely on the Theistic argument, which, as to Omnipotence, it has been before ob- served, depends wholly upon revelation, and thus cannot legitimately be made the basis of argument antecedent to that revelation, or of evidence in proof of it. Archbishop Whately remarks: “ Superhuman Archbishop Whately. “ would perhaps be a better word than supernatu- sral: for, if we believe that nature' is merely “ another word used to signify that state of things “and course of events which God has appointed, “nothing that occurs can be strictly called “super- “natural.' Jesus himself accordingly describes his “works, not as violations of the laws of nature, but “ as works which none other man did.'»2 | Christianity (translation), p. 228. 2 Easy Lessons on Evidences, ch, v. § 2. 302 [Essay II. S III. 302 . NATURE NATURE . AND REVELATIONAND REVELATIONDean Trench. 11 The broad principles of general laws, at least to a certain extent, appear to be admitted by the Dean of Westminster, Dr. Trench. In his preliminary Essay he offers several illustrations of apparent exceptions to general rules which yet really fulfil them. But, upon the whole, the nature of his dis- tinction as to miracles is expressed in terms such as to leave us in some uncertainty as to the precise meaning. He observes:-“ They (miracles) exceed “the laws of our nature, but not of all nature. “.... A comet is a miracle as regards our solar s system; that is, it does not own the laws of our “system, neither do those laws explain it. Yet “is there a higher and wider law of the heavens, 66 whether fully discovered or not, in which its s motions are included as surely as those of the “ planets which stand in immediate relation to “our sun." The sense in which we are to take the learned author's distinction between our nature and all nature, is far from clear; while it is difficult to in- terpret his idea of the laws of the solar system, unless 1 Notes on Miracles, 1846. 2 Note, p. 16. Essay II. $ III.] 303 OPINIONS OF DIVINES. it be understood to imply a view of the real subordi- nation of miracles to some general natural laws, far more complete and philosophical than perhaps the tenor of other parts of his remarks might seem to countenance. If, indeed, miracles differ from ordinary events only as comets differ from planets, or unexplained phe- nomena from those whose laws are known, they do not differ at all in the only sense in which any philosophical difficulty arises. But this would hardly accord with the meaning in which they have been usually appealed to by theologians. Dr. T. Brown, on his peculiar view of causation, Dr. T. Brown. argues that “a miracle does not violate the laws of causation," on the ground that the non-production of similar effects from similar causes would indeed be a violation, — but here, he says, the causes are not similar, since “ to the usual operation of natural “agents there is superadded a special intervention of “the author of nature.” But this is simply to beg the whole question; un- less, indeed, we understand it in the sense which elsewhere the same author seems to intimate when he considers the divine intervention as in fact a co vuses 304 [Essay II. § 111. NATURE AND REVELATION. Dr. Car- penter. Mr. Kings- ley. part of the powers of nature," and thus miracles as natural phenomena. 1 One of our most enlightened physiologists remarks of miracles, that, “If they are exceptions to general “laws, they are so only in human estimation, since “ they are as much a part of the Divine will, and 6 were as much foreseen by Divine Omniscience as “ any of those occurrences which are usually re- “ garded as constituting the order of nature.” 2 Another able and popular writer has indulged in carrying out the same idea to the extent that, as health and life are the normal condition of physical order, and disease and death interruptions of it, so the miracles of healing and resuscitation were but the assertion of the higher and divine principle of order, to restore the true condition and law of nature, instead of being at variance with it; while “contra-natural prodigies, signs from heaven,” were refused; and that those which were granted took place “according to some great primal law unknown to us whereby the spirit of life operates.” 3 i On Cause and Effect, note E. 2 Dr. Carpenter, “General Physiology," p. 135, note. 3 Rev. C. Kingsley, “Alton Locke,” ii. 263. Essay II. § 111.] 305 DIFFICULTIES OF THE CASE view. These various specimens of the expressions of a General remark general view, more or less clearly put forth, exhibit, on this doubtless, conceptions gaining authority at the pre- sent day of a more worthy character than the unphilosophical notion of suspensions of the laws of nature. But in some of the illustrations proposed it may be doubted whether there is evinced that distinct grasp of the real idea of physical law as the paramount principle on which alone all further inferences can be philosophically built. These and all arguments of the same class, it must Argument involves also be remembered, rest entirely on the assump- doubtful tion of Theistic hypotheses, often of a very doubtful tions. nature, or which cannot be adopted antecedently to revelation, since they are unsupported by positive scientific evidence. Yet there are doubtless many minds to whose conceptions such a view disencumbers the subject of serious difficulties; and in the coincidence of cer- tain intermittent effects foreseen by an overruling Providence, or in the belief that God might make use of extraordinary natural events as instruments to His designs, they are satisfied to acknowledge divine assump- 306 Essay II. $ III. NATURE AND REVELATION. 1- [manifestations accrediting a disclosure of divine truth. To others, however, such a view may appear to fall short of the requirements of the case, especially when they attempt to realise it in detail as applied to the actual recorded cases of the New Testament narrative. Yet it may not be superfluous or un- profitable to advert to any form of explanation which may seem to claim attention on a subject on which so much serious difficulty and perplexity has been felt. To some more detailed views which have been put forth with this object, attention will be directed in the next Essay. ESSAY III. ON THE RATIONALISTIC AND OTHER THEORIES OF MIRACLES. x 2 RATIONALISTIC THEORIES OF MIRACLES, &c. § I.--INTRODUCTION -- GENERAL NATURE AND OBJECT OF CRITICAL AND RATIONALISTIC THEORIES OF MIRACLES. § II.--THE NATURALISTIC OTHERS. THEORY OF PAULUS AND 1.THE MYTHIC THEORY OF STRAUSS. $ 1V.-THE SUBJECTIVE THEORY OF FEUERBACH. § V.--THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF EWALD. $ VI.---THE DOCTRINAL THEORY OF NEANDER. CONCLUSION-GENERAL REMARKS ON THEORIES OF MIRACLES. ESSAY III. ON THE RATIONALISTIO AND OTHER THEORIES OF MIRACLES. wannar $ I. - INTRODUCTION - THE GENERAL NATURE AND GROUNDS OF RATIONALISTIC THEORIES OF MIRACLES. WHEN the serious difficulties attending the question Origin and aim of of miracles have been duly considered, as well as the rationalism doubts which have in consequence arisen in the minds of so many, it is not surprising that a disposi- tion has manifested itself, on the part of a consider- able school of professed advocates of Christianity (especially in the speculative spirit of the German theology), to avoid the rejection of the miracles by attempts to explain them, or the origin of the narratives of them, according to some recognised and general principles, and in what is considered a “ rational” point of view: in a word, on the same principles as would be applied in a rational criticism X 3 310 [ESSAY III. $ 1. , RATIONALISM. to be fairly estimated. of supernatural incidents in ordinary history. Yet all such attempts have been regarded by many divines with suspicion and hostility in respect to their entire nature, character, and pretensions, without entering on the question of the intrinsic reasonableness or sufficiency of the particular explanations suggested. In a complete and dispassionate survey of the sub- ject of miracles, this, portion of it cannot be over- looked: nor ought the candid inquirer to shrink from an examination of what is at least proposed by able and learned writers, as a means of solving those difficulties which many serious thinkers have found so formidable. When the inviolable sanctity of the claims so long maintained to their unlimited extent by the ancient church had been once invaded by the unsparing hand of Protestant criticism, and the plea of reason and free inquiry once recognised, :-it must be allowed that if one school of Pro- testantism should have adopted a bolder line of inquiry, or followed it out to a more ambitious extent, it is clearly not so much in principle as in the degree, the mode, the tone, of their speculations that they have subjected themselves to the censures Essay III. $ 1.] 311 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. SO felt to speculation. of the more literal interpreters. And it cannot be denied that there has sometimes been much justly offensive to the believer in the character and style of these criticisms. Yet, while everything in the mode of expression calculated to give offence should be strongly repudiated, the candid inquirer will not disregard the real claims of fair discussion on matters so essential to the full - appreciation of Christian truth. Many very good men, alarmed for the security of Objections established opinions, are . led to look with indefinitè rationalistic suspicion on all critical inquiry, and to denounce all free investigation as unwarrantable and dangerous. But though some speculations of the kind have been pushed to a faulty and offensive extreme, and evince a perversion and misuse of rational argument, it is surely rather on this very ground that they ought to be met. They claim, at least, to be founded on principles identified with those of reason and sound criticism. It is then on similar principles and with similar arguments that the polemic must be pre- pared to encounter them. It is utterly idle at the present time for the advocate of Christianity to indulge in mere empty declamation against Ra- X 4 312 [Essay III. & I. RATIONALISM. Historical criticism. tionalism; or to content himself with censuring and anathematising such speculations as presumptuous and sinful. It is not by any such sweeping con- demnation that they can be really or effectually opposed. They profess to be built on considerations of an exact and philosophical kind, by such phi- losophical, learned and candid discussion therefore they ought to be combated. The whole subject of the rational criticism of his- torical narratives, and more especially what is called the “higher criticism,” is a branch of study even now but little attended to among us, and till of late almost unknown to our literature. Thus the reading public some years ago was altogether startled at the liberties taken by Arnold and Niebuhr with the time-sanctioned legends of the Roman history; and even when such criticism is tolerated with re- ference to other branches of ancient and even eccle- siastical history, there is still a vehement prejudice entertained against any application of it to the Scrip- ture narrative; and an impression felt that it is a sort of profanation to subject to the same tests those records in which above all others it would seem most important that the actual truth should be vindi- ESSAY III. $ 1.] 313 C HISTORICAL CRITICISM. cated and distinguished: more especially as it is on their strictly historical character that so much stress is laid by divines of the older school. But here again we cannot but trace an under current of popular feeling, which invests those nar- ratives with a character somewhat different from what the strict evidential school would demand: and which views the sacred records' much more through the medium of a religious feeling, and a sense of the doctrinal turn which is to be given to them, than as mere matters of chronological and annalistic detail. And regarding the Gospel miraculous narratives in this sacred light, popular prepossession is startled and offended at critical discussion; and thus virtually disparages their historical character. It is sometimes argued against the application Argument of such criticism, that in our own days very ex- traordinary events have happened, which, if nar- the present rated in brief fragmentary records to a distant age, would appear so improbable that they ought on the same critical principles to be rejected as incre- dible, or explained away as fabulous, though pos- sibly enveloping some small germ of real history. Yet, being in possession of the actual facts, we see from ex- traordinary events at day. 314 [Essay III. $ 1. RATIONALISM. that when all the real conditions are known,--the defective links. supplied, — and the true causes of dible and conformable to experience. · Thus what such a representation really proves is, stances of orthodox vels; and it is on the general persuasion that in any case some such rational explanation really exists, though unknown to us,—that any historical state- ment of an apparently marvellous kind is rendered credible. Partial in- In the nature of such attempts to explain miracles such in.. there is nothing absolutely new or peculiar. It has terpretation allowed by been a practice with divines of many times and divines. countries, occasionally to view the Scripture nar- ratives of miracles, either as explicable by natural causes, or as figurative or allegorical representations of doctrines. These modes of interpretation were not unfrequently resorted to by the Fathers of the early Church, and few would refuse to admit that such ex- planations may be in certain cases plausible, and may even tend fairly to smooth down difficulties apparent on the face of the literal narratives. Many find it satisfactory to admit, as a general Essay III. $ 1.] 315 INSTANCES OF EXPLANATION. principle, the probability that extraordinary natural events may have been used as the means or instru- ments of introducing religious truths, or have been narrated and believed in remote ages as special in- terpositions in favour of nations or individuals, or that a supernatural colouring might have been some- times given to narratives even of ordinary transac- tions in times when, in popular estimation, most G in the old For example: many who strongly uphold the au- Examples thority of the Old Testament, yet think it reasonable Testament: to regard the description of the shower of stones in the book of Joshua (ch. x.) as really a fall of me- teorites, such as modern observation has so fully substantiated : while others look upon the passage, especially including the other phenomena mentioned, as a figurative or poetical description quoted (as indeed seems to be implied) from the lost book of Jasher. But the only ground on which either ex- planation becomes of any importance is in connection with the primary conviction, and the degree to which it is admitted, that the order of nature would not be violated. Again: no educated person at the present day for 316 [ESSAY III. & I. RATIONALISM. a moment imagines the “standing still” of the sun and moon, or the going back of the dial of Ahaz, to have been a real stoppage or retrogradation of the earth’s rotation ; however little they may be able to imagine what the case described really was. As little doubt would be entertained (assuming the historical character of the Mosaic writings) that some secondary agents were employed in the ex- traordinary events connected with the exode of the Israelites and the delivery of the law, though we know Particular not of what nature. The precise explanations sug- solutions may be un- gested may be frivolous and unsatisfactory; yet we satisfactory. may be convinced there is some explanation. Some have assigned a precise theory of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, including the fate of Lot's wife? by the agency of a volcanic eruption:-others again have alleged that the “manna” in the wil- derness was an unusual supply of the gum from a species of Tamarisk known to be often found scat- tered on the ground in those regions. These and numerous other like suggestions may be utterly futile; yet it may be true that if the See Henderson's - Travels in Iceland," i. 153. Essay 111. § 1.] 317 INSTANCES HANNT OF EXPLANATION. incidents are regarded as real some natural agents may have been the causes of them. 1 In general, the peculiar difficulties attaching to General principles miraculous narratives, as well as the importance of admitted, looking to such considerations as might tend to ob- viate them, will doubtless appear of very different magnitude to different minds. Among the most or- thodox and approved divines, attempts to explain certain portions of the Gospel narratives so as to obviate objections felt on physical grounds have not been discountenanced. In such cases it has been 1 We may illustrate the subject by another recent instance of this kind of explanation, suggested, on purely chronological and astronomical grounds, by Dr. Ideler (“ Handbuch der Mathemat.” &c., vol. i. p. 407); that the star of the Magi may have been a remarkable conjunction of the planets Jupiter and Saturn, so near, he conceives, that “they miglit have seemed confounded into one," or have been so described; which he calculated took place a.d. 7; and this explanation has been adopted in the Greek Testament of Dr. Alford, Dean of Canterbury. It has, however, since been clearly shown by the more exact calcula- tions of the Rev. C. Pritchard (Memoirs of the Royal Astron. Society, vol. xxv. p. 119, 1856), that the nearest approach of the two planets was, in fact, a distance of more than two diameters of the moon, so as to exclude the possibility of their being confounded into one. Since the publication of Mr. Pritchard's paper it has appeared that Professor Encke bad already made a similar calculation with exactly the same result, notwithstanding which some of the rationalistic commen- tators persist in affirming this conjunction to be the star of the Magi. 318 [Essay III. & I. RATIONALISM. . : Inferences beyond the literal narrative. allowed a reasonable caution to abstain from too hasty an assumption of Divine interposition, and natural causes have been allowed sometimes to afford at least plausible solutions. Again: most critical inquirers admit it right, as a general rule, not to insist on more than the words of the writers necessarily imply. The popular no- tion of a particular recorded occurrence may very often be found to run beyond what the strict lan- guage of the narrative really conveys: and the difficulty felt in the supposed supernatural character of an incident may turn wholly on an interpretation given perhaps to a single expression, or on something inferred rather than positively stated. In such cases the most orthodox will allow that the critic has a full right to whatever real or supposed advantage he can fairly gain, without trenching on the integrity of the text. Such are a few general and preliminary considera- tions which may tend to facilitate the more particular examination of several theories proposed, to which we now proceed. ses Essay III. g 11.] 319 NATURALISTIC THEORY. $ II. — THE NATURALISTIC THEORY OF PAULUS AND OTHERS. of the The principle of going into minute criticisms of the Grounds narratives of the Evangelists, so as, in many cases, “natural explana- to avoid the apparent supernatural sense, and by re- tion. ferring to natural causes to explain events apparently described as miraculous, has been designated as the “ natural,” in contradistinction to certain other hypotheses referring to the composition of the narrative. Such modes of interpretation had indeed been carried on, with reference to detached portions of the sacred narrative, by some of the German theologians of earlier date. But Semler (about the middle of the last century), who may perhaps justly claim the title of the founder of the Rationalistic school, attempted a more connected application of it, es- pecially as to the cases of the demoniacs. His views were taken up by numerous coadjutors and disciples, until they received at last their most fully systema- tised development in the labours of Paulus. 320 [Essay III. 11. RATIONALISM. Polemical divines, both in England and on the Continent, have been too prone to ascribe an irreli- gious motive to all such speculators; an accusation which, in some cases at least, is quite unfounded. The “Autobiographic Sketches” of Paulus, for in- stance, present a very different picture of the spirit in which his inquiries were carried on. He appears to have been throughout animated by the most sincere desire of vindicating the truth of the New Testament, whatever may be thought of the wisdom, skill, or success of the attempt. The publication of the celebrated Wolfenbuttel Fragments, under the name of Reimarus (1773–8), ascribed to Lessing, was perhaps not unjustly con- sidered as one of the most formidable attacks which the cause of Christianity had sustained ; since it directly impugned, on critical grounds, the entire credit of its records, especially the miraculous portions of them. It was chiefly in reply to this attack, that Paulus presented himself as the cham- pion of Christianity. He grounded his argument upon the broad principle (in itself so readily ad- missible) that those portions of the New Testament which have a special reference to the age and S Essay III. § 11.] 321 Tº NATURALISTIC THEORY. nature of the parties addressed may, and ought to, be care- fully distinguished from those which are of a more general and permanent import. In following out this idea, Paulus included miracles under the former class. According to his view of them, they were real Assumed events which were regarded as miraculous in that miracles. age and country; but which ought to be viewed in a different light by the more advanced intel- ligence of our times. They were either extraordinary natural effects; or results whose causes have been simply omitted in the narrative; or the triumphs of superior skill and knowledge, which the Evangelists have described, in the popular language of their day, as supernatural interpositions; or, in other in- stances, he would suppose them to have really been nothing more than those “ symbolic actions,” or “acted parables,” which were familiar to the Jews, from the recorded instances of such actions per- formed by the Prophets, designed as merely illus- trative of some doctrine, though the nature of them was afterwards misconceived. Paulus at length introduced a complete system of the Gospel history composed upon these principles, in his “ Commen- 322 [ESSAY III. S II. RATIONALISM. tary on the Gospels” (1800), and his “Life of Jesus” (1828). To illustrate the nature of these theories, it will be important to consider a few in- stances of their application in detail. Miracles by In certain instances, it is alleged that in the text, implication, when closely examined, no miracle will, strictly speaking, be found to be actually asserted, or neces- sarily implied. Thus, in what is often called the miracle of the tribute money', the Evangelist, in fact, only mentions a command given to Peter, and not the fulfilment of it: and even this has been in- terpreted as merely a proverbial mode of expression for gaining money by fishing. Events too, it is alleged, are often described as they appeared at the time to the unenlightened disciples, not as they really were : thus that Jesus seemed to their excited apprehensions to walk on the sea, perhaps only wading through the shallows, while Peter's attempt was simply a failure. Again, many events not in their own nature miraculous, such as a sudden calm, an unexpected shoal of fishes, and the like, could only be so regarded from coincidence of circumstances which O } Matt. xvij. 27. Essay III. $ 11.] 323 NATURALISTIC NYTT THEORY. might be ill understood, or omitted in the description. The miraculous nature of the introduction of wine at the marriage feast, it is remarked, turns only on the expression that it was “ a beginning of mira- cles” (signs), and that “the water which was made wine” only means that Jesus had privately in- structed the servants to substitute wine (a usual pre- sent on such occasions) when he gave the signal, by commanding them to fill with water. Some think it may have been a symbolic action; while others ascribe it to mesmerism, or some of those kindred modes of action, which are said to produce effects very similar. The several narratives of the multiplication of the Miracles by loaves and fishes have been regarded as magnified in tion. popular apprehension beyond what the strict sense of the facts necessarily implies. The words of Jesus to Philip (after all, not asserting that the multitude had no food) were expressly to prove him', by merely putting a supposition: and in none of the other accounts does it absolutely appear that the multitude had no food with them. The inquiry of Christ, and the circumstance that one had provisions, exaggera- | John vi. 6. 