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:
ARTES
1817
LIBRARY VERITAS
SCIENTIA
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
UNUM
TUEBOR
SI-QUÆRIS-PENINSULAM-AMⱭENAMA
CIRCUMSPICE
CROSSLEY & CLARKE
HARROW
USE

Abotter W Supp
1-3-057
D:
NOTES
ON THE
CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION,
BY
M. ROMANOVSKI.
CALCUTTA:
OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF GOVERNMENT PRINTING.
1870.
Jos Gil 429
17382
twitt
!
PREFACE.
AMONG the numerous questious engaging the attention
of the Russian public, and questions of importance as regards
their results in the future, that of Central Asia occupies a
very prominent part. Without reference to the military
operations, which at least up to this time have been con-
nected with its solution, and which always excite a lively
interest, this question, without doubt for many other reasons,
is deserving of public attention.
Besides the general political significance to Russia of
our Central Asiatic affairs, the importance of which becomes
each year more and more visible, and besides their relation
to our industry and trade which from remote times have
found for themselves a lucrative market in the East, it is
evident to all that the Central Asiatic question has now
arrived at that stage when any further delay in its settlement
is impossible, and at which, in one way or the other, it must
be brought to a conclusion. It will, at the same time, be
understood by all that from the mode of its settlement will
depend, among many other consequences, the economical
side of the question, and this latter, at the period of reform
through which Russia is now passing, constitutes one of the
most vital conditions of every matter.
Besides Mr. Levshine's well-known work, one that is
valuable even to the present day, we ourselves possess a
great deal of interesting data, and even complete circum-
stantial information, on the Kirghiz Stéppes and the lower
course of the Syr-Daria. But on the populated parts of
Central Asia, the late possessions of Bokhara and Kokand,
and equally on the Khanats themselves of Central Asia, in
our literature and in that of foreign countries, information
is far from abundant, and yet it is these very parts that at
iv
the present moment attract a more lively interest. Vam-
bery's work and the works of our learned men, Khanykof,
Nikiforof, Kühlewein, Danilevski, and others who have at
least succeeded in penetrating as far as the principal points
in this remote country, give us, of course, tolerably accurate
ideas in general of the life and character of the people, but
they are far from being rich enough to enable us to decide
upon all those vital questions now collectively before us.
Naturally enough these works, though they are of great
merit, cannot contain all we require at present. Circum-
stances and the march of time have brought with them fresh
demands, and it is these latter that ask now to be satisfied.
The readers of the above-mentioned works will of course
bear in mind the suspicion and animosity with which every
European is regarded in the countries of Central Asia, and
how limited were consequently his powers to make a com-
plete collection of data, and to produce a trustworthy and
exhaustive work. The only available process by which a
traveller could obtain information was by means of interro-
gation; but independent of the faultiness of such a process,
answering badly in all localities and among all people in
Central Asia, a source of information like this presented an
additional disadvantage; the natives, similar to savages, met
all questions made to them by foreigners with suspicion,
whilst sometimes, even though desirous to be candid, they
could not give accurate information, simply because they
could not comprehend the use of the interrogatories.
Under such circumstances, whilst on the one hand an
extremely important and complicated question is requiring
an immediate solution, and on the other the data already at
hand for the purpose are anything but remarkable for their
richness, the observations and opinions on the region of
people who have been there, formed too from facts and
correct materials, are calculated to be more than ever timely.
In order, however, that the degree of authoritativeness of
such opinion may be appreciated by the majority of the read-
ing public, it is requisite that the facts themselves, on which
these opinions are founded, should be laid before them in
sufficient detail; the public can in such case only estimate
the value of the theories and deductions placed before them.
In questions so new and complicated as our Central
Asiatic question, there will hardly be found a man possessing
sufficient self-confidence seriously to propose a complete
V
finished system of action, touching everything we have yet
to do in the region. No little time will probably elapse
before a faultless and perfect view of the matter will be
taken, and before an orderly and elaborate system will be
worked out. But there is no doubt that both the view and
the system will all the sooner and easier be arrived at by a
more frequent expression in point of candid and well-founded
opinions.
However contradictory these published opinions may be,
the question itself must win by the discussion. It is a
hackneyed aphorism that a collision of opinions gives birth
to truth.
The contemporary position of every country is inevita-
bly the result of acts and events of past periods, and in
most instances depends chiefly from the very latest events,
from the very latest actions. This truth, so old, so long, and
so well known, cannot but apply as well to our Central
Asiatic affairs.
On the above grounds, wishing to familiarize those who
are but little or not at all acquainted with the region with
the question of Central Asia as it stands at present, I have
considered it necessary to review in detail the principal acts
performed and events which have transpired there since the
beginning of the year 1854. The period from 1854 to 1867
is particularly remarkable for the working out of the long
contemplated project for the settlement of the region, and
for the accomplishment of all that directly led to the present
position of our affairs in Central Asia. At the same time
I consider it necessary also to cast a cursory glance back
over all that had passed even prior to that. If this remote
past has had nothing to do with bringing about the present
condition of Central Asiatic affairs, it has helped at least
to discover the measures which have been put into operation
during the last 13 years.
Yet, to all that occurred before my arrival in the pro-
vince, and of which I was not a witness, I shall make no
more allusion than is necessary to give fullness to my
narrative.*
*The Appendices consist of the reports of those who controlled the operations of
the Military Commanders, of the copies of the correspondence with the neighbouring
Central Asiatic rulers, and of the communications addressed by the Cootees to our
authorities on the frontier, as well as of several documents and materials giving
a more clear and correct understanding of the region generally as well as of our
position therein.
vi
The last occurrences in Central Asia are yet too fresh;
they have had too little time to explain themselves to lend to
our account of them in any form whatever an historical
character. In this respect all similar works can be regarded
merely as material for history. But again I say that on the
strength of all the information I produce the reader will,
as I hope, himself be able to weigh the accuracy of the
observations drawn from it, and by this means to guard
himself against all extravagancies on my part should such
against my will have crept into my notes.
I shall, at all events, allow myself to hope that the
reader will not deny the two most important conclusions
established by this book :-
1.-That the position we have gained in Central Asia
up to the year 1867 is in all respects a more advantageous
one than that we occupied 13 years ago, or, in other words,
that the Central Asiatic question is now much more in the
hands of the Government and under its control than at
any previous time. This is not in the least affected by the
circumstance that much remains still to be done finally to
establish sound and profitable relations with our Central
Asiatic neighbours, and to give our new Central Asiatic
possessions a final and equally sound organization.
2. That the extension of our dominions in the coun-
tries of Central Asia, within due limits, will not require any
such extraordinary sacrifices and disbursements as will weigh
heavily on the empire. Even now, taking into consideration
all the results we have obtained, our position in respect
of pure economy is not more onerous than it was in 1854;
and in the future this side of the question gives promises of
progressive improvement.
But at any rate I shall consider myself very fortunate
if
my observations on the Central Asiatic question will, by
calling forth the judgments of competent persons, conduce
in some measure towards the formation of opinions prac-
tically serviceable in the matter.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
FIRST RELATIONS OF RUSSIA WITH CENTRAL ASIA-GENERAL CHARACTERISTIC OF
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT THERE, FROM PETER THE GREAT'S
TIME TO THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS OF THIS CENTURY AND SUBSEQUENTLY-
THE RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN 1854 WITH REGARD TO THE
CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION-MEDITATED PROJECT FOR THE CONNECTION OF
THE ADVANCED LINES OF THE ORENBURG AND SIBERIAN FRONTIERS-IMPOR-
TANCE OF THIS SCHEME-INDISPENSABILITY OF THE MEASURE AND DIFFICUL-
TY OF ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT IN EARLIER TIMES-DISTRIBUTION AND NUMERI-
CAL STRENGTH OF OUR TROOPS ON THE CONFINES OF CENTRAL ASIA IN
1854-Two CHIEF OPINIONS ON THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS MODE OF ACTION
FOR US TO ADOPT IN CENTRAL ASIA
PAGE.
1
CHAPTER II.
THE CRIMEAN WAR HINDERS THE CARRYING OUT OF THE PROJECT OF CONNECTING
THE ORENBURG AND SIBERIAN FRONTIERS-FIRST STEPS TOWARDS ITS ACCOM-
PLISHMENT-OPERATIONS IN 1860-OCCUPATION OF THE KOKAN FORTS OF
TOKMAK AND PISHPEK-CONSTRUCTION OF FORT DJULEK ON THE SYR-DARIA—
DEMOLITION OF FORT YANY-KURGAN IN 1862-REALISATION OF THE LONG
CONTEMPLATED PROJECT OF CONNECTING THE FRONTIERS-SIMULTANEOUS
ADVANCE OF THE DETACHMENTS FROM THE SYR-DARIA AND FROM WESTERN
SIBERIA-CAPTURE OF TURKISTAN AND AULIETA-JUNCTION OF THE TWO
DETACHMENTS-CAPTURE OF CHEMKEND-VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT AT
THAT PERIOD-FIRST UNSUCCESSFUL MOVEMENT AGAINST TASHKEND-IRRUP-
TION OF THE KOKANIANS -ACTION AT THE VILLAGE OF IKAN-FORMATION Or
THE TURKISTAN PROVINCE-MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1865-CAPTURE OF FORT
NIAZ-BEK-OCCUPATION OF FORT CHINAZ-CONQUEST OF TASHKEND-ARREST
OF BOKHARIAN MERCHANTS WITH THEIR GOODS-ARRIVAL OF THE GOVERNOR
GENERAL IN THE NEWLY OCCUPIED REGION-DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN
THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF ORENBURG AND THE MILITARY GOVERNor of
TURKISTAN-PLANS OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR RECONCILING THIS DIFFERENCE
OF OPINION
10
CHAPTER III.
INCREASE OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH BOKHARA-DESPATCH OF A MISSION TO
BOKHARA FROM TASHKEND-DETENTION OF OUR OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS BY
THE EMIR-COMMENCEMENT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS-MOVEMENT UPON
DJIZAK AND RETURN TO CHINAZ—APPOINTMENT OF A NEW CHIEF OVER THE
TURKISTAN PROVINCE IN MARCH 1866-INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE NEW
CHIEF, AND HIS OWN IDEAS OF AFFAIRS-THE DIFFICULT POSITION OF THE
PROVINCE AT THAT TIME IN POLITICAL, MILITARY, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONO-
MICAL RESPECTS
***
•
15
viii
CONTENTS.
PAGE.
CHAPTER IV.
STATE OF THE ACTIVE DETACHMENTS AND OUR RELATIONS WITH BOKHARA AT THE
END OF MARCH-MEASURES FOR STRENGTHENING THE DETACHMENTS AND FOR
THE DEFENCE OF THE REGION-ACTION AT MUZZA-RABAT ON THE 5-17тп of
APRIL-COMMUNICATIONS WITH BOKHARA AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH KOKAN—
ARRIVAL OF THE STEAMERS-CO-OPERATION FROM WESTERN SIBERIA-NO
HOPE OF ASSISTANCE FROM ORENBURG-INCREASE OF DIFFICULTIES-DESIGNS
OF THE EMIR-REPEATED ATTACKS ON OUR COMMUNICATIONS AND IN THE
REAR OF ACTING COLUMNS-ANOTHER MISSION TO THE EMIR-PRETENSIONS
OF THE BOKHARIAN POTENTATE-OATEGORICAL ANSWER TO THEM-ARRIVAL
OF REINFORCEMENTS-ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE REGION-
INEVITABLE NECESSITY FOR A DETERMINED ADVANCE ON OUR PART-
ENCOUNTER AT IRDJAR ON THE 8-20TH OF MAY-MOVEMENT ON KHODJEND
SEIZURE OF THAT TOWN ON THE 24TH MAY (5TH JUNE)-EMBASSIES FROM
BOKHARA AND KOKAN-RETURN OF ONE OF THE RUSSIAN OFFICERS DETAINED
IN BOKHARA-CESSATION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AND RETURN TO TASHKEND
ON THE 2-14TH JUNE
...
...
23
CHAPTER V.
CHANGE IN THE ASPECT OF AFFAIRS IN THE PROVINCE AND IN THE DEMEANOUR
TOWARDS US OF THE NATIVES-RETURN OF OUR OFFICERS FROM BOKHARA—
NEW MISSIONS OF PEACE FROM BOKHARA AND KOKAN-ANSWERS TO THE
EMIR OF BOKHARA AND KHAN OF KOKAN-PRECAUTIONS TO INSURE THE SAFETY
OF MEN AT THE FRONT, AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR INDISPENSABLE ENGINEERING
WORKS-INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION-ACCOUNTS-FORMATION OF
OF RUSSIAN
SETTLEMENTS IN TASHKEND, KHODJEND, AND CHINAZ—FOUNDATION OF AN
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL-EXPLORATION OF THE SOURCES OF THE CHIRCHIK
CHAPTER VI.
MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND DISTURBANCES IN THE PROVINCE-DETENTION OF BOKHA-
RIAN MERCHANTS IN ORENBURG-AGITATIONS IN BOKHARA AND KOKAN—
RUMOURS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ON A LARGE SCALE CONTEMPLATED BY
US-LETTER OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL-VIEWS OF GENERAL KRYJANOVSKI
ON THE CONQUEST OF KOKAN-DESIGNS AGAINST BOKHARA AND FORMATION
OF A TASHKEND DISTRICT-REJOINDER-ARRIVAL OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL
IN THE PROVINCE ACCEPTANCE OF TASHKEND AS A DEPENDENCY OF RUSSIA-
ESTABLISHMENT OF MEKHKEME-ANNEXATION OF THE TRANS-CHIRCHIK RE-
GION KHODJEND AND NAU-RELATIONS WITH KOKAN AND BOKHARA-RENEWAL
OF MILITARY OPERATIONS-CAPTURE OF URATIUBE AND DJIZAKH-THE GO-
VERNOR GENERAL'S RETURN FROM THE CORPS OF OPERATION, AND HIS DEPAR-
TURE FROM THE PROVINCE- PROJECTS FOR MILITARY AND CIVIL ADMINISTRA-
TION-GENERAL RESULT OF THE MEASURES OF 1866 WITH REGARD TO THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND FISCAL ORDER
CHAPTER VII.
35
...
45
RECAPITULATION.-TURKISTAN CONSTITUTED A MILITARY DISTRICT AND GOVERNOR-
GENERALSHIP-A FEW WORDS ON THE ROADS AND TRADE
+
56
APPENDICES.
APPENDIX I.
PAGE.
i
...
Report of Colonel Zimmermann, Commanding the Troops in the Trans-Ili District,
to the General in Command of the Detached Corps of Siberia, August 28th,
1860 ...
APPENDIX II.
...
Report of Colonel Zimmermann, Commanding the Forces in the Trans-Ili District,
to the General in Command of the Detached Corps of Siberia, 5th September
1860
APPENDIX III.
Statement of the Strength of the Trans-Chú Force
APPENDIX IV.
Translation from the Kokaniandese
...
APPENDIX V.
iv
viii
ix
...
ib.
Return of the Strength, &c., of the Trans-Chú Force under the command of
Colonel Cherniayef
...
APPENDIX VI.
Extract from the Report of Colonel, now Major General, Cherniayef, of the 6th
June 1864
...
APPENDIX VII.
...
Σ
Extract from a Report by Colonel, now Major General, Verefkin, of the 19th
June 1864
*
...
...
APPENDIX VIII.
Formation of the new Kokand line
APPENDIX IX.
xi
***
xvi
Abstract of a Communication from General Cherniayef, dated 25th September
APPENDIX X.
Extract from General Cherniayef's Report
ib.
xviii
APPENDIX XI.
Abstract of General Cherniayef's Report of the 14th October 1864
...
ib.
X
APPENDICES.
APPENDIX XII.
Extract from General Cherniayef's Report of 27th December 1864
PAGE,
XX
APPENDIX XIII.
Order of the day of the Minister of War-(No. 56, dated 12th February 1865) ...
xxii
APPENDIX XIV.
Extract from the Report of General Cherniayef,-dated 2nd May 1865
APPENDIX XV.
Extract from General Cherniayef's Report of 11th May 1865
APPENDIX XVI.
...
Extract from the Report of General Cherniayef~(No. 2085, dated 1st June
1865)
...
...
APPENDIX XVII.
xxiii
xxiv
...
xxvi
Report from General Cherniayef, dated 17th June 1865
APPENDIX XVIII.
...
►
Extract from Report of General Cherniayef, dated 26th June 1865, to the Officer
Commanding the Troops in the Orenburg Region
...
...
APPENDIX XIX.
To the Governor General Cherniayef
...
...
APPENDIX XX.
Abstract of General Cherniayef's Report of the 7th July 1865
APPENDIX XXI.
Extract from General Cherniayef's Report of the 6th August 1865
APPENDIX XXII.
To His Highness the Emir of Bokhara
APPENDIX XXIII.
...
xxviii
...
ib.
To His Highness Muzafer Bagadur Khan, the highly exalted Emir of Bokhara
APPENDIX XXIV.
Address presented to the Governor General of Orenburg by the inhabitants of
Tashkend on the 18th September 1865
...
...
APPENDIX XXV.
Extract from General Cherniayef's Report of the 12th January 1866...
APPENDIX XXVI.
Letter addressed to the Emir of Bokhara by General Cherniayef
APPENDIX XXVII.
To Michael Cherniayef
"
:
ib.
xxix
XXXV
xxxix
ib.
xl
xli
xlii
xliit
APPENDICES.
xi
PAGE.
APPENDIX XXVIII.
General Cherniayef to the Emir of Bokhara
APPENDIX XXIX.
General Cherniayef's Report of the 31st January 1866
APPENDIX XXX.
...
xliii
$
Extract from General Cherniayef's Report of the 19th February 1866
APPENDIX XXXI.
General Cherniayef to the Einir of Bokhara
APPENDIX XXXII.
xliv
ib.
xlvi
...
Report of the Chief of the Staff of the province of Turkistan, to the Officer
Commanding the Troops in the Orenburg Military Circuit, dated the 7th
(19th) March 1866
...
APPENDIX XXXIII.
Report of the same to Colonel Count Voronzow, Dakshkoff of H. I. M.'s Aide-
de-Camp, dated the 14th (26th) March 1866
...
APPENDIX XXXIV.
Journal of Military operations and events on the Central Asiatic Frontier from
the 14th (26th) February to the 10th (22nd) April
xlvii
it.
ib.
APPENDIX XXXV.
Draft of a letter to the Emir of Bokhara
...
APPENDIX XXXVI.
Copy of a letter to Mahommed Yakub-bek of Jizakh
APPENDIX XXXVII.
:
:
:
A copy of a letter from Mahommed Jacub-bek of Djizakh
APPENDIX XXXVIII.
An extract from General Romanofski's Report, dated 11-23rd April 1866
APPENDIX XXXIX.
Journal of Military operations and events which took place on the Central Asiatic
frontiers, from the 10th of April to the 1st of May 1866
APPENDIX XL.
APPENDIX XLI.
General Romanofski's report from the 11th of May 1866
APPENDIX XLII.
141
:
Extract from a letter of General Romanofski, Commander of the Troops of the
Orenburg District, dated the 30th May 1866
APPENDIX XLIII.
Extract from the report of V. M. Severoff, Controller of the Native Settlement of
the Tashkend District, and Commander of the Troops of the Turkistan
Region, dated 10th May 1866
...
li
it.
lii
ib.
liv
lix
lx
lxv
lxix
xii
APPENDICES.
(Translation from the Persian)
APPENDIX XLIV.
...
...
PAGE.
lxix
APPENDIX XLV.
Report of General Romanofski, dated 6th June 1866
APPENDIX XLVI.
ib.
...
...
To Major General D. J. Romanofski, Governor of the Province of Turkistan
lxxvi
APPENDIX XLVII.
Your High Eminence
APPENDIX XLVIII.
Your High Eminence
APPENDIX XLIX.
Your High Eminence
...
...
:0
lxxvii
3
lxxviii
...
:.
APPENDIX L.
To the Russian Emperor's Major General Romanofski, Military Governor of the
Province of Turkistan
...
APPENDIX LI.
Extract from the Report of General Romanofski, dated the 7th October 1866
APPENDIX LII.
Extract from General Romanofski's Report of the 1-13th November 1866
Proclamation
APPENDIX LIII.
APPENDIX LIV.
Letter from Khudayar Khan
APPENDIX LV.
Letter to Khudayar Khan
lxxix
ib.
...
ib.
lxxxix
...
xcvi
104
xcvii
APPENDIX LVI.
To His Excellency the Highly-respected Well-wisher and Appreciator of Friends
Major General Romanofski, the Governor of the Turkistan Province
APPENDIX LVII.
To the Governor General of the Turkistan Province and the Ruler of the
Kipchaks
...
APPENDIX LVIII.
Your High Eminence
...
Your High Eminence
14
APPENDIX LIX.
I
ib.
xcviii
ib.
xcix
...
*
с
xii
APPENDICES.
APPENDIX LX.
To His Excellency the Governor of the Turkistan Province
APPENDIX LXI.
On the Mekhkémé in Tashkend (Extract from an Official Document)
APPENDIX LXII.
PAGE.
ci
Circular Order to the Forces of the Province of Turkistan,
21st June
3rd July
1866
ciii
APPENDIX LXIII.
Address of the inhabitants of Khodjend, submitted to General Romanofski,
5th
17th
of June 1866
APPENDIX LXIV.
Address of the inhabitants of Tashkend, submitted to General Romanofski,
11th
of June 1866
23rd
..
...
Your High Eminence
Your High Eminence
...
APPENDIX LXV.
APPENDIX LXVI.
APPENDIX LXVII.
J
civ
ib.
...
:.
ib.
CV
...
cvi
Record of Military operations and events on the Central Asiatic Frontier from the
15-27th July to the 1-13th August 1866
APPENDIX LXVIII.
Address of the inhabitants of Tashkend, presented on the 17-29th August 1866 ...
APPENDIX LXIX.
To all the Aksakols, Elders, and inhabitants of the Village of Pishikand
APPENDIX LXX.
To the Aksakols and Elders of Pishkand
APPENDIX LXXI.
cvii
cviii
***
cix
10
ib.
To the Governor General of Orenburg and Commander of the Troops in the
Orenburg Military District, the Adjutant General Kryjanovski
APPENDIX LXXII.
Most respected and highly reverend Kazy-Mulla-Mir-Hamiditdin
*
Your High Eminence ...
APPENDIX LXXIII.
APPENDIX LXXIV.
Letter to the Emir of Bokhara
...
ib.
100
ib.
CX
xiv
APPENDICES.
APPENDIX LXXV.
General Romanofski's Report to the Governor General of Orenburg, 12-24th
September 1866 ...
APPENDIX LXXVI.
Major General Romanofski, the Governor of the Turkistan Province ...
APPENDICES LXXVII & LXXVIII.
Lists of Administrative and Police Officers serving in Turkistan
...
APPENDIX LXXIX.
PAGE.
CX
ib.
cxi
ib.
...
Observations on the disbursement and revenues of the Tashkend and Khodjend
Districts (submitted to the Governor General on his visit to the region in
August 1866)
...
...
APPENDIX LXXX.
Approximate Estimate of Taxes payable by the inhabitants of the Tashkend Dis-
trict and Trans-Chirchik Region for the year 1866
•
APPENDIX LXXXI.
Revenue of the Turkistan Region for the Year 1866
...
APPENDIX LXXXII.
Extracts from the Full Accounts and Estimates submitted to the Governor Gene-
ral with Report dated 28th February 1867, No. 313 ...
APPENDIX LXXXIII.
...
The Population of Turkistan
...
..
..
cxiii
cxiv
CXV
...
APPENDIX LXXXIV.
Extract from a Minute on the project for a temporary Military Administration in
the Turkistan Region
APPENDIX LXXXV.
Cossack population of the Ural, of Orenburg and Siberia (including the Semirechensk
Region) to 1st January 1867 ...
•
...
...
APPENDIX LXXXVI.
cxvi
ib.
cxviii
cxix
...
Return of Cannon taken from the Kokanians at the capture of Turkistan,
Chemkend, Tashkend and Aùliétà in 1864 and 1865...
APPENDIX LXXXVII.
Distribution of Regular Troops of the late separate corps of Orenburg and Siberia
in December 1854
APPENDIX LXXXVIII.
cxxii
...
Circular to the Troops of the Turkistan Region, No. 173, dated, St. Petersburg,
the 14th-26th April 1867
cxxiii
NOTES
ON THE
CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
CHAPTER I.
FIRST RELATIONS OF RUSSIA WITH CENTRAL ASIA-GENERAL CHARACTERISTIC OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT THERE, FROM PETER THE GREAT'S TIME TO THE
FIRST TWENTY YEARS OF THIS CENTURY AND SUBSEQUENTLY-THE RESOLUTION OF
THE GOVERNMENT IN 1854 WITH REGARD TO THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION-
MEDITATED PROJECT FOR THE CONNECTION OF THE ADVANCED LINES OF THE OREN-
BURG AND SIBERIAN FRONTIERS-IMPORTANCE OF THIS SCHEME-INDISPENSABILITY
OF THE MEASURE AND DIFFICULTY OF ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT IN EARLIER TIMES-
DISTRIBUTION AND NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF OUR TROOPS ON THE CONFINES OF
CENTRAL ASIA IN 1854-TWO CHIEF OPINIONS ON THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS MODE
OF ACTION FOR US TO ADOPT IN CENTRAL ASIA,
As soon as Russia began to free herself from the Tartars and to form an
independent State, the views of her rulers turned towards the east, and
in no long time, with comparatively small sacrifice, the power of Russia
extended over most of her present Asiatic possessions.
Perm was subdued in 1472, during the reign of John III. "This
conquest, by which the dominions of Moscow were made to abut on
the Ural range of mountains, gladdened the Czar and the people by its
promise of great commercial advantage, and by the memory it brought
of the happy past."* Soon after this, and in the same reign, the subju-
gation of Viatka and of the Yugor country (north-western portion of
Siberia) was effected. Subsequently, in the reign of John IV, and after
the final downfall of the Kingdoms of Kazan and Astrakhan, Yermak
annexed the greater part of Siberia, and almost simultaneously the
Cossacks of the Ural occupied the valley of the Ural. The profits of trade
and the natural fertility of the newly-acquired countries attracted many
enterprising people, and with their assistance, in the seventeenth century
Russia extended her dominion without much difficulty over the whole of
Siberia as it now is, and over the Orenburg region to the Irtysh and
Ural.
In addition to a constant and persevering attention to the firm and
regular settlement of our frontiers along the Ural and Irtysh, by the
establishment of Cossack colonies and the construction of fortifications,
the Russian Government has, at intervals, since the close of the seventeenth
century, undertaken tolerably large expeditions into the interior of the
Steppes, and even into the very depths of Central Asia and its Khanats.
* History of the Russian Empire, Karamzin, Vol. VI.
2
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
But neither in the days of Peter the Great, nor during the reigns of
Elizabeth II, Paul I, or even Alexander I, could these operations have
been conducted on any system, or have been the results of any pre-con-
ceived plan. At these periods, the primitive geographical and statistical
data relative to the countries adjoining the north-eastern confines of
Russia were too imperfect and confused to point the way clearly to any
one permanent object, or to admit of its being steadily pursued. In those
times, too, it required no small amount of care and of means thoroughly
to secure our old lines along the Ural and Irtysh, and to organize the
settlements of the Ural, Orenburg and Siberian Cossacks. We should
look upon all those expeditions as reconnaissances for the purpose of
gathering information about the region in which we were about to act,
rather than as enterprizes based upon a pre-concerted plan.
As regards the actions and measures of our Government in relation
to the Kirghiz Steppes and Central Asiatic Khanats during the last
thirty or forty years, it may be easily observed that they were prosecuted
with a firmness of purpose which has been well defined for the last
thirteen years. The object which we should strive to attain became clear
enough during the thirty years that preceded the year 1854. It was
then that we first began to act upon many sound and rational sugges-
tions concerning the organization of the Steppes and the best and most
advantageous form of relations with our Central Asiatic neighbours-
Khiva, Bokhara and Kokan.
It may even be said that, if the Crimean war had not diverted the
attention of the Government, the state of our south-eastern confines
and our relations with the Central Asiatic Khanats would now have
been satisfactory.
So early as 1854, it was resolved by a Special Committee, and con-
firmed by the Emperor, to connect the then newly established Syr-Daria
line with the newly advanced Siberian line of frontier.
Such a measure was even at that time substantially indispensable,
since it was the only one that could secure the object of that advance
into the Steppes which we commenced during the first twenty years of
the present century, and which the force of circumstances compelled us
to make.
As the old lines were established during the last century and in the
beginning of this, and as they became more secure against the inroads
of neighbouring nomads, so the settlers along those lines and the nomads
camping about in the vicinity of our frontiers began to prosper, whilst
Russian industry and trade found opportunity for development. But, in
addition to these good results from the establishment of the old lines,
another result soon became more and more evident, and that was, the
utter impossibility of confining ourselves to the old lines along the Ural
and Irtysh, and the necessity of moving still further into the Steppes;
and at that time, especially, that necessity could not but involve us in
difficulties, for many reasons.
In front of the old lines, to the east and south of the Ural and
Irtysh, stretches a boundless plain, spreading on the one side thousands
of versts up to the frontiers of Persia, and on the other, to the upper
courses of the Syr and Amu-Daria, broken only in a few places by incon-
siderable mountain ranges and rivulets, and presenting for the most
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
3
part a waterless desert, with patches of sand extending for hundreds of
versts. All the conditions necessary to settled life are found only on the
south-eastern and southern borders of this vast level, where it is invaded.
by the spurs of the Tian Shan that confine it on the east and south, and
by those of the Hindu Kush by which it is limited on the south. On
those borders, particularly near the Tian Shan, at the upper courses of
the Ili, Chui, Syr-Daria and other rivers, there is picturesque scenery and
land richly endowed by nature. Such are found in the neighbourhoods
of Almaty (Vernoe), Tashkend, Khodjend and other places. All these
localities are remarkable for the fertility of their soil, for the luxuriance
of their vegetation, and for their mineral wealth. But even here such
localities are separated from each other, either by great distances,
by arid steppes, or by mountains without any vegetation. Further
west and north of the Tian Shan and Hindu Kush, fertile oases are of
rarer occurrence. Even the valleys of the two principal rivers of this
region, the Syr-Daria and Amu-Daria, are suitable for colonization only
for a short distance from their banks,-at the lower course of the Syr-
Daria for not more than 5, 10, and seldom 15 versts. The remainder of
the area included between the Persian frontier, the Caspian and the Aral,
as well as that to the north of the Syr-Daria (our Kirghiz Steppes)
is only fit for nomads. The few spots here and there suitable for settle-
ments could only be occupied at great expense and trouble.
If we add to this that a great part of the Steppes, even those of
considerable width, are visited by severe winters and frequently subject to
violent snowstorms, the difficulties of travelling over them may be
easily conceived.
Even the nomads, although they wander perpetually over the Step-
pes, are obliged, by the scarcity of water and pasturage, to perform their
migrations only at certain seasons of the year, and then, too, along
a few known tracks. There are still fewer convenient roads for traversing
the Steppes from our frontiers to the permanently settled districts of
Central Asia.
Trade still avails itself mostly of the so-called caravan routes. The
number of these roads is very small, and some of them are devoid of
water over a length of 70 versts and more, which necessitates the almost
exclusive use of camels in the carriage of goods.*
The general features of the country to the south and east of the
Ural and Irtysh were well known to our Government forty years ago,
when not a single point in front of our old lines had yet been occupied.
It is plain, therefore, why our Government hesitated so long in assuming
direct possession of even those portions of the Steppes-the Kirghiz
Steppes-which had long been considered as belonging to Russia, and
why we reconciled ourselves to the many unfavourable consequences that
ensued from our moderation. These, however, at length assumed such
importance, that any further delay in the occupation of the Steppes
became absolutely impossible.
* We have now established postal communication along some of these roads, but this
has been effected by the digging of wells and other artificial works. It must, nevertheless,
be confessed that these postal communications have been very unsatisfactory, even up to a
recent date.
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Although the Kirghizes had acknowledged themselves subjects
of Russia in the first half of the last century, this subjection was merely
nominal for the majority of the Kirghizes up to the time of the occupa-
tion of the Steppes. Many of the tribes calling themselves Russian sub-
jects not only entered, according to their own pleasure, into one form or
other of relations with the Central Asiatic Khanats and conducted des-
perate warfare among themselves, but even rose against us, attacked our
caravans, and sometimes made raids upon our lines. Some of the
Orenburg Kirghizes, as for instance the Adayefs, still preserve similar
relations towards us.
By doing everything to avoid the erection of works, and the move-
ment of troops into the Steppes to cover them, the Government limited
its action in respect to the Kirghizes to governing them from within the
old lines, and thereby renounced all immediate active control over them.
But as the settlement of the old lines progressed, and as order became
established, such a state of confusion could not be allowed to continue; it
was not alone insufferable to us, but also to those Kirghiz tribes who,
living in the vicinity of our lines, and accommodating themselves to
Russian life, had ceased to participate in the ceaseless quarrels of their
brethren, and heartily wished to devote themselves to a peaceful exist-
ence and to industrial pursuits. To aid them in this, to enter closer into
their mode of life, and to protect them against their turbulent neigh-
bours, was morally obligatory on Russia. In order to effect this, it was
necessary to move our troops forward, to establish posts, and to build
forts in the Steppes. These measures were also needed for the protection
of our caravans, and for the purpose of counteracting the influence of
the Central Asiatic Khanats over the Kirghizes, which was hostile
towards Russia.
From the beginning of their submission to Russia, the Kirghizes
were divided for administrative purposes, and placed under the juris-
diction of the Governors General of Siberia and Orenburg. These two
independent Governors did not always agree in their views as to the
best method of governing the Kirghizes, and as to the conduct generally
of affairs in the Steppes. It not unfrequently happened that their
opinions were diametrically opposite. A môre immediate interest in the
condition of the Kirghizes and in their internal government according
to Russian forms was first taken by Count Speranski when Governor
of Western Siberia. It was from Western Siberia that our advance into
the Steppes originated: first small bodies of troops were sent out to
watch and to protect the Kirghizes; then fortified posts were established;
and at last detached forts were built, and Russian settlements intro-
duced into the Steppes. The authorities of Orenburg long abstained
from establishing any kind of permanent posts in the Steppes, and
confined themselves to sending out small detachments for the main-
tenance of order. But the insufficiency of this measure became
more and more apparent, especially after the year 1839, when the
attempt to bring Khiva under our influence, as the power most hostile to
us, by means of a single strong expedition, failed of success.
In this manner, however great were the apparent difficulties of an
advance into the Steppes, and however conflicting were the views of the
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
5
LO
Governors General of Siberia and Orenburg regarding the settlement of
our north-eastern frontiers, the force of circumstances, both on the side.
of Siberia and of Orenburg compelled us to abandon our old lines and
gradually to occupy the Steppes. Yet so great an object could not have
been accomplished at once. Not only did the erection of forts and the
establishment of colonies in the Steppes entail very heavy expenses, in
addition to other difficulties, the maintenance of the troops in most of the
advanced posts was of itself always very costly. Everything that was
required by the garrisons of those forts, not excepting provisions, had to
be brought from the old lines. What the expense must have been, we
may easily imagine from the fact that the transport of one chetvert (5.77
bushels) of flour from Orenburg to the Syr-Daria cost the Government
sometimes more than R. 20 (£3).
Our first advance into the Steppes may be said to have taken place
in the early part of the first twenty years of this century, when the outer
districts of Western Siberia were organized. During the thirty years
following, we gradually penetrated further and further until we spread
ourselves nearly over its entire extent. Between the years 1850 and
1860 our detached posts, forts, and military settlements were scattered
over the vast surface of the Steppes on the one side, from the Ural and
Irtysh to the north-eastern part of the Caspian as far as the northern
parts of the Sea of Aral and Syr-Daria; and on the other, as far as the
valley of the Ili river, at the base of the Tian Shan mountains. Thus,
in 1854, we had the fort of Novo-Petrovski, on the Mangyshlak peninsula,
on the north-eastern coast of the Caspian, while the Syr-Daria line was
established along a distance of 400 versts from the fall of that river into
the Sea of Aral as far as Fort Perovski; permanent communication
being established between this and the old lines by means of several
military posts and of forts, the former of which were surrounded by
small settlements.
From the side of Siberia a whole brigade of Cossacks was colonized
in the Steppes, in addition to the erection of forts.
Owing to these measures, we became more completely masters in the
Steppes than we had ever been before. The majority of the Kirghizes,
not only nominally, but actually, succumbed to Russian power. The
Steppes became peaceful, the well-being of the inhabitants increased,
whilst Russian industry and trade visibly progressed. At the same time,
the introduction of a flotilla on the waters of the Aral enabled us to
prevent any hostile attack against us on the part of Khiva.
Nevertheless, neither our position in the Steppes, nor our relations
with the Central Asiatic Khanats could be considered satisfactory, and
we could not but acknowledge that the results we had attained were not
in the least degree proportionate, either to the sacrifices we had made.
for them, or to the means required for the conduct of affairs as they
then stood.
All our available military force, of the then Orenburg and Siberian
Corps, was almost exclusively employed in the Steppes. Excepting the
Ural, Orenburg and Siberian Cossacks, settled in the Steppes, and who
number altogether 400.000 men, women and children, the military force
consisted of 23 battalions of the line, exclusive of invalid, escort and
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
other companies.* Notwithstanding, however, the greatness of these
means, we did not succeed in placing ourselves in a favorable position
with regard to our neighbours, nor did we either finally or effectually
pacify the Steppes.
Notwithstanding the insignificance of the Central Asiatic Khanats
of Khiva, Bokhara and Kokan, with their six or seven millions of
inhabitants, inclusive of their semi-dependent nomad populations; not-
withstanding, also, that their weak governments are perpetually at war
with each other and are always threatened by internal tumults; those
Khanats, surrounded as they are by thousands of miles of Steppes so
difficult to be traversed, have accustomed themselves to a sense of perfect
independence, and, with the exception of Bokhara, have generally
assumed a hostile attitude towards Russia. Even with Bokhara, friendly
relations were not maintained without some sacrifices on our part. In
addition to the kindness and attention bestowed by our Government on
the Emirs of Bokhara, and the immunities enjoyed by Bokharian mer-
chants in Russia, who were permitted to trade in our country without
paying guild dues, the customs duties on Bokharian merchandise were
reduced to a most trifling figure, while such of our merchants who
managed to penetrate into Bokhara were charged, like all non-Mussul-
men, at the maximum rate of duty, viz., 10 per cent. instead of 2 per
cent., and were subjected to every kind of molestation and violence.
Nomads pursued by us for turbulent conduct and for robberies, as well as
our deserters, nearly always found safe shelter in Bokhara. Our rela-
tions with Khiva improved after the establishment of the Syr-Darian
line and the Aral flotilla. They became noticeably less hostile, but, on
the other hand, as we approached Kokan from Orenburg, along the Syr-
Daria, or from Siberia in the direction of the Tian Shan, so the
Kokanians became more hostile towards us, and considering themselves
sufficiently powerful, they not only refused to make any concessions to
us, but even made occasional inroads into those portions of the region
which we had occupied. For instance, in the winter following our occu-
pation of Fort Perovski, 12,000 Kokanians with 10 guns surrounded the
fort. They were, however, totally defeated under its walls by Lieutenant-
Colonel (now Major-General) Ogaref, who was sent out against them
with a column numbering 500 to 600 men.
Yet, notwithstanding our material and moral superiority over our
Central Asiatic neighbours, we cannot but admit that, considering the
position of our forts and the military resources of the Orenburg region
and of Siberia in 1854, we could not calculate much upon the effect of
our moral influence over the Khanats.
The difficulty and cost of maintaining the troops at the advanced
posts, more than 1,000 versts in front of the old lines, compelled us
to limit their garrisons to the smallest number possible. In 1854 we
did not hold a single point from Novo-Petrovski fort to the Aral, about
600 versts, or from Fort Perovski to Fort Ili, which is about 1,000
versts distant. Under these circumstances, our Central Asiatic neighbours
* In the late detached Orenburg Corps there were 11 battalions of the line, and in
that of Western Siberia 12 (excepting, of course, the battalions in Eastern Siberia),
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
7
བ
could not only fancy themselves secure against all attacks, but had also
opportunities for freely invading our Steppes which, although unoccupied
by Russia, nevertheless belonged to us. These attacks were more com-
monly made by Kokan between Forts Ili and Perovski,-a part of the
country which served as a refuge for all the turbulent individuals of the
Steppes who fled from punishment for their crimes.
Although the country between the Caspian and Aral also suffered
from disturbances and from the inroads of nomads, who were either not
under our control or who rebelled against our Government, yet those
inroads and disturbances were not of such consequence as the Kokan
irruptions. They were occasioned by insignificant tribes who could be
easily dealt with by small detachments. In the direction also of Khiva
the country was ensured against attacks by the distance which separated
us, as well as by the difficulty of communication across the barren and
rocky Ust-Urt which separates the Caspian and Aral seas.
Nor were
there any caravan roads in that direction requiring protection, whilst
there were many that intersected the unoccupied tracts on the side of
Kokan.
In order to pacify the Steppes and to alter our position with regard
to the Central Asiatic Khanats, i. e., to place ourselves in such a position
that instead of being obliged to guard against their invasion it might
be the reverse, and that in the event of any hostile designs against
us, we might be able to threaten the Khanats with attack, it became
necessary-
1. To protect the yet unoccupied parts of our frontier by advanced
forts, as we had already done on the Syr-Daria and at the base of the
Tian Shan, from the side of Siberia, or at least to protect that portion of
the Steppes between Fort Perovski and Vernoe which had suffered most
from attack.
2. To concentrate on our front lines as many troops as would be
sufficient, not only for defence, but, if necessary, for aggression also.
The necessity of taking those measures had long been acknowledged.
So early as 1834 Colonel (now Adjutant General) Verigin, who executed
a survey of the Steppes at the instance of the War Ministry, pointed
out the necessity of their adoption. Later, in 1841, the same sugges-
tions were made by General Annenkof and by the Governor General of
Western Siberia, General Hasford. But at that time there were
undoubtedly many serious difficulties to be encountered in the execution,
not only of the second measure, i. e., the concentration of a large force,
but also in that of the first,-the construction of forts along the entire
extent of our advanced Siberian and Orenburg frontiers, for we had then
no advanced posts at the base of the Tian Shan, and no line on the
Syr-Daria. In the year 1854, however, when we were complete masters
of the greater part of the Steppes, with safe communications with our
old lines, and when the unoccupied extent of country was already reduced
by half, the connection of the lines might easily have been effected within
a few years. Moreover, the advanced forts of the Siberian lines, owing
to the settlements made around them, were at that time supplied with
provisions obtained on the spot, and not brought from the old lines as on
the Syr-Daria. It was consequently more practicable at that time to
concentrate a strong body of troops on the advanced frontiers. The
∞
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
projected line to connect the frontiers was contiguous to, and partly passed
through, a locality which had always been famous for its fertility; there
was consequently a sure prospect of obtaining a sufficient quantity of
local supplies on the establishment of that line. In fact, we had then
traversed the most difficult and the poorest portion of the Steppes, and
we had only to take advantage of a position which was in every respect
more advantageous than the one we occupied.
On the strength of all these considerations, the Committee of 1854,
which deliberated on the organization of our south-eastern confines, and
in which Count Perovski, the then Governor General of Orenburg, and
General Hasford, Governor General of Western Siberia, took part,
decided in favour of the connection of the Orenburg and Siberian lines.
But whilst accepting this decision, which must have inevitably led
one way or another to the subjection of Kokan, Bokhara and Khiva to
our influence, the Russian Government was far from entertaining any
ambitious views.
There have always existed two diametrically opposite opinions as to
the best mode of action in Central Asia. Some, pointing to the anoma-
lous nature of our relations with the feeble, but restless Khanats, believe
that the best way to alter those relations is to commence resolute
aggressive operations against Kokan, Bokhara, and Khiva, and to con-
quer them at once. The holders of this opinion, at the same time, affirm
that, in hesitating to conquer those Khanats, we run the risk of creating
another Caucasus. Others, whilst fully admitting the anomaly of our
position with regard to the Khanats and the necessity for an imme-
diate change in the character of our relations with them, consider that
there is yet no urgent necessity for such resolute aggressive action.
They apprehend that, considering the small amount of information which
we possess concerning Central Asia, an immediate conquest of the
Khanats, which would require very extensive means without bringing
any particular profit, might involve us in new, worthless and endless
conquests. Examining into the causes of the anomalousness of our
relations with the Central Asiatic Khanats, they do not see any reason
yet for giving up all hope of removing them, and of seeing the Khanats
situated as we should like them to be; provided even the more important
part of the ancient policy of Russia is fully carried out by firmly estab-
lishing our advanced frontier over such an extent of country as circum-
stances may require us to hold; when, having strengthened our military
position, we can refrain from all further aggression. The supporters of
the second and more moderate form of action, believe that it will be
more effectual in protecting us against any inimical attempts than any
acts of determined aggression on our part. They believe that, by
renouncing unnecessary conquests, we may entertain the hope of sincerely
attaching towards us, not only the mass of the population that has long
derived material benefits from its relations with Russia, but the rulers
of Central Asia as well, who would then look upon our Government as
their natural protector.
But while the representatives of the second opinion do not, of
course, render themselves responsible for the success of the moderate plan
of action (there being as yet no reliable ground for such responsibility),
they do not take upon themselves to assert that we must once for all
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
9
desist from further aggressive operations. Their opinion amounts only
to this, that it is in every respect better to confine ourselves at present
to laying a firm foundation for future action, when every shot shall not,
as it now does, cost the Government scores of roubles, and that it is
advisable to concentrate a sufficient number of troops in Central Asia
ready for any emergency.
As regards the apprehension that, by a dilatory extension of Russian
power and influence in Central Asia, we may bring about a state of
warfare similar to that which existed in the Caucasus, the advocates of
the moderate form of action consider that the fear is not sufficiently
justified. In their opinion, the industrious and peaceful inhabitants
of Central Asia cannot, in the course of a few years, be turned into idle
and warlike Caucasian mountaineers, who by nature and history have,
for a long series of ages, been a martial people.
However that may be, in approving, in 1854, the recommendation
to connect the advanced frontiers of Orenburg and Siberia, the Govern-
ment resolved to limit itself to the execution of that plan, and was far
from harbouring projects of further conquest.
B
CHAPTER II.
THE CRIMEAN WAR HINDERS THE CARRYING OUT OF THE PROJECT OF CONNECTING
THE ORENBURG AND SIBERIAN FRONTIERS-FIRST STEPS TOWARDS ITS ACCOMPLISH-
MENT-OPERATIONS IN 1860-OCCUPATION OF THE
-OCCUPATION OF THE KOKAN FORTS OF TOKMAK AND
PISHPEK-CONSTRUCTION OF FORT DJULEK ON THE SYR-DARIA-DEMOLITION OF FORT
YANY-KURGAN IN 1862-REALISATION OF THE LONG CONTEMPLATED PROJECT OF
CONNECTING THE FRONTIERS-SIMULTANEOUS ADVANCE OF THE DETACHMENTS FROM
THE SYR-DARIA AND FROM WESTERN SIBERIA-CAPTURE OF TURKISTAN AND AULIETA
-JUNCTION OF THE TWO DETACHMENTS-CAPTURE OF CHEMKEND-VIEWS OF THE
GOVERNMENT AT THAT PERIOD-FIRST UNSUCCESSFUL MOVEMENT AGAINST TASHKEND
-IRRUPTION OF THE KOKANIANS-ACTION AT THE VILLAGE OF IKAN-FORMATION
OF THE TURKISTAN PROVINCE --MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1865-CAPTURE OF FORT
NIAZ-BEK-OCCUPATION OF FORT CHINAZ-CONQUEST OF TASHKEND—ARREST OF
BOKHARIAN MERCHANTS WITH THEIR GOODS-ARRIVAL OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL
IN THE NEWLY OCCUPIED REGION-DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN THE GOVER-
NOR GENERAL OF ORENBURG AND THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TURKISTAN-PLANS
OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR RECONCILING THIS DIFFERENCE OF OPINION.
THE accomplishment of the proposed scheme to join the frontiers,
approved by the Government in 1854, was delayed by the Crimean War.
There was no intention of giving it up, and, as far as our circumstances
and means would permit, preparations were gradually made for carrying
out this necessary and important undertaking.
Accordingly, between 1854 and 1860, we took possession of the
trans-Ili region; Forts Vernoe and Kastek were built at the very foot of
the Tian Shan range of mountains, and in 1860 Major General
Zimmermann took and destroyed the Kokan forts of Pishpek and Tokmak;
(see apps. 1, 2, 3, 4). In later
In later years, reconnaissances were made
from Siberia of the valley of the Chui river and of Auliéta fort. With
the same view, Fort Djulek was constructed in 1859 from the side of
Orenburg; and in the three following years, surveys were made of the
valleys of the Syr-Daria and of the Karataù mountains. In 1863
Lieutenant General Debout captured the Kokan fort of Yany-Kurgan,
situated not far from Turkistan.
Thus, by the year 1864, all we had to do in order to effect a junction
of the lines was, to make a minute survey of the country from Yany-
Kurgan to the valley of the Chui, and to establish ourselves firmly in it.
At
The Government recognized the expediency of effecting this by
means of simultaneous expeditions from Siberia and from the Orenburg
region. A detachment of about 2,500 men under Colonel (now Major
General) Cherniayef, was appointed for the work from Siberia, and
another, about 1,200 strong, from Orenburg, under Colonel (now Major
General) Verëfkin. It was first proposed to draw the new line from
Auliéta to Suzan and Djulek along the small Karataù ridge.
General Verëfkin's recommendation this was changed for a line in the
direction of Turkistan, but it was subsequently advanced to Chemkend,
at the instance of General Cherniayef. All these measures
executed within the same year. In the month of June, Auliéta was
taken by General Cherniayef (app. No. 6) and Turkistan by General
Verëfkin (app. No. 7); while in the month of October, the combined
were
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
11
forces, under the command of General Cherniayef, occupied Chemkend
(apps. Nos. 9, 10).
Thus the long meditated project of connecting the Orenburg and
Siberian lines was at length accomplished. There is no doubt that the
line eventually adopted was much more advantageous than the one origi-
nally proposed. By occupying Auliéta, Turkistan and Chemkend, we
not only obtained possession of more fertile localities and insured thereby
the means of drawing supplies for our troops on the spot, but by estab-
lishing ourselves in those places we finally occupied the fertile oasis in
which they were situated, and which is separated from that in which
Tashkend is placed by an inferior, but bare and uninhabited, chain of
mountains.
Everything appeared to have been done in accordance with the view
which the Government had long entertained with regard to the settle-
ment of our Central Asiatic frontiers. We enclosed our Steppes and
emerged beyond them into a fertile country capable of affording local
supplies, and this consequently gave us the facility of concentrating our
troops at pleasure. Being well satisfied with the results obtained, our
Government sincerely desired to rest there. The sincerity of that desire
was well known to all who served in Central Asia. Having no inten-
tion of performing any further acts of aggression, the Government natu-
rally issued no more money for the purpose, so that, when a combination
of unforeseen circumstances made it necessary to open further military
operations, the local authorities had no alternative but that of appro-
priating the sums that first arrived, whether these were for wages,
soldiers' rations, or anything else.

·
Notwithstanding unforeseen circumstances, we are justified in be-
lieving that the general results obtained during the last few years have
not been unfavourable to Russian interests in Central Asia. It would
nevertheless be unfair to accuse the Central Government of insincerity
in its professions on the subject of Central Asiatic affairs.
Considering it necessary to obtain a more intimate knowledge of the
state of affairs in Tashkend before the winter set in, General Cherniayef,
who directed the military operations, made a move upon Tashkend imme-
diately after occupying Chemkend. In this "reconnaissance," on the
assumption that the numerous but unwarlike population of the town
would not be able, under a sudden attack, to defend the whole length
of their walls (24 versts long), General Cherniayef stormed a part
which seemed to him most accessible. Contrary, however, to expect-
ation, the attempt failed (app. No. 11). Nevertheless, General Cherniayef
represented the necessity of an immediate occupation of Tashkend,
and wishing to reconcile what seemed to him an inevitable neces-
sity with the previous views of the Government, which objected to
the extension of our dominions, he proposed, after conquering Tashkend,
to make it independent of Kokan, and to place it under the protec-
torate of Russia. In the meanwhile, towards the end of 1864, the
Kokanians made an inroad into the newly occupied region from
Tashkend in the direction of Turkistan, in the same way as in 1853,
when they attacked Fort Perovski, and were repelled by General Ogarëf,
as in 1859. Soon after the demolition of Pishpek, they broke into our
territories and were entirely routed by General Kolpakovski. This time
12
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
also they obtained no military success. All the endeavours of their host
of 12,000 men, under the personal command of Alimkul, the then ruler
of Kokan, were spent in vain against the firm stand of a single sotnia
(hundred) of Ural Cossacks under Colonel Serof. After sustaining a
three days' attack by the Kokanians near the village of Ikan, this
"sotnia" actually obliged the enemy to throw up siege works and
retreated with honor to Turkistan.
The Kokanians, however, succeeded in taking possession of the
village of Ikan (25 versts from Turkistan), which, though very recently
annexed to Russia, remained true and held out several days (see app.
No. 12). In order to punish the resistance of the inhabitants, the
Kokanians took them all prisoners to Tashkend.
The Government refused its sanction to General Cherniayef's pro-
ject of conquering Tashkend, but took care to provide him, without loss
of time, with means for a strong defence of the whole of the extent of
country already occupied. With that object, the newly acquired territory,
inclusive of the line of the Syr-Daria, was converted, in the beginning of
1865, into a province with the name of Turkistan (see app. No. 13), and
subordinated to Orenburg; and in addition to the troops there under
General Cherniayef, who was appointed Governor of the region and
commander of the forces, fresh troops were sent out from Orenburg and
Western Siberia. The aggregate number of troops in the new province
was to have amounted, by the month of September 1865, to 15,000 men,
which was not only to have been sufficient for the defence of the newly
occupied country, and for the execution of works generally performed by
soldiers, but was also to have supplied a reserve for operations in the field,
in case of emergency.
Whilst not approving General Cherniayef's project of occupying
Tashkend, the Government did not deem it expedient to place too great a
check upon him, as he was personally responsible for the defence of a
region then completely unknown. For the better elucidation of the state
of affairs, General Kryjanovski, then newly appointed to Orenburg, was
to have made a journey through the province during the summer of
1865, and to submit his opinions upon the subject.
Rumours having reached General Cherniayef, in April 1865, of a
gathering of Bokharian troops at Ura Tiube, which made him appre-
hend the seizure of Tashkend by the Emir (app. No. 14), the Military
Governor of Turkistan was induced to commence aggressive operations,
the first object of which was to place Tashkend in a state of depen-
dence, and thus to compel its submission.
With that object, General Cherniayef marched his force to the
Kokan fort of Niazbek, which commanded the water supply of Tashkend,
and, after two days obstinate resistance on the part of the Kokanians,
possessed himself of it on the 29th April (O. S.). Leaving a
small garrison in Niazbek, General Cherniayef took the direction
of Tashkend, and, on the 7th May, encamped within eight versts of
the town. The garrison of Tashkend had, meanwhile, been strength-
ened, and the ruler of Kokan himself hastened to its assistance. On
the 9th of May, a "sortie" was made from Tashkend with a force of
7,000 men and artillery, led by Alimkul in person, The enemy were
beaten, losing two guns, and Ålimkul was mortally wounded (app. 15).

CUTTY
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
13
But even after this success, and although assured by some of the inhabi-
tants that Tashkend desired to submit to Russia, General Cherniayef
restricted himself to measures for the prevention of the Emir's approach
to the town.
In the middle of May our troops occupied Chinaz, a fort situated
on the road to Bokhara at the confluence of the Chirchick with the Syr-
Daria, and Tashkend was invested on three sides. In the beginning of
June, a party of Bokharians succeeded in secretly entering Tashkend,
and Iskander Bek came from Bokhara to take command of the garrison.
As rumours of the advance of the Emir were increasing, General
Cherniayef found it necessary to seize Tashkend by open force. After a
three-days' struggle on the walls and in the streets, Tashkend was
compelled to surrender (apps. Nos. 16, 20).
This populous and important commercial town then passed into our
hands. From a military point of view, the success was brilliant. Yet
in the face of our insufficiency of troops, its acquisition could not but
increase the difficulties of our position, generally, in the region. Although
reinforcements were despatched from Orenburg and from the Volga as
soon as intelligence of the capture of Tashkend was received, the latter
arrived in Orenburg only in the autumn, and the authorities in Orenburg
found it impossible to forward them before the next spring, so that
the reinforcements actually reached the province only in the month of
September 1866.
In the meanwhile, the Emir of Bokhara, by seizing Hodjent almost
simultaneously with our capture of Tashkend, changed his hitherto
friendly attitude to one of menace against us. In order to check him, it
was necessary to have recourse to a measure which, if it incommoded the
Bokharians, was no less inconvenient to ourselves, and that was to stop
the trade with Bokhara. Tashkend had scarcely been occupied when
General Cherniayef was obliged to arrest all Bokharians and their mer-
chandize within the province, and in his report of the 26th June, i. c.,
nine days after his entrance into that town, he represented to the
Governor General the urgency of extending that measure to the whole
of the Empire. He stated that, unless such a measure were adopted,
our influence in Central Asia would succumb to that of Bokhara, and
that it would be impossible to answer for the safety of the province
(apps. 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24). On the strength of these representations,
in the middle of July, all Bokharian subjects who were then in Orenburg
were arrested, and their goods sequestered. The Emir did not commence
hostilities against us, but at the same time we could not hinder him
from taking Kokan and from subjecting the whole of that Khanat to
himself, in consequence of which he gained a very great accession to his
means, and particularly to his influence in Central Asia. Nor were we
able to prevent the Emir from arresting on his part our merchants and
their goods in Bokhara, which he immediately did on hearing that we
had detained his subjects.
Small reinforcements arrived from Orenburg in August, but they were
scarcely sufficient to render it possible to occupy even that part of the
trans-Chirchik region which was nearest to Tashkend.* And yet,
*The Chirchik is only nine versts from Tashkend.
}
14
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
irrespective of political and military considerations, that occupation was
absolutely necessary, for, situated within a very short distance of Tashkend,
that region contains a great many fields belonging to the inhabitants of
the town, who to this day derive the greater part of their supplies
from it.
In the month of September, the Governor General of Orenburg
arrived in the province, and was met on the Syr-Daria by a friendly
mission from the Emir of Bokhara, which requested permission to proceed
to St. Petersburg in order to negotiate with the Imperial Government.
As the Governor General was already empowered to negotiate with the
Emir, the request was not granted; and, in the expectation of further
instructions from the Emir, the mission remained at Fort No. 1 on the
Syr-Daria, where it met the Governor General.
After taking possession of Tashkend and gaining a closer insight
into the state of affairs, General Cherniayef abandoned his previous idea
of making Tashkend independent, and advised its final annexation to the
Empire. General Kryjanovski, on the contrary, adopting the original idea,
insisted on its execution, notwithstanding an address of the inhabitants
of Tashkend, in which they prayed to be annexed to the Empire without
being formed into a separate Khanat. But as will be shown in detail
hereafter, the address contained some requests which we could not well
grant, and which were inserted at the instigation of the clergy. This
difference of opinion, and the refusal of the Emir to negotiate with the
Governor General, caused the question to be left unsettled. On his return
to Orenburg, General Kryjanovski submitted his own plans, together with
the opinion of General Cherniayef, to the consideration of the Imperial
Government.*
The Imperial Government then resolved to summon Generals
Kryjanovski and Romanovski to St. Petersburg, in order to make a
searching enquiry into the misunderstanding that had arisen with refer-
ence to the settlement of our Central Asiatic affairs, and to arrive at a
final decision by the aid of a special committee composed of persons well
acquainted with the subject. This step was the more necessary, since the
occupation of Tashkend, originally unintended, had altered the old
programme of the Government, and had made requisite the preparation
of a new one, to serve, at least in outline, as a guide to local officers.

*Having accompanied General Kryjanovski during his journey into the province of
Turkistan, the author of this work is necessarily well acquainted with the views held by the
Governor General.
پیران
CHAPTER III.
INCREASE OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITII BOKHARA-DESPATCH OF A MISSION TO BO-
KHARA FROM TASHKEND-DETENTION OF OUR OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS BY THE EMIR
-COMMENCEMENT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS-MOVEMENT UPON DJIZAK AND RE-
TURN TO CHINAZ-APPOINTMENT OF A NEW CHIEF OVER THE TURKISTAN PROVINCE
IN MARCH 1866-INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE NEW CHIEF, AND HIS OWN IDEAS
OF AFFAIRS-THE DIFFICULT POSITION OF THE PROVINCE AT THAT TIME IN POLI-
TICAL, MILITARY, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMICAL RESPECTS.
сложным
THE affairs of the province became still more complicated at the end
of October 1865, very soon after the departure of the Governor General
of Orenburg. Desirous of re-establishing friendly relations with
Bokhara and of re-opening trade, General Cherniayef despatched to the
Emir a mission composed of Military and Civil Officers. The Emir had
the audacity to detain that mission, whereupon General Cherniayef
** found himself obliged to commence operations against him with a view
to the release of his officers.
3ade
In the month of January, General Cherniayef collected a force at
Chinaz and marched to Djizak, expecting that this menace would of itself
produce the release of the detained mission. These expectations were not
fulfilled. A lack of forage and provisions obliged our troops to return
from Djizak after a slight brush under the walls of the town; they
therefore did not wait for the release of the mission, and obtained only
certain promise of the Emir. On its way back to Chinaz the detach-
ment was pursued by Bokharian cavalry assembled in haste several
thousand strong (app. Nos. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 33).
On receipt of the first intelligence of these new complications, the
Government hastened to recall Generals Cherniayef and Kryjanovski to
St. Petersburg for the purpose of deliberating on the future conduct of
affairs with respect to the Khanats, and appointed the author of this
sketch to the command of the troops and to the post of Military Governor,
under the control of the Governor General of Orenburg, who, in all
further proceedings, was to be guided by instructions drawn up by the
Ministries for War and Foreign Affairs and approved by the Emperor.
These instructions were submitted by me to the Governor General and
were thenceforward taken as a guide. Their basis and chief sense
was, to reconcile as soon as possible the previous programme with the late
accidental circumstances. Whilst adhering to its former view, i. e.,
that of not extending our limits any further, and of organizing first of all
the newly acquired territory, the Government at the same time fully
recognised the primary necessity of maintaining our dignity under the
altered circumstances, and of reducing the Emir to the position which
he should always hold in relation to Russia.
The instructions went on to say:
"From incomplete information received, it appears that all attempts
to arrive at that amicable understanding with the Central Asiatic Rulers,
which is so essential to the tranquility of our possessions, have not
alone failed of success, but, on the contrary, the late proceedings have
irritated the neighbouring potentates against us, and have, perhaps,
16
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
turned the Emir of Bokhara, who has long considered himself a friend
of Russia, into an open enemy. The late events have, at the same time,
tended to show that the conversion of the nearest outlying portions of
Central Asia into feudatory states, would be practically attended with
great difficulties, and would raise questions, which can only be developed
in the course of time."
Further:
"While striving undeviatingly to avoid the extension of absolute do-
minion in Central Asia, it is not advisable that we should refrain from
such operations and arrangements as might be indispensably necessary;
and, generally, the true interests of Russia should be kept in view.'
As regards Tashkend, the instructions observed:
""
"It is not expedient that we should embarrass ourselves with any
minute regulations in Tashkend but the town should receive such an
organization, as would be commensurate with our common advantage."
Finally, with reference to Bokhara, the following instructions were
laid down:
"As regards Bokhara, it is above all desirable to re-establish speedily
friendly commercial relations with that Khanat; but at the same time,
the immediate local chief is bound to remember that the Asiatic respects
only the force of arms; that the slightest vacillation and irresolution,
and particularly any concession, in the face of any uncalled for representa-
tions or acts on the part of the Asiatics, will be looked upon by them as
symptoms of weakness, and will therefore not only fail of the object,
but may also have a disastrous effect in the country newly occupied by
us, in the Steppes as well as on our former lines."
"The main object of the Commander should therefore be to make
the Emir understand that we are not desirous of conquests, and that we do
not threaten the integrity of his dominions, but that we shall not allow
him to extend his dominion in the direction of our limits.'
Subsequently, when the return of our detachment from Djizak
became known at St. Petersburg, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
expressed itself still more strongly with reference to Bokhara. Until
the release of our mission all negotiations with the Emir were justly
considered to be quite out of the question.
Leaving St. Petersburg on the 10th of February (O. S.), I reached
the Syr-Daria only in the beginning (O. S.) of March, having been
detained about a week by official duties at Orenburg. The first intelli-
gence that reached me in the province of Turkistan was conveyed in a
despatch from General Cherniayef to the Governor General, reporting the
withdrawal of our troops from before Djizak to Chinaz.
Before entering into the subject of the events that occurred up
to the month of August while I had the chief control of affairs, until
the arrival of the Governor General, I consider it necessary to express
my own opinion as to the method of arriving at an advantageous
settlement of affairs in Central Asia. Of course I endeavoured above
all to act strictly in accordance with the instructions and orders which
were sent to me, but owing to the country being almost unknown, and
to the difficult circumstances under which I was placed, I frequently had
to act according to my own judgment, and was consequently guided by
my own personal views.
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
17
I always sincerely belonged to the moderate party of which I have
spoken, and which, while not objecting to military operations as extreme
measures, believed in the greater advantage of endeavouring to subject
our Central Asiatic neighbours to our influence by means of a strong
and durable settlement of our frontier, and by moral persuasion rather
than by direct conquest of the Khanats. It appeared to me, and I am
still convinced, that the principal obstacle to the establishment of the
most desirable form of relations with the Central Asiatic Khanats, has
been our own mode of action in those countries.
In the first place, we have always been numerically weak in pro-
portion to the area which we occupied, and no sooner did reinforcements
arrive than we annexed more territory, leaving behind no reserves for
action in cases of emergency. Our neighbours knew our circumstances,
and seeing our inability to undertake any aggressive movement were
not induced to observe a careful attitude. Their actions were not in the
least restrained because of our presence; on the contrary, they contrived
to turn our presence to their own advantage. If, for instance, we
had had any spare troops in the summer of 1865, the Emir of Bokhara
would scarcely have dared to take advantage of the disorders in Kokan
consequent on the death of Alimkul, or to have occupied Khodjend
and Kokan before our very eyes, an act by which he almost doubled the
extent of his dominion, and which cannot, of course, be regarded as
having been favourable to Russian policy.
Secondly, notwithstanding our long continued and uninterrupted
successes in Central Asia, from the capture of Fort Perovski to the
brilliant military achievements of later times, of which the capture of
Tashkend is unmistakeably one, we have not convinced the half savage
population of Central Asia of our real superiority over Bokhara. Ön
the contrary, knowing nothing of our country, they form their conclu-
sions from superficial observations, and give an unfavourable interpre-
tation to what they see. The clemency and kindness with which our
government treated Bokhara in former times were of course explained
to the people in a sense conformable to the views of the Khan; and
the outspread of Bokharian dominion at the expense of Kokan, before
our very eyes, naturally contributed to confirm a belief in the correct-
ness of their opinions.
To our last vigorous measures, the arrest of Bokharian merchants
and their goods,-the Government of Bokhara responded by a measure
of still greater vigour, viz., the arrest of our own merchants and mer-
chandise, and the detention of the officers whom we had sent on a
mission to Bokhara.
At Orenburg, I met the Bokharian mission which had been passed
on from Fort No. 1 simultaneously with the despatch of some officers to
Bokhara by General Cherniayef. The result of the advance of our
troops against Djizak was not then known at Orenburg; we only knew
that it had been undertaken; considering, therefore, that the Bokharian
mission had frequent and quick direct communication with Bokhara, I
thought it advisable to express strongly the intentions of our Govern-
ment, and to support General Cherniayef's demand for the immediate
release of our officers, pointing, at the same time, to the consequences.
which might result from any delay in complying with that demand. The
C
18
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Bokharians admitted the necessity of releasing our mission, but, never-
theless, displayed a remarkable amount of calmness and firmness in dis-
cussing the possibility of a rupture or a war between Bokhara and Russia.
We could not fail to notice that they were well acquainted with the
weak points of our position.
Thirdly and lastly, notwithstanding our amicable views, we had had
no opportunity for proving practically the friendliness of our dispo-
sition towards our Central Asiatic neighbours. On the contrary, our
dominion has been rapidly and ceaselessly extending. So that, in
addition to a variety of other causes, and to an extraneous hostile influ-
ence, a natural desire for self-preservation urged them to oppose us in
every possible way.
For all these reasons, I came to the conclusion, that, in order to
improve and strengthen our position, it was imperatively necessary for
us to weaken the influence of Bokhara as much as possible, to limit our
extension to the occupation only of such points as would give us a better
command of the region instead of enfeebling our position, and finally
to convince our neighbours practically of the peaceful views of our
Government. This I strove to accomplish in all my subsequent acts,
to the extent, of course, of the powers and means at my disposal.
But before I proceeded to any action which was thenceforward to
depend upon my own initiative, it was incumbent upon me first to deal
with the difficulties that stood in the way of the mode of action I desired
to adopt, and to remove them to an extent that would enable me to act.
These difficulties were not few, and the condition of the province
was in no respects satisfactory. The insufficiency of troops and the
want of money, are vividly traced in General Cherniayef's report to
the Governor General, dated the 12th-24th January 1866, in which
he most urgently requests a speedy supply of men and money
(app. 25).
Among the chief difficulties, I may mention the insufficiency of
troops, the entanglement of previous accounts, and the want of means
to cover many unavoidable expenses.
It must be borne in mind that, immediately after the occupation
of Tashkend, on the strength of General Cherniayef's representations,
it was acknowledged necessary to increase the forces in Turkistan by
several battalions from the Volga, in order to ensure the safe tenure of
the newly-acquired territories. On the arrival of those troops, the
force in the province would have been increased to about 16,000, but
3,000 of them were detained in Orenburg for the winter; and, according
to the arrangements made by the Orenburg authorities, could be
expected to reach the scene of action only in the month of August 1866.
Consequently, the number of troops in the province on my arrival
was limited to the same figure of 13,000, which had been recognised
as insufficient for the defence even of the province; and yet hostilities
had already been commenced against Bokhara.
It must also be remembered that, owing to the sudden capture of
Tashkend, which was unexpected by the Imperial Government, no funds
had previously been assigned for the undertaking; and that the local
authorities were consequently obliged to appropriate monies issued for
other purposes to the necessary expenses of war, the building of forts,

NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
19
barracks, hospitals, &c. We may easily imagine the confusion to which
this led in the accounts, especially when we consider that the require-
ments of the province had already outgrown the number of officers
employed in the service of administration. The staff of Civil and
Military functionaries was that which had been fixed for a region
with a frontier only as far as Chemkend, and a proportionate body of
troops. But even these establishments, inclusive of the Intendantship,
were fixed only in the latter part of 1865, so that they were practically
applicable only in 1866. The Imperial Government, on the other hand,
receiving no correct accounts of expenses incurred, could make no issues.
for meeting them, and yet whilst these accounts were being made up,
fresh military operations were begun which were equally unforeseen,
and for the prosecution of which there was no alternative but that of
seizing the funds that first came to hand.
*
In addition to these pecuniary embarrassments, the timely transmis-
sion of money was greatly embarrassed by the immensity of the distance,
while the keeping of accounts was rendered more difficult by the intro-
duction of a new system of audit. As regards the civil administration
itself on my arrival in the province in March (O. S.) 1866, I found
only 8, out of the 18 offices created actually filled, and only 5 men
at their posts, who were thoroughly acquainted with the duties they
had to perform. The rest, instead of fulfilling the duties to which they
were appointed, were temporarily employed in other duties (app.
77). It would be unjust not to praise the useful services of most
of these worthy officers. Nevertheless it is not difficult to understand
to how small an extent it was possible, with so limited a staff, to carry
out the system recommended by the local authorities and established by
Imperial order in 1865; and it can as easily be imagined what amount of
immediate, effective control could be exercised with so small a staff, over
all that occurred in the newly constituted province. The necessity for
such control was growing greater and greater in the interior, as the
province was, so to speak, palpably lapsing into that period of disenchant-
ment which invariably succeeds every conquest, and which is all the
stronger and more dangerous when the language, customs, and religion
of the conquerors and conquered present striking contrasts.
The innovations introduced by conquerors into a strange country
cannot be equally agreeable to all, however beneficial they may be on the
whole, and by the very force of circumstances, irrespective of individuals,
they cannot but be more or less oppressive to those who previously
commanded the greatest influence in the country, as well as to their
friends and adherents. Whether the men of influence be kings, princes,
nobles, or spiritual chiefs, when removed by conquest to a secondary
position, they do not willingly reconcile themselves to it, and almost
never, otherwise than after a more or less protracted and strong internal
commotion. Italy and Germany have lately shown and do still show
examples of this. We all know how a few battalions of volunteers
proved sufficient for the annihilation of the Neapolitan kingdom, while
it took an army of 120,000 men, and more than one year to establish
an order of things desired by the whole of the Italian nation.
Among these were two Civil functionaries, two Military Officers of the regular forces,
and four Cossack Officers.
༡
20
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
alyst pe
Similar internal commotions have attended the transition of exist-
ing orders of things in the Caucasus, the Crimea, and the Orenburg
Region.
The more humanizing principles which Russia introduced into all
those countries gave her at first a host of adherents, but the influence
of those who were foremost previous to the invasion soon produced an
inward commotion and a period of disenchantment. We did not escape
such a period even in Georgia-a country which professed our own
faith and which had long and earnestly solicited our assistance. Those
who have read the interesting work of Dubrovin will have seen what
great difficulties our government had to contend with during the first
year of the annexation of Georgia to Russia. And where, besides a
difference in language and customs, there happens to be a difference in
religion, such internal resistance is the more unavoidable, and will
assume a variety of forms that depend principally on the character of
the conquered race.
dyx.26-natives
духов
breta
This immutable law of "disenchantment" could not fail to operate
against us in Central Asia, but with this sole difference, that the
natives are more reserved, and that their more influential order-the
clergy-have been accustomed to clothe their opposition in a very docile
form and bearing. Thus, in the address presented by the inhabitants of
Tashkend (app. 24) to the Governor General in the autumn of 1865,
and written under the influence of the clergy, the annexation of Tash-
kend to the empire is very earnestly requested; yet the same address
demands, not less urgently, that their Spiritual Chief or "Kazy-Kilian"
should possess the right not only of making appointments to all spiritual
offices, but also of nominating Judges or "Kazys" within the whole of
the province of Turkistan. All who are acquainted with Mussulman
legislation will at once see what an enormous power we should have
accorded to the native clergy had we acceded to thisr equest. By granting
the petition, which was drawn up in a very humble form, the Russian
Government would have placed in the hands of the clergy, and particu-
larly in those of their chief, a power over the people and the whole
region superior to any which they had wielded under their own Mahomedan
rulers. The Tashkendians did not forget, also, in their address, to petition
for immunities from house tax, &c., &c.
na3px
In the rupture with Bokhara, which occurred soon after our occupa-
tion of Tashkend, the conduct of the clergy did not inspire confidence.
Many had seriously compromised themselves, and a conspiracy which
was set on foot in Tashkend did not, certainly, owe its failure to the
influence of the clergy.
Acquainted with the state of affairs in Turkistan, from which I only
returned in the month of November, I foresaw the nature of the diffi-
culties I should have to deal with. I therefore took the precaution,
when at St. Petersburg, to make the following requests :-firstly, that
in case of emergency I might be allowed to refer to the authorities of
Western Siberia for a temporary supply of even small reinforcements;
and secondly, that in the case of an urgent want of money, I might
dispense with formalities, and employ, as loans, monies destined for other
purposes, on the condition, however, of such measures being immediately
reported, and detailed accounts being duly rendered. Both these requests
Magn charming pags
над
вер
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
21
were found reasonable, and the Governor General of Siberia was in-
structed to assist me with troops to the extent of his ability. His
Imperial Majesty was, at the same time, pleased to order all the revenues
of Tashkend and other places not yet annexed to the Empire to be carried
to an extraordinary account, and to be placed at the disposal of the
Military Governor, under the supervision of the Governor General, until
the settlement of affairs and final organization of the province. On my
way through Orenburg, I repeated to the Governor General my request
not to be hampered by formalities, and General Kryjanovski, who was
well acquainted with the state of affairs, could not but admit the reason-
ableness of such a request.
As might have been expected, on reaching the province, I found the
deficiency in men and money to be the first great obstacle in my path.
The intelligence of the withdrawal of our troops from before Djizak,
which I received on entering the province, argued plainly the necessity
of strengthening our active force. That hostilities would soon assume a
greater proportion could not be doubted. One circumstance was in our
favour, and that was the cessation of trade with Bokhara, which
by stimulating our trade with Khiva, induced the latter to be better
disposed towards us, and thus enabled us to reduce without danger the
garrisons on the Syr-Daria line to a minimum. I found, on commu-
nicating with the authorities of that line, that I could strengthen the
forces in Turkistan by two companies of infantry, besides a company of
rifles and some Cossacks. The authorities of the line were, however,
not only unable to equip those troops for a march of 1,000 versts, but they
had not even the means of supplying their ordinary wants. For instance,
soldiers returning from the province on unlimited furlough, after having
served their full terms, could not continue the journey beyond the forts,
because there was no money with which to pay the allowances that
were due to them. I considered these circumstances justified me in
dispensing with formalities; and therefore, as I was followed by a
baggage train with specie for the Pay Master's Department, I issued an
order to the Commandant of Fort No. 1 to take from the chests on their
passage the sums required for the despatch of the companies and for the
payment of the unlimited-furlough men.
It became known to the Governor General at Fort Perovski, by
a report from General Cherniayef, that military operations on an ex-
tensive scale were impending; that the Emir had proclaimed a holy war
against us; that Kokan and Khiva were invited to participate in it;
that immense quantities of troops and stores were already being concen.
trated in Bokhara; and, finally, that the Emir himself had set out to join
his advanced army at the Bokharian frontier fort of Ura-Tiube. All
these rumours, with the exception of that of the alliance between
Bokhara and Khiva, had the semblance of truth, especially as the warlike
character of the present Emir was well known; for, during his eight 95
years' reign, he had constantly waged war against his neighbours, and
so successfully, that he had almost trebled his dominions. The rumoured
participation of Khiva in a war against us was not very credible.
That Khanat appreciated too highly the profits of a trade which had
greatly increased; and, moreover, Khiva looked upon Bokhara with
distrust.
22
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Jeeve
Further alarming rumours from Tashkend (apps. 32 and 34) urged
me to apply to the authorities of Western Siberia for a temporary supply
of reinforcements, and simultaneously to request the Governor General of
Orenburg to hasten the despatch of the troops which had been ordered
into the province so far back as 1865. At Fort Perovski, it was arranged
that two steamers should prepare, as quickly as possible, to proceed up
the river to Chinaz, in order to support the military operations.
The information received at Turkistan from the detachment was of
a still more alarming character. The Kirghizes began to show signs of
disturbance, which necessitated the formation of a militia at once.
All
these measures for the immediate reinforcement of our active force at Chinaz
necessitated an outlay of money, which was also required for the defence
of the province, so that, as there were no available sums (at some posts,
even private remittances were appropriated to Government services), I
was obliged to issue to every post an order similar to that given by me to
the Commandant of Fort No. 1. All the Commandants had to report
on the receipt of the monies taken from the train as it passed through.
The total expenses on the occasion did not, however, exceed 30,000 to
40,000 roubles, and there was no confusion in the accounts, for arrange-
ments were duly made for replacing the sums thus borrowed.
I arrived at Tashkend on the 25th March (O. S.), and staying
there only one day, reached the detachment on the 26th. On the
27th I assumed the command of the troops and the Military Governor-
ship, while General Cherniayef took his departure for St. Petersburg.
DEFENCE
CHAPTER IV.
STATE OF THE ACTIVE DETACHMENTS AND OUR RELATIONS WITH BOKHARA AT THE END
OF MARCH-MEASURES FOR STRENGTHENING THE DETACHMENTS AND FOR THE
OF THE REGION-ACTION AT MUZZA-RABAT ON THE 5-17TH OF
APRIL-COMMUNICATIONS WITH BOKHARA AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH KOKAN-ARRIVAL
OF THE STEAMERS-CO-OPERATION FROM WESTERN SIBERIA-NO HOPE OF ASSISTANCE
FROM ORENBURG-INCREASE OF DIFFICULTIES-DESIGNS OF THE EMIR-REPEATED
ATTACKS ON OUR COMMUNICATIONS AND IN THE REAR OF ACTING COLUMNS-
ANOTHER MISSION TO THE EMIR-PRETENSIONS OF THE BOKHARIAN POTENTATE-CATE-
GORICAL ANSWER TO THEM-ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS-ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE
DEFENCE OF THE REGION-INEVITABLE NECESSITY FOR A DETERMINED ADVANCE
ON OUR PART-ENCOUNTER AT IRDJAR ON THE 8-20TH OF MAY-MOVEMENT ON
KHODJEND—SEIZURE OF THAT TOWN ON THE 24TH MAY (5TH JUNE) — EMBASSIES
FROM BOKHARA AND KOKAN-RETURN OF ONE OF THE RUSSIAN OFFICERS DETAINED
IN BOKHARA-CESSATION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AND RETURN TO TASHKEND ON
THE 2-14TH JUNE.
THE following was the condition of the detachments, and the state
of our relations with Bokhara at the end of March when I assumed
command of the forces. All our resources for war consisted of two
detachments: the principal one composed of 2 thousand troops collected.
at Chinaz, and the Keréúchi detachment, in the neighbourhood of
Keréúché fort and numbering about 500 men, the two detachments
forming an aggregate of 3,000 fighting-men. With the exception of
the forts on the Syr-Daria, garrisons in Tashkend and other forts were
so feeble as to be scarcely equal to the defence of the nearest outlying
localities.
There was a great deal of illness in the active detachment in con-
sequence of the men having constantly lived in earth huts or in hastily
erected barracks while undergoing a variety of privations during a
winter campaign. The cases of sickness daily exceeded 20 in the prin-
cipal detachment. At the same time the troops despatched from the
Syr-Daria for the reinforcement of the detachments assembled for
operations in the field, and the contingent from Siberia could not arrive
before the end of April (O. S.). Meanwhile the Emir, whose advanced
troops were not more than 50 versts distant from Chinaz, was declared
to have mustered an army of 100,000 men with 100 guns. It should
also be mentioned that our troops had hitherto never come into collision
with the Bokharians or their regular forces, which were held in high
esteem by the natives, whilst the Emir himself was held to be unconquer-
able.
The detachments felt the want of funds much more strongly
than the forts. I found no money at all with the troops, and, pending
the arrival of supplies, was obliged to expend my own private means
on such primary objects as, for instance, the care of the sick, the pay-
ment of spies, and the expenses of carriage. When my means failed I was
24
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
compelled to borrow of Major-General Count Woronzow-Dashkof, now
of his Imperial Majesty's Staff, who arrived with me.*
War had not yet been formally declared either by us or by the
Bokharians, but the military operation which commenced in the advance
to Djizak in the month of January had not been discontinued.
Bokharian horsemen made frequent attacks on our communications, and
even made onslaughts in the neighbourhood of our camp. Thus, on the
24th of February, two of our soldiers barely escaped from 10 Bokharian
horsemen, who fell upon them within sight of our camp; and on the
26th 2 Cossacks were made prisoners by the Bokharians, also within
sight of our camp.
On the 11th of March some Bokharian horsemen seized a soldier
who had incautiously strayed beyond our lines; the man was beheaded.
on the spot, and the Bokharians carried away his head (Appendix 34).
In the beginning of March, the Bokharians having placed a small
garrison in Fort Chardary began to send out detachments to operate
against our communications; however, by General Chernayef's orders,
they were soon driven out of Chardary by a small column under
Captain (now Colonel†) Abramof, on which occasion our troops captured
2,000 Bokharian sheep.
For these reasons, although I sincerely desired to improve our
position in the country without having recourse to hazardous under-
takings which, in the event of miscarriage, would involve additional
sacrifices, I could not but come to the conclusion that such action was,
under the circumstances, absolutely indispensable.
Familiar as I was with the temper of Asiatics, through my previous
service in the Caucasus, I could not but deem it necessary firstly, to
guard against any thing that might be interpreted as a symptom of
weakness, and secondly, to decline to enter into futile negotiations with
Bokhara. On these grounds, therefore, I could not mark the inaugu-
ration of my command by any amicable negotiations with an antagonist
who had insulted us, and that too in a strange country, where the
result of the collision was being anxiously watched by all.
Indefinitely postponing negotiations, I considered it necessary first
of all to devote myself to the task of making preparations for a hostile
collision. All my endeavours were directed towards the improvement of
the condition of the troops, the reduction of the amount of illness
amongst them, as well as towards increasing the strength of the opera-
ting detachments by recalling the men who had been draughted
for various service, and who could be temporarily spared. Small
detachments of Cossacks and militia were meanwhile formed to
put an end to the attacks of the enemy in the vicinity of our camp and
on our communications, and minor columns were detached for the same
*Count Woronzow-Dashkof was sent to proclaim to the troops, in the name of the
Emperor, His Imperial Majesty's thanks for their gallant conduct, as reported by the
Governor General on his inspection in 1865, and to distribute gratuities amongst them.
In the month of September, Count Woronzow-Dashkof was appointed by the Governor
General to act as my assistant in command of the forces of the province, and in October,
in addition to his elevation to the rank of Major-General, Count Woronzow was, by
Imperial order, appointed Assistant Military Governor.
+ Now Major-General Abramof.
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
25
purpose from our corps of operation. It was also considered expedient
to make reconnaissances from time to time in the direction of the enemy,
with the object of obtaining a better knowledge of the locality, as
well as with that of anticipating any sudden attack upon our camp by
the Bokharians, rumours of which, confirmed by spies, were perpetually
current. Thus, on the 5-17th April, I made a reconnaissance in the
direction of Muzza-Rabat, situated nearly midway between Chinaz and
Irdjar, where the advanced forces of the Emir had been located for several
weeks. This reconnaissance was undertaken in consequence of informa-
tion which I received on the 4-16th concerning the accumulation of a large
body of the enemy's horse at Muzza-Rabat, about whose intentions the
spies learnt nothing definite. The enemy was discovered before reaching
Muzza-Rabat at a distance of 10 or 15 versts from our camp. The head
of our column routed the Bokharian horse, and succeeded in taking
14,000 head of sheep, partly belonging to the Beks of Djizak,
Uratiúbé, and Samarkand, and partly taken from the inhabitants on
the occasion of the approaching festival of Kuram-Bairan.
The Emir had intended to observe this holiday with special solem-
nity in the midst of his army assembled at Uratiúbé. The trifling
affair at Muzza-Rabat was in itself of no actual significance, but, besides
suffering a very palpable material loss, it must have impressed the enemy
with a greater respect for our force. From that time the inroads into
the vicinity of our camp ceased entirely. The skirmish was of great
importance to me personally, because it gave me an opportunity of study-
ing the spirit of the troops over whom I was taking command under very
trying circumstances. I could now place full and perfect confidence in
them, and could wait more calmly for an improvement in the condition
of affairs.
4211A
The advanced troops that took part in the affair consisted of 2½
sotnias of Cossacks, 2 pieces of horse artillery, a company of infantry, and
a rocket company. The numbers of the Bokharians were differently stated
by the spies. At any rate, the enemy considerably outnumbered our
advanced detachment, and it more than once happened during the conflict
and the pursuit that, observing the disorder into which our Cossacks were
thrown when elated with success, the Bokharians rapidly fell back, and
at the same time threw forward bodies of horse to take us in flank or to
fall upon the guns, which were sometimes left entirely exposed to attack.
In all instances of this kind, we had a company of soldiers who, following
at a run, almost kept pace with the Cossacks, and, watching the enemy
sharply, always came up at the right time. (Appendix No. 38).
The booty taken from the enemy at Muzza-Rabat proved very sea-
sonable. The number of head of cattle seized on this occasion and
those captured by Colonel Abramof at Chardary amounted to more than
16,000, so that the men of the main detachment, as well as those sta-
tioned within a certain distance, had their rations considerably increased.
After the hard winter which the troops had passed this increase of allow-
ance was not superfluous.
Having regard to the pacific aims of our Government, and taking
into consideration that the affairs of Chardary and Muzza-Rabat had,
*The Rifle Company of the late 4th Orenburg, now the Turkistan battalion of the tine
D
26
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
in some measure at least, smoothed the impression produced on the
natives by the retreat of our detachment from before Djizak to Chinaz.
I now found that I might enter into negotiations with the Emir.
Three days after the action, I despatched to the Khan of Bokhara
a letter (Appendix 35), in which I informed him of my appointment to
the office of Military Governor, and proposed as conditions of peace the
immediate release of our mission and the removal of all his troops from
our territory. At the same time I entered, through agents, into com-
munication with the Khan of Kokan, and endeavoured to reassure him
with regard to the aims of our Government.
Before my
letter to the Emir had reached its destination, a messenger
arrived in camp with a letter from the Bek of Djizak (Appendices 36, 37).
It scontents were, however, exactly similar to those of the letters that had
been repeatedly written to my predecessor. The Bek assured me of the
continuance of the ancient friendship of Bokhara towards Russia, and
entreated me not to violate that friendship by any acts of hostility, but
to endeavour to establish peace as quickly as possible. As usual he
alluded very evasively to the return of our embassy, insisting only that
our officers were being kindly treated by the Emir in Bokhara and very
well entertained.
It was evident that the Bokharians were only trying to gain time
and to collect more troops. But it was still more important to us to
gain time. The Bokharians could not, in the course of a few weeks,
strengthen either their regular troops or their field artillery, i. e., the
chief and only military arm which could be the object of any serious.
concern on our part, as up to that time we had had no encounters with
those branches of the Bokharian army. The principal mass of the
Bokharian forces, viz., their irregular horse, which was constantly
increasing in strength, could offer_no_serious resistance in case of a
decisive collision. But to us the gain of a few weeks afforded the pros-
pect of an increase of our active force by one-third. I was therefore in
no hurry to clear up our mutual relations, and commissioned Count
Woronzow-Dashkof, who was then acting chief of the staff of the detach-
ment, to acquaint the Bek that I had dispatched a letter to the Emir,
and that my further action would depend on the answer which I expected.
My reply was very brief, for it was necessary to show the Bokharians
that we were not disposed to enter into any fruitless recriminations.
The first steamer arrived at Chinaz from Fort Perovski, on the
10-22nd of April, and the other joined a few days later; they had both
exchanged shots with the Bokharians, who had several times tried to
stop them. The companies of Rifles and Cossacks from Fort Perovski
arrived at the same time.
On the 15-27th of April, I was very much gladdened by intelli-
gence from Western Siberia to the effect that the assistance I had
asked for had been dispatched immediately on receipt of my request, so
that I could now reckon upon an increase by the end of the month
of the troops in the neighbourhood of Tashkend to the extent of 2
companies, 2 sotnias, and 2 guns; by that time, also, the 2 companies
from the Syr-Daria which were advancing almost without halting and
by forced marches were calculated to come up. But to my great regret
the reply from Orenburg, which arrived simultaneously with that from
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
27
Western Siberia, was not of the same character. While sympathizing
with me in the difficulty of my position, the Governor General only an-
nounced that the three battalions which were to reinforce the troops
in the province would arrive by the month of August, and that, accord-
ing to the distribution of the troops marked out for me by His Excel-
lency, I would by that time be able to take the field with 30 com-
panies a force with which, His Excellency stated, I should know how
to repulse the Emir in a proper manner. As regards hastening the
despatch of this contingent, it appeared that the advance of only two
of the foremost companies could be accelerated, and that they might
be expected, not by the end of June as previously arranged, but not
before the middle, or perhaps even the end, of July.
In the meanwhile, it became daily more evident towards the end of
April that decisive aggressive operations on our part were unavoidable. H
The attacks on our communications were renewed (Appendix 39).
Parties of the enemy's horse again began to appear in the vicinity of
Chardary, on our line of communication between Chemkend and Tash-
kend, and they were particularly strong on the left bank of the Chirchik.
Attacks were even made in the neighbourhood of Tashkend, in the
gardens surrounding the town. Thus, on the 18th of April, a party of
mounted Bokharians succeeded in penetrating almost up to Tashkend
itself, and at a distance of 12 versts from the town captured three of our
soldiers, and on the 19th, the same party carried off our picket of
militia at Niazbek. At the same time we intercepted several letters
from the Emir and other influential persons in Bokhara addressed to
the people under our rule, and which revealed traces of an extensive
conspiracy preparing in Tashkend and elsewhere in the region newly
occupied by us. Most ridiculous rumours were likewise circulated
among the people about what was believed to be the perilous position
of our detachment stationed at Chinaz. It was said in the bazars that
the detachment remained at Chinaz only because it could not undertake
anything, that it did not dare to venture against the army of the Emir,
and was afraid to retreat for the whole of the Emir's army would at
once descend upon it. In the latter part of April, all the troops of the
Emir assembled at Uratiúbé had actually been concentrated in the
direction of Irdjar. The Emir himself was expected to arrive early in
May, when it was also expected that a decided aggressive movement
would be made by the enemy. The scale of the arrangements for these
aggressive operations, and the expectations of the Emir as regards sup-
port and assistance in the country, were as follows. After the victory at
Irdjar, besides immense quantities of military stores scattered along all
the roads by which the Bokharians retreated, or rather fled, 220,000
cartridges and 700 pounds of gunpowder were found untouched on the
site of their position alone.
The state of affairs with the detachment and in the neighbourhood
of Tashkend was so constrained, that it naturally affected our general
position in the whole province, making it more and more trying.
We could only alter the position of affairs by decisive aggressive
operations and the utter annihilation of the Emir's army. It was
however necessary to strengthen our active force, and to await a favor-
28
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
able opportunity, as otherwise resolute action might have increased the
difficulty of our position instead of improving it.
L'
Such then was the condition of affairs, when I received a letter*
from the Emir on the 19th April (1st May.) Though referring as
usual to his old friendship with the Russian Czar, the Ruler of Bokhara
nevertheless very openly expressed his opinion on the subject of my
predecessor's advance against Djizak. Referring to that advance in a
tone exactly similar to that employed by the Bek of Djizak, he strongly
insisted on the immediate withdrawal of our troops beyond the Syr-
Daria, and warned me that we might otherwise meet with the fate of
our troops before Djizak. The release of our mission was alluded to very
evasively. It was a significant fact that the mission which brought me
this letter avoided the route by which former envoys had come, and
appeared quite unexpectedly at the village of Chinaz, lying seven versts
to the rear of our camp, on the road to Tashkend. We found that it had
crossed the Syr-Daria in the neighbourhood of Irdjar with the assistance
of the local inhabitants, and had very deliberately traversed the Trans-
Chirchik, district, halting in the villages and spreading all sorts of
rumours favorable to Bokhara, none of the inhabitants deeming it
necessary to give information either to the principal detachment or to
that at Kereúchi, although both were at no great distance.
Fully appreciating the importance of the moment, and feeling that
this was not an occasion for the least display of weakness, I explained
categorically to the Emir all the inconsistency of his proposals, and of
his conduct in general since our occupation of Tashkend, whilst I
did not, of course, omit to controvert the strange inference he had
drawn from my predecessor's mode of action and advance on Djizak.
In conclusion, I demanded more peremptorily than ever the instant
return of our mission and the immediate withdrawal of all the troops
and partizans of the Emir from our limits.
The conferences with the Bokharian embassy lasted more than a
week. The envoys left me only at the end of April (O. S.), and of
course by the direct road to the enemy's camp, not by the Trans-
Chirchik region. The time passed in these conferences was of great
importance and profit to us. In addition to receiving all the reinforce-
ments which we expected, i. e., those from Western Siberia and the
line of the Syr-Daria, we had, by the end of April, finished all the
works of Fort New Chinaz (founded in the beginning of that month),
for which a very favorable position was chosen at the mouth of the
Chirchik (very close to the position we then held), and to which the
garrison and arms of Old Chinaz were transferred. As this fort stood
on the very bank of the Syr-Daria, we were enabled to deposit in it all
our superfluous baggage, and to leave there the steamers and other
appliances for transport, which greatly facilitated the impending advance.
The Bokharian mission was invited to witness the ceremony of
raising the flag of the fort, which was armed and consecrated in their
presence.
* To my great regret I have not yet received a copy of this letter, so that I can give
the contents of it only from memory. As soon as I receive it I shall not fail to publish
it, as well as the letter I wrote in answer to the Emir.
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION
29
As the reinforcements came in, they were either forwarded to the
active detachment or placed in the forts nearest to the scene of action,
and a special flying detachment was formed for the protection of the
more immediate vicinity of Tashkend and the Trans-Chirchik district.
The main detachment remained almost unaltered: it was strengthened
only by two guns and reduced by a sotnia of Cossacks. But as the
complement of each arm was at the same time made as full as possible,
the total of the chief detachment was raised to 3,000 men.*
This force included about 600 cavalry, a figure which our active
detachments in Central Asia had hitherto not possessed, and which con-
duced very much towards our further successes. The Kereúchi detach-
ment was somewhat strengthened; its number was made up to 1,000
men in order that it might, during the prospective advance, afford to
keep a garrison in the fort of Kereúchi, and still be a sufficiently inde-
pendent force.
Thus, all the arrangements connected with strengthening the active
detachments and distributing the troops, as far as they appeared to meet
the position of affairs, were completed by the beginning of the month of
May (O. S.); and we had then only to wait for a favorable opportunity
to advance. On the 5-17th and 6-18th of May, we received intelligence
that the Emir had come to Irdjar; that immediately on his arrival a
host of 10,000 men had been despatched to the right bank of the Syr-
Daria and into the Trans-Chirchik region; and that the alarming rumours
and the agitation of the population, especially in Tashkend, were much
on the increase.
The time for decisive action on our part had at last arrived.
I confess that at that moment I had to struggle inwardly with
strong emotions. Great as was my confidence in the troops and my
reliance on their superiority to the Bokharians, I was nevertheless
aware that firstly, in addition to numerous irregular masses, the Emir
had tolerably good regular troops, which, up to that time, we had not
encountered; and secondly, that success did not invariably attend the
most desperate acts of determination. At the same time, a failure when
we had no reliable points of support in our rear nearer than fort
Perovski and Fort Vernoë, 700 or 800 versts distant, would inevitably
have been followed by a catastrophe; the new province would have
been lost to us, and much money and time would have been required for
its re-occupation. On the other hand, a temporizing course threatened
to bring about the same catastrophe-the loss of the province. The
reinforcements from Orenburg were to arrive only in August. The
Emir knew of their being on their way to the province, and, of course,
would not have waited idly at Irdjar until we had received our supports.
That the policy which he had pursued in the Trans-Chirchik region and
in Tashkend would have been soon applied to the whole province does
not admit of a doubt. The favorable disposition shown towards him by
the population and his great masses of horsemen, gave him all the
chances of success. It would have been more than visionary to hope,
* At this time, as during the advance on Djizak under the command of General
Chernayef, the chief detachment consisted of 14 companies of foot, 5 sotnias of Cossacks
(instead of 6), 22 guns (instead of 20), and a rocket company.
30
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
under such circumstances, to be able to retain a province which extended
over 1,500 versts with the number of troops we then had in it, and
while we confined ourselves to defensive operations. It was impossible
for the Emir to withdraw from his position at Irdjar in the face of our
advance without accepting battle, as such a proceeding would have
abased him for ever before the eyes of the entire population of Central
Asia.
On the morning of the 7-19th of May, the main detachment set
out along the left bank of the Syr-Daria in the direction of Irdjar,
and the Kereúchi detachment was marched towards the same place
along the right bank, their advance being so timed that both the
detachments might appear before the enemy simultaneously.
A decisive encounter between our detachments and the Emir's army
took place on the 8-20th of May at Irdjar (Appendices 40, 41).
With all praise to the Almighty, the truly gallant spirit of our
troops, and the exemplary conduct of the officers, produced results than
which we could have desired no better. The Emir's army was annihi-
lated, his artillery, immense stores, and the whole of his camp were left
in our hands. For the first time, after a successful military career of
eight years, the ruler of Bokhara was obliged to seek safety in precipitate
flight, and he just saved himself from us as well as from his own people
by taking the shorter road through Djizak to Samarcand.
The consequences proved that for more reasons than one our advance
was undertaken at the proper time. The conspiracy revealed to us in the
middle of April was joined by a great many in Tashkend. The time
and mode of action were already settled by the conspirators. It was
proposed to admit secretly into Tashkend a party of the enemy and
then simultaneously to fall upon and massacre all the chief inhabitants
devoted to our cause, after which an attack was to be made on the gar-
rison, in conjunction with another body of the enemy conducted towards
the town. At that time the fort of Kereúchi was surrounded by a
host of 10,000 men, and was in a state of blockade from the 8-20th
to the 10-22nd May, i. e., until the enemy received intelligence of the
Emir's defeat at Irdjar.
The conspiracy in Tashkend miscarried through the opportune mea-
sures taken by the officer placed over the native population of Tashkend,
and after our military successes all attempts at conspiracy were aban-
doned by the natives.*
The action at Irdjar having completely altered our position in the
country, left me free to take such measures as I might consider most
advantageous under the circumstances.
Although the instructions which received Imperial confirmation
before my departure from St. Petersburg contained general directions
* Count Woronzow-Dashkof, who, being laid up with a broken leg, could not take part
in the campaign, and who, on my departure with the troops for Irdjar, was left in
charge of the province, bore special testimony in favour of the extraordinary zeal and
capacities of that worthy officer. Indeed, by his brave conduct at Ikan, Mr. Serof attracted
the attention of my predecessor, and fully justified his appointment in 1865. In a short
time he succeeded in winning over many natives, who became sincerely devoted to our cause,
and perceptibly weakened the party hostile to us. For his useful service at Tashkend he
was in a few months recommended by General Cherniayef for the order of St. Vladimir of
the 4th class. It was through his unceasing endeavours, chiefly, that the malevolent designs
of the natives were revealed in time and anticipated.
"
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
31
for my conduct with relation to Bokhara and Kokan, yet, when they
were drawn up in the beginning of February, our position in May could
not naturally have been foreseen. Neither the local authorities nor the
Supreme Government had then lost all hope of averting a collision with
Bokhara by peaceful means. It was equally impossible to ask for fresh
directions. An answer could not have reached me in less than two or
three months. For these reasons I was guided principally by my own
views from the 8-20th of May to the middle of June (O. S.), when fresh
orders arrived from the Governor General based on considerations arising
out of the defeat of the Emir; but I continued to use my own discrimi-
nation until the month of August when the Governor General himself
arrived in the province. The responsibility for my acts up to that time
rests therefore exclusively upon me.
Two courses were left open to us for following up our decided suc-
cess at Irdjar,-one was vigorously to pursue the defeated enemy and to
march on to Djizak, Samarcand, and even beyond; the other to proceed
to Naù and Khodjend.
The first of these courses undoubtedly offered the best chances of easy
and rapid successes. In all probability we should, without much trouble,
have taken possession of Djizak and other points as far as we may have
gone, and should even hardly have stopped at Samarcand. But the
experience of the last years had convinced us that, after occupying any
point in Central Asia, it was impossible for us to abandon it. The
arrival of Russian troops creates at once a mass of Russian adherents
whom it is impossible for us, without detriment to our own moral
influence, to forsake again to the mercies of semi-barbarous potentates.
At the same time the extension of our dominions in the direction of
Bokhara never entered into the programme of our Government, nor
did it present any great advantages. It is not to be forgotten, in
addition, that we were not then in possession of either Khodjend or
Ouratiubé, and that the only direct communication with Djizak lay
across the barren steppe; at the same time we could not but labour under
apprehensions as to the probable fate of our mission and of our merchants
detained in Bokhara. In a moment of desperation both might become
the victims of any adverse circumstances, and such moments would have
been rendered inevitable both for the Government and population of
Bokhara by an advance into the limits of the Khanat.
A march on Khodjend did not offer any of these disadvantages.
The possession of this point, important both in military and commercial
respects, was to us a matter of the greatest necessity. Situated on the
Syr-Daria, near the bend of the river, at a point where it abruptly
turns to the south-east, and at a crossing of the roads to Tashkend
and Kokan, Balkh, and Bokhara, Khodjend, as during the wars be-
tween Kokan and Bokhara, always took a prominent part in Central
Asiatic trade.
It was only by occupying Khodjend that we could consider ourselves
really masters in the Trans-Chirchik region, and could look forward
to the establishment of perfect tranquillity in the newly-occupied regions
of Central Asia. The presence of our troops in Khodjend would at the
same time sever Kokan from Bokhara, and give us the most convenient
access into both of these dominions.

32
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
On the strength of these considerations both the detachments, the
main one and that of Kereùchi, were advanced from Irdjar to Khodjend
(Appendix 45); the first along the left bank of the Syr-Daria by Naù,
the second by the straight road along the right bank; the small but
strong fort of Naù was taken without a single shot, the garrison fled,
and the inhabitants offered their allegiance. On the 17-29th of May
both the detachments met under the walls of Khodjend, each halting
on their respective sides of the river.
From Chinaz I had issued proclamations to the inhabitants
(Appendix 40), in which I informed them that, having arrived in the
province by order of the "White Czar" to establish within it peace and
tranquillity, I was going to act only against the Emir's troops, and
invited all the peaceful inhabitants not to take part in the military
operations, but quietly to continue their ordinary occupations. In return
for this I promised them complete security for their lives and properties.
A similar proclamation was again issued after Irdjar. And indeed, with
the exception of Naù, the inhabitants of all the villages along the road
met me with offerings of bread and salt. Even from other and very
remote villages people came to me with similar tokens of submission.
Upon this I expected that Khodjend too would surrender without
resistance, but on this head the inhabitants of the villages expressed
great doubts.
Khodjend is one of the most populous, wealthy, and picturesque
towns of Central Asia, and its inhabitants were always distinguished for
their spirit of independence, great obstinacy, and at the same time, to do
them justice, for the faithful performance of their promises. Profiting
by their position between Kokan and Bokhara, the inhabitants of
Khodjend had acquired a certain degree of freedom, submitting at
pleasure to the authority of the ruler of either of these Khanats. They
spared no means to support this independence. The fortifications of
Khodjend, notwithstanding their length of 11 versts, with the excep-
tion of the side facing the river, consist entirely of a double row of
very high and thick walls, strengthened by towers and barbettes. The
citadel stands almost in the very centre of the town by the bank of the
Syr-Daria on an artificial elevation, and may be considered impregnable.
Generally speaking the defences of Khodjend were stronger than those
of any of the forts occupied by us before and after in that country.*
The capture of Khodjend was attended with this other difficulty,
that our relations with Kokan were then not yet clearly defined, and the
Kokanians appeared to be making preparations for an energetic defence
of the place; large parties were hovering in the vicinity, and some suc-
ceeded in getting into the town.
Thanks, however, to our brave troops and to their commanding
officers, who had so brilliantly distinguished themselves at Irdjar,
Khodjend was taken by storm on the 24th May or 5th June after a siege
of eight days.
On the first day of the arrival of the detachment before Khodjend,
some emissaries came to our camp with a letter from the Bek of Djizak,
* Djizak is the only exception; it had this superiority, that while strongly fortified it
was defended by a garrison of corresponding strength.
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
33
in which the latter begged me to suspend hostilities, and informed me
that the Emir had ordered the release of our envoys. I considered it
not only inexpedient to reply to this letter, but detaining the emissaries
in camp, and giving them into the charge of one of the officers of my
staff, I caused them to be informed that I should myself release them
only when our own envoys were in my camp. Ten days afterwards, i. e.,
on the day after our occupation of Khodjend, one of the members of our
mission, the Cossack Khorundji Gerasimof, did actually return to me,
while another letter from the Bek, brought by a fresh messenger who
arrived at the same time, informed me that our envoys had already been
released and were expected in a few days at Djizakh. The Bek desired
me in this letter to let him know where the envoys should be sent to :
to our troops in Khodjend or by direct road to Chinaz? In the name of
the Emir, the Bek also earnestly requested me to give some guarantee
of our peaceful intentions, and not to occupy any more of the Emir's
dominions.
This fresh envoy from Bokhara had hardly left me when
another from the Khan of Kokan arrived. In an extremely friendly
letter, Hudoyar Khan of Kokan congratulated me on the successes I had
achieved and on the occupation of Khodjend, and expressed his sincere
readiness to co-operate with me in re-establishing good relations with
the Russians (Appendix 46).
Such expressions on the part of Bokhara and Kokan fully corres-
ponded with the long felt and constant desires of our Government, as
they afforded the possibility of establishing at length befitting friendly
relations with our Central Asiatic neighbours. It must at the same
time be confessed that these representations came to me very opportunely,
for at this juncture I was prevented by orders from Orenburg, issued
through misunderstandings, from military operations.
A few days before the storming of Khodjend I received, under its walls,
a reprimand in writing from the Governor General of Orenburg for
arrangements made by me on my way to Tashkend on the subject of the
issues of money at the forts, of which an explanation has already been
given. In this communication I was strictly enjoined not to depart
from the new rules with regard to disbursements, i. e., to use the
different sums only for the purposes for which they were assigned. A
communication to the same effect was also received by the Intendant
from the Chief Intendant of the Orenburg district. By this order the
Tashkend Intendant was placed in such a position that he was utterly
unable to fulfil any of my demands with regard to the pay of the
expeditionary force, for no allowance had yet been made on account of
the expedition, although a special sum had long been applied for to cover
its expenses.
The want of funds was so great, that Count Woronzow-Dashkof
was obliged to have recourse to that same method, which was more than
once employed by my predecessor, viz., to borrow from one of the rich
natives a sum of 3,000 roubles for the purpose of forwarding the last
transport to Khodjend.
In my reply to the letter from Bokhara (Appendix 48), I requested
that our mission might be sent direct to Tashkend by Chinaz, expressing
my complete readiness, on the return of our mission, to assist in the estab
E
34.
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
lishment of peace. The Government of Bokhara was at the same time
informed that, in proof of our peaceful intentions with regard to
it, after the necessary garrisons were placed in Naù and Khodjend,
our troops would be withdrawn to the right bank of the Syr-Daria.
It was, however, also given to understand that the troops on their way
back would be located on the Syr at Irdjar in expectation of the return
of our mission and pending the conclusion of peace. I replied by
a still more friendly letter to Hudoyar Khan (Appendix 47), whose con-
duct towards us I found generally very sensible and quite in conformity
with the views of our Government.*
It must be here observed that it would be perfectly wrong to regard
Central Asiatic potentates from an European point of view; to expect from
them what may be expected from friendly European Governments. If,
on the one hand, the Central Asiatic Khans make no scruple whatever to
deal arbitrarily with a certain portion of their subjects, on the other hand
very many of their subjects only nominally submit to their authority.
After finishing all the most necessary preparations for the protection
of newly annexed districts on the left bank of the Syr-Daria, and for
the introduction of an internal administration, I hastened to return to
Taskhend. It was necessary as quickly as possible to provide in some
way for the detachments left on the advanced line, which, as all issues
from the Intendantship for expeditionary requirements had ceased,
might, even remaining where they were, be placed in a difficult
predicament.
It would have been extremely rash to have relied upon the
professions of Bokhara until the final return of all the Russians
detained there. It was much safer to provide for our detachments,
so that in case of need they might be able at once to resume aggressive
operations.
On the 21st of May, (12th June,) I left Khodjend, proceeding by
way of Kereùchi. This road was recommended to me as best suited for
the establishment of postal communications. And such indeed I found it.
On the 2nd-14th of June I was again in Tashkend.
* During the whole period of our conflict with Bokhara, Hudoyar Khan behaved with
great moderation, and there were no evidences of his having taken part in the war against
us. If some bands of Kokanians did really act with the Bokharians, and afterwards
assist in the defence of Khodjend, the Khan could not be blamed. His power is not at
all so great that he can restrain all disorderly people from acts of this kind. If Hudoyar
did assist the Emir in a general way, he did not do so zealously, and there is no doubt that
had he lent him more vigorous aid he might have greatly embarrassed us.
CHAPTER V.
CHANGE IN THE ASPECT OF AFFAIRS IN THE PROVINCE AND IN THE DEMEANOUR
TOWARDS US OF THE NATIVES-RETURN OF OUR OFFICERS FROM BOKHARA-NEW
MISSIONS OF PEACE FROM BOKHARA AND KOKAN—ANSWERS TO THE EMIR OF
BOKHARA AND KHAN OF KOKAN-PRECAUTIONS TO INSURE THE SAFETY OF MEN AT
THE FRONT, AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR INDISPENSABLE ENGINEERING WORKS-INTERNAL
ADMINISTRATION-ACCOUNTS-FORMATION
-ACCOUNTS—FORMATION OF RUSSIAN SETTLEMENTS IN TASHKEND,
KHODJEND, AND CHINAZ-FOUNDATION OF AN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL-EXPLORATION OF
THE SOURCES OF THE CHIRCHIK.
I CAN hardly describe the change I found in the province and in the
demeanour of the people, not excepting even the inhabitants of Tashkend,
on my return from Khodjend in the beginning (O. S.) of June. Not
more than three weeks had elapsed since the issue of the detachment
from Chinaz to Irdjar, yet everything was different, and complete
tranquillity prevailed. Not alone had the enemy's bands disappeared,
even the marauding parties which had always infested the Trans-Chui
district had now vanished into the mountains at the head waters of the
Chirchik and Syr-Daria rivers. A peace and quiet were established,
the like of which the old men of the country declared they had never
before enjoyed. The inhabitants of all the villages round about flocked
to meet me with earnest expressions of gratitude and with assurances of
their readiness to obey all orders; their faces, previously wearing lowering
and distrustful expressions, now beamed with confidence. Some of the
natives implicated in secret communications with Bokhara naively con-
fessed that they could never conceive how so small a detachment could
defeat so great a man as the Emir.
At Tashkend I found our embassy already returned by way of
Chinaz, attended by an agent from the Emir bearing presents to me
(a khalat and a cap), who begged to know the conditions upon which we
would agree to a treaty of peace. Very soon after another friendly
embassy arrived from the Khan of Kokan with similar interrogatories
(see Appendix 46). Thus at one and the same time friendly embassies
appeared at Tashkend from both of these neighbouring potentates who had
ever contended one against the other, and who had occasionally combined
for hostilities against us. It was necessary to give them prompt replies,
although the nature of these might greatly influence the future.
The conflict with Bokhara, as well as everything that had occurred
in the region from February to May; had been so unforeseen that there
was nothing in the instructions which I had received to guide me
through the circumstances that had arisen. The movement on Khodjend
and the capture of that town had been dictated by my own judgment
with a view to increase the effect of our victory at Irdjar. In the mean-
while, the position of the province being differently circumstanced
other views might be entertained by the Government, and a fresh line of
action might perhaps be chosen. This was all the more probable since
my predecessor and the Governor General himself, who had left Oren-
burg almost at the same time as General Cherniayef, were both at St.
36
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Petersburg. Owing to the great distance between us it was impossible
to receive fresh instructions before the month of July.* But of course
I could not put off my replies to Bokhara and Kokan for so long a
period. Such a delay would inevitably have alarmed our neighbours,
always exceedingly suspicious, and the trust which they had visibly
begun to place in us might again have been shaken.
Under these circumstances, considering that any excessive demand,
or any engagement which the Government might afterwards not recog-
nize, would shake the growing confidence in Russia, and that the
same result would probably proceed from any evasion on my part, I
acted in the following manner :-All that appeared to me necessary for
the final pacification of the region and for the development of our trade,
i. e., for the accomplishment of all those objects which mainly the Russian
Government had always in sight, I expressed in the form of preliminary
conditions and indications as bases for treaties in which the Governor
General of Orenburg himself had power finally to conclude. Of
these conditions I only apprized the Emir, promising to suspend
military operations if he would assent to them. I exacted the im-
mediate performance of things which in my opinion brooked no delay if
hostilities were to be suspended, and gave notice that these would be
continued if the least hesitation were shown.
Mindful of the two truly rational fundamental principles of action
of the Russian Government with reference to Central Asia, I deemed
it necessary before all deliberately and impartially to regard our position
from the stand-point supplied by them; these principles were-the
maintenance of our moral influence in Central Asia, and not the extension,
but the consolidation of our freshly occupied territories, and the general
pacification of the region. Towards the attainment of the first object,
after the successes we had achieved, it appeared to me to insist on the
immediate liberation of all our merchants, adopting as a rule for the
future the fulfilment of all our engagements. To attain the second,
I judged it necessary to retain all the country newly occupied by us on
the left bank of the Syr-Daria, but yet to avoid making any further
acquisitions whatever in the direction of Bokhara. On the Kokan side
it appeared to me not inexpedient to annex Namangan, more especially
if the Government, as it was rumoured, had the intention of increasing
the number of troops in the province.
Besides the fact that Namangan is in itself of importance as a
great centre of trade, the province of Turkistan, by the annexation to
it of that town, would extend to the head waters of the Naryn which has
long been reckoned as our own river, and we should thus obtain the whole
of the right bank of the Syr-Daria as a frontier to Khodjend. From
thence our frontier would pass along the boundaries of the Khodjend
and Naú districts as far as the Kizyl-Kum sands.
The annexation of Namangan would, I considered, give us, in
addition, a well wooded country and localities always famed for their
mineral wealth. Forming a fragmentary portion of the Kokan domi-
nions, the last of the Kokan possessions on the right bank of the
* Under the most favourable circumstances, no answer to applications from Tashkend
ever reached in less than from seven to eight weeks.
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
37
Syr-Daria,—it was to be expected that Namangan could, on a promise of
protection being given to the Khan of Kokan, be annexed without
recourse to military operations. In the commencement we might have
conflicts with the small detached tribes of nomads, who lately, when
Kokan was reduced, roamed in the vicinity of Namangan, without
properly acknowledging the authority of any government. There was
no doubt, too, that even these nomads would submit to our rule and be
pacified in the course of time.
But in every case the occupation of Namangan was not a matter
of prime necessity; there was no authority for it in the instructions;
and it would have been advantageous only on the condition of an
increase of our forces in the province to a number exceeding even that
of the 16,000 men who composed the establishment for 1865. Besides,
this undertaking could have been performed in August only on the
arrival of the contingent then on its way from Orenburg. The num-
ber of troops in the province at that time, that is in the beginning
(O. S.) of July, was still confined to the previous figure of 13,000, which
was recognised to be insufficient for its tenure even in 1865, immediately
after the capture of Tashkend when neither the Trans-Chirchik region
nor the country on the left bank of the Syr-Daria were yet in our posses-
sion.
The project for the occupation of Namangan was not carried out for
reasons which will be explained in due course. I may nevertheless
here mention one argument which was raised by some in opposition to
this project. Pointing out the contiguity of Kokan to our frontier which
such an occupation would entail, it was said that our communications
with Namangan would be in constant danger. There might have
been some foundation for this apprehension if the idea of a perpetual
enmity towards us of Kokan could have been admitted. But it could
not be imagined that, after the occupation of Tashkend and Khodjend,
Kokan would assume such an attitude. Holding these two points
we can suffer Kokan to retain her independence only on the condition
of her being friendly, or at the least not inimical towards us.
Such a
relative position is for numerous reasons far more advantageous to us
than a direct conquest of Kokan. Should our good relations cease
and Kokan break out against us, the destruction of its independence
would be to us a matter of necessity. Not admitting then the pro-
bability of hostile relations with Kokan, all cause for apprehensions
for the safety of our communications with Namangan must naturally
disappear.
On the strength of the above considerations I made the following pro-
positions in my answer to the Emir, which was partly by letter and partly by
word of mouth; they were the preliminaries to final negotiations for
which he was to send an agent to the Governor General:-
(a).—The recognition of our right of proprietorship over all the
lands recently conquered, and acceptance of the deserts and Kizyl-Kum
sands as the Russian boundaries;
(b).-The reduction of the duties imposed in Bokhara on Russian
goods to the level of those levied by us on Bokharian products;
(c). The concession of full liberty to, and the protection of, all our
subjects in Bokhara; and
38
+
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
locesandtan
выскак
(d).—The reimbursement of all our military expenses for the last
expedition.
The fourth clause I added chiefly with a view to the substitution
of a demand for an indemnity by any other claim which it might be
found necessary to make in case the altered circumstances should produce
a change in the policy of the Government.
As a condition on which military operations would be stopped, I
demanded the instant release of our merchants and their goods. But in
order at the same time to assure the Government of Bokhara of the sincerity
of our peaceful inclinations, I promised to endeavour to procure the im-
mediate release of Bokharian subjects in Orenburg and their despatch,
without delay, to the forts on the Syr-Daria, where, however, they should
bide the return of our own merchants from Bokhara to the same river.
;
Being vested with no authority, the Emir's envoy did not take upon
himself to give any assurances relative to these preliminary conditions
but with reference to the release of our merchants, he positively declared
that the Emir would not delay their return, with their goods, free from
all hindrances, and therefore begged that military operations might be
postponed for at least a few days.
As regards my reply to the Khan of Kokan (see Appendix 47), I
confined myself, in my letter, to proposing a joint protection of
his traders and our own, and the equalization of the duties exacted on our
side and in Kokand; I demanded, moreover, that he should do his
utmost to prevent all his troublesome subjects from making inroads into
our limits, and by no means allow his troops to cross to the right bank
of the Syr-Daria. I considered it at that time premature to enter into
any more detailed explanations. The Khan's envoy, on taking the
letter and learning its contents, assured me that Hudoyar Khan would
always faithfully obey the commands of Russian authorities,-a most sig-
nificant and characteristic assurance, which, was more than once repeated
later by emissaries from the Khan.
These negotiations and the considerations by which I was guided
I reported at once to the Governor General of Orenburg, forwarding
at the same time a copy of the whole correspondence.
Whilst conducting these negotiations I had to study to provide for
our men at the front, and to find means for prosecuting our engineering
works for which also no sums had yet been received.
It appeared on enquiry that the local revenues, placed partially
under the control of the Military Governor, amounted at that time
only to the insignificant sum of 822 roubles 1 cops.* (about £123),
the rest having been applied to the payment of expenses incurred before
my time, and to the payment of salaries to the officers of the local
administration.t I had no other resources. In the Department of Issue
there was, however, cash enough not alone to cover the pay of the troops
and the cost of all their requirements, but even to admit of the advance
to me of a loan-pending the receipt of the amounts already applied
for-of as much as I then needed. The only difficulty was this-accord-
* Report to the Governor General of Orenburg,
30th November
12th December
1866, No. 1211.
+ The amount of the revenue of Taskend in the preceding year did not, however,
exceed 35,000 roubles, owing to the immunities that were granted,
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
39
ing to the new system of control, no sum could be applied to a purpose
different from that for which it was assigned, and no issue in the form
of a loan was permitted.
Packed.
My extremity was so great that I was obliged to call a committee,
composed of all the persons concerned in the disbursement of monies,
such as the Intendant, the Chief of the Issue Department, and the
officers who had recently arrived in the province to establish the new
order of control, the officials from the Ministry of Finance and Con-
trol. I explained to them the nature of the pressing circumstances in
which I was placed, the necessity for dispensing in this instance with
the observance of the new regulations, and asked the sanction of the
Committee for an advance, in the form of a loan, from the Issue De-
partment to meet immediate wants. The responsibility for this
departure from the rules I was myself, of course, obliged to assume.
But there was no reason to apprehend that this course would involve any
difficulties, since there was cash enough in the Issue Department, and
since the receipt of the much-needed means which had long ago been
applied for could not fail to arrive shortly. Without reference even to
the necessity for providing instantly for the detachments, it was impos-
sible to defer the prosecution of the engineering works. Any such
delay might leave the troops without winter quarters, and might con-
sequently produce amongst them sickness and mortality. It was resolved
in Committee to sanction the advance of a sum of money pending the
arrival of the funds demanded, throwing upon me the responsibility for
this unavoidable departure from the regulations, and to acquaint the
Governor General at once with this divergence from them,-all the
members agreeing to report thereon to their respective superior autho-
rities,-which was forthwith done.
The whole of the month of June passed in perfect quiet. The
skirmishes on the line, owing to the unsettled state of the region and to
the freedom of some of the bordering tribes of nomads from every restraint,
were in themselves of no importance during that period. The intelli-
gence arriving from Bokhara and Kokan was as satisfactory as could
be desired. Immediately on the return of his envoy, the Emir did.
indeed allow our merchants to depart, after delivering up to them all their
merchandise. This intelligence was highly gratifying, for had our mer-
chants been wronged and suffered losses, we had not the wherewith
to compensate them. The greater portion of the Bokharian goods seques-
trated in Orenburg in 1865 had long been sold and the proceeds given
up to the Bokharians. We had certainly the option of renewing mili-
tary operations, with perfect confidence in brilliant results, but from
these our merchants would not have reaped any advantages.
In like manner, the Khan of Kokan also most conscientiously
fulfilled the promises made by his envoy.
I was at this time much rejoiced by a letter from the Governor
General, written from St. Petersburg immediately after the receipt of the
news of the victory at Irdjar, but before the results of our further opera-
tions had become known. Among other things, the Governor General
dwelt very strongly in his letter on the necessity for occupying Khodjend
before coming to any terms with Bokhara. It was therefore to be hoped
40
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
that, as this had in the meanwhile been accomplished, the fact did not
run counter to the views of the Government.
All these favorable circumstances gave us at last the opportunity to
realize the settled purpose of the Government, viz., to organize the
internal administration of the province and to adjust the local revenues,
which were in every respect matters of necessity. Radical reforms were
out of the question, so also was the idea of making these departments
answer every expectation; but at the least it was necessary to introduce
those principles for a local administration, and for the assessment and
collection of taxes, which are essential to a proper government of the
province.
These views, however limited, in their practical application, provoked
much greater difficulties than those that could stand in the way of even a
resumption of hostilities, notwithstanding the fatigue of the troops and
the lack of material resources. The latter can always be obtained in
one way or the other, and as regards soldiers, we all know how soon the
fatigues of a campaign are forgotten when success attends them, and
how much they prefer a life of military exploits to the monotony of
peaceful occupations, and particularly to engineering labours. Mine was
an ungrateful task. It was necessary to exercise a vigilant control, to
enforce the observance of certain rules, and what was still more im-
portant, to impose duties and taxes upon the population in place of the
immunities which they enjoyed. I had also to contend with the Mus-
sulman expounders of the law. But it was full time at length to carry
out the projects of the Government. Having by our military suc-
cesses lowered the Emir (the head of the Mussulman spiritual class
in Central Asia) in the estimation of the people, and thereby visibly
weakened the influence of the spiritual class, it was all the more neces-
sary at that time to hasten the accomplishment of the task. The native
teachers of religion having witnessed the defeat of their head and chief,
and feeling conscious that many of their order were seriously compromised
in relations with Bokhara, became very subdued.
As I have observed before, I found on my return to Tashkend that
the local revenues amounted to the modest figure of 800 roubles; yet
I received, at the same time, an order to draw on the revenues the sum
of 62,000 roubles which had been demanded on account of supplies for
the troops, and that of 50,000 roubles for engineering works. Such
an order could have been issued by Government only in the full expecta-
tion of a positive increase of the local revenues, for in the preceding
year, the whole of the revenue of Tashkend was limited to a total of
33,000 roubles.
With respect to internal administration and to the collection of
taxes, the province entrusted to my charge was composed at that time of
two totally distinct parts; the former Syr-Darian line, with the territory
from Julek to Tokmak inclusive, annexed during the period from 1859
to 1864, composed then the Turkistan district, for the administration
of which a plan had already been settled, although it had not been
brought into operation merely for want of time and of officials. All
the remaining portion of the region, from Tashkend to Khodjend and
Nau, was not only unprovided with any Imperial Regulations for its
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
41
government, but its annexation to the empire had not even yet been
sanctioned.
,
The local revenues of the Turkistan district were carried to the
account of general revenue of the empire, and had to be paid over intact
to the local department of the Finance Ministry. But the revenues
of the rest of the country not yet annexed to the empire, and perhaps
only temporarily occupied by our troops, were allowed to be appropriated
to extraordinary purposes. At that time all the settled population in
the Turkistan, district, and all the inhabitants generally of the Tashkend
'rayon,' were exempted from the payment of taxes through the inter-
were
cession of my predecessors. Fortunately these immunities expired in
1866, therefore, being of opinion that, irrespective of economical consi-
derations, the grant of similar exemptions was calculated to produce
more harm than good, I recommended the re-imposition of taxes in the
region occupied before my advent, and the assessment of the people in
the remaining portion of the province from the day of its occupation by
our troops.
УСТО НОton +11
Prior to our rule in the region, the taxes imposed upon the in-
habitants were of two kinds; there were permanent taxes based on the
Sharihat or on the customs of the people, and so-called Khan's taxes,
arbitrarily imposed by the Khan, and sometimes exceeding twice the
amount of all the other taxes put together. Conformably with imperial
directions, it was intended to do away entirely with the tribute to the
Khan and to levy only the legal taxes. This measure was calculated to
relieve the people of a heavy burthen, therefore there was no need to
apply in their behalf for any fresh exemptions. And we had already
conferred upon the people a great benefit by emancipating them from the
tyranous yoke of their former rulers.
Moreover, a system of exemption, followed by the imposition of taxes,
has, in the period of transition, invariably produced murmurs and com-
plaints.
I have already remarked, that when I arrived in the province the
local authorities had but small means for carrying out the project of
administration of 1865, and that there was a great lack of persons quali-
fied to serve in the local government. As I said before, there were in
the end of March only eight officers to fifteen posts, and of these
six had been taken from the front. This deficiency was not made up
even by June month. Not a single officer prepared for the service was
sent out during that period. But as military operations had ceased, it
was found possible to detach some perfectly reliable officers from the front
who were competent to serve well in the internal administration. This
and similar measures were taken in the beginning of June. A corres-
ponding form of administration was at the same time introduced into
the recently occupied districts.
For the purpose of promoting a more thorough acquaintance with
the country, a statistical department was formed in the Military Go-
vernor's office, the expenses of which were defrayed from the local
*Excepting the so-called "customs dues," i. e., 1-40th of the value of all in-coming
and out-going caravans, and a bazar impost.
F
42
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION
resources,* and concurrently with all this, measures were adopted for
arranging the heads of the different sources of revenue of the province,
and for introducing some proper order into the system of receipts and
issues. The Intendant Department of the district, established in 1865,
had by this time succeeded in introducing some regularity in the current
accounts, if not in thoroughly disentangling those of former times.
As regards the revenue accounts, they were wanting both in accuracy
and regularity, because, owing to a want of time and of officials, local
administration was as yet more a theory than a practice, and in some
places no accounts were kept at all.
I am here bound to acknowledge that, neither during this state of
confusion, nor later, when the accounts were in order, did it occur to me
to discover any corrupt practices; and not alone that, but all who were
engaged in the completion of this important work displayed great zeal in
co-operating with me. But progress was impeded, firstly, by the novelty
of the work, and secondly, by the fact that many of the officers were but
little acquainted with the method of dealing with Government sums.
For example, collectors would deduct from the amount of revenue
payable intact to the exchequer sums due to them on various accounts,
and refund the balance. This could not be called corrupt practice, but
the proceeding complicated the accounts and made it more difficult to
act up to the regulations.
For all these reasons it was excessively difficult to make even the
simple improvements that had long been called for; as for radical reforms,
they were necessary only in Tashkend, where the inhabitants constituted
only one-tenth of the whole population of the province. Besides, the
reforms there applied merely to the establishment of civil law courts,
which referred neither to the religion nor the customs of the people, and
which were temporarily established by the local authorities to supply a
pressing want.
The address presented to the Governor General of Orenburg by the
inhabitants of Tashkend in the autumn of 1865 (see Appendix_24),
plainly showed the object aimed at by the local religious class and by
their head, the Kazy Kilian of Tashkend. Later events, also, proved
how little reliance could have been placed even in the temper of the popu-
lation, had the influence of the head of the Mussulman preachers not been
weakened in one way or another. I had occasion to be dissatisfied with
the Kazy Kilian on my arrival in the province, but for the nonce I was
obliged to restrict myself to palliative measures with regard to him, in
the form of advice, reprimands, &c., &c., &c. These measures to some
extent served their end. He toned down in his conduct; he interfered
less in the affairs of the officer in charge of the population; and in his
relations with me he changed his insulting demeanour into an
manner. With all that, he was a person of great importance. Confer-nu
ring as he did upon his nearest relatives all the principal religious offices
and judgeship, and combining in his own person the chief spiritual and
judicial powers, the Kazy Kilian of Tashkend was capable of doing us a
great deal of injury notwithstanding that he was disliked by the people.
insinuatink
* The labours of some of the members of this department have been published in
various journals.
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
43
Not to take advantage of the times, when the population had ceased
to regard us with distrust, for improving this situation seemed to be a
dereliction of duty.
I could have dealt with the Kazy Kilian of Tashkend in either of
two ways.
мученик
By virtue of the powers then vested in the Military Governor of
the province of Turkistan, I could have exiled the Kazy Kilian to a
residence in Omsk, and in his place I could have appointed somebody who
could be better relied upon. But while such a measure could not finally
have secured us against a recurrence of the same circumstances, his
banishment might have lent his relatives and adherents a pretext for
proclaiming him a martyr to religious convictions, and even for turning
him into a saint, although up to that time the people had not in the
least been well disposed towards him. There was another method avail-
able by which, without converting the Kazy Kilian into a martyr,
without even affecting his own religious privileges, there was a possibility
of depriving all the religious class of Tashkend of those powers which
were particularly damaging to our influence, a method which, by us as
well as by others, had been more than once employed with great benefit
under similar circumstances, and which had everywhere met with the
sincere sympathies of the people.
This last method was the establishment of mekhkemé, i. e., civil
tribunals, for Mahomedan natives alone, similar to the courts established
by the French in Algeria; the same were first instituted by us in the
Caucasus in Yermolof's time, and subsequently popularized with great
benefit by Field Marshal Prince Bariatínski. In no instance have the
mekhkemé ever excited, nor can they excite, the fanaticism of the natives,
because the mollahs themselves take part in the adjudication on all
matters that come before these courts, with others chosen from among
the people, in the presence of an officer of the Government.
I was, however, firmly convinced that the establishment of mekhkemé
would prove beneficial, yet, considering how slight was our acquaintance
with the region, and bearing in mind that there was never yet a measure
applied well, and with even the best of intentions, and great, which was
not regarded in a wrong light, I concluded that it was expedient to
consult the people, or at least the most influential persons among them,
on the subject of the proposed institutions. After explaining to the
latter the nature of the innovation, I commissioned them to ascertain the
opinion of the people. In the meanwhile I, of course, gathered this
information myself through my interpreters. It appeared that the people
very soon understood the advantages of these institutions, and even found
in them much that resembled a system that had prevailed among them
sometime previously. At all events, it was not before two months' later
that I could apply myself to the establishment of a mekhkemé,-the open-
ing of the first institution of this kind in Tashkend took place only on the
arrival of the Governor General in the province. But about three weeks
previous to the opening ceremony, I sanctioned adjudication in this
court in order practically to acquaint the people with the working of the
system.
In addition to all this variety of cares, I had to take immediate
steps for building quarters for the troops, and for forming Russian
44
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
settlements, however small, in Tashkend, in Khodjend, and at Chinaz.
In Tashkend there were many private houses, but still not enough for
our wants. To satisfy these, a space was appropriated in Tashkend for
a European quarter; a town council was formed; a macadamised road
was commenced, &c. At the same time a Russian school was built,
partly by subscription and partly on local funds, in which it was intended
to give elementary instruction to boys and girls.
Whilst all these measures for the organization of the province were
in hand, it was found practicable to send a small detachment of troops to
perform a minute survey of the head waters of the Chirchik (Chatkal),
said to be rich in forests and the favourite haunt of bands of robbers.
CHAPTER VI.
MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND DISTURBANCES IN THE PROVINCE-DETENTION OF BOKHARIAN
MERCHANTS IN ORENBURG—AGITATIONS in BOKHARA AND KOKAN-RUMOURS OF
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ON A LARGE SCALE CONTEMPLATED BY US-LETTER OF THE
GOVERNOR GENERAL-VIEWS OF GENERAL KRYJANOVSKI ON THE CONQUEST OF KOKAN
-DESIGNS AGAINST BOKHARA AND FORMATION OF A TASHKEND DISTRICT-REJOINDER
ARRIVAL OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN THE PROVINCE-ACCEPTANCE OF TASHKEND
AS A DEPENDENCY OF RUSSIA-ESTABLISHMENT OF MEKHKEME-ANNEXATION OF THE
TRANS-CHIRCHIK REGION KHODJEND AND NAU RELATIONS WITH KOKAN AND
BOKHARA-RENEWAL OF MILITARY OPERATIONS-CAPTURE OF URATIUBE AND DJIZAKH
-THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S RETURN FROM THE CORPS OF OPERATION, AND HIS
DEPARTURE FROM THE PROVINCE PROJECTS FOR MILITARY AND CIVIL ADMINISTRA-
TION-GENERAL RESULT OF THE MEASURES of 1866 WITH REGARD TO THE ESTABLISH-
MENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND FISCAL ORDER.
THUS, in proportion to our power and means, the essential requirements
were satisfied. It was to be hoped that the steps taken would, if
matters were steadily persevered in, bring forth sufficiently satisfactory
results for the first year. There was all the more reason to hope so,
because nothing in the region indicated the necessity of a call for a
speedy resumption of hostilities. To add to this, information was
received in the end of June, (O. S.) that the demand for money to
cover the military expenses had been granted; that the money would in
a short time come to hand, and that a special commission was coming
from St. Petersburg to lighten the labours of the local authorities and
to regulate the accounts for the past period.*
Unfortunately, however, our hopes on a calm continuance of peace-
ful occupations were frustrated. The mutual confidence between us and
our neighbours, as well as the perfect tranquillity of the region—so
identical with the former-continued only for a very short time.
A strange rumour reached us from Bokhara in the beginning of
July to the effect that our merchants, after being first conscientiously
allowed to depart from Bokhara with all their merchandise, were again
detained by the Emir, who for some reason doubted the return of his
own subjects, and fancied that we were harbouring some deep designs
against him. It was said that troops were again gathering in Bokhara,
and that the frontier forts were being strengthened. Then also came the
news that disturbances and fears had arisen in Kokand, and in confirma-
tion, as it were, of these strange rumours, there happened at this time
an affray at our advanced posts at Naú with the Bokharian pickets, and
the supply of timber from Kokan to Khodjend, which we so much
needed for the works which we had already commenced, was put a stop
to.
+
* A special commission under Colonel Bykof was sent out from St. Petersburg in 1866
for the purpose of revising and closing the accounts on the spot, and a sum of Rs. 4,00,000
was remitted to cover the non-estimated expenses incurred for military purposes. The
commission was directed to open accounts from the date of the last expeditions so as to
obviate as speedily as possible any confusion in the future. The accounts, therefore, for the
expedition of 1866, were finished last year (1867), when a portion of the earlier accounts
was also closed.
46
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Without attributing particular importance to these rumours, I
nevertheless considered it necessary to visit the advanced posts and to
intimate to our neighbours that with all our great inclination to live in
peace and concord with them, we should, without a moment's hesitation,
recommence military operations if they showed the slightest intention
of disturbing our good relations.
For this once the alarm was not followed by any serious con-
sequences. I received on the road re-assuring news concerning our
merchants. At that time, too, the Bokharians delivered up some natives
who had been seized in the neighbourhood of Naú; it was
was this
that had given rise to the conflict mentioned. Very soon after our good
understanding with Kokan was re-established.
Two months had not elapsed since our occupation of Khodjend, and
yet the inhabitants met me with bread and salt according to Russian
custom, and with assurances of their great pleasure and happiness in
becoming subjects of Russia (see Appendix 63). I had been met in the
same manner on my return to Tashkend (see Appendix 64). In the
address delivered to me on that occasion the more influential citizens of
the town expressed themselves, in the name of the whole people, very
strongly in favor of the contemplated establishment of mekhkemé. This
was all the more significant, inasmuch as it deprived those who were
against us of the power of spreading the report that this new institu-
tion was opposed to the will of the people.
A feeling of security seemed again to prevail in the region, but in
fact that tranquillity which had commenced to reign no longer existed.
Hostile conflicts and collisions happened, indeed, but rarely up to the
resumption of military operations, and were of no significance, but yet
a perfect mutual confidence between us and our neighbours was not
again restored. Various alarming rumours were incessantly current, the
theme being almost always one and the same, for instance, that we were
making preparations for aggressive operations on a large scale. Our
merchants returned from Bokhara, but the merchandise of those in the
rear on the way back was abandoned on the road by the Bokharian
drivers; we had to send out Kirghizes to bring it to the forts.
Towards the end of July, I at last received a reply to my letter
relative to further operations. But to my great regret this reply was
not such as to encourage me in the work I had already commenced.
Alluding in very complimentary terms to all that I had done, and with-
out even making objections to my propositions, General Kryjanovski
nevertheless seemed to desire an enlargement of the programme sub-
mitted by me. His Excellency did not limit his views to the occupation
of Namangan, but considered it necessary to occupy the entire Khanat
of Kokan and to extend our dominions to the celestial mountains and
* The affair of Kolesnikof's gold seekers, which gave rise to strange interpretations in
some of our journals, is referable to this period. The affair happened within the sphere of
operations of the detachment sent to survey the head waters of the Chirchik, not in the
quarter of the province already pacified. The authors of the accounts of this business seem,
by their extravagant statements, to have had no wish to receive the facts of the case from
Kolesnikof himself (see No. 12 of the "Vest," 1867), and even after the publication of
his explanation of it, they continued to give their own versions, whereby the facts, which of
themselves spoke in our favour, were most unceremoniously distorted, and, instead of the
praises which were due, brought down blame upon our administration.
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
4.7
the Bolors. This he proposed to accomplish without delay on the arrival
of reinforcements and on his own arrival in the province. With this
view I was recommended to "assume a high tone towards Kokan and to
treat Hudoyar Khan as a man who by his position should be a vassal of
Russia. Should he take umbrage and operate against us," wrote the
Governor General, "so much the better, it will give us a pretext to close
with him." The Governor General at the same time appeared to be
dissatisfied with the relations which I had begun to establish with the
Emir of Bokhara. My representations in favor of the release of the
merchants in Orenburg and of their return to the Syr-Daria were looked
upon by His Excellency as a concession on our part. With reference to
the Emir, it was said in the letter, "having beaten the Emir as you have
done, everything must be demanded of, nothing conceded to, him;" at the
same time His Excellency, fearing lest the Bokharian merchants, through
oversight of the commandants, might escape from the forts on the Syr-
Daria, considered their release inexpedient, so that the Bokharians were
not allowed to depart from Orenburg to that river.
With reference to the internal administration, General Kryjanovski
in the above letter announced a totally fresh scheme, and requested me to
take immediate measures for carrying it out. I had, as it has been fully
explained, already applied myself to the settlement of the important
question of the local revenues; yet other and greater reforms were pointed
out to me in this letter. Thus, among other things, I was directed "to
draw up a project for detaching the Turkistan district from Western
Siberia, and from Tashkend" (which was to give name to a new district
the Governor General contemplated inaugurating). "The boundary
projects," he wrote, "are to be formed on the spot with the aid of persons
to be specially appointed for the service, to which I beg your Excellency
will give your immediate attention." As no one was sent out for the
execution of this work, it was necessary to make a selection from among
the very limited number of persons in the region.
It will easily be conceived how embarrassing was the situation in
which I was placed by this letter.
In questions so open as that of Central Asia he thinks that the course
he prefers is unerring and the best for his country. I, of course, had no
such assurance, more especially as the Governor General may have
founded his instructions on prescripts of which I was totally ignorant,
and calculated on resources which I neither commanded nor expected
to possess. It was, at all events, evident that General Kryjanovski
wished to change the moderate form of proceeding for one of more decided
action. But it will doubtless be acknowledged by all that, in the interest
of affairs themselves, it is essentially necessary for those participating
directly in their settlement, with whom rest more or less independent
rights of action, and who bear some degree of responsibility, as was
my case in the Central Asian question, that it is, I repeat, essentially
necessary for those to be thoroughly convinced before carrying it out
that the method indicated to them for the settlement of such affairs is
really the best that can be adopted; otherwise, it appears to me, it
were irreconcilable with their conscience to continue in the direction of
affairs; they ought, on the first opportunity, to retire and leave matters
48
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
in the hands of those who do not doubt the soundness of the proposed
measures.
My opinion on the settlement of the Central Asian question has
already been stated. By this opinion, in all that depended from me, I
was guided from first to last. Yet the mode of action dictated to me
by General Kryjanovski, and his schemes for the future, were diame-
trically opposed to my own unbiassed view of affairs-and one in which
I had long been confirmed through its practical application. The old
truism, that "it is the tone that makes the music," would here most
inevitably have been demonstrated, and applied, I may say, literally.
The "high" tone which I was directed to assume, of course, excluded
every kind of condescension on our part; whereas, from the view I took,
it appeared to me that condescension, with a certain amount of firmness
of course, was one of the most essential conditions for the permanent
establishment of that mutual confidence which was evidently coming
about between ourselves and our neighbours. With reference to Kokan,
there was one more very important circumstance-besides those already
mentioned-which could not be lost sight of; even by the annexation of
Namangan only one-third of Kokan would have passed into our hands,
the other two-thirds of the Khanat on the left bank of the Syr-Daria
would have still remained to be conquered (see Appendix 83). Truly,
in military operations against Kokan our success would have been
undoubted, and easier too than in the direction of Bokhara, but for
the actual occupation of the Khanat we should have been obliged to
employ all the expected reinforcements and at the same time to have
located them there for the winter in any quarters we might have
found, Under these circumstances, and while the Emir's very natural
enmity would continue to last, we might very easily have found our-
selves in the spring of 1867 in a situation not a whit better than that
which we occupied in the spring of the year 1866.
The designs of General Kryjanovski might, however, possibly have
undergone a change on his arrival in the province, and after some insight
into the position of affairs. But the detention of the Bokharians in
Orenburg, while our merchants, released from Bokhara, were already on
their way with all their goods to the Syr-Daria, was an accomplished
fact, and it was much to be feared that this would be found to be the
cause of the perturbations arising in the province.
In my answer to the letter I did not screen from His Excellency any
one of my apprehensions or withhold any of my convictions. I also
humbly begged to be allowed to conduct affairs as I had commenced
them, at least until the arrival of the Governor General himself. This
answer was despatched without any delay.
I received no fresh instructions after this, and in the middle of
August (O. S.) the Governor General himself arrived in Tashkend.
On his entry into the town, His Excellency was received in great
state by all the inhabitants, and the leading citizens, in the name of all,
presented him with the bread and salt, and with an address in which
they urgently begged the acceptance of their allegiance to Russia. But
it was remarkable that, in this fresh address (see Appendix_68) the
Tashkendians did not, as in the address of last year, express any other
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
4.9
particular desires, but begged only that their town might be made a
A component part of the empire and placed on an equal footing with its
other portions.
With regard to this, the following passage occurred in the address:-
"In one sea there are not two seas, consequently also in one empire
there cannot be two empires, so take it then upon yourself to recom-
mend the annexation of our district to Russia as a part always to
belong to her on an equality with the other parts of the empire."
In the same address the Tashkendians, alluding to the beneficial
results accruing to them through the establishment of Russian rule in
the province, spoke with especial praise of the mekklemé. On this subject
it was said in the address-“A mekhkeme has been established which,
dealing justly, disinterestedly and impartially, settles our affairs in perfect
accordance with the rules of our religion and our popular customs.'
This could not but be taken as an evidence of a circumstance most
favorable to us,-a diminution of the influence of the religious party.
On his arrival in the province the Governor General approved all
my proceedings with respect to both military and civil affairs, abandoned
his own schemes for the settlement of the province and fell in with my
own plans. In the military operations, which commenced soon after,
General Kryjanovski, although himself present with the troops, left me
in command of the corps and confined himself to general directions,
reserving to me the management of all the details. Such relations
with the superior of the province could not but be a source of great
pleasure to myself and it stimulated my zeal for the service. But with
all that there was still one circumstance which could not but embarrass
me. However much I desired to do so, I could not persuade His Excel-
lency to look upon Kokand with a more amicable, or lenient eye. On
his arrival at Tashkend, General Kryjanovski immediately reported to
St. Petersburg on the necessity of commencing decisive operations against
Kokand without delay.
On this point my own views and those of my superior were
frequently in collision. Thus, for example, General Kryjanovski blamed
the Khan of Kokand for the attacks made by parties of robbers, and for
the concentration of his forces on his own territories.
It was my opinion that the Khan of Kokand simply had not the
means wherewith to put a stop to the inroads of predatory parties, and
that the concentration of his troops in Kokand was merely the very
natural consequence of the concentration of our own troops in Khodjend,
which began immediately after the arrival of the Governor General in
the province.
As our relations with Kokand had not yet been definitely settled,
his measures for self-defence were but natural and lawful. It must at
the same time be observed that, simultaneously with the adoption of
these measures for self-defence, the Kokandians sent me two letters: one
was from the highest dignitaries in Kokand, and the other from the Khan
himself. In both of these letters (see Appendices 54 & 60) was expressed
not only a disinclination to war against us, but also a perfect readiness to
enter into the most stable friendly relations. In each of these letters it
was said that the bearer--a Kokandian of rank-was empowered to
express minutely the desires of the inhabitants, and that whatever he
Ꮐ
50
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
asserted was to be believed. The bearer testified to the desire of the
Kokandians to become subjects of the "White Czar." These letters
were then and there submitted to the Governor General.
The sincerity of the amicable disposition of the Kokandians
was proved by their conduct during the military operations against
Bokhara, which commenced soon after.
Little qualified as I may have been to consider my own views as
faultless, my apprehensions of evil consequence from the advance against
Kokand, projected by the Governor General, were very burdensome. I
must confess that if I did not there and then insist on my recall, it was
purely on the grounds of the apparent inevitability of hostilities with
Bokhara. There were other reasons why I wanted to withdraw, if only
for a time two journeys from St. Petersburg to Tashkeud and a close
application to business, had greatly fatigued me. However, General
Kryjanovski promised to grant me leave to go to Russia in the winter.
I do not know what our projects with regard to Kokand would have
ended in had circumstances not compelled us to turn our entire attention
to Bokhara.
On the Governor General's arrival in Tashkend the Emir was at
once made acquainted with the fact, and was invited, in case he wished
to make peace with us, to send a delegate immediately (see Appendices 73
& 74). Pending this His Excellency occupied himself with internal
affairs and with reviewing the troops.
The forces were found, according to General Kryjanovski's report,
to be in a somewhat improved condition as compared with that of
last year.
Constant campaigns and movements did not, of course, allow
of their being brought to the desirable state of perfection; there was
yet much to be done for their improvement, organization and formation.
But with all their defects, the troops had been specially favoured in the
last year of 1865, through the representation of the same Inspector, with
the "Imperial thanks" conveyed to them through an Aide-de-Camp from
St. Petersburg, and there was the more hope of their attaining the
desired perfection, seeing they were already improved since then.
Being commissioned by His Imperial Majesty to accept the allegi-
ance of the inhabitants in case the latter should reiterate their request
to be made subjects of Russia, General Kryjanovski announced to them
that they should be so constituted. Upon this the inhabitants of the
Trans-Chirchik District also applied to the Governor General with urgent
petitions to the same effect, and the inhabitants of Khodjend and of
other localities followed in their wake, so that all the country to Khodjend
and Naù inclusive, occupied by us up to May 1866, became for ever
subjected to Russia.
The announcement of the acceptance of their allegiance was made
by General Kryjanovski with becoming solemnity, and the opening of
the mekhkemé in Tashkend was attended on the same day with like
ceremony. At this opening, the Governor General stated, in my presence,
to an assembly of the inhabitants that he considered my services in the
matter of the establishment of the mekhkemé quite as important as the
victory at Irdjar. I cannot omit to mention that at a lunch given on
this occasion by Mr. Serof, the Controller of the population, the inha-
bitants from various other localities, who had come to the celebration,
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
51
appealed to the Governor General with requests for the establishment of
similar mekhkemés amongst them.
In a short time an answer came from Bokhara, intimating that a
delegate would soon arrive to conclude a treaty of peace. As the
Governor General intended to proceed early in September to Khodjend,
where, as it has been observed, the troops began to concentrate imme-
diately on his arrival in the province, the embassy from Bokhara was
consequently sent to that place. As a base for operations, Khodjend
then offered undoubted advantages; that point commanded all the most
convenient approaches to Bokhara, by way of Oura-Tiubé and Jizakh,
as well as to Kokand, and to Namangan.
The Governor General's arrival in Khodjend, in the first days of
September, was immediately followed by that of the embassy from the
Emir (see pp. 71, 72). The envoy on this occasion was a very great
and influential personage in the Khanat of Bokhara; Karili was the
chief of the religious class of the capital, a man who was on intimate
terms with the Emir's family, even during the reign of the present ruler's
father, and who had always commanded special confidence and respect.
The envoy gave assurance in the Emir's name of his master's perfect
readiness to fulfil all our demands, as it was also written in the letter
he presented. When it came, however, to the question of an indemnity,
the envoy spoke first in terms of evasion, saying he had no authority on
the subject, and then begged us to be lenient.mccour
It was more difficult for us to make concessions at this time, when
the Bokharians had collected their troops and strengthened their forts,
than it had been at the time when Bokhara was unarmed, as in July
month. For this reason, the Governor General found it impossible to
agree to any concessions (see App. 73), and declared to the envoy that,
if in the course of ten days no indemnity were forwarded, military oper-
ations would be renewed. At the very same time I was ordered by His
Excellency to prepare everything for a campaign and for a march, with
such calculation, that on the tenth day we might enter within the limits
of Bokhara.
14th
30th
The ten days' term was to expire on the 23rd September (5th
October), and as no intelligence was received from the Emir when it
elapsed our column entered the Khanat. The military operations thus
commenced placed in our hands the forts of Oura-Tiubé and Jizakh;
the first was taken by storm on the 2nd, and the second on the 18th of
October. The small fort of Zaámin, as the enemy did not attempt to
defend it, was seized without a shot (see Appendices 51 & 52). Time
alone can, of course, determine which of the two frontiers was the best,-
that which I had previously traced across the hungry Steppe, or that
which we obtained in consequence of our new conquests. Anyhow
it was a cause of great satisfaction that on the recommencement of hos-
tilities in the year 1866, military operations were conducted in the direc-
tion of Bokhara instead of Kokand. Besides acquiring thereby a
position which served better to protect the region occupied by us than that
in which we should have found ourselves placed through the occupation
of Kokand, we reduced, by operations against Bokhara, an enemy most
dangerous to us; whereas by operations against Kokand we should
52
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
have weakened the perpetual rival of Bokhara, and a ruler, too, who at
that time evidently sought the protection of Russia.
us.
Shortly after the capture of Jizakh, a deputation arrived in our
camp from Shuhr-i-Subz and other localities in our front, begging us
to continue our advance, and professing a readiness to co-operate with
But the lateness of the season, and a disinclination to extend our
conquests beyond the range of mountains forming the southern wall of
the plain of the Syr-Daria, induced the Governor General to arrest
our progress. The troops were put into winter quarters and, as a
matter of course, a detachment strong enough in itself-of 10 com-
panies, 12 guns, and 3 "sotnias" of Cossacks-was left in Jizakh.
Simultaneously with the cessation of military operations, a pro-
clamation was issued to the inhabitants, in which the peaceful residents
were informed of the causes of the commencement and termination of
hostilities and requested to have no fears, but to return quietly to their
homes and resume their peaceful avocations (see App endix 53).
On the day after the capture of Jizakh, the Governor General
received a telegram from St. Petersburg in answer to his propositions
relative to Kokand, in which the disinclination of the Government.
to extend our limits was very positively stated. The Government
insisted on an adherence to the instructions which had been given on the
strength of the achievements of May 1866. These, framed by the
Ministers for War and Foreign Affairs, were merely to the following
effect :-" Should the inhabitants of Tashkend and of other localities
occupied by our troops in that region renew their requests to be adopted
as our subjects, in order to obtain protection against the designs of the
Emir, His Imperial Majesty is graciously pleased to permit of their being
constituted subjects of Russia.”
13th
In the end (O. S.) of October, General Kryjanovski returned to
Tashkend, and on the 1st of November left for Orenburg. On his
departure, His Excellency handed me a draft of new regulations for the
province, but at the same time gave me leave to construct a fresh plan
in case I objected to his draft, and to proceed to Orenburg and St.
Petersburg in order to report personally upon all the schemes.
A committee of officers of long service in the province, was called in
Tashkend to consider the new regulations contained in the draft which
had been made in the chancery of the Governor General.
Upon careful consideration of this draft, the committee could not
agree with many of its leading principles, whereupon fresh projects
were sketched of military and civil administration. I ought to observe
that, in my own opinion, it was better to put off the drawing up of new
regulations. It appeared to me that we were yet too little acquainted
with the region to establish any. But in compliance with orders, I
proceeded to draw up a project in which, however, the existing order of
things was as far as possible retained, and which allowed of a new system
being gradually introduced according to the judgment of the local author-
ities.
I was enabled through the termination of military operations to
revert to the labours connected with the settlement of the internal admin-
istration and the local revenues; but even during the six weeks which
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
53
I passed in the province after the departure of the Governor General, I
had once more to tear myself away from my peaceful occupations in order
to visit our advanced line, where it was necessary to make final arrange-
ments for the coming winter. This journey occupied about two weeks,
but nevertheless the projects of administration drawn up by the com-
mittee over which I presided myself, were finished and despatched to
Orenburg in the beginning of December.
The extremely unsatisfactory condition of the existing forms of
direction, and the utter impossibility of removing their defects without
the necessary means to do so, were candidly expressed in these projects,
(see Appendix 84), for whilst a reticence under the circumstances might
have injuriously affected the cause, the local administration had no reason
to screen anything. Never and nowhere have people yet been blamed for
not having had the strength to accomplish impossibilities. It was out of
the question to introduce order even into the military administration so
long as the various staffs remained the same as when the dimensions of
the province were half as small, when the number of troops was consi-
derably less, and so long as the officers in the service, while fulfilling the
current duties of their respective offices, were being constantly diverted
from them by military operations and other calls of the service, which
in their turn were equally imperative.
As regards the organization of the civil branch, this complicated
question having been only very recently taken up, and the number of
officials qualified for this service being so very limited, the impossibility
of putting this branch into a satisfactory working condition could not
have been more self-evident.
What was, however, practicable in this matter was not neglected.
While the number of officials in the civil branch had almost doubled in
consequence of the extension of the province, no fresh supply of trained
officials was sent from St. Petersburg in 1866, yet it was then directed
that all the berths should be filled by December, and that the officers
appointed should remain constantly at their posts; the appointments
were accordingly all made, one officer being drawn from the Caucasus
(see Appendices 77 & 78). Most of the officers selected were taken from
the various bodies of troops; among twenty-two officers in departments of
the Civil Administration in December month, three alone were Civilians,
thirteen were officers of the regular forces, and six were Cossacks.
Nevertheless, very few of these failed to justify the confidence that was
placed in them.
It is incumbent on the Chief of a fresh and remote region to give
his serious attention not alone to whatever complaints may reach him,
but sometimes even to rumours, although the latter are very frequently
the result of misunderstanding and "ennui," &c. I did so. Yet, as the
results of information laid before me and of legal investigation, corrupt
practices were discovered only in two instances. One of these referred
to a man who was not concerned in the civil administration, and in the
other the person implicated had only just been appointed. The same
cannot be said of the natives who held appointments in this service.
Over these, too, "Supervision was of course exercised, and they
were sometimes subjected to a severe punishment; but, doubtless, no
little time will elapse before all the natives accustom themselves to
the idea, which is perfectly new to them, that a power given by
54
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Government should not be employed for self-enrichment. The ap-
pointments that were made were, of course, only the first steps towards
the establishment of a desirable order in the province; and, as by these
first steps the affairs of the province were being brought under the more
immediate actual control of the organs of the Government, it may be
inferred that, as they showed in the end, they were also in the beginning
not without good results. The appointment of Russians to the posts of
supervisors of the population, assistant supervisors, &c., throughout the
entire region, very materially conduced, with other causes, firstly, to the
fact that during the whole of the year 1866, as during the winter of
1866-67, not a single mail was robbed, and that no other mal-practices
of a serious nature occurred within it, and, secondly to that, that the
transition from immunities to imposts-a transition not lightly or
pleasantly borne in any country-was effected, I shall not say without
murmurs or complaints, but without any great difficulties.
With reference to the establishment of a system in the accounts of
local revenue, even during the presence of the Governor General in the
region, returns of income and expenditure were rendered to His Excel-
lency from all parts where the collection of taxes constituted part of the
duty of the Military Governor (see pp. 79, 80). Owing to the novelty
of the work, the returns of income were, of course, only approximative.
At the end of the year, similar returns were rendered to the Governor
General for all the other portions of the region, excepting Oura-Tiubé
and Jizakh, which had only just been annexed (see app. 81). By this
time the accounts were so accurately kept that the Supreme Government
was not alone made acquainted with all the sources and amounts of the
revenue of the province, but was likewise enabled to assign these sums to
the purposes it considered they would best serve. Towards the end of
the year 1866, the regularity established in the accounts of receipts and
expenditure was such that it was possible in 1867 to render monthly
returns to the Governor General.
13th
The first returns of this nature, giving every detail from the 1st April
1866, were rendered up to the 1st February (see Appendix 82).
13th
These accounts showed all the receipts to have amounted to
R. 262,455-15 cop. (about £39,368),* and the expenditure incurred
by Imperial authority, or that of the Governor General, limited, for
the same period, to R. 199,205-371 cop. (about £29,880), leaving a
credit balance of R. 63,249-78 cop. (about £9,487).
13th
The local revenues having considerably increased since the abolition
of immunities, i. e. since the 1st of July, the sum of R. 262,455-154 cop.
properly represents the income for the last seven months and not for all the
ten months. Consequently, the approximative return of annual revenues
from the Tashkend and Khodjend" rayons," submitted in the month of
August to the Governor General, showing R. 370,000 (about £55,500),
was very nearly correct.
Besides the incomes from Tashkend, Khodjend and other newly
occupied portions of the region under the charge of the Military Gov-
ernor, incomes were derived from the former Syr-Darian line, from Tur-
kistan and other places (see Appendix 81) which amounted to R. 165,533
*Calculating at 3s. to the Rouble.
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
55
(about £ 24,830); so that the entire local revenue amounted, during
the first year, to no less than Roubles 530,000 (£79,500).
There were other measures adopted in 1866 for the settlement of
the region which were not fruitless of good consequences. Besides the
new points of Oura-Tiubé, Zaámin and Jizakh, our troops had elsewhere,
generally speaking, satisfactory hospitals and quarters for the winter.
Notwithstanding the scanty means that had been available for the
purpose, the Russian settlements in Khodjend and Chinaz were tolerably
well constructed. In Chinaz, which was only founded in April, and in
which there was only one house in July, there were, in addition to the
barracks, to an excellent hospital and to officers' quarters, 72 private
houses constructed by the month of October. In Tashkend, a macada-
mised road was completed, and the buildings in the European quarters
of the town, commenced in the summer, were very far advanced; some
tolerably handsome buildings were even finished.
My last visit to the advanced lines, performed at the close of the
month of November, finally convinced me that, owing to the precautions
taken, there was no cause for apprehension of any serious operations on
the part of Bokhara during the approaching winter, notwithstanding
the close proximity of Samarcand.
As regards Kokand, during the whole period of my direction of the
affairs of the region, I not only failed to observe anything hostile in the
behaviour of the Khan, but on the contrary experienced an eager desire
on his part to enter into closer amicable relations with us.
We again
twice exchanged friendly letters and presents in the month of November
and in the beginning of December (see Appendices 75, 76, 74, 73).
first Russian trading caravan left for Kokand before my departure from the
province. This caravan was not the last; others followed, as I learned,
so that I conclude our merchandise has found a profitable market in
that khanat.
*
The
Whilst the Governor General was in the province of Turkistan,
the Chief of the Orenburg Customs District and the so-called Steppe
Commission arrived in it. The latter, composed of four members, was
organized in the beginning of the year 1865, the first object of these
Commissioners was to travel through the Kirghiz Steppes, and afterwards
to draw up a new scheme of regulations to apply to the Kirghizes alone.
When the limits of the province of Turkistan were subsequently extended,
the Commisioners were deputed to travel through it also with the same
object. All those who visited the region afterwards, collected information
about it which has served since to throw greater light upon the whole
question.
23rd
On the 11th of December I took my departure from Tashkend,
having thus performed the duties of Military Governor of the Turkistan
province for a period of eight months and sixteen days, of which
nearly four months were passed in campaigns. Therefore if in my time
anything was done for the advantage of the region, I must of course con-
sider myself much indebted to my late colleagues for their sincere attach-
ment to their duties and for their honest zeal.
* Acting Privy Councillor Hirzs of the Ministry of the Interior, Colonel (now Major
General) Heins, of the War Ministry, Major General (the late) Gutkovski of the Orenburg
region, and Lieut.-Colonel Protzenko, of Western Siberia.
Hey, Bou
не!
ན་།
CHAPTER VII.
RECAPITULATION.—TURKISTAN CONSTITUTED A MILITARY DISTRICT AND GOVERNOR GENE-
RALSHIP A FEW WORDS ON THE ROADS AND TRADE.
THE preceding sketch of occurrences on our Central Asiatian Frontier
during the period from 1854 to 1866, inclusive, will, it is hoped,
sufficiently explain the real significance of all that latterly transpired in
the region. A careful consideration of each fact, and of the whole com-
bination of circumstances by those who have not visited the region must
lead them to the conviction that all the later events on our Central Asiatian
Frontier were the direct consequences of a scheme that had been very
long in contemplation, and which had been favoured with His Imperial
Majesty's approval in the year 1854. But the vastness of the scheme,
and the then prevalent ignorance with regard to the region, entirely
prevented the execution of the complicated task according to the detailed
plan originally drawn up. Confining itself to general directions, and
making these applicable only to the time being, the Government never-
theless held firmly to, and pursued its chief original idea. During the
period between the years 1854 and 1865, the Government scheme was
actually carried out; the advanced lines of Orenburg and Western Siberia
were finally closed, and at the same time we obtained beyond the steppes
fertile tracts of land upon which, without inconvenience, we could con-
centrate an adequate number of troops. Here the Government proposed
to halt. But it was exactly at this point that those unlooked for events
occurred which, being but the natural results of circumstances, interfered
temporarily with the regular course of affairs.
The unauthorised occupation of Tashkend, and the accomplishment
of this, too, at a time when the reinforcements for the province had not
yet arrived, placed us in a very embarrassing position with regard to our
Central Asiatic neighbours. Not having sufficient troops wherewith
openly to counteract their hostile designs, the character of which was of
course aggravated by our occupation of Tashkend, we were by degrees
forced to take measures which rendered our own situation more and more
difficult. The cessation of trade; the detention of our envoys by the
Emir of Bokhara and the attempt to recover them by force of arms, and
finally the unsuccessful advance on Jizakh--without exaggeration it may
be said-placed at stake all our fresh acquisitions in Central Asia.
In the spring of the year 1866 we were compelled to engage in a war
with Bokhara under circumstances which to us were extremely unfavour-
able. Being far from well settled in the province, and lacking everything,
were obliged to sustain ourselves in a struggle against the chief
potentate in Central Asia, who, besides possessing great political and
spiritual influences, was regarded by the native population as an invin-
cible conqueror, and whose regular forces our soldiers had as yet never
encountered.
The number of troops then in the province was about 13,000, but
being obliged to preserve tranquillity in the interior of a province,
немеден
прост
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION,
67
1,500 versts in extent, by means of scattered garrisons, the corps of
operation mustered not more than 3,000 men.
This number could be
increased to 4,000 only towards the close of April by means of small
contingents from the line of the Syr-Daria and from Western Siberia.
As regards the main supports destined for the province, they were still at
Orenburg in the month of April 1866-that is 2,000 versts from
Tashkend. On the other hand, the forces assembled for action by the
Emir, were not farther than 50 versts from our advanced detachments,
and amounted, according to all accounts, to an enormous figure. There
may have been great exaggeration in these rumours, but the numerical
force of the army collected by the enemy was, without doubt, 60,000
or 70,000; in every case exceeding our military strength by fifteen or
twenty times. It is true that, with the exception of some 5,000 or 7,000
regular Bokharian soldiers, the rest were in no way to be distinguished
from the Kokandian troops with whom we were so well acquainted.
But being composed of cavalry capable of moving swiftly from one place
to another, they may have proved very dangerous to us, if we had suffered
the least check or had shown any hesitation. The occupation of Ikan by
Alimkul's hordes in the winter of 1864, and the abduction of our subjects
on that occasion, were still fresh in the memory of the people.
Our decided victory at Irdjar averted all danger and dispelled the
phantom invincibility of the Emir, and the subsequent occupation of
Khodjend perfectly tranquillized the province. Besides finally annexing
the Trans-Chirchik district and pacifying the country along the right
bank of the Syr-Daria, we severed the Khanats of Bokhara and Kokand
by taking Khodjend. But we failed to conclude an opportune treaty of
peace with the Emir, and the misunderstandings that followed led to a
resumption of hostilities.
This unfavorable eventuality arose partially from the fact of our
having been obliged to go to war against Bokhara when we were ourselves
unprepared for it, and perhaps more from the fact that the guiding power
was 2,000 versts distant from the theatre of action, and could not cor-
rectly realize the true position of affairs, whilst the acting power on
the spot neither wielded authority nor received instructions. Yet even
these operations were not barren of good results. By the capture of
Oura-Tiubé and Jizakh in the autumn of the year we completely sepa-
rated Kokand from Bokhara, and the whole valley of the Syr-Daria fell
into our possession. In every case these acquisitions render it easier for
us now to assume towards Bokhara, the attitude that may best suit our
Government.
as
The behaviour of the Khan of Kokand during the whole of the
year 1866 gave us hopes that that Khanat would submit to our
influence, without recourse to military operations, even if only insomuch
we could and had a right to expect. At all events, all our just
demands and desires were promptly fulfilled. We abstained, however,
from making any extravagant claims, and our relations steadily improved.
Relations like these show that there is no reason yet to despair of
the possibility of attaining desirable results in Central Asia without
hostilities. In the event, however, of our good relations with Kokand
being broken off in the future, military measures against Kokand, as it
འགའ
H
58
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
now stands detached, will at least be easier than against Kokand in combi-
nation with Bokhara.
The operations of 1865 and 1866 could, of course, not have
entered into the Government programme. The Government could in
no way have desired operations attended with risk,-which in case of
failure might have involved enormous sacrifices to retrieve entailed loss.
But such operations having been commenced, the country being remote
and utterly unknown, there was no other course but to rely upon the
executive powers on the spot for the application of measures which would
harmonise the original programme with the unforeseen circumstances
which had arisen. The authorities in the region having but general
instructions, very frequently took widely different views of one and the
same question. Nevertheless the general results of the later operations
proved in the long run to be satisfactory enough.
Our present position in the Kirghiz Steppes, and relations with the
Central Asiatic Khanats are incomparably better than they were thirteen
years ago, whilst our present military expenditure for the protection of
our South-eastern frontiers, exclusive of the cost of campaigns, is hardly
in excess of what it was before; if there is an excess, it is very insigni-
ficant when compared with the aggregate of advantages that we have
gained.
It has been already shown that in 1854 twenty-three battalions of
the line were employed in the protection of our steppes, besides the
Cossack forces of the Ural, of Orenburg and Siberia, which lined the
frontiers of the steppes. At the present time, in addition to these
Cossack forces, (see Appendix 84,) there are only sixteen battalions of the
line and one rifle battalion (see Appendix 87) in all the three military dis-
tricts of Orenburg, Siberia and Turkistan. It is true that some of these
line battalions have been substituted by local corps and that a brigade
of Artillery has been newly organized, but with all that the numerical
strength of the regular troops is not greater, but rather less than that
of 1854. As regards the cost of local administration, the expenditure
under this head is more than covered by the local revenue.
Almost simultaneously with the formation of the province of
Turkistan a code of Imperial Regulations was issued for it, and it was
enjoined that special attention should be paid to the adjustment of the
local revenues. But the military operations which continued almost
without cessation through the year 1865 and during the first six months
of the year 1866 prevented the realization of these views of the Government
also. Subsequently, that is, immediately after the occupation of
Khodjend, the code of Regulations and the local revenues engaged the
unremitting attention of the local authorities. Towards the end of 1866
the newly occupied region was governed on the principles of a regular
Russian province. The influence of Bokhara and Kokand and of the
Mohammedan priesthood over the people, so injurious to ourselves,
sensibly declined. The exemption of the people from taxes was substi-
tuted by imposts; correct estimates of the revenues of the province were
at length made, and order was introduced into the systems of accounts.
By these accounts it appears that in the first year after the abolition of
immunities, not only was the whole cost of the local administration
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
59
covered by the local revenues, but that a large surplus of the latter was
transferred to the Imperial exchequer. Many expenses generally pro-
vided for in the Imperial estimates were charged against the local
revenue; such as engineering works, formation of Russian settlements
in the province, &c., &c.
Through the common efforts of the local administration, of the
Governor General himself, of the members of the Steppe Commission
and of other persons, the light thrown in 1866 on the Central Asiatian
question has at least been so great that the Government has been able at
last to lay down certain broad principles for its final settlement, although
a variety of circumstances have of late rendered it still more complicated.
The opinions so obtained, with reference to the further conduct
of political affairs in Central Asia and to the organization of the province,
at a time when the question was not fully understood, were very different,
and, in some instances, diametrically opposed to each other.
But notwithstanding all this difference of opinion some ideas already
stand out in relief, with reference to which all who have considered the
subject are almost entirely of one mind, and which, it is to be hoped, will
aid in removing those Utopian fancies which have hitherto obscured the
Central-Asiatian question.
footh and eme
D
Central Asia being so little known, it was regarded by some as so
peculiar a country that neither our own experience nor that of any other
people in the matter of governing a non-European race was considered
available in it. Whilst we ourselves and all other nations, not excepting
the English in India, have after much bitter experience arrived at the
conviction that it is impossible to rule without a firm administration
of one's own, it has been declared that in Central Asia such an adminis-
tration is altogether superfluous and that the country should be
governed upon some kind of peculiar principles. The suggestions made
at the same time were so vague that it was not only impossible to
analyze but ever to comprehend them. Now-a-days very few advocates
will be found of a complicated system of administration with a large staff
of officials; but an adequate number of the latter is indispensable. The
only means perhaps by which we can secure a desirable position in
Central Asia without extending our administration over any new coun-
tries, is by making the neighbouring khanats subordinate to us without
entirely destroying their dependence.
For the final settlement of the question of the organization of the
province, a committee was formed at St. Petersburg, other persons
besides the members being invited to take part in the deliberations.
The committee was composed of thirteen members*; all of them unani-
mously agreed on the necessity of establishing a regular and firm Russian
administration in the province, and of giving the local Government all
the means for conducting it. All the members, excepting the Governor
General of Orenburg, were equally unanimous regarding the necessity
of immediately separating the province from the Government of Orenburg
and of forming a distinct Governor Generalship. rep. Imik-fe
* President, General Miliútin, Minister of War; Members: General Kryjanovski, Gov-
ernor-General of Orenburg; Count Heyden-Chief of the Etât Major, Privy Councillor
Stremoükhof, Major General Romanovsk, Count Voronow Dashkof, both of his Majesty's
Suite, Major General Cherniayef, State Councillor Mansurof, State Councillor Galkin, and
four members of the Steppe Commission.
60
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Confirming the opinion of the majority, His Imperial Majesty
was pleased to command that the late Turkistan region and a portion of
the region of Semipalatinsk be converted into a new military district and
into a new Governor Generalship of Turkistan, divided into two new districts
called the Syr-Darian and Semirechensk districts.
At the same time, from the projects prepared by the local autho-
rities and the Governor-General the Steppe Commissioners drew up one
of their own. In its construction, however, the Commissioners were
chiefly guided by their own opinions. The principles of this last project
were approved by the Council of Ministers. It was, however, resolved
not to make it compulsory on General Kaufmann, the newly appointed
Governor-General of the Turkistan Province, to act up to the project of
the Commissioners, but to reserve to him the liberty of following those
of the recommendations it contained which, after giving due considera-
tion to this as to the other projects, it might seem to him more expedient
to adopt.
Thus, we may, say with reference to the Central-Asiatian question,
we have now seen the beginning of the end. Adequate means and
powers have been granted to the local authorities. There is no doubt
but that it will cost the local Government some time and trouble to
bring the province into a satisfactory condition, and in one way or the
other to establish durable relations with our neighbours. With respect
to this the local administration will find guidance on the spot. Having
myself left the region about a year ago, and being now far away from the
theatre of action, I do not feel justified in touching upon these points of
the subject.
There are, however, other sides of the Central-Asiatian question
which may be greatly benefited by public discussion. There is no
doubt that the province will be more quickly developed, and that it will
become more speedily a source of profit to Russia if. the lines of commu-
nication are perfected, and if Russian trade is more rapidly increased.
There have been up to this time, and are still, only two known ways
of communication with the new province, and there are three other routes
which have been proposed. Each of these has its advantages and disad-
vantages.
Of the two existing routes,-one proceeds by way of Samara, Oren-
burg, Fort No. 1, and then along the valley of the Syr-Daria; the other
goes from Kazan to Omsk and Fort Vernoë. The first is the shortest, but
it lies, for the most part, across Steppes, and having been more recently
established than the second is on the whole the least convenient of the
two, although it offers no extraordinary difficulties.
Of the three newly proposed routes, one lies from Kresnavodsk bay,
on the Caspian, along the old bed of the Amu-Daria (Oxus) to its present
estuary, another traverses the Ust-Urt from Mertvi-Kultuk bay to
Chernishef bay in the Aral Sea, and the third runs from Kazala (Fort
No. 1) across the Baziaúksands to the mouth of the Emba.
Áll these three new routes offer undoubted advantages,-firstly,
because during summer they considerably shorten the overland transport,
for when the roads are opened and steam-boat-communication is estab-
lished the whole overland transport, for instance from Nijni to Khodjend,
by the second of these newly proposed roads across the Ust-Urt, will be
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
61
no more than 300 versts; secondly, because they facilitate and shorten the
communication between the new province and the Caucasus,-which is
in many respects of very great importance.
There is no doubt that whilst on the one hand it will be necessary
for a long time to come to keep a large body of troops in the Caucasus,
on the other, we shall also for a long time to come with a small number
of soldiers be able to do a great deal in Central Asia. Experience has
proved to us that it now takes two years to move troops from the Volga
to the Turkistan district. But it would take only a few weeks to trans-
port troops from the Caucasus if a road were laid down in one of the
new directions, and considering the immense force in the Caucasus, the
detachment of two or three battalions-quite an army in Central Asiatic
-from there, would be a matter of no inconvenience, so that with
easy communication there would be no necessity of maintaining a special
reserve in the new province.
The first of the newly proposed routes along the old bed of the
Amu-Daria offers, we are informed, no natural obstructions for laying
a road, and is perhaps preferable to either of the three. But there is
no doubt also that, with the increase of caravan traffic, we should have
to maintain along this road a considerable military force for the pro-
tection of trade against the Turkmen who are the most warlike and
numerous race of people in those parts. The second route being the
shortest, offers every advantage; only the artificial improvements in this
direction would probably have to be greater than in the two others.*
Lastly, the third route from Kazala to the mouth of the Embat has, as
far as we know, no natural impediments; only it is more circuitous than
the others, and would also cost a great deal in improvements.
Whichever one of the old or new routes may be chosen as the most
convenient and best, the cost of making a good road will nevertheless be
considerable. Therefore, the sooner the choice is made, the sooner shall
we derive practical benefits from the result.
Commercial relations with Central Asia, as with Asia generally, offer
to Russia so many advantages that they have existed and developed even
under inauspicious circumstances, but especially since we first felt the
benefit of the cotton supply from that country. Thus, for example, from
1825 to 1850 the increase of trade between Russia and Europe represented
43 per cent., whereas with Asia it increased more than 300 per cent.
Circumstances being now still more in favor of the Central Asiatian
trade, we may expect to see it increase to a very important degree.
These expectations are in a measure justly based on the discoveries and
acquisition made in the region during the later years. For example,
it has been found that American cotton may be grown in Turkistan,
and there is no lack of suitable land for raising cotton crops, some
expenditure being of course incurred for irrigation. Khodjend and the
* This route engaged the special attention of General Field Marshal Prince
Bariatinski during his administration in the Caucasus. A railway for this part was even
then projected. But, as I was personally informed by the prince, his main object was a
speedy and minute survey in this direction.
In 1866 I commissioned Major Mikhailof to proceed to collect information of the
country in this direction that officer, without even a convoy, profiting only by his know-
ledge of the Kirghizes, succeeded in making his way to Fort Kazbek on the Emba,-70 versts
about its estuary.
62
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
district beyond the Syr-Daria are rich in silk. There are hopes, too, of
finding gold and silver ores; coal beds have already been discovered not
far from the Syr-Daria.
Thus, there is reason enough to expect that, notwithstanding the
remoteness of the region, or the fact of its being yet very little known,
Russian trade will become permanently established within it, and will
develop. And there is all the more reason for these expectations because
the Government, solicitous in the cause of the speedy promotion of
Central Asiatian trade, contemplates, it is said, the adoption in a short
time of some very judicious measures.
There is a talk of the total abolition of the customs as regards the
Central Asiatian khanats, and of an imposition of guild-dues, which
Central Asiatics do not as yet pay in Russia.
These measures would now be very opportune. The profits to the
exchequer, from the Orenburg customs line, are insignificant, whilst the
formalities, the loss of time and other drawbacks to which Asiatic caravans
are liable in passing through our custom houses, produce a very bad
impression on the natives. Those who have chanced to converse with
Central Asiatic merchants who have conducted caravans through our
custom houses, have, of course, observed the dread with which the latter
have referred to our searchers and to the custom house drum. There is
no doubt but that this impression alone, exclusive of other considerations,
would operate very injuriously against our Central Asiatian trade, if the
earlier scheme of removing the customs line to the Syr-Daria and to
Tashkend were carried out. This, however, seems to be abandoned, and
the intention is to abolish the Orenburg customs line altogether.
The permission granted to Central Asiatic merchants to trade in
Russia without paying guild-dues was perhaps beneficial in its time,
but now, when our merchants can themselves freely go to Tashkend
and Khodjend, and even farther, there is, it seems, no necessity for
continuing this exemption, whilst it is now an injustice to our own
merchants.
Besides this, in concluding a treaty of peace with the Emir, which
will probably not be long delayed, our Government will, doubtless, not
overlook the interest of our merchants, but see that all they have long, and
justly desired, with reference to Bokhara, shall at last be conceded to
them.
After that it will be hardly fair to wish the Government to exert
itself any more for the promotion of Central Asiatian trade. It is very
desirable that our mercantile class should itself co-operate to this end,
to the utmost of its own endeavours. Our merchants will cer-
tainly find the means to do this if they set to work with a good
will. The arrangements in this matter made by the Government in
1865, which met with the active support of the Moscow merchants, will
greatly conduce towards success. On the strength of this arrangement
some of the leading commercial houses of Moscow formed themselves in
the beginning of the year 1866 into a Moscow-Tashkend trading society,
whose object was to open direct relations between Moscow and Tashkend,
and to supply the latter, with all articles of trade that are required by
native as well as by Russian residents at the most moderate prices. The
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
63
operations of this society would confer a real blessing on the Russian
people thrown into that remote country where they are obliged frequently
to pay fabulous prices for utterly worthless commodities; but what is
still more important, by establishing a regular trade this society would
undoubtedly cause the demand for Russian productions to increase
immensely, and would thus powerfully aid in extending our trade through-
out Central Asia generally. A society like this would have no need for
conducting its business in secrecy; it might court the fullest publicity
in its operations. In our time it is hardly necessary to prove that
publicity in trade, as in every other business is the best safeguard against
erroneous interpretations and serves best to obviate temptation, and
speculation which are prejudicial to every affair.
Far from considering myself a competent authority in matters of
commerce I touch only on those sides of the question on which I have had
the opportunity to rectify my former opinions by consulting those
people better informed than myself. It is very likely there are many
other more serviceable measures which might be applied for the promotion
of trade.
In this respect, and throughout the whole of this sketch generally,
I have preferred to confine myself merely to an indication of certain facts
and projects, a proper consideration of which may lead to a speedier prac-
tical solution of the whole question.
•
APPENDICES.
APPENDIX I.
Report of Colonel Zimmermann Commanding the Troops in the Trans-
Ili District, to the General in Command of the Detached Corps of
Siberia, August 28th, 1860.
I have the honor respectfully to report to Your Excellency that, on the
23rd August, the force under my command moved in two columns in order to
pass the ridge which separates the Trans-Ili District from the river Chú. The
left column, under Lieutenant Colonel Shaitanoff, composed of 300 Cossacks,
two mountain guns, one rocket apparatus and a commissariat train of 250
camels, ascended the valley of the river Kastek, then proceeded through that
of its affluent, the Syr-djaz, and further over a pass at the head of the river
Karakunas; this was the shortest route and the most abundant in fodder
and water, not having such an ascent as the Bish-Mainak route, and in con-
venient for wheeled carriages, only on account of the narrowness of some parts
of the defiles, where even the mountain artillery had to be carried on the
camels' backs. The right column, under my own command, composed of all
the infantry of the force, two field battery guns and four light field pieces,
three rocket stands, an engineer and artillery park and a field hospital, crossed
the Bugú-Mayus and then proceeded over the Bish-Mainak Pass.
The passage over the mountains was exceedingly difficult.
The country
very much resembles Daghestan, and only differs from it by a total absence
of wood and by its small supply of water, which rising in mountain springs,
only flows in small rivulets through the defiles.
On the 23rd August, the right column halted for the night at the spot
where the Bugú-Mayus issues from the defile on to a plateau, and on the 24th,
it made a very difficult march of 15 versts to a locality called Baladjan-Saz.
A company of pioneers under Sub-Lieutenant Hakkel was sent on in front
to clear the more difficult parts of the road. It was more particularly diffi-
cult to bring the battery guns down the mountain slopes and to get them up
steep inclines. In some places the mountain paths along which the detach-
ment proceeded wound along ledges of rocks. Battery guns would hardly
be taken in the Caucasus along such paths. The two 20-pr. howitzers
which accompanied the detachment, were attended by fifty foot soldiers,
who lowered them with ropes. The Baladjan-Saz locality has probably an
elevation of 6,000 feet; at night the thermometer fell to 20 Reaumur.
I left there for the day a part of the force, consisting of two companies
of infantry, and the field battery which was led by Major Eckeblad,
and the camels that showed most fatigue, while with the remainder of
the force went over the pass on the 25th August, and performing a march of
about thirty versts, descended to the plateau at the spot where the
Karakunas issues from the defile. Along the whole of this road, although it
was less difficult than the preceding stage, there was no water, except two
very poor springs.
I
ii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
The artillery, and particularly the light horse division, performed this
march in the most brilliant manner, owing to the zeal and energy of the
officers, and I may more particularly mention the services rendered by Staff
Captain Obukh.
On the Karakunas we formed a junction with the column under
Lieutenant Colonel Shaitanoff who had reached that river a few hours earlier.
This column crossed the mountain without a single case of sickness and
with the loss of only one camel, a result which I have much pleasure in attri-
buting to the care and discretion of Lieutenant Colonel Shaitanoff.
The right column did not lose a single camel. During the halt on the
banks of the Karakunas, the son of Djantai, the Manapof-Sary-bash, came into
camp to tender submission.
On the 26th August, the force moved towards the ford over the
river Chú. The Cossacks formed an advanced guard with two light pieces of
artillery and two mountain guns. The passage of the river presented no diffi-
culties, for the water was only knee-deep.
When bivouacking on the Karakunas I received information that
Tokmak was occupied by the enemy. On crossing the Chú this intelligence
was confirmed. I pushed on with the advanced guard without halting,
having sent ahead a few Kirghizes to the Kokand fort, which, according to
information received, had a garrison of 100 men with two small guns. On
the previous day I had sent to Khankula, the Kokand Officer in command
of Tokmak, the proclamation which I had the honor of submitting to
Your Excellency on the 19th August. When we were within a mile of
Tokmak, our Kirghizes returned with intelligence that some men had
left the fort to treat with us. Two Sarts soon came up to us, who,
on being required to surrender the fort, humbly entreated us to grant
them a delay of two days in order that they might get an answer from
Atabek-Datkha, the Commandant of Pishpek. They were told that we
should open fire unless they surrendered within an hour. In the meanwhile,
Titoff, Krishtanofski, Hakkel, and Kamenogradski,-Officers of Engineers,
took an observation of the fort approaching within a distance of thirty
fathoms Receiving no
ha
answer from the garrison, I sent forward the
Kirghiz Kuvat, who riding up to the ditch of the fort, tried to per-
suade the Commandant to surrender. The latter replied that "he dared
neither to surrender the fort nor to defend it," and actually during the
whole affair only a few muskets were fired, without effect, from its ramparts. I
ordered a battery consisting of five mortars and one gun to be put in position
on a mound a little more than 200 fathoms from Tokmak. At 6 in the
evening we opened a fire which was continued for about an hour, discharging
fifty shells, under the superintendence of Staff Captain Obukh, Sub-Lieutenant
Loginof, and Your Excellency's Aide-de-Camp Blumenthal. On the approach of
night firing was discontinued, and a man issued from the fort and called out
for mercy.
We afterwards learnt that although our fire had been feeble
(for we did not fire from our nearest point), it had nevertheless done consider-
able damage within the fort. Our vertical fire had more particularly made
an impression upon the Sarts, of whom the greater number concealed them-
selves. The Commandant, however, according to the reports of his subordi-
nates, remained sitting on the wall, determined to die; but the cries of the
women, of whom fifteen were found in the fort, compelled him to agree to a
surrender. Some of the women had children at the breast, and one woman
was wounded slightly by the fragment of a shell. She was attended to next
day by our Medical Officer.
APPENDIX I.
iii
When the Sart who had come out of the fort was brought before me, he
declared that the garrison was ready to surrender, and asked me to send, accord-
to eastern custom, a musket bullet as a token that the people should be
wu coding
spared. Having complied with the request of the Sart and called upon
the Commandant to come immediately to me, I sent forward Some Sappers to
throw up epaulements for guns, close up to the fort.
But within half an hour Khankula came into my camp and made an
unconditional surrender. I ordered him to quit the fort with the whole of
his garrison, which he immediately complied with, leaving Tokmak in our
possession. We found in it a standard which I forward herewith, two small
cast iron guns, eleven wall pieces, forty-seven ordinary muskets, thirty-five
swords, seven pikes, a few drums and thirty-two and one-half puds of gun-
powder, besides a quantity of lead, some small shells, bullets, &c.
The garrison had originally consisted of 200 men, but the Kirghizes who
belonged to it had run away together with twenty Kokand soldiers, leav-
ing only seventy men in the place, many of whom had their wives and
children with them. Khankula declared that if he returned to the
Kokandians they would take off his head, and he therefore asked to be
allowed to settle on Russian territory. On the following day I permitted
the garrison to return to the fort in order to fetch such of their property as
may have been left in it, after which I ordered the fortifications to
be demolished.
The Sarts were much astonished at our humane treatment of prisoners
of war and at our taking only their arms from them, Khankula expressed
his own astonishment on the subject to the interpreter, and candidly said
that according to their customs, the prisoners, if spared, would have been des-
poiled of everything they possessed. It was explained to him that Russians
carried on war differently.
The fort of Tokmak, of which a detailed plan made by Ensign Strelnikof,
of the Topographical Corps, is herewith annexed, stands on an escarpment of
the left gradient of the valley of the Chú river. The site has been well
selected. On the north and south it abuts on a ravine. There were two walls
within the fort; the outer wall crenelated was from 1 to 2 fathoms high
and from 13 to 2 fathoms in thickness at the base, while the ditch in front of
it was from 2 to 2 fathoms deep and from 1 to 5 fathoms broad. The
crenelated wall of the second inclosure, or citadel, was 3 fathoms high and 14
arshins thick. The turrets (of which there were six in the citadel but none on
the outer wall) were four fathoms high built of clay, in some places they were
of considerable strength, although shots from a 10-pr. howitzer went through
the walls of the citadel. The ditch had no flank defence. The works were
exactly like those formerly constructed in Turkey. The gate opened into
a dark corridor, and there was a similar entrance to the citadel. Stones
had been heaped on the walls ready to be thrown on a storming party, and
there were also found enormous bludgeons and spikes.
On the next day, the 27th August, we began to demolish Tokmak. A
portion of the citadel was blown up in the evening. The towers, under
which a mine of Kokand powder was laid, blew up amidst the shouts and to the
astonishment of the Kirghizes. On the 28th August, the whole of the outer
wall was pulled down; at midday the remaining three turrets were blown up,
and towards evening the demolition of the inner wall was complete. On the
approach of darkness the buildings within the fort were set on fire.
Lieutenant Titof of the Sappers, was in charge of these works.
On the morning of the 27th August, Major Eckeblad joined the force.
iv
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
We found a sufficiency of fodder throughout our march, and there was
such an abundance of hay, millet, wheat and clover at Tokmak that precautions
were taken to prevent the horses from being overfed.
The health of the force is excellent, and a rest of two days in front of
Tokmak has refreshed the men after their difficult passage across the moun-
tains. We have eleven sick, but only one serious case. We have as yet only
lost one camel and two horses.
Yesterday evening we were joined by Lieutenant Colonel Kolpakofski
with 90 Cossacks and 150 Kirghizes, including Sultan Tezek.
To-morrow, the 29th August, we move forward, and on the 30th we shall
be close to Pishpek,
Khankula states that Pishpek has a garrison of 500 men, which has
lately been reinforced by Alashir from Fort Merké with 200 men.
At Tokmak we found a letter addressed to Khakunla by the Command-
ant of Pishpek ordering him to defend the fort and not to surrender it to the
Russians. Our previous information to the effect that the garrison of Tokmak
had been ordered to evacuate the fort in case of the approach of a consider-
able force, and to fall back on Pishpek, has therefore proved incorrect.
This report will be delivered to Your Excellency by Ensign Griaznof,
who has acted as Commandant of Tokmak.
APPENDIX II.
Report of Colonel Zimmermann, Commanding the Forces in the Trans-Ili
District, to the General in Command of the Detached Corps of Siberia, 5th
September 1860.
I have the honor to report to Your Excellency that on the 4th
September the Kokand fortress of Pishpek surrendered unconditionally
with the whole of the garrison after a siege of five days.
On the 29th August, I left the ruins of Tokmak with the force under
my command, and after a march of 28 versts, in excessively cold and un-
favourable weather, halted for the night on the banks of the Issagata river.
On the next day we had to perform a march of 25 versts to Pishpek. At
two in the afternoon the advanced guard consisting of cavalry with horse artillery
and mountain guns came within range of the guns of Pishpek and began to
cross the Alamedin, a mountain stream flowing on the eastern side of the
fortress.
A rapid fire was at once opened from the fortress. The shells had a
range of almost two versts, but caused us no harm. Having halted the
force on the Alamedin, two versts above the fortress, I advanced at once with
the Officers of Engineers and Artillery to make a reconnaissance. The for-
tress proved to be of much larger dimensions than we had expected accord-
ing to information obtained by Captain Veniukof, during a reconnaissance
made last year, the fortress of Pishpek was supposed to be a quadrangle,
measuring 60 to 65 fathoms on each face. It proved, however, to have a face
of 105 fathoms, and it was, therefore, three times as large as we had expected
to find it. It appeared in every way stronger than Tokmak.
It was useless to think of taking the fort by assault. The walls
of the outer defences were lined with men, many of whom wore the scarlet
uniform of the Sarbaz or regular troops of the Khan of Kokand. I resolved
to lay regular siege to Pishpek, seeing no other means of obtaining possession
of it.
APPENDIX II.
V
The reconnaissance which I made showed that the western face of the
fort presented most facilities for attack, as the gardens which fronted it for
250 fathoms afforded sufficient shelter for the commencement of works.
The force immediately took up a new position on the Ala-archi rivulet
beyond the gardens, two versts in front of the western face of the fort.
Notwithstanding the distance which we had marched on that day, the
preliminary siege operations were commenced that night, and towards day-
light the three following pit batteries were completed.: (1), 2 battering guns
and 2 light pieces; (2), 4 18-pounders and 3 mortars; and (3), 2 light guns
with 6 rifle pits.
The enemy fired in all directions throughout the night. At daylight
our works were discovered, and assailed by an increased fire from guns and
wall pieces, of which the projectiles carried as far as 400 fathoms. At 5
o'clock our batteries opened fire, which was continued till night. We fired
400 projectiles which did visible damage to the walls of the inner and outer
defences. The Kokandians fired more frequently. In the afternoon their
artillery fire became slacker; but the wall pieces continued to be discharged
with particular rapidity. We lost one man and two horses. On the approach
of night firing ceased on both sides, and I sent out a working party with
a guard. During the night 100 fathoms of trenches were opened and a
new mortar battery with 4 more pits for rifle men were dug. On the next
day (the 1st September) our fire was slacker and we only expended 150
rounds. I ordered the projectiles to be economised with a view to employing
them at a shorter distance. A volunteer party of 250 men was formed under
Lieutenant Vrochenski for service in the trenches in the same order as at
Sebastopol.
+
The fortress continued a heavy fire at intervals from guns and wall pieces
(called "Jurks").
During the night of the 2nd September the trenches were pushed
forward 84 fathoms, and a breaching battery for 4 guns was constructed
within 5 fathoms of the wall of the fortress.
In the morning the trenches were strengthened and at mid-day the
battery was fully armed.
On the 2nd September a stream of water which flowed into the fortress
was diverted.
But some wells and a pond still remained within Pishpek,
on the northern side of which the Alamedin rivulet approaches almost to the
very ditch.
The breaching battery opened fire in the afternoon and only fired 100
shots which damaged the outer wall of the fortress, and particularly the south-
western corner turret. During the night of the 3rd September, the works
were pushed rapidly forward, notwithstanding the proximity of the fortress;
the men laboured at only 85 to 30 fathoms from its walls, and under a con-
tinuous fire from guns, wall pieces and muskets. The trenches had to be cut
in very hard rocky ground. The enemy increased his fire, but did not do us
much harm, for we had only three men wounded. At daylight we advanced
within 30 fathoms of the south-western projecting angle, and at the extremity
of the works we raised a new battery for 4 mortars (leaving 3 18-pound
mortars on the other batteries) while on the breaching battery two more
embrasures were opened. The volunteers in the front serving a cover per-
formed their duties with great zeal, cleared the ground all round the fortress
from lurking foes, crawled up to the ditch and seized three Kirghizes and
one Indian (either from Khunduz or Afghanistan) who were making their
way into the fortress. The soldiers of the line had now smelt a good deal
of gun-powder and became far more courageous. A constant fire of musketry
vi
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
was directed against the fortress from the trenches. The batteries were all
ready in the afternoon, and at 4 o'clock an intensified fire was opened from
the breaching battery along the wall of the fortress to the left of its projecting
angle and upon the half turret. The enemy, after first attempting to reply,
soon became silent. By the excellent fire of the breaching battery the crest
and breast-work of the outer wall were soon knocked down and the whole of
that part of the turret which faced us was destroyed. I ordered this fire to be
slackened somewhat towards night, and that from the mortar batteries to be
increased. On the approach of darkness, a working party was sent forward to
push on the trenches by flying sap towards the projecting angle and to crown
the glacis.
Sub-Lieutenant Kamenogradski was wounded in the arm by a
musket ball. The Engineers pushed on the works very boldly, and successfully,
notwithstanding the closeness of the fortress walls, from which, however,
the musketry fire became slacker. The enemy now began to hurl stones.
Our fire from mortars and muskets was increased. Both shells and gra-
nades fell thickly into the fortress, when at 10 P. M. two men issued from
the gate crying out: "Aman!" "Aman!" They were immediately seized
and brought to me. They declared that the Commander in Pishpek,
-Atabek Datkha (Colonel) and Alashir Datkha asked for mercy and were
ready to surrender the fortress, in proof of which they sent a letter under
their joint seals, a translation of which is herewith annexed. Having sent to
this camp for an interpreter, I ordered the firing to be suspended, but the
works to be actively pushed on. After reading the letters of the two Datkhas
I sent to summon them to surrender unconditionally with the entire
garrison, to whom I promised security of life and property.
I demanded at the same time that one of the Datkhas should immediately
come to me in the trenches. At 1 A. M. I received answer that at daylight
both the Datkhas would come to the trenches. In the meanwhile the senior
Commander, Atabek, sent me his sword and three hostages. The fortress was
now closely guarded on the East and North sides by a chain of Cossacks.
day light the glacis was successfully crowned opposite the projecting angle
of the fort. Two men were wounded in the early part of the night.
By
When day broke, Atabek and Alashir issued from the fortress and declared
that they surrendered unconditionally with the whole garrison and threw
themselves on the clemency of the Russian Czar. I ordered the garrison to
evacuate Pishpek at once, leaving within it all their arms, powder and other
military stores. A bridge was thrown over the ditch by our Sappers, and the
garrison at once left the place.
The total number that surrendered was 627 (including five Russians, who
are under arrest), of these 84 are traders and labourers. There were also
sixty-three women and thirty-eight young children. They were camped in
a garden near the fortress and surrounded by Cossacks. They took all their
property with them.
Our troops took possession of the fortress as soon as it was evacuated,
and Lieutenant Titof of the Sappers was appointed Commandant.
We found within the fortress the scimitar of Atabek, three standards
which are forwarded herewith, the red one being that of Atabek and the
white one that of Alashir; 5 brass guns of which 4 five-pounders are mounted
on carriages, and 1 small one not mounted ; 11 small cast-iron cannons of 1 and
2 pounds, without carriages; 49 wall pieces, of which some are of incredible
lengths (10 feet) and of heavy calibre; 367 flint muskets and matchlocks,
including many ancient English and Dutch pieces; 6 pistols, 366 swords,
206 pikes, 16 shields with silver ornaments and one with gilt ornament, sent
herewith; 1 helmet of chain armour, 5 drums, 4 trumpets, 114 puds of
powder, many shells, cast-iron bullets for wall pieces, lead, &c.
APPENDIX II.
vii
I beg to forward a plan of the fortress with a short description of it
by Lieutenant Krishtanofski.
Pishpek is considered one of the strongest frontier fortresses of Kokand,
it is three times as large as Akellechet, taken in 1853, and has two walls
while the latter had only one.
The garrison had 20 men killed and 50 wounded. The more serious
cases were attended to by the Medical Officer.
We fired 954 projectiles, a few rockets and 12,869 cartridges. The
enemy fired more shots, but his aim was so bad that our loss only consists of
one superior Officer wounded, and one soldier killed, 5 wounded, and one
contused.
The enemy would have continued to defend the place, had he not run
short of projectiles, and had it not been for the severe damage done to the south-
west angle of the fortress and for the approach of our works to the very ditch.
The Kokandians knew, from their experience at AkMechet, that we should
have blown up the walls and stormed the place. Atabek Datkha had hanged
three men from the garrison of Tokmak, who had been sent to tell him of its
capture. A gallows stood on a mound to the right of our trenches, and the
mound itself was covered with the graves of the men who had been executed.
I ordered the gallows to be taken down and burned.
In the anticipation that the siege would have lasted longer, I had
despatched Lieutenant Colonel Shaitanof with 200 Cossacks to Tokmak, and
ordered 50 Cossacks with 100 camels to be sent to Kastek for artillery
ammunition, which was to have been despatched to that place from Vernoö by
preconcerted arrangement. I shall now get Lieutenant Colonel Shaitanof back
to Pislipek.
On the 2nd September about 400 Dikokamenni Kirghizes made their
appearance at the mouth of the Alamedik defile.
They were driven back into the hills by the Kirghizes under Sultan
Tezek and two sotnias of Cossacks under the Esaùl (Colonel) Butakof and
Lieutenant Baron Wrangel, Your Excellency's Aide-de-Camp.
affair one Kirghiz was killed.
Many Kirghiz tribes are now sending in their submission.
In this
The weather continues very fine; the health of the troops is excellent ;
only 8 men on the sick list.
I intend to remain about five days longer at Pishpek. To-morrow we
shall begin to demolish the fortress.
The orders of your Excellency have thus been carried out, and the object
of this expedition has been attained, in accordance with your Excellency's
indications.
The report concludes by bringing to the notice of the General the
officers and men who had distinguished themselves during the siege.
viii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
APPENDIX III.
Statement of the Strength of the Trans-Chú Force.


