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A Documentary History
of the Peace Negotiations
JVew York
The Ramad School of Social Science


To the Reader:
With the following documentary account of the Brest-
Litovsk Peace Negotiations, hitherto an unwritten chapter in
the history of the Russian Revolution, the Department of
Labor Research begins the publication of a series of mono-
graphs on economic and political questions which it is hoped
will prove valuable contributions to the literature of the
Socialist and Labor movements.
The American Labor Year Book, which the Department is
publishing, will be continued as a part of the series. The
1919 issue (Vol. III) is now being prepared for the press and
should be ready for distribution by the end of the Summer.
Organizations and individuals interested in the work of the
Department should address
ALEXANDER TRACEITENBERG,
Director, Department of Labor Research,
Rand School of Social Science,
7 East 15th St., New York.
Copyright, 1919,
by
THE RAND SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE,
New York

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PREFACE
An attempt is made in this book to give an impartial,
documentary account of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations
and their general background in Russia, Germany, and
other belligerent countries. There is no pretense at lit-
erary # between many of the items listed there
is no connection other than that of similar dates. The
general division into thirteen chapters is largely arbitrary
and the account often jumps without warning from one
land to another. Yet the story has essential unity; and,
quite apart from whatever value it may have as a collec-
tion of documents, for me, at least, it possesses the fasci-
nation of a mighty drama.
The account lays no claim whatever to completeness.
It is only raw material for a structure, or, at best, the
rough frame-work. The justification for publishing it is,
that there seems to be no other collection of similar docu-
ments bearing upon one of the great episodes of the great
WàI’.
The material was in hand, for the most part, a year
ago. It was collected at a period of the war when the
censorship on news and on European publications was
especially severe. The fortunate possessor of a Manchester
Guardian was besieged by inquiries as to how he got it.
It was a period when the arrival from time to time of
the Neue Zürcher Zeitung at the New York Public Li-
brary was not talked about, for fear the subscription might
be cancelled.
The main sources of the material were: The New York
Times, The Times’ Current History, The Manchester
Guardian, The London Times, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung,
the New Yorker Volkszeitung, the New Europe; publica-
tions of the World Peace Foundation and the American
Association for International Comciliation, and, in estab-
lishing the chronology and in verifying statements, the
London Nation, the New Statesman, and the Cambridge.
Magazine, were often helpful. The speech of Trotzky on
February 14, was taken from his recently published,
“From October to Brest-Litovsk,” and Lenin's speech
of March 14, was taken from the booklet, “The Soviets at
Work.’’
No guarantee can be given for the correctness of any
document, inasmuch as I have not had the originals be-
fore me. Moreover the translations are of very uneven
quality. It was simple enough to translate a German
text now and again, but it was not so simple to choose
between two or more poor English translations of a text,
or to “English’’ an English translation a bit without at
the same time changing the text of a document.
A sincere effort has been made to be entirely objective
and impartial, insofar as this is at all possible in a work
dealing with history and with politigs. No judgments are
expressed and no conclusions are drawn, despite the temp-
tation at almost every step. Men and peoples follow each
other on and off this great stage and speak but for a mo-
ment. Yet for all the brevity of their lines, their voices
are authentic, and it does not seem an altogether impos-
sible task to evaluate personalities and events. Some day
the original documents will be available and ‘‘scientific’’
judgments will be possible. It is hoped that the material
here presented may be of some aid in establishing truth.
J. L. MAGNES.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER,
I. The Soviet Peace Proposals. . . . . . . . . . .
II. The Attitude of the Belligerents. . . . . . .
III. Negotiations for a Preliminary Truce
and Armistice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. The Formal Armistice Negotiations. . . .
W. Negotiations for a General European
Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VI. The Interval to permit Allied Participa-
tion . . . . . 1 s e e º e e s tº e º º e e º e º e º e s e º 'º
VII. The Separate Peace Negotiations. Rus-
sia’s Stand for No Annexations and
for Self-Determination . . . . . . . . . . .
VIII. The Second Interval.................
IX. The Separate Peace Negotiations. The
Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
X. No War and No Peace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
YI. The New German War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
XII. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. “A. Tilsit
Peace” . . . . . . . . . . . } • * * * * * * * * * * * * *
XIII. After Brest-Litovsk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
XIV.
Table of Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19
25
29
40
50
96
105
133
148
I. THE SOVIET PEACE PROPOSALS
1 November 6–7. The Kerensky Government was over-
thrown by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the
Petrograd Soviet of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Delegates.
In a proclamation addressed to the army, to all Soviets
and to the garrison and proletariat of Petrograd, the Com-
mittee proclaimed its authority, “until the creation of a
Government by the Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Delegates.”
The Committee considered the first point in the “program
of the new authority” to be “the offer of an immediate
democratic peace.” The proclamation closed with the
words: “Soldiers! for Peace, for Bread, for Land, and
for the Power of the People !”
2 November 7–8. The Second All-Russian Congress of
Soviets began its sessions on November 7, and on the fol-
lowing day it proclaimed that “All power lies in the Work-
men’s and Soldiers’ Delegates.”
The Congress addressed an appeal to the workmen, sol-
diers and peasants of Russia, declaring that
it will propose to all peoples an immediate demo-
cratic peace and an armistice, to come into force at
once at all points. . . . The Congress calls the soldiers
in the trenches to vigilance and firmness, and it is
persuaded that the Revolutionary Army will be able
to protect the Revolution against all Imperialist efforts
until the moment when the new Government shall have
obtained the democratic peace which it will propose
direct to all peoples. . .
3 November 10. The Congress passed its first peace resolu-
tions, suggesting an immediate armistice of three months
and proposing that the representatives of “all the nations
of the war or its victims’’ participate in the negotiations,
8 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-IITOWSK
after which a Conference of all the nations of the world
should be called to give final sanction to the peace terms
thus drafted.
* The Government considers a peace to be democratic
and equitable which is aspired to by a majority of
the working classes of all the belligerent countries.
. . . It should be an immediate peace, without an-
nexation, (that is to say, without usurpation of for-
eign territory, and without violent conquest of nation-
alities,) and without indemnities. . . . .”
If any population be kept by force under the control
of any state, and if, contrary to its will expressed in
the press or in national assembly, or to decisions of
parties, or in opposition to rebellions and uprisings
against an oppressor, the population is refused the
right of universal suffrage, of driving out an army
of occupation and organizing its own political regime,
such a state of things is annexation or violent usurpa-
tion. The Government considers that the active pro-
longation of the war in order to partition weak na-
tionalities, which have been conquered, among rich and
powerful nations, is a great crime against humanity.
4 November 11. The first peace proclamation of the Soviet
Government was published in Izvestia, the official organ of
the Petrograd Soviet :
Immediate democratic peace, this is one of the great
world problems of the Russian revolution. But only
a Workmen’s and Peasants’ Government is capable
of realizing this program, since only such a government
expresses the will of the whole Russian people and will
inflexibly carry out that will. Thus, for the first time
in the course of the seven months of the Revolution,
the fate of the masses of the people is in their own
hands. . . . \
It has established the question of peace on simple,
unshakable ground. It raises high the red flag of
international Socialism, and demands peace without
annexations or contributions, in principle condemning
all annexations, no matter when they were made. . . .
It demands an immediate truce on all fronts, an-
nounces its willingness to consider calmly and ob-
SOVIET PEACE PROPOSALS 9
jectively all peace proposals, and sets a period of three
months for the consideration of these proposals.
While demanding a truce on all fronts, the Work-
men's and Peasants’ Government spurns the base in-
sinuation that it is striving after a separate peace. It
is not at all seeking to break with its Allies, but it
has taken a defensive position, thanks to which in
all Allied countries the true workmen’s democracy will
have the decisive voice.
And the fact that, in Russia, power and the nego-
tiation of peace are in the hands not of a traitor, but
of the real representatives of the workmen, soldiers
and peasants, will strengthen the movement in favor
of peace in Allied countries also as well as in Germany
and Austria. This open advance with the demand
for peace, with its condemnation of secret diplomacy,
Will find an echo not only in the world’s proletariat,
but also among the great masses of the countries
forced and dragged into the war—Poland, Roumania,
Bulgaria, Belgium and the Colonies.
By this means the Governments of the warring im-
perialistic countries are placed in a position in which
the beginning of immediate peace negotiations will be
irresistibly forced upon them. . . .
5 November 20. Leon Trotzky, Russian Commissar for
Foreign Affairs, sent to the Entente and American Em-
bassies at Petrograd a Note, announcing that “the Con-
gress of Workmen’s, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Delegates of
All the Russias, instituted on November 8 a new Govern-
ment of the Republic of All the Russias,” and that the
Congress had approved ‘‘proposals for a truce and for a
democratic peace without annexation and without indem-
nities, based on the principle of the independence of na-
tions and of their right to determine for themselves the
nature of their own development.” Trotzky asked further
that his Note be considered “in the light of an official pro-
posal for an immediate truce upon all the fronts, and to
take immediate steps to set on foot negotiations for peace.”
He added that his Government “is addressing the same
proposal to all the nations and their Governments.’’
6 On the same day a general notice of the armistice offer
was sent to Russian representatives abroad, and instruc-
10 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOVSK
tions were issued to Dukhonin, Commander-in-Chief of the
Russian armies, for the Council of People’s Commissars
by Lenin, Trotzky, Krylenko, Bonch-Bruevitch and Gor-
bunov, informing him of their “obligation to offer to all
the peoples and their respective governments an imme-
diate armistice on all fronts, with the purpose of imme-
diately opening pourparlers for the conclusion of a demo-
cratic peace . . . an armistice to all the nations involved
in the war, to the Allies and also to the nations at war with
us.” They ordered him upon receipt of the message to
“approach the commanding authorities of the enemy armies
with an offer of a cessation of all hostile activities for the
purpose of opening peace pourparlers. In charging you
with the conduct of these preliminary peace pourparlers
the Soviet . . . orders you . . . to sign the preliminary
act only after approval by the Council of the People’s
Commissars.”
The Ukrainian Rada adopted on the same day, the text
of a general proclamation known as the “Universal.”
Ukrainian People and Peoples of the Ukraine ! . . .
We, the Ukrainian Central Rada, by your will, for
the purpose of maintaining order, for the sake of cre-
ating order in our country, and for the sake of saving
the whole of Russia, announce that henceforth Ukrainia
becomes the Ukrainian People’s Republic. Without
separating from the Russian Republic and while pre-
serving its unity, we take our stand firmly on our
lands, in order that with our strength we may help the
whole of Russia, and the whole Russian Republic may
become a Federation of free and equal Peoples. . . .
Until the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly meets, the
whole power of establishing order in our lands, of
issuing laws and of governing, rests in us, the Ukrain-
ian Central Rada and in our Government—the General
Secretariat of the Ukraine.
After outlining the frontiers of the National Ukrainian
Republic, the “Universal’’ abolishes “the existing rights
of ownership to the lands of large proprietors and other
lands not worked by the owners. . . .”
It fixes an eight-hour working day in factories and work-
shops, and it establishes state control of production.
It insists upon “peace as soon as possible,” making reso-
SOVIET PEACE PROPOSALS 11
lute efforts to compel “both Allies and enemies to enter
immediately upon peace negotiations.”
It abolishes the death penalty, grants a full amnesty to
all political prisoners, and guarantees “all the liberties won
by the Russian Revolution,” namely,
freedom of the press, of speech, of religion, of as-
Sembly, of union, of strikes, inviolability of person
and of habitation, the right and the possibility of
using local dialects in dealing with all authorities.
. . . We announce to the Great Russian, Jewish, Polish
and other peoples of the Ukraine, that we recognize
national personal autonomy for the security of their
rights, and freedom of self-government in questions
of their national life. . . . The working out of these
reforms must be effected at the Ukrainian and All-
Russian Constituent Assemblies. The date for the
election of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly is fixed
for January 9, 1918, and the date of its summoning,
January 22, 1918. . . .
November 22. A statement was issued for the Soviet
by Lenin, President, and Krylenko, People’s Commissar
of War, to “all Committees of regiments, divisions, corps,
armies; to all the soldiers of the revolutionary army; and
to all the sailors of the revolutionary navy,’’ informing
them that Dukhonin had refused to obey the instructions
of the Government, that he had been deposed, and that
Krylenko had been appointed the new Commander-in-Chief.
The soldiers were told that “the question of peace is now
in your hands. You must not permit the counter-revolu-
tionary generals to destroy the great work of peace. . .
Let the regiments which are on the frontal positions elect
immediately plenipotentiaries who shall formally begin the
peace pourparlers with the enemy. . . . Only the Council
of the People’s Commissars has the right to sign the final
agreement of armistice. . . . Have watchfulness, tenacity,
energy, and the will for peace will win.”
The same message declared that the preliminary pourpar-
lers had actually “been in progress since 4:30 A. M. to-
day.” tº
November 23. The People's Commissars at Petrograd is-
sued a decree confirming the right to freedom and self-
12 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSE
H0
determination on the part of the various nationalities of
Russia and expressly stating that “this right of the Rus-
sian peoples to their self-determination is to be extended
even as far as separation and the formation of independent
States.” -
On the same day Trotzky began the publication of the
diplomatic documents (the “secret treaties’’) which he
found in the archives of the Russian Foreign Office.
The previous day he had announced to the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviets that “All the secret
treaties of Russia are now in my hands. These docu-
ments which are more cynical in their provisions than we
had supposed will soon be published. German diplomacy
will prove to have been no less cynical than that of the
Allies. . . . An appeal to all nations is being printed and
will be distributed everywhere with the decree. We do
not imitate Kerensky who addressed supplications to the
Allies. His letter will be published. We confront all
the Governments with facts showing that we wish to end
the war. We sweep all secret treaties into the dust bin.”
Accompanying the first publication, he issued a state-
ment outlining the attitude of the Soviet Government to
secret diplomacy, which, he declared,
is a necessary weapon in the hands of a propertied
minority, which is compelled to deceive the majority
in order to make the latter serve its interests. Im-
perialism, with its world-wide plans of annexation
and its rapacious alliances and arrangements, has de-
veloped to the highest extent the system of secret
diplomacy. . . . The Russian people, as well as the
peoples of Europe and of the whole world, must know
the documentary proof about those plots which were
hatched in secret by financiers and industrialists, to-
gether with their parliamentary and diplomatic agents.
. . . To abolish secret diplomacy is the first condition
of an honorable, popular, and really democratic foreign
policy. . . . For this reason, while openly offering to
all the belligerent peoples and their governments an
immediate armistice, we publish simultaneously those
treaties and agreements which have lost all their ob-
ligatory force for the Russian workmen, soldiers and
peasants. . . . When the German proletariat, by revo-
SOVIET PEACE PROPOSALS 13
lutionary means, gets access to the secrets of its Gov-
ernment chancellories, it will produce documents from
them of just the same nature as those which we are
now publishing. It is to be hoped that this will hap-
pen as soon as possible. . . . We desire a speedy peace
so that the peoples may honorably live and work to-
gether. We desire a speedy dethronement of the su-
premacy of capital. In revealing to the whole world
the work of the governing classes as it is expressed
in the secret documents of diplomacy, we turn to the
workers with that appeal which will always form the
basis of our foreign policy: “Proletarians of all coun-
tries, unite l’’
11
R2
13
14
II. THE ATTITUDE OF THE BELLIGERENTS
On the same day the English Government through Lord
Robert Cecil made a hostile reply to the Russian proposal
for an armistice.
The action just taken by the extremists in Petrograd
. . . would of course be a direct breach of the agree-
ment of September 5, 1914, and . . . if approved and
adopted by the Russian nation would put them prac-
tically outside the pale of the ordinary councils of
Europe. But I do not believe that the Russian people
will confirm this action or approve a proclamation
. . . to open all along the line peace negotiations with
the enemy across the trenches. . . . There is no inten-
tion of recognizing such a Government.
The British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, while
awaiting final instructions from his Government, published
a declaration in which he said that Trotzky’s note had been
delivered to the representatives of the Allied Powers 19
hours after the order had been given to Commander-in-
Chief Dukhonin to offer an armistice. “The Allied Gov-
ernments thus find themselves in the presence of a fait
accompli on a subject concerning which they have not been
consulted. It is furthermore impossible for the Embassy
to reply to the notes of a Government which his own Gov-
ernment has not recognized.”
November 25. Trotzky sent a Note to the diplomatic
representatives of neutral powers in Petrograd, informing
them of the proposed armistice and adding that “the con-
summation of an immediate peace is demanded in all coun-
tries, both belligerent and neutral. The Russian Govern-
ment counts on the firm support of workmen in all coun-
tries in the struggle for peace.”
November 27. At a meeting of Ambassadors at the
United States Embassy, Petrograd, it was decided to ignore
Trotzky’s note which “will be met with a fin de non re-
cevoir.” Nevertheless, it was decided to address a protest
to General Dukhonin, who had already been deposed as
ATTITUDE OF BIELLIGERENTS 15
15
16
17
Russian Commander-in-Chief. The Entente protest was
filed by General Lavergne, head of the French mission at
the Russian Staff Headquarters:
The Premier and War Minister of France have
charged me to make the following declaration to you:
“France does not recognize the power of the People’s
Commissars. Trusting in the patriotism of the Rus-
sian High Command it counts upon the firm resolu-
tion of the military leaders to repel every criminal
pourparler and to keep the Russian army facing the
common enemy.” Besides, I am charged to call your
attention to the fact that the question of an armistice
is a governmental question, whose discussion cannot
be taken up without previous consent of the Allied
Governments. No Government has the right to dis-
GIISS separately the question of an armistice or of
peace. -
The protest of the United States was made separately
to General Dukhonin by Major Kerth, Military Attaché
at Petrograd. The failure to join the protest entered by
the other Allied Ministers was due, according to a Petro-
grad despatch of December 2, ‘‘to the fact that it was
based upon the London agreement against a separate peace
to which America is not a signatory.” Major Kerth’s
protest was as follows:
Acting by virtue of instructions received from my
Government and transmitted through the Ambassador
of the United States at Petrograd, I have the honor
to bring to your knowledge the fact that the United
States, an ally of Russia, pursuing with her the war
which is the struggle of democracy against autocracy,
protests energetically and categorically against any
separate armistice that might be concluded by Russia.
November 28. The Russian Government sent out a wire-
Hess “TO ALL’’ signed by Trotzky and Lenin, and “de-
claring its willingness to enter into peace negotiations with
the belligerent powers.”
*-
Krylenko ordered “firing to cease immediately and frat-
ernization to begin on all fronts. Great vigilance is neces-
16 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
18
19
20
21
sary regarding the enemy. . . . Our army is starving. It
is Without clothes and boots. . . . In a short time we shall
obtain a general peace.”
He announced that “our envoys have returned, bringing
an official reply from the German Commander-in-Chief,
signifying his assent to the proposal to inaugurate nego-
tiations for an armistice on all fronts. The first meeting
of the negotiators is fixed for December 2.”
November 29. The German Chancellor, von Hertling,
declared in his first speech before the German Reichstag,
“that in the proposals of the Russian Government, which
have so far become known, a discussable basis for the open-
ing of negotiations may be found, and that I am prepared
to enter into such negotiations as soon as the Russian
Government sends authorized representatives for this pur-
pose. . . . As regards the countries of Poland, Lithuania,
and Courland, which were formerly under the sovereignty
of the Czar, we consider that the peoples living in those
countries have the right to determine their own fate.”
Count Czernin, Foreign Minister of the Austro-Hun-
garian Government, wired the Russian Government that
“the guiding lines announced by the Russian Government
for negotiations for an armistice and a treaty of peace,
counter proposals to which are awaited by the Russian
Government, are, in the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian
Government, a suitable basis for entering into these nego-
tiations . . . regarding an immediate armistice and gen-
eral peace.”
The first plenary session of the Interallied Conference
was held in Paris. Sixteen nations were represented by
their Premiers or High Commissioners. Despite the over-
throw of the Kerensky Government, Russia was represented
by two appointees of that Government: Sevastopoulo, Coun-
cillor of the Embassy at Paris, and Maklakov, “Ambassa-
dor to France (by special invitation and unofficially, as he
has not yet presented his letters).”
November 30. Maklakov was dismissed by Trotzky as.
Russian Ambassador to France because he attended the
session of the Inter-Allied Conference.
ATTITUT) E OF BIFLLIGERENTS 17
22
23
24
25
The German Foreign Secretary, von Kuehlmann, in ad-
dressing the Main Committee of the Reichstag, said:
Russia has set the world ablaze. . . . Russia has
Swept away the culprits, and she is laboring to find
through an armistice and peace an opportunity for
her internal reconstruction. . . . The principles an-
nounced to the world by the present rulers in Petro-
grad appear to be entirely acceptable as a basis for
the reorganization of affairs in the East—a re-
organization which, while fully taking into account
the right of nations to determine their own destinies,
is calculated permanently to safeguard the essential
interests of the two great neighboring nations, Ger-
many and Russia.
Trotzky informed the representatives of the Allied Gov-
ernments in Petrograd ‘‘that the German High Command
in reply to the formal proposal of the People’s Commis-
Sars has agreed to open negotiations on all fronts . . . that
military operations on the Russian front have been stopped,
and asks the diplomatic representatives of the Allies in
Russia to state in reply whether they desire to participate
in the negotiations, which will be opened on Sunday eve-
ning, December 2, at 5 o'clock.”
On the same day Trotzky issued a warning respecting
the letters addressed by the heads of the French and
American military missions at Russian headquarters to
General Dukhonin, who had protested against Russia’s con-
cluding either a separate peace or armistice: “The Gov-
ernment cannot permit Allied diplomatic and military
agents to interfere in the internal affairs of our country
and attempt to incite civil war.’’
On the same day, addressing the Petrograd Soviet,
Trotzky announced Austria-Hungary’s acceptance of the
offer of an armistice. He said:
In no case shall we allow a wrong interpretation of
our principles for a general peace. We shall confront
our enemies with questions which will admit of no
ambiguous answers. Every word spoken by us or by
them will be written down and sent by wireless to
18
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOVSE
all nations, who will be the judges of our negotiations.
Under the influence of the lower classes, the German
and Austrian Governments have agreed to place them-
selves in the dock. Be assured, comrades, that the
prosecutor in the person of the Russian Revolutionary
Delegation will speak with thunderous accusation
against the diplomacy of all Imperialists. It is all
the same to us how the Allied and enemy Imperialists
treat us. We shall carry on our independent class
policy, whatever they do.
26
III. NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PRELIMINARY
TRUCE AND ARMISTICE
The preliminary negotiations for a formal truce were
begun on November 29.
Second Lieutenant Senneur, Army Doctor Sagalovitch
and Volunteer Meren, envoys of the Committee of the Rus-
sian 5th Army before Dvinsk, were empowered to open
negotiations, and at 5 A. M. they crossed the German lines
blindfolded. The report rendered to Commander-in-Chief
Krylenko continues:
We handed over our written authorization from the
People's Commissars to two officers of the German
General Staff who had been sent for the purpose. The
negotiations were conducted in the French language.
Our proposal to carry on negotiations for an armistice
on all the fronts of belligerent countries, in order later
to make peace, was immediately handed over to the
staff of the division, whence it was sent by direct
wire to the staff commander of the German armies
(Hindenburg). . . . At midnight a written answer to
our proposal was given to us by General von Hofmeis-
ter: . . . ‘The chief of the German eastern front is au-
thorized by the German Commander-in-Chief to carry
on negotiations for an armistice. The chief of the
Russian armies is requested to appoint a commission
with written authority to be sent to the headquarters
of the commander of the German East front (Brest-
Litovsk). On his side the German commander will
name a commission with special authorization. The
day and hour of the meeting are to be fixed by
the Russian Commander-in-Chief. . . . The time ap-
pointed is mid-day of December 2.’ At the same time
we were informed that no firing would occur unless
prompted, and that enemy fraternization would be
stopped. We were blindfolded again and conducted
to our lines.
27 December 1. A Delegation of Russian officers and sol-
diers called at the headquarters of the Austro-German Com-
20 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
28
29
30
31
mand at Czernowitz where they were in consultation one
and one-half hours. 4,
The situation during these days is thus described "in an
official Vienna communication of December 3:
During the last few days an armistice has been an-
nounced on many sectors of the Russian front, from
division to division and from corps to corps. In the
Pripet region the Russian army concluded an official
armistice with the opposing command of the allied
[Central] troops.
Trotzky informed the American Military Attaché, Gen-
eral Judson, who visited him unofficially on Dec. 1, that
every stage of the negotiations would be made public, that
every detail would be discussed in the Soviet, and that “the
Allies, if they thought it advisable, might intervene at a
later stage of the negotiations.”
December 2. On the morning of Sunday, December 2,
the Russian Delegation, which consisted of Kamenev, So-
kolnikov, Mme. Bizenko, Captain Metislavsky and a work-
man, a soldier, a sailor and a peasant, together with two
military experts of the General Staff, arrived at Dvinsk on
their way to Brest-Litovsk, and addressed the Extraor-
dinary Congress of the Fifth Army before Dvinsk.
They were received with rounds of applause which
developed into a long ovation. The Congress gave a
solemn promise in the name of the army that it would
destroy all the wasp nests of the counter-revolution.
At 5:30 P. M. they were received in the neutral zone by
the German Delegates.
December 3. A temporary truce for 48 hours (up to De-
cember 5) was signed at Brest-Litovsk between Russia and
Germany. This was to be regarded as ‘‘merely a prelim-
inary arrangement” in order to permit the formal nego-
tiations for a general armistice to be begun without inter-
ference. •
The formal negotiations for a general armistice were
opened at Brest-Litovsk in the presence of representatives
of Russia, and of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and
TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS 21
32
Bulgaria. The Delegation of the Central Powers was ex-
clusively military and was under the leadership of General
Hoffmann. An account of the negotiations is given in the
official Russian Report.
The Russian Delegates opened with a declaration con-
cerning their peace aims, with a view to which the armistice
had been proposed.
The Central Delegates replied that their credentials
authorized them solely to begin negotiations for an
armistice and not for peace; that they were soldiers
and could add nothing to the political declarations of
Count Czernin and Baron von Kuehlmann; nor were
Russia’s Delegates authorized to speak for Russia’s
Allies. The Russian Delegates, taking due note of
this evasive declaration, proposed that they should
immediately address to all countries involved in the
war, including Germany and her Allies and all States
not represented at the Conference, a proposal to take
part in the drawing up of an armistice on all fronts.
The Central Delegation again replied evasively that they
had no such authority. They accepted the proposal of
the Russian Delegation that they ask their Governments
for such additional powers. This power was not accorded
them.
December 4. At the second day's sitting, the Russian
Delegation submitted their armistice proposals whose prin-
cipal points were:
a. An armistice of six months’ duration.
b. Evacuation by the German troops of the islands of
the Moon Sound in the Gulf of Riga.
c. Interdiction against sending German forces from
the Eastern front to other fronts, or even their
transference to rest quarters.
The Central Delegation regarded these conditions as “in
part quite astonishingly far-reaching in view of the Rus-
sian military situation.” The Central Delegation proposed
an armistice: ”
a. Of 28 days’ duration, which is to be automatically
prolonged save upon seven days’ notice.
b. Along the whole front from the Baltic Sea to the
Black Sea, the Riga Islands not to be evacuated.
22 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
C. Without acceptance of the interdiction against
transference of troops, since “such demands could
be addressed only to a conquered country.”
33 At this point attention should be called to President
Wilson’s address to Congress on this day, asking for a
declaration of war against Austria-Hungary. He made
here his first reference to the Russian revolutionary peace
formula which had been current since April, 1917:
You catch with me the voices of humanity that are
in the air. They grow daily more audible, more articu-
late, Iriore persuasive, and they come from the hearts
of men everywhere. They insist that war shall not
end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation
or people shall be robbed or punished because the ir-
responsible rulers of a single country have themselves
done deep and abominable wrong. It is this thought
that has been expressed in the formula, No annexa-
tions, no contributions, no punitive indemnities.
Just because this crude formula expresses the in-
stinctive judgment as to the right of plain men every-
where it has been made diligent use of by the masters.
of German intrigue to lead the people of Russia
astray, and the people of every country their agents
could reach, in order that a premature peace might
be brought about before autocracy has heen fallight its
final and convincing lesson and the people of the world
put in control of their own destinies.
But the fact that a wrong use has been made of a
just idea is no reason why a right use should not be
made of it. It ought to be brought under the pat-
romage of its real friends.
34 December 5. At the third day’s sitting the Russian Dele-
gation made the categorical declaration that they “were
treating for an armistice on all fronts with the view to the
conclusion of a general peace on the basis established by
the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.’’
Although authorized to negotiate at the present only
with the Russian Delegation, in view of the absence of the
Allies of Russia from the Conference, the Central Delega-
tion promised “to transmit to their respective Governments
TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS 23
35
36
the proposal made by the Russian Delegation to invite all
the belligerent countries to take part in the negotiations.”
Under the circumstances, ‘‘the Russian Delegation re-
fused to sign at this stage of the negotiations a formal
armistice.’’
It was thereupon agreed:
a. To interrupt the negotiations for an armistice for
one week to December 12, and
b. To suspend hostilities (Waffenruhe) for ten days
beginning on December 7 and ending December 17
at noon.
c. During the truce troops numbering a division or
more may be moved only if orders therefor had
been given prior to December 5.
December 6. Some of the Russian Delegates returned to
Petrograd. The remaining members of the Russian Dele-
gation and representatives of the Quadruple Powers “held
Committee sittings at which the drawing up of protocols
in respect of the previous sittings and the preliminary
work for the future full sittings was concluded.”
Trotzky sent a note to all the Allied Embassies and Lega-
tions in Petrograd, informing them of the course of the
negotiations up to that date and stating that the negotia-
tions had been interrupted for a week,
with the purpose of providing the opportunity during
this period of informing the peoples and Governments
of the Allied countries of the existence of such negotia-
tions and of their tendency. . . . As a result a period of
over one month will exist between the first peace de-
cree of the Soviets on November 8 and the moment
of the continuation of the peace negotiations on De-
cember 12. This period is even for the present dis-
turbed state of international communications amply
sufficient to afford the Allied Governments the oppor-
tunity to define their attitude towards the peace ne-
gotiations—that is, their willingness or their refusal
to take part in the negotiations for an armistice and
peace. In case of a refusal they must declare clearly
24 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
37
38
40
41
and definitely before all mankind the aims for which
the peoples of Europe may have to lose their blood
during a fourth year of war.
Pravda, a leading Bolshevik organ, declared that the
Soviet Government may have to resort to a repudiation of
Russia’s debts as a means of forcing the Allies to partici-
pate in the coming negotiations.
December 7. The independence of Finland was pro-
claimed. This was unanimously confirmed by the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviets on January 9.
The Ukrainian Parliament authorized the sending of
Delegations to Brest-Litovsk and Roumania. It also called
upon all belligerents to participate in the peace negotia-
tions and it notified neutrals that it had taken these steps.
It also declared that it was preparing a peace program
from the point of view of the recognition of the Ukraine
as a part of the Russian Federative Republic.
It was announced from Petrograd that on that day for
the first time since the war not a shot had been fired on
the Russian front from the Black Sea to the Baltic.
It was announced from Jassy that the Roumanian troops
had decided to associate themselves with the Russians in
the proposed armistice, and on December 8 a truce agree-
ment with Roumania was signed by General Tcherbatchev
at Focsani.
42
43
44
45
IV. THE FORMAL Aſſistice NEGOTIATIONS
December 11. The Russian Delegation, consisting of
thirteen members—including General Skalok, five repre-
Sentatives of the Russian armies of all the Eastern fronts,
the naval representative, Altflater, and five political Dele-
gates—started for Brest-Litovsk.
December 12. Trotzky issued a declaration,
throwing the responsibility for Russia concluding a
separate armistice on the Governments which refuse
to present conditions for an armistice and peace. A
separate armistice is not yet a separate peace, but it
means the danger of a separate peace. Only the
peoples themselves can avert this danger.
Trotzky added that in the negotiations the Commissars
do not consider themselves bound by a single one of the
old treaties. As the basis of peace negotiations he put
forward:
1. No forcible annexations.
2. The right of all peoples to decide by referendum
whether they will belong to one or another State
as a whole, or whether they will retain their inde-
pendence. Before such decisions, refugees should
be enabled to return and foreign troops be removed.
This principle was applicable to colonies as well as
to parent States.
December 13. The negotiations for an armistice to replace
the existing truce were begun at Brest-Litovsk.
At the first day's sittings three questions were con-
sidered :
1. Troop transfers—concerning which the Germans
insisted upon their own view.
2. Naval matters in relation to which the Germans
made concessions.
3. Conditions for fraternization between the two
armies. .
December 14. The conditions and draft of an armistice
treaty were finally formulated, the Russian Delegates, how-
26 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
ever, desiring to obtain supplementary instructions on some
points from their Government.:
§§
46 On this day Lloyd George made a number of references
to Russia in an address before Grey’s Inn Benchers:
Russia threatens to retire out of the war and leave
the French Democracy, whose loyalty to the word they
passed to Russia brought on them the horrors of this
war, to shift for themselves. I do not wish to mini-
mize in the least the gravity of this decision. Had -
Russia been in a condition to exert her strength this
year we might now be in a position to impose fair
and rational terms of peace. By her retirement she
strengthens the Hohenzollerns and weakens the forces
of democracy. Her action will not lead, as she im-
agines, to universal peace. It will simply prolong
the world’s agony, and inevitably put her in bondage
to the military dominance of Prussia. . . . If the Rus-
sian democracy has decided to abandon the struggle
against military autocracy, the American democracy
is taking it up. . . . . The Russians are a great-hearted
people, and valiantly have they fought in this war, but
they have always been—certainly throughout this war
—the worst organized State in Europe.
47 December 15. The armistice between Russia and all the
Central Powers was signed. It is to begin at noon on
Monday, December 17, and remains in force until January
14, 1918. Unless seven days’ notice is given it continues
in force automatically.
The agreement contains ten articles together with a
supplement:
Article I gives the duration of the agreement.
Article II extends it to all the land and air forces
of the common fronts. The contracting parties “un-
dertake that until January 14, 1918, they will not put
into operation the removal of troops from the front
between the Black Sea and the Baltic, that is to say,
such removals as had not been commenced before the
time when the armistice agreement was signed.”
Article III specifies how the lines of demarcation
and the neutral zones between the two sides shall be
determined.
Article IV provides the conditions under which,
“for the development and strengthening of friendly

ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS 27
2-
2 *
T
relations between the nations of the contracting par-
ties, organized intercourse between troops shall be per-
mitted.” Intercourse is permitted for pourparlers
and to armistice commissions; also at the two or three
intercourse centers on every sector of a Russian divi-
Sion, “there must not be present at any one time more
than 25 unarmed persons from each side. The ex-
change of views and newspapers is to be permitted.
Open letters may be handed in for despatch. The
Sale and exchange of wares of everyday use is to be
permitted at the intercourse centers.”
Article V extends the armistice to all of the naval
and aerial forces in the Black Sea and in the eastern
Baltic and other waters, and it provides for the regu-
lation of trade and mercantile shipping.
Article VI seeks “to prevent unrest and accidents
at the front” by regulating infantry exercise, artil-
lery practice, land mining, captive ballooning, work
on positions.
Articles VII and VIII provide for armistice com-
missions to meet in eight places along the whole front
for the purpose of carrying out the stipulations of
the armistice.
Article IX provides that “the contracting parties,
immediately upon signing this treaty, for the armis-
tice, will commence negotiations for peace.”
Article X reads: “Based upon the principle of the
freedom and independence and territorial inviolability
of the neutral portion of the Persian Empire, the
Turkish and Russian High Administrations are both
prepared to withdraw their troops from Persia. They
will immediately enter into communication with the
Persian Government in order to arrange details for
their evacuation and also for the guaranteeing of the
above-mentioned principle and for the establishment of
other necessary measures.”
Supplement to the armistice agreement provides for
the immediate exchange of civil prisoners and of pris-
oners of war unfit for further military service .
the sending back to their homes of women and of chil-
28 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
48
49
50
dren under 14 years of age . . . and the amelioration
of the condition of prisoners of war on both sides. . .
In furtherance of negotiations for peace and in order
to heal civilization of the wounds caused by the war,
measures will be devised for the re-establishment of
cultural and economic relations between the contract-
ing parties. . . . For the settlement of details a mixed
commission is to meet shortly in Petrograd.
December 17. Trotzky is reported to have “notified the
Allied Embassies that the armistice has reached definite
results and that peace negotiations will begin, and asking
them tº, participate, or to state whether they wish peace
or not.’
The Petrograd Telegraph Agency issued a declaration
to “the Socialists of all countries, especially the Socialists
of Germany’’ who “must understand that between the
program of the Russian workmen and peasants and the
program of the German capitalists, landowners and gen-
erals there is an irreconcilable contradiction . . . the work-
ers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey
must substitute for the Imperialist program of their ruling
classes their own revolutionary program of solidarity and
collaboration between the workers of all countries.’’
The Soviet Government delivered an ultimatum to the
Ukrainian Rada stating that “in case a satisfactory reply
has not been received within twenty-four hours, the Council
of the People’s Commissars will consider the Rada in a
state of war against the influence of the Soviets in Russia
and in the Ukraine.” In the ultimatum the ‘‘independent
national rights of all the nationalities that were oppressed
by the Czarist Great Russian bourgeoisie, even to the point
of recognizing the right of these nationalities to separate
themselves from Russia,’’ are once more confirmed. Never-
theless, the Rada is accused “under cover of phrases and
declarations regarding national independence,” of having
given itself over to a “systematic bourgeois policy” and of
giving assistance to the “counter-revolutionary forces of
the Cadets and of Kaledin.” This ultimatum was ignored
at Kiev, and war between the two Republics was formally
begun on December 18.
51
52
53
V. NEGOTIATIONS FOR A GENERAL
EUROPEAN PEACE
Von Kuehlmann and Czernin notified Trotzky that they
would arrive in Brest on December 18 to begin negotiations
for a general European peace. Czernin added that the
meeting place for a general European Conference would
also be discussed.
December 18. A Preliminary Conference was held be-
tween the representatives of Russia and of the Central
Powers to consider who would participate in the forth-
coming formal negotiations and what would be the basis of
the negotiations. The Germans considered it necessary to
know the replies of the Allies before opening formal nego-
tiations. The Germans were reported as ‘‘disposed to ac-
cept the principle of no annexations or indemnities, but
they have made express reservations with regard to the
right of nationalities to dispose of themselves.”
December 20. Lloyd George in discussing the military
situation before the House of Commons said:
It would be idle to pretend that the hopes we had
formed at the beginning of the year have been re-
alized, and our disappointment is attributable entirely,
in my judgment, to the Russian collapse. The Russian
army has been practically quiescent throughout the
year. . . . The Russian situation has changed within
the last few weeks. Russia was at any rate before
nominally at war with Germany. Her army occupied
a very long line of trenches, and that compelled the
Germans and the Austrians to keep in front of that
army a very considerable number of troops.
There is an armistice and peace is being negotiated.
It is perfectly true that there are conditions which
impose upon Germany the obligation not to move any
troops from the eastern front to the west. Well, we
have heard of scraps of paper before. . . .
Since Russia has entered into separate negotiations
she of course must alone be responsible for the terms
in respect of her own territories. . . . -
30 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
54
December 22. The formal negotiations for a general
peace were begun. The meeting was attended by the fol-
lowing Delegates:
Germany—Foreign Minister von Kuehlmann, Chair-
man, and von Rosenberg, Baron von Hock, General
Hoffmann, Major Brinckmann.
Austria-Hungary—Foreign Minister Czernin, Chair-
man, and von Merey, Freiherr von Wisser, Count Col-
lerda, Count Osaky, Field Marshal von Cziezericz,
Lieutenant Polarny, Major von Gluise.