2 Matt, XV. 32 ; Mark vi. 36; viii. 1. Y 2 324 [Essay III. $ II. RATIONALISM. would be against that supposition. In two of the narratives ? the want of food is not hinted at. And it is further imagined that, from the suggestion given by Christ's inquiry, those present who had provisions contributed to supply those who had not. The dis- tribution of the small portion after the solemn benediction; is thus regarded as a purely “sym- bolical action," or type of the doctrine conveyed in the discourse of Jesus setting forth the true bread of life?; or even as having a sacramental design.3 The nativity is thus explained away: accord- ing to these writers, Jesus is asserted to have been the son of Mary and Joseph, as universally be- lieved by the Jews, and as, they contend, several pas- sages, especially Mary's calling Joseph His father + (to whom also the genealogies apply), seem literally to intimate. They are supposed to have been vir- tually married; and that the birth excited surprise only on account of the age of Joseph, whence it was viewed as specially providential, and said to be The Nativity. ? Matt. xiv. 19; Luke ix. 12. ? John vi. 3 St. Augustine (Serm. cxxx. 1) compares this miracle to that of the annual multiplication of corn, which he considers equally mira- culous. 4 Luke ii. 48. Essay III. & 11.] 325 N NATURALISTIC THEORY. “ of the Holy Ghost.” The case is regarded as parallel with that of the birth of John the Baptist; as they think is intimated by St. Luke. It is also alleged by some that “the miraculous concep- tion," in the received sense, is not asserted in so many words even in the narrative of St. Matthew, but rather left to be inferred : and that it is not again referred to in any part of the New Testament; . though made so prominent a feature in the Creed of the early Church. The belief of the Jews in ascribing all diseases to Demoniacs, the infliction of Satan?, and especially certain singular forms of mental disorder, accompanied by bodily convulsions, to possession by evil spirits, and their practice of exorcism 3 (we must suppose not without some apparent effect), have been referred to, to explain the ejections as practised in adaptation to the ex- isting belief. This branch of the subject was indeed long since referred to by Lightfoot and other divines of the Church of England, and was followed out in detail by Semler and the older rationalists. The S01 I Luke i. 36. 2 Luke xiii. 16; Acts x. 38. 3 Luke ix. 49; xi. 19. 4 Lightfoot observes (" Horæ Hebraicæ"): “ Judæis usitatissimum Y 3 326 [Essay III. $ 11. RATIONALISM. difficult case of the possession of the swine, is dis- posed of by Eichorn on the supposition that the command to go into them was merely a wise com- pliance with the hallucinations of the disordered person, at whose ravings the swine took flight, and whose cure was mainly assisted by the belief that the expelled spirits had entered into the swine and caused their destruction. If the Evangelists speak without hesitation in the language of their time of those possessed with devils (daljoviçouevoi), they speak as positively of those influenced by the moon! (oelnui Gouevoi); and if they are to be taken literally in the one case they ought to be so equally in the other. Again, it must be remembered that on the subject of evil spirits, in “ erat morbos quosdam graviores, eos præsertim quibus distortum erat “ corpus, vel mens turbata et agitata phrenesi, malis spiritibus attri- - buere.” Bishop Douglas (“Crit.” 236) explains the Jewish and Pagan ex- orcisms by natural causes, deception, &c. See - Tracts for the Times," viii. 8; Whitby, Pref. to Epistles, $ 10; Farmer on Miracles, 241. The practice of exorcism among the Jews is testified by Josephus (" Antiq." viii, 2, 5) as common in his time, as it is still in some parts of the East (see “Phases of Faith,” 128), and traced up to Solomon. See Krebsius on Acts xix. 13; see also Dr. H. Farmer “On the Demoniacs of the New Testament," 1775. Matt. iv, 24; xvii. 15. Essay III. $ 11.] I NATURALISTIC 327 THEORY. the absence of all evidence from natural science the whole popular belief rests entirely on the verbal interpretation of the Scripture expressions. The various general statements of “healing" the Healing of diseases. , sick might, it is pretended, often signify only pre- scribing means for their cure. Some more specific in- stances, it is alleged, may have been only the public announcement of cures previously wrought; or even the ceremonial recognition of them with a view to the legal purification. Sometimes even the mere detection of a mendicant impostor may have been afterwards misconceived as a cure. Paulus imagines, for instance, that the lepers were already in a sufficient stage of recovery to be pro- nounced clean according to the law, and that Jesus merely seized a public opportunity of formally de- claring them so. It is supposed that Christ possessed great medical skill, beyond his contemporaries : which was of course regarded as supernaturall: and that He thus foresaw ? Dean Trench and other divines, with no leaning whatever to ra- tionalism, have collected many instances where cases parallel to the Gospel miracles are alluded to by secular writers. For example, the anointing of the eyes of the blind is referred to : “ Lippitudines matu- tinâ quotidie solent inunctione arceri.” (Plin. “ Nat. Hist.” xxviii. 2.) Y 4 328 [Essay III. $ 11. RATIONALISM. the recovery of the centurion's servant. In some cases the application of means is mentioned; in others it may be supposed. Nervous influence and effects allied to mesmerism are largely appealed to, especially for visions, trances, voices, and the like. The cases of raising of the dead have been in like Raising the dead. Suetonius (“ Vespas.” 7) and Tacitus (" Hist." iv. 8) both mention saliva used by Vespasian in such a cure. Lucian (" Vera Hist.” ij. 4) alludes to walking on water (also in • Philopseudes," 13) as among the incredible tales of poets, historians, and philosophers. Also to healing, expulsion of demons, &c. I Luke viii. 40; Acts v. 8; xiji. 12; xx. 1, &c. 2 With respect to the idea of explaining miracles by mesmerism or the like agency, a very able advocate of the so-called “spiritualistic " manifestations at the present day, (whose remarks being printed for private circulation only I am not, perhaps, at liberty to quote by any more express reference,) observes positively:- “ The development of the phenomena of mesmerism, clairvoyance, “ and what is commonly called electro-hiology, have shown unmistake- “ably that the supposed miracles of Christ were due simply to a power « inherent in human nature, though, like other powers, bestowed in “ lavish measure but on the few. Rationalism, which had resorted to " interpretations of the supernatural (so-called) incidents of Scripture, “ so extravagantly forced and opposed to common sense, has thus be- “ come supplied with arguments of a very different kind and effi- s ciency." In a note he ascribes the shining of the face of Moses to a luminous appearance or halo produced by mesmerism; and in another place contends that the Roman Catholic miraele, the elevation of St. Cuper- tin from the earth, is precisely an effect (as he asserts) frequently ex- hibited among “spiritualists” by the agency of natural causes of the class referred to. ESSAY III. $ 11.] 329 TO NATURALISTIC THEORY. manner viewed as instances of “ suspended anima- tion.” In the case of Lazarus, they observe that, had not the body been thus preserved, decomposition must have commenced. These cases are compared with the recovery of St. Paul after being left for dead. Even the death of Jesus is thus regarded : Death and resurrection it being undoubtedly quite out of the ordinary course of Christ. that He should expire so soon as within a few hours ; since crucified persons were known to continue alive for several days: and thus it is averred that the revival may have commenced as soon as the body was laid in the cave. Medical testimony is adduced to show that a state of suspended animation often exhibits every symptom of death, the only actual proof of which is the commencement of decom- position: and nothing is more insisted on than that the body of Jesus “ saw no corruption." 2 i Acts xiv. 29. 2 Acts ii. 31; xiii. 37. Josephus (“ Contra Apion.” 1031) and others mention that per- sons crucified commonly lived three, sometimes even nine days. Car- dinal Wiscman (" Lectures," i. 266, on “ Connexion of Religion and Science,”) quotes a minute account of the sufferings of a person sub- jected to this punishment, who existed forty-eight hours. Some startling cases of suspended animation are mentioned in Dr. II. Mago's letters ou “Truths contained in Popular Superstitions," p. 33. 330 [Essay III. $ 11. RATIONALISM. The ascension. One of these commentators maintains — that it was not the practice of the Romans in crucifixion to nail the feet, and would thus remove the difficulty of Christ's walking to Emmaus: that He showed Thomas only His hands and his side: while the common belief arose from the desire to see the literal fulfilment of the prophecy." The rare appearances after the resurrection, it is pretended, are accounted for by the necessity of keeping out of the way of the inveterate Jews. Hence also (according to these views), even the as- cension itself is represented as a final retreat from the world ;-as a disappearance from the Apostles in a cloud which enveloped the top of the moun- tain; Jesus having “ gone apart” (LEOTY, Luke xxiv. 57), which corresponds to nopevojevov (Acts i. 10), not “going up” but going away; while the general expressions (επηρθη and ανεφερετο), “ carried up into heaven," being indefinite, it is contended do not necessarily imply the literal bodily ascent familiar to received belief and pictorial representation. The narratives of the apostolic miracles in the Acts are, perhaps with still greater readiness, brought Miracles of the Apostles. 1 John xx. 27; Ps. xxii. 17. Essay III. $ 11.] 331 . NATURALISTIC THEORY. under a similar mode of explanation by writers of this school:_even the excellent and learned Ne- ander', while he upholds high spiritual influences, yet in regard to some of the physical miracles suggests interpretations of a kind according closely with the naturalistic theory.2 Thus, the events at Pentecost are described as "an earthquake attended by a whirlwind and flaming lights:" external events conspired with internal im- pressions to make the Apostles fitting preachers of the new faith ; and, after a laboured kind of expla- nation of the gift of tongues, it is finally suggested that the Apostles might possibly have already pos- sessed among them some knowledge of the various neighbouring dialects (each, perhaps, being ac- quainted with some one or two), which was inten- sified in their then highly excited condition. Ananias, it is asserted, was struck dead from mere terror; an effect which in the case of Sapphira was powerfully aided by the sudden announcement of her husband's fate. Again, the varied “ gifts” are largely 1 History of “First Planting of Christianity,” 1832, transl. ? We shall see in the sequel that in more important instances he has adopted a different view. See infrà, & v. 332 [Essar III. $ 11. RATIONALISM. discussed in a similar liberal spirit of interpretation ; though in some cases of healing the explanation is not fully carried out. . In cases of appearances, as of angels, it is held that the presence of a real sensible object is not necessarily implied. St. Paul was simply overtaken by a thunder-storm, and struck with lightning. This cooperated with spiritual convictions already beginning to work in him to effect his conversion. He himself calls it a “ heavenly vision.”! It is admitted, however, that there was some appearance of Christ, which was necessary to make him a witness of the resurrection. The possessed damsel at Philippi was, simply “in a state resembling somnambulism," from which she was awakened by the Apostle. But, without going into more details, it will pro- bably suffice to remark in general on such explana- tions, that although in some instances they have a semblance of plausibility, yet it cannot be denied that in the incessant attempt to find or force such in- terpretation in every case, – “Aut viam inveniam aut faciam,"— the resources employed are often of a trivial, far-fetched, and laboured kind; and the General remarks, : Acts xxvi. 19. Essay III. $ 11.] 333 NATURALISTIC THEORY. immense multitude of coincidences and combinations of circumstances and extraordinary occurrences, which it thus becomes necessary to suppose concentrated in one short period, presents too complex a mass of hy- potheses to furnish a real and satisfactory theory of the whole series of the evangelical miracles. Yet it should be observed that such attempts, even if inju- dicious, must, in some instances at least, be allowed the credit of having originated in the sincere wish to elucidate and vindicate the sacred narrative. At all events they ought not to be condemned indiscrimi- nately, on the ground that such a mode of endea- vouring to remove objections in any one instance will encourage the disposition to explain away every- . thing: an argument which, if valid, would condemn all elucidation of difficulties whatever. Let these explanations be fairly judged and esti- mated on their own merits; and with especial reference to the question, whether they would really affect the doctrinal application of the narratives, or afford less substantial foundation for the argument which the Apostles grounded on them. 334 [ESSAY III. $ 111. RATIONALISM. - [I, “THE MYTHIC THEORY OF STRAUSS. Introduc- tory remarks, UNDER the generic name of Rationalism many varieties have been included, but it would be diffi- cult to find any two systematic investigations more entirely opposed to each other, even in their first prin- ciples, than those of the older and the later rational- ists;- the disciples of Paulus and of Strauss ;-the advocates of the “Natural” and those of the “Mythic” system ;—the interpreters of the evangelic narrative regarded as historical, but explained in its miraculous events by natural causes ; and the philologists who on critical grounds deny the historical character of the incidents, and represent the narratives as intrinsically and designedly fictitious, and as a my- thical invention for exalting the Messianic character of Jesus. Of the last school, the most distinguished supporter, though not the entire originator, is Strauss. In maintaining a system thus essentially at va- Essay III. $ 111.] 3:35 MYTHIC THEORY. riance with that of the older rationalists, Strauss introduces, and makes way for, his own speculations in every instance, by a sweeping and unsparing attack on all the interpretations of the “natural” school, to such an.extent that the most orthodox divine could not desire a more thorough demolition of the systems of Paulus and Eichorn, than that with which Strauss furnishes him, carrying with it all the additional force which belongs to the testi- mony of an opponent. Strauss expressly refers to Woolston ? as having Woolston's views. more than a century ago started some speculations much of the same kind. He represents Woolston's theory as putting an alternative between the “na- turalistic” view of miracles or their explanation as real facts by natural causes, and the acceptance of them as the allegorical vehicles of divine truths. In other words, he contends that, to be a true history, they must lose their divine character; to retain it, they must cease to be a true history, and be regarded as mythical. If this is to be understood as intended to cha- 1 1726–9. See above, Essay I. p. 136. Strauss's “ Life of Jesus," Introd. S v. French Transl. i. 23. 336 [Essay III. $ 111. RATIONALISM. racterise the argument of Woolston, it is certainly overcharged. The speculations of Woolston are utterly devoid of all pretension to a philosophic character: he never betrays the slightest conception of any re- ference to physical generalisations, though he exhibits great research and erudition, especially in his ap- peals to the Fathers and ecclesiastical antiquity: his whole discussion is characterised by a strange eccen- tricity of manner, and unhappily too often couched in a tone of ridicule and sarcasm, directed against the most serious subjects, and coupled with offensive attacks on the theologians of his day, which, pro- bably more than his abstract opinions, exposed him to the persecution he underwent. He attacks the literal sense of the Gospel narra- tives merely on the ground of what he regards the unworthy character of the miracles, which he charges with inconsistency and uselessness; and es- pecially as affording no proof of the Messiahship of Jesus: examining each in detail, and enlarging on the objections. On this plea against accepting them literally, he adopts the idea of interpreting them as allegorical symbols and representations of Essay III. $ 111.] 337 MYTHIC THEORY. the spiritual doctrines of the Gospel, and of the character and office of Christ, which he zealously upholds; and defends his interpretation by copious quotations from the Fathers, some of whom it is well known adopted similar views. 1 · Strauss makes it his primary assumption that in Origin of the mythic the received sense of real suspensions of nature theory." miracles are "impossible:"2 and hence, considering the “natural” explanations as frivolous and unsatis- factory, he seeks some rational grounds for the origin of the narratives. When he proceeds to details we cannot but own the ingenuity and acuteness with | The following extract from a passage in which he is summing up his views, will give at once some clue to his meaning, and exhibit a truly characteristic specimen of his style : - “ Imprimis : I believe, upon the authority of the Fathers, that the “ ministry of the letter of the Old and New Testament is downright “anti-Christianism. "Item : I believe, upon the authority of the Fathers, that the mira- “cles of Jesus, as they are recorded by the Evangelists, literally under- “stood, are the lying wonders of Anti-Christ. " Item: I believe, upon the authority of the Fathers, that all oppo- “sition and contradiction to spiritual and allegorical interpretations of “the Scriptures, is the sin of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. "Item: I believe, upon the authority of the Fathers, that the “ ministry of the Spirit, or allegorical interpretation of the law and the “ prophets, will be the conversion of Jews and Gentiles,” &c. &c. - WOOLSTON, Ninth Discourse, p. 68. ? Introd. $ xIII. 338 [Essay III. $ III. RATIONALISM. which he has worked out the critical data, and the uncompromising boldness with which he has applied to every part of the Gospel narratire, his universal solution of all its difficulties, the hypothesis of its mythic origin. This idea had confessedly been applied by some earlier writers, as Rosenmüller and Anton, to certain portions of the Gospel; and, so limited, was acknowledged to possess the sanction of the Fathers.' But Strauss was the first to apply it generally; and to justify it on the strength of general considerations, derived from the probable circum- stances under which the Gospel narratives were pro- duced, and from the absence of direct evidence as to their origin. The argument in behalf of this hypothesis is sup- ported by a searching examination in detail of every Strauss's argument. ticism are employed to bring out, in their strongest contrast, every circumstance of discrepancy between the different narratives, and the different parts of the same Evangelist. Whence the author proceeds to account for them on the supposition of divers · Introd. $ 1v. Essay III. § 111.] 339 MYTHIC THÈORY. grounds. versions having been formed out of a collection of traditional “myths,” originating in the character and attributes which the Jews expected to find in the Messiah ; --- all of which, accordingly, the fol- lowers of Jesus believed were found united in his person and life. The broader grounds on which Strauss frames his Critical theory ought to be examined distinct from its de- tails. He enters in the first place largely into the discussion of the general question of the criticism of history when it presents marvellous features; and observes particularly that in narratives composed some time after the events, and especially under strong and peculiar prepossessions, it becomes very difficult to determine what share the opinions of the writers had in giving the tone of the represen- tations, and the colouring of the events recounted.1 In that age, he observes, even the learned among the Jews, --- without reference to peculiar religious views?, — had not the precise idea of critical history. And in regard to religious narratives, especially in certain stages of advance, history and fiction are Strauss, French transl. vol. i. p. 32. ? Ibid. vol. i. p. 79. 22 340 [ESSAY III. S III. · RATIONALISM. Theory of myths, not clearly distinguished; and under the influence of a peculiar doctrinal belief and a powerful faith, the one migrates insensibly into the other." Hence, the conception of myths, of which Strauss discusses extensively the theory and history; and on philosophical grounds contends that they must form an unavoidable element in all religious sys- tems; it being the very nature of religious faith to give that ground of assurance to the conscience under the form of an image, which philosophy gives as an idea. A myth is a doctrine expressed in co narrative form, an abstract moral or spiritual truth dramatised in action and personification; where the object is to enforce faith not in the parable but in the moral. According to Strauss's view, the forma- tion of myths constitutes a necessary stage or phase in the development of the religious conceptions of man. He regards it as the only way in which, in a ruder and simpler state, men can possibly realise those relations of a higher and more spiritual kind, of which they have a vague and indefinite, yet pow- erful, perception; and which they are wholly inca- Strauss, French transl. vol. i. p. 104. ? Ibid. Introd. S x1v. vol. i. p. 91. Essay III. $ 111.] 341 MYTHIC THEORY. tive. pable of accepting in an abstract sense. They thus frame some imagination of what is spiritual and unseen, by the fiction of persons and actions recog- nisable by sense, and vividly put forth in descrip- tive narration. Thus, every dogma is more or less a myth, as it is necessarily conveyed in analogical language and anthropomorphic action. In examining the narratives of the existing Gospels Discre- pancies in taken as they stand, Strauss first dwells forcibly and the narra- minutely on all the discrepancies, bringing them out in the strongest relief. Thus he enlarges on the . « quæstio vexata” of the two contradictory genealo- gies, which, after the volumes of erudition employed on them, still remain as irreconcilable as when Luther prohibited the discussion as among the “endless genealogies” censured by St. Paul:-The well-known chronological difficulties of the census; many cir- cumstances connected with the Nativity; the obvious incompatibility of the presentation in the temple and residence at Nazareth, with the visit of the Magi and flight into Egypt, as well as the historical dif- ficulties attending the massacre. The various discrepancies in the several histories of John the Baptist are then pointed out; in those of (D z 3 342 [Essay III. S III. RATIONALISM. Distinct characters of the Gospels. the baptism of Christ,– in the circumstances of the commencement of His ministry, and the call of the Apostles; -- the differences in the several accounts as to the occasion, the connection, and the matter of His several discourses and detached sayings; es- pecially the Sermon on the Mount, and some of the parables. In these and other instances the author traces the apparently varied combinations of portions of different discourses and narratives put together according to the different views of the compilers. Besides these points he enlarges on the entirely distinct character of the first three Gospels from that of the fourth, marked in particular by the several journeys to Jerusalem, while the others represent the whole ministry as confined to Galilee or the ad- jacent districts till the final visit to Jerusalem ; the discrepancies in the accounts of the crucifixion, and especially of the resurrection, the subsequent appearances, and the two accounts of the ascension compiled by St. Luke. On such points of material variation as well as on general grounds of criticism, Strauss infers that the Gospels cannot claim any pro- perly historical character; that they in very few in- stances convey the testimony of eye-witnesses, but Essay III. $ 1n.] 343 MYTHIC THEORY. for the the idea of consist of fragments compiled from different sources, of whose origin or authenticity nothing can be col- lected; that in our ignorance of the dates it is quite Opening possible that a sufficient interval occurred between invention of myths. the time assigned to the events and the composition of the narratives, to allow a wide opening for my- thical invention to mingle with, or rather arise out of, the belief respecting the Messiahship of Jesus, to exalt which would be the object and moral as it were of the parables so framed. In some cases, similitudes to which Christ re- Myths from ferred in His instructions may have been as it were the Mes- dramatised, and misunderstood as miracles. Such myths as vehicles of religious doctrine were familiar to Jewish apprehensions, and this concurring with the consideration that the mind in certain earlier stages of progress does not clearly draw the line between history and fiction, Strauss thinks will suf- ficiently account for the actual formation of the Gospel narratives according to the Jewish expec- tation of the Messiah. He must be supposed sur- Origin of miraculous rounded with at least as much mystery and miracle narratives. as the ancient prophets, and even with more; and the wonders recorded of them furnished or suggested siah. 24 344 [ESSAY III. $ TII: RATIONALISM. the materials for mythic representation of the glories of the Messiah. Thus several of the incidents are only recounted on the plea “ that it might be ful- filled which was spoken by the prophets." Such prepossessions, together with the natural proneness to magnify in after times the origin and lives of those who have risen to high eminence, Strauss conceives tended together to produce the entire myth of the nativity and its attendant events, - the formation of the several genealogies of Joseph, to accord with a descent from David, -as well as many of the subsequent narratives of the scenes of Christ's Messianic office and ministry. The same process is applied, with a facility before which all difficulties and objections are made to give way, to resolve almost every circumstance, especially those of a miraculous nature, into fable. At length (on this view) the delivery of Jesus to death having put an end to the temporal hopes of His followers, in the strong revulsion of their feelings they began to conceive an enthusiastic belief in the spiritual nature of His kingdom. This new idea, earnestly cherished and supported by a spiritualised view of the meaning of many passages in the Old Mythic view of the resurrec- tion. Essay III. $ Y 345 MYTHIC THEORY. 