1.-INFANTRY.
The 8th and 9th Siberian Battalions of the
line
...
...
Attached to the baggage train, the camels
and hospital, included
...
2.—CAVALRY.
The 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th
Regiments of the Siberian Cossacks of
the line
...
...
Including:-
Staff Officers.
Commanding Officers.
Staff Offi-
cers.
Superin-
tending
Officers.
Sergeants.
Orderlies.
Musicians.
Rank and File.
CIVIL OFFI-
CERS.
1 19
61
21 943
1
7
t
...
NON-COM-
BAVANTS.
Sergeants.
Privates.
20
27
...
...
1
12
27 32 8
578
Attached to the rocket Company
To the baggage trains and camels
3.—ARTILLERY.
1
Battery Troop
...
Light Horse Division
Mortar Company
...
...
...
...
:
257 25
35
...
...
...
1
4
...
:
1
47
1
4
...
...
2
3
2
67
3
...
:
1
1-4
...
...
An Officer sent from St. Petersburg with
rockets...
...
4.-ENGINEERS.
5. TOPOGRAPHERS.
6.-NON-COMBATANTS.
Policemaster
...
...
Officer in charge of Artillery Park
Attached to Camp Hospital
Chief Medical Officer
Surgeon of Battalions
Hospital Dresser
Dresser's Assistants
Kirghiz Militia
...
...
...
1
...
...
...
Interpreters
TOTALS
1
4
2
...
:
...
...
...
:
...
2
...
2
:
1
1
...
1
1
7
...
...
:
:
:
5
•
...
...
:
:
:
:
:
:
225
...
...
:
:
:
...
2
6
1
...
:
2
1
...
...
co
3
19
1
4 100
32 32 1,914
4
35
The force is accompanied by two battery guns, four pieces of the light
horse artillery and two mountain pieces; four 20-pounder and three 6-pounder
mortars, and four rocket stands.
The train consists of 485 camels, 68 draught horses, and 182 Kirghiz
horses.
APPENDIX V.
ix
APPENDIX IV.
Translation from the Kokaniandese.
To the respected and highly exalted Commander of the Russian troops,
we send the following words: Coming with your troops, you took Tokmak,
and then you have come against us; for about five days we have proved our-
selves worthy of the salt given to us by our Khan, and we fought; but we
became convinced that we should be conquered, and therefore being unable to
resist, we send you an envoy and beg you not to do all our djigits harm, and
if you will let us depart in safety we shall evacuate the fortress and surrender
it to you.
We send you our agent, the Mollah Abdrahim; send also to us an agent
of your own. (Sealed with the seals of Atabek and Alashir.)
APPENDIX V.
Return of the Strength, &c., of the Trans-Chú Force under the command
of Colonel Cherniayef.
May 14th, 1864.