Bulgaria—Minister of Justice Popov, Chairman,
and Gossev, Postmaster General Stoyanovich, Colonel
Ganchev, Dr. Anastasov.
Turkey—Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Nezim
Bey, Chairman, and the Ambassador to Germany,
Hakki Pasha, Under Foreign Secretary Hekmit Bey,
General Zekki (Izzet) Pasha.
Russia—Joffe, Chairman, and Kamenev, Mme. Bi-
Zenko, Petrovsky, Karaghan, Lubinski, Weltman, Pav-
lovich, Admiral Altvater, General Tumorrl, Colonel
Zeplett, Captain Lipsky.
After introductory remarks by Prince Leopold of Ba-
varia and Hakki Pasha, v. Kuehlmann was unanimously
chosen first President of the negotiations. He declared
among other things that
there can be no question of preparing an instrument
of peace elaborated in its smallest details. What I
have in mind is fixing the most important principles
and conditions on which neighbourly intercourse, espe-
cially in cultural and economic respects, can speedily
be re-established, and deciding upon the best means
to heal the wounds caused by the war. . . . Our nego-
tiations . . . must take into account on the one hand
what has become historical in order not to lose our
footing on the firm ground of facts; but on the other
hand they must also be inspired by that new great
leading motive of peace that has brought us here to-
gether. -
The Russian Delegation demanded and obtained publicity
for the sittings and the right to publish protocols. After
additional rules of order were adopted, Joffe declared that
the Russian Delegation based itself upon the clearly ex-
GENERAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 31
pressed will of the people of Russia to attain as soon as
possible a general and just peace. He appealed to the
resolutions of the All-Russian Congress of Workmen and
Soldiers’ Deputies and the All-Russian Peasants’ Congress,
and he declared the war a crime “if continued for the sake
of annexations.” Starting from these principles, the Rus-
sian Delegation proposed that peace negotiations be based
upon the following six points:
f
*
f
&
1. No forcible union of territories conquered during
the war shall be permitted. Troops occupying such
territories shall be withdrawn within the shortest pe-
riod.
2. The political independence of peoples that have
lost their independence during the war shall be re-
stored to its fullest extent.
3. National groups which before the war were not
politically independent shall be guaranteed the possi-
bility of deciding by referendum the question of be-
longing to one State or another, or enjoying their
political independence. This referendum must be ar-
ranged in such a manner that complete independence
of voting is guaranteed for the entire population of
the region in question, including emigrants and ref-
ugees.
4. In regard to territory of mixed nationality, the
right of a minority shall be protected by special laws
giving it independence of national culture, and, if
practical, autonomous administration.
5. None of the belligerent countries shall be obliged
to pay another country any so-called war costs. Con-
tributions already levied are to be paid back. Re-
garding the indemnification of losses suffered by pri-
vate persons in consequence of the war, these shall
be met out of a special fund to which belligerents shall
proportionately contribute.
6. Colonial questions shall be decided in conformity
with the principles laid down in points 1 to 4.
\ The Russian Delegation also regards as intolerable
> any restriction of the liberty of weaker nations by the
stronger, such as through an economic boycott, the Sub-
jection of one country to another by the imposition of
!
*
32 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
55
commercial treaties, and separate customs conventions,
hindering the freedom of commerce with a third coun-
try.
After this declaration v. Kuehlmann stated that the
Central Delegations required an interval to consider their
reply.
December 25. Count Czernin, who presided, declared in
the name of the Delegates of the Quadruple Alliance that
the main lines of the Russian proposals form a
discussable basis for . . . an immediate general peace
without forcible acquisitions of territory and without
war indemnities. . . . The statesmen of the Allied
[Central] Governments, in their programs, have
repeatedly emphasized that the Allies [Central] would
not prolong the war a day in order to make conquests.
. . . They solemnly declare their determination to
sign without delay a peace that will end this war on
the foregoing basis without exception and with the
same just conditions for all belligerent powers.
Czernin expressly pointed out, however, that this accept-
ance of the Russian terms was to be binding upon the
Central Powers only on condition that
all the powers now participating in the war must,
within a suitable period, without exception and with-
out any reserve, bind themselves to #. most precise
adherence to the terms binding every other nation.
. . . For, it would not do for the Powers of the
Quadruple Alliance negotiating with Russia, one-
sidedly to tie themselves to these conditions without
a guarantee that Russia’s Allies will recognize and
carry out these conditions honestly and without reserve
as regards the Quadruple Alliance as well.
Having made this prior condition, Czernin proceeded to
reply to the six terms of the Russian proposal:
1. It is not the intention of the Allied [Central]
Governments to appropriate forcibly the territories
which are at present occupied. The question of the
troops in occupied territories must be settled in the
sense of the withdrawal of troops from specifically des-
ignated places. If no such agreement can be reached
\
GENERAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 38
beforehand there must be stipulations in the peace
treaty regarding the evacuation of such places.
2. It is not the intention of the Allies [Central] to
deprive of its political independence any of the na-
tions which have lost it in the course of this war.
3. The question of the State allegiance of national
groups which possess no State independence cannot,
in the opinion of the Quadruple Alliance, be solved
internationally, but is, if required, to be solved by
every State independently with its peoples in a con-
stitutional manner.
4. Likewise, in accordance with declarations of
statesmen of the Quadruple Alliance, the protection,
of the right of minorities forms an essential and com-
ponent part of the constitutional right of peoples to
self-determination. The Allied (Central) Govern-
ments also grant validity to this principle everywhere,
in so far as it is practically realizable.
5. The Allied [Central] Powers have frequently em-
phasized the possibility that both sides might renounce
not only indemnification for war costs, but also indem-
nification for war damages. In these circumstances,
every belligerent power would have only to make in-
demnification for expenditures for its nationals who
have become prisoners of war, as well as for damage
done in its own territory by illegal acts of force com-
mitted against civilian nationals belonging to the en-
emy. The Russian Government’s proposal for the cre-
ation of a special fund for this purpose could be taken
into consideration only if the other belligerent powers
were to join in the peace negotiations within a suitable
period.
6. Of the four Allied [Central] Powers Germany
alone possesses colonies. The German Delegation, in
complete accord with the Russian proposals regarding
colonies, adds that the return of the German colonies
taken by force during the war constitutes an essential
part of the German demands from which Germany
will never desist; just as the Russian demand for the
evacuation of territory occupied by an adversary cor-
responds with Germany’s intentions.
As to self-determination for the German colonies
now proposed by the Russian Delegation, Czernin de-
34 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
clared that “the nature of the German colonial terri-
tories’’ makes that “at present impossible.” More-
over, the natives have given ‘‘proof of their attach-
ment and their resolve by all means to preserve al-
legiance to Germany, proof which, by its significance
and weight, is far Superior to any expression of popu-
lar Will.’’
Finally, the principles to govern the economic relations
between nations, as proposed by the Russian Delegation,
are approved wholly by the Delegations of the Allied
[Central] Powers, who always have denied any eco-
nomic restrictions and who see in the re-establishment
of regulated economic relations, which are in accord
with the interests of all peoples concerned, one of the
most important conditions for bringing about friendly
relations between the powers now engaged in war.
Having heard the reply of the Central Delegations, the
Russian Delegation, through Chairman Joffe,
expresses its satisfaction that . . . Germany and her
Allies So far from having plans of territorial annexa-
tion and conquest, do not aim at the destruction of
the political independence of any people whatsoever.
The abolition of annexation is the logical consequence
of the general principle of the right of peoples to
regulate their own destinies. This right is recognized
in existing constitutions only in a minor degree, and
consequently to speak of constitutional channels as the
sure means to achieve this right is to nullify this prin-
ciple. It must be said that the four Allied (Central)
Powers, while they agree not to apply the right of
the strongest in the territories occupied during the
war, do nothing for small nationalities in their own
territory. The war cannot come to an end without
the restoration of independence to small nationalities.
The Russian Delegation as heretofore insists on the
rights of these nationalities being protected in the
peace treaty. Historical prescription does not justify
one people’s subservience to another. The Russian
Delegation further attaches importance to the indem-
nification from an international fund of private per-
sons who have suffered from acts of war. The Russian
Delegation sees no contradiction with its principles
. in the annulment of the Entente regime insti-
GENERAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 35
56
tuted during the war in the German colonies, as show-
ing that the peoples who have taken part in the war
are entitled to express a will of their own. Any diffi-
culties arising therefrom can be adjusted by Commis-
Sions to be officially appointed. Seeing that the dec-
laration of Germany and her Allies admits the possi-
bility of peace pourparlers, the Russian Delegation de-
clares at the same time that, in spite of the differences
already mentioned, the main points of the Allies’
[Central] declaration are not aggressive and it enters
into pourparlers for general peace between belligerents.
The Russian Delegation proposes the suspension of
hostilities during a period of ten days, beginning at
10 P. M. on December 23, 1917, to 10 P. M. on Janu-
ary 4, 1918, so that the peoples, whose Governments
have not joined in the pourparlers, may have the op-
portunity of becoming acquainted with the new prin-
ciple of peace. After this period, the pourparlers
will be resumed, even if other peoples do not take part
in them. -
The next plenary sitting of the Delegations for the
discussion of the terms of a general peace between all
belligerents was then fixed for Friday, January 9, 1918,
at 9 A. M.–five days after the expiration of the period
fixed for the suspension of hostilities and for communicat-
ing the “new principle of peace” to all the belligerents.
Before the adjournment of the Conference on December
25, Czernin asked the Russian Delegation to present its
answer in writing, and he proposed an immediate start
with negotiations on those special points which in any
case would have to be settled between the Russian Gov-
ernment and the Governments of the Central Powers. The
head of the Russian Delegation expressed his readiness
immediately to enter upon the discussion of those specific
points, which even in the event of general European peace
negotiations, would have to form the subject of special
discussions between Russia and the Quadruple Allies.
Upon motion of von Kuehlmann, it was unanimously de-
cided, with a view to avoiding all loss of time, and having
regard to the importance of the task to be fulfilled, to
begin these special negotiations on the next day, Wednes-
day morning, December 26.
December 26–28. The available record of these sessions
is somewhat confused. It would appear that on Decem-
36 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
57
ber 26 the Russian Delegation presented a draft of two
Articles of an agreement concerning the treatment of oc-
cupied territories as follows:
I. In full accord with the public declarations of both
contracting parties that they cherish no bellicose plans,
and that they desire to conclude peace without forcible
annexations, Russia will withdraw her troops from all
parts of Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Persia, occu-
pied by her, while the Powers of the Quadruple Alli-
ance will withdraw theirs from Poland, Lithuania,
Courland and other regions of Russia.
II. In accordance with the principles of the Russian
Government, which has declared the right of all peoples
living in Russia to self-determination, including even
separation from Russia, the populations in these dis-
tricts will be given an opportunity within the shortest
possible period of deciding entirely and freely the
question of their union with one or the other Empire,
or of their formation into separate States. In this
connection the presence of any troops, apart from the
national or local militia in the territories which are
voting, is not permissible. Until this question is de-
cided the government of these regions will remain in
the hands of representatives of the local population
elected democratically. The date of evacuation and
other circumstances and the commencement of the de-
mobilization of the army is to be fixed by a special
military commission.
We have not found a record of the discussion following
this proposed draft. The German Delegation proposed as
a substitute the first two Articles of a preliminary peace
treaty. At the same time, they brought forward the draft
of the remaining Articles of a complete preliminary peace
treaty containing, in all, sixteen Articles:
Article I. “Russia and Germany are to declare the
state of war at an end. Both nations are resolved to
live together in the future in peace and friendship.
On the condition of complete reciprocity, vis-à-vis
her allies, Germany would be ready as soon as peace
is concluded with Russia and the demobilization of
the Russian armies has been accomplished, to evacuate
GENERAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 3?
her present positions in occupied Russian territory in
SO far as no different inferences result from Article
II.”
Article II. “The Russian Government having, in ac-
cordance with its principles, proclaimed for all peoples
without exception living within the Russian Empire
the right of self-determination, including complete sep-
aration, takes cognizance of the decisions expressing
the will of the people demanding full State independ-
ence and separation from the Russian Empire, for Po-
land, Lithuania, Courland, and portions of Esthonia
and Livonia. The Russian Government recognizes that
in the present circumstances these manifestations must
be regarded as the expression of the will of the people,
and is ready to draw conclusions therefrom. As in
those districts to which the foregoing stipulations ap-
ply, the question of evacuation is not such as is pro-
vided for in Article I, a special commission shall dis-
cuss and fix the time and other details in conformity
and in accordance with the Russian idea of the neces-
sary ratification—by a plebiscite on broad lines and
without any military pressure whatever—of the al-
ready existing proclamations of separation.”
Article III concerns treaties and agreements in force
before the war. &
Articles IV, V, VI and VII. No discrimination
against the subjects, merchant ships or goods of either
party; no economic war; no burdensome import duties;
the exchange of goods to be organized through mixed
commissions; new commercial treaty of navigation to
replace treaty of 1894-1904; most favored nation rights
in commerce and navigation for twenty years.
Article VIII. “Russia agrees that the administra-
tion of the mouth of the Danube be entrusted to a
European Danube Commission, with a membership
from the countries bordering upon the Danube and
the Black Sea. Above Braila the administration is
to be in the hands of the countries bordering upon
the river.’’
Article IX. “Military laws limiting the private
rights of Germans in Russia and of Russians in Ger-
many are abolished.”
Article X. “The contracting parties are not to de-
mand the payment of war expenditures nor for dam-
|
38 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
ages suffered during the war, this provision including
requisitions.”
Article XI. “Each party is to pay for damage done
within its own limits during the war by acts against
international law with regard to the subjects of other
parties, in particular their diplomatic and consular
representatives, as affecting their life, health, or prop-
erty. The amount is to be fixed by mixed commis-
sions with neutral chairmen.’’
Article XII. “Prisoners of war who are invalids
are to be immediately repatriated. The exchange of
other prisoners is to be made as soon as possible, the
dates to be fixed by a German-Russian commission.’’
Article XIII. “Civilian subjects interned or exiled
are to be immediately released and sent home without
cost to them.”
Article XIV provides for the emigration to Germany
of Russian subjects of German descent.
Article XV. The return by each party of merchant
ships.
Article XVI. “Diplomatic and consular relations
are to be resumed as soon as possible.’’
In the discussions of December 26, 27, 28, of which we
have but a scant record, substantial agreement seems to
have been arrived at on all points with the exception of
the crucial Articles I and II, which form the basis of all
the further negotiations. In relation to these two Articles,
the Russian Delegation defined its position as follows:
Our standpoint is, that only such manifestation of
will can be regarded as de facto the expression of the
will of the people as results from a free vote taken
in the districts in question with the complete absence
of foreign troops. We therefore must insist upon a
clearer and more precise formulation of this point.
We, however, consent to a special commission being
appointed to examine the technique of such a referen-
dum and fix the definite date for evacuation. In view
of the course which the negotiations have hitherto
taken, it can be stated with satisfaction that as regards
the settlement of the most important questions the
views of the represented powers tally on many points,
GENERAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 39
58
while as regards others they approach each other, so
that regarding the latter points also, the hope of ar-
riving at an agreement is well founded.
On December 28 at the third and last sitting before ad-
journment to January 9, Popov, Bulgarian Minister of
Justice, referred ‘‘to the significance of the peace nego-
tiations as promising a basis for a new era in the devel-
opment of international law.” He then asked Joffe, leader
of the Russian Delegation, to preside over the session.
Hakki Pasha pointed out that the approaching practical
solution of the different questions raised during three and
a half years of war “was greatly due to the Russian Dele-
gation, which had shown sincerity, justice and common
sense, and proved to be good diplomats and statesmen.”
Joffe, in closing the sitting, ‘‘expressed the opinion that
the negotiations had well begun and allowed the expecta-
tion of a speedy termination to a devastating war.’’
59
60
VI. THE INTERVAL TO PERMIT ALLIED
PARTICIPATION
December 27. Trotzky informed the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviets that he would officially ask the
Entente Powers whether they intended to support the
Russian or the German peace proposals, or whether they
would propose some alternative terms. If the Entente
Allies refused to join in the negotiations within ten days,
Russia would be forced to conclude a separate peace.
December 28. M. Pichon, in his first speech as Foreign
Minister, said in the French Chamber:
Germany is trying to involve us in her Maximalist
negotiations. After suffering as we have, we cannot
accept peace based on the status quo. By agreement
with our Allies, we are ready to discuss direct prop-
ositions regarding peace, but this is indirect.
Russia may treat for a separate peace with our
enemies or not. In either case the war will continue
for us. An Ally has failed us. . . . But another Ally
has come from the other end of the world. . . .
The Secret treatics publishcd by the Bolsheviki had
not compromised France. . . . .
All the Allies through their representatives made
the same declaration at Petrograd, that on the day
when a regularly constituted government founded on
the national will existed in Russia, we would be ready
to examine with it our war aims, and the conditions
of a just and durable peace. The Allies’ representa-
tives are all unable to recognize a Government which
concluded an armistice without consulting its Allies,
opened negotiations for an immediate peace, summon-
ing all belligerents to reply immediately whether they
accepted these negotiations, and threatened to declare
void all foreign financial obligations created by pre-
vious Governments. Trotzky declared he did not need
to be recognized by capitalistic Governments and that
he was addressing the people directly, proposing a
democratic peace. . . .
FIRST INTERVAL 41
61
62
63
By the acts of the Bolsheviki, Russia is completely
disorganized. . . . Amid the general disorganization,
we ought to unite with them [the sane elements
of Russia], whether they be Socialists, Liberals or
Revolutionaries. . . . We are not intervening in the
internal policy of Russia, but we are taking the neces-
Sary measures to safeguard the considerable interests
in the country to which we have been attached by
alliance for a quarter of a century. In conformity
with the principles of the Maximalists, we are replying
favorably to the populations which wish to maintain
relations with us. We are not working for the break-
up of Russia, but we wish to serve a policy which
will regenerate Russia.
December 29. The Petrograd Telegraph Agency issued
the following message to the ‘‘Peoples and Governments
of Allied countries: The Peace pourparlers at Brest-
Litovsk . . . have been interrupted for ten days until
January 8 in order to give a last chance to the Allied
countries to take part in the further pourparlers and thus
so safeguard themselves from all consequences of a separate
peace between Russia and enemy countries.”
January 1, 1918. A U. S. Government wireless picked up
“Russian peace terms, in which she is asking the Entente
to join.” A detailed account of the Russian peace terms
is given. “The Russian Delegation makes known its de-
termination to append their signatures to these conditions
for peace, which they claim will end the war upon the
foundation of the principles of just conditions for all peo-
ples in like manner without exception.”
January 2. The Central Executive Committee of Soviets
met to consider the situation.
After Kamenev, one of the Brest-Litovsk Delegates, had
reported on the peace pourparlers, representatives from all
the fronts were summoned by telegraph to Petrograd.
Without concealing the distressing situation on the fronts,
they declared that the front would defend the Russian revo-
lution, but that it demands bread and boots.
Trotzky, in the name of the Commissars, denounced Ger-
many’s “hypocritical peace proposal” and he declared that
if Poles and Letts and other nationalities were not given
42 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
the right of self-determination, it would become urgently
necessary courageously to defend the revolution.
After Trotzky’s speech a joint Assembly was held of
the Central Executive of the Soviets, the Workmen’s, Sol-
diers’ and Peasants’ Delegates, the Petrograd Soviet, and
the Congress of the whole Army, which had been appointed
to consider the question of demobilization.
The Assembly passed the following resolution:
This Assembly confirms the fact that the program
proclaimed by the representatives of the Quadruple
Alliance at Brest-Litovsk recognizes in principle the
conclusion of peace without annexations or indemni-
ties. This recognition established a basis for further
pourparlers with a view to a general and democratic
peace.
However, already in this declaration, the repre-
sentatives of the German Government refused to admit
the free right of the oppressed nations, and colonies,
seized before the beginning of war in 1914, to dis-
pose of their own destiny. Already this restriction,
which was immediately reported by the Russian Dele-
gation, signified that the dominant parties in Ger-
many, compelled by the pressure of the popular move-
ment to grant concessions to the principles of a demo-
cratic peace, nevertheless are trying to distort this
idea in the sense of their old annexationist policy.
The Austro-German Delegation, in setting out the
practical conditions of peace in the East, alters still
further the idea of a just democratic peace. This
declaration is made in view of the fact that the Ger-
man and Austrian Governments refuse to guarantee
immediately and irrevocably the removal of their
troops in the occupied countries of Poland, Lithuania,
Courland, and parts of Livonia and Esthonia. In
fact, a free affirmation of their will by the popula-
tions of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and all other
countries occupied by the troops of other States is
impossible until the moment of the return of the na-
tive population to the places they have evacuated.
The allegation of the German Delegation that the
will of the people of these countries has already been
manifested is devoid of all foundation. Under martial
FIRST INTERVAL 43
64
law and under the yoke of the military censorship
the peoples of the occupied countries could not ex-
press their will. The documents on which the Ger-
man Government at best could base their allegation
Only prove a manifestation of the will of a few iso-
lated and privileged groups, but in no way the will
of the masses in these territories.
We now declare that the Russian Revolution remains
faithful to the policy of internationalism. We de-
fend the right of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland
to dispose of their own destiny, really, freely. Never
will we recognize the justice of imposing the will of
a foreign nation on any other nation whatsoever.
This joint session insists that the peace pourparlers
shall be communicated later to the neutral States, and
instructs the Soviets and Commissars to take measures
to realize this.
We say to the peoples of Germany, Austria, Hun-
gary, Bulgaria, and Turkey: “Under your pressure
your Governments have been obliged to accept our
motto of no annexations and no indemnities, but re-
cently they have been trying to carry out their old
policy of evasions. Remember that the conclusion of
an immediate democratic peace will depend actually
and above all on you. All the peoples of Europe
look to you. Exhausted and bled by a war such as
there has never been before, you will not permit
the German and Austrian Imperialists to make war
against revolutionary Russia for the subjection of
Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and Livonia.’’
Chairman Joffe of the Russian Delegation, under instruc-
tions of the Central Executive, telegraphed on January 2
to General Hoffmann “that the Government of the Russian
Republic considers it necessary to conduct the further ne-
gotiations regarding peace on neutral territory and pro-
poses on its part to transfer the negotiations to Stock-
holm.” Articles I and II of the German draft of a treaty
were declared to be in direct conflict with the principle
of the self-determination of nations insisted upon by the
Russian Republic.
On the same day Izvestia, the official Soviet organ, de-
nounced the Germans as “wolves in sheeps’ clothing.”
44 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
65
66
The same day also a pamphlet was circulated within the
German lines declaring that the German peace conditions
show their promises of a democratic peace to be “uncon-
Scionable lies.” After describing the actions of the Ger-
mans in Poland and Lithuania in recruiting forced labor
and shooting hunger strikers, the pamphlet continues:
“The German Government only found support in Courland
from the hated slave-owners, the German Barons, who have
their prototypes in the Polish landowners.” The pamphlet
declares that Germany desires to bring the peoples on
Russia's western frontier beyond the range of the Russian
Revolution in order to subjugate them with German cap-
ital, impose an Austrian monarchy on Poland, and make
Lithuania and Courland German duchies. It concludes:
“On Such a basis the Russian Workmen's Government can
never enter negotiations.” , ' '
On this day also the Ambassador of the United States at
Petrograd, David R. Francis, issued to Colonel Raymond
Robins of the Red Cross Mission, the following “Suggested
Communication to the Commissar of Foreign Affairs’’:
At the hour the Russian people shall require as-
sistance from the United States to repel the action of
Germany and her allies you may be assured that I
will recommend to the American Government that it
render them all aid and assistance within its power.
If upon the termination of the present armistice Rus-
sia fails to conclude a democratic peace through the
fault of the Central Powers, and is compelled to con-
tinue the war, I shall urge upon my Government the
fullest assistance to Russia possible, including the ship-
ment of supplies and munitions for the Russian armies,
the extension of credits, the giving of such advice
and technical assistance as may be welcome to the
Russian people in the service of the common purpose
to obtain through the defeat of the German autocracy
the effective guarantee of a lasting and democratic
peace.
I am not authorized to speak for my Government
on the question of recognition, but that is a question
which will of necessity be decided by actual future
events. I may add, however, that if the Russian
armies now under command of the People's Com-
missars commence and seriously conduct hostilities
FIRST INTERVAL 45
against the forces of Germany and her allies, I will
recommend to my Government the formal recognition
of the de facto Government of the People's Commis-
Sal’S. . . .
“The circumstances of the preparation, O. K.-ing and
initialing of this document,’’ Colonel Robins stated before
the U. S. Senate Committee on March 10, 1919, were as
follows:
For some days I had been working under the ver-
bal instructions of the Ambassador of the United
States, in conferences with Lenin and Trotzky and
other officers of the Soviet Government, seeking to
prevent the signing of a German peace at Brest-
Litovsk. To provide against the possibility of error
in statement and subsequent refutation of my author-
ization to represent the Ambassador in the manner
indicated by his verbal instructions, this document
was prepared by me and submitted to him as a cor-
rect statement of his verbal instructions to me and
was O. K.’d by him.
Document, filed as “Robins Document No. 2,” is
an actual copy of an original in my possession, the
notations on this document being in the handwriting
of the American Ambassador, written therein in my
presence in his private office in the American Em-
bassy at Petrograd on the evening of the 2d of Jan-
uary, 1918.
The document is as follows:
(Note in lead pencil ‘‘To Colonel Robins: This
is substance of cable I shall send to Department on
being advised by you that peace negotiations are ter-
minated and Soviet Government decided to prosecute
war against Germany and Austria-Hungary.—D. R.
F.”)
“From sources which I regard as reliable I have
received information to the effect that Bolshevist lead-
ers fear complete failure of peace negotiations because
of probable demands by Germany of impossible terms.
“Desire for peace is so fundamental and widespread
that it is impossible to foretell the results of the
abrupt termination of these negotiations, with only
alternatives a disgraceful peace or continuance of war.
46 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSR
67
‘Bolshevist’ leaders will welcome information as to
what assistance may be expected from our Govern-
ment if continuance of war is decided upon. Assur-
ances of American Support in such event may de-
cidedly influence their decision.
“Under these circumstances and notwithstanding
previous cables I have considered it my duty to instruct
General Judson to informally communicate to the
Bolshevist leaders the assurance that in case the pres-
ent armistice is terminated and Russia continues the
war against the Central Powers I will recommend to
the American Government that it render all aid and
assistance possible. I have also told Robins of Red
Cross to continue his relations with Bolshevist Govern-
ment, which are necessary for the present.
‘Present situation is so uncertain and liable to Sud-
den change that immediate action upon my own re-
sponsibility is necessary, otherwise the opportunity for
all action may be lost.
“Nothing that I shall do will in any event give formal
recognition to the Bolshevist Government until I have
explicit instructions, but the necessity for informal
intercourse in the present hour is so vital that I should
be remiss if I failed to take the responsibility of ac-
tion.’ -
This document was prepared by me and submitted
to the Ambassador and O. K.’d by him, for the same
reasons and purposes stated in the circumstances of
Document 1.
In ºccordance with Petrograd despatches, this attitude
of the Russians came as a great surprise to the Germans.
On January 2, Kaiser Wilhelm received in joint audience
Chancellor von Hertling, Field Marshal von Hindenburg,
General von Ludendorff, Finance Minister von Roedern
and Foreign Secretary von Kuehlmann. Furthermore, the
Eoreign Affairs Committee of the Bundesrath, under the
presidency of Count von Dancl, discussed the Russian
situation at the Chancellor’s palace. Von Hertling had
a long talk also with Admiral von Tirpitz, former Minister
of Marine; and Kaiser Karl of Austria-Hungary received
in audience Professor Kucharzevski, the Polish Premier.
FIRST INTERVAL 47
68
69
70
71
Von Hertling addressed the Main Committee of the
Reichstag and stated that the German Government must
return a negative reply to the Russian proposal to transfer
the conference to Stockholm. Further, he declared, that
von Kuehlmann, who had left again for Brest-Litovsk, had
been instructed to inform the Russian Delegates that Ar-
ticles I and II of the draft of a treaty as proposed by
the Russians could not be accepted by Germany.
The Council of the People’s Commissars at Petrograd
tried to enter into fresh negotiations with the Ukrainian
Rada, sending a formal document signed by Gubunov, Sec-
retary, suggesting pourparlers at Smolensk or Vitebsk;
but like the ultimatum of December 17 this was ignored.
A note was issued at Petrograd giving the text of von
Kuehlmann’s answer to the Russian Peace Delegation
which had protested against the refusal of passports to
German Independent Socialists for a visit to Russia. Von
Kuehlmann said that “the discussion of unofficial ques-
tions could not assist in achieving a treaty of peace and
a suspension of hostilities. The attitude of the German
Government could not be interpreted as a lack of desire for
universal peace, but as arising out of a desire on its part
to avoid pitfalls which might arise on the way to peace.”
January 5. Mr. Lloyd George, the British Prime Minis-
ter, in outlining before British Labor leaders ‘‘the char-
acter and purpose of our war aims and peace conditions,”
said as to Russia:
I will not attempt to deal with the question of the
Russian territories now in German occupation. The
Russian policy since the Revolution has passed so rap-
idly through so many phases that it is difficult to speak
without some suspension of judgment as to what the
situation will be when the final terms of European
peace come to be discussed. . . . The present rulers of
Russia are now engaged without any reference to the
countries whom Russia brought into the war, in Sep-
arate negotiations with their common enemy. I am
indulging in no reproaches; I am merely stating facts
with a view to making it clear why Britain cannot be
held accountable for decisions taken in her absence,
and concerning which she has not been consulted or
48 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
72
73
her aid invoked. No one who knows Prussia and her
designs upon Russia can for a moment doubt her ulti-
mate intention. Whatever phrases she may use to
delude Russia she does not mean to surrender one of
the fair provinces or cities of Russia now occupied by
her forces. Under one name or another—and the name
hardly matters—these Russian provinces will hence-
forth be in reality part of the dominions of Prussia.
They will be ruled by the Prussian sword in the in-
terests of Prussian autocracy, and the rest of the peo-
ple of Russia will be partly enticed by specious phrases
and partly bullied by the threat of continued war
against an impotent army into a condition of complete
economic and ultimate political enslavement to Ger-
many. We all deplore the prospect. The democracy
of this country means to stand to the last by the
democracy of France and Italy and all our other
Allies. We shall be proud to fight to the end side by
side by the new democracy of Russia, so will America
and so will France and Italy. But if the present
rulers of Russia take action which is independent of
their Allies, we have no means of intervening to arrest
the catastrophe which is assuredly befalling their
country. Russia can be saved only by her own people.
The Delegations of the Quadruple Alliance circulated
by wireless a “mutual decision,” declaring that on De-
cember 25 they had outlined “certain guiding principles
for the conclusion of an immediate general peace. In
order, however, to avoid any one-sided commitment they
expressly made the validity of these guiding principles an
obligation upon all powers engaged in the war without
exception. . . . The Russian Delegation then fixed the term
of ten days within which other belligerents should . . .
decide as to whether they would join in peace negotia-
tions or not. The Delegations of the Allied [Central]
Powers now place on record the fact that the ten days’
term agreed upon lapsed on January 4, and that no dec-
laration regarding the participation in these peace nego-
tiations has so far been received from any of the other
belligerents.’’
January 6. The French Government recognized the in-
dependence of the Finnish Republic.
IFIRST INTERVAL 49
74
Meanwhile at Petrograd and Odessa joint commissions
were meeting to consider the cessation of naval warfare,
conditions in the Black Sea, the future of the Dardanelles,
the naval position in the White Sea and on the Muririan
Coast. The head of the German Naval Commission was
Baron Kaiserling.
Another Russo-German Commission began its sessions at
Petrograd on December 31 to consider the exchange of
prisoners and the resumption of commercial relations. The
head of the German Delegation was Count Mirbach, and
the head of the Russian Delegation was Radek, who at
the outset declared that “a successful start with our hu-
manitarian work will be made infinitely more difficult” be-
cause of information that German Social Democrats and
Independents had been jailed and because many Russian
citizens—Poles and Letts among them—‘‘have been de-
prived of their liberty by the German Government for
conducting peace propaganda.” Radek declared that “the
situation in regard to peace conditions created by the
Germans did not at present permit the discussion of eco-
nomic relations except in so far as an improvement in the
condition of prisoners of war was concerned.” Accord-
ingly but three committees were chosen to deal respectively
with telegraphs, posts and railways. The Russian Dele-
gation demanded the right to send any publications they
desired to prisoners of war in Germany and to Socialists
of the Central Powers. Considerable difference of opinion
seems ſto have characterized most of the deliberations of
the Commission.
75
76
77
VII. THE SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS-
RUSSIA’S STAND FOR NO ANNEXATIONS
AND FOR SELF—DETERMINATION
January 7. The Russian Delegation, headed now by
Trotzky, reached an agreement at Brest-Litovsk with a
Delegation of the Ukrainian Rada who had stated a few
days before that “their Government is preparing to con-
duct their own international relations. They declare their
wish for a speedy democratic peace and say they hope
to be able to act together with the Bolshevik representa-
tives at the peace negotiations.” *
January 8. A “preliminary discussion” took place be-
tween the Chairmen of the various Delegations, Trotzky,
von Kuehlmann, Czernin and Talaat Pasha. Trotzky,
speaking for more than an hour, declared that he had not
come as the representative of a defeated nation. He was
there to act as a true revolutionary.
We shall contend for a free, independent Russia and
for the future of the great masses of the workers. . . .
The working democracies of the Central Powers . . .
will not suffer Young Russia to be wiped off the face
of the earth and enslaved by conquering imperialists.
He insisted upon a transfer of the negotiations to Stock-
holm. Questions of procedure were also discussed. After
a half hour's pause for deliberation, the Germans declared
their willingness to go on with the negotiations.
President Wilson addressed Congress and made the pro-
ceedings at Brest-Litovsk the occasion for outlining
his own “program of the world’s peace . . . the only pos-
sible prognºm,” based upon his fourteen points:
Gentlemen of the Congress:
Once more, as repeatedly before, the spokesmen of
the Central Empires have indicated their desire to dis-
cuss the objects of the war and the possible basis of a
general peace. Parleys have been in progress at Brest-
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 5]:
Litovsk between Russian representatives and represen-
tatives of the Central Powers, to which the attention
of all the belligerents has been invited, for the purpose
of ascertaining whether it may be possible to extend
these parleys into a general conference with regard to
terms of peace and settlement. The Russian represen-
tatives presented not only a perfectly definite statement
of the principles upon which they would be willing to
conclude peace, but also an equally definite program
for the concrete application of those principles. The
representatives of the Central Powers, on their part,
presented an outline of settlement which, if much less
definite, seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation
until their specific program of practical terms was
added. That program proposed no concessions at all,
either to the sovereignty of Russia or to the preferences
of the population with whose fortunes it dealt, but
meant, in a word, that the Central Empires were to
keep every foot of territory their armed forces had
occupied—every province, every city, every point of
vantage—as a permanent addition to their territories
and their power. It is a reasonable conjecture that the
general principles of settlement which they at first
suggested originated with the more liberal statesmen
of Germany and Austria, the men who have begun to
feel the force of their own peoples’ thought and pur-
pose, while the concrete terms of actual settlement came
from the military leaders who have no thought but to
keep what they have got. The negotiations have been
broken off. The Russian representatives were sincere
and in earnest. They cannot entertain such proposals
of conquest and domination.
The whole incident is full of significance. It is also
full of perplexity. With whom are the Russian rep-
resentatives dealing 2 For whom are the representa-
tives of the Central Empires speaking? Are they
speaking for the majorities of their respective Parlia-
ments or for the minority parties, that military and
imperialistic minority which has so far dominated their
whole policy and controlled the affairs of Turkey and
52
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-I/ITOVSE
****
of the Balkan States, which have felt obliged to become
their associates in this war? The Russian representa-
tives have insisted, very justly, very wisely, and in the
true Spirit of modern democracy, that the conferences
they have been holding with the Teutonic and Turkish
statesmen should be held with open, not closed, doors,
and all the world has been audience, as was desired.
To whom have we been listening, then 2 To those who
speak the spirit and intention of the resolutions of the
German Reichstag of the 9th of July last, the spirit
and intention of the liberal leaders and parties of Ger-
many, or to those who resist and defy that spirit and
intention and insist upon conquest and subjugation?
Or are we listening, in fact, to both, unreconciled and
in open and hopeless contradiction ? These are very
serious and pregnant questions. Upon the answer to
them depends the peace of the world.
Dut whatever the results of the parleys at Brest-
Litovsk, whatever the confusions of counsel and of pur-
pose in the utterances of the spokesmen of the Central
Empires, they have again attempted to acquaint the
World with their objects in the war and have again
challenged their adversaries to say what their objects
are and what sort of settlement they would deem just
and satisfactory. There is no good reason why that
challenge should not be responded to, and responded
to with the utmost candor. We did not wait for it.
- Not once, but again and again we have laid our whole
thought and purpose before the world, not in general
terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to
make it clear what sort of definite terms of settlement
must necessarily spring out of them. Within the last
week Mr. Lloyd George has spoken with admirable
candor and in admirable spirit for the people and Gov-
ernment of Great Britain. There is no confusion of
counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers,
no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail.
The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless
frankness, the only failure to make definite statement
of the objects of the war, lies with Germany and her
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 53
allies. The issues of life and death hang upon these
definitions. No statesman who has the least concep-
tion of his responsibility ought for a moment to per-
mit himself to continue this tragical and appalling out-
pouring of blood and treasure unless he is sure beyond
a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice
are part and parcel of the very life of society and that
the people for whom he speaks think them right and
imperative as he does.
There is, moreover, a voice calling for the definitions
of principle and of purpose which is, it seems to me,
more thrilling and more compelling than any of the
many moving voices with which the troubled air of the
world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people.
They are prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem,
before the grim power of Germany, which has hitherto
known no relenting and no pity. Their power appar-
ently is shattered. And yet their soul is not subser-
vient. They will not yield either in principle or in
action. Their conception of what is right, of what is
humane and honorable for them to accept, has been
stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a gener-
osity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which
must challenge the admiration of every friend of man-
kind; and they have refused to compound their ideals
or desert others that they themselves may be safe. . .
They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in
what, if in anything, our purpose and our spirit differ
from theirs; and I believe that the people of the United
States would wish me to respond with utter simplicity
and frankness. Whether their present leaders believe
it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some
way be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist
the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of lib-
erty and ordered peace. %
It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of
peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open,
and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no
54
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
Secret understandings of any kind. The day of con-
quest and aggrandizement is gone by ; so is also the day
of Secret covenants entered into in the interest of par-
ticular Governments and likely at some unlooked-for
moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this
happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man
whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is
dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation
whose purposes are consistent with justice and the
peace of the world to avow now or at any other time
the objects it has in view.
We entered this war because violations of right had
occurred which touched us to the quick and made the
life of our own people impossible unless they were cor-
rected and the world secured once for all against their
recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore,
is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world
be made fit and safe to live in ; and particularly that
it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which,
like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its
own institutions, be assured of justice and fair deal-
ings by the other peoples of the world, as against force
and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the World
are in effect partners in this interest and for our own
part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to
others it will not be done to us.
The program of the world’s peace, therefore, is our
program, and that program, the only possible program,
as we see it, is this:
1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after
which there shall be no private international under-
standings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed
always frankly and in the public view. . . .
6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such
a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will
secure the best and freest co-operation of the other
nations of the world in obtaining for her an unham-
pered and unembarrassed opportunity for the inde-
pendent determination of her own political develop-
ment and national policy, and assure her of a sincere
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 55
welcome into the society of free nations under institu-
tions of her own choosing; and, more than a Welcome,
assistance also of every kind that she may need and
may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by
her sister nations in the months to come will be the
acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of
her needs as distinguished from their own interests,
and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. . . .
