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Reprinted from STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY Vol. I, No. 1, June, 1926 1 BE 441 I] 9 Cattol & Saws of Aunaise. Tyck. 11-1-1927 PREFATORY NOTE Psychology and Psychiatry are so closely interrelated that it should not seem strange that a series of studies should be pub- lished embodying the results of research in both fields. Many problems of Psychology are best understood by analys- ing the abnormal developments that are manifested in the psychoses. This is particularly true of that field of Psychology which has to do with the emotions, impulses and desires. On the other hand the progress of Psychiatry is retarded by the present inadequacy of psychological analysis. Psychology has not as yet attained a generally accepted ultimate analysis of the elements of mental life. Consequently, it is as yet unable to give Psychiatry an outline of a scientific analytic mental examination along with methods of measurement that would clearly define the specific form and amount of degenera- tion present in any given case. It is in the hope of aiding in the development of both sciences that this series of studies has been founded. It is earnestly desired by the editors that the investigation of theoretical scientific problems in the two sciences will, by the union of these disciplines, be of practical value to humanity. EDWARD A. PACE. ACKNOWLEDGMENT The author wishes to express her gratitude to those professors at the Catholic University and at Trinity College with whom she did her work, and especially to Monsignor Pace and to Dr. Moore, for valuable aid and suggestions in the preparation of the manuscript. The author welcomes this opportunity also to thank all those who so kindly acted as subjects and so made this study possible by their generous coöperation. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING INTRODUCTION. CHAPTER I PHILOSOPHICAL AND NON-EMPIRICAL THEORIES. a. Older philosophical theories... b. Modern non-empirical theories CHAPTER II EXPERIMENTAL WORK ON JUDGMENT AND INFERENCE 1. Work of German School of Würzburg. 2. Hollingworth's study..... 3. Minor experimental studies.. 4. Binet's Psychology of Reasoning. 5. Lindworsky's Logik.. • + THEORIES OF LOGICIANS. 1. Jevons.. 2. James Mill. 3. John S. Mill 4. Schiller. 5. Spencer.. 6. Bosanquet 7. Bradley... 8. Wundt. 9. Sigwart.. • • MIRIAM FRANCES DUNN • I. HISTORICAL OUTLINE • · • METHOD OF PROCEDURE. • GENERAL INTROSPECTIONS. • CHAPTER III II. EXPERIMENTAL CHAPTER I CHAPTER II iii ·· • · • V 1 1 1 10 10 10 11 11 18 22 22 23 25 27 31 35 41 45 49 55 69 iv CHAPTER III TABLES OF RESULTS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION... 1. Major Premise.. 2. Minor Premise. 3. Conclusion.... BIBLIOGRAPHY CHAPTER IV TABLE OF AUTHORS' THEORIES AND RESULTS HERE OBTAINED..... 109 1. Major Premise. 2. Minor Premise 109 120 122 3. Conclusion. INDEX. · • CONTENTS • GENERAL SUMMARY OF RESULTS.. } CHAPTER V .. • • 84 94 101 103 • 131 .. 134 139 INTRODUCTION Reasoning deals with concepts, judgments, and inference. To treat of the whole reasoning process, then, from the very first rising up of the concepts, which later function in the reasoning process, or indeed to attempt to cover the whole field of every kind of reasoning, would be a task impossible of accomplishment in any single investigation. Titchener, in his Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes, reviews the various con- tributions to the higher mental processes and to thought in general, and maintains that Watt, Ach, Messer, and Bühler failed to reach any certain conclusions largely because they at- tacked the whole problem of the psychology of thought rather than part problems worked out in detail. Störring, too, who worked on the problem of inference, failed to reach any conclu- sion. Accordingly, Titchener observes: Then a programme for the experimental study of judgment lies before us. We have to work steadily and one by one at the part problems set by the investigations already made, and we have to compare our results with the teachings of the standard books on logic. The logicians disagree, as the psychologists disagree. But we shall find out, by our comparison and by the suggestion of further work that issues from it, what types of con- sciousness there are that correspond with current logical definitions of judgment. As the explanation goes on, uniformities will appear of them- selves, and ultimately we shall be able to decide whether judgment is a general term for a great variety of consciousness, a name like "percep- tion," or whether it is, like "fusion," the name of a specific mode of con- scious agreement.¹ C This, then, is Titchener's suggestion as to the methods of in- vestigating the problem of judgment, and the method is a general one, applicable as well to the investigation of any of the higher mental or thought processes. Similarly, Calkins2 points out that in the investigation of the ¹ Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes. E. B. Titchener, 1909, p. 192. 2 Professor Titchener on the Thought Processes. Mary W. Calkins, Psychological Bulletin, 1910, vii, 9. Pp. 293–297. V GK. vi INTRODUCTION thought processes most of the experimental investigations have been too broad in scope; that Binet, for example, undertook to investigate memory, attention, imagination, and the higher mental phenomena, and that Messer, who began with experiments on free association, was led on endlessly from experiment to experi- ment, by his results. Marbe, although he studied judgment exclusively, obtained only negative results to the effect that there were no psychological conditions of the judgment. With the nature of the concept and the various problems and controversies which have centered around it this paper is not primarily concerned. It was, however, impossible to avoid en- tirely any consideration of concepts because of the involvement of the "image theory" in the general account of the reasoning process as a whole in such authors as Sigwart and Binet, whose theories, among others, were used as a basis for investigation. Similarly in the case of judgment, no attempt has been made at a complete investigation of the problem, but only in so far as judgments are necessarily involved in acts of reasoning that is, in the particular acts of reasoning here considered. It is primarily with the nature of the mental processes in volved in inference or in concluding that the present investiga- tion is concerned. And here no attempt is made at the dis- covery of an all-comprising, universal theory of reasoning. Prob- ably there is no universal type. However, it is hoped that this investigation has revealed what may be considered at least one very characteristic form of the process of reaching a conclusion. The method has been that of simple introspection and the data legal cases and mathematical problems. It is difficult to imagine any means other than that of introspection in the consideration of such complicated mental processes as those that are involved in reaching a conclusion. This purely technical difficulty, no doubt, accounts for the large amount of theorizing about, and the correspondingly small amount of experimental investigation of the higher thought processes, especially in the case of the purely behavioristic psychologists who deny the reliability and useful- ness of the introspective method. For the study of these higher mental processes the school of Würzburg, in the early years of this century, employed the method of introspection. It was the INTRODUCTION vii method used later by Moore in his Process of Abstraction and again in his Image and Meaning in Memory and Perception. Sheldon, in the case of judgment, reviews the four methods of investigating the problem; namely, the linguistic, the conceptual, the psychological, and the genetic methods, and points out that the psychological method is impractical because of the difficulty in the use of introspection, although introspection is more reliable than is inference from physical events. There are, however, some experimental studies of judgment in which the method of introspection is entirely debarred-such studies as those described and conducted by Hollingworth. The author first defines the four chief problems of the study of judg- ment. The first is that of the nature and mechanism of judg ments, and here are found "studies which have sought for intro- spective ear-marks or criteria of the judgment process." The second problem is that of the forms, varieties, and classification of judgments, and this is a task for logical inquiry. The third problem is that of the basis or perceptual criteria of typical judgments, and here the attempt is made to discover "on what data one relies when he judges the efficiency of a work process or the extent or duration of a voluntary movement."4 The fourth problem is that of the "laws of behavior and the ways in which. they are modified or the behavior conditioned by specific varia- tions of the judgment situation."4 Such studies consider the form of expressing judgments, individual, age, sex differences, the effect of previous training, etc. It is with the third and fourth aspects of the problem that Hollingworth is concerned, and although he states that the in- terest actuating his investigation has been in "the way in which the mind works rather than in what is in the mind at the moment of its operation," and claims that such an interest can make but little use of the method of introspection, yet it is difficult to understand how an interest in the "outcome of this moment in 3 Experimental Studies in Judgment. H. L. Hollingworth. Archives of Psychology, 4, No. 29, 1913. Columbia Contributions to Philosophy and Psychology, vol. XXII, No. 3, p. V. 4 Op. cit., p. v. Op. cit., p. vi. viii INTRODUCTION the form of behavior, an act, a choice, a judgment, and in the character, reliability, constancy, and significance which the out- come of such a mental operation possesses," is an interest pri- marily in the way in which the mind works. It would seem to be, as the author states, an interest in the outcome rather than in the method of evolving that outcome. A study of the judg- ment of personal efficiency by the use of such processes as those of executing tapping movements at maximal speed, of naming opposites, colors, etc., is quite different from a study of the mechanism of judgment as such. And even in these studies, when Hollingworth states his findings, that the correctness of an individual's judgment of the efficiency of his own performance varies with his degree of confidence, we see that the method of introspection has crept in, to some extent at least. In the still more complicated field of reasoning, however, in- trospection seems to have been the only method used. The theories of Spearman and of Dewey are the results of their own introspections, and in the few studies of reasoning to be found purporting to be experimental in nature, such as those of Stör- ring and Lindworsky and the very short studies of Gard and Kline, we again find the method of introspection employed. • Op. cit.. p. vi. PART I HISTORICAL OUTLINE 1 CHAPTER I PHILOSOPHICAL AND NON-EMPIRICAL THEORIES In reasoning, then, one is dealing with concepts, judgments, and inference. With concepts, however, we are not here con- cerned, merely accepting them without inquiring as to their nature or the process of their formation. A modern psycholog- ical discussion of the concept is to be found in Moore's Process of Abstraction, which is an experimental investigation of the nature of the concept and the process of its formation. Here too may be found an account of the literature on the problem of the concept and abstract ideas. On judgment and inference there are innumerable theories. There are, first of all, the older philosophical theories of the judgment and of inference: those of Aristotle, of Plato, of Kant, Hegel, etc., an account of which may be found in Ueberweg, especially §67, pp. 187-195, and §74, pp. 225–282.¹ Then in more recent times there has been much theorizing. There is a chapter on the subject in most text-books of psy- chology. Baldwin, for instance, approaches the problem geneti- cally and is interested primarily in the belief aspect of logic and defines "Experimental Logic as that enquiry which, pursuing genetic and functional methods, investigates thinking with a view to tracing the derivation, development, and embodiments of belief." John Dewey's Studies in Logical Theory consists of eleven studies by members of the department of philosophy of the University of Chicago, and all are historical or philosophical-none em- pirical. Some authors attempt a division of judgments, as Lodge, who reviews the theories of Sigwart, Bradley, Bosanquet, and Wundt, and then states his own division, on a basis of the comparative predominance of sensory and intellectual elements, 1 System of Logic and History of Logical Doctrines. Dr. Friederich Ueberweg. Transl. from German by Thomas M. Lindsay. London, 1871. 2 Thought and Things or Genetic Logic. James M. Baldwin. 1908, vol. II, p. 7. 1 2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING into judgments of perception, symbolic judgments, judgments of experience, and transcendent judgments. Pillsbury attempts to harmonize the current psychological theories of the judgment and arrives, again by a process of theorizing, at a most general sort of definition; namely, that "in some form or other judg- ment is the process that an impression undergoes as it enters consciousness, and this interpretation is always due to the attach- ment of meaning."4 Again the impersonal judgment has been interpreted and justified. Wolters, in a discussion of the prob- lem of negation, finds that "for logical theory verbal proposi- tions may require to be divided into affirmative and negative, but there is no psychological difference between the judgments underlying them." 8 The literature abounds in further theorizing, as Wodehouse,7 who claims that judgment and apprehension are identical, and Höffding, who claims that the formation of concepts and the formation of judgments are in reality one and the same process. This is but a small sampling of the literature on the judgment, practically all of which, however, is non-empirical. Similarly, in the case of inference there are numerous papers, discussions, whole volumes, and again, almost all are non-em- pirical, or at best, give the introspection of the author only. There are such articles as Tagart's Remarks on Mathematical or Demonstrative Reasoning, Shelton's Limits of Deductive Reason- ing, Analysis of Thinking, by W. C. Johnson, The Paradox of Logical Inference, by Jones, Schweitzer's Les idées directrices de la logique génétique des mathématiques, and many others. And 3 The Division of Judgments. R. C. Lodge. Jour. Phil., Psych., elc., 1918, 15, 541-550. 4 An Attempt to Harmonize the Current Psychological Theories of the Judgment. Psych. Bull., 1907, 4, 237-242, p. 242. The Impersonal Judgment, Its Nature, Origin, and Significance. Simon Fraser. 1897. Chicago. • The Process of Negation. A. W. Wolters. Brit. J. Psych., 1915, 8, 183-211 (p. 207). 7 Cf. Judgment and Apprehension. Helen Wodehouse. Mind N.S. 1908, 17, 359–367. 8 Cf. La case psychologique de jugements logiques. H. Höffding. Revue philosophique, 1901, 52, 345-378, 501-539. PHILOSOPHICAL AND NON-EMPIRICAL THEORIES 3 there have been attempts at an exposition of the reasoning of in- fants, such as Webber's article, where it is necessary to work backward and speculate as to the child's mental processes, from his remarks on conduct. There are also the larger works of Dewey, Spearman, and Pillsbury, and the still more recent Introduction to Reflective Thinking, from Columbia and Rignano's Psychology of Reasoning. Dewey, in How We Think, gives his own introspections on his thinking processes in solving three cases or problems, and in each case he finds five logically dis- tinct steps: "a felt difficulty, its location and definition, sug- gestion of possible solution, development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion, further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or disbelief." "There is thus," says Dewey, "a double movement in all reflection; a movement from the given partial and confused data to a suggested comprehensive (or inclusive) entire situation; and back from this suggested whole-which as suggested is a meaning, an idea to the particular facts, so as to connect these with one another and with additional facts to which the suggestion has directed attention. Roughly speak. ing, the first of these movements is inductive, the second deduc- tive. A complete act of thought involves both-it involves, that is, a fruitful interaction of observed (or recollected) particular con- siderations and of inclusive and far-reaching (general) mean- ing, "10 a conclusion very similar to that reached at the end of this study. Again, in Practical Procedure in Inference, Hibbin remarks that in practical every day experience many of our modes of inference depart from the traditional syllogistic form- as for instance, that the usual mode of inference suppresses one of the premises, again a phenomenon found frequently in the reasoning processes employed in this present study. Spearman, in his Nature of Intelligence, describes deducing a conclusion as the "cognizing of a relation between propositions" and brings out the prevalence and importance of the suppressed major in reasoning: "For if one looks at the actual course of thought as 11 'How We Think. John Dewey. 1900, p. 72. 10 How We Think. John Dewey, 1900, pp. 79-80. 11 The Nature of Intelligence. Charles Spearman, 1923, p. 290. 4 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING exhibited in writings or conversation, the syllogistic form-even as dealing with characters instead of classes-appears to be sur- prisingly infrequent. An indubitably genuine specimen is quite hard to discover. But this appearance of poverty is immediately altered into one of abundance on bringing into account, in addi- tion to whatever can be detected in manifest consciousness, all that can be inferred in subconsciousness. Take, for instance, the following sentence, picked almost at random from the litera- ture: "The sincerity of the old English showed their greatness of mind.' Here the complete thought seems to admit of being rendered as: Sincerity shows greatness of mind (major premise); the old English were sincere (minor premise); therefore the old English had greatness of mind (conclusion)."'12 Again: "In order to appreciate the great practical importance of this (usually subconscious) syllogistic procedure, we must note that in the course of time every concept becomes, so to speak, a little depot stored in readiness to equip whatever thoughts may happen to march its way. Any item of thought, on thus coming to be sub- sumed under the concept, is thereby offered a pick from illuminat- ing major premises in multitude."13 Spearman goes so far as to resolve even induction "ultimately into some particular case of syllogistic deduction."14 Pillsbury's Psychology of Reasoning is in no sense empirical, but is a long and theoretical treatise on reasoning from the stand- point of psychology. Pillsbury is to a large extent a disciple of Bosanquet and Bradley, and so defines the judgment as "the attribution of meaning to the given,"15 thus indicating that "the process of ascribing meaning is the process of entering con- sciousness.”’16 As for reasoning, it, "as a purely mental opera- tion, is, like all of the cognitive processes, to be explained by association. It is primarily a process of making use of the ac- quired experiences, and these are to be explained, so far as their connections and the order of their recall are concerned, in terms 12 The Nature of Intelligence. Charles Spearman. 1923, p. 291. 13 Ibid., p. 291–292. 14 Ibid., p. 297. 15 Pillsbury, W. B. The Psychology of Reasoning, 1910, p. 106. 16 Ibid., p. 107. PHILOSOPHICAL AND NON-EMPIRICAL THEORIES 5 LO of association."'17 There is a continuity, then, among all thought processes, for "similarly, if one will but follow through a chain of reasoning, it will be observed that the elements are connected by the same laws of association that are operative in the simplest recall. Neither the materials nor medium of reasoning, or the laws of connection, then, are distinctive of reasoning as opposed to recall or imagination. What does seem to be characteristic is the way the material is applied and the resulting attitude toward the construction, the attitude of belief or of doubt. . Reasoning gives a product that is believed but not recognized; memory a product that is at once believed and recognized; while imagination's product is neither believed nor recognized."'18 In inference "the laws that govern the appearance of the solu- tion or that give rise to the suggestions or to the movements are the laws of association."19 The differences ordinarily considered to be present in reasoning are not really in the different ways in which conclusions are reached, but rather in the different ways of testing conclusions once arrived at. The conclusion may be tested by induction, deduction, analogy, experiment, but the conclusion itself is reached by a process of suggestion governed by the laws of association. "The so-called forms of reasoning differ only in the way the results are proved, not in the way they are attained.' 1120 17 The Psychology of Reasoning. W. B. Pillsbury. 1910, p. 3. 18 Ibid., p. 3-5. The Introduction to Reflective Thinking, by the Columbia Asso- ciates in Psychology, and Rignano's Psychology of Reasoning are recent works on the general subject of reasoning and reflective thinking, and neither is experimental. The purpose and the method of the first book are given as an attempt "to show think- ing at work by describing some of the great achievements of thought in the field of science and morals."21 It is suggested that the book be used as a "first course in philosophy, or in con- nection with an introduction to science." Again: "It (the 19 Ibid., p. 191. 20 The Psychology of Reasoning. W. B. Pillsbury. 1910, p. 194. 21 An Introduction to Reflective Thinking. Columbia Associates in Philosophy. 1923. Preface. 22 Ibid., p. 15. 6 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING book) hopes to point out some of the workings of thought and the habits of mind which those who desire to participate in the enter- prise of knowing should cultivate,"23 and the method is that "of presenting contrasting solutions to a series of problems." The basis for many of these solutions is Dewey's analysis of an act of thought into: the occasion of reflection, the definition of the difficulty, the rise of suggestions, the mental elaboration of sug- gestions, and evidence in fact and conclusion. Thus, Chapter III, on Diagnosis, treats of the second stage in an act of thought; that is, the definition of the difficulty, and then the importance of observation, definition, and classification is emphasized. Again, a chapter on the Development of Hypotheses in Astron- omy illustrates the fourth phase of the act, that of the mental elaboration of suggestions, and a chapter on the Methods of Experimental Science treats of the fourth and fifth steps in Dewey's analysis. In the chapter on Diagnosis, two cases of diagnosis are considered, both imaginary. In both the same patient is treated, in the one case by doctors in ancient Egypt in the year 400 B.C., and in the other at the Massachusetts General Hospital in 1906. Thus there is, as it were, a working backwards, here and similarly throughout the book. The two diagnoses are taken and from these, by a theoretical discussion, the author works backwards and endeavors to discover the mental attitudes and mental processes of the various doctors in these cases. The process is similar in the case of all those whose decisions, discoveries, etc., form the subject matter of the book. The result of the investigation of the two cases in the chapter on Diagnosis is summed up: "In adequate observation a basic idea is im- portant. Observation must not miss any circumstance; it must know all about the past and future of the thing to be observed. . . The observer must use all his senses, unim- paired, and may supplement them by instruments, apparatus, and experiment."24 So in the chapter on Hypotheses, those of Ptolemy and of Copernicus are discussed, and from this discus- sion the marks of a good hypothesis are finally evolved. There • • 23 Ibid., p. 16. 24 An Introduction to Reflective Thinking. Columbia Associates in Philosophy, 1923, pp. 32–33. PHILOSOPHICAL AND NON-EMPIRICAL THEORIES 7 is also a treatment of Historical Investigation and its methods. In the chapter on Thinking in Law, we find: "The whole legal process, from the first agitation for a certain line of legislation or judicial decision to the final assimilation or rejection of the statute (or decision, as the case may be) in the established body of the law of the land, is really a single act of reflective thought, though it take several decades or centuries to complete it.”25 Obviously, the chief interest in the book is from the point of view of philosophy or the history of civilization in general, rather than from that of experimental psychology. Rignano's Psychology of Reasoning is in reality a complete treatise on psychology, to which the author found himself being led from his attempt at an analysis of reasoning, which to him appeared as a combination of psychical phenomena most com- plex in themselves. Accordingly, the author was led from these very complex phenomena to those which were less and less com- plex, and finally he arrived at "sensorial mnemonic reproduction (enactions of past sensations) and affective tendencies. Affec- tive tendencies are the class of organic tendencies appearing ob- jectively as desires, appetites, needs, and as a whole series of principal affective tendencies all of which may be reduced to one single fundamental tendency of every organism to maintain or to restore its stationary physiological state, that is, to maintain its physiological invariability. This tendency to maintain a constant condition is the result of "the fundamental mnemonic characteristic of all living matter,"26 for affective tendencies have a mnemonic origin and character. One confirmation of this is to be found in their property of "transference" by which "mere parts or fragments of certain environmental relations, striven for originally in their totality," or "analogous" relations or relations always accompanying a certain end, come finally to "evoke the same activity as the original end itself."27 Again, "for the organism is equipped potentially with this or that 'idio- syncratic' affective tendency, with this or that 'nostalgia' accord- ing to the various environments or conditions in which the species Ibid., p. 320. 26 The Psychology of Reasoning. Eugenio Rignano. 1923, p. 6. 27 Ibid., p. 18. 8 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING and the individual were placed for a longer or shorter time in the past, in other words, to their individual history."28 With this as his basic principle, the author passes on to a dis- cussion of attention, which he attacks not by means of intro- spection, but by the method of observing the beast of prey, the child, etc., that is, by a phylogenetic method. Finally, he comes to the conclusion that attention "does not consist of a single affective state, but of the conflict arising from the coexistence of two affective states,"29 and that the state of attention is a state of suspense. Thus a state of attention would result from a con- flict between hunger as the first affectivity and repugnance as the secondary affectivity, or similarly between the two conflicting tendencies of desire and fear. Finally coming to a consideration of reasoning, the author finds himself obliged to abandon the phylogenetic method and to observe reasoning first in man. Here he finds it to be nothing more than "a series of operations or experiments simply thought of,"30 instead of being actually performed because from similar experiments actually performed in the past, we already know the results. It is a Gedankenexperiment or "a mental combination of imagined experiments." This is the essential nature of reasoning, and while easily observed in the simplest reason- ings, yet it still persists even in the highest forms, although here the complications may disguise its essential nature. The idea of the end, which controls and lends coherence to the entire reasoning process, is merely the affectivity for that end and this constitutes the primary affectivity, as in the state of attention. Furthermore, in opposition to this primary affectivity, since a state of conflict is the sine qua non of a state of attention, there is the secondary affectivity which may consist in the fear of fall- ing into error. An examination of the reasoning of animals similarly is revealed to be a very simple form of Gedankenexperi- ment. From its simpler and concrete forms, reasoning becomes highly complicated and abstract, by reason of the discovery or 28 Ibid., p. 12. 29 Ibid., p. 35. 30 Ibid., p. 81. 31 Ibid., p. 82. PHILOSOPHICAL AND NON-EMPIRICAL THEORIES 9 formation of new concepts and the extension of old ones and the increasing of the number of experiments whose results are known to us beforehand. This ever-widening field results from our symbolism, which is becoming always more complicated. A good example of this is found in mathematical reasoning, where the symbolism is particularly complicated and prominent and also in particularly condensed form. The distinction between constructive and dialectic reasoning is emphasized, for in dialectic reasoning the reasoner aims at showing the truth of results which he already desires. It is classificatory in nature and may appear either in syllogistic form or in other more or less similar forms. These syllogistic forms. are not peculiar to dialectic reasoning, but occur in constructive reasoning, where, however, their function is subsidiary and one of control only. They are applicable only after constructive reasoning has done its work, and so have only a secondary func- tion, as contrasted with their primary function in dialectic reasoning. CHAPTER II EXPERIMENTAL WORK ON JUDGMENT AND INFERENCE There has been but little experimental work on either judg- ment or inference. As stated above, the work of the school of Würzburg on the thought processes, although experimental in nature, was too broad in scope, in that it attacked the whole problem of the psychology of thought rather than part problems. Marbe and Watt studied the judgment. Marbe's subjects were asked to determine the difference in weight of objects of the same size and shape, or to listen to the tone of a tuning fork and then to sing the same tone as accurately as possible, or to add two numbers given by the experimenter, or to answer questions on well-known facts of history, objects of daily use, etc. Emphasis was placed on introspections which were always required. As Titchener points out,' neither Marbe nor Watt gave any real analysis of the process or act of judgment, but rather discuss chiefly the Aufgabe and predicative relation, although they gave no account of the nature of this relation. Störring, too, worked on inference, but reached only negative conclusions. There are in addition to Hollingworth's study reviewed above a few short studies such as Experiments in Judgment, by Mulhall, where the interest is in seeking to find whether or not there is a general judicial capacity rather than in the method of judging per se. There is also Gard's Preliminary Study of the Psychology of Reasoning, in which he gave to his subjects problems in long division with only certain given figures and the missing ones were represented by crosses which the subject was to replace by the proper figures, and to note his mental processes in the solution. The author claims that the psychological process of reasoning, as revealed by his experiments, does not follow the form of the syllogism, although much of the reasoning used could be re- stated in syllogistic form. He found "only the familiar processes of association and apperception working under the special condi- ¹ Cf. Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes. Edward B. Titchener, New York, 1909. 10 EXPERIMENTAL WORK ON JUDGMENT 11 4 tions of attention to the particular matter in hand." He adds that some subjects reported the existence of a "vague back- ground which guided the associations." However, no further introspective analysis of this background was attempted and the author, realizing that the final analysis has not been reached, gives a theory of the nature of this background and prefers to consider it "a general habit of attention under certain circum- stances" rather than "a general arithmetical principle'. His theory, then, is purely negative. There is also a recent report on the relation of synaesthesia to reasoning, in which the reasoning processes of a blind synaesthetic subject were compared with those of an asynaesthetic subject as check observer. Analogies, absurdities, abstract problems, were used and introspections were recorded. The results seem to indicate that "no imageless or non-sensory contents of consciousness'5 were found in either sub- ject, and that in the case of the blind subject no reasoning took place in the absence of synaesthetic imagery. Thus, "Logical steps develop in terms of change in spatial relationships of imagery, changes in coloration and in movements of the line of regard." And again: "Synaesthesia is essential to the cogni- tive activities of the subject who possesses it, because it is the only structural tool he has for comprehending meanings."'7 The bearing of this upon any theory of reasoning is evident and it again brings up the whole problem of imageless thought, and with that problem we are not here primarily concerned. Among the empirical studies there is also the larger work of Binet on the Psychology of Reasoning, and since this was part of the material used as the basis of the present investigation, it is necessary to give a complete account of his theories. His study is based upon experimental researches in hypnotism, upon the study of morbid cases, of dreams, illusions, hallucinations, 2 A Preliminary Study of the Psychology of Reasoning. Willis L. Gard, Amer. Jour. Psychol., 1907, 18, 490-504 (p. 502). Ibid., pp. 502-503. 4 Ibid., p. 503. 5 Synaesthesia in the Process of Reasoning. T. D. Cutsworth. Amer. Jour. Psychol., 1924, 35, 88-97 (p. 97). 6 Ibid., p. 97. 7 Ibid., p. 97. 12 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING etc. To him reasoning and perception are one and the same: that is, both are acts of reasoning and have the same internal structure. Accordingly Binet considers Spencer's theory of reasoning namely, that it is a classification of relations as the only true account of the reasoning process. So "the foundation of all reasoning is of the recognition of similitude, i.e., between the fact affirmed and the anterior truth upon which it depends.' As stated above, his work is based upon experimental researches in hypnotism. He believes that the states of consciousness which constitute formal reasoning are so complicated that it is not possible to observe their laws. When one says all men are mortal, Socrates is a man.. Socrates is mortal, no accurate ac- count of what takes place in the mind can be given, according to Binet's concept. In such a case only a strain of confused images appears, and we cannot possibly understand how they are connected in consciousness. However, since perception and reasoning are so closely allied, if we could study perception we would thereby be reaching some understanding of reasoning, and perception we can study. Finally, there is the further aid in evidence obtained from the study of morbid cases, of dreams, illu- sions, hallucinations, etc., which form the basis of Binet's study of perception. • 998 The association of images is the essence of his theory, and the simplest and most complex forms of reasoning are all deter- mined by the association, the fusing and grouping of images. To quote him: "The fundamental element in the mind is the image, and reasoning is an organization of images, determined by the properties of the images themselves." Images and sensations form the materials of all intellectual operations, of memory, or reasoning, and of imagination, all of which consist essentially in the grouping of images. Such is the prominent place afforded images. As to their nature: "Each image is a sensation spontaneously revived."10 It is "generally simpler and more feeble than the original impression, but capable of acquiring, under given conditions, an intensity so great as to make us believe 8 The Psychology of Reasoning. Alfred Binet. 1899, p. 8. ⁹ Op. cit., pp. 9-10. 