DESCRIPTION OF TROOPs.
No. 8 Battalion of Western Si-
beria
...
Battalion composed of the Rifle
Companies of Battalions Nos.
3 and 5, and of the 4th Com-
pany of 9th Battalion
2nd Division of No. 21 Battery
Horse Artillery
1st Division of Siberian foot
Battery
...
Troop of Mountain Artillery
Mortar Company
Rocket Company
Cossacks of Siberia
Number of companies,
sotnias, and divisions.
Staff Officers.
Commanding
Officers.
Civil Servants.
Sergeants.
Musicians.
Rank and File.
Incapables.
Non-combatants.
Servants.
TOTALS.
Artillery.
Cossack.
Draught.
NUMBER OF MEN.
Horses.
LO
5
2 21
...
83 16 1,029
4
40
11 1,206
51
3 1 15
30
11
497
12
556
...
1
...
...
LA
5
1
2
1
1
1
Co
:
1
7
...
2
71
5
...
90
8 2
90
...
4
2
2
27
...
3
Co
48
...
# *
41
27
316
1
8
...
1
2
...
Sappers of the Guards...
Cavalry of the Army Corps
Galvanic Company
...
...
From the Engineers' Departt.
Industrial Corps No. 15
...
Sappers of 9th Battalion
Topographers
Medical Officers
Purveyors
...
:
...
...
...
..
...
...
...
TOTALS
...
...
...
:
...
...
...
:
2
2
:
2
3
1
1
4
4
**
...
•
19
...
8
:
...
...
:
10
...
...
...
:
27
3
102
13
...
53 35
44
1
385 386
30
417
...
1
3
...
2
5
сл
...
...
20
9
6
8
3
...
•
...
11 2,503 265 447
94
4
...
...
...
:
2
1
15
6 59
6
177
34 2,138
4
67
K
X
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
APPENDIX VI.
Extract from the Report of Colonel, now Major General, Cherniayef, of the
6th June 1864.
As reported to your Excellency in my despatch No. 202, the force under
my command left Merké on the 28th May and reached a locality called
Uzun Bulak without meeting the enemy. The train of oxen followed
making the same halts. Having received informations that the Kokandians in-
tended to meet us in front of Auliéta, I left the heavier part of our train with
the waggons under the protection of 2 companies of infantry, 500 Cossacks,
with a rocket apparatus and 2 battery guns, destined to be mounted in
Auliéta, and marched forward at daylight on the 2nd instant.
After a march of about 10 versts we saw some Kokandian vedettes, which
fell back without firing. When within 7 versts of Auliéta, I halted the force,
which required rest after a 25 versts' march made through a country destitute
of water. At about 5 versts' from the camp we observed a body of Kokan-
dians on the Tek Turmas heights commanding the town. After a rest of 3
hours I moved the force towards those heights, sending in front a Sotnia of
Cossacks and the Kirghiz militia with 2 rocket stands, a troop of the mountain
artillery and a company of rifles. On the approach of these troops, the
Kokandians cleared the height which they had occupied and took possession of
another elevation closer to the town. The enemy numbered about 1,500.
When the main force came up, two companies of skirmishers were thrown out
and they soon drove back the Kokandians and made them hurriedly cross over
to the left bank of the Talas, where the enemy had posted 4 guns brought
out from the fortress, under cover of 500 foot and 300 mounted Sarbazes. The
excellent fire of the artillery which had occupied the second height compelled
them to withdraw at once into the fortress. Leaving on the latter height
the battery and horse divisions protected by 2 companies, I encamped the
rest of the force at about a verst in the rear. Wishing to avoid the neces-
sity of destroying the town and of shedding blood, I sent a letter, the
same evening, to the commandant of Auliéta, but receiving no answer
within the time I had specified, I opened fire on the town and fortress with
4 light and 4 battery guns. At 6 o'clock next morning my messenger
returned with a trader of Auliéta, charged with the answer of the Com-
mandant. He asked to be allowed 14 days for consideration, I requested
Captain Valikhanoff to reply to the Bek that the condition I had offered
could not be departed from, and at the same time I ordered the fire to be
opened again, adding an 80 Hb. mortar to the other 8 pieces. The baggage
train having come up, on the following day I sent over to the left bank of the
Talas 2 companies of infantry with a troop of mountain artillery and
a Sotnia of Cossacks with a rocket stand under Lieutenant Lerché, to
protect a reconnoissance which I caused to be made by Staff Captain
Krasofski, Captain Krishtanofski No. 1, Captain Krishtanofski No. 2 and Lieu-
tenant Prince Tumanof of the Engineers. Having personally satisfied myself
that the western part of the town wall had not a strong profile, and
that there was cover in front of it, while the fortress itself was but
feebly provided with artillery, I determined to take the town without having
recourse to trenches and to act against the citadel under cover of the town
buildings. At 6 o'clock of the following morning, leaving in camp 2 com-
panies of infantry, 200 Cossacks with 2 mountain guns, 2 rocket stands and
the Kirghiz militia, I crossed the Talas in a heavy rain with the remaining
5 companies of infantry, 1 Sotnia of Cossacks and 8 guns, and coming
up to the western side of the town, within a distance of 400 fathoms, I
placed the whole of my artillery in position. After firing at the fortress from.
this distance I advanced the guns to within 300 fathoms. The Kokandians
APPENDIX VII.
xi
concentrated at this point the greater part of the garrison, with 4 guns of small
calibre, but the successful fire of the battery and horse divisions, enabled
the 1st and 2nd companies of rifles of the 8th battalion with the company of
Sappers to drive the enemy from the shelter they had obtained in front
of the walls and to rush in to the town and fortress after them. The
artillery and the remaining 2 companies followed.
When we gained posses-
sion of the town and fortress the commandant with 400 horsemen escaped
from the citadel which we were not able to surround, owing to the great
extent of the walls. The foot Sarbazes, throwing away their weapons, mingled
with the inhabitants. Two hours after we had opened fire, the town, the
fortress and the citadel were completely in our hands. This easy success,
attended as it was, by scarcely any loss on our side, is attributable to the
excellent fire of the artillery and to the impetuous attack of the infantry.
We had only 3 men slightly wounded and one officer and one man bruised.
The enemy's loss has not yet been ascertained. Yesterday, the inhabitants
buried 307 bodies by my order. Nearly all the killed belonged to the garrison.
The wounded Kokandians, numbering about 390 and principally Sarbazes,
have been attended to by the medical officer. We have taken 341 Sarbazes
prisoners. Our trophies are:-3 horse-tail banners, 5 guns, 6 falconets, 13
wall pieces, 397 matchlocks and rifles, 513 swords, 450 pikes, 82 puds of
gunpowder, 70 puds of lead and 415 puds of shells of various calibre.
(The Report then enumerates the officers who more particularly dis-
tinguished themselves on the occasion).
APPENDIX VII.
Extract from a Report by Colonel, now Major General, Verëfkin, of the 19th
June 1864.
On the 6th June the force under my command came up to the demo-
lished fortress of Savrun; on the 7th it reached the fort of Charnak,
and on the 8th moved towards the Karaichik rivulet. The troops halted
midway in the latter stage. During the halt it was observed that a large party
of Kokandians had occupied a mound to the right of the road. In order to
prevent them from molesting us on our march, followed as we were by a
large train, 40 Kirghiz volunteers under Niaz Muhameof were ordered to
drive back the enemy, to occupy the elevation and to keep it until the
force came up, which was done by the volunteers with perfect success, after
firing a few musket shots.
On nearing the Karaichik rivulet our patrols observed that the Kokandians,
leaving the fortress in considerable numbers, occupied a strong position on
both banks of the rivulet protected by riflemen concealed in a ditch. The
force in order of battle-the infantry in the centre-formed in companies, with
the skirmishers in front, and the artillery in the intervals, the cavalry and
rocket companies being on either flank, continued to advance. The skirmishers
opened fire at a distance of 800 paces and began to advance rapidly on the
enemy, who having suffered from their fire, first crossed over to the opposite
bank and then retreated before us, taking their wounded with them. But
unable to face our fire-long, the Kokandians fell into disorder and ran in the
direction of the town.
Having taken up a position in front of the rivulet and posted sentries
on the opposite bank, the force remained there until the following morning,
after taking every precaution against a sudden attack. It was impossible to
xii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
pursue the Kokandians any further, for the men were tired, and it was necessary
to make preparations for the passage of the artillery and waggons across the
rivulet, which runs between excessively high banks.
On the 9th instant, crossing the Karaichik, the force advanced along
the road leading to the town of Turkistan, about 9 versts distant. We
could see the gardens which encircle the town of which only the high
cupolas of the mosque of Azret Sultan were visible. When within about
3 versts of the gardens, the force was once more formed in order of battle.
The centre was occupied by the infantry with the artillery in the intervals; the
Ural Cossacks formed the right flank and the Orenburg Cossacks, the left
flank; the baggage train followed behind in a close column under cover of a
Company of Infantry. Both horse and foot could be seen moving behind the
garden walls; our skirmishers, advancing to within 800 paces, opened fire;
this was replied to with balls from muskets and falconets from behind the
garden walls. Two 10-pr. howitzer and one 12-pr. were unlimbered, and
opened fire; the first shot fell into the midst of a crowd outside the gardens,
which at once withdrew behind the walls. After the sixth round, there was
not a single man opposite our centre outside the garden walls.
Our Skirmishers then ran up to the walls, and with a loud cheer threw
themselves into the gardens; the walls were immediately broken down in
several places; then the whole of the Infantry followed. At the same time
the Ural Cossacks, commanded by Major Rukin, having taken up a flank
position, menaced the rear of the enemy and threw them into complete disorder
with two rockets. Driven back and afraid of being cut off from the fortress,
the Kokandians threw themselves into it with great haste, leaving a few dead,
whom they had not been able to carry away.
On reaching the inner margin of the gardens, a reconnoissance was at
once made of the ground which stood between us and the fortress and a front
was selected for attack, after duly taking care that the roads leading from our
camp to the batteries should not be enfiladed from the fortress, and conse-
quently that there should be no waste of labour in establishing our
communications.
Taken aback by our energetic advance, the Kokandians ceased fire for
some time, and indeed our skirmishers prevented a single man from showing
himself on the battlements. They soon, however, rallied and opened a
heavy fire from muskets, falconets and guns. During a heavy fire that lasted
two hours we only lost one man. The firing was kept up with less spirit
for the remainder of the day.
During the night of the 10th, cast-iron shells, six lbs. in weight, were
thrown from the fortress; many shells fell into our camp, but without occasion-
ing any loss. The siege works were commenced the same night by 102 men
under the command of Lieutenant Tarasenkof, of the Engineers. They were
covered by a Company of Infantry under Staff Captain Redkin, who, taking
up a position behind a garden wall at some distance from the right flank of
Battery No. 1, kept up a fusillade with the Kokandians at rare intervals
during the whole night, and thus diverted the attention of the enemy, which
permitted the works to be pushed on very successfully without any loss.
The works were ready at daybreak; the following batteries were mounted:
No. 1 two 20-pr. howitzers and two 12-prs.; No. 2 two 20-pr. mortars; and
No. 3 two 20-pr. and two 6-pr. mortars. The Kokandians finding at
daybreak that our batteries were completed opened a strong fire upon
them, but their shots did us no injury.
During the course of the 10th an almost continuous fire was kept up
from our batteries; by well directed shots the upper crest of the walls was in
APPENDIX VII.
xiii
many places destroyed, but on the wall itself, owing to its thickness, no im-
pression was produced. After the first few shots from our Artillery, the guns
of the Kokandians were silent for a long time, probably because of the people
repairing damages. Our vertical fire produced several conflagrations in the
town, which, judging by the incessant swinging of the well poles, the in-
habitants were very active in extinguishing. Of the guns firing upon us
two were silenced altogether by 1 o'clock P. M., but the third gun of large
calibre, notwithstanding all our endeavours, could not be put hors-de-combat
owing to its being placed deep in a thick walled turret of small dimensions
from which it shot vertically.
The engineering works this day consisted in the preparation of gabions
and fascines.
A few days before, it had been rumoured, not without some cause, that
the Beks of Suzak and Tashkend intended to come to the assistance of Turkis-
tan.
On the 10th of the month, these rumours were in a measure verified by
Sadyk's entry into Turkistan with 120 men in armour, being the combined
garrisons of Suzak and Chulak-kurgan. In consequence of this it was deter-
mined to proceed with the attack as energetically and as rapidly as possible.
Sadyk, crossing the Djamantas, first marched to Kurnak, but on learn-
ing near the latter place of our commencement of the siege, he turned off
to the left, and passing round the southern slopes of the mountains, struck
the Tashkend road. The Esaúl Savin sent out with a "Sotnia" against him
could not cut him off from the Tashkend gates, Sadyk, when the parties fell in
with each other, being nearer to the gates than the Esaúl Savin; moreover,
when the Cossacks attacked him, he withdrew under cover of the fire from
the walls of the fortifications, seeking to allure the Cossacks on.
It was determined to commence making the approaches from our batteries
on the night of the 11th; 180 men were told off for the work, and Company No. 1
was appointed to cover them. Captain Yablonski directed the labours. It
was a clear night, and whilst the moon was shining brightly, the Kokandians
opened a severe fire upon our men as soon as ever they were distributed over
the ground for the work, and at 11 o'clock they made a sortie against the head
party; the affair was very animated. The Kokandians made three attacks,
but were each time driven back with great loss. We had three men killed and
sixteen wounded, besides nine who received contusions-one Officer ( Ensign
Rukin) and eight men. Our trench during this night was advanced a consi-
derable way, and some of our men, notwithstanding the showers of stones,
lumps of clay and sticks, from the walls, measured all its dimensions; we
were, however, prevented from deepening and widening it by the alarm
occasioned by the sorties.
At daybreak of the 11th we found ourselves at 80 fathoms' distance from
the basement of the walls.
On the first alarm in the front, Ensign Tarasenkof was sent out from
the camp to ascertain the condition of our works. After executing this
commission he was again sent into the trench, and by my order, profiting by
the confusion in front, took twenty labourers from the nearest trench and
erected Battery No. 4 for two light howitzers. It had been intended earlier
to erect this battery, but the sorties had hindered this during the previous
evening. By daybreak the men here had some cover, working in a sitting
position and on their knees. By 9 o'clock, owing to the zeal of the workmen,
and notwithstanding a severe fire, the battery was completed, and at 10 o'clock
the howitzers opened fire.
During the 11th the firing from the fort and batteries continued, and some
conflagrations ensued in the town from the vertical firing. The two Kokand
xiv
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION
guns, silenced on the first day, now again opened upon us, but were soon again
disabled. Two hundred men were sent into the trenches to work; during the
day the entire trench was widened and deepened to the necessary dimensions.
On the evening of the 11th two Companies were sent into the trench;
one for working, the other as a cover, under Captain Kahovskoi of the General
Staff. Captain Kahovskoi volunteered for this service, and performed it with
true heroism. The battery was covered besides by a Company of Rifles.
As soon as the workmen reached the spot, Ensign Tarasenkof, directing
the works, distributed them in the direction of the lodgment to the right of
the trench; on the left there was a considerable elevation, under the shadow of
which although the moon was shining brightly, eight of our workmen could be
perfectly concealed, but the ninth man was visible, and our operations were
detected. A great noise was raised within the walls, and shots were immediately
fired at our works; regardless of the strong fire, however, the lodgment was
effected, and in a short time our men succeeded in sheltering themselves
behind their diggings.
Captain Kahovskoi, expecting a sortie, at once threw out a chain of
men along the elevation, where the men could shelter themselves behind some
small mounds; but for the better protection of this chain some gabions and
spades were thrown up to them from the trenches.
At the same time there arose sounds of alarm from where our detachment
was stationed: during my absence whilst on a visit to the batteries, the troops
were in command of Major Rukin.
Some Kokandians making their way through the gardens attacked the camp,
but being met with a shower of cartridge and musket balls at a very short dis-
tance, were repulsed with immense losses in killed and wounded.
Profiting by the alarm in the camp, and seeing that our works could
not be concealed, Ensign Tarasenkof determined on laying an approach
along the edge of the mound by means of a flying sap and called out volun-
teers for the purpose. The volunteers speedily placed the gabions, and other
workmen at the same time made a trench from the commencement of the
flying sap to the head of the work of the preceding night. When the labour
was being regularly proceeded with, a lodgment was made on the elevation to
the left of the trench, which was intended for a battery to operate on the
breach in the wall of the fort on the day on which it was to be blown up.
The alarm in the camp had no sooner subsided, when cries were heard
to proceed from the rear of the right lodgment from an approaching body
of Kokandian cavalry, and at the same time a large mass of people was
discovered secretly crawling from the rounded corner of the fort. Here
Captain Kahovskoi immediately, but with perfect coolness, made every prepa-
ration for a repulse; in the front of the approach, half of the men took
to their muskets to meet the crawling enemy, whilst the other half continued
their work without even being interrupted by the firing which ensued.
Allowing the Kokandians to come up as near as possible, the men of the 3rd
and 1st companies opened a telling fire, whereupon the enemy turned and fled
towards the fosse in front of the fort; but a portion of the cavalry taking fright
at a shot from our battery plunged to the left and stumbled upon our trench;
hastily dismounting the Kokandians jumped in and fell upon our soldiers with
their sabres and whirlbats, but they were all bayoneted. On our side only one
soldier was severely wounded in this encounter.
Almost at the same time an attack was made on our battery No.
3, where some of our riflemen were located. A fire was opened at a distance
of 15 feet, and the enemy at the first volley turned round and fled leaving
many dead on the ground.
APPENDIX VII.
XV
This sortie was no sooner over, than a great mass of Kokandians, with
a standard, determining again to try an attack on our works from the left side,
appeared on the elevation. Here too a fire was opened upon them when
they were very near; the standard fell at the first volley; the crowd thrown
into confusion, turned round and, pursued by shots, returned to the fort.
In repelling all these attacks, my strict orders to the infantry were to
reserve their fire until the enemy was quite close, in consequence of which
the losses of the Kokandians, more especially in their best and bravest
men, were so great, that they resolved to make no more open attacks, but
disturbed our works only with a sharp fire from the walls. Thus Captain
Kahovskoi was killed outright by a shot from a falconet and one man
was wounded.
Whilst the men were working in the trench, six infantry soldiers and
sergeant Zlobin of the sappers, were wounded.
By this time our head works had reached so near to the front fosse
that the labourers apprehending there were concealed enemies in it advanced
hesitatingly. Ensign Tarasenkof then proposed that Captain Wulfert, sent from
battery No. 3 to replace Captain Kahovskoi in the command, should occupy
the fosse in front. The latter at once acted on this suggestion, and followed by
the skirmishers rushed with a cheer across a perfectly open space of 15
fathoms under a heavy fire, and took the fosse, driving the enemy out of it.
After this our works advanced rapidly to the front fosse and a mantelet,
prepared before hand, was brought forward for the purpose of commencing
a sap.
After this the fire from the fort which had been very heavy before day-
break considerably slackened, and some of our men transported the_gabions to
the main force for the construction of a passage. There were now rumours of
an intention to surrender the fort, and the fire from the walls ceased altogether.
This was taken advantage of to make a covered way to the town.
Murza-Davlet, frightened by the rapid approach of our siege works to
the very walls, and apprehending an immediate explosion and a storm, and
having moreover experienced an immense loss from the desperate attacks on
the camp, batteries and trenches. issued from the fort with 330 men of various
ranks who were most attached to him personally, under the pretext of a sortie,
and disappeared by the Tashkend road; on learning this the inhabitants sent a
deputation to me at 8 o'clock in the morning announcing the surrender of the
town and citadel.
All the works were thereupon stopped, the guns were withdrawn from
the batteries, and a Russian garrison was placed in Turkistan at 10 o'clock at
night.
The garrison of the fort consisted of no less than 1,500 men, exclusive
of the armed citizens who took part in the defence, but a large number of
these deserted during the sorties. Three hundred and thirty men, as. stated
above, went off with Murza-Davlet by the Tashkend road; more than 350 men,
all Sarts, indicated by the inhabitants, were conducted under escort out of
the town and sent across the Arys, and as many Kirghizes were sent off to
their Auls under guarantee of their Biis.
Within the fort we seized 4 guns, more than 200 poods of powder
stored in the Mesjid Azret Sultan, 100 poods of lead in pigs, 20 falconets,
17 garrison muskets, more than 100 ordinary fowling pieces, and a quantity
of pikes and sabres; but all the best arms had been taken off by Murza Davlet
and his party.
xvi
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Our loss during the whole of these proceedings was as follows:-
1 Officer
4 Men
24 do.
1 Officer
8 Men
}...
...
...
}...
Projecticles expended on the
Ordinary shells from
Grape shot
Ordinary shells from
Grape shot charges
Vertical shots
Shot from 12-pr. guns
6 ">
9th 10th 11th
21st' 22nd' 23rd'
pood howitzers
pood howitzers
""
...
"
...
...
...
...
...
killed.
wounded.
contused.
12th
and
24th
of June.
...
...
...
...
..
Ordinary shells from pood mortars (vertical)
Shells with fire balls
"
:
...
...
216
...
...
2
10
5
...
...
109
190
4
...
672
17
217
53
Total
1,495
Cartridges with minié balls
...
...
...
...
French
...
32,618
10,560
Total
...
43,208
Ordinary shells from 6-pr. mortars (vertical)
Rockets 2"
…
...
...
...
...
Although a flying column of Cossacks and Kirghizes was sent in pursuit
of Davlet, it returned after following the road for 25 versts, without having
come up with him. From information received it appears that Murza-Davlet
with a band of not more than 100 men (the rest dispersed by the way) is
in the vicinity of Chemkend. Sadyk also left him, and withdrew to his
encampments; he has since sent his sons to us with assurances of submission
and with a request for forgiveness.
Here Major General Verefkin proceeds to make special mention of all
the officers of his detachment who distinguished themselves in the affair.
APPENDIX VIII.
Formation of the new Kokand line.
18th
His Imperial Majesty has been pleased on the 30th of July last to
command that all the forts erected in the newly-occupied extent of country
from the river Chù to the Syr-Daria as far as the Kokand fort of Yany-kurgan,
inclusive, be considered as temporarily forming a new Kokand line of frontier,
to the command on which His Majesty has been pleased to appoint Major
General Cherniayef, who is to have chief command of all the troops along
it,those of Western Siberia as well as those of the Orenburg region.
APPENDIX IX.
Abstract of a Communication from General Cherniayef, dated 25th September.
The troops located in Turkistan, being placed under my command, I
moved two columns from different directions, as follows: one, led by myself,
APPENDIX IX.
xvii
from Turkistan, composed of 6 companies of infantry, 6 battery guns, 2 light
pieces of horse artillery, 24 pood mortars, 1 rocket-stand, and 1 "sotnia" of
Cossacks, the other from Auliéta, composed of 4 companies of infantry, 2
battery guns, and 2 light pieces of horse artillery, 1 mountain gun, 2 rocket-
stands, 1 2-pood mortar, 2 pood mortars, 2 pood, 6b mortar, one
"sotnia"
of Cossacks and 1,000 Kirghiz militia; this latter column was placed under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel Lerché who was directed to be at
Mankent on the 18th; the Turkistan column, as the strongest, reached
Chemkend on the same day.
On the 19th of September both columns united, and a reconnoissance of
the citadel and fortifications of the town was at once performed.
On the night of the same day a battery for four guns was erected, which
opened fire at day-break; to this the Kokandians replied with a fire from
7 guns and 2 mortars.
The enemy's fire, throughout the whole day on the 20th September
evidently showed that the Kokand artillery, directed by no native techno-
logist, had immensely improved, and it was only by extraordinary good
fortune that we sustained small loss from their fire. Having convinced
myself that the enemy's fire reached farther than our own, I calculated on
having the advantage in rapidity and accuracy at a shorter distance, and
therefore ordered a battery for 6 guns and 4 mortars to be raised 300
fathoms in advance of the first. The extreme firmness of the soil and a
sortie made by the enemy during the night of the 21st of September
prevented the completion of this battery before day-break. The Kokandians,
however, encouraged by the delay occasioned to our siege works, commenced
aggressive operations by means of trenches, gradually advancing batteries
and even throwing out skirmishers in front of their works. Lieutenant
Colonel Lerché, taking advantage of the circumstance, led the majority of
the troops in the trenches against the forward body of Kokandian infantry
whom he overthrew, and following close upon them, he ran up to the town
gates, where he cleared the opening with his bayonets and broke into the town
over the corpses of the Kokandians.
This took place under a galling fire from all the enemy's batteries on the
eastern side of the fortification and citadel.
On receiving the first intelligence from Colonel Lerché of his advance,
I sent out to him from the camp a support of 2 companies with a troop of
horse artillery, and then myself followed with 2 companies of infantry and
2 battery guns. The soldiers, hearing the cheer in front, rushed forward,
and in an hour's time the citadel and fortress were completely in our hands.
Our loss during this storm was 2 killed, 7 wounded, 19 men suffered
from contusions, but during the whole of the siege 6 were killed and 14
wounded and hurt.
The most important trophies captured by our troops were-11 horse-hair
banners, 4 flags and 26 pennons, 19 large cast-iron guns one of which was
rifled* (brass), 4 brass guns, 4 mortars of large calibre, a great number of
falconets, garrison muskets and other firearms and weapons with bayonets,
besides a variety of military accoutrements, &c., such as mail armour,
drums, bugles, &c., &c., &c.
* On closer examination of the gun this was not found to be the case; there were, it
is true, some kind of grooves, but not like those in rifled cannon; the Kokandians are
yet unacquainted with the use of such an arm,
L
xviii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
APPENDIX X.
Extract from General Cherniayef's Report.
It appears from General Cherniayef's report on the capture of Chemkend
that two columns were advanced against it for its seizure.
One from Turkistan, composed of 6 companies of infantry, 6 battery
guns, 2 pieces of light horse artillery, 2 pood mortars, 1 rocket-stand, and
11 "sotnia" of Cossacks.
2 Another from Auliéta composed of 4 companies of infantry, 2 battery
guns, and 2 pieces of light horse artillery, 1 mountain gun, 1 2 pood mortar,
2 pood mortars, 1 6-pr. mortar, 2 rocket-stands, 1 "sotnia" of Cossacks,
and 1,000 Kirghiz militia.
2
Thus, there were employed against Chemkend-
10 companies of infantry.
8 battery guns.
4₁
guns
of light horse artillery.
1 mountain gun.
6 mortars.
rocket-stands.
2}}
2 "sotnias" of Cossacks and 1,000 Militia.
2nd November 1864.
APPENDIX XI.
Abstract of General Cherniayef's Report of the 14th October 1864.
After the capture of Chemkend the intelligence received concerning the
portion of the garrison that had fled was both vague and contradictory. The
Kushbegi of Tashkend who commanded in Chemkend was by some accounted
to have been killed during the storm, and by others he was said to be still
alive; his fugitive troops had, it was affirmed by some, entered into the com-
position of the garrison of Tashkend; by others it was stated that they had
been refused admission into that town by the inhabitants.
At last, as I
have already had the honor of acquainting your Excellency, information was
received, which has subsequently been confirmed, that Tashkend had entered
into relations with the Emir of Bokhara. Therefore, for the purpose of
bringing about a solution of affairs, and of ascertaining the amount of resources
still left to the enemy, I made an advance towards Tashkend on the 27th Sep-
tember with 8 incomplete companies and 1 "sotnia" of Cossacks or 1,550
men, altogether with 12 field pieces. This detachment was accompanied by
400 Kirghiz militia-men.
The number of troops here being so small in proportion to the population
of the region, I did not contemplate the seizure of such an immense town as
Tashkend, where, within an area of 40 versts, there are about 100,000 residents,
but I was, from the very beginning of the present campaign, constantly informed,
as during my last year's expedition to Chulak, that this population was peace-
ful and industrial, lived principally by trade with Russia, suffered very much
from the consequences of the present military operations, that in all things
the people blamed the ruling Kipchaks in Kokand, and desired peace, and that
the majority of them, moreover, were inclined to be made subject to Russia.
I consequently meditated taking advantage, if possible, of the impression
produced by the storming of Chemkend, whereby the Khanat had lost almost.
:.
APPENDIX XI.
xix
all its artillery, to turn the Kokand garrison out of Tashkend, and after-
wards, in case the inhabitants declared themselves in our favour, to send a
deputation from amongst them to St. Petersburg, and in the interim leav-
ing the civil administration of the town in their own hands, whilst I
guarded against all external influence pending further orders from Gov-
ernment.
It was evidenced during the two first stages that there was a Kokand
garrison in Tashkend besides the troops defeated at Chemkend, and that these
Kokand troops even domineered over the population; between the two above-
named towns, the habitations, stores, corn and hay along the road were all
abandoned.
On reaching the last stage but one, on the way to Tashkend, I sent four
men into the town, who had connexions there by trade, commissioning them
to enter into communications with the Aksakals of the town and with the
more influential residents who were known to them, in order to ascertain the
feelings of the inhabitants.
These emissaries were detained by the Kokand patrols; they were not
allowed to pass into the town, but were put into pits, and in a day's time
returned with very indefinite and unsatisfactory written replies, bearing no
signatures, to the effect that, without taking counsel with some of the Kokand
statesmen, nothing could be resolved upon.
After this, on the 1st October, having passed round to the eastern side
of the town, I took up a position at its south-eastern angle within 5 versts
of the Kokand gates.
On the following day, I removed the troops to this road and undertook
a survey of the citadel. The Kokandians appeared on the walls and opened
a musketry fire upon the officers executing the survey; they then commenced
to fire upon our approaching troops from 3 guns (of very small calibre),
placed upon the earthworks.
Answering their fire, I occupied the heights, commanding the citadel at a
distance of 350 fathoms, with 8 battery guns and pushed forward from the
right along the Kokand road and under cover of the gardens which extended
to the very walls of the town, two companies with a mounted division, under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel Obukhof of the artillery, who was to
open fire from this side and to report to me on his proceedings.
After a
very accurate fire from our artillery, Lieutenant Colonel
Obukhof reported that a breach was made in the wall and requested per-
mission to storm it. Knowing the experience, the presence of mind in action
and the judgment of this excellent staff officer, I sent him one more com-
pany with Lieutenant Colonel Lerché who had distinguished himself at
Chemkend, replying-"if possible, go and God be with you," and myself
advanced to him with two companies. Lieutenant Colonels Obukhof and
Lerché then led on their men with a cheer to the wall; the walls of the
barbet at the Kokand gates were destroyed, but the Kokandians had from
the inside blocked the gates, and had succeeded in removing the bridge
across the moat in their front. On nearing the moat, Lieutenant Colonel
Obukhof was mortally wounded; Lieutenant Colonel Lerché was wounded in
the hand and in the left side; they both headed the troops on foot. Ensigns
Reichard and Konopelski were also wounded.
On losing their officers and finding it impossible to clamber up the
steep escarpment of the moat, the troops halted, got into the moat and began
replying to the enemy's fire.
Approaching with two companies to within 100 fathoms of the town wall,
and on perceiving the state of affairs, I was obliged to abandon the siege,
which it was possible to carry on without siege works.
XX
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
In order to enable the troops to withdraw from the moat, all our 12
guns opened fire upon the enemy on this side, under cover of which the men
returned to our batteries. At the same time the line of skirmishers was
strengthened on the left flank of our position where the gardens also extended
to the wall; but after a detailed inspection of the enemy's fortifications from
this side as well, an immediate assault was found to be impracticable.
One
The fire from our artillery continued until the enemy's fire ceased.
of the Kokand guns was dismounted, and the three barbets from which they
fired were seriously damaged. The accurate aims of our skirmishers, at close
distances, occasioned the garrison a heavy loss of not less than 200 men,
almost every turban that appeared on the walls was knocked over by our
riflemen; but the killed were replaced by fresh foes.
Our loss has also been considerable, viz., 16 killed and 62 wounded.
Two out of the 4 wounded officers, viz., Lieutenant Colonel Obukhof and
Ensign Reichard, soon died; I beg your Excellency to make special application
for relief in behalf of their families.
After this affair all the troops were anxious for a fresh engagement,
considering they were beaten not by the enemy, who had suffered a greater
loss than ourselves, but by the depth and steepness of the moat.
But seeing
the enormous extent of Tashkend,-as many as 15 versts in length and 8 in
breadth inside the town walls, exclusive of the outskirts,-I did not consider
it expedient to attack it on any other side than that of the citadel, which com-
mands the entire town, and this would have required more means than were
at my disposal. Besides, after the affair of the 2nd of October to jeopardise
the detachment under Tashkend (for the formation of which I was obliged
to retain only the garrisons in Auijéta, Turkistan and Chemkend, in the
midst of a population of half a million), to risk the only reserve of the whole
region for a fresh assault, was to stake the very security of the new Kokand
line on a card.
Therefore, notwithstanding the animation of the troops who were desir-
ous of giving the Sart a lesson and of taking Tashkend at any price, I
satisfied myself with the reconnoissance made and returned to Chemkend,
leaving Tashkend on the 4th and reaching the former on the 7th of October.
The enemy, after suffering a defeat even beyond his walls, did not so much
as dare to appear within our view.
APPENDIX XII.
Extract from General Cherniayef's Report of 27th December 1864.
On the morning of the 4th December, three Kirghizes came to Lieutenant
Colonel Jemchujnikoff, the acting Commandant of Turkistan, and announced
that the Kokandians had invested Chilik on the evening of the 3rd December.
They were not able to state the strength of the enemy even approxi-
mately. Having received my despatch respecting the movement of Sadyk
with a band of 400 men from Tashkend to the Arys, Lieutenant Colonel
Jemchujnikoff thought that the Kokandians before Chilik could not be
numerous, and he therefore despatched to Ikan the Ural sotnia of Cossacks
armed with rifles, and having a double supply of cartridges, under the com-
mand of Esaál Seroff. They also took with them a mountain howitzer.
detachment had just left when another Kirghiz came in (this time from Ikan),
with a request for assistance. An order was thereupon sent to Seroff to halt
at a distance of about 10 versts from Turkistan in case he should see large
masses of the enemy, whose movements he was at the same time charged to
The
APPENDIX XII.
xxi
observe. But the man who was sent with this order returned and reported
that Ikan was already surrounded by the enemy, and that the detachment had
halted at about 4 versts from the village. In the meanwhile, Seroff having
received information that the enemy was in the vicinity of Ikan led his
Cossacks on at a trot. Neither the advanced guard, nor the patrols on the
flanks, saw any enemy. Towards evening at about 4 versts from Ikan, large
fires became visible in the neighbourhood to the right. Concluding that these
were the camp fires of the Kokandians, Seroff halted the detachment and
sent one of the Kirghiz guides in front to ascertain the strength of the enemy
and the distance to their camp; but the guide returned at once, having fallen in
with a Kokandian patrol. Seroff had scarcely time to fall back on a position
which he had meanwhile discovered, before he was surrounded of a sudden
by immense masses of the enemy who rushed on the detachment with wild
cries. As it was impossible to retreat, Seroff hastened to shelter his detach-
ment in a small ditch, on the open sides of which a breast-work was made
of the commissariat and forage bags. The howitzer was placed behind this
breast-work. The enemy advanced at once, but having been allowed to
come within a very short distance, was received with a discharge of grape
shot and musketry that compelled him to retreat in disorder. Subsequent
attacks were repelled with the same success. Falling back to a considerable
distance, the enemy formed in dense columns, and remaining within range of
our rifles, opened a vertical fire of shells from three pieces of artillery and
continued it throughout the night. The fire was increased on the following
morning. Shells fell continuously in the midst of the detachment; while
the besiegers were receiving large re-inforcements and were increasing their
musketry fire. The detachment was continually suffering loss, but kept
its ground with great gallantry, and, by a well-directed fire, aimed principally
at the enemy's gunners, prevented the enemy from advancing further, and
compelled him to move his artillery frequently.
Seeing the utter impossibility of approaching the detachment, the
Kokandians began to bring up quantities of reeds for the construction of shields
and mantelets.
Meanwhile firing had been heard in Turkistan from 5 o'clock of the 4th
December in the direction of Ikan, and as it was continued throughout the
night and on the following day, Lieutenant Colonel Jemchujnikoff, who had not
received any intelligence from the detachment, resolved to send out a company
of infantry with two guns.
This detachment was placed under the command of Sub-Lieutenant
Suhorko, with orders to fall back in case he met with the enemy in great force.
After marching for about 15 versts and consequently when within 4 versts of
Seroff's sotnia, Sub-Lieutenant Suhorko met large masses of the enemy, and
without making any attempt to form a junction with Seroff, began to fall
back.
At 4 o'clock, six close columns of the enemy came up to Turkistan and
invested the town on three sides. By this time also Sub-Lieutenant Suhorko
had regained the town, without incurring any loss during his retreat.
Seroff's detachment heard firing in the direction of Turkistan, and learned
subsequently that a detachment had been sent to his relief. As soon as the
latter began to retreat, Alimkul sent Seroff a letter informing him that the
relieving party had been driven back, and proposing that he should surrender
and throw himself on his mercy. Receiving no reply from Seroff, Alimkul
opened fire again and continued it until night. The detachment did not lose
spirit, and, strengthening its position with the carcases of horses and camels,
and encouraged by the example of its fearless chief, awaited death with heroic
firmness.
xxii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
During the night some of the Cossacks volunteered to make the position
of the detachment known in Turkistan, and two of them, with a Kirghiz,
actually made their way through the enemy and reached Turkistan in safety.
девори
нечего
Early in the morning of the 6th, finding that the Kokandians had
finished the mantelets and shields, under cover of which they were already
beginning to advance in several directions, and wishing to gain as much time
as possible in the hope of receiving assistance, Seroff went out in front
his trench and gave the Kokandians to understand that he wished to parley.
A Kokandian came forward, and in reply to Seroff's request for an interview
with Alimkul, was informed in pure Russian that his requests could not be
complied with.
After talking to this Kokandian for about an hour Seroff returned to the
detachment, and was the first to open fire upon the enemy. The incensed
enemy replied very quickly and with great accuracy. Four times they
rushed from behind their mantelets to assault our position, but each time
they were driven back. The detachment had by this time lost all its horses,
and 37 men killed.
Seeing that his position was most critical and that he could not hold out
any longer, Seroff spiked the howitzer (one of its wheels having been broken),
broke up the spare muskets, and with a cheer threw himself, with what re-
mained of his sotnia, on the enemy, determined to fall, or to reach the
detachment which he hoped had been sent to his relief.
He was not mistaken, for it had that very day been decided by a council
of war to send a detachment out from Turkistan under the command of the
same Sub-Lieutenant Suhorko.
The retreat of Seroff lasted about four hours over a distance of almost
eight versts (six miles), and all that time under a heavy cross fire of musketry.
The enemy frequently cut the detachment off in front, dismounted and fired
their rifles within close range. The greater part of the men were wounded.
With the blood pouring from their wounds, harassed physically and morally,
those fearless men who had not had anything to eat or drink for 48 hours,
and who had thrown away everything except their shirts and muskets, fell
back undaunted, leaning on each other, and leaving a stream of blood to
mark the line of their retreat.
At last they effected a junction with the relieving party at about seven
versts from Turkistan. By that time there was not a man able to walk any
further. They were carried in carts into Turkistan. The enemy ceased to
остановил
pursue as soon as the two detachments met.
The losses in Seroff's detachment were as follows: killed 1 officer,
4 non-commissioned officers, 50 Cossacks, 1 hospital dresser, and 1 man of the
baggage train; wounded 1 officer, 1 non-commissioned officer, 36 Cossacks,
4 artillerymen, and 1 Kirghiz guide. 5-43
APPENDIX XIII.
Order of the day of the Minister of War,-(No. 56, dated 12th February
1865).
With the view to a better organization of the Orenburg Region and
Western Siberia, His Imperial Majesty has been pleased to order as follows:-
1. The advanced line established last year in the Trans-Chú Region to
be connected with the line of the Syr-Daria, and one province to be formed,
under the title of the Province of Turkistan, of the whole of the territory
bordering the Central Asiatic possessions, from the sea of Aral to Lake
Issyk-kul.
APPENDIX XIV.
xxiii
2. The administration of the new province to be entrusted to a special
Military Governor, who shall at the same time command the forces stationed
within the province.
3. The Military Governor of the Turkistan Province to be subject, in
military matters, to the commander of the troops of the Orenburg Region,
and in civil affairs, to the Governor General of Orenburg.
4. The province of Samara to be detached from the Orenburg Region
and annexed, in a military respect, to the Military District of Kazan.
In making the above order known to the military branch of the service,
the Minister of War adds that the Official List and Estimate of the new
province (subsequently approved by His Imperial Majesty on the 6th
August 1865) will be published separately.
APPENDIX XIV.
Extract from the Report of General Cherniayef,-dated 2nd May 1865.
The forces of the Emir of Bokhara, collected some months ago at Samar-
cand, began to move in the direction of Ura-Tiubé, while their advanced
posts penetrated further within the limits of the Khanat of Kokan.
This movement could only be interpreted as a desire on the part of the
Emir of Bokhara to take advantage of the difficulties of the Khanat, and
to mix himself up in its affairs.
Taking into consideration that the public feeling in Tashkend was far
from being in favour of the Kokand Government, and that its inhabitants
had long been groaning under the despotic rule of Alimkul, the Regent of
the Khanat, I could not remain indifferent to the proceedings of the Emir,
and was therefore obliged, without waiting for re-inforcements, to move
forward at once along the road to Tashkend.
As I did not consider it convenient, under present circumstances, to
occupy Tashkend by force, and finding it at the same time necessary to
place that town in a position of immediate dependence upon us, I determined
to occupy the fortress of Niazbek, which commands the waters that supply
Tashkend, in order to have the latter at any time under command.
Leaving the direct roading to Tashkend on the 27th April, I reached
Niazbek on the following day, and summoned the commandant to surrender.
Receiving a refusal, I entrusted my assistant, Major General Kachaloff,
with the duty of taking the place.
After making a careful reconnoissance, General Kachaloff selected a
position for batteries, which were raised during the same night.
The fortress of Niazbek lies on the open and perfectly level left bank
of the Chirchik River, 25 versts north-east of Tashkend. It is built
in the form of an irregular quadrangle with faces 35, 38, 39, and 47
fathoms long and 3 fathoms high. The faces are flanked by towers slightly
raised above the battlements, with armed barbets and tall embrasures. On
three sides of the fortress is a ditch three fathoms in width and depth; the
fourth side faces the Chirchik and stands on its bank; the ditch can be easily
filled with water by means of canals dug in front of the north-west face.
The walls are five fathoms thick at their base; the slopes are almost perpendi.
cular. Embrasures for musketry run along each of the faces, and partly in
two tiers; the gate at the south angle is protected by a strong traverse, and it
has a covered way for infantry facing the river.
xxiv
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Both from its position and profile, the fortress must be considered one
of the strongest in the whole of the Khanat,
A siege battery was erected against the north angle, at a distance of 215
fathoms and another against the western angle, within 170 fathoms. The
works were completed by day-break, and armed, the first with two 20-pound
mortars and the second with two battery guns.
Our batteries opened fire at day-break. The enemy replied very ener-
getically with a fire from guns, muskets and falconets, but our batteries
placed within such short range destroyed the two barbets within a few
hours, and forced the enemy first to weaken his artillery fire and at last to
cease it altogether. The musketry and falconet fire were continued for some
time longer, but likewise ceased a considerable time before dusk.
Although the disastrous effects of our artillery prevented the garrison
from doing us much harm, while it inflicted great losses on the enemy, yet it
did not appear to daunt their courage, for a second summons to surrender was
rejected, probably in the expectation of speedy relief from Tashikend. Indeed,
at about 3 P. M., information was brought to me that a force of 3,000 men,
with two guns, was marching to Niazbek from Tashkend and that our pickets
had met those of the enemy.
On receiving this intelligence I left the camp immediately with five half
companies and four guns, and at a distance of three versts encountered the
enemy who had occupied the gardens in the neighbourhood. Our artillery fire
drove the enemy from his position, and a hot pursuit over a distance of
six versts turned his retreat into a flight.
The bombardment of the fortress had been meanwhile renewed with
vigour. Not wishing to spend much time or ammunition in this siege, and
seeing the remarkable determination of the garrison, it was considered neces-
sary to strengthen the batteries with two more guns and with a rocket appa-
ratus, in order to be able to invest the fortress the same night and take it by
storm. In the course of a few hours, the north-west face was entirely demo-
lished and admitted of storming parties ascending the wall.
The garrison, knowing that the fortress would be at once stormed and
that the relieving force had been driven back, at last consented to capitulate,
and surrendered the fortress by 10 P. M. of the same day (the 29th).
Our trophies consist of 370 prisoners of war, 6 guns of large calibre,
7 falconets, 315 muskets, 105 swords, and a quantity of bombs, shells, grape-
shot and powder.
Our loss consists of 7 rank and file slightly wounded and 3 contused.
After the occupation of Niazbek, our relations with Tashkend acquired
a more settled character. This point is in all respects of no ordinary import-
ance, and I have reason to expect many no less important results from its
occupation.
(The General proceeds to mention the names of the officers who distin-
guished themselves on the occasion).
APPENDIX XV.
Extract from General Cherniayef's Report of May 11th, 1865.
Although our relations with Tashkend acquired a more definite character
after the capture of Niazbek, yet, as the Russian party in Tashkend, notwith-
standing their numbers, were unable to elude the vigilance of the Kokan
APPENDIX XV.
XXV
garrison and declare themselves in our favour, I found it indispensable to
press the city as much as possible, and to place it in direct and immediate
dependence upon us. With that object, immediately after the occupation of
Niazbek, I turned off the waters of two of the principal branches of the Chir-
chik, which supplied Tashkend and its neighbourhood, and compelled the inhabi-
tants to declare anew, although not officially, their readiness to submit to us.
In consequence of this assurance, I left a garrison in Niazbek, and on the
7th May took up a new position, 8 versts from Tashkend.
On the 8th instant, a reconnoissance
reconnoissance was made of the N. E. part
of the town, and by agreement with the inhabitants, the latter were to fall
upon the garrison as we approached the town, and to open the gates of the
fortress to us; but on the same day, Mullah Alimkul entered Tashkend with
6,000 men and 40 guns brought from Kokan, and by his presence in the
city, prevented the contemplated movement from being carried into execution.
I returned into camp after making the reconnoissance, and determined to
remain in the new position until I could obtain more precise information
respecting the state of affairs in Tashkend.
While moving towards Tashkend, as well as on our way back to the
camp, small bands of Kokandian cavalry tried to harass the detachment, but they
were in every case driven back with some loss, without inflicting any loss on
our force.
On the next day, our pickets reported the movement of long columns
of the enemy in the direction of the camp. At 6 o'clock in the morning, about
7,000 of the enemy were in view of the camp, within a short distance.
Not knowing as yet the object of the movement, but presuming that
Alimkul intended to attack the camp, I gave him time to form his troops
on the neighbouring heights, while I made preparations for an attack.
At 7 o'clock the enemy opened a canonade on the camp from a battery
of 12 guns, which had previously been marked. Notwithstanding the
range (800 fathoms), the fire was remarkably well directed, for all the shells
fell within our camp, although fortunately without doing us any harm.
I immediately sent four companies of infantry, with a battery division,
under the command of Captain Borislavski, straight against the enemy's
front. When within 400 fathoms, our artillery opened fire on the enemy's
battery and the nearest columns, while two companies moving to the right,
began to turn the left flank of the enemy.
The enemy's fire was now directed towards Captain Borislavski's force,
but our artillery, by a well-directed fire, pushed back their columns and to
some extent weakened the fire of their guns.
Taking advantage of this, two of Borislavski's companies were ordered
to advance, and, under cover of the artillery, to attack the enemy simulta-
neously with the two companies engaged in turning the left flank. This
movement was successfully executed with very great rapidity. As soon as our
infantry began to ascend the heights, the enemy opened a sharp and heavy
fire from all their guns, which proved to be 40 in number. Under this fire
our columns gained the heights and at once threw the enemy into confusion.
The Khan's guards were the first to fall back, and they were followed by the
cavalry. When our troops reached the position, they found the enemy in
full flight. Throwing themselves on the rear of the retreating enemy, they
seized two guns, and then pressed forward, destroying a body of infantry
which they overtook, while the enemy's cavalry galloped away. The pursuit
was kept up to the very walls of the town, in which Alimkul, with the re-
mains of his host, took refuge.
Although the town might have been then occupied, yet, as I could not
run any risks with the last of my reserves, and as moreover the occupation
M
xxvi
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
would in any case have cost us not a little, I gave up the pursuit and return-
ed into camp, having resolved to remain in that position, in order to watch
the progress of events within the city, and if possible to occupy it on the
first opportunity.
In addition to the two guns, the enemy lost 300 men killed, and about
200 muskets.
Our loss consists of 10 wounded rank and file and 12 contused, includ-
ing one officer.
(The General here praises the valour of his officers and men).
APPENDIX XVI.
Extract from the Report of General Cherniayef,—(No. 2085, dated 1st June 1865).
After the engagement of the 9th May, as already reported to your
Excellency, I remained on the same position, 7 versts from Tashkend, for the
purpose of watching events in the town and of occupying it as soon as an
opportunity offered.
The death of Mullah Alimkul naturally brought about a crisis, not only
in the town itself but throughout the Khanat also, but it is to be regretted
that the crisis did not turn in our favor at Tashkend. The party for
Bokhara gained the ascendancy. The ruler of the town was chosen by the
people, and amongst them Atabek, the former commandant of Pishpek, who
had been our prisoner, sent at once an embassy to the Emir, asking him to
assist them and to take the town under his protection.
Although it appeared scarcely probable that the Emir of Bokhara would
consent to give open aid to a town which we had invested, yet, as even the
most insignificant succour arriving at Tashkend in the name of the Emir
would have given great moral support to the inhabitants, I determined to
quit the position which I had been occupying, and to pass round the town
towards the Syr-Daria, to prevent the possibility of any relief from that side
of the river. With the same object I ordered the steamers, which had
brought our heavy baggage and material to Turkistan, to ascend the river
as far as Tashkend, but the melancholy state of those vessels still deprives me
of the important co-operation of a flotilla. Leaving at Sary-Tiubé, our last
position which we had fortified, 3 companies of infantry and 4 guns
under the command of Colonel Kraevesky, I took, on the 17th May, with the
rest of the force, the road to Bokhara, and on coming up to the village of
Zinchátá, was very cordially received by the aksakals and inhabitants. Our
advanced guard captured in this village a Khivan envoy who had been sent
to Alimkul, while the latter was still alive. At his own request, the envoy was
sent back to Khiva by way of Fort Perofski, with presents to the Khan and
with a letter, of which I beg to enclose a translation.
Служ
As reports were continually in circulation of the Emir being on the
way to relieve the town, and as the inhabitants who escaped to our
camp confirmed the fact that relief was actually expected, and that the
current rumour was the only cause why they held out so long, notwithstand-
ing the great want of bread and water (there being only one small spring
in the town), I made a movement towards the mouth of the Chirchik, in
order to take the fort of Chinaz, which commanded the passage of the Syr-
Daria, and thus to prove to the inhabitants that the Emir of Bokhara would
in no case be allowed to get as far as Tashkend.
Before we got within a march of Chinaz, the aksakals came to tell me
that the commandant and garrison had fled across to the other side of the
APPENDIX XVI.
xxvii
Syr-Daria, and that the inhabitants had charged them to declare their sub.
mission to the Government of Russia.
Halting my force within 20 versts of the town, I sent forward a light
detachment with two guns, under Captain Abramof, with orders to disarm
the fortress, destroy the passage over the river, and quiet the inhabitants.
This was done with perfect success. Five garrison guns of cast-iron and
some large falconets were brought out of the fortress. The gunpowder
and projectiles, which were found in great quantities, were thrown into the
nearest branch of the Chirchik, and the means of crossing the Daria were
destroyed.
The fortress of Chinaz lies at the confluence of the Chirchik with the
Syr-Daria, on the high road to Bokhara, at a distance of 3 versts from the
former river and 8 versts from the latter. Like all other Kokandian fortifica-
tions, it has the form of an irregular quadrangle, and stands on a height
which considerably commands the town and neighbourhood. From its profile,
the height of its walls, the depth of the ditch, and generally from its size,
this fortress is considerably stronger than Niazbek, and is only inferior to
Chemkend because the latter stands on
a greater elevation. The town
adjoins the fortress and is also very little inferior to Chemkend in size and
extent of population. As a strongly fortified point at the principal passage
of the Syr-Daria, the position of Chinaz is of great importance.
As soon as the detachment returned from Chinaz I fell back on
Tashkend, and in order not to lose sight of the Bokhara road, I took up a posi-
tion on the south side of the town, at a distance of seven versts from its walls;
while on the road to Kokan, in order to cut off communication and to
prevent the passage of the Chirchik, I placed a detachment of two companies
with two guns under the command of Captain Grebenkin. Invested on
three of its sides, the town was reduced to great straits. The want of
bread compelled the inhabitants and garrison to sally out daily to reap the
corn, which had already ripened, and also to send their cattle to graze in the
vicinity of the town. Always informed of this in time, our light detachment
prevented the corn from being cut and the animals from being pastured.
In these forages we always took some prisoners and cattle. The former
invariably told us that the town was getting very short of bread and water,
that our party were loud in favour of surrendering, and that in fact the
town was only held by the garrison which occupied all the gates and prevented
any demonstrations on the part of the inhabitants. Knowing, on the
one hand, that the garrison was weak, and that it held out only because
we had not yet taken any decisive step, and, on the other, having
information that the Emir of Bokhara had sent envoys into the town
to advise the inhabitants not to surrender, I determined to approach closer
to the walls of the town, in order to induce the inhabitants to make a demon-
stration in our favour, and to prevent a complication of the affairs through
any interference on the part of the Emir. With this view, during the night
of the 6-7th June, I ordered Colonel Kraeveski, who had taken the command
of the detachment posted on the Kokan road, to advance towards the Kokan
gate; while with the main force, and leaving only one company with two guns
to hold my position, I made a movement along the south side of the town in
order to approach it from the other side.
Colonel Kraevesky having at past 2 in the morning come up to the
Kokan gate and being observed by the enemy, opened fire with his four guns
within a range of 250 fathoms. Under cover of this fire he made a recon-
noissance of the Kokan and Samlia gates, which adjoin each other.
battery destroyed one tower, knocked down a barbet, and considerably
Красивый
зрения
Our
xxviii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
damaged the gate. The main force which had advanced simultaneously was
not able to come up to the walls of the fortress in its full strength, for
at a distance of five versts it came across an immense ravine which entirely
prevented the passage of our artillery. I therefore halted and caused a
reconnoissance to be made of the walls by a light detachment. As soon as
this was finished, I advanced the camp nearer to the town and took up a
position four versts from the walls between the Bokhara road and the
Syr-Daria.
(The General subjoins a plan of the camp and reports the death of
Balynbai, a Cossack Officer, killed during the reconnoissance).
APPENDIX XVII.
Report from General Cherniayef,- dated 17th June 1865.
15th
During the night of 14th June, the town and citadel of Tashkend were
taken by storm by means of scaling ladders.
Our loss consists of 125 rank and file:-25 killed; wounded: 3 officers,
86 rank and file, and contused 24 rank and file.
Our trophies are—
Standards, large 16, and a quantity of pennons; guns about 60, the
great part brass, including a mountain howitzer which had been abandoned
by the Ural Cossacks in the engagement at Ikan.
The reasons which induced me to take this decisive step and a detailed
account of the engagement I shall forward by Lieutenant Makarof, of the
Engineers, one of my principal coadjutors during the whole of the present
expedition.
(The General then mentions briefly the names of the officers who had
particularly distinguished themselves during the assault, and that a priest had
marched in front of the troops carrying a cross).
Having mentioned those who specially distinguished themselves on this
occasion, I consider myself bound to certify that each man of the force did
his duty thoroughly, and that it is easier to be conquerors than the conquered
with such troops.
The occupation of Tashkend has given us a position in Central Asia com-
mensurate with the interest of the Empire and the power of the Russian
nation.
APPENDIX XVIII.
Extract from Report of General Cherniayef,-dated 26th June 1865, to the
Officer Commanding the Troops in the Orenburg Region.
I have the honor to forward herewith, in the original, communications
which have been received from the Bokharian camp in Khodjend, and to
request Your Excellency will give orders for the immediate arrest of all
caravans and subjects of the Emir of Bokhara within the confines of the
empire.
APPENDIX XIX.
GOD IS GREAT.
To the Governor General Cherniayef.
Be it known to thee that the person sent by thee to our high person,
has been told that without imperial instructions thou canst not give away
APPENDIX XX.
xxix
any dominion and also that thou hast no right of thine accord to leave it,
and to go back; that thou shalt report this first to thine Emperor, and until
receipt of instructions remain where thou art. We, therefore, not crossing the
Chirchik, shall protect the bank opposite to thee and shall act according to the
reply which thine Emperor shall make. As thou art agreeable to this, we-
high personage-have also written a letter from ourselves to thine Emperor send-
ing it to the Supreme Court by one of our servants, and trusting in our former
friendship await an answer, on receipt of which we shall commence to act
according to its contents. But until then, desirous that the inhabitants of
this country may be secured from danger, we have appointed headmen from
among them, whom we have commanded to maintain a watch and not to
allow any one to cross the river Chirchik; therefore, thou, too, order thy
subordinates to keep in like position until the receipt of the expected intel-
ligence. This our gracious message is despatched with our faithful servants,
Iman-Hodja and Seid-Hodja, who will deliver it to you.
Inscribed "Emir Seid Muzafer" on the seal, month of Safar 1282, translated
by Colonel Councillor Bekchurin.
TRANSLATION FROM THE PERSIAN.
To the Governor General Cherniayef.
We present you with a black shawl for the waist and a khalat made
from a Cashmere shawl.
Inscribed on the seal "Emir Seid Muzafer."
APPENDIX XX.
Abstract of General Cherniayef's Report of the 7th July 1865.
The inhabitants of Tashkend, pressed to the utmost by a continued and
strict blockade, and suffering from entire lack of provisions and more especially
of water, trusted solely in the Emir to whom at last they sent an embassy
composed of the chief representatives of the town. The Emir did not
refuse assistance to the Tashkendians, but demanded that they should first
send him the young Khan as a hostage. In the nights of the 9-10th or
21-22nd of June, the Kokand Khan, with 200 of his followers secretly
left the town, and a small party of Bokharians with Iskendenbek, who assumed
command of Tashkend, as secretly entered into it. The Emir's main forces, long
assembled at Samarcand, began to make their appearance at the Kokand forts
on the frontier, along the left bank of the Syr-Daria.
All these circumstances, with the positive information received through
a succession of run-a-ways from Tashkend, to the effect that the town
was in a most critical position, and that it was only the garrison and a trust
in aid from the Bokharians that kept it from surrendering, obliged me to resolve
on the final step, in order to anticipate the open interference of the Emir and
to avert collision with him.
It was impossible to undertake the siege of a fortified town 24 versts
in circumference with a population of from 150 to 200,000, and possessing
great means of defence. To oppose a handful of men numbering 1,951 with
12 guns and one complement of ammunition against a town which could
concentrate, at the point attacked in a very short period, at least as many
as 30,000 men with 50 guns, and at the same time expecting a demonstration
XXX
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
by the Emir of Bokhara, was evidently out of the question. Yet to retire
from before the town was to give the Emir a great reputation in Central Asia,
and to strengthen him with all the military resources concentrated in Tashkend.
I therefore determined to take the town by open force, the following consider-
ations entering into my calculations on success :—
1st. The garrison of the town, owing to the great length of the line of
defence, was scattered over a large area, for which reason it was very probable
to seize the works before it could be collected at the point of attack.
2nd.—The enemy's artillery, although very numerous, but scattered over
an area of 15 versts, over the whole of the southern extremity of the town,
could not also at any given moment operate unanimously.
3rd.—The inhabitants of the town were divided into two parties, and the
one devoted to us was by agreement to aid us in the event of our taking the
defences.
It was found after a series of surveys of the works of the town, per-
formed by Lieutenant Makarof, of the Engineers, during the blockade of the
fort, that Tashkend might be attacked by one of the gates on the south-
eastern side; an attack on this quarter of the town had also this advantage,
that on obtaining possession of it we should gain the whole town, because
the right side or Bas-Su, where all the wealthy and mercantile classes of
Tashkend resided, was inclined towards us; whereas the whole side of the
town which was attacked was exclusively occupied by the military class and
the party of the Emir of Bokhara. Besides, in an attack on the south-
eastern side, the military class alone would suffer from the consequences
of the storm and not the peaceful citizens who were devoted to us.
Repeated reconnoissances of the walls, in greater strength, conducted
by the same officer who approached as near as the counter scarp of the
fort trench, convinced me that the most advantageous point of attack was
the Komelan gates.
In the night of the 14 to the 15 it was determined to storm these gates
in the following order :-
The main detachment under my own personal command quitting its
position at 11 o'clock at night was to attack the Komelan gates at day-break
by means of scaling ladders, and a special contrivance of Captain Yablonski,
of the Engineers, consisting of arbas* with folding ladders to be employed in
crossing the trench.
Simultaneously with the attack by the main detachment a demonstration
was to be made by Colonel Kraevski's detachment, stationed at Kiúmuik,
on the side of the Kokand gates (six versts from the Komelan gates), but
without undertaking anything decisive it was to support the attack by
bombarding the town.
After occupying the outer defences it was proposed that the foremost
troops should immediately advance to the right along the street running
round the town wall and on reaching the Kokand gates open them to Colonel
Kraeveski and then capture the citadel.
The main detachment advanced in three columns. The volunteers and
21 companies chosen for the purpose of effecting the storm marched ahead.
com-
The volunteers were commanded by Captain Wulfert and Ensigns
Shorokhof and Lapin. But the whole of the storming column was
manded by Staff Captain Abramof, of the artillery. The storming column
was followed at a distance of one verst by two companies with two light
guns under Major de la Croix, and these at one verst again by a reserve
*Arba two-wheeled carts.
APPENDIX XX.
Xxxi
of 24 companies with four battery guns under Lieutenant Colonel Jemchuj-
nikof.
This order of advance was necessary, because there was only one road
leading to these as to most of the other gates of the town.
1
At & past 2 o'clock, on the approach of the storming column under Captain
Abramof to within one and half verst of the gates, the men took the ladders
from off the camels' backs, and carrying them in their hands marched along
both sides of the road through the gardens; a small line of skirmishers ad-
vanced at their head; this movement directed by Lieutenant Makarof, acting
with the column as a staff officer, was performed with remarkable silence.
The chain of skirmishers profiting by the darkness of the night and
the cover of the gardens came up to the very walls without being observed
by the enemy's watch, stationed in front of the walls.
The day began to break. The volunteers with the ladders were within
about 100 paces of the gates and the skirmishers on the outskirts of the gardens
under the very walls, when our advance was discovered by the guards,
against whom our men stumbled with the ladders; in a moment a simul-
taneous cheer arose in front, and before the garrison had time to recover
their surprise, our foremost men were upon the barbet, from which they hurled
down both the enemy and the guns that were there.
The first to mount the wall by ladder was Sergeant Khmclef, the second,
Captain Wulfert, and the third Junker Favodski.
The priest Molof walked in front of the attacking body, carrying the cross.
After taking the wall a portion of the men commenced at once to
throw open the gates, and the rest proceeded to occupy the adjacent houses
and gardens.
Captain Wulfert mounting the wall with a few men threw himself along
it, and notwithstanding the desperate resistance of the Kokandians drove them
off the nearest barbet at the point of the bayonet and seized a gun; he was,
however, wounded by a shot in the hand. In the meanwhile our reserves were
already running up to the walls, and as soon as the foremost of them came
in sight, with 250 men Captain Wulfert proceeded up the street on the right
along the town wall in order to admit Kraeveski's detachment. On the first
barbet Abramof was met by an artillery fire from four guns covering 200
sarbazes ensconced in the turrets. A rush was made, with a cheer, and the
guns were spiked by our men and hurled down into the trench; they
went on further. On coming up to the second barbet they were again
greeted with an artillery fire, but these guns also fell into our hands
like the last. Two more barbets were then taken with the bayonet, and
the rest, along the whole extent (14 versts) of the wall traversed by
Abramof, were abandoned, so that he had only to spike the guns and throw
them off the barbets. Amongst the guns taken was a 10-pounder mountain
howitzer abandoned by the Cossacks in the action at Ikan.
Passing along as far as the Kara sarai gates, commencing from which the
inhabitants of that part of Tashkend were in favour of our cause, Abramof
entered into town. In the very first street he encountered barricades defended
by strong musketry fire; they were all broken through, and the detachment
advanced to the principal bazar.
There the resistance was still greater; besides barricades, at every turn all
the houses were filled with musketeers. Leaving the bazar, the detachment
now found several barricades strongly defended in every street, so that each
one had to be taken with the bayonet. After traversing thus nearly the
whole of that half of the town, Abramof entered the citadel which he found
already occupied by de la Croix and Jemchujnikof.
xxxii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
So soon as Abramof turned off to the right, the enemy recovering him-
self began to concentrate opposite to our left flank, occupying the nearest
houses and gardens, and when the soldiers were clearing these with their
bayonets, large masses of the enemy's infantry, assembled in two of the adja-
cent streets leading to the bazar, fell upon our troops calling out "Allah" and
sounding their drums. I sent Lieutenant Makarof to attack them with 50
riflemen and a rocket company. Two well-directed 36-pounder rockets followed
up by a bayonet charge compelled them to turn and to clear the streets, which
they did with great loss. From this moment our left flank was perfectly
secure, although the firing from the occupied portion of the walls and from
the trees and furthermost houses was continued until the evening.*
Almost simultaneously with Abramof's advance, I led into the town two
pieces of horse artillery and three battery guns, which opened fire upon the
town. A short time after I despatched Major de la Croix with two companies
and one gun in the same direction as that taken by Abramof, and following
upon these, two more companies with two guns, under Lieutenant Colonel
Jemchujnikof.
Notwithstanding that Major de la Croix was sent almost immediately
after Abramof, he fell in with fresh barricades along the same road, which
the enemy constructed with remarkable rapidity of "arbas" and felled trees.
While de la Croix was driving the enemy from the barricades, Jemchujnikof
came up, and combining their forces they both marched to the citadel, which
they took at past 7 a. M. Here also the artillery was at once brought to
fire upon the town. The enemy driven into the centre of the town ceased
the musketry fire, but our detachment was obliged to evacuate the citadel,
as the Kokandians fired the offices of the Khan's palace, and the fire spreading
very fast might have caused an explosion of the powder stored there.
Colonel Kraevski's detachment leaving its position at Kuiliuk moved
towards Tashkend at midnight. To prevent him from giving the alarm, and
from thus allowing the enemy time to assemble on the walls, he was ordered
not to open fire until he was himself discovered, or until he heard the firing
from the main column.
The enemy on discerning Colonel Kraevski's detachment, opened fire
with nine guns, to which Colonel Kraevski replied with four light pieces of
artillery; the cheer behind the walls was soon heard, and Kraevski's infantry,
assisted by the men of the main column, commenced scrambling up by means
of their muskets.
At this time Kraevski was informed of the appearance of the enemy
on the right flank in the act of escaping from the town. He at once galloped
off with his Cossacks and with four pieces of horse artillery to intercept them.
Some well-directed discharges of grape at a short distance, made the crowds
run; a party of 39 Cossacks rode after them; other bodies of Kokandian
cavalry which followed were not less succesfully received, being also turned to
flight.
The whole of this numerous cavalry, more than 5,000, pursued by a mere
handful of brave men, scattered their banners along the road, and galloping
to the Chirchik rushed into the river, where they trampled each other
in fording.
In the meanwhile the infantry having scaled the wall, joined Abramof
and proceeded with him along it. Kraevski himself on entering the town
joined Jemchujnikof, who had then left the citadel, and in obedience to my
* At this time three of our officers were wounded, Lieutenant Mesiatsef (mortally),
Ensigns Lapin and Soltanovski, besides several men killed and wounded.
1
APPENDIX XX.
xxxiii
orders placed himself in a position between the Kokan and Kashgar States on
the site of the Khan's habitation.
When the half of the town was cleared and the musketry fire had
ceased, the main column took up its quarter at the Komelan gates.
The Aksakals of the portions of the town favourable to us presented
themselves with assurances of complete submission, and promised on the next
day to appear in camp with ten elders and the foremost citizens of the whole
town, whom they hoped to be able to convince of the utter impossibility of
resisting us. But in the evening the enemy again got into the adjacent
houses and opened a musketry fire on our lines. Communication between
the main column and Kraevski's detachment was nearly cut off. Barricades
re-appeared in all the streets and at all the crossings. The resistance to us
was still more desperate. There were instances of a single man with a halbert
falling upon a company and dying on their bayonets without asking for
mercy.
The small parties of men sent to secure the neighbouring streets had to
struggle against fearful opposition. Each house had to be taken with the
bayonet, and was cleared only after all its occupants were put to death.
The most obstinate resistance was encountered in the street leading from
the gates to the principal "Kosh” or bazar.
"Sotnik" Ivanof, of the Cossack artillery, whom I sent with 50 men
to clear the above street, found barricades defended with artillery. As his fire
had no effect on the Kokandian musketeers he rushed on the first barricade, and
notwithstanding their desperate defence of it, drove them away at the point
of the bayonet and took possession of their gun; there was another barricade
a little farther on armed with two cannon; in front of it was a deep "aryk"
(canal) which served as a trench. A cross fire from the two-storied houses in
the vicinity afforded a strong additional defence; the handful of brave
fellows having only just taken the first barricade after a hard fight, and before
having had time to remove it, were met with a shower of grape from the
second. Seeing the difficulty of his position and the impossibility of keeping
up any fire of musketry, Ivanof was the first to make a rush with a
cheer inciting his soldiers to follow him; the guns and the barricade were
taken; here he received a contusion and was taken back to the camp;
Lieutenant Makarof was sent to fill his place.
Bravely acting in common, our courageous troops cleared the streets
a second time. The artillery advanced one verst towards the interior of the
town and opened a fire which continued all night. In the evening our
grenades had set fire to some houses in the adjacent quarter of the town, and
the conflagration lasted till the next day. For the night all the troops
assembled at the Komelan gates. On the morning of the 16th, Colonel Kraevski
with three companies and two guns was commissioned to collect the enemy's
cannon and to blow up the citadel. All along the road he fell in with
barricades and encountered the same fire from the adjacent houses as the
day before. The barricades were, however, destroyed, the houses taken,
and the detachment safely entered the citadel, where he was again resisted;
all the nearest houses and gardens were occupied by Kokandian musketeers
who opened a frequent and very accurate fire upon the detachment, but
owing to Kraevski's good management the detachment executed its task
and returned to camp without any great loss.
By the evening the streets were free, and before sunset the natives sent
by the Aksakals at length made their appearance, requesting permission for all
the elders of the town to present themselves on the next day.
N
xxxiv
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
On the 17 all the Aksakals and leading citizens actually presented them-
selves before me, declaring their complete readiness to submit to the Russian
Government.
The town surrendered unconditionally, and orders were immediately given
to disarm it. All the Aksakals and many of the inhabitants took the most
energetic steps in searching for arms in the town, and by the evening they
themselves brought in 20 brass cannon and about 300 muskets. The town
became perfectly quiet; not a single shot was fired. Tashkend was finally
conquered.
Our trophies were 16 large banners, including one Bokharian banner,
a great number of pennons, 63 guns of various calibres, of which 48 were
brass, and remarkably well cast, besides a number of muskets. Among the
brass guns was an 8-pr. mortar.
There were found about 2,000 poods of powder and about 10,000
various projectiles.
Our losses were.-
Officers
Men
...
...
Killed. Wounded, Contused.
3
25
86
4
24
The enemy's garrison was reported to have consisted of 5,000 "Sarbazes" and
1,000 Sepoys, the majority of whom fled when the storm commenced.
The total number of defenders, according to the most moderate accounts,
was about 30,000.
In the course of time it may be possible to leave Tashkend to itself,
but as yet the presence of Russian troops here is indispensable. There is no
doubt that on the departure of our troops from here differences would arise
between the party favourable to us and that inclining to Bokhara, and the
position of the Khan nominated by us would be very difficult.
Besides there is no guarantee that Kokand will not begin a war with
Tashkend when the latter is abandoned by the Russian troops, and that the
Emir of Bokhara will not again assert his right to the town.
Bearing these circumstances in mind, and taking into consideration local
conditions and my own resources, I have determined to leave in Tashkend
a garrison of one battalion of infantry with ten guns (eight batteries and two
rifled guns) and two "sotnias" of Cossacks, selecting for a fortification
the height near the Komelan gates (the citadel being too far from the centre
of the town and its defences being too feeble).
For the purpose of establishing perfect tranquillity and for the defence
of the newly conquered country, I propose to place garrisons in Niazbek
and Chinaz. The latter by its position by the ferry across the Syr-Daria,
on the great caravan road to Bokhara, is of great importance.
But for the accomplishment of all this the actual military resources of
the Turkistan region appear insufficient, and I ain compelled to request your
Excellency to recommend the immediate despatch hither of one more battalion
of infantry and two "sotnias" of Cossacks.
Upon this, in my opinion, order and tranquillity will be temporarily
secured in the newly occupied country; but as experience has proved that
reinforcements cannot arrive in due time from either Orenburg or Omsk, it
will be necessary next year, so as to be prepared for every emergency and to
avert it, to send here, early in the spring, a regiment of infantry.
The countries occupied last year and this possess all the means for
independent existence, so that nothing but powder and shot will be required
from Russia.
Reverting in conclusion to the occupation of Tashkend, I cannot refrain
from observing that this feat could be performed only by troops fully
APPENDIX XXI.
XXXV
experienced in and accustomed to victories, like those I have the happiness to
comniand.
I consider it my duty to beg your Excellency to bring before the
gracious notice of his Imperial Majesty this handful of untiring, fearless
warriors who have gained for the Russian name in Central Asia a prestige
proportionate to the dignity of the empire and power of the Russian nation.
[Here follows honourable mention of all the officers who took part, and distinguished
themselves, in the siege and capture of Tashkend.]
APPENDIX XXI.
Extract from General Cherniayef's Report of the 6 August 1865.
The accompanying correspondence will acquaint Your Excellency with
the course of the negociations which I entered into with the Emir of Bokhara
relative to our occupation of Tashkend.
My first letter to the Emir was despatched immediately after the action
of the 9 May, when, on the death of Mullah Alimkul, the inhabitants
of Tashkend applied to me for assistance.
The concentration of the Bokharian troops at Samarcand, and their
advance within the limits of the Khanat of Kokand, induced me to make an
attempt to divert the Khan from any interference in the affairs of Tashkend
and to give another direction to his movements, which would be more com-
patible with our interests.
Knowing that the same Emir had in 1863 been to Kokand with the
intention of placing his own son-in-law, the late Khudayar Khan, on the
Kokand throne, I informed him of the conquest of the northern portion of
the Khanat of Kokand, and proposed that he should proceed to carry out his
design, in which, by the way, I could do nothing to thwart him.
In order to lend more weight to my proposition, I promised the Emir
that, in case of necessity, I would apply to Government for permission to give
him aid, if his own powers were inadequate.
This proposition, made conditionally, did not bind me to anything.
This letter did not reach its destination, and the Emir, remaining in
ignorance as to the object of our conquests in Central Asia, and, peradventure,
somewhat apprehensive on account of his own possessions, amassed an enor-
mous host, with which he marched to Khodjend.
By taking Tashkend I anticipated the Emir, and intercepted his approach
to the Syr-Daria where it is crossed, and prevented a collision with him.
On arriving in Khodjend, the Emir demanded to know the reasons for
which we had taken Tashkend, and, laying claim to that town, called upon me
even to withdraw to Chemkend, pending the return of his embassy from St.
Petersburg."
Having received in reply a letter which had been even previously intended
for him, the Emir was apparently satisfied with it, and sent me another
embassy, and this time with presents. All his demands were to the effect,
that we should not cross the Chirchik, on the pretence that the whole of the
population in that part of the country had submitted to him, and he desired
that in future that river should be our mutual boundary.
Having reason to suppose that, if the Emir brought his affairs to a
satisfactory conclusion in Kokand, he might again bring forward his pretensions
to Tashkend, I considered it necessary to prepare for all eventualities, and to
gain as much time as possible, until the arrival of the reinforcements destined
for this province.
xxxvi
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
I therefore gave no definite answer to the Emir. Having told his envoys
that I must refer them to my previous declaration until I received further
commands from His Imperial Majesty, I dismissed them with presents, in
exchange for those which they had brought.
The envoys stated that their master was offended at our not sending a
single embassy while he had already sent two missions, and they entreated
me to comply with the wishes of the Emir in this matter. I excused myself
on the ground that I could not take such a step after the letters which I had
received from Khodjend, and with which my Government would not in all
probability be satisfied.
They gave no positive answer to my question as to the object of the
embassy sent by the Emir to St. Petersburg, and they confined themselves to
insisting that I should not cross the Chirchik until its return. When I told
them that, if even the embassy were allowed to proceed to St. Petersburg,
it could, in no case, return for four or five months, and that it would be far
more convenient if the Emir would convey his wishes to me, in order that I
might submit them to my Government, they replied that the Emir would
agree provided my Government informed him that I had been furnished with
the necessary full powers.
In conclusion I consider it my duty to submit to your Excellency the
data on which instructions might at the present time be supplied to the
local commander.
C
1-
1. Although I submitted last year the necessity of forming Tashkend
into an independent Khanat without the presence of our troops, yet I must
acknowledge that, after studying both the state of affairs in the place itself and
the character of its population, I have become convinced of the practical im-
possibility of carrying out such a scheme. I was induced to suggest it mainly
from a consideration of the difficulties, which I supposed would attend the estab-
lishment of a police and the keeping of so populous a city in subjection.
Considering the number of troops that are required to mount guard in Moscow
and St. Petersburg, and the immense sums which are spent in the maintenance
of the police, I could never have imagined that Tashkend, with its Mussulman
population of 200,000, assembled for purposes of trade from the extremest
points of Asia, would require so few troops and such little expenditure for
the purpose of being kept in peace and order.
Experience has shown that, if self-government be accorded to the inhabi-
tants, peace and perfect submission can be secured by one battalion and
two sotnias" quartered in the citadel, which stands apart from the town.
The police management can be left to the inhabitants.
Within a week after the town had been taken by storm, complete tran-
quillity and order were introduced without scarcely any interference on our
part. The deep respect of the inhabitants for order and authority is most re-
markable, and can only be found elsewhere in the most civilized states. The
police is so good that few cases of theft or other crime remain undetected.
I therefore would recommend the application of the principle of self-
government, and that our interference be limited to a supervision of those
who may be placed in office, reserving to ourselves the right of dismissing
them should they not justify our selection.
It is, therefore, only necessary to have a Governor and Assistant Governor
at Tashkend, with two interpreters and two writers. Two officers should also
be attached to the Governor for the purpose of controlling the taxes
and customs' duties; each to have the assistance of an interpreter and a
writer. The salaries of all these officials should be paid out of the town
The neighbouring villages should also be placed within the juris-
diction of the Governor of Tashkend.
revenue.
APPENDIX XXL
xxxvii
2. I do not consider that it would be desirable at the present moment
to establish an independent Khanat at Tashkend subject to the supremacy
of Russia. The Khan that might be named by our Government would in the
eyes of the people still be the same Russian official by whom they are at
present ruled, with this difference that the authority of the latter is recognised
because it is backed by a force, whereas the power of the Khan can never be
more than nominal. In order that he should have some weight with the
people, it would be necessary to support him by military force, and the result
would be that we should only lose that part of the revenue which would be
appropriated to the maintenance of the Khan.
Moreover, the conversion of Tashkend into an independent Khanat
would deprive us of that important political position, which we have acquired
by the occupation of a town which is the capital of the whole of Central
Asia.
With reference to the frontier which should separate us from the neigh-
bouring Khanats, I am convinced that it ought to run along the Syr-Daria
for the following reasons:
1st. The valley of the Chirchik is uncommonly fertile. Agriculture is
more especially developed on the left side of the valley, which is exclusively
occupied by the Kurama tribe of settled Kirghizes, who sow immense fields of
rice which they sell almost entirely at Tashkend.
Under present circumstances, while the Emir of Bokhara holds Kokand
and Khodjend, the supply of corn from beyond the Chirchik has ceased, and
this has become very apparent from the prices in the bazaar of Tashkend.
2nd. Among the Trans-Chirchik population are two very warlike
tribes, the Kongly and Chaishkly. During the whole of our operations in
front of Tashkend, the Kirghizes of those tribes made constant raids on this
side of the river, robbing the population which had submitted to us. These
incursions still continue, although much less frequently, aud, owing to the
waters of the Chirchik being at present very low, admitting of the river
being forded at any part, it is quite impossible to keep those robber bands pro-
perly in check.
3rd.-A. frontier along the Syr-Daria would completely and definitely open
the river to our steamers, which could then ascend as far as the river is
navigable, whereas with a frontier along the Chirchik, the navigation of
the Jaxartes would be in our hands only as far as the mouths of the
Chirchik.
Moreover, by taking possession of the whole course of the Syr-Daria,
we become close neighbours of the Khanat of Kokand, and place ourselves.
in the rear of its capital, at a distance of only 40 versts, which will enable
us to watch events, while with another fortified post at Namangan or Kurtka,
we might establish our influence over the Kipchaks, and thus open a road
to Kashgar for our caravans.
Independently of the above considerations, it is impossible to foresee all
the inconvenience of a frontier so close to Tashkend, many fields belonging to
the latter town being situated on the opposite bank of the Chirchik.
In view of this fact, I begged your Excellency to send into the province
in my charge, another battalion of the line and a regiment of three battalions,
as our present means are insufficient for the complete military occupation
of the whole of the territory which we indispensably require, and for keeping
peaceful possession of a country which cannot expect timely aid from any
quarter whatever. Moreover, our advanced fortresses being separated by
great distances, require garrisons entirely independent of each other, and
even our reserve must be sufficiently strong to support at any time our
demands on Kokand and Bokhara.
xxxviii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
If my request for the despatch of more troops be complied with, I shall
be able to take into the field a force of five battalions, with two and a half
batteries, after leaving sufficient garrisons in all the fortresses. With such
a force the Government will be able to dispose at pleasure of the fate of
Central Asia.
I now turn to our present relations with the Emir of Bokhara and to
the future organization of the Khanat of Kokand.
The pretensions to Tashkend which the Emir brought forward at
Khodjend, where he has halted with all his immense bands, are of considerable
importance to us for being esteemed the head of the Mahomedan world in
Central Asia ; and possessing great material resources, he is the only ruler that
can oppose our views.
His request that we should evacuate Tashkend proves that he places
great reliance on his own strength; and if he is apparently satisfied with my
answers, it is only because of his present unfavourable position in Kokand,
and also because the Bokharian caravans have not yet returned from
Russia.
If, contrary to expectations, the Emir should succeed in improving the
state of his affairs, it is very probable that he will not allow an opportunity
to escape
of renewing his pretensions, in which case the question will have
to be solved by arms.
The present is the most favourable time for finally compelling him to
renounce his pretensions and even to open his dominions to our trade, and I
regret that I cannot avail myself of so favourable an opportunity.
In the first place, re-inforcements destined for the frontier line have
not yet arrived, and they are urgently wanted in case of military operations
against the Emir; secondly, all the troops are at present occupied in preparing
quarters for the winter; and, thirdly, we are collecting provisions for the troops,
and in case of a rupture with the Emir, this operation cannot be conducted
with any rapidity, for the local population always maintain a strict neutrality
in such cases until the crisis is over.
These circumstances do not permit me to insist more decidedly on the
satisfaction of our demands by the Emir, and they compel me to seek to
gain time.
Considering, that the Emir of Bokhara can scarcely retain the Khanat
of Kokand for any length of time, although even he should succeed in putting
down the Kipchaks, I am of opinion that it would be more advantageous
to us if Khudayar, the son-in-law of the Emir, were to be placed in possession
of the Khanat.
Khudayar is not distinguished either by his ability or character, and he
does not possess the confidence of the people, particularly that of the
Kipchaks, who, in such a case, would always be our tools against the Khan.
The Emir of Bokhara, bound by such an arrangement, would attach import-
ance to our friendship, especially since he would not always be able to sup-
port his son-in-law alone; and as the latter would be considerably nearer to
us than to Bokhara, he would inevitably submit to our exclusive influence.
In order to satisfy the vanity of the Emir, the appointment of Khudayar might
be made to appear as if it had been the result of a mutual understanding
between us.
In consequence of intelligence just received respecting the state of affairs
in Kokand, circumstances will perhaps give us the opportunity of taking
at once the side of the Kipchaks, and of co-operating to the elevation, not of
Khudayar, but of some other Chingizide to the Khanat. In any case the
person who shall be elected to the Khanat will adopt the views of our
Government, as laid down in Your Excellency's instructions. Events follow
APPENDIX XXIII.
xxxix
so fast and so unexpectedly in Asia, that in most cases, it is impossible to
foresee them.
APPENDIX XXII.
To His Highness the Emir of Bokhara.
The constant disorders in the Khanat of Kokand have at last turned the
attention of my great sovereign to that country.
He has sent me to give peace and tranquillity to an oppressed people,
and to bring it under his high protection.
Your Highness is aware that last year I conquered half the Khanat,
and that my only reason for not proceeding further at that time was my being
then occupied in organizing the government of the country. I had hoped that
the Kokand Government would come meanwhile to its senses. But the
incursions made by Alimkul on the villages of Ikan and Chilik have con-
vinced me of the contrary.
I am now under the walls of Tashkend, and on the 9th May fought a
battle with the Kokandians at a distance of seven versts from the town.
The Kokandian troops suffered a general defeat, they lost several guns,
and Mullah Alimkul himself, the Regent of the Khanat, was killed. The
disorders and internecine strife consequent on his death will accomplish the
ruin of the country.
Although I have the orders of my sovereign not to cross the Syr-Daria,
yet His Majesty desires, nevertheless, that the remaining part of the Khanat,
which cannot, for certain circumstances, be incorporated with the empire
and enjoy his protection, should be reduced to a state of order and tranquil noe
lity such as is enjoyed by the subjects of my great sovereign and by those
of Your Highness.
As the Emirs of Bokhara have the honor of being in friendship with
my mighty sovereign, the emperor, I consider it my duty to acquaint
Your Highness with the present state of affairs, in order that you may judge
whether it be advisable to bestow the throne of Kokand on its lawful Khan
Khudayar.
If Your Highness should require the aid of Russian troops, I will at
once, on being informed thereof, request the permission of the emperor to
that effect.
I beg Your Highness will not fail to order that I should be informed of
the decision which you may have been pleased to take in this matter.
I shall await such answer under the walls of Tashkend.
I consider it necessary at the same time to communicate to Your
Highness that the whole of the country from the sea of Aral to the fortress
of Vernoö has now been formed by the will of my sovereign into a distinct
province bearing the name of Turkistan, and of which I have been appointed
Military Governor ; I am also Commander of the Forces which are stationed
within the province; as well as of those which are on the way to join it.
I have the honor to express to Your Highness my sentiments of perfect
devotion and respect.
APPENDIX XXIII,
To His Highness Muzafer Bagadur Khan, the highly exalted Emir of
Bokhara.
I had the honor to receive Your Highness's letter, but I was obliged to
ask your envoys to await my answer at Tashkend, while I went to Auliéta
to inspect the troops which have arrived from Siberia.
xl
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Your Highness's letter was at once forwarded to my mighty sovereign,
and I have at present nothing to add to what I have already had the honor
of communicating in my previous letter.
While gratefully acknowledging the presents which you sent, I beg Your
Highness to accept the accompanying articles of silver-plate in testimony of
my deep respect.
APPENDIX XXIV.
Address presented to the Governor General of Orenburg by the inhabitants of
Tashkend on the 18th September 1865.
Translation from the Tartar.
Firstly in the Name of the Maker, &c.
To Aide-de-Camp General Kryjanovski, Governor General of Orenburg.
On Friday, the 6th day of the month of Safar, in the year 1282 of
the Mahomedan era, we, the inhabitants of Tashkend, having called in
the power of the great sovereign, placed ourselves under his protection.
It was graciously announced to us at that time that, although we had
submitted to the rule of the Russian Government, yet that it desired that
the administration should, as heretofore, remain in our own hands, and that
with that object we should elect a Chief from amongst ourselves.
Although we were much rejoiced at this gracious proposal, for which
we beg to express our gratitude, yet we must be pardoned for stating that the
appointment of a Chief from amongst our own people for the service of the
great sovereign would be on our part an act of too much self-confidence and
would also be out of place. While fulfilling the commands of the authorities,
we beg to report as follows:
It has come to our knowledge that in Russia all matters relating to the
We would therefore
Mahomedan religion are under the direction of a Mufti.
wish that all similar matters concerning our Sharigate should be under the
direction of our Kazy-Kilian, on condition that no one should interfere
with his arrangements, excepting the person who, by appointment from the
higher authorities, shall have the functions of an arbitrator and afford us
protection, in which case, it will not be necessary to elect a Chief from amongst
ourselves, and we even fear that such an election might give rise to great
disorders among the people and originate evil and injustice.
We have therefore resolved to ask that all matters relating to the
Sharigate should be entrusted to our Kazy-Kilian; that the appointment
in Tashkend to offices subordinate to him, of Kazis, Agliams, Muftis, Riaises,
Mutavalies (?) and Imaums be left to the discretion of the same Kazy-
Kilian, subject to confirmation by General Cherniayef, and that the ap
pointment of Zaketchis (tax collectors), Kurbashis, Aksakals and other
similar officials, be left to General Cherniayef; moreover, that the chief
government over this population be also confided to General Cherniayef,
as he has already been two years in this country, and since he has
been so condescending to the inhabitants of Tashkend since the capture of
the town as to return good for evil, and no Tashkendian has yet suffered
wrong at his hands. At the same time General Cherniayef knows well every
one here from great to small, the bad as well as the good.
Leaving General Cherniayef at the head of the Government of Tash-
kend, we beg that to his authority and government may be also made
subject such places as once formed part of this territory, and of which
the boundaries were on the cast, the Issyk Kul, Ili, Utch-Kurgan, to the
APPENDIX XXV.
xli
very river Syr-Daria; on the north, the same Ili Ak-Mechet, to the fortress
of Raim; on the west, the whole extent, from the beginning to the end, of
the course of the Syr-Daria, with its left bank, and with the fortification of
Chardara; on the south, the same extent from the beginning to the end,
along the river Syr-Daria.
Being desirous of freeing the inhabitants of Tashkend from all such
taxes as are not imposed by the Sharigate, we beg that no imposts be levied
on houses within the town of Tashkend or on lands acquired with the
knowledge and confirmation of the Kazy-Kilian. As regards the Government
lands let to us, we engage, in compliance with the Sharigate, to pay one-
tenth part of the profits, partly in produce, partly in money.
We further ask that no inhabitant of Tashkend be made a soldier or
turned into a Cossack; that we shall not be required to quarter troops, and
that we shall be freed from the money-exactions formerly made on the decease
of members of the community (succession duty); that the marriage ceremony
of maidens be performed by the Kazy-Kilian, and that of widows by the
Riaises; that all immoveable property known as Vakf made over by any one
as a free gift, and wherever situated, i. e., whether in Tashkend or outside
the town, be exempt from all taxes, and that we be allowed freely to apply
the revenues from such property to the objects for which the Vakf was
originally bestowed.
We beg that all the acts of grace and the privileges which may be
bestowed upon us by our great monarch be extended to such of the people of
Tashkend as may at present be in other towns.
While subject to the administration of Tashkend, all persons holding office
in the province, whether high or low, should receive their appointments solely
at the will and by the confirmation of General Cherniayef.
This is necessary,
in order that such persons should be personally known to the Chief Governor
of Tashkend and that no disorder should ensue.
Whereupon, by the resolution of our Sharigate, we are bound constantly
and everlastingly to pray God for the health and welfare of our great
sovereign.
If we have any shortcomings, we pray that the same may be forgiven.
1282.
(To the original are affixed fifty-eight seals bearing the names of the most
respectable inhabitants of the town of Tashkend.)
APPENDIX XXV.
Extract from General Cherniayeff's Report of the 12th January 1866.
In laying before your Excellency the enclosed correspondence between
myself and the Bokharian Government respecting our embassy to Bokhara, I
beg to state the circumstances which gave rise to it:
The first news of our embassy brought to Tashkend by some Bokharians
was favorable, namely, that it had been received with honor and welcome at
Samarcand and Bokhara, and that it had been received by the Emir; but a
report was circulated later to the effect that one of the envoys had died (which
proved incorrect), and that the Emir kept back their letters.
Receiving no reports whatever, I wrote to the Emir on the 7th December,
demanding an explanation of the reason why he had not sent back the mission
within the stipulated period of thirty-five days.
Your Excellency will see very distinctly from the letter of the Emir that
his displeasure, which resulted in the detention of the mission I had sent,
was evoked by the news of his envoy at Orenburg.
O
xlii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
The change of tone in his letters from supplication to insolence, can only
be explained by the return of his caravans from Russia, and by their having
been allowed to leave Orenburg and Troitsk under the pretext of their being
Khivan, Tashkendian, or Kirghiz caravans.
In order to support my enclosed answer to the insolent letter of the
Emir, I have this day moved forward, as a demonstration, a rifle battalion
with four guns, towards the passage of the Syr-Daria at Chinaz, and in order to
replace these troops, I have sent to Tashkend for four companies and four guns.
At the same time, in view of possible eventualities, I humbly beg your
Excellency to send with all possible despatch, mounted on camels, one of the
battalions destined for the Turkestan province with a double supply of
cartridges.
In order to hasten their march, they should only be halted at fortified
places, for the desert and arid nature of the country affords no rest to the
troops, and they are only harassed by halts in the steppe. By following this
plan, the 4th Siberian Battalion (now the 1st Orenburg), which marched
on foot from Omsk, arrived at Aulieta (2,260 versts) on the 14th June, whereas
the 6th Orenburg Battalion from Troitsk only came up in the middle of
October. The battalion I ask for will find provisions here, but it must be sup-
plied with money for pay and other necessaries, particularly since two battalions
have already arrived without a single copeck between them, and as the finances
of the province of Turkestan are in a more than desperate position. My fre-
quent representations, now of old date, and personal statements to your Ex-
cellency, have not yet met with any result.
The 100,000 Roubles which I have received will be far from sufficient
for defraying the past expenditure of the force under my command; there is
nothing wherewith to pay for the provisions and forage purchased on credit;
our credit in the country is shaken, and my quittances are no longer accepted.
In such a condition of our credit, paper money cannot enter into circula-
tion until its value is raised, and I therefore beg that specie only should be
sent and in sufficient amount to defray the expenditure of the troops which
are to be sent here up to the 1st January 1867.*
In frankly reporting the exact state of affairs, I am persuaded that your
Excellency will afford me all possible co-operation for the maintenance of the
honor and dignity of Russia in Central Asia. All is quiet in the province
and at Tashkend.
APPENDIX XXVI.
Letter addressed to the Emir of Bokhara by General Cherniayeff.
Receiving no intelligence from the envoys whom I sent to your Highness
a month and a half ago in accordance with your desire conveyed through
Imaum Hodja, and being informed that one of them had died on the road, I
sent a messenger to them with a letter, in which I required them to state why
they had not informed me of such an important event, since they must know
that I am accountable to my master for each of his subjects.
My messenger was stopped on the way, and told that my envoys were
detained at Bokhara under guard, and that no one was allowed to come near
them.
* Paper money was not only sti'l taken by the inhabitants in 1866, but it was in that
year even found possible to increase the quantity sent to Turkistan for Government purposes
as compared with specie. This was due to the extension of our frontier, the abolition of
immunities from taxation, the institution of offices where the paper money could be
exchanged, &c.
APPENDIX XXVIII.
xliii
As I do not understand the meaning of these rumours, and having as
yet received no intelligence from my envoys, while your own, when at Tash-
kend, were not prevented from despatching messengers, I consider it my duty
to acquaint your Highness therewith, believing as I do in your friendship
towards my mighty sovereign, and I beg at the same time to request that
you will explain the present misunderstanding.
APPENDIX XXVII.
To Michael Cherniayeff
Be it known, you have asked about your envoys, they are in good
health. We likewise sent a mission to your Czar, and I now hear from
persons who have returned from Russia that my envoys were not admitted
to the Czar, but were detained somewhere on the road, which is not a friendly
act, and I have therefore detained your envoys also. Envoys have hitherto
never been molested, and those you sent are in no way treated ill. Your
envoys will, however, remain here until mine appear before your Czar and
obtain an answer. As soon as friendly news shall have been received from your
Czar, then will I allow your envoys to depart with the greatest pleasure.
Month of Tagban.
APPENDIX XXVIII.
General Cherniayeff to the Emir of Bokhara.
After five centuries of friendly relations between Bokhara and mighty
Russia, the pretensions advanced in Your Highness's name to Tashkend, already
taken by the Russian troops, gave rise to misunderstandings, in consequence
of which, by the orders of the White Czar, your caravan and mission were
detained at Fort No. 1 until the circumstances were cleared up.
Your Highness will have seen from my letters the constant desire of the
Russian Government to clear up these misunderstandings as quickly as possi-
ble, and to renew our friendly and commercial relations.
Requiring no conquests, and desiring peaceful commercial relations with
the countries which border his empire of half the globe, the All-powerful
White Czar gave authority to the Governor General of Orenburg to bring the
misunderstanding to a conclusion by means of negotiations.
The Governor General of Orenburg was prevented by circumstances from
remaining any length of time in the province of Turkestan and therefore made
over his full power to me.
On the strength of such powers, I stated to your envoy Imaum Hodja
the conditions which might lead to the speedy re-establishment of our friendly
relations. To these conditions Imaum Hodja gave assurance of your High-
ness's full acquiescence, stating at the same time that it would be agreeable to
you to sce a Russian embassy in Bokhara and promising that it should return
in 35 or 36 days.
Believing you would agree to the conditions which I mentioned to
Imaum Hodja, and putting faith in the words which he spoke for you, I des-
patched an embassy to your Highness, in the desire to please you.
Calculating that the envoys I sent would return in 35 days with a reply
from your Highness, that friendly relations would in this wise be restored,
xliv
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
and that your embassy would consequently be allowed to proceed to
St. Petersburg, I made arrangements for sending it on its journey.
Now your Highness informs me that the envoys I despatched have been
detained by you, and will not be suffered to leave Bokhara until your own
embassy is forwarded to St. Petersburg, and brings back from my All-powerful
Emperor the answer you expect.
But your Highness may conclude from the above that the admission of
your embassy into St. Petersburg, and the delivery of the caravans is closely
connected with the return of my envoys from Bokhara with a friendly
answer.
Thus the accomplishment of your desires rests entirely with you; as
regards myself in my further proceedings I shall obey the will of my All-
powerful Ruler.
APPENDIX XXIX.
General Cherniayeff's Report of the 31st January 1866.
On the 21st of January the detachment assembled at Chinaz began to
cross the Syr-Daria on native boats drawn by ropes. Through the energy
with which Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs carried out the arrangements
for the transport of the troops, the whole of the detachment composed of 14
companies, Ĝ sotnia and 16 guns,* with the artillery park and engineer
6
train, and with supplies for a month,—was by the 28th of January on the
left bank of the Syr.
On the 28th January a man arrived at Chinaz from the Bek of Jizakh,
accompanying the dead body of one of our Cossacks who conveyed the envoys
sent by me to Bokhara. It was found on examination that this Cossack
died of fever, and the letter from the Bek of Jizakh showed that the body
was forwarded by request of the envoys to Bokhara. With respect to our
advance the messenger from the Bek of Jizakh had no instructions, and
seeing that even on the 29th January no answer came from the Emir to the
demand made for the release of the envoys, I advanced on the 30th January
with the whole of the detachment to a position by lake Uètiubé, within 13
versts from the Syr-Daria on the road to Jizakh.
Reporting to your Excellency this advance to the confines of Bokhara,
I will add that I shall not fail to acquaint your Excellency with my further
operations.
APPENDIX XXX.
Extract from General Cherniayeff's Report of the 19th February 1866.
On the 31st of January the troops were brought to a halt for the day for
the purpose of making final arrangements for their further progress, and
on the 1st February they marched towards Jizakh across the hungry steppe
which the Bokharians considered to be the most reliable bulwark, believing
it to be quite impassible for troops.
* Battalion of riflemen, 2 companies of No. 6 and 2 of No. 7 battalions, 3 companies of
No. 3 and 3 of No. 4 battalions, a siege battery, a division of rifled artillery, a company of
lightened, and a company of light horse artillery of No. 1 battery, 1,200 camels.
APPENDIX XXX.
xlv
While making the second march from Uètiubé I received a letter from
the Emir, wherein he informed me that he had summoned the envoys to
Samarcand and would send them back to me on his own arrival. Calculating
that this letter was written under an influence of fear produced by our move-
ment and that on the withdrawal of the menace his promise might not be kept,
I replied to the Emir that his letter had found me in the middle of a water-
less steppe, that it was for that reason alone, instead of turning back, I would
march on to the first water where I should wait for the return of the envoys,
after which 1 should retire at once.
On the 4th of February I reached the river Uètiubé, 8 verts from
Jizakh, and stopped. On the next day a letter arrived from the Emir
stating that the Russians, whom he had detained, had departed from
Bokhara, and on the 5th would be in Samarcand whence they would
be sent out to me. In addition to this the Emir on his part requested me
not to undertake any hostilities pending the return of the envoys. In reply to
this letter I again promised to withdraw immediately on the fulfilment of his
engagement, repeating once more that I had no other object in my advance.
On the strength on what appeared to be the clearly expressed relations
of the Emir towards us, I applied on the 6th February to the Bek of
Jizakh with a request that he would send out to our pickets, natives
with wood and hay for sale. The Bek at first was willing, but when
I demanded an immediate compliance with my request as a proof of friendly
feeling, he answered that as he had not received from the Emir any
orders on the subject he could not comply. After informing the Bek that
unless on the next day, the 7th February, wood and hay were not sent
out, I should be obliged to order the employment of forcible means
for obtaining them. I sent on the 7th a detachment to the town, com-
posed of 2 companies, 4 sotnias of Cossacks, with foragers and 2 guns, under
Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs. Colonel Pistolkohrs was instructed to repeat
the demand for wood and hay, and in case of refusal, to seize a supply
of both in the vicinity of the town, without touching anything else, and
not to have recourse to arms except in the event of their being first
employed by the other side. On nearing the town crowds of armed Bokha-
rians issued out to meet the detachment, which, while parleying with
Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs, gradually drew back into the suburbs, and
when the detachment drew into the town they suddenly opened an obstruc-
tion raised across the street, and from behind they met our troops with a
volley. The obstruction was immediately carried, and the troops pursuing
the Bokharians penetrated to the market place in the town, during which
course the foragers gathered all the wood and hay they could find in the
yards of the houses and in the bazaar, without touching any other property of
the residents, or the merchandize. When the obstruction was carried a fire
was opened from the fort, but the cannon shots did us no injury, first because
of the wrong direction of their fire, and then because when our men were
close to the fort the shot flew over their heads. With the first volley fired in
the town a simultaneous attack was made on the 'sotnia' of Cossacks left at
the entrance to the suburb to cover the retreat, by the Bokharians who,
up to that moment, were in friendly converse with them. The Cossacks,
taken unawares, were quickly surrounded on all sides, but 2 companies with
2 guns sent out by me from the camp when the firing commenced, forced the
Bokharians to retire; at this time the troops having collected a sufficient
quantity of wood and hay emerged from the town and joining the companies
outside returned to camp.
In this affair 8 soldiers and Cossacks were killed
and 19 wounded. According to Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs's report there
were about 6,000 armed Bokharians; the loss of the latter was more than
100 killed on the spot. I immediately acquainted the Emir with the conduct
xlvi
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
of the Bek of Jizakh, which was not in accordance with the Emir's letter,
and added that a continuance of similar behaviour would compel me to take
Jizakh which, as I was only marching to the encounter of our envoys, I
would otherwise be unwilling to do.
On the morning of the 8th of February crowds of Bokharians made their
appearance within view of the camp at no great distance. I twice warned
them that I should take their approach as a mark of hostility, and at last
after a third intimation I gave orders to fire at those crowds that were within
reach of gun shot. The crowds at once dispersed, and of my having been
compelled to fire I at once sent to inform the Emir.
In the evening a messenger from the Bek of Jizakh came to me with an
expression of regret for the fire that had been opened upon me which he attri-
buted to a misunderstanding, and with the intimation that the Emir's sanction
having been received, inhabitants of the town would come next day with wood
and hay for sale.
On the 9th February, foragers were sent to the outposts, but the
inhabitants did not appear, excusing themselves on the ground of their fear for
the great number of men sent to the pickets.
Seeing by their behaviour that the Bokharians were only trying to gain
time I resolved to withdraw. I desired that the expedition should be regarded
as one undertaken merely to urge compliance with my demands.
Moreover
I had obtained two letters from the Emir in which he abandoned his former
pretensions, and in addition, the want of fodder for the horses would not admit
of a longer stay while the 9th of February was the very earliest possible day by
which the Russians could reach the camp from Samarcand. It was also possi-
ble that circumstances over which the Emir could have no control, might
delay them still longer, or that the Emir counting on the speedy arrival of all
his reinforcements and artillery, intended to back with force conditions that I
could not accede to.
On the
Having determined to withdraw I ordered another foraging excursion to
be made on the 9th. Two companies with two guns, under Lieutenant Colonel
Fovitzki sent out with this object obtained a supply of wood and hay and
returned to camp without a shot having been fired on either side.
evening of the same day two other companies with 2 guns, under Major
Nazarof performed an equally successful foraging excursion; on this occasion
although the Bokharians put in an appearance, those who approached near
were fired at and driven away.
On the 10th of February a third letter reached me from the Emir,
by which he again engaged to send back the Russian envoys.
The messenger verbally informed me that the Emir had given orders to
send us wood and hay for sale, which was confirmed by a letter from the
Bek of Jizakh.
Adhering to my resolution to withdraw to the Syr-Daria, under
the impression that the Bokharians would still raise difficulties and delay,
I began to retreat on the 11th of February, acquainting the Emir,
that as a proof of the absence of any other intention than that of seeking the
release of the envoys, I withdrew to the Syr-Daria where I should wait for,
and expect them, on the strength of the promise given by him in his three
letters.
APPENDIX XXXI.
General Cherniayeff to the Emir of Bokhara.
Beginning the transport of the troops across the Syr-Daria, I consider it
necessary to inform your Highness, out of respect for the five hundred years'
APPENDIX XXXIV
xlvii
friendship of Bokhara with powerful Russia, that it depends upon yourself to
avert war.
I come not for the purpose of conquest, but because Russian Officers are
detained in Bokhara, which is an injury to the White Czar himself and to
all his 76 millions of subjects; I am compelled to march until I meet my
envoys, and shall return back when I have met them.
APPENDIX XXXII.
Report of the Chief of the Staff of the province of Turkestan, to the Officer
Commanding the troops in the Orenburg Military Circuit, dated the
7th (19th) March 1866.
Information has been received that the Emir of Bokhara has assembled
at Jizakh as many as 40,000 men with 16 guns, and that he has applied to
the Khan of Khiva for assistance, which, according to reports from Khiva,
he is likely to obtain.
The Military Governor has desired me to report this to your Excellency,
and, independent of his report, humbly to request you will arrange for the
quickest possible dispatch from Orsk of a battalion of men on camels.
At the same time Major General Cherniayeff has ordered me to beg you
will expedite to the utmost the departure of the two remaining battalions from
Orenburg.
APPENDIX XXXIII.
Report of the same to Colonel Count Voronzow-Dashkoff, H. I. M.'s Aide-
de-Camp, dated the 14th (26th) March 1866.
According to information received from the Syr-Darian detachment, the
Emir of Bokhara having assembled a force with 40 guns, intends advancing
in three columns, one of which joining with the Kokandians, will march on
Khodjend, another against our detachment stationed on the left bank of the
Syr-Daria opposite to the mouth of the Chirchik, while the third crossing at
Chardary (within 60 versts of Tashkend) will be directed to the line of com-
munication between Chemkend and Tashkend.
I am requested by Major General Cherniayeff to inform you of this, and
humbly to request you to proceed to Tashkend, only in the event of your being
able to arrive here not later than on the 19th (31st) of the present month of
March; but otherwise to remain at Chemkend or in Turkestan according to
where this communication may find you.
I shall, in due course, acquaint you of the possibility of pushing forward
in safety.
APPENDIX XXXIV.
Journal of Military operations and events on the Central Asiatic Frontier,
from the 14th (26th) February to the 10th (22nd) April.
The detachment operating at Jizakh returned on the 14th (26th)
February to the Syr-Daria, and camped as before on the left bank of the river,
by the ferry, 5 versts below the mouth of the Chirchik.
xlviii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Here the detachment remained until the 10th (22nd) of March. The
Bokharians alarmed at the advance of our troops, hastened to collect their
cavalry, of whom about 10,000 assembled while the detachment was tationed
before Jizakh. This cavalry en masse followed the detachment to the end of
the first march from the town.
A few days afterwards the Bokharians established a strong picket beyond
Sardaba, 40 versts from the camp (on the Jizakh road), and from time to time
sent out small parties to molest the detachment.
The following were the occasions for attacks :
On the 24th of February (8th March) two soldiers of the 3rd Orenburg
battalion strolled away 3 versts from the pickets for the purpose of having
some sport in the jungles, they were suddenly surrounded by ten mounted
Bokharians, the soldiers united together and keeping off the Bokharians with
their fire safely returned into camp.
On the 26th February (10th March) ten armed Cossacks were sent out
to gather wood. At a short distance from the camp, four Cossacks detached
themselves from the party, in pursuit of wild ducks, the rest proceeded on their
way. Soon after two more detached themselves. When the latter had gone about
300 fathoms, the remainder were suddenly set upon by a party of 100 Bokha-
rians, who jumped out of the reeds and surrounded the Cossacks. The two
Cossacks who had just left on seeing this, galloped off to the camp to give
information. The body of cavalry sent out under Lieutenant Colonel
Pistolkohrs came up with the Bokharians and pursued them till night by
moonlight, but they were not able to rescue the captive Cossacks, because our
cavalry horses had not yet recovered from the tedious and difficult, but quick,
march to Jizakh, and still suffered from want of forage. The Bokharians
had fresh horses, and the majority of them had even two apiece, by which
means they were enabled to send their prisoners quickly on to Jizakh. Our
cavalry, consisting of 300 men, took 4 prisoners, a quantity of muskets and
6 horses.
For the better protection of the trans-Chirchik country, a special force
was organized towards the end of February (O. S.); it was composed of 5
companies of infantry, 1 sotnia of Cossacks, and 4 guns, placed under the com-
mand of Colonel Krayevski and stationed in the neighbourhood of Kereùchi.
On the 24th of February (8th March), this Kereùchi force, in con-
sequence of alarming reports relative to the appearance of Kokandian bands
under the leadership of Rustam-bek in the Kurama Hills, advanced in that
direction. The Kokandians on discovering the movement fled, and the force
marched on 40 versts, but did not come up with them.
In order to secure a better communication with the Kereùchi force
and to protect the ford across the Chirchik, the camp of the main detachment
was on the 10th (22nd) March, removed to the mouth of that river, where
a new ferry was established across the Syr-Daria, while for the protection
of this ferry, against the event of the detachment leaving, two forts were
constructed, one on the left bank of the Syr in the shape of a Tête de pont and
the other in that of a redoubt on the nearest island.
On the 11th (23rd) of March some mounted Bokharians killed one of
our soldiers who had strolled away beyond the cordon of the new camp. The
soldier was decapitated within sight of our camp; the body was left, but the
head taken away.
Small parties began to appear in the month of March along the line of
our communications. Thus on the 20th March (1st April) a Cossack courier
emerging from the gardens on the outskirts of Tashkend, on his way to
Chemkend, was attacked by several men; the Cossack was wounded, but made
his escape.
APPENDIX XXXIV.
xlix
On the 24th March (5th April) a party of 30 men from the Bokharian
Garrison of Chordara made their way to the Tashkend road for the purpose
of plundering, and within 25 versts of that road attacked a post of our militia
men. The attack was made in the night, the Kirghizes dispersed, and 10 of
them were taken prisoners.
развивались
The chief den of the gangs which showed themselves on our lines of
communication, was fort Chordara, where the Bokharians held a small garrison
of 100 men.
For the destruction of the place, and at the same time for the purpose
of inflicting a punishment on the Kirghizes of the Kungrad tribe, who camped
along the Arys, and who, in the month of January of the present year, had
passed over to the number of 600 tents (Kibitkas) into the Bokharian
limits beyond the Syr-Daria, a column of 3 corps of infantry, 1 sotnia
of Orenburg Cossacks with two batteries, guns and 2 pieces of horse artillery
under Captain Abramof, was sent on the 22nd March (3rd April) to Chordara.
The 75 versts distance was marched in 2 days, and on the morning of the 25th
or 26th the troops neared the fort. The Bokharian garrison quickly evacuated
the fort, and we at once proceeded to demolish the works. At the same
time we seized from the Kirghizes camping on the grounds, under protection
of the Bokharian garrison, about 2,000 rams, 150 head of large cattle and
camels. In the struggle with the Bokharians we had 3 Cossacks and
1 artilleryman wounded. The loss of the Bokharians consisted of 10 men.
The whole of Captain Abramof's force then camped on the Syr-Daria, 3 versts
from Chordara. A post of 10 militia men was established on the right bank
of the Syr to keep up communication with the main detachment.
On the 26th of March (7th April) a small party of mounted men was
seen from Captain Abramof's camp descending from the hills on the right side
of the river. Fifteen Cossacks and as many foot soldiers were at once sent
down the stream, some in the ferry boat and others swimming. These with
some militia men from the other side pursued the Bokharian party and rescued
6 Kirghizes who had the day before been seized from the post between Chemkend
and Tashkend. Three of the enemy were killed. On the 29th March (10th
April) Captain Abramof's force returned to the main detachment.
On the 27th March (8th April) the command of the chief detachment,
as well as of all the troops of the province of Turkestan, was handed over by
Major General Cherniayeff to Major General Romanovski.
During the whole of the month of March reports were frequently received
of the intention of the Emir to commence decisive aggressive operations
against us in conjunction with Kokand and even with Khiva. The alliance
with Khiva was not very probable, as owing to the cessation of the trade
between Bokhara and Russia the Khivans now derive great benefit from that
circumstance. But the intelligence relative to the aid obtained by Bokhara
from the Turkomans of Khiva, received repeated confirmation in communica-
tions from the Syr-Daria line as well as in letters from Bokhara. The
alliance between Kokand and Bokhara was the more likely, because, simul-
taneously with the increase of disturbances in the region occasioned by
Bokharian horsemen in sight of the Kereúchi force, parties of mounted
Kokandians were observed in that quarter. Our_spies described the
dimensions of the Bokharian forces as something enormous, stating the figure
of the Emir's troops at 100,000 with 100 cannon; at the said time they said
that while the Emir marched on Chinaz and Chordara, Khudoyar Khan was
to march into the trans-Chirchik country with a separate army of 40,000
men with 50 guns.
Information to the same effect was received on the night of the 27th
March (8th April). The spy affirmed that the Emir's advanced army of