111.] Testament, — derived from the recollections of the private instructions of their Master, —working pow- erfully on their bewildered, anxious, and excited minds, was further heightened perhaps by spectral impressions, and at length an extraordinary excite- ment at the feast of Pentecost;—all which combined to create the myth of the resurrection and ascension, which they now boldly declared as the true inter- pretation of the Messianic parts of prophecy, and made the basis of the new doctrine. The Scripture required that Christ must die and rise again, they therefore believed that Jesus had died and risen again. The impressions thus vividly excited in their minds, repeated and enlarged upon in varied forms, were afterwards put together in the several mythical narratives, out of which, in different fragmentary combinations, the existing Gospels took their rise. The account given by Strauss of the formation General of nearly the whole narrative, allowing some small Strauss's basis of ordinary history, in the way of designed myths, however plausible, in some instances, in detail, seems, as a whole, an hypothesis of so extremely overstrained and improbable a character when ap- plied generally, that the sober critic, - to say nothing remarks on theory. 346 [Essay III. $ 11r. RATIONALISM. 'Some points ad- missible, of the devout believer,--may well be staggered at the contemplation of it. Many of the suggestions on which the theory rests, considered abstractedly, are, however, no doubt reasonably open to fair consideration. In re- spect to some of the discrepant parts of the narrative, the existence of serious difficulties cannot be dis- puted. For instance, in the several varied accounts of the resurrection; (on which Strauss dwells so much, it can hardly be questioned that there is room for difference of opinion, or that some of the representations may be thought to accord better with a real bodily revival, others with a spi- ritualised appearance: and that the narrators had not themselves any very defined view as to their re- collections or impressions, which were all absorbed in the one great thought of the application of the Messianic prophecies. Again, it might be readily conceded as possible that there might be in some cases a typical or doc- trinal intention, which came to be overlooked in the desire to discover sensible miracles; as, for example, in the conversion of water into wine; the multipli- cation of the loaves; or the walking on the sea.. Essay III. $ 101.] 347 MYTHIC THEORY. points un While in other instances,--as in the Incarnation and the Ascension, — the event as such is never after- wards mentioned, but only alluded to in a purely doctrinal or spiritualised sense : and it may be on all hands admissible that doctrinal and didactic objects may have had a greater or less share in the dictation of those narratives; as would seem more confessedly to characterise the composition of the fourth Gospel." The main objection to the mythic hypothesis Other consists in the fact that in the universal predispo- tenable. sition of that age towards the supernatural, the miracles were believed to have really occurred by the Jews and other enemies of the faith, however differently they might interpret them. Thus the point is to account for this literal re- ception of the facts, to explain how narratives drawn up designedly as myths should have come to be universally mistaken for true histories both by friends and opponents ? The Jews ascribed the miracles of Christ to evil spirits (except the resurrection, which they denied). vever See Johu xx, 31, 349 [Essay III. $ II. RATIONALISM. II Critical difficulties. Celsus and Julian, and other heathen opponents, set them down to magic, imposture, or superior skill in natural means; but never for a moment attacked the account of them as purely fictitious, — which would have been an obvious reply at once destruc- tive to their pretensions. Strauss's criticisms and review of the documentary, evidence must be fairly taken apart from his theory of myths. No discerning reader would deny the existence of the discrepancies on which so much stress is laid, and which cannot be removed without doing more or less violence to the letter of the text; nor could he refuse assent to the inference that where these differences are real, the writers were not in those instances preserved from inaccuracy, and would consequently allow the propriety of not at- tempting to stretch the literal authority of the text too far. Nor can we shut our eyes to the bearing of this consideration, or the uncertainty as to the origin and sources of the formation of the narratives, on the strength of such very precise attestation as miracles are admitted by the evidential writers to require. But we must fairly estimate and allow for the Doctrinal Essay III. $ 111.] 349 MYTHIC THEORY. obvious character and design of these compositions. objects of the Evan- The impression on the mind of the discerning reader gelists. can only be that the writers or compilers of the Gospels put together their narratives in a simple and unsystematic manner: devoted to one great ob- ject they paid little attention to the exactness which in modern times is expected in historical composi- tion. They represent events in the aspect in which a reference to that object would place them; and describe them, as they were traditionally reported and believed to have occurred, in the phraseology of their age and country, and in accordance with their own impressions and prepossessions, or the ideas, belief, and prejudices of their education. Lastly, it appears from Strauss's own declaration that he regards the mythical exposition as in no way impugning doctrinal belief;—though the sense in which he interprets that doctrinal belief may be found of a somewhat unusual and not very intel- ligible kind. He observes :-“ The author knows that the in- Influence " ternal essence of Christian faith is completely mythic theory on 6 independent of his critical researches. The super- doctrines. so natural birth of Christ, his miracles, his resur- of the 350 [ESSAY III. $ IIT. RATIONALISM. S “rection, and his ascension into heaven, remain “eternal truths, to whatever doubts the reality of “ the facts in the light of historical events may be “subjected. This certainty alone can give repose “and dignity to our critical examinations, and dis- “ tinguish them from the explanations on natural s principles of former ages : explanations which, “ dreaming to overthrow at once religious truth with “historical fact, were necessarily marked with a “ character of frivolity. A chapter at the end of - the work will show that the dogmatic sense of the “ life of Jesus has sustained no loss.” 1 In the concluding portion of the work, after an elaborate examination of all the various schemes dogmatic and mystical, adopted, whether by orthodox or rationalistic divines, respecting the real nature, character, and mission of Christ, the author's view of the case is given as follows:—“We conceive “ Christ, as he in whose spirit the unity of the “ Divine and the human has risen, for the first “ time, with energy, to such a point as to leave in “his entire moral nature and life, no more than an I Strauss, “Life of Jesus,” Preface to Ist edit. French transl. p. 8. Essay III. $ 111.] 351 MYTHIC THEORY. “ infinitely small value to anything impairing that "unity; and who, in this sense, is unique and with- sout equal in the history of the world; although " the religious spirit attained and promulgated by “him for the first time has not been able in detail " to withdraw itself from the purification and ex- “tension which result from the progressive deve- “lopment of the human mind." I These declarations are of a sufficiently vague character; and it would be easy to cite others in which the author follows out interpretations more utterly extravagant, mystical, and fanciful. These speculations certainly do little to commend Strauss's theory to any rational inquirer, and less towards any explanation of miracles. There is no end to the visionary fancies which a fertile imagination may construct out of the plainest narrative;- but all this has no relation to the question of fact, — what was the real design and actual mode of composition of that narrative ?—which carries with it all discussion whatever of the miracles; and the general recep- tion of these memorials confessedly rests on the S i Strauss, “ Life of Jesus," Final Diss. $ CLXIX, 2 See especially, vol. ii. p. 762. 352 [ESSAY III. S III. RATIONALISM. traditional testimonies delivered by Irenæus, Euse- bius, Jerome, and others of the Fathers, mixed up as they are with much which is fanciful and le- gendary, and equally appealing to other writings now generally rejected. There is, however, the strong internal evidence of the style and language, which, to the scholar, stamps them at once as productions of the Apostolic age. While in a religious point of view. the concurrence of succeeding ages in receiving these narratives alone, out of many which existed, confers the sanction due to the belief of the early Church, and invests them with the character of pre- scriptive objects of faith. Essay III. $ Iv.] 353 FEUERBACH'S THEORY. THE SUBJECTIVE THEORY OF FEUERBACE. view. ) 1 The remarkable speculations of Feuerbach' tend to General reduce all religious belief whatever to mere internal impressions, or ideal images, the subjective repre- sentations or reflections of man's own moral feelings or spiritual aspirations, so vividly conceived as to be mistaken for external objective realities. This idea, commencing from the very belief in a God?, is extended to all parts of the Christian scheme, and thus includes miracles; - though, as the author observes, he is professedly considering only " their religious significance and genesis," and thus does not discuss their evidence, or attempt to explain them in historical detail. He distinctly allows that “ many miracles may really have had originally a “physical or a physiological phenomenon as their | Essence of Christianity, transl. London, 1854. ? Of the Theistic part of this theory I have given a sketch in the « Oxford Essays,” 1857, Essay v. p. 201. 3 Note, p. 133. A A 354 [Essay III. $iv. RATIONALISM. SS of super- of his theory, the miraculous parts of them are viewed as being the result of internal impressions believed to be external realities: the reflection upon itself of the earnest aspirations of the soul, which are rea- lised by the sole influence of intense internal conviction. Principle According to the author's theory, there exists naturalism. necessarily a perpetual antagonism between the re- ligious principle and the recognition of external nature. Hence the supposition that the laws of nature must be subdued to the superior power of religious faith. Hence supernaturalism is the es- sential element of religious belief. “As long," he subjective, says, “ as true, unfeigned, unfalsified, uncompromis- “ing Christianity existed ;-as long as Christianity “was a living practical truth, — so long did miracles “happen: and they necessarily happened, for faith “in dead, historical, past miracles is itself a dead “ faith,--the first step towards unbelief,—or rather “ the first, and therefore the timid, uncandid, servile “mode in which unbelief in miracle finds vent.” 1 Miracles Essence of Christianity, transl. p. 132. Essay III. $ 1v.] 355 FEUERBACH'S THEORY. He admits that a miracle may include some sub- stratum, as it were, of real events, or external con- ditions; but the essential part of the supernatural event consists entirely in the mode or process; as in the healing of the sick, which becomes miraculous when believed to be effected suddenly by a word;— coinciding with earnest desires and undoubting con- fidence. « The power of miracle," he says, “is nothing but the power of the imagination”l....“mi- racle is to reason inconceivable.” Again, he observes, “ Miracles confirm and authenticate doctrine ;-what s doctrine ? simply this, that God is the Saviour of man, — their Redeemer out of all trouble--in e “ a being corresponding to the wants and wishes “ of man; — and therefore a human being: what “the God-man declares in words, miracle demon- “ strates ad oculos by deeds." 2 After dwelling on the nature of any miraculous act, e. g. the conversion of water into wine, as in- volving physically a contradiction, he adds, “The “miraculous act, -- and miracle is only a transient “act, is therefore not an object of thought, for it ? No * Essence of Christianity, p. 129. 2 Note, ibid. A A 2 356 [Essay III. S IV. RATIONALISM. “ nullifies the very principle of thought; but it is “just as little an object of sense, ---an object of real s or possible experience; .... miracle is a thing of “ the imagination.”! If such a mode of explanation should be objected to as superficial and unsatisfactory, the author in- vites the reader to transplant himself in thought to the times and country in which the miracles were believed to occur; to consider the universal faith in the supernatural continually manifested, and hence to see the explanation of miracles in the ardent as- pirations and undoubting expectations of the believ- ing Spirit; and the power of imagination exalted to such a pitch as to cause a belief as if of sensible facts occurring to the individual, experienced in his own person, witnessed by his own senses, or oc- curring to others, or in external objects. It may be freely admitted that it is difficult, if not impossible, to set limits to the deceptions which ima- gination may practise upon us, especially under the influence of peculiar conditions of bodily or organic affection or excitement, by which it may be exalted Remarks. | Essence of Christianity, p. 130. Essay III. § iv.] FEUERBACH'S THEORY. 357 357 to an almost incalculable pitch of intensity. But the real difficulty lies in applying these or other similar modes of explanation in detail, and in making them accord with the precise circumstances of any recorded case in the Gospel miracles; and if we once invade the integrity of the text, the neces- sity for any explanation is done away. АА 3 358 [Essay III. $ v. SPIRITUALISM. $ v.- THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF EWALD. Obscurity In the theological literature of Germany the title of of this theory. generic designation of an entire class of writings. To the already numerous list of these productions, each taking their particular theory of the subject, another has been recently added from the pen of the cele- brated Orientalist Professor Ewald, which presents a view of the whole course of the Gospel narrative considerably different from those of any of his pre- decessors, repudiating in fact much of the rational- and spiritualised conception. Yet on the particular point of the miracles, the mystical tone which he adopts throughout so much obscures his meaning, that it seems difficult to collect any positive clue to the light in which he really regards them. The following passages may, however, serve to convey some notion of his mode of viewing the case:- Essay III. S v.] 359 EWALD'S THEORY. “In Christ the common labours of every day were “an unbroken series of mighty works; what, there- “fore, must those actions of his be, which, in certain “rare moments, as if out of the concentration of “spiritual forces already roused into the highest “ activity, sprang forth above the ordinary level of “ his life! So far then we have no reason whatever “to limit the measure of spiritual forces, and arbi- “trarily determine how far in Jesus they might reach “ in the course of their highest operation.”..... “But then this mighty effort and agitation of the “ inmost powers of the purest and loftiest spirit as “it wrought in Christ, moving the world by his “ deeds, was so promptly met on the other hand by “the highly raised expectations and willing faith of “his disciples, that in those rare moments of which "we have spoken they saw all the infinite greatness “ realised, which they dreamed of and hoped for in “ Him. It was only out of the concurrence of these 6 two spiritual movements that there arose into vi- “sible shape, the conception and description of those “ rarer displays of the highest results and mightiest “ signs in which, as in some mysterious foreboding “or rapt vision, a deep-rooted faith can alone ex- JI A A 4 360 [Essay III. S v. SPIRITUALISM. “press its true sense of the actual manifestations of “ the highest in Jesus. Here already in actual his- “tory, although in only a few of its more favoured “moments, the intensest longing had found its sa- “tisfaction .... and if in former days a like feeling “had striven to still its cravings with the far lower “manifestations of Elijah and Elisha, how much “purer satisfaction was opened to it in the history 6 of Christ ?"1 Ewald adds in a note to this passage, “ That the “ narratives (of miracles) in the New Testament have “altogether grown out of those of the Old is a view “ completely at variance with history; nevertheless, “it is true that the facts of the former were expected “ in consequence of the latter, and the narratives of 56 them therefore the more easily formed themselves.” The author's theory seems to depend on the as- sumption of the existence of a peculiar kind of action of spirit on matter, whence I have ventured to call it a psychological theory. This kind of action he supposes capable of a singular degree of exaltation under particular conditions ;-a transcendent instance of which was furnished in the person of Christ. Supposed psycho- logical principle. 1 Life of Christ, p, 196. Essay III. $ v.] 361 EWALD'S THEORY. It would seem that the author allows something Origin of narratives. for the “ formation of the narratives” of the Gospels; and thus probably the theory which we are to collect, would be that Jesus possessed these spiritual powers in an exalted degree; and the reputation he acquired for them, combined with the sanctity of his life, and the overpowering influence of his preaching, obtained for him such an unlimited veneration on the part of his followers, that all his actions were soon invested in a halo of mystery, which in course of time natu- rally became exaggerated, and produced the existing narratives of his wonderful works: and that the Jewish prepossessions of his followers further connected all these characteristic peculiarities with the ideas they already entertained respecting such manifestations in the old dispensation, to which these were assimilated, more especially under the influence of the belief in the Messianic sense of prophecy, when they came to understand it no longer in a worldly and temporal, but in a spiritual and heavenly, sense. In some instances Ewald seems to fall in with the Leaning towards naturalistic interpretation of the older rationalists natural interpre- which he elsewhere is inclined altogether to con- tation, demn. Thus he represents the miracle at Cana as 362 [Essay III. $ v. SPIRITUALISM. min IT 1 wholly symbolical. “ It was,” he says, “the joyous “influence of his” (Christ's) “ spirit which made the “ guests drink water as wine.”i So again, the pos- session of the swine is regarded as a mere coinci- dence, connected with the case of the demoniacs only in popular belief. The raising of Lazarus is interpreted into an idealised representation of the strong assurance which the comforting presence of Christ gave to his followers of the belief in a future resurrection, on the occasion of the death of one of their number. 3 And in the same spirit the resurrec- tion of Christ himself is spoken of as simply san eternal glorification," the idea having originated in the subsequent belief of the apostolic period, and therefore not entering as a fact into the historical life of Christ. Upon the whole, uncertain as we may feel whether we entirely apprehend the author's meaning, which seems involved in so much mysticism of expression, we yet collect enough to perceive a general acknow- ledgment on his part thatsome broader principle ought fairly to be resorted to than the narrow, and (as we may emarks. | Life of Christ, p. 224. ? Ibid. p. 299. 3 Ibid. p. 361. Essay III. S v.] 363 EWALD'S THEORY. consider it at the present day) generally renounced notion of real violations of the order of nature. Of the power of mind over matter we can form little idea ; of the power of mind over mind, — of an ex- alted spirit over those of inferior capacity,— we may incline to larger admissions. But in such cases as these before us we seem hardly able to advance beyond the most vague and general conjectures, so long as we appeal to any sort of philosophical speculations, 364 DOCTRINAL THEORY. I. - THE DOCTRINAL THEORY OF NEANDER. More orthodox specula- tions bearing op rational- ism. A “LIFE OF CHRIST” I produced some years after the publication of his histories of the “ Early Christian Church,” and apparently designed as an introduction to them, exhibits on the part of the distinguished, pious, and learned Neander, a considerable recession from the at least semi-rationalistic tone we have already noticed in some of his earlier inquiries, and a strong leaning towards the more orthodox inter- pretation. Yet the examination of its contents is eminently important in reference to our present subject. It was regarded by some as a reply to Strauss; but the author seems to intimate that such was not his design, nor indeed does the work fulfil any such expectation. In regard to the critical question of the origin of the Gospels, Neander admits the supposition that the first three Gospels were simply compilations of Origin of the Gospels. | Published 1837, translated 1848, in Bohn's Standard Library. Essay III. § v.] 365 NEANDER. existing traditions. He moreover distinctly states his opinion that “the Gospel of Matthew, in its “present form, is not the production of the Apostle, 6 though it is founded on an account written by him “in Hebrew." ? The hypothesis of the fourth Gospel having been written in the second century he rejects, simply on the ground that its whole style and manner are alien to the ideas and opinions prevalent in that age. Our present object, however, is merely concerned with his view of the miracles, and this is clearly to be understood as resting, in every particular in- stance, upon the universal application of one common great principle, assumed and fully expounded in the commencement. Neander sets out with the distinct assumption Miracles as subordinate that Christianity is altogether a “divine manifesta- parts of a tion" of which he considers miracles to be a natural natural and necessary part and consequence. 3 But admitting generally the Divine manifestation, the farther question arises ;-Is it more credible and probable that such manifestation would be external or inter- super- system. I P. 7. 2 Ibid. 3 Introd. p. 2, 3. 366 [Essay III. $ Ví. DOCTRINAL THEORY. nal, physical or spiritual ? And throughout the whole of Neander's subsequent views, though the former idea is generally or apparently implied, yet in many passages his meaning may seem such as to incline much towards the more spiritual and internal view of the case. In his general discussion of the nature of miracles?, he maintains that a physical event, however ex- traordinary or inexplicable, may be fully admissible on sufficient evidence; but this does not constitute it a miracle. With respect to a proper miracle, he observes, that “ within the sphere of religion alone “the conception of a miracle is a reality. It “ leaves us still in the domain of nature and of s natural agencies. It is not upon this road there- “ fore that we can lead men to recognise the super- “natural and the Divine, — to admit the powers of “heaven as manifesting themselves on earth. Mi- “ racles belong to a region of boliness and freedom, “ to which neither experience nor observation nor “s scientific discovery can lead. There is no bridge “ between this domain and that of natural pheno- LU | Book iv. pt. ii. ch. v, p. 132—162. ESSAY III. 8 vi. 367 NEANDER. “mena. Only by means of our inward affinity for 6 this spiritual kingdom, only by keeping and obey- “ing in this stillness of the soul the voice of God “ within us, can we reach those lofty regions.” I The author also subsequently draws a parallel, that as in nature Omnipotence is always acting, but is only traceable in natural causes, so in miracles the divine agency is not directly seen, but is perceived only by faith.2 The main point on which I would remạrk as Miracles objects of eyinced in these and numerous other passages to faith. the same effect, is, that the acceptance of miracles as such seems to be here distinctly recognised as the sole work of a religious principle of faith, and not an assent of the understanding to external evidence, the appeal to which seems altogether disowned and set aside. Conviction appears to be avowedly re- moved from the basis of testimony and sensible facts, and placed on that of spiritual impression and high religious feeling. Again, to complete the distinction between a marvellous event and a miracle, he says it is neces- 1 P. 135. 