78 January 9. The plenary session of the Delegations at
Brest-Litovsk that had been adjourned from December 25
was opened by Talaat Pasha, who gave over the chairman-
ship to von Kuehlmann. The Ukrainian representatives.
also participated. Among the Russians were Trotzky,
Mme. Bizenko, Joffe, Kamenev, Petrovsky and three coun-
sellors.
Von Kuehlmann made an extended statement. He first
gave a review of the negotiations from the original Russian:
offer of peace on November 22, 1917, up to the wireless dec-
laration of the Central Powers on January 5 that no answer
had been received from any of the Entente belligerents
concerning participation in the peace negotiations. He
added:
Their non-participation in those conditions has the
result, in keeping with the contents of the declaration
and the expiration of the period fixed, that the docu-
ment (of December 25) has become void.
As to the transfer of negotiations to Stockholm or some
other neutral country he
would like to express at once the determined and unal-
terable decision of the four Allied [Central] Powers
that they are not in a position to continue in any other
place the negotiations for a preliminary peace which
have been commenced here. . . . They were, out of
courtesy, quite willing to undertake the formal final
negotiations and the signature of the preliminaries at
a place to be agreed upon with the Russian Delegation
and to enter upon a discussion regarding the selection
of this place.
Moreover, in the interval between negotiations, much had
happened, “to cause doubt as to the candid intentions of
the Russian Government to arrive at the conclusion of a
56 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
rapid peace with the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance.”
He referred here to the Petrograd Telegraph Agency re-
port—“invented in every particular”—of the reply of
Chairman Joffe in the sitting of December 28. Never-
theless
in so far as a conclusion may be drawn from the nego-
tiations which preceded the interval in our labors, I
do not think the difficulties of a material nature are
so great as to justify the wrecking of our peace efforts
and there with presumably, the recommencement of war
in the East with its incalculable consequences.
Czernin then said that the reasons for the refusal to
transfer negotiations at the present time were of a two-
fold nature. First, both parties have direct wires and
a daily exchange of views takes place by you with Pet-
rograd and Kiev and by us with our official centers.
. . . Even more important is the second point. You,
gentlemen, had sent us an invitation for general peace
negotiations. We have accepted it and we have come
to an agreement regarding the basis for a general
peace. On this basis you have put to your Allies a
ten days’ ultimatum. Your Allies have not answered
you, and today it is no longer a question of negotia-
tions for bringing about a general peace, but rather of
a separate peace between Russia and the Quadruple
Alliance. The transfer of negotiations to a neutral
country would give . . . the longed-for opportunity
. . . to the Governments of France and England, be-
fore as well as behind the scenes, to do everything pos-
sible to prevent the realization of this separate peace.
We refuse to give the Western Powers this opportu-
nity. But we are prepared to undertake the official
final negotiations and the signature of the peace treaty
at a place yet to be determined. As regards the terri-
torial part of the negotiations, in which no agreement
has as yet been arrived at . . . all four Allies [Cen-
tral] are completely agreed to conduct the negotiations
to the end upon the basis explained by Dr. von Kuehl-
mann and myself and agreed upon with the Russians.
If the Russian Delegation is not animated by the same
intentions . . . responsibility for war will fall exclu-
sively on the Russian Delegation.
Talaat Pasha for Turkey and Minister of Justice Popov
for Bulgaria associated themselves with these remarks.
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 57
79
Thereupon General Hoffmann of the German Delegation
made the following declaration: -
There are lying before me a number of wireless mes-
sages and appeals signed by the representatives of the
Russian Government and by the Russian main army
administration, which are partly abuse of German
army institutions and partly appeals of a revolutionary
character to our troops. These wireless messages and
appeals without doubt transgress the spirit of the
armistice concluded between the two armies. In the
name of the German army administration I protest
most emphatically against the form and contents of
these wireless messages and appeals.
Field Marshal von Cziezericz, Colonel Ganchev and Gen-
eral Izzet Pasha joined in this protest in the name of the
Austro-Hungarian, the Bulgarian and the Ottoman army
administrations.
Upon motion of Trotzky the sitting was then adjourned
until the next day.
Announcement was made in Paris of the appointment of
General Tabouille, Chief of the French Military Mission to
the Southwestern front, as Representative of France to the
Ukrainian Republic. It was also reported that the French
Government had made a loan to the Ukrainian Government,
some reports placing the figure at 180,000,000 francs. The
French mint was also reported to have printed a large
quantity of Ukrainian paper money. General Winne-
chenko, President of the Ukrainian Secretariat, in the
course of a long report to the Rada, is said to have declared
that France, the United States, Great Britain, Belgium and
Roumania were interested greatly in the organization of the
Ukrainian Republic. He added:
As circumspect people they hesitate to recognize the
Republic completely. But when they find it expe-
dient they will extend us their hands which we will
accept if we think it necessary. . . . *
One constantly hears that the regeneration of the
Moscovite monarchy is impossible. Perhaps the
Ukraine, therefore, will appear as an oasis of revolu-
tionary achievement.
As an indication of the hopes placed upon the Ukrainians
at this period in Allied countries, it may not be out of
58 * NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
80
place to refer to an editorial in the New York Times of
January 4, headed, “The Ukrainians to the Rescue.”
The Ukrainians, not the Bolsheviki, have saved Rus-
sia for the time being from the calamity of a separate
peace with Germany. . . . The intervention of the
Ukrainians put a stop to the infamous proceedings and
for the moment there is some hope that separate peace
negotiations will not be resumed on the original Bol-
shevist basis. . . .
January 10. The sitting was begun by a statement from
Trotzky. Answering von Kuehlmann, he declared that the
report of the sitting of December 28 as published by the
semi-official German Wolff Bureau was accurate and that
the Russian Delegation was ignorant of any real or ficti-
tious telegrams of the Petrograd Agency. Answering
General Hoffmann’s protest against Russian wireless ap-
peals of a revolutionary character to the German troops,
he stated that neither the conditions of the armistice nor
the character of the peace negotiations limited freedom
of press or speech.
He then reaffirmed Russia’s refusal to accept the Ger-
man view of self-determination for the people of occupied
territories,
by which the will of the people was in reality replaced
by the will of a privileged group acting under the con-
trol of the authorities administering the occupied ter-
ritories. . . . We confirm. . . . our former resolution
. . . to continue the peace negotiations regardless of
the adhesion or otherwise of the Entente Governments
therein. Taking cognisance of the declaration of the
Quadruple [Central] Powers that the bases for a gen-
eral peace as formulated on December 25 have become
null and void—the Entente Powers not having ad-
hered thereto in the course of the ten days’ suspension
of negotiations—we now declare for our part that with-
out taking into account any delays whatever, we shall
continue to defend the principles of a democratic
peace as proclaimed by us.
As to the transfer of the Conference to a neutral country
he explained that by this proposal they sought to place
both sides in analogous positions.
We share the view of the President of the German
Delegation that the atmosphere in which the negotia-
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 59
tions are conducted is of the greatest importance.
. . . For the Russian Delegation to stay in the fort-
ress of Brest-Litovsk at the headquarters of the enemy
armies under the control of the German authorities
Creates all the disadvantages of an artificial isolation
in no way compensated for by the enjoyment of a
direct telegraph wire. This isolation . . . is at the
Same time causing alarm and uneasiness to the public
Opinion of our country. . . . All these considerations
acquired the more importance as, precisely during the
recent sittings, there had arisen profound divergences
of view on the subject of the political future of the
Polish, Lithuanian, Lettish and other peoples. There-
fore we consider it very undesirable to continue these
labors in conditions which might justify the allegation
that we are taking part in the settlement of the future
of existing peoples isolated from all sources of infor-
mation regarding the public opinion of the world and
without any guarantee that our opinions and declara-
tions reach the peoples of the Quadruple Alliance.
Replying to the fears of Count Czernin concerning pos-
sible intrigues of Entente agents in a neutral country, the
Russian Delegation pointed out that the Russian revolu-
tionary power had sufficiently shown its independence in
regard to diplomatic intrigues tending to the oppression
of the laboring masses.
We replied and we continue to reply by severe re-
pression to all counter-revolutionary manoeuvres and
intrigues of the Allied diplomatic agents in Russia,
seeking to render abortive the cause of peace. We do
not believe that Allied diplomacy can operate on neu-
tral territory with greater success than at Petrograd.
The sincerity of our aspirations for peace is sufficiently
proved by our attitude in regard to the right of free
development for Finland, Armenia and the Ukraine.
The opposing side has, therefore, only to show an anal-
ogous attitude to the regions occupied by it. We can-
not pass over in silence the argument advanced yes-
terday by the Chancellor of the German Empire,
namely, his statement with regard to the powerful po-
sition (Machtstellung) of Germany. The Russian Del-
egation cannot deny that its country, owing to the
policy of the classes until recently in power, has been
60 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LTTowsR
weakened. But the position of a country in the world
is determined not only by its present status, by its
technical apparatus, but by its internal resources
which, once recalled to life, manifest their power
Sooner or later. Our Government has placed at the
head of its program the word “Peace,” but it has en-
gaged itself at the same time before its people to sign
Only a democratic and just peace.
The Russian Delegation then spoke of the sympathies of
the Russian people for the working people of Germany and
her Allies, and showed that years of war had not hardened
the hearts of the Russian soldiers who, moved by the senti-
ment of fraternity, had stretched out their hands to the
peoples on the other side of the trenches. The refusal of
the Delegations of the Central Powers to transfer the Con-
ference to a neutral country is only explicable by the de-
sire of their Governments and their powerful annexation-
ists for a peace, based not on principles tending to the rec-
onciliation of all nations, but on the war map. But war
maps disappear while peoples remain.
An ultimatum was delivered to us—pour parlers at
Brest-Litovsk or no pour parlers. This ultimatum is a
proof that the elements of the Quadruple Alliance
which pursue a policy of annexation, regard as more
favorable to that policy a rupture of pourparlers on
technical grounds than a settlement of the political
future of Poland, Lithuania, Courland and Armenia.
A rupture of pourparlers on technical grounds would
make it more difficult for the working masses of Ger-
many and her Allies to understand the causes of the
dispute, and would facilitate the efforts of the semi-
official annexationist agitators who are seeking to make
the German people believe that behind the open and
frank policy of Russia is to be found a British or other
stage manager. In view of these considerations, we
think it necessary to declare that we accept the ulti-
matum handed to us. We remain, therefore, here at
Brest-Litovsk, so that the slightest possibility of peace
may not be left unexhausted. Notwithstanding the
extraordinary attitude of the Delegates of the Quad-
ruple Alliance, we think it our duty to the peoples and
armies of all countries, to make a fresh effort to estab-
lish clearly and distinctly here at the Headquarters
f
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 61:
81
of the Eastern front, whether immediate peace with
the Quadruple Alliance is possible without violence to
the Poles, Lithuanians, Letts, Esthonians, Armenians
and other nationalities to whom the Russian Revolu-
tion, as far as it is concerned, assures the full right to
free development without reservation, without restric-
tion, without arrière pensée.
The Ukrainian delegate, Holubovich, then announced that
the Ukrainian Republic, having resumed its international
existence, which it lost 250 years ago, had decided to adopt
an independent attitude towards the negotiations and that
the General Secretariat had instructed him to hand the fol-
lowing note to the Powers represented at the Conference:
The Ukrainian People’s Republic brings the follow-
-ing to the knowledge of all belligerents and neutral
States: The Central Rada on November 20 proclaimed
a People's Republic, and by this act an international
status was determined. Striving for the creation of
a Confederation of all the Republics which have arisen
in the territory of the former Russian Empire, the
Ukrainian People’s Republic, through its General Sec-
retariat, proceeds to enter into independent relations,
pending the formation of a Federal Government in
Russia and until the relations of the Ukraine with the
future Federation are established.
Von Kuehlmann, with the assent of the meeting, declared
that the question of separate representation for the Ukraine
would first be discussed at private conferences between the
Delegations of Austria-Hungary and Germany on the one
hand, and of Russia on the other, and that further consid-
eration would be reserved for a plenary sitting of all the
Delegations.
It was then agreed by the Delegates of Russia, Germany
and Austria-Hungary to form a Committee to discuss polit-
ical and territorial questions, as also a second Committee
of experts for the preliminary discussion of economic and
legal questions. 4.
A meeting of the Committee on Political and Territorial
Questions was forthwith held. The Ukrainian question
was taken up. Holubovitch elaborated the Ukrainian peace
policy, and presented a Note containing nine clauses:
The General Secretariat declares in the name of the
Ukrainian People’s Republic as follows:
62
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
The whole of the democracy of the Ukrainian State
strives for the termination of the war in the whole
World, for peace between all nations at present at war,
a general peace.
The peace to be concluded between all the Powers must
be democratic, and must guarantee to every nationality
or people, even the very smallest nation of any State,
the complete, unlimited right of national self-determi-
nation.
In order to render possible a real expression of will on
the part of the peoples, corresponding guarantees must
be created.
Accordingly, annexation of any kind, that is to say,
any forcible annexation or cession of any part of a
country whatever without the agreement of its popula-
tion, is inadmissible.
Equally inadmissible, from the standpoint of the inter-
ests of the working classes, is any war indemnity of any
kind, no matter what form may be given to such in-
demnity.
Small nations and states which have suffered consid-
erable damage or ravages owing to the war must be
given material assistance in accordance with rules which
will have to be worked out during the Peace Congresses.
The Ukrainian People’s Republic, which at the present
moment is holding the Ukrainian front on its territory,
and which is appearing independently in international
affairs, through its Government, charged with the pro-
tection of the Ukrainian national interests, must, like
the other Powers, be enabled to participate in all peace
negotiations, Conferences, and Congresses.
The power of the Council of the National Commissars
does not extend over the whole of Russia, and does not
apply to the Ukrainian People’s Republic. Therefore
the peace, which may eventually result from the nego-
tiations with the Powers waging war against Russia,
can only then be binding for Ukrainia when the con-
ditions of such a peace are accepted and signed by the
Government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. ---
In the name of the whole of Russia only such a Govern-
ment (and indeed exclusively a Federal Government)
can conclude peace, which has been recognized by all
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 63
89
the Republics and organized States of Russia. If, how-
ever, it should not be possible to form such a Govern-
ment in the near future, such a peace can only be con-
cluded by the united representatives of these Republics
and territories. • ,
Strictly adhering to the principle of a democratic
peace, the General Secretariat strives at the same time
for the quickest possible realization of this general
peace, and attaches the greatest importance to all at-
tempts which may bring its realization nearer. The
General Secretariat therefore considers it necessary
to maintain representation at the Conference in Brest-
Litovsk, hoping at the same time that the final solu-
tion of the problem of peace will be found at an Inter-
national Congress, to the preparation of which the
Government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in-
vites all belligerents.
Von Kuehlmann proposed that the Ukrainian Note be
placed on the records of the Conference as “an important
historical document.” He added that the Allies [Central]
welcomed the Ukrainian representatives, but reserved their
attitude toward their proposals. He then asked the Chair-
man of the Russian Delegation whether his Delegation in-
tended in the future to represent the affairs of all Russia.
Trotzky replied that his Delegation was in full accord
with the fundamental recognition of the right of self-deter-
mination for every nation, even to complete Severance, and
he saw no obstacle to the participation of the Ukrainian
Delegation in the negotiations acting as an independent
body which had been recognized by the Russian Delegation.
A number of “peace riots” took place in Germany. On
that day the Independent Socialist group in the Reichstag
issued a manifesto of protest and appeal to the working
class: *
. . . We have reached a turning point in history.
The war aims of the Government have been openly laid.
down at Brest-Litovsk. We were assured over and
over again in the past that the German Government
wanted only to protect the frontiers of the Empire and
that it did not intend to make annexations. No think-
ing person can believe this assertion any longer.
Germany wants the annexation of Russian territory.
. . . If Germany should have success in making a peace
64 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
83
of conquests against the Russian people, it would be a
misfortune for Russia, the Poles, Lithuanians and
Letts. But it would be an even greater misfortune for
us ourselves. The result would be a postponement of
general peace, new threats and a desire for revenge,
increased armaments and intensified reaction in our
land. This calamity must be prevented.
The manifesto then goes on to describe the almost insu-
perable difficulties in the way of those who desire to advo-
cate a democratic peace. Peace meetings are suppressed,
many persons are kept from speaking and many are thrown
into prison, or placed under military control. Factories
are being militarized, houses searched, and severe punish-
ments meted out by administrative order on the part of
the police and judiciary. On the other hand, the annexa-
tionist parties are given every right and privilege to advo-
cate their Machtpolitik. One of these political parties is
about to get up ‘‘storm-petitions’’ on behalf of their an-
nexationist program. -
If the workers now neglect to emphasize their posi-
tion, that will most likely be regarded as approval of
this agitation. Or, as though the masses of the Ger-
man people were not yet weary of this terrible war.
Or, that they are ready to give their support to a con-
tinuation of this horrible struggle upon an even vaster
scale. In reality the masses of the people think and
feel quite differently. . . .
Men and women of the working class | No time is
to be lost. After all the horrors and sufferings of the
past there is threatening a new and more horrible ca-
lamity for our people and all mankind. Only a peace
without annexations and indemnities and upon the
basis of the self-determination of peoples can save us.
It is now time to lift your voices for such a peace.
Now you must speak.
January 11. Commander-in-Chief Krylenko issued a re-
cruiting appeal on behalf of the People's Revolutionary
Guard. After declaring that peace is in danger he pro-
ceeds: .
The Russian Republic and its Soviets are surrounded
on all sides by enemies. The American and French
financiers are lending money to provide war material
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 65
84
85
\
for General Kaledin. The German bourgeoisie is quite
prepared to use them as allies for the stifling of the
Russian Revolution.
These are conditions which raise for the Russian
peasants and workmen the whole question of all the
conquests achieved by the Revolution and of a holy
war against the Russian bourgeoisie and that of Ger-
many, France and Great Britain. . . .
It may be that a holy war of the Revolution at the
front as well as behind the lines stands before us as a
terrible and unavoidable fate. . . . A People’s Rev-
olutionary Guard must be organized. . . .
Comrades, the people of Italy, Spain, France, Aus-
tria and Switzerland look to you with hope and await.
the call to battle against their bourgeoisie. The sol-
diers will not march against Revolutionary Russia.
The French Minister for Foreign Affairs gave the deci-
sion of the Allies in relation to the invitation to participate.
in the negotiations: -
I telegraphed to our Allies and inquired whether
they did not think it opportune to agree to make iden-
tical combined statements. They finally decided unan-
imously that it was preferable to keep to separate dec-
larations, leaving to each country full latitude as to
form, since there was no disagreement as to substance.
January 11-12. The Committee on Political and Territorial
Questions held three long sittings at Brest. The attempt
was made at these sittings to arrive at a text for Articles
I and II of the proposed treaty of peace.
It was agreed that the first point of Article I should be
a declaration that the state of war between the belligerents
had been terminated.
Point 2 of the German draft of Article I reading:
“Both nations are resolved to live together in future in
peace and friendship,” was objected to by Trotzky, who
considered this to be a decorative phrase which does not
describe the sense of the relations which, in the future, will
exist between the Russian and the German peoples, and the
peoples of Austria-Hungary. He hoped quite other things
& © ºn.
66 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOVSK
would influence the relations between the peoples. After
discussion, it was decided to return to this point later.
It was agreed that Point 3 of Article I should establish
the principle of the evacuation by both parties of occupied
territory on a basis of full reciprocity, so that the evacua-
tion of the Russian territories by Germany and Austria-
Hungary should be linked with the evacuation by Russia
of the occupied regions of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and
Persia. At a further stage in the discussion Persia was
stricken out in this context as not being a belligerent party.
Trotzky proposed to insert at the end of Article I the fol-
lowing sentence: “Russia undertakes to remove as speed-
ily as possible her troops from the occupied territory of
neutral Persia.” He added that he had no other ground
for the proposed alteration than the desire to emphasize the
crying wrong committed by the former Russian Govern-
ment against a neutral country. Von Kuehlmann then said
that he was all the more glad to hear this declaration, as
the liveliest sympathies were entertained by Germany for
the old Persian Kultur and for the Persian nation, and
they wished for nothing more than that in the future the
Persians, free from oppression, should be able to devote
themselves to their national Kultur.
Point 4 of Article I was to deal with the date for the
evacuation of the occupied districts. The Germans pro-
posed that the evacuation take place after the conclusion
of peace, when Russia would have demobilized. Otherwise,
there was the danger that Russia, before demobilizing,
might be able to carry out offensive operations owing to
future changes in the governmental system and intentions.
Trotzky then expressed a wish that the evacuation be car-
ried out simultaneously with the demobilization of both
parties. As to this, a further agreement could be reached.
Von Kuehlmann pointed out that, according to the Russian
proposal, the evacuation of the occupied districts would be
prolonged until the conclusion of a general peace among
all belligerents. The discussion on this point was here
broken off.
The draft of the text of Article II of the proposed treaty
of peace was then taken up. It was to contain provisions
as to which parts of the occupied territories should be evac-
uated and as to the method by which the principle of self-
determination should be applied.
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 67
Von Kuehlmann gave the German view in the following
Statement :
In accordance with the definition of the word evac-
uation, it can only extend to those regions which are
still parts of the State territory of that Power with
which peace is concluded. It does not extend to such
regions which, on the conclusion of peace, no longer
form part of this State territory. It would, therefore,
be a matter for investigation as to whether and what
portions of the former Russia could, on the conclusion
of peace, be regarded as still belonging to Russian ter-
ritory. The Russian Government, in accordance with
its principles, had proclaimed for all peoples without ex-
ception living in Russia the right of self-determination,
even going as far as complete separation. We main-
tain that, in the exercise of this right of self-deter-
mination in part of the regions now occupied by us,
the de facto plenipotentiary bodies representing the
peoples in question have already exercised the right of
self-determination in the sense of separation from Rus-
sia, so that in our view these regions can no longer be
considered as belonging to the Russian empire as hith-
erto constituted.
The Russian view was presented by Trotzky in the fol-
lowing statement:
We fully maintain our declaration that peoples in-
habiting Russian territory have the right of self-
determination without outside influence, even to the
point of separation. We cannot, however, recognize
the application of this principle otherwise than in re-
gard to peoples themselves, and not in regard to cer-
tain privileged parts of them. We must reject the
view of the President of the German Delegation—
that the will of the occupied districts has been ex-
pressed by de facto plenipotentiary bodies—because
these de facto plenipotentiary bodies could not appeal
to the principles proclaimed by us.
Following on these statements of principle, a lengthy
debate arose on the question as to what conditions and at
what time a new State arises by the separation of its com-
ponent parts from an existing State.
In summing up the views of the Central Empires, von
Kuehlmann said:
68 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSEC
Our view is that State individuality emerges and is
in a position to make legally binding declarations as
to the bases of its existence, as soon as any representa-
tive body qualified to represent and to act as a mouth-
piece announces, as the expression of the undoubted
will of the overwhelming majority of the people in
question, a decision to be independent and to exercise
, the right of self-determination. Our view appears to
me to approach considerably nearer the character and
fundamental correctness of the right of self-determina-
tion than the view laid down here by the representa-
tives of the Russian Delegation. The latter have not
yet told us how a body can arise or be created which,
in a national entity not yet formed, is to organize a
vote on a broad basis; yet it is this which, in the opin-
ion of the Russian Chairman, is the prerequisite con-
dition for the emergence of such a legal entity.
Von Kuehlmann referred to the examples of Finland and
the Ukraine, which had constituted themselves in the sense
of the principles enunciated by Germany and whose inde-
pendence the Petrograd Government had recognized, al-
though these new States had not arisen according to the
principles now presented by the Russian Delegation.
Trotzky adhered to his own view, and commented upon
the examples cited by the German Government:
Finland is not occupied by foreign troops. The will
of the Finnish people had expressed itself in a fashion
and a manner which could and must be designated as
democratic. Not the slightest objection could be raised
on the Russian side to the express will of the Finnish
people actually being put into effect. Regarding
the Ukraine, the process of such democratic self-deter-
mination had not yet been carried through there. But
as the Ukraine, on the other hand, was not occupied
by foreign troops and the Russians were also of opin-
ion that the evacuation of Ukrainian territory by
Russian troops could not produce difficulties of any
kind, especially as this was purely a technical and not
a political question, the Russian Delegates saw no hin-
drance of any kind to the self-determination of the
Ukrainian people leading to the recognition of the in-
dependent Ukrainian Republic.
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 69.
The outcome of the statements of the two sides on this
point was summed up by von Kuehlmann as follows:
M. Trotzky proposes the establishment of representa-
tive bodies which should be entrusted with organizing
and fixing the methods of procedure under which pop-
ular votes or popular manifestations, which were, for
the time being, purely theoretically conceded by us,
shall follow on a broader basis; while we adopt and
must adopt the standpoint that, in the absence of other
representative bodies, the existing bodies which have
become historical, are the presumptive expression of
the people's will, especially in the vital question of a
nation’s will to be a nation.
In the subsequent debate on the character and signif-
icance of the representative bodies operating in occupied
territories, von Kuehlmann and Czernin said that their
impression was that in the December negotiations the Rus-
sian Delegation was inclined to recognize the existing rep-
resentative bodies in the occupied territories as de facto
representative bodies.
Joffe, who had been the leader of the Russian Delegation
in the December negotiations, replied that he had always
accentuated the necessity of carrying out the popular vote
with no occupying troops present, but he did not desire to
deny having declared in conversation that in one or two
parts of Russia the existing organs might play a certain
part in establishing the necessary popular vote. Trotzky
hereupon remarked that expressions of will by such exist-
ing Diets of course possessed great political importance,
and he did not want to exclude from an expression of their
will that part of the country’s population represented in
these Diets.
Von Kuehlmann then said it would seem from Trotzky’s
statement that the latter was ready to recognize the exist-
ing organs of popular representation in occupied territo-
ries as provisional organs, if these parts of the country
were not militarily occupied, and that he would also attrib-
ute to them competency to carry out the referendum de-
manded by him.
Trotzky hereupon declared that the utterances of Diets,
municipal bodies and similar organs might be regarded as
expressions of will of a certain influential part of the pop-
70 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
ulation, but that such expressions only constituted a ground
for the assumption that the people in question was not sat-
isfied with its political position. The conclusion followed
that a referendum must be taken, for which, however, the
preliminary condition was the creation of a body which
could guarantee a free vote of the population. Trotzky
further asserted that there was a contradiction between
the declaration of the Central Powers on December 25 and
the formulation of Articles I and II on December 27. This
was shown clearly in the comment of the German press.
Von Kuehlmann in reply said that both documents were
emanations of the same spirit and policy as was announced
by the Chancellor in his program speech (November 29)
in the Reichstag. This speech in effect already contained
the Allies’ [Central] declaration of December 25, and thus
also indicated that German policy intended to direct its
relations towards Poland, Lithuania and Courland with
due consideration for the people’s right of self-determina-
tion. He contended further that those parts of Russia,
striving for severance (according to declarations of the will
of the institutions already existing), were even now justi-
fied in making agreements on all questions, including in-
tended frontier rectifications.
Trotzky could not but see in this conception an under-
mining of the principle of self-determination. He asked
why these organs of the peoples in question had not been
invited to the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, if they ought to
have the right of disposal even over portions of their ter-
ritory. Such participation of representatives of these peo-
ples in the negotiations was naturally not thought of, be-
cause these nations were regarded not as subjects but as
objects of the negotiations.
Von Kuehlmann replied:
The previous speaker has complained that we have
here no representatives of the nations under discussion.
If, by that, he wished to express the opinion that, in
his view, these national entities have now been created
and can in the exercise of the right of self-determina-
tion undertake foreign relations, I on my part am
ready fully to recognize this admission of the Russian
Delegation and discuss the idea whether and in what
form it would be possible for representatives of the
nations in question to take part in our negotiations.
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 71.
Thereupon Trotzky, having regard to these extraordinar-
ily important declarations of the representatives of the Cen-
tral Powers, moved the adjournment to enable the Russian
Delegation to consult their Government.
86 January 12. Upon the adjournment of the Committee on
Political and Territorial Questions on Saturday, January
12, a plenary sitting of all the Delegations was held under
the chairmanship of Count Czernin, who in the name of
the Delegations of the four Central Powers made the fol-
lowing declaration:
We recognize the Ukrainian Delegation as an inde-
pendent Delegation of plenipotentiaries representing
the independent Ukrainian Republic. The formal rec-
ognition of the Ukrainian Republic as an independent
State by the four Allied [Central] Powers is reserved
for the peace treaty.
Trotzky then said:
Such conflicts as have occurred between the Russian
Government and the General Sekretariat of the
Ukraine had and have no connection with the question
of the self-determination of the Ukrainian nation.
They arose through the Ukrainian opposition to the
policy of the Soviet and the Peoples’ Commissars as
regards the self-determination of the Ukraine, now
actually expressed there in the form of the People’s
Republic. This can give no scope for a conflict of
opinion between the two sister-Republics. Consider-
ing the fact that there are no troops of occupation in
the Ukraine, that the political life there is carried on
freely, that there are neither medieval organs there
which desire to represent the country nor ministries
which are appointed from above on the ground of
power and position and which act within the limita-
tions prescribed for them from above, considering that
everywhere in the territory of the Ukraine freely
elected Soviets are in existence, that in the election of
all organs of self-government the principle of a gen-
eral, equal, direct and secret suffrage is applied, there
is and can be no doubt that the power of self-deter-
mination of the Ukraine, within the geographical lim-
its and political forms corresponding to the will of
the Ukrainian State, will find its consummation. In
view of the foregoing, which is in accord with the dec-
72 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
laration made during the sitting of January 10, the
Russian Delegation sees no hindrance of any sort to
the independent participation of the Delegation of the
General Sekretariat in the peace negotiations.
Holubovitch, the Ukrainian Secretary of State, accepted
the statements of Czernin and Trotzky and announced that
his Delegation would participate in the peace negotiations
on that basis.
General Hoffmann, the German Military Delegate, then
protested against the Russian wireless statements issued
during the recess upon Trotzky’s instructions, as trans-
gressing the spirit of the armistice. Trotzky desired to
know in what particular the spirit of the armistice had
been transgressed by the communications, to which General
Hoffmann replied:
At the head of the armistice treaty stood the words
“to bring about a lasting peace.” Your Russian prop-
aganda transgressed this intention because it did not
strive after a lasting peace, but wished to carry revo-
lution and civil war into the countries of the Central
Powers. -
Trotzky answered Hoffmann, pointing out that all the
German newspapers were being freely admitted into Rus-
sia, even newspapers which were supporting the views of
the extreme Russian reactionaries. Complete equality had
been observed in this respect, and it had nothing to do with
the armistice treaty. Hoffmann retorted that his protest
was not directed against the Russian press, but against
official Government statements and statements which bore
the signature of Ensign Krylenko, Commander-in-Chief of
the Bolshevist forces. Trotzky replied that the terms of
the armistice treaty contained and could contain no restric-
tions on the expression of opinion on the part of citizens
of the Russian Republic or their governing officials. Von
Ruehlmann interrupted Trotzky, saying, “Non-interference
in Russian affairs is the fixed principle of the German Gov-
ernment, which has the right to demand complete reci-
procity in this respect.” Answering von Kuehlmann,
Trotzky replied: “On the contrary, the Russians will
recognize it as a step forward if the Germans freely and
frankly express their views regarding internal conditions
in Russia in so far as they think this necessary.”
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 73
87
Upon the adjournment of the plenary sitting of the Dele-
gations, the meeting of the Committee of German, Austro-
Hungarian and Russian representatives to discuss the regu-
lation of Territorial and Political Questions was resumed
on the same day.
Von Kuehlmann, after summarizing the result of the pre-
vious deliberations, remarked:
We expressed the view that the peoples dwelling on
the western frontier of the former Russian Empire
had already expressed their will in a manner that was
adequate and that was for us authoritative. On the
suggestion of the Chairman of the Russian Delegation,
we also declared it an idea quite open to discussion
whether and under what conditions these new States
might participate in the peace negotiations. We have
not yet, however, been clearly informed by the Russian
Delegation whether, to use an expression employed by
the Russian Delegation, they can participate as sub-
jects at the discussion, or whether, until further no-
tice, they are to be regarded as objects of statesman-
ship. I should be grateful if the Russian Delegation
would answer this question in a manner excluding all
doubt.
Trotzky thereupon asked the delegates to hear Kamenev,
who proposed for the Russian Delegation that to avoid all
misunderstandings, both parties should put in writing their
views as unfolded during the discussion. The Russian
Delegation thereupon presented a written statement con-
taining three main divisions, and in the third division the
four chief issues of the negotiations were formulated. The
Russian Delegation proposed that the joint replies to these
four points “shall constitute in the treaty of peace the
paragraphs that are to take the place of Article II of the
German draft of December 28, 1917.”
The document presented by Kamenev for the Russian
Delegation reads: *
As during occupation, nowhere, either in Poland,
Lithuania or Courland, could there be constituted, or
could there exist any democratically elected Organs
which could lay claim with any right whatever to be
considered as expressing the will of large circles of
T4
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOVSE
the population as regards . . . any effort to attain
complete State independence, the Russian Delegation
declares:
A. From the fact that the occupied territories be-
long to the former Russian Empire, the Russian Gov-
ernment draws no conclusions which would impose any
constitutional obligation on the population of these
regions in relation to the Russian Government. The
old frontiers of the former Russian Empire, frontiers
formed by acts of violence and crimes against peoples,
especially against the Polish people, have, together with
Czarism, vanished. The new frontiers of the Fra-
ternal League of the Peoples of the Russian Republic
and of the peoples which desire to remain outside its
borders, must be formed by free resolution of the peo-
ples concerned.
B. The main task of the present negotiations for
the Russian Government does not consist, therefore,
in defending in any way whatever a further forcible
retention of the territories mentioned within the bor-
ders of the Russian Empire, but in safeguarding real
freedom of self-determination as to the internal State
organization and the international position of such ter-
ritories. The Russian Republic will feel itself secure
against being dragged into any territorial disputes and
conflicts, only when it is convinced that the line which
separates it from its neighbors has been formed by the
free will of the peoples themselves and not by violence
from above, which could only suppress that will for a
short time.
C. Our task thus understood presupposes a previous
understanding on the part of Germany and Austria on
the one hand and Russia on the other, of four main
points:
1. The eactent of territory over which any popula-
tion will be called upon to exercise the right of self-
determination. <!
The right to territory and self-determination be-
longs to nations and not, as provided by Article II of
the German draft of December 28, to occupied parts
thereof.
Accordingly, the Russian Government, on its own
initiative, grants the right of self-determination simul-
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 75
taneously to those parts of nations both outside [and
within] the occupied regions. Russia binds herself
not to compel these territories, either directly or indi-
rectly, to accept this or any other State organization,
or to restrict their independence through tariffs or mili-
tary conventions that might be concluded before the
final constitution of these regions on the basis of their
right to self-determination.
The Governments of Germany and of Austria-
Hungary, on their part, categorically confirm the ab-
sence of any claims whatever either to the annexation
of the territories of the former Russian Empire now
occupied by the armies of Germany and Austria-
Hungary or to so-called frontier rectifications at the
cost of these regions. They further undertake not to
compel these regions to accept this or that State form,
or to restrict their independence by any tariff or mili-
tary convention which might be concluded before the
constitution of these regions on the basis of the polit-
ical right to self-determination of the nations inhabit-
ing them.
2. The general political prerequisites governing the
solution of the question of the political destinies of the
territories and nations concerned.
The solution of the question regarding the fate of
regions determining their own lot must take place un-
der conditions of full political freedom and without
external pressure.
The voting must, therefore, take place after the with-
drawal of foreign armies and the return of the fugi-
tives and of the population removed since the begin-
ning of the war.
The date for the withdrawal of the armies will be
determined by a special commission in accordance with
the situation as regards transport and food supplies.
After the termination of the world war the protec-
tion of law and order in regions undergoing the proc-
ess of self-determination devolves on the national
armies and local militia.
Fugitives and those removed by the occupying au-
thorities since the beginning of the war will be given
full freedom and the material possibility of returning.
76 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOVSK
3. The transitional régime that shall exist until the
moment of the final political constitution of these ter-
ritories.
From the moment of the signing of peace until the
final political constitution of the territories named,
their internal administration and the direction of their
local affairs, finances, etc., pass into the hands of the
temporary organ formed by agreement between polit-
ical parties which have proved their vitality in the
midst of their people before and during the war.
The main task of these temporary organs consists,
simultaneously with the maintenance of the normal
course of social and economic life, in the organization
of a plebiscite.
4. The way in which the population of these terri-
tories will be required to make their will known.
The final solution of the question of the State posi-
tion of the territories in question and the form of their
State organization will follow by means of a general
freferendum.
After declaring that the joint replies to the above four
points shall constitute Article II of the Treaty of Peace, the
document concludes as follows:
With a view to expediting the work of the Peace
Conference, the Russian Delegation considers it ex-
traordinarily important to receive from the German
and Austro-Hungarian Delegations a complete and ex-
act reply to all the questions which are raised in this
declaration. As regards other questions, they might
be so treated as to be answered in connection with the
exact reply to these points.
The reply to the Russian proposals was made by General
Hoffmann and von Kuehlmann. General Hoffmann said:
I must first protest against the tone of these pro-
posals. The Russian Delegation talks to us as if it
stood victorious in our countries and could dictate con-
ditions to us. I would like to point out that the facts
are just the reverse and that the victorious German
army stands in your territory. I would then like to
state that the Russian Delegation demands for the oc-
cupied territories the application of the right of self-
determination of peoples in a manner and to an extent
which its Government does not apply to its own coun-
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 77
try. Its Government is founded purely on power, and
indeed, on power which ruthlessly suppresses by force
all who think otherwise. Every one with different
views is regarded as a counter-revolutionary and bour.
geois, and simply declared an outlaw. -
I shall only substantiate my view by two examples.
During the night of December 30 the first White Rus-
sian Congress at Minsk, which desired to put into force
the right of the White Russian people to self-deter-
mination, was broken up by Maximalists with bayonets
and machine guns. When the Ukrainians claimed
their right of self-determination, the Petrograd Gov-
ernment sent an ultimatum and endeavored to carry
through their will by force of arms. As far as I can
make out from wireless messages here before me, civil
War is still in progress. Thus do the Maximalists
apply in practice the right of peoples to self-determi-
nation. The German Supreme Army Command must
therefore decline to interfere in the occupied terri-
tories.
As far as we are concerned, the peoples of the occu-
pied territories have already clearly and unmistakably
expressed the wish for severance from Russia. Among
the most important decisions of the population, I
should like to point out the following: On September
21, 1917, the Courland Diet, which described itself
expressly as representing the entire population of
Courland, requested the protection of the German
Empire. On December 11, 1917, the Lithuanian Diet,
which is recognized by Lithuanians at home and
abroad as the sole authorized representative of the
Lithuanian people, proclaimed its desire for severance
from all constitutional connections which had hitherto
existed with other peoples. On December 27, the
Municipal Council of Riga made a similar request of
the German Empire. This request was supported by
the Riga Chamber of Commerce, the great Guilds, rep-
resentatives of the rural population, and seventy Riga
societies. Finally, in December, 1917, representatives
of the Orders of Knighthood, the rural, urban, and
ecclesiastical communities on the Islands of Oesel,
Dagö and Moon in various declarations severed them-
selves from their previous connections.