P
1
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Coughe
100,000 with 20 guns had reached the Syr-Daria and had encamped within
40 or 50 versts of our chief camp, and that the Emir himself with the
remaining mass of his troops in the vicinity of Oura-tiubé was expected to
follow.
Major General Romanovski being informed on his way to Tashkend of
the disturbed state of the province, made arrangements en route for two com-
panies of the 5th Battalion from Fort No. 1, and a company of rifles and
Cossacks from fort Perovsky, besides a portion of the troops in the Alataù
district, to proceed to Tashkend.
On the strength of preliminary instructions from the minister for war, the
authorities of Western Siberia were ordered to send to the Turkestan province,
in case of a demand for reinforcements, a portion of their troops. Upon this
the Chief of the Alataù district was requested to forward two companies of
infantry, 2 sotnias of Cossacks and 2 guns for the occupation of the posts on
the left flank, and the commander of the left flank was instructed to despatch
those of his troops so detached from the garrison to Tashkend. By these
arrangements the main detachment as well as the Kereùchi force and our
communications were considerably strengthened. But still two or three
weeks' time would necessarily elapse before all this was carried out, therefore,
in order to guard against the depredations of marauding parties which always
attended the agression of Central Asiatic Rulers, on receipt of the intelligence
respecting the advance of the Emir, orders were at once issued for the forina-
tion of a militia in Tashkhend, Chemkend, and Turkestan, of trustworthy
Kirghizes.
30645
At the same time stronger measures of precaution were taken in the
camp, and on the next morning a reconnoissance was undertaken.
The reconnoissance was deferred till 29th on account of very bad
weather.
On this day, and on the 29th and 30th following, a small force examined
the country around the camp, within a circuit of 20 versts, but no enemy was
anywhere discovered. At the same time some spies who could be relied on,
and who were sent to obtain correct information, returned with more tran-
quilizing news. Although all this confirmed the intelligence of the assembly
of a considerable quantity of Bokharian troops in Oura-tiubé, and on the road
from Khodjend to Chinaz, yet the number of these was shown to be only
half of what had been previously stated. They also doubted that the Khan
of Kokand intended co-operating with the Emir.
The earth huts in which the troops had so long lived in Tashkhend, and
the difficult winter march to Jizakh, had very much exhausted our men, and
bred typhus fever, scurvy and ague. On some days the number of men
falling sick was 25. Among the 14 companies, 8 sotnias, and 18 guns which
composed the main detachment, the personnel was only 2,000. ·
As there were a great many besides the garrison men attached to the
office of the Staff in Tashkhend, one more company was demanded from
thence.
Ôn the 1st (13th) of April the foundation of a fort was laid on the right
bank of the Syr-Daria opposite the ferry, on a site in every respect more
advantageous than that of old Chinaz. This was done with the object of
obviating the necessity of leaving garrisons in old Chinaz, 6 versts from the
camp, and in the new forts by the ferry. As soon as the works are com-
pleted, it is intended to transfer the garrison from Chinaz into this new fort.
On the 2nd (14th) of April two militia posts were established to facili-
tate communications between the main detachment and that at Kereúchi.
On the 3rd (15th) of April the Tashkend militia, organized by the
Cossack Elder Serof, was sent out to reconnoitre the neighbourhood of
Tashkend, and the roads from Tashkend to Chinaz and the Syr Daria.
APPENDIX XXXVI.
}
On the 4th of April a sotnia of Ural Cossacks was sent from the main
detachmant to examine the right and left banks of the Chirchik and the right
bank of the Syr for a distance of 30 versts from the camp, with the same
object of clearing the country of small parties of depredators.
These parties of militia and Cossacks patrolled for 4 days up to the 8th
(20th) April.
Gangs of 10 to 30 men were found hovering about, but these fled on the
appearance of the patrols, and being pursued several of them were killed, the
others being forced hurriedly to escape by swimming across the Syr, withiu
sight of the Cossacks.
On the 4th (16th) of April news was received in the main detachment
that large bodies of Bokharian horse were within 20 versts of the camp
higher up the Syr-Daria; and some vague intelligence of the enemy's designs.
A reconnoisance in the direction of Murza-Rabat, which is reported on
separately, was therefore undertaken on the 5th (17th) of April.
APPENDIX XXXV.
Draft of a letter to the Emir of Bokhara.
YOUR HIGHNESS,-Having by the will of my Sovereign entered into fulfil-
ment of the duties of Military Governor of the Province of Turkestan and of
Commander of the troops situated therein, in the place of General Cherniayeff
called to St. Petersburg on service, I consider it my duty to inform you
thereof.
This appointment will afford you an opportunity for showing the consi-
derations by which you are governed in your relations towards Russia, ¿. 2.,
whether you intend to wage war against us, or whether your actions spring from
some misunderstandings with General Cherniayeff personally.
If you wish for war, then of course there is no need for negotiations ;
act as you know best. I, on the other hand, shall act in accordance with my
duty as Military Commander, i. e., in the same manner in which I was obliged
to act towards your cavalry which presumed, when I was already here,
to make an attack on my Sovereign's troops, causing thereby turbulence
and disorder in the region under the supreme protection of the White Czar.
You will at the same time remember that by retaining the officers sent
to you by General Cherniayeff you offer an insult to all Russians.
APPENDIX XXXVI.
Copy of a letter to Mahommed Yakub-bek of Jizakh.
Your messenger Sadyk has delivered your letter to His Excellency Major
General Romanovski, the Military Governor of the province of Turkestan,
and has been well treated by him. While commissioning me to thank you
for your friendly letter, His Excellency has desired me to inform you that
on the day before the arrival of your servant he despatched from himself to
your Emir a notification of his assumption of his present duties, and of the
punishment inflicted on your cavalry for daring to attack the troops of the
White Czar.
Major General Romanovski while fully agreeing with you that good neigh-
bours should above all avoid falsehood and duplicity, informs you that, pend-
ing the receipt of an answer to the letter sent to His Highness the Emir,
that he does not consider it expedient to enter into any explanations.
lii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
APPENDIX XXXVII.
A copy of a letter from Mahommet Jacub-Bek of Djizakh.
To Cherniayeff, who has lately returned from the White Czar, be it
known that, thanks to the Almighty and the great kindness of my Lord and
Master, I am in the enjoyment of good health and happiness. And now I
must inform you that last year, after the Emir had conquered Kokand, Michael
Cherniayeff himself made an agreement to the effect that he would not cross
either the Chirchik or the Syr-Daria, and it was also agreed that our people
should not cross over these rivers. Our Lord and Master, desiring to secure
the friendship of his ancestors, consented to Michael's terms, and to prove
that he had done so, returned to Bokhara with his army.
It has always been the custom of our great Bokharian rulers to welcome
their visitors with great warmth and hospitality, to entertain them liberally
for six months, and to pay them every respect and attention on their depar-
ture. Michael, unwilling to wait for his ambassadors, who were then being
entertained and feasted, according to custom, and for whom an answer was
being prepared, broke the treaty he had made by crossing the Syr-Daria
with his army and artillery and commenced hostilities; he marched up to
Djizakh, suffered defeat, and then returned humbled to this side of the Syr-
Daria. On learning this, our Emir with all the Mussulman troops crossed
from the road of condescension to the road of a holy war (Hazavat), waiting
at the same time for intelligence from the White Czar or from our ambassa-
dor before commencing active operations. We soon learned that Michael
Tchernayef had been deprived of his post and had departed; thou hast replaced
him, but we know not with what spirit thou comest here, warlike or friendly.
I being thy nearest neighbour send thee this letter, entreating thee to answer,
whether it is for the sake of war that thou hast come amongst us! We then
shall know, according to thy answer, and with God's help, what steps to take.
If thy purposes are friendly, and thou desirest the return of the ambassadors
let me know; let me know, besides all that the White Czar has deigned to tell
thee, but speak the truth, so that I may not appear a liar while mediating
for the sake of peace and for the tranquillity of thine and our people. I will
lay all before the Emir, and thy officials shall be well treated and returned to
thee. For this object I send my well-tried servant Sadyk to thee with this
letter;
all that thou wishest to learn, ask of him, and all that thou desirest
should be repeated to me in words, tell him. The month of Zilhadjar
5-8th April 1282-1866. Written in the Djizakh Chancery, with Mahommet
Jacub-Bek's seal prefixed.
APPENDIX XXXVIII.
An extract from General Romanoski's Report, dated 11-23rd April 1866.
On the 5th a strong reconnoitring party, under my personal command,
marched towards the Kodjend road with the object of ascertaining whether there
was any foundation for the often-repeated rumour, that a party of some
thousand men was encamped between Irdjar and Mourza-Rabat, a place 30
versts distant from us. On the 4th of April our scouts repeating the same
rumours, added others of the enemy, being bent on some great movement. The
reconnoitring expedition had also for its object to clear the neighbourhood of
APPENDIX XXXVIII.
lii
the camp of small parties, which, after disappearing for a few days, again
returned in sight of the principal camp.
The reconnoitring column consisted as follows:-
2 Companies of Orenburg Sharp-shooters.
1 Company Sharp-shooters belonging to the 4th Orenburg Battalion of the line.
1 Company Sharp-shooters belonging to the 3rd Orenburg Battalion of the line.
1 Company Sharp-shooters belonging to the 7th Orenburg Battalion of the line.
A Division of Rifled guns.
One hundred Ural Cossacks.
A Battery of Light Cossack Horse Artillery belonging to the Orenburg Brigade.
A Rocket Company with its full complement of 30 Militiamen.
This column was placed under the command of Aide-de-Camp Colonel
Count Vorontsof-Dashkof. For the purpose of taking the enemy by
surprise, a part of the abovementioned regiment of Sharp-shooters, belonging
to the 4th battalion with 10 horsemen, was ordered to march out before the
dawn of day, two hours before the march of the remainder of the detach-
ment, so as to join the cavalry at 10 versts distance from the camp. I led
the latter at a trot, ordering the remainder of the infantry, with the division
of rifle guns, to follow as close as possible.
The detached company had scarcely marched 5 versts from the camp
when they noticed at some distance from the road a party of mounted
Bokharians, 50 in number, making their way towards our advanced Cossack
picket. The Cossacks on seeing the enemy dismounted, received the charge
and killed one of them; the others seeing the advancing company, left the
Cossacks and quickly disappeared. The only loss we sustained was a Cossack
horse wounded with a lance.
Having passed the Utch-tiubé mounds, we overtook the company of
Sharp-shooters of the 4th battalion, and here for the first time came in sight
of the enemy, stationed at Ak-tiubé, numbering about 150 men; behind these
were seen a large dark mass which we could not well distinguish. A
hundred men sent in advance drove the enemy off the mound, from which
could then plainly be discerned considerable parties of mounted horsemen
advancing towards us. Collecting behind the mound all the cavalry and
supported by a company, I moved forwarded at a trot to meet the enemy whose
numbers were gradually increasing. The Bokharian cavalry at this time was
2,000 or 3,000 strong, 3 flags being stationed in front. These we subse-
quently learned from prisoners belonged to the Beks of Samarcand, Oura-tiubé
and Djizakh, who had been sent out of the Bokharian force actually stationed
on the Irdjar, with the object of attacking our camp, and also for the defence
of an enormous flock of sheep which were partly the property of the above-
mentioned Beks, but principally tribute and gifts from the Syr-Darian tribes
to the Emir of Bokhara, on the occasion of his celebration of the Kourban
Bairam at Oura-tiubé.
As we advanced, however, the Bokharians began to retire, but after march-
ing 7 versts beyond Ak-tiubé, and remarking the absence of infantry amongst us,
without which we were only a tenth part of their own strength, they
determined on attacking us, and having occupied a sufficiently advantageous posi-
tion, they opened fire upon us from some falconets. But a Cossack battery,
with a rocket company, rapidly pushed out in front, soon cooled their ardour,
and then an impetuous onslaught of the Cossacks drove them from their
position with great loss on their side, compelling them even to abandon their
flocks and to retreat to a distance of 10 versts. Having stopped the cavalry
and waited for the approach of the company of Sharp-shooters of the 4th
liv
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
battalion which followed us, I sent a sotnia of Orenburg Cossacks under
Kalougin and all the militiamen to collect together the cattle which had
strayed away over the field and to drive them towards our reserve at
Ak-tiubé. With the remaining troops under my command, namely a sotnia, a
rocket company, and a company of light Cossack artillery, I established myself
in position and remained stationed for two hours. In the meantime, the
enemy almost disappeared and seemed to have abandoned all idea of an
attack, as well as all attempt to get back the booty fallen into our hands ;
stopping, therefore, the advancing column of our infantry, I decided on
marching with the cavalry in the direction of the Syr-Daria with the object
of finding a convenient encampment for the night, as it would have been
too fatiguing for the troops to return to the camp on the same day.
Leaving a Cossack picket in the same position to watch the enemy, and
ordering it to join the infantry a little later, I led the foremost troops in the
direction of the river. But we had scarcely got over 2 versts when we
noticed that our picket Cossacks were being gradually surrounded by a crowd
of Bokharians. The sotnia of Ural Cossacks under Golounof was immediately
directed against the enemy, and as the Bokharians were separated from us by
a small ridge, they could not see all our movements; the brave Ural
Cossacks were therefore able to overtake the enemy, to kill some of them,
and to make one a prisoner. This circumstance was very important, as the
prisoner could, to a certain extent, explain to us the contradictory reports
of our scouts. The Cossacks pursued the enemy 5 versts.
After this last attack the enemy did not trouble us any more, and the
entire reconnoitring detachment, with the exception of one company and
Kalougin's sotnia, which had been sent to cover the retreat of the party and
to drive in the flocks that had been seized by the former, encamped on the bank
of the Syr-Daria, 7 versts below Mourza-Rabat; at this place the last of the
scattered sheep were collected.
Leaving the detachment under the command of Count Vorontsof
I returned with Golounof's sotnia to the Chinaz camp; my object in this move-
ment was to protect the foremost lot of sheep which we had captured, and
which could not reach the camp by night fall.
When day dawned the enemy again attacked Count Vorontsof's column,
but this, however, was their last feeble attempt which cost them some men;
four days have passed since then and nothing more of them has been seen
by our troops.
On the 6th, at 1 o'clock P. M., the whole army returned to the Chinaz
camp.
The cattle taken were about 14,000 in number.
APPENDIX XXXIX.
Journal of Military operations and events which took place on the Central
Assian frontiers, from the 10th of April to the 1st of May 1866.
On the 12th of April, the following intelligence was received:-
The steamer Perovsky accompanied by a barge and an iron ferry
supported along the bank by 30 men of the 4th company 2nd battalion,
proceeding from Fort "Perovsky" where it had wintered, to Chinaz, was on
the 6th of April at 7 o'clock in the morning, at about 30 versts above the
mouth of the River Arys, fired at from the dense reeds by a party of
Bokharians consisting of several hundreds of men.
APPENDIX XXXIX.
lv
The fire of our Sharp-shooters stationed along the sides of the
steamer, and several discharges of grape shot from the guns, obliged the
Bokharians to quit their position, and enabled the steamer again to pursue her
way unmolested. Attempts of this kind on the part of the Bokharians were
repeated several times during the day, but the same resistence being shown
from on board the boat, and our shots telling on the Bokharians and causing
them considerable loss, they at last kept out of reach of the guns. As the
supply of Saxaul fuel prepared for the steamer had been burned by the
enemy, the Captain was obliged to send his crew on shore to chop timber,
protected by a line of Sharp-shooters; a supply of fuel was safely taken into
the steamer without any loss of life.
On the 14th of April, the steamer Perovsky arrived safely at new
Chinaz, where it cast anchor. There was not a single man wounded among
the crew or the soldiery. On the 7th of April, the overseer of the central
population brought intelligence to the Commandant of Chemkend that a
considerable band of Bokharians, under the command of Sadyk, had shown
themselves on the left bank of the Syr-Daria opposite the mouth of the
River Arys. According to the intelligence collected, the aim of this
band of Bokharians was to destroy the fuel prepared for our steamers,
and also to cut off our communications. With the
With the object of opposing
Sadyk's tactics, Lieutenant Colonel Gorodnichenko immediately dispatched
to the mouth of the Arys, under the command of Ensign Kazin, a party of
70 Siberian Cossacks, 11 artillery men, with one rocket stand and 80
militiamen. After having reached the mouth of the River Arys and
turned upwards along the right bank of the River Syr-Daria, Ensign Kazin,
on the 14th and 15th of April, began to fall in with small bands of Bokharian
Kirghizes, who retreated on his approach; and it was only on the 16th,
near the Lake Sary-Kul, that he encountered a large party of them, num-
bering about 300 men, who opened fire on Kazin's detachment. But not
being able to stand our fire, the enemy's band, together with their leader
Sadyk, fled across to the left bank, bearing away their wounded. Taking
advantage of their flight, Kazin called out some "Djigit" Volunteers and sent
them across the river in pursuit of the enemy, from whom they seized one
horse and then returned in safety. Having driven away Sadyk to the other
side of the Syr-Daria, Kazin marched along the river towards the ruined
fortress of Chardara. Ensign Kazin was informed that Sadyk's band was being
reinforced, in consequence of which intelligence he requested the Commandant
of Chemkend to strengthen his detachment, which was done on the 20th of
April by a reinforcement of 18 mounted men with one under officer,
6 Cossacks and 16 militiamen under the command of Ensign Ahmerof. Taking
advantage of this reinforcement, Kazin decided on attacking Sadyk's band
which was encamped on the left bank. Throwing out some Sharp-shooters,
Kazin, accompanied by 40 Cossacks, crossed to the enemy's side, and, under
cover of the fire from our band, fell on the enemy, and without any loss on his
side drove away Sadyk and took possession of a good-sized boat. Sadyk
and his band fled upwards along the Syr-Daria. On the 22nd, Kazin learned
that Sadyk had, according to hearsay, strengthened his band to about 2,000
men and was marching towards us down the River Syr-Daria with the object'
of acting on our communications. In consequence of these rumours Kazin
with his detachment marched likewise towards the mouth of the Arys.
In the trans-Chirchik region Colonel Kraefsky received intelligence that
a band of marauders had been seen in a north-easterly direction from Kereùchi,
in the village of Oishun, for the dispersion of this band on the 8th of
April Sotnik Voljintsof was sent there with 21 Cossacks and 5 militiamen.
At sunset, on the same day, Voljintsof reaching Oishun actually fell in with a
:
Ivi
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
considerable band, numbering about 500 with 4 flags; not daring with so
small a force to run the risk of attacking the enemy, Voljintsof took up a
convenient position and immediately sent intelligence to Kereùchi that he
had fallen in with a considerable band much stronger than his own detachment.
The enemy in the meanwhile fell upon the Cossacks, but were repulsed by a
fire of musketry; noticing that the enemy possessed no fire-arms, Voljintsof
assumed the offensive, and after gradually driving the enemy back, was obliged,
owing to the approach of night, to take up a convenient position, where he
spent the night of the 8th-9th April. All through the night the enemy did not
give a moment's rest to our small detachment, but when morning dawned
they had disappeared, and Voljintsof, without any loss whatever, returned to
the camp, meeting on his way thither a sotnia of Cossacks who had been sent
to his assistance. The loss of the enemy in this encounter, according to
eye-witnesses, was not slight.
Colonel Kraefsky having ascertained that the band against which
Voljintsof had operated had not dispersed, but only retired into the deepest
recesses of the mountains, sent on the 12th into the mountains a sotnia of
Cossacks and 50 Sharp-shooters mounted on camels, under the command of the
same officer, with the object of dispersing them, or at least gaining correct
information as to the enemy's formation, objects, and movements.
On the 13th of April, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the detachment
overtook the free-booters between Namdan and Parkent, but this time it was
greeted with a volley of shots. But our return fire silenced their discharges,
and the approach of the Sharp-shooters on their camels compelled them to
abandon their entrenchments on the mountains and to retire higher and
farther. After a long pursuit the men and horses were so fatigued that
they had to return. After giving time for the troops to rest Voljintsof
returned.
On the despatch of Voljintsof's detachment, Colonel Kraefsky with the
remaining troops started on the 13th from the position they occupied near
Kerys and marched to the Karaktaú, so as to be near the scene of action in the
mountains. Joining Voljintsof on the 14th, Colonel Kraefsky on the 15th
directed his steps to Kereùchi, where he left his extra luggage. On the 15th
Colonel Kraefsky gave up the command of the detachment to Captain
Mihailofsky, having been summoned on service to Tashkend.
At dawn of day,
on the 16th, Captain Mihailofsky received intelligence to the effect, that a con-
siderable band of Kokandians were descending the mountains, in consequence
of which he immediately despatched in that direction 3 companies, 4 guns and
80 Cossacks. On seeing the approach of the Russians, the enemy turned and
fled into the mountains pursued by the Cossacks to the very steepest ascents.
The detachment took up the same position again before Kerys.
On the 17th news was again received that the same band was descend-
ing into the valley near Karaktai; Captain Mihailof, therefore, sent thither
40 Sharp-shooters and 40 Cossacks under the command of Ensign Sadiakin;
Sadiakin's detachment profiting by a fog which had set in came up quite close
to the enemy at dawn of day on the 18th without being seen; his sudden
appearance so startled the band of Kokandians, which consisted of 400 men,
that they fled in great confusion. The Cossacks and "Djigits" sent in pursuit
of the enemy succeeded in capturing two prisoners.
On the 19th Colonel Kraefsky's detachment assembled again on its former
position at Kerys.
From small expeditions into the mountains and from intelligence
gathered from other sources we learned that the three principal ringleaders of
these hostilities against us were to be found in the trans-Chirchik region :
Roustambek, who since last year seldom quitted those parts, Ishpouta
APPENDIX XXXIX.
Ivii
(a Kirghiz), having a party of his own consisting of 500 men, and
Irkary, one of the former Aksakals of the village of Ablyk. These ring-
leaders were being joined by turbulent spirits incited and encouraged by the
Emir. These are the people who chiefly cause all these disorders and com-
mit petty robberies.
On the 6th of April, the principal detachment returned safely from a
reconnoitering expedition under Mourza-Rabat without having seen anything
of the enemy in the neighbourhood of the camp.
The troops were by turns sent across to the right bank where they were
employed in raising earth-works for the fortification of new Chinaz.
On the 19th some envoys arrived at the camp from the Bokharian
Emir with a letter for me. The contents of this letter as likewise my
answer are known to your Excellency from the copy of the correspondence
annexed to my report.
In the neighbourhood of Tashkend on the right side of the Chirchik and.
also on the roads between Chinaz and Tashkend bands of freebooters, although
in small numbers, began to appear; these bands had the audacity to rob our
post and attack the Aùls which are subject to us.
On the 18th one of these bands, under the command of Ishputa, came
up within 12 versts of Tashkend and carried off three men of the 6th battalion,
who had been chopping wood in the gardens; the same band on the 19th over-
powered our picket of dashing volunteer cavaliers attached to the fort of Niazbek.
Owing to the small number of cavalry in Tashkend, 20 sharp-shooters were
mounted on horses and sent after the robbers, but after proceeding more than
25 versts from Tashkend, Lieutenant Skorenkof, in command of this detach-
ment, was obliged to return without having overtaken the enemy. Ishputa's
men, we heard, were mounted on excellent horses and most of them had a
spare horse.
On the 20th of April, the steamer Syr-Daria arrived at Chinaz towing
a barge laden with goods and two iron barges. The voyage of the steamer from
Fort Perofsky to Chinaz was a prosperous one, save that a want of fuel had
been felt. The Bokharians had also fired on this steamer on the 12th of April,
but after exchanging shots for ten minutes they were obliged to retreat; out of
25 men who were on board defending the steamer, one sharp-shooter received
a slight contusion in the head.
For the object of keeping up communications between the Chinaz
detachment and that of Colonel Kraefsky a column of infantry was des-
patched on the 19th, with some light guns and 50 Cossacks. This column
was placed under the command of Major Baranof. Crossing the Chirchik,
Baranof, after encountering great difficulties owing to the absence of roads
and the overflow of canals, reached the river Angren from whence he sent
Sotnik Kalougin with 50 men to join Kraefsky; he himself with the remainder
of the detachment halted for a day on the Angren, and on the 22nd of April
returned to the chief detachment. Volunteers of picked horsemen under-
took to capture the robbers who had dared to plunder our post and to carry
off our post guard. These picked horsemen succeeded in overtaking the
robbers and re-capturing the post guard and the papers, as well as making
two of the band prisoners.
One of the captured robbers was sentenced, in accordance with military
law, to be hanged. An account of these proceedings is presented to your
Excellency herewith.
To oppose the bands infesting the neighbourhood of Tashkend and the
trans-Chirchik country, the commander of the region, Major General
Romanovsky, determined to take advantage of the arrival of the reinforcement
of two companies of the 5th battalion, a division of light battery from
Q
viii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Aulièta, and a flying column of 110 riflemen of the 5th battalion. Mount-
ing them on horses hired from the inhabitants of the Tashkend, he despatched
a detachment of 150 men under Captain Grebenki to Niazbek and to the
other bank of the Chirchik.
On the 24th party of Bokharians fell unexpectedly on the detachment
stationed at Kerys, and succeeded in cutting of a picket consisting of two
Cossacks, which was stationed in front of the camp, and seized a drove of
camels and horses belonging to us. As soon as this became known a detach-
ment of Cossacks, headed by Kalougin's half sotnia, set off in pursuit of the
freebooters whom they overtook at about one verst's distance from the camp
and killing ten of their number. While pursuing the enemy over an extent of
8 versts, the Cossacks fell upon another band, consisting of about 300 Bokha-
rians, whom they routed and dislodged from behind their stone defences, and
pursued along the foot of the mountains. The pursuit continued over an ex-
tent of 30 versts. On our side, excepting the two Cossacks who had been
seized at their pickets, we sustained no loss; the enemy, on the contrary, had
60 men killed.
On the 24th of April a company of infantry under the command of Cap-
tain Semenof was sent to meet Sotnik Kalougin's party of 50 men, who were
returning to the principal camp; they met at the river Angren and returned
safely to the camp on the 27th of April.
The principal detachment was reinforced by a company of infantry of the
4th battalion sent from Tashkend in exchange for one of the 5th battalion
which had arrived there with a company of light horse artillery.
The light detachment commanded by Captain Grebenkin, which left
Tashkend on the 25th of April, arrived at Niazbek on the 26th at dawn of
day, and not having encountered any bands of freebooters on the way, took an
upward course along the Chirchik until they reached the ford. After crossing
over to the left bank with great difficulty, Captain Grebenkin marched towards
Parkent where, according to intelligence received, a band was stationed. The
detachment arrived at Parkent on the 27th. On the news of the movement of
the Russian detachment, most of the inhabitants of Parkent fled to Samarsk
(a distance of about 8 versts) where Ishputa and his band were encamped.
Having left 62 sharp-shooters in Parkent with Lieutenant Symakof, Captain
Grebenkin set out with the remaining 39 men at a sharp trot to Samarsk, but
they met with no bands there, not even a single male inhabitant; all had re-
tired into the mountains. Taking with him 39 of the best mounted sharp-
shooters, Grebenkin set off with the utmost speed in pursuit of the retreating
foe into the mountains, and having ridden 4 versts saw a band of the enemy
numbering from 150 to 200 men on a high and steep hill; in dismounting and
leaving the horses in charge of their attendants at the foot of the hill, Greben-
kin commenced the ascent with the remaining men. The enemy opened fire
on them, but with little success. The sharp-shooters who had remained in
Samarsk, 22 in number, arrived at that moment on the scene of action, and
on their approach the band began to retreat into the mountains.
After having pursued the foe for a considerable distance, Captain Greben-
kin seeing the fatigue of the men, stopped the pursuit, and decided on
returning to Samarsk and joining the troops left under the command of
Lieutenant Symakof. But scarcely had the detachment commenced its return
to Samarsk, when Ishputa, who had been joined by 200 men, surrounded the
detachment on every side and opened a frequent fire upon our men, striving
likewise to engage in a hand to hand combat; the road lay through a somewhat
marrow defile and it was necessary to occupy the heights and to dislodge the
enemy from behind the rocks at the point of the bayonet. In this order we
APPENDIX XL.
lix
retreated almost to Samarsk; Ishputa and his band seeing the approach of
Lieutenant Symakof's sharp-shooters at about one verst's distance from Samarsk,
turned and fled. In this encounter we had four men wounded: two sharp-
shooters and two "Djigits." The enemy's loss we must conclude was consider-
able from the fact that the bayonet was brought into play; Captain Grebenkin
left Samarsk for Kersugi, which place he reached on the 28th of April.
In order to connect the Kereùchi and Chinaz detachments, two com-
panies of sharp-shooters under command of Major Pistchemouka were sent
to the river Angren on the 27th of April. The object of this expedition,
besides the connection of the detachments, was to watch over the trans-
Chirchik region and to protect the inhabitants against the attacks of pillagers,
rendered of late especially necessary, the Emir's hordes had begun to assemble
in considerable force on the Syr-Daria.
The overseer of the tribes in our centre, Sotnik Krymof, having learnt
that the inhabitants of the Aùls belonging, to the Kungrad tribe had
omitted to prepare fuel for steam boats between Oush-Kaiùk and the Arys,
according to agreement with the Commandant of Turkestan, took 5 Cossacks
and 40 " Djigits" and set out for the mouth of the river Arys with the
object of forcing them under threat of a "Baranta" or raid to fulfil the orders
of the Russian Government.
On reaching the spot, and finding the only convenient place for the pre-
paration of fuel was the left bank of the Syr-Daria, and that the Aùls, sub-
ject to us since 1864, would not fulfil our demands, Krymof decided on
sending some of the "Djigits" across to the left bank of the river for the
purpose of carrying out a "Baranta" in the Aùls situated right opposite the
mouth of the river Arys, the Bey of which, besides not fulfilling his lawful
engagements, was supplying Sadyk's party with men and provisions. For
the purpose of supporting the " Djigits" already sent, Krymof with the Cossacks
and the remaining "Djigits" likewise crossed over to the Bokharian bank; his
appearance there stopped their attempts at self-defence and the "Baranta" was
carried out without any bloodshed. Taking advantage of the panic caused by
the appearance of the Russians on the Bokharian side, Krymof obliged them
with threats, which, however, he did not carry out, to fulfil their demands for
the preparation of Saxaul. Proceeding along the left bank from the Arys to
Oush-Kaiùk and considering it dangerous to remain longer with a handful of
men in the midst of the enemy, Krymof re-crossed the Daria and directed his
steps towards Oush-Kaiùk and by the end of April returned to Turkistan.
The result of such a bold and brilliant move was that Saxaul was prepar-
ed at the places specified.
UE WORDBACK.
APPENDIX XL.
We hereby declare to all and each for general information that the
Russians are against no one, against no people, and still less against the peaceable
Bokharians; they are animated by no hostile feeling, but have been forced into
military operations through the obstinacy of the Emir of Bokhara, who, not-
withstanding his repeated promises and assurances of friendship, has not up to
the present moment permitted the Russian embassy (invited by himself to
Bokhara) to return to Russia, and also takes the liberty of making raids on
peaceable inhabitants living under the protection of the White Czar.
The war,
solely against the Emir, will continue as long as the Emir is not brought to
a sense of justice. All peaceable inhabitants are desired to occupy themselves
lx
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Their life
with their own affairs and not to take any part in the hostilities.
and their property in this case will be respected by the Russians.
Signed by the Military Governor of the Turkistan district, Major General
Romanofsky.
APPENDIX XLI.
General Romanofski's Report from the 11th of May 1866.
a per #D
The continual appearance of more or less considerable parties in our rear
as well as on our roads of communication, and the encampment of the
Emir's principal army in the Irdjar locality, forced us to have recourse
to offensive measures. Having established at the end of March
manent ferry across the Syr-Daria and pitched two large encampments in the
neighbourhood of this river, the enemy, so to say, was in possession of both
banks, and could send out parties when they chose to the trans-Chir-
chik side. But the weakening of the army by sickness and death, the result
of a hard winter's campaign, the great want of troops in Chemkend and
generally on our communication with the Syr-Daria line, and our many
various wants, as for instance, our great want of money, did not allow us
even to think of a decided course of action until the end of April. Earlier
than this we could not receive reinforcements from the Syr-Daria or from
Western Siberia, as well as supplies for the various wants of the army; two
steamers, the Perovsky and the Syr-Daria, were also expected to arrive about
this time.
All these expectations were realized, not, however, in April, but at the
beginning of May. The arrival of fresh reinforcements enabled us, without
weakening our rear or the garrison of Tashkend, but on the contrary, helping
rather to strengthen them, and to add considerably to the numerical strength
of the principal detachment; and the fortifications of Chinaz having been by
this time roughly completed, our advance was accordingly rendered easier.
In the mean time the expressed views of the Emir left no doubt that an
engagement with his army would be the only means of forcing him to
abandon his impracticable demands and put an end to the hostilities he had
been the cause of.
The Emir's demands, among other things, were expressed in letters which
I have had the honor to lay before your Excellency.
On the 5th and 6th of May intelligence was received from different
quarters in the principal detachment encamped near Chinaz that the Emir,
having returned from Irdjar after a journey to Samarcand, had strength-
ened his army with fresh reinforcements and was already contemplat-
ing an attack, for which purpose he had sent a portion of his army to the
right bank of the Syr-Daria in the trans-Chirchik country. The scouts
reported that the Emir's army amounted to the enormous number of 100,000
men and 30 guns. It was plain of course that these reports were very
much exaggerated, but even allowing this, it was expected, as it subse-
quently proved, that the Emir's army was a very large one.
This army
consisted of Sarbazes (regular infantry), artillery and contingents contri-
buted by the Beks of Samarcand, Oura-tiubé and others, and also gathered
from the Kirghizes wandering on the confines of Bokhara. The Sarbazes and
riflemen, about 5,000 in number, were very well armed; the artillery consist-
ing of 21 guns (some of which were somewhat larger than our battery guns );
the contingents and Kirghizes were not less than 35,000.
On the 7th of May the principal Chinaz detachment, consisting of 14
infantry companies, 500 Cossacks, 20 guns and 8 rocket stands, left its former
}
APPENDIX XLI.
ہینہ
Ixi
position at the dawn of day and marched towards Irdjar along the Mourza-Rabat
road in the following order: first came the 500 Cossacks with the rocket
company, a division of light horse artillery, and a company of rifle guns
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs; a column of infantry
consisting of 4 companies of the 3rd Orenburg battalion; 2 companies of the
4th battalion, a division of rifled and a division of heavy battering guns; this
column was under the general command of Captain Abramof; behind these
columns came the active reserves and the trains, under the general command of
Lieutenant Colonel Favitsky, formed of 4 companies of the rifle battalion,
2 companies of the 7th, 1 company of the 4th, and I company of the 6th battalion
with a division of battery guns and a company of light Orenburg infantry. One
of the reserve companies, namely the 4th company of the 4th battalion
together with 30" Djigits" under the command of Major Nazarof, was moved to
the front before the army began to advance and subsequently closely followed
the cavalry. The detachment was supplied with provisions for 12 days,
each soldier carrying provisions for two days with him; the provisions for
10 days being transported in waggons. The park of artillery was laden with
200 charges for every piece of cannon, and as many cartridges for each gun
belonging to the infantry, and 150 cartridges for each Cossack's gun. Be-
sides this the steamer Perofsky, which left Chinaz on the same day, taking
an upward course along the Syr-Daria, was stored with 10 days' provisions
for the whole detachment, as well as with a portion of the war ammunition.
The remaining park of artillery and other heavy stores belonging to the
detachment were left at Chinaz, which, as well as the troops left behind in the
fort and in charge of the Tête de pont, were placed under Count Vorontsof-
Dashkof, who, owing to a broken leg, was unable to take an active part in
the approaching action.
As soon as the Chinaz detachment began to advance, the Kereùchi de-
tachment under the command of Colonel Kraefsky was ordered to march
along the right bank of the Syr-Daria to Irdjar, and to endeavour to reach that
place not later than night-fall on the 8th of May. After the celebration of
divine service, the Chinaz detachment began to advance halting for the first
time at the Ak-Cheta Kurgan on the shores of a fresh water lake, at which
place they similarly halted during the reconnaissance on the 5th of April.
The enemy's cavalry began to make its appearance at about 15 versts
from our camp, but kept at a distance, a few shots only being exchanged.
After a short rest the army marched towards the band up the Syr-Daria, where
it encamped some versts above Mourza-Rabat. The army thus made more
than 30 versts on the first day, but in spite of this, and regardless of the heat,
which rose to 40 degrees of Reaumur, there were no stragglers and no illness
in the army.
From Mourza-Rabat to the Emir's first encampment on the Irdjar, there
remained not more than 20 versts. A considerable band of the enemy came
within sight of the camp at dawn of day on the 8th. For this reason the
march from Mourza-Rabat, although made in the same order, was continued
with every readiness to enter into an engagement at any moment, and the
columns, therefore, kept in sight of each other, the baggage trains not being
allowed to remain far distant.
At 9 o'clock in the morning, when the column approached the lake
Aik-Chaganak, the enemy was found assembled in great force, and here the
first skirmish took place between the Cossacks and the enemy's cavalry, which
ended in the Bokharians having some men killed while we had only one
Cossack wounded. When, however, the army at 12 o'clock at noon were
making preparations for a halt on the banks of the lake Yak-Kahan, masses
of the enemy's cavalry began to press so heavily on the vanguard and luggage
Ixii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
wagons that the artillery had to be brought into action, after which the
fusillade never ceased, both during the halt and during the subsequent
advance until the end of the engagement.
After the army left its halting place, it advanced in the following manner :
along the straight road to Irdjar, Captain Abramof's column marched first in
the same complement as the day before and in the same fighting order ;
Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs's column advanced more to the right and on the
same elevation with the other column. Immediately behind these two
columns, somewhat to the right of the road, and in sight of the general reserve
of the combative force, three regiments of the battalion of sharp-shooters
and one battery division advanced under the command of Major Pichemouka.
All the luggage train of the detachment guarded by the remaining four
regiments and two guns under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Favitsky
followed behind Captain Abramof's column.
Scarcely had the army left the halting place a verst behind when masses
of the enemy's cavalry, concentrating their forces, attempted to surround us,
so that it was necessary to throw out in advance and on our flanks a line of
sharp-hooters, while the cavalry was obliged to stop constantly and fire at
the approaching masses of Bokharian cavalry with rockets and cannon balls.
Under these circumstances, it can easily be understood how difficult it was for
the luggage to follow the army; although it was reduced to as small a com-
pass as possible, being limited to 600 camels and about 100 wagons, still an
uninterrupted march of two days under a hot sun had exhausted the horses
and camels, and rendered a halt unavoidable. I must here testify to the
unusual energy which Lieutenant Colonel Favitsky displayed on this occasion.
Even before the army left its halting place and when a speedy encounter with
the enemy seemed inevitable, he found it possible to detach to the effective
reserves, 3 companies with a division of guns, limiting the escort of the
baggage trains to 4 regiments and 2 light guns, and in spite of all these diffi-
culties, he led his column so rapidly that he scarcely detained the army at all;
but besides the above-mentioned stoppages, he was obliged to halt also to resist
the masses of the enemy's cavalry which surrounded him. The fact of the
enemy's building hopes on the difficulties attending the march of the army
from its halting places to the positions, proves how hard in general were the
obstacles which we had to surmount.
Among the papers found in the Emir's tent was a report of the Bek of
Samarcand, commander of the advanced forces of the Bokharians, sent to the
Emir, as it is supposed, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. In this report,
among other things, the Bek writes that the Russians had not yet reached
their position and were already surrounded by his troops, and that he trusted
soon to make them all prisoners.
At 5 o'clock the army neared the enemy's position, and at about one
verst and a half's distance from it, were met with a heavy artillery fire from
behind the trenches which the Bokharians had raised to defend their front
at the same time masses of the enemy appeared in front of our cavalry
and baggage trains. The entire detachment, one may say, excepting the left
flank, which was protected by the river, was surrounded by the enemy.
For
the support of the cavalry, and to resist the masses of Bokharians, which
pressed upon us on the right, the reserve was advanced and the whole
of our artillery was placed in a position for action. The enemy allowed our
columns to advance within easy shot, and then operated with great rapidity and
perseverance; the direction of the shot was very correct, but not calculating the
distance, they gave such a great angle of elevation to their guns that most of
their projectiles flew over the heads of our troops and lodged partly in our
baggage train and partly beyond it; to this and to our unusual good luck can
#
APPENDIX XLI.
Ixiii
alone be attributed the significance of our losses, considering that our troops.
had to hold out under this cannonade for about an hour before our artillery
and fire-arins and several gallant cavalry attacks cooled the ardour of the Bok-
harian cavalry which pressed heavily on our flanks and rear. In face of these
difficulties our artillery under the general command of Lieutenant Colonel
Silverstvan rendered great service to us. No one could witness without
admiration the unequalled skill and coolness with which our artillery men
served the guns at the hottest period of the engagement. It may justly be
said that not a single shot they fired was wasted; the enemy's position strewn
with mutilated bodies, broken guns and waggons and heaps of dead cattle,
presents even at the present moment a most hideous picture of the havoc made
by our artillery.
When at 6 o'clock the attacks of the enemy's cavalry began to grow
weaker, being fully convinced of the invincibility of our infantry, I ordered
Captain Abramof to advance, and charged Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs to
make a decided attack with the right flank. Captain Abramof advanced with
uncommon coolness and skill; neither the accelerated discharges of the enemy's
artillery and fire-arms, nor the intrenchments they had raised, could prevent
the orderly advance of our storming column. All the movements were ex-
ecuted as on a review. In about half an hour our really invincible
infantry were bayonetting behind the intrenchments, the Bokharian artillery
men, while our own artillery, already in front of the intrenchments, was strik-
ing down fresh masses of the enemy who endeavoured to stop our advance
with grape shot.
Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs gallantly moved his cavalry forward
simultaneously with Captain Abramof's advancing column. Lieutenant
Colonel Pistolkohrs galloped boldly forward between the enemy's intrench-
ments, drove back in a moment the Bokharian cavalry, took up a position
in front of the intrenchments, and opened a fierce artillery fire from 6 guns,
partly on the flank of the enemy who were then endeavouring to prevent the
further progress of Captain Abramof, and partly on fresh masses of cavalry
and infantry which had again mustered in front. Then passing from one
position to another, he pressed the enemy back more and more to the right
and put them to disorderly flight. The pursuit was carried on hotly by the
Cossacks over an extent of more than 5 versts.
The whole of the field between the first intrenchments, as far as the
Bokharian camp, was strewn with the enemy's dead bodies struck down in
hundreds by our brave Cossacks. It was for the first time that the Cossacks in
Central Asia fought in regular order and en masse like regular cavalry,
having their own artillery and rocket stands; it must be confessed that
this first attempt was crowned with success. It was afterwards reckoned
that on one field alone our cavalry had smitten down about one thousand
men.
Our enemies fled so hurriedly, that they had even no time to enter their
camp which we found with all the belongings of the Bokharians, as well as
traces of its recent occupation: large cauldrons steaming with hot food,
smoking kettles prepared for drinking tea, &c., &c.
It was already 9 o'clock in the evening. The approaching night, and the
scattered condition of our small detachment over an extent of seven versts,
obliged us to put an end to the pursuit. The troops that had been collected
together encamped in front of the enemy's camp on the shore of the lake
Maida-Djilgan, where all the columns were at last assembled at about
1 o'clock A. M. At dawn of day a small column was sent to take possession
of the second Bokharian camp, which the Emir had deserted the preceding
evening with almost all its belongings. Even the Emir's tent had been left
exactly in the state in which it had been occupied by the martial sovereign of
lxiv
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Bokhara head of the Mahomedans in Central Asia,—with its carpets, divans,
and kitchens and many other articles of Asiatic luxury.
In spite of the immense losses of the enemy, which, according to accounts
received subsequently, amounted in killed alone to far more than 1,000 men,
our loss, thank God, did not exceed more than 12 men wounded, but not a
single man was killed. During the operations above described, Colonel Kraefsky,
commander of the Kereùchi detachment, having spent the night of the 7th
and 8th May with the principal detachment on a height, appeared suddenly
on the 8th of May, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, opposite Irdjar on the right
bank of the Syr-Daria. The ground did not permit him to take any imme-
diate part in the action, and his co-operation was limited to a few well aimed
shots from the rifled guns; but the appearance alone of Colonel Kraefsky's
column could not but be conducive to the general success of the action, and
most certainly prevented parties of the enemy from flying in the direction of
the trans-Chirchik country, where their appearance would have been anything
but desirable. Our trophies consist of six guns taken during the storming of
the enemy's position (four of which are in Captain Abramof's column and two
in Colonel Pistolkohrs' column), and four guns deserted by the enemy during
the flight. Perhaps we may come across other guns after a further advance
and a closer inspection of the enemy's position, as our prisoners assure us the
Emir had only time before his flight to carry away with him two guns.
They even assure us that he was obliged to leave these on the road to Õura-
tíubè, from whence he turned off towards Djizakh with only 2,000 cavalry.
In the camps were found, besides the belongings of the Bokharians, enormous
stores of powder, and in general the entire park of artillery, which bears
testimony to the warlike intentions of the Emir. Without reckoning the
war materiel we found scattered over the roads the enemy fled along, which,
not having the means of transporting, were partly destroyed and partly
thrown into the water, there was found about 670 pounds of powder and about
220,000* cartridges and great quantities of shot and other artillery stores.
Having the good fortune to report such an important and fresh success of
the Russian arms in Central Asia, I consider it a sacred duty to testify that
the entire army, from the officer to the soldier, comported itself as brave
Russian soldiers should do; all with one accord rushed into the battle and
all conscientiously deserve the gracious notice of His Majesty the Emperor.
They fully understand the dignity of bearing the name of Russians, and
uphold it with honor. I do not consider myself justified in naming any
one especially, excepting those to whose fate it fell to take a prominent part
in these events: Captain Abramof and Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs and
Lieutenant Colonel Favitsky, who in every
every respect performed the
duties entrusted to them in the most exemplary manner; Sotnik Ivanoff,
who performed the duties of the chief of the staff of artillery, proved also á
most exemplary officer, and was a most useful assistant to me.
While humbly begging your Excellency to direct the attention of His
Majesty to the services rendered by the army and by those persons who have
been mentioned in this report; I would also request your Excellency's sauction
to my making a special submission respecting the other 22 staff officers and
superior officers who for their excellent services justly merit encouragement.
This report is sent by your Excellency's Aide-de-Camp, Major Kashkin,
who during the movements of the army and during the engagements
was always with me, and fulfilled most satisfactorily all the commissions he
was entrusted with; he can verbally give a fuller account of all the events
mentioned herein.
* Artillery charges without projectiles.
APPENDIX XLII.
lxv
APPENDIX XLII.
Extract from a letter of General Romanovski, Commander of the Troops of
the Orenburg District, dated the 30th May 1866.
As a detailed report of the recent actions will necessarily take some time
in its preparation, and in order to acquaint your Excellency as soon as
possible with the present state of affairs, which look promising, I hasten to
send you a short account of all that has transpired here since the 8th May.
Our encounter with the Bokharians on the 8th May was, as it now proves,
an unavoidable necessity, and was followed by results of far greater importance
than we at first anticipated.
From the enclosures in this letter (the reports of the senior officer Seroff
and the letters of the Emir to the people of Tashkend), one cannot but feel
convinced that all the disturbances in our trans-Chirchik region were not
only caused by the appearance of the Emir's detachments, but formed the
results of a great conspiracy, the ramification of which extended as far as
Tashkend. Thank God, we were enabled to put an end to this conspiracy in
time. The disquietude in the trans-Chirchik region, as your Excellency
will be pleased to observe from the detailed report, continued until the 10th
May. A great multitude of the enemy surrounded even Kereùchi, but no
harm was done, owing to the energetic measures of Count Vorontsof, who
acted for me in the region, and to the detachment of a small force of cavalry
from the main body. When, however, the news of the defeat of the Emir's
army spread throughout the trans-Chirchik region, all parties fled across to
the left bank, and from that timecomplete peace has reigned on the right bank
of the Syr.
In order to profit by our success at Irdjar, and to attain the object with
which the expedition was undertaken in the month of January on the right
bank, viz., to rescue our envoys and to punish the Emir for his treacheries,
two modes of action were open to us: to pursue the defeated enemy, and to
march to Oura-tiubé, Samarkand and further, or else to go on towards Naù
and Khodjend.
The experiences of the last few years plainly showed that every decided
advance of our troops in these parts, is, when successful, attended with the
inevitable necessity of occupying the region, if not permanently, then at all
events of leaving troops there for a considerable period. A triumphant
arrival of our troops always forms a party of Russian adherents among
the natives, whom we cannot possibly afterwards leave to the mercy of the
half-savage rulers without loss of Russian prestige. Having this in view,
I thought it in all respects more advisable to avoid, if possible, for a time,
entering the limits of Bokhara, and to set out towards Naù and Kod-
jend, of which towns the first is a small, but very strong, fortress, and
has an important strategic signification, being a point situated on the principal
road from Bokhara to Kokan; while the second, independent of its commercial
importance, was always the stronghold of turbulent people who were the
cause of all the disturbances in our trans-Chirchik region. The loss of these
two towns to the Emir, and the advantage of our occupying them with a
view of pacifying the right bank of the Syr, is consequently evident. Besides,
there was reason to hope, as it afterwards proved, that a movement on Nau
and Kodjend, and a speedy liberation of our Envoys would sooner secure the
attainment of our objects, as it would be less hurtful to the national feelings
of the Bokharians and to the dignity of the Emir.
R
Ixvi
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
On the strength of these considerations, having allowed the troops at
Irdjar the required rest, putting the baggage-train into proper order, and hav-
ing sent from thence by steamer to Chinaz all superfluous incumbrances and
trophies, I marched on the 14th May to Naù; and as your Excellency already
knows by my report sub-No. 627, we succeeded in occupying that fort without
bloodshed; the 15th and 16th of that month were employed in strengthening
the earth-fortifications and in occupying the fortress where we left 2 companies,
2
guns, and a detachment of Cossacks. On the 17th May I reached Khodjend
with all the remaining troops of the Chinaz division, while Colonel Kraeovsky's
detachment approached the town simultaneously with me, and according to
previous arrangement, along the right bank.
Notwithstanding that pacific proclamations (copies enclosed) had been
sent from Naù to the inhabitants of Kokan and Khodjend, the latter town
encountered our approach with shots, while the inhabitants of the surrounding
districts, who welcomed us very warmly, and who apparently desired our im-
mediate occupation of Khodjend, gave us information that the Kokandians
were hastening from all parts to the rescue of the town, and that great num-
bers had already made their appearance in the neighbouring districts of
Khodjend.
The 18th and 19th May were spent in reconnoitering along the right and
left banks of the Syr-Daria, on which occasion some considerable cannonading
took place and a brisk fire of musketry, which the defenders provoked.
These reconnoitrings showed that the points most favorable for an attack
on the town were situated on the north-eastern side, but that an attempt
to seize the place, without preliminary arrangements, would be accompanied
by great risks; the fortifications of Khodjend, as your Excellency will see
from the plans and profiles which will be presented together with the report,
are very strong, and are, according to the general opinion of persons present
at the former capture of Kokandian towns, on a greater scale than those of
the latter towns; the 20th May was therefore spent in bombarding the town
from several sides, while the assault was fixed for the 21st. But as the troops
were advancing to make an attack, a deputation issued from the town with a
declaration of submission; the troops were therefore recalled to their former
position. The parleys, however, which continued twenty-four hours, unfor-
tunately led to no satisfactory result; the hostile party in the town, at the
head of which was the old Aksakal, Khadji-Emil, who was not only opposed
to a surrender, but had already arrested the chief representatives of the peace
party, viz. the Kazi-Kilian, the elder Kazi, and Khadji-Gazamat, one of the
most influential and rich inhabitants. The latter was sent to Kodjend with a
second proclamation, a copy of which I here enclose. At the expiration of the
term fixed by me, for the presentation of a definite answer by the inhabitants
of the town, we commenced a bombardment which lasted from 6 o'clock in
the evening of the 22nd until 2 o'clock on the 24th.
After the discovery of our nocturnal movement by the Khodjendians on
the 21st May, we could not hope to carry out successfully a sudden assault at
dawn, and consequently, though valuable as time was for us, in view of the
danger threatening us from Kokan, it was however necessary to find some
other means for the capture of the town. Adhering to the original intentions
of directing the attack from the north-eastern side, I found it expedient to
commence a false attack by digging approaches on the southern side, where
the trenches were opened on the night of the 22nd and 23rd May. Besides
this, in order to divert the attention of the defenders and for the greater
security of the routes leading from Kokan, the blockading troops were divided
into several detachments, and powerful Cossack pickets were placed in the
APPENDIX XLII.
lxvii
rear of the force. The general surveillance of the routes and the defence on the
Kokan quarter were entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohrs, who, as usual,
fulfilled the duties with which he was charged with great success. All these
measures led, thank God, to very useful results; the arrival of fresh
reinforcements from Kokan was entirely stopped, and the defenders directed
their attention more especially to the eastern side.
In order to economise our ammunition, the bombardment of the town
during the 22nd and 23rd, with the exception of two mortars firing day and
night, was carried on twice a day, at mid-day and at 6 in the evening. Thus,
on the 24th, at mid-day, a bombardment was made, after which followed the
assault.
The troops were formed in two columns: one under the command of
Mihailoff, Captain of Artillery, at the extreme end of the north-eastern side
adjoining the river; the other under the command of Captain Baranoff, towards
the Kelenau gates, the nearest to the river. Major Nazaroff followed next in
reserve with a special column, the object of which was to occupy the citadel
after a successful assault of the gates, the remaining troops I kept by me in
reserve for the support of the three above-mentioned columns.
Owing to the spirited behaviour of the troops and of their commanders,
notwithstanding the most obstinate resistance on the part of the defenders,
all my plans were punctually executed before night, and not only the town,
but the citadel likewise, fell into our possession. A small detachment of
Colonel Kraevsky's column crossed the river in a boat and joined the troops
who had occupied the town.
During the reconnoitring and the bombardment, and throughout the
whole of the attack, the defenders fought with great obstinacy; their killed
alone numbered 2,500_men. It will be easily understood that, under such
conditions, our loss also could not but be very great, but, thank God, it does
not, however, exceed 71 men killed and wounded, 63 contused, and 6 men
missing. Out of this number only 1 officer is wounded and 6 are contused.
Our trophies, over and above a quantity of various fire-arms and flags,
consist of 13 guns and a large Kokandian banner, belonging to the defenders
of Kodjend, but which Khudoyar Khan refuses to claim, as your Excellency
will subsequently see.
On the very first day of my arrival at Khodjend, I was waited upon by
deputation sent to me by the Bek of Djizakh, which informed me of the
readiness of the Emir to deliver up our envoys. But as this deputation
was headed by a Bokharian, whom I already knew as a very suspicious
character, and apprehending lest this letter should be one of a series sent dur-
ing the march of the troops to Djizakh, I commissioned the chief of my staff to
receive the commissioners with the usual hospitality, and after having written a
civil answer to the Bek's letter, to inform the envoys that I would not receive
them until our embassy had returned to our camp. On the evening of the
25th May, that is on the day following our occupation of Khodjend, Cornet
Gerasimoff arrived at the camp with another very friendly letter from the
Bek of Djizakh, and with a verbal message to the effect that the Emir was
very anxious for peace, and was quite willing to send back our envoys, who
had already been despatched to Djizakh, but that he wished to receive some
guarantee on my side, that after our occupation of Khodjend, to which
town the Emir withdrew every claim, I would not to enter the boundaries of
Bokhara. Without loss of time, I sent, on the following day, a letter to the
Emir, a copy of which I bere enclose. Cornet Gerasimoff informed me at the
same time that the Bokharians number their forces at Irdjar not at 40,000,
as I wrote in my report, but at 60,000, and that they reckoned not 1,000 kill-
ed, but 5,000.
lxviii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Envoys have arrived from Kokan this 28th May, from Khudoyar
Khan, with a letter, the copy of which I forward, in which he congratulates
me in the sincerest manner on our occupation of Khodjend.
Your Excellency will thus be pleased to see that our three weeks'
expedition has not alone given us every reason to anticipate the safe return
of our embassy and the conclusion of peace with our two principal neighbours,
but has also been the means of our gaining, on the left bank of the Syr Naù
and Khodjend, all claim which towns, the Emir and the Khan, their former
possessors, have willingly relinquished; while at the same time this region,
besides being a durable guarantee for tranquillity along the right bank of the
Syr, has every attraction nature could bestow on it. Situated in a lovely
mountainous country, Naù and Khodjend and the adjoining settlements which
by the beauty of their situation, as well as by their fields and gardens, and
the apparent opulence of the inhabitants, far surpass any of our possessions
in Central Asia, including even Tashkend.
Independent of this, it is also expedient to draw your Excellency's
attention to the commercial and political significance of Khodjend: both the
one and the other are of the highest importance. In reference to its
commerce, Khodjend, especially under a general state of peace throughout
the country, has a future in store even brighter than that of Tashkend.
Its political significance is still greater. Its strong fortifications and the war-
like spirit of its inhabitants, have always given Khodjend the semblance of
an independent republic, which, although ruled at times now by the Emir
and now by the Khan, only yielded obedience according to its own wishes
and under certain conditions. In this manner Khodjend subjected itself
last year to the Emir. This was the first time, so said the inhabitants, that
Khodjend had been taken by force. As we were approaching Khodjend, all the
inhabitants of the adjoining settlements, who came to offer their submission,
unanimously assured us that, in case of our occupation of the town, the whole
population of that region would succumb to us, and that even Kokan and the
Khan would hasten to enter into friendly relations with us. These predictions
are actually being accomplished at the present moment. During the last few
days, Aksakals have been arriving even from the Kokan districts; although
I receive the latter as cordially as the rest, I inform them nevertheless that,
entertaining hopes of friendly relations with Kokan, I could not place them
under the protection of the Russian army, and therefore advised them to re-
main peacefully under submission to their rulers, and to place their entire
confidence in us. If I am not mistaken, the inhabitants are beginning to
appreciate our sincerity. The draft of my answer to Khudoyar Khan's letter,
which I have the honor of presenting to your Excellency, I think of sending
to-morrow.
At the present moment I am occupied in establishing civil order in
Khodjend, and distributing the troops in conformity with existing circumstances.
The management of the settlements of the Khodjend and Naù districts I en-
trust to Captain Mihailoff, a very trustworthy officer; the commandant is
Lieutenant Colonel Favitsky, of whose great worth I have already had the
honor to report to your Excellency.
The garrison at Khodjend will consist of 6 companies, 6 guns (4 smooth
and 2 rifled), and 200 Cossacks, with 4 rocket stands. At the same time the
garrison at Naù will be reinforced by 3 companies and 1 sotnia. The
Khodjend garrison will be stationed in the citadel, which is in very good condi-
tion. The remaining troops have already commenced crossing over to the right
bank, and a portion will remain, until the settlement of affairs, close to the
town of Bouka, where they will have good pasturage, while another portion
will return to Tashkend for engineering works.
APPENDIX XLV.
Ixix
APPENDIX XLIII.
Extract from the report of V. M. Seroff; Controller of the Native Settlements
of the Tashkend District, and Commander of the Troops of the Turkistan
Region, dated 10th May 1866.
Previous to the departure of the head detachment from Chinaz, reports
were being diligently spread throughout Tashkend by the Emir and
Roustembek, that the latter had crossed over to the right bank of the Daria
with a large band of followers, and that he purposed going to Tashkend in
order to create a rebellion amongst the inhabitants there, and to act in unison
with them against the Russians. Throughout the whole town, and at all
the town gates, most active measures were taken which secured the tranquil-
lity of the inhabitants. On the 8th May Roustenbek with his band advanced
at night and halted near Parkent, which is not more than 17 versts from
Tashkend, and on the night of the 9th he sent a scout into the town with a
letter from the Emir, with which proceeding I was, however, immediately
acquainted by one of our most faithful adherents, and requisite measures were
accordingly taken to prevent the admission of the scout and the delivery of
the letter to any one of our trusted Mussulmen. Certain natives thoroughly
devoted to us executed this commission with exemplary punctuality; the
envoy was so cleverly watched that he did not succeed in delivering the
letter, while on the 9th May, at early dawn, he was seized by some young
Tashkendians sent for that purpose, and brought to me with the Emir's letter
which I here enclose together with a translation of it in Russian.
APPENDIX XLIV.
(Translation from the Persian).
He (God) the Everliving.
Be it known to all Seyds, head dignitaries, warlike and devoted descen-
dants of the Prophet, learned chiefs of districts, Aksakals, and others of high
and low degree, of the four parts of the town of Tashkend, that these are
my gracious royal words :—
I have given orders that the following commanders should march to
Tashkend on the road to conquest,-Abdul-Gaffar-Bek-Bi, Divan-Big, Khodja-
Nazar-Bi, Mohamed-Goussin-Bï, Abdul-Halim-Khan, Khoudai-Berda, Imin-
Aga-Bashi, Abdul-Vagab-Bek, Imik-Aga-Bashi, Umar-Bek,
Imik-Aga-
Bashia, Mirbaba-Imik-Aga-Bashi, Tuksaba-Mulla-Gedai, Tuksaba-Mirza-Abdul,
and Tuksaba-Kourbak. But you, adhering to your faith and your co-religion-
ists, after having admitted my generals into Tashkend, put suddenly to death
all those people who are devoted to the unfaithful. All ye, true believers
form but one body. Do not doubt, and without loss of time, let them in.
If you encounter any obstacles, write to me immediately, and peace be with
you. In the year 1282. On the seal is engraved Emir-Seid Muzafer.
APPENDIX XLV.
Report of General Romanovski, dated 6th June 1866.
In my letter of the 30th (O. S.) May I had the honor of explaining
the motives which induced me, after the battle with the Bokharians at
Irdjar on the 8th May, to direct my forces towards Naù and Khodjend.
lxx
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
These cogent reasons, as your Excellency already knows, consisted chiefly in
the exact fulfilment of the views of the Government, which anxious to avoid
all further conquests and to limit itself merely to such military operations as
were of absolute necessity for the tranquillity of the country placed under
the protection of Russia and for the maintenance of our dignity in Central
Asia.
At first I hoped to have been able to profit in this movement by the
same advantages which I enjoyed on my advance to Irdjar, namely, the
assistance of the steamer Perovsky, but a preliminary investigation of the
river with the steamer' without the cargo proved that the navigation of the
Syr above Irdjar was only possible for 20 or 30 versts up its course. Beyond
this, the space of country along both banks of the Syr-Daria changes its
steppe character to a mountainous one, and the Syr-Daria itself becomes a
mountain torrent, forming occasional rapids. For these very reasons
the steamer and the cargo were sent back to Chinaz with all the sick and
wounded, and with all the superfluous incumbrances and trophies; while
we had only left for our use a barge which, during the advance of the troops,
was towed up the Daria by the men. For the conveyance, however, of heavy
stores required by the detachment, camels were hired from the neighbouring
Kirghizes.
On the left bank of the Syr-Daria, the country, while changing from a
stoppe to a mountainous one, becomes more populated. All the extent of
country traversed by us, from the first village (Koshturmen) as far as Khodjend,
was in general thickly populated, covered with gardens and mulberry
trees, and intersected by small mountain rivulets and canals; the villages and
settlements are generally speaking very well built, the fields are large and
well cultivated, and all things show that the natives here have an abundance
of everything-a rare phenomenon in these parts. Besides, in this country,
owing to its mountainous character, the roads and communications are with-
out doubt, of great importance. Roads fit for the use of carts and artillery
are of rare occurrence, and are all concentrated in the extent of country
between the Bokharian and Kokandian territories in the environs of Naù.
The former rulers of this town, the Khans of Kokan, evidently recognised the
strategic importance of this point: the fortress built by them, although of no
considerable size, is very strong; the greater part of it consists of a triple,
and only in some places, of a double wall, the spaces between which are exposed
to a discharge of grape shot from the towers and barbets. But thoroughly
convinced they would prove invincible at Irdjar, the Bokharians have of late
occupied the fortress with but a small garrison, consisting chiefly of cavalry,
which fled at the approach of our forces, leaving in the fortress the only gun
there, and the whole of the artillery stores.
The inhabitants of all the settlements, including those of the town of
Naù, received us very civilly, the Aksakals and Kazis crowding round us
with bread and salt, and willingly providing for all the necessities of the
troops, but at the same time not concealing their doubts as to the possibility
of our capture of Khodjend.
Situated on the Syr-Daria, close to the bend of the river, where it takes
an abrupt turn to the south-east, and which bend forms the central point of
the roads to Tashkend, Kokan, Balkh and Bokhara, Khodjend has always
played as important a part in commerce, as in the wars of Bokhara with
Kokan; latterly, however, with the gradual decline of Kokan, Khodjend
gained some political independence. The town authorities arbitrarily wielded
the destinies of the town, and several times expelled the Rulers sent by
Kokan, or Bokhara ; and Khodjend prided itself on the fact that it had never
been taken by force, and had never grudged means for the construction of
APPENDIX XLV.
its fortifications. The town rampart, stretching to the extent of 11 versts,
consists entirely of a double row of high and massive walls, strengthened
like that of Naù, with towers and barbets. The north-eastern side forms
the only exception, as the defenders thought it was better protected by the
irregularity of the ground and the proximity of the river.
On the occupation of the fortress of Naù by 2 companies, 2 guns, and a
portion of our Cossacks, commanded by Captain Lihacheff, the troops of the
head Chinaz Detachment continued their march on the 17th May to Khodjend,
and on the same day, when close to the town, at a distance of 5 versts, took
up their position on the Bokharian road, close to the banks of the river,
which in this place, as it approaches the mountains, runs through a narrow
pass. The Kereùchi Detachment, which arrived at Khodjend almost simul-
taneously with the head detachment, placed itself on the same heights on the
right bank of the river.
Our truce-bearers, who were sent over with proclamations, were met
by a volley of shots, and the defenders stationed behind the walls refused to
listen to any overtures.
It was evident that the inhabitants had been pre-
paring for a defence during the last few days. The gardens, the fields and
numerous houses surrounding the town were abandoned; part of the roads
leading to the town were inundated from the neighbouring aryks, and all the
space in front of the walls was cleared of the gardens and trees for a more
effectual action of their guns.
On the 18th, reconnoitrings were made on each side of the river, on the
right bank by Colonel Kraevsky's column, and on the left by a small detach-
ment of 6 companies, 3 sotnias of Cossacks with 6 guns, and a rocket com-
pany, commanded by myself. The enemy encountered the reconnoitring
troops with fierce and frequent cannonade, and when a portion of
the troops were approaching the walls, they were received by discharges
from falconets and muskets, which did not, however, prevent the reconnoitr-
ing party from acquiring a general notion of the position of the fortifications
and to discover their weakest sides. On the same day, part of the column
having reconnoitred the town from the left side, took up its position on the
Kokan road, about 3 versts from Khodjend.
On the 9th, with the purpose of making a more detailed inspection of the
earth-works on the left bank, two columns were despatched, one under the
command of Captain Mihailoff, who was commissioned to inspect the whole
extent of country from the right of the Kokan road as far as the river, while
the other column, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pistolkohrs,
was to follow the line of walls to the left of that road as far as the Syr-Daria.
The inspection of the town from the right side, was, during the same time,
being made by myself under the escort of Colonel Kraevsky's column.
A close inspection of the locality and of the town walls left no vestige
of a doubt that in case an obstinate resistance on the part of the inhabitants,
the only way to effect a speedy conquest would be by an assault;
and that the points most favorable for such an assault were on the north-
eastern side, viz.,—the barbet nearest the river, and the Kelenau gates, but
that here also a successful termination of the assault, without preliminary
arrangements, could only be the result of accident. In the meanwhile, it was
most essential for many reasons that we should lose no time, and use all
speed in taking possession of Khodjend. The very limited means of transport,
which was the result of that impecuniosity which I have so frequently had the
honor of mentioning to your Excellency, did not allow our detachments to be
accompanied either by commissariat or warlike stores. At the same time
we were daily receiving from Kokan reports of an unfavorable nature. On
the following day when we arrived at Khodjend several Kokan parties made
lxxii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
their appearance in the settlements nearest to Khodjend, and demanded that
the inhabitants should en masse proceed with them to the rescue of the town.
A portion of this party contrived in the following night to make its way into
the town, while another portion was kept behind in check by outposts and a
small column, sent for that purpose to the lower Kokan road running parallel
with the bank of the river.
On the night of the 19th, batteries were erected, two on the right
bank and two on the left, the two last on the southern side of the town,
one on the Bokharian, the other on the Kokan road, all of which opened fire
at dawn. In all the four batteries there were 18 guns and two mortars in
action. The firing continued the whole day until 10 o'clock at night, becom-
ing fiercer on all sides at 8, 12 and 4 o'clock. The results of the bombard-
ment were very important, and great confusion was caused by several fires
perceptible in the town.
•
Contemplating to make the assault of the town on the morning of the
21st from the above-mentioned points on the north-eastern side, I removed the
chief body of the troops at sunset of the 20th, to the lower Kokan road, which
they reached by 12 o'clock at night. At 3 o'clock the troops were advanced
for the assault. The columns had barely time to enter the gardens, when
they were met by a deputation proceeding from the town, and headed by
Khodja Gazamat, one of the most influential and rich inhabitants of Khodjend;
the deputation stated that the town surrendered, consequently the troops
were ordered back into position at the Kokan gates.
The negotiations that were subsequently opened led to no results whatever.
Our truce-bearers, who were sent with Gazamat, were received with shots,
and afterwards even Khodja Gazamat, who was sent by me into the town with
proclamations, was arrested in Khodjend. The fact of the matter was this,
the peace-party, headed by the Kaza-Khan, the Kaza-Kilian and the above-
mentioned Khodja Gazamat, triumphant at the commencement, had to give in
at last to the war-party, at the head of which was one of the oldest Aksakals
of the town, a very rich and influential native of Khodjend, Khodja-Emin,
who had all the three above-mentioned persons arrested.
At 12 o'clock on the 22nd, the period, fixed by the Kodjendians for the
presentation of their answer, expired, and consequently the bombardment
of the town recommenced from 2 o'clock, from all the former batteries,
and continued unceasingly until the very moment of the assault. At 6 o'clock
in the day on the 22nd, at 12 and 6 o'clock on the 23rd, and at 12 o'clock on
the 24th, the town was bombarded as fiercely as on the 20th.
As it has been said above, owing to the strong profiles of the earth-works,
the only hopes of a successful assault depended on accident, in order therefore
to attain this object, it was necessary, after the discovery of the movement
of our columns on the night of the 21st, to change the hour of the attack.
For these very reasons, the assault was fixed for 2 o'clock on the 24th after
the strong bombardment.
For the greater distraction of the enemy's attention, trenches were
ordered to be dug on the night of the 22nd, on the south side of the town
opposite the Kokan gates, a work which lasted until the very hour of the
assault. This work, like the bombardment and reconnoitring, was always
carried on under very fierce fire, and was, as a matter of course, attended
with great losses on our side. The work on the left bank was superintended
by the military engineers, Lieutenant Fischer and Bogaevsky and that on the
right by Lieutenant Svitchevsky. All these officers discharged their duties
in a very laudable manner. Lieutenant Svitchevsky is especially praised
by Colonel Kraevsky, the commander of the column. It is but just to
mention also the under officers who took part in the engineering work,
APPENDIX XLV.
Íxxiii
and who, by their great bravery and courage, and extraordinary activity,
attracted general attention, and fully deserve every encouragement.
Two columns were appointed for the assault, one from the 3rd company
of infantry,* with 2 batteries and 2 light guns under the command of Captain
Mikhailof; and the other consisting of the same number of infantry, but
without guns, under the command of Captain Baranoff.
Both these columns left their position at dawn on the 24th; the first
advanced straight to the north-eastern side of the town, with the object of
first erecting, at the nearest distance, a breaching battery opposite to the barbet
nearest the river, and then opening fire at mid-day simultaneously with the
other batteries; the second column first made an advance towards the Kokan
gates, so as to be able, during the assault, to enter the Kelenaù gates at the
very beginning of the bombardment; to the Kokan gates at the same time, a
large portion of cavalry was sent, whose duty it was, together with one of
the companies belonging to Baranoff, to defend the bombarding battery and
the trench-diggers in the absence of Captain Baranoff. At 7 o'clock the reserve
force of the assaulting column was advanced; it consisted of two companies
and of two light guns under the command of Major Nazaroff; the main reserves
consisted of the same number of companies, and of one sotnia of Cossacks
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Favitzky. Placing myself at the head
of this reserve force, I marched to the Kelenaù gates and remained concealed
in the gardens on the Kelenaú road behind the mosques where the invalid
depôt had been established. Owing to the broken nature of the ground
in that locality, to the numerous buildings and to the dense gardens, the move-
ments of the assaulting columns as well as of the reserves were entirely hidden
from the enemy, and attracted no attention whatever. Captain Mikhailof's
column having approached to within 150 fathoms of the forts without
being observed, was made to rest with its right flank on the river, being
located in a ravine which screened it from the enemy, then throwing out im-
mediately a body of riflemen, that officer commenced the erection of a couple
of batteries, one for 2 guns at a distance of 65 fathoms from the barbet, and an-
other for two light guns at a distance of 50 fathoms. Notwithstanding the
fierce fire of artillery and musketry, the labour at the batteries proceeded suc-
cessfully and was completed by the time the cannonading commenced. The
shots from the batteries erected so close to the walls were very effective;
the enemy's fire ceased; the crest of the walls was much broken and the
walls generally of the barbet were considerably damaged. In the mean-
while the troops of both columns had prepared themselves for the assault,
supplying themselves with ladders, and taking up their position as close
under cover of the walls as possible, awaited only the signal for advancing.
The signal was to be given by Captain Mikhailovsky.
At 2 P. M., as soon as the bombardment was over, the rifle company of the
3rd battalion, headed by Ensign Shorokhof, an officer long known here for his
bravery, and also by Mikhailovsky himself, the principal officer of the column,
was the first to rush to the assault with a cheer: this company was follow-
ed by two others. The cheers had hardly echoed through Mikhailof's column
when Captain Baranoff, who was only waiting to hear it, pushed on his com-
pany at a quick run towards the Kelenaù gates.
* Captain Mihailoff's column: the 1st and rifle companies of the 3rd Orenburg battalion
and the 1st battalion of sharp-shooters. Baranoff's, a rifle company of the 4th battalion, the
3rd company of No. 3 battalion, and 4 companies of the battalion of sharp-shooters. Major
Nazaroff's 3rd and 4th companies of the 4th battalion.
The Reserve: the 1st company of the 4th battalion and of a company of sharp-shooters
of the 7th battalion.
S
U.
lxxiv
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
megance
Placing three ladders against the barbet, Shorokhof's company commenced
scrambling up the walls, but no sooner had the foremost reached the crest
when there suddenly appeared on the walls of the barbet a fresh body of
defenders. Stones, bullets, and iron balls were showered down upon the
assaulters. Captain Mikhailof, Ensigns Shorokhof, Kousonsky, and Beliaef were
the first who fell sacrifices in this escalade. They were all severely hurt by
the stones and bullets.
Although this caused some delay, it did not damp the ardour of the be-
siegers. Those who fell under the blows were replaced by others, and in
order to weaken the fire from the fortress, the Commander of the skirmishers,
Lieutenant Tille, boldly advanced his guns from the battery almost under the
very walls, and directed a hot fire of grape at the defenders, when he was
wounded by a ball in the breast; this, however, did not prevent his remaining
with his troops. Whilst this determined struggle was going on at the barbet
nearest the river, Captain Baranoff rushing quickly with his companies to the
Kelenaù gates, and regardless of the fierce fire, contrived to place some ladders,
and under a shower of bullets, grape shot, and stones, and also of missiles in the
shape of beams, climbed up the first wall, burst open the gates, and carrying
the ladder through, soon reached the second wall. Of this column the first
to mount the wall was Ensign Mazing of the artillery of the guard. The
gates of the second wall were also thrust open, and both companies entered the
town. Major Nazaroff's reserves followed next, and, according to the prelimi-
nary arrangements a portion of these led by Major Nazaroff himself advanced
straight to the citadel, whilst another portion went to the aid of Captain
Mikhailovsky. I sent also 50 Cossacks from the main body of reserve under
the command of Prince Bariatinski, and a company of infantry with Captain
Kirichenko. At the very commencement of the assault, Captain Mikhailovsky
received several blows on the head, and bleeding fearfully was obliged to
leave his troops, and to give up his command to Captan Bergbom of the
Orenburg rifle battalion. Profiting by the passage of Baranoff's column over
the wall, Bergbom renewed the assault with some reinforcements, and this time
with complete success. All the defenders of the barbet were bayoneted : the
besiegers ascended the barbet dispersed over the walls, and then descended into
the town.
At this moment Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohs came galloping up to the
main body of reserves with his Cossacks. Charging him to take the general
command of the troops who had penetrated into the town, and leaving a small
detachment of Cossacks and infantry under the command of Staff Captain
Vodar for the defence of the invalid depôt, I led all the remaining infantry
with two lightened guns to the Kelenau gates, and placing the guns in the
streets leading to the gates, I occupied the nearest portion of the town with
the infantry. At the same time I sent a detachment of rifles, one body under
Colonel Favitzky and another under Ensign Kalitin who was attached to me in
the capacity of Adjutant of the Orenburg rifle battalion, to take posses-
sion of the barbets and towers nearest to the gates.
The enemy, although driven away from the gates by the attacking party,
succeeded nevertheless in surrounding the columns, and strove once more
to gain possession of the walls of the towns, but the grape shot and the
well directed fire from our rifles, and more especially our occupation of the
barbets, forced them to abandon all further attempts.
Having made mention of the invalid depôt I consider it a bounden duty
to testify to the self-abnegation and exemplary zealous conduct of all the
medical men attached to the troops during the siege, forgetting their own
personal danger-Doctors Pokrishkin, Nikiten, Nikitnikof, and Chestneishi
APPENDIX XLV.
lxxv
Barishevski, devoted their entire attention to rendering immediate assistance
and to relieving the wounded.
The companies of Captain Baranoff, at the occupation of the Kelenaù
gates, detaching in accordance with previous arrangements, some of their men,
advanced to the left along the walls, whilst Major Nazaroff's column marched
straight through the bazar to the citadel. Dispersing themselves over the
walls to the left of the besieged gates, this column destroyed the defences by
spiking and overthrowing the guns, and after advancing steadily forward
till they came to the Kokan gates, joined the third company which had been
placed there. Here they co-operated for the last time in bursting open and
in making their way through the Kokan gates; next, taking possession of
six guns, one of which was taken by assault, the column proceeded along the
walls, reached the river and joined for the night Nazaroff's troops which had
contrived to occupy the citadel and to carry into it two guns.
Leading his troops over the walls, Captain Bergbom directed one portion
to the left of the Kelenaù gates, and another along the river to the citadel, where
he seized several guns and entered into the citadel for the night. The
Russian “hurrah” had hardly echoed through the walls of Kodjend when Colonel
Kraovsky, placing some of his riflemen in a boat belonging to the detachment,
crossed over quickly to the left bank of the river, and taking advantage of the
tumult in the town, scaled the wall in front of the river and broke into the
town. Seizing one gun on his way Kraevsky with his riflemen passed through
several streets, and appearing again at the citadel where he encountered Major
Nazaroff, he crossed over once more to the right bank.
All the columns during their movements through the town met with the
most fierce resistance. The defenders fought every inch of ground in the town,
erected barricades, placed guns behind them, and planted riflemen in all the
houses that faced the streets. The troops had hard work in clearing the
streets.
In order to clear the town as quickly as possible, I despatched, after the
infantry to the Kelenaù gates, a portion of Cossacks, of which one sotnia,
commanded by Esipoff, was ordered by Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohs to galop
through the town, and another mixed sotnia, commanded by Chertorogoff, was
led into the town for the purpose of reinforcing the infantry. Esipoff's sotnia of
Cossacks obeyed the order most gallantly, and returned safely to the reserves.
By 7 o'clock the cannonading in the town had entirely ceased, and the
fusillade was becoming apparently less. The citadel had already been in
our possession some time; 10 companies, 4 guns, and 200 Cossacks, not in-
cluding the Cossacks stationed at the Kelenaù gates, had been introduced into
the town and citadel, consequently our possession of the town could not be
disputed. But at the same time some precautions were required as regarded
the baggage waggons which had been left in the first position on the Kokand
Road, protected merely by one company, 30 Cossacks, and 4 battery guns
under the command of Captain Bourakoff. These baggage waggons were
menaced by a party of Kokandians, assembled in our rear to render assist-
ance to the besieged, as well as by the Kokandians who were defending
Khodjend, and who, forced to take flight, must have either encountered Captain
Bourakoff's column or Major Pishtchemoukoff's; the latter, consisting of two
companies, two battery guns and 30 Cossacks, occupied a position on the
Bokhara road. Thus, giving over the general command of the troops in the
town to Lieutenant Colonel Pistolkohs, I hastened with a sotnia of Cossacks
and a rocket company to Captain Bourakoff's column, having sent an order to
Major Pishtchemoukoff to follow thither likewise. A portion of the defenders
of Khodjend, mounted and numbering some hundred men, flying along the
Bokhara and Kokand roads, actually came across our columns stationed there,
lxxvi
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
and suffering a great loss in killed and wounded (the former Kokandian
Commandant of Kereùchi, Mulla-Touicha-Dadkha, was amongst the killed),
scattered themselves throughout the neighbouring towns.
As for the party
which had assembled in the rear of the besieging troops, they all dispersed as
soon as they heard that the town had been taken.
The night passed quietly in the town as well as along the position, and in
the morning the Aksakals made their appearance with protestations of entire
and unconditional submission.
In this manner, owing to the heroic spirit of the troops, the energy and
management of the several Officers, the resistance of the Khodjendians was
overcome ; and Khodjend, which is considered the barrier to Central Asia,
was occupied by Russian troops.
The obstinate resistance of the defenders cost them about 2.500 killed
alone. The dead were collected and buried during the course of the week.
Crowds of wounded began to make their appearance at the Medical
Depôt.
On the third day after our occupation of Khodjend the petitions received
for medical assistance were so numerous, that, notwithstanding the efforts of
our doctors, they were obliged to wait several days till they were all attended
to.
The trophies taken at Khodjend, not including fire-arms, consisted of flags,
falconets and other arms, 13 guns and one large Kokand Banner.
The opposition having been so great, our loss was necessarily severe.
During the siege we had 5 killed and 65 wounded; 57 received contusions
and 6 were missing; amongst these were, 1 officer wounded and 6 con-
tused. But however severe our losses, and however great the heroism of
our troops and of their several commanders, it cannot but be confessed
that the rapidity with which we occupied Khodjend was in no small degree
due to the circumstance of the total defeat of the Ameer prior to our attack
on the town. Forsaken by the Bokharians and not having had time to
establish good relations with Kokand, Khodjend could not prepare for a
proper defence.
The artillery and the garrison of the town were not
numerically proportionate to the determined spirit of the defenders, or to the
length of line of the earthworks. It was only under such favourable cir-
cumstances as these that it was possible to resolve on
an attack.
In any
other case
an assault against a fortification similar to that of Khodjend
would have been out of the question, and the only way to take possession of
this strongly fortified and thickly populated town would have been by
means of a regular siege, which would have required great resources and
much time.
Here follows honorable mention of all the officers and subaltern officers
engaged in the operations.
APPENDIX XLVI.
TO MAJOR GENERAL D. Romanofski, Governor of the Province of Turkistan.
Be it known unto your Excellency that by the grace of the Supreme Maker
we live well and happily. My soul has but one desire to be a sincere friend
of the White Czar; I have no intention to be at enmity with him, but on the
contrary, considering myself a friend of the White Czar, I cherish the hope
that, in case the enemy should enter our borders, you will not fail to afford
us your co-operation. Should traders or any other class of persons belonging
APPENDIX XLVII.
lxxvii
we trust
to the people of the White Czar come to us for any purpose whatsoever, we shall
in every case treat them with respect, and favour them more than our own
subjects; and they shall trade freely amongst us, as of old; also, whatever
number of traders may go hence to the Empire of the White Czar,
that as your own subjects will be treated here, you will in like manner
favour ours and admit them to trade freely, for so it is always done. When
that free commercial relation shall be established on both sides, the people
will praise God for the enjoyment of such liberty and peace. I say in
the name of the Almighty that we have but one God, and that, there-
fore, what is said is sacred. I herewith send you Mohamed Karim Mirakhur
who wishes us well, and whatever he shall say in our name respecting peace
and agreement, the same is to be believed and considered true, 1283. (The
original was sealed by Khudoyar Khan Sait Mohamet.
APPENDIX XLVII.
Your High Eminence,
I have received the letters which you sent me by Mohamed Karim
Mirakhur and am satisfied with their contents. I am likewise well satisfied
with the acts of the commander of your out-posts, who restored our soldier to
11s. Most honoured Khan, you may be fully assured that as long as you act
towards me as you act at present, you shall never suffer ill from me, or
displeasure, but, on the contrary, I am willing and ready to give you every
good and friendly co-operation.
Even up to the present time you may have seen that I have had no inimical
intentions towards you, and, moreover, that after taking Khodjend, I did not
march on Kokan, nor did I begin (nor have I now begun) any inimical
actions throughout the whole of the summer. I have also done no harm to
any of your subjects, except of those, of course, who have dared to attack
the present subjects of the White Czar. Your trading caravans pass freely to
Khodjend and Tashkend and they are not hindered in any way.
I repeat what I have said more than once both to yourself and to other
rulers in this country, as well as to the inhabitants, that the mighty White
Czar seeks no conquests here, but only wishes to restore peace and tranquillity
and to protect those natives who have adopted Russian allegiance. Con-
sequently, as long as your acts do not in any way appear in disagreement
with the will of my mighty Master the Emperor of all the Russias, so long
will I not only abstain from commencing military operations against you, but
I shall also be ready to assist you in all good things; and I even now willingly
propose to you to send your caravans and traders not only to Tashkend and
Khodjend, but also to all other Russian towns. You may be assured that
they will meet with nothing but favour and advantage. As regards, how-
ever, a close friendship and alliance between us, and the protection of the
White Czar, mentioned in your last letter, and which Mohamed Karim
Mirakhur has verbally communicated to me with great minuteness, I should
be heartily glad to promote an intention so good and beneficial for Kokan,
But I cannot undertake any representations on the subject until you have
given me the fullest proof of your intentions being firm and sincere, and for
that purpose it is necessary :—
1st.—That your bands shall not cross over to the right bank of the Syr,
and shall not dare to attack the people who are subject to the White Czar.
2nd.—That none of our people who may wish to proceed to Kokan on
business shall be molested or oppressed, and be made to pay more than the
rate of duty (4th part) agreed between us.
Ixxviii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
I must direct your special attention to this point, for our traders are
still sometimes badly treated at Kokan, as you will see from the complaints
which I have placed in the hands of Mohamet Karim Mirahúr.
I beg your
High Eminence will look into this complaint and give legal satisfaction,
in case it should be found just. I engage on my own part to give the same
satisfaction should any of your traders have met with any molestation at
Tashkend, Khodjend, or in other parts of Russia.
3rd.—That you shall not receive or give shelter to our criminals or de-
serters, and that you will send all such to me at Tashkend or Khodjend.
4th. That you shall not oppress, but in every way protect those who
may wish to bring down rafts of wood or other merchandize.
If your High Eminence will be pleased to fulfil sacredly all the conditions
I have laid down, then by God's help will be fulfilled that which you desire
for your own welfare and for that of your people; and in the meanwhile,
I beg you to accept the silver coffee pot and cup which I send herewith as
a proof of my friendly intentions and in token of my respect for the friendly
sentiments which you have expressed in your letter.
Your High Eminence,
APPENDIX XLVIII.
In my last letter I announced that in order to terminate the war
between Russia and Bokhara, it was first of all necessary that the Russian
merchants detained at Bokhara should be sent back to us, and at the same
time, partly also, verbally, through your envoy, I communicated to your
High Eminence the bases on which our former friendly relations might be
resumed. To that letter I requested an immediate answer.
Two months have now passed since I sent that letter, but no answer
has yet reached me. I must confess to your High Eminence that this delay,
together with the unseemly acts of the Bek of Oura-Tiubé (which, however,
have now ceased), have more than once called for the resumption of hosti-
lities. But as in the meanwhile I have been in receipt of information from
Bokhara proving your friendly intentions (such as the release of the
Russian traders, your prohibiting the Bek of Oura-Tiubé from making in-
cursions into the Naú district and the like), I have not only abstained from
renewing the war (notwithstanding that you have sent no answer to my
letter), but I have even permitted your envoy to remain at Kazala as long
as he chooses. Having, however, received no answer, I have not been able
to fulfil all that I promised. These are the reasons for which your traders
have not yet been returned to you. Orders have, however, been given for
their release immediately on the return of the last of our merchants.
I repeat to your High Eminence what I have said more than once,
namely, that the mighty White Czar, remembering the ancient friendship
between Russia and Bokhara, does not desire to be at enmity with you.
I may direct the attention of your High Eminence to the fact that notwith-
standing what has occurred between us of late, the troops of His Majesty have
hitherto not entered within the ancient boundaries of Bokhara. Hostilities
were provoked by the detention of our envoys and by the necessity of pro-
tecting those who had placed themselves under the protection of Russia,
and as soon as we had attained those objects we stopped. Our future
relations, i. e., either peace or war, depend entirely on your High Eminence;
and in order to prove to you that we do not desire war except as a last
resource, I hasten to inform you notwithstanding the silence of your
APPENDIX LI.
lxxix
High Eminence, that the Governor General of Orenburg, who is the chief
Governor of this region, arrived yesterday at Tashkend in order to review
the troops, and that as he is empowered by His Majesty the Emperor to treat
with you and conclude a peace, I have obtained from him the enclosed letter
addressed to your High Eminence, which will give you the possibility of
durably restoring the peace that has been interrupted.
If your High Eminence does not desire war, will you be pleased to
send an envoy to Tashkend with full powers to negotiate with the chief
Commander of the region and troops; and if you choose to do this, be pleased
to send him immediately, for otherwise military operations may be renewed,
and of the responsibility of these I divest myself by the present letter.
(Signed by Major General Romanofski, Military Governor of the province
of Turkistan).
Your High Eminence,
APPENDIX XLIX.
Having recently arrived at Tashkend to review the region and troops
which I command, I herewith inform you, through the medium of Major
General Romanofski, that on the report of General Romanofski to my
mighty Sovereign, His Imperial Majesty has been graciously pleased to order
me to enter into direct communication with you for the purpose of concluding
a peace that shall be durable and beneficial to all, for which object I have
been furnished with the most gracious commission, of which I herewith
enclose a copy.
I trust that this time nothing will hinder you from sending to me at
Tashkend, with as little delay as possible, an envoy with a commission
similar to that with which I have been honoured by the White Czar for the
purpose of concluding final and durable conditions of peace. (Signed by Gene-
ral Aide-de-Camp Kryjanovski, Governor General of Orenburg).
APPENDIX L.
To the Russian Emperor's Major General Romanofski, Military Governor of
the Province of Turkistan.
My words are as follows:-The letter which you sent I have received.
You write respecting the despatch of a good man for the negotiation of peace.
I have appointed such an one and he will speedily set out.
I have read your
proposals of peace. I understand them and fully agree to them.
of Rabikhsani, year 1283. (Seal of Emir Seid Muzafer).
APPENDIX LI.
The month
Extract from the Report of General Romanofski, dated the 7th October 1866.
By the 7th and 19th of September the troops concentrated at Hodjent;
exclusive of the garrison, were 19 companies of infantry,* 5 section of Cossacks,
*Depôt battalions were formed of the infantry. The first depôt battalion was com-
posed of the 2nd company of the 1st battalion of the line, the rifle company of the 2nd
battalion, the 2nd company of the 4th battalion, and the 4th company of the 5th battalion.
The 2nd depôt battalion was formed by 4 rifle companies, the 6th battalion of the line,
and the 3rd and rifle companies of the 7th battalion. The 3rd Oreuburg battalion of the
line retained its full complement. The 4th Samara battalion and two companies of the
Orenburg rifle battalion formed a separate half battalion, with half a company of sappers.
T
lxxx
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
with a rocket company, 16 foot artillery guns, 8 horse artillery pieces, and
4 20-pound mortars*. This force was supplied with a double complement
of projectiles, and with an additional half complement of cartridges, with an
engineer park, and with provisions for 15 days, which, having by your Excel-
lency's permission included half a pound of meat in lieu of a half ration
of biscuit, were sufficient for one month. The camp hospital was furnished
with medical stores for four months, in case it should be necessary to establish
new hospitals. All the above materiel, together with stores of spirits, groats,
barley, sheepskin coats, &c., was loaded on 600 arbas (2-wheel carts) and 800
camels, besides the regimental wagons.
9th
On the 21st September the force encamped on the road to Bokhara at
about 7 versts from Hodjent, and in the expectation of an answer to the last
letter addressed to the Emir, giving him an opportunity of bringing our
quarrel with him to a peaceful termination, occupied the same position until
the 20th September.
The term granted to the Emir for his final answer was to expire on the
23rd September (5th October), and therefore, in order on the one hand not to
break any promises, and on the other to lose no time uselessly, considering
its value at this late season of the year, the Hodjent force entrusted to me
under your superior orders left its position by your Excellency's directions
on the 20th September, and bivouacked on the same day at the fortress
of Naú.
After passing a day at Naú, and taking a company from its garrisont,
the troops continued their march on the 22nd September (O. S.) 4th October
(N. S.).
The distance from Naú to Qura-Tiubé is considered to be about 40 versts
(27 miles); the last 12 versts (8 miles) from the village of Naúgandy are
over a mountainous country, and therefore, with the intention of making a
reconnaissance of the country and roads in the vicinity of the fortress, the
force was halted and encamped at Naúgandy.
From
Naúgandy was the first village within the district of Oura-Tiubé.
the summit of a high mound in the vicinity of the village may be seen in the
distance the fortifications of Oura-Tiubé as well as a portion of the plain which
that fortress commands. Following the foot of the hills parallel with
their snowy ridge, the plain is dotted with a great number of villages and
intersected in all directions by streams, forming evidently a very rich and
populous district. But, notwithstanding its picturesqueness, the neighbour-
hood of Oura-Tiubé presented a very melancholy aspect on our march to
Naúgandy. The villages were empty, and many of them with stores of forage
had been fired. By orders of the Bek of Oura-Tiubé the inhabitants had
been driven by force into the fortress or into the mountains, while the most
influential families had been arrested as hostages. He also sent Bokhariani
troops to fire the villages, but we soon arrested the conflagrations.
These measures clearly showed that we could not reckon upon a peaceful
termination of our differences with Bokhara. Nevertheless, in despatching
a column to reconnoitre the fortress on the 23rd September (5th October), its
* Of the Orenburg artillery brigade, a battery in full complement, 1 divisions of
light artillery, 1½ divisions of rifled artillery, a squad (?) of No. 1 Siberian Cossack battery,
a squad of mountain artillery, and a mortar division.
Two sotnias of Ural Cossacks and 3 sotnias of Orenburg Cossacks, with 8 rocket
stands.
The rifle company of the 4th battalion, which had been attached to the 1st depôt
battalion.
APPENDIX LI.
lxxxi
commander, Colonel Count Woronzoff Dashkoff, Aide-de-Camp to His Im-
perial Majesty, was ordered to parley with the Bek of Oura-Tiubé before
opening fire against the fortress. Accordingly, although our troops were fired
upon, Count Woronzoff Dashkoff, in strict compliance with his instructions, did
not reply to the fire until the Bek sent out a messenger with a reply to the
letter which was addressed to him, which messenger treacherously wounded
in the hand one of our militiamen who had carried the letter to the fortress.
Count Woronzoft's column consisted of 3 sotnias of Cossacks, with a rocket
company, 7 companies of infantry,* with 4 pieces of horse artillery, and 4 of
foot artillery. He was accompanied by the chief of the staff, by Lieutenant
Colonel Trotski of the staff, and another staff officer for the purpose of making
plans and surveys.
The northern façade of the fortress of Oura-Tiubé, to which the Naú roads
lead up, extends over three considerably high and steep elevations, standing
almost in a straight line and sloping gradually to the opposite or southern
side. The town is situated on these slopes; it is surrounded on all the other
sides by a great number of turrets, by a double row of high walls, and by a
deep trench.
All the towers and barbets were armed with guns, which denoted that
the fortress was strongly defended with artillery. According to the most
accurate accounts, the number of guns was 30. Of course it was not to be
doubted that the material portion of the artillery of Oura-Tiubé was imperfect.
The guns were, for the most part, of small calibre, from 3 to 12 pors. ; but
justice must be done to the Bokharian artillerymen by saying that they
availed themselves to perfection of the materials they possessed. Having
large supplies of powder and shot, the Bokharians brought their guns to play
with great precision, especially at long distances; firing with heavy charges,
and almost vertically, they hit all the surrounding heights at a distance of
900 fathoms and more with remarkable accuracy.
The treachery of the Bokharians towards our militiaman (the messenger
who carried Count Woronzoff's letter to the fort) untied the Count's hand; after
advancing the batteries into position, and, in his turn, opening fire upon the
fort, Count Woronzoff boldly, and regardless of the strong fire from the fortifi-
cations, moved forward with some small bodies of infantry and cavalry, and
passing round the northern and western façades, succeeded, with the aid of the
officers of the staff, in gathering ample and correct information as to the posi-
tion of the town. Small surveying parties were at the same time sent into the
neighbouring localities, and these returned with the requisite information
respecting the nearest roads.
The result of Count Woronzoff's bold and thorough reconnaissance having
finally confirmed the information already possessed that the northern front
was the strongest side of the fort and commanded the whole town, and having
also procured a circumstantial knowledge of the nearest roads, afforded the
possibility of forming plans as to the distribution of the attacking columns and
the movement of the troops.
On the strength of this, the next few days were employed in stationing the
troops which were appointed for the siege, and which were formed into detach-
ments, and at the same time a few more detailed examinations of the fort
and town were made under the personal superintendence of Your Excel-
lency.
* Two companies of the rifle battalion, the 3rd battalion of the line in full com-
plement, a company of sappers, a division of the battery of artillery, a squad of ritied
artillery, and a squad of the Siberian Cossack battery.
lxxxii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
It was evident that the most vulnerable part of the town was its southern
side. Having in their front no natural obstructions, and surrounded by
gardens, which in some places spread to the very walls, the southern works of
Oura-Tiubé afforded better chances for secretly placing breaching batteries close
to them and for leading up troops for the storm. But it had at the same time
to be considered that these works lay at the foot of an elevation upon which
stood the principal northern fortifications of Oura-Tiubé, and that even the
capture of the southern walls would not in itself be a guarantee of success
beyond them.
Keeping the fortifications on the northern side, and at the same time
holding the citadel which was in the very centre of these works, the enemy
could maintain the defence of the town and dispute it step by step until we
took the north side, more especially as the elevation upon which the north-
cast bastion stood was separated from the town by a double row of high walls
with a deep trench. This was all the more to be anticipated, as the recessary
preparatory arrangements for the siege, such as the erection of batteries, &c.,
could not be disguised from the enemy, who would have timely warning of
the threatening danger.
At the same time the greatly extended limits of the province, and the
many military operations which would inevitably ensue while our military
resources continued still to be very limited, made it more than ever necessary
to remember the rule of economy in respect of men and ammunition.
Taking all this into consideration, on the 27th of September (9th October)
the troops, in accordance with the proposed plan of attack, were disposed
around the fort in the following manner :-
The main forces, consisting of 11 companies of infantry and 1 sotnia,
with 10 guns and the whole of their train, under the command of Colonel
Manteúfel, were stationed on the road to Jizakh, within 3 versts of the south-
western angle of the fort. They occupied an advantageous position on the
slopes of elevations surrounded by ravines, which rendered it possible, in case
of need, to leave all the heavy lumber under a very slight protection. In front
of these, 1 verst nearer to the south-western angle under cover of some heights,
was stationed the advanced guard composed of 4 companies of infantry,
3 sotnias of Cossacks, with 8 guns and 6 rocket stands, under the command
of Colonel Count Woronzoff Dashkoff, of His Imperial Majesty's suite, while
another detachment of 5 companies of infantry, a party of sappers, 1 sotnia
of Cossacks, with 6 guns of the foot artillery and 2 rocket stands, under Captain
Abramof, were left on the Naú road, also within 3 versts of the fort, protected
by elevations from the fire from the fort.
On the 27th and 28th of September (O. S.) the walls around the whole
of the fort were surveyed most minutely. Small foraging columns were in
addition sent out from the main detachment into the nearest villages, which
enquired into the character of the country; one of these under Lieutenant
Colonel Grizorief, composed of 3 companies of infantry, a sotuia of Cossacks,
with 2 rocket stands, to which were attached some officers of the staff, a party
of the surveyors and engineer officers of mines, penetrated as far as the main
range of snowy mountains, and brought back a great deal of important and
useful information.
It was determined to commence storming the place simultaneously from
the southern and north-eastern fronts with several columns,* some of which
* 3rd Orenburg battalion of the line in full complement, one rifle company of the 7th
battalion of the line, and the 10th and 11th companies of the Samara battalion.
APPENDIX L1.
lxxxiii
were placed under the chief command of Count Woronzoff, and the rest under
that of Captain Baranof, whose detachment, under the circumstances, was
augmented to 8 companies of infantry and 12 guns (8 battering guns and
4 rifled cannon), and 2 sotnias of Cossacks with 2 rocket stands.
In order to insure the success of the storming, it was considered necessary
to establish several batteries on the south side and opposite to the north-
eastern front.
Of these preparatory works the establishment of breaching batteries
opposite to the north-east front was the most difficult, for the ground in front
of the bastion to be attacked on this side was perfectly open and sloped down
from the fort very abruptly. The only site it was possible to select for the
battery was a hillock not more than 90 fathoms from the bastion, defended by
a natural moat in the shape of a deep aryk (canal) running at the bottom
of the slope of the fort parallel with the walls.
To facilitate the accomplishment of this exceedingly difficult work, which
was to be done on the night of the 29th of September (11th October), Colonel
Count Woronzoff Dashkoff superintended a severe bombardment from the
south side, while false attacks of cavalry with a rocket company were made
on the south-eastern angle, and small columns of infantry with 3 guns made
demonstrations against the north-western angle. Before the night set Captain
Baranof's column was to pass over to the position assigned to it opposite to
the north-eastern bastion, keeping to the hollows so as not to be detected by
the enemy, and to proceed with the erection of the battery when the firing
commenced on the night from the south side.
By the time it was dark all the troops and guns which were to operate
against the fort from the south and west were in their respective positions, and
opened a fire, which they kept up all night without intermission. Full credit
must be given to our artillerymen for their excellent practice, and to the men
who worked the rockets. Major General Kondratief, chief officer of artil-
lery in the Orenburg military circuit, personally superintended the artillery
with unwavering zeal during the whole of the siege. It may be positively
asserted that not a single shot was fired without effect; many of the enemy's
guns, beginning even from midnight, being obliged to give up all competition;
our rifled cannon and mortars were especially telling. The town was set fire
to in several places, and in the stillness of the night the cries uttered by the
besieged at the havoc and devastation caused by our shells were frequently
heard.
This was the first serious operation of our artillery against Oura-Tiubé,
which in the above respect was crowned with complete success. Unfortunately
all that was intended to have been done that night could not be accomplished.
Captain Baranof's column had to make a long and difficult detour, so that
it could not have commenced its work before midnight, and consequently could
not have completed it by daybreak. Fully realizing his position, Captain
Baranof therefore rightly concluded that if he attracted the attention of the
enemy he would not be able to carry out the project except at an immense
loss, and so deferred the work until the following night.
Through the happy selection made by Captain Baranof of a place for
stationing his column, which, though under the fire of the fort, yet screened
our men from the enemy's sight, enabled us, while keeping up a slight cannon-
ade during the day from the south and south-west sides, to keep our real
intentions hidden from the foc.
In order, however, still more to mislead the enemy, whose attention was
chiefly turned to the south and west fronts, the following manœuvre was per-
formed: at 3 P. M. on the 30th September (12th October), I collected all the
lxxxiv
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
available cavalry of the force, viz., 3 sotnias with 6 rocket stands, and adding
to these a small body of infantry, with one gun taken from the detachment
left by Captain Baranof on the Naú road, and directed them against the
north-west angle of the fort, instructing Colonel Pistolkors to make
a strong demonstration against it and the junction of the forces (?)
while at the same time I reinforced Captain Baranof with one company of
infantry and a sotnia of Cossacks from the main column, which proceeded
to join him by forced marches, and remained with him till the work in the
trenches was finished.
2
The lodgment for the breaching batteries was effected with extraordinary
success. As soon as the firing of the rockets commenced from Colonel Pistolons'
column and the artillery began to play in that quarter, which was at past 6
in the evening, Baranof's column, previously drawn up in an adjacent hollow,
fully prepared and provided with all that was necessary for the work it had
to perform, began to draw silently towards the place chosen for the erection of
the breaching batteries. The enemy being attracted by the enforced opera-
tions against his south and west sides at first paid no attention whatever to
this movement. He not only did not increase his fire upon the approaching
column, but even silenced for a time the artillery that had been playing on
this side during the day, and removed some of the guns from here to the
opposite point. It was only when all the batteries were placed, the men told
off to their posts, and when they began breaking the earth, that the enemy,
hearing the sound, opened fire on the labourers. The most difficult part of the
work was, however, done, and the enemy's fire did not for a moment interrupt
our brave soldiers. With a very slight loss they completed during the night
all they had been directed to do.
By daybreak the breaching battery was finished and the guns placed; a
convenient passage was effected across the aryk protected by a trench, and
a covered way was made from the battery to the hollow where the reserve was
located. The total length of trench work performed that night under the
clever and experienced direction of Lieutenant Colonel Yablonski, of the
Engineers, was more than 200 fathoms. Two small lodgments for 4 rifled
guns were also made there to support the breaching battery.
These guns
opened fire with those of the battery at daybreak. During the night of the 1st
(13th October), under the general superintendence of Lieutenant Colonel Osipof
(Engineers), Captain Plet, Staff Captain Sristchevski, and Lieutenant
Priorof, of the guards battalion of sappers, the batteries on the south side
were also completed; these were mounted with 2 rifled and 6 lightened guns,
and 4 mortars, which likewise opened fire at daybreak.
Both the breaching batteries operated with extraordinary success,
especially the one opposite to the north-east front. Here Staff Captain Zinovief,
of the artillery of the guard, managed the guns with remarkable ability; he
made a point of proving the efficacy of artillery fire against the walls on that
side, which were of a peculiar construction and considered proof against shot.
It must be acknowledged that Captain Zinovief's efforts were crowned with
complete success; by midday, before even 150 shells were thrown at the wall,
breaches began to appear-one about two fathoms wide by about one fathom in
height, and another somewhat smaller. The operation of the batteries on the
south side was also very satisfactory; the firing from these was directed by
Lieutenant Colonel Silveretan under the chief superintendence of Major
General Kondratief, who frequently levelled the guns himself. On this side
our artillerymen succeeded by the evening in making two large breaches, not
only in the front wall, but also in the farthest at the shoulder angle of the
south-west barbet.
APPENDIX LI.
lxxxv
The proceedings preparatory to the siege were thus coming to an end ; all
that there was left to do was to prevent the enemy from repairing the
damages done to the fortification and to silence his fire; for which purpose the
whole of our guns were brought to bear upon him during the night of the
1st (13th October), after which, at daybreak, a rocket gave the signal to storm
the place from all sides at one and the same time.
The south side was to be stormed by three columns commanded by
Colonel Count Woronzoff Dashkoff, each composed of 2 companies of infantry
and a party of sappers. The first* led by Captain Schauffs of the life guard re-
giment of lancers, was to proceed to the gates nearest to the south-west barbet.
The secondt column was to advance on the left of the first, under Captain
Glukhovski of the life guards regiment of cuirassiers, and the third, under
the command of Major Bazarof, was to be led to the breach near the barbet.
These columns were provided with a reserve of three companies with two
mountain guns, commanded by Colonel Slantenfel.
The north-east side was to be assaulted by Captain Baranof, commanding
two columns organized for the purpose, each composed of two companies and
a party of sappers,-one headed by Lieutenant Shorokhof, || and the other by
Staff Captain Konopelski ;¶ these also had a reserve of one company with two
rifled cannons under Lieutenant Kuzminski.** These columns were to advance
to the two breaches effected during the day.
At about midnight of the 2nd-14th the troops appointed for the
assault having the scaling ladders with them, took up their positions, on the
grounds previously chosen for them, as near as possible to the fort.
To the right of the storming columns, on the southside and in the valley
of a rivulet, Colonel Pistolkors was located with a detachment of cavalry of 3
sotnias with 6 rocket stands, which thus formed a link between Count
Voronzow's and Captain Baranof's columns.
1
Besides this, in order to divert the enemy, a small column under
Captain Siarkovski, composed of 2 companies of infantry, one gun and a party
of Cossacks detached from Baranof's force, was directed against the north front.
At past 5 in the morning, at early dawn, the signal was given, our
artillery ceased fire for a time, and the columns advanced to the assault. From
the south Schauffs' and Glukhovski's columns moved forward simultaneously,
and these were shortly afterwards followed by Nazarof's column.
The riflemen of Schauffs' column were the first who, under a shower of
balls and stones, cleared the distance to the trench, and they at once adjusted
a ladder against the wall of the turret which protected the gates. Captain
Griffenberg, commanding the rifles, mounted first; he was followed by
Ensigns Mashin and Fedorof and several men, after whom the ladder gave
way. At this critical moment the small party that had mounted, animated by
Griffenberg's example, boldly fell upon and put to death the defenders of the
turret, while Schauffs was already preparing to assist them. Those who
* 3rd company of the Orenburg rifle battalion, rifle company of the 2nd battalion
of the line, and a party of sappers.
+ 2nd company of the Orenburg rifle battalion, rifle company of the 6th battalion
of the line, and a party of sappers.
† 2nd and rifle companies of 4th battalion of the line, and a party of sappers,
§ 2nd company of the 1st battalion of the line, 4th company of the 5th battalion, and
a party of sappers.
3rd rifle company of 3rd battalion of the line, and a party of sappers.
T 1st and 2nd companies of 3rd battalion of the line.
** Rifle company of the 7th battalion of the line.
lxxxvi
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
followed Griffenberg, but who could not get up by the ladder,- Ensign Kalitin
and Mr. Lerkhé,* with other volunteers,-rushed at the gates with axes in
their hands and cut them down. The rest of the riflemen had in the meanwhile
placed another ladder. Thus, not only were the first who mounted the wall
backed in proper time by assistance, but also, notwithstanding the most.
obstinate defence made by the enemy, Schauffs' column in very quick time
broke open both gates and penetrated into the town; the latter, however,
had not yet altogether entered into the street before it was attacked between
the two walls by large masses of the enemy, which had to be kept off with
the bayonet. Having shaken the enemy off, the column passed through the
gates, and, in accordance with an order previously given, proceeded to the
right along the wall, where it forcibly took 4 guns.
By order of Count Voronzow, Captain Glukhovski advanced at the same
time as Schauffs' to the left of the latter, Captain Pletz with the volunteers and
party of sappers marching in front. Our foremost men had hardly emerged
from the corner of the gardens when the enemy opened a strong fire of
muskets, falconets and cannon. Paying no attention to this, the volunteers,
with Pletz at their head, descended into the trench and adjusted their ladders.
Leaving only a portion of his riflemen on the edge of the trench to fire at
the enemy on the walls, Captain Glukhovski, with all the rest of his men
headed by Captain Sveltchkof, followed up the volunteers. A shower of
stones, cannon balls and balls of burning pitch (fire balls) fell on the heads of
the besiegers, who nevertheless passed over the first wall. But here the
column stumbled upon large masses of the besieged, some of whom fell upon
our men, while the others lodged themselves in the contiguous dwellings and
turrets, and then opened a strong musketry fire. A long and bloody struggle
now took place. Captain Pletz was killed, whereupon the command of the
volunteers was taken by Lieutenant Komarof. Ensign Konchitz and Lieute-
nant Pleshkof, both of the Orenburg rifle rattalion, were mortally wounded;
Lieutenant Fedorof, of the same battalion, was also wounded, and Captain
Glukhovski, Lieutenant Komarof and Ensign Leontiêf received contusions.
Two guns and several falconets were here wrested from the enemy.
By this time some of the general reserves of the columns storming on the
south side began to approach the outer gates broken open by Schauffs, led by
Lieutenant Colonel Grigorief, and Schauffs' column, taking the second or
inner gates, was already entering the town.
Glukhovski's column, strengthened with 2 guns from the reserve force,
entered at the same time, and agreeably with previous orders advanced to the
citadel.
It must be here observed that the brunt of the affair was borne by these
two columns; each composed of 2 companies and a party of sappers, they
separately did not number more than 250 men ; Schauffs' column sustained
a loss altogether of 77 in killed, wounded and contused, and Glukhovski's 74.
By order of Count Voronzow, Major Varof, with his column and a party
of sappers, followed up the preceding two columns. He entered the
breach without any great loss, descended into the space between the two
walls, and, clearing it of the masses which intercepted his way at the point of
the bayonet, led a portion of the column against the second breach, while the
other portion was directed to proceed along the western front. The two
companies of the 4th battalion, led by their brave Captain Baron Renné
*Titular Councillor Lerkhé was attached to the Military Governor of Turkistan, and
took part in the military operations as a volunteer.
APPENDIX LL.
lxxxvii
and by Lieutenant Bogolinhof, and the company of sappers, headed by
Lieutentant Pletz No. 2, which composed Nazof's column, behaved with the
courage for which they were renowned, and very soon took possession of that
part of the town wall and 4 guns.
Thus, in not more than half an hour all the columns commanded
by Count Voronzow succeeded in making themselves masters of the walls
and in penetrating into the town. The first obstacle was overcome, but they
might have encountered another and more difficult one. The streets opening
to the walls on this side were narrow and tortuous and abounded with
large dark caravanserais. These were occupied by some of the defenders
of the walls, while others again filled the dwellings and stationed themselves
behind the fences, and from all sides opened a strong fire of musketry.
Directing Lieutenant Colonel Trotski, of the Etât Major (and chief of
the staff of the province, who was all throughout attached to the south-
ern force), to support Schauffs and Glukhovski with a portion of the
reserve, Count Voronzow, with the rest of the reserve, himself marched to the
breach, and when all the columns had penetrated into the town, he hastened
with all the reserve force to support those in the streets where the firing
was growing hotter, and the hand-to-hand struggle was becoming fierce. The
resistance in the streets could not, however, last long; the besieged soon
noticed Captain Baranof's column in their rear.
As soon as the signal was given with the rocket, Baranof, without losing a
moment, boldly led his two columns to the siege, bidding Captain Dennet to
follow with his reserves. The brave companies of the 3rd battalion with their
worthy officers, Captain Baranof, Lieutenant Shorokhof, Captain Konopelski
and Ensign Alenitch, paying no heed to the fire which was opened upon them,
ran quickly over the ground to the breach, and scrambling up by ladders and
over the ruins instantaneously occupied the wall. Shorokhof and Konopelski
were the first to enter the breach. The enemy fell back into the nearest
turrets and barbets, but before they had time to recover from the shock,
Captain Baranof at once led one portion of the storming column straight
towards the citadel, while the other was directed to pursue the enemy running
towards the south side; Alenitch's company was told off to the left along
the wall to seize a strongly fortified barbet in that direction and some guns,--
an order which was soon and accurately fulfilled.
Generally speaking, Captain Baranof's orders were obeyed by all the
officers of his column with coolness, bravery and alacrity. They were hard at
work at once in all directions, and in less than an hour the citadel was occu-
pied by Baranof's troops, and another portion of his force was proceeding to
the south side in the rear of the obstinate defenders of the southern face.
Baranof's storming column took 7 guns by main force.
The citadel was no sooner taken, than Baranof's reserves under Lieute-
nant Kuzminski appeared on the ground with 2 rifted guns, which, notwith-
standing the steepness of the road, were brought up to the very gates of the
citadel, from which points some telling shots were fired at the north-west
bastion and at the masses of the enemy. Notwithstanding the great
obstinacy of the besieged, their resistance could not possibly be of
long duration. All the quarters of the town were soon cleared of the
enemy, and then the troops were led to the last refuge of the defen-
ders, the north-west bastion,-which was situated on the most elevated
part of the fort and armed with two large and several small cannon. From
the commencement of the siege the defenders of this bastion directed a fre-
quent fire on the contending parties without distinguishing between friend
and foe, They continued this fire even when the greater part of the town
U
Ï x x x v i ii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
and the citadel were in our hands, but even here a cheer and a bayonet charge
decided the affair; by 7 o'clock the bastion was taken.
Justice demands that something be said too of the valuable assistance given
by the small columnn under Captain Siarkovski, which during the siege succeed-
ed in penetrating into the fort through the Naù gates, and by No. I sotnia of
Ural Cossacks under Lieutenant Prince Bariatinski (of the Preobrajenstic
regiment of His Imperial Highness Czaréwitch's body guard), which in
the very heat of the battle broke open and entered through the gates to the
right of Schauffs' column, cut down the men on some of the barbets, overthrew
several guns, and bravely swept through the streets to the consternation of
the enemy.
This sotnia came up in time to assist in the attack on the
northern bastion,—the last refuge of the besieged. Mention must also be made
of the excellent and praiseworthy management of Colonel Pistolkors in
command of the cavalry, who, despatching Prince Bariatinski's sotnia of
Cossacks to the aid of the besiegers, failed not himself with the rest of the
cavalry to cut off in proper time the fugitive garrison of Oura-Tiubé, the
majority of which fled to the hills to the south-east of the fort.
The hundreds of dead bodies of the enemy which lay for several days
on the ground in the neighbourhood of Oura-Tiubé bore witness to the terrible
havoc made by our Cossacks.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning Your Excellency, in the name of His
Imperial Majesty, personally thanked the troops in the citadel of Oura-Tiubé
for their usual brave service rendered to His Majesty.
The firing in the town had almost ceased.
In this manner, after 1½ hours' hard fighting, fell Oura-Tiubé, one of the
chief bulwarks of the Emir's power in Central Asia, and over the walls of its
citadel now waves the Russian banner.
By God's aid we may expect that the fall of a point of such importance to
Bokhara will have very great weight, not only with regard to the consolidation
of our power in Central Asia, but also very beneficially as regards the general
pacification of the region.
Situated on the confines of Bokhara and Kokand, Oura-Tiubé has very
long and constantly served either as a point of defence or as an object of the
hostile design of the barbarous despots of this country; and its inhabitants,
with the intention of stimulating their martial spirit, have systematically been
trained by the native rulers to robbery.
The numerous and extensive burial grounds, occupying more than half of
the town and the immediate vicinity, and the undeveloped state of trade and
industry in Oura-Tiubé, as compared in that respect with the neighbouring
towns, bears outward evidence of its mournful history.
2nd
14th
The trophies of our victory on the October, besides the important
fort, are 4 banners, 16 large mortars, including one 72-pounder mortar,
16 small cannon, a great number of falconets and muskets, immense stores of
powder, lead, cartridges and projectiles, including bomb-shells, &c. The
enemy's loss is enormous; in the town and immediate vicinity alone not less
than 2,000 bodies have been buried.*
Our loss, too, in this severe engagement was necessarily heavy—
Killed
Wounded
Contused
...
Officers,
Men.
3+
14
1
102
6
101
*According to the Aksakals of Oura-Tiubé, the inhabitants of the place prior to the
siege numbered up to 30,000; after the siege these were reduced by a half, and they assert
that in killed and wounded their loss amounted to 15,000, but this is of course incredible.
Captain Pletz No. 1 killed outright. Lieutenant Pleshkof and Sub-Lieutenant
Kouchitz, both mortally wounded, died within a few hours.
APPENDIX LII.
lxxxix
These numbers include the killed and wounded during both the siege and the
storm, at which period our losses did not exceed altogether 3 killed and 10
men wounded.
Here follows honourable mention of all the officers engaged in the action,
APPENDIX LII.
Extract from General Romanovski's Report of the
1st
13th
November 1866.
After the fall of Oura-Tiubé, the ruler of Bokhara remained possessed of
only one more place which gave him a chance of still retaining hold of the
valley of the Syr-Daria, and that was the fortress of Jizakh.
Jizakh, which always derived an importance from its situation, had of
late risen into still greater significance, situated at the northern extremities
of the Djalan-Uty defile, through which lies the main and almost the only
convenient road from the direction of the Kirghiz Steppes to Samarcand
and Bokhara. Jizakh had always served the Bokharians as a point of
defence against the irruptions of their neighbours in the north, or as a
means of support in their aggressive operations in the steppes and against
the Kokanians. Jizakh had long been protected by a citadel and a town wall,
but during the last eight months it had been very considerably strengthened.
Several thousand men had worked daily in the fortifications.
A triple row of walls, one rising above the other (the outer one newly built
this year was 33 fathoms high and 4 fathoms thick); a triple row of trenches,
the front one being in parts as many as 11 yards deep; a great number of
barbets and of works projected very far out, which well flanked the trenches,
-the outlying country, too, being exposed to a cross-fire from them; the very
system of the construction of the new fortifications of Jizakh, which were
a great improvement on the old Bokharian forts, i. c., the system of sloping
Dozopsion nymb. apertures, of covered ways, also with screened apertures;
all this gave Jizakh really a very formidable appearance. To take the most
moderate figure, the garrison numbered 10,000 men, consisting of the remnant
of the Emir's best troops, and reinforced by fresh relays of Afghans,
Persians, and Turkmen, who were armed not only with the old matchlocks,
but also with very good muskets of the European pattern; after the seige a
great many revolvers were found, besides percussion arms. The artillery con-
sisted of 53 cannon, the gun carriages were well made according to the English
pattern, and a great quantity of shells was found in the store houses.
The defence of Jizakh was conducted by the most trustworthy of the
Emir's coadjutors, the Toksabapervanachi Alayar, Yobuk, the late Bek of
Jizakh, the commander of the Afghan troops, and many other Beks, eighteen in
number.
It will consequently be understood that so long as such a place like
Jizakh, so strongly fortified and defended, remained in the possession of the
late arbitrary controller of the destiny of Central Asia, it was not only
in vain for us to look forward to any serious concessions on his part, but
could not even expect that tranquillity would prevail in the valley of the
Syr-Daria.
Seeing that even after the occupation of Oura-Tiubé there came not
the promised friendly mission from Bokhara, the troops were immediately
XC
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
marched towards Jizakh after the necessary arrangements were completed in
Ora-Tiubé for the location of the garrison, and after the detachment received
fresh supplies from Khodjend.
The garrison left in Oura-Tiubé amounted to three companies of soldiers,
with two guns and a company of Cossacks.
6th
18th
5th
A column of five companies, three sotnias of Cossacks, with a rocket
company and guns of the horse artillery, had previously (October) been
sent forward on the road to Zaámin, a small fort standing half way between
Oura-Tiubé and Jizakh.* On the two other companies, with two guns
and a sotnia of Cossacks, were ordered to follow. The command of these
advanced troops was given to Colonel Count Woronzoff Dashkof. The
enemy fled so precipitously that he left a gun in Zaámin, and the fort was
taken without a shot being fired.
2
The rest of the forces were then gradually advanced along the same road,
and all assembled at Zaámin on the evening of the of October.
12th
24th
•
10th
2nd
Leaving in Zaámin, in the charge of a small force, all the heavy lum-
ber that could be dispensed with, the detachment, consisting of 16 com-
panies, 5 sotnias of Cossacks, a rocket company, with 8 guns of horse
and 12 of foot artillery, moved towards Jizakh. Halting for the night
in the village of Rabot, 12 versts from Jizakh, the Khodjend detach-
ment marched at daybreak of the towards the south side of the
town, and before midday took up a position on the Samarcand road
between Jizakh and the mouth of the Djalan-Uty defile.
The troops
reached the heights forming the defile and skirting Jizakh on the south by
about 11 A. M.; the enemy's pickets, which were fallen in with on
resuming the march after the last night halt, gradually drew back towards
the town, though they did not relinquish their posts without a more or less
prolonged exchange of shots and hand to hand fights with our advanced bodies.
In these encounters our militiamen and Cossacks made several prisoners, who
gave us a great deal of valuable information on the situation of the town and
about the garrison.
When the head of our column emerged on the Samarcand road, some
of the enemy's pickets retired into the defile, although most of them
drew back to the fort.
The strong fortifications of Jizakh and the numerous garrison could be
easily discerned from the last gradients of the mountains at not more than
3 versts distance. The walls and the portion of the town nearest to them were
crowded with defenders. We could see a great number of tents in the space
between the town walls and the citadel. There were several guns mounted on
the barbets and projecting parts of the walls. It is to be observed that, contrary
to the practice of opening fire from a great distance followed by the Central
Asiatics on all occasions up to this time, the enemy did not on this day
and to the end of the siege open fire from his guns until our troops approached
within close range, and then his artillery played rapidly and accurately upon
us; it was evident that it was directed by an experienced hand. Some
prisoners brought in apprised us of the important fact that Allayar Bek, com-
manding in Jizakh, had determined to make a desperate defence, and that in
order to prevent the garrison from abandoning the fort and from entertaining
any idea of surrendering it, he had closed all egress by blocking the gates,
leaving all the small wickets free; the inhabitants were at the same time
strictly forbidden to say a word about surrender. By his order the portion
*The distance between the two latter is estimated at a little more than 100 versts.
APPENDIX LII
xci
ojek
of the town nearest the wall and the market place were sacrificed to the
purposes of defence; houses and fences were pulled down for the construction
of an esplanade, some were burned down, and the gardens were cleared of
the trees. All the preparations for the defence were made before our very
eyes; up to the last moment of the siege, while the fire from our batteries
and chain of riflemen was beeing poured in upon them, every possible thing
was done to strengthen the situation.
After placing the detachment in position within 4 versts of the town on
the banks of the river giving its name to the Djalan-Uty defile, a reconnais
sance was on the same day performed under the personal command of Your
Excellency. A survey was made of the main pass, about 40 to 50 fathoms wide,
through which lies the road to Samarcand. The enemy's pickets found at the
entrance into the defile disappeared and kept a good way off during the recon-
naissance. It was nevertheless found necessary to establish a strong picket in
the defile to guard the road; the picket remained there up to the close of
the siege, under the command of Markofelder of Cossacks. On the evening
of that day one of the officers of the Afghans was taken prisoner. We
were impelled by the strong defence of Jizakh, the numerous pickets of
the enemy in our rear, which confirined the statements of the prisoners that
large reinforcements were coming up from Samarcand, and also by the lateness
of the season, to push the siege and to capture Jizakh as quickly as possible.
It was at the same time evident that an open siege without preparations—siege
work was an affair of too great a risk-and the erection of batteries and of
more or less considerable covered approaches, were at all events indispensable.
Therefore, without loss of time, gabions and fascines were commenced on a
large scale on the next day. On the recommendation of the Military Engi-
neer Osipof measures were at the same time taken to divert the water from
the town, which flowed into it from the Djalan-Uty; this was done to the
utmost of our ability.
14th
26th
These preparatory
27th
13th
works lasted without intermission over the 25th,
15th
and of the month; from three to four companies of soldiers being
employed on them; while minute inspections of the fort and road through the
defile was daily made by another portion of the forces, a third body being
told off to cover the advancing transports from Zaámin, which, among other
things, was bringing up part of the park of the artillery.
13th
25th
On the two columns, each composed of three companies, were sent
out to inspect the fortifications, one under the command of Captain Baranof,
the other under that of Major Pistcheninkof. The first marched towards the
Samarcand gates on the south side of the town, and the other to the Oura-
Tiubé gates at its south-eastern angle. On the approach of these columns to
the fort they were met with severe discharges from the guns, and soon after
found that ditches were dug across the roads, which were also obstructed by
earth-works and barricades. The houses in the immediate vicinity of these,
as well as these barricades, were occupied by Sarbazes, who fired upon our
troops as they advanced. But the enemy's purpose here was utterly frus-
trated by a brave bayonet charge. With considerable loss and leaving several
prisoners in our hands, the enemy hurriedly retreated into the fort; the
obstructions were removed and the locality was surveyed.
The results of this reconnaissance were very valuable. It was discovered
that, although the enemy had made great exertions to form esplanades around
the new walls, yet in many places large buildings and stone fences were left
intact, which, without much labour, could be turned into breaching batteries.
Advantage was at once taken of this oversight on the enemy's part, by
lodging thre companies under Lieutenant Colonel Grigorief during the night
xcii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
'Sth
25th
14th
26th
of the and in the gardens and houses nearest to the spots selected
for the erection of the batteries.
At daybreak on the 14th, the neighbourhood of Jizakh on the western and
northern sides was examined by Captain Gulkhovski and a surveying party
under cover of two sotnias of Cossacks with two rocket stands. At the
same time Lieutenant Colonel Grigorief's companies lodged in advance of the
camp in the gardens and houses close to the fort were relieved by three other
companies under Major Svintsitski.
At about 10 A. M., large bodies of the enemy began to assemble on the
defile in front of the pickets stationed there, which in a short time made
an attack on a picket of our foragers; the attack was repulsed; in the mean-
while, on receipt of the first intelligence of the gathering of Bokharian
horsemen in the defile, our militia and two sotnias of Cossacks, with a rocket
company, under Count Woronzos Dashkof, were marched in that direction;
and in obedience to Your Excellency's orders I myself followed with two
companies of infantry and four guns; the militia under the elder Korin, who
were the first to arrive after the alarm had been given, being backed in time
by the Cossacks, rushed at the Bokharians, overthrew them, cut to pieces some
scores of men, and took nine prisoners. On the approach of our companies the
whole of the cavalry charged, and although the enemy was by this time 23
to 3 thousand strong, they were without much trouble thrown into confusion,
turned and pursued as far as the southern extremity of the defile, i. e., for about
20 versts from the camp: on this occasion some scores of the Bokharians were
slaughtered and nine taken prisoners.
Simultaneously with the appearance of the enemy in the defile, that is,
at about 11 o'clock in the morning, the Bokharians made a 'sortie' from the
fort and attacked Major Svintsitski's companies. Here they were also repulsed
with loss and our position was retained.
The transport from Zaámin bring up the remainder of the stores, &c.,
arrived safely in the evening of the same day.
15th
27th
On the of October, a column of three companies under Captain
Baranof was sent out to inspect in detail the southern and eastern and northern
sides of the fort; engineering officers of artillery and surveying parties under
the commands of officers of the Etât Major were attached to the column,
which accomplished its labours successfully and without much loss.
15th
Thus, by the evening of the 27th every information necessary for the
formation of a plan of attack was obtained; all the material required for the
erection of the batteries and for the approaches was in readiness, it was
therefore determined by Your Excellency that same night to place the batteries
opposite to the fronts to be attacked.
The numerous garrison of Jizakh enabling the enemy to make a good
defence along the whole line of fire as well as to make sorties, and we being
obliged as much as possible to concentrate our forces in order to keep a good
watch on the defile, the fronts selected for the attack were the two nearest to
the camp; the south front a little to the right of the Samarcand gates, where
a breach was to be made, and south-east front, which was to be breached
a little to the left of the Oura-Tiubé gates. There was this advantage to
be gained from the selection of these fronts for an assault, that communication
could be maintained between the chief camp and the batteries along the high
roads to Samarcand and Oura-Tiubé. The batteries were to be placed in the
houses and behind the fences which were left standing on the esplanade.
For the construction of these batteries two columns were sent from the
camp on the evening of the
one commanded by Captain Mikhail-
ovski, composed of four companies, six light guns, and two mortars, which
15th
27th
APPENDIX LII.
xeiii
proceeded towards the Oura-Tiubé gates, and the other under Lieutenant Colo-
nel Grigorief, composed of four companies, four battery guns, and two mortars,
which marched towards the Samarcand gates. Colonel Yoblovski was charged
to superintend the erection of the batteries.
These columns had not left the camp when a sortie in force was made
from the fort against Major Donaurof's companies stationed in advance
This sortie,
of the position to guard the grounds chosen for the batteries.
notwithstanding the suddenness with which it was made, and the darkness
of the night, was repulsed with very small loss on our side, and when the
columns approached, the enemy withdrew into the fort, leaving several
dead bodies on the scene. But in withdrawing the Bokharians set fire to
the houses left standing on the esplanade, and our men had to make their
way through the burning edifices and to extinguish the flames. The pro-
posed works were, however, nearly completed that night, so that by the
morning the troops were sufficiently protected. At daybreak the Bokharians
noticed the danger which menaced them, and, opening a sharp fire upon
both our columns, sallied out in large numbers, attacking the right flank
and rear of Captain Mikhailovski's column, but they suffered such a consider-
able loss that no more sorties were made afterwards.
16th
On the morning of the 28th fire was opened from the batteries of both
the columns, and to divert the enemy's attention at the same time, four rifled
guns under cover of two rifle companies, two sotnia of Cossacks, and a rocket
company, commanded by Count Woronzoff Dashkof, were sent out to operate
upon the south-western angle of the fort.
The firing from the breaching batteries was very successful. Captain
Mikhailovski himself directed the fire from his batteries, all of which were
under the general superintendence of Colonel Silvershivan, and in Lieutenant
Colonel Grigorief's column the fire from the batteries was directed by
Captain Zinonief, of the artillery of the guards, who before Oura-Tiubé
had so well proved the practicability of making breaches in the walls of Asiatic
fortresses. By the evening, Captain Mikhailovski had half accomplished the
breach, but as this was protected by a flank fire from some of the barbets
and by a strong cannonade, it was found necessary to erect a new battery a
little in advance of the other to operate against the latter.
It was also found
necessary to strengthen Lieutenant Colonel Grigorief's battery. All this work
was very soon and well done through the aptitude of our engineer officers and
the bravery of our sappers, notwithstanding that the enemy, after discovering
our object, continued almost unremittingly a redoubled fire of cannon and
musketry by night as well as by day, and to avert the threatened danger,
the enemy's sharp shooters occupied the covered way and breach in great
force, while, regardless of the fire from our batteries, the Bokharians endeavoured
during the night to make good the dilapidations of the walls.
17th
29th
By the morning of the the Bokharians had raised an enormous
shield higher than the wall by the breach at the Oura-Tiubé gates. By
directing their fire first at the uninjured part of the wall against which the
shield rested, and then at its base, our artillerymen not only succeeded in
not alone knocking the shield over into the trench, but even in considerably
widening the breach and in making it more passable.
By the same time Captain Zinonief's battery had also completed a breach.
During the course of the day a column under Count Woronzoff Dashkof,
composed of two companies, two sotnias, and four guns, was sent out to create a
diversion by operating against the western and northern fronts of the fort.
In the evening when, it became dark, parties were detached from Mikhail-
ovski's and Grigorief's columns, which, under cover of volunteers, minutely
xeiv
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
examined the ground in front of the batteries, with a view to the advance
of the besieging columns, and Lieutenant Kuzminski, commanding a com-
pany of the 7th battalion of the 6th lancers of the line, with the assistance of
Serjeant Gonnof, himself measured the depth of the trench.
It has become a regular practice in this warfare to commence the siege of a
fort at daybreak. The negligence of the Asiatics, who do not follow our.
rules with regard to garrison duty and advanced posts, particularly at night
time, justified this practice, which we followed almost without exception, we
30th
16th
2sth
But in the same way, as circumstances compelled us to disregard this practice
at the siege of Khodjend, so there were conditions which, in the siege of Jizaklı,
obliged me to storm the place in the day time. Notwithstanding the
animated fire from our batteries during the night of the Bokharians
still continued tolerably well to fill up the breach by the Oura-Tiubé gates; it
was then to be apprehended that, in case of an assault at daybreak of the
18th our troops would probably encounter some unforeseen impediment.
Besides we could not fail to observe that the garrison of Jizakh, forewarned by
our early attack on Oura-Tiubé just taken, was on the alert before the morning,
and that it was exactly at that time that the fire from the works was
frequent. Yet a sudden attack on Jizakh, with its numerous garrison, than
which no stronger fort had yet been found in the country, was more than
ever an indispensable condition on which depended our success. It was only by
a sudden attack that we could hope to gain the place without considerable
loss.
more
Considering this it was Your Excellency's pleasure to authorize me to
conduct the assault at midday on the of October.
18th
30th
The fort would be stormed by two columns under Captain Mikhailovski
and Lieutenant Colonel Grigorief, each composed of four companies of foot,
with companies of sappers and Cossacks. The reserve for these columns consisted
of four companies, with two mountain guns and a sotnia of Cossacks under
Count Woronzoff Dashkof. In order to screen our designs from the enemy,
and to divert his attention from the points selected for the attack, a small
column of three sotnias of Cossacks, with a rocket company and two light guns
under Colonel Pistolkors, was sent out during the night of the 30th
to make a demonstration against the north-western angle of the fort, and the
reserve force of the storming columns was marched out exactly at the time
when the troops at the batteries were relieved, i. e., at 10 A. M.
17th
29th
17th
The fire from our batteries during the night of the
which were
strengthened on that occasion by the addition of some rifled cannon, did not
allow the enemy to repair the damages done to the walls to that degree in
which he had succeeded in doing so the day before, and all the effected
repairs were at dawn of day very soon destroyed by our artillerymen, after
which the action of our artillery was directed against the buildings flanking
the breach, and against the guns covering the ground to be traversed by our
storming columns.
Notwithstanding the strong cannonade from the enemy's works, our
artillerymen succeeded by dint of their clever practice and sang froid in
thoroughly effecting all these purposes, until most of the enemy's guns
on the points attacked were either injured or silenced even before the com-
mencement of the assault.
In the meanwhile the commanders of the storming columns, with the
engineers, once more examined the roads to the trench and breach during
the day, prepared the scaling ladders, ranged the storming companies, and
waited only for the appointed hour to commence the assault.
At 10 o'clock in the morning, Colonel Pistolkors was ordered to make
a still stronger demonstration against the north-west angle. In obedience
APPENDIX LIT.
XCV
to this order, Colonel Pistolkors, hurrying on a sotnia of Cossacks, leaving
the other two concealed in the gardens, approached quite close to the walls
with the former, with a rocket company and two guns, and opened so strong a
fire that he obliged the Bokharians to sally out upon him from the fort. In the
encounter which ensued, our Cossacks and men of the horse artillery proved
themselves quite equal to combat on foot and in line formation against the
best Bokharian infantry. We suffered in only 1 officer and 11 Cossacks
wounded, while the enemy, leaving several dead bodies on the ground, was
forced to withdraw in haste. It was, however, still more important that the
chief object of the demonstration—the diversion of the enemy—was accom-
plished.
Thus by midday all was ready for the sudden assault. We had only to
rely on the bravery and confident spirit of our troops, and on the good
management of the different commanders.
The men of Mikhailovski's column had yet to pass over the ground
between the battery and the breach, about 90 fathoms; those of Grigorief's
column had to traverse 100 fathoms of ground. Your Excellency was, of course,
no indifferent witness to the worthy manner in which our officers and men
of the storming columns obeyed the order to clear these distances.
Unhesitatingly our storming companies emerged from the houses and
gardens upon the esplanade, and led by their worthy commanders, Captain
Mikhailovski and Lieutenant Colonel Grigorief, with Captain Konopelski,
Baron René, Lieutenant Kuzminski, and Ensign Alenètch, then quickly and
in good order marched to the breach, insantly threw their ladders into the
trench, and in less than a quarter of an hour were upon the walls of the fort.
By a previous order of Lieutenant Colonel Yoblovski, directing the siege
works, small companies of sappers, under the command of Captain Svint-
chevski and Lieutenant Priorof, simultaneously rushed to the gates, supported by
the brave rifle companies of Captains Griffenberg and Svertchkof. The enemy,
not expecting the attack, had not time enough to meet with a fire, and
although the Bokharians rushed to the defence of the breaches (where
Lieutenant Kuzminski, the first to mount the wall, was severely wounded),
their resistance could not long endure. Our brave cheer compelled the
defenders to fall back, and then quickly to turn into flight in the greatest
despair and disorder, which resulted in less than half an hour in the defeat
of the entire garrison.
The besiegers on occupying the breach divided into several different
columns, some proceeding along the wall, others into the space between the
walls and the citadal. A portion of the reserve of the storming columns
immediately followed the foremost troops into the fort; those under Captain
Glukhovski following Captain Mikhailovski, and those under Captain Baranof
following Grigorief. With Glukhovski's column Captain Svintchevski
and Lieutenant Leontief succeeded in quickly bringing two mountain and
one rifled gun into the fort. Thus the enemy still held only the north gates,
whereas in all the others there was only a small wicket open for escape into
the fields.
We may easily imagine the terrible and desperate situation in which the
garrison of Jizakh was now placed, but in justice to the Bokharians it must
be said that, even in this difficult moment, many of them still displayed real
heroism. Of the 18 Beks, 16 perished in a hand-to-hand struggle, and among
these was the Toksabapervanachi Alayar, the chief of the garrison. A por-
tion of the defenders threw themselves into a powder magazine close to the
citadel, and seeing they were inevitably lost, they blew up the magazine,
causing 16 of our men to be severely wounded or burnt.
W
xcvi
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
It was not yet one o'clock when our reserves entered the fort and
your Excellency yourself appeared on the scene of action. Our anxiety
now was not concerning the possession of Jizakh, for it was already in our
hands, but was for the re-establishment of order in the town, which was
burning in a great many places, for the lives of the unfortunate defenders,
who, despairing of their fate, were determined to surrender.
A very smalĺ
number of these escaped through the wicket of the Tashkend gate, but even
there they were met by Colonel Pistolkor's cavalry and Bezobrasof's sotnia
from Captain Mikhailovski's column, which passed round by the wall.
Judging from all that occurred, and from the statements of the
Bokharians, very few of the defenders of Jizakh escaped; the majority were
destroyed, and about 2,000 were taken prisoners.
While the events above described were taking place, there appeared
within the walls of the fort and around it, in our rear and in front of
the troops left to protect the camp under the command of Colonel Mantenpel,
and in front of Colonel Pistolkors' column, fresh masses of Bokharian
cavalry, followed at an interval of one march by 2,000 Sarbazes with 18 guns,
despatched by the Emir to the support of Jizakh; met, however, with a fire
from our guns, and learning the fate that had already overtaken Jizakh, all these
masses disappeared in haste, after which no enemy was anywhere visible.
The trophies of the day, besides a first class fort, consisted in 23 large
and 30 small cannon, 16 banners, a quantity of arms of various descriptions,
and of very rich booty.
The loss of the enemy, according to the statements of the prisoners,
amounted to no less than 6,000 men. Our loss, thank God, throughout the
whole of the siege and on the day of the assault, was limited to only
6 killed, 76 wounded (among whom were 5 officers, and 16 contused, among
whom was one staff officert). The greater part of those who received con-
tusions and some of those who were wounded have returned to the ranks
and are on active duty.
The General here mentions by name all the officers who took part
in this siege and distinguished themselves.
APPENDIX LIII.
Proclamation.
It is hereby made known to all, that by the will of the all-powerful
White Czar, the Russian troops have come here not for hostile purposes, but to
put an end to war, to establish peace and tranquillity.
Having in the spring of the present year commenced military operations
against the Emir to punish him for the detention of our envoys and for
other malicious intents, we did not go any further after overthrowing the Emir's
army at Irdjar and after taking Naù and Khodjend, in the hopes that the
ruler of Bokhara would release our envoys and satisfy all our other just
demands, but this last was not done. The Emir not alone failed to satisfy
these demands, but even raised forts against us, collected troops, gave refuge
to our deserters, and generally showed signs of hostile intentions with regard
We were once more compelled to have recourse to arms, and once
more severely punished him, taking from him his strongest forts, Oura-
Tiubé and Jizakh, and annihilated his best troops. But having accomplished
*Lieutenant Kuzminski, Sub-Lieutenants Alenètch, Rievetski Spitzberg, and Redkin.
to us.
† Lieutenant Colonel Grigorief.
APPENDIX LV.
xcvii
this, and having seized Oura-Tiubé and Jizakh, we again halt in the hope
that the Emir will understand the relations which he should have with us,
and will satisfy all our just demands.
At all events, the inhabitants, not only of the districts bordering on the
forts Oura-Tiubé and Jizakh, which we have just occupied, but the population.
of Bokhara generally, are hereby invited to abstain from interfering with
military operations, and in no way whatsoever to do harm to any of our newly-
constituted subjects. If they act in accordance with this, then, on our part, no
evil shall be done to them, no insult shall be offered; they will receive from
us only favour and protectior. If, on the other hand, they do not do as they
are desired, and allow themselves to do any evil to us, or to any one of our
new subjects, then severe punishment shall be meted to them.
Trade remains as it was, and caravans may proceed freely as they usually
did in time of peace on the same conditions.
We trust in general that by God's aid trade and industry in these parts
under our influence may not only not decline, but will flourish and increase
for the general welfare.
APPENDIX LIV.
Letter from Khudoyar Khan, To the most worthy and respected Appreciator
of Friends, Major General Romanofski, Governor General of the Turkis-
tan Province.
The blessing of God be upon us.
I have the honor to acquaint Your Excellency, as a faithful and honoured
friend, that, thanks to the Most High Creator, we live in pleasure and
in peace.
Hearing of your capture of Oura-Tiubé and Jizakh, I send you my con-
gratulations on your victories, and enquiries after your health, by my faith-
ful servant, Mahomed Karim Mirakhur, whose words I beg you will take
for the truth; and in token of friendship I send you some maifa for six
robes as a keepsake. The month of Razan 1283.
[To the original is attached the seal of Seid Mahomed Khudoyar Khan.]
APPENDIX LV.
Letter to Khudoyar Khan.
Your High Eminence,
I was
I offer you my sincere thanks for your friendly felicitations and kindly
words delivered to me by your agent, Mahomed Karim Mirakhur.
sincerely glad to hear of your co-operation in cementing the friendship.
between us, as, for instance, in encouraging caravan trade, in allowing rafts to
be sent down to us, &c., and now I am more than ever convinced that all
doubts and misunderstandings betwixt us are, thank God, at an end. 1
repeat to you that the greater our friendship, the better will it be for trade,
industry, and for all peaceful people generally, and by it we should also
give greater pleasure to the powerful White Czar, as His Majesty sincerely
wishes for the happiness and welfare of this country. I thank you sincerely
for the handsome presents you have sent me, and which I have received
intact, and in my turn I beg you to accept from myself, as tokens of
friendship and in memory of me, a gold watch, a silver tankard, and a
crystal glass.
xeviii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
APPENDIX LVI.
To His Excellency the highly respected Well-wisher and Appreciator of
Friends, Major General Romanofski, the Governor of the Turkistan
Province.
Your Excellency, I have to inform you, that, by the mercy of the All-High
Creator, with us peace and tranquillity are flourishing in every respect, and
that we pass the time well and merrily. Your friendly letter by Mahomed
Karim Mirakhur and accompanying articles we have had the pleasure to
receive; the contents of the said letter and your words delivered to us by
Mirakhur were very gratifying to us, and gave us heartfelt pleasure. What
has been said by us with reference to the preservation of amicable relations
between us is sacredly observed and shall not be violated. What is not con-
tained in this letter will be repeated to you by the said Mirakhur and is to be
taken for truth. In token of friendship I send four pieces of blue maifa for
four robes, two pieces of red maifa for two robes, and some maifa worked
with gold for two robes. Month of Shahban 1283.
[ Attached to the original are the seal and mark of said Mahomed Khu-
doyar Khan ]
Your High Eminence,
Thanks to our mutual amity, both your letters have given me great
satisfaction; but your last letter, and your words repeated to me by your
faithful and good envoy, Mahomed Karim Mirakhur, have rejoiced me
still more.
Being from all things assured that you, most respected Khan, have
clearly understood our relations and have fully appreciated the beneficent
intentions of the White Czar, I thank God that he has aided me in convinc-
ing our good neighbours of the same, and that he has rendered
possible for our mutual friendship to take root.
it
I am very grateful to you for the favour you have shown to our, Russian
merchants. Your Kokan merchants shall also ever meet a like reception
among ourselves in Russia.
I undertake with pleasure to execute all your commissions, and, by
God's help, I hope to give you the most undoubted proofs that the beneficent
intentions of my all merciful Sovereign, the Emperor of all the Russias,
with regard to our good neighbours are as great and vast as the vastness
and power and his White Emize.
10/h
22nd
December 1866.
APPENDIX LVII.
To the Governor General of the Turkistan Province and the Ruler of the
Kipchaks.
It is not unknown to you that from of old this country was in the
possession of my ancestors, and that it has come to me by inheritance. At the
tîme when the government passed into my hands, I was on terms of friend-
ship with the White Czar, having pretensions to the lands belonging to him ;
but at that time fate deprived me of my khanat, and I retired to Bokhara.
Malla Khan having seized my khanat, and the Kirghiz-Kipchaks, without
any respect for the White Czar, began to oppose him. At last, after a Tapse
of some time, this country, as I heartily desired, became again mine. Intending
APPENDIX LVIII.
xcix
to continue the friendship with the White Czar, I was about to send you
a letter by messenger, but fearing the Emir of Bokhara, I did not succeed in
despatching it. In the meanwhile, the Emir wishing to commence a war,
collected his troops, advanced to Jizakh, and invited me to join him, saying,
that every Mussulman should defend himself against you according to the
books of Mahomedan law. Preserving the friendship between me and
the White Czar, I remained in Kokan under various pretexts, and assembling
an army of 35,000 men for the protection of my frontiers, I stood at Shaidan
Muzgar. I heard after this that the Emir withdrew his troops and their
commander from Khodjend, leaving that place quite empty, upon which
I returned back with my troops and artillery; if I had not desired to be
friendly with the White Czar, I might have passed into Khodjend from
Shaidan with my troops, by which means, with the Emir of Bokhara, I might
have become a powerful enemy. By the help of God Khodjend was con-
quered by you; learning this, to strengthen our former friendship, I congratu-
late you on your conquest, and send you this letter by Mahomed Mullatun.
Whatever you wish to communicate to me tell to Mahomed Mullatun; whe-
ther you wish to continue the former friendship or no, then I shall act accord-
ing to your answer.
All the Mussulmen from Kokan to Kashgar are living in peace and
prosperity; the people who were disturbed, and who were in war with you
in Malla Khan's time, are now tranquil. Although we and you are of differ-
ent religions, I send you, in friendship, a man, by whom I beg you will
return a straightforward reply.
24th day of the month of Muhurrum, 1283. Sealed with the seal of
Khudoyar Khan.
Your High Eminence,
APPENDIX LVIII.
I hasten to offer you my respectful thanks for your friendly feelings
towards the Russians, expressed to me by your Beks, and for sending back
to us our envoys, of whom one has already safely arrived in camp.
I hasten to assure you that this news will be pleasing to my great
Sovereign, who never wished to be at war with Bokhara, and that according
to the measure in which your High Eminence will be pleased to return
to the path of sincere amicable relations with us, you will more and more
be convinced of the amount of friendly feeling for Bokhara which is still
entertained by us Russians.
My gratitude for the return of our envoys is all the more deep-felt,
because the intelligence of it reached us at the most appropriate time.
Being compelled by circumstances to commence hostile operations, and yet
desiring as much as possible not to extend them without extreme necessity, I
have hitherto limited myself to such measures alone as are necessary for the
safe defence of the peaceful inhabitants taken under the protection of Russia.
In the event of a prolongation of the war, after having occupied
Khodjend, there remains no other alternative than to advance to the limits
of Old Bokhara.
Now, thanks to the commencement of the return of our embassy, I shall
not do this.
In compliance with the request of your High Eminence, verbally
delivered to me by your people who accompanied the Horunji Jerassimof, xopter
I hasten, without delay, to give you on my part proofs of sincerely amicable
intentions. Leaving a portion of the troops in Naú and Khodjend, I return
с
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
with the rest to the right bank of the Syr-Daria, and shall not even enter
within the limits of Old Bokhara.
I trust your High Eminence will correctly appreciate my actions;
at the same time, I humbly beg you to bear in mind that I am only a mili-
tary commander. Your High Eminence is free in your actions, whereas I
am responsible to my Sovereign for all, consequently for loss of time as well.
Be pleased to hasten, as much as possible, the return of ali Russians
detained in Bokhara. I promise you that immediately afterwards all Bokha-
rians shall be released, and that commercial relations will be at once renewed,
whereupon, with God's help, the ancient friendship between your High Emi-
nence and the all-powerful White Czar shall be at once resumed. Be
pleased also to instruct your Beks to arrange for the safe return of our
envoys, whom I beg you to send direct to Chinaz.
I cannot conceal from your High Eminence my fears, lest in the event
of a detention in the release of the Russians, or, which God forbid, of any
misfortune to our envoys on their way back, there should be a renewal of
hostilities, when the re-establishment of peace will be a matter of great
difficulty.
APPENDIX LIX.
Your High Eminence,
I offer you my heartfelt thanks for the friendly feeling towards the
Russians, and for the congratulations on the fresh successes of the Russian
arms, contained in your letter which I have received.
I have learned with pleasure from the verbal explanations of your envoy,
that the Kokanians assembled for the defence of Khodjend, appeared there
without your consent, and that Rustem Bek, Ishbuta and others in arms
against us, did not find refuge with you. I was all the more pleased to learn
this, since, fully appreciating your late arrangements, I myself wished you
well and not evil, and did not desire to war against you, though I might
have been driven to do so by your people who assembled in bodies. Now,
however, on receipt of your letter, I hope you will yourself take proper
measures against such people. I shall go beyond the Khodjend district
with my troops.
I shall not fail to inform the Emperor of your letter, and I am sure that
your friendly feelings will be pleasing to the White Czar, for the Emperor is
not striving after conquests; he was forced to open military operations, first
to defend the frontiers, and then to release our embassy detained in Bokhara,
and to defend the peaceful inhabitants of Tashkend and of the trans-
Chirchik country, which were placed under the protection of Russia.
By God's help all this has now been accomplished or is being accom-
plished; so that we may now hope that the other chief wish of the Emperor
will be realized, i. e., that peace and tranquillity will reign in these parts,
that trade and agriculture will flourish, and that the lives and properties
of all will be made secure.
In all things I sincerely wish to be your good neighbour, and beg, there-
fore, that you will communicate everything you may find necessary to in-
form me of, and I shall do the same.
APPENDIX LX.
To His Excellency the Governor of the Turkistan Province.
I am very well satisfied with the contents of Your Excellency's letter,
and am extremely glad that there is concord between me and you, and that
COURTNE
APPENDIX LXI.
ci
that we
trade may be opened. Having this in view, I send you again the former envoy
with the present letter. I am first of all bound to apprize you
Mussulmen, guided by our spiritual laws, take dues from every one,
without distinction, at the rate of one from forty, neither more nor less, for it
would be contrary to the Shariat. I do not know your laws and customs;
and if I have really gained the friendship and favour of the White Czar, then
you will oblige me by informing me without delay as to the basis and
limits of the future trade between mine and Russian merchants; in accord-
ance therewith we shall commence business.
At the present time all people and all States respect the White Czar;
of course all is done by the will of God.
Relying on your letter, I have already announced to my traders that
they may depart with their merchandise; it is desirable that you should do
the same, and then the ancient trade of Russia with Kokan, if God so wills
it, shall never be suspended. There is no untruth in these words; the
trade will actually be splendid. We Mussulmen shall never violate terms of
peace
if they only conform with our Shariat and "Sunna”(?); but we have
no knowledge whatever of your laws and customs, of your conditions of
trade, but shall of course become sooner acquainted when you become friendly
disposed towards us. To this object we entreat you to send us a circum-
stantial letter by our envoy, and to send him back to us without delay. In
your letter you write that you are Major General Romanofski of the Great
Emperor of all the Russias, and you signed your name and sealed it with
your seal, therefore, in token of my friendship and good-will, I put my own
seal to this letter, and beg you to believe all.
Written Safara, 4th day, 1283.
Inscribed on the seal, Sied Mahomed Khudoyar Khan.
APPENDIX LXI.
ON THE MEKHKÉMÉ IN TASHKEND.
(Extract from an Official Document.)
Mekhkémé means public court; it is no new institution in the Mus-
sulman world. It existed among the Arabs when their civilization raised
them above Mahomedanism, and was by them introduced everywhere. As
their civilization increased and extended, this institution was well received
wherever it was introduced, and it was preserved so long as the civilization
of the Arabs kept up to its level; but when, in consequence of political revo-
lutions, this began to decline, and in its place Mahomedanism gained ground,
the institution of the Mekhkémé also lost force and significance, until, at last,
it was replaced by the personal jurisdiction of the Kazy. According to the
law of Mahomed, the spiritual classes could not, of course, reconcile them-
selves to an institution which rivalled them, weakened their significance, and
partly overruled their judgments.
When their power increased they denounced this institution as anta-
gonistic to the spirit of the laws of Mahomed and abolished it. Again,
the Mekhkémé was established wherever the Mahomedan population
was subject to European rule, the chief aim and object being to weaken the
Mussulman influence and to accustom the people to accept the judgments
of a regular court, as for instance in North Africa and in the Caucasus.
Although the spiritual classes always opposed themselves to this institution,
the people accepted them with gratitude, and on its establishment the influence
of the spiritual classes sensibly declined. The people familiarized with
cii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
the Europeans, and availing themselves of a better and more just court,
became more amenable to civilization.
An institution similar to the Mekhkémé was first introduced by us into
the Caucasus among the conquered mountaineers in the time of Yermolof:
one was established in Nalchik for Kobarda, and another in fort Vnozapnoi
for the Kumyks-both of these were known under the name of popular
courts. It is true that, owing to some defects in the organization of these
courts, the first experiments with them did not produce the good they might
have done. In the year 1825, Lieutenant General (now Field Marshal)
Prince Bariatinski, then commanding the left flank, remodelled the
organization of the Mekhkémé, and, with the sanction of the Prince M. S.
Voronzow, opened Mekhkémé on the improved principle in Fort Grosnoi for
the Chetchuck District. This Mekhkémé had such great success, and was so
quickly appreciated by the people, that in a year's time the hill tribes of
the neighbouring districts prayed to be also endowed with one like it. After
a time, during the governorship of the Prince Bariatinski, Mekhkémés
were established throughout the whole of the Caucasus.
A great fault in the original Mekhkémé was the very low rate of pay
given to the Russian officers, the President and Secretary, and to the
native officers of the court. This led either to neglect of their duties on
the part of the officers or to abuses and it was very difficult to find any
respectable men in the service willing to undertake duties in a distant
country for which they received inadequate rewards. This fault was
remedied by the Prince Bariatinski and the Mekhkémé met with success
among the people, who are now highly satisfied with it.
A Mekhkémé, after the latest Caucasian pattern, has been opened in
Tashkend. Its organization is as follows:--A President" the officer in
charge of the native population,"-and three native members, besides the
Kazy, a permanent member of the court.
The members of the Mekhkémé are chosen by the native population.
But the system of election being almost entirely unknown to the natives, and
the civil administration at that time being as yet such that the first election
could not have been properly made by the people, the supervisor of the
population invited the attendance of two hundred of the most respectable
citizens of Tashkend, without distinction of grade or private means, but men
commanding respect for their moral principles, and called upon the assembly
to select from amongst themselves, or the people generally, some of the best
known individuals. Thus were the first members chosen. The eldest
member of the Mekhkémé receives R. 2,400, the two junior members
R. 900 each, and the Kazy R. 1,200 per annum.
court.
The Mekhkémé is strictly a judicial tribunal; it is literally a public
In this sense it is a permanent institution. But as the administration
of the province is not yet completely settled, the Mekhkémé, being composed
of chosen members, and consequently of the most conscientious men who
command universal respect, has sometimes served as a municipal institution,
in the supervision of the dues and taxes, in the foundation of beneficial
institutions in the town, such as dispensaries, hospitals, &c. But these
services, as it is said above, were only temporarily performed, and the Mekhkémé
had neither an administrative character, nor did it in any way act as a police.
There is a separate section of the Mekhkémé, composed of Beys or
members of the nomad class of the population. This section deals exclu-
sively with Kirghiz law cases, and the Kazy here is not a permanent member.
The Kirghiz section of the Mekhkémé has one feature only in common with
the Sart section, which is the president, who presides over both. The
members of the Khirghiz section receive inferior pay to those of the Sart
APPENDIX LXII.
ciii
section, both because the Kirghizes in Taskhend are few in numbers than
the Sarts, and because the Kirghizes less frequently appeal to the court.
The eldest of the Kirghiz members receives a salary of R. 500, and the
junior members R. 250 each. The Mekhkémé bases its judgments in affairs
between Sarts on the Sharigate and on udat or native customs, and settles
Kirghiz affairs almost always in accordance with the customs of the nomads.
The President follows the proceedings of the court merely to see that the
judgments are correct; when a difference of opinion arises between him and
the other members, the case is referred to the Military Governor. The order
of the proceedings is very simple; appeals are made vivâ voce, and if pos-
sible the case is at once entered into and settled in open court. In the
more important cases judgments are drawn up in writing, to which all the
members attach their seals; the "Act" is then copied verbatim into the
journal of the court, is numbered and handed over to the plaintiff. In cases
of small impost the judgment is at once carried out.
As a court of law the Mekhkémé could not affect the system of police,
though it has altered the legal process. Formerly in Tashkend there were
three Kazys with associate Muftés; there are now in the Mekhkémé one
Kazy and three counsellors.
There are still Kazys in the town, although they have lost their old
powers, and they are sometimes summoned to the Council of the Governor.
The other functionaries, such as “Aksakals,”
Aksakals,” “Ziaketchis," Raises,"
&c., are not yet interfered with.
66
APPENDIX LXII.
Circular Order to the Forces of the Frovince of Turkistan, 21st June 1866.
3rd July
1. A Statistical Committee, over which I shall myself preside, is formed
of the staff of the Turkistan forces; this Committee will collate and correct
the statistical data concerning the province which is already possessed by
the staff; it will collect fresh information and will reduce all to a system with
the view of publication.
2. The permanent members of this will be M. Yujakof, attached to
me for special service, and Captain Debagori Mokriévitch, of the Etât Major.
An interpreter and two writers will be attached to the Committee.
3. The chief of my staff, my Chief Secretary and the Mining
Engineers, Lieutenant Colonel Tatarinof and Captain Nikolski, Mr. Struvé
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Severtsof, Zoologist, are invited
to be active members of the Committee, and to communicate all scientific
information that may be required.
4. The officers in charge of the population of the country, chiefs of
districts, commanders of troops, commandants of forts, medical officers and
all the authorities in general are in duty bound to reply to all enquiries made
by the Committee, and to send all the information demanded by the Com-
mittee, and to give every assistance to any active members of the Committee
who may be prosecuting his labours within their districts.
5. When a member of the Committee is travelling in the province the
commandants are enjoined to give him a proper convoy.
Hana. All questions before the Committee will be openly discussed by
the members when I myself or the senior member is presiding.
7. The resolutions of the Committee will be carried out by the perma-
nent members.
X
civ
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
8. The permanent members will labour without intermission; the
whole Committee will assemble at the invitation of the President when
occasion may require, all the members being called together.
9. Invitations to all others to attend the sittings of the Committee will
be made subject to the approval of the President.
APPENDIX LXIII.
Address of the Inhabitants of Khodjend, submitted to General Romanofski,
5th
17th of June 1866.
The inhabitants of Khodjend meet you, General, with bread and salt.
Since the occupation of our town by the Russians, we have suffered no injury
or oppression; from your officers we have received only justice and kind
treatment. We see that in placing us in subjection to the White Czar you
have consolidated our happiness. We pray to God for welfare and long life to
the White Czar and his General, the Protector of Khodjend. We shall in the
future be like all the other subjects and zealous servants of the White Czar,
in order that he may love us as much as his other subjects.
APPENDIX LXIV.
Address of the Inhabitants of Tashkend, submitted to General Romanofski,
11th of June 1866.
23rd
We, all the inhabitants of Tashkend and its neighbourhood, accounting
ourselves Russian subjects, venture to submit to our merciful and most kind
Protector, that, being under the rule of the most equitable and autocratic
White Czar, and well satisfied with everything, are exceedingly obliged, and
bless God that you, like the Rinstiam (an ancient hero) the brave overthrower
of the enemy's ranks, the generous and benevolent and wise ruler have been
sent among us. Although Your Excellency has but lately come among us,
you have already, by an attentive and wise government, given us peace and
quiet, such only as could have been desired, and by beating the Bokharian and
Kokan troops you have opened to our traders free communications, and at
the same
time you have finally rid us of those vicious robbers, the
Bokharians and Kokanians, who always threatened us with evils; now, how-
ever, we are perfectly tranquil and merry. On your return from your
travels Your Excellency at once visited our Medressé, were gracious to the
teachers, and distributed among them rewards in money, for which they pray
to God in your behalf. Besides, while being mindful of the welfare of the
teachers, you have promised to establish a hospital and to provide a
Mussulman doctor. You have also given your attention to the establishment
of a Mekhkémé, where all the appeals of the inhabitants will be heard,
and where all affairs will be settled according to the Sharigate.
APPENDIX LXV.
Your High Eminence,
It was with great pleasure I received your letter, which proves that your
High Eminence correctly values the real motives of the Russian Government.
APPENDIX LXVI.
CV
I take upon myself once more to assure you that the powerful White Czar
does not seek here for any conquests, but desires only that peace and tran-
quillity should be reinstated in these regions disturbed by war and disorders,
so that all peaceful and industrious people may quietly follow their occupa-
tions to the success of the country and the increase of trade. The Great Russian
Emperor sees in this, before all things, the real benefit of the people taken
under the protection of Russia as of his neighbours, against whom he wages
war only in such cases when they, like the Emir of Bokhara, venture to at-
tack our frontier, or to foment disturbances and enmity within them. I hope,
however, that after all that has happened, the Emir himself will abstain from
similar proceedings, and that by God's aid, all our neighbours will evince
towards us the confidence you have already shown in your letter.
Your letter to me I have forwarded to the supreme authorities, and it
will be submitted to the all-merciful consideration of His Majesty.
The final settlement of all our future relations will, of course, depend on
the will of the Emperor; but knowing, as I do, the wise and really just
principles by which the powerful White Czar is guided, and which are above
alluded to, I am convinced that these relations will be equally advantageous
to both parties so long as Kokan places a sincere confidence in Russia.
But in order to accelerate these relations, I have, on the strength of the
powers vested in me by one of your letters, already sanctioned the importa-
tion of merchandize from Kokan into Khodjend and Tashkend, subject to the
duty mentioned by you in your letter, and which, be it observed, was in accord-
ance with the Sharigate, formerly levied by us, viz., one on every forty. At the
same time it has reached me that the Tashkendians who have brought cotton to
Kokan are being charged 5 tikas on each camel over and above the one on
every forty. I beg you will not make this levy, which is in excess of that
laid down by the Sharigate, and that you will receive Tashkend and
Khodjend merchants on the same footing as you wish Kokand merchants to
be received in Tashkend and Khodjend. Besides this, as I am desirous of
showing you still greater friendship for your confidence, I am endeavouring to
obtain the sanction of His Imperial Majesty to have resident commercial
agents or consuls among us, and to send consuls to reside in Kokan, as it is
agreed between the Russian Emperor, the Emperor of China, the Shah of Persia,
and other friendly Asiatic States; together with which all your subjects will
be permitted to travel and to trade in person throughout the whole wide
extent of the Russian Empire; in Orenburg, Nijni, Novgorod, Moscow,
St. Petersburg, and in other of our first class towns; we shall let your subjects
enjoy the same great benefits which the Bokharians of old had long enjoyed
among us.
I beg to be excused for having detained your envoy several days. I have
done so in order to give him an opportunity, as a welcome guest, of taking
part in a military festival held in Tashkend.
In conclusion, I repeat my former request that you will not allow parties
of your people to cross over to the right bank of the Syr; and to communi-
cate, as you now do, all that you deem necessary to acquaiut me with.
APPENDIX LXVI.
Your High Eminence,
Your congratulations on our occupation of Khodjend, and the expression of
your friendly sentiments I received in good faith, and in replying to you in the
same spirit, I gave no small proofs of my own sincerity. I not alone refrained
evi
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
from chastising the parties of Kokanians who dared to hinder me in the cap-
ture of Khodjend, and abstained after taking that town from passing your limits,
but even consented at once to enter into friendly commercial relations with
you, and agreed to levy the duty at the rate you begged. Besides this, I
allowed your frontier post to stand on the frontier of the Khodjend District,
and to avoid every kind of misunderstanding, I did not establish an advanced
post there myself.
I long refused to believe the rumours that reached me from Kokan,
which were in direct contradiction to the friendly professions of your High
Eminence; for example, of the fortification of Kokan, the increase of the rate
of duty which, by mutual arrangement between us, was to be levied on
merchandize brought to Kokan from Khodjend and Tashkend, the obstacles
placed by Kokanians in the way of floating down timber to Khodjend, and the
molestation of the inhabitants of Makhrane, Beshkend, and other places within
the Khodjend District by your people, &c., &c. But the letters I have received,
of which copies are herewith forwarded, confirm the accuracy of the reports
relative to the last mentioned circumstance. At the same time, I have also
heard that two Cossacks, treacherously seized on the road from Tashkend to
Khodjend, have been taken to Kokan, and that the same has been done with
two Russian labourers,* seized by Kirghiz baronta men.
I could not endure any more, and then sent orders to one of my
advanced posts to chase your party that had crossed to the right bank of the
Syr, which was done. I even prepared for other measures. But taking into
consideration the arrangements recently made by you for the return of
the two labourers, who have returned, for which I am grateful to your High
Eminence, I feel bound to suspend military operations, and to observe in
this letter that your High Eminence might consider it more profitable to
guard against a war, and to return to the path of negotiations, to which you
yourself invited me, with the purpose, of course, of conducting them in
good faith.
To this end you must remove all the above cited causes of a rupture
in our friendly relations.
APPENDIX LXVII.
Record of Military Operations and Events on the Central Asiatic Frontier
15th
1st
from the 7th July to the
13th
August 1866.
It was mentioned in the last report that Captain Schaufs' detachment
was sent to explore the River Chirchik. This detachment has now returned,
having executed that work most satisfactorily.
From the 27th of June (9th July) to the 20th July (1st August) the detach-
ment was continuously on the move, making its way with difficulty in a moun-
tainous country along narrow footpaths hardly practicable for single men.
Captain Schaufs was ordered to fell some timber, but in addition he was
commissioned, if he found it possible, to connect Niazbek by a survey with the
town of Chinaz on the Chirchik, a point to which the survey had been brought
in 1863 by Major (now Colonel) Lerkhé. Captain Schaufs succeeded in
reaching Chinaz, which is 175 versts (1163 miles) distant from Tashkend.
On approaching within 30 versts of Chinaz, where the valley of the
Chirchik (here called the Chotkal) widens, timber was at last found, but the
trees were of no great size, although there were some which were worth felling
* According to later and more authentic accounts the Cossacks were taken to Samarcand, and that the
labourers who did actually get into Kokan were immediately released, and, after receiving kind treatment
and presents by order of the Khan, returned safely to Tashkend,
APPENDIX LXVIII.
cvii
to be floated down. A part of the infantry force was left here to execute
this work; these men felled 300 trees; but unfortunately the labor went for
nothing, because, owing to the extreme rapidity of the current and the number
of sunken rocks, the timber could not be floated down in rafts, but singly;
the greater part was consequently stopped by the rocks or broken into
splinters. It was impossible to follow the timber down stream, because the
road did not always run along the banks of the river, and these being very
steep, the descents to the river were very few.
This unsuccessful attempt proved the impossibility of supplying timber
to Tashkend, which is in great want of it.
During the progress of the detachment, a great number of bis and elders
from thauls along the Chirchik came forward tendering their submission and
requesting to be made subjects of Russia.
11th
23rd
On its way back the detachment, starting afresh on the July, took
another road to the Pskent river (an affluent of the Chirchik), so as to obtain
a knowledge of a greater extent of country.
In the meanwhile, Anarbai's party hovering about Namangau, emboldened
by the departure of the detachment, seized two Russian labourers, sent out by
the goldseeker Kolesnikof on an exploring expedition with others.
Kolesnikof, seeing the amicable disposition of the Kirghizes of the locality,
thought the country was already perfectly secure, and dispatched his exploring
party to a place 30 versts away from the line of march of the detachment.
On receipt of a report relative to this affair, measures were at once taken
to discover the offenders, but before they could be carried out, the prisoners
were returned to Tashkend by order of the Khan of Kokan, to whom they
were taken, and who gave them money and presents.
At about the same time two Cossacks left Khodjend with the post bags;
these men have not yet returned; it is to be presumed that they have either
been kidnapped or killed.
1st
18th
to the
15th
27th
June that
It was mentioned in the report of the
there
was great agitation in the Great and Little Barsuks,* which, according to a
report from the commandant of fort No. 1, were threatened with an attack by
Turkomen. On the strength of this report a light detachment of 75 Cossacks
was sent out in that direction. These men have returned without having
encountered anybody and having left the country perfectly quiet.
Information has been received from Bokhara and Kokan that it is feared
there we are about to make an attack; the forts and frontier posts are conse-
quently being strengthened and armed, and troops are being collected. Although
tranquillity prevails in the province generally, in the regions of Bokhara and
Kokan bordering upon our frontiers there is evidently some commotion, and
trading caravans, which, in the month of June, came to Khodjend and even to
Tashkend in great numbers, now arrive much less frequently.
APPENDIX LXVIII.
17th
Address of the Inhabitants of Tashkend, presented on the 29th August 1866, to
the Adjutant General of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of all the
Russias, Kryjanovski, Governor General of Orenburg, and Knight of
various orders.
Your Excellency,
This is your second visit to our country since our submission to the rule
of the all-powerful Emperor of all the Russias, and we beg to welcome you
* Little and Great Barsuk sands lying to the north of the Aral.
R. M.
cviii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
with the bread and salt, according to the ancient Russian fashion, trusting that
you will not refuse our offering, but will receive it in good part.
We know that Your Excellency has come to us as the representative of the
most potent and most merciful White Czar, the fountain of all blessings and
happiness to his subjects, overflowing with love and good will towards us, as a
good and tender father to his children, and, considering ourselves in our hearts
long the faithful subjects of His Majesty, we are not without hopes of finding
the same love and good will towards us reflected in your own self.
?
Although we have not been more than a year under the protection of the
White Czar, we have already, in that short time, realized the inagnitude of the
benefits which have been awarded to us, because our faith has remained
inviolate; our Medressé (schools) are supported and flourish; a Mekhkémé
(popular court) has been established, which, dealing equitably, honorably, and
impartially, settles our affairs in accordance with the principles of our religion
and with popular custom; we are not burthened with any illegal taxes; we 3-11
are not injured or oppressed by any one; in conclusion to all this we venture
to assure your Excellency that, since the defeat of the army of the Emir of
Bokhara, perfect peace and tranquillity prevail among us as well as in the
neighbouring districts, which was not the case in former times.
Yet, notwithstanding all this happy state of affairs, we cannot help fearing
that if, contrary to our expectations, and through some unforeseen circum-
stances, the Russian troops are removed from the Tashkend territory, the same
horrors, oppressions, and compulsion which we suffered before the advent of
the Russians will be repeated. We therefore venture to pray humbly and
lowly that your Excellence will once and for ever free us from these dreadful
thoughts, and will reassure us that the potent and merciful White Czar regards
us as his children and as the rest of his faithful subjects.
There are not two seas in one sea; consequently also, in one empire there
cannot be two empires; take it then upon yourself to endeavour to annex our
region to Russia, as a part always to belong to her, on an equality with all the
other parts of the empire.
By acceding to this our request you will make us ever pray to the All-
High Creator for health and long life to His Majesty the White Czar, and will
give us cause to bless your name as well as that of all Russians concerned in
the fate and settlement of our country.
Sealed with the seals of sixty-two of the most respectable inhabitants,
many of them being of the higher spiritual class; fifteen signatures
are attached, most of them being those of moollahs.
APPENDIX LXIX.
To all the Aksakols, Elders, and Inhabitants of the Village of Pishkand.
I hereby notify that the Khan Khudoyar of Kokond has annexed your
village to Charku, and that I appoint Shofak Bey as chief of that village, and,
by order of the Khan, you the Elders of Pishkand to appear before me. At
the same time I warn you that if you offer your allegiance to the Russians it
will go hard with you.
BEY ABRAKHMAN,
Dotkha of the Agazot Tribe.
APPENDIX LXXIII.
cix
APPENDIX LXX.
To the Aksakols and Elders of Pishkand.
I appoint Mulla Batyr to be my assistant in your village. I command
you to pay the full ziopet on your corn, otherwise I shall be obliged to destroy
your village.
Seal of Shofak Bey of the Agazot Tribe.
APPENDIX LXXI.
To the Governor General of Orenbury and Commander of the Troops in the
Orenburg Military District, the Adjutant General Kryjanovski.
Having constituted Sadr Kazy Mulla Mir Hamiditdin our agent, we send
him with full powers. Month of Djumai-El-Erval 1283 (August 1866).
Seal of the Emir Seid Muzzafeer.
APPENDIX LXXII.
Most Respected and Highly Reverend Kazy Mulla Mir Hamiditdin,
On receipt of this you are to set off to the Governor General of
Orenburg to conclude with him a treaty of friendship and peace.
APPENDIX LXXIII.
Your High Eminence,
Your Envoy, Sadr Mir Hamiditdin, has neither brought full powers for
the conclusion of a treaty of peace nor your consent to the conditions notified
to you some months ago by General Romanofski, I therefore fail to see any
sincere desire on your part to return to a good understanding.
I hasten to inform you of the following final decision
Your High Eminence broke the peace by interfering in our affairs with
Kokan; therefore, in pledge of abstaining for ever in entering in the affairs of
Kokan, you will send us the young Khan of Kokan, Sultan Seid Murat
Khan, whom you took after our occupation of Tashkend. You may rest
assured that no harm will be done to him.
In order to establish peace your High Eminence will besides engage
yourself—
1st.—To send immediately a sum of 100,000 tillas.
2nd.--To receive in Bokhara a Russian caravan-basha, who will at all times
have the right to apply to you on matters concerning Russian subjects residing
in your dominions.
3rd. To allow Russian subjects to establish Russian caravanserais in
Bokharian towns, wherever they may desire to do so, where they may store
their merchandise.
4th.-To place Russian traders on a perfect equality in the matter of
caravan and other dues, and not to levy any arbitrary contributions from
Russian subjects.
To this I add that, if in ten days from to-day's date, the 100,000 tillas
here demanded are not received, if Sultan Seid Murad Khan is not sent, and
your written consent to all my other conditions is not received, then on that
day war will be renewed. In the mean time, I shall march from Khodjend
with my troops only for the purpose of being nearer to you, and I shall not
CX
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
commence hostilities if I receive no opposition, but every attack shall be
resisted with arms.
In token of remembrance, I send the accompanying silver articles.
APPENDIX LXXIV.
Letter to the Emir of Bokhara.
Your High Eminence,
You will learn from the letter addressed to you by the Governor General
the state of affairs and the conditions on which peace may be established. I
as a good neighbour, can offer you only one piece of good advice, if you
desire peace, then save time by hastening to fulfil all the essential conditions,
for that is the only way to avert war.
I offer you my sincere thanks for the presents sent to me, and in return
offer you others in token of my respect.
APPENDIX LXXV.
24th
General Romanofski's Report to the Governor General of Orenburg, 12th
September 1866.
Herewith copies of letters addressed to me by Khudoyar Khan of Kokan
and the leading inhabitants of Kokan.
I have, at the same time, the honor to state that Mahomed Karim Mirakhur,
by whom they were delivered, whose words I am requested in the letter by
the Khan and the inhabitants to believe, assures me most positively that the
Kokan people and their ruler are not alone willing to submit to the Russian
Emperor, but would consider themselves fortunate to be made subjects of his
Imperial Majesty if only they could rely on the preservation of their sharigate,
Mirakhur at the same time refers with satisfaction to our new institutions
in Tashkend.
APPENDIX LXXVI.
To Major General Romanofski, the Governor of the Turkistan Province.
Be it known that, thanks to the All-High Creator, by the mercy of our
Khan we live well and merrily. The single desire of our Khan is to be the
sincere friend of the White Czar; he has no intention to war, but, on the
contrary, considering himself a friend of the White Czar, is in hopes that
should an enemy enter our country, you will not refuse us your aid; if traders
arrive here, or any other subjects of the White Czar, they will in every case
be respected and well treated, more so even than the subjects of the Khan
we hope that all those from here entering the empire of the White Czar will
be treated as your own subjects, and allowed to trade freely as of old. If in
this way free commercial relations are established between us, people of
all classes profiting thereby will bless God. We send this by our well-wisher
Mahomed Karim Mirakhur; whatever he may say relative to peace is to be
believed as true and just.
To the original are attached the seals of-
Prelat Dotkha Tuktakulyf.
Atabek Dotkha Mahomed Kul Otalykof.
Shiroli Bi-Husiagiladin.
Abdulnazar Dotkha Mirzanazarof.
Aluahman Musulmankulof.
Mulha Kashil Mulla Mirzayasof-Hudoyar Im-
Agazy-Muhometiarof,
APPENDIX LXXIX.
exi
APPENDICES LXXVII & LXXVIII
ARE
Lists of Administrative and Police Officers serving in Turkistan.
Showing that in December 1866 twenty-two officers were employed on
these services, one post being vacant. Twenty officers permanently attached
to their posts, and only two temporarily.
APPENDIX LXXIX.
Observations on the Disbursement and Revenues of the Tashkend and Khodjend
Districts (submitted to the Governor General on his visit to the region in
August 1866).
It is impossible to determine the exact amount of the revenues of the
Tashkend and Khodjend Districts for the present year 1866, or for the coming
year 1867.
Up to the month of June of this year, the income of the Tashkend
District was derived alone from bazaar and caravan dues collected in Tashkend.
Bazaar dues were collected in other places, but the amount of these was very
insignificant; for instance, in the village of Tai-Tiubé, although it contains
about 2,000 houses and courts, the total amount of bazaar dues did not reach
R. 100.
Nor was any regularity observed in the collection of these few items
of the revenue. Although petty traders are always and everywhere made to
pay bazaar dues, those were released from payment of the charge who brought
less than two camel loads or araba loads of merchandise to a bazaar, and
some very important items of revenue arising, duties on salt and coals were
allowed to be appropriated by private individuals.
Since the month of June, attempts have been made to improve the system
of levying dues, to which end the Mekhémé established in Tashkend has
done much; this court has fully realized the injustice of increasing the wealth
of the rich at the cost of the poor, and strives zealously to remove all irre-
gularities.
In consequence of this, income from caravan and bazaar dues has greatly
increased. While last year the sum raised in the bazaars and from caravans
did not amount to R. 3,000* a month on an average, it was more than
R. 5,000 in June of the present year, and in July R. 4,898. In other
localities of the Tashkend District, the bazaar dues were last year so very small,
that the amount did not cover the expense of its collection. In the month of
July of the present year, a sum of R. 700 was obtained from this source in
the bazaars of the trans-Chirchik country.
Arrangements have at the same time been made for the imposition of a
land-tax, at the customary rate under the Kokan Government.
There is no
doubt that this work being new to us, we shall at the outset unavoidably
make omissions. The accompanying returns at all events show that we may
expect from these sources to obtain a revenue of not less than R. 100,000 in
Tashkend and the neighbouring villages during the period from the 1st July
of the present year to the 1st of July of 1867, and that a similar, if not a
larger, amount may be expected from the trans-Chirchik country, so that the
* The caravan and bazaar dues collected in Tashkend up to the 1st of June 1866 from
the day of our occupation of that town, i. e., for nearly an entire year, amounted to about
R. 33,000.
exii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
revenue accruing from the lands in the Tashkend District will amount to not
less than R. 200,000, the caravan and bazaar dues to about R. 50,000. But
there are some new items of income to be derived from a tax on salt, ferry
charges, &c., as well as from the taxes collected from the nomads.
These new
items of revenue will not amount to much, not even the tax of the nomads,
seeing that there are very few of the latter in the district. Nevertheless, these
new items will bring in a sum of not less than R. 20,000.
Thus the total amount of revenue of the Tashkend District (rayon) for the
period commencing from the 1st July 1866 and ending 1st July 1867 will be
not less than R. 270,000.*
The revenues of the Khodjend District are calculated on the same prin-
ciples, but they cannot all be gathered in this year, because, owing to the military
operations, many of the taxes were collected by the Emir in advance. But there
is reason to believe that this district will bring in a total revenue of no less
than R. 100,000, so that the entire sum of the local revenue this year
must amount to about R. 370,000.
The expenditure of the present year indispensably chargeable to the local
revenue is as follows:-
Roubles.
30,192
...
11,234
1. Military Administration of the Tashkend and trans-Chirchik region...
2. Military Administration of the Khodjend District
3. Military directions, considering the forts in Tashkend, Khodjend and
Chinaz of the 1st class, and those of Naú and Ablyn of the 2nd
class ...
...
...
20,000
4. Quartering and provisioning of troops of the Turkistan region
62,000
5. Extraordinary expenses of the Military Governor
6. Engineering works...
25,000
50,000
7. Building of Governor's house
....
...
20,000
...
8. Payment for land purchased of the inhabitants of Tashkend for Euro-
pean quarters
10,152
9. Payment for land purchased for the same purpose in Khodjend
10. Maintenance of postal communications
11. Purchase of houses from private individuals
12. Erection of mills, factories, workshops, hospitals for the natives,
&c., &c....
13. Elementary school ...
14. Despatch of a deputation of natives to the Imperial Court
10,000
86,000
...
5,000
20,000
•
...
1,000
10,000
TOTAL
360,578
* For particulars, see annexed return.
APPENDIX LXXX.
cxiii
APPENDIX LXXX.
Approximate Estimate of Taxes payable by the Inhabitants of the Tashkend
District and trans-Chirchik Region for the Year 1866.