10 Op. cit., p. 17. EXPERIMENTAL WORK ON JUDGMENT 13 that the external object is still seen." It is these images, then, which form the elements of perception, and the account of perception is gained from hypnotic experiments on visual hallu- cinations. For instance, a pure white card or sheet of paper was given to a patient and she was told: "See here is your por- trait." Immediately the subject saw her portrait and described it. Then, after she had looked at it for a time, the card was taken and shuffled among twelve cards and all were given to the subject, who was then able to select the one before offered. as being her portrait, and again she saw on it her portrait. This Binet explains by supposing that the hallucinating image (that is, the image of her portrait) is associated unconsciously with the visual sensations from the white card, for a card, even if pure white, has some little distinguishing marks upon it and these are perceived by the patient and serve as points of identifica- tion for the image. Experiments such as these, on hypnotized subjects, form the basis for the establishment of Binet's theory of normal perception, and from such cases as the one just cited he concludes that "when an exterior object conveys an impres-. sion to our senses, the mind adds, upon its own initiative, a certain number of images to the sensations experienced. A combination of sensations and images is formed, and although these two elements come from very different sources, since one is sensory and the other ideal, they unite so as to form a single whole.''12 ،، *Bath and So we a -- From this the author goes on to show the great extent of the term 'perception." He claims that there is more than one kind of per- ception, and that it has a variable nature, since on the one ex- treme it is identical with conscious reasoning composed of three verbal propositions, and at the other end, with the most ele- mentary and automatic acts, such as reflexes. So "a perfect continuity exists between the simplest perceptions, as, for exam- ple, the perception of a color and the complicated perceptions which verge upon logical and conscious reasoning, and in short, a single act, in developing, in evolving, begins by being a simple perception and is transformed by degrees into a complex reason- - at the 11 Op. cit., p. 17. 12 Op. cit., p. 65. + hot 14 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING ing." Perception, then, is an act of reasoning, and reasoning is perception, so "perception is an act of reasoning, all that may be granted is that in reality certain reasonings are conscious and others are automatic, and perception is of the second class.''14 That both have the same characteristics he proceeds to show by a comparison of the perception of an orange with an act of formal reasoning. Between the two he finds the following analogies. "The two acts belong to indirect and secondary knowledge."15 This is obvious in the conclusion as to the mortality of Socrates and in the case of the orange, the per- ception is indirect in that its characteristics of structure, taste, etc. are not a part of the visual impression made by seeing an orange. Secondly, "The two acts have a common feature in implying the existence of certain anterior intellectual states or recollections (premises in logic and anterior experiences in per- ception)."'16 Thirdly, "both imply the recognition of a simili- tude between the fact affirmed and the anterior truth upon which it depends." "The work involved in every perception then is identical with the operation which consists in drawing a conclu- sion when the premises are given."'18 Again, Binet establishes still another parallel between per- ception and the syllogism, in which he uses the perception of a book. "The actual vision of the book (A) excites in our thought, by the force of similarity, the ocular image of the same book (B) which is due to a former vision, and this second state of con- sciousness, in its turn, excites, by the force of continguity, the group of tactile and muscular impressions (C) (resulting from former experiences with books). It is the state of consciousness (B) which enables the first state to excite the third; so I propose to call it the intermediate state of consciousness in order to ex- press its function."19 The original visual sensation, then, rising 13 Op. cit., pp. 72-73. 14 Op. cit., p. 84. 15 Ibid., p. 77. 10 Ibid., p. 78. • 17 Ibid., p. 81. 18 Ibid., p. 85. 19 Ibid., p. 139. EXPERIMENTAL WORK ON JUDGMENT 15 from the presentation of the book to view, has become united to a group of tactile and muscular images and the formation of this association is what constitutes the conclusion of perceptive reasoning. In an act of perception, as here analyzed, are found, according to Binet, all the parts that are necessary to constitute an act of reasoning. Both are "transitions from the unknown to the known."20 Both employ three terms. In the percep- tion these terms are A, B, and C; A, the actual vision of the ob- ject; B, the former vision; and C, the inferred properties. In the syllogism there are three terms: Socrates, man, mortal. In the syllogism the middle term is present in the major and minor premises and disappears in the conclusion, and in the percep- tion B is a true middle term, for it blends with A, the actual vision of the object, and then vanishes in the conclusion. Simi- larly, the perception, as the syllogism, may be divided into three parts. As for the major, in the case of the syllogism the major proposition, "All men are mortal," states a relation be- tween two facts and it "means psychologically that there exists in our mind an association between two groups of images, one group of abstract images representing man, and one group of generic images representing death. We understand by the word association that these two images are produced simultaneously or in immediate succession in our mind."21 It is then a propo- sition of coexistence, and since the images are contiguous, we call it also a proposition of contiguity. Similarly, in the process of perceiving a book, the corresponding step was B-C, which was the formula used to represent the pre-formed association between the two images the one of the former vision of the book, B, and the other of the experiences of active touching of the book, C. There is in both, then, an association of images, an association of contiguity. The minor premise expresses a resemblance between the mental representation of Socrates and that of the attributes connoted by the word humanity in "Socrates is a man." Cor- respondingly in the case of the perception in the formula A=B, there is an identification between the actual vision of the book, A, and the recollection of a former vision, B; that is to say. 20 Ibid., p. 144. 21 Ibid., p. 137. 16 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING between the sensation and the image of one and the same thing. So on both sides there is the same association of resemblance. Finally the conclusion, "Socrates is mortal," indicates that an association of contiguity exists between the image of Socrates and the image of death or mortality, and similarly in the case of perception, when the perception was really completed, there was an association of contiguity between the vision of the book and the idea of its tangible attributes. The schema of the analogies between the two processes is this: Reasoning 1. Major premise 2. Minor premise 3. Conclusion Perception B-C 22 Ibid., p. 156. 23 Ibid., p. 144. 24 Ibid., p. 141. 25 Ibid., p. 74. 20 Ibid., p. 143. (A A B = B) - C 1122 So we see here Binet's idea that "Three images which succeed each other, the first evoking the second by resemblance and the second suggesting the third by contiguity, that is reasoning,' and the analysis of the syllogistic reasoning and the perception of the orange conclusively proves to him that perception is com- posed of the same parts as is formal reasoning. He writes: "The analogy is so great that we have been able to compare percep- tion to formal reasoning and to show that perception contains all the essential elements of a syllogism."23 His final definition of reasoning is this: "Reasoning is the establishment of an association between two states of consciousness, by means of an intermediate state of consciousness, which resembles the first state, which is associated with the second and which, by fusing itself with the first, associates it with the second."24 This theory of perception and of reasoning is, then, an image theory. "Judgment therefore becomes reduced to an associa- tion of images, for the time being indissoluble,"25 and "in every perception there exists a succession of three images, the first of which fuses with the second, which in its turn, suggests the third."26 EXPERIMENTAL WORK ON JUDGMENT 17 And again: "Three images which succeed each other, the first evoking the second by resemblance and the second suggesting the third by contiguity, that is reasoning."27 And again: "The preceding theory explains reasoning by the properties of images and sensations and by these properties alone."28 Moreover, the theory implies automatism, that the activity of the images is spontaneous and that their organization is determined solely by their own properties, and that the self intervenes only when the real work of the reasoning process is finished. Thus: "Reason- ing is an organization of images, determined by the properties of the images themselves, and the images have merely to be brought together for them to become organized, and reasoning follows with the inevitable necessity of a reflex."29 Finally: "It is often convenient to characterize a theory by one word. Our theory of reasoning is a theory of substitution. We see here the large term A substitute itself for the term B, that is to say, one image takes the place of another with which it is par- tially identical."30 It is interesting to note, as would be necessary in such a theory, that to Binet the premises are essential if there is to be any conclusion. Finally, then, in this theory the fundamental element of the mind is the image, and reasoning is no more than an organiza- tion of images, determined by the properties of the images them- selves: and they have only to be brought together to become so organized that a process of reasoning results automatically. It is, then, a pure image theory, denying any conscious control or any intervention of the reasoning subject. In contrast to such a theory and that of Sigwart, it is interesting to note here the results obtained by Moore in an examination of image and meaning. The subjects were normal persons and the reaction times to meaning and to imagery in the case of objects, pictures, and written and spoken words, were recorded. From these, and also from the introspections, it was found that meaning pre- 27 Ibid., p. 156. 28 Ibid., p. 161. 29 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 30 Ibid., p. 141. 18 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING ceded imagery in all cases, and so by no means could the meaning have been determined by the imagery. Lindworsky's work is experimental, using the method of introspection. His investigation consisted of two series of experi- ments, the first on syllogistic concluding and the second on natural concluding processes. His material in the syllogistic experiments was what he called exercises and consisted of very short problems of some sort, such as: If molten bodies solidify, they warm their surroundings. When in winter the ponds freeze, . . No man is free from the desire for gratitude. All benefactors are men. No true art consists of ab- solutely mechanical activity. Much virtuosity is absolutely mechanical activity. In the first set of experiments he was interested in syllogistic concluding, and in the second set, in what he called natural con- cluding. Thus for his first set the traditional Aristotelian figures were used, but only the first two of these, because the third and fourth were found to be too artificial to permit of a sufficiently rapid conclusion. On each mode of the first two figures, then, the tasks which he used were based. The problems were alternately spoken and read and all external apparatus was abolished. An interval of only 45 seconds was allowed for the subject's reac- tion. The subjects were told that they would be given two sentences and that their task was to draw the most obvious con- clusion from them. As soon as the subject had found a solution he was to tell his experience with this condition, that he was to state only that of which he was certain and that he would be asked some questions. Such questions as these were asked: Were the two sentences perceived with pertinent interest? What was the character of the coming up of the solution in your mind? Which of the following designations applies best to the case in question-worked out, coming of itself, pressing forward, appear- ing like a compulsion, or none of these? Did you use any sort of aid, visual or logical schemes? How did you come to the con- clusion? Does one of the following descriptions apply? To a certain extent with or without insight into the essential necessity 31 Cf. Lindworsky, Johannes. Das Schlussfolgernde Denken. 1916. 31 EXPERIMENTAL WORK ON JUDGMENT 19 of the testimony; by help of word reproduction, etc.? Were there any general ideas present upon which you based the operation, such as if two sizes are to a third, etc.? The results showed a great variety of conclusions. The formal type of conclusion was the most common and this was caused, he thinks, by the relative simplicity of the problem. There was also a noticeable correlation between the number of formal and the number of correct conclusions. The formal conclusions were as follows: those where emphasis on the middle term was promi- nent; those of subordination; conclusions from a factual relation- ship only. These last were perfectly natural, common-sense sort of conclusions, not going back to school forms or schemes, but the conclusion rested solely upon the content of the matter. There were also conclusions by a chance method of understand- ing, some by substitution and by reproduction, that is, where a speech mechanism of some sort seems to have relieved the sub- ject of having to solve the problem. In the second series of experiments the interest was in non- syllogistic processes of conclusion and the method was varied accordingly. Such problems as these were used: Eclecticism, which chooses what appeals to it from the teachings of all times. and all peoples, is always a sign of philosophic creative power On the moon there is no atmosphere. What would then be true of falling bodies on the moon? When the judge is no longer tied to a literal conception of justice- Again there was no apparatus used and an effort was always made to avoid describing the general task by any such remarks as, "You are to draw a conclusion," or "You are to reason out something from what lies at hand." Rather the subjects were told, for example, that they would receive a sentence in which there was a gap, and that their task was to fill in the gap sensibly. In general, visual presentation was employed, except in very definite types of task where auditory presentation seemed more suitable. Again the time for the task was strictly limited to 45 seconds. The record of the subject's account was then made. The most general result of these experiments was that sponta- neously the subjects designated as conclusions the problems solved by them. As to how the problem was solved, the number A 20 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING of variations in the method in the rather small number of ex- periments used was surprising. The author claims also to have found that thought processes form a fairly continuous chain, reaching close to the purely perceptual functions and still re- taining the essential differences. The various methods of solu- tion used were schematic, anticipation (as to know, for instance, that an adjective was needed to describe a person and then sud- denly to think of it), visual imagination of the circumstance and conclusion from it, conceptual clarification of circumstance, etc. The most prominent in the process of concluding, however, was the conception of relationship. The subject sees something in the circumstance, or, in other cases, something in the circum- stance is revealed to him which before he did not see. The condi- tion which is inherent in the recognition of relationship can hardly be observed in circumstantial conclusions, but plays a large rôle in the syllogism; namely, the grasping of a point of relationship. It does not matter in non-syllogistic conclusions what point of relationship is chosen, if the problem permits of a choice. Of the various points of relationship there were those of equality or the recognition of similarity between two things, the recognition of contrast, logical dependence, etc. Sometimes the perception of relationship appeared directly in consciousness without any intermediary. Although the present work was not meant to decide the long disputed question as to whether the syllogism is capable of im- parting new knowledge, nevertheless, it has revealed that psy- chologically, if we think syllogistically, we may certainly gain new insight, because our actual thinking is of such a kind that in utilizing a concept we never have all of its implications in view. Another question is whether or not we actually use the syllogism. This most certainly may happen if in speech or writing a new fact is presented to us syllogistically, but when our thinking is not tied to a form imposed from the outside, the use of the syllogism is probably very rare. The syllogism, then, from these results, did not seem to be the medium of natural thought progression. Many text-books of logic and of psychology state that instead of the syllogism, the enthymeme constitutes the natural method of concluding. Lindworsky agrees with GRAN A EXPERIMENTAL WORK ON JUDGMENT 21 this, but gives the enthymeme a new significance, by making it a special case of his more general formula, that natural concluding takes place by means of a group of relationships. And this formula sums up Lindworsky's theory. He says, for example, that with the major and minor alone, the conclusion is not yet finished, for these are its body, while the group of relationships must be added as its soul, in order to make it true. So, it is in the recognition of relationships, and in this only, that progress in thought takes place. CHAPTER III THEORIES OF LOGICIANS Finally, there are the works of the logicians, and just as the psychologists disagree, so do the logicians disagree on the prob- lems of the nature of the concept, judgment, and inference. And here again, since a review of the contents of every work on logic would be of no special value, only some of the leading logicians of the nineteenth and of the present century have been considered and their theories used as the material for the present investigation on the nature of the reasoning process. JEVONS The theory of Jevons is perhaps the simplest and so may well be considered first. It is mechanical in nature, to the effect that, processes of inference always are accomplished by the method of substitution, and this method is based on his idea that the basis of all inference is either identity or similarity. Thus: "Same- ness or identity presents itself in all degrees and is known under various names; but the great rule of inference embraces all degrees, and affirms that so far as there exists sameness, identity or likeness, what is true of one thing will be true of the other." So he says: "The fundamental action of our reasoning faculties consists in inferring or carrying to a new instance of a phe- nomenon whatever we have previously known of its like, analogue, equivalent or equal," and "the great difficulty of reasoning con- sists in ascertaining that there does exist a sufficient degree of likeness or sameness to warrant an intended inference.' An example of the simplest kind of inference is found in the use of a pattern or sample, where, since the two things to be compared resemble the pattern, they resemble each other, and similarly in the use of a measure to compare the size of two objects where resemblance of the two measurements is the condition of the 113 1 The Principles of Science. W. S. Jevons. 1874, vol. I, p. 11. 2 Ibid., p. 11. ³ Ibid., p. 11. 22 THEORIES OF LOGICIANS 23 } "" inference regarding the resemblence of the two objects, as the height of two mountains, both as compared to sea level. In this theory reasoning is little more than a mechanical, mathematical substitution or replacement of similars or equivalents. Even the sign "=" is employed and is taken as always denoting “some form or degree of sameness or equivalency." "The general formula A B must be taken to mean that A and B are sym- bols for the same object or group of objects."5 In applying his theory to such a proposition as "all mammalia are vertebrata, for instance, where mammalia and vertebrata obviously are not identical, he explains the proposition as a partial identity and says that it means that mammalia form a part or are identical with a part of the large class of vertebrata. This same condi- tion was explained by Aristotle as inclusion in a class, that is, of mammalia in the class of vertebrata, but Jevons prefers to consider Aristotle's relationship of inclusion as itself resting upon what to him is the more fundamental notion of identity. So again, "the fundamental action of our reasoning faculties con- sists in inferring or carrying to a new instance of a phenomenon whatever we have previously known of its like, analogue, equiva- lent, or equal," and "this power of mutual replacement exist- ing between any two objects which are to a sufficient degree like or equivalent," he terms "the substitution of similars." The actual rule also he gives. "By deduction we investigate and un- fold the information contained in the premises; and this we can do by one single rule. For any term occurring in any proposition or expression, substitute the expression which is asserted in any premise to be identical with it." The essence of his theory, then, is that reasoning proceeds by a method of substitution of equals or similars. JAMES MILL 4 Ibid., p. 19. ❝ Ibid., p. 20. Ibid., vol. I, p. 11. 7 Ibid., p. 21. 8 Ibid., p. 69. James Mill's theory of reasoning is based upon his doctrine of the association of ideas or images. Thus, "I recognize the 24 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING meaning of names solely by association." And again, "If I say I have the idea of a horse, I can explain distinctly what I mean. I have the idea of the sensations of sight, of touch, of hearing with which the body and actions of a horse have im- pressed me; these ideas, all combined, and so closely that their existence appears simultaneous, and one. This is my idea of a horse. If I say I have a conception of a horse and am asked to explain what I mean, I give the same account exactly, and I can give no other. My conception of the horse is merely my taking together, in one, the simple idea of the sensations which consti- tute my knowledge of the horse; and my idea of the horse is the same thing.”10 Thus the concept of a horse is to James Mill a fusion of various mental images, visual, auditory and kinaesthetic. The proposition he defines as "a name for that form of words which makes a predication," and "Predication consists essentially in application of the two marks to the same thing."12 Predication, then, is a form of naming and the predicate is always of the same or of greater extent than the subject. "All predication is pred- ication of genus or species."13 In the proposition the subject idea and the predicate idea arise together and their meanings are suggested by association. Moreover, they are but two names for the same thing, and since the meaning of names is recognized solely by association, similarly belief or the "recog- nition of the coincidence, entire or partial,"14 of these two names is brought almost solely by association. This process of asso- ciation functions in a similar way throughout the whole reason- ing process. Thus: "In each of the two preceding propositions two terms or names are compared. In the last proposition a third name is compared with both the other two; immediately with the one, and, through that, with the other; the whole, ob- viously, a complicated case of association."15 ⁹ Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. James Mill. 1878, vol. I, pp. 388-389. 10 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 234–235. 11 Ibid., vol. I, p. 388. 12 Ibid., vol. I, p. 388. 13 Ibid., vol. I, p. 169. 14 Ibid., vol. I, p. 392. 15 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 425-426. 1 THEORIES OF LOGICIANS 25 1 JOHN STUART MILL Of the various theories concerning the nature of propositions, John S. Mill considers that certain of these, such as that judg- ment is inclusion of a subject in a class or that it is the attribut- ing of two names to the same thing, are a partially correct account of the process. There is, however, according to his theory, a universal type, for every proposition asserts that a given object does or does not possess a given attribute, or it asserts that two attributes do or do not co-exist. Thus the sub- ject and predicate of the major premise are connotative terms, denoting objects and connoting attributes. The assertion in the major premise is that with one of the two sets of attributes we always find the other, that the attributes connoted by "man, for example, never exist unless conjoined with the attribute called mortality. So "Existence, Co-existence, Causation, Resem- blance, one or other of these is asserted or denied in every propo- sition which is not merely verbal," and this is his concept of the universal type. "" As for reasoning, which is generally considered to be of two kinds, from generals to particulars or deduction, and from partic- ulars to generals or induction, to Mill there is a third type, which is the foundation of both of these, and it is that of reason- ing from particulars to particulars. He claims that there is difficulty in the common theory of the syllogism in the incon- sistency between considering the syllogism as a process of proof or inference and the principle that there can be nothing in the conclusion which was not already asserted in the premises. His theory that reasoning proceeds from particulars to particulars is an attempt to explain away this difficulty, and he adds that such a concept of the process is not a mere theory of a method by which we may reason, but rather is a true account of the way in which we do reason. For instance, a child who has burned his hand avoids putting his hand again into the fire, but Mill claims that his avoidance of the fire is not a conclusion derived from any general principle that fire burns, but that the child looks only at the present case, and is inferring a particular conclu- 16 A System of Logic. John Stuart Mill. 1874, p. 85. 26 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING sion from a particular event in the past. The fact that we reason from particulars to particulars does not at all, however, preclude general principles, universal propositions. All in- ference is from particulars to particulars and general proposi- tions function merely as registers of such inferences and short formulae for making more. The major premise of a syllogism, consequently, is a formula of this description, but the real major premise from which we would conclude that Mr. S. is mortal would be that our ancestors and A and B and C and innumerable other people were mortal. From these instances which we have observed we would feel warranted in concluding that the same would hold in all similar cases and we could make the general statement that all men are mortal. The real inference, how- ever, consists not in concluding from this general statement that Mr. S. is mortal, but rather the inference is finished when we have asserted that all men are mortal. The syllogism, then, is only the latter half of the process of passing from the original particular premises to the conclusion, and the function of the syllogism is merely to interpret. So, to Mill, the syllogism is not a correct analysis of the process of reasoning, but rather the process passes from particulars to particulars by means of two steps, first, an inference from particulars to generals, induction, and then an interpretation of the generalization made, or a so- called deduction. A syllogism, however, is not entirely useless. in the process of reasoning, for it is at least "an indispensable collateral security" for the correctness of the generalization, in- asmuch as it shows whether or not the case in hand also supports the general proposition. Again, concerning the value of general propositions, he says that if we have a collection of particulars which warrant an induction, we need not form a general propo- sition from these particulars to other particulars, but that when- ever a set of particular cases are such that we can legitimately draw an inference, we may then make this inference a general one. Yet it is always possible, and generally advantageous, in arguing from a number of known cases to another case, to make use of a general proposition, and it is necessary, if there is any doubt about the validity of our conclusion. Also, he criticizes another author for striking out the major altogether from the THEORIES OF LOGICIANS 27 reasoning process and failing to substitute anything in its place. In a sense, then, in Mill's theory, the existence of a major is necessary. At least the facts must be such as to warrant an induction or a general proposition being made from them, and although we may not explicitly state this proposition or major, nevertheless it must be possible to state it. So that, in reality, it is the factor which is determining the conclusion. In brief, then, the major premise itself is necessary, but not its conscious formulation. SCHILLER In Schiller we find a most vigorous attack upon formal reason- ing. This author gives a fourfold analysis of propositions, that is, one of four varieties of meaning may be asserted about the objects of thought. We may intend to assert about (1) "the relations of concrete things to each other," as for example, Some philosophers are Christians; (2) "the relating of a quality or 'attribute' to a thing," as The house is big; (3) "the interrela- tion of qualities"-Virtue is knowledge; (4) "the quality in rela- tion to a thing"-All that glitters is not gold.¹7 Thus in all cases there is the assertion of some sort of relation- ship, either of things to each other or qualities to each other or of qualities and things. Although the formal analysis of a propo- sition divides it into a Subject, about which the assertion is made, a Predicate which is asserted or denied about the Sub- ject, and a Copula, which is the mark of predication, actual propositions do not conform to this model, because the whole meaning is sometimes conveyed by a single word, as "Fire!" Similarly with the process of inference, it is defined as "any process of thought by which a mind passes from one judgment to another,"18 but it is in reality a most complex process and beyond the realm of formal analysis. Thus Schiller says: "Every actual inference was, of course, inspired by motives which led to it and not to any alternative, and these (whether good or bad) form its real grounds. But of these formal analysis knows and can know nothing. .. The only way of really explaining 17 Formal Logic. F. R. S. Schiller. 1912, p. 32. 18 Ibid., p. 165. 28 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING the course thought is going to take is to go into its antecedents, i.e., the motives, character and circumstances of the thinker."19 In such a theory the syllogism could not possibly be a true account of the actual reasoning process, and this we find is the author's opinion. As to its structure, the "syllogism is a com- bination of three propositions so arranged that the third, called the Conclusion, follows with logical necessity from the first two, called the Premises. By 'logical necessity' is meant that no one who has once accepted the premises as true can refuse to acknowledge the truth of the conclusion."20 Also, "the three propositions contain three terms, called the major, the minor, and the middle. They are so arranged that each occurs twice, and the middle term, by occurring in each of the premises, renders possible or 'mediates' an inference about the relation of the minor to the major, which is expressed in the conclusion."21 Such is the structure of the formal syllogism, but in point of fact, according to Schiller it plays no real part in any reasoning process. "As a form, therefore, the syllogism is impotent and has no power of compulsion. The selection of its premises is always the product of a free choice among infinite possibilities of knowledge."22 Its necessity is entirely "ex post facto" and "the inference is over when the premises have been brought together.''23 The conclusion then follows merely as a matter of course. Thus: "The 'necessity of thought' which it (the syllogism) professed to display, lay merely in an ex post facto reflection on the completed form, and did not exist in the actual reasoning,"24 and the con- clusion reveals nothing new. Its apparent novelty is psycho- logical only. The petitio principii argument also is advanced in that it is claimed that the syllogism argues in a circle. For exam- ple, in the case of the much overworked syllogism: All men are mortal, Mr. S. is a man and therefore Mr. S. is mortal, it is neces- sary in order to know that all men are mortal, as a part of that 19 Ibid., pp. 171–172. 20 Ibid., p. 179. 21 Ibid., pp. 179–180. 22 Ibid., p. 196. 23 Ibid., p. 208. 24 Ibid., p. 220. THEORIES OF LOGICIANS 29 25 Ibid., p. 211. 26 Ibid., p. 210. 27 Ibid., p. 336. very knowledge, that Mr. S. also is mortal. This criticism of the petitio principii Schiller considers valid if the formal account of the syllogism is accepted. If, however, with Schiller, one does not accept the formal account, there is another and entirely satisfactory explanation of the apparent difficulty, where it is a case not of begging but rather of raising a question. Thus "every real syllogism (as opposed to the defunct form of words which Formal Logic substitutes for the real reasoning) is the expression of an experiment which tests the consistency of our knowledge. The conclusion states what on the strength of previous knowl- edge we had a right to expect; but it has to be confirmed in fact. And if we had not felt it to be doubtful, we should not have reasoned. Actually, therefore, the syllogism does not beg, but raises a question, and this perhaps reveals the deepest difference between the different types of logic. For while Formal Logic seems to hold that all questions may be begged with impunity, a critical study of actual thinking inclines us rather to the conviction that all questions, or at all events all logical questions, should be raised."25 Again: "All men are mortal means those whose death has been recorded and does not include Smith (who is still alive), nor, therefore, beg the question. 'Smith' here stands for a new case which has not been examined, and it is of course always thinkable that he should prove discrepant."26 Thus the author has shown that although formally inadequate and not true as an account of the actual reasoning process, at least there is one field in which the value of the syllogism is manifest; that is, as a means of criticism, since all arguments are capable of being put into syllogistic form. In the way of a positive theory of inference, Schiller offers a theory of reasoning by analogy. "The interaction of 'case' and 'law,' and the reference of both to experience, are the vital points in real reasoning wherever it occurs."27 There is then no essential difference between inductive and deductive reasoning, and the process is always empirical, because the result 30 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING 11128 has always to be verified by its working in experience. Thus: "Our procedure in reasoning is always the same. It is always experimental, whether we assume a 'law' (or rule) and 'deduce' (apply to it) a 'case,' or assume a 'case' by a selection from the 'given' and infer from it a 'law.' "In 'Deduction' we start from the formula and argue to the 'case,' in 'Induction' we start from the 'cases' and argue to the formula."29 The procedure, then, is very simple. Thus: "It is now, however, become pos- sible to understand how we really reason. In logical form our procedure is always essentially the same and extremely simple. We select a 'fact' tentatively, as a 'case' of a 'law' and try to find a law that fits the 'fact.'"'30 The 'law' is not an absolute certainty, but it is "a flexible formula for application to cases, and gets its real meaning from the cases to which it has been successfully applied."3 So, in speaking of legal decisions he suggests: "Is the case more justly conceived as case al of law A or as case bI of law B?''32 Schiller mentions also arguing from particular to particular as allowable, but, with this condi- tion: "The facts we argue from are understood to be 'cases' of 'laws,' so are the 'facts' we argue to."33 Although, then, the possibility of formulating these 'laws' is essential, the author goes on to say: "But why should these laws be stated? They can, of course, be stated on demand; but how does this add to the value of the reasoning? If we argue directly from the cases, we argue by analogy, and if it is to be a good analogy, the cases must be relevant; if we formulate a rule, we merely state the ground of this same analogy. The analogy does not become better by being formulated as a universal rule, nor is its risk diminished."34 So again, although its explicit formulation is unessential, in this theory, too, it would seem that what is com- monly called a major premise is in reality an essential. 28 Ibid., p. 335. 29 Ibid., p. 336. 30 Ibid., pp. 318–319. 31 Ibid., p. 320. 32 Ibid., p. 321. 33 Ibid., p. 217. 