78
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSE
For technical administrative reasons, too, the Su-
preme German Army Command must refuse to evac-
uate Courland, Lithuania, Riga and the Islands of the
Riga Gulf. None of these regions has administrative
organs, legal or judicial organs, railways, telegraphs
or posts. All is in German possession, under German
management. They are also unable, within measure-
able time, owing to lack of the appropriate organs, to
establish their own militia or soldiery.
After General Hoffmann had concluded, von Kuehlmann
said:
I should like to point out that it is impossible for
us to take up any attitude whatever regarding the
written declaration just read by the Russian Delega-
tion. I must reserve a further statement of our posi-
tion on all points. But, speaking personally, I should
like to say, that the modus procedendi proposed by the
Russian Delegation, that the Delegations should each
present declarations in writing, will neither be condu-
cive to the acceleration of the negotiations nor, if the
documents resemble those presented today, will it con-
tribute in the least to placing in an especially rosy
light the prospects for the negotiations which we are
now conducting. Personally, I am of opinion that it
would have been better to continue in the manner be-
gun yesterday until the whole material had been dealt
with and, after the conclusion of the oral discussion,
lay down in writing the result of such discussion, if
necessary. As, however, the Russian Delegation, by
its proposal of today, thinks otherwise, I propose to
adjourn for the purpose of consulting our Allies.
Trotzky then said:
Of course, it is not our object to put difficulties in
the way of progress by raising technical points. If
the other side maintains that the time has not come to
present a written statement, then our proposals of
today would come up for oral discussion and we would
reserve the right to return, in the course of the further
negotiations, to our declaration as such, or to single
points thereof, without in any way desiring to force a
ºlar treatment of the subject matter upon the other
SIOle.
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 79
88
Von Kuehlmann replied:
I cannot accept that proposal. It would be highly
undesirable to have written and worked out proposi-
tions on the one side with no corresponding formula-
tion from the other side. I must, therefore, adhere to
my opinion that before taking up any attitude on the
new situation, a fresh consultation with our Allies is
necessary.
The sitting was thereupon adjourned without a fixed date
for the next meeting.
January 14. The Committee on Political and Territorial
Questions held its fourth sitting January 14. Von Kuehl-
mann presented a written reply to the formulated proposals
of the Russian Delegation. He expressed the view that if
they really wished to reach a peaceful settlement, it would
be advisable in future to talk matters over and then entrust
their draft on paper to an editorial committee consisting
of one representative from each side.
The text of the reply of the Central Powers was as fol-
lows:
The proposals of the Russian Delegation . . . di-
verge to such a degree from the views of the Central
Powers that in their present form they must be char-
acterized as inacceptable. . . . They do not possess the
character of an attitude of compromise for which the
Central Powers have striven, but rather a one-sided
Russian demand which precludes all consideration of
the justice of the views of the opposing side. In spite
of that, the Central Powers are prepared again to give
a clearly formulated expression of their opinions. . . .
One portion of the territories occupied by the Cen-
tral Powers is dealt with in Article I of the German
draft . . . and requires no further discussion.
The machinery by which State-life should be granted
was [thought of in Article II as] purely temporary
and had four stages:
(a),The period of time between the conclusion of
peace with Russia and the termination of Russian
demobilization. -
(b) The peºšod of time between a Russian and a
general peace. -
80
NEGOTIATIONS AT BRESTLITovsk
(c) The period of time for the transition stage of
the new peoples. *
(d) The finally definitive stage which the new
States require for the complete installation of their
State organization.
It must be repeatedly pointed out that for the Cen-
tral Powers, as distinct from the case of Russia, the
conclusion of peace with Russia has no connection
whatever with a general peace, and that the Central
Powers are compelled to continue the war against other
enemies. . . .
Of great importance for the question of the individ-
uality of a State is tº decision come to by the Supreme
Court . . . in Washington in the year 1808 in which
it was stated, “that the sovereign right of the United
States of North America must be recognized as having
fully and completely existed from the day of the an-
nouncement of its independence, that is to say, as from
the 4th of July, 1776, quite independently of its rec-
ognition on the part of England in the Treaty of the
year 1783.” (Droit International Codifié, page
160.) . . .
It might be asked from what system of law the pres-
ent Russian Government deduces its right and duty to
assure real freedom of self-determination to these ter-
ritories to the uttermost, that is to say, even, under
certain circumstances, to a continuation of the war.
If the fact that the occupied territories belonged to
the former Russian Empire imposes no duty at all
upon the population of these territories towards the
Russian Republic, then it is not obvious, without fur-
ther explanation, on what the Russian Republic in-
tends to base its rights and duties as regards that pop-
ulation. If, however, one takes the stand, as the Rus-
sian Delegation has done, that the Russian Republic
has such a right, then indeed, (1) the extent of the
territory, (2) the political provisions for tº exercise
of the right of self-determination, (3) the transitional
regime, and (4) the form of expression of the will of
the people, are the four points on "flich an endeavor to
reach an adjustment must be made. -
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 8].
1. Eactent of Occupied Territory
The assertior, that the right of self-determination is
an attribute of nations as a whole and not of parts of
nations is not our conception of the right of self-deter-
mination. Parts of nations can justly conclude inde-
pendence and separation. It is by no means assumed,
however, that the limits of occupation are to be taken
as a standard for the fixing of the boundaries of such
parts. Courland, Lithuania and Poland constitute,
also, national units from an historical point of view.
Germany and Austria-Hungary have no intention of
incorporating the territories now occupied by them
into their respective countries. They do not intend to
compel the territories in dispute to accept this or that
form of State, but they reserve for themselves and for
the peoples of the occupied territories a free hand for
the conclusion of treaties of every kind.
2. Political Provisions for Self-Determination
As to the Russian declarations in this respect, they
pass over the fundamental difference which the con-
stituted Delegations are repeatedly pointing out. The
withdrawal of the armies is impossible as long as the
world war lasts. However, in the event of military
conditions permitting, the endeavor may be made to
bring about a reduction of the occupying troops to
such a number as is absolutely necessary for the main-
tenance of order and the technical requirements of the
country. The setting up of a national gendarmerie
may be striven for. -
As regards the return to their homes of the refugees
and those persons evacuated during the course of the
war, a benevolent examination of the matter may take
place from time to time. This question could, as it is
not of outstanding political importance, be entrusted
to a special commission.
3. Transitional Régime
The Russian proposal is not sufficiently clear in its
details and necessitates further explanation. It is,
however, admitted without further argument that, with
the progressive approach of a general peace, the chosen
82
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSE
representatives of the people of the country will co-
operate, to an ever increasing extent, in administrative
tasks.
4. Referendum
The Allied [Central] Delegations are prepared to
agree in principle that a people’s vote on broad lines
be sanctioned on the basis of citizenship. The setting
up of a referendum appears to be impracticable. In
the opinion of the Allied [Central] Delegations, it
would suffice, if a vote on a wide basis were taken
from an elected and supplemented representative body.
It may also be pointed out that the setting up, within
the former Russian Empire, of States recognized by
the Government of the People’s Commissars, such,
for instance, as the Ukraine and Finland, was brought
about, not in the way of a referendum, but by resolu-
tions of a national assembly elected on a wide basis.
Inspired by the desire to endeavor to come to an
understanding with the Russian Government, the Gov-
ernments of Germany and Austria-Hungary have made
these far-reaching proposals, and at the same time add
thereto that they represent the most extreme limits
within which they still hope to come to a peaceful
understanding. In developing these fundamental prin-
ciples, they have been permeated, as in duty bound,
by the intention of not allowing any weakening in
their defensive capacity so long as the wretched war
continues, and also by the intention, that certain
peoples on territory adjacent to their own shall
finally and independently be placed in a position to
decide their own future without thereby falling into
a state of extreme need, misery and desperation. An
understanding between Russia and the Central Em-
pires on these difficult questions, however, is only pos-
sible if Russia shows an earnest desire to reach an
understanding, and if she will endeavor, instead of
attempting to advance one-sided, dictatorial aims,
to see the question from the point of view of the
opposite side, and find a way such as can alone
lead to a peaceful result. Only under the condition
that such intentions are shown, can the Delegations of
the Allied [Central] Powers still hope for a peaceful
adjustment of the conflict.
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 83
Upon the conclusion of the reading of this reply, Trotzky
took the floor. He declared that the reply of the Central
Powers had removed the doubts which had arisen in the
Russian Delegation by reason of the speech made by Gen-
eral Hoffmann at the previous sitting. It was now clear,
from what Secretary of State von Kuehlmann had read,
that all points of the negotiations rested exclusively on the
political will of the German Government alone.
When General Hoffmann pointed out that the Rus-
sian Government based its position on power, and that
it made use of force against all those whose opinions
differed from its own, and that it stigmatized them as
counter-revolutionaries and bourgeois, it must be no-
ticed that the Russian Government was based upon
power. Throughout the whole of history, no other
kind of government had been known. So long as soci-
ety consisted of struggling classes, the power of gov-
ernment would be based upon strength, and these gov-
ernments would maintain their dominion by force.
He must, however, protest categorically against the
assertion that his own Government outlawed everyone
who differed from it. That which the Governments of
other countries objected to in the doings of the Russian
Government, was the way in which it made use of its
power and in which it did not allow itself to be de-
terred.
When the Roumanian Government had endeavored
to make use of force on Russian territory against rev-
olutionary soldiers and workmen, he and his friends
proposed from Brest-Litovsk to the Petrograd Gov-
ernment that the Roumanian Ambassador and all his
staff, as well as the Roumanian military mission,
should be arrested. And the reply was received that
such a course had already been taken.
As regards the two instances which General Hoffmann
has adduced, they by no means represent our policy on
national questions. We have had sent to us the result
of investigations regarding the White Russian Con-
gress. This Congress was composed of representatives
of White Russian agrarians, and it had made an at-
tempt to take possession of all those points of support
which must be the property of the White Russian peo-
ple, and if it met with resistance, such resistance orig-
84 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
inated with the soldiers, amongst whom were repre-
senſed Great Russians, White Russians and Little Rus-
sians. I have already stated in my formal declaration
that those conflicts which arose between ourselves and
the Ukraine, and which, to my regret, are not yet com-
pletely overcome, have in no way restricted the right
of the Ukrainian people to self-determination; and
they have not prevented us from recognizing the inde-
pendence of the Ukrainian Republic.
Trotzky then spoke of the destiny of the occupied terri-
tories, and he said that the views uttered by the Ger-
man Delegation could only tend to strengthen the views of
the Russian Delegation concerning the very subordinate
rôle played by legal philosophy in deciding the destiny of
peoples. This applies equally to the legal philosophy of
the American Supreme Court. Anyone who has carefully
read the history of the decisions of that Court knows that
it has frequently modified the interpretation of its legal
philosophy according to the necessity, or otherwise, for the
extension of United States territory. After declaring that
the interest of the Russian Delegation in the destiny of the
occupied territories was due to their interest in the prin-
ciple of the right of self-determination for peoples, Trotzky
closed with the observation that the Russian Delegation
reserved to itself the right to make a more precise state-
ment regarding the nature of the declarations which had
been read out that day.
Von Kuehlmann then spoke as follows:
As regards the speech of General Hoffmann, may I,
on behalf of myself and of General Hoffmann, reserve
the right to return to this question? The political
competence of the German Empire has been correctly
characterized by the previous speaker with the precise
knowledge of international conditions which he pos-
sesses. The Imperial Chancellor, the sole responsible
Imperial Minister, has imparted instructions with re-
gard to the whole field of foreign policy. Moreover,
it goes without saying, by reason of the close relations
in which I am bound to General Hoffmann, that be-
tween our respective conceptions no divergence exists.
The fundamental difference between our conception
and that of the Russian Delegation is, that contrary
to it we wish to see arise in those regions, without
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 85
break or violent transition, an orderly State, and that
we decline to act, out of pure excess of life, on the
theory of creating a vacuum, so as to allow of the
establishment of a State within this vacuum in no
more clearly defined manner than has so far been put
forward.
M. Trotzky’s depreciatory estimate of the decision
of the American Supreme Court surprises me. To me,
the history of the founding of that great Republic and
a decision of its Supreme Court is, however, not with-
out importance for forming an opinion in the contro-
versies pending between us. . . .
I now propose that in future we observe the method
of procedure as proposed by the Russian Delegation,
so that we may really enter upon a detailed discussion
of the four points given in our reply. I hope that in
a few days we shall have progressed so far and with
a feeling of complete responsibility, as to be able to
say whether the difficulties can be overcome, or whether
the attempt made here must be abandoned.
Trotzky then declared that in his opinion they could
now pass on to the discussion of the two documents which
had been put forward. He must, however, once more em-
phasize his disagreement with the view of von Kuehlmann,
that, in the event of the army of occupation withdrawing,
it would leave a vacuum. The peoples who inhabited Po-
land, Lithuania and Courland would by no means find
themselves in a difficult political situation if the army of
occupation left them to their own devices. In so far as
technical difficulties were concerned, such as not having
their own railways, posts, etc., an agreement on such ques-
tions could always be arrived at, even without the control of
an army of occupation. But Secretary of State von Kuehl-
mann had pointed out that besides technical grounds, ques-
tions of security, which had been brought forward, played
a very important rôle in the regions referred to.
Von Kuehlmann then moved that the discussion of the
four points proposed by the Russian Delegation should
now commence in businesslike manner, and that these points
should be taken in the order suggested by the Russian Dele-
gation. After Trotzky had agreed to this proposal, the
next sitting was fixed for the following day.
86 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOVSE
39
January 15. The fifth sitting of the Committee on Politi-
cal and Territorial Relations was held on January 15.
It took up first the suggestions in the German document
of January 14 concerning the period of time which was to
elapse between the conclusion of peace with Russia and the
final organization of those new States which were to be
created by the exercise of the right of self-determination
by the peoples of occupied territories. Trotzky’s view was
that there were not sufficient reasons for binding the fate
of the regions in question with the course of the world war.
He held that the fate of the occupied regions should be
dependent upon the conclusion of peace on the Eastern
front alone. Von Kuehlmann replied that it had already
been a conciliatory act on the part of the Central Powers
to propose Article I of the Austro-German draft of the
peace treaty. In this Article they declared themselves
ready “to evacuate their present positions in occupied
Russian territory in so far as no different inferences result
from Article II’’ as soon as the demobilization of the Rus-
sian armies had been accomplished and without regard to
the continuance of the world War on other fronts. Further
conciliation on this last point was not impossible should an
agreement be reached on other points. As, however, there
was a considerably greater possibility, or probability, of
fighting again beginning on the Eastern front in the event
of war continuing on the other fronts than there would be
after the conclusion of a general peace, he must say that
it was impossible to contemplate evacuation of the regions
mentioned in Article II of the German draft (Poland,
Lithuania, Courland and portions of Esthonia and Livo-
nia), except in relation to the conclusion of a general peace
on all fronts. So long as the war in general lasted, the Cen-
tral Powers could not give any further safeguard than
that provided in Article II of the German draft, which
provides that “a special commission shall discuss and fix
the time and other details in conformity and accordance
with the Russian idea of the necessary ratification—by
plebiscite on broad lines and without any military pressure
whatever—of the already existing proclamations of separa-
tion.’’
To this statement, Trotzky replied:
The replies to our questions appear to be essentially
contradictory, and indicate the handing over to the
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 87
occupying Power of the full and unlimited right, based
exclusively on physical force, to decide arbitrarily the
destiny of the occupied territories, and to dispose of
such and such bodies without taking into account the
moment of their appearance, their social basis and what
their real political weight may be.
If, however, the Governments of either side continue,
at least in the peace powrparlers, to characterize these
bodies as free representatives of the will of peoples.
which have already freely decided their own des-
tiny, we consider it desirable in the highest degree to
invite these bodies to collaborate with us. We are:
ready to accept the proposal, twice defeated by the
other side, to invite here the representatives of such,
bodies. These representatives will come here as public
criers of these peoples. We must then come to an un-
derstanding on whether these peoples are firm units
or whether their representatives come here as private
individuals. In the latter case, they have nothing to
do at the pourparlers.
If these preliminary conditions are accepted by the
President of the German Delegation, then I consent
immediately to begin discussions with our own repre-
sentatives on the question as to whether the Russian
Delegation desires to admit representatives of these
countries, and if so, in what form. We cannot decide
or regard as decided a question which is for the mo-
ment the principal subject of our diversities of opinion.
The will of the people must everywhere be expressed
by the people, and not by economically privileged
groups. It would be a complete abrogation of the
principles which are the essence of our program if,
directly or indirectly, we should seek a pretext to tell
the masses in Poland and Lithuania and the Letts that
we were ready to admit a representation of the upper
and privileged classes of their country and their peo-
ples. -
The sitting was adjourned, and on its resumption von
Kuehlmann said:
This morning we concluded our discussions regard-
ing the period of time to elapse between the Russian
demobilization and the final organization of the new
States, and we must note with regret that despite the
33 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
entirely convincing reasons brought forward by us,
there has been no inclination on the other side to ac-
cept our point of view in any way. I should like to
postpone question (1) that of “the extent of territory
over which any population will be called upon to exer-
cise the right of self-determination.” I think the
question of territories will be the least disputed of all.
Referring to question (2) the ‘‘general political pre-
requisites governing the solution of the question of the
political destinies of the territories and nations con-
cerned,’’ in the nature of the case, this, too, in great
part, is a military question. A certain number of
armed and disciplined forces is necessary to maintain
discipline and public order. Some organized military
forces are required to keep the economic machinery
of the country going. We will give a binding promise
that these organized forces shall indulge in no political
activity, and exercise no political pressure. We there-
fore maintain that the presence of these forces is in
no way prejudicial to the freedom of the vote.
Trotzky reverted to the question of the evacuation of
the occupied regions, and, being requested by von Kuehl-
mann to speak to the point, namely, the question under
what conditions the vote should be held, declared that he
must have complete clearness on the evacuation question.
Von Kuehlmann replied that he could give no guarantee
that, within the period actually in question for the voting,
military considerations would make a complete evacuation
of the region possible. It was clear that the minimum pro-
gram of the Central Powers had been drawn up with the
most careful regard to military necessities.
Trotzky declared he could not answer these questions in
this form, but must confine himself to stating that the pres-
ence of organized troops in these regions would, in the Rus-
sian view, very grievously prejudice the significance of the
vote. The return of fugitives and the evacuated popula-
tion was closely connected with the questions just discussed.
£n his view, a vote could be taken when a majority of these
people had returned home. The formula used in the
Austro-German document (of January 14) appeared to him
too restrictive.
Von Kuehlmann admitted in principle that the fugi-
tives would be justified in returning home, but it was the
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 89
90
task of the administrative authorities to decide whether,
and if so, what exceptions should be made to this general
rule. In order to facilitate a survey of the subject, he
asked Trotzky to let them have the material in the Russian
Government's possession bearing on it.
Trotzky expressed his readiness to do this, and the sitting
thereupon closed.
The British Labor Party issued, the same day, an address
to the Peoples of Russia and of Central Europe:
We have reached a crisis in the war. The negotia-
tions at Brest-Litovsk have been interrupted because
the Germans have refused to admit the principle of
Self-determination of peoples and the doctrine of no
annexations. In thus acting, the Central Powers are
speaking clearly in the name of a militarist State.
In this crisis the British people must speak, because
the Russians can only succeed in their great and per-
ilous task if supported by the people everywhere. The
British people must proclaim to Russia and the Cen-
tral Powers that its aim is identical with Russia's;
that we, too, see no solution for the evils of militarism
except self-determination and no indemnities.
In applying this Russian principle to our own case,
we are conscious of the problems raised, but we do not
shrink therefrom. The British people accepts the prin-
ciple of no annexations for the British Empire. This
applies in our case to the Middle East, Africa and
India. . . . -
We adjure the peoples of Central Europe to declare
themselves or make their Governments speak for them
in answer to Russia and ourselves. We call on them
to renounce annexations in Europe with the same good
faith in which we are renouncing them in Asia. We
call on them to give the same self-determination to the
French, Alsatian, Italian, Polish and Danish members
of their States as Russia has given to Finland, Cour-
land, Lithuania and Russian Poland.
The family interests of dynasties or the desire of the
German, Austrian, and Magyar governing classes to
dominate other classes and nationalities must no more
be suffered to prevent self-determination in Central
90 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LTTOWSK
Europe, and thereby imperil it in Europe as a whole,
than the interests of British imperialism or British
capitalism must be suffered to do so elsewhere.
Peoples of Central Europe, this catastrophe of the
human race, this fatal schism in the civilized world,
can only be ended by the defeat of militarism on both
sides, and by the victory on both sides of moral and
intellectual fair dealing. If the world is to be saved,
it must be saved by good faith and reciprocity on the
part of all. Do not fail us now. Do not let your Gov-
ernments drive the British people, as they are driving
the Russian people, into the terrible choice between
continuing the war and abandoning the only princi-
ples that can save the world.
If this choice is forced upon us, we shall choose as
Russia chose. We shall continue, but the responsibil-
ity will be yours.
91 January 16. The following morning the Delegations of the
92
93.
four Allied [Central] Powers assembled for private dis-
cussion. Von Kuehlmann reviewed at length the negotia-
tions with the Russian representatives during the past few
days for the adjustment of political and territorial ques-
tions. The leaders of the Allied [Central] Delegations ex-
pressed their thanks and approval to von Kuehlmann.
In the afternoon, at the residence of Count Czernin, a
private meeting of the Central Delegation with the Ukrain-
ian Delegation took place. The discussion, lasting an hour
and a half, led to the settlement in principle of questions
concerning the future political relations between the Cen-
tral Powers and the Ukraine. The resumption of these
private discussions was arranged for the next day, Jan-
uary 17, when economic questions were to be considered.
After the anticipated early conclusion of this private pre-
paratory exchange of ideas, discussions of greater detail
were to be initiated.
January 17. The confidential discussions between the Ger-
man and Austro-Hungarian Delegations and the Ukrainian
Delegation were resumed.
Czernin called special attention to the general principle,
valid for the Brest negotiations and recognized by the
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 9i
94
Ukrainian Delegation, that the intervention of one party
in the internal affairs of the other party was quite out of
the question. On the other hand, both parties agreed that
peace was to be assured through the discussion of the va-
rious political and cultural questions interesting both par-
ties. In this regard Count Czernin, by way of example,
referred to the necessity of assuring the destiny of that
Polish minority which may belong to the future Ukrainian
State. His statements were greeted with approval by the
Ukrainian Delegation, which was prepared to enter upon
further negotiations upon this basis.
During the subsequent discussions concerning economic
relations it appeared that no differences existed in the fun-
damental conceptions of both parties such as might prevent
an agreement. The discussions even extended to concrete
questions, such as the exchange of commodities. Further
discussion on these questions was entrusted to a special
commission which was to complete its labors with the great-
est possible speed.
January 18. The sittings of the Committee on Political
and Territorial Relations were resumed.
Von Kuehlmann referred to the question of the return
of fugitives and the evacuated population of the occupied
territories. He declared that the Central Powers were
agreed in principle, and that the practical carrying out
of this repatriation should be referred to that commission
which was considering the exchange of civilian prisoners.
Answering the question if it would be possible for the Rus-
sian Government to give such emigrants certificates show-
ing that before their evacuation they had lived in the re-
gions in question, Trotzky declared that these refugees
had been grouped in Russia in accordance with their for-
mer places of residence, and that it would doubtless be
possible to give them proper certificates.
The Committee then took up question (4), that of the
method of voting on the future State organizations in the
occupied territories.
The German Delegation pointed out that the Russian
proposal for a referendum was not justified by the political
development of the population of these regions, and that it
would be more proper to enlarge the existing representative
92 NEGOTIATIONS AT BRESTLITOVSK
bodies through elections upon a broad basis in order that
through this enlargement they might actually become the
representatives of the entire population.
In answer to this, Trotzky remarked that the Russian
Delegation did not share the opinions just expressed con-
cerning the intelligence and education of the populations
in question, and that they persisted in their proposal that
the future State organization of these territories be decided
by referendum.
In his reply, von Kuehlmann pointed to the endeavor
of the Central Powers to accord to the broad masses of the
population of these regions an ever increasing political in-
fluence. What must under all circumstances be conceded
was the maintenance of order during the period of transi-
tion. What must be hindered is the spread of the revolu-
tion to these regions, which were already sufficiently dev-
astated by the war.
The further discussion of this question was postponed.
Point No. 1 of the Russian Document of January 12 con-
cerning the extent of territory over which any population
will be called upon to exercise the right of self-determina-
tion was then taken up again. Upon the invitation of the
chairman, General Hoffmann spread out a map and drew
with his finger a line from the shore of the Gulf of Finland
east of Moon Sound and then on to Walk, Dvinsk and
Brest-Litovsk. When the Russians referred to the occu-
pied territories south of Brest-Litovsk, General Hoffmann
replied, “We will speak about them to the Ukrainian
Republic.” -
Thereupon Trotzky replied that, ‘‘the process of the
self-determination of the Ukraine had not yet progressed
so far that the question of determining the boundaries
between us and the new Republic can be regarded as
finally settled. I remarked at the time that this need
create no difficulties in the discussions, since, according
to our principles, the boundaries are to be determined by
the will of the masses of the populations interested, and
in every individual instance it would require an agreement
between us and the Ukrainian Delegation. This applies in
the fullest measure also to those occupied territories south
of Brest-Litovsk.” Answering Czernin’s query as to
whether the question of the occupied regions south of
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 93.
Brest-Litovsk should be discussed with the Russian Gov-
ernment or, as the Ukrainian Delegation wished, only with
the Ukraine, Trotzky replied that the right of the Ukrain-
ian Delegation to consider this question in a one-sided and
independent manner could not be recognized. Czernin de-
clared that he would speak on the question further after
the problem of competency between the Russian and the
Ukrainian Delegations had been clarified.
Referring further to questions of territory, von Kuehl-
mann asked for a statement regarding the relations be-
tween the Caucasus and the Petrograd Government.
Trotzky made the following statement: “The army of
the Caucasus is completely under the command of officers
who are unqualifiedly devoted to the Soviet of People’s
Commissars. That was confirmed about two weeks ago at
the Congress of Delegates at the Caucasian front.”
Von Kuehlmann asked further if the affairs of the
Aland Islands were to be dealt with by the Soviet Gov-
ernment or if the Republic of Finland was now to deal with
the international aspects of these affairs. Trotzky made
the following statement: “The proclamation of the inde-
pendence of the Finnish State has thus far brought about
no changes in the question of the Aland Islands.”
Trotzky reserved any expression of opinion on the mer-
its of this question and, addressing the meeting, declared:
The position of the Austro-Germans is now abso-
lutely clear. Germany and Austria seek to cut off
more than 150,000 square versts from the former Po-
lish Kingdom of Lithuania, also the area populated
by the Ukrainians and White Russians, and, further,
they want to cut into the territory of the Letts and
separate the islands populated by the Esthonians from
the same peoples on the mainland. Within this terri-
tory Germany and Austria wish to retain their reign
of military occupation, not only after the conclusion
of peace with Russia, but after the conclusion of a
general peace. At the same time the Central Powers
not only refuse to give any explanation regarding the
terms of evacuation, but also refuse to obligate them-
selves regarding the evacuation.
The internal life of these provinces lies, therefore,
for an indefinite period in the hands of these powers.
94. NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSEC
Under such conditions any indefinite guarantees re-
garding an expression of will by the Poles, Letts
and Lithuanians are only of an illusory character.
Practically it means that the Governments of Austria
and Germany take into their own hands the destiny
of these nations.
Trotzky declared that he was glad now that the Central
Powers were speaking frankly, stating that General Hoff-
mann’s conditions proved that their real aims were built
on a basis quite different from that of the principles recog-
nized on December 25, and that real or lasting peace was
Only possible on the actual application of self-determina-
tion. -
“It is clear,” Trotzky declared, “that the decision could
have been reached long ago regarding peace aims if the
Central Powers had not stated their aims differently from
those expressed by General Hoffmann.”
Von Kuehlmann replied to Trotzky, declaring that Gen-
eral Hoffmann’s aims were in principle the same as those
advanced at Christmas. Throughout the negotiations, he
said, the Germans had kept in view the ethnological bound-
aries, but also the actual boundaries of the old Russian
Rºmpire. The Central Powers intended to permit free self-
determination, and he scoffed at the theory that the pres-
ence of troops would prevent this. Regarding evacuation,
von Kuehlmann said that this must be taken up with the
newly born self-determined Governments.
“If General Hoffmann expresses these terms more
strongly,” said von Kuehlmann, “it is because a soldier
always uses stronger language than diplomats. But it
must not be deduced from this that there is any dissention
between us regarding the principles, which are a well
thought-out whole.’’
At the close of the sitting, Trotzky explained that be-
cause of inner political reasons (the Russian Constituent
Assembly had opened at Petrograd on that very day) he
would be compelled to return to Petrograd for about a
week. Moreover, the sittings of the Committee had led
to a full discussion of all questions in detail. He therefore
proposed that the deliberations of the Committee be ad-
journed until the 29th of January. With his departure,
the leadership of the Russian Delegation would be turned
SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 95
95
over to Joffe. The Delegations of the Central Powers con-
sented to this request, declaring, however, that it would
be much pleasanter if they could continue the negotiations
without interruption, as the former recess had brought
about many misunderstandings; and they expressed the
hope that after Trotzky's return a complete agreement
would be arrived at.
January 18-19. The Constituent Assembly which had been
elected, according to the Soviet Government, “from the
old election lists’’ and which was “the expression of the
old regime, when authority belonged to the bourgeoisie,”
attempted to meet at Petrograd. The Soviet Government
laid before the Constituent Assembly a draft of a funda-
mental law whose main provision was that “power must
lie exclusively in the hands of the working classes and their
representatives, the Soviets.” The Constituent Assembly
refused to adopt this document, and, as a consequence, on
January 19, the Soviet Government issued a decree out-
lining its attitude toward the Constituent Assembly and
closing with the words, “The Central Executive Commit-
tee therefore orders the Constituent Assembly dissolved.”
96
97
98
VIII. THE SECOND INTERVAL
January 19. “Peace strikes” began to spread throughout
Austria-Hungary, particularly in Vienna and Budapest.
Newspapers stopped appearing and industry was brought
to a standstill and lighting works interfered with. Depu-
tations of workers were received by various ministers. It
was made clear in every instance that the strikes were be-
ing carried on in order to secure Governmental declara-
tions that the Brest negotiations would not be permitted
to break down over territorial issues. The Austrian Prime
Minister, von Seydler, informed the deputation calling
upon him that
it was his Majesty’s wish to end the war at the ear-
liest possible moment by an honorable peace. . . . If
for the present, however, only a separate peace with
Russia is practicable, the responsibility rests solely
with the Entente Powers, which have rejected repeat-
edly our peace offers.
Premier Wekerle in the Hungarian Parliament declared
that the Government adhered to the principle of peace
without annexations and indemnities, and that this view
was shared by every organ of the monarchy, above all by
the King. }
January 20–21. The first official sittings of the Russo-
German Legal Commission were held. Articles for the
Treaty of Peace on the following points were discussed
and formulated: *
1. The ending of belligerency.
2. The renewal of diplomatic and consular relations.
3. War damages.
4. The renewal of State treaties.
On the same days the Russo-German Economic Commis-
sion continued its discussions, referring to sub-commissions
preliminary work for further deliberations.
January 21. Trotzky arrived at Petrograd. He said that
the German terms preponderatingly favored annexations,
SECOND INTERVAL 97
99
100
their object being to strangle Russia economically and po-
litically. The Austrian Delegates had played no very ac-
tive rôle in the negotiations, merely assenting to every
German proposal. -
Rarakhan, Secretary of the Russian Delegation at
Brest, announced that the Russian Delegation had made
an official protest to the heads of the German and Austrian
Delegations regarding the omission from the official Ger-
man reports of the declaration of Trotzky at the last sit-
ting of the Brest Conference, that after a fortnight’s nego-
tiations Germany and Austria were insisting upon terms
contrary to the principles acknowledged on December 25
respecting peace without annexations and indemnities.
January 22. The Russian Government issued two wireless
communications “TO ALL’’ with the object of showing
that by von Kuehlmann’s declaration that the Central
Powers cannot remove their armies from the occupied re-
gions until the conclusion of a general peace, the peoples of
Germany and Austria-Hungary were being deceived.
One communication asserts that the annexationists have
been sufficiently powerful to impose their will upon the
evasive diplomats of the von Hertling-von Kuehlmann
school, but that the Governments of the Central Powers
did not dare divulge this to their own peoples. It con-
tinues:
This object is monstrous, the annexation of Poland,
Lithuania, Courland, Riga, parts of Livonia, Moon
Sound and the Islands, with the purpose of the com-
plete economic and political subjugation of Russia,
while the rôle of the Austrian representatives at Brest-
Litovsk has been limited to humble approval. Aus-
trian statesmen are appeasing their restless workmen
by affirming that the Central Powers are striving for
a democratic peace, but to have such a program and
to talk at the same time of a democratic peace sur-
passes even the limits permitted to diplomacy.
The second wireless “TO ALL’’ emphasizes the absolute
refusal to give any sort of guarantee for the evacuation of
occupied territories.
In such circumstances the words self-determination
sound like a mockery of principles and of the peoples
98 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
Concerned. . . . The revolution cannot live in an at-
mosphere of deceit and falsehood. The revolution may
not at a given moment be in a position to repudiate the
annexationists, but it will never humiliate itself so as
to call black white and will not cover up brutal annex-
ationist pretensions with the fig leaf of democracy.
The significance of the Brest-Litovsk pourparlers is
that they have stripped from German imperialism its
false cloak temporarily borrowed from the democratic
Wardrobe, and exposed the cruel reality of the annex-
ationism of owners and capitalists. There is nothing
more to be demanded from the powrparlers.
101 January 24. Two addresses were delivered, both of them
dealing with the Brest negotiations and with President
Wilson’s fourteen points. The one was delivered by the
German Chancellor, von Hertling, before the Main Com-
mittee of the German Reichstag and the other by Count
Czernin, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Austrian Par-
liamentary Delegation.
Some extracts from Hertling’s address referring to the
Brest negotiations follow:
The negotiations are progressing slowly. They are
exceedingly difficult. . . . Indeed many times there
were reasons to doubt whether the Russian Delegation
were in earnest with their peace negotiations, and all
sorts of wireless messages, which are going around the
world with remarkably strange contents, tended to
strengthen this doubt. Nevertheless, I hold firmly to
the hope that we shall come to a favorable conclusion
in the near future with the Russian Delegation at
Brest-Litovsk.
Our negotiations with the Ukrainian representatives
are in a more favorable position. Here too difficulties
have yet to be overcome. . . . We hope shortly to
reach conclusions with the Ukraine which will be in
the interests of both parties and will be economically
advantageous.
Referring to Points I and VI of President Wilson's
Fourteen Points, Chancellor Hertling said:
I. The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk are being con-
ducted with full publicity. This proves that we are
SECOND INTERVAL 99
102
quite ready to accept this proposal and declare pub-
licity of negotiations to be a general political principle.
VI. Evacuation of Russian territory. Now that
the Entente has refused within the period agreed upon
by Russia and the Quadruple Alliance to join in the
negotiations, I must in the name of the latter decline
to allow any subsequent interference. We are dealing
here with questions which concern only Russia and the
four Allied [Central] Powers. I adhere to the hope
that with recognition of self-determination for the
peoples on the western frontier of the former Russian
Empire, good relations will be established both with
these peoples and with the rest of Russia, for whom
we wish most earnestly a return of order and peace
and of conditions guaranteeing the welfare of the
country.
Over two-thirds of Foreign Minister Czernin’s lengthy
speech has to do with the proceedings at Brest-Litovsk.
He describes in detail the difficulties of the negotiations.
They are due in the first instance to the fact that the nego-
tiations
have taken place in full view. . . . Our task is to
build a new world. . . . Various phases of all past
peace negotiations which we know of have developed
more or less behind closed doors and their results were
told to the world only after the negotiations had been
completed. . . . But when these various phases and
these details are each day telegraphed to the world, it
it quite easily understood that they . . . excite public
opinion. We were completely aware of the disadvan-
tages of this procedure. Still we immediately gave
way to the desire of the Russian Government for pub-
licity because we wished to show ourselves friendly
and because we have nothing to hide. . . . But the
other fact consequent upon this complete publicity of
the negotiations is, that the great public, the country
behind the front, and, above all, the leaders, must keep
their nerves steady.
After declaring that “the basis upon which Austria-
Hungary treats . . . is that of no contributions nor annex-
ations. . . . I declare once more that I demand not a
square meter nor a penny from Russia,” he went on to
describe -
100
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
the two greatest difficulties which contain reasons why
the negotiations are not progressing as rapidly as we
all should like.
The first difficulty is that we are not treating with
one Russian peace-maker, but with various newly-
created Russian Governments which have not clearly
defined among themselves their spheres of competency.
. . . first, that part of Russia led by Petrograd, second,
our own new neighboring State, great Ukrainia, third,
Finland, and fourth, Caucasus. . . .
What interests us especially and chiefly is the newly-
created great State which will be our neighbour in
the future, Ukrainia. We have got very far in our
negotiations with this Delegation. We have agreed
on the above-mentioned basis of no annexations or
compensations and have agreed what and how com-
mercial relations with the newly-created Republic are
to be re-established. But . . . I confess I do not know
what the situation is to-day, for yesterday my rep-
resentative at Brest-Litovsk received two telegrams
to the effect that M. Joffe, the President of the Rus-
sian Delegation had sent to the Delegations of the
Quadruple. Alliance a circular Note declaring that the
Government of The Republic of Workmen and Peas-
ants of the Ukraine, which sits at Kharkov, in no case
recognizes the Secretariat-General of the Kiev Rada
as representing the entire Ukrainian people, because
the Central Rada represents only the capitalist classes
and cannot consequently speak in the name of the
Ukrainian people. The Note also states that the
Kharkov Rada does not recognize any agreements
which might eventually be concluded by the Central
Rada without its consent and announces that the Khar-
kov Rada is sending two Delegates of the Central
Committee of all the Soviets of Workmen, Soldiers
and Peasants in the Ukraine . . . (who) recognize
the People’s Commissars as the organ of all the
Soviets of Russia and as having the right to speak
in the name of the entire Russian Federation. . . .
President Joffe adds in his communication that his
Delegation is ready to co-operate to the fullest extent
with the new Ukrainian Delegation. . . .
We want nothing at all of Poland. . . . Poland’s
people shall choose their own destiny, free and un-
SECOND INTERVAL IOI
influenced. I consider the form of the popular decision
of this question as not especially important. . . . I
should have liked to see the Polish Government take
part in the negotiations, for, according to my opinion,
Poland is an independent State. The St. Petersburg
Government, however, thinks that the present Polish
Government is not entitled to speak in the name of the
country and it has failed to recognize it as a competent
representative of the country. . . .
The second difficulty . . . is the difference of opin-
ion between our German ally and the St. Petersburg
Government in the interpretation of the right of the
Russian nations to determine their own destinies, that
is, in those territories occupied by German troops.
Count Czernin then explained the German and the Rus-
sian views as they had developed during the discussions
at Brest, first as to the representative character of the
existing legislative and communal bodies in the occupied
provinces, and second, as to the conditions (with or with-
out the presence of German troops) under which a plebi-
scite should take place. “In both questions,” he declared,
“we must find a compromise.’’
After discussing President Wilson’s Fourteen Points and
after declaring, “I desire peace with St. Petersburg also
because it makes general peace nearer,” he reverted in de-
tail to the impending peace with the Ukraine—‘‘the wheat
peace.”
The question is not one—I repeat it the tenth time
—of imperialist or annexationist plans and inten-
tions, but of assuring our population a finally de-
served reward for steadily holding out and giving it
those foodstuffs which it will gladly accept. . . .