Roubles.
On Grapes
""
Djaùrekā (?)
Guzal cotton
...
13,014
6,000
3,000
Sakcha (?) ...
Tribute in corn, about 20,000 botmans*, valuing each botman of anything
grown at 4 roubles
...
...
3,000
The same tribute from the trans-Chirchik country
Caravan and bazaar dues from Tashkend
Taxes from the nomads, ferry charges, salt tax, &c.
80,000
100,000
...
1
...
...
50,000
20,000
TOTAL
...
275,000
* A botman is a Russian measure of 20 poods; 1 pood 36 lbs. English,
NOTE. The amount of the taxes and tribute collected from the inhabitants
of the trans Chirchik country formerly was equal to that of the sum gathered
in Tashkend, but in the present year it will be greater, because the taxes pre-
viously paid in Tashkend by some nomads, whose winter encampments were
beyond the Chirchik, are now paid to the Superintendent of the trans-Chirchik
country.
cxiv
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
APPENDIX LXXXI.
REVENUE OF THE TURKISTAN REGION FOR THE YEAR 1866.
(Extract from the Report of the Military Governor to the Governor General,
dated 4th December 1866, No. 1234.)
16th
EXPECTED
RECEIVED IN
1865.
FOR THE
YEAR 1866.
IMPERIAL REVENUE.
REMARKS.
Permanent Sources.
In the Turkistan Dis-
trict.
Rls. Cps. Rls.
Caravan dues ...
946 75 2,000
Tent dues
9,636 0 15,000
Chemkend District.
Tent dues
Syr-Daria District.
Tent dues
Left Flank of the
Region.
Caravan dues ...
Tent Dues.-
Aùliétá
Merké
Sakmak
TOTAL
...
104
12,784 20
17,700
37,727.51
33,333
Estimated by the Com-
mandant of the town of
Turkistan.
This increase is owing to
the removal of some Kir-
ghizes from the Chemkend
to the Turkistan District.
Increase owing to the more
regular system of collec-
tion.
This figure is based on the
actual number of tents :
the amount for the last
was calculated on the num-
ber of tents throughout
three consecutive years.
17,723 89 20,000
Approximately, since up to
the 1st September the
amount collected under
this head was Rls. 15,000.
(a) 80,284 0 (b) 77,520 (a). Including a
sum of
Rls. 10,417 not paid in.
(b). This figure has de-
creased, owing to the de-
ficiency of last year,
arising from the irregular
system of assessment, the
number of tents rated
having been overesti-
mated.
(c) 159,120 0 165,553 (c). Or, deducting the sum
of Rls. 10,417, Rls.
148,703 15 Copecks.
APPENDIX LXXXII.
CXV
APPENDIX LXXXII.
Extracts from the Full Accounts and Estimates, submitted to the Governor Gene-
ral with Report, dated 28th February 1867, No. 313.
Receipts during the period beginning 1st April 1866 and ending 1st February
1867, and carried to the account of local Revenue.
Caravan dues
Bazaar
""
Tent
Land taxes (Heradj)
In the Tashkend District.
TOTAL
Deduct amount expended during same
period as per accounts
...
BALANCE TO CREDIT
Khodjend District.
...
:
Rls. Cps.
32,872
0
20,484 5
15,196 0
136,515 45
205,067 50
157,853 312
47,214 18
From the period commencing from the occupation of Khodjend to the 1st February
1867
Caravan dues
Bazaar
Tent
""
...
Rls. Cps.
23,605 591
4,788 89/1/
nil
Land taxes (Heradj)
TOTAL
Deduct expenditure for the same period
BALANCE TO CREDIT
Oura-Tiubé District.
18,016 871
46,411 361
...
38,082 98
8,328 981
From the date of the occupation of that place to 1st February
Caravan dues
...
Rls. Cps.
1,767 88
809 5
Bazaar
">
Tent
nil.
Land taxes
2,779 60
TOTAL
5,356 50
Deduct expenditure on account of military ad-
ministration of the district and of com-
mandantship
3,269 67
...
BALANCE TO CREDIT
2,086 83
Juzak District.
From first occupation to 1st February-
Rls. Cps.
Caravan dues
Bazaar
4,969 39
650 40
TOTAL
5,619 79
No expenditure.
Sum total of local receipts to 1st February
Expenditure to account of same
Rls.
Cps.
262,455 15
199,205 371
BALANCE TO CREDIT
63,249 78
exvi
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
APPENDIX LXXXIII.
THE POPULATION OF TURKISTAN.
The exact number of the population of the Turkistan region was not
known at the end of the year 1866, the difficulty of obtaining this inform-
ation being rendered still greater by the prolongation of military opera-
tions, for the inhabitants who removed during the war had not all come back
to their habitations; but according to the
Information collected by M. Bekhehurin.
Tashkend has a population of about 100,000, Namousan 30,000, Iskend
10,000, Tzialu 5,000, Chemkend 4,000, Agalyk 3,000, Sairam, Karabulak,
Karata, and Mengliand 2,000 each, Aùliétá 1,000, Tai-Tiubé and Kerenche
1,000 each. The villages along the Chirchik contain altogether about 8,000,
those along the Angren and in the Kurama hills 10,000, and other towns
and villages not named about 10,000. Thus the settled population along
the right bank of the Syr Daria numbers about 190,000, the nomads about
150,000, making a total of 340,000.
The city of Kokand and neighbourhood contain 100,000, Khodjend
has 40,000, Kosiak 30,000, Morgilk 20,000, Chusa 20,000, Kanebodem 15,000,
Una 5,000, Us-Kurgan 150,000 inhabitants, giving a total of about 300,000
settled inhabitants in the Khanat of Kokan on the left bank of the Syr.
The number of nomads within the same extent of country is not known,
but it does not exceed that of the settled population.
This shows the population of the whole of this country to be about
600,000.
The Khanat of Kokand embraced then within its former limits an entire
population of about 1,000,000, of which resided on the right, and on
the left bank of the Syr-Daria.*
From information supplied by Superintendents of the Population.
Along the former Syr-Daria line there are about 100,000 nomads and 1,000
permanent inhabitants; in the Turkistan (Hazrel) District 30,000 nomads and
8,000 permanent inhabitants; in the Chemkend District 28,000 nomads,
12,000 permanent inhabitants; in the Aùliétà and Tokmak District 130,000
nomads and 2,000 permanent inhabitants; in the Tashkend district 150,000
permanent inhabitants (80,000 of whom are in the town of Tashkend,
and 70,000 in the trans-Chirchik region) and 5,000 nomads; in the district
of Oura-Tiubé (including Zaámin) 35,000 permanent inhabitants and 15,000
nomads.†
The entire population, according to these particulars, would be only
about 620,000, but it must be considerably greater, for the Superintendents as
they themselves say, always accepted the smallest estimates when the actual
number could not be positively ascertained, and when statements differed.
APPENDIX LXXXIV.
Extract from a Minute on the project for a temporary Military Administration
in the Turkistan Region.
With reference to the inadequateness of the administrative staff of the
region, as established in 1866 under the circumstances of the extension
of the limits and of the increased number of troops, it was observed
*According to Mr. Vambery the Khanat of Kokan contains 3 millions of inhabitants.
They numbered 20,000 formerly; those who left the country during the war had not returned
by the end of the year 1866.