2 P. 137. 368 [Essay III. § VI. DOCTRINAL THEORY. sary “ that the Divine power in the phenomenon “shall reveal it to our religious consciousness as a “ distinctive sign of a new Divine communication “ towards the natural progress and powers of hu- “manity.” 1 It is clear then that the test here supposed to be applied (if such it can be called) for distinguishing a miracle—is a purely internal assurance of Divine communication, which of course, it is implied, is more certain than sensible evidence. It is therefore difficult to see wherein this view differs from that which entirely supersedes external by internal evi- dence, and renders the former wholly superfluous, and therefore in fact incredible to reason, however acceptable to religious feeling or faith. In proceeding more precisely to the miracles of Christ he regards them all (in accordance with his broad principle) as merely subordinate parts in the far greater and paramount miracle of his manifes- tation on earth ?, and as more especially showing forth his glory), and therefore discusses them very little in detail. He appears to admit that ordinary I P. 136. 2 P. 138. S P. 141. Essay III. $ VI.] 369 NEANDER. U Ten Juu 600 addressed. rational history cannot include miracles as such.' But the manifestation of Christ must be taken as a whole, and constitutes one great historical event, into which the miracles enter merely as subsidiary and natural accessories. Neander dwells much on the qualifications of the Miracles relative to individual mind for the reception of a belief in mi- the parties racles, requiring, as he says, a susceptibility to such impressions, and hence he repels the objection de- rived from the little effect produced by miracles on the generality of men:- the world was not fitted to receive them --it required the spirit of faith to do so. This, he contends, was especially the case in the resurrection }; and he notices it as particularly exemplified in many of the other Gospel miracles. Indeed, in following out the details of the subsequent history, most of the miraculous narratives are given simply without comment in their literal sense, the general remarks at first made being supposed to apply sufficiently to them all without requiring a detailed reference. But in two P. 139. 2 P. 142. SP. 475. .: B. B . 370 DOCTRINAL THEORY. Apne al to religious feeling. special instances he offers remarks which require a more particular notice. He supports the assertion of the miraculous in- carnation of Christ, on the express ground that the supposition of the merely human birth (as held by the rationalists) would be revolting to every religious feeling ; -an argument which, however true in point of fact, simply resolves itself into viewing the whole in accordance with devotional sentiment, not by the rules of historical criticism. If the accept- ance of the Gospel narrative be fairly placed on this ground, there is an end of all objection or discussion. But this is to ignore the appeal to positive historical evidence so much insisted on by the orthodox school. · Again, when referring to the miracles of raising the dead, the author makes a very peculiar and im- portant remark, which shall be simply left to the consideration of the reader. After discussing the question of the naturalistic explanation by supposing suspended animation or the like, he adds, - “In 6 regard to Christ's own words it is a fair question “s whether he meant to distinguish closely between " apparent and real death, or whether he made use s of the term “death' only in accordance with the Essay IIITY 371: NEANDER. . $ vi.] U tion of the “popular usage. If it be presupposed that the dead “ were restored to earthly life after having entered “ into another form of existence, into connection with 6 another world;- the idea of resurrection would be “ dismal: but we have no right to form such a pre- « supposition in our blank ignorance of the laws “ under which the new form of consciousness de- “velops itself in the soul after separation from the “ body.” 1 When Neander asserts 2 that “ Christianity can Assump- ca only be explained as a supernatural principle,” if super- this be meant, as seems to be implied, to include principle. physical miracles, he manifestly begs the whole question at issue with the rationalists: what is affirmed by them is merely that the Gospel narra- tive does admit of a plausible or possible explanation without recurring to supernatural causes, as far as regards the recorded physical events. Now it is certainly no answer to such an allegation to say that if we assume the supernatural character of the manifestation generally, we must admit it in all the subordinate parts of the scheme. natural CU P. 162. 2 P. 139, B B 2 372 [Essay III. S VI. 372 DOCTRINAL THEORY. . Yet the author's entire view resolves itself into one, which, though not refuting rationalism, is practi- cally accordant with the spirit of progressing opinion, in looking more to spiritual than to intellectual con- viction: and eminently harmonises with the habitual views of the majority of believers in rather affirming miracles on the ground of inspired authority,-of religious associations and faith,—and regarding too close and critical a reference to evidential argu- ment as misplaced, if not profane. But even taking the matter in an intellectual and explained. reasoning point of view, we cannot but remark in conclusion one eminently just and sensible observa- tion of Neander,-(which would in fact apply much more generally in such inquiries,) — when, — after throwing out some hints as to the spiritualised nature of the body of Christ after his resurrection,-sup- posed by some with a view to the physical belief in the ascension, -- he adds, “ we deem it better to “ acknowledge a problem unsolved than to give « attempts at solution on the one side or the other, "s which will not satisfy a clear thinker. » 1 Miracles left un- į Note, p. 485. Essay III.] 373 CONCLUSION. CONCLUSION. remarks on miracles. We have thus taken a somewhat extended survey General of the several chief modes of viewing the miraculous theories of narratives of the New Testament, which have been proposed in our times, with the express design of obviating the objections entertained on philosophical grounds; and, upon the whole, it will probably be the impression on the mind of the more cautious and dispassionate inquirer, that, although each of these methods considered in itself may be allowed to include much which is valuable, and to suggest some reasonable and probable grounds of explana- tion in particular cases, — yet, as embracing the whole range of the inquiry none of them will appear perfectly satisfactory. We may fully admit that the application of a strict and scrutinising criticism to the question maintained as historical, is fair and legitimate; we may reject the restrictions which a narrow dogmatism would impose, and determine to examine the matter in the most perfectly free and unprejudiced spirit, and by BB 3 374 [ESSAY III. CONCLUSION. in all the theories. the aid of sound philosophical principles. But even upon such grounds, on a close examination of the so- lutions suggested, it would seem that upon the whole Difficulties the attempt at explanation is surrounded by difficul- ties nearly as great as those proposed to be overcome. However readily some few cases may be elucidated by one, and others by another, of the several prin- ciples advanced, yet when we proceed to such universal and complete systems of the whole of the New Testament narrative, explained on one common principle, as either the “naturalistic," the “ mythic," or any of the other hypotheses furnish,—the more cautious inquirer will be disposed to allow that such a superstructure is larger than the foundation will support. In the difficulties attending the critical study of the documentary evidence, most candid inquirers will concur:--they will admit that minute evidential dis- cussions of the miracles are vain. In no cases have we really data for such examination: we cannot recall the conditions or cross-question the witnesses. In many cases no such attestation is claimed ;-and in others the demands of strict criticism are little borne out by the documentary testimony. Indeed Essay III.] 375 CONCLUSION. I some of the ancient Fathers of the Church have made admissions which may appear startling to modern biblicists, that there are many things in the Sacred narrative which cannot be accepted as literal and historical facts; and for which they would con- sequently seek a figurative interpretation.! Even the most earnest believers usually evince the Faith rem jects criti- greatest repugnance to examine the Gospel narra- cism. tives critically, as if mere dry chronicles of matter of fact. They look at them in a different and a spi- ritualised light. They more especially always aver that miracles and the narratives of them are to be regarded as exceptional cases, and not to be criticised like ordinary events or ordinary histories: they con- tend that the Gospels ought to be always interpreted with respect to their inspired character, and that thus all critical difficulties become insignificant in amount when the whole is regarded and accepted Thus, e. 9., “ Historia Scripturæ interdum interserit quædam vel “ minus gesta, vel quæ omnino geri non possunt; interdum quæ “ possunt geri nec tamen gesta sunt."-Origen, De Princip., lib. iv. “Multa sunt quæ non sinunt nos simplici sensu facta evangelica “ suscipere, interpositis enim nonnullis rebus quæ ex natura humani “ sensus sibi contraria sunt. Rationem quærere cælestis intelligentiæ " admonemur.”_ Hilary, In Matth. lib. xx. $ 2. B B 4 376 [ESSAY III. CONCLUSION. rather in the spirit of doctrine than in the letter of history. Some of the most orthodox divines denounce “ the 6 pride of unsanctified intellect irreverently intrud- 6 ing its criticisms into what ought to be veiled in “ religious reserve:" by consequence the miracles and the records of them would be sheltered from criticism, and thus virtually removed from the province of history to be placed within the pale of religious faith. Thus these theologians seem prac- tically to approach towards the view of miraculous narratives as compositions whose proper object is not so much the events they relate as the doctrine and instruction they embody, and thus approximate in principle to the mythic theory. While philosophy is freely allowed its proper do- minion in regulating general physical views, and criticism in sifting documentary evidence, faith is duly recognised in the acceptance of truths which, from their nature, could not be objects of scientific knowledge, and are not affected by the decisions or the doubts of criticism. The literal sense of physical events impossible to cience cannot be essential to spiritual truth ; nor Essay III.] 377 CONCLUSION. LL have contraventions to natural order any necessary connection with vital Christianity. The philosophic thinker, whatever view he takes Broad principles of any, or all, of the rationalistic speculations, will paramount. perceive that the grand inductive principle of the immutable uniformity of natural causes, – the sole substantial ground for belief in a supreme moral cause, — must ever remain unassailed; and firmly grasping this broad principle on the one hand, and perceiving the essential spirituality of Christianity on the other,--he will repose on these convictions, and admit that the miraculous narratives of the Gospel may be received for the divine instruction they were designed to convey, without prejudice to the invariable laws of physiology, of gravitation, or of the constitution of matter. ESSAY IV. ON THEOLOGICAL VIEWS Lor MIRACLES. ON THEOLOGICAL VIEWS OF MIRACLES. $ I. — MIRACLES OF THE CHURCH. $ II. - GENERAL ARGUMENT. ESSAY IV. ON THEOLOGICAL VIEWS OF MIRACLES. $ I. - MIRACLES OF THE CHURCH, MODERN AND ANCIENT. en The various rationalistic and other systematic theories of the miracles of the Evangelists discussed in the last essay have met with little acceptance or even notice among English theologians, partly from causes of an obvious practical nature. But some apprecia- tion of the primary difficulties which those theories were proposed to obviate can hardly have failed to force itself on the mind of any enlightened inquirer in the existing state of knowledge. Accordingly we may trace indirect indications of the advance of opinion and the progress of thought on this subject, even where the direct argument or object of theolo- gical writers might appear little in accordance with 382 S THEOLOGICAL VIEW. IV. § 1. [Essay it. A few instances will best illustrate these re- marks. Extraordi- It is a circumstance bearing much on the present nary events viewed as question, that in some eminently religious minds miracles. we find a disposition to believe passing events, - especially those of a striking and extraordinary cha- racter, — to be as properly miraculous as those recounted in Scripture. Such a view, nevertheless, must tend directly to neutralise the distinction so much insisted on by systematic theologians, of re- garding the latter as essentially special interventions. for the attestation of revelation: while it must be admitted that a very high function and privilege is: thus conceded to faith, in enabling it to elevate any extraordinary event into a Divine intervention. And this we must suppose to apply as much in past times as in the present: so that we fall back on the question of real interruption generally. At all events we may take as a remarkably sug- gestive declaration, the following passage from a very eminent divine:—“Whoso will not recognise “ the finger of God in His providential cures will not “ see it in His miraculous. . . . . When men had “explained away, as the mere effects of imagination, Essay IV. $1.] 383 MODERN MIRACLES. 6 cures, in modern times, out of the wonted order ** of God's providence, which, though no confirmation “ of a religious system, seem to have been personal “ rewards to strong personal faith, they were ready sto apply the same principle to many of the mira- “cles of the Gospel: when they had ceased to see “ in lunatics the power permitted to evil spirits, “ they were prepared, and did, as soon as it was “suggested, deny it in the demoniacs of the New 66 Testament." Again: “Whoso lifteth not up the earthly to the “ heavenly, will bring down the heavenly to the “ earthly. 'Homer (says even a heathen) trans- “ferred human things to the Gods: would he had “ rather things divine to man!' (Cic. Tusc. i. 26.) "2 If it should be objected, these are the opinions of a limited and peculiar theological school, we can refer to many divines of very different views, both of the present and of past times, who have up- held miracles as properly an attribute of the Chris- tian Church in all ages alike, however occasionally | Dr. Pusey, Sermon on 5th of Nov. 1837, p. 3. 2 Ibid. p. 4. 384 (Essay IV. & Is THEOLOGICAL VIEW.. 1. Instance of a modern miracle. in abeyance, or the power not exercised from want of faith; among these are Dr. Barrow!, Archbishop Tillotson?, and Grotius 3: while in recent times in reference to some alleged miracles, especially those believed to have been wrought in Scotland, and among the followers of Mr. Irving, there is a pub- lished discourse of the Rev. H. M´Neile4 in which the same doctrine is unequivocally maintained. But we can adduce a more remarkable case of an alleged miracle in our own days, which some years ago excited considerable notice and discussion. The whole nature of that discussion is instructive, as ex- hibiting the actual condition of thought and character of the reasoning, by which even thinking and emi- n'ently religious men are guided in their entire view and estimate of miraculous evidence: the more distinctly marked because in this case there existed no dispute on points of testimony or evidence. The bare apparent facts were fully admitted and undis- I Works, vol. iv. p. 467. ed. 1818. 2 Works, vol. x. p. 230. 3 On Mark xvi. 17. 4 Published in « The Preacher," 1830. See “Documents on the Case of Miss Fancourt,” p. 68. 1831. Essa 385 Essay IV. § 1.] . MODERN MODERN MIRACLES. MIRACLESputed on either side. The whole case as to the mere facts, was simply that, a young lady who for some years had suffered severely under what was pro- nounced a spinal disorder affecting the hip-joint,- received a very sudden and complete cure. But while the mere apparent fact was not and could not be questioned by any of the parties con- cerned, the most opposite opinions were entertained in respect to the nature and cause of the event. Some viewed it as an instance of peculiar action on the nervous system, or ascribed it to other agencies of a physiological kind, while others, under the in- fluence of religious views, affirmed the cure to be due solely to the efficacy of prayer, and to be truly and properly miraculous. Two eminent divines of the Established Church, the Rev. T. Boys and the Rev. Dr. S. Maitland, took!, the case and argued strenuously in favour of this miraculous view.". Dr. Maitland especially referred to distinguished medical authorities who pronounced i | The most condensed view of the arguments on either side will be found in a small volume entitled “Eruvin; or, Miscellaneous Essays.” by the Rev. S. Maitland, D.D., &c., London, 1850, Second Edition, Essay X., where the other authorities are referred to. сс 386 [Essay IV. & I. THEOLOGICAL VIEW. UU their opinion “ that such a disorder should be rec- “ tified and reduced by excitement was beyond all “belief and contrary to experience.” 1 That a belief in the miraculous nature of the case should be confined to a few persons of strong reli- gious views-and that the great majority of those who inquired into it should have held a contrary opinion, is what we should be prepared to expect. But it may be more a matter of surprise that the sceptical view should have been warmly taken up by that considerable section of the religious world of professed evangelical principles, whose organ is “ The Christian Observer," and was ad- vocated both in that journal and in a separate pamphlet by the editor, dedicated to the late Bishop of London, and approved, as he tells us, by numerous communications, “lay, clerical, medical, and even episcopal," while he avows that a “ disbelief in alleged modern miracles is what 6 he sincerely thought (till the late Scotch mira- - cles) was the opinion of every reasonable man 6 in Christendom." Eruvin, p. 245. Essay IV. § I.] 387 MODERN MIRACLES. LI CUIUIU The point to which attention chiefly requires to be Nature of the argu- directed is the nature and ground of the arguments ments on either side. adopted on either side. We may pass over as little to the purpose the various conditions and limitations laid down by one of the writers referred to as the tests of true miracles, (and which are a kind of extension of those long ago proposed by Leslie and others,) since Dr. Maitland very justly points out their insufficiency, and adds, that to insist on them “would be a hard thrust at some of the Scripture miracles.” 1 . Dr. Maitland's own view is altogether founded on the assumption that revelation and miracles are a declaration of another law of God besides that dis- closed in nature.2 But while he applies this to the Scripture miracles he expressly avows—“I cannot “ grant to the infidel that a miracle is a thing con- “trary to nature;"3—and again, “ How far an effect " may be a true miracle in the production of which “ there is an intervention of a second cause, is a “ question which I know not how to fathom.”4 ? Eruvin, p. 273. 3 Ibid. p. 249. 2 Ibid. p. 249, 4 Ibid. p. 268. CC 2 388 [Essay IV. & I. THEOLOGICAL VICW. Now we have only to remark, that in the present case, the whole question at issue was, whether the effect was or was not “contrary to nature;” and whether we could explain it or not by the admission of " second causes.” 1 Against the supernatural view, it was argued by some that in the present case the patient was brought into a high state of excitement, and her system pre- disposed to receive the influence administered. Dr. Maitland, on the other side, dwells on the numerous instances in the Scripture miracles where such ex- citement and predisposing causes manifestly existed, and which on the same principle might also thus be explained away. He concludes his essay by a strong caution against the dangers in which the received evidences of Christianity may be involved by such discussions, and suggests as the best remedy a recur- rence to the powers conferred on bishops, by the councils of Noyon, Trent, and Cambray, to inquire It is worthy of remark that another eminent supporter of orthodoxy at the present day, while strongly denouncing what he calls “the shallow and crude assumption of the impossibility” of miracles, yet admits that “a miracle, in one sense, need not be necessarily a violation of the laws of nature: God may make use of instruments." (Mansel's “ Bampton Lectures," p. 197. Essay IV. $1.] 389 MODERN MIRACLES. into, and decide upon, questions of alleged mi- racles. 1 On the other side, the views of the editor of the “ Observer” and his friends are at least far more definite and summary. He says, “ While we admit “the facts we utterly disclaim the jnference that a 6 miracle has been wrought.”....“We must admit “any solution rather than a miracle," —... “We could not have anticipated that in the 19th cen- “tury we should have been constrained gravely to “ argue that the cure of a young lady, however re- “markable in some of its circumstances, is not a miraculous suspension of the laws by which the “ Creator ordinarily governs the universe," .... “ because it is more likely that we are ignorant than " that God has suspended his laws."2 Another point much dwelt upon by the editor and his correspondents is that there was no object an- answered, no attestation to doctrine concerned in this case. But the argument which seems to weigh most with them is the danger to the truth incurred | Eruvin, p. 277. ? Quoted in “Eruvin,” p. 245. CC3 390 [Essay IV. § 1. THEOLOGICAL VIEW. in the admission of such miraculous inter position, and this on two grounds:--first, a parallel has been hinted at between this instance and that of certain Romanist miracles:-hence the admission of the one might tend to strengthen the claims of the other,– a thing abhorrent to all Protestant convictions. Hence “it is safer to admit the facts but deny the theolo- gical inferences in both cases." Secondly, the infidel may be imagined to allege, “ the miracle in this case is as good a miracle as any in Scripture:" nay, some of the correspondents have actually pointed out close analogies in this case with the circumstances of some of the Scripture miracles ; —a comparison from which all pious minds would recoil. Hence, the editor contents himself by strongly denying all real analogy between the cases as an admission equally dangerous to Protestantism in par- ticular, as to belief in revelation in general. In this case, however, the point most worthy of remark is the real and final ground of distinction on which the editor rests his whole case. He ob- serves, — “ The miracles recorded in Scripture we "separate by a wide line of distinction from all Essay IV. $ 1.] 391 MODERN MIRACLES. “ human narratives . . . . We best indicate the mi- “ racles of Scripture when we place between them “ and all uninspired narratives a broad line of de- “marcation not to be transgressed." Again ;-we accept the former, “simply, because we are taught so in the inspired Volume.” 1 We have thus a remarkably instructive case of an General alleged extraordinary fact, and of the very opposite varieties of opinion under which it is viewed. We have on either side the fact uncontested: but one religious party adoring it as a true miracle, at the same time admitting that a suspension of the laws of nature, or a denial of the operation of secondary causes is not essentially involved in the idea of a miracle;--- another pre-eminently religious party as strenuously denying its miraculous character,-be- cause it is not a miracle of Scripture. The one believing that miracles may occur every day though not necessarily supernatural; — the other, that no miracles can be believed except on the authority of revelation. remarks. | Eruvin, p. 279. CC4 392 [Essay IV. § 1. THEOLOGICAL VIEW. Each of the theological parties in the controversy simply viewed one and the same event through the medium of their respective prepossessions. The learned and critical theologian found his view of the powers of the Christian Church supported by claim- ing the event as a true miracle: the ardent if not enthusiastic religionist of another school could allow no possible case of rivalry to the wonders of the finally closed canon of revelation. The one ac- knowledged miracles at all times characterising the Church : the other could admit none but the standing miracle of the inspiration of the Bible, and those involved in it. An extraordinary event may then be firmly be- lieved and admitted by disputants on both sides, and yet simply according to their preconceived ideas, one man will worship it as a special divine interpo- sition, another equally religious will pass it by as merely an unexplained phenomenon. But after all, the most material point remains to be added :- In the opinion of the most distinguished medical men of the day, the apparent spinal or hip disease was due entirely to the deceptive effect of hysterical affection simulating the supposed disorder, State of the facts. Essay IV. $ 1.