If you want to spoil peace and refuse grain ship-
ments, then it is logical to force my hand by speeches,
resolutions, strikes and demonstrations. . . . If behind
the front you arrange strikes . . . you are cutting
your own flesh and all those who think that such means
hasten peace are in awful error. . . .
. . . You must help me or you must bring about
my fall. g
103 January 25. Von Kuehlmann discussed the Brest-Litovsk
negotiations before the German Reichstag. He defended
102 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
104
the correctness of General Hoffmann’s attitude. He was
certain that friendly relations would be established soon
with Finland and he considered an early conclusion of
peace with the Ukraine to be probable. “The greatest dif-
ficulties are in coming to a conclusion with the Petrograd
Bolsheviks . . . who maintain themselves by brutal force
and whose arguments are cannon and machine guns. The
Bolsheviks preach beautifully, but they practice other-
wise.” Without denying the Trotzkian desire for peace,
the Minister said he had come across more than one state-
ment from the Maximalist side showing that “those gen-
tlemen are indulging in another policy than that of con-
cluding an open and honorable peace with the bourgeois
Governments of the Central Powers which are hated like
poison.’’
January 25–27. The Third All-Russian Congress of
Soviets met at Petrograd to hear a report of the Brest
negotiations and to determine upon the further policy of
the Russian Delegation. Members of the Peasants’ Assem-
bly were also given seats.
Kamenev emphasized the new grouping in the World
struggle which was ceasing to be a struggle of One im-
perialistic group against another, but in Europe, at any
event, was a struggle of the general proletariat against the
bourgeoisie.
We welcome the rising of Austrian workmen and
shall welcome their emancipation from Austro-German
imperialism exactly as we shall welcome the escape
of the Irish people from the imperialism of England.
He read a statement from Austrian Socialists who had at
the beginning of the war supported their Government and
who now realized that the Russians and Germans could not
come to terms, not because they were Russians opposed
to Germans, but because they were Social Democrats deal-
ing with landowners and bourgeois.
Martov and other opponents of the Bolsheviki, while
criticising details in the management of the negotiations,
agreed that they had been of service in making the situation
clear to democracy throughout the world. All were unani-
mous in refusing to accept the conditions now offered by
Germany. There was less unanimity on what was to be
SECOND INTERVAL 103
done, some delegates insisting upon the physical impossi-
bility of fighting.
An exposition of the history, method, aims and results of
the peace negotiations was given by Trotzky. He pointed
out that the Allies had now had two and a half months
in which to come in and that Kerensky’s repeated efforts
to move the Allies toward peace had proved fruitless. The
object of the negotiations was to make the actual obstacles
to peace clear. He touched on the weak point on the
Russian side—the Delegation from the Ukrainian Rada.
‘‘We asked them like ourselves to hold no unpublished con-
versations with the enemy. They said they would consult
Eiev before answering. That answer we have never re-
ceived in spite of repeated requests.’’ He read a telegram
showing that Albert Thomas even to-day believed that the
patriotic Rada was going to save Russia from making a
separate peace, when as a matter of fact the Rada was
concluding a separate peace itself. Then after mentioning
three distinct tendencies in Germany he said that the main
point on which the discussions hung was the refusal of
Germany to name a date for the removal of troops. He
sketched the line which the Germans intended to be the
new frontiers and said it was so planned as to make fur-
ther German aggression easy:
The whole scheme of the German argument was
based on the assumption that the Russian Government
would understand but remain silent, and be grateful to
the Germans for saving their faces by giving a mock
democratic character to their peace. The bourgeois
Governments can sign any kind of peace. The Govern-
ment of the Soviets cannot. . . . Either we shall be
destroyed or the power of the bourgeoisie throughout
Europe will be destroyed. We have left the imperial-
istic war and we shall never return to it. . . . I can-
not say that the Russian revolution is assured of vic-
tory over German imperialism. More than that, I
declare that anyone who says that the Russian revo-
lution will not under certain conditions be obliged
to accept an unfortunate but not disgraceful peace is
a demagogue and a charlatan. We cannot give you
a pledge that we will not conclude separate peace.
If we gave such a pledge we should make the Russian
army dependent upon French and American gold.
104 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
105
We are strong because we are rousing the people's
conscience to protest in all countries. The conversa-
tion between the Russian revolution and German im-
perialism is not finished yet. We shall still say our
Say there and we will not bend our banners.
With regard to the further negotiations, he asked to be
allowed freedom of action. In any case he would not sign
a non-democratic peace.
The Congress adopted a resolution approving the policy
of the Brest Delegation, declaring against the German
terms, but giving the Delegation a free hand.
January 28. “Peace, Bread and Liberty’’ strikes began
in Berlin. At this time a Soviet was formed in Berlin,
to which members of even the Majority Socialists adhered
before the whole movement was suppressed by military
force. The Berlin workmen formulated the following con-
ditions which were to be fulfilled before the workers were
to return to work:
1. Peace without annexations or indemnities, based
on the right of the free action of peoples, as soon as
possible.
2. Labour representatives from all countries shall
participate in the peace negotiations.
3. A reorganisation of the food system so that all
elasses shall get the same.
4. The state of siege shall be immediately abolished,
as well as the prohibition against meetings.
5. Newspapers and meetings shall be permitted free
expression of opinion.
6. The military control of industry shall no longer
exist.
7. All political prisoners shall be released.
8. The whole organisation of the German Empire
shall be thoroughly democratised.
9. General, direct, secret suffrage for all over 20
years, men and women, shall be introduced into
Prussia.
IX. THE SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS_
THE UKRAINE
106 January 30. The pourparlers at Brest-Litovsk were re-
sumed under the presidency of the Turkish Grand Vizier,
Talaat Pasha. A plenary sitting was held.
The Russian Delegation consisted of the following:
Trotzky, Joffe, Bizenko and Karelin as representatives of
the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Work-
men’s, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ delegates. Two members
of the Ukrainian People’s Republic had been added—
Medvediev, President of the Executive Committee at Khar-
kov, and General Shachray, Secretary of State for military
affairs of the Kharkov Committee. The Russian Dele-
gation included also the following experts: General
Samoljo, Captains Lipski and Grinberget, Admiral Alt-
water, representing military Councils; Radek, expert in gen-
eral and Polish affairs; Bobinski, Polish expert; Teriain,
expert for Armenia; Stuczka and Mickiewicz, experts for
Lettish and Lithuanian affairs respectively.
The Bavarian Government, by virtue of its treaty rights
and after agreement with the German Emperor and the
Imperial Chancellor, had appointed Count von Podewils-
Duernitz as its representative in the negotiations.
The question of the competency of the Delegations from
the Ukraine formed the subject of discussion at the meeting.
Trotzky gave the information that the Ukrainian Soviets
were engaged throughout the Ukraine in a determined
battle against the Kiev Rada. The Soviet was in posses-
sion of the whole Donetz coalfield, the entire mining region
of Ekaterineslav, and the Governments of Kharkov and
Poltava. The power of the Soviet was increasing while
that of the Rada was declining. It was reported also that
the Kiev Secretariat had resigned. What influence this
would have upon the Delegation of M. Holubovich was
not yet known. But it was clear that a peace concluded
with the Delegation of the Kiev Rada could not be regarded
as a peace concluded with the Ukraine Republic. Dis-
senting from Kuehlmann’s representation to the Reich-
stag that the Russians had altered their view regarding
106 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
107
the competency of the Ukraine Delegation as soon as the
latter would not play the rôle of auxiliary, he recalled his
declaration at the first sitting that the process of developing
the Self-determination of the Ukraine was still going on.
Now, when the Ukrainian Soviets were represented at the
All-Russian Congress at Petrograd, which had established
a federative basis for the Russian Republic, the inclusion of
representatives of the Ukrainian Soviet in the Russian Del-
egation entirely corresponded to conditions obtaining in the
Russian Republic. If the Delegation of M. Holubovich
had as before the mandate of the Kiev Secretariat, no
objection was raised to its further participation in the peace
negotiations. In any case, however, only such an agree-
ment made with the Ukraine could be recognized that se-
cured the formal endorsement of the Government of the
Federative Republic of Russia.
Levitsky of the Kiev Delegation declared that it had been
agreed that until the return of the entire Delegation from
Kiev the one or two members who remained behind at
Brest would not act on political questions. The attitude
of their Delegation was therefore reserved.
Von Kuehlmann, while undertaking to postpone the dis-
cussion until the arrival of the Kiev Delegation, complained
of the absence of any hint that besides the Delegation
headed by Holubovich other bodies existed, claiming to
speak on behalf of the Ukraine. The Central Delegations
would thoroughly examine this important question.
Trotzky replied that the question would be decided by
the result of the struggle between the two organizations.
Czernin proposed, and Trotzky assented, that to avoid
delay the Committee on Territorial and Political Questions
should resume its work. *
The plenary sitting was then closed by Talaat Pasha.
It was announced in Petrograd that Trotzky had ad-
dressed a letter to the Persian Minister in Petrograd de-
claring that the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 was
directed against the liberty and independence of the Per-
THE PART OF UERAINE 107
108
sian people, and was null and void for all time. The
Russian Government denounce all agreements preced-
ing or following the said agreement which in any way
restrict the rights of the Persian people to free and inde-
pendent existence. The Government will do all in its power
in the domain of international relations to bring about com-
plete evacuation of Persia by Turkish and British troops.
A meeting was held of the Russo-Austro-Hungarian Com-
mittee on Political and Territorial Questions under the
Chairmanship of Count Czernin, who pointed out that thus
far the Committee had discussed the question of the re-
gions occupied by German troops. He now proposed to
attain certainty regarding the regions occupied by Austro-
Hungarian troops. Before entering upon details he felt it
necessary to observe that the Ukrainian Delegation held
that they alone and independently were competent to dis-
cuss and decide this question.
Replying, Trotzky emphatically protested against the
view of the Kiev Delegation that it could independently
solve territorial questions. He pointed, in support of his
view, to the participation as members of the Russian Dele-
gation of representatives of the Kharkov Executive Com-
mittee. As to the facts themselves, he considered, on the
strength of various reports, especially a telegram just re-
ceived, that the participation of the Delegation of the Kiev
Rada was more a question of the past than of the future.
Czernin in reply proposed that a plenary sitting be held
as soon as possible to settle definitely the controversy
between the Kiev and Petrograd Delegations. From
his impressions at the first sittings, he did not understand
that the frontiers of the Ukraine with respect to Poland,
for instance, were to be the subject of special discussion
with Petrograd. He asked the following question, “Does
the President of the Russian Delegation intend to exclude
the idea that the Ukraine can alone decide matters concern-
ing the independent Ukrainian State, particularly with re-
spect to its frontiers?”
Trotzky replied that the Ukraine was part of the Fed-
erative Republic of Russia and that therefore everything
would have to be decided from the point of view of consti-
tuting such a Republic.
108 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
109
After a brief passage concerning the possibility of ad-
mitting to the negotiations the President of the existing
Polish Ministry, M. Kucharczewski, the meeting was ad-
journed.
February 1. A plenary sitting of all the Delegations took
place. The Delegation of the Kiev Rada was present.
The Bulgarian Premier, Radoslavov, sat as leader of the
Bulgarian Delegation.
Severjuk, who announced that he had assumed the lead-
ership of the Kiev Delegation, referred to the Manifesto
of the Ukrainian Central Rada on November 20, 1917, pro-
claiming the international position of the Ukrainian Peo-
ple’s Republic, which at that time was recognized by the
Council of People’s Commissars as well as by the represen-
tatives of the four Allied [Central] Powers. Furthermore,
inasmuch as a Federative Government of all Russian Re-
publics had not materialized and could not be materialized,
the Ukrainian Central Rada must let the formation of a
Federative Government drop. In order to avoid fresh
wrong interpretations from any side whatever, the Ukrain-
ian Delegation proposed the formal recognition of the
Ukrainian Republic as an entirely independent State.
Thereupon, at Trotzky’s request, Medvediev, represent-
ing the Kharkov Ukrainian Executive Committee, said that
the Kiev Rada had only spoken at Brest-Litovsk in the
name of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. The Ukrainian
Soviets had not been represented. As regards occupied ter-
ritories, the Ukrainian Executive Committee fully shared
the Russian Delegation’s standpoint, and declared that the
Ukrainian people refused to recognize any agreements or
treaties with the Kiev Rada.
Trotzky then stated that they had that day heard from
the head of the Kiev Delegation an extraordinarily impor-
tant change in the conception and principles of the Kiev
Rada regarding the international legal position of the
Ukraine. The Kiev Rada declined to join the Federative
Russian Republic, and that very afternoon the Russian
State had been recognized as a Federative Republic at the
TEIE PART OF UKRAINE 109.
Third Soviet Congress at Petrograd at which the Ukrainian
people had been represented. Continuing, Trotzky said:
Many quarters have overvalued the tendencies striv-
ing for secession in to-day’s revolutionary Russia. In
the border regions of the former Russian Empire the
separatist idea is advocated by those very groups and
classes which, under the old regime, were obstinate
supporters of centralization. In this separatism no
continuous historical tendency is perceptible. It
forms merely a transient weapon of defense in the
hands of those groups who feared the results for them-
selves of revolutionary power in Russia. The firmer
the power of the Soviets is established throughout
the country, the more did the propertied classes trans-
fer their separatist tendencies to the border regions.
If these clásses were to get the upper hand in the pres-
ent Russia they would again become the advocates of
centralization. Representatives of the Central Powers
could not here assume the rôle of arbiters in regard
to the present situation in Russia and the Ukraine. . . .
So long as the Delegation of the Kiev Rada retained
its plenipotentiary powers, he did not protest against
its independent participation in the negotiations. But
now that the representatives of the Ukrainian Execu-
tive Committee had joined the Russian Delegation, he
must repeat with redoubled emphasis that no agree-
ments with the Kiev Rada could be recognized unless
they were also recognized by the Russian Delegation.
Hereupon a member of the Kiev delegation, Lubynsky,
entered upon a detailed defense of the Kiev Rada and a
severe attack upon the Bolshevik Government. He laid
down the principle that
internal conflicts within the States are in no wise to be
brought to the cognizance of opposing parties during
official negotiations. But since the Ukrainian Rada
has proclaimed the independence of the Ukrainian
Republic, and since that Republic has also been rec-
ognized by friendly and other powers, these questions
have ceased to be internal questions for them, and their
110
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
mission now obliges them resolutely to protest against
false assertions made by M. Trotzky during their
absence.
The Bolsheviks’ loud declarations about the complete
liberty of the peoples of Russia are only coarse dema-
gogic expedients. The Bolsheviks’ Government,
which broke up the Constituent Assembly and which
is supported on the bayonets of the mercenaries of the
Red Guard, will never resolve to apply in Russia itself
the just principles of the right of self-determination.
The Bolshevik Government only proclaimed the prin-
ciple of self-determination in order to combat the prin-
ciple in its practical application. .
The struggle of the Petrograd Government against
the Government of the Ukrainian Republic and its
manifest insincerity on the occasion of the recognition
of our Delegation evoked suspicion on our part. . . .
On the day we left for Kiev to get our final instruc-
tions a fresh Delegation arrived here via Petrograd
and Dvinsk at the incitement and with the benevolent
co-operation of the Bolsheviks, its object being to un-
dermine our authority in the eyes of the laboring
masses of Europe.
In order to establish the rights of this Delegation,
we must go more closely into detail. The Ukrainian
people, united by common ideals and aspirations, which
incline to quiet and orderly forms of State life, Zeal-
ously devoted itself from the first to the long expected
possibility of State construction. As a result of this
labor, which had been prepared for through long years
of endeavor by Ukrainian politicians, and as the prod-
uct of Ukrainian revolutionary creative power, the
Ukrainian Rada came into being, composed of repre-
sentatives of Ukrainian soldiers, peasants and work-
men. The Ukrainian Rada, which chose as its first
Government the General Secretariat last June, thereby
formed the first Government in Russia which was solely
composed of Socialists. The Ukrainian people thus
created its own State, and the Petrograd Government
has no cause for interference in its internal affairs.
Already under the Czar's regime soldiers of non-
Ukrainian origin were sent by preference to the
TEIE PART OF UKRAINE 111
Ukraine and adjoining fronts, and it has not been pos-
sible during the Revolution to free the Ukraine from
these foreign elements. In some towns of the Ukraine
these troops established their soldiers’ Soviets which
have no influence on the life of the surrounding dis-
tricts, although frequently representatives of the local
workers participate in these Soviets. Desiring to in-
terfere in the internal life of the Ukrainians, the Pet-
rograd Bolsheviks began to demand that the entire
authority of government in the Ukraine should be
transferred to these soldiers’ Soviets without any re-
gard to the demands of the Bolsheviks at the Peace
Conference that foreign troops be removed from occu-
pied regions. The Ukrainian Government could not
comply with this demand.
A second ground for interference with the infernal
life of the Republic was furnished by the demand of
the Petrograd Bolsheviks, that a new election of the
Central Rada should be held. Apart from the fact
that such a demand constitutes an open violation of
the right of self-determination, it is also impracticable
because the electors have the right to recall their rep-
resentatives in the Rada and replace them. The elec-
tions for the Constituent Assembly for All Russia at
the end of November led all over the Ukraine to the
brilliant victory of the Ukrainian Central Rada. Over
75 per cent of the Ukrainian candidates were elected,
and of the Bolsheviks less than 10 per cent. In the
government of Kiev. 20 of our 22 candidates were
elected, in Podolia 18 out of 19, in Volhynia 9 out of
10, in Poltava 14 out of 17, etc. These are the masses
on which the Ukrainian Central Rada rests and in
whose name we come here to speak.
Finally the Petrograd Government, with the tacit
consent of the Central Rada, convoked a Ukrainian
Congress of peasants and soldiers for December 3 in
Kiev. Over 2,000 delegates attended and, against the
hopes of the conveners, began with a great ovation for
the Kiev Central Rada and its President, Professor
Gruzevski, and by an overwhelming majority expressed
full confidence in the Central Rada. After this a
small group of Bolsheviks about 80 strong fied to Khar-
kov and declared itself a new Government of the
112
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
\
Ukrainian Peoples’ Republic. The Peoples’ Commis-
Sars sent thither unorganized bands of Red Guards
to plunder the population of Kharkov and to protect
the Kharkov Government from the inhabitants. This
Government can hardly be regarded as representing
even the town of Kharkov.
Our future, our history, our descendants, and broad
masses of working people on both sides of the front
will decide which of us is Socialist and which counter-
revolutionary, which creates and which destroys that
which has been created.
Czernin then made the following statement:
In view of the altered attitude of the President of
the Russian Delegation at the plenary sitting of
January 30, according to which only such an agree-
ment with the Ukraine could be recognized and put
into force as was formally endorsed by the Government
of a Federative Republic of Russia, the Delegations of
the four Allied [Central] Powers make the following
declaration respecting the standpoint of the Kiev Peo-
ples’ Ministerial Council just set forth :
‘‘We have no reason to withdraw or restrict the rec-
ognition of the Ukrainian Delegation as an independ-
ent Delegation and as a plenipotentiary representative
of the Ukrainian Peoples’ Republic, which was ac-
corded at the plenary sitting of January 12. On the
contrary, we find ourselves disposed to recognize
the Ukrainian Peoples’ Republic as an independ-
ent, free and sovereign State which is in a position to
make independent international agreements.’’
Trotzky briefly remarked that he had not altered the con-
ception of the character of the Ukrainian State which he
had hitherto held. He must point out that it would be dif-
ficult for the Central Powers to state the geographical fron-
tiers of the Republic just recognized by them. At peace
negotiations, however, the frontiers of a State were not a
matter of no moment.
The sitting then closed. g
In a Petrograd account of the sitting of February 1, Sev-
erjuk, leader of the Kiev Delegation, is quoted as follows:
By this act the Ukrainian international position is
recognized by the Council of Workmen’s and Soldiers’
TEIE PART OF UKRAINE 113
110
111
Delegates as well as by the representatives of the four
Allied [Central] States, and also by the French Re-
public and the British Government, which have ap-
pointed and sent diplomatic representatives to the Gov-
ernment of the Ukrainian Peoples’ Republic.
A Finnish Deputation, issued on February 1 at Brest-
Litovsk, a declaration denying that the Finnish Govern-
ment had been overthrown and insisting that the revolu-
tionaries had succeeded merely in assuming power tempo-
rarily, by forcible means, in a small section of Southern
Finland. The Delegates contended that they represented
the rightful Finnish Government and possessed authority
to represent the country in the negotiations.
February 3. A meeting of the Committee on Political and
Territorial Questions was held.
Von Kuehlmann opened the discussion by declaring that
the standpoint of the Central Powers remained quite un-
changed regarding the invitation or admission of the West-
ern Border States to the negotiations.
Trotzky replied:
We for our part recognize the independence of the
Polish State to its full extent. But we cannot close
our eyes to the fact that its independence is only make-
believe so long as Poland is under the regime of occu-
pation.
Just because we recognize the absolute independence
and autonomy of the Polish people and State, we can-
not, without impugning the independence of the Polish
State, regard as representatives of the Polish people
those representatives who have been appointed by the
will of the occupying authorities.
Eſe added that he could only recognize a Deputation of
a Polish State based on the broad masses. In not recog-
nizing M. Kucharczewski’s Government as a plenipotentiary
Government of the Polish people, the Russian Delegation
by no means meant that it did not recognize the independ-
ence of the State or of the people.
Von Kuehlmann said he did not know why the Chairman
of the Russian Delegation to-day made an exception of
Poland, inasmuch as the affairs of Poland, Lithuania and
114 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
112
Courland had hitherto been discussed together. He be-
lieved, however, that he could perceive a certain advance in
the fact that Trotzky recognized the independence of the
Polish State to its full extent. If the Chairman of the
Russian Delegation would also recognize the independence
of the other Western Border peoples of Russia, the negotia-
tions would thereby make a considerable step forward.
Trotzky: “Has Germany recognized Finland?”
Von Kuehlmann : “Conditions there are still uncer-
tain.’’
Trotzky continued:
As to Finland, Russia will not interfere in the Fin-
nish revolution. As to Poland, Russia recognizes the
complete right of the Polish people to be free and inde-
pendent. But the present State is occupied by foreign
troops and the present Government can move only
within given limits. Either the Polish State is a State:
then it must have geographic boundaries. If it is a
Kingdom, then it must have a King. But without
either it is neither a State nor a Kingdom.
Czernin remarked:
The Polish State is still developing. The Russian
Republic is also without boundaries. The willingness
of the Central Powers to deal with radical States is
proved by the present negotiations. . . . I cannot ad-
mit that the question, whether the present Polish Gov-
ernment is entitled to represent the Polish State,
should be submitted to the arbitration of a third Gov-
ernment.
Both Czernin and von Kuehlmann protested that they
had not come to engage in an intellectual wrestling match.
At the close the German Secretary of State explained that
he was obliged by unavoidable duties to depart for a short
time, but said that during his absence the Political and the
Economic Committees could continue their negotiations.
The Supreme War Council of the Allies issued a state-
ment at Versailles from which the following excerpts are
taken:
The Supreme War Council gave the most careful
consideration to the recent utterances of the German
THE PART OF UKRAINE 115
113
114
Chancellor and the Austro-Hungarian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, but was unable to find in them any
approximation to the moderate conditions laid down
by the Allied Governments. This conviction was only
deepened by the impression made by the contrast be-
tween the professed idealistic aims with which the Cen-
tral Powers entered upon the present negotiations at
Brest-Litovsk and their now openly disclosed plans of
conquest and spoliation.
In the circumstances the Supreme War Council de-
cided that the only immediate task before them lay in
the prosecution, with the utmost vigor and in the
closest and most effective co-operation of the mili-
tary effort of the Allies until such time as the pressure
of that effort shall have brought about in the enemy
governments and peoples a change of temper which
would justify the hope of the conclusion of peace on
terms which would not involve the abandonment, in
face of an aggressive and unrepentant militarism, of
all the principles of freedom, justice and the respect
for the law of nations which the Allies are resolved to
vindicate. . . .
February 4. Von Kuehlmann and Czernin with their suite
left for Berlin where they arrived on February 4. On
that day Hindenburg, Ludendorff and Count von Wedel,
German Ambassador in Vienna, also arrived in Berlin.
The Bulgarian Premier Radoslavov and the Turkish Grand
Vizier Talaat Pasha arrived in Berlin on February 5. All
participated in important conferences with the German
Emperor on the Russian and Ukrainian peace situation.
The leading article in the semi-official North German
Gazette for February 4 contained the following Statements:
We have seen how the Maximalists, by long speeches
about the right of self-determination, have tried to
cause obstruction at Brest-Litovsk. The German peo-
ple must reckon with the possibility that these tactics
may be continued, and it will have to ask itself what
value, if any, Germany should attach to the conclusion
of peace with Northern Russia. . . . The Ukraine has
not been internally deranged by social revolutions to
the same extent as Northern Russia. The Central
116.
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
115
Powers have it in their power either to satisfy to a cer-
tain extent the territorial aspirations of the Ukraine
in regard to which they have already shown their sym-
pathy, or to place obstacles in their way.
The German ‘‘peace, bread and liberty” strikes were
finally suppressed—but not before a manifesto had been
addressed to the “Soviets’’ in Berlin and Vienna by the
Soviet of Petrograd through Zinoviev, its President.
Brothers: Across the barbed wire barriers of the
trenches, through the triple barrier of the military cen-
sorship, the news has filtered through to us of your
glorious fight against German and universal Imperial-
ism. The workers and soldiers of Petrograd have wel-
comed the news with transports of indescribable enthu-
siasm. At the very time when the Austro-German
landowners and bankers were making ready to strangle
unhappy, martyred Poland, and the Hoffmanns, Kuehl-
manns, and Hindenburgs were threatening the liberty
and independence of Courland and Lithuania, you
raised your voices in Vienna, Berlin, Hamburg, Kiel,
Nüremburg, Leipzig, and many other cities.
Brothers and companions in arms, by your strikes
and demonstrations and the creation of your Soviet of
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Delegates, you have shown that
the Austro-German working class will not allow the
hangmen and spoilers to impose a peace of violation
and annexations on the Socialist Republic of the
Soviets. We have never had a moment of greater joy
at the Soviet than to-day, when Comrades Liebknecht
and Adler were unanimously elected as Honorary
Presidents of the Soviet.
Brothers, throwing a retrospective glance back on
the road which has been traversed, we say this to you:
During the first months our Soviets floundered in a
‘‘social-patriotic” network, and it was only through
the bitter and too costly experience of our ‘‘patriots’’
that the Soviets have freed themselves from a series of
errors. Comrades, do not repeat this bitter experience.
At the present moment, too serious and too great a
responsibility rests upon the German workers’ move-
ment. The bankruptcy of a system of Society based
on a demoralized patriotism which has been renounced
TEIE PART OF UKRAINE 117.
116
117
by the better portions of the proletariat of the world
presents to your eyes an object-lesson of what the work-
ing class should avoid. Civil war in Russia is nearing
its end in the complete victory of the social revolution.
In Finland, that revolution is making way towards a
glorious end. The Soviets of Workers’ Delegates have
been born in Austria and Germany. The red spectre
of communism is invading the whole of Europe, and
the universal social revolution is here. Midnight has
struck. We must sacrifice all for the victory of So-
cialism. Our Socialist generation has been allotted
the great happiness of taking part in this decisive
Struggle.
The destined outcome of the peace pourparlers is
being decided not at Brest-Litovsk but in the streets of
Berlin and Vienna and other German and Austrian
cities. It is being decided within the walls of the
Council Chambers of the Soviets of Workers’ Delegates
in Berlin and Vienna. Brothers, we cordially believe
that you will do all that is possible to insure that the
peace powrparlers begun by the Russian Workmen’s
and Peasants’ Government with the Government of
Ruehlmann shall end in powrparlers between the Rus-
sian Workmen’s and Peasants’ Government with the
German Government of Liebknecht. All that is best
and heroic in the proletariat of the world is watch-
ing you. - - -
Comrades, members of the Soviets of Workers’ Dele-
gates of Berlin and Vienna, your victory will signify
the full and indisputable victory of Socialism, for two
victorious revolutions in Russia and in Germany will
be invincible. Long live the Soviets of Workmen’s
and Soldiers’ Delegates of Berlin and Viennal Long
live Communism *
By order of the Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Soviet of
Petrograd.
(Signed) ZINOVIEW, President.
February 6. Germany sent an ultimatum to Roumania
demanding peace within four days.
February 7. Von Kuehlmann and Czernin, returned to
Brest-Litovsk and another sitting of the Committee On
118 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
118
ºrial and Territorial Questions was held the following
ay.
Bodinski, the Russian Delcgation’s expert for Polish af-
fairs, read a statement in Russian which his colleague
Radek repeated in German. Both Delegates, who described
themselves as the sole appointed representatives of the Po-
lish people, demanded the immediate removal of the present
Government organs in Poland, and criticized the independ-
ence of Poland as hitherto developed. They further de-
clared that up to now revolutionary Russia alone had de-
fended the true interests of Poland’s freedom, and both
appealed to the Poles fighting in the German and Austro-
Hungarian armies.
Von Kuehlmann asked Trotzky whether this statement
was to be regarded as an official communication by the Rus-
sian Delegation. -
Trotzky replied that within the limits which the Russian
Delegation had fixed at the beginning of the negotiations,
these views were to be regarded as an official declaration,
and that in so far as they exceeded those limits they were
only to be considered as information.
Von Kuehlmann said that the statement appeared to be
wholly addressed to the gallery, and that it was quite in-
comprehensible to him how Trotzky could have imagined
that the negotiations could have been served by such pro-
vocative speeches. He emphatically refused to receive any
declarations from the Russian Delegation which did not
from the outset represent the official declarations of the
entire Delegation. He feared the patience of the Allied
[Central] Delegations would be put to a very hard test by
occurrences such as the speeches just listened to, and a
doubt must now arise, not on the part of the German press.
alone, whether the Russian Delegation really intended to
bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.
February 8. The decree abolishing the Russian National
Debt was published. Inasmuch as part of its purpose was
said to have been the exertion of additional pressure upon
the Allies to come to the aid of the Soviet Republic at
Brest-Litovsk, a reproduction of the decree will not be out
of place here: *
1. All State loans concluded by the Governments of
the Russian landlords and Russian bourgeoisie, enu-
THE PART OF UKRAINE 119.
merated in a special list, are hereby repudiated as from
December 14, 1917. The December coupons of these
loans are not paid.
2. In the same way are all the guarantees repudi-
ated which the said Governments gave to loans of va-
rious concerns and bodies.
3. All foreign loans, without exception, are abso-
lutely repudiated.
4. Short-term liabilities and Treasury bonds remain
in force. Interest on them is not paid, but the bonds
themselves have a currency along with credit notes.
5. Poorer citizens who hold State bonds of internal
loans to an amount of not more than 10,000 roubles
nominal receive in exchange certificates, made out in.
their names, of a new loan of the Russian Socialist
Federative Soviet Republic to an amount not exceeding
10,000 roubles. The terms of the loan will be fixed.
later on.
6. Deposits at the State savings banks and interest.
on them remain intact. All debentures of the an-
nulled loans which belong to the savings banks are:
replaced by a book debt on the part of the Russian.
Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.
7. Co-operative organizations, local government
bodies, and other democratic bodies or institutions of
common utility holding debentures of the repudiated
loans are to be given certificates in accordance with
rules to be drawn up by the Supreme Economic Coun-
cil in conjunction with representatives of these bodies,
which must prove that the debentures were acquired
by them previous to the publication of the present de-
cree. (Note.—The local organs of the Supreme Eco-
nomic Council have to determine which of the local
bodies can be regarded as democratic or of common
utility.)
8. The general direction of the liquidation of the
State loans is entrusted to the Supreme Economic
Council.
9. The work in connection with the liquidation of
the loans is entrusted to the State Bank, which shall
immediately begin the registration of all the deben-
tures of State loans and other interest-bearing papers
I20 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
in the hands of various holders, which may or may not
be subject to invalidation.
10. The Soviets, in agreement with the local eco-
nomic Councils, appoint committees to determine what
citizens are to be regarded as poor. These commit-
tees have the right to annul all savings not acquired
by personal labor, even if they do not exceed the sum
of 5,000 roubles.
119 February 8–9. After the return of the Delegations of the
Central Powers to Brest-Litovsk on February 6, the sep-
arate negotiations for a peace with the Ukraine were con-
tinued. An agreement on all points was established on
February 8. Owing to technical difficulties connected with
the framing of five treaty texts, it was not possible to hold
the formal final sitting of the Central Delegations and the
Ukrainian Delegation and affix signatures until the early
morning hours of February 9. Von Kuehlmann, as Presi-
dent, opened the sitting shortly before two in the morning.
He said:
Gentlemen: None of you will be able to close his
eyes to the historical significance of this hour at which
representatives of the four Allied [Central] Powers
are met in this hall with representatives of the Ukrain-
ian Peoples’ Republic to sign the first peace to be at-
tained in this world war. That this peace is signed
with a young State which has emerged from the
storms of the great war gives special satisfaction to
the representatives of the Allied [Central] Delega-
tions. May this peace be the first of a series of blessed
conclusions of peace, blessed both for the Allied [Cen-
tral] Powers and for the Ukrainian Peoples’ Republic,
for the future of which we all cherish the best wishes.
The President of the Ukrainian Delegation replied:
We state with joy that from this day peace begins
between the Quadruple Alliance and the Ukraine. It
is true that we came here in the hope that we should be
able to achieve a general peace and make an end of the
fratricidal war. The political position, however, is
such that not all the powers are met together here to
sign a general peace treaty. Inspired with the most
ardent love of our people and recognizing that this
long war has exhausted the cultural and national pow-
TEIE PART OF TERAINE 121
ers of our people, we must now direct all our strength
to do our part to bring about a new era and a new
birth. We are firmly persuaded that we conclude this
peace in the interest of our great democratic masses,
and that this peace will contribute to a general ter-
mination of the great war. We gladly state here that
the long and hard labor performed at Brest-Litovsk
has been crowned with success and that we have at-
tained a democratic peace that is honorable for both
parties. -
From to-day the Ukrainian Peoples’ Republic is born
to a new life. It enters as an independent State into
the circle of nations and ends the war on its front.
It will see to it that all the powers that in it lie will
rise to new life and flourish. -
At one minute before two von Kuehlmarin as the first
signatory signed the copy of the peace treaty prepared for
Germany and by 2:20 a. m. all the signatures were ap-
pended. -
The full text of the treaty with the Ukraine, in German
and with an English translation, has been published by the
British Government. An official summary of its terms was
issued by Germany immediately upon its conclusion. The
following extracts from the official summary are given:
Article I.-The contracting parties “declare that the
state of war between them is at an end. . . . They are re-
solved henceforth to live in peace and friendship with one
another.’’
Article II.-The borders between Austria-Hungary and
the Ukraine are to be “those frontiers which existed before
the outbreak of the present war.” Tentative frontiers are
fixed for “further north,’’ which are to be determined ‘‘in
detail by a mixed commission, according to ethnographical
conditions and with a regard to the desires of the popu-
Jation.’’
Article III.-‘‘The evacuation of occupied territories
will begin immediately after the ratification of the present
treaty. The manner of carrying out the evacuation and
transfer of the territories will be determined by the pleni-
potentiaries of the interested parties.”
122 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
190
Article IV.-Concerning the resumption of diplomatic
and consular relations.
Article V.-The contracting parties renounce reimburse-
ment of their war costs—that is to say, the state expendi-
ture for carrying on the war as well as indemnification of
damages—that is to say, those damages suffered by them.
and their subjects in the war as through military measures,
including all requisitions made in the enemy’s countries.
Article VI.-Concerning the exchange of prisoners of
WàI”.
Article VII.-‘‘The contracting parties undertake mu-
tually and without delay to enter into economic relations
and organize an exchange for goods on the basis of the fol-
lowing prescriptions:’’
(Then follow five lengthy sections outlining the manner
in which commodities are to be exchanged between the
Ukraine and Austria-Hungary and Germany.)
Article VIII.-Concerning the “restoration of public
and private legal relations,’’ interned civilians, amnesty,
merchantmen in enemy hands—all of these subjects to be
regulated in separate treaties.
Article IX.-‘‘The agreements made in this peace treaty
form an indivisible whole.’’
Article X.-The concluding part of the treaty provides:
“The present peace treaty will be ratified. Ratified docu-
ments shall be exchanged as soon as possible. So far as
there are no provisions to the contrary, the peace treaty
shall come into force on ratification.’’
A letter purporting to have been written about this time
from Brest-Litovsk by Trotzky to Lenin has had consider-
able currency, and, as far as known, its authenticity has
not been disputed. From the developments at the final
session on February 10 it would seem to give a true picture
of Trotzky’s attitude.
Dear Vladimir Ilyitch:
It is impossible to sign their peace. They already
have agreed with fictitious Governments of Poland,
Lithuania, Courland and others concerning territorial
TEIE PART OF TJECRAINE 123,
concessions and military and customs treaties. In
view of “self-determination,” these provinces, accord-
ing to German interpretation, are already independent
States, and as independent States they already have
concluded territorial and other agreements with Ger-
many and Austria-Hungary.
To-day I put these questions squarely and received a
reply leaving no room for misunderstandings. Every-
thing is stenographed. To-morrow we shall present
the same questions in writing. We cannot sign their
peace. My plan is this:
We announce the termination of the war and demo-
bilization without signing any peace. We declare we
cannot participate in the looting war of the Allies nor
can we sign a looting peace. Poland’s, Lithuania’s
and Courland’s fate we place upon the responsibility
of the German working people.
The Germans will be unable to attack us after we
declare the war ended. At any rate, it would be very
difficult for Germany to attack us, because of her in-
ternal condition. The Scheidemannites adopted a for-
mal resolution to break with the Government if it
makes annexationist demands of the Russian revolu-
tion.
The Berliner Tageblatt and the Vossische Zeitung
demand an understanding with Russia by all means.
The Centrists favor an agreement. The internal strife
is demoralizing the government. Bitter controversy is
raging in the press over the struggle on the western
front.
We declare we end the war but do not sign a peace.
They will be unable to make an offensive against us.
If they attack us, our position will be no worse than
now, when they have the opportunity to proclaim and
declare us agents of England and Wilson after his
speech and to commence an attack.
We must have your decision. We can still drag on
negotiations for one or two or three or four days.
Afterward they must be broken off. I see no other
solution than that proposed. I clasp your hand.
Yours,
TROTZKY.
Answer by direct wire: “I agree to your plan” or
‘‘I don’t agree.’’
124 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
121
February 9. The final session of the Committee on Polit.
ical and Territorial Questions was held under the chair-
manship of von Kuehlmann.
Von Kuehlmann:
. . . We have reached the point where it is neces-
sary to give an account of the negotiations. As we
all know, these negotiations have been of a political
character. . . . I regret to say that up to the present
we have not succeeded in bringing together to any
great extent the two points of view in spite of the de-
bates. . . . Faithful to my principles during all the
negotiations, I still hope that a free discussion of prin-
ciples may bring us nearer to our goal. But I shall
dispel all doubts, and I say that the circumstances at
the moment are of such a character that we must reach
a decision promptly. . . . In putting these questions
again before you, I only wish to tell you that I desire
to see them all connected up, the one with the other.
The commissions have already discussed all the details.
. . . So far as the economic questions are concerned,
the preparatory work of the commissions has not at
present sufficiently progressed; nevertheless I hope
that in regard to these questions, during the short time
which remains at our disposal, we shall reach some sat-
isfactory agreement—satisfactory to both sides.
Czernin:
. . . I think that the past discussions have shown the
different points of view qualifying the territorial
changes which must take place. But they have not
indicated that an agreement in these matters is impos-
sible. Secretary of State von Kuehlmann on Decem-
ber 28 clearly stated what changes must take place.