APPENDIX LXXXIV.
ex vii
in this minute that, in confirmation of this opinion, and for the purpose
of better illustrating the utter futility of even the most strenuous efforts to
overcome the existing disorder and to establish regularity in the military
administration of the region, it is sufficient to point to the spheres of action of
some of the branches of the administration, and to the means placed at their
disposal by the temporary regulations of the isth August 1865.
6th
18th
The infantry troops, i. e., only those actively employed, without including
garrison companies, engineers, &c., consist of 11 battalions and 1 company
of sappers-or very nearly an entire division.
The cavalry are 21 sotnias of Cossacks, equalling a cavalry division.
All the accounts of these two divisions of infantry and cavalry are kept
by the Etât Major of the region, which, by virtue of the temporary regula-
tions for the administration of the region, are worked on the principle of
divisional direction.
The Etât Major is charged with all the clerical work of the special
arms in the region; with the correspondence relating to the Aral flotilla, which,
according to the regulations for the flotilla, is subordinated to the Military
Governor; with the very heavy and important accounts of the hospital estab-
lishments; with the superintendence of the military, topographical and
military statistical labours; with the intricate correspondence relating to
the receipt, disbursement, accounts of, and directions concerning, the sums
raised from a greater part of the region for expeditions and extraordinary
purposes, which, owing to the absence in the region of financial establish-
ments, are paid into the Etât Major under the old system, &c., &c., &c. The
Etât Major also takes cognizance of judicial affairs and of the distribution of
prize money. All these occupations are considerably complicated by the inces-
sant movements of the troops, by the constant military operations, more es-
pecially as there are no military offices or establishments, as the means of
communication are imperfect and the material condition of the forces is
generally bad.
6th
Sth
And yet the staff of the Etât Major of the forces of the Turkistan region,
as fixed by the regulation of the August 1865, is composed of only
three senior Adjutants, a Chief Auditor, an Assistant Auditor, three Roving
Auditors, and 12 Writers.
It is no wonder then that the actual state of affairs of the Etât Major
of the Turkistan region is as follows :-
The hospital accounts have not yet been touched, and the returns have
not been looked into. The distribution of the prize money has been entirely
neglected. The Tashkend prize money was paid nearly a year and a half
after the place was taken (June 1865). The recommendations for prize
money for Khodjend, taken on the 24th May (5th June) were forwarded to
Orenburg on the November. The confusion of the accounts of the
commissariat, stores, and purveyor's branches is so great that, with the
means now at hand, it is quite impossible to keep it from growing still
greater.
5th
27th
The whole of the registry branch of the Etât Major, the courier's and
post branches are at the present time under the sole direction of a single
writer.
Heaps of papers, the accumulation of the last year and a half, and of
papers relating to the direction of the former Syr-Daria line, are lying
scattered through all the offices of the Etât Major through want of accom-
modation and of some person to take charge of them.
There is neither an office for printing or lithographing, nor a draughts-
man's room.
cxviii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
All the topographical surveys and maps executed up to this time have
been made by 2 officers and 3 topographers sent from Orenburg, and by 3
officers and 8 topographers from Siberia. The Siberian officers returned to
Omsk in February last, and the Siberian authorities are now insisting on the
return of the 8 topographers. We occupy a region of which we yet know
almost absolutely nothing. There is not a single statistical fact, not a survey
of the smallest extent of country, which would not now be invaluable to us.
Military, administrative, and scientific interests demand the fullest develop-
ment of this work in the region, and who is there to do it?
There are no materials, no funds for making topographical surveys or
for constructing maps. The former surveys were charged to the sums appro-
priated for extraordinary purposes and expeditions, out of which sums
various other allowances to officers and writers of the Etât Major are still paid.
Such, and even worse than this, is the condition of affairs of the Etât
Major.
The work of the intendant's branch is performed by one officer, with
two assistants, one book-keeper and two controllers of accounts, and yet the
officer has actually much more work than any intendant of a military district
in the interior of the empire. Under these circumstances, the troops at the
same tine being constantly on the march, and being scattered over a large area
in small detachments having no officers specially acquainted with the economi-
cal branches,ths of the requirements of the forces are ill-provided for ; as for
checks of any kind, they are not to be even thought of, so that an irregularity
in the mode of supply is perpetuated until it is discovered by a lucky
chance.
In one word, the arrears and confusion in all the branches of the mili-
tary direction of Turkistan are so great, that the condition of the forces and
the interest of the State are very materially affected, and it is quite beyond
the power and the will of the responsible authorities to put things in order.
Therefore, and for political considerations, it is necessary not only to adopt
palliative measures, but to organize (and that at once) a local military ad-
ministration with the proper means for keeping affairs in a normal condition
which would suit the exceptional position of the troops and the nature of the
country, and which would inspire the native population, at the first step from
chaos to a new form of life, with a faith in the superiority of our laws, and
with a respect for our troops and Government institutions.
APPENDIX LXXXV.
Cossack population of the Ural, of Orenburg and Siberia (including the Semi-
rechensk region), to 1st January 1867.
Ural
Orenburg
...
Western Siberia with Semirechensk 113,138
...
91,852 of both sexes.
239,046
ditto.
ditto.
...
Total 444,036
ditto.
APPENDIX LXXXVI.
cxix
APPENDIX LXXXVI.
Return of Cannon taken from the Kokanians at the capture of Turkistan,
Chemkend, Tashkend and Aùliétà in 1864 and 1865.
AT TURKISTAN.
AT TASHKEND AND CHEMKEND, (IN STORe at
CHEMKEND).

No. of
Guns.
Calibre.
Length
in
inches.
No. of
Guns.
Calibre.
Length in
inches.
2
11
4
6-Pr. cast-iron guns.
* 54
41
4.4
44
4
brass
ditto
""
3
ditto
""
70
50/1/2
10
5
18-Pr. howitzers, brass
43
42
4.2
+15
9,, ditto ditto
ditto {
from33
to 31
2
7,, ditto ditto...
ditto...{
42
39
1
6½,, ditto ditto...
42
4.7
444
43
6
6,, ditto ditto...
41
40
39
77
74
40
37
∞
10 ditto ditto...
35
33
32
32
77
72
10
5
6,, ditto
ditto...
70
67
41
1
3,, ditto ditto...
43
41
41
4
2
ditto ditto...
4.1
AT AÙLIÉTÀ.
43
3
2-Pr.
brass
cast-iron
ditto
51
4.-1
...
2
20-Pr. cast-iron
50
43.
44
78
...
30
75
4
3
13,, cast-iron
10,,
ditto
...
30
45
41
44
28
101
10
,, brass
...
22
77
6
6,, ditto
76
...
∞
72
45
73
*The muzzle of this gun is broken, the length
of the gun must have been about 70 inches.
+ These guns and the carriages are made from
the pattern of our mountain howitzer which fell
into the hands of the Kokanians at Ikan,
Z
CXX
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
Return of Cannon taken from the Kokanians at the capture of Turkistan
Chemkend, Tashkend and Aúliétá in 1864 and 1865.-(Continued.)
AT TASHKEND AND CHEMKEND, STORED AT CHEMKEnd.
No. of
Guns.
Calibre.
Length in
inches.
No. of
Guns.
Calibre.
Length in
inches.
92
1
87
2
48
46
7
9
3-Pr. cast-iron
45
1
45
1
15
955
39
وو
""
2 Pr. Cast Iron
1 "
9/1/20
mortars
ditto
ditto
...
{
41
35
ditto brass...
WIDEES
40
43
26
18
33
44
1
44
48
brass cannon
32
cast-iron ditto
།
TOTAL... 80
Total number of guns captured in the years 1864 and 1865...92.
Return showing the number and calibre of Bokharian Guns taken at Irdjar
and in Khodjend, Oura Tiubé, Zaámin and Jizakh.
IRDJAR.
KHODJEND.
No. of
Guns.
Calibre.
Length in
inches.
No. of
Guns.
Calibre.
Length in
inches.
98
prend
1
60-Pr. Cast iron
2
12-Pr. brass
...
* 45/3
661/20
2
6,, ditto
83
115/1/1/0
49
3
6
brass
74
112
...
70
4
cast iron ...
42
3,, ditto
77
49
3
2,,
brass
31/0
4.5
ditto
31/12/20
4.6
...
1
1
""
wrought iron.
28
46
1
11}\
ditto
28
10
5
"
12,, ditto
35
1
6
Howitzer, brass
45
"",
11 guns besides, 11 others of a small
calibre.
cast iron
3
14
wrought iron
{
322
288
21
21
42
28
42
15 guns
*The muzzle of this gun is broken off, the original
length must have been 70 inches.
APPENDIX LXXX VI.
cxxi
Return showing the number and calibre of Bokharian guns taken at Irdjar
and in Khodjend, Oura Tiubé, Zaúmin and Jizakh.-(Continued.)