} 393 MODERN MIRACLES. which was at once removed, when the hysteria was subdued.) Thus in cases of extraordinary cure it may be well first to inquire into the reality of the disease:- 1 In the pamphlet entitled “The Case of Miss Fancourt; a Collection of Documents, &c.” by the Rev. S. C. Wilks, 1831, ---- which includes the papers printed in the “ Christian Observer," and other matter, - it is remarkable that while the various arguments are stated, in full detail, tending to refuste the miraculous view of the case, so little prominence should be given to the strongest fact for that conclusion - the one im- portant document of the whole collection (p. 61)-a letter from Mr. Travers, the eminent surgeon, who was consulted on the case, and who, after some amount of doubt, at length explained it in the way just stated. It is worthy of notice that all allusion to this view of the case is omitted by Dr. Maitland; and still more, that long after the publication of these documents he should have printed a second edition of his Essay (1850) without any change in this respect. I am indebted to Sir Benjamin Brodie, P.R.S., for pointing out to me this view of the case, who, in a small volume (" Lectures on Local " Nervous Affections,” &c., London, 1837) has collected a number of remarkable cases of the extraordinary effects of hysteria in producing a variety of symptoms undistinguishable from those which would arise from real local injury or disease. Among these he mentions simply :-“In the Christian Observer' “ for November, 1830, we find the recorded case of Miss Fancourt, who “ had long been unable to move in consequence of what was evidently “ an hysterical affection simulating disease of the hip-joint, and was “ supposed to have been miraculously cured under the influence of the “ prayers of her spiritual adviser, --- leaving her couch at once, and “ walking down stairs to supper, to the astonishment of her family." (, 87.) 394 [Essay IV. & I. THEOLOGICAL VIEW. Miracles of the Port Royal. thus a volume of controversial argument may be based on a mere delusion as to the fact. The celebrated miracles of the Port Royal afford a good example of the force of strong religious belief in investing extraordinary facts with a miraculous character. The numerous cases of wonderful cures effected by the touch of a thorn asserted to be from the crown of Christ;—those wrought at the tomb of the Abbé Paris,--and others equally well known, hardly require to be enumerated. We have only the hands of the Jansenists, were disputed and dis- paraged by their bitter enemies the Jesuits and Molinists. Yet they were wholly unable to disprove the facts, and finding the evidence unassailable, were driven to have recourse to the assertion of demo- niacal influence. Again, it is curious to remark how completely the same argument of parallelism with the Scripture miracles above binted at pervades the various discussions of these wonders, especially the celebrated « Recueil des Miracles de l'Abbé Paris." Among Protestant writers these miracles have been generally rejected and discredited, because being ESSAY IV. § 1.] 395 PORT ROYAL MIRACLES. papistical they were of course incapable of being true: even though of Jansenist (or semi-Protestant) tendency, it would be wrong for a moment to coun- tenance them. In the strength of this assumption Middleton takes his stand against the assertors of the older ecclesiastical miracles, and thinks it amply sufficient to challenge them to produce any marvels of the primitive Church equally well supported, and to assign any reason for upholding the primitive, while they (of course) deny the Port Royal miracles. 2 If, from the sceptical age in which we live, we The an- glance backwards to past times, we find an increasing siastical miracles. belief in miraculous occurrences, through the me- diæval period, up to the earlier ages of the Christian Church, attested by the statements of a succession cient eccle- various opinions have been entertained; and it be- comes a point of the highest interest to examine | Free Inquiry into Miraculous Powers, &c., before referred to. 2 Perhaps the most remarkable confession of the difficulties of the subject of the Port Royal miracles is to be found in an elaborate article in the “ Edinburgh Review” (vol. lxxiii.), ascribed to a very eminent writer, where (especially at p. 340) it will be seen how completely irresistible he finds the evidence of the facts, and to what an extent the resulting perplexity carries him in seeking a solution. 396 [Essay IV. & I. THEOLOGICAL VIEW. siastical these narratives with special reference to the light in which they may be, and have been viewed, whe- ther by the advance of philosophical criticism on the one hand, or on the other, under the influence of that. veneration for ecclesiastical antiquity which invests them with so different a character, and which has become so prevalent at the present day. The eccle The claim to the possession of miraculous gifts miracles and powers on the part of a long and uninterrupted differently viewed. succession of saints and eminent upholders of the Christian faith, — or rather, perhaps, as generally vested in the collective body of the Church, has been always insisted on in its full extent and integrity by the Romanists. But it has been also upheld with scarcely less zeal, though possibly with some modi- fication in extent, by many divines of the reformed Church. Rejected It is true the majority of modern Protestants have by most Protestants. been little disposed to credit these miraculous his- tories; and at the present day the prevailing dis- belief perhaps may too unsuspiciously repose on the authority of some eminent critical writers who have cast at least a general shade of doubt over them; and thus, perhaps, the very nature of these alleged ma- Essay IV. $ 1.] 397 ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES. 397 instances. nifestations of Divine power is comparatively little known. Yet many are acquainted, for example, with A few the miracles which attended the discovery of the true cross by the Empress Helena; -and the super- natural multiplication of the wood of which it was composed, until it became a common saying that there was enough of it in Europe to build a first-rate ship, as well as of the miraculous effects produced by the touch of it;--some again may have heard of St. Martin wandering in a forest when a furious storm brought down a large tree, which was in the act of falling directly on the saint's head, — but he made the sign of the cross, and the tree was whirled aloft and fell at some distance ;—of a priest, out- wardly orthodox, but inwardly tainted with the heresy of Arius, who was celebrating the Eucharist, when on performing the consecration of the ele- ments the bread was instantly transformed into a cinder ; -- as well as of the temptation with which St. Anthony was assailed by the Devil in his solitude. These are a very few examples of the long cata- logues of recorded wonders which, however, once made subjects of incredulity, and even ridicule, are 398 [Essay IV. § I. THEOLOGICAL VIEW. 20 ik among those which have been in our own times particularly dwelt upon and discussed by Anglican divines as avowedly to be placed on the same general ground and level of credibility with narratives which most Protestants have been accustomed to regard in a very different light. Upheld by With the real and consistent Romanists indeed Catholicists, as con there is a reason and a coherence in the belief nected with infalli. awarded to all these prodigies. The infallible cha- bility. racter and supernatural authority of the Catholic Church of course invests all these miracles ancient or modern alike, — from those of the Bible in one continuous series, through those of the early Fathers, St. Martin, St. Hilarion, and St. Gregory, down to those of the Holy Thorn, and the Abbé Paris, the “ Addolorata,” and “ Estatica," and the winking Ma- donna, of recent times, with the same universal attribute of reality and divinity: even if it be al- lowed that here or there an alleged instance has not been sufficiently authenticated, or has not re- ceived the due stamp of formal authority. The most striking representation of the whole subject in modern times has, perhaps, been that given in the very acute and remarkable Essay pub- 7 Essay IV. $ 1.] ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES. 399 lished by Dr. J. Newman? before his conversion to the only faith which openly and unreservedly sup- ports its claim to the possession of these miraculous powers, — a publication which attracted much atten- tion, and presented the subject in a point of view naturally startling to Protestant apprehensions, by upholding the continued dispensation of these powers to the Church, with whatever lesser deductions or exceptions from critical · objections, in particular instances, yet in such a way as to allow of no essen- tial distinction in nature and credibility between those of one age and of another: and expressly con- tending that though the miracles of the ecclesiastical historians may in some respects differ in character from those of Scripture, yet that in general they rest on no other grounds of probability or reason than those of the Bible. The author criticises the argu- Parallel - with Scrip- ments of Douglas, Middleton, and others, against the ecclesiastical miracles, as being precisely parallel with that of Hume against those of the New Testament, and as being even less consistent and ture mi. racles. See “ An Essay on the Miracles recorded in Ecclesiastical History," by the Rev. J, H, Newman: Oxford, 1843. 100 . [Essay IV. § I. THEOLOGICAL VIEW. urged with less reason." He afterwards observes, - “ those who have condemned the miracles of the • Church by such a rule have before now included “ in their condemnation the very notion of a miracle “altogether." 2 And again, when the critical writers referred to, ascribe the ecclesiastical miracles either to imposture or delusion, or natural causes ill understood, or allege that the belief in them originated out of the vague language and exaggerated statements of tra- ditional rumour, of popular legends, or theological myths, the suggestion is all along made—why are not similar rationalistic explanations equally appli- cable to the Scripture miraculous narratives ?3 while referring to the systematic distinctions of the “evidential” writers, the author expressly contends that very few of the Scripture miracles really fulfil the precise tests laid down by Leslie, Lyttleton, Douglas, and others, whose arguments he discards as altogether unsatisfactory. 4 We may best illustrate these remarks by a few instances in the author's own words:- “ There is 1 Newman's “ Essay," p. 20. 3 Ibid. p. 86 et seq. 2 Ibid. p. 54. 4 Ibid. p. 107. ESSAY IV. $1.] 401 ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES. “not a more startling, yet a more ordinary gift in “the history of the first ages of the Church than the “powef of exorcism; while at the same time it is “open to much suspicion, both from the comparative “ facility of imposture and the intrinsic strangeness “ of the doctrine it inculcates. Yet here Scripture “has anticipated the Church in all respects; even “going the length of relating the possession of brute “animals, which appears so extravagant when intro- 6 duced, as instanced above, in the life of Hilarion “ by St. Jerome. Again, we have a prototype of the “ miracles wrought by relics in the resurrection of “ the corpse which touched Elisha's bones, -_a work “s of Divine power, which, whether considered in its “ appalling greatness, the absence of apparent object, " and the means through which it was accomplished, “ we should think incredible, with the now prevail- “ing notions of miraculous agency, were we not “ familiar with it. Similar precedents for a super- “ natural presence in things inanimate are found in “ the miracles wrought by the touch of our Saviour's “garments, and by the handkerchiefs and aprons “which had been applied to St. Peter's body; not DD 402 ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES. [Essay IV. § 1. s to insist on what is told us about St. Peter's “shadow."1 “ Elijah's mantle is another instance of a relic “ endued with miraculous power. Again, the mul- “ tiplication of the wood of the cross (the fact of “ which is not here determined, but must depend “ on the testimony and other evidence producible) is “but parallel to Elisha's multiplication of the oil " and of the bread and barley, and our Lord's mul- “tiplication of the loaves and fishes. Again, the 66 account of the consecrated bread becoming a cinder “ in unworthy hands, is not so strange as the very “ first miracle wrought by Moses, the first miracle “ for evidence recorded in Scripture, when his rod “ became a serpent and then a rod again; nor stranger “than our Lord's first miracle, when water was turned “into wine. When the tree was falling upon St. “ Martin, he is said to have caused it to whirl round 6 and fall elsewhere by the sign of the cross: is this “ more startling than Elisha's causing the iron “ axe-head to swim by throwing a stick into the 6 water ?" 2 1 Newman's Essay, p. 57. 2 Ibid. p. 58. ESSAY IV. $ 1.] PARALLELISM WITH SCRIPTURE. 403 “ It is objected that the ecclesiastical miracles are 6 not distinct and unsuspicious enough to be true “ones, but admit of being plausibly attributed to “ fraud, collusion, or misstatement in narrators; yet “ in like manner St. Matthew tells us that the Jews “persisted in maintaining that the disciples had « stolen away our Lord's body, and He did not show “ Himself, when risen, to the Jews; and various other “ objections, to which it is painful to do more than á allude, have been made to the other parts of the “ sacred narrative. It is objected, that St. Gregory's, “St. Martin's or St. Hilarion's miracles were not be- “ lieved when first formally published to the world " by Nyssen, Sulpicius, and St. Jerome; but it must “be remembered that Gibbon observes scoffingly, " that 'the contemporaries of Moses and Joshua be- “held with careless indifference the most amazing “ miracles;' that even an Apostle who had attended " our Lord through His ministry did not believe his “ brethren's report of His resurrection, and that St. “ Paul's supernatural power of punishing offenders swas doubted at Corinth by the very parties who “had seen his miracles and been his converts." I | Newman's Essay, p. 58. DD 2 404 ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES. [Essay IV. § I. “ The Scripture miracles may be distributed into o the Mosaic, the prophetical, and the evangelical ; “ of which the first are mainly of a judicial and re- 6 tributive character, and wrought on a large field; “ the last are miracles of mercy, and the intermediate “ are more or less of a romantic or poetical cast.” I 55 As the prophetical miracles in a great measure 66 belong to the schools of Elijah and Elisha, so the 6 ecclesiastical have a special connection with the “ ascetics and solitaries of the orders or families of “ which they were patriarchs, with St. Anthony, St. “ Martin, and St. Benedict, and other great con- “ fessors or reformers, who are the antitypes of the “prophets. Moreover, much might be said con- “cerning the romantic character of the prophetical “ miracles. Those of Elisha in particular are related, “not as parts of the history, but rather as his “acta, “ with a profusion and variety very like the style of “ writing which offends us in the miraculous narra- s tives of ecclesiastical authors.” 2 ..“Or, take again the history of Samson; what a “ mysterious wildness and eccentricity is impressed i Newman's Essay, p. 59. % Ibid. p. 60. Essay IV. § 1.] PARALLELISM WITH SCRIPTURE. 405 “ upon it, upon the miracles which occur in it, “and upon its highly favoured though wayward “ subject.” 1 In another work, in precisely the same spirit, the temptation of St. Anthony is referred to as “not unworthy to be compared with that of our Lord.” 2 Other writers of the same school dwell at large on instances of the Scripture miracles, and then on cases exactly parallel in ecclesiastical tradition, or in the Apocrypha, which are often dismissed as legen- dary or superstitious, -and demand why are the one class to be rejected or explained away and not the other ? 3 Again, they allege many cases in the Martyrolo- gies in which circumstances are narrated, and mys- tical explanations made of them exactly parallel,- as they represent them,-€. g. to the appearance of the “water and the blood” at the Crucifixion, and St. John's comment upon it“, -and ask why are the former disregarded as fanciful and incredible, while the latter are held sacred ? | Newman's Essay, p. 60. 2 The Church of the Fathers, p. 369. 3 Tracts for the Times, No. 85, p. 87. 4 Ibid. p. 93. DD 3 406 [Essay IV. & I. ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES. It would be needless to go into more instances: we will merely remark that such modes of view- ing and applying the ecclesiastical miracles — such avowed' or implied inferences and comparisons — cannot but excite surprise among Protestants, and perhaps even disgust and offence in many minds accustomed to regard the matter in so different a light. But to those who look at the case in a rea- soning point of view, the remarkable turn thus given to the argument, may suggest many reflections bear- ing on the entire grounds of the belief in miracles. We will merely here observe that an argument from consistency and parallelism may often tell as much on one side as on the other. 1 TY: 1 Without pretending here to go into the details of testimony on this most difficult and much agitated question, it may be proper to refer to one or two of the chief authorities cited. The testimony of Irenæus (about A. D. 200) is as follows : — “Whence “ also in His name, as many as are His true disciples, having received " from Him grace for the salvation and benefit of all the rest, do these " things, as each of them has received of Him the gift. For some cast “out demons truly and effectually ;- so that they who are freed from 6c these evil spirits often embrace the faith and continue in the Church : s others are gifted with prescience of the future, with visions, and pro- - phetical predictions : others heal the sick by imposition of hands, and “ restore them to their former health: even the dead oftentimes (as we “ have before said) are raised up, and afterwards remain with us for Essay IV. $ 1.] 407 EVIDENCE. miracles. L As to the actual evidence, unless we reject the Evidence for the ec- testimony of the early Fathers altogether, even on clesiastical questions of fact, we must believe that the Christian missionaries, through at least some of the earlier centuries, ejected evil spirits, healed the sick, and raised the dead: the same assertions continue to be made by subsequent ecclesiastical writers, and in- vested with increasing characters of the marvellous, in one unbroken chain down to later ages; and the question,-if we admit these claims for the first few centuries, where can we limit them? ----has been at once the triumphant boast of the Catholic writers and the anxious and perplexing inquiry of the Pro- testant. We need not allude to the volumes of dis- cussion by which, after all, few at the present day feel that the difficulties of the subject are wholly removed. “ many years. What should I say more? It would be impossible “ to enumerate all the gifts which the Church throughout the whole “ world receives from God in the name of Jesus Christ, and daily exer- “ cises for the benent of the Gentiles.” (Irenæus, “ Adv. Hæret.” ii, 57; see also ibid. 28, 32.) Other testimonies are those of Origen “Contra Celsum,” iii. 24; xiii. 420; Justin “Apol.” i. 45 ; ii. 6; Tertullian “Apol.” § 23, 37, 43, and in several of his other works. DD4 408 ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES. [Essay IV. $ 1. Critical objections. Preposses- sions for or against. The arguments of theologians and the attestations of the Fathers and ecclesiastical historians have been subjected to the searching criticisms of Middleton, Jortin, Gibbon, Douglas, and others. These criticisms and allegations, on either side, it would be impossible here to discuss in detail. But the more the whole case is considered, the more, it must be confessed, it appears surrounded by difficulties, from which none of these discussions have fully relieved it. If indeed we are to be guided merely by theological prepossessions on one side or the other, it is easy to decide the question; to uphold all the marvels alike as Divine manifestations, with Dr. J. Newman on the one hand, or, on the other, to pronounce, with Dr. Jortin, that “we. may as well believe, on the authó- “rity of Æsop or Phædrus, that the fox and the cat “held a dialogue together in Greek or in Latin." I The difficulty is to lay down a rule or a principle. When we reflect on the serious difficulties involved on either hand, whether in accepting or in rejecting the statements of the ecclesiastical miracles, - it can hardly be considered surprising that even acute Difficulties · on either side. Remarks on Ecc. Hist. ii 217 Essay IV. § 1.] 409 ROMANIST VIEW. thinkers with deep religious sympathies should have believed that those difficulties and embarrassments were only capable of being avoided by decrying evi- dence altogether, and resting their belief in a simple acknowledgment of the entire supernatural attributes, and consequent infallible character, of the Church,- one and the same throughout all ages, - and thus honestly and conscientiously seeking the solution of all perplexities in an implicit faith and prostrate sub- mission to the one unchanged, unreformed Church, which has uniformly preserved the integrity of her claims, unbroken and unimpeachable, from the first age down to the present. Thus the eminent writer before quoted has but Romanist consistently followed up his former views since his case. reception into the Roman Catholic Church. Dr. J. Newman (in his celebrated Birmingham lec- tures)', dwells at large on the miracles of the Church, asserting in the strongest terms his own sincere and entire belief, even in the most apparently extravagant of them, and arguing expressly against the incon- view of the · Lectures on the present position of Catholics, &c. By J. H, New- man DD., 1851. See especially Lecture vii. 410 MIRACLES. [Essay IV. § i. TM ECCLESIASTICAL Belief consistent. sistency of those who reject them as incredible, while they yet believe the infinitely greater and most tran- scendent miracle of all, the Incarnation. So long as the infallible divinity of the Church is maintained, it appears clear that the one class of miracles must be consistently placed on exactly the same level with the other. And as to the apparent unworthiness or puerility of some of the marvels, it ought to be viewed (as in all such cases) with a refer- ence to the capacities of those to whom they were addressed. What to cold reasoning Protestants in England may appear a very clumsy imposture or childish delusion, may to the ignorant but ardent de- votion of the peasant of Italy or the Tyrol seem the most glorious or affecting testimony to the Divine truth of his faith and the authority of his Church; and in past ages, when the belief in the supernatural was universal, there was of course no difficulty in the ad- mission of any marvels as such. The express grounds on which the continuance of miraculous powers has been maintained is the as- Conse- quences from the i Some Roman Catholic writers draw distinctions, and maintain that all miracles are not equally articles of faith. Mr. Butler, in his reply to Southey, restricts to this class the Bible miracles. Essay IV. & J.] 411 . ROMANIST VIEW. sumption of the general supernatural character of the ecclesias- Church, as a continuous Divine institution, to which racles. the same character and claims attach equally in all ages. It would thus follow, that whatever is handed down as of a supernatural kind in connection with it has, in fact, no more distinct authority, and is en- titled to no more peculiar respect, in one age than in another, at the earliest epoch than in modern times. The character of the later miraculous preten- sions thus implicates that of the earlier, and even of the first age; and the records of them all (as to their general claims) are placed on the same level. Thus it would clearly follow that there was no peculiar evidence derived from special interposition in the first age more than in later times, and that the original promulgation of the Gospel was not at all more properly divine, as being substantiated by any more distinguishing supernatural characteristics, than the ministrations and teachings of the Church in subse- quent ages. tical mi- The argument of Middleton tends to the dilemma that either the miracles of the Church establish the authority of the Fathers and Coun. cils, and thence of Romanism, or that ecclesiastical antiquity must be rejected altogether. It was this dilemma which led Gibbon in the earlier part of his life to embrace Romanism. 