34 Ibid., p. 217. THEORIES OF LOGICIANS 31 SPENCER The type of theory given by Binet is again exemplified in Herbert Spencer-namely, that of associating the reasoning process with the process of perceiving. Spencer attacks logic and the syllogism. The science of logic formulates laws existing among objective things, not the laws governing the ideas which correspond to those existences or things. And the syllogism is inadequate as an account of the real reasoning process. No axiom can rightly express the actual ratiocinative act. An analysis of reason can only "disclose the act of consciousness through which these and all other mediately known truths are discerned; and this we have in the inward perception of likeness or unlikeness of relations. But a truth of this kind does not admit of axiomatic expression because the universal process of rational intelligence cannot become solidified into any single product of rational intelligence."'35 The simplest and most complex deliverances of reason have alike a form which the syllogism fails to represent. The data for reaching such an axiomatic truth as that Things same thing = each other, cannot be expressed syllogistically. The syl- logism, then, if taken to represent the form of the inferential act, has the fundamental fault that it fails to cover the whole of the ground it professes to cover. So the ratiocinative act is not truly expressed by the syllogism. Furthermore, the syllogism is a psychological impossibility, because in an actual syllogism the mind is occupied with the individual before it is occupied with the class. "When I say All crystals have planes of cleavage This is a crystal therefore This has a plane of cleavage; and when it is asserted that this described the mental process by which I reached the conclusion, there arises the question: What induced me to think of 'all crystals?' It must have been, then, that a consciousness of the particular crystal identified 35 The Principles of Psychology. Herbert Spencer. 1914, vol. II, p. 95. 32 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING by me as such, was antecedent to my conception of 'all crystals.' For the mind being, as we see, occupied about the indi- vidual crystal before it is occupied about the class, there re- sult the two inquiries (1) why, having been conscious of the individual crystal, should I, in this particular case, go on to think of the class, crystals; instead of thinking of some other thing? And (2) why, when I think of the class crystals, should I think of them as having planes of cleavage instead of thinking of them as angular, or as polished, or as brittle, or as having axes? There is one answer, and only one. Before consciously asserting that all crystals have planes of cleavage, it has already occurred to me that this crystal has a plane of cleavage."36 There is also the objection of petitio principii, that is, that the minor is an assertion of a judgment which has been tacitly or implicitly stated beforehand. • 7 However, even if the syllogism is not the expression of the process of reasoning; even if it does not describe the process by which a conclusion is reached, at least it is the correct account of the process by which the conclusion may be justified. "The process of thought which the syllogism seeks to describe is not that by which the inference is reached, but that by which it is justified; and in its totality is not gone through at all, unless the need for justification is suggested."37 It is a convenient way of showing the data and so facilitates the deliberate proof or verifica- tion of an inference already drawn, and this is its only real value. So to Spencer the syllogism represents not the primary and direct reasoning, gone through almost spontaneously and without dis- tinct assertion of data, but the secondary and indirect reasoning, consciously undertaken and carried through as a means of veri- fication. What, then, is the theory of reasoning, since the syllogism is so inadequate and incorrect a description of the process? In Spencer's view, reasoning is carried on by a comparison of rela- tions. The reasoning consists in the inward perception of the likeness or unlikeness of relations. And there is a way of repre- 26 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 97-98. 87 Ibid., vol. II, p. 98. THEORIES OF LOGICIANS 33 senting the syllogistic process which is in accord with such a doctrine. Thus: "To symbolize the deductive process in a complete manner, the inferred relation must be placed before, as well as after, the class of relations to which it is assimilated. On presentation of some object, there is suggested to the mind some unperceived attribute as possessed by it. This act is simple and spontaneous, resulting not from a remembrance of the before-known like relations, but merely from the in- fluence which as past experiences, they exercise over the asso- ciation of ideas. Commonly, the inference thus determined suffices us, and we pass to some other thought; but if a doubt is internally or externally suggested, then the acts of thought repre- sented by the rest of the symbol are gone through we have a process of conscious reasoning."38 And, "It is universally ad- mitted that induction must precede deduction."39 Not only of reasoning in its "ensemble" is this true, but also, of each particu- lar inference. Each particular act of deduction implies a pre- paratory act of induction. "For may we not properly say that the mental transition from the spontaneously inferred relation with which every deductive process must commence to the class of relations it belongs to, parallels the act by which the mind originally passed from particular relations to the general rela- tion?'"'40 And this form of representing the deductive process is in accord with the doctrine "that reasoning is carried on by com- parison of relations."41 The theory of reasoning through a comparison or classification of relations, is carefully worked out. First of all, "Every rational proposition expresses some relation. But how is a relation thinkable? It is thinkable only as of a certain order as be- longing to some class of before-known relations. It must be with relations as with their terms; which can be thought of as such or such only by being thought of as members of this or that class.' 1742 "This is an animal" implies that animals have been 38 Ibid., pp. 101-102. 39 Ibid., p. 102. 40 Ibid., p. 102. 41 Ibid., p. 103. 42 Ibid., p. 114. 34 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING previously presented to consciousness, and the assertion is "a grouping of the new object perceived with the similar objects remembered."43 As the proposition expresses some relation, so also reasoning or inference is the expression of relations, although here the method of establishing the relations is not as direct as in the proposition. Thus, "Reasoning is the indirect es- tablishment of a definite relation between two things, and the achievement of this is by one or many steps, each of which con- sists in the indirect establishment of a definite relation between two definite relations."'44 The association of reasoning with perceiving, then, must be obvious from such an account of the reasoning process. And Spencer says knowing by Reason differs from knowing by Per- ception in its indirectness. If the terms of a cognition are so presented that the relation between them is immediately cog- nized-if their co-existence, or succession, or juxtaposition is knowledge through the senses, we have a perception. If the relation is not knowable through the senses but is mediately cognized, we have a ratiocinative act. Reasoning, then, is the “indirect establishment of a definite relation between two things.''45 And the process of its establishment is this and this only. "If a relation between two things is not directly knowable, it can be disclosed only through the intermediation of relations that are directly knowable or are already known. Two mountains, not admitting of a side by side comparison, can have their relative heights determined only by reference to some common datum line, as the level of the sea. Hence every ratiocinative act is the indirect establishment of a definite relation between two things, by the process of establishing a definite relation between two definite relations.”46 Perception and Ratiocination then differ only in degree of directness or indirectness, and in general Spencer considers the divisions commonly made among the various mental processes as true only to a superficial view. So perception "passes at one 43 Ibid., p. 114. 44 Ibid., p. 116. 45 Ibid., p. 115. 46 Ibid., pp. 115–116. THEORIES OF LOGICIANS 35 extreme into reasoning and at the other borders upon sensation."47 Perception borders upon sensation because "a mere physical affection of the organism does not constitute a sensation proper."48 We must be conscious of the sensation, and here perception enters the field. And perception borders upon reasoning because "all psychologists concur in the doctrine that most of the ele- ments contained in the cognition of an observed object are not known immediately through the senses, but are mediately known by instantaneous ratiocination."49 This would seem to identify what is ordinarily known as perception with "instantaneous ratiocination." And again, since ordinary daily cognitions involve a classification of relations, and since the essence of ratiocination is a classification of relations, again the two are synonymous. So ordinary every day cognitions all "involve classification or recognition of attributes, groups of related attributes and relations between such groups; all of them embody inferences; all imply intuitions of likeness or unlikeness."50 And so the divisions made among the various mental processes have merely a superficial truth. Reasoning involves the in- direct establishment of relations, and similarly Perception, by which complex objects become specifically known, also involves the indirect establishment of relations. A building is known first mediately. "The indirect passes into the direct by long- continued habit,"51 and the building seems to be immediately known. So in Spencer's concept "only relatively, and not ab- solutely, is reasoning distinguished from perception by its indirectness."'52 T BOSANQUET 47 Ibid., p. 245. 48 Ibid., vol. II, p. 246. 49 Ibid., vol. II, p. 133. 50 Ibid., vol. II, p. 134. 51 Ibid., vol. II, p. 134. 52 Ibid., vol. II, p. 135. According to Bosanquet, the fundamental activity of thought is the same throughout all its workings, and the essential in judgment, as in inference, is the reference of an ideal content to reality. "The ultimate subject of the perceptive judgment is the 36 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING real world as a whole, and it is of this that, in judging, we affirm the qualities or characteristics."53 This idea he demonstrates first in regard to the judgment or proposition and then in regard to the inference. An act of judgment then takes place when "I affirm the meaning of the idea, or the idea considered as meaning to be a real quality of that which I perceive in my perception."54 For instance, when a plate with a white substance upon it is presented to view and the judgment is made that 'it is bread,' “I affirm the reference or general meaning which constitutes the symbolic idea 'bread' in my mind to be a real quality of the spot or point in present perception which I attempt to designate by the demonstrative 'this.'"'55 That is, in all perceptive judg- ments, there is something that is real, and this is the subject and this reality is qualified by having referred to it some mean- ing which can be symbolized by a name and these are the main elements in all judgments of every kind. A judgment finds verbal expression in a proposition, and while in a proposition there are three distinct parts, a subject, a predicate, and a copula, in the judgment these parts are differences within an identity. "Thus I am of opinion that Subject and Predication are essential elements in the judgment. But whereas in the judgment they are differences within an identity, in the proposi- tion they are isolated parts of an extended whole."56 And, "In arriving at a judgment we undoubtedly appear to begin with a ready-made Subject, to which a Predicate is added by a sub- sequent transition. But closer attention will show that this is not the case."'57 Again: "It is plain that the judgment, however complex, is a single idea. The relations within it are not rela- tions between ideas, but are themselves a part of the idea which is predicated."'58 "Thus in the Perceptive Judgment at least we find the meaning or objective reference of an idea—such a 63 Logic or the Morphology of Knowledge. Bernard Bosanquet. 1888, p. 78. 54 Ibid., vol. I, p. 76. 55 Ibid., vol. I, p. 76. 56 Ibid., vol. I, p. 83. 57 Ibid., vol. I, p. 86. 58 Ibid., vol. I, p. 81. THEORIES OF LOGICIANS 37 content as is indicated by a name-affirmed to characterise some reality present in sense-perception, and through it, reality as a whole. We shall find that all judgments of every kind share the main elements of this description; only that the reference to an indeterminate element of sense-perception is gradually displaced by the introduction of explicit ideas to designate the immediate subject."59 This explanation then gives, implicitly at any rate, Bosanquet's idea of meaning. He said that one refers some meaning to the real and that this meaning can be symbolized by a name. In Sigwart, James Mill, and Wundt, the theory as to the nature of meaning is entirely different from the theory here presented. Here "the meaning of every name is in what it refers to, or is meant to mean; an idea or concept is not an image, though it may make use of images. It is a habit of judging with reference to a certain identity."60 Again, the idea is a fixed. content, not the psychical images which pass through the mind and never recur. "The psychical images that pass through our minds might be compared to a store of signal flags," while the idea is taken for the signification, so to speak, of the signal flags, not for the particular flags themselves, whose meaning is not affected if different bits of cloth are used on every occasion. Since every judgment expresses an identity in difference, it is both analytic and synthetic, and these are but two aspects of the same process. Thus "if I say, 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon,' I start with an individual Caesar, whose continued identity ex- tended through a certain space of time and revealed itself in a variety of acts, and I exhibit his identity in one of the acts and moments-its differences through which it persisted. What I mean by the affirmation is that he, the Caesar who had before. conquered Gaul, and who was afterwards murdered on the Ides of March, displayed his character and enacted part of his history by crossing the Rubicon. This is a clear case of exhibiting an identity in difference. But the process has inevitably two aspects. On the one hand, I analyze the individual whole that is called Caesar by specifying one of the differences that may be 59 Ibid., vol. I, p. 78. 60 Ibid., vol. I, p. 41. 61 Ibid., vol. I, p. 74. 38 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING considered as a part within it; on the other hand, I construct or make synthesis of the individual whole in question, by exhibiting it as a whole that pervades, and absorbs, in itself, each or all of its differences."62 The judgment, then, is a single idea and the relations within it are not relations between different ideas, but they are them- selves part of one general idea that pervades the whole and is the identity within which the judgment has merely expressed some diversity. "For a universal is that which without preju- dice to its identity persists through or contains in itself different relations."'63 Such a concept of the judgment obviously excludes any theory such as that of the association of ideas, for such a theory would mean the association of particulars and so pre- clude an all-pervading universal. 9964 The same concept of the active universal, or the identity, per- sisting through the differences which exist within itself, con- stitutes Bosanquet's theory of inference, for inference he de- fines as the "mediate reference of an ideal content to reality.' "The universal in its differences is then the basis of mediate judgment or inference. Mediate judgment or inference is the indirect reference to reality of differences within a universal by means of the exhibition of this universal in differences directly referred to reality."'65 And again: "It is unquestionable that in inference we start from data, from facts thrown down before us, it may be in chaotic disorder and with no suggestion of a result. We go to work upon these facts and after the labour of hours, of days, or of a lifetime we light upon a conclusion which issues from them and to which they are related as premises; i.e., which exhibits them as differences in a universal."'66 And again, "the essence of inference is to drag into consciousness the operation of the active universal as a pervading unity of content on which inference depends." There seems, then, but little if any dif- 62 Ibid., vol. I, p. 99. 68 Ibid., vol. I, p. 200. 64 84 Ibid., vol. II, p. 1. 6 Ibid., vol. II, p. 4. 66 Ibid., vol. II, p. 5. 67 Ibid., vol. II, p. 2. THEORIES OF LOGICIANS 39 ference between judgment and inference as here analyzed, and such is Bosanquet's concept. Thus: "We admit, however, that the function of thought from elementary reproduction upwards is essentially one, and we more especially contend that every judgment, in so far as it is explicitly synthetic that is to say, in so far as it affirms one definite content to be a consequence of another definite content, is an activity only separated from Inference by the degree of distinction with which the parts are analyzed."68 And, "we meet the data with a judgment when they are laid before us, and we modify this judgment continu- ously throughout our inference. The conclusion is in no way different in logical character from the first steps of preparatory activity with which reason penetrates the facts laid before it."69 "Any section, taken, so to speak, across the interval of intellec- tual activity from first data to ultimate conclusion would lay bare the whole structure of inference."70 Again, "the funda- mental activity of thought is the same throughout and always consists in reproduction, by a universal or a real identity pre- sented in a content, of contents distinguishable from the present content, which also are differences of the same universal."" So then, the judgment reveals differences in a universal, and the universal in its differences is the basis also of mediate judgment or inference, and obviously there is no difference between the two processes. Coming to the more specific consideration of the syllogism, it is "a subsumptive reasoned judgment depending upon the iden- tity of differences within an individual subject, and making the intelligible ground of this unity explicit in various degrees, according to which the unity displays itself as a conjunction or as a coherence," a concept of the syllogism that is entirely in accord with his general theory of reasoning and inference. Again: "An explicit inference is a conclusion from two premises and no more, which assert relations between differences as belonging to a 68 Ibid., vol. II, p. 200. 69 Ibid., vol. II, p. 7. 70 Ibid., vol. II, p. 6–7. 71 Ibid., vol. II, p. 7. 72 Ibid., vol. II, p. 203. 40 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING single universal . the two premises must have an iden- tical term in common."73 And this identical term must be universal. "This follows necessarily from the theory of inference which has been developed, and follows also from the fact that this one term is able to stand in both premises. For a universal is that which, without prejudice to its identity, persists through or contains in itself different relations."74 1175 Bosanquet then remarks that there are many forms of in- ference which would conform perfectly to these conditions and yet be excluded by the traditional syllogism. As for the premises in such a theory as this: "There is no justification for the tradi- tional pre-eminence assigned to one premise as the major" nor for the distinction between universal and particular premises, because both are merely parts of the universal, the one just as much so as the other. So-called particulars are not particulars. but differences within a universal, and "any one of the elements of the universal may stand as the middle term in reasoning, i.e., the ground or universal par excellence."76 Again, as would follow inevitably from such a theory, "the order of the premises is immaterial. "If we are urged to say whether we know the major, the minor or the conclusion first, the only true answer is that in their full import, we know them simultaneously. As detached fragments of experience we may know any of them first. And as each element of the universal when rightly under- stood involves the others in their full determinateness, there can be no real difference in kind of import between major and minor premises, and no reason for preferring one order of terms to another.''77 The question of the necessity of the major also arises, and again the view is that the major itself is necessary, although its explicit formulation is non-essential. Moreover, there can in reality be no inference from particulars to particu- lars, and when there appears to be such it is merely that the ground of inference is not mentioned. Inference cannot possibly 73 Ibid., vol. II, p. 200. 74 Ibid., vol. II, p. 200. 75 Ibid., vol. II, p. 202. 76 Ibid., vol. II, p. 189. 77 Ibid., vol. II, p. 188. < THEORIES OF LOGICIANS 41 take place except through the medium of an identity or uni- versal, and "we find that the major premise consists in an explicit enunciation of the common nature which really warrants the conclusion. The point is, however, that though the enunciation itself is not indispensable, yet the operation of that identity which the enunciation formulates is indispensable."'78 Consequently, "the pervading identity or universal, which we affirm to be the operative power in inference, often appears, as in Mill's theory, to be simply non-existent."79 In such a theory, then, in which the process of inference is merely the unfolding, as it were, of the universal, it might seem that the conclusion could give no new idea or new concept. This Bosanquet explains, however, in this way. He defines syllogism: "The syllogism, as we have described it, is a subsumptive reasoned judgment depending upon the unity of difference within an individual subject, and making the intelligible ground of this unity explicit in various degrees, according to which the unity displays itself as a conjunction or as a coherence."80 Yet the conclusion is, in a sense, a new judgment, for "ultimately perhaps every inference may or should be represented as a single judg- ment, as being a mere extension of an existing whole of thought, and not a transition to a different one. Such an idea conflicts with the traditional differentia of inference, that it should lead to a new judgment; but this only means a bona fide extension of the previous whole, such that, if taken in abstraction from the process that generates it, it would appear a perfectly new judg- ment."'81 To Bosanquet, then, the conclusion, although in reality only a further development of the one universal, is, by itself, a “per- fectly new judgment." BRADLEY 78 Ibid., vol. II, p. 31. 79 Ibid., vol. II, p. 29. 80 Ibid., vol. II, p. 203. 81 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 88-89. Before giving his own theory of the judgment, which is sim- ilar to that of Bosanquet, Bradley first criticizes what to him are 42 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING various false theories. Thus, it is not true that all judgments have two ideas. They have put one, for "any content whatever which the mind takes up as a whole, however large or small, simple or complex, is one idea and its manifold relations are em- braced in an unity."'82 He, too, defines judgment as the reference of an ideal content to reality and says that "In this ideal content there are groups and joinings of qualities and relations, such as answer to nouns and verbs and prepositions. But these various elements, though you are right to distinguish them, have no validity outside of the whole content. That is one idea which contains all ideas which you are led to make in it, for, whatever is fixed by the mind as one, however simple or complex, is but one idea. But if this is so, the old superstition that judgment is the coupling a pair of ideas must be relinquished."83 Also judg- ment is not an association of an idea with a sensation, nor is it the mere strength of ideas. This gives an interesting criticism of Binet, especially since Bradley, as does Binet, gives the exam- ple of an orange, which presents us with visual sensations and in connection with which images of movement, hardness, weight, are called up and joined together. But, he asks, "if you simply associate this bundle of facts, who would take them as one fact?"84 Nor is the idea nothing more than an image, as in James Mill's theory. "The idea in judgment is the universal meaning; it is not ever the occasional imagery, and still less can it be the whole psychical event."85 Nor is judgment inclusion in, nor exclusion from a class. "Judgment is not inclusion in or exclusion from a class. It is as absurd as the assertion that in 'It is our son John,' or 'It is my best coat,' or '97 +2,' I think of a class of 'our sons John,' or 'my best coats,' or that which is equal to 7 plus 2."'86 Nor is the judgment an assertion of equality be- tween subject and predicate. Judgment is not the assertion that subject and predicate are identical or equal, for whenever we write =' there must be a difference or we should be unable to distinguish the terms we deal with. ( • 82 The Principles of Logic. F. H. Bradley. 1922, vol. I, p. 12. 83 Ibid., pp. 12–13. 84 Ibid., p. 14. 85 Ibid., p. 10. 86 Ibid., vol. I, p. 21. THEORIES OF LOGICIANS 43 As for positive theory, Bradley's is similar to Bosanquet's and, accordingly, it is a philosophical and rather abstract theory. "All judgment is the attribution of an ideal content to reality, and so this reality is the subject of which the content is predi- cated. Thus in 'A precedes B,' this whole relation A-B is the predicate, and, in saying this is true, we treat it as an adjective of the real world. It is a quality of something beyond mere A-B. But, if this is so, the reality to which the adjective A-B is referred is the subject of A-B and is the identity which un- derlies this synthesis of differences."87 As for inference, it is defined as "a truth judged true because of something else, and the going to a truth from the ground of a judgment or supposition are what we mean by conclusion and reasoning.''88 As for the actual process, it is one of analysis and synthesis, two processes which are in reality one and the same. All inference, then, can be reduced to the acts of synthesis and analysis, and we find "no inference which does not contain" either "synthetical construction" or "analytical elimination,"89 or both. These two processes function similarly in the case of judgment: "All judgment necessarily contains a relation, but every relation, beside its pair of related elements, presupposes a unity in which they subsist. Hence the judgment, in so far as it is the synthesis of the elements, is just so far the analysis of that whole to which they belong."90 Again in the case of in- ference: "The operations we mentioned seem to fall under the heads of synthetical construction and analytical elimination. We may at least say of these, that we find no inference which does not contain one of them."91 "Take an act of analysis in which A becomes (A) bcd. The elements in the result come to us as separate, but this very separation involves a relation. They are distinguished by virtue of a central identity, and they stand thereby in some kind of relation with one another. But this relation is synthetical. Thus the analysis, whilst analyzing, has 87 Ibid., p. 28. 88 Ibid., p. 243. 89 Ibid., vol. II, p. 450. 90 Ibid., p. 478. 91 Ibid., p. 450. 44 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING shown itself synthesis."92 Also: "Now take an act of synthesis. We have A-B, B-C, and from these we go on to produce A-B-C. We have got to a relation which before was absent, but our process is also an act of analysis. For A, B and C are now related within a whole, these terms and their relations are the constituent elements of the whole A-B-C. Thus the synthesis has analyzed while it seemed but to conjoin."93 Again: “In that form of reasoning which is most familiar, we verify the presence of both these activities. Thus from A-B, B-C we go by synthesis to A-B-C and then use elimination to bring out A-C."94 7795 Both judgment and inference, then, involve analysis and syn- thesis, and from this it might seem to follow that there is no essential difference between the two processes. Bradley claims, however, that there is, in a sense at least, a marked difference. Judgment is not the same as inference, because in inference the result described in the conclusion must be procured from the starting-point, that is, the predicate must come from the datum or the product must be gotton from the premises. But not so in judgment, where we may take X and simply 'add a Y as a suggestion that comes from the outside, and then judge X-Y. Again: "So judgment is not inference and a process which was nothing more than a judgment would never be reasoning.' Yet, on the other hand, they are not really distinct, for "Ex- plicit judgment is assuredly distinct from explicit inference."'96 But “the earliest judgment will imply an operation which, though it is not inference, is something like it, and the earliest reasoning will begin with a datum which, though kin to judgment, is not intellectual, and from the first these two functions imply one another. You can not say that in development either comes first; they emerge together as two sides and elements implicit within one primitive whole."97 Finally, "and our conclusion holds that as there is no inference without judgment, so, on the 92 Ibid., pp. 470-471. 93 Ibid., p. 471. 94 Ibid., p. 450. 95 Ibid., p. 438. 96 Ibid., p. 481. 97 Ibid., p. 481. THEORIES OF LOGICIANS 45 other side, there is no possible judgment without inference. In principle the two are no more than inseparable aspects of one process."'98 In point of fact, then, the two processes are the same and consist of analysis and synthesis, which in turn are but two aspects of the same process. And throughout all there is the purely metaphysical concept that in every judgment of what- ever sort, there is "the attribution of an ideal content to re- ality."99 WUNDT Concepts are constituent parts of any thought process and in Wundt's idea of the concept, images play a very prominent part.100 The formation of total images is gradual. First there is agglu- tination of images and then synthesis, and between these are innumerable degrees. In the case of agglutination, separate images are so bound together that a new one results. An example of such a process occurs daily and is seen in such words as Schreib- feder and Heerführer. The distinguishing character in the case of agglutination, however, is this, that each constituent of the compound word, already having an established meaning con- tinues to remain as an independent image and comes to conscious- ness along with the total image; that is, there is a distinct con- sciousness of the elements of the compound image. In the case of the synthesis of images, on the other hand, these constituent images no longer exist, and in such a synthesis there is a certain analogy with the associative fusion of conscious perception. In synthesis there has been a development in which a distinction of the elements has been made, and so synthesis has in this way evolved from agglutination. Again there are examples to be found, and as in Heerführer, the two elements are comprehended as separate images; on the other hand, in Herzog, Marschaal, the two elements are no longer independent and only the word as a whole has a meaning. Between the formation of concepts and the source of thought there exists a reciprocal relationship; that is, the organization of 98 Ibid., pp. 497-498. 99 Ibid., vol. I, p. 28. 100 Cf. Wundt, Wilhelm. Logik. 1906. I. pp. 36 ff. 46 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING the images set in relation to one another is closely connected with the apperceptive progress of thought. And, on the other hand, these separate images which enter into the final image are brought into relation with one another through thought. The two processes are simultaneous in that the course of thought is a condition for the further development of concepts and, on the other hand, the various characteristic forms of the course of thought follow from the analysis of concepts. The way in which concepts arise in us is by the synthesis of images already de- scribed, the synthesis of a prevailing image with a series of in- vidual images. From this there follows the various changes in the meaning of words and the displacement of the prevailing image, and finally the word comes to be a symbol and there re- sults the completion of present concepts and the formation of new ones. On the other hand, the concept is a source of the course of development of thought. The chains of thought so arising are connected through the original concept and a develop- ment of thought from concepts arises always when one es- pecially prevailing concept is placed in relation with a series of other concepts. As for the formation of the judgment, its theory is intimately connected with the relation between the formation of images and the development of thought. The statement that the judg- ment is a subjective union of images, or that it is the form of the binding together or separation of concepts, is in general, too indefinite, and, as a matter of fact, not even correct. For the judgment does not bring together concepts which have arisen separately, but it analyzes concepts out of a total image: that is, it analyzes a total image into its constituent parts. In even such simple judgments as I give, I think, there are not two con- cepts, the I and the giving or the thinking, arising independently of one another, and only subsequently being brought together, but the uniting into one image is the earlier process and the later, the analysis of the total image into its constituent parts, is the real judging. Similarly, in such judgments as "Righteousness is a virtue," or "Good actions make happy" there is first of all the thought as a whole and then there comes the separation into its conceptual constituent parts. So one may say that all judg- THEORIES OF LOGICIANS 47 ments have an analytical function. The judgment represents the thought, and for the purpose of this representing, it analyzes the thoughts into their elements, the concepts. So the judg- ment does not combine thoughts from concepts, but it resolves or analyzes thoughts into concepts. The constituent parts of the judgment are the subject and predicate, for in the judgment it is not possible that an indefinite number of images be brought together, but their union is limited by a restricting law, a law which is expressed by the relation of subject and predicate, and the judgment analyzes the total image into the image of the object which constitutes the subject and the image of a quality or a condition recognized in the object, and this constitutes the predicate. These two, subject and predicate, are the constituent parts. The copula, although it does not form a third constituent, nevertheless has value and is an important aid to our thought, for it makes it possible for us to bring into connection with a given subject many concepts which would not by themselves be appropriate as predicates. The copula, then, is the expression of the relation between sub- ject and predicate. As for the conclusion, this concept includes numerous psycho- logical processes and in a general sense may be defined as a union of thoughts through which from given judgments, a new judgment arises. It is an extension of the process of judging, inasmuch as every conclusion results from a union of judgments, which, although independent, are associated, one to another, through common concepts. In order to form a conclusion, then, at least two judgments are necessary, which have one con- cept in common, namely, the middle concept. Traditionally, these two judgments were designated as the premises and the third as the conclusion. In point of fact, however, it is not the conclusion or third judgment that is the all-important part, and to which the two independent judgments are but premises, but in reality, these so-called premises are the chief parts of the process and they alone are independent judgments. The con- clusion merely represents, in a special judgment, a union which already exists in the premises, and in which the middle concept is eliminated. But this is a real advance of knowledge, a union 48 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING of judgments that belong together, but which prior to reasoning the mind did not know as related "So that it is not right to say that the conclusion contains logically nothing new." (Logic I, 305.) As to the general fundamental forms according to which these unions of judgments take place, these forms are con- ceived of as forms of thought itself, and the outward arrange- ment of the separate parts is a matter of but secondary im- portance. Finally, the explanation of the ground of all con- clusions in that it is the principle of relationship. It is not ad- missable to make subsumptive reasoning the fundamental form of all concluding, and accordingly the rule that the general premise must always precede cannot be held true. Moreover, it is natural that we begin with the object to be classified and not with the species. Yet the opposite course has its rights, for example, in cases where it is a question not of the classification of an object in its class, but of the application of a general rule to a special case, where naturally the rule comes first. There have been many attempts to formulate a general law, applicable to all kinds of concluding, as the rule in the scholastic logic of the Dictum de omni et nullo-but all have been insufficient. A wider observation shows that whenever from given judgments a conclusion may arise, a complete or partial relation of identity between the known concepts in the premise must be given, and from this standpoint one may designate the principle of sub- sumption as the fundamental law of all concluding. Again, from algebraic equations, various forms of substitution have been carried over to the sphere of logic, and all judgments have been considered as logical equations. In itself, however, the substi- tution is not a principle, but merely a process that adapts itself to a principle, the principle of identity, and then one sees that all concluding results from the statement of identity, and, as is necessitated by negative judgments, from the statement of con- tradiction. Yet neither is the principle of identity an accurate description of judgments of every sort, for in cases where in the premises a relation of dependence or of condition or of cause is given, it would be necessary to shift the real relation of the con- cepts, if the relation of cause and consequence, for instance, were to be changed to that of a whole to its parts, and the process THEORIES OF LOGICIANS 49 of concluding so be placed under the statement of identity. Accordingly, the only principle which can possibly be considered as valid for all kinds of concluding processes is a general principle of relationship, and upon analysis this relationship reduces it- self to three principles: the statement of identity, the statement of contradiction, and the statement of the cause. SIGWART 105 Ibid., p. 53. 