They concern Courland and Lithuania, parts of Livo-
nia and Esthonia, and also Poland. Let us put aside
the question as to how these proposed changes are to
be characterized. Let us try and clear up the point as
to whether these disputed questions would form an
obstacle to the conclusion of peace.
Trotzky:
. . . The peace negotiations began with our declara-
tion of December 22 and the reply of the Quadruple
Alliance through its declaration of December 25.
THE PART OF UKRAINE 125
These two statements formulated the object of the ne-
gotiations as being based on the principle of the self-
determination of peoples. During a short interval—
which could be measured by hours—it appeared that
this principle, accepted by both sides, would serve as a
means for the solution of the national and territo-
rial questions arising out of the war. But after an
exchange of views on December 27 it became clear
that the appeal to this principle was of a character
calculated only to complicate all other questions. The
point of view of our side, as applied by the other side,
was a direct negation of the very principle itself.
Afterward, the discussions took on an entirely aca-
demic character, without any prospect of a practical
settlement, because the opposite side was striving, with
the aid of complicated logical manoeuvres, to draw from
the principle of self-determination what, in their opin-
ion, was in accordance with the actual situation as dis-
closed by the military maps.
The question of the occupied territories, which was
the principal theme of all the discussions, was reduced
after a number of sessions to the question of the evac-
uation of the occupying troops. . . . The first formula
of the other side, so far as we understood it—and we
honestly tried to understand it—was as follows: Un-
til the end of the war, so far as Germany and Austria-
Hungary were concerned, there could be no question
of the evacuation of occupied territory on any front,
owing to military considerations. Our Delegation
later understood that the opposite side had now the
intention of evacuating these occupied regions on the
conclusion of a general peace, when the above men-
tioned strategical considerations would have been put
aside. This conclusion of ours, however, also ap-
peared to be wrong. The German and Austro-
Hungarian Delegations have refused categorically to
make a declaration which would bind them to with-
draw their troops from the occupied regions, with the
exception of the small belt of territory which they pro-
posed to return to Russia. The situation only then
became clear. This clarity became, if possible,
greater when General Hoffmann in the name of both
Delegations proposed to us the frontier line which
would in future separate Russia from its western
126
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
neighbors. These neighbors were actually to be Ger-
many and Austria-Hungary, inasmuch as the separated
regions were to be occupied by their troops for an in-
definite period unrestricted by any treaty. . . .
The new frontier proposed by the other side is dic-
tated by military and strategic considerations, and
from this point of view must be judged not only the
separation from Russia of Poland and Lithuania, but
even the separation of the Lettish countries. If such
had been the desire of the peoples of these regions,
then no danger would arise for the safety of the Rus-
sian Republic. Friendly relations with these States,
which had freely formed for themselves an independ-
ent existence, would follow as a natural consequence
of their origin and their conditions. . . . But these
new frontiers which the opposite side proposes appear
to us in a very different light. Germany and Austria-
Bungary, while maintaining their troops in the occu-
pied regions are linking these regions to their States
by railways and by other means, and for us the new
frontier must thus be considered not as a frontier with
Poland, Lithuania and Courland and so on, but as a
frontier with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Both
these are seeking military expansion, as is clearly
shown by their attitude toward the occupied regions.
. . . What are really the military conceptions of the
other side when they ask for such a frontier ? For the
purpose of examining this new question from the point
of view of the leading military institutions of the Re-
public, I shall ask for the views of our military ad-
TVISCI*S.
We have here to meet a new difficulty. We have
heard nothing of that part of the new frontier which
is to run to the south from Brest-Litovsk. The oppo-
site side was of the opinion that this part of the fron-
tier had to be established in discussion with the Dele-
gation of the Kiev Rada. . . . We officially informed
the other side that the Ukrainian Rada was deposed.
Nevertheless the negotiations with a non-existent Gov-
ernment have been continued. We proposed to the
Austro-Hungarian Delegation, in a private conversa-
tion, it is true, but formally nevertheless, that they
should send their representatives to Ukrainia with the
TEIE PART OF UKRAINE - 127
object of seeing for themselves that the Ukrainian Rada
no longer existed and that the negotiations with its
Delegation could not have any practical value. We
understood that so far as the Delegations of the Cen-
tral Powers needed confirmation of facts they would
postpone the signature of the Peace Treaty until the
return of their representative from Ukrainia. We
have been informed that the signature of the peace
treaty could not be postponed any longer. While nego-
tiating with the Government of the Federative Russian
Republic, the Governments of the Central Empires, in
spite of their former declaration, not only hurried to
recognize the independence of the Ukrainian Republic
on February 1, at the very moment when it declared
itself to be a part of the Russian Federation, but are
signing a treaty with a Government which, as we have
categorically declared to the other side, does not exist
any longer. Such conduct is creating doubts as to
whether there is any sincerity of purpose on the side
of the Central Powers for the establishment of peace-
ful relations with the Russian Federation. We are
striving for peace now as in the beginning of the nego-
tiations. . . . Only such a peace treaty will be binding
for the Russian Federative Republic and its countries
as will be signed by our Delegation. . . . We ask the
opposite side to complete on our map the frontier line
which was submitted to us by General Hoffmann.
Von Kuehlmann :
If I am not replying to the detailed explanation of
the preceding speaker, it is as I have already stated
to-day with the purpose of avoiding every controversy.
Accordingly, I shall not reply to the historical review
of our negotiations. They have become public; they
can be studied and compared. . . .
I shall propose that the question of frontiers be first
submitted to a military sub-commission. . . . This
sub-commission could be formed at the present session
and must prepare for our next session, to-morrow, a
report concerning the results of its discussions. . . .
Our policy as regards the newly created States will
always be directed toward the maintenance of friendly
relations and non-intervention in their internal life, as
soon as this war is satisfactorily ended.
128
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
That is all I have to say concerning the fron-
tiers. . . .
Concerning the . . . Ukraine, the point of view of
the Central Powers has been repeatedly stated here,
and we are of the opinion that all further explanation
is unnecessary. The Central Powers have concluded
to-day a peace with the representatives of the Central
Rada which they have recognized. The consequences
for the Central Powers are obvious. . . . This is no
hostile act against Russia. We have concluded with
the Ukraine no Alliance, but only a Peace Treaty.
Ukrainia has not become our Ally, but only a neutral
State. If we could arrive at a peace with Russia,
Russia would also become a neutral State. In such
case our relations to Russia would be the same as they
are now to the Ukraine. There will be a difference if
we are unable to come to an agreement with the Gov-
ernment of the Peoples’ Commissaries, because then
. . . those regions, which submit themselves to the
authority of the Council of People’s Commissars, we
shall have to consider as regions against which we are
in a state of war. We are willing to avoid that by a
conclusion of peace with Russia. If we had ignored
the Rada, as M. Trotzky wished, that would have
meant that we should have to intervene in the internal
life of Russia. And we will not do it. . . . We are
not arbiters in questions which concern only Russia
herself. . . . We do not demand that the President of
the Russian Delegation shall renounce his claim for the
authority of the Soviet for the whole of former Rus-
sia. We shall avoid difficulties if we sign an event-
ual treaty concerning these regions which are under
the authority of the Council of the Peoples’ Commis-
sars. How many regions such a treaty would concern
we cannot tell at present. We realize that such a
treaty would be concluded without knowing for which
regions exactly it would be valid; but the situation
which would be created would be more disagreeable
for us than for the Government of the Russian Repub-
lic. Nevertheless we agreed to do it for the sake of
peace.
Concerning the . . . fate of the occupied regions
. . . I cannot give the categorical reply asked for by
THE PART OF UKRAINE 129
the President of the Russian Delegation, but I gladly
agree that a communication on this subject should be
made to the sub-commission.
Czernin:
I agree completely with the preceding speaker . . .
and I do not see any reasonable objection why a reply
could not be given to this question afterward.
Trotzky:
. . . It seems to me that there can be no objection to
the creation of a military technical sub-commission
which will have to examine the question of fron-
tiers. .
Von Kuehlmann :
. . . Our proposal has been known a long time. All
the questions concerned have been discussed in detail,
and I firmly believe that all arguments have already
been used and that now we must bring them to a con-
clusion with a view to making a decision concerning
our peace negotiations. I have already stated our pro-
posal, which, in a certain degree, replaces Article II
of the projected peace treaty. This formula is as fol-
lows:
Russia must agree to the following territorial
changes which will enter into force after the ratifica-
tion of the peace treaty: The regions between the
frontiers of Germany and Austria-Hungary and the
indicated line will not be in the future a dependency
of Russia. As a result of their former adhesion to the
Russian Empire no obligation will bind them to Rus-
sia. The further destiny of these regions will be set-
tled in agreement with the peoples concerned, namely,
on the basis of those agreements which have been con-
cluded between them and Germany and Austria-
Hungary.
In handing over this formula to the President of
the Russian Delegation, I state that an essential part
of our proposal is included in Article I [of the draft
of the projected treaty] which we have already suf-
ficiently discussed. . . . -
I will give my point of view in a few words. It is
as follows: The evacuation of certain territories was
I 30
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSE
promised by us under the condition that at the same
time the evacuation of regions taken from our Allies
should be carried out. At that time we considered, as
the nearest date when the evacuation was to begin, the
date of the complete demobilization of the Russian
army. I state that concerning this date we are ready
to compromise and I must repeat what I have already
stated. I declare that we cannot accept a peace treaty
in which it is not diplomatically promised to evacuate
the provinces taken from our Allies. In accordance
with the explanation given by the People’s Commis-
sar for Foreign Affairs, I think there is no ground
for doubt that the troops which are in occupation of
Turkish provinces are under the authority of the Pet-
rograd Government. I shall touch here also the sec-
ond clause, which has been discussed by us many times,
namely, the question of the Aland Islands. I must
point out that the peace treaty must give us at least
the same rights as we had before the beginning of the
war. I shall also recall to you the most passionate
wish of the Swedish people to reunite with these islands
where they have, aside from geographical and eth-
nographical considerations, the most vital interests.
Trotzky:
Concerning the evacuation of the Turkish provinces,
we find in our principles sufficiently weighty consid-
erations for our declarations, that the evacuation of
the Armenian territories could not be considered sim-
ply as exchange for the evacuation of the one or the
other portions of the occupied Russian territories. As
we are withdrawing our troops from Persia, we shall
also withdraw them—we have already begun it—from
Armenia. It is beyond doubt that we shall establish
that clearly in our peace treaty with Turkey, if our
negotiations should advance so far. Concerning the
Aland Islands, I must say that I did not understand
of what minimum of rights the Secretary of State was
speaking. If he had in view the obligation of Russia
not to fortify these islands, . . . we have, as is known,
in our possession documents which prove that in 1907
von Schoen for Germany and Gubastov for Czarist
Russia signed a treaty, which cannot be published, in
which von Schoen declared that Germany would not
THE PART OF UKRAINE 131
192
123
consider it a breach of the treaty of Paris if Russia
fortified the Aland Islands. Before the question can
be discussed, my opinion is that it should be prepared
from a technical point of view by the military com-
mission.
Von Kuehlmann:
In remaining faithful to my statement at the be-
ginning of the session, I will not discuss the importance
of the document which the preceding speaker refers
to. I shall once again express my opinion in a few
words, that the Peace Treaty must return us all the
rights which we possessed before the war. As far as
these Islands are concerned, it is a demand of prin-
ciple. If in the opinion of the President of the com-
mission we did not possess any rights before the war
then such a demand must appear to him as one which
can be easily agreed upon. I used the word minimum
with the object of expressing exactly that our demand
is for us a demand of principle. If some one asked
me of what I was thinking in using the word maxi-
mum, then I should reply, as I have suggested several
times previously, that it means the neutralization of
these Islands by the consent of the peoples on the
borders of the Baltic Sea.
For the further discussion we need some prepara-
tory work by the sub-commission. . . . In any case I
propose to have our next session at six o'clock p. m.
We shall discuss the report of the sub-commission. . . .
After remarks concerning the personnel of the sub-
commission, von Kuehlmann declared the session closed.
February 10. Before the final plenary session took place
the military sub-commission held two sittings, under the
chairmanship of Dr. Gratz. The Russian military ex-
perts attempted to demonstrate the strategical disadvan-
tages to which Russia would be exposed by the new fron-
tier line, while the Germans denied this contention, adding
that it was not a matter of the Russo-German frontier, but
of the frontier between Russia and the new border States.
The sub-commission could not reach an agreement.
The final plenary sitting of all the Delegations was held
on the same day. -
132 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
Dr. Gratz having reported that no agreement could be
reached in the military sub-commission as to frontiers, von
Kuehlmann asked Trotzky whether he had any communica-
tion to make which might contribute to a satisfactory solu-
tion. This question led to the final rupture.
Trotzky, replying, said his Delegation considered that
the decisive hour had arrived. After an attack on im-
perialism, he declared that,
while Russia was desisting from signing a formal Peace
Treaty, it declared the state of war to be ended with
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria,
simultaneously giving orders for the complete demo-
bilization of Russian forces on all fronts.
This announcement, he said, had been made by wireless
to all peoples and their Governments. -
To this statement von Kuehlmann rejoined that, if he
analyzed the present situation correctly, the Quadruple
[Central] Alliance was still at war with the Russian Gov-
ernment. Acts of war had been ended when Russia and
the Allies had signed the armistice, but on the lapse of
the armistice warfare would automatically revive. The fact
that one of the two contracting parties had demobolized
its armies would in no wise alter this situation. The ex-
istence of the customary international relations between
States was the mark of a state of peace. He therefore re-
quested Trotzky to say where the frontiers of Russia ran
and whether Russia was willing to resume diplomatic, legal
and commercial relations with the Central Powers. It was
essential to determine these questions in order to judge
whether or not the Quadruple [Central] Alliance was still
at war. Von Kuehlmann then proposed a sitting for the
next day, at which the attitude of the Central Powers to
the latest statement of the Russian Delegation might be
made known. t
Trotzky replied that his Delegation had now exhausted
its powers and considered it necessary to return to Petro-
grad. The Central Powers might communicate with
Petrograd by wireless or through the Commissions of the
Central Powers then in Petrograd.
The sitting then closed.
124
195
|
x. NO WAR AND NO PEACE
A wireless addressed “To All Whom It May Concern,”
dated at Brest-Litovsk, Feb. 10, 1918, and signed by the
entire Russian Delegation, reads:
The peace negotiations are at an end. German
capitalists, bankers and landlords, supported by the
silent coöperation of the English and French bour-
geoisie, Submitted to our comrades, the members of
the Peace Delegation at Brest-Litovsk, conditions such
as could not be subscribed to by the Russian Revo-
lution.
The Governments of Germany and Austria desire
to possess countries and peoples vanquished by force
of arms. . . . We could not sign a peace which would
bring with it sadness, oppression and suffering to mil-
lions of workmen and peasants. But we also cannot,
will not, and must not continue a war which was be-
gun by Tsars and capitalists. We will not and we
must not continue to be at war with Germans and Aus-
trians—workmen and peasants like ourselves. . . .
Our Delegation, fully conscious of its responsibility
before the Russian people and the oppressed workers
and peasants of other peoples declared on February
10 . . . that it refuses to sign an annexationist treaty.
Russia for her part declares the present war with
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria at
an end. . . .
February 11. President Wilson, in replying to the ad-
dresses of January 24 of the German Chancellor and the
Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs made one
direct reference to the Brest negotiations: ‘‘Count Hert-
ling’s reply . . . confirms I am sorry to say rather than
removes the unfortunate impression made by what we had
learned of the conferences at Brest-Litovsk.”
134 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
126
128
February 12. An official announcement was made in Lon-
don that “the British do not consider themselves bound
to recognize the peace concluded between the Austro-Ger-
mans and those who have signed it on behalf of the
Ukraine.”
Lloyd George in the House of Commons said:
The action of Germany in reference to Russia proves
that all her declarations about no annexations and no
indemnities have no real meaning. . . . In spite of
the undertaking given by the Germans to the Rus-
sians that during the period of the armistice no troops
would be moved from the East to the West, they are
moving them as speedily as railway and transport ar-
rangements will allow. That has to be kept in mind
when we discuss terms of peace, because it has a real
... bearing upon guarantees. &
February 14. Trotzky reported on the course and results
of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations before the Central Exec-
utive Committee of the Soviets. An official statement is-
sued at the close of the session declares that “a resolution
was passed which approves the whole of the policy of the
Brest-Litovsk Delegation of the Council of the People's
Commissaries.”
Trotzky reviewed the history of the peace negotiations
as follows:
“When history put before the Russian Revolution the
question of the peace negotiations, we had no doubt
that in these negotiations, and so long as the decisive
power of the revolutionary proletariat of the world
had not interfered, we should be compelled to stand
the bill of three and a half years of war. There was
no doubt in our minds that in the person of Ger-
man imperialism we were dealing with an opponent
who was saturated with the consciousness of his im-
mense power, which was strikingly revealed during the
present War.
NO WAR AND NO PEACE 135
All the arguments made by bourgeois cliques that
we might have been incomparably stronger if we had
conducted these negotiations together with our Allies
are absolutely without foundation. In order that we
might at an indefinite future date conduct negotiations
together with our Allies, we should first of all have
had to continue the war together with them. And if
our country was weakened and exhausted, the contin-
uation of the war, a failure to bring it to a conclusion,
would have still further weakened and exhausted it.
We should have had to settle the war under conditions
still more unfavorable to us. In the case even that the
combination of which Russia, owing to international
intrigues of Czarism and the bourgeoisie, had become
a part—the combination headed by Great Britain—
in the case even that this combination had come out of
the war completely victorious—let us for a moment
admit the possibility of such a not very probable issue
—even in that case, comrades, it does not mean that
Our country would also have come out victorious. For
during further continuation of this protracted war,
Russia would have become even more exhausted and
plundered than now. The masters of that combina-
tion, who would concentrate in their hands the fruits
of the victory, that is, Great Britain and America,
Would have displayed toward our country the same
methods which were displayed by Germany during the
*
peace negotiations. It would be absurd and childish .
to appraise the politics of the imperialistic countries
from the point of view of any considerations other
than those considerations of naked interests and mate-
rial power. Consequently, if we, as a nation, are at
present weakened before the imperialism of the world,
We are Weakened, not because of extricating ourselves
from the fiery ring of the war, having already pre-
viously extricated ourselves from the shackles of inter-
national military obligations: no! we are weakened by
that very policy of the Czarists and the bourgeois
classes, which we, as a revolutionary party, have al-
Ways fought against before this war and during this
War.
136
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOVSK
~
You remember, comrades, under what conditions our
delegation went to Brest-Litovsk last time, right after
one of the sessions of the Third All-Russian Congress
of the Soviets. At that session, we reported on the
state of the negotiations, and the demands of our oppo-
nents. These demands, as you remember, were really
no more than masked, or, rather, half-masked annexa-
tionist aspirations at the expense of Lithuania, Cour-
land, a part of Livonia, the Isles of Moon Sound, as
well as a half-masked demand for a punitive war in-
demnity which we then estimated would amount to six,
eight or even ten milliards of rubles. During the in-
terruption of the sessions, which continued for about
ten days, a considerable disturbance took place in
Austria-Hungary; strikes of masses of workers broke
out, and these strikes were the first recognition of our
methods of conducting peace negotiations that we met
with from the proletariat of the Central Empires, as
against the annexationist demands of German mili-
tarism. We promised here no miracles, but we did say
that the road we were pursuing was the only road re-
maining to the revolutionary democracy for securing
the possibility of its further development.
There is room for complaint that the proletariat of
the other countries, and particularly of the Central
Empires, is too slow to enter the road of open revolu-
tionary struggle, yes, it must be admitted that the
pace of its development is all to slow—neverthe-
less, there could be observed a movement in Austria-
Hungary which swept the entire country and which
was a direct echo of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations.
Leaving for Brest-Litovsk, it was our common opin-
ion that there was no ground to believe that just this
wave would sweep away Austro-German militarism.
If we had been convinced that this could be ex-
pected, we would gladly have given the promise that
several persons demanded from us, namely, that under
no circumstances would we sign a separate peace with
Germany. I said at that very time, that we could not
make such a promise, for it would amount to taking
NO WAR AND NO PIEACE 137
upon ourselves the obligation of vanquishing German
militarism. The secret of attaining such a victory was
not in our possession. And inasmuch as we would not
undertake the obligation to change the balance of the
world powers at a moment’s notice, we frankly and
openly declared that revolutionary power may under
certain conditions be compelled to agree to an annexa-
tionist peace. A revolutionary power would fall short
of its high principles only in the event that it should
attempt to conceal from its own people the predatory
character of the peace, but by no means, however, in
the event that the course of the struggle should com-
pel it to adopt Such a peace.
At the same time, we indicated that we were leav-
ing to continue negotiations under conditions which
were seemingly improving for us and becoming worse
for our enemies. We observed the movement in Aus-
tria-Hungary, and there were signs indicating (this
was made the basis for statements by representatives
of the German Social Democracy in the Reichstag)
that Germany was on the eve of similar events. We
went with this hope. During the first days of this visit
to Brest-Litovsk the wireless brought us from Vilna
the first news that in Berlin an enormous strike move-
ment was developing; this movement as well as that of
Austria-Hungary was directly connected with the
course of negotiations in Brest. However, as is often
the case, by reason of the dialectic of the class struggle,
just this conspicuous beginning of the proletarian ris-
ing, which surpassed anything Germany had ever seen,
was bound to push the property classes to a closer con-
solidation and to greater hostility against the proleta-
riat. The German dominating classes are saturated
with a sufficiently strong instinct of self-preservation
to understand that concessions in such an exigency as
they were in, under the pressure of the masses of their
own people—concessions however small—would amount
to capitulation before the idea of the revolution. That
is why, after the first moment of perplexity and panic,
the time when Kuehlmann deliberately dragged out
the negotiations by minor and formal questions, had
passed—as soon as the strikes were disposed of, as soon
as he came to the conclusion that for the time being
138
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-I/ITOWSE
no imminent danger threatened his masters, he again
changed front and adopted a tone of unlimited self-
confidence and aggression.
Our negotiations were complicated by the participa-
tion of the Kiev Rada. We called attention to this last
time, too. The delegation from the Kiev Rada ap-
peared at a time when the Rada represented a fairly
strong organization in the Ukraine and when the way
out of the war had not yet been predetermined. Just
at that time, we made the Rada an official offer to con-
clude a definite treaty with us, making as one of the
conditions of such a treaty the following demand:
that the Rada declare Kaledin and Kornilov to be
counter-revolutionists and put no hindrance in the way
of our waging war on these two leaders. The dele-
gation from the Kiev Rada arrived, just when we
hoped to reach an understanding with it on these mat-
ters. We declared that as long as the people of the
Ukraine recognized the Rada, we considered its in-
dependent participation in these negotiations permis-
sible. But with the further development of events in
Russian territory and in the Ukraine, and the more
the antagonism between the Ukrainian masses and the
Rada increased, the greater became the Rada’s readi-
ness to conclude any kind of treaty with the govern-
ments of the Central Empires, and, if need be, to drag
German imperialism into the internal affairs of the
Russian Republic, in order to support the Rada against
the Russian revolution.
On the 9th day of February we learned that the
peace negotiations carried on behind our backs between
the Rada and the Central Powers, had been signed.
The 9th of February happened to be the birthday of
Leopold of Bavaria, and, as is the custom in monarchi-
cal countries, the triumphant historical act was timed—
with or without the consent of the Kiev Rada for this
festive day. General Hoffmann had a salute fired in
honor of Leopold of Bavaria, having previously asked
permission to do so of the Kiev Delegation, since by
the treaty of peace Brest-Litovsk had been ceded to
the Ukraine.
Events had taken such a turn, however, that at the
time General Hoffmann was asking permission for a
NO WAR AND NO PEACE 139
military salute, the Kiev Rada had but very little ter-
ritory left outside of Brest-Litovsk. On the strength
of the telegrams we had received from Petrograd, we
officially made it known to the Central Powers’ Delega-
tion that the Kiev Rada no longer existed, a circum-
stance which certainly had some bearing on the course
of the peace negotiations. We suggested to Count
Czernin that his representatives accompany our officers
into Ukrainian territory to ascertain whether the Kiev
Rada existed or not. Czernin seemed to welcome this
suggestion, but when we asked him if this meant that
the treaty made with the Kiev Delegation would not
be signed before the return of his own mission, he hesi-
tated and promised to ask Kuehlmann about it. Hav-
ing inquired, he sent us an answer in the negative.
This was on February 8th. By the 9th, they had to
sign the treaty. This could not be delayed, not only
on account of Leopold's birthday, but for a more im-
portant reason, which Kuehlmann undoubtedly ex-
plained to Czernin: “If we should send our represent-
atives into the Ukraine just now, they might really
convince themselves that the Rada does not exist; and
then we shall have to face a single All-Russian delega-
tion which would spoil our prospects in the negotia-
tions.” . . . By the Austro-Hungarian Delegation we
were advised to put principle aside and to place the
question on a more practical plane. Then the German
Delegation would be disposed to concessions. . . . It
was unthinkable that the Germans should decide to
continue the war over, say, the Moon Islands, if you
put this demand in concrete form. -
We replied that we were ready to look into such
concessions as their German colleagues were prepared
to make. “So far we have been contending for the
self-determination of the Lithuanians, Poles, Livonians,
Letts, Esthonians, and other peoples; and on all these
issues you have told us that such self-determination
is out of the question. Now let us see what your plans
are in regard to the self-determination of another peo-
ple—the Russians; what designs and plans of a
military strategic nature are behind your seizure of the
Moon Islands. For these islands, as an integral part of
an independent Esthonian Republic, or as a possession
of the Federative Russian Republic would have only a
140
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSE
defensive military importance, while in the hands of
Germany they would assume offensive significance,
menacing the most vital centers of our country, and
especially Petrograd.”
But, of course, Hoffmann would make no concessions
whatsoever. Then the hour for reaching a decision
had come. We could not declare war, for we were too
weak. The army had lost all of its internal ties. In
order to save our country, to overcome this disorgan-
ization, it was imperative to establish the internal
coherence of the toilers. This psychological tie can
only be created by constructive work in factory, field
and workshop. We had to return the masses of labor-
ers, who had been subjected to great and intense suf-
fering—who had experienced catastrophes in the war
—to the fields and factories, where they must find
themselves again and get a footing in the labor world,
and rebuild internal discipline. This was the only
way to save the country, which was now atoning for
the sins of Czarism and the bourgeoisie. We had to
get out of the war and withdraw the army from the
slaughter house. Nevertheless, we threw this in the
face of the German militarism: The peace you are
forcing down our throats is a peace of aggression and
robbery. We cannot permit you, Messrs. Diplomats,
to say to the German workingmen: “You have char-
acterized our demands as avaricious, as annexationist.
But look, under these very demands we have brought
you the signature of the Russian revolution.” Yes,
we are weak, we cannot fight at present. But we have
sufficient revolutionary courage to say that we shall not
willingly affix our signature to the treaty which you
are writing with the sword on the body of living peo-
ples. We refused to affix our signature. I believe
we acted properly, comrades.
I do not mean to say, friends, that a German advance
upon Russia is out of the question. It were too rash
to make such an assertion in view of the great strength
of the German imperialistic party. But I do believe
that the stand we have taken in the matter has ren-
dered it far more difficult for German militarism to
advance upon us. What would happen if it should
advance? To this there is but one thing to say: If
it is possible in our country, a country completely ex-
!
NO WAIR AND NO PEACE 14],
hausted and in a state of desperation, to raise the
spirits of the more revolutionary energetic elements;
if a struggle in defence of our Revolution and the
territory comprised within it is still possible, then this
is the case only as a result of our abandoning the War
and refusing to sign the peace treaty.’’
* During the first few days following the breaking
off of negotiations the German Government hesitated,
not knowing what course to pursue. The politicians and
diplomats evidently thought that the principal objects
had been accomplished and that there was no reason
for coveting our signatures. The military men were
ready, in any event, to break through the lines drawn
by the German Government at Brest-Litovsk. Pro-
fessor Krigge, the advisor of the German Delegation,
told a member of our Delegation that a German inva-
sion of Russia under the existing conditions was out
of the question. Count Mirbach, then at the head of
the German missions at Petrograd, went to Berlin with
the assurance that an agreement concerning the ex-
change of prisoners of war had been satisfactorily
reached. But all this did not in the least prevent Gen-
eral Hoffmann from declaring on the fifth day after
the Brest-Litovsk negotiations had been broken off—
that the armistice was over, antedating the Seven-day
period from the time of the last Brest-Litovsk session.
It were really out of place to dilate here on the moral
indignation caused by this piece of dishonesty. It fits
in perfectly with the general state of diplomatic and
military morality of the ruling classes.
The new German invasion developed under circum-
stances most fatal for Russia. Instead of the week’s
notice agreed upon, we received notice only two days
in advance. This circumstance intensified the panic
in the army which was already in a state of chronic dis-
solution. Resistance was almost unthinkable. The sol-
diers could not believe that the Germans would advance
after we had declared the state of war at an end. The
panicky retreat paralyzed the will even of such indi-
vidual detachments as were ready to make a stand.
In the workingmen’s quarters of Petrograd and Mos-
* The remainder of this item is not a part of Trotzky's speech,
but is a further extract from his book “From October to Brest-
Litovsk.”
142
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
cow, the indignation against the treacherous and truly
murderous German invasion reached a pitch of great-
est intensity. In these alarming days and nights, the
workers were ready to enlist in the army by the ten
thousand. But the matter of organizing lagged far
behind. Isolated tenacious detachments full of enthu-
siasm became convinced themselves of their instability
in their first serious clashes with German regulars.
This still further lowered the country’s spirits. The
old army had long ago been hopelessly defeated and
was going to pieces, blocking all the roads and byways.
The new army, owing to the country’s general exhaus-
tion, the fearful disorganization of industries and the
means of transportation, was being got together too
slowly. Distance was the only serious obstacle in the
way of the German invasion.
The chief attention of the Austro-Hungarian govern-
ment was centered on the Ukraine. The Rada, through
its Delegation, had appealed to the Governments of the
Central Tºmpires for direct military aid against the
Soviets, which had by that time completely defeated
the Ukrainians. Thus did the petty-bourgeois democ-
racy of the Ukraine, in its struggle against the work-
ing class and the destitute peasants, voluntarily open
the gates to foreign invasion.
At the same time, the Svinhufvud government was
seeking the aid of German bayonets against the Fin-
nish proletariat. German militarism, openly and be-
fore the whole world, assumed the rôle of executioner
of the peasant and proletarian revolution in Russia.
In the ranks of our party hot debates were being
carried on as to whether or not we should, under these
circumstances, yield to the German ultimatum and sign
a new treaty, which—and this no one doubted—would
include conditions incomparably more onerous than
those announced at Brest-Litovsk. The representatives
of the one view held that just now, with the German
intervention in the internal war of the Russian Re-
public, it was impossible to establish peace for one part
of Russia and remain passive, while in the South and
in the North, German forces would be establishing a
regime of bourgeois dictatorship. Another view, cham-
pioned chiefly by Lenin, was that every delay, even
the briefest breathing spell, would greatly help the
NO WAR AND NO PEACE 143
internal stabilization and increase the Russian powers
of resistance. After the whole country and the whole
world had come to know of our absolute helplessness
against foreign invasion at this time, the conclusion of
peace would everywhere be understood as an act forced
upon us by the cruel law of disproportionate forces.
It would be childish to argue from the standpoint of
abstract revolutionary ethics. The point is not to die
with honor but to achieve ultimate victory. The Rus-
sian Revolution wants to survive, must survive, and
must by every means at its disposal avoid fighting
an uneven battle and gain time, in the hope that the
Western revolutionary movement will come to its aid.
German imperialism is still engaged in a fierce an-
nexationist struggle with English and American mili-
tarism. Only because of this is the conclusion of peace
between Russia and Germany at all possible. We must
fully avail ourselves of this situation. The welfare
of the Revolution is the highest law. We should ac-
cept the peace which we are unable to reject; we must
secure a breathing spell to be utilized for intensive
work within the country and, especially, for the crea-
tion of an army. -
At the conference of the Communist party as well as
at the Fourth Conference of the Soviet, the peace par-
tisans triumphed. They were joined by many of those
who in January considered it impossible to sign the
Brest-Litovsk treaty. “Then,” said they, “our signa-
ture would have been looked upon by the English and
French workingmen as a shameful capitulation, with-
out an attempt to fight. Even the base insinuations
of the Anglo-French chauvinists as to a secret compact
between the Soviet Government and the Germans,
might in case that treaty had been signed find cre-
dence in certain circles of European laborers. But
after we had refused to sign the treaty, after a new
German invasion, after our attempt to resist it, and
after our military weakness had become painfully obvi-
ous to the whole world, after all this, no one dare to
reproach us for surrendering without a fight.
The Brest-Litovsk treaty, in its second enlarged edi-
tion, was signed and ratified. 4.
In the meantime, the executioners were doing their
Work in Finland and the Ukraine, menacing more and
144
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSE
more the most vital centers of Great Russia. Thus
the question of Russia’s very existence as an independ-
ent country is henceforth inseparably connected with
the question of the European revolution.
When our party took over the government, we knew
in advance what difficulties we had to contend with.
Economically the country had been exhausted by the
war to the very utmost. The revolution had destroyed
the old administrative machinery and could not yet
create anything to take its place. Millions of workers
had been wrested from their normal nooks in the na-
tional economy of things, declassified, and physically
shattered by the three years’ war. The colossal war
industries, carried on on an inadequately prepared na-
tional foundation, had drained all the lifeblood of the
people; and their demobilization was attended with
extreme difficulties. The phenomena of economic and
political anarchy spread throughout the country. The
Russian peasantry had for centuries been held together
by barbarian national discipline from below and iron-
Czarist rule from above. Economic development had
undermined the former, the revolution destroyed the
latter. Psychologically, the revolution meant the awak-
ening of a sense of human personality among the peas-
antry. The anarchic manifestations of this awakening
are but the inevitable results of the preceding oppres-
sion. A new order of things, an order based on the
workers’ own control of industry, can come only
through gradual and internal elimination of the an-
archic manifestations of the revolution.
On the other hand, the propertied classes, even
though deprived of political power, will not relinquish
their advantages without a fight. The Revolution has
brought to a head the question of private property in
land and the tools of production—that is, the question
of vital significance to the exploiting classes. Politi-
cally this means ceaseless, secret or open civil war. In
its turn, civil war inevitably nourishes anarchical ten-
dencies within the working men’s movement. With the
disorganization of industries, of national finances, of
the transportation and provisioning systems, prolonged
civil strife thus sets up tremendous difficulties in the
way of constructive organizing work. Nevertheless,
the Soviet Government can look the future in the face
NO WAR AND NO PEACE 145
with perfect confidence. Only a careful inventory of
all the country’s resources; only a rational organization
of industries—an organization born of one general
plan; only wise and careful distribution of all the
products, can save the country. And this is Social-
ism. Either a complete descent to colonial status or a
Socialist resurrection—these are the alternatives be-
fore which our country finds itself.
The war has undermined the soil of the entire cap-
italistic world. Herein lies our unconquerable
strength. The imperialistic ring that is pressing
around us will be burst asunder by the proletarian
revolution. We do not doubt this for a minute, any
more than we doubted during our decades of under-
ground struggle the inevitableness of the downfall of
Czarism.
To struggle, to unite our forces, to establish indus-
trial discipline and a Socialist regime, to increase the
productivity of labor, and to press on in the face of all
obstacles—this is our mission. History is working in
Our favor. The proletarian revolution will flare up,
Sooner or later, both in Europe and America, and will
bring emancipation not only to the Ukraine, Poland,
Lithuania, Courland, and Finland, but also to all suf-
fering humanity.
199 Kaiser Karl of Austria-Hungary issued a manifesto “To
My Peoples,” regarding the peace with the Ukraine:
Thanks to God’s gracious aid we have concluded
peace with Ukrainia. Our victorious arms and the
sincere peace policy which we have pursued with in-
defatigable perseverance have shown the first fruits of
a defensive war waged for our preservation. . . .
Under the impression of this peace with Ukrainia,
our glance turns with full sympathy to that aspiring
young people in whose heart first among our oppo-
nents the feeling of neighborly love has become opera-
tive. . . . It thus has been the first to leave the camp.
of our enemies, in order, in the interest of the speediest
possible attainment of a new and great common aim,
to unite its efforts with our strength. . . .
May the Almighty bless us further with strength
and endurance that not only for ourselves and our
146 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
130
faithful allies, but also for all humanity We may
attain a final peace.
When the terms of the Brest Treaty with the Ukraine
were made public, there was great excitement throughout
Poland because the Province of Kholm had been ceded
to the Ukrainian People's Republic.
A manifesto was issued by the Polish Regency Council,
which had been set up in accordance with the independ-
ence granted Poland by the German and Austro-Hungarian
Governments in November, 1916, and which consisted of
Archbishop Kakovski, Count Ostrovski, and Prince Lu-
bomirski.
. . . But when the Czar's reign in Russia came to
an end, and Russia’s new rulers began peace negotia-
tions with the Central Powers, Poland was not ad-
mitted to thogo negotiations. We demanded our par-
ticipation in these negotiations earnestly and inces.
santly, We were promised this parlicipation Then
the answer was delayed, and we were deluded until
the plenipotentiaries of Germany and Austria-Hun-
gary decided alone about our ſrouliers, contrary lo
our rights. We were not admitted in order that peace
might be made at our cost, and in order that the de-
sired security in the East might be obtained. At the
price of our nation’s living body, a piece of Polish
land was carved out and given to the Ukrain-
1811S. . . .
The Polish Club also issued a manifesto signed by six
Polish political parties: -
The reports of the peace negotiations at Brest-
Litovsk published in the press show that the German
Delegates have formed ideas in regard to the terri-
tories occupied by them, that is to say, in regard to
the Kingdom of Poland, which Polish public opinion
cannot accept. The German Delegates hold among
other things the theory that “the various political
bodies authorized to represent the various nationali-
ties in the occupied territories can express the will of
the nation,’’ and that for this reason they are “from
henceforth competent to conclude conventions.” This
theory proceeds evidently from a serious and danger-
ous misunderstanding. . . . Any engagement made in
NO WAR AND NO PEACE 147
the name of the nation, any conclusion of facts of
any kind by provisional bodies, would certainly call
forth throughout Poland a unanimous protest. . . .
131
132
XI. THE NEW GERMAN WAR
February 15. It was announced that Germany had re-
Solved to resume military operations against Russia. The
decision had been reached at a conference of German mili-
tary and political leaders, including the Kaiser. Russia’s
action of February 10, in refusing to sign a Treaty of
Peace, was declared to be equivalent to a denunciation
of the armistice signed on December 15. Accordingly,
German Army Headquarters announced that the armistice
on the Russian front would expire at noon on Monday,
February 18.
February 17. The Ukrainian Government addressed a
declaration “To the German People’’: -
On February 9 we signed, in the deep and ardent
desire to live in peace and friendship with our neigh-
bors, a peace treaty with the States of the Quadruple
Alliance. . . . The joyful news of February 9, how-
ever, for which the working masses of our people so
greatly longed, has brought us no peace in our land.
. . . The Russian Maximalists who a month ago dis-
persed the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in Petro-
grad, consisting almost solely of Socialists, have now
undertaken, as they call it, a holy war against the
Socialists of the Ukraine. . . . Before the whole world
we declare that the Petrograd Commissars of the
People lie when they talk about a rising of the people
in the Ukraine. . . . The Petrograd Commissars
who, with words only, have stubbornly defended the
weal of the Ukraine, Poland, Courland and other peo-
ples, have made use of a fine pose at Brest-Litovsk
to recall from the front the remnants of the Russian
army for the purpose of secretly throwing them against
the Ukraine to rob us, to send our stocks of corn to
the north and to subjugate the country. . . .