412 ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES. [Essay IV. § I. Views of writers on the evi- dences Such a view (it is clear) is eminently consistent with the claims of the unreformed and infallible Church. But the difficulty is to reconcile such admissions with the professed principles of Protes- tantism. Nevertheless, in former times the con- tinuance of supernatural powers, however occa- sionally dormant in the Christian Church, has been upheld by some eminent Protestant divines, as was before remarked; yet they do not seem to have observed how obviously this admission might recoil on the received external evidences of revelation. But in later times the difficulties of the question have been better appreciated. Campbell and others have consistently contended, that these · miracles, if ad- mitted, must be accepted as the attestation of conti- inued new revelations—further developments, in short, of Christianity: and, by necessary consequence, setting aside the finality of the New Testament. On the other side it has been a common insinuation that as all early histories have their legends and pro- digies, and all religions their miracles, their Divine incarnations and apotheoses, so the religions exhibited in the Bible have theirs : and those who extend pre- cisely the same comparison to the subsequent develop- OL of sceptics. Essay IV. § 1.] 413 PROTESTANT VIEWS. distinctions ment of Christianity, and to the miraculous claims and marvellous legends of the Church, which they contend cannot be really distinguished from those of Scripture, they place all such supernatural narratives on the same level, and make the evidences in the one case no better than in the other. Hence, to draw a broad line of demarcation, has Critical been felt to be imperatively necessary, and the ten- in eccle- dency of those views which amalgamate and identify miracles. the one class of miracles and marvels with the other becomes the more obviously conspicuous. Thus, on both grounds, the majority of Protestant writers (with whatever difference of opinion as to the precise period) have usually contended for some limit in point of time, beyond which miracles cease to be credible.1 But in order to draw such a line they siastical Dodwell (“ Dissert. in Iren.” ii. & 55) maintains miracles till the conversion of Constantine (A.D. 312). Whiston till A.D. 381; and, as he characteristically observes, “when “ the Church became Athanasian, Antichristian, and Popish, they “ ceased, and the Devil lent his own cheating and fatal power instead.” (“: Account of Dæmoniacs," p. 65.) Waterland admitted some miracles in the 5th century. (“Misc. Tracts,” p. 173.) Locke says, we must either “go no further than the Apostles' time, “ or else not stop at Constantine.” (“ Third Lett. on Tol." ch. x. p. 269.) 414 [Essay IV. $ I. ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES. necessarily have recourse to grounds of rationalising criticism, which they often apply with no sparing hand. Some reject all miracles except those of the New Testament. Others place the limit more or less. early or late, but with little apparent consistency of principle. Views of Dean Lyall has extensively and forcibly treated Dean Lyall. this subject; — and in connection with some remarks on Gibbon's reference to the alleged miracles of the Church as among the causes of the propagation of Christianity, he thus delivers his opinion :- “The “ third cause is the pretension of the first Christians “ to miraculous gifts. But, supposing the miracles “ ascribed to Christ to have been really wrought, and “ that the power of working them was extended to “the Apostles, surely it need not make much impres- “sion on the mind of any man, who knows what “human nature is, to be told that miracle-mongers “ continued to infest the Church long after all mira- “culous gifts had really been withdrawn. Such an “ effect was the natural consequence of a belief in “the miracles related of Christ and his Apostles. All “ it proves is, that the minds of men were excited, “ and, as has happened in other cases, that designing “men took advantage of the fact. “Prodigia eo anno Essay IV. § 1.] 415 PROTESTANT VIEWS. e “multa nunciata sunt, says Livy, speaking of the “ second Punic war, “quæ quo magis credebant sim- “plices et religiosi homines, eo etiam plura nuntiaban- “ tur.' I can only say, as for myself, that I do not “ believe in the continuance of miraculous powers in “the Church from the period when Jerusalem was de- “stroyed. General assertions there are in allegation of s miraculous gifts more than enough; but it is observ- “able that none of the Fathers speak of such gifts as “ possessed by themselves, however credulous they may s seem in the instance of others. . . . . The belief in “ lying wonders, though' naturally and reasonably to “ be accounted for, was the opprobrium of the early “ Church; but, instead of reckoning this belief, as “Gibbon does, among the causes of the success “of Christianity, my persuasion is, that, on the “contrary, it was among the impediments which “it had to overcome, just as in the present day “ the similar pretensions of the Church of Rome “ are the causes of much of the infidelity which is snow in the world. In the earlier ages of the “ Church, such miracles as we read of in ecclesiastical “ writers, even if they had been true, would not have “ advanced the cause of Christianity; for there were “none, either in or out of the Church, who reasoned 416 IV. & I. Y ECCLESIASTICAL [ESSAY LY MIRACLES. involved. “ upon this evidence as we do; even the vulgar in “ those days looked upon them simply as the effects “ of magical arts, or otherwise of spiritual agency, “ good or bad; and we cannot doubt that wise and “ learned men, instead of being attracted by such “ arguments, must have been often kept away.” ? Difficulties Nothing can be more true than some of the allega- tions and grounds of reasoning here appealed to; but it may be questioned whether the same arguments might not apply further than was probably intended. Again : why the period of miracles must be limited to the fall of Jerusalem is by no means apparent. But chiefly it must be remarked, that this summary rejection of the appeal to miracles in the early Church Miraculous —which even the historian of “The Decline and Fall” propagation seems disposed to admit as influencing the convic- tions of the converts — tends directly to set aside the argument, commonly so much dwelt upon, of the necessity of miracles for the propagation of the Gospel. For there was clearly no very wide-spread or very numerous accession of converts during the age of of Chris- tianity. Propædia Prophetica, Diss. I. p. 348. - ESSA 417 TESTIMONY OT THE FATHERS. of the criticised, the New Testament miracles : it was not till a later period that the great and overflowing extension and prevalence of Christianity in all places and among all ranks occurred. It is therefore difficult to see how it can be maintained that the universal extension of Christianity was effected by outward supernatural means, by those who discard the miraculous claims of the early Church. Again, by others, the confession of Chrysostom Testimonies (A.D. 380) has been appealed to—“argue not that Fathers “ miracles did not happen then because they do not “ happen now"l—as decisive of the question in his age. The later miraculous narratives of Gregory and others, as well as those of Eusebius, are criticised as of a legendary and suspicious character: and it is urged the earlier statements of Origen and Tertullian, of Justin and Irenæus, are indefinite in their tenor, and in no case reported on the credit of eye-witnesses. While, going back still earlier, more remarkable is the fact that not one of the Apostolic Fathers -- 1 Hom. in 1 Cor. vi. 2; to the same effect also. Augustine, “ De Civ, Dei,” xxii. 6. EL 418 ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES. [Essay IV. & 1. neither Ignatius, nor Polycarp the disciple of St. John, nor Clement the fellow-labourer of St. Paul, make the smallest reference to miracles as existing in their age. . For, — that Ignatius puts hypothetically the case of working miracles, that the Martyrology of Polycarp' (whose author and date are quite un- certain) details some prodigies attending his death, and that Clement appeals to the miracle, as he be- lieved it to be, of the Phoenix, will perhaps hardly be regarded as exceptions. That the stream should thus be most defective nearest its source—the chain broken at its very commencement-remains to be accounted for. But in admitting any process of searching criticism and sceptical exceptions applied to the documentary authority or origin and force of the testimony in support of the miraculous powers ascribed to the early Christian Church, others have felt the greatest difficulty, as it would seem to involve the admission of a similar right of uncompromising critical exami- nation applying equally to the miracles of one age as of another. And if, regarding the question as merely Scepticism incon- sistent. | Frag. ix. 2 IIapadočov onueLov, I.“ Ad Cor.” § 25. Essay IV. § 1.] 419 EVIDENCE DECRIED. one of historical fact, we are at liberty freely to can- vass, to reject, or explain away as much or as little as may seem reasonable in the one case, they do not see the consistency of prohibiting such criticism in the other. Yet in fact those speculations of the Ratio- nalistic school, which create so much offence in the minds of orthodox Protestants, proceed on no other principles than those which dictate their own critical rejection of the ecclesiastical miracles, and vindicate the disposition to regard them as mythical inven- tions on the one hand, or exaggerated versions of extraordinary natural events, on the other. Some have, indeed, sought to avoid the difficulties Various of the case by maintaining the distinction that the adopted. ecclesiastical miracles were not evidential, but wrought only for the support and comfort of the Church under * difficulties and persecutions. Others, again, contend that they were only a species of marvels raised up as antagonistic to the heathen magical wonders, and appealed to as a triumph of superior power. Some, too, have explained the narratives of them pleas 1. See Neander, “ Ecc. Hist,” transl. i. 67, and Paley's " Evid." ii. 339. E E 2 420 [Essay IV. § 1. ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES. as merely pious frauds for the support of the faith in a later age: but the question naturally arises, why does not all this apply equally in an earlier age, and to other cases, however consecrated by prescrip- tive belief ? Others have urged the consideration that these prodigies belong to an age when their production, or their introduction to public notice, was altogether in the hands of a dominant hierarchy, and that they were always such as favoured and supported its pre- tensions among the mass of willing, and for the most part ignorant, votaries of increasing credulity and superstition. Dr. Arnold, while referring to this distinction, dwells still more emphatically on the total want of combination of these external manifestations with the internal appeal to doctrine, and thence argues that the mediæval miracles and those of the Gospel by no means “stand on the same ground."1 . Such varied and contradictory views of the ecclesi- astical miracles evince only the perplexity in which UUU I Lect, on Modern Hist. p. 133. This distinction is also dwelt upon by Dean Lyall, “ Prop. Proph.” 441. Essay IV. § 1.] 421 FUNCTIONS OF THE CHURCH. connected powers and Church. the whole question is unavoidably involved, -unless taken up on far more comprehensive principles, whether on one side or the other, than most are willing to adopt. But the subject is closely connected with other Argument arguments of the same school of writers who support with the the ecclesiastical miracles, and is eminently eluci- functions of the dated by them. These writers uphold continued supernatural in- fluence in the Christian Church, of a less sensible kind, but not less really manifested in the spiritual powers and functions of its ministry, down to the present day; and the exercise of these functions is even placed in complete parallelism and identity with the Scripture miracles; an argument which at least may easily be understood as rather casting a re- flected light upon those miracles. To illustrate this, a few extracts will suffice. “ Are miracles the only way in which a claim can “ be recognised? Is a man the higher minister the “ more miracles he does ? Are we to honour those “ who minister temporal miracles, and to be content “ to eat and be filled with the loaves and fishes ? “ Are there no higher miracles than visible ones? EES 422 ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES. [Essay IV. § I. IL ......“ If Christ is with His ministers, according to His promise, “even to the end of the world,' so 66 that he that despiseth them despiseth Him, then, “ though they do no miracles, they are in office as “ great as Elisha. And if baptism be the cleansing “ and quickening of the dead soul — to say nothing “ of the Lord's Supper — they do work miracles. If “ God's ministers are then only to be honoured when “we see that they work miracles, where is the place “ for faith ? Are we not under a dispensation of faith, “ not of sight?” ? · Again: it is asked, “Why is it so readily believed that virtue went out from Christ,” and yet denied in ordination from the hands of a bishop? Why are such powers admitted in the persons of the Apostles and not in the administration of the sacraments by priests ordained in succession from them ? 2 In another publication it is distinctly affirmed that “ the change wrought by the consecration of the ele- “ments in the Holy Communion is as much a miracle “as the change of the wine in the marriage at “ Cana."3 While another eminent advocate of the 2 Ibid. p. 90. 1 Tracts for the Times, No. lxxxv. p. 95. | British Critic, xxvii. p. 259. Essay IV. $ 1.] TUNCTIONS OF THE CHURCH. 423 same views argues that the “Spiritual, yet real, pre- sence of Christ in the Eucharist” is no more in- credible than His appearances after the resurrection, His passing through closed doors, or vanishing at Emmaus, or even than the ascension. But in following out the same kind of comparison sometimes admissions of a more striking kind are made: thus it is alleged—“The Deluge will appear “ to men of modern tempers more and more in- “ credible the longer and more minutely it is dwelt “ upon," and a similar remark is applied to the physical miracles recorded of Elisha, Jonah, and others. 1 Again: it is asked, “ Can we doubt but that the “account of Christ's ascending into heaven will not “ be received by the science of the age, when it is “carefully considered what is implied in it? Where “is heaven? beyond all the stars? If so it would “take years for any natural body to get there. We “say with God all things are possible. But this age, rwise in its own eyes, has already decided the con- “ trary in maintaining, as it does, that He who vir- 1 Tracts for the Times, No. Ixxxy. p. 93. EE 4 424 [Essay IV. § I. ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES. Inferences testimonies. “tually annihilated the distance between earth and “ heaven in His Son's ascension cannot annihilate it “in the celebration of the Holy Communion so as to “ make us present with Him, though He be on God's “right hand in heaven.” 1 from these Such reasonings require little comment. They may be viewed under some diversity of aspect; but they readily admit an interpretation calculated to relieve the question of all critical difficulties, especially those of a philosophical kind,-- by placing what have been commonly regarded as sensible and physical mi- racles precisely on a level with purely spiritual influences. Mystic Nor, in connection with these references to a views of the Fathers. school which founds everything on the authority of the Fathers of the Church, can we fail to remember that it was on no other ground that Woolston (as before noticed)? long ago founded his rejection of the historical character of the Gospel narratives of miracles, and assigned to them that mythic origin, and allegorical interpretation, which Origen, 1 Tracts for the Times, No. lxxxv. p. 97. 2 See p. 335. Essay IV. & 1.] 425 TENDENCY TO RATIONALISM. Hilary, and others distinctly sanction, and which was the germ and suggestion of the speculations of Strauss. These views, to say the least, represent miracles in a sense very different from that in which the formal logic of the last century discussed them;- and possibly one not exempt from some reflection of the advancing light of philosophy which these writers ciation of not without a reference to such ideas, that in the evidences same school of theology from which these views emanated, the disparagement of the evidence of miracles has been carried out even to a more pre- cise extent; as appears perhaps in the most striking manner from the direct testimony of an able writer, formerly a pupil of this school, as to the nature of the instruction once imparted in it. “We began to follow him [“ the great teacher'] “ along the subtle reasonings with which he drew “away from under us the supports on which Pro- “ testant Christianity had been content to rest its 6 weight. We allowed ourselves to see its contradic- “ tions, to recognise the logical strength of the argu- “ments of Hume, to acknowledge that the old 426 [ESSAY IV. $ I. ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES. “ arguments of Campbell,—the Evidences of Paley, 56 - were futile as the finger of a child on the “ spoke of an engine's driving wheel. Nay, more " to examine the logic of unbelief with a kind of “ pleasure, as hitting our adversaries to the death, “and never approaching us at all.”] consistent Such distinct avowals may perhaps appear start- with tradi- tional prin- ling to those who have not attentively considered the tendencies of the peculiar school from which they emanate in all their bearings; but they harmonise entirely with the principles involved in the very nature of that system, —which was in fact that of the ancient Fathers, and which tend to disembarrass the subject of all evidential difficulties, by acknow- ledging the whole basis of belief to rest simply in tradition and prescriptive authority. ciple. | The Nemesis of Faith, p. 126. Taking the subject in a more controversial light, the Chevalier Bunsen has observed of the Tractarian school : “ Those who were once 6 their leaders now preach that historical Christianity must be given up “as a fable, if an infallible authority be not acknowledged declaring it " to be true." (Bunsen's “ Hippolytus," &c. vol. i. Preface, p. xvi.) By the last extract some light is perhaps thrown on a much earlier state of the case here represented, before the qualifying alternative had been adopted. Essay IV. § 1.] 427 ANTIQUITY AND NEOLOGY. 427 DU I And in this depreciation of evidential reasoning, and recurrence to the merely traditional ground of all Christian testimonies, we cannot but perceive the reflection of the critical views of the Neological school. The Patristic theology, which places the marvellous legends and myths of the Church in exact parallel- ism with the miraculous narratives of the Bible, is but the counterpart of the Rationalistic, which re- duces the Scripture narratives to the level of legend and myth." But it must in fairness be added, that what is here remarked is no imputation on the reality or earnestness of a religious belief founded on such a traditional basis. The spirit of faith, --so nearly We might adduce many other instances of this kind of parallelism, Anglican theologians here referred to, and those of the rationalistic school: For instance, the writers of the “ Tracts for the Times,” freely admit the Platonic origin of some of the Christian doctrines, as that of the “ Logos” and other points ; but vindicate the adoption of them as scattered relics of earlier Divine tradition. See “ Tracts for the Times," No. lxxxv. p. 75. Similar admissions are fully made by some of the Fathers : thus, in reference to the Incarnation, S. Jerome says : “ Sapientiæ principem non aliter (Platonistæ] arbitrantur, nisi de “partu virginis editum.” (Jerome adv. Jovin. i. 26.) 428 ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES. [Essay IV. § I. allied to the æsthetic and imaginative faculties of our nature,--may be most fervently and sincerely associated with what is fabulous or mythical, or may attach itself to a high spiritual truth under the out- ward imagery of a marvellous narrative. It has even been contended that mystery and parable are more truly congenial to the nature of faith than fact and history; which are rather subjects of reason and knowledge; far below the aspirations of the spiritual mind. Essay IV. $ 11.] 429, BELIEF IN MIRACLES. $ II. —- GENERAL ARGUMENT DEDUCIBLE FROM THE BELIEF IN MIRACLES. ON faith. - - It is the general appeal to a primary distinction Reason and in nature and function between reason and faith, - intellect and religious sense,—and the admission that what is a legitimate object of the one, may not even be recognisable by the other, which seems to afford the most satisfactory solution of many of the difficulties in which we find ourselves involved in reference to the present question. From what has preceded it appears that while the difficulties of miracles are fully seen, if not explicitly avowed by some theologians, the acceptance of them is regarded purely as a matter of religious faith and spiritual apprehension, not as a point of reason or a deduction of the intellect -- to which they admit it is even opposed. And thus this confession on the side of religion entirely concurs and harmonises with the verdict of philosophy, which, if it fail to recognise physical interruption, freely acknowledges spiritual 430 [Essay IV. § 11. GENERAL ARGUMENT. Evidential arguments, influence and the power of faith; and where its own dominion ends, cordially recognises the landmarks of the neighbour territory, and allows that what is not a subject for a problem may hold its place in a creed. In a past age, as we have already noticed, great stress was laid on certain precise “evidential” argu- ments, especially turning on inferences from miracles. The exclusive, or even principal, importance of this class of proofs has in later times been greatly called in question — even by orthodox theologians, who have evinced a disposition to recede much from formal arguments addressed to the intellect, and to prefer an appeal to spiritual conviction and religious sense. It is now admitted that the strict “evidential” tests once exacted are little applicable to a great part of the Gospel narratives, especially in the earlier portion. Bishop Butler' long ago drew the distinction : “ There are also invisible miracles, the incarnation of Christ, for instance," which are there- fore wholly matters of faith: and Anglican theo- Analogy, Pt. 11. ch. ii. p. 227, ed. 1807. Essay IV. § 11.] 431 REASON AND FAITH. - logians insist upon the traditional source of all our knowledge of the origin or authority of the Gospels as derived from the Fathers ;-—and maintain that evidence and reasoning are little congenial to the spirit of faith, which harmonises better with spiritual doctrine and submission to divine teaching: again, on quite an opposite sidel it is observed that St. Paul, when he does enter on evidential discussion, dismisses it very slightly; his own witness 2 to the resurrection being merely to an appearance long after, the nature of which he does not even mention, but he nevertheless considers this attestation fully equal to that of the other Apostles: while it is con- tended all real conviction must be from within. Hume indeed expressly puts forward his argu- Appeal to ment against miracles on the plea that “it may serve 66 to confound those dangerous friends or disguised “ enemies to the Christian religion, who have under- “ taken to defend it by the principles of human “ reason. Our most holy religion is founded on “FAITH, not on reason: and it is a sure method of “exposing it to such a trial as it is by no means faith. 1 Phases of Faith, p. 181, 1st. ed. 2 1 Cor. xv. 8. 432 [Essay IV. § 11. BELIEF IN MIRACLES. “ fitted to endure.”! If understood in accordance with the distinction between physical interruption and spiritual influence, this declaration would be eminently satisfactory: but it appears from the con- text of the passage (before cited?), that the author makes this very “ faith” to which he refers, in itself something as supernatural, and contrary to reason as any of the miracles which he rejects. The decla- ration can thus only be regarded as designed in an insidious sense. Yet if understood in the meaning just indi- cated, the appeal to faith entirely harmonises with the views of some of the most earnest advocates of revelation who have expressly maintained that “ conversions not miracles are the real and abiding evidences of Christianity." And more reasoning in- quirers have admitted that if the miracles of the Evangelists be regarded as adapted to the concep- tions of the age to which they belong, still the internal evidence of Christianity, - its moral and spiritual appeals to the hearts and consciences of men, equally address themselves to more enlightened apprehensions in all ages. 1 Essays, Vol. II. p. 136, ed. 1800. ? See before, p. 280. Essay IV. $ 11.] 