106 Ibid., p. 53. In Sigwart's work judgments are the consequences of all thought which is aiming at certainty and the proposition in which "something is stated about something, is the verbal expression of the judgment."101 With regard to the parts of a proposition, the subject and predicate, the subject may be any object which we can "retain independently in consciousness, ""102 an abstract idea, an object, an event. The predicate, however, must "be taken from those four ideas already known to us and must be named by words which are understood."103 Simple judgments are those "in which we name particular objects of intuition."'104 "The subject-idea is given immediately to intuition as a unity, the predicate-idea is mentally reproduced with its appropriate word, and the act of judging consists in the thought by which the two ideas are consciously unified."105 The mental process, then, in such a judgment is very simple: "The object before us awakens an idea left by some former impression, and connected with the word and the two are unified.”106 The nature of this process of unification is determined by Sigwart's concept of the nature of ideas, and the idea to him is a mental image, and these images, by becoming fused or associated, constitute judgment. He con- siders that "the idea connected with a word arises originally in this way from the intuition of a particular object, the incom- plete and shifting image of which constitutes the first meaning 101 Logic. Christoph Sigwart. 1895, vol. I, p. 25. 102 Ibid., p. 27. 103 Ibid., p. 27. 104 Ibid., p. 53. 50 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING of the word."107 And again: "As soon as it (the idea) has dis- engaged itself from the original intuition with its spatial and temporal connections, and is a mental image which can be freely reproduced-it is capable also of fusing with a number of fresh intuitions or ideas and of appearing as their Predicate in a judg- ment."108 "So, that for every word there finally remains a group of distinguishable ideas, all of which it serves to denote. They do not, however, all bear the same relation to the word; one image, more definite than the others, is specially connected with it, as the center of the group round which the others gather. In a region where fir trees grow, the image of the fir is that which a man principally connects with the word tree."109 And again: "The simplest judgments are those which are merely denominative judgments, declaring the immediate coincidence of images un- mediated by subsumptive inferences."110 It is a fusion of images, then, which constitutes the process of forming judgments that are simple or immediate. The process is unanalyzable and functions not only in immediate but also in mediate judgments or inference. So "this judgment (a mediated judgment) then is manifoldly mediated; in it is repeated several times the process which takes place at once in the coincidence of two images through the unanalyzable act by which they are brought together."111 Here, then, is another image theory, recalling that of Binet and of James Mill, where also judgment consists in a simultaneous association of images. The process which functions in this coincidence of images is obviously a process of synthesis. Synthesis, however, implies also analysis. In uttering a judgment such as: "This cloud is red. we first express the unity of a subject with its activity or attributes, this being indicated by the form of the words; we then name the attribute or activity which we have perceived by unifying it with the general idea "red." That which is given to perception is the red cloud . . " "" 107 Ibid., p. 46. 108 Ibid., p. 46. 109 Ibid., p. 48. 110 Ibid., p. 81. 111 Ibid., vol. 8, p. 55. • the THEORIES OF LOGICIANS 51 running horse, but we analyze the originally individual whole of perception by distinguishing and separating the attribute and activity from the idea of the subject. We have recognized by its shape and position that what we see is a cloud, and this recog- nition is expressed in calling it by the definite subject-word cloud. We are struck by the color, and hence this is easily disengaged from the whole. It is this color which we call red and ascribe to the cloud as its attribute. We recognize the thing which is run- ning to be a horse; as presented to use, "it is in movement, it is running, but we distinguish this incident from the subject which under other circumstances is known to us as standing still. It is this particular kind of movement which we express as running. We have thus distinguished the constituent parts in the total- image, the thing and its activity; in each of them we find again an idea already familiar to us, and by uniting the two elements in our statement, we express just what we have seen as a unity of a thing with its attribute or activity. Thus the judgment pre- supposes an analysis whilst its own work is to synthesize the different elements."112 The movement of thought may vary: that is to say, sometimes the subject-idea comes first to conscious- ness, sometimes the predicate. "In the former case the attribute or activity is first distinguished as a part of the total idea and then named; in the latter it is perceived first by itself and named, and then referred to a thing."113 Again: "All immediate judg- ments are analytical which only reunite the elements obtained by analysis of a presentation, judgments, that is, in which either the contents of the predicate are already presented in the subject, as in those of naming attributes or activities; or in which subject and predicate, together with the relation between them, form part of a complex presentation, as in relation judgments."114 That all immediate judgments are analytical, however, is only a necessary preliminary to the essential work of judging, which is a process of synthesis. "The basis and presupposition of all judgment is that judgment which is immediate, simple and positive; and this consists in the synthesis of a subject and predi- 112 Ibid., pp. 58-59. 113 Ibid., p. 59. 114 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 103-104. 52 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING cate, accompanied by the consciousness of objective validity,''115 and "that all immediate judgments should be analytical in this sense in no way contradicts the essence of the judgment, which is to be a σύνθεσις νοημάτων. For the analysis is only the prepa- ration for the act of judgment, not that act itself; the work of judgment is to restore union between the elements which have been thus distinguished."116 Thus, to return to the judgment that "this cloud is red," here we first analyze the total image of red cloud and separate the quality of redness. This is analysis. Then the process of synthesis functions when we again unite the two elements, the subject-idea and its quality in the proposition or statement of our judgment. In mediate judgments or inference the subject-idea and the predicate-idea are not immediately recognized as one, but some mediation is necessary. Inference is defined thus: "The process of drawing a conclusion or inference takes place psychologically whenever we are led to believe in the truth of a judgment by our belief in the truth of one or more judgments, and not immediately by the ideas of the subject and predicate connected in it."117 And here also the process is not well defined, for there are many ways in which this belief may be brought about psychologically, and it often happens that we are not even clearly conscious of the process of mediation by which we derive the certainty of one judgment from that of another. Thus: "This mediation de- pends frequently upon habits of association and combination which are governed, as a matter of fact, by fixed rules of which we are not expressly conscious."118 Immediate unification is thus distinguished from the more involved sort of process where a series of intermediate acts of thought are necessary in order that the subject and predicate of the conclusion may be unified. "When 'snow' or 'blood' denotes a scientific concept, the dis- tinguishing characteristics of which are present in memory, we do not form a judgment at first sight, but investigate the object in order to ascertain whether all the characteristics of the con- 115 Ibid., p. 233. 116 Ibid., vol. I, p. 104. 117 Ibid., vol. I, p. 336. 118 Ibid., vol. I, p. 327. THEORIES OF LOGICIANS 53 cept are appropriate to it. It is only upon the ground of a process of inference that we place the object under the concept; that is, that we attribute to it the whole complex of qualities universally accepted or contained in the term 'snow' or 'blood.' This judgment, then, is manifoldly mediated; in it is repeated several times the process which takes place at once in the coin- cidence of two images through the unanalyzable act by which they are brought together."119 A mediate judgment, then, con- sists of a series of immediate judgments, and since immediate judgments result from a coincidence of images, the mediate judg- ment also, conforms to the image theory. The process of media- tion, as already stated, is not always clearly conscious. Thus expectation of future events is based upon inference, but the ground of the expectation, which is previous experience, is not always consciously before the mind; that is, there is no law or universal proposition actually present at the focus point of con- sciousness. The existence, however, of such a proposition is essential. "It is evident that the particular instances known to us cannot enable us to infer a new instance with confidence, unless they provide a sufficient ground for the general proposition. This general proposition is an abbreviated formula for all that we hold ourselves justified in inferring from the testimony of experience; in it is contained the only real inference, and what follows is merely a 'deciphering of our own notes which we made to remind us that experience justified us in passing to further instances.'''120 And here Sigwart gives a most interesting criti- cism of Mill: "There is no doubt that we frequently infer from one particular case to another, but the question is whether we are justified in so doing. This question is decided by the validity of the general proposition, which does not as Mill represents- yield a collateral security, but is the one thing which makes the inference legitimate. Mill himself shows that the inference from particular cases to a new instance is not justified unless the general proposition may be inferred; and in reality the truth of the universal major premise is the condition of the truth of the conclusion. Thus the conclusion does, after all, depend upon 119 Ibid., vol. I, p. 55. 120 Ibid., vol. I, p. 360. 54 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING the major premise and cannot be proved without it."121 In practice, then, a major is necessary and also a minor. Thus: "The inference is always brought about by the same means; its fundamental condition is a major premise, which in some form or other includes a necessary consequence and constrains us to affirm a proposition in case another proposition is true. To this is added the minor premise, which indicates an instance to which the major premise is applicable."122 Finally, "In logical terminology the rule according to which we infer is always called the major premise, the datum from which we infer the minor premise."'123 The order is immaterial and depends simply upon the movement of thought in the particular instance at hand. Sigwart's theory, then, is an image theory; a major premise is necessary and definite relationships between the premises, and the recognition of these relationships comes about through a simultaneous coincidence of images. 121 Ibid., vol. I, p. 361. 122 Ibid., p. 373. 123 Ibid., p. 328. PART II EXPERIMENTAL 1 1 CHAPTER I METHOD OF PROCEDURE In order that the mental experiences studied might be real acts of reasoning in the solution of actual problems it was de- cided to present to the subject more or less difficult tasks that he would be called upon to solve and then give an account of the mental processes he had made use of in the solution. Actual legal cases on which judge and jury have exercised their mental acumen afford a very excellent material for the study of reasoning. Simple geometrical problems also call forth a real process of reasoning from the college student of average ability. The following are the legal cases just as they were read to the subjects. The opinion of the judge was not read to the subject until after he had given his own decision and introspection. MARY SHORT VS. STONE In the Queen's Bench, January 20, 1846 ASSUMPSIT. The declaration stated that, "in consideration that the plaintiff, being then unmarried, at the request of the defend- ant, had then promised the defendant to marry him, the defend- ant, he the defendant then promised the plaintiff to marry her within a reasonable time next after he should be thereunto re- quested by the plaintiff so to do; and the plaintiff avers that she, confiding in the said promise of the defendant, hath always hitherto remained and continued, and still is, sole and unmarried, and was always, from the time of the making of her said promise until the marriage of the said defendant as hereinafter mentioned, ready and willing to marry the defendant, whereof the defendant hath always had notice, yet the defendant, disregarding his said promise, after the making thereof and before the commence- ment of this suit, wrongfully and injuriously married a certain 55 56 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING other person, to wit, one Edith Collins, contrary to his said promise.' "" Plea 2. The defendant says that he was not at any time before the commencement of this suit requested by the plaintiff to marry her according to his said promise in that behalf. Veri- fication. If a party puts himself out of a condition in which a request could properly be made, he dispenses with the request. Here it is alleged that the defendant married another person. It was not necessary to show that that person was living when the ac- tion was commenced; there was a breach of contract at once when the defendant married. If the defendant disables himself from fulfilling such a request, then, in the first place, he dispenses with the request, because it has become impossible to make the request effectually; and, secondly, he has broken his own contract, because he is no longer able to fulfill that. RICHMOND, FREDERICKSBURG & POTOMAC RAILROAD COMPANY VS. MARTIN, ADMINISTRATOR Supreme Court of Appeals, Virginia, December 9, 1903 This action was brought by the defendant in error, Patrick Martin, administrator of Alice Martin, deceased, against the plaintiff in error, the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Rail- road Company, to recover damages for the negligent killing of his intestate, a daughter seven years of age, by a passenger train of the defendant company at a public crossing. The mother of the child was killed in the same collision, and the action was instituted for the sole benefit of the father, who, under the statute, is entitled to the recovery. At the trial there was a verdict for the plaintiff upon which judgment under review was rendered. The defendant adduced evidence, tending to prove that Patrick Martin, Jr., a minor eleven years old and a son of the plaintiff, was put in charge of a two-horse Dayton wagon, as driver, by his father, in which his mother and two younger sisters and a negro boy were to be driven from their home in the country to METHOD OF PROCEDURE 57 the city of Fredericksburg; that Patrick Martin, Jr., negligently drove upon and attempted to cross the railway track at Falmouth Crossing, in plain view of a rapidly approaching train; and that in the collision which followed his mother and two sisters, who occupied a rear seat in the vehicle were instantly killed. Sole question in the case, namely, whether a father, whose negligence has contributed to the death of his minor child, can, under the statute, in an action instituted by him as adminis- trator, suing for his own benefit, recover damages for the death of the child. The authorities all agree that there can be no recovery where the action is brought in the name and for the benefit of one whose negligence has contributed to the accident. WILLIAM LORING AND ANOTHER VS. CITY OF BOSTON Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, March Term, 1844 (Reported in 7 Metcalf, 409) Assumpsit to recover a reward of $1000, offered by the de- fendants for the apprehension and conviction of incendiaries. Writ dated September 30th, 1841. At the trial before Wilde, J., the following facts were proved: On the 26th of May, 1837, this advertisement was published in the daily papers in Boston: "$500 reward. The above reward is offered for the apprehension and conviction of any person who shall set fire to any building within the limits of the city. May 26, 1837. Samuel A. Eliot, Mayor." On the 27th day of May, 1837, the following advertisement was published in the same papers: "$1000 reward. The frequent and successful repetition of incendiary attempts renders it necessary that the most vigorous efforts should be made to prevent their recurrence. In addition to the other precautions, the reward heretofore offered is doubled. One thousand dollars will be paid by the City for the conviction of any person engaged in these nefarious practices. May 27, 1837. Samuel A. Eliot, Mayor." These advertisements were continued in the papers but about a week; but there was no vote of the city government, or notice to the mayor, revoking the 58 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING advertisements, or limiting the time during which they should be in force. Similar rewards for the detection of incendiaries had been offered and paid on the conviction of the offenders; and at the time of the trial of this case a similar reward was daily published in the newspapers. In January, 1841, there was an extensive fire on Washington Street, when the Armory House (so-called) and several others were burnt. The plaintiffs suspected that Samuel Marriott, who then boarded in Boston, was concerned in burning said buildings. Soon after the fire said Marriott departed for New York. The plaintiffs declared to several people their intention to pursue him and prosecute him, with the intention of gaining the reward of $1000 which had been offered as aforesaid. They pursued said Marriott to New York, carried with them a person to iden- tify him, arrested him, and brought him back to Boston. They then complained of him to the county attorney, obtained other witnesses, procured him to be indicted and prosecuted for setting fire to the said Armory House. And at the March term, 1841, of the Municipal Court, on the apprehension and prosecution of the said Marriott, and on the evidence given and procured by the plaintiffs, he was convicted of setting fire to said house, and sentenced to ten years' confinement in the State Prison. The only question in the case was whether said offer of reward continued to be in force when the Armory House was burned. In the first place it is to be considered that this is not an ordinance of the city government, of standing force and effect; it is an act temporary in its nature, emanating from the executive branch of the city government, done under the exigency of a special occasion indicated by its terms, and continued to be published but a short time. Although not limited in its terms, it is manifest, we think, that it could not have been intended to be perpetual, or to last ten or twenty years or more, and therefore must have been understood to have some limit. Supposing, then, by fair implication, there must be some limit to this offer, and there being no limit in terms, then by a general rule of law it must be limited to a reasonable time; that is, the services must be done within a reasonable time after the offer made. METHOD OF PROCEDURE { 59 Under the circumstances of the present case, the Court are of the opinion that three years and eight months is not a reasonable time within which, or rather to the extent of which, the offer in question can be considered as a continuing offer on the part of the city. In that length of time, the exigency under which it was made having passed, it must be presumed to have been forgotten by most of the officers and citizens of the community, and cannot be presumed to have been before the public as an actuating notice to vigilance and exertion on this subject; nor could it justly and reasonably have been so understood by the plaintiffs. We are therefore of the opinion that the offer of the city had ceased before the plaintiffs accepted and acted upon it. as such, and that consequently no contract existed upon which this action, founded on an alleged express promise, can be main- tained. WILLIAM H. TAYLOE, APPELLANT VS. THE MERCHANTS' FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF BALTIMORE Supreme Court of the U. S., January Term, 1850 (Reported in 18 Curtis, 191, 9 Howard, 390) This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court for the District of Maryland, which was rendered for the Defendants. William H. Tayloe, of Richmond County, Virginia, applied to John Minor, the agent of the defendants, residing in Fredericks- burg, in that State, for an insurance upon his dwelling-house to the amount of $8,000 for one year; and, as he was about leaving home for the State of Alabama, desired the agent to make the application in his behalf. His application was made accordingly, under the date of 25th November, 1844, and an answer received from the secretary of the company, stating that the risk would be taken at seventy cents on the hundred dollars, the premium amounting to the sum of fifty-six dollars. The agent stated in the application to the company the reason why it had not been signed by Tayloe, etc., that he had gone to the State of Alabama on business and would not return until February following; and that if he was 60 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING desired, to communicate to him at that place, the answer of the company. On receiving the answer the agent mailed a letter directed to Tayloe, under the date of 2nd of December, advising him of the terms of the insurance and adding, "Should you desire to effect the insurance, send me your check payable to my order for $57 and the business is concluded." The additional dollar was added for the policy. This letter, in consequence of a misdirection, did not reach Tayloe till the 20th of the month, who, on the next day, mailed a letter in answer to the agent, expressing his assent to the terms, and enclosing his check for the premium as requested. He also desired that the policy should be deposited in the bank for safe- keeping. This letter of acceptance was received on the 31st at Fredericksburg by the agent, who mailed a letter in answer the next day, communicating to Tayloe his refusal to carry into effect the insurance, on the ground that his acceptance came too late, the center building of the dwelling house, in the meantime, on the 22nd of the month, having been consumed by fire. The company on being advised of the facts, confirmed the view taken of the case by their agent, and refused to issue the policy or pay the loss. A bill was filed in the court below by the insured against the company, setting forth substantially the above facts and pray- ing that the defendants might be decreed to pay the loss, or for such other relief as the complainant might be entitled to. The unqualified acceptance by one, of the terms proposed by the other, transmitted by due course of mail, is regarded as closing the bargain from the time of the transmission of the acceptance. COMMONWEALTH VS. HACKETT Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., 1861 Indictment for murder The defendant contended that there was evidence to show the wounds of the deceased were unskilfully and improperly treated by the surgeon who attended him, and requested the court to instruct the jury as follows: METHOD OF PROCEDURE 61 1. The rule that the death must happen within a year and a day is one of limitation only and does not change the burden of proof, or release the government from the duty of proving affirmatively that the deceased died of the wounds alleged in the indictment. 2. It is not enough to satisfy this burden for the government to prove that without the wounds the deceased would not have died. 3. If the death was caused by the im- proper applications or improper acts of the surgeon in dressing the wounds, the case of the government is not made out. The court instructed the jury in conformity with the first clause of the instructions asked for, but declined to give the others, and in place thereof instructed them, substantially, that the burden of proof was upon the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the deceased died of wounds inflicted by the defendant. If the defendant wilfully and without justifiable cause inflicted a wound which was ultimately the cause of death, it made no difference whether the wound was in its nature instantly mor- tal, or whether it became the cause of death by reason of the deceased not having adopted the best mode of treatment. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a con- sequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes co- operated in producing the fatal result. BROWN VS. COLLINS Supreme Court, New Hampshire, June, 1873 Trespass, etc., Albert H. Brown against Lester Collins, re- cover the value of a stone post on which was a street lamp, situated in front of his place of business in the village of Tilton. The post stood upon the plaintiff's land, but near the southerly line of the main highway leading through the village and within four feet of said line. There was nothing to indicate the line of the highway, nor any fence or other obstruction between the highway, as travelled, and the post. The highway crosses the railroad near the place of accident, and the stone post stood 62 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING about fifty feet from the railroad track at the crossing. The defendant was in the highway, at or near the railroad crossing, with a pair of horses loaded with grain, going to the grist mill in Tilton village. The horses became frightened by an engine on the railroad near the crossing, and by reason thereof became unmanageable and ran, striking the post with the end of the pole and breaking it off near the ground, destroying the lamp with the post. No other injury was done by the accident. The shock produced by the collison with the post threw the defendant from his seat in the wagon and he struck upon the ground between the horses, but suffered no injury except a slight concussion. The defendant was in the use of ordinary care and skill in managing his team, until they became frightened as aforesaid. The foregoing were agreed upon for the purpose of raising the question of the right of the plaintiff to recover in this action. Judge Shaw, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "We think, as the result of all the authorities, the rule is correctly stated by Mr. Greenleaf, that the plaintiff must come prepared with evidence to show either that the intention was unlawful, or that the defendant was in fault; for if the injury was un- avoidable, and the conduct of the defendant was free from blame, he will not be liable. -- The occurrence complained of in this case was one for which the defendant is not liable, unless every one is liable for all damage done by superior force overpowering him, and using him or his property as an instrument of violence. The de- fendant, being without fault, was as innocent as if the pole of his wagon had been hurled on the plaintiff's land by a whirlwind, or he himself, by a stronger man, had been thrown through the plaintiff's window. Upon the facts stated, taken in the sense in which we understand them, the defendant is entitled to judgment. CORE STOFFER V. STATE¹ From the bill of exceptions it appears that, after the state had given evidence tending to prove that the plaintiff made an 1 Beale (1907), 542. METHOD OF PROCEDURE 63 assault upon Webb in the street, with the intent to murder him with a knife, and that in the conflict which ensued, Webb was killed by him, the plaintiff in error gave evidence tending to prove that he desisted from the conflict, declined further combat, and retreated rapidly a distance of one hundred and fifty feet, and took refuge in the house of a stranger, where he shut and held the door; that Webb, his brother and one Dingham im- mediately pursued, throwing stones at him, and crying "Kill him!" as he retreated, and, forcibly opening the door, they en- tered the house and assaulted him, and in the conflict which im- mediately ensued, Webb was killed. While he remains in the conflict, to whatever extremity he may be reduced, he cannot be excused for taking the life of his antagonist to save his own. In such a case, it may be right- fully and truthfully said that he brought the necessity upon him- self by his own criminal conduct. But when he succeeded in wholly withdrawing himself from the contest, and that so palpably as, at the same time, to mani- fest his own good faith and to remove any just apprehension from his adversary, he is again remitted to his right of self- defense, and may make it effectual by opposing force to force, and, when all other means have failed, may legally act upon the instinct of self-preservation and save his own life by sacrificing the life of one who persists in endangering it. The accused had, in good faith and abandoning all criminal purpose, withdrawn from the combat; he had not only retreated to the wall, but behind the wall; and had not only gone from the view of his adversary but to a place of supposed security from his attacks. REGINA VS. LATIMER² The prisoner was indicted for unlawfully and maliciously wounding Ellen Rolston. There was a second count charging him with common assault. The evidence showed that the prosecutrix, Ellen Rolston, kept a public house in Devanport; that on Sunday, the 14th day of 2 Beale, op. c., p. 198. 64 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING February, 1886, the prisoner, who was a soldier, and a man named Horace Chapple, were in the public house, and a quarrel took place; and eventually the prisoner was knocked down by the man Horace Chapple. The prisoner subsequently went out into a yard at the back of the house. In about five minutes the prisoner came back hastily through the room in which Chapple was still sitting, having in his hand his belt which he had taken off. As the prisoner passed he aimed a blow with his belt at the said Horace Chapple and struck him slightly; the belt bounded off and struck the prosecutrix, who was standing talking to Horace Chapple, in the face, cutting her face open and wounding her severely. At the close of the case the learned Recorder left these ques- tions to the jury: 1. Was the blow struck at Horace Chapple in self-defense to get through the room, or unlawfully and mali- ciously? 2. Did the blow so struck in fact wound Ellen Rolston? 3. Was the striking Ellen Rolston purely accidental, or was it such a consequence as the prisoner should have expected to follow from a blow aimed at Chapple? The jury found: 1. That the blow was unlawful and mali- cious. 2. That the blow did in fact wound Ellen Rolston. 3. That the striking Ellen Rolston was purely accidental, and not such a consequence of the blow as the prisoner ought to have expected. The question for consideration of the court was, whether upon the facts and the findings of the jury the prisoner was rightly convicted of the offense for which he was indicted. If a person has a malicious intent towards one person, and in carrying into effect that malicious intent he injures another man, he is guilty of what the law considers malice against the person so injured, because he is guilty of general malice; and is guilty if the result is of unlawful act be to injure a particular person. But he had an intent to do an unlawful act, and in carrying out that intent he did injure a person; and the law says that, under such circumstances, a man is guilty of maliciously wound- ing the person actually wounded. METHOD OF PROCEDURE 65 MARLOR VS. BALL In the Court of Appeal, March 1, 1900 (Reported in 16 Times Law Reporter, 239) There was an application by the defendant for judgment or a new trial in an action tried before Mr. Justice Phillimare and a special jury at Manchester. The action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff through being bitten by a zebra belonging to the defendant. The plain- tiff was a working man. The defendant was the proprietor of the Chadderton Hall pleasure grounds, at Oldham, where he kept an exhibition of wild animals. The plaintiff went with his wife and his mother-in-law to see the exhibition, and having paid for admission, entered the gardens. While they were walking along they found the door of a stable standing open and went in. There were four zebras inside the stable, each in a separate stall and properly tied up by a halter to the manger. The animal kicked out, and the plaintiff, being then standing against the partition, the animal pressed him through the partition and he fell into the next stall, where another zebra bit his hand, which had to be amputated. At the trial the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for £175. It is conceded that a zebra is a dangerous animal, and that by law a man who kept a dangerous animal must do so at his peril, and that if any damage suit resulted, then, apart from any ques- tion of negligence, he was liable for the damage. But that was subject to this, that the person who complained of damage must not have brought the injury on himself. Where the plaintiff did something which he had no business to do-e.g., [by meddling, as the plaintiff in the case had done then the defendant was not liable. HILDEBRAND VS. PEOPLE³ The prosecutor handed the prisoner, who was a bar-tender in a saloon, a fifty-dollar bill (greenback) to take ten cents out of in Beale, op. c., p. 736. 66 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING payment for a glass of soda. The prisoner put down a few coppers upon the counter, and when asked for the change, he took the prosecutor by the neck and showed him out-doors, and kept the money. The question is presented on behalf of the prisoner whether larceny can be predicated upon these facts. There was no trick, device, or fraud in inducing the prosecutor to deliver the bill; but we must assume that the jury found, and the evidence was sufficient to justify it, that the prisoner intended, at the time he took the bill, feloniously to convert it to his own use. It is urged that this is not sufficient to convict, because the prosecutor voluntarily parted with the possession not only, but with the property, and did not expect a return of the same property. This presents the point of the case. It was an incomplete transaction, to be consummated in the presence and under the personal control of the prosecutor. There was no trust or confidence reposed in the prisoner and none in- tended to be. The delivery of the bill and the giving of change were to be simultaneous acts and until the latter was paid the delivery was not complete. The prosecutor laid his bill upon the counter and implicitly told the prisoner that he could have it upon delivering to him $49.90. 