In this hard struggle for our existence, we look
around for help. We are firmly convinced that the
peaceful and order-loving German people will not re-
main indifferent when it learns of our distress. The
German army that stands on the flank of our northern
enemy possesses the power to help us, and by its in-
|NEW GERMAN WAR 149
#33
134
H35
tervention to protect the northern frontiers against
further invasion by the enemy.
February 18. Two hours after the armistice came to an
end, the German army crossed the Dvina and entered
Dvinsk in the north with the immediate objective of seiz-
ing Livonia and Esthonia. The Germans declared that it
was their aim to rescue the population of these provinces
from the Bolshevist rule of murder and looting. Simul-
taneously, the town of Lutsk in Volhynia was occupied
without fighting, in response, according to the official Ger-
man statement, to an appeal of the Ukrainians. In an
army order, Prince Leopold of Bavaria, Commander-in-
Chief on the Russian front, declared that the aim of the
advance was not annexation, but restoration of order and
suppression of the anarchy threatening to infect Europe.
“Russia is sick and is trying to contaminate all the coun-
tries of the world with a moral infection. We must fight
against the disorder inoculated by Trotzky, and defend
outraged liberty. Germany is fortunate in being the in-
carnation of the sentiments of other order-loving peoples.”
On the same day it was announced in Vienna that “an
agreement had been reached between Germany and Aus-
tria-Hungary whereby in the event of military action being
necessary, the German troops would be confined to the
frontier of Great Russia and the Austrians to the Ukraine
only.” ! l
February 19. Von Seydler, the Austrian Premier, an-
nounced in the Reichsrat the signing of a supplementary
treaty by representatives of the Ukrainian Rada and the
Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the Province
of Kholm. The Polish, Czech, Slav and Socialist Deputies
had threatened to unite in voting against any further
credits unless the Brest treaty was changed on that point.
The passage in the supplementary treaty reads:
For the purpose of avoiding all misunderstandings
in the interpretation of Clause 2, Article II, of the
Peace Treaty concluded at Brest-Litovsk on February
9, 1918, . . . it is hereby declared that the mixed com-
mission provided for in Paragraph 2 of this Article
of the Treaty shall, in fixing the frontier, not
be bound to draw the frontier line through the places
of Bielgorag . . . Sarnaki, but shall have the right on
150 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-ILITOWSK
the ground of Article II, Clause 2, of this Peace Treaty,
to draw the frontier which may result from ethno-
graphical conditions and from the desires of the local
populations east of the line named.
136 Von Seydler stated that the mixed commission to deter-
mine the new boundary would be composed of representa-
tives of the contracting parties and representatives of Po-
land, each sending an equal number of delegates to the
commission. -
At 5:30 in the morning, after an all-night meeting of
the Council of People’s Commissars, a proclamation of pro-
test was addressed by wireless to the Berlin Government:
The Council of People’s Commissars protests against
the fact that the German Government has directed its
troops against the Russian Soviet Republic, which has
declared the war as at an end and which is demobiliz-
ing its army on all fronts.
The Workmen’s and Peasants’ Government of Rus-
sia could not anticipate such a step because neither
directly nor indirectly has any one of the parties which
concluded the armistice given the seven days’ notice
required in accordance with the treaty of December
15 for terminating it.
The Council of People’s Commissars in the present
circumstances regards itself as forced formally to de-
clare its willingness to sign a peace upon the condi-
tions which had been dictated by the Delegations of
the Quadruple Alliance at Brest-Litovsk.
The Council of People’s Commissars further de-
clares that a detailed reply will be given without de-
lay to the conditions of peace as proposed by the
German Government.
(Signed) For the Council of People’s Commissars,
LENIN,
TROTZFCY.
#37 On the same day, the People’s Commissar of War, Kry-
lenko, addressed the following message to headquarters
on all fronts:
The Council of People’s Commissars has offered to
the Germans to sign peace immediately. I order that,
in all cases where Germans are encountered, massed
powrparlers with the German soldiers should be or-
ganized and the proposal to refrain from fighting made
NEW GERMAN WAR 151
138
139
140
to them. If Germans refuse, then you must offer to
them every possible resistance.
On the same day Trotzky forwarded a wireless message
to Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister:
The German Government having re-established a
state of war with Russia without even giving the seven
days’ previous notice, I have the honor to ask you to
inform me whether the Austro-Hungarian Government.
also considers itself in a state of war with Russia, and
if not, whether it believes it possible to reach a prac-
tical realization of the agreements worked out at Pet-
rograd.
The German reply came late in the afternoon of the
same day. It was signed by General Hoffmann :
To the Council of People’s Commissars:
A wireless message signed by Nicolai Lenin and L.
Trotzky from Tsarskoe-Selo was today received at
König Wusterhausen at 9:12 a. m. It has been handed
over to the Royal Government, although a wireless
message cannot be regarded as an official document
because the original signatures are absent. I am au-
thorized to request from the People’s Commissars au-
thentication in writing of the wireless message which
must be sent to the German Command at Dvinsk.
To this message, the Council of the People’s Commis-
sars made the following reply: -
We are sending today from Petrograd a messenger
to Dvinsk with the wireless message containing the
original signatures of Lenin and Trotzky. We beg
you to give us an acknowledgment of this message
and inform us if it has been received promptly. We
also beg you to reply in writing.
Speaking on the same day before the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviets, Lenin defended the Council
of Commissars by pointing out that the country was com-
pletely unable to offer resistance, and that peace was in-
dispensable for the completion of the social revolution in
Russia. He also argued that the imperialist governments
then at war would sooner or later unite for the purpose of
crushing the Socialist commonwealth of Russia, and that
it was therefore imperative to make peace while Russia’s
enemies were divided. -
152 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
141 February 20. Von Kuehlmann, at the opening session of
the Reichstag, delivered an address dealing at length with
the peace treaty signed by the Central Powers with the
Ukraine and the collapse of the peace negotiations with
Russia. He asserted that the pacific intentions of Russia
could no longer be credited, but that even today Germany
was prepared to conclude a peace “which corresponds to
our interests.’’ He instanced the peace agreement with
the Ukraine as an indication of the readiness of the Central
Powers for peace. “Ukraine is a rich country, and the
decisive factor for the conclusion of peace was economic.”
When it came to the fixing of the frontiers, Ukraine
claimed Kholm. There was danger that negotiations might
be wrecked if this demand were not taken into account.
The frontiers of Kholm have not yet been fixed definitely.
They will be established by a commission, including repre-
sentatives of the Ukraine and Poland.
He then read a wireless despatch from Lenin and Trotzky
announcing that they found it necessary to sign a peace
agreement on the terms dictated by the Central Powers.
He warned the members of the Reichstag that peace with
Russia will have been arrived at only when the signatures
on the treaty are dry. He said that the conduct of the
Russian Delegates at Brest-Litovsk and in particular that
of Leon Trotzky was without precedent in history. With
his final declaration Trotzky had attempted to extricate
himself from a position that had become untenable, and he
was not really desirous of concluding peace. Von Kuehl-
mann expressed the conviction that if anything could in-
duce Trotzky to sign a satisfactory peace, it would be the
Ukrainian Treaty which he considered an important means
for arriving at a settlement tolerable for both Germany
and Russia. He defended the “new war’’ against Russia
as necessary to enforce peace.
42 Meanwhile, the German and Austrian advance continued
almost unopposed. On February 21, German detachments
were 70 miles northeast of Riga, and their cavalry was
pushing toward Mohilev, the former Russian General Head-
quarters. On February 23, the Turkish army began an
offensive in the Caucasus.
†43 February 21. Two proclamations were issued by the Peo-
ple’s Commissars calling the Russian soldiers, workmen
and peasants to arms “for the defense of the Republic
NEW GERMAN WAR, 153
against the masses of bourgeoisie and imperialists of Ger-
many.” They declared that “the German Generals desire
to establish their own order in Petrograd and Kiev. . . .
German militarism wishes to smother the working classes
and the Ukrainian masses, to give back the land to the land
owners, factories and workshops to the bankers, and power
to a monarchy.” The proclamation then enumerates eight
paragraphs containing instructions to “all the forces in
the country in their entirety,’’ as to how they are to ‘‘place
themselves at the service of the defense of the revolution.”
Each position must be defended to the last drop of blood.
Railways, rolling stock, corn and provisions in general are
if necessary to be destroyed. Petrograd and Kiev and all
towns and villages on the line of the new front must be
defended by battalions “under the direction of the mili-
tary Socialists,’’ and members of the bourgeois class,
women as well as men, must enter these battalions under
the surveillance of Red Guards. All institutions resisting
the defense of the revolution or profiting ‘‘by the invasion
of the imperialistic masses in order to overthrow the au-
thority of the Soviets must be closed. Directors of and
collaborators with these institutions who are capable of
work must mobilize themselves to dig trenches and engage
in other defensive works. Foreign agents and speculators
are regarded as counter-revolutionary agitators, and Ger-
man spies must be shot on sight. The Socialist Fatherland
is in danger | Long live the People’s Social Revolution l’’
In the appeal to the workmen and peasants the People’s
Commissars say:
We agreed to sign peace terms at the cost of enor-
mous concessions in order to save the country from
final exhaustion and the ruin of the revolution. Once
more the German working class, in this threatening
hour, has shown itself insufficiently determined to stay
the strong criminal hand of its own militarism. We
had no other choice but to accept the conditions of
German militarism until a revolution changes or can-
cels them.
The German Government is not hastening to reply
to us, evidently aiming to seize as many important
positions in our territory as possible. . . . We even
now are convinced that the German working classes
will rise against the attempts of the ruling classes to
stifle the revolution. But we cannot predict with cer-
154
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOVSK
144
tainty when this will occur. . . . The Commissars,
call upon all loyal Soviets and army organizations to
use all efforts to recreate the army. Perverted ele-
ments of hooligans, marauders, and cowards should
be expelled from the ranks, and in the event of re-
sistance, wiped off the face of the earth. . . .
February 23. The Russian Government received by
courier from Dvinsk a new offer of peace from Germany,
signed by von Kuehlmann and the Commander-in-Chief
of the Army. The document reads:
Germany will renew the peace negotiations and will
conclude peace on the following conditions:
Both to declare the war ended.
All regions west of the line indicated at Brest-
Litovsk to the Russian Delegation, which formerly be-
longed to Russia, to be no longer under the territorial
protection of Russia. In the region of Dvinsk this
line must be advanced to the eastern frontier of Cour-
land.
The former attachment of these regions to the Rus-
sian State must in no case involve for them obliga-
tions toward Russia. Russia renounces every claim
to intervene in the internal affairs of those regions.
Germany and Austria-Hungary have the intention to
define further the fate of these regions, in agreement
with their population.
Germany is ready, after the completion of Russian
demobilization, to evacuate the regions which are east
of the above line. So far as it is not stated otherwise,
Livonia and Esthonia must immediately be cleared of
Russian troops and Red Guards. -
Livonia and Esthonia will be occupied by German
police until the date when the constitution of the
respective countries shall guarantee their social se-
curity and political order. All inhabitants who were
arrested for political reasons must be released imme-
diately. -
Russia will conclude peace with the Ukrainian Peo-
ple’s Republic. Ukraine and Finland will be imme-
diately evacuated by Russian troops and Red Guards.
Russia will do all in its power to secure for Turkey
the orderly return of its Anatolian frontiers. Russia
A NEW GERMAN WAR 155,
recognizes the annulment of the Turkish Capitula-
tions.
The complete demobilization of the Russian Army,
inclusive of the detachments newly formed by the pres-
ent Government, must be carried out immediately.
Russian warships in the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea,
and the Arctic Ocean must immediately either be sent
to Russian harbors and kept there until the conclu-
sion of peace or be disarmed. Warships of the En-
tente which are in the sphere of Russian authority
must be regarded as Russian ships.
Merchant navigation of the Black Sea and the Baltic
Sea must be renewed, as stated in the armistice treaty.
The clearing away of mines is to begin immediately.
The blockade of the Arctic Ocean is to remain in force
until the conclusion of a general peace.
The Russo-German commercial treaty of 1914 must
be put into force again. In addition, there must be a
guarantee for the free export, without tariff, of ores,
and the immediate commencement of negotiations for
the conclusion of a new commercial treaty, with a guar-
antee of the most favored nation treatment, at least
until 1925, even in the case of the termination of the
provisorium, and, finally, the sanctioning of all clauses
corresponding to paragraph 11, of classes 3, 4, and 15
of the Ukrainian peace treaty.
Legal and political relations are to be regulated in
accordance with the decision of the first version of
the Germano-Russian convention. So far as action
on that decision has not yet been taken, especially
with respect to indemnities for civilian damages, this
must be in accordance with the German proposal. And
there must be indemnification with expenses for war
prisoners, in accordance with the Russian proposal.
Russia will permit and support, so far as she can,
German commissions for war prisoners and war ref-
ugees.
Russia promises to put an end to every propaganda
and agitation, either on the part of the Government
or on the part of persons supported by the Govern-
ment, against members of the Quadruple Alliance and
their political and military institutions, even in locali-
ties occupied by the Central Powers.
156 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOvsK
#45
The above conditions must be accepted within forty-
eight hours. The Russian plenipotentiaries must start
immediately for Brest-Litovsk and sign at that place
within three days a peace treaty which must be rati-
fied within two weeks.
February 24. The Central Executive Committee of the
Soviets met all night to consider the German offer with
the result that a message was sent to the Berlin Govern-
ment, announcing that a representative had left Petrograd
at noon for Dvinsk for the purpose of transmitting to the
German High Command at Dvinsk Russia’s official reply
to Germany’s peace conditions. Another wireless ad-
dressed “TO ALL’’ announced that the following mes-
Sage had been sent to the German Government:
According to the decision of the Central Executive
of the Soviets taken at 4:30 Sunday morning, the
Soviets and People’s Commissars have decided to ac-
cept Germany’s peace conditions, and will scnd a Dele-
gation to Brest-Litovsk. -
This decision was taken at the meeting by a vote of 126
to 85, twenty-six members not being present, among them
Trotzky. It was decided that an entirely new Delega-
tion, with the exception of Secretary Karakhan, should go
to Brest, and the following were chosen: Zinoviev, Presi-
dent of the Petrograd Soviet; Alexiev, Acting Commissary
for Agriculture, and Sokolkokov. These were to be accom-
panied by naval and military representatives and were to
leave for Brest that evening.
The Bolshevik majority at the meeting were convinced
by Lenin of the correctness of his own policy as against
that of Trotzky. He differed from Trotzky on two points:
First, he was sure no effective resistance could be offered
to the Germans, and second, he did not believe in the im-
manence of the proletarian revolt in Germany and Austria.
At the Bolshevik party caucus Radek, Volodarsky and
Bronsky were the advocates of resistance to the bitter end
and of a refusal to sign the peace treaty. Martov was the
spokesman of the Mensheviks at the general meeting. They
were in favor of resistance. Lenin’s attitude was outlined
by him in two articles in the Pravda which appeared be-
fore the meeting of the Central Executive took place. He
Writes: -
NEW GERMAN WAR 157
I am absolutely convinced that to refuse to sign
these terms is only possible to those, who are intoxi-
cated by revolutionary phrases. Up till now I have
tried to impress upon the members of the party the
necessity of clearing their minds of revolutionary cant.
Now I must do this openly, for unfortunately my
worst forebodings have been justified.
Party workers in January declared war on revolu-
tionary phrases and said that a policy of refusal to
sign a peace would perhaps satisfy the craving for
effectiveness—and brilliance—but would leave out of
account the objective correlation of class forces and
material factors in the present initial moment of the
Socialist revolution. They further said that if we
refused to sign the peace then proposed, more crush-
ing defeats would compel Russia to conclude a still
more disadvantageous separate peace.
The event proved even worse than I anticipated,
for our retreating army seems demoralized and ab-
solutely refuses to fight. Only unrestrained phrase-
making can impel Russia at this moment and in these
conditions to continue the war, and of course I per-
sonally should not remain one second either in the
Government or in the Central Committee of our party
if the policy of phrase-making were to prevail.
This bitter new truth has revealed itself with such
terrible distinctness that it is impossible not to see it.
All the bourgeoisie in Russia is jubilant at the ap-
proach of the Germans. Only a blind man or a man
infatuated with phrases can fail to see that the policy
of a revolutionary war without an army is water on
the bourgeois mill. In the bourgeois papers there is
already exulting in view of the impending overthrow
of the Soviet Government by the Germans.
We are compelled to submit to a distressing peace.
It will not stop revolution in Germany and Europe.
We shall now begin to prepare a revolutionary army,
not by phrases and exclamations, as did those who
after February 10 did nothing even to attempt to
stop our fleeing troops, but by organized work, by
the mighty creation of a serious, national, mighty
army.
* * * * ,
158
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOVSK
46
}47
In his address before the meeting Lenin added:
. Their knees are upon our chest and our position
is hopeless. This peace must be accepted as a respite,
enabling us to prepare a decisive resistance to the
bourgeois and imperialism. The proletariat of the
Whole world will come to our aid. Then we shall re-
new the fight.
. On the same day the Petrograd Soviet passed a resolu-
tion approving the action of the Government and at the
same time, faced with the plain intention of German im-
perialism to refuse peace on any conditions, summoning
the working class and garrison of Petrograd to the defense
of Socialist Russia and the revolutionary capitol.
February 25. Chancellor Hertling addressed the German
Reichstag, taking up in detail the four principles of Presi-
dent Wilson's address of February 11. As to Russia and
the prospects of peace at Brest-Litovsk, he said:
Our war aims from the beginning were the defense
of the Fatherland, the maintenance of our territorial
integrity, and the freedom of our economic develop-
ment. Our warfare, even where it must be aggressive
in action, is defensive in aim. I lay especial stress
upon that just now in order that no misunderstand-
ings shall arise about our operations in the east.
After the breaking off of peace negotiations by the
Russian Delegation on February 10 we had a free hand
as against Russia. The sole aim of the advance of
our troops, which was begun seven days after the rup-
ture, was to safeguard the fruits of our peace with
the Ukraine. Aims of conquest were in no way a deter-
mining factor. We were strengthened in this by the
Ukrainians’ appeal for support in bringing about or-
der in their young State against the disturbances car-
ried on by the Bolsheviki.
If further military operations in other regions have
taken place, the same applies to them. They in no
way aim at conquest. They are taking place solely
upon the urgent appeals and representations of the
populations for protection against atrocities and dev-
astation by Red Guards and other bands. They have
therefore, been undertaken in the name of humanity.
NEW GERMAN WAR 159
They are measures of assistance, and have no other
gharacter. It is a question of creating peace and order
in the interest of peaceable populations.
We do not intend to establish ourselves, for example,
in Esthonia or Livonia. In Courland and Lithuania
our chief object is to create organs of self-determina-
tion and self-administration. Our military action,
however, has produced a success far exceeding the orig-
inal aim.
You already know from the announcement made by
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that M.
Trotzky had by a wireless message, which was speedily
followed by a written confirmation, declared his readi-
neSS to resume the peace negotiations which had been
broken off. We replied immediately by transmitting
Our peace conditions in the form of an ultimatum.
Yesterday—and this is a very gratifying communica-
tion which I have to make to you—news arrived that
the Petrograd Government accepted our peace condi-
tions and had sent representatives to Brest-Litovsk
for further negotiations.
It is possible that there will still be dispute about
the details, but the main thing has been achieved.
The will to peace has been expressly announced from
the Russian side, while the conditions have been ac-
cepted, and the conclusion of peace must ensue within
a very short time.
To safeguard the fruits of our peace with the
Ukraine, our army command drew the sword. Peace
with Russia will be the happy result.
Peace negotiations with Rumania began at Bucharest
yesterday. It appeared necessary that Secretary von
Kuehlmann should be present there during the first
days when the foundations were laid. Now, however,
he will presumably soon go to Brest-Litovsk. It is
to be remembered regarding negotiations with Ru-
mania that we are not taking part in them alone, and
are under obligations to champion the interests of our
allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, and
to see to it that a compromise is arranged there re-
garding any divergent desires that will possibly give
rise to difficulties. But these difficulties will be over-
£OYO €.
I60. NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
With regard to Rumania, too, the guiding principle
will be that we must, and we desire to, convert into
friends the States with which on the basis of the suc-
cess of our army we now conclude peace.
I will say a word regarding Poland, in behalf of
which the Entente and President Wilson have recently
appeared specially to interest themselves, a country
liberated from oppressive dependence on Czarist Rus-
sia by the united forces of Germany and Austria-
Hungary, for the purpose of establishing an independ-
ent State, which, in unrestricted development of its
national culture, shall at the same time become a pil-
lar of peace in Europe. The constitutional problem
—in the narrower sense the question what constitution
the new State shall receive—could not, as is easily
understood, be immediately decided, and is still in the
stage of exhaustive discussions between the three coun-
tries concerried. A fresh difficulty has been added
to the many difficulties which have in this connection
to be overcome, difficulties especially in the economic
domain in consequence of the collapse of old Russia.
This difficulty results from the delimitation of the
frontier between the new State and the adjacent Rus-
sian territory. For this reason the news of peace
with the Ukraine at first evoked great uneasiness in
Poland. I hope, however, that with good-will and
proper regard to the ethnographical conditions a com-
promise on the claims will be reached. The announced
intention to make a serious attempt in this direction
has greatly calmed Polish circles. -
In the regulation of the frontier question only what
is indispensable on military grounds will be demanded
on Germany’s part.
148 February 26. In the Reichstag debate on the Brest-
Litovsk treaty, Philip Scheidemann, the Majority Socialist
leader, took issue with the Government:
We fought for the defense of the Fatherland against
barbarism and against the Entente's plans of con-
quest. We did not, however, fight for the dismember-
ment of Russia or the subjugation of Belgium. The
Government's policy toward Russia is not ours.
True the Bolsheviks played into the hands of all
the disintegrating tendencies of Russia, but we do not
NEW GERMAN WAR I61.
149
desire a peace with the Entente like that which is
being concluded with Russia. The Government must
remain ready for a real peace by understanding.
At the same time, Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian For-
eign Minister, informed the Russian Government that Aus-
tria-Hungary was ready jointly with her allies to bring
the peace negotiations to the desired end.
Despite these announcements, a Russian wireless of Feb-
ruary 25, signed by Lenin and Trotzky and addressed “TO
ALL’’ and to Berlin, Dvinsk, Sofia and Constantinople, de-
clared that no formal reply had been received either from
the German Government or German Headquarters to the
communication of Krylenko on February 24, asking if, an
armistice would automatically ensue upon the same basis
as previously, and that meanwhile the Germans were still
advancing. A reply was asked for.
February 27. It was announced from Petrograd that Gen-
eral Hoffmann had replied to Krylenko’s inquiry by say-
ing that the German advance would be continued until a
treaty of peace, as laid down in the German peace terms,
had been signed.
The answer to General Hoffmann's reply was resistance
by the Russian troops both around Pskov and Vitebsk and
Orsha in the North, as well as near Zhitomir in the Ukraine.
A Russian proclamation calling upon the people for
“resistance to the German hordes’’ was issued on the same
day: -
A Peace Delegation is now on the way to Brest-
Litovsk. We expect any moment news that it has ar-
rived at the place appointed for peace negotiations,
but there is no armistice. The German Government
has formally refused an armistice, and German de-
tachments continue to advance.
We are prepared to sign their peace of usurpation.
We have already declared this, but there are many
indications that the German imperialists do not desire
peace at the present moment, but rather an immediate
strangling of the Workmen’s and Peasants’ Revolu-
tion.
Brave, heroic, obstinate and pitiless resistance thus
becomes the principal task of the Revolution. . . .
162 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSEC
#50
Every possible obstacle must be put in the way of the
enemy. . . . Should the threat to Petrograd increase,
the Government will remove to Moscow or any other
city of Russia. . . . Even if they think they can reach
Petrograd by a mere military promenade, we will prove
to them that they will have to disperse themselves
all over Russia before they can reach and crush the
authority of the Soviets. . . . However deeply they
penetrate Russia, then the more surely will they bring
about the outbreak of a revolution in Germany. . . .
If peace with the revolution is not the aim of the Ger-
man imperialists, they will see that the revolution
knows how to defend itself.
In another proclamation, the Council of People's Com-
missars declares that the German invaders are arresting
the Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Councils, shooting captured
Red Guards, and arming German and Austrian prisoners
in the Ukraine. The proclamation concludes: ‘‘May the
blood spilled in this unequal struggle fall on the heads of
the German Socialists, who are allowing the German work-
men to be ranked among the Cains and Judases.”
The British Foreign Secretary Balfour replied to Chan-
cellor Hertling in an address in the House of Commons:
Von Hertling tells us that the recent invasion of
Russia was solely taking place on urgent appeals from
populations for protection against the atrocities and
devastations by the Red Guard and other bands, and
has, therefore, been undertaken in the name of human-
ity. We all know—of course we all know—the poet
has told us so—‘‘That East is East and West is West,’’
but I cannot, even with that aphorism ringing in my
ears, quite follow the distinction between German
policy on the East and German policy on the West.
German policy on the East it appears has been recently
entirely directed towards preventing atrocities and
devastation and carrying out military operations in
the name of humanity. German policy on the West
is entirely occupied in performing atrocities and dev-
astations and in trampling under foot not only the
letter and spirit of treaties, but the very spirit of
humanity itself. Why is there this difference of
treatment of Belgium on the one side and of the Baltic
NEW GERMAN WAR 163
151
152
Provinces on the other ? Why this humanity appeal,
with such an overmastering force, of Count Hertling
when he talks about Russia, and why is it brushed
aside as a neglible quantity by him and his associates
when he is talking of Belgium ? I know of no ex-
planation except one, which is, that Germany pursues
her methods with remorseless insistency. All that .
varies is the excuse that she gives for her policy. If
she wishes to invade Belgium, it is a military neces-
sity; if she wishes to invade Courland, it is the dic-
tates of humanity and the desire to prevent outrages
and devastations. . . . I am unable to understand how
anybody can get up in the Reichstag and say, as Count
Hertling said, that the war Germany has been waging
is a defensive war.
On the same day, Lord Robert Cecil, Minister of Block-
ade, said regarding Hertling’s speech :
It would be foolish to enter into negotiations unless
there were a reasonable prospect of success. We do
not desire to repeat the experiment of the Brest-Litovsk
negotiations.
February 28. The German military communication con-
tained the following passage:
Eastern Theatre—Operations are taking their regu-
lar course. In Esthonia, the Fourth Esthonian Reºri-
ment also has placed itself under our command to clear
the country of bands overrunning it.
March 1. The Petrograd Government received a message
from Brest-Litovsk signed by Karakhan, Secretary of the
Russian Peace Delegation, as follows:
Send us a train to Toroshaets near Pskov, escorted
by sufficiently large forces. Communicate with Kry-
lenko concerning the bodyguard.
This message was interpreted by Lenin in a message
“To all the Soviets’’ as follows:
This message most probably signifies that the pe ce
negotiations have been broken off by the Germans. We
must be ready for an immediate German advance on
Petrograd and on all fronts. It is necessary that all
the people rise and strengthen the measures for de-
fense.
164 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSR
153
154
In addition to making preparations for the defense of
Petrograd, the Extraordinary General Staff, which was
formed for the defense of the revolution, announced the
capture by Bolshevik forces of Rostov-on-Don and Novo-
cherkask after battles with troops of Generals Kaledin
and Kornilov and Alexiev.
March 2. The German General Staff announced that
“Kiev, capital of the Ukraine, has been liberated by
Ukrainian and Saxon troops.’’
155
XII. THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK–“A
TILSIT PEACE’’ 3.
March 3. The Russian Delegation signed the treaty of
peace with the Central Powers, without in any way dis-
cussing its contents. They had asked Lenin for a special
train because they were convinced that further delibera-
tions might make matters worse, in view of the German
refusal to cease military operations until the treaty was
signed. Before signing the treaty they issued the follow-
ing statement:
The Workmen’s and Peasants’ Government of the
Russian Republic, which has announced the cessation
of war and has demobilized its army, is compelled by
the attack of the German troops to accept the ultima-
tum presented by Germany by announcement on the
twenty-fourth of February and has delegated us to
sign these terms which are being imposed on us by
violence.
The negotiations which previously took place in
Brest-Litovsk between Russia on one side and Ger-
many and her allies on the other made it evident to
all that the so-called (by the German representatives)
“Peace of Agreement” is in reality a peace definitely
annexational and imperialistic. Now the Brest terms
are made a great deal worse. The peace which now
is being concluded here, in Brest-Litovsk, is not a
peace based on free agreement of the people of Rus-
sian, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Tur-
key. It is a peace which is being dictated at the
point of the gun. It is a peace which Revolutionary
Russia is compelled to accept with its teeth clenched.
It is a peace which, under the pretext of “liberation”
of the frontier districts of Russia, in reality turns
them into German provinces, and denies them the
right of free definition which was granted to them
by the Workmen’s and Peasants’ Government of Rev-
olutionary Russia. It is a peace which under the
pretext of re-establishing order in these districts,
gives armed assistance to the oppressing classes against
the working class, and helps to put back on the labor-
ing masses the yoke of oppression, which was thrown
off by the Russian Revolution. It is a peace which
166
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
imposes, for a long time, on the laboring people of
Russia the old commercial treaty of 1904, which was
made in the interests of the German agrarians, and
which is now made even worse; and at the same time
it assures the payment of interest to the German
and Austro-Hungarian bourgeoisie on the obligations
of the Czar’s Government, which were repudiated by
Revolutionary Russia. Finally, as if to emphasize
clearly the real class character of the German armed
raid, the German ultimatum attempts to stop the
mouth of the Russian Revolution by prohibiting agita-
tion directed against the governments of the Quad-
ruple Alliance and their military authorities.
But not only all that. Under the same pretext of
re-establishing order, Germany by force of arms oc-
cupies districts with a purely Russian population and
establishes there a regime of military occupation and
a return to the pre-Revolutionary order. In the
Ukraine and in Finland Germany demands non-
interference of Revolutionary Russia, and at the same
time actively assists the counter-Revolutionary forces
against Revolutionary workmen and peasants. In the
Caucasus, in direct violation of the terms formulated
by Germany itself in the ultimatum of February 21,
Germany tears away for the benefit of Turkey the
districts of Erivan, Kars, and Batum, which were
not conquered even once by the Turkish armies, with-
out any consideration whatsoever of the real will of
the population of these districts.
The most brazen forcible annexational seizures and
possession of the most important strategic points,
which can have only one purpose; the preparation of
further invasion of Russia; and the defense of capi-
talistic interests against the workmen’s and peasants’
revolution—these are the real aims that are served
by the offensive of the German troops, undertaken on
the eighteenth of February, without the seven days’
notice which was assured by the armistice treaty made
between Russia and the powers of the Quadruple Alli-
ance on the fifteenth of December 1917.
This invasion was not stopped, in spite of the state-
ment of the Council of People’s Commissars of its
acceptance of terms formulated in the German ulti-
matum of February 21. This invasion was not stop-
* A TILSIT PEACE * * 167
ped, in spite of the resumption of the work of the
Peace Conference in Brest-Litovsk and in spite of
the official protest of the Russian Delegation. By
all this all the peace terms offered by Germany and
her allies are reduced entirely to an ultimatum pre-
sented to Russia and supported from the side of the
framers of this peace treaty by threat of direct armed
violence.
But in the situation thus created Russia has no pos-
sibility of choice. By demobilizing its armies the
Russian Revolution had placed its fate in the hands
of the German people.
The Russian Delegation in Brest-Litovsk had openly
stated, in due time, that not a single honest man
would believe that a war against Russia now might
be a defensive war. Germany has undertaken the
offensive. Under the slogan of establishing order, but
in reality for the purposes of strangling the Russian
Workmen’s and Peasants’ Revolution in the interests
of the world’s imperialism, German militarism has
now succeeded in moving its troops against the work-
ingmen and peasant masses of the Russian Socialist
Republic. The German proletariat has not as yet
proved to be sufficiently strong to stop this attack.
We do not doubt for a single minute that this triumph
of imperialism and militarism over the international
proletarian revolution will prove to be only tem-
porary and transitory.
Under the present conditions the Soviet Govern-
ment of the Russian Republic, which is left only to
its own resources, cannot resist the armed offensive
of German imperialism, and in the name of the preser-
vation of Revolutionary Russia is compelled to accept
the demands presented to it.
We are authorized by our Government to sign the
peace treaty. Compelled, in spite of our protests,
to carry on negotiations under the very exceptional
conditions of continuing military operations, which
are not meeting with resistance from the Russian side,
We cannot subject to any further butchery the Rus-
sian workmen and peasants, who have refused to con-
tinue the war any longer.
We openly state before the face of workmen, peas-
ants, and Soldiers of Russia and Germany, before the
168 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
face of the laboring and exploited classes of the whole
world, that we are compelled to accept the ultimatum
dictated by the side which is at the present time more
powerful, and are signing immediately the peace treaty
presented to us by ultimatum, desisting from any
deliberation upon it whatsoever.
#56 The following are the terms of the Treaty signed be-
tween Russia and the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk
on March 3, 1918.
Article 1.-The Central Powers and Russia declare
the state of war between them to be terminated and
are resolved henceforth to live in peace and friendship
with one another.
Article 2.-The contracting nations will refrain
from all agitation or provocation against other signa-
tory Governments, and undertake to spare the popu-
lations of the regions occupied by the powers of the
Quadruple Entente.
Article 3.−The regions lying west of the line agreed
upon by the contracting parties, and formerly belong-
ing to Russia, shall no longer be under Russian Sov-
ereignty. It is agreed that the line appears from
the appended map, No. 1, which, as agreed upon, forms
an essential part of the peace treaty. The fixing of
the line in the west will be settled in the German-
Russian Mixed Commission. The regions in question
will have no obligation whatever toward Russia, aris-
ing from their former relations thereto. Russia un-
dertakes to refrain from all interference in the inter-
nal affairs of these territories and to let Germany
and Austria determine the future fate of these terri-
tories in agreement with their populations.
Article 4.—Germany and Austria agree, when a
general peace is concluded and Russian demobiliza-
tion is fully completed, to evacuate the regions east
of the line designated in Article 3, No. 1, in so far
as Article 6 does not stipulate otherwise. Russia will
do everything in her power to complete as Soon as
possible the evacuation of the Anatolian provinces and
their orderly return to Turkey. The districts of Eri-
van, Kars, and Batum will likewise without delay be
evacuated by the Russian troops. Russia will not in-
** A TILSIT PEACE * * - 169
terfere in the reorganization of the constitutional or
international conditions of these districts, but leave
it to the populations of the districts to carry out the
reorganization, in agreement with the neighboring
States, particularly Turkey.
Article 5.—Russia will without delay carry out the
complete demobilization of her army, including the
forces newly formed by the present Government. Rus-
sia will further transfer her warships to Russian har-
bors and leave them there until a general peace or
immediately disarm. Warships of States continuing
in a state of war with the Quadruple Alliance will be
treated as Russian warships in so far as they are
within Russian control. The barred zone in the ar-
ticle continues in force until the conclusion of peace.
An immediate beginning will be made of the removal
of mines in the Baltic and in so far as Russian power
extends in the Black Sea. Commercial shipping is
free in these waters, and will be resumed immediately.
A mixed commission will be appointed to fix further
regulations, especially for the announcement of routes
for merchant ships. Shipping routes are to be kept
permanently free from floating mines.
Article 6.—Russia undertakes immediately to con-
clude peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic and
to recognize the peace treaty between this State and
the powers of the Quadruple Alliance. Ukrainian
territory will be immediately evacuated by the Rus-
sian troops and the Russian Red Guard. Russia will
cease all agitation or propaganda against the Gov-
ernment or the public institutions of the Ukrainian
People’s Republic. Esthonia and Livonia will like-
wise be evacuated without delay by the Russian troops
and the Russian Red Guard. The eastern frontier
of Esthonia follows in general the line of the Narova
River. The eastern frontier of Livonia runs in gen-
eral through Peipus Lake and Pskov Lake to the south-
westerly corner of the latter, then over Lubahner (Lu-
ban) Lake in the direction of Lievenhof on the Dvina.
Esthonia and Livonia will be occupied by a German
police force until security is guaranteed by their own
national institutions and order in the State is restored.
Russia will forthwith release all arrested or deported
inhabitants of Esthonia and Livonia and guarantee
170
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSE
the safe return of deported Esthonians and Livonians.
Finland and the Aland Islands will also forthwith be
evacuated by the Russian troops and the Red Guard,
and Finnish ports by the Russian fleet and Russian
naval forces. So long as the ice excludes the bringing
of Russian warships to Russian ports only small de-
tachments will remain behind on the warships. Rus-
sia is to cease all agitation or propaganda against the
Government or the public institutions in Finland. The
fortifications erected on the Aland Islands are to be
removed with all possible dispatch. A special agree-
ment is to be made between Germany, Russia, Finland,
and Sweden regarding the permanent non-fortification
of these islands, as well as regarding their treatment
in military, shipping, and technical respects. It is
agreed that at Germany’s desire the other States bor-
dering on the Baltic are also to have a voice in the
matter.
Article 7.—Starting from the fact that Persia and
Afghanistan are free and independent States, the con-
tracting parties undertake to respect their political
and economic independence and territorial integrity.
Article 8.-Prisoners of war of both sides will be
sent home.
Article 9.—The contracting parties mutually re-
nounce indemnification of their war costs, that is to
say, State expenditure for carrying on the war, as well
as indemnification for war damages, that is to say,
those damages which have arisen for them and their
subjects in the war regions through military measures,
inclusive of all requisitions undertaken in the enemy
country.
Article 10.--Diplomatic and Consular relations be-
tween the contracting parties will be resumed imme-
diately after ratification of the peace treaty. Special
agreements are reserved relative to the admittance of
the respective Consuls. -
Article 11.-The prescriptions contained in appen-
dices 2 to 5 shall govern the economic relations be-
tween the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance and Rus-
sia, namely: Appendix 2 for German-Russian, Ap-
pendix 3 for Austro-Hungarian-Russian, Appendix 4
for Bulgarian-Russian, and Appendix 5 for Turkish-
Russian relations.
** A TILSIT PEACE * > 171
157
158
Article 12.—The restoration of public and private
relations, the exchange of prisoners of war, interned
civilians, the amnesty question, as well as the treat-
ment of merchant ships which are in enemy hands,
will be regulated by separate treaties with Russia
which shall form an essential part of the present peace
treaty and as far as is feasible shall enter into force
at the same time.
Article 13.−For the interpretation of this treaty the
German and Russian text is authoritative for the re-
lations between Germany and Russia; for the rela-
tions between Austria-Hungary and Russia, the Ger-
man, Hungarian, and Russian text; for the relations
between Bulgaria and Russia, the Bulgarian and Rus-
sian text; for the relations between Turkey and Rus-
sia, the Turkish and Russian text.
Article 14.—The present peace treaty will be rati-
fied. Instruments of ratification must be exchanged
as soon as possible in Berlin. The Russian Govern-
ment undertakes at the desire of one of the Quadruple
Alliance powers to exchange ratifications within two
weeks. The peace treaty enters into force on its rati-
fication, in so far as its articles, appendices, or sup-
plementary treaties do not prescribe otherwise.
The German semi-official Wolff Bureau stated that the
trade and political questions referred to in Article 11 are
to be regulated according to the demands of the German
ultimatum and analogously to the Ukrainian treaty.
March 4. The German General Staff issued the following
statement: “The military operations in Great Russia
stopped yesterday in consequence of the signing of a Peace
Treaty with Russia.’’