OURA TIUBE.
JIZAKH.
No. of
Guns.
Calibre.
Length in
inches.
No. of
Guns.
Calibre.
Length in
inches.
76
cast-iron
...
S 126
63
67
cast-iron
64
4
6- Pr.
51
brass
{
872/1/20
6-Pr.
51
59
72
68
52/1/
45/1/20
63
brass
1212
55
48
cast-iron
42
42
f cast-iron
8888
62
60
10
3 "
42
54
51
9
3,,
55
44
54
brass
42
52
brass
...
4.2
48
56
44
2
4 "
brass
45
43
56
39
cast-iron
31/3/1
4
2,,
31/31/
HAHA
2
2
brass
50
2,, cast-iron
13,, { cast-iron
{brass
32
43
40
...
2
1,, cast-iron
...
{
451/
28
22 guns
1
2 Pood (72 It Engl.)
mortar cast-iron
Besides 31 guns of small calibre.
21
23 guns
1
Besides 6 cast-iron
9 wrought-
iron
...
15
guns
of small
calibre.
AT ZAÁMIN.
3-Pr. cast-iron gun 44.
Total number of guns captured in 1866, 129.
cxxii
NOTES ON THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION.
APPENDIX LXXXVII.
Distribution of Regular Troops of the late separate corps of Orenburg and
Siberia in December 1854.
ORENBURG CORPS.
23RD INFANTRY DIVISION, HEAD QUARTERS, ORENBURG.
Battalions of the Line--
1st Brigade
No. 1 Battalion
Nos. 2 & 3
No. 4
5
2nd Brigade
No. 6 Battalion
7
35
دو
دو
دو
...
...
8
""
...
...
9
10
""
11
...
Town of Orenburg.
""
Uralsk.
(Nos. 2 and 4 Companies in Fort Novopetrovsk)
...
...
•
...
...
...
...
...
Town of Orenburg.
Fort Perovsko.
Orsk.
Ekaterinburg.
Troitsk.
Zlatonstovsk Works.
Ekaterinburg.
Boyoslovski Works.
Ufa.
Samara.
2
...
SIBERIAN CORPS.
1st Brigade
No. 1 Battalion
3
Nos. 4, 5 and 6 Battalions
2nd Brigade
No. 7 Battalion
""
9
8
""
10
11
12
3rd Brigade
No. 13 Battalion
14
15
""
""
16
""
:
...
...
...
•
4
...
...
...
...
...
...
•
...
...
...
...
...
...
Omsk.
Tobolsk.
Fort Okmolinsk.
Petropavlovsk.
Fort Omsk.
Tomsk.
Semipalativsk.
Fort Kapal.
Ust Kamenagorsk.
Barnaùl.
Tomsk.
Fort Ustkamenosorsk.
Serving under the com-
mand of the Gover-
nor General of Eastern
Siberia.
Total, 23 Battalions of the Line exclusive of invalid and " étope" com-
panies.
Distribution of Regular Troops in the Military Districts of Orenburg,
Western Siberia and Turkistan in October 1867.
temporarily.
...
In Orenburg.
1 Battalion of Rifles
...
•
1
""
of 37th division of Infantry .
:
In Western Siberia.
Battalions of the Line
4
M
APPENDIX LXXXVIII.
cxxiii
Battalions of the Line
Ditto of Rifles
In Turkistan.
Ditto of 37th Infantry Division
1 Brigade of Foot Artillery.
Total No. of Battalions in active service
Without the 3 temporarily employed
With 1 Brigade of Foot Artillery.
12
1
1 temporarily.
20
7
Invalid and "étope" companies are not included, as also provincial
battalions and battalions of the reserve, which are not appointed for active
service, having their own special duties.
APPENDIX LXXXVIII.
Circular to the Troops of the Turkistan Region, No. 173, dated,
14th
St. Petersburg, the 26th April 1867.
Giving up the duties of Military Governor of the Turkistan Legion and
of Commander of the Forces therein, and parting with my companions, I beg
each and all to accept my most warm, heart-felt gratitude for the distinction
they have achieved in action, which has earned for me so many high imperial
rewards; to the brave soldiers of the ranks I express my sincere and hearty
thanks.
I shall ever bear in mind with special pride and satisfaction the period
of my command over the brave Tarkistanians, and I shall consider myself
perfectly happy when, by God's will, I shall again have the command over
equally brave soldiers.
To be read in all companies, sotnias and batteries.
Military Governor of the Turkistan region and Commander of the Troops
therein stationed.
ROMANOFSKI, Major General,
of His Majesty's Suite.
EASTERN TURKESTAN AND DZUNGARIA,
AND THE
REBELLION OF THE TUNGANS AND
TARANCHIS,
1862 to 1866,
*
By Robert Michell.
LIST OF AUTHORITIES.
1. "Russian Invalid," February 1870.
2." Turkestan Gazette," 1870 and 1871.
3. Wells Williams's "Middle Kingdom." New York: John Wiley.
1861.
4. Ritter's "Erdkunke von Asien." Russian Annotated Edition.
5. Timkofski's "Travels of a Russian Mission through Mongolia to
China." London, 1827.
6. "Journals and Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society."
London.
7. "Journals of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society." 1865.
8. "Account of a Russian Mission to Kashgar in October 1868.”
9. Official Papers.
And Others.
It has been the custom with some writers to style as
the Chinese province of I'lí all that extent of country to
the extreme west of China which embraces Dzungaria,
and what is geographically known as Eastern Tur-
kestan. As a political entity the latter has in some
measure become familiar to us under the name of
Kashgaria. It is now subject to the sole authority of a
Khan, and constitutes an independent State, severed
alike from China, Dzungaria, and Kokan, socially,
politically, and geographically.
12718.
A
2
Wells Williams is the only writer on whose authority
all this country came under the general denomination
of I'lí. I'lí, properly so called, was distinctly and solely
that country to which exiles were constantly sent from
China, where alone Chinese military colonies were esta-
blished, and where, particularly, voluntary immigrants
from China settled and grew prosperous. It was one
of four districts into which Dzungaria was divided
naturally, and it was called after the chief town of the
same name.* It is true that the town of Kuldja or I'lí
was the principal seat of Chinese military control over
the entire region, including the southern province, but
we doubt if it will be found even in Chinese records
that Nan-lu and Peh-lu were, as is shown on our maps,
the proper names for the northern and southern divi-
sions of one single province entitled the Province of I'lí.
We take it that this is a misnomer, arising partly from
the popularity of the I'lí district in Pekin, and partly
from the existence of a head jurisdiction in the city of
I'lí, to which all the Chinese ambans in Turkestan and
Dzungaria were nominally subordinated. The I'li
district was well known in China both as a place of
punishment and an "El Dorado."
We find that a Chinese garrison of soldiers, with an
amban, were the only Chinese occupants of the Mussul-
man towns in Turkestan, with the addition of a few
Chinese merchants in the principal commercial centres.
In Dzungaria, on the other hand, there were numerous
Chinese inhabitants of all classes: military, industrial,
commercial, agricultural, and criminal. These were
for the most part settled in the Kuldja or I'lí district,
so that the name and fame of that district came gra-
dually, though by mistake, to refer to the country
beyond the proper limits of the radius of military ad-
* Otherwise Kuldja, founded in 1764, or probably re-christened I'lí
by the Chinese at that time, for there is mention of its having existed
in 1678 as a Mussulman town; was this latter not old Kuldja or
Almalig ?-See "Cathay and the Way thither," by Colonel Yule.
3
1
ministration over the extreme north-western depen-
dencies of China.
Altyshar and Dzungaria did not form one, but two
separate dependencies, notwithstanding that the prin-
cipal military command of the forces scattered over
both was held by one Officer, who was, for greater
convenience, established near the Russian frontier.
The name of I'lí is, moreover, strictly applicable
only to a portion of the region to the north of the
Thian Shan,* and for geographical reasons could not
have embraced two countries distinguishable, among
other features, by totally separate water systems.
Altyshar, or Kashgaria, in Eastern Turkestan, has
been lately named Djety-Shar, or circuit of the Seven
Citiest, under the supreme rule of Yakub-bek, the Khan
of Kashgar, or the Atalykh-Ghazi.
But it comes under our notice as Kashgaria, a name,
however, which was not uncommon to some portion of
Eastern Turkestan before the years 1863 and 1864.
Before entering upon the question of the rebellions in
Eastern Turkestan and Dzungaria, it may not be out of
place briefly to describe those countries, and to pass in
review their general condition, prior to the outbreak
which led to their severance from China.
((
The whole range of country between the parallels of
37° and 44° of north latitude and of 72° and 93° of east
longitude was held by the Eleuths from 1683 to 1758,
when it was conquered by the Chinese in the reign of
the Emperor Kien-lung. It was then called the
country of the new frontier," and it was later ad-
ministratively distinguished from Dzungaria as the
country to the south of the Thian Shan line of frontier
or “Nan-lu,” a Peh-lu" or northern line being similarly
drawn along the northern bases of the same mountain
chain in Dzungaria. The names of these two separate
* The valley of the I'lí river, most of which has been absorbed by
Russia.
† Kashgar, Yarkend, Aksu, Hoten, Utch, Kucha, and Harashar.
A 2
६
4
lines of frontier applied only administratively to the
countries they respectively skirted. Eastern Turkestan
lies between the southern slopes of the Thian Shan
mountains and the Kuen-lun and Kara Korum (Nan
Shan) ranges. In the west it is walled by the crested
margin of the great Pamir upland, by the so-called
Belur-Tagh* mountains which divide Central Asia into
Eastern and Western Turkestan. In the east it fades
away into the vast Mongol desert, Shamo or Gobi, and
the level lands annexed to the Chinese province of
Han-su. Skirting the north lie Dzungaria and the
Russian territories (the Semirechensk district). To the
south, beyond the Kuen-lun range, are situated Cashmere
and Thibet, while Kokan and Badakhshan, with the
Russian portion of Bokhara (the Zarafshan district)
intervening, encompass Eastern Turkestan immediately
beyond its broad line of demarcation in the west.
Eastern Turkestan "reaches nearly 1,250 miles" from
west to east "and varies from 300 to 500 miles in
breadth" but the plain surface alone between the Kuen-
lun and Thian Shan, i.e., between 37° and 40° to 43° 30′
N. latitude (Kashgar being situated in 39° 25′ or 39° 23′
according to Lieutenant Hayward, and Turfan in 43° 30′
N. lat.) is 180 to 400 geographical miles wide, while its
length from Kashgar to Hami, or more properly to Lob-
Otherwise Bolor or Tziun-lin. Humboldt's theory of an independent
transverse ridge from the Thian Shan to the Himalayas has been dis-
puted, and it has been said that the ascent from Yarkend and Kashgar
westwards to the table land of Pamir is gradual and imperceptible.
But Lieutenant Hayward has subsequently ascertained and pointed
out that, contrary to the usual supposition that "the eastern crest
"of the Pamir slopes down very gradually into the high plateau of
"Eastern Turkestan, or the high plain country of Central Asia, the
range forming its eastern crest rises into a chain of lofty peaks of
“20,000 to 21,000 feet above sea level, the spurs from which run down
"most abruptly into the high table land below, the range thus pre-
"senting a steep face towards the plains of Eastern Turkestan."
If, then, the Pamir table land is bordered on its eastern side by a
chain of lofty peaks from north to south, Humboldt's theory may be
partially perpetuated.
† Well's Williams's "Middle Kingdom," vol. i., p. 174.
5
Nor at the western extremity of the Mongol desert, is
about 740 geographical miles. The plain suface thus
embraces about 48,000 square geographical miles of
country.* The entire area of Eastern Turkestan within
the limits described is computed at 80,000 square miles.†
The greater part of Eastern Turkestan is composed of
desert and steppe, traversed by the River Tarim, but the
northern and western extremities are of a different cha-
racter; the northern is intersected by projecting spurs
of the Thian Shan mountains, and the western is an
elevated table land gradually sloping away to the south-
east and covered with short projections from the "Belur-
Tagh" mountain chain, which are both steep and bare,
and which alternate with deep fissures. From the Kirghiz
Alataù towards the east, the Thian Shan mountains,
forming the northern boundary of Eastern Turkestan,
bear different local appellations. The elevations in those
mountains which Russians have reached vary from
12,000 to 21,000 feet, and the principal passes, such as
the Bars-Kaùn, Zaùkù, Kantak, and Muzart, occur at
heights of 10,000 to 16,000 feet. The great military
road from China into Eastern Turkestan, or the so-called
South Thian Shan road, passed along the bases of the
southern spurs of those mountains through all the princi-
pal towns, from Hami to Kashgar.
Father Hyacinth has estimated the distance from
Kashgar to Pekin at 11,925 "lis." There is said to be
a road from China to Hoten through the country of the
Koko-Nor Mongols, and there are two ways of com-
munication between Eastern Turkestan and Thibet,
one from Ilchi, through Tak, along the base of the Kara-
Korum mountains, into Central Thibet, and another from
Yarkend, through Leh, into Western Thibet.
There are no Chinese data by which we can fix even
the approximate number of the population. Father
* Ritter's "Erdkunde von Asien." Russian annotated edition.
† Wells Williams observes that Eastern Turkestan or, as he calls it
"the southern circuit of the province of I'lí," is about two-thirds of the
entire area of the province, which is 900,000 square miles.
6
Hyacinth, drawing from Chinese sources, puts it at one
million. But this figure is, in all probability, below the
mark. The information we possess is very contradictory,
and the statements made on this point have all been
hypothetical. Mont. Martin's figure of 30,000,000 “for
"the vast region constituting the whole of the western
"dependencies of China is considered fabulous," and in
these "vast regions" he included all Mongolia and
Manchuria. It has been asserted in a Russian paper
that the population of Eastern Turkestan is under-es-
timated at 20,000,000, but 20,000,000 of inhabitants
placed within the entire area would give an average of
250 individuals to each square mile, and we must bear
in mind that only the borders of the country have a
settled population, the centre of it being desert, steppe,
and waste land.*
On Klaproth's authority, if it is to be at all considered,
Mont. Martin's 30,000,000, referable to all the western
dependencies of China should be 7,000,000; and if
that of M. Valikhanof is to be equally credited, the
20,000,000 of the Russian paper should be reduced
to 580,000. But the district of Hoten, with the town of
Harashar, is alone said to contain a population of
3,000,000, although Dr. Morrison says only 44,630.
The compilers of the Russian Military Statistical Review
for 1868, basing their assumption on the most recent
inquiries, estimate the entire population of Eastern
Turkestan at "very probably 3,000,000." It has been
stated still more recently, in the "Turkestan Gazette,"
that the population of Altyshar is 1 million.† The
* 20,000,000 distributed over the habitable portions of Eastern
Turkestan would give about 417 individuals to the square mile.
†The following figures are given on the authority of Islam Hodja, a
Kashgar officer, who commanded a troop of horse in the late rebellion :
Kashgar, 16,000 houses. Maral Bashi, 12,000 houses. Yarkend,
32,000 inhabitants. Hoten, 40,000 inhabitants. Ush-Turfan, 15,000
inhabitants. Aksu, 10,000 inhabitants, Kucha, 6,000 inhabitants.
Balty, 8,000 inhabitants. Harashar, 20,000 inhabitants. Urumtsi,
37,000 inhabitants. Villages in the neighbourhood of Kashgar ;
south side, Sarmian (within 2 miles), 300 inhabitants. Ak Taglyk
S
7
great bulk of the population of Eastern Turkestan are
Ouigurs or Uzbeg Turks, speaking the Jaghatai, or purest
Turk tongue.
Harashar, and the slopes of the Yuldus in the south-
east, have been peopled with Kalmuk Tartars of the
Khoshot and Durbot tribes since the reign of the
Emperor Kien-lung, when the Hoten district was
depopulated. The population of the market towns is
composed of a medley of various Asiatic tribes and
races, and before the year 1863 those towns contained
great numbers of Chinese traders. Education is con-
fined to a knowledge of the Koran, and to reading and
writing in Arabic, but very few possess the latter
acquirements. The written characters of the Ouigur
tongue, which were in common use in Mongolia during
the Oihor or Ouigur dynasty, have been preserved only
in Turfan. The Mahomedans pay for the education of
their sons in contributions of kind (corn, flour, or ewes)
to the medresses or colleges.
The inhabitants of Aksu have the reputation of being
the most civilized people in Eastern Turkestan. The
inhabitants of Kashgar rank next to these in respect to
politeness and hospitality. The people of Harashar are
characterised as totally devoid of good manners, and
wanting much in decorum ; as slothful, inclined to
theft and robbery, and as incapable of deriving any
benefit from their excellent lands. The inhabitants
of Utch are said to be rude and shy. During the Chinese
tenure of the country the civil administration was entirely
in the hands of native officers called Beks, who were
the chief civil authorities, and appointed all subordinates
(2 miles), 150. Ak Tam (10 miles, 50; this last is a frontier post. On
the west Ustuin Artush (10 miles), 300. Astun Artush (11 miles),
100. Bish-Koram (10 miles), 500. North-east, Kyzyl-Sui (15 miles),
500. Khanaryk (13 miles), 400. Faizuvad (27 miles), 2,000; and on
the south-east Yanghissar (43 mtles, Hayward says 53 miles), 2,000
inhabitants.
It must be noted that these figures are considered extravagant.
According to the "Turkestan Gazette," Kashgar contains 7,000
inhabitants.
8
to their posts. The Beks held their appointments from
the Chinese Government, and were divided into classes,
according to the dignity of each office. They were pro-
moted by transfer from one service into another. Each
town and burgh had an Akim-Bek or mayor; a Dukha-
Bek, assistant; Kaznatchi-Bek, collector of taxes; a
Shan-Bek, intendant; a Min-Bek, chiliarch, or chief of
a thousand; a Kazi-Bek, or judge; and a Raïs, or pre-
server of order and propriety. Besides these, there were
rural officers called Sarkars. The Beks of district towns
were superior in rank.
Except in the towns of Kashgar, Yarkend, and
Hoten, where, in addition to plots of ground, the Beks
received a salary of 50 to 80 tengas from the Chinese
Government, those Officers were remunerated by grants
of land only.
The Beks of the seven large towns were required to
appear at court in Pekin with tribute.* They performed
this journey in rotation, and thus long intervals elapsed
before the several towns repeated their acts of homage
to the Brother of the Sun. The Princes of Turfan and
Hami, however, prostrated themselves annually at the
foot of the throne.
The local administration dispensed justice according
to the Mussulman law, that is, according to the Sharigate,
and in accordance with the customs prevailing among
Mahomedans generally. Cases of importance were,
however, tried by the Chinese Military Governor, and
capital offences were dealt with under the Chinese
criminal code.
The seven principal towns of Eastern Turkestan were
* Hami (Kamil, or Kamul) and Turfan, not Included in Eastern Tur-
kestan, are two separate principalities subject to China, and known
as Si-Yu, or western limits of the empire. They have preserved
the hereditary rule of their own chieftains, although the tribes in
occupation are arranged under the different Manchur banners; this
military organization being under the control of a Chinese General
resident in Han-su.-See Colonel Yule's "Cathay, and the Way
thither."
1
9
garrisoned with Chinese soldiers located in the citadels
established in the outskirts. Those troops were under
the command of a Chinese amban, or military Governor,
resident in the citadel, to whom, at the same time, the
civil administration of the town and its district was
subordinate. The seven ambans of Eastern Turkestan
were inferior in rank to the Tsian-Kiung of Kuldja (I'lí)
in Dzungaria, who was thus head and chief (but no-
minally rather than practically) over all the Chinese
forces distributed over Eastern Turkestan and Dzun-
garia. The senior officer in Eastern Turkestan, to whom
the others were subordinate, was the amban of Yarkend.*
According to Dr. Claydon and Mr. Wells Williams,
the Chinese troops in Eastern Turkestan numbered
about 73,000. These were originally Manchur and
Chinese soldiers of eight divisions of banners, whose com-
plement, was, however, systematically made up by native
levies. The garrisons of the towns of the interior were
considerably stronger than those of the frontier cities,
which would show that the Chinese felt the necessity of
guarding against an insurrection of the people more
than against any irruption of a foreign foe.
The tribute and taxes imposed by the Chinese on the
population of the towns of Eastern Turkestan were not
burthensome. In the event of a family having no
member capable of bearing arms in the service, the
Chinese Government exacted from such a household
tribute in silver and copper coin, grain, copper ore, lead,
sulphur, T cloth, or raw cotton. The tribute of Yarkend
* According to Islam Hodja, already referred to in a note, the
principal seat of Chinese military administration was at Urumtsi,
Chinese Turkestan being divided into ambanships thus:-1. Yarkend,
including Kashgar, Maral Bashi, with surrounding villages; 2. Hoten
and neighbourhood; and, 3. Harashar, with the subordinate amban-
ships of Ush-Turfan, Aksu, Kucha, and Balty.
66
† In this we shall be found to differ from Lieutenant Hayward, who
observes that "the population of the country had become irritated and
disgusted at the unscrupulous manner in which an exorbitant revenue
was extorted." May this extortion not be attributed rather to the
native Beks, who taxed the people and exhausted the revenues?
10
amounted to 35,400 sacks of corn, 57,569 pieces of
T cloth, 15,000 pounds of copper, and a quantity of
gold, beads, silk, and hemp. The people were rated each
according to his means; thus the father of Islam Hodja
(who will hereafter be quoted), a man of some position
and affluence, having three shops in Kashgar, 12 wives
in different towns, and 31 children, whom he supported,
paid 14 yambs (257. per annum); others paid two, three,
and four yambs. The nomads rendered a tenth of their
flocks.
The revenue of Eastern Turkestan was raised in
the form of house tax, shop tax, and taxes on fruit
and kitchen gardens. Duties were also charged on
raw goods and on manufactured articles introduced
into the country for local consumption. With regard to
the rates of duty on goods imported through Kokan,
nothing more is known than that 70 per cent. of the
customs duty upon them was paid over in Kashgar to
the Kokan aksakal, or consul, for his own Government.
The population of the country was obliged to render
services to the Chinese, such as attending to stables,
keeping post stations, and at Kashgar the inhabitants
provided a police force of 500 men, but those individuals
were exempt from taxes.
The cost of the civil administration, and of the main-
tenance of the troops, was one million "lans," in part
payment of which the Chinese Government distributed
quantities of a cotton material called "daba," and the
balance was generally redeemed by other commercial
operations into which the Government entered.
We may now turn towards the north, and contemplate
the region between the Altai mountain system and the
Thian Shan. What is known as Dzungaria is composed
of the three districts of I'lí, Kur-kara- Usu, and Tar-
bagatai. Some portion of Dzungaria has been absorbed
by the Russians, by whose territories it is bounded
11
polve
along the whole of its north-western side. This line runs
from the Lake Nor-Zaisan, or rather from a point some
way up the Black Irtysh, to the Tarbagatai mountains;
following these towards the west, it proceeds across an
open country, striking the Emil river at about mid-
course, to the Alataù mountains, and skirting the latter
it runs on to the Russian outpost of Borokhudzir; from
here it is drawn across the valley of the River I'lí to the
mountain knot at the eastern extremity of Issyk-Kul.
At this point the green line on the map is drawn along a
ridge of hills extending from north-east to south-west,
terminating in an elevation to the south of Kuldja, from
which, passing the Sumbé mountain and intersecting the
valley of the Tekés, the Russo-Dzungarian frontier ter-3araver
minates at Tengri-Khan, in the Thian Shan mountains.
Until lately the Russian Semirechensk region, from
Semipalatinsk, as well as the Balkhash, and Issyk-Kul
formed part of Dzungaria, or rather composed the I'lí
region, of which only a small portion, namely the Kuldja
district, was retained by the Chinese. Since 1844, how-
ever, that country has been gradually, and without
opposition, absorbed by the Russians. Preoccupied in
the preservation of tranquillity in the more populous
localities, and loth to issue from their citadels, the
Chinese authorities and garrisons were, it seems, su-
premely indifferent to Russian encroachments over an
extent of surplus country which they were unable to
protect.
Thus the Russian Kazaks came gradually to mono-
polize the fisheries in the waters until, on the one side, a
line of pickets was advanced up the Irtysh to the Narym
mountains, while another line was thrown out from Ust-
Kamenogorsk to Kokpektinsk, with a third line projecting
from Semipalatinsk to Kopal, and thence to Vernoë.
More recently a chain of posts was established from
Sergiopol to Urdjar, along the Tarbagatai mountains,
on the road to Chuguchak, and another from the main
line near Kopal to Lepsinsk, at the foot of the Alataù,
on the Semipalatinsk line. Nor-Zaisan and the right
12
bank of the embouchure of its feeder are now included
within the Russian limits, as well as the whole of the
basin of lake Ala-Kul and the lower course of its chief
affluent, the Emil river.*
Mr. Abramof observes, in a paper on the Nor-Zaisan,
that the Chinese, adhering to their peaceful policy, took
no notice of the monopoly of these waters by the Russian
Kazaks.
In the north-east, Dzungaria is bounded by the Black
Irtysh and Mongolia; in the east and south-east, by
Urumtsi and Barkul; and in the south, by the Thian
Shan range.
The I'lí district occupies the wide and well irrigated
valley of the river of that name, surrounded on three
sides by mountains.
The Tarbagatai district is mountainous, but possesses
a steppe flora; it embraces the basin of the Black Irtysh
river.
The Kur-Kara-Usu district is filled with a system of
lakes extending towards the east, and forming a marshy
zone passing through Urumtsi and Barkul. The two
principal lakes here are Eshik-Nor and Sairam; Kur-
Kara-Usu lies between I'lí and Tarbagatai.
Mr. Wells Williams observes, that Dzungaria extends
about 900 miles in length, the width being, on an average,
300 miles, and that the area is a little more than a third
of 900,000 square miles, which he gives as the extent of
all Eastern Turkestan, with Dzungaria. It may be
said to lie between 79° and 89° east longitude, and be-
tween 42° 30′ and 48° north latitude. Russian travels
in the direction of Dzungaria have not extended beyond
Kuldja and Chuguchak. Even while the Chinese were
masters of that country the Russians never strove to
penetrate into it for the purpose of exploration. The
botanist Sievers, in 1793, was the first traveller who
visited it, but he only reached Tarbagatai (Chuguchak).
Humboldt's travels did not extend beyond Tarbagatai,
* For definition of the Semirechensk boundary, see note, page 58.
13
}
so that with reference to Dzungaria modern science has
added little or nothing to the information obtained from
early Chinese sources and from obscure accounts of
exploration of the thirteenth century, such as those of
Plano Carpini, André Longjumel, and Wilhelm Rubruquis.
A Russian, called Baikof, an envoy of the Tsar Alexei
Fedorovitch, did indeed traverse Dzungaria in the
middle of the seventeenth century (1654), proceeding to
China, but the record he left was as valueless as those
of Madatof, who passed on to India from Semipalatinsk,
and of a few other Russians who penetrated into Dzun-
garia and Eastern Turkestan in the beginning of the
present century.
The road we have already traced from the Huan
barrier, in the Chinese province of Hansu, to Hami,
divides, at the latter place, into two, the one called the
Nan-lu proceeds, as we have stated, to Kashgar, the
other, known as the Peh-lu, passes through Urumtsi to
Kur-Kara-Usu, where it branches off, on the left to
Kuldja, on the right to Chuguchak; these were all
military roads, originally constructed by the Chinese for
the march of troops, when it was necessary to send them
into the "new territories," to quell successive rebel-
lions. In order to keep open this communication with
Dzungaria, the northern road was lined with fresh settle-
ments.
During the independence of Dzungaria, its population
was composed of Eleuths, or Mongol Kalmuks, with an
admixture of Kirghizes, and of some tribes of Buruts
inhabiting the country of the Altai mountains. But
upwards of a million of these were massacred by the
Chinese in the latter half of the eighteenth century, and
a great number either perished from hunger and disease,
or fled in terror to the adjacent countries before the
Manchurs.
The lands thus vacated were appropriated by the
conquerors, and apportioned among the troops under a
system of military colonization. Settlers were in great
numbers sent into the country from China, gangs of
14
criminals of every degree were poured into it and
settled on the lands under a military surveillance, and
chiefly along the Peh-lu. At the same time many
thousands of the poorer classes of Kashgaria were driven
into that region, to serve as labourers under the new
occupiers of the soil.
Sarts, occupied with trade and agriculture, settled in
the towns and villages, or dwelt, as retail traders, in the
"ulusses" of the wandering tribes.
The nomads of Dzungaria are Turguts* (Kalmuks) of
the Mongol race. They are divided into four branches;
one roaming in Eastern Turkestan, by the Kaidu River,
in Harashar, and the rest distributed over Dzungaria
as follows:-the northern division are located in Kho-
bak and Sarin, east of Chuguchak; the eastern division
inhabit the country between An-how-tzien and Balgaizi;
and the western division are spread over the country
stretching from the south of An-how-tzien to Bora-
Burgasu.
The last-named division number about 40,000 indi-
viduals, supplying 3,900 horsemen; the southern division
are the most numerous, mustering 8,100 horsemen.
The Hoshoits are another Mongol tribe of nomads,
most of whom passed over from Siberia, some of them
having returned to Dzungaria from Koko-Nor. They
roam along the great Yuldus river, and number about
18,000 individuals, producing in the field 1,800 horsemen.
The settled population of Kuldja was, prior to the re-
bellion, 50,000; that of Chuguchak, 5,000.
The total population of Dzungaria has been estimated
by Wells Williams at about 2,000,000.
The three districts of Dzungaria were severally
governed by an amban, or Chinese Military Governor,
* Or Torgoúts; these are the descendants of the Kalmuks, who, in
1770, to the number of 40,000 tents, vacated their lands on the Volga,
and who, chased by the Kirghizes with terrible effect, sought refuge in
the Chinese province of I'lí; they were settled by the Chinese along
the banks of the Yuldus under the mountains of that name, where they
now abide, beset on all sides by Tungans and Taranchis.
15
while the chief military authority was vested in the
Chinese Tsian-Kiung, or Commander-in-Chief, resident
in Kuldja (Ilí).
The military classes were ranged under the Manchur
division of banners.
The nomad tribes had a separate form of government,
similar to that of the Mongols, but they were equally
under the control of the local amban, and under that
of the superior officer at Kuldja.
They were divided into chulkans, or families of Tur-
guts, Durbots, and Hoshoits, and these again were ranged
under 30 different standards.
The Chinese inhabitants of the towns were subject to
the Chinese civil code; the Mahomedans were judged
according to the Sharigate, while the nomads were
forced to observe regulations framed by the Chinese
Department of Foreign Relations. The military or-
ganization was the same as that of Mongolia, and the
Dzungarian troops were included in the grand total of
the Mongol army. In the reign of Kien-Lung, Dzun-
garia was conquered and occupied by an army of
70,000 men; of these only from 3,000 to 5,000 Chinese
soldiers remained up to a recent date.
Eastern Turkestan is a geographical distinction of com-
paratively modern origin, dictated by the great physical
barrier which, in the shape of the Pamir upland, nature
has placed longitudinally, between East and West, in
Central Asia. Ethnographically, this physical line of
limitation marks no distinction of race. One homo-
geneous family of Turks fills the whole of that zone
from the extreme western limits of Asia to the borders
of Western China. In the eastern division of Central
Asia there may indeed be a perceptible difference in the
national character of the Turks, but this comes from
the interspersion of some heterogeneous elements among
the dominant population. The rule, and the manners
and customs of China have, during the course of more
than a century, caused some alteration in the character
of the people. Buddhists in the south, and a variety
16
of Tartar tribes in the north, have doubtless had some
considerable effect in re-idiomatising the language of
the Turks, in modifying their habits, and perhaps, also,
in toning down to some extent their faith and religious
observances.
Originally, the population of Eastern Turkestan was
Buddhist, but for many ages the un-animating forms
of idolatry have been superseded by Mahomedanism.
Women are, however, reported to enjoy an extensive
share of freedom, and there is, perhaps, less fanaticism
in the country of the Seven Cities than in the western
division of Central Asia. Nevertheless, the Mahomedan
faith has an irrepressible vitality in Eastern Turkestan,
for it has frequently, in the country under consideration,
roused all the worst passions of its adherents.uderen
HÄUSHEENSLE
Such has not, however, been the case in Dzungaria,
where the population is made up of various Tartar tribes,
of Mongols, Manchurs, and Chinamen, with a smaller
ingredient of Mahomedan devotees.
The latter are, at present, more strictly fanatical and
exclusive than the Kashgarians, but this is mainly attri-
butable to those social and political causes which have
produced the downfall of Chinese rule in that depen-
dency of the Celestial Empire. It is true that the
Dzungarians made common cause with the rebellious
Mahomedan subjects of China under the same banner of
revolt, but their mainspring of action was not identical
with that of the Tungans. It was the oppression which
they suffered at the hands of their masters, and the
sense of their degraded position in the category of
classes, that stirred them to join the insurrection of the
Tungans. But it will be seen that, after exterminating
their late masters and effecting their own liberation by
joining the successful rebels of the south, the people of
Dzungaria finally separated themselves from their
Mahomedan allies.
From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century the
whole of Kashgaria was under the rule of the Hodjas,
the saintly descendants of Mahomed. The dissensions
17
which occurred among them brought about a division of
parties as well as constant bloodshed, and a general
revolution. The result was the conquest of all Kash-
garia by the Kalmuks of Dzungaria. But in 1756,
Dzungaria was seized by the Chinese, and in 1758 the
whole of Eastern Turkestan likewise succumbed to their
authority. From that time, until 1864, Eastern Tur-
kestan was known to us as Chinese Turkestan.
Having been banished from Altyshar, the descendants
and representatives of the Hodja dynasty* resided with
some of their adherents in Kokan, from whence they
used constantly to send emissaries, sometimes venturing
even in person to raise the Mahomedans against the
Manchurs in Altyshar. Thus, in the years 1825, 1829,
1847, and 1857 the people, instigated by the Hodjas,
attempted to subvert the Manchur Government, but
the attempts were on each occasion abortive. ¿
The Hodjas were not unaided in their intrigues; pro-
fiting by the demonstrations which were made by the
natives of the towns of Altyshar against their masters,
the Kokan Government took an active part in pro-
moting them. Nor did the Kokan Government cease to
co-operate with the rebels, even after pledging itself
not to allow the Hodjas and their interdicted partisans
to overstep the Kokan frontier into Eastern Turkestan.
An agreement to that effect was made after the insur-
rection of 1829, and in return the Chinese gave the
Khan of Kokan permission to levy duties on all foreign
merchandise brought into Kashgar. A Kokan aksakal
was thereupon established in that city, and his receipts
were paid over to the Kokan Governor of Andijan once
a year. Up to the time of the recent massacre of the
Chinese, Kokanians enjoyed in Kashgar all the privileges
of native subjects of China, while they paid no taxes to
the Chinese Government.
The Mussulman populations of the western provinces
of China rose in rebellion against the Manchur Govern-
* See "Russians in Central Asia, 1865," for history of the Hodjas.
12718.
B
18
ment in 1862, and in 1866 those in the north-west
completely emancipated themselves from the Manchur
yoke. This event, coupled with the earlier outbreak of
the Taepings, shook the throne of the reigning dynasty
in Pekin, and produced a profound sensation throughout
Central Asia. Yet the cause and the course of the in-
surrections in Eastern Turkestan and Dzungaria re-
mained for a long time obscure.
The Chinese themselves were unacquainted with the
chain of events that brought about the rebellion of the
Tungans, and with the circumstances which marked its
progress, and on the first appearance of symptoms of
disaffection in the country bordering Southern Siberia,
the little intercourse that had been maintained by
the Russians with Dzungaria was almost entirely in-
terrupted.
The south-western province of Yunnan having been in
a state of chronic rebellion since 1856, and being now
practically independent of China, Burmah has been cut
off from all communication with Pekin, and the "Mayor
of the Palace," who rules Nepaul, has for the same
period been unable to send his quinquennial embassy
to the Chinese Emperor through Szechuen and Thibet.
But if on the north, west, and south the physical
features of the country have, together with other circum-
stances, combined to prevent the world from acquiring
a knowledge of what was transpiring within Dzungaria,
it may not have been unreasonable to look to Pekin
for some light on a great crisis which more or less
affected the interests of three empires. As no informa-
tion has, however, been forthcoming from China, we
must conclude that the Chinese authorities and garrisons
in Dzungaria and Eastern Turkestan were either wholly
exterminated, or that in the massacres not a single
Celestial was spared who on his return could have been
capable of rendering an account of events.
The first, and perhaps most original, source whence
we have drawn information on the origin and course of
the rebellion of the Tungans is a paper on the subject
19
by Mr. Severtsof, the Russian explorer of the Thian
Shan system; the second, and fuller account, was con-
tained in an article published in a Russian magazine,
by Mr. Heintz, a Russian Officer, who, while serving on
a Commission in the Semirechensk district of the new
Russian province in Asia, wrote from evidence collected
from people who had been either eye witnesses of the
rebellion or direct participators in it.
Mr. Heintz's paper has served as the basis of that
portion of the late Mr. Wyllie's article in the "Edin-
burgh Review" for April 1868 which treats of the
question.
Dr. Cayley,* the late Lieutenant Hayward,† and
Mr. Shaw have subsequently contributed particulars
of the rebellion, and largely added to the information
imparted to us by Russian authorities.
The principal performers in the drama, of which the
first act was played in the bordering provinces of China
in the year 1862, were the Hodjas of Kashgaria, the
Tungans of Chinese Turkestan, and the Taranchis of
Dzungaria. In our treatment of the latter we shall
borrow from the writings of Mr. Van Hoyer, a later
Russian authority.
As regards the Tungans, their appellation is supposed
to be derived from the Turk word for remnant, applied
to the late rebellious subjects of China because they were
supposed to be the descendants of the Turks who fol-
lowed Alexander of Macedon on his Eastern Expedition,
and who remained to settle in the countries they had
conquered. This superstition is indeed supported by
what Alexander Burns has said, or rather, it is to him
that the explanation now given of the name is attri-
butable. Burns's derivation of the name was supported
by statements made by a party of pilgrims from Tur-
kestan, on their way through Bombay to Mecca in 1835.
* Parliamentary Paper, No. 384, 1869.
t "Journal of the Royal Geographical Soeiety, 1870," vol. 40.
Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society for May 1870.
B 2
20
They agreed that the Tungaus had preserved a tradition
concerning Alexander the Great. In order to dispose of
this, it need only be observed that Alexander did not
penetrate into Little Bokhara or Eastern Turkestan.
your Jobles
According to the accounts of the Mecca pilgrims
a class of pedlars called Tungan lived in Yarkend. The
name is very similar to that of Tupgan, which is given in
I'l to the proprietors of public-houses and generally to
that class of individuals who, like their brethren in all
jostle markets in the East, carry on their backs and over
their arms whatever they can offer for sale. But this
is clearly not a class denomination, for those petty
tradesmen and keepers of public-houses were of a race
called Tungan. They were known to have followed their
occupations in Kuldja, Urumtsi, and elsewhere. In
Urumtsi, the Tungans occupied various official posts;
among others, they filled all the offices in the Custom-
houses in that town as well as in Kuldja, and in other
places. After the conquest of Dzungaria and Kash-
garia, the Tungans were doubtless attracted to those
countries, with numerous bodies of emigrants, trades-
men, and speculators from China. If the Mecca pil-
grims are to be believed, the Tungans were not employed
by the Chinese in military service for fear they might
revolt and produce an insurrection among their co-
religionists. Burns says the contrary, and evidently he
is correct.
The tradition which would throw back the origin of
the name to the earliest period of Central Asian history,
appears to be mere fable. qua
Originally, the Ouigurs occupied Eastern Turkestan
(Little Bokharia), and in the sixth century they formed a
strong kingdom, known to the Chinese as Hao-Chan or
Kaochang of which the capital was Harashar. The Ouigurs
were then pure Buddhists, and Chinese pilgrims were in
the habit of visiting Hao-Chan, for the purpose of studying
the religious forms and doctrines of the people. In the
eighth century, however, Mahomedanism began to pene-
trate into that country, and the Ouigurs at length
21
became as devoted to Islamism as they had previously
been to Buddhism. The Tan dynasty, which came to
the Chinese throne in the seventh century, being appre-
hensive of danger to its metropolis, which was then
Singan-fu, in the province of Shensi, and which was con-
sequently very close to the frontiers of the country of the
Ouigurs, waged an almost incessant war against the latter
during the seventh and eighth centuries. After finally
destroying the Ouigur capital, the Chinese reduced the
whole of Eastern Turkestan to subjection.
But even this not having had the desired effect of
thoroughly reducing the Ouigurs, who continued fre-
quently to rise against the Chinese, the Tan dynasty, in
order to complete their pacification, and to neutralize the
effects of the rapid progress which the new faith was
making, caused a great deportation of the bellicose tribes.
and converts into China in the latter part of the eighth
and in the beginning of the ninth century. According to
Chinese history, there were two deportations, in one
case of upwards of 800,000 families, and in another of
more than 200,000. Doubtless, voluntary immigrations
into China followed afterwards, but history contains no
record of them. The immigrants, called Hoi-hoi-tsi, or
Turks of Turkestan, were mainly settled in the pro-
vince of Han-su, whence, in subsequent times, under
the general designation of Han-hoi-tsi, or Chinese Turks,
they gradually spread all over China, but principally
over the northern provinces along the great wall, and
over the provinces of the west, such as Shensi, Szechuen,
Yunnan, and Kwei-chan, where they came to be dis-
tinguished as Tun-Han-Su, that is, "the same as those
of Han-su." Hence, very likely, the corruption of their
name into Tungan was made by the Ouigurs themselves,
since to them it had a signification.
"The word is also
"East Turkestan for 'vert,'* and may, indeed, have
"other interpretations."
"Selected writings of Viscount Strangford," p. 227, vol. 2.
London, Bentley, 1869
22
A residence of a thousand years among the Chinese
must necessarily have effaced in the Tungans nearly all
the distinguishing marks of Ouigur nationality. They
adopted Chinese habits and customs, assimilated them-
selves in dress and in speech to the native inhabitants of
the provinces of China proper, and at last acquired all
the rights and privileges of Chinese citizens. Their
denationalization was, indeed, favoured by the circum-
stance of their early deportation (soon after their adoption
of the Mahomedan faith), and it was, moreover, promoted
by the imposing barriers which, in the shape of a
wilderness on one side and of an extensive tract, peopled
by Mongols and Kalmuks on the other, lay between
them and the cradle of their birth. But the Chinese
Government availed itself of every circumstance, and
studied every art, in order to destroy the identity of the
Ouigurs. It encouraged mixed marriages of Tungans
with Chinese women, while no Chinaman was allowed to
marry a Tungan woman. The influence of the Chinese
mind was thus carried into every Tungan household,
In almost every respect the Tungans were at last
welded as it were to the Chinese. The latter, who have
no religion, but a practical morality, have great respect
for their parents, and much reverence for their ancestors.
They learned to reason before religious dogmas obtained
an influence in the world. Their principles of morality
being based on a sense of their own antiquity are strongly
tinged with a spirit of exclusiveness. The Chinese have
no regard for those upon whom they are in no way de-
pendent, and keep at arm's length all who have not with
them a common ancestry. It was constantly impressed
upon the minds of the Tungans, and upon all the other
races who came in contact with the Chinese, that they
did not belong to the hundred primitive families by
which China was peopled. The Mongols, Manchurs,
Kalmuks, and Tungans, who have composed the Empire,
have consequently never blended with the Chinese
proper, or combined to form one harmonious society.
The result of close contact with the Chinese has been
наства сельсаве
23
that each people has, in a great measure, become
imbued with Chinese ideas and casuistry. The Kalmuk,
indeed, remains still a Buddhist, and the Tungan a
Mahomedan, but the Buddhist and the Mahomedan in
China have lost much of their religious fervour.
Whether it is to be ascribed to an adherence to the
laws of the Prophet, or to any other cause, it is said to
be a fact that the Tungans have hitherto preserved all
their strong physical peculiarities; they observe strict
rules in life, abstain from drink, opium, and even from
tobacco. They hold themselves aloof from the Central
Asiatics of the race from which they sprang, for, not-
withstanding the prevalent idea among all the Mahome-
dans of Central Asia, that the Chinese are not the de-
scendants of Adam but of beings created before man in
a somewhat similar shape, the Tungans actually refuse
to give their daughters in marriage to Sarts, who claim
a common descent.
But, although placed by the laws on the same footing
as the Chinese, the Tungans were not allowed to fill
high offices in the State, nor were they, according to
some authorities, elevated to superior grades in the
army. Their military contingent did not originally
form a distinct body of troops; the corps in which they
served were composed of a mixture of Tungans and
Chinese. These troops were placed by the Manchur
Government under the green banner, partly because in
the southern parts of Asia green was the Mahomedan
colour,* and partly because it was the prevalent colour
in Chinese women's attire. The colour of the banner
under which the Chino-Tungan troops were ranged was
thus, no doubt, significant of the contempt in which the
cowardly Chinese were held by the Manchurs, and of the
desire on the part of the latter to conciliate the Mahome-
dans, and to induce them to enlist as soldiers.
* In Central Asia the Mahomedan colour is white, which among the
Chinese is emblematic of death. Before the ascension of the Manchur
dynasty to the Chinese throne, the Chinese national colour was yellow;
this was adopted by the Manchurs, and has been retained by them since.
24
Mr. Heintz has said that the Chino-Tungan troops
were conspicuous for their bravery and martial spirit.
Mr. Van Hoyer thinks otherwise, and refuses to give
them credit for those attributes, which, he says, apper-
tain only to the Mongol and Kalmuk Cavalry, the first
having distinguished themselves in the Anglo-French
invasion, the second having the reputation throughout all
Central Asia of being the finest horsemen.
Such was the position of the Tungans in China when
the Anglo-French invasion and the rebellion of the
Taepings shook the Manchur monarchy, and inspired
the Tungans with the idea of attempting to build a
political structure of their own on the ruins of the then
tottering edifice. They contemplated being perfectly in-
dependent both of the Taepings (the original Chinese
stock) and of the Manchurs.
In 1862, the Tungans in China numbered 30,000,000
of people, spread over all the interior provinces of China,
and preponderating greatly in Han-su.
In Urumtsi there were about 200,000 Tungans. At
Kuldja, however, there were considerably less, and they
did not there, as in Urumtsi, compose the staple of the
population.
As in Urumtsi, so also in Kuldja, the Tungans were
employed at the Custom-house; they kept refresh-
ment houses, and carried on a petty retail trade in
Chinese manufactures. The garrisons in Dzungaria and
Eastern Turkestan were filled with Tungan soldiers,
and so confident had the Manchurs at last become in
the fidelity of that people, that they had relaxed the rule
against their elevation to superior military grades, and
had raised them even to responsible commands.
Salar, in the Hochow district of the province of Shensi,
being the place of residence of the religious head of the
Tungans, was always their rallying point, and the
Tungan community within it, which existed in the days
of Genghiz Khan, was at the head of all their movements
against the Chinese Government. During the present
Manchur dynasty the Tungans have frequently revolted,
25
but they have been invariably subdued. The origin of
the rebellions has never been explained, and we are
uninformed as to whether they arose from an antipathy
to Manchur rule, as in the case of the Taepings, or from
other and independent causes.
When the Tungan rebellion broke out in Hansu and
Shensi, the Manchurs reckoned that there were upwards
of 100,000 rebels in arms.* In 1864, the Manchurs had so
far obtained the advantage over them that they expelled
them from Han-su, forcing them to retire to the western
district of Urumtsi, where they found numerous sym-
pathisers, and, after a while, willing coadjutors.
In the Urumtsi district there was a Chinese military
force of 20,000 men of the green banner, but it was com-
posed entirely of native volunteers, not of the privileged
classes of Manchurs and Mongols; the greater portion of
them were Tungans; the majority of the officers, too,
were of the same race. The Officer second in command
of the body was also a Tungan.
We have stated that the rebels, in the first stage of the
insurrection, were driven to the Urumtsi district. Con-
temporary chroniclers of the commotions agree that the
Chinese succeeded in pacifying the North-West provinces
and in ejecting the irreconcileables; but it is an indis-
putable fact that the line of communication across the
desert of Gobi, from Kobdo and Barkul to Pekin, was not
broken until very recently. Until last summer a regular
post passed to and fro; and Hami and Barkul, which
intercept that line of route, have not been occupied by
the Tungans. We are consequently obliged to conclude
that the rebellion was practically quashed in the bordering
provinces, and that only a spirit of sedition percolated
through the towns and garrisons along that line into the
region westwards of it. With this spirit all Eastern Tur-
kestan to Kashgar and Hoten was thoroughly imbued;
but it was the return tide that brought back the turbid
* These must have included the Panthay Mahomedan insurgents in
Yunnan and Szechuen.
26
ocean of riot and havoc to the district of Urumtsi, the
tide upon which the Hodjas rode out to assert their
supremacy over Altyshar.
The following is a brief account of the operations of
the Mahomedan rebels by a native officer who commanded
a troop in the rising at Kashgar. The relation is pub-
lished in the Turkestan Gazette of September 1870.
Islam Hodja, the officer in question, was a Piandj
Basha, or chief of 50 men, in the rebel force. Without
giving any dates, he related to a Russian officer that the
immediate cause of the rising in Kashgar was the rape
of a Mahomedan girl by the Chinese amban, and the
refusal of the latter, on an application which was made
by the father of the girl through the native Beks of the
town, to restore her to her family and to make amends
for the injury. Two brothers, Vali Khan and Buzurg
Khan, of the hereditary race of rulers, were then at the
head of the civil administration over Kashgar and the
surrounding country. Omar Khan, a third brother,
governed in Maral-Bashi and Yarkend; a fourth-Katta
Tiuria-held similar powers over the remaining towns.
The Kashgarians, ever ready on the slightest pretext
to rise against their Chinese masters, were on this occasion
incited to rebellion by rumours of the successes of the
Tungans in the far east. Set at nought by the amban,
Vali Khan and Buzurg Khan communicated with the
two other Beks, Omar and Katta Tiuria,* and resolved
upon a plan for the overthrow of the Chinese dominion.
On a given day the people rose simultaneously in
all the towns garrisoned and occupied by Chinese, and
the native Beks put themselves at the head of a Ma-
homedan army.
The Chinese Galdai and his small
detachment of 100 men in the centre of Kashgar were
put to death, after which all those who could carry arms
in the town ranged themselves under Vali Khan who
next proceeded to besiege the Gulbakh or citadel (six
miles from Kashgar). Islam Hodja was then appointed
*Hab-ibula Khan ?
27
to the command of 50 men. The arms of the rebels
consisted of a small number of matchlocks, of swords,
pikes, and bows and arrows; wooden cannon were im-
provised, which could be discharged from five to eight
times before bursting; these were afterwards exchanged
for brass and cast-iron guns taken from the Chinese.
The Chinese citadel was surrounded, but the garrison
held out 3 months, until all the provisions were ex-
hausted, and then assembling his family and friends in
his apartments, and collecting in a heap all the property
of the garrison, the amban blew himself up with them;
700 Chinese survived the catastrophe in Kashgar, and
were mercifully allowed to go free.
But Islam Hodja did not stay to see the end of the
siege. After remaining a month with the blockading
force, he was sent as Yuzbashi with an hundred men to
Yanghissar (a small place with 2,000 inhabitants, 53 miles
south-east of Kashgar) which was given up to him for
the maintenance of himself and his troops. While
quartered there he requisitioned the inhabitants for clothes
and all the necessaries of life, over and above which, he
taxed the people at the rate of 3,000 tillas a year.
After the siege of the Kashgar citadel Islam Hodja
rejoined the rebels in that town, who with Vali Khan at
their head marched on Maral-Bashi. Having ousted the
Chinese from that place, Vali Khan led them to Yarkend,
where, allying himself with the forces of Omar Khan,
he attacked the Chinese garrison, and annihilated it
within a week.
истретил
Having possessed themselves of Yarkend, Vali Khan
and Omar Khan marched to Hoten. Katta Tiuria, the
elder brother, had already occupied it with a force of his
own. The combined army, numbering 40,000 men,
was placed under Katta Tiuria's command and awaited
within the walls of Hoten an attack by a Chinese
army of 16,000 men, which was advancing to the rescue
of the garrisons in the country. The Chinese came up
in a week's time, and having issued from the gates with
20,000 men, the Khans gave them battle. The fighting
28
continued for three days with no success on either side.
On the fourth, Islam Hodja and his troop, having been
sent to do outpost duty, were surprised and surrounded
when asleep by the Chinese. They were taken prisoners
and led away to the camp on the Kara Daria, five miles
from the town. They were manacled, and chained
together. After having been kept there two days "well
fed, treated well, and not beaten" they were marched off
to Aksu. From Aksu, after a week's time, they were
marched to Ush-Turfan, where their chains were struck
off and substituted by wooden collars on their necks.
At the end of ten days they were again chained together
by the neck and conducted through Kucha and Balty to
Harashar. Here they wore the "otun kunda," or iron
collar, for three weeks, after which they were taken in
chains to Urumtsi.
During his three months' detention in Urumtsi, Islam
Hodja learned that Aksu and Ush-Turfan had been
seized by Katta Tiuria and Omar Khan, and that the
Khan of Kokan had sent Yakub-Bek with an auxiliary
force to assist them.
From Urumtsi the prisoners were conducted to Kuldja,
where, in a fortnight after their arrival, they regained
their liberty on the capture of the town by a Tungan
force of 16,000 men.
About two months later Islam Hodja returned with a
caravan to Kashgar, where Yakub-Bek was already
installed as sole master. He there learned that Yakub
had come with 17,000 men to the support of Katta
Tiuria, that he had seized Kashgar by force, had pressed
all the Chinese who had survived into his service, had
put to death all the native officers of the rebel forces, and
had rapidly taken Maral-Bashi, Yarkend, and the sur-
rounding villages. Katta Tiuria still held possession of
Hoten, Aksu, Ush-Turfan, Kucha, and Balty, while the
Chinese retained Harashar, and Urumtsi. Being in fear
for his life, Islam Hodja took advantage of Yakub Bek's
absence in Yarkend to escape to Kokan, and arrived
safely in Tashkend. After defeating Vali Khan, his most
29
formidable rival, Yakub Bek gained a victory over Katta
Tiuria. Vali Khan was put to death, but Katta Tiuria,
being a Hodja, was spared and treated with the greatest
respect.*
MOURC
We are therefore led by Islam Hodja to conclude and,
indeed, from collateral sources we know it to be a fact,
that the Chinese were beaten at Hoten and driven back.
We learn, also, that Kashgar and Yarkend were seized
by Vali Khan and Omar Khan long before Yakub-
Bek's appearance on the scene. It may, indeed, be
positively asserted that Yakub-Bek did not enter into
any conflict with the Chinese, because when he arrived
from Kokan there were no Chinese to fight. Without
anticipating the course of events, it is necessary to
point out here a few discrepancies between some
of Lieutenant Hayward's statements and the facts
as gathered from several Russian sources. Lieu-
tenant Hayward says that when the Kush-Begi Yakub-
Bek arrived with his followers from Kokan, he found
the Kirghizes under Sadyk laying siege to the Chinese
citadel. According to Islam Hodja and several Russian
accounts, Kashgar had already fallen to the Tungans.
Lieutenant Hayward states that the Tungans, having
taken Yarkend, "turned their attention towards Kash-
"gar, where the Chinese garrison and population were
being besieged by the Kush Begi;" that the Kashgar
citadel sustained an eight months' siege, and that that of
Yarkend had been previously besieged by the Tungans
for 40 days. We find that the Mahomedans of Kashgaria
(who were, by the way, not identical with the Tungans
of the east) had already completed the work in Kashgar,
and had thence marched upon Yarkend and Hoten.
According to Islam Hodja, the Chinese in Kashgar suc-
cumbed after a three months' siege, and in Yarkend
(C
* Either Lieutenant Hayward and Dr. Cayley are in error in stating
that Hab-ibula Khan was put to death by Yakub, or Katta-Tiuria
(which, by the way, is the title of an elder prince) and Hab-ibula
were totally different persons.
30
after an assault which lasted only one week. The favour
with which Yakub was afterwards regarded by the Pekin
Government for driving out the rebels and for punishing
the Tungans in the east, appears to confirm the asser-
tion that he had no hand in exterminating any of the
Chinese garrisons. But of this mention will be made.
further on.
Applying it to the occurrence at Kashgar instead of
at Yarkend, the description given by Lieutenant Hay-
ward of the closing fate of the Chinese citadel is as
follows:-"The one extreme demand," made by the
besiegers, was that the Chinese should all embrace
"Mahomedanism. On hearing this demand the Amban,
"who had previously formed his plan of action, as-
"sembled his officials and courtiers under the pretence
"of consulting with them as to the terms of capitula-
"tion. The consultation took place in an upper room
"of the palace, under which had been stored a large
"amount of gunpowder, while by orders of the Amban
"a train had been laid connecting it through the floor,
"immediately from under his chair of state. As-
"sembled here, the old Amban laid before his Officers
"the terms of the capitulation, and requested them to
"state what amount of ransom each was prepared to
give. The last act in this tragedy was described
by a Monrumbashee, formerly in tne service of the
Amban, with a glow of feeling quite oriental. The
courtiers, in ignorance of their approaching doom, are
wrangling and disputing as to the amount of ransom
"each shall give, at the same time the sons of the
"Amban are handing round tea and sweetmeats to
"them as guests.
(C
66
66
""
(6
Regarding the scene before him with the calmness.
"of a stoic, sits the grey-bearded old Amban in his
"chair of state, quietly smoking a long pipe, while
"beside him kneel his weeping daughters, all conscious
"of their coming fate. Suddenly the clamours of the
disputing courtiers are hushed, as the report of
cannon is heard, and the deep muttered sounds of
66
""
31
66
"6
(6
'Allah-ho-Akbar" burst upon the ear. It is the
enemy shouting their war cry, as, all impatient of
delay, they rush to storm the gates. The old Amban
"has taken his resolution of dying sooner than fall into
"the hands of the cruel foe, and the courtiers, now
aware of his dread intention, start up in the wildest
despair, but all too late. With one word of farewell
"to his trembling children, the old Amban slowly
"reverses his long pipe, and, allowing the ashes of his
"bowl to fall upon the fatal train, in this act of self-
"immolation perishes with all around him, and thus
"ends the rule of a dynasty which had held sway for
upwards of a century."
CC
That this happened at Kashgar, we read in Islam
Hodja's relation, who makes no mention of a similar
explosion in Yarkend, where he assisted in person at
the siege. But, although we have greater reason to
credit the amban of Kashgar with the act above related,
there are no grounds for denying that the amban of
Yarkend followed the example. Mr. Shaw has assured
us that, from what he had heard in Central Asia; nearly
all the Chinese garrisons resorted to the same alternative,
and we shall see that the same thing happened at Kuldja.
The acceptance of the Mahomedan religion being out of
the question, no Chinese commander could survive a
defeat with any prospect but that of execution on his
return home. In any case, however, this was only the
first signal of the downfall of the Manchur rule in
Eastern Turkestan, for its overthrow was first concerted
and commenced in Kashgar.
But to resume the story from the period of the battle
between the Mahomedans and Chinese under the walls
of Hoten. The dates are uncertain, although we cannot
be far wrong in giving some period of the year 1863 as
the date of the junction of the Mahomedan forces of Vali
Khan with those of Katta Tiuria (Hab-ibula Khan?), and
that of the defeat of the Chinese at Hoten. Since
Buzurg Khan, in Islam Hodja's narrative, is lost sight of
after the march towards Yarkend and Hoten, we may
32
conclude that he was left in Kashgar, in order to aid in
the expulsion of the Chinese in the east, while his
brothers were operating in the south. Following the
track of the captive Islam Hodja, and arguing from the
removal of the prisoners from place to place until they
were brought for safety to Kuldja, it will agree with
nearly every account that all the towns of Eastern Tur-
kestan as far eastwards as Harashar and Turfan were
seized by the four brothers who, representing the earlier
Hodja dynasty, enlisted into their cause the entire popu-
lation of the country, including the Tungan deserters
from the enemy's ranks.
The outbreak in Kashgaria appears to have preceded
that in the remoter districts of Urumtsi, and it would
also appear that the Chinese had barely turned their
backs upon the Kashgarians when the Tungan rebellion
overwhelmed them. In the sixth moon of the year
1864, says Mr. Severtsof, writing in the month of De
cember of the same year, the Tungans were in pos-
session of Urumtsi. Being a Tungan, the officer
second in command of the Chinese force aided the
rebels in Urumtsi, upset the Manchur authority, and
pillaged the stores. It was said at the time in Chugu-
chak that the insurgents at Urumtsi massacred 130,000
individuals of both sexes and of all ages, and that they
set fire to the stores of merchandise. This was, how-
ever, a great exaggeration, and we have seen it stated
in a Russian journal that traders who afterwards visited
the town found the stores of merchandise intact. H
After this, all communication with Kuldja and Chu-
guchak from the Nan-Lu was cut off, so that the
Manchur authorities in Dzungaria were obliged to com-
municate with the Government of Pekin by way of
Kobdo, Uliasutai, and Barkul.
According to the Russian version of affairs, all the
towns as far as Urumtsi fell, one after the other, either
* Mr. Forsyth says that he met him in 1868 on his way to Mecca
when Buzurg Khan said that Yakub had sent him out of the country.
ས
33
to the advancing Mussulman armies from Hoten, or
almost simultaneously to the Tungan rebels on their
approach in the wake of the defeated Chinese. We are
not told that Buzurg Khan advanced from Kashgar on
Aksu while his brothers marched to the south, but we
learn that Aksu held out for some time after Urumtsi
had fallen. From this we might presume that Katta
Tiuria led his forces across country, joined the Tungans
at Urumtsi, possessed himself of all the towns named in
Islam Hodja's account, and then turned back, westwards,
to Aksu. For Mr. Severtsof says, that at Urumtsi the
insurgents separated into two bodies, one proceeding to
Dzungaria in the north, while the other, traversing an
easy pass over the Thian Shan mountains, entered
Eastern Turkestan, and possessed itself of the towns of
Turfan, Harashar, and Kucha, until they came to Aksu,
to which place they laid siege. It may be finally con-
cluded from this that the rebels obtained possession of
Urumtsi very shortly after the Chinese prisoners of war
had left that town for Kuldja, and that, after the separa-
tion of the Tungan force into two bodies, the movement
to Aksu was a Tungan movement, totally independent
of the Western Mahomedans.
It was, therefore, at Aksu, if anywhere, that the two
waves of rebellion met, and culminated in overwhelming
the last vestige of Chinese dominion in Eastern Tur-
kestan. The roads from all the four sides of the com-
pass meet at Aksu, and render that town one of great
commercial importance, as well as of immense strategic
value. From the south is the road from Hoten; to the
north, the road to Kuldja, over the Yan-Shan-Kow pass;
from the west, the road from Yarkend and Kashgar;
and to the east, that to Harashar and Barkul—the key
to the communications with China.
At Aksu, the Mahomedan army of the dynastic
brothers joined the forces of the Eastern Tungans, and,
led by Katta Tiuria, made its last effort to efface
the only remaining Chinese garrison in the Mahomedan
12718.
C
34
country. The Chinese amban, sensible of his danger, yet
recognizing the necessity of preserving so valuable a posi-
tion, held out for some time. He looked to Kuldja for
reinforcements, but in vain. The Tsian-Kiung of I'lí
was himself in a critical position. From Urumtsi, the
northern body of Tungans was advancing through
Kur-Kara-Usu; moreover the discontented inhabitants
of Kuldja had shown, in the year 1862, that they were
ever ready for an outbreak. The rebels in the south
very soon occupied the pass between Kuldja and Aksu,
and thus destroyed the amban's only hope of salvation.
Nevertheless, he seems to have made an attempt to
disperse them from before the walls; he sent out all his
troops and militia; but in the sixth moon of 1864
Chinese Turkestan was emancipated from a yoke which
it had borne for upwards of a century. The fall of
Aksu, however, was coupled with the end of the west-
ward progress of the successful Tungans. Another
power was growing, which was destined to eclipse them
and to hurl them back upon their late masters.
This new theory is totally at variance with the
account given by Mr. Heintz, upon whose sole autho-
rity the progress of the Tungans is given in the "Edin-
burgh Review" for April 1868. It is borne out by data
from Russian sources, and by casual notes in the Russian
"Turkestan Gazette." It is, perhaps, impossible to
improve upon the late Mr. Wyllie's recital of the
occurrence, up to the organization of the Tungan revolt
at Singanfu, in Shensi. He has, with much display
of knowledge, led up from the ancient history of the
Ouigurs to the proclamation of the Holy War in Salar.*
With reference, however, to later events there is now a
greater abundance of information.
The impression prevails, and we believe correctly,
* The rebellion in Western China has also been the subject of two
interesting papers in the "Revue des Deux Mondes," February and
April, Nos. 1870.
35
that although the Kashgarians availed themselves
largely of the assistance of the Tungan soldiery in the
Chinese garrisons of Kashgar, Yarkend, and Hoten, yet
they had nothing whatever to do with the insurrection
of the Tungans, properly so called, in the western pro-
vinces of China. Relying on Islam Hodja, we have shown
that the massacre of the Chinese in Kashgaria was little
more than coincident with the insurrection in the east.
The entire extermination of the Chinese military forces
throughout all Turkestan was so sudden, so simul-
taneous, that we are, by that fact, somewhat supported
in our theory.
As the Panthay rebellion in Yunnan had no con-
nexion with the Tungan movements in Shensi and
Hansu, so the Tungan insurrection had no relation to
the outbreak in Kashgaria. The one, indeed, preceded
the other, and the first begat the last. There was
evidently a continuity of action in the bordering pro-
vinces from south to north, and a culmination in the
north-west after an almost instantaneous uprising of the
Hodjas in Altyshar. The only circumstance which gave
an appearance of common action between the commotions
in Hansu and the operations of the Kashgarians, was the
Tungan element in all the Chinese garrisons, of which
the Hodjas dexterously availed themselves, taking the
opportunity to re-establish their independence while.
they were cut adrift from the throne before which they
had been bound to make their obeisance. Kashgar,
Yarkend, and Hoten were seized by them before Urumtsi
fell or Dzungaria revolted, but they knew the difficulties
with which the Chinese were contending along the eastern
borders of the Great Desert, and a breath from thence
set in motion fanatics, whose passions were easily and at
once fanned into a flame by the revered and holy
Chieftains.
But to conclude with the Tungans.
With the aid of a good map a notion may be had of
their present position from what follows. The northern-
c 2
36
most limit of the country held by that people passes from
Manassy* by the Kutubi picket, to Urumtsif and through
Sandju, a very considerable town with a population of
7,000, of whom 2,000 are Tungans and 5,000 Chinese.†
From Urumtsi, to Barkul in the east, they are bounded
by the Guechen range of mountains,§ where, in the
Kalasha-daban (pass), not far from Barkul, they main-
tain a picket; this is their easternmost point. The city
of Guechen,|| at the northern base of this range, was
seized by the Tungans at the early period of the
rebellion, and has since been abandoned.
In the immediate vicinity of Urumtsi the Tungans
hold two forts, Habshin-Chin and Mashbin-Chin, the one
with 3,000 and the other with 4,000 soldiers.
To the east of Urumtsi, on the road to Pekin, the
Tungans have established a picket of 100 Kara-Kitayans
and 50 Tungans, at a place called Tukalu; they further
*Manassy is situated between Urumtsi and Kur-Kara-Usu, in a
fertile plain; it contains 1,500 Tungans and 700 Chinese and Kara-
Kitayans, the latter belonging exclusively to the Tungan forces.
For an explanation of the name of this people, see Note, p. 573,
Colonel Yule's "Cathay, and the Way thither."
† Urumtsi is situated in a barren rocky defile. Before the rebellion it
is said to have contained a population of about 120,000, now reduced to
50,000. This place was formerly the nucleus of the trade between
China and Central Asia. It is 40 miles south-east of Sandju. From
Urumtsi to Barkul it is a month's journey.
The Chinese occupy a distinct portion of the town, cultivating the
soil, and provisioning the Tungan troops.
§ The Guechen range is the central part of a chain projecting from
the Thian Shan, south of Kur-Kara-Usu, and merging into the Great
Desert after passing between Hami and Barkul. This range is broken
at Urumtsi and near Barkul,
Guechen, or Kuchin, was garrisoned by the Chinese with a force
of 400 Cavalry, and contained a population of more than 15,000, mostly
Manchurs, who were nearly all massacred. Guechen is said to have
been entirely sacked and deserted. According to the Chinese refugees
in the Semirechensk region, this was the easternmost point of the out-
break of the Tungans. From Guechen there is a direct road to Kobdo,
passing through the town of Pedo-Chai-Sa, which was protected by a
line of Chinese pickets. For a length of 173 miles this is, however, a
waterless track used only by the Kalmuks,
37
hold Kumudu,* Fu-Kan-Sian, Khotan, and Timusa-
Sian.
In the autumn of 1870 the Tungans made an attempt
on Shudju, a place beyond Barkul,+ on the Pekin
road, but being intercepted by a Chinese force from
Hami, they were beaten and forced to take refuge for
the winter in Kumudu. It is said that in Shudju there
are a great many Tungans occupying a separate
quarter of the town, where they are blocked in by
the Chinese; as these, however, have not been im-
plicated in the rebellion, they are not treated with
any violence, but they are charged exorbitant prices
for the supplies which they are obliged to purchase of
the Chinese.
The Tungans have many difficulties and foes to
contend with. They are beset by Yakub's forces, by
inimical Kalmuks and Taranchis, and by the Chinese
in the east. Added to this, they are subject to the
attacks of formidable bodies of Chinamen who have
taken refuge in the mountains; these have established
a guerilla warfare, and frequently descend upon the
unwary Tungans in the night, murdering them and
setting fire to their habitations. They are, indeed, such
a danger to the Tungans that only armed bodies can
safely pass from one town to the other, -as from
Urumtsi to Manassy. Even in an attempt to raise
Yakub's siege of Turfan, a Tungan force from Urumtsi
was set upon and routed by a large band of these
despoiled Manchurs.
The Chinese refugees in the Russian Tarbagatai
* Kumudu is said to have been a populous place prior to the re-
bellion. Fu-Kan-Sian and Timusa-Sian were military colonies; the
latter is situated on a large river, the lands around it being highly
cultivated. Khotan is about 60 miles from Timusa-Sian, standing
somewhat off the Pekin road. It was famous for its silks, with which
it supplied all Western China. It is supposed that Khotan has been
entirely destroyed. From Chuguchak to Khotan traders performed
the journey in 50 days.
† Barkul is an almost impregnable position; it is situated on an
island in an impassable morass of a radius of about 17 miles.
38
district stated, that in 1868 and 1870 the Chinese
offered an amnesty to the Tungans and a free pardon
if they would return to their allegiance, but that, having
little faith in these promises, they refused.
A Tartar of Fort Vernoë, named Selim, went on a
trade venture to Urumtsi in 1867, and returned in
1868, having been detained four months. On being
questioned by the Russian authorities as to what he had
seen and heard, Selim made the following statement:-
The Tungans, he said, were ruled by an old man, a
mollah, who had long enjoyed the reputation of a saint.
His proper name was Lotai, and he was styled Larinji
or Hazret (saint). Since the massacre of the Chinese,
the Tungans have established no regular form of
government. The old man rules alone, and keeps the
people under the influence of terror. The people,
Selim reported, believed in the efficacy of the old man's
curses or blessings, and were consequently submissive.
The old man drove through the town in a two-wheeled
covered chariot, attended by a bodyguard.
The Tungans in Uruntsi said there were from 25,000
to 30,000 men in the town capable of bearing arms.
Selim said that the Tungans dressed in the Chinese
fashion, shaved their chins, and wore Chinese pigtails.
Indeed, it is said to have been reported by Selim, and
by other Tartars who had been to Urumtsi since the
rebellion, that turbans and khalats were so rare that
children came out into the street to gaze on those who
wore them. Some of the old Mahomedans hid their
pigtails under a turban when going to prayers in the
mesjid. The women dressed in Chinese robes, decked
their hair with flowers, and even followed the Chinese
classical mode of cramping their feet.
The Tartar Selim reported to the Russian authori-
ties in Vernoë that bread sold at 2s. 6d. the pound in
Urumtsi, that a sheep cost 30s., and that everything
was enormously dear in consequence of the Tungans
being surrounded on all sides by foes. Tea, he said,
was in abundance, the Chinese stores not having
39
been destroyed or disposed of, and took the place
of money, which was scarce. Gold and silver were
carefully hidden away against the day of flight when
the Chinese troops might reappear. Mahomedan
tradesmen in Urumtsi were told by the inhabitants that
it was owing to this expectation of the Chinese that
beards were shaved and that pigtails continued to be
worn. Turbans, khalats, and beards might, they feared,
in the event of the re-assertion of authority by the
Chinese, render them amenable to the consequences of
their sympathy and co-operation with the rebels.
It may be observed here, as a strange result of the
rebellion of the Tungans, that the latter have found
themselves disowned in the countries which they have
directly and indirectly been the means of emancipating.
They have forfeited all hope of mercy at the hands of
the Manchurs, and yet they have been foiled in their
successful career and driven back eastwards by Yakub-
Bek. Their Chinese pigtails and lukewarm Mahomedan-
ism were offensive to the Mussulmans of Turkestan, who
spurned them; the Taranchis and Kalmuks of Dzun-
garia severed their connexion with them, and, baffled on
all sides, compressed within small limits, they dare not
even return to the yoke of that people whose example
in life they have but too successfully emulated.
Our information on the northward career of the
Tungans from Urumtsi is not sufficiently precise to
follow it with any exactness. It is said that they sus-
tained several checks, and that the garrisons held out
very obstinately against them. Of the two dependen-
cies the province of I'li was the stronghold of the
Chinese, in which they certainly had reason to feel more
secure. We have observed that Mahomed was secon-
dary to Fo and Buddha in this region -the special care
of the provident and painstaking Chinese. But the
Chinese had unwittingly undermined their own con-
fidence, and reposed on a slumbering crater. The com-
bustible matter consisted of those degraded classes of
whom we have made mention already, and of the 8,000:
40
to 12,000 Kashgarians who, in 1829, were deported to
I'lí as a precautionary measure against further attempts
of insurrection by the Hodjas. All these people were
placed upon the soil, and practically became slaves to
the military colonists, while groaning under their many
heavy burdens and disabilities. These wretched people
obtained the name of Taranchis or "people of the
bloody sweat."*
The news of the rising of the Han-hoi-tsi, or Tungans
of Han-su, does not seem to have stirred the inhabi-
tants of I'lí to rebellion for some time, and the insurrec-
tion may not have excited the bulk of the population of
Dzungaria, too busily occupied as it was in agriculture
and trade, had it not been for incidental circumstances
which worked on their minds.
The incidental circumstances were these: The hostile
front presented to the Russians by the Bokharians and
Kokanians; the warfare along the whole of the line
from Kuldja to Tashkend, i. e., along the whole extent
of the northern trade route from China into Central
Asia; the consequent collapse of trade, which threw
most of the people out of their occupations; the
gathering together in Kashgar of numerous fugitives
from Bokhara and Kokan, which added to the fanatic
element in all the countries to the east of the scene of
Russian operations; the revolution in Kashgar; the
sudden and easy deliverance of that place and of others
from China; the impunity with which these defections.
were suffered to pass; the closing of the southern trade
route; and lastly, the exaggerated accounts of the
successes of the Tungans in Han-su.
The appearance of the Northern Tungans was the
signal for their deliverance. They hailed the rebels with
joy, and yet quailed before the audacity of an attempt
to subvert an authority under which their spirits had
been crushed and their Mahomedanism become diluted.
They seemed to fear the terrible consequences of so
*This name is also said to be derived from
66
taran," millet.
41
bold a scheme; it was not the prospect of greater
misery in case of failure, but it was, when the alter-
native really offered itself, the sudden vision of freedom
and happiness, that appalled them. Nevertheless, with
whatever sullen resignation they may have bent their
necks to a still more severe yoke, they were not so
greatly appalled by the choice which was given them
as to discard it utterly; the townspeople in Kuldja
had dared to murmur and to strive for themselves
before, and in the possible reality of a better state
even they had begun to trust. They rose at last
with but little persuasion, and quite outdid the Tungans
in ferocity. The neighbouring Kirghizes, ever ready to
plunder, were easily induced to side with them, under a
promise of rich booty.
The result was an universal massacre of the Chinese,
the destruction of Chugachak,* the seizure and sacking
of Kur-Kara-Usu and other small towns and villages, the
appropriation and burning of all Chinese stores, and at
last the investment of Kuldja.
While receiving applications from Aksu and else-
where for succour, the Tsian-Kiung of I'lí was himself
sending constant and urgent requests to Fort Vernoë for
Russian support. He grew frantic with despair when
he learned that the Taranchis were in arms, and ad-
dressed pathetic appeals and unceasing messages to the
Russian Commander at the fort, but that officer had no
authority to give the required aid. He did, indeed, at
that time hold instructions to send a detachment to
Kuldja; it had been promised to the Chinese when
affairs had not so serious an aspect. The Russian
Consul, who by treaty was to reside in that town, was
at Vernoë, and was to have been accompanied to his
post by the military contingent, but the despatch of the
latter was, under various pretexts, withheld, and the
Consul, mindful of the fate of the Russian factory in
*The first rising in Chuguchak occurred on the 15th (27th) January
1865, but the citadel held out till the 6th (12th) April 1866.
42
Chugnchak in 1854, lingered in Vernoë, waiting the
issue of affairs in I'lí. The Tsian-Kiung represented
that an army was marching to the relief of I'l from
China, that it would soon reach I'lí and put an end to
all disturbances, that the presence in the meanwhile of
Russian troops in Kuldja would encourage the Chinese
garrison, and dispirit the rebels. The Russian General
was still deaf to these supplications. The Tsian-Kiung
then urged the expediency of establishing the Russian
Consul without delay in Kuldja and the advantage of
immediately sending merchants to trade with the in-
habitants, on the ground that the storehouses in the
town were filled with great quantities of tea. No
temptations, however, could induce the Governor of
the Semirechensk district to move one way or the
other. The anxieties of the Chinese were daily in-
creasing, while their solicitations for succour were of no
avail.
At length, as a temporizing measure, or in order to
put an end, probably, to the importunities of the Chinese,
a party of 15 Kazaks was sent to Kuldja in July 1865,
from Aral Tiubé (about 34 miles from the Chinese
frontier). The officer in charge of this party was to
examine the place; though his ostensible object, while
bearing a communication to the Tsian-Kiung, was to see
to the accommodation provided for the Russian Consul
and factory and for the detachment of soldiers which it
was understood should accompany him.
The Consul did in the end go to Kuldja, but he was
not destined to occupy for any length of time the post
to which he was appointed, and the force which it was
deemed inexpedient to send in the face of the calamity
which was threatening to overwhelm the defenceless
Chinese garrison was never sent.
The road to Kuldja from the Russian frontier, first
traverses a very hilly and difficult country, and lies
farther on across a sandy desert. At the entrance into
this sandy waste three tall poles stood planted in the
ground, and from pole to pole was stretched a rope,
43
on which was suspended a number of bones with
Chinese inscriptions signifying, "Who goes to Kuldja
shall himself find food, but his horse will starve.”
After a stay of four days in the town, during which
time he had seen nothing but the inner fortifications
of the citadel and the quarters assigned to the factory
and to the expected Russian detachment, the Russian
officer left the place, telling his hosts, in answer to their
strong invitations to tarry longer, that his horses were
starving, that, in order to save them, he must depart at
The storehouses, he concluded, were empty, for
the Chinese declined showing them to him.
once.
The Chinese fort was in the form of a square, the
length of the walls on each side was about 14 of a mile;
they were crenellated, and had embrasures; they were
about 24 feet high, and about 12 feet thick at mid
height.
The principal armament consisted of three guns, one
of two-inch calibre, the others composed of iron tubes
coppered over. There were some other guns of the same
make, but smaller, and of 1½ inch calibre.
The tragic fate of the last Chinese citadel and
garrison in Dzungaria was in every respect similar to
that of Yarkend. Seeing he could no longer hold out
against the rebels who finally surrounded the place, the
Chinese Tsian-Kiung heroically resolved to destroy
himself, with all his people, rather than fall into the
hands of the savage and bloodthirsty "barbarians."
On the 7th of March 1866 he gathered together the
members of his family and his retinue, and perished
with them in the ruins of the fort, which, with his own
hand, he blew up with a cool, though not unexampled,
premeditation.
Fourteen thousand of the inhabitants of Kuldja took
refuge in the Russian dominions, but 90,000 remained
to be enslaved by their conquerors. The Kalmuks who
remained true to the Chinese Government decamped,
some into the interior of the steppes, others within the
Russian lines. The Tungans, boastful of their Chinese
44
cultivation, asserted their right to the conquered country.
The ruder Taranchis objected to a fresh subordination,
and, forming the most numerous class of the population
in Dzungaria, fell upon their allies, massacred the
Tungans in Kuldja, and drove the rest beyond the
limits of the I'lí valley through the Talk Pass, which
they now hold.
The Khirghizes, having enriched themselves with
plunder, and fearing lest the Taranchis should make
them give it up, moved their encampments into the
deserts and steppes, whence some of them were after-
wards chased by the Kalmuks, who obliged them to
take refuge in Southern Siberia.
Dzungaria proper is now divided between the Taran-
chis and Kalmuks thus: the Tarbagatai or Chuguchak
district is in the hands of the latter, while Kuldja and
the neighbouring towns are held by the former. They
are both separated by the district of Kur-Kara-Usu,
which, laid waste and abandoned, forms a neutral zone,
covered with the bleaching bones of the victims of the
rebellion, and freely roamed over by beasts of prey.
We learn that the Taranchis are ruled by a Khan,
but we know nothing of the form of government which
prevails among them. Russian traders and caravans
are strictly excluded from Kuldja, so that, although that
town is only 67 miles distant from the Russian frontier,
the events that occur within its walls are surrounded
with mystery. The country is known to be peopled,
from the fact of the constant appearance of armed bands
on the Russian lines and from repeated incursions of
marauding parties over the borders. It has, however,
been ascertained by the Russians that the Kalmuks who
had retired beyond the Yuldus mountains have returned
to their fields in the neighbourhood of Kuldja. The
Kalmuks are ruled by an aged woman.
A Tartar who had returned from Kuldja related, at
Vernoë, that he had seen this Kalmuk Ruler proceeding
to an interview with the Chief of the Taranchis. Her
hair, he said, hung in long tresses down her back; they
45
were so heavily laden with golden coins and other
precious ornaments that they had to be supported by
two men as she walked.
She was ruling in the absence of her son, a boy of 14,
whom she had sent to Pekin. The presence among
them of the Kalmuks (numbering 17 "summuns "), is
said to cause some uneasiness to the Taranchis, because
they think that, with some assistance from China, they
would be sure to rise against them.
At the present time the Taranchis in and around
Kuldja are said to number about 12,000. They form a
body politic distinct and estranged from, and completely
independent of, Tungans and Kashgarians. They have,
as it were, isolated themselves from the surrounding
people. They possess lands which have been greatly
improved under Chinese cultivation, and command
sources of natural wealth which the same Chinese have
developed to a remarkable degree. They guard their
possessions with the utmost jealousy, for they are
sensible of the superior strength and intelligence of
even the Tungans, who, they feared, might again reduce
them to servility.
It may at first sight seem strange that, with so large
an army garrisoning the country, the Chinese should
have been unable to retain it; it may appear stranger
still, that after more than 100 years' tenure, their
downfall in it should have been so sudden, so complete,
and so ignominious. The reason is simple enough, and
a summary of it will be found in the words of an
Uzbeg in Kashgar to a Russian Officer, in 1868:
"Your law," he said, speaking of the restrictions put
on Russians in Kashgar, "gives liberty to Uzbegs in
your country; ours is intolerant of foreigners, be-
"cause we see what has happened through the freedom
"allowed us in Kashgar by the Chinese."
66
It cannot be said that the Chinese tyrannized over
their Mahomedan subjects or drove the population
of Turkestan to rebellon by cruelty and persecution.
The evidence points in quite another direction. They
46
have lost their "new territories" irretrievably, and
have suffered what threatens to be only the first of a
series of the most terrible calamities to the Manchur
dynasty in China, through a neglect of the laws of
precaution which they had prescribed for themselves at
the outset, and through a fatal, easy-going and unsus-
pecting reliance on the stability of their rule. It must
be said of them that they were not intolerant either of
religion, of public opinion, or of the influence exercised
over the populace by leading natives; and it must, we
think, be added to their credit, that they were not ex-
acting in their demands on the people.
They had shown themselves great adepts in the mode
of subduing alien and barbarous races; they had an
extensive acquaintance with the character and temper of
the numerous peoples with whom conquests had brought
them into contact; the long period during which they
continued to retain their dominion proves their good
tact and judicious policy, but unfortunately they un-
learned their lesson, and in the secession of their Maho-
medan subjects we must see the necessary consequence
of a system of lethargic, fatuous Government, the result
of an overweening pride and inflated self-assurance.
We now come to Yakub or Yusuf Bek, who was sent
by the Khan Hudoyar of Kokan, with an auxiliary force,
to the assistance of the Hodjas in Kashgaria. Yakub's
antecedents are nowhere precisely given. The first
casual mention we find of this man, in Russian accounts,
is in the records of certain operations in the steppes, at
the mouth of the Jaxartes, connected with the chase
after Kenisar-Kasimof, the famous Knight of the Steppes,
which was continued with broken intervals for nine
years, namely from 1838 to 1847. Yakub-Bek was at
that time Commandant of Ak-Mesjid, now Fort Perovski.
The disturbances which this Kokanian created in the
steppes by his constant wholesale depredations and
assaults on the Kirghizes who had sworn fealty to Russia,
and his resolute attempt to impede the progress of the
Russians from the sea of Aral up the stream, occasioned,
47
in 1850, the first collision between Russia and Kokan.
Yakub-Bek in that year checked a Russian detachment
which had advanced from Fort Aralsk (Raim) to survey
the lands along the right bank of the Jaxartes to Kumysh
Kurgan and Chim Kurgan; and in 1853 he energetically
and successfully resisted the first attack on Ak-Mesjid.
He subsequently accompanied a Kokan force from Tash-
kend, which was defeated in its attempt to oppose the
Russians; after this he seems to have withdrawn to
Kokan. Having fallen into disgrace with his master,
the then regent in Kokan, for his persistent remonstrances
against the utility of any further combats with the
Russians, he abandoned the camp and court, and took
up his residence, we believe, in his native town of
Andijan. We are given to understand that he found
employment as Aksakal, or Consul, in Kaskgar, and
that he resided there for three or four years before the
conspiracy of the Hodjas.
He came to Kashgar with a force of, some say 10,000,
some only 500 men, about the year 1865, after the ex-
tirpation of the Chinese from the country.
Buzurg-Khan, the idol of the people, was soon thrust
aside; Yakub, the master mind, the man of instant
action, occupied Kashgar in his own name, massacred
the Tungans who were in the place, drafted into his
service all the surviving Chinese and the Kokanians, and
then took Yarkend and Hoten. After thus dispossessing
the Hodjas in a manner truly Asiatic, and by a recourse
to acts of treachery and murder, Yakub-Bek assumed
the reins of sovereignty. After consolidating his power
in the three cities, he turned his attention to the Tun-
gans in the east, and proceeded to Utch and Aksu.*
In the year 1869, he is said to have been employed
in making or improving a road to Aksu, across the
* The first conflict between them is said to have taken place at
Kolia, a city "a few marches" distant from Kucha. We find it stated,
in the "Turkestan Gazette," that Yakub's forces were commanded
either by Mirza-Ahmet,-formerly parvanachi in Tashkend,- or by the
eldest son of the Emir of Bokhara.
48
Muzart Pass,* with the view, as stated by Russian
writers, of conducting a trade with Western China which
should be totally free from Russian participation.
After some pause in his conflict with the Tungans, during
which Yakub received friendly communications from
China and offers of submission from the Taranchis of
Kuldja, he again, in 1870, sent his forces to the East.
The Tungans had re-occupied Kucha and Harashar, and
had thus recommenced hostilities. Those places he is
said to have recovered. In the autumn of the same
year he seized Turfan,† and extended his sway to
Hami, the inhabitants of which, independent Torgout
Mongols, aided him in his campaign. Hami was given
up to him by the widow of the late ruler of that city.
At one time, the Russian "Turkestan Gazette " doubted
the probability of Yakub leaving Kashgar in the hands of
people he could barely trust, and of pushing a force across
the Muzart "in the face of a Russian line of pickets."
But they evidently did not know their man. He had
previously told Mr. Khludof, "he would conquer the whole
of China, if the Russian Tsar would allow him ;" and,
indeed, perhaps contrary to their expectations, after the
Russian envoy (Captain Reinthal) had left him, after
Lieutenant Hayward and Mr. Shaw had departed, and
after his nephew, Shadi Mirza,§ had returned from St.
Petersburg, and left Kashgar again for Calcutta, he
gathered together his troops, Chinamen and Kokanians,
and, with the most perfect confidence that all would
* The Muzart Pass is covered with ice all the winter, and steps are
chopped to make it passable. Yakub placed a guard there of 500 men.
† This is Kupé, or Old Turfan, not to be confounded with Ush or
New Turfan, in Kashgaria.
From an unpublished memoir by Mr. Khludof, the Russian mer-
chant of Tashkend who was erroneously supposed to have penetrated
to Karategin a few years ago.
§ Mirza Shadi must have been back from St. Petersburg when
Lieutenant Hayward and Mr. Shaw were in Kashgar (March 6th to
May 30th, 1869, date of their departure from Yarkend), yet no mention
of him is made in Lieutenant Hayward's narrative. Mirza Shadi was
in India in March 1870.
49
be safe during their absence, sent them against the
Tungans.
He appears to be profoundly politic, remarkably
clever, and of great strength of mind. Resolute, am-
bitious, and cunning, with traits apparently far above
the average in Central Asia, he is, undoubtedly, the
greatest man for good or evil that has yet come upon
that stage. He declares that he will resign himself
to any fate, whether it be subordination to Russia or
the exercise of sovereignty over the Tsar's country and
subjects.
That he was hostile to the Russians in the early
period of their Central Asian career is undoubted, but at
the same time, we have seen him suspected of receiving
Russian gold.* We do not pretend to believe that he
has been bribed, or that he is in the pay of the Russians,
but why should he not have been lately amenable to
Russian persuasion ? We often hear through Russian
sources, and indeed we read in the organ of the Governor
General of Tashkend, that he is hostile to Russian in-
terests. But this intelligence comes from irate Russian
traders upon whose goods he has set arbitrary prices.
And what may be said of Yakub may with almost
equal justice be brought against the Khan of Kokan.
Hudoyar, it is true, is well disposed towards Russia,
but it is with the greatest difficulty and danger to
himself that he maintains amicable relations with Ge-
neral Kaufmann and suffers Russians to trade and dwell
securely in his capital. While the Khan is friendly
to Russians, the populace is barely restrained from
robbing and murdering them. A Russian tradesman
was murdered in Kokan but a year ago,† and the fanatic
who committed the crime was punished (not on a bazar
day, but when the streets were empty) only on the
strong representations of a Russian prince, who was
* Edinburgh Review.
† Putilof, he died in a few days from the effects of severe wounds
received in broad day and in the crowded street.
12718.
D
50
fortunately there at the time of the occurrence, and
who was himself almost daily insulted in the streets,
even on the occasion of his return in gorgeous robes of
honour from an audience which he had had of the Khan.
Even the prince (who was there on private business, in
connexion with silkworms) received the attention of
which he was the object merely because he had a strong
letter of recommendation from the Kokan envoy in
Tashkend, backed by one in still stronger terms from
the Governor General. Yakub-Bek may also be well
inclined towards Russia, but a suspicion of it in Kashgar
might ruin him, for the Russians are unmitigatedly
hateful to the native population. Yakub, moreover, is
said to be surrounded and supported on his throne only
by Kokan refugees who have left their country because
of Hudoyar's Russian predilections. Hudoyar's own
brother, who is eager to supplant him, is among the
refugees.
However badly Russian subjects may be treated in
Kashgar, it is not to be argued from thence that the
ruler is not personally on good terms with the Imperial
Government; even the attack on Khludof's caravans
some few years ago, the plunder of his goods, the
murder of his men, and his failure to obtain redress,*
do not preclude the possibility of some understanding.
The Atalykh may urge that his hands are fettered. If
he serves Russian ends, the wiser and the only policy to
pursue is to leave him in power. Nevertheless, when
he shall have served his time and can be dispensed with,
retribution will doubtless come, and past offences will
be punished by a stroke which will add to the prestige
that accompanies the Russian name in Central Asia.
Yakub-Bek has certainly friends at the Court of the
Bogdo Khan, for he has received from Pekin a caravan
* Yukub-Bek delivered to the Russians only a Kirghiz or two engaged
in the attack, but as the attacking party was an organized force with
banners, acting under orders from Kashgar, the gravity of the case re-
quired fuller amends.
51
of rich presents, and grateful messages. The Chinese
Government is avowedly thankful to the Atalykh for his
chastisement of the rebels, for the diversion against
them in favour of the Chinese troops at Barkul and
Hami; he encourages the Chinese refugees in the Eren-
Kobyrga and Lian-San mountains and in the Guechen
(Kuchin) range, who sally down upon the Tungans
from their fastnesses. He drafts all Chinese into his
army, and favours the Manchurs within the towns. It
is not to be supposed that his intention is to restore
Eastern Turkestan to the rule of the Chinese; and the
Chinese can at present nurse no such hope, but there is
strong presumptive evidence to the effect that the
Chinese were induced to believe, before their situation
became desperate, that he was acting in their behalf.
This sketch of the line he is pursuing appears to accord
with a certain harmony that exists between his policy
and that of the Russian Government.
The first step taken by the Russians towards securing
a safe passage for caravans going to Kashgar was the
construction of a bridge over the Naryn (the head waters
of the Jaxartes), and of a fort to guard it.* As these
works were progressing, Yakub-Bek was informed by
letters from the Russian Commander who superintended
them, that an Officer was about to be sent to him "to
*The new fortification stands on the left bank of the river, in the
encamping grounds of the Kara-Kirghizes (Diko-Kamenui) of the
Sary-Bogu tribe. This locality is wholly included within the Issyk-
Kul district of the Semirechensk region, so that the Sary-Bogu Kir-
ghizes and the Bogus, still further east, who were previously only
nominal subjects, are now practically controlled by Russian authorities.
There is no access to this bridge from Hodjend, as the Russians have
no right of passage through Kokan. From Tokmak there are two
mountain tracks practicable for single horsemen only :-one by the
Búam pass, and the other over the Shamsi pass in the Alexandrofski
mountains, both of which meet at the Djuvan Aryk river, a tributary
of the Kachkar running into the Issyk-kul. The only available way
for troops and artillery is therefore by the Zaûkù pass. It will be
observed that this post, thrown out like all other advances in Asia,
is a position that provides for future contingencies in Kokan, and will
lead to the closing of a broken and open line of frontier.
D 2
52
negotiate on the subject of a proper understanding."
It was upon the strength of this that Yakub-Bek
despatched his nephew, Shadi Mirza, to Tashkend
through Vernoë. At Vernoë this man was detained
by the Russian Governor until the Governor General
instructed him to recognize Yakub's relative as his
envoy, and to send him on. The same letter contained
instructions to send Captain Reinthal to Kashgar.
Captain Reinthal, a Staff Officer of Artillery, set out
from the fort on the 23d of October 1868, and he
reached Kashgar on the eighth day; the distance was
134 miles, direction S.S.W.
The reception given to the Russian Envoy was quite
as courteous as that accorded subsequently to Lieutenant
Hayward and Mr. Shaw; but he was also placed under
the same restrictions. He was received by Yakub-Bek
on the very day of his arrival in Kashgar (19th (31st) of
October)—a mark of either very particular favour, or
of great anxiety on the part of Yakub to learn the
purport of his mission, if we may judge by the assurance
given to Prince Drutskoi-Sokolinski in Kokan (who
was granted an audience on the third day after his
arrival) that so prompt a reception was given him purely
out of consideration for his high standing and for his
friendship with the Governor General. Yakub repeatedly
assured the Russian envoy that so long as he lived he
would never undertake anything against the Tsar, and
that it would be his constant care to cement friendly
relations with Russia.
We shall now proceed to offer a few concluding re-
marks on the condition of affairs on the Russo-Mongol
and Semirechensk frontier.
Notwithstanding the affray between the Russians and
Chinese near Borokhudzir in 1863,* the relations be-

* This was a collision between a Kazak force from Kopal sent to
occupy the frontier, as agreed upon by the Treaty of Pekin. The
Russian Frontier Commissioner was Captain Golubef, now dead, after-
wards succeeded by Major Erkofski, later by Lieutenant-Colonel Lerché,
and finally, in July, by Captain Obukh, who was killed at Tashkend on
53
tween them has been most amicable, that is to say, since
the defection of the Mohamedan population of the
north-west, the Pekin Government, while lavishing its
blandishments on Yakub of Kashgar, was markedly com-
pliant and amiable towards the Russian Government.
The ostensible reason for this was the asylum afforded to
the Chinese refugees from I'lí. We may here say a few
words with reference to those fugitives, the greater part
of whom left the Russian Semirechensk district for
Kobdo in the course of last year.
In 1867, the Chinese officials and all the Chinese
fugitives who had taken refuge in the Russian terri-
tories received orders from Pekin to take up their
abode in Uliasutai, It required a great deal of
persuasion to make all these people obey the orders
of the Chinese Government. They were distressed
at the idea of leaving behind them the tombs of their
fathers and forefathers, and of never, perhaps, seeing
them again. The scenes that took place when the
Chinese officials gathered them together for departure
are said to have been painfully affecting. A Chinese
66
Officer flatly refused to lead away his subordinates.
He wrote to the Russian Officer at Vernoë,—“ The
"Russian Tsar who received us, and who has pro-
"tected our families from the ruffians, will not turn
us away now from his territories. Here, within sight
"of the graves of our forefathers, we shall await the
coming of the great host, and together we shall re-
cover our sanctuaries or lay down our heads where
"C our ancestors laid down theirs."
CC
Kotzebue, the Chinese amban (the senior Chinese
Officer among the refugees), exerted himself to his
utmost to lead away all the Chinese subjects to
Uliasutai, saying their disobedience would cost him
the 14th October 1865. The Chinese were beaten on the Beibulak
heights, 18 cannon being taken from them, and the valley of Boro-
khudzir was occupied by the Russians finally in 1865.
54.
his head. It took a year to assemble the fugitives and
to execute practically the injunctions of the Chinese
Government.
We may here take the opportunity of mentioning a
fact related by Mr. Van Hoyer. When the intelligence
of the capture of Samarcand reached Vernoë, the
Chinese amban presented himself, with all his staff,
to the Russian Military Governor of the district, and
in congratulating the latter on the event said: "You
“Urusses are new comers in Central Asia, and cannot,
66
"6
66
therefore, fully realize the importance of the thing
you have done. We who have been long in these
parts can estimate its true value, and are fully aware
"of the significance with which it is pregnant in the
"minds of all the Mahomedan population."
Their departure was attended with religious cere-
monies. A special service was performed for them in
the Russian church, into which they all crowded by
turns. They took the road with sorrow and great mis-
givings as to the chance of ever coming back to re-
possess themselves of the tombs of their ancestors, their
homesteads, and the lands on which, by their industry,
generations of them had lived and prospered.
The Russians equally regretted the departure of a
people,* who, painstaking and industrious, had even
during their short residence within the Russian district,
applied themselves to various labours. They are said to
have instructed the Kazaks within that interval in the
art of burning bricks and building walls.†
* The refugees numbered 14,000, of whom 8,500 were nomads and
5,500) Solons and Sibos. 1,750 of the latter became Russian subjects,
and settled in the Russian districts of Kopal and Vernoë. The entire
body of nomads, lately increased by 300, is also numbered among the
Russian population of the same region.
†The Russians are said to have been overwhelmed with letters from
Chinese who had been enslaved by the rebels, conveying the sense of
their gratitude for the kindness and protection accorded to their country-
men, and expressing a firm trust in their ultimate emancipation by the
55
These refugees have evidently leaped from the frying-
pan into the fire, for Kobdo, Uliasatai, and Urga, have
been wrenched from the Chinese. We can trace no
other connexion between this circumstance and the re-
bellion of the Tungans and Taranchis than that it is
part and parcel of a general Moslem revival. The
element that is devastating that region is one which the
Chinese evidently cannot cope with. While temporising
with, and watching the rebels from Barkul and Hami,
and while spreading reports of the advance of a large
army, the Chinese have relied upon a prophecy in their
official calendar, to the effect that the rebellion would
cease of itself after a run of eight years and some
months. They are now at their wits' end to account for
its continuance and growth, but although Prince Kung
has confessed "there is nothing for it but to forage
"their horses and sharpen their knives," they still
remain inactive and confine themselves to boasting.
We are not qualified to pass an opinion on the military
resources of China, but we may take it for granted that
the impression among the refugees, to the effect that
their Government intended to leave their dependencies
in that quarter to their own fate, was correct, and that
the Court of Pekin had not contemplated sending an
expedition across the desert to their relief. All their
reliance seems to have been placed in the Torgout
Kalmuks, and yet these were so beset by the insurgents,
and so apprehensive of danger, that they sent their female
ruler on a conciliatory mission to the Khan of Kuldja.
In Kobdo all the Chinese inhabitants put their faith in
the Kalmuks, and especially in one man, whom it may
be worth while to mention. He goes by the name
of Chogan Kegen; he is a Kara Kalmuk; his real
age is 42, although he is said to have a younger
appearance; he holds the Chinese rank of a Tsian-
Russian Tsar. These letters were addressed to the Russian Governor
General of Western Siberia, thus:—
"To the strong as the lion, the brave as the leopard," &c.
56
Kiung and is authorised by the Bogdo Khan to form
any army he thinks proper, and to operate with it
against whomsoever he may see fit. But Chogan Kegen
is, at the same time, a spiritual chief, and is looked upon
as a mediator between God and man,-as a prophet, and
as an oracle of supreme wisdom and goodness; his repu-
tation is said to have spread far and wide, bringing
worshippers from the most distant lands. Although
his age is positively determined, his birth and origin are
unknown to all; his existence is a reality, his origin is
mythological, in fact he is a duplicate of the Huť’ukht'u,
with this difference, that the re-embodiment of his spirit
does not seem to have been ever sought in any new-born
child. He asserts himself when he is again ripe in age
and worldly experience. He was reverenced and be-
lieved in by everybody in Kobdo, from the highest
Chinese official to the humblest nomad Kalmuk. His
existence is popularly supposed to have run a course
of 1,500 years; this is his eighteenth revival on earth;
his normal term of life is 80 years, after which he dies
and reappears in another place. As Tsian-Kiung, he
can foretell when and where the enemy will approach,
his purpose, his strength, and the result of an approaching
conflict with him, as well as the number that will be
slain on both sides.
Since the expulsion of the Chinese, Dzungaria has
been a thorn in the side of Russia. Incessant disturb-
ances on the borders have caused great trouble to the
Russian local authorities and produced perpetual agita-
tion and alarm among the population on the Russian
side. The states that have been formed by the rebels of
Dzungaria are not calculated to be long lived, nor are
they so organized as to render inroads into the Russian
territories of unfrequent occurrence. They contain all
the elements of ever-varying internal dissensions.
This is of itself a great source of vexation to the
Russian Government, which at the present moment
declares that it cannot tolerate the consolidation of a
contiguous and powerful Mussulman State.
57
The anxiety of the Russian authorities for the peace
and security of their bordering towns being fully com-
mensurate with the consternation and unrest of the
Russian subjects within them, General Kolpakovski
represented to his Government the necessity of taking
some steps in order to restore tranquillity and to guard
against any complicity of Russian Kirghizes, in the re-
bellion, as well as against incursions of Tungans and
Taranchis. It was pointed out that, even within
Russian limits, Russian caravans were exposed to the
danger of being attacked and plundered by lawless
bands, whose numbers and audacity increased with
the growing disquietude in the disaffected regions.
On the strength of this, the General was authorized in
1865 to station some bodies of Kazaks along the Chinese
frontier, and to push detachments to the extreme borders
of the Semirechensk district. Numerous parties were
at once advanced in various directions, and posts were
established at Kurchum, Temersinsk, Borokhudzir,
Chundjinsk, Kaptagai, in the Thian Shan, on the Aksu
river, and in other localities. These detachments, how-
ever, were posted at the above points only during the
summer, and not unfrequently the distribution, nu-
merical strength and number of the detachments were
varied according to circumstances and to the progress of
the insurrection. In 1867, a greater portion of the
Semipalatinsk region was converted into the Semire-
chensk region, and included in the province of Tur-
kestan, the whole of which was formed into a military
circuit subordinate to the officer in command of the
troops. When this was effected, General Kolpakovski
was called upon to state his views with respect to the
defence of the frontier. He drew up a paper in which
he represented the necessity of strengthening the forces
along the frontier, of permanently locating the troops
along the advanced line, of fortifying the posts, and of
pushing the front in some parts still further into Dzun-
garia. The weight of his recommendations was admitted,
and in 1868 they were carried into effect.
58
This advance, and the permanent occupation of the
hitherto nominal frontier from the eastern extremity of
Lake Issyk-Kul towards the east, which has been effected
during the last two years, has converted it into an actual
line of defence, as well as into one of possible future
aggression.
The Mongolian frontier was readjusted last year
after an irruption of a large body of Chinese Kalmuks
into Western Siberia. An indemnity of 20,000l.,
which was claimed by the Russian Government as
the amount of the injury inflicted on the Russian
population, was partially paid by the Chinese immediately
after, and they agreed to pay the rest in three yearly
instalments.
This question led to a definition of the boundaries
according to the protocol of Chuguchak, signed in 1854.
From the extreme boundary mark of Shabindabag, in
Eastern Siberia, set up in 1727, the Frontier Commis-
sioners, in 1869, planted marks as far as the Khabar-
Osa pass, in the Tarbagatai mountains, opposite to the
western extremity of Lake Nor-Zaisan. This frontier
is now distinctly drawn along the Altai range, and
thence along the spurs that form the eastern side of the
Kurchum valley. From here it proceeds like a wedge
to the Nor-Zaisan, and back again up the Black Irtysh
to Ak-Tiùbé mountain, on the left bank of the river,
facing the mouth of the Koldjir.* The lower course of
the Black Irtysh is choked with reeds, but at Ak-Tiùbé
the river is deep and favourable for navigation. The
*The Zaisan wardship (pristafstvo) was formed in 1868, when the
Russian Government assumed sovereignty over the Kirghizes of Zaisan,
Kurchum, and Bukhtarma. This wardship was composed of the ter-
ritories ceded to Russia by China under the protocol of Chuguchak.
Its boundaries were as follows:-In the south and east, the Chinese
frontier; in the west, the limits of the Kokpektinsk district, passing
from the Tarbagatai by the River Tymyrsik across the embouchure
of the Chergi river to the Zaisan lake, and thence by the Irtysh to
the mouth of the Narym river; on the north the boundary of the
Government of Tomsk, along the rivers Narym and Bukhtarma. In
this way the Chinese frontier abutted on the Zaisan lake, and the ward-
59
locality about Ak-Tiùbé is within the Russian lines, and
efforts are now being made to colonize the banks of that
river. The Zaisan fort stands within 35 miles of the left
bank of the Irtysh, at the base of the Kitchkené-Taù
mountain (a spur of the Mus-taù) on the Djemen river.
The Russo-Chinese tea trade* by way of Irkutsk and
Kiakhta having fallen off, it is of all the more con-
sequence that the other channel should be open. In
former years the tea trade was almost the exclusive
ship was consequently divided into two parts by the interposition of the
lake, to the great inconvenience of the Chief Warder. For instance,
to pass from the Zaisan post into the Bukhtarma valley he had to
traverse the marshes of the embouchure of the Kenderlyk, to cross
the Black Irtysh, trespass over the Chinese territories, and pass over
the great Altai mountains,-a journey which could not be performed
under seven or eight days on horseback. The consequence was that, in
all matters of urgency, the subordinate officers of the Bukhtarma and
Kurchuk divisions of the ward acted upon their own responsibility,
merely acquainting the Warden afterwards with their proceedings. In
military respects the head quarters of the southern division, with the
reserve of Kazaks and artillery, were at Kokpekty, and in the northern
division, at Ust-Kamenogorsk, the chief military commander residing
at Kokpekty. To remedy this a re-adjustment of the Chinese frontier
followed on the 1st January 1870. At present all the lands of the
Kokpekty district and of the Zaisan wardship are intersected by a line
from west to east, dividing them into what is now called the Ust-
Kamenogorsk district, with Ust-Kamenogorsk as its military and admi-
nistrative centre on the north side, and the Zaisan wardship (which
will probably soon be turned into a district), with the Zaisan post on
the Djemen river for a central point, on the south side. The boundary
line between the new district and the wardship passes from the Chinese
frontier on the Black Irtysh across the Zaisan lake to the north of
the Kokpektinka, up that river to the Djusagatch picket, whence it
runs in a direct line to the Bukon, the Soldatskoi Hutor, and to the
Little Bukon river, as far as the Kolbin hills, and from thence westwards
to the boundaries of the Sergiopol district, along the Kolbin hills,
south of the sources of the Great and Little Djanishké rivers, and by
the watershed of the Kokpektinka on the south, and the affluents of the
Char on the north. Ust-Kamenogorsk includes ten Kirghiz settle-
ments (more than 13,000 tents), the towns of Ust-Kamenogorsk, and
the Kazak stations of Krasnoyarsk, Ust-Kamenogorsk, Bukhtarminsk,
Verkh-Aleisk, Charish, and Antoniefsk, with out settlements. The new
Zaisan wardship embraces 12 Kirghiz settlements (more than 15,000
tents), with Kokpektinsk station and the Bukon settlements.
* See separate "Report on the Overland Trade between Russia and
China; its Decline and future Prospects," by R. Michell. May 1871.
60
monopoly of Russian merchants. They obtained the
produce of the best tea-growing provinces in China,
and not only did they provide for the wants of the
entire Russian nation, but they were almost the only
agents through whom all Europe was supplied with that
commodity. They have lived to see Europeans en-
croaching on their trade with China, while during the
last ten years a series of fortuitous events has militated
against them, and in the end robbed them of a trade which
was once entirely their own. The prospects of the
Russian trade are now aggravated by the Mahomedan
rebellion, and by the consequent close of communica-
tions with China, which they fear will throw the markets
of Kashgaria into the hands of the English, their com-
mercial competitors in the East. The commercial fleets
of rival powers have brought away from Canton and
Shanghai to London and Hamburgh the cargoes mainly
carried before by "ships of the desert" to Kiakhta,
whence they are transported to St. Petersburg; and a
final blow was struck at the Russian trade by the con-
flagrations in Kiakhta and Maimachin. So long, how-
ever, as the road across the desert remained open and
practicable, it seemed to some enterprising Russian
spirits that the case was not utterly hopeless; they
saw that it was only necessary to compete in the Chinese
markets with foreign purchasers in order to retrieve
their position to a certain extent. Accordingly, a few
Russian capitalists bought some tea plantations in
Hankow, and opened houses of business. The specu-
lation is said to have succeeded tolerably well. Other
Russian merchants established offices in Tien-Tsin and
Kalgan. From these points, and through Urga, Russia, if
not the whole of Europe, was again to be supplied with tea
by Russian hands and through Russian channels. A Con-
sul was appointed to Urga, on the northern side of the
desert; another was but a short time ago sent to Kobdo,*
Mr. Vardugin.
61
while another went to Uliasutai.* The prospect bright-
ened. It is true, that the advantages of the new trade
were on the side of the Chinese, who insisted on cash
payments and declined to exchange tea for Russian mer-
chandise. Moreover, the price of tea in Moscow and
St. Petersburg having fallen in consequence of the
cheaper importations by way of Europe, the consign-
ments from Hankow either remained long on hand, or
sold at an unremunerative rate, but for all that a time
was looked forward to when these circumstances would
alter.
If there be any foundation for the rumours that have
lately been spread, or for the grave apprehensions at St.
Petersburg relative to the headway made on all sides by
the rebels, and also in regard to the precarious position
of the present ruling dynasty in China, it may be the fate
of Russia once more to be disappointed in her hopes.
The Russians have not the means in Siberia, nor would
they have the temerity to attempt in concert with the
Chinese, to suppress a formidable rebellion, unless, as it
would appear from very late intelligence, fresh troops
have been recently concentrated there. Greatly as they
are concerned in the maintenance of tranquillity, and in
the preservation of the roads across the desert, they
cannot hold out a hand to promote either the one or the
other without very vigorous action on a large scale.
Agents have been directed by the Russian authorities to
penetrate at any cost into the rebel districts, and to
bring back information as to the condition of affairs, and
tenders of assistance have been made to the Chinese
Government, which does not, however, seem to have
responded with any alacrity. If the Russians should
undertake mainly upon themselves the reduction of the
rebels, they can hardly be expected to give them over
to Chinese Commissioners without securing a cession of
* Mr. Pavlinof, who accompanied a party of Russian merchants with
the object of opening a trade with China through that place. He barely
escaped from there with his life in November 1870, when the town was
seized by rebels.
62
some commanding position in Dzungaria, or equivalent
advantages. At any rate, it seems to be decided that
the Chinese prophecy is not to be falsified, and that
Yakub-Bek is to be indulged no longer.
Note. This paper was already in print when the
"Turkestan Gazette" of the 12th (24th) April came to
hand, in which it is stated that, according to the latest
intelligence received from the Semirechensk frontier,
the war between Yakub-Bek and the Tungans was termi-
nated in December 1870, with the reduction of Urumtsi,
Sandju, and Manassy. The Tungans also paid Yakub
a contribution of 100,000 "siars," or 2,300 yambs (equal
to about 31,2507.). After receiving an embassy from
Kuldja, Yakub-Bek hastened to Kashgar, having, learned
that the Hodjas, taking advantage of his absence, had
issued with a force from Kokan to seize the country.
This intelligence requires confirmation. If there be
any truth in the report of the attack made on Kashgar
from Kokan, the Russians would surely have heard of
it sooner at Tashkend than at Vernoë, for they are on
very friendly terms and in constant communication
with Yakub's foe Hudoyar. If Yakub had any mis-
givings when he left his own territories unprotected, he
must sorely repent the first great mistake he has made
in listening to the alluring voice of ambition. The only
comment we can pass upon this circumstance is that,
if it be true, and if the Hodjas have really been suc-
cessful, it is a culmination long desired by the Russians,
who have cried out loudly enough in Europe against
Yakub's usurpation, and who would be glad enough, for
the time, to see a nominee of Hudoyar in his place.
The same Gazette states that Kobdo is still retained
by the Chinese, but that it is menaced by a body of
insurgents from northern China, who have also advanced
on Urga.
1

Shakespear's Journey punterat to Whiva:
Files
/Parwan at _ This cange of hills N. Itterat -
2 Khush Robat : jove woad - fine Karvansara
3 Ralch-i-Japat,
Khush river
in
4
Bank of Khush
5 Munghubriver
5 Along Menghab valley
Past Bank : Yeratin
8 Relating
9
Nero
Perhaps morning march curecinded?
As Shakespear cuits the distance from berat
It must be supposed this in heb is cited
There are two roads from Stew to thion (Arsans):
One the inchi Takht
The the Rakic (hashmar
1. Alany Menghab
Mung has river
2
3
15.
Foford 15 beyond 5
In to desert
ک ک
1212
45½
30
44

22
32
27
22
2411½
260
18.12

Saraks
Khail of Salu Turkmens.
12
3314
20
23
3114
4
گو
6 Alonghighroad
5 To Water 16½ beyond

d 15-
7
j
Desert, sand, wishes
March.
9
Takhti Suliman, alarge sand hill
10
40
6
30
18
Окис
[Rappa Kulch /
40/4

11 - Whuch Halch_but this only part of unsccorded dister_ 4
12. Water in river bed
13.
14
Along river
March
33
30
15 offter 11 miles left river - then to Butanic in all _ 35
17 Mark.
13
38
4241/4
9th May 1893. Echould think the abme mightberoughly
Estimated this:
Berit to Mew = 260 miles,
New to Rhiva
440
И
700
Krasnovodsky
Isuin today's "Zimmer " the distance from
khsive exhmales at, 485 vests = 471 miles.
Shakeupeace makes it about 254 miles from Evers to the
Deus, whereas M. Jaylen Thumma estimates it at 170.
considerable and bench to the
Rifference of 84 miles is very
Suppriting that, though bith freins woue in
more probable as
have
The
their way to
leather whe
नी,
Khion, they ninat, reached the quarrives from which Whion.
thesives it's our're by at different points. This native in the
Mr. Shunsun ursives at Habaleli, and
Shakespeare at or near Ruppa Kalah. Bus Bony mind the
Wissume that they mean the same point is geoste.
Shakespeone reaches a
about 40
##
Eartsmans
५
лый
་་
4
large sandhill called the "Paletet," et
will, from the trains, & which he songs this to
belive was simcted by Solomon. Templom Menu
Lays about 36 miles before nearly the Creus,
This place is duff) impotent to be w
Made the
back of the road in which it was. The would,
"
a len.
In resp
distigmily
This "Palcht?
of
se

Kulja ? the land ofte Seven Cities.
22nd May
18841

Plyrial and Velikial feography specia
이
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