17120 2a The property is not parted with until the whole transaction is complete, and the conditions have been fulfilled on which the property is to be parted with. The legal case was simply presented to the subject by being read to him, and the problem which the case presented for solu- tion. The subject was then asked to consider the case and en- deavor to come to a decision and then to give an account of his own mental processes in reaching his conclusion. Although all the subjects had had some training in psychology, yet in many cases the process of introspecting seemed very difficult for them. Again, in many cases, it seemed that the reasons expressly stated by the subject as the grounds for their conclusion were really inadequate to account for the decision. The task was therefore, if possible, to discover whether or not there had been some guid- METHOD OF PROCEDURE 67 ing principle in the background of his mind and to bring it to the foreground of consciousness and make the subject aware of its influence upon his decision. For instance, a subject would say that the defendant in one of the legal cases did not commit murder because he killed in self-defense, and yet he would be unable to analyze any farther his mental processes. The method employed in endeavoring thus to get a clear account of the sub- ject's mental activity was to ask him questions, such as: Prove your conclusion. Why do you think he is guilty? or whatever the case happened to be. Often this was sufficient and re- sulted in a clear-cut, brief statement of a proof, but if the above questions failed, and if it was evident from the introspection which the subject had offered that there was involved, and un- consciously operating, some general guiding principle, the process of questioning was continued with a few test questions, such as: Am I correct in supposing that you have assumed this in your conclusion? and then the supposedly assumed principle was stated. Then, of course, if the subject agreed that he had assumed this principle, or possibly some other, as the case hap- pened to be, he was asked if he had been conscious of this assump- tion before it was pointed out to him, or if he felt that it had been present in the background of his mind, operating sub- consciously. When finally the subjects had recognized that some general guiding principle or other was involved, the next step was to obtain some information as to what application they had made. of it to the case in hand, and this was gained by such questions as: Did you apply this principle to the case in hand? If the subject said no he was then asked: Do you feel that, even if you did not consciously apply this principle in this case, nevertheless it did govern the case? Do you feel that there was perhaps a subconscious application of the principle? What makes you feel this? How would you formulate the application of the principle to the case in hand? Thus eventually a brief, concise statement would be given which appeared as a sort of minor premise, with the general guiding principle acting as a major premise. This slow process of gradually bringing the general principle and its application to the foreground of consciousness 68 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING was usually no longer necessary after a subject had been given a few cases. Then all the necessary data was given sponta- neously, due, I think, to the subject having learned to analyze more deeply his mental processes. Finally, a series of questions was formulated, based upon various theories of the proposition and the reasoning process, the theories chiefly of the writers reviewed above. After obtain- ing the subject's general introspection, he was asked again to go over his reasoning, with special attention to what had consti- tuted his major or his minor premise, and to respond to the series of questions which were then put to him. A list of questions will be found immediately preceding the tabular presentation of the results on page 84. In the case of the geometrical problems, the same procedure was followed, except that the material was presented visually instead of orally. The follow- ing propositions were employed: Euclid Book I, 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, 16, 23, 27. It may be remarked in regard to the questions that, in all cases, all of the sub-questions were not used, usually be- cause the response to the main question made their use un- necessary, and again, as in question IX on the conclusion, be- cause they seemed to be too complicated and involved the sub- ject in too great difficulties in analyzing his mental processes. Sou Unda CHAPTER II GENERAL INTROSPECTIONS Some of the general introspections are given-those offered. first and spontaneously, before the series of questions was put to the subject. Those given are characteristic and indicate per- haps some of the difficulties encountered in obtaining satis- factory general introspections upon so lengthy a mental activity as that involved in reasoning about a legal or a mathematical problem. STOFFER VS. STATE It certainly is not first degree murder, but it seems to be second degree murder, because he, in the first place, provoked the quarrel by assaulting Webb on the street. I thought that, although in the end he may have killed for self-defense because he was pursued by Webb, nevertheless he wouldn't have been pursued if he hadn't attacked Webb in the first place, and so he, the plaintiff, was the ultimate cause of the murder. I don't think he was guilty of first degree murder, because he had de- sisted from the first attack, and his guilt was somewhat alle- viated because the assault was turned on him. (This was the entire conscious process.) Was there any guiding general principle? I knew no general principle that this particular case could come under-I just decided who was guilty in this particular case. But can you prove your conclusion? The plaintiff attacked Webb with the intention of murder. Webb was justified in defending himself by attacking the plain- tiff. In the quarrel Webb was killed when he pursued him into the house, and the plaintiff was guilty of his murder because he had first provoked the quarrel. You were not conscious of any general principle, then? None except a very general one that no man has a right to take another life, which I suppose was present. 69 70 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING Do you see any general principle involved in the proof you have just given? No. Do you know of any which applies to this case? I can see none to which there would not be some loophole. Suppose you say, anyone who takes another man's life is guilty of murder; but insanity and killing in self-defense would be killing and yet not murder. I know there must be a general principle, but I don't know it. Do you think this principle was implied in your proof? A man who himself provokes an attack with the intent to murder, and who later, in the course of the conflict kills, even in self- defense, is nevertheless guilty of murder? Yes. I was seeking something more general. Using this as a general principle, could you formulate proof? The man attacked Webb with intent of murder, and later, when attacked by him, killed him. He was guilty of murder. (C. M., April 16, 1923.) RICHMOND RAILWAY VS. MARTIN, ADMINISTRATOR Immediately the mind asks, Who is responsible? An attempt to search for the true principle applying to the case. Morally, if a man by his own negligence, sustains injury, he has no right to recover damages, even though the law might allow it. It seems that the father, by his own negligence, has suffered damages. Therefore he has no right to recover. The question which arises now is mainly whether or not the father has been negligent. If he risks placing an eleven-year old child in charge of driving the wagon, he must bear the consequences. He has done this. He must bear the consequences. The assumption here is that the railroad company has no duty to slow up at this crossing, and that a mature mind in charge of the wagon would have had no difficulty in avoiding the accident. Psychologically, there is here again the seeking of a principle and the application of a case to the premises. The image of child, wagon, and train is illustrative merely, and has no actual part in the process of reasoning. (T. M., February 9, 1923.) • GENERAL INTROSPECTIONS 71 1 MARLOR VS. BALL The mind searches for a principle to apply. This principle suggests itself. Any one maintaining a show of wild animals open to the public is bound to take reasonable precautions that the public cannot unsuspectingly come in contact with the ani- mals and so be injured. The defendant maintained such a show. Therefore he was bound to take those precautions. The second argument formulates itself thus: One who is negligent is guilty of the consequences. The defendant was negligent. He is guilty of the consequences. The assumption here is that one, who leaves a door open so that entrance to the wild animals is possible, is not taking proper precautions. Here again the conscious content cannot be adequately described without mentioning as the main element intellectual insight into rela- tionships, meanings, that attach themselves to principles and propositions. Kinaesthetic experiences resulting from thinking, fragments of visual imagery appeared as something wholly different from the process of reasoning. On reading the decision of the court the question comes as to the validity of the assumption that one maintaining a show for wild animals, open to the public, is bound to prevent unsuspecting persons having entrance to the wild animals. It still seems to me that there is such an obligation and unless it could be shown that the plaintiff went where he was forbidden to go, and in spite of blocks being placed in his way, it would still seem that the defendant was negligent in preventing that ingress. Psychologically there is a peculiar consciousness that accom- panies if. The consciousness is not the same with every if, inasmuch as along with the condition there are specific ideas in mind, so that even though there might be several components of a particular if, identical in all cases, nevertheless these sensory components do not constitute the whole conscious experience, which involves insight into the conditions and consequence in the particular case in question. (T. M., February 9, 1923.) 素 ​SHO COMMONWEALTH VS. HACKETT With the statement that there was evidence to show that the wounds of the deceased were unskilfully and improperly treated. 72 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING by the attending surgeon, the idea comes to mind-This looks like a ruse to avoid the responsibility for the death. Neverthe- less the principle formulates itself-If there were gross mal- treatment on the part of the attending surgeon, and if the wounds of themselves were such as would not ordinarily cause death, it would be possible to shift the responsibility from the one who inflicted the wounds to the one who dressed the wounds. At once the mind tends to think of an extreme case. Suppose a very slight wound, suppose the surgeon used dressings that might easily have been contaminated with tetanus and gave no tetanus antitoxin, then it would be clear that if the patient died of tetanus he would not have died of his injury but of infection due to gross maltreatment. The problem seems to reduce itself to the nature of wounds and the nature of treatment, and cannot be solved on the general principle alone, but must require further details. of facts. Psychologically, all this is accompanied by practically no visual imagery. There is a good deal of what might be termed non-specific kinaesthesis which might be brought out by intro- spection, but any attempt to do so seems to turn the mind away from the train of thought. This whole argument is based upon conscious principle. Thus back of the argument is an assump- tion. A man is only responsible for what he himself does. Then there is another principle that commences to appear. A man is responsible, not only for what he himself does, but for the effects which might be reasonably expected to follow from his action. It is likely that the party in question is guilty because probably the wounds inflicted were not of a trivial nature. A full syllogism was not formulated but tends now to be formulated. It would be this: Every man who inflicts an in- jury is responsible not only for the injury but its natural con- sequences. This man has inflicted an injury. He is responsible for the injury and its natural consequences. In this reasoning the mind searches for a principle of general application. The mind sees that the case in question is governed by the principle. There is no conscious reference to mathematical equations, no thought of the extension of the subject to the predicate in the proposition, nor that of any mathematical identity and substitu- tion, merely the realization of the case in question and what holds < GENERAL INTROSPECTIONS 73 of the principle must be applied to the case. It may be briefly expressed as the subsumption of a particular in a universal. Imagery plays no part. There are insights and meanings and relationships that cannot be accounted for in sensory terms. On reading the decision of the court it seems that it is essen- tially identical with the analysis given. It asserts the principle of responsibility for acts and their consequences, and further denies the alteration of the original responsibility because other factors may have contravened. The argument of the court is a syncopated syllogism, the conclusion being drawn without defi- nite expression in syllogistic form. (T. M., February 9, 1923.) TAYLOE VS. MERCHANTS FIRE INSURANCE CO. The agent accepted the insurance on the condition that the plaintiff send his check. The plaintiff fulfilled the condition. Therefore the company is bound, through its agent, it being assumed that the plaintiff acted in good faith. This argument as expressed is not in syllogistic form, but the syllogistic form is in the background of the mind. If expressed it would take this form. A contract, made under the condition that one party fulfill certain requirements, binds when that party fulfills them in good faith. This contract was so made and the conditions were so made in good faith. Therefore the contract binds. The only question of doubt is whether or not the condition were really fulfilled. The agent did not stipulate that the contract would bind when he received the premium, provided no fire had occurred in the meantime. The agent stipulated that the contract would bind when the plaintiff sent the premium. The plaintiff fulfilled the condition of the contract and it binds the company through its agent. Major: This is a part of my mental stock. It goes back to studies of ethics and moral theology. It is not based on any induction, even in its original formation, but upon general con- siderations of justice. However, at present it is very difficult to give an account of the original adoption of this stock principle. As a matter of fact, a real piece of reasoning is taking place. Its starting point is the seeking of a general principle governing the particular case in question. The principle does not exist as images. It was not formulated in words in the original non- 74 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING syllogistic reasoning. It existed in the background of conscious- ness as a principle governing that reasoning. It does not exist as a mathematical identity, S = P. It can only be conceived of as a law of general application governing the relationships of men. The minor premise came with doubt as to its validity. Assum- ing it to be true, it merely specifies that the case in question is one to which the general principle applies. There seems to be present a consciousness of the identity of relationship in the minor and in the major, rather than the subsumption of an indi- vidual in a class. At all events, the subsumption does not ex- haust the matter. The case in point not only belongs to the same class but pre- sents identical conditions. The conclusion was originally given as a question: Is the com- pany bound to pay or not? The steps in solving the problem were: What principle governs the case? The formulation of the principle; the formulation of the minor with doubt as to its validity. Further considerations establishing the validity of the minor: Assent to the conclusion because of the demonstration of the minor. I think, but I am not sure that the conclusion was formulated spontaneously, in inwardly spoken words. Once the minor was accepted, no other conclusion was possible. The reasoning did not involve any past personal experience, emotional history, etc. It was an isolated phenomenon, based perhaps only on the stock principle already existing in my mind. (T. M., February 16, 1923.) BROWN VS. COLLINS The post was on the private property of the plaintiff and he was not responsible for the horses becoming frightened at the crossing. I should think that a distance of the post of four feet from the main highway would be sufficient. The plaintiff owned the land and the post was on his private property. When he had taken due precautions to protect it from injury, anyone else injuring it should pay the damages. The fact that the man GENERAL INTROSPECTIONS 75 ¡ was a good driver would make him even more liable than if he were inexperienced, because he should be better able to manage the horses in case of an emergency. He must have seen the train coming and he had no right to go so close to the tracks that the horses would become frightened. Therefore, I'd say he was responsible and had to pay the damages. Have you any general principle? One assumes that a man has acquired his property through his own effort and he has full rights over that property. If any one violates that right he must make compensation. You assumed then, that any one who violates the rights of another over that other's property must make compensation? The conclusion was reached also by a process of elimination, in that I decided that neither the plaintiff nor the railroad could be held responsible and that the defendant was responsible. There was the negative procedure in reaching the conclusion. The general principle stated above came as the positive aspect of forming my decision. I applied the general principle to the case and, although I did not consciously formulate the state- ment of its application, it is this, now that I do make the attempt to state it in attempting to prove the validity of my conclusion. The defendant violated the rights of another over that other's property and therefore must make compensation. Although I did not consciously formulate this, yet it was implied in my mind and was the essence of my reasoning. (C. M., April 12, 1923.) STOFFER VS. STATE The principle that immediately comes to my mind is that a man is not guilty of murder when he kills some one in self-defense. According to the defendant's story, it would seem he shot Webb in self-defense because it was after pursuit and assault. The major premise was the general law of self-defense, and then the specific case came as the minor premise. That specific case en- tered under the general law from which I deduced the conclusion that the man was guilty. Process was this: A man who kills another in self-defense is not guilty of murder. The defendant shot in self-defense. Therefore he is not guilty of murder. 76 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING 1 I experienced visual imagery of the scene the defendant de- scribes which helped to formulate the minor premise; that is, merely made it clearer in my mind. The imagery related to the story and not to the thought that formulated itself in my mind, that he shot in self-defense. I saw that the general law went back to even more funda- mental law the instinct of self-preservation. When I said that he was not guilty, that he did not remain in the conflict-I recalled his exact words "to desist from the conflict," visual and auditory images accompanied this memory. There was a feeling of satisfaction that my decision accorded with that of the court. (E. S., March 20, 1923.) BROWN VS. COLLINS Two possibilities occur to the mind; one, whether or not the post was in a position to cause danger to traffic, the other, assum- ing that the post was not in a position to cause danger to traffic, whether or not a man whose horses ran away, and he thereby does injury to another man's property, is responsible for the damage. In solving the problem I will assume that the post was not in a dangerous position, so that the plaintiff is not responsible for placing the post where it could cause damage. With this assumption it seems that the principle should hold that a man is responsible for the damage done by his runaway team. It is a misfortune then that they ran away and that they damaged other people's property. If, however, they do this damage, it appears to me that he should be held responsible for the damage done. Various considerations come in an attempt to prove this. If he were not responsible, it would be hard to hold a man responsible who drove, for instance, a pair of lively, excitable horses, assum- ing the principle that a man is responsible for the damage he does without intending to cause it in the lawful pursuit of his business. The defendant has done damage in the lawful pur- suit of his business without intending to do it and is responsible. I am not absolutely certain of the major, but it seems to be an expression of other principles that are dormant in my mind. When the decision of the court is read I perceive that it is arrived at by assuming that one is not responsible for damage GENERAL INTROSPECTIONS 77 involuntarily done by forces he makes use of in the lawful pur- suit of his business. I now attempt to think further on the question and I feel there should be a distinction between the personal guilt for damage done and the responsibility for acci- dents following from the normal use of means of locomotion. (T. M., April 6, 1923.) REGINA VS. LATIMER This time, even though I seemed to be arranging the facts in my mind, I was aware that in the background of consciousness there was a general principle which fitted this case. Without attempting to pick out the specific elements in the case which were of primary importance, I sought the general principle. This was for some time in an unanalyzed state. From this state I formulated the general principle that a man is responsible for his acts. The minor came more or less readily then, but was not clearly expressed in my mind and remained indistinct for some time and was particularly hard to express in words. The conclusion came without the definite formulation of the minor, namely, that the defendant is responsible for the wounding of the prosecutrix. While imagery had no part in the reasoning process itself, I had some general visual images during the re- cital of the case. One of the most noteworthy things was the difficulty in expressing the general principle and minor in words, particularly the minor. (T. F., March 24, 1923.) MARLOR VS. BALL The first thing that comes to my mind is that he might have been entitled to some damages on account of the stable being open, because I think that might have been due to negligence on the part of some employe and the proprietor should be responsible. But still, the plaintiff should have been more careful than to come in such close contact with those animals. I think he was not wholly to blame, because he did not realize at first what he was doing and the animal turned on him so quickly that he got him- self into a position where he could not avoid the accident. On the whole, he should be justified in seeking some reparation, because dangerous animals in such a place should not be left 78 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING open and there should have been other precautions, as signs. I don't think there was enough precaution on the part of the management. Any principle? The public should be safeguarded with all reasonable care and precautions, and if these safeguards are not taken the public are justified in seeking some damages. That is a principle which holds and was in my mind as a general principle. I thought that this case was one where such precautions had not been carried out. Then he was justified in seeking damages from the manage- ment. (C. C., May 16, 1923.) REGINA VS. LATIMER First of all, I tried, from the facts given, to determine just what is the essential point in the case. From my knowledge of law it appears that the essential point is whether or not the prisoner, without just cause, committed the alleged wrong. Thus I call up to mind different principles of law bearing upon that general issue or upon cases as similar as possible. Thus, by analyzing the facts I form my conclusion that under these circum- stances the prisoner is clearly committing a wrongful act without just cause and is guilty. The major premise was a general prin- ciple of law, that a person who, without cause, wilfully injures. another is guilty of assault. My minor premise was that the prisoner did, without cause, wilfully injure the prosecutrix. Therefore the prisoner is guilty of assault. (J. D., April 9, 1923.) WILLIAM LORING VS. CITY OF BOSTON Consciousness of doubt as to possible legal limitations. It seems to me that the city has promised a reward for any person convicting another of incendiarism for any fire taking place within the limits of Boston. The City of Boston is therefore bound to pay the reward if the fire takes place within the city limits. There seems to be a principle in the back of my mind that promises of this kind, made without limitation to time, hold until they are revoked. This might be formulated some- what in this way: If the mayor's promise holds until it is re- voked, this man is entitled to his reward. But the promise GENERAL INTROSPECTIONS 79 1 does hold until it is revoked, therefore he is entitled to his reward. The problem is entirely in regard to the minor: "But the promise does hold until it is revoked." I find it difficult to prove the minor. Difficulty in finding a principle on which to establish the minor. Acts of a city government, unless limited by their own wording, or, by the essential nature of the case, should hold until they are revoked. But this is an act not limited by the wording or by the essential exigencies of the case, therefore it holds until it is revoked. (T. M., May 4, 1923.) HILDEBRAND VS. PEOPLE The first part was an immediate judgment that the prisoner was guilty of theft. This came as soon as the case was pre- sented. I noticed several processes of reasoning. One was when it was stated that when the prosecutor passed the bill to the prisoner he did not expect to get it back, but he only pre- sented this bill contingently-accordingly the prisoner had no right to keep it. I think the whole thing was an immediate judgment which was formed as soon as the case and circumstances were presented. The conclusion is that the prisoner is guilty of theft. How do you know he is guilty of theft? Those who take forcibly the possessions of another without their consent are guilty of theft. The bartender took the pos- sessions of the prosecutor forcibly without his consent; therefore bartender was guilty of theft. (T. F., May 5, 1923.) TAYLOE VS. MERCHANTS FIRE INSURANCE CO. I reasoned that since agent had agreed with the man to look after the insurance if the check was sent, and since the check was sent, the delay was not due to the man himself but to other factors over which he had no control. Then, since the check was sent before the fire actually took place, the company should really pay him for the damage. I did not form consciously any major or minor. I had the main facts in mind and from them drew the conclusion that the insurance company was responsible. This was not arrived at by any syllogistic reasoning that I am aware of. It appeared to me merely a presentation of the facts 80 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING from which one would draw a conclusion. It seemed to me also that the case was similar to the process of forming conclusions, as exemplified by the deductions from the study of Mendel's work, or another example which I had recently met. In attempt- ing to prove the validity of the conclusion the following process occurred. An agreement holds if not abrogated by the other party. Neither party abrogated this agreement. Consequently the agreement held. I cast about for a general principle that would apply to this case. After some difficulty, during which several general prin- ciples came to my mind, none of which seemed to be applicable to the present case, I finally got this general principle in a sort of vague form, and in applying it to this particular case I formed the minor. Then the conclusion followed at once and spon- taneously, and seemed a necessary conclusion. There was no imagery whatever, certainly no kinaesthetic imagery. (T. F., March 23, 1923.) BROWN VS. COLLINS First I reviewed the facts in my own mind, got them firmly fixed and tried to make a picture in my own mind of the place and just how the accident occurred. Then I ask myself upon what theory of law the plaintiff can recover, and whether or not the defendant owed any legal duty to the plaintiff in this case. From the facts it is plain to me that the defendant exercised proper care and performed his duty. That is a self-evident proposition. I cannot see any legal obligation that the defendant violated. Because the defendant violated no obligation, it is evident to my mind that this was a pure accident and that there- fore the plaintiff cannot recover. On being asked to prove more clearly the conclusion: I start out with the general proposition, that if the defendant violated a legal obligation owing to the plaintiff, he is liable to the plaintiff for damages. That is self-evident to the mind. I had to reason as to whether or not the defendant did violate any obligation. Then I analyzed the term obligation to find out what it means in this case. From the facts of the case, calling upon my imagination and reasoning from those facts present in GENERAL INTROSPECTIONS 81 imagination, I see that the defendant performed every legal duty in exercising due care. Therefore, I see that there is nothing left undone by the defendant that constituted any obligation. Therefore, I form my minor that the defendant in this case owed no legal obligation which he did not perform and the conclusion follows that therefore the plaintiff cannot recover. (J. D., April 9, 1923.) STOFFER VS. STATE Immediately there comes to mind the distinction between internal guilt and external, that is guilt of murder in foro interno and foro externo. Any man who intends to kill another man is guilty of murder, even though he fails in the attempt. In the case in question the principle formulates itself: If this man in- tended to kill the other he is guilty before God of murder. But he did intend, therefore before God he is guilty of murder. Here we have a conditional syllogism, where a rule is laid down con- conditionally. The condition is found to be realized, and there- fore the rule is seen to apply. Yet to be guilty before God and to be guilty before man are two different things. If the sub- sequent fight had not occurred, the plaintiff could only have been held guilty of assault with intent to kill. In the fight that ensued he appears to have killed in self-defense. He therefore was not guilty of murder when the killing was done, assuming that the second fight was a new incident. It appears that in the first fight he was guilty of assault with intent to kill, in the second fight he merely killed in self-defense and is not guilty of murder. Psychologically vague imagery of fight, closing of doors, etc. This imagery does not seem to enter into the reasoning. There is an intellectual distinction of two scenes in one act, a realiza- tion that they are governed by different conditions, the con- sciousness of different principles to apply to conduct of the two cases, the application of these principles in syllogistic form, and the conclusion drawn accordingly. No consciousness of any mathematical equivalents, but of relationships, of conditions, of the general principles, recognition of the involvement of the particular case under the general principle. 82 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING QUI On reading the decision of the court a feeling of gratification that the court makes the same distinction between the two in- cidents. The argument of the court is to prove the distinction by definite characteristics. (T. M., February 9, 1923.) EUCLID-PROPOSITION I Upon looking at the figure and reading the proposition, the proof flashed upon me without the various steps. Immediately upon seeing the two equal circles and that their radii formed the triangle, I realized that the triangle must be equilateral. A is the center of the circle, B, C, D, and all points in the circum- ference are equally distant from the center and the distance chosen for the radius was AB, so line AC, that goes from the center to the circumference, must necessarily be equal to AB. The fact that all points in the circumference are equally distant from the center was present in my mind, but not explicitly stated in the text. There is another little bridge in my mind, but not in the text, to the effect that bridging over from the postulate to the result, to the effect that AC is a radius and so is AB, and hence they are equal. After that the same reasoning is used for the circle ACE. After reasoning that CB is equal to AB, I returned to the thought that AC is equal to AB, and so by axiom I, which was implied in the text and in my mind, even before reading the text, I saw that CA must equal CB. I then saw that the triangle ABC was equilateral, because both AC and CB were equal to AB and to each other. (E. S., March 13, 1923.) EUCLID BOOK I-PROPOSITION 27 Read proposition. See at once that it must be so. Memory of demonstration years ago. Argument is a conditional syllogism. If GEF is the triangle, its exterior angle AEF is greater than the interior opposite angle EFG, but by hypothesis this is not so. Therefore GEF is not a triangle. The whole argument is stated explicitly in the text. (T. M., March 16, 1923.) GENERAL INTROSPECTIONS 83 EUCLID-PROPOSITION II The minor came first in the process of drawing the conclusion. The major came second and only with an effort of recall. The whole process is this: Radii of a circle are all equal. BC and BG are radii of the same circle. Therefore BC and BG are equal. The minor came before the major and the process in the larger sense is this. The proposition once stated, the conclusion came almost at once, and even before there was any awareness that there was a conclusion to be drawn. (T. F., March 14, 1923.) EUCLID-PROPOSITION II Because the point B is the center of the circle CGH, BC BG. Insight into the truth of this is dependent upon the knowl- edge of the principle present in the mind that the radii of a circle. are all equal. It is not explicitly stated that BC or BG are radii, but one sees that from the construction. What is stated is the minor, but this is stated only implicitly. The statement is equivalent to the following: BC and BG are radii of the same circle. This is the minor. The major is referred to as a defini- tion. It is, however, present in my mind without the reference. The argument therefore is that all the radii of any one circle are equal. BC and BG are radii of one circle, therefore they are equal. (T. M., March 9, 1923.) CHAPTER III TABLES OF RESULTS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION The results are presented in tabular form, first for the ques- tions relating to the major, then those on the minor, and finally those as to the conclusion. In cach case, also, the results from the legal and the mathematical cases are kept separate, and at the end are given the combined results of both the legal and the mathematical reasoning. LIST OF QUESTIONS Major I. How did you find it? II. Is it a part of your mental stock? III. Did it arise in the course of your attempt to solve the problem? IV. Did the subject and predicate exist in your mind as images -i.c., did the meaning of the subject and predicate exist as images? James Mill, Binet, Sigwart. V. Did it appear to you as a mathematical identity, S Jevons. P? a. Did it appear that S and P were symbols for the same object or group of objects? b. For a similar object or group of objects? c. Did S appear to be identical with a part of P? VI. Was the predicate conceived of as a class to which the subject belonged? James Mill. VII. Did it seem to you that the meaning of the subject was identified with that of the predicate? a. Was it identified in this way, that the meaning of the sub- ject existed as an image and the meaning of the predicate as an image, and that the judgment consisted in the coincidence of the two images? Sigwart. VIII. Did the processes of analysis and synthesis function in the formulation of the proposition? Sigwart, Bradley, Bosanquet. 