433 INTERNAL EVIDENCE. and internal Among these advocates of Christianity who over- External look, or do not at all appreciate, the consideration evidence. of the abstract question of physical credibility, many pursue the evidential argument, not indeed directly excluding miracles, but contending that their attes- tation ought always to be combined with, and ruled by, that of the internal evidence supplied by the nature of the doctrine inculcated: thus really placing belief on the paramount ground of our moral and spiritual impressions of religious truth. This kind of argument has been dwelt upon by many approved theologians. But it has been per- haps most comprehensively considered by Pascal, who thus sums up the case :-—“Il faut juger de la “ doctrine par les miracles,-il faut juger des mi- “ racles par la doctrine: la doctrine discerne les “ miracles, et les miracles discernent la doctrine: “tout cela est vrai, mais cela ne se contredit pas." He then illustrates the point by the case of the Pharisees who decided on the one side that he who worked a cure on the Sabbath could not be from God; and the people who argued on the other - can a sinner open the eyes of the blind ?”i Pensées, Par. II. Art. xvi. $ 1. FF 434 (Essay IV. § 11. BELICT IN MIRACLLS. It is probably only in connection with the same view that Pascal seems to go still further in dis- paragement of the evidential argument, when he observes : — “Je ne parle pas ici des miracles de “ Moïse, de Jésus Christ, et des Apôtres, parcequ'ils “ne paraissent pas d'abord convaincans, et que je ne “ veux mettre ici en évidence que tous les fondemens “ de cette religion chrétienne, qui sont indubitables, “ et qui ne peuvent être mis en doute par quelque “personne que ce soit.” 1 In other words, some other ground of conviction is appealed to: a miracle as such proves nothing, but is wholly overruled by the predisposing ideas and opinions of those to whom it is addressed. If we look to the actual representation of the New Testament, in an age when the belief in the super- natural was universal, we find, on the express testi- mony of the Gospels which recount the miracles, that the appeal to them was addressed in vain to many with whom it might have been supposed powerful, and in few instances produced any real conviction: even Nicodemus was but a half convert. Scepticism in the age of the Gospel 1 i Pensées, Par. II. Art, xvii, $ 9. Essay IV. § 11.] SPIRITUAL CONVICTION. 435 dence but · The Pharisees did not at all deny the miracles of Christ, but set them down to the influence of evil spirits. In that age it was not any doubt as to supernatural power as such, - it was the influence of their peculiar prepossessions on quite other points on which the different parties raised their arguments and drew their distinctions; and ascribed the work either to God or to Beelzebub, according to their predisposing impressions or foregone conclusions. It is as dependent on the entire difference in habits not evi- of thought between those ages and the present, that conviction. we now look back to the narratives of the Gospel miracles. Even under then existing views, though accepted by properly disposed minds, they were re- jected by others. It was not the mere external apparent event, but the moral and spiritual quali- fications of the parties which formed the ground of real conviction. The miracles are represented as being to some a sign leading them onwards to a higher and purer faith, to others a stumbling block : the pillar of fire to the one, the cloud to the other. On this point some striking testimonies will be found in Dean Lyall's “ Propædia Prophetica,” p. 438. FF 2 436 [Essay IV. § II. BELIEF IN MIRACLES Nor was the appeal to miraclés either exclusively or even principally relied on by Christ or His Apostles. ? False prophets might give signs and wonders 2: the evidence was nothing but as pointing to spiritual enlightenment: Christ dismisses in silence the logic of Nicodemus to turn instantly to the essential re- quirement of spiritual regeneration.3 Such was the spirit in which the appeal to miracles was regarded in former ages : little question of facts or evidence, still less any of higher reason, was entertained: conviction depended on quite other considerations. And the slightest observation will convince us that this accords exactly with the view commonly recognised and admitted by the great mass of pro- fessing believers, who are guided in their reception of Christianity, not by evidential arguments, but simply either by the prepossessions of early educa- tion and received opinion, or by what is believed to be the influence of Divine grace: — miracles are admitted as a part of the Gospel, not as the antece- dent or preliminary proof of it. Common belief with. out evi. dences. | Jobn x. 38; xiv. 11. ? Matt. xxiv. 24, 8 Joba ii. 2. Essay IV. $ 11.] 437 AS OBJECTS OF FAITH. The vast majority of ordinary believers, when they hear any objection started against the miracles of the New Testament, will with one consent regard it, not as a critical difficulty weakening the evidences, but as a profanation, in questioning what is asserted by inspired authority; that is, they believe the miracles in consequence of the assumed inspiration, not as the proofs of it. They answer all objections by a quotation from Scripture, — with God nothing is impossible.”] Their argument is founded on the previous belief in inspiration,—which is a question of faith. Some argue for belief in miracles that creation is a miracle; but creation is solely the doc- trine of revelation 2: the argument, therefore, is still simply one of faith. If we suppose the question put to the great majo- Miracles apart from rity even of more reasoning Protestant Christians, - revelation discredited. whether they believe in the miracles asserted to have been wrought by the Emperor Vespasian or by Apol- lonius of Tyana, by monkish saints or modern priests, -they would unhesitatingly reject them; because, i Luke i. 37. 2 See above, p. 250. IF 3 438 [Essay IV. § 11. BELIEF IN MIRACLES AD they would say, these alleged wonders, however posi- tively asserted by the narrators and firmly believed in their day, or among a particular communion, had either no connection with a religious revelation, or, if any, with a false and superstitious creed : that is, the popular belief in miracles is entirely governed, not by the question of historical evidence, but by the consideration of the religious faith with which they are connected. On this ground it is that while so many reject these alleged miracles of heathenism or of popery, they accept those of the Gospels. The super- natural event which would be discredited as a mere point of history, is invested with quite a different character when connected with doctrinal belief: though it would be regarded as incredible if stated nakedly in history by itself, it acquires credit and passes current from the force of association with the admitted and cherished creed, and as a part of the doctrine with which it stands connected. And this view is confirmed and supported by the authority of eminent theologians. “ Miracles,” says Dr. Arnold, “ are the natural ac- “ companiment of the Christian revelation....... “ Miracles must not be allowed to overrule the Essay IV. $ 11.] 439 AS OBJECTS OF FAITH. inference. 5 Gospel; for it is only through our belief in the “ Gospel that we accord our belief to them.”? And, even before his conversion to a religion of pure authority and infallibility, Dr. J. Newman had declared that “ Miracles are rather truths to be believed on the authority of inspiration.” 2 Thus, on every ground, — from the nature of the General case, from the arguments of the learned, from the practical confessions of the unlearned, from the admissions of the orthodox and the controversies of the heterodox, — on the combined consideration of the remarks last made and the facts and authori- ties formerly cited, — we can only arrive at the conclusion that the belief in miracles, whether in ancient or modern times, has always been a point, not of evidence addressed to the intellect, but of religious faith impressed on the spirit. The mere fact was nothing: however well attested, it might be set aside; however fabulous, it might be accepted, — according to the predisposing religious persuasion of the parties. If a more philosophical survey tend to i Lect. on Modern Hist. pp. 133, 137. ? Essay, &c. p. 107. FF 440 [Essay IV. § 11. BELIET IN MIRACLES. ignore suspensions of nature, as inconceivable to reason, the spirit of faith gives a different inter- pretation, and transfers miracles to the more con- genial region of spiritual contemplation and Divine mystery. CONCLUSION.] 441 CHRISTIANITY AND SCIENCE. CONCLUSION. GENERAL RELATIONS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH AND PHYSICAL TRUTH. UNDERSTOOD in its full extent, the grand idea of COSMOS, and the view of universal mind, at first enlarged upon, at once, on its positive side, sub- verts atheism, and on its negative, pantheism –“the poetry of atheism."1 In its extension, it opens the door to faith ; in its restriction, it cuts off visionary speculations of reason on matters beyond its pro- vince; and if it exclude interruptions to physical order in the material universe, it is fully consistent with the admission of spiritual mysteries in the invisible world. The subject of miracles has been thus far dwelt Relations of Christi- upon as that in which, above all others, the claims of anity to physical revelation seem to come into most immediate contact points not with physical considerations and the great truth of the order of nature. miraculous. · F. Newman, " Theism," p. 26. 442 [CONCLUSION. PHYSICAL TRUTH But this topic, important as it is, is only one branch of a wider question which arises when we con- sider that the spiritual disclosures of the Christian revelation are in so many ways represented as more or less related to the external world; when spiritual and moral doctrines are at least expressed in terms derived from objects of sense, or the things of the heavenly and invisible world represented under some outward connection with visible objects and physical events. Hence a few remarks on some of the principal cases of this kind, where difficulty may have arisen in the reception of Christian doctrines on physical grounds not directly referring to miracles, will pro- perly close the present discussion. Physical . In general, no reflecting person who considers the language of Scripture. peculiar circumstances under which any part of the Bible was written, or the objects for which it was obviously designed, will hesitate to admit that on all physical subjects the sacred writers' beyond question held the accepted doctrines of their age. No thinking reader for a moment imagines that they professed or See “ Unity of Worlds," Essay II. § ii. q. 322, 2nd ed. ConclusION.] 443 AND CHRISTIAN FAITH. had attained the slightest advance in Astronomy, in Geology, in Physics, or in Physiology, beyond their cotemporaries. On these and the like topics, then, they of course simply used the current language, as they adopted the common belief of their day, and, even in religious applications, could only describe events, where they involved any reference to outward nature, in terms implying the ideas with which they and their hearers or readers were conversant. Indeed, even had it been otherwise, no other language could have been intelligible to those they addressed, and the representation must have failed in its object. When more precise and circumstantial descriptions Physical or narratives occur, as in certain instances, especially tions in the Old in the Old Testament, the case may present peculiar Testament. features requiring more distinct consideration, es- pecially if regarded as compared with, or supposed addressed to, the apprehensions of the present age. In the former Essays the most remarkable of such cases was fully considered, the contradiction to phy- sical fact in the Mosaic cosmogony, to which other instances, such as the Deluge, -- as well as many less prominent, in the narrative of the Hebrew Scriptures, might be added, and to which the same general re- 1 contradic- 444 [CONCLUSION. PHYSICAL TRUTH Physical difficulties in relation to Chris- tianity. ES IULUI marks. would apply so obviously as to render more particular discussion of them needless. But in regard to these cases of physical difficulty. as affecting the Old Testament, a further special ground of argument was resorted to, viz. the inde- pendent basis on which Christianity stands, and the consequent irrelevancy of objections which might be valid against any part of the Judaical system or records, and yet not affect the claims of the Gospel. Nevertheless, it may still be urged that we have not taken a complete or comprehensive view of the case. There may be, and in fact there are, nu- merous other cases of physical statements which seem more closely and directly to affect some points in Christianity in which similar difficulties occur We must proceed to consider a few instances. There have been some doctrinal views upheld with great earnestness in the Christian Church founded upon a very literal adherence to Scriptural state- ments of an apparently physical kind; as, for ex- ample, those physiological effects so commonly imagined to be connected with the doctrine of the Fall,” in virtue of which death is supposed to have become for the first time inherent not only in the The Fall. Death. CONCLUSION.] 445 AND CHRISTIAN FAITH. human constitution but in that of all inferior ani- mals; an assertion which the slightest knowledge of palæontology at once disproves. Physical death is the necessary condition of animal existence in this world, as the slightest reflection must show that immortality in the body in this earth would be simply a physical impossibility. The sentence of death pronounced on Adam would surely still have been penal, even if he were already mortal. The highest privileges of the Gospel do not exempt men from bodily dissolution, nor has its spiritual infirmity, suffering, or labour. These evils must have occurred in natural life on Labour and suffering. the earth constituted as it is, or ever has been. Yet they are to a great extent, and may and will be hereafter to a far greater, remedied and overcome by the use of the faculties and means with which man is gifted, and by science duly applied to physical agents. Among these we may notice as a pre-eminent instance the discovery of chloroform, which has prac- tically annulled the Mosaic denunciation on partu- rition; yet there have been found some bigots at once 446 [CONCLUSION. PHYSICAL TRUTH Sin and 1 evil. so inhuman and so senseless as to denounce the invention and forbid its use because it does so. That the human race is by natural transmission actually subject to disease and death, is of course undeniably the fact, as is the case in various degrees with all other species of animals. Again,-as a matter of fact,—that all men are naturally prone to evil is equally the teaching of all experience and history as of Scripture. But the tenor of St. Paul's argument—while he adopts the Mosaic narrative of Adam's disobedience, and traces sin to that origin- is clearly not to enforce any physical ideas, but to bring his hearers to acknowledge the condemnation of all men for their sins!: and this with the sole object that they might seek deliverance in Christ. 2 Thus, without insisting on anything at variance with truths recognised by reason and science, faith can advance, without disparagement or difficulty, to the spiritual doctrines of original sin and regeneration asserted in the Christian creeds. The descent of the whole human race from one primeval stock, so as to constitute only one natural Origin of man. 1 Rom. v. 12. 2 Rom. v. 14. CONCLUSION.] 447 AND CHRISTIAN FAITH. species, has been an opinion extensively maintained on physiological grounds, yet to which, on like scien- tific arguments, physiological and archæological, by others, serious objections have been felt, and an opposite view maintained. Though there can be little doubt that the writers of the New Testament held the common belief of their countrymen on this point, as derived from the Mosaic writings, yet they nowhere lay any stress upon the assertion of it; nor would the spiritual and practical doctrines they found upon it be in the least invalidated even if the opinion of a diversity of race, so much advocated by some philosophers, should eventually be established. We find numerous references and allusions, more Physical or less direct, in the New Testament to the physical to the Old statements and representations of the Old; such as to the Creation, the account of Adam and Eve, the Deluge, the Mosaic and prophetic miracles, and the like. In general it may be supposed admitted that such references would be made by the Apostles and Evangelists, as Jews, in the literal acceptation of references Testament. | As e.g. 1 Cor. x, 1, &c.; 1 Pet. iii, 21; 2 Pet. iii, 6, 13, &c. 448 [CONCLUSION. PHYSICAL TRUTH Testament their cotemporaries; yet at the same time we observe them always introduced and applied solely for the purposes of higher moral and religious instruction, never dwelt upon in themselves. Physical Throughout the New Testament, allusions to ex- allusions in the New ternal nature and the physical economy of the world —its creation, or predicted destruction and renova- tion, are of course made in descriptive language, and modes of expression accordant with the prevalent ideas and belief, especially as derived from the Hebrew Scriptures. But in these instances we may clearly regard the real object as referring to the doctrine in- culcated, not the physical imagery in which it may be conveyed. Various expressions of the sacred writers, literally of a peculiar physical import, in accordance with the ideas of their age, -obviously cannot now be under- stood in the same sense, or possess the same force, in, the existing state of knowledge. Thus, phrases im- plying literally a local heaven above the solid firma- ment, or a local hades beneath the earth,—an ascent to the one, or a descent to the other, cannot now be. accepted as physical descriptions. Yet no reflecting inquirer at the present day sup- CONCLUSION.] 449 AND CHRISTIAN FAITH. 449 affect the doctrine. poses that because better cosmological views have been attained, the substantial religious doctrines conveyed under those representations are at all impugned. No educated or thinking person supposes that the do pot existence of antipodes, or the motion of the earth,-- Christian or of the entire solar system,—or the infinite exten- sion of stellar worlds--or any similar physical truths, can in any way really affect the spiritual mysteries proclaimed by the Apostles, whether relating to the person and office, the humiliation or glorification, of Christ, or to the condition, privileges, or hopes of His followers,—in whatever descriptive language or sensible imagery they may have been clothed and inculcated. The announcement of a future life, and even of Description of future the manner and circumstances in which its intro- state. duction is predicted to take place, forming, as it does, so prominent a topic in the New Testament, are delivered in terms, no doubt directly derived from material objects and expressive of physical agency, which may reasonably be understood as a mode of representing unseen mysteries to human apprehension by sensible imagery, and in their literal and material G G 450 (CONCLUSION. PHYSICAL TRUTH sense, can no more be insisted on than the literal period of their occurrence, so undeniably assigned in the Apostolic writings as then close at hand. The reality represented belongs wholly to a spiritual order of things:and though it might be argued that, even in a philosophical point of view, we know not how many or how vast are the changes which matter and life, body and spirit, the material and the moral world, — may be destined to undergo in the progress of countless ages,—yet any such conceptions must fall infinitely short of those elevated contem- plations,--rather are of a totally different order from any ideas of a future state to which Christianity points; -- and which are wholly incomprehensible to human reason, and exclusively the embodiments of revelation, and objects of faith. Wholly The representations of a future life are put forth nected with in the New Testament in a sense wholly different philosophy. from that of any philosophical speculations on an immaterial or immortal principle existing in man, and in no way dependent on the question of mate- rialism or immaterialism. It is spoken of in spiri- tualised language as “a mystery”? which conveys no uncon- il Cor. xv. 51. CONCLUSION.] 451 AND CHRISTIAN FAITH. ideas cognisable to reason; and the whole doctrine, as delivered by the Apostle, is altogether alien from any philosophical views whatsoever, physical or me taphysical, and is wholly the creation of inspiration, the teaching of faith." This doctrine is expressly made of the most fun- damental importance by the Apostle”, although the precise nature of the event spoken of is not in the slightest degree hinted at. The metaphor of the seed sown and the plant springing up from it has manifestly no analogy with a material body and an immaterial soul. The corporeal resurrection of Christ, whose “flesh saw no corruption,"3 is still less lite- rally applicable to the remote future resurrection of a “spiritual body." In such representations here is ņo parallel in reason; they can be accepted solely as matters of faith and revelation, in the sense put how entirely spiritual mysteries must stand on their natural comparisons or material conceptions. They See “Unity of Worlds," p. 309, 2nd ed. ? 1 Cor. xv. 14. 3 Acts ii. 31. QO 2 452 [CONCLUSION. PHYSICAL TRUTH Materialism and imma- terialism. are matters necessarily unsatisfactory to curiosity, unapproachable by reason, yet sufficient for faith- and for practice.. Again : with respect to spiritual influences, whether in a more ordinary or more exalted form, and those doctrines of Christianity which relate to them,-and are often understood as if necessarily assuming a distinct spiritual principle of existence in man,--it must be observed that any expressions of the New Testament writers which seem to imply such a distinct existence yet nowhere assert it in any precise or phy- siological sense. All that is said is conveyed in forms of representation referring to an order of things totally distinct from those contemplated in any philo- sophical theories, and implying that distinct and spiritual character which is expressed by such phrases as a new birth, a new creation', and the like, derived wholly from the Divine gift; while at the same time it is not less clearly intimated that such influence is to be judged of solely by its practical fruits, as the only test of its reality. But all these practical results or operations are the same on any UU 1 John iii. 2; Gal. vi. 15, &c. CONCLUSION.] 453 AND CHRISTIAN FAITH. hypothesis as to the internal nature of man, and the reference to them is entirely independent of any question between the material and the immaterial theories of metaphysicians, which in no way affect any of the doctrines of Christianity,—the infusion of Divine grace ?, or the renewal of man in the image of God. So long as man is admitted to have the capacity for receiving, and the power of acting in accordance with, these Divine inspirations, it is wholly. irrelevant whether his constitution be believed to consist of material atoms or of immaterial entities, or a combination of both. On either theory the operations of the mind will practically remain equally distinct from those of the body;-and the spiritual nature and affections equally different from the carnal or animal nature and propensities of man. Nor can any such questions as to present existence in any way affect the belief in a future life,—resting, as we have observed it does, entirely on the simple assertion of inspired teaching, which is wholly irrespective of any distinctions of human reason or speculative theories. 11 Cor. xii. 7. 2 Col. ii. 10, GG 3 454 [CONCLUSION. PHYSICAL TRUTH Temporal blessings and judge ments, The belief, common to many nations, but an essential point in the religion of the Jews, – that famines and pestilences, droughts and rains, fer- tility and abundance, —and the like temporal and na- tional events,—were judgments or blessings, brought about as express retributions, by direct divine inter- position,—though deprived of its religious importance by the essential principles and very nature of the New dispensation !, was yet doubtless sometimes al- luded to by the Apostles ; -- but never in such a way as either to contravene the spiritual, future, and unseen nature of the sanctions held out by the Gospel, or to stand in any contradiction to the ad- vance of modern knowledge, by whose light all such events are seen to be the results of immutable laws, and a part of the fixed order of the natural world, which constitutes the idea of Divine Providence. Not unconnected with the last topic are the con- fessedly obscure allusions made by St. Paul to a power vested in the Apostles of punishing offenders against the order of the Church by temporal inflic- Apostolic powers. I See Second Series of Essays, “ Christianity without Judaism," pp. 105, 109, 152. CONCLUSION.] 