Emperor William sent the following telegram to Chan-
cellor von Hertling :
. The German sword wielded by great army leaders
has brought peace with Russia. With deep gratitude
to God, Who has been with us, I am filled with proud
joy at the deeds of my army and the tenacious per-
severance of my people. It is of especial satisfaction
to me that German blood and German kultur have
been saved. Accept my warmest thanks for your
faithful and strong coöperation in the great work.
172 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
159
160
161
162
March 5. Announcement was made that Moscow was to
become the capitol of Russia in place of Petrograd, and
that State institutions were to be transferred to Moscow,
Nizhni-Novgorod and Kazan.
A preliminary peace treaty was signed between Rou-
mania and the Central Powers at Bucharest.
March 6. Between March 4 and 6 the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviets, the Moscow Soviet and the Petro-
grad Soviet had all voted to instruct their Delegates to the
forthcoming All-Russian Congress of Soviets to support
the ratification of the peace terms. In the Central Execu-
tive there were 26 dissenting votes. The German peace
terms were those of “political bandits.” But ratification
was necessary in view of the lack of a strong army and the
weakness of the German working class movement. The
Russian people would never be reconciled to the peace terms
and would accept them in order to afford the social revolu-
tion ‘‘an absolutely necessary respite.’’
At the meeting of the Moscow Soviet, Pokrovski of the
Peace Delegation explained all the disadvantages of the
treaty. The new frontiers constituted a ring of iron
around revolutionary Russia. The Germans were trying
to stifle the Revolution, the conquests of which were re-
duced to nothing by the economic demands of Berlin.
The decree nationalizing the banks had fallen into abey-
ance because the German terms had the effect of convert-
ing the banks into German concerns.
At the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, Zinoviev, Sverd-
lov and others said the Russian Delegates were compelled
to sign the treaty at Brest-Litovsk as a tactical measure,
owing to the situation brought about by the Ukraine in
agreeing to ignominious terms.
March 7. A peace treaty was signed between the Svin-
hufvud Government of Finland and Germany. The
treaty provided that the contracting parties were resolved
to live in peace and friendship and that Germany would
exert herself to secure recognition by all the Powers of
Finland's autonomy and independence. Finland, on the
other hand, would cede no portion of her territory to a
foreign power, without previously coming to an under-
standing with Germany on the subject. Each party re-
** A TILSIT PEACE * * 173
163
nounces compensation for war costs and indemnities.
Those treaties between Germany and Russia which had
ceased to be operative were to be replaced by new treaties,
particularly by a new commercial treaty. A commission
was to meet in Berlin for the purpose of fixing civil dam-
ages. It was to be composed of representatives of both
parties and of neutral members, each to have a one-third
representation. The President of Switzerland was to be
requested to nominate neutral members, including the
Chairman. The treaty contains stipulations for the ex-
change of prisoners of war, and of interned civilians, for
amnesty, compensation for merchant ships, etc., and for
the settlement of questions concerning the Aland Islands,
the fortifications on these islands to be removed as speed-
ily as possible, and the permanent non-fortification of the
islands regulated by Special agreement. -
March 9. Ambassador Francis sent the following cable
to the Secretary of State at Washington, according to a
document laid before a sub-committee of the U. S. Sen-
ate Committee on Judiciary investigating propaganda on
March 10, 1919, by Colonel Robins:
Colonel Robins arrived at midnight. He returned
from Petrograd after an important conference with
Trotzky on the fifth. The result of that conference
he wired to me in the code of the military mission,
but as the mission had left for Petrograd, of , which
fact you were advised, with the code, I did not learn
of the conference until the arrival of Robins an hour
ago.
Since R. left Petrograd, the Moscow and Petrograd
Soviets have both instructed their delegates to the
conference of March 12 to support the ratification of
the peace terms. I fear that such action is the result
of a threatened Japanese invasion of Siberia, which
I have anticipated by sending Wright eastward.
Trotzky told Robins that he had heard that such in-
vasion was countenanced by the Allies and especially
by America, and it would not only force the Govern-
ment to advocate the ratification of the humiliating
peace, but would so completely estrange all factions
in Russia that further resistance to Germany would be
absolutely impossible.
174
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOVSE
Trotzky furthermore asserted that neither his Gov-
ernment nor the Russian people would object to the
supervision by America of all shipments from Vladi-
vostok in Russia and a virtual control of the opera-
tions of the Siberian Railway, but a Japanese inva-
Sion would result in non-resistance and eventually
make Russia a German province. In my judgment a
Japanese advance now would be exceedingly unwise
and this midnight cable is sent for the purpose of
asking that our influence may be exerted to prevent
S3]T162.
164 March 11. The Central Executive Committee of the
Soviets, together with the Council of the People's Com-
missars, established themselves at Moscow as the capitol.
March 14-16. The Fourth All-Russian Congress of Soviets
met at Moscow. 1164 delegates were present. The treaty
of peace with Germany was ratified by a vote of 704 to 261.
Lenin made the principal speech for ratification:
#65
. . . And in a few days an imperialistic brigand
knocked us down, attacking those who had no arms.
He forced us to sign an incredibly oppressive and
humiliating peace—a penalty for our daring to break
away, even for as short a time as possible, from the
iron grip of the imperialistic war. And the more
threateningly the spectre of a working class revolu-
tion in his own country rises before the brigand, the
more furiously he oppresses and strangles and tears
Russia to pieces.
We were compelled to sign a Tilsit peace. We must
not deceive ourselves. We must have courage to face
the unadorned, bitter truth. We must measure in
full, to the very bottom, the abyss of defeat, partition,
enslavement, humiliation, into which we have been
thrown. The clearer we understand this, the firmer,
the more hardened and inflexible will become our will
for liberation, our desire to arise anew from enslave-
ment to independence, our firm determination to see
at all costs that Russia shall cease to be poor and
weak, that she may become truly powerful and pros-
perous.
She can become such, for we still have left suffi-
cient expanse and natural resources to supply all and
** A TILSIT PEACE’’ 175
every one, if not with abundance, at least with suffi-
cient means of subsistence. . . . Russia will become
such provided she frees herself of all dejection and
phrase-mongering, provided she strains her every
nerve and every muscle, provided she comes to under-
stand that salvation is possible only on the road of
the international socialist revolution which we have .
chosen. To move forward along this road, not be-
coming dejected in the face of defeat, to lay stone upon
stone, the firm foundation of a Socialist society, to
work tirelessly, to create discipline and self-discipline,
to strengthen everywhere organization, order, effi-
ciency, the harmonious coöperation of all the people’s
forces, universal accounting and control over the pro-
duction and distribution of products—such is the road
towards the creation of military power and socialist
power.
It is unworthy of a true Socialist if badly defeated,
either to deny that fact or to become despondent. It
is not true that we have no way out, that we can only
choose between a “disgraceful” (from the point of
view of a feudal knight) death, which an oppressive
peace is, and a “glorious’’ death in a hopeless battle.
It is not true that we have betrayed our ideals or
our friends, when we signed the Tilsit peace. We
have betrayed nothing and nobody. We have not
sanctioned or covered any lie. We have not refused
to aid any friend or comrade in misfortune in any
way we could, or by every means at our disposal.
A commander who leads into the interior the remnants
of an army which is defeated or disorganized by a
disorderly flight and who, if necessary, protects this
retreat by a most humiliating and oppressive peace,
is not betraying those parts of the army which he
cannot help and which are cut off by the enemy. Such
a commander is only doing his duty. He is choos-
ing the only way to save what can still be saved. He
is scorning adventures, telling the people the bitter
truth, “yielding territory in order to win time,” util-
izing any, even the shortest, respite, in order to gather
again his forces and to give the army which is af-
fected by disintegration and demoralization a chance
to rest and recover.
176
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
We have signed a Tilsit peace. When Napoleon
I. forced Prussia in 1807 to accept the Tilsit peace,
the conqueror had defeated all the German armies,
occupied the capitol and all the large cities, established
his police, compelled the conquered to give him auxil-
iary corps in order to wage new wars of plunder by
the conquerors, and he dismembered Germany, form-
ing an alliance with some German states against other
German states. And, nevertheless, even after such a
peace, the German people were not subdued. They
managed to recover, to rise, and to win the right to
freedom and independence.
To any person able and willing to think, the example
of the Tilsit peace (which was only one of the many
oppressive and humiliating treaties forced upon the
Germans in that epoch) shows clearly how childishly
naïve is the thought that an oppressive peace is, under
all circumstances, ruinous, and that war is the road
of valor and salvation. The war epochs teach us that
peace has in many cases in history served as a respite
to gather strength for new battles. The peace of
Tilsit was the great humiliation of Germany, and at
the same time a turning point to the greatest national
awakening. At that time the historical environment
offered only one outlet for this awakening—a bour-
geois state. At that time, over a hundred years ago,
history was made by a handful of noblemen and small
groups of bourgeois intellectuals, while the mass of
workers and peasants were inactive and inert. Owing
to this, history at that time could crawl only with
awful slowness.
Now capitalism has considerably raised the level of
culture in general and of the culture of the masses
in particular. The war aroused the masses, awakened
them by its unheard of horrors and sufferings. The
war has given impetus to history and now she is
speeding along with the speed of a locomotive. His-
tory is now being independently made by millions
and tens of millions of people. Capitalism has now
become ripe for Socialism.
Thus, if Russia now moves—and it cannot be denied
that she does move—from a Tilsit peace to a national
awakening and to a great war for the fatherland—
** A TILSIT PEACE’” 177
the outlet of such an awakening leads not to the bour-
geois state but to an international, Socialist revolu-
tion. We are “resistants’’ since November 7, 1917.
We are for the “defense of our fatherland.” But
the war for the fatherland towards which we are
moving is a war for a Socialist fatherland, for So-
cialism, as a part of the universal army of Socialism.
A new Central Executive Committee was elected. Chi-
cherin was made Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and
Trotzky was made Chairman of the newly created Gov-
ernment of Petrograd, known as the Petrograd Labor
Commune. It was asserted that the full provisions of the
treaty had not been made public, and that Germany had
exacted an indemnity of 9,000,000,000 roubles, and that
secret economic provisions gave Germany complete mas-
tery of Russia. At this Congress, the Bolsheviks changed
the name of their party to the Communist Party.
At the opening of the Congress on March 14, Sverdlov,
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, who pre-
sided, said in presenting a telegram from President Wilson,
dated Washington, March 11:
Comrades, I shall have difficulty in reading all the
telegrams. received here. We have received a vast
number. One telegram stands out among them, which
I shall submit to your attention. It is the telegram
from President Wilson. The telegram is as follows:
May I not take advantage of the meeting of the
Congress of the Soviets to express the sincere sym-
pathy which the people of the United States feel for
the Russian people at this moment when the German
power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back .
the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the
wishes of Germany for the purposes of the people of
Russia? Although the Government of the United
States is unhappily not now in a position to render
the direct and effective aid it would wish to render,
I beg to assure the people of Russia through the Con-
gress that it will avail itself of every opportunity to
Secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and
independence in her own affairs and full restoration
to her great rôle in the life of Europe and the modern
world. The whole heart of the people of the United
States is with the people of Russia in the attempt to
178.
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
free themselves forever from autocratic government
and become masters of their own life.
- [Signed] WOODROW WILSON.
[Applause.]
Comrades, allow me, in the name of the Congress,
to express my firm belief that the wide masses of the
proletariat and the semi-proletariat of Western Eu-
rope, as well as of America and Australia, are with
us with all their hearts. Allow me to express my firm
belief that these masses are watching with the closest
attention the struggle which we are carrying on here
in Russia, and I will permit myself to submit to your
attention the resolution which was adopted by the
presiding body of the Central Executive Committee
in answer to President Wilson’s address to the Con-
greSS. o
The resolution reads as follows: The Congress ex-
presses its gratitude to the American people, above
all to the laboring and exploited classes of the United
States, for the sympathy expressed to the Russian
people by President Wilson through the Congress of
Soviets in the days of severe trials.
The Russian Socialist Federative Republic of Soviets
takes advantage of President Wilson’s communica-
tion to express to all peoples perishing and suffering
from the horrors of imperialistic war its warm sym-
pathy and firm belief that the happy time is not far
distant when the laboring masses of all countries will
throw off the yoke of capitalism and will establish a
Socialist state of society, which alone is capable of
securing a just and lasting peace as well as the culture
and well being of all laboring people. [Applause.]
Comrades, allow me to consider this applause a suffi-
cient answer that you all join in this resolution.
166
167
IXIII. AFTER BREST_LITOWSK
March 18. The Supreme War Council of the Allies, is-
sued a statement in London on the Russian and Roumanian
Treaties, which they called ‘‘political crimes which, under
the name of a German peace, have been committed against
the Russian people.” The statement continues:
Russia was unarmed forgetting that for four years
Germany had been fighting against the independence
of nations and the rights of mankind. The Russian
Government, in a mood of singular credulity, expected
to obtain by persuasion that “democratic peace’’ which
it had failed to obtain by war.
The results were that the immediate armistice had
not expired before the German Command, though
pledged not to alter the disposition of its troops, trans-
ferred them en masse to the Western front and so
weak did Russia find herself that she dared to raise
no protest against this flagrant violation of Germany’s
plighted word.
What followed was of like character. When ‘‘the
German peace’’ was translated into action, it was
found to involve the invasion of Russian territory, the
destruction or capture of all Russia’s means of de-
fense and the organization of Russian lands for Ger-
many’s profit—a proceeding which did not differ from
‘‘annexation” because the word itself was carefully
avoided.
Meanwhile, those very Russians who had made mili-
tary operations impossible, found diplomacy impotent.
Their representatives were compelled to proclaim that
while they refused to read the Treaty presented to
them, they had no choice but to sign it; so they signed
it, not knowing whether in its true significance it
meant peace or war, not measuring, the degree to which
Russian national life was reduced by it to a
shadow. . . .
Von Hertling on the first reading in the Reichstag of
the Peace Treaty with Russia, declared that he did not
wish to discuss the opinions of Germany’s enemies re-
garding the Treaty. He continued:
180
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-I/ITOWSK
Hypocrisy has become second nature to the enemy,
whose untruthfulness is made worse by its brutality.
. . . The treaty with Russia contains no conditions
disgraceful to Russia if the provinces breaking away
from Russia say it is in accordance with their own
wish, and the wish is accepted by Russia. . . . If the
Reichstag adopts the Peace Treaty, peace on the whole
Eastern front will be restored.
The Chancellor referred to Russia’s proposal that all
the belligerents enter into the peace negotiations, and
added: -
We and our allies accepted the proposals and Sent
Delegates to Brest-Litovsk. The Powers until then
allied with Russia remained aloof. The course of the
negotiations is known to you. You remember the end-
less speeches which were intended, not so much for
the Delegates there assembled as for the public-at-
large, and which caused the desired goal of an under-
standing to recede into the distance. You remember
the repeated interruptions, the rupture and the re-
sumption of the negotiations. The point had been
reached where yes or no had to be said, and on March
3 peace was concluded at Brest-Litovsk. On March
16 it was ratified by a competent assembly in Moscow.
If, in the telegram from Washington, it was thought
fit to express to the Congress assembled at Moscow
the sympathy of the United States at a moment when,
as it says, the German power obtruded itself in order
to bring success for the battle for freedom, then I
put that calmly aside with the rest. We have not
for a moment contemplated, and do not contemplate,
opposing the justified wishes and endeavor of Russia
to be liberated. . . . The Russian treaty contains no
conditions whatever which dishonor Russia, no men-
tion of oppressive war indemnities, no forcible appro-
priations of Russian territory. A number of the bor-
der States have severed their connection with the Rus-
sian State in accordance with their own will, which
was recognized by Russia. In regard to these States,
we adopt the standpoint formerly expressed by me,
* that under the mighty protection of the German Em-
pire, they can give themselves political form corre-
sponding with their situation, and the tendency of
AFTER BREST-LITOWSK 181
168
169
170
171
172
173
their kultur, while at the same time, of course, we
are safeguarding our own interests.
March 20. Meanwhile the Austro-German advance in the
Ukraine continued. The invaders held Kiev, Odessa and
most of the principal cities of the Ukraine. The Turks
had recovered Trebizond and Erzerum and were in pos-
session of Trans-Caucasia, thus giving the Central Powers
full control of the Black Sea.
Trotzky is reported to have approached the American
Military Mission in Moscow, asking for aid in organizing
a volunteer army and improving transportation. A dis-
patch of that date says: “There has been a marked change
in the attitude of the Allies toward the Soviet Govern-
ment. . . . There are many signs of renewed coöperation
between Russia and the Allies.” It was also reported at
about the same time that Trotzky had asked the French
to help him in organizing his military forces. A leading
article in Premier Clemenceau’s L’Homme Libre declared:
“The Entente as long as the war lasts will regard Russia,
the one and indivisible Russia which signed the pact of
London, as an Ally.”
March 21. The Trans-Caucasian Constituent Assembly
at Tiflis refused to ratify the Peace Treaty with Germany
and urged immediate war.
March 22. The Main Committee of the Reichstag ap-
proved the Russo-German Peace Treaty.
March 29. The Caucasus Diet approved the basis of a
Peace Agreement with Turkey, including autonomy for
Armenia and the restoration of old frontiers.
April 2. Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Min-
ister, replied to President Wilson's address of Feb. 11, in
a speech to a deputation of the Vienna City Council. He
said: ... *
Three Treaties of Peace have been signed—with
Petrograd, Ukraine and Rumania. One principal sec-
tion of the war is thus ended. . . .
We first gave international recognition to the sep-
aration of the Ukraine from Russia, which had to be
accomplished as an internal affair of Russia. Prof-
iting from resultant circumstances which were favor-
182 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
able to our aims, we concluded with the Ukraine the
peace sought by that country.
This gave the lead to peace with Petrograd, whereby
Rumania was left standing alone, so that she also had
to conclude peace. So one peace brought another; and
the desired success, namely, the end of the war in
the East was achieved. . . . -
In concluding peace with the Ukraine and Rumania,
it has been my first thought to furnish the monarchy
with foodstuffs and raw materials. Russia did not
come into consideration in this connection owing to
the disorganization there. . .
An immediate general peace would not give us fur-
ther advantages, as all Europe is to-day suffering from
lack of foodstuffs. . . .
The forcible annexation of foreign peoples would
place difficulties in the way of a general peace. .
What we require are not territorial annexations, but
economic safeguards for the future.
We wish to do everything to create in the Balkans a
situation of lasting calm. Not until the collapse of
Russia did there cease to exist the factor which hith-
erto made it impossible for us to bring about a def-
inite state of internal peace in the Balkans.
We know that the desire for peace in Serbia is very
great, but Serbia has been prevented by the Entente
Powers from concluding it. . . .
It is a distortion of fact to assert that Germany has
made conquests in the East. Lenin’s anarchy drove
the border peoples into the arms of Germany. Is Ger-
many to refuse this involuntary choice of foreign bor-
der peoples? .
A general, honorable peace is nearer than the public
imagines. But no one has the right to remain aside
in this last decisive struggle. -
174 Lord Robert Cecil replied to Czernin. He said:
. . . I must confess I prefer Prussian brutality to
Austrian hypocrisy. . . .
Count Czernin claims with the greatest audacity
that he and his allies have just made proposals that
are moderate, and even guided by the principles of
self-determination, no annexations, and no indemni-
ties.
AFTER BREST-LITOWSK 183
As far as self-determination is concerned, in every
one of the new States they have set up they have done
so without the slightest regard to the wishes of the
peoples and no serious attempt was made even to fol-
low racial boundaries or racial antecedents. The
province of Dobrudja which has been handed over to
Bulgaria has only 18 per cent Bulgarians and 50 per
cent Roumanians, and Southern Bessarabia, which is
apparently offered to Roumania, is the part of Bessa-
rabia having the fewest Roumanians.
As for no annexations . . . what he really has done
is to take an important part of the Danube and all
the passes between Austria-Hungary and Roumania.
Not only that, he has driven back the Carpathian
frontier eight or ten miles.
But the most hypocritical part . . . is the fact that
they have imposed one of the heaviest war indemnities
ever levied. It is a curious provision which applies
to the new States, that they are to be under no obliga-
tion toward Russia arising from former relations with
her. The result is to concentrate on Russia [Soviet
Russia] the debt which was hitherto spread over the
whole of Russia. . . .
175 April 6. On ‘‘the anniversary of our acceptance of Ger-
many’s challenge to fight,’’ President Wilson delivered an
address in which he said:
At Brest-Litovsk her civilian delegates spoke in sim-
ilar terms; professed their desire to conclude a fair
peace and accord to the peoples with whose fortunes
they were dealing the right to choose their own alle-
giances. But action accompanied and followed the
profession. Their military masters, the men who act
for Germany and exhibit her purpose in execution,
proclaimed a very different conclusion. We cannot
mistake what they have done—in Russia, in Finland,
in the Ukraine, in Roumania. The real test of their
justice and fair play has come. From this we may
judge the rest.
They are enjoying in Russia a cheap triumph in
which no brave or gallant nation can long take pride.
A great people, helpless by their own act, lies for the
time at their mercy. Their fair professions are for-
184
NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSE
gotten. They nowhere set up justice, but everywhere
impose their power and exploit everything for their
own use and aggrandizement, and the peoples of con-
quered provinces are invited to be free under their
dominion |
Are we not justified in believing that they would do
the same things at their western front if they were
not there face to face with armies whom even their
countless divisions cannot overcome 2 If, when they
have felt their check to be final, they should propose
favorable and equitable terms with regard to Belgium
and France and Italy, could they blame us if we con-
cluded that they did so only to assure themselves of a
free hand in Russia and the East 3
Their purpose is, undoubtedly, to make all the Slavic
peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Bal-
kan Peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated
and misruled, subject to their will and ambition, and
build upon that dominion an empire of force upon
which they fancy that they can then erect an empire
of gain and commercial supremacy—an empire which
will ultimately master Persia, India and the peoples
of the Far East. . . .
ſWhat then are we to do? For myself, I am ready,
ready still, ready even now, to discuss a fair and just
and honest peace at any time that it is sincerely pur-
posed—a peace in which the strong and the weak shall
fare alike. But the answer when I proposed such a
peace, came from the German commanders in Russia,
and I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer. ...). . .
176 April 7. The Peoples’ Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
+3.8 Chicherin, signified to the German Government his willing-
£77
ness to open peace negotiations with the Ukrainian Rada.
April 10. The Commissar of Commerce announced that
under the Brest-Litovsk treaty Russia had suffered the fol-
lowing losses:
Seven hundred and eighty thousand square kilome-
ters (301,000 square miles) of territory.
Fifty-six million inhabitants, constituting 32 per
cent of the entire population of the country.
AFTER BREST-LITOWSE 185
178
One-third of Russia's total mileage of railways,
amounting to 21,530 kilometers (13,350 miles).
Seventy-three per cent of the total iron production.
Eighty-nine per cent of the total coal production.
Two hundred and sixty-eight sugar refineries, 918
textile factories, 574 breweries, 133 tobacco factories,
1,685 distilleries, 244 chemical factories, 615 paper
mills, 1,073 machine factories.
These territories which now become German for-
merly brought in annual revenue amounting to 845,-
238 (?) roubles, and had 1,800 savings banks.
Trotzky was appointed Peoples’ Commissar of War and
the Marine. He insisted upon the necessity of having a
strictly disciplined army. It was reported that the Soviet
Government was hoping to have a Red Army of 500,000 by
the Fall. In adopting the red banner with the inscription,
“Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic’’ on April
9, the Chairman had said:
The Russian flag will have to wave over the em-
bassies in Berlin and Vienna and we cannot have the
old tricolor, so I think it most proper to adopt the red
flag under which we fought and gained victory.
And in proposing a strictly disciplined army Trotzky
had said:
We cannot preserve the illusion that European cap-
ital will patiently suffer the fact that in Russia the
power is in the hands of the working class. . . . We
are surrounded by enemies on all sides. If it were
proposed to France to return Alsace, the French
Bourse would sell Russia tomorrow. -
September 6. New agreements supplementary to the
Brest-Litovsk Treaty were ratified in Berlin between the
German Imperial and Russian Soviet Governments. These
supplementary treaties are divided into three parts: (a)
political; (b) financial; and (c) relating to exchange, pat-
ents and arbitration. . -
(a) Supplementary Political Treaty
Article I.-Deals mainly with frontier problems. It pro-
vides above all for the establishment of “neutral zones
between the respective fronts’’ of Germany and Russia,
from which the troops of both parties are to be excluded.
186 NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOWSK
Article II.-A special commission is appointed for the
demarcation of the Eastern frontiers of Esthonia and Livo-
nia, and as soon as it reaches a decision, German troops
are to be withdrawn from the country lying further to the
East.
Article III.-The evacuation of the territory east of
Beresina is, however, made contingent upon the cash pay-
ments by Russia provided for in the special financial
treaty, and is to take place in five stages according to the
five money installments. This evacuation is to take place
before the conclusion of general peace.
Articles V and VI.-Russia undertakes to “employ at
once all the means at her disposal to expel the Entente
forces from North Russian territory in observance of her
neutrality;” and in return for this Germany guarantees
that ‘‘during these operations there shall be no Finnish
attack of any kind on Russian territory, particularly on
Petrograd.” The Germans also undertake that after the
ejection of the Allies, the restrictions of the barred zone
shall be relaxed in favor of Russia for coastal shipping and
fishing boats always subject to German control of contra-
band.
Articles VII-X.-Russia renounces, also, sovereignty
over Esthonia and Livonia, as she had already done in
Courland and Lithuania, and undertakes to refrain from
all interference in their internal affairs and to leave their
future fate to be ‘‘decided in agreement with their inhabi-
tants.’’ Russia, however, obtains the right of free through
transit for her goods to Reval, Riga and Windau, which
become free ports, with free Russian zones immune from
local customs control. Special provisions are made for
railway and waterway tariffs, in particular on the River
Dvina: for the maintenance of Lake Peipus, for Petrograd
interest in the water power of the River Narova, as a
source of electric supply, and for the transference of na-
tionals and their property between Russia and the newly
formed States.
Articles XIII-XIV.-Germany undertakes to evacuate
the districts bordering on the Black Sea (with the excep-
tion of the Caucasus) as soon as peace shall have been con-
cluded between Russia and the Ukraine. The Rostov-
Voronez railway will be evacuated when the Government
AFTER BREST-LITOWSK - 187
of Moscow requests it. With regard to the Don coal ba-
sin, an arrangement is made by which Russia is to receive
three tons of coal for every ton of oil which Germany re-
ceives from Baku, and it is laid down that Germany is to
obtain at least one-quarter of Baku’s tot il output of oil.
The minimum monthly amount to be supplied and the scale
of prices to be followed are left to be settled later. Russia
consents to German recognition of Georgian independence,
while Germany in return undertakes to prevent ‘‘the
forces of a third Power” crossing a frontier line, running
from the mouth of the Kura River through Petropavlov-
skoje and Agriova, along the north boundary of the Baku
District to the Caspian.
Article XV.--The Germans undertake to restore Russian
shipping after the conclusion of the general peace.
(b) Supplementary Financial Treaty
This treaty assigns to Germany a sum of 6,000,000,000
marks, due (a) for the war losses of German subjects on
Russian territory or through Russian occupation, and (b)
for the expenses incurred by Germany in housing and
feeding her Russian prisoners. Stipulations for payment
are made under four distinct heads:
1. 2,500,000,000 to be floated as a 6 per cent Russian
loan.
2. 1,000,000,000 to be delivered in goods, not later than
M rch 31, 1920 (the cash payment being correspondingly
increased in the event of failure to comply). -
3. 1,500,000,000 in cash. This again falls into two
sections: --
(a) 545,000,000 roubles of Czarist paper money, val-
tled at the rate of 11% marks to 1 rouble.
(b) 245,564 kilograms of fine gold, which is valued at
683,000,000 marks in gold. The first installment, 42,860
kilogr ms in gold, and 90,900,000 roubles in paper was to
be paid, and actually was paid, on September 10; the sec-
ond installment on September 30, and three more at inter-
vals of a month.
4. The balance of 1,000,000,000 falls to Finland and the
Ukraine.
According to the Frankfurter Zeitung, the Soviet Gov-
ernment itself offered gold because they considered that
under their new system they will not require gold as an
international medium.
*
tº
1917
Nov.
INov.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Now'.
Nov.
Nov.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
:
22
23
25
27.
28
29
30
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
... The Armistice proposals
|
#
TABLE OF ITEMS
The overthrow of the Kerensky Government
The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets
The first Peace and Armistice offer to belliger-
ents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . de
The first Soviet Peace proclamation. . . . . . . . . .
Trotzky offers Armistice and Peace to Entente
The Soviet offer to open ‘‘pour parlers’’ With
the enemy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The ‘‘ Universal’’ of the Ukrainian Rada. . . . .
The appointment of Krylenko as Commander-
in-chief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Decree concerning Self-Determination . . . . . . . .
The publication of the secret treaties. . . . . . . . .
The English reply to the proposal for an
Armistice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The British Ambassador and the Notes of the
Soviet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trotzky to Neutral Powers on Armistice and
Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The attitude of the Entente and American am-
bassadors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The protest of the U. S. lodged with Gen.
Dukhonin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Russian wireless offering Peace to belligerents
Erylenko orders firing to cease and fraterniza-
tion to begin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Von Hertling declares Russian proposals ac-
ceptable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Czernin declares Russian proposals acceptable.
The Inter-Allied Conference convenes at Paris
Maklakov dismissed as Russian Ambassador to
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Von Kuhlmann regards Russian principles as
acceptable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trotzky invites Allies to participate in Nego-
tiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trotzky warns Allied Missions against inter-
ference in Russian affairs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trotzky declares for publicity for Negotiations
Preliminary negotiations for a Truce with the
Germans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Truce with the Austrians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trotzky asks participation of Allies in Nego-
tiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Russian Armistice Delegation at Dvinsk.
A Truce for 48 hours signed at Brest-Litovsk. .
The opening of Negotiations for Armistice. . . .
President Wilson accepts the Russian Peace
Formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Russian Delegation for General Armistice
Preparations for future Negotiations. . . . . . . . .
Trotzky informs Allied Governments of Nego-
tiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e tº º gº e
Pag
:;
9
11
11
12
14
14
14
14
15
15
15
16
16
16
16
17
17
17
17
19
19
20
20
20
20
21
22
22
23.
23
TABLE OF ITEMS 189
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
- Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
1918
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
11
12
13
14
15
17
18
20
22,
25
26-28
27
28
29
6
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
Repudiation of Russia’s debts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The independence of Finland proclaimed. . . . . .
The Ukrainian Parliament authorizes Armistice
Delegations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ‘e e s = * * * * * * * * *
Cessation of hostilities on the Russian Front. . . .
Truce between Russia and Roumania. . . . . . . . .
The Russian Delegation for Brest-Litovsk. . . .
Trotzky on a Separate Armistice and Separate
Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The First Sitting of the Armistice Delegations
The Second Sitting of the Armistice Delega-
tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lloyd George says America will take the place
of Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Third Sitting of the Armistice Delegations
Trotzky asks Allied participation in the Peace
Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A declaration to the Socialists of all countries
The Soviet Ultimatum to the Ukrainian Rada. .
Ruhlmann and Czernin at Brest. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A preliminary Conference between the delega-
tions at Brest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lloyd George says Russia must be responsible
for Territorial Terms of the Negotiations. .
The Negotiations for a General Peace are
begun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The reply of the Central Powers and Joffe’s
allSWeſ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The First Sitting concerning Text of Treaty.
The Russian Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Second Sitting. The German Draft. . . . . . . . . .
Final Sitting of the Committee of the Whole. .
Trotzky on the Entente and a Separate Peace
Pichon on the reply of the Allies. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Russian invitation to “The Peoples and Gov-
ernments of Allied Countries’’. . . . . . . . . . . .
Russian wireless with Peace Terms picked up
at Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soviet condemns German Terms. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Izvestia, calls Germans “wolves in sheeps”
clothing” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Russian propaganda among German soldiers. . .
Proposed aid to Soviet Government. Francis
and Robins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Leaders of Central Powers meet with the
Raiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Von Hertling opposes transfer of Negotiations
to Stockholm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soviet seeks understanding with the Rada. . . .
Germany refuses passports for Russia to Inde-
pendent Socialists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lloyd George outlines peace terms. . . . . . . . . . . .
Expiration of the time limit for Allied partici-
pation in the Negotiations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
France recognizes the Finnish Republic. . . . . . .
Meetings of the Naval and Economic Commis-
SIOIlS
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * e s e e s e s a e e s * * * * g e • e. e.
24
24
24
24
24
25
25
25
25
26
26
28
28
28
29
29
29
30
32
35
36
39
40
40
41
41
41
43
44
44
46
47
47
47
47
48
48
49.
190
TABLE OF ITEMS
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
IFeb.
Feb.
10
11
11-12
12
14
15
16
17
18.
18-19
19 cºrº
20-21
21
22
24
25
25-27
28
30
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
I10.
111.
Agreement between the Russian and Ukrainian
Delegations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trotzky as a “true revolutionary” at Brest-
Litovsk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
President Wilson addresses Congress on the
14 points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Plenary Session of the Peace Delegations at
Brest-Litovsk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Allied recognition of The Ukraine. . . . . . . . . . . .
Plenary Session of the Peace Delegations. . . . .
First Sitting of the Committee on Political and
Territorial Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
‘‘Teace Riots’’ in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Krylenko issues appeal for Revolutionary
Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attitude of the Allies to the Negotiations. . . .
Second Sitting of the Committee on Political
and Economic Questions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Plenary Session of the Peace Delegations. . . . .
Third Sitting of the Committee on Political and
Economic Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fourth Sitting of the Committee on Political
and Economic Questions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fifth Sitting of the Committee on Political
and Territorial Questions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Address of the British Labor Party to the
Peoples of Russia and Central Europe. . . . .
Private Conference of the Central Delegations
Confidential discussion of Central Delegations
with Ukrainian Delegations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Confidential discussions continued. . . . . . . . . . . .
Fifth Sitting of the Committee on Political
and Territorial Questions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bussian Constituent Assembly dissolved. . . . . .
Peace Strikes in Austria-Hungary. . . . . . . . . . . .
Sittings of the Russo-German Legal Commis-
Sion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trotzky at Petrograd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bussian protest against incorrect German re-
ports of Brest Negotiations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Two Russian wireless messages “To All’’. . . .
Hertling’s reply to Wilson’s 14 points. . . . . . .
Czernin’s account of the Brest-Litovsk Nego-
tiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kuehlmann on the Brest Negotiations. . . . . . . .
The Third Congress of Soviets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
‘‘Peace, Bread and Liberty’’ strikes in Berlin
Resumption of Plenary Sittings at Brest-
Litovsk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Denunciation by Russia of the Anglo-Russian
Agreement concerning Persia. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sixth Sitting of the Committee on Political
and Territorial Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Plenary Session of the Peace Delegations. . . . . .
|Finnish Delegation at Brest-Litovsk. . . . . . . . . .
Seventh Sitting of the Committee on Political
and Territorial Questions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
112.
The Allied War Council answers Hertling and
Czernin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
50
50
50
55
57
58
61
63
64
65
65
71
73
79
86
89
90
90
90
91
95
96
96
96
97
97
98
99
101
102
104
105
106
107
108
113
113
TABLE OF ITEMS 191
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
- Feb.
.g
10
11
12
14
15.
17
18
19
20
21
23.
24
Conference of Central Powers at Berlin. . . . . .
North German Gazette on difference between
Northern Russia and The Ukraine. . . . . . . .
The Petrograd Soviet to the “Soviets’’ in Ber-
lin and Vienna. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
German peace ultimatum to Roumania. . . . . . . .
Eighth Sitting of the Committee on Political
and Territorial Questions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Decree abolishing the Russian National Debt ..
The Separate Peace of the Central Powers and
The Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Letter from Trotzky to Lenin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Final Sitting of the Committee on Political
and Territorial Questions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sittings of the Military Sub-Commission . . . . .
The final Plenary Sitting of the Peace Delega-
tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A wireless “To All” from the Russian Delega-
tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
President Wilson in reply to Hertling and
Czernin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - -
Great Britain does not recognize the Ukrainian
Separate Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lloyd George on Germany at Brest-Litovsk. . . . .
Trotzky before the Central Executive Commit-
tee at Petrograd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Manifesto of Kaiser Karl concerning Peace
with The Ukraine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Polish protests against the cession of Kholm to
The Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Announcement by German Army Headquarters
that armistice expires January 18. . . . . . . . .
Declarations of the Ukrainian Government
‘‘To the German People’’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
German purposes in ‘‘the new war’’. . . . . . . . .
German-Austrian military agreement. . . . . . . . . .
Supplement to the Ukrainian Treaty concerning
Kholm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wireless of Council of People’s Commissars to
Perlin offering to sign dictated peace. . . . .
FCrylenko’s orders to the Russian armies. . . . . .
Trotzky asks if Austro-Hungarian Government
is at War with Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
German request for written authentication of
Council’s Wireless . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lenin before the Central Executive Committee
of Soviets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Von Kuehlmann’s defense of the ‘‘ new War ’’
With Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The German, Austrian and Turkish advances. .
Proclamations of the People’s Commissars call-
ing for armed “defense of the Republic’”. .
Russia receives the terms of the German peace
ultimatum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Central Executive Committee accepts Ger-
many’s conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Petrograd Soviet approves action of the Gov-
ernment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
115
116
117
117
118
…”
120
122
124
131
131
133
(133 '.
134
134
134
145
146
148
148
149
149
149
150
150
151
151
151
152
152
152
154
156
192
TABLE OF ITEMS
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.
March
March
March
March
March
March
March
March
March
March
March
March
March
March
March
April
April
April
25
26
27
6
7
9
11
14-16
18
20
21
22
29
7
6
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
Hertling on German aims in Russia. . . . . . . . . . .
Scheidemann on the Brest Treaty. . . . . . . . . . . .
Russian resistance to the German advance. . . .
Balfour and Cecil reply to Hertling’s statement
on German aims
The German advance in Esthonia. . . . . . . . . . . .
Bequest of Russian Delegation at Brest for
armored train
Advance of Soviet forces in Don region. . . . . .
German Staff announcement that Kiev
been liberated by Ukrainian and Saxon
troops”
Statement of Russian Delegation before sign-
ing the Treaty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. . . . .
German Staff announces cessation of military
operations a
Emperor William to Chancellor Hertling. . . . .
Moscow to become the Capitol of Russia. . . . . .
Preliminary Treaty between Roumania and the
Central Powers
The Soviets instruct their Delegates to ratify
Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Treaty between Finland and Germany. . . . . . . .
Ambassador Francis cables to the Secretary of
State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moscow the Russian Capitol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Fourth Congress of Soviets ratifies the
Treaty. Lenin’s address. President Wil-
son’s message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Allied War Council on the Russian and Rou-
manian Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Von Hertling on the Treaty with Russia. . . . . .
The Austro-German and Turkish advances. . . .
Russia and the Allies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Trans-Caucasian Assembly refuses to ratify
Treaty
The Reichstag Main Committee approves the
Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Caucasus approves Peace Agreement with
Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Czernin on the Treaties with Petrograd, The
Ukraine and Roumania. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cecil replies to Czernin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
President Wilson on the Brest Negotiations...
Russia and the Ukrainian Rada. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Russia’s losses under the Brest Treaty. . . . . . .
The terms of Russo-German Supplementary
Agreements
e e s e e s e s e e e s e s tº e e s e e º º e º &
e e e o a e e º e s e e e s e º e s e s a tº e º e s e
e e º e e e e e s e e s e º e ºs e e e º e º e º e s e º 'º e º a
• e e = e e s a e º e s e º e e s e º e º e < e <>
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * s e e º e o e e s e e e g º e e e s o
April
Sept.
178.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
164
165
168
171
171
172
172
172
172
173
174
174
179
179
181.
181
181
181
181
181
182
183
184
184
*::: ... :: *, *-*-
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