84 TABLES OF RESULTS 85 IX. Did the process of association play any part in the formu- lation of the promise? How? X. Did the premise state any relationship between the sub- ject and predicate? What sort of relationship? XI. Did the major premise appear to you as the record of innumerable previous inferences? J. S. Mill. a. Were these inferences obtained as a result of your own activity or were they otherwise obtained? XII. Was there in your mind any idea that you were affirming the existence of some quality of the subject? What quality? a. Did you do this by analyzing the total image, as for example, red cloud, into a subject idea cloud, and its quality red, so that the process was "the red cloud is red?" Sigwart. b. Did you seem to be affirming the meaning of an idea con- sidered as meaning to be a real quality of what you perceived? Bosanquet. XIII. Was the predicate conceived of as merely another name for that which was named by the subject? James Mill. XIV. Did the major premise appear to you as a law or rule from which to infer? Schiller, Sigwart, J. S. Mill. XV. Did the major premise become explicitly or focally con- scious before you drew your conclusion? a. Did it exist subconsciously then? b. Do you feel that it determined your conclusion? XVI. Was there any idea of the premise as being the unfolding of some universal, i.e., the middle term? Bradley, Bosanquet. XVII. Did the major premise appear essential in order to reach the conclusion? a. Did its explicit formulation seem essential? Schiller, J. S. Mill, Bosanquet, Bradley, Sigwart, Binet. XVIII. Did the premise appear to contain two separate ideas or merely to state a relation within one universal idea? Bosan- quet. Minor I. How did it arise in your mind? II. Is it a part of your mental stock? III. Did it arise in the course of your attempt to solve the problem? 86 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING IV. In what order did the major and minor premises arise in your mind? V. Did you perceive a relationship between the premises before drawing the conclusion? What relationship? a. Did a relationship exist? b. Was it a relationship caused by the perception of the fact that they possessed an identical term? Bosanquet, Binet, Sig- wart, Bradley. c. Was it a relationship caused by the resemblance of the case to some general law or principle? Schiller. d. Was more than one kind of relationship perceived? e. Which was the more prominent? VI. Was the minor premise known to you mediately or im- mediately? Spencer. Conclusion I. Was it formulated in innerly spoken words? II. Did these words form themselves spontaneously or did you have to bring them out by voluntary effort? III. Could you have formulated another conclusion at will? Accepting the premises, could you? Schiller. IV. Was your whole personality involved in drawing the con- clusion or was this piece of reasoning more or less isolated from your emotions, hopes, aspirations, etc.? Schiller. V. Have your emotions had any play in the conclusion? VI. What seemed to you the most essential process in reaching the conclusion? VII. After formulating the conclusion, did it seem to you to be certainly true? VIII. Was the conclusion freely expressed in the premises, or did it appear to you as something new, an intellectual insight which you had not had before? Bradley. a. If not new, why? b. Did the conclusion seem to be implicit in the premises, i.e., was it a mere interpretation of the premises? J. S. Mill. c. Did the conclusion-if taken in abstraction from the premises seem new? Is it psychologically new, that is, a judgment to which you assent after having formulated the premise? TABLES OF RESULTS 87 d. Was the conclusion a mere repetition of what was con- tained in the premises? e. Did it seem new even if, upon reflection, you consider that it was obtained in the premises? f. Could you have reached the conclusion without a process of argumentation? IX. Did the reasoning process seem to be the same as per- ception? Was there any resemblance between the two proces- ses? What? a. Does perception involve a process of reasoning, and there- fore is reasoning identical with perception? b. Is there any difference between saying, for example, "This is a knife," if you are asked a question about an object presented to you and arriving at the conclusion that you have just made? c. In what way, if any, does reasoning differ from perception? d. Did the process of including involve assent? Did mere perception of relations involve assent? Then are they the same? X. Did the conclusion consist, psychologically, in a comparison, direct or indirect, of the terms of the proposition? James Mill. XI. Did it seem to you that you reached the conclusion by the substitution of equivalent terms? Jevons. XII. Did the process seem to be one of subsumption? How? Bosanquet, Schiller. XIII. Upon what mental activity did the process of media- tion depend, i.e., the perception of middle concept, or applica- tion of a case to a law, etc. XIV. Was the mental process involved in reaching the conclu- sion the same or different from the process involved in getting the premises? Was it a more complicated form of the same activity? How was it the same? Spencer, Binet, Bosanquet, Sigwart. XV. Did you reach the conclusion by a process of analogy— that is, by recognizing the resemblance of the present case to some case or cases previously known? Schiller, J. S. Mill. a. Do you understand the previously known case to be a case of any law? Schiller, J. S. Mill. b. Could you have stated the general proposition that is to be inferred from the case or cases previously known? J. S. Mill. 88 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING QUES- TION 234 LO LO 5a 5c 6 7 72 8 9 10 11 11a 23+ 12 13 T. M. + 0404 5 0404 18{ 1 + Sp 31 C. M. 31 3 + ∞ 01 4 13 04 31 1 3 4 2 2 0 4 4 0 4 01 4 14 15 3 1 0 15a 15b 16 17 17a 18 + - w 1 1 2 M. C. 2 + ww C.Mu. 30 30 3 + 1 3 1 3 212 2 0 4 1 3 0 3 2 1 0 4 0 4 0. 30 30 3 + 30 30 3 03030 0 3 1 2, 0 2 3 2 ideas. 1 idea. T. F. 0 3 2 1 0 0 3 1 20 2¹ 3 0 1 2 1 20 3.0 30 30 3 1 2 2 1,0 3 30 1x ¦ 02030 2 0 3 0 1 0 2 030 2 0 1 1 1 23 + 0 4 04 0 30 4 3 1 3 30 30 2 1 34 0 30 30 13 1 0 H. C. 0 30 014 0 1 S 0 4 0 со 4 TH 0 20 412 4 2 2 0 2 ㄓ​ˇ LEGAL CASES-MAJOR PREMISE CYS + 3 4 0 4 A. M. 20 0 2 20 20 2 0 02 02 0 2 01 2 1 1 1 0 4 01 2 14 0 20 4 1 1 0 1 1 20 20 1x 1 1 1 02 20 20 SUBJECT + — 20 02 1 1 1 1 1 20 20 1x 1 20 0 2 20 1 1 02 20 2 2 + M. T. 2 1 2 2 40 + 3 1 1 2 04 1x 1 2 40 3 03 0 3 4 0 03 0 04 0 30 3 13 030 precede facad 1 2 4 0 0 4 2 1 1 400 213 04 04 1 40 2 2 T J. D. ∞ ∞ toned 1 + 0 со с 2 2 permend yourd 2 2 3 1 1 20 2 M. K. 3 1 02 2 0 20 3 0 3 0 303 0 1 + 2 2 NOM I 130 2 TA∞ O 1O2 30 020 со со 0 1 1 20 1 E. S. 2 O O 020 30 010 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 2 + 1 0 20 1 1 0 prada pad 21 22O O HOH H 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 M. L. | 1 1 0 10 1 1 + 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 R. II. 0 0 1 1 przed przed 1 1 0 1 0 0 00 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 TOTAL PERCENTAGE + 388 M 1 37 1 0 38 3 36 + 17 22 4 35 0 41 21 17 10 29 39 0 14 25 4x 3x = 2 12 27 4 35 39 0 26 13 5 0 0 2 18 21 1 3 17 13 3 97 96 by 3 4 0/100 8 92 44 56 10 90 0 100 55 45 26 74 100 0 36 64 44 33 22 30 70 10 90 100 0 67 33 100 0 100 0 10 90 95 5 15 85 81 19 TABLES OF RESULTS 68 QUES- TION ~~+DON 2 3 4 5 5a 5c 6 7 7a 8 9 10 11 11a 12 13 14 15 15a 15b 16 17 17a 18 3{ 11a (x 18 + 12 HON N T. M. 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 2 NON Q 2 2 2 0 2 0 OON O 2 2 O 2 OH∞ O 210 2 2 2 0 + 2 2 NO O OO 2 N 44O 2 1 0 0 + = 2 ideas. = 1 idea. 0 1 E. S. 2 O NO O 2 ON N O NO O 0 0 2 0 2 2 22 + 0 in both ways). 4 0 0 0 M. C. 2 2 0 2 MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS-MAJOR PREMISE SUBJECT 0 0 4 2 2 2 OO+ N 2 20 O OON 2 OON 2 T 4 0 4 402 HH~ ~ + 0 4 1 1 0 4 1 1 0 20 0 21 2 1 0 1 1 240 O OON ~ 1x 0 4 0 2 A. M. 0 + 0 2 2 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 1 220 O O2 2 NOO − 2 0 0 0 1 0 yourself T. F. 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 Jak parad 1 210 N 20 2 2O2 ~ O NOO 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 + 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 M. T. 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 TOT 1 0 0 0 0 1 famed ford 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 TOTAL + 12 13 0 3 1 0 3 0 4 13 5 1x ∞ 110 + N K 5 1 0 13 10 0 2 11 10 1 11 8 0 8 funda 1 LO PERCENT- AGE + 92 100 2 0 23 5 0 13 13 0 100 13 0 100 0 62 100 0 100 15 85 23 77 0 100 15 85 33 67 100 0 28 62 50x 50 8 5 17 0 100 1 80 50 100 77 0 28 0 100 0 0 83 0 20 50 LEGAL AND MATHEMATICAL + Total 50 50 0 6 2 6 19 7 0 23 14 52 19 5x 2 20 4 52 39 5 3 26 7 15 2 1 51 46 ++ 2 4 10 12 33 75 33 37 45 13 5 28 37 32 48 Percentage 0 13 + 96 98 10 0 100 88 67 25 0 100 45 55 27 73 0 100 0 33 37 63 4 46 M 42 11 18 38 8 100 385983 63 87 36 62 92 0 75 25 0 100 0 100 0 23 12 88 1 96 4 18 28 72 5 75 25 06 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING QUES- TION 1188KG 2 3 4 5 5a 5b 5c 5d 5e 6 5e + T. M. | + 4- + 0405 050 4 05 0 0 4 0 5 4 0 2 3 = + === C. M. 31 32 2 3 2 = + 04 M. C. 403 O 1 5 1 30 4 0 1 | + panel 2 3 2−− 2 4 2 15 1 LO major first. minor first. 0 5 C. Mu. 050 0 K 3 1 + ← ∞ ∞ x 1 ly 30 5 30 5 2 1 0 5 0 30 4 0 T. F. G 1 + 2 HILO LO LO LO TH 1 5 5 5 H. C. 4 LEGAL CASES-MINOR PREMISE C LO 5 + 03 040 5 40 1 5 03 1 040 03 0 A. M. farmac SUBJECT 40 1 1 3 0 { X = Ꭹ 6− + = known immediately. known mediately. known both mediately and immediately. + O31 ∞ 0 21y 2 C. C. Allerg 30 3 10 2 3 2 ~ ~ ∞ ∞ ∞ 2 M + 304 040 2 2 1 0 0 2 40 3 M. T. 3 M 3 1 + Where case and law relationship was more prominent. Where some other kind of relationship was more prominent. Relationship of equality. Relationship of possessing identical middle term. www J. D. 03 3 0 3 3 1 + M. K. G 0 3 0 0 3 030 03 31 2 + I + 30 2 E. S. 02 ON 1 - 1 1 1 20 M. L. 1 1 0 1 01 0 1 1 0 1 + 0 R. H. 0 1 0 1 Ma 0 010 1 0 TOTAL + K 0 46 0 100 47 0 100 0 14 33 30 70 42 5 89 11 100 4 17 6 12 PERCENT- AGE + 74 26 23 0 100 17 9 65 35 13 3 81 19 31 15 67 33 TABLES OF RESULTS 91 QUES- TION 1 2 3 4 5 5a 5b 5c 5d 5e 6 + T. M. 0 2 1 1 Jord 2 + 0 1 pred pok M. C. 1 1 1 1 201 0313 MON O O 2 O 2 2 ON O 3 0 0 + T. F. 2 0 0 Mod MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS-MINOR PREMISE Notes: Same as for legal-minor. SUBJECT 2 1z 0 2 + 0 1 A. M. 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 + OHH O O NO 2 202 C 0 21 2 2O1 O 0 1 2 10 121 12 2 2 2 − ∞ 0 M. T. 0 2 0 1 ly 0 + E. S. 1 2 0 TOTAL 1z + 0 12 4 0 12 454 ∞ ∞ 3 8 13 1 9 0 1 1 w 2.z PERCENT- AGE + 0 100 92 31 69 100 0 80 20 0 20 25 23 15z 100 80 75 62 COMBINED LEGAL AND Total + 0 **** 22298 18 54 4 MATHEMATICAL 16 39 Percentage 0 7 0 10 4 18 2z + 59 0 100 1 98 2 42 30 70 5 92 8 100 0 75 25 100 0 68 32 60 20 66 31 3z 92 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING QUES- TION 123 HLO 4 6 7∞ 8 8b 8f 9 10 =23 11 12 13 14 15 15a 15b 16 16a T. M. + 0 0 0 0 0 21 он 20 1 2 1 0 221 + 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 E. S. 1 0 2 2 2 0 2 + + 1 2 1 2 2 0 2 0 220 2 N. C. ♡♡ I SUBJECT 3 0 1 со со со 21 2 2 2 2 11~ OHON NO 021220 131 2HT ♡ I OON 2 HO MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS-CONCLUSION 1 3 0 0 3 2 20 1 0 2 O 0 A. M. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 O 2 0 2 0 0 1 2 + 0 0 2 2 2 ~ 201 2 2 O O O OON 2 2 0 21 T. F. 1 0 + 0 1 K 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 M. T. 0 0 0 prod TOTAL + ∞ ∞ 8 0 0 261O2 m m 0 0 9 0 8 1 1 0 ON NM O 2 2 3 0 10 12 11 4 66 0 100 0 0 0 3 CONCLUSION 0 | 100 5 55 0 100 10 + 9 9 3 3 11 33 0 100 100 100 LEGAL AND MATHEMATICAL Total 0 45 0 0 100 17 83 25 75 25 75 75 25 73 27 41 8 92 4 0 100 0❘ 100 0 0 100 0 1 75 25 3 0 100 + 19 15 0 5 4 50 33 15 1 6 LO LO 5 1939 193 45 2 ~ ~ ~ ~ 2 2 2 17 0 28 4 48 45 43 Conclusion w cr + 40 60 79 21 0 100 10 60 9 91 0 100 15| 69 0 100 14 93 37 14 86 44 10 44 10 90 10 7 96 91 0 0 1.5 5 90 3 93 47 4 19 9 0 100 0 100 3 14 98.5 98.5 0 31 0 7% 8888 90 0 100 TABLES OF RESULTS 93 QUES- TION 123 + LON∞ 20 4 5 7 8 8b Sf 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 T. M. | + + C. M. Mar 1 4 0 4 1 2 0 4 40 5 0 4 0 2 1 1 3 0 3 2 20 0 5 0 4 4 0 4 0 4 0 1 4 140 05014 + 0 1 0 Question 2− + += new. 3 2 2 0 05 04 0 50 22 2 2 50 2 0 5 1 20 0 1 1 0 M. C. 1 0 15a 15b 1 16 1001 1 16a 1 = со со со 3 0 03 1 2 30 со со соN 03 3 2 + 1 0 2 0 3 0 0 3 C. Mu 30 ( 0 0 со со 03 0 0 30 0303 0 ∞ 1∞ O2 ∞ 21 H ♡♡ 2 233 2 8{ fully impressed. 11a (x = in both ways). 13. + 1 + 1 0 3 0 3 0 2 1 1 20 2 0 1 20 1 0 1 1 0 20 T. F. 30 3 о со со 0 30 1 20 1 1 1 1 spontaneously. 1 со со со 3 0 3 0 + 1♡♡ O 3 0 3 0 нсо 0 03 03 30 1 0 1 H. C. 1 3 | со со со 201 1 3 0 02 1 LEGAL CASES-CONCLUSION 30 со со со со + 0 0 03 2 0 A. M. SUBJECT 02 2 NO O || 020 02 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 3 0 2 2 + 2 2 C. C. M 1 1 1 03 03 + 1 0 3 3 0 4 0 4 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 1 M. T. 4 0 02 0 perception of relationship existing between premises. 4 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 40 0 4 0 1 0 4 00 4 + 0 3 2 4 2 120∞∞ J. D. 03 I 1 со со со 30 ♡ 1 O 2 2 + 0 0 0 M. K. 1 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 2 0 3 0 3 3 21020101 030 + 30 301 0 1 02 20 30 3 0 0 3 0 3 0 03 0 CO 3 0 3 21 E. S. M 22 2 302 2 2 2 O ON 220 + 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 M. L. 0 I 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 Sp 1 1 0 1 0 100 + 0 0 0 1 R. H. 1 0 0 1 1 0 mkāja 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 TOTAL + + 11 24 31 69 7 4 64 36 0 38 0 100 95 33 13 13 87 432 11 89 38 0 27 10 14 - 36 33 PERCENT- AGE 21 2 14 0 0 100 27 73 73 0 100 1 11 4 27 235 2 35 2 0 1 36 2 15 12 12 0 6 94 87 5 95 5 95 95 5 0 7 93 88 27 13 13 100 0 100 0 0 100 0 2 88 12 11 0/100 94 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING 1 XVI. Did the processes of analysis and synthesis function in the entire reasoning process? How? Bradley, Bosanquet. a. Did it seem to be an analysis of a universal and that the premises were expressing differences, but differences existing within the universal? Bosanquet. MAJOR PREMISE I. How did you find it? The answers here were too varied to admit of classification and their chief value was in elucidating any doubtful responses to questions II and III. In general, however, the major seems to have arisen by actually searching for it, or because it was al- ready implicit in the subject's mind and it was recalled either by effort or arose spontaneously upon the subject's hearing the In some cases the conclusion came almost immediately and the major appeared in the center of consciousness only during the attempt to verify the conclusion. In these cases, however, its operation subconsciously, in arriving at the conclusion, was recognized by the subject. In some of the mathematical cases, of course, the major premise was given directly in the text. case. II. Is it a part of your mental stock? 50 +. 2 It would seem that the major must of necessity be a part of one's general knowledge or mental stock. At least it must be known in some way before the conclusion is reached. In the results obtained here, in only two cases was a negative response given that is, that the major was not a part of the subject's mental stock, and in both of these cases the major was considered essential, as is evident from the positive response, in both cases, to question XVII major. The negative responses here may be explained by reference to the subject's interpretations. One case was based on mathematical reasoning and the subject, when asked how he found the major premise, responded that it was given in the text. Therefore, although perhaps not a part of his general mental stock, it most certainly was a part of his mental stock of the moment, and the conclusion had a basis resting upon previous knowledge. The second case, again with the same subject, was one of legal reasoning, and in this case the subject gave a part of his introspection: "I found it (the TABLES OF RESULTS 95 major) with difficulty. It had to be formulated to meet the situation and was dependent upon my general ideas of responsibil- ity. It was formulated by an analysis of those ideas in the light of the problem." So, even here, although the premise did not exist, ready-made and in clear-cut form, at least the "general ideas of responsibility existed, and from these the premise was formulated. So here, too, the premise was im- plicitly a part of the subject's mental stock. The subject, apparently recognizing this fact himself, in response to this same question in a later case, gave a positive answer and modified it by saying that it was an implicit, not an explicit part of his mental stock. III. Did it arise in the course of your attempt to value the problem? 50 . 1 . In only one case was the major said not to have arisen in the course of the attempt to solve the problem, and here again, resort to the general introspection shows that the subject recog- nizes the presence of a definition in the mind. It was in the legal case of Hildebrand vs. People. The introspection follows: "Immediately the conclusion comes that the prisoner is guilty. There is the uncertainty of the legal definition of larceny. The conclusion was based upon no reasoning, but was immediate and spontaneous. "The prisoner has done wrong.' Now comes the question, 'What wrong has he done?' He has misappro- priated the goods of another. Therefore he is guilty of stealing in the moral sense. Evidently there is a definition in the mind that stealing is the misappropriation of the goods of another. This man has appropriated the goods of another. Therefore, he has stolen." (T. M.) Again, with another subject, although in response to question I he said that the major was deliberately sought after, it was not spontaneous nor was it a sequence to the minor. "It arose during my attempt to prove the validity of my conclusion." Yet this same subject gave a positive response here to this question, so evidently considering his attempt to prove the validity of his conclusion a part of his general attempt to solve the problem. So, then, at some stage, and either implicitly or explicitly, in the first spontaneously offered proof, or in the proof 96 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING asked for by the experiments, the major premise was present in the mind of the subject in every one of the four cases. It may be remarked here that the results in regard to this particular question might seem to conflict with a later finding, namely, that in only about seventy-five per cent of the cases was the major reported as having become focally consciou before the drawing of the conclusion. The subject, however, must have considered its mere presence, even though subconscious, as sufficient grounds for describing it as having arisen in the attempt to solve the problem. IV. Did the subject and predicate exist in your mind as images? +0. 51. In no case was it found that the subject and predicate existed as images, that is, in the sense of James Mill, of Sigwart, and of Wundt, where the imagery constituted the actual meaning of the term. In some cases the presence of imagery was reported as merely present or as helpful, but in no case was it the meaning itself. V. Did it appear to you as a mathematical identity S 6 +. 46 P? In a certain number, namely 12 per cent of the cases, the premise appeared as a mathematical identity, and here an interesting difference between the legal and the mathematical comes to light. In the legal cases only 8 per cent of the subjects con- sidered the S and P to be identical, while in the mathematical cases 23 per cent so regarded them, a difference explicable, no doubt, by the difference in the nature of the material of the reasoning and the readiness with which mathematical problems yield themselves to concepts of equality, inequality, etc. How- ever, Jevons' interpretation of the judgment as a mathematical identity is by no means universal, for the total percentage of those cases conforming to this theory is very small. Even this small percentage is somewhat modified by a consideration of the subquestions, a, b, and c which are the following: Va. Did it appear that S and P were symbols for the same object or group of objects? 2 +. 4 −. S b. For a similar object or group of objects.? c. Did S appear to be identical with a part of P? 6+. 2 TABLES OF RESULTS 97 a b с The results are these for the six cases in which a positive response to V was given: 1 + MATHEMATICAL 2 0 3 0 4 + 3 LEGAL 10 5 ++1 B 1 + In only one of the mathematical cases was question V a asked, and here the response was positive; but in the legal cases, of the three who considered the statment an identity, only one considered the subject and predicate as symbols for the same object or group of objects, and how then could the statement in the other two cases be an identity, if the subject and predicate do not refer to an identical object? In one of these cases (5b) the subject finally concluded that the subject and predicate were similar objects, and again, in c, that the subject was identical with a part of the predicate. This, then, would reduce still further the percentage of those considering the S and P identical, and yet this apparently is one way of regarding at least a certain number of statements. VI. Was the predicate conceived of as a class to which the sub- ject belonged. 19. 33 -. James Mill considers that all predication is predication of genus or species, and although this seems to be a more general way of regarding propositions than as mathematical identities, yet neither is it by any means the universal method. VII. Did it seem to you that the meaning of the subject was identified with that of the predicate? 7+. 45. a. Was it identified in this way, that the meaning of the sub- ject existed as an image and the meaning of the predicate as an image, and that the judgment consisted in the coincidence of the two images? 0+. 5 -. Although the main question VII, by itself, evoked some posi- tive answers, VII a found no corroboration whatever, again tending, as did IV, to which it is similar, to disprove the image theories of judgment and reasoning. 98 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING VIII. Did the processes of analysis and synthesis function in the formulation of the proposition? 23 +. 28 -. Analysis and synthesis function in almost half of the cases, in the forming of the propositions. So again, although a more common method of procedure than that investigated in V and VI, yet it is not universally active in all propositions. In many cases, too, not both but only one-that is, analysis or synthesis- was reported. It is interesting to note that, while in only 15. per cent of the mathematical cases did analysis and synthesis function, in 55 per cent of the legal cases their presence was noted, possibly because so much of the mathematical material was presented pre-formed, as it were. IX. Did the process of association play any part in the formu- lation of the premise? 14 +. 37. Association seems to be a process of still more general occur- rence in the formulation of the premise. Yet here again there is no evidence for the association of ideas in its most commonly understood meaning, as in such theories as those of James Mill and Binet. · X. Did the premise state any relationship between the sub- ject and the predicate. 52 +. 0-. The question seems superfluous and the response was unani- mous, that every proposition states a relationship between the subject and the predicate. XI. Did the major premise appear to you as the record of innumerable previous inferences? 19+ 33 -. a. Were these inferences obtained as a result of your own activity or were they otherwise obtained? 2 +. 4 −. 5 in both ways. The premise apparently did not always appear as a record of innumerable previous inferences. The negative responses here might well receive further investigation. Only a small per- centage were acquired as a result of the subject's own activity, and about half were the result of both his own and other's activity. XII. Was there in your mind any idea that you were affirm- ing the existence of some quality of the subject? 20 +. 32 -. a. Did you do this by analyzing the total image, as for exam- TABLES OF RESULTS 99 ple, red cloud, into a subject idea cloud, and its quality red, so that the process was "the red cloud in red?” b. Did you seem to be affirming the meaning of an idea con- sidered as meaning to be a real quality of what you perceived? Here is revealed still another way of regarding the statement, but again, contrary to Bosanquet's contention, not the uni- versal way. Here a and b were given in almost no cases, a, because it was unnecessary after a negative response to IV and VII and b, because when attempted it proved too abstract and imprac- tical, although in the few cases in which it was given (about three) the response was negative. The reason for the greater number of positive responses here in the case of the mathematical reasoning is rather difficult to explain. XIII. Was the predicate conceived of as merely another name for that which was named by the subject? 4+. 48 -. In very few cases was the predicate considered as merely another name for what was named by the subject, quite such a result as would be expected from the results in the case of ques- tion V, and a result which would disprove James Mill's theory that predication consists essentially in the application of two marks to the same thing. XIV. Did the major premise appear to you as a law or rule from which to infer? 52 +. 0-. In every case the major appeared as a law or rule from which to infer. XV. Did the major premise become explicitly or focally con- scious before you drew your conclusion? 39 +. 13 a. Did it exist subconsciously then? 5 +. 0. b. Do you feel that it determined your conclusion? 40+. 0-. XVII. Did the major premise appear essential in order to reach the conclusion? 26 +. 1 −. a. Did its explicit formulation seem essential? 7+. 18 In all the mathematical cases the major became explicitly and focally conscious before the conclusion was drawn, no doubt because of the nature of the cases in which, in all instances, the major was given in the context, and the chief work of the sub- ject was to recognize it as such. In only two-thirds of the legal cases, however, did it reach the focus point of consciousness before 100 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING a conclusion was reached. In all of the cases of negative response, where the major did not become conscious, XV a was not asked, but in all those cases in which it was given, the subject gave a positive response to the effect that, although not focally con- scious, the major was present subconsciously. And in all of the cases in which XVb was asked, the answer was that, although perhaps subconsciously, yet the major did determine the conclu- sion. Moreover, although it is not possible to state as a result of the investigation of XV alone that a premise was active in all cases, either consciously or subconsciously, yet, taken in con- junction with XVII, we can say that the presence of a major is a universal requirement. In the case of XVII there was but one response to the effect that the major did not appear essential in order to reach the conclusion, and this statement was contra- dicted by the subject's response to XV, in which, after saying that the major existed subconsciously, he added in b, that he felt that it determined his conclusion. So we have again, in point of fact, a unanimous response to another question, namely, that the major appeared essential in order to reach a conclusion. The expicit formulation of this major, however, is not essential, as is shown in XVII a. XVI. Was there any idea of the premise as being the unfolding of some universal, i.e., the middle term? 3 +. 23 XVIII. Did the premise appear to contain two separate ideas or merely to state a relationship within one universal idea? 15 i.e. two ideas. 5 — i.e. one idea. XVI and XVIII. These two questions may well be con- sidered together and their results correlate fairly well, although XVIII was not used from the first and so was given in a smaller number of cases than XVI. In only 10 per cent of the cases was the major considered as a part of the general unfolding of a universal idea, and in 81 per cent of the cases in XVIII the premise seemed to contain two separate ideas rather than to state a relation within one idea. So the idea of the premise as the unfolding of a universal is again one attitude or interpreta- tion, but again it is not an all-comprising account of the nature of the proposition, as Bradley and Bosanquet contend. TABLES OF RESULTS 101 MINOR PREMISE I. How did it arise in your mind? Here, as in the case of Major I, the results are too varied to admit of classification. In many cases the subject reported that the minor was given in the case or in the context, as in the mathematical cases. Some said the minor arose from an analysis of the facts of the case, and again, in the mathematical cases, some said from the figure. One subject considered the minor to be implicit in her mind, yet the same subject, in response to III and IV, showed the explicit character of the premise by her introspection. Thus, in the case of Minor III, the minor "arises because it is practically mentioned in the text;" and in Minor IV: "The major arose first: You hear the minor first, when it is. read, but you are unconscious of it as a minor until you have for- mulated the principle." And the same subject, in Minor II, says that the minor is not a part of her mental stock. How, then, is it implicit in her mind? Again, another subject con-. sidered the minor as following upon the major and being a sum- mary of the explicit case in hand. Again, another reported that she found the minor by a comparison of this case with another, the solution of which she knew, in general, then, in contrast to the major, the minor is a new bit of information, explicit and very particular in character and gained from the particular case in hand. II. Is it a part of your mental stock? + 0. 59 In no case was the minor found to be a part of the subject's mental stock, in the sense of being a general principle or theory, as is the case with the major premise. So again, as seen in I, the minor is a very specific bit of information, obtained from the material under consideration at the moment. III. Did it arise in the course of your attempt to solve the problem? 59 +. 1 In almost every case, as seems inevitable, the minor was pres- ent during the solution of the problem. Some subjects remarked that it was given, or was present previous to the attempt at solution. Such responses were recorded as positive. IV. In what order did the major and minor premises arise in your mind? 18+ major first. 42 18+ major first. 42 minor first. S 102 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING In 30 per cent of the cases the major was reported as arising first and in 70 per cent the minor. Many of those reporting the minor as first remarked that, as a premise, it was the major that first arose, but that the minor was first in the sense of being given or found in the test first. Although this confusion may have somewhat obscured the results, at least it was found that the order in which the premises arise is obviously immaterial, and depends largely upon the circumstances of the case. This would contradict such a theory as that of Binet, where, since the three images succeed one another in a very particular order, only one arrangement of premises would be possible. V. Did you perceive a relationship between the premises before drawing the conclusion? What relationship? 54 +. 5 -. a. Did a relationship exist? 4+. 0 −. b. Was it a relationship caused by the perception of the fact that they possessed an identical term? 21+. 7 −. c. Was it a relationship caused by the resemblance of the case to some general law or principle? 28. 0. d. Was more than one kind of relationship perceived? 21 +. 10 - P e. Which was more prominent? 16+ i.e. case and law re- lationship more prominent. 4 - some other relationship more prominent. That there should be any cases in which a relationship between the premises was not perceived seems at first thought impossible. Yet, when it is recalled that in many cases the major was sup- pressed, it is seen that in such cases there obviously could be no relation consciously perceived. In all of the mathematical cases a relationship was perceived, and that a relationship existed, even when not perceived, was recognized by all of the subjects to whom Va was given. It was given in four of the five cases in which a relationship was not perceived. As to the nature of the relationship, which, unfortunately was not investigated in the earlier cases, more than one sort was found to exist. The relationship resulting from both premises possessing an identical term was recognized in a large percentage of both mathematical and legal cases. Another sort of relationship, however, that of TABLES OF RESULTS 103 1 the resemblance of the case in hand to some general law or prin- ciple was recognized in all cases. In the majority of cases, then, more than one kind of relationship was recognized, and in about 80 per cent of them the second relationship, that of case to law, was the more prominent. In three of the four instances in which this was not the case, the more prominent relationship was that of the identical middle term, and in the fourth, the two kinds of relationship seemed to have equal prominence. VI. Was the minor premise known to you mediately or im- mediately? 39. 18. 2 both ways. The minor was known in the greater number of cases im- mediately, in about 30 per cent of the cases mediately, and in a very small percentage, about 3 per cent, both mediately and immediately. J CONCLUSION I. Was it formulated in inwardly spoken words? 19 +. 28 In a little less than half the cases the conclusion was formulated in inwardly spoken words. Kinaesthetic and verbal imagery, therefore, cannot be in all cases the sine qua non of meaning, as Watson would seem to indicate in his theory of meaning. II. Did these words form themselves spontaneously or did you have to bring them out by voluntary effort? 15+. 4-. In the majority of cases where verbal imagery existed it arose spontaneously. III. Could you have formulated another conclusion at will? 0+. 48 In the mathematical cases no other conclusion was possible and this is the condition which would be expected where the facts are entirely clear-cut and often given in the text. In the case of the legal problems, however, a difficulty often arose be- cause of doubt as to the validity of the major premise, or of the application of the particular principle to the case in hand, etc. In no case, however, once the premises were accepted, was there any doubt as to the conclusion being the only possible one in the case. IV and V. Was your whole personality involved in drawing 104 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING the conclusion or was this piece of reasoning more or less isolated from your emotions, hopes, aspirations, etc. 5+ (i.e. 5+ (i.e. per- sonality involved). 45 -. Have your emotions had any play in the conclusion? 4+. 43 -. An interesting distinction between the reaction to the two types of cases is here reached, for in the mathematical the sub- ject's personality and emotions play no part at all, while in a certain number of legal cases, only about 12 per cent, however, the decision was influenced by personality or emotions. VI. What seemed to you the most essential process in reach- ing the conclusion? The answers here were too varied for classification. Of the mathematical cases, in two the formulation of the major seemed the most essential process; in two others, obtaining the minor; in six, as was found later in conclusion XIII, the seeing of the relationship between the premises. In most cases the relation- ship was that of case to law which the subject evidently sought to find. Also the realization of an unfulfilled condition was reported as the most important part. In the legal cases, in nine the obtaining of the major was most difficult and important, and eight the decision concerning the minor seemed most important; few mentioned both of these processes. In the majority of the cases, namely, seventeen, the understanding of the relationship between the two premises was considered the most essential, and in most of these again, a relationship of case to law or general principle was mentioned specifically as the relationship involved. VII. After formulating the conclusion, did it seem to you to be certainly true? 50 +. 0 In contradistinction to Schiller, it would seem that in every case here investigated, the conclusion did not appear to the subject as needing verification, but seemed to be true. VIII. Was the conclusion fully expressed in the premises, or did it appear to you as something new, an intellectual insight which you had not had before? 33 +. 15 b. Did the conclusion seem to be implicit in the premises; i.e., was it a mere interpretation of the premises? 15+. 0-. f. Could you have reached the conclusion without a process of argumentation? 1+. 14 -. TABLES OF RESULTS 105 In about two thirds of the cases the conclusion appeared as something new and more than a mere unfolding of the premises. In every case in which the question was used, the conclusion, however, was implicit in the premises. Again, in fifteen of the seventeen cases where the conclusion did not seem new, VIII ƒ was given, and in all but one case a process of argumentation was deemed necessary; that is, although the conclusion gave no new idea, yet the premises were not sufficient in themselves and some process of argumentation was necessary. IX. Did the reasoning process seem to be the same as percep- tion? 6. 