455 AND CHRISTIAN FAITH. tions 1 : but these (whatever they may mean) are on all hands admitted to have no application beyond the temporary circumstances of the case and the personal authority of the Apostle. It may here also be added (in relation to a topic Witchcraft. before adverted to) there can be little doubt that the Apostles partook in the belief of their age in the reality of witchcraft, though nowhere expressing it otherwise than by denouncing the practice as a sin?, which it must be to any one believing in it. Again, the doctrine of the Divine counsels—the Moral order. providential government of the world, the nature and destinies of man, are topics which may remotely be found connected with science in respect to those great inductive laws which (as we before observed) are now beginning to be investigated as regulating the course of human events, and the conditions of social existence, enabling us to trace plan and order even in the moral world; but these deductions cannot really impugn the truths of the spiritual world. Philosophy teaches us that “we live and move and have our being” according to certain deter- ? As, e.g. 1 Cor. xi. 30 ; v.5. 2 Gal. v. 20. GC4 456 CONCLUSION. minate laws: Revelation tells us that we do so “in God.” Reason and science point out the natural and moral order of the world and its invariable laws. Faith invests them with a new character as the manifestations of Divine government and providence. Metaphysical principles may lead to the theory of moral necessity on the one hand, or of free agency on the other. The Gospel, without entering on the question at all, at once inculcates moral obligations as the results of faith, and refers everything to Divine grace. General conclusion. to faith. In the foregoing survey of the relations of Chris- Recurrence tianity to the physical order of things, and especially to miracles, in the form which any view of that question necessarily takes in the present day, it has been observed that the point to which opinion seems from various quarters to be converging, both among enlightened believers and thinking and inquiring minds, even of very different schools, is to recede from the precise and formal arguments once so much insisted on, but now seen to involve so many phy- CONCLUSION. 457 sical difficulties, and to recur to more purely spiritual considerations and the ground of faith in the recep- tion of revelation ;- a view which so eminently harmonises with its nature as a disclosure of spiritual mysteries of the unseen world. If in what has preceded no reference has been No diffi. culty in made to such high mysteries as the Trinity, the spiritual, mysteries union of the Divine and Human natures in Christ, from pby- sical truth. the Atonement by His death — the influence of the Holy Spirit-or Sacramental grace, it is because these and the like tenets of the Church do not pro- perly fall under the present discussion --since though in some few points touching upon material things—on the human existence and death of Christ, and on the nature of man,- yet they involve no consideration of a physical kind infringing on the visible order of the natural world; and thus cannot be open to any difficulties of the kind here contemplated :-- in fact all the objections which have been raised against them are of a metaphysical, moral, or philological nature. But if, in other cases, the highest doctrines are essentially connected with the narrative of miracles, we have seen that the most earnest believers con- - 458 CONCLUSION: Miracles merged in mys. teries. T VI, Greater miracles spiritual- ised in template the miracle by the light of the doctrine, and both solely with the eye of faith; and thus when, as in some of the chief articles of the Chris- tian formularies the invisible world seems to be brought into immediate connection with the visible, - the region of faith with that of sense, - when heavenly mysteries are represented as involved in earthly marvels,—the spirit of faith obviates the dif- ficulties of reason by claiming them to its own province and prerogative. And if we turn to the New Testament, and acknow- ledge in its later writings, especially those of St. Paul, the fullest development of Apostolic Christianity, we there find, in a very remarkable manner, that no reference is made to any of the Gospel miracles, except only those specially connected with the per- sonal office and nature of Christ; and even these are never insisted on in their physical details, but solely in their spiritual and doctrinal application. Thus, the resurrection of Christ is emphatically dwelt upon, not in its physical letter, but in its doc- trinal spirit”; not as a physiological phenomenon, but as the corner-stone of Christian faith and hope, the New Testament. 1 Rom. iv. 25. CONCLUSION. 459 . C the type of spiritual life here and the assurance of eternal life hereafter.! So, în like manner, the transcendent mysteries of the Incarnation and the Ascension are never alluded to at all by the Apostles in a historical or material sense, but only so far as they are involved in points of spiritual doctrine, and as objects of faith; as con- nected with the Divine manifestation of “ the Word made flesh," 2 " yet without sin,"3_with the inscru- table work of redemption on earth 4 and the unseen intercession in heaven", -- with the invisible dispen- sations of the gifts of grace from above, and with the hidden things of the future", which “eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor have entered the heart of man," — with the predicted return of Christ to judge the world, — and the eternal triumph of His heavenly kingdom.' And in this spiritualised sense has the Christian In the Church in all ages acknowledged these Divine mys- teries and miracles, “not of sight, but of faith,"— not Church. 1 Rom. vi. 4; Col. iii. 1, 2. 2 John i. 14; Gal. iv. 4. 3 Heb. iv, 15. ^ Phil. ii. 6. 5 Rom. viii. 34. 6 Eph. iv. 8. * 1 Cor. ii. 9. 8 Acts ii. 11. 9 1 Cor. xv. 24. 460 CONCLUSION. expounded by science, but delivered in traditional for- mularies,-celebrated in festivals and solemnities, by sacred rites and symbols,-embodied in the crea- tions of arty_and proclaimed by choral harmonies; —through all which the spirit of faith adores the “ great mystery of godliness — manifested in the “ flesh-- justified in the spirit —- seen of angels — 6 preached unto the Gentiles — believed on in the “ world — received up into glory." I į 2 Tim. iii. 16. APPENDIX. APPENDIX. No. I. On Recent Views of Organic “ Creation.” In relation to the whole question of the origin of species and the theory of “creation,” I cannot omit to make a brief reference to a recently published work, which appears to be of the highest interest, more especially as bearing on the same points to which I have adverted in my third Essay on the “ Unity of Worlds,” affording a striking instance of the high philosophic spirit in which a writer, eminent as a geologist and naturalist, has ven- tured to reason freely, and to break through at least some conventional dogmas; while his argument tends to confirm, to a very considerable extent, with the weight of detailed evidence from wide and accurate generali- sations, in many respects at least the same views which I have attempted, on analogical and theoretic grounds alone, to uphold. I allude to the “Investigation of the Laws of Development of the Organic World,” &c., by Professor H. G. Bronn, of Heidelberg, which obtained the prize of the French Academy of Sciences, 1856, and of which a notice has appeared in the Quarterly Journal of the Geological Society, No. 57, February, 1859. 464 APPENDIX. In order to note more precisely the extent to whichi what I have regarded as the true inductive view of the case, is borne out by the elaborate investigations of Professor Bronn, I will subjoin a few extracts from his work (taken from the notice referred to), in which those points are specially introduced which are most material to the question,-adding my own comments. With respect to the succession of species the author observes that the naturalist might at first be “disposed “ to consider them as the immediate emanation of a divine “ creative act. But ... he must also say to himself “that nothing else in nature acts by such a power, but “ that everything is arranged and formed by universal “laws implanted in the matter itself; that here also “ analogy necessarily leads us to presuppose a similar, “ although to us unknown, power, which has produced “ the species of plants and animals, and which, perhaps, “as has been assumed by Lyell, still continues, although “ only on rare occasions, to produce them.” As to the first supposition of a sudden creative act, the real question would be what is meant by the ex- pression ? And the least reflection shows that it is simply an idea derived from religion, and which, there- fore, can have no place in science, as it is derived from nothing which science can teach. The alternative hardly need have been proposed. But all analogy undoubtedly demands the author's second supposition. It is, however, an assumption not to be too hastily made, that the power in question is of an unknown kind. This is to beg the whole question : theories have been suggested which propose known causes; these, therefore, APPENDIX. 465 require careful examination before we can be certain that no known cause, under any modifications, can suffice. It is, however, equally clear in itself, and most pro- perly adverted to by the author, that the great point at issue is not so much the changes in species at successive epochs, as the original constitution of any such thing as distinct species,—the original separation of organic and inorganic forms. But with regard to new species :- “No experience proves that any one species or genus, “or even an order or a class, has really been transformed “into another. And, as for those palæontologists who “ maintain that only the first plants and animals of the “earth were produced by immediate creation, they have “obtained no real simplification of the laws of nature “by merely limiting the period of immediate creation to “a somewhat shorter time.” The argument against transformation from want of experience, I conceive I have fully disposed of. It is not likely that the author had seen my essays; or, I think, he would not have reiterated this stereotyped form of objection without some notice of the arguments which appear to me to evince its utter fallacy and inappli- cability. Most just and admirable is the remark which follows: the idea of “ Creation” certainly gives no explanation ; it professedly shuts out all explanation, and reduces the whole to a point of faith. Again :-“.... The naturalist would be equally U 1 Unity of Worlds, Essay III. $ 3. p. 434. 2nd ed. H H 466 APPENDIX. CU “inconsistent if he trusted to a generatio spontanea, “which has never been proved; and yet we know of no “third explanation.” We could, I should say, imagine a third explanation only when we can imagine matter to come under some third class besides organic or inorganic. An organised being must, I conceive, have originated either out of its inorganic elements, or out of some previously organised form. It is idle to dispute on such terms as “generatio spontanea” or “equivoca.” The real question is, which does natural analogy render most probable, as a con- jecture, of the only two possible suppositions. Again the author puts the alternative that we must suppose either a continued supernatural creation, or, what he justly contends is far more worthy of the divine perfections, that “there existed some natural power “hitherto entirely unknown to us, which, by means of “ its own laws, formed the species of plants and animals, " and arranged and regulated all those countless indi- “vidual conditions ;—which power, however, must in “this case have stood in the most immediate connection “ with, and in perfect subordination to, those powers “ which caused the gradually progressing perfection of “the crust of the earth, and the gradual development of “the outward conditions of life for the constantly in- “creasing numbers of higher classes of organic forms." Here, in the first instance, the same assumption is made that the productive power must be of a kind wholly unknown to us. We have no positive evidence to disprove the formation of organised beings out of their inorganic elements, however much evidence to prove it be wanting. The same is equally true of their development out of 90 APPENDIX. 467 S existing organised forms; though here we have some slight foundation for conjecture in the occasional de- viations from established types, which might conceivably be carried out to a greater extent under great changes of condition and in immense periods of time. When the author says, “No traces can be found of a “gradual transformation of old species and genera into “new, but the new have everywhere appeared as new “ without the cooperation of the former," he appears to found his conclusion on the trite argument of the absence of intermediate remains, and on the supposition of real gaps between the different formations or epochs of organised life. But the belief in the universal law of continuity as a paramount natural principle, must lead us to regard such appearances of interruption as simply due to our ignorance. The apparent isolation and separation of the new species from the old, even in the most marked and extreme cases, we are warranted in inferring, can only be the real exponent of the absence of evidence to us, not of real deficiency of links in the chain of exist- ence. The apparent interval between the forms of paleo- zoic (for example) and of mesozoic life, is most probably only the indication of a vast period of time which inter- vened, and during which no remains happened to be embodied in any deposits which have come to our view, or, during which no deposits were made at any points hitherto examined. The author maintains that the sequence of organic beings has been regulated by these two laws :- “ 1. By an independent productive power, constantly “advancing in an intensive as well as extensive direction “ or degree.” EI 2 468 APPENDIX. .“2. By the nature and change of the outward con- “ditions of existence under which the organic beings to “be called forth, were to live. . . . Both these laws are “in the closest connection with each other, although we “cannot understand the productive power.” I will only add that, though at present we have no positive knowledge of the productive power, it is clear that it will be by the careful study of the operation of these great laws conjointly that we may hope ultimately to obtain that knowledge. It is absurd to argue that the introduction of new forms of life, or new species of organised beings, in the successive epochs of the earth's formation, involves a peculiar mysterious power, or supernatural creation, merely because we do not at present know the cause of life or see new species arise before our eyes, which, it may be added, we could never detect as such if they did. All such fancies must be sternly banished from the domain of real science. Life is found superadded to matter, acting upon it, and acted upon by it: in every way it is connected with matter and dependent on the laws of matter and influenced by physical agencies. It is every instant being continually imparted to fresh matter by purely physical agencies; and subject to laws which, being invariable, are therefore physical, and, being unknown, only remain to be made known. In fact, the whole history of the past discussion of these and the allied topics has displayed little more than that kind of unsatisfactory controversy in which the rival influences of the philosophical and the mystical spirit have been arrayed against each other, the real point at issue frequently misunderstood, or too often 0 U APPENDIX. 4.69 purposely obscured. If the term “creation” be used, it is only important to bear in mind the distinction that it is not any conception of science, but the language in which religion invests natural facts, or connects them with more sublime reflections. It may not be irrelevant to add that, among the various approaches towards the synthesis of organic structures by chemical means, an additional step has been recently made by Mr. Rainey, M.R.C.S.', who, by a double decomposition of lime with carbonate of soda or potash, each previously dissolved in water, containing in solution some viscid animal or vegetable substance (as gum arabic or albumen), and left at rest for some weeks, has produced carbonate of lime, not in a crystalline, but a globular form, and found these molecules to combine into a structure so closely resembling certain animal products that no microscope could detect a difference. No. II. On Materialism. I HAVE before alluded to a fallacy into which some eminent writers have fallen on the question of mate- rialism.2 It is remarkable that a writer, in a recent number of the “ Edinburgh Review," has adopted exactly the same fallacious line of argument. The passage is as follows:- | Medico-Chirurgical Review, No. XL., Oct. 1857, p. 451. ? See above, Essay I. p. 178. II 3 470 APPENDIX. UICE “ The question of materialism, on which so much con- “ troversy has been wasted — a controversy equally “fruitless, we believe, in all time to come, since no con- “ception can reach the abstract nature either of matter “or mind, nor any argument show that things perceived 6 by the senses have more of independent reality than “ the principle perceiving, and the intelligence and “ volition acting upon them. The materialist fancies "himself on firm ground because his argument has matter “ for its foundation. This matter itself is known only “ by, and through, that mind which he assumes to create 66 out of it.” 1 On this I would observe that the question of materialism (even supposing it to be thus hopeless) is surely not so for the reason assigned :-- it does not in the least depend on the abstract nature either of matter or of mind, or our power to conceive it. The real question is simply whether the phenomena of what we call thought and intellect, can possibly be ex- plained by any imaginable combination of purely physical agencies, such as might arise from the conditions of material organisation. Nor is this question at all hopeless, since more extended inductive inquiry is continually bringing us nearer to more intimate knowledge of those vital and organic functions, of the action of the brain and nervous system, which constitute the most probable channel through which some knowledge of this kind may be eventually, however remotely, conveyed to us. | Edinb. Rev. Jan. 1859, p. 251. APPENDIX. 471 The assertion with which the writer arrives at his climax, that matter is only known through mind, does not really touch the question whether mind may be explicable by any combination of the actions or affections of matter, or whether it may be possible to prove that the brain thinks in the same sense as that in which the stomach digests or the lungs respire. And this is independent of the question whether the physical agencies or agents concerned are believed to be material or not; the points really contemplated are solely relations already known and established under physical laws, and the question is whether the source of mental operations can ever be brought under those laws or relations, or whether it is necessary to refer them to some others of a different kind and order. The superior certainty with which conclusions re- specting matter (i. e. the relations of matter) are deduced is in no way affected by the reference to mind through which alone those conclusions are formed ; it results simply from the definiteness of the nature of the phe- nomena, their being capable of repeated examination and comparison under varied conditions, and, in so many cases, of exact measure and computation, and, that being external, they are less determined by subjective con- siderations. Moral and mental phenomena, not being susceptible of this precision in statement, or of the same kind of exami- nation, necessarily remain more vague; and, being in- ternal, must inevitably be, in a far greater degree, purely subjective. HH 4 472 APPENDIX. No. III. On Grounds of Belief. S As bearing closely on some of the main topics of the foregoing discussion, and corroborating what I have advanced, by the authority of one of the first philosophers of the age, I must here add two brief quotations from the admirable lecture on Mental Education of Professor Faraday. The first of these sums up, in brief, but emphatic terms, the whole question of a class of marvels before alluded to?:- “I am not bound to explain how a table tilts any more “ than to indicate how, under a conjuror's hands, a pud- “ding appears in a hat. The means are not known to “ me. I am persuaded that the results, however strange “ they may appear, are in accordance with that which is “truly known, and, if carefully investigated, would “justify the well-tried laws of nature.” 2 The next passage refers to the higher topic of the grounds of religious belief :--- “I believe that the truth of that future [life] cannot “ be brought to his [man's] knowledge by any exertion “of his mental powers, however exalted they may be: that “it is made known to him by other teaching than his "own, and is received through simple belief of the testi- I See above, p. 264. 2 Lectures on Education, delivered at the Royal Institution : "On “ Mental Education," p. 78. 1855. APPENDIX. 473 “mony given. Let no one suppose for a moment that “the self-education I am about to commend, in respect “ of the things of this life, extends to any consi- “ derations of the hope set before us, as if man by “reasoning could find out God. It would be improper “here to enter upon this subject further than to claim “an absolute distinction between religious and ordinary “ belief. I shall be reproached with the weakness of “ refusing to apply those mental operations which I “think good in respect of high things, to the very “highest. I am content to bear this reproach. Yet, “even in earthly matters, I believe that the invisible “clearly seen, being understood by the things which are “made, even His eternal power and Godhead. And I “have never seen anything incompatible between those “things of man which can be known by the spirit of “man, which is within him, and those higher things “ concerning his future, which he cannot know by that “spirit.” 1 No. IV. Note on Bishop Berkeley. (See p. 129.) speculations ought not to be omitted, — those, namely, referring to the theory of Vision;-- to which he expressly gave a theological turn- more especially in a tract, | Lectures on Education : "On Mental Education," p. 40. 474 APPENDIX. perhaps less known than some of his writings, entitled “ The Theory of Vision, or Visual Language, showing “ the immediate Presence and Providence of a Deity, “vindicated and explained, 1723,” where he goes into extensive discussions, both optical and metaphysical, in reference to the connection of ocular impressions withi intellectual ideas, and their relation to the order of the natural world, maintaining especially that “Vision is the language of the Author of nature.” 1 No. V. Theory of Life. In reference to the remarks made on this deeply inte- resting, and as yet obscure subject, I may take the op- portunity of alluding to some highly ingenious specula- tions, and original researches on the subject, by Mr. Hinton, in a paper “On the Proximate Cause of Func- tional Action.”3 He compares the organised body to a machine in which certain sources of power are held in constraint (as the pressure of steam, the force of the spring, the gravitation of the weight, &c, in machines), which are brought into action by the mechanism, per- mitting just so much as is wanted to produce the result. Thus, in the animal body, the various chemical, &c., forces are held in constraint, and only act just so far as the various antagonistic causes permit. 2 Page 170. 1 Page 32. 3 Med. Chir. Rev., July, 1856. APPENDIX. 475 S No. VI. On Causation. THROUGHOUT the whole of the preceding discussion no point is of more essential importance than a clear con- ception of what is meant by the term “ causation." In further illustration of this point I cannot omit here to cite a remarkable passage in the masterly work of Mr. Buckle, so often before referred to, and to which I most gladly own my obligations, especially in many parts of my historical sketch. Speaking of the popular belief in divine interposition in natural events, Mr. Buckle observes! :- • The people at large never enter into such subtleties “ as the difference between law and cause ; a differ- “ence, indeed, which is so neglected that it is often “ lost sight of even in scientific books. All that the “ people know, is that events, which they once believed “to be directly controlled by the Deity and modified by “ Him, are not only foretold by the human mind, but “ are altered by human interference. The attempts which “Paley and others have made to solve this mystery, by “rising from laws to the cause, are evidently futile, “because, to the eye of reason, the solution is as incom- “prehensible as the problem, and the arguments of the “ natural theologians, in so far as they are arguments, “must depend on reason. As Mr. Newman truly says, ““ A God, uncaused and existing from eternity, is to the " . LIL OM . . 4. . e- . + ... SY IL 1 : : . . : SORT . . . . . . . !.. . . . . . - - - . - " IYOL . . C . . . .. I I . ! . . . t. . . . 11 . 11. 1 - . . . . . . . . . . . . PSI . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . + * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. : : . . . . . . . . . . . . ** 1 - - . . . . . * * * ** .. . .. . . . . . S . . 10T04 . . . . . . . . . . . . N O . . . P " . . -. : . 1 .- . . - . 1 TO . . . . . I ed. " . . 1.Don 4 . . r . . . . . . I 20. . . . . 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