37 Ag Patta) This question offered great difficulty, because of the lack on the part of many subjects of a definite concept as to the nature of perception, or of reasoning, or of both, although all of the subjects had had some training in psychology. While this made. a detailed examination of the problem and any use of the sub- questions impossible, nevertheless enough was understood for the subject to be able at least to answer the main question, even though they could but seldom give any reasons for their answer. In the majority of cases, the two processes were felt to be essen- tially different, at least not the same, although in a certain number of cases similarities were mentioned. Binet and Spencer, then, are not corroborated by the results here obtained. X. Did the conclusion consist, psychologically, in a compari- son, direct or indirect, of the terms of the proposition? 5+. 44 In very few, only 10 per cent, of the cases did the conclusion seem to consist in a comparison of the terms of the proposition. And even here this could not have been the complete account of the process, for in four of the five cases which considered a com- parison of terms as an account of the process, the process of subsumption also figures, as revealed by these subjects' re- sponses to XII. In these cases there was also evidence against comparison in the sense of Mill's theory of the association of images. XI. Did it seem to you that you reached the conclusion by the substitution of equivalent terms? 5+. 44 In only 10 per cent of the cases did it seem that the conclusion C 106 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING was reached by the substitution of equivalent terms, and here the greater proportion was in the case of mathematical reasoning. XII. Did the process seem to be one of subsumption? How? 45. 5. In 90 per cent of the cases the process of concluding seemed to be one of subsumption-a larger percentage by far than that in the case of any other question in which an account of the process in general was sought. At least, then, the process of subsump- tion seems to be a far more general account of the process than any other here investigated. There are only five cases in which subsumption did not seem to be a correct description of the proc- ess, three legal and two mathematical cases. In the mathe- matical reasoning the process might easily appear a somewhat mechanical process, such as the perception of identical elements in major and minor, or the perception of a hypothetical relation- ship, as in one of these cases, and as in another of a negative case, of a condition which was not fulfilled. In the legal cases there were two negative responses, both given by the same subject, and they would seem to indicate perhaps a lack of com- prehension of the meaning of subsumption. In both these cases an accurate account of the subject's mental processes was obtained only with difficulty, and yet in both the spontaneously offered introspection, before the responses to the specific ques- tions, was an exact account of what is here regarded as a process of subsumption. And in response to question XIII of the con- clusion, the subject said that his process of mediation had de- pended upon a comparison in the syllogism formed of the facts of the particular case with the general rule necessary to make the thing murder;" and in the second case, in response to the present question, the subject said, "No, I had the case first and sought for the law governing it;" in both cases, then, really a descrip- tion of the process of subsumption. It would seem, then, that in all the legal and in the majority of the mathematical cases, the process was one of subsumption, and that this may be regarded as an account of the mental activity that is involved in much of our reasoning activity. XIII. Upon what mental activity did the process of media- tion depend? TABLES OF RESULTS 107 Here, in all the legal cases, the mental activity upon which the process of mediation depended was an insight into, an ability to see the relationship existing between the two premises. In many cases, too, the response was more specific in nature, as the ability to see the relationship of case and law, etc. In three mathematical cases the perception of relationships, in the sense of relationship of the premises as wholes, is not mentioned, but rather the perception of identical elements in major and minor, the comparison of two sums and the identification of two angles as being the same, and the third was a hypothetical relation and the recognition of the non-fulfillment of the condition. XIV. Was the mental process involved in reaching the con- clusion the same or different from the process involved in get- ting the premises? 2+. 47 —. In 96 per cent of the cases the process of concluding was re- garded as a process different from that involved in formulating the premises. In 4 per cent, in reality only two cases, the proc- ess was considered to be the same as the process of formulating the minor, but the minor only. So in no case was the formula- tion of the major the same as the process of concluding. XV. Did you reach the conclusion by a process of analogy, that is, by recognizing the resemblance of the present case to some case or cases previously known? 2+. 19 a. Do you understand the previously known case to be a case of any law? 2+. 0 b. Could you have stated the general proposition that is to be inferred from the case or cases previously known? 2+. 0-. This question was not used in the earlier cases, and in 9 per cent of the legal cases in which it was used, the process of analogy seemed to function in reaching the conclusion. In no case was it regarded as a correct account of the process in the mathe- matical problems. In the 9 per cent, here representing only two cases, the subjects considered the process of concluding to be one of subsumption also. So here again analogy was not a complete account of the reasoning process. Moreover, as to the analogy, the previously known case to which the present bore a resemblance was in both cases considered to be a case of a law, and the general principle, illustrated by the case was capable of being formulated. M 108 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING XVI. Did the processes of analysis and synthesis function in the entire reasoning process? How? 17 +. 3. a. Did it seem to be an analysis of a universal and that the premises were expressing differences, but differences existing within the universal? 0+. 14 - This question, as XV, was a later addition, but fortunately, the problem involved was, in part at least, covered in question VIII, of the major premise. In 86 per cent of the cases in which this question was used, the functioning of analysis and synthesis in the reasoning process was recognized, but in no case was there any idea of the analysis of the universal or Bosanquet. An interesting point arises here in connection with question XVIII of the major, where there were a few cases namely five in which the major appeared not to contain two separate ideas, but rather to state a relation within a universal. Of these five, three considered that analysis and synthesis functioned in the entire reasoning process, one did not recognize their presence, and the fifth was doubtful. Only one of the five, however, considered the analysis involved in the entire process of reasoning to be an analysis of a universal, that is, that the premises were expressing differences within a universal. So, although the major might state differences within a universal, in all but one case the entire process seemed to involve ideas too disparate to be grouped in the one universal of Bosanquet. CHAPTER IV TABLES OF VARIOUS AUTHORS' THEORIES AND RESULTS HERE OBTAINED The following table is added more by way of historical in- terest than as contributing to our theory of reasoning. It con- sists of a sort of outline in which the questions used in this in- vestigation constitute the topics, and under each is given the various authors' theories bearing upon that particular point. In each case, also, the results as found in our experimental study are given. MAJOR PREMISE II. How did you find it? Is it part of your mental stock? Jevons: "The fundamental action of our reasoning faculties consists in inferring or carrying to a new instance of a phenomenon whatever we have previously known of its like, analogue, equivalent or equal." (Jevons, 1878, vol. I, p. 11.) J. S. Mill: "Truths are known to us in two ways: some are known directly and of themselves; some through the medium of other truths. The former are the subject of intuition or consciousness; the latter, of Inference. The truths known by intuition are the original premises from which all others are inferred; our assent to the conclusion being grounded on the truth of the premises, we could never arrive at any knowledge by reasoning, unless something could be known antecedently to all reasoning." (Mill, 1874, p. 19.) Schiller: "To be scientifically intelligible, this analysis (of judgments into the subject, predicate and copula) should be conceived to rest on psychological observations that in a situation which makes thought one feature is commonly singled out as the problematic 'thing' about which affirmations (or denials) require to be made, by means of the previous knowledge which is attached to (or detached from) this 'subject' and is then said to be predicated from it." (Schiller, 1909, p. 19.) Bradley: "There is another mark which a conclusion possesses. It is not a mere fragment or isolated unit; it does not exist in and by itself, but is the result of a process. It rests upon a basis, and that basis is something we already know. In inference we advance from truth pos- sessed to a further truth; and the conclusion could never be reached at all if it were not for knowledge already attained." (Bradley, vol. I, 1922, pp. 245–246.) 109 110 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING In every case, then, the major premise was "a truth already possessed" and a part of the mental stock, either explicitly or implicitly, or as having been given in the case in hand. III. How did you find it? Did it arise in the course of your attempt to solve the problem? Spencer: "When I say: • All crystals have planes of cleavage; This is a crystal; therefore This has a plane of cleavage; and when it is asserted that this described the mental process by which I reached the conclusion; there arises the question-what induced me to think of 'all crystals?' . It must have been, then, that a con- sciousness of the particular crystal identified by me as such was ante- cedent to my conception of 'all crystals.' For the mind being, as we see, occupied about the individual crystal before it is occupied about the class, there resulted the two inquiries—(1) why, having been conscious of the individual crystal, should I, in this particular case, go on to think of the class, crystal, instead of thinking of some other thing? And (2) why, when I think of the class cystals, should I think of them as hav- ing planes of cleavage; instead of thinking of them as angular, or as pol- ished, or as brittle, or as having axes. There is one answer, and only one. Before consciously asserting that all crystals have planes of cleavage, it has already occurred to me that this crystal has a plane of cleavage. . . . The process of thought which the syllogism seeks to describe is not that by which the inference is reached, but that by which it is justified; and in its totality is not gone through at all, unless the need for justification is suggested." (Spencer, 1914, vol. II, pp. 97-98.) Schiller: "Experience is hardly ever a passive receptiveness towards 'impressions,' it is nearly always a reaction upon the given. One of the most persistent and important of these reactions is the assumption, which we make almost continually, that what we experience means something. This assumption is the taking up of an attitude towards our experience which is an addition to the mere experiencing. It makes our experience a problem. We question it and ask what it means, and test the answers we obtain. This assumption of meaning is the logically important proc- ess which underlies the formation of concepts." (Schiller, 1909, pp. 89-90.) • In every case the major was present at some phase of the solving of the problem. IV. Did subject and predicate exist in your mind as images? TABLES OF VARIOUS AUTHORS' THEORIES 111 James Mill: "If I say, I have the idea of a horse, I can explain dis- tinctly what I mean. I have the ideas of the sensations of sight, of touch, of hearing, of smelling, with which the body and actions of a horse have impressed me; these ideas, all combined, and so closely that their exist- ence appears simultaneous, and one. This is my idea of a horse. If I say, I have a conception of a horse, and am asked to explain what I mean, I give the same account exactly, and I can give no other. My conception of the horse is merely my taking together, in one, the simple ideas of the sensations which constitute my knowledge of the horse; and my idea of the horse is the same thing." (James Mill, 1878, vol. I, pp. 254-255.) Bosanquet: "An idea or concept is not an image, though it may make use of images." (Vol. I, p. 41.) "I now return to some further characteristics of the logical meaning of names, and shall follow Mr. Bradley in using 'idea' for a fixed content or logical meaning, not for the psychical images which pass through the mind and never recur-for the signification, so to speak, of the signal flags, not for the particular flags themselves, whose meaning is not affected if different bits of cloth are used on every occasion." (Bosanquet, 1888, vol. I, p. 46.) Binet: "The fundamental element in the mind is the image and reason- ing is an organization of images, determined by the properties of the images themselves." (Binet, 1899, pp. 9-10.) "Judgment therefore becomes reduced to an association of images for the time being indissoluble; it is often accompanied by an affirmation, expressed by words thought, pronounced or written (verbal proposition), but it may exist independently of all expression; it may consist solely of images." (Ibid., p. 74.) "The major premise means psychologically that there exists in our mind an association between two groups of images, one group of abstract images representing man and one group of generic images representing death." (Ibid., p. 137.) Moore: "Meaning therefore appears to be a conscious state, sui generis, distinct from imagery." (P. 155.) "But is it true that the image conveys meaning? Our whole analysis of the process of perception and the temporal relation of meaning and imagery tell us no. For how can the image convey the meaning when the meaning appears in consciousness before the image?" (Moore, 1919, p. 215.) "The meaning is the interpretation and arises before the image, and can never be identified with what is merely one of the many possible illustrations." (Ibid., p. 215.) Sigwart: "The simplest judgments are those which are merely denomina- tive judgments, declaring the immediate coincidence of images." (Sig- wart, 1895, vol. I, p. 103.) "So that, for every word remains a group of distinguishable ideas, all of which it serves to denote. They do not, however, all bear the same 112 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING relation to the word; one image more definite than the others is specially connected with it, as the center of the group round which the others gather. In a region where fir trees grow, the image of the fir is that which a man principally connects with the word tree." (Ibid, p. 48.) Wundt: The judgment does not bring concepts together which have arisen separately, but it analyzes concepts out of a total image, that is, it analyzes a total image into its constituent parts. . . The judg- ment analyzes the total image into the image of the subject which consti- tutes the subject and the image of a quality or a condition which consti- tutes the predicate. (Cf. Wundt, 1906.) All the evidence tends to disprove the image theories of Binet, of James Mill, of Sigwart, of Wundt. V. Did it appear to you as a mathematical identity? Jevons: "I conceive that the sign always denotes some form or degree of sameness or equivalency, and the particular form is usually indicated by the nature of the terms 'joined by it.' Thus '6720 pounds 3 tons' is evidently an equation of quantities." (Jevons, 1874, vol. I, p. 19.) "The general formula A B must be taken to mean that A and B are symbols for the same object or group of objects." (Ibid., p. 20.) "When we say that 'All mammalia are vertebrata,' we do not mean that mammalian animals are identical with vertebrate animals, but only that the mammalia form a part of the class vertebrata. Such a proposition was regarded in the old logic as asserting the inclusion of one class in another, or of an object in a class." . . . . It is surely evident that the relation of inclusion rests upon a relation of identity. Mammalian ani- mals cannot be included among vertebrates unless they be identical with part of the vertebrates." (Jevons, 1874, pp. 47-48.) Bradley: "Judgment is not the assertion that subject and predicate are identical or equal." (Vol. I, p. 22.) Whenever we write '=' there must be a difference, or we should be unable to distinguish the terms we deal with." (Bradley, 1922, vol. I, p. 27.) == Garden *** In only a small percentage of cases was the premise conceived of as a mathematical identity. In some few cases it was con- sidered a partial identity. Jevons' theory, then, is not of uni- versal application. VI. Was the predicate psychologically conceived of as a class to which the subject belonged? James Mill: "We now arrive at a very important conclusion; for it thus appears that all Predication is Predication of genus or species, since the Attributes classed under the titles of Differentia, Proprium, Accedens, cannot be used but as part of the name of a species. (Mill, 1878, p. 169.) TABLES OF VARIOUS AUTHORS' THEORIES 113 ! Bradley: "Judgment is not inclusion or exclusion from a class. It is as absurd as the assertion that in 'It is our son John,' or 'It is my best coat,' or '9 7 plus 2,' I think of a class of 'our sons John, or 'my best coats,' or that which is equal to 7 plus 2." (Bradley, 1922, vol. I, p. 21.) In almost one third of all the cases the predicate was con- ceived of as a class to which the subject belonged. So the ex- treme position of Bradley cannot apply to all forms of judgment. VII. Did it seem to you as if the meaning of the subject was identified with that of the predicate? Sigwart: "The simplest and most elementary form of judgment is that in which we name particular objects of intuition. The subject-idea is given immediately to intuition as a unity, the predicate-idea is mentally reproduced with its appropriate word, and the act of judging consists in the thought by which the two ideas are occasionally unified." (Sigwart, 1895, vol. I, p. 53.) • "Thus ; in it is repeated several times the process which takes place at once in the coincidence of two images through the unanalyzable act by which they are brought together. . . . But what the judgment always states is, that the idea of the predicate agrees with that of the sub- ject in such a way that the predicate, as a whole, is one with the sub- ject." (Vol. I, p. 55.) • • "That which takes place in judgment is always the recognition of the agreement between an idea previously known and one element of the sub- ject." (Ibid., p. 233.) Again there is no support for Sigwart's and the various other pure image theories. VIII. Did the processes of analysis and synthesis function in the forming of the proposition? Bosanquet: "Every judgment is both analytic and synthetic." (Vol. I, p. 97.) "If I say 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon,' I start with an individual Caesar whose continued identity extended through a certain space of time and revealed itself in a variety of acts, and I exhibit his identity in one of the acts and moments-its differences-through which it persisted. What I mean by the affirmation is that he, the Caesar, who had before conquered Gaul, and who was afterwards murdered on the Ides of March, displayed his character and enacted part of his history by crossing the Rubicon. This is a clear case of exhibiting an identity in difference. But the proc- ess has inevitably two aspects. On the one hand, I analyze the individual whole that is called Caesar by specifying one of the differences that may 114 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING be considered as a part within it; on the other hand, I construct or make synthesis of the individual whole in question, by exhibiting it as a whole that pervades, and absorbs in itself, each or all of its differences." (Bosan- quet, 1888, vol. I, p. 99.) Sigwart: "Thus all immediate judgments are of necessity analytical, if those judgments are analytical which only re-unite the elements ob- tained by analysis of a presentation, judgments; that is, in which either the contents of the predicate are already presented in the subject, as in those of naming attributes or of activities; or in which subject and pred- icate, together with the relation between them, form parts of a com- plex presentation, as in relation judgments." (Sigwart, 1895, vol. I, pp. 103-104.) τω "That all immediate judgments should be analytical in this sense in no way contradicts the essence of the judgment, which is to be a σúvleo iO voŋμáтwv. For the analysis or decomposition is only the preparation for the act of judgment; not that act itself; the work of judgment is to restore union between the elements which have been thus distinguished. (Ibid., p. 104.) Bradley: "All judgment necessarily contains a relation, but every relation, beside its pair of related elements, presupposes a unity in which they subsist. Hence the judgment, in so far as it is the synthesis of the elements, is just so far the analysis of that whole to which they belong." (Bradley, 1922, vol. II, p. 479.) "The operations we mentioned seem to fall under the heads of synthetical construction and analytic elimination. We may at least say of these, that we find no inference which does not contain one of them." (Ibid., p. 450.) “In that form of reasoning which is most familiar, we verify the presence of both these activities. Thus from A-B B-C we go by a synthesis to A-B-C, and then use elimination to bring out A-C." (Ibid., p. 450.) "But disjunctive reasoning may employ all three processes, but it certainly need not do this." (Ibid., p. 453.) Wundt: The judgment represents the thought and analyzes the thoughts into their elements, the concepts. So the judgment does not combine thoughts from concepts, but it resolves or analyzes thoughts into con- cepts. (Cf. Wundt, 1906, I, 148–149.) Analysis and synthesis function, either the one or the other or both, in about 50 per cent of the cases. At least their operation was recognized in only 50 per cent of the cases, although many of the logicians consider analysis and synthesis the essence of the judgment and of the reasoning process. IX. Did the process of association play any part in the formula- tion of the premise? TABLES OF VARIOUS AUTHORS' THEORIES 115 James Mill: "I recognize the meaning of names solely by association. (Mill., 1875, vol. I, p. 338.) "In each of the preceding propositions, two terms or names are com- pared." (Ibid., p. 425.) "Thus when I believe the truth of the proposition 'Man is an animal,' the meaning of the name 'man' is called up by association and the meaning of the name 'animal' is called up by association. Thus far is certain. But there is something further-I recognize that 'animal' is a name of whatever 'man' is a name of, and also of more. In having the meaning of the name 'man' called up by association; that is, in having the ideas, I recognize that 'man' is a name of James and John, and Homer and Soc- rates, and all the individuals of the same class, as well as of all the indi- viduals of the same classes; and this is all that is meant by my Belief in the truth of the proposition. Man is the name of one cluster of ideas; animal is the name of a cluster including both this and other clusters." (Ibid., pp. 389–391.) Binet: "The major premise means psychologically that there exists in our mind an association between two groups of images, one group of ab- stract images representing man, and one group of generic images repre- senting death. We understand by the word 'association' that the two images are produced simultaneously, or in immediate succession in our mind. (Binet, 1899, pp. 137–138.) Association functioned in about 75 per cent of case, but it was not an association between groups of images, as James Mill and Binet contend. X. Did the premise state any relationship between the sub- ject and the predicate? Spencer: "What is the content of every rational proposition? Invari- ably a predication-an assertion that something is, was, or will be con- ditional (or not) in a specified manner-that certain objects, forces, attri- butes, stand to each other thus or thus, in Time, or Space. That is, every rational proposition expresses some relation. (Spencer, 1914, vol. II, p. 114.) J. S. Mill: "At the very commencement of our inquiry, we found that every act of belief implied two things: "We have now ascertained what, in the most frequent case, these two things are, namely, two Phenomena; in other words, two states of consciousness; and what it is which the proposition affirms (or denies) to subsist between them, namely, either succession or co-existence." (Mill, 1874, p. 81.) "Existence, Co-existence, Sequence, Causation, Resemblance: one or other of these is asserted (or denied) in every proposition which is not merely verbal.” (Ibid., p. 85.) Bosanquet: "Thus I am of the opinion that Subject and Predication are 116 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING essential elements in the judgment. But whereas in the judgment they are differences within an identity, in the proposition they are isolated parts of an extended whole." (Bosanquet, 1888, vol. I, p. 83.) "It is plain that the judgment, however complex, is a single idea. The relations within it are not relations between ideas, but are them- selves a part of the idea which is predicated." (Ibid., p. 81.) Schiller: "In framing judgments about the objects of our thought, there are four varieties of meaning which can be formally distinguished. We may intend to assert (1) about the relations of concrete things to each other, (2) about the relating of a quality or 'attribute' to a thing, (3) about the interrelation of qualities, or (4) about a quality in relation to a thing." (Schiller, 1909, p. 32.) Sigwart: "But what the judgment always states is that the idea of the predicate agrees with that of the subject in such a way that the predicate, as a whole, is one with the subject. (Sigwart, 1895, vol. I, p. 55.) "" Bradley: “All judgment necessarily contains a relation." (Bradley, 1922, vol. II, p. 479.) "" Binet: "From the logical point of view the percept is a judgment, an act which determines the relation between two facts, or in other words, an act which affirms something of something.' (Binet, 1899, p. 73.) "Judgment therefore becomes reduced to an association of images, for the time being indissoluble." (Ibid., p. 74.) Wundt: The constituent parts of the judgment are the subject and predicate an indefinite number of images cannot be brought together in the judgment, but the number is limited by a restricting law which is ex- pressed by the relation of the subject and predicate. (Cf. Wundt, 1906.) K Every proposition was found to state a relationship between its subject and predicate. XI. Did the major premise appear to you as a record of in- numerable previous inferences? J. S. Mill: "The real inference is always from particulars to particu- lars." (Mill, 1874, vol. I, p. 280.) Sigwart: "This general proposition is an abbreviated formula for all that we hold ourselves justified in inferring from the testimony of ex- perience." (Sigwart, 1895, vol. I, p. 360.) Apparently in all cases the major did not appear as a record or register of previous experiences or inferences, for in only 37 per cent of the instances was it so regarded. XII. Was there in your mind any idea that you are affirming the existence of some quality of the subject? TABLES OF VARIOUS AUTHORS' THEORIES 117 Bosanquet: "Thus in the Perceptive Judgment at least we find the meaning or objective reference of an idea-such a content as is indicated by a name-affirmed to characterise some reality present in sense-per- ception, and through it, reality as a whole. We shall find that all judg- ments of every kind share the main elements of this description; only that the reference to an indeterminate element of present sense-percep- tion is gradually displaced by the introduction of explicit ideas to desig- nate the immediate subject." (Bosanquet, 1888, vol. I, p. 78.) Bradley: "All judgment is the attribution of an ideal content to re- ality." Only in about 40 per cent of the instances was it considered that the existence of some quality of the subject was being affirmed. XIII. Was the predicate conceived of as merely another name for that which was named by the subject? James Mill: "Proposition is a name for that form of words which makes a predication." (Mill, 1878, vol. I, p. 388.) "Predication consists essentially in the application of two marks to the same thing." (Vol. I, 388.) Calls Predication an "important part of the business of naming." (Ibid., p. 162.) In treating of "Belief in the truth of Propositions," he says: and the Belief is nothing more than recognition of the coincidence, entire or partial, of two general names." (Ibid., p. 392.) (C In only 8 per cent of cases was the predicate merely another name for what was named by the subject. Predication, then, cannot be merely the "application of two marks to the same thing." XIV. Did the major premise appear to you as a law or rule from which to infer? Schiller: “It is now, however, become possible to understand how we really reason. In logical form our procedure is always essentially the same and extremely simple. We select a 'fact' tentatively, as a 'case' of a 'law' and try to find a 'law' that fits the 'fact.' (Schiller, 1912, pp. 318– 319.) Referring to legal decisions: "Is the case more justly conceived as Case al of law A or as Case bI of law B? (Ibid., p. 321.) Sigwart: “But in logical terminology, the rule according to which we infer is always called the major premise. (Sigwart, 1895, vol. I, p. 328.) 118 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING Cf. also XV and XVII. In every case the major seemed a law or rule from which to infer. XVI and XVIII. Was there any conception of the premises as being the unfolding of some universal, i.e., the middle term? Bosanquet: “It is unquestionable that in inference we start from data, from facts thrown down before us, it may be in chaotic disorder and with no suggestion of a result. We go to work upon these facts, and after the labour of hours, of days, or of a lifetime, we light upon a conclusion which issues from them and to which they are related as premises; i.e., which exhibits them as differences in a universal." (Bosanquet, 1888, vol. II, p. 5.) Bradley: "If one of the premises were not universal, how could they both have a common identity? The term B must be shared by both the premises. It is a single content in two different contexts. But, since thus it is universal, at least one premise must have the same character." (Bradley, 1922, vol. I, pp. 294–295.) In a small percentage of cases, namely, 10 per cent, the major appeared as a part of the unfolding of a universal, in this case, the middle term. In the majority of cases each premise seemed to contain two separate rather than the one idea, the universal of Bradley and Bosanquet. XV and XVII. Did the major premise become explicitly and focally conscious before you drew your conclusion? Did it exist subconsciously? Do you feel that it determined your con- clusion? Did it appear that the major premise was essential in order to reach the conclusion? Did its explicit formulation seem essen- tial? J. S. Mill: “All inference is from particulars to particulars; general propositions are merely registers of such inferences already made and short formulae for making more. The major premise of a syllogism, consequently, is a formula of this description; and the conclusion is not an inference drawn from the formula, but an inference drawn according to the formula: the real logical antecedent, or premise, being the partic- ular facts from which the general proposition was collected by induc- tion." (Mill, 1874, p. 146.) "The use of the syllogism is in truth no other than the use of general propositions in reasoning. We can reason without them; in simple and obvious cases, we habitually do so; minds of great sagacity can do it in TABLES OF VARIOUS AUTHORS' THEORIES 119 cases not simple and obvious, provided their experience supplies them with instances essentially similar to every combination of circumstances likely to arise.” (Ibid., p. 151.) Bosanquet: "Putting aside we find that the major premise consists in an explicit enunciation of the common nature which really warrants the conclusion. The point, however, is that though the enuncia- tion itself is not indispensable, yet the operation of that identity which the enunciation formulates is indispensable." (Bosanquet, 1888, vol. II, p. 31.) • Binet: "Without premises, no conclusion. The mind does not accept the proposition 'Socrates is mortal' unless it knows the truth of a different proposition, 'All men are mortal.' There is here especially a distinctive character of all indirect processes of knowledge, that being indirect they necessarily require proof. It makes little difference whether or not that proof be presented to the mind at the moment when we are making use of it; that which is essential is sufficient; that we know it. There exist thus many simplified reasonings whose premises are uncon- scious. Most of the inferences which we make daily, for the needs of practical life, are of this class." (Binet, 1899, pp. 78-79.) Schiller: "The facts we argue from are understood to be 'cases of laws'; so are the 'facts' we argue to. But why should those laws be stated? They can, of course, be stated on demand; but how does this add to the value of the reasoning? If we argue directly from the cases, we argue by analogy, and if it is to be a good analogy the cases must be relevant; if we formulate a rule, we merely state the ground of this same analogy. The analogy does not become better by being formulated as a universal rule, nor is its risk diminished." (Schiller, 1912, p. 217.) Sigwart: "It is evident that the particular instances known to us can- not enable us to infer a new instance with confidence, unless they provided a sufficient ground for the general proposition. This general proposition is an abbreviated formula for all that we hold ourselves justified in infer- ring upon the testimony of experience; in it is contained the only real inference, and what follows is merely a 'deciphering of our own notes,' which we have made to remind us that experience justified us in passing to further instances." (Sigwart, 1895, vol. I, p. 360.) "There is no doubt that we frequently infer from one particular case to another, but the question is whether we are justified in so doing. The question is decided by the validity of the general proposition, which does not merely as Mill represents-yield a collateral security, but is the one thing which makes the inference legitimate. Mill himself shows that the inference from particular cases in a new instance is not justified unless the general proposition may be inferred; and in reality the truth of the universal major premise is the condition of the truth of the conclusion. Thus the conclusion does, after all, depend upon the major premise, and cannot be proved without it." (Ibid., p. 361.) Bradley: "The major premise, as we have seen, is a delusion." (Vol. I, p. 248.) • 120 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING Yet: "If one of the premises were not universal, how could they both have a common identity? The term B must be shared by both the prem- ises. It is a single content in two different contexts." (Bradley, 1922, p. 294.) XV and XVII. The major was not in all cases explicitly and focally conscious before the conclusion was attained. Here, at least, then, Binet Bosanquet, Schiller, and Sigwart agree. How- ever, in every case, contrary to Mill's idea that all inference proceeds from particulars to particulars, the presence of a major was deemed necessary, although in most cases its explicit formu- lation seemed superfluous. Much reasoning, then, would seem to proceed by means of the suppressed, subconsciously func- tioning major. MINOR PREMISE IV. In what order did the major and minor premises arise in your mind? Jevons: "Before quitting the subject of deductive reasoning, I may remark that the order in which the premises of any argument, or any proposition whatsoever, are placed, is a matter of logical indifference. Much discussion has taken place at various times concerning the arrange- ment of the premises of a syllogism; and it has been generally held, in accordance with the opinion of Aristotle, that the so-called major premise, containing the major term, or the predicate of the conclusion, should stand first. This distinction, however, falls to the ground in our system, since the proposition is reduced to an identical form in which there is no dis- tinction of subject and predicate." (Jevons, 1874, vol. I, p. 131.) Bosanquet: "If we are urged to say whether we know the major, the minor or the conclusion first, the only true answer is that, in their full import, we know them simultaneously. As detached fragments of ex- perience we may know any one of them first. And as each element of the universal when rightly understood involves the others in their full deter- minateness, there can be no real difference in kind of import between Major and Minor premises, and no reason for preferring one order of terms to another. The order will, in fact, be subjective, depending upon the qualification of reality which we take as starting-point, whether in time -if our inference has the accidental aspect of a progress in time-or because of its individual nature." (Bosanquet, 1888, vol. II, p. 188.) Schiller: "Our procedure in reasoning is always the same. It is always experimental, whether we assume a 'law' (or rule) and 'deduce' (apply it to) a 'case,' or assume a 'case' by a selection from the 'given' and infer from it a 'law.' (Schiller, 1912, p. 335.) TABLES OF VARIOUS AUTHORS' THEORIES 121 "In 'Deduction' we start from the formula and argue to the 'case,' in 'Induction' we start from the 'cases' and argue to the formula." (Ibid., p. 336.) Sigwart: "The order of the premises depends upon what the movement of thought happens to be." (Sigwart, 1895, p. 328.) The order was found to be immaterial. In the majority of cases, about 70 per cent, the minor arose first. V. Did you perceive a relationship between the two premises before drawing the conclusion? Spencer: "Hence, every ratiocinative act is the indirect establishment of a definite relation between two things, by the process of establishing a definite relation between two definite relations." (Spencer, 1914, vol. II, p. 116.) J. S. Mill: "In our analysis of the syllogism, it appeared that the minor premise always affirms a resemblance between a new case and some case previously known." (Mill, 1874, p. 158.) Bosanquet: “An explicit inference is a conclusion from two premises and no more, which assert relations between differences qua belonging to a single universal. Assuming the two premises must have an identical term in common." (Bosanquet, 1888, vol. II, p. 200.) • Schiller: "The three propositions contain three terms, called the Major, the Minor, and the Middle. They are so arranged that each occurs twice, and the middle term, by occurring in each of the premises, renders possible or 'mediates' an inference about the relation of the Minor to the Major, which is expressed in the conclusion." (Schiller, 1912, pp. 179-180.) Binet: "Three images which succeed each other, the first evoking the second by resemblance, and the second suggesting the third by con- tiguity, that is reasoning." (Binet, 1899, p. 156.) Wundt: The conclusion is an extension of the process of judging, in- asmuch as every conclusion results from a union of judgments that, al- though independent, are associated one to another, through common concepts. At least two judgments are necessary in order to form a con- clusion and they must have one concept in common. Again: The explanation of the ground of all conclusions is the princi- ple of relationship. (Cf. Wundt, 1906.) Sigwart: "The discovery of the proof of a proposition consists in the discovery of middle concepts." (Sigwart, 1895, vol. II, p. 192.) Bradley: "An identity must underlie every judgment." (Bradley, 1922, vol. I, p. 28.) "If we are willing to give up the superstition of the copula and to ad- mit diversity of relations in judgment, we may say that in inference every pair of premises has one term the same, and that, if it is not the same, there can be no inference." (Ibid., p. 286.) 122 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING Schiller: "It is now, however, become possible to understand how we really reason. In logical form our procedure is always essentially the same and extremely simple. We select a 'fact' tentatively as a 'case' of a 'law' and try to find a 'law' that fits the 'fact.'" (Schiller, 1912, pp. 318-319.) In practically every case a relationship was recognized as existing, although in some cases, namely, in those of the sup- pressed major, this relationship was subconsciously present. The relationship of resemblance of case to law was reported in all cases and was the more prominent in the majority of cases where more than one kind of relationship was perceived. In some few cases, however, a relationship brought about by the possession of a middle or identical term superseded it. Schil- ler's theory, then, would seem to be the one most substantiated by these results. VI. Was the minor premise known to you mediately or im- mediately? Spencer: "The constant assumption is that the minor premise, 'This is a is immediately known, whereas it is always known mediately." (Spencer, 1914, vol. II, p. 120.) 9 In 66 per cent of cases the minor was found to have been known immediately, and in 31 per cent mediately. In the remaining 3 per cent the subjects thought it was known both mediately and immediately. This would seem to contradict Spencer's theory that the minor is always known mediately. CONCLUSION III. Could you have formulated another conclusion at will? Schiller: "The Syllogism is a combination of three Propositions so arranged that the third, called the Conclusion, follows with logical neces- sity from the first two, called the Premises. By 'logical necessity' is meant that no one who has once accepted the premises as true can refuse to acknowledge the truth of the conclusion". (Schiller, 1912, p. 179.) But, "Now, after the event the inference, if it was of the type called 'logical,' may, of course, appear as 'necessary;' it may be seen to have grounds and to depend on them; if it were not in this sense 'necessary,' it would be irrational and indefensible. But just the same situation would have appeared if any of its rivals had in fact been preferred.” (Ibid., p. 172.) TABLES OF VARIOUS AUTHORS' THEORIES 123 "A will to infer, even if it is granted, still leaves us free to infer in every conceivable direction. It does not tie us down to the 'valid in- ferences' which are formally 'necessary.' It leaves us a choice between a vast number of inferences, all of which are formally arbitrary. Having judged 'the day is fine,' shall I infer 'I will go out,' or 'what a pity I have to work,' or 'I hope it will be fine tomorrow,' or 'I hate picnics,' or 'so it is untrue that there are no fine days in Scotland,' or anything else that might be suggested to my mind or another? Which of these infer- ences it is rational for me to draw, and which I shall actually draw, depends on my character and circumstances, my interests and purposes." (Ibid., p. 169.) "The 'necessity of thought' which it (the Syllogism) professed to dis- play, lay merely in an ex post facto reflection on the completed form, and did not exist in the actually reckoning." (Ibid., p. 220.) Binet: "Reasoning is an organization of images determined by the properties of the images themselves, and the images have merely to be brought together for them to become organized, and reasoning follows with the inevitable necessity of a reflex." (Binet, 1899, pp. 9–10.) Once the premises were accepted, only one conclusion was possible in every case. IV. Was your whole personality involved in drawing the con- clusion, or was this piece of reasoning more or less isolated from your emotions, hopes, aspirations, etc.? Schiller: "Every actual inference was, of course, inspired by motives which led to it, and not to any alternative, and these (whether good or bad) form its real grounds. But of these Formal analysis knows, and can know, nothing.. The only way of really explaining the course thought is going to take is to go into its antecedents, i.e., the motives, character and circumstances of the thinker." (Pp. 171–172.) "What does, in fact, generate and hold together any actual inference is the personality of the man who draws it in a particular context, and the nature of his intelligence, interests, purposes, and ends." (Schiller, 1912, p. 231.) • In no mathematical, and in only about 12 per cent of legal cases, have personality or emotions exerted any particular in- fluence upon the conclusion. VI. What seemed to you the most essential process in reaching the conclusion? Jevons: "Sameness or identity presents itself in all degrees, and is known under various names; but the great rule of inference embraces all 124 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING degrees and affirms that so far as there exists sameness, identity or likeness, what is true of one thing will be true of the other. The great difficulty of reasoning doubtless consists in ascertaining that there does exist a suffi- cient degree of likeness or sameness to warrant an intended inference." (Jevons, 1874, vol. I, p. 11.) Spencer: "A consciousness of similarity, underlying at once the act of classification or general inference, and the act of ratiocination which gives any special inference, is the basis of either or both." (Spencer, 1914, vol. II, p. 131.) J. S. Mill: “The reasoning lies in the act of generalization, not in in- terpreting the record of that act." (Mill, 1874, p. 148.) Bosanquet: "The essence of inference is to drag into consciousness the operation of the active universal as a pervading unity of content on which inference depends." (Vol. II, p. 2.) "Syllogism as we have described it is a subsumptive reasoned judgment depending upon the unity of differences within an individual subject, and making the intelligible ground of this unity explicit in various degrees, according to which the unity displays itself as a conjunction or as a co- herence." (Bosanquet, 1888, vol. II, p. 203.) Schiller: "The interaction of 'case' and 'law,' and the reference of both to experience, are the vital points in real reasoning wherever it occurs. (Schiller, 1912, p. 336.) "" Binet: "Reasoning is an organization of images determined by the properties of the images themselves and the images have merely to be brought together for them to become organized and reasoning follows with the inevitable necessity of a reflex." (Binet, 1899, pp. 9-10.) "The foundation of all reasoning is the recognition of similitude, i.e., between the fact affirmed and the anterior truth upon which it depends." (Ibid., p. 81.) Wundt: The explanation of the ground of all conclusions is the principle of relationship. Upon analysis of this relationship it reduces itself to three principles, the statement of identity, the statement of contradic- tion, and the statement of the cause. (Cf. Wundt, 1906, 1, 300.) The results here vary greatly, showing that, contrary to the authors quoted, no one element or process is considered as being the most important in all cases of reasoning. In the majority of cases the most important process was considered to be the perception of the relationship existing between the two premises, this relationship being in many cases that of the interaction of case and law. So the second statement of Binet quoted above would seem to be supported by these findings, were it not for his first statement, concerning the automatic activity of the images which are the constituents of the reasoning process. I TABLES OF VARIOUS AUTHORS' THEORIES 125 Again, the mention of the formulating of the major as of greatest importance in some of the cases seems to favor Mill's statement that the reasoning lies in the act of generalization, not in inter- preting that act, were it not for the fact that in all of these cases, except one, where the subject was doubtful, the responses to question VIII of the Conclusion showed that the conclusion ap- peared to them as something new. So again we find no one theory, as the authors quoted above seem to assume, to be an adequate explanation of all cases. VII. After formulating the conclusion, did it seem to you to be certainly true? Schiller: "Our procedure in reasoning is always the same. It is always risky, because the abstraction or extraction involved may always prove wrong. It is always empirical, because our result has always to be verified by its working in experience." (Schiller, 1912, p. 335.) • In all cases, again as in III, once accepting the premises, the conclusion seemed true. VIII. Was the conclusion fully expressed in the premises, or did it appear to you something new, an intellectual insight that you did not have before? Jevons: No-"By deduction we investigate and unfold the informa- tion contained in the premises." (Jevons, 1874, vol. I, p. 59.) J. S. Mill: No-"The reasoning lies in the act of generalization, not in interpreting the record of that act." (Mill, 1874, p. 148.) Bosanquet: "Ultimately perhaps every inference may or should be represented as a single judgment, as being a mere extension of an existing whole of thought, and not a transition to a different one. Such an idea conflicts with the traditional differentia of inference, that it should lead to a new judgment; but this only means a bona fide extension of the previous whole, such that, if taken in abstraction from the process that generates it, it would appear a perfectly new judgment." (Bosanquet, 1888, vol. I, pp. 88-89.) Schiller: "Here the antinomy may be sharply formulated as being that (a) psychologically there must be novelty, while (b) logically there cannot be novelty." (Schiller, 1912, p. 172.) "Whatever, therefore, the inference drawn, even if it is as trivial as the formal extraction of 'some S is P' from 'all S is P,' it must have seemed to convey a sufficient degree of novelty to its maker not to seem an idle and paintless repetition, at least at the time when he inferred. So soon as he had finished, he may have recognized that after all he had inferred 126 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING 'nothing new,' because his conclusion was implicit in the premises; but at the time he cannot have seen this, or he would not have judged." (Ibid.) "But this psychological novelty, which accompanies all actual in- ferences, wholly evaporates when we take to contemplating logical 'Forms' in abstraction from actual thinking. For the Form must always contain in itself the full ground for the 'inference.' It can therefore only be human stupidity which is surprised, or human ignorance which is en- lightened, when the latent inference is successfully exhumed." (Ibid., p. 173.) • Bradley: "It must convey some piece of information, and must tell us something else than the truths it depends upon. We have no inference at all, we have simply a frivolous show and pretense, if taking something we already know, we assert the whole or part of this once more and say— I have reasoned and got to a conclusion." (Bradley, 1922, vol. I, p. 246.) In about two-thirds of the cases the conclusion seemed some- thing new-new at least in the particular case in hand. So the conclusion seemed more than a mere unfolding of the informa- tion in the premises, as Jevons, J. S. Mill, and Bosanquet consider it. There was, then, in many of these cases, at least the psychological novelty of Schiller. IX. Did the reasoning process seem to be the same as per- ception? Was there any resemblance between the two processes? Spencer: "All psychologists concur in the doctrine that most of the elements contained in the cognition of an observed object, are not known immediately through the senses, but are mediately known by instanta- neous ratiocination." (Spencer, 1914, vol. II, p. 133.) "When . . . we are forced to admit that it is only relatively, and not absolutely, that reasoning is distinguished from Perception by its indirectness.” (Ibid., p. 135.) Binet: "Perfect continuity exists between the simplest perceptions, as for example, the perception of a color, and the complicated perceptions which verge upon logical and conscious reasoning; and in short, a single act, in developing, in evolving, begins by being a simple perception and is transformed by degrees into a complex reasoning." (Binet, 1899, pp. 72-73.) "Perception is an act of reasoning. All that may be granted is that in reality certain reasonings are conscious and others are automatic, and perception is of the second class." (Ibid., p. 84.) Binet asserts the following analogies between perception and reasoning: 1. "The two acts belong to indirect and secondary knowledge. 2. The two acts have a common feature in implying the existence of certain anterior intellectual states of recollections (premises in logic, anterior · TABLES OF VARIOUS AUTHORS' THEORIES 127 experiences in perception). 3. Both imply the recognition of a similitude between the fact affirmed and the anterior truth upon which it depends." (Ibid., pp. 77, 78, 81.) "The two operations (reasoning and perception) are reasonings, transi- tions from the unknown to the known. The analogy is so great that we have been able to compare perception to formal reasoning and to show that perception contains all the essential elements of a syllogism." (Ibid., p. 144.) • In the majority of cases, 87 per cent, perception and reasoning are not considered to be the same sort of mental process. So Binet's and Spencer's theories on the continuity of thought are not substantiated by these results. X. Did the conclusion consist psychologically in a comparison, direct or indirect, of the terms of the proposition, that is, of the third with the first and second? James Mill: "In the last proposition, a third name is compared with both the other two; immediately with the one, and through that, with the other; the whole, obviously, a complicated case of association. (Mill, 1878, vol. II, pp. 425-426.) In only 10 per cent of cases was Mill's theory substantiated, and even here this was not the one and only process involved. XI. Did it seem to you that you reached the conclusion by the substitution of equivalent terms? Jevons: "The Substitution of Similars is a phrase which seems aptly to express the power of mutual replacement existing between any two ob- jects which are to a sufficient degree like or equivalent." (Jevons, 1874, vol. I, p. 21.) "By deduction we investigate and unfold the information contained in the premises; and this we do by one single rule. For any term occurring in the proposition or expression substitute the expression which is asserted in any premise to be identical with it." (Ibid., p. 59.) Binet: "It is often convenient to characterize a theory by one word. Our theory of reasoning is a theory of substitution. We see here the large term A substitute itself for the term B, that is to say, one image takes the place of another with which it is partially identical." (Binet, 1899, p. 141.) Wundt: From algebraic equations various forms of substitution have been carried over to the sphere of logic, and all judgments have been considered as logical equations. In itself, however, the substitution is not a principle, but a process which rests upon a principle, namely, that of identity. (Cf. Wundt, 1906, I, 299.) 128 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING In only 10 per cent of the cases did the conclusion seem to be attained by the substitution of equivalent terms, and, moreover, the percentage is higher in the case of mathematical problems as would be expected. Here, too, in all of the five cases com- posing this 10 per cent, the process of subsumption also figured; so in no case was the substitution of terms a complete account of the process. XII. Did the process seem to you to be one of subsumption? Bosanquet: "Syllogism as we have described it is a subsumptive reasoned judgment depending upon the unity of difference within an individual sub- ject, and making the intelligible ground of this unity explicit in various degrees, according to which the unity displays itself as a conjunction or as a coherence." (Bosanquet, 1888, vol. II, p. 203.) "The syllogism as thus understood is (a) co-extensive with subsumption, and exclusive only of calculation and construction." (b) The difference be- tween the syllogism thus understood and the abstract combinations of arith- metical or geometrical reasoning, lies merely in the correlative imperfec- tions of the two processes. And therefore (c), if the determinate ground is made clear within a subsumption, or the individual subject is made clear which includes a combination of relations, the two types of in- ference fall theoretically together, and either may be classed as the perfect form of the other." (Ibid., vol. II, pp. 203-204.) Schiller: "It has now, however, become possible to understand how we really reason. In logical form our procedure is always essentially the same and extremely simple. We select a 'fact,' tentatively, as a 'case' of a 'law' and try to find a 'law' that fits the 'fact.' (Schiller, 1912, pp. 318-319.) • • Wundt: Whenever from given judgments, a conclusion arises, a com- plete or partial relation of identity between the known concepts in the premises must be given. From this standpoint it is possible to designate the principle of subsumption as the fundamental law of all concluding. (Cf. Wundt, 1906, I, 298.) In all of the legal and in the majority of the mathematical cases, the process of subsumption seemed to be an accurate account of the process of reasoning or reaching a conclusion. XIII. Upon what mental activity did the process of mediation depend? Sigwart: "The process of drawing a conclusion or inference takes place psychologically whenever we are led to believe in the truth of a judg- ment by our belief in the truth of one or more judgments, and not im- mediately by the ideas of the subject and predicate connected in it. There TABLES OF VARIOUS AUTHORS' THEORIES 129 are many ways in which this belief may be brought about psychologically, and it often happens that we are not even clearly conscious of the process of mediation by which we derive the certainty of one judgment from that of another. This mediation depends frequently upon habits of association and combination which are governed, as a matter of fact, by fixed rules of which we are not expressly conscious." (Sigwart, 1895, vol. I, pp. 326-327.) Binet: "Reasoning is the establishment of an association between two states of consciousness, by means of an intermediate state of conscious- ness which resembles the first state, which is associated with the second, and which, by fusing itself with the first, associates it with the second." (Binet, 1899, p. 141.) Cf. also quotation under Conclusion VI. The process of mediation in all legal and in the majority of mathematical cases depended upon the perception of relation- ships existing between the two premises. XIV. Was the mental process, involved in reaching the con- clusion the same, or a more complicated form of the same process as that involved in formulating the premises? Sigwart: "This judgment, then, is manifoldly mediated; in it is re- peated several times the process which takes place at once in the coin- cidence of two images through the unanalyzable act by which they are brought together." (Sigwart, 1895, vol. I, p. 55.) Bradley: "And our conclusion holds that, as there is no inference with- out judgment, so, on the other side, there is no possible judgment without inference. In principle the two are no more than inseparable aspects of one process." (Bradley, 1922, vol. II, pp. 497-498.) James Mill: "In each of the two preceding propositions, two terms or names are compared. In the last proposition, a third name is com- pared with both the other two; immediately with the one, and, through that, with the other; the whole, obviously a complicated case of associa- tion." (Mill, 1878, vol. I, pp. 425-426.) Spencer: "Not only does the kind of proposition called an inference assert a relation; but every proposition, whether expressing mediate or immediate knowledge, assert a relation." (Spencer, 1914, vol. II, p. 115.) Bosanquet: "We admit, however, that the function of thought from elementary reproduction upwards is essentially one, and we more es- pecially contend that every judgment, in so far as it is explicitly synthetic, that is to say, in so far as it affirms one definite content to be a consequence of another definite content, is an activity only separated from Inference by the degree of distinctness with which the parts are analyzed." (Bosan- quet, 1888, vol. II, p. 200.) 130 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING Binet: "The work involved in every perception is identical with the operation which consists in drawing a conclusion when the premises are given." (Binet, 1914, p. 85.) Contrary to all the theories advanced, in no case was it found that the process of formulating the major was the same as that of concluding, and in only 4 per cent of the cases did the con- cluding process seem the same as that of formulating the minor. CHAPTER V GENERAL SUMMARY OF RESULTS In general, then, the results of this investigation are as follows. The presence, although often subconscious, of a major and a minor premise seems essential, and they must always be re- garded in relation to each other. As for the major, it is always known, either implicitly or explicitly, or is a part of the given data of the problem, as when presented in the text in the case of much of the mathematical reasoning. Always there is recog- nized some sort of relationship existing between the subject and predicate, but, contrary to the dogmatic theories of many authors, there is evidence here for no universal, omnipresent type of relationship. Thus, in a small percentage of cases, the major appears as a mathematical identity, and more so in the case of the mathematical than of the legal problems. In a larger per- centage of cases, the predicate seemed a class to which the sub- ject belonged. Some considered the proposition as affirming the existence of some quality of the subject, and in a very few cases, the predicate seemed merely another name for what was named by the subject. Again, in a small percentage of cases, the major seemed an unfolding of a universal, that is, the middle. term, but in most cases the premise seemed to contain two ideas rather than being but a part of one universal. Obviously, then, there is no universal sort of relationship between subject and predicate in a proposition, and more than one kind of relationship may be recognized as existing in the same proposition, and of these the affirming of the existence of some quality of the subject and the conception of the predicate as a class to which the subject belonged are the most common. In the formulation of the premises, analysis and synthesis functioned in about half of the cases, and much more so in the legal than in the mathematical reasoning. Association also functioned in a smaller percentage of cases and often, too, the major arose spontaneously from memory. In all cases the evi- 131 132 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING dence is against the various image theories, as those of Binet, James Mill, Wundt, and Sigwart. In every case the major was regarded as a law or rule from which to infer, although very often not explicitly and focally conscious before arriving at the conclusion. That is, the major premise was present subconsciously in about 25 per cent of the cases, and in all of these cases it was considered essential in order to reach a conclusion. This, then, would indicate that much reasoning is carried on by virtue of a suppressed major premise. TAYLAN The minor premise, in contrast to the major, is not a part of the subject's general mental stock, in the sense of being a general principle or theory. It may be known mediately or immediately. The order in which the premises arise in the subject's mind is immaterial, but the premises must always be taken in conjunc- tion, inasmuch as a relationship, necessary for the progress of the argumentation, always exists between them. In fact, in most cases, more than one kind of relationship is recognized, although in most cases the relationship of the premises, as of case to principle, is the more prominent. As for the conclusion, in all cases, accepting the premises, it was satisfactory and seemed true and the only possible conclusion. The majority considered the conclusion as something new. There is evidence against considering reasoning and perception but two degrees of the same essential mental process. In no case is the process of concluding the same as the formulation of the major, but in two cases it seemed to resemble the process of attaining the minor. Analysis and synthesis functioned in the majority of the argumentations, and analogy in a small percentage. In a few cases the conclusion seemed a comparison of terms, and again in a very few it seemed to be arrived at by a substitution of equivalent terms. None of these descriptions of the process, however, offered a complete account of the process, for in every legal case and in all but three of the mathematical cases, sub- sumption also figured. So, then, the process of subsumption, that is, of the specific case in hand under some general law or principle, would seem to be an account of a great deal of reason- ing, although obviously, neither is it a universal account of the GENERAL SUMMARY OF RESULTS 133 process, since in a few of the legal cases other processes func- tioned. Finally, in every legal case, and again in all but three mathematical cases, the process of mediation depended upon an` insight into the nature of the relationship existing between the major and minor premises. In general, then, there seems to be no account, universally holding in all its details, of such a complicated process as that of reasoning or drawing conclusions, yet an ac- count of reasoning, as proceeding by virtue of a major premise, either recognized consciously, or else suppressed and operated subconsciously, and by virtue of insight into the relationships existing between the premises, seems an account that is applicable to by far the greatest part of the reasoning which furnished the basis of this study. Moreover, although in general the results from the mathematical and from the legal cases seem to correlate well, it is interesting to note that the only variations from the account just suggested all occur in one class of cases, namely, the mathematical. In general, then, much reasoning is by virtue of a suppressed major premise with only the minor demonstrated, and the conclusion is drawn in virtue of the suppressed major unconsciously present. #1 WHA The psychological mode of appearance of the premises may be described as conceptual, in contradistinction to sensory and imaginal. The premises themselves exist in conceptual form and their relationships are understood not sensed. No sense quality (hard, soft, red, blue, etc.) is applicable to the knowledge of the relationship that exists in the mind between the premises and the conclusion. The awareness of this relationship is a piece of knowledge that cannot be referred to any category of sense experience. The meaning of the premises as principles of knowledge is also a specific intellectual non-sensory experience. Imagery at times appears in reasoning but as an incidental experience. It seems much more easily dispensed with in infer- ence than in perception. 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INDEX Analysis and synthesis: essence of all judgment; Bosan- quet, 37; Sigwart, 51 in formulation of propositions, 98 in reasoning process, 132 Association: of images: Binet, 16; James Mill, 23; Sigwart, 49 process of in formulating proposi- tions, 98 cf. also idea Binet: 11, 111, 115, 116, 119, 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 129, 130 Bosanquet: 35, 111, 113, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 124, 125, 128, 129 Bradley: 41, 43, 109, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 126, 129 Columbia Associates in Psychol- ogy: 5 Concepts: 1, cf. ideas Conclusion: as a comparison of terms, 105, 127, 132 as new or expressed in premises, 104, 125, 132 formulated in innerly spoken words, 103 involvement of personality in, 103, 123 mental activity in process of mediation, 106, 128, 132 mental process in, as compared with that in getting premises, 107, 129, 132 most essential process in reaching, 104, 123, 132 possibility of any other con- clusion, 103, 122, 132 process of subsumption in, 106, 128, 132 Conclusion: cf. reasoning also inference, Dewey: 3, 6 Enthymeme: 20 Gard: 10 Hollingworth: ix Idea: Bradley, 42 Mill, James, 24 Sigwart, 42 cf. also image Image theory: Binet, 16 Mill, James, 23 Moore, 17 Images: Binet, 12, 13, 17 Gard, 11 incidental in reasoning, 133 Mill, James, 24 not essence of ideas, 96, 110 Sigwart, 45 Wundt, 49 Inference: 139 as analysis and development of a universal idea, 38, 41, 108 Binet, 11 by means of analogy, 29, 107, 132; analysis and synthesis, 43, 108, 132; association of ideas or images, 23, 98, 114; establish- ment of relationships, 20, 33, 48, 54, 102, 121, 133; immediate 140 INDEX coincidence of images, 12, 16, 54, 133 experimental work on, 10; Binet, 11; Lindworsky, 18 from particulars to particulars, 25, 40, 53 logicians, theories of, Bosanquet, 35, 38, 39; Bradley, 43, 44; Jevons, 22; Lindworsky, 19; Mill, James, 23; Mill, J. S., 25; Schiller, 27; Sigwart, 52; Spen- cer, 31; Wundt, 47 non-empirical theories of, 2; Columbia Ass. in Psychology, 5; Dewey, 3; Pillsbury, 4; Rig- nano, 7; Spearman, 3; relation to perception, 13, 34, 105, 126, 132 cf. also conclusion, reasoning Introspection as a method, viii, x, 18, 55 Introspections of subjects: general, 69; on legal cases, 69; on mathematical problems, 82 Jevons: 22, 109, 112, 120, 125, 127 Judgment: experimental work on, ix, 10, 11, 18 logicians, theories of, 23, 24, 25, 27, 33, 35, 41, 46, 49 non-empirical theories of, 1 process of, compared with process of concluding, 107, 129, 132 cf. also proposition Lindworsky: 18 Material used in present study: legal cases, 55 mathematical problems, 55, 68 Meaning: 16, 17, 23, 37, 49, 96, 110 Mediation: cf. conclusion, inference, reasoning Method of procedure: 55 introspective, viii material used, 55, 68 presentation of material, 66 questions to subjects, 84 Mill, James: 23, 117, 127, 129 Mill, John Stuart: 25, 53, 109, 115, 116, 118, 121, 124, 125 Moore: ix, 17, 111 Perception, and reasoning: 13, 34, 105, 126, 132 Pillsbury: 4 Premise: cf. also judgment, proposi- tion Propositions: Major, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 131, 132 Minor, 101, 102, 103, 120, 121, 122, 131, 132 predicate of, 96, 97, 98, 99 relationship between, 102, 121, 122, 132, 133 subject of, 96, 97, 98 Reasoning: an intellectual non-sensory ex- perience, 133 by virtue of suppressed major, 132 essential character of, 133 material of, vii methods of investigating, vii cf. also conclusion, inference Results of investigation: comparison of with logicians' theories, 109 general summary of, 131 interpretation of, 94 tables of, 88 Rignano: 7 Schiller: 27, 109, 110, 111, 117, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 128 Scope of present study: viii Sigwart: 49, 52, 53, 111, 113, 114, 116, 117, 119, 121, 129 INDEX 141 Spearman: 3 Spencer: 31, 110, 115, 122, 124, 126, 129 Syllogism: 15, 20, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 39 Theories of logicians: 22 comparison of with results here obtained, 109 Wundt: 45, 46, 112, 114, 116, 121, 124, 127, 128 Um VITA Miriam Frances Dunn was born in Springfield, Massachusetts, September 22, 1901. She was educated in the public schools of Springfield, Massachusetts, and graduated therefrom in June, 1917. In September, 1917, she entered Wellesley College and there completed the first year of college work. In September, 1918, she entered the sophomore class at Smith College. She received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from Smith in 1921, and in the same year began work at Trinity College, Washington, D. C., toward the fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. Courses were pursued in the departments of psychology and philosophy and she was granted the degree of Master of Arts in 1922. The thesis offered for this degree was A Standardization of Information Tests. The following Sep- tember (1922) she was matriculated at the Catholic University of America, and during that year pursued courses leading to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. These courses included work under Dr. Moore, Monsignor Pace, Dr. Dubray and Dr. Jordan. The major work was done in the department of psychology, the first minor being education, and the second minor ethics. The last year of work in preparation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy was spent in absentia at Cambridge University, England, where courses were pursued in psychology statistics and education. In the fall of 1924 the author entered the Johns Hopkins Medical School, where she is at present enrolled as a member of the second year class. Um UNIVERS FAMICHIC CHIEN 66 CHIG MICHIS CHIG AN UNIVERS ERSITY AN CHIG NIVERS Bo MICHIG AN CHIG NIVERS AN RSITY MICH NIVERS RSITY UNIVERSITY MICHIG CHIGAN $4 MICHIC RSITY. 清爽 ​UNIVERS UNIV AN M AMICHI The AN. ERSITY RSITY UNIV HIG AN. MICHIG MICHI AN UNIV 00 ERSITY A AN VERSIT FAMI UNIV AN MICHI VERSITY MICHIG AN ERSITY ERSITY IND MI MICHIG AN AN RSITY AN The NIVERSI AN NIVERSIT MICHIS AME CHIC ·MI AN N 00 SIT MI HIG 1000 AN 67982 JAN 04 1982 NIVERS BITY AN M AN MICHIG NIVERS! 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